alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 10.4




 


ADDENDUM TO EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT







THIS ADDENDUM TO EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT (“Addendum”), is entered into December 15, 2011, but made effective retroactive to November 16, 2011, by and between LiqTech NA, Inc., a Delaware corporation (the “Company”), and Donald S. Debelak (the “Employee”).







RECITALS







WHEREAS, the Company and the Employee are parties to that certain employment agreement dated November 16, 2005 (the “Employment Agreement”); and 







WHEREAS, the Company and the Employee have mutually agreed to exercise the Second Option term of the Employment Agreement as described in Section 1.3 of the Employment Agreement; and 







WHEREAS, the Company and the Employee, as a condition to their mutual agreement to the Second Option term, have agreed to be bound by the terms of this Addendum.







NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises set forth above and the mutual covenants set forth below, the Company and the Employee agree that the Employment Agreement shall be modified as follows:









	 	
1.

	
Section 3.4 of the Employment Agreement shall be replaced with the following:














3.4 Termination by the Company Without Cause.  The Company may terminate the Employee’s employment without Cause upon twelve (12) months prior written notice to the Employee. 









	 	
2.

	
Section 3.5 of the Employment Agreement shall be replaced with the following:














3.5 Resignation by the Employee.  The Employee may terminate his employment upon six (6) months prior written notice to the Company (the “Resignation Notice Period”).








3.           Until further agreement between the Company and the Employee, the Employee’s annual salary described in Section 2.2 of the Employment Agreement shall be fixed at $162,000.00.











	 	
4.

	
A new Section 2.7 shall be added to the Employment Agreement, as follows:














2.7 Incentive Compensation.  The Employee shall receive additional yearly warrants based on LiqTech International, Inc.’s EBIT as established by its financial statements.  The number of warrants is equal to 0.15 EBIT divided by that company’s average share price during the ten (10) days before the publication of that company’s financial results.  One-third (1/3) of such warrants may be exercised immediately, one-third (1/3) after twelve (12) months, and one-third (1/3) after twenty-four (24) months. 


 




  





1











  











IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned parties hereto execute this Addendum effective as of the date written in the preamble above.








	  	
COMPANY


	  	  
	  	
LIQTECH NA, INC.,


	  	
  a Delaware corporation


	  	  
	  	
By: 

	
/s/ Lasse Andreassen


	  	   	
Lasse Andreassen


	  	
Title: 

	
Director, on behalf of the Board of Directors


	  	  
	  	
EMPLOYEE


	  	  
	  	
/s/ Donald S. Debelak


	  	
Donald S. Debelak







 




  





2
Unassociated Document


 


Exhibit 4.7


 


AMENDMENT TO THE


BENIHANA INC.


2003 DIRECTORS’ STOCK OPTION PLAN












This Amendment to the Benihana Inc. 2003 Directors’ Stock Option Plan (the “Plan”) is adopted by Benihana Inc. (the “Company”) on December 1, 2011 effective as of November 29, 2011.  Capitalized terms used but not defined herein shall have the meanings given such terms in the Plan.







WHEREAS, the Plan provides for the grant of stock options which entitle the holders thereof to purchase shares of the Company’s Class A Common Stock (the “Stock”); and







WHEREAS, pursuant to an amendment of the Company’s certificate of incorporation, each share of the Company’s Class A Common Stock was reclassified as and changed into one share of the Company’s Common Stock effective November 29, 2011; and







WHEREAS, Section 11 of the Plan provides that in the event of specified changes in the capitalization of the Company a corresponding adjustment shall be made in the number and class of shares available for issuance under the Plan;







NOW, THEREFORE, the Plan is hereby amended so that all references to the Company’s Class A Common Stock, including in the definition of “Stock,” shall instead refer to the Company’s Common Stock.







All other provisions of the Plan shall remain the same and in full force and effect.
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion

should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited

circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-50720

Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

GERARDO SAUCEDO-ESPINOZA

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 2:06-CR-973-ALL

Before JOLLY, HIGGINBOTHAM, and PRADO, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:*

Appealing the Judgment in a Criminal Case, Gerardo Saucedo-Espinoza

raises arguments that are foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres v. United States,

523 U.S. 224, 235 (1998), which held that 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) is a penalty

provision and not a separate criminal offense. United States v.

Pineda-Arrellano, 492 F.3d 624, 625 (5th Cir. 2007), petition for cert. filed (Aug.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

December 5, 2007

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 07-50720

2

28, 2007) (No. 07-6202). The Government’s motion for summary affirmance is

GRANTED, and the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### International Trade Commission

          - [USITC SE-17-039]

# Agency Holding the Meeting:

 United States International Trade Commission.

# Time and Date:

 September 14, 2017 at 11:00 a.m.

