PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

RONNIE STEVE DOOLEY, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

HARTFORD ACCIDENT AND INDEMNITY

COMPANY,  No. 12-1882

Defendant-Appellee,

and

WILMER DAVID PHILLIPS, JR.,

Defendant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Virginia, at Roanoke.

Samuel G. Wilson, District Judge.

(7:11-cv-00149-SGW-PMS)

Argued: March 22, 2013

Decided: May 16, 2013

Before KING, GREGORY, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Keenan wrote the opinion, in which Judge King and Judge Gregory joined. 
COUNSEL

ARGUED: John Janney Rasmussen, INSURANCE RECOVERY LAW GROUP, PLC, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. John Becker Mumford, Jr., HANCOCK DANIEL

JOHNSON & NAGLE, PC, Glen Allen, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Jeffrey H. Krasnow, THE KRASNOW

LAW FIRM, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellant. Kathryn E.

Kasper, HANCOCK DANIEL JOHNSON & NAGLE, PC,

Glen Allen, Virginia, for Appellee. 

OPINION

BARBARA MILANO KEENAN, Circuit Judge:

In this appeal, we consider an issue of automobile insurance coverage in a policy issued by Hartford Accident &

Indemnity Co. (Hartford). We review whether the district

court erred in holding that the Hartford policy prohibited Ronnie S. Dooley, the insured party, from "stacking," or combining, the uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage (UM/UIM

coverage) for each insured vehicle, when the policy failed to

specify any particular amount of UM/UIM coverage afforded.

On appeal, Dooley contends that this omission from the

policy’s terms renders ambiguous the policy language prohibiting stacking and that, therefore, the policy should be construed against Hartford to allow the stacking of UM/UIM

coverage. Upon our review, we conclude that because Virginia Code § 38.2-2206(A) mandates that UM/UIM coverage

"shall equal" the general liability coverage, this provision by

operation of law provided Dooley an equal amount of

UM/UIM coverage under the Hartford policy. Accordingly,

we hold that the anti-stacking provision in Dooley’s policy

unambiguously prevents the stacking of UM/UIM coverage,

and we affirm the district court’s award of summary judgment

in favor of Hartford. 

2 DOOLEY v. HARTFORD ACCIDENT AND INDEMNITY CO.
I.

Dooley first obtained an automobile insurance policy from

Hartford in 2003 and paid two separate premiums for coverage of two vehicles.1

 Included in the "Declarations" section of

the policy, under a heading entitled "Coverages and Limits of

Liability," were subsections listing separate entries for "Liability" and "Uninsured Motorists." These entries provided policy limits of $100,000 per person for each covered vehicle, for

both liability and UM/UIM coverage.2 In 2004, Dooley added

a third vehicle to the policy, and continued to pay separate

premiums for each vehicle for liability and UM/UIM coverage. Dooley renewed the policy annually for three additional

years without requesting any changes to his coverage. 

Dooley later renewed his policy in November 2008 (the

policy or the 2008 policy). The 2008 policy was in effect

when Dooley was injured in an automobile accident while

driving a vehicle insured under the policy. The accident

occurred when a vehicle driven by Wilmer Phillips struck

Dooley’s vehicle. As a result of the accident, Dooley sustained serious bodily injury, causing him to incur medical and

related expenses that exceeded the liability coverage provided

under Phillips’ automobile insurance policy. Therefore, Dooley contended that Phillips was an underinsured motorist,

within the meaning of Virginia Code § 38.2-2206(B),3 and

1Dooley’s wife, Phyllis Dooley, also was an insured party under the policy. 

2The limits of liability at issue in this case are those relating to bodily

injury coverage for each person. The policy also provided bodily injury

coverage of $300,000 for each accident and limits of liability for property

damages, but those classes of coverage are not at issue in this appeal. 

3

In Virginia, "[a] motor vehicle is ‘underinsured’ when, and to the

extent that, the total amount of bodily injury and property damage coverage applicable to the operation or use of the motor vehicle and available

for payment for such bodily injury or property damage . . . is less than the

total amount of uninsured motorist coverage afforded any person injured

as a result of the operation or use of the vehicle." Va. Code § 38.2-

2206(B). 

DOOLEY v. HARTFORD ACCIDENT AND INDEMNITY CO. 3
sought payment from Hartford based on the UM/UIM coverage provided in the 2008 policy (the UM/UIM endorsement).

In contrast to the declarations sections of the earlier policies issued by Hartford, which showed UM/UIM coverage of

$100,000 per person for each covered vehicle, the declarations section of the 2008 policy did not contain any reference

to an amount of UM/UIM coverage. However, that declarations section provided general liability coverage of $100,000

per person for each covered vehicle. 

