J-S27040-21

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

PATSY MARLIN MARANO 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 270 WDA 2021

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 9, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-26-CR-0000384-2018

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

PATSY MARLIN MARANO 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 271 WDA 2021

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 9, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-26-CR-0000385-2018

BEFORE: OLSON, J., NICHOLS, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.: FILED: January 19, 2022

Appellant, Patsy Marlin Marano, appeals from the judgments of sentence 

imposed by the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County in two criminal 

cases following a consolidated jury trial at which he was convicted of 

attempted rape, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse (IDSI), sexual assault, 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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statutory sexual assault, aggravated indecent assault, indecent assault, 

indecent exposure, and corruption of minors. For the reasons set forth below, 

we affirm.

In February 2018, Appellant, who was 66 years old, was charged in CP26-CR-0000384-2018 (CR-384-2018) with seven counts of IDSI, seven 

counts of sexual assault, seven counts of indecent assault, and seven counts 

of corruption of minors arising out of sexual activity with a 17-year-old boy

(Minor 1). In February 2018, Appellant was also charged in CP-26-CR0000385-2018 (CR-385-2018) with attempted rape, sexual assault, four 

counts of IDSI, six counts of statutory sexual assault, four counts of 

aggravated indecent assault, six counts of indecent assault, two counts of 

indecent exposure, and four counts of corruption of minors arising out of 

sexual activity with a 13-year-old boy (Minor 2), who was Minor 1’s younger 

brother. 

Both cases were tried to a jury from April 1, 2019 to April 3, 2019. At 

trial, Minor 2 testified that beginning in the summer of 2017, he did 

construction work for Appellant and was at Appellant’s house approximately 

10 times. N.T., 4/2/19, at 12-15. Minor 2 testified that on two occasions, 

Appellant pulled Minor 2’s pants and underwear down and put his finger in 

Minor 2’s anus and forced Minor 2 to kiss him. Id. at 18-20. Minor 2 testified 

that on one occasion, Appellant held Minor 2 down and tried to insert his penis 

in Minor 2, despite Minor 2’s objection. Id. at 20-22, 35-36. Minor 2 also 
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testified that Appellant took a shower with Minor 2 on two occasions and put 

his mouth on Minor 2’s penis, that Appellant put his tongue in Minor 2’s anus 

twice, and used a pink dildo on Minor 2. Id. at 22-24. Minor 2 testified that 

Appellant had two laptop computers and that Appellant showed him video of 

Appellant and another man engaged in sex acts on one of the computers, and 

identified a photograph of one of the computers. Id. at 24-25, 29. Minor 2

testified that Appellant sometimes paid him when he came to Appellant’s 

house and that he did not report what was happening for a while because 

Appellant threatened that “if any of us told, he would kill us” and he was 

scared. Id. at 23, 25-26, 33. Minor 2 testified that he reported what was 

happening after another person who worked for Appellant, Charlie Thorpe, 

walked in on Appellant wrestling on Appellant’s bed with Minor 2, who was in 

his underwear. Id. at 16-18. 

Minor 1 testified that he also did construction work for Appellant and 

was at Appellant’s house approximately six or seven times. N.T., 4/2/19, at

41-43. Minor 1 testified that on those six or seven occasions, Appellant 

showed him videos on Appellant’s computer of people having sex and pulled 

Minor 1’s pants down and performed oral sex on Minor 1. Id. at 43-48, 50,

59. In addition, Minor 1 testified that Appellant repeatedly touched Minor 1’s 

penis over his clothes one day at a job site. Id. at 61-62. Minor 1 also 

testified that on one occasion, he saw Appellant kissing Minor 2 in Appellant’s 

bedroom. Id. at 45-46. Minor 1 testified that Appellant never threatened 
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him, but that Appellant told him not to tell anyone and paid Minor 1 $50 extra 

each time Minor 1 came to the house in addition to his pay for the construction 

work. Id. at 48-50, 62. Minor 1 identified a photograph of the computer that 

Appellant used to show him sex videos. Id. at 52, 56.

Thorpe testified that one day in late November 2017, after he and Minor 

2 had been painting a nativity set at Appellant’s house, he went in the house 

and saw Appellant fondling Minor 2, who was in his underwear. N.T., 4/2/19, 

at 65-68, 72-73. Thorpe testified that after this incident, he had discussions 

with both Minor 1 and Minor 2. Id. at 69-70. Appellant objected to Thorpe’s

testimony about these conversations as hearsay, but the trial court overruled 

the objection and held that Minor 1’s and Minor 2’s statements to Thorpe were 

admissible as prior consistent statements to rebut an inference of recent 

fabrication. Id. at 70. Thorpe then testified that Minor 2 told him that 

Appellant touched him with dildos and that Appellant threatened him with a 

gun. Id. at 70-71. Thorpe testified that Minor 1 told him “basically the same 

things.” Id. at 71. Thorpe later testified on cross-examination that Minor 2

told him that Appellant fondled Minor 2’s anus and that Appellant made Minor 

2 perform oral sex on him. Id. at 77.

Halie Gray, a waitress who knew Minor 1, Minor 2 and Appellant, was 

also called by the Commonwealth to testify to conversations with Minor 1 and 

Minor 2. Appellant objected to this testimony as hearsay, and the trial court 

again overruled the objection on the grounds that it was admissible as a prior 
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consistent statement. N.T., 4/2/19, at 83. Gray then testified that while she 

was taking Minor 2 to the police station, Minor 2 started telling her “about 

watching videos on the computer, about the toys that was used on him,” 

“[a]bout finger penetration,” and that Appellant would pay him afterwards. 

Id. at 84. Gray testified that she spoke to Minor 1 the next day and “asked 

[Minor 1] if it happened and he said, yes.” Id. at 85. Gray also testified that 

Appellant had previously told her that Minor 2 slept in the same bed with him. 

Id. at 84-85. 

Pennsylvania State Police Trooper Terrance Crowley testified concerning 

his investigation of Minor 1’s and Minor 2’s accusations and identified a pink 

sex toy and two computers seized from Appellant’s home pursuant to a search 

warrant. N.T., 4/2/19, at 91-97. Trooper Crowley testified that adult 

pornography was found on the computers, but that no child pornography was 

found on the computers. Id. at 140. Trooper Crowley also testified 

concerning his interview of Appellant after Appellant was arrested and 

identified the Miranda1 warnings that he read to Appellant and that Appellant 

signed before he questioned Appellant. Id. at 98-101. Trooper Crowley 

testified that Appellant did not appear to be impaired or under the influence 

of drugs or alcohol at the time of the interview and that he did not threaten 

Appellant or promise Appellant anything. Id. at 100-01. 

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1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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The audio and video recording of Trooper Crowley’s interview of 

Appellant was played to the jury without any objection by Appellant. N.T., 

4/2/19, at 102-36.

2

 In this interview, Appellant admitted that he and Minor 

2 performed oral sex on each other on more than one occasion in 2017, that 

his hand touched Minor 2’s “butt” and his finger touched Minor 2’s anus, and 

that he licked Minor 2 “[d]own below his balls,” but he denied that he 

penetrated Minor 2 or attempted to penetrate Minor 2 with anything and 

denied that he licked Minor 2’s anus. Id. at 106-07, 110-21, 125-26, 131-

35. Appellant also admitted that he “jacked [Minor 1] off to get him off” on 

three occasions when Minor 1 was 17 and that Minor 1 consented to this sexual 

activity. Id. at 127-29. 

At the close of its case, the Commonwealth moved for admission of a 

number of the exhibits that witnesses had identified, including the recording 

of Appellant’s interview, the computers seized from Appellant’s house, and the 

Miranda warnings and waiver form signed by Appellant. Appellant objected 

to admitting the computers and the Miranda form in evidence. N.T., 4/2/19, 

at 141-43. The trial court overruled these objections and admitted the 

computers and Miranda form in evidence, but directed that the computers

would not be given to the jury. Id.

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2 Appellant had filed a pre-trial motion to suppress the recorded statement 

that was denied prior to trial.
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Appellant testified in his own defense and denied engaging in any sexual 

contact with Minor 1 or Minor 2. N.T., 4/3/19, at 11-13. Appellant testified 

that he had taken a sleeping pill just before he was interviewed by Trooper 

Crowley and that Trooper Crowley promised him that if he just admitted a few 

things he would be released and would only pay a small fine. Id. at 10-11. 

