Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1602-MH-335| September 2, 2016 Page 1 of 7

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Joel M. Schumm

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE

Anna Kirkman

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Matter of the 

Commitment of H.F.,

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

Eskenazi Health/Midtown, 

Clinic,

Appellee-Petitioner.

September 2, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No.

49A02-1602-MH-335

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court

The Honorable Steven Eichholtz, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

49D08-1601-MH-1348

Robb, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1602-MH-335| September 2, 2016 Page 2 of 7

Case Summary and Issue

[1] In January 2016, police officers transported forty-seven-year-old H.F. to 

Eskenazi Health Midtown Community Mental Health (“Eskenazi”) after she 

displayed disruptive behavior at two downtown Indianapolis hotels. An 

Eskenazi psychiatrist diagnosed H.F. with bipolar I disorder, citing H.F.’s odd 

behavior, delusions, and illogical thinking. Eskenazi then petitioned for the 

temporary involuntary civil commitment of H.F. in order to provide treatment. 

Following a hearing, the trial court ordered H.F. be committed to Eskenazi for 

a period not to exceed ninety days. H.F. now appeals, raising the sole issue of 

whether the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s temporary civil 

commitment order. Concluding the evidence was sufficient, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In 2009, H.F. was involuntarily committed to St. Vincent Hospital after 

suffering from suicidal thoughts and depression. In August 2015, H.F. was 

arrested after spitting on her husband’s face. Following her arrest, H.F. was 

admitted to Community Hospital North due to her “manic” state. Transcript at 

10. In September 2015, H.F. stopped taking her medications and attending her 

doctor’s appointments. 

[3] On the morning of January 10, 2016, H.F. visited a downtown Indianapolis

hotel. There, she became disruptive and refused security’s requests to leave the 

premises. Police officers arrived and escorted H.F. from the hotel. Unable to 
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open her vehicle door due to freezing temperatures, H.F. “started licking it to 

try and open the door.” Id. at 7. H.F. then travelled to another hotel and again 

became disruptive. After being escorted out of the hotel, H.F. was apprehended 

by police officers. Police officers then escorted H.F. to Eskenazi where she 

received treatment from psychiatrist Sarah Lark. Dr. Lark diagnosed H.F. with 

Bipolar I disorder and attempted to treat her. However, H.F. refused to take 

her prescribed medication and her disruptive behavior continued in the 

hospital.

[4] On January 13, 2016, Eskenazi filed a petition seeking to involuntarily commit 

H.F. to Eskenazi. On January 19, 2016, the trial court held a hearing on the 

matter. Dr. Lark testified H.F. exhibited symptoms of delusions and illogical 

thoughts. For example, when Dr. Lark attempted to discuss Bipolar I disorder 

with H.F., H.F. began talking about polar bears and igloos. Further, H.F. did 

not sleep, attempted to have sex with her husband in front of hospital staff, 

made sexual comments to hospital staff, and could not hold a logical 

conversation. H.F. had taken only one dose of one of the prescribed 

medications while hospitalized because she claimed “the medicines collide with 

her brain and that [Dr. Lark] should give them to the people in Haiti.” Id. at 

14. Dr. Lark opined H.F.’s judgment is severely impaired, and if left untreated, 

H.F. could be arrested again or relapse into a depressed and suicidal state. Dr. 

Lark concluded H.F. is gravely disabled, and without treatment, a danger to 

herself. H.F. also testified at the hearing. On the same day, the trial court

noted H.F.’s testimony indicated her thoughts are “very disorganized” and 
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ordered H.F. involuntarily committed for treatment for a period not exceeding 

ninety days.1 Id. at 30. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

I. Mootness

[5] H.F. acknowledges her ninety-day involuntary commitment to Eskenazi 

hospital has expired and therefore this case is moot. See Appellant’s Brief at 10-

11. Generally, a case is deemed moot and usually dismissed when a court is 

unable to render effective relief to a party. R.P. v. Optional Behaviors MHS, 26 

N.E.3d 1032, 1035 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). Because H.F. has been released from 

her temporary commitment at Eskenazi, this court cannot render effective relief 

to her. See id. However, “Indiana courts have long recognized that a case may 

be decided on its merits under an exception to the general rule when the case 

involves questions of great public interest. Typically, cases falling in the ‘great 

public interest’ exception contain issues likely to recur.” Id. (citation omitted). 

We have previously acknowledged the issue of whether there is sufficient 

evidence to establish a person is gravely disabled and in need of involuntary 

commitment is a matter of great public importance that is likely to recur. See id. 

Therefore, we will address the merits of H.F.’s claim. 

 

1 H.F. has since been released from Eskenazi.
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II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[6] H.F. argues Eskenazi failed to present clear and convincing evidence sufficient 

to establish she was gravely disabled. When reviewing a challenge to the 

sufficiency of the evidence, we look to the evidence most favorable to the trial 

court’s decision and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Id. If the trial 

court’s commitment order represents a conclusion a reasonable person could 

have drawn, the order must be affirmed, even if other reasonable conclusions 

are possible. Id. at 1036. 

[7] In Indiana, a person may be involuntarily committed if the petitioner proves by 

clear and convincing evidence “(1) the individual is mentally ill and either 

dangerous or gravely disabled; and (2) detention or commitment of that 

individual is appropriate.” Ind. Code § 12-26-2-5(e).2 Indiana Code section 12-

7-2-96 defines “gravely disabled” as,

a condition in which an individual, as a result of mental illness, is 

in danger of coming to harm because the individual:

(1) is unable to provide for that individual’s food, 

clothing, shelter, or other essential human needs; or

(2) has a substantial impairment or an obvious 

deterioration of that individual’s judgment, reasoning, or 

 

2 H.F. does not challenge whether the evidence is sufficient to support the trial court’s conclusion she suffers 

from a mental illness or whether commitment was appropriate.
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behavior that results in the individual’s inability to 

function independently.[3]

In determining whether the totality of the circumstances supports an 

involuntary commitment, we consider the gravity of the behavior leading to the 

hospital admission, the behavior in the hospital, and the relationship between 

problematic behaviors and the person’s mental illness. R.P., 26 N.E.3d at 1035.

[8] Here, H.F. has previously been involuntarily committed to hospitals for 

treatment, most recently in August 2015. Shortly following her release from 

involuntary commitment in 2015, H.F. stopped taking her medication, which 

resulted in her current manic state. Given H.F.’s current conduct and 

condition, Dr. Lark opined H.F.’s judgment is severely impaired. H.F. has 

again refused to take her prescribed medications, and if this continues, Dr. Lark 

fears H.F. could be arrested or relapse into a depressed and suicidal state. In 

addition, as the trial court noted, H.F.’s testimony evidences her incoherent, 

illogical, and disorganized state of mind. Based on this evidence, a reasonable 

person could conclude H.F. is gravely disabled and a danger to herself. 

Therefore, Eskenazi presented sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s 

order.

 

3 Because section 12-7-2-96 is written in the disjunctive, clear and convincing evidence establishing only one 

of the two prongs is sufficient to establish H.F. is gravely disabled. We therefore only address the second 

prong.
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Conclusion

[9] We conclude the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s involuntary 

commitment order. Accordingly, we affirm.

[10] Affirmed.

Mathias, J., and Brown, J., concur.