MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions

Decision: 2022 ME	42

Docket: Yor-21-344

Argued: June	6,	2022

Decided: July	26,	2022

Panel: STANFILL,	C.J.,	and MEAD, JABAR,	HORTON,	CONNORS,	and	LAWRENCE,	JJ.

RICHARD	OUELLETTE

v.

SACO	RIVER	CORRIDOR	COMMISSION

JABAR,	J.

[¶1]	 Richard	 Ouellette	 appeals	 from	 a	 decision	 of	 the	 Superior	 Court	

(York	 County,	 Douglas,	 J.)	 affirming	 the	 decision	 of	 the	 Saco	 River	 Corridor	

Commission	 denying	 Ouellette’s	 application	 to	 build	 a	 privacy	 fence	 along	 a	

portion	of	his	property	because	such	a	fence	would	unreasonably	despoil	the	

scenic,	rural,	and	open	space	character	of	the	Saco	River	Corridor.		Because	the	

Commission’s	“scenic	 view” rule,	 94-412	 C.M.R.	 ch.	 103, §	 2(G)(3) (effective	

Jan. 30,	 2006), neither	 conflicts	 with the	 Saco	 River	 Corridor	 Act,	 38	 M.R.S.	

§§ 951-969 (2022),	nor	is unconstitutionally	void	for	vagueness,	and	because	

the	 Commission’s	 decision	 was	 supported	 by	 substantial	 evidence	 in	 the	

record,	we	affirm.
2

I.		BACKGROUND

[¶2]	 	 The	 following	 facts	 are	 drawn	 from	 the	 Commission’s	 findings,	

which	are	supported	by	competent	record	evidence.		See	Sultan	Corp.	v.	Dep’t	of	

Env’t Prot.,	2022	ME	21,	¶	2,	272 A.3d	296.		Richard	Ouellette	owns	property	on	

the	Saco	River	on Pool	Street	in	Biddeford.		The	property	is	located	within	the	

Limited	Residential	District	of	the	Saco	River	Corridor	as	defined	by 38 M.R.S.	

§ 957-B.	 	 The	 property	 abuts	 11	 and	 13	 Marblehead	 Lane.	 	 If	 there	 are	 no	

obstructions,	 the	 Saco	 River	is	 visible	 from	 the	 Marblehead	 Lane	 properties	

when	looking	over	the	Pool	Street	property	during	certain	seasons.		

[¶3]		In	June	2020,	it	came	to	the	Commission’s	attention	that	Ouellette	

had	 replaced	 an	 existing	 264-foot-long,	 5-foot-tall,	 vinyl	 post-and-rail	 fence	

with	 a	 6- to 7-foot-tall	 privacy	 fence,	 without	 obtaining	 a	 permit	 from	 the	

Commission.		Ouellette	installed	this	fence	to	block	his view	of	his neighbor’s	

backyard. After	the	Commission	contacted	Ouellette about	the	fence,	he	applied	

for	an	after-the-fact	permit	 for the	project.		This	initial	application	proposed	

keeping	the	entire	fence	intact.		The	neighbors	at	11 and	13	Marblehead	Lane	

submitted	comments	that	their	views	of	the	Saco	River	were	obstructed	by	the	

new	 fence	in	a	way	 that	 they	were	 not	 by	 the	 previous	 fence	and	 submitted	

photographic	evidence	supporting	the	comments.		Commission	staff	visited	the	
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site	on	August	14,	2020,	and	two	commissioners	visited	the	site	on	August	24,	

2020.		The	Commission	considered	 the	application	at	 their	August	26,	2020,	

meeting.		By	a	vote	of	7-3,	the	Commission	denied	the	application,	determining	

that,	under	the	standards	set forth	in	94-412	C.M.R.	ch.	103,	§ 2(G),	the	fence	

unreasonably	obstructed	the	views	of	the	river	from	abutting	properties.		The	

Commission	issued	a	written	decision	on	September	2,	2020.		

[¶4]		Ouellette initially	appealed	 this	decision	but	withdrew	his	appeal	

after	he	reapplied	for	the permit	on	September	16,	2020.		The	new application	

proposed	replacing the six solid panels	nearest	 to	 the	river	with	 the	original

split-rail fence.		On	September 30,	2020, commissioners	visited	the	site	again.

