SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY 

 APPELLATE DIVISION 

 DOCKET NO. A-1730-21 

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, 

 Plaintiff-Respondent, 

v.

CHRIS A. BENTON, a/k/a 

CRAIG MCCUTCHEN, 

SAMUEL MCCUTCHEN, 

KEITH HOWARD, 

CARL ANDERSON, and 

CHRIS BENTON, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

________________________

Argued November 8, 2023 – Decided February 15, 2024 

Before Judges Haas and Natali. 

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Middlesex County, Indictment No. 18-08-

1151 and Accusation No. 21-07-0645.

Lucas B. Slevin, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, 

argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, 

Public Defender, attorney; Elizabeth Cheryl Jarit, 

Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the briefs). 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE 

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION 

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2 A-1730-21

Randolph E. Mershon III, Assistant Prosecutor, argued 

the cause for respondent (Yolanda Ciccone, Middlesex 

County Prosecutor, attorney; Erin M. Campbell, 

Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief). 

PER CURIAM 

Following the denial of his motion to suppress, defendant Chris A. Benton 

pled guilty to three counts of third-degree possession of a controlled dangerous 

substance with intent to distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1) and -5(b)(3), and was 

sentenced consistent with his negotiated plea to a 364-day custodial term with

four years of probation. He appeals from the decision denying his suppression 

application, his sentence, and the imposition of certain fines, and raises the 

following issues for our consideration: 

I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING 

THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS BECAUSE NO 

PROBABLE CAUSE EXISTED TO REMOVE A 

NON-DESCRIPT PILL BOTTLE FROM 

DEFENDANT'S WAISTBAND, BECAUSE NO 

PROBABLE CAUSE EXISTED TO SEARCH HIS 

VEHICLE, AND BECAUSE THE INVENTORY 

SEARCH COULD NOT APPLY AS DEFENDANT 

WAS NEVER BOOKED AND JAILED. 

A. THE POLICE LACKED PROBABLE CAUSE 

TO REMOVE AN INNOCUOUS-LOOKING PILL 

BOTTLE FROM MR. BENTON'S PANTS. 

B. THE POLICE LACKED ANY 

INDIVIDUALIZED OR PARTICULAR SUSPICION 
3 A-1730-21

THAT MR. BENTON'S VEHICLE CONTAINED 

EVIDENCE OF ANY CRIME. 

C. THE SEARCH AT THE POLICE STATION 

WAS NOT JUSTIFIED AS AN INVENTORY 

SEARCH BECAUSE MR. BENTON WAS NEVER 

BOOKED AND JAILED. 

II. BECAUSE THE COURT FAILED TO 

PROVIDE AN ADEQUATE STATEMENT OF 

REASONS FOR SENTENCING AND CONSIDERED 

DEFENDANT'S SUBSTANCE DEPENDENCY TO 

ONLY FIND AGGRAVATING FACTORS, 

RESENTENCING IS REQUIRED. 

III. A REMAND FOR REASSESSMENT OF FINES 

IS REQUIRED BECAUSE THE COURT 

INCORRECTLY BELIEVED IT WAS REQUIRED 

TO IMPOSE TWO DRUG ENFORCEMENT AND 

DEMAND REDUCTION PENALTIES WHEN IT 

HAD THE DISCRETION TO IMPOSE ONE. (Not 

raised below) 

We reject defendant's arguments in Point I and affirm his convictions. We 

agree, in part, however, with his arguments in Points II and III, and accordingly 

remand the matter with directions for the sentencing judge to articulate the 

reasons for his sentencing decision and to address the propriety of imposing 

multiple drug enforcement and demand reduction (DEDR) penalties. 

I.

The events leading to defendant's arrest were described in detail at the 

suppression hearing in which Detective Sean Freeman, a New Brunswick Police 
4 A-1730-21

Officer with six years of experience with the New Brunswick Police 

Department, and approximately nine years of law enforcement experience 

overall, was the sole witness. The detective's training and experience included 

the manner in which heroin and cocaine are packaged as well as the distribution 

and sale of controlled dangerous substances generally. 

Detective Freeman stated that during the afternoon of May 21, 2018, he 

and Officers Monticello and Powers1 of the New Brunswick Police Department 

were patrolling a high-crime area in plainclothes and in an unmarked car as 

members of the Street Crimes Unit. Detective Freeman testified he previously 

made "[s]eventy, maybe [one] hundred" arrests in the area defendant was 

arrested, and those arrests were of a "wide variety," but "mostly narcotics." 

