Peace Corps Employmmemd: Policies for Pregmamlt Volumteeirs

The Pregnancy Discrimination A ct (PDA) would prohibit the Peace Corps from implementing an across-the-board policy of terminating or reassigning volunteers solely 

because they become pregnant while assigned overseas, or because they have an 

abortion. A decision to terminate a pregnant volunteer must be based on a case-by-case 

assessment of the volunteer’s ability to function effectively in her assignment while 

pregnant or after delivery of the child.

Under the PDA, the fact that a volunteer who has been terminated because of pregnancy 

chooses to have an abortion cannot be considered in a decision on her reapplication for 

service.

Even though a specific restriction in the Peace Corps’ appropriation prohibits the use of 

its funds to perform abortions, so that the Peace Corps may not pay for the cost of an 

abortion for one of its volunteers, the PD A would require the Peace Corps to continue 

to pay travel and per diem expenses to volunteers evacuated to have an abortion, as 

long as it provides such compensation to other volunteers evacuated for comparable 

medical conditions. The Peace Corps must also allow volunteers to draw upon their 

accumulated readjustment allowance to pay for an abortion, if similar access is allowed 

for other medical expenses.

November 20, 1981

MEMORANDUM OPINION FOR THE GENERAL COUNSEL,

PEACE CORPS

This responds to your request for this Office’s views on several 

questions about the Peace Corps’ policies on hiring and reinstatement of 

volunteers who become pregnant while overseas and of pregnant volunteers who elect to have an abortion, and on reimbursement of travel 

and per diem expenses to volunteers evacuated to the United States for 

the purpose of obtaining an abortion. We conclude that the Pregnancy 

Discrimination Act would prohibit the Peace Corps from implementing 

any across-the-board policy of terminating volunteers who become 

pregnant while overseas or pregnant volunteers who elect to have 

abortions, but that in some limited circumstances termination or reassignment may be appropriate, on an ad hoc basis, because of the unique 

demands and constraints of Peace Corps service. We do not believe, 

however, that the Peace Corps may consider the fact that a volunteer 

who had been terminated because of pregnancy subsequently elected to 

have an abortion in reviewing that individual’s application for reinstatement. With respect to the funding of abortion-related expenses, we 

conclude that the Peace Corps is not barred from using appropriated 

funds to pay travel costs and a per diem to volunteers who are evacu350
ated for the purpose of obtaining an abortion, and, in fact, that the 

Pregnancy Discrimination Act requires the Peace Corps to continue 

paying those costs, so long as travel and per diem expenses are paid to 

volunteers evacuated for other comparable medical disabilities.

I. Background

Current Peace Corps policy provides for an ad hoc determination 

whether volunteers who become pregnant or pregnant volunteers who 

elect to have an abortion will be allowed to remain in their assigned 

countries. In determining whether a pregnant volunteer (including her 

spouse) should be allowed to remain in service, the Country Director 

looks at a variety of factors, including health hazards to the mother and 

child, the ability of the parents to support the child, and the prospects 

for continued effectiveness by the parents. A pregnant volunteer who 

elects to have an abortion may be separated, or returned to duty if the 

Country Director determines she will be able to serve effectively under 

the circumstances. Pregnant volunteers, volunteers with dependent children, and volunteers who have had abortions while in service do serve 

in the Peace Corps, although individuals who are pregnant or who 

have dependent children are not encouraged to become volunteers. 

Volunteers who choose to have an abortion are generally evacuated to 

the United States for the procedure. The Peace Corps pays travel 

expenses and a per diem to those volunteers who have an abortion, as it 

does for volunteers evacuated for other medical or surgical treatment.1 

Because of a prohibition in the Peace Corps’ current appropriations 

authority against the use of appropriated funds to pay for abortions 

except where the life of the woman would be endangered or in cases of 

reported rape or incest, the Peace Corps does not now pay the costs of 

the abortion procedure itself. Volunteers may, however, draw upon 

accumulated readjustment allowance funds to pay for abortion procedures.2

You have asked us to address the following questions:

1. Can the Peace Corps terminate any volunteer who becomes pregnant while a volunteer because of pregnancy? If so, could such a policy be limited to single 

volunteers?

