MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions Decision: 20 2 2 ME 42 Docket: Yor

- 21

- 344 Argued : June	6,	2022 Decided: July	26,	2022 Panel: STANFILL ,	C.J.,	and MEAD, JABAR ,	HORTON , CONNORS , and	LAWRENCE, JJ.

RICHARD	OUELLETTE

v. SACO	RIVER	CORRIDOR	COMMISSION
JABAR ,	J. [¶1] Richard	 Ouellette	 appeals	 from	 a	 decision	 of	 the	 Superior	 Court (York	 County, Douglas,	 J. )	 affirming	 the	 decision	 of	 the	 Saco	 River	 Corridor Commission	 denying	 Ouellette’s	 application	 to	 build	 a	 privacy	 fenc e	 along	 a portion	of	his	property	because	such	a	fence	would	unreasonably	despoil	the scenic,	rural,	and	open	space	character	of	the	Saco	River	Corridor. Because	the Commission’s “ scenic	 view ” rule , 94

- 412	 C.M.R.	 ch.	 103 , §	 2(G)(3) (effective Jan. 30, 2006) , neither	 conflicts	 with the	 Saco	 River	 Corridor	 Act, 38	 M.R.S. §§ 951

- 969 (2022) , nor	is unconstitutionally	void	for	vagueness,	and because the	 Commission’s	 decision	 was	 supported	 by	 substantial	 evidence	 in	 the record,	we	affirm.2 I.		BACKGROUND [¶ 2 ]	 	 The	 following	 facts	 are	 drawn	 from	 the	 Commission’s	 findings, which	are	supported	by	competent	record	evidence. See	Sultan	Corp.	v.	Dep’t	of
Env ’t Prot. ,	2022	ME	21,	¶	2, 272 A.3d 296 .		Richard	Ouellette	owns	property	on the	Saco	River on Pool	Street	i n	Biddeford.		The	property	is	located	within	the Limited	Residential	District	of	the	Saco	River	Corridor as	defined	by 38 M.R.S. § 957

- B.	 	 The	 property	 abuts	 11	 and	 13	 Marblehead	 Lane. If	 there	 are	 no obstructions,	 the	 Saco	 River	is	 visible	 from	 the	 Marbl ehead	 Lane	 properties when	looking	over	the	Pool	Street	property	during	certain	seasons. [¶ 3 ]		In	June	2020,	it	came	to	the	Commission’s	attention	that	Ouellette had	 replaced	 an	 existing	 264

- foot

- long,	 5

- foot

- tall,	 vinyl	 post

- and

- rail	 fence with	 a 6

- to 7

- foot

- tall	 privacy	 fence,	 without	 obtaining	 a	 permit	 from	 the Commission.		Ouellette	installed	this	fence	to	block his view	of his neighbor’s backyard. After	the	Commission	contacted	Ouellette about	the	fence ,	he	applied for	an	after

- the

- fact	permit	 for the	project.		This	initial	application	proposed keeping	the	entire	fence	intact.		The	neighbors	at	11 and	13	Marblehead	Lane submitted	comments	that	their	views	of	the	Saco	River	were	obstructed	by	the new	 fence	in	a	way	 that	 they	were	 not	 by	 the	 previous	 fence	and	 submitted photographic	evidence	supporting the	comments .		Commission	staff	visited	the3 site on	August	14,	2020,	and	two	commissioners	visited	the	site	on	August	24,
2020. The	Commission	considered	 the	application	at	 their	August	26,	2020, meeting.		By	a	vote	of	7

- 3,	the	Commission	denied	the	application,	determining that ,	under	the	standards	set forth	in 94

- 412	C.M.R.	ch.	103,	§ 2(G) , the	fence unreasonably	obstructed	the	views	of	the	river	from	abutting	properties.		The Commission	issued	a	written	decision	on	September	2,	2020. [¶ 4 ] Ouellette initially	appealed	 this	decision	but withdrew	his	appeal after	he	reapplied	for	the permit	on	September	16,	2020. The	new application proposed	replacing the six solid panels	nearest	 to	 the	river	with	 the	original split