During their patrol, the officers observed defendant's vehicle "fail to come 

to a complete stop at a stop sign and improperly use its turn signal," and also 

noticed the vehicle circle the block. Based on the aforementioned traffic 

infractions, the officers decided to conduct a motor vehicle stop. Officer 

Monticello approached the defendant who was driving the car, while Officer 

Powers and Detective Freeman interacted with the passenger. 

1

 The record does not include the first names of Officers Monticello and Powers. 
5 A-1730-21

When Officer Monticello asked defendant for his license and registration, 

Detective Freeman testified he "fumbl[ed] through the paperwork and you could 

. . . see his hands shaking." He also failed to make "direct eye contact with 

Officer Monticello," repeated himself, and spoke in a low tone. Based on these 

observations, Officer Monticello asked defendant to step out of the car, where 

he was immediately directed to the rear of his vehicle to speak with Detective 

Freeman, who observed defendant's "shirt tucked in, and a bulge." Detective 

Freeman testified he attempted to discern the source of the bulge when he 

noticed the "cap of pill bottle, a white cap . . . protruding from [defendant's] 

underwear, between his shirt and underwear." 

When he asked defendant what was in his waistband, he "immediately" 

replied, "'[y]ou got me,' and began to reach for the pill bottle." At that point, 

Detective Freeman told defendant to place his hands on his head and removed 

the pill bottle. Detective Freeman testified the pill bottle was green tinted but 

he "could clearly see through it," and observed it contained "several packets of 

heroin and crack cocaine." 

After Detective Freeman removed the green pill bottle, he immediately 

observed and removed a second container, located in the same area as the first, 

which he described as blue with a white lid and with markings from a local 
6 A-1730-21

hospital that he could not see through. Detective Freeman testified defendant 

was then formally placed under arrest, and a further search of defendant was 

conducted incident to his arrest, which uncovered no further contraband. 

The police also questioned the passenger of the vehicle, and after 

confirming he had no active warrants, released him from the scene. According 

to Detective Freeman, police then searched defendant's vehicle, because 

"[defendant] exited the vehicle with that amount of narcotics on him, we 

believed there would be more narcotics in the vehicle." That search revealed a 

brown paper bag containing approximately "fifty packets" of heroin. Detective 

Freeman stated the bag was either in a cup holder or on the floor of the vehicle 

and acknowledged the bag was not in plain view. 

Defendant was transported to police headquarters where he was 

"processed," which according to Detective Freeman meant he was 

"[f]ingerprint[ed], photographed, [] searched a second time . . . placed in a cell, 

issue[d] a motor vehicle summons . . . and released on a summons complaint." 

This second search of defendant resulted in the seizure of $141 in assorted U.S. 

currency. A later search of the green pill bottle revealed twenty-two packets of 

heroin and five bags of crack cocaine and a search of the blue container revealed 

120 packets of heroin and five packets of crack cocaine. 
7 A-1730-21

Defendant moved to suppress the drugs located in the two pill bottles and 

the heroin in the bag found in his car.2 The court denied defendant's application 

in a March 4, 2019 written opinion. In its decision, the court found the officers 

were justified in executing the motor vehicle stop because they observed 

defendant commit multiple traffic violations. The court also concluded the 

officers had probable cause to order defendant out of his vehicle, thus seizing 

defendant, for their own safety, because defendant was "acting nervously and 

fumbling with his paperwork . . . mumbling and speaking in a low tone while 

avoiding eye contact with the officers." 

The court rejected the State's argument the officers had probable cause to 

arrest defendant based solely on their observations prior to defendant's removal 

from the vehicle. The court stated, "it does not appear that probable cause 

existed based only on the [d]efendant's nervousness and tone while inside the 

vehicle," because the pill bottle was not "in plain view," until defendant was 

asked out of the vehicle. The court found, however, "probable cause was 

strengthened" after defendant said, "you got me," to Detective Freeman. At that 

2

 Before us defendant has not reprised his argument that his inculpatory 

statement – "you got me" should be suppressed because he was not read his 

Miranda rights. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). We 

accordingly do not address those arguments and consider them waived. 
8 A-1730-21

point, the court concluded, defendant's "presence in the high-crime area, his 

nervousness, and the strange placement of the pill bottle (in the waistband of his 

underwear)," made the officers' "suspicion that a crime was being committed 

objectively reasonable." 

