In the United States Court of Federal Claims

No. 10-617 C

(Filed December 12, 2013)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

KENNETH EARMAN, *

*

Plaintiff, *

*

v. *

*

THE UNITED STATES, *

*

Defendant. * 

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

Alan I. Saltman, Washington, DC, for plaintiff. Richard W. Goeken, 

Washington, DC, and Charles W. Surasky, Atlanta, GA, of counsel. 

Sharon A. Snyder, United States Department of Justice, with whom were 

Stuart F. Delery, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Jeanne E. Davidson, 

Director, Bryant G. Snee, Deputy Director, Washington, DC, for defendant. 

Joshua Schnell, Office of General Counsel, United States Department of 

Agriculture, Washington, DC, of counsel.

_________________________

OPINION

_________________________

BUSH, Senior Judge.

Now pending before the court are defendant’s motion to dismiss pursuant to 

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims (RCFC),

and the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment pursuant to RCFC 56. These

motions have been fully briefed. Oral argument was held on October 31, 2013. 

For the reasons described below, the court grants defendant’s motion to dismiss 

Contract; Reformation and 

Breach; Conservation Security 

Program, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3838-

3838c (2012); Incorporation of a

Statute and Regulations into a

Contract.
and motion for summary judgment, and denies plaintiff’s cross-motion for 

summary judgment.

BACKGROUND1

The Conservation Security Program (the CSP or the Program) is a federal 

conservation program administered by the Natural Resources Conservation Service 

(the Service or the agency) within the United States Department of Agriculture (the 

USDA). Under the CSP, potential participants develop and submit for approval 

plans to adopt specified conservation practices on their agricultural property. 

Upon the government’s approval of such a plan, the participant then enters into a 

written contract with the government to implement the approved conservation 

practices in exchange for technical and financial assistance.

Kenneth Earman, the plaintiff in this case, is the holder of a CSP contract 

seeking damages under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2006), for 

increased payments pursuant to his CSP contract. Mr. Earman alleges that the 

government has breached his contract – as well as the contracts of a putative class 

of similarly situated CSP participants – by calculating CSP payments in a manner 

inconsistent with the CSP statute and the Service’s implementing regulations. Mr. 

Earman also argues that he and others similarly situated are entitled to reformation 

of their contracts to excise certain provisions on the ground of mutual mistake. 

Further, plaintiff asserts that he and others similarly situated possess a contractual 

right of renewal which was breached when Congress enacted legislation in 2008 

that prohibited the renewal of CSP contracts after September 30, 2008. Finally, 

Mr. Earman alleges that the government’s alleged repudiation of his and similarly 

situated CSP participants’ contractual right of renewal constitutes an 

uncompensated taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution.

I. Factual Background

A. The 2002 Farm Bill and the Conservation Security Program

1

/ The facts recounted in this opinion are taken from the Fourth Amended Complaint and 

the parties’ submissions in connection with the motions currently pending before the court. 

Except where otherwise noted, the facts recounted in this opinion are undisputed.

2

 
In May 2002, Congress enacted the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act 

of 2002 (the 2002 Farm Bill), Pub. L. No. 107-171, 116 Stat. 134, which is now 

codified as amended at sections 3838 through 3838c in Title 16 of the United 

States Code (the CSP statute). Fourth Am. Compl. ¶ 7. The 2002 Farm Bill 

amended several portions of the Food Security Act of 1985 (the 1985 Farm Bill), 

Pub. L. No. 99-198, 99 Stat. 1354 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 3801-3862 

(2012)), and created a voluntary conservation program known as the Conservation 

Security Program. Fourth Am. Compl. ¶ 8. As originally enacted, the legislation 

required the Service to establish and implement the CSP in each of fiscal years 

(FY) 2003 through 2007. 2002 Farm Bill, sec. 2001, § 1238A, 116 Stat. at 225. 

Congress later extended authorization for the CSP through FY 2011. See Deficit 

Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, tit. I, sec. 1202(a), § 1238A(a), 120 

Stat. 4, 5 (2006); Fourth Am. Compl. ¶ 10. 

The CSP statute explains that the purpose of the program is “to assist 

producers of agricultural operations in promoting, as is applicable with respect to 

land to be enrolled in the program, conservation and improvement of the quality of 

soil, water, air, energy, plant and animal life, and any other conservation purposes, 

as determined by the Secretary.” 16 U.S.C. § 3838a(a); see Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s 

Revised Proposed Findings of Uncontroverted Facts (Pl.’s Resp. to DPFUF) ¶ 8. 

The CSP statute defines “producer” as “an owner, operator, landlord, tenant, or 

sharecropper” who “shares the risk of producing any crop or livestock” and “is 

entitled to share in the crop or livestock available for marketing from a farm (or 

would have shared had the crop or livestock been produced).” 16 U.S.C. § 

3838(9)(A). The statute defines “the Secretary” as “the Secretary of Agriculture, 

acting through the Chief of the Natural Resources Conservation Service.” Id. § 

3838(12). 

In order to become eligible for participation in the CSP, an agricultural 

producer must:

(A) develop and submit to the Secretary, and obtain the 

approval of the Secretary of, a conservation security plan 

that meets the requirements of subsection (c)(1) of this 

section; and

(B) enter into a conservation security contract with the 

3
Secretary to carry out the conservation security plan.

Id. § 3838a(b)(1). 

Under the CSP statute, potential participants in the program must first 

develop a conservation security plan to be approved by the Service. The statute 

provides that all such plans must identify the land and resources to be protected, 

must describe the specific conservation practices to be implemented, must set forth 

a schedule for the implementation and maintenance of those practices during the 

term of the conservation security contract, and must indicate the tier of the 

conservation security contract under which the plan will be implemented. Id. § 

3838a(c)(1). 

Once the Service has approved a producer’s conservation security plan, it 

enters into a conservation security contract with that producer to enroll the land 

covered by the plan in the CSP. Id. § 3838a(e)(1). The CSP statute directs the 

agency to offer eligible producers three tiers of conservation security contracts –

Tier I, Tier II, and Tier III – pursuant to which CSP payments may be made to such 

producers. Id. § 3838a(d)(1)(A), (d)(5). Although the CSP statute sets forth 

general requirements for the three contract tiers, the statute provides that the 

specific minimum requirements for each contract tier are to be “determined and 

approved by the Secretary.” Id. § 3838a(d)(6). 

The CSP statute provides for two forms of assistance to eligible producers 

who adopt specified conservation practices on eligible land. First, the statute

provides that “[f]or each of fiscal years 2003 through 2007, the Secretary shall 

provide technical assistance to producers for the development and implementation 

of conservation security contracts, in an amount not to exceed 15 percent of 

amounts expended for the fiscal year.” Id. § 3838c(g). Technical assistance refers 

to conservation planning, design, and implementation assistance that the Service

provides to producers, including assisting producers to enroll in the CSP. Pl.’s 

Proposed Findings of Uncontroverted Fact (PPFUF) ¶ 4; see also 7 C.F.R. §§

1466.3 (defining technical assistance as “technical expertise, information, and tools 

necessary for the conservation of natural resources on land active in agricultural, 

forestry, or related uses” and stating that the term includes, inter alia, (1) 

“[t]echnical services provided directly to farmers, . . . such as conservation 

planning, technical consultation, and assistance with design and implementation of 

4
conservation practices,” and (2) “[t]echnical infrastructure, including activities, 

processes, tools, and agency functions needed to support delivery of technical 

services”), 1469.9(b) (“Technical assistance may include, but is not limited to: 

Assisting applicants during sign-up, processing and assessing applications, 

assisting the participant in developing the conservation stewardship plan; 

conservation practice survey, layout, design, installation, and certification; 

information, education, and training for producers; and quality assurance 

activities.”).

Second, the statute authorizes the government to make an annual payment to 

each eligible producer who has entered into a conservation security contract with 

the agency. Annual payments under such contracts comprise as many as three 

separate components: (1) a specified percentage of a base payment for the type of

land covered by the contract (which the court refers to as an adjusted base 

payment);2 (2) a cost-sharing payment; and (3) an enhanced payment. 16 U.S.C. § 

3838c(b)(1). 

Under the CSP statute, the base payment is equal to the 2001 average 

national per-acre rental rate for the particular type of land use covered by the 

contract. Id. § 3838c(b)(1)(A)(i); Fourth Am. Compl. ¶ 15. In the alternative, the 

statute provides that the Service may instead adopt as the base payment “another 

appropriate rate for the 2001 crop year that ensures regional equity.” 16 U.S.C. § 

3838c(b)(1)(A)(ii); see also Fourth Am. Compl. ¶ 15. Once the Service has 

determined the base payment for the enrolled property, the adjusted base payment 

is calculated according to the appropriate contract tier for that property. For Tier I, 

Tier II, and Tier III contracts, the adjusted base payment is equal to five percent, 

ten percent, and fifteen percent of the base payment, respectively. 16 U.S.C. §

3838c(b)(1)(C)(i), (b)(1)(D)(i), (b)(1)(E)(i); Fourth Am. Compl. ¶ 15.

2

/ Although the CSP statute uses the term “base payment,” the Service substituted the 

term “stewardship payment” for “base payment” in the implementing regulations. Interim Final 

Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. 34502, 34509, 34514 (June 21, 2004). The regulations define “stewardship 

payment” as “the CSP base payment component of the payment as described in [7 C.F.R.] § 

1469.23(a).” 7 C.F.R. § 1469.3. For the sake of consistency with the language of the CSP 

statute and the court’s prior opinion in Meyers v. United States, 96 Fed. Cl. 34 (2010), this 

opinion refers to stewardship payments as base payments.

5

 
The CSP statute also provides for cost-sharing payments, which reimburse 

eligible producers for the cost of adopting new conservation practices and 

maintaining existing conservation practices on their properties. In general, eligible 

producers may receive a cost-sharing payment of up to seventy-five percent of the 

2001 average county cost of approved practices implemented pursuant to a 

conservation security contract. 16 U.S.C. § 3838c(b)(1)(C)(ii), (b)(1)(D)(ii), 

(b)(1)(E)(ii). In addition, “beginning farmers or ranchers” may receive a higher 

cost-sharing payment of up to ninety percent of the 2001 average county cost of 

the conservation practices implemented under their contracts. Id.

Finally, eligible producers may receive an enhanced payment for the

adoption or maintenance of certain conservation practices that exceed the 

minimum requirements for the applicable tier of conservation security contract. 

See id. § 3838c(b)(1)(C)(iii), (b)(1)(D)(iii), (b)(1)(E)(iii). Enhanced payments may 

be received for addressing local conservation priorities, participating in a research 

or pilot project, and in other limited circumstances. See id. The CSP statute 

provides that enhanced payments are to be “determined by the Secretary.” Id. § 

3838c(b)(1)(C)(iii). 

The total annual payment to an eligible producer is the sum of the adjusted 

base payment, cost-sharing payment, and enhanced payment (if any) to which a 

producer is entitled under its conservation security contract. The CSP statute 

provides that the total annual payment received by a producer may not exceed 

$20,000 for a Tier I contract, $35,000 for a Tier II contract, or $45,000 for a Tier 

III contract. Id. § 3838c(b)(2)(A). In addition, the adjusted base payment 

component of the total annual payment under a conservation security contract may 

not amount to more than $5000 for a Tier I contract, $10,500 for a Tier II contract, 

or $13,500 for a Tier III contract. Id. § 3838c(b)(2)(B).

B. Congressional Limitations on Program Spending

From its inception, the CSP has not been operated with annually 

appropriated funds. PPFUF ¶ 6. Rather, the 2002 Farm Bill provided that the CSP 

would be funded through borrowing authority funds drawn from the Commodity 

Credit Corporation (CCC). Pub. L. No. 107-171, tit. II, sec. 2701, § 1241, 116 

Stat. at 278; see also PPFUF ¶ 7. The CCC is a federal corporation that was 

created to stabilize, support, and protect farm prices, and provides financing for 

6
various agricultural programs administered by the USDA. 15 U.S.C. § 714 (2012); 

PPFUF ¶ 8.

The 2002 Farm Bill initially provided an unlimited source of CCC funds for 

the CSP. Meyers v. United States, 96 Fed. Cl. 34, 39 (2010); Fourth Am. Compl. ¶ 

10. Congress, however, subsequently imposed a number of annual and multi-year 

spending limitations on the Program. In February 2003, Congress enacted the 

Consolidated Appropriations Resolution of 2003, which imposed a multi-year 

limitation on CSP spending of “not more than $3,773,000,000 for the period of 

fiscal years 2003 through 2013.” Pub. L. No. 108-7, div. N, tit. II, sec. 216(c), § 

1241(a)(3), 117 Stat. 11, 546; Pl.’s Resp. to DPFUF ¶ 12. Congress subsequently 

removed this multi-year limitation in January 2004, when it enacted the 

Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2004, and instead instituted a $41,443,000 

annual spending limitation for FY 2004. Pub. L. No. 108-199, div. A, tit. VII, §

752, 118 Stat. 3, 38 (“Not more than $41,443,000 for fiscal year 2004 of the funds 

appropriated or otherwise made available by this or any other Act shall be used to 

carry out the conservation security program . . . .”); Fourth Am. Compl. ¶ 20; Pl.’s 

Resp. to DPFUF ¶¶ 12-13. In October 2004, however, Congress enacted the 

Military Construction Appropriations and Emergency Hurricane Supplemental 

Appropriations Act of 2005, which instituted a new $6,037,000,000 multi-year 

limitation on CSP spending for the period from FY 2005 through FY 2014. Pub. 

L. No. 108-324, div. B, ch. 1, sec. 101(e), § 1241(a)(3), 118 Stat. 1220, 1235

(2004); Fourth Am. Compl. ¶ 29; Pl.’s Resp. to DPFUF ¶ 12.

In December 2004 and November 2005, Congress enacted appropriations 

acts for FY 2005 and FY 2006, respectively, which provided that “[n]one of the 

funds appropriated or otherwise made available by this or any other Act shall be 

used to pay the salaries and expenses of personnel to carry out a Conservation 

Security Program” in excess of $202,411,000 for FY 2005 and $259,000,000 for 

FY 2006. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-447, div. A, 

tit. VII, § 749, 118 Stat. 2809, 2845 (2004); Agriculture, Rural Development, Food 

and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 2006 (2006 

Appropriations Act), Pub. L. No. 109-97, tit. VII, § 741, 119 Stat. 2120, 2155

(2005); Fourth Am. Compl. ¶¶ 30, 38; Pl.’s Resp. to DPFUF ¶¶ 14, 16. 

In February 2006, Congress enacted the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, by

which it extended the Program through 2011, removed the $6,037,000,000 multi7
year limitation on CSP spending for the period of FY 2005 through FY 2014, and 

imposed new multi-year limitations of $1,954,000,000 for the period of FY 2006 

through FY 2010 and $5,650,000,000 for the period of FY 2006 through FY 2015. 

Pub. L. No. 109-171, tit. I, sec. 1202(b), § 1241(a)(3), 120 Stat. at 5-6; Fourth Am. 

Compl. ¶¶ 10, 46. 

Congress did not pass an appropriation bill for FY 2007. Fourth Am. 

Compl. ¶ 47; PPFUF ¶¶ 77-79. Instead, it passed a series of continuing 

appropriations resolutions, the culmination of which was the Revised Continuing 

Appropriations Resolution of 2007, which amended the 2006 Appropriations Act

but continued the $259,000,000 annual limitation on CSP salaries and expenses 

that had been enacted in the 2006 Appropriations Act. Pub. L. No. 110-5, sec. 2, § 

20115, 121 Stat. 8, 16; see Fourth Am. Compl. ¶ 47; PPFUF ¶¶ 77-80. In May 

2007, however, Congress enacted the U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans’ Care, 

Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act of 2007 (the 

Katrina Act), which eliminated the $259,000,000 annual limitation on CSP salaries 

and expenses which had been imposed by the 2006 Appropriations Act but left in 

place the multi-year limitations on CSP spending which had been enacted in the 

Deficit Reduction Act of 2005. Pub. L. No. 110-28, tit. IX, sec. 9010, § 20115, 

121 Stat. 112, 218; Fourth Am. Compl. ¶ 52; Pl.’s Resp. to DPFUF ¶ 20.

C. The 2008 Farm Bill

In 2008, Congress passed the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 

(the 2008 Farm Bill), which replaced the CSP with a new Conservation 

Stewardship Program to be carried out in FY 2009 through FY 2012 (codified at 

16 U.S.C. §§ 3838d-3838g), and further provided that the Service was not 

authorized to enter into or renew any CSP contracts after September 30, 2008 

(codified at 16 U.S.C. § 3838a(g)(1)). See Pub. L. No. 110-246, tit. II, subtit. D, § 

2301, 122 Stat. 1651, 1768. The 2008 Farm Bill further provided that all CSP 

contracts executed on or before September 30, 2008 – as well as those CSP 

contracts executed after that date for which an application was received by the 

Service during the 2008 sign-up period – would continue to receive payments 

under the program. See 16 U.S.C. § 3838a(g)(2); Meyers, 96 Fed. Cl. at 39. The 

2008 Farm Bill also removed the multi-year limitations on CSP spending that had 

been enacted in the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, and instead directed the Service 

to carry out the Program “using such sums as are necessary to administer contracts 

8
entered into before September 30, 2008.” Pub. L. No. 110-246, tit. II, subtit. D, 

sec. 2701(c), § 1241(a)(3), 122 Stat. at 1800 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 

3841(a)(3)(A)). 

D. The Service’s Implementation of the Program

The 2002 Farm Bill contained an express delegation of rulemaking authority

that specifically empowered the Secretary of Agriculture, acting through the 

Service, to adopt regulations necessary to implement the CSP statute. See Pub. L. 

No. 107-171, tit. II, § 2001(b), 116 Stat. at 233 (“Not later than 270 days after the 

date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Agriculture shall promulgate 

regulations implementing the amendment made by subsection (a).”); Meyers, 96 

Fed. Cl. at 53; Pl.’s Resp. to DPFUF ¶ 26. Additionally, the CSP statute itself 

requires the Service to promulgate regulations to protect the interests of tenants 

and sharecroppers and to ensure a fair and reasonable application of the payment 

criteria set forth in the statute. See 16 U.S.C. § 3838c(d). 

Pursuant to this statutory grant of authority, the agency promulgated

regulations for the CSP in June 2004. See Interim Final Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. 34502 

(June 21, 2004) (codified as amended at 7 C.F.R. §§ 1469.1-1469.36 (2013)). The 

implementing regulations include a number of provisions that were not contained 

in the CSP statute. Most pertinent to plaintiff’s claims here, the regulations

establish a mechanism for prioritizing applications by assigning them to enrollment 

categories and subcategories, and set forth a method for calculating base payments 

and adjusted base payments. 

First, the regulations provide that the Service will assign enrollment 

categories and subcategories to each applicant in accordance with various criteria

specified in the sign-up notice for the applicable fiscal year. 7 C.F.R. § 1469.6(b). 

At each program sign-up, the agency “will announce the order in which categories 

and subcategories are eligible to be funded.” Id. § 1469.6(b)(4). Enrollment 

categories are “funded in the order designated in the sign-up notice until the 

available funding is exhausted.” Id. § 1469.6(d)(1).

Second, with respect to base payments, the regulations provide that the 

agency “will initially calculate the average 2001 [national per-acre rental] rates 

using the Agriculture Foreign Investment Disclosure Act (AFIDA) Land Value 

9
Survey, the National Agriculture Statistics Service (NASS) land rental data, and 

Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) rental rates.” 7 C.F.R. § 1469.23(a)(2)(i). 

Additionally, “[w]here typical rental rates for a given land use vary widely within a 

State or between adjacent States, NRCS will adjust the county-level rates to ensure 

local and regional consistency and equity.” Id. § 1469.23(a)(2)(ii); see also

PPFUF ¶ 28. The regulations further provide that adjusted base payments are to be 

calculated by multiplying the base payment by a tier-specific reduction factor of 

twenty-five percent for Tier I contracts, fifty percent for Tier II contracts, and 

seventy-five percent for Tier III contracts, and then by the tier-specific percentage 

set forth in the CSP statute (five percent for Tier I contracts, ten percent for Tier II

contracts, and fifteen percent for Tier III contracts). 7 C.F.R. § 1469.23(a)(2)(iv), 

(a)(3); Fourth Am. Compl. ¶¶ 25-26, 85; PPFUF ¶ 31; Pl.’s Resp. to DPFUF ¶ 43. 

Finally, the regulations provide that “[i]n the event that annual funding is 

insufficient to fund existing contract commitments, the existing contracts will be 

pro-rated in that contract year.” 7 C.F.R. § 1469.23(h).

Between FY 2004 and FY 2008, the Service administered the CSP in 

accordance with the regulations. In each published sign-up notice to prospective

CSP participants, the agency announced that it intended to sort responsive 

applications (i.e., those which met minimum requirements of the Program) into 

enrollment categories and subcategories which would be funded in the order 

specified in the sign-up notice until all available funds were exhausted. 69 Fed. 

Reg. 34533, 34533 (June 21, 2004); 70 Fed. Reg. 15277, 15278 (Mar. 25, 2005); 

71 Fed. Reg. 6250, 6250 (Feb. 7, 2006); 73 Fed. Reg. 16246, 16246 (Mar. 27, 

2008). Each sign-up notice further stated that payments would be prorated if a 

category or subcategory could not be fully funded. 69 Fed. Reg. at 34535; 70 Fed. 

Reg. at 15280; 71 Fed. Reg. at 6250; 73 Fed. Reg. at 16246, 16249. Additionally, 

each sign-up notice indicated that adjusted base payments – i.e., stewardship 

payments – would be calculated by applying the tier-specific percentage set forth 

in the CSP statute as well as the additional tier-specific reduction factor specified 

in the implementing regulations. See 69 Fed. Reg. at 34534-35; 70 Fed. Reg. at 

15279; 71 Fed. Reg. at 6252; 73 Fed. Reg. at 16248-49; Pl.’s Resp. to DPFUF ¶

56.

3

 Consistent with its sign-up notices, from FY 2004 through FY 2008, the 

3

/ Each sign-up notice also stated that cost-sharing payments for existing practices would 

be calculated as a flat rate of twenty-five percent of the adjusted base payment. 69 Fed. Reg. at 

10

 

(continued . . .)
Service calculated base payments and adjusted base payments pursuant to the 

methodology set forth in 7 C.F.R. § 1469.23. PPFUF ¶¶ 33, 66, 76, 89, 127. 

In FY 2005, the Service spent a total of $194,592,715 on the Program, of 

which between $25,000,000 and $30,000,000 was spent on technical assistance

and the remainder was spent on financial assistance. See PPFUF ¶ 64; Pl.’s Resp. 

to DPFUF ¶ 15. In FY 2006, the Service spent approximately $250,000,000 on the 

Program, of which between $34,000,000 and $39,000,000 was spent on technical 

assistance and the remainder was spent on financial assistance. In FY 2007, the 

Service spent between $288,000,000 and $297,000,000 on the Program, of which 

between $22,500,000 and $26,500,000 was spent on technical assistance and the 

remainder was spent on financial assistance. Although the parties dispute the 

precise amounts expended on technical and financial assistance in FY 2005 

through FY 2007, the aforementioned ranges are undisputed and in any event, the 

variances between Mr. Earman’s and defendant’s estimation of the technical and 

financial assistance provided to CSP participants in FY 2005 through FY 2007 are 

immaterial to the court’s resolution of this case.

E. Plaintiff’s Contract

In response to defendant’s sign-up notice for FY 2005, Mr. Earman filed an 

application to enroll in the CSP and, on September 21, 2005, entered into a tenyear Tier II CSP contract with the CCC pursuant to which he agreed to utilize 

certain specified conservation practices in the operation of his farm.4

 Fourth Am. 

Compl. ¶ 64; PPFUF ¶¶ 44, 49. On January 16, 2007, Mr. Earman’s contract was 

modified to a Tier III contract because plaintiff had satisfied the additional 

eligibility requirements for Tier III contracts. PPFUF ¶ 49. Plaintiff’s contract, as 

modified, consists of four components: (1) a Conservation Program 

Application/Contract; (2) a Contract Appendix; (3) a Conservation Plan Schedule 

34534-35; 70 Fed. Reg. at 15279; 71 Fed. Reg. at 6252; 73 Fed. Reg. at 16248-49; PPFUF ¶¶ 26, 

42, 72, 121; Pl.’s Resp. to DPFUF ¶ 34. 

4

/ Mr. Earman’s contract, like all CSP contracts, is administered by the Service on behalf 

of the CCC. PPFUF ¶¶ 16, 53; Declaration of Michael Hubbs (Hubbs Decl.) Ex. 1 at A00016 

(“NRCS is administering this Contract on behalf of the CCC. Therefore, where this Contract 

refers to ‘CCC,’ NRCS may act on its behalf for the purposes of administering this Contract.”). 

11

 
of Operations (the Schedule of Operations); and (4) a revised Conservation Plan 

Schedule of Operations reflecting plaintiff’s contract modification (the revised 

Schedule of Operations). Pl.’s Resp. to DPFUF ¶ 67; Hubbs Decl. Exs. 1-3 

(Earman Contract).

Mr. Earman’s contract, as modified, provides for an expiration date of 

September 30, 2014. Pl.’s Resp. to DPFUF ¶ 2; Hubbs Decl. Ex. 3 at A00046. 

Although the contract provides for termination in certain circumstances, see Hubbs 

Decl. Ex. 1 at A00015 (Contract Appendix ¶¶ 10, 12), plaintiff’s contract has not 

been terminated and remains in effect. 

Regarding payments under plaintiff’s contract, paragraph 5A of the Contract 

Appendix provides, in pertinent part:

Subject to the availability of funds, CCC will make 

stewardship, existing practice, new practice or 

enhancement payments at the rates specified in this

Contract after a determination by CCC that an eligible 

practice or activity has been established in compliance 

with the conservation stewardship plan of operations and 

in accordance with appropriate standards and 

specifications.

Hubbs Decl. Ex. 1 at A00012; see also Fourth Am. Compl. ¶ 67. Paragraph 5F of 

the Contract Appendix further provides:

Payment under this Contract is subject to the availability 

of funds. In the event that annual funding is insufficient 

to fund existing contract requirements, payment on the 

existing contracts will be prorated in that contract year, 

as determined by the Chief.

Hubbs Decl. Ex. 1 at A00013.

The Schedule of Operations set forth eight specific conservation activities 

that plaintiff was contractually obligated to perform in 2005, as well as the 

payment amounts corresponding to each item. PPFUF ¶ 59 (citing Hubbs Decl. 

Ex. 1 at A00021-23, A00037). The payment amounts corresponding to these eight 

12
conservation activities totaled $5091. Id. ¶¶ 59, 61. The Schedule of Operations 

also includes Item No. 88, entitled “[r]eduction due to insufficient annual funding,”

by which plaintiff’s annual payments have been reduced by $2648. Fourth Am. 

Compl. ¶ 68; PPFUF ¶ 62; Hubbs Decl. Ex. 2 at A00042.

5

 As a result of this 

reduction, Mr. Earman received a total payment of $2443 in FY 2005. See Fourth 

Am. Compl. ¶ 65; PPFUF ¶ 62; Hubbs Decl. Ex. 2 at A00044. This payment, as 

well as each subsequent payment made to Mr. Earman under his contract, was

calculated in accordance with the methodology set forth in the regulations at 7 

C.F.R. §1469.23. See Fourth Am. Compl. ¶¶ 85-89; Pl.’s Mot. at 26 (“Utilizing 

these rates set forth in the regulations, the agency established base payments (and 

consequently calculated adjusted base payments) that were far lower than would 

have been the case had the 2001 national average rental rates been used.” (citing

PPFUF ¶ 116)), 27 n.34 (noting that 7 C.F.R. § 1469.23 “sets out the further 

mechanism by which adjusted base payments (‘called the stewardship component 

of a participant’s CSP payment’) are computed under the regulations” (citing 7 

C.F.R. § 1469.23(a)(2)(ii)-(v), (a)(3))); 29 n.36 (noting that the regulations “form 

the basis for the improper amounts . . . paid to plaintiff (and each member of the 

yet-to-be certified class)”).

