2014 UT App 240

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### T H E 

### U TA H 

### C O U RT O F 

### A P P E AL S

S T E PH E N R I P P E Y

, Peti tioner and Appellant,

v. S TAT EOF U TAH

, Respondent and Appellee.

Memor andumDeci si on No. 20110783-CA Filed October 17, 2014

Thi rd Di stric t Co urt, West Jor dan Department The Honorable Mar k S . Kour i s No. 100403251

Cor y A. Talbot, M egan J. DePau li s, and Rebec ca H.

Held, Atto rneys for Appellant Sean D. Reyes and Bret t J. DelPorto , Att or neys

for Appellee

J UD G E J OH N A. P E ARC Eauthore d thi s Memorandum Dec i si on, in whi ch J UD G E S G RE G OR Y K. O R M Eand J AM E S Z. D AVI Sconcu rr ed.

PEARCE, Judge:

¶1 St ephen Ri ppey appeals from the d istric t court’s or der di smi ssing hi s peti tion for post-convic tion reli ef. We affi rm.
¶2 In July 2008, te n-year-old S.B. repo rt ed to her mother that Ri ppey had sexually abus ed her at least ten tim es—and possi bly as many as t hi rt y tim es—over the prev i ous three year s. When S.B.’s mothe r co nfr onted Ri ppey about the abus e, he i mmedi ately admi tte d to touching S.B. sexually as well as sexually abus ing her wi th a spatula. Ri ppey also admi tte d the sexual abus e to the doctor who perfor med hi s post-arrest psychosexual evaluation.Rippey v. S tate

¶3 The S tate charged Rip pey wi th three counts o f ag gr avat ed sexual abus e of a chi ld and two counts of object rape of a chi ld, all fi rst degr ee feloni es. On Nove mber 12, 2008, Rip pey enter ed a gui lty plea to one count of aggr avat ed sexual abus e of a chi ld and

o ne co unt of object rape of a chi ld. The St ate di smi ssed the oth e r three charges in exchange for Ri ppey’s gui lty plea. On Februar y 5, 2009, t he di stric t court sentenced hi m to two concu rr ent pris on ter ms of fi fteen year s t o li fe. R i ppey di d not seek to wi thdraw hi s gui lty plea pr i or to sentencing.
¶4 On Februar y 11, 2010, Ri ppey fi led a pro se petiti on for relief under the Post-Convic tion Remedi es Act (PCRA). See Utah Code Ann. §§ 78B-9-101 to -405 (Lexi sNexi s 2012 & Supp. 2013); Utah R. Ci v. P. 65C. Ri ppey’s petiti on reci ted seventeen gr ounds for relief, ei ght of whi ch t he d i stric t court sum mari ly di smi ssed as faci ally fri vo lous. See Utah R. C iv

. P. 65C(h)( 1). The di stric t court

1 permi tte d the remain der of Ri ppey’s clai ms t o p r oceed. These clai ms inclu ded allegations that Ri ppey’ s plea was not knowing and vo luntary becau se of hi s di mini shed mental capac i ty and that Ri ppey’s couns el had been ineffec tive in fai ling to interv i ew key wi tnesses, fai ling to appris e the di stric t court of Ri ppey’s mental health i ssu es, and fai ling to advis e R ipp e y of the actual evidenc e again st hi m.
¶5 The St ate mo ved to di smi ss Ri ppey’s remaining clai ms, arg uing that they lacked a legal or factual b asi s. Th e di stric t c ourt held a hearin g on the St ate’s motion, at whi ch Ri ppey repr esented hi mself

. At the hearin g, the di stric t court que st i oned Ri ppey ext ensi vely to di scern the facts upon whi ch Ri ppey based hi s clai ms. At the conclu si on of the hearin g, the di stric t court gr anted the St ate’s motion to di smi ss. In i ts sub sequent wri tt e n di smi ssal

or der, the di stric t court ruled that Ri ppey’s di rect challen ges to the validi ty of hi s plea were procedurally barred becau se th e y co uld

1. The di stric t court’s di smi ssal of those clai ms i s not at i ssu e in thi s appeal.

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have been rais ed at tr ia l o r o n d i rect appeal. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-106( 1)(c ) (Lexi sNexi s 2012). The di stric t court also deter mined that Ri ppey’s ineffective assi stance of couns el clai ms
were not procedurally barred but t ha t they lacked merit. Speci fi cally, the di stric t co ur t ruled that Ri ppey “cannot meet hi s burden to demonstrat e hi s plea was in fact unknowing and involuntar y.”

