No. 87-381 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1988 

THE STATE OF MONTANA, 

Plaintiff and Respondent, 

KATHERINE MICHELLE BROWN, 

Defendant and Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Gallatin, 

The Honorable Thomas A. Olson, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

McKinley T. Anderson, Bozeman, Montana 

For Respondent : 

Honorable Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana 

Betsy Brandborg, Assistant Attorney General 

Mike Salvagni, County Attorney, Bozeman, Montana 

Marty Lambert, Deputy County Attorney 

For Amicus Curiae: 

Robert M. McCarthy, Butte, Montana (County Attorneys 

Association) 

Submitted: March 1, 1988 

Decided: May 41 1988 

Filed: 
Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the 

Court. 

Following a bench trial on May 18 and 19, 1987, before 

the Honorable Thomas A. Olson, in the 18th Judicial District, 

the defendant, Katherine Michelle Brown (hereinafter Brown) 

was found guilty of the criminal sale of dangerous drugs, a 

felony, in violation of 5 45-9-101(1), MCA. Defendant 

appeals and we affirm. 

On November 14, 1986, Officer Dave Petersen of the 

Bozeman Police Department was contacted by one Curt Hawley. 

Hawley informed Petersen that an individual named Ernest 

Elliot was attempting to organize the sale of a large amount 

of marijuana. Hawley agreed to re-contact Elliot and begin 

negotiations for the sale. A subsequent undercover 

investigation generated Brown's arrest and conviction. 

Hawley and Elliot engaged in three phone conversations 

on November 15, 1986. Petersen monitored and recorded the 

conversations with Hawley's consent, but no search warrant 

was obtained. Elliot indicated his cousin would transport 

significant amounts of marijuana to the Bozeman area for 

sale, and Hawley indicated he had contact with a potential 

purchaser. Elliot explained that Hawley would need to deal 

with Elliot's girlfriend, defendant Brown, to complete the 

transaction. Brown's involvement was necessary because 

Elliot was scheduled to begin serving a sentence in the 

county jail due to a prior conviction. This arrangement was 

confirmed November 16, 1986, when Hawley met and spoke with 

both Brown and Elliot in a grocery store parking lot. 

After Elliot reported to the county jail, Hawley phoned 

Brown on November 17, and 20, 1986 to discuss further 

arrangements. Both calls were monitored and recorded with 

Hawley's consent and no warrant was obtained. A meeting was 
arranged between Brown, Hawley, and the potential purchaser. 

The "purchaser" was Officer Evanson of the Bozeman Police 

Department. 

The three met on November 20, 1986, and the 

conversation was monitored and recorded without a warrant by 

using a body wire transmitting device which was attached to 

Evanson. Brown and Evanson discussed the purchase while in a 

vehicle parked in a bar parking lot. Evanson showed Brown a 

large amount of cash to demonstrate he was a serious buyer 

and agreed to purchase a large amount of marijuana when it 

arrived in the Bozeman area. 

On November 21, 1986, Evanson checked into a local 

motel and phoned Brown. Brown indicated the marijuana 

arrived by stating a friend with a baby had come to town, and 

Evanson asked Brown to come to his motel room. The telephone 

conversation was monitored and recorded without a warrant. 

Brown arrived at Evanson's room with Don Elliot, Ernest 

Elliot's cousin from Missouri. The ensuing conversations 

were again monitored and recorded without a warrant by using 

a body wire attached to Evanson. After a brief conversation, 

the three proceeded to a different local motel and the money 

and marijuana were exchanged. Brown was arrested shortly 

thereafter, along with Don Elliot and his companion, Randy 

Fowler. 

On January 14, 1987, defendant filed a motion to 

dismiss her charge alleging the information was not supported 

by probable cause. Defendant alleged, among other things, 

that Hawley "illegally taped or recorded telephone 

conversations with the Defendant without her knowledge 

. . . " A District Court hearing was held February 10, 1987 

and defendant's motion was denied February 26, 1987. 

Defendant was subsequently convicted of the criminal sale of 

dangerous drugs. 
Defendant raises four issues for our consideration on 

appeal : 

1. Was there sufficient evidence to convict defendant 

of the sale of dangerous drugs? 

