Docket No. 109137.



### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STA TE OF IL LINOIS

BRIAN T. HUBBLE, A

ppel le e, v. BI-STATE DEV ELOPMENT AGENCY

OF THE IL

LI NOIS-MI SSOURI METROPOLI TAN DISTRI CT, d/b/a Metro and Bi-Sta te, a/k/a Bi-State Development Agenc y, A ppellant

. Opinion filed September 23, 2010.

JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the judgment of

the cour t, with opinion. Chief Justice Fitzgerald and Justices Thomas, Kilbride, Garman, Karmeier, and Burke conc urred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

Plaintiff, Brian Hubble, brought a per sonal injury action in the circuit court of St. Clair County aga inst def e ndant, B i-State Development

Agency of the Illinois-Missouri Metropol itan Distr ict, doi ng business a s Metro or Bi-State , also know

n as Bi- Stat e Development

Agenc y ( hereaf ter Bi- State or Metro). Bi-State moved to dismiss the

action, a ss ertin g t hat plaintiff filed his complaint outside of the applicable statute of limitat ion s (735 I LCS 5/2–619(a)(5) (West 2006)). The circuit court denied Bi-State’s motion to dismiss, but certified for interlocutory

appeal a question of law asking whether Bi-State is a “local public e ntity” as defined b y the Local Governmental a nd Gov ernm ental Employees Tor t1 The com plaint co ntained a separate neg ligence count ag ainst the bus driver

. However, on April 30, 2007, plaintiff voluntarily d ismissed the bus driver from the case.
-2- Immunity Act (Tort Immunity

Act or Act) and thereby

subject to its one-yea r statute of limitations (745 ILCS 10/1–101 et seq . (West 2006)). A divided panel of the appellate court answere d the certified question in the negative. 393 Ill. App. 3d 1016. T he case is now before this court on a certificate of importa nce granted by t he appe llate cou

rt (I ll. Const. 19 70, art. VI, §4(c); 155 Ill. 2d R. 316). We revers e t he judgment of the appellate court and the order o f the circuit court, and remand the cause to the circ uit court with dire ctions to d

ismiss plain

tiff’s c omplaint.

I. BACKGROUND OnSeptember 13, 2005, a Metro bus owned an d operat ed byBiStat e col lided with

plaintiff ’s automo bile at the intersec tion of Illinois Highway 159 and FStreet in

Belleville. On March

1, 2007, plaintiff filed a complaint against Bi-State alleging that the Metro bus driver

was negligent and that Bi-State was vi carious ly liable based on the doctrine of resp ondeat

superior

. 1 Illinois has a two-y ear general statute of limitations for personal injury actions (735 IL CS 5/13–202 (West 2006)), and plaintiff filed his complaint within that period. Bi-State m oved t o dismiss pla

intiff’s complain

t pursuan t to section2–619(a

)(5) of the Code o f Civil Proc edure ( 735 I LCS 5/2–619(a)(5) (West

2006)). I n its suppor

ting memorandum, B i-State explained that it i s a bo dy c or po ra te an d p ol it ic cr ea te d b y a congr essional ly approve d intersta

te c ompact between Illinois and Missouri (hereafter

Compact). The Compact also created the Bi-State MetropolitanDistrict, which con sists of the City of St. L ouis, Missouri, and the Mi ssouri co unti es of St . Louis, St. Charles, and Jefferson, and

the I llinois cou

nties of Ma

dison, St. Clair, and Monroe (hereafter District). 45 IL CS 100/0.01 et seq. (West 2006); Mo. Ann. Stat. §70 .37 0 (W est 200 4); Pu b. L. No. 81–74 3, 64 Stat. 568. The two states authorized

Bi-State, among other activities, to own and operate buses and passeng er tra nsportation facilities. Pursuant to the Compact, Bi-State provides public m ass transportation throughout the2 In a ddition to its m otion for in terlocutory appeal, B i-State filed an

answer to plaintiff’s compl a int. T he answ er rai sed, as an affi rmative defense, the one-y

ear statute of limitat

ions con tained in section 8–101 of the Tort I mm unity Act.

-3- District. 45 IL CS 110/0. 01 et s eq . (West 200 6); Mo. An n. Stat. §70.373 (West 2004); Pub. L. No . 86–303, § 2, 73 Stat. 5 82. Bi-St ate contended

that it is a “local public entity” under the Tor t Immu

nity Ac t, whic h provide s for a one-y ear sta tute of lim

itations. 7 45 IL

CS 10/8–101(a) (West 2006). Bi-State argued that plaintiff’ s complaint

was time-barred under section 8–101 of the Act because plaintiff filed his complaint over one ye ar after the injury

. The circuit c ourt r ejecte d Bi-Stat e’s cont ention an d denied B iState’s motion to dismiss. Bi- State filed a motion for interlocutory appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 308 (155 Ill. 2d R. 308). 2 The circuit court den ied Bi-State ’s motion. On Octobe r 26, 2007 , this court entered a superv isory order dire cting the circuit court to grant Bi-State’s motion for an interlocut ory appea l and to stay the procee dings pending

the outcome of the

appeal. Complying

with this court’s order, the circuit court stay ed the proceedings and certified the following question of law for interlocutory appeal: “W hether

Bi-State Development

Agenc y is a local p ublic entity as defined by

the Local Governmental and Gov ern men tal Emp lo yees Tor t Im mu nity Act, [ci tation], and is therefore subject to the one–y ear stat ute o f limitations set forth in the Act.” 393 Ill. App. 3d at 1017. A divided panel of the app el late court answered the certified question in the negative, concluding that the legislature did not

intend to include B i-State within the me anin g of the term “ local pub lic

en ti ty” as defined

in the Tort Immunity

Act. 393 Ill. App. 3d at 1023. Justice Spomer disagreed

with the c ourt on al l materia l points. 39 3 Ill. App. 3d at 1033 (Spomer, J., dissenting). The appella

te court granted Bi-State’sapplica tion for a certifi cate
o f importance. See Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI , §4(c). We will refer t o additional pertinent background in the context of our analy sis of the issues.-4- II. AN ALYS IS A. Preliminary Matters At the outset, w e note what is actually before this court and our standard of revie w. First, the cer

tificate of importance states that the appella te cou rt “grants a certificate of importance concerning the following question of law for review by the I llinois Supreme Court,” and t he n states the certified question that was presented to the appella te court. However, under Supreme Court Rule 316 (155 Ill. 2d R. 316), the

wholecase comes before the supre me court and not on

ly

a particular issue. O’Casek v. Childre

n’s Home & Aid Socie ty , 229 I ll. 2d 421, 436 (2 008), quot ing People v. Crawford Distributing Co. , 78 Ill. 2d 70, 73 (1979). Second, Bi-State moved

to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to section 2–619 of

the Code of

Civil Procedure (735 IL CS 5/2–619 (West 2006)). A section 2–619 motion to dismiss admits the legal sufficiency

of the plaintiff’s claim, but asserts affirmative matter that defeat s the claim

. King v. First Capital Financial Services Corp. , 215 Ill. 2d 1, 12 (2005). Among such affirmative matter is that “the action

was not comme

nced with

in the time lim

ited by law.” 73 5 ILCS 5/2–619(a)(5) (West 2006). When ruling on a section 2–619 motion to dismiss, the

circuit c ourt must i

nterpr et all pleadings and supporting document s in the lig ht most favorable to the nonmoving pa rt y. Onappeal, review i s de novo

. Orlak v. Loyola Uni versity Health System , 228 Ill. 2d 1, 7 (2007) ; Bor owiec v. Gateway 2000, Inc. , 209 Ill. 2d 376, 383 (2004).

B. “Lo ca l P ub li c E nt it y” Turning to the merits, a divided panel of the appellate court concluded

that plain tiff’s c omplaint w as not time -barre d pursuan t to the Tort Immunity

Act. Based on

canons of statutory c onstruction, the appella te court determined that

Bi-State was not a local pub lic entity within the purview of the Act. We disagree. As we will explain, BiState is a “local public entity” w ithin the purview of the Tort Immun ity Act , notwithst

anding Bi-State ’s status a s an interstate compact entity, and so the one-y

ear statute of limitations provided by

sec tion 8–101(a) of the Act (745 I LCS 10/8–101(a) (West 2006) ) applies t o civil act

ions aga inst Bi-St

ate. Plai ntiff’s c omplaint is therefore time-barred.3 To the extent that we constru e provisions of the

Compact, we recogn ize that the interpretation of a cong ressionally sanctioned in terstate com

pac t present s a question of

federal law. New Jersey v. New York , 523 U.S. 7 67, 810-11, 140 L. Ed. 2 d 993, 102 9-30, 11 8 S. Ct. 1726, 1750 (1998) (and

cases cited therein). That is not to say that state courts lac k jurisdiction. Rather, it me ans onl

y that if the s ignatory sta

tes dispute t heir r espec tive obligations under a comp act, then the United

States Supreme Court has the final say. Balling

er v. D elawar

e River Port A uthority , 172 N.J. 586, 5 93, 800 A.2d 97, 10 1 (2002 ). State courts exercise concurrent jurisdict ion wit h federal courts in construing interstate compac ts

. Reidelb erger v. Bi-St ate Development

Agency , 8 Ill. 2 d 121, 123- 24 (1956); accord International Union of Operating Engine ers, Local 68 v. D elaware River & Bay Author ity , 147 N .J. 433, 441- 42, 68 8 A.2d 569, 5 73 (199 7).

-5- We conduct our

analysis within a familiar analytical fr

amework. The primary g oal of construing the meaning of a statute is to ascer tain and give ef fect tothe int ent of the

legisla ture. The most relia

ble indicator of such intent is the statutory lang uage, which must be given its plain and ordina

r y meaning . A statute is viewed as a whole. Therefore, w ords a

nd phrases must be interpreted in light of other rele vant prov isions of the statute and must no t be const rued in isolation. County of Du Page v. Illinois Lab or Relatio ns Board , 231 Ill. 2d 593, 603 -04 (2008 ); People ex rel. Sherman v. Cryns , 203 I ll. 2d 264, 279-80 (2003). Accordingly, in determin in g leg islative i

ntent,
a court may

properly c onsider not only the lang uage of the statute, but

a lso the purpose and necessity for the law, the evils sought to b e remedied and the goals to be achieved, and the consequences that would result from construing the statute one way or the other. County of Du Page , 231 I ll. 2d at 60 4; Cryns , 203 Ill. 2d at 280. Further, the

canons of statutory

construction apply

to interstate compacts. 1A N. Singer & J. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction §32 :5, at 723 (7th ed. 2 009); F. Zimmer man & M. We

ndell, The

Law and Use of Interstate Compacts 1 (19 76) (same); see, e.g. , S&M I nvestment Co. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency , 911 F.2d 324, 326-27 (9 th Cir. 1990). 3 Section1–206 of the Tort Immunity Act define s a “loca l public entity ” as follows:

“ ‘Loc al public

entit y’ includes a c ounty, township,4 We obser ve that section 2–1 01 of the Tort Im munity A ct states: “Nothing in this Act affects the

liabilit y, if any, of a loc al publi c entity *** based on *** [o]peratio n as a common carrier ***.” 745 ILCS 10/2–101(b) (West 2006). In

the present case, Bi- State was not operating as a comm on carrier with respect to plaintiff at the time of the acc ident since he was not
a passenger. See, e.g. , Katamay v. Chicag o Trans it Autho rity , 53 Ill. 2d 27,

-6- mu ni ci pa li ty, municipa

l corpor atio n, school district, school board, education al service region, regional boa rd of school t rustees , trustees of schools of townships, treasur ers o f schools of townsh

ips, commu

nity colleg e district, communit y colle ge board, forest pres erve district, park district, fire prot ecti ondistrict, sanitary district, museum dist rict, emergency

telephone system boar d, and all other local governmental

bodies

. ‘Local public entity ’ also includes library systems and any

intergovernmental agenc y or similar entity formed purs uant to the Constitution of the State of Illinois or the Intergove

rnmental Cooperation Act as well as anynot-for-prof

it corporation organized for the purpose of conducting

pu blic busin ess . It does not include the State or any office, officer, department, division, bureau, boa rd, commission, universi

t y o r similar agency

of the State.” (Emphases added.) 745 ILCS 10/1–206 (West 2006). This co ur t h as re pe at ed ly o bs er ve d t ha t t he te rm “l oc al pu bl ic en ti ty” is broadly def

ined

. Carver v

. Sheriff o f La Salle Cou nty , 203 Ill. 2d 497, 512 (2003); Boyles v. Greater Peoria Mass Transit District , 113 Ill. 2d 545, 553 (1986); see A. Alstyne, Governm ental Tort Liability: A Decade of Change , 1966 U. Ill. L.F . 919, 933 (l isti ng, as one of the “significant

characteristics” of the Act, that it applies “to eve ry kind of local governmental body ”); E. Kionka & J. Norton, Tort Liability of Local Gov

ernment s and Their E

mployee s in Illinois , 5 8 I ll. B .J. 620, 628 (1970 ) (same) . Ill i nois courts have widely r ecognized various public entities as coming within the definition of “ local pub lic entity,” althoug h those en

tities wer e not expre ssly

identifie d in section1–206 of the Tort Immunity Act. See, e.g. , Carver, 203 Ill. 2d at 512; Roark v. Macoupin Creek Drainage District , 316 I ll. App. 3d 835, 839 (2000 ); Luciano v. Waubonsee Community College , 245 I ll. App. 3d 1077, 1083 (1993) (collecting cases). 431 (1972) ; Pence v. Northeast Illinois Regional Com muter R.R. Corp

. , 398 Ill. App. 3d 13, 19 (20 10).

-7- The appe llate cou

rt outline d its analy

sis as foll ows: “In order f

or Bi- State t o qualify as a ‘ local public entity,’ however, it would

hav e to fit wit

hin the g eneral

catcha ll category of ‘other local governmental bodies.’ To dete rmine whether the leg islature

intended to include interstate compact agencies within this general ca tc ha ll ca te go ry, we must look at the nature and characteristicsof intersta te compa cts gener ally and of Bi-State specifically and interp ret th e Tort Immun ity Act in lig ht of those

charac teristic s.” 393 I

ll. App. 3d at 1020-21. The flaws in t

he appe llate court’s analy sis begin with its premise. The app el late court sta

ted that B i-State c ould quali fy as a loca

l public entity only if it fit within the gener al catchall category

of “other local governmentalbodies” referenced in section 1–206 of the Tor t Immunity Act. 393 Ill. App. 3d at 1020. The appella

te court did not con sider whe

ther Bi- State fit w

ithin any of the other categories of loca l public entities listed in section 1–206. Bi-State qualifies as a local p ublic ent ity b ecause

it is a “notfor-pr ofit corporation organized

for the purpose o f conducting publ ic business.” 745 IL CS 10/1–206 (West 2006). See McQueen v. Shelby County , 730 F. Sup

p. 1449, 14 53 (C.D. I

ll. 1990) ( construi

ng Act, stating that “the phrase ‘any not-for-profit corporation organized

for the purpose of conducting public bus ines s’ is itself a specif ically

e numerated

entity which applies to a par ticular cl ass o f organ izations” ). Bi-State is a corporation created pursua nt to the United States Constitution; Bi-State has no shar eholde rs and is composed

of commissioners who are chosen by I llinois and Missouri government

officials; Bi-State is funded with public an d user fee revenue; and Bi-State operates, inter alia , a transit system in the public interest . As such, Bi-State falls w ithin sec tion 1–206 of the Tort Immun ity Act, which

expressly

includes non profit pu

blic corporations within its definition of “local public entity.” 745 IL CS 10/1–206 (West 2006). See Barnes v . Chicago H

ousing Auth ority , 32 6 Ill. App. 3d 710, 724-29 (2001) (recognizing re sident-8- management

