1998 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

8-26-1998

United States v. Williamson

Precedential or Non-Precedential:

Docket 97-3692

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Recommended Citation

"United States v. Williamson" (1998). 1998 Decisions. Paper 206.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1998/206
Filed August 26, 1998 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

No. 97-3692 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

v. 

STEPHEN A. WILLIAMSON, 

 Appellant 

On Appeal From the United States District Court 

For the Western District of Pennsylvania 

(D.C. Crim. No. 97-00077) 

Submitted Under Third Circuit Rule 34.1(a) 

July 16, 1998 

Before: BECKER, Chief Judge, and STAPLETON and 

WEIS, Circuit Judges 

(Opinion Filed: August 26, 1998) 

 LINDA L. KELLY, ESQUIRE 

 United States Attorney 

 BONNIE R. SCHLUETER, ESQUIRE 

 Assistant U.S. Attorney 

 MARY BETH BUCHANAN, ESQUIRE 

 Assistant U.S. Attorney 

 Office of United States Attorney 

 633 United States Post Office 

 & Courthouse 

 Pittsburgh, PA 15219 

 Attorneys for Appellee 
 SHELLEY STARK, ESQUIRE 

 Federal Public Defender 

 KAREN S. GERLACH, ESQUIRE 

 Office of Federal Public Defender 

 960 Penn Avenue 

 415 Convention Tower 

 Pittsburgh, PA 15222 

 Attorney for Appellant 

OPINION OF THE COURT 

BECKER, Chief Circuit Judge. 

This sentencing appeal presents the narrow issue 

whether the two-level upward adjustment for obstruction of 

justice under United States Sentencing Guideline S 3C1.1 is 

mandatory once the sentencing court has determined that 

the factual predicates for the enhancement have been met. 

The appellant, Stephen A. Williamson, contends that it is 

not. We hold, however, consistent with all the other circuits 

that have previously interpreted this Guideline, that it is. 

Accordingly the district court's judgment imposing sentence 

on Williamson will be affirmed. 

I. BACKGROUND 

The narrow scope of Williamson's appeal renders the

facts underlying his conviction and sentencing largely 

tangential to our decision, hence we need only outline 

them. Williamson was convicted of bank robbery following 

a jury trial and was thereafter sentenced to sixty-three 

months imprisonment to be followed by a three-year term 

of supervised release. In calculating the applicable 

Sentencing Guideline range, the district court determined 

that Williamson had perjured himself at trial -- afinding 

which the district court believed rendered the imposition of 

a two-point offense level enhancement for obstruction of 

justice mandatory. On appeal, Williamson challenges this 

aspect of his sentence. Notably, however, he does not argue 

that the district court erred in determining that he 

committed perjury at his trial or that his perjurious 

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testimony did not amount to an attempt to obstruct justice 

within the applicable guideline provision. Rather, 

Williamson appeals solely upon the narrow ground that the 

district court erroneously believed that it was required to 

apply the obstruction of justice enhancement once it 

determined on the facts that Williamson had committed 

perjury.1 

II. DISCUSSION 

Section 3C1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines provides: 

 If the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or 

 attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of 

 justice during the investigation, prosecution, or 

 sentencing of the instant offense, increase the offense 

 level by 2 levels. 

U.S.S.G. S 3C1.1. Williamson argues that the failure of this 

Guideline to include words such as "must" or "shall" 

renders it ambiguous as to whether the increase in offense 

level must automatically follow a determination that the 

defendant has engaged in qualifying conduct. This 

ambiguity, he contends, requires application of the rule of 

lenity and thus the resolution of all doubts regarding the 

Guideline's construction in his favor. We disagree, finding 

nothing ambiguous about U.S.S.G. S 3C1.1. Rather, the 

logical structure of the Guideline ("if A, then B") clearly 

commands that a definite result -- a two level increase in 

offense level -- must follow the occurrence of a stated 

conditional event -- a finding that the defendant willfully, 

obstructed . . . the administration of justice. This reading is 

supported by the language of a recent Supreme Court

opinion and is shared by every circuit court of appeals that 

has addressed the issue. 

