UNITED STATES ARMY COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

Before

KRIMBILL, ARGUELLES,

1

and WALKER

Appellate Military Judges

UNITED STATES, Appellee

v.

Sergeant JARED D. CRAIN

United States Army, Appellant

ARMY 20190265

Headquarters, 1st Theater Sustainment Command

John M. Bergen, Military Judge 

Lieutenant Colonel Tony Y. Kim, Staff Judge Advocate 

For Appellant: Colonel Elizabeth G. Marotta, JA; Lieutenant Colonel Tiffany D. 

Pond, JA; Major Angela D. Swilley, JA; Captain Brianna C. Tuohy, JA (on brief).

For Appellee: Colonel Steven P. Haight, JA; Lieutenant Colonel Wayne H. 

Williams, JA; Captain Christopher T. Leighton, JA; Captain R. Tristan C. De Vega, 

JA (on brief).

8 October 2020

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MEMORANDUM OPINION

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This opinion is issued as an unpublished opinion and, as such, does not serve as precedent.

WALKER, Judge:

Appellant pleaded guilty to misuse of a fuel card as a violation of a lawful 

general regulation. He now asserts the military judge abused his discretion in 

accepting his plea because the regulation to which he ple aded guilty of violating was 

not the regulation applicable to his misconduct. We agree and provide relief in our 

decretal paragraph. 

We review this case under Article 66, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 

U.S.C. § 866 [UCMJ].

 

1

Judge Arguelles decided this case while on active duty.
CRAIN—ARMY 20190265

2

I. BACKGROUND

A military judge sitting as a general court-martial convicted appellant, 

pursuant to his pleas, of one specification of attempted escape from confinement, 

one specification of violation of a lawful general regulation, one specification of 

wrongful destruction of government property, one specification of willfully 

suffering military property to be wrongfully disposed, three specifications of 

wrongful use of a controlled substance, two specifications of larceny, and one 

specification of wrongful appropriation, in violation of Articles 80, 92, 108, 112a, 

and 121, UCMJ (2016). The military judge sentenced appellant to a bad-conduct 

discharge and confinement for thirty months. Appellant received 139 days of

confinement credit for pre-trial confinement. The convening authority took no 

action on the findings or sentence. 2

In 2018, appellant struggled with drug abuse and turned to stealing items from 

the unit as well as shoplifting so he could pawn the items for cash in order to 

purchase drugs.3 Appellant received non-judicial punishment for misconduct related 

to his drug abuse and thereafter his command initiated administrative separation 

proceedings.4 Due to his financial struggles, appellant’s chain of command 

authorized his use of a government-owned vehicle and a Government Services 

Administration fuel card (fuel card) in order to facilitate the required travel from 

Shaw Air Force Base, South Carolina, appellant’s duty station, to Fort Jackson, 

South Carolina, where he was required to go in order to attend separation 

appointments.5 Appellant was authorized to use the fuel card only for purchasing 

fuel for the assigned government vehicle. 

 

2 For the reasons articulated in United States v. Coffman, 79 M.J. 820 (Army Ct. 

Crim. App. 2020), we find the convening authority erred by failing to take action on 

appellant’s sentence because appellant was convicted based on misconduct that 

occurred both prior to and after 1 January 2019. We have considered this as part of 

our review of appellant’s case and, while we find the convening authority erred, we 

determine the error was neither jurisdictional nor prejudicial.

3 Appellant was diagnosed with opioid dependence, cannabis dependence, and 

alcoholism. 

4 Appellant received non-judicial punishment for failure to go to his appointed place 

of duty, misuse of his government travel card, false official statement, wrongful 

selling of military property, wrongful use of marijuana, and shoplifting. See UCMJ 

art 15. 

5 Shaw Air Force Base is approximately thirty-five miles from Fort Jackson.
CRAIN—ARMY 20190265

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On 5 October 2018, appellant wrecked the government vehicle during an 

unauthorized trip unrelated to his separation appointments. Appellant realized that 

there were several items at his ex-wife’s home in North Carolina that he needed to 

turn in before his separation from the Army. Since appellant could not afford to 

drive his personal vehicle to North Carolina, he chose to use the government vehicle 

to make the trip. While traveling on a dark road late at night, appellant swerved to 

avoid hitting a deer in the road and hit an embankment, totaling the vehicle. 

Appellant removed the government license plates from the vehicle and left it with a 

towing company. Appellant failed to inform his chain of command about the 

accident or location of the vehicle.

