alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Ezequiel Munoz TELLEZ; et al., Petitioners, v. Michael B. MUKASEY,* Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 07-70508.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Dec. 20, 2007 **.

Filed Dec. 28, 2007.

Richard Mendez, Esq., Law Offices of Mendez & Lopez, Los Angeles, CA, for Petitioners.

CAC-District Counsel, Esq., Office of the District Counsel Department of Homeland Security, Los Angeles, CA, Ronald E. Lefevre, Chief Counsel, Office of the District Counsel Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, Christopher P. McGreal, Benjamin J. Zeitlin, Esq., U.S. Department of Justice Civil Div./Office of Immigration Lit., Washington, DC, for Respondent.

Before: GOODWIN, WALLACE, and HAWKINS, Circuit Judges.

*

 Michael B. Mukasey is substituted for his predecessor, Alberto R. Gonzales, as Attorney General of the United States, pursuant to Fed. R.App. P. 43(c)(2).

**

 The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM ***

Ezequiel Munoz Tellez, his wife Felipa Mayo Cortes, and their son Alexis Em*942manuel Munoz Mayo seek review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming an immigration judge’s order denying the parents’ applications for cancellation of removal. To the extent we have jurisdiction, it is pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review de novo claims of constitutional violations in immigration proceedings, *see Ram v. INS,*243 F.3d 510, 516 (9th Cir.2001), and we dismiss in part and deny in part the petition for review.

We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s discretionary determination that petitioners failed. to show exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to a qualifying relative. *See Romero-Torres v. Ashcroft,*327 F.3d 887, 892 (9th Cir.2003). We do not consider petitioners’ contentions regarding physical presence and moral character, because petitioners’ failure to establish hardship is dispositive.

We are not persuaded that the qualifying relative requirement for cancellation of removal violates equal protection. *See Ram,*243 F.3d at 517 (“ ‘[Ljine-drawing’ decisions made by Congress or the President in the context of immigration and naturalization must be upheld if they are rationally related to a legitimate government purpose.”); *Molina-Estrada v. INS,*293 F.3d 1089, 1093-94 (9th Cir.2002) (concluding that petitioner who failed to show evidence of qualifying relative was ineligible for cancellation of removal).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DISMISSED in part; DENIED in part.

***

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
NO. 07-03-0500-CR

	IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

	FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

	AT AMARILLO

	PANEL B

	JANUARY 7, 2004

	______________________________

	JEREMY HUNTER,

			Appellant

	v.

	THE STATE OF TEXAS, 

			Appellee

	_________________________________

	FROM THE 137TH DISTRICT COURT OF LUBBOCK COUNTY;

	NO. 99-429,897; HON. CECIL PURYEAR, PRESIDING

	_______________________________

Before JOHNSON, C.J., and QUINN and CAMPBELL, JJ.

	Appellant, Jeremy Hunter, appeals the judgment revoking his probation for delivery of a controlled substance.  We dismiss the proceeding for lack of jurisdiction.     

	The judgment revoking probation, from which appellant is appealing, indicates that sentence was imposed on March 28, 2003.  Appellant then filed a notice of appeal on November 24, 2003.  No motion for new trial was filed. 

	To be timely, a notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after the sentence is imposed or suspended in open court or within 90 days after that date if a motion for new trial is filed.  Tex. R. App. P. 26.2(a).  Thus, appellant's notice of appeal was due to be filed on or about April 28, 2003, but was not filed until November 24, 2003.  Furthermore, he did not move for an extension of the deadline. 

	A timely filed notice of appeal is essential to invoke our appellate jurisdiction.  Olivo v. State, 918 S.W.2d 519, 522 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).  If the notice is not timely, then the court of appeals can take no action other than to dismiss the proceeding.  Id. at 523.  Because appellant's notice of appeal was untimely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider the appeal. 

	Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

							Per Curiam 

Do not publish.
I 

112TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 2392 

To authorize the Secretary of Agriculture to enter into building leasing 

agreements. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JUNE 24, 2011 

Mr. PETERSON introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

A BILL 

To authorize the Secretary of Agriculture to enter into 

building leasing agreements. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. AUTHORITY OF SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE 

4 TO ENTER INTO LEASE AGREEMENTS. 

5 Section 585 of title 40, United States Code, is 

6 amended by adding at the end the following new sub7 section: 

8 ‘‘(d) SPECIAL LEASING AUTHORITY FOR SECRETARY

9 OF AGRICULTURE.—The authority provided to the Admin10 istrator under subsection (a)(1) with respect to entering 


jlentini on DSK4TPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 2392 IH

1 into lease agreements shall also apply to the Secretary of 

2 Agriculture for purposes of entering into lease agreements 

3 for the Department of Agriculture or any agency, adminis4 tration, or service thereof.’’. 

Æ 


jlentini on DSK4TPTVN1PROD with BILLS
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Stephen Kelemen, Appellant.

Submitted February 4, 2008;

decided March 25, 2008

*805Motion for leave to appeal dismissed upon the ground that no civil appeal lies from the order of the Appellate Division entered in this criminal action *(see*NY Const, art VI, § 3 [b]; CPLR 5602; CPL 450.90). Motion for poor person relief dismissed as academic.
Exhibit 32.2

Certification of Chief Financial Officer

Pursuant to

Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. 1350)

In connection with this Annual Report on Form 10-K (the Report) of CM Finance Inc (the Registrant), as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof, I, Rocco DelGuercio, the Chief Financial Officer of the Registrant, hereby certify, to the best of my knowledge, that:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as
amended; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
condition and results of operations of the Registrant.



/s/    Rocco
DelGuercioName:

Rocco DelGuercioDate:

September 4, 2018
CIRCUIT COURT OF CHESTERFIELD COUNTY

#### Clarendon National Ins. Co. v. M & F of Richmond et al.

July 16, 2003

Case No. CL02-707

By Judge F. G. Rockwell, III

The parties were before the Court on June 23,2003, for a hearing on Sears, Roebuck & Company’s (“Sears”) Motion to Dismiss based on M & F of Richmond, Inc.’s (“M & F”) failure to give reasonable notice of the impending claim. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court took the matter under advisement.

After considering the oral arguments, the applicable case and statutory law, and the briefs submitted by both parties to the motion to dismiss, the Court makes the following finding.

*Facts*

This matter arises out of damage caused to a house by a dishwasher that allegedly leaked. M & F purchased the dishwasher from Sears to put into the house. Winn’s Plumbing (“Winn”), M & F’s subcontractor, then installed the dishwasher.

On October 25,1999, the homeowners called M & F to complain about the leaking dishwasher. M & F dispatched Winn to address the problem. Sears contends that it did not receive notice of the claim until three years after the breach and that Sears is therefore prejudiced and should be entitled to have the *306action dismissed. M & F alleges that Sears in fact received notice in a timely manner.

*Finding*

The Court finds that the matter regarding notice is governed by Va. Code Ann. § 8.2-607(3)(a) (1950) which states:

> (3) Where a tender has been accepted

> (a) the buyer must within a reasonable time after he discovers or should have discovered any breach notify the seller of breach or be barred from any remedy.

*Begley*v. *Jeep*Corp., 491 F. Supp. 63 (W.D. Va. 1980), provides guidance in this matter. The Court in *Begley*considered a breach of warranty claim under Va. Code § 8.2-607(3)(a) for timeliness of notice. The Court held that:

> The only question before the court, therefore, is whether plaintiffs gave defendants “reasonable” notice of the breach of warranty. Ordinarily, this is a question of fact reserved for the jury; however, *if the evidence is*clear, the court can rule as a matter of law that a party failed to give proper notice. The burden of proof is on the plaintiff to show that notice was given within a reasonable time.

*Begley*at 65 (emphasis added, citation omitted).

