IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION THREE

STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Respondent,

v.

TABOR JAMES TAYLOR,

Appellant.

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No. 39602-9-III

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

LAWRENCE-BERREY, C.J. — Tabor Taylor appeals his conviction for possession of 

a stolen motor vehicle. In his opening brief, Taylor argues the trial court violated the 

time-for-trial rule when it set trial past a purported January 12, 2023 outside trial date, 

and again when it set trial past a purported February 11, 2023 outside trial date. In his 

reply brief, he concedes the arguments raised in his opening brief and raises a new 

issue—whether the 30-day buffer period may be utilized more than once to extend time 

for trial. We accept his concession, decline to address the issue raised for the first time in 

his reply brief, and affirm his conviction.

FACTS

Taylor was arrested in Kittitas County on March 8, 2022, and subsequently 

charged with possession of a stolen motor vehicle. He was arraigned on March 14, 2022, 

FILED

JUNE 20, 2024

In the Office of the Clerk of Court

WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
No. 39602-9-III

State v. Taylor

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and remained in custody. 

Between April 15, 2022, and September 9, 2022, the trial court granted Taylor’s 

five motions to continue the trial date. From late October 2022 until Taylor’s March 8, 

2023 trial, the trial court granted six motions for continuance, five of which are germane 

to this appeal:

• October 31, 2022. The State moved for a continuance of the November 1, 

2022 trial date because the victim had entered behavioral health treatment 

and would be unavailable for 30 days. The court found good cause1and 

continued the trial to December 13, 2022. Thirty days from this date was 

January 12, 2023. 

• November 16, 2022. The trial court granted defense counsel’s motion 

to withdraw, owing to Mr. Taylor’s allegations of ineffective assistance 

of counsel. Sixty days from withdrawal of counsel was January 15, 2023.

• December 9, 2022. The State moved for a continuance of the trial date 

because the arresting officer was unavailable to testify. The court granted 

the motion and continued the trial date to January 4, 2023. Thirty days 

from this date was February 3, 2023.

• January 3, 2023. The State moved for a continuance of the trial date 

because the victim was in custody in Spokane and Spokane County would 

not transport him to Kittitas County. The trial court continued the trial to 

January 10, 2023, which remained within the time-for-trial date. Although 

the court characterized the delay as a reset, the corresponding order 

suggested it was a good-cause continuance. 

 

1

 The orders for all five discussed continuances cite “good cause” as their basis. 

“Good cause” appears to be shorthand for continuances granted in accordance with 

CrR 3.3(f)(2)—required in the administration of justice that would not prejudice the 

defendant. On appeal, Mr. Taylor does not challenge any good cause finding.
No. 39602-9-III

State v. Taylor

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• January 13, 2023. Defense counsel was ill on January 10, 2023, and the 

trial court apparently struck the trial date. Three days later, because the 

arresting officer was on paternity leave and could not testify, the State 

moved for a continuance. The court found good cause for a continuance—

citing both defense counsel’s illness and witness unavailability. The court 

continued the trial to February 16, 2023. Thirty days from this date was 

March 14, 2023.

Trial commenced on March 8, 2023,2and Mr. Taylor was found guilty of

possession of a stolen vehicle. He timely appeals his conviction. 

ANALYSIS

Mr. Taylor’s opening brief argues the trial court erred by setting trial past a 

purported January 12, 2023 outside trial date, and erred again by setting trial past a 

purported February 11, 2023 outside trial date. His reply brief concedes both issues. 

For the reasons explained below, we accept his concessions. 

Application of time-for-trial rules presents questions of statutory interpretation this 

court reviews de novo. State v. Kenyon, 167 Wn.2d 130, 135, 216 P.3d 1024 (2009).

Where a criminal defendant is in jail, the State must try that defendant within 60 

days of commencing charges against him. CrR 3.3(b)(1)(i). The 60-day period resets 

upon, among other events, disqualification of counsel. CrR 3.3(c)(2)(vii).

 

2 The trial court granted an agreed continuance on February 15, 2023. That 

continuance is not relevant to this appeal.
No. 39602-9-III

State v. Taylor

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Where the trial court grants a continuance upon agreement of the parties—or finds 

good cause for a continuance upon a motion by either party—that continuance is 

excluded from the time-for-trial period. CrR 3.3(e)(3), (f). No time-for-trial date will 

expire sooner than 30 days after the conclusion of any excluded period. CrR 3.3(b)(5).

Here, Mr. Taylor concedes no time-for-trial violation occurred prior to October 31, 

2022. Moreover, he does not challenge the validity of any granted continuance. 

Accordingly, we begin our analysis at October 31, 2022.

On October 31, 2022, the trial court continued trial to December 13, 2022. By 

operation of the 30-day buffer period, that continuance moved time for trial to a date no 

sooner than January 12, 2023.

On November 16, 2022, the trial court granted defense counsel’s motion to 

withdraw. This reset the 60-day time-for-trial period, resulting in a time-for-trial date of 

January 15, 2023.

On December 9, 2022, the trial court on a finding of good cause continued trial to 

January 4, 2023. Although this remained within the time-for-trial date, the good-cause 

continuance nevertheless resulted in an excluded period. By operation of the 30-day 

buffer period, the new time-for-trial date could not have been sooner than February 3, 

2023.
No. 39602-9-III

State v. Taylor

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On January 3, 2023, the trial court reset trial to January 10, 2023, which remained 

within the time-for-trial parameters. To the extent this delay constituted a reset rather 

than a continuance—as the hearing suggested—it did not alter the time-for-trial date. If 

the delay was a good-cause continuance—as the order suggested—the new time-for-trial 

date was 30 days after January 10, 2023, or February 9, 2023. Because it will not alter 

our analysis, we assume here, in deference to Mr. Taylor’s argument, the delay was 

merely a reset, leaving the time-for-trial date as February 3, 2023.

On January 10, 2023, the trial court struck trial because defense counsel was ill. 

Three days later, on January 13, 2023, the court continued the trial date to February 16, 

2023, citing both defense counsel’s illness and the unavailability of a State’s witness. 

The January 13, 2023 continuance moved the outside trial date to no sooner than 

March 18, 2023 (30 days after February 16, 2023). Because Mr. Taylor’s trial 

commenced on March 8, 2023, no time-for-trial violation occurred.

For the first time in his reply brief, Mr. Taylor raises the issue of whether the 30-

day buffer period may be utilized more than once to extend time for trial. He admits the 

issue is novel, and he has no authority on point. In general, appellate courts will not 

consider an issue raised for the first time in a reply brief. In re Marriage of Bernard, 

165 Wn.2d 895, 908, 204 P.3d 907 (2009); State v. Eyman, 24 Wn. App. 2d 795, 814, 
No. 39602-9-111 

State v. Taylor 

521 P.3d 265 (2022), review denied, 1 Wn.3d 1021, 532 P.3d 151 (2023). The lack of 

authority on the untimely raised issue further supports our decision not to consider it. 

Affirmed. 

A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the 

Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to 

RCW 2.06.040. 

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Lawrence-Berrey, C.J. 

WE CONCUR: 

Pennell, J. 

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