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NON - PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 IN THE INTEREST OF: M.A.C., a Minor : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : : : : APPEAL OF: H.C., Mother : No. 223 MDA 2017

Appeal from the Decree entered January 31, 2017 in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County, Orphans’ Court Division, No(s): 1805 o f 2015 IN THE INTEREST OF: M.L.C., a Minor : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : : : : APPEAL OF: H.C., Mother : No. 224 MDA 2017

Appeal from the Decree entered January 31, 2017 in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County, Orphans’ Court Division, No(s): 1804 o f 2015 IN THE INTEREST OF: M.X.C., a Minor : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : : : : APPEAL OF: H.C., Mother : No. 225 MDA 2017

Appeal from the Decree entered January 31, 2017 in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County, Orphans’ Court Division, No(s): 1803 o f 2015J

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IN THE INTEREST OF: D.M.C.S., a Minor : : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA : : : : : APPEAL OF: H.C., Mother : No. 226 MDA 2017

Appeal from the Decree entered January 31, 2017 in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County, Orphans’ Court Division, No(s): 1802 o f 2015
BEFORE: STABILE, MOULTON and MUSMANNO, JJ. MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J. : FILED JUNE 27, 2017 H.C. (“Mother”) appeals from the Decree granting the Pe tition filed by the Lancaster County Children and Youth Social Service Agency (“the Agency”) for the involuntary termination of her parental rights to M.A.C. (born in 2010), M.L.C. (born in 2009), M.X.C. (born in 2008) and D.M.C.S. (born in 2006) (collecti vely “Children”) under the Adoption Act. S ee 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511. 1 We affirm. In its Opinion, the trial court set forth the relevant factual and procedural history, which we adopt for the purpose of this appeal. See Trial Court Opinion, 2/22/17, at 1

- 7. On appeal, Mother raises the following issues for our review:

1 In its Decree, the trial court also changed Children’s permanency goals to adoption. However, Mother challenges only the termination of her parental rights to Children, and does not challenge the changing of Children’s permanency goals to adoption.J

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A. Whether the evidence presented at the [t]ermination of [p]arental rights hearing was sufficient to support [the] termination of Mother’s [parental] righ ts[?]
B. Whether the evidence presented at the [t]ermination of [p]arental rights hearing was sufficient to find that it was in the best interests of [C]hildren to terminate Mother’s parental rights[?] Brief for Mother at 7. 2
Our standard of review is as fo llows: [A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion standard when considering a trial court’s determination of a petition for termination of parental rights. As in dependency cases, our standard of review requires an appellate court to accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law or abused its discretion. As has been often stated, an abuse of discretion does not result merely because the reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion. Instead, a decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, pa rtiality, prejudice, bias, or ill

- will. ... [U]nlike trial courts, appellate courts are not equipped to make the fact

- specific determinations on a cold record, where the trial judges are observing the parties during the relevant hearing and often presidin g over numerous other hearings regarding the child and parents. Therefore, even where the facts could support an opposite result, as is often the case in dependency and termination cases, an appellate court must resist the urge to second guess the trial c ourt and impose its own credibility determinations and judgment; instead we must

2 Although Mother has identified two issues in her Statement of Questions Presented, she failed to separate her issues in the Argument section of h er brief, or provide headings for the issues. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (providing that “[t]he argument shall be divided into as many parts as there are questions to be argued; and shall have at the head of each part

— in distinctive type or in type distinctive ly displayed

— the particular point treated therein....”).J

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defer to the trial judges so long as the factual findings are supported by the record and the court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an error of law or an abuse of di scretion. In re Adoption of S.P. , 47 A.3d 817, 826

– 27 (Pa. 2012) (citations omitted). Termination of parental rights is controlled by section 2511 of the Adoption Act. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511. The burden is on the petitioner to prove by clear and convi ncing evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental rights are valid. In re R.N.J. , 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009). “[C]lear and convincing evidence is defined as testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty and convincin g as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” Id . (citation and quotation marks omitted). Satisfaction of any one subsection of section 2511(a), along with consideration of subsection 2511(b), is sufficient for the involuntary termination of parental rights. In re B.L.W. , 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) ( en banc ). In this case, we will review the trial court’s decision to terminate Mother’s parental rights based upon su bsections 2511(a)(8) and (b), which state the following: (a) General Rule

. — The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following grounds: * * * (8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement withJ

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- an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the date of removal or placement, the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child c ontinue to exist and termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child. * * * (b) Other considerations.― The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and e motional needs and welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent . With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the petition. 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8), (b). With respect to subsection 2511(a)(8), Mother contends that the conditions which led to placement of Children were “truancy [], chaos in the home, concerns for drug use[,] and domestic violence in the home.” Brief for Mother at 24. Mother asserts that “[t]he evidence offered in the [termination] hearings suggests that those issues have been addressed.” Id

. “Section 2511(a)( 8) sets a 12

- month time frame for a parent to remedy the conditions that led to the children’s removal by the court.” In
re A.R. , 837 A.2d 560, 564 (Pa. Super. 2003). Once the 12

- month period has been established, the court must next determine whether th e conditions that led to the children’s removal continue to exist, despite the reasonableJ

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good faith efforts of the Agency supplied over a realistic time period. Id

