1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

COUNCIL ON AMERICAN-ISLAMIC 

RELATIONS ACTION NETWORK, INC.,

et al., 

 Plaintiffs 

v.

PAUL DAVID GAUBATZ, et al., 

 Defendants

Civil Action No. 09-2030 (CKK)

MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER

(December 17, 2015) 

More than two-and-a-half years after the close of discovery and after the filing and 

resolution of multiple dispositive motions in this case, Plaintiffs have filed a [220] 

Motion to Reopen Discovery for Limited Purpose of Disclosing an Expert Witness on the 

Economic Impact of Reputational Damages. It is too late in the game to reopen discovery 

as proposed by Plaintiffs, particularly because Plaintiffs have disclaimed reputational 

damages since January 15, 2010, and the Court stated consistently that it would hold 

Plaintiffs to their representations to that effect. Plaintiffs argue, in their reply, that the 

Court “precluded” Plaintiffs from proving reputational damages only with respect to the 

common law claims, but that they were not barred from proving reputational damages 

with respect to the statutory claims remaining in this case. Not only does the long history 

of this case belie Plaintiff’s reading of the Court’s previous actions—as described 

below—Plaintiffs miss the key point: they disclaimed reputational damages early on in 

these proceedings and consistently through the discovery period in this case, and the 

Court simply stated that it would hold them to their representations. Nor do Plaintiffs 

explain why it is appropriate, long after the close of discovery and the resolution of 

numerous dispositive motions, to reopen discovery now—when the Court and the parties 

are otherwise ready to move towards a trial on the claims that remain in this case. To the 

contrary, the Court concludes that reopening discovery now as Plaintiffs propose would 

prejudice Defendants in light of the late date of this request, the costs associated with 

reopening discovery, and given that discovery in this case was premised on Plaintiffs’ 

explicit disclaimer of reputational damages without qualification. Accordingly, having 

considered Plaintiff’s motion, Defendants’ opposition, and Plaintiffs’ reply, the Court 

concludes that Plaintiffs have not shown good cause to open reopen discovery now, and 

the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s [220] Motion. 
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Background 

To explain fully why Plaintiffs’ motion is not justified, it is necessary to review 

several key filings and decisions over the course of the long history of this case. Doing so

shows how Plaintiffs disclaimed reputational damages early and consistently and 

demonstrates how the current request to reopen discovery is untimely and prejudicial to 

Defendants. 

First, in their [34] Motion to Dismiss, filed on December 20, 2009, the Gaubatz 

Defendants contended that the First Amendment either protects their conduct or bars 

Plaintiffs from obtaining any relief in this case. Council on American–Islamic Relations 

Action Network, Inc. v. Gaubatz (“CAIR II”), 793 F. Supp. 2d 311, 330 (D.D.C. 2011) 

(citations omitted). Specifically, in light of “the principle that the special protections that 

the First Amendment affords defendants charged with defamation may also extend to 

other kinds of legal claims where the plaintiff seeks damages for reputational or 

emotional harm allegedly flowing from the publication of protected speech,” id. (citations 

omitted), the Gaubatz Defendants argued that Plaintiffs are attempting to make an 

“impermissible end run” around the First Amendment by asserting what are effectively 

defamation claims seeking publication damages in the guise of various statutory and 

common law claims, id. In response, Plaintiffs expressly disclaimed damages for 

reputational or emotional harm through their Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss. Pls.’ 

Resp. in Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 37, dated January 15, 2010, at 8 (“Plaintiff 

Does Not Seek Damages for Injury to its Reputation or State of Mind”). Plaintiffs 

explained that they are not seeking reputation damages that would be subject to a libel 

standard: 

It is true that the law does not permit a plaintiff to recover defamation-type 

damages under non-reputational tort claims. But the “defamation-type

damages” which the First Amendment precludes absent satisfaction of 

constitutional libel standards are claims for injury to reputation and state 

of mind resulting from publication. See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 

U.S. 46 (1988). The Complaint does not seek either type of damages. 

