alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule

47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 96-60283

Summary Calendar

 

BRYCE DALLAS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

TOMMY JACKSON, Individually and Officially, ET AL.,

 Defendants,

TOMMY JACKSON, Individually and Officially,

Defendant-Appellee.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

BRYCE DALLAS,

 Plaintiff,

versus

KENNETH MCLENDON ET AL.,

 Defendants.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Mississippi

USDC No. 3:93-CV-178-WS

- - - - - - - - - -

June 12, 1997

Before JONES, DeMOSS and PARKER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Bryce Dallas has appealed the district court’s summary
No. 96-60283

- 2 -

judgment dismissing his civil rights claims against Tommy 

Jackson. As his appellate brief, Dallas has presented only a

photocopy of a combined cross-motion for summary judgment and

response to Jackson’s summary-judgment motion, which Dallas filed

in the district court. By failing to identify or brief any

appellate issue, Dallas has in effect abandoned any issues he may

have raised on appeal, relative to the findings and conclusions

which the district court stated in granting summary judgment to

Jackson and in denying Dallas’s said motion. See Al-Ra’id v.

Ingle, 69 F.3d 28, 31, 33 (5th Cir. 1995); Weaver v. Puckett, 896

F.2d 126, 128 (5th Cir. 1990). 

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
#### UNITED STATES of America, v. William VASQUEZ, Defendant.

United States District Court S. D. New York.

Feb. 21, 1958.

Paul W. Williams, U. S. Atty., S. D. New York, New York City, James R. Lunney, Asst. U. S. Atty., New York City, of counsel, for the United States.

Theodore Krieger, New York City, for defendant.

WEINFELD, District Judge.

The defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment or in the alternative granting an inspection of the Grand Jury minutes because of failure to proceed with the hearing of the complaint before the United States Commissioner, is denied. There is no requirement that having initiated the prosecution by means of a complaint pursuant to Rule 5 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Government must proceed with the hearing before presenting evidence to the Grand Jury.

The defendant’s motion for a bill of particulars is granted to the following extent.

1. Set forth the date when it is alleged the defendant committed the crime charged.

2. Set forth the place where it is alleged defendant committed the crime charged.

3. State the name of the person or persons to whom it will be claimed the defendant sold or transferred the narcotic drug.

4. Whether such person or persons were at the time of the alleged sale or transfer directly or indirectly in the employ of the Government.

5. Whether such person or persons were acting at the instance of the Government at the time of the alleged sale or transfer.

Cf. United States of America v. Wing et al., No. C 154-309, decided February 4, 1958; Roviaro v. U. S., 353 U.S. 53, 77 S.Ct. 623, 1 L.Ed.2d 639.
_______________________________________ __ Michigan Supreme Court 

# Order

Lansing, Michigan

September 21, 2007 Clifford W. Taylor, Chief Justice
133590 Michael F. Cavanagh Elizabeth A. Weaver Marilyn Kelly Maura D. Corrigan PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman, Justices

v SC: 133590 COA: 272091 Monroe CC: 06-035205-AR 1 st Judicial DC: 05-07924-FY GARY ALLEN GROESBECK, Defendant-Appellant.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the application fo r leave to appeal th e February 9, 2007 order of the Court of Appeals is consid ered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court.

p0914 I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

September 21, 2007

Clerk
CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY

#### Artitech, Inc. v. Kaled Naser et al.

February 19, 2008

Case No. CL07-5431

By Judge Robert w. Wooldridge, Jr.

This matter came before me on the demurrer of Defendant James DeBoer, Trustee, and the demurrer of Defendants Kaled Naser and Tamara Shukri. Upon argument of counsel, I took the demurrers under advisement.