The	 abutting	 landowners	 again	 submitted	 comments	 in	 opposition	 to	 the	

application. During	its	October	28,	2020,	meeting,	the	Commission	denied	the	

application	by	a	vote	of	10-3	and	found	that	the	proposed	privacy	fence	“would	

unreasonably	involve	factors	enumerated	in	Section	959-A.1.A. through	K	of	the	

Act	INCLUDING:	G.	Despoliation of	the	scenic,	rural,	and	open	space	character	

of	 the	 corridor”	 by	 unreasonably	 obstructing	 the	 views	 of	 the	 river	 from	

abutting	properties.		The	Commission	issued	its	written	decision,	with	findings,	

on	November	4,	2020.		
4

[¶5]		On	November	27,	2020,	Ouellette	requested	that	the	Commission	

reconsider	 the	 application,	 pursuant	 to	 94-412	 C.M.R.	 ch.	 101,	 §	 5	 (effective	

Jan. 30,	2006).		The	neighbors,	as	they	did	with	the	application,	filed	documents	

opposing	the	request	for	reconsideration.		The	Commission	heard	the	request	

for	 reconsideration at	 its	 January	 4,	 2021,	 meeting.	 	 By	 a	 vote	 of	 8-6	 the	

Commission	rejected	the	request.		A	commissioner	then	proposed	replacing	ten	

panels	with	the	original	split-rail	fence,	but	this	proposal	failed	to	carry	because

the Commission	voted	7-7.		The	Commission	issued	its	decision	with	findings	

on	January	13,	2021.		On	February 3, 2021,	Ouellette	timely	appealed	from	the	

Commission’s	decision	to	the	Superior	Court.1		See	M.R.	Civ.	P.	80C(b);	5	M.R.S.	

§	11002(3)	(2022).

[¶6]	 	 Following	 argument	 on	 August	 17,	 2021,	 the	 Superior	 Court	

affirmed	 the	 Commission’s	 decision	 on	 October	 15,	 2021.	 	 Ouellette	 timely	

appeals.		See	5	M.R.S.	§	11008(1)	(2022).

1 Although	38	M.R.S.	§	968 (2022) provides	that	appeals	 from	decisions	of	the	Commission	be	

taken	pursuant	 to	M.R.	Civ.	P.	80B,	the	statute	was	enacted in	1979, prior	 to	 the	adoption	of	M.R.	

Civ. P. 80C in	1983.		See	Palesky	v.	Sec’y	of	State,	1998	ME	103,	¶	7	n.2,	711	A.2d	129	(“Prior	to	the	

adoption	of	M.R.	Civ.	P.	80C,	both	governmental	and	agency	actions	were	reviewed	according	to	M.R.	

Civ.	P.	80B . .	.	.”). Because	the	Commission	is	an	administrative	agency,	see	5	M.R.S.	§	8002(2)	(2022),	

this	 appeal	 was	 properly	 brought	 under	 M.R.	 Civ.	 P.	 80C,	 which	 “applies	 to	 appeals	 from	 state	

administrative	 action,”	Dubois v.	 Town	 of	 Arundel,	 2019	ME	 21,	 ¶	 5,	 202	 A.3d	 524. See	 also	M.R.	

Civ. P. 80B Advisory	 Committee’s	Notes	 to	 February 15,	 1983	Order	 Amending	 Rule	 80B	 (“[M.R.	

Civ. P. 80B	and	80C]	now	provide	separate	procedural	paths	for	judicial	review	of	local	government	

agencies	 and	 for	 review	 of	 state	 administrative	 agencies	 subject	 to	 the	 Maine	 Administrative	

Procedure	Act.”).	
5

II.		DISCUSSION

[¶7]		On	appeal,	Ouellette	contends	that	the Commission’s “scenic	view”

rule	 conflicts	 with	 the	 Saco	 River	 Corridor	 Act, that	 the	 rule	 is	

unconstitutionally	 vague, and that	 the	 Commission’s	 decision	 to	 deny	 the	

permit	was	not	supported	by	substantial	evidence	in	the	record.		

