Filed 4/11/16 P. v. Barrow CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

RAEKUBIAN BARROW,

 Defendant and Appellant.

2d Crim. No. B264704

(Super. Ct. No. 15PT-00218)

(San Luis Obispo County)

Raekubian Barrow appeals a judgment committing him to the State 

Department of State Hospitals for treatment as a mentally disordered offender (MDO). 

(Pen. Code, § 2962.)1 We conclude sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s finding 

that Barrow meets the criteria for commitment. Barrow’s counsel did not render 

ineffective assistance when he did not offer a translation of an Italian newspaper article or 

object to expert testimony about a probation report and hospital progress notes. We 

affirm. 

BACKGROUND

In 2008, a jury convicted Barrow of making criminal threats after he 

threatened to kill his roommate and her family. (§ 422.) The roommate said Barrow had 

twice previously threatened her with knife. The trial court sentenced Barrow to seven 

years in state prison. Barrow’s criminal history includes convictions for assault with a 

 

1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.
2

deadly weapon or force likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245), carrying a 

concealed weapon (former § 12025, subd. (a)), grand theft from a person (former § 487, 

subd. (c)), second degree robbery (§ 211), and false imprisonment (§ 236).

When Barrow completed his prison term in April 2015, the Board of Parole 

Hearings determined that he met the criteria for commitment as a mentally disordered 

offender. (§ 2962.) Barrow requested a trial. (§ 2966, subd. (a).) The trial court 

appointed counsel to represent him. Barrow waived jury. The court found beyond a 

reasonable doubt that Barrow meets the commitment criteria. It ordered him committed 

to the California Department of Mental Health for treatment.

At trial, Joe DeBruin, Ph.D., a psychologist employed by Atascadero State 

Hospital (ASH), opined that Barrow suffers from a delusional disorder, a severe mental 

disorder within the meaning of section 2962 that is not in remission. DeBruin based his 

assessment on a personal meeting with Barrow and consultations with a member of 

Barrow’s treatment team. DeBruin also reviewed progress notes about Barrow’s daily 

behavior at ASH, prior evaluations, and a probation officer’s report that described 

Barrow’s commitment offense and prior criminal history. The parties stipulated to the 

qualifying conviction. DeBruin testified that during the interview Barrow was 

“extremely delusional,” his mood was “very elevated,” and he had "very poor insight.”

DeBruin described Barrow’s “delusional ideation,” and “persecutory 

delusions,” including Barrow’s belief that his arrest and conviction were a “setup,” that 

his neighbor and roommate conspired against him, and that the district attorney was 

corrupt and gave a witness a free trip to Hawaii. 

DeBruin also described Barrow’s “grandiose delusions.” Barrow told 

DeBruin that he was a judo champion at San Francisco State University, was the 

Northern California Tennis Association’s player of the year, and played professional 

football in Italy as a “running back, a defense and a wide receiver.” Barrow talked about 

playing for the National Football League and the Canadian Football League. Barrow told 

DeBruin that he was a model for Georgio Armani on the front cover of magazines and 

that “the paparazzi were all over [him] like ants.” Barrow said he was a friend of female 
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celebrities and was a body guard for Janet Jackson. He said he was a computer 

programmer. He told DeBruin he had never committed a crime and went to prison three 

times as the result of ineffective assistance of counsel. In progress notes, a nurse noted 

that Barrow said that he was “a great inventor” and “a pilot with a hangar full of jets.”

DeBruin said that Barrow’s illness cannot be kept in remission without 

treatment and that Barrow does not follow his treatment plan. DeBruin said Barrow is 

“adamant” that he does not have a mental illness or need medication. DeBruin said 

Barrow is responsible about attending treatment groups. DeBruin acknowledged that 

delusional disorder is often refractory to medication, but said there are times when it can 

be treated with medication. He said Barrow’s unwillingness to try medication indicates 

Barrow is not following his treatment plan. 

Barrow testified. He said he was wrongfully convicted and his “dream 

team of investigators [would] expose the false imprisonment.” He said he never 

threatened anybody; he was in a situation where he had to "defend [himself] and the 

attacks that have happened to [him].” Barrow has never taken psychotropic medications. 

He has attended all of his treatment group sessions, until recently when an injury to a

finger prevented him from attending. If paroled, Barrow would work teaching tennis or 

“anything of that nature,” work on an engineering degree, and “live happily ever after and 

stay out of trouble.” 

Barrow presented a photograph of himself from 1986 or 1987 that he 

described as a modeling “composite” and another photo that he described as his “head 

shot.” He presented photographs of himself in football uniforms from the same time 

period and said they were taken when he played football in Italy, for which he was paid. 

