IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA 

No. 07–0296 

Filed December 19, 2008 

STATE OF IOWA,

 Appellee, 

vs. 

TROY HARLEY JORGENSEN,

 Appellant. 

 On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals. 

 Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Cerro Gordo County, 

Carlynn D. Grupp, Judge. 

 Defendant appeals his conviction for indecent exposure. 

DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS AND DISTRICT COURT 

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. 

 Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Theresa R. Wilson, 

Assistant State Appellate Defender, for appellant. 

 Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Sheryl A. Soich, Assistant 

Attorney General, Paul L. Martin, County Attorney, and Carlyle D. Dalen 

and Steven D. Tynan, Assistant County Attorneys, for appellee. 

 
 2 

TERNUS, Chief Justice.

 The district court convicted the appellant, Troy Jorgensen, of 

indecent exposure after store employees, through a closed-circuit video 

system, observed him follow an unidentified woman through the store 

while repeatedly exposing his penis and masturbating. On appeal, the 

court of appeals rejected Jorgensen’s contention there was insufficient 

evidence to support his conviction because there was no evidence that he 

knew he was being watched on a closed-circuit video system or that he 

knew or should have known the employees would be offended by his 

conduct. We conclude there is sufficient evidence to support the 

elements of the offense of indecent exposure, and therefore, we affirm the 

decisions of the district court and court of appeals. 

I. Facts and Prior Proceedings. 

 On June 2, 2006, an employee, working in the loss prevention 

department at the Shopko in Mason City, Iowa, was watching activity in 

the store on a closed-circuit video system. She noticed a man, later 

identified as Troy Jorgensen, walking through the store fondling himself 

over his clothes. As the employee continued to watch, she saw the man 

expose his penis several times and masturbate. The employee contacted 

two fellow employees for assistance. The three employees observed 

Jorgensen follow a woman through the store while repeatedly exposing 

his penis and masturbating. The woman may have seen Jorgensen’s 

penis, but she could not be located later and was never identified. 

 While one store employee contacted the police, two of the 

employees left the video room to locate Jorgensen. When Jorgensen saw 

the two employees approach, he stopped fondling himself and attempted 

to exit the store. He was, however, detained by an off-duty officer. 
 3 

Upon questioning, Jorgensen claimed he was wearing shorts that 

were too small for him and that sometimes the fly would open and 

expose his penis. Jorgensen was arrested for indecent exposure. 

None of the three store employees who observed Jorgensen’s 

behavior via the closed-circuit video system were married to him. All 

three stated they were offended by his conduct. 

On June 22, 2006, the State filed a trial information charging 

Jorgensen with indecent exposure (second offense) in violation of Iowa 

Code section 709.9 (2005). Thereafter, Jorgensen entered a plea of not 

guilty. 

Jorgensen subsequently filed a motion to adjudicate law points. 

He argued he did not commit indecent exposure because there was no 

evidence to support a finding that he knew the store employees might 

have viewed him through a closed-circuit video system. Jorgensen also 

asserted there was no evidence he purposefully exposed himself to the 

Shopko employees knowing, or under circumstances where he 

reasonably should have known, that the act was offensive to the 

employees. Therefore, Jorgensen claimed, he could not be convicted of 

indecent exposure. 

A hearing on the motion was held. The court noted the crime of 

indecent exposure contains four distinct elements. The first element 

requires either the exposure of the genitals and pubes to someone other 

than the actor’s spouse or that the actor committed a sex act in the 

presence or view of a third person. The court found the State could not 

prove indecent exposure by commission of a sex act under the facts 

alleged. It did, however, find the facts sufficient for the State to proceed 

under the first alternative: exposure of the genitals and pubes to 

someone other than the actor’s spouse. The court further concluded 
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there was sufficient evidence of the other three elements of indecent 

exposure.1 

Jorgensen waived his right to a jury trial and proceeded to a bench 

trial on a stipulated record that included the minutes of testimony and 

the amended trial information.2 On December 27, 2006, the district 

court issued its ruling, finding the defendant guilty of indecent exposure. 

Jorgensen filed a motion for a new trial, asserting the district court 

erred in allowing evidence the employees saw him expose himself 

through store security cameras. The court had considered this evidence 

because it found a reasonable shopper would believe the store would 

monitor activities of patrons and/or employees through closed-circuit 

video systems. Jorgensen contended he could not have reasonably 

known store personnel would see his actions and would be offended by 

them. The defendant’s motion was overruled, and the district court 

sentenced Jorgensen to a suspended one-year sentence and placed him 

on probation. 

In his appeal, Jorgensen maintained the State produced 

insufficient evidence of indecent exposure. The court of appeals 

disagreed and affirmed the defendant’s conviction. We granted further 

review and now affirm the decision of the court of appeals and the 

judgment of the district court. 

 II. Scope of Review. 

Sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges are reviewed for correction 

of errors at law. State v. Hansen, 750 N.W.2d 111, 112 (Iowa 2008). 

 1The court also rejected the defendant’s argument the statute was void for 

vagueness. This conclusion has not been challenged on appeal. 

2The trial information was amended to delete any reference to a prior indecent 

exposure conviction. 
 5 

“The district court's findings of guilt are binding on appeal if supported 

by substantial evidence.” Id. Evidence is substantial if it would convince 

a rational trier of fact the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 

State v. Hopkins, 576 N.W.2d 374, 377 (Iowa 1998). “To the extent the 

issue presents a question of statutory interpretation, our review is for 

correction of errors at law.” State v. Garcia, 756 N.W.2d 216, 219 (Iowa 

2008). 

III. Merits.

 The issue before us is whether there was sufficient evidence to 

convict Jorgensen of indecent exposure. Indecent exposure is defined in 

Iowa Code section 709.9. In pertinent part it states: 

 A person who exposes the person’s genitals or pubes 

to another not the person’s spouse . . . commits a serious 

misdemeanor, if: 

 1. The person does so to arouse or satisfy the sexual 

desires of either party; and 

 2. The person knows or reasonably should know that 

the act is offensive to the viewer. 

Iowa Code § 709.9. 

 We have previously broken down the crime of indecent exposure 

into four elements: 

 “1. The exposure of genitals or pubes to someone 

other than a spouse . . .; 

 2. That the act is done to arouse the sexual desires of 

either party; 

 3. The viewer was offended by the conduct; and 

 4. The actor knew, or under the circumstances should 

have known, the victim would be offended.” 

State v. Isaac, 756 N.W.2d 817, 819 (Iowa 2008) (quoting State v. Adams, 

436 N.W.2d 49, 50 (Iowa 1989)). 
 6 

 Jorgensen asserts there was insufficient evidence he was aware he 

was being watched by the store employees or that he would have reason 

to know his conduct would be offensive to those employees.3 According 

to Jorgensen, “[n]owhere in the minutes of testimony does it indicate that 

the security system cameras were visible to store patrons or that there 

were posted signs warning store patrons that they may be watched by 

security cameras.” He further claims he did not expose himself to the 

employees with the specific intent to arouse his or their sexual desires, 

insomuch as he was unaware of their presence via the closed-circuit 

video system. 

 It is undisputed the State lacked sufficient evidence regarding the 

defendant’s exposure of his penis to the unidentified woman, the 

presumed target of his actions. The question raised by this case is 

whether the statute requires knowledge by the actor of the identity of his 

actual victim; or, stated somewhat differently, whether the defendant can 

be found guilty of exposing himself to an audience of whom he was not 

specifically aware. This question has not been previously addressed by 

this court. 

 Our goal in interpreting criminal statutes “ ‘is to ascertain 

legislative intent in order, if possible, to give it effect.’ ” State v. Finders, 

 3The appellant does not challenge whether observation via a closed-circuit video 

system itself constitutes exposure for purposes of the statute, only that there was 

insufficient evidence he was aware he was being observed via video camera. Cf. State v. 

Bouse, 150 S.W.3d 326, 331 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004) (holding Missouri statute defining 

sexual misconduct involving a child did not limit the means or mode of exposure and 

concluding “expose” included an exposure on the Internet as well as in a public park), 

with Swire v. State, 997 S.W.2d 370, 373–74 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999) (Burgess, J., 

dissenting) (asserting under Texas statute, “indecent exposure requires that a 

defendant actually expose himself to another individual” and therefore concluding there 

was insufficient evidence of indecent exposure because the defendant was unaware of 

the video camera recording his actions, although noting exposure to a known video 

camera would be a different question).
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743 N.W.2d 546, 548 (Iowa 2008) (quoting State v. Conley, 222 N.W.2d 

501, 502 (Iowa 1974)). “ ‘We consider the object sought to be 

accomplished and the evil sought to be remedied, and seek a reasonable 

interpretation that will best effect the legislative purpose and avoid 

absurd results.’ ” Id. (quoting State v. Byers, 456 N.W.2d 917, 919 (Iowa 

1990)). “ ‘When a statute’s language is clear, we look no further for 

meaning than its express terms.’ ” State v. Kamber, 737 N.W.2d 297, 

298–99 (Iowa 2007) (quoting State v. Beach, 630 N.W.2d 598, 600 (Iowa 

2001)). 

