If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

MARIO LOUIS CORSETTI,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

UNPUBLISHED

May 30, 2024

v No. 368001 

Oakland Circuit Court

LAUREN A. COHEN, LC No. 2019-877406-DP

Defendant-Appellee.

Before: BORRELLO, P.J., and SWARTZLE and YOUNG, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

In this paternity action, plaintiff appeals as of right the trial court’s ruling denying his 

motion to modify parenting time. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we reverse and remand 

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. BACKGROUND

The parties were involved in a relatively brief dating relationship at one point but were 

never married. Plaintiff initiated this paternity action alleging that he was the father of defendant’s 

child, who was born after the parties ended their dating relationship. Paternity testing was 

completed, and the trial court entered an order determining that plaintiff was the biological father 

of the child. 

Eventually, a consent order was entered regarding custody and parenting time. Pursuant 

to this order, defendant was awarded sole legal custody and primary physical custody of the child, 

and plaintiff’s parenting time was suspended until further order of the court.

As relevant to this appeal, defendant also obtained a personal protection order (PPO) 

against plaintiff1that prohibited him from, among other things, entering onto defendant’s property, 

 

1 The PPO was obtained in a separate case number, but the same judge presided over both the PPO 

action and the instant paternity action.
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assaulting or attacking defendant or the child, threatening to kill or physically injure defendant or 

the child, and removing the child from defendant “except as allowed by custody or parenting-time 

order provided removal of the children does not violate other conditions of this order.”

On June 8, 2023, plaintiff filed a motion seeking a modification in parenting time to grant 

him specific parenting time. A hearing was held on July 12, 2023 to address the motion. The trial 

court ruled from the bench and denied plaintiff’s motion because there was “a valid PPO, which 

prevents [plaintiff] from having contact with [his] child.” The court further ruled that plaintiff 

could revisit the matter when the PPO expired in February 2025. The trial court explicitly ruled 

that the “PPO trumps . . . everything.”

The trial court denied plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration. Plaintiff now appeals.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“Orders concerning parenting time must be affirmed on appeal unless the 

trial court’s findings were against the great weight of the evidence, the court 

committed a palpable abuse of discretion, or the court made a clear legal error on a 

major issue.” Under the great weight of the evidence standard, this Court should 

not substitute its judgment on questions of fact unless the facts clearly preponderate 

in the opposite direction. In child custody cases, “[a]n abuse of discretion exists 

when the trial court’s decision is so palpably and grossly violative of fact and logic 

that it evidences a perversity of will, a defiance of judgment, or the exercise of 

passion or bias.” Clear legal error occurs “when the trial court errs in its choice, 

interpretation, or application of the existing law.” [Shade v Wright, 291 Mich App 

17, 20-21; 805 NW2d 1 (2010) (citations omitted; alteration in original).]

III. ANALYSIS

As an initial matter, we must address defendant’s argument that this Court is required to 

dismiss plaintiff’s appeal because the trial court failed to enter a written order specifically 

memorializing its verbal order that was made on the record at the July 12, 2023 hearing. This 

Court has previously explained:

[I]t is a settled maxim that courts generally speak through their judgments and 

decrees, and not their oral statements or written opinions. However, there are 

circumstances in which “[a]n oral ruling has the same force and effect as a written 

order,” as when, for example, an oral ruling clearly communicates the finality of 

the court’s pronouncement. When assessing whether an oral ruling has equal effect 

to that of a written order, we consider whether the oral ruling contains indicia of 

formality and finality comparable to that of a written order. [Arbor Farms, LLC v 

GeoStar Corp, 305 Mich App 374, 387-388; 853 NW2d 421 (2014) (citations 

omitted).]

Here, it is evident from the hearing transcript that the trial court’s denial of plaintiff’s 

motion was the court’s final pronouncement on the issue. We thus concluded that under these 

circumstances, the trial court’s oral ruling had the effect of a written order. Id. We now turn to 

our review on the merits of the trial court’s ruling.
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“As set forth in MCL 722.27(1)(c), when seeking to modify a custody or a parenting-time 

order, the moving party must first establish proper cause or a change of circumstances before the 

court may proceed to an analysis of whether the requested modification is in the child’s best 

interests.” Lieberman v Orr, 319 Mich App 68, 81; 900 NW2d 130 (2017). The standard for 

defining “what constitutes proper cause or a change of circumstances under MCL 722.27(1)(c) 

will vary depending on the nature of the requested amendment or modification.” Kaeb v Kaeb, 

309 Mich App 556, 570; 873 NW2d 319 (2015). 

“If the request involves a change that alters an established custodial environment, then the 

more stringent framework from [Vodvarka v Grasmeyer, 259 Mich App 499; 675 NW2d 847

(2003)] will apply.” Kaeb, 309 Mich App at 570. Under Vodvarka, “proper cause means one or 

more appropriate grounds that have or could have a significant effect on the child’s life to the 

extent that a reevaluation of the child’s custodial situation should be undertaken.” Vodvarka, 259 

Mich App at 511. Alternatively, establishing a “change of circumstances” under Vodvarka

requires proof that since the last custody order was entered, the “conditions surrounding custody 

of the child, which have or could have a significant effect on the child’s well-being, have materially 

changed.” Id. at 513. In making this showing, “the evidence must demonstrate something more 

than the normal life changes (both good and bad) that occur during the life of a child, and there 

must be at least some evidence that the material changes have had or will almost certainly have an 

effect on the child.” Id. at 513-514.

However, if the request only involves a modification of parenting time that does not alter 

the established custodial environment, then “a more expansive definition of ‘proper cause’ or 

‘change of circumstances’ is appropriate,” under which normal life changes may properly be 

considered. Shade, 291 Mich App at 28-31. Finally, the standard is even less stringent and more 

flexible if the requested modification or amendment only involves “a condition on parenting time.” 

Kaeb, 309 Mich App at 570-572.

“A court is not bound by what litigants choose to label their motions because this would 

exalt form over substance,” and a court must instead “consider the gravamen of the complaint or 

motion based on a reading of the document as a whole.” Lieberman, 319 Mich App at 77 n 4

(quotation marks and citation omitted). Hence, “[i]f a change in parenting time results in a change 

in the established custodial environment, then the Vodvarka framework is appropriate.” Shade, 

291 Mich App at 27 (emphasis added). “Whereas minor modifications that leave a party’s 

parenting time essentially intact do not change a child’s established custodial environment,

significant changes do.” Lieberman, 319 Mich App at 89-90 (citation omitted).

By its terms, the PPO recognized that the restrictions on custody and parenting-time could 

be modified by order of the court. Here, the trial court failed to address whether plaintiff made 

this threshold showing of proper cause or a change in circumstances before denying outright 

plaintiff’s motion to modify parenting time. The trial court’s complete failure to apply the proper 

legal framework to deciding plaintiff’s motion constitutes a clear legal error on a major issue. 

Shade, 291 Mich App at 20-21. We therefore reverse the trial court’s ruling and remand this matter 

for the trial court to decide plaintiff’s motion under the proper legal framework.
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Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.

/s/ Stephen L. Borrello 

/s/ Brock A. Swartzle 

/s/ Adrienne N. Young