Cause No. PD-1396-14

IN THE TEXAS COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

JON THOMAS FORD, §

Petitioner, §

§ FROM THE 

vs. § FOURTH COURT OF

 APPEALS

§ SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS

THE STATE OF TEXAS, § 04-12-00317-CR

Respondent. §

PETITIONER’S AMENDED BRIEF 

ON PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

On appeal from Cause No. 2010-CR-7741

IN THE 186th DISTRICT COURT

BEXAR COUNTY, TEXAS

CYNTHIA EVA HUJAR ORR

Bar No. 15313350

GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN & HILLEY

310 S. St. Mary’s St.

29th Floor Tower Life Bldg.

San Antonio, Texas 78205

210-226-1463

210-226-8367 facsimile

whitecollarlaw@gmail.com

ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER

PD1396-14

COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

AUSTIN, TEXAS

Transmitted 4/22/2015 4:55:48 PM

Accepted 4/27/2015 3:25:26 PM

ABEL ACOSTA

CLERK
ii

PARTIES TO THE CASE

Representing the State of Texas, at Trial:

Susan D. Reed

Former District Attorney

Catherine Babbitt

L. Katherine Cunningham

Kirsta Leeberg Melton

Former Assistant District Attorneys

Paul Elizondo Tower

101 West Nueva, Fourth Floor

San Antonio, Texas 78205

Representing the State of Texas, on Appeal:

Susan D. Reed

Former District Attorney

Jay Brandon

Assistant District Attorney

Paul Elizondo Tower

101 West Nueva, Fourth Floor

San Antonio, Texas 78205

Petitioner: Jon Thomas Ford

Representing Jon Thomas Ford, Defendant, at Trial

Dick DeGuerin

Todd Ward

DeGuerin & Dickson

1018 Preston Ave. Seventh Floor

Houston, Texas 77002

Representing Jon Thomas Ford, Appellant, on Appeal:

Cynthia E. Orr

Goldstein, Goldstein & Hilley

310 S. St. Mary’s Street

29th Floor Tower Life Building

San Antonio, Texas 78205
iii

The Honorable MARIA TESSA HERR, presided at trial formerly in the 186th

Judicial District Court, Bexar County, San Antonio, Texas.
iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Parties to the Case.....................................................................................................ii

Table of Authorities................................................................................................. iv

Statement of the Case and Procedural History ......................................................... 1

Issues Presented ........................................................................................................ 1

I. Whether a warrantless search of involuntarily conveyed historical cell 

tower data is an illegal search

II. The Court of Appeal's holding, that cell tower data information conveyed 

from a phone involuntarily, is public information under the third party 

record doctrine; is contrary to Richardson v. State, 865 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 1993)

Statement of Facts..................................................................................................... 1

Summary of Argument ............................................................................................. 5

Argument .................................................................................................................. 6

Conclusion and Prayer............................................................................................ 12

Certificate of Compliance ....................................................................................... 12

Certificate of Service .............................................................................................. 13

Appendix

Ford v. State, 444 S.W.3d 171 (Tex. App. – San Antonio 2014).
v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 130 S.Ct. 2619, 177 L.Ed.2d 216 (2010).....

................................................................................................................................. 10

Coolridge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971)

................................................................................................................................. 10

Ford v. State, 444 S.W.3d 171 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2014)....................... passim

In re Application of U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n 

Serv. To Disclose Records to Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304 (3d Cir. 2010)........................... 6

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) ............. 7

Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 121 S.Ct. 2038, 150 L.Ed.2d 94 (2001).......... 8

Madrigal v. State, 347 S.W.3d 809 (Tex. App.- Corpus Christi 2011).................... 5

Richardson v. State, 865 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) ..................... iv, 1, 11

Riley v. California, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 189 L.Ed.2d 430 (2014) .............................. 8, 9

Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979) ..... 5, 9, 11

Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 85 S.Ct. 506, 13 L.Ed.2d 431 (1965)................... 7

Tracy v. Florida, 152 So.3d 504 (Florida 2014)..................................................... 10

United States v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945, 181 L.Ed.2d 911 (2012)..................... 7, 9, 10

United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 104 S.Ct. 3296, 82 L.Ed.2d 530 (1984) .. 7, 11

United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 96 S.Ct. 1619, 48 L.Ed.2d 71 (1976)........... 9

Rules, Statutes and Other:

Article 1, Section 9 of the Texas Constitution........................................................ 11
vi

First Amendment of the United States Constitution ................................................ 7

Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution ................................... 6, 7, 10
Statement of the Case and Procedural History

 Appellant, JON THOMAS FORD (hereinafter “Ford”), was convicted in the of 

murder and sentenced to forty (40) years imprisonment on February 24, 2012. 

1CR23, 19RR89. The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction with 

Justice Luz Elena D. Chapa dissenting. Ford v. State, 444 S.W.3d 171 (Tex. App.-

San Antonio 2014). Justice Chapa found that Ford had a reasonable expectation of 

privacy in his physical movements and location, also rejecting the third party 

record; she would have reversed Mr. Ford’s conviction because it was obtained 

with illegally seized evidence. Thereafter, this Court granted his petition for 

discretionary review ordering briefing on the three questions stated below.

Issues Presented

I. Whether a warrantless search of involuntarily conveyed historical cell tower data 

is an illegal search.

II. The Court of Appeal's holding, that cell tower data information conveyed from a 

phone involuntarily, is public information under the third party record doctrine; is 

contrary to Richardson v. State, 865 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).

Statement of Facts

As is set out in the majority, Mr. Ford’s conviction for the murder of Dana 

Claire Edwards [hereinafter DE] was primarily based upon evidence from 

historical cell tower data [hereinafter HCD] ostensibly placing him at DE’s condo. 
2

The State’s theory was formed upon HCD, alleging that Ford uncharacteristically1

flew into an unobserved rage following a conversation by others at a New Year’s 

Eve (“NYE”) party. It asserts, that Ford maintained this status for two hours at

DE’s place 12R168-74, unseen by a neighbor, Jordon Hasslocher; who knew Ford

and who was outside all evening. 9R27, 45, 57-60.

The State places Ford at DE’s condo and Olmos Dam with HCD. 18R75-76. 

(DE’s condo 11:45pm, Gallery Court 1:19am and Olmos Dam at 1:32am). 18R75-

76. But, Hasslocher, saw DE walking her dogs at 1:20am (15R182, 14R141), so 

she was not dead at 1:19am. The State says Ford disposed of DE’s dog at Olmos 

Dam at 1:32am. But video shows DE’s dog was alive the next morning. CR571, 

SX132a-n. The State chose an implausible time of death2, to make HCD relevant. 

However, the HCD does not fit. 

																																																							 1 Ford’s friends describe him as peaceful his entire life. 17R160. He rarely loses his temper, 

even when provoked. 17R145. His active social life and his friends date back to his childhood.

Id.

2 DE attended the party with an alcohol and drank more at midnight. 7R193, 14R143. She left at

12:45am. 7R193. A body doesn’t metabolize alcohol after death. 14R126, 142, 154. If she died 

at 1:19 am, she had less than one hour to metabolize it. Alcohol remains three hours. 15R179. 

DE’s autopsy showed no traces of alcohol. 14R126. And vitreous shows traces of alcohol for 

about two hours longer than the rest of the body, and DE’s vitreous showed no traces. 14R154..

Thus, DE was alive long enough to metabolize the alcohol she consumed that night and it is, 

therefore, impossible for DE’s time of death to have been before 2:02am. The State’s medical 

examiner concedes, the time of death could have been noon on 1/1/2009. 14R150-51. The 

defense’ medical examiner established lividity and rigor placed her time of death sometime after 

4:00am on 1/1/2009. 15R182. 
3

Ford left the NYE party at 11:30pm with others, 7R110, 7R191. He watched 

TV and retired at home, his cell phone with him. SX1-A. The State claimed video 

showed a person entering and exiting DE’s condo, but that it was impossible to 

identify the person or the vehicles.12R171. The State argued HCD identified 

Ford’s exact location, but its witness said the variables involved, the HCD cannot 

definitively identify a person’s location. 8R145-146. 

The State obtained “cellular site information” as well as contents of 

communications, SCR 196-97 with the SCA, without a search warrant. It stated 

that DE was found on 1/2/2009, but did not say when she died. The applications 

discusse the NYE party and video of a vehicle like Ford’s without attaching any 

significance to it or verifying that it was Ford’s. SCR180–199. The information is 

sought to “develop and/or confirm investigative leads....” SCR 196-97.

Finally, the State argued unremarkable touch DNA found on the edge of a 

guest towel proved Ford was present when DE was murdered. 6R37, 157-98. But, 

this towel was cross-contaminated (15R50-51) and had more of the expert’s own 

DNA. 15R53, 16R176. More importantly, Ford stayed at DE’s when they dated 

and he had been there recently, cleaning up after her dogs and putting her to bed 

after she drank too much. 11R91-93; 6R102; 7R88-90. Police agreed Ford’s DNA 

would have been all over the condo. 11R91-92.
4

DE’s parents discovered her in her guest bathroom on 1/2/2009. 9R133, 147. 

They contacted police and waited alone at the scene. 9R141, 147. They

contaminated the towel by handling it, 9R148, and police also left it behind for a 

week. 11R217. In photos, the towel is moved against the base of the toilet. CR564. 

The only touch DNA located was on the edge of this guest towel after an 

unproductive testing and its contamination with larger quantities of the scientist’s 

own DNA. 15R64. The State contended the towel had been washed after Ford was 

in the condo. But, DE washed used linen and was unaware Ford used the towel. 

9R94.

The police also did not preserve evidence and DE’s parents controlled their 

access. 12R71. Evidence was not timely collected and was lost. 11R217, 6R30-31. 

The State admitted that the police “screwed up.” 6R30-31. 

The Court allowed a hole punch purchased online three years after DE’s 

death, SX66, in evidence as a weapon. SX58, 9R168. But, “Det. Snow reported in 

his supplement report as finding no signs of forced entry, or any items missing.” 

CR629. 

The medical examiner testified the hole punch was only a possible weapon. 

14R75. And the State speculated that Ford went back to DE’s home to retrieve it, 

18R79, to explain why HCD allegedly placed him at the condo at 3am. There was 

no evidence that a three-hole punch was used as a weapon. 
5

The trial Court also admitted a power cord as a weapon (9R197) over 

objection (9R196). Again, the mother claimed this was missing, “[t]hree years after 

[DE] died” (9R196). SX66 does not have the “[f]abric or some pattern to 

whatever the ligature was,” described in the autopsy report: “slightly irregular, 

possibly patterned inferior margin.” 14R178, CR390, SX210. 

“[T]estimony that is based solely on speculation and conjecture necessarily 

lacks probative value, and therefore fails to meet the relevancy requirement of the 

rules of evidence.” Madrigal v. State, 347 S.W.3d 809, 813 (Tex. App.—Corpus 

Christi 2011, pet. ref’d.) But the Court of Appeals sustained Ford’s conviction on 

these weapons, holding: “Speculation is a proper use of circumstantial evidence 

and a question of fact for the jury to resolve.” Ford v. State, No. 04-12-00317-CR, 

444 S.W.3d 171, 195 (Tex. App. – San Antonio 2014).

Summary of Argument

Tracking of individuals’ movement and location through historical cell 

tower data [HCD] implicates privacy concerns because such tracking reveals 

information from areas where there is an expectation of privacy (in their homes) as 

well as associational information (whom and where they are visiting and what apps 

and information they use and obtain). HCD conveys more than electronic 

connection information or the phone numbers dialed into a phone as was addressed 

in Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 61 L.Ed.2d 220(1979). 
6

The United States Supreme Court has recognized that obtaining a great deal 

of location information implicates the Fourth Amendment because tracking an 

individual’s movements over a long period exceeds what law enforcement would 

be able to do. In addition, five justices questioned the continued viability of the 

third party record doctrine in light of digital communication. Since cell phones 

convey a great deal more than mere digital contact and without the participation of 

the person who owns the cell phone, this information must be obtained with a 

search warrant. Such private information conveyed via cell phone will not be 

unavailable to law enforcement, but will merely require that they obtain a warrant. 

Currently, search warrants can be obtained with great efficiency.

ARGUMENT

Questions I and II are argued together

This case is particularly well suited to decide whether such data is deserving 

of Fourth Amendment protection, since it concerns only data involuntarily 

conveyed from Ford’s telephone to the cell towers.

“The records used by the State to pinpoint Ford’s location on 

the night of Edwards’s murder were determined from records of 

passive activity on his phone, i.e. he was not placing a call when his 

phone connected with the cell tower. Rather, the records relevant to 

the State’s case, the 11:45 p.m. and 1:19 a.m. “pings” off of the 

Gallery Court tower, were from a missed call and text message, 

respectively, from Tarver.” Ford v. State, 444 S.W.3d 171, 190 n. 2

(Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014).
7

The Third Circuit agrees that HCD is not “voluntarily” given by cell phone 

customers. In In re Application of U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. 

Commc’n Serv. To Disclose Records to Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 317 (3d Cir. 2010)

[“[a] cell phone customer has not ‘voluntarily’ shared his location information with 

a cellular provider in any meaningful way.”] 

On NYE, much detail about one’s life is gathered in a short period. Justice 

Sotomayor concurring in United States v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945, 956 (2011) stated 

that “even short term monitoring” implicates privacy and chills First Amendment3 

protected associational and expressive freedoms. It “generates a precise, 

comprehensive record of a person’s public movements that reflects a wealth of 

detail about her familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations” 

that can be obtained and searched for information from a service provider for 

“years into the future.” 

A Fourth Amendment search can be conducted without any physical 

intrusion, U.S. v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 712-713(1984); Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347,

353 (1967)[a listening device need not be placed within a telephone booth to 

implicate the Fourth Amendment], the Supreme Court also held that capturing 

thermal images of inside a person’s residence constitutes a search because all 

																																																							 3 First Amendment protected matters must be described with scrupulous exactitude. Stanford v. 

Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485, 85 S.Ct. 506, 13 L.Ed.2d 431 (1965).
8

aspects of information from a home are intimate details. Kyllo v. U.S., 533 U.S. 27, 

38 (2001). 

A cell phone is “a pervasive and insistent part of our daily life, Riley v. 

California, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014), and conveys “far more than the most 

exhaustive search of a house: A phone not only contains in digital information 

from many sensitive records previously found in the home; it also contains a broad 

array of private information never found in a home in any form....” Id. at 2491. 

Comparing a cell phone to a rotary telephone is much like comparing a 

laptop to a typewriter; Yes, a laptop can produce a letter on a piece of paper just as 

a typewriter could, and yes, a modern day cell phone can make a call to another 

person just as a rotary telephone could. But, a modern day cell phone and laptop 

can do so much more than their 20th century predecessors. In Ford, the cell phone 

conveyed what type of communication was occurring (automatic data, calls, or 

texts) and what Mr. Ford did in response to those communications (not answering, 

or checking messages at home, 3R14).

Thus, Justice Chapa’s dissent correctly distinguishes a 1970s pen register 

from HCD. Justice Chapa states that, much like a cell phone is different from a 

cigarette pack, you can’t tell what’s in it by touch, HCD is different from a pen 

register, because HCD reveals so much more. It is, in fact, information within a 

cell phone besides the mere numbers dialed. 
9

Justice Chapa’ correctly analogized the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine in 

Riley to the Third Party Doctrine: “Similar to the way that the search-incident-toarrest doctrine was ill suited to the digital data contained on cell phones seized 

during an arrest, the third-party doctrine is ‘ill suited to the digital age, in which 

people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third parties in the 

course of carrying out mundane tasks.’” Ford v. State, 444 S.W.3d 171, 202 (Tex. 

App.—San Antonio 2014)(quoting U.S. v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) 

(Sotomayor, J. concurring). 

The majority, leapt to the conclusion that because Ford voluntarily used

AT&T, all information communicated to his provider and stored was voluntarily 

revealed and were not entitled any expectation of privacy. Ford, at 190.

Since none of the HCD was voluntarily conveyed, here, it is distinguishable 

from United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976)[bank deposits] and Smith v. 

Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979)[number dialed on rotary phone]. See Riley, 134 

S.Ct 2473 [cell phones “display data stored on remote servers rather than on the 

device itself”]. 

In Jones, supra, the Court recognized a reasonable expectation of privacy 

in digtal data obtained without a trespass. Justice Scalia stated that this may be “an 

unconstitutional invasion of privacy....” Jones, at 954. Justice Sotomayor noted,

concurring, that, Justices Altio, Ginsburg and Bryer, said such searches will shape 
10

the evolution of societal privacy expectations. And that short-term monitoring 

implicated privacy because cheap data collection evades the ordinary checks that 

constrain law enforcement practices. Id. at 955-56.

Cell phones continually and automatically connect with towers, identifying 

the equipment, its electronic identification number, the location of the phone, the

type of communication and what, if any, was Ford’s response. All of this occurs 

unbeknownst to the user “while the cell phone is turned on regardless of whether a 

call is being placed.” Tracy v. Florida, 152 So.3d 504, 507 n.1 (Florida 2014). 

See also SX11 data is not the same as “the invoice received by the subscriber” and 

is information “not for use or disclosure.” 

The Fourth Amendment must advance with technology. Coolridge v. New 

Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971). And jurists must 

“proceed with care when considering ... privacy expectations in” electronic 

communication devices.4

The States’ witness testified HCD was “private” and “everybody has a 

reasonable expectation of privacy.” 8R100-101. HCD note a number dialed and

convey voicemail, texts and internet. 8R108-109.

Here, we are not dealing with a vehicle on a public road. This was

information collected from inside Ford’s home, information about data downloads 

																																																							 4 City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S.Ct. 2619, 2629 (2010).
11

and whether he responded to texts and calls. Like the presence of the beeper in 

Karo’s home, United States v. Karo, 458 U.S. 705, 710, 104 S.Ct. 3296, 82 

L.Ed.2d 530 (1984), the HCD revealed Ford’s presence, his pedestrian movements 

through a neighborhood, and checking voicemail at home. 

Further, Richardson v. State5 demands a warrant for information from ThirdParty Records. Richardson held that using a pen register constitutes a “search” 

under Article I, § 9 of the Texas Constitution.6 Seven other states rejected Smith v. 

Maryland. See Richardson, at 950-951[“the user has no practical alternative but to 

forego the use of the telephone all together.”].

 Richardson consisted of voluntary activities while, here, there are passive 

activities.7 But the Court affirmed Ford’s conviction despite the inapplicability of 

the third party record doctrine. Ford’s HCD should be afforded an expectation of 

privacy that society regards as reasonable. The warrantless search sustained on the 

anachronistic third party record doctrine should be held unconstitutional and his 

conviction reversed.

																																																							 5 Richardson v. State, 865 S.W.2d 944 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). 6 See Id. at 953 (vacating and remanding to the court of appeals to decide if the search was 

“‘unreasonable’ in the absence of probable cause.”

7 Richardson at 953.
12

Conclusion and Prayer

For the above reasons, this Honorable Court should find that the State was 

required to obtain a search warrant for the HCD and that Ford’s conviction cannot 

be sustained upon this illegally obtained evidence.

Respectfully Submitted: 

____/s/Cynthia E. Orr_____________

Cynthia E. Orr

Bar No. 15313350

GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN & HILLEY

310 S. St. Mary’s St.

29th Floor Tower Life Bldg.

San Antonio, Texas 78205

210-226-1463

210-226-8367 facsimile

whitecollarlaw@gmail.com

Attorney for Petitioner, 

JON THOMAS FORD

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I hereby certify that this document complies with the typeface requirements of 

Tex. R. App. P. 9.4(e) because it has been prepared in a conventional typeface no 

smaller than 14-point for text and 12-point for footnotes. This document does 

comply with the word-count limitations of Tex. R. App. P. 9.4(i)(3) because it 

contains 1,500 words, excluding any parts exempted by Tex. R. App. P. 9.4(i)(1).

By:__/s/ Cynthia E. Orr______

CYNTHIA E. ORR
13

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the above Petitioner’s Amended 

Petition for Discretionary Review has been sent via E-file.Texas.gov, as registered 

participants, on this the 22nd day of April, 2015 to the following:

Nicolas LaHood

District Attorney

Jay Brandon

Assistant District Attorney

Paul Elizondo Tower

101 West Nueva, Fourth Floor

San Antonio, Texas 78205

E-mail: jay.brandon@bexar.org, 

____/s/Cynthia E. Orr_____________

Cynthia E. Orr
APPENDIX
444 S.W.3d 171, *; 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 9159, **

Jon Thomas FORD, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee

No. 04-12-00317-CR

COURT OF APPEALS OF TEXAS, FOURTH DISTRICT, SAN ANTONIO

444 S.W.3d 171; 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 9159

August 20, 2014, Delivered 

August 20, 2014, Filed

NOTICE: PUBLISH

SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: Petition for discretionary review granted by In re Ford, 2015 Tex. Crim. App.

LEXIS 77 (Tex. Crim. App., Feb. 4, 2015)

PRIOR HISTORY: [**1] From the 186th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas. Trial Court No.

2010CR7741. Honorable Maria Teresa Herr, Judge Presiding.

DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED.

CASE SUMMARY:

OVERVIEW: HOLDINGS: [1]-A rational jury could have found defendant guilty of murder, in

violation of Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.02(b)(1) (2011), because witnesses testified that his car was

not at home when it should have been, cell phone records proved he was in the vicinity of the

victim's condominium at times relevant to her murder, and DNA evidence linked him to the towel

covering the victim's face; [2]-The trial court did not err under Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art.

40.001 (2006) in denying defendant's motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence

because evidence underlying potential "new" experts was not newly discovered; [3]-The trial court

did not err under Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 36.28 in responding to the jury's note regarding

the testimony of an expert because the testimony read back by the trial court included the expert's

answer to the specific question.

OUTCOME: Judgment affirmed.

CORE TERMS: cell, phone, murder, tower, site, cord, overrule, new trial, condominium complex,

juror, cellular, provider, opening statements, missing, jury argument, circumstantial, admissible,

reasonable expectation of privacy, probable cause, next contends, detective's, suppress, exiting,

abused, search warrant, continuance, towel, burden of proof, acquisition, disclosure

LEXISNEXIS(R) HEADNOTES

Criminal Law & Procedure > Juries & Jurors > Province of Court & Jury > Credibility of Witnesses

Criminal Law & Procedure > Juries & Jurors > Province of Court & Jury > Weight of the Evidence

Criminal Law & Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review > Substantial Evidence > Sufficiency of

Evidence

Evidence > Procedural Considerations > Burdens of Proof > Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt
Evidence > Relevance > Circumstantial & Direct Evidence

HN1 When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case, an appellate court

applies the legal sufficiency standard as set out in Jackson. Applying the Jackson standard,

the appellate court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and

determines whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of

the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellate court is permitted to consider all of

the evidence in the record, whether admissible or inadmissible, when making its sufficiency

determination. In circumstances where the record supports conflicting inferences, the

appellate court must presume the factfinder resolved any conflicts in favor of the verdict

and defer to that determination. This presumption includes conflicting inferences from

circumstantial evidence. Further, the appellate court may not re-evaluate the weight and

credibility of the evidence nor may it substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder.

Evidence > Relevance > Circumstantial & Direct Evidence

Criminal Law & Procedure > Criminal Offenses > Homicide > Murder > General Overview

HN2 In Texas, a person commits the offense of murder if he intentionally or knowingly causes

the death of an individual. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.02(b)(1) (2011). Even for an offense

as serious as murder, circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in

establishing the guilt of an actor, and circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to

establish guilt. In cases where the available evidence is circumstantial in nature, it is not

necessary that every fact and circumstance point directly and independently to the

defendant's guilt; it is enough if the conclusion is warranted by the combined and

cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances.

Criminal Law & Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review > Deferential Review > General

Overview

HN3 In the event of an evidentiary conflict, an appellate court must presume the jury resolved

the matter in favor of the verdict and defer to that resolution.

Criminal Law & Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review > Abuse of Discretion > New Trial

Criminal Law & Procedure > Postconviction Proceedings > Motions for New Trial

HN4 An appellate court reviews a trial court's ruling on a motion for a new trial for an abuse of

discretion. The appellate court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial

court's ruling and upholds the trial court's ruling if it was within the zone of reasonable

disagreement. The appellate court may not substitute its judgment for the trial court's;

rather, it is limited to deciding whether the trial court's ruling was arbitrary or

unreasonable. Therefore, denying a motion for new trial is an abuse of discretion only

when no reasonable view of the record could support the trial court's ruling.

Criminal Law & Procedure > Postconviction Proceedings > Motions for New Trial

HN5 Under the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, a new trial shall be granted an accused where

material evidence favorable to the accused has been discovered since trial. Tex. Code Crim.

Proc. Ann. art. 40.001 (2006). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals interprets this

provision to require the satisfaction of the following four-part test: 1) The newly discovered

evidence was unknown or unavailable to the movant at the time of his trial; 2) The

movant's failure to discover or obtain the evidence was not due to a lack of diligence; 3)

The new evidence is admissible and is not merely cumulative, corroborative, collateral, or

impeaching; and 4) The new evidence is probably true and will probably bring about a

different result on another trial. Reaching new and different opinions from the same

foundational evidence does not render the evidence newly discovered, even if those new

opinions may be material.

Criminal Law & Procedure > Postconviction Proceedings > Motions for New Trial

Criminal Law & Procedure > Juries & Jurors > Voir Dire > Questions to Venire Panel

HN6 Generally, when a partial, biased, or prejudiced juror is selected without fault or lack of

diligence on the part of defense counsel, who has acted in good faith upon the answers
given to him on voir dire not knowing them to be inaccurate, good ground exists for a new

trial. However, because written questions are by nature vulnerable to misinterpretation,

even questions that appear to be subject to only one interpretation, "diligent" counsel will

not rely on written questionnaires to supply any information that counsel deems material.

Counsel who does so otherwise is simply not diligent.

Criminal Law & Procedure > Juries & Jurors > Jury Questions to the Court > Appellate Review

Criminal Law & Procedure > Juries & Jurors > Jury Questions to the Court > Requests to Review

Evidence

Criminal Law & Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review > Abuse of Discretion > General

Overview

HN7 Under Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 36.28, if a jury disagrees as to the statement of a

witness, they may apply to the court to have read to them from the court reporter's notes

that part of the witness's testimony in dispute. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 36.28. An

appellate court should not disturb a trial judge's decision under art. 36.28 unless a clear

abuse of discretion, as well as harm, is shown. When the jury indicates a specific and

limited portion of testimony to be read, a trial court does not abuse its discretion by

providing only the requested information.

Criminal Law & Procedure > Juries & Jurors > Jury Questions to the Court > Requests to Review

Evidence

HN8 With regard to jury notes, a trial court must interpret the communication, decide what

sections of the testimony will best answer the inquiry, then limit the re-reading accordingly.

Criminal Law & Procedure > Pretrial Motions & Procedures > Suppression of Evidence

Criminal Law & Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review > De Novo Review > Motions to

Suppress

Criminal Law & Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review > Deferential Review > General

Overview

HN9 An appellate court reviews a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress under a bifurcated

standard. The appellate court gives almost total deference to the trial court's determination

of facts, and reviews the trial court's application of the law de novo.

Criminal Law & Procedure > Search & Seizure > Electronic Eavesdropping > General Overview

HN10 Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 18.21, § 5(a) (Supp. 2013) states that a court shall issue

an order authorizing disclosure of records, or other information of a wire or electronic

communication held in electronic storage if the court determines that there is reasonable

belief that the information sought is relevant to a legitimate law enforcement inquiry.

Criminal Law & Procedure > Search & Seizure > Electronic Eavesdropping > Beepers & Pagers

Criminal Law & Procedure > Search & Seizure > Electronic Eavesdropping > Pen Registers & Trap-&-

Trace Devices

HN11 See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 18.20, § 1(15).

Criminal Law & Procedure > Search & Seizure > Exclusionary Rule > Rule Application &

Interpretation

HN12 Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.23(a) (2005) states that no evidence obtained by an

officer or other person in violation of any provisions of the Constitution or laws of the

State of Texas shall be admitted in evidence against the accused on the trial of any

criminal case.

Criminal Law & Procedure > Search & Seizure > Electronic Eavesdropping > Warrants

HN13 18 U.S.C.S. § 2703(d) requires a government entity seeking a court order to offer specific

and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the

contents of a wire or electronic communication, or the records or other information

sought, are relevant and material an ongoing criminal investigation.
Criminal Law & Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review > De Novo Review > General Overview

HN14 An appellate court reviews a constitutional issue under a de novo standard of review.

Constitutional Law > Bill of Rights > Fundamental Rights > Search & Seizure > Scope of Protection

Criminal Law & Procedure > Search & Seizure > Expectation of Privacy

HN15 If an individual knowingly exposes his activities to third parties, he surrenders protections

under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, U.S. Const. amend. IV,

and, if the government is subsequently called upon to investigate his activities for

possible violations of the law, it is free to seek out these third parties, to inspect their

records, and to probe their recollections for evidence. Furthermore, the fortuity of

whether or not the third party, acting at its own discretion, chooses to store the

information makes no constitutional difference. Essentially, once an individual voluntarily

exposes information to a third party, it can be used for any purpose, such as conveying it

to law enforcement authorities.

Constitutional Law > Bill of Rights > Fundamental Rights > Search & Seizure > Scope of Protection

HN16 Like the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, U.S. Const. amend. IV, the

Texas Constitution provides that the people shall be secure in their persons, houses,

papers, and possessions, from all unreasonable seizures or searches. Tex. Const. art. I, §

9.

Criminal Law & Procedure > Appeals > Procedures > Briefs

HN17 A conclusory statement in an appellate brief supported by neither argument nor authority

presents nothing for review.

Criminal Law & Procedure > Search & Seizure > Search Warrants > Affirmations & Oaths >

Sufficiency Challenges

Criminal Law & Procedure > Search & Seizure > Search Warrants > Probable Cause > General

Overview

Constitutional Law > Bill of Rights > Fundamental Rights > Search & Seizure > Scope of Protection

HN18 Where a defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement

knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by an

affiant in a warrant affidavit, and if the allegedly false statement is necessary to the

finding of probable cause, the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, U.S.

Const. amend. IV, requires that a hearing be held at the defendant's request. The first

prong of the Franks holding requires a defendant to allege a deliberate falsehood, or the

affiant's reckless disregard for the truth, and specifically point out that portion of the

affidavit alleged to be false. The second prong of Franks requires a defendant to

accompany her allegations of falsity with either an offer of proof, affidavit, or otherwise

reliable witness statement, unless the absence of such support is satisfactorily explained.

The third and final prong of Franks requires a defendant to prove that if the deliberately

false sections of the affidavit are removed, the remainder of the "four corners" of the

affidavit no longer presents probable cause to search a particular location.

Criminal Law & Procedure > Search & Seizure > Search Warrants > Probable Cause > Totality of

Circumstances Test

Criminal Law & Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review > Deferential Review > Probable Cause

Determinations

HN19 Probable cause for a search warrant exists when, viewed under the totality of the

circumstances, there is a fair probability that evidence of a crime will be found at the

specified location. This is a flexible and non-demanding standard. Where a magistrate

found probable cause, an appellate court applies a highly deferential standard of review

due to the constitutional preference for searches to be conducted pursuant to a warrant

as opposed to a warrantless search. The appellate court will uphold the magistrate's

probable cause determination as long as the magistrate had a substantial basis for
concluding probable cause existed.

Criminal Law & Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review > Abuse of Discretion > Evidence

Evidence > Procedural Considerations > Rulings on Evidence

HN20 An appellate court reviews a trial court's decision to admit or exclude evidence for an

abuse of discretion. An appellate court may hold a trial court abused its discretion only if

its decision falls outside the zone of reasonable disagreement.

Criminal Law & Procedure > Appeals > Reviewability > Preservation for Review > Requirements

Criminal Law & Procedure > Appeals > Reviewability > Preservation for Review > Evidence

Criminal Law & Procedure > Appeals > Reviewability > Waiver > Waiver Triggers Generally

Criminal Law & Procedure > Appeals > Reviewability > Waiver > Admission of Evidence

HN21 An appellant affirmatively waives their right to have a trial judge determine the

admissibility of evidence when they state "no objection" to the offered evidence. A party

is not excused from the procedural requirement to object at trial to the admission of

evidence even if the error involves a constitutional right. An appellant who did not object

to the admission of evidence at trial waives any claim on appeal that the trial erred in

admitting that evidence. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1.

Evidence > Relevance > Relevant Evidence

HN22 Under the Texas Rules of Evidence, all relevant evidence is admissible, except as provided

otherwise by constitution, statute, or other rules of evidence. Tex. R. Evid. 402.

Criminal Law & Procedure > Trials > Opening Statements

HN23 During a criminal proceeding, the State has the statutory right to state to the jury the

nature of the accusations against the defendant and the facts which are expected to be

proved by the State in support thereof. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 36.01(a)(3).

Criminal Law & Procedure > Trials > Motions for Mistrial

Criminal Law & Procedure > Trials > Closing Arguments > General Overview

Criminal Law & Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review > Abuse of Discretion > Mistrial

HN24 Only in extreme circumstances of incurable prejudice will mistrial be required. In

evaluating whether a trial court abused its discretion by denying a mistrial for improper

argument, an appellate court applies and balances the following three factors: (1) the

severity of the misconduct; (2) the measures adopted to cure the misconduct; and (3)

the certainty of conviction absent the misconduct.

Criminal Law & Procedure > Jury Instructions > Curative Instructions

Criminal Law & Procedure > Trials > Closing Arguments > General Overview

HN25 Usually, an instruction to disregard an argument will cure any error caused by the

improper argument.

Criminal Law & Procedure > Trials > Closing Arguments > General Overview

Criminal Law & Procedure > Appeals > Reversible Errors > Prosecutorial Misconduct

Criminal Law & Procedure > Appeals > Prosecutorial Misconduct > Tests

HN26 Proper jury argument falls generally within one of four areas: (1) summation of the

evidence; (2) reasonable deduction from the evidence; (3) answer to argument made by

opposing counsel; and (4) a plea for law enforcement. Error exists when an argument

presents facts not supported by the record to the jury, but the error is not reversible

unless, in light of the entire record, the argument is extreme or manifestly improper.

Criminal Law & Procedure > Trials > Closing Arguments > Defendant's Failure to Testify

Criminal Law & Procedure > Appeals > Reviewability > Waiver > Waiver Triggers Generally

Criminal Law & Procedure > Appeals > Reviewability > Waiver > Prosecutorial Misconduct

Criminal Law & Procedure > Appeals > Reviewability > Preservation for Review > Prosecutorial

Misconduct
HN27 The State's comment on a defendant's failure to testify violates the defendant's state and

federal constitutional privileges against self-incrimination. However, a defendant's failure

to object to a jury argument or failure to pursue an adverse ruling to an objection to a

jury argument forfeits the defendant's right to complain about the argument on appeal.

Criminal Law & Procedure > Trials > Continuances

Criminal Law & Procedure > Pretrial Motions & Procedures > Continuances

Criminal Law & Procedure > Appeals > Reviewability > Preservation for Review > Requirements

HN28 The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure allows a continuance in a criminal action only upon

the written motion of the State or of the defendant setting forth sufficient cause. Tex.

Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 29.03. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals explicitly refuses to

recognize a due process exception to the rule requiring motions for continuances to be

written and sworn in order to be preserved on appeal.

Criminal Law & Procedure > Discovery & Inspection > Discovery by Defendant > General Overview

Criminal Law & Procedure > Discovery & Inspection > Brady Materials > Duty of Disclosure

HN29 See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 39.14(a) (2009).

Criminal Law & Procedure > Defenses > Burdens of Proof

HN30 When a defendant seeks to introduce evidence of an "alternate perpetrator," he must

establish a sufficient nexus between that person and the crime. It is not sufficient for a

defendant to merely proffer "unsupported speculation" that another person may have

committed the crime. Specifically, when the evidence does not point to a particular

individual as being responsible for the crime, the proffered evidence amounts to no more

than mere speculation that another person may have committed the crime.

COUNSEL: For APPELLANT: Cynthia Hujar Orr, San Antonio, TX.

For APPELLEE: Jay Brandon, Assistant District Attorney, San Antonio, TX.

JUDGES: Opinion by: Marialyn Barnard, Justice. Dissenting Opinion by: Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice.

Sitting: Catherine Stone, Chief Justice, Marialyn Barnard, Justice, Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice.

OPINION BY: Marialyn Barnard

[*176] AFFIRMED

A jury found appellant Jon Thomas Ford guilty of the offense of murder. Based on the jury's

recommendation, the trial court sentenced him to forty years' imprisonment. Ford raises eighteen

points of error on appeal, asking this court to reverse his convictions. We affirm the trial court's

judgment.

BACKGROUND

On December 31, 2008, Dana Clair Edwards attended a New Year's Eve party with her friends Melissa

Federspill and Alan Tarver at the home of a mutual friend. Edwards's ex-boyfriend, Jon Thomas Ford,

and other guests also attended the party. Edwards left the party after midnight and was seen walking

her dog by a neighbor between 12:30 a.m. and 1:00 a.m. on January 1, 2009. Edwards's body was

later discovered by her [**2] parents in the early hours of January 2, 2009. She was found lying face

down on her bathroom floor with a white, blood-soaked towel covering her head. Although the autopsy

revealed lacerations and blunt force trauma to her head, the cause of death was determined to be

OPINION
strangulation by ligature sometime between the early morning hours and noon of January 1, 2009.

After an investigation, Ford was arrested and charged with murdering Edwards.

Although Ford was at the same New Year's Eve party as Edwards, he did not stay until midnight to

celebrate the new year. Ford left the party early because, according to testimony, he was offended by a

comment made by Federspill during a group card game regarding his and Tarver's resistance toward

marriage. According to Federspill, the subject of marriage "was one of the sticky spots for [Ford] and

[*177] Dana Clair" during their dating relationship. When Tarver asked later in the evening why Ford

left early, Ford responded by text message: "No longer fun."

According to Ford, he went straight home after the party and was asleep before midnight. The State

presented evidence suggesting this was not true. At trial, the State presented circumstantial evidence

linking [**3] Ford to the murder, including: (1) the testimony of Ford's and Edwards's mutual friends,

Federspill and Tarver, that Ford's SUV was not parked in his home's driveway after the New Year's Eve

party; (2) historical cell phone data reflecting activity on Ford's phone in the vicinity of Edwards's

condominium around the time of the murder; (3) pictures from a bank's ATM camera depicting a white

SUV similar to Ford's and an unidentified figure entering Edwards's condominium complex around the

time of the murder; and (4) Ford's DNA on the bloody towel covering Edwards's face.

After considering the evidence above, as well as other testimony and evidence presented at trial, the

jury found Ford guilty of the offense of murder. The trial court sentenced Ford to forty years'

confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. After the trial

court denied his motion for new trial, Ford perfected this appeal.

ANALYSIS

On appeal, Ford raises eighteen points of error, contending: (1) the evidence is legally insufficient to

support his murder conviction; (2) the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for

new trial, which was based on insufficient [**4] evidence, newly discovered evidence, and the

selection of an allegedly partial juror; (3) the trial court improperly responded to a jury note

concerning the testimony of cell tower expert Kenneth Doll "regarding the possibility of a cell phone

connection between tower SX 3155 (Gallery Court) & the residence at 333 Rosemary Ave"; (4) the trial

court erred by failing to suppress historical cell phone records obtained from AT&T and used by the

State to suggest Ford's proximity to Edwards's residence at the time of her murder; (5) the affidavits

used to obtain the warrants to search Ford's home, vehicle, and obtain his DNA contained materially

false statements and omissions; (6) the trial court improperly admitted into evidence a metal threehole punch and cordless electric drill charge cord; (7) the State engaged in improper jury argument by

calling Ford a liar during opening statements, allegedly shifting the burden of proof during closing

argument, and commenting on Ford's failure to testify; (8) the trial court erroneously denied Ford's

oral request for a continuance during trial; (9) the trial court erred by denying Ford's motion for

independent examination of DNA evidence under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article

39.14(a) [**5] ; and (10) the trial court erred by excluding "alternate perpetrator" evidence regarding

a break-in at Edwards's parent's ranch house the day before the murder.

Sufficiency of the Evidence

In his first point of error, Ford contends the evidence is insufficient to support his murder conviction.

HN1 When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case, we apply the Supreme Court's

legal sufficiency standard as set out in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d

560 (1979). See Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Applying the Jackson

standard, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a [*178]

reasonable doubt. Carrizales v. State, 414 S.W.3d 737, 742 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing Jackson,

443 U.S. at 319). We are permitted to consider all of the evidence in the record, whether admissible or

inadmissible, when making our sufficiency determination. Powell v. State, 194 S.W.3d 503, 507 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2006); Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); Green v. State, 893

S.W.2d 536, 540 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) ("If the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged following a
jury trial, appellate courts consider all of the evidence presented whether properly or improperly

admitted."). In circumstances where the record supports conflicting inferences, we must presume the

factfinder resolved any conflicts in favor of the verdict and defer to that determination. Wise v. State,

364 S.W.3d 900, 903 (Tex. Crim. App.2012); see Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318. This presumption [**6]

includes conflicting inferences from circumstantial evidence. Mayberry v. State, 351 S.W.3d 507, 509

(Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, pet. ref'd) (citing Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2007)). Further, we may not re-evaluate the weight and credibility of the evidence nor may we

substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder. Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2007).

As mentioned above, Ford was convicted of the offense of murder. HN2 In Texas, a person commits

the offense of murder if he intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an individual. TEX. PENAL CODE

ANN. § 19.02(b)(1) (West 2011). Even for an offense as serious as murder, "circumstantial evidence is

as probative as direct evidence in establishing the guilt of an actor, and circumstantial evidence alone

can be sufficient to establish guilt." Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). In

cases where the available evidence is circumstantial in nature, "it is not necessary that every fact and

circumstance 'point directly and independently to the defendant's guilt; it is enough if the conclusion is

warranted by the combined and cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances.'" Temple v.

State, 390 S.W.3d 341, 359-60 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (quoting Johnson v. State, 871 S.W.2d 183,

186 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993)).

Here, the State relied upon circumstantial evidence to convict Ford. Specifically, the State relied upon

the testimony of Federspill and Tarver, cell phone records, ATM photographs, and DNA evidence to

rebut Ford's alibi and connect him to the murder.

According [**7] to the State's theory of the case, the chain of events that ultimately resulted in

Edwards's murder began when Ford became upset at the New Year's Eve party. While guests were

playing a card game at the party, Federspill made a comment to Ford and Tarver about their resistance

or reluctance with regard to "marriage." Ford did not appreciate the comment. According to Federspill,

Ford approached her after the comment, told her he did not appreciate it, and left the party shortly

thereafter. Additionally, after Tarver texted Ford at 11:31 p.m. about his abrupt departure from the

party, Ford responded, "No longer fun." Federspill explained that Edwards broke up with Ford because "

[Edwards] mentioned to me that she was unhappy in the relationship, looking for her life to progress

forward in terms of marriage and/or motherhood . . . She wanted to have kids and get married."

Despite Ford's claim that he went straight home and went to bed, both Tarver and Federspill testified

they did not see Ford's white Chevy Tahoe parked in his driveway after midnight. The pair drove to

Ford's home to deliver a cooler [*179] Ford left behind at the party. Although Ford was known to

occasionally park in a church [**8] parking lot directly behind his home, Tarver testified he was

"looking for it right there and I don't see it." Ford counters that Tarver did not see the Tahoe because it

was parked in a dark corner of the church parking lot instead of its normal place directly behind his

house. However plausible, we must presume the jury resolved this conflict in favor of the verdict and

defer to that determination. See Wise, 364 S.W.3d at 903.

After using the testimony of Tarver and Federspill to prove Ford was not at home around the time of

the murder as he claimed, the State turned to historical cell phone data obtained from Ford's cellular

provider, AT&T, to determine where he in fact was in the early hours of January 1, 2009. The

information revealed in the records includes: the date and time of a cellular device's usage; the type of

usage; the number calling and called during the usage; the duration of the usage; and the exact

location (latitude and longitude coordinates) of the tower that processed the usage of the cellular

device. According to the State's historical cell data expert Kenneth Doll, an employee of AT&T, this data

is collected even from passive activity on the cellular device — including letting a call [**9] go to

voicemail by not answering it — because even with passive activity:

[T]he device acknowledged — the device acknowledged to the network that, yes, here I

am, in this service area . . . If your phone rings, if the phone rings, it is in communication

with our network and it has set up a communication path with the site that it is best server
[sic] with.

(emphasis added). As a result of collecting a cellular device's active and passive activity, Doll testified

he is able to tell where a phone is located based upon the data gathered from cell towers. Regarding

this case specifically and the tower servicing the area in proximity to Edwards's condo — referred to as

"Gallery Court" at trial — Doll testified that "[i]f you were at the Gallery Court location and you had

activity on your cellular device, this would be the sector it would be on." Additionally, Doll stated it

would not have been possible for Ford's phone to show activity in the Gallery Court sector from his

home address "because you don't have line of sight to [the Gallery Court Tower] . . . [s]o your device

won't see that tower and that tower won't see your device."

At oral argument, Ford suggested Doll actually testified the tower reflected [**10] in the historical

record is the one closest to the phone placing the call, instead of Ford's phone that was receiving the

calls and text messages. In support of this argument, Ford directed the court to the record and our

decision in Wilson v. State where historical cell phone records were used to track the movements of a

murderer on the day of his crime. See 195 S.W.3d 193, 196 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2006, no pet.).

The record, despite citation to it by Ford, does not support this assertion. Even if the record could be

construed as lending some passing support to the proposition advanced by Ford at oral argument, it

would conflict with other portions of Doll's testimony. HN3 In the event of an evidentiary conflict, we

must presume the jury resolved the matter in favor of the verdict and defer to that resolution. See id.

Further, our decision in Wilson does not support Ford's argument. In Wilson, we held the trial court did

not abuse its discretion by admitting the testimony of an expert regarding historical cell phone records

over a challenge to the expert's qualifications. 195 S.W.3d at 202. In short, Wilson, despite Ford's

contention at oral argument, is irrelevant here. See id. at 201-02.

[*180] Despite Ford's novel contentions at oral argument, the historical cell phone data, [**11] as

interpreted by the testimony of Doll at trial, supports the conclusion that Ford was not at his home on

the morning of the murder as he claimed. Rather, the historical cell data reveals two communications,

a missed call from Tarver at 11:45 p.m. and a text from Tarver at 1:19 a.m., both of which place Ford

in the service area of Edwards's condo on the morning of her murder. In addition to this historical cell

data placing Ford's phone, and presumably Ford himself, in close proximity to the crime scene at the

relevant times, the State also presented pictures from an ATM camera that appear to show Ford's

vehicle, and possibly Ford, entering Edwards's condominium complex.

Before introducing the recovered ATM camera photos, the State first admitted into evidence a photo of

Ford's white Chevy Tahoe. The photo shows Ford's 2004 white Chevy Tahoe had black roof rails, which

are generally used to tie down luggage, and a horizontal black stripe down the lower quarter of the

Tahoe's side. Although these identifying features are certainly not unique to Ford's vehicle, the features

are visible in the grainy ATM photographs and a reasonable juror could determine a vehicle similar to

Ford's is [**12] depicted.

Even though the vehicle in the ATM photos was never conclusively identified as belonging to Ford, the

State introduced ATM photos depicting a vehicle that is similar in appearance to Ford's white Chevy

Tahoe (i.e. exhibiting the roof rails and/or black horizontal stripe) entering and exiting Edwards's condo

complex around the time of the murder. In addition to photos of the vehicle, the State also introduced

photos depicting a figure — claimed by the State to be Ford based on the figure's clothing, which

allegedly matched what Ford wore that night — entering and exiting Edwards's condominium complex.

The photos were presented to the jury as follows:

1.) Vehicle entering Edwards's condominium complex from the north at 11:24 p.m. on

December 31, 2008.

2.) Vehicle exiting Edwards's condominium complex to the south at 11:26 p.m. on

December 31, 2008.

3.) Vehicle driving past Edwards's condominium complex from the south at 11:36 p.m. on

December 31, 2008.

4.) Vehicle entering Edwards's condominium complex from the north at 11:37 p.m. on

December 31, 2008.
5.) Vehicle exiting Edwards's condominium complex to the north at 11:39 p.m. on

December 31, 2008.

6.) Figure allegedly entering Edwards's [**13] condominium complex from the north at

11:42 p.m. on December 31, 2008.

7.) Vehicle believed to be Edwards's red Chevy Tahoe entering the complex from the north

at 12:47 a.m. on January 1, 2009.1

8.) Figure allegedly exiting Edwards's condominium complex to the north at 2:02 a.m. on

January 1, 2009.

9.) Vehicle passing Edwards's condominium complex heading south at 2:07 a.m. on

January 1, 2009.

10.) Vehicle entering Edwards's condominium complex from the south at 3:12 a.m. on

January 1, 2009. This photo only reveals the vehicle's back end and lit taillights. It does

not depict a vehicle possessing similar identifying characteristics to Ford's, i.e. the roof

rails and black side stripe are not visible.

11.) Vehicle exiting Edwards's condominium complex to the south at 3:16 [*181] a.m.

on January 1, 2009. Unlike the other photos, the vehicle exiting Edwards's complex does

not have its headlights on.

The State argued to the jury that this timeline of events, based on the ATM photos, is evidence of

Ford's activities on the night of Edwards's murder. Although Ford countered the State's timeline by

introducing ATM photographs of other SUVs driving past the entrance to Edwards's condominium

complex at times [**14] relevant to the case, we presume the jury resolved any of the conflicts in

favor of the verdict and must defer to that determination. See Wise, 364 S.W.3d at 903.

FOOTNOTES

1 The record reflects Edwards drove a red Chevy Tahoe.

The last piece of evidence the State used to link Ford to Edwards's murder was the identification of his

DNA on the white towel found covering her face at the murder scene. The State's forensic expert,

Robert Sailors, testified Ford was the source of human male DNA extracted from samples of the towel

removed from Edwards's face. Although Ford presented numerous attacks on the weight and credibility

of this evidence (e.g., Ford's DNA on the towel is unremarkable as a former boyfriend and guest of

Edwards's condo; the towel is contaminated evidence because Sailor's DNA was also identified on it),

we must once against presume the jury resolved any evidentiary conflicts in favor of the verdict and

defer to that determination. See Wise, 364 S.W.3d at 903.

Taken together, the State introduced evidence strongly suggesting Ford was not home at the time of

Edwards's murder as he said, but rather was at the scene of the crime. Specifically, the State used the

testimony of Federspill and Tarver to show Ford's car was not at home [**15] when it should have

been, cell phone records to prove he was in the vicinity of Edwards's condominium at times relevant to

her murder, ATM photos showing a vehicle similar to Ford's entering and exiting the condominium

complex around the time of the murder, and DNA evidence linking Ford with the towel covering

Edwards's face. Although Ford has diligently argued the evidence presented by the State is neither

perfect nor without conflict, our standard of review for the sufficiency of the evidence does not weigh

in Ford's favor because we must presume conflicts are resolved in favor of the verdict. See id.

Having reviewed the record in the light most favorable to the verdict, we hold the jury rationally could

have found Ford guilty of murder beyond a reasonable doubt. See Carrizales, 414 S.W.3d at 742. The

combined and cumulative force of the incriminating circumstances presented by the State point toward

Ford's guilt. See Temple, 390 S.W.3d at 359-60. Accordingly, we overrule Ford's first point of error.

Ford counters this conclusion by arguing there is a hole in the State's storyline that is supported by the

very cell phone evidence used to convict him, evidence that renders the circumstantial evidence

presented by the State insufficient. Ford [**16] points out the cell phone records indicate he was in
the proximity of Olmos Dam at 1:32 a.m. on the morning of Edwards's murder because his cell phone

recorded activity from a tower in that area. Those same cell records indicate that only 13 minutes

earlier, at 1:19 a.m., Ford was in the vicinity of Edwards's condo a few miles away. Problematically, the

ATM photos used by the State do not show Ford leaving in the same manner as the State alleges he

entered the complex, i.e., walking in the front entrance. The State had no explanation for this apparent

conflict and admitted as much during its closing: "[w]ill I ever be able to tell you precisely how the

Defendant got over the [Gallery Court] wall or why the Defendant got over the wall? No. No." However,

as stated [*182] above, we must presume the jury resolved this conflict in the evidence in favor of

the verdict and defer to that determination, as we have already done on other occasions. See Wise,

364 S.W.3d at 903.

In a further attack on the sufficiency of the evidence, Ford directs the court, for the first time in its

reply brief, to a Court of Criminal Appeals decision where the court reviewed a set of circumstantial

facts and determined that "[w]hile these facts together [**17] might create suspicion, . . . they do

not add up to probable cause that appellant committed the murders." Hankins v. State, 132 S.W.3d

380, 389 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). Ford argues that if the Court of Criminal Appeals could not find

probable cause under the facts in Hankins, then this court would err to find the present facts sufficient

to support Ford's guilt. This argument is not persuasive as the Hankins case is completely

distinguishable. Hankins involved a determination of the existence of probable cause, a standard

inapplicable to the sufficiency review we apply here. Compare id. (determining existence of probable

cause), with Carrizales, 414 S.W.3d at 742 (setting out standard of review for sufficiency of evidence).

Motion for New Trial

In his second point of error, Ford contends the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his

motion for new trial. Specifically, Ford argues the trial court erred because: (1) the evidence was

insufficient to establish Ford's guilt; (2) newly discovered evidence regarding the historical cell phone

data and the ATM pictures tends to exculpate Ford; and (3) it was discovered that a juror allegedly lied

about his knowledge of cell towers on his juror selection form.

HN4 We review a trial court's ruling on a motion for new trial for [**18] an abuse of discretion.

Webb v. State, 232 S.W.3d 109, 112 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). "We view the evidence in the light most

favorable to the trial court's ruling and uphold the trial court's ruling if it was within the zone of

reasonable disagreement." Id. We may not substitute our judgment for the trial court's, rather we are

limited to deciding whether the trial court's ruling was arbitrary or unreasonable. Id. Therefore,

denying a motion for new trial is an abuse of discretion only when no reasonable view of the record

could support the trial court's ruling. Id.

Sufficient Evidence:

Ford first argues the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion for new trial because the

evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction. This argument is identical to Ford's first point of

error on appeal. As we held above, the evidence is sufficient to support Ford's conviction, and we

therefore overrule this portion of Ford's second point of error.

"New" Evidence:

Ford next argues he should have been given a new trial because of newly discovered evidence. HN5

Under the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, "a new trial shall be granted an accused where material

evidence favorable to the accused has been discovered since trial." TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.

40.001 (West 2006) (emphasis [**19] added). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has interpreted

this provision to require the satisfaction of the following four-part test:

1.) The newly discovered evidence was unknown or unavailable to the movant at the time

of his trial;

2.) The movant's failure to discover or obtain the evidence was not due to a lack of
diligence;

3.) The new evidence is admissible and is not merely cumulative, corroborative, collateral,

or impeaching; and,

[*183] 4.) The new evidence is probably true and will probably bring about a different

result on another trial.

Keeter v. State, 74 S.W.3d 31, 36-37 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (emphasis added).

Here, Ford contends he presented newly discovered, material evidence entitling him to a new trial. The

new evidence includes: (1) an expert to counter Doll's testimony as to whether historical cell tower

data can establish a phone's approximate location; and (2) an expert to testify that the figure seen in

the ATM photos entering the Gallery Court complex could not have been Ford because the figure was

too tall. The State counters Ford's claims by arguing this evidence is not actually "new." We agree.

The evidence underlying the potential "new" experts is not, in fact, newly discovered. Ford had access

to the historical cell data [**20] records from AT&T and the ATM images used by the State before the

start of trial. Reaching new and different opinions from the same foundational evidence does not

render the evidence newly discovered as required by Keeter, even if those new opinions may be

material. See id. Accordingly, we overrule this portion of Ford's second point of error.

Allegedly Impartial Juror:

Ford's final argument regarding his motion for new trial concerns juror number 66. According to Ford, a

court deputy overheard juror 66 admit after trial that he did in fact have experience and knowledge

about cell phone towers due to his training and experience with his job at H.E.B. Ford contends this

contradicted the juror's answer on the juror questionnaire. On the questionnaire, potential jurors were

asked whether they "had any experience, training or education in: criminal law, autopsies, DNA,

forensics, cell phone towers, [etc.]." (Emphasis added). Juror 66 answered "No."

Ford contends having juror 66 on the jury deprived him of a fair trial because juror 66 is biased

regarding the historical cell data relied upon by the State. HN6 Generally, "when a partial, biased, or

prejudiced juror is selected without fault or [**21] lack of diligence on the part of defense counsel,

who has acted in good faith upon the answers given to him on voir dire not knowing them to be

inaccurate, good ground exists for a new trial." Franklin v. State, 12 S.W.3d 473, 478 (Tex. Crim. App.

2000) (quoting Von January v. State, 576 S.W.2d 43, 45 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978)). However, because

"written questions are by nature vulnerable to misinterpretation — even questions that appear to be

subject to only one interpretation," the Court of Criminal Appeals has said "'diligent' counsel will not

rely on written questionnaires to supply any information that counsel deems material." Gonzales v.

State, 3 S.W.3d 915, 917 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). "Counsel who does so otherwise is simply not

diligent." Id. (holding counsel was not diligent when he did not follow up on answers to written

questionnaire with more specific questioning during voir dire.).

Here, we have not located a single instance where Ford's trial counsel specifically questioned the venire

about cell phones or cell towers during voir dire. Therefore, we hold trial counsel was not diligent

during voir dire, see id., and Ford may not now claim he deserves a new trial because an allegedly

biased juror was selected without fault or lack of diligence on the part of his counsel. See Franklin, 12

S.W.3d at 478 (emphasis added). Accordingly, we overrule this portion of Ford's second point [**22]

of error.

Jury Note

Ford next contends the trial court erred by insufficiently responding to the following jury note at trial:

[*184] Jurors have a dispute concerning the testimony of AT&T expert, Ken Doll,

regarding the possibility of a cell phone connection between tower SX 3155 (Gallery Court)
& the residence at 333 Rosemary Ave.

HN7 Under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 36.28, if the jury disagrees as to the statement of

a witness, they may apply to the court to have read to them from the court reporter's notes that part

of the witness's testimony in dispute. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.28. This court should not disturb

a trial judge's decision under article 36.28 unless a clear abuse of discretion, as well as harm, is

shown. Howell v. State, 175 S.W.3d 786, 792 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). When the jury indicates a

specific and limited portion of testimony to be read, a trial court does not abuse its discretion by

providing only the requested information. Robison v. State, 888 S.W.2d 473, 481 (Tex. Crim. App.

1994). Here, Ford contends the trial court improperly limited the amount of Doll's testimony read back

to the jury in response to its note.

In response to Ford's objection, the trial court clarified its decision before actually rereading Doll's

testimony to the jury, stating:

Well, in light of the way the question was phrased, it was fairly specific. And although I

understand that generally [**23] it covers some of the issues, but it's in very general

terms, and so I have narrowed that request to Page 67, Line 4 through Page 68 of Line 8,

which covers the same issue but with more specificity, based on the question that was

presented by the jury. So your objection is duly noted for the record and the request is

denied.

The trial court's reasoning appears in line with the Court of Criminal Appeals' directive HN8 regarding

jury notes: "the trial court must then interpret the communication, decide what sections of the

testimony will best answer the inquiry, then limit the re-reading accordingly." Brown v. State, 870

S.W.2d 53, 55 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). After explaining its decision to Ford, the trial court proceeded to

read back Doll's testimony concerning the specific issue of whether Ford's phone could connect with

the Gallery Court tower from his home on 333 Rosemary Ave. The testimony included cross

examination by Ford's counsel regarding, among other things, the cell tower technology available at

the time in question, as well as Doll's "line of sight" rationale for why the connection with Gallery Court

was impossible.

Ford contends the trial court's rereading was insufficient because it excluded the following testimony

that arguably [**24] impeaches Doll's response to the specific question regarding the Gallery Court

tower:

Q: As a general principle, you cannot tell this jury that if the record shows that a certain

sector of a cell tower was pinged by a cell device, that that cell device was in that sector

beyond any argument, can you?

A: No.

Q: And that's because depending on a number of variables, a different cell tower or a

different sector might service that activity?

A: Yes.

. . .

Q: Okay. Let's put that together. So even though the records show a cell tower and a

sector to the cell tower, that does not mean beyond all doubt that the cell device was in

that sector, does it?

A: There are cases where you can set up a call on a cell site that is not the closest cell site

to you, or you could potentially even set up a cell — a call on a cell site across town, but

those are very [*185] rare and I would say that they're — there — there's a lot of

variables in there.
Although this testimony does seem to impeach Doll's testimony regarding the possibility of a cell phone

connection between the Gallery Court tower and Ford's residence, we hold the excluded cross

examination above is not responsive to the jury's specific inquiry. The jury [**25] asked specifically

about the possibility of a "cell phone connection between tower SX 3155 (Gallery Court) & the

residence at 333 Rosemary Ave.," and the testimony read back by the trial court included Doll's answer

to that specific question, i.e., it is impossible because the tower did not have line of sight with the

residence. The testimony proffered by Ford addresses the issue as a broad general principle and not as

a response to the jury's specific question. Accordingly, we hold the trial court did not clearly abuse its

discretion in responding to the jury's note as it did. See Howell, 175 S.W.3d at 792.

Historical Cell Phone Data — Location Information

Across six points of error, Ford argues the State improperly acquired and used historical cell phone

data collected by AT&T to connect him to Edwards's murder. AT&T's records regarding Ford's cell phone

were acquired by the State pursuant to a court order under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article

18.21, not by search warrant. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 18.21, Sec. 5(a) (West Supp. 2013).

Ford contends this action by the State was improper and violated his rights because: (1) the State

obtained the historical cell phone records in violation of Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 18.21;

(2) the State violated Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.23; (3) the State violated Article I,

section 9 of the Texas Constitution; (4) the State violated 18 U.S.C. § 2703; (5) the State

violated [**26] the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures; and

(6) the State violated the First Amendment's protection regarding the right to freely associate.

At trial, Ford contested the admissibility of the cell phone records with a motion to suppress, which the

court denied. HN9 We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress under a bifurcated

standard. St. George v. State, 237 S.W.3d 720, 725 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Guzman v. State, 955

S.W.2d 85, 88-89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). We give almost total deference to the trial court's

determination of facts, and review the trial court's application of the law de novo. See State v.

Mendoza, 365 S.W.3d 666, 669 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 328 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2000). Here, both Ford and the State agree the trial court rendered a legal ruling affecting

Ford's constitutional rights, and therefore this court should apply a de novo standard of review. See

Wall v. State, 184 S.W.3d 730, 742 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). We agree.

Ford has made two types of challenges to the historical cell site data obtained and used by the State.

First, Ford challenges the acquisition of the data based on statutory law concerning court orders to

obtain such data. Second, Ford challenges the acquisition of the data without a search warrant, even if

the acquisition is authorized by statute without a warrant.

Statutory Arguments

Ford raises three statutory arguments with regard to the manner in which the State obtained historical

records of his [**27] cell phone use from AT&T contending: (1) the applications did not comply with

Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 18.21; (2) the applications violated Texas Code of Criminal

Procedure article 38.23; and (3) [*186] the applications were insufficient under 18 U.S.C. § 2703.

Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 18.21

Ford contends the State improperly obtained his historical cell phone records from AT&T by obtaining a

court order pursuant to article 18.21, section 5(a) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. HN10

Section 5(a) states "[a] court shall issue an order authorizing disclosure of . . . records, or other

information of a wire or electronic communication held in electronic storage if the court determines

that there is reasonable belief that the information sought is relevant to a legitimate law enforcement

inquiry." TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 18.21, Sec. 5(a) (emphasis added). Here, Ford argues the

information requested by the State was not a "wire or electronic communication" encompassed by the

statute. This argument does not comport with his article 18.21 based argument made before the trial

court.
At trial, Ford argued that the assistant district attorney who signed the application was not the

"prosecutor" authorized to file the application under article 18.21(2)(b). See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.

art. 18.21(2)(b) ("A prosecutor may file . . ."). Ford contended the term "prosecutor" referred only to

the actual district attorney herself, an argument rejected by the trial court. Because this article 18.21

argument does not comport with Ford's [**28] complaint on appeal, we hold Ford did not preserve

this point of error, and his current argument cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. See, e.g.,

Reynolds v. State, 423 S.W.3d 377, 383 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). However, even if Ford had properly

preserved his present argument for our review, it still fails.

Article 18.20 defines "electronic communication" for the purposes of the order as HN11 "a transfer of

signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in

part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic, or photo-optical system." TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.

ANN. art. 18.20, Sec. 1(15). We hold the information collected by the State in this case is AT&T's

records of the transfer of signs, signals, and data from Ford's cellular phone serviced by AT&T and falls

within the definition of an "electronic communication" subject to disclosure via court order. See id. Ford

attempts to distinguish the information obtained by the State as "cellular site information" concerning

connection and location data that is not "intelligence of any nature" referenced by article 18.20,

Section 1(15); however, this argument is without merit because it ignores the full scope and definition

of "electronic communication" set out above. Accordingly, we overrule this complaint and hold the

records acquired [**29] from AT&T were obtained pursuant to a proper order under article 18.21.

See id.

Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 38.23

Ford next contends the State's applications to obtain historical cell site data from AT&T violate Texas

Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.23. HN12 Article 38.23(a) states that "no evidence obtained by

an officer or other person in violation of any provisions of the Constitution or laws of the State of Texas

. . . shall be admitted in evidence against the accused on the trial of any criminal case." TEX. CODE CRIM.

PROC. ANN. art. 38.23(a) (West 2005). According to Ford, because the State's applications were not

authorized by article 18.21, the use of the evidence against him violates article 38.23. However, as we

held above, the records from AT&T do not violate article 18.21. Therefore, article 38.23 cannot serve

as a basis to exclude the evidence used against Ford.

[*187] Required Disclosure of Customer Records under 18 U.S.C. § 2703

Ford next contends the State's applications were inadequate under federal law, which requires the

government to show the existence of an ongoing investigation to obtain the court order. See 18 U.S.C.

§ 2703 (2009) ("A court order for disclosure under subsection (b) or (c) may be issued [if] . . . the

records or other information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.").

Ford contends the applications are deficient because the State needed to illustrate an [**30] ongoing

investigation but they "do not use this language." There are two problems with Ford's appellate

argument.

First, Ford did not make this argument in either his written motion to suppress or during the hearing

on the motion. The closest Ford came to making this argument before the trial court is when he argued

during the hearing that obtaining the cell data "must be done with a warrant . . . [b]oth the State and

federal statutes say that." Accordingly, we hold Ford did not preserve this ground for our review. See

TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1. However, even if Ford did preserve his argument under section 2703, it fails on the

merits.

HN13 Section 2703 requires the government entity seeking the court order to offer "specific and

articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or

electronic communication, or the records or other information sought, are relevant and material an

ongoing criminal investigation." 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d). Both of the State's applications contain a

subsection "IV" that not only describes the information requested as "relevant to the investigation of a
criminal offense," but also sets out the self-described "supporting information/'specific and articulable

fact(s)'." This section includes [**31] information provided by investigating detective Leroy Carrion

explaining the background of the case against Ford and why the State needed his cellular records.

Having reviewed the State's applications, we hold they comply with the showing of an ongoing

investigation required by section 2703(d). See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d).

Constitutional Arguments

Ford also contends, in addition to his statutory claims, that the State unconstitutionally obtained his

cellular records from AT&T without a search warrant. Specifically, Ford contends the State's warrantless

acquisition of the records from AT&T violated his constitutional rights under: (1) the Fourth

Amendment to the United States Constitution; (2) Article I, section nine of the Texas Constitution; and

(3) the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.

Fourth Amendment:

Ford contends the State's acquisition of his historical cell site records from AT&T without a search

warrant violated the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unlawful searches and seizures. See U.S.

CONST. amend. IV. Specifically, Ford relies on the Supreme Court's decision in U.S. v. Jones, 132 S.Ct.

945, 181 L. Ed. 2d 911 (2012), to argue individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy "in our

technologically advanced tools that also reveal our locations." As discussed above, HN14 we review

this constitutional issue under a de novo standard of review. See Wall, 184 S.W.3d at 742.

In Jones, the police attached a Global-Positioning-System (GPS) tracking device to an

individual's [**32] vehicle without a valid warrant. Jones, 132 S.Ct. at 947. The police then used the

GPS device to track the vehicle's movement for the next twenty-eight days. Id. Applying a trespass

theory of Fourth Amendment protection, [*188] the Supreme Court held that attaching a GPS

tracking device to a vehicle without a warrant and using the device to record the vehicle's location was

an impermissible search under the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 949. However, the facts in this case

distinguish it and remove it from Jones's purview. Here, the State did not initially gather the

information sought to be suppressed. Rather, a third-party, AT&T, gathered and maintained the

information as business records of the service provided to Ford's phone. As the Fifth Circuit recognized

when addressing a similar Fourth Amendment issue, the "question of who is recording an individual's

information initially is key." In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 610 (5th Cir. 2013).

Relying on and concurring with the Fifth Circuit's analysis, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals recently

held a defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy under Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.

Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1967) and its progeny was not violated when the State obtained cell tower

records from a third party without a warrant. See Barfield v. State, 416 S.W.3d 743, 749 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.). In Barfield, the State offered third-party cell tower records

obtained without a warrant to establish [**33] the defendant's whereabouts during times relevant to

the crime — just as the State did in this case. See id. at 745. According to the Fourteenth Court of

Appeals, this action did not violate the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights because HN15 if "an

individual knowingly exposes his activities to third parties, he surrenders Fourth Amendment

protections, and, if the Government is subsequently called upon to investigate his activities for possible

violations of the law, it is free to seek out these third parties, to inspect their records, and to probe

their recollections for evidence." Id. at 748 (quoting In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d at

610); Reporters Comm. For Freedom of Press v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 593 F.2d 1030, 1043, 192 U.S.

App. D.C. 376 (D.C. Cir. 1978). Furthermore, the fortuity of whether or not the third party, acting at its

own discretion, chooses to store the information makes no constitutional difference. Barfield, 416

S.W.3d at 748 (citing In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d at 610); Smith v. Maryland, 442

U.S. 735, 745, 99 S. Ct. 2577, 61 L. Ed. 2d 220 (1979)). Essentially, once an individual voluntarily

exposes information to a third party, it can be used for any purpose, such as conveying it to law

enforcement authorities. Barfield, 416 S.W.3d at 748 (citing In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724

F.3d at 610); S.E.C. v. Jerry T. O'Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735, 743, 104 S. Ct. 2720, 81 L. Ed. 2d 615

(1984) ("[W]hen a person communicates information to a third party even on the understanding that
the communication is confidential, he cannot object if the third party conveys that information or

records thereof to law enforcement authorities.")); see also United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443,

96 S. Ct. 1619, 48 L. Ed. 2d 71 (1976).

Applying the precedent above, Ford cannot [**34] successfully complain about the State's

warrantless retrieval of the AT&T records. The cell site data acquired by the State is simply the

business records memorializing Ford's voluntary subscriber transaction with AT&T for the service he

wanted from his cellular provider all along, i.e. the ability to transmit and receive data on AT&T's

network of cell towers. See Barfield, 416 S.W.3d at 748. The fact that this data happens to reveal the

general location of Ford's cell phone, and presumably himself, at given points in historical time is of no

consequence to the legal analysis here. Accordingly, we overrule this issue and hold the State's actions

did [*189] not violate Ford's Fourth Amendment rights because he could not have a reasonable

expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily conveyed to a third party. See id. at 746-48.

Ford contends that this result, based on his supposed voluntary disclosure of information to a third

party, is improper. Specifically, Ford argues: (1) the Court of Criminal Appeals has rejected the legal

premise that a voluntary disclosure of information to a third party destroys a reasonable expectation of

privacy in said information; and (2) he did not voluntarily disclose his location information to his

service [**35] provider. We disagree.

One of the seminal Supreme Court cases for the legal analysis applied above is Smith v. Maryland. 442

U.S. 735, 745, 99 S. Ct. 2577, 61 L. Ed. 2d 220 (1979). In Smith, the Supreme Court held the

petitioner had no Fourth Amendment, legitimate expectation of privacy in the pen register kept by his

phone provider because:

When he used his phone, petitioner voluntarily conveyed numerical information to the

telephone company and "exposed" that information to its equipment in the ordinary course

of business. In so doing, petitioner assumed the risk that the company would reveal to

police the numbers he dialed.

Id. at 744. The Court of Criminal Appeals has expressly stated Smith's proposition represents "an

erroneous belief" of voluntarily assumed risk defeating a reasonable expectation of privacy in dialed

phone numbers. Richardson v. State, 865 S.W.2d 944, 951-52 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). Ford contends,

therefore, this court may not rely on the third-party doctrine applied in federal courts.

Unlike the Supreme Court's decision in Smith, the Richardson decision does not concern an individual's

protection under the Fourth Amendment; rather, the Court of Criminal Appeals was determining

whether the use of a pen register constitutes a "search" under Article I, section 9 of the Texas

Constitution. See Richardson, 865 S.W.2d at 953. After examining Smith, the court stated "society

recognizes as objectively reasonable the expectation [**36] of the telephone customer that the

numbers he dials as a necessary incident of his use of the telephone will not be published to the rest of

the world." Id. However, this proclamation is regarding the Texas Constitution, as opposed to the

Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution that Ford is invoking here. Accordingly, we reject

Ford's argument.

In addition to his argument based on Richardson, Ford also attacks the third-party disclosure theory on

the ground that he did not voluntarily disclose his location information to AT&T, which cases like Smith

require for a forfeiture of protected privacy interests. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 743-44 (noting "[t]his

Court consistently has held that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he

voluntarily turns over to third parties" (emphasis added)). In support of this argument, Ford directs the

court to authority for the proposition that an individual placing or receiving a call on a cell phone has

not voluntarily exposed their location information. See United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205, 2014 WL

2599917 at *10 (11th Cir. 2014); In re App. of the U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec.

Commc'n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov't., 620 F.3d 304, 317 (3d Cir. 2010); In re App. of the

U.S. for an Order Auth. the Release of Hist. Cell-Site Info., 809 F.Supp.2d 113, 127 (E.D.N.Y. 2011).

The Fifth Circuit, responding to the same argument raised by the ACLU in U.S. for Historical Cell Site

Data, rejected Ford's position outright. See 724 F.3d at 612-13. [*190] We agree with the Fifth
Circuit's [**37] conclusion.

The Fifth Circuit emphasized that a cell phone user generally understands: (1) their cell phone must

send a signal to a nearby cell tower in order to wirelessly connect their call; (2) if their cell phone

cannot pick up a signal, they are out of range of their service provider's tower network; and (3) if too

many customers in the same area attempt to make calls at the same time, the call may not go through

because the network's local towers are overloaded with traffic. Id. at 613; Barfield, 416 S.W.3d at 748.

Accordingly, a cell phone user knows that in order to receive service the provider will have to know

which tower their phone is connecting to. In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d at 613;

Barfield, 416 S.W.3d at 748.

This information — AT&T's records of which towers Ford's phone connected with to receive cellular

service — was what the State used to determine his phone's approximate location at certain times on

the night Edwards was murdered. Ultimately, Ford voluntarily decided to obtain a cell phone, chose

AT&T as a service provider, and availed himself of the benefits of its network of cell towers. See

Barfield, 416 S.W.3d at 748-49. Accordingly, we overrule this issue and hold Ford voluntarily disclosed

the location of his cell phone through cell site data to a third party. See id.; In re U.S. for Historical Cell

Site Data, 724 F.3d at 614.

Admittedly, unlike [**38] the situation in the Fifth Circuit case, where the user data included

affirmative activity like placing calls, Ford's incriminating evidence was determined from records of

passive activity on his cell phone.2 However, this is a distinction without a functional difference. Ford

still voluntarily availed himself of AT&T's cellular service, which includes the ability to receive data sent

to a subscriber's phone, when he chose it as his provider.

FOOTNOTES

2 The records used by the State to pinpoint Ford's location on the night of Edwards's murder were

determined from records of passive activity on his phone, i.e. he was not placing a call when his

phone connected with the cell tower. Rather, the records relevant to the State's case, the 11:45

p.m. and 1:19 a.m. "pings" off of the Gallery Court tower, were from a missed call and text

message, respectively, from Tarver. None of Ford's active cell phone usage on the night in question,

e.g., his response text to Tarver at 11:33 p.m. or his checked voicemail at 2:30 a.m., is located in

the vicinity of the Gallery Court tower near Edwards's residence.

And finally, with regard to Ford's Fourth Amendment claims, we note he directed the court, after oral

argument, to the United [**39] States Supreme Court's recent decision in Riley v. California, U.S.

 , 134 S. Ct. 2473, 189 L. Ed. 2d 430, 2014 WL 2864483 (2014). In Riley, the Court held that the

police must obtain a warrant before searching the contents of a cell phone seized incident to an arrest.

134 S. Ct. 2473, 189 L. Ed. 2d 430, Id. WL at *20; cf. State v. Granville, 423 S.W.3d 399, 417 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2014) (holding "a citizen does not lose his reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents

of his cell phone merely because that cell phone is being stored in a jail property room."). Although

Riley concerned cell phones and the Fourth Amendment, it is otherwise dissimilar to the present case.

Unlike the present situation where a third party collected the information later obtained by the police

without a warrant, in Riley the police directly examined the private contents of the suspect's cell

phone. 134 S. Ct. 2473, 189 L. Ed. 2d 430, Id. WL at *5. Riley does not concern the third party

doctrine espoused in Smith, 442 U.S. at 743-44, and relied upon in reaching our decision. Therefore,

Riley is [*191] otherwise inapplicable to the present situation involving a court order to obtain

AT&T's business records of Ford's use of its cell tower network. Accordingly, we reject Ford's argument

that Riley is applicable in this case.

Article I, section 9 of the Texas Constitution:

In addition to his Fourth Amendment challenge, Ford contends the State's warrantless acquisitions of

his historical cell site records from AT&T violated his rights under the Texas Constitution. [**40]
Specifically, Ford contends his rights under Article I, section nine — which mirror those of the Fourth

Amendment — were violated. HN16 Like the Fourth Amendment, the Texas Constitution provides that

"[t]he people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions, from all unreasonable

seizures or searches. . ." TEX. CONST. art. I, § 9. However, Ford did not preserve this issue for our

review.

Ford's written motion to suppress and oral argument before the trial court made no mention of his

rights under the Texas Constitution. It is also not apparent from the context of the record that the

error is preserved by way of the parties having a shared understanding of a Texas constitutional

complaint being made. See Pena v. State, 285 S.W.3d 459, 464 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Lankston v.

State, 827 S.W.2d 907, 911 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). Accordingly, we overrule Ford's argument and hold

he did not preserve this argument based on the Texas constitution for our review. See Pena, 285

S.W.3d at 464 (holding appellant failed to preserve for review claim that right to due course of law

under Texas Constitution provided greater protection than due process clause of U.S. Constitution

when he did not argue at trial that Texas Constitution provided greater protection.); TEX. R. APP. P.

33.1.

First Amendment:

Ford next contends his First Amendment right to freely associate was violated by the State's

warrantless acquisition of historical cell site records of his phone from AT&T. [**41] See U.S. CONST.

amend. I. Specifically, Ford argues that "[b]y accessing and scrutinizing location data without a

warrant supported by probable cause, the State is engaged in actions that chill the freedom of

association."

Although the State contends Ford did not preserve this issue for our review, the record reveals Ford's

counsel made the following passing reference to a First Amendment-based argument during the

hearing on the motion to suppress:

Gathering information that the Supreme Court has just said is the type of information that

is subject to a reasonable expectation of privacy, even to a First Amendment objection on

— in that sometimes this sort of information reveals association, the Freedom of

Association Clause of the Constitution of the Bills of Rights.

Ford has supplemented this brief argument at trial with citations to Justice Sotomayor's concurrence in

Jones, 132 S.Ct. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring), and Stanford v. Texas for the proposition that

search warrants must be supported by probable cause that describes the things to be seized with

scrupulous exactitude. See 379 U.S. 476, 485, 85 S. Ct. 506, 13 L. Ed. 2d 431 (1965). Admittedly,

Justice Sotomayor's concurrence does express concern that "[a]wareness that the Government may be

watching chills associational and expressive freedoms . . . [a]nd the Government's unrestrained power

to assemble data that reveal private aspects of identity [**42] is susceptible to abuse." Jones, 132

S.Ct. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). However, Ford has not argued how that concern affects our

decision here.

[*192] Ford has not presented an actual First Amendment issue for the court to consider because he

has not argued how the State's use of his historical cell site records actually and specifically interfered

with his freedom of association. Rather, without relevant citation to the record, Ford has merely argued

in conclusory fashion that "the State is engaged in actions that chill the freedom of association."

Accordingly, we hold Ford inadequately briefed this issue for our review by failing to present an actual

argument of how his First Amendment associational rights were infringed by the State. See TEX. R. APP.

P. 38.1(h); see also Lockett v. State, 16 S.W.3d 504, 505 n.2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet

ref'd) (holding that HN17 conclusory statement supported by neither argument nor authority presents

nothing for our review). Further, even if Ford would have presented a legitimate "association"

argument, we hold it fails on the merits.

The general premise underlying our holding on the Fourth Amendment issue is that the historical cell

site data obtained by the State was a legitimate business record of information Ford initially conveyed
to a third party, the subsequent conveyance of which he cannot successfully challenge [**43] under

the Fourth Amendment. See Jerry T. O'Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. at 743. If this court were to hold that the

State could not obtain Ford's historical cell site records from AT&T without a warrant due to First

Amendment concerns, the holding would have to apply to all business records. This is because any

business record, whether it be a grocery receipt, Amazon invoice, or charitable giving receipt, reveals

an individual's associations and could be subject to abuse by the State. We decline to render a decision

with such broad implications. Therefore, we overrule Ford's issue and hold his associational freedoms

under the First Amendment were not infringed.

Search Warrants — Ford's Home, Car, and DNA

In his next points of error, Ford contends he was entitled to a Franks hearing on his motion to suppress

the searches resulting from warrants to obtain his DNA, search his home, and search his vehicle. Ford

claims Detective Leroy Carrion's affidavits, which were used to obtain the search warrants, contained

false statements that were necessary to the threshold finding of probable cause.

The United States Supreme Court held in Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S. Ct. 2674, 57 L. Ed.

2d 667 (1978):

[W]here the HN18 defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that a false

statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth,

was [**44] included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and if the allegedly false

statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause, the Fourth Amendment requires

that a hearing be held at the defendant's request.

Id. at 155-56; Cates v. State, 120 S.W.3d 352, 355 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). The Court of Criminal

Appeals has refined the requirements to obtaining a Franks hearing into three prongs. See Cates, 120

S.W.3d at 357-59. The first prong of Franks requires a defendant to allege a deliberate falsehood, or

the affiant's reckless disregard for the truth, and specifically point out that portion of the affidavit

alleged to be false. Id. at 357. The second prong of Franks requires a defendant to accompany her

allegations of falsity with either an offer of proof, affidavit, or otherwise reliable witness statement,

unless the absence of such support is satisfactorily explained. Id. at 358. [*193] The third and final

prong of Franks requires a defendant to prove that if the deliberately false sections of the affidavit are

removed, the remainder of the "four corners" of the affidavit no longer presents probable cause to

search a particular location. Id. at 358-59. Here, the State conceded the first two Cates prongs at trial.

The trial court then redacted the affidavits and concluded probable cause existed even in the absence

of the redacted [**45] information. Therefore, we are left to consider whether Ford established the

remaining portions of Detective Carrion's affidavits were insufficient to support probable cause to

search Ford's home, car, and obtain his DNA.

Ford alleged before the trial court that Detective Carrion falsely stated Tarver and Federspill's

testimony, and mischaracterized the photos taken of the Gallery Court entrance from the ATM camera.

Specifically, Ford challenged Detective Carrion's characterization of the testimony regarding whether

Ford's car was not seen in the church parking lot, Ford's responses to text messages, as well as the

detective's recitation of the contents of the ATM photographs.

HN19 Probable cause for a search warrant exists when, viewed under the totality of the

circumstances, there is a fair probability that evidence of a crime will be found at the specified location.

State v. McLain, 337 S.W.3d 268, 272 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). This is a flexible and non-demanding

standard. Id. (emphasis added). Here, where the magistrate did find probable cause based on the

redacted affidavits, we apply a highly deferential standard of review due to the constitutional

preference for searches to be conducted pursuant to a warrant as opposed to a warrantless

search. [**46] Id. at 271. We will uphold the magistrate's probable cause determination as long as

the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding probable cause existed. Id.

Here, even without the portions of Detective Carrion's affidavit challenged by Ford, we hold Detective

Carrion's affidavit was sufficient to establish probable cause to support the search warrants.
Specifically, the redacted affidavits assert: Ford is a recent ex-boyfriend of Edwards; he attended the

same New Year's Eve party as Edwards; he drove to the party in his white Chevy Tahoe; despite

allegedly heading home after the party, Ford's friends did not see his Tahoe parked in his driveway

after the party; surveillance photos depict a vehicle similar to Ford's entering and exiting Edwards's

condominium complex around 11:40 p.m.; surveillance photos depict a figure consistent in appearance

with Ford walking into the complex at 11:42 p.m.; and male DNA was found on the towel covering

Edwards's head. Given the nexus between Ford and Edwards's murder from the information remaining

in Detective Carrion's affidavits, under the totality of the circumstances, we hold there is a fair

probability evidence relating to the murder would have [**47] been found in Ford's vehicle, home,

and DNA. See McLain, 337 S.W.3d at 272. Accordingly, we hold Ford did not satisfy the third prong

required for a Franks hearing and overrule his point of error. See Cates, 120 S.W.3d at 358-59.

Improperly Admitted Evidence of Alleged Murder Weapons

Ford next contends the trial court erred when it allowed the State to introduce into evidence two pieces

of demonstrative evidence representing the alleged murder weapons. Specifically, Ford contends the

trial court erred by allowing the admission of a metal three-hole punch and a charging cord for a

wireless electric drill. The State sought to introduce these items because [*194] Deborah Edwards,

the mother of the victim, testified at trial she discovered these items were missing from her daughter's

condominium when she was packing it up three years after the murder.

HN20 We review the trial court's decision to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse of discretion.

Green v. State, 934 S.W.2d 92, 101-02 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d

372, 379-80 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990); Young v. State, 382 S.W.3d 414, 420 (Tex. App.—Texarkana

2012, pet. ref'd). We may hold a trial court abused its discretion only if its decision falls outside the

zone of reasonable disagreement. Green, 934 S.W.2d at 102.

Three-Hole Punch

At trial, Deborah Edwards testified she discovered her daughter's antique, metal three-hole punch was

missing from the condominium. She also testified she was able to [**48] locate and purchase a

three-hold punch that was a close match to the missing hole-punch. She testified the item she

purchased was "very similar" to the one owned by her daughter. The State then moved to offer the

hole-punch into evidence and counsel for Ford stated "No objection."

HN21 An appellant affirmatively waives their right to have the trial judge determine the admissibility

of evidence when they state "no objection" to the offered evidence. Holmes v. State, 248 S.W.3d 194,

200 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). A party is not excused from the procedural requirement to object at trial

to the admission of evidence even if the error involves a constitutional right. Jimenez v. State, 32

S.W.3d 233, 235 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Accordingly, an appellant who did not object to the admission

of evidence at trial waives any claim on appeal that the trial erred in admitting that evidence. See

Holmes, 248 S.W.3d 200; see also TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1. Because Ford did not object to the admission of

the three-hole punch at trial, we hold Ford waived this argument on appeal and overrule this point of

error. See Holmes, 248 S.W.3d 200.

Ford directs this court to Jimenez and contends in his brief that we should not find the alleged error

waived, but rather review it as plain or fundamental error that deprived him of a fair or impartial trial.

We disagree. Jimenez dealt with jury charge error [**49] as "fundamental error" under Texas Code of

Criminal Procedure article 36.19. See Jimenez, 32 S.W.3d at 236-37 (citing TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.

art. 36.19). Alleged jury charge error is not at issue here, and Ford has not directed this court to any

authority applying fundamental error principles to the unobjected to introduction of evidence at trial.

Accordingly, we overrule Ford's argument.

Charging Cord

At trial, Deborah Edwards testified that a power cord used to charge a cordless electric drill was also
missing from her daughter's condominium. Specifically, Deborah Edwards testified:

She had one and she bought her father one just like it. And when we were putting things

up, the cord was missing from hers. It was in her office. . . . She bought them at the same

time.

The State then moved to introduce into evidence the identical charging cord from the drill Edwards had

purchased for her father. Ford objected that the cord was not relevant and invited speculation. The

State responded that the proffered "exhibit is an exact copy of the charging cord that is missing from

the deceased's cordless charger that was in the office where she was found murdered by

strangulation." The trial court overruled Ford's objection and admitted the cord into evidence. Ford

[*195] contends the trial court erred, but we [**50] disagree.

As stated above, we review the trial court's decision to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse of

discretion. Green, 934 S.W.2d at 101-02. We may hold a trial court abused its discretion only if its

decision falls outside the zone of reasonable disagreement. Green, 934 S.W.2d at 102. HN22 Under

the Texas Rules of Evidence, all relevant evidence is admissible, except as provided otherwise by

constitution, statute, or other rules of evidence. TEX. R. EVID. 402.

Here, the power cord introduced by the State was properly admitted over objection as demonstrative

evidence of an item missing from the victim's home. The victim died from strangulation by ligature and

it is relevant that a possible ligature, the power cord, was missing from the victim's home. Whether or

not the power cord is the type of ligature used to murder the victim is a question of fact to be

determined by the jury and is not the present issue. The present issue is whether or not the power

cord introduced by the State is acceptable demonstrative evidence of the power cord missing from the

victim's home. Here, Deborah Edwards testified the victim had purchased identical drills with identical

charging cords for her father and herself. Accordingly, we hold the trial court did not abuse [**51] its

discretion by allowing the State's exhibit as demonstrative evidence of the missing power cord. See

Green, 934 S.W.2d at 101-02.

Ford's counter argument seems to focus on the State's purpose for introducing the power cord — to

present it as the murder weapon used to strangle Edwards. Ford argues, in essence, the admission of

the cord as the speculative murder weapon is not based on the evidence and deprived him "of a fair

trial by allowing the State to present to the jury a full story and avoid the fact that it lacked any

weapons and any real evidence against Ford." This argument is without merit. The State elicited

testimony that the cord was missing from the crime scene, presented an identical cord into evidence,

and argued that the missing cord could have in fact been the murder weapon. Such "speculation" is a

proper use of circumstantial evidence and a question of fact for the jury to resolve.

Improper Jury Argument

Ford next contends his "conviction should be reversed and he should be granted a new trial" because

of several alleged instances of improper jury argument by the State. Specifically, Ford argues: (1) the

State improperly called Ford a liar twelve times during opening statements; (2) the State [**52]

improperly shifted the burden of proof during its closing argument; and (3) the State improperly

commented on Ford's failure to testify during its closing argument.

Opening Statements

Ford contends the State engaged in improper jury argument when it allegedly called him a "liar" twelve

times during opening statements. Having reviewed the portion of opening statements referenced by

Ford in his brief, it appears Ford objected to the following instances of being called a "liar" at trial:

1.) "What you will see is a man who has his lies down."

2.) "What you will see is that he's able to account for everything and he has the lies down.

And you will know that they are lies by the technology . . ."
3.) "I expect that you will see that he is lying. And I expect that the evidence will show

that he is lying and that he has an answer for everything. And you will hear that on his

[*196] DVD. It is his statement. What you will recognize is that he gives an alibi and

that that alibi is a blatant lie and that will be revealed by the assertions in this case."

4.) "He didn't count on those things. And he didn't count on the technology to reveal his

lies."

5.) "The evidence will show that time and time again — and [**53] the evidence will

highlight that this self-constructed alibi is a lie."

The trial court sustained Ford's objections as to the first four instances set out above, but did not rule

on his fifth objection. Instead, the trial court stated after the fifth objection, "[l]et's move on, please."

Despite an instruction to "move on," the State continued and stated:

You will see that he lied repeatedly to police, to friends, to everyone. And you will see that

this alibi is a lie.

Ford's counsel objected again, prompting the trial court to ask the State to discuss "what you expect

the evidence to show, please." To which the State responded: "Sure. . . [t]he evidence will show he's a

liar." The trial court then asked counsel to approach the bench. After a brief discussion of the issue, the

trial court gave the following instruction to the jury:

All right. Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury, we have an — ongoing opening statements

going on, so the opening statement is to tell you what the evidence is expected to show. In

the course of opening, if there's argument, and right now I think the reference to, in

particular, the issue being that the Defendant is a liar, that part I'm — I'm holding is

argument and I'm [**54] asking you to disregard that portion of the opening statement.

Ford then moved for a mistrial, and the trial court denied his request.

HN23 During a criminal proceeding, the State has the statutory right to state to the jury the nature of

the accusations against the defendant and the facts which are expected to be proved by the State in

support thereof. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.01(a)(3); Taylor v. State, 947 S.W.2d 698, 706 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth 1997, pet. ref'd). Because the trial court sustained Ford's ongoing objection to the

State's accusations in its opening statement, and instructed the jury to disregard said statements, "

[t]he only adverse ruling — and thus the only occasion for making a mistake — was the trial court's

denial of the motion for mistrial." Archie v. State, 340 S.W.3d 734, 738 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011)

(quoting Hawkins v. State, 135 S.W.3d 72, 76-77 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). Therefore, the proper issue

is whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying Ford's request for a mistrial. See Archie, 340

S.W.3d at 738-39; Hawkins, 135 S.W.3d at 77.

HN24 Only in extreme circumstances of incurable prejudice will mistrial be required. Hawkins, 135

S.W.3d at 77. In evaluating whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying a mistrial for

improper argument, we apply and balance the following three factors: (1) the severity of the

misconduct (magnitude of the prejudicial effect of remarks); (2) the measures adopted to cure the

misconduct (efficacy of any cautionary instruction by [**55] the trial court); and (3) the certainty of

conviction absent the misconduct (strength of evidence supporting conviction). Archie, 340 S.W.3d at

739 (adopting factors from Mosley v. State, 983 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998)).

Here, after applying the foregoing factors to the statements made by the State, we hold the trial court

did not abuse its discretion by denying Ford's request for a mistrial. First, although the State [*197]

used the blunt and arguably prejudicial approach of referring to Ford's "lies," it does not appear it

engaged in an overtly improper opening statement. Under article 36.01, the State has a statutory right

to present to the jury its accusations against the defendant and the facts that support it, which is what

it appears the State is doing here — casting aspersions on Ford's alibi. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.
art. 36.01(a)(3). The State's principal theory of the case and accusation against Ford is that his alibi of

being at home at the time of Edwards' murder is a lie, and that he was in fact at Edwards's home

murdering her. The challenged statements, in essence, make abundantly clear to the jury that the

State believes the evidence will illustrate Ford's alibi is a lie. Accordingly, we hold the State's actions do

not constitute outright misconduct that goes outside the scope of opening statements [**56] and

prejudices Ford. See id. Admittedly, the use of the term "lies" is charged language that could be viewed

as prejudicial in nature; however, as discussed below, the trial court's instruction to the jury resolved

any damage that might have been caused by the statements.

At Ford's request, the trial court instructed the jury to disregard the portion of the State's opening

statement setting Ford out as a "liar." It is presumed the jury duly obeyed this instruction to disregard

the contested portions of the State's opening argument. Archie, 340 S.W.3d at 741. This court has held

that "[u]sually, an HN25 instruction to disregard the argument will cure any error caused by improper

argument." Berkley v. State, 298 S.W. 3d 712, 714 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2009, pet. ref'd). Here,

we see no reason to hold the instruction did not cure any harm caused by the State's opening, and

Ford has not presented any argument to rebut the curative strength of the jury instruction.

Accordingly, we overrule Ford's argument and hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it

denied Ford's request for a mistrial. See Archie, 340 S.W.3d at 738-39.

Ford, however, has directed this court to our decision in Gilcrease v. State for the proposition that

name calling can be grounds for reversal if employed as a repeated tactic. See 32 S.W.3d 277, 279

(Tex. App.—San Antonio 2000, pet. ref'd). In Gilcrease, the [**57] State argued during closing

argument the victim "was selected by this bastard over here to be his victim." Id. at 278. The trial

court overruled an objection to calling the defendant a "bastard," and we held the trial court should

have sustained the objection and admonished the State's attorney. Id. at 279. Gilcrease is

distinguishable from the present case. The use of the term "bastard" served no legitimate purpose and

is substantially more inflammatory than the references to the "lies" the State legitimately expected to

prove to the jury here. Simply stated, referring to the defendant's "lies," even though a repeated

tactic, is not name calling on par with the term "bastard." Additionally, unlike in Gilcrease, Ford's

objections to the State's comments were sustained and he obtained a jury instruction to disregard the

potentially harmful references to Ford's "lies." Accordingly, Gilcrease is distinguishable.

Burden Shifting

Ford next contends the State improperly shifted the burden of proof during its closing argument. After

discussing Ford's alibi and the evidence presented at trial, the State made the following closing

argument:

If not him, who? I mean, they're going to tell you that's shifting the burden [**58] of

proof. . . Who? They've put on a case. They've called witnesses. They — they have

certainly cross-examined. Who?

[*198] Ford's objection to this argument was overruled by the trial court.

HN26 Proper jury argument falls generally within one of four areas: (1) summation of the evidence;

(2) reasonable deduction from the evidence; (3) answer to argument made by opposing counsel; and

(4) a plea for law enforcement. Brown v. State, 270 S.W.3d 564, 570 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). Error

exists when an argument presents facts not supported by the record to the jury, but this error is not

reversible unless, in light of the entire record, the argument is extreme or manifestly improper. See id.

Here, the trial court properly overruled Ford's objection because the State's argument was a

reasonable deduction from the evidence. See id. Having presented its theory of the case and web of

circumstantial evidence linking Ford to the murder, it was a reasonable deduction from the evidence for

the State to argue no one else could have or would have committed this crime except Ford.

Accordingly, we hold the State engaged in proper jury argument.

Ford counters by citing to Dee v. State, 388 S.W.2d 946 (Tex. Crim. App. 1965), for the proposition
that prosecutorial jury argument that shifts the burden of proof is reversible error. [**59] Not only

does Ford's passing citation fail to describe how the State actually shifted the burden of proof, but also

Ford's reliance on Dee is misplaced. The eventual reversal in Dee was not based on an improper

argument shifting the burden of proof, but rather the prosecution's argument erroneously placing the

defendant's character in issue. See id. at 947; see also Waldo v. State, 746 S.W.2d 750, 756 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1988) (noting Dee concerned prosecution erroneously placing the defendant's character at

issue). Accordingly, Dee is not on point and does not offer any direct support for Ford's position.

Ford's Failure to Testify

Ford next contends the following jury argument by the State was an improper comment on his failure

to testify at trial:

And they keep talking about this rumor mill, this rumor mill. Well, you know what? A

rumor mill doesn't paralyze you. If there's — if a rumor starts to generate, well, do

something to dispel it. How about say for once to somebody, I didn't do this! And he has

not said that one time to anyone.

Ford failed to object to this allegedly improper comment on his failure to testify.

HN27 The State's comment on an accused's failure to testify violates the defendant's state and federal

constitutional privileges against self-incrimination. [**60] Archie, 340 S.W.3d at 738. However, a

defendant's failure to object to a jury argument or failure to pursue an adverse ruling to an objection

to a jury argument forfeits the defendant's right to complain about the argument on appeal. Cockrell v.

State, 933 S.W.2d 73, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); see Mathis v. State, 67 S.W.3d 918, 927 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2002) (affirming Cockrell as being in line with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1).

As stated above, Ford did not object to the State's argument complained of on appeal. Accordingly, we

hold this argument was not preserved for our review. See Cockrell, 933 S.W.2d at 89.

Ford, however, directs this court to Rodriguez v. State, 646 S.W.2d 539, 542-43 (Tex. App.—Houston

[1st Dist.] 1982, no writ.), to support the proposition directly quoted in his brief that "neither a timely

objection nor an adverse ruling is required to preserve error if the argument is so prejudicial that an

instruction to disregard cannot cure the harm." There are two [*199] problems with Ford's counter

argument. First, Rodriguez does not contain this language nor does it support the proposition for which

it is cited. See id. Second, even if Rodriquez supported Ford's argument, it conflicts with Cockrell,

which expressly held that any prior cases to the contrary, such as Romo v. State, 631 S.W.2d 504 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1982), are overruled. Cockrell, 933 S.W.2d at 89 (overruling Romo, 631 S.W.2d 504, which

held a defendant may complain for the first time on appeal about an unobjected-to, erroneous jury

argument that could not have been cured by an instruction [**61] to disregard.).

Additionally, Ford directs this court to the decision of York v. State, 126 Tex. Crim. 659, 73 S.W.2d 538

(Tex. Crim. App. 1934), for the proposition that the Court of Criminal Appeals has a long history of

reversing criminal judgments where the prosecution has engaged in referencing the failure of the

accused to testify. See id. ("For the error in the argument mentioned we have no option but to reverse

the judgment and remand the cause for new trial."). That may be the case; however, the Court of

Criminal Appeals also requires a defendant to properly preserve the issue of improper jury argument

for appeal. See Cockrell, 933 S.W.2d at 89. Accordingly, we overrule Ford's point of error.

Equitable Continuance

Ford next contends the trial court erred when it denied his oral request for a continuance. Ford sought

the continuance in order to review exhibits presented by State expert Kenneth Doll. At trial, Doll used

color charts representing cellular coverage that had, admittedly, not been provided to Ford before trial.

The State contended the charts contained only information that was included in the cell phone records

that had in fact been provided to Ford before trial. Ford asked the trial court for "at least a couple of

hours" to review the charts, and the trial court [**62] denied his request.
HN28 The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure allows a continuance in a criminal action only upon the

written motion of the State or of the defendant setting forth sufficient cause. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.

art. 29.03 (emphasis added). Ford argues there is a due process exception to the rule requiring a

continuance to be in writing. See O'Rarden v. State, 777 S.W.2d 455, 459 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1989,

pet. ref'd). The Court of Criminal Appeals has "explicitly refused to recognize a due process exception

to the rule requiring motions for continuances to be written and sworn in order to be preserved on

appeal." Blackshear v. State, 385 S.W.3d 589, 591 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (citing to Anderson v. State,

301 S.W.3d 276, 280 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009)). Likewise, this court has expressly rejected this notion.

Jimenez v. State, 307 S.W.3d 325, 331 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2009, pet. ref'd). Accordingly, we

overrule Ford's point of error and hold his failure to file a written continuance failed to preserve error

for our review. See Blackshear, 385 S.W.3d at 590.

Independent Examination of DNA Evidence

After his conviction, but prior to the filing of the motion for new trial, Ford filed a motion for

independent testing of DNA evidence in the State's possession, including but not limited to, four brown

human hairs found on Edwards's left hand at the scene of her murder. The trial court denied Ford's

motion at the hearing on the motion for new trial. Ford contends the trial court abused its discretion by

doing so.3

FOOTNOTES

3 The State argues [**63] there is no error preserved for our review because the "motion was not

presented to the court during the hearing, and Appellant never asked the court to rule on it." This

is simply not the case. During the hearing on Ford's motion for new trial, his counsel reminded the

trial court that:

We do have my motion for DNA testing, the mitochondrial blood testing of the right

hand of Ms. Edwards. I want to obtain the Court's ruling on that motion so I may

preserve the issue that I'm raising for this motion for new trial.

The trial court then denied Ford's motion on the record.

[*200] Under the version of Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 39.14(a) applicable at the time

of trial:

HN29 Upon motion of the defendant showing good cause therefor and upon notice to the

other parties . . . the court in which an action is pending shall order the State before or

during trial of a criminal action therein pending or on trial to produce and permit the

inspection . . . [of] evidence material to any matter involved in the action and which are in

the possession, custody or control of the State or any of its agencies.

Act of April 16, 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., ch. 276, 2009 Tex. Gen. Laws 733 (amended 2014) (current

version at TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14(a) (West 2014)) (emphasis added). The State [**64]

contends Ford's motion was not timely filed, and therefore the trial court did not err by denying the

motion. We agree.

Article 39.14(a) allowed discovery and inspection of the material evidence sought by Ford when

requested "before or during trial." See id. (emphasis added). Here, Ford's motion was filed after he

was found guilty of murdering Edwards, not before or during trial, and was therefore not timely under

article 39.14(a). See id. Accordingly, we overrule Ford's argument and hold the trial court did not err

by denying his motion to inspect DNA evidence.

Alternate Perpetrator Evidence
Ford next contends the trial court erred by denying his attempt to introduce evidence that the Edwards

family's Gillespie County home was burglarized without signs of forced entry on December 30, 2008,

the day before Edwards's murder. Ford argues this evidence was admissible as alternate perpetrator

evidence and, alternatively, admissible as contextual evidence.

As noted above, we review a trial court's ruling on the admissibility of evidence for an abuse of

discretion. Green, 934 S.W.2d at 101-02. We may hold a trial court abused its discretion only if its

ruling falls outside the zone of reasonable disagreement. Id. at 102.

Ford's first argument is that the evidence [**65] of the burglary is admissible alternate perpetrator

evidence. HN30 When a defendant seeks to introduce evidence of an "alternate perpetrator," he must

establish a sufficient nexus between that person and the crime. Lopez v. State, 314 S.W.3d 54, 61

(Tex. App.—San Antonio 2010, pet. ref'd) (citing Wiley v. State, 74 S.W.3d 399, 406 (Tex. Crim. App.

2002)). This court has recognized it is not sufficient for a defendant to merely proffer "unsupported

speculation" that another person may have committed the crime. Id. at 61. Specifically, when the

evidence does not point to a particular individual as being responsible for the crime, the proffered

evidence amounts to no more than mere speculation that another person may have committed the

crime. See id. at 61-62 (emphasis added).

Here, Ford has not directed the court to any particular alternate individual suspected of committing the

crime. Rather, Ford has directed the court to the burglary to [*201] suggest an unidentified common

culprit. The evidence proffered by Ford does not present a sufficient nexus for admissible alternate

perpetrator evidence. See id. at 61. Instead of suggesting an identified particular individual as being

responsible for the crime, Ford merely provided speculation that there is a common culprit for both

incidents. Accordingly, we overrule this portion of the issue and hold the trial [**66] court did not

abuse its discretion. See Green, 934 S.W.2d at 101-02

Ford also argues evidence of the Gillespie County burglary is admissible "context evidence" with regard

to Edwards's murder. He makes this argument for the first time on appeal. Accordingly, he has not

preserved this argument for our review. See Reynolds, 423 S.W.3d at 383; TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1.

However, even if Ford's "context evidence" argument were preserved, it still fails.

In support of his "context evidence" argument, Ford directs the court to Mann v. State, 718 S.W.2d

741 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986), for the proposition the evidence proffered here is almost always

admissible. Specifically, Ford argues offenses rarely occur in a vacuum, and the burglary at the

Gillespie County property immediately preceding the events at Edwards's condominium provides

admissible context evidence for the murder. We disagree. Mann does not support the "context

evidence" Ford sought to introduce at trial. Rather, Mann concerned introduction of extraneous offense

evidence used against the defendant and held:

[E]vidence of the context of the offense is almost always admissible under the reasoning

that events do not occur in a vacuum and the jury has a right to have the offense place in

its proper setting so that all of the evidence may be realistically evaluated.

Id. at 744. Here, Ford [**67] was not attempting introduce extraneous offense "context" evidence

against himself. Accordingly, we overrule Ford's argument.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, we overrule Ford's points of error and affirm the trial court's judgment.

Marialyn Barnard, Justice

Publish

DISSENT BY: Luz Elena D. Chapa
"[A] Fourth Amendment search occurs when the government violates a subjective expectation of

privacy that society recognizes as reasonable." Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33, 121 S. Ct.

2038, 150 L. Ed. 2d 94 (2001); see Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360-62, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L.

Ed. 2d 576 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). Ford's cell phone provider tracked, collected, and recorded

information about Ford's physical movements and location whenever he received or placed a call or

text message. This "historical cell site data" was based on the cell phone towers through which his calls

and texts were routed. Because I would hold that Ford retained an objectively reasonable expectation

of privacy in his physical movements and location, I respectfully dissent from the court's judgment

affirming Ford's conviction.

The amount of detailed information that a cell phone provider has the means to track, collect, and

record about its customers as they conduct their everyday lives is staggering. See United States v.

Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945, 963, 181 L. Ed. 2d 911 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring in judgment). For instance, "

[h]istoric location information is a standard [**68] feature on many smart phones and can

reconstruct someone's specific movements down to the [*202] minute, not only around town but also

within a particular building." Riley v. California, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 2490, 189 L. Ed. 2d 430 (2014).

Although less precise than GPS records, the historic cell site data compiled by cell phone providers can

generate a "comprehensive record of a person's public movements that reflects a wealth of detail

about her familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations." See Jones, 132 S.Ct. at

955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); see also id. at 963 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment).

The majority holds that the third-party doctrine precludes Ford from having a reasonable expectation

of privacy in this "historical cell site data" because he "voluntarily disclosed" it to his cell phone

provider in the course of using his cell phone. To achieve this result, the majority relies on Smith v.

Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 99 S. Ct. 2577, 61 L. Ed. 2d 220 (1979) and United States v. Miller, 425 U.S.

435, 96 S. Ct. 1619, 48 L. Ed. 2d 71 (1976).1 These cases predate the advent of the earliest

commercially available handheld cell phones.2

FOOTNOTES

1 Although the majority primarily cites to opinions from the Fifth Circuit and the Fourteenth Court of

Appeals, the underpinnings of its reasoning flow directly from the also-cited Smith and Miller.

2 The first commercial cell phone system was introduced in 1983. Mobile Telephone,

[**69] ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA ONLINE,

http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1482373/mobile-telephone/279851/Development-ofcellular-systems (last updated Sept. 5, 2013).

But the Supreme Court has recently recognized that modern cell phones—now a "pervasive and

insistent" part of modern life—present privacy concerns far beyond the founding principles of the

Fourth Amendment and the circumstances of the founding era. See Riley, 134 S.Ct. at 2484. In Riley,

the Court held that the search-incident-to-an-arrest doctrine did not allow arresting officers to search

the digital contents of cell phones seized in connection with an arrest. Id. at 2493-94. The Court

recognized that "[m]odern cell phones, as a category, implicate privacy concerns far beyond those

implicated by the search of a cigarette pack, a wallet, or a purse" and that "[c]ell phones differ in both

a quantitative and a qualitative sense from other objects that might be kept on an arrestee's person."

Id. at 2488-89. Thus, the Court eschewed a "mechanical application" of its prior precedent that might

well have supported a warrantless search of the appellant's cell phone. Id. at 2484. Similar to the way

that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine was ill suited to the digital data contained on cell phones

seized during an arrest, the third-party doctrine is "ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a

DISSENT
great deal [**70] of information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out

mundane tasks." Jones, 132 S.Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).

The majority's application of the third-party doctrine sweeps intimate details of a person's life outside

the scope of the Fourth Amendment's protections because cell phone customers "voluntarily disclose"

their location information simply by owning and using their cell phones. The majority thus confronts

cell phone customers with a choice between Scylla and Charybdis: either forego the use of technology

that has become a pervasive and insistent part of modern, everyday life or forego the protections of

the Fourth Amendment. I cannot join such a sweeping and mechanical application of Smith and Miller.

Instead, I agree with the Third and Eleventh Circuits and conclude that "a cell phone customer has not

'voluntarily' [*203] shared his location information with a cellular provider in any meaningful way."

In re Application of U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc'ns Serv. to Disclose Records

to Gov't, 620 F.3d 304, 317 (3rd Cir. 2010); United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205, 1216-17 (11th Cir.

2014). I would therefore hold that Ford did not voluntarily surrender his reasonable expectation of

privacy in his physical location and movements simply by using his cell phone. Because the State did

not secure a warrant before obtaining the historical cell site data from [**71] Ford's cell phone

provider, Ford's Fourth Amendment rights were violated, and the trial court should have granted his

motion to suppress.

Because the Fourth Amendment required suppression of the historical cell site data, the denial of Ford's

motion to suppress was constitutional error. When an appellate court determines there was

constitutional error at trial, it must "reverse a judgment of conviction . . . unless the court determines

beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the conviction . . . . TEX. R. APP. P.

44.2(a). The evidence against Ford was largely circumstantial, and I am unable to conclude beyond a

reasonable doubt the erroneous admission of the historical cell site data did not contribute to Ford's

conviction. I would therefore reverse Ford's conviction and remand this case to the trial court for

further proceedings. Because the majority does not do so, I dissent.

Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

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Citation: 444 s.W.3d 171

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Date/Time: Monday, March 23, 2015 - 11:34 PM EDT

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