Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 09A05-1704-CR-756 | September 5, 2017 Page 1 of 8

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as 

precedent or cited before any court except for the 

purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Mark K. Leeman

Leeman Law Office and Cass County 

Public Defender

Logansport, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Katherine Cooper

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana 

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Byron Snelbaker,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

September 5, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

09A05-1704-CR-756

Appeal from the Cass Superior Court

The Hon. Richard Maughmer, Judge

Trial Court Cause No. 

09D02-1610-F5-59

Bradford, Judge.
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Case Summary

[1] Appellant-Defendant Byron Snelbaker pled guilty to two counts of Level 5

felony battery and one count of Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement and 

admitted to being a habitual offender. The trial court imposed two consecutive 

six-year sentences for Snelbaker’s battery convictions—enhanced six years by 

virtue of Snelbaker’s habitual offender status—for an aggregate sentence of 

eighteen years of incarceration. Snelbaker contends that the trial court erred in 

imposing consecutive sentences for his two battery convictions and that those 

convictions violate constitutional and common-law prohibitions against double 

jeopardy. Because we disagree, we affirm. 

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On October 24, 2016, Snelbaker was driving his girlfriend’s gray Honda in 

Logansport without a license. When Logansport Police Officer Mark Van 

Horn attempted to stop Snelbaker, he fled, running through a number of stop 

signs and red lights and eventually exceeding 120 miles per hour. The police 

pursuit of Snelbaker eventually proceeded into Carroll County before returning 

to Cass County. When a stop stick blew out Snelbaker’s right front tire, he 

continued to flee from the police. 

[3] At one point, a police vehicle driven by Logansport Police Officer Shonn 

Parmeter pulled in front of Snelbaker, who attempted to force the police vehicle 

from the road by intentionally steering his vehicle into the officer’s. Officer 
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Parmeter sustained injuries when Snelbaker’s vehicle struck his. Eventually, 

near an airport, police officers executed a maneuver that forced Snelbaker from

the road into a field. In the field, Snelbaker again intentionally struck Officer 

Parmeter’s occupied police vehicle with his. 

[4] On October 25, 2016, the State charged Snelbaker with Level 5 felony battery 

with a deadly weapon, Level 5 felony battery resulting in bodily injury to a 

public safety officer, and Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement. On 

February 15, 2017, the State added a habitual offender allegation. On February 

24, 2017, without a written plea agreement, Snelbaker pled guilty to all charges 

and admitted his habitual offender status. On April 3, 2017, the trial court 

sentenced Snelbaker to six years of incarceration for each battery conviction, to 

be served consecutively, and two and one-half years for resisting law 

enforcement, to be served concurrently with the battery sentences. The trial 

court enhanced Snelbaker’s twelve-year sentence by six years by virtue of his 

habitual offender status, for an aggregate sentence of eighteen years. 

Discussion and Decision

I. Consecutive Sentences 

[5] Snelbaker contends that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing 

consecutive sentences for his two Level 5 battery convictions, one by means of a 

deadly weapon and one on a public safety officer resulting in injury. 

The determination of a defendant’s sentence is within the trial 

court’s discretion, and will be reversed only upon a showing of 
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abuse of discretion. Pritscher v. State, 675 N.E.2d 727, 729 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 1996). The legislature prescribes penalties for crimes 

and the trial court’s discretion does not extend beyond the 

statutory limits. Id. Therefore, in reviewing a sentence, we will 

consider whether it was statutorily authorized. Id. Further, we 

are duty bound to correct sentences that violate the trial court’s 

statutory authority to impose consecutive sentences under 

Indiana Code section 35-50-1-2.

Ballard v. State, 715 N.E.2d 1276, 1279 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). 

[6] Indiana Code section 35-50-1-2 provides, in part, as follows:

[E]xcept for crimes of violence, ... the total of the consecutive 

terms of imprisonment to which the defendant is sentenced for 

felony convictions arising out of an episode of criminal conduct 

may not exceed the following:

....

(2) If the most serious crime for which the defendant is 

sentenced is a Level 5 felony, the total of the consecutive 

terms of imprisonment may not exceed seven (7) years.

[7] Snelbaker correctly notes that neither of his battery convictions are crimes of 

violence as defined in Indiana Code subsection 35-50-1-2(a). Snelbaker, 

however, must also establish that his two battery convictions arose out of a 

single episode of criminal conduct. Snelbaker has failed to establish that this is 

the case. 

[8] An “episode of criminal conduct” refers to “offenses or a connected series of 

offenses that are closely related in time, place, and circumstance.” Ind. Code § 

§ 35-50-1-2(b). Whether multiple offenses constitute a single episode of 

criminal conduct is a fact-sensitive inquiry to be determined by the trial court.
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Schlichter v. State, 779 N.E.2d 1155, 1157 (Ind. 2002). In making this 

determination, we look to the simultaneous and contemporaneous nature of the 

crimes, which would constitute a single episode of criminal conduct. Reed v. 

