NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 

23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, 

as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties 

and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's 

decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire 

court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. 

A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 

2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted 

above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 

n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

23-P-293

THE PATRIOT GROUP, LLC

vs.

STEVEN C. FUSTOLO & others.1

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

After a bench trial on a complaint for civil contempt, a 

judge of the Superior Court found that the defendant, Steven C. 

Fustolo, violated a 2012 permanent injunction that imposed 

certain spending limits on Fustolo's living expenses and 

required him to document his expenditures until he satisfied an 

outstanding $20.4 million judgment in favor of the plaintiff,

1 Winchester Savings Bank was a trustee process defendant. 

The following defendants were joined solely on reach and apply 

claims: James J. Fox & Company LLP, National Tax Institute, 

Inc., CPE Meetings, Inc., Terrace Hall Partners LLC, Five High 

Street LLC, Huntington Properties, Inc., Property Trust 

Corporation, Huntington Properties Holding Company, L.L.C., 23-

25 Highland Avenue, LLC, Fustolo Development LLC, and Atlas 

Garden Supply LLC. Fustolo CPE, LLC, was later added as a reach 

and apply defendant pursuant to the judgment on the contempt 

complaint.
2

the Patriot Group, LLC (Patriot). A judgment entered that, 

among other things, ordered Fustolo to provide documentation of

his and his wife's annual expenditures from 2012 forward, 

enjoined Fustolo and his wife from spending more than $7,000 per 

month on ordinary living expenses, and added a newly-formed

entity, Fustolo CPE, LLC (Fustolo CPE), as a reach and apply 

defendant.2 By separate order, the judge also awarded Patriot 

$15,000 in attorney's fees.

On appeal, Fustolo argues that the judge erred in finding 

Fustolo in violation of the injunction (but not in contempt)

both because the requirement that Fustolo provide annual

documentation of his expenditures was not clear and unequivocal,

and because Fustolo was not obligated to comply with the 

injunction during two bankruptcy stays entered in this matter. 

Fustolo also argues that the judge exceeded his authority by

clarifying the injunction to require Fustolo to provide annual 

accountings dating back to 2012, by adding to Fustolo's wife and 

Fustolo CPE to the injunction, and by awarding attorney's fees

to Patriot. We affirm.

2 Although Fustolo's notice of appeal also identifies a May 

31, 2022 order for judgment, and an August 23, 2022 order on 

Patriot's motion to compel Fustolo's compliance with the order 

for judgment, we treat those two orders as subsumed in the 

judgment on the contempt complaint dated January 6, 2023.
3

Background. We set forth those facts that are undisputed, 

as well as the facts found by the judge after trial. We reserve 

certain facts for our later discussion.

1. Underlying judgment and injunction. Fustolo has been a 

certified public accountant (CPA) since the 1980s. He has 

wholly owned and operated businesses involving real estate 

development, publishing, and continuing professional education 

for CPAs, attorneys, and other tax professionals. In 2007, 

Fustolo created a company to hold and develop a property located 

in the city of Revere. That development company secured a $13.6 

million loan from Patriot, a private lender. The company 

subsequently defaulted on the loan and Fustolo became liable 

under a personal guaranty.

In February 2010, Patriot brought an action in the Superior 

Court against Fustolo under the guaranty and named several 

companies that are owned by Fustolo as reach and apply 

defendants (Superior Court action).3 In May 2011, a separate and 

final judgment entered against Fustolo in the amount of $20.4 

million. Patriot then moved for entry of a reach and apply 

judgment and permanent injunction under G. L. c. 214, § 3 (6). 