¶6 Ri ppey, now repr esented by couns el, rais es two arg uments
on appeal. F ir st, Ri ppey contends that the di stric t court err ed in conclu ding that hi s di r e ct ch a llenges to hi s gui lty plea were procedurally barred, becau se Uta h Code secti on 77-13-6( 2)(c ) speci fi cally allows hi m to pursue hi s di rect challen ges under the PCRA. S e e Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6( 2)(c ) (Lexi sNexi s 2012). Second, Ri ppey arg ues that hi s petiti on adequately stated multi ple ineffec tive assi stance of couns el claims a nd that the di stric t court

err ed in di smi ssing them. Both of these arg uments present questi ons of law, the resolution of whi ch we rev i ew for corr ectness. See Brown v. State, 2013 UT 42, ¶ 36, 3 08 P.3d 486 (“We rev i ew a di stric t court‘s interpr etat i on of a statute for corr ectness.” (ci tation and internal quotation marks omi tte d)); Taylor v. State, 2012 UT 5, ¶ 8, 270 P.3d 471 (“We rev i ew an appeal from an or der di smi ssing
or denying a petiti on for post-convic tion relief for corr ectness

. . . .” (ci tation and internal quot ation marks omi tte d)).

¶7 Ri ppey fi rst arg ues that the di stric t court err ed when i t ruled that hi s direct challen ges to t he knowing and vo luntary nature of hi s gui lty plea were procedurally barred becau se those challen ges could have been, but were not, rais ed at tr i al or on appeal. Ri ppey arg ues that the PCRA’s procedural bars do not apply to hi s clai ms becau se he di d not seek to wi thdraw hi s gui lty plea prior to sentencing and Utah Code secti on 77-13 -6(2)(c) prov i des, “Any challen ge to a gui lty plea no t made [by motion befor e sentence is

announc ed] shall be pursued under [the PCRA].” S ee Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6( 2)(c ). According to Ri ppey’s arg ument, the words “shall be pursued” in the statute mandate that di rect challen ges to

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a gui l ty plea be brought under the PCRA—apparently wi thout reg ard to other wi se appli cable procedural requi rements.

¶8 Section 77-13-6( 2)(c ) has a well-es tabli shed l i mi tin g effect on
a defendant’s abi li ty to challen ge a gui lty plea on di rect appeal. See, e.g. , State v. Merrill , 2005 UT 34, ¶¶ 13–20, 114 P.3d 585. Ri ppey asks

us to interpr et secti on 77-13-6 (2)( c) as a li mi tation on the PCRA’s procedural bars as well. However , we d e cl ine to address thi s arg ument bec ause it was not preserv ed for appeal. “‘[I]n order to preserv e an iss ue for appeal[,] the i ssu e mus t be presented to the tr i al court in such a way that the t rial c ourthas an opportuni ty to rule on that i ssu e.’” McNair v. State, 2014 UT App 127, ¶ 7, 328 P.3d 874 (alterat i ons in or i gin al) (quoting 438 Main St. v. Easy Heat, Inc. , 2004 UT 72, ¶ 51, 99 P.3d 801).

¶9 Rule 2 4 (a)(5) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires an appellant’s bri ef to contain ei ther “ci tation to the recor d showing that the i ssu e was preserv ed in the t r ial court” or “a statement of gr ounds for seeking rev i ew of an i ssu e not preserv ed in the tri al court.” See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)( 5). Ri ppey’s appellate br ief cont ains neither. We have conduc ted our own disc ret i onary
rev i ew of the record, see Holladay v. Storey, 2013 UT App 158, ¶ 11 n.4, 307 P.3d 58 4 , bu t even affording the then-unrepresented Rip pey “ever y consi derat i on that may reasonably be indulged,” s e e State v. Winfiel d, 2006 UT 4, ¶ 19, 128 P. 3 d 1171 (ci tation and internal quotat i on marks omi tte d), we see nothin g in the recor d to indi cate that Ri ppey made any ver si on of hi s arg ument about Utah Code secti on 77-13-6 to the di stric t court. Cf. McNair, 2014 UT App 127, ¶¶ 7–8 (conc luding that pro se li tigant had preserv ed a tolling i ssu e becau se he “explain ed hi s mental li mi tations and asked the court to consi der the petiti on in the intere sts of jus t ice , ” the St ate resp o nd ed to that arg ument, and the tr i al court speci fi cally r uled that t he tolling prov i si on di d not apply). Accordingly, we decline to addr ess thi s argument becaus e i t isunpreserved.

