IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Edward M. Gower, Jr., :

Petitioner :

:

v. :

:

Workers' Compensation Appeal :

Board (Haines & Kibblehouse Inc.), : No. 572 C.D. 2015

Respondent : Submitted: September 18, 2015

BEFORE: HONORABLE BERNARD L. McGINLEY, Judge

HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

HONORABLE JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BY JUDGE McGINLEY FILED: November 17, 2015

Edward M. Gower, Jr. (Claimant) challenges the order of the 

Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board) that affirmed the Workers’ 

Compensation Judge’s (WCJ) decision that granted Claimant’s claim petition in 

part, suspended benefits from May 10, 2012, through July 9, 2012, reinstated total 

disability benefits from July 10, 2012, through July 24, 2012, modified benefits to 

partial disability benefits from July 25, 2012, to November 29, 2012, and 

terminated benefits as of November 30, 2012. The WCJ also denied and dismissed 

Claimant’s penalty and review petitions and granted the termination petition of 

Haines & Kibblehouse, Inc. (Employer) as of November 30, 2012.

Claimant worked as a truck driver for Employer for approximately 

two years. On May 10, 2012, Claimant slipped when he attempted to get in the 

“loader” and landed flat footed on the ground and felt a jolt through his back. That 

same day, as he attempted to clean a cement mixer with a chipping hammer to 
2

remove excess concrete from inside the barrel of the cement mixer, he bent over 

and felt a pinching in his lower back. Also, on May 10, 2012, Claimant attempted 

to remove the forms used to make concrete blocks. When Claimant bent over to 

pull the form away from the concrete, he felt “like a pop in my lower back and . . . 

it was like when you hit your funny bone, how it goes up through your arm. I felt 

that through my butt down through my legs and toes.” Notes of Testimony, 

October 12, 2012, (N.T.) at 14; Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 22a. Claimant 

notified Employer of his injuries and, after working on May 11, 2012, did not 

return to work.

On June 14, 2012, Employer issued a notice of temporary 

compensation payable. On August 8, 2012, Employer issued a notice stopping 

temporary compensation because Employer decided not to accept liability. Also, 

on August 8, 2012, Employer issued a notice of workers’ compensation denial

which indicated that Employer contested liability. The Bureau of Workers’ 

Compensation Claim Forms Summary indicates that the notice of workers’ 

compensation denial was filed on August 13, 2012.

On August 15, 2012, Claimant petitioned for benefits and alleged that 

he suffered a “spine injury, herniation at T12-L1; low back injury,” on May 10, 

2012, when he was “falling, chipping with air chisel, lifting heavy object.” 

Claimant Petition, August 15, 2012, at 1. Also, on August 15, 2012, Claimant 

petitioned for penalties and asserted that PMA, Employer’s insurer, issued a notice 
3

of denial on the ninety-first day after the work injury in violation of Section 406.1 

of the Workers’ Compensation Act (Act),177 P.S. §717.1.

Also, on August 15, 2012, Claimant petitioned to review 

compensation benefits and alleged that a notice of temporary compensation

payable dated June 12, 2012, contained an incorrect description of the injury and 

an incorrect average weekly wage. Employer denied the allegations contained in 

all three petitions. 

On February 14, 2013, Employer petitioned to terminate benefits and 

alleged that Claimant had fully recovered. The four petitions were ultimately 

consolidated before the WCJ. 

At hearing before the WCJ on October 12, 2012, Claimant testified 

regarding his injury on May 10, 2012. Claimant continued to experience pain in 

his lower back and “the pain still goes through the back part of my butt and down 

the back of my legs.” N.T. at 18; R.R. at 26a. Sometimes, Claimant had trouble 

bending and lifting. N.T. at 18; R.R. at 26a. Although at one point his physician, 

Charles C. Norelli, M.D. (Dr. Norelli), released him to return to work with 

restrictions of lifting not more than ten pounds, with no overhead work, no 

bending, and no repetitive movements, Claimant never returned to work. N.T. at 

19; R.R. at 27a. When he took the medication Neurontin which was prescribed for 

treatment of the work injury, he became “aggravated and very uneasy. I just . . . 