In April 2012, final judgment and a permanent injunction entered 

3 For the names of the reach and apply defendants, see note 

1, supra.
4

against Fustolo and the reach and apply defendants. As relevant 

here, paragraphs two and four of the injunction read as follows:

"2. That Steven C. Fustolo and his respective managers, 

agents, members, partners, nominees, representatives, 

servants, employees, attorneys, and all people in active 

concert or participation with them are permanently 

restrained and enjoined from directly or indirectly 

assigning, alienating, selling, transferring, pledging, 

encumbering, concealing or in any other manner, disposing 

of, diminishing, dissipating, re-directing or otherwise 

instructing the re-direction and/or misapplication of any 

and all intangible properties received by Steven C. Fustolo 

from the Reach and Apply Defendants, except to pay ordinary 

living expenses for mortgage, food and the like, not to 

exceed $84,000 per year or a cumulative average of $7,000 

per month, to be documented to the Plaintiff on an annual 

basis, and to pay ordinary operating expenses for the 

operation of the Reach and Apply Defendants, including but 

not limited to real estate taxes, utilities, insurance 

premiums, payroll (excluding Steven C. Fustolo), payroll 

taxes, occupancy costs, and supplies, or as otherwise 

directed by this Court and from paying any monies directly 

or indirectly to any other person or entity created or 

controlled by Steven C. Fustolo;

. . .

"4. That the Reach and Apply Defendants . . . and all of 

their respective managers, directors, officers, agents, 

partners, members, subsidiaries, nominees, representatives, 

servants, employees and attorneys, and each and every one 

of them, and all people in active concert or participation 

with them, are permanently restrained and enjoined from 

directly or indirectly paying money or any other form of 

compensation or dividend to or for the benefit of Steven C. 

Fustolo, or from altering, amending, modifying, 

hypothecating, assigning, alienating, selling, 

transferring, encumbering, concealing or in any other 

manner, disposing of, diminishing or dissipating the value 

of Steven C. Fustolo's beneficial, equitable, shareholder 

and/or ownership interests in the Reach and Apply 

Defendants. However, the above Reach and Apply Defendants 

may advance funds to Fustolo in an amount not to exceed 

$84,000 per year or a cumulative average of $7,000 per 
5

month to cover his personal living expenses as described 

above in paragraph 2, or to pay the Plaintiff."

2. Bankruptcy matters. Shortly after the injunction 

issued, in 2013, Patriot (and other creditors) brought a chapter 

7 involuntary bankruptcy proceeding against Fustolo. In 2014, 

Patriot (and another creditor) commenced a related adversary 

proceeding against Fustolo, also in bankruptcy court, seeking to 

except certain debts from discharge or, in the alternative, deny 

Fustolo a discharge. After a six-day trial, the bankruptcy 

judge ultimately denied Fustolo's bankruptcy discharge.

While the bankruptcy matters were pending, two automatic 

stays were imposed in the Superior Court action pursuant to 11 

U.S.C. § 362. The stays were in effect from May 2013 to January 

2017, while the matter initially was pending before the 

bankruptcy judge, and from July 2018 to February 2019, after a

remand by the United States Court of Appeals for the First 

Circuit.

3. Contempt action. a. Proceedings. After the first

bankruptcy stay was lifted in 2017, Patriot filed a Superior 

Court complaint for civil contempt against Fustolo and the reach 

and apply defendants.4 Patriot alleged, among other things, that 

Fustolo violated paragraph two of the injunction by spending in 

4 As of May 2018, Fustolo had not made any payments toward 

the outstanding judgment to Patriot.
6

excess of $84,000 per year on ordinary living expenses and 

failing to provide documentation of same; Patriot also alleged 

that Fustolo violated paragraph four by transferring in excess 

of $84,000 per year from the reach and apply defendants or their 

successors to Fustolo.

During the proceedings, Fustolo took the position that he 

complied with the injunction based on his understanding that 

paragraph two only required him to document and limit his living 

expenses if he received intangible property (which, according to 

Fustolo, did not include cash payments) from the reach and apply 

defendants. Fustolo further argued that he complied with 

paragraph four because "money" did not include the repayment of 

loans that Fustolo previously had made to the reach and apply 

defendants, and paragraph four did not impose any documentation 

requirement.