corporation as not-for-profit corporation co nducting p ublic business) ; Smith v. Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter R.R. Corp. , 210 Ill. App. 3d 223, 227-28 (1991) (same; METRA). Further, significant persuasive authority supports our conclusion that Bi-State is a nonprofit public corporation. The decisions of both federal and state courts may guide our interpretation o f compact provisions (see Remick v. Lopes , 203 Conn. 494, 498, 525 A.2d 502, 504-05 (1987)) , and the c ourts of s ignator y st ates sh ould

promote consistency

in interpreting an interstate compact, based on comi ty (see State ex

rel. Ohio A dult Parole

Authority

v. Coniglio , 82 Ohi o App. 3d 52 , 55, 610 N .E.2d 1196 , 1198 (19 93); State v. H ill , 334 N.W.2d746, 748 (Iowa 1983)), or be cau se th ose courts are interpretingthe same

federal law (see American Sugar Refining Co. of New York v. Waterfront Comm’n of New York Harbor , 55 N.Y.2d 11, 25-26, 432 N.E.2d 578, 584, 447 N.Y.S.2d 685, 691 (1982)). Federaland Missouri courts have recognized: “ ‘Ther e is no question that Bi-St ate o perate s as a nonp rofit cor poration in the publ ic interest.’ ” Redbird E

ngineeri ng Sales, I

nc. v. Bi -State Development Agency of

Missouri-Illinois Metropolitan District , 806 S.W.2d 695, 698 (Mo. A pp. 19 91), q uoti ng Ladue Loca l Lines, In c. v. Bi-State Development Agency of the Missouri-Illinois Metropolitan District , 433 F.2d 131, 134 (8th Cir. 1970) ; accor d Love 1979 Partners v. Pub lic Service Co mm’n , 715 S.W.2d 482, 489 (Mo. 1986) (describing Bi-State as a nonprofit

public agency

). Bi-State is a local public en tity because it is a nonprofi t public corporation, which i s specif ically refer enced in section 1 –206 of the

Tort I mmunity Act. As noted, the app el late cou rt did not c onsider w

hether B i-State fellwithin the section 1–206 c ategory o f nonprofit public corporation. Rather, the appe llate cou rt concl uded that Bi-State was not a local public entity

because it did not fit within the section 1–206 category of “other l ocal governmen tal bodie s.” 745 I

LCS 10/1 –206 (West 2006). We d isag ree with this conc lusion for

a number

of reas ons. Ini ti al ly, we note that

pursuant to the Compa

ct, Bi-State

is expressl

y “a body corpora te and pol itic.” 45 IL CS 100/1 (We st 2006); Mo

. Ann. Stat. §70.3 70 (W est 2004) . Furthe r, Bi-Sta te was expr

essly created t o perform public or governmental functions. B i-State’s powers inclu de: (1 ) plan ning, const ructi ng, and maint aining bridges , airports , and

terminal facilities; (2) making plans for the coordination-9- of streets and highways; (3) charging and collecting fees; (4) issuing bonds; (5) receiving contributions fr om local, state, and federal gover nments; (6) the power to perform all other nec essary and in cidental functions; and (7) the power to exercise such additional powers as shall be conferred on it by the legislature of

either state and concurred in by the leg islature of the other state and approved by Act of Congress. Lastly

, B i-Stat e is “loc al” in tha t it performs its governmentalor public funct ions wi thin its defined district. See 45 IL CS 100/1 (West 2006); Mo. Ann. Stat. §70.370 (West 2004); Pub. L. No. 81–743, 64 Stat. 568. Thus, in addition to falling wi thin the section1–206 category

of nonprofit public corporation, Bi-State also constitutes a form o f “local governme nt body ” as ref erence d in section1–206 of

the Tort Immunity

Act and, theref

ore, a “ local pub lic entity ” under t he Act. Our conclusion finds suppo rt i n Grady v. Bi-State Development Agency , 151 Ill. App. 3d 748, 750 (1986). There, the appella te court , consideri ng Bi-State’s status, relied on the same aforementioned factors to reach a

similar c onclusion

as to Bi- State’s st

atus as a local public entity pursuant to section 1–206. Subsequent dec isions of the Fifth District have like

wise app lied the provisio ns of t he Tort Immun ity Act to B i-State . See Cooper v. Bi-State Development Age ncy , 158 I ll. App. 3d 19 (1987) ; McClintock v. Bi-St at e Development Agency , 228 Ill. App. 3d 382 (1992). We note, too, that our determination is faithful to the intent of the legislature. Subsequent to Grady , decided in 1986, the Gen eral Assembly hasamended section 1–206 of the Tort I

mmunity Act six times to inc lude various entities within the statutory definition of “local public entity.” 745 I LCS 10/1–206 (West 2006). A cou r t presumes that the le gislatu re amen ds a st atut e with knowledge of judicial dec isions interpreting the statute. Morris v. Willia m L. Dawson Nursing Center, Inc. , 187 I ll. 2d 494, 4 99 (1999) ; Bruso v. Alexian Brothers Hospital , 178 Ill. 2d 445, 458 ( 1997); In re May 1991 Will Co unty Gran d Jury , 152 I ll. 2d 381 , 388 (199 2). I n this case, therefore, we presume that the legislature knew o f Grady ’s holding when

it amended

section 1 –206 six times

in the pas t 24 years. The legislature’s failure to expressly exclude Bi-Sta

te from section 1–206 (see Bruso , 178 Ill. 2d at 458-59 ), or expr

essly add Bi- State to those already

listed (see Morris , 187 Ill. 2d at 499; Grand Jur

y , 1525 Bi-State presents the attenuated argum ent of the appellate court dissent thatBi-State is a

form of “local g

overnmental body,” as refer enced in section1–206 of the Tort Im munit y Act, b ased on

the def inition of “unit s of local gov ernme

nt” in artic le VII

of the I llinois Constit

ution (I ll. Con st. 1970, art. VII , §1) read together with section 2(e) of the Transportation Cooperation