 

1 Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended. This section was added by the Act of 

February 8, 1972, P.L. 25.
4

felt like I was losing control of everything.” N.T. at 20; R.R. at 28a. He was 

prescribed Ativan to counteract this side effect of the Neurontin. N.T. at 20; R.R. 

at 28a. Prior to taking Ativan, Claimant called Benetta Corley (Corley) at 

Employer and Victoria Eckert (Eckert), the PMA adjuster, because his workers’ 

compensation check was late. Claimant explained what he said in messages to 

them: 

I believe it was along the lines of I’m telling you the 

same thing of what I told my doctor, which was that I 

was that stressed out from everything going on, that I was 

starting to count my rifle shells and that’s why he 

prescribed me the other medication, so I wouldn’t feel 

that way. 

N.T. at 23; R.R. at 31a. 

After Claimant took the Ativan, he “started to feel calmer and more 

back to my old self.” N.T. at 24; R.R. at 32a. He telephoned Eckert and Corley to 

apologize for his earlier calls. N.T. at 24; R.R. at 32a. Employer fired him 

because of the threats he made. N.T. at 25; R.R. at 33a. Claimant did not believe 

that he could return to his time of injury job because it was too hard on his back. 

N.T. at 27; R.R. at 35a. Claimant attended an Independent Medical Examination

(IME) conducted by Dr. Kovalsky but left before the examination was complete 

because Dr. Kovalsky “didn’t want to listen to me or pay attention to what I was 

trying to explain to him or tell him and I just . . . couldn’t take it anymore.” N.T. at 

28; R.R. at 36a. On cross-examination, he admitted that he told Eckert that he was 

“going to blow and it wouldn’t be pretty.” N.T. at 40; R.R. at 48a. He also 

admitted that when he left the examination with Dr. Kovalsky he was already 

taking Ativan. N.T. at 44-45; R.R. at 52a-53a. 
5

Claimant presented the deposition testimony Dr. Norelli, boardcertified in physical medicine and rehabilitation and Claimant’s treating physician. 

Dr. Norelli first examined Claimant on July 10, 2012, took a history, and reviewed 

medical records. Dr. Norelli also ordered a magnetic resonance imaging test for 

Claimant which revealed a “herniated disc, moderate to large up at T12-L1.” 

Deposition of Charles C. Norelli, M.D., December 7, 2012, (Dr. Norelli 

Deposition) at 8; R.R. at 60a. Dr. Norelli testified within a reasonable degree of 

medical certainty that the cause of the disc herniation was trauma from the May 10, 

2012, work incidents. Dr. Norelli Deposition at 9, 13; R.R. at 60a-61a. With 

respect to the effect Neurontin had on Claimant, Dr. Norelli explained that anxiety 

was not the usual side effect of Neurontin but that it could happen. Dr. Norelli 

Deposition at 14; R.R. at 62a. At the time of the deposition, Dr. Norelli 

characterized Claimant as having mild back pain, no leg pain, and had the ability to 

perform some “pretty heavy duties” in his backyard with a chainsaw. Dr. Norelli 

Deposition at 16; R.R. at 62a. He did not believe that it would harm Claimant if he 

attempted to resume his time of injury job. Dr. Norelli Deposition at 17; R.R. at 

62a.

Trooper Krystal Dugan (Trooper Dugan) of the Pennsylvania State 

Police testified on behalf of Employer that she was contacted by Corley regarding 

messages to her from Claimant. Employer introduced into evidence her 

investigative report. Trooper Dugan contacted Claimant and informed him that 

Employer did not want to receive any more phone calls. Employer did not press 

charges. Notes of Testimony, January 28, 2013, (N.T. 1/28/2013) at 10; R.R. at 

97a. 
6

Eckert testified that she received a phone call from Claimant: “There 

was a phone call in July. He was upset over a few items that had happened and 

said that if things didn’t change that he was going to blow, and it wouldn’t be 

pretty.” N.T. 1/28/2013 at 17; R.R. at 104a. She discussed this message with 

Corley who told her of a message she had received from Claimant. Eckert felt 

threatened by the contact. N.T. 1/28/2013 at 18; R.R. at 105a. 