¶10 Ri ppey next co nt e nds that the di stric t court err ed in di smi ssing hi s ineffec tive assi stance of couns el clai ms. He arg ues

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that he pleaded suffi ci ent facts in hi s PCRA petiti on to adequately state hi s ineffec tive assi stance of couns el clai ms. He further arg ues that the di stric t court err ed by fai ling to tr eat those facts as tr ue and fai ling to evaluate them again st the ineffec tive assi stanc e of couns el standards stated in Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

¶11 Th e St ate moved to di smi ss Ri ppey’s PCRA petiti on pursuant to rule 12(b) (6) of the Ut ah Rules of Ci vil Procedure. See Utah R. Ci v. P. 12(b) (6) (gov ernin g motions to di smi ss for “fai lure to state a clai m upon whi ch relief can be gr anted”); McNair, 20 14 UT App 127, ¶¶ 11, 15 (applying rule 12(b) (6) to PCRA petiti ons). U nder rule 12(b) (6), “we mus t accept the factual allegations [in Ri ppey’s petiti on] as tr ue and draw all reasonable inferences from those facts in a li ght most favor able to [Ri ppey].” McNair, 2014 UT App 127, ¶ 15 (ci tation and internal quotat i on marks omi tte d). Addi tionally, Ri ppey’s pro se petiti on “‘is to be liberally construed,’” and i ts di smi ssal was p r o per only “‘i f i t appears beyond doubt that [Ri ppey] can prov e no set of facts in supp or t of hi s clai m whi ch would entitle hi m to relief

. ’ ” Id. ¶ 12 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).

¶12 However , to avo i d d i s m i s s a l, a P C RA p e titi one r—even a pro se peti tioner—mus t stilladequately plead facts upon whi ch reli ef may be g ranted. “The pleading standards for a post-convic tion p e t it io n

. . . are set out in rule 65C of the Utah Rules of Ci vil Procedure, whi ch ‘go ver ns proceedings in all petiti ons for post-convic tion relief fi led under’ the PCRA.” Id. ¶ 9 (quoting Utah R. Ci v. P. 65C(a)). Under rule 65C, a PCRA petiti on “shall state

. . . in plain and conci se ter ms, all of the facts that form the basi s of the p e t i tioner’s clai m to relief.” Utah R. Ci v. P. 65C(d)( 3) (emphasis added). A PCRA petiti one r mu st addi tionally attach “affi davits, copi es of recor ds and other evidenc e in supp or t of the allegations” to hi s petiti on i f such documents are availab le. Id. R. 65C(e)(1)

. Thus, PCRA petiti ons are held to “a somewhat hi gher stand a r d than the gener al pleading standard found in rule 8(a)” of the Utah

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Rules of Ci vil Procedur e

. McNair, 2014 UT App 127, ¶ 9; see also 2 Utah R. Ci v. P. 8(a)( 1) (requi ring that pleadings contain “a sh or t and plain

. . . statement of the clai m showing that the party i s entitled to re li ef”).

