*********************************************** 

The “officially released” date that appears near the beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was 

released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions 

and petitions for certification is the “officially released” 

date appearing in the opinion. 

All opinions are subject to modification and technical 

correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut 

Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of 

discrepancies between the advance release version of an 

opinion and the latest version appearing in the Connecticut 

Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports 

or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is to 

be considered authoritative. 

The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the 

opinion as it appears in the Connecticut Law Journal and 

bound volumes of official reports are copyrighted by the 

Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not 

be reproduced and distributed without the express written 

permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. 

*********************************************** 
SCIENT FEDERAL CREDIT UNION v.

MARK RABON

(AC 43915)

Bright, C. J., and Elgo and Suarez, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff sought to recover damages resulting from the defendant’s

alleged breach of a credit card agreement. In its complaint, the plaintiff

alleged that the defendant applied for and received a credit card by

virtue of a credit card agreement, and the defendant defaulted under

the terms of that agreement by failing to make the payments agreed to

therein. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the

trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over him due to insufficient

service of process, which the court denied without issuing a memorandum of decision. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion for summary

judgment as to liability and damages. The plaintiff appended to the

motion an affidavit from H, the director of collections for the plaintiff. H’s

affidavit stated that as a result of the defendant’s credit card application

submitted to the plaintiff, the defendant received two credit cards.

Attached as exhibits to the affidavit were the defendant’s credit card

application, credit card disclosure statements, transaction listings for

the two accounts, and the credit card agreement that allegedly established the defendant’s liability to the plaintiff and the amount of the

debt that the defendant owed, $46,812.08. The defendant opposed the

motion for summary judgment, arguing that it differed from the complaint because the complaint referenced only one credit card and underlying agreement, while the motion for summary judgment referenced

multiple credit cards with separate debts, along with documents that

indicated the existence of separate agreements. The trial court granted

the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and rendered judgment

thereon, from which the defendant appealed to this court. Held:

1. The trial court properly granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, that court having properly concluded that the plaintiff met its

burden to establish the absence of any genuine issue of material fact

as to the factual basis for the defendant’s liability to the plaintiff and

the amount of damages owed: although the defendant argued that the

complaint referenced only one credit card agreement and one credit

card, the defendant admitted at oral argument before this court that he

held two separate accounts with the plaintiff and that the two accounts

arose from the same application and, therefore, he failed to establish

that there was a genuine issue of material fact with respect to his liability

on the two accounts; moreover, because H’s affidavit asserted that the

plaintiff was owed $46,812.08, which was also reflected in the attached

transaction ledger for each account, and the defendant admitted at

oral argument before this court that the total amount of the debt was

$46,812.08, there was no genuine issue of material fact in dispute as to

the amount of damages.

2. The trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss that

alleged that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over him due to

insufficient service of process: pursuant to the applicable rule of practice

(§ 10-30 (b)), a claim of lack of personal jurisdiction as a result of an

insufficiency of service of process is waived unless raised by a motion

to dismiss filed within thirty days of the filing of an appearance; accordingly, because the defendant filed an appearance and failed to file a

motion to dismiss within thirty days of filing his appearance, he waived

any right to challenge the court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction

over him.

Argued January 6—officially released March 15, 2022

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for the breach of a credit

card agreement, and for other relief, brought to the

Superior Court in the judicial district of New London,
where the court, Hon. James J. Devine, judge trial

referee, denied the defendant’s motions to dismiss and

to strike; thereafter, the court, Hon. James J. Devine,

judge trial referee, granted the plaintiff’s motion for

summary judgment and rendered judgment thereon,

from which the defendant appealed to this court.

Affirmed.

Mark E. Rabon, self-represented, the appellant (defendant).

Kyle R. Barrett, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion

SUAREZ, J. In this action seeking to recover credit

card debt, the self-represented defendant, Mark Rabon,

appeals from the judgment rendered by the trial court

in favor of the plaintiff, Scient Federal Credit Union,

following the granting of the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. The defendant claims that the trial

court improperly (1) granted the plaintiff’s motion for

summary judgment and (2) denied the defendant’s

motion to dismiss. We affirm the judgment of the trial

court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant for our resolution of the defendant’s claims. The

plaintiff initiated this action by a single count complaint,

which was dated July 13, 2017. In the complaint, the

plaintiff alleged that ‘‘[b]y virtue of a Visa credit card

agreement, the defendant applied for and received a

credit card.’’ The plaintiff further alleged that ‘‘[t]he

defendant defaulted under the terms of the credit card

agreement by failing to make the payments agreed to

therein.’’ Finally, the plaintiff alleged that ‘‘the defendant has failed and refused to satisfy the debt owed to

the plaintiff’’ and that, ‘‘[a]s a result of the defendant’s

conduct, the plaintiff has been damaged.’’