- rail fence.		On	September 30,	2020, commissioners	visited	the	site	again. The	 abutting	 landowners	 again	 submitted	 comments	 in	 opposition	 to	 the application. During	its	October	28,	2020,	meeting,	the	Commission	denied	the application	by	a	vote	of	10

- 3	and	found	that	the	proposed	privacy	fe nce “ would unreasonably	involve	factors	enumerated	in S ection	959

- A.1.A

. through	K	of	the
Act	INCLUDING:	G. Despoliation of	the	scenic,	rural,	and	open	space	character of	 the	 corridor”	 by	 unreasonably	 obstructing	 the	 views	 of	 the	 river	 from abutting	properties.		The	Commission	issued	its	written	decision,	with	findings, on	November	4,	2020.4 [¶ 5 ] On	November	27,	2020, Ou ellette	requested that the	Commission reconsider	 the	 application,	 pursuant	 to	 94

- 412	 C.M.R.	 ch.	 101,	 §	 5	 ( effective Jan. 30, 2006).		The	neighbors, as	they	did	with	the	application,	filed	documents opposing	the	request	for	reconsideration .		The	Commission heard	th e	request for	 reconsideration at	 its	 January	 4,	 2021, meeting .	 	 By	 a	 vote	 of	 8

- 6	 the Commission	rejected	the request .		A c ommissioner	then	proposed	replacing	ten panels	with	the	original	split

- rail	fence,	but this	proposal	failed	to	carry because
t he Commission	voted	7

- 7.		The	Commission	issued	its	decision	with	findings on	January	13,	2021.		On	February 3, 2021,	Ouellette	timely	appealed	from	the Commission’s	decision	to	the	Superior	Court. 1 See M.R.	Civ.	P.	80C(b);	5	M.R.S. §	11002(3) (2022)

. [¶ 6 ]	 	 Following	 argument	 on	 August	 17,	 2021,	 the	 Superior	 Court affirmed	 the	 Commission’s	 decision	 on	 October	 15,	 2021.	 	 Ouellette	 timely appeals. See 5	M.R.S.	§	11008(1)	(2022)

.

1 Although	38	M.R

. S.	§	968 (2022) provides	that	appeals	 from	decisions	of	the	Commission	be taken	pursuant	 to	M.R.	Civ.	P.	80B, the	statute	was	enacted in	1979, prior	 to	 the	adoption	of M.R. Civ. P. 80C in	1983

. See	Palesky	v.	Sec ’ y	of	State ,	1998	ME	103,	¶	7	n.2,	711	A.2d	129	( “Prior	to	the adoption	of	M.R.	Civ.	P.	80C,	both	governmental	and	agency	actions	were	reviewed	according	to	M.R. Civ.	P.	80B

. .	.	. ”). B ecause	the	Commission	is	an	administrative	agency, see 5	M.R.S.	§	8002(2)	(2022) , this appeal	 was	 properly	 brought	 und er	 M.R.	 Civ.	 P.	 80C ,	 which	 “applies	 to	 appeals	 from	 state administrative	 action , ” Dubois v.	 Town	 of	 Arundel ,	 2019	ME	 21,	 ¶	 5,	 202	 A.3d	 524

. S ee	 also M.R. Civ. P. 80B A dvisory C ommittee’s N otes	 to	 Feb ruary 15,	 1983 O rder A mending	 Rule	 80B	 (“[ M.R. Civ. P. 80B	and	80C]	now	provide	separate	procedural paths	for	judicial	review	of	local	government agencies	 and	 for	 review	 of	 state	 administrative	 agencies	 subject	 to	 the	 Maine	 Administrative Procedure	Act.”).5 II.		DISCUSSION [¶ 7 ] On	appeal,	Ouellette	contends	tha t	the Commis sion’s “ scenic	view ” rule	 conflicts	 with	 the	 Saco	 River	 Corridor	 Act , that	 the	 rule	 is unconstitutionally	 vague , and that	 the	 Commission’s	 decision	 to	 deny	 the permit was	not	supported	by	substantial	evidence	in	the	record.
A. The “ Scenic	View ” Rule
1. Standard	of	Review [¶ 8 ] “In	an	appeal	from a Superior	Court	judgment	on	a	Rule	80C	petition,
we	review the	underlying	administrative	agency	decision	directly	for	abuse	of discretion,	errors	of	law,	or	findings	unsupported	by	substantial	evidence	in	th e record.” Maquoit	Bay,	LLC	v.	Dep’t	of	Marine	Res. ,	2022	ME	19,	¶	5,	271	A.3d
1183. We	review a	trial	court’s	interpretation	of	statute	de	novo

