UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-4243

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

DAVID ONELIO ESPAILLAT,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Newport News. Rebecca Beach Smith, 

District Judge. (4:04-cr-00147-WDK-001)

Submitted: October 21, 2011 Decided: November 1, 2011

Before DAVIS, KEENAN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender, Frances H. 

Pratt, Rodolfo Cejas II, Assistant Federal Public Defenders, 

Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellant. Lisa Rae McKeel, Assistant 

United States Attorney, Newport News, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

David Onelio Espaillat appeals the twenty-four-month 

sentence imposed upon revocation of his term of supervised 

release. Espaillat’s counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders 

v. California

We will not disturb a sentence imposed after 

revocation of supervised release that is within the prescribed 

statutory range and is not plainly unreasonable. 

, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are no 

meritorious grounds for appeal, but questioning whether the 

sentence is plainly unreasonable because the district court 

failed to consider the Chapter Seven policy statement range, 

improperly considered factors not permitted by 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3583(e) (2006), and opined that supervised release was a 

privilege. Espaillat was advised of his right to file a pro se 

supplemental brief, but he did not file one. We affirm.

United States 

v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 437-39 (4th Cir. 2006). In making this 

determination, we first consider whether the sentence is 

unreasonable. Id. at 438. “This initial inquiry takes a more 

deferential appellate posture concerning issues of fact and the 

exercise of discretion than reasonableness review for 

[G]uidelines sentences.” United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 

652, 656 (4th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citations 

omitted).
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Although a district court “ultimately has broad 

discretion to revoke its previous sentence and impose a term of 

imprisonment up to the statutory maximum,” Crudup, 461 F.3d at 

439 (internal quotation marks omitted), the court must consider 

the Chapter Seven policy statements in the federal Sentencing 

Guidelines manual, as well as the statutory requirements and 

factors applicable to revocation sentences under 18 U.S.C. 

§§ 3553(a), 3583(e) (2006). Chapter Seven provides that “at 

revocation the court should sanction primarily the defendant’s 

breach of trust, while taking into account, to a limited degree, 

the seriousness of the underlying violation and the criminal 

history of the violator.” U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual

Citing 

ch. 

7, pt. A(3)(b) (2010). Section 3583 approves consideration of a 

majority of the factors listed in § 3553(a), omitting only two. 

18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). Among the omitted factors is the need for 

the sentence “to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to 

promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for 

the offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A).

Crudup, Espaillat contends that his sentence is 

plainly unreasonable because the district court improperly

considered the need to promote respect for the law, the 

seriousness of the offense, and the need for just punishment. 

We conclude that the district court’s observations regarding the 

seriousness of Espaillat’s offense and the need to provide just 
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punishment and promote respect for the law were relevant to 

other required considerations, including “the nature and 

circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics 

of the defendant,” adequately deterring criminal conduct, and 

protecting the public from further crimes of the defendant. 18 

U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C). The district court 

noted Espaillat’s failure to abide by the terms of his 

supervised release, a factor relevant to Chapter Seven’s policy 

that a revocation sentence should focus on the breach of the 

court’s trust. Moreover, the district court expressly 

considered the factors in § 3553(a) that are applicable to 

revocation sentences. We conclude that in light of the district 

court’s articulation of factors specifically listed in § 3583, 

consideration of other factors did not render Espaillat’s 

sentence plainly unreasonable. 

Espaillat also contends that his sentence was plainly 

unreasonable because the district court did not specifically 

reference the Chapter Seven policy statement sentencing range. 

Consideration of the range was implicit in the court’s ruling in 

light of defense counsel’s concession at the revocation hearing 

that a sentence within that range was not necessarily supported 

by the circumstances of Espaillat’s case and the court’s 

detailed reasoning for imposing the statutory maximum sentence. 

United States v. Davis, 53 F.3d 638, 642 (4th Cir. 1995). 
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We further reject Espaillat’s contention that the 

district court committed reversible error by referring to 

supervised release as a privilege. First, the district court’s 

view of supervised release as a privilege, in a general sense,

is not erroneous. See generally United States v. Johnson

In accordance with 

, 529 

U.S. 53, 59 (2000) (“Congress intended supervised release to 

assist individuals in their transition to community life. 

Supervised release fulfills rehabilitative ends, distinct from 

those served by incarceration.”). Second, Espaillat points to 

no legal authority prohibiting the district court from viewing 

supervised release as a privilege. We therefore find no error 

in the district court’s expression of its opinion that 

supervised release is a privilege. 

Anders, we have reviewed the entire 

record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for 

appeal. We therefore affirm. This court requires that counsel 

inform their client, in writing, of his right to petition the 

Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If the 

client requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes 

that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move 

in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. 

Counsel’s motion must state that a copy of the motion was served 

on their client. We dispense with oral argument because the 

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
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materials before the court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

AFFIRMED