J-S22010-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

LEON D. BODLE

Appellant No. 1234 MDA 2015

Appeal from the Order Entered June 26, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-41-CR-0001997-2008

 CP-41-CR-0002072-2008

BEFORE: MUNDY, J., DUBOW, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY MUNDY, J.: FILED APRIL 20, 2016

Appellant, Leon D. Bodle, appeals from the June 26, 2015 order, 

denying his petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 

42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. After careful review, we affirm based on the 

sound reasoning of the PCRA court’s June 26, 2015, and September 18, 

2015 opinions. 

The PCRA court summarized in detail the procedural history of this 

case and the facts adduced at the March 17, 2014 evidentiary hearing on 

Appellant’s petition, and we need not repeat that history in full here. We 

note that Appellant filed a timely pro se PCRA petition on February 3, 2014. 

Counsel was appointed and an amended and a supplemental amended PCRA 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S22010-16

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petition were subsequently filed. On March 17, 2014, the PCRA court held a 

hearing to address Appellant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims, based 

on counsel’s alleged failure to call certain witnesses at trial. In a written 

opinion and order filed June 26, 2015, the PCRA court denied Appellant’s 

PCRA petition on its merits. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on July 

20, 2015.1

On appeal, Appellant raises the following issues for our review.

I. Did the [PCRA] Court err in precluding 

Karen Bodle from testifying to specific acts 

which were reiterated to her by parents and 

teachers of community [sic] to illustrate the 

[Appellant’s] good reputation in the 

community[?]

II. Did the [PCRA] Court err in finding that 

failing to put any evidence on the record 

including Ronald Weigle’s testimony of 

[Appellant’s] good character in the community 

was not ineffective assistance of counsel[?]

Appellant’s Brief at 4.2

We first address an issue raised by the PCRA court in its September 

18, 2015 opinion, wherein it opined that Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement 

____________________________________________

1 Appellant and the PCRA court have procedurally complied with 

Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925. We discuss Appellant’s 

substantive compliance with the Rule infra. The PCRA court’s September 18, 

2015 Rule 1925(a) opinion incorporated and expanded on its June 26, 2015 

opinion, which accompanied its dismissal order.

2 The Commonwealth has not filed a brief in this appeal.
J-S22010-16

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was too vague and that the issues raised therein were subsequently waived. 

PCRA Court Opinion, 9/18/15, at 1 n.1. 

[G]enerally [] issues not raised in a Rule 1925(b) 

statement will be deemed waived for review. An 

appellant’s concise statement must properly specify 

the error to be addressed on appeal. In other words, 

the Rule 1925(b) statement must be specific enough 

for the trial court to identify and address the issue 

[an appellant] wishe[s] to raise on appeal. [A] 

[c]oncise [s]tatement which is too vague to allow the 

court to identify the issues raised on appeal is the 

functional equivalent of no [c]oncise [s]tatement at 

all. The court’s review and legal analysis can be 

fatally impaired when the court has to guess at the 

issues raised. Thus, if a concise statement is too 

vague, the court may find waiver.

Commonwealth v. Hansley, 24 A.3d 410, 415 (Pa. Super. 2011) (internal 

quotation marks and citations omitted), appeal denied, 32 A.3d 1275 (Pa. 

2011). “One of the main purposes of the waiver doctrine is to ensure that 

the appellate court is provided with the benefit of the trial court’s 

reasoning.” Commonwealth v. Santiago, 822 A.2d 716, 723 (Pa. Super. 

2003), appeal denied, 843 A.2d 1237 (Pa. 2004), cert. denied, Santiago v. 

Pennsylvania, 542 U.S. 942 (2004). Thus, if the lower court authors a 

1925(a) opinion that addresses an appellant’s issue on appeal, allowing 

meaningful review, we will not find waiver. Commonwealth v. Smith, 955 

A.2d 391, 393 (Pa. Super. 2008); but see Commonwealth v. Lemon, 804 

A.2d 34, 38 (Pa. Super. 2002) (concluding, “when an appellant fails to 

identify in a vague Pa.R.A.P.1925(b) statement the specific issue he/she 
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wants to raise on appeal, the issue is waived, even if the trial court guesses 

correctly and addresses the issue in its Pa.R.A.P.1925(a) opinion”).

Instantly, Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement included the following.

2. [Appellant] was denied the effective 

assistance of counsel as guaranteed by Article 1, § 9 

of the Pennsylvania Constitution and the 6th and 14th

Amendments of the United States Constitution, in 

that [trial counsel] failed to present testimony that 

would offset the weight of evidence offered by 

prosecution when [trial counsel] knew (1) that 

witness existed; (2) that witness was available; (3) 

that counsel was informed of existence of witness or 

should have known of witness’s existence; (4) that 

witness was prepared to cooperate and would have 

testified on [Appellant’s] behalf; and (5) that 

absence of testimony prejudiced [Appellant].

3. The [PCRA c]ourt erred in finding that 

there was no basis upon which to grant relief after 

an evidentiary hearing.

Concise Statement of Matter Complained of on Appeal, 12/12/15, at 1-2.

Turning to Appellant’s first issue on appeal, we cannot overlook the 

complete absence of the issue from Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement. In 

his first issue, Appellant challenges the evidentiary rulings of the PCRA court 

during the PCRA hearing relative to the testimony of Karen Bodle, who 

Appellant proffered as a character witness that trial counsel failed to call. 

Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement in no way suggests a challenge to the 

PCRA court’s evidentiary rulings and the PCRA court addresses those rulings 
J-S22010-16

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only tangentially, hampering our ability to review the issue. Accordingly, we 

deem Appellant’s first issue waived.3 See Hansley, supra.

