J-S44008-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

FRANK JAMES GARCIA 

Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 399 MDA 2020

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 27, 2020

In the Court of Common Pleas of Northumberland County Criminal 

Division at No(s): CP-49-CR-0000300-2017

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., NICHOLS, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED NOVEMBER 18, 2020

Appellant, Frank James Garcia, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

of 72 hours’ to 6 months’ incarceration, and a consecutive year of probation, 

imposed after he was convicted, inter alia, of driving under the influence (DUI) 

of a controlled substance. Appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of his 

pretrial motion to suppress, claiming that the stop of his vehicle was an illegal 

detention because it was not supported by probable cause. After careful 

review, we affirm.

The trial court briefly summarized the facts of Appellant’s case, as 

follows:

On or about January 2, 2017, around 5:45 a.m., Officer 

[Kevin] Rushton of the Point Township Police Department 

observed ... Appellant’s vehicle in the Borough of Northumberland 

with headlights that were not illuminating the highway in front of 

the vehicle. The officer conducted a traffic stop as a safety 

concern and for a probable violation of the vehicle code. After the 

officer approached the vehicle and spoke with Appellant, the 
J-S44008-20

- 2 -

officer could smell burnt marijuana emanating from the vehicle. 

Appellant was asked to step out of the vehicle and the officer 

conducted field sobriety tests. Upon conducting those tests, ... 

Appellant was arrested for [DUI].

Trial Court Opinion (TCO), 5/5/20, at 1 (unnumbered). After Appellant’s 

arrest, he was transported to the hospital where he consented to a blood draw. 

See id. 

On August 30, 2017, Appellant filed a motion to suppress the evidence, 

arguing, inter alia, that the stop of his vehicle was illegal. On March 2, 2018, 

the trial court conducted a suppression hearing, at which Officer Rushton was 

the sole witness. On April 27, 2018, the court issued an order denying 

Appellant’s motion to suppress. He proceeded to a non-jury trial on April 26, 

2019. At the close thereof, he was convicted of two counts of DUI, 75 Pa.C.S. 

§§ 3802(d)(1)(i) and (d)(2); possession of drug paraphernalia, 35 P.S. § 780-

113(a)(32); driving without a license, 75 Pa.C.S. § 1501(a); and operating a 

vehicle with unsafe equipment, 75 Pa.C.S. § 4107(b)(2). Appellant was 

acquitted of possession of marijuana, 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(31), and driving 

without headlights, 75 Pa.C.S. § 4303(a). On January 27, 2020, Appellant 

was sentenced to the aggregate term of incarceration and probation set forth 

above. He filed a timely notice of appeal, and he complied with the trial court’s 

order to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on 

appeal. The court filed its Rule 1925(a) opinion on May 5, 2020.

Herein, Appellant states a single issue for our review:

1. Whether the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s motion to 

suppress evidence when the stopping of Appellant’s vehicle was 

done in violation of his rights under Article 1 Section 8 of the 
J-S44008-20

- 3 -

Pennsylvania Constitution and under the Fourth Amendment to 

the United States Constitution because it was made without 

probable cause to believe that either Appellant or his vehicle was 

in violation of the Motor Vehicle Code?

Appellant’s Brief at 7 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

Preliminarily, we note:

An appellate court’s standard of review in addressing a challenge 

to the denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining 

whether the suppression court’s factual findings are supported by 

the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those 

facts are correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed before 

the suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the 

Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as 

remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as 

a whole. Where the suppression court’s factual findings are 

supported by the record, the appellate court is bound by those 

findings and may reverse only if the court’s legal conclusions are 

erroneous. Where the appeal of the determination of the 

suppression court turns on allegations of legal error, the 

suppression court’s legal conclusions are not binding on an 

appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if the suppression

court properly applied the law to the facts. Thus, the conclusions 

of law of the courts below are subject to plenary review.

Commonwealth v. Smith, 164 A.3d 1255, 1257 (Pa. Super. 2017) (cleaned 

up).

Here, Appellant challenges the legality of Officer Rushton’s stop of his 

vehicle, contending that the officer did not possess the requisite probable 

cause that Appellant’s vehicle violated the Motor Vehicle Code (MVC).

