IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION THREE

BAKER BOYER NATIONAL BANK,

Respondent,

v.

JAMES PATTERSON FOUST, JR.,

Appellant.

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No. 35526-8-III

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

SIDDOWAY, J. — The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Baker 

Boyer National Bank and entered judgment against James Foust Jr. for the more than $1 

million owed by his limited liability company—a debt that Mr. Foust had personally 

guaranteed. Mr. Foust appeals, contending the court erred in summarily dismissing his 

counterclaims alleging fraud in the inducement and negligent misrepresentation, and in 

denying reconsideration. We find no error or abuse of discretion and affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This case arises out of a failed investment opportunity originally conceived in 

2012 by Greenflex Housing, LLC, (Greenflex1) during an oil boom in North Dakota’s 

 

1 For simplicity, we refer to Greenflex Housing, LLC as “Greenflex.” Other 

Greenflex entities exist, but we have no occasion to refer to any of them in this opinion.

FILED

OCTOBER 18, 2018

In the Office of the Clerk of Court

WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
No. 35526-8-III

Baker Boyer Nat’l Bank v. Foust

2

Bakken oil field. The oil boom created a housing need that a Washington resident, John 

Eakin, and several friends concluded could be profitably addressed by delivering

Greenflex modular homes to locations where oil field housing was needed. Mr. Eakin, 

who served as Greenflex’s chief executive officer at relevant times, offered the following 

explanation of its business plan:

Greenflex Housing LLC is a company we formed to provide portable 

worker housing for construction, oil, gas, pipeline, and virtually anyone 

who has a need for housing in hard to reach areas. Our company basically 

has “unit owners” who purchase Greenflex homes from the Greenflex 

factory in Salem, Oregon. After looking at the information on how we 

build those homes you will understand why we exclusively use the 

Greenflex brand. Super insulated concrete structures that are fire proof, 

waterproof, mold proof, and virtually indestructible are the perfect solution 

for rental worker housing. The fact that they are portable makes for ease of 

placement in hard to a [sic] build areas with limited infrastructure. The 

basic idea is to have several “unit Owners” who pool their homes into 

Greenflex Housing, LLC so we can be a large housing provider across the 

nation.

Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 110.

One of the early investors in the venture was Jason Sundseth, whose limited 

liability company (LLC) purchased 30 modular homes, or “units,” with financing 

provided by Baker Boyer Bank. By the spring of 2013, however, Dr. Sundseth wanted to 

sell the LLC’s units, which had by then been moved to leased sites in recreational vehicle 

(RV) parks in North Dakota. James Foust Jr. learned of the opportunity to purchase the 

Sundseth LLC’s units from Cameron Jones, a friend of Mr. Eakin’s. Mr. Jones 

introduced Mr. Foust to Dr. Sundseth, Mr. Eakin, and Greenflex’s chief financial officer. 
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3

In September 2013, Mr. Foust, as managing member of his own LLC, JPF Enterprises

(JPF), entered into an agreement to buy the 30 units from the Sundseth LLC, contingent 

on reaching financing terms with the bank. The agreement provided for a $52,150 sales 

commission to Mr. Jones, to be paid by JPF.

2

JPF agreed to purchase the 30 units for $1,245,000, approximately $1,000,000 of 

which would be paid to the bank in order to discharge the bank’s liens. Mr. Foust had not 

done business with the bank before, but began corresponding with one of its loan officers, 

Chris Sentz, on or before June 4, 2013. In e-mails exchanged on that date, Mr. Foust 

identified his expectations, which included that he would have a lease agreement with 

Greenflex. Mr. Sentz responded with an expression of interest outlining a framework for 

financing that assumed that Mr. Foust’s LLC would have a six-year contract with 

Greenflex.

3

 Over the next four months, Mr. Foust, an experienced business owner and 

operator, investigated and assessed the potential investment. The bank engaged in its 

underwriting process. 

 

2 Mr. Foust later speculated that Mr. Jones was retained by the bank to offload the 

Sundseth LLC’s investment, but there is no evidence that Mr. Jones had a connection 

with the bank. The fact that his commission was paid by JPF suggests that he was acting 

on Mr. Foust’s behalf, not the bank’s.

