Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1564 | April 18, 2024 Page 1 of 18

IN THE

Court of Appeals of Indiana

Shaka Adiyia Shakur,

Appellant-Plaintiff

v.

Jack Hendrix Executive Director, et al.,

Appellees-Defendants

April 18, 2024

Court of Appeals Case No.

23A-CT-1564

Appeal from the Sullivan Circuit Court

The Honorable Robert E. Hunley, II, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

77C01-1902-CT-64

Opinion by Chief Judge Altice

Judges Bradford and Felix concur.

Altice, Chief Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1564 | April 18, 2024 Page 2 of 18

Case Summary

[1] Shaka Shakur appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of 

Indiana Department of Correction (DOC) Commissioner Robert Carter, Jr.

(Commissioner Carter), DOC Director Jack Hendrix, and Westville 

Correctional Facility (Westville) Warden Richard Brown (collectively, the 

DOC Officials). Shakur claims that the trial court erred in concluding that his 

claims of due process violations and cruel and unusual punishment were timebarred. Shakur further contends that genuine issues of material fact remain as 

to whether his constitutional rights were violated as a result of DOC 

disciplinary sanctions and alleged medical neglect at various DOC facilities.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On July 25, 2003, Shakur was transferred to the Pendleton Correctional Facility 

(Pendleton) following the imposition of a sixty-three-year sentence for murder. 

Thereafter, Shakur was transferred to the following DOC facilities: 

4. [Shakur was] transferred to Wabash Valley Correctional 

Facility [Wabash] on July 20, 2005.

5. [The next day], Shakur was . . . transferred to [Westville]. . . . 

6. [Shakur] was . . . transferred back to [Wabash] on November 

3, 2005.
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7. [Shakur] remained there until he was transferred to 

[Westville] on March 2, 2012.

8. Thereafter, [Shakur] was transferred to New Castle 

Correctional Facility [New Castle] on March 25, 2014.

9. [Shakur] was then transferred to [Pendleton] on July 17, 2014.

10. Thereafter, [Shakur] was transferred back to [Wabash] on 

January 8, 2016.

11. [Shakur] remained there until he was transferred to Nottoway 

Correctional Center in Burkeville, Virginia [Virginia Correctional 

Center] pursuant to an interstate compact agreement on

December 19. 2018.

Appellant’s Appendix Vol. II at 20-21.

[4] In January 2004, Shakur received his first conduct violation report while 

incarcerated at the DOC for refusing to accept a work assignment. Thereafter, 

Shakur committed more than thirty-five additional disciplinary offenses at 

various DOC facilities, and at least three of those incidents resulted in criminal 

charges against him. More specifically, a murder charge in 2005 was resolved 

through a plea agreement, wherein Shakur pleaded guilty to possession of a 

dangerous device, a Class B felony, and was sentenced to twenty years. Shakur 

also was convicted of Class B felony battery by bodily waste in 2006, for which 

he was sentenced to a two-year term of incarceration. And in 2017, Shakur 

pleaded guilty to Level 5 felony battery and was sentenced to three years for 

that offense. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1564 | April 18, 2024 Page 4 of 18

[5] As a consequence of Shakur’s 2005 murder charge, a one-year disciplinary 

segregation sanction was imposed. After completing that sanction, Shakur 

continued to remain in “restrictive housing” at the DOC. Appellant’s Appendix 

Vol. II at 227. Restrictive housing required Shakur to be isolated from the 

general prison population and reside in a single cell. Shakur, however, could 

have visits from family members, and he was permitted to make weekly phone 

calls. Shakur could also use the prison library and exercise in a fenced-in area. 

Mental health care providers performed weekly rounds in Shakur’s unit, and 

Shakur could request additional mental health care services from prison staff in 

addition to those weekly visits. 

[6] On May 23, 2014, a disciplinary hearing officer found Shakur guilty of refusing 

to submit to a drug test and a suspended three-month sanction in disciplinary

segregation was imposed. Three months later, Shakur was found guilty of 

possessing contraband and a cellphone, both of which resulted in placement in

disciplinary segregation. Following those incidents, Shakur remained in 

disciplinary segregation for the duration of his incarceration in the DOC.

