alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
_______________________________________ __ Michigan Supreme Court 

# Order

Lansing, Michigan



### February 19, 2008 Clifford W. Taylor, Chief Justice


### 135210 Michael F. Cavanagh Elizabeth A. Weaver Marilyn Kelly Maura D. Corrigan 

### PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman, Justices



### v SC: 135210 COA: 278054 Oakland CC: 1999-166151-FC RODERICK DEWAYNE LEE, Defendant-Appellant.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the October 23, 2007 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because the defendant has failed to meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).

s0211 I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

February 19, 2008

Clerk
| (logo) WELLS FARGO | **Commercial Mortgage  Servicing**D1050-084, 8th Floor  401 South Tryon St.  Charlotte, NC 28202  1-800-326-1334 |
|--------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

 

**ANNUAL STATEMENT OFCOMPLIANCE**

 

 

Reference is hereby made tothat certain Trust and Servicing Agreement dated as of July 1, 2013, by andamong WELLS FARGO COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE SECURITIES, INC., as Depositor, WELLSFARGO BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, as Master Servicer, RIALTO CAPITAL ADVISORS,LLC, as Special Servicer, PARK BRIDGE LENDER SERVICES LLC, as Trust Advisor,WELLS FARGO BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION as Certificate Administrator, as TaxAdministrator, and Custodian, and U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, as Trustee,with respect to Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2013-LC12(the "Agreement"). Capitalized terms used herein not otherwisedefined shall have the meanings assigned in the Agreement.

 

 

Pursuant to Section 11.12 ofthis Agreement, I, Daniel Bober, Executive Vice President of CommercialMortgage Services do hereby certify that:

 

1.           A review of the activities of the Master Servicer during the period fromJanuary 1, 2016 through December 31, 2016 (the “Reporting Period”),and of its performance per the Agreement during such period has been made undermy supervision, and

 

2.           To the best of my knowledge, based on such review, the Master Servicer hasfulfilled all of its obligations under this Agreement in all material respectsthroughout the Reporting Period.

 

 

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, theundersigned has executed this Certificate as of the 28th day of February 2017.

 

 

/s/Daniel Bober

Daniel Bober

Executive Vice President 

Wells Fargo Bank

 

 

| Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. | (logo) Together we’ll  go far |
|------------------------|-------------------------------------|
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 11**  **- 6451** 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee ,
v. MARION MAYS , Defendant

- Appellant
.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Sou th Carolina , at Aiken
. Margaret B. Seymour , District Judge. ( 1:03

- cr - 00726

- MBS

- 1; 1:07

- cv - 70123

- MBS )

Submitted : October 6, 2011 Decided: October 20, 2011

Before WILKINSON, GREGORY, and AGEE , Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by un published per curiam opinion
. Marion Mays, Appellant Pro Se. Jimmie Ewing, Mark C. Moore, Assistant United States Attorneys, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Marion Mays seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. A. § 2255 ( West Supp. 2011 ) motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(1) (B) (200 6 ). A certificate of appeala bility will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (200 6 ). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see Miller

- El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336

- 38 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural
g rounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack , 529 U.S. at 484

- 85. We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Mays has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials3 before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process. DISMISSED
Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas

J U D G M E N T

In the Interest of A.M.G., a Child

No. 06-19-00032-CV

Appeal from the 354th District Court of 

Hunt County, Texas (Tr. Ct. No. 85846). 

Memorandum Opinion delivered by Justice 

Stevens, Chief Justice Morriss and Justice 

Burgess participating.

As stated in the Court’s opinion of this date, we find no error in the judgment of the court 

below. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

We note that the appellant has adequately indicated her inability to pay costs of appeal. 

Therefore, we waive payment of costs.