The demurrers are sustained on the grounds that the memorandum of mechanic’s lien at issue fails to comply with the requirements of §§ 43-4 and 43-5 of the Code of Virginia as to the affidavit that must accompany the lien. No inaccuracy in a lien memorandum or in the description of the property to be covered by the lien invalidates the lien if the property at issue can reasonably be identified and the memorandum conforms substantially to certain statutory requirements. Va. Code § 43-15 (2002 Repl. Vol.). However, the memorandum here fails to substantially conform. The memorandum is required to be “verified by the oath of the claimant, or his agent.” Va. Code § 43-4 (2002 Repl. Vol.). Here the claimant, a corporation,1 is also listed as the agent. The affidavit wholly fails to identify the capacity of the person executing the document on behalf of the complainant or the agent, or that such *40person is indeed an agent for the complainant. *See Clement v. Adams Bros.Paynes Co.,*113 Va. 547, 75 S.E. 294 (1912). As the claimant is a corporation, its oath must be verified by its agent. There is no indication that the person making the oath possesses any such authority. No corporate title or position of the affiant is noted. Such deficiencies are not remedied, nor is the memorandum saved, by § 43-15 of the Va. Code.

Plaintiff filed an Amended Statement of Account and Affidavit with this Court on November 30, 2007. That filing cannot timely replace an affidavit accompanying a memorandum of lien filed over a year before.

The remaining grounds of the demurrers are overruled.

For the above reasons, the demurrers are sustained. As enforcement of the memorandum of mechanic’s lien is the only count of the complaint, the complaint is dismissed with prejudice.

1

 Both the memorandum and the affidavit list the claimant as “Artitech, Inc., Ardeshir Sahebi.” The affidavit lists the agent as Artitech, Inc. Counsel for the plaintiff acknowledges that the claimant is really Artitech, Inc., a corporation.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DANIEL VERDUZCO, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

C. E. DUCART; et al., 

Defendants-Appellees, 

and 

G. KIMBREL, 

Defendant.

No. 20-17100 

D.C. No. 4:18-cv-04596-JSW 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Jeffrey S. White, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted December 14, 2021**

Before: WALLACE, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.

California state prisoner Daniel Verduzco appeals pro se from the district 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

DEC 16 2021

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 20-17100 

court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging deliberate 

indifference to his health and safety. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 

We review de novo. Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004). We 

affirm. 

The district court properly granted summary judgment because Verduzco 

failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants were 

deliberately indifferent to his health in treating his July 27, 2016 tongue injury or 

to his safely on August 17, 2016. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 

(1994) (a prison official is deliberately indifferent only if he or she “knows of and 

disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be 

aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of 

serious harm exists, and he [or she] must also draw the inference”). 

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Verduzco’s motion 

to compel defendants to provide a copy of his deposition transcript. See Sopcak v. 

N. Mountain Helicopter Serv., 52 F.3d 817, 818 (9th Cir. 1995) (standard of 

review); Tedder v. Odel, 890 F.2d 210, 211-12 (9th Cir. 1989) (expenditure of 

public funds on indigent litigants’ discovery fees not authorized by Congress).

AFFIRMED.
Opinion issued November 25, 2014

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The 

First District of Texas 

————————————

NO. 01-14-00879-CV

———————————

IN RE TRACY M. GIBBS, Relator

Original Proceeding on Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Relator, Tracy M. Gibbs, has filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus.* We 

deny the petition.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Bland and Huddle.

 

*

The underlying case is In the Interest of [C.M.G.], cause number 2001-25797, 

pending in the 257th District Court of Harris County, Texas, the Hon. Judy Warne

presiding.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM (A) THE
CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 1996 AND THE CONSOLIDATED
STATEMENT OF OPERATIONS FOR THE NINE MONTHS ENDED SEPT. 30, 1996 AND IS
QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH (B) FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
INCLUDED IN ITS FORM 10-QSB FOR THE PERIOD ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 1996.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1996
<CASH>                                       4,226,533
<SECURITIES>                                 4,922,067
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             9,280,441
<PP&E>                                         221,210
<DEPRECIATION>                                 111,570
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               9,955,789
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          660,796
<BONDS>                                      2,000,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        54,142
<OTHER-SE>                                   7,240,851
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 9,955,789
<SALES>                                          6,805
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               529,234
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  422,540
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              96,466
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (1,145,812)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (1,145,812)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (1,145,812)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.33)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.33)
        