2. Did defendant receive an excessive sentence? 

3. When police record telephone conversations without 

a warrant and with the knowledge of one but not all the 

participants in the conversation, are the recordings 

admissible in a subsequent criminal trial? 

4. When police use a body wire transmitting device to 

record a face-to-face conversation without a warrant and with 

the knowledge of one but not all the participants of the 

conversation, are the recordings admissible in a subsequent 

criminal trial? 

1. Was there sufficient evidence to 

convict defendant of the sale of 

dangerous drugs? 

Defendant contends that § 45-9-101(1), MCA, requires 

that she actually sell or transfer a dangerous drug before 

she can be convicted of the crime for which she was charged. 

Defendant states the evidence fails to demonstrate she 

actually sold the marijuana. Further, she alleges she never 

took actual possession of the marijuana and concludes that 

the correct charge should have been conspiracy to sell drugs 

and not the actual sale of drugs. 

We agree that the applicable language of § 45-9-101(1), 

MCA, requires that defendant sell, barter, exchange, give 

away, or offer to sell, barter, exchange or give away a 

dangerous drug. We addressed a remarkably similar issue in 

State v. Martinez (Mont. 1985), 700 P.2d 991, 42 St.Rep. 798. 

In holding there was substantial evidence to support 

defendant ' s conviction for the criminal sale of dangerous 

drugs we stated: 
"To sell [drugs] means to knowingly and 

intentionally transfer possession or 

ownership of the [drugs] to another for 

money or other valuable consideration. 

For a person to make such a sale it is 

not necessary that he personally handle 

all of the details of the transaction. 

It is sufficient if the transaction is 

arranged by him and handled by persons 

under his direction and is sufficient to 

constitute a sale if the person charged 

with sale is involved in the transaction 

by accepting, handling, or counting the 

money and directing the delivery of the 

[drugs] . In other words, the person 

charged with the sale does not have to 

personally conduct all of the various 

elements of delivery of the [drugs] and 

the transfer of the money. It is 

sufficient if he participates therein to 

such an extent that it is obvious that he 

is a part of the making of the sale." 

Martinez, 700 P.2d at 992, 42 St.Rep. at 800 (citing, State 

v. Davis (Mont. 1980), 620 P.2d 1209, 1214-15, 37 St.Rep. 

1958, 1964). After reviewing the record, we conclude that 

there is substantial credible evidence demonstrating 

defendant assisted in organizing and coordinating the sale 

and was therefore an active participant in the sale. The 

evidence is sufficient to support the conviction and we 

affirm the District Court. 

2. Did defendant receive an excessive 

sentence? 

Defendant states her sentence is excessive because the 

statute outlawing the sale of dangerous drugs is in fact an 

absolute liability offense. Section 45-9-101(1), MCA, states 

in part: 

A person commits the offense of criminal 

sale of dangerous drugs if he sells, 

barters, exchanges, gives away, or offers 

to sell, barter, exchange, or give away . . . any dangerous drug . . . 
Since the statute requires no mental state, defendant argues 

it is an absolute liability offense and that pursuant to 

SS 45-2-103 and -104, MCA, the maximum penalty for such an 

absolute liability offense is a $500 fine. 

Section 45-2-104, MCA, does provide that a person may 

be guilty of an absolute liability offense "only if the 

offense is punishable by a fine not exceeding $500 or the 

statute defining the offense clearly indicates a legislative 

purpose to impose absolute liability for the conduct 

described." However, 45-9-101(1), MCA, is not an absolute 

liability offense, because the State must prove that the 

defendant purposely or knowingly committed the offense. 

Section 45-2-103 (1) , MCA states: 

Except for deliberate homicide as defined 

in 45-5-102 (1) (b) or an offense which 

involves absolute liability, a person is 

not guilty of an offense unless, with 

respect to each element described by the 

statute defining the offense, he acts 

while having one of the mental states 

described in subsections (33), (37), and 

(58) of 45-2-101. 

The section provides that all elements of an offense must be 

performed with one of the three mental states provided for in 

the Montana Criminal Code. Section 45-2-101 (33), MCA, 

defines the mental state of "knowingly" and S 45-2-101 (58), 

MCA, defines the mental state of "purposely." The definition 

of "negligently" is addressed in § 45-2-101(37), MCA, and has 

no application to the offense of selling dangerous drugs. 

State v. Starr (1983), 204 Mont. 210, 218, 664 P.2d 893, 897. 

In Starr, the defendant asserted that S 45-9-101, MCA, 

was unconstitutionally vague. This Court noted that this 

statute has "no internal requirement of mental state as an 

element of the crime." Starr, 204 Mont. at 218, 664 P.2d at 

897. Therefore, we concluded that the statute was subject to 
$ 45-2-103, MCA, providing generally for all three mental 

states. Despite the fact that there is no internal mental 

state requirement in $ 45-9-101 (I), MCA, the offense of 

criminal sale of dangerous drugs is subject to the 

requirements of 45-2-103(l), MCA, and the State is thus 

required to prove the offense was committed either purposely 

or knowingly. 

The evidence clearly demonstrates that defendant 

Brown's intention was to purposely or knowingly organize and 

coordinate the sale. Brown was not convicted pursuant to an 

absolute liability offense and the sentence of the District 

Court is affirmed. 

3. When the police record telephone 

conversations without a warrant and with 

the permission of one but not all 

participants in the conversation, are the 

recordings admissible in a subsequent 

criminal trial? 

Defendant contends that all of the recordings of 

telephone conversations took place with the knowledge and 

permission of only one of the participants in the 

conversation. Defendant states that these telephone 

recordings violate the privacy section of the Montana 

Constitution and should not be admissible in a later criminal 

trial. Defendant cites $ 45-8-213(1)(c), MCA, and points out 

that it is a criminal offense to record conversations without 

the knowledge of all parties to the conversation. That 

subsection makes an exception for public employees performing 

an official duty, but defendant contends this exception is 

overly broad and therefore unconstitutional. 

We hold that if one party to a telephone conversation 

freely consents, the conversation can be electronically 

monitored and recorded without a warrant, and the evidence 

obtained is admissible in a subsequent criminal trial. This 
rule remains true even if the consenting party is an 

informant or a police officer. State v. Canon (Mont. 1984) , 

687 P.2d 705, 707-08, 41 St.Rep. 1659, 1661-62; State v. 

Coleman (1980), 189 Mont. 492, 502-03, 616 P.2d 1090, 

1095-96; and State v. Hanley (1980), 186 Mont. 410, 608 P.2d 

104. We refuse to reverse this well established rule. 

Further, defendant's reliance on S 45-8-213 is 

misplaced. That statute defines when one violates privacy in 

communications and prohibits one from recording conversations 

without the knowledge of all participants. As noted by 

defendant, the statute clearly excepts "duly elected or 

appointed public officials or employees when the 

transcription or recording is done in the performance of 

official duty . . . " The exception applies to law 

enforcement officers while performing their duty. We fail to 

see how this exception can be declared unconstitutional 

because it is "overly broad." There is certainly no absolute 

requirement that the statute exist at all should the 

legislature decide to abolish it. The legislature has simply 

determined that such recordings should be prohibited under 

certain circumstances and provided for an exception which 

applies in this case. 

4. If police use a body wire 

transmitting device to record a 

face-to-face conversation without a 

warrant and with the knowledge of one but 

not all the participants of the 

conversation, are the recordings 

admissible in a subsequent criminal 

trial? 

Defendant argues that the right to privacy section of 

the Montana Constitution prohibits the use of body wire 

recordings as evidence under the facts of this case. As 

support, defendant cites State v. Brackman (1978), 178 Mont. 

105, 582 P.2d 1216. In Brackman, police placed an electronic 
monitoring device on an individual which was used to record 

his conversation with the defendant. No warrant was obtained 

and the defendant had no knowledge that his conversation was 

recorded. The District Court suppressed the recordings and 

transcriptions and this Court affirmed. The majority held 

there was no violation of defendant's right to be free of 

unreasonable searches and seizures, but that the use of the 

recording as evidence would violate the right to privacy 

granted by the Montana Constitution. 

We now hold that warrantless consensual electronic 

monitoring of face-to-face conversations by the use of a body 

wire transmitting device, performed by law enforcement 

officers while pursuing their official duties, does not 

violate the right to be free of unreasonable searches and 

seizures nor the privacy section of the Montana Constitution. 

