alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Th e HONORABLE DAVID S. DOTY, United States District Judge for th e 1 District of Minnesota. United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 97-1380

___________ United States of America, * * Appellee, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * District of Minnesota. Reginald Daval Johnson, * * [UNPUBLISHED] Appellant. *

___________ Submitted: August 19, 1997 Filed: August 25, 1997

___________ Before WOLLMAN, LOKEN, and HANSEN, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM. In 1991, the district court sentenced Reginald Daval Johnson to 51 month s 1 imprison ment

and 3 years supervised release following his guilty plea to robbing a credit union, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). In 1995 , the court revoked Johnson & s supervi sed release after he violated his supervised-release conditions, and impose d 9 months imprisonment and additional supervised release. In 1997, while Johnson was serving the supervised-release portion of his revocation sentence, the district court-2-

again found that he had violated hi s supervised release. The court once again revoked supervis ed release, this time sentencing Johnson to 12 months and 7 day s imprisonment. On appeal, Johnson challenges the length of his revocation sentence
. We reject his challenge and affirm 

## . The distri ct court found that Johnson had violated the conditions of hi s supervised release both by testing positive for cocaine use and by failing to report for his daily outpatient drug treatment. Although the court determined the sentencing range according to the revocation table was 3 to 9 months imprisonme nt, see U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 7B1.4(a), p.s. (1995), the court concluded a higher sentence was appro priate to give Johnson a meaningful opportunity to receive drug treatment i n prison for his longstanding cocaine addiction. Johnson & s sentence does not exceed the maximum authorized under th e revocation statute, see18 U.S.C. § 358 3(e)(3); United States v. St. John , 92 F.3d 761, 766 (8th Cir. 1996), and the district court was otherwise free to depart from th e recomm endedGuidelines range in section 7B1.4, see United States v. Carr , 66 F.3 d 981, 983 ( 8th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (Chapter 7 Guidelines are advisory and non

binding; district court can depart from revocation imprisonment range when, in it s considered discretion, such departure is warranted). Given the court & s desire to afford Johnson a serious opportunity for drug treatment, we cannot say the court abused its discret ionin imposing the revocation sentence it did. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e ) (requiringconsideration of factors set forth in, inter alia, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D)); 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D) ( need to provide defendant with necessary medical care or other c orrectional treatment in most effective manner is factor for consideration) ; United States v. Grimes , 54 F.3d 489, 492 (8th Cir. 1995) (standard of review). Accordingly, we affirm.-3-

A true copy. Attest: CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

DOMINIC JAQUARIUSPA RAY,

Petitioner :

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

: No. 427 MAL 2019

Petition for Allowance of Appeal

from the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW , this 4th day of December, 2019

, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal

is DENIED

.
_______________________________________ __ 

### Michigan Supreme Court 

# Order

Lansing, Michigan



## September 9, 2008 Clifford W. Taylor, Chief Justice


## 136485 Michael F. Cavanag h Elizabeth A. Weave r Marilyn Kell y Maura D. Corriga n 

## PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman, J ustices



## v SC: 136485 COA: 284475 Kent CC: 07-009460-FH ROBERT MARK JENKINS, Defendant-Appellant.

________________ _________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appe al the April 30, 2008 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court.

s0828 I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

September 9, 2008

Clerk
#### The People of the State of New York, Appellant, v Andrew Packer, Respondent.

