IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 13-1824

Filed November 26, 2014

STATE OF IOWA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

BILLY TRUE BENEDICT,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Madison County, Paul R. Huscher, 

Judge. 

A defendant asks to be resentenced on his conviction for possession of 

methamphetamine, second offense. AFFIRMED.

Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Nan Jennisch, Assistant 

Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Mary A. Triick, Assistant Attorney 

General, and Julie Forsyth, County Attorney, for appellee.

Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Doyle and Tabor, JJ.
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TABOR, J.

Billy True Benedict claims he received ineffective assistance of counsel at 

his sentencing hearing because his attorney did not object to the State’s alleged 

breach of the plea agreement. Because the State honored the agreement 

recited at the plea hearing, we affirm.

During the execution of a search warrant at a Winterset residence in 

March 2013, police discovered Benedict in possession of a baggie containing 

methamphetamine and a pipe used to smoke the controlled substance. In April 

2013, the State charged Benedict by trial information with possession of 

methamphetamine, second offense, an aggravated misdemeanor, in violation of 

Iowa Code section 124.401(5) (2013). 

The Madison County Attorney engaged in a series of plea negotiations 

with Benedict. Benedict’s counsel made a record concerning the last two plea 

offers rejected by his client; those offers included resolution of not just the current 

drug charge, but other pending charges of theft and criminal mischief. Defense 

counsel asked the prosecutor on September 10, 2013, the morning of trial, if the 

earlier plea offers were still on the table. At that point, the prosecutor limited the 

plea offer to the methamphetamine possession charge. 

Off the record, Benedict and his counsel discussed the possibility of 

accepting the State’s plea offer rather than going forward with the trial. After that 

discussion, defense counsel stated on the record his client was willing to enter a 

guilty plea to the charge of possession of methamphetamine, second offense, 

“and then we would ask that a PSI [presentence investigation report] be done 
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and we be free to argue sentencing.” The county attorney told the court that 

agreement was acceptable to the State. 

The court then started to step through the plea colloquy with Benedict, 

determining he was thirty-three years old and understood the charge against him. 

Before Benedict entered his guilty plea, the county attorney expressed her desire 

to clarify the terms of the plea agreement. 

[The State]: Your Honor, I believe the State needs to set 

forth what the plea agreement is so that all parties understand.

THE COURT: Very well. You may do so.

[The State]: Your Honor, the offer that was made, and my 

understanding is that Mr. Benedict has accepted, is that he would 

plead guilty as charged in this Trial Information. There is no 

agreement as to sentencing. A Presentence Investigation will be 

ordered, and the parties are free to argue whatever sentence that 

they would like to have imposed.

THE COURT: Is that agreeable?

[Defense Counsel]: That is agreeable, and that is my 

understanding of the plea agreement.

THE COURT: Is that agreeable with you?

[Benedict]: Yeah.

THE COURT: Okay. Is there anything, Mr. Benedict, you 

don’t understand about the plea agreement as it stands now?

[Benedict]: Everything’s clear.

The court resumed the plea colloquy, during which Benedict admitted 

possessing methamphetamine on March 21, 2013, and also admitted a previous 

drug conviction. The court accepted his guilty plea. 

Benedict appeared for sentencing on November 12, 2013. The State 

asked the court to adopt the sentencing recommendation set forth in the PSI, 

namely a two-year prison term. Defense counsel argued for one year of

probation, telling the court: “I think probation actually would be a greater 

punishment for Mr. Benedict than prison. Mr. Benedict has been in prison 
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before. In fact, when he entered the plea to this, he had informed me that he 

probably would prefer prison over probation.” Benedict personally spoke to the 

court, confirming what his attorney had said: “[I]t’s probably going to be more of a 

challenge on probation than just going and sitting in prison doing nothing.” But 

Benedict explained because of his family situation, he was asking to be placed 

on probation.

Citing Benedict’s criminal history and prior unsuccessful probationary 

terms, the district court determined incarceration was the appropriate sentence. 

The court sentenced Benedict to an indeterminate two-year prison term.

Benedict now argues his counsel provided ineffective assistance at the 

sentencing hearing by failing to object to the State’s recommendation of a twoyear prison term instead of a two-year suspended sentence and one year of

probation.

Because they invoke constitutional rights, we review claims of ineffective

assistance of counsel de novo. See State v. Finney, 834 N.W.2d 46, 49 (Iowa 

2013). “To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant 

must prove that his counsel failed to perform an essential duty and that the 

defendant suffered prejudice as a result of this failure.” State v. Horness, 600 

N.W.2d 294, 298 (Iowa 1999). 

The State must comply with both the letter and the spirit of a plea 

agreement. Id. at 296. If the State breaches a plea agreement, counsel has a 

duty to object because “only by objecting could counsel ensure that the 

defendant received the benefit of the agreement.” Id. Defense counsel’s 
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objection would lead to a different outcome—sufficient to show prejudice—

because it would alert “the court to correct the taint by allowing the defendant to 

withdraw the plea or by scheduling a new sentencing hearing with a prosecutor 

who will make the promised recommendation.” State v. Bearse, 748 N.W.2d 

211, 218 (Iowa 2008). 

On appeal, Benedict argues the two discussions at the plea hearing must 

be “read together” and, if we do so, we will find the State agreed to recommend a 

two-year suspended sentence and one-year probation as part of the final plea 

agreement. Benedict recognizes “there was talk that the parties would argue 

sentencing and that there was no agreed upon sentence,” but he contends those 

statements “most likely meant that the defense was going to request a lesser 

sentence than the State.” Benedict claims he received little benefit from entering 

a plea to “the maximum offense in return for the State’s recommendation of the 

maximum sentence. He might as well have gone to trial and taken his chances.”

The State acknowledges “some confusing and possibly contradictory 

statements” regarding the plea offer available to Benedict made during the 

pretrial hearing which turned into a plea proceeding. But the State points out the 

county attorney, “in an effort to make things abundantly clear,” took the 

opportunity before Benedict entered his plea to articulate the express terms of 

the offer. Specifically, the county attorney stated Benedict “would plead guilty as 

charged in this Trial Information. There is no agreement as to sentencing. A 

presentence investigation will be ordered, and the parties are free to argue 

whatever sentence that they would like to have imposed.” 
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Both counsel and Benedict himself acknowledged the county attorney’s 

recitation reflected their understanding of the plea agreement. When asked by 

the district court if there was anything he did not understand about the plea 

agreement “as it stands now,” Benedict responded: “Everything’s clear.” Having 

said the final plea offer was clear to him, Benedict cannot now fault counsel for 

not attempting to resurrect terms of a plea offer the State had taken off of the 

table. The final plea agreement contemplated the parties were free to argue 

whatever sentence they believed appropriate. Accordingly, the State’s 

sentencing recommendation of a two-year prison sentence, in accord with the 

PSI report, did not breach its agreement with Benedict. Benedict’s counsel had 

no cause to object at sentencing and did not perform below constitutional 

standards. See State v. Reynolds, 670 N.W.2d 405, 411 (Iowa 2003) (holding 

trial counsel cannot be held ineffective for failing to raise meritless issue).

In response to Benedict’s argument that the final plea offer was of little 

benefit, the State contends Benedict may have accepted it because he was 

actually “anticipating requesting a term of incarceration over probation.” Benedict 

and his counsel both told the sentencing court that probation could be viewed as 

a more onerous punishment for him than prison. But whatever Benedict’s 

motivation for accepting the plea offer; he fails to show his attorney breached an 

essential duty by not objecting to the State’s sentencing recommendation.

AFFIRMED.