A judge held three days of trial on the contempt complaint 

in May 2018. However, before the trial concluded, the second 

bankruptcy stay was imposed. After that stay was lifted, the 

trial on the contempt complaint resumed for two additional days 

before a different judge in April 2022 (hereinafter, the judge).5

5 The first judge had retired by the time that the trial 

resumed.
7

b. Findings. Following the trial, the judge found as 

follows. Fustolo never provided Patriot with any report or 

disclosure of his expenditures traced to money that he received 

from the reach and apply defendants. Moreover, despite having 

the expertise to do so, Fustolo also did not set up any system 

to track his expenses (ordinary living or otherwise) or the 

funds that he received from the reach and apply defendants after 

the injunction issued. Instead, Fustolo, who had twenty-nine 

business bank accounts and nine personal accounts, comingled 

money from his companies with his personal accounts (including 

those held with his wife). Like the bankruptcy judge, the judge

found that "Fustolo used his businesses to promote fraud. . . . 

Fustolo took money from [reach and apply defendant CPE Meetings, 

Inc.] and other companies when he saw fit, ignoring the 

[injunction] that . . . required Fustolo to document expenses to 

Patriot." In short, the judge found that Fustolo's failure to 

maintain records, books, or accounts precluded his creditors, 

like Patriot, from fully understanding his financial condition

and business transactions.

Based on this conduct, the judge found that Fustolo 

violated the injunction by failing to document his monthly 

expenses to Patriot on an annual basis; however, the judge also 

found that Fustolo was not in contempt because the documentation 
8

requirement concerning cash payments from the reach and apply 

defendants was not "clear and unequivocal." The judge reasoned 

that paragraph four of the injunction -- that limited the

transfer of funds from the reach and apply defendants -- did not 

explicitly include the documentation requirement and the 

requirement was only incorporated through cross-reference to 

paragraph two -- that limited the transfer of intangible assets 

by the reach and apply defendants. Although the judge noted the 

obvious intent of the documentation requirement was to allow 

Patriot to verify that Fustolo had complied with the living 

expense limitations, he concluded that the proper course was to 

clarify the injunction to require Fustolo to document his living 

expenses for each year since the injunction issued.

Unlike the injunction's documentation requirement, the

judge found that paragraph four did include a clear and 

unequivocal command that Fustolo was prohibited from receiving 

funds from the reach and apply defendants exceeding $84,000 per 

year or a cumulative average of $7,000 per month to cover his 

personal expenses as described in paragraph two, i.e.,

"mortgage, food and the like." The judge explained that he had 

"serious suspicions" that Fustolo had exceeded the spending 

limit and had "serious questions about the use of various 

entities to conceal assets or personal spending." However, the 
9

judge found that Patriot was not able to prove a violation of 

the spending limit by clear and convincing evidence at that

juncture through no fault of its own. The judge deferred acting 

on that portion of the complaint until Fustolo furnished Patriot 

with the requisite documentation.6

c. Order for judgment. On May 31, 2022, the judge issued 

an order for judgment (the substance of which entered as a 

judgment on January 6, 2023). The order required Fustolo to 

remedy his violation of the documentation requirement by 

providing Patriot on or before August 31, 2022, "with an 

accounting [demonstrating], on a yearly basis, beginning from 

April 19, 2012, the expenditures from all funds received by 

Fustolo, his wife, and anyone else acting in concert with him, 

and identify the specific source of the funds for each 

expenditure (e.g., from any Reach and Apply Defendant)."

The order also "clarified and modified" the injunction by 

setting forth the following conditions that applied 

prospectively: Fustolo and his wife were restrained from 

directly or indirectly spending more than $7,000 per month on 

ordinary living expenses until the underlying judgment was 

6 Although the judge indicated that he intended to dismiss

the portion of the contempt complaint alleging a violation of 

the spending limit without prejudice, the judgment deferred 

action on that portion of the complaint.
10

satisfied; Fustolo was required to provide a detailed and 

itemized description of the prior year's expenses with 

documentation on August 1st of each year; and Fustolo was 

prohibited from causing any entity he owned or controlled from 

paying him more than $7,000 per month subject to certain 

conditions. The order also set certain fines for any future 

violations of the above conditions, added Fustolo CPE as a reach 

and apply defendant, and permitted Patriot to file a fee 

petition.7

d. Attorney's fees. As authorized by the order for 

judgment, Patriot filed a petition with a supporting affidavit, 

seeking $104,080 in attorney's fees and $24,441.35 in costs. 