The consent must be clearly obtained from at least one party 

to the conversation and must be freely made and without 

compulsion. Evidence obtained by such monitoring is 

admissible in a subsequent criminal trial. As in the case of 

telephone recordings, the consenting party may be an 

informant or a police officer. To this extent, the Brackman 

case is specifically overruled. 

In the past, the rules regarding electronic monitoring 

in Montana have not been entirely clear. Partially, the 

confusion is present because there is no firm agreement as to 

whether electronic eavesdropping should be analyzed under 

Montana's constitutional right to privacy, search and seizure 

law, or some combination of the two. Additionally, there is 

virtually no Montana statutory authority directing the 

procedures followed by law enforcement personnel. 

In the Brackman case we analyzed and considered whether 

participant electronic monitoring violates the Fourth 

Amendment to the United States Constitution. After an 
analysis of the United States Supreme Court decisions 

regarding this topic, we concluded that when at least one 

party to the monitored conversation freely consented to the 

monitor, there was no impermissible search or seizure under 

the Fourth Amendment. Brackman 178 Mont. at 112, 582 P.2d at 

1220. 

Currently, there is no need to alter this portion of 

the Brackman case, and there are strong indications that this 

conclusion is more certain today. In determining that there 

was no Fourth Amendment violation, this Court relied on U.S. 

v. White (1971), 401 U.S. 745, 91 S.Ct. 1122, 28 L.Ed.2d 453. 

The White case addressed the issue of whether the Fourth 

Amendment barred from evidence the testimony of governmental 

agents who related certain conversations which occurred 

between the defendant and a government informant and which 

the agents overheard by monitoring a radio transmitter 

carried by the informant. In a plurality opinion, Justice 

White stated the monitoring did not violate the defendant's 

right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures. The 

precedential value of White is often attacked because it was 

a plurality opinion. However, despite the passage of 

seventeen years, White has not been reversed. Since that 

time, the United States Supreme Court has stated: 

[Nleither the Constitution nor any act of 

Congress requires that official approval 

be secured before conversations are 

overheard or recorded by Government 

agents with the consent of one of the 

conversants. 

U.S. v. Caceres (1979), 440 U.S. 741, 744, 99 S.Ct. 1465, 

1467, 59 L.Ed.2d 733, 738 (addressing the admissibility of 

consensual recordings made by an Internal Revenue Service 

agent that failed to observe and comply with Internal Revenue 

Service regulations). Additionally, "all eleven Circuit 
Courts of Appeals have accepted White as constitutional 

authority for the principle that search warrants are not 

required to authorize consensual interceptions . . . " 

C. Fishman, Wiretapping and Eavesdropping, S 9, at 17 (1978). 

Warrantless consensual electronic monitoring of face-to-face 

conversations does not violate the Fourth Amendment to the 

United States Constitution. 

The Montana Constitution also provides that the people 

shall be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Mont. 

Const. Art. 11, S 11. Although the language of this 

provision is nearly identical to that contained in the Fourth 

Amendment to the United States Constitution, we recognize 

that such a provision in the Montana Constitution may be 

interpreted so as to provide a greater amount of rights than 

that contained in the Federal Constitution. See, State v. 

Johnson (Mont. 1986), 719 P.2d 1248, 1254-55, 43 St.Rep. 

1010, 1016-17; and Butte Community Union v. Lewis (Mont. 

1986), 712 P.2d 1309, 1313, 43 St.Rep. 65, 70. Additionally, 

the Montana Constitution provides that the right of 

individual privacy shall not be infringed without the showing 

of a compelling state interest. Mont. Const. Art. 11, S 10. 

There is no similar textual language in the United States 

Constitution and we have therefore recognized that this 

section grants rights beyond that inferred from the United 

States Constitution. See generally, Montana Human Rights 

Division v. City of Billings (1982), 199 Mont. 434, 649 P.2d 

1283. Because Montana's Constitutional protections have an 

existence which is separate from the Federal Constitutional 

protections it is necessary to offer an independent analysis 

of the privacy and search and seizure provisions of the 

Montana Constitution. 