RENDERED SEPTEMBER 27, 2019

BY ORDER OF THE COURT

JOSH R. MORRISS, III

CHIEF JUSTICE

ATTEST:

Debra K. Autrey, Clerk
## In The Court of Appeals Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06

- 18

- 00017

- CR

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellant

V. TYLEEN MARIE TATE, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Court at Law Fannin County, Texas Trial Court No. 49259

Before Morriss, C.J., Moseley and Burgess, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Morriss2 

### MEMORANDUM OPINION
The State of Texas filed a notice of a ppeal attempting to appeal from the trial court’s grant of Tyleen Marie Tate’s motion to suppress evidence. See T EX
. C ODE C RIM
. P ROC

. A NN
. art. 44.01(a)(5) (West Supp. 2017). More specifically, the State attempted to appeal from a January 11, 2018, letter from the trial court to the parties advising them how the court planned to rule on Tate’s
motion. This Court lacks jurisdiction over an appeal absent a written judgment or order. See, e.g. , Nikrasch v. State , 698 S.W.2d 443, 450 (Tex. App.

— Dallas 1985, no pet.). As our sister court in Dallas so aptly stated, A letter from the trial court to counsel is typically not the type of document that constitutes a judgment, decision, or order. Only a letter evidencing a decision actually rendered, describi ng the decision with certainty as to parties and effect, and publicly announcing entry of the decision by prompt filing possesses all the necessary attributes of an order. Cooksey v. State , No. 05

- 12

- 00301

- CR, 2013 WL 1934943, at *2 (Tex. App.

— Dallas May 10, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citations omitted); 1 see Goff v.
Tuchscherer , 627 S.W.2d 397, 398

– 99 (Tex. 1982) (typically, “Letters to counsel are not the k ind of documents that constitute a judgment, decision or order from which an appeal may be taken.”). By letter dated February 9, 2018, we informed the State of the potential jurisdictional issue stemming from the lack of an appealable written order and pr ovided the State an opportunity to

1 Although this unpublished case has no precedential value, we may take guidance from it “as an aid in developing reasoning that may be employed.” Carillo v. State , 98 S.W.3d 789, 794 (Tex. App.

— Amarillo 2003, pet. ref’d).3

demonstrate how we have jurisdiction notwithstanding the noted defect. We afforded the State ten days to respond to our jurisdictional defect letter. The State did not file a response. Because the trial court’s January 11, 2018, letter does not constitute an appealable written order, we lack jurisdiction over this appeal. Consequently, we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

Josh R. Morriss, III Chief Justice
Date Submitted: February 26, 2018 Date Decided: F ebruary 27, 2018
Do Not Publish
#### Nafi NDIAYE, Petitioner, v. Michael B. MUKASEY, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 07-1771.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: May 28, 2008.

Decided: June 19, 2008.

Ronald D. Richey, Law Offices of Ronald D. Richey, Rockville, Maryland, for Petitioner. Jeffrey S. Bucholtz, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Lindemann, Assistant Director, Ethan B. Kanter, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

Before WILKINSON, MICHAEL, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Petition denied by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

*249PER CURIAM:

Nafi Ndiaye, a native and citizen of Mauritania, petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“Board”) denying her motion to reopen and reconsider. We have reviewed the record and the Board’s order and find that the Board did not abuse its discretion in denying Ndiaye’s motion. *See*8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) (2008). Accordingly, we deny the petition for review for the reasons stated by the Board. *See In Re: Ndiaye*(B.I.A. July 11, 2007). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*PETITION DENIED.*
**EXHIBIT 32.2**

 

**Certification of Chief Financial Officer Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as Adopted  Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**

 

In connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K of Merit Medical Systems, Inc. (the “Company”) for the year ended December 31, 2010 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Report”), I, Kent W. Stanger, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:

 

(1)   The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2)   The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 
| Date:   March 15, 2011 | /s/   Kent W. Stanger           |
|-----------------------------|---------------------------------|
|                        | Kent   W. Stanger               |
|                        | Chief   Financial Officer       |
|                        | (principal   financial officer) |

 

This certification accompanies the foregoing Report pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not, except to the extent required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, be deemed filed by the Registrant for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.  A signed original of this certification has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

 

----
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1997
<CASH>                                       1,837,105
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             2,705,322
<PP&E>                                       1,288,309
<DEPRECIATION>                                 333,081
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               3,707,258
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        1,519,728
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         3,185
<OTHER-SE>                                   2,124,610
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 3,707,258
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                22,349
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                1,951,518
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              26,665
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (1,911,059)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (1,929,168)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (1,911,059)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (0.60)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.60)
        

</TABLE>
#### Greater New York Savings Bank, Respondent, v 2120 Realty, Inc., et al., Appellants, et al., Defendants.