The court found the arrest valid, prior to the search, "because of the 

[d]efendant's nervous behavior and the presence of a pill bottle in his 

waistband," and "[defendant's statement] tips the balance of reasonable 

suspicion in the officers' favor, making the determination of probable cause 

objectively reasonable." Because officers had the "right to arrest" defendant, 

the court, relying on State v. O'Neal, 190 N.J. 601, 614 (2007), held it was 

inconsequential the search occurred prior to defendant's incident to arrest. 

The court also concluded the warrantless search of defendant's vehicle was 

proper. Relying on State v. Witt, 223 N.J. 409, 447 (2015) and State v. Alston, 

88 N.J. 211, 233 (1981), the court explained, under the automobile exception, 

New Jersey courts "permit warrantless searches of (1) readily movable vehicles 

when (2) the police officers have probable cause to believe that the vehicle 

contains contraband or evidence of a crime and (3) the circumstances giving rise 

to probable cause are unforeseeable and spontaneous." 
9 A-1730-21

Applying this test, the court acknowledged the mere presence of drugs on 

defendant did not "automatically create probable cause to search his vehicle," 

but concluded, here, "the amount of heroin and cocaine recovered from 

[d]efendant's person—multiple bags of both narcotics—was reasonabl[y] 

assumed not to be purely for personal use." As such, the court found the officers 

had reason to believe more narcotics would be found in the vehicle, and 

therefore established probable cause to conduct the search. Finally, the court 

noted, as defendant did not contest the second search at the police station, it 

would not suppress the $141. 

In a nine-count indictment, defendant was charged with two counts of 

possession of a CDS (counts one and five), possession of a CDS with intent to 

distribute (counts two and six), possession of a CDS with intent to distribute 

within 1,000 feet of a school (counts three and seven), and possession of a CDS 

with intent to distribute within 500 feet of certain public property (counts four 

and eight), and one count of financial facilitation of a crime (count nine). On 

June 7, 2021, defendant pled guilty to two third-degree counts of possession of 

a CDS with intent to distribute (counts two and six) and the remaining counts of 

the indictment were dismissed. 
10 A-1730-21

Defendant was later arrested on separate drug offenses, waived indictment 

and was charged in Accusation No. 21-07-645-A with third-degree possession 

of CDS with intent to distribute (count one); two counts of third-degree 

possession of CDS (counts two and three); and third-degree conspiracy to 

distribute CDS (count four). Defendant ultimately pled guilty to a single thirddegree count with regard to the accusation, with all remaining charges 

dismissed. As a result, defendant entered guilty pleas to three counts of thirddegree possession of CDS with intent to distribute. 

On October 12, 2021, the court sentenced defendant, consistent with his 

plea, to two concurrent terms of four years' probation contingent on 364 days in 

county jail. When sentencing defendant, the court found aggravating factors 

three, "[t]he risk that the defendant will commit another offense," N.J.S.A. 

2C:44-1(a)(3); six, "[t]he extent of the defendant's prior criminal record and the 

seriousness of the offenses of which the defendant has been convicted," N.J.S.A. 

2C:44-1(a)(6); and nine, "[t]he need for deterring the defendant and others from 

violating the law," N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(9), outweighed the non-existent 

mitigating factors. The court also imposed various penalties and fees, including 

a $2,000 DEDR penalty. After issuing an amended Judgment of Conviction to 
11 A-1730-21

correct the charge and degree listed for the conviction with respect to Accusation 

No. 21-07-645-A, this appeal followed. 

 II. 

In defendant's first point, he contends the motion court erred in denying 

his suppression motion because officers lacked probable cause to remove the 

non-descript pill bottle from defendant's waistband and to search his vehicle. 

Specifically, in Point I.A., defendant, relying on Russell v. Coyle, 266 N.J. 

Super. 651, 654 (App. Div. 1993), and authority from other jurisdictions, argues 

Detective Freeman's observation of the top of a prescription pill bottle in 

defendant's waistband did not create probable cause that the bottle contained 

evidence of a crime. 