The Court finds that the evidence submitted at this point is not clear as to when Sears received notice of the claim. The Court therefore denies Sear’s Motion to Dismiss at this time. Each party should be afforded the opportunity to put on evidence as to when notice was given and received.
EXHIBIT 31.1





CERTIFICATION





I, Julia A. Sloat, certify that:





1. I have reviewed this report on Form 10-K and all reports on Form 10-D required to be filed in respect of the period covered by this report on Form 10-K of Ohio Phase-In-Recovery Funding LLC (the "Exchange Act periodic reports");





2. Based on my knowledge, the Exchange Act periodic reports, taken as a whole, do not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;





3. Based on my knowledge, all of the distribution, servicing and other information required to be provided under Form 10-D for the period covered by this report is included in the Exchange Act periodic reports;





4. I am responsible for reviewing the activities performed by Ohio Power Company, as Servicer, and based on my knowledge and the compliance review conducted in preparing the servicer compliance statement required in this report under Item 1123 of Regulation AB, and except as disclosed in the Exchange Act periodic reports, the servicer has fulfilled its obligations under the Servicing Agreement dated as of August 1, 2013 between Ohio Phase-In-Recovery Funding LLC, as the Issuing Entity, and the Servicer, in all material respects; and





5. All of the reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed securities and the related attestation reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed securities required to be included in this report in accordance with Item 1122 of Regulation AB and Exchange Act Rule 13a-18 and 15d-18 have been included as an exhibit to this report, except as otherwise disclosed in this report. Any material instances of noncompliance described in such reports have been disclosed in this report on Form 10-K.





6. In giving the certifications above, I have reasonably relied on information provided to me by the following unaffiliated parties: U.S. Bank National Association, as Indenture Trustee.





Date: March 28, 2016/s/ Julia A. SloatName:  Julia A. SloatTitle: Treasurer and Senior Officer in Charge of theServicing Function, Ohio Power Company, as Servicer
I 

112TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 2345 

To amend title 38, United States Code, to extend the authorization of appropriations for the Secretary of Veterans Affairs to pay a monthly assistance allowance to disabled veterans training or competing for the 

Paralympic Team and the authorization of appropriations for the Secretary of Veterans Affairs to provide assistance to United States 

Paralympics, Inc. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JUNE 23, 2011 

Mr. STUTZMAN introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Veterans’ Affairs 

A BILL 

To amend title 38, United States Code, to extend the authorization of appropriations for the Secretary of Veterans 

Affairs to pay a monthly assistance allowance to disabled 

veterans training or competing for the Paralympic Team 

and the authorization of appropriations for the Secretary 

of Veterans Affairs to provide assistance to United 

States Paralympics, Inc. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 


jlentini on DSK4TPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 2345 IH

1 SECTION 1. EXTENSION OF AUTHORIZATION OF APPRO2 PRIATIONS FOR PAYMENT OF A MONTHLY AS3 SISTANCE ALLOWANCE TO DISABLED VET4 ERANS TRAINING OR COMPETING FOR THE 

5 PARALYMPIC TEAM. 

6 Section 322(d)(4) of title 38, United States Code, is 

7 amended by striking ‘‘2013’’ and inserting ‘‘2018’’. 

8 SEC. 2. EXTENSION OF AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIA9 TIONS FOR ASSISTANCE TO UNITED STATES 

10 PARALYMPICS, INC. 

11 Section 521A of such title is amended— 

12 (1) in subsection (g), by striking ‘‘2013’’ and 

13 inserting ‘‘2018’’; and 

14 (2) in subsection (l), by striking ‘‘2013’’ and in15 serting ‘‘2018’’. 