¶13 Applyin g these standards to the di stric t court’s tr eatment of Ri ppey’ s PC R A petiti on, we see no err or in the di stric t court’s di smi ssal of Rip p e y’s ineffec tive assi stance of couns el clai ms. Ri ppey’s petiti on and i ts accompa ny ing memorandum contain factual allegations that, i f take n as tr ue, arg uably state one or more clai ms that hi s couns el perfor med defi ciently in some respects. However , the di stric t court proper ly focus ed on the standard that Ri ppey was ulti mately required to meet—that hi s tr i al co uns el’s alleged defi ci enci es resulted in a gui lt y p lea that “was in fact not knowing and vo luntary.” See Blueme l v. State, 2007 UT 90, ¶ 18, 173 P.3d 842 (c i tation and internal quot ation marks omi tte d). In other words, in the context of seeking to wi thdraw a gui lty plea, Ri ppey’s tr i al couns el’s alleged defi ci ent perfor manc e may se r v e as an avenue to demonstrate that hi s gui lty plea was not vo luntary, bu t i t i s not an end unto i tself. Se e S ta te v
. Walker, 2013 UT App 198, ¶ 42, 308 P.3d 573 (di scu ssing the prej udice r e qui rement for challe nging a gui lty plea based on an ineffec tive assi stance of

couns el clai m).

¶14 Ri ppey arg ues that tr i al couns el’ s alleged defi ci enci es render ed hi s plea unknowing or involuntar y notwi thstanding the wai ver s embodied in hi s plea agr eement. However , when challen gin g a gui lty plea on the gr ounds of ineffec tive assi stance of

couns el, a PCRA petiti oner “mus t show that there i s a reasonable probabi li ty t ha t, but for couns el’s err or s, he would not have

2. We note that the “somewhat hi gher” pleading standard under rule 65C i mpli es that there may well be PCRA petitio ns that, i f challen ged on a motion to di smi ss, would state a clai m under rule 8 but fall short under rule 65C. See McNair v. State, 2014 UT App 127, ¶ 9, 328 P.3d 874.

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pleaded g ui lty and woul d ha v e insi sted on going to tr i al and that

such a deci si on would ha ve been rat i onal under the ci rcums tances.” Ramirez-Gil v. State, 2014 UT App 122, ¶ 8, 327 P.3d 12 2 8 (emphas i s added) (ci tations and internal quotat i on marks omi tte d). In evaluating the li kelih ood and rat i onali ty of a deci si on to r ej e ct a p lea bargain and go to tr i al, “‘we look to the factual ci rcums tances surrounding the plea.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Clin gman , 288 F.3d 1183, 1186 (10th Ci r. 2002)); see also Walker , 2013 UT App 198, ¶ 42.

¶15 Ri ppey has not i denti fi ed any facts he pleaded in hi s petiti on
or proffere d at the hearin g that, i f tr ue, would establi sh a “rat i onal” basi s for reje cting the State ’s plea offer and insi sting on a tr i al. See Ramirez-Gil , 2014 UT A p p 122, ¶ 8; see also Clin gman , 288 F.3d at 1186 (stating that a “mere allegation that [a defendant] would have insi sted on tr i al

. . . i s ulti mately insu ffi ci ent to entitle hi m to relief” (ci tation and internal quotat i on marks omi tt e d )). By the tim e Ri ppey deci ded to accept the plea offer, he had admi tte d to the acts underlyin g the charges again st hi m to at least two people. Further, 3 hi s plea bargain wi th the St ate resulted in t he di smi ssal of three other fi rst deg ree felony counts against hi m.
¶16 Under these ci rcums tances, i t appears rat i onal for Ri ppey to have accept ed the St ate’s plea offer. To ov ercome that seemingly rat i onal deci si on, Ri ppey’s petiti o n needed to i denti fy factual allegatio ns that would establi sh—or at least supp or t an inference—“‘that a dec i si on to rej ect the plea bargain would have been rat i onal under the ci rcums tances.’” Walker, 2013 UT App 198, ¶ 42 (quoting Padilla v. Ke n tu c ky, 559 U.S. 356, 372 (2010))

. In the abse n c e of f a c tu a l allegations showing that Ri ppey’s rej ecti on of the plea deal would have been rat i onal under the ci rcums tances,

3. Even at the post-convic tion stage, Ri ppey di d not deny sexually abus ing S.B. To the contrar y, one of the addenda to hi s petiti on was
a postsentencing lette r to hi s atto rney wherein Ri ppey stated, “[A]t least I to ld the tr uth.”

20110783-CA 7 2014 UT App 240Rippey v. S tate

Ri ppey’s petiti on fai ls to state a clai m for relief based on ineffec tive assi stance of coun sel.

¶17 We affi rm the di stric t court’s di smi ssal of R ipp e y ’s PCRA petiti on.

20110783-CA 8 2014 UT App 240