A. The	“Scenic	View” Rule

1. Standard	of	Review

[¶8]		“In	an	appeal	from	a Superior	Court	judgment	on	a	Rule	80C	petition,	

we	review the	underlying	administrative	agency	decision	directly	for	abuse	of	

discretion,	errors	of	law,	or	findings	unsupported	by	substantial	evidence	in	the	

record.”		Maquoit	Bay,	LLC	v.	Dep’t	of	Marine	Res.,	2022	ME	19,	¶	5,	271	A.3d	

1183.		We	review a	trial	court’s	interpretation	of	statute	de	novo.		SAD	3	Educ.	

Ass’n	v.	RSU	3	Bd.	of	Dirs.,	2018	ME	29,	¶	14,	180	A.3d	125.		When	a	statute’s	

language	 is	 unambiguous,	 “we interpret	 the	 provisions	 according	 to	 their	

unambiguous	meaning	 unless	 the	 result	is	illogical	 or	 absurd,”	 and	 only	if	 a	

statute	 is	 ambiguous do we “consider	 the	 statute’s	 meaning	 in	 light	 of	 its	

legislative	history	and	other	indicia	of	legislative	intent.”		Id. (quotation	marks	

omitted).
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2. The	Saco	River	Corridor	Act

[¶9]		The	Saco	River	Corridor	Act	establishes	the	Saco	River	Corridor	and	

the	 Commission.	 	 The	 Legislature	 found	“that	 [the	 Saco,	 Ossipee,	 and	 Little	

Ossipee	 Rivers]	 and	 their	 adjacent	 lands	 possess	 outstanding	 scenic	 and	

aesthetic	qualities.”		38	M.R.S.	§	951.		The	purpose	of	the	Act	includes preserving	

the	“scenic,	rural	and	unspoiled	character	of	the	lands	adjacent	to	these	rivers.”		

Id.		The	Act	separates	the	corridor	into	three	districts—the	Resource	Protection	

District,	the	Limited	Residential	District,	and	the	General	Development	District.		

Id.	§	957.		Ouellette’s	property	is	in	 the	Limited	Residential District,	which	is	

defined	as	“lands	within	the	corridor	which	may	be	suitable	for	development,	

but	which	are	not	necessary	for	the	growth	of	areas	of	intensive	development.”		

Id.	§	957-B(1).		Uses	that	are	allowed	by	permit	include	single-family	residences	

and	accessory	structures.		Id. § 957-B(3)(E).		“Fences”	are	included	in	the	Act’s	

definition	of	“structure.”		Id. § 952(16).

[¶10]	 	 To	 receive	 a	 permit to	 construct	 a	 structure	 in	 the	 Limited	

Residential	 District,	 an applicant	 must	 show	 that	 a	 proposed	 use	 will	 not	

unreasonably	 cause	 any	 of	 eleven	 enumerated	 conditions.	 Id.	

§ 959-A(1)(A)-(K).	 	 Paragraph (G)	 requires	 the	 applicant	 to	 prove	 that	 the	

proposed	 use	will	 not	involve an	 unreasonable	 “[d]espoliation	 of	 the	 scenic,	
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rural	 and	 open	 space character of	 the	 corridor.”	 	 The	 Commission,	which	 is	

authorized	to	adopt additional	standards	for	permitted	uses,	id.	§	954-C(1),	has	

promulgated	rules	that	expand	upon	section	959-A(1)(G).		One	of	these	rules,	

the	“scenic	view” rule,	requires	applicants to	show	“[t]he	proposed	use	will	not	

unreasonably	 obstruct	 scenic	 views	 from	 neighboring	 properties	 or	 public	

roads.” 94-412 C.M.R.	ch.	103, § 2(G)(3).

[¶11]		Ouellette	argues	that	the	“scenic	view”	rule conflicts	with	the	Act	

because	the	Commission	cannot	deny	a	permit	based	on	a	proposed	use’s	effect	

on	 an	 abutting	 landowner,	 categorically	 bans	 all	 fences	 in	 the	 corridor, and	

empowers	the	Commission	to	create	de	facto	view	easements.		