# Place:

 Room 101, 500 E Street SW., Washington, DC 20436, Telephone: (202) 205-2000.

# Status:

 Open to the public.

# Matters to be Considered:

*1. Agendas for future meetings:*                         None.                    

2. Minutes.

3. Ratification List.

4. Vote in Inv. No. 731-TA-1185 (Review) (Steel Nails from the United Arab Emirates). The Commission is currently scheduled to complete and file its determination and views of the Commission by September 29, 2017.

                        5.                         *Outstanding action jackets:*                         None.                    

In accordance with Commission policy, subject matter listed above, not disposed of at the scheduled meeting, may be carried over to the agenda of the following meeting.

By order of the Commission.

Issued: September 6, 2017.

William R. Bishop,

Supervisory Hearings and Information Officer.

[FR Doc. 2017-19299 Filed 9-7-17; 4:15 pm]

 BILLING CODE 7020-02-P
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_______________________

No. 00-10520

_______________________

JOE CARRABBA, JR., Individually & on behalf of all others similarly

situated; JOE MELTON, Individually & on behalf of all others

similarly situated; CRAIG McKNIGHT, Individually & on behalf of all

others similarly situated; ROBERT H. BURROWS, JR., Individually &

on behalf of all others similarly situated; BARBARA A. WILLIAMS,

Individually & on behalf of all others similarly situated; LOYD

WELLESLEY, Individually & on behalf of all others similarly

situated; WILLARD P. CORRELL, SR., Individually & on behalf of all

others similarly situated; BRUCE PHILPOT, Individually & on behalf

of all others similarly situated; J. BRUCE GRAY, Individually & on

behalf of all others similarly situated; RICK WILLIAMS,

Individually & on behalf of all others similarly situated; A. JOE

CUTRER, Individually & on behalf of all others similarly situated;

ROBERTO G. FERNANDEZ VINAS, Individually & on behalf of all others

similarly situated; THOMAS D. McCARTHY; WYLIE HOLMES; DAVE COOPER;

ED FORTNER; JACK D. NEAL; FLOYD E. FULCHER; JACK W. SPRABARY;

ROBERT L. STOCKTON; CARROLL E. BROWN; MICHAEL J. HAMMER; SCOTT E.

PETERSON; WILLIAM H. MANSFIELD, JR.; JAMES S. STANDIFER; BETTIE J.

GARRETT; CHERIE J. STOWE; ARVIL R. MARTIN, JR.; SANFORD W. MAYNARD;

DENISE P. MILLER; EVERETT G. GROSGEBAUER; GREGORY E. SMITH; MICHAEL

CHESSMORE; IMA DELL IRVIN, Individually & on behalf of all others

similar situated.

Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross-Appellees,

versus

RANDALLS FOOD MARKETS, INC.,

Defendant-Appellee-Cross-Appellant.

_________________________________________________________________

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

_________________________________________________________________

May 22, 2001
2

Before JONES, DeMOSS, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

The court has carefully considered this appeal in light

of the excellent briefs, oral arguments, and pertinent portions of

the record. Having done so, we find no reversible error of fact or

law by the district court and affirm based on that court’s

conscientious, well-reasoned opinions, which will be be published.

AFFIRMED.
MICHAEL JOE MCCOY , Appellant,

v. STATE OF FLORIDA , Appellee

. IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
CASE NO. 1D 14

- 5914

______ _______________________/ Opinion file d June 21, 2016. An appeal from the Circuit Court for Bay County

. James B. Fensom , Judge

. Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Danielle Jorden, Assistant Public Defender , Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Pamela Jo Bond i, Attorney General, and Thomas H. Duffy, Assistant Attorney General , Tallahassee, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM. Appellant Michael J. McCoy was charged with the second

- degree murder of a man with whom he believed h is wife was having an affair and of the a ttempted

s econd

- degree murder of the wife. A jury found him guilty of the lesser

- included offenses of manslaughter and aggravated battery with a firearm. On appeal, he challenges his judgment and sentence for aggravated battery with a firearm ,2 alleging tha t the jury instructions and verdict form were fundamentally erroneous because the aggravated battery was listed after the attempted manslaughter option. He avers that lesser offenses must be listed on a verdict form in descending order by degree of offense ; because aggravated battery is a second

- degree felony ( which carries a maximum sentence of fifteen years in prison but was enhanced here by
the 10

- 20

- Life statute to a minimum mandatory penalty of twenty

- five years in prison ) , it should have been listed b efore the attempted manslaughter offense , which is a third

- degree felony (carr ying a maximum of five years in prison)