Id. Plaintiffs’ disclaimer of reputation damages is applicable to all the claims in the 

complaint, both statutory and common law. In resolving the Gaubatz Defendants’ Motion 

to Dismiss—on June 24, 2011—the Court noted that Defendants had explicitly 

disclaimed damages for reputational or emotional harm and stated that “the Court will 

hold them to that representation.” CAIR II, 793 F. Supp. 2d at 332. Just as Plaintiffs’ 

disclaimer was patently applicable to all claims in the Complaint, so too was the Court’s 

assessment of that disclaimer, and the Court’s statement that it would hold Plaintiffs “to 

that representation.” In other words, since January 2010, Plaintiffs have disclaimed 
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reputational damages with respect to all claims in this action, and the Court has 

recognized the binding effect of that disclaimer since at least June 2011.

Next, through the Court’s Scheduling and Procedures Order, issued on September 1, 

2011, the Court ordered that proponent’s expert disclosures were due on September 7, 

2012, and opponent’s expert disclosures were due on December 7, 2012. The Court notes 

that the deadlines for expert disclosures were approximately three years before the filing 

of Plaintiff’s request to reopen discovery for that purpose. Discovery closed on January 

18, 2013. The Court denied a motion to extend discovery filed on the last day of 

discovery for a limited purpose—a purpose wholly unrelated to the issue of expert 

disclosures now before the Court—and discovery was therefore closed as of January 18, 

2013.1 Plaintiffs never sought an extension of discovery with respect to expert witnesses 

until the pending motion was filed—more than 2.5 years after the close of discovery. 

During discovery, Plaintiffs explicitly disclaimed damages for lost donor revenue and 

damages related to diminution in lobbying power. See Pl. CAIR’s Supplemental Answers 

to CSP Defendants’ First Set of Interrogatories Directed to Plaintiffs, ECF No. 154-17 

(attached to Declaration of Robert J. Muise, Esq. (Exhibit A to Defs.’ Motion for 

Summary Judgment), ECF No. 154)) (“Pls.’ Supp. Answers”), ¶¶ 12-13. The full 

responses, which were dated May 10, 2012, are as follows:

12. Identify all donors to CAIR from 2005 to the present and the amount of 

the donation provided from each broken down by month and year. Indicate 

for each donation whether it was made to CAIR-AN or to CAIR-F.

Answer: Without waiving the previous objection, Plaintiffs are no longer 

seeking damages for lost donor revenue. 

13. Identify all legislators and policymakers with whom you or any of your 

agents or employees had contact from 2005 to the present, including the 

name of the legislator or policymaker, the nature of each contact, which 

CAIR employee(s) or agent(s) made the contact, the medium of the contact 

(i.e., face-to-face, telephone, email, letter, etc.), the purpose of each 

contact, and the date of each contact. Indicate for each contact whether it 

was made by CAIR-AN or CAIR-F. 

 

1 On the date discovery was set to close, Plaintiffs moved to extend the close of discovery for 30 

days to permit the deposition of two non-party witnesses. See Pls.’ Motion for Extension of 

Discovery Period, ECF No. 144. That motion was opposed, and the Court denied the motion 

shortly thereafter on the grounds that (1) the motion was untimely, (2) Plaintiffs had failed to 

show good cause for extending the discovery period, and (3) Plaintiffs had failed to comply with 

this Court’s Scheduling and Procedures Order in that they had failed to explain how the requested 

extension would affect other deadlines set in this case, including the mediation scheduled for that 

time period. See Order, dated February 8, 2013, ECF No. 147. 
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Answer: Without waiving the previous objection, Plaintiffs are no longer 

seeking damages related to the loss of contact with legislators and 

policymakers.

Id. Plaintiffs’ disclaimers were categorical, not limited in any way to certain claims in this 

action. And Plaintiffs never sought to repudiate these categorical disclaimers during 

discovery or to further amend these responses. 

Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint, which was filed during the discovery period,2

further affirmed the disclaimers issued through Plaintiffs’ discovery responses, stating 

explicitly that Plaintiffs did not seek damages pertaining to lost donations or diminished 

political contacts on any claims. See Third Am. Compl., ECF No. 126, ¶¶ 5, 7-9.3 In 

addition, the Third Amended Complaint nowhere mentions damages for “reputation” 

standing alone. Indeed, in resolving Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file the Third Amended 

Complaint, the Court noted that “Plaintiffs propose to narrow the scope of their demand 

for damages to reflect that they no longer seek damages for lost donations or diminished 

 

2

 Plaintiffs filed a motion to amend their complaint, with the proposed Third Amended Complaint 

attached, on March 9, 2012. The Court granted that motion in part and denied that motion in part 

on September 17, 2012; to the extent relevant to the discovery question before the Court today, 

the motion to amend was granted.

