*Of the District of Puerto Rico, sitting by designation.

United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

_________________

No. 03-2246

JORGE MERCADO-ALICEA; ANGEL NAZARIO,

Plaintiffs, Appellants,

THE DE FACTO TOURISM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION OF POLITICALLY

DISCRIMINATED EMPLOYEES,

Plaintiff,

v.

P.R. TOURISM COMPANY; MILTON SEGARRA, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

OF P.R. TOURISM; GUILLERMO CABRET; NELSON CARDONA-MUÑIZ;

JOSE F. FAZ; MARIANO MÉNDEZ-SALCEDO; WILLIAM MÉNDEZ;

ANABEL JAIME,

Defendants, Appellees,

JOSÉ REYES; JOSÉ T. RIVERA; JOHN DOES,

Defendants.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

[Hon. Jay A. García-Gregory, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Boudin, Chief Judge,

Torruella, Circuit Judge,

and Fusté,* District Judge.

Francisco R. González with whom F.R. Gonzalez Law Office was

on brief for appellants.

Laura Beléndez-Ferrero with whom Ineabelle Santiago-Camacho

and Reichard & Escalera were on brief for appellee Puerto Rico

Tourism.
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Irene S. Soroeta-Kodesh, Assistant Solicitor General,

Department of Justice, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, for appellee

Jaime etc.

January 27, 2005
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FUSTE, District Judge. Jorge Mercado (“Mercado”) and

Angel Nazario (“Nazario”) brought an action against defendants, the

Puerto Rico Tourism Company (“PRTC”), Milton Segarra, Nelson

Cardona, José Faz, Mariano Méndez (“M. Méndez”), William Méndez,

and Anabel Jaime, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2003). Plaintiffs

complained that they were terminated and constructively discharged

because of their political affiliation. The district court granted

summary judgment for defendants upon finding that the plaintiffs

had failed to comply with Local Rule 311.12. The plaintiffs filed

this appeal, challenging whether the district court (1) properly

deemed as admitted defendants’ statement of uncontested facts; and

(2) properly concluded that defendants had not violated Mercado’s

and Nazario’s due process and First Amendment rights. We affirm.

I.

Statement of Facts

A. Mercado

Mercado worked as the Gaming Official Supervisor, a

career position, at the PRTC since 1996. His duties included,

inter alia, visiting casinos to ensure compliance with the Games of

Chance Statute. 

On or about December 1999, Mercado visited the Hotel

Ambassador Plaza with a check made to the order of the New

Progressive Party (“NPP”) for the amount of one thousand dollars

($1,000). The check bore the name Carlos Pesquera on the lower
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left-hand side. On the reverse of the check, Mercado wrote the

name of a bank, his name “Georgie Mercado” and the word “tourism.”

M. Méndez, the Ambassador Hotel’s Cage and Collection Manager,

cashed the check.

On February 16, 2001, Mercado requested treatment at the

State Insurance Fund. He thereafter requested medical leave and

license without pay from August 23, 2001, until October 31, 2001.

Mercado returned to work on November 1, 2001. On June 27, 2002,

Mercado was dismissed for violations of Section 12-3 of the PRTC

Human Resources Regulations, which prohibit, in relevant part:

(3) Availing yourself of your job’s duties

and powers, property or public funds to

directly or indirectly benefit from the same,

for family member or any other person,

business or entity, to gain advantages,

benefits or privileges not allowed by the law.

(5) Accepting or soliciting from anyone,

either directly or indirectly for any member

of your family unit, or any other person,

business or entity, asset of any financial

value, including gifts, loans, promises,

favors or services, in exchange of an action

by said official or public employee, being

influenced to favor that or any other person.

(16) Using your official position for

political ends - partisan or for other ends

that are not compatible with public service.

(17) Perform duties or tasks that result in a

conflict of interest with your obligations as

a public employee.

(18) Conduct that is improper or is against

duties, which taint the good name of the

[PRTC] or of the Government of Puerto Rico.

Alicea v. Puerto Rico Tourism Co., 270 F. Supp. 2d 243, 248 (D.P.R.

2003). 
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Mercado’s letter of dismissal also stated that his

conduct constituted a violation of the PRTC’s Discipline Manual,

which enumerates the following as violations of the same:

(22) Conduct yourself in such a way that

taints the good name of the Company, either

during or out of regular work hours as a

public employee.