. An error in the trial court’s listing of lesser

- included offenses on a verdict form and in jury instructions is not fundamental error in this district. S ee Graham
v. State , 100 So. 3d 755 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) . For that reason, McCoy urges this Court to certify conflict between Graham and the Fifth District’s decision in Thomas v. State , 91 So. 3d 880 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012). In Thomas , the defe ndant was convicted of aggravated battery , but the Fifth District reversed the conviction and sentence . It remanded the case for a new trial, holding that “the trial court fundamentally erred” in the way it listed the lesser

- included offenses because “the jury could reasonably have concluded that the offenses were presented in descending order of seriousness and that attempted voluntary manslaughter was less serious than aggravated battery. As such, it is impossible to determine whether the jury, if given t he opportunity, would have ‘pardoned’ the defendant by3 convicting him of attempted voluntary manslaughter under a proper instruction.” Id. at 881

- 82. Because the jury was accurately instructed and the evidence support s McCoy’s convictions obtained , we affi rm the judgment and sentence at issue, but certify conflict with Thomas v. State , 91 So. 3d 880 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012).
AFFIRMED.
LEWIS , B.L. THOMAS , and MAKAR , J J

. , CONCUR.
Exhibit
32.1



CERTIFICATION
OF PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE

OFFICER
PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION

906
OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In
connection with the Quarterly Report (the “Report”) of Digerati Technologies, Inc. (the “Company”) on
Form 10-Q for the period ending January 31, 2018, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof, I,
Arthur L. Smith, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant
to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that,



| | 1) | the
                                         Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
                                         Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | -- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2) | the
                                         information in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition
                                         and result of operations of the Company.
| | -- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------





|March 22, 2018 | By: | /s/
    Arthur L. Smith              
|-------------- | --- | -------------------------------------
|               |     | Arthur L. Smith                      
|               |     | President and Chief Executive Officer
Motion Granted; Dismissed and Memorandum Opinion filed December 18 , 2014.

In The 

## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14

- 14

- 00367

- CV

DONTERIAN G. HECTOR , Appellant

V.

ECONOMY MUD PRODUCTS COMPANY , Appellee

On Appeal from the 334th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 2012

- 36539



### MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is an appeal from an order signed April 8, 2014, granting appellee’s motion for summary judgment . On December 15, 2014 , appellant filed a motion to dismiss the appeal because the part ies have settled the underlying dispute

. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.1. The motion is granted.
Accordingly, the appeal is ordered dismissed.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Chief Justice Frost and Justices Boyce and McCally.
Exhibit 32.1
 CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
 PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
  (a)
    
    the Form 10-Q of the Company for the quarter ended September 30, 2007 filed on the date
hereof with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the Report) fully complies with the
requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934; and(b)
    
    the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
 By:
    /s/ KENNETH D. TUCHMANKenneth D. TuchmanChairman and Chief Executive Officer
Electronically Filed Intermediate Court of Appeals CAAP-16-0000072 27-SEP-2018 08:46 AM
1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

GEORGE GRIGSBY, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) Civil Action No. 12-0448 (EGS)

 )

JUDGE MARY THOMAS, )

)

Respondent. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter comes before the Court upon review of George Grigsby’s pro se “Petition for 

Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 USC 2241, 2254.” It appears that petitioner is challenging 

“THE DECISION OF JUDGE MARY MAXWELL OR JUDE THOMAS OF THE CIRCUIT 

COURT OF COOK COUNTY ILLINOIS TO PLACE HIM IN A MENTAL INSTITUTION

WITHOUT A GRAND JURY INDICTMENT.” Pet. at 1 (emphasis in original). 

It is unclear whether the petitioner currently is in custody for purposes of habeas relief. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c) (requiring some form of custody as the basis for seeking habeas relief). 

Assuming that the petitioner is currently in custody, his recourse lies in the judicial district having 

personal jurisdiction over his immediate custodian. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 546 U.S. 426, 434-35 

(2004); Blair-Bey v. Quick, 151 F.3d 1036, 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (citing Chatman-Bey v. 

Thornburgh, 864 F.2d 804, 810 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). And, “a district court may not entertain a

habeas petition involving present physical custody unless the respondent custodian is within its

territorial jurisdiction.” Stokes v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 374 F.3d 1235, 1239 (D.C. Cir. 2004).

Neither the petitioner nor his custodian are located in the District of Columbia, and this Court, 
2

therefore, cannot entertain this petition. Accordingly, the petition will be denied and this case 

will be dismissed. An Order is issued separately.

Signed: EMMET G. SULLIVAN

United States District Judge

Dated: April 3, 2012
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

MIDDLE DISTRICT 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

 Respondent 

 v. 