. The “relevant inquiry in this regard is whether the conditions that led to removal have been remedied and thus whether reunification of parent and child[ren] is imminent at the time of the hearing.” In re I.J. , 972 A.2d 5, 11 (Pa. Super. 2009). Further, the application of [subs]ection (a)(8) may seem harsh when the parent has begun to make progress toward resolving the problems that had led to removal of her children. By allowing for termination when the conditions that led to removal continue to exist after a year, the statute implic itly recognizes that a child’s life cannot be held in abeyance while the parent is unable to perform the actions necessary to assume parenting responsibilities. This Court cannot and will not subordinate indefinitely a child’s need for permanence and stab ility to a parent’s claims of progress and hope for the future. Indeed, we work under statutory and case law that contemplates only a short period of time, to wit eighteen months, in which to complete the process of either reunification or adoption for a child who has been placed in foster care. Id . at 11

- 12 (citation omitted, emphasis in original). In its Opinion, the trial court considered the requirements of subsection 2511(a)(8), and determined that the Agency had met its burden of proving the ground s for termination of Mother’s parental rights to Children. See Trial Court Opinion, 2/22/17, at 10

- 11 (wherein the court determined that Mother’s efforts have been minimal, she has never secured stable income or suitable housing, and Children have been in placement for 33 months). We agree with the trial court’s determination, which is supported by the record and free of legal error, and affirm on this basis as to Mother’s first issue. See id

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With respect to subsection 2511(b), Mother contends that Su zanne Ail, Ph.D (“Dr. Ail”), the psychologist who performed the bonding assessment, utilized improper or incorrect information to make her recommendation that, despite the existence of bonds between Mother and Children, Mother’s parental rights should be t erminated. Brief for Mother at 24. Mother asserts that, while it is commonplace in custody proceedings to evaluate a child’s bonds with the biological parents as well as the foster parents, this practice is “inappropriate and out of place in an attachmen t evaluation.” Id . at 24

- 25. Mother claims that, whereas a biological parent’s relationship with a child will be strained by separation when placement occurs, “the foster family’s interactions with the child[] will almost always appear to be stronger
... t han those of a biological parent’s.” Id . Mother argues that Dr. Ail’s assessment failed “to account for the tremendous disparity in time that [M]other had with [C]hildren compared with that of the foster families.” Id

. Mother also points to Dr. Ail’s o bservations of Mother playing with Children, and contends that Dr. Ail’s conclusions drawn from such observations do “not allow for such realities as a child who is willful, and does not wish to follow the prompts of an adult.” Id . Mother asserts that, i n making her recommendation, Dr. Ail improperly considered the level of progress that Mother had made in her plan which, Mother claims, is irrelevant to an attachment analysis. Id . at 26. Mother further argues that, in making her assessment, Dr. Ail impr operly conducted a “best interests” analysis which,J

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Mother contends, is the exclusive province of the trial court. Id . Mother asserts that Dr. Ail’s judgment was clouded by her belief that, despite the termination of Mother’s parental rights, Mother woul d always be permitted to be a part of Children’s lives. Id . Mother claims that the trial court failed to recognize Dr. Ail’s bias, and the flaws in her assessment. Id

. Mother also contends that her inability to obtain appropriate housing and income, i n order to support herself and Children, is beyond her control. Id . at 21, 22. Mother asserts that her panic attacks prevent her from maintaining employment. Id . at 21; see also id . at 22 (wherein Mother claims that mental health diagnoses are “beyond t he control” of a parent). Mother argues that her lack of adequate housing was also caused by the removal of Children from her home. Id . at 22. Mother contends that, “[o]nce the [A]gency removed [C]hildren from [her] home[,] the [supplemental security in come] payments [that she had been receiving for Children] were then paid to the [A]gency or county, not [M]other.” Id

. Regarding subsection 2511(b), the court inquires whether the termination of Mother’s parental rights would best serve the developmenta l, physical and emotional n eeds and welfare of the child. See In re C.M.S. , 884 A.2d 1284, 1286

- 87 (Pa. Super. 2005). “Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability are involved in the inquiry into the needs and welfare of the child.” Id . a t 1287 (citation omitted). The court must also discern the nature and status of the parent

- child bond, with utmost attentionJ

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to the effect on the child of permanently severing that bond. Id .; see also
In re Z.P. , 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa. Super. 2010) (st ating that “the court must take into account whether a bond exists between child and parent, and whether termination would destroy an existing, necessary and beneficial relationship.”). Additionally, “the strength of emotional bond between a child and a p otential adoptive parent is an important consideration in a ‘best interests’ analysis.” In re I.J. , 972 A.2d at 13; see also In re T.S.M. , 71 A.3d 251, 268 (Pa. 2013) (stating that “courts considering termination must also consider whether the children ar e in a pre

- adoptive home and whether they have a bond with their foster parents.”). Finally, the focus in terminating parental rights under section 2511(a) is on the parent, but it is on the child under section 2511(b). In re Adoption of C.L.G. , 956 A.2d 999, 1008 (Pa. Super 2008) ( en banc )

. In its Opinion, the trial court considered the requirements of subsection 2511(b), and determined that the Agency had met its burden of proving that it was in Children’s best interests to terminate Mother’s parental

r ights. See Trial Court Opinion, 2/22/17, at 12 (wherein the court determined that, while each of the Children have an attachment to Mother, the court “does not see a bond between Mother and [C]hildren sufficient to interfere with the termination of Mother ’s parental rights[;]” and their bonds with their respective placement parents are considerably stronger and warmer than their attachments to Mother); see also id . (wherein the courtJ

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noted that D.M.C.S. and M.X.C. have “fractured” relationships with Mother ). We agree with the trial court’s determination, which is supported by the record and free of legal error, and affirm on this basis as to Mother’s second
issue. See id

. Decree affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 6/27/2017Circulated 06/08/2017 12:05 PM