J-S37034-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: M.A.C., a Minor : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

:

:

:

:

APPEAL OF: H.C., Mother : No. 223 MDA 2017

Appeal from the Decree entered January 31, 2017

in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County,

Orphans’ Court Division, No(s): 1805 of 2015

IN THE INTEREST OF: M.L.C., a Minor : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

:

:

:

:

APPEAL OF: H.C., Mother : No. 224 MDA 2017

Appeal from the Decree entered January 31, 2017

in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County,

Orphans’ Court Division, No(s): 1804 of 2015

IN THE INTEREST OF: M.X.C., a Minor : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

:

:

:

:

APPEAL OF: H.C., Mother : No. 225 MDA 2017

Appeal from the Decree entered January 31, 2017

in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County,

Orphans’ Court Division, No(s): 1803 of 2015
J-S37034-17

- 2 -

IN THE INTEREST OF: D.M.C.S., a 

Minor

:

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

PENNSYLVANIA

:

:

:

:

:

APPEAL OF: H.C., Mother : No. 226 MDA 2017

Appeal from the Decree entered January 31, 2017

in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County,

Orphans’ Court Division, No(s): 1802 of 2015

BEFORE: STABILE, MOULTON and MUSMANNO, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED JUNE 27, 2017

H.C. (“Mother”) appeals from the Decree granting the Petition filed by 

the Lancaster County Children and Youth Social Service Agency (“the 

Agency”) for the involuntary termination of her parental rights to M.A.C. 

(born in 2010), M.L.C. (born in 2009), M.X.C. (born in 2008) and D.M.C.S. 

(born in 2006) (collectively “Children”) under the Adoption Act. See 23 

Pa.C.S.A. § 2511.1 We affirm.

In its Opinion, the trial court set forth the relevant factual and 

procedural history, which we adopt for the purpose of this appeal. See Trial 

Court Opinion, 2/22/17, at 1-7. 

On appeal, Mother raises the following issues for our review:

 

1

In its Decree, the trial court also changed Children’s permanency goals to 

adoption. However, Mother challenges only the termination of her parental 

rights to Children, and does not challenge the changing of Children’s 

permanency goals to adoption.
J-S37034-17

- 3 -

A. Whether the evidence presented at the [t]ermination of 

[p]arental rights hearing was sufficient to support [the] 

termination of Mother’s [parental] rights[?]

B. Whether the evidence presented at the [t]ermination of 

[p]arental rights hearing was sufficient to find that it was in 

the best interests of [C]hildren to terminate Mother’s parental 

rights[?]

Brief for Mother at 7.2

Our standard of review is as follows:

[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion 

standard when considering a trial court’s determination of a 

petition for termination of parental rights. As in dependency 

cases, our standard of review requires an appellate court to 

accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the 

trial court if they are supported by the record. If the factual 

findings are supported, appellate courts review to determine if 

the trial court made an error of law or abused its discretion. As 

has been often stated, an abuse of discretion does not result 

merely because the reviewing court might have reached a 

different conclusion. Instead, a decision may be reversed for an 

abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. 

... [U]nlike trial courts, appellate courts are not equipped to 

make the fact-specific determinations on a cold record, where 

the trial judges are observing the parties during the relevant 

hearing and often presiding over numerous other hearings 

regarding the child and parents. Therefore, even where the 

facts could support an opposite result, as is often the case in 

dependency and termination cases, an appellate court must 

resist the urge to second guess the trial court and impose its 

own credibility determinations and judgment; instead we must 

 

2 Although Mother has identified two issues in her Statement of Questions 

Presented, she failed to separate her issues in the Argument section of her 

brief, or provide headings for the issues. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (providing 

that “[t]he argument shall be divided into as many parts as there are 

questions to be argued; and shall have at the head of each part—in 

distinctive type or in type distinctively displayed—the particular point treated 

therein....”). 
J-S37034-17

- 4 -

defer to the trial judges so long as the factual findings are 

supported by the record and the court’s legal conclusions are not 

the result of an error of law or an abuse of discretion. 

