SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4406-18T1

PRO CAP II, LLC by its 

CUSTODIAN: US BANK,

Plaintiff,

v.

JAMES WILLIAMS, MRS. 

JAMES WILLIAMS, wife of 

JAMES WILLIAMS, MONMOUTH 

COUNTY TREASURER, NEWARK

BETH ISRAEL MEDICAL CENTER, 

COLUMBUS HOSPITAL, EUGENE 

DUKES, LANGTON E. BARTON, 

CHRISTOPHER CHUDAKOWSKI, 

TOMAR, SIMONOFF, ADOURIAN, 

O'BRIAN, KAPLAN, JACOBY,

& GRAZIANO, CHRIST HOSPITAL,

EMMA VACCA, INTERBANK OF 

NEW YORK n/k/a INVESTORS BANK, 

HOUSEHOLD AUTOMOTIVE 

FINANCE CORPORATION, FORD 

MOTOR COMPANY, VINZINENT

MAIMONE, PETER J. MAIMONE, 

NELSON TOBOLSKY, LANDMARK

AMERICA, INC., NEW JERSEY 

PROPERTY LIABILITY INSURANCE 

GUARANTY ASSOCIATION,

ADMINISTRATOR UNSATISFIED CLAIM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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AND JUDGMENT FUND, ADINOLFI &

SPEVACK PA, NEW JERSEY 

PROPERTY LIABILITY 

INSURANCE GUARANTY

ASSOCIATION, MERCER COUNTY

PROBATION SERVICES, NEWARK 

BETH ISRAEL MEDICAL CENTER,

PELLETTIERI RABSTEIN & ALTMAN, 

ANTHONY BODY, THE TRUST 

COMPANY OF NEW JERSEY n/k/a 

CAPITOL ONE, NATIONAL 

ASSOCIATION, GARDEN HOMES 

MANAGEMENT, CUMBERLAND

INSURANCE, FORD MOTOR

CREDIT COMPANY, OIMH 

RADIOLOGY GROUP, ALAN B. 

CLARK MD, HOSPITAL & DOCTORS 

SERVICE BUREAU, RAHWAY MRI, 

MONTCLAIR COMMUNITY 

HOSPITAL, PARKWAY MANOR

HEALTH CENTER, COUNTY OF 

CAMDEN, UNIFUND CCR PARTNERS, 

HOSPITAL CENTER AT ORANGE, 

CALVARY PORTFOLIO SERVICES 

LLC, ATLANTIC CREDIT AND 

FINANCE, AFFINITY FEDERAL

CREDIT UNION, WILLIS MORTON,

ROY HENDRICKS, WALTER WISE, 

FRANK GRAVES, CSC TKR, INC. 

d/b/a CABLEVISION OF RARITAN

VALLEY, JACKSON HEWITT, INC.,

STATE OF NEW JERSEY and 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendants,

and
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A-4406-18T1

901 SOUTH 18TH LLC and LOAN

FUNDER LLC SERIES 1968,

Intervenors-Appellants.

_______________________________

RASHID SAYYID,

Third-Party PlaintiffRespondent,

v.

THE CITY OF NEWARK,

ESSEX COUNTY SHERIFF'S

OFFICE, PRO CAP II, LLC, and

MOC SOUTH 18 LLC,

Third-Party DefendantsRespondents.

____________________________

Argued telephonically March 24, 2020 –

Decided April 29, 2020

Before Judges Yannotti and Hoffman.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Essex County, Docket No. F025248-15.

Michael D. Malloy argued the cause for appellants 901 

South 18th LLC and Loan Funder LLC Series 1968 

(Finestein & Malloy, LLC, attorneys; Michael D, 

Malloy, on the briefs).

Ariadna Peguero, Assistant Corporation Counsel, 

argued the cause for respondent City of Newark
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(Kenyatta K. Stewart, Corporation Counsel, City of 

Newark-Department of Law, attorney; Azeem M. 

Chaudry, Assistant Corporation Counsel, and Ariadna 

Peguero, on the brief).

Sylvia Hall, Assistant County Counsel, argued the 

cause for respondent Essex County Sheriff's Office 

(Courtney M. Gaccione, Essex County Counsel, 

attorney; Sylvia Hall, on the brief).

Wanda M. Akin argued the cause for respondent Rashid 

Sayyid (Wanda M. Akin & Associates, attorneys, join

in the brief of respondent City of Newark).

PER CURIAM

 In this tax sale certificate foreclosure action, intervenors 901 South 18th LLC 

(South LLC) and Loan Funder LLC Series 1968 (Loan Funder) appeal from 

Chancery Division orders vacating the Sheriff's sale of the family home of 

respondent Rashid Sayyid, who inherited the property as his father's sole intestate 

heir, when his father died in 2012. In vacating the sale, the motion judge concluded 

Sayyid redeemed the property before delivery of the Sheriff's deed.

 On appeal, appellants contend the judge abused his discretion by vacating the 

Sheriff's sale. They assert that while Sayyid may have had the right to redeem, he 

did not validly redeem the property under the applicable provisions of our Tax Sale 

Law (the Act), N.J.S.A. 54:5-1 to -137. Specifically, they contend that, under 

N.J.S.A 54:5-98, once the foreclosure complaint was filed, redemption of the 
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A-4406-18T1

property could have been made "in that cause only." Having considered the 

arguments and applicable law, we affirm.

 I

 We glean the following facts from the record. James Williams, Sayyid's father, 

owned a home (the home or the property) located on 18th Street in Newark. On 

November 15, 2012, Sayyid became his father's legal guardian due to ongoing 

medical issues. On November 26, 2012, Williams died intestate, leaving Sayyid as 

his sole heir.

 After his father died, Sayyid continued to reside in the home, but took no action 

to administer his father's estate. Nor did he record a deed reflecting that he inherited 

the home. Sayyid's family has lived in the home for over 40 years. He currently 

resides there with his "significant-other," five young children, and a young adult who 

suffers from "bipolar [disorder], epilepsy and has neurological impairment." Sayyid 

recalled he began receiving notices from the City of Newark regarding overdue tax 

payments "beginning in 2013 or 2014."

 On February 8, 2013, Pro Cap II, LLC (Pro Cap) purchased the tax sale 

certificate1for the home issued by the City of Newark Tax Collector – due to 

 

1

 The Act provides a mechanism for individuals or entities to purchase tax liens 

from municipalities and initiate foreclosure actions against property owners who 
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A-4406-18T1

delinquent taxes, water and sewer charges. On June 16, 2015, Pro Cap sent a letter 

to the property addressed to James Williams, indicating he had thirty days to redeem 

the tax sale certificate or a foreclosure action would commence. 

 On July 20, 2015, Pro Cap filed its complaint commencing the foreclosure 

action, naming "James Williams; Mrs. James Williams, Wife of James Williams" as 

defendants, along with John Doe and Jane Doe. The complaint did not name the 

"heirs" of James Williams as defendants. On July 22, 2015, Pro Cap attempted to 

serve a copy of the summons and complaint on Williams. Sayyid accepted service 

of the complaint. Thereafter, Pro Cap filed an affidavit of service, which verified 

Sayyid told the process server that he was James Williams' son. It appears Sayyid 

did not mention his father's passing.

 On August 20, 2015, Sayyid attempted to file an answer to the complaint, signing 

as "James Williams." The answer was marked received but not filed because Sayyid 

 

are delinquent in paying their property taxes. The foreclosure process begins 

when a property owner fails to pay the property taxes, as the unpaid balance 

becomes a municipal lien on the property. N.J.S.A. 54:5-6. "When unpaid taxes 

or any municipal lien . . . remains in arrears on the [eleventh] day of the eleventh 

month in the fiscal year when the taxes or lien became in arrears, the collector

. . . shall enforce the lien by selling the property . . . ." N.J.S.A. 54:5-19. Upon 

completion of the sale, a certificate of tax sale is issued to the purchaser. 

N.J.S.A. 54:5-46.
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failed to include a case information statement with the answer. On September 4, 

2015, defendant filed the same answer, again signing it in his father's name. 

 On December 8, 2015, Pro Cap filed a second amended foreclosure 

complaint adding approximately fifty additional defendants reflecting persons 

and entities whose names appeared on a judgment search of James Williams' 

name; however, this amended pleading again failed to include the heirs of James 

Williams as defendants. 

 On May 24, 2016, Pro Cap filed a motion for entry of default and final 

judgment in the tax sale foreclosure action. On June 29, 2016, the court entered 

final judgment in favor of Pro Cap and against Williams for $24,950.50, plus 

interest and counsel fees. A writ of execution issued on June 29, 2016.