3

 The relevant provisions of the Prayer for Relief in the Third Amended Complaint provide as 

follows: 

5. Award Plaintiffs compensatory damages in an amount to be determined at trial 

but not including damages pertaining to lost donations or diminished political 

contacts; 

* * * 

7. For each violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2701 [the Stored Communications Act], 

award Plaintiffs damages reflecting the actual damages suffered but not including 

damages pertaining to lost donations or diminished political contacts by 

Plaintiffs and any profits made by Defendants as a result of each such violation 

or statutory damages in the amount of $1,000, whichever is greater; 

8. For each violation of D.C. Code § 23-542 and 18 U.S.C. § 2511 [the Federal 

and D.C. Wiretap Acts], award Plaintiffs damages reflecting the sum of the 

actual damages suffered by Plaintiffs but not including damages pertaining to 

lost donations or diminished political contacts and the profits made by 

Defendants or, if higher, liquidated damages computed at the rate of $100 a day 

for each day of violation, or $1,000 for each violation of D.C. Code § 23-542 and 

$10,000 for each violation of 8 U.S.C. § 2511, whichever is greatest. 

9. For each violation of D.C. Code § 36-403 [Misappropriation of Trade Secrets], 

award Plaintiffs damages reflecting the sum of the actual damages suffered by 

Plaintiffs but not including damages pertaining to lost donations or diminished 

political contacts and the profits made by Defendants. 

Third Am. Compl. ¶¶ 5, 7-9 (emphasis added).
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political contacts.” Memorandum Opinion, ECF No. 125, at 28. The Court also noted that 

“the proposed amendment would only narrow the scope of Defendants’ potential liability 

and further simplify this case.” Id. 

Furthermore, Defendants directly relied on these several disclaimers in their Motion 

for Summary Judgment. See Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. and Stmt. of Undisp. Material 

Facts, ECF No. 154, ¶ 238 (“Plaintiffs have repudiated any reputational damages.”) 

(citation omitted); id. ¶ 239 (“Plaintiffs have repudiated any damages from loss of 

donations or diminution in lobbying influence.”) (citations omitted). Plaintiffs did not 

dispute the factual statements in Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts in 

opposing Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. See Plaintiffs’ Response to 

Defendants’ Statements of Material Fact, ECF No. 164-1. Defendants relied on these 

factual statements to argue that Plaintiffs have no compensable or common law damages, 

but the underlying factual statements were in no way limited to those specific legal 

claims. See Mem. of Points & Auth. in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. for Summary Judgment, ECF 

No. 154-64, at 37-43. In responding to Defendants’ argument regarding damages, 

Plaintiffs argued that they could prove damages on the common law claims, but they 

never referred to damages for reputational harm, loss of donations, or diminution in 

lobbying ability. See Pl.’s Mem. in Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. for Summary Judgment, ECF 

No. 164, at 35-41. In sum, both parties’ briefing regarding Defendants’ Motion for 

Summary Judgment confirms that Plaintiffs had disclaimed reputational damages.

Through an opinion issued on March 27, 2014, the Court resolved the summary 

judgment motions that had been filed, denying Plaintiff CAIR-Foundation’s [156] 

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and granting in part and denying in part 

Defendants’ [154] Motion for Summary Judgment. Council on American-Islamic 

Relations Action Network v. Gaubatz (“CAIR IV”), 31 F. Supp. 3d 237, 243 (D.D.C. 

2014). The Court fully resolved Defendants’ motion with respect to Plaintiffs’ Wiretap 

Act claims (Count I), Plaintiffs’ Stored Communications Act claims (Count II), Plaintiffs’ 

claims for breach of contract (Count V), and Plaintiffs’ claims for tortious interference 

with contract (Count VI)—granting in part and denying in part the motion with respect to 

those claims.4 See CAIR IV, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 276-77. 

