UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

GLORIA D. GREEN,

Appellant,

v.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL 

MANAGEMENT,

Agency.

DOCKET NUMBER

AT-844E-22-0166-I-1

DATE: June 26, 2023

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL1

Gloria D. Green, Selma, Alabama, pro se.

Heather Dowie, Washington, D.C., for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman

Raymond A. Limon, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which 

affirmed the reconsideration decision of the Office of Personnel Management 

(OPM) denying her application for a disability retirement annuity under the 

Federal Employees’ Retirement System (FERS). For the reasons discussed 

 

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add 

significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, 

but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not 

required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a 

precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board 

as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
2

below, we GRANT the appellant’s petition for review, REVERSE the initial 

decision and OPM’s reconsideration decision, and ORDER OPM to award a 

disability retirement annuity to the appellant. 

BACKGROUND

¶2 The appellant worked for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (COE) from 

August 7, 2017, until she resigned effective March 13, 2021. Initial Appeal File 

(IAF), Tab 5 at 29, 42. At the time of her resignation, she was an Administrative 

Support Assistant at COE’s Hydropower Branch in Mobile, Alabama. Id. at 42. 

Her duties included providing clerical and administrative support in matters such 

as timekeeping, purchasing/procurement, supply management, travel, personnel 

management, and inventory control. Id. at 52. On March 4, 2021, she applied for 

disability retirement under FERS based on major depression and anxiety. Id. 

at 31, 35. 

¶3 According to the appellant’s medical documentation, she has suffered from 

anxiety since at least 2005. Id. at 107. In 2013, the Department of Veterans 

Affairs determined that the appellant had a service-connected disability rating of 

50% for major depressive disorder, effective September 2003. Id. at 72. 

According to the appellant, her mental conditions negatively affect her 

concentration and cause her to have paranoid thoughts and experience heart

palpitations, chest pain, and headaches, which resulted in a 17-day stay at a VA 

psychiatric hospital in 2019. Id. at 17, 31. She further notes that her conditions 

worsen when she is under increased stress, despite her continuous treatment and 

taking medication. Id. at 31. 

¶4 OPM issued a reconsideration decision, denying the appellant’s application 

for a disability retirement annuity. Id. at 4-6. The appellant filed this appeal of 

OPM’s reconsideration decision and requested a hearing. IAF, Tab 1. After the 

appellant failed to submit prehearing submissions and attend the prehearing 

conference, and failed to provide responsive information to an order to show 
3

cause, the administrative judge cancelled the hearing and issued a close-of-record 

order. IAF, Tabs 11, 14. Following the appellant’s response, the administrative 

judge issued an initial decision that affirmed OPM’s decision. IAF, Tab 15, 

Initial Decision (ID) at 2, 6. She reasoned that the appellant did not show that her 

depression and anxiety were disabling conditions. ID at 4-6. She found that it 

was undisputed that the appellant completed 18 months of civilian service under 

FERS, suffered from depression and anxiety for many years and those conditions 

were expected to continue throughout her lifetime, and that the agency was 

unable to accommodate or reassign her. ID at 4. 

¶5 The appellant has filed a petition for review. Petition for Review (PFR) 

File, Tab 1. OPM has filed a response. PFR File, Tab 3. 

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW

¶6 In an appeal from an OPM decision on a voluntary disability retirement 

application, the appellant bears the burden of proof by preponderant evidence. 

Thorne v. Office of Personnel Management, 105 M.S.P.R. 171, ¶ 5 (2007); 

5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(b)(2)(ii). To be eligible for a disability retirement annuity 

under FERS, an employee must show the following: (1) she completed at least 

18 months of creditable civilian service; (2) while employed in a position subject 

to FERS, she became disabled because of a medical condition, resulting in a 

deficiency in performance, conduct, or attendance, or, if there is no such 

deficiency, the disabling medical condition is incompatible with either useful and 

efficient service or retention in the position; (3) the condition is expected to 

continue for at least 1 year from the date that the application for disability 

retirement benefits was filed; (4) accommodation of the disabling medical 

condition in the position held must be unreasonable; and (5) she did not decline a 

reasonable offer of reassignment to a vacant position. 5 U.S.C. § 8451(a); 

