alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT

DOROTHY S. TOWNE, ESQ., D/B/A ) DOTTIE TOWNE, ATTORNEY AT ) LAW, ) ) Petitioner, ) ) v. ) Case No. 2D18-4615 ) VAKA LAW GROUP, P.L., ) ) Respondent. ) ___________________________________) Opinion filed October 2, 2019. Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County; Martha J. Cook, Judge. Roy D. Wasson of Wasson & Associates, Chartered, Miami, for Petitioner. John V. Trujillo, Tampa, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM.

Denied.
KHOUZAM, C.J., and NORTHCUTT and BLACK, JJ., Concur.
#### Thompson & Co. *v.*Shea.

*(Circuit Court, D. Iowa, C. D.*

June 18, *1881)*

1. Damages — Province of Jury.

It. is tlie province of the jury to find the amount due, as well as plaintiil’s right to recover, and after the jury are discharged the court cannot increase the sum found.

2. New Teiae— Discretion of Court.

Motions for new trial are addressed to the sound discretion of the court.

On Motion to Set Aside Verdict.

*Parsons & Runnells,*for plaintiffs.

*Phillips, Goode & Phillips,*for defendant.

Love, D. J.

I have consulted with Mr. Justice Miller about the motion in this case, and we find no warrant in law for increasing the sum found by the jury, and entering judgment for said increased sum. It W'as a part of the province of the jury to find the amount due, as well as the plaintiff’s right to recover. If the jury had brought a verdict for the plaintiff without finding any sum, the eourt would have directed them to amend their verdict in that regard; and it would have been competent for the plaintiff to have moved the court to require the jury to correct their verdict before they were discharged; but the jury having been discharged, the court cannot increase the sum found. All that the court could do would be to set aside the verdict and order a new trial. Motions for new trials are, in the United States courts, addressed to the sound discretion of the court. The party losing has no absolute right to a new trial. This *848cause having been three times tried, and the sum now in dispute being less than $1,000, the court must refuse to exercise its discretion in favor of granting a new trial.

The plaintiff’s motion is denied and overruled, and there will be a judgment in accordance with the verdict.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff

- Appellee,

v. DIAMANTE ALFRED, AKA Alfred, AKA Diamante Deshon,

Defendant

- Appellant. No. 19

- 10244
D.C. No. 1:12

- cr - 00160

- LJO

- SKO

- 1

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California Lawrence J. O ’ Neill, District Judge, Presiding Submitted March 3, 2020 * *
Before: MURGUIA, CHRISTEN, and BADE, Circuit Judges.
Diamante Alfred appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges
the 60

- month sentence imposed upon his second revocation of supervised release

. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm

.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Accordingly, Alfred’s request for oral argument is denied. 

# FILED

MAR 6 2020 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2 19

- 10244

Alfred contends that the district court improperly based the sentence on an earlier promise to impose the statutory maximum term if Alfred violated supervised release, rather than an individualized sentencing determination. He also
contends that the distr ict court’s purported pre determination of his sentence required the court’s recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455 and the Due Process Clause. We review for plain error, see United States v. Valencia

- Barragan , 608 F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 2010) , and conclude that there is none. T hough the district court
referred during the revocation hearing to its earlier promise that a violation of supervised release would result in imposition of the statutory maximum term, the
district court considered the 1 8 U.S.C. § 3583(e) factors and properly based the sentence on the need to protect the public, Alfred’s multiple breach es of the court’s trust, and a determination that Alfred was not amenable to supervision. See United
States v. Simtob , 485 F.3d 1058, 106 2 (9th Cir. 2007)

. Further, contrary to Alfred’s contention, the district court’s explanation of its decision to impose the statutory maximum sentence was adequate. See United States v. Carty , 520 F.3d 984, 992

- 93 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). This record does not support Alfred ’s argument that the court’s decision to impose the 60

- month sentence was based on improper bias, and the district judge did not plainly err by failing to recuse himself

. See United States v. Rangel , 697 F.3d 795, 804 (9th Cir. 2012 )

. Alfred next contends that the sentence is substantively unreasonable. The3 19

- 10244

district court did not abuse its discretion. S ee Gall v. United States , 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007) . The above

- Guidelines sentence is substantively reasonable in light of
the § 3 583(e) sentencing factors and totality of the circumstances , including Alfred’s poor performance on supervision and the nature of his violations

. S ee Gall , 552 U.S. at 51

. AFFIRMED
.
#### Seyed Abbas MOUSAVI, Petitioner, v. Michael B. MUKASEY,* Attorney General, Respondent.

Nos. 04-76032, 06-73362.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Dec. 3, 2007 **.

Filed Dec. 28, 2007.

Seyed Abbas Mousavi, Santa Clarita, CA, pro se.

Howard R. Davis, Esq., Law Offices of Barbara J. Darnell, Los Angeles, CA, for Petitioner.

CAC-District Counsel, Esq., Office of the District Counsel Department of Homeland Security, Los Angeles, CA, Ronald E. LeFevre, Chief Counsel, Office of the District Counsel Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, M. Jocelyn Lopez Wright, Esq., U.S. Department of Justice Civil Div./Office of Immigration Lit., Mark L. Gross, Esq., Nathaniel Pollock, U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division/Appellate Section, Washington, DC, for Respondent.

Before GOODWIN, WALLACE, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.

*

 Pursuant to Fed. R.App. P. 43(c)(2), Michael B. Mukasey is substituted for his predecessor, Alberto R. Gonzales, as Attorney General of the United States.

**

 The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM ***

Seyed Abbas Mousavi, a native and citizen of Iran, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) orders denying his first (No. 04-76032), and his second (No. 06-73362) motion to reopen his removal proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for abuse of discretion. *Malty v. Ashcroft,*381 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir.2004). We deny the petitions for review.

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Mousavi’s first motion to reopen as untimely because it was filed more than 90 days after the final order of removal, *see*8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Mousavi *977failed to demonstrate prima facie eligibility for asylum, *see Malty,*381 F.3d at 947; *Limsico v. INS,*951 F.2d 210, 213-14 (9th Cir.1991) (where the petitioner has had a hearing, it is appropriate for the BIA to view and interpret the “new” evidence at face value).

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Mousavi’s second motion to reopen as both number and time barred because Mousavi had previously filed a motion to reopen, *see*8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2); the second motion was filed more than 90 days after the final order of removal, *see id.;*and Mousavi failed to demonstrate prima facie eligibility for asylum or CAT relief based on changed circumstances, *see Malty,*381 F.3d at 947; *Limsico,*951 F.2d at 213-14.

To the extent Mousavi contends that the BIA failed to consider some or all of the evidence he submitted with his first and second motion to reopen, he has not overcome the presumption that the BIA did review the record. *See Fernandez v. Gonzales,*439 F.3d 592, 603 (9th Cir.2006).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED IN NO. 04-76032.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED IN NO. 06-73362.

***

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
EXHIBIT 99.2
                 Citizens Financial Corporation and Subsidiaries
                    CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
                       PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350


                  In  connection  with the  Quarterly  Report  on  Form 10-Q  of
Citizens  Financial  Corporation  (the "Company") for the quarterly period ended
March 31, 2003, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date
hereof (the  "Report") I, Brent L. Nemec,  Vice  President  and Chief  Financial
Officer of the  Company,  certify  pursuant to 18 U.S.C.  ss.  1350,  as adopted
pursuant to ss. 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002, that, to the best of my
knowledge:

1.       The  Report fully  complies with the  requirements  of section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2.       The  information  contained  in  the  Report  fairly  presents,  in all
material  respects,  the  financial condition and  results  of operations of the
Company.


                                             By:       /s/ Brent L. Nemec
                                                       -------------------------
                                                       Brent L. Nemec
                                                       Chief Financial Officer

Date: May 20, 2003
### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 17

- 40820 Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff

- Appellee

v.
JULIO RAMIREZ

- HERRERA, also known as Eliseo Lucas

- Pineda , Defendant

- Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. 5:17

- CR

- 407

- 1

Before DAVIS, HAYNES, and COSTA, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: *
The attorney appointed to represent Julio Ramirez

- Herrera has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and United States v. Flores , 632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Ramirez

- Herrera h a s not filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous

* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5 , the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED April 1 7 , 2018 Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 17-40820 Document: 00514433116 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/17/2018No. 17

- 40820

2 issue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the
APPEAL IS DISMISSED. See 5 TH C IR

. R. 42.2. Case: 17-40820 Document: 00514433116 Page: 2 Date Filed: 04/17/2018
EX-34.1
(logo) pwc


Report of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm

To the Board of Directors, PNC Financial Services Group, Inc.:

We have examined management's assertion, included in the accompanying Report on
Assessment of Compliance with Regulation AB Servicing Criteria, that Midland
Loan Services, a division of PNC Bank, National Association ("Midland" or the
"Company") complied with the servicing criteria set forth in Item 1122(d) of the
Securities and Exchange Commission's Regulation AB for the commercial
mortgage-backed securities transactions (the "Platform"), as of December 31,
2013 and for the year then ended, excluding criteria 1122(d)(1)(iii),
1122(d)(3)(i)(B), 1122(d)(3)(i)(C), 1122(d)(3)(i)(D), 1122(d)(3)(ii),
1122(d)(3)(iii), 1122(d)(3)(iv), and 1122(d)(4)(xv), which the Company has
determined are not applicable to the servicing activities performed by it with
respect to the Platform. Management is responsible for the Company's compliance
with the servicing criteria. Our responsibility is to express an opinion on
management's assertion based on our examination.

