17-3226 Huang v. Barr BIA Tsankov, IJ A098 469 134 

### UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS **FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT** 

## SUMMARY ORDER

**RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF**  **APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT** = **S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN**  **ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.**  **At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals** 1 **for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall** 2 **United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of** 3 **New York, on the 30 th**  **day of May, two thousand nineteen.** 4 5 **PRESENT:** 6 **DENNIS JACOBS,** 7 **PETER W. HALL,** 8 **DENNY CHIN,** 9 Circuit Judges. 10

**_____________________________________** 11 12 **HAIFAN HUANG,** 13 Petitioner **,** 14 15 **v. 17-3226** 16 **NAC** 17 **WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES** 18 **ATTORNEY GENERAL,** 19 Respondent **.** 20

**_____________________________________** 21 22 **FOR PETITIONER:** Yok-seung Chiu, New York, NY. 23 24 **FOR RESPONDENT:** Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant 25 Attorney General; Anthony C. 26 Payne, Assistant Director; Liza S. 27 Murcia, Attorney, Office of 28 Immigration Litigation, United 29 States Department of Justice, 30 Washington, DC. 312 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 1 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 2 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review 3 is DENIED. 4 Petitioner Haifan Huang, a native and citizen of the 5 People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a September 15, 6 2017, decision of the BIA affirming an April 28, 2017, 7 decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Huang’s 8 application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief 9 under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Haifan 10 Huang, No. A 098 469 134 (B.I.A. Sept. 15, 2017), aff’g No. 11 A 098 469 134 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Apr. 28, 2017). We assume 12 the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and 13 procedural history in this case. 14 We have reviewed the decision of the IJ as supplemented 15 and modified by the BIA. See Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of 16 Justice , 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 2005); Yan Chen v. 17 Gonzales , 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 2005). Because Huang 18 does not challenge the agency’s conclusion that she is 19 ineligible for asylum because she committed a particularly 20 serious crime, we consider only her eligibility for 21 withholding of removal and CAT relief. See Yueqing Zhang v. 22 Gonzales , 426 F.3d 540, 545 n.7 (2d Cir. 2005). The 233 applicable standards of review are well established. See 1 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Wei Sun v. Sessions , 883 F.3d 23, 2 27 (2d Cir. 2018) (reviewing factual findings for substantial 3 evidence and questions of law and the application of law to 4 undisputed facts de novo). 5 To qualify for withholding of removal, an applicant must 6 establish that her “life or freedom would be threatened” in 7 the country of removal on the basis of one of five statutory 8 grounds: “race, religion, nationality, membership in a 9 particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. 10 § 1231(b)(3)(A); see 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b); Ramsameachire v. 11 Ashcroft , 357 F.3d 169, 178 (2d Cir. 2004). Because Huang 12 was not persecuted in the past, she had to establish “that it 13 is more likely than not” that she “would be persecuted.” 8 14 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(2). To establish eligibility based on 15 future persecution, an applicant must show that her fear is 16 objectively reasonable. Ramsameachire , 357 F.3d at 178. To 17 meet this standard, an applicant must demonstrate that she 18 would likely be “singled out individually for persecution,” 19 or that there is a “pattern or practice” of persecution of 20 persons “similarly situated” to her. 8 C.F.R. 21 § 1208.13(b)(2)(iii). An applicant, like Huang, who has 22 requested “relief based exclusively on activities undertaken 234 after h[er] arrival in the United States . . . must make some 1 showing that authorities in h[er] country of nationality are 2 (1) aware of h[er] activities or (2) likely to become aware 3 of h[er] activities.” Hongsheng Leng v. Mukasey , 528 F.3d 4 135, 138, 143 (2d Cir. 2008). 5 Similarly, an applicant for CAT relief must show that 6 she is “more likely than not” to be tortured. 8 C.F.R. 7 § 1208.16(c)(2). “Torture is defined as any act by which 8 severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is 9 intentionally inflicted . . . by or at the instigation of or 10 with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other 11 person acting in an official capacity.” Id. § 1208.18(a)(1). 12 “Torture is an extreme form of cruel and inhuman treatment 13 and does not include lesser forms of cruel, inhuman or 14 degrading treatment or punishment that do not amount to 15

torture.” Id. § 1208.18(a)(2). In assessing the likelihood 16 of torture, “all evidence relevant to the possibility of 17 future torture shall be considered, including, but not 18 limited to . . . [e]vidence of past torture,” the possibility 19 of relocation within the country, “[e]vidence of gross, 20 flagrant or mass violations of human rights . . . and . . . 21 relevant information regarding conditions in the country of 22 removal.” Id. § 1208.16(c)(3). To meet her burden of proof, 235 Huang was required to establish that someone in her 1 “particular alleged circumstances” would more likely than not 2 be tortured. Mu-Xing Wang v. Ashcroft , 320 F.3d 130, 144 (2d 3 Cir. 2003). 4 Huang failed to establish an objectively reasonable fear 5 that she would more likely than not be persecuted or tortured. 6 As the IJ noted, Huang was unable to testify with specificity 7 about who would harm her in China and in what way, she was 8 unaffiliated with any church or reli gious group in China, and 9 she could not explain how the authorities would become aware 10 of her attendance at underground church gatherings. 11 Moreover, the country conditions reports do not demonstrate 12 a pattern or practice of persecution or torture of the average 13 churchgoer in Huang’s home province of Zhejiang. The most 14 recent reports described closures of churches and arrests of 15 pastors, activists, and journalists, but not persecution or 16 torture of ordinary churchgoers. The reports also recounted 17 harassment and monitoring, but not persecution or torture, of 18 Christians in Zhejiang. See Ivanishvili v. U.S. Dep’t of 19 Justice , 433 F.3d 332, 341 (2d Cir. 2006) (reasoning that 20 treatment must rise above the level of “mere harassment” to 21 constitute persecution). Thus, the reports do not show that 22 someone in Huang’s position who attends an underground church 236 is more likely than not to suffer harm rising to the level of 1 persecution or torture, given that the arrests and detentions 2 were of pastors and activists. See Hongsheng Leng , 528 F.3d 3 at 142; Ivanishvili , 433 F.3d at 341. 4 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 5 DENIED. As we have completed our rev iew, any stay of removal 6 that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, 7 and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition 8 is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument 9 in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of 10 Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and S econd Circuit Local Rule 11 34.1(b). 12

FOR THE COURT: 13 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, 14 Clerk of Court 15