Federal Register / Vol. 82, No. 175 / Tuesday, September 12, 2017 / Rules and Regulations 42729 

a mealybug; Cryptosporiopsis kaki 

(Hara) Weinlm, a fungus; Homonopsis 

illotana (Kennel), a moth; Lobesia 

aeolopa (Meyrick), a moth; fungi 

Mycosphaerella nawae Hiura & Ikata, 

Pestalotia diospyri Syd. and P. Syd., 

Pestalotiopsis acaciae (Thumen) 

Yokoyama & Kaneko, Pestalotiopsis 

crassiuscula Steyaert, Phoma kakivora 

Hara, and Phoma loti Cooke; 

Ponticulothrips diospyrosi (Haga & 

Okajima), a thrip; Pseudococcus cryptus 

(Hempel), a mealybug; Scirtothrips 

dorsalis (Hood), a thrip; Stathmopoda 

masinissa (Meyrick), a moth; 

Tenuipalpus zhizhilashviliae (Reck), a 

mite; and Thrips coloratus (Schmutz), a 

thrip. 

(a) General requirements. (1) The 

national plant protection organization 

(NPPO) of Japan must provide an 

operational workplan to APHIS that 

details the activities that the NPPO of 

Japan will, subject to APHIS’ approval 

of the workplan, carry out to meet the 

requirements of this section. The 

operational workplan must include and 

describe the quarantine pest survey 

intervals and other specific 

requirements as set forth in this section. 

(2) Commercial consignments. 

Persimmons from Japan may be 

imported in commercial consignments 

only. 

(b) Places of production requirements. 

(1) All places of production that 

participate in the export program must 

be approved by and registered with the 

Japan NPPO. 

(2) The NPPO of Japan must visit and 

inspect the place of production monthly 

beginning at blossom drop and 

continuing until the end of the shipping 

season for quarantine pests. Appropriate 

pest controls must be applied in 

accordance with the operational 

workplan. If the NPPO of Japan finds 

that a place of production is not 

complying with the requirements of this 

section, no fruit from the place of 

production will be eligible for export to 

the United States until APHIS and the 

NPPO of Japan conduct an investigation 

and appropriate remedial actions have 

been implemented. 

(3) Harvested fruit must be 

transported to the packinghouse in 

containers marked to identify the place 

of production from which the 

consignment of fruit originated. 

(c) Packinghouse requirements. (1) All 

packinghouses that participate in the 

export program must be approved by 

and registered with the Japanese NPPO. 

(2) During the time the packinghouse 

is in use for exporting persimmons to 

the United States, the packinghouse 

may only accept persimmons from 

registered approved production sites 

and the fruit must be segregated from 

fruit intended for other markets. 

(3) All damaged or diseased fruit must 

be culled at the packinghouse. 

(4) Boxes or other containers in which 

the fruit is shipped must be marked to 

identify the place of production where 

the fruit originated and the 

packinghouse where it was packed. 

(5) The NPPO of Japan must monitor 

packinghouse operations to verify that 

the packinghouses are complying with 

the requirements of the systems 

approach. If the NPPO of Japan finds 

that a packinghouse is not complying 

with the requirements of this section, no 

fruit from the packinghouse will be 

eligible for export to the United States 

until APHIS and the NPPO of Japan 

conduct an investigation and 

appropriate remedial actions have been 

implemented. 

(d) Sampling. Inspectors from the 

NPPO of Japan must inspect a biometric 

sample of the fruit from each 

consignment at a rate to be determined 

by APHIS. The inspectors must visually 

inspect for quarantine pests listed in the 

operational workplan required by 

paragraph (a) of this section and must 

cut fruit to inspect for quarantine pests 

that are internal feeders. If quarantine 

pests are detected in this inspection, the 

consignment will be prohibited from 

export to the United States. 

(e) Phytosanitary certificate. Each 

consignment of persimmons must be 

accompanied by a phytosanitary 

certificate of inspection issued by the 

Japan NPPO with an additional 

declaration stating that the fruit in the 

consignment were grown, packed, and 

inspected and found to be free of pests 

in accordance with the requirements of 

7 CFR 319.56–79. 

(Approved by the Office of Management and 

Budget under control number 0579–0455) 

Done in Washington, DC, this 6th day of 

September 2017. 

Michael C. Gregoire, 

Acting Administrator, Animal and Plant 

Health Inspection Service. 

