J-S53001-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: TERMINATION OF PARENTAL 

RIGHTS TO P.B.W.-V., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: M.W., MOTHER, AND 

S.J.

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1483 EDA 2020

Appeal from the Decree Entered July 1, 2020

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County 

Orphans’ Court at No(s): No. A2019-0097

BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., LAZARUS, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED: JANUARY 25, 2021

Appellants, M.W. (“Mother”) and Mother’s fiancé, S.J. (“Fiancé”), appeal 

from the final decree dated June 30, 2020, and entered on July 1, 2020. The 

decree dismissed Mother and Fiancé’s petition for adoption of P.B.W.-V. 

(“Child”), born in August 2012, finding that they had not established good 

cause for their failure to comply with 23 Pa.C.S. § 2901 or for the court to 

extend the applicability of 23 Pa.C.S. § 2903 to Fiancé. The decree 

additionally dismissed as moot the companion petition to involuntarily 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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terminate the parental rights of A.V., Child’s biological father (“Father”) 

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511.1 After careful review, we affirm the decree.

The record reflects that on December 20, 2019, Mother filed a petition 

to terminate Father’s parental rights.

2 Petition for Involuntary Termination of 

Parental Rights, 12/20/19. Additionally, Appellants filed a joint petition for 

adoption of Child. Petition for Adoption, 12/20/19. Child, Mother, and Fiancé 

have resided together as a family unit since 2014. N.T., 6/25/20, at 7. 

Moreover, Fiancé has been Child’s sole father-figure throughout Child’s young 

life. Id. at 19. Fiancé has been very involved with Child and his upbringing, 

including feeding, changing diapers, participating in morning and bedtime 

routines, and helping with homework. Id. at 8-9. Mother and Fiancé have 

been engaged since 2016. Id. at 11, 20. They delayed their wedding due to 

concerns regarding Mother’s and Child’s surnames following the marriage.3 

Id. at 12, 15-16, 20. 

By orders dated December 27, 2019, the court directed Mother and 

Fiancé to serve Father with the termination petition and to file a report of 

____________________________________________

1 Father did not file a separate appeal and did not participate in the instant 

appeal.

2 Mother and Fiancé sought to terminate Father’s parental rights pursuant to 

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1). Petition for Involuntary Termination of Parental 

Rights, 12/20/19.

3 Mother and Fiancé mistakenly believed that Mother’s surname would 

automatically change to Fiancé’s upon marriage, leaving Child with a different 

surname. N.T., 6/25/20, at 12, 15-16, 20, 22-23.
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intention to adopt. The court additionally scheduled a termination hearing for 

February 14, 2020. Subsequently, counsel entered her appearance on behalf 

of Mother and Fiancé on January 14, 2020, and a report of intention to adopt 

was filed on January 24, 2020. 

On January 31, 2020, a hearing on the petition for adoption was 

scheduled for February 10, 2020. Pursuant to an order filed on February 12, 

2020,4the orphans’ court continued the termination hearing due to the 

inability to serve Father, and all matters were re-listed for May 15, 2020. On 

March 3, 2020, the orphans’ court filed an order stating:

[Appellants] shall appear before the undersigned on May 15, 2020 

at 9:30 a.m. for a hearing to show cause why they should be 

permitted to proceed with the Petition For Adoption without the 

termination of Mother’s parental rights as required by 23 Pa.C.S.A. 

