IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

JANUARY 21, 2010 Session

JACQUELINE REDMON v. CITY OF MEMPHIS, ET AL.

Direct Appeal from the Chancery Court for Shelby County

No. CH-08-2201-2 Arnold Goldin, Chancellor

No. W2009-01520-COA-R3-CV - Filed February 19, 2010

A City of Memphis employee was terminated after accessing a city-owned database to obtain

the telephone number of a police officer who had arrested her husband and calling the officer

at his home to inquire about the arrest. Both the City of Memphis Civil Service Commission

and the trial court upheld her termination, and we affirm. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3; Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed

ALAN E. HIGHERS, P.J., W.S., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which HOLLY M. KIRBY,

J., and J. STEVEN STAFFORD, J., joined.

Thomas E. Hansom, Leigh H. Thomas, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Jacqueline

Redmon

Bruce McMullen, Imad Abdullah, Tonya Johnson, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellee,

City of Memphis
 According to a March 12, 2008 letter, the Memphis Police Internal Affairs report sustained the 1

allegations that Appellant had violated PM 62-12, Employee Conduct, and PM 70-05, Confidentiality of

Medical records.

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OPINION

I. FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Jacqueline Redmon (“Appellant”) was hired as a benefits specialist for the City of

Memphis (the “City”) in December of 2005. In this capacity, she was responsible for

maintaining benefits information for City employees and had access to employees’ personal

information, including social security numbers, addresses, dependent and spouse information,

phone numbers, salaries, garnishments, and benefits information. After Appellant’s husband

was arrested in November of 2007, Appellant accessed the City’s Oracle database to obtain

the telephone number of the arresting officer, Officer Darnell Gooch, and she called Officer

Gooch at his home to inquire about the arrest. 

Officer Gooch was upset by Appellant’s telephone call as he had recently been the

victim of identity theft. Thus, he called the City’s benefits office to verify that Appellant

worked for the City, and he also met with Appellant’s supervisor, Pearl Gibson, regarding

the incident. Officer Gooch filed a formal complaint with his supervisors, which was

ultimately forwarded to the “security squad[.]” 

Following the police department’s internal affairs investigation which sustained the

allegations against Appellant, Ms. Gibson prepared a disciplinary statement. According to 1

Ms. Gibson, she then met with Appellant to review the police findings. Appellant

acknowledged the truth of the facts contained within the police internal affairs report, and

she was terminated via a March 12, 2008 letter.

Recognizing that it had failed to conduct a fact-finding hearing, the City issued a letter

on March 18, 2008, rescinding Appellant’s termination, reinstating her employment, and

placing her on administrative leave pending a fact finding hearing. A second letter, also

dated March 18, 2008, was sent to Appellant scheduling a hearing for March 24, 2008, and

charging her with three violations: PM 38-02; PM 78-04; and PM 66-12.

A fact finding hearing was conducted on March 24, 2008, at which Appellant was

afforded an opportunity to speak on her own behalf. According to the City, Appellant

admitted to accessing the database to retrieve Officer Gooch’s telephone number and to

calling him at home regarding her husband’s arrest, but she insisted that she had done

nothing wrong. In an April 14, 2008 letter, Appellant was terminated for violating the three
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above-mentioned policies.

Appellant appealed her termination to the City’s Civil Service Commission (the

“Commission”), and a hearing was held on September 5, 2008. At the hearing, Appellant

testified that she had acquired Officer Gooch’s telephone number through the Oracle

database, that she knew she was only to access the database for “job function[s],” and that

her telephone call to Officer Gooch had not been work-related. However, she claimed that

she had no intention to harm Officer Gooch, and that she had only contacted him “for [her]

own safety.” She also pointed out that the telephone conversation was polite and that it had

lasted only approximately one minute. 

On October 2, 2008, the Commission upheld Appellant’s termination, unanimously

concluding:

(a) that Ms. Redmon had accessed the Oracle data base to obtain contact

information for Officer Gooch, who had recently arrested her husband; (b) that

she had used that sensitive information to contact Officer Gooch at his home

while he was off duty to discuss her husband’s arrest; (c) that her access to the

Oracle data base for that purpose was unrelated to her employment duties and

for her personal benefit; (d) that the information obtained by her was

confidential; (e) that from her previous work experience, as well as from her

City job training, she knew, or should have known, the information she was

accessing was confidential and not for personal use; and (f) that her actions

were unprofessional, in violation of City policy and were potentially harmful

to both Officer Gooch and the City. 

