Filed 5/20/22 In re E.G. CA2/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not 

certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been 

certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re E.G., JR., et al., Persons 

Coming Under the Juvenile 

Court Law.

 B315741

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No.

 18CCJP00869F, G)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF 

CHILDREN AND FAMILY 

SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

N.V.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles 

County, Stacy Wiese, Judge. Affirmed.

Karen B. Stalter, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Defendant and Appellant.

Rodrigo A. Castro-Silva, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant 

County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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N. V. (Mother) appeals an order terminating parental rights. 

(Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26.)1 The children’s paternal grandmother 

(PGM) is adopting them. Mother contends that the Los Angeles County 

Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) failed to 

interview extended family members about their ancestry under the 

Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA). (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.; 

Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224 et seq.)

Mother, an immigrant from Mexico, denied Indian heritage and 

never, since 2018, claimed otherwise. Neither DCFS nor the court had 

reason to believe the children are Indian. Even now, Mother makes no 

claim that she or any relative is Indian. She has not shown prejudice 

from DCFS’s failure to interview extended family members. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Mother has seven children born between 2001 and 2019. DCFS 

has investigated the family multiple times since 2007. Two children 

are the subject of this appeal: E.G., Jr. (born in 2017) and Y.G. (2019). 

Their father E.G. (Father) did not appeal the termination of parental 

rights.

When E.G., Jr. was three months old, DCFS learned that Father 

sold drugs, hiding them among the baby’s clothes. Mother was 

scratched and bruised from a violent altercation with Father, who 

choked and threatened to kill her; she attempted suicide and was 

involuntarily hospitalized. (§ 5150). She told DCFS she took cocaine, 

methamphetamine and marijuana. She heard voices, tried to smash a 

house window, punched her stomach while pregnant and drove while 

Father clung to the side of her car. Though they sought mutual 

restraining orders, the parents intend to remain together.

E.G., Jr. was detained and deemed “at very high risk” of abuse 

and neglect. He was placed with PGM, where he has remained for over 

four years. Attached to the dependency petition filed in February 2018 

1 Unlabeled statutory references are to the Welfare and 

Institutions Code.
3

are “Indian Child Inquiry” forms stating that the children have “no 

known Indian ancestry.”

On February 9, 2018, Mother and Father signed “Parental 

Notification of Indian Status” (ICWA-020) forms. They declared under 

penalty of perjury, “I have no Indian ancestry as far as I know.” The 

detention report reads, “The parents . . . stated they do not have any 

Native American ancestry.” At the detention hearing, the court cited 

the ICWA-020 form to find that Father has no Indian ancestry, to 

which his counsel said, “Correct.” Mother asserted that the father of 

her oldest child is not Indian; the court replied, “Okay. Still no reason 

to know [ICWA] applies.”

The minute order reads, “The Court does not have a reason to 

know that this is an Indian Child, as defined under ICWA, and does not 

order notice to any tribe or the BIA. Parents are to keep [DCFS], their 

Attorney and the Court aware of any new information relating to 

possible ICWA status. ICWA-020, the Parental Notification of Indian 

Status is signed and filed.”

After detention, neither parent enrolled in a drug program. 

Mother missed most drug tests and Father tested positive for 

methamphetamine and marijuana. Mother confided to the social 

worker that Father threatened to kill her in the past; she fears he will 

harm her or the children if she leaves him. Mother was increasingly 

paranoid; her appearance and demeanor suggested possible drug abuse. 

PGM denied awareness of parental domestic violence but knew they 

abuse drugs. The parents, who lived in a car, had always left E.G., Jr. 

in PGM’s care.

Mother was born in Mexico in 1985. When she met with the 

social worker in May 2018, she admitted missing drug tests but denied 

drug use or domestic violence. She claimed people are trying to kill her 

and her children are “hacking” into her phone and listening to her 

conversations. The older children were shaken by Mother’s aggression. 

