alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Hayward and another *v.*City of St. Louis and another.*

*(Circuit Court, E. D. Missouri.*

April 14, 1882.)

Lettebs Patent — Extended Teem — Statute of Limitations.

Where suit was brought for an infringement of reissued letters patent, reissued in 1868, and a plea of the statute of limitations was interposed, *held,*(1) that the state statute did not apply; (2) that section 55 of the act of July 8, 1870, had not been repealed, so as to relieve either party to the case from the federal limitation of six years after the expiration of the extended term.

Demurrer to the plea of the statute of limitations. This is a suit for an infringement of letters patent of the United States, originally *428granted in the year 1854, and reissued for an extended term of seven years in 1868. The petition alleges that the defendants “infringed upon the exclusive rights and privileges intended to be secured to plaintiffs by the reissued letters patent, ” but does not state when said rights and privileges were infringed. The board of president and directors of the St. Louis public schools (one of the defendants) filed a separate answer *containing*— First, a general denial; and, *second,*a plea that the alleged cause of action set forth in the petition did not accrue to the plaintiffs within five years next before the commencement of the suit.

D. *M. Spier, Jr.,*and *O. B. Sansum,*for plaintiff.

*Leo Rassieur,*for the board of president and directors of the St. Louis public schools.

*

 Reported by B. P. Rex, Esq., of the St. Louis bar.

Treat, D. J.

The defendant pleads the statute of the state which requires suit to be brought within five years from date of cause of action accrued. • v

The state statute does not apply, inasmuch as congress has fixed the date in patent cases whereof the federal government has exclusive jurisdiction. It is contended that the congressional limitation has been repealed. If so, no limitation would prevail, except as by the state statute. Without repealing what has been so ably consid-. ered by other United States courts, it is held that the federal statute in this respect has not been repealed so as to relieve either of the parties to this case from the federal limitation of six years. The plea, therefore, is bad, but the petition is very indefinite.

As the case is presented, the defendants, if they desire to set up that the claim is barred by the federal statute, must aver the period of six instead of five years.

Demurrer is sustained.*

*

Act of July 8, 1870, § 55; Rev. St. § 5599; *Sayles*v. *Louisville City R. Co.*9 Fed. Rep. 512; *Sayles*v. L. *& M. S. R. Co.*Id. 515; *Sayles v. Dubuque & S. C. R. Co.*Id. 516.
```

[Congressional Bills 114th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. Res. 154 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

114th CONGRESS
  1st Session
S. RES. 154

          Designating May 16, 2015, as ``Kids to Parks Day''.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             April 29, 2015

 Mr. Wyden (for himself, Mr. Portman, Mr. Booker, Ms. Hirono, and Mr. 
Heinrich) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the 
                       Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                               RESOLUTION

 
          Designating May 16, 2015, as ``Kids to Parks Day''.

Whereas the 5th annual Kids to Parks Day will be celebrated on May 16, 2015;
Whereas the goal of Kids to Parks Day is to promote healthy outdoor recreation 
        and environmental stewardship, empower young people, and encourage 
        families to get outdoors and visit the parks and public land of the 
        United States;
Whereas on Kids to Parks Day, individuals from rural and urban areas of the 
        United States can be reintroduced to the splendid national, State, and 
        neighborhood parks located in their communities;
Whereas communities across the United States offer a variety of natural 
        resources and public land, often with free access, to individuals 
        seeking outdoor recreation;
Whereas the people of the United States, young and old, should be encouraged to 
        lead more healthy and active lifestyles;
Whereas Kids to Parks Day is an opportunity for families to take a break from 
        their busy lives and come together for a day of active, wholesome fun; 
        and
Whereas Kids to Parks Day will broaden an appreciation for nature and the 
        outdoors in young people: Now, therefore, be it
    Resolved, That the Senate--
            (1) designates May 16, 2015, as ``Kids to Parks Day'';
            (2) recognizes the importance of outdoor recreation and the 
        preservation of open spaces to the health and education of the 
        young people of the United States;
            (3) encourages the people of the United States to observe 
        the day with appropriate programs, ceremonies, and activities; 
        and
            (4) encourages the President to issue a proclamation for 
        Kids to Parks Day, calling on the people of the United States 
        to observe Kids to Parks Day with appropriate programs, 
        ceremonies, and activities.
                                 <all>
```
Three Months EndedMarch 31,2010
    
