14-3864 Whelan v. Pascale



### UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS **FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT**



## SUMMARY ORDER

**R ULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT**  **. C**  **ITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER**  **J ANUARY**  **1, 2007,**  **IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY F**  **EDERAL R** **ULE OF A** **PPELLATE P**  **ROCEDURE 32.1**  **AND THIS COURT ’**  **S L** **OCAL R** **ULE 32.1.1.**  **W HEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A**  **DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT ,**  **A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE F**  **EDERAL A** **PPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE**  **( WITH THE NOTATION**  **“ SUMMARY ORDER**  **”). A**  **PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL**  **. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals**  1 **for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United** 2 **States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,** 3 **on the 30 th** **day of April, two thousand fifteen.** 4 5 **PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS,** 6 **ROSEMARY S. POOLER,** 7 **PETER W. HALL,** 8 **Circuit Judges**

**.** 9 10 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X 11 **David J. Whelan, Mary M. Whelan,** 12 **Plaintiffs-Appellants ,**  13 14 **-v.- 14-3864** 15 16 **Judith A. Pascale, individually and in** 17 **her official capacity as Clerk of the** 18 **County of Suffolk, New York; County of** 19 **Suffolk; David Jannetti; Does, 1-5,** 20 **Defendants-Appellees**

**.** 21 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X 22 23 **FOR APPELLANTS:** PATRICIA WEISS, Sag Harbor, New 24 York. 25 26 **FOR APPELLEES:** RUDOLPH M. BAPTISTE, Assistant 27 County Attorney (forDennis M. 28

1Brown, Suffolk County Attorney), 1 Hauppauge, New York, for 2 defendants-appellees Judith 3 Pascale and the County of 4 Suffolk. 5 6 THOMAS J. McGOWAN, Meltzer, 7 Lippe, Goldstein & Breitstone 8 LLP, Mineola, New York, for 9 defendant-appellee David 10 Jannetti. 11 12 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District 13 Court for the Eastern District of New York (Bianco, J. ). 14 15 **UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED** 16 **AND DECREED**that the judgment of the district court be 17 **AFFIRMED**

. 18 19 Plaintiffs David and Mary Whelan (“the Whelans” or 20 “plaintiffs”) appeal from the judgment of the United States 21 District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Bianco, 22 J. ), granting defendants’ motions to dismiss for failure to 23 state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 12(b)(6)

. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the 25 underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues 26 presented for review. 27 28 We review de novoa district court’s grant of a motion 29 to dismiss for failure to state a claim, accepting all 30 factual allegations as true and drawing all reasonable 31 inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Lotes Co., Ltd. v. 32 Hon Hai Precision Indus. Co. , 753 F.3d 395, 403 (2d Cir. 33 2014). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must 34 contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 35 ‘state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.’” 36 Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell 37 Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 38 39 **1.** Defendants contend that, under the Rooker-Feldman 40 doctrine, the federal courts lack subject-matter 41 jurisdiction over the Whelans’ claims. Defendants are 42 incorrect. The Whelans do not “complain[] of injuries 43 caused by state-court judgments,” nor do they “invit[e] 44 district court review and rejection of those judgments.” 45 Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp. , 544 U.S. 280, 46 284 (2005). The Whelans bring independent constitutional 47

2claims, arguing that New York’s notice-of-pendency 1 procedures (codified at N.Y. Civil Practice Law & Rules 2 6501-6516 (“Article 65”)) are unconstitutional. So the 3 Rooker-Feldmandoctrine does not apply. See Diaz v. 4 Paterson , 547 F.3d 88, 94 (2d Cir. 2006) (explaining that 5 Exxon Mobil “rendered the Rooker-Feldmandoctrine plainly 6 inapplicable” to a similar constitutional challenge to 7 Article 65). 1 8 9 **2.** The Whelans argue that the Article 65 process 10 violates the Due Process Clause of the United States 11 Constitution. Our Court has already rejected virtually 12 indistinguishable claims, holding that Article 65 “provides 13 all the process that is due in respect of the claimed 14 property interests at stake.” Diaz , 547 F.3d at 96. A 15 panel of this Court is “bound by the decisions of prior 16 panels until such time as they are overruled either by an en 17 banc panel of our Court or by the Supreme Court.” United 18 States v. Wilkerson , 361 F.3d 717, 732 (2d Cir. 2004). 19 20 **3.** The remaining federal claims--brought under the 21 Equal Protection Clause and the Free Speech Clause--were 22 appropriately dismissed for the reasons stated in the 23 district court’s Memorandum and Order. 24 25 **4.** Having dismissed all federal claims, the district 26 court did not err in declining to exercise supplemental 27 jurisdiction over any remaining state-law claims; in denying 28 as futile plaintiffs’ request to file an amended complaint; 29 or in denying as moot plaintiffs’ motion to disqualify each 30 of defendants’ counsel. 31 32 * * * 33 34 For the foregoing reasons, and finding no merit in 35 plaintiffs’ other arguments, we hereby **AFFIRM** the judgment 36

1 Because there is no defect in subject-matter jurisdiction, we need not consider whether (as the district ruled) a federal court “may bypass Rooker-Feldmanto reach the merits of a dispute,” Whelan v. Pascale , No. 13-cv-6998, 2014 WL 4638851, at *4 n.3 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2014), notwithstanding that the doctrine eliminates federal subject-matter jurisdiction when applicable, see Exxon Mobil , 544 U.S. at 292.

3of the district court. Plaintiffs’ motion for an injunction 1 is **DENIED** . Plaintiffs’ motion for sanctions is **DENIED**

. 2 3 FOR THE COURT: 4 CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK 5 6

4