Although the statute does not define the term “expose,” we have 

held that indecent exposure is “ ‘essentially a visual assault crime.’ ” 

State v. Bauer, 337 N.W.2d 209, 211 (Iowa 1983) (quoting Kermit L. 

Dunahoo, The New Iowa Criminal Code: Part II, 29 Drake L. Rev. 491, 

541 (1979–80)); accord Isaac, 756 N.W.2d at 819. This interpretation 

corresponds with the dictionary definition of “expose,” which means “to 

lay open to view . . . EXHIBIT, DISPLAY.” Webster’s Third New 

International Dictionary 802 (unabr. ed. 2002); accord Merriam-Webster’s 

Collegiate Dictionary 409 (10th ed. 2002) (defining “expose” as “to cause 

to be visible or open to view”); Black’s Law Dictionary 783 (8th ed. 2004) 

(defining “indecent exposure” as “[a]n offensive display of one’s body in 

public, esp. of the genitals”). See generally State v. Lane, 743 N.W.2d 

178, 182 (Iowa 2007) (noting “ ‘we may refer to prior decisions of this 

court and others, similar statutes, dictionary definitions, and common 

usage’ to determine [the statute’s] meaning” (quoting State v. Shanahan, 

712 N.W.2d 121, 142 (Iowa 2006))). Thus, the first element of the crime 

requires the defendant to expose or “cause to be visible or open to view” 

his or her genitals or pubes to someone other than a spouse. As this 

court noted in discussing a predecessor indecent exposure statute: “The 
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words ‘indecent exposure’ clearly imply that the act is either in the actual 

presence and sight of others, or is in such a place or under such 

circumstances that the exhibition is liable to be seen by others, and is 

presumably made for that purpose, or with reckless and criminal 

disregard of the decencies of life. . . . The exposure becomes ‘indecent’ 

only when [the actor] indulges in such practices at a time and place 

where, as a reasonable person, he knows, or ought to know, his act is 

open to the observation of others.”4 State v. Martin, 125 Iowa 715, 718, 

101 N.W. 637, 638 (1904). This definition presupposes a public 

exposure as opposed to a private one. 

Nothing, however, in the plain language of the statute limits the 

contours of the crime of indecent exposure to those acts involving the 

specific victim/viewer targeted by the actor. The statute does not require 

the actor to be aware or have knowledge of the specific person or persons 

to whom he is exposing himself. The statute also does not explicitly 

restrict the mode of exposure. The only limitation on the first element is 

that the exposure or act of making visible must be to another person not 

the defendant’s spouse. See State v. Sousa, 201 A.2d 664, 666 (Conn. 

Cir. Ct. 1964) (“ ‘While the exposure must be intentional and not 

accidental, the intent required is only a general one, and need not be 

directed toward any specific person or persons.’ ” (quoting Peyton v. Dist. 

of Columbia, 100 A.2d 36, 37 (D.C. 1953)); Parnigoni v. Dist. of Columbia, 

933 A.2d 823, 826 (D.C. Ct. App. 2007) (under statute that made it 

 4At the time, Iowa Code section 4938 (1897) provided: 

Lewdness—indecent exposure. . . . [I]f any man or woman, married or 

unmarried, is guilty of open and gross lewdness, and designedly makes 

an open and indecent or obscene exposure of his or her person, or of the 

person of another, every such person shall be imprisoned in the county 

jail not exceeding six months, or be fined not exceeding two hundred 

dollars. 
 9 

unlawful “for any person or persons to make any obscene or indecent 

exposure of his or her person,” court concluded the law did “not require 

that an accused have a specific intent to expose himself to any particular 

person”); see also State v. Stevenson, 656 N.W.2d 235, 240 (Minn. 2003) 

(in which relevant question under Minnesota indecent-exposure statute 

was whether defendant’s conduct was so likely to be observed “that it 

must be reasonably presumed that it was intended to be witnessed,” 

court concluded that, “given the location of [defendant’s] vehicle, parked 

next to a public sidewalk adjacent to a beach where there were hundreds 

of people, it was almost certain that someone would walk by and observe 

[the defendant] masturbating,” requirement that conduct was committed 

with the deliberate intent of being indecent or lewd was met). 

 It is reasonable to assume that a person who exposes himself in a 

public place runs the risk that he will be observed by more than his 

targeted audience, including those viewing by closed-circuit video 

systems installed in a public shopping area. It is also reasonable to 

assume this unwanted public exposure was the evil the legislature 

sought to remedy with this law. See United States v. Boston, 494 F.3d 

660, 665 (8th Cir. 2007) (finding probable cause to arrest defendant for 

violating section 709.9 when off-duty police officer came upon defendant 

masturbating while walking along a trail in a park). The district court 

correctly concluded there was sufficient evidence to establish the 

defendant exposed his genitals to another person, other than a spouse, 

as the minutes of testimony of the three employees confirmed the 

employees had observed the defendant expose his penis and none of the 

employees were married to the defendant. 

 There was also sufficient evidence the act was done to arouse the 

sexual desires of the defendant, thus satisfying the second element of the 
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crime. The defendant acknowledges “it is reasonable to conclude that he 

was attempting to arouse or satisfy his own sexual desire” but notes his 

desire was “with respect to this unidentified woman,” not the store 

employees who saw him. While this observation may be true, it is 

irrelevant to our inquiry here. The relevant inquiry is whether, at the 

time of the exposure, the actor was intending to arouse his own sexual 

desires or the sexual desires of the unwilling viewer. See Iowa Code 

§ 709.9. 

The requisite intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any 

person can be inferred from an accused’s conduct, remarks, and all 

surrounding circumstances. Isaac, 756 N.W.2d at 820. Here, the 

minutes of testimony established that the defendant, while wandering 

through the store, fondled his penis through his clothing, and then, as 

he followed an unidentified woman through the store, removed his penis 

from his shorts and openly masturbated. This behavior with its clearly 

sexual motivation was observed by the three Shopko employees while it 

was occurring, thereby meeting the second requirement. See State v. 

Plenty Horse, 741 N.W.2d 763, 765 (S.D. 2007) (holding “the prosecution 

must link the exhibition of one’s genitals to the intent to seek sexual 

gratification”); cf. Isaac, 756 N.W.2d at 820 (noting “our statute requires 

[a sexual motivation] at the time of exposure to the viewer” and finding 

that, at the time of the defendant’s exposure to the police officer, the 

required purpose no longer existed). 

 The third element requires the viewer be offended by the conduct. 

Here, the minutes of testimony established that all three store employees 

who viewed the defendant’s public act of masturbation were offended. 

Thus, substantial evidence supports the third element. 
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 The fourth and final element requires “the actor knew, or under 

the circumstances should have known, the victims would be offended.” 

Bauer, 337 N.W.2d at 211; accord Iowa Code § 709.9. The incident 

report prepared by one of the store employees, who was continuing to 

observe the defendant on the closed-circuit video system as the other two 

employees approached him, stated the defendant continued to fondle 

himself after walking past the unidentified female shopper, but when he 

observed the two store employees approaching him, he quit fondling 

himself and proceeded to attempt to exit the store. This action suggests 

Jorgensen knew the employees would find his conduct offensive, thereby 

meeting the fourth element of the offense. See Bauer, 337 N.W.2d at 211 

(“ ‘It is only exposure with a sexual motivation, inflicted upon an unwilling 

viewer, which will constitute the offense.’ ” (quoting 4 John J. Yeager & 

Ronald L. Carlson, Iowa Practice: Criminal Law and Procedure § 217, at 

63 (1979)) (emphasis added)). Moreover, applying common mores, 

Jorgensen should have known that store employees would find his acts 

of unsolicited public masturbation to be offensive. Cf. Hankins v. State, 

85 S.W.3d 433, 435 (Tex. Ct. App. 2002) (under indecent exposure 

statute that requires recklessness about whether another is present who 

will be offended by act, Texas court held rational fact finder could have 

concluded defendant who exposed himself in adult book store was 

reckless because, as far as he knew, the other person was present simply 

to watch a movie, not to see the defendant’s body). 

IV. Conclusion. 

The district court’s finding that the defendant was guilty of 

indecent exposure when he exposed himself to three store employees is 

supported by substantial evidence. Although the three employees were 

not the object of Jorgensen’s sexual desire, Jorgensen’s exposure of his 
 12 

genitals was sexually motivated at the time they witnessed it. In 

addition, the viewers were offended, and Jorgensen knew or should have 

known under the circumstances these unwilling viewers would be 

offended. The district court’s judgment is affirmed. 

 DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS AND DISTRICT COURT 

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. 

All justices concur except Baker, J., who takes no part.