NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ROSA PEDRO-VICENTE; MARI LUZ 

VIVIANA MIGUEL-PEDRO, 

Petitioners, 

 v. 

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney 

General, 

Respondent.

No. 19-72957 

Agency Nos. A206-455-157 

A206-455-158 

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted August 17, 2023**

Pasadena, California

Before: WARDLAW, CHRISTEN, and SUNG, Circuit Judges.

Rosa Pedro-Vicente and her minor daughter Mari Luz Viviana Miguel-Pedro 

(“Petitioners”) petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”)

decision dismissing their appeal of the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

AUG 21 2023

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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Petitioners’ applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the 

Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Petitioners also appeal the BIA’s 

affirmance of the IJ’s denial of Petitioners’ motion to suppress evidence and 

terminate immigration proceedings for alleged violation of Petitioners’ Fourth 

Amendment rights. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We deny the 

petition. 

We review questions of law de novo and the agency’s factual findings for 

substantial evidence. See Vilchez v. Holder, 682 F.3d 1195, 1198–99 (9th Cir. 

2012).

1. Petitioners’ argument that their Notices to Appear are defective for 

failure to list the date and time of their hearing is unexhausted. We therefore 

decline to address it on the merits. See Umana-Escobar v. Garland, 69 F.4th 544, 

550 (9th Cir. 2023).

2. The BIA properly affirmed the IJ’s denial of Petitioners’ motion to 

suppress their Form I-213s and terminate proceedings. Petitioners argue that their 

Form I-213s, which indicate that they entered into the United States without 

inspection or admission, contain statements made during an initial encounter with 

border patrol agents within a mile of the border with Mexico. Petitioners assert

that the agents failed to establish probable cause or reasonable suspicion under the 

Fourth Amendment to question Pedro-Vicente and her daughter, and that, 
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therefore, the Form I-213s should be excluded from evidence under the 

exclusionary rule. 

The exclusionary rule applies to immigration proceedings only “(1) when 

the agency violates a regulation promulgated for the benefit of petitioners and that 

violation prejudices the petitioner’s protected interests; and (2) when the agency 

egregiously violates a petitioner’s Fourth Amendment rights.” Sanchez v. Sessions, 

904 F.3d 643, 649 (9th Cir. 2018) (internal citations omitted). It is wellestablished that immigration authorities may seize a noncitizen based solely on 

reasonable suspicion, which cannot include “race and ethnicity alone.” Id. at 650–

53, 656. Where there is no seizure, however, immigration officers do “not need 

reasonable suspicion to ask [a noncitizen] for [their] name, date and place of birth, 

or immigration status.” Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 101 (2005). Questioning 

by an officer rises to the level of a seizure only when, “taking into account all of 

the circumstances surrounding the encounter, the police conduct would have 

communicated to a reasonable person that [they were] not at liberty to ignore the 

police presence and go about [their] business.” Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 

437 (1991) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). While Pedro-Vicente 

argues that she did not feel free to leave when approached because the agents were 

armed and clearly identified, she does not allege any additional facts to establish an 

objectively reasonable belief that her liberty was restricted. Without more, this 
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encounter does not involve a sufficient display of authority or coercion to render it 

a seizure. United States v. Crapser, 472 F.3d 1141, 1146 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding 

that no seizure occurred where officers were armed but did not attempt to draw 

attention to their weapons or use physical force during a daytime encounter in 

public). Accordingly, we need not address whether the border patrol agents had 

reasonable suspicion under the Fourth Amendment to seize Pedro-Vicente and her 

daughter. Petitioners have not made a prima facie showing that their Fourth 

Amendment rights were egregiously violated.

3. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s dismissal of Petitioners’ appeal 

of the IJ’s denial of asylum and withholding of removal. Even assuming that 

Petitioners did not waive the issue of nexus, there is no evidence that the gang 

members targeted Pedro-Vicente and her daughter on the basis of any protected 

ground. Although Pedro-Vicente testified that a vendor told her that gang 

members were looking for her and wanted to kill her “because of my situation,”

Petitioners have not offered any additional facts to show a nexus to a protected 

ground. And as both the BIA and IJ noted, Petitioners claim only that they fear 

general future criminal violence. The record does not compel the conclusion that

Pedro-Vicente and her daughter face persecution on the basis of a protected ground

as required for asylum or withholding of removal. See Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 

1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010) (“An alien’s desire to be free from harassment by 
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criminals motivated by theft or random violence by gang members bears no nexus 

to a protected ground.”).

4. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s dismissal of Petitioners’ appeal 

of the IJ’s denial of Petitioners’ CAT claim. Although Petitioners allege that the 

Guatemalan police have been corrupted by cartels, the record does not compel the 

conclusion that Pedro-Vicente and her daughter will more likely than not be 

tortured with the government’s acquiescence if returned to Guatemala. See 

Delgado-Ortiz v. Holder, 600 F.3d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Petitioners’ 

generalized evidence of violence and crime in Mexico is not particular to 

Petitioners and is insufficient to meet this standard.”).

PETITION DENIED.