Following the commencement of the present case,

the defendant filed a motion to dismiss and a supporting

memorandum of law on March 8, 2018. The defendant

moved to dismiss this action on the ground that the

court lacked personal jurisdiction over him due to insufficient service of process.1 The plaintiff filed an objection to the motion to dismiss on April 18, 2018. The

court, Hon. James J. Devine, judge trial referee, denied

the motion to dismiss on May 1, 2018, and sustained

the plaintiff’s objection to the motion on the same day

without issuing a memorandum of decision.

On September 27, 2018, the defendant filed a motion

to strike, to which the plaintiff objected. In his motion

to strike, the defendant alleged that ‘‘[t]he complaint

[did] not properly plead facts with enough specificity’’

and that ‘‘[t]he complaint [alleged] conclusions that

[were] unsupported by the facts alleged.’’ The court,

Hon. James J. Devine, judge trial referee, sustained the

plaintiff’s objection to the motion on February 4, 2019,

and the motion was denied on February 6, 2019.

On May 30, 2019, the plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment claiming that no genuine issues of material fact existed and that it was entitled to judgment as

a matter of law as to both liability and damages. In

support of its motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff submitted the affidavit of Irvine Hagewood, the

director of collections for the plaintiff. The affidavit

stated that the defendant submitted a ‘‘Loanliner Visa

credit card application’’ to the plaintiff and, as a result

of that application, the defendant received two credit
cards. The plaintiff extended the credit accounts to the

defendant on or about April 4, 2013. The defendant

thereafter defaulted on the accounts by failing to pay

the amounts that were due under the agreement. The

affidavit further stated that the defendant was indebted

to the plaintiff in the total amount of $46,812.08.2 The

affidavit provided that the defendant had failed to pay

the plaintiff the balance due, which constituted the outstanding balances under both accounts. The plaintiff

attached to its affidavit several exhibits, including the

defendant’s application, credit card disclosure statements, transaction listings for the two accounts, and

the credit card agreement.

In its memorandum of law in support of the motion

for summary judgment, the plaintiff argued that,

because ‘‘the defendant has raised no special defenses

and the plaintiff’s affidavit in support of summary judgment establishes the defendant’s liability to the plaintiff

and the amount of damages owed, summary judgment

is proper as there are no genuine issues of material fact

left in dispute and the plaintiff is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law.’’

On November 12, 2019, the defendant filed his objection to the motion and a memorandum in opposition to

the motion for summary judgment. In the memorandum,

the defendant argued that genuine issues of material

fact existed for several reasons. The defendant asserted

that the plaintiff’s complaint referenced only one credit

card agreement that had been breached and indicated

that the defendant had received only one credit card.

Although not stated in the complaint, the plaintiff’s

memorandum of law in support of the motion for summary judgment asserted that the total amount of damages being sought reflected a combination of debts from

two separate credit card accounts. The defendant also

asserted in an affidavit, which was filed with his objection to the motion for summary judgment, that he

received more than one credit card from the plaintiff.

The defendant’s memorandum further asserted that

both the plaintiff’s complaint and Hagewood’s affidavit

failed to identify which credit card agreement had been

breached. The defendant argued that the motion for

summary judgment and the complaint ‘‘stand in stark

contradiction’’ because the complaint referenced only

one credit card and underlying agreement, while the

motion for summary judgment referenced multiple

credit cards with separate debts, along with documents

indicating the existence of separate agreements.3

Despite raising these arguments, the defendant

admitted in his affidavit, and he does not dispute on

appeal, that he held multiple credit card accounts with

the plaintiff. In his memorandum in opposition to the

motion for summary judgment, the defendant also

admitted that he owed the total amount being sought of

$46,812.08, and that this amount reflected the combined
balance of multiple credit cards.4

On November 12, 2019, the court, Calmar, J., ordered

the defendant to refile his memorandum because it

contained personal identifying information. The memorandum was refiled with redactions but without substantive changes on November 21, 2019. Prior to the

defendant’s refiling of the memorandum, on November

15, 2019, the court, Hon. James J. Devine, judge trial

referee, granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. The defendant filed a motion to reargue on

November 21, 2019, which the court denied on January

22, 2020. The defendant also filed a motion for articulation on November 21, 2019, which the court denied on

January 22, 2020.

The defendant filed the present appeal on February

10, 2020. Subsequent to filing this appeal, the defendant

moved for the court to issue a written decision pursuant

to Practice Book § 64-1, and the court issued its memorandum of decision on February 25, 2020. In its memorandum of decision, the court stated that, because the

‘‘defendant has raised no special defenses and the plaintiff’s affidavit in support of summary judgment establishes the defendant’s liability to the plaintiff and the

amount of damages owed, summary judgment is proper

as there are no genuine issues of material fact left in

dispute and the plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.’’ This appeal followed.