[FR Doc. 2017–19226 Filed 9–11–17; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 3410–34–P 

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE 

Animal and Plant Health Inspection 

Service 

9 CFR Part 94 

[Docket No. APHIS–2015–0050] 

RIN 0579–AE21 

Importation of Bone-In Ovine Meat 

From Uruguay 

AGENCY: Animal and Plant Health 

Inspection Service, USDA. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: We are amending the 

regulations governing the importation of 

certain animals, meat, and other animal 

products by allowing, under certain 

conditions, the importation of bone-in 

ovine meat from Uruguay. Based on the 

evidence in a risk assessment that we 

prepared, we believe that bone-in ovine 

meat can safely be imported from 

Uruguay provided certain conditions are 

met. This final rule will provide for the 

importation of bone-in ovine meat from 

Uruguay into the United States, while 

continuing to protect the United States 

against the introduction of foot-andmouth disease. 

DATES: Effective October 12, 2017. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dr. 

Stephanie Kordick, Import Risk Analyst, 

Regional Evaluation Services, National 

Import Export Services, VS, APHIS, 920 

Main Campus Drive, Suite 200, Raleigh, 

NC; (919) 855–7733; 

Stephanie.K.Kordick@aphis.usda.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Background 

The regulations in 9 CFR part 94 

(referred to below as the regulations) 

prohibit or restrict the importation of 

certain animals and animal products 

into the United States to prevent the 

introduction of various diseases, 

including rinderpest, foot-and-mouth 

disease (FMD), African swine fever, 

classical swine fever, and swine 

vesicular disease. These are dangerous 

and destructive communicable diseases 

of ruminants and swine. Section 94.1 of 

the regulations contains criteria for 

recognition by the Animal and Plant 

Health Inspection Service (APHIS) of 

foreign regions as free of rinderpest or 

free of both rinderpest and FMD. APHIS 

considers Uruguay to be free of 

rinderpest. However, APHIS does not 

consider Uruguay to be free of FMD 

because Uruguay vaccinates cattle 

against FMD. 

On July 1, 2016, we published in the 

Federal Register (81 FR 43115–43120, 

Docket No. APHIS–2015–0050) a 


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42730 Federal Register / Vol. 82, No. 175 / Tuesday, September 12, 2017 / Rules and Regulations 

1To view the proposed rule, the supporting 

documents, and the comments we received, go to 

http://www.regulations.gov/ 

#!docketDetail;D=APHIS-2015-0050. 

proposal 1 to amend the regulations to 

allow the importation of fresh bone-in 

ovine meat from Uruguay under certain 

conditions. 

We solicited comments concerning 

our proposal for 60 days ending August 

30, 2016. We received 17 comments by 

that date. They were from producers, 

importers, exporters, industry and 

professional associations, specialty food 

retailers, and representatives of local 

and foreign governments. Ten 

commenters were generally supportive 

of the proposed rule. Four commenters 

were opposed to the proposed rule but 

did not address specific provisions. The 

remaining commenters raised questions 

or concerns about the proposed rule and 

the risk analysis. The comments are 

discussed below. 

Risk Analysis 

One commenter stated that previous 

risk assessments, conducted in 2002 and 

2012, are too old and should not be used 

to support this action. The commenter 

also stated that the 2014 site visit 

appears to be an update of the 2012 

visit. 

The 2014 risk assessment focused on 

evaluation of factors related to the 

system of mitigations proposed for the 

select lambs. While specific conclusions 

reached in previous evaluations were 

not necessarily revisited, information 

collected during the 2014 evaluation 

substantiated our previous conclusions. 

Two commenters stated that before 

action is taken on this matter, an 

updated and comprehensive 

quantitative risk analysis should be 

conducted and the results made 

available to the public for review and 

comment. 

Most of APHIS’ risk analyses for FMD 

have been, and continue to be, 

qualitative in nature. APHIS believes 

that, when coupled with site visit 

evaluations, qualitative risk analyses 

provide the necessary information to 

assess the risk of the introduction of 

FMD through importation of 

commodities such as fresh ovine meat. 

Quantitative risk analysis models may 

not be the best tool to use to assess the 

risk of FMD posed by exports from a 

country, such as in cases where the 

types of data required by such models 

are either unavailable or suffer from a 

high level of parameter uncertainty. In 

these instances, APHIS’ approach is to 

characterize the risk of outbreak 

qualitatively in order to determine what 

appropriate measures to implement in 

order to mitigate the risk posed to the 

United States in the event of an 

outbreak in the exporting country (e.g., 

maturation and pH of meat, no 

diagnosis of FMD in the previous 12 

months). 

One commenter stated that a 

transparent review process for the 

recognition of the animal health status 

for export countries, to include 

documented management controls and 

written reporting of site visits, would 

provide livestock stakeholders in the 

United States with the assurance of a 

rigorous, scientific decisionmaking 

process for assessing and minimizing 

animal disease risks associated with the 

trade of animals and animal products. 

The risk analysis document, which 

was made available at the time the 

proposed rule was published, includes 

all relevant information collected during 

the evaluation process, including during 

the site visit. APHIS encouraged review 

and comment on this document, 

especially if additional scientific 

information is available that informs the 

risk determination. 

In the past, site visit reports and other 

relevant documents have either been 

made available as part of the supporting 

documentation accompanying the 

proposed rule or upon request. Going 

forward, these documents will routinely 

be made available at the time of 

publication. 

One commenter stated that when a 

product has increased value—in this 

case bone-in lamb meat sales to the 

United States from Uruguay—and there 

are like products in other zones, regions, 

or areas of lower value because they 

cannot export their products, there is an 

opportunity for transshipment or 

smuggling. The commenter stated that 

such risk should be measured and 

included in a quantitative risk analysis. 

APHIS notes that this comment could 

be understood in different ways. If the 

commenter is referring to the potential 

for illegal importation of ovine meat not 

derived from select lambs from 

Uruguay, we note that the risk of direct 

smuggling of ovine meat into the United 

States is outside the scope of the risk 

analysis. 

If the commenter’s concern is that 

animals or their products could be 

smuggled into Uruguay and represented 

as Uruguayan lambs (or ovine meat), we 

note that all lambs selected for inclusion 

in the select lamb facility originate from 

source flocks that have been certified by 

the national veterinary authority of 

Uruguay. Each lamb that enters the 

facility receives an official ear tag by the 

government authority and once the 

cohort is complete the flock is closed to 

new entries. The national veterinary 

authority of Uruguay is responsible for 

oversight and audit of the select lamb 

facility. Traceability is maintained from 

the source flock to the finished, labeled 

product at the slaughter plant. 

Surveillance and Testing 

One commenter stated that more 

information is needed on the specific 

procedures used by the Veterinary 

Laboratories Division of Uruguay 

(DILAVE). The commenter stated that 

information should be published on the 

laboratory quality control procedures, 

the proper use of positive and negative 

controls, and other procedures in place 

to routinely assess the quality and 

accuracy of the current diagnostic 

testing procedures used. The commenter 

also stated that while FMD test kits are 

validated by laboratories approved by 

the World Organization for Animal 

Health (OIE), the labs using the test kits 

should provide evidence of annual or 

more frequent blind testing for accuracy 

by an independent agency. 

Information about laboratory 

procedures and practices at DILAVE 

were evaluated as part of the 2002 and 

2012 evaluations. These procedures 

were determined to be satisfactory as a 

result of those evaluations. Updated 

information was provided as part of the 

current evaluation; DILAVE has since 

updated its quality assurance program, 

hiring a quality manager and achieving 

International Organization for 

Standardization (ISO) 9001:2008 

certification and ISO/IEC17025–2005 

accreditation, which help ensure 

compliance with laboratory standards. 

DILAVE continues to use OIE-validated 

test kits for its FMD testing. Therefore, 

APHIS maintains confidence in 

Uruguay’s laboratory capacity for the 

detection of FMD virus. 

One commenter expressed concern 

about the serological surveillance 

conducted in Uruguay. The commenter 

stated that the term ‘‘systematic 

sampling’’ is used but not well-defined. 

The commenter also stated that 

depending on the type of ‘‘systematic 

sampling’’ used, significant bias could 

be introduced that would lessen the 

likelihood of selecting and detecting an 

FMD infected animal. As an example, 

the commenter stated that the 

assumption of a 0.5 percent prevalence 

among herds means that a sampling 

scheme could miss testing an infected 

herd or flock for every 200 herds 

sampled and that a very large number of 

herds would have to be sampled to 

ensure that the population does not 

include a few infected herds. The 

commenter noted that APHIS states that 

since FMD is a highly contagious 

disease, most animals in a herd would 


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Federal Register / Vol. 82, No. 175 / Tuesday, September 12, 2017 / Rules and Regulations 42731 

2Sharma, G.K., J.K. Mohapatra, et al. (2014). 