Act of 1971 (5 ILC S 225/2 (e) (West 2006)) . See 3 93 I ll. App. 3d at 1036 (Spom

er, J., disse nting). Our statutory analysis obv

iates discussion

of this constitutional arg

ument. See Beahringer v. Page , 204 I ll.

-10- Ill. 2d at 388), indicates legisla tive acq uiescen ce in Grady ’s hol ding. If the legislature intended to exclude Bi-State from the purview of the Tort Immunity

Act, it would have done so expressly, a s it did wit h “any en tity organ ized under

or subjec t to the ‘Me

tropolita n Transit Authority Act.’ ” 745 I

LCS 10/2–101(b) (West 2006). Also, our conc lusion is consistent w ith federal authority . See, supra , at B. In Barket, Levy & Fine, I nc. v. St. Louis Thermal Energy Corp. , 948 F.2d 1084 (8th Cir. 1991 ), the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Ci rcuit exhaustively analy zed Bi-State’s status to determine whether the agency was entitled to eleventh amendment immunity as an “a rm” of e ither sta

te. The c ourt conc luded: “On balance, we believe Bi-State is more like a local governmentalentity than an arm of Mis souri and Illinois. State law characterizes Bi-State asa local p ublic body. Much like a county, Bi-State’ s objec t is t o plan , deve lop, and en gage inproprietary

functi ons in a defined region with local governance, for the c ommon goo d of the c ommunities within the region . The com

pact doe s not ident

ify Bi-State as an arm of the states or grant Bi-St ate so vereign immu nity. Al thou gh Missouri and I llinois retain cont rol over Bi-State ’s action s, Mis souri and I llinois ar

e not comp elled to f

und Bi-St

ate

. Sig n if ic an tl y, nothing o

bligate s Missouri a

nd Ill inois to

satisfy Bi-State ’s liabilities and obligations.” Barket , 948 F.2d at 1088. Cl ea rl y, Bi-State is a form of “local government body ” as referenced insection1–206 of the Tort I mmunity Act. See F. Zimme

rman & M

. Wendell, The Law and Use of Interstate Compacts 11 (1976) (stating that interstate compact

entities “ are publ ic bodies with characteristics similar to those of other governmental organs” ). 52d 363, 370, 3 78 (200 3) (deci ding c ase on n oncons titutional gro

unds).

-11- Notwithstanding the abov e, pla intiff ar gues tha t the appe llate court here correctly

determined that Bi-State’s status as an intersta te compact entity prevented it fr

om receiving the protections of the Tort Immuni ty Act. W e disa gree. Al thou gh the appellate court discussed the general nature of interstate c ompacts and survey ed the provisions of the Compa ct (39 3 Ill. App. 3d at 1021-23), the court over looked dispositive aspects

of interstate compacts, including theCompact in the present case, which renders its analy sis unpersuasive.

C. Interstate Compact Principles The United States Constitution provides mechani sms to addr

ess “matters that are clearly

bey ond the re alm of indi

vidual sta te authority butwhich, due to their na ture , may not be with

in the imme diate purviewof the federa l gover nment or easi ly resolv ed thr ough a purely federal response.” C. Broun, M. Bueng er, M. McCabe & R. Masters, The Evolving

Use and t he Changing Role

of In terstate Compacts: A Practitioner’s Guide 1 n.2 (2006).

“Of all the me chanisms

avail abl e, none is

more for mal,

more state-focused, more adaptable to collective state needs, and per haps less unde

rstood tha

n intersta

te compa

cts. Compactsare fun

damenta lly negotia

t ed agreements among member stat es that have the status of both contract and st atutory law. Interstate compac

ts *** represent the o nl y mechani smin the Constitution by which the states themselves

can alter the dyna

mics of their relationships without running afoul of the au

thority of the federal government or re ordering the federal structure of gove rnment. Thus, com

pac ts are singula rly important because thr o ugh a compact, the states

can create a state-ba sed so lution to regional or national problems and eff ectively retain policy control for the f

uture.” (Emphasi s in original.) C. Broun, M. Buenge r, M. McCabe & R. Masters, The Evolving Use and the Changing Role of Interstate Compacts: A Practitioner’s Guide 2-3 (2006). Accord F. Zimme

rman & M . Wendell, The L aw and U se of I nterstat e Compacts46 (1976) (statingthat “[t]he intersta te compa ct is the mo st-12- effective medium” for establishment by two or mor e states of joint entities “to provide and administer joint public works and

facilities”); J. Winters, Inters tate Metropolitan Areas 12 (1967) (observing that “th e increa sing aw arenes s of the ma gnitude of [inters t ate ] metropolitanarea pr

oblems ha s been ac comp an ied by the incre ased use of the compact to solve such problems”). The compact

clause o f the Unit

ed States Constitution

provides : “No State shall, without the Consent of Congress *** enter into any Agreement

or C om pac t wi th ano th er S tat e ** *.” U.S . C ons t. , ar t. I, §10, cl. 3. Interstate compact entities occupy a sig nificantly differ

ent position in our f

edera l system than do the states themselves. The states are separate sovereig ns and constituent

elements of

the Union. In contrast, interstate compact entities ty pically are

creation s of a t least three distinct sovereigns: two or more states and the fe dera l gover nment. Hess v. P

ort A ut hority Trans-Hudson Corp. , 513 U.S. 30, 40, 130 L. Ed. 2d

245, 255, 115 S. Ct. 394, 40 0 ( 19 94 ). No rm al ly, the “ultimate control of ev ery state- created entity resides with the State, for the State may destroy or reshape any

unit it creates.” Hess , 513 U.S . at 47, 130 L. Ed. 2d at 260, 115 S. Ct. at404. However: “As part of the federal plan prescribed by the Constitution, the States agreed to the power sha

rin g, coordination, and unified action that typify Compact Clau se creations.” Hess , 51 3 U. S. at 4 1-4 2, 1 30 L. Ed. 2d at 256, 115 S. Ct. at 40 1. Thus, “no one State alone can control the course of a Compact Clause entity.” Hess , 513 U.S. at 47, 130 L. Ed. 2d at 260, 115 S. Ct. at 4 04. Once given, congre ssional consent transfo rms an in terstate compact within this clause into a federal law. One consequence of this transformation is that, unless the

com p act to which Congress has consented is somehow unconstit utional, no court may

order r elief inc onsistent w

ith its express terms. Texas v. New Mexico , 462 U.S. 554, 564, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1, 12, 103 S. Ct. 2558, 2565 (1983).

D. Approbative Legislation Inthe present case, p laintiff echos what the appellate court stressed: that Congress’s approval of the Compact contained a proviso that proh

ibits Bi-State from

exercising any

additional powers “unless and until

such power or powers shall have been c onferred uponthe Bi-State Agency by the legislature of one of the States to the-13- compact and conc ur red in by

the leg islature

of the oth er and shall have been approved

by an Act of Cong

ress.” Pub. L. No. 81–743, 64 Stat. 568, 571. The appellate court reasoned:

“Bi-State’s powers ar e c onfined by the ter ms of the compact , and its powe rs ca nnot be altered or expanded withoutthe consent of both Illinois and Missouri and approval from Congress. Each stat e gave up it s sov ereign right to exclusively control its portion of the District so that Bi-State could operate transportation ser vice s within the entire District for the betterment of both states. As a res ult, neither Illinois nor Missou

ri may act unila terally with respect to modifying or e

xpa n ding Bi-State’s powers, duties, or obligat ions. Bi-State is an auton o mous entity that is vested with specific powers a

nd author

ity t o perfor m specifi c functions independent from the control of any one state.” 393 Ill. App. 3d at 1023. According

to the appellate court, “Missour i and I llinois must enact identical legislation on matters involving Bi-State’s powers,” which Congress must approve. 393 Ill. App. 3d a t 1028. We disagree. Ini ti al ly, congr

essional c onsent is not necessary “in respect of each and every

matter relating

to or growing out

of a cong ressiona lly approved ‘compact ’ or ‘agreement’ betwee n States.” Henderson v. Delaware River Joint Toll Bridge Comm’n , 36 2 Pa. 475, 486, 66 A.2d 843, 849 (1949 ) (collecting cases). Fur ther, it is true that one party to an i nterstat

e compac t may not enact legisla

tion that w ould impose burdens upon

the compact

absent the concurrence of the other signatory states. However, t

he co nverse i s widely

recog nized: “I t is within the competency

of a State, which

is a party to a compa

ct with anoth er State, to legislate in respect of matters covere d by the compact so long as such legislative action is in approbation and

not inreprobation of the compact.” Henderson , 362 Pa. at 488, 66 A.2d at 849-5 0, cit ing Olin v. Kitzmiller , 259 U.S. 260, 263, 66 L. Ed. 930, 933, 42 S. Ct. 510, 511 (1922); accord Kansas Cit y Area Transportation Authority v. Missou ri , 640 F.2d 1 73, 174 (8th Cir. 1981); Bi-State

Develo pment Agency of the Miss ouri-Illi

nois Metropolitan District v. Director o f Revenue , 781 S.W.2d 80, 82 (Mo. 1989); Roehl

Transport, I

nc. v. Di vision of H

earings & Appeals , 213 Wis. 2d 452, 464, 570 N.W.2d 864, 870 (App. 1997).-14- Inthe present

case, the appell ate court failed to recognize that the express purpose of

the Tort I mmunity Act “is to

protect local pub lic entities and pub lic employees from liability arising from the operation of gover nment. I t grant s only

immunities a

nd defen se s.” 745 IL CS 10/1–101.1(a) (West 2006). Thus, the Act ge ne ra ll y protects , rather than burd ens, the C ompact. Sp ec if ic al ly, section 8–101(a) of the Act requires that a plaintiff

commence a civil action for any injury agains ta local public entity or any of its e mployee s “within one year from the date that the injury

was received or the cause of action a ccrued .” 745 I

LCS 10/8–101(a) (West 2006). The purpose of

the one-ye ar limitation period contained insection 8–101(a) is to encourage ea rly inves ti gation i

nto a cla im agains ta local g overnmental entity whe n the matter is still fresh, witnesses are available, and conditions have not materially changed. Ferguson v. McKe

nzie , 202 Ill. 2d 304, 313 (2001); Saragusa v. City of Chicago , 63 I ll. 2d 288, 2 93 (1976) . Such an i nvestig ation per

mits promptset tlem ent of meritorious claims and allows governmental entities to plan the ir

budget s in

light of potential liabilities. Ferguson , 202 Ill. 2 d at 313; Reynold s v. City of

