NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 

23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, 

as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties 

and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's 

decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire 

court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. 

A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 

2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted 

above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 

n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

21-P-904

THOMAS MICHAEL BONAPARTE & another1

vs.

MICHELA DEVOTI.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

This appeal stems from divorce proceedings in the Probate 

and Family Court between Michela Devoti (wife) and Thomas 

Bonaparte (husband), during a portion of which the wife was 

represented by Attorney Lauren G. Klein. After Klein withdrew 

from her representation of the wife, she initiated a Superior 

Court action to determine the amount of her attorney's lien.

The Superior Court proceedings determined the amount of the lien 

and also resulted in the imposition of sanctions on the wife for 

vexatious litigation. A Probate and Family Court judge (remand 

judge) thereafter issued an "amended judgment on remand" on 

September 9, 2021 (amended divorce judgment), providing, among 

other things, that all amounts due to Klein under the Superior 

1 Lauren G. Klein, intervener.
2

Court judgment would be paid directly to Klein from the wife's 

portion of the property division. The wife appeals, challenging 

the portions of the amended divorce judgment pertaining to the 

attorney's lien, statutory interest, sanctions, retroactive 

child support, college expenses, and property division.2 We 

reverse so much of the amended divorce judgment as requires the 

parties to contribute to the minor child's future college 

expenses. The amended divorce judgment is affirmed in all other 

respects.

Background. The parties were married in October 2005, and 

their child was born in 2006. Although they lived together as a 

family in Massachusetts for a short period of time, during most 

of the parties' marriage and throughout the litigation in this 

case, the wife and the child have resided in Italy, while the 

husband has resided in the United States. In May 2015, the 

husband filed a complaint for divorce in the Probate and Family 

Court and a judgment of divorce nisi issued in June 2016 (2016 

divorce judgment). The wife appealed and, in 2018, this court 

vacated the 2016 divorce judgment (except for the portion 

dissolving the parties' marriage) and remanded the case for a 

new trial because the wife had not been permitted to testify 

2 The wife also appeals from a "postjudgment" order dated 

September 10, 2021, but makes no separate argument with regard 

to this order, which essentially deals with the same issues 

already addressed in this appeal.
3

either telephonically or electronically. See Bonaparte v. 

Devoti, 93 Mass. App. Ct. 603, 608 (2018). Klein represented 

the wife in the divorce proceedings through the entry of the 

2016 divorce judgment.

After the 2016 divorce judgment entered, Klein withdrew as 

the wife's counsel and moved to enforce her attorney's lien 

pursuant to G. L. c. 221, § 50. On August 2, 2016, nunc pro 

tunc to July 21, 2016, a Probate and Family Court judge issued 

an order providing, in relevant part, that Klein was entitled to 

a lien "for her reasonable legal fees and costs, which shall be 

paid from any final award or settlement that is entered or made 

to the [wife], or from any other proceeds that the [wife] may 

receive in this matter"; however, "[t]he amount of this lien is 

not hereby determined, but must be determined by a proceeding 

brought in another Court" (emphasis omitted).

In December 2016, Klein commenced a Superior Court action 

to determine the amount of her attorney's lien. After

unsuccessfully moving to dismiss, the wife filed a number of 

motions seeking reconsideration, resulting in her being 

sanctioned by a Superior Court judge for vexatious litigation.

She was further sanctioned by another Superior Court judge for 

other "behavior throughout th[e] [Superior Court] litigation 

that appear[ed] to be intended to delay and to impose 

unnecessary burdens on opposing counsel and th[e] [c]ourt." In 
4

July 2020, following a trial, a different Superior Court judge 

issued findings of fact and judgments (1) declaring that

$36,891.60 was the amount of reasonable attorney's fees owed by 

the wife for services rendered by Klein in connection with the 

divorce proceedings; and (2) requiring the wife to pay the 

previously ordered sanctions, in the amount of $3,990, plus 

statutory prejudgment interest from December 2019 to July 2020. 

