Filed 4/24/13 In re Cynthia L. CA5 

 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

In re CYNTHIA L., a Person Coming Under 

the Juvenile Court Law. 

THE PEOPLE, 

Plaintiff and Respondent, 

 v. 

CYNTHIA L., 

Defendant and Appellant. 

F064829 

(Super. Ct. No. 510856) 

OPINION

THE COURT*

 APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Stanislaus County. Susan D. 

Siefkin, Judge. 

 Suzanne M. Morris, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant. 

 Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney 

General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Louis M. Vasquez and Rebecca 

Whitfield, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 

-ooOoo- 

 

* Before Wiseman, Acting P.J., Poochigian, J., and Peña, J. 
2 

 In July 2011, appellant, Cynthia L., a minor, pled no contest to a single count of 

attempted first degree burglary (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 460, subd. (a), 664). In August 2011, 

the juvenile court adjudged appellant a ward of the court and placed her on probation, 

with various terms and conditions. 

 In April 2012, a supplemental wardship petition (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 777) was 

filed in which it was alleged appellant committed multiple noncriminal violations of 

probation; appellant admitted the allegations; and the court continued appellant as a ward 

of the court and continued her on probation. Her conditions of probation included several 

that refer to criminal street gangs that had not been previously imposed, including the 

directive that she “not associate or communicate with any person that [she] know[s] is a 

gang member ....”1 

 On appeal, appellant contends the gang association condition is unconstitutionally 

overbroad. We affirm. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2

The Attempted Burglary 

 A detention report stated that according to a Modesto Police Department (MPD) 

report, the victims of the offense told police the following occurred on November 2, 

2010: “[Appellant] came to their front door and they thought she was soliciting so they 

did not answer the door. A short time later, [appellant’s] father Jose was attempting to 

break the glass on the back door to gain entry. Once Jose saw the victims in the 

residence he fled.” 

 

1 We refer to this condition of probation as the “gang association condition.” 

2 Except as otherwise indicated, all information in this section is taken from the 

dispositional social study filed April 19, 2012. 
3 

The Instant Probation Violations 

 The conditions of probation imposed following appellant’s adjudication of 

attempted burglary included the following: She was to (1) attend school, (2) be in her 

home between the hours of 9:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. unless in the company of her parents, 

and (3) complete 15 hours of community service by March 27, 2012. 

 “According to school records from the Peterson Alternative Center Education 

(PACE) dated April 5, 2012, [appellant] was dropped from enrollment on March 22, 

2012, due to excessive absences.” 

 On March 12, 2012, a probation officer made contact with appellant’s mother at 

appellant’s last known address. Appellant’s mother told the officer she “had not seen 

[appellant] ‘in a while.’” Appellant was arrested at another location on April 4, 2012. 

She told the officer she had been staying at that location with a friend for approximately 

one month. 

On March 13, 2012, the “coordinator of community service” informed the 

probation officer that numerous attempts to set up an appointment with appellant “to sign 

[her] up for her community service hours” had been unsuccessful, and appellant had “not 

submitted proof of completion of community service.” 

Additional Background 

 At the time of the disposition hearing in April 2012, appellant, then 17 years old, 

was approximately eight months pregnant. The “presumed biological father” of the thenunborn child is appellant’s boyfriend, K.S. (K.). 

 With regard to “peer influence and associations,” appellant told the probation 

officer “she only has one friend and would just ‘hang out’ with [K.],” and she “is aware 

[K.] is not a good influence on her as he is on probation and is currently incarcerated in 
4 

juvenile hall.”3 Appellant “denied ever associating with a gang.” She told the probation 

officer, “‘My mom’s side of the family are Northerners and my dad’s side of the family 

are Southerners.’” She also stated that both her father and her brother are “involved with 

Northern and Southern gangs.” An MPD report stated that appellant’s father, during the 

booking process following his arrest for the attempted burglary discussed above, stated 

he was a “Southerner,” and that he was “classified as such and placed with people of 

similar gang affiliation.” 

 Appellant’s mother told the probation officer the following: Appellant “has a lot 

of friends” who are “Northerners.” Appellant “is not a member ... but she does hang out 

with them.” Appellant “‘has Northerner songs on [her mother’s] phone.’” Appellant’s 

mother “‘didn’t allow her to wear red over here.’” Appellant “was doing good” on 

probation; she “wasn’t out there getting into trouble.” However, “once [K.] got out, it 

was all about [K.]” 

The Disposition Hearing4

The court noted that gang conditions had not previously been imposed, at which 

point the following exchange occurred: 

“THE COURT: Is there a basis for ordering [gang conditions] now? 

“[Appellant]: My boyfriend. 

“MS. VARNER [probation officer]: By association. So her boyfriend, the father 

of the child.” 