. SAD	3	Educ. Ass’n	v.	RSU	3	Bd. o f	Dirs. ,	2018	ME	29,	¶	14,	180	A.3d	125 .		When	a	statute’s language	 is	 unam biguous, “ we interpret	 the	 provisions	 according	 to their unambiguous	meaning	 unless	 the	 result	is	illogical	 or	 absurd,”	 and	 only if	 a statute	 is	 ambiguous do we “consider	 the	 statute’s	 meaning	 in	 light	 of	 its legislative	history	and	other	indicia	of	legislative	intent.” Id. (quotation	marks omitted).6 2. The	Saco	River	Corridor	Act [¶ 9 ] The	Saco	River	Corridor	Act	establishes	the	Saco	River	Corridor	and the	 Co mmission.	 	 The Legislature	 found “ that	 [the	 Saco,	 Ossipee,	 and	 Little Ossipee R ivers]	 and	 their	 adjacent	 lands	 possess	 outstanding	 scenic	 and aesthetic	qualities .” 38	M.R.S. §	951. The	purpose	of	the	Act	include s preserving the	“scenic,	rural	and	unspoiled	character	of	the	lands	adjacent	to	these	rivers.” Id. The	Act	separates	the	corridor	into	three	districts

— the	Resource	Protection District,	the	Limited	Residential	District,	and	the	General	Development	Distric t. Id. §	957.		Ouellette’s	property	is	in	 the	Limited Residential District,	which	is defined	as	“lands	within	the	corridor	which	may	be	suitable	for	development, but	which	are	not	necessary	for	the	growth	of	areas	of	intensive	development.” Id. §	957

- B(1 ).		Uses	that	are	allowed	by	permit	include	single

- family	residences and	accessory	structures. Id. § 957

- B( 3 )(E). “Fences”	are	included	in	the	Act’s definition	of “ structure

. ” Id. § 952(16). [¶1 0 ] To	 receive	 a	 permit to	 construct	 a	 structure	 in	 the	 Lim ited Residential	 District , an applicant	 must	 show	 that	 a	 proposed	 use	 will not unreasonably	 cause	 any	 of eleven enumerated conditions

. I d. § 959

- A(1)(A)

- ( K ). Paragraph (G)	 requires	 the	 applicant	 to	 prove	 that	 the proposed	 use	will	 not involve an	 unreasonable	 “[d]espol i ation	 of	 the	 scenic,7 rural	 and	 open	 space character of	 the	 corridor.”	 	 The	 Commission, which	 is authorized	to adopt additional	standards	for	permitted	use s, id .	§	954

- C(1),	has promulgated	rules	that	expand	upon	section	959

- A (1 ) (G).		One	of	these	rules, the “ scenic	view ” rule,	requires	applicants to	show	“[t] he	proposed	use	will	not unreasonably	 obstruct	 scenic	 views	 from	 neighboring	 properties	 or	 public

ro ads .” 94

- 412 C. M.R.	ch.	103 , § 2(G)(3). [¶1 1 ] Ouellette	argues	that	the “scenic	view”	rule conflicts	with	the	Act because	the	Commission	cannot	deny	a	permit	based	on	a	proposed	use’s	effect on	 an	 abutting	 landowner ,	 categorically	 bans	 all	 fences	 in	 the	 corridor, and empowers	the	Commission	to	create	de	facto	view	easements.

a. Effect	on Abutting	Landowners [¶1 2 ] The plain	language	of	section	959

- A(1)(G) of	the	act requires	the Commission	 to	 determine	 whether	 a	 proposed	 use	 will	 involve “ any unreasonable	.	.	.	despoliation	of	the	scenic,	rural	and	open	space	character	of the	 corridor.” T his	 requirement	 clearly	extends	 to	 the	lands	adjacent	 to	 the
river. See id. §	951 (“[I]t	is	the	purpose	of	this	chapter	.	.