1 Payment of medical and related expenses for Peace Corps volunteers is authorized by 22 U.S.C. 

§ 2504(e) (1976), which provides that “(vjolunteers shall receive such health care during their service 

. . . as the President may deem necessary or appropriate . .

2 Under the Peace Corps Act, codified at 22 U.S.C. §2501-2523 (Supp. Ill 1979), volunteers are 

entitled to receive a readjustment allowance of $125 per month, payable on return of the volunteer to 

the United States. 22 U.S.C. § 2504(c). Amounts accrued as readjustment allowance may be paid to the 

volunteer, members of his family, or others during the period of the volunteer’s service, “under such 

circumstances as the President may determine.” The readjustment allowance is transferred on a 

monthly basis, to a noninterest bearing account until payment to the volunteer. For income tax 

purposes, the allowance is deemed paid to the volunteer when transferred to the fund from which the 

readjustment allowance is payable. Id.

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2. Can the fact that a volunteer has a husband in-country 

be cause to allow a pregnant volunteer to remain in that 

status longer than she would if she were single?

3. Does payment for travel for a volunteer to return to 

Washington and per diem while here, leaving the payment for the abortion procedure up to the volunteer, 

comply with the legislative restriction on Peace Corps 

appropriations?

4(a). If a volunteer is terminated, asked to resign due to 

pregnancy, and subsequently obtains an abortion, can 

that fact be considered if she applies for readmission to 

the Peace Corps as a volunteer?

(b). Since a normal term for volunteers is two years, if the 

answer to (a) is “no,” could the fact that a volunteer 

resigned more than once to have an abortion be considered upon her request for readmission?

II. Requirements of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act

The Peace Corps’ termination, reinstatement, and benefits policies for 

pregnant volunteers or volunteers who have an abortion must comply 

with the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) 

(Supp. Ill 1979). The PDA amended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 

of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-16 (1976), to clarify Congress’ intent that 

the sex discrimination prohibited by Title VII includes discrimination 

on the basis of “pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions.” 3 

The PDA provides that “women affected by pregnancy, childbirth or 

related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employmentrelated purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or 

inability to work . . . .” The prohibition against discrimination does 

not require an employer to pay “health insurance benefits” for abortions, except where the life of the mother would be endangered if the 

fetus were carried to term, or where medical complications arise from 

an abortion.

Except for the express language allowing an employer to refuse to 

pay health benefits for abortion, the prohibition against discrimination 

contained in the PDA is to be read broadly to extend to “the whole 

range of matters concerning the child-bearing process,” including pregnancy, miscarriage, abortions, and childbirth, and to the whole range of 

employment policies that can adversely affect pregnant workers, including “hiring, reinstatement, termination, disability benefits, sick leave,

8 The Pregnancy Discrimination Act applies to “volunteers serving under . . . the Peace Corps 

A ct” by virtue of § 12 of the Domestic Volunteer Services Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 5057(c)(1), 

with the exception o f provisions affording aggrieved individuals a right of appeal to the M ent Systems 

Protection Board.

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medical benefits, seniority and all other conditions covered by Title 

VII.” See H.R. Rep. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1978 

U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 4749, 4752-53 (1978 House Report). 

Any employment practice or policy that treats pregnant employees 

differently from other disabled workers, with the exception of payment 

of health insurance benefits for an abortion, is a prima facie violation of 

the Civil Rights Act. See Harriss v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.,

649 F.2d 670, 673 (9th Cir. 1980); see generally Dothard v. Rawlinson,

433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977).