[7] On February 23, 2017, Director Carter issued an Executive Directive 

(Directive) establishing that any offender found guilty of a battery or assault 

involving a “Department staff member, volunteer, or visitor” that results in 

“bodily injury or serious bodily injury, . . . shall receive, in addition to other 

sanctions for the offense . . . a loss of the entire balance of the offender’s accumulated 

earned credit time.” Id. at 167 (emphasis added). The Directive was effective
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immediately and was “applicable to all [DOC] facilities housing adult 

offenders.” Id. 

[8] Six months later when Shakur was being escorted to Wabash’s recreation area, 

he removed his restraints, pulled a sharpened piece of plastic from his 

waistband, and stabbed a correctional officer multiple times. Shakur was found 

guilty of battery on a correctional officer for this offense, which resulted in the 

revocation of all 3,190 days of his earned credit time. Shakur was thereafter 

transferred to the Virginia Correctional Center. 

[9] On February 7, 2019, Shakur filed an action against the DOC Officials pursuant 

to 42 U.S.C. § 19831

 (Section 1983 Action), alleging violations of his 

Fourteenth and Eighth Amendment rights under the United States 

1

 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides in part that

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of 

any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any 

citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the 

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, 

shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper 

proceeding for redress[.]

42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a civil remedy against a person who, under color of state law, subjects a 

United States citizen to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 

federal Constitution or federal laws. Long v. Durnil, 697 N.E.2d 100, 105 (Ind. Ct. App.

1998), trans. denied. In order to recover damages under this statute, a plaintiff must show that (1) 

he held a constitutionally protected right, (2) he was deprived of this right, (3) the defendant acted 

with reckless indifference to cause this deprivation, and (4) the defendant acted under color of state 

law. Id. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was designed to prevent the states from violating the Constitution and 

certain federal statutes and to compensate injured plaintiffs for deprivations of those federal 

rights. Culver-Union Twp. Ambulance Serv. v. Steindler, 629 N.E.2d 1231,1233 (Ind. 1994). 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1564 | April 18, 2024 Page 6 of 18

Constitution. Shakur asserted that the DOC Officials denied him “adequate 

process and meaningful periodic review concerning his approximately thirteen . 

. . years in solitary confinement” in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 

Appellant’s Appendix Vol. II at 31-32. Shakur also claimed that his due process 

rights were violated by “the retroactive enlargement of his sentence by more 

than eight (8) years,” that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated by the 

“denial of access to adequate mental health care,” and that the DOC Officials 

failed to protect him “from the known danger of extended placement in solitary 

confinement.” Id. at 32. Shakur sought damages and the reinstatement of his

3,190 days of credit time.

[10] After denying the allegations, the DOC Officials filed a motion for summary 

judgment, claiming that they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law 

because Shakur’s claims regarding his housing status from 2005 to 2016 were 

barred under the two-year statute of limitations, that Shakur’s due process rights 

were not implicated because he had no liberty interest in being free from 

disciplinary segregation, and that Shakur’s Eighth Amendment rights were not 

violated because Shakur was properly ordered to remain in disciplinary housing

and was provided with adequate mental health care and counseling during his 

incarceration. 

[11] Following a hearing, the trial court granted the DOC Officials’ motion for 

summary judgment on June 9, 2023. The order states in relevant part that '

4. Shakur’s claims regarding his housing status from 2005 to 

2016 are barred by the statute of limitations.
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5. Shakur was appropriately placed in disciplinary segregation.

6. Shakur appropriately remained in segregated housing due to 

his ongoing severe conduct violations and criminal charges, 

including the stabbing of a Correctional Officer, and the safety 

needs of the facilities.

7. A prisoner’s claim of violations of due process stemming from 

a prison disciplinary hearing is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. §

1983 when the prisoner’s “claim for declaratory relief and money 

damages, [is] based on allegations of deceit and bias on the part 

of the decisionmaker that necessarily imply the invalidity of the 

punishment imposed.” Edwards v. Balisock, 520 U.S. 641, 648 

(1997). 

8. [Shakur] has no liberty interest in being free from disciplinary 

segregation and due process protections do not apply in this case. 

