alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Juan Manuel RANGEL, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 07-40173

Summary Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Jan. 23, 2008.

James Lee Turner, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for PlaintiffAppellee.

Oscar A. Vela, Jr., Law Offices of Oscar A. Vela Jr., Laredo, TX, for Defendants Appellant.

Before KING, DeMOSS, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Juan Manuel Rangel was convicted, following a bench trial, of possession with intent to distribute more than 50 kilograms of marijuana. Rangel was sen-fenced to 37 months of imprisonment and to a three-year term of supervised release. He argues on appeal the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the marijuana because the border patrol agents lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop of his vehicle. He also argues that the district court erred in finding that he gave the agents consent to search the trunk of his vehicle.

Under the totality of the circumstances and in consideration of the factors set forth in *United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,*422 U.S. 873, 884-85, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975), especially the proximity to the border, the sensor alert, and the characteristics of the vehicle, the border patrol agents’ stop of Rangel’s vehicle was based on reasonable suspicion. *See id., United States v. Jacquinot,*258 F.3d 423, 427 (5th Cir.2001). Additionally, based on the district court’s credibility determination and because there are sufficient factors to support consent, there is no clear error regarding the district court’s determination that Rangel gave the agents consent to search the trunk of his vehicle. *See United States v. Estrada,*459 F.3d 627, 633-34 (5th Cir.2006).

Accordingly, Rangel’s conviction and sentence are AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-1088

EMMETT JOHNSON JAFARI,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

JOHN RUSSELL GOOD, M.D.; MCGUIRE, WOODS,

BATTLE & BOOTHE; MARY M.H. PRIDDY, Esquire;

THOMAS J. MARKOW, Chief Judge, Circuit Court

of the City of Richmond,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond. Robert R. Merhige, Jr., Senior

District Judge. (CA-96-825)

Submitted: March 13, 1997 Decided: March 20, 1997

Before HALL, ERVIN, and WILKINS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Emmett Johnson Jafari, Appellant Pro Se. Anisa Patrice Kelley,

FISCELLA, KELLEY & MOONEY, Richmond, Virginia; Franklin Brawner

Greer, MCGUIRE, WOODS, BATTLE & BOOTHE, L.L.P., Richmond, Virginia;

Alice Ann Berkebile, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA,

Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Appellant appeals the district court's order dismissing his

civil action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We have

reviewed the record and the district court's opinion and find no

reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the

district court. Jafari v. Good, No. CA-96-825 (E.D. Va. Dec. 16,

1996). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
***Text
Omitted and Filed Separately

    CONFIDENTIAL
TREATMENT REQUESTED

    UNDER
17 C.F.R. §§ 200.80(b)(4) AND 240.24b-2

     

    
      	
      
              Google
      Inc. 

            	
                    
                [Google Logo]

              

            	
      
              Main
      650 253.0000

            
	
                    
                1600
      Amphitheatre Parkway

              

            	
               

            	      
              Fax
      650 253.0001

            
	
      
              Mountain
      View, CA 94043

            	
               

            	
      
              www.googIe.com

            



     

    November
24, 2010

    


    Via Email and Courier:

    


    Divx,
Inc.

    c/o Legal
Department

    4780
Eastgate Mall

    San
Diego, CA 92121

    


    Re:
Renewal of Google Promotion and Distribution Agreement (the
“Agreement”)

    


    To whom
it may concern:


     

    Per
Section 5.1 of the Agreement (effective March 1, 2009), this letter serves as
the formal [ ***  ] notice for the renewal of the Agreement beginning
on March 1, 2011. During the Renewal
Term, all of the terms and conditions of the Agreement will remain intact and in
full force going forward.

     

    If you
have any questions concerning this written notice, please contact Bill Kilday or
Jim Kolotouros as soon as possible.

    


    
      	 
      	
              /s/
      Nikesh Arora

            	 
      
	
              Sincerely,

            	
              Nikesh
      Arora

            	 
      
	 
      	
              President,
      Global Sales and

            	 
      
	 
      	
              Business
      Development

            	 
      
	 
      	
              Google Inc.

