alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 10.2

                        2nd AMENDMENT TO PROMISSORY NOTE

     This 2nd Amendment to Promissory Note (the "2nd Amendment") is made
December 9, 2011, by and between Domark lnternational, Inc. (the Company") and
Infinite Funding, Inc. (the "Holder").

     WHEREAS, on June 10, 2011, the Company entered into a Promissory Note (the
"Note"), a copy of which is attached hereto, in the aggregate amount of $75,000,
with a due date of October 15, 2011;

     WHEREAS, on September 28, 2011, the Company and Holder executed an
Amendment to Promissory Note (the "Amendment"), a copy of which is attached
hereto;

     WHEREAS, pursuant to the terms of the Amendment, the Note is due on or
before December 15, 2011;

     WHEREAS, as of the date hereof, the Company has not made payments on the
Note;

     WHEREAS, on December 9, 2011, the Company and Holder agreed to amend
certain provisions of the Note;

     NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY AGREED AS FOLLOWS:

     1.   EXTENSION OF DUE DATE OF NOTE. The Parties agree that the Due Date of
          the Note shall be extended to April 15, 2012.

     2.   EXTENSION FEE. The Parties agree that a fee in the amount of $20,000
          will be added to the principal balance of the loan in consideration
          for the extension granted herein.

     3.   PRINCIPAL BALANCE. Upon signing of this Amendment, the aggregate
          principal balance due under the June 2011Note shall be $95,000.

     4.   EFFECTIVE DATE. The effective date of this Agreement shall be December
          9, 2011. All other provisions of the Note and of the Amendment remain
          in force.

     IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Company and the Holder hereby execute this
Agreement as of the date first written above.

DOMARK INTERNATIONAL                          INFINITE FUNDING, INC.


By: /s/ R. Thomas Kidd                        /s/ Alina Yurovskay
    --------------------------------          ----------------------------------
    R. Thomas Kidd                            Alina Yurovskay
    Chairman                                  President

GUARANTOR


By: /s/ R. Thomas Kidd
    --------------------------------
    R. Thomas Kidd
    An Induvidual
**Exhibit 32.1****CERTIFICATION**     The undersigned officer of DATATRAK International, Inc. (the “Company”), does hereby certify,to such officer’s knowledge, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that: 1. the Company’s Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended September30, 2005 (the “Form 10-Q”) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and  2. the information contained in the Form 10-Q fairly presents, in all materialrespects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company as of, andfor, the periods presented in the Form 10-Q.        Dated: November 14, 2005  /s/ Jeffrey A. Green   Jeffrey A. Green   Chief Executive Officer
Exhibit 32.2
 CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
 PURSUANT
TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
  (a)
    
    the Form 10-Q of the Company for the quarter ended March 31, 2009 filed on the date
hereof with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the Report) fully complies with the
requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934; and(b)
    
    the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
 By:
    /s/ JOHN R. TROKA, JR.John R. Troka, Jr.Interim Chief Financial Officer
[932 NYS2d 665]

#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Joshua Pena, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Term, First Department,

September 28, 2011

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

*Martha Rayner*for appellant. *Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney,*for respondent.

*49OPINION OF THE COURT

Per Curiam.

Judgment of conviction, rendered September 14, 2010, reversed, on the law, accusatory instrument dismissed and fine remitted.

Defendant initially was charged with riding a bicycle on a sidewalk in violation of section 19-176 (b) of the Administrative Code of the City of New York, upon allegations that he rode the bicycle “on a pedestrian pathway inside the entrance of a [specified] subway station.” The cited code section prohibits the riding of bicycles “upon any sidewalk unless permitted by an official sign,” and provides that a violation thereof is punishable by a civil penalty not to exceed $100 recoverable “in a proceeding before the environmental control board.”

In the absence of a contrary argument by defendant-appellant, we assume for purposes of this appeal that a violation of Administrative Code § 19-176 (b) constitutes an offense cognizable in Criminal Court *(see People v Bey,*22 Misc 3d 62 [2008]; *but compare People v Pesantes,*10 Misc 3d 676 [2005]). However, we agree with defendant that the underlying information was facially insufficient since it failed to set forth, prima facie, defendant’s commission of the charged offense. Even if established as true, allegations that defendant was observed riding a bicycle inside a subway station entrance would not make out a legally sufficient case that defendant violated Administrative Code § 19-176 (b), an essential element of which is proof that the bicycle riding took place on a “sidewalk,” a term narrowly defined in the ordinance as “that portion of the street . . . between the curb lines or the lateral lines of a roadway and the adjacent property lines, intended for the use of pedestrians” (Administrative Code § 19-176 [a] [2]). We decline to adopt the People’s broad reading of the term “sidewalk” as encompassing all manner of “pedestrian conduits,” even those “set back from the street.” Had the City Council intended to extend the definitional reach of the term “sidewalk” in such an expansive fashion, it would have been a simple matter to include appropriate language to that effect, as it did elsewhere in the Administrative Code *(see*Administrative Code § 7-201 [c] [1] [b] [the Pothole Law], defining a sidewalk to include “a boardwalk, underpass, pedestrian walk or path, step and stairway”).

Since the factual portion of the information negates a finding that the conduct complained of occurred on a “sidewalk” within *50the meaning of the bicycle ordinance, viz., a specified area of the street outside the adjacent property line, the accusatory instrument is jurisdictionally defective and must be dismissed *(see generally People v Hurell-Harring,*66 AD3d 1126 [2009]; *see also People v Jones,*9 NY3d 259 [2007]).

Lowe, III, EJ., Schoenfeld and Hunter, Jr., JJ., concur.
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Postal Service

# AGENCY:

                        Postal ServiceTM.                    

# ACTION:

Notice.

# SUMMARY:

The Postal Service gives notice of filing a request with the Postal Regulatory Commission to add a domestic shipping services contract to the list of Negotiated Service Agreements in the Mail Classification Schedule's Competitive Products List.

# DATES:

*Date of notice required under 39 U.S.C. 3642(d)(1):*                         September 12, 2017.                    

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Elizabeth A. Reed, 202-268-3179.

# SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

                    The United States Postal Service® hereby gives notice that, pursuant to 39 U.S.C. 3642 and 3632(b)(3), on September 6, 2017, it filed with the Postal Regulatory Commission a                     *Request of the United States Postal Service to Add Priority Mail & First-Class Package Service Contract 54 to Competitive Product List.*                     Documents are available at                     *www.prc.gov,*                     Docket Nos. MC2017-192, CP2017-293.                

Elizabeth A. Reed,

Attorney, Corporate and Postal Business Law.

[FR Doc. 2017-19277 Filed 9-11-17; 8:45 am]

 BILLING CODE 7710-12-P
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

HAMID JAVADI; et al.,

 Petitioners,

 v.

LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,

 Respondent.

No. 12-73931

Agency Nos. A098-522-637

A098-522-638

A098-522-639

A098-522-640

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted July 21, 2015** 

Before: CANBY, BEA, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.

Hamid Javadi and Mojgan Fooroughi, natives of Iran and citizens of Iran

and Germany, and Armin Javadi and Zara Eileen Javadi, natives and citizens of

Germany, petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order

denying their motion to reopen removal proceedings and reissue its previous

FILED

AUG 04 2015

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

 * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

 ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
decision. We dismiss the petition for review. denying their motion to reopen 

We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision to decline to exercise its

discretionary authority pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) to reopen and reissue its

December 2011 decision. See Mejia-Hernandez v. Holder, 633 F.3d 818, 823-24

(9th Cir. 2011). 

PETITION FOR REVIEW DISMISSED. 

2 12-73931
#### Ana Cecilia ROSAS-CABRERA, Petitioner, v. Michael B. MUKASEY, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 06-75041.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Dec. 3, 2007.*

Filed Dec. 28, 2007.

Charles E. Nichol, Esq., Law Office of Charles E. Nichol, San Francisco, CA, for Petitioner.

Ronald E. Lefevre, Chief Counsel, Office of the District Counsel Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, Linda S. Wendtland, Esq., Luis E. Perez, Esq., DOJ-U.S. Department of Justice Civil Div./Office of Immigration Lit., Washington, DC, for Respondent.

Before: GOODWIN, WALLACE, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Ana Cecilia Rosas-Cabrera, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ denial of her motion to reopen the BIA’s underlying denial of her application for cancellation of removal based on petitioner’s failure to establish exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to her qualifying relative. In her motion to reopen, petitioner presented additional evidence that her United States citizen daughter’s anxiety had increased, and that she also suffered from depression, so as to constitute exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.

The evidence that petitioner presented with her motion to reopen concerned the same basic hardship grounds as her application for cancellation of removal, *see Fernandez v. Gonzales,*439 F.3d 592, 602-03 (9th Cir.2006), and we therefore lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s discretionary determination that the evidence was insufficient to establish a prima facie case of hardship. *See id.*at 601. Petitioner’s statement that the BIA’s refusal to reopen constituted a denial of due process does not amount to a colorable constitutional claim. *See Martinez-Rosas v. Gonzales,*424 F.3d 926, 930 (9th Cir.2005).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DISMISSED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF DAISYTEK INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION AND SUBSIDIARIES FOR
THE SIX MONTHS ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 1997 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY
REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          MAR-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1997
<CASH>                                           1,494
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   96,402
<ALLOWANCES>                                     2,242
<INVENTORY>                                     65,181
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               162,968
<PP&E>                                          24,138
<DEPRECIATION>                                  11,649
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 180,519
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           71,732
<BONDS>                                         31,207
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            68
<OTHER-SE>                                      78,003
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   180,519
<SALES>                                        352,380
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               352,380
<CGS>                                          317,203
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  317,203
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                   819
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               1,071
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 12,471
<INCOME-TAX>                                     4,773
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              7,698
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     7,698
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     1.08
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
| (logo) Rialto 

CAPITAL |  

  |
|-------------------------|----------------|

 

 

 

 

2014 Annual Statement of Servicer Compliance (Item 1123)

 

                 

Pooling and Servicing Agreement (the “Pooling and Servicing Agreement”) dated as of  June 1, 2013  by and among Wells Fargo Commercial Mortgage Securities, Inc., as Depositor, Wells Fargo Bank, National Association as Master Servicer, Rialto Capital Advisors, LLC as Special Servicer, Wells Fargo Bank, National Association as Certificate Administrator, as Tax Administrator and as Custodian, Pentalpha Surveillance, LLC, as Trust Advisor and U.S. Bank National Association as Trustee relating to the WFRBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2013-C14, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2013-C14  **(WFRBS 2013-C14)**

 

                

The undersigned, a duly authorized officer of Rialto Capital Advisors, LLC, as special servicer (the “Special Servicer”) herein certifies to the following:

 

1.        All servicing activities and performance of such servicing activities under the Pooling and Servicing Agreement are performed on behalf of the Special Servicer.

 

2.        A review of the servicing activities and performance by the Special Servicer for the period of January 1, 2014 to December 31, 2014 (the “Reporting Period”) in accordance with the Pooling and Servicing Agreement has been conducted under my supervision.

 

3.        To the best of my knowledge, based on such review, the Special Servicer has fulfilled all of its obligations under the terms of the Pooling and Servicing Agreement, in all material respects for the Reporting Period and if there has been a failure to fulfill any such obligations in any material respect, each failure and the nature and status thereof has been specifically identified herein.

 

 

 

 

Certified by:  /s/  Adam Singer                                                                        Date:  March 5, 2015

       Adam Singer, Managing Director
### D ISTRICT 

### C OURT 

### O F 

### APPEAL 

### O F 

### F LORIDA 

### S ECOND 

### D ISTRICT SHANNON DUFF WAGNER, a/k/a SHANNON RENEE DUFF,

Appellant, v. STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee. No. 2D20-3529 September 3, 2021 Appeal from the Circuit Court for Polk County; Mark F. Carpanini, Judge. Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Eric S. Gardner, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant . Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee. PER CURIAM. Affirmed.2

SILBERMAN, KELLY, and LUCAS, JJ., Concur. Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.
**EXHIBIT 13.2**

**Certification**

Pursuantto Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Subsections (a) and (b) of Section 1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18, United States Code), the undersigned officer of Avianca Holdings S.A. (the “Company”), doeshereby certify, to such officer’s knowledge, that: 

The Annual Report on Form 20-F for the year ended December 31, 2013 of theCompany fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and information contained in the Form 20-F fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and resultsof operations of the Company. 

Dated: April 30, 2014 

 

 
Section 906 CFOCertification
#### Mary K. Hellenga vs. Janey S. Pratt.

March 26, 2008.

*Supreme Judicial Court,*

Appeal from order of single justice.

Mary K. Hellenga appeals from a judgment of a single justice of this court denying her petition for relief pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3. We affirm.

Hellenga commenced an action in the Superior Court seeking a court order directing Janey S. Pratt, a physician who had performed surgery on Hellenga, to provide Hellenga with a detailed statement of the surgery and Hellenga’s current gastrointestinal anatomy for use by other surgeons. A judge “order[ed] that [the] plaintiff may obtain a complete copy of her medical records from Dr. Pratt and the hospital where her surgery was performed. The complaint is otherwise dismissed for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted.” Hellenga moved unsuccessfully for reconsideration. She then sought relief pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, to no avail.

*1036The case was submitted on briefs.

*Mary K. Hellenga,*pro se.

The case is now before us on Hellenga’s memorandum and appendix pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 2:21, as amended, 434 Mass. 1301 (2001). Because she is not challenging an interlocutory ruling of the trial court — her case having been dismissed — rule 2:21 does not strictly apply. In any event, Hellenga cannot demonstrate that she lacked an adequate alternative to relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3; she presents no reason why she cannot pursue a direct appeal to the Appeals Court. See *Spencer*v. *Beacon Hill*Hotel, 448 Mass. 1017 (2007); *Sterling*v. *Delmonico,*443 Mass. 1018, 1019 (2005). And to the extent that she might have concerns about the speed with which the Appeals Court would handle such an appeal, she could move to expedite the appeal. Cf. *Restucci*v. *Commonwealth,*442 Mass. 1045, 1046 (2004).

*Judgment affirmed.*
#### Jack KLIGMAN, Petitioner, v. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, Respondent.

No. 2008-3059.

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

Dec. 11, 2007.

Jack Kligman, pro se.

*ORDER*

The court treats Jack Kligman’s motion to undocket as a motion to voluntarily dismiss his petition for review.

Upon consideration thereof,

IT IS ORDERED THAT:

(1) The motion is granted.

(2) Each side shall bear its own costs.
Unassociated Document




Exhibit 10.8


 


First Amendment


Franklin Federal Savings Bank Employment Agreement


(Donald F. Marker)







WHEREAS, Franklin Federal Savings Bank (the “Bank”) and Franklin Financial Corporation, (the “Company”), have previously entered into an employment agreement (the “Agreement”) with Donald F. Marker (the “Executive”); and







WHEREAS, the Bank, the Company and the Executive have determined that a modification to the Agreement is necessary and appropriate, and desire to enter into this First Amendment (the “Amendment”) on the terms and conditions set forth herein.







NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants herein contained, and for other good and valuable consideration, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, the Bank, the Company and the Executive hereby amend Section 5.1, effective as of the Effective Date of the Agreement (as defined therein),  to read as follows:







“5.1           Change in Control Benefits. If a Change in Control occurs during the term of this Agreement and, thereafter, the Executive’s employment terminates involuntarily but without Cause or if the Executive voluntarily terminates employment with Good Reason, the Bank shall make or cause to be made a lump-sum payment to the Executive in an amount in cash equal to three (3) times the Executive’s average annual compensation.  For this purpose, average annual compensation means the Executive’s average annual taxable income reported by the Bank (or any affiliate of the Bank) for the five (5) calendar years immediately preceding the calendar year in which the Change in Control occurs, provided, however, that such average annual taxable income shall not include any amount reported in the Executive’s Corrected Wage and Tax Statement on Form W-2c, Box 11, relating to distributions received by the Executive from the 2001 Amended and Restated Franklin Federal Savings Bank Deferred Compensation Plan for Directors and Senior Officers.  The payment required under this paragraph is payable no later than five (5) business days after the Executive’s termination of employment.  If the Executive receives payment under Section 5.1, the Executive shall not be entitled to any additional severance benefits under Section 4.1 of this Agreement.  In addition to the cash severance benefit provided for under this Section 5.1, the Company shall provide the Executive with the post-termination insurance coverage described in Section 4.2(a) of this Agreement, subject to the provisions of Section 4.2(b) of this Agreement.”







*     *     *     *     *







In all other respects, the parties hereby ratify and affirm the terms of the Agreement.






  





  











  








IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Bank and the Company have caused this Amendment to be executed by duly authorized officers, and the Executive has signed this Amendment, as of the 21 day of December, 2011.








	  	
FRANKLIN FEDERAL SAVINGS BANK


	  	  
	  	
By:

	
 
/s/ Richard T. Wheeler, Jr.




	  	  
	  	
FRANKLIN FINANCIAL CORPORATION


	  	  
	  	
By:

	
/s/ Richard T. Wheeler, Jr.


	  	  
	  	
/s/ Donald F. Marker


	  	
Donald F. Marker