An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute 

controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with 

the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. COA22-503

Filed 21 March 2023

Cabarrus County, No. 20-JT-109

IN THE MATTER OF: S.I.D.-M.

Appeal by petition for writ of certiorari by respondent-father from order 

entered 18 March 2022 by Judge Christy E. Wilhelm in District Court, Cabarrus 

County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 21 February 2023.

Richard Croutharmel, for respondent-appellant-father.

No brief for petitioner-appellee-mother.

STROUD, Chief Judge.

Respondent-father appeals from an order terminating his parental rights for 

willfully abandoning his child. Father argues he did not willfully abandon his child 

because he attempted to reach out to Mother by email, through the parties’ attorneys, 

two weeks before the termination petition was filed. Because clear, cogent, and 

convincing evidence exists in the record to support the trial court’s findings of fact, 

and the trial court’s findings support its conclusion that the minor child was an 
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Opinion of the Court

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abandoned juvenile, the trial court’s termination of Father’s parental rights is 

affirmed.

I. Background

Sidney1 was born to Mother and Father in February 2018. Mother and Father 

were never married. In a previous custody proceeding in Mecklenburg County, 

Mother was granted full custody of Sidney with scheduled visitation for Father. 

Venue of the custody proceeding was later transferred to Cabarrus County. 

In early August 2019, Father “attempted suicide and was hospitalized for 

mental health purposes.” On 13 August 2019, Mother secured an ex parte custody 

order suspending Father’s visitation. Mother also filed a motion to modify visitation, 

and on 28 August 2019, the District Court in Cabarrus County entered a written 

order extending the ex parte order and suspending Father’s visitation (the “Order 

Suspending Visitation”) until he “presents himself to the Court and shows just cause 

as to why his visits should be reinstated.”2 The relevant portions of the Order 

Suspending Visitation, which is not at issue on appeal, state:

FINDING AS FACT

. . . .

3. An ex parte order was entered herein on or 

about August 13, 2019;

1 A pseudonym is used.

2 The original custody order is not in the record on appeal, but the petition made detailed allegations 

regarding the Custody Order and the Order Suspending Visitation, and Father admitted these 

allegations in his answer.
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4. The Cabarrus County Department of Social 

Services has opened an investigation and has been unable 

to locate the [Father];

5. Service by the Sheriff was returned unserved 

and [Mother] has no information regarding [Father]’s 

present whereabouts;

6. [Father]’s mental stability is in question and 

it would be contrary to the minor child’s best interest for 

him to have visitation at this time.

Based on these Findings of Fact, the Court hereby 

makes the following:

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

. . . .

2. This temporary order is in the best interest of 

the minor child.

And based on these Findings of Fact and 

Conclusions of Law:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED ADJUDGED AND 

DECREED as follows:

1. [Father]’s visitation with the minor child 

[Sidney] is suspended until such time as he presents 

himself to the Court and shows just cause as to why his 

visits should be reinstated.

Father was unable to return to work for several months because of his mental health 

issues but his therapist eventually approved his return to work in March 2020. 

On 24 July 2020, Mother filed a “Petition for Termination of Parental Rights” 

(the “Petition”) in the District Court, Cabarrus County. The Petition recited basic 

facts about the parties, that Mother had full custody of Sidney and Father had 
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Opinion of the Court

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visitation, and then alleged:

7. Petitioner alleges that the following facts 

establish grounds for the [Father]’s parental rights to be 

terminated:

a. Pursuant to 7B–1111(a)(4), [Father] has 

willfully failed without justification to 

adequately pay for the care, support, and 

education of the juvenile in that he has fallen 

behind on his child support obligation and 

currently has an arrearage of approximately 

$2,500.00.

b. Pursuant to 7B–1111(a)(6), [Father] is 

incapable of providing for the proper care and 

supervision of the juvenile in that:

i. On or about August 2, 2019, [Father] 

attempted suicide by jumping off [a 

bridge]. [Father] was saved by a 

Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Officer. He 

was then escorted by ambulance to 

Novant–Mill Hill where he was 

hospitalized for a mental health 

evaluation.

c. Pursuant to 7B–1111(a)(7), [Father] has 

willfully abandoned the juvenile for at least six 

consecutive months immediately preceding the 

filing of this petition based upon the following:

i. Respondent has not visited with the child 

since July 2019;

ii. Since the Order on August 28, 2019, 

[Father] has not made any efforts to reach 

out to [Mother] about the minor child nor 

has he filed anything in the Chapter 50 

Action to have his visitation reinstated;

iii. Respondent has at all times known how to 
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Opinion of the Court

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contact [Mother] either via phone or email. 

[Father] knows [Mother]’s residential 

address as well as how to contact [Mother] 

through her family[.]

Father filed an answer 10 September 2020 admitting the allegations regarding 

the parties’ and child’s residences, the parties’ status as parents of the child, and 

allegations regarding the prior custody action and the Order Suspending Visitation. 

Father denied the remaining allegations of the Petition. As to the grounds for 

termination, Father’s answer stated:

7. The allegations contained in Paragraph 7 are denied.

a. Denied as to willfulness. [Father] was out of 

work following his mental health crisis and 

began to resume his child support payments 

upon returning to work.

b. Admitted as to the incident [of attempted 

suicide], but denied as to a continual issue that 

would render [Father] incapable of providing for 

the proper care and supervision of the juvenile 

following his treatment after his mental health 

crisis.

c. Denied as to willfulness.

i. Admitted as to time [Father] has not seen 

his child.

ii. Denied. [Father] obtained counsel and 

reached out via counsel as to what 

documentation was needed to resume 

visits on July 13, 2020 and Petitioner 

responded by filing to terminate his rights 

on July 23, 2020.

iii. [Father] has [Mother’s] email and was 

communicating with her via email through 

at least August 2019 about their child.

