COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Willis, Annunziata and Overton 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

KELLY YVETTE TIMBERS 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 2249-97-2 JUDGE ROSEMARIE ANNUNZIATA 

 AUGUST 18, 1998 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF MADISON COUNTY 

Lloyd C. Sullenberger, Judge 

 Diana H. Wheeler for appellant. 

 Marla Graff Decker, Assistant Attorney 

General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General; 

Richard B. Campbell, Assistant Attorney 

General, on brief), for appellee. 

 Kelly Yvette Timbers (appellant) challenges the sufficiency 

of the evidence in support of her conviction as a principal in 

the second degree for distribution of cocaine in violation of 

Code § 18.2-248. We hold that the evidence is sufficient to 

support her conviction, and affirm. 

 Appellant rented apartment 109 at Poplar Ridge Apartments. 

Sean Campbell, known as "Shy," lived in the apartment with 

appellant, and paid the rent and fees for damage to the 

apartment. Appellant was not employed, and Campbell earned money 

by selling crack cocaine. 

 Appellant accompanied Campbell on trips to New York, 

Washington, D.C., and Maryland to obtain cocaine. Campbell kept 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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a supply of powder and crack cocaine buried in a jar in the 

woods. Only Charles Hall and Campbell knew the location of the 

cocaine in the woods. Hall told an officer that Campbell kept 

the cocaine in the woods to prevent appellant from using it. 

Campbell "cooked" the powder cocaine into crack cocaine, a small 

amount at a time, both in appellant's apartment and other 

apartments, and kept only a small supply on his person. 

Appellant assisted Campbell with "cooking" the cocaine. On one 

occasion, appellant was present while Campbell "cooked" the 

cocaine, but did not assist. 

 Hall and Sylvia Brock stood outside the apartment complex 

and fielded requests for cocaine. After receiving a request, 

Hall or Brock would go to Campbell in apartment 109, or one of 

several other apartments, to obtain cocaine. Appellant was 

sometimes present when Campbell transferred cocaine to Hall or 

Brock. 

 Campbell also sold cocaine directly from appellant's 

apartment and other apartments. Appellant was present at least 

some of the time Campbell sold the cocaine directly out of her 

apartment. 

 On August 28, 1996, police responded to a report of domestic 

violence by Campbell against appellant. While one officer talked 

to appellant, another officer followed, questioned, and 

apprehended Hall. The police seized a jar containing powder 

cocaine which Hall had placed behind the apartment building. 
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Hall initially claimed that the cocaine belonged to him, but 

later admitted that he worked for Campbell, and that the cocaine 

belonged to Campbell. The jar was the same jar Campbell used to 

store his cocaine. The street value of the cocaine in the jar 

was thirteen to fourteen thousand dollars in crack cocaine form. 

 The Commonwealth charged appellant with the manufacture, 

sale, or distribution of cocaine. At trial, after the 

Commonwealth rested, appellant moved to strike the Commonwealth's 

evidence on the basis that no evidence showed that she was 

directly involved in criminal activity. In response, the 

Commonwealth argued that appellant acted as a principal in the 

second degree because she facilitated Campbell's sale of cocaine. 

 The court denied the motion to strike. The court, sitting 

without a jury, found that appellant "aided and abetted 

Campbell's distribution and to some extent manufacturing of 

cocaine," and found her guilty as a principal in the second 

degree. The court sentenced appellant to five years 

incarceration, with three years and one month suspended. 

 Appellant argues that the trial court erred in finding her 

guilty as a principal in the second degree of the manufacture and 

distribution of cocaine. On appeal, we review the evidence "'in 

the light most favorable to the Commonwealth and accord to the 

evidence all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom.'" 

Phoung v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 457, 460, 424 S.E.2d 712, 

714 (1992) (quoting Traverso v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 172, 
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176, 366 S.E.2d 719, 721 (1988)). "The judgment of the trial 

court is presumed correct, and we are required to affirm that 

judgment unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to 

support it." McGill v. Commonwealth, 24 Va. App. 728, 732, 485 

S.E.2d 173, 175 (1997) (citation omitted) (citing, inter alia, 

Code § 8.01-680). 