Dealing next with Appellant’s second issue, we conclude that, although 

it is broadly stated, the issue, that the PCRA court erred in determining the 

failure of trial counsel to call Weigle as a character witness at trial did not 

constitute ineffective assistance of counsel, was fairly suggested by 

Appellant’s 1925(b) statement, and was fully addressed by the PCRA court in 

its June 26, 2015, and September 18, 2015 opinions. Accordingly, we do 

not conclude our review of that issue is hampered, and we decline to find 

waiver. See Smith, supra.

Our review of an order denying PCRA relief is guided by the following. 

Our standard of review of [an] order granting 

or denying relief under the PCRA requires us to 

determine whether the decision of the PCRA court is 

supported by the evidence of record and is free of 

legal error. The PCRA court’s findings will not be 

disturbed unless there is no support for the findings 

in the certified record.

Commonwealth v. Melendez-Negron, 123 A.3d 1087, 1090 (Pa. Super. 

2015) (citation omitted). We review the PCRA court’s legal conclusions de 

____________________________________________

3 The PCRA court discussed in detail its reasons for determining that Karen 

Bodle’s testimony did not establish that she would be a viable character 

witness and for determining that trial counsel did explore the possibility of 

calling her as a witness, but ultimately deferred to Appellant’s decision not to 

do so. PCRA Court Opinion, 6/26/15, at 12-14; PCRA Court Opinion, 

9/18/15, at 2. Thus, even if Appellant’s first issue was not waived, we would 

adopt the PCRA court’s findings and analysis as an alternative basis for 

affirming.
J-S22010-16

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novo. Commonwealth v. Rigg, 84 A.3d 1080, 1084 (Pa. Super. 2014) 

(citation omitted).

In order to obtain relief under the PCRA based on a 

claim of ineffectiveness of counsel, a PCRA petitioner 

must satisfy the performance and prejudice test set 

forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 

104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). In 

Pennsylvania, we have applied the Strickland test 

by requiring a petitioner to establish that: (1) the 

underlying claim has arguable merit; (2) no 

reasonable basis existed for counsel’s action or 

failure to act; and (3) the petitioner suffered 

prejudice as a result of counsel’s error, with 

prejudice measured by whether there is a reasonable 

probability that the result of the proceeding would 

have been different. Commonwealth v. Pierce,

567 Pa. 186, 786 A.2d 203, 213 (2001). Counsel is 

presumed to have rendered effective assistance, 

and, if a claim fails under any required element of 

the Strickland test, the court may dismiss the claim 

on that basis. Commonwealth v. Ali, 608 Pa. 71, 

10 A.3d 282, 291 (2010).

To prevail on a claim that trial counsel was 

ineffective for failing to present a witness, the 

petitioner must prove that: (1) the witness existed; 

(2) counsel was either aware of or should have been 

aware of the witness’s existence; (3) the witness 

was willing and able to cooperate on behalf of the 

defendant; and (4) the proposed testimony was 

necessary to avoid prejudice to the petitioner. 

Commonwealth v. Tharp, 627 Pa. 673, 101 A.3d 

736, 757 (2014).

Commonwealth v. VanDivner, 130 A.3d 676, 680 (Pa. 2015). “A defense 

counsel’s failure to call a particular witness to testify does not constitute 

ineffectiveness per se.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 27 A.3d 244, 247 

(Pa. Super. 2011). At issue is trial counsel’s decision not to call certain 
J-S22010-16

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character witnesses at trial, which implicates the following additional 

considerations.

As a general rule, evidence of a person’s character

may not be admitted to show that individual acted in 

conformity with that character on a particular 

occasion. Pa.R.E. 404(a). However, Pennsylvania 

Rule of Evidence 404(a)(1) provides an exception 

which allows a criminal defendant to offer evidence 

of his or her character traits which are pertinent to 

the crimes charged and allows the Commonwealth to 

rebut the same. Pa.R.E. 404(a)(1). This Court has 

further explained the limited purpose for which this 

evidence can be offered:

It has long been the law in Pennsylvania that 

an individual on trial for an offense against the 

criminal law is permitted to introduce evidence 

of his good reputation in any respect which has 

“proper relation to the subject matter” of the 

charge at issue. Such evidence has been 

allowed on a theory that general reputation 

reflects the character of the individual and a 

defendant in a criminal case is permitted to 

prove his good character in order to negate his 

participation in the offense charged. The 

rationale for the admission of character

testimony is that an accused may not be able 

to produce any other evidence to exculpate 

himself from the charge he faces except his 

own oath and evidence of good character.

It is clearly established that evidence of good 

character is to be regarded as evidence of 

substantive fact just as any other evidence 

tending to establish innocence and may be 

considered by the jury in connection with all of 

the evidence presented in the case on the 

general issue of guilt or innocence. Evidence 

of good character is substantive and positive 

evidence, not a mere make weight to be 

considered in a doubtful case, and, ... is an 

independent factor which may of itself 
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engender reasonable doubt or produce a 

conclusion of innocence. Evidence of good 

character offered by a defendant in a 

criminal prosecution must be limited to 

his general reputation for the particular 

trait or traits of character involved in the 

commission of the crime charged. The 

cross-examination of such witnesses by the 

Commonwealth must be limited to the same 

traits. Such evidence must relate to a period 

at or about the time the offense was 

committed, and must be established by 

testimony of witnesses as to the 

community opinion of the individual in 

question, not through specific acts or 

mere rumor.

Commonwealth v. Luther, 317 Pa.Super. 41, 463 

A.2d 1073, 1077–78 (1983) (citations omitted) 

(emphasis added).

Id. at 247-248.