Appellant had a statement that he had prepared and wanted to read at the 

end of his direct testimony. Id. at 15. The trial court did not allow Appellant 

to read the statement. Id. Appellant also called Minor 1’s and Minor 2’s father 

to testify about a statement the father signed, but the father testified that the 

paper was blank when he signed it, that he cannot read, and that Appellant 

asked him to sign the paper. Id. at 33-36. Minor 1’s and Minor 2’s father 

also testified that Appellant offered to pay him $1,000 if he could have the 

charges dropped. Id. at 36-37. 

Trooper Crowley, on rebuttal, denied that he made any promises to 

Appellant before the interview and specifically denied that he told Appellant 

that Appellant would go home with a fine if he admitted a few things. N.T., 

4/3/19, at 44-45.

On April 3, 2019, the jury convicted Appellant of all charges in both 

cases. On April 9, 2019, the trial court sentenced Appellant to consecutive 

terms of imprisonment of 6

1/2 to 15 years for the first IDSI conviction in CR384-2018 and 61/2 to 15 years for the attempted rape conviction in CR-385-

2018, for an aggregate sentence of 13 to 30 years’ imprisonment. CR-384-
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2018 Count 1 Sentencing Order ¶4; CR-385-2018 Count 1 Sentencing Order 

¶4. The trial court imposed no additional penalty for the other convictions. 

CR-384-2018 Counts 2 Through 28 Sentencing Order; CR-385-2018 Counts 2 

Through 28 Sentencing Order. The trial court also imposed lifetime sex 

offender registration on Appellant under the Sex Offender Registration and 

Notification Act (SORNA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.10-9799.42. CR-384-2018 

Count 1 Sentencing Order ¶¶9-22; CR-385-2018 Count 1 Sentencing Order 

¶¶9-22.

Appellant did not file any post sentence motions in either case. 

Appellant filed timely notices of appeal on April 29, 2019, but this Court 

dismissed those appeals on October 3, 2019 for failure to file a brief. On 

February 13, 2020, Appellant filed petitions under the Post Conviction Relief 

Act.

3 PCRA counsel for Appellant was appointed and filed amended PCRA 

petitions seeking reinstatement of Appellant’s appellate rights, which the trial 

court granted by order entered February 8, 2021. These timely appeals

followed. 

In these appeals, which this Court consolidated sua sponte, Appellant

presents the following issues for our review:

1. Whether Appellant’s reporting requirements under the 

Pennsylvania Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act 

(SORNA) II are constitutional?

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3 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541–9546.
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2. Whether the trial court erred by allowing Charles Thorpe and 

Hallie Gray to testify about statements allegedly made by the 

alleged victim [Minor 2] under the prior consistent statement 

exception to the hearsay rule?

3. Whether the court erred in admitting into evidence 

Commonwealth’s Exhibit C, two laptop computers, because said 

computers contained no relevant information?

4. Whether the court erred in admitting Commonwealth’s Exhibit

D into evidence, the Rights, Warning and Waiver form allegedly

signed by the Appellant, because said document was not properly

authenticated?

5. Whether the court erred in preventing appellant from reading 

a narrative that he prepared to the jury?

Appellant’s Brief at 3. We address Appellant’s second, third, fourth, and fifth 

issues first, since they challenge Appellant’s convictions, and then address 

Appellant’s first issue, which challenges only a portion of his sentence. 

Appellant’s second, third, fourth, and fifth issues all involve claims of 

error in the admission or exclusion of evidence. A trial court’s rulings

regarding the admissibility of evidence generally may be reversed only on a 

showing that the trial court abused its discretion. Commonwealth v. 

Raboin, 258 A.3d 412, 422 (Pa. 2021); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 42 

A.3d 1017, 1027 (Pa. 2012). The admission of out of court statements, 

however, requires examination of the language of our rules of evidence, and 

therefore involves a question of law as to which our standard of review is de 

novo and our scope of review is plenary. Raboin, 258 A.3d at 422; 

Commonwealth v. Brown, 52 A.3d 1139, 1176 (Pa. 2012).
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We agree that the trial court erred in admitting Thorpe’s and Gray’s 

testimony concerning Minor 2’s prior statements about Appellant’s sexual 

activities with him.

4

 The trial court admitted this evidence on the ground that 

the statements were admissible as prior consistent statements to corroborate 

their testimony because Appellant had challenged Minor 2’s credibility on 

cross-examination. N.T., 4/2/19, at 70, 83; Trial Court Opinion at 3. The 

circumstances under which prior consistent statements are admissible to 

corroborate a witness’s testimony, however, were not present with respect to 

these statements. 

The admissibility of prior consistent statements is governed by 

Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 613(c), which provides: 

(c) Witness’s Prior Consistent Statement to Rehabilitate. 

Evidence of a witness’s prior consistent statement is admissible 

to rehabilitate the witness’s credibility if the opposing party is 

given an opportunity to cross-examine the witness about the 

statement and the statement is offered to rebut an express or 

implied charge of:

(1) fabrication, bias, improper influence or motive, or faulty 

memory and the statement was made before that which has been 

charged existed or arose; or

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4 Appellant appears in the argument section of his brief to also contend that 

the admission of Thorpe’s and Gray’s testimony concerning Minor 1’s 

statements was error. Appellant’s Brief at 17-18. Any issue concerning Minor 

1’s prior consistent statements, however, is waived because Appellant raised 

only a claim that the admission of Minor 2’s prior statements was error in his 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. Concise Statement of Issues on Appeal ¶2; 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii)(“Issues not included in the [concise statement of 

errors complained of on appeal] and/or not raised in accordance with the 

provisions of this paragraph (b)(4) are waived”). 
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(2) having made a prior inconsistent statement, which the 

witness has denied or explained, and the consistent statement 

supports the witness’s denial or explanation.

Pa.R.E. 613(c). Under Rule 613(c)(1), a prior consistent statement is 

admissible to rebut a claim that the witness’s testimony is false or inaccurate 

only where the statement was made before the motive to lie or reason for the 

claimed inaccuracy arose. Commonwealth v. Busanet, 54 A.3d 35, 66-67

(Pa. 2012); Commonwealth v. Bond, 190 A.3d 664, 667-70 (Pa. Super. 

2018); see also Pa.R.E. 613(c)(1) (requiring that “the statement was made 

before that which has been charged existed or arose”). Although Rule 

613(c)(2) does not require that the prior consistent statement pre-date the 

motive to fabricate or any other event, it applies only where the opposing 

party has claimed that the witness has “made a prior inconsistent statement.” 

Pa.R.E. 613(c)(2). 

Here, while Appellant contended that Minor 2’s accusations against him

were fabricated, the statements to Thorpe and Gray were not made before 

the alleged motive to fabricate arose. Rather, they were made shortly before 

Minor 2 spoke to the police; indeed, Minor 2’s statements to Gray were made 

on the way to the police station. N.T., 4/2/19, at 69-71, 74-75, 83-84. There 

was no suggestion that any event occurred after the statements to Thorpe 

and Gray that created any animosity between Minor 2 and Appellant or that 

gave him a motive to fabricate accusations that did not exist at the time that 

he made the statements to Thorpe and Gray. 
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Nor was there any suggestion that Minor 2’s memory of the sex acts 

was faulty. Appellant did suggest that Minor 2’s testimony that he was 

threatened by Appellant was inconsistent with his statement to police in 

December 2017 and could be due to faulty memory. N.T., 4/2/19, at 33. 

Thorpe’s testimony that Minor 2 told him in November 2017 that Appellant 

threatened Minor 2 was therefore admissible to refute the claim that Minor 2’s 

recollection of this in 2019 was faulty. Thorpe’s and Gray’s testimony, 

however, far exceeded that scope and included statements concerning sex 

acts as to which there was no claim that Minor 2’s testimony at trial added 

details that he did not report in 2017. Because the statements do not predate any motive to fabricate and there was no contention that Minor 2’s trial 

testimony concerning the sex acts was a product of faulty memory, Thorpe’s 

and Gray’s testimony concerning Minor 2’s statements about Appellant’s 

sexual activity with him was not admissible under Rule 613(c)(1). Bond, 190 

A.3d at 669-70. 