‘‘Comparative evaluation of non-structural proteinantibody detecting ELISAs for foot-and-mouth 

disease sero-surveillance under intensive 

vaccination.’’ Journal of Virological Methods 207: 

22–28. 

3Brocchi, E., I. Bergmann, et al. (2006). 

‘‘Comparative evaluation of six ELISAs for the 

detection of antibodies to the non-structural 

proteins of foot-and-mouth disease virus.’’ Vaccine 

24(47): 6966–6979. 

4Armstrong, R.M., Cox, S.J., Aggarwal, N., 

Mackay, D.J., Davies, P.R., Hamblin, P.A., Dani, P., 

Barnett, P.V. and Paton, D.J., 2005. ‘‘Detection of 

antibody to the foot-and-mouth disease virus 

(FMDV) non-structural polyprotein 3ABC in sheep 

by ELISA.’’ Journal of Virological Methods, 125(2): 

153–163. 

Blanco, E., Romero, L.J., El Harrach, M. and 

Sa ́nchez-Vizcaı ́no, J.M., 2002. ‘‘Serological evidence 

of FMD subclinical infection in sheep population 

during the 1999 epidemic in Morocco.’’ Veterinary 

Microbiology, 85(1): 13–21. 

Bruderer, U., Swam, H., Haas, B., Visser, N., 

Brocchi, E., Grazioli, S., Esterhuysen, J.J., Vosloo, 

W., Forsyth, M., Aggarwal, N. and Cox, S., 2004. 

‘‘Differentiating infection from vaccination in footand-mouth-disease: evaluation of an ELISA based 

on recombinant 3ABC.’’ Veterinary Microbiology, 

101(3): 187–197. 

Lu, Z., Cao, Y., Guo, J., Qi, S., Li, D., Zhang, Q., 

Ma, J., Chang, H., Liu, Z., Liu, X. and Xie, Q., 2007. 

‘‘Development and validation of a 3ABC indirect 

ELISA for differentiation of foot-and-mouth disease 

virus infected from vaccinated animals.’’ Veterinary 

Microbiology, 125(1): 157–169. 

S<rensen, K.J., Madsen, K.G., Madsen, E.S., Salt, 

J.S., Nqindi, J. and Mackay, D.K.J., 1998. 

‘‘Differentiation of infection from vaccination in 

foot-and-mouth disease by the detection of 

antibodies to the non-structural proteins 3D, 3AB 

and 3ABC in ELISA using antigens expressed in 

baculovirus.’’ Archives of Virology, 143(8): 1461– 

1476. 

be infected. The commenter stated that 

this assumption may not be true for 

sheep raised in a country with a 

reasonably aggressive vaccination 

program being practiced in cattle. 

Uruguay’s national serologic 

surveillance program for FMD has been 

addressed in prior evaluations. The 

active surveillance component of the 

program has included herd level testing 

within the bovine and ovine 

populations, using both systematic and 

random selection of animals, depending 

on the study and the year. APHIS 

determined that the overall sampling 

scheme was rigorous. Furthermore, 

under the proposed system of 

mitigations, additional FMD testing is 

conducted in 100 percent of lambs upon 

entry into the select lamb facility 

followed by herd level testing within 

the facility prior to slaughter. 

Two commenters stated that the 

claims of sensitivity of the FMD virus 

antibody test for sheep are not 

supported by the studies, as cited. The 

Sharma study 2 cited in the risk analysis 

did not examine sheep, and therefore, 

there is no scientific basis in that study 

to support that the assay would have a 

99 percent sensitivity in sheep. The 

commenters stated that the Brocchi 

study 3 cited in the risk analysis did 

examine sheep but reported in the 

abstract a 99 percent sensitivity only for 

cattle. 