[608 NYS2d 463]

—Order, Supreme Court, New York County (William J. Davis, J.), entered on or about January 8, 1993, which *inter alia*granted plaintiff’s motion for summary and related relief on the foreclosure of a first mortgage given on certain property located at 325-327 West 51st Street, New York, and dismissed defendants’ counterclaims, unanimously affirmed, with costs.

Plaintiff established a prima facie case of entitlement to foreclosure of the property secured by a 1988 mortgage and recovery of any deficiency from the guarantors based on its production of relevant documents and defendants’ undisputed default on the obligation to make payments of principal and interest *(Travelers Ins. Co. v 633 Third Assocs.,*194 AD2d 418). Defendants’ unsupported allegations that plaintiff acted wrongfully in connection with the purported sale of the property to a third party, are insufficient to warrant denial of summary judgment to plaintiff *(see, Gilbert Frank Corp. v Federal Ins. Co.,*70 NY2d 966, 967).

Further, there is no support in the record for defendants’ assertion that their counterclaims should not have been dismissed with prejudice, but instead severed, since the right to assert such claims was waived pursuant to the 1988 note *(see, Sterling Natl. Bank & Trust Co. v Giannetti,*53 AD2d 533). Moreover, none of the counterclaims sounding in breach of duty to deal in good faith, breach of implied consent and breach of contract could overcome the waiver provision in the absence of fraud which has not been made out *(see, Sterling Natl. Bank & Trust Co. v Giannetti, supra).*Concur — Sullivan, J. P., Carro, Ellerin, Wallach and Nardelli, JJ.
| (logo) WELLS FARGO | Commercial Mortgage Servicing

D1086-120, 12th Floor

550 South Tryon Street

Charlotte, NC 28202

1-800-326-1334 |
|--------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

 

ANNUAL STATEMENT OF COMPLIANCE

 

 

Reference is hereby made to that certain Pooling and Servicing Agreement dated as of August 1, 2013, by and among GS Mortgage Securities Corporation II, as Depositor, Wells Fargo Bank, National Association, as Master Servicer and Certificate Administrator, LNR Partners, LLC, as Special Servicer, Pentalpha Surveillance LLC, as Operating Advisor and Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas as Trustee, with respect to Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through GSMS Certificates Series 2013-GCJ14 (the "Agreement"). Capitalized terms used herein not otherwise defined shall have the meanings assigned in the Agreement.

 

Pursuant to Section 10.07 of this Agreement, I, Daniel Bober, Executive Vice President of Commercial Mortgage Services do hereby certify that:

 

1. A review of the activities of the Master Servicer during the period from January 1, 2015 through December 31, 2015 (the “Reporting Period”), and of its performance per the Agreement during such period has been made under my supervision, and

 

2. To the best of my knowledge, based on such review, the Master Servicer has fulfilled all of its obligations under the Agreement in all material respects throughout the Reporting Period.

 

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has executed this Certificate as of the 4th day of March 2016.

 

 

/s/ Daniel Bober

Daniel Bober

Executive Vice President

Wells Fargo Bank

 

 

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.                                                                         (logo) Together we’ll go far
```

[Congressional Bills 112th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2408 Introduced in House (IH)]

112th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 2408

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to temporarily increase the 
         investment tax credit for geothermal energy property.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                              July 6, 2011

Mr. Reichert (for himself and Mr. Blumenauer) introduced the following 
      bill; which was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to temporarily increase the 
         investment tax credit for geothermal energy property.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Geothermal Tax Parity Act of 2011''.

SEC. 2. TEMPORARY INCREASE IN INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT FOR GEOTHERMAL 
              ENERGY PROPERTY.

    (a) In General.--Subclause (II) of section 48(a)(2)(A)(i) of the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by striking ``paragraph 
(3)(A)(i)'' and inserting ``clause (i) or (iii) of paragraph (3)(A)''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by this section shall apply 
to property placed in service after the date of the enactment of this 
Act.
                                 <all>
```
#### In the Matter of: Pepi SCHAFLER, Debtor, Pepi Schafler, Appellant, v. Richard J. Spear, Trustee, Appellee.

No. 07-15265.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted May 20, 2008.*

Filed May 28, 2008.