§2901, and why the statutory exception to such termination, set 

forth at 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2903, should be extended to apply to a 

minor’s adoption by a parent’s fiancé; and,

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the [Petition for Involuntary 

Termination of Parental Rights] shall be removed from the 

May 15, 2020 Hearing List and a ruling upon [Appellants’] request 

for the appointment of a guardian ad litem and/or counsel for 

[Child] is deferred.1

1

If [Appellants] fail to establish sufficient “cause” to 

permit the adoption without termination of Mother’s 

rights, the [Petition for Involuntary Termination of 

Parental Rights] would be rendered moot and there 

would be no need to require [Appellants] to locate and 

serve Father with the [Petition for Involuntary 

Termination of Parental Rights] and notice of hearing, 

____________________________________________

4 The February 12, 2020 order bears a handwritten date of “February 20.” 

However, the record reflects that the order was filed and docketed on 

February 12, 2020. 
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or to rule upon Petitioners’ request for appointment of 

a guardian ad litem or counsel for the minor pursuant 

to 2[3] Pa. C.S.A. §2313(a).

Order, 3/3/20, at 1-2. The show-cause hearing was continued to June 25, 

2020. Order, 4/29/20.

The court held the show-cause hearing on June 25, 2020. At the 

hearing, Appellants were represented by counsel, and both Mother and Fiancé

testified remotely. N.T., 6/25/20, at 4. Father was not present or represented 

by counsel. Following the hearing, in a final decree filed on July 1, 2020, the 

orphans’ court concluded that Mother and Fiancé had neither established good 

cause for their failure to comply with 23 Pa.C.S. § 2901 nor provided a basis 

upon which the orphans’ court could extend the applicability of 23 Pa.C.S. 

§ 2903 to Fiancé. Thus, the court dismissed the petition for adoption. 

Additionally, the orphans’ court dismissed the petition to involuntarily 

terminate the parental rights of Father pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511 as moot.

Mother and Fiancé filed a timely notice of appeal on July 30, 2020, along 

with a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). The orphans’ court filed its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) 

opinion on August 26, 2020.

On appeal, Appellants raise the following issues for our review:

1. Whether the [o]rphan’s [c]ourt abused its discretion and 

committed an error of law by determining, prior to a [h]earing on 

the [i]nvoluntary [t]ermination of [p]arental [r]ights, that the 

adoption of child by proposed adoptee was not permissible under 

the Pennsylvania Adoption Act[?]
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2. Whether the [o]rphan’s [c]ourt abused its discretion and 

committed an error of law by determining that [Appellants] failed 

to establish “cause” under Section 2901, to permit an adoption 

without terminating biological Mother’s rights and adoption by 

proposed adoptee, prior to a [h]earing on the merits of the 

[i]nvoluntary [t]ermination of [p]arental [r]ights of biological 

[f]ather, and when sufficient evidence was presented to 

demonstrate that the proposed adoption would create a new 

parent-child relationship, create a new family unit, and further the 

best interests of the child[?]

3. Whether the [o]rphan’s [c]ourt abused its discretion and 

committed an error of law by issuing a Final Decree and 

[d]ismissing as [m]oot the Petition for Involuntary Termination of 

Parental Rights of biological [f]ather before service of said Petition 

was ever made on biological [f]ather and before a [h]earing on 

the merits could be held[?]

4. Whether the [o]rphan’s [c]ourt abused its discretion and 

committed an error of law by holding a separate Rule to Show 

Cause Hearing, not authorized or required by the Adoption Act, on

[Appellants’] worthiness to proceed with a [h]earing on the 

[i]nvoluntary [t]ermination of [p]arental [r]ights of biological 

[f]ather and proposed [a]doption[?]

Appellants’ Brief at 6-7.

The Adoption Act is codified at 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101-2938; we note that 

in Pennsylvania, adoption is purely a statutory right. In re E.M.I., 57 A.3d 

1278, 1284 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation omitted). “[T]he interpretation and

application of a statute is a question of law that compels plenary review to 

determine whether the court committed an error of law.” Wilson v. 

Transport Ins. Co., 889 A.2d 563, 570 (Pa. Super. 2005). “As with all 

questions of law, the appellate standard of review is de novo and the appellate 

scope of review is plenary.” In re Wilson, 879 A.2d 199, 214 (Pa. Super. 