Instantly, Appellant claims the PCRA court erred in failing to find trial 

counsel was ineffective based on the following. 

[Appellant] asserts that after trial counsel was 

notified that Ronald Weigle could testify at trial as to 

[Appellant’s] good character in the community and 

failed to call him, or any other witness, trial counsel’s 

omission was per se ineffective assistance of counsel 

under Commonwealth v. Hull[, 982 A.2d 1020 (Pa. 

Super. 2009)]. There could have been no legitimate 

purpose for trial counsel’s omission and there was no 

evidence that his alternative strategy offered a 

potential of substantially greater success.

Appellant’s Brief at 13.

The PCRA court, after a full hearing, determined that Appellant failed 

to meet his burden to show ineffective assistance of trial counsel in two 
J-S22010-16

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respects. First, the PCRA court determined that Weigle’s evidence indicated 

he had little relevant knowledge at the time of trial and what he did offer 

would not constitute admissible character evidence as it was based on 

specific acts rather than general community reputation. PCRA Court 

Opinion, 6/26/15, at 14; PCRA Court Opinion, 9/18/15, at 2. Second, the 

PCRA court determined that trial counsel had a reasonable strategy for not 

calling character witnesses, having investigated Appellant’s general 

reputation and discovered negative aspects, which could have been 

presented to the jury by the Commonwealth if the defense opened the door 

by putting character at issue. PCRA Court Opinion, 6/26/15, at 13-14; PCRA 

Court Opinion, 9/18/15, at 2.

After careful review, we conclude that the PCRA court’s June 26, 2015, 

and September 18, 2015 opinions fully set forth Appellant’s claim, identify 

the proper standards of review, discuss the relevant law, and explain the 

bases for its conclusion that Appellant has failed to establish any of the 

Pierce prongs for ineffective assistance of counsel. See VanDivner,

supra. We also conclude the PCRA court correctly determined that 

Appellant’s reliance on Hull is misplaced. PCRA Court Opinion, 6/26/15, at 

13-14. As explained by the PCRA court, the Hull court held it was 

ineffective assistance of counsel to fail to consider offering character 

witnesses on the ground it would open the door for negative reputation 

without at least investigating the defendant’s reputation in the community. 
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Hull, supra at 1025-1026. Instantly, trial counsel did investigate and his 

concerns were based on his investigation not on mere speculation. PCRA 

Court Opinion, 6/26/15, at 14. Accordingly, we adopt the June 26, 2015, 

and September 18, 2015 opinions of the Honorable Richard A. Gray as our 

own for the purposes of our disposition of this appeal.

Based on the foregoing, we conclude the PCRA court committed no 

error or abuse of discretion in dismissing Appellant’s PCRA petition on its 

merits. See Melendez-Negron, supra; VanDivner, supra. Accordingly, 

the PCRA court’s June 26, 2015 order is affirmed.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/20/2016
·-1 

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1 18 Pa. C.S. § 902(a); 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 63 I 8(A); 18 Pa. c.s. § 5903(c)(I ); I 8 Pa. c.s.&2§:-J l~(A)(~; I 8 ~ 

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the third degree, count 5, unlawful communication with a minor, a felony of the third 

obscene and other sexual materials, count 4, obscene and other sexual materials, a felony of 

of the second degree, count 2, criminal solicitation, a felony of the third degree, count 3, 

nine year old girl and a six year old boy as follows: count 1, criminal solicitation, a felony 

charged Bodle at docket no. 2072-2008 with sexual offenses against a nine year old boy, a 

a minor, a misdemeanor of the first degree. 1 On December 10, 2008, the Commonwealth 

indecent assault, a misdemeanor of the first degree; and count 5, corruption of the morals of 

degree; count 3, obscene and other sexual material, a felony of the third degree; count 4, 

solicitation, a felony of the first degree; count 2, unlawful contact, a felony of the first 

five counts of sexual offenses against a seven year old boy as follows: count 1, criminal 

On January 2, 2009 the Commonwealth charged Bodle at docket no. 1997-2008 with 

I. Factual and Procedural Background 

case-law, and for the reasons provided below, the Court DENIES the petition for relief. 

Following an evidentiary hearing and upon consideration of the testimony, arguments and 

Bodle, pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa. C.S. §§ 9541-9546. 

Before the Court is a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief filed by Defendant, Leon 

ORDER 

LEON BODLE, 

v. 

/ 

CR-1997-2008; 

CR- 2072-2008 

CRIMINAL DIVISION. 

PCRA HEARING 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, 

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF LYCOMING COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 

Circulated 03/31/2016 03:00 PM
2 

2 18 Pa. C.S. § 902(a); 18 Pa. C.S. § 5903(c)(l ); I 8 Pa. C.S.A. §63 l 8(A); 18 Pa. C.S. §3127 (A); J 8 Pa. C.S.A. 

§630l(a)(l). 

Court affirmed the judgment of sentence. 