II. Procedural History

A. Initial Proceedings 

On September 14, 2010, pseudonymous plaintiff John Doe filed his initial 

complaint in this case. In that complaint, Mr. Doe, a CSP contractor, sought to 

recover damages for the government’s alleged failure to make sufficient payments 

to him under his contract. On the same day he filed his complaint, Mr. Doe filed a 

motion to proceed under a pseudonym.

On September 30, 2010, Mr. Doe filed a motion for class certification, in 

which he requested that the court designate him as the representative of a class of 

similarly situated plaintiffs and appoint his counsel as the attorney of record for the 

5

/ Plaintiff’s revised Schedule of Operations, which reflects plaintiff’s 2007 contract 

modification, also includes a similar “[r]eduction due to insufficient annual funding” proviso. 

Hubbs Decl. Ex. 3 at A00078.

13

 
proposed class. Mr. Doe also filed, by right, his First Amended Complaint for the 

purpose of accommodating potential class members in his proposed class action.

On November 15, 2010, the government filed an unopposed motion to stay 

the proceedings in this case pending the court’s ruling on the government’s motion 

to dismiss the complaint in the related case of Meyers v. United States, No. 09-538. 

Because the legal and factual issues in this case were closely related to those 

involved in Meyers, the court granted the motion to stay this case on November 17, 

2010.

On December 23, 2010, the court dismissed the three-count complaint in 

Meyers in its entirety. In reaching that decision, the court held that “the CSP –

understood as encompassing the CSP statute and its implementing regulations –

fails to meet any of the three prongs under Samish II [Samish Indian Nation v. 

United States, 419 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2005)] and is therefore not a moneymandating source of law in this court.” 96 Fed. Cl. at 60. The court also held that 

the government’s denial of benefits under the CSP did not effect a taking of private 

property requiring compensation under the Fifth Amendment because the plaintiffs 

did not possess any compensable property rights in monetary benefits under the 

CSP. Id. at 62-64.

The plaintiffs in Meyers appealed this court’s decision to the United States 

Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit on February 18, 2011, but they 

subsequently moved to voluntarily dismiss their appeal. The Federal Circuit 

granted that motion and dismissed the appeal on May 9, 2011.

On June 21, 2011, following the dismissal of the appeal in Meyers, this court 

lifted the stay of proceedings in this case. In response to a request from the parties, 

the court ordered Mr. Doe to file another amended complaint on or before June 29, 

2011. The court also ordered defendant to respond to Mr. Doe’s motion to proceed 

under a pseudonym. Finally, the court directed the Clerk’s Office to continue the 

stay of proceedings for the pending motion for class certification.6

6

/ Pursuant to the court’s order of June 21, 2011, the motion for class certification 

remains suspended.

14

 
Mr. Doe filed his Second Amended Complaint on June 29, 2011, and the 

government moved to dismiss that complaint pursuant to RCFC 12(b)(1) and 

RCFC 12(b)(6) on August 29, 2011.

B. Proceedings Involving Mr. Earman

Mr. Doe did not respond to the government’s motion to dismiss; instead, 

with the consent of the government, he filed a five-count Third Amended 

Complaint on September 30, 2011. The Third Amended Complaint included a 

new named plaintiff, Kenneth Earman, in addition to Mr. Doe. The complaint also 

set forth the RCFC 23 class action requirements that had been omitted from the 

earlier versions of the complaint. The court denied the government’s pending 

motion to dismiss as moot on October 3, 2011. On December 2, 2011, defendant 

filed a motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, to dismiss the Third 

Amended Complaint.

On July 30, 2012, the court granted the government’s motion to dismiss 

under RCFC 12(b)(1) with respect to Count I of the Third Amended Complaint, 

but denied the government’s motion with respect to all remaining counts. In 

reaching that decision, the court held that Mr. Doe and Mr. Earman had failed to 

exhaust their administrative remedies as required by law. In a separate order 

issued the same day, the court denied Mr. Doe’s motion to proceed under a 

pseudonym and also ordered Mr. Doe to either reveal his true identity or withdraw 

from the case. On August 8, 2012, Mr. Doe voluntarily withdrew from this suit, 

leaving Mr. Earman as the sole plaintiff in this case.7

With permission of the court, Mr. Earman filed a Fourth Amended 

Complaint on November 19, 2012. The Fourth Amended Complaint contains five 

counts. In the first count, Mr. Earman seeks reformation of his contract to excise 

the “[r]eduction due to insufficient annual funding” proviso in Item 88 of the 

Schedule of Operations. Plaintiff contends that Item 88 is contrary to law and 

based on the mistaken belief that sufficient funding was not available to make 

“full” adjusted base payments to CSP participants, i.e., adjusted base payments 

calculated without using an additional reduction factor. Mr. Earman also seeks 

7

/ The court will henceforth refer to Mr. Earman as “plaintiff” or by name. 

15

 
reformation on behalf of a putative class of similarly situated CSP participants to 

excise similar provisos in their CSP contracts. 

In the second count, plaintiff alleges that the government breached his and 

similarly situated CSP participants’ contracts in FY 2005 and each year thereafter

by paying lower base payments than the CSP statute required. In the third count, 

presented as an alternative to Count II, plaintiff alleges that the government has 

breached his and similarly situated CSP participants’ contracts since at least May 

2007 by continuing to pay lower base payments even after Congress had removed

annual limitations on CSP spending. Mr. Earman further alleges that these alleged 

underpayments have resulted in a reduced existing practice cost-sharing payment. 

In Counts II and III, Mr. Earman seeks damages for amounts he and similarly 

situated CSP participants have allegedly been underpaid.

In the fourth count, Mr. Earman asserts that he and others similarly situated 

possess a contractual right of renewal and that the government breached this right 

by enacting the 2008 Farm Bill, which prohibited the renewal of any CSP contracts 

after September 30, 2008. In the fifth count, plaintiff alleges, in the alternative to 

Count IV, that the abrogation of his and similarly situated CSP participants’ 

alleged right of renewal effected an uncompensated taking in violation of the Fifth 

Amendment to the United States Constitution. 

C. The Pending Motions

On February 1, 2013, the government filed a motion to dismiss Counts II 

and III of the Fourth Amended Complaint under RCFC 12(b)(6), as well as a 

motion for summary judgment on Counts I, IV, and V under RCFC 56. On March 

20, 2013, plaintiff filed a response to the government’s motions as well as a crossmotion for summary judgment on all counts. The government filed its reply and 

response on June 28, 2013, and plaintiff filed his reply on August 1, 2013. 

Defendant moves to dismiss Counts II and III for failure to state a claim on 

the ground that plaintiff fails to allege any provision of his contract entitling him to 

the additional payments he seeks. Defendant further contends that to the extent 

plaintiff is challenging the agency’s payment methodology without reference to 

specific contractual terms and conditions, the court lacks jurisdiction over Counts 

II and III because, as the court held in Meyers, the CSP is not a money-mandating 

16
source of law sufficient to confer jurisdiction under the Tucker Act. Additionally, 

defendant argues that the Service’s methodology for calculating payments to CSP 

participants, as set forth in the agency’s regulations, is entitled to deference under 

Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 

(1984).

In response to the government’s arguments for dismissal of Count II, 

plaintiff contends that deference is inappropriate because the Service’s 

methodology for calculating base payments and adjusted base payments is contrary 

to the CSP statute and its legislative history. With respect to Count III, plaintiff 

argues that the Service violated its own implementing regulations by continuing to 

calculate adjusted base payments using an additional reduction factor after 

Congress had removed annual limitations on CSP spending. Plaintiff contends that 

these alleged violations constitute a breach of his contract because the CSP statute 

and regulations are incorporated into his contract. Furthermore, as an additional 

argument in support of Count II, plaintiff argues that he is entitled to reformation 

of his contract because it is contrary to the CSP statute. 

In reply, defendant argues that the Service’s methodology is consistent with, 

and gives effect to, the plain meaning of the CSP statute and regulations. 

Additionally, defendant contends that, even if the CSP statute and regulations were 

ambiguous, the agency’s methodology reflects a reasonable and permissible 

construction of the statute and regulations. 

Defendant also moves for summary judgment on Counts I, IV, and V. 

Regarding Count I, defendant argues that plaintiff cannot establish that he is 

entitled to contract reformation based on an assertion of mutual mistake. With 

respect to Counts IV and V, defendant asserts that plaintiff’s contract does not 

provide a right of renewal and, thus, plaintiff is unable to demonstrate a specific 

contractual provision that has been breached and has no cognizable property 

interest that could be the subject of a valid takings claim under the Fifth 

Amendment. In response, plaintiff argues that his contract provides a right of 

renewal because it incorporates the CSP statute, including 16 U.S.C. § 

3838a(e)(4)(A), which plaintiff asserts required all CSP contracts to be renewable 

at the option of the contractor. 

17
Finally, with respect to Count V, defendant contends that plaintiff’s alleged 

right of renewal is not the proper subject of a takings claim because it arises 

exclusively under plaintiff’s contract. In response, plaintiff argues that his takings 

claim is an alternative to his breach of contract claim in Count IV, and asks the 

court to stay the filing of plaintiff’s reply as to Count V, as well as the court’s 

disposition of count V, pending the court’s resolution of Count IV.8

DISCUSSION

I. Standards of Review

A. RCFC 12(b)(6) 

It is well-settled that a complaint should be dismissed under RCFC 12(b)(6) 

“when the facts asserted by the claimant do not entitle him to a legal remedy.” 

Lindsay v. United States, 295 F.3d 1252, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2002). When considering 

a motion to dismiss under this rule, “the allegations of the complaint should be 

construed favorably to the pleader.” Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), 

abrogated on other grounds by Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). 

“[W]hen the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of 

entitlement to relief,” dismissal is warranted under RCFC 12(b)(6). Bell Atlantic 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007). To survive a motion to dismiss for 

failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain “more than labels and 

conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not 

do.” Id. at 555. While a complaint is not required to contain detailed factual 

allegations, it must provide “enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible 

on its face.” Id. at 570. In order to meet the requirement of facial plausibility, the 

plaintiff must plead “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 

B. RCFC 56 

8

/ No such request for a stay was included in plaintiff’s opening brief. Indeed, in that 

brief, plaintiff requested summary judgment on Count V. Pl.’s Mot. at 3, 65-67.

18

 
The availability of summary judgment helps a federal court “‘to secure the 

just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.’” Celotex Corp. v. 

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 1). Summary judgment 

is appropriate where there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. RCFC 56(a); Anderson v. 

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986). A fact is material if it would affect 

the outcome of the suit. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. A dispute of material fact is 

genuine if a reasonable trier of fact could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. 

See id.; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 

(1986) (citation omitted) (stating that there is no genuine issue “[w]here the record 

taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving 

party”). 

The moving party bears the burden of showing the absence of any genuine 

issue of material fact. Dairyland Power Coop. v. United States, 16 F.3d 1197, 

1202 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325). All doubt over factual 

issues must be resolved in favor of the party opposing summary judgment. Mingus 

Constructors, Inc. v. United States, 812 F.2d 1387, 1390 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 

However, the nonmoving party has the burden of producing sufficient evidence to 

show a genuine dispute of material fact which would allow a reasonable finder of 

fact to rule in its favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. Such evidence need not be 

admissible at trial; nevertheless, mere denials, conclusory statements or evidence 

that is merely colorable or not significantly probative are not sufficient to preclude 

summary judgment. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50, 256; 

Mingus, 812 F.2d at 1390-91; see also Barmag Barmer Maschinenfabrik AG v. 

Murata Mach., Ltd., 731 F.2d 831, 835-36 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“With respect to 

whether there is a genuine issue, the court may not simply accept a party’s 

statement that a fact is challenged.”) (citation omitted). “The party opposing the 

motion must point to an evidentiary conflict created on the record by at least a 

counter statement of a fact or facts set forth in detail in an affidavit by a 

knowledgeable affiant.” Barmag, 731 F.2d at 836. Summary judgment must be 

granted against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the 

existence of an essential element to that party’s case and on which that party bears

the burden of proof at trial. Dairyland, 16 F.3d at 1202 (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 

323).

19
Cross-motions for summary judgment “are not an admission that no material 

facts remain at issue.” Massey v. Del Labs., Inc., 118 F.3d 1568, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 

1997) (citing United States v. Fred A. Arnold, Inc., 573 F.2d 605, 606 (9th Cir. 

1978)). The parties may focus on different legal principles and allege as 

undisputed a different set of facts. Id. “Each party carries the burden on its own 

motion to show entitlement to judgment as a matter of law after demonstrating the 

absence of any genuine disputes over material facts.” Id.

II. Analysis 

A. Contract Reformation Claim (Count I)

In Count I, Mr. Earman seeks reformation of his contract to excise the 

“[r]eduction due to insufficient annual funding” proviso in Item 88 of the Schedule 

of Operations by which plaintiff’s annual payment under his contract was reduced 

by $2648 in FY 2005 and each fiscal year thereafter. See Fourth Am. Compl. ¶¶ 

34-36, 64-82; PPFUF ¶¶ 62-63. Plaintiff argues that Item 88 must be excised from 

his contract because it was based on the Service’s “mistaken belief that in fiscal 

years (‘FY’) 2005 and 2006 insufficient funds were available to pay all CSP 

contractors in full for work required to be performed under their contracts.” Pl.’s 

Mot. at 4; see also Fourth Am. Compl. ¶¶ 64-82. 