These prior statements were likewise not admissible under Rule 

613(c)(2). A claim that Minor 2 had a motive to fabricate accusations of sexual 

abuse or that he lied does not constitute a charge that he made a prior 

inconsistent statement and does not make Thorpe’s or Gray’s testimony 

admissible as an explanation or denial of a prior inconsistent statement. See

Bond, 190 A.3d at 670 (rejecting argument that prior consistent statement 

was admissible under Rule 613(c)(2) where defendant’s claim was that child 
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witness had fabricated the accusations from the outset and child witness had 

not explained or denied any prior inconsistent statement). While Appellant 

did assert that Minor 2’s trial testimony that he did not see Appellant’s penis

was inconsistent with the details in his statement to the police, N.T., 4/2/19, 

at 32, neither Thorpe nor Gray testified that Minor 2 told them anything 

related to that alleged inconsistency. 

We conclude, however, that the trial court’s error in admitting this 

evidence does not require reversal of Appellant’s convictions because the error 

was harmless. An appellate court may sustain a judgment despite the 

erroneous admission of evidence of prior consistent statements of witnesses,

if it is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the admission of the 

statements was harmless, and may affirm on harmless error grounds even 

though the trial court and Commonwealth have not raised that issue.

5

 

Commonwealth v. Hamlett, 234 A.3d 486, 492-93 (Pa. 2020); Bond, 190 

A.3d at 670-71, 673. An error may be harmless where the evidence in 

question did not prejudice the defendant or any prejudice was de minimis, 

where the evidence in question was cumulative of other, substantially similar 

evidence that was properly admitted, or where the properly admitted and 

uncontradicted evidence of guilt was so overwhelming and the prejudicial 

effect was so insignificant by comparison that the error could not have 

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5 The Commonwealth filed no brief in these appeals.
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contributed to the verdict. Commonwealth v. Poplawski, 130 A.3d 697, 

716 (Pa. 2015); Commonwealth v. Taylor, 209 A.3d 444, 450 (Pa. Super. 

2019); Commonwealth v. Radecki, 180 A.3d 441, 461 (Pa. Super. 2018). 

The effect of the testimony concerning Minor 2’s prior statements would 

be insignificant in CR-384-2018, because that case related solely to 

Appellant’s abuse of Minor 1 and none of Minor 2’s statements involved 

Appellant’s conduct with Minor 1. Even in CR-385-2018, the prejudicial effect 

of the prior statements concerning Appellant’s sex acts with Minor 2 was de 

minimis and insignificant by comparison to the other evidence of guilt. The 

testimony concerning these prior statements was brief and contained limited

detail and the trial court instructed the jury that this evidence could be 

considered only with respect to Minor 2’s credibility. N.T., 4/2/19, at 70-71, 

77, 83-84; N.T., 4/3/19, at 56. The prior statements were also immediately 

before and contemporaneous with the reporting of the crime to the police, and 

therefore showed little beyond the fact that Minor 2 reported the crimes to 

which he testified at trial. 

Most importantly, this was not a case where the only evidence of guilt 

was the victim’s testimony, which was denied by the defendant. In addition 

to Minor 2’s testimony, the evidence against Appellant included Appellant’s

recorded statement in which he admitted committing many of the sex acts in 

question with Minor 2. The sexual assaults referenced in the prior statements 

were all either acts to which Minor 2 testified or acts that Appellant admitted 
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committing in his interview. While Appellant denied the truthfulness of his 

recorded statement in his trial testimony, given his lengthy and detailed 

admissions, any possible erroneous bolstering of Minor 2’s credibility from the 

prior statements is insignificant in comparison. 

Indeed, the aspect of the prior statements that Appellant argues was 

prejudicial was Thorpe’s testimony that Minor 2 told him that Appellant 

threatened him. Appellant’s Brief at 18. As we have already held, however, 

that testimony was admissible under Rule 613(c)(1) to refute Appellant’s 

suggestion that Minor 2’s testimony concerning the threats was unreliable 

because he had failed to mention it to the police closer to the time of the 

events. There is, moreover, nothing in the record indicating that the 

Commonwealth emphasized the erroneously admitted prior statements in its 

arguments to the jury.

6

 

Appellant’s remaining claims of error with respect to the admission or 

exclusion of evidence are all without merit. In his third issue, Appellant 

contends that the trial court erred in admitting the computers that the police 

found in Appellant’s room because the computers allegedly were not relevant. 

