42844 Federal Register / Vol. 82, No. 175 / Tuesday, September 12, 2017 / Notices 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY 

COMMISSION 

[NRC–2017–0189] 

Biweekly Notice: Applications and 

Amendments to Facility Operating 

Licenses and Combined Licenses 

Involving No Significant Hazards 

Considerations 

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission. 

ACTION: Biweekly notice. 

SUMMARY: Pursuant to Section 189a.(2) 

of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as 

amended (the Act), the U.S. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission (NRC) is 

publishing this regular biweekly notice. 

The Act requires the Commission to 

publish notice of any amendments 

issued, or proposed to be issued, and 

grants the Commission the authority to 

issue and make immediately effective 

any amendment to an operating license 

or combined license, as applicable, 

upon a determination by the 

Commission that such amendment 

involves no significant hazards 

consideration, notwithstanding the 

pendency before the Commission of a 

request for a hearing from any person. 

This biweekly notice includes all 

notices of amendments issued, or 

proposed to be issued, from August 15, 

2017 to August 28, 2017. The last 

biweekly notice was published on 

August 29, 2017. 

DATES: Comments must be filed by 

October 12, 2017. A request for a 

hearing must be filed by November 13, 

2017. 

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments 

by any of the following methods: 

• Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to 

http://www.regulations.gov and search 

for Docket ID NRC–2017–0189. Address 

questions about NRC dockets to Carol 

Gallagher; telephone: 301–415–3463; 

email: Carol.Gallagher@nrc.gov. For 

technical questions, contact the 

individual listed in the FOR FURTHER

INFORMATION CONTACT section of this 

document. 

• Mail comments to: Cindy Bladey, 

Office of Administration, Mail Stop: 

TWFN–8–D36M, U.S. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission, Washington, 

DC 20555–0001. 

For additional direction on obtaining 

information and submitting comments, 

see ‘‘Obtaining Information and 

Submitting Comments’’ in the 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of 

this document. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Paula Blechman, Office of Nuclear 

Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission, Washington DC 

20555–0001; telephone: 301–415–2242; 

email: Paula.Blechman@nrc.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Obtaining Information and 

Submitting Comments 

A. Obtaining Information 

Please refer to Docket ID NRC–2017– 

0189, facility name, unit numbers, plant 

docket number, application date, and 

subject when contacting the NRC about 

the availability of information for this 

action. You may obtain publiclyavailable information related to this 

action by any of the following methods: 

• Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to 

http://www.regulations.gov and search 

for Docket ID NRC–2017–0189. 

• NRC’s Agencywide Documents 

Access and Management System 

(ADAMS): You may obtain publiclyavailable documents online in the 

ADAMS Public Documents collection at 

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/ 

adams.html. To begin the search, select 

‘‘ADAMS Public Documents’’ and then 

select ‘‘Begin Web-based ADAMS 

Search.’’ For problems with ADAMS, 

please contact the NRC’s Public 

Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 

1–800–397–4209, 301–415–4737, or by 

email to pdr.resource@nrc.gov. The 

ADAMS accession number for each 

document referenced (if it is available in 

ADAMS) is provided the first time that 

it is mentioned in this document. 

• NRC’s PDR: You may examine and 

purchase copies of public documents at 

the NRC’s PDR, Room O1–F21, One 

White Flint North, 11555 Rockville 

Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852. 

B. Submitting Comments 

Please include Docket ID NRC–2017– 

0189, facility name, unit numbers, plant 

docket number, application date, and 

subject in your comment submission. 

The NRC cautions you not to include 

identifying or contact information that 

you do not want to be publicly 

disclosed in your comment submission. 

The NRC will post all comment 

submissions at http://

www.regulations.gov as well as enter the 

comment submissions into ADAMS. 

The NRC does not routinely edit 

comment submissions to remove 

identifying or contact information. 

If you are requesting or aggregating 

comments from other persons for 

submission to the NRC, then you should 

inform those persons not to include 

identifying or contact information that 

they do not want to be publicly 

disclosed in their comment submission. 

Your request should state that the NRC 

does not routinely edit comment 

submissions to remove such information 

before making the comment 

submissions available to the public or 

entering the comment submissions into 

ADAMS. 

II. Notice of Consideration of Issuance 

of Amendments to Facility Operating 

Licenses and Combined Licenses and 

Proposed No Significant Hazards 

Consideration Determination 

The Commission has made a 

proposed determination that the 

following amendment requests involve 

no significant hazards consideration. 

Under the Commission’s regulations in 

§ 50.92 of title 10 of the Code of Federal 

Regulations (10 CFR), this means that 

operation of the facility in accordance 

with the proposed amendment would 

not (1) involve a significant increase in 

the probability or consequences of an 

accident previously evaluated, or (2) 

create the possibility of a new or 

different kind of accident from any 

accident previously evaluated, or (3) 

involve a significant reduction in a 

margin of safety. The basis for this 

proposed determination for each 

amendment request is shown below. 

The Commission is seeking public 

comments on this proposed 

determination. Any comments received 

within 30 days after the date of 

publication of this notice will be 

considered in making any final 

determination. 

Normally, the Commission will not 

issue the amendment until the 

expiration of 60 days after the date of 

publication of this notice. The 

Commission may issue the license 

amendment before expiration of the 60- 

day period provided that its final 

determination is that the amendment 

involves no significant hazards 

consideration. In addition, the 

Commission may issue the amendment 

prior to the expiration of the 30-day 

comment period if circumstances 

change during the 30-day comment 

period such that failure to act in a 

timely way would result, for example in 

derating or shutdown of the facility. If 

the Commission takes action prior to the 

expiration of either the comment period 

or the notice period, it will publish in 

the Federal Register a notice of 

issuance. If the Commission makes a 

final no significant hazards 

consideration determination, any 

hearing will take place after issuance. 

The Commission expects that the need 

to take this action will occur very 

infrequently. 


pmangrum on DSK3GDR082PROD with NOTICES1
Federal Register / Vol. 82, No. 175 / Tuesday, September 12, 2017 / Notices 42845 

A. Opportunity To Request a Hearing 

and Petition for Leave To Intervene 

Within 60 days after the date of 

publication of this notice, any persons 

(petitioner) whose interest may be 

affected by this action may file a request 

for a hearing and petition for leave to 

intervene (petition) with respect to the 

action. Petitions shall be filed in 

accordance with the Commission’s 

‘‘Agency Rules of Practice and 

Procedure’’ in 10 CFR part 2. Interested 

persons should consult a current copy 

of 10 CFR 2.309. The NRC’s regulations 

are accessible electronically from the 

NRC Library on the NRC’s Web site at 

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doccollections/cfr/. Alternatively, a copy of 

the regulations is available at the NRC’s 

Public Document Room, located at One 

White Flint North, Room O1–F21, 11555 

Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, 

Maryland 20852. If a petition is filed, 

the Commission or a presiding officer 

will rule on the petition and, if 

appropriate, a notice of a hearing will be 

issued. 

As required by 10 CFR 2.309(d) the 

petition should specifically explain the 

reasons why intervention should be 

permitted with particular reference to 

the following general requirements for 

standing: (1) The name, address, and 

telephone number of the petitioner; (2) 

the nature of the petitioner’s right under 

the Act to be made a party to the 

proceeding; (3) the nature and extent of 

the petitioner’s property, financial, or 

other interest in the proceeding; and (4) 

the possible effect of any decision or 

order which may be entered in the 

proceeding on the petitioner’s interest. 

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.309(f), 

the petition must also set forth the 

specific contentions which the 

petitioner seeks to have litigated in the 

proceeding. Each contention must 

consist of a specific statement of the 

issue of law or fact to be raised or 

controverted. In addition, the petitioner 

must provide a brief explanation of the 

bases for the contention and a concise 

statement of the alleged facts or expert 

opinion which support the contention 

and on which the petitioner intends to 

rely in proving the contention at the 

hearing. The petitioner must also 

provide references to the specific 

sources and documents on which the 

petitioner intends to rely to support its 

position on the issue. The petition must 

include sufficient information to show 

that a genuine dispute exists with the 

applicant or licensee on a material issue 

of law or fact. Contentions must be 

limited to matters within the scope of 

the proceeding. The contention must be 

one which, if proven, would entitle the 

petitioner to relief. A petitioner who 

fails to satisfy the requirements at 10 

CFR 2.309(f) with respect to at least one 

contention will not be permitted to 

participate as a party. 

Those permitted to intervene become 

parties to the proceeding, subject to any 

limitations in the order granting leave to 

intervene. Parties have the opportunity 

to participate fully in the conduct of the 

hearing with respect to resolution of 

that party’s admitted contentions, 

including the opportunity to present 

evidence, consistent with the NRC’s 

regulations, policies, and procedures. 

Petitions must be filed no later than 

60 days from the date of publication of 

this notice. Petitions and motions for 

leave to file new or amended 

contentions that are filed after the 

deadline will not be entertained absent 

a determination by the presiding officer 

that the filing demonstrates good cause 

by satisfying the three factors in 10 CFR 

2.309(c)(1)(i) through (iii). The petition 

must be filed in accordance with the 

filing instructions in the ‘‘Electronic 

Submissions (E-Filing)’’ section of this 

document. 

If a hearing is requested, and the 

Commission has not made a final 

determination on the issue of no 

significant hazards consideration, the 

Commission will make a final 

determination on the issue of no 

significant hazards consideration. The 

final determination will serve to 

establish when the hearing is held. If the 

final determination is that the 

amendment request involves no 

significant hazards consideration, the 

Commission may issue the amendment 

and make it immediately effective, 

notwithstanding the request for a 

hearing. Any hearing would take place 

after issuance of the amendment. If the 

final determination is that the 

amendment request involves a 

significant hazards consideration, then 

any hearing held would take place 

before the issuance of the amendment 

unless the Commission finds an 

imminent danger to the health or safety 

of the public, in which case it will issue 

an appropriate order or rule under 10 

CFR part 2. 

A State, local governmental body, 

Federally-recognized Indian Tribe, or 

agency thereof, may submit a petition to 

the Commission to participate as a party 

under 10 CFR 2.309(h)(1). The petition 

should state the nature and extent of the 

petitioner’s interest in the proceeding. 

The petition should be submitted to the 

Commission no later than 60 days from 

the date of publication of this notice. 

The petition must be filed in accordance 

with the filing instructions in the 

‘‘Electronic Submissions (E-Filing)’’ 

section of this document, and should 

meet the requirements for petitions set 

forth in this section, except that under 

10 CFR 2.309(h)(2) a State, local 

governmental body, or Federallyrecognized Indian Tribe, or agency 

thereof does not need to address the 

standing requirements in 10 CFR 

2.309(d) if the facility is located within 

its boundaries. Alternatively, a State, 

local governmental body, Federallyrecognized Indian Tribe, or agency 

thereof may participate as a non-party 

under 10 CFR 2.315(c). 

If a hearing is granted, any person 

who is not a party to the proceeding and 

is not affiliated with or represented by 

a party may, at the discretion of the 

presiding officer, be permitted to make 

a limited appearance pursuant to the 

provisions of 10 CFR 2.315(a). A person 

making a limited appearance may make 

an oral or written statement of his or her 

position on the issues but may not 

otherwise participate in the proceeding. 

A limited appearance may be made at 

any session of the hearing or at any 

prehearing conference, subject to the 

limits and conditions as may be 

imposed by the presiding officer. Details 

regarding the opportunity to make a 

limited appearance will be provided by 

the presiding officer if such sessions are 

scheduled. 

B. Electronic Submissions (E-Filing) 

All documents filed in NRC 

adjudicatory proceedings, including a 

request for hearing and petition for 

leave to intervene (petition), any motion 

or other document filed in the 

proceeding prior to the submission of a 

request for hearing or petition to 

intervene, and documents filed by 

interested governmental entities that 

request to participate under 10 CFR 

2.315(c), must be filed in accordance 

with the NRC’s E-Filing rule (72 FR 

49139; August 28, 2007, as amended at 

77 FR 46562, August 3, 2012). The EFiling process requires participants to 

submit and serve all adjudicatory 

documents over the internet, or in some 

cases to mail copies on electronic 

storage media. Detailed guidance on 

making electronic submissions may be 

found in the Guidance for Electronic 

Submissions to the NRC and on the 

NRC’s Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/ 

site-help/e-submittals.html. Participants 

may not submit paper copies of their 

filings unless they seek an exemption in 

accordance with the procedures 

described below. 