The courts have held that the prima facie test applies both to facially 

neutral policies or practices which have a disparate impact on pregnant 

employees, and policies or practices that single out pregnant employees 

for disparate treatment. See, e.g., Harriss, 649 F.2d at 673. An employer 

may show that facially neutral policies or practices are justified by and 

based upon a nondiscriminatory business purpose, although the employee may rebut that showing if other devices that do not have a 

similar discriminatory effect would serve that business purpose. See

Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971); Dothard, 433 U.S. 

at 329. Where a policy or practice overtly discriminates against pregnant employees, it may be justified only if the employer can show that 

the discrimination is “a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably 

necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e). The federal courts have consistently 

stated that this exception is “extremely narrow” and requires the employer to demonstrate, for example, that the discrimination is “reasonably necessary to the essence of his business,” 4 that he has a “factual 

basis for believing that all or substantially all [pregnant] women would 

be unable to perform safely and efficiently the duties of the job involved . . . ,” 5 or that it would be “impossible or highly impractical to 

deal with [pregnant women] on an individualized basis.” 6 See Harriss,

649 F.2d at 676; see generally Dothard, 433 U.S. at 334.

It is important to note that the PDA does not require an employer to 

treat pregnant employees in any particular manner or to provide particular benefits for pregnant employees. Rather, it prohibits only discriminatory treatment that is not fully justified by the particular requirements of the job. Women disabled due to pregnancy, childbirth, or 

related medical conditions must be provided the same benefits and same 

employment consideration as those provided to other similarly disabled 

workers, but need not be provided any greater benefits or consideration. 1978 House Report at 4, 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 

4752. Thus, the initial question is whether the Peace Corps’ current

4 See Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224, 236 (5th Cir. 1976); Diaz v. Pan American

World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir. 1971), cert, denied, 404 U S. 950 (1971).

hSee Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969); Diaz, 442 F.2d at 388.

6See Weeks, 408 F.2d at 235 n.5.

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policies or the possible changes raised by your questions would be 

consistent with the treatment of other volunteers who are similarly 

affected in their ability to perform the major functions of their assignments. If any of those policies treats volunteers differently or has the 

effect of treating volunteers differently because of pregnancy (including 

volunteers who have abortions), it would be a prima facie violation of 

the PDA. The second level of inquiry would then be whether the 

discrimination is justified as a bona fide occupational qualification (if 

the policy discriminates on its face) or by business necessity (if the 

policy is facially neutral but discriminatory in impact).

HI. Temmmatioin aad Reinstatement

Under current policy, a Peace Corps volunteer may be separated 

from service before the end of his or her term for a variety of reasons, 

most of which involve a discretionary determination by the Country 

Director that the volunteer’s continued effectiveness has been impaired. 

A volunteer may be terminated, for example, for use of illegal drugs or 

for excessive use of alcohol. Marriage is a ground for early termination 

in some instances, for example, if the volunteer marries another volunteer whose term has ended, or if a volunteer marries a dependent nonvolunteer and it is determined that the volunteer will be unable to 

support his or her spouse while in service. Marital separation or divorce is generally cause for reassignment of one volunteer, or, if no 

other suitable assignment is available, for termination of one volunteer. 

A volunteer may also be terminated for failure to adjust to the conditions of the assignment, unacceptable personal conduct, inadequate job 

performance, or lack of a suitable assignment. As noted above, a pregnant volunteer may be separated from service if the Country Director 

determines that continued service could present a health hazard for the 

mother or child, if the volunteer will be unable to support the family, 

or generally if having a child will impair the volunteer’s continued 

effective service. A volunteer who obtains an abortion may be terminated if the Country Director determines she will not be able to serve 

effectively.

A. Pregnancy

We believe that, so long as a decision to terminate a pregnant volunteer is based on an assessment of the volunteer’s ability to function 

effectively in her assignment after delivery of the child, the Peace 

Corps’ current policy allowing discretionary termination of pregnant 

volunteers does not violate the PDA. We base this conclusion on our 

understanding that the same considerations are applied to any volunteer 

who has a dependent, including volunteers who have dependent children or spouses prior to entering the Corps, and volunteers who marry 

dependent spouses during service. The application of this policy, on an

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ad hoc basis, would thus not have a disparate impact on volunteers who 

become pregnant during their term overseas, and would not be discriminatory under the PDA. To the extent that the Peace Corps considers the marital status of any volunteer who has dependents as relevant to the volunteer’s continued effectiveness in the assignment, we 

believe the Peace Corps may take into consideration a pregnant volunteer’s marital status, and whether her spouse accompanies her in her 

assignment, in deciding whether termination is appropriate. Similarly, if 

the Peace Corps as a matter of policy or practice reassigns or terminates volunteers if continued service in a particular assignment would 

pose a health threat to the volunteer or his or her children, the Peace 

Corps may reassign or terminate a pregnant volunteer if a bona fide 

threat to her health or to the health of the child exists.

