NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. MARTY LISH, Defendant - Appellant. No. 12-30004 D.C. No. 4:10-cr-00100-BLW-1

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Idaho B. Lynn Winmill, Chief District Judge, Presiding Submitted April 7, 2014 ** Seattle, Washington Before: HAWKINS, RAWLINSON, and BEA, Circuit Judges. Marty Lish (“Lish”) appeals his jury trial conviction for Conspiracy to Distribute Less than 50 grams of Methamphetamine and Possessi on with Intent to 

# FILED

APR 10 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).Distribute a Controlled Substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. We affirm. Lish’s Fourth Amendment challenge to the denial of his motion to suppress fails because an investigatory vehicle st op does not offend the Fourth Amendment if it is supported by reasonable suspicion. United States v. Twilley , 222 F.3d 1092, 1095 (9th Cir. 2000). At the time of the stop, the o fficers knew: (1) a reliable informant had seen Lish in possession of and di stributing methamphetamine earlier that morning; (2) Lish had met with a suspected drug trafficker that day in a parking lot, from which she proceeded to get into Lish’s car, drive around with him for a few minutes, and then return to her vehicle; (3) Lish had made s hort visits to various residences of suspected drug users and traffi ckers; (4) Lish had driven in a manner to avoid being followed; and (5) based on dispatch’s records, Lish’s license plate did not match his vehicle. It was rational for the officers to infer from these specific articulable facts that Lish “may have committed or [was] about to commit a crime.” United States v. Garcia-Acuna , 175 F.3d 1143, 1146 (9th Cir. 1999)

. The subsequent search of Lish’s ve hicle also did not violate the Fourth Amendment since his parole conditions aut horized searches of this kind, and the officers had reasonable suspicion that he had engaged in criminal activity. S ee Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 850–57 (2006) (upholding search under

2suspicionless-search parole condition); United States v. Knights , 534 U.S. 112, 121–
22 (2001) (upholding search based on proba tion conditions and reasonable suspicion). Lish does not dispute that he consented to parole conditions requiring him to submit to searches of his vehicle and personal prope rty “at any time, with or without a search warrant, whenever reasonable cause is dete rmined by a Parole Agent” or whenever “any . . . law enforcement offi cer” so desires. Nor does he dispute his parole officer’s determination that, based on the informati on an officer provided him regarding the criminal investigation, there was reas onable cause to conduct a parole search. 1 Finally, the admission into evidence of text messages from Lish’s cell phone and the limitation on his ability to impeach this evidence was not plain error. Under United States v. Gonzalez-Aparicio , 663 F.3d 419, 428 (9th Cir. 2011) , Lish would need to show, among other things, that any error a ffected substantial rights and seriously affected the fairness, int e grity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. Lish has not demonstrated either. AFFIRMED.

1 Because we find the officers possessed reasonable suspicion to stop Lish’s vehicle and his conditions of parole jus tified the subsequent search, we need not examine the district court’s alternative holding based on probable cause. 3