To comply with the procedural 

requirements of E-Filing, at least 10 

days prior to the filing deadline, the 

participant should contact the Office of 

the Secretary by email at 


pmangrum on DSK3GDR082PROD with NOTICES1
42846 Federal Register / Vol. 82, No. 175 / Tuesday, September 12, 2017 / Notices 

hearing.docket@nrc.gov, or by telephone 

at 301–415–1677, to (1) request a digital 

identification (ID) certificate, which 

allows the participant (or its counsel or 

representative) to digitally sign 

submissions and access the E-Filing 

system for any proceeding in which it 

is participating; and (2) advise the 

Secretary that the participant will be 

submitting a petition or other 

adjudicatory document (even in 

instances in which the participant, or its 

counsel or representative, already holds 

an NRC-issued digital ID certificate). 

Based upon this information, the 

Secretary will establish an electronic 

docket for the hearing in this proceeding 

if the Secretary has not already 

established an electronic docket. 

Information about applying for a 

digital ID certificate is available on the 

NRC’s public Web site at http://

www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals/ 

getting-started.html. Once a participant 

has obtained a digital ID certificate and 

a docket has been created, the 

participant can then submit 

adjudicatory documents. Submissions 

must be in Portable Document Format 

(PDF). Additional guidance on PDF 

submissions is available on the NRC’s 

public Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/ 

site-help/electronic-sub-ref-mat.html. A 

filing is considered complete at the time 

the document is submitted through the 

NRC’s E-Filing system. To be timely, an 

electronic filing must be submitted to 

the E-Filing system no later than 11:59 

p.m. Eastern Time on the due date. 

Upon receipt of a transmission, the EFiling system time-stamps the document 

and sends the submitter an email notice 

confirming receipt of the document. The 

E-Filing system also distributes an email 

notice that provides access to the 

document to the NRC’s Office of the 

General Counsel and any others who 

have advised the Office of the Secretary 

that they wish to participate in the 

proceeding, so that the filer need not 

serve the document on those 

participants separately. Therefore, 

applicants and other participants (or 

their counsel or representative) must 

apply for and receive a digital ID 

certificate before adjudicatory 

documents are filed so that they can 

obtain access to the documents via the 

E-Filing system. 

A person filing electronically using 

the NRC’s adjudicatory E-Filing system 

may seek assistance by contacting the 

NRC’s Electronic Filing Help Desk 

through the ‘‘Contact Us’’ link located 

on the NRC’s public Web site at http:// 

www.nrc.gov/site-help/esubmittals.html, by email to 

MSHD.Resource@nrc.gov, or by a tollfree call at 1–866–672–7640. The NRC 

Electronic Filing Help Desk is available 

between 9 a.m. and 6 p.m., Eastern 

Time, Monday through Friday, 

excluding government holidays. 

Participants who believe that they 

have a good cause for not submitting 

documents electronically must file an 

exemption request, in accordance with 

10 CFR 2.302(g), with their initial paper 

filing stating why there is good cause for 

not filing electronically and requesting 

authorization to continue to submit 

documents in paper format. Such filings 

must be submitted by: (1) First class 

mail addressed to the Office of the 

Secretary of the Commission, U.S. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 

Washington, DC 20555–0001, Attention: 

Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff; or 

(2) courier, express mail, or expedited 

delivery service to the Office of the 

Secretary, 11555 Rockville Pike, 

Rockville, Maryland 20852, Attention: 

Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff. 

Participants filing adjudicatory 

documents in this manner are 

responsible for serving the document on 

all other participants. Filing is 

considered complete by first-class mail 

as of the time of deposit in the mail, or 

by courier, express mail, or expedited 

delivery service upon depositing the 

document with the provider of the 

service. A presiding officer, having 

granted an exemption request from 

using E-Filing, may require a participant 

or party to use E-Filing if the presiding 

officer subsequently determines that the 

reason for granting the exemption from 

use of E-Filing no longer exists. 

Documents submitted in adjudicatory 

proceedings will appear in the NRC’s 

electronic hearing docket which is 

available to the public at https://

adams.nrc.gov/ehd, unless excluded 

pursuant to an order of the Commission 

or the presiding officer. If you do not 

have an NRC-issued digital ID certificate 

as described above, click cancel when 

the link requests certificates and you 

will be automatically directed to the 

NRC’s electronic hearing dockets where 

you will be able to access any publiclyavailable documents in a particular 

hearing docket. Participants are 

requested not to include personal 

privacy information, such as social 

security numbers, home addresses, or 

personal phone numbers in their filings, 

unless an NRC regulation or other law 

requires submission of such 

information. For example, in some 

instances, individuals provide home 

addresses in order to demonstrate 

proximity to a facility or site. With 

respect to copyrighted works, except for 

limited excerpts that serve the purpose 

of the adjudicatory filings and would 

constitute a Fair Use application, 

participants are requested not to include 

copyrighted materials in their 

submission. 

For further details with respect to 

these license amendment applications, 

see the application for amendment 

which is available for public inspection 

in ADAMS and at the NRC’s PDR. For 

additional direction on accessing 

information related to this document, 

see the ‘‘Obtaining Information and 

Submitting Comments’’ section of this 

document. 

Duke Energy Progress, LLC, Docket Nos. 

50–325 and 50–324, Brunswick Steam 

Electric Plant, Units 1 and 2, Brunswick 

County, North Carolina 

Date of amendment request: June 29, 

2017. A publicly available version is in 

ADAMS under Accession No. 

ML17180A538. 

Description of amendment request: 

The amendments would adopt changes, 

with variations, based on the NRCapproved safety evaluation of Technical 

Specifications Task Force (TSTF) 

Traveler TSTF–542, Revision 2, 

‘‘Reactor Pressure Vessel Water 

Inventory Control,’’ dated December 20, 

2016 (ADAMS Package Accession No. 

ML16343B066). The revisions would 

replace existing technical specification 

(TS) requirements related to ‘‘operations 

with a potential for draining the reactor 

vessel’’ (OPDRVs) with new 

requirements on reactor pressure vessel 

water inventory control (RPV WIC) to 

protect Safety Limit 2.1.1.3, which 

requires reactor vessel water level to be 

greater than the top of active irradiated 

fuel. 

Basis for proposed no significant 

hazards consideration determination: 

As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the 

licensee has provided its analysis of the 

issue of no significant hazards 

consideration, which is presented 

below: 

1. Does the proposed change involve a 

significant increase in the probability or 

consequences of an accident previously 

evaluated? 

Response: No. 

The proposed change replaces existing TS 

requirements related to OPDRVs with new 

requirements on RPV WIC that will protect 

Safety Limit 2.1.1.3. Draining of RPV [reactor 

pressure vessel] water inventory in Mode 4 

(i.e., cold shutdown) and Mode 5 (i.e., 

refueling) is not an accident previously 

evaluated and, therefore, replacing the 

existing TS controls to prevent or mitigate 

such an event with a new set of controls has 

no effect on any accident previously 

evaluated. RPV water inventory control in 

Mode 4 or Mode 5 is not an initiator of any 

accident previously evaluated. The existing 

OPDRV controls or the proposed RPV WIC 

controls are not mitigating actions assumed 

in any accident previously evaluated. 


pmangrum on DSK3GDR082PROD with NOTICES1
Federal Register / Vol. 82, No. 175 / Tuesday, September 12, 2017 / Notices 42847 

The proposed change reduces the 

probability of an unexpected draining event, 

which is not a previously evaluated accident, 

by imposing new requirements on the 

limiting time in which an unexpected 

draining event could result in the reactor 

vessel water level dropping to the top of the 

active fuel (TAF). These controls require 

cognizance of the plant configuration and 

control of configurations with unacceptably 

short drain times. These requirements reduce 

the probability of an unexpected draining 

event. The current TS requirements are only 

mitigating actions and impose no 

requirements that reduce the probability of 

an unexpected draining event. The proposed 

change reduces the consequences of an 

unexpected draining event, which is not a 

previously evaluated accident, by requiring 

an Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) 

subsystem to be operable at all times in 

Modes 4 and 5. The current TS requirements 

do not require any water injection systems, 

ECCS or otherwise, to be operable in certain 

conditions in Mode 5. The change in 

requirement from two ECCS subsystems to 

one ECCS subsystem in Modes 4 and 5 does 

not significantly affect the consequences of 

an unexpected draining event because the 

proposed Actions ensure equipment is 

available within the limiting drain time that 

is as capable of mitigating the event as the 

current requirements. The proposed controls 

provide escalating compensatory measures to 

be established as calculated drain times 

decrease, such as verification of a second 

method of water injection and additional 

confirmations that containment and/or 

filtration would be available if needed. The 

proposed change reduces or eliminates some 

requirements that were determined to be 

unnecessary to manage the consequences of 

an unexpected draining event, such as 

automatic initiation of an ECCS subsystem 

and control room ventilation. These changes 

do not affect the consequences of any 

accident previously evaluated since a 

draining event in Modes 4 and 5 is not a 

previously evaluated accident and the 

requirements are not needed to adequately 

respond to a draining event. 

Therefore, the proposed change does not 

involve a significant increase in the 

probability or consequences of an accident 

previously evaluated. 

2. Does the proposed change create the 

possibility of a new or different kind of 

accident from any accident previously 

evaluated? 

Response: No. 

The proposed change replaces existing TS 

requirements related to OPDRVs with new 

requirements on RPV WIC that will protect 

Safety Limit 2.1.1.3. The proposed change 

will not alter the design function of the 

equipment involved. Under the proposed 

change, some systems that are currently 

required to be operable during OPDRVs 

would be required to be available within the 

limiting drain time or to be in service 

depending on the limiting drain time. Should 

those systems be unable to be placed into 

service, the consequences are no different 

than if those systems were unable to perform 

their function under the current TS 

requirements. The event of concern under the 

current requirements and the proposed 

change is an unexpected draining event. The 

proposed change does not create new failure 

mechanisms, malfunctions, or accident 

initiators that would cause a draining event 

or a new or different kind of accident not 

previously evaluated or included in the 

design and licensing bases. 

Thus, based on the above, this change does 

not create the possibility of a new or different 

kind of accident from an accident previously 

evaluated. 

3. Does the proposed change involve a 

significant reduction in a margin of safety? 

Response: No. 

The proposed change replaces existing TS 

requirements related to OPDRVs with new 

requirements on RPV WIC. The current 

requirements do not have a stated safety basis 

and no margin of safety is established in the 

licensing basis. The safety basis for the new 

requirements is to protect Safety Limit 

2.1.1.3. New requirements are added to 

determine the limiting time in which the 

RPV water inventory could drain to the top 

of the fuel in the reactor vessel, should an 

unexpected draining event occur. Plant 

configurations that could result in lowering 

the RPV water level to the TAF within one 

hour are now prohibited. New escalating 

compensatory measures based on the limiting 

drain time replace the current controls. The 

proposed TS establish a safety margin by 

providing defense-in-depth to ensure that the 

Safety Limit is protected and to protect the 

public health and safety. While some less 

restrictive requirements are proposed for 

plant configurations with long calculated 

drain times, the overall effect of the change 

is to improve plant safety and to add safety 

margin. 

Therefore, the proposed change does not 

involve a significant reduction in a margin of 

safety. 

The NRC staff has reviewed the 

licensee’s analysis and, based on this 

review, it appears that the three 

standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 

satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff 

proposes to determine that the 

amendment request involves no 

significant hazards consideration. 

Attorney for licensee: Kathryn B. 

Nolan, Deputy General Counsel, 550 

South Tryon Street, M/C DEC45A, 

Charlotte, NC 28202. 

NRC Branch Chief: Undine Shoop. 

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., 

Docket No. 50–255, Palisades Nuclear 

Plant (PNP), Van Buren County, 

Michigan 

Date of amendment request: July 27, 

2017. A publicly-available version is in 

ADAMS under Accession No. 

ML17208A428. 

Description of amendment request: 

The proposed amendment would revise 

certain staffing and training 

requirements, reports, programs, and 

editorial changes in the Technical 

Specifications (TSs) Table of Contents; 

Section 1.0, ‘‘Use and Application’’; and 

Section 5.0, ‘‘Administrative Controls,’’ 

that will no longer be applicable once 

PNP is permanently defueled. 

Basis for proposed no significant 

hazards consideration determination: 

As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the 

licensee has provided its analysis of the 

issue of no significant hazards 

consideration, which is presented 

below: 

1. Does the proposed amendment involve 

a significant increase in the probability or 

consequences of an accident previously 

evaluated? 

Response: No. 

