NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

HEATHER L. GILLILAND, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of 

Social Security, 

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 17-17428 

D.C. No. 2:16-cv-01978-GMS 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

G. Murray Snow, Chief District Judge, Presiding

Submitted September 10, 2020**

Before: LEAVY, CLIFTON, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.

Heather L. Gilliland appeals the district court’s judgment affirming the 

Commissioner of Social Security’s decision denying her application for disability 

insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. We have jurisdiction 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). We review de novo, Attmore v. 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

SEP 11 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 17-17428 

Colvin, 827 F.3d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 2016), and we reverse and remand for further 

proceedings.

When assessing the limitations from Gilliland’s fibromyalgia, the

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) erred by discounting the opinion of treating 

rheumatologist Dr. Mona Amin without considering Dr. Amin’s treating 

relationship or specialization. See Revels v. Berryhill, 874 F.3d 648, 664 (9th Cir. 

2017) (“[A] rheumatologist’s specialized knowledge is particularly important with 

respect to . . . fibromyalgia.”); Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664, 676 (9th Cir. 

2017) (ALJ’s failure to consider the requisite factors “constitutes reversible legal 

error”); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2), (5) (generally, a treating physician’s opinion is 

entitled to greater weight than an opinion from a non-treating source, and a 

specialist’s opinion is entitled to greater weight than an opinion from a nonspecialist).

The ALJ also erred by discounting Dr. Amin’s opinion as unsupported by 

objective findings and apparently based on Gilliland’s subjective complaints. See 

Revels, 874 F.3d at 656-57, 663 (because fibromyalgia is marked by normal 

objective findings and diagnosed based on the patient’s subjective complaints, ALJ 

erred by discounting treating physician’s opinion as unsupported by objective 

findings). The ALJ likewise erred by accepting the opinion of a nonexamining 

medical advisor as supported by normal objective findings. See id. 
3 17-17428 

The ALJ also erred by discounting Dr. Amin’s opinion as unsupported by 

Gilliland’s routine and conservative treatment, where he pointed to no evidence 

that Gilliland’s treatment, which included several pain medications and trigger 

point injections, was “conservative.” See id. at 667 (ALJ’s finding that a series of 

medications and epidural steroid injections were conservative treatment for 

fibromyalgia was unsupported). Finally, the ALJ erred by discounting Dr. Amin’s 

opinion as inconsistent with Gilliland’s activities of daily living, where the record 

established that Gilliland performed these activities with frequent breaks. See id.

at 664 (claimant’s ability to perform some household tasks with breaks was not 

inconsistent with doctor’s opinion that she needed significant breaks); see also

Vertigan v. Halter, 260 F.3d 1044, 1050 (9th Cir. 2001) (a plaintiff’s ability to 

carry on “certain daily activities” does not detract from credibility). 

As to limitations resulting from Gilliland’s mental health impairments, the 

ALJ provided germane reasons to discount the opinion of licensed professional 

counselor Nicole Balles as unsupported by and inconsistent with the record. See 

Revels, 874 F.3d at 655 (setting out standard). The ALJ reasonably incorporated 

the opinion of consulting psychologist Dr. Kenneth Littlefield into the residual 

functional capacity by limiting Gilliland to occasional interaction with coworkers 

and supervisors. See Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 

2008) (no error where ALJ translated assessed impairments into concrete work 
4 17-17428 

restrictions). 

The ALJ provided clear and convincing reasons to discount Gilliland’s 

symptom testimony based on the reason she stopped working and her attempts to 

find employment at a higher exertional level than her past work. See Bruton v. 

Massanari, 268 F.3d 824, 828 (9th Cir. 2001) (ALJ properly discounted testimony 

because claimant stopped working because he was laid off, not because he was 

injured); Macri v. Chater, 93 F.3d 540, 544 (9th Cir. 1996) (ALJ properly 

considered unsuccessful attempts to find employment); see also Molina v. Astrue, 

674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012) (where the ALJ has provided a rational 

interpretation of the evidence, this court must uphold the ALJ’s conclusion). Any 

error in the ALJ’s remaining reasons was harmless. See Molina, 674 F.3d at 1115 

(where ALJ provided at least one valid reason to discount testimony, error in 

remaining reasons is harmless).

We reverse and remand to the district court with instructions to remand to 

the agency for further proceedings. See Treichler v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin.,

775 F.3d 1090, 1099 (9th Cir. 2014). 

REVERSED and REMANDED.