[Cite as State v. Jackson, 2012-Ohio-5885.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

No. 98157 

STATE OF OHIO

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE

vs. 

THEODORE JACKSON

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

JUDGMENT: 

AFFIRMED

Criminal Appeal from the 

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Case No. CR-527856 

BEFORE: Boyle, P.J., Jones, J., and Keough, J. 

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: December 13, 2012
FOR APPELLANT 

Theodore Jackson, pro se 

Inmate No. 590-406 

Marion Correctional Institution 

P.O. Box 57 

Marion, Ohio 43302

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Timothy J. McGinty 

Cuyahoga County Prosecutor 

BY: Daniel T. Van 

Assistant County Prosecutor 

The Justice Center 

1200 Ontario Street 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113 
MARY J. BOYLE, P.J.: 

{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Theodore Jackson, appeals the trial court’s judgment 

denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. In his sole assignment of error, he 

claims that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea 

without an evidentiary hearing. Finding no merit to his appeal, we affirm. 

Procedural History and Factual Background

{¶2} In June 2009, Jackson was indicted on one count of escape, in violation of 

R.C. 2921.34(A)(1). The indictment alleged that on or about June 16, 2009, Jackson, 

knowing he was under detention, purposely broke or attempted to break the detention, or 

purposely failed to return to detention, and the offense for which he was under detention 

was “aggravated murder, murder, or a felony of the first or second degree.” 

{¶3} In March 2010, Jackson pleaded guilty to an amended count of attempted 

escape, a third degree felony, in violation of R.C. 2923.01 and 2921.34. The trial court 

sentenced him to 16 months of community control sanctions. 

{¶4} Four months later, in July 2010, the trial court found that Jackson violated 

the terms of his community control sanctions. The trial court revoked Jackson’s 

community control and imposed a sentence of one year in prison. The trial court further 

advised Jackson that he would be subject to three years of discretionary postrelease 

control upon his release from prison. 
{¶5} In February 2012, Jackson moved to withdraw his guilty plea, which the 

trial court denied without a hearing. It is from this judgment that Jackson appeals. 

Motion to Withdraw a Post-Sentence Guilty Plea

{¶6} Jackson contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to 

withdraw his guilty plea to attempted escape. He contends that when he was sentenced 

in 2001 to four years in prison, he was not properly notified of postrelease control, and 

thus, his 2001 sentence was void. He asserts that when he was released from prison in 

2005 and placed on five years of postrelease control, it was based on that 2001 purported 

void sentence. He, therefore, claims that when he failed to report to the parole board in 

June 2009, he could not have been convicted of escape because he was not validly on 

postrelease control. 

{¶7} Jackson did not appeal his 2010 attempted escape conviction. In State v. 

Fischer, 128 Ohio St.3d 92, 2010-Ohio-6328, 942 N.E.2d 332, paragraph one of the 

syllabus, the Ohio Supreme Court held that “[a] sentence that does not include the 

statutorily mandated term of postrelease control is void, is not precluded from appellate 

review by principles of res judicata, and may be reviewed at any time, on direct appeal or 

by collateral attack.” Jackson, however, is not challenging his 2001 sentence that 

purportedly has the invalid postrelease control. Rather, he is challenging his 2010 guilty 

plea to attempted escape that arose from that purported 2001 erroneous 

postrelease-control sentence. The Ohio Supreme Court recently addressed this exact 

issue and held that “if a trial court sentences a defendant to an improper term of 
postrelease control and the defendant subsequently pleads guilty to violating postrelease 

control, the defendant is not barred by the principles of res judicata from challenging his 

conviction.” State v. Billiter, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-5144, ¶ 11. 

{¶8} A motion to withdraw a guilty plea is governed by the standards set forth in 

Crim.R. 32.1, which states: “A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest may be 

made only before sentence is imposed; but to correct manifest injustice the court after 

sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw 

his or her plea.” 

{¶9} “A motion made pursuant to Crim.R. 32.1 is addressed to the sound 

discretion of the trial court, and the good faith, credibility and weight of the movant’s 

assertions in support of the motion are matters to be resolved by that court.” State v. 

Smith, 49 Ohio St.2d 261, 361 N.E.2d 1324 (1977), paragraph two of the syllabus. 

Thus, our review is limited such that we cannot reverse the trial court’s denial of the 

motion unless we find that the ruling was an abuse of discretion. Id.

{¶10} A defendant who attempts to withdraw a guilty plea after sentence has been 

imposed bears the burden of demonstrating a manifest injustice. Smith at paragraph one 

of the syllabus. This court has explained: 

[a] manifest injustice is defined as a “clear or openly unjust act, * * * an 

extraordinary and fundamental flaw in the plea proceeding.” Again, 

“manifest injustice” comprehends a fundamental flaw in the path of justice 

so extraordinary that the defendant could not have sought redress from the 

resulting prejudice through another form of application reasonably available 

to him or her. 

(Citations omitted.) State v. Sneed, 8th Dist. No. 80902, 2002-Ohio-6502, ¶ 13. 
{¶11} Further, “[a] trial court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing on a 

post-sentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea, except when the facts, as alleged by the 

defendant, indicate a manifest injustice would occur if the plea was allowed to stand.” 

State v. Britford, 10th Dist. No. 11AP-646, 2012-Ohio-1966, ¶ 12. 

{¶12} There is no transcript before us. Jackson did attach several exhibits to his 

motion to withdraw his plea, as well as his appellate brief. Some of the exhibits are not 

readable and he does not explain the relevance of all of them. The most significant 

exhibit that Jackson attached is a case information form (“CIF”) regarding his June 2009 

indictment charging escape. The CIF was prepared by Anessa Slater from the Cleveland 

APA. Slater explains: 

Details of Offense[:] On 9/1/05, the subject was released from prison after 

serving a 4.0 + 13.0 - 60.0 year prison term for escape (F2), kidnapping 

(F1), aggravated robbery (F1), felonious assault (F2), RSP (F3) x2, 

aggravated robbery (F1) x2, RSP (F4)[.] Upon release, he was given five 

(5) years of parole supervision. On 6/3/09, the subject failed to report 

for an out of custody parole violation hearing as instructed. On 6/10/09, 

his whereabouts were listed as unknown after attempts to [unreadable]. 

As of this writing, the subject has not contacted the APA in any manner and 

a [unreadable] warrant for his arrest is active. 

(Emphasis added.) 

{¶13} It is clear from reviewing the documents attached to Jackson’s motion to 

withdraw his plea, as well as his appellate brief, that the trial court did not properly advise 

Jackson in 2001 of the correct term of postrelease control. But it is also clear, according 

to the CIF, that when Jackson was released from prison in 2005, he was not placed on 

postrelease control pursuant to his 2001 sentence. Jackson was placed on parole 
supervision due to his release from an indefinite prison sentence. 

{¶14} Thus, based on the record before us, we find that Jackson did not meet his 

burden of establishing that a manifest injustice would occur if his guilty plea was allowed 

to stand. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied 

Jackson’s motion without an evidentiary hearing because the facts, as alleged by Jackson, 

do not “indicate a manifest injustice would occur if the plea was allowed to stand.” 

Britford, 10th Dist. No. 11AP-646, 2012-Ohio-1966, ¶ 12. 

{¶15} Jackson’s sole assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶16} Judgment affirmed. 

It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common 

pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s conviction having 

been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court 

for execution of sentence. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of 

the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

 

 

MARY J. BOYLE, PRESIDING JUDGE 

LARRY A. JONES, SR., J., and 

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., CONCUR