Slip Op. 24-54

UNITED STATES 

COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 

Court No. 22-00107 

SAHAMITR PRESSURE CONTAINER PLC., 

Plaintiff, 

and 

WORLDWIDE DISTRIBUTION, LLLP, 

Plaintiff-Intervenor, 

v. 

UNITED STATES, 

Defendant, 

and 

WORTHINGTON INDUSTRIES, 

Defendant-Intervenor.

Before: M. Miller Baker, Judge 

OPINION 

[Sustaining the Department of Commerce’s final determination.] 

Dated: May 2, 2024 

David E. Bond, Ron Kendler, and Danica Harvey, 

White & Case LLP of Washington, DC, on the briefs 

for Plaintiff. 
Ct. No. 22-00107 Page 2 

Gregory S. Menegaz, J. Kevin Horgan, and Alexandra 

H. Salzman, deKieffer & Horgan, PLLC, of Washington, DC, on the briefs for Plaintiff-Intervenor. 

Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General; Patricia M. McCarthy, Director; Tara K. 

Hogan, Assistant Director; and Alison S. Vicks, Trial 

Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice of Washington, DC, 

on the brief for Defendant. Of counsel on the brief was 

Spencer Neff, Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel for 

Trade Enforcement & Compliance, U.S. Department of 

Commerce of Washington, DC. 

Paul C. Rosenthal; R. Alan Luberda; David C. Smith, 

Jr.; and Matthew G. Pereira, Kelley Drye & Warren 

LLP of Washington, DC, on the brief for DefendantIntervenor. 

Baker, Judge: In this antidumping case, a foreign 

producer of propane canisters and a domestic importer 

challenge the Department of Commerce’s recalculation of the former’s proffered sales expenses. Finding 

the agency’s methodology supported by substantial evidence, the court sustains it. 

I 

This matter arises from a Commerce order 

imposing tariffs on propane canisters. Steel Propane 

Cylinders from the People’s Republic of China and 

Thailand: Amended Final Determination of Sales at 

Less Than Fair Value and Antidumping Duty Orders, 

84 Fed. Reg. 41,703 (Dep’t Commerce Aug. 15, 2019). 

Sahamitr Pressure Container PLC, a Thai producer 
Ct. No. 22-00107 Page 3 

and exporter, and Worthington Industries, a domestic 

manufacturer, each requested an administrative 

review of that order as it pertains to Thailand. 

Appx1007; see also Antidumping or Countervailing 

Duty Order, Finding, or Suspended Investigation; 

Opportunity to Request Administrative Review, 

85 Fed. Reg. 47,167, 47,168 (Dep’t Commerce Aug. 4, 

2020). 

The Department obliged and opened a review covering a 19-month period in 2019 and 2020. Initiation 

of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Administrative Reviews, 85 Fed. Reg. 63,081, 63,085 (Dep’t Commerce Oct. 6, 2020). It selected Sahamitr as the sole 

respondent. Appx6013. 

As relevant here, Commerce requested that Sahamitr report sales costs using a transaction-specific 

method and cautioned that providing such information 

on an “allocated basis (e.g., on an average basis)” was 

permissible only when those expenses could not “be 

tied to a specific sale.” Appx6027. The Department further warned that allocated reporting would be acceptable only if the company could “demonstrate that the 

allocation is calculated on as specific a basis as is feasible (e.g., on a customer-specific basis, product-specific basis, and/or monthly-specific basis, etc.) and is 

not unreasonably distortive.” Id. (emphasis added). 

Sahamitr nonetheless reported its certification expenses1 for U.S. sales on an allocated basis by applying 

1 Third parties test and certify the canisters as safe for use. 

See ECF 29-1, at 3. 
Ct. No. 22-00107 Page 4 

a “certification-fee ratio” to “customers’ gross unit 

prices to calculate the [reported] per-unit certification 

expense.” Appx2352. The company did not explain why 

it couldn’t disclose such costs using a transaction-specific system or why its method wasn’t distortive. 

At Worthington’s prompting, Commerce directed 

Sahamitr to explain why it “cannot report the [certification] price adjustment or expense on a more specific 

basis” and why its “allocation methodology does not 

cause inaccuracies or distortions.” Appx3450. 

The company responded that it 

pays its certification fees to outside vendors after [its] production and sale of the merchandise 

under review, [and] the company cannot attribute individual certification-related expenses to 

individual sales invoices. The expense-allocation 

provided is the most accurate basis on which 

[the company] is able to report [period-of-review] 

certification expenses using the books and records the company maintains in the normal 

course of business . . . . 

Appx3654. Sahamitr also observed that “the Department accepted this approach in the underlying . . . investigation.” Id. The company again, however, failed 

to explain why its allocation method did not cause distortions. 