2012, Bodle filed a direct appeal to the Superior Court. On January 8, 2014, the Superior 

November 27, 2012, this Court reinstated Bodle's direct appeal rights. On December 24, 

2012, the court appointed the public defender to represent Bodle in that PCRA matter. On 

first PCRA petition and petition for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. On August 24, 

the appeal for failure to include the relevant transcripts. On August 20, 2012, Bodle filed his 

2011. On July 6, 2012, the Superior Court granted the Commonwealth's motion to dismiss 

Bodle did not file post-sentence motions. Bodle filed a notice of appeal on May 5, 

months and the maximum of which was 484 months. 

aggregate sentence at a State Correctional Institution, the minimum of which was 242 

The Court sentenced Bodle on April 6, 2011. The Court sentenced Bodle to serve an 

counts. 

jury rendered a verdict of guilty on all counts at both docket numbers for a total of 15 

held on December 6-7, 2011, at which the Undersigned presided. On December 7, 2011, the 

The Court consolidated these cases for the purpose of trial. A two-day jury trial was 

degree, and count 10 corruption of minors, a misdemeanor of the first degree.2 

misdemeanor of the first degree, count 9 corruption of minors, a misdemeanor of the first 

count 7 indecent exposure, a misdemeanor of the first degree, count 8 indecent exposure, a 

degree, and count 6, unlawful communication with a minor, a felony of the third degree, 
3 

3 Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 

1988) 

called his nephew, Devan Bodle, and his nephew's girlfriend, Haley Groulx, to testify that 

evidence about the child victims. In addition, Bodle contends trial counsel should have 

should have been called as witnesses to provide positive character evidence and negative 

Specifically, Bodle contends that his mother, Karen Bodle and his uncle, Ronald Weigle, 

relief on the grounds that trial counsel was ineffective for failure to call certain witnesses. 

January 14, 2015, Bodle filed a supplemental PCRA. In his amended PCRA, Boldle seeks 

relevant evidence and trial counsel's strategy with respect to what witnesses were called. On 

January 10, 2015, identifying what the subject witnesses could add to the case that could be 

counsel. PCRA counsel was ordered to file a supplemental amended petition on or before 

matter was continued on November 26, 2014 to allow PCRA counsel to meet with trial 

On November 24, 2014, Bodle filed an amended PCRA. Upon Bodle's motion, the 

the matter was then continued from October 23, 2014 to November 25, 2014. 

matter was continued from August 25, 2014 to October 23, 2014. Upon Bodle's application, 

trial. A conference was scheduled for August 28, 2014. Upon Bodle's application, the 

was also directed to attach certifications concerning any witnesses that were not called at 

preparation of transcripts of jury selection pursuant to the request of Bodle. PCRA counsel 

extension of time to file an amended PCRA petition to August 11, 2014 and directed the 

June 20, 2014. Following an initial conference on July 1, 2014, the court granted an 

directed PCRA counsel to file an amended petition or Turnery/Finley' letter on or before 

2014, the Court appointed Jeffy Lynch, Esq. to represent Bodle in the instant PCRA and 

On February 3, 2014, Bodle filed the instant PCRA petition prose. On April 24, 
4 

4 In his amended PCRA, Bodle contends that an inmate, William Heiser, should have been called to testify that 

one of the Commonwealth's witnesses told Heiser that he intended to fabricate testimony against Bodle. The 

witness certification established that the information Heiser only notified trial counsel on May 6, 2011, well 

over a year after trial. As such, this contention lacks merit. Failure to call a witness requires that "counsel 

knew or should have known of the existence of the witness." Commonwealth v. Walls, 993 A.2d 289, 302 (Pa. 

Super. 2010) quoting, Commonwealth v. Wright, 599 Pa. 270, 331, 961 A.2d 119, 155 (2008) (citations 

omitted). Moreover, since Heiser did not testify at the PCRA hearing and no further argument was raised as to 

Heiser, it appears the issue has been abandoned and waived. 

community as to his character. Karen Bodle's only proffered testimony about specific 

establish that Karen Bodle had personal knowledge of any reputation that Bodle had in the 

Bodle had good character because he cared for his grandfather. There was no foundation to 

Bodle, testified that had she been called and if admissible, she would have testified that 

PCRA hearing but did not provide any testimony as to reputation. Bodle's mother, Karen 

positive character evidence and negative evidence about the child victims testified at the 

The remaining two witnesses that Bodle contends should have been called to provide 

fabrications made by the children. 

the Old Lycoming Police by the children. Neither witness testified to any knowledge of 

Bodle's claims. Both denied any knowledge of supposed false allegations allegedly made to 

PCRA evidentiary hearing, those two witnesses did not provide any testimony in support of 

have been called to testify as to false allegations made by the children. However, at the 

witnesses, Bodle's nephew, Devan Bodle, and his nephew's girlfriend, Haley Groulx, should 

Bodle contends should have been called at his trial. Bodle contends that two of those four 

At the PCRA evidentiary hearing, Bodle presented six witnesses, four of whom 

2014. 

February 4, 2015, an evidentiary hearing was held and testimony was received on March 17, 

the children had made false allegations to police in the past." Following a conference on 
5 

As to the specific witnesses at issue, trial counsel testified as follows. Trial counsel 

was concerned about calling Devan Bodle to testify because Devan Bodle vigorously 

testified for the Commonwealth in the other trial with testimony that would be harmful to 

Bodle. If Devan Bodle testified, damaging information might come in to play by opening 

the door, particularly to evidence relating to evidence in the other trial that had been ruled 

inadmissible in this trial. Nonetheless, trial counsel left the decision about whether to call 

incidents of good acts by Bodle. Similarly, there was no foundation to establish that Karen 

Bodle had personal knowledge of any reputation in the community as to any of the victims' 

reputation for truthfulness or dishonesty. Instead Karen Bodle proffered testimony only as 

to specific instances of dishonesty or bad acts by the child victims. Karen Bodle was 

confused while providing testimony at the PCRA hearing and some of her testimony was 

non-responsive. Bodle's Uncle, Ronald Weigle testified at the PCRA hearing that his 

knowledge of the case was through what others might have said, but that he had no proof. 

Weigle further testified that he did not know more about the case until after the trial. Weigle 

did not provide testimony as to any reputation in the community that Bodle may have had. 