Defendant also argues the court, in concluding the police had probable 

cause to search him, improperly "relied heavily on his presence in a high crime 

area as well [as] his nervous behavior and lack of eye contact during the motor 

vehicle stop," citing to State v. Pineiro, 181 N.J. 13 (2009), State v. Nyema, 249 

N.J. 509, 533 (2022), and State v. Goldsmith, 251 N.J. 384, 404 (2022). 

Defendant specifically contends police failed to provide specific evidence of the 

"high crime" area patrolled and failed to articulate the connection between 

defendant's nervousness and any criminality. 
12 A-1730-21

 Defendant further asserts defendant's statement, "you got me," did not "tip 

the balance" towards establishing probable cause, either with respect to 

defendant's arrest or the seizure of the pill bottle. Defendant maintains at the 

time of the statement, police only observed traffic violations and nervous 

behavior in a high crime area, and there was nothing to indicate defendant was 

involved in criminal activity or possessed contraband. Defendant claims his 

statement was at best ambiguous, could have referred to the traffic stop, or, at 

most, could have "aroused suspicion." 

In Point I.B., defendant argues even if the seizure of the two pill bottles

was proper, police did not have probable cause, specific and individualized to 

the vehicle, to conduct a warrantless search under the automobile exception. 

Relying on State v. Chippero, 201 N.J. 14, 31 (2009), defendant asserts the 

narcotics found in the pill bottles "does not automatically permit the search of 

other constitutionally protected areas." Defendant maintains police failed to 

articulate a basis to establish probable cause that contraband would be found 

inside the vehicle, and thus engaged in an unlawful search. On this point, 

defendant also relies on State v. Wilson, 178 N.J. 7, 15 (2003), for the 

proposition the quantity of narcotics found on an individual does not, alone, 

create probable cause for police to search a vehicle without a warrant. 
13 A-1730-21

We disagree with all of these arguments and conclude that the court 

correctly determined the officers possessed probable cause to conduct a 

warrantless search of defendant and his vehicle. On this point, we affirm 

therefore substantially for the reasons stated by the trial court in its 

comprehensive written decision. We add only the following comments. 

III. 

Our review of a trial judge's decision on a motion to suppress is limited. 

State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 15 (2009). In reviewing such an application, we 

must uphold the judge's factual findings, "so long as those findings are supported 

by sufficient credible evidence in the record." State v. Rockford, 213 N.J. 424, 

440 (2013) (quoting Robinson, 200 N.J. at 15). "Those findings warrant 

particular deference when they are 'substantially influenced by [the trial judge's] 

opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the "feel" of the case, 

which a reviewing court cannot enjoy.'" Ibid. (alteration in original). We review 

de novo the judge's pure determinations of law, State v. Mann, 203 N.J. 328, 

337 (2010), as well as the application of legal principles to factual findings. 

State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391, 416 (2004). 

"The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, 

Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution, in almost identical language, 
14 A-1730-21

protect against unreasonable searches and seizures." State v. Smart, 253 N.J. 

156, 164 (2023) (quoting Nyema, 249 N.J. at 527). "Warrantless seizures are 

presumptively invalid as contrary to the United States and the New Jersey 

Constitutions." Pineiro, 181 N.J. at 19. 

"To justify a warrantless search or seizure, 'the State bears the burden of 

proving by a preponderance of the evidence that [the] warrantless search or 

seizure falls within one of the few well-delineated exceptions to the warrant 

requirement.'" State v. Vanderee, 476 N.J. Super. 214, 230 (App. Div. 2023) 

(quoting State v. Chisum, 236 N.J. 530, 546 (2019)). Each exception to the 

warrant requirement has their own essential elements that must be satisfied to 

justify a warrantless search. State v. Johnson, 476 N.J. Super. 1, 20 (App. Div. 

2023). 

One such exception to the warrant requirement is the search incident to 

arrest, an exception "limned for two specific purposes—the protection of the 

police and the preservation of evidence." State v. Eckel, 185 N.J. 523, 524 

(2006). Under this exception to the warrant requirement, "an officer [has] the 

right to search a defendant's person without a warrant if there is probable cause 

to arrest." State v. Roman-Rosado, 462 N.J. Super. 183, 201 (App. Div. 2020). 
15 A-1730-21

In State v. O'Neal, our Supreme Court held that under the search-incidentto-arrest doctrine, police may in certain circumstances conduct a search and 

remove drugs before actually placing the suspect under arrest. 190 N.J. at 614. 

The Court explained that when police search a person before arresting him or 

her "as part of a single, uninterrupted transaction, it does not matter whether the 

arrest precedes the search." Ibid. (quoting State v. Bell, 195 N.J. Super. 49, 58 

(App. Div. 1984)). "It is the 'right to arrest,' rather than the actual arrest, that 

'must pre-exist the search.'" Ibid. (quoting State v. Doyle, 42 N.J. 334, 342 

(1964)). 

Under the plain view exception, an officer may, without a warrant, "seize 

evidence or contraband that is in plain view." State v. Gonzales, 227 N.J. 77, 

90 (2016). To lawfully seize evidence or contraband under this exception, the 

"officer must lawfully be in the area where he observed and seized the 

incriminating item or contraband, and it must be immediately apparent that the 

seized item is evidence of a crime." Id. at 101. 

Pursuant to the automobile exception, our Supreme Court has long 

recognized "under our State Constitution, 'when the police have probable cause 

to believe that [a] vehicle contains contraband or evidence of an offense and the 

circumstances giving rise to probable cause are unforeseeable and spontaneous,' 
16 A-1730-21

law enforcement may search the vehicle without first obtaining a warrant." State 

v. Cohen, 254 N.J. 308, 319-20 (2023) (alteration in original) (quoting Witt, 223 

N.J. at 447). 

"Whether in the arrest context or in a search context, it is the same 

standard of proof that controls: probable cause." Chippero, 201 N.J. at 27. "In 

assessing whether probable cause exists, 'courts must look to the totality of the 

circumstances and view those circumstances . . . from the standpoint of an 

objectively reasonable police officer.'" State v. Diaz, 470 N.J. Super. 495, 529 

(App. Div. 2022) (quoting State v. Gibson, 218 N.J. 277, 293 (2014)). "[C]ourts 

are to give weight to 'the officer's knowledge and experience' as well as 'rational 

inferences that could be drawn from the facts objectively and reasonably viewed 

in light of the officer's expertise.'" State v. Citarella, 154 N.J. 272, 279 (1998) 

(quoting State v. Arthur, 149 N.J. 1, 10-11 (1997)). 

We initially note defendant does not dispute the propriety of the police 

officers' actions in stopping his vehicle based on his undisputed motor vehicle 

violations, or removing him from his car based on their observations of his 

behavior when they asked him for routine credentialing information. Instead, 

defendant narrows his constitutional arguments to events that occurred after he
17 A-1730-21

was at the rear of the vehicle, and argues the police conduct at that point violated 

his Fourth Amendment rights. We therefore limit our discussion accordingly. 

In applying the aforementioned substantive principles, we pay close 

attention to the timing and requiring of the police officers' interaction with 

defendant. Once at the rear of the vehicle, defendant was observed with a pill 

bottle secreted in his waistband. When asked a simple question by Detective 

Freeman about the pill bottle, defendant "immediately" offered the inculpatory 

statement "you got me." We reject defendant's interpretation of that statement 

as innocuous or possibly related to the motor vehicle stop as unmoored to the 

record and specifically in the context under which the statement was made –

while defendant was at the rear of the vehicle and in response to specific inquiry 

about the pill bottle. 

The police action in seizing the pill bottle – while defendant was reaching 

for his waistband was entirely proper, as was the seizure of the second pill bottle 

hidden in the same peculiar location in defendant's waistband area. At the point 

defendant was asked to place his hands above his head, the police had the right 

to arrest him. Under the totality of the circumstances, which included Detective 

Freeman's training combined with defendant's presence in a high-crime area, his 

nervousness during their initial interaction, the location of the pill bottle, - 
18 A-1730-21

partially secreted and partially in plain view -, and defendant's damning 

inculpatory statement, the police had an objective belief that "an offense has 

been or is being committed." State v. Torres, 253 N.J. 485, 503 (2023) (quoting 

State v. Sims, 75 N.J. 337, 354 (1978)). Police also had the right to conduct a 

search incident to arrest without the need for a warrant. That the seizure 

occurred before the arrest is of moment under the circumstances as the court 

correctly concluded, see O'Neal, 190 N.J. at 614, as the search was "part of a 

single, uninterrupted transaction." Ibid. 