The proposed amendment would not take 

effect until the PNP Certified Fuel Handler 

Training and Retraining Program has been 

approved by the NRC, and PNP has 

permanently ceased operation and entered a 

permanently defueled condition. The 

proposed changes would revise the PNP TS 

by modifying the definitions, in TS Section 

1.0, and administrative controls, in TS 

Section 5.0, to correspond to the permanently 

defueled condition. Additionally, certain 

portions of the administrative control 

sections are deleted because they are no 

longer applicable to a permanently defueled 

facility. 

The proposed deletion and modification of 

provisions of the administrative controls do 

not directly affect the design of structures, 

systems, and components (SSCs) necessary 

for safe storage of spent nuclear fuel or the 

methods used for handling and storage of 

such fuel in the spent fuel pool (SFP). The 

proposed changes to the administrative 

controls are administrative in nature and do 

not affect any accidents applicable to the safe 

management of spent nuclear fuel or the 

permanently shutdown and defueled 

condition of the reactor. Thus, the 

consequences of an accident previously 

evaluated are not increased. 

In a permanently defueled condition, the 

only credible accidents are the fuel handling 

accident (FHA), the failure of tanks 

containing radioactive liquids, and a spent 

fuel cask drop accident. The probability of 

occurrence of previously evaluated accidents 

is not increased, because extended operation 

in a permanently defueled condition will be 

the only operation allowed. This mode of 

operation is bounded by the existing 

analyses. Additionally, the occurrence of 

postulated accidents associated with reactor 

operation are no longer credible in a 

permanently defueled reactor. This 

significantly reduces the scope of applicable 

accidents. 

Therefore, the proposed change does not 

involve a significant increase in the 

probability or consequences of an accident 

previously evaluated. 

2. Does the proposed amendment create 

the possibility of a new or different kind of 

accident from any accident previously 

evaluated? 

Response: No. 

The proposed amendment has no impact 

on facility systems, structures, and 

components (SSCs) affecting the safe storage 

of spent nuclear fuel, or on the methods of 

operation of such SSCs, or on the handling 


pmangrum on DSK3GDR082PROD with NOTICES1
42848 Federal Register / Vol. 82, No. 175 / Tuesday, September 12, 2017 / Notices 

and storage of spent nuclear fuel itself. The 

proposed amendment does not result in 

different or more adverse failure modes or 

accidents than previously evaluated because 

the reactor will be permanently shutdown 

and defueled, and PNP will no longer be 

authorized to operate the reactor or retain or 

place fuel in the reactor vessel. 

The proposed amendment does not affect 

systems credited in the PNP accident 

analysis for a[n] FHA, or for mitigating 

accident releases from the failure of tanks 

containing radioactive liquids or from a spent 

fuel cask drop. The proposed changes will 

continue to require proper control and 

monitoring of safety significant parameters 

and activities. 

The proposed amendment does not result 

in any new mechanisms that could damage 

the remaining relevant safety barriers that 

support maintaining the plant in a 

permanently shutdown and defueled 

condition (e.g., fuel cladding and SFP 

cooling). Since extended operation in a 

defueled condition will be the only operation 

allowed, and this condition is bounded by 

existing analyses, such a condition does not 

create the possibility of a new or different 

kind of accident. 

Therefore, the proposed change does not 

create the possibility of a new or different 

kind of accident from any accident 

previously evaluated. 

3. Does the proposed amendment involve 

a significant reduction in a margin of safety? 

Response: No. 

The proposed amendment involves 

deleting and/or modifying certain TS 

requirements once the PNP has been 

permanently shutdown and defueled. As 

specified in 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2), the 10 CFR 

50 license for PNP will no longer authorize 

operation of the reactor or emplacement or 

retention of fuel into the reactor vessel 

following submittal of the certifications 

required by 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1). Therefore, 

the occurrence of postulated accidents 

associated with reactor operation are no 

longer credible. 

The only remaining credible accidents are 

the fuel handling accident (FHA), the failure 

of tanks containing radioactive liquids, and 

a spent fuel cask drop accident. The 

proposed amendment does not adversely 

affect the inputs or assumptions of any of the 

design basis analyses that impact these 

analyzed conditions. 

The proposed changes are limited to those 

portions of the TS that are not related to the 

SSCs that are important to the safe storage of 

spent nuclear fuel. The requirements that are 

proposed to be revised or deleted from the 

PNP TS are not credited in the existing 

accident analysis for the remaining 

applicable postulated accidents, and as such, 

do not contribute to the margin of safety 

associated with the accident analysis. 

Postulated design basis accidents involving 

the reactor are no longer possible because the 

reactor will be permanently shutdown and 

defueled, and PNP will no longer be 

authorized to operate the reactor or retain or 

place fuel in the reactor vessel. 

Therefore, the proposed change does not 

involve a significant reduction in a margin of 

safety. 

The NRC staff has reviewed the 

licensee’s analysis and, based on this 

review, it appears that the three 

standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 

satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff 

proposes to determine that the 

amendment request involves no 

significant hazards consideration. 

Attorney for licensee: Mr. William 

Dennis, Assistant General Counsel, 

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., 440 

Hamilton Ave., White Plains, NY 10601. 

NRC Branch Chief: Douglas A. 

Broaddus. 

Exelon Generation Company, LLC, 

Docket No. 50–461, Clinton Power 

Station, Unit No. 1, DeWitt County, 

Illinois 

Date of amendment request: July 18, 

2017. A publicly-available version is in 

ADAMS under Accession No. 

ML17199F854. 

Description of amendment request: 

The proposed change would revise the 

design value for the spent fuel storage 

pool in Technical Specification (TS) 

4.3.2, ‘‘Drainage,’’ to an appropriate 

value, consistent with the original 

design basis. 

Basis for proposed no significant 

hazards consideration determination: 

As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the 

licensee has provided its analysis of the 

issue of no significant hazards 

consideration which is presented below: 

1. Does the proposed amendment involve 

a significant increase in the probability or 

consequences of an accident previously 

evaluated? 

Response: No. 

No physical changes to the facility will 

occur as a result of this proposed 

amendment. The proposed changes will not 

alter the physical design. The proposed 

change will revise the current TS 4.3.2 value 

for the SFP [spent fuel pool] level design to 

be consistent with the original design basis 

value and the applicable regulatory 

requirements. The proposed value will 

continue to ensure that inadvertent draining 

of the SFP will not result in the uncovering 

of spent fuel, as well as provide adequate 

shielding for personnel protection. 

Therefore, the proposed change does not 

involve a significant increase in the 

probability or consequences of an accident 

previously evaluated. 

2. Does the proposed amendment create 

the possibility of a new or different kind of 

accident from any accident previously 

evaluated? 

Response: No. 

The proposed change does not alter the 

physical design, safety limits, or safety 

analysis assumptions associated with the 

operation of the plant. Accordingly, the 

change does not introduce any new accident 

initiators, nor does it reduce or adversely 

affect the capabilities of any plant structure, 

system, or component to perform their safety 

function. The proposed change will revise 

the current TS 4.3.2 value for the SFP level 

design to be consistent with the original 

design basis value and the applicable 

regulatory requirements. The proposed value 

will continue to ensure that inadvertent 

draining of the SFP will not result in the 

uncovering of spent fuel, as well as provide 

adequate shielding for personnel protection. 

Therefore, the proposed change does not 

create the possibility of a new or different 

kind of accident from any previously 

evaluated. 

3. Does the proposed amendment involve 

a significant reduction in a margin of safety? 

Response: No. 

The proposed change conforms to NRC 

regulatory guidance regarding the content of 

plant Technical Specifications. The proposed 

change does not alter the physical design, 

safety limits, or safety analysis assumptions 

associated with the operation of the plant. 

Therefore, the proposed change does not 

involve a significant reduction in a margin of 

safety. 

The NRC staff has reviewed the 

licensee’s analysis and, based on this 

review, it appears the three standards of 

10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, 

the NRC staff proposes to determine that 

the amendment request involves no 

significant hazards consideration. 

Attorney for licensee: Tamra Domeyer, 

Associate General Counsel, Exelon 

Generation Company, LLC, 4300 

Winfield Road, Warrenville, IL 60555. 

NRC Branch Chief: David J. Wrona. 

Exelon Generation Company, LLC, 

Docket Nos. 50–352 and 50–353, 

Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 

and 2, Montgomery County, 

Pennsylvania 

Date of amendment request: July 19, 

2017. A publicly-available version is in 

ADAMS under Accession No. 

ML17200D096. 

Description of amendment request: 

The amendments would replace existing 

technical specification (TS) 

requirements related to ‘‘operations 

with a potential for draining the reactor 

vessel’’ (OPDRVs) with new 

requirements on reactor pressure vessel 

(RPV) water inventory control (WIC) to 

protect Safety Limit 2.1.4. Safety Limit 

2.1.4 requires RPV water level to be 

greater than the top of active irradiated 

fuel. The proposed changes are based on 

Technical Specifications Task Force 

(TSTF) Traveler TSTF–542, ‘‘Reactor 

Pressure Vessel Water Inventory 

Control,’’ Revision 2 (ADAMS Package 

Accession No. ML16250A231). 

Basis for proposed no significant 

hazards consideration determination: 

As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the 

licensee has provided its analysis of the 

issue of no significant hazards 

consideration, which is presented 

below: 


pmangrum on DSK3GDR082PROD with NOTICES1
Federal Register / Vol. 82, No. 175 / Tuesday, September 12, 2017 / Notices 42849 

1. Does the proposed amendment involve 

a significant increase in the probability or 

consequences of an accident previously 

evaluated? 

Response: No. 

The proposed changes replace existing TS 

requirements related to OPDRVs with new 

requirements on RPV WIC that will protect 

Safety Limit 2.1.4. Draining of RPV water 

inventory in OPERATIONAL CONDITION 4 

(i.e., cold shutdown) and OPERATIONAL 

CONDITION 5 (i.e., refueling), is not an 

accident previously evaluated and, therefore, 

replacing the existing TS controls to prevent 

or mitigate such an event with a new set of 

controls has no effect on any accident 

previously evaluated. RPV water inventory 

control in OPERATIONAL CONDITION 4 or 

5 is not an initiator of any accident 

previously evaluated. The existing OPDRV 

controls or the proposed RPV WIC controls 

are not mitigating actions assumed in any 

accident previously evaluated. 

The proposed changes reduce the 

probability of an unexpected draining event 

(which is not a previously evaluated 

accident) by imposing new requirements on 

the limiting time in which an unexpected 

draining event could result in the reactor 

vessel water level dropping to the top of the 

active fuel (TAF). These controls require 

cognizance of the plant configuration and 

control of configurations with unacceptably 

short drain times. These requirements reduce 

the probability of an unexpected draining 

event. The current TS requirements are only 

mitigating actions and impose no 

requirements that reduce the probability of 

an unexpected draining event. 

The proposed changes reduce the 

consequences of an unexpected draining 

event (which is not a previously evaluated 

accident) by requiring an Emergency Core 

Cooling System (ECCS) subsystem to be 

operable at all times in OPERATIONAL 

CONDITIONS 4 and 5. The current TS 

requirements do not require any water 

injection systems, ECCS or otherwise, to be 

Operable in certain conditions in 

OPERATIONAL CONDITION 5. The change 

in requirement from two ECCS subsystems to 

one ECCS subsystem in OPERATIONAL 

CONDITIONS 4 and 5 does not significantly 

affect the consequences of an unexpected 

draining event because the proposed Actions 

ensure equipment is available within the 

limiting drain time that is as capable of 

mitigating the event as the current 

requirements. The proposed controls provide 

escalating compensatory measures to be 

established as calculated drain times 

decrease, such as verification of a second 

method of water injection and additional 

confirmations that containment and/or 

filtration would be available if needed. 

The proposed changes reduce or eliminate 

some requirements that were determined to 

be unnecessary to manage the consequences 

of an unexpected draining event, such as 

automatic initiation of an ECCS subsystem 

and control room ventilation. These changes 

do not affect the consequences of any 

accident previously evaluated since a 

draining event in OPERATIONAL 

CONDITIONS 4 and 5 is not a previously 

evaluated accident and the requirements are 

not needed to adequately respond to a 

draining event. 

Therefore, the proposed changes do not 

involve a significant increase in the 

probability or consequences of an accident 

previously evaluated. 

2. Does the proposed amendment create 

the possibility of a new or different kind of 

accident from any accident previously 

evaluated? 

Response: No. 

The proposed changes replace existing TS 

requirements related to OPDRVs with new 

requirements on RPV WIC that will protect 

Safety Limit 2.1.4. The proposed changes 

will not alter the design function of the 

equipment involved. Under the proposed 

changes, some systems that are currently 

required to be operable during OPDRVs 

would be required to be available within the 

limiting drain time or to be in service 

depending on the limiting drain time. Should 

those systems be unable to be placed into 

service, the consequences are no different 

than if those systems were unable to perform 

their function under the current TS 

requirements. 

The event of concern under the current 

requirements and the proposed changes is an 

unexpected draining event. The proposed 

changes do not create new failure 

mechanisms, malfunctions, or accident 

initiators that would cause a draining event 

or a new or different kind of accident not 

previously evaluated or included in the 

design and licensing bases. 

Therefore, the proposed changes do not 

create the possibility of a new or different 

kind of accident from any previously 

evaluated. 

3. Does the proposed amendment involve 

a significant reduction in a margin of safety? 

Response: No. 

The proposed changes replace existing TS 

requirements related to OPDRVs with new 

requirements on RPV WIC. The current 

requirements do not have a stated safety basis 

and no margin of safety is established in the 

licensing basis. The safety basis for the new 

requirements is to protect Safety Limit 2.1.4. 

New requirements are added to determine 

the limiting time in which the RPV water 

inventory could drain to the TAF in the 

reactor vessel should an unexpected draining 

event occur. Plant configurations that could 

result in lowering the RPV water level to the 

TAF within one hour are now prohibited. 

New escalating compensatory measures 

based on the limiting drain time replace the 

current controls. The proposed TS establish 

a safety margin by providing defense-indepth to ensure that the Safety Limit is 

protected and to protect the public health 

and safety. While some less restrictive 

requirements are proposed for plant 

configurations with long calculated drain 

times, the overall effect of the change is to 

improve plant safety and to add safety 

margin. 

Therefore, the proposed changes do not 

involve a significant reduction in a margin of 

safety. 

The NRC staff has reviewed the 

licensee’s analysis and, based on this 

review, it appears that the three 

standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 

satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff 

proposes to determine that the 

amendment request involves no 

significant hazards consideration. 

Attorney for licensee: Tamra Domeyer, 

Associate General Counsel, Exelon 

Generation Company, LLC, 4300 

Winfield Road, Warrenville, IL 60555. 

NRC Branch Chief: James G. Danna. 

Florida Power & Light Company, et al., 

Docket Nos. 50–335 and 50–389, St. 

Lucie Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, St. Lucie 

County, Florida 

Date of amendment request: January 

23, 2017, as supplemented by letter 

dated July 3, 2017. Publicly-available 

versions are in ADAMS under 

Accession Nos. ML17025A399 and 

ML17184A176, respectively. 

Description of amendment request: 

The license amendment request was 

originally noticed in the Federal 

Register on March 28, 2017 (82 FR 

15383). The notice is being reissued in 

its entirety to include the revised scope, 

description of the amendment request, 

and proposed no significant hazards 

consideration determination. As a result 

of the revised scope, updates to the 

‘‘Basis for proposed no significant 

hazards consideration determination’’ 

section of this notice are delineated by 

brackets. 

The amendments would modify the 

Technical Specifications (TSs) by 

limiting the MODE of applicability for 

the Reactor Protection System (RPS), 

Startup, and Operating Rate of Change 

of Power—High, functional unit trip. 

Additionally, the proposed amendments 

add new Limiting Condition for 

Operation (LCO) 3.0.5 and relatedly 

modifies LCO 3.0.1 and LCO 3.0.2, to 

provide for placing inoperable 

equipment under administrative control 

for the purpose of conducting testing 

required to demonstrate OPERABILITY. 

Basis for proposed no significant 

hazards consideration determination: 

As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the 

licensee has provided its analysis of the 

issue of no significant hazards 

consideration, which is presented 

below: 

1. Does the proposed amendment involve 

a significant increase in the probability or 

consequences of an accident previously 

evaluated? 

Response: No. 

Limiting the MODE 1 applicability for RPS 

functional unit, Startup and Operating Rate 

of Change of Power—High, to Power Range 

Neutron Flux Power ≤15% of RATED 

THERMAL POWER, is an administrative 

change in nature and does not alter the 

manner in which the functional unit is 

operated or maintained. The proposed 

changes do not represent any physical 


pmangrum on DSK3GDR082PROD with NOTICES1
42850 Federal Register / Vol. 82, No. 175 / Tuesday, September 12, 2017 / Notices 

change to plant [structures, systems, and 

components (SSC(s))], or to procedures 

established for plant operation. The subject 

RPS functional unit is not an event initiator 

nor is it credited in the mitigation of any 

event or credited in the [probabilistic risk 

assessment (PRA)]. As such, the initial 

conditions associated with accidents 

previously evaluated and plant systems 

credited for mitigating the consequences of 

accidents previously evaluated remain 

unchanged. 

The proposed addition of new LCO 3.0.5 

to the St. Lucie Unit 1 and Unit 2 TS and 

related modification to [LCO 3.0.1 and] LCO 

3.0.2 is consistent with the guidance 

provided in NUREG–1432, Volume 1 

[ADAMS Accession No. ML12102A165] 

(Reference 6.1 [of the amendment request]) 

and thereby has been previously evaluated by 

the Commission with a determination that 

the proposed change does not involve a 

significant hazards consideration. 

Therefore, facility operation in accordance 

with the proposed license amendments 

would not involve a significant increase in 

the probability or consequences of an 

accident previously evaluated. 

2. Does the proposed amendment create 

the possibility of a new or different kind of 

accident from any accident previously 

evaluated? 

Response: No. 

Limiting the MODE 1 applicability for the 

RPS functional unit, Startup and Operating 

Rate of Change of Power—High, to Power 

Range Neutron Flux Power ≤15% of RATED 

THERMAL POWER, is an administrative 

change in nature and does not involve the 

addition of any plant equipment, 

methodology or analyses. The proposed 

changes do not alter the design, 

configuration, or method of operation of the 

subject RPS functional unit or of any other 

SSC. More specifically, the proposed changes 

neither alter the power rate-of-change trip 

function nor its ability to bypass and reset as 

required. The subject RPS functional unit 

remains capable of performing its design 

function. 

The proposed addition of new LCO 3.0.5 

to the St. Lucie Unit 1 and Unit 2 TS and 

related modification to [LCO 3.0.1 and] LCO 

3.0.2 is consistent with the guidance 

provided in NUREG–1432, Volume 1 

(Reference 6.1 [of the amendment request]) 

and thereby has been previously evaluated by 

the Commission with a determination that 

the proposed change does not involve a 

significant hazards consideration. 

Therefore, the proposed change does not 

create the possibility of a new or different 

kind of accident from any previously 

evaluated. 

3. Does the proposed amendment involve 

a significant reduction in a margin of safety? 

Response: No. 

Limiting the MODE 1 applicability for RPS 

functional unit, Startup and Operating Rate 

of Change of Power—High, to Power Range 

Neutron Flux Power ≤15% of RATED 

THERMAL POWER is an administrative 

change in nature. The proposed changes 

neither involve changes to any safety 

analyses assumptions, safety limits, or 

limiting safety system settings nor do they 

adversely impact plant operating margins or 

the reliability of equipment credited in safety 

analyses. 

The proposed addition of new LCO 3.0.5 

to the St. Lucie Unit 1 and Unit 2 TS and 

related modification to [LCO 3.0.1 and] LCO 

3.0.2 is consistent with the guidance 

provided in NUREG–1432, Volume 1 

(Reference 6.1 [of the amendment request]) 

and thereby has been previously evaluated by 

the Commission with a determination that 

the proposed change does not involve a 

significant hazards consideration. 

Therefore, operation of the facility in 

accordance with the proposed amendment 

will not involve a significant reduction in the 

margin of safety. 

The NRC staff has reviewed the 

licensee’s analysis and, based on this 

review, it appears that the three 

standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 

satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff 

proposes to determine that the 

amendment request involves no 

significant hazards consideration. 

Attorney for licensee: William S. 

Blair, Managing Attorney—Nuclear, 

Florida Power & Light Company, 700 

Universe Boulevard, MS LAW/JB, Juno 

Beach, FL 33408–0420. 

NRC Branch Chief: Undine Shoop. 

Florida Power & Light Company, Docket 

Nos. 50–250 and 50–251, Turkey Point 

Nuclear Generating Unit Nos. 3 and 4, 

Miami-Dade County, Florida 

Date of amendment request: June 29, 

2017. A publicly-available version is in 

ADAMS under Accession No. 

ML17195A569. 

Description of amendment request: 

The amendments would modify the 

Technical Specification (TS) 

requirements for mode change 

limitations in TS 3.0.4 and TS 4.0.4 

based on Technical Specifications Tasks 

Force (TSTF) Improved Standard 

Technical Specifications Change 

Traveler, TSTF–359, Revision 9, 

‘‘Increase Flexibility in MODE 

Restraints’’ (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML031190607). 

The NRC issued a notice of 

opportunity for comment in the Federal 

Register on August 2, 2002 (67 FR 

50475), on possible amendments 

concerning TSTF–359, including a 

model safety evaluation and model no 

significant hazards consideration 

determination, using the consolidated 

line item improvement process (CLIIP). 

Subsequently, on April 4, 2003, the NRC 

published a Notice of Availability for 

TSTF–359, Revision 8, in the Federal 

Register (68 FR 16579). That notice 

announced the availability of this TS 

improvement through the CLIIP. The 

NRC subsequently made two 

modifications in response to comments, 

as well as one editorial change, which 

have been incorporated into TSTF–359, 

Revision 9. The changes proposed in the 

licensee’s submittal are, therefore, based 

on TSTF–359, Revision 9. 

Basis for proposed no significant 

hazards consideration determination: 

As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the 

licensee has provided its analysis of the 

issue of no significant hazards 

consideration, which is presented 

below: 

1. Does the proposed amendment involve 

a significant increase in the probability or 

consequences of an accident previously 

evaluated? 

Response: No. 

The proposed change allows entry into a 

mode or other specified condition in the 

applicability of a TS, while in a TS Action. 

Being in a TS Action is not an initiator of any 

accident previously evaluated. Therefore, the 

probability of an accident previously 

evaluated is not significantly increased. The 

consequences of an accident while relying on 

Actions as allowed by the proposed LCO 

3.0.4 are no different than the consequences 

of an accident while relying on Actions for 

other reasons, such as equipment 

inoperability. Therefore, the consequences of 

an accident previously evaluated are not 

significantly affected by this change. The 

addition of a requirement to assess and 

manage the risk introduced by this change 

will further minimize possible concerns. 

Therefore, this change does not involve a 

significant increase in the probability or 

consequences of an accident previously 

evaluated. 

2. Does the proposed amendment create 

the possibility of a new or different kind of 

accident from any accident previously 

evaluated? 

Response: No. 

The proposed change does not involve a 

physical alteration of the plant (no new or 

different type of equipment will be installed). 

Entering into a mode or other specified 

condition in the applicability of a TS while 

in a TS Action, will not introduce new 

failure modes or effects and will not, in the 

absence of other unrelated failures, lead to an 

accident whose consequences exceed the 

consequences of accidents previously 

evaluated. The addition of a requirement to 

assess and manage the risk introduced by this 

change will further minimize possible 

concerns. Thus, this change does not create 

the possibility of a new or different kind of 

accident from an accident previously 

evaluated. 

3. Does the proposed amendment involve 

a significant reduction in a margin of safety? 

Response: No. 

The proposed change allows entry into a 

mode or other specified condition in the 

applicability of a TS while in a TS Action. 

The TS allow operation of the plant without 

the full complement of equipment through 

the Actions for not meeting the TS Limiting 

Conditions for Operation (LCO). The risk 

associated with this allowance is managed by 

the imposition of Actions that must be 

performed within the prescribed completion 

times. The net effect of being in a TS Action 

on the margin of safety is not considered 


pmangrum on DSK3GDR082PROD with NOTICES1
Federal Register / Vol. 82, No. 175 / Tuesday, September 12, 2017 / Notices 42851 

significant. The proposed change does not 

alter the required actions or completion times 

of the TS. The proposed change allows TS 

Actions to be entered and the associated 

required actions and completion times to be 

used in new circumstances. This use is 

predicated upon performance of a risk 

assessment and the management of plant 

risk. The change also eliminates current 

allowances for utilizing Actions in similar 

circumstances without assessing and 

managing risk. The net change to the margin 

of safety is insignificant. Therefore, this 

change does not involve a significant 

reduction in a margin of safety. 

The NRC staff has reviewed the 

licensee’s analysis and, based on this 

review, it appears that the three 

standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 

satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff 

proposes to determine that the 

amendment request involves no 

significant hazards consideration. 

Attorney for licensee: William S. 

Blair, Managing Attorney—Nuclear, 

Florida Power & Light Company, 700 

Universe Boulevard, MS LAW/JB, Juno 

Beach, FL 33408–0420. 

NRC Branch Chief: Undine Shoop. 

National Institute of Standards and 

Technology (NIST), Docket No. 50–184, 

Center for Neutron Research Test 

Reactor, Montgomery County, Maryland 

Date of amendment request: March 2, 

2017 (two letters), as supplemented by 

letters dated March 29, 2017, and May 

25, 2017. Publicly-available versions are 

in ADAMS under Accession Nos. 

ML17068A163, ML17068A164, 

ML17097A243, and ML17153A172, 

respectively. 

Description of amendment request: 

The proposed amendment would 

modify the NIST test reactor’s technical 

specifications (TSs) to remove 

limitations in the present version of the 

TSs that prohibit use of a test procedure 

and to change the organizational chart 

in the TSs. In addition, the proposed 

amendment would modify the NIST test 

reactor’s license to allow transfer of 

instrumentation calibration and testing 

sources from the NIST’s material license 

to the reactor license. 

Basis for proposed no significant 

hazards consideration determination: 

As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the 

licensee has provided its analysis of the 

issue of no significant hazards 

consideration, which is presented 

below: 

1. Does the proposed amendment involve 

a significant increase in the probability or 

consequences of an accident previously 

evaluated? 

Response: No. 

No, the proposed amendment would not 

increase the probability or consequences of 

an accident previously evaluated. The 

proposed amendment removes conformance 

conflicts within the Technical Specifications 

that would occur when operating the reactor 

as permitted under TSs 2.2(4). The conflicts 

are removed from the TSs by adding 

exception statements. When the reactor is 

operated under the NRC approved conditions 

in TSs 2.2(4), steady state thermal hydraulic 

analysis shows that operation at less than 500 

kW [kilowatt] with natural circulation results 

in a critical heat flux ratio and onset of flow 

instability ratio greater than 2. Transient 

analysis of reactivity insertion accidents 

shows that the fuel cladding temperature 

remains far below the safety limit. The limit 

of 10 kw was chosen since that was deemed 

adequate for any operational situation 

requiring natural circulation operation, such 

as testing of an unknown core loading. 

2. Does the change create the possibility of 

a new or different kind of accident from any 

accident previously evaluated? 

Response: No. 

No, the proposed amendment would not 

create the possibility of a new or different 

kind of accident from any accident 

previously evaluated. The proposed 

amendment removes conformance conflicts 

within the Technical Specifications that 

would occur when operating the reactor as 

permitted under TSs 2.2(4). The conflicts are 

removed from the TSs by adding exception 

statements. The accident analysis was 

discussed in the document, NIST Response 

to NRC Request for Information (TAC No. 

MD3410), August 19, 2008, ADAMS 

Accession Number ML082890338. The 

request from the NRC was: ‘‘. . . Provide 

justification for 500 kW power operations 

under natural convection flow by 

demonstrating that no credible accidents 

would result in exceeding the safety limit

. . . ,’’ the following was the response by 

NIST. ‘‘This analysis shows that there is 

ample margin between the maximum clad 

temperature in any credible accident and the 

safety limit of 450 °C [degrees Centigrade].’’ 

The details of the analysis are presented in 

the above reference. 

The intent with this amendment is to 

allow, without apparent TSs 

nonconformance, operation analyzed and 

evaluated by the NRC. This will allow the 

use of testing similar to that which was 

performed in the commissioning of NIST test 

reactor. 

3. Does the proposed change involve a 

significant reduction in a margin of safety? 

Response: No. 

No, the proposed amendment would not 

involve a significant reduction in a margin of 

safety. This amendment will allow testing 

when commissioning a core configuration 

that is unknown in the most conservative 

manner appropriate. It removes apparent TS 

conflicts that would force the licensee into 

situations that would be less conservative 

and with less margin of safety. 

The NRC staff has reviewed the 

licensee’s analysis and, based on this 

review, it appears that the three 

standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 

satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff 

proposes to determine that the 

amendment request involves no 

significant hazards consideration. 

Attorney for licensee: Melissa J. 

Lieberman, Deputy Chief Counsel for 

NIST, National Institute of Standards 

and Technology, 100 Bureau Drive, 

Gaithersburg, MD 20899. 

NRC Branch Chief: Alexander Adams, 

Jr. 

Southern Nuclear Operating Company, 

Docket Nos. 52–025 and 52–026, Vogtle 

Electric Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4, 

Burke County, Georgia 

Date of amendment request: April 21, 

2017, as supplemented by letter dated 

August 15, 2017. Publicly-available 

versions are in ADAMS under 

Accession Nos. ML17111A958, and 

ML17227A775, respectively. 

Description of amendment request: 

The amendment request proposes to 

depart from approved AP1000 Design 

Control Document (DCD) Tier 2 

information (text, tables and figures) as 

incorporated into the Updated Final 

Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) as 

plant-specific DCD information, and 

also proposes to depart from involved 

plant-specific Tier 1 information (and 

associated Combined License (COL) 

Appendix C information). Specifically, 

the amendment request proposes 

changes to COL Appendix C (and plantspecific Tier 1) Table 2.2.4–1 and Figure 

2.2.4–1 to add two main feedwater 

thermal relief valves and two start-up 

feedwater thermal relief valves. The 

proposed COL Appendix C (and plantspecific DCD Tier 1) changes require 

additional changes to corresponding 

Tier 2 information in UFSAR Chapters 

3 and 10. Because this proposed change 

requires a departure from Tier 1 

information in the Westinghouse 

Electric Company’s AP1000 DCD, the 

licensee also requested an exemption 

from the requirements of the Generic 

DCD Tier 1 in accordance with 10 CFR 

52.63(b)(1). 

Basis for proposed no significant 

hazards consideration determination: 

As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the 

licensee has provided its analysis of the 

issue of no significant hazards 

consideration, which is presented 

below: 

1. Does the proposed amendment involve 

a significant increase in the probability or 

consequences of an accident previously 

evaluated? 

Response: No. 

The changes to Combined License (COL) 

Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Table 

2.2.4–1 and Figure 2.2.4–1, and associated 

Updated Final Safety Analysis Report 

(USFAR) design information do not adversely 

impact previously evaluated accidents. The 

addition of the thermal relief valves to the 

feedwater lines does not adversely impact the 

ability to isolate the main and startup 

feedwater lines following a steam or 


pmangrum on DSK3GDR082PROD with NOTICES1
42852 Federal Register / Vol. 82, No. 175 / Tuesday, September 12, 2017 / Notices 

feedwater line break or steam generator tube 

rupture. The new thermal relief valves are 

normally closed and required to open to 

prevent potential overpressure conditions 

when ambient temperatures increase in the 

area. Thermal relief valves added into the 

feedwater lines operate mechanically and are 

not activated upon a new engineered safety 

features (ESF) signal in response to design 

basis accidents. Isolation capabilities of the 

main and startup feedwater lines are not 

adversely affected as ESF signals are not 

changed. The proposed change does not 

reduce the temperature of feedwater and does 

not increase feedwater flow during any 

operational mode as main feedwater and 

startup feedwater isolation and control valves 

are not changed by this activity. Performance 

of overpressure relief supports the safetyrelated functions of the isolation and control 

valves in the main and startup feedwater 

lines when isolation is required. 

No safety-related structure, system, 

component (SSC) or function is adversely 

affected by this change. The change does not 

involve an interface with any SSC accident 

initiator or initiating sequence of events, and 

thus, the probabilities of the accidents 

evaluated in the plant-specific UFSAR are 

not affected. The proposed changes do not 

involve a change to the predicted radiological 

releases due to postulated accident 

conditions, thus, the consequences of the 

accidents evaluated in the UFSAR are not 

affected. 

Therefore, the proposed amendment does 

not involve a significant increase in the 

probability or consequences of an accident 

previously evaluated. 

2. Does the proposed amendment create 

the possibility of a new or different kind of 

accident from any accident previously 

evaluated? 

Response: No. 

The proposed changes to COL Appendix C 

(and plant-specific Tier 1) Table 2.2.4–1 and 

Figure 2.2.4–1, and associated UFSAR design 

information do not reduce the temperature of 

feedwater and do not increase feedwater flow 

during any operational mode such that it 

would result in a new or different kind of 

accident from accidents previously 

evaluated. Conclusions of existing analyses 

are not changed by this activity as existing 

feedwater isolation and control valves 

functions are not changed. 

The proposed changes to add thermal relief 

valves to the main and startup feedwater 

lines do not adversely affect any safetyrelated equipment, and do not add any new 

interfaces to safety-related SSCs that 

adversely affect safety functions. No system 

or design function or equipment qualification 

is adversely affected by these changes as the 

changes do not modify any SSCs that prevent 

safety functions from being performed by the 

existing main feedwater and startup 

feedwater valves. The changes do not 

introduce a new failure mode, malfunction or 

sequence of events that could adversely affect 

safety or safety-related equipment as 

feedwater isolation capabilities are not 

changed. Performance of overpressure relief 

supports the safety-related functions of the 

isolation and control valves in the main and 

startup feedwater lines when isolation is 

required. 

Therefore, the proposed amendment does 

not create the possibility of a new or different 

kind of accident from any accident 

previously evaluated. 

3. Does the proposed amendment involve 

a significant reduction in a margin of safety? 

Response: No. 

The proposed changes to COL Appendix C 

(and plant-specific Tier 1) Table 2.2.4–1 and 

Figure 2.2.4–1, and associated UFSAR design 

information add thermal relief valves to the 

main feedwater and startup feedwater lines. 

These valves are designed to the same codes 

and standards as the existing piping to which 

they are connected, including ASME Code 

Section III, Class C, seismic Category I. The 

proposed changes do not affect any other 

safety-related equipment or fission product 

barriers. The requested changes will not 

affect any design code, function, design 

analysis, safety analysis input or result, or 

design/safety margin. No safety analysis or 

design basis acceptance limit/criterion is 

challenged or exceeded by the requested 

changes. There are not any changes to 

operation of the main feedwater and startup 

feedwater isolation and control valves when 

isolation of the lines is required. Operation 

of the relief valves supports isolation 

capabilities for the main and feedwater 

isolation and control valves. 

Therefore, the proposed amendment does 

not involve a significant reduction in a 

margin of safety. 

The NRC staff has reviewed the 

licensee’s analysis and, based on this 

review, it appears that the three 

standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 

satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff 

proposes to determine that the 

amendment request involves no 

significant hazards consideration. 

Attorney for licensee: Mr. M. Stanford 

Blanton, Balch & Bingham LLP, 1710 

Sixth Avenue North, Birmingham, AL 

35203–2015. 

NRC Branch Chief: Jennifer DixonHerrity. 

Southern Nuclear Operating Company, 

Inc., Docket Nos. 52–025 and 52–026, 

Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 3 

and 4, Burke County, Georgia 

Date of amendment request: July 14, 

2017. A publicly-available version is in 

ADAMS under Accession No. 

ML17195B047. 

Description of amendment request: 

The requested amendment proposes to 

depart from Tier 2 information in the 

Updated Final Safety Analysis Report 

(UFSAR) (which includes the plantspecific design control document (DCD) 

Tier 2 information) and involves related 

changes to plant-specific Tier 1 (and 

associated Combined License (COL) 

Appendix C) information, and COL 

Appendix A Technical Specifications. 

Specifically, the requested amendment 

proposes changes to add a second 

normal residual heat removal system 

(RNS) suction relief valve in parallel to 

the current RNS suction relief valve, 

with the necessary piping changes. 

Additionally, a change is proposed to 

Tier 1 Figure 2.2.1–1, for penetration 

P19, to accurately depict the orientation 

of the class break of containment 

isolation valve RNS–PL–V061. 

Basis for proposed no significant 

hazards consideration determination: 

As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the 

licensee has provided its analysis of the 

issue of no significant hazards 

consideration, which is presented below 

with NRC staff’s edits in square 

brackets: 

1. Does the proposed amendment involve 

a significant increase in the probability or 

consequences of an accident previously 

evaluated? 

Response: No. 