 "In the case of a felony, every principal in the second 

degree may be indicted, tried, convicted and punished as if a 

principal in the first degree." Allard v. Commonwealth, 24 Va. 

App. 57, 62, 480 S.E.2d 139, 141 (1997) (citing Code § 18.2-18). 

 "To hold an accused accountable as a principal in the second 

degree, the Commonwealth must show that the accused was present, 

aiding and abetting, and intended his or her words, gestures, 

signals, or actions to in some way encourage, advise, urge, or 

. . . help the person committing the crime to commit it." 

McGill, 24 Va. App. at 733, 485 S.E.2d at 175 (citing Ramsey v. 

Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 265, 269, 343 S.E.2d 465, 468 (1986)). 

 Mere presence during the commission of a crime is not 

sufficient to render a person guilty as a principal in the second 

degree. Pugliese v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 82, 93, 428 S.E.2d 

16, 25 (1993) (quoting Foster v. Commonwealth, 179 Va. 96, 99, 18 

S.E.2d 314, 316 (1942)). However, "'proof that a person is 

present at the commission of a crime without disapproving or 

opposing it, is evidence from which, in connection with other 

circumstances, it is competent for the [trier of fact] to infer 
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that he assented thereto, lent to it his countenance and 

approval, and was thereby aiding and abetting the same.'" Id. at 

93-94, 428 S.E.2d at 25 (quoting Foster, 179 Va. at 100, 18 

S.E.2d at 316). 

 The record is clear that Campbell, while living in 

appellant's apartment, manufactured and distributed crack 

cocaine. The evidence supports appellant's conviction as a 

principal in the second degree in both the manufacture and 

distribution of cocaine. 

 With respect to the manufacture of cocaine, the record shows 

that appellant accompanied Campbell on trips to purchase cocaine. 

 Appellant provided Campbell with the use of her apartment to 

"cook" cocaine, and was present when Campbell "cooked" the powder 

cocaine into crack cocaine. Appellant also directly assisted 

Campbell with "cooking" the cocaine. 

 With respect to distribution of cocaine, the record shows 

that appellant knowingly allowed Campbell to use her apartment as 

a distribution center for cocaine. Appellant was present in her 

apartment when Campbell transferred cocaine to Hall and Brock to 

pass along to customers. Appellant was also present when 

Campbell sold cocaine directly to customers in appellant's 

apartment. Appellant was unemployed, and Campbell paid the rent 

and damages fees for her apartment. The trial court was free to 

draw the reasonable inference that appellant knew that the money 

Campbell used to pay the bills was derived from the drug sales he 
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routinely made in her presence. 

 Thus, the evidence clearly shows that appellant was present 

during the commission of the crime and aided and abetted the 

manufacture and distribution of cocaine. The Commonwealth did 

not present direct evidence of appellant's intent, but 

"'[b]ecause direct proof of intent is often impossible, it must 

be shown by circumstantial evidence.'" White v. Commonwealth, 25 

Va. App. 662, 668, 492 S.E.2d 451, 454 (1997) (en banc) (quoting 

Servis v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 507, 524, 371 S.E.2d 156, 165 

(1988)). We must respect reasonable inferences drawn by the 

finder of fact from the evidence presented at trial. Phoung, 15 

Va. App. at 460, 424 S.E.2d at 714 (citing Traverso, 6 Va. App. 

at 176, 366 S.E.2d at 721). The court drew a reasonable 

inference that appellant intended her actions of accompanying 

Campbell to buy drugs, helping Campbell "cook" cocaine, providing 

Campbell a location for the sale of drugs, and profiting from his 

drug sales to assist Campbell in the manufacture and distribution 

of cocaine. 

 Accordingly, we affirm. 

 Affirmed.