The UM/UIM endorsement contained in the 2008 policy

stated that "[Hartford] will pay, in accordance with Va. Code

Ann. Section 38.2-2206, damages which an insured . . . is

legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an

uninsured motor vehicle or an underinsured motor vehicle."

(Emphasis added). Several paragraphs later, under the heading "Limit of Liability," the UM/UIM endorsement addressed

the maximum UM/UIM coverage available (the anti-stacking

provision). The anti-stacking provision stated, in relevant part,

that "[t]he limit of [ ] Liability shown in the Declarations for

each person for [UM/UIM] Coverage is [Hartford’s] maximum limit of liability for all damages . . . arising out of bodily

injury sustained by any one person in any one accident," "regardless of the number of" insured parties, claims made, vehicles, or premiums "shown in the Declarations." (Emphasis

added). Thus, the UM/UIM endorsement did not state the

amount of UM/UIM coverage available but simply referred

the reader to the "[d]eclarations" section of the policy, which

likewise did not contain any specified amount of such coverage.

Despite this complete omission from the declarations section of any stated UM/UIM coverage limits, Hartford agreed

that it remained obligated under Virginia Code § 38.2-2206(A)4

4Under Virginia Code § 38.2-2206(A), an insurer may not issue an automobile insurance policy on a vehicle in the Commonwealth unless the pol4 DOOLEY v. HARTFORD ACCIDENT AND INDEMNITY CO.
to provide UM/UIM coverage "equal" to the policy’s general

liability limits. However, based on the anti-stacking clause,

Hartford maintained that the policy limit for UM/UIM coverage for each person was $100,000.5

 The parties’ disagreement, therefore, ultimately was reduced to the question

whether the anti-stacking clause prevented Dooley from

stacking the UM/UIM coverage of $100,000 per person provided in the policy for each of the three insured vehicles. 

To resolve this dispute, Dooley filed a complaint in a Virginia state court seeking a declaratory judgment. In his complaint, Dooley claimed coverage under the UM/UIM

endorsement on the basis that Phillips, whose insurer paid

Dooley $100,000, was an underinsured motorist. Dooley

asked the state court to declare that he was entitled to stack

the UM/UIM coverage provided under the 2008 policy,

because the omission on the declarations page of any stated

amount of UM/UIM coverage rendered the anti-stacking provision ambiguous and unenforceable. Based on this asserted

ambiguity, Dooley alleged that he was entitled under Virginia

law to UM/UIM coverage of $100,000 for each of the three

covered vehicles, for a total amount of up to $300,000. 

Hartford removed the action to federal district court asserting diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Hartford

filed a counterclaim seeking a declaration that the express language in the anti-stacking provision limited Dooley’s

icy provides UM/UIM coverage. Unless the insured party explicitly

requests lower UM/UIM coverage, which Dooley has not done in this

case, the statute provides that the UM/UIM coverage limits "shall equal"

the "limits of the liability insurance provided by the policy." Va. Code

§ 38.2-2206(A). 

5Dooley initially alleged in state court that the omitted UM/UIM coverage limits entitled him to "unlimited" UM/UIM coverage. However, Dooley abandoned that argument on appeal and conceded that Virginia Code

§ 38.2-2206(A) is applicable. Accordingly, on appeal, the parties agree

that the applicable UM/UIM coverage limits are $100,000 per person for

each insured vehicle. 

DOOLEY v. HARTFORD ACCIDENT AND INDEMNITY CO. 5
UM/UIM coverage to a maximum of $100,000 and that,

therefore, Phillips was not an underinsured motorist.6

After discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The district court awarded judgment in favor

of Hartford. Dooley v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 892

F. Supp. 2d 762 (W.D. Va. 2012). Dooley timely filed this

appeal. 

II.

A.

We review a district court’s award of summary judgment

de novo. Henry v. Purnell, 652 F.3d 524, 531 (4th Cir. 2011)

(en banc). Summary judgment is appropriate when the record

does not disclose a genuine issue of material fact, and the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Couch v. Jabe, 679 F.3d 197, 200 (4th Cir. 2012); Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(a). 

B.

Dooley argues that the district court erred in determining

that he was not entitled to stack the UM/UIM coverage provided under the 2008 policy for the three insured vehicles.

According to Dooley, because the anti-stacking provision

refers to the limits of liability "shown in the [d]eclarations for

each person for [UM/UIM] Coverage" and the declarations

page omitted any such limits, the anti-stacking provision is

ambiguous. Dooley maintains that application of Virginia

Code § 38.2-2206(A) does not resolve this ambiguity, because

6Hartford advanced an alternative theory in the district court, namely,

that Hartford was entitled to reformation of the contract because the

UM/UIM coverage limits had been erroneously omitted from the policy.