The proposed changes to Combined 

License (COL) Appendix C (and plantspecific Tier 1) Figures 2.2.1–1 and 2.3.6–1, 

Tables 2.3.6–1, 2.3.6–2 and 2.3.6–4, COL 

Appendix A, Technical Specification 3.4.14 

and associated Updated Final Safety Analysis 

Report (UFSAR) design information to 

identify a new normal residual heat removal 

system (RNS) relief valve, RNS–PL–V020, do 

not adversely impact accidents previously 

evaluated in the safety analysis. Transients 

that are capable of overpressurizing the 

reactor coolant system (RCS) are categorized 

as either mass or heat input transients. The 

relief valves must be capable of passing flow 

greater than that required for the limiting 

low-temperature overpressure protection 

(LTOP) transients while maintaining RCS 

pressure less than the lowest pressure 

represented by the pressure/temperature 

limit curve, 110% of the design pressure of 

the RNS, or the acceptable RNS relief valve 

inlet pressure. The restrictions added to COL 

Appendix A, Technical Specification 3.4.14 

to close chemical and volume control system 

(CVS) makeup line containment isolation 

valve, CVS–PL–V091, limit flow capacity 

when the RCS is aligned to the RNS to 

support LTOP functions and provide reliable 

operation of the RNS relief valves during 

mass and heat input transients. When CVS– 

PL–V091 is open, the RCS is depressurized 

and an RCS vent of ≥4.15 square inches is 

established. Transient conditions including 

mass input and heat input are not changed 

and probability of events is not increased as 

the added RNS relief valve, RNS–PL–V020, 

supports LTOP functions as required by 

Technical Specification 3.4.14. The current 

3-inch RNS relief valve is sufficient to 

terminate identified transients; however, the 

added 1-inch RNS relief valve reduces 

chatter in the current valve during low flow 

scenarios. 

Responses to mass and heat input 

transients are not changed as LTOP functions 

to prevent overpressurization of the RCS are 

not changed by this activity. The added RNS 

relief valve, RNS–PL–V020, is designed in 

accordance with the same requirements as 

the current RNS relief valve, RNS–PL–V021, 

but with a lower flow capacity and functions 

at a lower setpoint pressure. Overpressure 

protection provided by the RNS is not 


pmangrum on DSK3GDR082PROD with NOTICES1
Federal Register / Vol. 82, No. 175 / Tuesday, September 12, 2017 / Notices 42853 

changed. The change does not adversely 

impact the capability of the RNS to protect 

the RCS from exceeding pressure and 

temperature limits in accordance with 10 

CFR 50, Appendix G or 110% of the design 

pressure of the RNS. Changes in piping to 

accommodate the addition of the valve and 

reduce inlet piping losses do not impact the 

consequences or probabilities of previously 

evaluated accidents. The class break 

correction for valve RNS–PL–V061, in COL 

Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Figure 

2.2.1–1 does not impact accidents previously 

evaluated. 

No safety-related structure, system, 

component (SSC) or function is adversely 

affected by this change. The change does not 

involve an interface with any structure, 

system, or component (SSC) accident 

initiator or initiating sequence of events, and 

thus, the probabilities of the accidents 

evaluated in the plant-specific UFSAR are 

not affected. The proposed changes do not 

involve a change to the predicted radiological 

releases due to postulated accident 

conditions, thus, the consequences of the 

accidents evaluated in the UFSAR are not 

affected. 

Therefore, the proposed amendment does 

not involve a significant increase in the 

probability or consequences of an accident 

previously evaluated. 

2. Does the proposed amendment create 

the possibility of a new or different kind of 

accident from any accident previously 

evaluated? 

Response: No. 

Conclusions of existing analyses are not 

changed by the proposed change as LTOP 

functions provided by both the current and 

added RNS relief valves continue to provide 

the assumed protection for LTOP events. RCS 

pressure is maintained within limits by the 

use of both RNS relief valves. The closure of 

CVS–PL–V091 limits flow and reduces the 

impact of mass and heat input transients 

when RNS relief valves are relied upon for 

overpressure protection. 

The proposed change to add the smaller 

RNS relief valve, RNS–PL–V020, does not 

adversely affect safety-related equipment, 

and does not add any new interfaces to 

safety-related SSCs that adversely affect 

safety functions. The added RNS relief valve, 

functions in the same manner as the current 

RNS relief valve, but has a lower capacity 

and lifts at a lower pressure. The added RNS 

relief valve also discharges to the liquid 

radwaste system (WLS) containment sump. 

No system or design function or equipment 

qualification is adversely affected by these 

changes as the change does not modify any 

SSCs that prevent safety functions from being 

performed by the RNS and the current relief 

valve. The changes do not introduce a new 

failure mode, malfunction or sequence of 

events that could adversely affect safety or 

safety-related equipment. Piping changes to 

accommodate the installation of the new 

valve do not create the potential for a new 

or different kind of accident as the piping 

requirements are consistent with those of the 

current relief valve, and subject to the same 

pipe rupture evaluation requirements. LTOP 

functions are not changed. The class break 

correction for valve RNS–PL–V061 does not 

impact accident analysis or create a new or 

different kind of accident as the function of 

the affected equipment and piping is not 

changed. 

Therefore, the proposed amendment does 

not create the possibility of a new or different 

kind of accident from any accident 

previously evaluated. 

3. Does the proposed amendment involve 

a significant reduction in a margin of safety? 

Response: No. 

The proposed changes do not affect safetyrelated equipment or fission product barriers. 

LTOP functions are not adversely impacted 

as both the current and added RNS relief 

valves continue to provide protection from 

overpressurization. The added RNS relief 

valve is designed in accordance with 

[American Society of Mechanical Engineers 

(ASME)] Code Section III, Class 2, 

requirements consistent with the current 

RNS relief valve. Modified piping is 

constructed consistent with current design 

requirements for RNS piping. The addition of 

the valve adds safety margin in regards to 

transients as the new valve lifts at a lower set 

pressure than the current valve, causing flow 

rates to be lower through the RNS piping. 

Therefore, margin of safety is not reduced. 

The requested changes will not affect any 

design code, function, design analysis, safety 

analysis input or result, or design/safety 

margin. No safety analysis or design basis 

acceptance limit/criterion is challenged or 

exceeded by the requested changes. Transient 

conditions, including mass input and heat 

input, are not changed and margin of safety 

is not reduced as the added RNS relief valve 

supports LTOP functions in the same manner 

as the current RNS relief valve. 

Therefore, the proposed amendment does 

not involve a significant reduction in a 

margin of safety. 

The NRC staff has reviewed the 

licensee’s analysis and, based on this 

review, it appears that the three 

standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 

satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff 

proposes to determine that the 

amendment request involves no 

significant hazards consideration. 

Attorney for licensee: Mr. M. Stanford 

Blanton, Balch & Bingham LLP, 1710 

Sixth Avenue North, Birmingham, AL 

35203–2015. 

NRC Branch Chief: Jennifer DixonHerrity. 

Southern Nuclear Operating Company, 

Docket Nos. 52–025 and 52–026, Vogtle 

Electric Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4, 

Burke County, Georgia 

Date of amendment request: May 31, 

2017. A publicly-available version is in 

ADAMS under Accession No. 

ML17151A296. 

Description of amendment request: 

The requested amendment proposes to 

depart from approved AP1000 Design 

Control Document (DCD) Tier 2 

information (text, tables, and figures) as 

incorporated into the Updated Final 

Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) as 

plant-specific DCD information, and 

from involved plant-specific Technical 

Specifications as incorporated in 

Appendix A of the combined license. 

Specifically, the proposed changes 

support the addition of chemicals 

necessary to achieve proper reactor 

coolant system (RCS) water quality by 

allowing an unborated water source 

through the chemical mixing tank to be 

unisolated for ≤1 hour for chemical 

addition to the pressurizer to be 

performed with reactor coolant pumps 

(RCPs) not in operation. In order to 

perform chemical addition to the 

pressurizer without the mixing provided 

by forced reactor coolant system (RCS) 

flow, administrative controls are 

established such that coolant introduced 

into the RCS is at a boron concentration 

greater than or equal to that required to 

meet the shutdown margin (SDM) boron 

concentration. 

Basis for proposed no significant 

hazards consideration determination: 

As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the 

licensee has provided its analysis of the 

issue of no significant hazards 

consideration, which is presented 

below: 

1. Does the proposed amendment involve 

a significant increase in the probability or 

consequences of an accident previously 

evaluated? 

Response: No. 

Updated Final Safety Analysis Report 

(UFSAR) 15.4.6, Chemical and Volume 

Control System Malfunction that Results in a 

Decrease in the Boron Concentration in the 

Reactor Coolant, addresses inadvertent boron 

dilution events. The principal means of 

positive reactivity insertion to the core is the 

addition of unborated, primary-grade water 

from the demineralized water transfer and 

storage system (DWS) into the reactor coolant 

system (RCS) through the reactor makeup 

portion of the chemical and volume control 

system (CVS). 

These events are primarily evaluated with 

one or more reactor coolant pumps (RCPs) in 

operation providing adequate mixing. The 

changes proposed by this amendment request 

do not involve operations where the RCPs are 

in operation. Therefore, there is no increase 

in the probability or consequences of 

inadvertent boron dilution events with RCPs 

operating. 

UFSAR Subsection 15.4.6 also describes 

that when a reactor coolant pump is not 

operating, the demineralized water isolation 

valves are closed and an uncontrolled boron 

dilution transient cannot occur. The 

proposed amendment adds provisions to 

allow a specific CVS unborated water source 

flow path to be opened through the chemical 

mixing tank to the RCS pressurizer when 

RCPs are not in operation for the purpose of 

chemical addition to the pressurizer. The 

administrative control provisions proposed 

provide adequate assurance that any 

injection to the RCS pressurizer would only 

occur such that injected water is limited to 


pmangrum on DSK3GDR082PROD with NOTICES1
42854 Federal Register / Vol. 82, No. 175 / Tuesday, September 12, 2017 / Notices 

boron concentrations greater than the 

required concentrations to meet the SDM. 

With no reduction in SDM, there would be 

no means of positive reactivity insertion to 

the core leading to an adverse reactivity 

event. As such, there is no significant 

increase in the probability of a previously 

evaluated boron dilution event as a result of 

this change. 

Since the proposed change does not lead 

to any positive reactivity insertion, there are 

no increased consequences of an accident 

previously evaluated. 

Therefore, the proposed amendment does 

not involve a significant increase in the 

probability or consequences of an accident 

previously evaluated. 

2. Does the proposed amendment create 

the possibility of a new or different kind of 

accident from any accident previously 

evaluated? 

Response: No. 

The administrative control provisions 

proposed provide adequate assurance that 

any injection to the pressurizer would only 

occur such that injected water is limited to 

boron concentrations greater than the 

required concentrations to meet the SDM. 

With no reduction in SDM, there would be 

no means of positive reactivity insertion to 

the core leading to an adverse reactivity 

event. Failure modes involving procedural 

controls and operator actions are considered 

in evaluating inadvertent boron dilution 

events. The possibility of a new or different 

kind of failure, malfunction, or sequence of 

events has been evaluated with these 

proposed changes; events are precluded with 

the proposed administrative controls and 

defense in depth features inherent in the 

AP1000 design. 

Therefore, the proposed amendment does 

not create the possibility of a new or different 

kind of accident from any accident 

previously evaluated. 

3. Does the proposed amendment involve 

a significant reduction in a margin of safety? 

Response: No. 

The margin of safety is established by 

maintaining the required SDM during 

shutdown activities. The proposed changes 

to the UFSAR and Technical Specifications 

do not adversely affect the safety-related 

functions of the RCS or CVS in maintaining 

adequate SDM. Provisions are proposed for a 

specific CVS unborated water source flow 

path to be opened through the chemical 

mixing tank to the RCS pressurizer when 

RCPs are not in operation; however, this 

activity is performed under administrative 

controls that preclude the potential for a 

reduction in SDM. 

The changes do not affect containment 

penetrations or any other safety-related 

equipment or fission product barriers. The 

requested changes will not affect any design 

code, function, design analysis, safety 

analysis input or result, or design/safety 

margin. No safety analysis or design basis 

acceptance limit/criterion is challenged or 

exceeded by the requested changes. The 

existing design and operation of the 

associated systems are adequate to preclude 

an inadvertent boron dilution from occurring 

when RCPs are not in operation. 

Therefore, the proposed amendment does 

not involve a significant reduction in a 

margin of safety. 

The NRC staff has reviewed the 

licensee’s analysis and, based on this 

review, it appears that the three 

standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 

satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff 

proposes to determine that the 

amendment request involves no 

significant hazard consideration. 

