NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

In re the Matter of:

KRISTEN LEIGH HENRY, Petitioner/Appellee,

v.

DAVID SPETZLER, Respondent/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 22-0172 FC

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. FC2020-001738

The Honorable Tracey Westerhausen, Judge

VACATED

COUNSEL

Mark J. DePasquale, P.C., Phoenix

By Mark J. DePasquale

Co-Counsel for Respondent/Appellant

Schmidt McElwee & Gordon, PLLC, Phoenix

By Paul G. Schmidt

Co-Counsel for Respondent/Appellant

FILED 5-16-2023
HENRY v. SPETZLER

Decision of the Court

2

Hallier Stearns, PLC, Phoenix

By Angela K. Hallier, Jason D. Brierley

Co-Counsel for Petitioner/Appellee

Jones, Skelton & Hochuli P.L.C., Phoenix

By Eileen Dennis GilBride

Co-Counsel for Petitioner/Appellee

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Acting Presiding Judge Jennifer B. Campbell delivered the decision of the 

Court, in which Judge David D. Weinzweig and Chief Judge Kent E. Cattani 

joined.

C A M P B E L L, Judge:

¶1 David Spetzler (Father) appeals the family court’s 

clarification order construing the extraordinary-care provisions of the

consent decree dissolving his marriage to Kristen Henry (Mother). For the 

following reasons, we vacate the family court’s order.

BACKGROUND

¶2 On April 1, 2021, the parties dissolved their marriage by a 

consent decree incorporating their joint decision-making agreement and 

parenting plan (the parenting plan). Specific to this appeal, the consent 

decree provides that support for the parties’ eldest child, who “has severe 

mental and physical disabilities,” will continue “past the age of majority.”

In relevant part, the consent decree states:

Child Support. Pursuant to the Child Support Worksheet . . ., 

[Mother] would pay [Father] $75 per month. [Father] will be 

paying the cost of [the eldest child’s] child care expenses (as 

set forth below) and all private school tuition for [the younger 

children] through high school. The parties have agreed and 

acknowledge that neither requires child support from the other 

given their respective economic circumstances with the exception 

of the expenses Father shall pay, which are in the nature of 

child support. Therefore, the Court finds and orders that a 

deviation from the Child Support Guidelines is in the best 
HENRY v. SPETZLER

Decision of the Court

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interest of the parties’ children and neither party shall pay 

child support to the other for the children except as to the 

expenses set forth in the child support worksheet. (Emphasis 

added.) 

¶3 The child support worksheet, attached as an exhibit to the 

consent decree, reflects that as of March 2021, Father paid $4,667 per month 

for the younger children’s extra-educational expenses and $11,500 per 

month for the eldest child’s extraordinary-care expenses. Consistent with 

the child support worksheet, the consent decree charges Father with the 

“sole[] responsib[ility] for paying private school tuition, uniforms and 

books” for the younger children. But in contrast to the simple and clear

assignment of the younger children’s extra-educational expenses wholly to 

Father, the consent decree details an elaborate framework for apportioning 

the costs of the eldest child’s extraordinary care as follows:

The parties shall jointly maximize the use of state funded care 

programs for [the eldest child]. If the parties agree upon a 

program or schooling with costs attendant to the 

program/schooling, [Father] shall pay all costs of the 

program or schooling. [Father] shall pay all care in [Mother’s]

home from 7 a.m. to 8:30 p.m. on days [the eldest child] is at 

[Mother’s] home and not eligible to be in school or a program. 

If [the eldest child] is attending school or a program on one of 

[Mother’s] parenting days, [Father] shall pay for care before 

and after the school/program but only during hours 

commencing at 7 a.m. and ending at 8:30 p.m. If [Mother] 

removes[the eldest child] from school or a program for reasons 

due to illness or a medical/dental appointment requiring a 

caregiver, [Father] will pay for that time. If [Mother] travels 

away from home with [the eldest child], [Father] will pay for 

[the eldest child’s] care for the number of hours he would 

have paid if [the eldest child] had been in the state-funded or 

other mutually agreed-upon program or schooling and on 

weekends for [Mother’s] travel from 7 a.m. to 8:30 p.m. if the 

program does not cover the weekend. The remainder of care 

costs for [the eldest child] shall be [Mother’s] responsibility. 

(Emphasis added). 

Using much of the same language, the parenting plan likewise spells out

the parties’ respective obligations for the eldest child’s extraordinary care:
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The parties shall jointly maximize the use of state-funded care 

programs for [the eldest child]. If the parties agree upon a 

program or schooling for [the eldest child] with costs 

attendant to the program/schooling, Father shall cover all 

costs of the program or schooling. Father shall pay all costs 

for [the eldest child’s] care while in Mother’s home from 7 

a.m. to 8:30 p.m. when [the eldest child] is not eligible to be in 

a school or a program. If [the eldest child] is attending school 

or a program on one of Mother’s parenting days, Father shall 

pay for care before and after the school/program, but only 

during hours commencing at 7 a.m. and ending at 8:30 p.m. If 

Mother removes [the eldest child] from school or a program for 

reasons due to illness or a medical/dental appointment 

requiring a caregiver, Father will pay for that time. If Mother 

travels away from home with [the eldest child], Father will 

pay for [the eldest child’s] care for the number of hours he 

would have paid if [the eldest child] had been in the program 

and on weekends for Mother’s travel from 7 a.m. to 8:30 p.m. 

if the program does not cover the weekend. The remainder of 

any care costs for [the eldest child] shall be Mother’s

responsibility. Neither parent requires the approval of the other 

parent as to the employed care providers working in their own home.

Subject to the other provisions of this Plan, the scheduling of 

[the eldest child’s] child care providers shall be done by each 

parent for their own parenting time. . . . Father shall only be 

obligated to reimburse Mother for [the eldest child’s] child care 

expenses for time the providers are actually providing care 

for [the eldest child] between the hours of 7:00 a.m. and 8:30 

p.m. and subject to the other provisions of the parties’ Decree of 

Dissolution of Marriage and this Plan (i.e., Father is not 

required to reimburse Mother for [the eldest child’s] child care costs 

if a state-funded care program is available). (Emphasis added.)

¶4 About two months after entry of the consent decree, Mother

petitioned for contempt, alleging Father violated the decree by failing to 

reimburse her for the extraordinary-care expenses she incurred in April and 

May 2021. Denying any violation, Father argued that the consent decree 

and parenting plan require him to pay for the eldest child’s extraordinarycare costs only when no state-funded care is available—meaning Mother 

must first exhaust available state-funded care for which the eldest child is 

eligible before Father is obligated to pay for in-home care. Asserting Mother

did not exhaust available state-funded care programs in April and May 
HENRY v. SPETZLER

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2021, Father contended he was not obligated to reimburse her for any 

extraordinary-care expenses (in-home care) she paid during that time. 

¶5 Given the parties’ conflicting interpretations of their 

respective obligations under the consent decree, Mother moved to clarify 

the extraordinary-care provisions or, alternatively, set aside those 

provisions and establish child support. Because the parties construed the 

consent decree and parenting plan requirements differently, Mother

claimed “there was no meeting of the minds” when the parties entered the 

agreements.

¶6 The family court accepted Mother’s framing―that the parties 

had no mutual understanding of the consent decree and parenting plan 

requirements concerning the eldest child’s extraordinary care―but found

that Father did not willfully fail to comply with a court order, denying

Mother’s petition for contempt. After oral argument on the motion to 

clarify, the family court entered a final order adopting Mother’s

interpretation of the extraordinary-care provisions:

In reviewing the relevant provisions as a whole, the Court 

agrees that the decree and parenting plan make a distinction 

between a program and day care. When [the eldest child] is 

enrolled in and attending a program (a structured event 

typically with a start and stop time for every day that a child 

is in the program), Father does not have to pay for day care. 

If the parties have not agreed on a program and [the eldest 

child] is receiving day care instead, Father pays for the caregivers. 

¶7 Father moved for reconsideration, which the family court 

denied. Father timely appealed. 

DISCUSSION

¶8 Father challenges the family court’s interpretation of the 

extraordinary-care provisions. First, he argues the term “program,” as used 

within the consent decree and parenting plan, includes in-home care. 

Second, he contends that absent an agreement between the parties, he has 

no obligation to pay for the eldest child’s extraordinary care during 

Mother’s parenting time if the eldest child is eligible to receive care from an 

available state-funded program―even if Mother refuses to utilize that 

resource. 
HENRY v. SPETZLER

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¶9 We review a family court’s interpretation of a consent decree 

de novo. Cohen v. Frey, 215 Ariz. 62, 66, ¶ 10 (App. 2007). To construe a

consent decree’s provisions, “we apply the general rules of construction for 

any written instrument,” considering the plain meaning of the words in the 

context of the entire decree and applying unambiguous language as 

written. Id. at ¶ 11.

¶10 Parties’ disagreement about the meaning of language does 

not, by itself, constitute an ambiguity. United Cal. Bank v. Prudential Ins. Co. 

of Am., 140 Ariz. 238, 258 (App. 1983). Because a consent decree is “an 

independent resolution by the court of the issues before it and rightfully is 

regarded in that context and not according to the negotiated intent of the 

parties,” we do not consider parol evidence to inform our interpretation of 

the decree. In re Marriage of Zale, 193 Ariz. 246, 249, ¶ 11 (1999).

¶11 When a plain reading of a provision, viewed in isolation, is 

susceptible to more than one construction, “we look to related provisions” 

of a decree to resolve the ambiguity. In re Marriage of Johnson, 231 Ariz. 228, 

234, ¶ 20 (App. 2012). In general, we presume a word or phrase appearing 

repeatedly in a decree “is used in the same sense in both places.” Id. But this 

“same meaning” rule does not override our obligation to interpret a consent 

decree in a manner that is consistent with its purpose and harmonizes its 

provisions. See State ex rel. Goddard v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 206 Ariz. 117, 

122, ¶¶ 23-24 (App. 2003) (explaining that “[w]hen the context of the words 

at issue differs[,] . . . a reasonable interpretation in one context does not 

compel that identical meaning in another context”); Cohen, 215 Ariz. at 67, 

¶¶ 14-15. To that end, we will not assign meaning “to part of the language 

which would render another part meaningless, nor remake the language to 

alter the existing rights or obligations.” Stine v. Stine, 179 Ariz. 385, 388 

(App. 1994).

¶12 Guided by these principles, we examine the extraordinarycare provisions of the consent decree and the parenting plan. In both 

documents, the provisions first state: “The parties shall jointly maximize 

the use of state funded care programs for [the eldest child].” As the parties 

note, “program,” viewed in isolation, has alternate meanings. Because 

neither the consent decree nor the parenting plan defines the word

“program,” Father contends that we should ascribe the term its ordinary 

meaning. See State ex rel. Winkleman v. Ariz. Navigable Stream Adjudication 

Comm’n, 224 Ariz. 230, 240, ¶ 24 (App. 2010) (explaining courts may consult 

dictionaries “to glean the plain meaning of” a word and should apply that 

plain meaning “unless the context suggests otherwise”). As commonly 

defined, a “program” is “a plan of activities to be done or things to be 
HENRY v. SPETZLER

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achieved.” Program, Cambridge Dictionary, 

https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/program (last 

visited May 10, 2023). Consistent with Father’s contention, the ordinary 

meaning of “program” is sufficiently broad to include in-home care. But, as 

first used within the extraordinary-care provisions of both documents, 

“program” is not a stand-alone term; rather, it is modified by the phrase 

“state funded care.” A “state funded care program” is a particular type of 

“program.” Section 36-558, which requires the State to establish, operate, 

and maintain state-funded programs and services for persons with 

developmental disabilities, specifically enumerates “[i]n-home” care 

services as a resource provided by the State. A.R.S. § 36-558(C)(4)(g). Thus, 

under A.R.S. § 36-558’s rubric, the phrase “state-funded care program”

expressly includes in-home care services. See Baumgartner v. Timmins, 245 

Ariz. 334, 337, ¶ 11 (App. 2018) (explaining words may have technical 

meanings unique to a field).

¶13 While acknowledging that the common definition of 

“program” encompasses in-home care services, Mother argues that within 

the broader context of the extraordinary-care provisions, applying the plain 

and ordinary meaning of “program” is nonsensical. As Mother correctly 

points out, most of the provisions’ other references to “program” omit the 

“state funded care” modifier and instead pair “program” with “school.”

Given the repeated coupling of “school” and “program,” Mother asserts 

under the noscitur a sociis doctrine the terms should be given 

“commensurate” meanings: an out-of-home service providing care. See City 

of Surprise v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, 246 Ariz. 206, 211, ¶ 13 (2019) (explaining 

“a word’s meaning cannot be determined in isolation, but must be drawn 

from the context in which it is used,” such that associating several terms 

suggests, in context, that “the terms have some quality in common”).

¶14 With Mother’s assertion in mind, we turn to the second 

sentence of the extraordinary-care provisions in each document, which are 

substantially the same: “If the parties agree upon a program or schooling” 

with attendant costs, Father must pay “all costs of the program or 

schooling.” By referencing attendant costs, “program,” as used in this 

sentence, clearly pertains to a third-party care service that is not funded by 

the State. But the context of the sentence does not preclude application of 

the plain meaning of “program,” which, as stated, encompasses in-home 

care services. 

¶15 Proceeding to the third sentence of each extraordinary-care 

provision―again substantively the same―Father must pay for “all costs” in 

Mother’s home from 7:00 a.m. to 8:30 p.m. if the eldest child is “not eligible 
HENRY v. SPETZLER

Decision of the Court

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to be in a school or a program.” Contrary to Mother’s contention, the 

context of this sentence does not suggest a deviation from the ordinary and 

plain meaning of “program,” which encompasses both in-home and out-ofhome care services. Nor does the context support Mother’s argument that 

the word “eligible,” as used here, means “actually enrolled in or attending,” 

such that Father is required to pay for all third-party care in her home 

unless the eldest child is “actually enrolled in or attending” a school or 

program. Indeed, Mother’s proposed construction strips the eligibility 

qualifier of any meaning because she does not incur in-home care expenses 

when the eldest child is “actually enrolled in and attending“ a school or 

program, see infra ¶ 16. (Emphasis added.) See Stine, 179 Ariz. at 388 (“A 

meaning should not be assigned to part of the language which would 

render another part meaningless.”). Ascribing the plain and ordinary 

meaning of eligible―“having the necessary qualities or satisfying the 

necessary conditions”―the sentence requires Father to pay all in-home 

extraordinary-care expenses incurred during Mother’s parenting time only 

if the eldest child fails to qualify for a school or program. Eligible, 

Cambridge Dictionary, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/

english/eligible (last visited May 10, 2023). This interpretation is consistent 

with the overarching principle underlying the introductory language of 

both extraordinary-care provisions, namely, that the parties must “jointly 

maximize the use of state-funded care programs.” Read in that context, 

ineligibility means that the eldest child does not qualify for a state-funded 

school or program, not that she has failed to register for or enroll in one. 

¶16 In sum, Father is financially responsible for extraordinarycare expenses incurred during Mother’s parenting time only if: (1) the 

parties have agreed to a school or program with attendant costs, (2) Mother 

has exhausted available state-funded care services, or (3) the eldest child is 

otherwise ineligible for state-funded care. While the parties are free to 

arrange for caregivers in their respective homes without the approval of the 

other, they must agree to any program with attendant costs to trigger 

Father’s financial obligation. In the absence of such an agreement, Mother 

must avail herself of her allotment of available state-funded care programs 

or bear the expense for other extraordinary-care services.1

1 We find no merit to Mother’s contention that adopting Father’s 

interpretation of the extraordinary-care provisions “undermin[es] the basis 

for the [family] court’s child support decision.” Although Mother correctly 

points to the substantial extraordinary-care expenses credited to Father in 

the child support worksheet, the consent decree expressly states that the 
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CONCLUSION

¶17 For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the family court’s 

clarification order.

parties’ respective economic circumstances―not Father’s payment of extraeducational and extraordinary-care expenses―warrant a deviation from the 

child support guidelines and further provides that Father’s financial 

obligation for the eldest child’s extraordinary care shall be determined by 

the framework outlined in the extraordinary-care provisions, not as 

detailed in the child support worksheet.