Submitted March 17, 2008;

decided March 20, 2008

*799Motion for assignment of counsel granted and Steven Banks, Esq., the Legal Aid Society, 199 Water Street, New York, NY 10038 assigned as counsel to the respondent on the appeal herein.
## 1999 D e c i sion s O p inion s of the U nit e d S t a t e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit

5-4-1999 

# C hir opr a c t ic Ame r ic a v

. L a vecchi a
P r e c e de n t i al or N on-P r e c e de n t i al : D ocke t 99-5060

F o l lo w thi s a nd a dd it ion al w ork s a t : h tt p://d i g it alc ommon s .l a w . v i l l a no v a . e du/thir dc ir c uit_1999

Thi s de c i sion i s br ou gh t t o y ou for f r e e a nd ope n a c c e s s b y the O p inion s of the U nit e d S t a t e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit a t V i l l a no v a U niv e r sit y S choo l of L a

w Di g it al Re posit or y

. It h as be e n a c c e pt e d for inclusion in 1999 D e c i sion s b y a n author i z e d a dmini s tr a t or of V i l l a no v a U niv e r sit y S choo l of L a

w Di g it al Re posit or y

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. C a rl s on@l a

w . v i l l a no v a . e du

. 

## Re c omme nde d C it a t ion

" C hir opr a ct ic Ame r ica v

. L a v e c chi a " (1999). 1999 D e cisio n s . P ape r 115. h tt p://d i g it alc ommon s .l a

w . v i l l a no v a . e du/thir dc ir c uit_1999/115

### UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 99-5060 Chiropractic America v. Lavecchia

The following modifications have been made to t he Court's opinion issued on April 14, 1999 in the abo veentitled appeal and will appear as part of the fina l version of the opinion:

The name of the attorney who argued for Appelle es was misspelled. Please change "Yanotti to "Yannotti".

/s/ P. Dou glas Sisk, Clerk

May 4, 1999
#### Paul F. ALLEN and Heloise Mae Allen, Plaintiffs, v. DENVER-CHICAGO TRUCKING COMPANY, Inc. and Merrill Marion Rossen, Defendants.

Civ. No. 14151-4.

United States District Court W. D. Missouri, W. D.

May 21, 1963.

*617Jones & Kennett, by Carrol C. Ken-nett, Kansas City, Mo., for plaintiffs.

Caldwell, Blackwell, Sanders & Math-eny, by William H. Sanders, Kansas City, Mo., for defendants.

BECKER, District Judge.

In this action for wrongful death of plaintiffs’ son, plaintiffs move for production of statements of defendant employee-operator Rossen and defendant’s employee Smith, who made statements to defendant’s safety department following the casualty in question. Defendant opposes the motion on the claim that good cause is not shown, relying upon Alltmont v. United States (C.A. 3) 177 F.2d 971, requiring a special showing of good cause in such a case. Since Rossen’s deposition has been taken and there is no claim that his memory of the events is not adequate, or that his testimony is evasive or unsatisfactory in detail, good cause is not shown on this basis. But plaintiffs’ son was killed and was not able to investigate at the time, and his testimony is not available. The factors provide good cause. Newell v. Capital Transit Co., D.C., 7 F.R.D. 732. In addition, Rossen is a party and portions of the statement may contain admissions against interest.

The requirement of a showing of good cause for the production of documents interferes with discovery as a matter of course. It has been eliminated in the Missouri Rules of 1960, Mo.Civ. Rule 58.01, V.A.M.R. The Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure recommended its elimination from Rule 34 in 1955.1 The trial courts *618should be as liberal in finding good cause as the facts and decisions will allow.

Production of the statement of the witness Smith will be required. Smith is a resident of Ontario, California, and can be reached only with difficulty and unnecessary expense. Therefore good cause appears. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 67 S.Ct. 385, 91 L.Ed. 451; Helverson v. J. J. Newberry Co. (W.D. Mo.) 16 F.R.D. 330; 4 Moore, Federal Practice! 26.23 [8.-2], pp. 1414-15.

For the reasons given, it is hereby

Ordered that within 15 days defendants produce at the office of their counsel for inspection and *copying*the statements of the defendant Rossen and the witness Smith contained in the report of Rossen and Smith to defendant’s safety department.

1

. The Advisory Committee Note of 1955 recommends that inspection of documents be secured without a showing of good cause under Rules 33 and 34. Protection against improper discovery would be afforded by protective order as in the case of depositions on oral examination. 4 Moore, *Federal Praetiee,*¶ 34.01 [4]-[5] (Supp.1962, pp. 116-17).
COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-12-00201-CR

Louis Gerardo Nieves

v.