Without the use of the government vehicle or the financial means to get to his 

separation appointments, appellant turned to using the fuel card to obtain fuel for his 

personal vehicle for travel to Fort Jackson. Appellant used the fuel card for his 

personal vehicle on four separate occasions. Based on this usage, the government 

charged appellant with violating “Joint Travel Regulation Number 7000.14R Volume 

10 dated 2017” in violation of Article 92, UCMJ, for wrongful use of the fuel card

(the Specification of Charge I).

Appellant pleaded guilty to the offense of violating a lawful general 

regulation for misusing the fuel card for his personal vehicle. The military judge 

accepted appellant’s plea and concluded the providence inquiry on this offense 

without requiring the government, or appellant, to specify which section or 

paragraph of the charged regulation appellant violated. During appellant’s 

providence inquiry into another offense, the government realized the title to the 

cited regulation in the Specification of Charge I was incorrect. The government 

moved to amend the charge sheet so that the charge relating to the misuse of the fuel 

card accurately stated appellant violated the “Financial Management Regulation” 

and not the “Joint Travel Regulation.” 6 Since neither the specification nor the 

stipulation of fact alleged the specific chapter of the regulation appellant violated, at 

that point the military judge required the government to have the excerpt of the 

regulation marked as an appellate exhibit. The government submitted chapter 23 of 

volume 10 of the regulation pertaining to the purchase card program. After a 

required amendment to the stipulation of fact on this issue, to which appellant 

agreed, the military judge reopened the providence inquiry into the Specification of 

Charge I. The military judge repeated the elements of the offense and affirmed with 

appellant that Department of Defense Financial Management Regulation 7000.14R

[DoD FMR 7000.14R] was the regulation he violated through his misuse of the fuel 

card. 

 

6 The actual title of regulation is “Department of Defense Financial Management 

Regulation 7000.14R,” [DoD FMR 7000.14R]. 
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II. LAW AND DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

A military judge’s acceptance of a guilty plea is reviewed for an abuse of 

discretion, whereas questions of law arising from the plea are reviewed de novo. 

United States v. Murphy, 74 M.J. 302, 305 (C.A.A.F. 2015). “A military judge 

abuses this discretion if he fails to obtain from the accused an adequate factual basis 

to support the plea—an area in which we afford significant deference.” United 

States v. Inabinette, 66 M.J. 320, 322 (C.A.A.F. 2008) (citing United States v. 

Jordan, 57 M.J. 236, 238 (C.A.A.F. 2002)); United States v. Care, 18 C.M.A. 535, 

541 (C.M.A. 1969).

When an appellant pleads guilty, any question as to his conviction “must be 

analyzed in terms of providence of his plea, not sufficiency of the evidence.” 

United States v. Faircloth, 45 M.J. 172, 174 (C.A.A.F. 1996). In the context of a 

guilty plea, our focus is on whether the plea was provident. United States v. Cowan, 

ARMY 20160031, 2017 CCA LEXIS 633, at *6 (Army Ct. Crim. App. 28 Sep. 2017)

(mem. op.). “A guilty plea is provident if the facts elicited make out each element 

of the charged offense.” United States v. Harrow, 65 M.J. 190, 205 (C.A.A.F. 2007) 

(citations omitted). Although the evidence is not fully developed in a guilty plea 

case, see United States v. Jordan, 57 M.J. 236, 238 (C.A.A.F. 2002), the military 

judge is still “charged with determining whether there is an adequate basis in law 

and fact to support the plea before accepting it. ” Inabinette, 66 M.J. at 321–22 

(citation omitted). 

In reviewing a military judge’s decision to accept a guilty plea, “appellate 

courts apply a substantial basis test: Does the record as a whole show a substantial 

basis in law and fact for questioning the guilty plea .” Id. at 322 (internal quotations 

and citation omitted). As our superior court has consistently held, a providence 

inquiry into a guilty plea must establish “not only that the accused himself believes 

he is guilty but also that the factual circumstances as revealed by the accused 

himself objectively support that plea.” Jordan, 57 M.J. at 244 (Sullivan, S.J., 

dissenting) (quoting United States v. Davenport, 9 M.J. 364, 367 (C.M.A. 1980)); 

see United States v. Higgins, 40 M.J. 67, 68 (C.M.A. 1994). Where an accused’s 

plea inquiry fails to establish factual circumstances that support each element of an 

offense, there is a substantial basis in law and fact to question a guilty plea to the 

offense. Jordan, 57 M.J. at 240 (citing Faircloth, 45 M.J. at 174). 
CRAIN—ARMY 20190265

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B. Appellant’s Actions Did Not Violate the Charged Regulation 

Appellant asserts, and we agree, that the regulation to which he pleaded guilty 

to violating is not a regulation applicable to his misuse of a fuel card. The 

government charged appellant with the wrong regulation in this case. We, therefore,

find a substantial basis to question the military judge’s acceptance of appellant’s 

plea of guilty to the Specification of Charge I.

