* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court

generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order

and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

F I L E D

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

FEB 11 1998

PATRICK FISHER

Clerk

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

MICHAEL MINTZ,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

GARY L. HENMAN, Warden;

FRANCISCO DELMURO, M.D.;

GILBERTO MEJIA; (NFN)

(HAROLD) HARRELL, Assistant

Warden; THOMAS V. (KRAJENKA);

KRAJENTA; TERRY L. CAIN;

JOSEPH M. MENDEZ; THOMAS S.

HYDE; MICHAEL (TALBOT)

TOLBERT; AND GREGORY G.

HOUGH,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 97-3081

(D.C. No. 93-CV-3535-RDR)

(D. Kan.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

Before BALDOCK, EBEL, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
1 Rule 56(f) provides:

(f) When Affidavits are Unavailable. Should it appear from the

affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the party cannot for

reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the

party’s opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment

or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or

depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such

other order as is just.

-2-

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined

unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral

argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is

therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.

Plaintiff Michael Mintz, a federal prisoner, appeals the district court’s entry

of summary judgment in favor of defendants on his civil rights claims. Plaintiff

concedes that, in responding to defendants’ motion, he did not come forward with

evidence demonstrating a genuine issue of material fact. See Kaul v. Stephan, 83

F.3d 1208, 1212 (10th Cir. 1996) (discussing standard for evaluating merits of a

summary judgment motion). He asserts, however, that the district court erred in

granting summary judgment in spite of his request for additional time to conduct

discovery, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f).1 After reviewing the district court’s

ruling for abuse of discretion, see International Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v.

Wyoming Coal Ref. Sys. Inc., 52 F.3d 901, 904 (10th Cir. 1995), we affirm.
-3-

Fed R. Civ. P. 56(f) allows a party opposing a motion for summary

judgment to seek deferral of a ruling pending discovery of essential facts. See

Committee for the First Amendment v. Campbell, 962 F.2d 1517, 1521-22 (10th

Cir. 1992). The rule is not “invoked by the mere assertion that discovery is

incomplete or that specific facts necessary to oppose summary judgment are

unavailable.” Pasternak v. Lear Petroleum Exploration, Inc., 790 F.2d 828, 833

(10th Cir. 1986). A party requesting additional time must provide an affidavit

“identifying the probable facts that are not available,” listing the steps “taken to

obtain these facts,” and explaining “how additional time will enable him to rebut

movant’s allegations of no genuine issue of fact,” Committee for the First

Amendment, 962 F.2d at 1522 (quotation omitted). “The purpose of the affidavit

is to ensure that the nonmoving party is invoking the protections of Rule 56(f) in

good faith and to afford the trial court the showing necessary to assess the merit

of a party’s opposition.” Id. (quotation omitted). If the party seeking deferral has

been dilatory, “no extension will be granted.” Jensen v. Redevelopment Agency

of Sandy City, 998 F.2d 1550, 1554 (10th Cir.1993). 

Here, defendants filed their summary judgment motion on March 5, 1996. 

Acting pro se, plaintiff responded on March 21 with conclusory statements

unsupported by any evidentiary matter. At a pretrial hearing held April 17,

plaintiff indicated that no further discovery was necessary. On August 16, 1996,
-4-

an attorney entered his appearance for plaintiff and asked for the court’s

permission to submit an out-of-time response to the summary judgment motion. 

The district court granted the request. On the December 9, the attorney filed a

memorandum opposing the motion. The memorandum disputed defendants’

version of certain material facts, but noted that plaintiff could not yet produce

opposing affidavits and asked for “a continuance to permit affidavits to be

obtained or discovery to be taken as envisioned by Rule 56(f).” Appellant’s App.

at 112, 113, 114. No affidavit accompanied the memorandum. 

“[C]ounsel’s unverified assertion in a memorandum opposing summary

judgment does not comply with Rule 56(f) and results in a waiver.” Committee

for the First Amendment, 962 F.2d at 1522. Moreover, even if plaintiff’s

counseled memorandum may be construed as the requisite affidavit, the

submission does not meet the requirements of Rule 56(f). For instance, the

memorandum provides no information on the steps plaintiff had already taken to

obtain discovery. Finally, the record reflects that plaintiff was dilatory. He made

no attempt to obtain discovery, even during the four-month period between

counsel’s entry of appearance and the filing of the memorandum. 
-5-

Under the circumstances, the district court did not abuse its discretion in

denying plaintiff’s Rule 56(f) motion. The judgment of the United States District

Court for the District of Kansas is AFFIRMED.

Entered for the Court

Bobby R. Baldock

Circuit Judge