Mr. Earman’s argument in that regard rests on two factual premises. First, 

plaintiff contends that the inclusion of Item 88 in his contract was based on the 

Service’s belief that insufficient funds were available to the Service to make 

financial assistance payments “in full” to CSP participants, i.e., payments 

calculated without using an additional reduction factor. In support of this premise, 

plaintiff refers to the Service’s discussion of its interim final regulations, in which 

the agency stated that it would (1) make payments to CSP participants according to 

enrollment categories and subcategories until CSP funding is exhausted and (2) 

reduce adjusted base payments by applying an additional reduction factor in those 

years in which the CSP is “only partially funded”:

The CSP statutory provisions were written without a 

specific mechanism for limiting payments if the program 

were only partially funded. With a cap of $41.443 

million for FY 2004, this interim final rule adopts 

20
provisions of the proposed rule setting forth a mechanism 

for limiting payments for those years when the CSP is 

only partially funded. In this regard, the interim final 

rule includes provisions to:

• Limit the sign-up periods.

• Limit participation to priority watersheds.

• Limit participation to certain enrollment 

categories.

• Reduce stewardship (base) payments by applying a 

reduction factor.

• Limit the number and type of existing and new 

practice payments.

. . . .

Once the highest enrollment category’s applications are 

funded within all priority watersheds, the next category 

would be funded, etc. If all the applications in a category 

cannot be funded, then NRCS will fund subcategories in 

the same manner. Subcategories will be announced in 

each sign-up. Funding will be distributed to each 

succeeding category to fund subcategories until funding 

is exhausted.

69 Fed. Reg. at 34503, 34506; see Pl.’s Mot. at 8; PPFUF ¶¶ 30, 37. Plaintiff also 

refers to the Service’s 2005 and 2006 sign-up notices, which stated that enrollment 

categories would be funded in order until available funding was exhausted, and 

that “[i]f funds are not available to fund an entire category, then the applications 

will fall into subcategories and funded in order until funds are exhausted.” 70 Fed. 

Reg. at 15278; 71 Fed. Reg. at 6250; see Def.’s Mot. at 9-10; PPFUF ¶¶ 43, 71. 

These authorities, plaintiff contends, “demonstrate[] . . . [that] to the extent 

that funds were available, the agency’s intention was to enter into CSP contracts 

pursuant to which it would pay the contractor at the full rates specified therein for 

the work required of him under the contract.” Pl.’s Mot. at 9 (citing PPFUF ¶ 38). 

Based on this alleged intention of the Service to make “full” payment so long as 

21
sufficient funds were “available” to the agency, plaintiff argues that Item 88 “states 

that his payments for 2005 were being reduced because funds were not available to 

make full payment.” Pl.’s Reply at 2.

As to plaintiff’s second factual premise in support of his reformation claim, 

plaintiff asserts that because the Service did not spend the full amount of its annual 

or multi-year spending limits for the CSP in FY 2005 or FY 2006, and because the 

Service spent more on technical assistance in those years than the total amount of 

alleged financial assistance underpayment to plaintiff and similarly situated CSP 

participants, sufficient funds were in fact “available” to make “full” payments to 

the contractors:

[T]here never was any such insufficient funding for CSP 

contracts in FY 2005 (or in FY 2006). Accordingly, even 

if potential CSP participants knew that funding could be 

pro-rated if sufficient funds were not available, that 

knowledge was of no moment where, as here, albeit not 

realized by either party, sufficient funds were, in fact, 

always available to make full payments to all contractors.

Pl.’s Mot. at 10. In this regard, plaintiff first notes that the Service spent only 

$194,592,715 on the Program in FY 2005 – “$7,818,285 less than the 

[$202,411,000] which Congress allowed it to spend.” Id. at 15. According to 

plaintiff, “[b]ecause there is no evidence that these funds were expended 

elsewhere, all $7,818,285 was available (and in fact more than sufficient) to have 

fully paid plaintiff and those similarly situated the $6,207,298 that they were 

denied in FY 2005 because of an alleged insufficiency of funds to do so.” Id.

(citing PPFUF ¶ 64).

9

 Plaintiff also asserts that, of the $194,592,715 spent on the 

CSP in FY 2005, more than $25,000,000 was spent on technical assistance – which 

9

/ Plaintiff makes a similar argument with respect to FY 2006, noting that the Service 

spent only approximately $250,000,000 on the Program in FY 2006 – which plaintiff contends is 

“$8.7 million less than what Congress allowed NRCS to spend.” Pl.’s Mot. at 15 n.24 (citing 

PPFUF ¶ 67). Plaintiff also asserts that “[t]his $8.7 million represents 70% of the amount 

($12,506,369) that CSP contractors were denied due to an alleged insufficiency of funds in FY 

2006.” Id. 

22

 
plaintiff contends is “an amount considerably in excess of the $6,207,298 by which 

Earman and others similarly situated were underpaid in FY 2005.” Id. at 12.10 

From these two factual premises, plaintiff draws the conclusion that 

“plaintiff’s contract (like that of each person similarly situated) was expressly 

based on the erroneous belief that such funds were not available. . . . [and] [t]his 

mistake as to the amount of funds actually available constituted the basic 

assumption underlying the inclusion in the contract of a Reduction Due to 

Insufficient Funding provision and the 50% reduction in the amount that Mr. 

Earman was paid for his services in 2005.” Pl.’s Mot. at 13-14 (footnotes omitted). 

Accordingly, plaintiff argues, “under the rules governing reformation of 

government contracts, Mr. Earman and all others similarly situated are entitled to 

reformation excising the ‘reduction due to insufficient funding’ provision from 

their contracts and payment for the amounts denied them as a result of the 

inclusion of that provision.” Id. at 14 (citations omitted).

As defendant correctly notes, reformation of a written agreement on the 

ground of mutual mistake is an “extraordinary remedy” and is available only upon 

satisfactory proof of four elements: (1) the parties to the contract were mistaken in 

their belief regarding a fact; (2) that mistaken belief constituted a basic assumption 

underlying the contract; (3) the mistake had a material effect on the bargain; and

(4) the contract did not put the risk of the mistake on the party seeking reformation. 

Nat’l Australia Bank v. United States, 452 F.3d 1321, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2006); see

Def.’s Reply at 1-2. “The general rule is that the elements of a claim for 

reformation must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.” Nat’l Australia 

Bank, 452 F.3d at 1329 (citing Philippine Sugar Estates Dev. Co. v. Gov’t of 

Philippine Islands, 247 U.S. 385, 391 (1918) (stating that reformation will not be 

granted “unless the proof of mutual mistake be of the clearest and most satisfactory 

character”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted), 27 Williston on 

Contracts § 70.54 (4th ed.), and Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 155 cmt. c, at 

410 (1981)).

10/ Again, plaintiff makes a similar argument with respect to FY 2006, noting that of the 

approximately $250,000,000 spent on the CSP in FY 2006, at least $34,000,000 was spent on 

technical assistance – which plaintiff contends is “an amount considerably in excess of the 

amount ($12,506,369) that CSP contractors were underpaid due to an alleged insufficiency of 

funds in FY 2006.” Pl.’s Mot. at 12 n.19.

23

 
The purpose of reformation of a written agreement on the ground of mutual 

mistake is “‘to make [the written agreement] reflect the true agreement of the 

parties on which there was a meeting of the minds.’” Atlas Corp. v. United States, 

895 F.2d 745, 750 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (quoting Am. President Lines v. United States, 

821 F.2d 1571, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1987)); see also Philippine Sugar Estates, 247 U.S. 

at 389 (noting that “[i]t is well settled that courts of equity will reform a written 

contract where, owing to mutual mistake, the language used therein did not fully or 

accurately express the agreement and intention of the parties”); Nat’l Australia 

Bank, 452 F.3d at 1329 (“[R]eformation is available ‘when the parties, having 

reached an agreement and having attempted to reduce it to writing, fail to express it 

correctly in the writing.’” (quoting Indiana Ins. Co. v. Pana Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. 

No. 8, 314 F.3d 895, 903-04 (7th Cir. 2003), and Restatement (Second) of 

Contracts, supra, § 155 cmt. a, at 406)).

Defendant argues that plaintiff cannot establish the first element of his 

reformation claim because he “cannot demonstrate that the parties were mistaken 

in their belief that limited CSP funding was available at the time of contracting.” 

Def.’s Reply at 3. Defendant asserts that it is undisputed that Congress had 

imposed annual limitations on CSP spending in 2005 and 2006, and, therefore, the 

parties could not have been mistaken in their belief that only limited funding was 

available for the CSP at the time that plaintiff’s contract was executed. Id. 

Additionally, defendant argues that the Service’s failure to exhaust the annual CSP 

spending limitations in FY 2005 and FY 2006 demonstrates, at most, its imprecise 

prediction regarding the “future costs of providing technical and financial 

assistance for the CSP,” not a mistake relating to facts in existence at the time 

plaintiff’s contract was entered. Id. at 5-6. 

In response, plaintiff asserts that his reformation claim is not based on a 

mutual mistake regarding whether there was limited funding for the CSP. Rather, 

plaintiff contends that the mistake allegedly made by the parties was their 

supposedly erroneous belief that insufficient CSP funds were “legally available”

for the agency to make “full” payments to CSP participants, i.e., without applying

an additional reduction factor, even taking into account annual spending 

limitations:

24
Contrary to defendant’s contention, the mistake here is 

not whether there was limited funding for [the] CSP in 

2005 and 2006, but whether sufficient funds were legally 

available to pay plaintiff and 4,875 other CSP contractors 

for work required by contract. That is, there is no dispute 

that in 2005 and 2006, Congress had imposed limits on 

the ability of the Commodity Credit Corporation 

(“CCC”) to spend money that it possessed on the CSP 

program. However, taking those spending limits into 

account, here the parties mistakenly believed that 

sufficient money was not available at the time of 

contracting for the CCC to pay Earman in full for the 

work to be performed under the contract in 2005.

Pl.’s Reply at 2 (citations omitted).

As noted, supra, summary judgment must be granted against a party who 

fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an essential element 

to that party’s case and on which that party bears the burden of proof at trial. 

Dairyland, 16 F.3d at 1202 (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323). Having considered 

all of the parties’ arguments regarding Count I, the court agrees with defendant that 

plaintiff has not produced sufficient evidence to show that a mutual mistake of fact 

occurred in this instance. 

The first and most fundamental flaw with plaintiff’s arguments with respect 

to Count I is the failure to cite any evidence of Mr. Earman’s belief as to the 

unavailability of CSP funds to fully compensate him for his conservation activities. 

Here, neither of plaintiff’s briefs cites any record evidence as to Mr. Earman’s 

beliefs, mistaken or otherwise, as to the availability or unavailability of CSP funds 

to fully compensate him for his conservation activities. Aside from a bare, 

unsupported allegation that a mutual mistake occurred so as to warrant reformation 

of Mr. Earman’s contract, plaintiff’s theory of mutual mistake relies entirely on 

supposition regarding the Service’s alleged mistake of fact regarding the 

unavailability of CSP funds. This is not enough to support a claim of mutual 

mistake, or to survive defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to Count I.

25
Second, the mistake plaintiff alleges does not relate to a fact in existence at 

the time plaintiff’s contract was executed. To satisfy the first element of a claim 

for reformation, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the parties held an “erroneous 

belief as to an existing fact.” Atlas Corp., 895 F.2d at 750 (emphasis added). “If 

the existence of a fact is not known to the contracting parties, they cannot have a 

belief concerning that fact; therefore, there can be no ‘mistake.’” Id. The 

“availability” of CSP funds in FY 2005 and FY 2006, as plaintiff uses that term, is 

necessarily dependent upon the amount of technical assistance and financial 

assistance ultimately spent by the Service in FY 2005 and FY 2006. Plaintiff 

entered his contract on September 21, 2005, before the end of FY 2005. PPFUF ¶¶

44, 49. At that time, the Service’s total CSP spending for FY 2005 (let alone for 

FY 2006) was not an “existing fact” but rather a future event which the parties 

could only predict. “‘A party’s prediction or judgment as to events to occur in the 

future, even if erroneous, is not a mistake as that word is defined [under the 

doctrine of mutual mistake of fact].’” Dairyland, 16 F.3d at 1203 (quoting 

Restatement (Second) of Contracts, supra, § 151 cmt. a, at 383); see also Northrop 

Grumman Corp. v. United States, 47 Fed. Cl. 20, 53-54 (2000) (citing Dairyland,

16 F.3d at 1203). Plaintiff cannot sustain a claim for reformation on the ground of 

mutual mistake with regard to the “availability” of CSP funds in FY 2005 and FY

2006 when such “availability” could not be determined until after the time of 

contracting.

Third, plaintiff’s additional argument for reformation, based on the United 

States Supreme Court’s decision in Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma v. Leavitt, 543 

U.S. 631 (2005), is similarly without merit. Plaintiff relies on Cherokee for the 

proposition that the amount the Service chose to spend on technical assistance in 

FY 2005 and FY 2006 has no effect on the “legal availability” of sufficient funds 

to make “full” financial assistance payments in those years because the Service 

could have reduced spending on technical assistance and, correspondingly,

increased spending on financial assistance. In Cherokee, two Indian tribes sued the 

government for breach of contract for failure to make contractually required 

payment of “contract support costs” incurred by the tribes in supplying health 

services normally provided by the Department of Health and Human Services’ 

Indian Health Service. 543 U.S. at 635-37. The government did not deny that it 

promised, but failed, to pay these costs; rather, it argued it was excused from 

having to make these payments because Congress had not appropriated sufficient 

funds for the payments. Id. at 636. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the 

26
Indian tribes, finding that the government could not avoid its contractual 

obligations on the ground of insufficient appropriations. Id. at 636-47.

Plaintiff erroneously argues that the facts in Cherokee are “quite analogous” 

to the instant case, see Def.’s Reply at 16, and that “[t]he holding in Cherokee has 

direct applicability” to plaintiff’s reformation claim, see id. at 18. As defendant 

correctly notes, Cherokee did not involve a contract reformation claim. See 543 

U.S. at 631; Def.’s Reply at 6 n.7. Indeed, plaintiff has not cited, and the court has

not found, any decision of any court citing Cherokee in support of a contract 

reformation claim. Moreover, the contract at issue in Cherokee clearly required 

the government to make the payments demanded; indeed, the government in that 

case conceded it had promised to make such payments but argued that it was 

excused from its contractual obligation because of insufficient appropriations. See

543 U.S. at 636. Here, by contrast, plaintiff was paid the full amount he was 

entitled to receive under the terms of his written contract. See Fourth Am. Compl. 