. to	preserve	the	scenic rural	and	unspoiled character of	the	lands	adjacent	to	[the	rivers	constituti ng the	corridor]	.	.	.	.”); id. §	953	 (“The	 [Saco	River	Corridor]	includes	 the	lands adjacent	to	these	rivers	to	a	distance	of	500	 feet.”). The rule	promulgated	in8 accordance	with	the	statute provides that	a use must not	unreasonably	obstruct
scenic views	from	the	road	and	neighboring	properties	or	be	highly	visible	from the	water. 94

- 412	C.M.R.	ch. 103 , § 2 (G)( 3 )

- ( 4 ). The	unambiguous	language	in

s ection	 2(G) does	 not	 conflict	 with	 the	 statute	 but	 instead	 provides	 the Commission	with	a	consistent	means	of	examining whether	the	use	will	involve

an “ unreasonable	[d]espoliation	of	the	scenic,	rural	and	open	space	character of	the	corridor,”	38	M.R.S.	§	959

- A(1)(G ). b. The	Act D oes N ot	Ban	Fences [¶1 3 ] Ouellette	argues	that	the	Commission’s “ scenic	view ” rule	conflicts with	 the	Act	 because	it	 categorically	 bans	 the	 use	 of	 fences,	a	 permitted	 use under	the	Act. See 38	M.R.S.	§§	952(2),	(16),	957

- B.		However,	the rule	does	not ban	 all	 fences,	 just	 those	 that	 unreasonably	 obstruct	 scenic	 views, 94

- 412 C.M.R.	 ch.	 103 , §	 2(G)(3), which aligns	 with	 the	 statute. See 38	 M.R.S. § 959

- A (1)(G) (barring	 uses	 that	 unreasonably	 cause	 “ [ d ] espol i ation	 of	 the
scenic	 .

. . character	 of	 the	 corridor”).	 	 “ [ W ] hether	 a	 proposed activity will unreasonably	interfere	with	an	existing	scenic	or	aesthetic	use	will	necessarily depend	on	the	specific	circumstances	of a	given case.” Uliano	v.	Bd. o f	Env ’t Prot. , 2009	ME	89,	¶ 23,	977	A .2d	400.		Ultimately,	neither	the	statute	nor	the	rules ban	the	use	of	all	fences,	and	whether	any	given	fence	unreasonably	interferes9 with	the	scenic	view	is	a	fact

- specific	determination	within	the	Commission’s role	as	fact finder.

c . View	Easements [¶1 4 ] Ouellette	also	argues	that the “ scenic	view ” rule	conflicts	with	the Act	because	 the	rule	empowers	 the	Commission	 to	 “create	and	give	away	de facto	 view	 easements	 to	 adjacent	 landowners,”	 a	 power	 the A ct	 does	 not bestow .		A	view	easement	requires	“t he	owner	of	the	servient	estate	[to]	not undertake	 any	 activities,	 such	 as	 the	 construction	 of	 a	 building,	 that	 would impede	 the	 view	 of	 the	 owner	 of	 the	 dominant	 estate.” Patterson	 v.	 Paul , 863 N.E.2d	527,	533	(Mass.	2007).		However,	Ouellette	points	to no	authority that	would	differentiate	the “ scenic view ” rule	from	other	rules	that	consider the	scenic	effect	on	neighbors and	that have	been	upheld. See,	e.g. , Uliano ,	2009 ME	89,	¶ 31 ,	977	A.2d	400	(“ [ P ] rotection	of	scenic	and	aesthetic	uses	serves	a
si gnificant	governmental	interest	and	is	a	valid	exercise	of the police	power.”)

. Further,	 the	 rule	 does	 not	 block	 all	 obstructions,	 only	 “unreasonable”	 ones.
38 M.R.S.	§	959

- A (1)(G)

. We	therefore	reject	this	argument.
B
. Void	for	Vagueness [¶1 5 ] Ouellette	contends	that	the “ scenic	view ” rule is	unconstitutionally void	for	vagueness. “ A person	challenging	the	constitutionality	of	a	legislative10 enactment	‘bears	a	heavy	burden	of	proving	unconstitutionality[,]	since	all	acts of	the	Legislature	are	p resumed	constitutional , ’” Jones	v.	Sec ’ y	of	State ,	2020	ME 113,	¶	18,	238	A.3d	982	(quoting Goggin	v.	State	Tax	Assessor ,	2018	ME	111, ¶ 20,	191	A.3d	341).		This	burden	also	applies	to	regulations. Davis	v.	Sec ’ y	of
State ,	 577	 A.2d	 338,	 341	 (Me.	 1990)	 (“The	 party	 challenging	 the	 regulation bears	the	heavy	burden	of	overcoming	its	presumption	of	constitutionality.”). In	 a	 void

- for

- vaguenes s	 challenge,	 the	 challenging	 party	 “must	 demonstrate that	the	statute	has	no	valid	application	or	logical	construction.” Stewart	Title
Guar.	 Co.	 v.	 State	 Tax	 Assessor ,	 2009	ME	 8,	 ¶	 40,	 963	A.2d	 16 9 .	 	A statute is unconstitutionally	 vague	 “when	 its	 languag e	 either	 forbids	 or	 requires	 the doing	of	an	act	in	terms	so	vague	that	people	of	common	intelligence	must	guess at	its	meaning,	or if it	authorizes	or	encourages	arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” Uliano ,	 2009	 ME	 89,	 ¶ 15,	 977	 A.2d	 400 (quotation marks omitted) .	 	 In	 a	 land	 use	 context,	 standards	 that	 are	 “wholly	 subjective”	 and “permit[]	 municipal	 employees	 or	 board	 members	 to	 make	 ‘legislative

- type decisions	based	on	any	factor	they	independently	deem [] appropriate”	are	void for	vagueness. Id. ¶ 25 (quoting Kosalka	v.	Town	of	Georgetown ,	2000	ME	106, ¶ 16,	 752	 A.2d	 183). 2 However,	 “[o]bjective	 quantification,	 mathematical

2 Kosalka	v.	Town	of	Georgetown addresses	an	improp er	delegation	of	legislative	authority	and does	not	address	a	void

- for

- vagueness	challenge. 2000	ME	106,	¶	1,	752	A.2d	183 .		However,	we11 certainty,	and	absolute	precision	are	not	required	by	either	the	United	States Constitution	or	Maine	Constitution.” Friends	of Me.’s Mountains	v.	Bd

. of	Env ’ t
Prot. ,	2013	ME	25,	¶	21,	61	A.3d	689 (quotation	marks	omitted)

. [¶1 6 ] We	have	held	that	a	st andard	that	required that a	proposed	activity “not	 unreasonably	 interfere	 with	 existing	 scenic,	 aesthetic,	 recreational	 or navigational	uses,”	38	M.R.S.	§	480

- D(1) (2022) , was	sufficiently	definite	to	not be	void	for	vagueness	or	unconstitutionally	delegat e	legislative	power. Uliano , 2009	 ME	 89,	 ¶¶ 14, 29

- 32,	 977	 A.2d	 400.	 	 In Uliano , addressing the	 lack	 of quantitative	 standards, we emphasized the difference	 between	 the	 limited requirement	in	the	statute	at	issue	there

— that	the	decision	maker determine whether	a	proposed	activity	unreasonably	interfered	with	an	existing	scenic	or aesthetic	use

— and Kosalka ’s	“amorphous	command	.

. . requiring	an	applicant to	 prove	 that	 a	 project	 will	 ‘conserve	 natural	 beauty. ’ ” Id. ¶	 25.	 	 Further, because the statute in Uliano was	 administered	 by	 an	 executive	 agency	 (the Board	 of	 Environmental	 Protection)	 subject	 to	 the	 Maine	 Administrative Procedure	Act,	the	parties	were	provided	with	greater	due	process	protections.

have	stated	that	“both	vagueness	and	unlawful	delegation	challenges	are	concerned	with	the	issue	of definiteness”	and that both	have	been	“properly	treated	as	a	single	inquiry.” Uliano	v.	Bd.	of Env’t Prot. ,	2009	ME	89,	¶	15,	977	A.2d	400.		We	look	to	our	analysis	in Kosalka for	limited	guidance	on	the specificity	required	to	meet	constitutional	requirements. See	id. ¶¶ 24