9. To the extent it was owed, [Shakur] received adequate due 

process in his disciplinary hearings. Prison disciplinary 

proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the full 

panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not 

apply. 

10. Deliberate indifference is “something approaching a total 

unconcern for a prisoner’s welfare in the face of serious risks,” or 

a “conscious, culpable refusal” to prevent harm. Duane v. Lane, 

959 F.2d 673, 677 (7th Cir. 1992). To prove deliberate

indifference, a prisoner must establish that the defendant had 

actual knowledge of an impending harm easily preventable, so 

that a conscious, culpable refusal to prevent the harm can be 

inferred from the defendant’s failure to prevent it. 
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11. [Shakur] has not provided any evidence to support his Eighth 

Amendment claims against [the DOC Officials]. [Shakur] was 

evaluated by a psychiatrist in 2018 and had no mental health

issues as alleged in his Complaint.

12. Based on the foregoing, . . . the [DOC Officials] . . . are 

entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.

[12] Shakur now appeals. 

Discussion and Decision

I. Standard of Review

[13] Our Supreme Court recently reiterated our standard of review of a trial court’s 

decision on summary judgment as follows: 

We review the trial court’s summary judgment decision de novo. 

[The moving party] is entitled to summary judgment if the 

designated evidence shows there is no genuine issue of material 

fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A 

genuine issue of material fact exists when there is contrary 

evidence showing differing accounts of the truth, or when 

conflicting reasonable inferences may be drawn from the parties’ 

consistent accounts and resolution of that conflict will affect the 

outcome of a claim. To the extent we have any doubts 

concerning the existence of a genuine issue of material fact, we 

must resolve those doubts in favor of the nonmoving party. 

Z.D. v. Community Health Net., Inc., 217 N.E.3d 527, 531 (Ind. 2023) (citations 

and internal quotes omitted). When reviewing the grant of summary judgment, 

we may affirm the trial court’s ruling on any basis apparent in the record. 

Markey v. Estate of Markey, 38 N.E.3d 1003, 1006-07 (Ind. 2015). 
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II. Shakur’s Claims

A. Due Process

[14] Shakur contends that the trial court erred in determining that his claims against 

the DOC Officials are time-barred. He argues that his Section 1983 Action is 

not foreclosed because the DOC Officials’ conduct constituted a “continuing 

violation” and, therefore, the statute of limitations was not triggered. 

Appellant’s Brief at 16. Shakur further maintains that genuine issues of material 

fact remain as to whether his retention in solitary confinement and the DOC 

Officials’ conduct regarding the revocation of his credit time violated his right 

to due process. 

[15] At the outset, we note that our research has revealed little Indiana authority on 

point as to the issues that Shakur presents in this appeal. Thus, we will turn to 

our sister states and federal cases for guidance and persuasive authority. See

Specialty Foods of Indiana, Inc. v. City of South Bend, 997 N.E.2d 23, 27 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2013), trans. denied. As for Shakur’s statute of limitations argument, at 

least one court has determined that the “applicable statute of limitations for 

section 1983 claims is the state period for personal injury torts.” Kalimara v. 

Illinois Dep’t of Corr., 879 F.2d 276, 277 (7th Cir. 1989) (citing Wilson v. Garcia, 

471 U.S. 261 (1985)). Indiana’s personal injury statute, Ind. Code § 34-11-2-

4(a), establishes that “[a]n action must be commenced within two (2) years after 

the cause of action accrues.” A cause of action “accrues and the statute of 

limitations begins to run when the plaintiff knew or, in the exercise of ordinary 

diligence, could have discovered that an injury had been sustained as a result of 
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the tortious act of another.” Indiana Dep’t of Child Servs. v. Morgan, 148 N.E.3d 

1030, 1033 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied.

[16] Here, the designated evidence shows that although Shakur was continuously 

placed in restrictive housing since 2005 at various DOC facilities, he did not file 

his Section 1983 Action against the DOC Officials until February 2019. Thus, 

in accordance with the two-year limitations period set forth in I.C. § 34-11-11-2-

4(a), Shakur’s claims were limited to damages—if any—that accrued within the 

twenty-four-month window prior to that date. Any claims for relief that 

accrued before that deadline were time-barred and unavailable to him. 