Dr. Pepi Schafler, Walnut Creek, CA, pro se.

Dennis D. Davis, Esq., Miriam Khati-blou, Esq., Goldberg Stinnett Meyers & Davis A Professional Corporation, San Francisco, CA, for Appellee.

Before: PREGERSON, TASHIMA, and GOULD, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument and therefore denies appellant’s request. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Pepi Schafler appeals pro se from the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel’s (“BAP”) de-*309cisión affirming the bankruptcy court’s final report and discharge order. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d). We review the BAP’s decision de novo. *Renwick v. Bennett (In re Bennett),*298 F.3d 1059, 1063 (9th Cir.2002). We affirm.

The BAP properly affirmed the bankruptcy court’s orders. Schafler failed to offer cognizable arguments to this court or the BAP that challenge the bankruptcy court’s orders. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 28; *United States v. Williamson,*439 F.3d 1125, 1138 (9th Cir.2006). Moreover, because disbursement under the final report was not stayed and all disbursements were made to entities that were not party to the appeal, the BAP properly concluded that any challenge to the final report was moot. *See Nat’l Mass Media Telecomm. Sys., Inc. v. Stanley (In re Nat’l Mass Media Telecomm. Sys., Inc.),*152 F.3d 1178, 1180 (9th Cir.1998).

Schafler’s petition for a writ of mandamus fails to establish circumstances warranting such extraordinary relief and is denied. *See Spencer v. United States Dist. Ct.,*393 F.3d 867, 869 (9th Cir.2004).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Exhibit 23.1

CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS

We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements on Form S-3 (No. 033-54741,
No. 33-66516, No. 333-00903 and No. 333-13099) and in the Registration Statements on Form S-8
(No. 333-29711, No. 333-95255, No. 333-95259, No. 333-75732, No. 333-98107,
No. 333-103682 and No. 333-103684) of Western Gas Resources, Inc. of our report dated March 9, 2004 relating to the financial statements, which
appears in this Annual Report on Form 10-K.

PricewaterhouseCoopers
LLP

Denver,
Colorado
March 11, 2004



QuickLinks
CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF SALEM

#### Lewie S. Cooper v. Douglas L. Wertz and Gail M. Alls

August 25, 2003

Case No. CL01-16

By Judge Robert P. Doherty, Jr.

Plaintiff, two Defendants, and the Defendants’ insurance companies arbitrated rather than tried their personal injury dispute. The arbitrator found that only one Defendant was negligent and awarded $42,500.00. The parties now disagree as to the terms of their arbitration contract that limited the award to a minimum of $12,500.00 and a maximum of $75,000.00. Defendant Alls claims the agreement called for payment to be made on the entire arbitration award, no matter who was found to be liable, with payment based on a formula of one-third by Defendant Wertz and two-thirds by Defendant Alls. Defendant Wertz argues that it was the intent of the parties to use their formula to divide the minimum figure and any award entered jointly against both Defendants. He contends, however, that it was their intent that if only one of the Defendants was found to be negligent, then that Defendant would pay the entire amount awarded over the minimum figure. Both parties are adamant in their respective positions. Alls points to the language of the contract, and Wertz argues that, if it had been the intent of the parties to divide the award no matter who was at fault, then the issue of which of the two Defendants was negligent would not have been submitted to the arbitrator. The Court finds in favor of Defendant Alls.

*456When faced with a controversy such as this, the Court must first look to the written instrument. If it is clear and unambiguous and appears to be complete on its face, then the Court is required to construe the terms according to their plain meaning. The Court is also compelled to find that the parties intended what their written instrument plainly declares. If that can be determined from the language contained within the four corners of the contract, then parol evidence is not admissible to explain their intent in any other manner. *Golding*v. *Floyd,*261 Va. 190, 192 (2001).

That is precisely the case here. There is no language in the contract which gives rise to the interpretation placed upon it by Defendant Wertz. His parol evidence cannot be considered. To do so would not only be contrary to settled law, but would also violate the very terms of the contract’s standard modification clause that “[t]his Agreement contains the entire agreement between the parties and shall be modified or amended only by a writing properly executed by both parties.” No such modification or amendment to the instrument was made. Wertz is required to pay one-third of the award in accordance with the written terms of the arbitration agreement.