A Guardian ad litem (“GAL”) was appointed 15 September 2020 and the hearing was 
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Opinion of the Court

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continued until 27 October 2020.3 The Termination of Parental Rights (“TPR”) 

hearing was then repeatedly continued before ultimately being set for 21 February 

2022. 

Our dissenting colleague notes that the TPR hearing was “inexplicably” 

delayed, and while we agree the record does not fully explain all the continuances, it 

does include all the relevant motions and orders. We also note Father did not raise 

any argument on appeal as to any continuance or the trial court’s denial of his motion 

to continue filed just before the final hearing. In fact, the delay would have served 

only to benefit Father, as it gave him more time and opportunity to demonstrate his 

concern for the child by requesting an opportunity to see or communicate with her, 

seeking information regarding her development and welfare, or sending gifts or cards. 

According to the record, on 27 October 2020, both parents, their counsel, and 

the GAL were present and the Pretrial Order was entered; the date of the TPR 

hearing was to be determined. On 20 April 2021, a “status review” hearing was set 

for 11 May 2021. At the 11 May 2021 hearing, a continuance order was issued for 

purposes of the GAL report and hearing was set for 25 May 2021. At the 25 May 2021 

hearing, the hearing was continued to 6 July 2021 for purposes of review of the status 

3 At the TPR hearing both parties reference a motion Father apparently made September 2020 to 

attempt to resume visitation. The trial court’s TPR order also references this motion. The record does 

not contain this motion and the evidence presented at the hearing did not address the details of the 

motion or the disposition, if any. The only document filed by Father in September 2020 in the record 

is Father’s answer. 
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Opinion of the Court

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of the GAL report and the hearing was “continued for Dom Setting Request” and set 

for 6 July 2021. On 4 June 2021, Mother’s counsel filed a “Juvenile Case Request for 

Setting,” and on 15 June 2021, the Chief District Court Judge set the matter for 

hearing on 26 August 2021. On or about 24 August 2021, Father filed an “Objection 

to Holding Audio-Video Hearing and Motion to Continue” to the hearing set for 26 

August 2021. According to Father’s Motion to Continue, the hearing had been set as 

an in-person hearing but on 23 August 2021, Mother’s counsel “notified the Court of 

a health issue that would prevent her client from attending the hearing in person.” 

Father informally objected by email to a remote hearing, but then received an order 

setting the hearing as a WebEx hearing on the originally-scheduled date of 26 August 

2021. Father objected to a remote hearing for various reasons and requested that the 

case be continued “until such time as it is safe for the matter to be heard in person.” 

On 24 August 2021, the trial court entered an order denying Father’s motion to 

continue. The trial court found that the minor child had tested positive for COVID 

and the parties had attempted to find an alternative in-person hearing date within 

the following 30 days but were unable to find a suitable date. The trial court denied 

continuance to avoid further delay. However, on 26 August 2021, the trial court 

entered a Continuance Order noting Mother’s COVID exposure and that both 

attorneys had agreed to continue the hearing to 12 October 2021. On 12 October 

2021, the trial court entered an “Order Continuing Case Off Calendar” finding 

Father’s attorney made a motion to continue in open court and Mother’s attorney 
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Opinion of the Court

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consented to continue to a new date to be determined. On the same day, Mother’s 

attorney filed a “Juvenile Case Request for Setting,” and on 19 October 2021, the 

Chief District Court Judge noticed the TPR hearing for 21 February 2022. 

The TPR hearing was held 21 February 2022. Father’s arguments on appeal 

only address the adjudicatory phase of the hearing. During the adjudicatory phase 

of the hearing, Father testified that at the time, in August 2019, when he was having 

his mental health crisis, he was not aware of the return hearing for the ex parte order, 

but later he did become aware of the Order Suspending Visitation entered 28 August 

2019. Father then testified that although he did not personally schedule anything 

with the trial court to resume visitation, as directed in the Order Suspending 

Visitation, he did attempt to resume visitation by communicating with Mother 

through his attorney. 

Father testified he thought “there was a no[-]contact order in place” and he 

“did not want to violate that order, so what [he] did was just try to make sure 

everything was done with [his] mental health so [he] could get documentation proving 

that [he was] not a threat to [his] child.” Father also testified he believed the Order 

Suspending Visitation was similar to a domestic violence protective order, and 

Mother “advised [him] that there was a no[-]contact order in place[,]” which is why 

he attempted to work with his attorney to resume visitation and never reached out 

to Mother directly. Father testified he had not attempted to send gifts or otherwise 

contact Sidney while he recovered from his mental health crisis and confirmed by the 
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Opinion of the Court

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time of the hearing it had been approximately 18 months since he had contact with 

Sidney. 

Mother testified she had not heard from Father since he was released from the 

hospital in August 2019. Mother testified her contact information had not changed 

since the last time she spoke to Father and that Father had also been provided 

Mother’s sister’s contact information that he could use to reach out to contact Mother. 

Mother then testified she had heard from Father as part of the TPR proceedings in 

July 2020. 

As to the Order Suspending Visitation, Mother confirmed she spoke with 

Father and “let him know that there was an order in place and he had to contact the 

county case worker that was assigned to the case and that they were trying to locate 

him.” Mother also testified the Order Suspending Visitation was not a no-contact 

order and Mother “told [Father] that he would have to go through the county case 

worker and through court to file the motion” to resume visitation with Sidney. 

Mother then testified she was told about the July 2020 email from Father’s attorney; 

the email said Father was “looking to resume visits;” and the email was received prior 

to her filing of the Petition. 

Less than 30 days following the hearing, as required by North Carolina 

General Statute § 7B-1109, on 18 March 2022, the trial court entered an order 

terminating Father’s parental rights (the “TPR Order”). The TPR Order makes

adjudicatory findings of fact addressing the Custody Order and Father’s attempted 
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Opinion of the Court

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suicide. The TPR Order also finds as fact that Father made no efforts to contact 

Mother since 2019, even though Father had contact information for Mother, and 

Father’s attorney did contact Mother’s attorney in July 2020. The trial court also 

found Father had resumed paying child support upon returning to work. 

The trial court ultimately found evidence did not exist to support termination 

of Father’s parental rights on the grounds he failed to pay child support or that Father 

was incapable of providing for the care and supervision of Sidney. The trial court did 

conclude Father’s parental rights should be terminated “[p]ursuant to [North 

Carolina General Statute §] 7B–1111(a)(7), [because Father] ha[d] willfully 

abandoned [Sidney] for at least six consecutive months immediately preceding the 

filing of th[e] petition based upon” the trial court’s findings and Father’s statements 

at the TPR hearing and also because “[f]or at least the six (6) months preceding the 

filing of the Petition, [Father] withheld his presence, love, and care from the child.” 

The Order then makes dispositional findings and concludes Father’s parental rights 

should be terminated. Father filed notice of appeal 21 April 2022. 

II. Jurisdiction

Father filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari with this Court stating his notice 

of appeal was untimely, but also noting no certificate of service was attached to the 

trial court’s TPR Order. The record does not contain a certificate of service attached 

to the TPR Order so our record does not provide the date Father was served with the 

TPR Order. Father also noted “[o]ur Juvenile Code requires that both [Father] and 
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Opinion of the Court

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his trial counsel sign the notice of appeal[,]” see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1001(c) (2022); 

N.C. R. App. P. 3.1(a), otherwise this Court is without jurisdiction to hear an appeal 

from a termination of parental rights. See In re L.B., 187 N.C. App. 326, 331-32, 653 

S.E.2d 240, 244 (2007). The signature date on Father’s notice of appeal is 12 April 

2022. Father asserts he and his trial counsel met on 12 April 2022 to sign the notice 

of appeal and he had no control over trial counsel’s actions after he signed the notice 

of appeal; the potentially late filing is therefore no fault of his own. 

North Carolina General Statute § 7B-1001(b) requires notice of appeal to “be 

made within 30 days after entry and service of the order” appealed from. N.C. Gen. 

Stat. § 7B-1001(b) (2022). However, there is no indication in the record when Father 

was served the 18 March 2022 TPR Order. If the TPR Order was served between 18 

March 2022 and 20 March 2022, then Father’s 21 April 2022 notice of appeal was 

untimely. If Father was served after 21 March 2022, then Father’s 21 April 2022 

notice of appeal was timely.

We have considered the gravity of termination of Father’s parental rights and 

Father’s assertion that he timely met with his counsel and signed the notice of appeal. 

In addition, if Father’s appeal was actually filed late, the greatest period by which 

Father’s appeal could be untimely was the short, 3-day difference between 18 April 

2022 and 21 April 2022. In an abundance of caution and in our discretion we allow 

Father’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari. See generally N.C. R. App. P. 21; see also 

State v. Gardner, 225 N.C. App. 161, 165, 736 S.E.2d 826, 829 (2013) (“We have also 
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Opinion of the Court

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held that where a [respondent] has lost his right of appeal through no fault of his 

own, but rather as a result of the actions of counsel, failure to issue a writ of certiorari 

would be manifestly unjust.”). 

III. Father’s Appeal

Our Juvenile Code establishes a two-stage framework for the termination of 

parental rights; the first stage is adjudicatory and the second dispositional. See N.C. 

Gen. Stat. §§ 7B-1109, 1110 (2020). Father only challenges the adjudication of Sidney 

as abandoned, and his sole argument on appeal is that “[t]he trial court reversibly 

erred in concluding the existence of the ground of abandonment to terminate 

[Father]’s parental rights because the evidence failed to support the findings of fact 

and the findings of fact failed to support this conclusion of law.” For the reasons 

below, we disagree and affirm the trial court’s TPR Order.

A. Standard of Review

At the adjudicatory stage, “[t]he standard of review in termination of parental 

rights cases is whether the findings of fact are supported by clear, cogent and 

convincing evidence and whether these findings, in turn, support the conclusions of 

law.” In re C.M.P., 254 N.C. App. 647, 654, 803 S.E.2d 853, 858 (2017) (quotation 

marks omitted). “If the trial court’s findings of fact are supported by ample, 

competent evidence, they are binding on appeal, even though there may be evidence 

to the contrary.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). “Unchallenged findings of fact are 

conclusive on appeal and binding on this Court.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). The 
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Opinion of the Court

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trial court’s conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. Id. (citation omitted).