(61) Performing services or financial

relationships with individuals or entities who

are considered to be a conflict of interest

with your duties as a public employee.

(62) Performing tasks, activities or duties

that entail conflicts of interest against your

duties as a public employee.

(66) Embezzlement or undue use of funds,

assets or services of the [PRTC]. 

Id.

The letter additionally stated that Mercado could appeal

the decision before the Office of the Examiner of the PRTC within

fifteen days, but Mercado failed to do so.

Mercado did not avail himself of several opportunities to

appeal his dismissal in an administrative hearing. 

B. Nazario

Nazario started working at the PRTC on August 4, 1999, as

Director of Information Systems, a Career Civil Service position.

On April 14, 2000, former governor Pedro Rosselló issued Executive

Order OE-2000-19, which established that Directors of Computer

Information Systems at government agencies should be designated by

the nominating authority and that such a position would be a trust
1Trust employees may be discharged at will and without cause.

See Correa Martínez v. Arrillaga Beléndez, 903 F.2d 49, 52 n.2 (1st

Cir. 1990). 

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position.1 On February 20, 2001, the PRTC named Daniela González

(“González”) as Principal Officer of Information Systems. Nazario

was ordered to report to González. On March 9, 2002, Nazario

requested and received a transfer with a pay increase to the

Municipality of San Juan, effective April 15, 2001. 

II.

Analysis

The plaintiffs now challenge the district court’s entry

of summary judgment on their due process and political

discrimination claims. The plaintiffs argue that the district

court erred in concluding that they had failed to comply with Local

Rule 311.12, which requires that they file their own statement of

facts when opposing a summary judgment motion. Plaintiffs also

argue that the district court improperly dismissed their first

amendment and due process claims on the merits. 

In reviewing the application of Local Rule 311.12, we

recognize that “[d]istrict courts enjoy broad latitude in

administering local rules.” Air Line Pilots Assoc. v. Precision

Valley Aviation, Inc., 26 F.3d 220, 224 (1st Cir. 1994). We review

a court’s granting of summary judgment de novo. Euromodas, Inc. v.

Zanella, Ltd., 368 F.3d 11, 16 (1st Cir. 2004); Podiatrist Ass’n,

Inc. v. La Cruz Azul de P.R., Inc., 332 F.3d 6, 13 (1st Cir. 2003).
2The District of Puerto Rico amended its local rules in

September of 2003. Because the summary judgment motions in this

case were adjudicated prior thereto, we refer throughout to the

pre-amended version.

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A. Local Rule 311.12

According to Local Rule 311.12, a party who moves for

summary judgment must submit “a separate, short, and concise

statement of the material facts as to which the moving party

contends there is no genuine issue to be tried and the basis of

such contention as to each material fact.” D.P.R.R. 311.12.2 The

opposing party must then file a statement “of the material facts as

to which it is contended that there exists a genuine issue to be

tried.” Id. Failure to file such a statement will result in the

court deeming admitted the movant’s statement. Id. (movant’s

statement will be “deemed admitted unless controverted by the

statement required to be served by the opposing party.”). 

As we have previously declared, “[w]e have consistently

upheld the enforcement of [the District Court of Puerto Rico’s

local rule], noting repeatedly that ‘parties ignore [it] at their

peril’ and that ‘failure to present a statement of disputed facts,

embroidered with specific citations to the record, justifies the

court’s deeming the facts presented in the movant’s statement of

undisputed facts admitted.’” Cosme-Rosado v. Serrano-Rodríguez,

360 F.3d 42, 45 (1st Cir. 2004) (quoting Ruiz Rivera v. Riley, 209

F.3d 24, 28 (1st Cir. 2000)). 
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The plaintiffs argue that the district court erred when

it deemed defendant’s facts admitted because of plaintiffs’ failure

to comply with Local Rule 311.12. Plaintiffs argue that defendants

themselves failed to refer to the record in their statement of

facts. 

The district court correctly ascertained that the

plaintiffs’ statement of facts failed to adhere to Local Rule

311.12. Instead of filing a statement of contested facts,

plaintiffs filed their own uncontested facts lacking any references

to the record that might aid the court in making its decision.