 Once the pill bottle was seized, and Detective Freeman observed multiple 

types of controlled dangerous substances, along with a second secreted pill 

bottle, the police clearly had probable cause to enter the vehicle under a totality 

of the circumstances analysis. As noted, at that point police observed 

defendant's unsettling behavior in the car, heard his inculpatory statement, and 

discovered defendant was in possession of at least one pill bottle containing 

multiple types of controlled dangerous substances. As the court recognized, 

while an individual's possession of narcotics does not automatically create 

probable cause to search a vehicle, significant additional facts existed here, 

including two pill bottles placed in defendant's waistband, one of which 

contained multiple drugs, which, together with the other circumstances of 
19 A-1730-21

police's interaction with defendant, established probable cause sufficient to 

search defendant's vehicle without a warrant. These facts, which were 

spontaneous and unforeseeable, more than sufficiently established the 

particularized belief the vehicle contained evidence of criminal activity. 

Rodriguez, 459 N.J. Super. at 22. 

IV. 

In Point I.C., defendant argues the search at the police station which 

revealed $141 was not justified as an inventory search because defendant was 

not booked and jailed. Defendant notes an inventory search is an exception to 

the general warrant requirement allowing police to search and inventory an 

arrestee's belongings before the arrestee is jailed. Defendant states this 

exception exists because police must hold an arrestee's belongings once an 

arrestee is jailed. If an arrestee is not jailed, defendant argues, "the police are 

not put in the position of becoming the bailee of the arrestee's property and the 

rationale requiring the seizure of the property no longer exists." Here, defendant 

contends he was wrongfully searched because he never jailed, and the $141 

discovered should be suppressed. We find defendant's arguments of insufficient 

merit to warrant extended discussion in a written opinion and provide the 

following to amplify our decision. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). 
20 A-1730-21

We first note defendant never moved to suppress the $141 seized at the 

police station before the trial court. Because defendant did not raise this issue 

we could choose not to address it as "[i]t is a well-settled principle that our 

appellate courts will decline to consider questions or issues not properly 

presented to the trial court when an opportunity for such a presentation is 

available 'unless the questions so raised on appeal go to the jurisdiction of the 

trial court or concern matters of great public interest.'" Nieder v. Royal Indem. 

Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973) (quoting Reynolds Offset Co., Inc. v. Summer, 

58 N.J. Super. 542, 548 (App. Div. 1959)). Although neither exception applies, 

we address defendant's arguments on the merits in the interest of completeness. 

An exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement is the 

inventory search. State v. Hummel, 232 N.J. 196, 207 (2018). "Police may 

search an arrestee without a warrant and inventory the property in the arrestee's 

possession before he or she is jailed." Id. at 208. An inventory search "is not 

an independent legal concept but rather an incidental administrative step 

following arrest and preceding incarceration." Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 

640, 645 (1983). Although administrative in nature, an inventory search, "is 

still a search and must be reasonable under the circumstances to pass 

constitutional muster." Hummel, 232 N.J. at 208. 
21 A-1730-21

"[T]he propriety of an inventory search involves a two-step inquiry: (1) 

whether the impoundment of the property is justified; and (2) whether the 

inventory procedure was legal." Ibid. (citing State v. Mangold, 82 N.J. 575, 583 

(1980)). "For there to be a lawful inventory search, there must be a lawful 

impoundment," and if impoundment is justified, "[c]ourts need only analyze the 

reasonableness of the inventory search." Ibid. With respect to the 

reasonableness of the inventory search, courts will balance factors such as "the 

scope of the search, the procedure used, and the availability of less intrusive 

alternatives," to ensure the search is not "more intrusive than reasonably 

necessary to respond to the protective functions which fostered its creation." Id. 

at 208-09 (quoting Mangold, 82 N.J. at 584, 587). 

Here, the search of defendant at the police station was lawful and 

reasonable and consistent with Hummel. As Detective Freeman testified, after 

his arrest at the scene, he was transported to the police station where he was 

processed, meaning he was fingerprinted, searched, placed in a cell, issued a 

summons, and ultimately released. Under those circumstances, the search and 

inventorying of defendant's possession was entirely justified and consistent with 

New Jersey law. Nothing in the record suggest the search was more intrusive 

than necessary or beyond the scope of a permissible inventory search. 
22 A-1730-21

V.