B. Abandonment of a Juvenile

The trial court terminated Father’s parental rights pursuant to North Carolina 

General Statute § 7B-1111(a)(7) for willfully abandoning Sidney at least six months 

before the Petition was filed. North Carolina General Statute § 7B-1111(a)(7) 

provides that:

(a) The court may terminate the parental rights upon a 

finding of one or more of the following:

. . . .

(7) The parent has willfully abandoned the juvenile for 

at least six consecutive months immediately preceding 

the filing of the petition or motion[.]

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(7) (2020). 

Our Supreme Court has further defined willful abandonment:

We have held that “[a]bandonment implies conduct on the 

part of the parent which manifests a willful determination 

to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental 

claims to the child.” In re Young, 346 N.C. 244, 251, 485 

S.E.2d 612, 617 (1997) (quoting In re Adoption of Searle, 82 

N.C. App. 273, 275, 346 S.E.2d 511, 514 (1986)); see also 

Pratt v. Bishop, 257 N.C. 486, 502, 126 S.E.2d 597, 608 

(1962) (“Abandonment requires a wil[l]ful intent to escape 

parental responsibility and conduct in effectuation of such 

intent.”). “It has been held that if a parent withholds his 

presence, his love, his care, the opportunity to display filial 

affection, and wil[l]fully neglects to lend support and 

maintenance, such parent relinquishes all parental claims 

and abandons the child.” Id. at 501, 126 S.E.2d at 608.

In re E.H.P., 372 N.C. 388, 393, 831 S.E.2d 49, 52 (2019). “In this context, the word 
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[‘]willful’ encompasses more than an intention to do a thing; there must also be 

purpose and deliberation. Whether a biological parent has a willful intent to abandon 

his child is a question of fact to be determined from the evidence.” In re A.K.D., 227 

N.C. App. 58, 61, 745 S.E.2d 7, 9 (2013) (quotation marks omitted). But, “[a] 

delinquent parent may not dissipate at will the legal effects of his abandonment by 

merely expressing a desire for the return of the abandoned juvenile.” In re C.J.H., 

240 N.C. App. 489, 504, 772 S.E.2d 82, 92 (2015) (citation omitted). 

Further, “‘[a]lthough the trial court may consider a parent’s conduct outside 

the six-month window in evaluating a parent’s credibility and intentions, the 

“determinative” period for adjudicating willful abandonment is the six consecutive 

months preceding the filing of the petition.’” In re N.D.A., 373 N.C. 71, 77, 833 S.E.2d 

768, 773 (2019) (quoting In re D.E.M., 257 N.C. App. 618, 619, 810 S.E.2d 375, 378 

(2018)). Here, because the Petition was filed 24 July 2020, the relevant six-month 

period for purposes of North Carolina General Statute § 7B-1111(a)(7) was 24 

January 2020 to 24 July 2020. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(7). 

We first address the findings of fact Father specifically challenges as 

unsupported by the evidence presented at the TPR hearing. This Court reviews the 

challenged findings for whether they “are supported by clear, cogent and convincing 

evidence[, and] . . . [i]f the trial court’s findings of fact are supported by ample, 

competent evidence, they are binding on appeal, even though there may be evidence 

to the contrary.” In re C.M.P., 254 N.C. App. at 654, 803 S.E.2d at 858 (citation and 
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Opinion of the Court

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quotation marks omitted). 

1. Finding 14

Finding 14 states: “In July 2020, an attorney for [Father] contacted the 

attorney for [Mother].” Father asserts finding 14 is “erroneous as a matter of law 

because it fails to include the reason for the July 2020 [email],” and the reason for the 

email, that Father wanted to resume visits, “negated the TPR ground of 

abandonment.” 

We first note a copy of this email is not in the record on appeal. However, 

Mother testified about an email from July 2020:

[Father’s Counsel]: Did your attorney communicate when 

she received communications in your case from either a 

party or an attorney?

[Mother]: Yes.

[Father’s Counsel]: And were you made aware of an e-mail 

that was sent in July?

[Mother]: I believe it was -- she attached it, or there was a 

forward in there, so yes.

[Father’s Counsel]: Did you (inaudible) an e-mail?

[Mother]: Yes

[Father’s Counsel]: On [Father’s] behalf about re-starting 

visitation?

[Mother]: It was sent through the -- I think what the e-mail 

said was he’s looking to resume visits, yes.

[Father’s Counsel]: Okay. And when did you get that in 

comparison to when you filed the TPR?
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[Mother]: That was all in July.

[Father’s Counsel]: And did you get the e-mail before you 

filed the TPR?

[Mother]: Yes.

After this exchange, Mother admitted her response after receiving the email was to 

file the Petition. This exchange is the only reference in the entire record to the 

substance of an email in July 2020 in which Father sought to resume visits with 

Sidney. 

Finding 14 is supported by the evidence, as Father’s attorney did contact 

Mother’s attorney by email. But the sole evidence indicating this email had anything 

to do with visitation is Mother’s uncertain statement: “I think what the e-mail said 

was he’s looking to resume visits, yes.” Father did not testify about the substance of 

the email sent in July 2020; he only testified about general contact with his attorney 

“about getting everything started back up for my visitation.” And, as stated above, 

the email was not presented to the trial court and is not in the record for this Court 

to review.