a. Effect	on	Abutting	Landowners

[¶12]		The	plain	language	of	section	959-A(1)(G) of	the	act requires	the	

Commission	 to	 determine	 whether	 a	 proposed	 use	 will	 involve	 “any

unreasonable	.	.	.	despoliation	of	the	scenic,	rural	and	open	space	character	of	

the	 corridor.”	 	This	 requirement	 clearly	extends	 to	 the	lands	adjacent	 to	 the	

river.		See	id.	§	951 (“[I]t	is	the	purpose	of	this	chapter	.	.	. to	preserve	the	scenic	

rural	and	unspoiled	character of	the	lands	adjacent	to	[the	rivers	constituting	

the	corridor]	.	.	.	.”);	id. §	953	 (“The	 [Saco	River	Corridor]	includes	 the	lands	

adjacent	to	these	rivers	to	a	distance	of	500	 feet.”).	 The	rule	promulgated	in	
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accordance	with	the	statute provides that	a use	must not	unreasonably	obstruct	

scenic views	from	the	road	and	neighboring	properties	or	be	highly	visible	from	

the	water. 94-412	C.M.R.	ch. 103, § 2(G)(3)-(4).		The	unambiguous	language	in	

section	 2(G) does	 not	 conflict	 with	 the	 statute	 but	 instead	 provides	 the	

Commission	with	a	consistent	means	of	examining	whether	the	use	will	involve	

an	“unreasonable	[d]espoliation	of	the	scenic,	rural	and	open	space	character	

of	the	corridor,”	38	M.R.S.	§	959-A(1)(G).	

b. The	Act	Does	Not	Ban	Fences

[¶13]		Ouellette	argues	that	the	Commission’s	“scenic	view” rule	conflicts	

with	 the	Act	 because	it	 categorically	 bans	 the	 use	 of	 fences,	a	 permitted	 use	

under	the	Act.		See	38	M.R.S.	§§	952(2),	(16),	957-B.		However,	the	rule	does	not	

ban	 all	 fences,	 just	 those	 that	 unreasonably	 obstruct	 scenic	 views,	 94-412	

C.M.R.	 ch.	 103, §	 2(G)(3),	 which aligns	 with	 the	 statute.	 	 See	 38	 M.R.S.	

§ 959-A(1)(G) (barring	 uses	 that	 unreasonably	 cause	 “[d]espoliation	 of	 the	

scenic	 . . .	 character	 of	 the	 corridor”).	 	 “[W]hether	 a	 proposed	 activity will	

unreasonably	interfere	with	an	existing	scenic	or	aesthetic	use	will	necessarily	

depend	on	the	specific	circumstances	of	a	given case.”		Uliano	v.	Bd.	of	Env’t Prot.,	

2009	ME	89,	¶ 23,	977	A.2d	400.		Ultimately,	neither	the	statute	nor	the	rules	

ban	the	use	of	all	fences,	and	whether	any	given	fence	unreasonably	interferes	
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with	the	scenic	view	is	a	fact-specific	determination	within	the	Commission’s	

role	as	fact finder.		

c. View	Easements

[¶14]		Ouellette	also	argues	that the	“scenic	view” rule	conflicts	with	the	

Act	because	 the	rule	empowers	 the	Commission	 to	 “create	and	give	away	de	

facto	 view	 easements	 to	 adjacent	 landowners,”	 a	 power	 the	 Act	 does	 not	

bestow.		A	view	easement	requires	“the	owner	of	the	servient	estate	[to]	not	

undertake	 any	 activities,	 such	 as	 the	 construction	 of	 a	 building,	 that	 would	

impede	 the	 view	 of	 the	 owner	 of	 the	 dominant	 estate.”	 	 Patterson	 v.	 Paul,	

863 N.E.2d	527,	533	(Mass.	2007).		However,	Ouellette	points	to	no	authority	

that	would	differentiate	the	“scenic view” rule	from	other	rules	that	consider	

the	scenic	effect	on	neighbors and	that	have	been	upheld.		See,	e.g.,	Uliano,	2009	

ME	89,	¶	31,	977	A.2d	400	(“[P]rotection	of	scenic	and	aesthetic	uses	serves	a	

significant	governmental	interest	and	is	a	valid	exercise	of	the	police	power.”).		

Further,	 the	 rule	 does	 not	 block	 all	 obstructions,	 only	 “unreasonable”	 ones.		