Rodney Grass (Grass), human resources manager for Employer, 

testified that Corley contacted him, after Claimant called her several times and 

complained that his workers’ compensation check was late. Claimant was upset 

and cursing. N.T. 1/28/2013 at 29; R.R. at 116a. Grass testified that Employer 

decided not to press charges against Claimant and fired him for violating company 

policy by making threats. N.T. 1/28/2013 at 31; R.R. at 118a. 

Daniel Condiles, Jr., general manager of Rahns Construction Material 

Company (Rahns), a related company to Employer, identified a letter he sent to 

Claimant that indicated that Rahns would have work for Claimant except for the 

fact that he was terminated. N.T. at 43; R.R. at 130a. 

Employer presented the deposition testimony of Neil Kahanovitz, 

M.D. (Dr. Kahanovitz), a board-certified orthopedic surgeon. On November 30, 

2012, Dr. Kahanovitz examined Claimant, took a history, and reviewed medical 

records. Within a reasonable degree of medical certainty, Dr. Kahanovitz 

diagnosed Claimant with a lumbar strain from which he fully recovered as of the 

examination on November 30, 2012. Dr. Kahanovitz opined that Claimant could 
7

resume his previous activities and occupation with no restrictions. Deposition of 

Neil Kahanovitz, M.D., February 14, 2013, (Dr. Kahanovitz Deposition) at 16; 

R.R. at 155a. According to Dr. Kahanovitz, the T12-L1 disc herniation was

clinically irrelevant. He did not agree with Dr. Norelli that the disc herniation was 

caused by the work incidents on May 10, 2012. Dr. Kahanovitz Deposition at 17; 

R.R. at 156a. If there had been earlier clinical manifestations of the T12-L1 disc 

herniation, none were present at the time of the examination. Dr. Kahanovitz 

Deposition at 20; R.R. at 159a.

The WCJ granted the claim petition in part. The WCJ suspended 

benefits from May 10, 2012, through July 9, 2012; reinstated total disability 

benefits from July 10, 2012, through July 24, 2012; modified to partial disability 

benefits from July 25, 2012, through November 29, 2012; and terminated benefits 

as of November 30, 2012. The WCJ denied the review and penalty petitions and 

granted Employer’s termination petitions as of November 30, 2012. The WCJ 

made the following relevant findings of fact:

2. Claimant first missed work on May 14, 2012. . . . 

Consequently, the 90 day period for filing the Notice 

Stopping Compensation and the Notice of Workers’ 

Compensation Denial (Denial) ends on August 12, 2012.

3. The Notice Stopping Temporary Compensation 

indicates Employer decided not to accept liability for the 

work injury. An envelope attached to the document 

bears a postmark of August 9, 2012. The Claim Forms 

Summary also indicates the document was filed on 

August 9, 2012. . . .

4. Defendant [Employer] also issued a Denial. The 

envelope accompanying the Denial also bears a postmark 

of August 9, 2012. However, the Claim Forms Summary 
8

indicates that this document was filed on August 13, 

2012. . . . Neither party has offered evidence regarding 

this date discrepancy. I find this evidence, without more, 

is insufficient to meet the claimant’s burden of proving a 

violation of the Act.

. . . .

14. Based upon my observation of them, I find the four 

defense witnesses entirely credible and persuasive. 

However, while defendant [Employer] had work 

available that claimant could perform, there is no 

evidence of what claimant would have earned, but for his 

misconduct. . . .

15. Based upon my observations of him, I find claimant 

is sincerely apologetic for his threatening phone calls. 

However, claimant’s belief that his agitation and hostility 

was caused by a reaction to Neurontin is rejected, in light 

of claimant’s behavior at the IME scheduled for July 31, 

2012.

16. In light of the fact that claimant made several rude 

and threating phone calls to the employer, a rude and 

threatening phone call to the claims adjuster, and was 

rude to Dr. Norelli’s office staff, I find the employer was 

justified in its decision to terminate claimant’s 

employment. The fact that the employer decided not to 

challenge claimant’s award of unemployment 

compensation benefits is not binding in this court. The 

employer witness persuasively explained that he was 

unwilling to confront claimant at an unemployment 

compensation hearing in light of claimant’s repeated past 

behavior. Consequently, I find some portion of 

claimant’s loss of earnings from July 25, 2012 and 

ongoing is a result of claimant’s volatile behavior. . . .