Under limited circumstances, we believe the Peace Corps could terminate or reassign a volunteer solely because she is pregnant, independent of the considerations outlined above. We can foresee the possibility 

that in individual cases a volunteer would not be able to function 

adequately during her pregnancy because of cultural biases in her 

assigned country. Because of the unique situation of Peace Corps volunteers, who must live and work in the culture of their assigned 

countries, in such a situation we believe the Peace Corps could exercise 

its discretion based on the facts of a particular case and remove the 

volunteer from her assignment. See, e.g., Dothard, 433 U.S. at 334

(1977).7

While the Peace Corps could terminate pregnant volunteers on a 

case-by-case basis for the reasons outlined above, we do not believe 

that the Peace Corps could, as a matter of overall policy, terminate 

pregnant volunteers solely because they become pregnant. Some recent 

decisions of lower federal courts have upheld policies requiring women 

to take mandatory leave beginning in the early stages of pregnancy, but 

those decisions turn on the narrow ground that continued employment 

of the woman during her pregnancy could pose a safety risk to coworkers and the public.8 We have not been informed of a comparable 

factual basis that would justify an across-the-board policy of terminating pregnant volunteers. In fact, the Peace Corps’ historic experience 

with pregnant volunteers who remain in service might undermine, if

7 We would caution that the Peace Corps should remain evenhanded in application of its policies. 

Thus, to the extent that the Peace Corps can accommodate volunteers with dependents, for example 

by choice of assignments or personal leave, or reassigns volunteers if necessary to avoid cross-cultural 

concerns, it must extend the same consideration to volunteers who become pregnant and have children 

while in service.

8 These cases have involved policies of major airlines requiring stewardesses to take mandatory 

leave upon learning of their pregnancy, or after the first few months of pregnancy. See, e.g., Harriss,

649 F.2d at 677; Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines. Inc.. 633 F.2d 361, 370 (4th Cir 1980), cert, denied, 450 

U.S. 965 (1981); Dothard, 433 U.S at 336-37 (“male-only” requirement for prison guards in “contact" 

positions allowed because of unique security and control problems in Alabama prisons).

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not preclude, an argument that such a policy is justified, even by the 

unique demands of the Peace Corps.

B. Abortion

We doubt that the Peace Corps would be able to make a showing 

under the PDA that would permit it to terminate a volunteer because 

she elects to have an abortion, so long as other volunteers who undergo 

surgery of a comparable nature are permitted to return to their assigned 

countries. The legislative history of the PDA and implementing guidelines promulgated by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 

(EEOC) state in categorical terms that a woman’s decision to have an 

abortion cannot be the basis for termination of employment. See House 

Report at 7, 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 4755 (“[N]o 

employer may, for example, fire . . . a woman simply because she has 

exercised her rights to have an abortion.”); 29 C.F.R. Part 1604 (Appendix). Moreover, the experience of the Peace Corps with volunteers 

who have had abortions and have returned to service would substantially undermine any argument that a volunteer who has had an abortion would be unable to perform effectively. This would not necessarily 

preclude the Peace Corps from reassigning a volunteer who has had an 

abortion if women who have abortions are ostracized or otherwise 

condemned by the culture of her assigned country. That circumstance 

could justify removal of the volunteer from her assignment, if her 

continued effective service would be substantially impaired by that 

cultural bias (assuming the fact of her abortion were public knowledge). 

However, such circumstances may be rare, and might be grounds only 

for reassignment of the volunteer, not for termination.

We do not believe that under the PDA the Peace Corps could justify 

a refusal to rehire a volunteer who had been terminated because of 

pregnancy and subsequently chose to have an abortion. Even if the 

ostensible reason for the refusal to rehire that volunteer were to avoid 

disruption caused by repeated breaks in service, or because of questions 

raised about the volunteer’s commitment to serve her full term,9 it 

would be difficult to overcome the inference that the volunteer was 

accorded different consideration in the employment decision because 

she became pregnant and chose to have an abortion, and might become 

pregnant and choose to have an abortion again in the future. One of the 

primary purposes of the PDA revealed in its legislative history is to 

prevent employers from acting on the basis of such stereotypes, i.e.,

that all women of child-bearing age are “potentially pregnant.” See

1978 House Report at 6-7, 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 4754- 

55; Weeks, 408 F.2d at 235-36. Thus, we conclude that under the PDA

9 Among the standards of selection for Peace Corps volunteers is ‘‘[motivation indicating commitment to serve a full term (usually 2 years) as a volunteer despite periods of stress.” 22 C .F R. 

§ 305.3(a).

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the fact that a volunteer chose to have an abortion cannot be considered in a decision on her reapplication for service.

III. Reimbursement of Expenses

You have also asked whether the Peace Corps must, or indeed can, 

consistent with the PDA and current restrictions on the use of appropriated funds, continue to pay travel costs and a per diem for volunteers who obtain an abortion while in service. The Peace Corps now 

pays those costs under a general policy providing for evacuation to the 

United States of volunteers who require “elective (necessary but not 

emergency) surgery of any consequence.” 10 Until the beginning of FY 

1979, the Peace Corps also paid for the costs of the abortion procedure 

itself. In 1978, Congress included language in the Peace Corps’ appropriations legislation limiting the use of appropriated funds for abortions. 

We understand that the currently effective language is contained in 

Pub. L. No. 96-536, § 109, 94 Stat. 3166, 3170 (1980), and prohibits the 

use of funds “to perform abortions except where the life of the mother 

would be endangered if the fetus were carried to term; or except for 

such medical procedures necessary for victims of [reported] rape or 

incest . . . or for medical procedures necessary for the termination of 

an ectopic pregnancy.”

On its face, this restriction covers only payments made “to perform 

abortions”; it does not prohibit the use of funds to pay expenses, such 

as a per diem or travel expenses, that are incidental to the abortion. We 

believe that the plain language of the appropriations restriction is dispositive, and does not require the Peace Corps to cease payment of 

incidental expenses other than the costs of the abortion itself.11

This does not, however, dispose of the question whether the Peace 

Corps, in its discretion, may cease payment of travel and per diem 

expenses for volunteers who elect to have abortions. The statutory 

authority for payment of those expenses vests broad discretion in the 

President or his delegated representative to authorize “such health care

10 The current policy set forth in the Peace Corps manual identifies a number of other factors that 

require evacuation to the United States, including: difficult diagnostic problems; cases requiring 

difficult treatment; psychiatric problems that are the primary reason for evacuation or that threaten to 

complicate the medical management of the case; cases involving a long recuperative period; and cases 

that can be handled more effectively and at lower cost in the United States than at an intermediate 

point. Evacuation to intermediate locations is suggested for a number of other problems, including: 

emergency surgery, elective surgery requiring short-term hospitalization or treatment on an outpatient 

basis; specialist consultations, simple orthopedic procedures; and treatment if a long recuperative 

period is not anticipated.

"M oreover, as we note below, any broader interpretation of the appropriations restriction would 

conflict directly with the requirements of the PDA, This inconsistency would raise a substantial 

question of congressional intent, because the latter-passed bill (the appropriations legislation) does not 

address the continuing applicability of the PDA. In genera], repeals by implication are not favored, 

especially when the subsequent legislation is an appropriations measure. See, e.g., TVA v. HiU, 437 U.S. 

153, 189-90 (1978). To the extent possible, therefore, we must interpret the restriction on the Peace 

Corps’ appropriated funds consistently with the PDA—Le., to prohibit only the use of funds to pay for 

the abortion procedure itself

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. . . as [is] necessary or appropriate.” 22 U.S.C. § 2540(e). We believe 

this authority is broad enough to allow termination of such payments. 

It must, however, be read in light of the non-discrimination requirements of the PDA.