In Pennsylvania, the authority that addresses the requisite cause 

for a traffic stop is statutory and is found at 75 Pa.C.S.[] § 

6308(b), which provides:

(b) Authority of police officer.—Whenever a police officer 

is engaged in a systematic program of checking vehicles or 

drivers or has reasonable suspicion that a violation of this 

title is occurring or has occurred, he may stop a vehicle, 
J-S44008-20

- 4 -

upon request or signal, for the purpose of checking the 

vehicle’s registration, proof of financial responsibility, 

vehicle identification number or engine number or the 

driver'’s license, or to secure such other information as the 

officer may reasonably believe to be necessary to enforce 

the provisions of this title.

75 Pa.C.S. § 6308(b). In Commonwealth v. Feczko, 10 A.3d 

1285 (Pa. Super. 2010) (en banc), this Court, consistent with our 

Supreme Court’s clarification of constitutional principles under the 

Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania 

Constitution, stated with respect to § 6308(b):

In light of our Supreme Court’s interpretation of the current 

language of Section 6308(b), we are compelled to conclude 

that the standards concerning the quantum of cause 

necessary for an officer to stop a vehicle in this 

Commonwealth are settled; notwithstanding any prior 

diversity on the issue among panels of this Court. Traffic 

stops based on a reasonable suspicion: either of criminal 

activity or a violation of the [MVC] under the authority 

of Section 6308(b) must serve a stated investigatory 

purpose. 

* * *

Mere reasonable suspicion will not justify a vehicle stop 

when the driver’s detention cannot serve an investigatory 

purpose relevant to the suspected violation. In such an 

instance, “it is encumbent [sic] upon the officer to articulate 

specific facts possessed by him, at the time of the 

questioned stop, which would provide probable cause to

believe that the vehicle or the driver was in violation of some

provision of the Code.” [Commonwealth v.] Gleason, ...

785 A.2d [983,] 989 [(Pa. 2001)] (citation 

omitted)[, superseded by statute, Act of Sept. 30, 2003, 

P.L. 120, No. 24, § 17 (amending 75 Pa.C.S.[] § 6308(b))].

Id. at 1290–[]91 (emphasis added in Gleason). Accordingly, 

when considering whether reasonable suspicion or probable cause 

is required constitutionally to make a vehicle stop, the nature of 

the violation has to be considered. If it is not necessary to stop 

the vehicle to establish that a violation of the [MVC] has occurred, 

an officer must possess probable cause to stop the vehicle. Where 

a violation is suspected, but a stop is necessary to further 
J-S44008-20

- 5 -

investigate whether a violation has occurred, an officer need only 

possess reasonable suspicion to make the stop.

Commonwealth v. Salter, 121 A.3d 987, 992–93 (Pa. Super. 2015).

In this case, Appellant contends that Officer Rushton was required to 

have probable cause to stop his vehicle. In support, Appellant notes that, at 

the suppression hearing, Officer Rushton testified that he stopped Appellant’s 

car because he believed that Appellant’s headlights did not comply with the 

lighting requirements set forth in 67 Pa. Code § 175.66(a) and/or (b). See 

N.T. Suppression Hearing, 3/2/18, at 5. According to Appellant, “the stopping 

of a vehicle for a headlamp violation is not such a violation that would require 

further investigation.” Appellant’s Brief at 12. Therefore, Appellant insists 

that probable cause was required to validate the stop under this Court’s 

holding in Feczko. 

Appellant’s argument is unconvincing. At the suppression hearing, 

Officer Rushton testified that Appellant’s vehicle “had, like, blue lights on the 

front of it. And they didn’t seem very bright.” N.T. Suppression Hearing at 5. 

The officer testified that he believed Appellant’s headlights did not meet the 

requirements of 67 Pa. Code § 175.66 (a) and/or (b). Id. Those provisions 

state:

(a) Condition of lamps and switches. Every required lamp or 

switch shall be in safe operating condition as described in § 175.80 

(relating to inspection procedure).

(b) Lighting standards. A lamp shall comply with vehicle lighting 

equipment requirements of this title. See Tables II--IV; Chapter 

153 and 75 Pa.C.S. § 4301.
J-S44008-20

- 6 -

67 Pa. Code § 175.66(a), (b). Other subparts of section 175.66, as well as 

section 175.80 and Tables II-IV of section 153, require, inter alia, that

headlights have high beams and low beams, be within a certain range of 

candlepower, direct light properly, be a certain color, and “not be so 

obstructed by a screen, bar, auxiliary equipment or a device as to obscure, 

change the color of or obstruct beam.” 67 Pa. Code §§ 175.66(c), (g); see

also 67 Pa. Code §§ 175.80(9); 67 Pa. Code § 153 Appendix A. 

Given the MVC’s specific requirements for headlights, and the nature of 

the violations suspected in this case, we conclude that Officer Rushton was 

required to possess only reasonable suspicion to stop Appellant’s vehicle. Our 

decision in Salter is instructive. There, an officer following Salter’s car 

observed that the light above his license plate seemed to be out. Salter, 121 

A.3d at 994. Notably, the officer “was able to confirm the violation by driving 

within 75 feet of [Salter’s] vehicle and turning his headlights off. Once he 

turned his headlights off, he indeed confirmed the plate was not illuminated.” 

Id. Accordingly, “[n]othing more was needed to be determined by [the 

o]fficer ... upon a stop to verify that the plate light was not operating” and, 

therefore, probable cause was required to initiate the stop. Id. at 993-94.

The facts of Salter are distinguishable from the present case. Here, 

Officer Rushton testified that as Appellant’s vehicle was driving towards him, 

he noticed that Appellant’s headlights appeared to be blue in color and were 

not very bright. See N.T. Suppression Hearing at 4-5. However, Appellant’s 

vehicle immediately turned right onto a side street, thereby requiring Officer 
J-S44008-20

- 7 -

Rushton to follow the vehicle. See id. at 5. From that vantage point, the 

officer could not discern whether the color and/or luminosity of Appellant’s 

headlights violated the requirements of the MVC without effectuating a traffic 

stop. Therefore, unlike in Salter, the officer required only reasonable 

suspicion to stop Appellant’s vehicle because further investigation was 

necessary. 

We further conclude that Officer Ruston possessed reasonable suspicion 

to conduct the stop. Our Supreme Court has declared that “under the present 

version of [s]ection 6308(b), in order to establish reasonable suspicion, an 

officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which led him to 

reasonably suspect a violation of the [MVC]....” Commonwealth v. Holmes, 

14 A.3d 89, 95 (Pa. 2011) (emphasis omitted). Here, Officer Rushton testified 

that when he first observed Appellant’s vehicle, it appeared that its headlights 

were blue in color and were not illuminating the roadway properly. See N.T. 

Suppression Hearing at 5. As the officer followed the vehicle, he “continued 

to see that it really wasn’t illuminating much in front of it[,]” which “raised 

[the officer’s] suspicion that it was almost a blue ... auxiliary lighting, or [that 

the headlights] were the improper color.” Id. These facts were sufficiently 

specific to demonstrate that Officer Rushton had reasonable suspicion to 

believe that Appellant’s headlights violated the MVC.1 Therefore, the officer 

____________________________________________

1 We add that the Commonwealth entered into evidence a video taken by the 

officer’s dashboard camera, which the trial court viewed and “found that the 
J-S44008-20

- 8 -

lawfully stopped Appellant’s vehicle to further investigate, and the trial court 

did not err in denying Appellant’s motion to suppress.2

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/18/2020

____________________________________________

vehicle[’s] headlights did not illuminate the highway properly....” TCO at 1 

(unnumbered). We have likewise viewed the video, and conclude that it 

supports the trial court’s factual finding. 

2 We recognize that the trial court denied Appellant’s motion to suppress 

because it found that Officer Rushton possessed probable cause to support 

the stop. While we conclude that probable cause was not required in this case, 

this Court is permitted to affirm the trial court “on any valid basis, as long as 

the court came to the correct result....” Wilson v. Transport Ins. Co., 889 

A.2d 563, 577 n.4 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citations omitted).