Appellant filed a “Petition for Writ of Certiorari” in the Shelby County Chancery

Court, seeking a review of the Commission’s decision. Appellant’s petition was heard on

June 11, 2009. The chancery court denied Appellant’s petition, specifically finding that the

Commission had complied with the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act in conducting

its deliberations in private, and that the Commission’s decision to uphold Appellant’s

termination Appellant was supported by substantial and material evidence. Appellant timely

appealed to this Court. 

 
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II. ISSUES PRESENTED

Appellant asserts that the chancery court erred in upholding the Commission’s

decision to terminate Appellant, because the Commission’s decision was erroneous for the

following reasons:

1. It was a violation of constitutional provisions which prejudiced Ms. Redmon’s rights;

2. The decision to uphold the termination was made upon unlawful procedure;

3. The decision rested upon no reasonable basis, was arbitrary and capricious, and

indicated an abuse of discretion; and

4. The trial court failed to indicate substantial and material evidence in support of its

decision.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In 1988, the General Assembly amended Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-9-

114(b)(1) to read, in part, “Judicial review of decisions by civil service boards of a county

or municipality which affects the employment status of a county or city civil service

employee shall be in conformity with the judicial review standards under the Uniform

Administrative Procedures Act, § 4-5-322.” See Davis v. Shelby County Sheriff’s Dep’t,

278 S.W.3d 256, 262 (Tenn. 2009). “In Davis, the Supreme Court clarified the application

of Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322 to Civil Service Boards not governed by Tenn. Code Ann. §

27-9-114(a)(1).” Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-9-114(a)(1) provides that

“[c]ontested case hearings by civil service boards of a county or municipality which affect

the employment status of a civil service employee shall be conducted in conformity with the

contested case procedures under the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, compiled in

title 4, chapter 5, part 3.” Morris v. City of Memphis Civil Serv. Comm’n, No. W2009-

00372-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 4547688, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 7, 2009) (citing Davis,

278 S.W.3d at 263). Because the City of Memphis is a home rule jurisdiction, the City of

Memphis Civil Service Commission is exempted from subdivision (a)(1)’s requirement that

contested case hearings affecting a civil service employee’s employment status be conducted

in conformity with the UAPA’s contested case procedures. See id. (citing City of Memphis

Ordinance No. 1852); see also Davis, 278 S.W.3d at 263. “However, as noted by the

Supreme Court, when Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-9-114(a) and (b) are read in pari materia, Tenn.

Code Ann. § 27-9-114(a)(2) does not affect the applicability of the judicial review standard

to the Commission’s decisions under Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-9-114(b).” Morris, 2009 WL

4547688, at *3 (citing Davis, 278 S.W.3d at 263). Thus, our standard of review is that set

forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 4-5-322: 

(h)The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for
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further proceedings. The court may reverse or modify the decision if the rights

of the petitioner have been prejudiced because the administrative findings,

inferences, conclusions or decisions are:

(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; 

(2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;

(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;

(4) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly

unwarranted exercise of discretion; or

(5)(A) Unsupported by evidence that is both substantial and material in the

light of the entire record.

 (B) In determining the substantiality of evidence, the court shall take into

account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight, but the court

shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight

of the evidence on questions of fact.

Our review of the Commission’s factual findings is limited by the provisions of Tennessee

Code Annotated section 4-5-322; however, our review of matters of law is de novo without

a presumption of correctness. Davis, 278 S.W.3d at 264 (citing Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d);

Cumulus Broad., Inc. v. Shim, 226 S.W.3d 366, 373 (Tenn. 2007)).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Open Meetings Act

On appeal, Appellant claims that the Commission “violated State law when it

deliberated over Petitioner’s appeal in private.” As support for this argument, Appellant cites

the Tennessee Open Meetings Act, Tennessee Code Annotated section 8-4-101, et seq.,

which requires that “[a]ll meetings of any governing body are declared to be public meetings

open to the public at all times, except as provided by the Constitution of Tennessee.” Tenn.

Code Ann. § 8-4-102(a). As relevant to this appeal, the Act defines a “governing body” as

“[t]he members of a public body . . . with the authority to make decisions for or

recommendations to a public body on policy or administration[.]” Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-44-

102(b)(1)(A). 
Tennessee Code Annotated section 4-5-101, et seq. 2

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At oral argument before this Court, Appellant contended that when the Commission

makes decisions regarding an employee’s termination, that it is making “decisions or

recommendations to a public body on . . . administration” as contemplated by the statute. We

disagree. This Court, in Hastings v. South Central Human Resource Agency, 829 S.W.2d

679, 686 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991), held that the SCHRA’s grievance committee was not a

“governing body” within the Act’s purview because its function was merely to “hear and

dispose of personnel complaints in accordance with the policies and procedures formulated

by the governing board.” Appellant has failed to show, or even argue, that the City of

Memphis Civil Service Commission has authority beyond that of the SCHRA’s grievance

committee. Accordingly, it does not appear to this Court that the Commission should be

viewed as a governing body subject to the Act, and thus, we find that the Commission’s

decision was not made in violation thereof.

Appellant seems to argue in the alternative that the Commission’s private

deliberations violated the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act (“UAPA”), specifically, 2

Tennessee Code Annotated section 4-5-312(d), which requires hearings before the Civil

Service Commission regarding contested cases “be open to public observation pursuant to

the provisions of [the Tennessee Open Meetings Act].” Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-312(d). As

we explained above, because the City of Memphis is a home rule jurisdiction, the

Commission is exempted from Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-9-114(a)(1)’s

requirement that “contested case hearings by civil service boards . . . be conducted in

conformity with contested case procedures under the [UAPA..]” See Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-

9-114; Davis, 278 S.W.3d at 263-64. Thus, we find Appellant’s argument without merit.

B. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Next, we address Appellant’s arguments concerning the sufficiency of the evidence

presented. Specifically, Appellant contends that the Commission “rendered a decision with

no reasonable basis, that was arbitrary and capricious, and that indicated an abuse of

discretion[,]” and that “the trial court failed to indicate any substantial and material evidence

upon which the commission relied to reach its decision in light of the entire record.”

Appellant suggests that her termination was “completely unreasonable” because she was

“very nice and polite” when she called Officer Gooch, and because his “discomfort stemmed

not from specifically receiving a call from [Appellant] but that it happened at a time that he

was experiencing identity theft.” She further points to her “clean work history” with the City

and she suggests that utilizing Officer Gooch’s telephone number was not a “very serious
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breach of confidentiality.” Appellant alleges that the Commission erroneously assumed that

Officer Gooch’s telephone number was confidential. She also claims that she was never

provided an employee handbook, that she never divulged Officer Gooch’s information to

anyone, and that Officer Gooch’s telephone number “was on the very screen she would see

after logging into her Oracle database[.]” She points out that no criminal charges were filed

against her, and she further contends that Officer Gooch had received other calls from City

employees and that his concern regarding her telephone call stemmed only from his recent

identity theft. Based on these allegations, Appellant maintains that her termination was

“excessive and unreasonable.” 

“In reviewing the [Commission’s] findings, we take into account whatever in the

record fairly detracts from the weight of the evidence, but we may not substitute our own

judgment on questions of fact by re-weighing the evidence.” Davis, 278 S.W.3d at 265

(citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322(h)(5)(B). “We may reject the [Commission’s] decision

only if a reasonable person would necessarily reach a different conclusion based on the

evidence.” Id. (citing Martin v. Sizemore, 78 S.W.3d 249, 276 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001)). We

will not reject the Commission’s decision merely because the facts could support a different

conclusion. Id. (citing Martin, 78 S.W.3d at 276). 

Appellant’s termination was based on violations of the following provisions:

PM 38-02(4) - “The employee’s conduct and/or behavior toward citizens,

public charges, vendors, contractors, management personnel, fellow

employees, etc., has been offensive, inappropriate, and fails to maintain

satisfactory and harmonious working relationships.”

PM 38-02(11) - “The employee has misappropriated City funds, appropriated

City property for personal use, illegally disposed of City property, removed or

destroyed City records, or has taken, borrowed, or removed City property,

regardless of size and/or cost from City premises without proper

authorization.”

PM 38-02(17) - “The employee has either on or off the employee’s regular

duty hours engaged in employment, activities, or enterprises that are

inconsistent, incompatible, or in legal, technical, or moral conflict with the

employee’s assigned duties, functions, and responsibilities.”
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PM 62-12 - “City employees . . . shall adhere to acceptable business principles

in matters of personal conduct and behavior and exhibit a high degree of

personal integrity. This not only involves respect for the rights and feelings

of other City employees, but demands that City employees refrain from any

conduct or behavior that is criminal or illegal, or that might be personally

harmful to co-workers and City of Memphis Government, or that could be

viewed unfavorably by the public at large. Therefore, City employees are

expected to behave in a professional manner by conducting themselves in a

way that best represents City Government and to exercise appropriate conduct

and judgment at all times. . . . Willful, deliberate, or careless misuse of City

equipment and/or City property shall not be tolerated. Such abuse will lead to

disciplinary action up to and including termination and/or assignment of

financial responsibility for loss or damage caused. . . .”

PM 78-04 - “All access to and use of personal computer hardware or software

owned by the City, including internet, internal e-mail, and external e-mail, by

any City employee . . . will be conducted in an ethical, professional, and lawful

manner, exclusively for business purposes in support of City operations, and

not for personal use. . . . Users will not access or use these tools in any manner

that breaches confidentiality of City business, legal, or other proprietary

information[.]”

We reject Appellant’s claim that the trial court “failed to indicate any substantial and

material evidence upon which the commission relied to reach its decision[.]” The trial court,

in finding that the Commission’s decision was supported by substantial and material

evidence, specifically found that PM78-04 required that access to City-owned computer

equipment be used exclusively for business purposes, that Appellant had no legitimate

business reason for accessing Officer Gooch’s confidential information to inquire about her

husband’s arrest, and that in doing so Appellant violated City policy. We agree with the trial

court’s statement that “[w]hether [Appellant’s] access and subsequent use of the confidential

information was innocent or whether Officer Gooch was concerned as a result of being

contacted by [Appellant] is irrelevant to whether [Appellant] violated the City’s policy[.]”

We further find irrelevant whether or not Appellant revealed Officer Gooch’s telephone

number to a third party, whether criminal charges were brought against Appellant, or whether

she had to access multiple screens within the Oracle database in order to locate his telephone

number. 
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We also reject Appellant’s contention that “the record from the Commission hearing

is rife with facts in evidence supporting the reinstatement of [Appellant].” Appellant’s claim

that she never received a handbook containing the above-mentioned policies is directly at

odds with the evidence presented to the Commission. The record before us contains a “City

of Memphis New Employee Orientation Checklist,” which Appellant conceded she signed

on January 10, 2006, acknowledging receipt of numerous policies and procedures, including

PM 62-12 and PM 78-04. Additionally, Appellant failed to substantiate her claim that

“Officer Gooch had received other calls from City employees . . . though not specifically

about arrests he had made.” 

As we stated above, at the Commission hearing Appellant testified that she accessed

the City-owned Oracle database to obtain Officer Gooch’s telephone number for personal,

rather than work-related, reasons. The Commission unanimously concluded, and we agree,

that City employees have an expectation that their confidential information will be used only

for business purposes, and “that the City must demand security and confidentiality of

sensitive personnel information and must not permit that information to be used for any

personal use, however harmless it may appear, without express permission or authorization.”

Accordingly, we find that Appellant’s termination was supported by substantial and material

evidence and that the Commission’s decision was not “arbitrary or capricious or

characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.” Tenn.

Code Ann. § 4-5-322(h)(4). 

C. Due Process

1. Hearings and Violations Charged 

Appellant argues that she was denied due process prior to her termination in that she

was initially terminated without a “requisite fact-finding hearing.” She also claims that the

fact-finding hearing following her reinstatement failed to comply with constitutional

requirements because it was merely an attempt to “formalize” her termination, and because

she was denied the “right” to “bring a witness” to the hearing. Finally, she contends that her

due process rights were somehow violated because the City “continued to vacillate on which

policies should be used in supporting [her] termination.” 

