IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-60136

Summary Calendar

MICHAEL EUGENE DAVIS,

Petitioner-Appellant

v.

RONALD KING,

Respondent-Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Mississippi

USDC No. 3:13-CV-253

Before DAVIS, CLEMENT and COSTA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Michael Eugene Davis, Mississippi prisoner # 164121, was convicted of 

armed robbery and, as a habitual offender, was sentenced to serve life in 

prison. Now, he appeals the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 

habeas corpus petition and argues that application of the four-part test given 

in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972), shows that his speedy trial rights 

were violated.

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

November 14, 2014

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 

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No. 14-60136

In reviewing the denial of § 2254 relief, this court reviews issues of law 

de novo and findings of fact for clear error. Ortiz v. Quarterman, 504 F.3d 492, 

496 (5th Cir. 2007). Additionally, the state court’s rejection of claims on the 

merits is afforded deference pursuant to § 2254(d). See Miller v. Thaler, 714 

F.3d 897, 902 n.3 (5th Cir. 2013). Under § 2254(d), habeas relief may not be 

granted with respect to a claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state 

court unless the state court’s decision “was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law as determined by 

the Supreme Court of the United States,” § 2254(d)(1), or “was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the State court proceeding,” § 2254(d)(2); see Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 

770, 787 (2011).

Under Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972), this court considers 

four factors when assessing a defendant’s claim that he was deprived of his 

constitutional right to a speedy trial: “Length of delay, the reason for the delay, 

the defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant.” 

Prejudice is considered while bearing in mind the factors meant to be protected 

by a speedy trial: “(i) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to 

minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility 

that the defense will be impaired.” Id. at 532.

The Barker analysis “eschews rigid rules and mechanical factor-counting 

in favor of a difficult and sensitive balancing process.” Amos v. Thornton, 646 

F.3d 199, 205 (5th Cir. 2011). Consequently, § 2254(d) mandates that this 

court “give the widest of latitude to a state court’s conduct of its speedy-trial 

analysis.” Amos, 646 F.3d at 205. Thus, so long as “there is any objectively 

reasonable basis on which the state court could have denied relief, AEDPA 

demands that [this court] respect its decision to do so.” Amos, 646 F.3d at 205. 

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Our review of the record and application of the Barker analysis shows an 

objectively reasonable basis for the state court’s rejection of this claim. 

Accordingly, the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED, and Davis’s request 

for appointed counsel is DENIED.

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