Thorne, 105 M.S.P.R. 171, ¶ 5; 5 C.F.R. § 844.103(a). 
4

¶7 The administrative judge found, and the parties do not dispute on review, 

that the appellant met the 18-month service requirement under FERS at the time 

she filed her application, that her conditions were expected to continue for 1 year 

from that date, that providing her an accommodation in her position was 

unreasonable, and that she did not decline a reasonable offer of reassignment to a 

vacant position. ID at 4; IAF, Tab 5 at 27-28, Tab 15 at 8-9. We decline to 

disturb those findings. The administrative judge affirmed OPM’s denial of the 

appellant’s disability retirement appeal on the basis that the appellant failed to 

prove that she had a disabling medical condition. ID at 4-6; see Thorne, 

105 M.S.P.R. 171, ¶ 5. We disagree.

¶8 There are two ways to meet the statutory requirement that the employee “be 

unable, because of disease or injury, to render useful and efficient service in the 

employee’s position.” Jackson v. Office of Personnel Management, 118 M.S.P.R. 

6, ¶¶ 6-7 (2012) (quoting 5 U.S.C. §§ 8337(a), 8451(a)(1)(B)). First, an appellant 

can establish that the medical condition caused a deficiency in performance, 

attendance, or conduct by showing that her medical condition affects her ability 

to perform specific work requirements, prevents her from being regular in 

attendance, or causes her to act inappropriately. Id., ¶¶ 7-8. Alternatively, the 

employee can show that her medical condition is incompatible with either useful 

and efficient service or retention in the position by showing that it is inconsistent 

with working in general, in a particular line of work, or in a particular type of 

work setting. Id.

¶9 The administrative judge found that the appellant failed to demonstrate that

her depression and anxiety caused deficiencies in her performance, conduct, or 

attendance. ID at 4-6. The administrative judge also concluded that the appellant 

failed to establish that her medical condition was incompatible with useful or 

efficient service; however, she did not explain her reasoning. ID at 6. Because 

we disagree with the administrative judge and find that the appellant did 

demonstrate that her depression and anxiety caused deficiencies in at least her 
5

performance and attendance, we need not reach the issue of whether her medical 

conditions were inconsistent with working in general, in a particular line of work, 

or in a particular type of work setting.

2

 

The administrative judge erred in finding that the appellant failed to establish that 

her medical conditions caused a deficiency in performance and attendance. 

¶10 In concluding that the appellant had failed to establish that her medical 

conditions caused a deficiency in performance, conduct, or attendance, the 

administrative judge acknowledged that the appellant’s depressive paranoid 

behaviors impacted her work. ID at 6. However, she found that absent additional 

medical evidence from the appellant, she could not conclude that the appellant 

was disabled by her conditions. Id. This determination was in error. 

¶11 Although objective medical evidence must be considered if available, such 

evidence is not required to establish disability. Confer v. Office of Personnel 

Management, 111 M.S.P.R. 419, ¶ 9 (2009) (citing Vanieken-Ryals v. Office of 

Personnel Management, 508 F.3d 1034, 1040-44 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). The Board 

will consider all pertinent evidence in determining an appellant’s entitlement to 

disability retirement: objective clinical findings, diagnoses and medical opinions, 

 

2 On review, the appellant alleges for the first time that she also suffered from a “sleep 

disorder (Obstructive Sleep Apnea),” which negatively affected her performance of her 

job duties. PFR File, Tab 1 at 5. Other than this allegation and general claims in the 

record below that she does not sleep well, there is no evidence in the record related to a 

sleep apnea condition. The appellant also did not include it in her disability retirement 

application. IAF, Tab 5 at 31. Generally, the Board will not consider evidence relating 

to a different or additional medical condition that was not the subject of the appellant’s 

application to OPM. Rozar v. Office of Personnel Management, 61 M.S.P.R. 136, 140 

