Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed May 21, 2024.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-07-00366-CR

DONTAE TERRELL MOORE, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 177th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 1061081

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This case was remanded from the Court of Criminal Appeals, which 

reversed this court’s holding that appellant had waived his complaints about the 

denial of his motion to suppress. See Moore v. State, No. PD-0239-23, 2023 WL 

4758682, at *2 (Tex. Crim. App. July 26, 2023) (not designated for publication). 

The high court directed this court to address appellant’s third and fourth issues—
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whether appellant voluntarily waived his Miranda1 rights and gave statements to 

the police. See id. at *1–2. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND AND FINDINGS

The factual and procedural background are set out in greater detail in this 

court’s prior opinion. See Moore v. State, No. 14-07-00366-CR, 2008 WL 

4308424, at *1–2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008), rev’d, 2023 WL 

4758682. Appellant moved to suppress his two recorded statements, contending 

that he did not voluntarily waive his Miranda rights and that his statements were 

involuntary because appellant was intoxicated and had a “high school level of 

education.” During the first interrogation, appellant said he dropped out of school 

in the tenth grade and had ingested marijuana and PCP earlier in the day. The 

detective conducted the second interrogation on the following day.

The detective and appellant testified at a hearing on the motion to suppress. 

Appellant testified, among other things, that the detective treated him nicely and 

that everybody treated him with respect. He testified that he understood the 

warnings that were given to him before his interviews, he knew what his rights 

were before he started talking, and he knew he had a right to an attorney and could 

have “executed” the interrogation. Appellant claimed to have ingested PCP shortly 

before the first interview but agreed he was not high for the second interview.

The court denied the motion to suppress. The court signed findings of facts 

and conclusions of law. Among other things, the court found:

• The detective was a credible witness and appellant was not a 

credible witness.

• Before appellant gave his first statement, the detective provided 

appellant the Article 38.22 and Miranda warnings, and appellant 

1 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966).
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“indicated that he understood each of those warnings which was 

all contained on the videotape.” Appellant “freely and 

voluntarily participated in the ensuing conversation.”

• The detective “observed the defendant during his interview and 

did not see any signs of intoxication.”

• During the first interview, appellant was “lucid and capable of 

understanding the warnings given to him and the nature of his 

statements.”

• The detective interviewed appellant a second time on the

following day after appellant “had been in custody for more than 

24 hours without access to drugs or alcohol.” 

• Before appellant gave his second statement, the detective

provided appellant the Article 38.22 and Miranda warnings and 

“had the defendant read the warnings aloud on the videotape, and 

the defendant stated that he understood each of the warnings.” 

Appellant “freely and voluntarily participated in the ensuing 

conversation.”

• During the second interview, the detective did not see any signs 

of intoxication.

• “There were no noticeable changes in the defendant’s behavior or 

responses between the first and second interviews.”

• “The defendant at no time asked to terminate any of his 

conversations with the investigating officer or inquired about 

contacting or obtaining an attorney.”

• “The defendant had at least a tenth grade education and 

demonstrated that he could read by reading aloud to the officer.”

• “At no time did any of the police officers that the defendant came 

in contact with ever threaten him, make any promise or any offer 

of inducement of any kind to him, or physically abuse or mistreat

him.”

• “The defendant knowingly and voluntarily participated in both 

interviews with the investigating officer, and he voluntarily 

provided his videotaped statements, in the absence of any threats, 

coercion, promises, or other improper inducement on the part of 

the investigating officer.”
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• Appellant “knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily gave up and 

waived the rights set out in art. 38.22, § 2, of the Code of 

Criminal Procedure.”

Following an out-of-time petition for discretionary review in the Court of 

Criminal Appeals, the court remanded for this court to address appellant’s third

and fourth issues from his original brief. Moore, 2023 WL 4758682, at *1–2. In 

his third issue, appellant contends that the State failed to prove by a preponderance

of the evidence that appellant voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his 