We conclude that under the PDA the Peace Corps must continue to 

pay travel and per diem expenses for volunteers evacuated to have an 

abortion, so long as it provides such compensation for other volunteers 

evacuated for comparable medical conditions. As noted above, the 

PDA expressly exempts from its coverage payment of “health insurance benefits for abortion,” except where the life of the mother would 

be endangered or “medical complications” arise. Because the Peace 

Corps in effect acts as a self-insurer for the volunteers, this exclusion is 

consistent with the restriction on use of appropriated funds discussed 

above.12 However, the legislative history of the PDA makes it clear 

that Congress intended the exclusion of abortion benefits to be limited 

to benefits for the abortion itself, and not to include incidental benefits 

available to employees with comparable temporary disabilities. The 

amendment excluding abortion benefits from the scope of the PDA was 

adopted during consideration of the bill by the House Education and 

Labor Committee. The version adopted by the House Committee, and 

subsequently by the House, provided as follows:

As used in this subsection, neither ‘pregnancy’ nor ‘related 

medical conditions,’ as they relate to eligibility for benefits

under any health or temporary disability insurance or sick

leave plan available in connection with employment, may 

be construed to include abortions, except where the life of 

the mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried 

to term ....

124 Cong. Rec. 21,435 (1978) (emphasis added). As drafted, the bill 

would have permitted an employer to deny not only payment for the 

abortion itself, but also incidental benefits such as sick leave and disability. Id. at 21,436 (remarks of Rep. Hawkins). The Senate version of the 

bill contained no exclusion for abortion benefits.

In conference, a compromise was reached on the language that 

appears in the enacted bill. Senator Javits’ remarks on the floor in 

support of the conference report clearly indicate that the intended 

scope of the exclusion was narrow:

[T]he conferees have adopted a compromise which requires the provision of sick leave and disability benefits in

12 Although the language of the PD A refers only to “health insurance benefits,” the legislative 

history indicates that the underlying concern was that employers would be required to pay for

abortions (whether directly or through insurance plans), even if that employer harbored religious or 

moral objections to abortions. See 1978 House Report at 7, 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 

4755.

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connection with an abortion on the same basis as for any 

other illness or disabling condition.

On the other hand, employers are not in any case required to provide health insurance benefits for the performance of the abortion procedure itself. . . .

*****

Finally, since the abortion proviso specifically addresses 

only health insurance, the proviso in no way affects an 

employee’s right to sick pay or disability benefits or, 

indeed, the freedom from discrimination based on abortion in hiring, firing, seniority, or any condition of employment other than medical insurance itself.

124 Cong. Rec. 36,818-19 (1978) (remarks of Senator Javits).

Thus, it is clear that, while an employer may refuse to pay the costs

of the abortion, under the PDA that employer cannot refuse to provide 

to women who elect to have an abortion other benefits that are available to temporarily disabled workers. Here, the Peace Corps’ evacuation policy, including the payment of travel expenses and a per diem 

allowance, is such an incidental benefit, and must be extended to volunteers who elect to have an abortion. We believe that the Peace Corps 

must also continue to allow volunteers to draw on their accumulated 

readjustment allowance in order to pay for the abortions if they so 

desire, so long as other volunteers are allowed similar access to cover 

medical expenses not otherwise covered by the Peace Corps.13 This 

would not preclude the Peace Corps from altering its current reimbursement policy to provide, for example, for evacuation to an intermediate location, or to eliminate or reduce per diem payments, provided 

the amended policy applies across the board to all temporarily disabled 

workers, and not just to volunteers who become pregnant or have an 

abortion.

T h e o d o r e B. O lson

Assistant Attorney General

Office o f Legal Counsel

13 We do not believe that allowing volunteers to use those funds would contravene the restriction 

on the Peace Corps’ use of appropriated funds “to perform abortions.” Although the readjustment 

allowance is not required to be paid to the volunteer until the end of his or her term of service, those 

funds are effectively held for the account of the volunteer and are taxable to the volunteer as accrued. 

See n.2 supra. Thus, withdrawal from those funds to pay the costs of an abortion would not be 

payment from funds appropriated generally for the Peace Corps, but rather payment to the volunteer 

of amounts owing to him or her.

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