The Superior Court judge noted that, with respect to the amount 

of the attorney's lien, because he had "not enter[ed] a judgment 

for money damages, [he] [did] not address the issue of interest, 

which [wa]s for the Probate and Family Court" to decide. The 

wife appealed from the Superior Court judgments, which were 

recently affirmed by a different panel of this court in an 

unpublished memorandum and order. See Klein v. Devoti, 101 

Mass. App. Ct. 1106 (2022).

While the Superior Court action was pending, the divorce 

matter was remanded to the Probate and Family Court for further 

proceedings. Klein moved to intervene in the remanded divorce 

proceedings. A one-day divorce trial was held before the remand 

judge on February 19, 2021, during which both parties were 

represented by counsel. The remand judge allowed Klein's 

renewed motion to enforce attorney's lien in an order dated 

February 19, 2021. 
5

In September 2021, the remand judge issued the amended 

divorce judgment providing, among other things, that (1) the 

husband shall pay weekly child support of $365; (2) the parties 

shall equally contribute to the child's college expenses "based 

upon his or her ability at the time"; and (3) as part of the 

property division, the wife shall receive $79,400 from the 

husband, less "all funds due" to Klein "pursuant to [the]

Superior Court [action], plus statutory interest from the date 

of the Superior Court [j]udgment through the date of 

distribution. Any such funds shall be paid by husband directly 

to Attorney Klein at that time." The present appeal by the wife 

followed.

Discussion. The wife challenges the portions of the 

amended divorce judgment (1) requiring the payment of Klein's 

lien, statutory interest, and Superior Court sanctions from the 

wife's share of the property division; (2) denying her request 

for retroactive child support; (3) allocating financial 

responsibility for the child's future college expenses; and (4) 

pertaining to the property division. We address her contentions 

in turn.

1. Amounts due to Klein. As an initial matter, we note 

that many of the issues raised by the wife in connection with 

the attorney's lien and the imposition of sanctions were either 

already decided in the prior appeal, Klein v. Devoti, 101 Mass. 
6

App. Ct. 1106 (2022), or were not raised below in the first 

instance. We will not revisit those previously decided issues, 

see King v. Driscoll, 424 Mass. 1, 7-8 (1996), nor will we 

entertain issues that have been raised for the first time on 

appeal. See Carey v. New England Organ Bank, 446 Mass. 270, 285 

(2006). We therefore turn to the wife's remaining contentions

regarding the amounts due to Klein; that the amended divorce 

judgment erroneously included statutory interest and sanctions

in the amount to be paid to Klein from the wife's share of the 

property division.

"An attorney's lien under G. L. c. 221, § 50, is a tool for 

the recovery of legal fees." Ropes & Gray LLP v. Jalbert, 454 

Mass. 407, 413 (2009). The purpose of interest under G. L. 

c. 231, § 6C3 is to "compensate a damaged party for the loss of 

use or unlawful detention of money." Craft v. Kane, 65 Mass. 

App. Ct. 322, 328 (2005), quoting Sterilite Corp. v. Continental 

Cas. Co., 397 Mass. 837, 841 (1986). Statutory interest may be 

awarded on an attorney's lien from the date that the court 

enters an order establishing the amount of the lien. Here, the 

remand judge awarded "statutory interest from the date of the 

3 "In all actions based on contractual obligations, upon a 

verdict, finding or order for judgment for pecuniary damages, 

interest shall be added by the clerk of the court to the amount 

of damages, at the contract rate, if established, or at the rate 

of twelve per cent per annum from the date of the breach or 

demand. . . ." G. L. c. 231, § 6C.
7

Superior Court [j]udgment" establishing the amount of Klein's 

lien. See Craft, supra (statutory interest may be awarded on 

attorney's lien from date that court enters order establishing 

amount of lien). We discern no error in the award of statutory 

interest set forth in the amended divorce judgment.