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826–27 (Pa. 2012) (citations 

omitted).

Termination of parental rights is controlled by section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511. The burden is on the petitioner to 

prove by clear and convincing evidence that the asserted grounds for 

seeking the termination of parental rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 

273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009). “[C]lear and convincing evidence is defined as 

testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to enable the 

trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of 

the precise facts in issue.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted).

Satisfaction of any one subsection of section 2511(a), along with 

consideration of subsection 2511(b), is sufficient for the involuntary 

termination of parental rights. In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 

2004) (en banc). In this case, we will review the trial court’s decision to 

terminate Mother’s parental rights based upon subsections 2511(a)(8) and 

(b), which state the following:

(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

* * *

(8) The child has been removed from the care of the 

parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with 
J-S37034-17

- 5 -

an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the 

date of removal or placement, the conditions which led to 

the removal or placement of the child continue to exist 

and termination of parental rights would best serve the 

needs and welfare of the child.

* * *

(b) Other considerations.―The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the 

child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on 

the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, 

furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be 

beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition 

filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall 

not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions 

described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the 

giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8), (b).

With respect to subsection 2511(a)(8), Mother contends that the 

conditions which led to placement of Children were “truancy [], chaos in the 

home, concerns for drug use[,] and domestic violence in the home.” Brief 

for Mother at 24. Mother asserts that “[t]he evidence offered in the 

[termination] hearings suggests that those issues have been addressed.” 

Id. 

“Section 2511(a)(8) sets a 12-month time frame for a parent to 

remedy the conditions that led to the children’s removal by the court.” In 

re A.R., 837 A.2d 560, 564 (Pa. Super. 2003). Once the 12-month period 

has been established, the court must next determine whether the conditions 

that led to the children’s removal continue to exist, despite the reasonable 
J-S37034-17

- 6 -

good faith efforts of the Agency supplied over a realistic time period. Id. 

The “relevant inquiry in this regard is whether the conditions that led to 

removal have been remedied and thus whether reunification of parent and 

child[ren] is imminent at the time of the hearing.” In re I.J., 972 A.2d 5, 

11 (Pa. Super. 2009). Further, 

the application of [subs]ection (a)(8) may seem harsh when the 

parent has begun to make progress toward resolving the 

problems that had led to removal of her children. By allowing 

for termination when the conditions that led to removal continue 

to exist after a year, the statute implicitly recognizes that a 

child’s life cannot be held in abeyance while the parent is unable 

to perform the actions necessary to assume parenting 

responsibilities. This Court cannot and will not subordinate 

indefinitely a child’s need for permanence and stability to a 

parent’s claims of progress and hope for the future. Indeed, we 

work under statutory and case law that contemplates only a 

short period of time, to wit eighteen months, in which to 

complete the process of either reunification or adoption for a 

child who has been placed in foster care.

Id. at 11-12 (citation omitted, emphasis in original). 

In its Opinion, the trial court considered the requirements of 

subsection 2511(a)(8), and determined that the Agency had met its burden 

of proving the grounds for termination of Mother’s parental rights to 

Children. See Trial Court Opinion, 2/22/17, at 10-11 (wherein the court 

determined that Mother’s efforts have been minimal, she has never secured 

stable income or suitable housing, and Children have been in placement for 

33 months). We agree with the trial court’s determination, which is 

supported by the record and free of legal error, and affirm on this basis as to 

Mother’s first issue. See id. 
J-S37034-17

- 7 -

With respect to subsection 2511(b), Mother contends that Suzanne Ail, 

Ph.D (“Dr. Ail”), the psychologist who performed the bonding assessment, 

utilized improper or incorrect information to make her recommendation that, 

despite the existence of bonds between Mother and Children, Mother’s 

parental rights should be terminated. Brief for Mother at 24. Mother asserts 

that, while it is commonplace in custody proceedings to evaluate a child’s 

bonds with the biological parents as well as the foster parents, this practice 

is “inappropriate and out of place in an attachment evaluation.” Id. at 24-

25. Mother claims that, whereas a biological parent’s relationship with a 

child will be strained by separation when placement occurs, “the foster 

family’s interactions with the child[] will almost always appear to be stronger 

... than those of a biological parent’s.” Id. Mother argues that Dr. Ail’s 

assessment failed “to account for the tremendous disparity in time that 

[M]other had with [C]hildren compared with that of the foster families.” Id. 

Mother also points to Dr. Ail’s observations of Mother playing with Children, 

and contends that Dr. Ail’s conclusions drawn from such observations do 

“not allow for such realities as a child who is willful, and does not wish to 

follow the prompts of an adult.” Id. Mother asserts that, in making her 

recommendation, Dr. Ail improperly considered the level of progress that 

Mother had made in her plan which, Mother claims, is irrelevant to an 

attachment analysis. Id. at 26. Mother further argues that, in making her 

assessment, Dr. Ail improperly conducted a “best interests” analysis which, 
J-S37034-17

- 8 -

Mother contends, is the exclusive province of the trial court. Id. Mother 

asserts that Dr. Ail’s judgment was clouded by her belief that, despite the 

termination of Mother’s parental rights, Mother would always be permitted to 

be a part of Children’s lives. Id. Mother claims that the trial court failed to 

recognize Dr. Ail’s bias, and the flaws in her assessment. Id. 

Mother also contends that her inability to obtain appropriate housing 

and income, in order to support herself and Children, is beyond her control. 

Id. at 21, 22. Mother asserts that her panic attacks prevent her from 

maintaining employment. Id. at 21; see also id. at 22 (wherein Mother 

claims that mental health diagnoses are “beyond the control” of a parent). 

Mother argues that her lack of adequate housing was also caused by the 

removal of Children from her home. Id. at 22. Mother contends that, 

“[o]nce the [A]gency removed [C]hildren from [her] home[,] the 

[supplemental security income] payments [that she had been receiving for 

Children] were then paid to the [A]gency or county, not [M]other.” Id. 

Regarding subsection 2511(b), the court inquires whether the 

termination of Mother’s parental rights would best serve the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. See In re C.M.S., 

884 A.2d 1284, 1286-87 (Pa. Super. 2005). “Intangibles such as love, 

comfort, security, and stability are involved in the inquiry into the needs and 

welfare of the child.” Id. at 1287 (citation omitted). The court must also 

discern the nature and status of the parent-child bond, with utmost attention 
J-S37034-17

- 9 -

to the effect on the child of permanently severing that bond. Id.; see also 

In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa. Super. 2010) (stating that “the court 

must take into account whether a bond exists between child and parent, and 

whether termination would destroy an existing, necessary and beneficial 

relationship.”). Additionally, “the strength of emotional bond between a 

child and a potential adoptive parent is an important consideration in a ‘best 

interests’ analysis.” In re I.J., 972 A.2d at 13; see also In re T.S.M., 71 

A.3d 251, 268 (Pa. 2013) (stating that “courts considering termination must 

also consider whether the children are in a pre-adoptive home and whether 

they have a bond with their foster parents.”). Finally, the focus in 

terminating parental rights under section 2511(a) is on the parent, but it is 

on the child under section 2511(b). In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d

999, 1008 (Pa. Super 2008) (en banc).

In its Opinion, the trial court considered the requirements of 

subsection 2511(b), and determined that the Agency had met its burden of 

proving that it was in Children’s best interests to terminate Mother’s parental 

rights. See Trial Court Opinion, 2/22/17, at 12 (wherein the court 

determined that, while each of the Children have an attachment to Mother, 

the court “does not see a bond between Mother and [C]hildren sufficient to 

interfere with the termination of Mother’s parental rights[;]” and their bonds 

with their respective placement parents are considerably stronger and 

warmer than their attachments to Mother); see also id. (wherein the court 
J-S37034-17

- 10 -

noted that D.M.C.S. and M.X.C. have “fractured” relationships with Mother). 

We agree with the trial court’s determination, which is supported by the 

record and free of legal error, and affirm on this basis as to Mother’s second 

issue. See id.

Decree affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/27/2017
Circulated 06/08/2017 12:05 PM