FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DALIA RASHDAN (MOHAMED),

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

MARC GEISSBERGER; EUGENE

LABARRE; AI B. STREACKER;

FOROUD HAKIM; NADER A.

NADERSHAHI; PATRICK J. FERRILLO,

JR.; LEIGH ANDERSON; JEFF MILES;

DANIEL J. BENDER; LOLA GIUSTI;

CRAIG YARBOROUGH; DOES 1–50;

UNIVERSITY OF THE PACIFIC,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 12-16305

D.C. No.

4:10-cv-00634-

SBA

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Saundra B. Armstrong, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted August 15, 2014*

San Francisco, California

Filed August 26, 2014

* The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
2 RASHDAN V. GEISSBERGER

Before: M. Margaret McKeown and Richard R. Clifton,

Circuit Judges, and David Alan Ezra, District Judge.**

Opinion by Judge McKeown

SUMMARY***

Employment Discrimination

The panel affirmed the district court’s summary judgment

on a claim of national origin discrimination in violation of

Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

Joining other circuits, the panel held that the McDonnell

Douglasframework for disparate treatment claims under Title

VII applied to the Title VI claim. Under this analysis, the

plaintiff did not establish a prima facie case of national origin

discrimination.

** The Honorable David A. Ezra, District Judge for the U.S. District

Court for the District of Hawaii, sitting by designation.

 

*** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
RASHDAN V. GEISSBERGER 3

COUNSEL

Jay T. Jambeck and Mandy G. Leigh, Leigh Law Group, San

Francisco, California, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Michael J. Vartain and Kathryn J. Burke, Vartain Law Group,

San Francisco, California, for Defendants-Appellees.

OPINION

McKEOWN, Circuit Judge:

Dalia Rashdan (Mohamed) was enrolled in a dentistry

program for international students at the University of the

Pacific. She appeals from the district court’s grant of

summary judgment in favor of the University and several

instructors and administrators on her claim of national origin

discrimination in violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act

of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d et seq. We join our sister

circuits in holding that the McDonnell Douglas framework

for disparate treatment claims under Title VII applies to

Rashdan’s Title VI claim. Under this analysis, Rashdan’s

claim fails because she did not establish a prima facie case of

national origin discrimination.

BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Rashdan, an Egyptian dentist, was enrolled in a two-year

International Dental Studies Program to credential her for

practice in the United States. Three months before

graduation, Rashdan followed her clinical supervisor’s

instructions to seat a crown, but the procedure was

unsuccessful. After the head of the restorative dentistry
4 RASHDAN V. GEISSBERGER

program, Dr. Geissberger, heard from a colleague about the

failed crown seating, he told Rashdan—within earshot of

other faculty, students, and patients—that her “clinical work

on the patient . . . was ‘Third World Dentistry.’”

Offended by the remark, Rashdan confronted Geissberger

in his office, explaining that the crown-seating procedure was

her clinical supervisor’s idea and that she was simply

carrying it out as his student. Geissberger told her that the

procedure was “nowhere in the syllabus.” Rashdan again

explained that her clinical supervisor had proposed the

procedure and that she “did not feel that it was [her] place to

question the direction of a respected faculty member.” 

Geissberger responded: “It’s still Third World Dentistry.” 

Rashdan replied: “I am offended by that remark.” 

Geissberger then asked her where she was from and, when

she said Egypt, he stated that Egypt was “not a Third World

country.” Rashdan retorted: “Yes it is.” Geissberger insisted:

“No it’s not and it’s still Third World Dentistry.” Rashdan

ended the conversation by saying: “Yes it is. And in any case

I learned this Third World Dentistry in your First World

clinic.”

Shortly after her exchange with Geissberger, another

supervisor, Dr. Hakim, greeted Rashdan by saying, “What’s

up, TW?” Rashdan looked puzzled, so Hakim clarified: “Oh

come on! Don’t you get it? . . . Third World?” A few

months later, Rashdan sent Hakim an effusive thank you

e-mail for assisting her with a procedure, which she signed

“Dalia Rashdan Mohamed a.k.a. T.W.”

Four days before graduation, Rashdan was informed that

despite her more than adequate performance in course work,

she was not recommended for graduation and that she would
RASHDAN V. GEISSBERGER 5

have to remediate in restorative dentistry and removable

prosthodontics. Rashdan entered an additional quarter of

clinical work at no extra cost during which her performance

did not improve; evaluators stated that she was actively

harming patients and her performance was “clinically

unacceptable.” Geissberger and other faculty exchanged

emails discussing her poor performance, attempting to come

up with a “strategy” to ensure that Rashdan would not

practice dentistry in the United States until she could do so

safely.

The faculty settled on a recommendation that Rashdan

pursue an additional quarter of remedial work on models,

after which she could return to clinical work on patients. 

Geissberger informed Rashdan of the recommendation and

called a meeting to discuss it with her, but the day before the

meeting, Rashdan submitted a request for absence. The

meeting went on without Rashdan, and the faculty sent her a

proposed remediation plan, echoing the earlier

recommendation and communicating the faculty’s hope that

Rashdan would “consider returning to school at [her] earliest

convenience to fulfill the requirements of the [remediation]

plan and earn [her] degree.” When Rashdan did not respond,

a committee accepted the plan on her behalf, and she was

notified of a right of appeal. Rather than appeal the plan or

begin the recommended remediation, Rashdan took a leave of

absence, did not return to school, and filed this lawsuit.

ANALYSIS

I. Title VI Framework

Title VI provides that “[n]o person in the United States

shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be
6 RASHDAN V. GEISSBERGER

excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or

be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity

receiving Federal financial assistance.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. 

