No. 80-157 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1980 

ROGER CRIST, 

Respondent and appellant, 

DAVID SEGNA and GARY L. 

WEISS I 

Petitioners and respondents. 

Appeal from: District Court of the Third Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Powell, The Honorable 

Robert Boyd, Judge presiding. 

Counsel of Record: 

For Appellant: 

Nick A. Rotering, Dept. of Institutions, Helena, 

Montana 

For Respondent: 

Sullivan & Holland, Butte, Montana 

Gary W. Gilbert, Havre, Montana 

Submitted on Briefs: November 6, 1980 

Decided: 3 - 1981 

Filed: FEB 3 - 1981 

6. "A&.-- ? 

Clerk 
Mr. Justice John C. Sheehy delivered the Opinion of the 

Court. 

Roger Crist, as warden of Montana State Prison, appeals 

from an order of the Third Judicial District Court, Powell 

County, granting habeas corpus to prison inmates Gary Weiss 

and David Segna. We affirm. 

Segna and Weiss are currently serving sentences in 

Montana State Prison. Each inmate was free on parole, and 

was subsequently returned to prison for violating conditions 

of parole. Neither man was credited with statutory good 

time at any time during their parole periods. 

The issues before this Court are: (1) may parolees be 

credited with statutory good time while on parole; and (2) 

is the crediting of such good time discretionary within the 

Department of Institutions and the prison warden? 

Both issues hinge on the correct interpretation of 

section 53-30-105, MCA, and other related statutes. Section 

53-30-105, MCA, provides in pertinent part: 

"53-30-105. -- Good time allowance. (1) The 

department of institutions shall adopt 

ruies providing for the granting of good 

time allowance for inmates employed in any 

prison work or activity. The good time 

allowance shall operate as a credit on his 

sentence as imposed by the court, conditioned 

upon the inmate's good behavior and compliance 

with the rules made by the department or the 

warden. The rules adopted by the department 

may not grant good time allowance to exceed: 

" (b) 13 days per month for those inmates 

placed outside the confines of the walls of 

the prison; 

" (c) 15 days per month for those inmates who 

have been assigned outside the walls of the 

prison for an uninterrupted period of 1 year 

on a minimum status; 
"(3) This section applies to all persons 

who are on probation or parole or eligible 

to be placed on probation or parole. No 

person convicted and sentenced before April 

1, 1955, shall have his good time allowance 

reduced as a result of this section." 

Appellant argues that prison officials have refused to 

credit parolees with good time based on this Court's holdings 

in Petition of McIlhargey (1970), 154 Mont. 510, 463 P.2d 

476 and Hill v. State (1961), 139 Mont. 407, 365 P.2d 44. 

In McIlhargey, we stated: "[Tlhe credit of good time is to 

be granted only to a 'convict confined in the state prison.'" 

154 Mont. at 511, 463 P.2d at 476. Appellant asserts that 

under Hill, section 53-30-105(3) acts only as a savings 

clause applicable for inmates convicted prior to April 1, 

Appellant's reliance on both McIlhargey and Hill is 

misplaced in this instance. The cited language from Mc- - 

Ilhargey is a recitation of the provisions of section 80- 

739, R.C.M. 1947, which was repealed in 1955. Hill held 

that the language of section 80-740, R.C.M. 1947, acted as a 

savings clause. When that section was repealed in favor of 

the predecessor of present section 53-30-105, MCA, the 

savings clause was retained as the second sentence of subparagraph (3). The first sentence of that subparagraph, 

with which we are here concerned, was first adopted in 1965 

and was not addressed by either McIlhargey or Hill. Both 

cases are therefore clearly inapposite. 

We find a number of rules of statutory construction 

applicable in our resolution of the issues at bar. Legislative intent must first be determined from the plain meaning 

of the words used; and if the language is plain, unambiguous, 

direct and certain, the statute speaks for itself. Dunphy 
v. Anaconda Company (19681, 151 Mont. 76, 438 P.2d 660. All 

provisions of a statute shall be given effect, if possible. 

Corwin v. Beiswanger (19521, 126 Mont. 337, 251 P.2d 252. 

This Court presumes that the legislature would not pass 

meaningless legislation; and must harmonize statutes relating 

to the same subject, giving effect to each. State ex rel. 

City of Townsend v. D. A. Davidson, Inc. (1975), 166 Mont. 

104, 531 P.2d 370. Finally, we presume that the legislature, 

in repealing an old law and adopting a new statute, intended 

to make some change. The courts shall endeavor to give some 

effect to that change. Mitchell v. Banking Corporation of 

Montana (1933), 95 Mont. 23, 24 P.2d 124. 

Section 53-30-105(1), MCA, plainly provides good time 

shall operate as a credit on an inmate's term; and section 

53-30-105 (3) plainly applies that credit to persons on 

probation or parole. Section 46-23-216(1), MCA, similarly 

allows good time as credit against a parolee's maximum term. 

The provisions of these sections can only be given meaningful, harmonious effect if construed literally according to 

their plain meanings. his conclusion is buttressed by the 

manifest legislative intent underlying the passage of Chapter 

199, Laws of 1965. That legislation repealed language codified 

in section 80-740, R.C.M. 1947 (apparently denying good time 

to parolees), and adopted the language now codified as the 

first sentence of section 53-30-105 (3) , !=A. 

Appellant next asserts that notwithstanding the availability of good time credit, it is within the discretion of 

the warden and the Department to actually allow such credits. 

Section 53-30-105(1), MCA, bestows upon prison officials 

discretion to determine the individual prisoner's good 

behavior and compliance with the rules. See, Seadin v. 
Crist (1980), Mont. - , 608 P.2d 1094, 37 St.Rep. 953. 

It does not extend prison officials unfettered discretion 

to deprive statutory good time to an entire otherwise eligible 

class of prisoners. Nor may we construe such wide-sweeping 

discretion in the face of clear legislative intent to the 

contrary. 

Prisoners on parole remain in the legal custody of the 

prison, section 46-23-215(1), MCA, and are assigned outside 

the walls of the prison. They are thereby eligible for 

statutory good time pursuant to sections 53-30-105(1) (b) and 

(c) , MCA. The discretion to disallow or forfeit an eligible 

parolee's good time credit is, as with all other prisoners 

eligible to receive good time, specifically limited to the 

determination of good behavior and rules compliance. 

In neither instance was there an individual determination by the warden that the prisoner was not entitled to 

good time during parole, based on behavior and rules compliance. 

In neither instance did the warden take action pursuant to 

section 53-30-105 (2) , MCA, to forfeit any good time allowance. 

We therefore conclude that if either respondents' maximum 

term of sentence, less all good time earned in prison or 

while on parole, has expired, that respondent is entitled to 

release. 

Affirmed. 

Justice 

We Concur: 

Chief Justice 
This cause was submitted prior to January 5, 1981.