However, the district court did not base its ruling on this theory, and we

need not address it in this appeal. 

6 DOOLEY v. HARTFORD ACCIDENT AND INDEMNITY CO.
that statute merely establishes the amount of required

UM/UIM coverage and does not operate to insert an actual

amount of UM/UIM coverage on the declarations page. Relying on Virginia Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Williams, 677 S.E.2d 299 (Va. 2009), Dooley contends that the

ambiguity in the anti-stacking provision should be resolved

against Hartford, and that Dooley is entitled to stack the

UM/UIM coverage provided for the different vehicles in the

2008 policy. We disagree with Dooley’s arguments.

In resolving this issue, we consider established principles

of Virginia law regarding the interpretation of insurance policies. When interpreting such agreements, we determine the

parties’ intent from the policy language employed. Williams,

677 S.E.2d at 302; Seals v. Erie Ins. Exch., 674 S.E.2d 860,

862 (Va. 2009) (citation omitted). We construe the various

provisions of an insurance policy together and, if possible,

harmonize any internal conflicts to effectuate the parties’

intent. Williams, 677 S.E.2d at 302; Seals, 674 S.E.2d at 862

(citation omitted).

When a disputed policy term is unambiguous, we apply its

plain meaning as written. Williams, 677 S.E.2d at 302; Va.

Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gile, 524 S.E.2d 642, 645 (Va.

2000). In contrast, if a disputed policy term is ambiguous,

such that it is capable of more than one meaning, we construe

the policy language in favor of coverage and against the

insurer. Williams, 677 S.E.2d at 302; Seals, 674 S.E.2d at 862

(citation omitted). This construction rightfully places the burden on the insurer, the customary drafter of an insurance policy, to articulate clearly both the coverage afforded and any

exclusions from that coverage. See Williams, 677 S.E.2d at

302.

In addition to these basic principles, we are guided by decisions from the Supreme Court of Virginia addressing an

insured party’s ability to stack UM/UIM coverage. In 1972,

the Supreme Court of Virginia established the rule in Virginia

DOOLEY v. HARTFORD ACCIDENT AND INDEMNITY CO. 7
that "stacking of [UM/UIM] coverage will be permitted

unless clear and unambiguous language exists on the face of

the policy to prevent such multiple coverage." Goodville Mut.

Cas. Co. v. Borror, 275 S.E.2d 625, 627 (Va. 1981) (interpreting Cunningham v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 189 S.E.2d 832 (Va.

1972) and Lipscombe v. Sec. Ins. Co., 189 S.E.2d 320 (Va.

1972)). 

In adopting this rule, the Virginia court found persuasive

the rationale articulated in Sturdy v. Allied Mutual Insurance

Co., 457 P.2d 34 (Kan. 1969). In that case, the Supreme Court

of Kansas stated that, in accord with "general principles of

indemnity," the amount of coverage afforded should be proportionate to the amount of premiums paid by the insured.

Cunningham, 189 S.E.2d at 836-37 (discussing Sturdy); see

also Lipscombe, 213 S.E.2d at 322 (same). Because UM/UIM

coverage protects named insured individuals who have paid

consideration for such coverage, the Supreme Court of Virginia determined that an insured party presumptively is entitled to the combined total of UM/UIM coverage applicable to

each vehicle for which he has paid a premium, absent clear

language in the policy prohibiting multiple coverage. See Lipscombe, 213 S.E.2d at 322-23. 

The policy considered by the Supreme Court of Virginia in

Lipscombe covered two vehicles for which the insured party

paid separate premiums, and specified in the declarations

UM/UIM coverage in the amount of $20,000 for each person

for each covered vehicle. Id. at 321. The policy’s UM/UIM

endorsement provided that the "limit of liability . . . stated in

the declarations as applicable to ‘each person’ [$20,000] is the

limit of the company’s liability for all damages . . . sustained

by one person as the result of any one accident." Id. at 322

(alterations in original). The court determined that this language was ambiguous, because it did not inform the insured

party whether he was entitled to UM/UIM coverage under

only one or both of the two insured vehicles for which separate premiums were paid. Id. at 323. 

8 DOOLEY v. HARTFORD ACCIDENT AND INDEMNITY CO.
Several years after Lipscombe, the Supreme Court of Virginia decided Goodville. The policy at issue in that case covered two vehicles under separate premiums and provided

limits of liability for UM/UIM coverage of $25,000 for each

person for each covered vehicle. Goodville, 275 S.E.2d at

626, 628. The policy also stated in the UM/UIM endorsement,

under the heading, "Limits of Liability":

Regardless of the number of . . . motor vehicles to

which this insurance applies, (a) the limit of liability

for bodily injury stated in the schedule as applicable

to "each person" is the limit of the company’s liability for all damages because of bodily injury sustained by one person as the result of any one

accident. . . .