State, 856 N.E.2d 1189, 1200 (Ind. 2006). Separate offenses are not part of a 

single episode of criminal conduct when a full account of each crime can be 

given without referring to the other offenses. Reeves v. State., 953 N.E.2d 665, 

671 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied.

[9] One of Snelbaker’s battery convictions required proof that he committed a 

battery on the road during the chase that injured a public safety officer, while 

the other required proof that he committed a battery in the field using a deadly 

weapon. Although the limited record does not indicate how far apart in time 

these two crimes occurred, each stands alone, and a full account of each can be 

given without referring to the other. In other words, the crimes occurred in 

different places and under different circumstances, and even if we assume they 

the second battery occurred not long after the first, they certainly were not 

simultaneous. Snelbaker has failed to establish that the trial court abused its 

discretion in imposing consecutive sentences for his two battery convictions.1 

 

1

 At least at the time of his guilty plea, Snelbaker must have shared our view in that he pled guilty to these 

two separate incidents and crimes. 
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II. Double Jeopardy2

[10] Snelbaker also argues that his two Level 5 felony battery convictions violate 

prohibitions against double jeopardy. In Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32 

(Ind. 1999), the Indiana Supreme Court held “that two or more offenses are the 

‘same offense’ in violation of Article I, Section 14 of the Indiana Constitution, 

if, with respect to ... the actual evidence used to convict, the essential elements 

of one challenged offense also establish the essential elements of another 

challenged offense.” Id. at 49-50. 

To show that two challenged offenses constitute the “same 

offense” in a claim of double jeopardy, a defendant must 

demonstrate a reasonable possibility that the evidentiary facts 

used by the fact-finder to establish the essential elements of one 

offense may also have been used to establish the essential 

elements of a second challenged offense.

Id. at 53. “In determining the facts used by the fact-finder to establish the 

elements of each offense, it is appropriate to consider the charging information, 

jury instructions, and arguments of counsel.” Lee v. State, 892 N.E.2d 1231, 

1234 (Ind. 2008) (citing Spivey v. State, 761 N.E.2d at 832 (Ind. 2002); 

Richardson, 717 N.E.2d at 54 n.48).

[11] Here, even on the limited record generated at Snelbaker’s guilty plea hearing, it 

is clear that his two battery convictions do not violate the “actual evidence” 

 

2

 The State contends that Snelbaker waived any claim that his convictions violate prohibitions against double 

jeopardy by pleading guilty. Rather than address the State’s waiver argument, we choose to address 

Snelbaker’s claim directly and express no opinion on the merits of the State’s argument. 
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test. As charged, one of Snelbaker’s battery convictions required proof that he 

committed a battery that injured a public safety officer, while the other required 

proof that he committed a battery using a deadly weapon. The factual basis 

included separate facts supporting each of these convictions. Supporting the 

first charge, Snelbaker affirmed that he intentionally ran his car into Officer 

Parmeter’s in an attempt to force him from the road and that the impacts 

caused the officer pain and swelling. As for the second charge, Snelbaker 

affirmed that later, in a field, he intentionally “slammed” his vehicle into 

Officer Parmeter’s occupied police vehicle. Tr. Vol. II p. 12. At the very least, 

the two convictions involve different impacts at different times and places (on 

the road and later in the field), and the first is supported by evidence of bodily 

injury that is irrelevant to the second. Snelbaker’s two battery convictions were 

not supported by the same actual evidence. 

[12] Snelbaker also argues that his two battery convictions violate an Indiana 

common-law prohibition against double jeopardy, namely “‘[c]onviction and 

punishment for a crime which consists of the very same act as another crime for 

which the defendant has been convicted and punished.’” Guyton v. State, 771 

N.E.2d 1141, 1143 (Ind. 2002) (quoting Richardson, 717 N.E.2d at 56 (Sullivan, 

J., concurring)). As mentioned, Snelbaker’s two battery convictions were based 

on two acts—Snelbaker running his car into Officer Parmeter’s as he tried to 

force him from the road and then then running his car into Officer Parmeter’s

again in the field after Snelbaker had been cornered. Snelbaker’s argument is 

based on his contention that the charging informations for the two batteries are 
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similar. Be that as it may, the factual basis at Snelbaker’s guilty plea hearing 

makes it clear that two distinct acts supported the two battery convictions. 

Snelbaker’s two battery convictions do not constitute being punished twice for 

the same act. 

[13] We affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

May, J., and Barnes, J., concur.