With respect to the six remaining claims—Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Trespass, 

Conversion, Fraud, Unjust Enrichment, and Misappropriation of Trade Secrets—the 

Court denied Defendants’ motion without prejudice to allow the parties to submit 

additional briefing as to those claims. Id. at 277. With respect to those claims, Defendants

had argued that there was no evidence that Plaintiffs were actually damaged by the 

actions by Defendants that underlie this case. The Court concluded that it could not, 

 

4 The exact disposition of those specific claims is complex not and material here. See CAIR IV, 31 

F. Supp. 3d at 276-77. 
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definitively, at that time, resolve Defendants’ motion for summary judgment with respect 

to these six claims. Id. at 275. Specifically, the Court found as follows: 

The Court finds that Plaintiffs have thus far been frustratingly unclear as 

to the injuries at issue for each of the claims. In addition, Plaintiffs have 

not specified which injury, if any, corresponds to which of the Plaintiffs, 

and have made little effort to explain the proximate cause linking the 

alleged tortious conduct to the injuries at issue. Instead, Plaintiffs speak in 

broad generalizations, asserting injuries and damages and proximate cause 

across multiple counts and multiple Plaintiffs. As a result, the Court has 

received only opaque and largely unhelpful briefing from both parties on 

the issues of injury, proximate cause, and damages. Plaintiffs are not 

specific as to these issues, making resolution of the threshold questions of 

injury and proximate cause next to impossible for the Court. For their part, 

Defendants appear to be guessing at what injuries and which damages 

theories Plaintiffs are asserting for each of these claims, which provides no 

further assistance to the Court.

Id. (citations omitted). The Court, therefore, denied Defendants’ motion for summary 

judgment without prejudice with respect to these common law claims to allow the parties 

to provide the Court “with more focused and specific briefing.” Id. Before allowing a 

renewed motion for summary judgment, the Court required Plaintiffs to file a Notice 

regarding their claims as follows:

Plaintiffs shall file a notice with both the Court and Defendants that sets 

out in clear terms with citations to the record, for each of these remaining 

claims, the conduct underlying this claim, the injury proximately caused 

by this conduct, and the theory of damages associated with this injury. 

This briefing should specifically set out the conduct engaged in by each 

Defendant. This filing should also explain how this conduct proximately 

caused the injury claimed by Plaintiffs. Furthermore, in making this 

explanation, Plaintiffs should set out the injury to each Plaintiff, CAIR–

AN and CAIR–F, that was proximately caused by the alleged conduct. 

Plaintiffs must also explain whether this injury is legally cognizable under 

each specific claim. The Court notes that Plaintiffs have specifically 

disclaimed any damages based on harm to their reputation from 

Defendants’ alleged actions, as well as damages based on a loss in 

donations as well as a diminution in their ability to lobby. 

Accordingly, Plaintiffs may not rely on these theories of injury to 

support their remaining claims. To the extent Plaintiffs are premising 

their injury for a particular claim or Plaintiff on the alleged disclosure of 

confidential or proprietary information, they must explain specifically 
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which documents they refer to, why these documents are confidential or 

proprietary, and how this disclosure harmed them. In explaining any harm 

from disclosure, Plaintiffs should address the fact that some or all of the 

documents were returned to Plaintiffs and not destroyed or lost and that 

some or all of the documents were designated by Plaintiffs to be destroyed 

as no longer having value to Plaintiffs. Finally, Plaintiffs should 

specifically describe which specific theory of damages of the many 

asserted by Plaintiffs is used to quantify the injury asserted for each 

specific claim, and explain why this theory quantifies the injury with “a 

fair degree of probability.” 

Id. at 275-76 (citations omitted; emphasis in italics in original; emphasis in bold added). 

After this Notice was filed, Defendants would be permitted to re-file a motion for 

summary judgment as to these claims. Id. at 276. 

To reiterate, the Court “note[d] that Plaintiffs have specifically disclaimed any 

damages based on harm to their reputation from Defendants’ alleged actions, as well as 

damages based on a loss in donations as well as a diminution in their ability to lobby.” Id. 

at 275. Therefore, the Court concluded that “Plaintiffs may not rely on these theories of 

injury to support their remaining claims.” Id. Plaintiffs now suggest that this statement by 

the Court only limited Plaintiffs from relying on such damages with respect to the 

common law claims. But the Court’s statement is not limited in any such way. While the 

Court’s statement was in the context of a discussion of the common law claims, there is 

nothing in the Court’s statement that suggests that the disclaimer of such reputational 

damages was limited to those specific claims. Indeed, the Court’s statement that the 

Plaintiffs have disclaimed reputational damages was based on Plaintiffs’ previous 

disclaimer of reputational damages in their Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, 

discussed above, and the Court’s statement that Plaintiffs had disclaimed damages 

pertaining to donations and lobbying was based on Plaintiffs’ explicit disclaimers to that 

effect in their discovery responses. See id. (citing [154] Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J and 

Stmt. of Undisp. Material Facts, ¶¶ 238-240). None of those disclaimers by Plaintiffs had 

been limited to damages for certain claims. In short, the Court simply recognized that 

Plaintiffs had previously disclaimed such categories of damages and that Plaintiffs had, 

until that point, never retreated from that disclaimer. The Court stated that it would hold 

Plaintiffs to their word—and the Court will continue to do so today. 