Although the number of sheep tested 

in the Brocchi study was too small to 

derive statistical conclusions, because 

results in sheep mirrored those in cattle, 

with a detection rate of 100 percent 20 

days post-infection, the authors 

concluded that the findings of the study 

indicated ‘‘performances [for sheep 

were] similar to those observed for 

cattle,’’ which was 99 percent overall. In 

addition, many peer-reviewed articles 

have demonstrated that the 3ABC nonstructural protein (NSP) enzyme-linked 

immunosorbent assay (ELISA) has 

adequate diagnostic sensitivity when 

used in sheep, including both those 

with clinically apparent and subclinical 

disease.4

One commenter stated that in the 

executive summary of an audit report 

carried out by the European 

Commission (EC) in March 2012 

concerning the animal health controls 

for FMD in Uruguay, three outstanding 

issues were noted as weakening the 

system of FMD controls in Uruguay. The 

first of these was insufficient attention 

paid to targeting official on-the-spot 

controls on FMD vaccination and 

deficient official reporting of those 

controls. Without appropriate targeting, 

adequate vaccination coverage in all 

areas with an increased risk of FMD 

cannot be ensured. 

As we explained in the proposed rule, 

Uruguay vaccinates cattle against FMD, 

but does not vaccinate sheep. APHIS 

evaluated factors related to the proposed 

system of mitigations for sheep in the 

2014 risk assessment. The cattle 

vaccination program was not reevaluated at this time; however, in our 

previous evaluations we determined 

that the vaccination program for cattle 

in Uruguay was robust. Additionally, 

the report cited in this comment 

determined that the observed 

deficiencies were compensated by the 

high level of cooperation observed 

among farmers, and that annual surveys 

demonstrated that immunity levels in 

the national cattle population clearly 

exceeded the OIE recommended target 

of 80 percent, demonstrating adequate 

vaccine coverage. 

The commenter noted that the second 

issue identified in the EC report was a 

very limited contribution of passive 

surveillance to the detection and 

notification of suspect cases of vesicular 

diseases. 

APHIS evaluated the contribution of 

passive surveillance to the overall 

national surveillance program in 

Uruguay in its 2012 evaluation, 

concluding that the measures were 

‘‘effective and rigorous.’’ Although 

national surveillance was not reevaluated in the October 2015 risk 

assessment, documents provided by 

Uruguay support these conclusions, 

demonstrating the continued legal 

requirements for notification of 

suspicious cases of FMD on the part of 

all livestock owners and workers and an 

ongoing awareness program. In addition 

to these requirements for animal owners 

and handlers, clinical inspection of 

livestock is conducted by official 

personnel during routine farm visits, at 

points of animal concentration such as 

auctions and at sanitary posts within the 

country, resulting in inspection of over 

1 million head per year. APHIS also 

notes that passive surveillance within 

the population of lambs designated for 

slaughter for export is carried out within 

the select lamb facility by the two full 

time employees assigned to the facility, 

as described in the risk analysis. APHIS 

believes that surveillance activities 

carried out in the national livestock 

population of Uruguay and the select 

lamb facility are sufficient to detect 

FMD if present. 

The third issue noted by the 

commenter in the EC report was nonvalidated sensitivity of the combination 

of diagnostic tests used to carry out the 

sero-epidemiological checks conducted 

since 2007 aimed at proving the absence 

of virus circulation in cattle and ovine 

populations. APHIS notes that the EC 

report addressed Uruguay’s use of the 

ELISA 3A and 3B tests to detect NSP, 

rather than the 3ABC NSP test, as 

recommended by the Pan American 

Foot and Mouth Disease Center. As 

described in the risk assessment, 

Uruguay is currently using the 3ABC 

NSP ELISA, the recommended 

screening test, in this cohort of lambs. 

In addition, although APHIS did not reevaluate the national FMD surveillance 

program in the current risk assessment, 

documentation received from Uruguay 

demonstrate that the recommended 

protocol was put in place beginning in 

late 2012, after the conclusion of the 

report. 

One commenter stated that a readily 

available and up-to-date FMD vaccine 

bank for the United States with the 

capacity to meet the demands of a type 

3 or greater FMD outbreak should be a 

priority action for the agency. 

We recognize that, depending on the 

size and scope of an FMD outbreak, the 

production and distribution of vaccines 

could prove challenging. While we do 

have a resource in the North American 

Foot-and-Mouth Disease Vaccine Bank 


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42732 Federal Register / Vol. 82, No. 175 / Tuesday, September 12, 2017 / Rules and Regulations 

(NAFMDVB), which stores many types 

of inactivated FMD virus antigens, this 

resource might be overwhelmed in the 

face of a large and expanding outbreak. 