2005) (en banc). Moreover: 
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[We] are constrained by the rules of statutory interpretation, 

particularly as found in the Statutory Construction Act. 1 

Pa.C.S.[] §§ 1501-1991. The goal in interpreting any statute is 

to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly. 

Our Supreme Court has stated that the plain language of a statute 

is in general the best indication of the legislative intent that gave 

rise to the statute. When the language is clear, explicit, and free 

from any ambiguity, we discern intent from the language alone, 

and not from the arguments based on legislative history or “spirit”

of the statute. We must construe words and phrases in the statute 

according to their common and approved usage. We also must 

construe a statute in such a way as to give effect to all its 

provisions, if possible, thereby avoiding the need to label any 

provision as mere surplusage. 

Cimino v. Valley Family Medicine, 912 A.2d 851, 853 (Pa. Super. 2006) 

(quoting Weiner v. Fisher, 871 A.2d 1283, 1285-1286 (Pa. Super. 2005)); 

see also 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b) (providing, inter alia, “The object of all 

interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the 

intention of the General Assembly.”). Pursuant to 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(c), “[i]t 

is only when the words of a statute are not explicit that a court may resort to 

other considerations, such as the statute’s perceived purpose, in order to 

ascertain legislative intent.” Sternlicht v. Sternlicht, 876 A.2d 904, 909

(Pa. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). Finally, “it is presumed that 

the legislature did not intend an absurd or unreasonable result. In this regard, 

we ... are permitted to examine the practical consequences of a particular 

interpretation.” Commonwealth v. Diakatos, 708 A.2d 510, 512 (Pa. 

Super. 1998). 

The crux of Appellants’ appeal is that the orphans’ court erred in 

addressing the validity of the proposed adoption prior to the requested 
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termination of Father’s parental rights and a termination hearing. Appellants’

Brief at 16-25. Appellants maintain that an intended or anticipated adoption 

is sufficient to require a termination hearing. Id. at 16. They assert “The 

relevant caselaw supports the argument that a factual averment of an intent 

to adopt is sufficient to obtain a hearing on the termination petition. Then, at 

the termination hearing, the court must then evaluate the ‘proposed adoption’

that was averred in the petition.” Id. at 24-25. Appellants continue:

The [o]rphan’s [c]ourt in this matter improperly scrutinized the 

“anticipated adoption” before, and outside the context of, a 

termination hearing. The [o]rphan’s [c]ourt did not engage in an 

analysis of the termination petition, which includes consideration 

of the “anticipated adoption” per Section 2511(b), because a 

hearing on same was [n]ever held.

Id. at 17. Appellants contend “The [o]rphan’s [c]ourt erroneously generated 

its own procedure, holding a hearing on a proposed adoption before a hearing 

on the termination of parental rights.” Id. at 21. 

As noted above, adoption is a purely statutory right. E.M.I., 57 A.3d at 

1284. Our Supreme Court has held:

To effect an adoption, the legislative provisions of the Adoption 

Act must be strictly complied with. [In re Adoption of 

E.M.A., 409 A.2d 10, 11 (Pa. 1979)]. Thus, our analysis is focused 

entirely on the relevant statutory provisions.

The Adoption Act provides that “[a]ny individual may be adopted, 

regardless of his age or residence.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2311. Similarly, 

“[a]ny individual may become an adopting parent.” [Id.] at § 

2312. Section 2701 sets forth the requisite contents of a petition 

for adoption filed by a prospective adoptive parent. ...
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In re Adoption of R.B.F., 803 A.2d 1195, 1199 (Pa. 2002). The Adoption 

Act provides, in part, as follows:

A petition for adoption shall set forth:

(1) The full name, residence, marital status, age, 

occupation, religious affiliation and racial background 

of the adopting parent or parents and their 

relationship, if any, to the adoptee.

(2) That the reports under sections 2530 (relating to 

home study and preplacement report), 2531 (relating 

to report of intention to adopt) and 2533 (relating to 

report of intermediary) have been filed, if required.

(3) The name and address of the intermediary, if any.

(4) The full name of the adoptee and the fact and 

length of time of the residence of the adoptee with the 

adopting parent or parents.

(5) If there is no intermediary or if no report of the 

intermediary has been filed or if the adoptee is over 

the age of 18 years, all vital statistics and other 

information enumerated and required to be stated of 

record by section 2533, so far as applicable.

(6) If a change in name of the adoptee is desired, the 

new name.

(7) That all consents required by section 2711 

(relating to consents necessary to adoption) are 

attached as exhibits or the basis upon which such 

consents are not required.

(8) That it is the desire of the petitioner or the 

petitioners that the relationship of parent and child be 

established between the petitioner or petitioners and 

the adoptee.

(9) If no birth certificate or certification of registration 

of birth can be obtained, a statement of the reason 

therefor and an allegation of the efforts made to 
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obtain the certificate with a request that the court 

establish a date and place of birth at the adoption 

hearing on the basis of the evidence presented.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2701.

As to consent to adoption, 23 Pa.C.S. § 2711 states, in part, as follows:

(a) General rule.--Except as otherwise provided in this part, 

consent to an adoption shall be required of the following:

(1) The adoptee, if over 12 years of age.

(2) The spouse of the adopting parent, unless they 

join in the adoption petition.

(3) The parents or surviving parent of an adoptee who 

has not reached the age of 18 years.

(4) The guardian of an incapacitated adoptee.

(5) The guardian of the person of an adoptee under 

the age of 18 years, if any there be, or of the person 

or persons having the custody of the adoptee, if any 

such person can be found, whenever the adoptee has 

no parent whose consent is required.

* * *

(d) Contents of consent.--

(1) The consent of a parent of an adoptee under 18 

years of age shall set forth the name, age and marital 

status of the parent, the relationship of the consenter 

to the child, the name of the other parent or parents 

of the child and the following:

I hereby voluntarily and unconditionally 

consent to the adoption of the above 

named child.

I understand that by signing this consent 

I indicate my intent to permanently give 

up all rights to this child.
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I understand such child will be placed for 

adoption.

* * *

23 Pa.C.S. § 2711(a)(1)-(5), (d).

Further, as to retention of parental rights, the Adoption Act states:

Unless the court for cause shown determines otherwise, no decree 

of adoption shall be entered unless the natural parent or parents’

rights have been terminated, the investigation required by Section

2535 (relating to investigation) has been completed, the report of 

the intermediary has been filed pursuant to Section 2533 (relating 

to report of intermediary) and all other legal requirements have 

been met. If all legal requirements have been met, the court may 

enter a decree of adoption at any time.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2901. However, 23 Pa.C.S. § 2903 provides an exception to 

Section 2901:

Whenever a parent consents to the adoption of his child by his 

spouse, the parent-child relationship between him and his child 

shall remain whether or not he is one of the petitioners in the 

adoption proceeding.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2903; see also Adoption of R.B.F., 803 A.2d at 1199-1200 

(remanding for a determination of cause pursuant to Section 2901 and stating, 

“Thus, absent a qualifying provision appearing elsewhere in the Adoption Act, 

it is clear from a plain reading of these sections that a legal parent must 

relinquish his parental rights in order to consent to the adoption of his child 

by a non-spouse.”).

With respect to the filing of a petition to terminate parental rights, the 

Adoption Act states:
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(a) Who may file.--A petition to terminate parental rights with 

respect to a child under the age of 18 years may be filed by any 

of the following:

(1) Either parent when termination is sought with 

respect to the other parent.

(2) An agency.

(3) The individual having custody or standing in loco 

parentis to the child and who has filed a report of 

intention to adopt required by section 2531 (relating 

to report of intention to adopt).

