* Pursuant to Fifth Circuit Rule 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be

published and is not precedent except under the limit ed circumstances set forth in Fifth Circuit Rule

47.5.4. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FIFTH CIRCUIT

_________________

No. 97-60451

_________________

JOSEPH GLASPER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

SID BOEDEKER SAFETY SHOE SERVICE, INC,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Mississippi

(2:95-CV-131-B-O)

April 15, 1999

Before EMILIO M. GARZA, DeMOSS, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Plaint iff Joseph Glasper (“Glasper”) appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for a new

trial. We affirm.

I

Glasper sued the defendants, Sid Boedeker Safety Shoe Service, Inc. (“Boedeker”) and

Heimburger, Incorporated (“Heimburger”), to recover for injuries allegedly caused by the defendants’

negligence. Glasper injured his back when he slipped on steps leading to a tractor-trailer where

Boedeker sold shoes. Heimburger had manufactured the steps. The jury found that Boedeker was

sixty percent negligent, Glasper himself was forty percent negligent, and Heimburge r was not

negligent. The jury found that the total damages stemming from the accident was $5,000. Glasper-2-

filed a motion for a new trial on the issue of damages, which the district court denied. He timely

appealed.

We review a district court’s ruling on a motion for a new trial for abuse of discretion. S ee

Dawson v. Wal-mart Stores, Inc.

, 978 F.2d 205, 208 (5th Cir. 1992). The reviewing court gives even

more deference to the district court’s ruling where, as here, “the district court has denied the new trial

motion and left the jury’s determination undist urbed.” I d. Glasper argues that the district court

abused its discretion because (1) the district court violated the “collateral source rule” by allowing

the defendants to present evidence and argument concerning Glasper’s workers’ compensation claim,

and (2) the amount of damages awarded by the jury is so inadequate as to warrant a new trial.

II

Under the collateral source rule, a tortfeasor may not reduce his or her liabilit y merely because

the plaint iff has recovered money from sourc es t hat are “collateral to, or independent of, the

tortfeasor.” P hillips v. Western Co. of N. Am.

, 953 F.2d 923, 929 (5th Cir. 1992). “The substantive

rule of no reduction carries with it an evidentiary rul e requiring the exclusion of evidence of any

collateral benefits.” I

d. Glasper asserts that the jury heard evidence and argument concerning

Glasper’s workers’ compensation claim arising the same accident at issue in this lawsuit. He contends

that his workers’ compensation benefits are a collateral source, any mention of which should have

been excluded. However, Glasper failed to properly object to the evidence and argument about his

workers’ compensation claim. Accordingly, he has waived his right to appeal this issue. S ee Rojas

v. Richardson , 703 F.2d 186, 189 (5th Cir. 1983).

Glasper also contends that a new trial is necessary because the jury awarded inadequate

damages. When ruling on such a request for a new t rial, “[t]he role of the district court is to

determine whether the jury’s verdict is within the confines set by state law.” G asperini v. Center for

Humanities, Inc.

, 518 U.S. 415 (1996) (quoting Brow ing-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal,

Inc.

, 492 U.S. 257, 279 (1989)). Mississippi law permits a new trial where the amount of damages

awarded is contrary to the overwhelming weight of credible evidence. S ee Miss. Code § 11-1-55;-3-

Harvey v. Wall

, 649 So.2d 184, 187 (Miss. 1995). Glasper contends that he presented

uncontroverted e vidence of damages totaling over $40,000. Thus he asserts that the jury’s

conclusion that Glasper suffered only $5,000 in damages is contrary to the overwhelming weight of

the evidence.

In assessing Glasper’s claim, “all the evidence must be viewed in a light most favorable to the

jury’s verdict, and

. . . the verdict must be affirmed unless the evi dence points so strongl y and

overwhelmingly in favor of one party that the court believes that reasonable persons could not arrive

at a contrary conclusion.” D awson

, 978 F.2d at 208. The record in this case contained evidence that

Glasper’s l o st wages and medical expenses were caused in part by past back problems, not by the

accident at issue in this case. Thus the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that

a reasonable jury could have found that the accident caused Glasper $5,000 in damages.

III

Accordingly, we affirm the district court.