I

The defendant first claims that the trial court improperly granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. Specifically, the defendant claims that he demonstrated that there were genuine issues of material fact

in dispute and, therefore, the court should not have

granted the plaintiff’s motion. Because the record establishes that there was no genuine issue of material fact

as to whether the defendant applied for and received

two separate credit accounts from the plaintiff by virtue

of a single application or as to the total amount of the

debt that the defendant owed on the two accounts, we

conclude that the court properly granted the plaintiff’s

motion for summary judgment.

We now set forth the legal principles and standard

of review relevant to this claim. ‘‘The fundamental purpose of summary judgment is preventing unnecessary

trials. . . . If a [party] is unable to present sufficient

evidence in support of an essential element of his cause

of action at trial, he cannot prevail as a matter of law.

. . . To avert these types of ill-fated cases from advancing to trial, following adequate time for discovery, a

[party] may properly be called upon at the summary

judgment stage to demonstrate that he possesses sufficient counterevidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to any, or even all, of the essential elements

of his cause of action. . . .
‘‘Practice Book § [17-49] provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is

no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

. . . In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the

trial court must view the evidence in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party. . . . The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the

absence of any genuine issue [of] material facts which,

under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle

him to a judgment as a matter of law . . . and the party

opposing such a motion must provide an evidentiary

foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine

issue of material fact. . . .

‘‘It is not enough . . . for the opposing party merely

to assert the existence of such a disputed issue. Mere

assertions of fact . . . are insufficient to establish the

existence of a material fact and, therefore, cannot refute

evidence properly presented to the court. . . . [T]ypically [d]emonstrating a genuine issue requires a showing of evidentiary facts or substantial evidence outside

the pleadings from which material facts alleged in the

pleadings can be warrantably inferred. . . . Only if the

. . . moving party has submitted no evidentiary proof

to rebut the allegations in the complaint, or the proof

submitted fails to call those allegations into question,

may the [nonmoving party] rest upon factual allegations

alone. . . .

‘‘[I]ssue-finding, rather than issue-determination, is

the key to the procedure. . . . [T]he trial court does

not sit as the trier of fact when ruling on a motion for

summary judgment. . . . [Its] function is not to decide

issues of material fact, but rather to determine whether

any such issues exist. . . . Our review of the decision

to grant a motion for summary judgment is plenary.

. . . We therefore must decide whether the court’s conclusions were legally and logically correct and find support in the record.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Carolina Casualty Ins. Co. v. Connecticut Solid Surface, LLC, 207 Conn. App. 525, 532–33, 262 A.3d 885

(2021).

The plaintiff’s complaint sounds in breach of contract. ‘‘The elements of a breach of contract action are

the formation of an agreement, performance by one

party, breach of the agreement by the other party and

damages.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) American Express Centurion Bank v. Head, 115 Conn. App.

10, 15–16, 971 A.2d 90 (2009).

We first conclude that there was no genuine issue of

material fact in dispute as to whether the defendant

was liable to the plaintiff for breaching his contract

with respect to two separate credit accounts. As noted

previously in this opinion, the plaintiff submitted with
its motion for summary judgment an affidavit prepared

by Hagewood, which stated that the defendant became

indebted to the plaintiff by virtue of a credit card application in which the defendant applied for two credit

cards. Following the defendant’s submission of the

application, the plaintiff and the defendant entered into

an agreement, and the plaintiff then extended the two

credit accounts to the defendant. The defendant subsequently defaulted under the accounts and has failed to

pay the balance due, which totals $46,812.08. On the

basis of these facts, the plaintiff has established the

defendant’s liability as to the two credit accounts.

Moreover, the defendant did not allege any defense

to liability or otherwise establish any genuine issue

of material fact that would eliminate his obligation to

satisfy the debt claimed by the plaintiff. Although the

defendant argues that the complaint referenced only

one credit card agreement and one credit card, the

defendant admitted at oral argument that he did in fact

hold two separate accounts with the plaintiff and that

the two accounts arose from the same application.

Despite the defendant’s argument that the complaint

only references the breach of a singular credit card

agreement, it is clear that both of the defendant’s

accounts arose from that same application and agreement. We therefore conclude that the defendant has

not raised a genuine issue of material fact with respect

to his liability on the two credit accounts.

We also determine that there is no genuine issue of

material fact in dispute as to the plaintiff’s damages.