He said he was going to play for the San Francisco 49ers when a National Football 

League strike prevented him. Barrow presented a copy of a newspaper article in Italian,

which said, according to him, that he was a photo model, that he and another player 

scored touchdowns to win a championship, and that he “was about to leave for San 
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Francisco to play for the 49ers.”2 Barrow also presented photographs of himself playing 

tennis and posing with other tennis players at local tournaments in San Jose, in Menlo 

Park, and in Lake Tahoe. 

DISCUSSION

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Barrow’s claim that counsel rendered ineffective assistance is not supported 

by a showing that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness, or a reasonable probability that he would have obtained a more favorable 

result but for counsel's deficient performance. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 

668, 688, 694.)

It is not reasonably probable that the outcome would have been different if 

counsel had offered an English translation of the newspaper article. The trial court 

allowed Barrow to testify to what the article said and no competing translation was 

offered. Even if a translation was consistent with Barrow’s description, the outcome 

would be the same. The article was hearsay, and Barrow was probably the source of any 

statement in it that he had been a model or was going to play for the 49ers. Even if the 

statements were true, they would not undermine DeBruin’s conclusions or those of the 

trial court based on their direct observations of Barrow’s exaggerations, his expansive 

mood, and his delusions. As DeBruin testified, “[Barrow] was all over the map and very 

delusional during my interview”; Barrow had “a lot of elevated, expansive moods, speech 

that’s pressured, . . . and a lot of perseverative thoughts about the wrongfulness of his 

conviction and his current situation.” Barrow’s testimony at trial was consistent with this 

characterization. 

Counsel did not perform deficiently when he did not object to DeBruin’s 

testimony on relevance or hearsay grounds. We begin with the presumption that counsel 

exercised reasonable professional judgment. (People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 703.) 

 

2

In a separate order, we deny Barrow’s motion to augment the record to include an 

English translation of the article that was not admitted into evidence, refused, or lodged 

with the superior court. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.122(b)(3), 8.155(a)(1)(A).)
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“Counsel does not render ineffective assistance by failing to make motions or objections 

that counsel reasonably determines would be futile.” (People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 

324, 387.) An objection to DeBruin’s testimony that Barrow suffers from delusions on 

relevance grounds would be futile. The parties stipulated to DeBruin's expertise, and his 

opinion was based on his personal interview of Barrow. That Barrow offered seeds of 

truth underlying his delusions did not render DeBruin’s opinion inadmissible. Only the 

trial court could determine the weight and credibility of the testimony. (People v. Ochoa

(1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206.) The trial court was in the best position to directly assess 

whether Barrow’s mood was expansive while he testified and whether his ideations 

appeared to be based on fact or delusion. 

An objection to DeBruin’s testimony about hospital progress notes and the 

probation report also would have been futile. An expert may rely on hearsay documents 

of a type reasonably relied on by experts in their field. (Evid. Code, § 801, subd. (b).) 

The California Supreme Court recently determined that the MDO’s qualifying offense 

may not be proven through an expert’s testimony about a probation report. (People v. 

Stevens (2015) 62 Cal.4th 325, 339.) But the expert may rely on it and on other hearsay 

information to reach conclusions on the remaining commitment criteria. (Id. at p. 336.) 

Here, the parties stipulated that Barrow committed the qualifying offense. DeBruin could 

rely on the probation report and progress notes in reaching his opinion on the other 

commitment factors. 

Moreover, DeBruin’s diagnosis did not depend on the progress notes. 

DeBruin testified, “My judgment, as a whole, based on the interview alone, never mind 

the various notations in the medical chart and also never mind the consultation that I had 

with one of the members of his treatment team . . . , [is] that this gentleman was still very 

delusional and was not in remission of his particular mental illness.” 

Substantial Evidence

Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Barrow qualified 

as an MDO beyond a reasonable doubt. 
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"A determination that a defendant requires treatment as an MDO rests on 

six criteria, set out in section 2926: the defendant (1) has a severe mental disorder; (2) 

used force or violence in committing the underlying offense; (3) had a disorder which 

caused or was an aggravating factor in committing the offense; (4) the disorder is not in 

remission or capable of being kept in remission absent treatment; (5) the prisoner was 

treated for the disorder at least 90 days in the year before being paroled; and (6) because 

of the disorder, the prisoner poses a serious threat of physical harm to other people." 

(People v. Clark (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1072, 1075-1076.) We draw all reasonable 

inferences in support of the judgment. "'"'[I]f the [finding] is supported by substantial 

evidence, we must accord due deference to the trier of fact and not substitute our 

evaluation of a witness's credibility for that of the fact finder.'"'" (Id. at p. 1083.) The 

testimony of DeBruin and Barrow provide ample support for the trial court’s findings. 

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

GILBERT, P. J.

We concur:

YEGAN, J.

PERREN, J.
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Michael L. Duffy, Judge

Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo

______________________________

Rudy Kraft, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant. 

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant 

Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Michael C. 

Keller, Eric J. Kohm, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.