NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE. 

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

In re the Marriage of:

TERRI LEE GOSS, Petitioner/Appellee, 

v.

CARROLL WAYNE GOSS, Respondent/Appellant. 

No. 1 CA-CV 20-0565 FC 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. FC2014-091690 

The Honorable Joan M. Sinclair, Judge

VACATED AND REMANDED

COUNSEL

Paul D. Nordini Attorney at Law, Scottsdale

By Paul D. Nordini

Counsel for Respondent/Appellant 

Rowley Law Group, PLLC, Mesa

By Scott R. Rowley

Counsel for Petitioner/Appellee

FILED 9-14-2021
GOSS v. GOSS

Decision of the Court

2 

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge D. Steven Williams delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge David B. Gass and Judge James B. Morse Jr. joined.

W I L L I A M S, Judge:

¶1 Carroll Goss (“Father”) appeals the superior court’s order 

dismissing his petition to modify legal decision-making, parenting time, 

and child support. For reasons that follow, we vacate the order and remand 

for an evidentiary hearing on Father’s petition. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Father and Terri Goss (“Mother”) divorced in 2014. Initially, 

the parents agreed to share joint legal decision-making authority for their 

two minor children. Father pled guilty to a DUI in 2017 and, thereafter, the

parties agreed to a revised parenting plan restricting Father’s parenting 

time. 

¶3 In 2018, police found Father intoxicated and passed out while 

the children were in his care. Mother moved to modify legal 

decision-making, parenting time, and child support given Father’s 

continued substance abuse. Mother, who was represented by counsel, and 

Father, representing himself, reached a stipulated agreement. The superior

court accepted the agreement and entered it as an order. The order granted

Mother sole legal decision-making authority of the minor children, limited 

Father’s parenting time to two hours of supervised visits every other week, 

and required Father to complete a one-year intensive alcohol abuse 

treatment program before he could seek to modify parenting time going 

forward. Specifically, the order required: 

Father may only request a change to this parenting plan after 

he has successfully completed an uninterrupted one (1) year 

intensive alcohol abuse treatment program under the 

guidance of a certified substance [abuse] counselor and has 

maintained 100% sobriety. Until such time as Father has 

completed an uninterrupted one (1) year intensive alcohol 

abuse program, Father is specifically barred from requesting 

any change to the parenting plan. 
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Decision of the Court

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¶4 Roughly a year-and-a-half later, Father petitioned the 

superior court to modify legal decision-making, parenting time, and child 

support. With his petition, Father provided character letters from various 

people claiming he had overcome his alcohol addiction, provided evidence 

of his participation and attendance of 24 treatment sessions through The 

Right Step treatment program, and provided multiple supervised 

parenting reports. Later, Father amended his petition claiming that since 

entry of the stipulated order, he maintained sobriety for nearly two years

and completed an out-patient program. Mother moved to dismiss Father’s 

petition, arguing Father provided no proof of completing a year-long

intensive alcohol abuse treatment program as required by the order. The 

superior court granted Mother’s motion to dismiss. 

¶5 Father timely appealed. Because the superior court’s order of 

dismissal lacked finality language as required by Arizona Rule of Family 

Law Procedure 78(c), this court revested jurisdiction to the superior court. 

The superior court issued a second dismissal order, with the certification of 

finality, and this appeal was reinstated. We have jurisdiction under Article 

6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution, A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), and

-2101(A)(1). 

DISCUSSION

¶6 A petitioner seeking to modify a legal decision-making or 

parenting time order must provide “adequate cause for [a] hearing” in 

his/her petition, A.R.S. § 25-411(L), including “present[ing] detailed facts 

which are relevant to the statutory grounds for modification,” Pridgeon v. 

Superior Court, 134 Ariz. 177, 181 (1982). Whether adequate cause exists

depends on whether the facts alleged by petitioner constitutes a change in 

circumstances. Id. at 180. 

¶7 We review the superior court’s denial of a petition to modify 

a legal decision-making or parenting time order for an abuse of discretion, 

Id. at 179; Baker v. Meyer, 237 Ariz. 112, 116, ¶ 10 (App. 2017), and defer to 

the court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, Engstrom v. 

McCarthy, 243 Ariz. 469, 471, ¶ 4 (App. 2018). 

¶8 Father argues the superior court erred in dismissing his 

petition outright without holding an evidentiary hearing to consider the 

best interests of the children. We agree. 

¶9 The superior court based its dismissal of Father’s petition on

a lack of evidence demonstrating Father completed “one full uninterrupted 

year of an intensive alcohol abuse program.” The record supports that
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finding. However, the purpose of the stipulated agreement was to aid in 

Father’s sobriety, and in turn, to benefit the children and their interaction 

with Father. Father alleged he had been sober for nearly two years and 

provided letters from others supporting his claim. Father also provided 

some evidence that he attended 24 alcohol treatment classes. Although we

cannot discern from the record how long it took Father to complete those 

classes, it is some evidence of steps he took to comply with the stipulated 

order.

¶10 Mother argues Father should not be allowed to seek 

modification until he completes the required one-year intensive program. 

If there is “an uninterrupted one (1) year intensive alcohol abuse program” 

in Arizona, the record contains no proof of its existence. If such a program 

does not exist, under Mother’s argument, Father will never qualify to seek 

any change in his legal decision-making authority, parenting time, or child 

support obligations. 

¶11 We acknowledge the basis for Mother’s argument that a 

finding of a change in circumstances is required before the superior court 

can reach the question of whether a change in custody would be in the 

children’s best interest. See Black v. Black, 114 Ariz. 282, 283 (1977). But

Father has provided evidence of a change in circumstances, even if it is not 

the specific change contemplated in the prior agreement. And the law

discourages parties from contracting out of responsibilities that could have 

an adverse impact on a child’s best interests. See Albins v. Elovitz, 164 Ariz. 

99, 101-02 (App. 1990) (providing that, while a custodial parent can waive 

child support payments and surrender visitation rights, “any such 

agreement is not binding on the court and will be enforced only so long as 

the interest of the child is not adversely affected”). Here, it is unclear from 

the record whether Father could comply with the requirement to complete 

a one-year intensive alcohol abuse treatment program. And the court is not 

bound to enforce an agreement between parties involving custody matters 

if the court is not convinced the agreement will advance the best interests 

and welfare of the children. Anderson v. Anderson, 14 Ariz. App. 195, 198 

(1971). Above all else, the primary consideration in custody determinations 

is the best interests of the children, Hays v. Gama, 205 Ariz. 99, 102, ¶ 18

(2003), and any attempt, through agreement or otherwise, which 

circumvents this paramount consideration requires a closer look. 

¶12 Because Father provided evidence with his petition of 

alcohol treatment and evidence of a length of sobriety beyond the time 

required for treatment in the stipulated order, the superior court should 

have granted Father an evidentiary hearing to further inquire whether a 
GOSS v. GOSS

Decision of the Court

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substantial and continuing change of circumstances exists, and whether a 

modification of Father’s legal decision-making authority, parenting time, 

and child support obligation would be in the children’s best interests. 

Consequently, we vacate the court’s dismissal order and remand for an 

evidentiary hearing on Father’s underlying petition.

¶13 In the exercise of our discretion, we deny Mother’s request for 

attorneys’ fees pursuant to A.R.S. § 25-324. 

CONCLUSION

¶14 We vacate the superior court’s dismissal order and remand 

for an evidentiary hearing on Father’s underlying petition to modify legal 

decision-making authority, parenting time, and child support.