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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

ALISON B. ALCOBA, ) No. 81961-5-I 

)

Respondent, )

) DIVISION ONE

v. )

)

BIJAN BERENJI, )

) UNPUBLISHED OPINION

Appellant. )

)

MANN, C.J. — Bijan Berenji appeals the trial court’s antiharassment and 

antistalking protection order against him in favor of Alison Alcoba. Berenji argues that

the trial court improperly granted a protection order because: (1) his course of conduct 

consisted predominantly of employment-related correspondence, which served a 

legitimate or lawful purpose and (2) there was insufficient evidence that he engaged in 

cyberstalking. We affirm.

FACTS

On December 8, 2019, Berenji e-mailed the Department of Physics (the 

Department) at the University of Washington (the University) regarding a potential 
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professorship. Alcoba, the then assistant to the Department faculty chair, was copied 

on the e-mail. 

The following day, the Department provided Berenji with a link to its application 

portal. On January 11, 2020, Berenji requested an offer letter for employment. On 

January 28, 2020, Berenji requested a status update, to which Alcoba replied that he 

was not under consideration as a candidate. Berenji replied with a scathing e-mail, 

enumerating his qualifications for a teaching position, suggesting discrimination on the 

part of the University, and threatening suit. 

On March 24 and May 5, 2020, Berenji e-mailed the Department, again asking 

for a position. On May 14, 2020, Berenji e-mailed Alcoba directly, telling her that he 

would be in Seattle for a few days if anyone was interested in talking to him. 

On May 25, 2020, Berenji e-mailed Alcoba on her personal e-mail address. 

Included in the e-mail were photos of Berenji in a speedo-style swimsuit. Alcoba replied 

that she did not know how Berenji obtained her personal e-mail, that the e-mail was 

inappropriate, and that she would file a report with the police. Alcoba explicitly 

instructed Berenji not to contact her again. 

On June 1, 2020, Berenji left a voicemail on Alcoba’s campus phone. Soon 

thereafter, Alcoba learned from University police that Berenji attempted to gain access 

to her place of work. University police told Berenji not to contact Alcoba further. 

On June 14, 2020, a nurse from Mason General Hospital left Alcoba a voicemail, 

which stated that a patient named Bijan had requested to speak with her. When Alcoba 

returned the call, she learned that Berenji had identified her as his next of kin. 
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On June 18, 2020, Berenji e-mailed the Department, reprimanding them for firing 

him and his wife, “Allison Berenji.” Berenji appeared to refer to Alcoba as his wife. 

On June 24, 2020, Alcoba filed a petition in King County Superior Court for a 

temporary order of protection. On July 31 and August 3, 2020, before process of 

service was completed, Berenji contacted Alcoba two more times regarding the status 

of his job application. 

On July 9, 2020, the court issued a temporary order of protection. The order was 

served on Berenji on August 7, 2020. 

On September 15, 2020, the court held a hearing for a permanent protection 

order and determined that Berenji’s conduct constituted stalking under RCW 7.92.020 

and unlawful harassment under RCW 10.14.030. The trial court entered an 

antiharassment and antistalking protection order for a period of one year. The court 

subsequently awarded Alcoba attorney fees. 

Berenji appeals.

ANALYSIS

A. Legitimate or Lawful Purpose

Berenji argues that the trial court improperly granted a protection order because 

his course of conduct consisted predominantly of employment-related correspondence, 

which served a legitimate or lawful purpose. We disagree. 

We review a trial court’s decision to grant a protection order for abuse of 

discretion. State v. Noah, 103 Wn. App. 29, 43, 9 P.3d 858 (2000). A trial court abuses 

its discretion if its decision is manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable reasons. 

Teter v. Deck, 174 Wn.2d 207, 215, 274 P.3d 336 (2012). When a trial court has 
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weighed the evidence, evaluated the credibility of witnesses, and made factual findings, 

the “substantial evidence” standard of review applies. In re Dependency of Schermer, 

161 Wn.2d 927, 940, 169 P.3d 452 (2007) (where trial court acts as a fact-finder, 

appellate review is limited to whether substantial evidence supports trial court's findings 

and whether findings support conclusions of law). Substantial evidence exists where 

the record contains a sufficient quantity of evidence to persuade a fair-minded, rational 

person of the truth of the finding. State v. Hill, 123 Wn.2d 641, 644, 870 P.2d 313 

(1994).

A court may enter a civil antiharassment protection order if it finds by a 

preponderance of evidence that “unlawful harassment” exists. RCW 10.14.080(3). 

Unlawful harassment consists of (1) a knowing and willful (2) course of conduct (3) 

directed at a specific person (4) which seriously alarms, annoys, harasses, or is 

detrimental to a person, and (5) serves no legitimate or lawful purpose. RCW 

10.14.020(1); see also Burchell v. Thibault, 74 Wn. App. 517, 521, 874 P.2d 196 (1994).