Plaintiffs subsequently filed their [176] Notice of Additional Briefing on Common 

Law and Statutory Claims, as required by the Court. For the first time since Plaintiffs had 

disclaimed harm based on reputation, Plaintiffs claimed damages to their reputation, 

explaining that their fraud claim and their breach of fiduciary duty claim were both, in 
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part, based on reputational harm.5 See Pls.’ Notice at 5, 11. Beyond stating that Plaintiffs 

suffered “reputational and other harm,” id., Plaintiffs provided no details regarding the 

claimed harm. Nor did Plaintiffs address the fact that they had previously disclaimed 

reputational harm, as the Court explained and emphasized in the Memorandum Opinion 

that set out the parameters for the required Notice. In addition, Plaintiffs did not seek at 

that time—or at any time until October 14, 2015—to reopen discovery with respect to 

reputational harm. 

After Defendants’ [180] Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment was fully briefed, 

the Court granted Defendants’ renewed motion for summary judgment with respect to the 

claims for conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment, fraud, and 

misappropriation of trade secrets through a Memorandum Opinion issued on March 6, 

2015.6 Council on American Islamic Relations Action Network, Inc. v. Gaubatz (“CAIR 

V”), 82 F. Supp. 3d 344, 354, 361 (D.D.C. 2015) reconsideration denied, No. CV 09-

2030 (CKK), 2015 WL 5011583 (D.D.C. Aug. 24, 2015). Insofar as Plaintiffs’ claims

were rooted in reputational harm, the Court’s denial was based on Plaintiffs’ previous 

disclaimer of such harm. Id. at 354, 359. Specifically, with respect to the breach of 

fiduciary duty claim, the Court noted that the Plaintiffs had previously specifically 

disclaimed damages based on harm to their reputation and, as a result, the Court had 

explicitly barred Plaintiffs from relying on reputational harm going forward. Id. at 354

(citing CAIR IV, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 275). Similarly, with respect to the fraud claim, the 

 

5 With respect to the Breach of Fiduciary Duty claim, Plaintiffs claimed as follows:

Because defendants participated together in making an agreement to engage in 

their outrageous plan, because they actually engaged in continual unlawful acts 

of fraud, inter alia, because plaintiffs suffered reputational and other harm 

proximately caused by defendants’ acts, and because defendants engaged in a 

series of overt acts over a substantial period of time pursuant to and in 

furtherance of their outrageous common scheme, they are liable as coconspirators and as aiders and abettors for punitive damages.

Pls.’ Notice at 5 (emphasis added and footnotes omitted). With respect to the Fraud claim, 

Plaintiffs claimed as follows:

Because defendants collectively participated in an outrageous plan, titled “The 

CAIR Film Project,” because they actually engaged in consistent and unlawful 

acts of fraud, because plaintiffs suffered reputational and other harm proximately 

caused by defendants acts, and because defendants engaged in a series of overt 

acts over a substantial period of time pursuant to and in furtherance of their 

outrageous common scheme, defendants are all liable as co-conspirators and as 

aiders and abettors for punitive damages.

Id. at 11 (emphasis added and footnotes omitted). 

6 For reasons not relevant here, the Court denied Defendants’ renewed motion for summary 

judgment with respect to Plaintiffs’ trespass claim against Chris Gaubatz and granted the motion 

with respect to the trespass claims against all other defendants. CAIR V, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 355-57. 
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Court once again concluded that Plaintiffs could not rely on reputational harm as they had 

previously disclaimed such harm. The Court also concluded that Plaintiffs’ reference to 

harm in connection with the fraud claim was fatally non-specific. Id. at 359. Finally, the 

Court notes, that while Defendants filed a motion to reconsider that decision, Plaintiffs

never did so and never submitted any filings—until the present motion—suggesting that 

the Court erred in concluding that Plaintiffs had disclaimed reputational harm as to all 

claims in this action. 