Trial counsel testified at the PCRA hearing about his trial strategy. Trial counsel 

testified that he represented Bodle in two separate trials involving sexual abuse to minors at 

around the same time period. Both trials included similar witnesses and investigations. 

Trial counsel testified that, after reviewing the pros and cons of any witnesses with Bodle, 

trial counsel left the decision of whether to call witnesses up to Bodle. Trial counsel testified 

that in his experience juries do not put a lot of weight into character evidence provided by 

the mother, close relatives, or friends of a defendant. 
6 

As to Ronald Weigle, trial counsel testified that Weigle could not give specifics and 

relied on hearsay. Even if admissible, such evidence may open the door to evidence that had 

already been determined inadmissible. 

Overall, trial counsel had significant concerns that if the defense called character 

witnesses, the Commonwealth would call witnesses in rebuttal. The investigation revealed 

that there were neighbors who were hostile to Bodle and could be called to rebut any 

positive character evidence with bad character evidence. Similarly, some individuals at the 

school where Bodle worked had a bad opinion of Bodle and there was concern they could be 

As to Defendant's mother, Karen Bodle, trial counsel had extensive contact with her 

and had concerns that she could be easily confused. She was very shaky physically. Trial 

counsel discussed with the Bodle how well his mother may or may not do on the stand, what 

harm she could do to Bodle' s case if she appeared confused, against the benefit and weight 

of any favorable testimony coming from a victim's mother. As to whether his mother 

should testify as to a specific incident of good character, if admissible, trial counsel had 

concerns about introducing evidence of good character which opens the door to significantly 

harmful evidence. The ultimate decision of whether to call his mother as a witness was left 

to Bodle. 

Devan Bodle to Bodle. Trial counsel also had concerns that Haley Groulx's testimony. 

Trial counsel believed Groulx's testimony to be based upon hearsay and would not establish 

reputation. Even if admissible, trial counsel was not convinced that Bodle could prove that 

the supposed allegations made by the children were indeed false. Trial counsel testified that 

he left the decision as to which witnesses to call to the defendant Bodle. 
7 

5 In his amended PCRA, Bodle identified other issues but appeared to abandon those claims as being without 

merit. Bodle asserted an issue related to exculpatory evidence and the change in time-line that had been 

adjudicated during the appeal process. This Court has independently reviewed such claims and agrees that 

they have been adjudicated through the appeal process. Bodle also contended that trial counsel failed to ask 

potential jurors whether they could render a fair verdict if Defendant elected not to testify, but his petition 

appears to have abandoned this claim because trial counsel asked whether anyone feels that could not be fair 

and impartial and because the trial court provided sufficient instruction to the jury as to that matter. Lastly, 

PCRA counsel appears to have abandoned the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to formally 

seek recusal of the Court because one of the victims' mother worked at the courthouse. The matter had been 

visited prior to trial and there was no evidence of prejudice. After conducting an independent review of those 

issues, the Court finds that those issues lack merit and were waived. 

Super. 2009) requiring a new trial no matter the circumstances. 

5 

per se ineffective under Commonwealth v Hull, 2009 PA Super 201; 982 A.2d 1020 ( Pa. 

character and dishonesty. Bodle appears to contend that failure to call character witnesses is 

defendant's alleged good character and witnesses as to the child victim's alleged bad 

C.S. § 954(a)(2)(i) and (ii) on the grounds that trial counsel failed to call witnesses as to 

In essence, Bodle's amended petition asserts eligibility for relief pursuant to 42 Pa. 

II. Issues Raised 

(N.T.), 12/7/2010, 22-23. 

informed the Court that the defense had no additional testimony. Notes of Testimony 

out, however, Bodle was colloquied as to his decision not to testify after trial counsel had 

understanding that others would be testifying on his behalf. As the Commonwealth pointed 

his decision not to testify on his own behalf at trial was made in reliance of his 

Although not raised in his amended PCRA, Bodle testified at his PCRA hearing that 

decision. 

determination of each witness; even if it is against his advice, he abides by the client's 

called as adverse witnesses. Trial counsel nonetheless allowed the client to make the 
* 

8 

183 (Pa. 2010). In order to succeed on a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, 

Trial counsel is presumed to be effective. Commonwealth v. Martin, 5 A.3d 177, 

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

IV. Legal Standards 

(3) That the allegation of en-or has not been previously litigated or 

waived. 

( 4) That the failure to litigate the issue prior to or during trial, during 

unitary review or on direct appeal could not have been the result of 

any rational, strategic or tactical decision by counsel. Id. 

* * * * * * * * * * 

(2) That the conviction or sentence resulted from one or more of the 

following: 

(i) A violation of the Constitution ofthis Commonwealth or the 

Constitution or laws of the United States which, in the 

circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truthdetermining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or 

innocence could have taken place. 

(ii) Ineffective assistance of counsel which, in the circumstances 

of the particular case, so undermined the truth-determining 

process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence 

could have taken place. 

(iii) A plea of guilty unlawfully induced where the circumstances 

make it likely that the inducement caused the petitioner to 

plead guilty and the petitioner is innocent. 

section 9543(a) also lists three (3) other eligibility requirements; these requirements include: 

uncontested that Defendant is currently serving a state sentence of incarceration. However, 

Defendant must be convicted and serving a sentence of incarceration. Id. In this matter, it is 

42 Pa. C.S. § 9543. Section 9543(a) provides that in order to be eligible for relief, a 

The PCRA provides specific requirements for eligibility for post-conviction relief. 