Contrary to Appellant’s contention, the computers were relevant because 

Minor 1 and Minor 2 testified that Appellant showed them sex videos on those 

computers as part of his sexual activities with them. N.T., 4/2/19, at 24-25, 

____________________________________________

6 Neither the opening statements nor the closing statements were transcribed. 

N.T., 4/2/19, at 8-9; N.T., 4/3/19, at 48.
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29, 44-45, 52. Indeed, Trooper Crowley testified that sexual material was 

found on the computers. Id. at 140. The trial court therefore did not abuse 

its discretion in admitting the computers in evidence.

In his fourth issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in 

admitting the Miranda warnings and waiver form signed by Appellant because 

it allegedly was not properly authenticated. That contention is contrary to the 

record. Not only did Trooper Crowley identify the Miranda form and testify 

that he read it to Appellant and that Appellant signed it, but the recording of 

Appellant’s statement shows that Trooper Crowley accurately read it aloud to 

Appellant, that Appellant also read a portion out loud, that Appellant 

acknowledged that he understood the warnings and the waiver of his rights, 

and that Appellant then signed the form. N.T., 4/2/19, at 99-100, 103-04. 

Because it was fully and properly authenticated, the trial court did not err in 

admitting the Miranda form in evidence.7 

In his fifth issue, Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in 

preventing Appellant from reading a narrative that he had prepared during 

trial to the jury during his direct testimony. This issue likewise fails. A 

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7 Although Appellant in his argument of this issue also briefly asserts that the 

trial court erred in allowing Appellant’s recorded statement in evidence, 

Appellant’s Brief at 21, that issue is not before us, as Appellant raised only the 

admission of the Miranda form and did not raise the admission of the 

recorded statement itself or the denial of his motion to suppress the recorded 

statement in his Rule 1925(b) statement. See Concise Statement of Issues 

on Appeal; Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii). 
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defendant does not have a right in a trial of guilt or innocence to read a 

prepared statement to the jury, and requiring the defendant to testify in 

response to questions is not an abuse of the trial court’s discretion to control 

the mode of interrogation of witnesses and presentation of evidence. 

Commonweallth v. Stollar, 84 A.3d 635, 645-51 (Pa. 2014);

Commonwealth v. Jermyn, 533 A.2d 74, 78-80 (Pa. 1987). Moreover, 

Appellant has not even shown that the contents of the statement would be 

relevant and admissible. The statement that Appellant sought to read was 

not provided to the trial court, N.T., 4/3/19, at 15, and does not appear in the 

record.

Appellant, in his remaining, first issue, contends that the reporting 

requirements of Subchapter H of SORNA that were imposed on him are 

unconstitutional and notes that this Court in Commonwealth v. Mickley, 

240 A.3d 957 (Pa. Super. 2020) vacated a denial of a constitutional challenge 

to Subchapter H of SORNA and remanded for an evidentiary hearing. We 

conclude that this challenge is barred by waiver. 

Challenges to the constitutionality of SORNA are waived if they are not 

raised in the trial court before sentencing or by post sentence motion. 

Commonwealth v. Reslink, 257 A.3d 21, 25 (Pa. Super. 2020). In Mickley,

the defendant had preserved his SORNA challenge by filing a post sentence 

motion in the trial court seeking to bar application of SORNA. 240 A.3d at

959. Here, in contrast, Appellant raised no SORNA challenge in the trial court; 
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he filed no post sentence motion and filed no pretrial or pre-sentence motion 

asserting that SORNA was unconstitutional or seeking to bar SORNA’s 

application. Rather, Appellant raised his challenge to SORNA for the first time 

in his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. Concise Statement of Issues on Appeal

¶1. Raising an issue for the first time in a Rule 1925(b) statement, however,

is insufficient to prevent waiver of an issue that the appellant failed to raise 

while the case was pending in the trial court. Steiner v. Markel, 968 A.2d 

1253, 1257 (Pa. 2009); Commonwealth v. Smith, 213 A.3d 307, 309 (Pa. 

Super. 2019); Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 174 A.3d 1130, 1145 n.6, 

1146 n.8 (Pa. Super. 2017). 

Because the trial court’s error in admitting evidence of prior consistent 

statements was harmless and all of Appellant’s other issues are either without 

merit or waived, we affirm Appellant’s judgments of sentence.

Judgments of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 1/19/2022