Plaintiffs also filed “Commentaries to Defendants’ Uncontested

Facts,” in which plaintiffs make reference to testimonies that are

not in evidence. Plaintiffs further made numerous conclusory

allegations and assertions of fact for which they offered no

support. District courts are not required to ferret through sloppy

records in search of evidence supporting a party’s case. See

Morales v. A.C. Orssleff’s EFTF, 246 F.3d 32, 35 (1st Cir. 2001)

(“[I]n his submission to the district court, plaintiff made only a

general reference to [a witness’s] testimony without pinpointing

where in that 89-page deposition support for that reference could

be found. This is precisely the situation that Local Rule 311.12

seeks to avoid.”). Additionally, contrary to plaintiffs’

allegations, defendants’ statement of facts contained references to

the record, making plaintiffs’ argument devoid of any merit. 
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Therefore, the facts pleaded by defendants were properly

deemed admitted according with Local Rule 311.12. See D.P.R.R.

311.12.

B. First Amendment

The First Amendment protects non-policymaking public

employees from adverse employment actions based on their political

opinions. See Padilla-García v. Guillermo Rodríguez, 212 F.3d 69,

74 (1st Cir. 2000); see also Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497

U.S. 62, 75-76 (1990). We employ a two-part, burden-shifting

analysis to evaluate claims of political discrimination. See Mount

Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287

(1977); Padilla-García, 212 F.3d at 74. To establish a prima-facie

case, a plaintiff must show that party affiliation was a

substantial or motivating factor behind a challenged employment

action. See Padilla-García, 212 F.3d at 74. “[A] plaintiff may

not prevail simply by asserting an inequity and tacking on the

self-serving conclusion that the defendant was motivated by a

discriminatory animus.” Correa-Martínez v. Arrillaga-Beléndez, 903

F.2d 49, 53 (1st Cir. 1990). Assuming proof of unlawful

discrimination, the burden then shifts to the defendant, who must

establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he would have

taken the same action regardless of the plaintiff’s political

beliefs. Id.; see Vázquez-Valentín v. Santiago-Díaz, 385 F.3d 23,

30 (1st Cir. 2004). 
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In other words, an employer “still prevails by showing

that it would have reached the same decision in the absence of the

protected conduct.” Id. (citing Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S.

574, 593 (1998)). Thus, “even if a plaintiff meets his or her

initial burden of showing that political affiliation was a

motivating factor for an employment decision, that is insufficient

to establish discrimination as a matter of law because the

plaintiff’s case at that point does not ‘distinguish[ ] between a

result caused by a constitutional violation and one not so

caused.’” Id. (citing Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 286). We have

noted that adopting “a view of causation that focuses solely on

whether protected conduct played a part in an employment decision

. . . would put an ‘employee in a better position as a result of

the exercise of constitutionally protected conduct than he would

have occupied [otherwise].’” Id. (quoting Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at

285). “However, if a plaintiff does not produce evidence

sufficient to allow a reasonable inference that political

discrimination was a substantial or motivating factor in the

challenged employment action, we need not analyze defendant’s Mt.

Healthy defense.” Vázquez-Valentín, 358 F.3d at 30.

We now review Mercado’s and Nazario’s claims. 

1. Jorge Mercado

Mercado argues that the district court erred when it

dismissed his claim because it was uncontested that his supervisors
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were aware that he was a member of the opposite political party.

“[S]tatements of political affiliation--unaccompanied by any

specific factual information to support [the] claim and unrelated

to any employment action taken by [defendant] against

[plaintiff]–[are] patently insufficient to establish an act of

political discrimination.” López Carrasquillo v. Rubianes, 230

F.3d 409, 414 (1st Cir. 2000). Here, there is no evidence on the

record showing that Mercado’s dismissal was the result of his

political affiliation. Instead, the evidence suggests that Mercado

was dismissed for cashing a check made out to a third party, in

violation of the PRTC Human Resources Regulations. 

Although the record indicates that Mercado was an NPP

member, Mercado failed to proffer evidence of any specific

discriminatory conduct which proves that his political patronage

was a substantial or motivating factor in the alleged adverse

employment decisions taken against him. Failure to proffer such

evidence warranted dismissal of his First Amendment claim. See

Vázquez-Valentín, 385 F.3d at 38 (stating that “[e]ven if a jury

could reasonably infer that defendants knew that plaintiff was a

member of the NPP, that still is insufficient. Proving that her

political affiliation was a substantial or motivating factor in the

adverse decision requires more than ‘[m]erely juxtaposing a

protected characteristic–someone else’s politics–with the fact that

the plaintiff was treated unfairly.’”) (quoting Correa-Martínez,
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903 F.2d at 58). Thus, the district court correctly dismissed

Mercado’s First Amendment claim. 