III. Eligibility for Post-Conviction Relief 
9 

Wright, 599 Pa. 270, 331, 961 A.2d 119, 155 (2008) (citations omitted) 

In order to prevail on a claim of ineffectiveness for failing to call a witness, a 

defendant must prove, in addition to meeting the three Pierce 10 requirements, that: 

(1) the witness existed; (2) the witness was available to testify for the defense; (3) 

counsel knew or should have known of the existence of the witness; (4) the witness 

was willing to testify for the defense; and (5) the absence of the witness's testimony 

was so prejudicial as to have denied him a fair trial. 

Commonwealth v. Walls, 993 A.2d 289, 302 (Pa. Super. 2010) quoting, Commonwealth v. 

settled. 

The standard for ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to call a witness is wellFailure to Call a Witness 

1994)). 

Sampson, 900 A.2d at 890 ( citing Commonwealth v. Howard, 645 A.2d 1300, 1307 (Pa. 

so evasive that it is reasonable it had an adverse impact on the proceeding's outcome. 

2003)). Actual prejudice must occur; that is, trial counsel's ineffectiveness must have been 

A.2d 1102 (Pa. 2006) (citing Commonwealth v. Lynch, 820 A.2d 728, 733 (Pa. Super. 

Commonwealth v. Sampson, 900 A.2d 887, 890 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006), appeal denied, 907 

(referencing Commonwealth v. Pierce, 527 A.2d 973, 975-76 (Pa. 1987)). See also 

counsel prejudiced Defendant. Commonwealth v. Chimel, 1 111, 1 127 (Pa. 201 1) 

counsel had no reasonable basis for her action or inaction, and (3) the performance of trial 

following three factors, that: (1) Defendant's underlying claim has arguable merit, (2) trial 

Defendant must overcome the presumption of counsel effectiveness by proving the 
10 

To succeed in an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, trial counsel must not have 

had a reasonable basis for the act or omission at issue. Chmiel, supra, 30 A.3d at 1127. 

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has concluded that "counsel's chosen strategy lacked a 

reasonable basis only if the petitioner proves that the alternative strategy not selected offered 

a potential for success substantially greater than the course actually pursued. 

Commonwealth v. Koehler, 614 Pa. 159, 36 A.3d 121, 132 (Pa. 2012)(emphasis added). 

Reasonable Basis for Trial Strategy 

"Evidence of good character is to be regarded as evidence of substantive fact just as 

any other evidence tending to establish innocence and may be considered by the jury in 

connection with all the evidence presented in the case on the general issue of guilt or 

innocence." Commonwealth v Hull, 2009 PA Super 201; 982 A.2d 1020 (Pa. Super. 2009), 

citing, Commonwealth v. Harris, 2001 PA Super 291, 785 A.2d 998, 1000 (Pa. Super. 

2001) (citing Commonwealth v. Luther, 317 Pa. Super. 41, 463 A.2d 1073, 1077 (Pa. Super. 

1983)). See Also, Commonwealth v. Johnson, 27 A.3d 244, 248 (Pa. Super. 2011). 

However, "[ e Jvidence of good character offered by a defendant in a criminal prosecution 

must be limited to his general reputation for the particular trait or traits of character 

involved in the commission of the crime charged." Commonwealth v. Johnson, 27 A.3d 

244, 248 (Pa. Super. 2011) ( emphasis added). The evidence must be "as to the community 

opinion of the individual in question, not through specific acts or mere rumor." Id., 

Commonwealth v. Luther, supra, 463 A.2d at 1077. (citations omitted)(emphasis added) 

Character Evidence 
11 

The first factor requires that Bodle show that there is arguable merit to the claim that 

trial counsel should have called the witnesses. In this case, there is no arguable merit that 

trial counsel should have called the witnesses. Generally, the failure to call provide positive 

Bodle has not overcome the presumption of counsel effectiveness by proving all, or 

even one, of the three factors required. A claim of ineffectiveness will be denied when 

defendant fails to establish any one of the three factors. Busanet, supra, 54 A.3d at 45. 

Bodle has not proven any of the required factors. 

V. Discussion 

"Prejudice in the context of ineffective assistance of counsel means demonstrating 

there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's error, the outcome of the proceeding 

would have been different." Commonwealth v. Champney, 65 A.3d 386, 396 (Pa. 2013), 

citing, Commonwealth v. Kimball, 555 Pa. 299, 724 A.2d 326, 332 (Pa. 1999). 

With these standards in mind, the Court will address Mr. Bodle's PCRA claims. 

Prejudice 

"Where matters of strategy and tactics are concerned, counsel's assistance is deemed 

constitutionally effective if he chose a particular course that had some reasonable basis 

designed to effectuate his client's interests." Commonwealth v. Colavita, 606 Pa. 1, 993 A.2d 

874, 887 (Pa. 2010) (quoting Commonwealth v. Howard, 553 Pa. 266, 719 A.2d 233, 237 

(Pa. 1998)). 11A finding that a chosen strategy lacked a reasonable basis is not warranted 

unless it can be concluded that an alternative not chosen offered a potential for success 

substantially greater than the course actually pursued." Id. 
12 

character evidence and negative character evidence about victims, particularly with respect 

to dishonesty, would have arguable merit. See, e.g., Hull, supra, Harris, supra, and Luther, 

supra. In the present case, however, none of the witnesses testified as to the reputation in 

the community of a character trait for Bodle or any of the child victims. 

Moreover, the Court had the opportunity to hear and observe the witnesses testify as 

they would have if called at trial. This Court presided over the two-day trial and was able to 

observe the atmosphere at trial. After hearing the testimony at the PCRA hearing, the Court 

concludes that there was no error in not calling these witnesses. Devan Bodle and Haley 

Groulx had no knowledge of the supposed false allegations to police that a child victim was 

alleged to have made. Bodle's mother and uncle appeared frail, easily confused and eager to 

help Bodle, such that their lack of helpful testimony was all the more harmful. These 

witnesses would have harmed Bodle's case, even in the absence of rebuttal evidence that 

trial counsel anticipated would be elicited from the Commonwealth in response. 