An adequate factual basis for violating a lawful general regulation requires 

the government to allege, and the military judge to discuss with an accused, the 

specific regulation violated. The elements of a violation of Article 92, UCMJ, are: 

(1) “[t]hat there was in effect a certain lawful general . . . regulation;” (2) “[t]hat the 

accused had a duty to obey it;” and (3) “[t]hat the accused violated or failed to obey 

the . . . regulation.” Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (2016 ed.), pt. IV, ¶ 

16.b.(1). In charging a violation of a lawful general regulation, a specification 

“must clearly identify the specific order or regulation allegedly violated. The 

general order or regulation should be cited by its identifying title or number, section 

or paragraph, and date.” Rule for Courts-Martial 307(c)(3) discussion. Appellant 

pleaded guilty to violating DoD FMR 7000.14R, volume 10, chapter 23, “Purchase 

Card Payments,” dated April 2017. This section of the regulation is only applicable 

to purchase cards and not fuel cards. Not only is there no mention of fuel cards in 

that entire chapter of the regulation, there is no mention of misuse of a fuel card 

being a violation of a lawful general regulation anywhere in the entire DoD FMR 

7000.14R.

The military judge abused his discretion in accepting appellant’s plea to 

violating a lawful general regulation because he did not have an adequate factual 

basis to support the plea as charged. In this case, appellant pleaded guilty to 

violating a regulation applicable to misuse of purchase cards and not fuel cards. 

While both are government charge cards, each card is governed by different 

regulations. Compare 41 C.F.R. § 102-34.320(a) (2020) (noting “fleet charge 

card[s]” are “specifically issued” for the purpose of purchasing fuel) with 48 C.F.R. 

§ 213.301 (2020) (discussing the use of government purchase cards). Furthermore, 

as appellant correctly points out, government purchase, travel, and fuel cards are 

separate and distinct charge cards addressed in a Department of Defense Guidebook. 

See DoD Government Charge Card Guidebook for Establishing and Managing 

Purchase, Travel, and Fuel Card Programs (1 October 2017) (revised 3 June 2020),

available at https://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/pdi/pc/docs/DoD_Govt_Charge_Card_

Guide_06_03-20.pdf (cited in 48 C.F.R. § 213.301(4)).

Although the military judge correctly recognized that the charge sheet needed

to “quote the actual provision” of the lawful order being violated, he failed to hold 

the government to that standard. Unfortunately, the military judge failed to 

recognize that even as amended, the regulation at issue pertained to purchase cards 
CRAIN—ARMY 20190265

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and not fuel cards. As such, the complexity of the various government purchase 

cards and governing policies and regulations resulted in an oversight by all parties 

involved.

Given that appellant pleaded guilty to violating a regulation that is not 

applicable to the misuse of a fuel card, we find a substantial basis to question 

appellant’s guilty plea and find that it was improvident. As such, we set aside and

dismiss the Specification of Charge I. 

C. Sentence Reassessment

In light of our determination that the military judge erred in accepting 

appellant’s plea to the Specification of Charge I, we now address whether we are 

able to reassess appellant’s sentence. Having considered the entire record, we 

conclude we are able to reassess the sentence and do so in accordance with the 

principles articulated by our superior court in United States v. Sales, 22 M.J. 305, 

307–08 (C.M.A. 1986) and United States v. Winckelmann, 73 M.J. 11, 15–16 

(C.A.A.F. 2013). 

There is no dramatic change in the penalty landscape by setting aside 

appellant’s conviction for violating a lawful general regulation. Appellant’s 

maximum sentence to confinement would be reduced only slightly from thirty-six 

years and six months to thirty-four years and six months by setting aside appellant’s 

conviction for the Specification of Charge I. We also recognize this case was tried 

by a military judge alone, which favors reassessment by this court. United States v. 

Adams, 74 M.J. 589, 593 (Army Ct. Crim. App. 2015) (finding reassessment 

appropriate, in part, because a judge alone sentenced appellant). Most importantly, 

we find that the remaining charges of one specification of wrongful destruction of 

government property, one specification of willfully suffering military property to be 

wrongfully disposed, three specifications of wrongful use of a controlled substance, 

two specifications of larceny, and one specification of wrongful appropriation 

capture the gravamen of appellant’s criminal conduct.

Based on our experience as judges on this court, we are familiar with the 

offense of violation of a lawful general regulation such that we may reliably 

determine what sentence would have been imposed had appellant’s plea not included 

this offense. Having conducted this reassessment, we affirm only so much of 

appellant’s sentence as provides for a bad-conduct discharge and confinement for 

twenty-nine months.