2. Angel Nazario

In order to show adverse employment action, a

prerequisite to his political discrimination claim, Nazario must

prove that he was constructively discharged as a result of

González’ appointment as Principal Officer of Information Systems,

and the resulting changes to Nazario’s duties. To prove that he

was constructively discharged, a plaintiff must show that the new

“working conditions imposed by the employer had become so onerous,

abusive, or unpleasant that a reasonable person in the employee’s

position would have felt compelled to resign.” Suarez v. Pueblo

Intern., Inc., 229 F.3d 49, 54 (1st Cir. 2000); see also AvilesMartínez, 963 F.3d at 6 (citing Calhoun v. Acme Cleveland Corp.,

798 F.2d 559, 561 (1st Cir. 1986)).

Nazario argued that requiring him to respond to a new

supervisor made him feel humiliated, and that defendants’ actions

constituted an attempt to force him out of the PRTC because of his

political affiliation. Such conclusory allegations are

insufficient to establish the prima facie case of constructive

discharge. To show that the work conditions forced him to resign,

a plaintiff must show that “the employer’s challenged actions

result in a work situation ‘unreasonably inferior’ to the norm for

the position.” Agosto-de-Feliciano v. Aponte-Roque, 889 F.2d 1209,
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1218 (1st Cir. 1989); see also Vega v. Kodak Caribbean, Ltd., 3

F.3d 476, 480 (1st Cir. 1993) (constructive discharge occurs when

“working conditions [are] so intolerable[ ] that a reasonable

person would feel compelled to forsake his job rather than to

submit to looming indignities”). Further, Nazario fails to proffer

any evidence suggesting that the new work conditions were inferior

to the norm or that requiring him to respond to a superior was a

result of political animus. We, therefore, conclude that the

district court properly dismissed Nazario’s First Amendment claim.

C. Due Process

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

guarantees public employees who have a property interest in

continued employment the right to at least an informal hearing

before they are discharged. González-De-Blasini v. Family Dept.,

377 F.3d 81, 86 (1st Cir. 2004); Santana v. Calderón, 342 F.3d 18,

23 (1st Cir. 2003); Kauffman v. P.R. Tel. Co., 841 F.2d 1169, 1173

(1st Cir. 1988); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S.

532, 538 (1985). In order to establish a procedural due process

claim under § 1983, “Plaintiffs must allege they have a property

interest as defined by state law and, second, that the defendants,

acting under color of state law, deprived [them] of that property

interest without constitutionally adequate process.” PFZ Props.,

Inc. v. Rodríguez, 928 F.2d 28, 30 (1st Cir. 1991); see Logan v.

Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428 (1982). “Under Puerto Rico
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law, career employees have a property interest in their continued

employment.” González-De-Blasini, 377 F.3d at 86; Kaufman v. P.R.

Tel. Co., 841 F.2d 1169, (1st Cir. 1989); 3 L.P.R.A. § 1336(4); 21

L.P.R.A. § 4560. 

1. Jorge Mercado

As a career employee, Mercado had a property interest in

his position, which vested him with a pre-termination hearing prior

to dismissal. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546; see also O’Neill v.

Baker, 210 F.3d 41, 48 (1st Cir. 2000). The record here indicates

that defendants granted Mercado a due process hearing, but he

failed to attend. Defendants rescheduled the hearing several times,

but Mercado repeatedly failed to appear. Defendants then allowed

Mercado to object to the dismissal in writing. Mercado seemed to

argue that his due process rights were violated when the hearing

was cancelled after he failed to appear on three separate

occasions. 

The district court correctly found that defendants did

not violate Mercado’s due process rights when his inability to

present his side of the story was due to his failure to

participate. 

2. Angel Nazario

As we previously explained, Nazario voluntarily quit his

career position at PRTC when he requested a transfer to the

Municipality of San Juan. Thus, as the district court stated,
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Nazario voluntarily gave up his property interest in his career

position and does not have a due process right to a hearing. 

For the reasons set forth above, the district court’s

judgment is affirmed.