[Cite as State v. Back, 2020-Ohio-451.]

COURT OF APPEALS 

ASHLAND COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

STATE OF OHIO, : JUDGES: 

 : Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J. 

 Plaintiff - Appellee : Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J. 

 : Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J. 

-vs- : 

 : 

RICKIE BACK, : Case No. 2019-COA-028 

 : 

 Defendant - Appellant : O P I N I O N 

 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Ashland County 

Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 

19-CRI-045 

 

JUDGMENT: Affirmed 

DATE OF JUDGMENT: February 10, 2020 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant 

CHRISTOPHER R. TUNNELL RUTH R. FISCHBEIN-COHEN 

Ashland County Prosecuting Attorney 3552 Severn Road 

 Cleveland, Ohio 44118 

By: COLE F. OBERLI 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney 

110 Cottage Street 

Ashland, Ohio 44805 
Ashland County, Case No. 2019-COA-028 2 

Baldwin, J.

{¶1} Defendant-appellant Rickie Back appeals from the July 3, 2019 Judgment 

Entry-Sentencing of the Ashland County Court of Common Pleas. Plaintiff-appellee is the 

State of Ohio. 

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE 

{¶2} On February 15, 2019, the Ashland County Grand Jury indicted appellant 

on two counts of non-support of dependents in violation of R.C. 2919.21, felonies of the 

fifth degree. At his arraignment on March 19, 2019, appellant entered a plea of not guilty 

to the charges. 

{¶3} Thereafter, on May 31, 2019, appellant withdrew his former not guilty plea 

and entered a plea of guilty to Count One. The trial court granted appellee’s motion to 

dismiss the remaining count. As memorialized in a Judgment Entry-Sentencing filed on 

July 3, 2019, appellant was sentenced to nine months in prison. 

{¶4} Appellant now raises the following assignments of error on appeal: 

{¶5} “I. THE DEFENDANT DID NOT MAKE THE WITHIN PLEA KNOWINGLY 

AND INTELLIGENTLY AS REQUIRED UNDER CRIMINAL RULE 11.” 

{¶6} “II. IT WAS ERROR TO IMPOSE THE WITHIN SENTENCE IN 

DEROGATION OF R.C. 2929.11.” 

I 

{¶7} In his first assignment of error, Appellant argues that his no contest plea 

was not made knowingly, intelligently or voluntarily. We disagree. 
Ashland County, Case No. 2019-COA-028 3 

{¶8} Appellant specifically contends that his plea was not made knowingly and 

intelligently because he was on medications for anxiety and depression at the time of the 

plea hearing. 

{¶9} “When a defendant enters a plea in a criminal case, the plea must be made 

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Failure on any of those points renders 

enforcement of the plea unconstitutional under both the United States Constitution and 

the Ohio Constitution.” State v. Engle, 74 Ohio St.3d 525, 527, 1996-Ohio-179, 660 

N.E.2d 450; see also State v. Veney, 120 Ohio St.3d 176, 2008-Ohio-5200, 897 N.E.2d 

621, ¶ 7. To that end, Crim.R. 11 sets forth certain constitutional and procedural 

requirements with which a trial court must comply prior to accepting a guilty or no contest 

plea. 

{¶10} Crim.R. 11(C) states, in relevant part, as follows: 

{¶11} (C) Pleas of Guilty and No Contest in Felony Cases..... 

{¶12} (2) In felony cases the court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or a plea 

of no contest, and shall not accept a plea of guilty or no contest without first addressing 

the defendant personally and doing all of the following: 

{¶13} (a) Determining that the defendant is making the plea voluntarily, with 

understanding of the nature of the charges and of the maximum penalty involved, and if 

applicable, that the defendant is not eligible for probation or for the imposition of 

community control sanctions at the sentencing hearing. 

{¶14} (b) Informing the defendant of and determining that the defendant 

understands the effect of the plea of guilty or no contest, and that the court, upon 

acceptance of the plea, may proceed with judgment and sentence.
Ashland County, Case No. 2019-COA-028 4 

{¶15} (c) Informing the defendant and determining that the defendant understands 

that by the plea the defendant is waiving the rights to jury trial, to confront witnesses 

against him or her, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in the defendant's 

favor, and to require the state to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt 

at a trial at which the defendant cannot be compelled to testify against himself or herself. 

{¶16} A determination of whether a plea is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary is 

based upon a review of the record. State v. Spates, 64 Ohio St.3d 269, 272, 1992-Ohio130, 595 N.E.2d 251. If a criminal defendant claims that his plea was not knowingly, 

voluntarily, and intelligently made, the reviewing court must review the totality of the 

circumstances in order to determine whether or not the defendant's claim has merit. State 

v. Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 108, 564 N.E.2d 474 (1990). 

{¶17} In the case sub judice, the trial court complied with Crim.R. 11. After 

appellant advised the trial court that he was taking medication for depression and anxiety, 

the following discussion took place on the record: 

{¶18} THE COURT: Are you taking medications, over-the-counter or 

prescriptions? 

{¶19} MR. BACK: Prescriptions. 

{¶20} THE COURT: What would that be? 

{¶21} MR. BACK: Cholesterol, high blood, depression, anxiety, that is about it I 

think. 

{¶22} THE COURT: Do any of those prescription medications impair your ability 

to comprehend or understand things? 

{¶23} MR. BACK: No, no, sir. 
Ashland County, Case No. 2019-COA-028 5 

{¶24} THE COURT: Are there any prescription medications that you are supposed 

to [SIC] taking but which you are not? 

{¶25} MR. BACK: No, sir. 

{¶26} THE COURT: And have you ever been determined by any court to be 

mentally incompetent or incapable of handling your own affairs?

{¶27} MR. BACK: No, sir. 

{¶28} THE COURT: Then the record should reflect that Mr. Back appears to be 

mature alert and reasonably educated, not under the adverse influence of any alcoholic 

beverages or drugs, and fully capable of understanding today’s proceeding’s. 

{¶29} Transcript of plea hearing at 5-6. When asked if he was entering the plea 

voluntarily and under his own free will, appellant indicted that he was. In addition, 

appellant acknowledged that he signed a written waiver and plea of guilty document. 

{¶30} We further find that there is no evidence in the record supporting appellant’s 

assertion that he was “mentally incapable of fully understanding the plea discussion and 

discourse” due to prescription medication. 

{¶31} Appellant’s first assignment of error is, therefore, overruled. 

II 

{¶32} Appellant, in his second assignment of error, contends that the trial court in 

this matter imposed a sentence that was more than necessary to accomplish the 

purposes of sentencing in derogation of R.C. 2929.11. 

{¶33} R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) sets forth the standard of review for all felony 

sentences. State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016–Ohio–1002, 59 N.E.3d 1231 ¶ 1. 

Pursuant to R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), an appellate court may only “increase, reduce, or 
Ashland County, Case No. 2019-COA-028 6 

otherwise modify a sentence * * * or may vacate the sentence and remand the matter to 

the sentencing court for resentencing” if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence 

“(a) [t]hat the record does not support the sentencing court's findings[,]” or “(b) [t]hat the 

sentence is otherwise contrary to law.” R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a)–(b). “An appellate court will 

not find a sentence clearly and convincingly contrary to law where the trial court considers 

the principles and purposes of R.C. 2929.11, as well as the factors listed in R.C. 2929.12, 

properly imposes postrelease control, and sentences the defendant within the permissible 

statutory range.” State v. Hall, 5th Dist. Richland No. 15CA112, 2017–Ohio–592, ¶ 9, 

citing State v. Ahlers, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2015–06–100, 2016–Ohio–2890, ¶ 8, and 

State v. Moore, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2014–02–016, 2014–Ohio–5191, ¶ 6. 

{¶34} R.C. 2929.11 governs the overriding purposes of felony sentencing and 

states, in relevant part, as follows: 

(A) A court that sentences an offender for a felony shall be guided by the 

overriding purposes of felony sentencing. The overriding purposes of felony 

sentencing are to protect the public from future crime by the offender and 

others and to punish the offender using the minimum sanctions that the 

court determines accomplish those purposes without imposing an 

unnecessary burden on state or local government resources. To achieve 

those purposes, the sentencing court shall consider the need for 

incapacitating the offender, deterring the offender and others from future 

crime, rehabilitating the offender, and making restitution to the victim of the 

offense, the public, or both. 
Ashland County, Case No. 2019-COA-028 7 

(B) A sentence imposed for a felony shall be reasonably calculated to 

achieve the three overriding purposes of felony sentencing set forth in 

division (A) of this section, commensurate with and not demeaning to the 

seriousness of the offender's conduct and its impact upon the victim, and 

consistent with sentences imposed for similar crimes committed by similar 

offenders. 

{¶35} R.C. 2929.12 lists general factors which must be considered by the trial 

court in determining the sentence to be imposed for a felony, and gives detailed criteria 

which do not control the court's discretion but which must be considered for or against 

severity or leniency in a particular case. The trial court retains discretion to determine the 

most effective way to comply with the purpose and principles of sentencing as set forth in 

R.C. 2929.11. R.C. 2929.12. 

{¶36} Among the various factors that the trial court must consider and balance 

under R.C. 2929.12 are: (1) serious physical, psychological, or economic harm to the 

victim as a result of the offense; (2) whether the offender has a history of criminal 

convictions; (3) whether the offender has not responded favorably to sanctions previously 

imposed by criminal convictions; and (4) whether the offender shows genuine remorse 

for the offense. R.C. 2929.12. 

{¶37} In the case sub judice, the trial court sentenced appellant to nine months 

incarceration for a violation of R.C. 2919.21(A), which was within the permissible statutory 

range. The trial court, both on the record and in its Entry, stated that it had considered the 

purposes of felony sentencing as set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and the provisions of R.C. 

Chapter 2929. In sentencing appellant, the trial court took into consideration appellant’s 
Ashland County, Case No. 2019-COA-028 8 

criminal history and his high ORAS score and also stated that appellant had “terror[ized] 

the family in an effort to get then to stop pursuing support” and that this was “a more 

severe nature of the offense.” Transcript of sentencing hearing at 8. 

{¶38} Based on the foregoing, we find that the trial court considered the principles 

and purposes of R.C. 2929.11, as well as the factors listed in R.C. 2929.12, and 

sentenced appellant within the permissible statutory range . 

{¶39} Appellant’s second assignment of error is, therefore, overruled. 

{¶40} Accordingly, the judgment of the Ashland County Court of Common Pleas 

is affirmed. 

By: Baldwin, J. 

Gwin, P.J. and 

Delaney, J. concur.