2017 WI 80

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN

CASE NO.: 2015AP89-D

COMPLETE TITLE: In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 

Against Mark Alan Ruppelt, Attorney at Law:

Office of Lawyer Regulation,

 Complainant-Respondent,

 v.

Mark Alan Ruppelt,

 Respondent-Appellant.

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST RUPPELT

OPINION FILED: July 7, 2017

SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 

ORAL ARGUMENT: March 15, 2017

SOURCE OF APPEAL:

COURT:

COUNTY:

JUDGE:

JUSTICES:

CONCURRED: ABRAHAMSON, J. concurs (opinion filed).

DISSENTED:

NOT PARTICIPATING: 

ATTORNEYS:

For the respondent-appellant, there were briefs filed by 

Terry E. Johnson and Peterson, Johnson & Murray, S.C., 

Milwaukee, and oral argument by Terry E. Johnson.

For the complainant-respondent, there was a brief filed by 

Paul W. Schwarzenbart and Office of Lawyer Regulation, Madison, 

and oral argument by Paul W. Schwarzenbart.
2017 WI 80

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further 

editing and modification. The final 

version will appear in the bound 

volume of the official reports. 

No. 2015AP89-D

STATE OF WISCONSIN : IN SUPREME COURT

In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 

Against Mark Alan Ruppelt, Attorney at Law:

Office of Lawyer Regulation,

 Complainant-Respondent,

 v.

Mark Alan Ruppelt,

 Respondent-Appellant.

FILED

JUL 7, 2017

Diane M. Fremgen

Clerk of Supreme Court

ATTORNEY disciplinary proceeding. Attorney's license 

suspended. 

¶1 PER CURIAM. This disciplinary matter comes to the 

court on Attorney Ruppelt's appeal of a report and 

recommendation of Referee James J. Winiarski. The referee based 

his report on a stipulation between Attorney Ruppelt and the 

Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR), in which Attorney Ruppelt 

admitted 16 counts of misconduct and agreed that his Wisconsin 

law license should be suspended for one year. In his report, 

the referee recommended a slightly longer suspension than what 
No. 2015AP89-D 

2

the parties had agreed upon: a 15-month suspension, rather than 

the parties' stipulated one-year suspension. Through his 

appeal, Attorney Ruppelt challenges the referee's 15-month 

suspension; he argues that it is excessive under our 

disciplinary case law, whereas the parties' stipulated one-year 

suspension is the appropriate length. Attorney Ruppelt also 

criticizes certain characterizations and findings by the 

referee, and proposes that this court should adopt a policy by

which the court would give deference to parties' disciplinary 

stipulations. 

¶2 When we review a referee's report and recommendation 

in an attorney disciplinary case, we affirm the referee's 

findings of fact unless they are found to be clearly erroneous, 

but we review the referee's conclusions of law on a de novo 

basis. In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Inglimo, 2007 WI 

126, ¶5, 305 Wis. 2d 71, 740 N.W.2d 125. We determine the 

appropriate level of discipline to impose given the particular 

facts of each case, independent of the referee's recommendation, 

but benefiting from it. In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 

Widule, 2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d 686.

¶3 After reviewing this matter and considering Attorney 

Ruppelt's appeal, we accept the referee's factual findings and 

legal conclusions based on the parties' stipulation. We agree 

with the referee's recommendation that a 15-month suspension is 

appropriate, despite Attorney Ruppelt's arguments to the 

contrary. We also reject Attorney Ruppelt's remaining 
No. 2015AP89-D 

3

arguments. Finally, we remand this matter to the referee for 

supplemental proceedings on the issue of restitution.

¶4 The OLR initiated this disciplinary proceeding with 

the filing of a five-count complaint, which it later amended in 

an 18-count complaint seeking a 15-month suspension. Attorney 

Ruppelt filed an answer in which he denied any professional 

misconduct. During the pre-hearing phase of this proceeding, 

the OLR dismissed two counts (Counts 15 and 16) due to 

evidentiary problems, leaving 16 counts to be resolved.

¶5 Shortly before the scheduled hearing in this matter, 

Attorney Ruppelt entered into a stipulation in which he admitted 

the remaining 16 counts of misconduct. Attorney Ruppelt and the 

OLR agreed to a one-year suspension. 