- 28.12 Id. ¶¶	26

- 28.		Ultimately,	we determined	t hat	the	phrase	‘scenic	and	aesthetic uses’	was	sufficiently	definite	and	offered	“an	intelligible	principle	to	which	the person	or	body	authorized	to	act	is	directed	to	conform.” Id. ¶¶	29

- 30	(quoting Whitman	v.	Am.	Trucking	Ass’ns ,	531	U.S.	457,	472	(200 1)). [¶1 7 ] However ,	the	analysis	as	to	whether	a	view	is	actually	scenic,	and therefore	whether	an	application	could	potentially	be	denied under the	rule , is more	complicated.		Ouellette	argues	that	not	every	view	of	the	corridor	is	scenic and	that	there	is	no	definition	th at	determines	what	views	are	scenic.		However, the	statute	supports	an	interpretation	that	all	views	of	the	river	are	considered
scenic. The	 Legislature	 found that	 “[the	 rivers	making	 up	 the	 corridor]	 and their	 adjacent	 lands	 possess	 outstanding	 scenic	 an d	 aesthetic qualities .”
38 M.R.S.	§	951.		Although	the	Act	specifies	that	there	are	areas	of	“exceptional scenic	value”	or	“exceptional	scenic	importance,” see	id. §§	951,	957

- A(F),	these areas	are	the	subject	of	special	statutes	and	rules, id. § 957

- A(F) ;	94

- 412	C.M.R. ch.	103 , §	2(G)(5),	implying	that	the	other	rules	would	apply	to	all	views	of	the

c orridor. Looking to	“the	context	of	the	whole	statutory	scheme	of	which	the section	at	issue	 forms	a	part	 to	achieve	a	consistent	and	harmonious	result,”
Fo rtin	v.	Titcomb ,	2013	ME	14,	¶	7,	60	A.3d	765	(quotation	marks	omitted),	we reject	Ouellette’s	argument.13 [¶1 8 ] The	statute	 f urther provides	greater due	process protections	 to Ouellette , thereby	weakening	his	vagueness	argument.		The Saco	River	Corridor Commission	was	established	by	 the	Legislature	and	is	subject	 to	Title	5. See 5 M.R.S.	 §	 12004

- G(1 3 ) (2022) ;	 38 M.R.S.	 §§	 954,	 954

- C.	 	 This	 provides “adequate	 procedural	 safeguards	 to	 protect	 against	 an	 abuse	 of	 discretion” when,	 like here,	 “the	 statutory	 enactment	 of	 detailed	 specific	 standards	 is impossible.” Uliano ,	 2009	 ME	 89,	 ¶	 26,	 977	 A.2d	 400 (quotation	 marks omitted) .		Ultimately,	we	conclude	that	the	rule	is	not unconstitutionally void for	vagueness.
C. Substantial Evidence [¶1 9 ] Ouellette	contends that	the	Commission’s	determination s that	the fence	unreasonably	obstructed	the	views	of	the	river	from	abutting	properties and	that	those	views	were	scenic	were	unsupported	by	substantial	evidence. [¶ 20 ] “In	 an	 appeal	 from	 a	 Superior	 Court	 judgment	 on	 a	 Rule	 80C petition,	 we	 review	 the	 u nderlying	 administrative	 decision directly for

. . . findings	unsupported	by	substantial	evidence	in	the	record.” Maquoit	Bay,
LLC ,	2022	ME	19,	¶	5,	271	A.3d	1183.		We	will	“not	substitute	our	judgment	for that	 of	 the	 agency	 and	 will	 affirm	 findings	 of	 fa ct	 if	 they	 are	 supported	 by substantial	 evidence	 in	 the	 record.” AngleZ	 Behav.	 Health	 Servs.	 v.	 Dep’t	 of14 Health	 &	 Hum.	 Servs. ,	 2020	 ME	 26,	 ¶	 12,	 226	 A.3d	 762 (quotation	 marks omitted).		“Substantial	evidence	exists	when	a	reasonable	mind	would	rely	on tha t	evidence	as	sufficient	support for a	conclusion.” Doane	v.	Dep’t	of	Health
& Hum.	Servs. ,	2021	ME	28,	¶	38,	250	A.3d	1101 (quotation	marks	omitted) .		We “examine	 the	 entire	 record	 to	 determine	 whether,	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 all	 the testimony	and	exhibits	before	it,	the	agency	could	fairly	and	reasonably	find	the facts	 as	 it	 did.” Id. (quotation	 marks	 omitted). However,	 the substantial