Similarly, Title VII prohibits an employer from

“discriminat[ing] against any individual . . . because of such

individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.

Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), the Supreme Court “set forth the

basic allocation of burdens and order of presentation of proof

in a Title VII case alleging discriminatory treatment.” Tex.

Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252–53

(1981).

First, the plaintiff has the burden of proving

by the preponderance of the evidence a prima

facie case of discrimination. Second, if the

plaintiff succeeds in proving the prima facie

case, the burden shifts to the defendant to

articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reason for the employee’s rejection. Third,

should the defendant carry this burden, the

plaintiff must then have an opportunity to

prove by a preponderance of the evidence that

the legitimate reasons offered by the

defendant were not its true reasons, but were

a pretext for discrimination.

Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

Although we have yet to consider whether McDonnell

Douglas applies to Title VI disparate treatment claims, we

have “look[ed] to” Title VII doctrines to analyze other Title

VI claims. See, e.g., Darensburg v. Metro. Transp. Comm’n,

636 F.3d 511, 519 (9th Cir. 2011) (disparate impact). We
RASHDAN V. GEISSBERGER 7

now join the other circuits in concluding that McDonnell

Douglas also applies to Title VI disparate treatment claims. 

See, e.g., Gazarov ex rel. Gazarov v. Diocese of Erie, 80 F.

App’x 202, 203–05 (3d Cir. 2003) (opinion); Bryant v. Indep.

Sch. Dist. No. I-38 of Garvin Cnty., Okla., 334 F.3d 928,

929–30 (10th Cir. 2003); Fuller v. Rayburn, 161 F.3d 516,

518 (8th Cir. 1998); Ga. State Conference of Branches of

NAACP v. State of Ga., 775 F.2d 1403, 1417 (11th Cir. 1985),

abrogated on other grounds by Lee v. Etowah Cnty. Bd. of

Educ., 963 F.2d 1416, 1419 n.3 (11th Cir. 1992).

II. Applying McDonnell Douglas to Rashdan’s Title VI

Claim

Although “[t]he requisite degree of proof necessary to

establish a prima facie case for [a] Title VII . . . claim[] on

summary judgment is minimal and does not even need to rise

to the level of a preponderance of the evidence,” Rashdan’s

claim fails. Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 889 (9th

Cir. 1994). On de novo review, the undisputed facts viewed

in the light most favorable to Rashdan do not “give[] rise to

an inference of unlawful discrimination.” See Godwin v.

Hunt Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d 1217, 1219–20 (9th Cir. 1998)

(internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).

Evidence of discriminatory motive can be direct or

indirect. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256 (citing McDonnell

Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804–05). “Direct evidence is evidence

which, if believed, proves the fact [of discriminatory animus]

without inference or presumption.” Vasquez v. Cnty. of L.A.,

349 F.3d 634, 640 (9th Cir. 2003) (alteration in original)

(internal quotation marks omitted). Rashdan’s direct

evidence of discriminatory intent—Geissberger’s comment

that her work was “Third World dentistry,” Hakim’s
8 RASHDAN V. GEISSBERGER

reference to her as “TW,” and the discussion of a “strategy”

about how to deal with her subpar clinical performance—do

not support a claim of discriminatory animus. To be sure, the

“Third World” reference was an offensive, insensitive, and

politically incorrect jab; it was directed, however, at the

procedure, not Rashdan’s national origin. See Stallcop v.

Kaiser Found. Hosps., 820 F.2d 1044, 1051 (9th Cir. 1987)

(“[D]erogatory ethnic statements, unless excessive and

opprobrious, are insufficient to establish a case of national

origin discrimination.”). In context, construing all inferences

in favor of Rashdan, Geissberger’s statement about “Third

World Dentistry,” referred to the procedure that Rashdan’s

supervisor ordered. Rashdan acknowledges that no one

affiliated with the Universitymade any disparaging comment

about Egypt or its people, customs, culture, religious

practices, or traditions, and she referred to herself as “TW” in

an e-mail to Hakim. Rashdan also offers no link between

statements about a “strategy” to address her performance and

any comments about the “Third World.”

Rashdan’s indirect evidence of allegedly similarly

situated students who were permitted to graduate also fails to

establish a prima facie case of discriminatory animus. 

Rashdan offers grades, clinical competency ratings, and

faculty comments for certain students whom she claims

performed as well or worse than she did, but Rashdan offers

no context to evaluate this data. A laundry list of scores

proves nothing in the absence of context or explanation. See

Dandy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 388 F.3d 263, 274 (7th

Cir. 2004) (“[The plaintiff] has given this court no concrete

way to measure the candidates she alleges were unlawfully

promoted over her and instead has taken a ‘kitchen sink’

approach to her appeal by listing every white male employee

promoted to a rank higher than full-time supervisor without
RASHDAN V. GEISSBERGER 9

identifying any coherent method of analysis.”). Simply

offering up clinical scores of students who graduated and

students sent for their own tailor-made remediation programs

is insufficient to meet a minimum threshold of identifying

students who are similarly situated to Rashdan. These

comparators miss the mark of establishing anything, let alone

a category of similarly situated individuals.

Rashdan’s direct and indirect evidence of discriminatory

motive falls short of establishing a prima facie case.1

AFFIRMED.

1 We also note that even if Rashdan had established a prima facie case

of discrimination, her claimnonetheless fails because she did not rebut the

legitimate, non-discriminatory justification for the additional remediation,

namely that she was performing very poorly in clinical restorative

dentistry. See Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 641–42.