38 M.R.S.	§	959-A(1)(G).		We	therefore	reject	this	argument.

B. Void	for	Vagueness

[¶15]		Ouellette	contends	that	the	“scenic	view” rule is	unconstitutionally	

void	for	vagueness.	 “A person	challenging	the	constitutionality	of	a	legislative	
10

enactment	‘bears	a	heavy	burden	of	proving	unconstitutionality[,]	since	all	acts	

of	the	Legislature	are	presumed	constitutional,’”	Jones	v.	Sec’y	of	State,	2020	ME	

113,	¶	18,	238	A.3d	982	(quoting	Goggin	v.	State	Tax	Assessor,	2018	ME	111,	

¶ 20,	191	A.3d	341).		This	burden	also	applies	to	regulations.		Davis	v.	Sec’y	of	

State,	 577	 A.2d	 338,	 341	 (Me.	 1990)	 (“The	 party	 challenging	 the	 regulation	

bears	the	heavy	burden	of	overcoming	its	presumption	of	constitutionality.”).		

In	 a	 void-for-vagueness	 challenge,	 the	 challenging	 party	 “must	 demonstrate	

that	the	statute	has	no	valid	application	or	logical	construction.”		Stewart	Title	

Guar.	 Co.	 v.	 State	 Tax	 Assessor,	 2009	ME	 8,	 ¶	 40,	 963	A.2d	 169.	 	A	 statute is	

unconstitutionally	 vague	 “when	 its	 language	 either	 forbids	 or	 requires	 the	

doing	of	an	act	in	terms	so	vague	that	people	of	common	intelligence	must	guess	

at	its	meaning,	or	if	it	authorizes	or	encourages	arbitrary	and discriminatory	

enforcement.”	 	 Uliano,	 2009	 ME	 89,	 ¶ 15,	 977	 A.2d	 400 (quotation marks	

omitted).	 	 In	 a	 land	 use	 context,	 standards	 that	 are	 “wholly	 subjective”	 and	

“permit[]	 municipal	 employees	 or	 board	 members	 to	 make	 ‘legislative-type	

decisions	based	on	any	factor	they	independently	deem[] appropriate”	are	void	

for	vagueness. Id. ¶ 25	(quoting	Kosalka	v.	Town	of	Georgetown,	2000	ME	106,	

¶ 16,	 752	 A.2d	 183).2	 	 However,	 “[o]bjective	 quantification,	 mathematical	

2		Kosalka	v.	Town	of	Georgetown addresses	an	improper	delegation	of	legislative	authority	and	

does	not	address	a	void-for-vagueness	challenge.		2000	ME	106,	¶	1,	752	A.2d	183.		However,	we	
11

certainty,	and	absolute	precision	are	not	required	by	either	the	United	States	

Constitution	or	Maine	Constitution.”		Friends	of	Me.’s Mountains	v.	Bd. of	Env’t	

Prot.,	2013	ME	25,	¶	21,	61	A.3d	689 (quotation	marks	omitted).		

[¶16]		We	have	held	that	a	standard	that	required	that	a	proposed	activity	

“not	 unreasonably	 interfere	 with	 existing	 scenic,	 aesthetic,	 recreational	 or	

navigational	uses,”	38	M.R.S.	§	480-D(1) (2022), was	sufficiently	definite	to	not	

be	void	for	vagueness	or	unconstitutionally	delegate	legislative	power.		Uliano,	

2009	 ME	 89,	 ¶¶ 14, 29-32,	 977	 A.2d	 400.	 	 In	Uliano,	 addressing the	 lack	 of	

quantitative	 standards,	 we emphasized	 the difference	 between	 the	 limited	

requirement	in	the	statute	at	issue	there—that	the	decision	maker determine	

whether	a	proposed	activity	unreasonably	interfered	with	an	existing	scenic	or	

aesthetic	use—and Kosalka’s	“amorphous	command	. . . requiring	an	applicant	

to	 prove	 that	 a	 project	 will	 ‘conserve	 natural	 beauty.’”	 	 Id.	 ¶	 25.	 	 Further,	

because the	 statute in	Uliano was	 administered	 by	 an	 executive	 agency	 (the	

Board	 of	 Environmental	 Protection)	 subject	 to	 the	 Maine	 Administrative	

Procedure	Act,	the	parties	were	provided	with	greater	due	process	protections.		

have	stated	that	“both	vagueness	and	unlawful	delegation	challenges	are	concerned	with	the	issue	of	

definiteness”	and that both	have	been	“properly	treated	as	a	single	inquiry.”		Uliano	v.	Bd.	of	Env’t

Prot.,	2009	ME	89,	¶	15,	977	A.2d	400.		We	look	to	our	analysis	in	Kosalka for	limited	guidance	on	the	

specificity	required	to	meet	constitutional	requirements.		See	id. ¶¶ 24-28.
12

Id.	¶¶	26-28.		Ultimately,	we determined	that	the	phrase	‘scenic	and	aesthetic	

uses’	was	sufficiently	definite	and	offered	“an	intelligible	principle	to	which	the	

person	or	body	authorized	to	act	is	directed	to	conform.”		Id.	¶¶	29-30	(quoting	

Whitman	v.	Am.	Trucking	Ass’ns,	531	U.S.	457,	472	(2001)).