In Points II and III, defendant contends resentencing is required because 

the sentencing court failed to provide an explanation of its finding aggravating 

factors. Defendant also contends the sentencing court improperly weighed 

defendant's history of substance abuse as the court only found aggravating 

factors. He also maintains the sentencing judge erred in imposing two DEDR 

fines, as the court incorrectly believed imposing multiple fines was mandatory 

rather than discretionary. 

We review defendant's sentence for abuse of discretion. State v. Pierce, 

188 N.J. 155, 166 (2006). We affirm a sentence "unless (1) the sentencing 

guidelines were violated; (2) the aggravating and mitigating factors found by the 

sentencing court were not based upon competent and credible evidence in the 

record; or (3) 'the application of the guidelines to the facts of [the] case makes 

the sentence clearly unreasonable so as to shock the judicial conscience.'" State 

v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57, 70 (2014) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Roth, 

95 N.J. 334, 364-65 (1984)). 

A sentencing court is obligated to examine the aggravating and mitigating 

factors enumerated in N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a) and (b). Id. at 72. Each factor found 

by the court must be relevant and supported by "competent, reasonably credible 
23 A-1730-21

evidence." Ibid. (quoting Roth, 95 N.J. at 363). The court then must conduct a 

qualitative balancing of the factors to determine the appropriate sentence. Id. at 

72-73. 

Here, the trial court provided no explanation for its conclusion that 

aggravating factors three, six, and nine applied. Nor did the court explain its 

finding that no mitigating factors, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b), applied. Instead, after 

reviewing and recounting the facts in the presentence report, and those

underlying defendant's arrests, the court's sole analysis is reflected in the 

following conclusory comments: 

In weighing the aggravating versus the mitigating 

factors, I find the following aggravating factors apply: 

3, the risk the [d]efendant will commit another offense; 

6, the extent of the [d]efendant's prior criminal history; 

and 9, the need for deterring the [d]efendant and others 

from violating the law. I find no mitigating factors. 

The aggravating factors substantially outweigh the 

mitigating factors. However, this is a negotiated plea, 

one which I can accept. 

 

The absence of meaningful analysis in the trial court's sentencing decision 

warrants further fact finding. That is so because to "facilitate meaningful 

appellate review, trial judges must explain how they arrived at a particular 

sentence." State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49, 65 (2014). "[T]he judge shall state reasons 

for imposing [a] sentence including . . . the factual basis supporting a finding of 
24 A-1730-21

particular aggravating or mitigating factors affecting sentence." R. 3:21-4(h). 

A court's mere enumeration of aggravating factors is insufficient to survive 

appellate review of a sentence. Case, 220 N.J. at 65, 68. 

In addition, we agree with defendant the court's analysis in applying two 

DEDR penalties was contrary to law. At sentencing, defendant's counsel 

questioned the court's imposition of the fees, as reflected by the following 

colloquy: 

Counsel: Judge, why are there two -- deters on a one 

case? A thousand for each – 

Court: Two separate -- two separate counts. 

Counsel: Well, Judge, I'm going to ask that you waive 

one of them. I think it's in your discretion to do it -- 

Court: It's not. It's mandatory. If it is, show me the 

case law, and I'll do it. 

[(Emphasis added).]

 Contrary to the court's statement, a defendant sentenced for more than one 

drug offense is not subject to mandatory penalties for each offense. Instead, as 

N.J.S.A. 2C:35-15 provides, a defendant sentenced for multiple drug offenses 

"may, in the discretion of the court, be assessed a single penalty applicable to 

the highest degree offense for which the person is convicted" if the court finds 

imposing multiple penalties "would constitute a serious hardship that outweighs 
25 A-1730-21

the need to deter" and the imposing a single penalty "would foster the 

defendant's rehabilitation." N.J.S.A. 2C:35-15(a). As it is clear the court 

mistakenly concluded it was without discretion to impose less than two $1,000 

penalties, we remand for the court to address the propriety of multiple DEDR 

penalties. 

 In sum, we affirm defendant's convictions and remand for a further 

statement of reasons for the sentence imposed, including a meaningful 

discussion of any applicable aggravating and mitigating factors and the basis for 

imposing multiple DEDR penalties. We retain jurisdiction.