- evidence	standard	o f	review	“does	not	involve	any	weighing	of	the merits	of	evidence;	instead, we will	vacate	an	agency’s	factual	findings	only	if there	is	no	competent	evidence	in	the	record	to	support	the	findings.” AngleZ Behav. Health	 Servs. ,	 2020	 ME	 26,	 ¶ 12,	 226	 A.3d 762 (quotation	 marks omitted) .		Accordingly, we will	affirm	the	agency’s	findings	“even	if	the	record contains	inconsistent	evidence	or	evidence	contrary	 to	 the	result	reached	by the	agency.” Friends	of	Lincoln	Lakes	v.	Bd.	of	Env ’ t	Prot. ,	2010	ME	18,	¶	1 3,	989 A.2d	1 1 28. [¶ 21 ]		With	respect	to	the unreasonable	obstruction	of	a	scenic	view ,	the Commission	found	as follows: The	prior	existing	split

- r ail	fence	allowed	views	to	the	river	from abutting	properties	and	Marblehead	Lane.		The	Commission	finds the	proposed	changes	to	the	fence	would	continue	to	unreasonably obstruct	 views	 of	 the	 river	 from	 abutting	 properties	 including15 11 and	 13	 Marblehead	 La ne.	 	 Before	 the	 privacy	 fence	 was constructed[,]	expansive	views	of	 the	river	and	 tidal	marsh	were visible	 from	11	and	13	Marblehead	Lane.		Views	of	 the	river	and marsh	 vary	 based	 on	 the	 season,	and	in	 the	late	 fall,	winter,	and early	spring	there	was	high visibility	of	the	river	before	the	fence was	erected.		This	determination	is	based	on	photographs	taken	by Commission	staff	and	provided	by	abutters	and	interested	parties that	 show	 the	 prior	 existing	 view	 of	 the	 river	 from	 different abutting	 properties. Commissioners	 present	 for the site	 visit provided	assessments	of	the	site	[ that were]	also	considered	in	the determination	 of	 this	 application.	 	 Based	 on	 the	 facts,	 the Commission	finds	the	proposed	design	is	not	within	the	meaning	of the	Act. [¶ 22 ] The Commission	reviewed	evidence	that	included photographs of the	views	from	the	properties	at	11	and	13	Marblehead	Lane, from	both before and	 after	 the	 fence	 was	 installed. Commission	 staff	 and	 some	 of	 the
commissioners made	several	visits	to	the	property	t o	examine	the	views	and the	 fence.		The	commissioners	considered	comments	 from	several	neighbors that described the	views	that	existed	before the	fence	was	installed .		Because the	 Commission	 had	 competent	 evidence upon which	 to	 determine that the
views	wer e	scenic,	to both neighbors	and	the	public,	and that	those	views were unreasonably	obstructed	by	Ouellette’s	fence,	the	Commission’s	decision	was supported	by substantial evidence. The	entry	is: Judgment	affirmed.16

Gene	R.	Libby,	Esq.,	and	Tyler	J. Smith,	Esq. (orally) ,	Libby	O’Brien	Kingsley	& Champion,	LLC,	Kennebunk,	for	appellant	Richard	Ouellette Aaron	M.	Frey,	Attorney	General,	Caleb	E.	Elwell,	Asst.	Atty.	Gen. (orally) ,	and Margaret	A.	Bensinger,	Asst.	Atty.	Gen.,	Office	of	the Attorney	General,	Augusta, for	appellee	Saco	River	Corridor	Commission

York	County	Superior	Court	docket	number	AP

- 2021

- 02 F OR C LERK R EFERENCE O NLY