Æ 


jlentini on DSK4TPTVN1PROD with BILLS
| (logo) WELLS FARGO | **Corporate Trust Services**MAC R1204-0109062 Old Annapolis RoadColumbia, MD 21045Tel: 410 884 2000 Fax: 410 715 2380 |
|--------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.383 Madison Avenue31st FloorNew York, New York 10179  RE: Annual Statement of Compliance for JPMBB Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2013-C14 Commercial Mortgage Pass Through Certificates, Series 2013-C14 Per the Pooling and Servicing Agreement dated as of August 1, 2013 (the "Agreement"), the undersigned, a duly authorized officer of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., as Certificate Administrator ("Wells Fargo"), hereby certifies as follows as of and for the year ending December 31, 2015 (the "Reporting Period"): (a) A review of Wells Fargo's activities during the Reporting Period and of its performance under the Agreement has been made under such officer's supervision; and (b) To the best of such officer's knowledge, based on such review, Wells Fargo has fulfilled all of its obligations under the Agreement in all material respects throughout the Reporting Period.  March 1, 2016 /s/ Brian SmithBRIAN SMITHVice President   Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
(logo) ncb

National Cooperative Bank

 

 

 

 

 

February 26, 2015

 

 

 

RBS Commercial Funding, Inc. as Depositor

Attn: Jim Barnard

600 Washington Blvd. 

Stamford, CT 06901

 

RE:          Annual Statement as to Compliance

WFRBS 2013 C15

 

Dear Sir/Madam: 

 

In accordance with the Pooling and Servicing Agreement entered into in connection with the issuance of the Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2013-C15, as an authorized officer of National Cooperative Bank, N.A., formerly NCB, FSB (the “NCB Master Servicer”), I hereby certify pursuant to Section 11.12 thereof that:

 

a .   A review of the activities of the NCB Master Servicer during the preceding calendar year (the “Reporting Period”) and of its performance under the Pooling and Servicing Agreement has been made under my supervision.

 

b.   To the best of my knowledge, based on these reviews, the NCB Master Servicer has fulfilled all obligations under this agreement in all material respects throughout the Reporting Period.

 

Please note that the annual financial statement will be sent under separate cover on or before March 31, 2015.

Best regards, 

/s/ Karyn Mann

 

Karyn Mann

Senior Vice President, Investor Compliance

National Cooperative Bank, N.A.
#### Carey *v.*Cunard Steam-Ship Co.*

*(Circuit Court, S. D. New York.*

January 26, 1883.)

*

 Affirmed. See 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1360

Shipman, J.

The motion of the defendant in the above-entitled cause for a new trial is denied, and the stage of proceedings *is*vacated.
United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 20-10897

Summary Calendar

United States of America, 

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

Michael Blaine Faulkner, 

Defendant—Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 3:09-CR-249-2

Before Jolly, Ho, and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Michael Blaine Faulkner, federal prisoner # 03829-078, appeals the 

denial of his 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) motion for compassionate release. 

He contends that the district court erred by relying on U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, p.s.,

in denying his motion because § 1B1.13 does not apply to § 3582(c)(1)(A) 

* Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this 

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited 

circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

July 12, 2021

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Case: 20-10897 Document: 00515934355 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/12/2021
No. 20-10897

2

motions brought by prisoners. We do not consider Faulkner’s claim, raised 

for the first time on appeal, that the district court erred by declining to grant 

him a transfer to home confinement under the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and 

Economic Security Act. See Leverette v. Louisville Ladder Co., 183 F.3d 339, 

342 (5th Cir. 1999).

We review the district court’s denial of Faulkner’s § 3582(c)(1)(A) 

motion for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Chambliss, 948 F.3d 

691, 693 (5th Cir. 2020). Faulkner must show that the district court “base[d] 

its decision on an error of law or a clearly erroneous assessment of the 

evidence.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Following the denial of Faulkner’s motion, we held that a district 

court is not bound by § 1B1.13 in considering a § 3582(c)(1)(A) motion 

brought by a prisoner. See United States v. Shkambi, 993 F.3d 388, 392-93 

(5th Cir. 2021). Because the district court treated § 1B1.13 as binding and 

dispositive, it abused its discretion. See id. at 393; Chambliss, 948 F.3d at 693.

The denial of Faulkner’s § 3582(c)(1)(A) motion is VACATED, and 

the case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this 

opinion. 

Case: 20-10897 Document: 00515934355 Page: 2 Date Filed: 07/12/2021
<PAGE>

                                                                      Exhibit 12
                                                                      ----------

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                                         Three Months Ended       Six Months Ended
                                                              June 30,                June 30,
                                                        --------------------    --------------------
                                                          2000        1999        2000        1999
                                                        --------    --------    --------    --------
<S>                                                     <C>         <C>         <C>         <C>
DETERMINATION OF RATIO OF EARNINGS TO
-------------------------------------
   FIXED CHARGES:
   --------------

Loss before benefit for income taxes                    ($ 2,237)   ($ 1,673)   ($ 2,679)   ($ 1,063)

Fixed charges
             Amortization of deferred financing costs        335         298         673         594
             Interest expense                              5,160       4,396      10,222       8,579
                                                        --------    --------    --------    --------
Earnings before fixed charges                              3,258       3,021       8,216       8,110

Fixed charges
             Amortization of deferred financing costs        335         298         673         594
             Interest expense                              5,160       4,396      10,222       8,579
                                                        --------    --------    --------    --------
Total fixed charges                                        5,495       4,694      10,895       9,173

Ratio of earnings to fixed charges                         0.59X       0.64X       0.75X       0.88X
                                                        ========    ========    ========    ========
</TABLE>
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR
. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR
. R. 47.5.4. 

### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-50149 Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Plaintiff-Appellee

v. ADRIAN OMAR PRECIADO-GINER Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC No. 3:07-CR-2233-ALL
Before DAVIS, WIENER, and PRADO, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Adrian Omar Preciado-Giner (Preciado) appeals his sentence of 46 months of imprisonment for conspiring to possess, and possessing with intent to distribute, more than 100 kilograms of marijuana. He argues that the district court erred by declining his request for a minor role adjustment pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b) because he acted only as a courier for the drugs at issue. Whether a defendant is a minor participant in a drug offense is a factual United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit 

### F I L E D December 10, 2008 Charles R. Fulbruge III ClerkNo. 08-50149

2 determination reviewed for clear error. U nited States v. Villanueva, 408 F.3d 193, 203 (5th Cir. 2005). “A factual finding is not clearly erroneous if it is plausible in light of the record read as a whole.” Id. An adjustment for a minor role applies toa defendant “who is less culpable than most other participants, but whose role could not be described as minimal.” § 3B1.2, comment. (n.5). To be eligible for a minor role adjustment, a defendant “must have been peripheral to the advancement of the illicit activity.” U nited S tates v. Miranda, 248 F.3d 434, 447 (5th Cir. 2001). The burden is on the defendant to establish his entitlement tothe reduction by a preponderance ofthe evidence. Burton v. United States, 237 F.3d 490, 503 (5th Cir. 2000). A defendant’s role in the offense “turns upon culpability, not courier status.” U nited States v. Buenrostro, 868 F. 2d 135, 138 (5th Cir. 1989). Consequently, drug couriers are not necessarily eligible for a reduction of their offense level under § 3B1.2. U nited Statesv. Edwards, 65 F.3d 430, 434 (5th Cir. 1995). To the contrary, couriers are often “an indispensable part of drug dealing networks. Without somebody to take the drugs across the border, the drugs will never reach their illicit market.” Buenrostro, 868 F.2d at 138. In denying Preciado a minor role adjustment, the district court observed that Preciado was arrested while transporting from Mexico to Memphis, Tennessee, an “exorbitant” amount of marijuana (474.9 kilograms) with a market value o

f $834,000. The district court did not clearly err in denying Preciado a minor role adjustment. See United States v. Gallegos, 868 F.2d 711, 712-13 (5th Cir. 1989). AFFIRMED.