IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. FRED ARTHUR STIER

 Appeal from the Circuit Court for Henry County

No. 12812 Julian P. Guinn, Judge

No. W1999-600-CCA-R3-CD - Decided April 7, 2000

The Defendant, Fred Arthur Stier, was charged with violation of the “light law”; resisting

stop, frisk, halt, arrest, or search; possession with intent to manufacture, deliver, or sell a controlled

substance; possession of a controlled substance; and possession of drug paraphernalia. Upon

dismissal of the remaining charges, the Defendant pleaded guilty to resisting stop, frisk, halt, arrest,

or search and to possession with intent to manufacture, deliver, or sell a controlled substance,

reserving a certified question of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(i).

The certified question presented to us is whether the trial court erred in overruling the Defendant’s

motion to suppress the evidence obtained against him as the result of an unlawful stop and frisk. The

State concedes on appeal that the trial court erred in overruling the Defendant’s motion to suppress.

We agree; accordingly, we reverse the Defendant’s convictions and dismiss the case.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3; Appeal of Certified Question; Judgment of the Trial Court is Reversed;

Case Dismissed

WELLES, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which TIPTON,J., and LAFFERTY,SR.J., joined.

Matthew M. Maddox, Huntingdon, Tennessee for the appellant, Fred Arthur Stier.

Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter, Mark E. Davidson, Assistant Attorney General,

Robert "Gus" Radford, District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

Two police officers with the Henry County Sheriff’s Department testified at the suppression

hearing. Officer Scott Lynn Wyrick stated that on February 20, 1998, he was working as a narcotics

officer with the Sheriff’s Department. He said that one or two days before February 20, he received

information from a “concerned citizen” that the Defendant “would possibly be carrying some

cocaine to the Henry County area” on February 20. The informant told Officer Wyrick the type of

car the Defendant would be driving, the license number of that car, an approximate time that the

Defendant would be in Henry County, and that the Defendant would be coming from Antioch,

Tennessee. Officer Wyrick provided very little information about the informant other than that the
-2-

informant was a “concerned citizen” as opposed to someone from the “criminal milieu.” He said that

the informant contacted him with the information and that he met with the informant in person. He

did not ask the person why he or she was providing the information. He said that he had previously

received information about an alleged drug dealer from this informant, but he did not follow up on

the information.

Officer Wyrick testified that based on the information from the informant, he set up

surveillance and located the Defendant at about 1:00 or 1:30 in the afternoon in Paris, Tennessee on

February 20, 1998. The Defendant was parked at the Union Planters Bank when he was located.

Officer Wyrick said that he did not think he had probable cause to obtain a search warrant to search

the Defendant’s car, so he told the other officers to observe the Defendant when the Defendant left

the parking lot and to pull the Defendant over if he committed a traffic violation. Officer Wyrick

was informed by Officer Archie that the Defendant committed some traffic violations, but he did not

personally see the Defendant violate any traffic laws.

Officer Donnie Archie testified that he was employed in the uniform patrol division of the

Henry County Sheriff’s Department on February 20, 1998. He received information from Officer

Wyrick to stop the Defendant if the Defendant committed a traffic violation. He was also informed

by Officer Wyrick that the Defendant was possibly bringing drugs into Henry County from Antioch.

He said that he observed the Defendant “make an illegal right turn” and that one of the bulbs in the

Defendant’s left tail light was inoperative. He explained that the street upon which the Defendant

was driving was divided into a left turn lane, a lane that went straight, and a lane to turn right. The

Defendant was in the lane that went straight, but he turned right from that lane at the intersection.

The Defendant did signal briefly before turning. 

Officer Archie testified that he stopped the Defendant based only on these traffic violations.

He asked the Defendant whether he had any weapons on his person and told the Defendant that he

“needed to pat him down” for safety. He said that did not have any reason to think that he might

have been in danger, but he “pat[s] down everybody that [he] ask[s] to get out of the car.” When

questioned about this procedure by the trial judge, Officer Archie said that he would have patted

down a seventy-five year old grandmother or grandfather if he or she had committed the same traffic

violation. 

Officer Archie said that while he was “patting [the Defendant] down,” he felt a bulge on the

inside of one of the Defendant’s socks. At this point, the Defendant attempted to run from Officer

Archie. The Defendant was apprehended and placed under arrest. Drugs were found in the

Defendant’s sock and in the vehicle.

After hearing this testimony, the trial court ruled that “Officer Wyrick had reasonable and

trustworthy information from a responsible citizen that a felony was going to be committed and had

the details of the felony to the extent that he could have obtained a search warrant. . . . He could have

stopped the vehicle at the bank and searched the man because he had probable cause.” The trial

court thus found that the stop of the Defendant’s vehicle and subsequent search of the Defendant
-3-

were lawful because the officers had probable cause to believe that the Defendant was transporting

drugs. With respect to the traffic stop, the trial judge stated,

Now, the traffic stop itself, there’s nothing in the world that says you can search a

person’s socks for making a wrong right-hand turn and not having a traffic [sic] light.

And I suspect that if that’s what the policy is now we’re getting ready to get a bunch

of lawsuits here. The first time they grab somebody’s granny and search her socks,

well, she’s going to file a lawsuit. And that’s not the law, and, to my knowledge, it’s

never been the law. You don’t arrest people for this, you give them a traffic citation.

A traffic stop doesn’t have anything to do with this lawsuit. The man had probable

cause, he had a good search. Let the motion to suppress be overruled.

On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in finding the officers had probable

cause to stop the Defendant and search his person and his car. He argues that the officers did not

have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify an investigatory stop of the Defendant based

on the informant’s tip, that the officers did not have probable cause to believe the Defendant

committed a traffic violation, and that they did not have reasonable suspicion that the Defendant was

armed to justify the “pat-down” of the Defendant. The State asserts that it is not necessary to address

whether the informant’s tip provided the officers with probable cause or reasonable suspicion to stop

the Defendant because Officer Archie testified that he stopped the Defendant based only on the

alleged traffic violations. The State then concedes that the officer did not have probable cause to

believe the Defendant committed a traffic violation or reasonable suspicion to believe the Defendant

was armed and dangerous; thus, the seizure and subsequent search of the Defendant were unlawful.

We agree. We also conclude that the officers did not have probable cause or reasonable suspicion

to seize the Defendant’s vehicle based on the informant's tip.

 When reviewing the grant or denial of a motion to suppress, we accept the trial court’s

findings of fact unless the evidence preponderates otherwise. See State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18,

23 (Tenn. 1996). However, the application of the law to the facts as found by the trial court is a

question of law which the appellate court reviews de novo. See State v. Yeargan, 958 S.W.2d 626,

629 (Tenn. 1997) (citing Beare Co. v. Tennessee Dept. of Revenue, 858 S.W.2d 906, 907 (Tenn.

1993)). Because the facts in this case are undisputed, we are called upon only to address questions

of law. As such, our review of the decision below will be de novo. 

Both the United States and Tennessee Constitutions protect against unreasonable searches

and seizures. See U.S. Const. amend IV; Tenn. Const. art. 1, § 7. Under both the United States and

Tennessee Constitutions, a search or seizure conducted without a warrant is presumed unreasonable.

See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971); State v. Simpson, 968 S.W.2d 776,

780 (Tenn. 1998); State v. Watkins, 827 S.W.2d 293, 295 (Tenn. 1992). Therefore, evidence seized

as a result of a search or seizure conducted without a warrant must be suppressed unless the State

proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the search was reasonable. See id. 

The stop of an automobile and the detention of its occupants constitutes a seizure, even if the

purpose of the stop is limited and the detention is brief. See Wren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806,
-4-

809-10 (1996); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 563 (1979); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428

U.S. 543, 556-58 (1976); State v. Vineyard, 958 S.W.2d 730, 734 (Tenn. 1997). Thus, the

Defendant in this case was seized by Officer Archie when his automobile was stopped, thereby

calling into play the protections of the United States and Tennessee Constitutions. However, a

police officer may stop or “seize” an automobile without a warrant if the officer has probable cause

to believe that a criminal offense or a traffic violation has occurred. See Wren, 517 U.S. at 810;

Prouse, 440 U.S. at 655, 659; Vineyard, 958 S.W.2d at 734. If the officer has probable cause to

believe that a violation of the traffic code has occurred, the seizure will be upheld even if the stop

is a complete pretext for the officer’s subjective motivations in making the stop. See Wren, 517 U.S.

at 813-17; Vineyard, 958 S.W.2d at 734-35. A police officer may also seize an automobile and

question its occupants if the officer has reasonable suspicion, based on specific and articulable facts,

that the occupants have been involved in or are about to be involved in criminal activity. See

Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 693 (1996); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968); State v.

Simpson, 968 S.W.2d 776, 780 (Tenn. 1998); State v. Vineyard, 958 S.W.2d 730, 734 (Tenn. 1997).

The facts forming the basis for the officer’s probable cause or reasonable suspicion need not

rest upon the personal knowledge or observation of the officer. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S.

143, 147 (1972); Simpson, 968 S.W.2d at 780. However, when a stop is based on the tip of an

informant, the danger of false reports becomes a concern. See State v. Pulley, 863 S.W.2d 29, 31

(Tenn. 1993). Consequently, we must apply tests for determining the reliability of an informant’s

tip. Id. Under Tennessee law, to establish probable cause based on an informant’s tip, there must

be a showing of both the informant’s credibility and his or her basis of knowledge. See State v.

Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d 430, 436 (Tenn. 1989). Although reasonable suspicion “requires ‘a lower

quantum of proof than probable cause,’” these Jacumin factors are useful in considering the

reliability of an informant’s tip for establishing reasonable suspicion as well as probable cause.

Pulley, 863 S.W.2d at 31. Our supreme court has maintained that “while independent police

corroboration could make up deficiencies in either prong, each prong represents an independently

important consideration that ‘must be separately considered and satisfied in some way.’” Jacumin,

778 S.W.2d at 436.

In considering the reliability of informant tips, the supreme court has distinguished between

information provided by a known citizen informant and information provided by a criminal or

professional informant. See State v. Stevens, 989 S.W.2d 290, 293 (Tenn. 1999); State v. Melson,

638 S.W.2d 342, 354 (Tenn. 1982). Information provided by a citizen or bystander witness who is

known to the officer is presumed to be reliable; thus, the State is not required to establish either the

informant’s credibility or the reliability of the information. See Stevens, 989 S.W.2d at 293. This

is because an ordinary citizen who reports a crime does so with an intent to aid the police in law

enforcement due to his or her concern for society or for his or her own safety; on the other hand, a

criminal informant generally reports crimes in exchange for some type of consideration from the

police. See id. at 294; State v. Luke, 995 S.W.2d 630, 636 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998).

Notwithstanding, for an informant to be considered a citizen informant as opposed to a criminal

informant, there must be some evidence of the informant’s status or relationship to the events or

persons involved, indicating the informant’s basis of knowledge. See Luke, 995 S.W.2d at 637. As

our supreme court noted in State v. Stevens with respect to informants who report drug crimes,
-5-

 [A]s a general proposition it is an informant from the criminal milieu rather than a

law-abiding citizen who is most likely to be present under such circumstances. This

is not to suggest that a person giving information about the location of narcotics may

never qualify as a citizen-informer, for it is sometimes possible to show with

particularity how a law-abiding individual happened to come upon such knowledge.

Rather, the point is that in such a case it should not be deemed sufficient that the

police have alleged in a rather conclusory fashion that the person was “an individual

who is neither a paid nor habitual informant,” “a responsible citizen of utmost

character and integrity” or “a reputable member of the community.” Perhaps a more

particularized showing of the law-abiding nature of the person supplying the

information will suffice. 

Stevens, 989 S.W.2d at 294-95 (emphasis in original) (quoting 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and

Seizure § 3.4(a) (3d ed. 1996)). 

The evidence here contains only conclusory allegations that the informant was a “citizen

informant” who was not from the “criminal milieu.” Officer Wyrick testified that the informant

provided information because he was concerned for his safety, but the officer did not explain how

the informant was related to the events or parties. Under Stevens, we do not believe this is enough

evidence for the informant to be considered a citizen informant. Also, as the supreme court noted

in Stevens, a citizen informant “‘usually would not have more than one opportunity to supply

information to the police, thereby precluding proof of his reliability by pointing to previous accurate

information which he has supplied.’” Id. at 294 (quoting State v. Smith, 867 S.W.2d 343, 347

(Tenn. Crim. App. 1993)). Officer Wyrick testified that this informant had provided information

about a drug dealer in the past, even though the officer did not follow up on the information. This

goes against the finding that the informant was merely a concerned citizen who happened upon some

information about drug transactions. Therefore, we may not presume the informant’s credibility or

the reliability of the information, and we must apply the test for reliability espoused by the supreme

court in Jacumin. See 778 S.W.2d at 436.

We first find that there is no proof of the informant’s credibility or his basis of knowledge.

The only testimony was that the informant was a “concerned citizen.” Since the informant cannot

be considered a citizen informant, this is not sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Jacumin. See

Stevens, 989 S.W.2d at 294-95. Recognizing that deficiencies in either of the two prongs of the

Jacumin test may made up by independent police corroboration, see Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d at 436;

Pulley, 863 S.W.2d at 31, we further find that there was insufficient corroboration in this case to

make up for the deficiencies. Officer Wyrick testified that the informant told him the Defendant

would possibly be coming from Antioch to Henry County with drugs, along with the approximate

time the Defendant would be in Henry County, the Defendant’s make and model of car, and the

license number on the car. Officer Wyrick located the Defendant in the car as described. These facts

are substantially similar to those in State v. Coleman, 791 S.W.2d 504 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1989), in

which we found no probable cause or reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant’s vehicle.
-6-

In Coleman, an informant, whom the officer “had previously arrested,” told the officer that

between 2:00 and 2:30 p.m. on August 10, a white female between the ages of twenty-five and thirty

five whose name was Carla would be en route to Robertson County from Davidson County on

