* NO T FO R PUB L ICAT IO N UNITED STATES C OUR T OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH C IR C U IT

JASON EAR

LY, a s Gua

rdia n Ad Lite m for S.E., Pla i ntiff,
a nd SAR AH EAR LY, Pla i ntiff-Appe lla

nt,
v. KEYSTONE R

ESTAUR ANT GR O UP, LLC , De fe nda

n t-Appe l le e , a nd SONIC INDUSTR IES, LLC ; e t a l.,

De fe nda n ts. No. 18-17148 D.C . No. 2:16-c v-00740-JAM -DB
M EM O R ANDUM *

JASON EAR

LY, a s Gua

rdia n Ad Lite m for S.E., No. 19-15463 

# FIL ED
MAY 20 2020 M OLLY C. DW Y E R, CLERK U. S. CO URT O F APPEALS

* This disposition is not a ppropria te for public a t ion a

nd is not pre c e de nt e xc e pt a s provide d

by Ninth C irc uit R

ule 36-3Pla i ntiff,

a nd SAR AH EAR LY, Pla i ntiff-Appe lle e , v. KEYSTONE R

ESTAUR ANT GR O UP, LLC , De fe nda

n t-Appe l la

nt,
a nd SONIC INDUSTR IES, LLC ; e t a l.,

De fe nda n ts. D.C . No. 2:16-c v-00740-JAM -DB

Appe a l from

the Unite d

Sta t e s Distric t C ourt for the Ea ste rn Distric t of C a lifornia J ohn A. M e nde z , Distric t Judge , Pre siding Subm itte d M a

rc h 23, 2020 * * Sa n Fra n c isc o , C a lifornia B e fore : GOULD, C HR ISTEN, a nd B R ESS, C irc uit Judge s. Pla intiff Ja son Ea

rly , on be ha lf of his da

ughte r, Sa ra h Ea

rly , a ppe a ls a
num be r of tria l-re la te d rulings. Ea rly a nd De fe nda

nts Ke y stone R e sta

ura nt Group,

** The pa

ne l una nim ously c onc lude s this c a se is suita ble for de c ision without ora l a

rgum e nt. Se e Fe d. R . App. P. 34(a )(2). 2LLC a nd Sonic Industrie s, LLC , c ross-a ppe a l the distric t c ourt’ s fe e a n d c ost
a wa rds. W e ha ve jurisdic tion pursua nt to 28 U.S.C . § 1291, a

nd we a ffirm

in pa rt
a nd re ve rse in pa

rt. B e c a use the pa rtie s a re fa m i lia r with the fa c ts a

nd proc e dura l history of this c a se , we re c ite the m only a s ne c e ssa

ry to re solve the issue s on
a ppe a l. 1. Early

a ppe a ls se ve ra l of the distric t c ourt’ s e vide n tia ry rulings tha

t
e xc lude d: (1) “ M e Too” te stim ony from a nothe r e m

ploy e e a lle ge dly

ha ra sse d by Sire nio Gonz a le z ; (2) c e rta in te stim ony on he a rsa y grounds; a

nd (3) e vide nc e of Gonz a le z ’ s prior write -ups. The distric t c o urt did not a buse its disc re tion by
e xc luding the“ M e Too” te stim ony be c a use it ha d pre viously

c o nc lude d

tha t Ea rly prove d a hostile work e nvironm e nt a s a m a tte r of la

w a nd Ke y stone did not dispute that Gonz a le z ha d ha

ra sse d Sa ra h Ea rly . The distric t c ourt did not a buse its disc re tion by

e xc luding thehe a rsa y

te stim ony , whic h

wa s e ithe r offe re d to prove the t ruth of the m a tte r a sse rte d or c um ula tive of othe r a dm issible te stim ony . The distric t c o urt did not a

buse its disc re tion by

e xc luding Gonz a le z ’ s pre vious write

ups be c a u se Gonz a le z , a

supe rvisor, a

nd Sa ra h Ea rly , a n e ntry -le ve l e m

ploy e e , we re not sim ila

rly situa te d. S e e Vasque z v . C t y . of L.A. , 349 F.3d 634, 641 (9th C ir. 2003).