Bodle also failed to prove the second factor which requires that trial counsel had no 

reasonable basis for not calling the witnesses. Trial counsel testified at the PCRA 

evidentiary hearing as to his trial strategy. The Court found trial counsel extremely credible 

and his strategy with respect to presentation of witnesses reasonable. Trial counsel weighed 

the possible benefits that might come from calling Bodle's mother and nephew against the 

possibility that they may become confused, garner little weight as family members, and the 

likelihood that such testimony would open the door to neighbors and co-workers providing 

adverse character evidence. Trial counsel advised Bodle of the pros and cons of each 

witness and allowed Bodle to make the final determination as to whether to call the witness. 
13 

6 In affirmance, the Superior Court noted that since the PCRA court observed the atmosphere of the trial, it 

must "determine whether the PCRA court's observations are supported by the record, and whether those 

observations support the result reached by the court." Hull, supra, 982 A.2d at 1027. The same is true in the 

present case. 

negative evidence" in rebuttal. Hull, supra, 982 A.2d at 1025. Specifically, the Court 

elicited. Trial counsel had "no reasonable expectation that any of the witnesses would have 

testimony. However, trial counsel was not aware of any adverse evidence that could be 

examined regarding the character evidence, the Commonwealth would elicit adverse 

character witnesses." Id. Trial counsel was afraid that when the Commonwealth crossnot fear "based on any particular concern he learned of in the course of investigating the 

The Superior Court specifically noted that trial counsel had a broad-based fear, and 

[C]ounsel lacked a reasonable basis for failing to call good character witnesses based 

on his overall trial strategy to show that the children were lying. Specifically, we 

hold that trial counsel may not state a broad concern that opposing counsel might 

introduce bad character evidence on cross-examination without having conducted 

any kind of investigation to determine if, in fact, there exists bad-character evidence. 

Hull, supra, 982 A.2d at 1021. 

following. 

counsel's failure to investigate and present character evidence. 6 The Hull Court held the 

affirmed the PCRA Court's determination that granted a new trial on the basis of trial 

evidence when there was no other testimony in the case-in-chief. In Hull, the Superior Court 

forgo character evidence in this case because there was no risk to presenting character 

Bodle relies on Hull for the proposition that there is no reasonable trial strategy to 

not calling the witnesses. 

The Court agrees. The Court concludes that trial counsel had a reasonable trial strategy for 

Trial counsel opined that more harm than good would come from calling these witnesses. 
14 

As to the third prong, the Court concludes that the failure to call the witnesses did 

not prejudice Bodle. To the contrary, the Court concludes that the witnesses would have 

harmed Bodle's case. There was no prejudice from failing to call them. This is particularly 

By contrast in the present case, trial counsel's investigation revealed hostile 

neighbors and co-workers with a bad opinion about Bodle who may be called to rebut 

character evidence. Trial counsel was reasonably concerned that the door to inadmissible 

evidence from another trial would be opened by these witnesses. One of the witnesses had 

testified vigorously for the Commonwealth in the other trial against Bode. In the present 

case, trial counsel had specific concerns about presenting the evidence. Hull does not 

require trial counsel to present character evidence every time a defendant does not present 

much evidence in his case-in chief and there is also an issue as to credibility of witnesses. 

Hull specifically considered whether "counsel had reason to believe that any negative 

consequences would outweigh this positive aspect." Hull, supra, 982 A.2d at 1024. In the 

present case, trial counsel credibly testified that he weighed the pros and cons of each 

witness and left the ultimate decision of whether to call the witness up to Bodle. Moreover, 

none of the proffered testimony constituted character evidence but instead referred to the 

witnesses' personal opinion of character and/or specific acts rather than reputation in the 

community. 

concluded that "counsel may not justify his failure to present good-character evidence by 

citing a broad concern that opposing counsel might introduce bad-character evidence on 

cross-examination without having investigated whether that concern is based in reality." 

Hull, supra, 982 A.2d at 1027. 
15 

ORDER 

AND NOW, this 26111 day of June 2015, Defendant is hereby notified that it is the 

Court's intention to dismiss his PCRA Petition, unless he files an objection to that dismissal 

within twenty days (20) of today's date. This Opinion and Order will be served on 

Defendant as set forth in Pa.R.Crim.P. 908(E). 

If the Notice of Appeal is not filed in the Clerk of Courts' office within the thirty (30) 

day time period, Defendant may lose forever his right to raise these issues. A copy of this 

order shall be mailed to Defendant by regular and certified mail, return receipt requested. 

Based upon the foregoing, the Court finds no basis upon which to grant the Bodle's 

PCRA Petition. After an evidentiary hearing, the petition is dismissed. 

Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure 908, Defendant is hereby 

notified that he has the right to appeal from this order to the Pennsylvania Superior Court. 

The appeal is initiated by the filing of a Notice of Appeal with the Clerk of Courts at the 

county courthouse, with notice to the trial judge, the court reporter and the prosecutor. The 

Notice of Appeal shall be in the form and contents as set forth in Rule 904 of the Rules of 

Appellate Procedure. The Notice of Appeal shall be filed within thirty (30) days after the 

entry of the order from which the appeal is taken. Pa.R.A.P. 903. 