17. I find Dr. Kahanovitz’[s] opinion that claimant 

sustained a lumbar strain, and that claimant is fully 

recovered from his work injury as of November 30, 2012, 

entirely credible and persuasive. In this regard, I note Dr. 

Kahanovitz[‘s] superior qualifications as an orthopedic 

surgeon, who completed a fellowship in spinal surgery 

and who limits his practice to treatment of disorders of 
9

the spine. Dr. Kahanovitz’[s] opinion of full recovery is 

supported by his thorough physical examination.

18. Dr. Norelli’s opinion that claimant sustained a T12-

L1 disc herniation as a result of the series of events on 

May 10, 2012, and Dr. Norelli’s opinion that claimant’s 

behavior toward the employer and the insurance adjuster 

was a side effect of Neurontin is entirely lacking in 

credibility. Dr. Norelli did not point to any medical 

literature or information in the Physician’s Desk 

Reference which would support his statement about the 

Neurontin. Dr. Norelli’s opinion that claimant was 

initially totally disabled and then partially disabled is 

credible and supported by his initial physical examination 

findings. As to his opinion that claimant remains 

partially disabled, the doctor’s opinion is rejected in light 

of the fact that he acknowledged claimant performed 

some work with a chainsaw in the back yard and he 

acknowledged observing grease stains in claimant’s 

hands. Furthermore, the physical exam findings on 

December 7, 2012 were entirely benign, and not 

consistent with a finding of an extruded disc. (Citations 

omitted).

WCJ’s Decision, April 8, 2013, Findings of Fact Nos. 2-4 and 14-18 at 1-2, and 6-

7; R.R. at 233a-234a and 238a-239a.

Claimant appealed to the Board which affirmed.

Claimant contends 1) that the WCJ erred when she granted the 

termination petition where Claimant presented competent, credible evidence that 

he was not fully recovered and Employer failed to present competent, credible 

evidence to the contrary; 2) that the WCJ erred when she denied the penalty 

petition when Employer’s Notice Stopping Temporary Benefits was filed more 

than ninety days after it was put on notice of Claimant’s injuries; 3) that the WCJ

erred when she denied the review petition when both parties acknowledged the 
10

presence of a T12-L1 herniation and the WCJ failed to adequately explain why she 

found Dr. Kahanovitz more credible than Dr. Norelli; 4) that the WCJ erred when 

she found that Employer’s termination of employment was reasonable when the 

stated reason for Claimant’s termination was the result of a side effect of 

Neurontin, a prescription drug that Claimant was compelled to take because of his 

May 10, 2012, workplace injury; and 5) that the WCJ erred when she admitted into 

evidence Dr. Kahanovitz’s report when the IME was conducted after the deadline 

imposed by the WCJ.2

Initially, Claimant contends that the WCJ erred when she granted 

Employer’s termination petition because Employer failed to prove that all 

disability had ceased.

The employer bears the burden of proof in a termination petition 

proceeding to establish that the work injury has ceased. In a case where the 

claimant complains of continued pain, this burden is met if an employer’s medical 

expert unequivocally testifies that it is his opinion, within a reasonable degree of 

medical certainty that the claimant is fully recovered, can return to work without 

restrictions and that there are no objective medical findings which either 

substantiate the claims of pain or connect them to the work injury. Udvari v. 

Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (US Air, Inc.), 705 A.2d 1290, 1293 (Pa. 

1997). 

 

2

This Court’s review is limited to a determination of whether an error of law was 

committed, whether necessary findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, or whether 

constitutional rights were violated. Vinglinsky v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board 

(Penn Installation), 589 A.2d 291 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1991).
11

Here, the WCJ found that Claimant suffered a work-related lumbar 

strain/sprain. Dr. Kahanovitz testified that Claimant was fully recovered from any 

injury suffered on May 10, 2012. With respect to the disc herniation at T12-L1, 

Dr. Kahanovitz found that it did not manifest itself clinically when he examined 

Claimant and that it was not caused by the May 10, 2012, work incidents. 