"Where no reasonable expectation of privacy exists, 

there is neither a 'search' nor a 'seizure' within the 
contemplation of . . . Article 11, Section 11 of the Montana 

Constitution." State v. Bennett (1983), 205 Mont. 117, 121, 

666 P.2d 747, 749. There must be some violation of a 

reasonable expectation of privacy before the provision 

applies. In the case at hand, the defendant Brown claimed an 

actual or subjective expectation of privacy, because she 

personally expected her conversations with the undercover 

officer to be private. However, it must also be determined 

whether her expectation was reasonably justifiable. We 

conclude that a defendant has no reasonably justifiable 

expectation that statements made to another will be kept 

private by that person. Therefore, the facts of this case 

present no unreasonable search or seizure within the 

contemplation of the Montana Constitution. 

The analysis however must go further because the 

framers of the Montana Constitution specifically provided an 

additional protection with the right to privacy provision. 

Due to the sensitive nature of this issue, we must consider 

more than just the defendant's reasonable expectation of 

privacy because such a test offers no more than that provided 

by Katz v. United States (1967), 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 

19 L.Ed.2d 576. Katz specifically notes that the "general" 

right to privacy is left largely to the law of the individual 

states. 389 U.S. at 350-51. 

Commentators have suggested that this Court consider 

"whether the area to be searched or the object to be seized 

is owned or possessed" by the defendant. Elison and 

NettikSimmons, Right of Privacy, 48 Mont.L.Rev. 1, 26 (1987). 

The "object" to be seized in this case is the conversation 

between the defendant and the undercover officer. It is 

logically difficult to strictly characterize the defendant's 

possessory interest in her conversation with the officer. We 

conclude that both participants had an equal interest in the 
conversation and that either could consent to the monitoring. 

Additionally, despite the fact that we have already 

determined the defendant had no reasonably justifiable 

expectation of privacy, we must also consider whether the 

government activity in this case is excessively intrusive. 

This additional consideration is needed because a defendant 

may have his reasonable expectation of privacy distorted by 

excessively intrusive government activity. In other words, 

the very fact that the government is acting in an overly 

intrusive manner may distort or obliterate any reasonable 

expectation of privacy. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland (1979), 

442 U.S. 735, 740-41, n. 5, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 2580, 61 L.Ed.2d 

220, 227. However, the warrantless consensual electronic 

monitoring in this case was not excessive. The unsolicited 

incriminating statements by Brown were freely spoken to the 

undercover officer as she attempted to coordinate the sale. 

Defendant Brown simply mistakenly placed her trust in the 

officer and we refuse to conclude that the recording of her 

words was excessively intrusive. 

There is no question that the undercover officer could 

testify as to the oral incriminating statements made to him 

by Brown. Logically, the recording of these statements by 

the officer and the introduction of the recording in 

evidence, with proper foundation at the trial, is equally 

admissible as the officer's testimony of what oral statements 

had been made by Brown. The recorded statements would be 

more reliable than the recall of the witness as to what had 

been said to him. 

To summarize, we hold there is no violation of 

Montana's right to privacy, or the prohibition against 

unreasonable searches and seizures, when law enforcement 

officers pursing their official duties perform warrantless 

consensual electronic monitoring of face-to-face 
conversations. It is important to stress that this holding 

does not open the floodgates to create an Orwellian society, 

and that the individual is not left without protections 

against inappropriate electronic eavesdropping. Section 

45-8-213, MCA, still makes it a criminal offense to record a 

conversation without the permission of all participants 

unless an exception provided within the statute applies. 

Additionally, warrantless monitoring of any conversation 

without the permission and consent of one participant is 

strictly prohibited by both the United States and Montana 

Constitutions. 

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District 

Court is affirmed in all respects. 

We concur: LJ 
Mr. Justice William E. Hunt, Sr., dissenting: 

I dissent with the majority regarding issues 3 and 4. 

Current federal law on the subject of telephone recordation 

and wiretapping apparently mandates the result of the 

majority but this trend of blatant disregard for the right of 

privacy that has developed in recent years gives me pause. 

In this decision, the majority overrules State v. 

Brackman (1978) , 178 Mont. 105, 582 P.2d 1216, in which this 

Court held that a warrantless recording of a conversation 

consented to by one party but not the defendant was 

inadmissible as evidence because it violated the right to 

privacy guaranteed by the Montana Constitution. 