To determine if a specific, knowing, and willful course of conduct serves a 

legitimate or lawful purpose, courts consider whether:

(1) Any current contact between parties was initiated by the 

respondent only or was initiated by both parties;

(2) The respondent has been given clear notice that all further 

contact with the petitioner is unwanted;

(3) The respondent’s course of conduct appears designed to alarm, 

annoy, or harass the petitioner;

. . .

(5) The respondent’s course of conduct has the purpose or effect of 

unreasonably interfering with the petitioner’s privacy or the purpose or 

effect of creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive living environment 

for the petitioner;

. . .
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RCW 10.14.030; Shinaberger ex rel. Campbell v. LaPine, 109 Wn. App. 304, 307-08 

(2001).

The record indicates that Berenji’s course of conduct did not serve a legitimate or 

lawful purpose. All contacts were initiated by Berenji to Alcoba’s professional e-mail, 

personal e-mail, telephone, and in person at her place of employment. Following the email containing Berenji’s swimsuit photos, Alcoba clearly instructed Berenji to no longer 

contact her. Berenji’s escalating course of conduct locating Alcoba’s personal e-mail, emailing her inappropriate photos, listing Alcoba as his next of kin, and referring to 

Alcoba as his wife support a finding that his actions appeared designed to alarm, annoy, 

or harass Alcoba and had the effect of unreasonably interfering with Alcoba’s privacy, 

as well as creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive living environment for Alcoba. 

Because the record supports the trial court’s findings that Berenji’s knowing and 

willful course of conduct was not for a legitimate and lawful purpose, the trial court did 

not abuse its discretion in granting Alcoba an antiharassment protection order. 

B. Stalking

Berenji argues that the trial court improperly granted an antistalking protection 

order because there was insufficient evidence that he engaged in cyberstalking, an 

alternative means of committing stalking under ch. 7.92 RCW. We disagree.

Under RCW 7.92.020(4)(a)-(c), “stalking conduct” is defined to include any of the 

following:

(a) Any act of stalking as defined under RCW 9A.46.110;

(b) Any act of cyberstalking as defined under RCW 9.61.260; 
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(c) Any course of conduct involving repeated or continuing contacts, 

attempts to contact, monitoring, tracking, keeping under observation, 

or following of another that:

(i) Would cause a reasonable person to feel intimidated, frightened, or 

threatened and actually causes such a feeling;

(ii) Serves no lawful purpose; and

(iii) The stalker knows or reasonably should know threatens, frightens, 

or intimidates the person, even if the stalker did not intend to 

intimidate, frighten, or threaten the person.

Berenji contends that the May 25, 2020, e-mail with the three photos of him in his

swimsuit was insufficient to support a finding of cyberstalking. The Washington law on 

cyberstalking states that:

(1) A person is guilty of cyberstalking if he or she, with intent to 

harass, intimidate, torment, or embarrass any other person, and under 

circumstances not constituting telephone harassment, makes an 

electronic communication to such other person or a third party:

(a) Using any lewd, lascivious, indecent, or obscene words, 

images, or language, or suggesting the commission of any lewd or 

lascivious act.

RCW 9.61.260.

Examining this language, the trial court found that Berenji sending lewd photos to 

Alcoba’s personal e-mail constituted cyberstalking.1 But even if the photographs were 

not lewd, lascivious, or indecent, under RCW 9.61.260 and thus not stalking under 

RCW 7.92.020(4)(b), the trial court alternatively found Berenji’s conduct stalking under 

RCW 7.92.020(4)(c). The court found:

I am granting Ms. Alcoba’s petition. I find by a preponderance of the 

evidence that Mr. Berenji’s conduct constitutes stalking under RCW 

7.92.020. In particular the cyberstalking acts of contacting Ms. Alcoba via 

 1 In his brief, Berenji suggests that the images of him in a swimsuit may not have been of him at 

all, that the e-mail “bijan.berenji@gmail.com” may not belong to Bijan Berenji, or that the evidence 

strongly indicates that he sent the images to Alcoba’s private e-mail on accident. These suggestions are

unfounded and the record is devoid of any evidence to indicate otherwise.
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email, both or her personal email sending lewd photos, then afterward, 

after she made it clear that such contacts were unwelcome, continuing to 

contact her in July and August of this year.

His other conduct, trying to access the building at her workplace, referring 

to her as his wife in an email, and referring to her as his next of kin when 

he was at a hospital, again would cause a reasonable person to feel 

intimidated, frightened, or threatened and actually did make Ms. Alcoba 

feel that way. His conduct served no lawful purpose and Mr. Berenji either 

knew or reasonably should have known that his conduct threatened, 

frightened, or intimidated her even if that was not his intention. 

The record supports the trial court’s findings. The trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in granting the protection order for both unlawful harassment under RCW 

10.14.020, and stalking under RCW 7.92.030. 

Affirmed.

WE CONCUR: