UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-4152

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

PHILLIP MICHAEL THOMAS BURTON,

 Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western 

District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Max O. Cogburn, Jr., 

District Judge. (3:11-cr-00411-MOC-1)

Submitted: October 16, 2014 Decided: October 20, 2014

Before MOTZ, WYNN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Seth Neyhart, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, for Appellant. 

Thomas A. O’Malley, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, 

Charlotte, North Carolina; Amy Elizabeth Ray, Assistant United 

States Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Phillip Michael Thomas Burton pled guilty to 

conspiracy to import MDMA or Ecstasy and importation of MDMA or 

Ecstasy. In April 2009, the district court sentenced Burton to 

forty-two months’ imprisonment, to be followed by thirty-six

months of supervised release. In December 2011, Burton was 

released from incarceration. In January 2014, Burton was before 

the district court on a supervised release violation. The court 

found that Burton committed a Level A violation based on an 

incident that involved his arrest for possession of 108 grams of 

marijuana. The court revoked his supervised release and imposed 

a twenty-one-month sentence. Burton’s counsel has filed a brief 

pursuant to Anders v. California, 686 U.S. 738 (1967), stating 

that there are no meritorious issues for appeal, but questioning 

whether the court clearly erred in determining that Burton 

committed the Grade A violation and whether the sentence was 

plainly unreasonable. Finding no clear error, we affirm.

We review a district court’s decision to revoke 

supervised release for abuse of discretion. United States v. 

Pregent, 190 F.3d 279, 282 (4th Cir. 1999). To revoke release, 

the district court must find a violation of a condition of 

release by a preponderance of the evidence. 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3583(e)(3) (2012). We review for clear error factual findings 

underlying the conclusion that a violation of the terms of 
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supervised release occurred. See United States v. Carothers, 

337 F.3d 1017, 1019 (8th Cir. 2003).

We conclude that the district court did not abuse its 

discretion in finding that Burton violated the conditions of 

supervised release by possessing marijuana. The Government 

presented evidence that police officers found a mason jar full 

of marijuana in the car in which Burton was driving and that a 

strong aroma of marijuana came from the car and Burton’s person. 

Based on this and other evidence, the district court found it 

more likely than not that Burton possessed the marijuana. 

Possession can be actual or constructive. United States v. 

Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 873 (4th Cir. 1996). Constructive 

possession can be shown by evidence of dominion and control over 

the drugs themselves or over the premises or vehicle in which 

the contraband is found. United States v. Blue, 957 F.2d 106, 

107 (4th Cir. 1992).

Viewed in the light most favorable to the Government, 

see United States v. Green, 599 F.3d 360, 367 (4th Cir. 2010), 

we find no clear error in the district court’s determination 

that Burton committed the Grade A violation of his supervised 

release. See United States v. White, 620 F.3d 401, 410 (4th 

Cir. 2010); see also United States v. Stevenson, 396 F.3d 538, 

542 (4th Cir. 2005) (providing that court of appeals will not 

reverse factual finding if district court’s view of the evidence 
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is plausible in light of the totality of the evidence, even if 

the appeals court would have resolved the facts differently).

Next, Burton specifically questions whether the 

district court correctly calculated his criminal history 

category and whether the court sufficiently articulated the 

reasons for the sentence imposed. He also generally questions 

the substantive reasonableness of his sentence.

The district court has broad discretion in determining 

a sentence upon revocation of supervised release. United 

States v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013). In examining 

a sentence imposed upon revocation of supervised release, we 

“take[] a more deferential appellate posture concerning issues 

of fact and the exercise of discretion than reasonableness 

review for [G]uidelines sentences.” United States v. Moulden, 

478 F.3d 652, 656 (4th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). We will affirm a revocation sentence that falls 

within the statutory maximum, unless we find the sentence to be 

“plainly unreasonable.” United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 

437 (4th Cir. 2006). In reviewing a revocation sentence, we 

must first determine “whether the sentence is unreasonable,” 

using the same general analysis employed to review original 

sentences. Id. at 438. Only if we find a sentence to be 

procedurally or substantively unreasonable will we determine 

whether the sentence is “plainly” so. Id. at 439. 
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A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if 

the district court has considered both the applicable 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a) (2012) factors and the policy statements contained in 

Chapter Seven of the Guidelines. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440. The 

district court also must provide an explanation of its chosen 

sentence, although this explanation “need not be as detailed or 

specific” as is required for an original sentence. United 

States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010). We have 

reviewed the record and conclude that the sentence imposed by 

the district court was not plainly unreasonable.

We therefore affirm the revocation judgment and the 

twenty-one-month sentence. We dispense with oral argument 

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented 

in the materials before this court and argument would not aid 

the decisional process.

AFFIRMED