            	 
      


    

     

    Nikesh Arora

    President, Global Sales and Business Development

     

    cc: Legal Department

    

     

    


    ***CONFIDENTIAL TREATMENT
REQUESTED
AMENDMENT TO $_______ 10% PARTICIPATING NOTE


DATED __________, 20__







WHEREAS, on _______, 20___ Buzz Kill, Inc., a New York corporation (the “Obligor”), issued a 10% Participating Note (the “Note”) due _______, 20___ (the “Original Maturity Date”) in the principal amount of $_______ in favor of ___________ (the “Payee”); and







WHEREAS, the Obligor and the Payee wish to amend the terms of the Note, to extend the Original Maturity Date by _____ years and to provide for the accrual of interest on the outstanding principal amount of the Note during such extension.







NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises set forth herein, the Obligor and the Payee hereby agree that: (i) the unpaid principal balance of the Note shall be due and payable on _______, 20___ (the “New Maturity Date”), and (ii) interest shall accrue on the unpaid principal balance of the Note at an annual rate of 10%, compounded monthly, from the Original Maturity Date until the New Maturity Date, and shall be paid in full on the New Maturity Date.  All other terms and conditions of the Note remain unchanged.







IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this Amendment has been duly executed by the Obligor and acknowledged by the Payee as of the ____ day of _______ 2010.








	  	
BUZZ KILL, INC.


	  	  	  
	  	
By:

	
  


	  	
Name:

	
Thomas H. Hanna, Jr.


	  	
Title:

	
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer


	  	  	  
	  	  	
  


	  	  	
Holder
#### David S. Pultz et al., Appellants, v Catherine Economakis et al., Respondents.

Submitted February 11, 2008;

decided February 14, 2008

Motion by Community Housing Improvement Program, Inc., et al. for leave to appear amici curiae on the appeal herein granted only to the extent that the proposed brief is accepted as filed. Three copies of the brief must be served and an original and 24 copies filed within seven days.
#### Alabama Gold Life Ins. Co. *v.*Girardy.

*(Circuit Court, D. Louisiana.*

1881.)

1. State Court — Process.

A state court cannot reach funds which have been made by an officer of a federal court on execution.

Eule on marshal to pay over moneys collected on execution.

Pardee, C. J.

In this case the marshal, on execution, has made the sum of $1,880.16 for the plaintiffs. To a rule directing him to pay over or show cause, he answers that the funds in his hands have been attached under process from the civil district court of the parish of Orleans, in a' suit brought by *W. H. Finnegan*v. *The Alabama Gold Life Ins. Co.*The answer is not sufficient. The funds are in the custody of this court, and are not subject to the control or process of the state court. See case of *Ellis*v. *Wooldridge,*2 Wood, 667.

The only doubt I have about making the rule absolute is whether, as *st*matter of comity, this court should not wait until the attachment is discharged in the state court, as it undoubtedly will be on suggestion of the facts, before disposing of the proceeds in the hands of the marshal.

But considering the absolute illegality of the pretended seizure, and that a delay may be taken as waiving the undoubted jurisdiction of this court in the premises, and repudiating any desire or intention of forestalling the action of the state court or of prejudicing its jurisdiction, I deem it my duty to make the rule absolute; and it is so ordered.
Exhibit 13.2





PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICER CERTIFICATION





PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350





In connection with this Annual Report of Dynagas LNG Partners LP (the "Partnership") on Form 20-F for the year ended December 31, 2013 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "SEC") on or about the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Michael Gregos, Principal Financial Officer of the Partnership, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





(1)           The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)           The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Partnership.





A signed original of this written statement has been provided to the Partnership and will be retained by the Partnership and furnished to the SEC or its staff upon request.








Date:  March 24, 2014








/s/ Michael Gregos


Michael Gregos


Chief Financial Officer
<PAGE>   1


                                   EXHIBIT 11
                        COMPUTATION OF PER SHARE EARNINGS
<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
     
                                 Three Months Ended June 30,              Six Months Ended June 30,
                                   1998              1997                 1998                 1997
                                   -----             -----               -----                -----
                                                  (in thousands, except per share data)
<S>                               <C>               <C>                 <C>                 <C>       
BASIC                    
                         
NET INCOME (LOSS)                 $  107            ($  569)            ($   36)            ($1,176)
/ WEIGHTED AVERAGE SHARES          1,391              1,391               1,391               1,391
-------------------------         ------            -------             -------             -------
BASIC EARNINGS (LOSS)    
   PER SHARE                      $ 0.08            ($ 0.41)            ($ 0.03)            ($ 0.85)
=========================         ======            =======             =======             =======
                         
                         
DILUTED                  
                         
NET INCOME (LOSS)                 $  107            ($  569)            ($   36)            ($1,176)
/ WEIGHTED AVERAGE SHARES          1,417              1,391               1,391               1,391
-------------------------         ------            -------             -------             -------
DILUTED EARNINGS (LOSS)  
   PER SHARE                      $ 0.08            ($ 0.41)            ($ 0.03)            ($ 0.85)
=========================         ======            =======             =======             =======
</TABLE>                 




Notes:
   - Weighted average shares outstanding have been adjusted to reflect the 10%
     stock dividends in 1998 and 1997.



                                       20
<PAGE>


                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.1

                CERTIFICATION REQUIRED BY 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
     (AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002)

I, Charles R. Eitel, as Chief Executive Officer of Simmons Bedding Company (the
"Company"), certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 (as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002), that to my knowledge:

        (1) the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the quarter
    ended June 26, 2004 (the "Report"), being filed with the U.S. Securities and
    Exchange Commission on the date hereof, fully complies with the requirements
    of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as
    amended; and

        (2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
    material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
    Company.


Date: August 10, 2004                             /s/ Charles R. Eitel
                                                  ------------------------------
                                                  Name: Charles R. Eitel
                                                  Title: Chief Executive Officer

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
provided to Simmons Bedding Company and will be retained by Simmons Bedding
Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff
upon request.


                                       3
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
This  schedule  contains  summary  financial   information  extracted  from  the
consolidated  financial statements and is qualified in its entirety by reference
to such statements.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              MAR-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                                   SEP-30-1997
<CASH>                                         12,308,054 
<SECURITIES>                                   16,355,741 
<RECEIVABLES>                                   4,218,356 
<ALLOWANCES>                                      130,000 
<INVENTORY>                                     7,250,670 
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               40,410,212 
<PP&E>                                          4,457,256 
<DEPRECIATION>                                    724,785 
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 46,725,787 
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           6,694,316 
<BONDS>                                                 0 
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                   0 
<PREFERRED>                                             0 
<COMMON>                                           99,697 
<OTHER-SE>                                     39,857,352 
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   46,725,787 
<SALES>                                        14,264,385 
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               14,264,385 
<CGS>                                           6,697,779 
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   7,822,124 
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                        0 
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                        0 
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 51,185 
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                   190,870 
<INCOME-TAX>                                     (121,582)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                               312,452 
<DISCONTINUED>                                          0 
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                         0 
<CHANGES>                                               0 
<NET-INCOME>                                      312,452 
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0.03 
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0.03 
                                                          
                                               

</TABLE>
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SOUTHERN MOTOR CARRIERS RATE CONFERENCE, INC., and North Carolina Motor Carriers Association, Inc., Defendants-Appellants, National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, Intervenor-Appellant.

No. 79-3741.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

July 1, 1985.

Allen I. Hirsch, Simon A. Miller, Atlanta, Ga., for Southern Motor Carriers.

Bryce Rea, Jr., David Hyler Coburn, Washington, D.C., for North Carolina Motor and amicus Nat. Motor Freight Traffic Ass’n.

Paul Rodgers, General Counsel, Charles D. Gray and Pamela R. Melton, Washington, D.C., for intervenor.

Robert P. Gruber, General Counsel, Wilson B. Partin, Jr., Deputy General Counsel, North Carolina Utilities Com’n, David Gordon, Associate Atty. Gen., Raleigh, N.C., for State of N.C. and North Carolina Utilities Com’n.

Barry Grossman, Elliott M. Seiden, Antitrust Div., Appellate Section, Nancy C. Garrison, Dept, of Justice, Washington, D.C., William L. Harper, U.S. Atty., Atlanta, Ga., for plaintiff-appellee.

ON REMAND FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Before GODBOLD, Chief Judge, RO-NEY, TJOFLAT, HILL, FAY, VANCE, KRAVITCH, FRANK M. JOHNSON, Jr., HENDERSON, HATCHETT, ANDERSON and THOMAS A. CLARK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

The district court judgment in this case, 467 F.Supp. 471, was affirmed by this Court in *United States v. Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc.,*702 F.2d 532 (5th Cir. Unit B 1983) (en banc). The judgment of this Court has now been reversed by the Supreme Court of the United States. *Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States,*— U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 1721, 85 L.Ed.2d 36 (1985).

WHEREUPON, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the district court is reversed, and this cause is remanded to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia for further proceed*749ings in conformity with the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the appellants recover from the United States their costs on this appeal.
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-16-00180-CR

Lawrence ARMSTEAD,

Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the 186th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2014CR5830

The Honorable Jefferson Moore, Judge Presiding

PER CURIAM

Sitting: Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice

Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

Delivered and Filed: August 3, 2016

DISMISSED

On June 16, 2016, we notified the appellant that the trial court’s certification in this appeal 

states that “this criminal case is a plea-bargain case, and the defendant has NO right of appeal.” 

Additionally, the clerk’s record contains a written waiver signed by the appellant pursuant to which 

he entered a plea of nolo contendere. The trial court’s judgment also reflects that the punishment 

assessed did not exceed the punishment recommended by the prosecutor and agreed to by the 

defendant. Therefore, the trial court’s certification accurately reflects that this criminal case is a 

plea-bargain case. See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(a)(2).
04-16-00180-CR

- 2 -

In our June 16, 2016 order, we warned the appellant that “[this] appeal must be dismissed 

if a certification that shows the defendant has the right of appeal has not been made part of the 

record under these rules.” See id. R. 25.2(d). We ordered that this appeal would be dismissed 

pursuant to Rule 25.2(d) unless the appellant caused an amended trial court certification to be filed 

by November 13, 2015 that showed the appellant has the right of appeal. See id. R. 25.2(d), 37.1; 

see also Chavez v. State, 183 S.W.3d 675, 680 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Daniels v. State, 110 

S.W.3d 174, 176 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, no pet.). No response was filed. Accordingly, 

we dismiss this appeal.

PER CURIAM

Do not publish
I 

112TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 2400 

To prevent States from prohibiting male circumcision. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JUNE 24, 2011 

Mr. SHERMAN (for himself, Mr. ELLISON, Mr. WAXMAN, Mr. NADLER, Mr. 

BERMAN, Mr. ENGEL, Mr. LEVIN, Mr. CARSON of Indiana, Mr. ISRAEL, 

and Mr. ACKERMAN) introduced the following bill; which was referred to 

the Committee on Energy and Commerce 

A BILL 

To prevent States from prohibiting male circumcision. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Religious and Parental 

5 Rights Defense Act of 2011’’. 

6 SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 

7 Congress finds the following: 

8 (1) Male circumcision carries significant med9 ical benefits, including lower risk of sexually-trans10 mitted diseases, certain kinds of infection, and over11 all improved hygiene. 


rfrederick on DSKD9S0YB1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 2400 IH

1 (2) Male circumcision is an important part of 

2 many world religions, including Judaism and Islam, 

3 and observers have safely embraced its practice for 

4 generations. 

5 SEC. 3. PREEMPTION OF STATE LAW PROHIBITING MALE 

6 CIRCUMCISION. 

7 No State or political subdivision of a State may adopt 

8 or continue in force a law, regulation, or order that pro9 hibits or regulates the circumcision of males who have not 

10 attained the age of 18 years and whose parent or guardian 

11 has consented to the circumcision, unless such law, regula12 tion, or order— 

13 (1) applies to all such circumcisions performed 

14 in the State; and 

15 (2) is limited to ensuring that all such 

16 circumcisions are performed in a hygienic manner. 

Æ 


rfrederick on DSKD9S0YB1PROD with BILLS