3 Mr. Sentz’s communication’s stated assumption was “a negotiated ‘6 year’ 

contract with John Eakin,” but it is undisputed that the bank contemplated a contract with 

Greenflex, presumably to be executed by Eakin as CEO. CP at 107.
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On October 17, 2013, Mr. Foust, as the managing member of JPF, executed a 

$1,077,600 promissory note in favor of the bank to close its purchase of the 30 units. The 

bank required, and Mr. Foust individually signed, a commercial guaranty. Among Mr. 

Foust’s representations and warranties in the guaranty was his agreement “that, absent a 

request for information, Lender shall have no obligation to disclose to Guarantor any 

information or documents acquired by Lender in the course of its relationship with 

Borrower.” CP at 12.

JPF made its last payment on the note a couple of years later, on November 2, 

2015. On March 4, 2016, the bank declared JPF in default, accelerated the loan, and 

demanded payment. In December 2016, it brought the action below, suing Mr. Foust

individually on his guaranty. In response to the bank’s motion for default or summary 

judgment, Mr. Foust answered and counterclaimed, alleging fraudulent inducement and 

negligent misrepresentation. 

When deposed, Mr. Foust was unable to identify any affirmative misrepresentation 

made to him by representatives of the bank, but he believed that misrepresentations might

be uncovered through discovery. He also relied for his fraud and negligent

misrepresentation claims on “sin[s] of omission.” CP at 203. This was based on his 

belief that bank employees knew but failed to tell him about problems Greenflex had in 

2013 with Badlands LLC, the rental manager for Greenflex’s units in North Dakota. 

Badlands also turned out to be the party holding lease rights to the RV sites where the 
No. 35526-8-III

Baker Boyer Nat’l Bank v. Foust

5

units were located. Badlands filed a lawsuit against Greenflex on or about July 12, 2013,

in which it reportedly obtained a temporary restraining order against Greenflex. The case 

was compromised and settled, and the claims against Greenflex were dismissed four 

weeks later, on August 9, 2013.

The trial court granted summary judgment in the bank’s favor. In a motion for 

reconsideration, Mr. Foust for the first time argued that the bank had violated the Equal 

Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691, and sought to retract his admission in 

answering the bank’s complaint that he entered into the commercial guaranty on behalf of 

his marital community. The trial court denied the motion. Mr. Foust appeals.

ANALYSIS

I. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT DISMISSING MR.

FOUST’S CLAIMS

Mr. Foust argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because 

genuine issues of material fact exist that require trial. We review a trial court’s grant of 

summary judgment de novo. Korslund v. Dyncorp Tri-Cities Servs., Inc., 156 Wn.2d 

168, 177, 125 P.3d 119 (2005), overruled on other grounds by Rose v. Anderson Hay & 

Grain Co., 184 Wn.2d 268, 358 P.3d 1139 (2015). Summary judgment is appropriate 

when the moving party shows there is “no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 

the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” CR 56(c). The 

nonmoving party “may not rely on speculation, argumentative assertions that unresolved 
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6

factual issues remain, or in having its affidavits considered at face value.” Seven Gables 

Corp. v. MGM/UA Entm’t Co., 106 Wn.2d 1, 13, 721 P.2d 1 (1986). “[A]fter the moving 

party submits adequate affidavits, the nonmoving party must set forth specific facts that 

sufficiently rebut the moving party’s contentions and disclose that a genuine issue as to a 

material fact exists.” Id. Like the trial court, we view all demonstrated facts and 

reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Jones v. 

Allstate Ins. Co., 146 Wn.2d 291, 300, 45 P.3d 1068 (2002).

A. The fraudulent inducement counterclaim was properly dismissed

To prevail on a claim of fraud, the plaintiff must prove nine elements by clear, 

cogent, and convincing evidence.

4 Among them are that the defendant made a material 

misrepresentation of existing fact. Beckendorf v. Beckendorf, 76 Wn.2d 457, 462, 457 

P.2d 603 (1969). Fraud in the inducement exists when the misrepresentation is of a 

matter or matters that motivate a defendant to enter into the transaction. Pedersen v. 

Bibioff, 64 Wn. App. 710, 722, 828 P.2d 1113 (1992). 