Attorney for licensee: M. Stanford 

Blanton, Balch & Bingham LLP, 1710 

Sixth Avenue North, Birmingham, AL 

35203–2015. 

NRC Branch Chief: Jennifer DixonHerrity. 

Southern Nuclear Operating Company, 

Docket Nos. 52–025 and 52–026, Vogtle 

Electric Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4, 

Burke County, Georgia 

Date of amendment request: July 28, 

2017. A publicly-available version is in 

ADAMS under Accession No. 

ML17209A185. 

Description of amendment request: 

The requested amendment proposes to 

depart from approved AP1000 Design 

Control Document (DCD) Tier 2 

information as incorporated into the 

Updated Final Safety Analysis Report 

(UFSAR) as plant-specific DCD 

information, and also proposes to depart 

from involved plant-specific Tier 1 

information and the associated 

combined license (COL) Appendix C 

information. Specifically, the 

amendment, if approved, would revise 

the COL documents mentioned 

previously to reflect the proposed 

changes to update Reactor Coolant 

System (RCS) requirements for the 

reactor vessel head vent (RVHV) mass 

flow rate. Pursuant to the provisions of 

10 CFR 52.63(b)(1), an exemption from 

elements of the design as certified in the 

10 CFR part 52, Appendix D, design 

certification rule is also requested for 

the plant-specific DCD Tier 1 material 

departures. 

Basis for proposed no significant 

hazards consideration determination: 

As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the 

licensee has provided its analysis of the 

issue of no significant hazards 

consideration, which is presented 

below: 

1. Does the proposed amendment involve 

a significant increase in the probability or 

consequences of an accident previously 

evaluated? 

Response: No. 

UFSAR Subsections 15.2.7, 15.5.1, and 

15.5.2 describe analyses performed for an 

increase in reactor coolant inventory due to 

a loss of normal feedwater flow, and for 

malfunctions of the chemical and volume 

control system and the core makeup tanks. In 

each of these evaluated accidents, it is 

assumed that the operators are alerted to the 

event due to a high pressurizer water level 

and take subsequent action to open the 

reactor vessel head vent valves. When the 

head vent is opened, the pressurizer water 

level increase slows and eventually 

decreases. 

Changing the required mass flow rate from 

8.2 lbm/sec at a Reactor Coolant System 

(RCS) pressure of 1250 psia [pounds per 

square inch absolute] to 9.0 lbm/sec [pounds 

mass per second] at an RCS pressure of 2500 

psia for the reactor vessel head vent (RVHV) 

flow path does not change the probability of 

these events occurring. The valves are used 

to mitigate the events. They are not an 

initiator of these accidents, or any other 

accident previously evaluated. Changing the 

required mass flow rate does not change the 

consequences of these accidents. The 

proposed flow rate change is made to be 

consistent with the latest AP1000 safety 

analysis. This change does not lead to an 

increase in the probability of a loss of coolant 

accident, nor does it cause the RVHV to 

exceed the capability of the normal makeup 

system. The changes described above 

continue to ensure the design is capable of 

providing adequate flow rate for emergency 

letdown and the prevention of long term 

pressurizer overfill. 

Therefore, the proposed amendment does 

not involve a significant increase in the 

probability or consequences of an accident 

previously evaluated. 

2. Does the proposed amendment create 

the possibility of a new or different kind of 

accident from any accident previously 

evaluated? 

Response: No. 

The proposed changes impact the 

acceptance criteria for RVHV mass flow rate. 

The required mass flow rate is changed from 

8.2 lbm/sec at an RCS pressure of 1250 psia 

to 9.0 lbm/sec at an RCS pressure of 2500 

psia to align with the events evaluated in the 

current safety analysis. The proposed 

changes do not result in a new accident 

initiator and do not impact a current accident 

initiator. 

Therefore, the proposed amendment does 

not create the possibility of a new or different 

kind of accident from any accident 

previously evaluated. 

3. Does the proposed amendment involve 

a significant reduction in a margin of safety? 

Response: No. 

The proposed changes impact the 

acceptance criteria for RVHV mass flow rate. 

The required mass flow rate is changed from 

8.2 lbm/sec at an RCS pressure of 1250 psia 

to 9.0 lbm/sec at an RCS pressure of 2500 

psia. The proposed changes are made to 

reflect the updated AP1000 plant safety 

analysis; the changes are conservative and 

bound the expected performance of the asbuilt equipment. 

COL Appendix C (plant-specific Tier 1) is 

proposed to be updated to reflect the new 

mass flow rate through the RVHV line and 

the associated system pressure. COL 

Appendix C (plant-specific Tier 1) is updated 

to reflect the latest safety analysis, which 

credits an emergency letdown mass flow rate 

of 9.0 lbm/sec at an RCS pressure of 2500 


pmangrum on DSK3GDR082PROD with NOTICES1
Federal Register / Vol. 82, No. 175 / Tuesday, September 12, 2017 / Notices 42855 

psia. At these conditions, long term 

pressurizer overfill is prevented. RCS 

calculations show that the expected mass 

flow rate through the emergency letdown 

path is 12.34 lbm/sec. Therefore, the safety 

analysis calculation, and the corresponding 

mass flow rate and RCS pressure values used 

in the proposed changes, is conservative and 

bounded by the expected mass flow rate. 

Therefore, the proposed amendment does 

not involve a significant reduction in a 

margin of safety. 

The NRC staff has reviewed the 

licensee’s analysis and, based on this 

review, it appears that the three 

standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 

satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff 

proposes to determine that the 

amendment request involves no 

significant hazards consideration. 

Attorney for licensee: M. Stanford 

Blanton, Balch & Bingham LLP, 1710 

Sixth Avenue, North, Birmingham, AL 

35203–2015. 

NRC Branch Chief: Jennifer DixonHerrity. 

STP Nuclear Operating Company, 

Docket Nos. 50–498 and 50–499, South 

Texas Project, Units 1 and 2, Matagorda 

County, Texas 

Date of amendment request: July 31, 

2017. A publicly-available version is in 

ADAMS under Accession No. 

ML17212A842. 

Description of amendment request: 

The amendment would revise the 

staffing and staff augmentation times 

described in the South Texas Project 

Emergency Plan. The proposed 

amendment would increase the 

Emergency Response Organization 

(ERO) response times and would modify 

minimum staffing functions and 

requirements of the ERO and Operations 

Support Center staff. The changes also 

include formatting, clarification, and 

editorial modifications. 

Basis for proposed no significant 

hazards consideration determination: 

As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the 

licensee has provided its analysis of the 

issue of no significant hazards 

consideration, which is presented 

below: 

1. Does the proposed amendment involve 

a significant increase in the probability or 

consequences of an accident previously 

evaluated? 

Response: No. 

The proposed amendment has no effect on 

normal plant operation or on any accident 

initiator or precursors and does not impact 

the function of plant structures, systems, or 

components. The proposed changes do not 

alter or prevent the ability of the Emergency 

Response Organization to perform their 

intended functions to mitigate the 

consequences of an accident or event. 

Therefore, the proposed STPEGS [South 

Texas Project Electric Generating Station] 

Emergency Plan change does not involve a 

significant increase in the probability or 

consequences of an accident previously 

evaluated. 

2. Does the proposed amendment create 

the possibility of a new or different kind of 

accident from any accident previously 

evaluated? 

Response: No. 

The proposed amendment does not impact 

any accident analysis. The change does not 

involve a physical alteration of the plant (i.e., 

no new or different type of equipment will 

be installed), a change in the method of plant 

operation, or new operator actions. The 

proposed change does not introduce failure 

modes that could result in a new accident, 

and the change does not alter assumptions 

made in the safety analysis. The proposed 

change revises the on-shift staffing and staff 

augmentation response times in the STPEGS 

Emergency Plan. The proposed changes do 

not alter or prevent the ability of the 

Emergency Response Organization to perform 

their intended functions to mitigate the 

consequences of an accident or event. 

Therefore, the proposed change does not 

create the possibility of a new or different 

kind of accident from any accident 

previously evaluated. 

3. Does the proposed amendment involve 

a significant reduction in a margin of safety? 

Response: No. 

Margin of safety is associated with 

confidence in the ability of the fission 

product barriers (i.e., fuel cladding, reactor 

coolant system pressure boundary, and 

containment structure) to limit the level of 

radiation dose to the public. The proposed 

change is associated with the STPEGS 

Emergency Plan staff and staff augmentation 

and does not impact operation of the plant 

or its response to transients or accidents. The 

change does not affect the Technical 

Specifications. The proposed change does 

not involve a change in the method of plant 

operation and no accident analyses will be 

affected by the proposed change. Safety 

analysis acceptance criteria are not affected 

by the proposed change. The revised STPEGS 

Emergency Plan will continue to provide the 

necessary response staff with the proposed 

change. Therefore, the proposed change is 

determined to not adversely affect the ability 

to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 

50.54(q)(2), 10 CFR 50 Appendix E, or the 

emergency planning standards described in 

10 CFR 50.47(b). 

Therefore, the proposed amendment does 

not involve a significant reduction in a 

margin of safety. 

The NRC staff has reviewed the 

licensee’s analysis and, based on this 

review, it appears that the three 

standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 

satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff 

proposes to determine that the 

amendment request involves no 

significant hazards consideration. 

Attorney for licensee: Kym Harshaw, 

General Counsel, STP Nuclear 

Operating Company, P.O. Box 289, 

Wadsworth, TX 77483. 

NRC Branch Chief: Robert J. 

Pascarelli. 

III. Notice of Issuance of Amendments 

to Facility Operating Licenses and 

Combined Licenses 

During the period since publication of 

the last biweekly notice, the 

Commission has issued the following 

amendments. The Commission has 

determined for each of these 

amendments that the application 

complies with the standards and 

requirements of the Atomic Energy Act 

of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the 

Commission’s rules and regulations. 

The Commission has made appropriate 

findings as required by the Act and the 

Commission’s rules and regulations in 

10 CFR chapter I, which are set forth in 

the license amendment. 

A notice of consideration of issuance 

of amendment to facility operating 

license or combined license, as 

applicable, proposed no significant 

hazards consideration determination, 

and opportunity for a hearing in 

connection with these actions, was 

published in the Federal Register as 

indicated. 

Unless otherwise indicated, the 

Commission has determined that these 

amendments satisfy the criteria for 

categorical exclusion in accordance 

with 10 CFR 51.22. Therefore, pursuant 

to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental 

impact statement or environmental 

assessment need be prepared for these 

amendments. If the Commission has 

prepared an environmental assessment 

under the special circumstances 

provision in 10 CFR 51.22(b) and has 

made a determination based on that 

assessment, it is so indicated. 

For further details with respect to the 

action see (1) the applications for 

amendment, (2) the amendment, and (3) 

the Commission’s related letter, Safety 

Evaluation and/or Environmental 

Assessment as indicated. All of these 

items can be accessed as described in 

the ‘‘Obtaining Information and 

Submitting Comments’’ section of this 

document. 


pmangrum on DSK3GDR082PROD with NOTICES1
42856 Federal Register / Vol. 82, No. 175 / Tuesday, September 12, 2017 / Notices 

Duke Energy Progress, LLC, Docket Nos. 

50–325 and 50–324, Brunswick Steam 

Electric Plant, Units 1 and 2 

(Brunswick), Brunswick County, North 

Carolina 

Duke Energy Progress, LLC, Docket No. 

50–400, Shearon Harris Nuclear Power 

Plant, Unit 1 (Harris), Wake County, 

North Carolina 

Duke Energy Progress, LLC, Docket No. 

50–261, H.B. Robinson Steam Electric 

Plant Unit No. 2 (Robinson), Darlington 

County, South Carolina 

Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, Docket 

Nos. 50–269, 50–270, and 50–287, 

Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 

3 (Oconee), Oconee County, South 

Carolina 

Date of amendment request: April 29, 

2016, as supplemented by letters dated 

October 3, 2016, and January 16, 2017. 

Brief description of amendments: The 

amendments (1) consolidated the 

Emergency Operations Facilities (EOFs) 

for Brunswick, Harris, and Robinson 

with the Duke Energy Progress, LLC 

(Duke Energy) corporate EOF in 

Charlotte, North Carolina; (2) decreased 

the frequency for a multisite drill at 

Oconee from once per 6 years to once 

per 8 years; (3) allowed the multisite 

drill performance with sites other than 

the Catawba Nuclear Station, McGuire 

Nuclear Station, or Oconee; (4) changed 

the Brunswick, Harris, and Robinson 

augmentation times to be consistent 

with those of the sites currently 

supported by the Duke Energy corporate 

EOF; and (5) decreased the frequency of 

the unannounced augmentation drill at 

Brunswick from twice per year to once 

per year. 

Date of issuance: August 21, 2017. 

Effective date: As of the date of 

issuance and shall be implemented 

within 180 days from the date of 

issuance. 

Amendment Nos.: 279 and 307 for 

Brunswick, Units 1 and 2; 160 for 

Harris, Unit 1; 254 for Robinson Unit 

No. 2; and 405, 407, and 406 for Oconee, 

Units 1, 2, and 3. A publicly-available 

version is in ADAMS under Accession 

No. ML17188A387; documents related 

to these amendments are listed in the 

Safety Evaluation enclosed with the 

amendments. 

Renewed Facility Operating License 

Nos. DPR–71 and DPR–62 for 

Brunswick, Units 1 and 2; NPF–63 for 

Harris, Unit 1; DPR–23 for Robinson 

Unit No. 2; and DPR–38, DPR–47, and 

DPR–55 for Oconee, Units 1, 2, and 3: 

The amendments revised the emergency 

plans. 

Date of initial notice in Federal 

Register: July 5, 2016 (81 FR 43650). 

The supplemental letters dated October 

3, 2016, and January 16, 2017, provided 

additional information that expanded 

the scope of the application as originally 

noticed and changed the NRC staff’s 

original proposed no significant hazards 

consideration determination as 

published in the Federal Register. 

Accordingly, the NRC published a 

second proposed no significant hazards 

consideration determination in the 

Federal Register on February 14, 2017 

(82 FR 10594). This notice superseded 

the original notice in its entirety. 

The Commission’s related evaluation 

of the amendments is contained in a 

Safety Evaluation dated August 21, 

2017. 

No significant hazards consideration 

comments received: No. 

Energy Northwest, Docket No. 50–397, 

Columbia Generating Station, Benton 

County, Washington 

Date of application for amendment: 

July 28, 2016, as supplemented by 

letters dated February 23, 2017, and 

June 21, 2017. 

Brief description of amendment: The 

amendment revised the current 

emergency action level scheme to one 

based on Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 

guidance in NEI 99–01, Revision 6, 

‘‘Development of Emergency Action 

Levels for Non-Passive Reactors’’ 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML12326A805). 

Revision 6 of NEI 99–01 was endorsed 

by the NRC in a letter dated March 28, 

2013. 

Date of issuance: August 28, 2017. 

Effective date: As of its date of 

issuance and shall be implemented 

within 180 days from the date of 

issuance. 

Amendment No.: 244. A publiclyavailable version is in ADAMS under 

Accession No. ML17188A230; 

documents related to this amendment 

are listed in the Safety Evaluation 

enclosed with the amendment. 

Renewed Facility Operating License 

No. NPF–21: The amendment revised 

the Operating License. 

Date of initial notice in Federal 

Register: September 27, 2016 (81 FR 

66305). The supplemental letters dated 

February 23, 2017, and June 21, 2017, 

provided additional information that 

clarified the application, did not expand 

the scope of the application as originally 

noticed, and did not change the staff’s 

original proposed no significant hazards 

consideration determination as 

published in the Federal Register. 

The Commission’s related evaluation 

of the amendment is contained in a 

Safety Evaluation dated August 28, 

2017. 

No significant hazards consideration 

comments received: No. 

Exelon Generation Company, LLC, 

Docket Nos. STN 50–454 and STN 50– 

455, Byron Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, 

Ogle County, Illinois 

Date of application for amendments: 

October 7, 2016, as supplemented by 

letter dated March 20, 2017. 

Brief description of amendments: The 

amendments revised the Updated Final 

Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) to 

identify the TORMIS Computer Code as 

the methodology used for assessing 

tornado-generated missile protection of 

unprotected plant structures, systems 

and components (SSCs) and to describe 

the results of the Byron Station sitespecific tornado hazard analysis. 

Date of issuance: August 10, 2017. 

Effective date: As of the date of 

issuance and shall be implemented 

within 60 days of the date of issuance. 

The UFSAR changes shall be filed with 

the NRC in the next periodic update to 

the UFSAR scheduled for December 15, 

2018. 

Amendment Nos.: 199 for NPF–37 

and 199 for NPF–66. A publiclyavailable version is in ADAMS under 

Accession No. ML17188A155; 

documents related to these amendments 

are listed in the Safety Evaluation 

enclosed with the amendments. 

Facility Operating License Nos. NPF– 

37, and NPF–66: The amendments 

revised the current licensing basis as 

described in the UFSAR. 

Date of initial notice in Federal 

Register: December 6, 2016 (81 FR 

87969). The March 20, 2017, 

supplement contained clarifying 

information and did not change the 

scope of the proposed action or affect 

the NRC staff’s initial proposed finding 

of no significant hazards consideration. 

The Commission’s related evaluation 

of the amendments is contained in a 

Safety Evaluation dated August 10, 

2017. 

No significant hazards consideration 

comments received: No. 

FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating 

Company, et al., Docket Nos. 50–334 

and 50–412, Beaver Valley Power 

Station (Beaver Valley), Unit Nos. 1 and 

2, Beaver County, Pennsylvania 

Date of amendment request: June 30, 

2017. 

Brief description of amendments: The 

amendments modified requirements on 

control and shutdown rods, and rod and 

bank position indication for Beaver 

Valley, Unit No. 2. The changes are 

consistent with Technical Specifications 

Task Force (TSTF) Traveler TSTF–547, 

Revision 1, ‘‘Clarification of Rod 


pmangrum on DSK3GDR082PROD with NOTICES1
Federal Register / Vol. 82, No. 175 / Tuesday, September 12, 2017 / Notices 42857 

Position Requirements.’’ Additional 

supporting changes to Beaver Valley, 

Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Technical 

Specifications were also made. 

Date of Issuance: August 16, 2017. 

Effective date: As of the date of 

issuance and shall be implemented 

within 30 days. 

Amendment Nos.: 299 (Unit No. 1) 

and 188 (Unit No. 2). A publiclyavailable version is in ADAMS under 

Accession No. ML17221A280; 

documents related to these amendments 

are listed in the Safety Evaluation 

enclosed with the amendments. 

Renewed Facility Operating License 

Nos. DPR–66 and NPF–73: Amendments 

revised the Renewed Facility Operating 

Licenses and Technical Specifications. 

Date of initial notice in Federal 

Register: July 11, 2017 (82 FR 32017). 

The Commission’s related evaluation 

of the amendments is contained in a 

Safety Evaluation dated August 16, 

2017. 

No significant hazards consideration 

comments received: No. 

Tennessee Valley Authority, Docket 

Nos. 50–259, 50–260, and 50–296, 

Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2 

and 3, Limestone County, Alabama 

Date of amendment request: 

September 21, 2015, as supplemented 

by letters dated November 13, December 

15 (two letters), and December 18, 2015; 

February 16, March 8, March 9, March 

24, March 28, April 4, April 5, April 14, 

April 22 (two letters), April 27, May 11, 

May 20 (two letters), May 27, June 9, 

June 17, June 20, June 24, July 13 (two 

letters), July 27, July 29 (two letters), 

August 3 (three letters), September 12, 

September 21, September 23, October 

13, October 28, and October 31, 2016; 

and January 20, February 3, March 3, 

and June 12, 2017. 

Brief description of amendments: The 

amendments revised Renewed Facility 

Operating Licenses (RFOLs) and 

Technical Specifications (TSs) to 

authorize an increase of maximum 

reactor core thermal power level for 

Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2, 

and 3 to 3,952 megawatt thermal (MWt). 

These license amendments represent an 

increase of approximately 14.3 percent 

above the current licensed thermal 

power level of 3,458 MWt, which is an 

increase of approximately 20 percent 

above the original licensed thermal 

power level of 3,293 MWt. The NRC 

considers the requested increase in 

power level to be an extended power 

uprate. 

Date of issuance: August 14, 2017. 

Effective date: As of the date of 

issuance and shall be implemented 

prior to startup from the refueling 

outages of fall 2018 (Unit 1), spring 2019 

(Unit 2), and spring 2018 (Unit 3). 

Amendment Nos.: 299 (Unit 1), 323 

(Unit 2), and 283 (Unit 3). A publiclyavailable version is in ADAMS under 

Accession No. ML17032A120; 

documents related to these amendments 

are listed in the Safety Evaluation (SE) 

enclosed with the amendments. 

Renewed Facility Operating License 

Nos. DPR–33, DPR–52, and DPR–68: 

Amendments revised the RFOLs and 

TSs. 

Date of initial notice in Federal 

Register: July 5, 2016 (81 FR 43666). 

The supplemental letters dated April 22 

(two letters), April 27, May 11, May 20 

(two letters), May 27, June 9, June 17, 

June 20, June 24, July 13, (two letters); 

July 27, July 29 (two letters), August 3 

(three letters), September 12, September 

21, September 23, October 13, October 

28, and October 31, 2016; and January 

20, February 3, March 3, and June 12, 

2017, provided additional information 

that clarified the application, did not 

expand the scope of the application as 

originally noticed, and did not change 

the staff’s original proposed no 

significant hazards consideration 

determination as published in the 

Federal Register. 

The Commission’s related evaluation 

of the amendments is contained in the 

SE dated August 14, 2017. 

No significant hazards consideration 

comments received: Yes, refer to Section 

6.0, ‘‘Public Comments,’’ of the SE. 

Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating 

Corporation (WCNOC), Docket No. 50– 

482, Wolf Creek Generating Station 

(WCGS), Coffey County, Kansas 

Date of amendment request: 

September 30, 2016, as supplemented 

by letters dated March 16 and April 26, 

2017. 

Brief description of amendment: The 

amendment revised the emergency 

action level (EAL) scheme used at 

WCGS. The currently approved EAL 

scheme is based on Nuclear 

Management and Resources Council/ 

National Environmental Studies Project 

(NUMARC/NESP)-007, Revision 2, 

‘‘Methodology for Development of 

Emergency Action Levels,’’ January 

1992. The amendment allows WCNOC 

to adopt an EAL scheme, which is based 

on the guidance established in Nuclear 

Energy Institute (NEI) 99–01, Revision 6, 

‘‘Development of Emergency Action 

Levels for Non-Passive Reactors,’’ 

November 2012. Revision 6 of NEI 99– 

01 has been endorsed by the NRC by 

letter dated March 28, 2013. 

Date of issuance: August 28, 2017. 

Effective date: As of its date of 

issuance and shall be implemented by 

September 30, 2018. 

Amendment No.: 218. A publiclyavailable version is in ADAMS under 

Accession No. ML17166A409; 

documents related to this amendment 

are listed in the Safety Evaluation 

enclosed with the amendment. 

Renewed Facility Operating License 

No. NPF–42. The amendment revised 

the Operating License. 

Date of initial notice in Federal 

Register: December 6, 2016 (81 FR 

87974). The supplemental letters dated 

March 16 and April 26, 2017, provided 

additional information that clarified the 

application, did not expand the scope of 

the application as originally noticed, 

and did not change the staff’s original 

proposed no significant hazards 

consideration determination as 

published in the Federal Register. 

The Commission’s related evaluation 

of the amendment is contained in a 

Safety Evaluation dated August 28, 

2017. 

No significant hazards consideration 

comments received: No. 

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 30th day 

of August 2017. 

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Eric J. Benner, 

Deputy Director, Division of Operating 

Reactor Licensing, Office of Nuclear Reactor 

Regulation. 

[FR Doc. 2017–19214 Filed 9–11–17; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY 

COMMISSION 

[Docket Nos. 50–282, 50–306, 50–368, 50– 

334, 50–338, 50–339, 50–280, 50–445, 50– 

395, 50–348, 50–364, 50–498, 50–499, 50– 

327, 50–390, 50–336, 50–335; NRC–2017– 

0188] 

Northern States Power Company— 

Minnesota; Entergy Operations, Inc.; 

FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating 

Company; Virginia Electric and Power 

Company; TEX Operations Company, 

LLC; South Carolina Electric & Gas 

Company, Inc.; STP Nuclear Operating 

Company; Tennessee Valley Authority 

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission. 

ACTION: 10 CFR 2.206 request; receipt. 

SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC) is giving notice that 

by petition dated January 24, 2017, Mr. 

Paul Gunter on behalf of Beyond 

Nuclear, and representing numerous 

public interest groups (collectively, 

Beyond Nuclear, et al., or petitioners), 

has requested that the NRC take action 


pmangrum on DSK3GDR082PROD with NOTICES1