Once again at Worthington’s importuning, the Department then requested that Sahamitr “calculate a 

monthly, per unit, certification expense for the [period 

of review] for the U.S., and, separately, the home 
Ct. No. 22-00107 Page 5 

market.” Appx5587. It responded with a calculation 

that showed wide fluctuations in costs from month to 

month. Appx5607. 

In its preliminary determination, Commerce found 

that Sahamitr’s (second) proffered allocation of its certification costs was distortive 

due to timing differences between when [the 

company] produces and sells cylinders and when 

it records the certification expenses associated 

with those sales. These timing differences create 

monthly fluctuations in [Sahamitr’s] reported 

certification[] expenses (e.g., two months of expenses allocated to a single month and no fee expenses allocated to other months). 

Appx1025. Thus, the Department “calculated a [period-of-review]-wide certification expense ratio . . . rather than relying on [the company’s] reported allocation methods.” Id. Commerce carried over that analysis to its final determination, Appx1323–1324, which 

(combined with other unchallenged aspects of that decision) resulted in a dumping margin of 13.89%, 

Appx1630. 

II 

Invoking jurisdiction conferred by 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1581(c), Sahamitr sued under 19 U.S.C. 

§ 1516a(a)(2)(B)(iii) to challenge Commerce’s final determination. ECF 2. Worldwide Distribution LLLP, a 

domestic importer of Sahamitr’s propane canisters, intervened as a plaintiff, ECF 23, and Worthington intervened in support of the government, ECF 18. 
Ct. No. 22-00107 Page 6 

Sahamitr (ECF 29) and Worldwide (ECF 30) both 

moved for judgment on the agency record. See USCIT 

R. 56.2. The government (ECF 31) and Worthington 

(ECF 33) opposed. Sahamitr (ECF 58) and Worldwide 

(ECF 60) replied. The court decides the motions on the 

papers. 

In § 1516a(a)(2) actions such as this, “[t]he court 

shall hold unlawful any determination, finding, or conclusion found . . . to be unsupported by substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise not in accordance 

with law.” 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i). That is, the 

question is not whether the court would have reached 

the same decision on the same record—rather, it is 

whether the administrative record as a whole permits 

Commerce’s conclusion. 

Substantial evidence has been defined as more 

than a mere scintilla, as such relevant evidence 

as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate 

to support a conclusion. To determine if substantial evidence exists, we review the record as a 

whole, including evidence that supports as well 

as evidence that fairly detracts from the substantiality of the evidence. 

Nippon Steel Corp. v. United States, 337 F.3d 1373, 

1379 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (cleaned up). 

III 

To determine whether merchandise is being 

dumped in the U.S., the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, requires Commerce to figure out the product’s 

“normal value,” 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)—the home 
Ct. No. 22-00107 Page 7 

market price, see Hung Vuong Corp. v. United States, 

483 F. Supp. 3d 1321, 1334 n.6 (CIT 2020)—and then 

compare that figure to the “export price or constructed 

export price” at which the product is sold to the importer, see id. at 1334 n.34 (explaining “export price” 

and “constructed export price”). The Act further directs the Department to adjust the normal value of 

such goods by the amount of “any difference” between 

that figure and the export price that “is established to 

the satisfaction” of the agency “to be wholly or partly 

due to . . . differences in the circumstances of sale.” Id.

§ 1677b(a)(6)(C)(iii). 

As described above, Sahamitr sought such an adjustment for costs associated with obtaining the requisite safety certifications for its propane cylinders. The 

Department requires that expenses be reported on a 

transaction-specific basis except when doing so “is not 

feasible, provided the Secretary is satisfied that the allocation method used does not cause inaccuracies or 

distortions.” 19 C.F.R. § 351.401(g)(1). When a respondent uses an allocated, rather than transactionspecific, method, that party has the burden of showing 

that the “allocation is calculated on as specific a basis 

as is feasible” and “explain[ing] why the allocation 

methodology used does not cause inaccuracies or distortions.” Id. § 351.401(g)(2). 

Sahamitr and Worldwide argue that the former’s 

recalculation of its certification expenses (performed 

at Commerce’s request) was as specific as feasible 

given the company’s records. See ECF 29-1, at 10–11; 

ECF 30-1, at 4–5; see also 19 C.F.R. § 351.401(g)(3) (requiring the Department to evaluate the feasibility of 
Ct. No. 22-00107 Page 8 

transaction-specific reporting based on the “records 

maintained by the party in question in the ordinary 

course of its business”). They also contend that the 

company’s recalculation of its expenses was more specific than the period-of-review-wide recalculation 

Commerce adopted, and that the agency violated 

19 C.F.R. § 351.401(g)(1)–(2) by choosing a less-specific calculation methodology. ECF 29-1, at 10–11; 

ECF 30-1, at 4–5.2

Sahamitr and Worldwide misapprehend the regulation, which requires the “party seeking to report an 

expense . . . on an allocated basis” to do so “on as specific a basis as is feasible.” 19 C.F.R. § 351.401(g)(2) 

(emphasis added). Commerce, on the other hand, “is 

not required to accept [expense] adjustments on an allocated basis.” NSK Ltd. v. United States, 510 F.3d 

1375, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing 19 C.F.R. 

§ 351.401(g)(1)). Instead, as the “master of antidumping law,” the Department has wide discretion to “select[] and develop[] proper methodologies.” Thai Pineapple Pub. Co. v. United States, 187 F.3d 1362, 1365 

(Fed. Cir. 1999) (quoting Daewoo Elecs. Co. v. United 

States, 6 F.3d 1511, 1516 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). 

Here, the Department exercised that discretion by 

selecting an allocation method that provided Sahamitr 

2 In its reply brief, Sahamitr argues for the first time that 

it was unreasonable for the Department to reject the company’s initial expense calculation for this review as insufficiently specific when the agency previously accepted an 

identical methodology in its original investigation. ECF 58, 

at 5–6, 9–10. The court declines to entertain this new argument. 
Ct. No. 22-00107 Page 9 

the opportunity to obtain a price adjustment for certification expenses, while avoiding the distortions reflected in the company’s recalculation. See Appx1324 

(explaining that Sahamitr’s recomputation “continues 

to fail to account for months in which certification expenses are overreported (e.g., the revised method continues to allocate multiple months of expenses to a single month)”). 

That brings us to the elephant in the courtroom 

that neither Sahamitr’s nor Worldwide’s opening brief 

directly confronts—Commerce’s finding that the 

former’s recalculated reporting was distorted because 

it resulted in months with zeroed-out certification 

expenses. Appx1025. That unchallenged determination is supported by substantial evidence. As the 

record shows, there were significant fluctuations in 

Sahamitr’s recalculated expenses from month to 

month, including some months with zero expenses. See

Appx5607. The Department therefore reasonably 

applied a methodology that allowed Sahamitr’s export 

price to be properly adjusted, but which did not feature 

those distortions. Appx1323–1324. 

The closest Sahamitr’s opening brief comes to challenging the finding that the company’s monthly-based 

calculation was distortive is the plaintive assertion 

that it’s “unclear why [Sahamitr’s] certification expenses—reported per the Department’s instructions—

were so unreasonably inaccurate that an alternate allocation methodology was warranted.” ECF 29-1, 

at 11. Commerce, however, explained precisely why it 

found that calculation distortive: The “timing differences between when [Sahamitr] produces and sells 
Ct. No. 22-00107 Page 10 

cylinders and when it records the certification expenses associated with those sales . . . create monthly 

fluctuations in [the company’s] reported certification[] 

expenses (e.g., two months of expenses allocated to a 

single month and no fee expenses allocated to other 

months).” Appx1025. Sahamitr fails to articulate how 

or why that determination is unreasonable or otherwise not supported by substantial evidence. 

The company’s more thorough reply brief argues 

that the finding that its monthly-based calculations 

were distortive, Appx1025, is unreasonable because 

fluctuations are inherent in such computations. 

ECF 58, at 6–7. Similarly, it maintains that the Department unreasonably rejected “an alternative allocation that [Sahamitr] proposed in its case brief to address the purported concerns about ‘timing differences.’” Id. at 8. The company further contends that 

“the antidumping questionnaire itself presumes differences based on timing when it directs respondents 

to ‘demonstrate that the allocation is calculated on as 

specific a basis as is feasible (e.g., on a customer-specific basis, product-specific basis, and/or monthlyspecific basis, etc.).’” Id. at 8–9 (boldface Sahamitr’s) 

(quoting Appx6027). 

The court rejects these new arguments, not only because they’re untimely, but also because they’re wrong 

on the merits. The regulation expressly authorizes 

Commerce to disregard a respondent’s allocated expense reporting, even if it is as specific as possible, if 

the Department concludes that it “cause[s] inaccuracies or distortions.” 19 C.F.R. § 351.401(g)(1). Contrary 

to Sahamitr’s specificity–über alles reading, specificity 
Ct. No. 22-00107 Page 11 

in allocated reporting under the regulation is merely a 

means to an end, not an end in itself. 

* * * 

The court denies the motions for judgment on the 

agency record and sustains Commerce’s final determination. A separate judgment will issue. See USCIT 

R. 58(a). 

Dated: May 2, 2024 /s/ M. Miller Baker

New York, NY M. Miller Baker, Judge