¶6 The referee's report accepted the parties' stipulation 

and determined that the stipulated facts supported legal 

conclusions that Attorney Ruppelt had engaged in the remaining 

16 counts of professional misconduct. The referee's factual 

findings and conclusions of law are described in the following 

paragraphs.

¶7 Attorney Ruppelt was admitted to the practice of law 

in this state in May 1994. He currently practices law in 

Milwaukee. Attorney Ruppelt has been the subject of 

professional discipline on one previous occasion: in 2014, this 

court publicly reprimanded him for engaging in improper sexual 

relations with a client and providing false information to his 

employer and the OLR regarding the nature and timing of his 

relationship with the client. See In re Disciplinary 
No. 2015AP89-D 

4

Proceedings Against Ruppelt, 2014 WI 53, 354 Wis. 2d 738, 850 

N.W.2d 1.

¶8 In the instant case, Attorney Ruppelt's actions fall 

into two broad categories of misconduct, both of which involve 

the same client, S.J. The first category of misconduct concerns 

Attorney Ruppelt's conversion of $50,000 of trust account funds 

to his own use, though he later repaid that amount. The second 

category of misconduct generally concerns Attorney Ruppelt's 

additional trust fund improprieties; his dishonest billing 

practices; his efforts to conceal his misconduct from opposing 

counsel, the circuit court, and the OLR; and his failure to 

reasonably consult with S.J. 

Misuse of $50,000 (Counts 1-5)

¶9 Attorney Ruppelt practiced law as a shareholder in a 

small law firm with one other shareholder. 

¶10 In approximately July 2006, S.J. hired the firm to 

represent him in a criminal matter involving a former 

girlfriend. About two years later, the firm began representing 

S.J. in a related civil action brought by his former girlfriend. 

Attorney Ruppelt was counsel of record for S.J. in both the 

criminal and civil cases. S.J.'s former girlfriend retained a 

lawyer to represent her in the civil action. 

¶11 Between August 2006 and June 2008, at least 

$170,332.55 of S.J.'s funds were deposited into the firm's trust 

account, most of which, as directed by Attorney Ruppelt, were 

applied to pay the firm for fees and expenses for the 

representation of S.J. in his criminal and civil cases. 
No. 2015AP89-D 

5

¶12 In approximately May 2007, Attorney Ruppelt needed 

money in connection with his and his then-wife's purchase of a 

home. Attorney Ruppelt and the firm's other shareholder agreed 

that the firm would loan $50,000 to Attorney Ruppelt for that 

purpose. Attorney Ruppelt directed the firm's office manager to 

disburse $50,000 from the firm's trust account to the firm; to 

attribute that payment to the S.J. matter; and to then disburse 

that $50,000 to him. About three months later, Attorney Ruppelt 

directed the office manager to deposit $50,000 of his own 

personal funds to the firm's trust account. During the course 

of the OLR investigation, Attorney Ruppelt provided testimony 

under oath that the $50,000 trust account disbursement was for 

legal fees earned by the firm in S.J.'s criminal and civil 

cases. This testimony was untrue. 

¶13 The parties stipulated, and the referee agreed, that 

Attorney Ruppelt's actions described above constituted a 

violation of SCR 20:1.15(b)(1)1 (Count 1); SCR 20:8.4(c)2 (Counts 

 

1 Effective July 1, 2016, substantial changes were made to 

Supreme Court Rule 20:1.15, the "trust account rule." See S. 

Ct. Order 14-07, (issued Apr. 4, 2016, eff. July 1, 2016). 

Because the conduct underlying this case arose prior to July 1, 

2016, unless otherwise indicated, all references to the supreme 

court rules will be to those in effect prior to July 1, 2016.

Former SCR 20:1.15(b)(1) provided: 

A lawyer shall hold in trust, separate from the 

lawyer's own property, that property of clients and 

3rd parties that is in the lawyer's possession in 

connection with a representation. All funds of client 

and 3rd parties paid to a lawyer or law firm in 

(continued)
No. 2015AP89-D 

6

2 and 4); SCR 20:1.15(b)(3)3 (Count 3); and SCR 22:03(6),4

enforceable via SCR 20:8.4(h)5 (Count 5). 