The State of Texas

§

§

§

§

§

From Criminal District Court No. 4

of Tarrant County (1234917D)

June 12, 2014

Opinion by Justice Dauphinot

(nfp)

JUDGMENT

This court has considered the record on appeal in this case and holds that 

there was no error in the trial court’s judgment. It is ordered that the judgment of 

the trial court is affirmed.

SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

By _/s/ Lee Ann Dauphinot______________

 Justice Lee Ann Dauphinot
I 

112TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 2581 

To provide that the public debt limit shall not affect timely payment in 

full of Social Security benefits. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JULY 18, 2011 

Mr. POSEY (for himself, Mr. WEBSTER, Mr. MILLER of Florida, Mr. AUSTIN

SCOTT of Georgia, Mr. LATTA, Mr. GRIFFITH of Virginia, and Mr. 

FARENTHOLD) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Ways and Means 

A BILL 

To provide that the public debt limit shall not affect timely 

payment in full of Social Security benefits. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Social Security Check 

5 Guarantee Act of 2011’’. 


smartinez on DSK6TPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 2581 IH

1 SEC. 2. TIMELY PAYMENT IN FULL OF SOCIAL SECURITY 

2 BENEFITS NOTWITHSTANDING THE PUBLIC 

3 DEBT LIMIT. 

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—Nothing in section 3101 of title 

5 31, United States Code, shall be construed to have the 

6 effect of— 

7 (1) precluding or otherwise limiting timely re8 demption of obligations owed to the Federal Old-Age 

9 and Survivors Insurance Trust Fund or the Federal 

10 Disability Insurance Trust Fund to the extent nec11 essary to provide for timely payment in full of bene12 fits payable from such Trust Funds, or 

13 (2) otherwise precluding or limiting timely pay14 ment in full of benefits payable from such Trust 

15 Funds. 

16 (b) OPERATION OF THE PUBLIC DEBT LIMIT IN

17 OTHER RESPECTS.—In applying the limitation on public 

18 debt under section 3101 of title 31, United States Code, 

19 subsection (a) shall be taken into account before applying 

20 such limitation to any other matter affected by such sec21 tion. 

Æ 


smartinez on DSK6TPTVN1PROD with BILLS
#### Edmund SHERMAN and Marcia Sherman, Plaintiffs, v. W. E. RENTH, Public Administrator of the Estate of Carl Anderson, Defendant.

Civ. No. 3907.

United States District Court E. D. Illinois.

Nov. 26, 1957.

*60Richard B. Dempsey, St. Louis, Mo., and Paul P. Waller, Jr., East St. Louis, 111., for plaintiff.

Oehmke, Dunham & Boman, East St. Louis, 111., for defendant.

JUERGENS, District Judge.

On September 26, 1957, the plaintiffs filed their complaint alleging that they had sustained injuries in an automobile accident between plaintiffs and the defendant’s deceased. In paragraph (2) of the complaint the plaintiffs charge that the collision of the automobile from which the injuries were sustained was caused by the “willfulness or recklessness or negligence of the defendant’s intestate.” The defendant filed his motion to strike the complaint stating as a cause therefor that it is improper to include willfulness and negligence in the same count or same paragraph of a count. The objection of the defendant is well founded.

Under the substantive law of Illinois, willful and wanton misconduct and negligent conduct give rights to separate causes of action. These causes are separate and distinct, each proceeding from a different legal principle. Cook v. Big Muddy-Carterville Mining Co., 249 Ill. 41, 94 N.E. 90. In order for the defendant to answer each of these causes of action it is essential that they be set out in separate numbered paragraphs and in the interest of clarity separate counts would be more appropriate. Although separate counts are not required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A., it is desirable that these causes of action be set out in separate counts. 210.03 Volume 2, Moore’s Federal Practice, 2005. It is, therefore, the opinion of the court that defendant’s motion to dismiss should be allowed and permission granted plaintiffs to amend their complaint to conform to-the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, if they so desire.
#### In the Matter of Pedro Jason William M. and Others, Infants. Pedro M., Appellant; Episcopal Social Services et al., Respondents.

Submitted February 11, 2008;

decided March 25, 2008

On the Court’s own motion, appeal dismissed, without costs, upon the ground that no substantial constitutional question is directly involved. Motion for leave to appeal denied. Motion for poor person relief dismissed as academic.
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**EXHIBIT
      32.1**





**Certification
      of Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer**


**Pursuant
      to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as Adopted**


**Pursuant
      to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**







I,
      Donald S. Robbins, certify to the best of my knowledge based upon a review
      of
      the Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB of CSMG Technologies, Inc. for the quarter
      ended June 30, 2007 (the “Form 10-Q”), that the Form 10-Q fully complies
      with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
      as amended, and that information contained in the Form 10-Q fairly presents,
      in
      all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
      CSMG
      Technologies, Inc. for the periods covered by the Form 10-Q.







Dated: August
      20, 2007      By: /s/
      Donald S. Robbins


Donald
      S.
      Robbins, Chief Executive Officer







I,
      K. Bruce Jones, certify to the best of my knowledge based upon a review of
      the
      Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB of CSMG Technologies, Inc. for the quarter
      ended
      June 30, 2007 (the “Form 10-Q”), that the Form 10-Q fully complies with the
      requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as
      amended, and that information contained in the Form 10-Q fairly presents, in
      all
      material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of CSMG
      Technologies, Inc. for the periods covered by the Form 10-Q.







Dated: August
      20, 2007      By: /s/
      K. Bruce Jones


K.
      Bruce
      Jones, Chief Financial Officer



















The
      above certification is furnished solely pursuant to Section 906 of the
      Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. §1350) and is not being filed as part of
      the Form 10-QSB or as a separate disclosure document.
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<FN>
<F1>RECEIVABLES ARE COMPRISED OF DUE FROM TAX CREDIT PARTNERSHIPS, CONSTRUCTION
CONTRACTS RECEIVABLE, NOTES RECEIVABLE AND DUE FROM RELATED PARTIES
<F2>OTHER EXPENSES ARE COMPRISED OF GENERAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE DEPRECIATION AND
AMORTIZATION EXPENSES AND JOINT VENTURE LOSSES.
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
#### In the Matter of City of Elmira et al., Respondents-Appellants, v John Doe, Appellant-Respondent.

Submitted December 31, 2007;

decided February 19, 2008

Motion for leave to appeal by appellant-respondent John Doe granted. Cross motion for leave to appeal by respondents-appellants City of Elmira et al. dismissed as untimely.
Order entered December 4, 2018

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-18-00518-CR

AGEAK M CHOL, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 283rd Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. F16-30952-T

ORDER

Appellant, who was convicted of indecency with a child by sexual contact, filed his brief 

on November 20, 2018. In the brief, he uses the name of the victim. Accordingly, we STRIKE

appellant’s brief. 

We ORDER appellant to file, within TEN DAYS of the date of this order, an amended 

brief that identify the victim and any other child under the age of eighteen either generically 

(“victim” or “complaining witness”) or by initials only.

We DIRECT the Clerk to send copies of this order to George R. Conkey and the Dallas 

County District Attorney’s Office.

/s/ LANA MYERS 

JUSTICE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

No. DA 20-0390

STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

JASON AARON CARRYWATER,

Defendant and Appellant.

ORDER

Upon consideration of Appellant’s motion for extension of time, and 

good cause appearing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant is granted an extension 

of time to and including November 10, 2021, within which to prepare, 

file, and serve Appellant’s opening brief on appeal.

Electronically signed by:

Mike McGrath

Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

October 7 2021

10/07/2021

Case Number: DA 20-0390