Miranda rights. In his fourth issue, appellant contends that law enforcement 

officials obtained appellant’s statements by overbearing his will so as to render his 

statements involuntary. Appellant does not directly challenge any of the trial 

court’s findings.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Constitutional and statutory confession claims are evaluated under a 

bifurcated standard of review. Sandoval v. State, 665 S.W.3d 495, 515 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2022). Questions of historical fact and questions that turn on credibility and 

demeanor are reviewed with deference to the trial court’s ruling. Id. Questions of 

law and questions that depend on the application of law to facts that do not turn on

credibility and demeanor are reviewed de novo. See id. Whether a statement is 

voluntary is a mixed question of law and fact that may depend upon credibility and 

demeanor. Garcia v. State, 15 S.W.3d 533, 535 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). When a 

defendant presents evidence raising a voluntariness question, the State must prove 

voluntariness by a preponderance of the evidence. See State v. Terrazas, 4 S.W.3d

720, 725 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); see also Leza v. State, 351 S.W.3d 344, 349 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2011).
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III. VOLUNTARINESS OF WAIVER AND STATEMENTS

Appellant addresses his third and fourth issues together, highlighting his

claimed intoxication and failure to complete high school. Issues concerning the 

voluntariness of Miranda waivers and the voluntariness of statements are distinct 

although they sometimes involve overlapping concepts. 

Constitutional claims regarding the voluntariness of Miranda waivers and 

statements made to law enforcement require police overreaching or misconduct. 

See Williams v. State, 502 S.W.3d 262, (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, 

pet. ref’d) (citing Oursbourn v. State, 259 S.W.3d 159, 170–71 (Tex. Crim. App.

2008); Umana v. State, 447 S.W.3d 346, 350 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]

2014, pet. ref’d)). Appellant does not identify any police misconduct or challenge 

the trial court’s findings about the lack of any threats, abuse, coercion, inducement, 

and the like. Indeed, he disclaimed any such conduct at the hearing and testified 

that everybody was respectful to him.

Nonetheless, a Miranda waiver must be made “with a full awareness both of 

the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to 

abandon it.” Leza, 351 S.W.3d at 349 (quotation omitted). When a defendant 

claims that a confession was involuntary due to their state of mind, those claims 

are resolved under state law, including the Texas Confession Statute, Article 38.22 

of the Code of Criminal Procedure. See Williams, 502 S.W.3d at 272. The 

voluntariness of Miranda waivers and a defendant’s statements under Article 38.22 

are assessed under the totality of the circumstances. See Leza, 351 S.W.3d at 349;

Williams, 502 S.W.3d at 272. The totality of the circumstances may include the 

defendant’s experience, background, conduct, and characteristics. See Williams, 

502 S.W.3d at 272.
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Although relevant, evidence of intoxication does not necessarily render a 

statement involuntary. Id.; see also Oursbourn, 259 S.W.3d at 173. 

Characteristics such as “youth, intoxication, mental retardation, and other 

disabilities are usually not enough, by themselves, to render a statement 

inadmissible.” Sandoval, 665 S.W.3d at 526 (quotation omitted). “When there is 

evidence of the defendant’s use of narcotics, medications, or other mind-altering 

agents, the question becomes whether those intoxicants prevented the defendant 

from making an informed and independent decision.” Williams, 502 S.W.3d at 

272–73. “A confession can be involuntary under state law if the suspect lacked the 

mental capacity to understand his rights or if, due to a temporary mental condition, 

he did not understand what he was confessing to.” Sandoval, 665 S.W.3d at 526.

The trial court was, of course, free to disbelieve appellant’s claim of

intoxication. See id. (“The fact finder was free to disbelieve the drug claim.”). 

Indeed, the trial court’s unchallenged finding was that appellant was lucid and 

capable of understanding the warnings given to him and the nature of his 

statements. Appellant testified that he understood the warnings and his rights, 

consistent with the trial court’s findings. See id. at 527 (“Appellant said that he 

understood his rights and agreed to waive them.”). And although appellant did not 

finish high school, he was capable of reading the warnings and understanding 

them.

The trial court’s findings—that appellant voluntarily waived his rights and 

made statements to the police—are fully supported by the record with minimal, if 

any, conflicting evidence. We must defer to the trial court’s resolution of this 

mixed question of law and fact that depends upon credibility. See Garcia, 15 

S.W.3d at 535. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant’s 

motion to suppress.
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IV. CONCLUSION

Appellant’s third and fourth issues are overruled. The trial court’s judgment 

is affirmed.

/s/ Ken Wise

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Wise, Poissant, and Wilson.

Do Not Publish — Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)