(1994). An exception to this general rule exists if there is sufficient evidence that the 

newly raised condition was related to the condition on which the application was based 

and, thus, is not a totally different or additional condition. Gardner v. Office of 

Personnel Management, 91 M.S.P.R. 391, ¶ 11 (2002) (citing Chappell v. Office of 

Personnel Management, 79 M.S.P.R. 302, ¶ 6 (1998)). Because we conclude, below, 

that the appellant has proven that her depression and anxiety were disabling, we decline 

to make a finding regarding whether the appellant’s sleep apnea is related to those 

conditions.
6

subjective evidence of pain and disability, and evidence relating to the effect of 

the applicant’s conditions on her ability to perform the duties of her position. 

Henderson v. Office of Personnel Management, 117 M.S.P.R. 313, ¶ 19 (2012). 

Nothing in the law mandates that a single provider tie all of this evidence 

together. Id. For example, if the medical provider sets forth clinical findings, a 

diagnosis, and a description of how the medical condition affects the appellant’s 

activities in general terms, the Board could consider that evidence, together with 

the appellant’s subjective account of how the condition has affected her ability to 

do her job and her daily life, testimony or statements from supervisors, 

co-workers, family members, and friends, and the appellant’s position description

to conclude that the appellant’s medical conditions were disabling. Id. 

¶12 Considering the evidence as a whole, we find that the appellant’s medical 

history does roughly correlate with her performance and attendance deficiencies. 

The appellant alleged that her depression and anxiety caused her to have paranoid 

thoughts that affected her ability to concentrate at work and miss deadlines, 

resulting in performance deficiencies. IAF, Tab 5 at 17; PFR File, Tab 1 at 5. In 

her disability retirement application, she explains that she believed that her

coworkers and supervisors were “plotting” and “scheming” against her. IAF, 

Tab 5 at 31. She claims that her supervisors would have “people” communicate 

with her “only to gain information to conspire and use it against [her].” Id. They 

would then “twist” things she said in an effort to “breakdown her relationship[s] 

and isolate [her]” in order to “frame [her] in a work related crime, and VA fraud.” 

Id. She describes that as a result of these thoughts she “spiraled out of control 

and feared for [her] life [when] traveling to work and at work.” Id. For example, 

on April 23, 2019 she left work because she believed she was in “emanate [sic] 

danger,” called ONSTAR vehicle security as she drove to a safe place, and was 

then admitted to a VA Psychiatric Hospital until May 10, 2019. Id. at 17. 

¶13 The appellant’s medical records corroborate that she was admitted to the 

VA Medical Center during this 17-day period and recommended not to return to 
7

work for an additional week, until she was medically cleared. Id. at 111. Indeed, 

according to her supervisor, following her hospitalization, the appellant was not 

able to return to work until September 23, 2019. Id. at 30. Similarly, the 

appellant’s daughter’s statement further corroborates that the appellant’s 

depression with psychotic features began to worsen in early 2019. IAF, Tab 15 

at 10. The daughter describes an incident where she accidentally turned the gas 

stove on and the appellant thought “someone else had come in to do it 

intentionally.” Id. She claims that the appellant made repeated statements about 

“feeling ‘unsafe’ being ‘way out there in the woods,’” referring to her remote 

work location. Id. Her daughter also claims that the appellant was so fearful of 

her well-being that she would send pictures of herself “to show her clothing” 

before heading to work in the morning. Id. 

¶14 The record reflects that during early 2020, at the beginning of the COVD-19 

pandemic, the appellant’s depression and psychotic features improved whil e she 

teleworked, although according to her daughter there was “always a sense of 

carefulness or mistrust about coworkers and supervisors.” Id. However, the 

appellant’s depressive psychotic thoughts began to worsen again in the 6 months 

leading up to her March 2021 resignation and disability retirement application. 