The judge awarded $15,000 in attorney's fees by order dated 

January 5, 2023. The judge reasoned that thus far, Patriot had 

only prevailed on the issues of the "failure to report and 

clarification of the court's earlier order."

Discussion. We review the judge's ultimate finding on the 

contempt complaint for abuse of discretion, but we review 

underlying conclusions of law de novo and underlying findings of 

7 In August 2022, Patriot filed a motion to compel Fustolo's 

compliance with the order for judgment. The judge allowed the 

motion, concluding that Fustolo violated the requirement that he 

provide an accounting for the prior year on August 1, 2022.
11

fact for clear error. See Commercial Wharf E. Condominium Ass'n

v. Boston Boat Basin, LLC, 93 Mass. App. Ct. 523, 532 (2018).

1. Violation of injunction. a. Documentation 

requirement. Fustolo first argues that the judge's decision was 

"internally inconsistent" because Fustolo could not be found in 

violation of the documentation requirement when that requirement 

was not clear and unequivocal. Fustolo is correct that to 

support a finding of civil contempt, a plaintiff must prove by 

clear and convincing evidence that the defendant disobeyed "a 

clear and unequivocal command." Birchall, petitioner, 454 Mass. 

837, 853 (2009). "Where the order is ambiguous or the 

disobedience is doubtful, there cannot be a finding of 

contempt." Martinez v. Lynn Hous. Auth., 94 Mass. App. Ct. 702, 

708 (2019), quoting Birchall, petitioner, supra at 852. It

follows then that not every violation of an order constitutes 

contempt. See Smith v. Smith, 93 Mass. App. Ct. 361, 363-364

(2018).

Here, the judge properly applied these principles. He 

found that the injunction imposed a documentation requirement on 

Fustolo, but that the command as written "just barely" fell 

short of constituting a clear and unequivocal command at least 

as related to the cash payments from the reach and apply 

defendants. Given that the language of the injunction was 
12

imprecise, the judge was permitted to "comb relevant parts of 

the record to discern the authoring court's intention," and he 

did just that. Negron-Almeda v. Santiago, 528 F.3d 15, 23 (1st 

Cir. 2008). Consistent with the overall purpose of the 

injunction, the judge concluded that paragraphs two and four 

limited the monthly living expenses that Fustolo could receive 

from the reach and apply defendants. The documentation 

requirement, in turn, was intended to ensure Fustolo's 

compliance with the spending limit and to provide verification 

of same to Patriot (beyond Fustolo's self-reports of 

compliance). As the judge ultimately found, and we agree, 

"[t]here is no reason to think that an order, so drafted, 

intended to allow the serious loophole that Fustolo now seeks to 

exploit."

For these reasons, the judge did not err in finding that 

Fustolo violated the injunction, but that the violation did not 

amount to contempt.8 This is so even if, as Fustolo argues, his 

noncompliance was in good faith based on his own interpretation 

8 To the extent Fustolo asserts that he voluntarily complied 

with the documentation requirement even though he was not 

required to do so, the judge found to the contrary based on 

Fustolo's testimony, and we find no basis to set aside that 

finding. See Demoulas v. Demoulas Super Mkts., Inc., 424 Mass. 

501, 509-510 (1997) (trial judge in best position to judge 

weight and credibility of evidence).
13

of the injunction. See Wooters v. Wooters, 74 Mass. App. Ct. 

839, 844 (2009) (finding husband in violation but not in 

contempt of alimony order where order not clear and unequivocal, 

and husband had good faith belief of compliance).9

b. Bankruptcy stays. Fustolo next argues that he was not 

required to comply with the injunction during the pendency of 

the bankruptcy stays. This argument fails as a matter of law.

Title 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(2), imposes a stay of the 

"enforcement" of any judgment against a debtor that was obtained 

before the commencement of a bankruptcy proceeding. See Ritzen 

Group, Inc. v. Jackson Masonry, LLC, 589 U.S. 35, 37 (2020) 

("filing a petition for bankruptcy automatically 'operates as a 

stay' of creditors' debt-collection efforts outside the umbrella 

of the bankruptcy case" [emphasis added; citation omitted]). 

"The purpose of the automatic stay is 'to relieve a debtor of 

collection proceedings which would nullify the Bankruptcy Code's 

objective of orderly liquidations or reorganizations which treat 

creditors equally'" (citation omitted). Beverly v. Bass River 

Golf Mgt., Inc., 92 Mass. App. Ct. 595, 599 (2018). Thus, 

"[t]he automatic stay is designed to effect an immediate freeze 

9 Because Fustolo was not found in contempt, we need not 

pass on "the kind and degree of intent that must be shown to 

support a judgment of contempt" against an individual, as 

opposed to a corporate, defendant. O'Connell v. Greenwood, 59 

Mass. App. Ct. 147, 150 n.3 (2003).
14

of the status quo." Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Holmes 

Transp., Inc., 931 F.2d 984, 987 (1st Cir. 1991).

Contrary to Fustolo's argument, the stay does not have the 

effect of relieving a debtor of his obligations under an 

outstanding judgment. Instead, the automatic stay simply bars a 

creditor from pursuing any "collection efforts against the 

debtor or the debtor's property." Black's Law Dictionary 1709 

(11th ed. 2019) (defining "automatic stay"). If the discharge 

is denied or the trustee abandons the property at issue, and the 

stay is lifted as a result, "title reverts to the bankrupt, nunc 

pro tunc, so that he is treated as having owned it continuously" 

(citation omitted). Barletta v. Tedeschi, 121 B.R. 669, 673 

(N.D.N.Y. 1990). See 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2). Cf. In re Wilton 

Armetale, Inc., 968 F.3d 273, 284 (3d Cir. 2020) (if trustee 

abandons derivative claim, creditor's right to pursue claim 

"spring[s] back to life" [citation omitted]). Accordingly, we 

discern no error in the judge's conclusion that once the 

bankruptcy stays were lifted, Patriot was free to pursue a claim 

that Fustolo violated the injunction by failing to satisfy the 

documentation requirement and spending limit, even during the 

stays.

2. Clarification and enforcement of injunction. Fustolo

next argues that the judge exceeded the scope of his authority 
15

by clarifying the injunction to require Fustolo to document his

annual expenses from 2012 to 2022, and by modifying the 

injunction to expressly include Fustolo's wife, Fustolo CPE, and 

other nonparties. We address each argument in turn.

a. Documentation of annual expenses. "'The purpose of 

civil contempt proceedings is remedial,' and the formulation of 

the remedy is within the judge's discretion." Eldim, Inc. v. 

Mullen, 47 Mass. App. Ct. 125, 129 (1999), quoting Demoulas v. 

Demoulas Super Mkts., Inc., 424 Mass. 501, 571 (1997). "[W]hile 

judges will not read into an order additional terms, judges will 

not allow a party to do indirectly what an order makes clear he 

cannot do directly" (citation omitted). Judge Rotenberg Educ. 

Ctr., Inc. v. Commissioner of the Dep't of Mental Retardation, 

424 Mass. 430, 449 (1997), abrogated on other grounds by 

Birchall, petitioner, 454 Mass. at 852-853. A judge may clarify 

a judgment on a contempt complaint. See Colorio v. Marx, 72 

Mass. App. Ct. 382, 385 (2008).

Here, the judge ordered Fustolo to provide documentation of 

his expenditures from 2012 forward. Although Fustolo 

characterizes this remedy as "retrospective," it is remedial and 

designed to determine whether Fustolo violated the injunction's 

clear and unequivocal limit on the amount of funds that could be 

advanced to Fustolo to cover personal expenses. See Labor 
16

Relations Comm'n v. Fall River Educators' Ass'n, 382 Mass. 465, 

476 (1981) ("Remedial or compensatory actions are essentially 

backward looking, seeking to compensate the complainant through 

the payment of money for damages caused by past acts of 

disobedience" [citation omitted]). Indeed, the judge expressed 

concern that Fustolo was not in compliance with the spending 

limit and cited several compelling reasons in support. For 

example, the judge noted large, unexplained deposits and

withdrawals of cash, and numerous expensive purchases made by 

Fustolo, including for gemstones and a country club golf 

membership. The judge also found that as of 2014, Fustolo's 

monthly household living expenses were approximately $20,000

(which, if substantiated, placed Fustolo well on track to exceed 

the annual $84,000 limit). Notably, the judge also found that

Fustolo -- and not Patriot -- was able to provide the 

documentation necessary to ascertain whether Fustolo violated 

the spending limit.

The judge was within his discretion to require that Fustolo 

provide that documentation where it was Fustolo's obligation to 

ensure that he complied with the spending limit.10 See Eldim, 

10 We also reject Fustolo's argument that the judge exceeded

his authority by clarifying the documentation and spending 

requirements prospectively. See Colorio, 72 Mass. App. Ct. at

385.
17

Inc., 47 Mass. App. Ct. at 128 ("Where an injunction is in 

effect, the party bound by the order is responsible for 

ascertaining whether any proposed actions are among the 

proscribed activities. It is not the plaintiff's obligation to 

police the decree but the defendant's obligation to make certain 

he does not violate it" [citation omitted]). See also New 

England Novelty Co. v. Sandberg, 315 Mass. 739, 746, cert. 

denied, 323 U.S. 740 (1944) (judge has power to compel obedience 

to his decrees and punish those who obstruct or degrade 

administration of justice). Cf. Judge Rotenberg Educ. Ctr., 

Inc., 424 Mass. at 449 ("contempt finding is appropriate where 

'steps are taken to subvert the decree'" [citation omitted]).11

b. Inclusion of Fustolo's wife, Fustolo CPE, and other 

nonparties. "An injunction is binding on the parties 'and upon 

those persons in active concert or participation with them who 

receive actual notice of the order by personal service or 

otherwise.'" Mohamad v. Kavlakian, 69 Mass. App. Ct. 261, 265 

11 Fustolo's argument that it is impossible for him to

comply with the documentation requirement for past years is 

premature. As the judge noted in a September 2022 order, 

impossibility might be a defense to a contempt finding, but 

litigation of that issue has yet to occur. See, e.g.,

Commonwealth v. One 1987 Ford Econoline Van, 413 Mass. 407, 412 

(1992).

Similarly, to the extent that Fustolo contests the 

potential fines for future noncompliance included in the 

judgment on the contempt complaint, none of the orders before us 

impose such a fine on Fustolo.
18

(2007), quoting Mass. R. Civ. P. 65 (d), 365 Mass. 832 (1974). 

Indeed, even a nonparty may be held in contempt if that person 

"counsels or aids a party in disobeying a decree" (citation 

omitted). Bird v. Capital Site Mgt. Co., 423 Mass. 172, 178 

(1996).

The judge enjoined, among others, Fustolo's wife from 

"directly or indirectly spending more than $7,000 per month 

. . . on ordinary living expenses for food, mortgage and the 

like until the judgment in this case is paid," starting in May 

2022. On the issue of notice, the evidence was that Fustolo's 

wife was shown a copy of the original injunction during a 

deposition in 2012, and she testified at the contempt 

proceedings in May 2018.

Evidence also was presented that Fustolo's wife was an 

active participant in Fustolo's financial affairs. Fustolo and 

his wife lived together and shared expenses. Fustolo's wife 

primarily paid the household bills using checks from her own 

accounts or joint accounts shared with Fustolo. The wife 

received funds in her accounts from unknown sources, including, 

for instance, $119,000 that Fustolo deposited into his wife's 

accounts during a one-year period between 2012 and 2013. 

Fustolo also comingled money from the reach and apply defendants 

with personal accounts that he shared with his wife; the judge
19

found that such use of the businesses "promote[d] fraud." 

Moreover, Fustolo's wife helped Fustolo with his seminar 

business for over a decade, and Fustolo, on behalf of Fustolo 

CPE, entered into an agreement with Fustolo's wife to compensate 

her for marketing and communications work that she did for the 

company. In light of this evidence, the judge did not err in 

including Fustolo's wife in the judgment, particularly where the 

injunction imposed a limit on spending for ordinary living

expenses. See Bird, 423 Mass. at 178-179 (wife who received and 

spent proceeds in violation of attachment order may be held in 

contempt if aware of order).

With respect to Fustolo CPE, Fustolo argues that 

Massachusetts did not have jurisdiction over the Delaware 

company. To the contrary, there are sufficient contacts between 

Fustolo CPE and Massachusetts to satisfy both the long-arm 

statute, G. L. c. 223A, § 3 (a), and due process. See, e.g., 

Nowak v. Tak How Invs., Ltd., 94 F.3d 708, 712-713 (1st Cir. 

1996), cert. denied, 20 U.S. 1155 (1997).

The judge found that Fustolo formed Fustolo CPE around 

December 2013, to carry on the same seminar business of two 

previously named reach and apply defendants, CPE Meetings, Inc., 

and National Tax Institute, Inc. As noted by the judge, the

bankruptcy judge found based on "'several badges of fraud,' 
20

[that] Fustolo 'transferred the business model to the new entity 

in an attempt to defraud creditors.'"

Fustolo CPE provided income to Fustolo at some points in 

time. For instance, the judge found that approximately $1.9 

million flowed through Fustolo CPE between December 2013 and 

December 2015, and Fustolo paid himself $100,000 from Fustolo 

CPE in 2015 alone without accounting for payments to pay down 

his wife's credit card debt.

The company's sole owner is Fustolo, a Massachusetts 

resident, and the company holds a bank account in Massachusetts.

See Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 285 (2014) (physical entry 

into State by agent relevant contact between defendant and 

forum). Fustolo, on behalf of the company, also entered into a 

contract with Fustolo's wife, another Massachusetts resident, 

for marketing services. Moreover, the company entered an 

appearance in a parallel action in the Superior Court, not for 

the limited purpose of challenging jurisdiction. Given this 

evidence, Fustolo CPE was properly added as a reach and apply 

defendant under G. L. c. 214, § 3 (8), for the purposes of 

satisfying the outstanding judgment against Fustolo.12

12 General Laws c. 214, § 3 (8), grants the Superior Court 

original and concurrent jurisdiction over the following:
21

3. Attorney's fees. Finally, Fustolo argues that Patriot 

was not entitled to attorney's fees in the absence of a contempt 

finding. As a general rule, a "successful" or "prevailing" 

litigant in a contempt action is entitled to attorney's fees. 

Ventresca v. Town Manager of Billerica, 68 Mass. App. Ct. 62, 66 

(2007). Here, the judge found that Patriot prevailed only in 

demonstrating that Fustolo violated the documentation 

requirement and in obtaining clarification of the injunction. 

Because most of the trial and preparation related to Patriot's 

other claims, the judge awarded Patriot just under fifteen 

percent of Patriot's requested fees.

The partial award of attorney's fees was appropriate 

because Patriot succeeded in obtaining an order directing 

Fustolo to provide accountings of his annual expenditures so 

that Patriot can assess whether Fustolo adhered to the spending 

limit in the injunction. The judge was within his discretion to 

award fees for that request. See Police Comm'r of Boston v. 

"Actions to reach and apply in payment of a debt any 

property, right, title or interest, real or personal, of a 

debtor, liable to be attached or taken on execution in a 

civil action against him and fraudulently conveyed by him 

with intent to defeat, delay or defraud his creditors, or 

purchased, or directly or indirectly paid for, by him, the 

record or other title to which is retained in the vendor or 

is conveyed to a third person with intent to defeat, delay 

or defraud the creditors of the debtor."
22

Gows, 429 Mass. 14, 18-19 (1999), and cases cited (fees may be 

awarded to party even when no finding of contempt).

Conclusion. The judgment on the complaint for contempt 

dated January 6, 2023, is affirmed. The order on the petition 

for attorney's fees and costs dated January 5, 2023, is 

affirmed.

So ordered.

By the Court (Meade, Blake & 

Desmond, JJ.13),

Assistant Clerk

Entered: May 28, 2024.

13 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.