¶ 65; PPFUF ¶ 62; Hubbs Decl. Ex. 2 at A00044 (Schedule of Operations stating 

that plaintiff’s total payment in FY 2005 would be $2443, i.e., $5091 minus the 

$2648 reduction set forth in Item 88). Thus, plaintiff’s reliance on Cherokee is 

misplaced.

Finally, in his reply brief, Mr. Earman argues for the first time that 

reformation of his contract is necessary to prevent the government from being 

unjustly enriched by withholding payment for the “full value” of plaintiff’s 

conservation activities in FY 2005 and FY 2006. Pl.’s Reply at 6 (citing United 

Elec. Corp. v. United States, 647 F.2d 1082, 1087 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (United Electric), 

and Land Grantors in Henderson, Union, & Webster Cntys. v. United States, 81 

Fed. Cl. 580, 609-11 (2008) (Land Grantors)). Because plaintiff raises this 

argument in his reply brief and defendant did not have an opportunity to respond, 

the argument is not properly before the court and the court need not consider it. 

See, e.g., Extreme Coatings, Inc. v. United States, 109 Fed. Cl. 450, 452 n.1 (2013) 

(stating that an argument raised for the first time in a reply brief is not properly 

before the court) (citations omitted). Moreover, even if plaintiff’s argument were

properly before the court, it is not persuasive because neither case cited by plaintiff 

involved a contract reformation claim. United Electric involved a subcontractor’s 

breach of contract claim against the government for compensation due under a 

subcontract where both the prime contractor and surety had failed or refused to 

make payment and where the government retained funds owing on the contract. 

27
The Court of Claims held that the subcontractor lacked standing to sue but noted, 

in dictum, that its holding “is not a happy result if [the subcontractor] ends up 

without payment to which it is entitled and for which contract money is available 

from the Government.” United Electric, 647 F.2d at 1087. Nothing in United 

Electric mandates reformation of a contract on the ground of unjust enrichment. 

Land Grantors involved a restitution claim based on alleged misrepresentations by 

one party to a contract and, accordingly, is completely inapposite to plaintiff’s 

reformation claim based on mutual mistake. 81 Fed. Cl. at 609 (noting that 

“misrepresentations made by Government agents in negotiating the 1942-44 

contracts were a factor in Claimants’ decision to sell [land containing coal, gas, oil, 

and mineral deposits], without further inquiry,” and that “mistake on one side and 

misrepresentation, whether willful or accidental, on the other, constitute a ground 

for reformation where the party misled has relied [on] the misrepresentation of the 

party seeking to bind him”) (citations omitted).

In summary, plaintiff has not identified sufficient evidence to raise a genuine 

issue of material fact as to the existence of a mutual mistake. Therefore, defendant 

is entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff’s contract reformation claim in Count 

I.

B. Breach of Contract Claim Based On Alleged Underpayment of 

Base Payments (Counts II and III)

As noted previously, Mr. Earman alleges in Counts II and III that the 

government has breached his contract – as well as the contracts of a putative class 

of similarly situated CSP participants – by paying lower base payments than were

required by his contract. Defendant moves to dismiss Counts II and III for failure 

to state a claim because plaintiff “fails to point to any provision of his contract that 

requires the specific payments he seeks” and even fails to attach a copy of his 

contract to the Fourth Amended Complaint. Def.’s Mot. at 9-11. 

In order to recover for a breach of contract, plaintiff must allege: (1) a valid 

contract between the parties; (2) an obligation or duty arising out of the contract; 

(3) a breach of that duty; and (4) damages caused by the breach. San Carlos 

Irrigation & Drainage Dist. v. United States, 877 F.2d 957, 959 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 

As stated previously by this court, “‘there is a minimum burden for [a] [p]laintiff, 

in asserting a breach of contract claim, to explicitly identify the provisions and 

28
terms of the contract that have been breached.’” Gonzalez-McCaulley Inv. Grp., 

Inc. v. United States, 93 Fed. Cl. 710, 715 (2010) (quoting Garreaux v. United 

States, 77 Fed. Cl. 726, 730 (2007)). This requirement is embodied in RCFC 9(k), 

which imposes a special pleading requirement for claims against the United States 

based on a contract:

In pleading a claim founded on a contract or treaty, a 

party must identify the substantive provisions of the 

contract or treaty on which the party relies. In lieu of a 

description, the party may annex to the complaint a copy 

of the contract or treaty, indicating the relevant 

provisions.

The rationale for this burden is that “[i]n order for the court to render a decision on 

a breach of contract claim, it must know the relevant terms of the contract.” 

Gonzalez-McCaulley, 93 Fed. Cl. at 715. 

Mr. Earman does not allege that the government has breached any provision 

within the four corners of his or similarly situated CSP participants’ written 

contracts. Indeed, there is no dispute that Mr. Earman and similarly situated CSP 

participants have received payments in accordance with the express terms of their 

contracts. Rather, Mr. Earman alleges that the government has calculated base 

payments and adjusted base payments in a manner inconsistent with the CSP 

statute and the Service’s implementing regulations. Mr. Earman contends that 

these alleged statutory and regulatory violations constitute a breach of his and 

similarly situated CSP participants’ contracts because the CSP statute and 

regulations are incorporated into all CSP contracts, either expressly or by operation 

of law. Therefore, to resolve the parties’ motions with respect to Counts II and III, 

the court must determine whether the disputed provisions of the CSP statute and 

regulations are indeed incorporated into plaintiff’s contract. 

1. Is the CSP Statute Incorporated into Mr. Earman’s 

Contract? (Count II)

In Count II, Mr. Earman alleges that the Service’s methodology for 

calculating base payments and adjusted base payments results in a breach of 

plaintiff’s and similarly situated CSP participants’ contracts because the

methodology is contrary to the CSP statute. See Fourth Am. Compl. ¶¶ 83-92. In 

29
this regard, plaintiff first contends that the base payment component of his total 

annual payment, which is calculated using the methodology set forth in the 

Service’s implementing regulations, 7 C.F.R. § 1469.23(a)(2), is lower than the 

2001 average national per-acre rental rate set forth in the CSP statute, see 16 

U.S.C. § 3838c(b)(1)(A)(i), and, thus, is contrary to congressional intent as 

expressed in the CSP statute and its legislative history, see Pl.’s Mot. at 25-29; 

Pl.’s Reply at 7-13.

11 Next, plaintiff argues that the agency’s use of an additional 

tier-specific reduction factor to calculate adjusted base payments is contrary to the 

plain language of the CSP statute, specifically 16 U.S.C. § 3838c(b)(1), which 

plaintiff contends contains “mandatory language . . . [which] prevented the agency 

from directly (or indirectly) adopting percentage reduction factors greater (or less) 

than the ones stated in the statute.” Pl.’s Mot. at 30; see also Pl.’s Reply at 13-14.

Plaintiff argues that the government’s alleged violations of the CSP statute

constitute a breach of his contract for two reasons. First, relying primarily upon 

the Federal Circuit’s decision in Roedler v. United States Department of Energy,

255 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2001), and this court’s decision in Dalles Irrigation 

District v. United States, 82 Fed. Cl. 346 (2008), plaintiff asserts that where, as 

here, a government contract implements a statute, the contract must be “construed 

in a manner consistent with the intent of the statute which the contract 

implements,” Pl.’s Mot. at 23-24, and is breached to the extent it contradicts 

congressional intent as set forth in the underlying statute, see id. at 28-29. Second, 

Mr. Earman argues that the CSP statute is incorporated into his contract via the 

Service’s implementing regulations, specifically 7 C.F.R. § 1469.21(e)(3). See id.

at 23 & n.30. This regulation provides that a CSP contract must “[i]ncorporate all 

provisions as required by law or statute,” including provisions requiring CSP 

participants to 

11/ In his opening brief, Mr. Earman’s argument with respect to base payments (as 

opposed to adjusted base payments) is based solely on the legislative history of the CSP statute. 

See Pl.’s Mot. at 25-29. In his reply brief, plaintiff contends for the first time that the Service’s 

methodology for calculating base payments is also contrary to the plain language of the CSP 

statute. See Pl.’s Reply at 7-11. Plaintiff’s base payments argument premised upon the plain 

language of the CSP statute is not properly before the court because it was presented for the first 

time in plaintiff’s reply brief. See, e.g., Extreme Coatings, 109 Fed. Cl. at 452 n.1. 

30

 
(i) Implement and maintain the practices as identified and 

scheduled in the conservation stewardship plan, including 

those needed to be eligible for the specified tier of 

participation and comply with any additional sign-up 

requirements,

(ii) Not conduct any practices on the farm or ranch that 

tend to defeat the purposes of the contract,

(iii) Comply with the terms of the contract, or documents 

incorporated by reference into the contract. NRCS will 

give the participant a reasonable time, as determined by 

the State Conservationist, to correct any violation and 

comply with the terms of the contract and attachments 

thereto. If a violation continues, the State 

Conservationist may terminate the conservation 

stewardship contract, and

(iv) Supply records and information as required by CCC 

to determine compliance with the contract and 

requirements of CSP[.]

7 C.F.R. § 1469.21(e)(3). Neither argument is persuasive.

At the outset, the court observes that plaintiff’s reliance upon Roedler and 

Dalles is unavailing. The plaintiffs in Roedler, a putative class of rate-paying 

customers for electric power produced from nuclear fuel by Northern States Power 

Company (Northern), sued the government for amounts paid by Northern into the 

Nuclear Waste Fund in accordance with the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, 42 

U.S.C. §§ 10101-10270 (2006) (the NWPA), and contracts entered between 

Northern and the Department of Energy (the DOE) pursuant to the NWPA. 

Dismissing the complaint, the district court held, inter alia, that the plaintiffs were 

not third-party beneficiaries of the contracts between the DOE and Northern. On 

appeal, the Federal Circuit considered the issue of whether the contracts between 

the DOE and Northern evinced a mutual intention to afford third-party beneficiary 

status to Northern’s customers. In addressing that issue, the Federal Circuit stated 

that “[f]or determination of contractual and beneficial intent when, as here, the 

contract implements a statutory enactment, it is appropriate to inquire into the 

governing statute and its purpose.” Roedler, 255 F.3d at 1352 (citing Rendleman v. 

Bowen, 860 F.2d 1537, 1541-42 (9th Cir. 1988), Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Schweiker, 

31
721 F.2d 170, 183 (7th Cir. 1983), and Busby School of N. Cheyenne Tribe v. 

United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 596, 602 (1985)). The court then considered the NWPA 

and its legislative history to determine whether the plaintiffs’ status as customers 

and users of nuclear-generated power afforded them third-party beneficiary rights 

under Northern’s contracts with the DOE, and answered that question in the 

negative. See id. at 1352-53. This court, in Dalles, cited Roedler for the broad 

proposition that “[w]here a contract implements or fulfills a statutory requirement, 

the interpretation of the contract will be guided by the underlying statute,” and 

interpreted a contract for the provision of hydroelectric power by the Department 

of the Interior to the plaintiff for irrigation pumping by considering the statute 

which authorized the contract. See 82 Fed. Cl. at 355. 

Relying upon Roedler and Dalles, Mr. Earman asserts that his contract 

“must be interpreted and applied in light of the underlying [CSP] statute,” Pl.’s 

Mot. at 31, and that “because defendant’s calculation of base payments (due to its 

use of rates lower than average national rental rates for 2001) and adjusted base 

payments . . . were contrary to the manner specified by statute, each constituted a 

separate breach of plaintiff’s CSP contract (and the contract of each and every 

other CSP participant),” id. at 32; see also id. at 29 (“[Dalles] teaches that, where 

Congress intended that adjusted base payments under a resulting contract were to 

be computed using specified factors, the agency wrongfully computed those 

payments when it used other factors.”). 

Plaintiff’s reliance upon Roedler and Dalles for the proposition that his 

contract must be read to include the underlying CSP statute is undermined by the 

Federal Circuit’s decision in St. Christopher Associates, L.P. v. United States, 511 

F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2008), which subsequently distinguished Roedler on its facts 

and rejected the same argument made by Mr. Earman here. In St. Christopher, a 

former owner of an apartment project sued the government for breach of contract

based on the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s refusal to consider 

the owner’s rent increase request. In support of its contention that the contract

required the agency to consider the rent increase request, the plaintiff asserted that 

the agreement “inherently includes an obligation to consider a rent increase request 

based on underlying statutes, regulations, and agency guidance.” St. Christopher, 

511 F.3d at 1381. In that regard, the St. Christopher plaintiff, citing Roedler, 

argued that the contract “should be construed in light of the statutory program that 

it implements and the purpose of that program.” Id. at 1383. In addressing that

32
argument, the Federal Circuit first noted that “[t]his court has been reluctant to find 

that statutory or regulatory provisions are incorporated into a contract with the 

government unless the contract explicitly provides for their incorporation.” Id. at 

1384 (citing Smithson v. United States, 847 F.2d 791, 794 (Fed. Cir. 1988)). The 

court then rejected the plaintiff’s argument for incorporation by implication, and 

stated that “there is simply no Federal Circuit precedent holding that it is proper to 

read into a contract statutes, regulations, or agency guidance when they are not 

incorporated by reference into the contract.” Id. (footnote omitted). In reaching 

this conclusion, the court rejected the plaintiff’s reliance on Roedler, and 

concluded that “Roedler holds only that when it is unclear from the contract 

whether a third party is a beneficiary, the court may look to the governing statute 

to attempt to adduce whether the party is an intended third party beneficiary.” Id.

at 1384 n.4. 