Discussion

Plaintiffs have not shown good cause for reopening discovery now as would be 

necessary for this Court to modify its earlier Scheduling and Procedures Order setting 

discovery deadlines in this case. See Hussain v. Nicholson, 435 F.3d 359, 367 (D.C. Cir. 

2006) (Rogers, J., concurring) (“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b) provides that a 

scheduling order ‘shall not be modified except upon a showing of good cause ....’ ”). 

As explained in detail above, beginning in January 2010, Plaintiffs disclaimed 

damages based on reputational harm, and beginning in March 2012, Plaintiffs explicitly 

disclaimed damages based on the loss of donor revenue and diminution in lobbying 

ability. Plaintiffs never deviated from this position throughout the entirety of the 16-

month discovery period in this case or during the first round of summary judgment 

briefing in this case. Nor did Plaintiffs ever indicate that those disclaimers were somehow 

limited to certain claims, and, indeed, the disclaimers themselves explicitly indicate the 

contrary. In light of those representations, the Court has consistently reiterated that 

Plaintiffs have disclaimed reputation-related damages, the Court has stated that it would 

hold Plaintiffs to those representations, and the Court has relied on those representations 

in resolving the parties’ dispositive motions. Only when the Court required Plaintiffs to 

indicate with specificity the damages with respect to six common law claims did 

Plaintiffs begin to suggest that there was, indeed, reputational harm—albeit providing no 

specificity as to the nature of such “reputational harm.” And while the parties briefed and 

the Court resolved several dispositive motions, including two motions for 

reconsideration, Plaintiffs never sought to reopen discovery with regard to the disclosure 

of expert witnesses or otherwise as to reputational harm—until the pending motion was 

filed.

In other words, Plaintiffs only sought to reopen discovery in October 2015—long 

after discovery was closed, after the resolution of multiple dispositive motions, and when 

the Court was ready to proceed to move towards trial in this case. See Memorandum 

Order and Opinion, dated August 24, 2015, ECF No. 208, at 5 (“It i[s] further 

ORDERED that the parties shall file a Joint Status Report by no later than September 

15, 2015, informing the Court how they wish to proceed in this action. Once again, the 

Court is willing to refer this case to mediation, if the parties wish to pursue that option. 
10 

Otherwise, the Court shall set a Pre-trial Conference in order to set a schedule for pretrial activities.”). Almost six years after Plaintiffs expressly disclaimed reputational 

damages, Plaintiffs may not now change their tune.7

 Not only is it far too late to do so, 

but it is clear that Defendants would be prejudiced by reopening discovery to allow for 

expert disclosures as this point. 

While Plaintiffs’ discovery motion purports to be limited to the identification of one 

or more expert witnesses, it is unclear what the factual predicate for any new experts 

would be—particularly because Plaintiffs had disclaimed such damages before and 

during the discovery period. Indeed, Defendants point out that, if Plaintiffs were allowed 

to disclose one or more experts at this time, they might seek to schedule additional 

depositions of Plaintiffs in order to discover the factual basis for the newly disclosed 

expert(s). Defendants may also seek to identify a counter-expert in response to any 

experts that Plaintiffs identify. All such experts would likely need time to prepare expert 

reports. Therefore, reopening discovery for these purposes would take significant time—

when the Court is ready to begin preparations for trial. Opening discovery now would 

also be unfair to Defendants given that discovery in this case and numerous dispositive 

motions were premised on Plaintiffs’ disclaimer of reputational damages.

Although a trial date has not yet been set in this case, the dispositive motions in this 

case are finally resolved, and it is now time to prepare for trial rather than time to reopen 

discovery, particularly when certain prior decisions of the Court were premised on the 

explicit disclaimer of reputational damages. Reopening discovery at this point, even for a 

limited purpose, would not serve the “just, speedy, and inexpensive” resolution of this 

matter. Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. Accordingly, for all of these reasons, and given the long history 

of this case recounted above, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not shown good cause to 

reopen discovery, and Plaintiffs’ motion is DENIED. 

By separate Order, the Court will schedule a Status Hearing to discuss pretrial matters 

in this case.

SO ORDERED.

 /s/ 

COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY

United States District Judge

 

7

 The Court notes that this request to reopen discovery comes as Plaintiffs retained new 

attorneys—once again—purportedly to take this case to trial. See Pl.’s Mot., ECF 220, at 3. While 

it is Plaintiffs’ prerogative to switch jockeys mid-course, they may not rewind time and begin the 

race again. To do so would be neither fair nor efficient.