    

2009(In thousands, except per share data)BASICNet loss available to common
    
    $
    (8,824
    )
    
    $
    (1,594
    )Shareholder
/ Weighted Average Shares
    
    
    3,737
    
    
    
    3,735Basic loss per Share
    
    $
    (2.36
    )
    
    $
    (0.43
    )DILUTEDNet loss available to common
    
    $
    (8,824
    )
    
    $
    (1,594
    )Shareholder
/ Weighted Average Shares
    
    
    3,737
    
    
    
    3,735Diluted loss per Share
    
    $
    (2.36
    )
    
    $
    (0.43
    )
 35
112TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 2415 

AN ACT 

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service 

located at 11 Dock Street in Pittston, Pennsylvania, 

as the ‘‘Trooper Joshua D. Miller Post Office Building’’. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
2 

•HR 2415 EH

1 SECTION 1. TROOPER JOSHUA D. MILLER POST OFFICE 

2 BUILDING. 

3 (a) DESIGNATION.—The facility of the United States 

4 Postal Service located at 11 Dock Street in Pittston, 

5 Pennsylvania, shall be known and designated as the 

6 ‘‘Trooper Joshua D. Miller Post Office Building’’. 

7 (b) REFERENCES.—Any reference in a law, map, reg8 ulation, document, paper, or other record of the United 

9 States to the facility referred to in subsection (a) shall 

10 be deemed to be a reference to the ‘‘Trooper Joshua D. 

11 Miller Post Office Building’’. 

Passed the House of Representatives November 16, 

2011. 

Attest: 

Clerk. 

112TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 2415 

AN ACT 

To designate the facility of the United States PostPost Office Building’’. Pennsylvania, as the ‘‘Trooper Joshua D. Miller al Service located at 11 Dock Street in Pittston,
### Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan

Clifford W. Taylor,
Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanag h
Elizabeth A. Weave r Marilyn Kell y Maura D. Corriga n Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman,
J ustices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

_______________________________________ __ Clerk November 25, 2008

s1117 

# Order

November 25, 2008

136816

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 136816 COA: 278600 Oakland CC: 92-121356-FC TARA N. GIVENS, Defendant-Appellant.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, on receipt of notice that the defendant died during the pendency of the appeal , the Court, on its own motion, di smisses the application for leave to appeal as moot.
1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

GEORGE GRIGSBY

, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) Civil Action No. 12

- 0448 (EGS)

)

JUDGE MARY THOMAS

, )

)

Respondent. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter comes before the Court upon review of George Grigsby ’ s pro se “ Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 USC 2241, 2254.” It appears that petitioner is challenging

“ THE DECISION OF JUDGE MARY MAXWELL O R JUDE THOMAS OF THE CIRCUIT

COURT OF COOK COUNTY ILLIN OIS TO PLACE HIM IN A MENTAL INSTITUTION

WITHOUT A GRAND JURY INDICTMENT .” Pet. at 1 (emphasis in original).

I t is unclear whether the petitioner currently is in custody for purposes of habeas relief.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c) (requ iring some form of custody as the basis for seeking habeas relief).

Assuming that the petitioner is currently in custody, his r ecourse lies in the judicial district having

personal jurisdiction over his immediate custodian. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 546 U.S. 426, 434

- 35

(2004); Blair

- Bey v. Quick , 151 F.3d 1036, 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (citing Chatman

- Bey v.