VI. Conclusion 

true since none of the testimony went to reputation evidence, and thus would have been 

inadmissible as specific acts of good and bad character. The Court finds that the evidence 

against Bodle was so overwhelming that the outcome would not have been different had any 

of the witnesses been called. 
1 

I This Court believes that the concise statement is too vague for meaningful review as it implicates the entirety of 

this Court's ultimate decision on the issues raised in the petition without specifying any specific legal conclusion or 

factual finding that was in error. "When the trial court has to guess what issues an appellant is appealing, that is not 

enough for meaningful review." Commonwealth v. Dowling, 2001 PA Super 166, 778 A.2d 683, 686 (Pa. Super. 

2001) Issues raised in an overly broad and vague concise statement are waived as being the "functional equivalent" 

of not being raised at all. See, e.g., Hess v. Fox Rothschild. LLP, 2007 PA Super 133, 925 A.2d 798 (Pa. Super. 

2007)( citations omitted). 

dated, June 26, 2015, in support of its request for the affirmance. Since the transcript was not 

In the absence of a specific error, 1 this Court respectfully relies upon it previous opinion 

The court erred in finding that there was no basis upon which to grant relief after an 

evidentiary hearing. 

Defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel as guaranteed by Article 1, § 9 

of the Pennsylvania constitution and the 6th and 141h Amendments of the United States 

Constitution, in that Attorney Protasio failed to present testimony that would offset the 

weight of the evidenced offered by prosecution when Attorney Protasio knew (1) that 

witness existed; (2) that witness was available; (3) that counsel was informed of existence 

of witness or would have known of witness's existence; (4) that witness was prepared to 

cooperate and would have testified on defendant's behalf; and (5) that absence of 

testimony prejudiced defendant. 

statement of matters complained of on appeal, Mr. Bodle provided the following. 

petition can be found in the opinion and order entered on June 26, 2015. In his concise 

following a full evidentiary hearing. The reasons for the court's decision to dismiss the PCRA 

Appellate Procedure 1925(a). This is an appeal from the denial of Mr. Bodle's PCRA petition 

OPINION AND ORDER 

Issued Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(a) 

..• This Court issues the following Opinion and Order pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of 

Defendant. PCRA APPEAL/ 1925 (a) 

LEON BODLE, 

vs. 

Plaintiff, 

1234 MDA 2015 , 

/ 

CR:. 1997-2008; 2072-2008 

OTN: K 735906-3; K 735914-4 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, 

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF LYCOMING COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 

Circulated 03/31/2016 03:00 PM
2 

The remaining witness that Bodle claims should have been called is his mother, Karen 

Bodle. However, Bodle did not establish that his mother could provide any relevant admissible 

testimony. The proposed testimony from Bodle's mother was that Bodle had allegedly never 

been in trouble before, N. T. 51 : 12-13, and that Bodle' s character was good because he cared for 

his grandfather. N.T. 51 :4-5. There was no foundation to establish that Bodle's mother had 

personal knowledge of any reputation in the community as to Bodle's character. N.T. 56:24; 

57:2-3, 21-23; 58:1. 

Moreover, even if there had been some admissible testimony as to character, the decision 

about whether to call witnesses, and more specifically as to whether to call Mr. Bodle's mother, 

was ultimately made by Mr. Bodle after consultation with his trial attorney. Trial Counsel 

testified that he discussed with Bodle whether to call his mother, and was concerned that she 

appeared easily confused. N.T. 22:4-7. Trial Counsel did not believe the defense could establish 

a general reputation of the victim being untruthful, N.T. 30:10-12, or establish what the kids' 

transcribed at the time of the opinion, this Court submits the following transcript references to 

supplement that opinion 

As this Court noted in its opinion, there is no arguable merit that trial counsel should 

have called the 4 witnesses at issue, counsel had a reasonable basis for not calling them and 

Bodle suffered no prejudice from the failure to call them. Two of the four proposed witnesses 

essentially testified that they had no knowledge about the information sought. Notes of 

Testimony, hearing on March 17, 2015, (N.T.) 47:20; 48:19-21; 64: 17-24; 65: 11. The third 

witness, Bodle's Uncle, Ronald Weigle, essentially admitted that he did not know much at the 

time of trial and what he did know, was something others had said, but which he could not prove. 

61 :16-19. 
3 

cc: District Attorney's Office (KO) 

Gerald E. Lynch, Esq. (PCRA Counsel for Defendant) 

Leon D. Bodle, JV-4596 

SCI Houtzdale 

P.O. Box 1000 

Houtzdale, PA 16698-1000 

(Superior & 1) 

A. Gray, J. 

September 17, 2015 

Date 

~COURT, 

/\ 

Jabove references to the record, this Court respectfully requests that its judgment be affirmed. 

For the reasons stated in this Court opinion dated June 26, 2015, as supplemented by the 

nonetheless allowed the client to decide whether to call each witness. N.T. 40. 

could potentially testify to bad character on the part of the defendant. N.T. 36-40. Trial counsel 

revealed that neighbors, teachers, others at the school had a "very bad opinion" of Mr. Bodle and 

criminal trial that would otherwise be inadmissible. N.T. 25-27; 36-40. An investigation 

examine witnesses in rebuttal, and that it might have opened the door to evidence from the other 

that if the defense called character witnesses, the Commonwealth would call witnesses and crossEven if there had been character evidence available, trial counsel had significant concerns 

Ultimately, as I usually do in almost every case -in fact I can't remember one where I 

wouldn't have - the ultimate decision is up to the client whether we call a witness. I 

explained to him the pros and cons and my opinion as to how well she [Bodle's mother] 

would do or not do and it was his decision not to have called her .... Ultimately that 

would have been his [Bodle's] decision. N.T. 22-23. 

decision about whether to call his mother was made by Bodle. 

reputations in the community were. N.T. 31: 18-21. Nonetheless, Trial counsel testified that the