Our examination was conducted in accordance with attestation standards of the
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (United States) and, accordingly,
included examining, on a test basis, evidence about the Company's compliance
with the applicable servicing criteria and performing such other procedures as
we considered necessary in the circumstances. Our examination included testing
of selected asset-backed transactions and securities that comprise the Platform,
testing of selected servicing activities related to the Platform, and
determining whether the Company processed those selected transactions and
performed those selected activities in compliance with the applicable servicing
criteria. Our procedures were limited to the selected transactions and servicing
activities performed by the Company during the period covered by this report.
Our procedures were not designed to detect noncompliance arising from errors
that may have occurred prior to or subsequent to our tests that may have
affected the balances or amounts calculated or reported by the Company during
the period covered by this report. We believe that our examination provides a
reasonable basis for our opinion. Our examination does not provide a legal
determination on the Company's compliance with the servicing criteria.

In our opinion, management's assertion that Midland complied with the
aforementioned applicable servicing criteria as of and for the year ended
December 31, 2013 for the Platform is fairly stated, in all material respects.

/s/ PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP

February 24, 2014


PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 1100 Walnut, Suite 1300, Kansas City, MO 64106
T: (816) 472 7921, F: (816) 218 1890, www.pwc.com/us
Exhibit 31.2





CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO RULE 13a-14(a) OR 15d-14(a) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934





I, William J. Clifford, certify that:





1.  I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of Gaming and Leisure Properties, Inc.;





2.  Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;





4.  The registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) and internal control over financial reporting (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(f) and 15d-15(f)) for the registrant and have:





(a)  Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;





(b)    Designed such internal control over financial reporting, or caused such internal control over financial reporting to be designed under our supervision, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial statements for external purposes in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles;





(c)  Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and





(d)  Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and





5.  The registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of the registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):





(a)  All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and





(b)  Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting.





Date:May 4, 2018/s/ William J. CliffordName: William J. CliffordChief Financial Officer
Exhibit 23.1











Consent of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm








We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements Nos. 333-192024, 333-197373 and 333-207658 on Form S-8 of our reports dated February 26, 2016, relating to the consolidated financial statements of Criteo S.A. and subsidiaries (the “Company”) and the effectiveness of the Company’s internal control over financial reporting, appearing in the Annual Report on Form 10-K of the Company for the year ended December 31, 2015.





/s/ Deloitte & Associés





Neuilly-sur-Seine, France





February 26, 2016





Represented by Anthony Maarek
**Exhibit 32.2**
**CERTIFICATION**
     The undersigned officer of DATATRAK International, Inc. (the “Company”),does hereby certify, to such officer’s knowledge, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,that:
 1. the Company’s Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarterended Setember 30, 2004 (the “Form 10-Q”) fully complies with therequirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities ExchangeAct of 1934, as amended; and  2. the information contained in the Form 10-Q fairly presents,in all material respects, the financial condition and results ofoperations of the Company as of, and for, the periods presented inthe Form 10-Q.        Dated: November 12, 2004 /s/ Terry C. Black   Terry C. Black   Chief Financial Officer
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<PERIOD-START>                             AUG-01-1999
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UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-6781

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus RAWLE ANTHONY COLE, Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Rock Hill. Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., District Judge. (0-98-cr-01126-JFA; 0-06-cv-02469-JFA) Submitted: October 18, 2007 Decided: October 24, 2007 Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and KING, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Rawle Anthony Cole, Appellant Pro Se. Marshall Prince, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.- 2 - PER CURIAM: Rawle Anthony Cole seeks to appeal the district court’s order treating his Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion as a successive 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000) motion, and dismissing it on that basis. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000); Reid v. Angelone , 369 F.3d 363, 369 (4th Cir. 2004). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that any assessment of the constitutional claims by the district court is debatable or wrong and that any dispositive procedural ruling by the district court is likewise debatable. Miller-El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); Rose v. Lee , 252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th Cir. 2001). We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Cole has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. Additionally, we construe Cole’s notice of appeal and informal brief as an application to file a second or successive motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. United States v. Winestock, 340 F.3d 200, 208 (4th Cir. 2003). In order to obtain authorization to file a successive § 2255 motion, a prisoner must assert claims- 3 - based on either: (1) a new rule of constitutional law, previously unavailable, made retroactive by the Supreme Court to cases on collateral review; or (2) newly discovered evidence, not previously discoverable by due diligence, that would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the movant guilty of the offense. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b)(2), 2255 (2000). Cole’s claims do not satisfy either of these criteria. Therefore, we deny authorization to file a successive § 2255 motion. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED