Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-MI-2682 | April 29, 2020 Page 1 of 16

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Mark J. Crandley

Barnes & Thornburg LLP

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR AMICUS – INDIANA 

PROSECUTING ATTORNEYS 

COUNCIL

Christopher W. Naylor

Executive Director 

J. Thomas Parker

Deputy Director

Indiana Prosecuting Attorneys Council

ATTORNEYS FOR AMICUS – STATE 

OF INDIANA

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Sierra A. Murray

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Margaret M. Christensen

Mark R. Molter

Dentons Bingham Greenebaum

LLP

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR AMICI –

REPORTER’S COMMITTEE

FOR FREEDOM OF THE

PRESS, ET AL. 

Michael A. Wilkins 

Broyles Kight & Ricafort 

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-MI-2682 | April 29, 2020 Page 2 of 16

Carroll County E911,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

Aishah Hasnie,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

April 29, 2020

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-MI-2682

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court

The Honorable Timothy W. 

Oakes, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

49D02-1802-MI-7041

Najam, Judge.

Statement of the Case

[1] Carroll County E911—the 9-1-1 call and dispatch center for Carroll County 

(“the Dispatch Center”)—appeals the trial court’s entry of summary judgment 

for Tribune Broadcasting Indianapolis, LLC, d/b/a Fox 59 (“Fox 59”), on Fox 

59’s complaint seeking disclosure of certain 9-1-1 calls pursuant to Indiana’s 

Access to Public Records Act, Ind. Code §§ 5-14-3-1 to -10 (2019) (“APRA”). 

The Dispatch Center raises the following two issues for our review:

1. Whether the 9-1-1 calls in question were records that may 

be excepted from public disclosure under APRA.
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2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it 

permitted Fox 59 to substitute itself for an employee as the 

real party in interest in this matter after the employee had 

left her employment with Fox 59.

[2] The 9-1-1 calls at issue here were originally received and recorded by the 

Dispatch Center but, thereafter, acquired by local law enforcement agencies 

pursuant to a criminal investigation. Those agencies asked the Dispatch Center 

not to honor Fox 59’s APRA request because public disclosure of the calls

could compromise their investigation. APRA allows for otherwise public 

records to be withheld from public disclosure when those records are the 

investigatory records of law enforcement agencies. Accordingly, we hold that, 

pursuant to that exception, Fox 59 is not entitled to summary judgment against 

the Dispatch Center. We therefore reverse the trial court’s entry of summary 

judgment for Fox 59 on the APRA issue. However, we affirm the trial court’s 

substitution of Fox 59 as the real party in interest.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] The Dispatch Center “is a public safety answering and dispatch point for police, 

fire, emergency medical[,] and emergency management service” for Carroll 

County. Appellant’s App. Vol. III at 6. Its mission is to “serve as the 

communications link between the citizen and public safety agencies; make 

accurate identification of the citizen’s location and public safety response needs; 

quickly and accurately activate public safety services; [and] provide 

communications support and coordination of all public safety and supporting 

agencies.” Id. The Dispatch Center’s Lead Communicator manages the 
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Dispatch Center and its employees and is required to inform the Carroll County 

Commissioners’ Office of any employee discipline within the Dispatch Center. 

Id. at 42.

[4] In November of 2016, four children died in a residential house fire in Flora, 

which is in Carroll County. Multiple 9-1-1 callers reported the fire to the 

Dispatch Center, which recorded the calls (“the 9-1-1 calls”). Indiana State 

Police Detective Benjamin Rector was part of the team that then investigated 

the fire, which became a criminal investigation that remains ongoing. He 

would later describe the 9-1-1 calls as follows:

7. The [9-1-1 calls] capture details regarding the fire relevant 

to the law enforcement investigation.

8. The public release of [the 9-1-1 calls] would harm the 

investigation.

9. This is because the recordings contain details about the fire 

not publicly known, including who witnessed the fire, what they 

reported about what they saw, when they witnessed it, the 

witnesses’ awareness[es] of who occupied the home where the 

fire occurred, and conversations occurring in the background of 

the calls.

10. Allowing these details to become publicly known would 

undermine the ongoing investigation because these details take 

significance when investigators interview witnesses and potential 

suspects.

11. If the details recorded in the [9-1-1 calls] became publicly 

known, potential suspects and witnesses could use this 
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information to evade questioning and it would limit 

investigators[’] ability to know what information suspects have 

first-hand knowledge of and which information witnesses learned 

through public disclosure of evidentiary material like [the 9-1-1 

calls].