</TABLE>
**EXHIBIT 31.2**
**CERTIFICATIONS**
I, Patrick W. Kellick, certify that:
 1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of ACG Holdings, Inc. and AmericanColor Graphics, Inc., ( collectively the “Company”);  2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a materialfact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light ofthe circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to theperiod covered by this report;  3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial informationincluded in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition,results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periodspresented in this report;  4. The registrant’s other certifying officers and I are responsible for establishing andmaintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15 and15d-15) for the registrant and have:
 a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures to ensure that materialinformation relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, ismade known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period inwhich this report is being prepared;  b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls andprocedures as of a date within 90 days prior to the filing date of this report (the“Evaluation Date”); and  c) presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of thedisclosure controls and procedures based on our evaluation as of the EvaluationDate;
 5. The registrant’s other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our mostrecent evaluation, to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of registrant’sboard of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):
 a) all significant deficiencies in the design or operation of internalcontrols which could adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process,summarize and report financial data and have identified for the registrant’sauditors any material weaknesses in internal controls; and  b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or otheremployees who have a significant role in the registrant’s internal controls; and
 6. The registrant’s other certifying officers and I have indicated in this report whetherthere were significant changes in internal controls or in other factors that couldsignificantly affect internal controls subsequent to the date of our most recentevaluation, including any corrective actions with regard to significant deficiencies andmaterial weaknesses.         Date: June 28, 2005   /s/ Patrick W. Kellick               Patrick W. Kellick        Chief Financial Officer
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr., Chief Justice

Stephen J. Markman

Mary Beth Kelly

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano

Richard H. Bernstein, Justices

Order 

February 4, 2015

149872-3

150042

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 149872

COA: 317158

Wayne CC: 13-001620-AR

SEAN HARRIS,

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 149873

COA: 317272

Wayne CC: 13-001620-AR

WILLIAM LITTLE,

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 150042

COA: 316072

Wayne CC: 13-001041-FH

NEVIN HUGHES,

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the applications for leave to appeal the July 15, 2014 

judgment of the Court of Appeals are considered, and they are GRANTED. The parties 

shall address: (1) whether the Disclosures by Law Enforcement Officers Act, 

MCL 15.391, et seq., precludes the use of false statements by a law enforcement officer 
I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 February 4, 2015

p0128

2

Clerk

in a prosecution for obstruction of justice; and (2) whether the waivers signed by the 

defendants bar the use of their statements in a criminal prosecution as violative of state or 

federal rights against self-incrimination.

The Prosecuting Attorneys Association of Michigan and the Criminal Defense 

Attorneys of Michigan are invited to file briefs amicus curiae. Other persons or groups 

interested in the determination of the issues presented in this case may move the Court 

for permission to file briefs amicus curiae. Motions for permission to file briefs amicus 

curiae and briefs amicus curiae regarding these cases should be filed in People v Harris

(Docket No. 149872) only.
#### Devon Moore, an Infant, by His Mother and Natural Guardian, Gina Townsend, Appellant, v New York Medical Group, P.C., et al., Defendants, and New York City Health & Hospitals Corporation, Respondent.

Submitted December 24, 2007;

decided February 12, 2008

Motion for leave to appeal dismissed upon the ground that the order sought to be appealed from does not finally determine the action within the meaning of the Constitution.
EX-35.18
(logo) WELLS FARGO

Commercial Mortgage Servicing
D1086-120, 12th Floor
550 Tryon Street
Charlotte, NC  28202
1-800-326-1334

Banc of America Merrill Lynch Commercial Mortgage Inc.
Bank of America Trust
One Bryant Park
New York, NY 10036
Attention: Leland F. Bunch


ANNUAL STATEMENT OF COMPLIANCE

Reference is hereby made to that certain Pooling and Servicing Agreement dated
as of October 1, 2013, by and among Morgan Stanley Capital I Inc., as
Depositor, Wells Fargo Bank, National Association, as Master Servicer,
Certificate Administrator, Certifiate Registrar, Authenticating Agent and
Custodian, Midland Loan Services, A Division of PNC Bank, National Association,
as Special Servicer, Trimont Real Estate Advisors, Inc, as Trust Advisor and
U.S. Bank National Association as Trustee, with respect to Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates Series 2013-C12 (the "Agreement"), as it relates to
the Pari Passu portion of the Marriott Chicago River North Hotel loan that is
in the Morgan Stanley Bank of America Merrill Lynch Trust 2013-C11. Capitalized
terms used herein not otherwise defined shall have the meanings assigned in the
Agreement.

Pursuant to Section 13.9 of this Agreement, I, Daniel Bober, Executive
Vice President of Commercial Mortgage Services do hereby certify that:

1. A review of the activities of the Master Servicer during the period from
   January 1, 2013 through December 31, 2013 (the "Reporting Period"), and of
   its performance per the Agreement during such period has been made under my
   supervision, and

2. To the best of my knowledge, based on such review, the Master Servicer, has
   fulfilled all of its obligations under the Agreement in all material
   respects throughout the Reporting Period.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has executed this Certificate as of the 7th
day of March 2014.


/s/ Daniel Bober
Daniel Bober
Executive Vice President
Wells Fargo Bank


Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.

(logo) Together we'll go far
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

March 2, 2005

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 04-40212

Summary Calendar

 

JAY GRIFFITH,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

JONATHAN PERKINS, in his official capacity; 

CITY OF SANGER TEXAS,

Defendants-Appellees.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas 

USDC No. 4:01-CV-292

--------------------

Before GARZA, DeMOSS, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Jay Griffith was issued a speeding ticket by Jonathan

Perkins, a police officer for the City of Sanger, Texas (the

City). Griffith filed suit against Perkins and the City alleging

that Perkins violated his constitutional rights by acting as a

police officer without having filed the necessary oath of office

with the Secretary of State of Texas. The district court

dismissed the claims against Perkins, granted summary judgment in
No. 04-40212

-2-

favor of the City, and awarded the City attorney’s fees pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Griffith contests that award.

The district court granted summary judgment against Griffith

because he failed to present a prima facie case. Griffith’s

appeal of the summary judgment was dismissed for failure to

prosecute. Griffith v. Perkins, No. 03-41040 (5th Cir. Nov. 4,

2003) (unpublished) The district court did not abuse its

discretion in awarding attorney’s fees to the City because

Griffith failed to present a prima facie case of liability by the

City. See Myers v. City of West Monroe, 211 F.3d 289, 293 (5th

Cir. 2000).

Griffith argues that the district court made an evidentiary

error in awarding attorney’s fees because the fee information was

not submitted by a valid affidavit. This claim is raised for the

first time on appeal and will not be considered. Leverette v.

Louisville Ladder Co., 183 F.3d 339, 342 (5th Cir. 1999).

The ruling of the district court is AFFIRMED.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               JAN-31-2000
<CASH>                                         403,000
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                               21,559,000
<ALLOWANCES>                               (1,101,000)
<INVENTORY>                                  1,027,000
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            24,834,000
<PP&E>                                      41,220,000
<DEPRECIATION>                            (18,054,000)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              74,668,000
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       24,137,000
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                    18,100,000
<OTHER-SE>                                           0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                74,668,000
<SALES>                                     19,181,000
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            19,181,000
<CGS>                                       10,832,000
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               10,832,000
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             5,732,000
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             685,000
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              1,932,000
<INCOME-TAX>                                   792,000
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          1,140,000
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 1,140,000
<EPS-BASIC>                                       0.12
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.12


</TABLE>
EXHIBIT 32.2

SECTION 1350 CERTIFICATIONS

The undersigned
executive officer of First Keystone Financial, Inc. (the Registrant) hereby certify that the Registrants Form 10-K for the year ended September 30, 2009 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the information contained therein fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Registrant.



|                        |  |                                                                                 
|----------------------- |  | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|                        | 
|Date: December 18, 2009 |  | /s/    David M. Takats                                                          
|                        |  | Name: David M. Takats Title:   Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to
First Keystone Financial, Inc. and will be retained by First Keystone Financial, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.