The Federal Circuit in St. Christopher thus expressly limited Roedler to the 

unique context of determining third-party beneficiary status under a government 

contract. As such, neither Roedler nor this court’s reliance on Roedler in Dalles

supports plaintiff’s arguments with respect to Count II. Additionally, to the extent 

that Dalles, including its characterization of the Federal Circuit’s decision in 

Roedler, may be read to support plaintiff’s breach of contract claims, Dalles is not 

binding on this court. See AINS, Inc. v. United States, 365 F.3d 1333, 1336 n.1 

(Fed. Cir. 2004) (stating that holdings of the Court of Federal Claims, “like those 

of federal district courts, are instructive but not precedential, and do not bind future 

court holdings”), abrogated on other grounds by Slattery v. United States, 635 

F.3d 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 

The only other binding authority cited by Mr. Earman in support of his 

contention that his contract must be read to include the underlying CSP statute is 

the Federal Circuit’s decision in Nebraska Public Power District v. United States, 

590 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2010). See Pl.’s Mot. at 28-29, 31-32. That case is 

readily distinguishable. Nebraska Public Power addressed the issue of whether a 

mandamus order issued by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 

Columbia was impliedly forbidden by the Tucker Act as invading upon the 

exclusive jurisdiction of this court for the adjudication of certain contract rights. 

See 590 F.3d at 1375-76. The Federal Circuit decided that question in the 

negative, concluding that the D.C. Circuit’s mandamus order “was issued pursuant 

to the D.C. Circuit’s authority to construe the NWPA and to direct DOE to comply 

33
with its obligations under the statute” and “did not address any issue of contract 

breach, direct the implementation of any remedy, or construe any contract defense, 

except to the extent that the proposed interpretation of the contract would conflict 

with the statutory directive in section 302(a)(5) [to accept and dispose of nuclear 

waste by January 31, 1998].” Id. Here, by contrast, plaintiff’s breach of contract 

claims call upon this court to decide only his contractual rights. As Nebraska 

Public Power says nothing about incorporation of a statute into a contract, it

provides no support for plaintiff’s claims. 

Accordingly, under binding precedent, this court may not read provisions of 

the CSP statute into plaintiff’s contract unless those provisions are expressly 

incorporated into his contract. See St. Christopher, 511 F.3d at 1384 & n.4; Texas 

v. United States, 537 F.2d 466, 471 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (“In suing for a breach of 

contract plaintiff must rely on the express terms of the contract and cannot, as it 

has attempted to do here, import into the agreement terms outside of those 

expressly contained in the agreement.”) (citation omitted); see also Precision Pine 

& Timber, Inc. v. United States, 596 F.3d 817, 826 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“In the 

absence of explicit contract language incorporating the [Endangered Species Act

(ESA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2012)], we decline to create a whole new set of 

obligations – compliance with the multitude of substantive and procedural 

requirements comprising the ESA – by mere implication.” (citing St. Christopher,

511 F.3d at 1384)). 

In its reply brief, the government surprisingly concedes, without discussion, 

that it “does not dispute that the CSP statute is incorporated into Mr. Earman’s

contract.” Def.’s Reply at 29. The government expanded upon this concession at 

oral argument by asserting that the CSP statute is incorporated into Mr. Earman’s 

contract by paragraph 13B of the Contract Appendix, which provides that the 

contract “shall be carried out in accordance with all applicable Federal statutes and 

regulations.” Tr. at 22. The government also expressed its “understanding that 

because [Mr. Earman’s] contract is a conservation security program contract[, . . .] 

it must comply with the [CSP] statute.” Id. 

Incorporation by reference, however, is a question of law. Northrop 

Grumman Info. Tech., Inc. v. United States, 535 F.3d 1339, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2008)

(Northrop Grumman) (citing Zenon Envtl., Inc. v. U.S. Filter Corp., 506 F.3d 

1370, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2007), and Advanced Display Sys. v. Kent State Univ., 212 

34
F.3d 1272, 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). Stipulations on questions of law are not 

binding on the court. Sanford’s Estate v. Comm’r, 308 U.S. 39, 51 (1939) (“We 

are not bound to accept, as controlling, stipulations as to questions of law.”)

(citations omitted); Technicon Instruments Corp. v. Alpkem Corp., 866 F.2d 417, 

421-22 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“‘If the stipulation is to be treated as an agreement 

concerning the legal effect of admitted facts, it is obviously inoperative; since the 

court cannot be controlled by agreement of counsel on a subsidiary question of 

law.’” (quoting Swift & Co. v. Hocking Valley Ry. Co., 243 U.S. 281, 289 (1917))). 

Therefore, it is for the court to decide whether the CSP statute is incorporated into 

plaintiff’s contract.

The court concludes that the CSP statute is not incorporated into plaintiff’s 

contract. For extrinsic material to be incorporated into a contract by reference, the

contract “must explicitly, or at least precisely, identify the written material being 

incorporated and must clearly communicate that the purpose of the reference is to 

incorporate the referenced material into the contract (rather than merely to 

acknowledge that the referenced material is relevant to the contract, e.g., as 

background law or negotiating history).” Northrop Grumman, 535 F.3d at 1345; 

cf. St. Christopher, 511 F.3d at 1384 (“This court has been reluctant to find that 

statutory or regulatory provisions are incorporated into a contract with the 

government unless the contract explicitly provides for their incorporation.” (citing 

Smithson, 847 F.2d at 794)). Nothing in plaintiff’s contract explicitly provides for 

the incorporation of the CSP statute. Rather, plaintiff’s contract merely provides 

that it “‘shall be carried out in accordance with all applicable Federal statutes and 

regulations.’” PPFUF ¶ 52 (quoting Hubbs Decl. Ex. 1 at A00016 (Contract 

Appendix ¶ 13B)). This language, which does not refer to any particular statutory 

or regulatory provision, cannot reasonably be read as incorporating the entire 

corpus of the CSP statute into plaintiff’s contract. See Smithson, 847 F.2d at 794 

(rejecting plaintiff’s argument that an entire body of regulations promulgated by 

the Farmers Home Administration was incorporated by reference into plaintiff’s 

contract, based on a provision stating that the contract was “subject to” such

regulations, because “[t]his is hardly the type of clause that should be read as 

incorporating fully into the contract all the FmHA regulations” and “if that were 

the parties’ purpose, they would have explicitly so provided”); cf. S. Cal. Edison 

Co. v. United States, 226 F.3d 1349, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (Southern California 

Edison) (concluding that contracts incorporated the terms and conditions of certain 

regulations by specifically referring to the regulations as being made part of the 

35
contracts “as fully and completely as though set forth herein [i.e., in the contracts] 

in length”). 

With respect to plaintiff’s second argument in support of incorporation of 

the CSP statute into his contract – i.e., that the CSP statute is incorporated into his 

contract via the Service’s implementing regulations, see Pl.’s Mot. at 23 & n.30 

(quoting 7 C.F.R. § 1469.21(e)(3)) – plaintiff cites no authority supporting the 

proposition that a statutory provision may be incorporated into a government 

contract via an agency regulation. Furthermore, even if the court were to assume

that an agency regulation could incorporate a statutory provision into a government 

contract, nothing in 7 C.F.R. § 1469.21(e)(3) explicitly provides for the 

incorporation of 16 U.S.C. § 3838c(b)(1) – the provision of the CSP statute setting 

forth the criteria for determining base payments and adjusted base payments to 

CSP participants – into plaintiff’s contract. 

Because plaintiff’s breach of contract claim in Count II is based solely on § 

3838c(b)(1) of the CSP statute, which the court concludes is not incorporated into 

plaintiff’s contract, plaintiff has failed to identify a contractual provision which 

plausibly entitles him to the additional payments he seeks in Count II.12

2. Is the Service’s Discussion of its Interim Final Regulations 

Incorporated into Mr. Earman’s Contract? (Count III)

In Count III, plaintiff alleges, as an alternative to Count II, that the Service

violated its implementing regulations by making reduced payments to Mr. Earman 

after Congress removed annual limitations on CSP spending by enacting the 

Katrina Act in May 2007. The specific language upon which plaintiff relies is a 

portion of the Service’s discussion of its interim final regulations in which the 

12/ In the alternative to his claim for damages, plaintiff also argues that he is entitled to 

reformation of his contract because it is based on regulations which are contrary to the CSP 

statute. Pl.’s Mot. at 32 (citing GHS Health Maint. Org., Inc. v. United States, 536 F.3d 1293 

(Fed. Cir. 2008), and LaBarge Prods., Inc. v. West, 46 F.3d 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). Plaintiff’s 

argument is unpersuasive. Here, in contrast to GHS Health and LaBarge, there is no moneymandating source of law which would allow the court to reach the predicate issue of whether the 

Service’s methodology for calculating base payments and adjusted base payments, as expressed 

in the implementing regulations and in plaintiff’s contract, violates the CSP statute. See infra

Part II.B.3. Therefore, GHS Health and LaBarge have no application to this case.

36

 
Service stated that the regulations established a “mechanism for limiting payments 

for those years when the CSP is only partially funded.” Fourth Am. Compl. ¶¶ 93-

100; Pl.’s Mot. at 33-34 (citing 69 Fed. Reg. at 34503). Although Mr. Earman

concedes, for the purposes of Count III, that the CSP was “partially funded” in FY

2004 through FY 2006 as a result of annual spending limitations, plaintiff argues 

that the CSP ceased to be “partially funded” in May 2007 when Congress enacted 

the Katrina Act and removed all annual spending limitations. See Pl.’s Mot. at 34; 

Pl.’s Reply at 17. In addition, plaintiff contends that, by enacting the 2008 Farm 

Bill and removing all multi-year limitations on CSP spending, Congress created an 

“indefinite appropriation” for the CSP, and therefore the Service’s continued use of 

an additional tier-specific reduction factor constitutes a continuing violation of the 

implementing regulations and a breach of Mr. Earman’s contract. See Pl.’s Mot. at 

49-50 & n.59.

Defendant does not dispute that “[t]he Appendix to each CSP cont[r]act 

incorporates by reference the CSP implementing regulations set forth in 7 C.F.R. 

part 1469.” Def.’s Mot. at 10 (citing Hubbs Decl. Ex. 1 at A00016 (Contract 

Appendix ¶ 13A)). As noted supra, the issue of whether the language quoted 

above is incorporated into plaintiff’s contract is a question of law which the court 

must decide. See, e.g., Northrop Grumman, 535 F.3d at 1343 (citations omitted); 

Technicon Instruments, 866 F.2d at 421-22 (citations omitted).

Although the court agrees that Mr. Earman’s contract incorporates the 

Service’s implementing regulations, the court does not agree with plaintiff that the 

Service’s discussion of its interim final regulations is so incorporated. Plaintiff’s 

contract incorporates only “[t]he regulations in 7 CFR part 1469.” Hubbs Decl. 

Ex. 1 at A00016 (Contract Appendix ¶ 13A) (“The regulations in 7 CFR part 1469 

for the CSP are incorporated, by reference, herein. In the event of a conflict 

between these regulations and the terms of this Appendix, the provisions of the 

regulations will prevail.”). The language upon which plaintiff relies in Count III is 

not contained in the text of the regulations, but is, instead, within the Service’s 

“[d]iscussion” of the regulations. See 69 Fed. Reg. at 34502 (introducing the 

Service’s “Discussion of the Conservation Security Program Interim Final Rule”). 

Plaintiff excerpts a small portion of this commentary, which appears under a 

heading titled “The Administration’s Response to Legislative Intent” and a 

subheading titled “Limiting Payments,” and attempts to make use of this language 

as a contractual basis for his claim. Plaintiff’s endeavor in that regard is 

37
convoluted and, ultimately, decidedly unfruitful. Plaintiff cites no authority for the 

remarkable proposition that an agency’s commentary regarding its regulations is

equivalent to the regulations themselves, and what little pertinent authority the 

court has found appears to undermine plaintiff’s position. Cf. Peterson Builders, 

Inc. v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 1227, 1229 n.3 (1992) (footnote omitted) (noting, 

in connection with defendant’s motion for reconsideration, that “[w]hile the court 

[in its prior order] took guidance from the comments to the interim regulations, 

they are in no way binding upon the court”), aff’d, 155 F.3d 566 (Fed. Cir. 1998).

Ultimately, plaintiff fails to identify any actual regulation in support of his 

contention that the Service’s regulations precluded its utilization of reduced rates 

after the enactment of the Katrina Act in 2007. Because plaintiff’s breach of 

contract claim in Count III is based solely on the Service’s discussion of its interim 

final regulations, which the court concludes is not incorporated into plaintiff’s 

contract, plaintiff has failed to identify a contractual provision which plausibly 

entitles him to the additional payments he seeks in Count III. 

3. Are Mr. Earman’s Breach of Contract Claims Reviewable 

in the Absence of Specific Contractual Provisions Allegedly 

Breached? (Counts II and III)

Because plaintiff has failed to allege an obligation arising out of his contract 

which would entitle him to the additional payments he seeks in Counts II and III,

the court must determine whether, in the absence of such contractual obligations, 

the CSP statute or its implementing regulations may serve as a money-mandating 

source of law which would permit the court to consider plaintiff’s claims. The 

court has already answered that question in the negative. As the court held in 

Meyers, “the CSP – understood as encompassing the CSP statute and its 

implementing regulations – fails to meet any of the three prongs under Samish II 

and is therefore not a money-mandating source of law in this court.” 96 Fed. Cl. at 

60; see Def.’s Mot. at 11 n.5. 

In apparent recognition of the court’s jurisdictional holding in Meyers, 

plaintiff does not allege that he is entitled to relief in Counts II and III under the 

CSP statute and implementing regulations themselves without reference to specific 

terms of his contract. Nevertheless, plaintiff argues that the court “does have 

jurisdiction to rule on the validity of the agency’s regulation[s]” because those 

38
regulations “were incorporated into plaintiff’s contract by reference and form the 

basis for the improper amounts both set forth in the contract of and paid to plaintiff 

(and each member of the yet-to-be certified class).” Pl.’s Mot. at 29 n.36. In 

support of this proposition, plaintiff cites the Federal Circuit’s decisions in Texas 

Health Choice v. Office of Personnel Management, 400 F.3d 895 (Fed. Cir. 2005), 

and GHS Health Maintenance Organization, Inc. v. United States, 536 F.3d 1293 

(Fed. Cir. 2008), and asserts that these cases “hold[] that, where the Court of 

Federal Claims has jurisdiction with respect to a contract claim it also has 

jurisdiction with regard to the validity of regulations related to it.” Pl.’s Mot. at 29 

n.36. 