_________________________________________________________________ 

1. The district court had jurisdiction over this criminal matter under 18 

U.S.C. S 3231. We exercise jurisdiction over the appeal under 28 U.S.C. 

S 1291 and 18 U.S.C. S 3742. Our review of the district court's 

construction and interpretation of U.S.S.G. S 3C1.1, or any sentencing 

guideline, is plenary. See United States v. Powell, 113 F.3d 464, 467 (3d 

Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. #6D6D 6D#, 118 S. Ct. 454 (1997). 

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In United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 113 S. Ct. 

1111 (1993), the Supreme Court held that a defendant's 

due process rights are not violated when a district court 

enhances a defendant's sentence under U.S.S.G. S 3C1.1 

based on a finding that the defendant committed perjury 

(as opposed to other forms of obstruction of justice) at trial. 

While the question whether such an enhancement, if 

permissible, was mandatory or discretionary was not

directly before the Court, its opinion concluded by noting 

that "[u]pon a proper determination that the accused has 

committed perjury at trial, an enhancement of sentence is 

required by the Sentencing Guidelines." 507 U.S. at 98, 113 

S. Ct. at 1119 (emphasis added). In accord with this 

language, the First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, 

Eighth and Ninth circuits have all held that the obstruction 

of justice enhancement is mandatory once the sentencing 

court has determined that the factual predicates for the 

enhancement have been met. See United States v. Tracy, 36 

F.3d 199, 201 (1st Cir. 1994) ("the obstruction of justice 

enhancement is mandatory under U.S.S.G. S 3C1.1 where 

the defendant willfully obstructed or attempted to obstruct 

the administration of justice during the prosecution of the 

case"); United States v. Hernandez, 83 F.3d 582, 585 (2d 

Cir. 1996) ("Once a court finds that obstruction of justice 

took place, however, the two-level enhancement is 

mandatory"); United States v. Ashers, 968 F.2d 411, 414 

(4th Cir. 1992) (noting, in the context of obstruction of 

justice enhancement, that "application of an enhancement 

to the offense level is mandatory, as opposed to 

discretionary, in the event the defendant engaged in 

conduct that is encompassed by a guideline providing for 

an enhancement"); United States v. Velgar-Vivero, 8 F.3d 

236, 242 (5th Cir. 1993) ("The increase is not discretionary. 

If the court finds the defendant obstructed justice, it must 

impose the two point increase"); United States v. Medina, 

992 F.2d 573, 591 (6th Cir. 1993) (discussing obstruction 

of justice enhancement and noting that "as we have 

explained previously, once a sentencing court makes a 

factual finding as to the applicability of a particular 

adjustment provision, the court has no discretion, but must 

increase the offense level by the amount called for in the 

applicable provision") (internal quotation marks and 

citations omitted); United States v. Zaragoza, 123 F.3d 472, 

485 (7th Cir. 1997) ("as the plain language of the Guideline 

reflects, the obstruction enhancement is mandated where 

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the defendant has engaged in qualifying conduct"); Hall v. 

United States, 46 F.3d 855, 859 (8th Cir. 1995) ("If Hall 

threatened the witness, the district court had no choice but 

to impose the sentence enhancement that the Guidelines 

mandate"); United States v. Ancheta, 38 F.3d 1114, 1118 

(9th Cir. 1994) (quoting language of S 3C1.1 and concluding 

"[t]his language is mandatory, not discretionary").

We join in this broad consensus interpreting the plain 

language of section 3C1.1, and accordingly hold that the 

two-level enhancement is mandatory once a district court 

determines that a defendant has obstructed justice.

The judgment of the district court will be affirmed. 

A True Copy: 

Teste: 

 Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 

 for the Third Circuit 

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