Id. According to the appellant, around the fall of 2020 when employees were 

instructed to return to the office 2 days a week, the appellant came in several 

days, but thereafter refused to work in the office because she believed that her 

coworkers and supervisor were trying to harm her and she became fearful for her 

life. IAF, Tab 5 at 17. For example, she implied on one occasion that her 

coworkers and supervisor tried to poison her or harm her when they insisted she 

eat food they cooked and were “looking at [her] and smirking, as if they had done 

something to the food.” Id. She also claims that she believed that they turned off 

the camera monitor in the office parking and gate areas in order to tamper with 

her car, as she believed they had done on several other occasions. Id. Around 
8

March 2021, she also believed she was being followed while driving home from 

work. IAF, Tab 1 at 11. 

¶15 The evidence described above is consistent with the medical notes from the 

appellant’s medical appointments prior to and following her March 2021 

resignation and application for disability retirement. On January 14, 2021, the 

appellant contacted her provider, the Central Alabama Veterans Health Care 

System’s Mental Health department, requesting to speak to her doctor about 

changing the dosage of her antipsychotic and depression medication, Quetiapine 

Fumarate (whose brand name is Seroquel). IAF, Tab 5 at 96. She stated that 

“[t]his past month was not good for work” and that she was “having trouble 

focusing and concentrating on [her] work.” Id. Then, on March 18, 2021, shortly 

after her March 13 resignation, she again contacted her doctor to increase the 

dosage of her Seroquel. Id. at 95. That day, her doctor conducted a telemedicine 

appointment with the appellant and noted that the appellant stated that she was 

“not doing well, not resting . . . having a lot of problem[s] on the job, [she had] 

been depressed, stressed out.” Id. at 89-90. She stated that the appellant was 

“having paranoid thoughts, felt that the people she worked with were plotting 

against her, playing games towards her well being.” Id. at 91. She further noted 

that the appellant “felt she was in a hostile work environment” and “she was 

afraid for her safety.” Id. She stated that the appellant provided an example 

about leaving work and thinking someone driving behind her was trying to harm 

her. Id. 

¶16 First, the administrative judge determined that there was insufficient 

evidence to establish that the appellant’s medical condition caused a deficiency in 

attendance, particularly because she was able to telework effectively in the spring 

of 2020 during the COVID-19 pandemic. ID at 4-5. We disagree.

¶17 There is sufficient evidence to conclude that the appellant’s absences were 

due to her medical conditions. According to her supervisor’s statement, the 

appellant’s attendance deficiencies began in April 22, 2019, which correlates with 
9

her hospitalization and resulting inability to work until September 23, 2019. IAF, 

Tab 5 at 30. The record also shows that, between April 2019 and March 2021, the 

appellant used 83 hours of annual leave, 60 hours of sick leave, 860 hours of 

leave without pay, and was absent without leave for about 24 hours. Id. 

Although the exact dates and reasons for the leave are not a part of the record , 

given the timing involved, we find that the appellant’s excessive absences were, 

more likely than not, at least partly attributable to her depression and anxiety.

¶18 Second, the administrative judge found that the appellant had not 

established a performance deficiency because, in the appellant’s response to 

OPM, she alleged that her performance deficiencies were due to harassment. ID 

at 4; IAF, Tab 5 at 16. We disagree and find sufficient evidence that the 

appellant’s performance deficiencies were caused by her depressive paranoid 

thoughts and anxiety. 

¶19 For instance, in the appellant’s supervisor’s statement, she indicated that 

the appellant’s performance became unacceptable beginning in September 2018. 

IAF, Tab 5 at 29. Indeed, the appellant’s most recent performance appraisal, 

covering the rating period from April 1, 2020, to March 31, 2021, demonstrates 

that the agency rated the appellant’s performance at the lowest possible level, 

Unacceptable, leading up to her retirement and disability retirement application in 

March 2021. Id. at 55-60. Consistent with the appellant’s statement that her 

conditions affected her ability to concentrate, meet deadlines, and made her 

paranoid in her communications with coworkers and supervisors, her supervisor 

noted that the appellant’s critical elements of customer servic e and acquisition of 

supplies and equipment were unacceptably low, particularly due to her difficulty 

communicating with her supervisor and coworkers and timely placing and 

tracking purchase card orders. Id. at 30. Her supervisor further observes that the 

appellant’s medical absences and performance deficiencies negativel y impacted 

the agency’s mission and work operations, and caused undue administrative 

burdens on other administrative personnel. Id. 
10

¶20 Lastly, the administrative judge essentially gave no weight to the 

appellant’s statement and her supervisor’s statements that her work deficiencies 

were related to her medical conditions because the appellant claimed that her 

work deficiencies were due to her supervisor’s harassment and her hostile work 

environment. ID at 4. This was error. The Board has rejected disability claims 

when the appellant’s conditions were largely situational, i.e., based exclusively 

on her reaction to a particular workplace or in the context of what she perceives 

as a hostile work environment. Luzi v. Office of Personnel Management, 

109 M.S.P.R. 79, ¶ 9 (2008); Cosby v. Office of Personnel Management, 

106 M.S.P.R. 487, ¶¶ 7, 10 (2007). However, the Board has distinguished such 

circumstances from ones in which job-related stress precipitated and exacerbated 

an appellant’s condition, which was itself disabling. Kimble v. Office of 

Personnel Management, 102 M.S.P.R. 604, ¶ 14 (2006) (finding that the

appellant’s work-related stress exacerbated her depression and anxiety to the 

point that her condition became disabling); Thorne, 105 M.S.P.R. 171, ¶ 15

(finding that the appellant’s job-related stress precipitated and exacerbated his 

psychiatric condition to the point that it became disabling). Job-related stress 

resulting in mental impairments that prevent an employee from performing the 

duties required in her position can warrant the granting of disability retirement. 

Kimble, 102 M.S.P.R. 604, ¶ 14; see Thorne, 105 M.S.P.R. 171, ¶ 15. 

¶21 Here, the medical evidence and statements do not support a finding that the 

appellant’s depression and anxiety were a reaction to her particular workplace or 

harassment from her supervisor or coworkers. Rather, these conditions were 

apparent outside of the specific work environment at the COE, where she began 

working in 2017. The record shows that in April 2005 the appellant experienced 

a similar episode of depression with psychosis including “mostly paranoid 

delusions concerning her job,” which also resulted in a 2-week psychiatric 

intensive day treatment program. IAF, Tab 5 at 104. The appellant’s medical 

notes in October and March 2020 leading up to her resignation also show that she 
11

was experiencing increased anxiety and work-related stress, which exacerbated

her psychotic depression and anxiety. Id. at 31, 90, 100. Lastly, the appellant’s 

most recent medical evidence from an appointment on April 22, 2022, shows that 

she has continued to suffer from depression and anxiety over a year after 

resigning and submitting her disability retirement application in March 2021. 

IAF, Tab 15 at 8-9; see Bell v. Office of Personnel Management, 87 M.S.P.R. 1, 

¶¶ 18-20 (2000) (finding that the appellant’s problems with interpersonal contacts 

following her removal from the agency supported the conclusion that she was 

impaired beyond just her assignment under the supervisors who allegedly 

precipitated her psychiatric disorder). Thus, we do not find that her depression 

and anxiety were situational.3 

¶22 Considering all of the evidence, we conclude that the appellant has shown 

by preponderant evidence that, while employed in a position subject to FERS, she 

became disabled from useful and efficient service. Accordingly, she has 

established her entitlement to a disability retirement annuity, and we reverse the 

administrative judge’s initial decision and OPM’s final decision. 4

ORDER

¶23 We ORDER OPM to award the appellant disability retirement. OPM must 

complete this action no later than 20 days after the date of this decision. 

 

3

The administrative judge found that the appellant’s medical conditions did not result 

in a deficiency in conduct, without providing an explanation for her finding. ID at 6. 

Because we find that the appellant established that her medical conditions caused 

deficiencies in attendance and performance, we do not reach the question of whether 

they also adversely impacted her conduct. See Beeler-Smith v. Office of Personnel 

Management, 112 M.S.P.R. 479, ¶¶ 8-18 (2009) (determining that an appellant proved 

she was disabled based solely on a performance deficiency).

4 Because we find that the appellant has established her entitlement to disability 

retirement benefits, we need not consider her remaining arguments on review that the 

administrative judge did not properly weigh her VA service-connected disability rating 

of 50% for major depressive disorder. PFR File, Tab 1 at 4. We also have not 

considered the appellant’s new evidence submitted on review. Id at 7-10.
12

¶24 We also ORDER OPM to tell the appellant promptly in writing when it 

believes it has fully carried out the Board’s Order and to describe the actions it 

took to carry out the Board’s Order. We ORDER the appellant to provide all 

necessary information OPM requests to help it carry out the Board’s Order. The 

appellant, if not notified, should ask OPM about its progress. See 5 C.F.R. 

§ 1201.181(b).

¶25 No later than 30 days after OPM tells the appellant it has fully carried out 

the Board’s Order, the appellant may file a petition for enforcement with the 

office that issued the initial decision on this appeal if the appellant believes that 

OPM did not fully carry out the Board’s Order. The petition should cont ain 

specific reasons why the appellant believes OPM has not fully carried out the 

Board’s Order, and should include the dates and results of any communications 

with OPM. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.182(a).

¶26 This is the final decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board in this 

appeal. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.113(c) (5 C.F.R. 

§ 1201.113(c)).

ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS

You may be entitled to be paid by the agency for your reasonable attorney 

fees and costs. To be paid, you must meet the requirements set forth at title 5 of 

the United States Code (5 U.S.C.), sections 7701(g), 1221(g), or 1214(g). The 

regulations may be found at 5 C.F.R. §§ 1201.201, 1201.202, and 1201.203. If 

you believe you meet these requirements, you must file a motion for attorney fees 

and costs WITHIN 60 CALENDAR DAYS OF THE DATE OF THIS DECISION. 

You must file your motion for attorney fees and costs with the office that issued 

the initial decision on your appeal.
13

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS5

You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By 

statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such 

review and the appropriate forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). 

Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit 

Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most 

appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a 

statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their 

jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should 

immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all 

filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time 

limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.

Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review 

below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions 

about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you 

should contact that forum for more information. 

(1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking 

judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S. 

Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court 

within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C. 

§ 7703(b)(1)(A). 

If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 

Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the 

following address: 

 

5

Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated 

the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the 

Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
14

U.S. Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit 

717 Madison Place, N.W. 

Washington, D.C. 20439 

Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal 

Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular 

relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is 

contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11. 

If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to 

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at 

http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation 

for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The 

Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that 

any attorney will accept representation in a given case. 

(2) Judicial or EEOC review of cases involving a claim of 

discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you 

were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action 

was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain 

judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination 

claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court (not the 

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you 

receive this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems 

Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case, 

and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file 

with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative

receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on 

race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be 

entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any 
15

requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See 42 U.S.C. 

§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a. 

Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective 

websites, which can be accessed through the link below: 

http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx. 

Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment 

Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding 

all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the 

EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive

this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case, 

and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file 

with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives

this decision. 

If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the 

address of the EEOC is: 

Office of Federal Operations 

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 

P.O. Box 77960 

Washington, D.C. 20013 

If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or 

by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to: 

Office of Federal Operations 

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 

131 M Street, N.E. 

Suite 5SW12G 

Washington, D.C. 20507 

(3) Judicial review pursuant to the Whistleblower Protection 

Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised 

claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or 

other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D). 

If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s 
16

disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section 

2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), 

(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the 

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of 

competent jurisdiction.6 The court of appeals must receive your petition for 

review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C.

§ 7703(b)(1)(B). 

If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for 

the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the 

following address: 

U.S. Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit 

717 Madison Place, N.W. 

Washington, D.C. 20439 

Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal 

Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular 

relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is 

contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11. 

If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to 

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at 

http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation 

for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The 

 

6

The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain 

whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on 

December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on 

July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of 

MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 

The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195, 

132 Stat. 1510. 
17

Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that 

any attorney will accept representation in a given case. 

Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their 

respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below: 

http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx. 

 

 

FOR THE BOARD:

Washington, D.C.

 /s/ for 

Jennifer Everling

Acting Clerk of the Board