This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations fr om the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 2 Plaintiff-Appellee, 3

v. NO. 34,079 4 JEFFERY WILLIAMS, 5 Defendant-Appellant. 6 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF CHAVES COUNTY 7 Steven L. Bell, District Judge 8 Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General 9 Santa Fe, NM 10 Kristen L. Cartwright, Assistant Attorney General 11 Roswell, NM 12 for Appellee 13 Thomas E. Lilley, P.C. 14 Thomas E. Lilley 15 Roswell, NM 16 for Appellant 17 MEMORANDUM OPINION 18 GARCIA, Judge. 192 {1} Defendant appeals from a conviction for DWI. We issued a notice of proposed 1 summary disposition, proposing to affirm . Defendant has filed a memorandum in 2 opposition. After due consideration, we remain unpersuaded by Defendant’s 3 assertions of error. We therefore affirm. 4 {2} Because the pertinent background informati on has previously been set forth we 5 will avoid undue repetition here , and focus instead on the content of the memorandum 6 in opposition. 7 {3} First, Defendant renews his argument th at retrial should have been prohibited, 8 in light of the magistrate court’s failure to specifically reserve th e power to retry after 9 a mistrial occurred. [MIO 4-9] We remain unpersuaded. The mistrial was clearly and 10 unequivocally the product of jury disagreement, [RP 109] which does not operate as 11 a bar to reprosecution. See State v. Collier , 2013-NMSC-015, ¶ 14, 301 P.3d 370 12 (“New Mexico courts have long held that a retrial following a mistrial declared for 13 manifest necessity [caused by a hung jury] does not implicate the double jeopardy 14 clause.”). Our Supreme Court has held th at where a mistrial is declared as a 15 consequence of the jury’s inability to reach a verdict, “the court automatically reserves 16 the power to retry the defendant” whether the court expressly reserves the right to 17 retry in its final order or not. Cowan v. Davis , 1981-NMSC-054, ¶ 7, 96 N.M. 69, 628 18 P.2d 314. Although Defendant c ontinues to argue that Cowanshould be limited or 193 distinguished, the principles articulated and applied therein are clearly controlling. 1 {4} The magistrate court’s failure to utilize formulaic language in its order to does 2 alter our analysis. See generally State v. White , 2010-NMCA-043, ¶ 15, 148 N.M. 214, 3 232 P.3d 450 (“When considering the effects of dismissal and refiling of criminal 4 charges, our courts look past the form to th e substance[.]”). While the magistrate court 5 could have used the form order supp lied by Rule 9-508, it was not required to do so. 6 Compare Rule 6-610(G) NMRA withRule 5-611(G), (H) NMRA. We reject 7 Defendant’s suggestion that the district court rule should apply to the magistrate court 8 proceedings. [MIO 7] 9 {5} Ultimately, the basis for the dismissal and the operative effect thereof are 10 unambiguous. We therefore reject Defe ndant’s first assertion of error. 11 {6} Second, Defendant continue s to assert that his BA C test results should have 12 been excluded on grounds that the State failed to establish that the officer who 13 administered the test adequately appris ed him pursuant to the Implied Consent 14 Advisory. [MIO 9-14] However, as we prev iously observed, the officer testified that 15 he recited, verbatim, from a card issued by the State to law enfo rcement officers for 16 this purpose. [DS 7; MIO 12] This was sufficient to support the district court’s 17 inference that Defendant was duly advised. [RP 222] See, e.g., State v. Duarte , 2007- 18 NMCA-012, ¶¶ 21-22, 140 N.M. 930, 149 P.3d 1027 (holding that where the officer 194 testified that he read the standardized implied consent card to the defendant, and that 1 the card contained a statement th at the subject has the right to an independent test, the 2 evidence was sufficient to support the districtcourt’s determination that the defendant 3 was adequately informed even though the content of the card was not read into 4 evidence). In his memorandum in opposition Defendant asserts that Duarte is 5 meaningfully distinguishable, insofar as th e testifying officer in that case specifically 6 indicated that the card contained a statement that the subject has the right to an 7 independent test. [MIO 12] Although we ac knowledge that the officer’s testimony in 8 this case was less specific, and far from ideal , [MIO 13] we nevertheless remain of the 9 opinion that his testimony was sufficient tosupport the district court’s reasonable 10 inference. See generally State v. Romero , 1968-NMCA-078, ¶ 17, 79 N.M. 522, 445 11 P.2d 587 (“An inference is merely a l ogical deduction from facts and evidence.” 12 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)) (quoting State v. Jones , 13 1935-NMSC-062, ¶ 21, 39 N.M. 395, 48 P.2d 403)). For foundational purposes, the 14 State’s showing was adequate. See generally State v. Martinez , 2007-NMSC-025, 15 ¶ 21, 141 N.M. 713, 160 P.3d 894 (observing that with respect to foundational 16 requirements, the trial court is not bound by the rules of evidence, and it must satisfy 17 itself only by a preponderance of the evidence). 18 {7} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm. 195 {8} IT IS SO ORDERED. 1

_______________ _________________ 2 TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge 3

WE CONCUR: 4

_______________________________ 5 MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Chief Judge 6

_______________________________ 7 LINDA M. VANZI, Judge 8