 On March 21, 2017, the home was sold at a Sheriff's sale to third-party purchaser 

MOC South 18 LLC (MOC) for $66,000. Thereafter, the Sheriff's Office tendered 

$32,044.25 to Pro Cap and sent the surplus of $32,394.78 to the Clerk of Superior 

Court in Trenton. The Sherriff's commission for the sale, including fees, was 

$3,678.50.

 At the time of sale, James Williams remained the record owner of the home. 

Sayyid did not move to intervene in the action nor was he present at the sale.
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 Nevertheless, on April 19, 2017, Sayyid went to the office of the City of 

Newark's Tax Collector and tendered $30,652.79, the amount the Tax Collector told 

him was due in order to redeem the property. The Tax Collector accepted his tender 

and issued a certificate of redemption. 

 Shortly after Sayyid purportedly redeemed the property, he claimed to have 

spoken to an agent of MOC, who told him that her company owned the property. 

This prompted Sayyid to go to the Sheriff's Office on April 24, 2017. According to 

Sayyid, a person in the office told him he still had time to file a motion to vacate the 

Sheriff's sale. The same individual also allegedly told him "[he] could file it 

[himself] as [his] father's Legal Guardian or [he] could hire a lawyer to file it for 

[him]."

 On April 26, 2017, Sayyid attempted to file a motion to vacate the Sheriff's sale. 

Under his father's name, he filed a "Certification in Support of Motion," which 

referenced a motion to vacate sale; however, he was unsuccessful because the 

motion was nonconforming under Rule 1:5-6(c)(1). Moreover, his certification of 

service only named Pro Cap as a party.

 The next day, on April 27, 2017, after Sayyid received his first certificate of 

redemption, MOC received the Sheriff's deed for the property. On May 3, 2017, 

Sayyid returned to the office of the City's Tax Collector because he continued 
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"receiving calls from people who claim they own my house." The office informed 

Sayyid that he owed an additional $4,185.57, to be paid by May 31, 2017, in order 

to successfully redeem the property. On May 12, 2017, MOC recorded its Sheriff's 

deed for the property in the Essex County Clerk's Office. On May 30, 2017, Sayyid 

paid the additional monies, which the Tax Collector accepted, and then issued a 

second certificate of redemption to him.

 Pro Cap, despite having knowledge of the Sheriff's sale, certified that – because 

it was unaware of MOC's completion of the purchase and since over a month had 

passed with the Sheriff failing to remit any funds – it endorsed the tax sale certificate 

for cancellation and returned it to the Tax Collector in exchange for the redemption 

proceeds. 

 On August 7, 2017, Pro Cap filed a stipulation of dismissal for the foreclosure 

action. On August 24, 2017, MOC sold the property to South LLC for $125,000. 

Loan Funder financed the purchase and took a first mortgage on the property. Sayyid 

and his family remained in the property throughout this time.

 On August 29, 2017, MOC filed an ejectment action seeking possession of the 

property, MOC South 18 LLC v. Angelina Keamey, Rashid Sayyid, et. al, Docket 

No. ESX-DC-17702-17. On September 21, 2017, the court dismissed the ejectment 

action and advised MOC to seek a writ of possession under the foreclosure docket 
10 A-4406-18T1

number. Accordingly, on September 26, 2017, MOC applied for a writ of possession 

in the foreclosure action. On October 2, 2017, the court denied the application 

because Pro Cap previously dismissed the case. On October 4, 2017, MOC moved 

to vacate Pro Cap's dismissal.

 On October 27, 2017, Sayyid filed a motion to intervene and opposed MOC's 

motion to vacate. On November 27, 2017, the court granted Sayyid's motion to 

intervene, and on November 30, 2017, granted MOC's motion to vacate the 

dismissal. 

 On December 7, 2017, Sayyid answered the second amended complaint in 

foreclosure, counterclaiming against Pro Cap and filing a third-party complaint 

against the City of Newark and the Essex County Sherriff's Office. South LLC then 

filed a motion to strike defendant's answer, contending the final judgment in 

foreclosure had never been vacated.

 On January 24, 2018, the court entered an amended order vacating Pro Cap's 

August 7, 2017 dismissal and permitting South LLC to file a writ of possession; 

however, the parties were to take no further action regarding possession of the 

property pending further court order. 
11 A-4406-18T1

 On January 29, 2018, Sayyid filed a motion to vacate the June 29, 2016 default 

judgment in foreclosure and to set aside the Sheriff's sale. On June 6, 2018, the 

motion judge held a hearing on defendant's motion. 

 At the hearing, Sayyid, while acknowledging some degree of fault, took the 

position that he was an unsophisticated party who lacked understanding of the 

situation, and that, once he realized what had occurred, Pro Cap and the Sherriff's 

Office – who had control and knowledge of all parties' positions – allowed him to 

redeem. Furthermore, since he did everything as instructed, any procedural bar 

should be set aside due to "equitable circumstances."

 Pro Cap continued to contend it had no knowledge of MOC's completed purchase 

after the Sheriff's sale because it never received a deposit. As a result, when the 

Sheriff's Office communicated that Sayyid was attempting to redeem the property, 

it accepted the redemption. 

 MOC and South LLC took the position that Sayyid received proper notice from 

the outset of the matter and the court should consider his actions. They further 

asserted, citing N.J.S.A. 54:5-98, that once a foreclosure action on a tax lien 

commences, the only method for proper redemption was by filing with the court in 

the existing foreclosure action. Therefore, they contended Pro Cap and the Sherriff's 
12 A-4406-18T1

Office had no authority to accept Sayyid's redemption once the foreclosure action 

commenced.

 On October 25, 2018, the motion judge placed his oral decision on the 

record. The judge considered the motion to vacate judgment before him under 

Rule 4:50-1. Addressing the parties' arguments, he first found the City's Tax 

Collector and Pro Cap properly served Sayyid throughout the foreclosure 

process. He also took note of Sayyid's failure to probate his father's estate, 

record the deed, and notify the parties of his father's passing. Accordingly, the 

judge concluded defendant could not vacate the judgment based on excusable 

neglect or exceptional circumstances based on his lack of legal training because 

"[a] property owner knows that he must pay taxes on his property and that if he 

fails to do so the municipality will sell the property[.]"

 Next, the motion judge turned to defendant's equitable argument. 

The Chancery Division of course has the authority to set 

aside a [S]heriff sale and order a resale of property. [First 

Trust Nat. Assoc. v. Merola, 39 N.J. Super. 44 (App. Div. 

1999).] The [courts] have recognized that such sales may 

be set aside by reasons of fraud, accident, surprise, or 

mistake, irregularities in the conduct of the sale and so on. 

But, caution that a judicial sale is not ordinarily vacated on 

the grounds of mistake flowing from a moving party's own 

culpable negligence. 
13 A-4406-18T1

The judge further noted that "courts have established that redemption may be 

made at any time prior to the delivery of the sheriff's deed[,]" citing Mercury 

Capital Corp. v. Freehold Office Park, Ltd., 363 N.J. Super. 235 (Ch. Div. 2003). 

 The motion judge concluded Sayyid's redemption was not barred, finding he 

redeemed the property before the Sheriff issued the deed to MOC. He 

considered it irrelevant that a balance remained after the initial tender because 

Sayyid, each time, paid exactly what the Sherriff's Office advised him to pay. 

 In response to the appellants' argument that N.J.S.A. 54:5-98 controlled, the 

judge reasoned that, when balancing the equities, owners and heirs are 

differently situated, and therefore treated differently, as compared to third-party 

purchasers. Furthermore, while Sayyid failed to pay the redemption amount in 

the action, "the payment was made in the case because [Pro Cap] obviously 

entered into a voluntary dismissal settling the case because of the payment that 

was made."

 As a result, after balancing the equities and considering the actions taken by 

all parties, the motion judge set aside the Sheriff's sale, entering an order the 

same day. The court later issued an order dated April 30, 2018, which clarified 

the October 25, 2018 order and provided further directives to the parties. This 

appeal followed.
14 A-4406-18T1

 II 

 South LLC and Loan Funders continue to contend the Act required Sayyid

to first intervene in the foreclosure action and then get approval from the court 

to redeem the property. They argue that requiring "redeemers" to intervene in 

the action advances the goals of notice and transparency.

 We review a trial court's order regarding intervention in a tax sale 

foreclosure under an abuse of discretion standard. Town of Phillipsburg v. Block 

1508, Lot 12, 380 N.J. Super. 159, 172 (App. Div. 2005). An abuse of discretion 

occurs where a decision is made "without a rational explanation, inexplicably 

departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis." Flagg 

v. Essex Cty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002) (quoting Achacoso-Sanchez 

v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 779 F.2d 1260, 1265 (7th Cir. 1985)).

 As noted by the City of Newark, this case does not involve the actions of a

third-party to redeem in a foreclosure action by acquiring an interest in the 

property during the pendency of the foreclosure action; instead, this matter 

involved Sayyid's redemption of his own property, which he acquired upon the 

death of his father. 

 In Simon v. Cronecker, 189 N.J. 304, 335-36 (2007), our Supreme Court 

interpreted the redemption statute, N.J.S.A. 54:5-98, to generally require that a 
15 A-4406-18T1

person who seeks to redeem a tax certificate, whether directly or indirectly, to 

intervene in the foreclosure action to allow for the protection of property owners 

through judicial oversight of the foreclosure process. The Court reasoned that 

this interpretation gives effect to the Legislature's goal of protecting distressed 

property owners from predatory third-party investors, who might seek to acquire 

the homeowner's property interest for "nominal value" and redeem the property

for themselves. Id. at 323-24, 336. Although the Court observed that the 

conduct of the third-party investor in Cronecker did not violate "a social policy 

embodied in the Tax Sale Law," it found that the investor was still required to 

intervene in the foreclosure case to permit judicial oversight of the transaction 

because it obtained a property interest. Id. at 328, 337.

 This court later applied Cronecker to a situation involving close family 

friends of a homeowner who had lent the owner money that was used to redeem 

a tax certificate. Phoenix Funding, Inc. v. Krute, 403 N.J. Super. 261, 264-65 

(App. Div. 2008). Notably in Krute, the friends were interested in acquiring the 

property themselves from the homeowner, who herself was looking to dispose 

of the house, which had fallen into disrepair. Id. at 265. The friends purchased 

the property shortly after it was redeemed. Id. at 264. We held in Krute that "the 

obligation to intervene extends to one who redeems 'indirectly' through an 
16 A-4406-18T1

arrangement of [this sort,]" reasoning that Cronecker "directs courts not to 

overlook the reality of the transaction" in determining whether a third party 

sought to redeem a tax certificate "indirectly" through the homeowner. Id. at 

267.

 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court in Cronecker made clear that only those 

parties who acquire or intend to acquire a property interest by facilitating 

redemption need to intervene in the tax foreclosure action. Cronecker, 189 N.J. 

at 336. The Court explicitly and repeatedly discussed "interested" third parties 

throughout its opinion. Id. at 337. Its reasoning was premised on the need to 

protect property owners from such third parties because of the ownership 

interest such third parties seek to acquire:

In the post-foreclosure complaint stage, the 

requirement that a person, directly or indirectly, 

seeking to redeem a tax certificate "be admitted as a 

party to such action" permits judicial oversight of the 

adequacy of consideration offered for the property 

interest.

By forbidding an interested investor, who is not a party 

to the foreclosure action from "indirectly" seeking 

redemption, we intend to interdict the myriad 

machinations that a creative mind might devise to elude 

the Tax Sale Law.

[Id. at 336. (citations omitted)]
17 A-4406-18T1

 Plaintiff's assertion that a property owner must intervene, regardless of 

owning the property, contradicts both the Court's reasoning in Cronecker, as 

well as the public policy and legislative intent of the Act. The specific evil the 

Legislature sought to address in N.J.S.A. 54:5-98 are the acts of predatory third 

parties who seek to take advantage of distressed property owners. Cronecker, 

189 N.J. at 323-24, 336. A property owner who redeems his own property does 

not implicate the Legislature's concern.

 The case before the motion judge presented such circumstances. Because 

Sayyid owns the property in question, he was not required to intervene in the 

foreclosure proceedings in order to effect redemption. The Tax Collector 

accepted Sayyid's payments twice and issued two separate certificates of 

redemption. This led Sayyid to believe his actions were proper. Moreover, Pro 

Cap, which filed the foreclosure action, was compliant in allowing defendant's 

redemption. Therefore, the equitable result reached here was not an abuse of the 

motion judge's discretion. We find no reason to disturb the motion judge's 

equitable resolution.

 Affirmed.