[17] Additionally, although Shakur maintains that the DOC Officials’ conduct 

amounted to a continuing episode of harm against him that would preserve his 

claim for damages before the 2017 cutoff, we note that the “continuing wrong” 

doctrine applies where an entire course of conduct combines to produce an 

injury. Crowe, Chizek, & Co., L.L.P. v. Oil Tech., Inc., 771 N.E.2d 1203, 1210 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied. When a loss is intermittent and recurring, 

“new limitations are triggered” each time the loss occurs. Kerr v. City of South 

Bend, 48 N.E.3d 348, 355 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).

[18] The designated evidence in this case does not establish that Shakur’s placement 

in disciplinary segregation at the various DOC facilities was a single, 

continuous episode. Rather, those sanctions resulted from a series of 

disciplinary proceedings that occurred at various times in 2005 and from 2013-

17. Each offense that Shakur committed, and the sanctions imposed thereon, 
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were separate and did not constitute an ongoing episode. Hence, Shakur’s 

recovery—if any—is “limited to losses which occurred beginning” two years 

before he filed his complaint. Id. As Shakur did not file his complaint until 

February 2019, his claims for damages occurring before February 2017 are 

time-barred under I.C. § 34-11-11-2-4(a), and only those that accrued after that 

date may proceed.

[19] Turning to those instances and Shakur’s claims of alleged violations of due 

process, the United States Supreme Court has observed that procedural due 

process claims are typically considered in two steps. First, it is determined 

whether the State has deprived the individual of a property or liberty interest, 

and the second step examines what process is due and whether the procedures 

utilized by the State comport with due process. See Kentucky Dep’t of Corr. v. 

Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989). Whether a liberty interest exists requires 

examining state law to determine if the person has a legitimate claim of 

entitlement. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-58 (1974). “The 

requirements of procedural due process apply only to the deprivation of 

interests encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of liberty 

and property.” Bd. Of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). Therefore, if 

neither a liberty nor a property interest is at stake, the State may “use any 

procedures it chooses, or no procedures at all.” Montgomery v. Anderson, 262 

F.3d 641, 645 (7th Cir. 2001).

[20] Here, Shakur is challenging the sanctions imposed while incarcerated in the 

DOC, claiming that the DOC Officials violated his due process rights by 
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revoking all of his credit time and depriving him of his liberty interest when he 

was placed in disciplinary segregation. Indiana state prisoners have a liberty 

interest in good time credits, and they are entitled to due process before the 

State may revoke those credits. Cochran v. Buss, 381 F.3d 637, 639 (7th Cir. 

2004). We note, however, that our courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to 

consider challenges to DOC’s administrative disciplinary decisions. Blanck v.

Indiana Dep’t of Corr., 829 N.E.2d 505, 507 (Ind. 2005). And prisoners may not 

generally invoke U.S.C. § 1983 to collaterally attack the outcome of prison 

disciplinary matters. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.475, 476 (1973). Instead, 

State prisoners who desire to challenge their sentences or administrative orders 

revoking good time credits must seek habeas corpus relief because they are 

contesting the fact or duration of confinement. Id. at 489. Stated differently 

when an offender challenges the sanctions imposed in a prison discipline 

proceeding on constitutional grounds, “habeas corpus—not §1983—is the 

specific instrument to obtain release from unlawful imprisonment.” Morgan v. 

Schott, 914 F.3d 1115, 1119 (7th Cir. 2019) (emphasis added). The two statutes 

are not interchangeable. Thus, when a prisoner challenges the fact or “duration 

of his confinement,” he fails to state a cognizable Section 1983 claim. Id. (citing 

Preiser, 411 U.S. at 489). 

[21] We also observe that before an offender can present a claim in a Section 1983

Action alleging a constitutional violation regarding a prison disciplinary

proceeding, he must satisfy the “favorable termination rule” set forth in Heck v. 

Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). That is, a prisoner must first have a conviction 
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or sentence reversed, expunged, or called into question through a writ of habeas 

corpus for an “allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment or for 

other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or 

sentence invalid.” Id. at 486-87; see also Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 648 

(1997) (where the rule in Heck was extended to preclude Section 1983 claims 

challenging procedural deficiencies that necessarily imply the invalidity of the 

outcome of a prison disciplinary proceeding). Shakur challenges the DOC’s 

disciplinary actions where habeas review was available, so they are not 

presentable pursuant to Heck and Edwards as a Section 1983 Action. See, e.g., 

Cochran v. Buss, 381 F.3d 637, 639 (7th Cir 2004) (observing that State prisoners 

seeking to challenge administrative orders revoking good time credits or 

equivalent sentence-shortening mechanisms must seek habeas corpus). 

[22] We also reject Shakur’s argument that the DOC Officials waived applicability 

of the Heck and Edwards rules because they failed to plead the issue as an 

affirmative defense. Even though Indiana Trial Rule 8(C) generally requires 

responsive pleadings to raise affirmative defenses, trial courts may exercise their 

discretion and entertain affirmative defenses that are not raised in a responsive 

pleading. Oshinski v. N. Indiana Commuter Transp. Dist., 843 N.E.2d 536, 538 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2006). Here, the trial court considered and ruled on the DOC 

Officials’ Heck and Edwards claims in its summary judgment order. And while 

the DOC Officials did not make specific references to Heck and Edwards in their 

Answer to Shakur’s complaint, they asserted that the trial court lacked “subject 

matter jurisdiction over all claims relating to or arising out of prison discipline” 
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and then went on to address the Heck and Edwards issue in their summary 

judgment motion. Appellant’s Appendix Vol. II at 49. Thus, the trial court and 

Shakur were on notice that the DOC Officials intended to argue that the trial 

court lacked the authority to adjudicate Shakur’s contentions as they related to 

prison discipline. That said, Shakur’s claim that the DOC Officials waived the 

applicability of the Heck and Edwards limitations, fails. 

[23] Finally, we note that Shakur’s claims that arguably are not precluded by Heck

and Edwards are those that involved the two disciplinary proceedings that 

occurred after October 4, 2017. In both those instances, Shakur was sanctioned 

with separate six-month terms of disciplinary segregation after the balance of his 

3,190 days of credit time had already been revoked. Shakur, however, did not 

treat the sanctions that were imposed after October 2017 as separate from the 

all-encompassing due process violations that he alleged in his complaint until 

he raised that issue in his reply brief on appeal. As a result, Shakur has waived 

the issue. See, e.g., Lafayette Rentals, Inc. v. Low Cost Spay-Neuter Clinic, Inc., 207 

N.E.3d 1222, 1233 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (holding that an appellant is 

precluded from raising an issue for the first time in his reply brief). 

[24] Waiver notwithstanding, the designated evidence demonstrates that Shakur has 

not served the sanctions that were imposed after October 2017. More 

specifically, because of the earlier conduct violations and sanctions that were 

imposed, the 2017 sanctions were not set to commence until 2020. Shakur, 

however, was transferred to the Virginia Correctional Center in December 

2018, at which time he was no longer housed in disciplinary segregation. As 
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Shakur did not serve any part of those sanctions, he has failed to demonstrate 

any injury that resulted from the DOC Officials’ actions. Thus, Shakur was 

without standing to bring a Section 1983 Action on those claims. See, 

e.g., Solarize Indiana, Inc. v. S. Indiana Gas & Elec. Co., 182 N.E.3d 212, 218 (Ind. 

2022) (standing requires a party to show that he has suffered or was in 

immediate danger of suffering a direct injury as result of the complained of 

conduct). For all these reasons, Shakur’s due process challenges fail, and we 

conclude that the trial court properly granted summary judgment in the DOC 

Officials’ favor as to those claims.

II. Eighth Amendment Challenges

[25] Shakur argues that the trial court erred in granting the DOC Officials’ motion 

for summary judgment on his Eighth Amendment claim because genuine issues 

of material fact exist as to whether the DOC Officials failed to protect him and 

provide him with necessary medical care. 

[26] When a prisoner raises an Eighth Amendment claim, a prison official cannot be 

found liable for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless 

the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety. 