Though Mother cannot have drug paraphernalia or be under the 

influence at visits, PGM saw her with a pipe or bong while visiting 

E.G., Jr.
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Born in Los Angeles to parents from Mexico, Father earns a 

living from “side jobs.” He admitted a 10-year history of drug abuse but 

denied recent use of methamphetamine. He admitted slapping Mother 

but said she was “having a seizure” and he did not know what else to 

do. He denied threatening to kill her. By August 2018, neither parent 

visited E.G., Jr. or tested for drugs.

At the jurisdiction hearing on October 17, 2018, the court 

sustained an amended petition, finding that the parents failed to 

protect and endangered the children by engaging in violent physical 

and verbal altercations in the presence of the children, including 

choking, slapping, bruising, and a threat to kill; the parents’ substance 

abuse prevents them from providing regular child care; Mother’s 

mental and emotional problems and suicidal ideation make her 

incapable of providing regular child care. At disposition, the parents 

were ordered to participate in a full drug program, drug testing, 

domestic violence and parenting programs, and individual counseling. 

The children were removed from parental custody. The parents were 

allowed monitored visits.

In April 2019, DCFS reported that E.G., Jr. was bonded with 

PGM, with whom he has lived since infancy. His parents were 

homeless, slept on the streets and did not visit him. They ended 

contact with DCFS, so it was unknown if they enrolled in court-ordered 

programs. Mother was pregnant but did not have prenatal care. When 

she gave birth, prematurely, she and newborn Y.G. tested positive for 

methamphetamine.

DCFS detained Y.G. and filed a petition. An inquiry under ICWA 

showed Y.G. has no known Indian ancestry. Mother made delusional 

statements to the social worker and Father had open sores associated 

with use of methamphetamine.

Father was living in a car; he was aware of Mother’s drug use 

because of her strange behavior but denied her accusation that he 

drugged her. DCFS found Y.G. at “very high” risk of danger from 

parental drug abuse, mental illness, and domestic violence. On April 

22, 2019, the court found a prima facie case justifying detention and 
5

removed Y.G. from parental care. The parents disappeared after Y.G.’s 

birth and did not attend the hearing.

Y.G. was placed with PGM, who said the parents “are still doing 

drugs and living on the streets.” PGM reported that Y.G. experienced 

drug withdrawal, observing that her “limbs would shake.” The parents 

came to PGM’s home once after Y.G.’s birth. PGM allowed them to 

view the baby but not to touch her. They did not seek further visits.

In May 2019, the court found the parents did not comply with the 

case plan; they do not visit or have a bond with E.G., Jr. It terminated 

reunification services and set a permanency planning hearing for E.G., 

Jr. The court sustained the petition as to Y.G., finding she is at serious 

risk of physical harm from being born with drugs in her system and 

from parental drug abuse, mental illness, and violence. The court 

denied reunification services. The parents did not attend the hearings.

In July 2019, Father told the DCFS social worker that he and 

Mother are homeless, sleep next to a freeway, and are unwilling to go 

to a shelter. He was personally given notice of the section 366.26 

hearing. E.G., Jr. is thriving, happy and bonded with PGM, who has 

provided a loving home since he was a few months old. PGM is 

committed to adopting him and Y.G. The parents do not visit and have 

no parent-child bond. Y.G. is thriving with PGM and meeting 

developmental milestones. The parents occasionally appeared in 

PGM’s neighborhood but made no effort to see Y.G. or arrange a

visitation schedule with DCFS.

In March 2020, DCFS reported that Mother is incarcerated. The 

social worker found Father on the streets. She encouraged both 

parents to attend court hearings. In January 2021, DCFS reported 

that Mother was in a criminal diversion program. She spoke to the 

children by phone. Father said he uses drugs, though less than before. 

He hoped to resume his relationship with Mother once she completed 

her diversion program. Four months later, Mother was still in the 

program, Father was still homeless and the children had “very minimal 

contact” with them. Adoption was the proposed plan.
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Mother sought a modification. The changed circumstances she 

cited are completion of an anger management class and a parenting 

program. She enrolled in a substance abuse outpatient program, a 

domestic violence support group and counseling, visits the children 

once a week, and has virtual visits every two days. She asked the court 

to return the children to her or reinstate family reunification services 

and allow unmonitored visits.