Tuscola , 48 Ill. 2d 339, 3 42 (1971). Because a local gove rnmental entity must anticipate that the number of claims

made ag ainst it wil l far exce ed th ose brought agains ta private individual, the provision of an abridged limitations period is reasonable. Ferguson , 202 I ll. 2d at 31 3; Saragu sa , 63 I ll. 2d at 293. Cle arly , the one-ye ar statut e of l imitations provided by section8–101(a

) of the T ort I

mmunity Ac t further

s or suppor

ts BiState and does not bu

rden it. 1. Article IX However, plaintiff observes, as did the appellate court , that t he Tort Immunity

Act must be construed as a whole, reasoning that the Act cannot apply to B i-State be cause a rti cle IX of the Act cannot apply to Bi-State. Article IX c oncerns the p ayment of claims and judgmen ts (745 I LCS 10/9–101 et

seq. (West 2006)). The court noted several provision s. Arti cle IX e mpowers a

nd directs local pu

blic entities to pay tort

judgme nts or settlements for compensatory damages and establishes the proceduretherefor. 745 IL CS 10/9–102 (West 2006). Article IX re quires local public entities that derive

revenue from rat

es or cha rges to set such r ates, or otherwise provide funds, in an amou

nt suffic ient to pa

y th eir tort j udgmen

ts an d6 Based on our p reviou s discus sion of Grady , we summ arily reject plaintif f’s cont ention t hat Grady

was erroneously decided.

-15- settleme nts in accor

dance w ith artic le IX

and their obligations under the Workers ’ Compen sation Act (820 IL CS 305/1 et seq. (West 2006)), the Workers’ Occupational Diseases Act (820 I LCS 310/1 et seq. (West

2006)), and the Unemploy ment Insurance

Act (820 IL CS 405/100 et seq . (West 2006)). 745 IL CS 10/9–106 (West 2006). Also, article IX a llows loca

l public e ntities to le

vy t axes upon all taxable propert y withi n its terri tory “for fund ing e xp enses relating to tort li ab il it y, insurance, and risk manag ement pr ograms .” 745 I

LCS 10/9–107 (West 2006). Based on these provision s, the a

ppellate court re asoned that artic le IX would grant Bi-State additional “powers,” or impose upo n BiState additional “burdens,” “duties,” or “oblig ations” that are bey

ond Bi-State ’s author

ity. 393 I ll. App. 3d

at 1023-26. The court posited: “Missouri has not consented to these ad ditio nal powers or duties contained within article IX o f the Tor t Immunity Act by ena

cting identical legislat ion, nor has Congress grante d approv al. These provisions in article IX of the Tort Immunity Act, therefore, cannot

va lidly appl y to Bi-State.” 393 I ll. App. 3d at 1025. The court concluded

that “the Illinois legislature ca nnot uni later ally gr

ant additional powers to or place additional burdens on Bi-State without

anexpress concurrence from Missouri and cong ressional approval.” 393 Ill. App. 3 d at 10 26. The appellate court also concluded that Gra d ywas erroneous and refused to follow it. 393 Ill. App. 3d at 1029-31. 6 The appella

te court overlook ed the na ture of the Tort I

mmunity Act and misap

prehend ed th e effect of article I X on Bi-State. As Justice Spomer explained in his dissent: “Contrary to the majority’s assertions, there is nothing in articl e IX of the Act that is incong ruent with the interstate compact which created Bi-State, and no section of

ar ticle IX modifies Bi-State’s power s or imposes additiona l obligations on Bi-State.” 393 Ill. App. 3d at 1036-37 (Spomer, J., dissenting). Ge ne ra ll y, the Tort I

mmunity Act conta

ins no req uiremen t that a governmentalbody

mu st possess the power to tax in order to be-16- classified as a “loc al public

entity .” I f the legislatu

r e intende d to restrict the definition of a “local public entity ” to those entities authorized

to levy taxes, it could have defined a “loca l public en ti ty”
as an entity

possessin

g the au thority to tax. However, section 1–206 does not contain such a restriction. Carve r , 203 Ill. 2d at 514; McQueen , 730 F. Supp. at 1454. Sp ec if ic al ly, art icl e IX of the Tort Immunity