APHIS continues to discuss this issue 

and engage our stakeholders in planning 

and preparation for any response, 

including identification of options and 

potential funding sources for expansion 

of the bank. In the event that the United 

States experiences an FMD outbreak in 

which a specific strain is identified, the 

United States Department of Agriculture 

will notify the NAFMDVB, which will 

request the manufacturing of finished 

vaccine from approved suppliers, based 

on the stockpiled antigens. 

Therefore, for the reasons given in the 

proposed rule and in this document, we 

are adopting the proposed rule as a final 

rule, without change. 

Executive Orders 12866 and 13771 and 

Regulatory Flexibility Act 

This final rule has been determined to 

be not significant for the purposes of 

Executive Order 12866 and, therefore, 

has not been reviewed by the Office of 

Management and Budget. Further, 

because this final rule is not significant, 

it is not a regulatory action under 

Executive Order 13771. 

In accordance with the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act, we have analyzed the 

potential economic effects of this action 

on small entities. The analysis is 

summarized below. Copies of the full 

analysis are available on the 

Regulations.gov Web site (see footnote 1 

in this document for a link to 

Regulations.gov) or by contacting the 

person listed under FOR FURTHER

INFORMATION CONTACT. 

With this rule, APHIS will exempt 

sheep meat imported from Uruguay 

from the deboning requirement for a 

select group of lambs subjected to 

additional risk-mitigating measures. 

These measures include testing for FMD 

with negative results, individual animal 

identification and traceability, and 

segregation of selected lambs from FMDsusceptible animals following testing. 

In 2013, the Food and Agriculture 

Organization of the United Nations 

estimated the sheep population in 

Uruguay to be 7.5 million head, 

generating income both from the sale of 

wool and sheep meat. With the 

exception of dairy farms, most of the 

livestock farms in Uruguay are mixed, 

running both beef cattle and sheep. 

There are approximately 15,000 farms 

with sheep, but income from sheep is 

only a minor proportion of total income. 

Uruguay has requested the exemption 

from the deboning requirement 

specifically to export rack of lamb, 

which includes the rib bones, to the 

United States. These cuts are higher 

quality and command a higher price 

than lamb meat that has been deboned, 

as currently required. 

Given the additional risk-mitigating 

measures, Uruguay expects to export 

bone-in meat from up to 6,000 lambs per 

year. These lambs will be between 6–8 

months of age at the time of slaughter, 

producing a total carcass weight of lamb 

meat of about 100 metric tons (MT) per 

year. While all meat from these lambs 

will be eligible for import under this 

rule, the focus will likely be on rack of 

lamb, which represents about one 

quarter of this weight, or about 25 MT. 

From 2012 through 2015, the United 

States imported an average of about 

43,300 MT of bone-in lamb meat 

annually, valued at over $427 million. 

The vast majority of these imports have 

been from Australia and New Zealand, 

with small quantities from Canada, 

Chile, and Iceland. Annual imports of 

100 MT of bone-in lamb from Uruguay 

would be equivalent to less than 3/10 of 

1 percent of total annual bone-in lamb 

imports into the United States. 

Given the very small quantity of bonein lamb meat expected to be imported 

from Uruguay, this action will not have 

a significant economic impact on 

domestic producers or importers, large 

or small. 

Under these circumstances, the 

Administrator of the Animal and Plant 

Health Inspection Service has 

determined that this action will not 

have a significant economic impact on 

a substantial number of small entities. 

Executive Order 12372 

This program/activity is listed in the 

Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance 

under No. 10.025 and is subject to 

Executive Order 12372, which requires 

intergovernmental consultation with 

State and local officials. (See 2 CFR 

chapter IV.) 

Executive Order 12988 

This final rule has been reviewed 

under Executive Order 12988, Civil 

Justice Reform. This rule: (1) Preempts 

all State and local laws and regulations 

that are inconsistent with this rule; (2) 

has no retroactive effect; and (3) does 

not require administrative proceedings 

before parties may file suit in court 

challenging this rule. 

Paperwork Reduction Act 

In accordance with section 3507(d) of 

the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 

(44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.), the information 

collection or recordkeeping 

requirements included in this final rule, 

which were filed under 0579–0449, 

have been submitted for approval to the 

Office of Management and Budget 

(OMB). When OMB notifies us of its 

decision, if approval is denied, we will 

publish a document in the Federal 

Register providing notice of what action 

we plan to take. 