32. The distric t c ourt did not e rr by dism issing Ea

rly ’ s re que st for punitive da m a g e s pursua

nt to Fe de ra l R

ule of C ivil Proc e dure 50(a ). B e c a use the jury found for Ke y stone on a ll of Ea rly ’ s fe de ra l c la i m s, Ea

rly suffe re d

no pre j udic e from

a ny pote n t ia l e rror in not a llowing the jury to c onside r the pra y e r for punitive da m a ge s pre m ise d on 42 U.S.C
. § 1981a . C a lifornia la w re q uire s

“ c l e a r a nd c onvinc i ng e vide nc e tha t the de fe nda

nt ha s be e n guilty

of oppre s sion, fraud, or m a lic e ” for a

pla i ntiff to be e ntitle d to se e k punitiveda m a g e s . C a l. C iv. C ode § 3294(a ). Ea

rly a sse rts tha

t the re wa s c le a r a

nd c onvinc ing e v ide nc e tha t Ke y stone a c te d with m a lic e or oppre ssion, but fa ils to ide ntify whic h e v ide nc e would ha ve be e n suffic ie nt for the jury to a wa rd punitive da m a g e s on the sta te -law
c la im s. The re wa s no e vide n c e tha t Ke y stone ha d a ny

prior knowle dge of Gonz a le z ’ s m isc o nduc t, a n d Ke y stone inve stiga

te d, suspe nde d, a

n d te rm ina te d Gonz a le z a fte r le a rning of the ha ra ssm e n t. 3. The distric t c ourt e rre d by dism issing Ea

rly ’ s c la i m

for wrongful te rm ination in viola

tion of publicpolic y

pre m ise d on a

re ta lia tion the ory . At the
c lose of pla intiff’ s c a se , Ke y stone m ove d for judgm e nt a s a m a tte r of la

w pursua nt to Fe de ra l R

ule of C ivil Proc e dure 50(a ) on two of Ea rly ’ s thre e the o rie s of wrongful te rm inat ion. The distric t c ourt e rre d by dism issing the

third the ory

a s duplic a tive without providing Ea rly a m e a n i ngful opportunity

to re spond. Se e

4Summe rs v . De lta Air Line s, Inc

. , 508 F.3d 923, 927–28 (9th C ir. 2007). De e m ing
a c la im re dunda nt or unne c e ssa

ry is not a prope r ground for dism issa l, so long a s the e vide n c e introduc e d

a t tria l supports the

c la im
. Se e id. 926 (e xpla ining R ule 50(a ) a llows dism

issa l of c l a im s “ w he n the re is not ‘ l e ga lly suffic ie n t e v ide ntia

ry ba sis’ to support a

pa rtic ula r outc om e .” ). 1 Ea

rly ’ s c la i m

for wrongful te rm ina tion in viola tion of publicpolic y

ha d a le g a lly suffic ie nt e vide n tia

ry ba sis, it wa s not
re dunda n t, a nd dism issa l wa s not ha

rm le s s. Early pre s e nte d

thre e re ta lia

tion-ba se d c la im s: Title VII re ta lia tion, Fa ir Em ploy m e nt a nd Housing Ac t (FEHA) re ta lia tion, a nd wrongful te rm ina tion in viola tion of publicpolic y

pre m ise d on re ta lia

tion. The jury

instruc tions for e a c h
c la im re quire d proof of re t a lia

tion a s a n e le m e nt, but e a c h pre se nte d a diffe re nt ba sis supporting tha

t the o ry of re ta lia tion. The distric t c ourt e rre d by dism issing Early ’ s c l a i m

for wrongful te rm ina t ion in viola t ion of public polic y pre m ise d on
re ta lia tion be c a use the jury

c o uld ha ve found tha

t Ke y stone te rm ina t e d Sa ra h Ea rly in re ta l ia t ion for he r c om

pla ints of se xua l ha

ra ssm e nt, de spite ha ving found tha t she wa s not te rm inate d in re ta lia tion for both he r pa rtic ipa t ion in Ke y stone ’ s inve stiga tion and he r a lle ga tions of se xua l a ssa u lt, a s re quire d by

he r FEHA c la i m .

1 The distric t c ourt did not invoke R ule 12(f), whic h a

p plie s only

to m otions to strike ple a dings. Se e Fe d . R
. C i v. P. 12(f). This c a se wa s we ll be y ond the ple a ding sta ge , a nd R

ule 50 provide d the prope r sta nda rd. 5Thus, the FEHA c la im a n d wrongful te rm ina tion c la im we re not duplic a tive a nd the j ury should ha

ve be e n a llowe d to c onside r Ea rly ’ s third the o ry . 2 The disse nt sugge sts tha

t the issue re ga

rding dism issa l of the c la im for wrongful te rm inat ion in viola tion of publicpolic y

wa s wa ive d in the distric t c ourt, but the distric t c ourt tra

nsc ript shows othe

rwise . W he n

Ea rly ’ s c ounse l ide ntifie d the a va ila bility of a t torne y s’ fe e s a s the diffe re nc e be twe e n the FEHA re ta lia

tion
c la im a nd the c la im

for wrongful te rm ina tion in viola tion of publicpolic y , she wa s
re sponding to a

spe c ific que stion a ske d by the distric t c ourt: “ Expla in to m e the diffe re nc e in te rms of damage s .” (e m pha sis a dde d). As for the c onte ntion tha t
c ounse l c onc e de d it would be inc onsiste nt for the jury

to find tha

t Sa ra h Ea rly wa s
re ta lia te d a g a inst a

n d not find tha

t she wa s wrongfully

te rm ina t e d be c a

use the two
c la im s we re “ tie d toge t

he r,” c ounse l’ s sta

te m e n t wa s e n tire l y

c orre c t. It would ha ve be e n inc onsiste nt for the jury

to find tha

t Ke y s tone re ta lia

te d a ga inst Sa

ra h Early for purpose s of the FEHA c la im , but not find for he r on the wrongful te rm ination c la im . B ut be c a use e a c h c la i m

wa s supporte d by

a diffe re nt the ory

of

2 The disse n t re lie s on M.M. v . Lafay e tte Sc h. Dist. , 681 F.3d 1082 (9th C ir. 2012), for the proposition tha t c ourts ha

ve broa d disc re tion to c o n trol the i r own doc ke ts, but tha

t c a se doe s not support the distric t c ourt’ s ruling. It m e re ly a ffirm e d dism issa l of a

re dunda nt c la im whe re a pla intiff file d two se pa

ra te c a se s involving the

sa m e pa rtie s, in the sa

m e c ourt, with ove rla

pping c l a im s. Id. a t 1091. Nota bly , one of the c om

pla ints in Lafay e t te wa s a llowe d to proc e e d on the m e rits. 6re ta lia

tion, this sta

te m e nt did not pre c lude a finding for Ea

rly on the wrongful te rm ination c la im

e v e n if she did not suc c e e d on the FEHA c la im
. 4. The distric t c ourt did not e rr by instruc ting the jury

not to use the
c ourt’ s prior finding tha

t Ea rly prove d a

hostile work e nvironm e nt to a sse ss Ea rly ’ s sta te a n d fe de ra l se x d i sc rim i na tion c la im s. The jury instruc t ion, whe n c onside re d in the c onte xt of the full jury c ha rge , se e J e n k ins v

. W h ittak e r C orp. , 785 F.2d 720, 730 (9th C i r. 1986), did not pre ve nt the jury from finding in Ea

rly ’ s fa vor on the
se x disc rim ination c la im s pre m ise d on se xua l ha ra ssm e nt a s a

form of se x disc rim ination. Ea

rly did not a dva

nc e tha t the ory of disc rim ina tion, but inste a d proc e e de d on a

dispa ra te tre a tm e nt disc rim ina tion the ory only
. 5. The distric t c ourt e rre d by a wa rding a

ttorne y s’ fe e s a

n d c osts to Sonic
. C ourts m a y

a w a rd fe e s to a

pre va iling Title

VII or FEHA de fe nda

nt only “ upon a finding tha

t the pla i ntiff’ s a c tion wa s frivolous, unre a sona ble , or without founda tion,” a nd m a

y not “ e nga ge in post hoc re a soning by c onc luding tha

t, be c a use a pla i ntiff did not ultim

a te ly pre va il, his a c tion m

u st ha v e be e n
unre a s ona

ble or without founda

tion.” C hristiansburg Garme

nt C o. v . EEOC , 434 U.S. 412, 421–22 (1978); se e also Bond v . Pulsar Vide o Prods. , 57 C a l. R p tr. 2d 917, 918–19 (C t. App. 1996). The distric t c o urt did not m a ke a ny suc h findings or
e xpla in the ba sis for its a

wa rd to Sonic , nor doe s the re c ord re ve a l a re a sona ble

7ba sis for c onc luding tha t Ea rly ’ s c la im s a ga inst Sonic we re frivolous, groundle ss,
unre a s ona

ble , or ve x a tious. Se e Patton v . C ty . of K ings , 857 F.2d 1379, 1381 (9th C ir. 1988). Thus, we

va c a te a nd re m a nd the orde r gra n ting Sonic fe e s a n d c osts. Se e EEOC

v . Bruno’s Re

st. , 13 F.3d 285, 288 (9th C ir. 1993). 6. B e c a

use we c onc lude tha

t the distric t c ourt e rre d by dism issing Early ’ s c l a i m

for wrongful te rm ina t ion in viola t ion of public polic y , we do not
c onside r the distric t c ourt’ s othe r c ost a nd fe e a wa rds. Se e Ass’n of Me x ic anAme ric an Educ ators v . C alifornia , 231 F.3d 572, 590 (9th C ir. 2000) (e n ba nc ) (de c lining to issue

a n a dvisory

opinion on a

n issue the pa

ne l did not c onside r). W e
va c a te those a wa rds a

nd re m a nd for furthe r proc e e dings c onsiste nt with this disposition. AFFIRM E D IN PART , RE V E RSE D IN PART AND RE M ANDE D, with the p a rtie s to be a r the ir own c osts on a ppe a l.

8Early v. Keystone Rest. Grp. , LLC , No. 18

- 17148 , 19

- 15463 BRESS, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part: I agree with the majority that the district court did not err in its evidentiary rulings or refusal to give a requested jury instruction , that punitive damages were properly disallowed, and that there is not a sufficient record on which to uphold the district court’s award of attorneys’ fees to Sonic. I respectfull y part ways with the majority , however, in its determination that the district court erred in dismissing as duplicative Earl y ’s claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy
. In my view, t hat is not a sound basis on which to vacate the judgment , which result ed from a four

- day trial and two and a half years of proceedings in the district court. I Prior to sending the case to the jury , the district court dismissed Early’s claim for wrongful termination in vio lation of public policy on the ground that it was duplicative of he r retaliation claim under California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) , and therefore “clearly likely to confuse the jury.” While the majority suggests a district court can never di smiss a claim as re dundant, “[i] t is well established that a district court has broad discretion to control its own docket, and that includes the power to dismiss duplicative claims. ” M.M. v. Lafayette Sch. Dist. , 681 F.3d 1082, 1091 (9th Cir. 2012) (hold ing that district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing a duplicative claim also filed in another action before the 

# FILED
MAY 20 2020 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2 same court); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). The real issue , as the majority later indicates, is whether the two claims here were, in fact, duplicative of each other. The majority holds they were not duplicative on the theory that “[t]he jury instructions for each claim . . . presented a different basis supporting [each] theory of retaliation.” Th is is not a n argument Early advanced in this court; her briefing devoted limited attention to this entire assignment of error. Indeed, while the majority ’s decision turns on language in the proposed jury instructions for the wrongful termination in viol ation of public policy claim, those proposed jury instructions were not even in cluded in the appellate excerpts of record. The district court’s dismissal of Early’s claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy is also understandable conside ring that Early’s counsel conceded in the district court that this claim was duplicative of the FEHA retaliation claim. The only difference that Early’s counsel identified between the claims was that the latter allowed recovery of attorneys’ fees. And whereas the majority concludes that Early could have prevailed on her claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy even if she did not prevail on her FEHA retaliation claim, Early’s coun sel conceded the opposite: “THE COURT: She can’t recover

-- under your theory, she can’t recover under wrongful termination unless you prove retaliation. [COUNSEL FOR EARLY]: Correct .” In fact, Early’s counsel effectively admitted that if the jury resolv ed the two claims differently, it would3 amount to an inconsistent verdict: THE COURT: So you have to prove your retaliation claim. In other words, it would be an inconsistent verdict for the jury