Thornburgh , 864 F.2d 804, 810 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). And, “ a district court may not entertain a

habeas petition involving present phys i cal custody unless the r espondent custodian is within its

territorial jurisdiction. ” Stokes v. U.S. Parole Comm’n , 374 F.3d 1235, 1239 (D.C. Cir. 2004).

Neither the petitioner nor his custodian are located in the District of Columbia, and this Court,2 therefore, cannot entertain this petition. Accordingly, the petition will be denied and this case

will be dismissed. An Order is issued separately.

Signed: EMMET G. SULLIVAN

United States District Judge

Dated: April 3, 2012
WARNING: THE EDGAR SYSTEM ENCOUNTERED ERROR(S) WHILE PROCESSING THIS SCHEDULE.

<TABLE> <S> <C>

<MULTIPLIER>     1
       
<S>                                     <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                           3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                       DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                          JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                            MAR-31-1999
<CASH>                                     2233813 
<SECURITIES>                              12046317 
<RECEIVABLES>                              7479576 
<ALLOWANCES>                                 15729 
<INVENTORY>                                      0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 0
<PP&E>                                     1977243 
<DEPRECIATION>                              784162 
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                            27081202 
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            0
<BONDS>                                   12819437 
<COMMON>                                      1000 
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                            0
<PREFERRED>                               10856000 
<OTHER-SE>                                 2234701 
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>              27081202 
<SALES>                                          0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                           3784939 
<CGS>                                            0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                              7070676 
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                             60465 
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                          713370 
<INCOME-PRETAX>                           (4059572)
<INCOME-TAX>                              (1598901)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                       (2460671)
<DISCONTINUED>                                   0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                  0
<CHANGES>                                        0
<NET-INCOME>                              (2460671)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                 (.44)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                 (.44)
        
                                    -- 38 --

<PAGE>

</TABLE>
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. This court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

** After examining the briefs and the appellate recor d, this three-judge panel has determined unanimously that oral argumentwould not be of material assistance in the determination of this appeal. Se e Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore ordered sub mitted without oral argument. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### NOV 5 1998 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT
STEVEN AYALA, Petitioner - Appellant, v. ZAVARAS, Executive Director; GAIL NORTON, Attorney General of the State of Colorado, Respondents - Appellees. No. 98-1192 (D.C. No. 98-D-67) (D. Colo.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before PORFILIO , KELLY , and HENRY , Circuit Judges. **
Petitioner-Appellant Steven Ayala, a pro se litigant, seeks to appeal the district court’s dismissal without prejudice of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). He has filed a motion for leave to proceed on appeal without prepayment of costs or fe es and an application for a- 2 -

certificate of appealability. He has also requeste d court-apppointed counsel and seeks to supplement his pleadings. We agree with the district court that Mr. Ayala has not demonstrated that he has exhausted state court remedies regarding his cl aims. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A); see also Demarest v. Price , 130 F.3d 922, 932 (10th Cir. 1997). Nor has he demonstrated futility. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B)(i) & (ii); see also Wallace v. Cody , 951 F.2d 1170, 1171 (10th Cir. 1991). Accordingl y, all pending requests for relief, including his motion to procee d in forma pauperis and his request for court-appointed counsel are DENIED, andthe appeal is DISMISSED.

Entered for the Court Paul J. Kelly, Jr. Circuit Judge
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. § 1350, AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Sirona Dental Systems, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the quarter
ended December 31, 2009 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Jost Fischer, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of
Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2. The information contained in the Report
fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



|                 |  |  |  |                          
|---------------- |  |  |  | -------------------------
|February 8, 2010 |  |  |  | /s/ JOST FISCHER         
|                 |  |  |  | Jost Fischer             
|                 |  |  |  | Chief Executive Officer  
|                 |  |  |  | (Chief Executive Officer)

A signed original of
this written statement required by section 906, or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, has
been provided to Sirona Dental Systems, Inc. and will be retained by Sirona Dental Systems, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
APOL_EX.10.1_Amended and Restated 2000 Stock Incentive Plan


EXHIBIT 10.1
APOLLO GROUP, INC.
AMENDED AND RESTATED
2000 STOCK INCENTIVE PLAN


PLAN AMENDMENT


The Apollo Group, Inc. 2000 Stock Incentive Plan, as amended and restated (the “Plan”), is hereby further amended, effective December 8, 2011, as follows:
1.    Section 5.1 of the Plan is hereby amended in its entirety to read as follows:
“5.1.  NUMBER OF SHARES.  Subject to adjustment as provided in Section 14.1, the aggregate number of shares of Stock reserved and available for grant under the Plan shall be 28,554,709 shares (which number takes into account all splits of the Class A common stock effected since the Effective Date and after the conversion of the University of Phoenix Online common stock into the Stock). Such share reserve includes (i) the 5,000,000-share increase authorized by the Board in May 2007 and subsequently approved by the holders of the Company's outstanding voting stock, (ii) an additional 5,000,000-share increase authorized by the Board in January 2008 and subsequently approved by the holders of the Company's outstanding voting stock, (iii) the 975,481 shares transferred from the Company's Long-Term Incentive Plan, effective June 25, 2009, with the approval of the holders of the Company's outstanding voting stock, and (iv) an additional 3,500,000-share increase authorized by the Board on December 8, 2011, subject, however, to the approval of such increase by the holders of the Company's outstanding voting stock. Shares of Stock subject to any Awards made on the basis of such 3,500,000-share increase shall not become issuable or exercisable unless and until such stockholder approval is obtained, and such Awards shall become null and void, and no shares of Stock based on such share increase shall become issuable or exercisable under those Awards, in the event such stockholder approval is not obtained by November 30, 2012.” 
2.    Except as modified by this Plan Amendment, all the terms and provisions of the Plan shall continue in full force and effect.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, APOLLO GROUP, INC. has caused this Plan Amendment to be executed on its behalf by its duly-authorized officer on this 8th day of December 2011.


	
			
	APOLLO GROUP, INC.

	 
	 
	 

	By:
	/s/ Sean Martin

	 
	 
	 

	 
	 
	 

	TITLE:
	Senior Vice President, General Counsel & Secretary
#### John WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, v. LEHIGH VALLEY RAILROAD COMPANY, Defendant. LEHIGH VALLEY RAILROAD COMPANY, Defendant, Third-Party Plaintiff, v. WILLIAM SPENCER *&*SON CORPORATION, Third-Party Defendant.

United States District Court S. D. New York.

June 26, 1956.

Satterlee, Browne & Cherbonnier, New York City, for plaintiff.

Pyne, Brush, Smith *&*Michelsen, New York City, for defendant and third-party plaintiff. Monroe J. Cahn, New York City, of counsel.

John P. Smith, New York City, for third-party defendant.

LEVET, District Judge.

Defendant, Lehigh Valley Railroad Company, has moved to vacate plaintiff’s notice to take the deposition of said defendant by

> “such employee or employees as has knowledge of the breaking of a *4"**286x 4" dunnage on said gas hoist allowing a pile of steel beams to be let down upon and to crush the left foot of the aforesaid plaintiff, or such employee or employees who made an inspection of such gas hoist and discovered a broken 4" x 4" dunnage at the place where the said steel beams had been let down on the foot of the aforesaid plaintiff.”

This notice is defective for several reasons. It does not comply with Rule 30(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A., which provides that where the name of the person to be ■examined is not known, the party seeking the examination shall give “a general description sufficient to identify him or the •particular class or group to which he belongs.” The Courts have consistently beld that notices couched in words similar to the aforementioned notice were •violative of Rule 30(a). Morrison Export Co. v. Goldstone, D.C.S.D.N.Y.1952, 12 F.R.D. 258; Freeman v. Hotel Waldorf-Astoria Corporation, D.C.S.D.N.Y. 1939, 27 F.Supp. 303.