Other conduct (Counts 6-14, 17-18)6

¶14 As noted above, the remaining misconduct counts 

concern Attorney Ruppelt's additional trust fund improprieties; 

his dishonest billing practices; his efforts to conceal his 

misconduct from opposing counsel, the circuit court, and the 

OLR; and his failure to reasonably consult with S.J. The 

referee made the following findings and conclusions regarding 

these counts.

 

connection with a representation shall be deposited in 

one or more identifiable trust accounts. 

2 SCR 20:8.4(c) provides: "It is professional misconduct 

for a lawyer to engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, 

deceit or misrepresentation." 

3 Former SCR 20:1.15(b)(3) provided: "No funds belonging to 

a lawyer or law firm, except funds reasonably sufficient to pay 

monthly account service charges, may be deposited or retained in 

a trust account."

4 SCR 22:03(6) provides: "In the course of the 

investigation, the respondent's willful failure to provide 

relevant information, to answer questions fully, or to furnish 

documents and the respondent's misrepresentation in a disclosure 

are misconduct, regardless of the merits of the matters asserted 

in the grievance."

5 SCR 20:8.4(h) provides: "It is professional misconduct 

for a lawyer to fail to cooperate in the investigation of a 

grievance filed with the office of lawyer regulation as required 

by SCR 21.15(4), SCR 22.00l(9)(b), SCR 22.03(2), SCR 22.03(6), 

or SCR 22.04(1)."

6 As stated above, the parties stipulated to the dismissal 

of Counts 15 and 16 due to insufficient evidence. 
No. 2015AP89-D 

7

¶15 Between January 2007 and July 2008, Attorney Ruppelt 

caused the firm to disburse as much as $104,644.68 of S.J.'s 

funds held as advanced fees in the firm's trust account in 

excess of the amounts that had been earned by the firm on S.J.'s 

cases. The parties stipulated, and the referee agreed, that 

this conduct constituted a violation of SCR 20:1.15(b)(4)7 and 

SCR 20:8.4(c) (Counts 6 and 7). 

¶16 Between August 2006 and July 2008, Attorney Ruppelt 

also caused the firm to disburse as much as $134,446.88 in fees 

from S.J.'s funds in trust, without providing S.J. with written 

notice of the disbursements at least five business days before 

making them, and without identifying the balance of S.J.'s funds 

in trust following the withdrawal of those fees. The parties 

stipulated, and the referee agreed, that this conduct 

constituted a violation of SCR 20:1.15(g)(1)8 (Count 8).

 

7 Former SCR 20:1.15(b)(4) provided:

Except as provided in par. (4m), unearned fees 

and advanced payments of fees shall be held in trust 

until earned by the lawyer, and withdrawn pursuant to 

sub. (g). Funds advanced by a client or 3rd party for 

payment of costs shall be held in trust until the 

costs are incurred.

8 Former SCR 20:1.15(g)(1) provided:

At least 5 business days before the date on which 

a disbursement is made from a trust account for the 

purpose of paying fees, with the exception of 

contingent fees or fees paid pursuant to court order, 

the lawyer shall transmit to the client in writing all 

of the following: 

(continued)
No. 2015AP89-D 

8

¶17 In 2008, Attorney Ruppelt used a general durable power 

of attorney from S.J. to liquidate S.J.'s life insurance policy 

without consulting with S.J. Attorney Ruppelt then deposited an 

$18,779.51 check payable from the life insurance company to S.J. 

in the firm's trust account, endorsing the check using S.J.'s 

power of attorney. The deposit of funds from the insurance 

company does not appear in S.J.'s client ledger. The parties 

stipulated, and the referee agreed, that this conduct 

constituted a violation of SCR 20:1.4(a)(2)9 (Count 9).

¶18 Both before and after Attorney Ruppelt's 

representation of S.J. ended, S.J. sent several letters to 

Attorney Ruppelt stating that he did not know how much of his 

money remained in the trust account. Attorney Ruppelt failed to 

provide S.J. with a full accounting for the funds received in 

trust either during or after the representation. The parties 

stipulated, and the referee agreed, that by failing to provide 

S.J. with a full, written accounting for his funds at the 

 

a. an itemized bill or other accounting showing 

the services rendered; 

b. notice of the amount owed and the anticipated 

date of the withdrawal; and 

c. a statement of the balance of the client's 

funds in the lawyer trust account after the 

withdrawal. 