The WCJ, as the ultimate finder of fact in workers’ compensation 

cases, has exclusive province over questions of credibility and evidentiary weight, 

and is free to accept or reject the testimony of any witness, including a medical 

witness, in whole or in part. General Electric Co. v. Workmen’s Compensation 

Appeal Board (Valsamaki), 593 A.2d 921 (Pa. Cmwlth.), petition for allowance of 

appeal denied, 600 A.2d 541 (Pa. 1991). This Court will not disturb a WCJ’s 

findings when those findings are supported by substantial evidence. Nevin 

Trucking v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Murdock), 667 A.2d 262 

(Pa. Cmwlth. 1995). Employer met its burden under Udvari. 

Claimant next contends that the WCJ erred when she denied his 

penalty petition because Employer filed its Notice of Workers’ Compensation 

Denial ninety-five days after Claimant’s injury.

Section 435(d)(i) of the Act, 77 P.S. §991,3provides that a penalty of 

up to fifty percent of the compensation due may be assessed against an employer if

there has been a violation of the Act or its regulations. The assessment of 

penalties, as well as the amount of penalties imposed, is discretionary, and absent 

 

3

This section was added by the Act of February 8, 1972, P.L. 25.
12

an abuse of discretion by the WCJ, this Court will not overturn the WCJ’s decision 

on appeal. Westinghouse Electric Corporation v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal 

Board (Weaver), 823 A.2d 209 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003). “An abuse of discretion is not 

merely an error of judgment but occurs, inter alia, when the law is misapplied in 

reaching a conclusion.” Id. at 213-214. A judge’s ruling on a penalty petition is to 

be reversed only if the judge has abused his discretion and misapplied the law. 

Westinghouse. 

Here, Claimant argues that Employer violated the Act because it did 

not file its Notice Stopping Temporary Compensation until more than ninety days 

after Claimant was disabled.

Section 406.1 of the Act, 77 P.S. §717.1, provides in pertinent part:

(2) The notice of temporary compensation payable shall 

be sent to the claimant and a copy filed with the 

department and shall notify the claimant that the payment 

of temporary compensation is not an admission of 

liability of the employer with respect to the injury which 

is the subject of the notice of temporary compensation 

payable. The department shall, upon receipt of a notice 

of temporary compensation payable, send a notice to the 

claimant informing the claimant that:

. . . .

(ii) the payment of temporary compensation entitles the 

claimant to a maximum of ninety (90) days of 

compensation; and

. . . .

(4) Payments of temporary compensation may continue 

until such time as the employer decides to controvert the 

claim.

(5)(i) If the employer ceases making payments pursuant 

to a notice of temporary compensation payable, a notice 
13

in the form prescribed by the department shall be sent to 

the claimant and a copy filed with the department, but in 

no event shall this notice be sent or filed later than five 

(5) days after the last payment.

. . . .

(6) If the employer does not file a notice under 

paragraph (5) within the ninety-day period during which 

temporary compensation is paid or payable, the employer 

shall be deemed to have admitted liability and the notice 

of compensation payable shall be converted to a notice of 

compensation payable.

The ninety day period for temporary compensation commences on the 

first date of disability. Galizia v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board 

(Woodlock Pines, Inc.), 933 A.2d 146 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007).

The WCJ found that Claimant’s first day of disability was May 14, 

2012. Ninety days from May 14, 2012, was August 12, 2012. The WCJ further 

found that the Notice of Stopping Temporary Compensation was filed on August 9, 

2012.4 The Notice of Workers’ Compensation Denial came in an envelope that 

was postmarked August 9, 2012. However, the actual document was not filed until 

August 13, 2012, one day after the deadline. August 12, 2012, was a Sunday, a 

date when state offices were not open for business. As a result, the filing on 

August 13, 2012, was timely and did not violate the Act. This Court is permitted 

to take judicial notice of the day of the week of a particular date. Mentz v. 

Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 370 A.2d 1232 (Pa. Cmwlth.

1977).

 

4 A review of the record indicates that this notice was filed on August 9, 2012, 

though it was not “received” until August 13, 2012.
14

Claimant next contends that the WCJ erred when he denied 

Claimant’s review petition to add the T12-L1 disc herniation to Claimant’s injury 

when Claimant proved that the injury occurred and the WCJ failed to give a 

reasoned decision as to why he found Dr. Kahanovitz more credible than Dr. 