BARRY WATTERS, 

 Petitioner 

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 99 MM 2014 

ORDER 

PER CURIAM 

AND NOW, this 21st day of August, 2014, the Petition for Leave to File Petition 

for Allowance of Appeal Nunc Pro Tunc is DENIED.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                                           7                      
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                                 JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                                   MAR-31-1998
<DEBT-HELD-FOR-SALE>                           45,755
<DEBT-CARRYING-VALUE>                          0
<DEBT-MARKET-VALUE>                            0
<EQUITIES>                                     18,043
<MORTGAGE>                                        169
<REAL-ESTATE>                                   3,863
<TOTAL-INVEST>                                 71,272
<CASH>                                          2,492
<RECOVER-REINSURE>                                124
<DEFERRED-ACQUISITION>                          3,885
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 86,977
<POLICY-LOSSES>                                42,454
<UNEARNED-PREMIUMS>                               172
<POLICY-OTHER>                                  1,067
<POLICY-HOLDER-FUNDS>                          15,485
<NOTES-PAYABLE>                                 3,410
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                           4,044
<PREFERRED>                                    0
<COMMON>                                        1,276
<OTHER-SE>                                     14,922
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   86,977
<PREMIUMS>                                      4,354
<INVESTMENT-INCOME>                               923
<INVESTMENT-GAINS>                              1,028
<OTHER-INCOME>                                      1
<BENEFITS>                                      2,626
<UNDERWRITING-AMORTIZATION>                       (51)
<UNDERWRITING-OTHER>                            2,075
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 1,100
<INCOME-TAX>                                      240
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                               860
<DISCONTINUED>                                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                0
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                      860
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.71
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.47
<RESERVE-OPEN>                                 0
<PROVISION-CURRENT>                            0
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<PAYMENTS-CURRENT>                             0
<PAYMENTS-PRIOR>                               0
<RESERVE-CLOSE>                                0
<CUMULATIVE-DEFICIENCY>                        0
        
                                             

</TABLE>
#### Karl E. LEHMANN and Elfriede Lehmann, h/w, and Uwe Lehmann, Rudiger Lehmann, and Elke Lehmann, minors, by their parent and natural guardian, Karl E. Lehmann, and Karl E. Lehmann, in his own right v. Ernest Luke HARNER and Harner’s Express, Inc.

Civ. No. 13168.

United States District Court D. Maryland.

Dec. 5, 1962.

Laurence J. Distefano, Jr., and Donald J. Williams, Philadelphia, Pa., and David K. Poole, Jr., Hagerstown, Md., for plaintiffs.

William B. Somerville, Herbert F. Murray, and Smith, Somerville & Case, Baltimore, Md., for defendants.

THOMSEN, Chief Judge.

Plaintiffs have filed a request under Rule 36, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that defendants admit: “That the accident of August 20, 1960 which occurred at approximately 7:00 P.M. in Towson, Maryland, involving Karl E. Lehmann, Elriede (sic) Lehmann, Elke Lehmann, Rudiger Lehmann and Uwe Lehmann, was caused solely by the negligence of Ernest Luke Harner.”

Defendants have objected to the request for admission on the grounds that it calls for a conclusion on one of the ultimate issues in the case and does not seek admission of a matter of fact but a conclusion of mixed fact and law.

The objection is supported by Moore’s Federal Practice, 2d Ed., Vol. 4, sec. 36.04, p. 2711, and by the reasoning of all the opinions cited or found which have construed Rule 36 in analogous situations. Demmert v. Demmert, D.Alaska, 115 F.Supp. 430, 433, 14 Alaska 425; Driver v. Gindy Manufacturing Corp., E.D.Pa., 24 F.R.D. 473; Petition of Reinauer Oil Transport, Inc., D.Mass., 19 F.R.D. 5; People of State of California v. The Jules Fribourg, N.D.Cal., 19 F.R.D. 432, 436; Alaska Credit Bureau of Juneau v. Stevenson, D.Alaska, 15 F.R.D. 409. See also Syracuse Broadcasting Corp. v. Newhouse, 2 Cir., 271 F.2d 910.

The request for admission is hereby denied.

*304At the pretrial hearing which followed the argument on the request for admission, plaintiffs offered to place on record in this case the amounts which their clients are willing to accept in settlement of their claims, and requested the court to require defendants’ insurer to state on the record the maximum amount which it is willing to offer in settlement. The purpose of this request is to facilitate any claim which plaintiffs might have against defendant’s insurer in the event the judgments exceed the policy limits.

The insurer is not a party to this case; the amounts of the settlement offers are not relevant to any issue herein; there are other means of determining, in a possible future case, what settlement offers may have been made; a knowledge of the settlement offers should not be in the mind of a judge considering a possible motion for new trial; and, the practice in this State and District does not support the request. The judges of this Court are agreed that the proposed requirement is undesirable and it will not be imposed.