9 SCR 20:1.4(a)(2) provides: "A lawyer shall reasonably 

consult with the client about the means by which the client's 

objectives are to be accomplished."
No. 2015AP89-D 

9

termination of the representation, Attorney Ruppelt violated SCR 

20:1.15(d)(2)10 (Count 10).

¶19 In the civil action brought by S.J.'s girlfriend 

against S.J., Attorney Ruppelt produced in discovery, pursuant 

to a circuit court order, twelve invoices dated between February 

of 2007 and October of 2009, when those bills were either 

altered in June of 2010 or not generated until June of 2010. 

The parties stipulated, and the referee agreed, that this 

conduct constituted a violation of SCR 20:8.4(c) (Count 11). 

¶20 Also in the civil action brought by S.J.'s girlfriend 

against S.J., Attorney Ruppelt filed an affidavit stating that 

"No funds have been expended for any reason other than the 

criminal defense of [S.J.]." This statement was untrue given 

that $50,000 of S.J.'s funds had been temporarily used to assist 

Attorney Ruppelt in the purchase of a new home, and Attorney 

Ruppelt had repeatedly withdrawn funds from the trust before 

they had been earned. The parties stipulated, and the referee 

agreed, that this conduct constituted a violation of 

SCR 20:3.3(a)(l)11 (Count 12).

 

10 Former SCR 20:15(d)(2) provided: "Upon final 

distribution of any trust property or upon request by the client 

or a 3rd party having an ownership interest in the property, the 

lawyer shall promptly render a full written accounting regarding 

the property." 

11 SCR 20:3.3(a)(1) provides: "A lawyer shall not knowingly 

make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to 

correct a false statement of material fact or law previously 

made to the tribunal by the lawyer."
No. 2015AP89-D 

10

¶21 Also in the civil action brought by S.J.'s girlfriend 

against S.J., Attorney Ruppelt failed to respond to discovery 

requests for retainer contracts, billing statements, and S.J.'s 

trust account ledger, necessitating two court orders to compel 

discovery. Attorney Ruppelt ultimately produced a retainer 

agreement, which was dated July 9, 2006, but had actually been 

signed by S.J. in early July 2010. Attorney Ruppelt also 

produced a trust account ledger that omitted the $50,000 

disbursed to Attorney Ruppelt in connection with his purchase of 

a new home, his replacement of that $50,000 several months 

later, and his deposit of the proceeds of S.J.'s life insurance 

policy. The parties stipulated, and the referee agreed, that 

this conduct constituted a violation of SCR 20:8.4(c) and 

SCR 20:3.4(d)12 (Counts 13 and 14).

¶22 During the course of his legal work for S.J., Attorney 

Ruppelt charged S.J. $395 per hour for work performed by an 

associate, whose hourly rate was then $200, as well as for work 

performed by his legal assistant. The parties stipulated, and 

the referee agreed, that this conduct constituted a violation of 

SCR 20:1.5(a)13 (Count 17).

 

12 SCR 20:3.4(d) provides: "A lawyer shall not in pretrial 

procedure, make a frivolous discovery request or fail to make 

reasonably diligent effort to comply with a legally proper 

discovery request by an opposing party."

13 SCR 20:1.5(a) provides: 

A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, 

or collect an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable 

amount for expenses. The factors to be considered in 

(continued)
No. 2015AP89-D 

11

¶23 During the course of the OLR investigation, Attorney 

Ruppelt represented to the OLR that he had provided S.J. with 

billing statements showing the work performed by the firm, when 

this was not in fact true. Attorney Ruppelt also falsely 

represented to the OLR he had provided an accurate trust account 

ledger both to opposing counsel in S.J.'s civil matter and to 

S.J. at the termination of representation. The parties 

stipulated, and the referee agreed, that this conduct

constituted a violation of SCR 22:03(6), enforceable via SCR 

20:8.4(h) (Count 18).