Father’s argument that finding 14 “is woefully inadequate in that it fails to 

indicate the nature of the July 2020 [email] contact” is without merit. The trial court 

has the duty of evaluating the weight and credibility of the evidence, see, e.g., In re 

K.W., 282 N.C. App. 283, 290, 871 S.E.2d 146, 152 (2022) (citation omitted), and in a 

TPR case, before making a finding of fact, the trial court must be sufficiently satisfied 
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Opinion of the Court

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with the evidence to be able to find the facts by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. 

In re B.C.B., 374 N.C. 32, 35, 839 S.E.2d 748, 751 (2020). Considering the minimal 

evidence that the email was regarding visitation, the trial court’s finding is proper. 

The finding acknowledges there was a contact between the parties’ attorneys and the 

trial court did not have any obligation to address the nature of the July 2020 contact 

further. 

2. Findings 12 and 21

Father next disputes findings 12 and 21 because “[t]hese two findings are 

contradicted by finding of fact #14[.]” Finding 12 states, “[Father] did not make any 

further efforts to contact [Mother].” Finding 21 states, “Other than the one phone 

call to [Mother] in August 2019, [Father] did not attempt to contact [Mother] to set 

up a visit or to check on the child.”

Finding 12 is not inconsistent with finding 14. Finding 12 immediately 

followed finding 11, which was unchallenged on appeal and stated:

[Father] called [Mother] one time in August 2019 after he 

was released from the hospital. [Mother] informed him 

that there was a new custody order in place and indicated 

that he should contact the social worker handling the 

Department of Social Services case.

Finding 11 summarizes the direct contact between Father and Mother since Father’s 

mental health crisis. When read in context, finding 12 builds on the context from 

finding 11, and there was “ample, competent evidence[,]” In re C.M.P., 254 N.C. App. 

at 654, 803 S.E.2d at 858, to support a finding that Father did not attempt to directly 
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Opinion of the Court

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call or contact Mother to seek visitation with Sidney between August 2019 and July 

2020. 

At trial, Father testified he believed a no-contact order was in place. Father 

also testified he was never served with a no-contact order, and he believed the Order 

Suspending Visitation was a no-contact order because he did not read the order 

thoroughly enough. The Order Suspending Visitation was in evidence and it has no 

provisions barring Father from contact or communication with Mother or Sidney; it 

only suspends his visitation set by prior order “until such time as he presents himself 

to the Court and shows just cause as to why his visits should be reinstated.” When 

questioned on his contact with Mother, Father admitted he never texted or called 

Mother, although he had her contact information; Father agreed he never “tried to 

send any cards or gifts or letters[;]”and Father agreed he never “tried to communicate 

with [Mother] in any way about [Sidney’s] well[-]being over the last couple years[.]” 

Mother testified that she had not heard from Father since August 2019, her 

contact information had not changed, and he was not blocked from communicating 

with her in any way. Similar to finding 14, the only evidence that Father contacted 

Mother regarding anything to do with Sidney is an equivocal statement by Mother 

that she heard from Father in July of 2020 and she thought Father had expressed a 

desire to resume visitation. The evidence in the Record is sufficient to support finding 

12, and finding 12 does not contradict finding 14. Finding 21 is not erroneous for the 

same reasons. There was competent evidence to support the trial court’s findings 
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that Father did not attempt to contact Mother between August 2019 and July 2020 

regarding Sidney’s welfare.

3. Finding 25

Finding 25 states: “At the time of the filing of the Petition, it had been eleven (11) 

months since the [Father] had visited with the child or communicated with the 

[Mother] about her well-being, a fact which he admits.” Father asserts this finding 

is erroneous for the same reasons as findings 12, 14, and 21. Father asserts his 

attorney’s email contained a request for visitation and “[s]uch a contact was 

tantamount to a communication with [Mother] about Sidney’s well-being.” We 

disagree. We have already addressed all the evidence regarding the substance of the 

email, which is minimal. There was no evidence Father requested any information 

about Sidney’s health, development, or welfare. At most, the email between the 

parties’ attorneys was Father “merely expressing a desire for the return of the 

abandoned juvenile.” In re C.J.H., 240 N.C. App. at 504, 772 S.E.2d at 92. For the 

reasons discussed above, this finding is supported by the evidence.

4. Conclusions of Law

Father then challenges finding 36 and asserts finding 36 is actually a 

conclusion of law because “it mirrors the language from the TPR statute on the 

abandonment ground.” We agree and will review finding 36, as well as the trial 

court’s other conclusions, de novo. In re C.M.P., 254 N.C. App. at 654, 803 S.E.2d at 

858; see also In re Helms, 127 N.C. App. 505, 510-11, 491 S.E.2d 672, 675-76 (1997) 
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(“[A]ny determination requiring the exercise of judgment, . . . or the application of 

legal principles, . . . is more properly classified a conclusion of law.”).

Finding 36 states:

36. That the Court finds by clear, cogent and 

convincing evidence that the following grounds exist to 

terminate the parental rights of [Father] . . . :

a. Pursuant to 7B–1111(a)(7), [Father] has 

willfully abandoned the juvenile for at least 

six consecutive months immediately 

preceding the filing of this petition based 

upon the previously stated Findings of Fact 

and [Father]’s own admission.

b. For at least the six (6) months preceding the 

filing of the Petition, [Father] withheld his 

presence, love, and care from the child.

c. The Court specifically reviewed the Supreme 

Court of North Carolina’s ruling in 372 N.C. 