12. Because the investigation is ongoing, investigators cannot

know all details in the recordings that may be of importance as 

the investigation continues. Releasing the records at this time 

may disclose facts of significance that potential suspects could 

use in attempting to evade prosecution.

13. Gathering [9-1-1] recordings is a common investigative 

technique in homicide and other major investigations. I have on 

several earlier occasions preserved [9-1-1] recordings that were 

later used as evidence in criminal prosecutions.

Appellant’s App. Vol. IV at 57.

[5] In June of 2017, Aishah Hasnie, then a news reporter for Fox 59, requested that 

the Dispatch Center release the 9-1-1 calls to her under APRA. The Dispatch 

Center declined, stating that, because “the fire is still under police 

investigation” by the Carroll County Sheriff’s Department and the Carroll 

County Prosecutor, those agencies were “exercising their discretion not to 

permit disclosure of such recording or recordings at this time, pursuant to 

[Indiana Code Section] 5-14-3-4(b)(1).” Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 15.

[6] Hasnie requested that the Indiana Public Access Counselor (the “PAC”) review 

her APRA request and the Dispatch Center’s denial of her request. The PAC 

opined that the Dispatch Center was required under APRA to disclose the 9-1-1 
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calls. However, the Dispatch Center disagreed and continued not to disclose 

the 9-1-1 calls. Hasnie then filed her complaint in the Marion Superior Court. 

[7] In April of 2019, Fox 59 moved to substitute itself as the real party in interest 

for Hasnie, who had left her employment there, and also moved for summary 

judgment. The Dispatch Center objected to the substitution of parties and filed 

its response to the summary judgment motion. In its response, the Dispatch 

Center designated the affidavit of Detective Rector. The trial court granted Fox 

59’s motion to substitute itself for Hasnie. The court then entered summary 

judgment for Fox 59.1

 This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Issue One: Whether the Dispatch Center Lawfully

Withheld the 9-1-1 Calls from Public Disclosure under APRA

[8] We first address the Dispatch Center’s appeal from the trial court’s entry of 

summary judgment for Fox 59 on the APRA request. Our standard of review is 

clear:

We review summary judgment de novo, applying the same 

standard as the trial court: “Drawing all reasonable inferences in 

favor of . . . the non-moving parties, summary judgment is 

appropriate ‘if the designated evidentiary matter shows that there 

is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Williams v. 

Tharp, 914 N.E.2d 756, 761 (Ind. 2009) (quoting T.R. 56(C)). “A 

1

 The court stayed its order for Fox 59 pending appeal.
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fact is ‘material’ if its resolution would affect the outcome of the 

case, and an issue is ‘genuine’ if a trier of fact is required to 

resolve the parties’ differing accounts of the truth, or if the 

undisputed material facts support conflicting reasonable 

inferences.” Id. (internal citations omitted).

The initial burden is on the summary-judgment movant to 

“demonstrate [ ] the absence of any genuine issue of fact as to a 

determinative issue,” at which point the burden shifts to the nonmovant to “come forward with contrary evidence” showing an 

issue for the trier of fact. Id. at 761-62 (internal quotation marks 

and substitution omitted). And “[a]lthough the non-moving 

party has the burden on appeal of persuading us that the grant of 

summary judgment was erroneous, we carefully assess the trial 

court’s decision to ensure that he was not improperly denied his

day in court.” McSwane v. Bloomington Hosp. & Healthcare Sys., 

916 N.E.2d 906, 909-10 (Ind. 2009) (internal quotation marks 

omitted).

Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1003 (Ind. 2014) (alterations original to 

Hughley).

[9] Whether the 9-1-1 calls here can be excepted from disclosure under APRA is a 

question of statutory interpretation. As the Indiana Supreme Court has stated:

[S]tatutory interpretation is a question of law that we review de 

novo. In interpreting a statute, the first step is to determine 

whether the Legislature has spoken clearly and unambiguously 

on the point in question. When a statute is clear and 

unambiguous, we apply words and phrases in their plain, 

ordinary, and usual sense. When a statute is susceptible to more 

than one interpretation it is deemed ambiguous and thus open to 

judicial construction. When faced with an ambiguous statute, 

our primary goal is to determine, give effect to, and implement 
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the intent of the Legislature with well-established rules of 

statutory construction. We examine the statute as a whole, 

reading its sections together so that no part is rendered 

meaningless if it can be harmonized with the remainder of the 

statute. And we do not presume that the Legislature intended 

language used in a statute to be applied illogically or to bring 

about an unjust or absurd result.

Anderson v. Gaudin, 42 N.E.3d 82, 85 (Ind. 2015) (cleaned up). 

[10] APRA generally provides that “it is the public policy of the state that all persons 

are entitled to full and complete information regarding the affairs of 

government and the official acts of those who represent them as public officials 

and employees.” I.C. § 5-14-3-1. “Thus, in APRA our legislature declared that 

transparency in government is the public policy of the State of Indiana.” Groth 

v. Pence, 67 N.E.3d 1104, 1108 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied. 

[11] However, “the public’s right of access to public records is also subject to wellrecognized exceptions under APRA.” Id. One of APRA’s exceptions states 

that the following records are not subject to disclosure “at the discretion” of an 

agency: “Investigatory records of law enforcement agencies . . . .” I.C. § 5-14-

3-4(b)(1). APRA defines an “[i]nvestigatory record” as “information compiled 

in the course of the investigation of a crime.” I.C. § 5-14-3-2(i). 

[12] As an initial matter, we cannot agree with the Dispatch Center’s assertion on 

appeal that it is a law enforcement agency under APRA. APRA defines 

“[p]ublic agency” to include “[a]ny law enforcement agency, which means an 

agency or a department of any level of government that engages in the 
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investigation, apprehension, arrest, or prosecution of alleged criminal 

offenses . . . .” I.C. § 5-14-3-2(q)(6). The statute further lists the following 

examples of an APRA law enforcement agency: “the state police department, 

the police or sheriff’s department of a political subdivision, prosecuting 

attorneys, members of the excise police . . . , conservation officers . . . , gaming 

agents . . . , gaming control officers . . . , and the security division of the state 

lottery commission.” Id. The Dispatch Center has not designated any evidence 

that it is subject to the direction or control of any law enforcement agency. 

Indeed, the designated evidence suggests it operates under the ultimate control 

of the Carroll County Commissioners. And neither is the Dispatch Center 

engaged in the “investigation . . . of alleged criminal offenses” when it merely 

relays information from phone calls to relevant emergency personnel. The 

Dispatch Center is a call relay center, not a law enforcement agency.

[13] Nonetheless, we agree with the Dispatch Center that the exception for 

investigatory records of law enforcement agencies applies to the 9-1-1 calls here. 

The Carroll County Sheriff’s Department and the Carroll County Prosecutor, 

which are law enforcement agencies under APRA, “compiled” the 9-1-1 calls in 

the course of their investigation of the suspected arson when they received 

copies of the calls from the Dispatch Center. As the Dispatch Center notes, the 

dictionary definition of “to compile” includes “to collect.” Appellant’s Br. at 

16 (quoting Merriam-Webster’s online dictionary). 

[14] And our case law is clear that, at least when requested from a law enforcement 

agency directly, 9-1-1 calls can be excepted from disclosure under APRA. Lane-
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El v. Spears ̧ 13 N.E.3d 859, 871-72 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. In LaneEl, a convicted child molester sought various police records underlying his 

conviction, including a 9-1-1 call, pursuant to APRA. We stated as follows:

We have not frequently interpreted the term “investigatory 

record.” However, we have held that although we are required 

to construe exceptions to public disclosure laws strictly, that does 

not mean that we will contravene expressed exceptions specified 

by the Legislature. Journal Gazette v. Bd. of Trustees of Purdue 

Univ., 698 N.E.2d 826, 828 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998). We have 

interpreted the definition of “information compiled in the course 

of the investigation of a crime” broadly to include records of 

autopsies, even when the autopsy results in a finding that a crime 

has not occurred. See Althaus v. Evansville Courier Co., 615 N.E.2d 

441 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that if a coroner can satisfy one 

of the conditions of the autopsy statute, that is sufficient to satisfy 

the coroner’s burden of proving that records are investigatory), 

reh’g denied; see also Heltzel v. Thomas, 516 N.E.2d 103 ([Ind. Ct. 

App.] 1987) (citing reasons for considering a coroner’s 

investigations investigatory records, including the fact that the 

record may contain “a narrative of the coroner’s observations, 

which may also include the impressions of law enforcement 

personnel present who are required to assist the coroner” and 

that “at the time of a death investigation by the coroner, it is 

often difficult to determine whether that particular case will be 

the subject of a criminal prosecution”), trans. denied. Contrarily, 

we have held that a subpoena is not the type of public record 

which would automatically fall into the category of “information 

compiled in the course of the investigation of a crime.” Evansville 

Courier v. Prosecutor, Vanderburgh Cnty., 499 N.E.2d 286, 288 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 1986), reh’g denied, trans. denied.
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Id. at 871. We then agreed with the police department that the defendant’s 

“requested records were investigatory because they were compiled by [the 

police department] during the investigation of [the defendant’s] . . . case.” Id.

[15] Thus, consistent with the plain text of the statute and pursuant to our holding in

Lane-El, we conclude that the trial court erred when it entered summary 

judgment for Fox 59. It would be incongruous to hold, as we did in Lane-El, 

that 9-1-1 calls may be withheld from public disclosure when requested directly 

from the law enforcement agency that compiled them, but then to hold 

otherwise when the records are instead sought from the dispatch center that 

originally received the calls. One purpose for the exception for investigatory 

records of law enforcement agencies is not to compromise the integrity of 

ongoing criminal investigations, and investigatory records compiled by our law

enforcement agencies often originate outside those agencies. That purpose 

would not be served if the exception applied only to requests made directly to 

law enforcement or to records that originated with the law enforcement agency. 

[16] Fox 59’s argument on appeal would effectively nullify APRA’s exception for 

the investigatory records of law enforcement agencies. As the State explains in 

its amicus brief on behalf of the Dispatch Center:

[Fox 59] argued below that a record may be disclosable under the 

investigatory records exception if requested from one agency[] 

but not disclosable if requested from a law enforcement agency. 

If interpreted in this way, the exception loses much of its utility. 

This is particularly true today because information is often stored 

in electronic form. It would be nearly impossible for a law 
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enforcement agency to ensure a record is not publicly disclosed 

by another agency short of physically seizing a computer hard 

drive or other electronic storage device. In other words, multiple 

agencies have “possession” of a record when stored in electronic 

form, and if the crux of disclosure is from which agency a record 

is requested, rather than if a law enforcement agency had 

compiled the record, the investigatory records exception ceases to 

serve its purpose.

[Fox 59] also misinterprets the language of the exception by 

essentially reading “compiled” to mean “created.” Even if a 

record is created outside of a criminal investigation, it may still 

be compiled for such a purpose. The plain language of the 

statute must govern, and to hold as much facilitates the 

underlying purpose of the exception—to facilitate the 

investigation and prosecution of crimes.

State’s Br. at 8-9 (citations omitted). We agree with the State’s analysis.

[17] We briefly address three remaining points raised by Fox 59 on this issue. First, 

Fox 59 asserts that the Dispatch Center failed to designate evidence in response 

to the motion for summary judgment that would create a genuine issue of 

material fact as to whether the 9-1-1 calls were in the actual possession of the 

Carroll County Sheriff’s Department or the Carroll County Prosecutor. We 

cannot agree. The Dispatch Center designated Detective Rector’s affidavit 

regarding the 9-1-1 calls, in which Detective Rector stated that the public 

release of the calls would compromise the ongoing investigation. Moreover, 

Fox 59 designated the Dispatch Center’s initial response to the APRA request, 

in which the Dispatch Center stated that the local sheriff’s department and 

prosecutor were “exercising their discretion not to permit disclosure” of the 9-1-
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1 calls. Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 57. A reasonable finder of fact could infer 

from the designated evidence that local law enforcement agencies exercised 

control over the records. Accordingly, we reject Fox 59’s argument that it is 

entitled to summary judgment based on the designated evidence.

[18] Fox 59 also asserts that this Court must defer to the PAC’s original 

determination in Fox 59’s favor. Fox 59 is simply not correct on this point. As 

we have explained:

The Public Access Counselor is appointed by the Governor. I.C. 

§ 5-14-4-6. The Public Access Counselor has the authority, 

among other things, to provide guidance to public agencies and 

officials regarding Indiana’s public access laws. I.C. § 5-14-4-10. 

This authority includes the power “[t]o issue advisory opinions to 

interpret public access laws . . . .” Id. Advisory opinions, by 

definition, are “nonbinding statements.” Black’s Law Dictionary 

1265 (10th ed. 2014).

Our General Assembly created the Public Access Counselor 

position to provide parties with efficient—but, correspondingly, 

nonbinding—advice regarding compliance with Indiana’s public 

access laws. In light of that purpose, a party “is not required to 

file a complaint” with the Public Access Counselor “before filing 

an action” in the trial court for an alleged violation of Indiana’s 

public access laws. I.C. § 5-14-5-4. As such, when a complaint is 

filed in a trial court after the Public Access Counselor has 

rendered an advisory opinion on the matter, the court may find 

the Public Access Counselor’s opinion persuasive but the court 

owes no deference to that opinion.
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Groth, 67 N.E.3d at 1111 n.4. Thus, we are not bound by the PAC’s opinion.

2

[19] Third, Fox 59 asserts several versions of its proposition that “[t]he public policy 

underlying APRA requires a liberal construction” of the disclosure requirement 

and “narrow construction of its exceptions.” Id. Amici for the Reporters 

Committee for Freedom of the Press and for Sixteen Media Organizations also 

rely on broad policy concerns in their brief in support of Fox 59, adding several 

examples of where media access to 9-1-1 calls has produced valuable public 

information. See Reporters Committee Amici Br. at 10-17. Be that as it may, 

the best evidence of our General Assembly’s intent regarding the scope of the 

APRA exception for the investigatory records of law enforcement agencies is 

the language of the statute itself, which is unambiguous. This Court has no 

discretion to consider what other policies might be important. We find Fox 

59’s and the amici’s arguments on this issue unpersuasive and instead apply the 

unambiguous statutory language.

Issue Two: Substitution of Fox 59 for Hasnie

[20] The Dispatch Center’s other argument on appeal is that the trial court abused 

its discretion when it permitted Fox 59 to substitute itself for Hasnie as the real 

party in interest in these proceedings after Hasnie had left her employment at 

Fox 59. Indiana Trial Rule 17 states that “[e]very action shall be prosecuted in 

2

 Indeed, the Dispatch Center is quick to point out that the PAC’s opinion here does not appear to be 

consistent with prior PAC opinions. Appellant’s Br. at 22-23 (citing two prior PAC opinions).
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the name of the real party in interest,” and our trial rules grant courts the 

authority to substitute parties as appropriate within the court’s discretion. E.g., 

Ind. Trial Rule 25. “An abuse of discretion is when the decision is clearly 

against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances.” Bennett v. State, 119 

N.E.3d 1057, 1058 (Ind. 2019). An abuse of discretion also occurs “when the 

trial court misinterprets the law.” Heraeus Med., LLC v. Zimmer, Inc., 135 N.E.3d 

150, 152 (Ind. 2019). 

[21] The Dispatch Center asserts that Fox 59 was not the real party in interest to 

Hasnie’s original APRA complaint. According to the Dispatch Center, “[o]nly 

the party making the [original] request has standing to bring an action under 

APRA.” Appellant’s Br. at 36. In support of that argument, the Dispatch 

Center cites Indiana Code Section 5-14-3-9, which refers to the “person making 

the request” under APRA. Further according to the Dispatch Center, that 

language prohibits the person who filed the APRA request or originally 

captioned the complaint from being an agent for a business. The Dispatch 

Center also asserts that any benefit that Hasnie’s request would have brought to 

Fox 59 would have been only “incidental.” Id. at 37.

[22] We reject the Dispatch Center’s argument on this issue. As Fox 59 points out:

Hasnie submitted the [APRA] request . . . in the course of her 

employment and as an agent of Fox 59. Fox 59 was the real 

party in interest from the outset of this litigation . . . as Hasnie’s 

actions . . . were solely in furtherance of Fox 59’s interests.
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Appellee’s Br. at 36. Fox 59’s assertions are readily supported by the facts and 

circumstances that were before the trial court when it considered Fox 59’s 

request to substitute itself for Hasnie. There is no dispute that Hasnie was 

employed as a news reporter for Fox 59 at the time of her APRA request and 

complaint; that she sought the records not out of some personal curiosity but 

pursuant to that employment; and that, had she obtained the records, she would 

have broadcast them on Fox 59 to, ostensibly, Fox 59’s benefit. Accordingly, 

the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it permitted Fox 59 to substitute 

itself for Hasnie after she left her employment with Fox 59.

Conclusion

[23] In sum, we hold that the trial court erred when it entered summary judgment 

for Fox 59 and concluded that the Dispatch Center was not entitled to withhold

the 9-1-1 calls as investigatory records of law enforcement agencies. However, 

we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it substituted Fox 

59 for Hasnie as the real party in interest. Thus, we affirm in part, reverse in 

part, and remand for further proceedings.

[24] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.

Crone, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.