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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 50825

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

SARAH ELLEN STANLEY,

Defendant-Appellant.

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Filed: August 14, 2024

Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED

OPINION AND SHALL NOT

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, State of Idaho, 

Teton County. Hon. Steven W. Boyce, District Judge. 

Order of the district court denying motion for relief from restitution, affirmed.

Erik R. Lehtinen, State Appellate Public Defender; Jenny C. Swinford, Deputy 

Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. 

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Amy J. Lavin, Deputy Attorney General, 

Boise, for respondent. 

GRATTON, Chief Judge 

Sarah Ellen Stanley appeals from the district court’s denial of her Idaho Rule of Civil 

Procedure 60(b)(6) motion for relief from restitution. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm. 

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Stanley fled to Alabama with her minor child, violating a custody agreement between 

Stanley and the father of the child. Stanley was arrested in Alabama for withholding the child 

from the father. The father flew to Alabama, retrieved the child, and returned to Idaho with the 

child. Following Stanley’s arrest, she was extradited back to Idaho where she pled guilty in the 

district court to child custody interference, Idaho Code § 18-4506. As part of the plea agreement, 

Stanley agreed to pay the costs incurred for her extradition and “any and all reasonable restitution 

amounts arising out of the facts and circumstances” of the underlying charge. In exchange for her 

guilty plea, an additional charge of misdemeanor criminal contempt was dismissed. All parties 

agreed to proceed to a sentencing hearing without conducting a presentence investigation. 
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At the sentencing hearing, the district court withheld judgment and placed Stanley on 

probation for a period of three years. The district court ordered restitution in the amount of 

$7,467.55 for the cost of Stanley’s extradition. The State informed the district court that the child’s 

father incurred expenses for flying to Alabama to retrieve the child. The State was given thirty 

days to file a motion to supplement restitution to reflect the costs incurred by the father. A payment 

plan was discussed off the record and the hearing concluded. Sixty-five days later, the State filed 

a supplemental motion for restitution in the amount of $3,004.30 and attached the father’s bank 

statements to reflect the costs he incurred for retrieving the child. The district court issued a final

restitution order in the amount of $7,467.55 for the cost of Stanley’s extradition, $3,004.30 for the 

father’s expenses, $245.00 in court costs, and $300.00 for public defender reimbursement, for a 

total restitution award in the amount of $11,016.85. 

A month later, Stanley filed an I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6) motion for relief from the $3,004.30 

restitution award for the father. She did not challenge the other restitution awards. Stanley argued 

that the State’s motion to supplement restitution was time barred for being filed outside the thirtyday period stipulated by the district court and that the restitution order was “unreasonable” because 

she was “truly indigent.” The district court held a hearing on Stanley’s motion for relief. At the 

hearing, Stanley reiterated her arguments that the State’s motion for restitution was time barred, 

the restitution amount was unreasonable because she was “truly indigent,” and she lacked the 

ability to pay. The district court denied Stanley’s motion for relief, stating “the order for restitution 

is totally appropriate under the circumstances” and “the order for restitution, for those expenses, 

is a necessary and reasonable order.” Stanley appeals. 

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court reviews a denial of a motion to grant relief under I.R.C.P. 60(b) for an abuse of 

discretion. Ciccarello v. Davies, 166 Idaho 153, 159, 456 P.3d 519, 525 (2019). When a trial 

court’s discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered 

inquiry to determine whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; 

(2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal 

standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the 

exercise of reason. Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018).
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III.

ANALYSIS

Stanley argues the district court abused its discretion when it denied her I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6) 

motion for relief from the restitution order for the expenses incurred by father because the district 

court failed to consider her ability to pay. Alternatively, Stanley argues if the district court properly 

weighed Stanley’s ability to pay, the district court did not exercise reason because Stanley’s 

financial resources, needs, and earning ability justified a reduction in the restitution ordered. The 

State asserts that Stanley’s argument is unpreserved or waived because Stanley agreed to pay 

restitution as part of her Idaho Criminal Rule 11 plea agreement. The State further argues if 

Stanley’s argument has not been waived, Stanley fails to demonstrate “compelling and unique 

circumstances” justifying relief under I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6). Alternatively, the State argues the district 

court properly considered Stanley’s ability to pay as one of the factors in its discretionary 

restitution determination. 

Idaho Code § 19-5304(2) provides “[u]nless the court determines that an order of restitution 

would be inappropriate or undesirable, it shall order a defendant found guilty of any crime which 

results in an economic loss to the victim to make restitution to the victim.” The sentencing court 

has discretion to determine whether restitution is appropriate and, if so, to set the amount. State v. 

McNeil, 158 Idaho 280, 283, 346 P.3d 297, 300 (Ct. App. 2014). In determining whether to order 

restitution and setting the amount, the sentencing court shall consider the amount of economic loss 

sustained by the victim as a result of the offense, the financial resources, needs, earning ability of 

the defendant, and such other factors as the court deems appropriate. I.C. § 19-5304(7). The 

immediate inability to pay restitution by a defendant shall not be, in and of itself, a reason not to 

order restitution. Id. 

Idaho Code § 19-5304(10) allows a defendant against whom a restitution order has been 

entered, to request relief from the restitution in accordance with the I.R.C.P. within forty-two days 

of the order. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) prescribes that the court may relieve a party 

from an order for “any other reason that justifies relief.” Under I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6), a court may 

grant relief only “on a showing of unique and compelling circumstances justifying relief.” In Re 

SRBA Case No. 39576 Subcase No. 37-00864, 164 Idaho 241, 252, 429 P.3d 129, 140 (2018); see

Miller v. Haller, 129 Idaho 345, 349, 924 P.2d 607, 611 (1996) (A district court’s discretion in 
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granting a Rule 60(b) motion is limited to “unique and compelling” circumstances.). Relief under 

I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6) is infrequently granted. Ciccarello, 166 Idaho at 163, 456 P.3d at 529.

On appeal, Stanley argues the district court did not act within the outer boundaries of its 

discretion or exercise reason in denying her I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6) motion for relief from restitution. 

She asserts the district court did not consider her ability to pay the ordered restitution as required 

under I.C. § 19-5304(7) by not accounting for her claims of indigency. 

This Court analyzes the terms of a plea agreement as it would a contract; in so doing, it 

looks to the contractual terms of a plea agreement. State v. Jafek, 141 Idaho 71, 73, 106 P.3d 397,

399 (2005). “Interpretation of an unambiguous document is a question of law, reviewed de 

novo.” State v. Claxton, 128 Idaho 782, 785, 918 P.2d 1227, 1230 (Ct. App. 1996). In general, 

“[a]n unambiguous contract will be given its plain meaning.” Credit Suisse AG v. Teufel Nursery,

Inc., 156 Idaho 189, 196, 321 P.3d 739, 746 (2014) (quoting Bakker v. Thunder Spring-Wareham,

LLC, 141 Idaho 185, 190, 108 P.3d 332, 337 (2005)). This Court must consider contractual terms 

that are expressly provided in the plea agreement, as well as those contractual terms that are 

implied. State v. Doe, 138 Idaho 409, 410-11, 64 P.3d 335, 336-37 (Ct. App. 2003).

Under the plea agreement, Stanley agreed to pay “any and all reasonable restitution 

amounts arising out of the facts and circumstances [of the] underlying charge.” Under 

I.C.R. 11(f)(1), a plea agreement “may include a waiver of the defendant’s right to appeal the 

judgment and sentence of the court . . . .” The language of Stanley’s plea agreement indicates that 

she waived her right to appeal the imposition of the district court’s restitution order, although she

may still challenge the reasonableness pertaining to the sufficiency of evidence relative to the 

determined restitution amount.1 In State v. Foeller, 168 Idaho 884, 888, 489 P.3d 795, 799 (2021), 

Foeller signed a plea agreement in which she agreed to “[p]ay restitution/reimbursement: If 

applicable per statute: for all charges, even those dismissed.” Foeller argued that the district court 

erred in awarding restitution by failing to consider her ability to pay. Id. at 886, 489 P.3d at 797. 

The State argued that Foeller waived any issue regarding restitution except whether the award 

1 The State was still bound to submit competent evidence to support any amount claimed in 

restitution per the plea agreement. See State v. Cunningham, 161 Idaho 698, 700, 390 P.3d 424, 

426 (2017) (holding that a statement of costs form without itemized time entries explaining the 

tasks performed or expenditures made in a particular case was insufficient evidence to support a 

restitution award). 
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covers an “economic loss” under the statute. Id. at 887, 489 P.3d at 798. The Supreme Court held 

that the reference to “per statute” meant that the district court was bound to consider the I.C. § 19-

5304 factors in assessing restitution. Id. at 888, 489 P.3d at 799. Here, Stanley’s plea agreement 

does not reference the statute. Therefore, Stanley contractually waived any requirement on the 

part of the district court, which may have otherwise been required under I.C. § 19-5304, to consider 

her ability to pay. For this reason, Stanley cannot show error in the district court’s order of 

$3,004.30 restitution to the father. 

Even considering Stanley’s challenge to the restitution order under her I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6) 

motion for relief, Stanley’s claim fails. Stanley argues the district court abused its discretion by 

not considering her ability to pay as required by I.C. § 19-5304(7). Throughout the legal 

proceedings Stanley presented no actual evidence for the district court to consider when making 

its restitution determination, nor did she point to anything within the record supporting her inability 

to pay on appeal. Stanley did not offer any affidavits, testimony, or evidence supporting her 

inability to pay restitution. Rather, Stanley made claims of indigency but mere claims of indigency 

alone are insufficient to be considered evidence towards her inability to pay. Additionally, Stanley 

had ample opportunity to introduce relevant evidence of her inability to pay but failed to do so. 

Stanley agreed to proceed to sentencing without a presentence investigation, she failed to present 

any evidence at her sentencing hearing, and she did not request a separate restitution hearing to 

introduce evidence of her indigency. Stanley submitted no competent evidence of her claimed 

indigency incident to the I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6) motion. Stanley also failed to object to the State’s 

motion to supplement restitution and/or the district court’s restitution order, both of which were

opportunities for Stanley to introduce evidence of her inability to pay. Because Stanley did not 

provide the district court with any actual evidence of her inability to pay restitution or point to 

such evidence within the record on appeal, she has failed to show that the district court abused its 

discretion by not considering her ability to pay. 

Stanley fails to show the district court abused its discretion because the district court did 

not expressly consider her current or future ability to pay. When assessing a restitution order, the 

district court is not required to “divine a defendant’s future financial capabilities” or “limit a 

victim’s right to restitution to what is presently known about the defendant.” State v. Garcia, 166 

Idaho 661, 683, 462 P.3d 1125, 1147 (2020). Additionally, the district court is not required to 

“summarize all of the evidence in the record supporting an ability to pay in order to conclude a 
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defendant has the foreseeable ability to pay before it may order restitution.” Foeller, 168 Idaho at

890, 489 P.3d at 801.

In this case, as stated above, Stanley did not offer the district court any relevant evidence 

to consider when conducting its analysis on the appropriateness of the restitution order. Because 

Stanley proffered no evidence of her inability to pay, the district court could only consider the 

limited information in the record: her agreement to pay restitution pursuant to her plea agreement, 

her sentence to three years’ probation rather than incarceration, and her requirement to maintain 

full-time employment as a condition of probation. In examining this evidence at the hearing on 

the I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6) motion for relief, the district court stated it had “reviewed the file,” deemed 

the restitution “totally appropriate under the circumstances,” and declared its belief that the 

restitution for the father’s expenses is “a necessary and reasonable order.” Similar to Foeller, 

where the Idaho Supreme Court held that a single sentence analysis of Foeller’s ability to pay 

restitution was appropriate, the brevity of the district court’s restitution analysis here is appropriate 

given the circumstances. Id. at 888-890, 489 P.3d at 799-801. Had the district court been provided 

with evidence of Stanley’s ability to pay restitution, perhaps a more vigorous restitution analysis 

may have been required; however, that is not the case here.

Stanley has failed to show the district court abused its discretion by not considering her 

ability to pay restitution as required under I.C. § 19-5304. Because she has failed to show that the 

district court abused its discretion, she has also failed to show any “unique and compelling 

circumstances justifying relief” from the restitution order under I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6). 

IV.

CONCLUSION

Stanley has failed to show error in the district court’s restitution order. Accordingly, the 

district court’s restitution award of $3,004.30 to the father is affirmed. 

Judge HUSKEY and Judge TRIBE CONCUR.