388 In the Matter of E.H.P. and K.L.P. filed 

August 16, 2019 in which a termination of 

parental rights was upheld even with a nocontact order actually in place.

The trial court ultimately concluded:

3. That by clear, cogent and convincing evidence 

[Father]: has willfully abandoned the juvenile for at least 

six consecutive months immediately preceding the filing of 

the petition as set forth in § 7B–1111[(a)](7). 

Father’s conduct met the statutory standard for willful abandonment under North 

Carolina General Statute § 7B-1111(a)(7), and these conclusions were not made in 

error.

By Father’s own admission, he had no contact with Sidney during the six 
IN RE: S.I.D.-M.

Opinion of the Court

- 21 -

months preceding the filing of the Petition. Father made no effort to inquire about 

Sidney’s welfare, either before or after the Petition was filed, even though he had 

current contact information, and he was not blocked from communicating with 

Mother. It is unfortunate he did not read the Order Suspending Visitation well 

enough to realize it was not a “no[-]contact” order particularly because the order set 

forth what he needed to do to resume visitation. And although the trial court must 

consider Father’s conduct during the six months preceding the filing of the petition 

determinative, “the trial court may consider a parent’s conduct outside the six-month 

window in evaluating a parent’s credibility and intentions.” In re N.D.A., 373 N.C. 

at 77, 833 S.E.2d at 773. During a time period of over thirty months from August 

2019, when Father was released from the hospital, until the TPR hearing in February 

2022, Father’s sole attempts at contact or communication with Mother or Sidney were 

the one phone call to Mother in August 2019 and the July 2020 email from his 

attorney to Mother’s attorney.

Father’s admission to not fully reading the Order Suspending Visitation cuts 

both ways. The trial court could have believed Father acted reasonably when he did 

not seek to see Sidney based upon his erroneous belief he was subject to a no-contact 

order. Father argues the trial court should have interpreted the evidence in this 

manner, and our dissenting colleague would agree. Or the trial court could infer–and 

did infer–Father was not sufficiently motivated or interested in resuming contact 

with Sidney even to take a few moments to read the Order Suspending Visitation 
IN RE: S.I.D.-M.

Opinion of the Court

- 22 -

carefully, even though he admittedly knew the order addressed custody of his child. 

On the one occasion Father contacted Mother in August 2019, Mother told Father 

that he simply needed to contact the county official managing Sidney’s case and show 

the trial court that he had adequately recovered from his mental health crisis and 

then Father would be able to resume visits with Sidney. Mother’s comments to 

Father were consistent with the provisions of the order, which noted that “[t]he 

Cabarrus County Department of Social Services [“DSS”] has opened an investigation 

and has been unable to locate the [Father]; . . . [Father]’s mental stability is in 

question and it would be contrary to the minor child’s best interest for him to have 

visitation at this time[;]” and “visitation with the minor child [Sidney] is suspended 

until such time as he presents himself to the Court and shows just cause as to why 

his visits should be reinstated.” But Father did not contact Cabarrus County DSS 

and did not present himself to the trial court to demonstrate he had recovered 

sufficiently to resume visitation, although he testified that he had stopped seeing his 

therapist and returned to work in March 2020–four months prior to the filing of the 

Petition. Father also testified he did not attempt to file a motion to resume visitation 

with Sidney with the trial court until September 2020, several months after the 

Petition was filed. 

The trial court’s findings were sufficient to support the conclusion that Father 

willfully abandoned Sidney. The trial court’s findings addressed Father’s mental 

health crisis, his contact with Mother in August 2019, his receipt of the Order 
IN RE: S.I.D.-M.

Opinion of the Court

- 23 -

Suspending Visitation, his failure to attempt to contact Mother again, and his failure 

to take any other action to resume visitation or even to send a card or a gift to the 

child, even though he was not prohibited from doing so. 

We conclude the trial court’s findings support its conclusion of abandonment 

as defined by § 7B-1111(a)(7). See In re C.M.P., 254 N.C. App. at 654, 803 S.E.2d at 

858. Because Father did not challenge the dispositional portion of the TPR hearing, 

we do not review the trial court’s dispositional findings and conclusions.

IV. Conclusion

The trial court’s adjudicatory findings are supported by clear, cogent, and 

convincing evidence and were not made in error. These findings support the trial 

court’s conclusions of law. The trial court’s termination of Father’s parental rights is 

affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

Judge ARROWOOD concurs.

Judge TYSON concurs in part and dissents in part.
No. COA22-503 – In re: S.I.D.-M.

TYSON, Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I concur to allow Father’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari. See N.C. R. App. P. 

21. “We have also held that where a [respondent] has lost his right of appeal through 

no fault of his own, but rather as a result of the actions of counsel, failure to issue a 

writ of certiorari would be manifestly unjust.” State v. Gardner, 225 N.C. App. 161, 

165, 736 S.E.2d 826, 829 (2013). Father’s appeal is properly before us.

In this private termination of parental rights petition (“TPR”) brought by 

Mother, I also agree the trial court correctly found and concluded Mother’s evidence 

did not support her asserted TPR grounds alleging Father had failed to pay child 

support or that Father was incapable of providing for the care and supervision of his 

daughter, Sidney, to terminate Father’s parental rights. 

The sole basis the trial court found to support Mother’s petition to terminate 

Father’s parental rights was “[p]ursuant to [N.C. Gen. Stat. §] 7B-1111(a)(7), [on the 

grounds Father] ha[d] willfully abandoned [Sidney] for at least six consecutive 

months immediately preceding the filing of th[e] petition based upon” the trial court’s 

findings and Father’s statements at the TPR hearing and also because “[f]or at least 

the six (6) months preceding the filing of the Petition, [Father] withheld his presence, 

love, and care from the child.” 

Father challenges the adjudication of Sidney as being “abandoned” and argues 
IN RE: S.I.D.-M.

TYSON, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

2

“[t]he trial court reversibly erred in concluding the existence of the ground of 

abandonment to terminate [Father]’s parental rights because the evidence failed to 

support the findings of fact and the findings of fact failed to support this conclusion 

of law.” I agree with Father that Mother has failed to carry her burden and to prove 

Father’s abandonment by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. I respectfully 

dissent. 

V. Standard of Review 

Mother, as petitioner, carries and maintains the burden of proof. “The 

standard of review in termination of parental rights cases is whether the findings of 

fact are supported by clear, cogent and convincing evidence and whether these 

findings, in turn, support the conclusions of law.” In re C.M.P., 254 N.C. App. 647, 

654, 803 S.E.2d 853, 858 (2017) (citations and quotation marks omitted). The trial 

court’s conclusions of law are reviewed de novo on appeal. Id. (citation omitted).

Our Supreme Court has recently held: 

While the question of willful intent is a factual one for the 

trial court to decide based on the evidence presented, and 

while the trial court’s factual determination is owed 

deference, it remains [the appellate court’s] responsibility 

as the reviewing court to examine whether the evidence in 

the case supports the trial court’s findings and whether, as 

a legal matter, the trial court’s findings support its 

conclusions of law.

In re B.R.L., 379 N.C. 15, 18, 863 S.E.2d 763, 767 (2021) (citations omitted). 

VI. Analysis 
IN RE: S.I.D.-M.

TYSON, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

3

While Father was undergoing medical treatment, Mother sought and secured 

an ex parte custody order suspending Father’s visitation with his daughter on 13 

August 2019. Mother also filed a motion to modify visitation. The trial court entered 

a written order on 28 August 2019 extending the ex parte order and suspended 

Father’s visitation (the “Order Suspending Visitation”) until Father “presents himself 

to the Court and shows just cause as to why his visits should be reinstated.” Less 

than a year later and after Father had twice contacted Mother to resume visitation 

with his daughter, Mother filed a “Petition for Termination of Parental Rights” on 24 

July 2020. 

Father’s answer was filed 10 September 2020. He admitted the allegations 

regarding the parties’ and child’s residences, the parties’ status as parents of the 

child, the prior custody action, and Mother’s ex parte petition pre-emptively seeking 

the Order Suspending Visitation. 

The record shows the court appointed a Guardian ad litem (“GAL”) on 15 

September 2020, and the scheduled hearing was continued until 27 October 2020. 

During this time, and while the Order Suspending Visitation prevented visitation 

between Father and his daughter, Sidney, the Termination of Parental Rights 

hearing was inexplicitly and repeatedly continued before ultimately being held on 21 

February 2022. The order from the hearing was entered 18 March 2022. 

Mother’s pre-emptive ex parte Order has succeeded in denying Father of 

visitation with Sidney for nearly four (4) years. Mother testified her husband, 
IN RE: S.I.D.-M.

TYSON, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

4

Sidney’s step-father, plans to adopt Sidney “immediately” if and after Father’s 

parental rights were terminated. (“Yes, we’d like to do [an adoption] immediately.”). 

Father’s persistence to maintain his parental rights in the face of Mother’s repeated 

efforts to exclude him from his daughter’s life clearly demonstrates he did not and 

has no intent to willfully “abandon” her. In re B.R.L., 379 N.C. at 18, 863 S.E.2d at 

767. The majority’s opinion asserts “the Petition was filed 24 July 2020, [and] the 

relevant six-month period for purposes of North Carolina General Statute § 7B1111(a)(7) was 24 January 2020 to 24 July 2020. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(7).” 

The record is clear Mother did everything she could to deny Father of any 

contact with his daughter and calculated to take deliberate advantage of Father’s 

mental illness. Immediately after Father’s release, undisputed evidence shows and 

the trial court found Father directly contacted Mother to resume his visitation. 

Mother testified and admitted Father had communicated with her regarding 

resuming visitation and she had “let him know that there was an order in place and 

he had to contact the [DSS] county case worker that was assigned to the case and 

that they were trying to locate him.” 

Mother also testified and admitted she had “told [Father] that he would have 

to go through the county case worker and through court to file the motion” to resume 

his visitation with Sidney. Mother also admitted she knew or was told about the July 

2020 email from Father’s attorney, the email said Father was “looking to resume 

visits,” and the email was received prior to her filing the Petition. 
IN RE: S.I.D.-M.

TYSON, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

5

Father correctly argues finding of fact 14 is “erroneous as a matter of law 

because it fails to include the reason for his attorney’s July 2020 [email],” his 

retaining of counsel to resume visitation, and the reason for the email asserting 

Father wanted to resume visits, “negated the TPR ground of abandonment” under 

the statute. Mother expressly admitted during cross-examination by Father’s 

attorney that she had received written notice from Father or his attorney in July 

2020, expressing Father’s desire to resume visitation with Sidney. Mother’s response 

after receiving the email was to file the private TPR Petition before us. 

In addition, both parties reference a motion Father made in September 2020 

to attempt to resume visitation. The trial court’s TPR order also expressly references 

this motion. 

Here, Mother’s evidence does not support the trial court’s finding that Father 

“willfully abandoned” Sidney during the relevant six-month period. In re B.R.L., 379 

N.C. at 18, 863 S.E.2d at 767. “Abandonment requires a wil[l]ful intent to escape 

parental responsibility and conduct in effectuation of such intent.” Pratt v. Bishop, 

257 N.C. 486, 502, 126 S.E.2d 597, 608 (1962) (citation omitted). “It has been held 

that if a parent withholds his presence, his love, his care, the opportunity to display 

filial affection, and wil[l]fully neglects to lend support and maintenance, such parent 

relinquishes all parental claims and abandons the child.” Id. at 501, 126 S.E.2d at 

608 (citation omitted) (emphasis supplied). 

“To find that a parent has willfully abandoned his or her child, the trial court 
IN RE: S.I.D.-M.

TYSON, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

6

must ‘find evidence that the parent deliberately eschewed his or her parental 

responsibilities in their entirety.” In re A.L.L., 376 N.C. 99, 110, 852 S.E.2d 1 (2020) 

(emphasis supplied) (quoting In re E.B., 375 N.C. 310, 318, 847 S.E.2d 666, 673 

(2020)). The trial court’s rejection of Mother’s allegations that Father had failed to 

pay child support or that Father was incapable of providing for the care and 

supervision of his daughter, Sidney, also supports Father’s claim he had not willfully 

“eschewed his . . . parental responsibilities in their entirety.” Id. (emphasis supplied).

Our Supreme Court has held: “Abandonment implies conduct on the part of 

the parent which manifests a willful determination to forego all parental duties and 

relinquish all parental claims to the child.” In re Young, 346 N.C. 244, 251, 485 S.E.2d 

612, 617 (1997) (quoting In re Adoption of Searle, 82 N.C. App. 273, 275, 346 S.E.2d 

511, 514 (1986)). This Court has held: “[i]n this context, the word ‘willful’ 

encompasses more than an intention to do a thing; there must also be purpose and 

deliberation.” In re A.K.D., 227 N.C. App. 58, 61, 745 S.E.2d 7, 9 (2013) (quotation 

marks omitted)(emphasis supplied). 

The trial court’s conclusion to terminate Father’s parental rights is not 

supported by its findings of fact of either “willful” and “purpose and deliberation” of 

Father’s intent to abandon Sidney. Id. 

Under the statute, “the trial court may consider a parent’s conduct outside the 

six-month window in evaluating a parent’s credibility and intentions, [but] the 

‘determinative’ period for adjudicating willful abandonment is the six consecutive 
IN RE: S.I.D.-M.

TYSON, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

7

months preceding the filing of the petition.” In re N.D.A., 373 N.C. 71, 77, 833 S.E.2d 

768, 773 (2019) (quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re D.E.M., 257 N.C. App. 618, 

619, 810 S.E.2d 375, 378 (2018). 

Father’s arguments have merit. Mother failed to carry her burden to produce 

clear, cogent, and convincing evidence to support the trial court’s findings. As such 

on de novo review, the trial court’s conclusions of law are unsupported by the findings 

of fact and are erroneous and prejudicial. In re B.R.L., 379 N.C. at 18, 863 S.E.2d at 

767. 

Father also disputes findings of fact 12 and 21 and argues “[t]hese two findings 

are contradicted by finding of fact # 14[.]” Finding of fact 12 states: “[Father] did not 

make any further efforts to contact [Mother].” Finding of fact 21 states: “Other than 

the one phone call to [Mother] in August 2019, [Father] did not attempt to contact 

[Mother] to set up a visit or to check on the child.” As noted above, the undisputed 

evidence and testimony clearly shows otherwise.

The majority’s assertion “the trial court must be sufficiently satisfied with the 

evidence to be able to find the facts by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence” 

misstates this Court’s standard of review by summarily affirming its conclusion to 

terminate Father’s parental rights for abandonment of his daughter. That conclusion 

is not based upon clear, cogent, and convincing evidence and findings. See Id. In 

light of Mothers failure to carry her burden, Father’s constitutionally-protected 

parental rights prevail and must be preserved. Id.
IN RE: S.I.D.-M.

TYSON, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

8

VII. Conclusion 

I concur to allow Father’s PWC and to affirm the trial court’s conclusions that 

Father supported his daughter and of him being a fit and proper parent to resume 

visitation with his child. 

Mother’s undisputed motives, admitted actions, and her failure to carry her 

burden under the statute, considered together with Father’s undisputed efforts to 

make repeated contacts, and retaining counsel to preserve his parental rights, 

compels reversal. The trial court’s adjudicatory findings are not supported by clear, 

cogent, and convincing evidence and its conclusions are affected by error. Id. These 

findings do not support the trial court’s conclusions of law to terminate Father’s 

constitutionally-protected parental rights based solely on Father’s abandonment. 

The trial court’s TPR order, based solely on the grounds of Father’s “willful 

abandonment”, is affected by error and is properly reversed. Id. I respectfully 

dissent.