As a rationale for this about-face, the majority 

explains that the defendant had no reasonably justifiable 

expectation of privacy in her conversations with the 

undercover officer. Additionally, holds the majority, since 

the defendant's "interest" in keeping the conversation 

private is equal to the officer's interest in revealing the 

conversation, the officer's consent was enough to satisfy the 

protections of the right of privacy provision in our state 

constitution. I disagree with both these contentions. 

First, by finding that a defendant "has no reasonably 

justifiable expectation that statements made to another will 

be kept private by that person" the majority ostensibly 

abolishes the requirement of a search warrant to record any 

and all conversations between any persons if one party is a 

government agent and consents. I believe if the average 

citizen was asked whether the Montana Constitution gave him 

the right to expect his conversations with other people to be 

kept private, the answer would be a resounding "yes!" A 
recent case decided by the Superior Court of Pennsylvania 

makes a convincing argument that the consent of a government 

participant in a conversation to the recordation or 

electronic monitoring of that conversation should not be the 

guidepost by which we measure the constitutionality of 

admitting that recording into evidence. 

In the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, no citizen 

should have to expect that the government may 

immediately and irrevocably seize his private 

thoughts every time he voices them to another 

person. Moreover, whatever the distinction between 

electronic eavesdropping done without consent and 

electronic eavesdropping done with the consent of a 

government informant, it does not support a 

rational conclusion that the first practice is a 

government "search and seizure" into the speaker's 

protected zone of privacy while the second practice 

is not. 

Commonwealth v. Schaeffer (Pa. Super. 1987), 536 A.2d 354, 

360. 

Second, the majority attempts to characterize the 

defendant's conversation as an "object" in which she has some 

kind of possessory interest. I agree with the majority's 

statement that it is logically difficult to characterize a 

conversation as something in which the defendant has a 

possessory interest. However, I disagree with the majority's 

assertion that the officer and the defendant had "equal" 

interests in the conversation. The officer's interest in the 

conversation is to obtain enough incriminating evidence to 

give him probable cause to arrest the defendant for a crime. 

At his disposal in this endeavor is the whole arsenal of the 

government's law enforcement weaponry. The provisions of the 

state constitution were designed to protect citizens from 

abuse and misuse of this arsenal. To state that the 

defendant has an equal interest is to state that she has no 
interest and consequently no protection from governmental 

intrusion. 

Although the majority seems to have harmonized Montana 

law in this area with the federal trend it does a disservice 

to the citizens of this state by ignoring the greater right 

of the individual to exclude unreasonable impositions by the 

government recognized by Art. 11, 10, of our state 

constitution. The majority found that the defendant had no 

reasonably justifiable expectation of privacy in this 

situation. After this conclusion, how could it find any 

protection under the state constitution's right to privacy 

provisions? The answer is it couldn't. 

The majority feels constrained by the decisions of the 

United States Supreme Court. But this state, through the 

adoption of the right to privacy provision of our state 

constitution, has elected to give Montana citizens even 

greater guarantees of privacy than the federal constitution 

gives. Whv the majority chooses to ignore this explicit 

guarantee puzzles me. The decision is particularly puzzling 

in light of the fact that this is not a case in which there 

was no time to obtain a warrant. Even if getting a warrant 

in these types of cases becomes a perfunctory exercise, it 

should be done so as to at least acknowledge the rights of 

the individual in such a situation. Requiring a warrant may 

also insure the documentation and availability of a recording 

which actually exculpates a defendant. 

The language of the opinion is broad enough to allow 

conversations between a defendant and his attorney or other 

privileged conversations to be recorded without the consent 

of the defendant and to be allowed into evidence. It can be 

assumed that the majority does not really intend to abrogate 
the rule concerning privileged communications. But it is 

expansive language such as this that provides the hammer and 

chisel for the chipping away of rights guaranteed by the 

Montana Constitution. 

The decision made today is indeed a sad one for the 

citizens of the state of Montana. The majority may have 

unwittingly opened the doors for the erosion of any 

protection the privacy clause gives individuals of this 

state. The result may be required by the current posture of 

federal law but it certainly was not intended by the framers 

A 

of our state constitution. 

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