Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A05-1408-CT-395 | March 20, 2015 Page 1 of 5

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as 

precedent or cited before any court except for the 

purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

APPELLANT PRO SE

Douglas Thompson 

Pendleton, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE

Paul B. Poracky

Koransky, Bouwer, and Poracky, P.C.

Dyer, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Douglas Thompson,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

Cheryl Majchrowicz and Amy 

Bensema, Individually and as 

Personal Representatives of the 

Estate of Beverly Jean 

Thompson, Deceased,

Appellees-Plaintiffs.

March 20, 2015

Court of Appeals Cause No.

45A05-1408-CT-395

Appeal from the Lake Superior 

Court; The Honorable Michael N. 

Pagano, Judge;

45D09-1407-CT-21

May, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A05-1408-CT-395 | March 20, 2015 Page 2 of 5

[1] Douglas Thompson appeals a summary judgment for Cheryl Majchrowicz and 

Amy Bensema (collectively, Appellees). He presents multiple issues for our 

review, only one1 of which we are able to address: whether the trial court erred 

when it denied his motion for enlargement of time and granted Appellees’ 

motion for summary judgment. 

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In 2011, a jury found Thompson guilty of murdering his wife, Beverly.2 On 

February 29, 2012, Appellees, who are Beverly’s daughters, sued Thompson for 

wrongful death, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent 

infliction of emotional distress because Thompson “callously and outrageously 

bludgeoned” Beverly to death. (Appellant’s App. at 11.) Thompson retained 

counsel Mark Lucas, who entered an appearance on March 13, 2012. Thom 

Kramer entered an appearance for Thompson on March 19, 2012. On May 7, 

Thompson filed an answer to Appellees’ complaint, and Lucas filed a motion to 

withdraw.

 

1 Thompson argues his attorney committed malpractice for failing to notify him of Appellees’ motion for 

summary judgment, and he argues Judge Pagano should have recused himself because he was tangentially 

involved in Thompson’s criminal prosecution. As those issues were not presented before the trial court, we 

are unable to address them. See Breneman v. Slusher, 768 N.E.2d 451, 463 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (issues raised

for the first time on appeal are waived).

2 We affirmed his conviction and sentence. Thompson v. State, 45A03-1201-CR-5 (Ind. Ct. App. October 2, 

2012), trans. denied. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A05-1408-CT-395 | March 20, 2015 Page 3 of 5

[4] On March 19, 2013, Kramer filed a motion to withdraw, and it was granted 

March 26. On May 30, Andrew Yoder filed a motion to withdraw despite not 

having filed an appearance in the civil case, though Yoder was listed as 

Thompson’s attorney in a pending matter regarding Beverly’s estate. Yoder 

tendered notice of his withdrawal from the estate case due to non-payment by 

Barbara Wagner, Thompson’s sister and holder of his power of attorney.

[5] On September 11, 2013, Appellees moved for summary judgment. Thompson 

did not have counsel at that time and was served at the prison. On October 28, 

he moved for enlargement of time and on November 18, he filed his response. 

On July 28, 2014, the trial court denied Thompson’s motion for enlargement of 

time and granted summary judgment for Appellees.

Discussion and Decision

[6] Thompson proceeds pro se. A litigant who proceeds pro se is held to the rules of 

procedure that trained counsel is bound to follow. Smith v. Donahue, 907 

N.E.2d 553, 555 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied, cert. dismissed. One risk a 

litigant takes when he proceeds pro se is that he will not know how to 

accomplish all the things an attorney would know how to accomplish. Id. 

When a party elects to represent himself, there is no reason for us to indulge in 

any benevolent presumption on his behalf or to waive any rule for the orderly 

and proper conduct of his appeal. Foley v. Mannor, 844 N.E.2d 494, 502 (Ind.

Ct. App. 2006).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A05-1408-CT-395 | March 20, 2015 Page 4 of 5

[7] We review summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the trial 

court. Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1003 (Ind. 2014). Drawing all 

reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party, we will find summary

judgment appropriate if the designated evidence shows there is no genuine issue 

as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 

of law. Id. A fact is material if its resolution would affect the outcome of the 

case, and an issue is genuine if a trier of fact is required to resolve the parties’

differing accounts of the truth, or if the undisputed material facts support 

conflicting reasonable inferences. Id.

[8] The initial burden is on the summary-judgment movant to demonstrate there is 

no genuine issue of fact as to a determinative issue, at which point the burden 

shifts to the non-movant to come forward with evidence showing there is an

issue for the trier of fact. Id. While the non-moving party has the burden on 

appeal of persuading us a summary judgment was erroneous, we carefully 

assess the trial court’s decision to ensure the non-movant was not improperly 

denied his day in court. Id. 

[9] If the non-moving party does not respond to a motion for summary judgment 

“within 30 days by either filing a response, requesting a continuance under 

Trial Rule 56(I), or filing an affidavit under Trial Rule 56(F), the trial court 

cannot consider summary judgment filings of that party subsequent to the 30-

day period.” HomEq Servicing Corp. v. Baker, 883 N.E.2d 95, 98-99 (Ind. 2008). 

Thompson argues the trial court erred when it denied as untimely his motion 

for enlargement of time and granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A05-1408-CT-395 | March 20, 2015 Page 5 of 5

[10] Appellees filed a motion for summary judgment on September 11, 2013, so 

Thompson’s response or request for continuance had to be filed by October 14, 

2013. Thompson did not file his motion for enlargement of time until October 

28, 2013, and did not respond to Appellees’ motion for summary judgment 

until November 18, 2013. Under HomEq, the trial court could not consider 

Thompson’s filings, as they were filed too late. As the facts in Appellees’ 

motion for summary judgment therefore stood undisputed, there was no 

genuine issue of material fact and the trial court properly granted summary 

judgment in favor of Appellees. Accordingly, we affirm.

[11] Affirmed.

Barnes, J., and Pyle, J., concur.