17-3226 

Huang v. Barr 

BIA 

Tsankov, IJ 

A098 469 134

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER

FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF 

APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER 

IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN 

ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY 

ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 

2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall 

3 United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 

New York, on the 30th 4 day of May, two thousand nineteen. 

5 

6 PRESENT: 

7 DENNIS JACOBS,

8 PETER W. HALL, 

9 DENNY CHIN,

10 Circuit Judges. 

11 _____________________________________ 

12 

13 HAIFAN HUANG, 

14 Petitioner, 

15 

16 v. 17-3226 

17 NAC 

18 WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES 

19 ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

20 Respondent. 

21 _____________________________________ 

22 

23 FOR PETITIONER: Yok-seung Chiu, New York, NY. 

24 

25 FOR RESPONDENT: Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant 

26 Attorney General; Anthony C. 

27 Payne, Assistant Director; Liza S. 

28 Murcia, Attorney, Office of 

29 Immigration Litigation, United 

30 States Department of Justice, 

31 Washington, DC. 
2

1 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 

2 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 

3 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review 

4 is DENIED. 

5 Petitioner Haifan Huang, a native and citizen of the 

6 People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a September 15, 

7 2017, decision of the BIA affirming an April 28, 2017, 

8 decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Huang’s 

9 application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief 

10 under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Haifan 

11 Huang, No. A 098 469 134 (B.I.A. Sept. 15, 2017), aff’g No. 

12 A 098 469 134 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Apr. 28, 2017). We assume 

13 the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and 

14 procedural history in this case. 

15 We have reviewed the decision of the IJ as supplemented 

16 and modified by the BIA. See Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of 

17 Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 2005); Yan Chen v. 

18 Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 2005). Because Huang 

19 does not challenge the agency’s conclusion that she is 

20 ineligible for asylum because she committed a particularly 

21 serious crime, we consider only her eligibility for 

22 withholding of removal and CAT relief. See Yueqing Zhang v. 

23 Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 545 n.7 (2d Cir. 2005). The 
3

1 applicable standards of review are well established. See

2 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Wei Sun v. Sessions, 883 F.3d 23, 

3 27 (2d Cir. 2018) (reviewing factual findings for substantial 

4 evidence and questions of law and the application of law to 

5 undisputed facts de novo). 

6 To qualify for withholding of removal, an applicant must 

7 establish that her “life or freedom would be threatened” in 

8 the country of removal on the basis of one of five statutory 

9 grounds: “race, religion, nationality, membership in a 

10 particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. 

11 § 1231(b)(3)(A); see 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b); Ramsameachire v. 

12 Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 178 (2d Cir. 2004). Because Huang 

13 was not persecuted in the past, she had to establish “that it 

14 is more likely than not” that she “would be persecuted.” 8 

15 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(2). To establish eligibility based on 

16 future persecution, an applicant must show that her fear is 

17 objectively reasonable. Ramsameachire, 357 F.3d at 178. To 

18 meet this standard, an applicant must demonstrate that she 

19 would likely be “singled out individually for persecution,” 

20 or that there is a “pattern or practice” of persecution of 

21 persons “similarly situated” to her. 8 C.F.R. 

22 § 1208.13(b)(2)(iii). An applicant, like Huang, who has 

23 requested “relief based exclusively on activities undertaken 
4

1 after h[er] arrival in the United States . . . must make some 

2 showing that authorities in h[er] country of nationality are 

3 (1) aware of h[er] activities or (2) likely to become aware 

4 of h[er] activities.” Hongsheng Leng v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 

5 135, 138, 143 (2d Cir. 2008). 

6 Similarly, an applicant for CAT relief must show that 

7 she is “more likely than not” to be tortured. 8 C.F.R. 

8 § 1208.16(c)(2). “Torture is defined as any act by which 

9 severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is 

10 intentionally inflicted . . . by or at the instigation of or 

11 with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other 

12 person acting in an official capacity.” Id. § 1208.18(a)(1). 

13 “Torture is an extreme form of cruel and inhuman treatment 

14 and does not include lesser forms of cruel, inhuman or 

15 degrading treatment or punishment that do not amount to 

16 torture.” Id. § 1208.18(a)(2). In assessing the likelihood 

17 of torture, “all evidence relevant to the possibility of 

18 future torture shall be considered, including, but not 

19 limited to . . . [e]vidence of past torture,” the possibility 

20 of relocation within the country, “[e]vidence of gross, 

21 flagrant or mass violations of human rights . . . and . . . 

22 relevant information regarding conditions in the country of 

23 removal.” Id. § 1208.16(c)(3). To meet her burden of proof, 
5

1 Huang was required to establish that someone in her 

2 “particular alleged circumstances” would more likely than not 

3 be tortured. Mu-Xing Wang v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 130, 144 (2d 

4 Cir. 2003). 

5 Huang failed to establish an objectively reasonable fear 

6 that she would more likely than not be persecuted or tortured. 

7 As the IJ noted, Huang was unable to testify with specificity 

8 about who would harm her in China and in what way, she was 

9 unaffiliated with any church or religious group in China, and 

10 she could not explain how the authorities would become aware 

11 of her attendance at underground church gatherings. 

12 Moreover, the country conditions reports do not demonstrate 

13 a pattern or practice of persecution or torture of the average 

14 churchgoer in Huang’s home province of Zhejiang. The most 

15 recent reports described closures of churches and arrests of 

16 pastors, activists, and journalists, but not persecution or 

17 torture of ordinary churchgoers. The reports also recounted 

18 harassment and monitoring, but not persecution or torture, of 

19 Christians in Zhejiang. See Ivanishvili v. U.S. Dep’t of 

20 Justice, 433 F.3d 332, 341 (2d Cir. 2006) (reasoning that 

21 treatment must rise above the level of “mere harassment” to 

22 constitute persecution). Thus, the reports do not show that 

23 someone in Huang’s position who attends an underground church 
6

1 is more likely than not to suffer harm rising to the level of 

2 persecution or torture, given that the arrests and detentions 

3 were of pastors and activists. See Hongsheng Leng, 528 F.3d 

4 at 142; Ivanishvili, 433 F.3d at 341. 

5 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 

6 DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal 

7 that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, 

8 and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition 

9 is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument 

10 in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of 

11 Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 

12 34.1(b). 

13 FOR THE COURT: 

14 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, 

15 Clerk of Court