J-A13028-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: ESTATE OF MELVEL W. 

SNITOW, DECEASED

APPEAL OF: SANDRA A. SNITOW, 

EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE OF 

MELVEL W. SNITOW, DECEASED

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1688 EDA 2019

Appeal from the Order Entered May 3, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Orphans' Court at 

No(s): No. 2008-X0350

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 15, 2020

Sandra A. Snitow (“Sandra”), executrix under the will of Melvel W. 

Snitow, Deceased (“Decedent”), appeals from the order of the Court of 

Common Pleas of Montgomery County, Orphans’ Court Division, confirming 

the accounts of her administration of the estate. Upon careful review, we 

dismiss the appeal.

The Honorable Lois E. Murphy set forth the relevant factual and 

procedural history of this matter as follows:

[Decedent] died on December 7, 2007, survived by his son, 

[appellee] Howard [Snitow (“Howard”)], and his daughter, 

Sandra. His will was admitted to probate and letters testamentary 

were granted to Howard and Sandra on January 30, 2008. The 

will poured the residuary estate into a trust that was executed in 

1991[, which] provided for the assets to be distributed equally to 

Howard and Sandra. 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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The litigation between the siblings began in January 2009 and has 

continued unabated since then. A summary of some[,] but not 

all[,] of the filings by the parties follows.

Howard was directed to file an account in April of 2009. This 

account, which was filed in August of 2009[,] was eventually 

returned unaudited. In 2011, the executors began battling over 

the sale of [Decedent’s] residence in Merion and over the amount 

of money owed by Howard to Shinobe Capital, Inc., a corporation 

wholly-owned by [Decedent]. In December of 2011, the [c]ourt 

determined that Howard owed the estate $71,949.92, and 

removed him as co-executor. In 2013, Howard sought 

unsuccessfully to remove Sandra as the fiduciary, alleging that 

she was wasting estate assets in allowing [Decedent’s] residence 

to deteriorate and remain unsold. In 2014, Howard brought a 

petition seeking, inter alia, to compel Sandra to accept a certain 

offer on the real estate. Sandra was then directed to file an 

account[,] which she did in June of 2014. Howard then filed a 

petition to be paid for his interest in [Decedent’s] residence or for 

authority to sell it himself. 

In a new line of attack1launched in April of 2015, Sandra filed a 

petition to have Howard account for the assets and income of 

Squire Service, Inc., 52% of the shares of which had been owned 

by [Decedent] and the balance by Howard. Sandra alleged that a 

letter dated July 11, 2007, wherein [Decedent] purportedly gave 

his shares to Howard, was obtained by Howard through fraud or 

undue influence. Sandra’s request for an account from Howard 

was eventually dismissed as untimely.

1

In addition to the proceedings in this [c]ourt, there was 

litigation between Howard and Sandra in the civil division of 

the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas relating to other 

businesses in which [Decedent] and his children had 

interests.

Sandra filed her amended first account on August 5, 2015, which 

replaced the first account filed in 2014. Howard filed objections 

and the parties then embarked on a period of discovery[,] which 

was, as was expected, highly contentious. In June of 2016, 

Howard filed another petition seeking to compel Sandra to pay 

over his share of the value of the house and also to file 

[Decedent’s] and the estate’s tax returns. The house was finally 

sold in November of 2016.
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Sandra renewed her request that Howard be required to account 

for the transactions involving Squire Service, Inc. By orders dated 

November 6 and 15, 2017, the undersigned determined that the 

Orphans’ Court did not have jurisdiction over the business 

dealings of Squire Service[, Inc.]; however, because it was alleged 

that [D]ecedent’s estate had an interest in Squire Service, Inc., 

the [c]ourt directed Howard to provide Sandra with copies of 

Squire Service[, Inc.’s] tax returns. The [c]ourt also scheduled 

the issue of the validity or invalidity of the alleged gift by 

[D]ecedent of his interest in the corporation to Howard to be 

considered at the time of the hearing on Howard’s objections to 

Sandra’s amended account. On November 9, 2017, Sandra filed 

her supplemental account.

Adjudication, 5/3/19, at 2-4 (footnote omitted). 