As for the inclusion of sanctions in the amended divorce 

judgment, the wife argues in a conclusory fashion that the 

attorney's lien "does not apply to sanctions awarded in a 

separate adversarial proceeding against a former client." The 

wife appears to be arguing that the remand judge lacked 

authority to enforce the Superior Court judgment pertaining to 

sanctions; however, she provides no relevant legal authority in 

support thereof. Accordingly, this contention does not rise to 

the level of reasoned appellate argument, and we decline to 

consider it. See Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (9), as appearing in 481 

Mass. 1628 (2019); Zora v. State Ethics Comm'n, 415 Mass. 640, 

642 n.3 (1993) ("bald assertions of error" in brief "lacking 

legal argument and authority . . . [do not] rise[] to the level 

of appellate argument").4 See also Maza v. Commonwealth, 423 

4 The wife cites to one case in her reply brief, Torphy v. Reder, 

357 Mass. 153, 155-156 (1970), for the proposition that Klein's 

attorney's lien may not include the sanctions awarded by the 

Superior Court. Notwithstanding that the wife should have 

included all relevant legal arguments and supporting authority 

in her main brief, see O'Meara v. Doherty, 53 Mass. App. Ct. 

599, 606 n.4 (2002), the case cited in her reply brief does not 

establish that the remand judge lacked authority to enforce the 
8

Mass. 1006, 1006 (1996) (appellant's pro se status does not 

excuse noncompliance with rules of appellate procedure).

2. Retroactive child support. The wife asserts that the 

remand judge erroneously denied her request for retroactive 

child support. We disagree.

We review child support orders for an abuse of discretion. 

See Department of Revenue v. C.M.J., 432 Mass. 69, 75 (2000). 

The wife contends, again without citing to relevant legal 

authority, that the judge abused her discretion in denying the 

wife's request for retroactive child support because she was 

deprived of adequate child support during the pendency of the 

original divorce action, appeal, and remand proceedings. The

remand judge found that, although the wife claimed the husband 

"did not provide enough support for [the child] over the years, 

Superior Court's judgment regarding sanctions. Although we do 

not reach the merits of this issue, we note that there is no 

blanket prohibition against seeking enforcement of a monetary 

judgment issued by a court of the Commonwealth in another court 

of the Commonwealth. See Mass. R. Civ. P. 69, 365 Mass. 836 

(1974) (identical to Mass. R. Dom. Rel. P. 69) ("Process to 

enforce a judgment for the payment of money shall be a writ of 

execution, unless the court directs otherwise. The procedure on 

execution, in proceedings on and in aid of execution shall be in 

accordance with applicable statutes"); G. L. c. 235, § 14 (b) 

("If a judgment is rendered for the plaintiff by a court in an 

action founded on a judgment rendered by a different court, 

within the commonwealth, execution shall not issue until the 

plaintiff files with the court rendering the judgment in the 

later action, a certificate of the judgment in the earlier case 

under the seal of the court rendering it, attested by the clerk 

of such court").
9

. . . [the] evidence prove[d] otherwise. [The] [h]usband 

consistently paid his child support obligation, . . . all 

finances [including travel expenses] required by the Italian 

Custody & Visitation Agreement[,] . . . [and] expenses incurred 

on behalf of [the child] above and beyond what he was court 

ordered to pay," including one-half of the child's private 

school tuition. The remand judge determined that the husband's 

presumptive child support obligation under the Child Support 

Guidelines (guidelines) was $365 per week, based on the parties' 

incomes at the time of the remand trial and the parenting plan 

under which the child resided principally with the wife. The 

remand judge declined to order the husband to contribute to the 

child's private school education. The judge was not required to 

order retroactive child support under the circumstances of this 

case,5 and it was not an abuse of discretion to deny the wife's 

request for retroactive support where the judge made detailed 

findings explaining the basis for her decision.6 Cf. Boulter5 The wife originally raised her request for retroactive child 

support in a complaint in equity. Where, as here, a child is 

born to married parents, there is no statute requiring a judge 

to order retroactive child support for any period predating the 

entry of the divorce judgment. See Department of Revenue v. 

Roe, 29 Mass. App. Ct. 967, 967-968 (1990). The issue of 

awarding retroactive child support for children born to married 

parents ordinarily arises in the context of a modification 

proceeding. See Boulter-Hedley v. Boulter, 429 Mass. 808, 809-

810 (1999).

6 The remand judge made the following subsidiary findings in 

support of her ultimate determination regarding retroactive 
10

Hedley v. Boulter, 429 Mass. 808, 812 (1999) (judge denying 

request for retroactive modification of child support should 

make "specific finding that retroactivity would be . . . unjust, 

or inappropriate" under circumstances of case).

3. College expenses. The wife contends that the provision 

in the amended divorce judgment requiring the parties to 

contribute equally to the child's future post-secondary (i.e., 

college) expenses was premature and therefore improper. We 

agree.

"Generally, 'support orders regarding the future payment of 

post-high school educational costs are premature and should not 

be made' . . . until college is 'imminent' for the child" 

(citations omitted). Rosen v. Rosen, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 677, 694 

(2016). Here, at the time of the remand trial, the child was 

child support. The husband has historically paid, and continues 

to pay, for all travel expenses incurred to exercise his 

parenting time with the child. Between 2016 and 2020, the 

husband incurred approximately $24,535 in travel expenses. The 

husband has voluntarily paid one-half of the child's private 

school tuition since September 2017. The husband paid 

approximately $8,307.19, representing one-half of the child's 

middle school expenses over a period of two years. At the time 

of trial, the husband was paying approximately $3,000 per year 

for the child's high school tuition and miscellaneous schoolrelated expenses. Beginning in January 2015, the husband made 

voluntary child support payments of $100 per week, increasing 

them to $150 per week as of September 2015. After the 2016 

divorce judgment entered, the husband made weekly child support 

payments of $240, consistent with that judgment.
11

fifteen years old and in his first year of high school.7 Neither 

party raised the issue of allocating responsibility for future 

college expenses, and there was no evidence showing that either 

(1) the child was preparing to attend college soon, see Cabot v. 

Cabot, 55 Mass. App. Ct. 756, 765 (2002), or (2) special 

circumstances existed warranting an order for the payment of

college expenses. See Taverna v. Pizzi, 430 Mass. 882, 885-886 

(2000); Passemato v. Passemato, 427 Mass. 52, 54-55 (1998). 

Accordingly, the provision of the amended divorce judgment 

ordering the parties to contribute to the child's future college 

expenses was premature and must be reversed. See Lang v. Koon, 

61 Mass. App. Ct. 22, 26-27 (2004) (order for payment of college 

expenses premature where children were ages fifteen and eleven, 

and "and there were no findings of special concerns regarding 

either the children or the parents").

4. Property division. When reviewing the distribution of 

the marital estate, "[w]e review the judge's findings to 

determine whether she considered all the relevant factors under 

G. L. c. 208, § 34, and whether she relied on any irrelevant 

factors." Zaleski v. Zaleski, 469 Mass. 230, 245 (2014). "We 

7 The child started high school in the fall of 2020, only a few 

months prior to the remand trial in February 2021. The judge 

found that the child would not turn eighteen until January 2024, 

more than two years after the entry of the amended divorce 

judgment.
12

will not reverse a judgment with respect to property division 

unless it is 'plainly wrong and excessive.'" Id., quoting 

Baccanti v. Morton, 434 Mass. 787, 793 (2001).

As noted by the remand judge, the "main asset that [was] 

contested by the parties [was] the former marital home."8 The 

judge was presented with three appraisals dated 2016 ($230,000), 

2019 ($285,000), and 2020 ($300,000). The judge used the 2016 

appraisal (the year that the parties were divorced) and, after 

deducting the mortgage, determined that the marital home had 

equity of $98,594.69. The judge found it "equitable" to award 

the wife the entirety of her $79,400 contribution to the marital 

home's down payment, leaving the husband with the remaining 

equity of $19,194.69 (which was only slightly more than his 

personal contribution of $18,900 to the down payment. Because 

the judge assigned the marital home to the husband, he also 

retained the postdivorce appreciation in the home's equity. The 

wife contends that she was entitled to a portion of the 

8 The parties were each assigned the property held in their 

respective individual names because they elected to "have a 

separate property regime in accordance with their Italian 

marriage certificate and [the] wife's premarital assets." The 

wife retained, among other things, two homes in Italy, which she 

inherited from her late mother, worth approximately $153,000. 

The husband retained, among other things, his retirement account 

valued at $88,779.24, which appears to have accrued entirely 

postdivorce. The value of the parties' other assets, including 

their individual bank account balances, remained relatively 

stable between 2016 and 2021. 
13

postdivorce appreciation, and that the judge erroneously valued 

the marital home as of the 2016 divorce. We disagree.

Where, as here, the property division in the 2016 divorce 

judgment was vacated and the matter was remanded for a new 

trial, "[t]his resulted in the case standing as if no judgment 

had been entered with respect to the [property] division." 

Johnson v. Johnson, 53 Mass. App. Ct. 416, 420 (2001). The 

remand judge "in this instance was charged with dividing the 

property anew, applying the § 34 factors as of the date of the 

divorce." Id. at 421. The remand judge "then was required to 

consider whether there had been any appreciation or depreciation 

with respect to the property, and if so, the extent to which 

such appreciation was attributable to one or the other of the 

parties or to some independent cause." Id. at 421-422. "[I]f 

the postdivorce increase . . . [was] attributable only to the 

postdivorce efforts of one spouse," the remand judge was to 

treat the "postdivorce increase . . . in the value of the 

property . . . as an after-acquired asset, not subject to 

division." Id. at 421.

Here, the judge found that the wife, aside from her 

contribution of $79,400 to the down payment for the marital 

home, made "limited contribution toward maintaining the property 

over the years." By contrast, the judge found that the husband 

had, at all times, been "solely responsible for the mortgage 
14

payments, taxes, and improvements to the marital home." The 

judge therefore implicitly found that the postdivorce 

appreciation of the marital home was attributable solely to the 

husband's efforts. See Johnson, 53 Mass. App. Ct. at 422-423

(consideration of one party's "contributions to the upkeep and 

improvement of the property, . . . w[as] factor[] that the judge 

could properly consider in determining whether appreciation of 

the marital property was solely attributable to [that party]").9 

Accordingly, we discern no error in the judge's decision to 

value the marital home as of 2016. We further conclude that the 

property division was not plainly wrong and excessive."10

Conclusion.11 So much of the September 9, 2021 amended 

judgment on remand requiring the parties to contribute equally 

9 The wife claims that she is entitled to her share of the 

marital home's appreciation "that is attributable to the rising 

real estate market," rather than to the husband's sole efforts. 

However, the cases cited by the wife do not support this 

proposition and are distinguishable from the facts of this case. 

See Pare v. Pare, 409 Mass. 292, 296 n.4 (1991); Johnson, 53 

Mass. App. Ct. at 421.

10 The wife also contends that the remand judge improperly made a 

number of findings regarding the parties' postdivorce 

circumstances. She does not, however, identify how those 

findings resulted in a "plainly wrong and excessive" division of 

property. Zaleski, 469 Mass. at 245, quoting Baccanti, 434 

Mass. at 793. Moreover, the judge's "consideration of matters 

occurring subsequent to the divorce," was not improper, where, 

as here, the 2016 divorce judgment was vacated and the property 

division had to be considered anew. Johnson, 53 Mass. App. Ct. 

at 422.

11 The wife's request for appellate costs is denied.
15

to the child's post-secondary educational expenses is reversed. 

The amended judgment on remand is affirmed in all other

respects.

So ordered.

By the Court (Massing, 

Singh & Hershfang, JJ.12),

Clerk

Entered: February 28, 2023.

12 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.