This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Reports. Please 1 see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. 2 Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated 3 errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does 4 not include the filing date. 5 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 6 STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 7 Plaintiff-Appellee, 8

v. NO. 26,742 9 KAMIL SEWELL, 10 Defendant-Appellant. 11 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY 12 Richard Knowles, District Judge 13 Gary K. King, Attorney General 14 Santa Fe, NM 15 Joel Jacobsen, Assistant Attorney General 16 Albuquerque, NM 17 for Appellee 18 McGarry Law Office 19 Kathleen McGarry 20 Glorieta, NM 21 for Appellant 22 MEMORANDUM 23 KENNEDY, Judge. 24After the district court denied his mo tion to suppress, De fendant Kamil Sewell 1 pleaded no contest to repeat offender trafficking in cocaine and child abuse, 2 preserving his right to appeal. Without reaching the merits of whether the initial 3 police stop was reasonable, this Court reversed the district court’s order. State v. 4 Sewell , 2008-NMCA-027, ¶ 1, 143 N.M. 485, 177 P.3d 536, rev’d 2009-NMSC-033, 5 ¶¶ 14, 26, 146 N.M. 428, 211 P.3d 885. On remand, we now consider the facts 6 surrounding that initial stop and hold that it was based on reasonable suspicion of 7 criminal activity. We hold that investigatory stops of vehicles are governed by the 8 same reasonable suspicion standard as stops of persons. We affirm. 9 BACKGROUND 10 We recount only those facts necessary toanalyze the issue before us. A more 11 detailed recitation of the facts and proce dural history of this case may be found in 12 Sewell , 2009-NMSC-033, ¶¶ 2-11. 13 On April 9, 2004, an undercover Albuquerque police officer identified a woman 14 he knew to be a prostitute standing near a street corner along Central Avenue. Id. ¶ 15 3. The officer had been patrolling in that area for more than four years, was familiar 16 with drug trafficking and prostitution investig ations, and had participated in more than 17 one hundred criminal cases at the time. Id. As he continued to observe, the prostitute 18 attempted to catch the attention of passing vehicles until a Chevrolet truck stopped 19 nearby. She then engaged ina conversation with the driv er of the truck and entered 202 on the truck’s passenger side. Id. As the truck drove away with the prostitute inside, 1 the officer noted that it made several suspicious maneuvers into and out of a 2 residential neighborhood. He te stified that this behavior is fairly typical of persons 3 attempting to evade law enforcement in drive-up prostitution cases. Id. 4 The truck soon stopped by a pay phone, wh ere the prostitute got out and made 5 a short call. When the call was finished, she immediately got back in, and the truck 6 drove away. Id. ¶ 4. The officer testified that inhis experience with other drug and 7 prostitution cases, such a call was likely a signal intended to set up a narcotics 8 transaction. Id. The truck soon stopped again, this time at a nearby shopping plaza, 9 where it was met by a Cadill ac driven by Defendant. Id. ¶ 5. The prostitute exited the 10 truck, got into Defendant’s Cadillac, and in less than one minute, came back to the 11 truck. Id. Both vehicles then drove away. The officer did not see what took place 12 inside the Cadillac, but based on his experien ce, he concluded he had just witnessed 13 a drug transaction. Id. In order to keep from compro mising his undercover status, the 14 officer notified a uniformed police unit of what he had just seen. Id. ¶ 6. Within two 15 to three minutes, police stopped Defendant’s Cadillac, questioned Defendant and his 16 passenger, and conducted a search that reveal ed narcotics and eventually led to this 17 appeal. Id. ¶¶ 6, 7-9. 18 STANDARD OF REVIEW 193 Suppression orders present mixed questions of law and fact. State v. Rowell , 1 2008-NMSC-041, ¶ 8, 144 N.M. 371, 188 P.3d 95. Factual questions are reviewed 2 for substantial evidence, and the district c ourt’s application of law to those facts is 3 reviewed de novo. State v. Neal , 2007-NMSC-043, ¶ 15, 142 N.M. 176, 164 P.3d 57. 4 We first view the facts in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, deferring to 5 the district court’s factual findings so l ong as substantial evidence exists to support 6 them. Id. Next, we analyze how the court app lied the law to those facts and make a 7 de novo conclusion as to whether the stop was constitutional. State v. Hand, 8 2008-NMSC-014, ¶ 6, 143 N.M. 530, 178 P.3d 165. 9 ANALYSIS 10 Without probable cause for an arrest, a police officer may conduct an 11 investigatory detention upon a citizen wh en the officer possesses reasonable and 12 articulable suspicion to believe “that criminal activity may be afoot.” Terry v. Ohio , 13 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). In determining wh ether an officer had such reasonable 14 suspicion, “the relevant inquiry is not wh ether particular conduct is innocent or guilty, 15 but the degree of suspicion that attaches to particular types of noncriminal acts.” State 16 v. Watley , 109 N.M. 619, 624, 788 P.2d 375, 380 (Ct. App. 1989) (internal quotation 17 marks and citation omitted). In order to justify such a stop, the State must be able to 18 point to “specific and articulable facts, ” and rational inferen ces from those facts, 194 which would give a reasonable person cause to be suspicious of criminal activity. Id. ; 1 see State v. Pallor , 1996-NMCA-083, ¶ 12, 122 N.M. 232, 923 P.2d 559. In such an 2 inquiry, we make no distinction betweenstops conducted on vehicles and those 3 conducted of persons on foot. Bothrequire reasonable suspicion. Compare Watley , 4 109 N.M. at 624, 788 P.2d at 380 (discussing reasonable suspicion of a vehicle), with 5 State v. Cobbs , 103 N.M. 623, 626, 711 P.2d 900, 903 (Ct. App. 1985) (discussing 6 reasonable suspicion of persons on foot who entered a vehicle and drove away). 7 “Unsupported intuition and inarticulate hunches are” insufficient. Cobbs , 103 N.M. 8 at 626-27, 711 P.2d at 903-04. 9 In this case, substantial evidence supports the district court’s finding that police 10 had reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant . As we stated above, the undercover 11 officer observed a woman he knew to be a prostitute attempting to catch the attention 12 of passing vehicles. When she finally su cceeded in attracting the driver of a Chevy 13 truck, she got in and rode away. The truc k then executed several maneuvers that were 14 consistent with measures used by criminals to avoid detection. Moments later, the 15 truck pulled up to a pay phone, on which the prostitute made a quick call. The truck 16 drove away again, and when it finally stopped, it was met by Defendant’s Cadillac. 17 The prostitute exited the truck and entere d Defendant’s Cadillac. She sat in the 18 Cadillac less than one minute, got out, reentere d the truck, and rode away again. The 195 officer who witnessed these events testifie d they were consistent, in his experience, 1 with a narcotics transaction involving two vehicles in which a prostitute is commonly 2 used as a go-between. In this case, those two vehicles were the truck and the Cadillac, 3 and this fact, when considered alongside th e other circumstances known to the officer, 4 created reasonable suspicion to stop either vehicle. We affirm. 5 CONCLUSION 6 For the reasons set forth herein, we hol d that substantial evidence supports the 7 district court’s determination that th e stop of Defendant’s Cadillac was lawful. 8 IT IS SO ORDERED. 9

10 RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Judge 11 WE CONCUR: 12

13 JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge 14

15 MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge 16