Norelli. It was Claimant’s burden to prove that the notice of compensation payable 

was materially incorrect. Section 413(a) of the Act, 77 P.S. §771. Claimant failed 

to do so. While Dr. Norelli opined that the cause of the disc herniation was the 

work-incidents of May 10, 2012, Dr. Kahanovitz disagreed and was found 

credible.

With respect to whether the WCJ issued a reasoned decision when he 

found Dr. Kahanovitz more credible than Dr. Norelli, Section 422(a) of the Act, 77 

P.S. §834, provides: 

Neither the board nor any of its members nor any 

workers’ compensation judge shall be bound by the 

common law or statutory rules of evidence in conducting 

any hearing or investigation, but all findings of fact shall 

be based upon sufficient competent evidence to justify 

same. All parties to an adjudicatory proceeding are 

entitled to a reasoned decision containing findings of fact 

and conclusions of law based upon the evidence as a 

whole which clearly and concisely states and explains the 

rationale for the decisions so that all can determine why 

and how a particular result was reached. The workers’ 

compensation judge shall specify the evidence upon 

which the workers’ compensation judge relies and state 

the reasons for accepting it in conformity with this 

section. When faced with conflicting evidence, the 

workers’ compensation judge must adequately explain 

the reasons for rejecting or discrediting competent 

evidence. Uncontroverted evidence may not be rejected 

for no reason or for an irrational reason; the workers’ 

compensation judge must identify that evidence and 
15

explain adequately the reasons for its rejection. The 

adjudication shall provide the basis for meaningful 

appellate review. 

 In Daniels v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Tristate 

Transport), 828 A.2d 1043, 1053 (Pa. 2003), our Pennsylvania Supreme Court 

stated that “absent the circumstance where a credibility assessment may be said to 

have been tied to the inherently subjective circumstance of witness demeanor, 

some articulation of the actual objective basis for the credibility determination 

must be offered for the decision to be a ‘reasoned’ one which facilitates effective 

appellate review.” (Footnote omitted and emphasis added). Our Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court further explained in Daniels that “where the fact-finder has had the 

advantage of seeing the witnesses testify and assessing their demeanor, a mere 

conclusion as to which witness was deemed credible, in the absence of some 

special circumstance, could be sufficient to render the decision adequately 

reasoned.” Daniels, 828 A.2d at 1053.

With respect to whether the WCJ satisfied the reasoned decision 

requirement in his acceptance of Dr. Kahanovitz’s opinion and his rejection of Dr. 

Norelli’s opinion, the WCJ explained that Dr. Kahanovitz had superior 

qualifications as a board-certified orthopedic surgeon and spine specialist and he 

conducted a thorough physical examination. This articulation of the basis for the 

WCJ’s credibility determination satisfied the reasoned decision requirement.

Claimant next contends that the WCJ erred when he determined that 

Employer’s termination of Claimant’s employment was reasonable because 

Claimant demonstrated that his conduct was the result of a negative side effect of 
16

Neurontin, a prescription drug which was prescribed for him as a result of the work 

injury. 

Once again, Claimant ignores the WCJ’s credibility determinations. 

The WCJ specifically did not credit the testimony of both Claimant and Dr.

Norelli. Claimant argues his version of the facts which this Court will not adopt 

where they were contrary to the facts the WCJ found which were supported by 

substantial evidence.

Finally, Claimant contends that the WCJ erred as a matter of law 

when she relied on Dr. Kahanovitz’s expert report when the WCJ ordered that the 

IME be completed within forty-five days of October 12, 2012, and it was not 

conducted until November 30, 2012, which was forty-nine days after the order. 

Claimant did not object to the submission of the report or the deposition testimony 

of Dr. Kahanovitz before the WCJ. Further, Claimant did not raise this issue in his 

appeal to the Board. An issue is waived unless it is preserved at every stage of a 

proceeding. Nabisco Brands, Inc. v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board 

(Tropello), 763 A.2d 555 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000).

Accordingly, this Court affirms.

____________________________

BERNARD L. McGINLEY, Judge

 
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Edward M. Gower, Jr., :

Petitioner :

:

v. :

:

Workers' Compensation Appeal :

Board (Haines & Kibblehouse Inc.), : No. 572 C.D. 2015

Respondent :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 17th day of November, 2015, the order of the 

Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board in the above-captioned matter is affirmed.

____________________________

BERNARD L. McGINLEY, Judge