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). Thus, Shakur would be required 

to show that the DOC Officials were “deliberately indifferent” to his “serious 

medical needs.” See Ratliff v. Cohn, 693 N.E.2d 530, 544 (Ind. 1998). 

Deliberate indifference has been defined as “something approaching a total 

unconcern for a prisoner’s welfare in the face of serious risks” or a “conscious, 
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culpable refusal” to prevent harm. Duane v. Lane, 959 F.2d 673, 677 (7th Cir. 

1992). It must be established that the DOC Officials were “subjectively aware 

of and intentionally disregarded an objectively serious risk to his health or 

safety.” Johnson v. Prentice, 29 F.4th 895, 904 (7th Cir. 2022), cert. denied. Also, 

before prison officials can be held liable for an Eighth Amendment violation, 

the plaintiff must articulate the conditions of confinement that he is challenging 

with specificity. Id. Challenges “to conditions of confinement cannot be 

aggregated and considered in combination unless ‘they have a mutually 

enforcing effect that produces the deprivation of a single, identifiable need such 

as food, warmth, or exercise—for example, a low cell temperature at night 

combined with a failure to issue blankets.’” Id. (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 

U.S. 294, 304 (1991)).

[27] In this case, the essence of Shakur’s Eighth Amendment claim is that the DOC 

Officials failed to protect his mental health when they placed him in restrictive 

housing. Shakur does not specify what conditions of restrictive housing 

contributed to the harm he alleges. Rather, the designated evidence Shakur 

presented assumes that his segregation from the general prison population 

caused him to suffer psychiatric symptoms. For Eighth Amendment liability to 

attach, a serious injury or medical need is “one that has been diagnosed by a 

physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay 

person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Henderson 

v. Sheahan, 196 F.3d 839, 846 (7th Cir. 1999). 
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[28] It is not established here that the DOC Officials were deliberately indifferent to

Shakur’s sufficiently serious injury or medical need. Shakur averred in his 

affidavit that he experienced symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder, heard 

voices, and had suicidal ideation. These assertions, however, were not 

supported with a medical diagnosis. Shakur only presented a secondary source 

that described various psychiatric conditions that might result from prolonged 

isolation in restrictive housing. The author of that work, however, did not 

diagnose Shakur with any of those illnesses. To the contrary, the medical 

evidence that does exist, i.e., a competency evaluation conducted by a 

psychiatrist at the Indiana University School of Medicine, established that 

Shakur was not suffering from a psychiatric illness. That report specifically 

stated that “[Shakur] did not appear to meet criteria for diagnosis with any 

anxiety, mood, psychotic, personality . . . trauma disorder, . . . or signs of 

psychosis.” Appellant’s Appendix Vol. II at 160.

[29] The designated evidence establishes as a matter of law that the DOC Officials 

were not indifferent to Shakur’s mental health to the extent that he could be 

negatively affected from disciplinary segregation. Shakur had weekly access to 

mental health care professionals during his incarceration, and he admitted that 

mental health care providers visited him “one day per week” to check on his 

well-being. Id. at 230. Although Shakur alleged that those visits were short, he 

further admitted that he could have lengthier conversations on occasion and 

request a mental health care provider in addition to the weekly visits. As a 

result, the undisputed material facts establish that the components of the 
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deliberate-indifference test could not be satisfied here. Thus, Shakur cannot 

challenge the overall conditions of his confinement, and the psychiatric illnesses 

he complains of did not amount to objectively serious harm. See Ratliff, 693 

N.E.2d 530 at 44. 

[30] In sum, the designated evidence established that Shakur was provided with 

regular access to medical care, and there is no evidence that the DOC Officials 

were deliberately indifferent to the conditions of Shakur’s confinement. Thus, 

Shakur’s Eighth Amendment claims fail as a matter of law, and we conclude 

that the trial court properly granted the DOC Officials’ motion for summary 

judgment as to those contentions. 

[31] Judgment affirmed. 

Bradford, J. and Felix, J., concur. 

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Christopher C. Myers

Ft. Wayne, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Theodore E. Rokita

Indiana Attorney General

Evan Matthew Comer

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana