THE ARMENIAN ASSEMBLY OF

AMERI CA, I

NC., et al. , Plaintiffs/Count er- Def endants,

v. GERARD L . CAFESJ I AN, et al. , Def endants/Counter-Plaintiffs.

UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE DIS TRICT OF COLUM BIA

Civil Action Nos. 07-1259, 08- 255, 08-1254 (CKK)

MEMORAN DUM OP INION (May 9, 2011) The a bove-c aptioned consolidate d actions involve a se ries of c laims and counter claims relating to the pa

rties’ attempts to create a museum and me morial in Washington, D.C. devoted to the Armenia

n Genoc ide. Followinga twelve -day bench tr ial in November

2010, the Court issued a Memora

ndum Opinion setting for th its findings of fa ct and c onclusions of law on J anuar y 26, 2011. See [193] Mem. Op. (Jan. 26, 2011). The Court found that none of the 1 parties’ substantive claims wer e mer itorious and dismiss ed all of the claims save one , holding that Def endants Ge rar d L . Cafesjian a nd J ohn J . Waters wer e entitled to indemnification from the Armenia n Genoc ide Museum and Me morial, Inc. (“ AGM& M”) f or leg al expenses incurr ed in defe nding c laims asserted a g ainst them in their capa cities as for mer off icer s of AGM& M. The Court also aff

irmed the va lidity

of a Grant Agree ment that provides Cafe sjian and the Caf esjian Family Foundation, I nc. (“ CFF ”) w ith a reve rsionary interest (nowvested) in c erta in properties owned by AGM& M. Since the Court’s ruling , the par ties have f

iled a var iety

of motions with

All docket number s ref

er to Civil Action No. 08-255. 1the Court relating to unre solved reme dial issues and enf orce ment of the Court’s judg ment. This Memorandum Opinion addr esses only one of those motions, the [208] Motion for NewTrial filed by The Ar menian Assembly

of Amer ica, Inc. (the “Assembly”) a nd subsequently

joined by AGM& M (collec tively , “Plaintiffs”). D efe ndants Cafe sjian Family Foundation, I nc. (“ CFF ”), J ohn J . Waters J r. (“ Waters”) , and Ge rar d L . Cafesjian ( “Cafe sjian”) ( collectively , “De fenda nts”) have f iled an opposition to P laintiffs’ motion, and Plaintiffs have f iled a re ply . Acc ording ly , the motion is ripe for

adjudication. The primar

y basis for Plaintiffs’ motion for a new tria l is an alleg ed “mutual inter est and benef icial re lationship” betwee n the Court and De fenda nt Gera rd L . Cafesjian ba sed on an alleg edly share d cultural a

nd financ ial interest in modern g lass art, whic h Plaintiffs believe may have bia sed the outcome of the be nch trial. Plaintiffs also sug g est that there is a political

connec tion between the Court and Cafe sjian based on a lleg edly mutual connec tions to former President Will iam J . Clint on. Although Plaintiffs have not filed a formal motion for disqualification pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 144, they argue that the Court should disqualify itself pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455 and rea ssign this matter to a ne w judg e for retria l. The Court finds that there is no substantive basis for a ne w trial bec ause no r easona ble observe r would question the Court’s impartiality based on the evidenc e produc ed by Plaintiffs: a share d interest in g lass art a lone does not sug g est partiality , and the a lleg ed political conne ction is far too attenuated to be sug g estive of bias. In addition to lackingmerit on substantive g rounds, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ attempt to disqualify the Court is procedur ally untimely beca use it was not ra ised until long af ter Plaintiffs should have le arne d the fa cts that form the ba sis for their motion. According ly , the Court shall DENY Plaintiffs’ Motion for N ew Tr ial.

2I. BACKG ROUND

A. Factual and Proce dural Background The Court set out its factua l findings thoroughly in its Memorandum Opinion issued on J anuar y 26, 2011, and the Court assumes f amiliarity with that opinion here. See A rmenian Assembly of Am., I

nc. v. Cafesjian , ___ F. Supp. 2d ___, 2011 WL229354 (D.D.C. Jan. 26, 2011). Relatively

fewfac ts from that opinion are r eleva nt to Pl aintiffs’ Motion for N ew Tr ial, and they are summarized below. In the late 1990s, Caf

esjian and se vera l individuals i nvolved with the Assembly joined forc es in an e ffor

t to crea te a museum de voted to memorializing the Ar menian Ge nocide. In 2000, the Assembly

purcha sed a pr ominent building in downtown Washington, D.C. (the “B ank Building ”) f

or the purpose of housingthe g enocide museum. This Bank B uilding wa s purcha sed using mone y

donated by

Cafesjian ( through CFF and anothe r org anization affiliated with Cafesjian) and anothe r philanthropist, Anoush Mathevosian. One of the c onditions for Cafesjian’ s donation was the c reation of a memorial a s part of the g enocide museum project. On Marc h 30, 2000, the Assembly sent Cafe sjian a letter c onfirminghis donations and its obli g ation to build a memorial. This letter noted that Caf esjian’s propose d desig n for the me morial had not been f inalized but that his conce pt consisted of a “ walk-in, c ontemplative, cha pel-like spac e, with interior wa lls of native Arme nian stone and a g lass sculpture by

Stanislav L ibensky

as the foc al point.” The memoria l was expected to take up approximately 1200 square fee t of floor spac e and 40,000 cubic f

eet of overa ll volume. The Assembly ag ree d to cooper ate with the de sign f irm or artist chosen by

CFF to complete the memor ial, and CFF ag ree d to make contr ibutions t o the Assembly to finance the memorial. Caf esjian had to a

bandon his plan for

the g lass sculpture
3when L ibensky died a f ew year s later, longbefor e this liti g ation beg an. Once the B ank B uilding wa s acquire d by the Assembly , Cafesjian be g an to ac quire proper ties adjac ent to the B ank B uilding. Cafe sjian initi ally planned to use the adjac ent proper ties to build a contemporar y art museum that would also dra w more visitors to the g enocide museum. Ultimately , Cafesjian a bandoned that plan and instead de cided to build a contempora

ry art museum in Yer evan, Armenia. A t that point, in l ate 2001, he decide d to donate the adjac ent prope rties to the Assembly for pur poses of e x pandingthe footprint of the g enocide museum project, a

nd his donation was sec ured through a Gr ant Ag ree ment which oblig ated the Assembly to make a spa ce a

vailable within the museum for a memoria l to be constructe d with input from CFF . In late 2003, AGM& M was for med as a new or g anization to manag e the proper ties and cr eate the g enocide museum. The g enocide museum project stalled a fter year s of disagree ment over its size and scope, ultimately

resultingin a serie s of lawsuits, the first of whic h was filed in Apr il 2007. One of the claims raise d by

Def endants in the law suits before the Court was that the g roup controlling AGM& M had not let Cafe sjian participate in the desig n for the me morial as re quired by the Gra nt Ag ree ment. The re cord at trial indicated that the group controllingAGM& M had considere d building the memor ial as a g arde n on the site. Howe ver, the Court found that the plans for the memorial we re ne ver f inalized, and the Court ruled a g ainst Defe ndants on this claim. The pa

rties did not present a

ny evidenc e at tria l reg arding Cafesjian’ s plans for the memorial af

ter 2000, a

nd there was no indication in the recor d that Cafesjian still intended to use g lass sculpture in the de sign a fter L ibensky died.

4B. Allegations Relating to t he Motion for New Tri al

Plaintiffs’ motion for a new trial is premised upon evide nce of an alleg ed “sha

red interest” be tween Ca fesjian a nd the Court relating to g lass art, a s well as an a lleg ed political

connec tion between the Court and Cafe sjian throug h former President Will iam J . Clint on. That evidenc e, which is attached in the f orm of exhibits to Plainti ffs’ motion and r eply brief, c onsists of the following

. In 1999, the under signe d and her husband, identified a s “Mr. a nd Mrs. J ohn T. Kotelly ,” contributed to the purc hase of a g lass sculpture c alled Vestment I I by Stanislav L ibensky

and J aroslava Br ychtova f or the c ollection of the Metr opolitan Museum of Art in New York City

. SeePl.’s Ex . F ( Metropolitan Museum of Ar t web pag e for Vestment I I ). The othe r donors who

are listed as contributing to the acquisition, which wa s a g ift from the He ller Ga llery in New York, a re D rs. My

ra a nd J . and Ha

rold Weiss, Georg e F . Russell J r., Ge offr ey J . I sles, and Ge rar d L . Cafesjian. Id. This piece is a lso describe d in an exhibit ion catalogue published in 2002 by the Museum of Glass in Tac oma, Washington c alled The Inner Light: Sculpture by Stanislav Libensky and J

aroslava Brychtov a ; the undersig ned and he r husband a re listed amongthe “Catalogue Sponsors,” while G era rd L . Cafesjian is listed amongthe “L ender s” to the exhibit ion, which fe ature d both Vestment I I and seve ral wor

ks from Cafe sjian’s own collec tion. See Pl.’s Reply Ex . A. Acc ordingto an ar

ticle published on a we bsite aff iliated with the Smit hsonian Americ an Art Museum, the unde rsig ned and he r husband be g an collec ting a rt in 1978, and their love of g lass was spar

ked in 1984 at an e x hibition of studi o g lass art at the Renwick Ga llery , a bra nch of the Smiths onian Amer ican Ar t Museum. See Pl.’s Ex . D (“ Collectors’ Roundtable: Glass Ac ts”).

5J ohn T. Kotelly is quoted in that article a s saying, “ People who ar e collec tors have a specia l ge ne, and we can’ t help ourselves.” Id. J ohn Kotelly is a past pre sident of the James Renwick Alliance, a

nonprofit org anization dedicated to Ame rica n cra ft art. See id. He is pre sently among44 individuals who serve on the Advisory Boa rd of the Art Alliance for Contempora ry Glass, a not-f

or-pr ofit org anization whose mission i s to further the development a nd appre ciation of ar t made fr om gla ss. See Pl.’s Ex . E (Ar t Alliance f

or Contemporar

y Glass L ist of Office rs, Boa rd of Dir ector s, Advisory Boa rd). Ac cordingto an ora l history by two collector s, the undersig ned and he r husband we re de scribed a s part of a long- rang e planningcommittee for the Art Alliance for Contempora ry Glass in 2001. See Pl.’s Ex . K (Or al History Interviewwith Dale and DougAnder son). In 2004, they offe red a tour of their home collection as pa rt of an a uction sponsored by

the J ames Renwic k Alliance. T hey are also listed in the acknowle dg ments section of the book Fire and Form: The Art of Contemporary Glass , published in 2003, where they are descr ibed by

the author a s “fr iends and fe llow collectors.” See Pl.’s Reply Ex . B. O ne of the

source s listed in the bibli og raphy for that book is a c atalogue fr om an exhibit ion of g lass works from Cafe sjian’s collec tion. See id. J ohn Kotelly is also mentioned in an April 2004 bulletin as beingpart of the cre ation of the F ounders’ Circle for the Mint Museum of Craft a nd Desig n in Charlotte, North Car olina, which has a perma nent collec tion that includes works by L ibensky and Br y chtova a nd Chihuly

. See Pl.’s Ex . H (F ounders’ Circle B ulletin). 2 Cafesjian te stified at trial that he w as an a vid art collec tor and c ollector of g lass art in

In their re ply

brief, Plaintiffs re fer

to an alleg ed grant by

the Art Allianc e for 2 Contemporary

Glass to the Museum of Contempora ry Arts and De sign f

or a “ L ibensky

and His Students” exhi bition in which Cafesjian alleg edly participated. Howe ver, Plaintiffs have not identified what evidence in the rec ord, if any , supports this claim. 6particula

r. See Pl.’s Ex . B ( Cafesjian Tr ial Tr.) at 137-38. Cafe sjian also testified that he initially planned f

or Stanislav L ibensky

to desig n something f

or the c hapel- like memorial spac e in the g enocide museum but that L ibensky died bef ore that could come to fr

uition. Id. at 138. Cafesjian te stified that his art museum in Armenia c ontains sever al piece s by L ibensky , Dale Chihuly , and Ar shile Gorky

. See Pl.’s Ex . A (Caf esjian Tria l Tr.) at 60. Accor ding to the website for

his museum in Armenia, Cafe sjian has over one hundre d piece s by

L ibensky and Br y chtova in his collec tion, and there have be en seve ral e x hibitions featuring their work at the museum in Armenia. See Pl.’s Ex . G. Another artist whose wor

ks have be en exhibited at Cafesjian’ s museum in Armenia is Sidney Hutter. See Pl.’s Ex . I

(L ist of Hutter Exhibi tions). Hutter’s w orks have also bee n exhibi ted at the Renw ick Galler y . Id. Plaintiffs have a lso produce d evidenc e sug g esting that another artist, Ginny

Ruffner , has had w orks exhibit ed at the Renwick Ga llery

as we ll as at the Scottsdale Museum of Contempora ry Art as pa rt of Cafe sjian’s collection. See Pl.’s Ex . J (L ist of Ruffner E x hibitions ). Plaintiffs also contend that ther e is a political conne ction betwee n Cafesjian a nd the Court. Plainti ffs ha

ve produc ed a published inter view with Dwig ht Opperma n, one of Cafesjian’ s former

colleagues, indicatingthat he knew President Clinton and once off ere d him a 3 place to sleep in his office duringClint on’s pre sidency

. See Pl.’s Ex . L(“D wig ht Opperma n: The Q& A”) . Plaintiffs argue that this connec ts Cafesjian to the Court bec ause the undersig ned

was a ppointed to the fede ral judiciar y by President Clinton. There wa s no evidenc e at tria l relating to any

connec tion between Ca fesjian or Opper man and Pre sident Clint on.

The re cord at trial indicated that Oppe rman wa s the Chairman a nd President of West 3 Publis hing while Cafesjian se rved a s one of two Executive Vic e-Pre sidents. 7C. Dec larations Fi led In Support and Opposition to Plaint iffs’ Motion

In support of their motion, Plaintiffs have provide d a dec laration from Van Kr ikorian, an attorney who is a member

of the Asse mbly ’s B oard of Trustee s and who ser

ved as the Assembly ’s cor

porate repr esentative at trial. See Dec l. of Van K rikorian ¶ 1. Krikorian a

vers that when the A ssembly

decide d to waive its rig ht to a jury trial and proc eed w ith a bench tr ial, the Assembly

was una war e of the Court’s alleg edly share d interests with Cafe sjian. Id. ¶ 6. Krikorian f

urther a vers that it was not until after the trial opinion was issued that the Asse mbly first lear ned of the joint donation relatingto Vestment I I and the other

alleg edly share d interests betwee n the Court and Cafe sjian. Id. ¶ 8. Krikor ian ave rs that af ter the tria l opinion was issued,

sever al Assembly

members f

amiliar with Cafe sjian rec alled him boasting of conne ctions with judge s. Id. Ba sed on these c omments, Krikorian pe rfor med web se arc hes for

the name of

the undersig ned and he r husband, pr oducingthe information that for ms the basis for Plaintiffs’ motion for a new

trial. Id. ¶ 9. In opposition t o Plaintiffs’ motion, Defenda nts have pre sented two de clar ations from Cafesjian. See Dec l. of Ger ard L . Cafesjian ( “Cafe sjian Dec l.”); Suppl. Decl. of G era rd L

. Cafesjian ( “Suppl. Cafesjian De cl.”) . Cafesjian state s that he has longheld an inter est in promoting the arts, and he has donate d to many museum acquisitions over the year s. Cafesjian Dec l. ¶ 2. Cafe sjian expl ains that in 1999, the Heller Galler y in New Yor

k City asked him if he wished to make a

donation to the Metropolitan Museum of Ar t to fund the ac quisiti on of a ne w work by Stanislav L ibensky

. Id. Cafesjian e x plains that he agree d to provide a dona tion, but he did not know the identities of any other donors to that a cquisition. Id. ¶ 3. Cafe sjian aver s that he wa s unawa

re tha t the undersig ned and he r husband ha d made a contribution to the L ibensky
8acquisition until t he Assembly filed its motion for a new tr ial. Id. ¶ 4. Cafe sjian also aver s that prior to the day

he testified in Court, he ha d never met or communicated with the under signe d. Id. Cafesjian f

urther states that he ha s never met or communicated with J ohn T. Kotelly

. Id. Cafesjian f

urther e x plains that befor e the c ase w as assig ned to this Court, he was not familiar with the undersig ned in any way and wa s not awar e of a

ny interest by

the under signe d or her husband in g lass art. Suppl. Cafesjian De cl. ¶ 5. II. LEGAL STANDARD A. Motions for a New T rial Under Rule 59 Fe dera l Rule of Civil Procedur e 59(a ) provides that “[t] he cour t may , on motion, gra

nt a new tria l on all or some of the issues—a nd to any party —as follows: . . . afte r a nonjury trial, for any rea son for whic h a re hear ing ha s here tofore be en g rante d in a suit in equity in fede ral c ourt.” Fe d. R. Civ. P . 59(a) (1)( B) . “The decision to g rant or de ny such a motion lies within the sound discretion of the court.” In re Lorazepam &Chlorazepate Antitrust Liti g. , 467 F. Supp. 2d 74, 87 (D.D.C. 2006) ( citations omitt ed). “ [J ]udi cial misconduct may serve as a ground for

g ranting a motion for new

trial.” Colunga v. Y

oung , 722 F. Supp. 1479, 1489 (W.D. Mich. 1989), aff’d , 914 F.2d 255 ( 6th Cir. 1990). “Misconduct may consist of ac tual bias or hostility on the trial judge ’s par

t, or cre ation by

the judg e of a

n appea ranc e of bia s or hostilit y .” Id. B. Motions for Disquali fication Fe dera l law provides that “ [a] ny justice, judg e, or ma g istrate judg e shall disqualify h[er]self in any

proce edingin which [her] im partiality might re asonably

be questioned.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). “ The que stion is whether a r easona ble and infor

med observe r would question the judg e’s impar

tiality .” United States v. Mic rosoft , 253 F.3d 34, 114 ( D.C. Cir. 2001).
9Disqualification is also re quired “ [w] here [t he judg e] has a per sonal bias or pre judice conc erning a par ty , or per sonal knowledg e of disputed e videntiary fac ts conce rningthe proc eeding ,” 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1), or

wher e the judg e “know s that [s he], indivi dually or as a fiduciar y , or [her] spouse or minor child re siding in [her] household, has a fina ncial intere st in the subject matter in controve rsy

or in a pa rty to the proce eding , or any other intere st that could be substantially aff ecte d by the outcome of

the proc eeding ,” id. § 455(b)( 4); see also id. § 455(b)( 5)(iii). 4 “[B]eca use judg es ar e pre sumed to be impartial, the Court must beg in its analy sis of the alleg ations supporting . . . a reque st [ for r ecusa l] with a pre sumption aga inst disqualification.” SEC v. Bilzerian , 729 F. Supp. 2d 19, 22 (D.D .C. 2010) (quotation marks a nd citation omitted); accord Am . Prairie Constr. Co. v. Hoich , 594 F.3d 1015, 1021 ( 8th Cir. 2010) (“A judg e is presumed to be impartial, and the pa rty seekingdisqualification bea rs the substantial burde n of provingotherwise.” ) (c itations and quotation marks omitted). L itigants may

compel a judg e to consider whether disqualification is warr anted by complying w ith 28 U.S.C . § 144, which provide s: Whenever a party

to any proce edingin a district court makes and files a timely and sufficie nt aff

idavit that the judge befor e whom the matter is pe nding has a persona l bias or prejudice either ag ainst him or in favor of any adver se party , such judge shall proce ed n o fu rt her there in, but another judge shall be assig ned to hear such proce eding

. The aff idavit shall state the fac ts and the rea sons for the belief that bias or prejudice exis ts, and shall be filed not less than ten day s befor e the beg inning of the term at which the proce eding is to be hear d, or g ood cause shall be shown for failure to f ile it within such time. A party may file only one such aff idavit in any case . I t shall be acc ompanied by a cer

tificate of counsel of rec ord stating that it is made in g ood faith.

Section 455(b) a lso describe s other cir cumstance s requiringrec usal, but they are not 4 rele vant her e. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(b). 1028 U.S.C. § 144. “The motion and af fidavit must be timely

filed, show a tr

ue per sonal bias, and must alleg e spec ific fa cts and not mere conclusions or g ener alities.” Bhd. of Locomotive Firemen &

Engineme n v. Bangor &Aroostook R.R. Co. , 380 F.2d 570, 576- 77 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (citations omitted). In decidingwhether to gr ant a motion to disqualify under § 144, the court “must acc ept the af

fidavit’s fa ctual alleg ations as true e ven if the judg e knows them to be f alse.” Loving Spirit

Found. , 392 F.3d at 496. “[D] isqualification is not automatic upon submission of aff idavit and ce rtificate ; rather , the judg e must review these submissions for leg al suffic iency and construe the m strictly

ag ainst the movant to preve nt abuse.” United States v. Miller , 355 F. Supp. 2d 404, 405 (D.D.C. 2005) (inter nal citations omitted). Fur thermore , “it is the duty

of the judge not to permit the use of a motion or affidavit of prejudice as a me ans to ac complish delay and other wise def eat the or derly

administration of justice.” United States v. Hall , 424 F. Supp. 508, 534 (W.D. Okla. 1975), aff’d , 536 F.2d 313 ( 10th Cir. 1976). The “ bias or pre

judice” ground for

disqualification under

§ 144 is covere d by

§ 455(b)( 1). See 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1) ( requiringdisqualification “[w]here [the judge ] has a persona l bias or prejudice conce rninga par ty , or per sonal knowledg e of disputed e videntiary fac ts conce rningthe proce eding .”). The “catchall” pr ovision of § 455(a) a lso covers the “bias or pr ejudice” g round but broade ns its scope to cover the objective appearance of bias or pr ejudice. Liteky v. U nited States , 510 U.S. 540, 548 (1994). Ac cording ly , the Court shall analy ze Plainti ffs’ “ bias or prejudice ” cla im through the broade r lens of § 455( a). 5 Plaintiffs impl y

in their reply

brief that the standard f

or disqualification under § 455 5 should be heig htened in ca ses such a s this one where the Court serve s as the finde r of f act at trial. Howeve r, Plaintiffs cite no author ity in support of this proposition, and the rec usal statutes do not make a ny distinction between a

judge ’s impartiality

for pur poses of pre siding ove r a jury trial and a judg e’s impar

tiality for pur poses of findingfac ts following a bench tr ial. Although this 11Although the Court must acce pt as true a ny specific fac ts alleg ed in a § 144 a ffidavit, “the fac ts alleg ed in the pape rs submitted by a per son relying on se ction 455 [need not] i n ever y case be ac cepte d as true, whether the pape rs be a

verifie d memorandum or a re in some other

form.” United States v. He ldt , 668 F.2d 1238, 1271 ( D.C. Cir. 1981). For purposes of de ciding Plaintiffs’ motion, the Court shall acce pt the fac ts presente d by Plaintiffs as true. In addition, and in the alternative, the Court shall acc ept as true the fa cts ave rre d by Cafesjian in his dec larations to the extent that they

are not contradic ted by

the evidenc e pre sented by Plaintiffs. III. DISCUSS ION Plaintiffs contend, base d on the fa cts prese nted in their Motion for Ne w Trial, that the impartiality

of the Court in makingits findings of f act a nd conclusions of lawmight re asonably be questioned, a

nd there fore the Court should stay all further

proce eding s and re fer

the matter to another judge for a

new tria l. Plainti ffs insist in their paper s that their motion for a ne w trial is filed pursua

nt to Rul e 59(a ) and that it is not filing a separ ate motion for disqualification pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 144. See Pls.’ Reply at 1 n.1. Howe ver, Plaintiffs also re ly in part on § 144 in their motion and purport to have complied with its provisions. Therefor e, out of a n abundanc e of c aution, the Court shall first consider Plaintiffs’ motion for a new tria l as if it were a motion filed under § 144. T hen, the Court shall indepe ndently consider whether

the Court should have disqualified itself unde r 28 U.S.C. § 455 and whethe r a ne w trial is appropr iate on that basis.

distinction m ight be rele vant in deter mining an a

ppropriate reme dy

for a failure to disqualify , the Court need not and doe s not decide that issue. 12A. Plaintif fs’ Motion Is Untimely Whether Plaintiffs’ motion is considered unde r § 144 or § 455, the Court must consider whether the motion was timely

filed. “Cruc ial to the integ rity of the judicial proc ess, the timeliness requireme nt [ in § 144] ensure s that a par ty may not wait and dec ide whethe r to file based on ‘ whether

he likes subseque nt treatment that he rec eives.’” SEC v. Loving Spirit Found., Inc. , 392 F.3d 486, 492 ( D.C. Cir. 2004) (quoting In re United Shoe Mach. Corp. , 276 F.2d 77, 79 (1st Cir. 1960)). “[W] hile section 455(a ) conta ins no ex press timeliness provision, most circ uits consideringthe matter ha ve conc luded that a litiga nt must raise the disqualification issue within a rea sonable time af ter the grounds for it ar e known.” United States v. Barrett , 111 F.3d 947, 951 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (c itations omi tted); accord Asc om Hasler Mailing Sys., Inc . v. U.S. Postal Serv. , Civil Action Nos. 00-1401, 00- 2089, 2010 WL4116858, at *2-3 (D .D.C. Oct. 19, 2010) (r uling that r ecusa l motion under § 455 was untimely when f iled three and a ha lf y ear s afte r eve nts supposedly

justify ing r ecusa l). Importantly , “[t] he rule has bee n applied whe n the fac ts upon which the motion relies ar e public knowledg e, eve n if the movant does not know them.” United States v. Siege lman , 561 F.3d 1215, 1243 ( 11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (citing Nat’l Auto Brokers Corp. v. Gen. M otors Corp. , 572 F.2d 953, 957- 59 (2d Cir. 1978)), vacate d on other grounds , 130 S. Ct . 3542 (2010); accord U niversal City Studios, Inc. v. Re imerdes , 104 F. Supp. 2d 334, 349 & n.88 (S.D.N.Y.) ( “F or purpose s of timeliness, the applicant is cha rg ed with knowledg e of a ll facts ‘known or knowa ble, if true, w ith due diligenc e fr om the public

rec ord or other

wise.’” ) (quoting Hirschkop v . Va. State Bar Ass’n , 406 F. Supp. 721, 724 (E.D. Va. 1975) ). In this case, Va

n Krikorian states in his declar ation that the information which f orms the
13basis for the ne w trial motion was obtained f rom an interne t searc h of the names “Mrs. John T. Kotelly ” and “ J ohn T. Kotelly” that Kr ikorian conduc ted base d on sug g estions from Assembly members a fter the trial opinion was issued. See Krikorian D ecl. ¶ 9. Although the Court cannot doubt that Krikorian wa ited until after the Court issued its trial opinion to perfor m such a sea

rch, Plaintiffs could have a

nd should have discove red a ny rele vant fa cts long befor e the tria l was held in these ac tions. I nformation about the a cquisition of Vestment I I by the Metropolitan Museum of Art in 1999 wa s publicly available long be fore the trial beg an in Novembe r 2010, as we re other fa cts relating to the inter est of the unde rsig ned and he r husband in g lass art. Information about Cafe sjian’s interest in g lass art ha s been known to the Assembly since at least 2000 when it confirme d Cafesjian’ s initi al plans for the memorial, a

nd additional information about Cafesjian’ s investments in art wer e produc ed in pre trial discover y . Indeed, one of Plaintiffs’ arguments at trial was that Cafesjian ha d shirked his duties to AGM& M by focusingall his

ener g y on his art museum in Armenia. T here fore , there is no reason why Plaintiffs could not have pe rfor

med a simple interne t searc h and discove red the alleg ed “c onnection” be tween the Court and Cafe sjian befor e the pa rties devoted substantial r esourc es trying the case befor e the undersig ned. 6 Ba sed on Va

n Krikorian’ s decla

ration, it appea

rs that the filingof the motion was motivated by

the fa ct that Plaintiffs rec eived a larg ely adver se dec ision from the Court rather than by the sudden discove ry

of an a lleg ed bias. Cf. Siegelman , 561 F.3d at 1243 (“[Party ’s] recusa l

I t is unclear whether

the information re lating to the a lleg ed political conne ction betwee n 6 Cafesjian a

nd the Court throug h Dwig ht Opperma n and President Clinton was publicly available long be fore Plaintiffs filed their motion for a ne w trial; the interview upon which Plaintiffs rely appea rs to have be en published in 2011. Ther efor e, to the extent Plainti ffs’ motion is based on this connection, it appea

rs to be timely

. 14motion . . . has all the ear marks of a

n eleve nth-hour ploy

based upon his dissatisfac tion with the jury ’s ver dict and the judg e’s post-tria l rulings.” ). B eca use Plaintiffs did not promptly bringtheir

conce rns to the attention of the Court, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ c halleng e to the Court’s qualifications based on §§ 144 and 455 is untimely and may be denie d on that basis alone. Howeve r, the Court shall proc eed in the a lternative a nd consider the merits of Plaintiffs’ arguments. B. Plaintif

fs’ Motion Does Not Comport wi th 28 U.S.C. § 144 Although Plaintiffs disclaim that they are filing a

motion for disqualification pursuant to § 144, Plaintiffs have provide d a ce rtificate of counse l that purports to comply with the statute. “[T] o g uard a g ainst the remova l of an unbiase d judge throug h the filing of a f alse a ffidavit, the statute requir es the attorney prese nting the motion to sign a cer tificate statingthat both the motion and declar ation are made in g ood faith.” Loving Spirit Foundation , 392 F.3d at 496 (interna l citations omit ted). The cer tificate submitted by

Plaintiffs’ counsel states that “Plaintiff’s re quest for the disqualification of Judge K ollar-Kote lly is made in g ood faith,” see Dec l. of Eric I . Abra

ham ¶ 2, but it does not state that the de clar ation of Va n Krikorian w as submitt ed in g ood faith. Ther efor e, Plaintiffs’ motion is not supported by a valid ce rtificate of counsel pursua

nt to § 144. Accor dingly , the motion may be denie d to the extent it is based on § 144. C. A Reasonable O bserve r W ould Not Question the Court ’s Impartiality Based on the Evide nce Produced By Plaintif fs Plaintiffs contend that the Court and Caf esjian have a “mutual inter est and be nefic ial relationship” that was not disclosed and may have bia sed the outcome of the be nch trial.

15Plaintiffs rely on the standar d for disqualification under § 455(a ), ar guing that the connec tion betwee n the Court and Cafe sjian rises to the level whe re the Court’s “impartiality might

rea sonably

be questioned.” Plaintiffs also argue that disqualifica tion is required unde r § 455(b) beca use the unde rsig ned or he r husband ha s an “inter est that could be substantially aff ecte d by the outcome of

the proc eeding .” 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(5) (iii). The Court shall eva luate ea ch of these c laims. 1. A Share d Intere st in Glass Art Does Not Sug g est Partiality The e vidence prese nted by Plaintiffs indicates that: (1) both Cafe sjian and the undersig ned, alongwith severa l other donors, c ontributed to the ac quisiti on of a pie ce of art by the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New Y ork City in 1999; (2) both Cafesjian a nd the undersig ned have an intere st in collecting works of g lass art by cer tain artists; and (3) both Cafesjian’ s name a

nd the names of

the under signe d and her

husband appe ar in c erta in publications relatingto gla ss art collec tions, predominantly museum collections. Plaintiffs insinuate that these “ connec tions” betwee n the Court and Cafe sjian imply to the rea sonable observe r that the Court had a pree x isting re lationship or “familiarity ” with Cafe sjian that was undisclosed to the par

ties. Even settingaside Caf esjian’s de clar ations expl icitly disavowingany

connec tion between himself a nd the under signe d and her husband or a

ny knowledg e of a

share d interest in g lass art, none of the e vidence cited by Plaintiffs indicates that the Court ac tually knew who Cafe sjian was prior to this litigation. The f act that the Court a

nd Cafesjian both donated funds for the acquisition of Vestment I I does not demonstrate that they acte d in conce rt. At most, Plaintiffs’ evidenc e could g ive rise to an inf ere nce that the undersig ned may have be en aw are of Cafesjian a s a fe llow patron of g lass art. B ut that infere nce w ould not lead a r easona ble observe r 16to question the Court’s impartiality

.

Plaintiffs impl y

that the Court was try

ing to hide its conne ction to Cafesjian whe n it “exhibited particular se nsitivi ty to the cross-e x amination of Mr. Caf esjian by trial counsel f

or the Assembly on the subject of his re lationship with m ember s of the fe dera l judiciary , sustaining a n objection by

Mr. Cafe sjian’s counsel.” Pl.’s Mot. at 3 n.1. A review of the trial transc ript

reve als that the Assembly ’s trial counse l asked Caf esjian a se ries of que stions relatingto Cafesjian’ s persona l relationships with Supreme Court justices and other judge s and whe ther Cafesjian w as proud of

those relationships. See Trial Tr. ( 11/19 AM) at 70-71. A fter the Assembly ’s counse l asked with whom Cafe sjian was per sonally friendly on the Supreme Court, the Court asked c ounsel why this information was re levant to the ca se. See id. at 71. The subjec t had ar isen in the context of Cafesjian’s w ork on rule- of-law initiatives in Armenia, when Cafesjian note d that former J ustice Sandra

Day O’Connor ha d helped him with that issue. See id. at 69-70. The Assembly ’s counse l expl ained that he was try ing to de monstrate that Cafe sjian was “ an eg omaniac.” Id. at 72. The Court noted that counsel wa s fre e to make that argument but that the Court was c apable of makingits own credibility deter minations, and knowing which justices on the Supreme Court Caf esjian knewwould not help the Court decide the re levant issues in the case

. Id. at 72-73. The ref ore, the Court’s comments duringthe cr oss-examination of Cafe sjian had nothing to do with any alleg ed re lationship between Caf esjian and the undersig ned; they

wer e foc used on limiti ngthe scope of testimony to issues that were rele vant. There was no indication from the re cord that Cafesjian wa s g oing to testify about any

connec tion with fede ral judg es base d on his art collec ting a ctivities. Even a ssuming ar g uendo that the Court wa s awa re of Cafesjian ba sed on their mutual
17interest in g lass art, such a familiarity

or shar ed intere st does not “ra ise the appe ara nce of prejudice in the mind of a re asonable person who is fa miliar with all the fac ts.” Heldt , 668 F.2d at 241-42. Judges ne ed not disqualify themselves under

§ 455 simply

beca use they have a prior relationship wit h a litiga

nt. For e x ample, judg es ar e not automatica lly require d to rec use themselves in ca ses involving their former clients. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(2) ( requiring disqualification only

wher e the judg e or a

lawy er w ith whom the judge prac ticed “se rved a s lawy er in the matter in controve rsy”) ; David v. City and County of Denv er , 101 F.3d 1344, 1351 7 (10th Cir. 1996) (“ [U] nder § 455( a), a judge ’s prior r epre sentation of a w itness or a pa rty in an unrelated matter doe s not automatically require disqualification.”) ; Nat’l Auto Brokers Corp. , 572 F.2d at 958 (“The prior re prese ntation of a pa rty by a judg e or his firm with re g ard to a matter unre lated to litigation bef ore him does not automatica lly require rec usal.”). In consideringwhether

a judg e’s r elationship with an intereste d party raises a rea sonable question as to the judg e’s impar tiality , courts look to the nature of the re lationship and its rele vance to the proce eding s befor e the judg e. See, e .g. , United States v. Cole , 293 F.3d 153, 164 (4th Cir. 2002) (holdingthat rec usal was not re quired in a c riminal case wher e def endant wa s the son of the judg e’s de cea sed g odpare nts and the judg e had not ha d any contac t with the defe ndant for ove r ten year s); United States v. Lovaglia , 954 F.2d 811, 816- 17 (2d Cir. 1992) (holdingthat judge ’s past social r elationship with family whose businesses w ere victimiz ed by defe ndants’ RI CO violations did not require rec usal wher e re lationship ended seve n or eig ht y ear s befor e sentenc ing a

nd the judg e had no know ledg e of c ontested fa cts as a r esult of the re lationship). The Supreme Court has explained that althoug h § 455(a) has a “ broade r re ach” than 7 § 455(b), the two subse ctions should be construed so a s to be consistent with eac h other. Liteky , 510 U.S. at 552-53 & n.2. 18The only

documented “ connec tions” betwee n the Court and Cafe sjian date ba ck to 1999 and 2002, long be fore the lawsuits now pendingbefor e the Court we re f iled, and Cafe sjian expl icitly denies that he knew the unde rsig ned bef ore this litigation. The fa ct that the Court appe ars to shar e a c ultural interest in g lass art with Cafe sjian would not lead a r easona

ble per son to question the Court’s impartiality . J udg es ar e not soulless automatons; they

are permitted to have social and c ultural interests outside the c ourtroom. Cf. Sexson v . Servaas , 830 F. Supp. 475, 478 (S.D. Ind. 1993) (“ In takingthe oath of of fice as a judge , a per son does not ag ree to be a he rmit removed f rom the world.” ). The f

act that a judge ’s interests over lap with those of a litig ant does not ordinar ily raise que stions about her ability to act impartially

in her c apac ity

as a judg e. See, e .g. , Hoatson v. N.Y . Archdioce

se , 280 F. App’ x 88, 90-91 (2d Cir. 2008) ( holding that involvement by judge and his wife in Catholic c ommunity org anizations did notrequire rec usal in case involving the Catholic Churc h). I t is ge nera lly

rec og nized, for example, that a judg e nee d not rec use her self fr om a ca se involving her

alma mater , even where the judg e’s pa st activities might re asonably sug g est that she has a n aff inity for the institution. See, e .g. , Lunde v. He lms , 29 F.3d 367, 370- 71 (8th Cir. 1994) (f inding no ba sis for re cusal whe re the judge was a n alumnus of the def

endant univer sity , had made financ ial contributions to the university , and had be en involved in the univer sity ’s educational prog rams), and W u v. Thomas , 996 F.2d 271, 274- 75 & n.7 ( 11th Cir. 1993) (no

rec usal requir ed whe re judg e made past contributions to the university defe ndant and he ld position as unsalaried a djunct profe ssor), both cited with approval in Dist rict of Columbia v. Doe , 611 F.3d 888, 899 ( D.C. Cir. 2010). But see Liljeberg v. H ealth Servs. Ac quisiti on Corp. , 486 U.S. 847, 864-68 (1988) ( requiringrec usal wher e judg e ser ved on the boa

rd of trustee s of a
19university

that had a f

inancial inter est in the litigation). Simi larly , a judg e’s pa st membership in org anizations that advocate for positions advanc ed by

a par ty does not nec essar ily

require rec usal. See Sie rra Club v. Simkins Indus., Inc. , 847 F.2d 1109, 1117- 18 (4th Cir. 1988) (holdingthat judge ’s past member ship in S ierra Club befor e appointment to the benc h more than a deca de ea

rlier did not re quire re cusal fr om case wher e the Sierr a Club was a pa rty ); W essman ex

rel. W essman v. B os. Sch. Comm. , 979 F. Supp. 915, 916-18 (D. Ma ss. 1997) (re jectingargument that disqualification was r equire d based on judge ’s past ac tiviti es as a civil rig hts lawy er a

nd membership in the L awyer’ s Commi ttee for Civil Rights of the B oston Bar Association). The claim that the under signe d would be biase d in favor of Cafe sjian beca

use she sha

res his af finity for g lass art is astonishing, f or it sugg ests that the Court is incapable of sepa ratingpersona l interests from the pe rfor mance of judicial duties. A

rea sonable obser

ver must assume that judg es ar e ordina rily capa ble of settingaside their own interests and a dhering

to their sworn duties to “f aithfully and impartially

discharg e and pe rfor

m all the duties” incumbe nt upon them. See 28 U.S.C. § 453 (judicial oath of off ice)

. In their motion for a ne w trial, Plaintiffs exagg erate the extent to which Cafesjian’ s interest in g lass art wa s actua lly rele vant to the issues at trial. Plaintiffs imply that Cafesjian’ s desire to build a memor ial with a L ibensky cente rpiec e wa s critical to his vision and that the Court would have be en influenc ed by this in deciding the merits of the c ase. B ut the rec ord at trial indicated only

that this was Cafesjian’ s initi al plan for the memorial in 2000, af ter whic h L ibensky died. Ther e wa s litt le, if any , evidenc e in the re cord a bout Cafesjian’s pla

ns for the memorial af

ter L ibensky

died, and ther e wa s no evidenc e that g lass art wa s a par t of Cafe sjian’s future pla ns. Cafesjian’ s plans for the me morial wer e re levant to Def endants’ c laims that the
20Assembly

and AGM& M had bre ache d their contra ctual oblig ations by failingto allow CFF to exercise its rig ht to participate in a nd approve the desig n of the memoria l, but the focus at tria l was not on the substanc e of Caf esjian’s plans but rather on the e x tent to which Cafe sjian was allowed to par

ticipate in the design and construc tion of the memorial. B eca use the e ntire g enocide museum project ne ver g ot past the planningstag es, the Court ultimately found that the Assembly and AGM& M had not brea ched the ir contra ctual oblig ations. See [193] Mem. Op. at 8 179-82. Ther efor e, Cafe sjian’s initial desire to include g lass art in the memoria l was not rele vant to the Court’s decision on these issues. Indeed, Plaintiffs re cog nize this in their reply brief, arguing some what ironica lly that the Court’s dec ision to i nclude the de tails about Cafesjian’ s initial plans for the memorial in its Memorandum Opinion demonstrates its bias. See Pl.’s Reply at 2-3 (“ The mer e re fer ence to the identity of the sculptor pr oves the point: whether or not L ibensky cre ated the sc ulpture had no r eleva nce to the issues of

brea ches of

fiduciar y and other duties that the J udg e wa s deciding . The Judge se ized upon this detail pre cisely beca use it was of particula r intere st to her.”) . Whil e it is true that Cafe sjian’s intent to work with L ibensky was ultimately

irrele vant to the merits of the pa rties’ c laims, the Court’s decision to include this historical fa ct about the g enesis of the memorial for context—on the fourth pag e of a rec itation of background fa cts that spanned 127 pa g es—ca n hardly be see n as evide nce of

bias by the Court. 9 Plaintiffs do not claim that the Court has a ny financ ial interest that would re quire

That the Court ruled in f avor of Plaintiffs on this i ssue should undermine a ny claim that 8 the Court was or is biase d in favor of Cafesjian. The Court also finds it signific ant that Plaintiffs have not pointed to any other a spects of 9 the Court’s Memora

ndum Opinion that purport to show bias in favor of Cafesjian ba sed on an alleg ed mutual intere st. 21disqualification. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4) ( requiringdisqualification wher e a judg e or he r

spouse or minor child re siding in her household “ha s a financ ial interest the subjec t matter in controve rsy

or in a pa rty to the proce eding. . . .”). I nstead, Plaintiffs ar g ue that disqualification is proper unde r § 455(b) (5)( iii), which requir es re cusal whe re the judge or her spouse or minor child “[i] s known by

the judg e to have an intere st that could be substantially aff ecte d by the outcome of the proce eding .” “Wher e a c ase . . . involves r emote, conting ent, indirec t or speculative interests, disqualification is notrequire d.” Lovaglia , 954 F.2d a t 815. For e x ample, a judg e g ener ally

need not r ecuse in case s where his or her c hild is a partner at a law firm that repr esents one of

the par ties in other matters not bef ore the judge ; the child’s financ ial interest in his client’s well-be ing is ty pically considere d too remote to influenc e the judg e. See, e .g. , Microsoft Corp. v. United States , 530 U.S. 1301, 1302 (2000) (state ment of Rehnquist, C.J .) (holding that rec usal was not re quired whe re son of Chief J ustice wa s partner at a law firm that repr esente d one of the parties in matter s pendingbefor e anothe r cour t); In re M

edtronic, Inc

. Sprint Fidelis L eads Prods. Liab. Li tig. , 601 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1124-28 (D . Minn. 2009) (same) , aff’d , 623 F.3d 1200 ( 8th Cir. 2010). Sim ilarly , a judg e who owns stock in a company is usually not require d to rec use in ca ses involving that c ompany ’s competitor, since any impacts on the marke t are likely

to be spec ulative and attenuated. See I n re Kan. Pub. Emps. Retirem ent Sys. , 85 F.3d 1353, 1362 ( 8th Cir. 1996) (“[A] judge holdingstock in Gene ral Motors should not have to

rec use fr om a ca se involving F ord Motor Company beca use some rulinghe may

make mig ht be used as pe rsuasive a

uthority in a ca se ag ainst GM.”); In re Plac id Oil Co. , 802 F.2d 783, 786- 87 (5th Cir. 1986) (findingno basis for r ecusa l where judge had lar g e investment in a ba nk and judge ’s ruling s might have dramatic impact on bankingindustry as a whole). The ref

ore, the fac t
22that there may be some remote c onnection betwe en a judg e’s inter ests and the c ase ove r which she pre sides is insufficient to require disqualification under § 455. Plaintiffs contend that “Caf esjian’s intere st in glass a rt and his intent to include such a rt in the [genoc ide] museum would further the inter est of Judge K ollar-Kote lly and her husband in raisingthe profile, a

nd value, of

this ty pe of a rt.” Pl.’s Mot. at 4. Plaintiffs further c laim that “a decision by

the J udg e that fa cilitated the ac complishment of Mr. Cafe sjian’s intentions . . . might also have the ef

fec t of incre asingthe value of the collec tion owned by

the J udg e and he r husband.” Pl.’s Reply

at 3. No matter

how Plaintiffs char acte rize the “intere st” at issue, there is no support for the c onclusion that this int ere st could be “substantially aff ecte d” by the outcome of this liti g ation. The c onsolidated ac tions before the Court involve alleg ations of bre ach of contra ct and br eac h of fiducia ry duty relating to the mana g ement of A GM& M; there is no g lass art a ctually

at issue in the litigation, and the re is not a sc intill a of e vidence in the rec ord indicatingthat Cafesjian pr esently plans to use g lass art a s part of the desig n of the museum or memorial. Plaintiffs appea r to be a rguing that any

decision that favors Cafe sjian financia lly will enable him to spend more money on g lass art, e ither as pa

rt of the g enocide museum and memorial or a s part of his indepe ndent collec tion, and this will raise the profile a nd value of

g lass art, ther eby

providing value to the unde rsig ned or he r husband. Such a n argument is entirely speculative, and the c ausal c onnection betwe en the Court’s r ulings a nd its alleg ed intere st is far too attenuated to wa

rra nt rec usal under § 455. “ [W ]here an inter est is not direct, but is remote, conting ent, or spec ulative, it is not t he kind of intere st which rea sonably bring s into question a judge ’s impartiality .” In re Dre xel Burnham Lambe rt Inc. , 861 F.2d 1307, 1313 ( 2d Cir. 1988). There fore , the Court finds that the intere st in glass a rt that the under signe d and her
23husband alleg edly share with Cafesjian is not an intere st that could be substantially aff ecte d by the outcome of

the proc eeding s pendingbefor e the Court, and it does not provide a basis fr om which the Court’s impar

tiality might re asonably

be questioned. 2. The Alleg ed Political Connection Be tween the Court and Cafe sjian Does Not Provide a B asis for Rec usal Plaintiffs argue in their motion for a new tria l that the Court’s “impartiality is further questioned base d on nexus [ sic] between Mr. Ca fesjian, f ormer Pre sident Clint on, and Judge Kollar-K otelly .” Pl.’s Mot. at 4. The Court’s only link to thi s alleg ed “political c onnection” is the fa ct that the under signe d was a ppointed to the fede ral be nch by President Clinton. P laintiffs appea r to bac k off this argument in their reply brief. See Pl.’s Reply

at 7 (“ Plaintiffs are not complainingthat J udg e Kollar -Kotelly should be disqualified bec ause she share s a ra cial or political background with Mr. Cafe sjian.”). The case law is clea r that re cusal is not war

rante d wher e a judg e is alleg ed to be biase d based solely on political connec tions to t he President who appointed her

. See Karim-Panahi v . U.S. Congress , 105 F. App’ x 270, 274-75 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (af firmingdistrict court’s de nial of motion for re cusal ba sed on alleg ations that the judg e wa s “biase d beca

use of he r ‘political-r elig ious connec tions’ and her alleg ed loy alty

to those who selec ted, conf

irmed, and a

ppointed her” ); MacD raw, Inc. v. CIT Grp. Equip. Fin., Inc

. , 138 F.3d 33, 38 (2d Cir. 1998) (r ejec ting plaintiff’ s alleg ation that “a judg e is not impartial solely beca use an attorne y

is embroiled in a contr oversy with the administration that appointed the judg e”)

. Indeed, c ourts have he ld that rec usal is not warra nted eve n when the Pre sident responsible for nominating the judg e is ac tually a par ty to the litigation. See, e .g. , In re Ex ec. O ffice of the President , 215 F.3d 25, 25 ( D.C. Cir. 2000) (orde r of Tatel, J .). Ac cording ly , the Court finds that

24there is no basis for re cusal ba sed on an a lleg ed “political c onnection” to Caf esjian throug h former President Clinton. Be cause neither the Court’s alleg ed political conne ction to Cafesjian nor its alleg edly share d interest in g lass art wa rra nts disqualification under § 144 or § 455, the Court shall deny Plaintiffs’ motion for a new trial. For that rea son, it is unnecessar y to addre ss Defe ndants’ alternative argument that a new trial would not be wa

rra nted eve n if disqualification we re require d. IV. CONCLUSION For the fore g oing r easons, the Court f inds that Pl aintiffs have failed to pre sent a va lid basis for or deringa new

trial. The Court finds that the e vidence prese nted by Plaintiffs of a share d interest in g lass art or a political connec tion between the Court and Cafe sjian throug h former President Clinton would notlead a rea sonable pe rson to question the Court’s impartiality

. Simpl y put, the Court’s aff

inity for a particula r ar t form would not influence the outcome of a

case that revolve s around the pa rties’ lar g ely

unsucce ssful eff

orts to build a museum that would

commemorate the Ar

menian Ge nocide a

nd exhibi t the culture, journe y , and suff eringof those who per ished and those who sur vived. Fur

thermore , the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ attempt to disqualify the Court is procedur ally untimely beca use it is based on fa cts that wer e either known to Plainti ffs or should have bee n discovere d well bef ore tria l, not after the Court issued its finding s of fa ct and c onclusions of law. The Court also finds that Plainti ffs’ motion ca nnot be considere d under 28 U .S.C. § 144 because Plaintiffs’ c ounsel has not ce rtified that the decla ration of Va

n Krikorian w as made in good f aith. Acc ording ly , the Court shall DENY Plaintiffs’ [208] Motion for NewTrial. An a ppropriate Orde r ac companies this Memora ndum
25Opinion.

Date: Ma y 9, 2011 /s/ COLLE EN KOLLAR-K OTEL LY United States District J udg e

26