SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2058-20

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

DOMINIC J. ALEXANDER,

a/k/a DOMINIC ALEXANDER,

J. DOMINIC CARTER ALEXANDER,

and SCOTT JAVEL,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________

Submitted September 28, 2022 – Decided October 14, 2022

Before Judges Currier and Mayer.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Passaic County, Indictment Nos. 05-05-0650, 

09-02-0206, and 11-05-0454.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Lee March Grayson, Designated Counsel, on 

the brief). 

Camelia M. Valdes, Passaic County Prosecutor, 

attorney for respondent (Leandra L. Cilindrello, 

Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief). 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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PER CURIAM

Defendant Dominic J. Alexander appeals from a June 16, 2020 order 

denying his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an evidentiary 

hearing. We affirm.

Defendant filed a PCR petition regarding three separate criminal 

indictments. We summarize the facts underlying each indictment that are 

relevant to our review of defendant's PCR application. 

On May 17, 2005, defendant was charged in Indictment No. 05-05-0650

with four counts of drug-related charges. On January 10, 2006, defendant 

pleaded guilty to a single count of third-degree distribution of a controlled 

dangerous substance within 1000 feet of a school zone, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 and 

N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a). 

At the plea hearing, defendant acknowledged reviewing the plea form with 

his attorney and understanding the proceeding. The plea hearing judge 

extensively questioned defendant regarding the plea. The judge explained that 

by entering a guilty plea, defendant "may be forced to go back to Jamaica" and 

"may be deported." Defendant stated he understood the deportation 

consequences of pleading guilty and wanted to proceed with his guilty plea. In 

reviewing the plea form, the judge noted defendant responded "yes" to question 
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17, stating he understood "that if [he is] not a United States citizen [he] may be 

deported." The judge twice confirmed defendant understood the potential 

deportation consequences during the plea colloquy.

Based on defendant's responses, the judge was satisfied defendant 

understood his rights and the plea offer. The judge further determined 

defendant's guilty plea was voluntary and defendant provided an adequate 

factual basis for his plea. 

The State recommended a sentence of probation with 364 days in the

Passaic County Jail. In accordance with the negotiated plea agreement, the 

judge sentenced defendant to probation. 

On September 7, 2006, defendant appeared before the same judge on a 

violation of his probation. Defendant pleaded guilty to that charge and the judge 

continued the probationary sentence. 

On May 25, 2007, defendant again appeared before the same judge on 

another violation of probation. Defendant pleaded guilty to the second violation 

of probation and the judge continued the probationary sentence. 

On December 16, 2008, defendant appeared yet again before the same 

judge on a third violation of probation. The judge terminated defendant's 

probation. 
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On February 19, 2009, defendant faced new charges for weapons

possession under Indictment No. 09-02-0206. On May 14, 2010, defendant 

appeared before a different judge and pleaded guilty to second-degree certain 

persons not to have weapons, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b). 

At the plea hearing under this indictment, defendant acknowledged 

reviewing the plea form with his attorney and understanding the legal

proceedings. Additionally, defendant told the judge he understood the questions 

on the plea form, his answers to those questions were truthful, and his guilty 

plea was given freely and voluntarily. During the plea colloquy, the judge did 

not specifically question defendant about the potential immigration 

consequences of his guilty plea. 

Regarding question 17 on the plea form, because he was not a United 

States citizen, defendant indicated he understood the following: he may be 

deported by virtue of his guilty plea; if the guilty plea related to a crime 

considered an "aggravated felony" under federal law, he would be subject to 

deportation/removal; and he had the right to seek legal advice on his 

immigration status prior to entering a guilty plea. In accordance with the 

negotiated plea under this indictment, on October 19, 2015, defendant received 

a five-year prison sentence with five years of parole ineligibility. 
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On May 10, 2011, defendant was charged under Indictment No. 11-05-

0454 with drug and weapons offenses. On September 15, 2015, defendant 

entered a guilty plea before Judge Sohail Mohammed to third-degree possession 

of a controlled dangerous substance with intent to distribute within 1000 feet of 

a school, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 and N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a); and second-degree certain 

persons not to have weapons, N.J.S.A. 2C: 39-7(b).

At the plea hearing, defendant acknowledged reviewing the plea form with 

his attorney and understanding the legal proceedings. When Judge Mohammed 

asked if defendant was a United States citizen, he responded "No." The judge 

then explained "because [defendant is] not a [United States] citizen, [his] guilty 

plea may result in removal or deportation," and advised defendant that he had 

the right to consult with an immigration attorney to discuss the possible 

ramifications of his guilty plea. Judge Mohammed asked defendant whether he 

discussed potential immigration issues with an attorney and defendant said he 

was satisfied with the advice provided by his attorney. 

Regarding question 17 on the plea form, defendant stated he understood 

the immigration consequences of entering a guilty plea and told the judge he 

wished to plead guilty.
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The State recommended a prison sentence of eight years, subject to five 

years of parole ineligibility, to run concurrent with all open dockets, including 

Indictment No. 09-02-0206. On October 9, 2015, the judge sentenced defendant 

in accordance with the plea agreement. 

On May 23, 2019, Alexander filed a pro se PCR application under 

Indictment Nos. 09-02-0206 and 11-05-0454. About six months later, assigned

PCR counsel filed a motion to amend the PCR petition to include Indictment 

No. 05-05-0650 and provided a certification signed by defendant.

On February 5, 2020, Judge Mohammed heard arguments on the PCR 

petition. In a June 16, 2020 order and accompanying written decision, Judge 

Mohammed denied defendant's PCR petition. 

On appeal, defendant raises the following arguments:

POINT I 

THE PCR COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE 

DEFENDANT'S PETITION FOR POST[-]

CONVICTION RELIEF WITHOUT AFFORDING 

HIM A FULL EVIDENTIARY HEARING THAT 

INCLUDED TESTIMONY FROM PLEA COUNSEL 

TO FULLY ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF HIS 

ATTORNEYS PROVIDING HIM WITH 

INCORRECT AND/OR MISLEADING ADVICE 

REGARDING THE IMMIGRATION 

CONSEQUENCES OF PLEADING GUILTY IN 

EACH INDICTMENT.
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POINT II

BECAUSE PLEA COUNSEL FAILED TO 

PROPERLY ADVISE THE DEFENDANT ABOUT 

THE IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES WHICH 

INCLUDED MANDATORY DEPORTATION, THE 

DEFENDANT'S GUILTY PLEAS WERE NOT 

VOLUNTARILY AND KNOWINGLY ENTERED 

AND MUST BE VACATED. 

POINT III

THE PCR COURT'S DECISION DENYING 

PETITIONER'S INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 

COUNSEL CLAIM AS TIME-BARRED FOR 

INDICTMENT 05-05-650-I WITHOUT 

CONDUCTING A FULL EVIDENTIARY HEARING 

THAT EXAMINED THE PERFORMANCE OF PLEA 

COUNSEL AND THE ISSUE OF HIS INCORRECT 

LEGAL ADVICE REGARDING THE 

IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES OF PLEADING 

TO THE THIRD-DEGREE CDS OFFENSE HAS 

RESULTED IN FUNDAMENTAL INJUSTICE, 

WHICH REQUIRES REMAND TO THE PCR COURT 

BEFORE A DIFFERENT JUDGE FOR A NEW 

HEARING.

We reject defendant's arguments and affirm for the reasons stated in Judge 

Mohammed's comprehensive June 16, 2020 written decision. We add only the 

following comments.

Our "standard of review is necessarily deferential to a PCR court's factual 

findings," and findings "supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record" 

should be upheld. State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 540 (2013). Where there is no 
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evidentiary hearing, we may "conduct a de novo review of both the factual 

findings and legal conclusions of the PCR court." State v. Reevey, 417 N.J. 

Super. 134, 146-47 (App. Div. 2013) (quoting State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 341, 421 

(2004)). We review a trial court's decision to deny a defendant's request for an 

evidentiary hearing for abuse of discretion. State v. Russo, 333 N.J. Super. 119, 

137 (App. Div. 2000) (citing State v. Artis, 36 N.J. 538, 541 (1962)).

A defendant is not automatically entitled to an evidentiary hearing by 

simply raising a PCR claim. State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154, 170 (App. 

Div. 1999). An evidentiary hearing is required only when: a defendant 

establishes a prima facie case in support of PCR; the court determines there are 

material issue of disputed fact that cannot be resolved by a review of the existing 

record; and the court finds an evidentiary hearing is required to resolve the 

claims asserted. State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 354 (2013) (citing R. 3:22-10(b)). 

To establish a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant 

must present legally competent evidence rather than mere "bald assertions."

Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. at 170.

To establish a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the 

defendant must satisfy the two-prong test articulated in Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and adopted by our New Jersey Supreme 
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Court in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42 (1987). First, a defendant must show 

counsel's performance was deficient, such that his or her performance falls 

below an objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. 

Second, a defendant must show counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the 

case, which requires demonstrating a reasonable probability that the result of the 

proceeding would have been different but for counsel's performance. Id. at 694. 

In the context of a guilty plea, a defendant must demonstrate: (1) counsel's 

performance was not "within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in 

criminal cases," and (2) "that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 

counsel's errors, [the defendant] would not have pled guilty and would have 

insisted on going to trial." State v. DiFrisco, 137 N.J. 434, 457 (1994) (alteration 

in original) (quoting Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 266 (1973) and Hill v. 

Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 54 (1985)).

Because defendant's 2005 and 2009 guilty pleas pre-dated 2010, defense 

counsel would be ineffective only if they "provide[d] false or misleading 

[material] information concerning the deportation consequences of a plea of 

guilty." State v. Nunez-Valdez, 200 N.J. 129, 138-40 (2009). 

In 2010, the United States Supreme Court held that:

Immigration law can be complex, and it is a legal 

specialty of its own . . . . There will, therefore, 
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undoubtedly be numerous situations in which the 

deportation consequences of a particular plea are 

unclear or uncertain. The duty of the private 

practitioner in such cases is more limited. When the 

law is not succinct and straightforward . . . a criminal 

defense attorney need do no more than advise a 

noncitizen client that pending criminal charges may 

carry a risk of adverse immigration consequences. 

[Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 369 (2010).]

The holding in Padilla did not retroactively apply to convictions that were 

final prior to March 31, 2010, the date of the Padilla decision. Chaidez v. United 

States, 568 U.S. 342, 344 (2013); State v. Gaitan, 209 N.J. 339 (2012). Thus, 

the Nunez-Valdez standard applies to defendant's plea in Indictment No. 05-05-

0650, and the Padilla standard applies to his pleas in Indictment Nos. 09-02-

0206 and 11-05-0454.

Having reviewed the record, we are satisfied defendant did not receive 

incorrect advice regarding the immigration consequences of his guilty plea. The 

plea colloquies with the judge in two of the indictments and the signed plea 

forms in all three matters indicated defendant was properly advised of the 

possibility of deportation by pleading guilty. 

Moreover, defendant failed to demonstrate he would not have pleaded 

guilty but for his attorneys' allegedly incorrect advice. Rather, defendant offers 

nothing more than bald assertions he would not have entered the guilty pleas 
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had he known the possibility of deportation. A "[d]efendant may not create a 

genuine issue of fact, warranting an evidentiary hearing, by contradicting his 

prior statements without explanation." State v. Blake, 444 N.J. Super. 285, 299 

(App. Div. 2016). At each court proceeding regarding all three indictments, 

defendant acknowledged he understood the possibility of deportation by 

pleading guilty.

Because defendant did not receive any incorrect legal advice during his 

plea hearings, defendant is unable to establish a prima facie case of ineffective 

assistance of counsel under either prong of the Strickland/Fritz analysis and 

therefore he was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing.

Affirmed.