 

The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits states from

depriving “any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” The hallmark

of property is an individual entitlement grounded in state law, which cannot be removed

except “for cause.” Armstrong v. Tenn. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 959 S.W.2d 595, 598
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(Tenn. Ct. App. 1997) (citing Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 430, 102 S. Ct.

1148, 71 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1982)). A state civil servant has a property interest in his or her

continued employment. Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-3-331(a). Therefore, minimum due process

must be afforded to such employees before actions affecting their property interest become

effective.

Prior to the termination of a public employee who may be discharged only for cause,

the employee must be given notice and an opportunity to respond to the charges against him.

Case v. Shelby County Civil Serv. Merit Bd., 98 S.W.2d 167, 170 n.1 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002)

(citing Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 105 S. Ct. 1487, 84 L. Ed. 2d 494

(1985)); see also Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-30-331. “[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such

procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” Id. (quoting Mathews v.

Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334, 96 S. Ct. 893 (1976)). Tennessee Code Annotated section 8-30-

331(b)(5) specifically states that the “predecision discussion . . . shall be informal” and that

the employee has the “right to present written statements of witnesses[;]” however,

“[a]ttendance and participation by persons other than the manager and the employee shall be

at the discretion of the manager[.]” Because the opportunity to call witnesses was

discretionary rather than mandatory, Appellant’s due process rights were not violated by her

supervisor’s decision to disallow witnesses at the April 14, 2008 fact-finding hearing.

Furthermore, Appellant’s due process arguments overlook the post-termination

process afforded to her. When less than a full evidentiary hearing is held prior to

termination, a formal post-termination hearing is required. Case, 98 S.W.2d at 173 (citing

Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 547). This Court has stated that “[t]he pretermination and

posttermination procedures are intertwined and must be reviewed together to determine

whether due process has been satisfied.” Id. (citing Carter v. Western Reserve Psychiatric

Habilitation Ctr., 767 F.2d 270, 273 (6 Cir. 1985)). Appellant’s termination was reviewed th

by the Commission in a full evidentiary hearing on September 5, 2008. At this hearing,

Appellant was represented by counsel, she testified on her behalf, she was allowed to crossexamine Officer Gooch and her supervisor, Ms. Gibson, and she had the opportunity to call

witnesses on her behalf although she apparently chose not to subpoena any witnesses.

Examining the pre-and post-termination procedures together, we have determined that

Appellant was afforded the required procedural safeguards. 

We also reject Appellant’s claim that the City’s vacillation regarding the policies

under which she was charged somehow violated her due process rights. In the initial

termination notice of March 12, 2008, Appellant was charged with violating PM 62-12,

Employee Conduct, and PM 70-05, Confidentiality of Medical Records. However, on
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March 18, 2008, Appellant was reinstated, and she was charged with violating three

provisions: PM 38-02, PM 78-04, and PM 66-12. Appellant had six days’ notice of the

violations charged prior to her fact-finding hearing of March 24, 2008, and it is for these

three violations that Appellant was ultimately terminated. Appellant has failed to

demonstrate any prejudice she suffered as a result of the City’s actions. Accordingly, we find

that the City’s substitution of charges did not violate Appellant’s constitutional rights. 

2. Void for Vagueness

Finally, on appeal Appellant claims that the three policies upon which her termination

was based are unconstitutionally vague. The City contends that Appellant failed to raise the

“vagueness” argument in the trial court. However, our review of the trial court transcript

reveals that Appellant briefly raised the issue regarding PM 38-02. Nonetheless, we find it

unnecessary to address Appellant’s argument regarding PM 38-02’s alleged “vagueness” as

Appellant failed to challenge the two other provisions under which Appellant was

terminated, and a violation of either, alone, constituted sufficient grounds for termination.

V. CONCLUSION

For the aforementioned reasons, the judgment of the trial court upholding the

termination is affirmed. Costs of this appeal are taxed to Appellant, Jacqueline Redmon, and

her surety, for which execution may issue if necessary.

_________________________________

ALAN E. HIGHERS, P.J., W.S.