Mr. Foust does not rely for his claim of fraudulent inducement on a material 

misrepresentation but contends, instead, that the bank failed to disclose material 

 

4 The nine elements are (1) a representation of existing fact, (2) that is material, (3) 

and false, (4) the speaker knows of its falsity, (5) intent to induce another to act, (6) 

ignorance of its falsity by the listener, (7) the latter’s reliance on the truth of the 

representation, (8) her right to rely on it, and (9) consequent damage. Pedersen v. Bibioff,

64 Wn. App. 710, 723 n.10, 828 P.2d 1113 (1992).
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information. “Ordinarily,” however, “the duty to disclose a material fact exists only 

where there is a fiduciary relationship.” Tokarz v. Frontier Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 33 

Wn. App. 456, 463-64, 656 P.2d 1089 (1982). When a duty to disclose exists, the 

suppression of a material fact is tantamount to an affirmative misrepresentation. Crisman 

v. Crisman, 85 Wn. App. 15, 22, 931 P.2d 163 (1997). 

A bank is not generally a fiduciary of its borrowers; instead, they deal at arm’s 

length. Tokarz, 33 Wn. App. at 458-59. Mr. Foust concedes that this court’s decision in 

Tokarz provides a controlling legal analysis of the special circumstances in which a bank 

might owe a duty of disclosure to a borrower. Br. of Appellant at 10-11. In Tokarz, the 

plaintiffs contracted with a builder and contractor to construct a home, obtaining 

financing through Frontier Federal Savings & Loan. Tokarz, 33 Wn. App. at 458. 

Frontier had made earlier loans for homes that the contractor was building. Id. A month 

after the Tokarzs’ financing was arranged, Frontier discontinued lending money to the 

contractor, having learned from a routine credit report that five liens had been filed on 

homes he was building. Id. When the Tokarzs had their own problems with the 

contractor, ordered him off the property, and then later learned that Frontier had earlier 

severed its own relationship with the contractor, they sued Frontier, alleging breach of 

fiduciary duty and fraud for not disclosing the contractor’s financial problems. Id. at 458. 

On appeal, this court recognized that no prior Washington case had addressed the 

precise issue of whether there was a special relationship between a plaintiff borrower and 
No. 35526-8-III

Baker Boyer Nat’l Bank v. Foust

8

a defendant bank giving rise to a duty to disclose another bank customer’s difficulties. 

Id. at 461. In the Tokarzs’ case, this court found “none of the special circumstances 

which may impose a fiduciary duty”:

There is no allegation or evidence that Frontier (1) took on any extra 

services on behalf of Tokarz other than furnishing the money for 

construction of a home; (2) received any greater economic benefit from the 

transaction other than the normal mortgage; (3) exercised extensive control 

over the construction; or (4) was asked by Tokarz if there were any lien 

actions pending.

Id. at 462. 

Mr. Foust argues that two important factual differences distinguish his case from 

Tokarz. He claims that here, (1) the bank “required” him to contract with Greenflex, Br. 

of Appellant at 11, (2) at the same time the bank was making inquiries about Greenflex’s 

operations as part of the bank’s underwriting of JPF’s investment in the housing venture. 

The only case he suggests recognizes these facts as additional bases for finding a duty to 

disclose is Hutson v. Wenatchee Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n, 22 Wn. App. 91, 588 

P.2d 1192 (1978). But Hutson predates Tokarz, and Tokarz characterizes Hutson as a 

classic case of a special relationship that arose because a borrower with “less knowledge, 

experience and judgment” than bank officers relied, with the bank’s knowledge, on the 

bank officers’ superior understanding of the type of mortgage or credit insurance that it 

was procuring on the borrower’s behalf. Tokarz, 33 Wn. App. at 460-61.
No. 35526-8-III

Baker Boyer Nat’l Bank v. Foust

9

Unlike the borrower in Hutson, Mr. Foust is an experienced businessperson. He 

cannot demonstrate bank awareness that he relied on the bank to disclose information 

encountered in the underwriting process because his guaranty expressly disclaimed

reliance on the bank to disclose such information. His representation and warranty that 

the bank had no obligation to disclose information it acquired does not contravene public 

policy, as he contends on appeal. To the contrary, it clarified the expectations of the 

parties.

