alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the
Balance Sheet at June 30, 1997 (Unaudited) and the Statements of Operations
for the Six Months Ended June 30, 1997 (Unaudited) and is qualified in its
entirety by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1997
<CASH>                                          50,966
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  101,617
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               152,583
<PP&E>                                       2,244,628
<DEPRECIATION>                               1,600,479
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 796,732
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                              115
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                     796,617
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   796,732
<SALES>                                        230,393
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               232,752
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                71,211
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                161,541
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            161,541
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   161,541
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    23.53
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    23.53
        

</TABLE>
IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-18-00131-CR

IN RE DAVID R. GRIFFITH

Original Proceeding

ORDER ON REHEARING

Appellant has filed a Motion for Rehearing.

Having considered the motion, Appellant’s motion for rehearing is denied by the 

Court. See TEX. R. APP. P. 49.3.

PER CURIAM

Before Chief Justice Gray,

Justice Davis, and

Justice Scoggins

Motion denied

Order issued and filed July 11, 2018

Do not publish
In the

Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06-23-00069-CR

ERICA JUNE LOVEWELL, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 5th District Court

Bowie County, Texas

Trial Court No. 19F1330-005

Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Rambin
2

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Erica June Lovewell has filed an untimely notice of appeal from the trial court’s

judgment revoking her community supervision and sentencing her to two years’ incarceration for 

possession of a controlled substance. We dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

Sentence was imposed in this matter on October 31, 2022, and Lovewell did not file a 

motion for new trial. As a result, Lovewell’s notice of appeal was due on or before 

November 30, 2022. See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.2(a)(1). Lovewell’s notice of appeal was not filed 

until March 30, 2023, well past the deadline for filing such notice. Consequently, Lovewell’s 

attempt to appeal her revocation judgment in this matter was untimely. The Texas Court of 

Criminal Appeals has expressly held that, without a timely filed notice of appeal, we cannot 

exercise jurisdiction over an appeal. See Olivo v. State, 918 S.W.2d 519, 522 (Tex. Crim. App. 

1996); see also Slaton v. State, 981 S.W.2d 208, 209 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (per curiam).

By letter dated April 21, 2023, we notified Lovewell that her notice of appeal appeared to 

be untimely and that the appeal was subject to dismissal for want of jurisdiction. We gave 

Lovewell twenty days to respond to our letter and to demonstrate how we have jurisdiction over 

the appeal notwithstanding the noted defect. Lovewell did not respond to our letter.

Because Lovewell did not timely file her notice of appeal, we dismiss the appeal for want 

of jurisdiction.

Jeff Rambin

Justice

Date Submitted: May 15, 2023

Date Decided: May 16, 2023

Do Not Publish
FILE0

COURT OF'APPEALS DIY I

STATE OF WASHINGTON

2018 SEP J7 AM 8:59

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

GILDARDO CRISOSTOMO VARGAS, )

an incapacitated person, by and ) DIVISION ONE

through WILLIAM DUSSAULT, his )

Litigation Guardian ad Litem; LUCINA ) No. 76893-0-1

FLORES, an individual; and LUCINA )

FLORES as Guardian ad Litem for )

PATRICIA CRISOSTOMO FLORES, ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION

and ROSARIO CRISOSTOMO )

FLORES, minor children, )

)

Respondents, )

)

v. )

)

RALPH'S CONCRETE PUMPING, )

INC., a Washington corporation, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

INLAND WASHINGTON, LLC, a )

Washington limited liability company; )

INLAND GROUP P.S., LLC, a )

Washington limited liability company; )

and MILES SAND & GRAVEL )

COMPANY d/b/a CONCRETE )

NOR'WEST, a Washington )

corporation, )

)

Defendants. ) FILED: September 17, 2018

)

DWYER, J. —A petition for discretionary review was filed by Ralph's Concrete

Pumping, Inc. Although no issue presented for review warranted discretionary review,

our commissioner granted discretionary review because such review was granted in a

companion case, No. 76717-8-1.
No. 76893-0-1/2

We have deemed review in No. 76717-8-Ito be improvidently granted and have

dismissed that case. Accordingly, we deem review in this matter to be improvidently

granted and also dismiss.