E-Government Act Compliance 

The Animal and Plant Health 

Inspection Service is committed to 

compliance with the E-Government Act 

to promote the use of the Internet and 

other information technologies, to 

provide increased opportunities for 

citizen access to Government 

information and services, and for other 

purposes. For information pertinent to 

E-Government Act compliance related 

to this rule, please contact Ms. Kimberly 

Hardy, APHIS’ Information Collection 

Coordinator, at (301) 851–2483. 

List of Subjects in 9 CFR Part 94 

Animal diseases, Imports, Livestock, 

Meat and meat products, Milk, Poultry 

and poultry products, Reporting and 

recordkeeping requirements. 

Accordingly, we are amending 9 CFR 

part 94 as follows: 

PART 94—RINDERPEST, FOOT-ANDMOUTH DISEASE, NEWCASTLE 

DISEASE, HIGHLY PATHOGENIC 

AVIAN INFLUENZA, AFRICAN SWINE 

FEVER, CLASSICAL SWINE FEVER, 

SWINE VESICULAR DISEASE, AND 

BOVINE SPONGIFORM 

ENCEPHALOPATHY: PROHIBITED 

AND RESTRICTED IMPORTATIONS 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 94 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 7 U.S.C. 450, 7701–7772, 7781– 

7786, and 8301–8317; 21 U.S.C. 136 and 

136a; 31 U.S.C. 9701; 7 CFR 2.22, 2.80, and 

371.4. 

■ 2. Section 94.29 is amended as 

follows: 

■ a. By revising paragraph (g); and 

■ b. By revising the OMB citation at the 

end of the section. 

The revisions read as follows: 

§ 94.29 Restrictions on importation of 

fresh (chilled or frozen) beef and ovine meat 

from specified regions. 

* * * * * 

(g) All bone and visually identifiable 

blood clots and lymphoid tissue have 

been removed from the meat; except 

that bone-in ovine meat from Uruguay 

may be exported to the United States 

under the following conditions: 

(1) The meat must be derived from 

select lambs that have never been 

vaccinated for FMD; 

(2) The select lambs must be 

maintained in a program approved by 

the Administrator. Lambs in the 

program must: 


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(i) Be segregated from other FMDsusceptible livestock at a select lamb 

facility operated under the authority of 

the national veterinary authority of 

Uruguay; 

(ii) Be subjected to an FMD testing 

scheme approved by the Administrator; 

and 

(iii) Be individually identified with 

official unique identification that is part 

of a national traceability system 

sufficient to ensure that only the 

products of select lambs meeting all 

required criteria are exempt from the 

deboning requirement. 

(3) Select lambs and their products 

must not be commingled with other 

animals and their products within the 

slaughter facility. 

* * * * * 

(Approved by the Office of Management and 

Budget under control numbers 0579–0372, 

0579–0414, 0579–0428, and 0579–0449) 

Done in Washington, DC, this 6th day of 

September 2017. 

Michael C. Gregoire, 

Acting Administrator, Animal and Plant 

Health Inspection Service. 

[FR Doc. 2017–19225 Filed 9–11–17; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 3410–34–P 

PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY 

CORPORATION 

29 CFR Part 4002 

Bylaws of the Pension Benefit 

Guaranty Corporation 

AGENCY: Pension Benefit Guaranty 

Corporation. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: The Pension Benefit Guaranty 

Corporation is amending its bylaws 

regulation to conform to changes in the 

bylaws adopted by the Board of 

Directors. 

DATES: Effective September 12, 2017. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Judith R. Starr (starr.judith@pbgc.gov), 

General Counsel, Pension Benefit 

Guaranty Corporation, 1200 K Street 

NW., Washington, DC 20005–4026; 202– 

326–4400, ext. 3083; Hilary Duke 

(duke.hilary@pbgc.gov), Attorney, 

Regulatory Affairs Division, Office of 

the General Counsel, 202–326–4400, 

extension 3839. (TTY and TDD users 

may call the Federal relay service tollfree at 800–877–8339 and ask to be 

connected to 202–326–4400, extension 

3083 or to 202–326–4400, extension 

3839.) 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The 

Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation 

(PBGC) administers the pension plan 

termination insurance program under 

Title IV of the Employee Retirement 

Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). 