(4) An attorney representing a child or a guardian ad 

litem representing a child who has been adjudicated 

dependent under 42 Pa.C.S. § 6341(c) (relating to 

adjudication).

(b) Contents.--The petition shall set forth specifically those 

grounds and facts alleged as the basis for terminating parental 

rights. The petition filed under this section shall also contain an 

averment that the petitioner will assume custody of the child until 

such time as the child is adopted. If the petitioner is an agency it 

shall not be required to aver that an adoption is presently 

contemplated nor that a person with a present intention to adopt 

exists. 

23 Pa.C.S. § 2512(a), (b).

5

 As suggested by Section 2512(b), where an 

agency is not involved, there must be a contemplated or intended adoption.

____________________________________________

5 During the pendency of this appeal, Section 2512(b) was amended as 

follows:

(b) Contents.--The following apply:

(1) The petition shall set forth specifically those 

grounds and facts alleged as the basis for terminating 

parental rights.
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A petition to terminate a natural parent’s parental rights, filed by 

one natural parent against the other under Section 2512(a)(1), is 

cognizable only if an adoption of the child is foreseeable. Even 

when a Section 2512(a)(1) petition might satisfy the statutory 

requirements for termination, a court still cannot grant the 

petition without a corresponding plan for an anticipated adoption 

of the child. A “contemplated adoption” is required in this context 

because Section 2512(a)(1) was not designed as a punitive 

measure to penalize an ineffective or negligent parent.

E.M.I., 57 A.3d at 1285 (internal citations omitted).

Lastly, we highlight the holding from In re Adoption of M.R.D., 145 

A.3d 1117 (Pa. 2016). In that case, our Supreme Court reversed the 

termination of a father’s parental rights where a mother, without relinquishing 

her parental rights to the child, sought to terminate the father’s parental 

rights. Mother endeavored to terminate the father’s parental rights in order 

for the maternal grandfather to adopt the child. In finding there was not a 

valid contemplated adoption, our Supreme Court stated:

____________________________________________

(2) Except as provided in paragraph (3), the petition 

filed under this section shall also contain an averment 

that the petitioner will assume custody of the child 

until such time as the child is adopted.

(3) If the petitioner is a parent and section 2514 

(relating to special provisions when child conceived as 

a result of rape or incest) applies, or if the petitioner 

is an agency, the petitioner shall not be required to 

aver that an adoption is presently contemplated nor 

that a person with a present intention to adopt exists.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2512(b). However, the amended version does not impact our 

analysis as it applies only to petitions to involuntarily terminate parental rights 

filed on or after December 28, 2020.
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Section 2512(a) of the Adoption Act sets forth the parties 

who may file a petition for involuntary termination, including, inter 

alia, a parent or agency. In contrast to an agency petition, a 

parent petitioning to terminate parental rights of the child’s other 

parent must file a termination petition containing an averment 

that the petitioner will assume custody of the child until such 

time as the child is adopted. Thus, the petitioning parent must 

demonstrate that an adoption of the child is anticipated in order 

for the termination petition to be cognizable. Section 2512(b)’s 

adoption requirement is consistent with the rationale behind 

permitting the involuntary termination of a parent’s rights, which 

we have explained is to dispense with the need for parental 

consent to adoption when, by choice or neglect, a parent has failed 

to meet the continuing needs of the child, rather than to punish 

an ineffective or negligent parent, or provide a means for changing 

the surname of the child.

 

Because a termination petition filed by one parent against 

the other must occur in the context of an anticipated adoption, 

and because adoption is a statutory right, we note that the parent 

seeking termination must strictly comply with all pertinent 

provisions of the Adoption Act in order for the adoption to be valid. 