[¶17]		However,	the	analysis	as	to	whether	a	view	is	actually	scenic,	and	

therefore	whether	an	application	could	potentially	be	denied	under the	rule, is	

more	complicated.		Ouellette	argues	that	not	every	view	of	the	corridor	is	scenic	

and	that	there	is	no	definition	that	determines	what	views	are	scenic.		However,	

the	statute	supports	an	interpretation	that	all	views	of	the	river	are	considered	

scenic.	 	The	 Legislature	 found that	 “[the	 rivers	making	 up	 the	 corridor]	 and	

their	 adjacent	 lands	 possess	 outstanding	 scenic	 and	 aesthetic	 qualities.”		

38 M.R.S.	§	951.		Although	the	Act	specifies	that	there	are	areas	of	“exceptional	

scenic	value”	or	“exceptional	scenic	importance,”	see	id.	§§	951,	957-A(F),	these	

areas	are	the	subject	of	special	statutes	and	rules,	id. § 957-A(F);	94-412	C.M.R.	

ch.	103, §	2(G)(5),	implying	that	the	other	rules	would	apply	to	all	views	of	the	

corridor.		Looking	to	“the	context	of	the	whole	statutory	scheme	of	which	the	

section	at	issue	 forms	a	part	 to	achieve	a	consistent	and	harmonious	result,”	

Fortin	v.	Titcomb,	2013	ME	14,	¶	7,	60	A.3d	765	(quotation	marks	omitted),	we	

reject	Ouellette’s	argument.		
13

[¶18]		The	statute	 further provides	greater due	process protections	 to	

Ouellette,	thereby	weakening	his	vagueness	argument.		The Saco	River	Corridor	

Commission	was	established	by	 the	Legislature	and	is	subject	 to	Title	5.		See	

5 M.R.S.	 §	 12004-G(13) (2022);	 38 M.R.S.	 §§	 954,	 954-C.	 	 This	 provides

“adequate	 procedural	 safeguards	 to	 protect	 against	 an	 abuse	 of	 discretion”	

when,	 like	 here,	 “the	 statutory	 enactment	 of	 detailed	 specific	 standards	 is	

impossible.”	 	 Uliano,	 2009	 ME	 89,	 ¶	 26,	 977	 A.2d	 400 (quotation	 marks	

omitted).		Ultimately,	we	conclude	that	the	rule	is	not	unconstitutionally	void	

for	vagueness.

C. Substantial Evidence

[¶19]		Ouellette	contends that	the	Commission’s	determinations that	the	

fence	unreasonably	obstructed	the	views	of	the	river	from	abutting	properties	

and	that	those	views	were	scenic	were	unsupported	by	substantial	evidence.		

[¶20]	 	 “In	 an	 appeal	 from	 a	 Superior	 Court	 judgment	 on	 a	 Rule	 80C	

petition,	 we	 review	 the	 underlying	 administrative	 decision directly for	

. . . findings	unsupported	by	substantial	evidence	in	the	record.”		Maquoit	Bay,	

LLC,	2022	ME	19,	¶	5,	271	A.3d	1183.		We	will	“not	substitute	our	judgment	for	

that	 of	 the	 agency	 and	 will	 affirm	 findings	 of	 fact	 if	 they	 are	 supported	 by	

substantial	 evidence	 in	 the	 record.”	 	 AngleZ	 Behav.	 Health	 Servs.	 v.	 Dep’t	 of	
14

Health	 &	 Hum.	 Servs.,	 2020	 ME	 26,	 ¶	 12,	 226	 A.3d	 762 (quotation	 marks	

omitted).		“Substantial	evidence	exists	when	a	reasonable	mind	would	rely	on	

that	evidence	as	sufficient	support for a	conclusion.”		Doane	v.	Dep’t	of	Health	

& Hum.	Servs.,	2021	ME	28,	¶	38,	250	A.3d	1101 (quotation	marks	omitted).		We	

“examine	 the	 entire	 record	 to	 determine	 whether,	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 all	 the	

testimony	and	exhibits	before	it,	the	agency	could	fairly	and	reasonably	find	the	

facts	 as	 it	 did.”	 	 Id.	 (quotation	 marks	 omitted). However,	 the	

substantial-evidence	standard	of	review	“does	not	involve	any	weighing	of	the	

merits	of	evidence;	instead,	we will	vacate	an	agency’s	factual	findings	only	if	

there	is	no	competent	evidence	in	the	record	to	support	the	findings.”		AngleZ	

Behav. Health	 Servs.,	 2020	 ME	 26,	 ¶ 12,	 226	 A.3d	 762 (quotation	 marks	

omitted).		Accordingly,	we will	affirm	the	agency’s	findings	“even	if	the	record	

contains	inconsistent	evidence	or	evidence	contrary	 to	 the	result	reached	by	

the	agency.”		Friends	of	Lincoln	Lakes	v.	Bd.	of	Env’t	Prot.,	2010	ME	18,	¶	13,	989	

A.2d	1128.

[¶21]		With	respect	to	the unreasonable	obstruction	of	a	scenic	view,	the	

Commission	found	as	follows:

The	prior	existing	split-rail	fence	allowed	views	to	the	river	from	

abutting	properties	and	Marblehead	Lane.		The	Commission	finds	

the	proposed	changes	to	the	fence	would	continue	to	unreasonably	

obstruct	 views	 of	 the	 river	 from	 abutting	 properties	 including	
15

11 and	 13	 Marblehead	 Lane.	 	 Before	 the	 privacy	 fence	 was	

constructed[,]	expansive	views	of	 the	river	and	 tidal	marsh	were	

visible	 from	11	and	13	Marblehead	Lane.		Views	of	 the	river	and	

marsh	 vary	 based	 on	 the	 season,	and	in	 the	late	 fall,	winter,	and	

early	spring	there	was	high visibility	of	the	river	before	the	fence	

was	erected.		This	determination	is	based	on	photographs	taken	by	

Commission	staff	and	provided	by	abutters	and	interested	parties	

that	 show	 the	 prior	 existing	 view	 of	 the	 river	 from	 different	

abutting	 properties.	 Commissioners	 present	 for	 the site	 visit	

provided	assessments	of	the	site	[that	were]	also	considered	in	the	

determination	 of	 this	 application.	 	 Based	 on	 the	 facts,	 the	

Commission	finds	the	proposed	design	is	not	within	the	meaning	of	

the	Act.

[¶22]		The Commission	reviewed	evidence	that	included	photographs of	

the	views	from	the	properties	at	11	and	13	Marblehead	Lane,	from	both before	

and	 after	 the	 fence	 was	 installed.	 	 Commission	 staff	 and	 some	 of	 the	

commissioners made	several	visits	to	the	property	to	examine	the	views	and	

the	 fence.		The	commissioners	considered	comments	 from	several	neighbors	

that	described the	views	that	existed	before the	fence	was	installed.		Because	

the	 Commission	 had	 competent	 evidence	 upon which	 to	 determine	that	the	

views	were	scenic,	to	both	neighbors	and	the	public,	and that	those	views were	

unreasonably	obstructed	by	Ouellette’s	fence,	the	Commission’s	decision	was	

supported	by	substantial evidence.

The	entry	is:

Judgment	affirmed.
16

Gene	R.	Libby,	Esq.,	and	Tyler	J.	Smith,	Esq. (orally),	Libby	O’Brien	Kingsley	&	

Champion,	LLC,	Kennebunk,	for	appellant	Richard	Ouellette

Aaron	M.	Frey,	Attorney	General,	Caleb	E.	Elwell,	Asst.	Atty.	Gen. (orally),	and	

Margaret	A.	Bensinger,	Asst.	Atty.	Gen.,	Office	of	the	Attorney	General,	Augusta,	

for	appellee	Saco	River	Corridor	Commission

York	County	Superior	Court	docket	number	AP-2021-02

FOR	CLERK	REFERENCE	ONLY