In opposing summary judgment, Mr. Foust did not demonstrate any other special 

circumstance giving rise to a fiduciary duty of disclosure on the part of the bank. He did 

not demonstrate that the bank provided services to Mr. Foust other than traditional 

financing with normal underwriting procedures. 

Mr. Foust argues that a fiduciary or special relationship arose because the bank 

gained a greater-than-usual economic benefit when his purchase of the units spared the 

bank the need to foreclose on its loan to the Sundseth LLC. To begin with, for a greaterthan-usual economic benefit to give rise to a fiduciary duty, it must be a benefit that the

parties recognize and that they know (or should know) transforms their relationship to 

one of unusual trust and confidence. This is clear from the Washington case law on

which Tokarz relied in concluding that a greater-than-usual economic benefit can give

rise to fiduciary duties. There is no evidence that Mr. Foust and bank representatives had 

a common understanding during loan negotiations that the bank was receiving a greater-
No. 35526-8-III

Baker Boyer Nat’l Bank v. Foust

10

than-usual economic benefit from the loan to JPF, so there was nothing to transform their

relationship into one of unusual trust and confidence.

Mr. Foust provides no admissible evidence that the bank did benefit economically 

when JPF stepped into the shoes of the Sundseth LLC. The evidence on which Mr. Foust 

relies for this argument is at best double hearsay: he points to unsworn electronic mail

from Mr. Eakin in which Mr. Eakin recounts information about Dr. Sundseth refusing to 

make payments and being nine days away from delinquency. This is information that 

Mr. Eakin might have learned from Dr. Sundseth or that he might have learned from 

someone further removed from the facts. Mr. Foust presents no admissible evidence that 

the Sundseth LLC would have discontinued making payments and no evidence, 

admissible or inadmissible, that Dr. Sundseth and his LLC were weaker financially than 

JPF and Mr. Foust. 

Mr. Foust’s most vigorous contention is that the bank imposed a “requirement” 

that JPF enter into a lease and management agreement with Greenflex, thereby allegedly 

exercising extensive control over JPF’s operations. Br. of Appellant at 5. Mr. Foust’s 

evidence shows only that after he sent an e-mail to Mr. Sentz on the early afternoon of 

June 4, 2013, expressing his “[e]xpectation[ ]” that he would enter into a lease of the 

purchased units to Greenflex, the bank made Mr. Foust’s expected lease a requirement of 
No. 35526-8-III

Baker Boyer Nat’l Bank v. Foust

11

the loan.5 CP at 108-09. It is normal for commercial lenders extending substantial credit 

to satisfy themselves, sometimes through loan conditions or requirements, that a 

borrower’s business will be operated competently during the loan term. Mr. Foust’s own 

deposition testimony makes clear that this is what the bank’s “requirement” was all 

about. Asked about the discussion with Mr. Sentz about the bank’s requirement for a 

lease of the units to Greenflex, Mr. Foust testified;

A He said that—that the GreenFLEX Housing had a great deal 

of experience in managing these things, and it was a prerequisite to, you 

know, pursuing business with Baker Boyer Bank, and probably because 

that was a board of directors—or whoever approved that line of business—

stated that was protection, I guess, on, you know, somebody that was 

inexperienced coming in.

Q Explain that. Who was inexperienced?

A I was inexperienced. I had no experience in managing units 

in an oil field in North Dakota. This company did. And it made sense.

Q It made sense to align the borrower with GreenFLEX 

Housing?

A Yes.

Q Did you ever tell the bank you didn’t want to have to lease the 

units you were going to buy to GreenFLEX Housing?

A No. That was—please understand, that wasn’t an option that 

was even open, that that was a requirement by Baker Boyer Bank.

CP at 172-73.