This matter is remanded to the superior court for further proceedings, as if review

had never been granted by this court in the first instance.

Dismissed.

2
<PAGE>


                                  Exhibit 4.25

                                 April 26, 2002

Speedcom Wireless Corporation
1748 Independence Boulevard, D-4
Sarasota, Florida 34243
Attention: Sara Byrne

DMG Legacy Fund LLC
DMG Legacy Institutional Fund LLC
DMG Legacy International Ltd.
c/o DMG Advisors LLC
One Sound Shore Drive, Suite 202
Greenwich, CT 06830

                  Re:  Letter Agreement
                       ----------------

Ladies and Gentlemen:

         This Letter Agreement is the Letter Agreement referred to in the Letter
Loan Agreement (the "Letter Loan Agreement") dated as of April 26, 2002 by and
                     ---------------------
among Speedcom Wireless Corporation (the "Company"), DMG Legacy Fund LLC, DMG
                                          -------
Legacy Institutional Fund LLC and DMG Legacy International Ltd. (collectively,
the "Lenders"). Capitalized terms used and not otherwise defined herein shall
     -------
have the meanings set forth for such terms in the Letter Loan Agreement.

         Pursuant to Sections 2(c) and 4(a)(i) of the Letter Loan Agreement and
as an inducement to the Lenders to make the Loans, I hereby agree not to sell or
transfer any of the shares of common stock of the Company as set forth on
Schedule I to this Letter Agreement beneficially owned by me, including,
----------
without, limitation, any shares under my control (the "Shares"). I hereby
                                                       ------
acknowledge and agree that so long as the Loans are outstanding, I will not sell
or transfer any of the Shares.

                                                     Sincerely,



                                                     Michael McKinney

<PAGE>

                                   Schedule I
                                   ----------

Shares directly owned by Michael McKinney: 1,849,995

Shares owned by Michael McKinney as custodian for Molly Michel McKinney: 321,780

Shares owned by Michael McKinney as custodian for Ryan Lewis McKinney: 321,780

                                      -2-
#### Bowen *against*Ferne.

On a *certio*ti< e\ Court* win not?TM reonlhe’grouS ‘ess wasluone form of action, and the plaintiff declared in another, altho’ the objection was taken in time, in the Court below, and overruled.

IN ERROR, on *certiorari*to a Justice’s Court.

The defendant in error brought an action in the Court below, against the plaintiff in error. The summons was issued in trespass; but the plaintiff below, the defendant in error, declared for a bridle, which had been taken out of his possession, and was found in the possession of the defendant below, and which had been demanded by the plaintiff, but the defendant refused to deliver the same to the plaintiff, and converted it to his own use. The defendant objected to the proceedings, on the ground that the summons was in trespass, and the declaration in trespass on the case, and, therefore, there was a variance; but the Justice overruled the objection. The defendant then pleaded the general issue, and after an adjournment, the cause was tried before a jury, and a verdict found for the plaintiff below.

*Per Curiam.*

The verdict and judgment on the merits are altogether with the plaintiff below. Strict justice has been done; and the only question is, whether the judgment must be reversed for the variance between the summons and the declaration. By the 17th section of the *act for the recovery of debts to the value of twenty five*dollars, it is pro*162vided, that on a *certiorari,*this Court shall proceed, and give judgment, as the very right ol" the case may appear, without regarding any imperfection, omission, or defect in the proceedings, before the Court below, in mere matters of form. The variance between the process and declaration was a mere matter of form ^ the very right of the cause is clearly with the defendant in error, and the judgment must, therefore, be affirmed. (10 *Johns. Rep.*240.)

Judgment affirmed.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision **

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

The Honorable Frederic Block, Senior United States District Judge for ***

the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

 v.

RUBEN CASTRO, AKA Nite Owl, AKA

Tecolote, AKA Teco,

 Defendant - Appellant.