Appellant confirmed, “... my boyfriend is a gang member.” 

Defense counsel objected to the gang conditions. 

 

3 The probation officer noted that K. had been adjudicated a ward of the court, and 

that on April 17, 2012, he was ordered to serve 270 days in juvenile hall. 

4 Information in this section is taken from the transcript of the April 2012 

disposition hearing. 
5 

DISCUSSION 

 Appellant contends the gang association condition is unconstitutionally overbroad 

because, she asserts, it (1) impinges on her constitutional rights to freedom of association 

and assembly, (2) is not “reasonably related to present or future delinquent conduct,” and 

(3) is not “narrowly tailored to the reason for the restriction or appellant’s individual 

needs.” (Boldface omitted.) 

Legal Background

Welfare and Institutions Code section 730 provides, in relevant part: “The 

[juvenile] court may impose and require any and all reasonable conditions [of probation] 

that it may determine fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done and the 

reformation and rehabilitation of the ward enhanced.” “[J]uvenile probation conditions 

must be judged by the same three-part standard applied to adult probation conditions 

under [People v.] Lent [(1975)] 15 Cal.3d 481: ‘A condition of probation will not be held 

invalid unless it “(1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was 

convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids 

conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality ....” [Citations.]’” (In re 

D.G. (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 47, 52-53.) Under this test, “All three requirements must 

be met before the condition is invalidated.” (In re Frank V. (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1232, 

1242.) 

“The juvenile court has wide discretion to select appropriate conditions ....” (In re 

Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 889 (Sheena K.).) “Although the goal of both [juvenile 

and adult] probation is the rehabilitation of the offender, ‘[j]uvenile probation is not, as 

with an adult, an act of leniency in lieu of statutory punishment; it is an ingredient of a 

final order for the minor’s reformation and rehabilitation.’ [Citation.] ... [¶] In light of 

this difference, a condition of probation that would be unconstitutional or otherwise 

improper for an adult probationer may be permissible for a minor under the supervision 
6 

of the juvenile court.” (In re Tyrell J. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 68, 81, overruled on other 

grounds by In re Jaime P. (2006) 40 Cal.4th 128, 139.) 

However, a court’s discretion is not boundless. “‘“‘Where a condition of 

probation requires a waiver of precious constitutional rights, the condition must be 

narrowly drawn....’”’” (In re Frank V., supra, 233 Cal.App.3d at p. 1242.) “A probation 

condition that imposes limitations on a person’s constitutional rights must closely tailor 

those limitations to the purpose of the condition to avoid being invalidated as 

unconstitutionally overbroad.” (Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 890.) “A restriction is 

unconstitutionally overbroad ... if it (1) ‘impinge[s] on constitutional rights,’ and (2) is 

not ‘tailored carefully and reasonably related to the compelling state interest in 

reformation and rehabilitation.’ [Citations.] The essential question in an overbreadth 

challenge is the closeness of the fit between the legitimate purpose of the restriction and 

the burden it imposes on the defendant’s constitutional rights—bearing in mind, of 

course, that perfection in such matters is impossible, and that practical necessity will 

justify some infringement.” (In re E.O. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1153 (E.O.).) 

Analysis 

 As indicated above, appellant’s constitutional overbreadth challenge to the gang 

association condition is premised on three claims, viz., the claims that the condition (1) 

impinges on constitutional rights, (2) is not reasonably related to present or future 

delinquent conduct, and (3) is not sufficiently narrowly drawn. The first of these is 

correct. As the People effectively concede, the gang association condition impinges on 

appellant’s First Amendment rights of association and assembly. However, appellant’s 

remaining two points, which we address in turn, are not well taken. 

Relation of Gang Association Condition to Present and Future Criminality

 Appellant contends the gang association condition “is not reasonably related to 

present or future delinquent conduct” because there was no indication that either the 
7 

underlying attempted burglary or appellant’s subsequent misconduct were “gang related 

or influenced” or “the product of gang associations.” (Boldface omitted.) 

 We assume without deciding that neither the instant offense nor appellant’s 

probation violations were gang related, and that therefore the gang association condition 

is not reasonably related to present delinquent conduct, but as we explain below, we 

conclude the challenged condition is reasonably related to future criminality. On this 

point, we find instructive In re Laylah K. (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 1496 (Laylah K.). 

In that case, two minors were adjudicated of various offenses based on an incident 

in which the minors, who had friends who were members of the Crips gang, accosted a 

woman on the street, demanded to know why she was wearing an article of red 

clothing—red being a color associated with a rival gang—and challenged her to fight. 

The minors argued that they were not gang members and therefore, the “‘Gang Terms 

and Conditions of Probation’” (Laylah K., supra, 229 Cal.App.3d at p. 1499) imposed 

there, which included a condition prohibiting the minors from “associat[ing] with known 

members of the Crips gang” (ibid.), “were not reasonably related to their crimes or their 

rehabilitation” (id. at p. 1500) and therefore were invalid under People v. Lent, supra, 15 

Cal.3d 481 (Lent).5 The court rejected the minors’ contentions. The court concluded that 

 

5 We note that whether a probation condition is invalid under Lent, and whether a 

condition is unconstitutionally overbroad, are separate questions. Appellant, however, 

frames her constitutional overbreadth argument in terms of the Lent standard for 

determining the validity of the probation condition. That is, she frames the issue in terms 

of whether the challenged condition is reasonably related to future criminality. (See Lent, 

supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 486.) The constitutional test for overbreadth, on the other hand, as 

phrased somewhat differently in E.O., supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 1153, requires 

consideration of whether the probation condition at issue is, in addition to being narrowly 

tailored, “‘reasonably related to the compelling state interest in reformation and 

rehabilitation.’” (Italics added.) In our view, in order for a probation condition to be 

reasonably related to a minor’s reformation and rehabilitation, it must also be reasonably 

related to present or future criminality. Therefore, Laylah K.’s response to the Lent-based 

argument raised there is instructive on the constitutional argument we address here. 
8 

the minors, “[i]f they were not already entrenched in the gang, they were well on their 

way[,]” based, in part, on the following: Both minors “admitted they had friends who 

were members of the Crips gang[,]” including another minor who was with the minors in 

committing the adjudicated offenses; a family member opined that the minors were 

“‘gang associates’”; and the probation officer concluded that the minors, in committing 

the adjudicated offenses, “participated in an apparent defense of what they perceived to 

be a symbolic challenge to Crips’ territorialism.” (Laylah K., at pp. 1500-1501.) 

The court stated further: “The minors’ contention that mere association with gang 

members does not justify terms aimed at known gang members is extremely shortsighted. 

Association with gang members is the first step to involvement in gang activity.... [¶] 

This court has previously held that probation conditions designed to curb dangerous 

associations with gangs were not unreasonable. (In re Michael D. (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 

1610, 1617.) While Michael D. had admitted gang affiliations, we see no logical or 

beneficial reason to require a court to wait until a minor has become entrenched with a 

gang, only then to apply mere prophylactic remedies. [¶] ... [¶] ... Evidence of current 

gang membership is not a prerequisite to imposition of conditions designed to steer 

minors from [the] destructive path [of gang membership].” (Laylah K., supra, 229 

Cal.App.3d at pp. 1501-1502.) 

We recognize that the minors in Laylah K. exhibited a greater involvement in and 

identification with a gang than that shown by appellant. However, by the same token, the 

record here indicates appellant’s relationship to a criminal street gang went beyond 

simply associating with persons who happened to be gang members. The record contains 

evidence that appellant had placed “gang songs,” i.e., presumably, songs having a special 

significance to gang members, on her mother’s telephone. Such an act indicates some 

interest, if not actual involvement, in gang activity. Based on this act, considered in 

conjunction with the evidence that appellant had, and associated with, gang member 
9 

friends, the court reasonably could conclude that appellant, though not in the same degree 

of imminent danger of “succumbing to gang pressures” (Laylah K., supra, 229 

Cal.App.3d at p. 1501) as the minors in Laylah K., was, at least slightly, moving in that 

direction. As in Laylah K., the court was not required to wait further before imposing 

conditions designed to “steer [her] from [the] destructive path [of gang membership].” 

(Id. at p. 1502.) On this record, the gang association condition was reasonably related to 

the prevention of future criminal behavior, and therefore also reasonably related to “‘the 

compelling state interest in reformation and rehabilitation.’” (E.O., supra, 188 

Cal.App.4th at p. 1153.) 

Overbreadth

 Appellant contends the gang association condition was “not narrowly tailored to 

address [her] unique needs” because it would prevent contact with her father, her brother, 

the father of her soon-to-be-born child, at a time when, given that she was soon to give 

birth, contact with such persons is particularly important to appellant. 

 The factors cited by appellant support what is not disputed: The gang condition 

impinges on important constitutional rights. However, these factors do not establish that 

the challenged condition imposes limitations on constitutional rights that are not “closely 

tailor[ed] ... to the purpose of the condition ....” (Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 890.) 

Here, the purpose of the condition is to foster appellant’s rehabilitation and to protect 

public safety by preventing appellant, who, as demonstrated above, has associated with 

gang member friends and has shown an interest in gang culture, from going any further 

down the path to gang involvement. A condition directed at preventing gang 

involvement that accomplishes this aim by prohibiting association with gang members is 

carefully tailored to its purpose. It is not overbroad. 

DISPOSITION 

 The judgment is affirmed.