Id. at 627 (emphasis added). The court in Goodville held that

this language unambiguously prohibited the stacking of

UM/UIM coverage for each vehicle based on the introductory

phrase, "[r]egardless of the number of . . . motor vehicles to

which this insurance applies." Id. at 628. 

The Supreme Court of Virginia recently revisited this issue

in Williams, on which Dooley relies. The policy in Williams

covered three vehicles, for which the insured party paid separate premiums, and in the UM/UIM endorsement stated that

"the limit of liability . . . stated as applicable to ‘each person’

is the limit of the company’s liability." Williams, 677 S.E.2d

at 300-01. Like the policy in Goodville, this limiting provision

included the phrase, "[r]egardless of the number of . . . motor

vehicles to which this insurance applies." Id. at 300. 

The court found that although, read in isolation, this phrase

unambiguously prohibited stacking, the phrase was rendered

ambiguous when read in the context of the entire policy. Id.

at 303. The court first noted that the anti-stacking language

directed the reader to the limits of liability stated for "each

person." Id. However, the court further observed that the preDOOLEY v. HARTFORD ACCIDENT AND INDEMNITY CO. 9
mium paid for one of the vehicles provided UM/UIM coverage of $250,000 for each person, while the premiums paid for

the two other vehicles both provided UM/UIM coverage of

$300,000 for each person. Id.

The court determined that this disparity in the amounts of

coverage for "each person" on the different vehicles, when

considered together with the "anti-stacking language" in the

UM/UIM endorsement, created an ambiguity because the policy could be read in more than one manner regarding the

extent of total UM/UIM coverage. Id. Thus, the court construed this ambiguity against the insurer and permitted the

insured party to stack UM/UIM coverage. Id.

In the present case, the anti-stacking provision establishes

the liability for UM/UIM coverage as the amount "shown in

the [d]eclarations for each person for [UM/UIM] Coverage."

Like the provisions in both Goodville and Williams, the antistacking provision before us unambiguously states that these

limits for "each person" are the maximum UM/UIM coverage

afforded "regardless of" the number of vehicles covered by

the policy or premiums paid. 

Dooley argues, nevertheless, that when the anti-stacking

provision is read in context, an ambiguity results because

there are no limits "shown in the [d]eclarations for each person for [UM/UIM] Coverage." We disagree.

Unlike the policy in Williams that provided inconsistent

amounts of UM/UIM coverage for the different vehicles, the

present policy fails to provide any stated limits for UM/UIM

coverage. In fact, the declarations page of the 2008 policy

does not contain any reference to UM/UIM coverage

amounts, in contrast to previous versions of the policy. 

In isolation, this complete omission of any amount of

UM/UIM coverage would indicate that the policy does not

provide any UM/UIM coverage. However, as explicitly stated

10 DOOLEY v. HARTFORD ACCIDENT AND INDEMNITY CO.
in the UM/UIM endorsement, Hartford is bound to provide

UM/UIM coverage in accordance with Virginia Code § 38.2-

2206. That statute not only requires that insurers providing

automobile liability insurance on vehicles in Virginia afford

UM/UIM coverage, with limited exceptions not relevant here,

but also states that UM/UIM coverage "shall equal" the general "limits of the liability insurance provided by the policy."

Va. Code § 38.2-2206(A). Therefore, the fact that the amount

of UM/UIM coverage is not separately "shown in the Declarations" section of the 2008 policy is not determinative. The

general liability limits for each person are "shown in the Declarations," and these limits, by operation of Section 38.2-

2206(A), afford Dooley the same amount of both liability and

UM/UIM coverage. 

These UM/UIM coverage limits, when considered along

with the anti-stacking provision, mandate the conclusion that

UM/UIM coverage for each of the three insured vehicles cannot be stacked. This conclusion is the only reasonable interpretation of the policy that gives effect to each of the relevant

provisions. See Williams, 677 S.E.2d at 302 (courts must construe insurance policies in their entirety and harmonize all

provisions when reasonably possible). We therefore conclude

that when read in its entirety, the policy unambiguously prohibits the stacking of UM/UIM coverage for each covered

vehicle. See Goodville, 275 S.E.2d at 628.

III.

For these reasons, we hold that the district court did not err

in concluding that the 2008 policy prohibited Dooley from

stacking the UM/UIM coverage for each insured vehicle.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment holding

that Dooley is not entitled to recover from Hartford under the

policy’s UM/UIM coverage. 

AFFIRMED

DOOLEY v. HARTFORD ACCIDENT AND INDEMNITY CO. 11