Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed May 21 , 2024.

In The 

## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14

- 07

- 00366

- CR

DONTAE TERRELL MOORE , Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS , Appellee
On Appeal from the 177th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Caus e No. 1061081

MEMORANDUM OPINION This case was remanded from the Court of Criminal Appeals , which reversed this court ’ s holding that appellant had waived his complaints about the denial of his motio n to suppress

. See Moore v. S tate , No. PD

- 0239

- 23, 202 3 WL 4758682 , at *2 (Tex. Crim. App. Ju ly 26, 2023) (not designated for publication). The high court directed this court to address appellant ’ s third and fourth issues

—2 whether appellant voluntarily waived his Miranda 1 rights and gave statements to the pol i ce. See id. at *1

– 2. We affirm.
I. B ACKGROUND AND F INDINGS The factual and procedural background are set out in greater detail in this
court ’ s prior opinion

. See Moore v. State , No. 14

- 07

- 00366

- CR, 2008 WL 4308424, at *1

– 2 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2008 ), rev ’ d , 2023 WL 4758682

. A ppellant moved to suppress his two recorded statements, contending that he did not voluntarily waive his Miranda rights and that his statemen ts were involuntary because appe llant was intoxicated and had a “ high school level of education. ” During the first interrogation, appellant said he dropped out of school in the tenth grade and had ingested marijuana and PCP earlier in the day. The detective conducted the second interro gation on the follo wing day

. The detective and app ellant testified at a hearing on the motion to suppress. Appellant testified , among other things, that the detec tive treated him nicely and that everybody treated him with respect. He testified that he understood the

war nings that were given to him b efor e his interviews , he knew what his rights were before he started talking, and he knew he had a right to an attorney and could have “ executed ” the interrogation

. Appellant claimed to have ingested PCP shortly before the first interview but agreed he wa s no t high for the second interview.
The court denied the motion to suppre ss . The court signed findings of facts and conclusions of law. Among other things, the court found:

• The d etective was a credible witness and appellant was not a credible witness.

• B efor e appellant gave his first statement, the det ective provid ed appellant the Article 38.22 and Miranda warnings, and appellant

1 See Miranda v. Ari zona , 38 4 U.S. 436 , 479 (1966).3 “ indicated that he understood each of those warnings which was all contained on the videotape. ” Appellant “ freely and voluntar ily participated in the ensuing conver sation. ”

• The detective “ observed the defendant during his interview an d did not see any signs of intoxication. ”

• During the first interview, app ellant was “ lucid and capable of understanding the warnings given to him an d th e nature of his statements

. ”

• The detective interviewed appellant a second time on the following day after appellant “ had been in custody for more than 24 hours without access to drugs or alcohol. ”

• Before appellant gave his second statement, the detec tive provided appellant the Article 38.22 and Miranda warnings and

“ had the defendant read the warnings aloud on the videotape, and the defendant stated that he understood each of t he warnings. ” Appellant “ freely and voluntarily participated in the ensuin g co nversation. ”

• During the second interview, the detective did not see any signs of intoxication.

• “ There were no noticeable changes in the defendant ’ s behavior or responses between the first and second interviews. ”

• “ The defendant at no time asked to termi nate any of his conversations with the investigating officer or inquired about contacting or obtaining an attorney. ”

• “ The defendant had at least a tenth grade education and demonst rated that he could read by reading aloud to the officer. ”

• “ At no time did a ny o f the police officers that the defendant came in contact with ever threaten him, make any promise or any off er of inducement of any kind to him, or physically abuse or mistreat him. ”

• “ The defendant knowingly and voluntarily pa rticipated in both intervi ews with the investigating officer, and he voluntarily provided his videot aped statements, in the absence of any threats, coercion, promises, or other improper inducement on the pa rt of the investigating officer. ”4 • Appellant “ knowingly, intelligently, and v olun tarily gave up and waived the rights set out in art. 38.22, § 2, of the Code of Criminal Procedure. ” Following an out

- of

- time petition for discretionary review in the Court of Criminal Appeals, the cou rt remanded for this court to address appellant ’ s t hird and fourth issues fr om his original brief. Moore , 2023 WL 4758682, at * 1

– 2

. In his third issue , appellant conte nds that the State failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that appellant volunt arily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his Mira nda rights. In his f ourth issue, appellant contends that law enforcement officials obtained appella nt ’s statement s by overbearing his will so as to render his statements involuntary. Appellant does not di rectly challenge any of the trial
court ’ s find ings

. II. S TANDARD OF R EVIEW Constitutional and statutory confession claims are evaluated under a bifurcated standard of review. Sandoval v. State , 665 S.W.3d 495, 515 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022). Question s of historical fact and quest ions th at turn on credibility an d demeanor are reviewed with deference to the trial court ’ s ruling. Id. Questions of law and questions that depend on the application of law to facts that do not turn on credibility and demeanor are reviewed d e novo. See id. W h ether a state ment is volu ntary is a mixed question of law and fact that may depend upon credibility and demeanor. Garcia v. S t ate , 15 S.W.3d 533, 535 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). When a defendant presents evidence raising a voluntariness question, the State m ust prove voluntariness b y a preponderance of the evidence. See State v. Terrazas , 4 S.W.3d 720, 725 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); see also Leza v. State , 351 S.W.3d 344, 349 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).5 III. V OLUNTARINESS OF W AIVER AND S TATEMENTS Appellant addresses his third and fourth issues together, highlighting his claimed intoxication and failure to complete high school. Issues concerning the voluntariness of Miranda waivers and the voluntariness of statements are distinct although they sometimes i nvolve overlappi ng concepts

. C on stitutio nal claims regarding the voluntariness of Miranda waivers and statements made to law enforcement require police overreaching or misconduct

. See Williams v. State , 502 S.W.3d 262, (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. ref ’ d) ( citing Oursbourn v. State , 259 S.W.3d 159, 170

– 71 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); Umana v. S t ate , 447 S.W.3d 346, 350 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. ref ’ d) ). Appellant does not identify any police misconduct or challenge the trial court ’ s findings a bo ut the lack of an y threat s, abuse, coercion , induc ement, and the like. Indeed, he disclaimed any such conduct at the hearing and testified that everybody was respectful to him. Nonetheless, a Miran da waiver must be made “ with a full awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it. ” Leza , 351 S.W.3d at 349 (quotation omitted). When a defendant claims that a confession was involuntary due to their state of mind, those claims

are resolved under sta te l aw, including the Tex as Confessio n Statute, Article 38.22 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. See Williams , 502 S.W.3d a t 272. The voluntariness of Miranda waivers and a defendant ’ s statements under A r ticle 38.22

a re assessed under the totality of the circumstances

. See Leza , 351 S.W.3d at 349; Williams , 502 S.W.3d at 272. The totality of the circumstances may include th e defendant ’ s experience, background, conduct, and characteristics. See Williams , 502 S.W.3d at 272

.6 Although relevant, evidence of into xication does not ne cessarily render a statement involuntary. Id. ; see also Oursbourn , 259 S.W.3d at 173. Characteristics such as “ youth, into xication, mental retardation, and other disabilities are us ually not enough, by themselves, to render a sta tement inadmissible. ” Sa ndoval , 665 S.W.3d at 526 (quotation omitted). “ When there is evidence of the defendant ’ s use of nar cotics, medicati ons, or other mind

- altering agents, the question becomes whether those intoxicants prevented the defendant from ma king an informed and inde pendent decision. ” Williams , 502 S.W.3d at 272

– 73. “ A confession can be involuntary unde r state law if the suspect lacked the mental capacity to understand his rights or if, due to a temporary mental condition, he did not underst and what he was confessin g to. ” Sandoval , 665 S.W.3d at 52 6.
The trial court was , of course, free to disbelieve appellant ’ s claim of intoxication. See id. ( “ The fact finder was free to disbelieve the drug claim. ” )

. Indeed, t he trial court ’ s unchallenged finding was that appella nt was lucid and capable of understanding the warnings given to him and the nature of his
statements

. Appellant testified that he understood the warnings and his rights , consistent with the trial court ’ s findi ngs. See id. at 527 ( “ Appellant said that he understood his rights and agreed to waive them. ” ). A nd although appellant did not finish high school, he was capable of reading the warnings and understanding them.
The trial court ’ s findings

— that appellant voluntarily waived his rights and made statement s to the police

— are fully supported by the record with minimal , if any, conflicting evidence. We must defer to the trial court ’ s resolution of this mixed question of law and fa ct that depends upon credibility

. See Garcia , 15 S.W. 3d at 535

. The trial cou rt did not abuse it s discretion by denying appellant ’ s motion to suppress.7 IV. C ONCLUSION Appellant ’ s third and fourth issues are overruled. The trial court ’ s judgment is affirmed.

/s/ K en Wi se J ustice
Pane l con s ists of Just ices Wise , Poissan t , and Wilson

. Do Not Publish

— Tex

. R. App. P. 47 .2( b )