On May 18, 2021, the court conducted the permanency planning

hearing, after many delays caused by the pandemic and DCFS’s 

inability to locate the parents. The court denied Mother’s request for a 

modification, observing that reunification services ended two years ago. 

Though Mother completed some of the case plan, the children have 

spent their entire lives with PGM, and Mother’s sporadic visits are 

monitored. Resuming services is not in the children’s best interests. 

DCFS and minors’ counsel asked the court to terminate parental rights 

because there is no parent-child bond. The children are bonded with 

PGM, who plans to adopt them. The court found that the parents did 

not regularly visit, the parental bond exception to adoption does not 

apply, and the children are adoptable. It terminated parental rights 

and freed the children for adoption. PGM is the prospective adoptive 

parent. Mother appealed.

DISCUSSION

The only issue Mother raises on appeal is the adequacy of the 

inquiry under ICWA. “We review a court’s ICWA findings for 

substantial evidence.’ [Citations.] ‘We must uphold the court’s orders 

and findings if any substantial evidence, contradicted or 

uncontradicted, supports them, and we resolve all conflicts in favor of 

affirmance,’ ” and Mother “ ‘has the burden to show that the evidence 

was not sufficient to support the findings and orders.’ ” (In re Austin J. 

(2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 870, 885.)

DCFS inquired about Indian ancestry before filing the

dependency petition. “Indian Child Inquiry” forms attached to the 

petition state that the parents offered no reason to believe the children 

are Indian. Both parents disclaimed Indian heritage in their ICWA-
7

020 forms. At the detention hearing, the court found ICWA does not 

apply, which Father’s attorney confirmed. The court ordered the 

parents to inform DCFS, their attorneys and the court of any new 

information about possible ICWA status. Despite having the 

opportunity over three years to submit the names of persons who could 

be questioned, the parents never identified family members with 

Indian ancestry.

The court and DCFS carried out their duty to inquire if the 

children are or may be Indian children. (§ 224.2, subd. (a); In re A.C. 

(2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 1060, 1069 [no duty to ask extended family about 

tribal membership under federal law].) There was no reason to know 

the children are Indian because (1) no person, tribe, or agency informed 

the court that the children are Indian; (2) they do not live on a 

reservation; (3) no participant informed the court of recently discovered 

information indicating Indian ancestry; (4) the children did not give the 

court reason to know they are Indian; (5) no one told the court the 

children are or have been wards of a tribal court; and (6) no one said 

the children have tribal membership cards. (§ 224.2, subd. (d)(1)-(6); 

Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(b)(1)(A)–(F).)

No further inquiry under ICWA was triggered. No information 

was supplied “suggesting that either the parent of the child or the child 

is a member or may be eligible for membership in an Indian tribe.” 

(§ 224.2, subd. (e)(1); In re Austin J., supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at pp. 883–

884.) DCFS and the court had no reason to doubt the parents correctly 

represented their Mexican heritage. “[T]he evidence already uncovered 

in the initial inquiry was sufficient for a reliable determination.” (In re 

Benjamin M. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 735, 743.)

Mother cites section 224.2, subdivision (b), which imposes a duty 

when a child is placed in county custody that includes “asking the child, 

parents, legal guardian, Indian custodian, extended family members, 

others who have an interest in the child, and the party reporting child 

abuse or neglect, whether the child is, or may be, an Indian child.” 

DCFS inquired about Indian ancestry, which both parents denied; 
8

further inquiry showed that Mother and her relatives immigrated from 

Mexico, as did Father’s parents.

The social worker had no reason to know, on this record, that an

Indian child may be involved. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(4)(A).) 

The parents denied Indian ancestry and their extended relatives are 

from another country. The children have spent their lives with PGM, 

who is adopting them. Though Mother complains that PGM was not 

questioned, failure to ask a grandparent seeking to adopt the children 

about Indian heritage is harmless error. (In re S.S. (2022) 75 

Cal.App.5th 575, 582–583 [an adopting grandparent has “a strong 

incentive” to disclose any Indian heritage to the court].)

Mother cites In re Y.W. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 542. It is 

inapposite. The father in that case declared he was or may be a 

member of a tribe; he wrote “ ‘Cherokee from Texas’ ” on his ICWA-020 

form, told a social worker his grandmother is 95 percent Cherokee, and 

provided vital family information. The mother in In re Y.W. disclaimed 

Indian heritage but said she was adopted at age two and had no 

information about biological relatives. (Id. at p. 548; see also In re N.G. 

(2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 474, 478–481 [duty to inquire arose when the 

child’s father signed an ICWA-020 form saying he had Indian ancestry 

and told the social worker his cousins are registered Cherokee tribe 

members].)

By contrast, DCFS had no evidence of a tribal link. Unlike the 

parents in In re Y.W., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th 542, Mother and Father 

never claimed Indian ancestry nor were they adopted or unaware of 

biological relatives. This is not a case in which the parents were 

missing and unavailable to report or deny Indian ancestry, giving rise 

to a duty to inquire with relatives. (In re Benjamin M., supra, 70 

Cal.App.5th at pp. 744–745 [father never appeared in the case and 

could not be asked if his children are Indian]; In re Josiah T. (2021) 71 

Cal.App.5th 388, 393, 403 [same].) Mother relies on cases in which 

ancestry is ambiguous; no such ambiguity exists here.

Even if there was a duty to interview extended family, we agree 

with our colleagues in Division One of this district that a parent 
9

claiming ICWA deficiencies following termination of parental rights 

must show prejudice from DCFS’s failure to conduct such interviews. 

(In re Darian R. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 502.) In Darian R., as here, the 

parents denied Indian ancestry; neither parent was adopted or 

estranged from family; and for years, they were “under court order to 

continue providing information relevant to ICWA.” (Id. at p. 510.) 

There was no basis for reversal because “[t]he record simply does not 

support mother’s unvarnished contention that additional interviews of 

mother’s father and sister would have meaningfully elucidated the 

children’s Indian ancestry.” (Ibid.)

Mother cites no evidence to support her claim that an Indian 

child may be involved, requiring further inquiry. When Mother and 

Father denied Indian ancestry in 2018, the court found ICWA did not 

apply and instructed them to inform DCFS, their attorneys, and the 

court of “any new information relating to possible ICWA status.” At no 

time since 2018 has anyone suggested that the children are Indian.

Mother waited until this appeal, after parental rights were 

terminated, to assert that the inquiry was inadequate. Even now, she 

does not identify in her brief any association with a tribe or offer a 

reason to believe her children are Indian. (In re A.C., supra, 65 

Cal.App.5th at p. 1069 [parent asserting failure to inquire must make 

an offer of proof or affirmatively claim Indian heritage on appeal]; In re 

H.B. (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 115, 122 [ICWA “ ‘is not a “get out of jail 

free” card dealt to parents of non-Indian children, allowing them to 

avoid a termination order by withholding secret knowledge, keeping an 

extra ace up their sleeves’ ” without showing their hand on appeal]; In 

re N.E. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 766, 769 [ICWA error harmless because 

father “does not assert on appeal that he in fact has any Indian 

heritage”].) The record shows that Mother immigrated to the United 

States, as did Father’s family. It is unlikely that foreign relatives are 

members of a U.S. tribe or could provide information likely to bear 

meaningfully upon whether the children are Indian.

“In sum, the record shows no prejudice flowing from DCFS’s 

failure to interview” extended family members. (In re Darian R., supra, 
10

75 Cal.App.5th at p. 510.) Mother has not shown a reasonable 

probability of a more favorable result had relatives been interviewed or 

a miscarriage of justice. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13; In re S.S., supra, 75 

Cal.App.5th at p. 581; In re S.B. (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1148, 1162.)

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

LUI, P. J.

We concur:

CHAVEZ, J.

HOFFSTADT, J.