While the Adoption Act provides that “[a]ny individual may 

become an adopting parent,” 23 Pa.C.S. [§ 2312], relevant to the 

instant matter, Section 2711 of the Act requires the parent 

seeking termination to consent to the adoption and to relinquish 

his or her parental rights. Requiring parental consent to the 

adoption and the relinquishment of his or her parental rights 

permits the child and the adoptive parent or parents to establish 

a new parent-child relationship. Thus, where no new parent-child 

relationship is contemplated, the involuntary termination of 

parental rights is not permitted under the Adoption Act.

* * *

The purpose behind the termination or relinquishment of an 

existing parent’s rights prior to an adoption is to facilitate a “new 

parent-child relationship” between the child and the adoptive 

parent, and to protect “the integrity and stability of the new family 

unit.” 
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Adoption of M.R.D., 145 A.3d at 1120, 1127-1128 (emphasis in original) 

(some internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (footnotes omitted).6

In the instant case, the orphans’ court determined that the petition for 

adoption should be dismissed, and the termination petition was moot. The 

orphans’ court reasoned as follows:

Because adoption is a purely statutory right and the 

legislative provisions of the Adoption Act must be strictly complied 

with, In re Adoption of E.M.A., 487 Pa. 152, 155, 409 A.2d 10, 

11 (Pa. 1979), we dismissed the Petition for Adoption for failure 

to comply with the consent requirements and dismissed [the 

termination petition] as moot because it cannot be considered 

without a viable pending adoption, See 23 Pa.C.S. § 2512(b); In 

re E.M.I., 57 A.3d 1278, 1286 (Pa. Super. 2012) (termination 

petition of one biological parent against the other, per Section 

2512(a)(1), is cognizable only as an aid to adoption).

A legal parent must relinquish her parental rights in order to 

consent to the adoption of her child by a non-spouse. In re 

____________________________________________

6 The Court in Adoption of M.R.D. also recognized: 

By contrast, in second-parent adoption cases in which the 

relinquishment of a parent’s rights is not required—i.e., 

stepparent adoptions and adoptions by same-sex couples—

relinquishment of the parent’s rights is unnecessary, and indeed 

damaging. In such cases, the parent and the prospective adoptive 

parent are committed partners—that is, they are involved in a 

horizontal relationship, are equals as between each other, and are 

equals with respect to the child. Adoption in such circumstances 

allows the prospective adoptive parent to create a new parentchild relationship with the legal parent’s child and a family 

unit together with the co-parent to whom he or she is committed. 

Thus, because the legal parent and prospective parent in secondparent adoption cases are part of the same family unit, the 

relinquishment requirement undermines, rather than promotes, 

family stability.

M.R.D., 145 A.3d at 1128 (emphasis in original).
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Adoption of R.B.F., 569 Pa. at 276, 277, 803 A.2d at 1199 

(referencing 23 Pa.C.S. § 2903). The language of 23 Pa.C.S. 

§ 2901 permits a petitioner to demonstrate by clear and 

convincing evidence why, in a particular case, he or she cannot 

meet the statutory requirements. Id., 569 Pa. at 283, 803 A.2d 

at 1203. The exercise of this discretion by the court does not open 

the door to unlimited adoptions by legally unrelated adults. Id.,

569 Pa. at 280, 803 A.2d at 1202. We exercised our discretion in 

holding a hearing to give [Appellants] the opportunity to provide 

clear and convincing evidence as to why they could not meet the 

statutory requirements.

[Appellants’] testimony clearly and unequivocally 

established that they had not married before instituting adoption 

proceedings because of their mistaken belief that Mother’s 

surname would automatically change to [Fiancé’s] surname upon 

their marriage, and Mother did not want the adoptee to question 

why his name was different from his mother’s name. This 

mistaken belief was corrected prior to the hearing. This is not a 

case where the [Appellants] cannot meet the statutory 

requirements, because, for example, one of the petitioners is 

involved in protracted and complex divorce proceedings that 

precludes remarriage in the foreseeable future, a case where a 

marriage would not be legal, or a case in which a marriage would 

have a significant adverse economic impact on one of the 

petitioners. In fact, [Appellants] have been engaged to be 

married since 2016 and are planning a wedding at this time. In 

other words, [Appellants] can satisfy the statutory requirements 

of the Adoption Act. They have simply chosen not to do so.