Section 4002(b)(3) of ERISA gives PBGC 

power to adopt, amend, and repeal, by 

the board of directors, bylaws. Section 

4002(f) of ERISA provides that the board 

of directors may alter, supplement, or 

repeal any existing bylaw, and may 

adopt additional bylaws from time to 

time as may be necessary. PBGC’s 

bylaws are set forth in 29 CFR part 4002. 

PBGC’s Board of Directors (the 

Secretaries of Labor, the Treasury, and 

Commerce) voted to amend the bylaws 

at a meeting of the Board of Directors on 

September 7, 2017. This rule replaces 

the old bylaws with the new bylaws in 

PBGC’s regulations. 

Compliance With Rulemaking 

Guidelines 

This is a rule of ‘‘agency organization, 

procedure, or practice’’ and is limited to 

‘‘agency organization, management, or 

personnel matters.’’ Accordingly, this 

rule is exempt from notice and public 

comment requirements under 5 U.S.C. 

553(b) and the requirements of 

Executive Order 12866 and Executive 

Order 13771. Because no general notice 

of proposed rulemaking is required, the 

Regulatory Flexibility Act does not 

apply to this rule. See 5 U.S.C. 601(2), 

603, 604. 

PBGC finds good cause exists for 

making the bylaws set forth in this rule 

effective less than 30 days after 

publication because the amendments 

were adopted by the Board of Directors 

on September 7, 2017. 

List of Subjects in Part 4002 

Administrative practice and 

procedure, Organization and functions 

(government agencies). 

■ Accordingly, 29 CFR part 4002 is 

revised to read as follows: 

PART 4002—BYLAWS OF THE 

PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY 

CORPORATION 

Sec. 

4002.1 Board of Directors, Chair, and 

Representatives of Board Members. 

4002.2 Quorum. 

4002.3 Meetings. 

4002.4 Place of meetings; use of conference 

call communications equipment. 

4002.5 Voting without a meeting. 

4002.6 Conflict of interest. 

4002.7 Director of the Corporation and 

senior officers. 

4002.8 Emergency procedures. 

4002.9 Seal. 

4002.10 Authority and amendments. 

Authority: 29 U.S.C. 1302(b)(3), 1302(f). 

§ 4002.1 Board of Directors, Chair, and 

Representatives of Board Members. 

(a) Composition and responsibilities 

of the Board of Directors—(1) Board. 

Section 4002(d)(1) of ERISA establishes 

the Board membership as the Secretaries 

of Labor (Chair), the Treasury, and 

Commerce. A person who, at the time of 

a meeting of the Board of Directors, is 

serving in an acting capacity as, or 

performing the duties of, a Member of 

the Board of Directors will serve as a 

Member of the Board of Directors with 

the same authority and effect as the 

designated Secretary. 

(2) Chair of the Board. As Chair of the 

Board, the Secretary of Labor will 

preside over all Board meetings. As a 

direct report to the Board under section 

4002(d)(4) of ERISA, the Inspector 

General of the Corporation reports to the 

Board through the Chair. The 

Participant and Plan Sponsor Advocate 

also reports to the Board through the 

Chair. 

(3) Board responsibilities. Except as 

provided in paragraph (b) of this 

section, the Board may not delegate any 

of the following responsibilities— 

(i) Voting on an amendment to these 

bylaws. 

(ii) Approval of the Annual Report, 

which includes the Annual 

Management Report (AMR) (and its 

components the financial statements, 

management’s discussion and analysis, 

annual performance report and 

independent auditor’s report), the 

Chair’s message, and other 

documentation in conformance with 

guidance issued by the Office of 

Management and Budget (OMB). 

(iii) Approval of the Corporation’s 

Investment Policy Statement. 

(iv) Approval of all reports or 

recommendations to the Congress 

required by Title IV of ERISA. 

(v) Approval of any policy matter 

(other than administrative policies) that 

would have a significant impact on the 

pension insurance program. 

(vi) Review of reports from the 

Corporation’s Inspector General that the 

Inspector General deems appropriate to 

deliver to the Board. 

(4) Investment Policy Statement 

review. The Board must review the 

Corporation’s Investment Policy 

Statement at least every two years and 

approve the Investment Policy 

Statement at least every four years. 

(b) Designation of and responsibilities 

of Board Representatives and Alternate 

Representatives—(1) Board 

Representatives. A Board 

Representative, as designated under 

section 4002(d)(3) of ERISA, may act for 

all purposes under these bylaws, except 

that an action of a Board Representative 


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