In addition, plaintiff’s notice to examine the defendant-corporation is defective for the reason that a corporate party cannot be examined through its employees. Denoto v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company, D.C.S.D.N.Y.1954, 16 F.R.D. 567; Mattingly v. Boston Woven Hose & Rubber Co., D.C.S.D.N.Y.1952, 12 F.R.D. 266. The basis for this rule is the fact that there is no adequate sanction under the Federal Rules to compel a party to produce his employees. 4 Moore’s Federal Practice, 2d Ed., 1051. Rule 37(d), which specifies the sanctions which may be imposed upon a party who fails to appear for an examinaiion, expressly refers to *“a*party or an officer or managing agent of a party” and ■does not refer to his employees.

Accordingly, defendant’s motion to vacate plaintiff’s notice to examine the ■defendant, Lehigh Valley Railroad Company, is granted.

So ordered.
```

[Congressional Bills 112th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2453 Engrossed Amendment Senate (EAS)]

                  In the Senate of the United States,

                    September 22 (legislative day, September 21), 2012.
    Resolved, That the bill from the House of Representatives (H.R. 
2453) entitled ``An Act to require the Secretary of the Treasury to 
mint coins in commemoration of Mark Twain.'', do pass with the 
following

                              AMENDMENTS:

            On page 7, strike lines 5 through 7 and insert the 
      following:

            (2) One-quarter of the surcharges, to the University of 
        California, Berkeley, California, for the benefit of the Mark 
        Twain Project at the Bancroft Library to support programs to 
        study and promote the legacy of Mark Twain.

            At the end, add the following:

SEC. 8. NO NET COST.

    The Secretary shall take such actions as may be necessary to ensure 
that--
            (1) minting and issuing coins under this Act will not 
        result in any net cost to the United States Government; and
            (2) no funds, including applicable surcharges, are 
        disbursed to any recipient designated in section 7 until the 
        total cost of designing and issuing all of the coins authorized 
        by this Act (including labor, materials, dies, use of 
        machinery, overhead expenses, marketing, and shipping) is 
        recovered by the United States Treasury, consistent with 
        sections 5112(m) and 5134(f) of title 31, United States Code.

            Attest:

                                                             Secretary.
112th CONGRESS

  2d Session

                               H.R. 2453

_______________________________________________________________________

                               AMENDMENTS
```
11TH COURT OF APPEALS

EASTLAND, TEXAS

JUDGMENT

Michael Marvin Russie, * From the 441st District Court

 of Midland County,

 Trial Court No. CR39309.

Vs. No. 11-17-00295-CR * December 14, 2017

The State of Texas, * Per Curiam Memorandum Opinion

 (Panel consists of: Wright, C.J.,

 Willson, J., and Bailey, J.)

This court has inspected the record in this cause and concludes that the 

appeal should be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Therefore, in accordance 

with this court’s opinion, the appeal is dismissed.
I 

112TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 2528 

To rescind the authority of the Secretary of the Treasury to develop a 

return-free tax system. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JULY 14, 2011 

Mr. SAM JOHNSON of Texas (for himself and Mr. REICHERT) introduced the 

following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means 

A BILL 

To rescind the authority of the Secretary of the Treasury 

to develop a return-free tax system. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Taxpayer Freedom to 

5 File Protection Act of 2011’’. 

6 SEC. 2. RESCISSION OF AUTHORITY TO DEVELOP RETURN7 FREE TAX SYSTEM. 

8 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of the Treasury 

9 may not develop or implement a return-free tax system. 


tjames on DSKG8SOYB1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 2528 IH

1 (b) REPEAL OF PRIOR AUTHORITY.—Section 2004 of 

2 the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform 

3 Act of 1998 is repealed. 

Æ 


tjames on DSKG8SOYB1PROD with BILLS