Hagewood’s affidavit asserts that the plaintiff is owed

$46,812.08 related to the agreement. Specifically, the

defendant owed the plaintiff $26,655.04 on one account

and $20,157.04 on the other account, which totaled

$46,812.08. The amounts of the debts were reflected on

the true and accurate copies of the transaction ledger

for each account. Before the trial court, the defendant

never disputed the total amount of the debt. In fact,

the defendant admitted at oral argument before this

court that the total amount of the debt was $46,812.08.

Accordingly, we conclude that there is no genuine issue

of material fact in dispute as to the amount of damages.

The court’s conclusion that there was no genuine issue

of material fact and that the plaintiff was entitled to

summary judgment as a matter of law was therefore

logically and legally correct.

II

The defendant also claims that the trial court improperly denied his motion to dismiss. We disagree.

We begin by setting forth the legal principles and

standard of review relevant to this claim. ‘‘A motion to

dismiss . . . properly attacks the jurisdiction of the

court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as

a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that
should be heard by the court. . . . A motion to dismiss

tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the

court is without jurisdiction.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Beecher v. Mohegan Tribe of Indians of Connecticut, 282 Conn. 130, 134, 918 A.2d 880 (2007).

‘‘A defect in process . . . implicates personal jurisdiction . . . . [W]hen a particular method of serving

process is set forth by statute, that method must be

followed. . . . Unless service of process is made as

the statute prescribes, the court to which it is returnable

does not acquire jurisdiction.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Pedro v. Miller, 281 Conn. 112, 117,

914 A.2d 524 (2007).

‘‘[T]he Superior Court . . . may exercise jurisdiction

over a person only if that person has been properly

served with process, has consented to the jurisdiction

of the court or has waived any objection to the court’s

exercise of personal jurisdiction. . . . Accordingly,

jurisdiction over a person can be obtained by waiver.’’

(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

Foster v. Smith, 91 Conn. App. 528, 536, 881 A.2d 497

(2005). Practice Book § 10-30 (b), which governs

motions to dismiss, provides that ‘‘[a]ny defendant,

wishing to contest the court’s jurisdiction, shall do so

by filing a motion to dismiss within thirty days of the

filing of an appearance.’’ (Emphasis added.) As our

Supreme Court has explained, § 10-30 (b) ‘‘specifically

and unambiguously provides that any claim of lack of

jurisdiction over the person as a result of an insufficiency of service of process is waived unless it is raised

by a motion to dismiss filed within thirty days . . . .

Thus, thirty-one days after the filing of an appearance

. . . a party is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. Any claim of insufficiency of process

is waived if not sooner raised.’’ (Citation omitted;

emphasis omitted; footnote omitted.) Pitchell v. Hartford, 247 Conn. 422, 433, 722 A.2d 797 (1999).

In the present case, the defendant filed a self-represented appearance on January 16, 2018. The defendant’s

motion to dismiss was not filed until March 8, 2018,

which was fifty-one days after the defendant filed his

appearance in the present matter. The defendant, therefore, has waived any potential defects in the court’s

personal jurisdiction over him. Considering the untimeliness of the defendant’s motion to dismiss, it is unnecessary for this court to examine the merits of the defendant’s argument with respect to any improper service

of process. Because the defendant filed his motion to

dismiss more than thirty days after he filed an appearance, the defendant had submitted to the jurisdiction

of the court. The defendant’s motion to dismiss was

untimely and, therefore, we conclude that the court

properly denied the motion.

The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 The defendant makes several arguments as to why the service of process

was insufficient in the present case. Because we conclude that the court’s

denial of the defendant’s motion to dismiss was proper on the basis of the

untimeliness of the motion, it is unnecessary for us to address the merits

of the defendant’s claims with respect to improper service of process.

2 Although not specified in the affidavit, the plaintiff’s memorandum in

support of the motion for summary judgment clarifies that the defendant

owed $26,655.04 on one credit account and $20,157.04 on the other credit

account, which totaled $46,812.08 in debt.

3

In this regard, the defendant essentially argued before the trial court

and argues before this court that the allegations in the complaint do not

align with the relief requested in the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.

The defendant, however, did not file a request to revise to clarify the allegations in the complaint. Moreover, although the defendant focuses on the

fact that the complaint references a single credit card, the uncontroverted

evidence presented by the plaintiff in support of its motion for summary

judgment reflects that it sought in its complaint to recover balances incurred

by him by the use of two separate credit cards, which the defendant received

after he filed a single application.

4 During oral argument before this court, the defendant once again

acknowledged that he did in fact hold two separate accounts at the plaintiff,

which were created simultaneously following the plaintiff’s approval of the

defendant’s single application. The defendant also acknowledged at oral

argument that he owed $46,812.08 on the two accounts, which was the same

amount that the plaintiff claimed in damages related to the accounts.