 

5 The lease agreement between JPF and Greenflex has an effective date of June 1, 

2013, which was several days before Mr. Foust’s and Mr. Sentz’s initial communications.
No. 35526-8-III

Baker Boyer Nat’l Bank v. Foust

12

There is no evidence that the bank insisted that the operating role Greenflex would 

fill must be filled by Greenflex to the exclusion of any other operator. Mr. Foust presents 

no evidence that he ever expressed the desire to fill the operational role with someone 

else qualified to rent units located in North Dakota. Traditional underwriting 

requirements that are designed only to ensure competent operation of a business but that 

do not divest management of the borrower of operational control do not give rise to a 

fiduciary relationship. See, e.g., In re Am. Consol. Transp. Cos., 433 B.R. 242, 254 

(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2010) (“[C]ontrol is not established when a lender insists on standard 

loan agreement restrictions, closely monitors the borrower’s finances, and makes 

business recommendations, even [in] the context of heated negotiations. . . . Nor is 

control established when a borrower hires a management or restructuring consultant 

selected by the lender.”).

Finally, Mr. Foust provides no evidence that Greenflex’s dispute with Badlands

proximately caused the failure of his investment in the 30 units. As set forth above, the 

Badlands lawsuit was dismissed with prejudice in less than a month. When deposed, Mr. 

Foust candidly admitted that the demise of JPF’s investment came with the end of the oil 

boom, explaining, “The major factor was that the drilling pretty much ceased to operate 

because there was no economical way to transport oil from North Dakota to the refineries 

in the south.” CP at 168. This was problematic for his rental units because, as he put it, 
No. 35526-8-III

Baker Boyer Nat’l Bank v. Foust

13

“When they stopped drilling, their people go home.” CP at 169. Summary judgment 

dismissal of the fraudulent inducement claim was proper.

B. The negligent misrepresentation counterclaim was properly dismissed

To prevail on a claim of negligent misrepresentation, a plaintiff must prove by 

clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that (1) a defendant supplied information for the 

guidance of others in their business transactions that was false, (2) the defendant knew or 

should have known that the information was supplied to guide the plaintiff in business 

transactions, (3) the defendant was negligent in obtaining or communicating false 

information, (4) the plaintiff relied on the false information supplied by the defendant, (5)

the plaintiff’s reliance on the false information supplied by the defendant was justified, 

and (6) the false information was the proximate cause of damages to the plaintiff. 

Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Baik, 147 Wn.2d 536, 545, 55 P.3d 619 (2002).

“Ordinarily, an omission alone cannot constitute negligent misrepresentation, 

since a plaintiff must justifiably rely on a misrepresentation.” Merriman v. Am. Guar. & 

Liab. Ins. Co., 198 Wn. App. 594, 614, 396 P.3d 351, review denied, 413 P.3d 565

(2017). “But if a party has a duty to disclose information, the failure to do so can 

constitute negligent misrepresentation.” Id. As is the case with fraud, the duty to 

disclose arises only in the context of an inherently fiduciary relationship or some type of 

special relationship of trust and confidence giving rise to quasi-fiduciary duties of 
No. 35526-8-III

Baker Boyer Nat’l Bank v. Foust

14

disclosure. Colonial Imports, Inc. v. Carlton Nw., Inc., 121 Wn.2d 726, 732, 853 P.2d 

913 (1993). 

Summary judgment dismissal of Mr. Foust’s negligent misrepresentation claim 

was proper for the same reason his fraudulent inducement claim was properly dismissed. 

II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING MR. FOUST’S 

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

Mr. Foust moved the court to reconsider its summary judgment rulings, relying on 

CR 59(a)(7) and (9). In addition to renewing his arguments in opposition to the bank’s 

motion for summary judgment, he argued for the first time that the trial court erred by 

dismissing his counterclaims because the bank had violated the Equal Credit Opportunity 

Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691. He also requested permission to amend his answer to the bank’s 

complaint, in order to deny that in executing the commercial guaranty, he was acting on 

behalf of his marital community. 

The trial court denied the motion “for the reasons set forth in [the bank’s] 

response.” CP at 339. Mr. Foust characterizes those reasons as “(1) there was no 

‘adverse action’ which required Bank to give its reasons to Foust, (2) Foust relied on 

conspiracy theories and speculation, and (3) Foust provided no basis to retract his 

admission of acting on behalf of his marital community.” Br. of Appellant at 17. 