Judge Murphy held hearings on Howard’s objections to the account and 

the validity of the alleged gift of Decedent’s interest in Squire Services, Inc., 

on May 8, 9, and 10, 2018. In its adjudication dated May 3, 2019, the court 

imposed upon Sandra a surcharge in the amount of $68,000 for her dilatory 

conduct in consummating the sale of Decedent’s residence; allowed and 

denied various out-of-pocket expenditures claimed by Sandra in her account; 

and concluded that the purported gift to Howard of Decedent’s 52% interest 

in Squire Service, Inc., was invalid. Sandra filed a motion for reconsideration, 

which the court granted in part and denied in part.1 This timely appeal follows, 

in which Sandra raises the following claims for our review:

1. Did not the [Orphans’ Court] commit legal error by its failure 

to order [Howard] to account and pay over [D]ecedent’s [52%] 

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1

In granting reconsideration, the court approved a revised valuation of 

Decedent’s interest in Squire Service, Inc., and adjusted by $400 the 

surcharge against Sandra for delay in selling Decedent’s residence 
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ownership of the value and earnings of Squire Service, Inc., with 

interest, to [Sandra]?

2. Did not the [Orphans’ Court] commit legal error by its failure 

to award punitive damages as a result of [Howard’s] concealment 

of transfer and conversion of Decedent’s 52% interest in Squire 

Service, Inc.[,] to [Howard], his failure to file a tax return in order 

to release $50,000.00 held in escrow, and his concealment of a 

secret autopsy performed upon [D]ecedent?

3. Did not the [Orphans’ Court] commit legal error by removing 

[Howard] as co-executor on the court’s own motion[,] stating “[i]t 

is the only way to protect the assets of the estate,” and yet 

allowing him to continue as co-trustee with respect to the assets 

of the former revocable trust that became irrevocable upon the 

settlor’s death?

4. Did not the [Orphans’ Court] commit legal error by dismissing 

[Sandra’s] petition to require [Howard] to account for breach of 

his fiduciary duties and for other relief in accordance [with] 20 

Pa.C.S.A. [§§] 7133 and 3317 [(]duty of co-trustee & co-executor 

to proceed against other co-trustee/co-executor[)]?

5. Did not the [Orphans’ Court] commit legal error by dismissing 

[Sandra’s] petition to require [Howard] to account for breach of 

his fiduciary duties and for other relief in accordance [with] 20 

Pa.C.S.A. [§] 3317, calling it “untimely” when the [Orphans’ 

Court] sits in equity and [Sandra] had consistently asserted 

[Howard’s] wrongdoing as well as his “unclean hands”?

6. Did not the [Orphans’ Court] abuse its discretion and 

wrongfully surcharge [Sandra] by failing to weigh and consider 

the animus of [Howard] following a meeting in Orphans’ Court 

attended by [Sandra], counsel Jack Bernard, Dr. Melman, Mrs. 

Melman, realtor Renee Hill (“Hill”), and Mr. Gregory, broker’s 

counsel, but from which [Howard] was excluded, leading to a sale 

by [Sandra] to Melmans at the highest price offered until that 

time. And yet, [Howard,] a 50% beneficiary of the estate[,] yelled 

in everyone’s earshot to the Melmans that they overpaid 

$25,000.00?

7. Did not the [Orphans’ Court] abuse its discretion and wrongly 

surcharge [Sandra] by failing to weigh and consider the conflict of 

interest and animus of Hill, who entered into a dual agency with 

[Sandra] and Dr. Melman, and lost her commissions?
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8. Did not the [Orphans’ Court] commit legal error by its failure 

to require [Howard] to comply with Local Orphans’ Court Rule 

2.7A(b), that required [Howard’s] attorney to file with the Clerk 

and serve upon the attorney for the accountant a written 

statement of contentions with all material facts relied upon at least 

20 days prior to the hearing?

9. Did not the [Orphans’ Court] abuse its discretion in refusing to 

allow [Sandra] to place in evidence her loans that benefitted the 

estate[,] and by reducing her commission?

10. Did not the [Orphans’ Court] commit legal error by imposing 

a surcharge upon [Sandra] for attorneys’ fees when it was 

necessary to defend more than seventeen petitions brought 

against her by [Howard], none of which [was] successful, and 

when she alone enhanced the assets of the estate, while 

[Howard’s] actions diminished it?

11. Did not the [Orphans’ Court] commit legal error by failure to 

order [Howard] to complete federal and state tax returns, K-1 

information returns for all businesses and investments [Howard] 

ran and controlled, in which Decedent had an interest, and by her 

failure to enforce her order for date of death valuations, despite 

the repeated efforts of the estate [accountant] and [Sandra] to 

obtain the information?

12. Did not the [Orphans’ Court] commit legal error by its failure 

to impose sanctions and punitive damages against [Howard] as a 

result of his fraud upon the estate by misrepresenting the mental 

health of [D]ecedent, and manipulation and conversion of 

[D]ecedent’s assets?

Brief of Appellant, at 4-7 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

Prior to discussing the merits of Sandra’s claims, we must address 

significant deficiencies in her appellate brief. “When deficiencies in a brief 

hinder our ability to conduct a meaningful appellate review, we may dismiss 

the appeal entirely or find certain issues to be waived.” Irwin Union 

National Bank and Trust Co. v. Famous, 4 A.3d 1099, 1103 (Pa. Super.

2010); Pa.R.A.P. 2101. “Appellate arguments which fail to adhere to [the 
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Rules of Appellate Procedure] may be considered waived, and arguments 

which are not appropriately developed are waived. Arguments not 

appropriately developed include those where the party has failed to cite any 

authority in support of a contention.” Lackner v. Glosser, 892 A.2d 21, 29-

30 (Pa. Super. 2006) (internal citations omitted). The brief must support the 

appellant’s claims with pertinent discussion, with references to the record and 

with citations to legal authorities. Id.; Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a)-(c). Further, the 

argument section of an appellate brief “shall be divided into as many parts as 

there are questions to be argued.” Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). 

Here, Sandra has submitted a lengthy brief, as well as an equally 

extensive reply brief. However, both filings are little more than protracted

regurgitations of Sandra’s version of the facts and history of this bitter dispute 

between brother and sister, peppered with accusations and complaints 

directed at both Howard and the Orphans’ Court. Sandra fails to make cogent, 

distinct arguments with regard to each of her claims, as required by the Rules 

of Appellate Procedure. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (“The argument shall be 

divided into as many parts as there are questions to be argued; and shall have 

at the head of each part—in distinctive type or in type distinctively displayed—

the particular point treated therein, followed by such discussion and citation 

to authorities as are deemed pertinent.”). Her section headings bear no 
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relation to the issues raised in her statement of the questions involved.

2

 

Indeed, the entire argument section of her brief appears to be nothing more 

than a prolix attempt to relitigate her case on the appellate level. 

Most significantly, Sandra’s brief is utterly devoid of citation to pertinent 

authority or to the record itself. Rule of Appellate Procedure 2119(c) requires 

that, “[i]f reference is made to the pleadings, evidence, charge, opinion or 

order, or any other matter appearing in the record, the argument must set 

forth, in immediate connection therewith, or in a footnote thereto, a reference 

to the place in the record where the matter referred to appears.” Pa.R.A.P. 

2119(c). In complete disregard of this rule, Sandra’s brief is replete with 

references to pleadings, orders, documents, factual assertions, and testimony, 

all of which are wholly unsupported by any references whatsoever to “the 

place in the record where the matter referred to appears.”3 Id. This wholesale

failure to provide this Court with citations to the record renders meaningful 

review impossible in this matter, where the electronic certified record consists 

of over 6,000 pages of documents and includes more than 700 pages of 

____________________________________________

2 The unnumbered section headings in Sandra’s argument section consist of 

the following: “Squire Service Inc.,” Brief of Appellant, at 16; “Valuation of 

Squire,” id. at 18; “One-Man Corp.,” id. at 19; “Satisfaction Issues,” id.; 

“Elder Abuse,” id. at 21; “Estate’s Petition to Require [Howard] to Account,” 

id. at 22; “Accounts and Objections,” id. at 24; “225 Melrose Circle,” id. at 

26; “Surcharges,” id. at 31; “Reimbursement to Executrix and Legal Fees,” 

id. at 32; “Executrix’s Commission,” id. at 46; “Taxes,” id. at 55; and 

“Consequences for [Howard],” id. at 63. Compare with id. at 4-7 

(“Statement of the Questions Presented”).

 

3

In several places throughout her brief, Sandra inserted blank citations to the 

record. See, e.g., Brief of Appellant, at 28 (“(R. a)”). 
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transcript. “It is not this Court’s responsibility to comb through the record 

seeking the factual underpinnings of [appellant’s] claim[s].” Irwin Union 

Nat. Bank & Tr. Co., 4 A.3d at 1103.

In sum, Sandra’s brief is utterly deficient and effectively hinders any 

attempt by this Court to conduct effective appellate review. See id. 

Accordingly, we are constrained to dismiss the appeal.

Appeal dismissed. Application to replace proof brief with definitive 

copies denied.4

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4 On June 15, 2020, counsel for the Appellant filed an “Application to Replace 

Proof Brief filed January 15, 2020 with Definitive Copies in Accordance with 

Pa.R.A.P. 2185(c).” In that application, counsel averred that Appellant’s 

“definitive brief” had been filed on June 10, 2020. A review of the docket 

indicated that it had not been filed at that time. On August 1, 2020, counsel 

submitted a letter to the Court, explaining that his “definitive brief” had been 

rejected for filing on June 15, 2020. Counsel explained that the Prothonotary 

had apparently deemed the “definitive brief” to be a second “substituted 

brief,” as he had previously submitted two briefs—one on December 13, 2019, 

and another on January 15, 2020. As such, the Prothonotary refused to accept 

the brief for filing. Accordingly, counsel requested that we grant his June 15, 

2020, application so that the Prothonotary would accept his “definitive brief” 

for filing. 

Rule of Appellate Procedure 2185(c) provides as follows:

(c) Definitive Copies.—If the record is being reproduced pursuant 

to Rule 2154(b) (large records) the brief served pursuant to 

Subdivision (a) of this rule [(governing time for serving and filing 

of briefs)] may be typewritten or page proof copies of the brief, 

with appropriate references to pages of the parts of the 

original record involved. Within 14 days after the 

reproduced record is filed each party who served briefs in 

advanced form under this subdivision shall serve and file 

definitive copies of his or her brief or briefs containing 

references to the pages of the reproduced record in place 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/15/2020

____________________________________________

of or in addition to the initial references to the pages of the 

parts of the original record involved. No other changes may 

be made in the briefs as initially served, except that typographical 

errors may be corrected.

Pa.R.A.P. 2185(c) (emphasis added). 

Here, Appellant’s “original” brief, filed on January 15, 2020, contained no 

“references to the pages or parts of the original record involved,” in violation 

of Rule 2185(c). Moreover, after this Court granted counsel permission to 

dispense with the filing of a reproduced record by Order dated May 5, 2020, 

counsel did not file his “definitive brief” within 14 days as prescribed by the 

rule. Rather, he waited more than one month to file an application to do so, 

in which he misinformed the Court that the “definitive brief” had already been 

filed. Because counsel failed to comply with any part of Rule 2185(c), we 

deny the application.

Finally, we briefly address the claim raised by counsel regarding the 

prothonotary’s rejection of his definitive brief. The powers wielded by the 

prothonotaries and clerks of court are purely ministerial in nature. 

Commonwealth v. Williams, 106 A.3d 583, 588 (Pa. 2014). “Far from 

operating as an independent reviewer and screening officer with respect to 

court filings, the clerk of courts fulfills a strictly administrative function[.]” Id.

at 588-89. “To afford the clerk of courts a broad discretionary power to . . .

enforce the rules of appellate procedure would be inconsistent with the nature 

of the office of the clerk of courts.” Id. at 588. Accordingly, rather than 

rejecting counsel’s filing, the better course of action for the prothonotary 

would have been to accept the brief for filing and allow the opposing party to 

raise its propriety with the merits panel if it so chose. 
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