-- if I let this go forward

-- inconsistent for the jury to find that she was retaliated against and not find that it was a wrongful termination in violation of public policy; in other words, you are tying the two claims together. [COUNSEL FOR EARLY]: They are tied together. They actually are. THE COURT: I’m glad I got you to admit that
. . . . I also do not think the majority is correct that the district court committed a procedural error by not “providing Early a meaningful opportunity to respond” on this issue. The district court held a hearing at whic h Early was given ample opportunity to argue . At no time did she request more briefing or argument. Finally, the slight difference that the majority perceives in the jury instructions for the two claims at issue is not material under the circumstances of this case. Early’s participation in the investigation and her complaints about sexual harassment coincided in one interview. I thus do not believe the record supports the majority’s conclusion that “each claim was supported by a different theory of retal iation.” The majority’s suggestion that Early could have been terminated only due to her complaints, but not her participation in the investigation, is therefore unpersuasive
. I thus respectfully dissent on this issue.4 II The majority’s decision to reverse the judgment requires it to vacate the district court’s award of fees and costs to Early. Keystone had cross

- appealed on that issue. Although the majority has no occasion to reach this cross

- appeal, I would need to reac h it given m y view that the judgment should be affirmed. Here, I believe the district court erred, albeit understandably, in awarding Early those attorneys’ fees incurred after she rejected Keystone’s second offer of judgment. Early rejected Keystone’s se cond settlement offer ( $75,000, exclusive of attorneys’ fees ) and won a less favorable judgment at trial ($50,000)

. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68, which applies here, see MRO Commc’ns, Inc. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. , 197 F.3d 1276, 1279 (9th Cir. 1999), “[i]f the judgment that the offeree finally obtains is not more favorable than the unaccepted offer, the offeree must pay the costs incurred after the offer was made.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 68(d). Under thi s rule, “[a] plaintiff that rejects a Rule 68 o ffer in excess of the judgment ultimately obtained at trial must bear its own and the defendant’s post

- offer costs.” Champion Produce, Inc. v. Ruby Robinson Co. , 342 F.3d 1016, 102 6 (9th Cir. 2003). Early only prevailed under FEHA. If this state law treats attorneys ’ fees as part of costs, they are treated as “costs” subject to Rule 68. Marek v. Chesny , 473 U.S. 1 , 9 (1985) ; Champion Produce , 342 F.3d at 1028. FEHA provides that a court may award t he prevailing party “reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.” Cal. Gov’t5 Code § 12965(b). But California law also provides that if a statute “ refers to the award of ‘costs and attorney’s fees,’ attorney’s fees are an item a nd component of the costs to be a warded.” Ca l. Civ
. Proc
. Code § 1033.5(c)(5)(A). The California Supreme Court has explained how these provisions work in combination: “Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5 defines which costs are allowable and which are not ” and “ explains, rather than contradicts, Government Code section 12965.” Davis v. KGO

- T.V., Inc. , 950 P.2d 567, 572 (Cal. 1998). 1 Accordingly, attorneys’ fees under FEHA are a “component of the costs,” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1033.5(c)(5)(A), and subject to Rule 68. Champion Produce , 342 F.3d at 1028; see also Steele v. Nibco, Inc. , 2002 WL 1316191, at *8

– 12 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (applying this reasoning to California Code of Civil Procedure § 998, the state analogue to Rule 68). The district court held otherwise based on an unpublished decision in which we said that FEHA attorneys’ fees are not subject to Rule 68 because FEHA “clearly provides attorney’s fees separately from costs.” Hasan v. Contra Costa Cty. , 45 F. App’x 795, 796 (9th Cir. 2002). But this portion of Hasan was dicta and did not address th e issue in detail. See id. I also believe, for the reasons stated above,

1 Williams v. Chino Valley Independent Fire District , 347 P.3d 976 (Cal. 2015), did not alter this. Williams explicitly noted that it did not disturb Davis ’s holding that “the definition of allowable costs in Code of Civil Procedure section 103 3.5 governs the type of costs that may be awarded under Government Code section 12965(b).” Id. at 982 (emphasis in original).6 that Hasan ’s interpretation of California law is not correct. Accordingly, I would have remanded this case to the district court for a redetermination of Early’s fee award ; she is only entitled to fees incurred prior to the second offer of judgment
. In all other respects, Keystone’s cross

- appeal is without merit , as is Early’s appeal of a cost award to Keystone.