Additional arguments made by the bank in its response were that Mr. Foust failed to 
No. 35526-8-III

Baker Boyer Nat’l Bank v. Foust

15

demonstrate a special relationship giving rise to a duty to disclose and that the Equal 

Credit Opportunity Act and withdrawal of admission issues were new theories of 

nonliability that he failed to make initially and that relied on new facts.

“By bringing a motion for reconsideration under CR 59, a party may preserve an 

issue for appeal that is closely related to a position previously asserted and does not 

depend upon new facts.” River House Dev. Inc. v. Integrus Architecture, P.S., 167 Wn. 

App. 221, 231, 272 P.3d 289 (2012). “But while the issue is preserved, the standard of 

review is less favorable.” Id. We review a trial court’s denial of a motion for 

reconsideration for abuse of discretion. Id. The trial court’s discretion includes its 

prerogative to refuse to consider an argument that is raised for the first time on 

reconsideration absent a good excuse. Id.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to reconsider the issues 

initially raised in Mr. Foust’s opposition to the bank’s motion for summary judgment, for 

the reasons set forth in section I.

As to the new issues, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to 

consider them because they were not closely related to positions Mr. Foust had 

previously asserted. They depended on new facts: whether a communication from Mr. 

Sentz on August 20, 2013, was an “adverse action” within the meaning of the Equal 
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Credit Opportunity Act,

6

and whether Mr. Foust had acted on behalf of his marital 

community in executing the commercial guaranty. For that reason alone, the trial court 

was not obliged to consider the arguments. Wilcox v. Lexington Eye Inst., 130 Wn. App. 

234, 241, 122 P.3d 729 (2005).

In addition, the contention that the Equal Credit Opportunity Act was violated is 

patently without merit. The act prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, 

religion, national origin, sex, marital status, or because a borrower gets public assistance. 

15 U.S.C. § 1691(a). To effectuate its purpose, the act includes protections, one being 

that an applicant against whom adverse action is taken must be provided by the creditor 

with a statement of reasons for the adverse action. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(d)(2). “‘[A]dverse 

action’ means a denial or revocation of credit, a change in the terms of an existing credit 

arrangement, or a refusal to grant credit in substantially the amount or on substantially 

the terms requested.” 15 U.S.C. § 1691(d)(6). The statement of reasons helps identify 

when the creditor has acted in a discriminatory fashion. 

 

6

In electronic mail to Mr. Foust on August 20, Mr. Sentz had stated, “I am sorry 

to inform you that your requested financing for units in North Dakota is no longer a 

viable possibility.” CP at 257. In deposition, Mr. Foust surmised that Mr. Sentz sent the 

e-mail because Mr. Foust had said he was “out of the deal” because Dr. Sundseth was 

“impossible to deal with.” CP at 188. Six days later, on August 26, Mr. Sentz sent an email to Mr. Foust explaining that he was once again able to consider financing for the 30 

units.
No. 35526-8-III

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Consistent with the clear intent of the legislation, the statement of reasons is 

required when adverse action is taken on the credit application and in this case there was 

only one application, by JPF, not Mr. Foust. The bank acted favorably, not adversely, on 

the application. No statement of reasons was needed because there could be no 

contention that the bank had discriminated in acting on JPF’s credit application. 

III. ATTORNEY FEES

The commercial guaranty provides that Mr. Foust must pay upon demand all of 

the bank’s attorney fees and legal expenses incurred in connection with the enforcement 

of the guaranty. Under RCW 4.84.330, 

In any action on a contract or lease . . . where such contract or lease 

specifically provides that attorneys’ fees and costs, which are incurred to 

enforce the provisions of such contract or lease, shall be awarded to one of 

the parties, the prevailing party, whether he or she is the party specified in 

the contract or lease or not, shall be entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees in 

addition to costs and necessary disbursements.

. . . .

As used in this section “prevailing party” means the party in whose 

favor final judgment is rendered.

Both parties request an award of attorney fees under the terms of the commercial 

guaranty and RCW 4.84.330, should they prevail. The bank is the prevailing party and is 

awarded its fees and costs on appeal subject to its timely compliance with RAP 18.1(d).
No. 35526-8-III 

Baker Boyer Nat'/ Bank v. Foust 

Affirmed. 

A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the 

Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 

2.06.040. 

WE CONCUR: 

Pennell, A.CJ. 

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