The court rejects plaintiff’s alternative basis for jurisdiction over his claims

in Counts II and III. Despite the incorporation of the CSP regulations into 

plaintiff’s contract, Texas Health and GHS Health do not “hold” that this court has 

jurisdiction to rule on the validity of regulations merely because they are 

incorporated into a contract which is alleged to have been breached. 

Texas Health and GHS Health involved contracts between health benefits 

carriers and the United States Office of Personnel Management (OPM) for health 

care benefits to federal employees pursuant to the Federal Employee Health 

Benefits Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 8901-8914 (2012). In both cases, the plaintiffs 

challenged the validity of an OPM-promulgated regulation which mirrored the 

language of a provision in their contracts with OPM. See GHS Health, 536 F.3d at 

1296; Texas Health, 400 F.3d at 897-98. In both cases, the Court of Federal 

Claims was found to possess exclusive jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ claims under 

the Contract Disputes Act (CDA), 41 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7109 (Supp. V 2011), which 

is a money-mandating source of law sufficient to confer jurisdiction under the 

Tucker Act. See Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Cmty. v. United States, 86 Fed. 

Cl. 607, 616 (2009) (citing Rick’s Mushroom Serv., Inc. v. United States, 521 F.3d 

1338, 1343-44 (Fed. Cir. 2008), and United States Sur. Co. v. United States, 83 

Fed. Cl. 306, 309 (2008)). The CDA, however, “applies only to express or implied 

government contracts for procurement of goods or services.” Rick’s Mushroom, 

521 F.3d at 1343-44. The CDA, therefore, has no application to the instant case, 

which involves a financial assistance agreement, not a procurement contract. See

Hubbs Decl. Ex. 1 at A00016 (Contract Appendix ¶ 13E) (“This Contract is a 

financial assistance agreement, not a procurement contract and is governed by the 

terms set forth herein.”); cf. Wesleyan Co., Inc. v. Harvey, 454 F.3d 1375, 1378 

39
(Fed. Cir. 2006) (“‘Procurement is the acquisition by purchase, lease or barter, of 

property or services for the direct benefit or use of the Federal Government.’” 

(quoting New Era Constr. v. United States, 890 F.2d 1152, 1157 (Fed. Cir. 1989))). 

Thus, Texas Health and GHS Health provide no authority for plaintiff’s contention 

that this court may review the validity of the CSP implementing regulations.

4. Is the Service’s Methodology for Calculating Adjusted Base 

Payments in FY 2007 and Thereafter Entitled to Deference? 

(Count III)

Even assuming, arguendo, that the Service’s discussion of its interim final 

regulations is equivalent to the regulations themselves, and is therefore 

incorporated into Mr. Earman’s contract by virtue of the incorporation language in 

paragraph 13A of the Contract Appendix, the court concludes that the Service’s 

methodology for calculating adjusted base payments in FY 2007 and thereafter 

represents a reasonable interpretation of any ambiguity in the regulations and is 

entitled to deference. 

Plaintiff contends that such deference is inappropriate because “[t]here is no 

agency interpretation involved with respect to Count III, i.e., there is nothing to 

which deference need be given.” Pl.’s Mot. at 34-35. In plaintiff’s view, “[t]he 

resolution of this alternative count does not turn on the Court giving any deference 

to NRCS’[s] judgment as to how best to administer the CSP. . . . Rather, here 

defendant simply failed to follow the regulations that it adopted to operate the 

CSP.” Pl.’s Reply at 15. Mr. Earman’s argument in this regard is, essentially, that 

the Service, in its discussion of its interim final regulations, unambiguously stated 

that it would apply an additional reduction factor to its calculation of adjusted base 

payments only in fiscal years in which the CSP was “partially funded,” i.e., only in 

fiscal years in which Congress imposed annual or multi-year spending limitations

on the Program. See Pl.’s Mot. at 33-34 (citing 69 Fed. Reg. at 34503); Pl.’s Reply 

at 18-19. In plaintiff’s view, “contrary to the regulations, defendant continued to 

make such reduced payments even in those fiscal years when CCC was not subject 

to any spending limit and/or payment at the full amounts provided for by statute 

was possible.” Pl.’s Reply at 19. 

The court does not agree that the Service’s discussion of its interim final 

regulations is as clear as plaintiff suggests. The Service stated that the interim final 

40
regulations “adopt[ed] provisions of the proposed rule setting forth a mechanism 

for limiting payments for those years when the CSP is only partially funded.” 69 

Fed. Reg. at 34503. This “mechanism” included provisions to “[r]educe 

stewardship (base) payments by applying a reduction factor.” Id. Contrary to 

plaintiff’s argument, the Service did not state that it would apply an additional 

reduction factor to its calculation of adjusted base payments only in those years in 

which the CSP is “partially funded.” Therefore, the plain language of the Service’s 

discussion of its interim final regulations does not compel the court to adopt Mr. 

Earman’s interpretation of that discussion. 

Moreover, as the government notes in its reply brief, other portions of the 

regulatory history suggest that the Service’s decision to use an additional reduction 

factor to calculate adjusted base payments was based on multiple factors in 

addition to spending limitations. For instance, the Service stated in its notice of 

proposed rulemaking that applying a consistent reduction factor would result in 

greater Program participation and would incentivize CSP participants to engage in 

enhanced conservation practices:

NRCS proposes to apply a consistent reduction factor to 

all regional rental rates to scale down the share of 

payments going to base payments (for all tiers of 

participation). The more that program payments are 

made toward aspects directly related to additional 

environmental performance, rather than on base 

payments, more conservation is likely to be obtained. 

The results of the CSP proposed rule economic analysis 

indicates that, all other payment held constant, the lower 

the reduction factor used on regional rental rates, the less 

the effect the base payment has on the overall producer 

payment. This results in more net environmental benefits 

accruing to the program. This will lower payments to 

producers, but does it in an equitable manner and allows 

more producers to participate within the available 

funding. NRCS proposes that the base rate, once 

established, will be fixed over the life of the program.

. . . .

41
Once local average 2001 rental rates for each land use 

category are established, NRCS will then multiply those 

average rental rates by a consistent reduction factor to 

compute the final base rates. The results of the CSP 

proposed rule economic analysis indicated that, with all 

other payments held constant, the lower the reduction 

factor used on regional land rental rates, the less effect 

the base payment has on the overall producer payment. 

This results in more net environmental benefits accruing 

to the program. NRCS proposes a reduction factor to be 

0.1, meaning that the final base rates will be 10 percent

of the local average rental rates. NRCS believes this 

discounting approach will help:

• Minimize the effect of the base payment on land 

rental rates, land values and commodity prices

• Maximize participation in the program

• Focus funds toward increased environmental 

performance through additional practices and 

enhancements payments

• Maximize environmental benefits and reduce 

program costs

• Continue to provide the participant with fair and 

equitable compensation for the social benefits 

derived from the contract.

69 Fed. Reg. 194, 199, 213 (Jan. 2, 2004); see Def.’s Reply at 26-27. Likewise, in 

its discussion of its interim final regulations, the Service again explained that 

applying a consistent reduction factor would result in greater environmental 

benefits:

NRCS will apply a consistent reduction factor to all 

regional rental rates to scale down the share of payments 

going to base payments (for all tiers of participation). 

The more that total program payments are made toward 

aspects directly related to additional environmental 

performance, rather than on stewardship payments, the 

42
more positive conservation results are likely to be 

obtained. The results of the CSP proposed rule economic 

analysis indicated that, if all other payment[s] are held 

constant, the lower the reduction factor used on regional 

rental rates, the less the effect the stewardship payment 

has on the overall producer payment. This results in 

more net environmental benefits accruing from the 

program. This will lower payments to producers, but

does it in an equitable manner and allows more producers 

to participate within the available funding. NRCS 

proposes that the stewardship rate, once established, will 

be fixed over the life of the program.

69 Fed. Reg. at 34509. In light of this regulatory history, the Service’s discussion 

of its interim final regulations is at least ambiguous with respect to whether an 

additional reduction factor was to be applied only in those fiscal years in which 

Congress had imposed annual or multi-year spending limitations on the Program. 

The court must therefore decide whether the Service’s continued use of an 

additional reduction factor after the enactment of the Katrina Act constitutes a 

reasonable interpretation of its ambiguous discussion of the interim final 

regulations.

“In situations in which the meaning of [regulatory] language is not free 

from doubt,” an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations must be given effect 

“so long as the interpretation sensibly conforms to the purpose and wording of the 

regulations.” Martin v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm’n, 499 U.S. 

144, 150 (1991) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); accord Thomas 

Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994) (“We must give substantial 

deference to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations.”) (citations omitted); 

Princess Cruises, Inc. v. United States, 201 F.3d 1352, 1359-60 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 

“Deference is particularly appropriate when the agency is applying its regulations 

to a complex or changing circumstance, thus requiring the agency to bring to bear 

its unique expertise and policy-making prerogatives.” Southern California Edison, 

226 F.3d at 1357 (citing Martin, 499 U.S. at 151). When judicial deference is 

appropriate, a court must accept the agency’s reasonable interpretation of a 

regulation, even if there may be other reasonable interpretations to which the 

regulation is susceptible, and even if the court would have preferred an alternative 

43
interpretation. Id. (citing Sharp Corp. v. United States, 63 F.3d 1092, 1096 (Fed. 

Cir. 1995)).

Mr. Earman argues that deference should not be afforded to the Service’s

methodology for calculating adjusted base payments in FY 2007 and thereafter 

because the government is itself a party to plaintiff’s contract. See Pl.’s Mot. at 35 

n.39 (“Moreover, Chevron deference may be inappropriate in situations such as 

this where the agency is an interested party to the agreement [alleged to have been 

breached].” (citing Nat’l Fuel Gas Supply Corp. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory 

Comm’n, 811 F.2d 1563, 1571 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (National Fuel), and ChickaloonMoose Creek Native Ass’n v. Norton, 360 F.3d 972, 980 (9th Cir. 2004))). As the 

Federal Circuit noted in Southern California Edison, “[t]his argument is not 

without force” because a party entering a contract with the government “should 

reasonably expect to be on equal legal footing with the government should a 

dispute over the contract arise,” and “[i]t would be unfair to give the government 

such a distinct advantage during an ordinary breach of contract litigation.” 226 

F.3d at 1357 (citing National Fuel, 811 F.2d at 1571). Nevertheless, as in 

Southern California Edison, the court concludes that the government’s status as a

party to plaintiff’s contract does not preclude the application of deference in this 

instance. 

First, despite the fact that the Service is charged with administering 

plaintiff’s contract, see PPFUF ¶¶ 16, 53 (citing Hubbs Decl. Ex. 1 at A00016), it 

is not a party to the contract. Rather, plaintiff’s contract, like all CSP contracts, is 

with the CCC. See Fourth Am. Compl. ¶ 64; PPFUF ¶ 49 (citing Hubbs Decl. Ex. 

1 at A00008 (“THIS CONTRACT is entered between the Commodity Credit 

Corporation (referred to as ‘CCC’) and the undersigned owners, operators, or 

tenants . . . on the farm identified above.”)). Indeed, as noted above, the CCC, not 

the Service, is the source of funds for the Program. See Fourth Am. Compl. ¶ 10; 

PPFUF ¶¶ 7-8. Therefore, the Service has no direct economic stake in the 

methodology used to calculate adjusted base payments to CSP participants. Cf.

Southern California Edison, 226 F.3d at 1357 (applying deference to an agency’s 

interpretation of regulations incorporated into contracts with private energy 

customers because, inter alia, “the agency was acting as a neutral arbiter resolving 

the customers’ rights to the over-collected funds, rather than as an interested party 

to a contract” (citing National Fuel, 811 F.2d at 1571)).

44
Second, as in Southern California Edison, “the statutory and regulatory 

framework supports the application of judicial deference in this case.” See 226 

F.3d at 1358 (deferring to an agency’s refund methodology, which involved an 

interpretation of its implementing regulations, because “Congress delegated 

significant responsibility for the administration of these energy contracts to the 

Secretary” and the agency’s regulations “do not provide detailed guidance” 

regarding the specific refund methodology to be used). As noted supra and in the 

court’s previous decision in Meyers, the 2002 Farm Bill and the CSP statute confer 

significant responsibility for the administration of CSP contracts to the Secretary of 

Agriculture, acting through the Service. See 16 U.S.C. § 3838a(a) (authorizing the 

Secretary to “establish” and “carry out” the CSP “as determined by the 

Secretary”); Pub. L. No. 107-171, tit. II, § 2001(b), 116 Stat. at 233 (“Not later 

than 270 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Agriculture 

shall promulgate regulations implementing the amendment made by subsection 

(a).”); Meyers, 96 Fed. Cl. at 53. 

Likewise, the Service’s implementing regulations do not mandate specific 

payment rates or amounts. As noted in Meyers, “while the regulations establish a 

general methodology for calculating adjusted base payments, the actual rates and 

payments are not set forth in the regulations, but are instead determined by the 

[Service] on an annual basis and published each year in the annual sign-up notice.” 

96 Fed. Cl. at 57 (citing 7 C.F.R. § 1469.23(a)(6)). Furthermore, in addition to 

conferring upon the Service discretion to establish the individual components of an 

annual payment, the implementing regulations provide that the Service “may limit 

the stewardship, practice, and enhancement components of CSP payments in order 

to focus funding toward targeted activities and conservation benefits [it] identifies 

in the sign-up notice and any subsequent addenda.” 7 C.F.R. § 1469.23(g); see 

Meyers, 96 Fed. Cl. at 58. In sum, “[w]ithin the broad constraints set forth in the 

CSP statute and its regulations, the [Service] enjoys substantial discretion in setting 

the payment amounts under conservation security contracts.” Meyers, 96 Fed. Cl. 

at 58. In light of the substantial discretion afforded the Service by the CSP statute 

and regulations, the role of this court is not to determine which payment 

methodology is most reasonable, but rather to ensure that the payment 

methodology selected by the Service is reasonable. 

The court concludes that the Service’s interpretation of its discussion of the 

interim final regulations, as reflected in its methodology for calculating adjusted 

base payments in FY 2007 and thereafter, is reasonable. As previously noted, the 

45
implementing regulations and regulatory history contain no language limiting the 

application of additional reduction factors to only those years in which CSP 

spending was limited by Congress. To the contrary, the regulatory history clearly 

indicates that the Service’s decision to apply an additional reduction factor was 

based on a variety of factors, of which only one was spending limitations imposed 

by Congress. See 69 Fed. Reg. at 199, 213, 34509; Def.’s Reply at 26-27. Most 

notably, the regulatory history indicates that the Service concluded, based on the 

“results of the CSP proposed rule economic analysis,” that utilizing a consistent 

reduction factor would incentivize CSP participants to engage in enhanced 

conservation practices and would therefore “result[] in more net environmental 

benefits accruing from the program.” 69 Fed. Reg. at 34509.

Additionally, even if the court were to assume the correctness of Mr. 

Earman’s interpretation of the Service’s discussion of its interim final regulations, 

the court agrees with defendant that the agency reasonably concluded that it 

remained constrained in its spending authority in FY 2007 and thereafter. See

Def.’s Reply at 23-25, 27-28. It is undisputed that the CSP remained subject to 

spending limitations after the enactment of the Katrina Act, which left in place the 

multi-year limitations imposed by the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005. See Pub. L. 

No. 110-28, tit. IX, sec. 9010, § 20115, 121 Stat. at 218; Pl.’s Resp. to DPFUF ¶

20; Def.’s Reply at 23-25. Moreover, the 2008 Farm Bill authorized the Service to 

carry out the CSP using only “such sums as are necessary to administer contracts 

entered into before September 30, 2008.” Pub. L. No. 110-246, tit. II, subtit. D, 

sec. 2701, § 1241(a)(3), 122 Stat. at 1768 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 3841(a)(3)(A)). 

As plaintiff’s contract was executed before September 30, 2008, it was entirely 

reasonable for the Service to conclude that the 2008 Farm Bill required it to 

expend only such sums as necessary to pay plaintiff in accordance with the extant 

terms of his contract, which included the $2648 reduction set forth in Item 88 of 

the Schedule of Operations. Therefore, even if the Service had intended to apply 

an additional reduction factor only in fiscal years in which CSP spending was 

subject to limitations, the Service reasonably concluded that it remained subject to 

such limitations in FY 2007 and thereafter. 

Accordingly, even if the Service’s discussion of its interim final regulations 

were incorporated into Mr. Earman’s contract, the Service’s interpretation of that 

discussion, as reflected in its methodology for calculating adjusted base payments 

in FY 2007 and thereafter, is reasonable and must be given effect. For this 

46
additional reason, plaintiff has failed to allege a plausible entitlement to the relief 

he seeks in Count III. Therefore, both Counts II and III fail to state claims upon 

which relief may be granted, and must be dismissed under RCFC 12(b)(6).

C. Breach of Contract Claim Based on Alleged Right of Contract 

Renewal (Count IV)

In Count IV, plaintiff asserts that his contract provides a right of renewal 

because it incorporates the CSP statute, which plaintiff asserts required all CSP 

contracts to be renewable at the option of the contractor. Fourth Am. Compl. ¶¶ 

16, 101-104. In this regard, plaintiff relies upon the following provision in the 

CSP statute:

Except as provided in subparagraph (B) [applicable to 

Tier I contracts],13 at the option of a producer, the 

conservation security contract of the producer may be 

renewed for an additional period of not less than 5 nor 

more than 10 years.

16 U.S.C. § 3838a(e)(4)(A); see Fourth Am. Compl. ¶ 16. Plaintiff alleges 

that the government anticipatorily breached this contractual right of renewal 

when Congress enacted the 2008 Farm Bill. Fourth Am. Compl. ¶¶ 102-

103. As codified, the 2008 Farm Bill provides, in pertinent part, that “[a] 

conservation security contract may not be entered into or renewed under this 

subpart after September 30, 2008.” 16 U.S.C. § 3838a(g)(1). 

In its motion for summary judgment on Count IV, the government first 

argues that “Mr. Earman points to no provision in his CSP contract that provides 

any right of renewal.” Def.’s Mot. at 29; see also id. at 28 (“There is no right to 

renew the CSP contracts on the face of the contract, in the Appendix that is part of 

the contract[,] or . . . in the [Service’s] implementing regulations.”). In addition, 

although the government “does not dispute that the CSP statute is incorporated into 

Mr. Earman’s contract,” Def.’s Reply at 29, it argues that the CSP statute does not 

confer a right of renewal, but rather provides plaintiff with only an “opportunity”

13/ It is undisputed that plaintiff never had a Tier I contract; Mr. Earman had a Tier II 

contract that was later modified to a Tier III contract. PPFUF ¶ 49.

47

 
to renew subject to the agency’s ultimate approval, see id. at 29-32. The 

government also argues that specific provisions in plaintiff’s contract, including 

the implementing regulations which are incorporated by reference into the contract,

prohibit the contract’s automatic and unconditional renewal. See id. at 31-32. 

Furthermore, the government contends that even if plaintiff’s contract includes a 

right of renewal, other provisions in the contract shield the government from 

liability for any alleged breach of that right. See Def.’s Mot. at 29-30; Def.’s 

Reply at 33-34. Finally, defendant argues that plaintiff is unable to establish the 

damages element of his claim because plaintiff cannot identify what terms and 

conditions would have been included in his renewed contract. See Def.’s Reply at 

34-35 & n.22. 

The court agrees with defendant that there is no specific provision of 

plaintiff’s contract which confers a right of renewal, but not for the reasons offered 

by defendant. As explained supra, the court is not bound to accept the parties’ 

stipulation that the CSP statute is incorporated into plaintiff’s contract, and 

concludes as a matter of law that the CSP statute is not incorporated into plaintiff’s 

contract. 

The court has considered all of plaintiff’s arguments to the contrary, and 

does not find them persuasive. Plaintiff offers three arguments in support of his 

assertion that the renewal provision in 16 U.S.C. § 3838a(e)(4)(A) is incorporated 

into his contract. First, plaintiff argues that the Service, during the notice and 

comment process, “publicly confirmed that the CSP contracts provided contractors 

with the right to renew” by stating that it declined to add a renewal provision to the 

implementing regulations because “renewal was fully provided for by the [CSP] 

statute.” Pl.’s Mot. at 54-55 (citing 69 Fed. Reg. at 34519 and 70 Fed. Reg. 15201, 

15202 (Mar. 25, 2005)). In this regard, plaintiff asserts that because his contract 

expressly incorporates the implementing regulations, see Hubbs Decl. Ex. 1 at 

A00016 (Contract Appendix ¶ 13A), it also incorporates the Service’s alleged 

“understanding that renewal of CSP contracts was provided for by the CSP 

statute,” Pl.’s Mot. at 55. As explained supra, however, although plaintiff’s 

contract expressly incorporates the Service’s implementing regulations, it does not 

incorporate the Service’s discussion of its interim final regulations. 

Second, plaintiff reiterates his contention – based upon Roedler, Dalles, and 

Nebraska Public Power – that because his contract implements the CSP statute, his

48
contract must be interpreted in light of the CSP statute and may not contradict the 

CSP statute. See Pl.’s Mot. at 55. Again, as explained supra, the court finds these 

authorities inapposite and unavailing.

Finally, plaintiff argues that 16 U.S.C. § 3838a(e)(4)(A) is incorporated by 

implication into his contract under the so-called “Christian Doctrine,” first 

articulated by the Court of Claims in G.L. Christian & Associates v. United States,

312 F.2d 418 (Ct. Cl. 1963), which provides that parties to a government contract 

are deemed to have agreed to contract terms required by law to be included in the 

contract. See Pl.’s Mot. at 55-56 (citing Coll. Point Boat Corp. v. United States, 

267 U.S. 12 (1925), and Enron Fed. Solutions, Inc. v. United States, 80 Fed. Cl. 

382, 392 n.11 (2008) (citing Christian)). This argument is similarly unpersuasive. 

“[T]he Christian Doctrine does not permit the automatic incorporation of every 

required contract clause.” Gen. Eng’g & Mach. Works v. O’Keefe, 991 F.2d 775, 

779 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Rather, it applies only to “mandatory contract clauses which 

express a significant or deeply ingrained strand of public procurement policy.” Id.

(citations omitted); see also S.J. Amoroso Constr. Co. v. United States, 12 F.3d 

1072, 1075 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“Under the Christian doctrine, a mandatory contract 

clause that expresses a significant or deeply ingrained strand of public procurement 

policy is considered to be included in a contract by operation of law.”) (citations 

omitted). As explained supra, the CSP involves financial assistance agreements, 

not procurement contracts. Thus, the Christian doctrine is not applicable to this 

case and is of no avail to plaintiff. 

 

Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim in Count IV is based solely on the 

incorporation of 16 U.S.C. § 3838a(e)(4)(A) into plaintiff’s contract. There are no 

disputed facts regarding this claim. Because the CSP statute is not incorporated 

into plaintiff’s contract, as a matter of law, defendant is entitled to summary 

judgment on Count IV. 

D. Takings Claim (Count V)

In Count V, plaintiff alleges, in the alternative to Count IV, that the 

government’s abrogation of his alleged contractual right of renewal effected an 

uncompensated taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution. See Fourth Am. Compl. ¶¶ 105-110. 

49
This court has jurisdiction over takings claims brought against the federal 

government under the Tucker Act. See Jan’s Helicopter Serv., Inc. v. Fed. 

Aviation Admin., 525 F.3d 1299, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“It is undisputed that the 

Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment is a money-mandating source for purposes 

of Tucker Act jurisdiction.”) (citation omitted). However, before determining 

whether a particular governmental action has effected a taking of private property 

requiring the payment of just compensation, “as a threshold matter, the court must 

determine whether the claimant has established a property interest for purposes of 

the Fifth Amendment.” Am. Pelagic Fishing Co. v. United States, 379 F.3d 1363, 

1372 (Fed. Cir. 2004); see also Colvin Cattle Co. v. United States, 468 F.3d 803, 

806 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (noting that “under our regulatory takings analysis, the 

threshold inquiry is whether the claimant has established a ‘property interest’ for 

purposes of the Fifth Amendment”) (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted). If the undisputed facts show that the interest alleged to have been taken 

is not a cognizable property right to which the Takings Clause of the Fifth 

Amendment applies, then plaintiff’s takings claim fails as a matter of law.

Plaintiff asserts that he has a cognizable property interest in his alleged 

contractual right of renewal. See Fourth Am. Compl. ¶ 106; Pl.’s Mot. at 65. 

Although contractual rights are cognizable property interests protected by the 

Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, see, e.g., Century Exploration New 

Orleans, Inc. v. United States, 103 Fed. Cl. 70, 76 (2012), the court has already 

concluded that plaintiff’s contract does not confer a right of renewal because the 

CSP statute is not incorporated into plaintiff’s contract. Moreover, to the extent 

that plaintiff bases his asserted property interest in the CSP statute itself, rather 

than in his contract, plaintiff has not cited a single case in which a court has held 

that the denial of monetary benefits under a government program constitutes a 

taking requiring compensation under the Fifth Amendment. Indeed, in Meyers, the 

court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that they possessed a property right in 

monetary benefits under the CSP. See 96 Fed. Cl. at 62 (“[T]he court holds that 

plaintiffs do not possess any property rights in monetary benefits under the CSP.”); 

cf. Adams v. United States, 391 F.3d 1212, 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“We decline to 

treat a statutory right to be paid money as a legally-recognized property interest, as 

we would real property, physical property, or intellectual property. Instead, we 

view it as nothing more than an allegation that money is owed.”). Because 

50
plaintiff has failed to identify a cognizable property interest under the Takings

Clause, defendant is entitled to summary judgment on Count V.

14

E. Motion for Class Certification 

In Greenlee County v. United States, 487 F.3d 871 (Fed. Cir. 2007), the 

Federal Circuit affirmed the decision of the Court of Federal Claims finding the 

issue of class certification moot because all of the plaintiff’s claims had been 

dismissed. 487 F.3d at 880-81. The Federal Circuit noted that it had “repeatedly 

found on appeal that issues related to class certification were moot in light of [its] 

resolution against the plaintiff of a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment” 

and saw “no reason to apply a different rule when it is the Court of Federal Claims 

that finds the issue moot.” Id. at 880. Having dismissed each count of Mr. 

Earman’s Fourth Amended Complaint, the court also denies as moot plaintiff’s 

pending motion for class certification. See id.; Meyers, 96 Fed. Cl. at 42 n.6 

(“Because plaintiffs’ complaint is dismissed in its entirety, the motions for class 

certification and to amend the pleadings are dismissed as moot.” (citing Greenlee 

County, 487 F.3d at 880)).

CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons, the court hereby grants defendant’s motion 

to dismiss Counts II and III, grants defendant’s motion for summary judgment on 

Counts I, IV, and V, and denies plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment on 

all counts. 

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that

(1) Defendant’s Revised Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Summary 

Judgment, filed February 1, 2013, is GRANTED;

14/ In his reply brief, plaintiff “requests that the Court stay the filing of plaintiff’s reply 

brief on Count V and disposition of Count V pending resolution of the issues in Count IV.” Pl.’s 

Reply at 30. Because plaintiff was afforded a full opportunity to brief summary judgment 

arguments regarding his takings claim, and because that claim fails as a matter of law, the court 

denies plaintiff’s request for a “stay.”

51

 
(2) Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, filed March 20, 

2013, is DENIED; 

(3) Plaintiff’s Motion for Class Certification, filed September 30, 2010, is 

DENIED as moot;

(4) The Clerk’s Office is directed to ENTER final judgment in favor of 

defendant, DISMISSING the Fourth Amended Complaint with 

prejudice; and

(5) Each party shall bear its own costs.

/s/Lynn J. Bush 

LYNN J. BUSH

Senior Judge

52