Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-23-00136-CR

Jaime Lee JAIME,

Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the 365th Judicial District Court, Dimmit County, Texas

Trial Court No. 19-12-03329-DCRAJA

Honorable Amado J. Abascal III, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice

Sitting: Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice

Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice

Delivered and Filed: January 17, 2024

AFFIRMED

A jury convicted appellant Jaime Lee Jaime of one count of assault on Wife,1 a family 

member or a person with whom he had a dating relationship, a third-degree felony. See TEX.

PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(a)(1), (b)(2). The jury assessed punishment at imprisonment for seven 

years in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. The trial court signed a final judgment of 

conviction and sentence in accordance with the jury’s verdict. Jaime timely appealed. In one

1 We use a pseudonym for the complainant.
04-23-00136-CR

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issue, Jaime contends that “[t]he State improperly denied [him] constitutionally guaranteed due 

process.” We affirm.

Before voir dire, Jaime objected to the State’s motion in limine that sought to limit “any 

reference to punishment during any portion of the guilt/innocence phase of trial.” Specifically, 

Jaime, through counsel, argued:

JAIME: . . . I mean, I believe they just need to find that he has been convicted 

of a prior assault/family violence; but the arguments I have — and I 

sent an Appellate Court case to them last week — it’s just so 

prejudicial to tell somebody: Well, he’s already been convicted of 

this once. We don’t normally do that, but —

COURT: Well, they’re going to have to say that they intend to show, not that 

he has.

JAIME: Right.

COURT: So as long as it’s phrased that way, it’s not prejudicial because it’s 

still an element that they would need to prove, like any other —

JAIME: Right. And then if they — and if they do show it, they might find 

that he’s guilty just based on the prior conviction: Oh, he’s done it 

before. So I’m — I think I’m allowed to voir dire about that, how 

people would feel about that, how they would feel about possibly 

hearing that he may have been — a conviction of this same type of

— of assault before.

COURT: You can — you can do that.

JAIME: Yeah. That’s what I want to do. And I’m going to do it as a 

hypothetical.

STATE: I just need to — just don’t refer to it as enhancement.

JAIME: I won’t use the word “enhance.” That’s fine.

STATE: I’m just saying because it’s an element. So one of the elements that 

they have to prove is that he’s got a prior conviction. How do youall feel about — you know, that this —

COURT: Well, not how you-all feel; but, I mean, would you convict on this 

only because you found out that he had a prior conviction.
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STATE: Right.

COURT: You can’t — [ask “]how do you feel about it,[”] that’s going to open 

the door to —

STATE: Yeah.

JAIME: Yeah.

COURT: — everything.

STATE: I’m just — I — I would ask that it be referred to as one of the 

elements of the Charge. This is one of elements that they have to

prove.

COURT: The State has to prove in order to convict him of this offense that 

he’s charged with in the indictment.

JAIME: Okay.

At trial, Wife testified that Jaime had assaulted her on two separate occasions. The most 

recent assault occurred on September 28, 2018, and it resulted in the underlying trial. The earlier 

assault occurred on November 17, 2017. Wife recalled that, as a result of the November 17, 2017 

assault, Jaime was arrested and he “appear[ed] before a court.” 

After Wife testified, the State called Daniel M. Gonzales, the County Attorney for Dimmit 

County, Texas. Jaime objected to the State calling Gonzales, arguing:

JAIME: I believe they’re calling Mr. Gonzalez to get into the facts of the 

prior conviction which I think will be improper. It violates 404. It’s 

not relevant because it’s not an element of — the facts are not an 

element. And I think [Wife] already testified that, yes, she’s aware 

of his conviction and she was the victim, and she even said the dates.

So I think there’s — I think anything Mr. Gonzalez states is 

cumulative and repetitive; so I — and I’m going to object under 

404(b) under my — my right to cross, my client’s right, Sixth 

Amendment right to cross-examine the witness on these facts. I 

don’t have any of this information other than the judgment.

COURT: It was my understanding that he was not going to testify as to the 

particular conduct, just —
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STATE: Right, Your Honor. He’s — he’s more here to — so we can solidify 

the conviction as to the, I guess, legal process of getting to that

conviction; but he’s not going to testify as to what, when, how, any 

of that.

JAIME: That’s beyond the scope of the element that’s required. We don’t

— they don’t need to learn about the process. They just need to 

know that he had a conviction, that’s it, and he wants to tell them 

about what it took to get there and his arrest, all that. That’s —

STATE: No. I mean, we’re going to describe that, you know, he was 

presented before the Court; you know, he — whether he entered or 

was found guilty, and then at this point we have the judgment.

JAIME: All that is prejudicial, Judge. They’re just beating him up.

STATE: We have to prove up our conviction.

COURT: All right. The objection is overruled.

Gonzales testified that he prosecutes misdemeanor charges in the county court. Gonzales 

identified a judgment, signed by the Dimmit County Court on June 26, 2018, that found Jaime 

guilty of “assault/family violence.” The State offered the June 26, 2018 judgment, and it was 

admitted without objection.2

In the summary of the argument section of Jaime’s brief, he contends that, “[i]n the guiltinnocence phase of a jury trial, the inclusion of a crime of moral turpitude as both a jurisdictional 

requirement and an element of the same crime for which the defendant is indicted effectively 

denies the defendant his constitutionally protected right of substantive due process.” In the 

argument section of Jaime’s brief, he references the objection he made before voir dire. Jaime 

then attempts to survey the testimony of four witnesses and concludes by arguing that “[o]ther than 

a previous conviction, what [other] basis could a jury have to rationally convict the Appellant?” 

2 Jaime specifically asserted, “I agree to admit this evidence. This is the only thing they need to show the jury. They 

don’t need his testimony. Again, they’re just trying to prejudice my client every way possible.”
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The State responds by arguing, among other things, that Jaime failed to preserve the substantive 

due process argument that he now asserts. 

“An objection stating one legal theory [at trial] may not be used to support a different legal 

theory on appeal.” Broxton v. State, 909 S.W.2d 912, 918 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (quoting 

Johnson v. State, 803 S.W.2d 272, 292 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990)); see also Paredes v. State, 129 

S.W.3d 530, 535 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (holding that defendant failed to preserve Confrontation 

Clause complaint for appellate review when trial objection was solely on hearsay grounds).

Liberally construing Jaime’s brief, we believe he now contends that nesting a prior 

misdemeanor conviction of assault against a family member within the elements of a third-degree 

assault against a family member charge constitutes a deprivation of his substantive due process 

rights. This contention was not presented to the trial court at either the arguments before voir dire 

or before Gonzales testified. Accordingly, Jaime’s sole issue is waived.

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice

DO NOT PUBLISH