Act does not confer uponBi -State the power to levy ta xes. Section 9–101(c) of the Act expressly recognizes that not all public entities have the power to levy taxes by defini ng a “local taxing entity” as “a local public entity that has th e p ow er to le vy or have levi ed o n its behal f taxes or
assessme nts upon prop erty

within the

territo ry of the e

ntity.” (Emphasi s added.) 745 ILCS 10/9–101(c) (West 2006). Likewise, section9–107 pr ov id es th at “[ a] lo ca l p ub li c e nt it y may annually levy

or have levied on its b ehalf

” proper ty ta xes in an amount suff

icient to

cover the costs of insuran ce and judgments against it. (Emphases added.) 74 5 IL CS 10/9–107(b) (West 2006). Indeed, sec tion 9–107 does not requi

re loca l p ublic ent

ities to le vy t hose taxes , but simply confers the authority to do so. Further, the Compact itself confers on Bi-State the powe

rs to have

taxes levie d on its beh alf. Ar ti cle III, paragraph 5, of the Compact

p rovides that Bi-State shall have the power: “To rece ive fo r its lawful activities any c ontributions or

mo ne ys appropr

iated by municipa lities, counties, state or other political subdivisions or a gen cie s.” 45 ILC S 1 00/ 1, a rt. III(5) (West 2006); Mo. Ann. Sta

t. §70.370 , art. I

II (5) (West 2004). Ac co rd in gl y, t hese sections of article IX a re in no way inc ongruent with the Compact. Moreover, article

II I, pa ragra ph 3, of the

Compact a

uthorizes B iState: “To charge and collect fees for use of the fac ilities owned and operated by it.” 45 I

LCS 100/1, art. II

I (3) (West 20 06); Mo. Ann. Stat. §70.370, art. II

I (3) (West 2004). Consistent wi th this express
au th or it y, the Tort Immunity Act authorize s local pu

blic entities that derive revenue from rates or charges to set such rates “in an amount sufficient to pay [their] tort judgmen ts and settle

ments.” 7 45 IL

CS 10/9–106 (West 2006). The appellate court’s use o f articl e IX as a
means to remove Bi-State from the purview of the Tort I mmunity Act

was “simply

wrong. ” 393 I ll. App. 3d at 1037 (Sp ome r, J. , dissenting). Nothing

about ar ticle I X affec ts our re cogniti on that B i--17- State falls within the definition of “local public entity” a s provided in section 1–206. E. Dang er of Ab surdity Curiously, the appellate cour t stated: “We are not asked to determine wh e ther the State of Illinois can unila

terally enact a valid stat

ute of lim

itati ons applica ble to cla ims aga i nst Bi-State or whether such an enactment

requires identical Missouri and Illinois laws along with Congress’s approva

l. Contrar y to the dissent’s assertion, we take no position on that issue. Our only task is to answer the certified question, and in order to answer that question, we must determine the legislature’s intent. For the reasons noted above, our only holding in this decision is that the legislature did not intend to include B i-S tate with in the Tor t Immu nity Act’s definition of a ‘local public entity.’ ” 393 I ll. App. 3d

at 1028-29. This disclaimer is perplexing. Rather than taking “no position on the issue,” the appellate court repeatedly stated that Illinois and Missouri must enact id entical l egisla

tion on matt

ers invol ving Bi -Sta

te ’s powers, which must also receive congressional appr oval . 393 I ll. App. 3d at 1023, 1025, 1026, 1028. In determining “the legislature’s intent ,” t he appellate court expressly reasoned that the legislature shared th e court ’s erroneously

narrow view of in

terstate compact s and, ac co rd in gl y, could

not have “intended to sweep Bi-State into the purviewof the Tor

t Immu nity Act with the gene

ral catc hall phra se ‘allother local governmental bodies.’ ” 393 Ill. App. 3d at 1028. As explained above, the appe llate court’s allege d “nonpos ition” pla inly misconstrues the law of

intersta te compacts and the Compact in this

case. By overlooking significant aspects of interstate compacts, the appella te court’s cons t ruction o f the Compa ct was so n

arrow that it could possibly render a

n absurd result. “[A] court con str uing the langua ge of a statu

te will assume that the legislature did not intend to produce anabsurd or unjust result” ( State Farm Fire &Casualty Co.

v. Yapejia n , 152 Ill. 2d 533, 541 (1992)), and will avoid a construc tion lead ing to an absurd r esult, if possible ( City of East

St. Louis v. Union Electric Co. , 37 Ill. 2d 5 37, 542 (1 967)). “ In a lmost-18- all instance s *** prag

ma ti c accommodations can be made [for an in te rs ta te co mp ac t e nt it y] which do not strain the letter or the intent of existing statutory or constitutional requireme nts.” F. Zimmerman & M. Wendell, The Law and U se of Inte rstate Co mpacts 11 (1976). This is why

intersta te co mpact analysis ac

knowledges persuasive decisions of fede

ral and s tate cou

rts, and r ecogn izes that courts should promote cons istency in interpr eting a n intersta te compa ct. Alth ough “[a] definition has yet to be drawn of its precise nature,” “the Bi-State

Agenc y is essentia lly a local g overnme

nt itse lf. ” M. Ri dg ew ay, Interstate Compacts: A Q uest ion of Federalism 133 (1971). Based on our ana lys is, and consistent w

it h sign ificant persuasive authority

, we hold t

hat Bi-St ate is a loc al public

entity within the purview of the Tor

t Immunity

Act. Consequently, the Act’s one-yea r statute of limitations applies to civil ac tions against Bi-State, and plaintiff’s complaint is time-barred.

III. CONCL

USION For the fo regoingreasons , the judg ment of the

appella te court , a nd th e o rd er of

th e c ir cu it co ur t o f S t. Cl ai r C ou nt y d enying Bi

State’s motion to dismiss, are revers ed, and the cause

remanded

to the circuit c ourt with d

irection s to dismiss p laintiff ’s compla int.

Appellate court judgment reversed; circuit court order reversed; cause remanded with directions

.