### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON A ssi gne d on Br ie fs N ove m be r 12, 200 8
MIC KEY JEFF RIES v. S TAT E OF TEN NES SEE Appeal f rom the Cr im inal Cou rt for Shelby Coun ty No. P -25642 W. Otis Higgs, Jr., Judge

No. W2007-02407-C CA-R 3-P C - F iled Janu ary 6, 2009

The pe titioner, Mickey

J eff ries, appea ls the denial of his petition for post-conviction re lief, ar g uing that his trial counsel provided ine ffe ctive assistanc e by his failure to adequately communicate a plea ag ree ment to him. Following our revie w, we a ffirm the de nial of the pe tition. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Cr im inal Cou rt A ff irm ed
A L AN E. G L EN N , J

. , d el ivere d the opinion of the cour t, in which J OS EP H M. T I PTON , P.J ., and D. K EL L Y T HOMAS , J R ., J ., joined.

J ake E rwin (at hear ing) and Claiborne H . Fe rg uson (on appe al), Memphis, T en n es s ee , for the
a pp e lla nt, Mic ke y

Jef fr ie s.
Rob e rt E. Co op e r, Jr., Attor

ne y Ge ne ra l and

Re po rt e r; J. Ros s D y e r, As sis tant A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; Wil liam L . Gibbons, District Attorney Gene ral; and Patience Br anham, Assistant D istrict Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee
.

OP IN ION

F AC TS Following a jury

trial, the petitioner wa s convicted in the Shelby County Criminal Court of fi rs t de g re e fe lony

mur de r i n th e pe rp e tr a tio n o f rap e and se nte nc e d to lif

e imp ri so nme nt. Hi s conviction was a ffirme d by this court on direc t appea l, and our supreme court denie d his application f o r p e r mi s s io nto a

p p e a l. St a te v
. M ic k e y

Je f f r ie s , N o
. W1 9 9 8- 0 0 0 0 2

- CC A

- R3

- CD , 2 0 0 0 WL 135388, at *1 (Te nn. Crim. App. Feb. 2, 2000) , perm. to appe al denied ( Tenn. Sept. 11, 2000). On September

17, 2001, the petitioner filed a pro se pe tit io n for po st- c on vic tio n r e lie f i n which he r aised numer ous claims, including ine ffe ctive assistanc e of tria l counsel. Post-conviction counsel wa s appointed and subse quently filed a notice that no amende d petition would be filed.-2-

Trial counse l was dec ea s ed by the time of the June 2, 2006, evidentiary hear ing. T he assistant district attorney who prosec uted the case , testify ing on the State’s beha lf, said that she ha d worke d with trial counsel, an assistant public defe nder, many times over the y ear s and that he w as “ver y well pre pare d” in this case, a s he wa s in every case . She particula

rly rec alled the e x cellent job trial counsel ha d done in cross-e x amining the medical e x aminer at trial. She said that the petitioner had orig inally been indicted for criminally neg lige nt homicide , but the medical examiner’s fur ther
re se arc h h a d r e su lte d in

the c ha rg e be ingup g ra de d to fe lony mur de r. Tr ia l c ouns e l, t hr ou g h c ro ssexamination, was able to e licit information unknown to the prosec uting attorney s, namely , that the
me dic a l e xami ne r h a d is su e d tw o d e a th c e rt if ic ate s f or the vic tim :
And w h a t h e w a s a

b le to g e t D r
. G u n th e r to te s ti f y to w a s th at she ha d,
un be kn ow ns t to us , is su e d tw o d e a th ce rt if ic a te s. Th e fi rs t on e ha d r ule d th a t th is victim had died of natural ca uses, of a hear t attack.
The sec ond one, af

ter looking at the cr ime scene evidenc e and r eviewingthe several co n fl i ct i ng statements that the def endant . . . g ave . . . to the police depar tment, she then ruled the cause of death, positi onal asphy x ia.
On cr oss-examinatio n , t h e p rosecutor ac knowledg ed that she w as not privy to counsel’s
conver sations with the petitioner, had no idea how many

tim es h e had me t with or talked to the petitioner outside of the courtroom, and did not know what he had done in prepa ration for trial. She said she could not “imag ine that there would have be en” a n offe r made to the petitioner on the criminally

neg lige nt homici de cha rg e bec ause, a s she re called, the superse ding f elony murder indictment came f

airly soon after

the cr iminally

neg lige nt homicide ind ic tm e nt. T h e ref ore, the re w as no t “ a bigla g in t ime that [th e y ] wo uld have be e n w or

kin g up thi s c ri min a lly

ne g lig e nt h omi c ide fi le and re laying of

fer s and going back and forth.” She stated t hat t he only offe r they would have ma de on the day

of trial would have been f or t he petiti oner to plead g uilty to the offe nse in exchang e for a life se ntence , as they

would have ha d no rea son to deviate fr om t h e Shelby County District Attorney ’s “no de als” policy , which had a lrea dy been put into ef

fec t by that time.
Th e pe tit ion e r t e sti fi e d th a t tr ia l c ouns e l me t w it h hi m on ly on c ourt date s, e a c h ti me inf or min g him tha t hi s c a se ha d b e e n r e se t. Tr ia l c ouns e l ne ve r e xpla ine d th e c ha rg e s a g a ins t hi m, did no t pr ov ide any

c op ie s o f d isc ov e ry , a

nd ne ve r d isc us se d a

ny de fe ns e str a te g ie s o r t

ri a l ta c tic s. T h e p et i t i o n er cl ai m ed , i n fa ct , t h at h e d i d n o tev en k

n o w t h at h e w as fa ci n g a f el o n y m u rd er ch ar ge rathe r than the or igina l criminally neg lige nt homicide char g e until his trial beg an. He also had no ide a un til he wa s b ro ug ht i nto the c ourt ro om o n th e da

y of tr ia l that his tr ia l wa s sc he du le d to b e g in that day . Consequently , he wa s not dressed f or cour t and had to be tr ied in his jail uniform.
Acc ording to the petitioner, just be fore the trial beg an, trial c ounsel met with him for about five minutes, the long est conve rsation he e ver ha d with him, to t ell him that the State was off ering a plea barg ain of twenty y ear s. He said he refused that offer beca use he be lieved he w as still facing
a c ha rg e of c ri min a lly

ne g lig e nt h omi c ide : “ Itol d h im no. I sai d, Iwa s awa re that my

c ha rg e is
c ri min a lly

ne g lig e nt h omi c ide and

Ido n’ t be lie ve that c arr ie s tw e nty -y e ars
. An d h e wa s li ke , w e ll-3-

we a lr e ady do ne got the jur y in t he re , le t’ s g o a

he a d a nd sta rt .” He state d th a t, h a d h e kn ow n h is char g e wa s felony

murder, he would “[m] ost definitely ” have acc epted the twe nty y ear s offe red by the State. On cr oss-examination, the petitioner acknow ledg ed havingconfirme d during voir dire be fo re the tr ia l c ourt

that c ouns e l ha d disc us se d with him mor e tha n onc e wh e the r or no t he s ho uld testify in his own defense

. On Au gu s t 3 0 , 2 0 0 7 , t h e po s t -c o n v i ct i o n co u rt en t er ed an o rd er d en y i n g t h e p et i t i o n , fi n d i n g, among other thing s, that the petitioner had not met his burde n of showing that counsel wa s deficie nt or that any

alleg ed def

iciency p re

j udiced the outc ome of his ca se. On Oc tober 12, 2007, the petitioner filed an untimely appea l to this court, followe d by a September

5, 2008, motion requesting that we wa ive the timely

filing. B y

order enter ed on September

10, 2008, we g rante d the motion.
AN AL YSI S
On a pp e a l, t he pe tit ion e r c on te nd s th a t tr ia l c ou ns e l’ s f a ilure to c omm

un ic a te , p art ic ula

rl y with respec t to the superseding indictment a nd the neg otiated plea ag ree ment, constituted ineffe ctive
a ssi sta nc e of c ouns e l. Th e State re sp on ds by arguin g , amon g oth e r t

hin g s, that th e re c or d s up po rt s the post-conviction cour

t’s denial of the petition. W e ag ree with the State. A post-conviction petitioner be ars the bur den of pr o v i n g h i s alleg ations by clea r and
c on vin c inge vid e nc e . T e nn . Co de Ann. § 4 0- 30 -1 10 (f ) ( 20 06 ). Whe n an e vid e nti ary he ari ngis h e ld in t he po st- c on vic tio n s e tti ng , th e fi nd ing s o f f a c t ma de by the c ourt are c on c lus ive on a pp e a l un le ss the evidenc e pre ponderates ag ainst them. See Tidwell v. State, 922 S.W .2d 497, 500 (Tenn. 1996)

. Where a ppellate r eview involves pur ely fac tual issues, the appe llate court should not reweig h or
ree valuate the evidenc e. See H enley v
. State, 960 S.W .2d 572, 578-79 (Te nn. 1997). Howe ver, re vie w of a tr ia l court ’s a

pp lic a tio n o f t

he law t o th e fa c ts o f t

he c a se is de novo , with no presumption of c o r r e c tn e s s
. Se e Ru f

f v
. St a te , 9 7 8 S. W. 2 d

9 5 , 9 6 ( T e n n
. 1 9 9 8 )

. T h e is s u e o f in eff ective assistance of counsel, which prese nts mixed que stions of fac t and law, is re viewed de novo , with a presumption of cor

rec tness g iven only

to the post-conviction cour t’s finding s of fac t. See Fie lds v. State, 40 S.W .3d 450, 458 (Tenn. 2001) ; Burns v. State, 6 S.W.3d 453, 461 (Tenn. 1999).
To establish a cla im of ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel, the petitioner ha s the burden to show both that t ri al co u nsel’s per formanc e wa s deficie nt and that counse l’s defic ient perf ormanc e pr e jud ic e d th e ou tc ome of

the pr oc e e din g
. Str ic kla

nd v. Was hin g ton , 4 66 U. S. 6 68 , 6 87 , 1 04 S. Ct

. 2052, 2064 (1984); see State v. Taylor, 968 S.W .2d 900, 905 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) (noting that
same sta nd ard fo r d e te rm ini ngine ff

e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l th a t is a

pp lie d in fe de ra l c a se s a lso
a pp lie s in Te nn e sse e ). Th e Str ic kla nd sta nd ard is a tw o- pr on g te st:
F ir st, th e de fe nd ant m

us t sh owthat c ouns e l’ s p e rf or manc e wa s d e fi c ie nt. Th is require s showing that counsel made err ors so serious that counse l was not fu nc tio nin g a s th e “ c ouns e l” g ua ra nte e d th e de fe nd ant b y

the Sixth A me ndme nt. Second, the de fenda

nt must show that the d ef icient per formanc e pre

judiced the-4-

defe nse. This requir es showing that counsel’s e rror s were so serious as to deprive the defe ndant of a

fair tr ial, a trial whose result is reliable. 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct . at 2064.
The de ficient pe rfor

mance prong of the test is satisfied by showi n g t h at “counse l’s acts or omissions wer e so serious as to f all below an objec tive standard of rea sonablene ss under pre vailing pr of e ssi on a l no rm s. ” Go a d v . St a te , 93 8 S.W. 2d 36 3, 36 9 ( Te nn . 1 99 6) (c iti ngStr ic kla nd , 4 66 U. S. at 688, 104 S. Ct. at 2065; Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W .2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975)). The prejudice prong of the test is satisfied by

showing a re asonable probability , i.e ., a “pr obability sufficie nt to undermine
con f id e n c e in the outcome,” that “but for c ounsel’s unprof essional er

rors, the r esult of the proc eeding would have be en diffe rent.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068.

I n denying relief on the claim that the petitioner ra ises on appea l, the post-conviction cour t’s
or de r s ta te s in

pe rt ine nt p a

rt :
Petitioner has not demonstrated that Counsel f ailed to c ommunicate, advise , or investig ate his ca se beyond Pe ti ti o n er’ s mere c onclusory alleg ations. Ex amination of the tr ia l tr ans c ri pt s ho ws that Coun se l wa s we ll- pr e pa re d an d sub

je c te d th e [S]ta te to ze a lou s r e pr e se ntatio n o f P e tit ion e r. I n li g ht o f th e str e ng th o f t he c a se a g a ins t P e t i t i o n e r , . . . C o u n s e l d i d t h e b e s tj o b p o s s i b l e b u tw a s u n a b l e t o p r e v a i l

. In
a d d i t i o n , C o u n s e l m e t w i t h P e t i t i o n e r n u m e r o u s t i m e s i n c o u rt

. F u rt h e r , e ve n if P et i t i o n er co u l d s h o w i n ad eq u at e c o m m u n i ca t i o n , P et i t i o n er has not shown how such
a la c k o f c o mm u n ic ati o n p r e ju d ic e d h is tr ia l[

. ]
The re cord f

ully supports the finding s and conc lusions of the p o s t -c o n v i cti on court. The assistant district attorney who prosecuted the case could not rec all any offe r havingbeen ma de to the petitioner on the da

y of trial and sa id that the only offe r that would have been ma de, due to the “ no deals” p o li c y in e f

f e c t, w o u ld h a v e b e e n f

o r th e p e ti ti o n e r to p le a d g u il ty in e xc h an g e f o r a life sentenc e. The post-conviction court obviously acc redited the testimony of t he prose cutor ove r that of the pe titioner, as was within its province

. Acc ording ly , we conclude that the petit ioner ha s not met his burden of de monstrating that counsel wa s deficie nt in his co m m u n i cation or that he was prejudice d as a r esult of that alleg ed def iciency

. CO NC LU SION
We conclude that the petitioner has not met his b u rd en o f showing that he r ece ived ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel. Acc ording ly , we a ff i rm t h e denial of his petition for post-conviction re lief.

___________________________________ AL AN E. GL ENN, JUDGE