Our ruling in this case is without prejudice to [Appellants’] 

re-filing both petitions, at such time as they can satisfy the 

requirements of 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2901 and 2903.

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 8/26/20, at unnumbered 3-4 (citations to the record 

omitted; footnote omitted).

However, after careful review, we need not examine the orphans’ court’s 

decision to address the proposed adoption prior to and separate from the 

requested termination of Father’s parental rights. Pennsylvania Rule of 
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Appellate Procedure 302(a) provides for the waiver of issues not first raised 

in the lower court (“Issues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot 

be raised for the first time on appeal.”). See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (providing for 

waiver of issues not first raised in lower court); see also Fillmore v. Hill, 

665 A.2d 514, 515-516 (Pa. Super. 1995) (stating, “to preserve an issue for 

appellate review, a party must make a timely and specific objection at the 

appropriate stage of the proceedings before the trial court. Failure to timely 

object to a basic and fundamental error, such as an erroneous jury instruction, 

will result in waiver of that issue. On appeal, the Superior Court will not 

consider a claim which was not called to the trial court’s attention at a time 

when any error committed could have been corrected.”) (citations omitted). 

As stated, all of Appellants’ issues involve and assail the orphans’ court’s 

decision to issue a ruling on the petition for adoption prior to and separate 

from the termination of Father’s parental rights. Appellants’ Brief at 6-7. 

Critically, Appellants did not object to the orphans’ court’s cancellation of the 

termination hearing and deferral of this issue pending the show-cause hearing. 

“No objections were filed to the scheduling orders, which were clearly 

premised upon the court’s view that the expenditure of time, effort and costs 

to effectuate proper service of [the termination petition] was not warranted, 

unless the Petition for Adoption could proceed without Mother relinquishing 

her parental rights.” Orphans’ Court Opinion, 8/26/20, at unnumbered 2-3. 

Furthermore, Appellants participated in the show-cause hearing and were 
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represented by counsel. Nonetheless, counsel failed to assert any objection 

to proceeding with a show-cause hearing prior to a hearing or decision with 

respect to the petition for the involuntary termination of parental rights or the 

failure to serve Father with said petition. Id. at unnumbered 3. Appellants’

lack of objection is demonstrated in the following interaction from the 

beginning of the hearing:

THE COURT: Good afternoon. You may be seated. You may sit 

down. I’m going to have you stand in a minute, so sit down. 

Okay.

Good afternoon. We are here with regard to the matter of 

the adoption of [Child] ... . The scheduled purpose for today is a 

hearing to show cause why the [c]ourt should permit the adoption 

to proceed without the termination of the mother’s parental rights 

as required by 23 Pa.C.S.[§] 2901.

[Counsel], you are here on behalf of [Appellants]?

[COUNSEL]: I am, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. And are you prepared to proceed with a 

hearing?

[COUNSEL]: Yes, Your Honor.

N.T., 6/25/20, at 4. 

Appellants failed to object to the proceedings and chose to move forward 

with the show-cause hearing relative to the petition for adoption prior to a 

ruling or hearing on the petition for the involuntary termination of parental 

rights. Appellants cannot now challenge the orphans’ court’s procedure, and 

their failure to object waived all of their issues on appeal. Pa.R.A.P. 302(a); 
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Fillmore, 665 A.2d at 515-516. We, therefore, affirm the orphans’ court’s 

decree.

7

Decree affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 1/25/21

____________________________________________

7 We reiterate, however, that the orphans’ court’s decree was entered without 

prejudice to Appellants’ ability to re-file both petitions and satisfy the 

requirements set forth in the Adoption Act. Orphans’ Court Opinion, 8/26/20, 

at unnumbered 4.