 

determining the reasonableness of a fee include the 

following: 

(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and 

difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill 

requisite to perform the legal service properly; 

(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, 

that the acceptance of the particular employment will 

preclude other employment by the lawyer; 

(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality 

for similar legal services; 

(4) the amount involved and the results obtained; 

(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or 

by the circumstances; 

(6) the nature and length of the professional 

relationship with the client; 

(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of 

the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and 

(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent. 
No. 2015AP89-D 

12

¶24 In his report, the referee recommended that the court 

suspend Attorney Ruppelt's license for 15 months, as opposed to 

the one year to which the parties had stipulated. In making 

this recommendation, the referee considered a number of 

aggravating factors. Among other things, the referee found that 

Attorney Ruppelt deliberately and repeatedly failed to follow 

trust account rules, apparently believing that he would never 

get caught; that he took advantage of a vulnerable client; and 

that he engaged in a variety of misleading and deceptive 

behaviors in an attempt to conceal his misconduct. 

¶25 The referee recommended that Attorney Ruppelt should 

be required to pay the full costs of this proceeding. The OLR's 

statement of costs discloses that as of April 28, 2017, the 

costs of this proceeding were $16,743.46.

¶26 The referee did not recommend restitution, nor did the 

OLR request it, explaining that there were no reasonably 

ascertainable restitution amounts.

¶27 We now turn to the merits of Attorney Ruppelt's 

appeal. Attorney Ruppelt argues that the referee's recommended 

15-month suspension is excessive. He argues that analogous 

disciplinary cases best support the parties' stipulated one-year 

suspension——not the referee's recommended 15-month suspension. 

See, e.g., In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Biester, 2013 

WI 85, 350 Wis. 2d 707, 838 N.W.2d 79 (one-year suspension for 

30 counts of misconduct in six client matters; misconduct 

included misuse of client funds, trust account violations, and

neglect of client matters); In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
No. 2015AP89-D 

13

Against Raneda, 2012 WI 42, 340 Wis. 2d 273, 811 N.W.2d 412 

(one-year suspension for 14 counts of misconduct in two client 

matters; misconduct included trust account violations, lack of 

candor toward a tribunal, and neglect of client matters).

¶28 Attorney Ruppelt further argues that this court should 

adopt a policy of awarding deference to parties' disciplinary 

stipulations. Attorney Ruppelt reasons that the parties know 

more about their case, the strength of the evidence, and the 

implications that evidence would have for discipline than the 

referee or this court. Attorney Ruppelt also stresses that 

respondent lawyers in disciplinary proceedings would greatly 

benefit from having some certainty that this court will approve 

reasonable disciplinary stipulations entered into with the OLR.

¶29 Attorney Ruppelt also complains that the referee's 15-

month suspension is erroneously based on supposition and 

conjecture. He claims that certain of the referee's factual 

findings about Ruppelt's conduct were not expressly included 

within the parties' stipulation and thus were not an appropriate 

basis for increased discipline. In particular, Attorney Ruppelt 

takes issue with the referee's statements that his conduct was 

premeditated and well planned; that he appeared to believe his 

misconduct would never be detected; that he apparently felt that 

S.J. was desperate and vulnerable; that he would never have 

taken these liberties with a corporate or government client; and 

that the referee had to assume that the parties' stipulation 

captured all of the improper disbursements from S.J.'s funds in 

trust. 
No. 2015AP89-D 

14

¶30 We disagree with Attorney Ruppelt's arguments. To 

begin with, we agree with the referee that Attorney Ruppelt's 

actions merit a 15-month suspension, as opposed to the one-year 

suspension called for in the parties' stipulation. Although 

this court often imposes the disciplinary sanctions that parties

jointly request, we are free to reject such agreements as 

circumstances require. See, e.g., In re Disciplinary 

Proceedings Against Schreier, 2013 WI 35, 347 Wis. 2d 92, 829 

N.W.2d 744 (rejecting the referee's recommendation, which was 

based upon the parties' stipulation, for a two-year suspension 

with no conditions for reinstatement, and instead imposing a 30–

month suspension with conditions for reinstatement). This 

discretion flows from the fact that in lawyer disciplinary 

cases, this court is obligated to act as a protector of the 

public, the court system, and the integrity of the bar——not as a 

scribe charged with formalizing the parties' mutual wishes. 

Although this court fully appreciates the efficiency attained 

through stipulations, we will not allow the goal of efficiency 

to take precedence over the necessity of effecting the core 

functions of the lawyer disciplinary system. Sometimes, then, a 

departure from a joint stipulation is necessary.

¶31 This is one of those cases. We agree with the referee 

that the parties' stipulated one-year suspension does not 

adequately take into account the duration and severity of 

Attorney Ruppelt's misconduct. We note in particular the 

referee's observations that Attorney Ruppelt deliberately and 

repeatedly "ignore[d] all trust rules and used trust funds as 
No. 2015AP89-D 

15

though they were his own"; that he displayed a willingness to 

cover-up his misconduct and deceive those who inquired about it; 

that his liquidation of S.J.'s life insurance policy without 

S.J.'s knowledge or consent was "most disturbing"; and that he 

exhibited "a total lack of professionalism and the moral 

character required of a licensed attorney." On these facts, 

which we deem justified by the record, our cases readily support 

the 15-month suspension called for by the referee. See, e.g.,

In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Edgar, 230 Wis. 2d 205, 

601 N.W.2d 284 (1999) (two-year suspension for conversion of 

$11,000 from escrow account, misrepresentations, and trust 

account violations). 

¶32 We acknowledge here, as we have in the past, that "the 

imposition of discipline in attorney disciplinary cases is not 

an exact science." In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 

Siderits, 2013 WI 2, ¶33, 345 Wis. 2d 89, 824 N.W.2d 812. This 

case certainly proves the point. To define with precision the 

boundary between conduct that merits a one-year suspension, as 

the parties requested, versus conduct that merits a 15-month 

suspension, as we deem appropriate, is virtually impossible; 

both terms are of significant length, both terms will greatly 

impact the respondent lawyer's practice, and both terms will 

require the respondent lawyer to successfully complete the 

formal reinstatement procedure set forth in SCRs 22.29 through 

22.33. 

¶33 On these particularly troubling facts, however, we are 

confident that a fifteen-month suspension is needed to impress 
No. 2015AP89-D 

16

upon Attorney Ruppelt and other lawyers in this state the 

seriousness of the professional misconduct at issue here, and to 

protect the public from similar misconduct in the future. 

¶34 We reject the remainder of Attorney Ruppelt's 

arguments. As foreshadowed by the above discussion, we will not 

adopt, through case law, a policy by which the court will defer 

to parties' disciplinary stipulations, as Attorney Ruppelt 

requests. Due to our overarching duty to protect the public and 

the bar, we must remain the ultimate arbiter of the appropriate 

level of discipline, owing no deference on this subject to 

either the parties or the referee. To be sure, parties' and 

referees' opinions on disciplinary sanctions are highly 

informative, but they are just that——opinions, not authorities 

to which we must defer. See In re Disciplinary Proceedings 

Against Roitburd, 2016 WI 12, ¶20, 368 Wis. 2d 595, 882 

N.W.2d 317 (stating that "it is ultimately this court's 

responsibility" to determine appropriate disciplinary 

sanctions).

¶35 Neither do we agree with Attorney Ruppelt's argument 

that a referee may not make any factual findings outside of the 

facts expressly included within the parties' stipulation. As a 

factfinder, the referee may draw any reasonable inferences from 

the evidence introduced——here, the stipulated facts——just as a 

circuit court may do when operating as a factfinder. See

SCR 22.16 (providing that a referee has the powers of a judge 

trying a civil action); see also Cogswell v. Robertshaw Controls 

Co., 87 Wis. 2d 243, 250, 274 N.W.2d 647, 650 (1979) (when the 
No. 2015AP89-D 

17

trial judge acts as the finder of fact, it is within the trial 

judge's authority to draw reasonable inferences from the 

credible evidence). 

¶36 It can be no other way. To illustrate the point, 

consider the number of factors relevant to disciplinary 

recommendations that referees must frequently infer. See 

generally American Bar Association's Standards for Imposing 

Lawyer Sanctions, § 9.22 (including, as potential aggravating 

factors to consider in evaluating discipline, the respondent 

lawyer's dishonest or selfish motive, bad faith obstruction of 

the disciplinary proceeding, refusal to acknowledge wrongful 

nature of conduct, and indifference to restitution). It would 

be an unusual lawyer indeed who would explicitly stipulate to 

any of these behaviors or attitudes. Simply put, some facts are 

inferential rather than empirical, and referees, like circuit 

courts, are empowered to infer them. We therefore reject 

Attorney Ruppelt's argument.