No. 08-50521

D.C. No. 2:06-cr-00599-CAS-1

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Christina A. Snyder, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted May 5, 2010** 

Pasadena, California

Before: O’SCANNLAIN and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges, and BLOCK, *** 

District Judge.

FILED

MAY 11 2010

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11. 1

2

Defendant-Appellant Ruben Castro appeals the denial of his Motion to

Withdraw Guilty Pleas. Castro was indicted in the Central District of California on

one count of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (“RICO”)

Conspiracy, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 1962(d), and two counts of Conspiracy to

Distribute Controlled Substances, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 846. Castro, proceeding

pro se but with the assistance of standby counsel, pled guilty as charged without a

formal plea agreement to all three counts after a Rule 11 plea colloquy. Shortly 1

thereafter, Castro moved to withdraw those pleas; that motion was denied. This

appeal timely followed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and

we affirm.

To ensure that a defendant’s guilty plea is knowingly, intelligently, and

voluntarily made, a district court must advise the defendant of—and confirm the

defendant understands—his rights, the nature of the charges against him, and the

consequences of pleading guilty. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1). The court also must

assure itself that there is a factual basis for the plea. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(3). 

Once the plea of guilty has been accepted by the district court, a defendant may

withdraw that plea prior to sentencing if he “can show a fair and just reason for

requesting the withdrawal.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B). A district court’s denial
3

of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is reviewed for abuse of discretion. United

States v. Showalter, 569 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2009).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Castro’s motion to

withdraw his pleas. The record as a whole demonstrates that Castro was

adequately advised of the nature of the charges against him and voluntarily pled

guilty to them. Further, the government’s proffer and Castro’s admissions

provided a sufficient factual basis for his pleas. Castro has not shown a fair and

just reason why he should be permitted to withdraw his pleas. 

AFFIRMED.
<PAGE>

                                                                    Exhibit 32.2

                                  CERTIFICATION
                       PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
           AS ADOPTED BY SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

      I, Paul G. Vanderhoven, as Senior Vice President - Finance and Chief
Financial Officer of Sterling Chemicals, Inc. (the "Company"), certify, pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002, that to my knowledge:

      (1) the accompanying Form 10-Q report of the Company for the period ending
June 30, 2005, as filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the
"Report"), fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

      (2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.

Dated: August 8, 2005

                             /s/ PAUL G. VANDERHOVEN
                             ------------------------------------
                             Paul G. Vanderhoven,
                             Senior Vice President - Finance and
                             Chief Financial Officer
```

[Congressional Bills 112th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2476 Introduced in House (IH)]

112th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 2476

To amend section 156 of the Water Resources Development Act of 1976 (42 
 U.S.C. 1962d-5f) to require the Secretary of the Army to evaluate the 
feasibility of continuing Federal participation in a beach nourishment 
                    project, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                              July 8, 2011

 Mr. McIntyre introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
             Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To amend section 156 of the Water Resources Development Act of 1976 (42 
 U.S.C. 1962d-5f) to require the Secretary of the Army to evaluate the 
feasibility of continuing Federal participation in a beach nourishment 
                    project, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Bringing Economic Advancement and 
Coastal Health Act''.

SEC. 2. BEACH NOURISHMENT.

    Section 156 of the Water Resources Development Act of 1976 (42 
U.S.C. 1962d-5f) is amended--
            (1) by striking ``The'' and inserting ``(a) The'';
            (2) by inserting before the period at the end the 
        following: ``or after the date of the last estimated periodic 
        nourishment as contemplated in the Chief's Report, whichever is 
        later''; and
            (3) by adding at the end the following:
    ``(b) Before the end of the fifty-year period referred to in 
subsection (a), the Secretary of the Army, acting through the Chief of 
Engineers, shall, subject to the availability of appropriations 
therefor, undertake a review of a project to which subsection (a) 
applies to evaluate the feasibility of continuing Federal participation 
in the project and shall make a recommendation to the Congress.''.
                                 <all>
```
<PAGE>



                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.2

                                  CERTIFICATION
                       PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
           AS ADOPTED BY SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

         I, Paul G. Vanderhoven, as Senior Vice President - Finance and Chief
Financial Officer of Sterling Chemicals, Inc. (the "Company"), certify, pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002, that to my knowledge:

         (1) the accompanying Form 10-Q report of the Company for the period
ending September 30, 2003, as filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (the "Report"), fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a)
or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

         (2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.

Dated:  November 12, 2003

                                            /s/ PAUL G. VANDERHOVEN
                                            -----------------------------------
                                            Paul G. Vanderhoven,
                                            Senior Vice President - Finance and
                                            Chief Financial Officer
<PAGE>   1
                                                                    EXHIBIT 23.1



INDEPENDENT AUDITORS' CONSENT

We consent to the incorporation by reference in Registration Statement Nos.
33-68084, 33-83276, 33-91150 and 333-58219 on Form S-3 and Registration
Statement Nos. 33-56706, 33-61884, 33-80945, 333-36171, 333-36175 and 333-69463
on Form S-8 of Creative BioMolecules, Inc. of our report dated February 26,
1999, appearing in the Annual Report on Form 10-K of Creative BioMolecules, Inc.
for the year ended December 31, 1998.



/s/ Deloitte & Touche LLP



Boston, Massachusetts
March 29, 1999
Exhibit 32.2 CERTIFICATION OF
PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICER PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 In
connection with the Quarterly Report of Schick Technologies, Inc. (the Company) on Form
10-Q for the period ended September 30, 2005, as filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Ronald Rosner, Director of Finance and
Administration of the Company, and its principal financial officer, certify, pursuant to
18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that: (1)
The
Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934; and  (2)
The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and results of          operations of the Company.   /S/ Ronald Rosner

Ronald Rosner
Director of Finance
and Administration
(Principal Financial Officer)
Schick Technologies, Inc.
November 9, 2005  18
[954 NYS2d 399]

#### The People *of*the State of New York, Respondent, v Theresa Shieh, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Term, First Department,

September 7, 2012

*56APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

*Theresa Shieh,*appellant pro se. *Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney,*New York City *(Yuval Simchi-Levi*of counsel), for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

Per Curiam.

Judgment of conviction, rendered October 6, 2011, reversed, on the law and on the facts, summonses dismissed, and fine, if paid, remitted.

This Summons Part prosecution stems from allegations that defendant, the alleged “owner/manager” of a Lower Manhattan bar, allowed the premises to become overcrowded in violation of the Fire Code *(see*Administrative Code of City of NY § 15-227 [a]) and violated an applicable Building Code egress requirement that there be “at least two door openings . . . leading to exits, from every room or enclosed space” of buildings with the type of “occupant load” of the premises at issue *(see*Administrative Code § 27-365 [a]). The police testimony elicited at trial showed that the officer who issued the summonses observed roughly 100 individuals standing in front of and across the street from the bar; that, upon conducting a “business inspection” of the interior of the premises, he “approximat[ed]” that there were “well over the ... 75 people” allowed by the governing certificate of occupancy; and that upon walking toward the rear of the premises, he observed only “one exit or entrance to the establishment.”

 With respect to the alleged overcrowding condition, the unadorned police testimony that there were “well over” the legal limit of 75 persons inside the premises — a “guesstimate” which, the officer admitted, was arrived at without the benefit of a headcount or the use of a counting device — appears largely speculative and, upon our independent review of the weight of the evidence *(see People v Danielson,*9 NY3d 342 [2007]), was insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt the violation of occupancy limits here alleged *(cf. Matter of 47 Ave. B. E. Inc. v New York State Liq. Auth.,*13 NY3d 820 [2009], *revg*65 AD3d *5733 [2009] [finding of overcrowding condition sustained under CPLR article 78 “substantial evidence” review]). Defendant’s conviction for the building code violation stands on no firmer ground, where the floor plan of the commercial premises depicted two exits, one of which led from the rear kitchen area to the backyard, and where the testifying police officer acknowledged that his walk-through of the premises ended at the front of the kitchen and that, while he looked into the kitchen area, he did not actually enter it.

Shulman, J.E, Hunter, Jr., and Torres, JJ. concur.