¶37 We turn next to the issue of costs. Our general 

practice is to impose full costs on attorneys who are found to 

have committed misconduct. See SCR 22.24(1m). Attorney Ruppelt 

has not claimed that there are reasons to depart from that 

practice in this matter, and we have not found any reason to do 

so. We therefore impose full costs. 

¶38 Finally, we turn to the issue of restitution. In 

response to a concern expressed by the referee in reviewing the 

parties' stipulation, the parties informed the referee that no 

restitution was due because there was no reasonably 
No. 2015AP89-D 

18

ascertainable restitution amount. The referee deferred to this 

view, though he expressed concern in his report that the

parties' stipulation was "unclear" on "whether [Attorney] 

Ruppelt ultimately accounted to his client for his time and all 

funds taken by [Attorney] Ruppelt out of the trust account," and 

shed no light on "whether the client was satisfied with any 

accounting that was rendered or . . . with the overall fees 

charged."

¶39 We share the referee's concerns. On this record, it 

seems that the amount of restitution owed, if any, is not so 

much unknowable as it is simply unknown. Attorney Ruppelt has 

stipulated that he prematurely disbursed $104,644.68 of S.J.'s 

advanced fees, and that he overstated the hourly rate of his 

associate and his legal assistant for the time they billed to 

S.J.'s cases. Based on statements made to the referee, it 

appears to be Attorney Ruppelt's position that, despite these 

billing improprieties, his firm ultimately provided sufficient 

legal services to justify all collected fees. Whether this 

proposition is true or not is a determinable fact, to be 

determined based on more than Attorney Ruppelt's mere say-so.

¶40 We are not, however, a fact-finding court. We 

therefore remand this matter to the referee for further 

proceedings on the issue of restitution. The referee is to file 

a supplemental report on this issue within 120 days. 

¶41 IT IS ORDERED that the license of Mark Alan Ruppelt to 

practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for a period of fifteen 

months, effective August 18, 2017. 
No. 2015AP89-D 

19

¶42 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mark Alan Ruppelt shall 

comply with the requirements of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties 

of a person whose license to practice law in Wisconsin has been 

suspended.

¶43 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 

of this order, Mark Alan Ruppelt shall pay to the Office of 

Lawyer Regulation the costs of this proceeding, which are 

$16,743.46 as of April 28, 2017.

¶44 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 120 days of the date 

of this order, the referee shall file a supplemental report on 

the issue of restitution, which shall include a recommendation 

on how the costs of the referee's supplemental review should be 

paid.

¶45 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that compliance with all 

conditions of this order is required for reinstatement. See

SCR 22.29(4)(c).
No. 2015AP89-D.ssa

1

¶46 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J. (concurring). I join the 

per curiam opinion. I write about deferring to parties' 

stipulations. 

¶47 Attorney Ruppelt proposes that the court give 

deference to parties' disciplinary stipulations. I disagree 

with his proposal. 

¶48 I wholeheartedly agree with the per curiam opinion 

stating that the court will not act as a "scribe charged with 

formalizing the parties' mutual wishes" and that the court will 

not give deference to the parties' stipulations: 

Although this court fully appreciates the efficiency 

attained through stipulations, we will not allow the 

goal of efficiency to take precedence over the 

necessity of effecting the core functions of the 

lawyer discipline system [namely to protect the 

public, the court system, and the integrity of the 

bar].

. . . .

Due to our overarching duty to protect the public and 

the bar, we must remain the ultimate arbiter of the 

appropriate level of discipline, owing no deference on 

this subject to either the parties or the referee. 

Per curiam op., ¶¶30, 35. 

¶49 That said, when the per curiam opinion refers to 

departure from a joint stipulation when "necessary," per curiam 

op., ¶30, it means when a departure from a joint stipulation 

would help protect the public, the court system and the 

integrity of the bar. 

¶50 For the reason set forth, I write separately. 
No. 2015AP89-D.ssa

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