Highway 431 South. Id. at 504. The informant further stated that Carla would be driving an older

model black Monte Carlo, that she would have several pounds of marijuana, and that she would

ultimately drive to a location on Washington Road. Id. The informant did not explain how he knew

this information. Id. The officer instructed other officers to stop any vehicle meeting the description

given. Id. Around 2:30 p.m. on August 10, after about forty-five minutes of surveillance, an officer

observed an older model black Monte Carlo traveling from Davidson County to Robertson County

on Highway 431 South. Id. The officer ran a check on the license plate, learned the plates were

registered in the name of Carla Coleman, and then initiated a stop. Id. at 504-05. In holding that

the officer did not have probable cause or reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle, we stated,

We know of no attempt made by the officers to verify the credibility of their

informant or the reliability of the information provided. The detention took place

before the officers had an opportunity to corroborate Washington Road in Robertson

County as the point of final destination. There was no significant period of

surveillance before the deputy made the investigative stop. That the car was in fact

registered in the name of Carla Coleman, innocent in and of itself, was the only

independently acquired fact supporting the tip’s veracity.

Id. at 506.

Here, as in Coleman, the facts corroborated were innocent in and of themselves. The

Defendant was in his car in Henry County. That the Defendant owned a particular vehicle and would

be in Henry County on a particular day were facts readily discoverable. Similar facts could be

discovered about many of the other people who were in Henry County that day. Without more

information about the informant’s credibility or basis of knowledge concerning drug activity, this

was not enough evidence to establish either probable cause or reasonable suspicion to the make the

stop to search for drugs. Thus, the trial court erred in finding that the officer’s stop was lawful based

on the informant’s tip.

We now turn to the traffic violations. Officer Archie testified that he stopped the Defendant

because the Defendant committed two traffic violations. It is clear that if Officer Archie had

probable cause to believe the Defendant committed a traffic violation, he could stop the Defendant

for the violation even if his subjective intention was to investigate drug transportation. Wren, 517

U.S. at 813-17; Vineyard, 958 S.W.2d at 734-35. However, the State concedes that the testimony

did not establish that Officer Archie had probable cause to believe the Defendant committed any

traffic violations. 

Officer Archie testified that one of the Defendant’s brake lights on the left side was

inoperable, thereby indicating that the Defendant had more than one brake light on each side and that

at least one of the brake lights on each side was working. Officer Archie characterized this as a

violation of the “light law.” The relevant statute is Tennessee Code Annotated § 55-9-402(b)(1)-(3),
-7-

which requires all motor vehicles to be equipped with one red tail lamp and one red “stoplight” on

each side of the vehicle, requires the “stoplight” to be visible upon the depression of the brake, and

provides that the “stoplight” may be incorporated with the tail lamp. Because it appears the

Defendant had at least one brake light visible on each side of his car, he was not in violation of this

statute. 

Curiously, the Defendant was not charged with a violation of the relevant “light law.”

Instead, he was charged with violating Tennessee Code Annotated § 55-9-401(a), which provides

as follows:

Every vehicle other than a motor vehicle, when traveling upon a state highway, state

aid road or other road, highway or street . . . shall be equipped with a light attached

to and on the upper left side of such vehicle, capable of displaying a light visible five

hundred feet (500') to the rear of such vehicle under ordinary atmospheric conditions,

and such light shall be displayed during the period from one-half (1⁄2) hour after

sunset to one-half (1⁄2) hour before sunrise and at all other times when there is not

sufficient light to render clearly discernible any person on the road or highway at a

distance of two hundred feet (200') ahead of such vehicle.

(Emphasis added). Because the Defendant was driving a motor vehicle and because he was driving

in mid-afternoon, this statute is clearly inapplicable. 

Officer Archie also testified that the Defendant made an improper right turn from the center

lane. However, the State failed to establish what traffic law this turn violated. We have found no

law which is clearly applicable. Therefore, we must hold that the State failed to meet its burden of

establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the police officers had probable cause to believe

the Defendant had committed a traffic violation which would have justified the stop of the

Defendant’s vehicle. Accordingly, we conclude that the stop of the Defendant’s vehicle was not

justified by either probable cause or reasonable suspicion, thereby making the stop unlawful under

the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 7 of the Tennessee

Constitution.

Because we hold that the stop of the Defendant’s vehicle was unlawful, we need not address

the actual search of the Defendant. Notwithstanding, we will briefly discuss the “pat-down” of the

Defendant after the seizure. Officer Archie testified that he had no reason to believe either that he

was in danger from the Defendant or that the Defendant was armed, but he frisked the Defendant

because that is his standard procedure. He said that he would frisk a seventy-five year old

grandmother who committed the same traffic violation. In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the

Supreme Court approved the limited and temporary seizure of a person for questioning and for a

“pat-down” for weapons if an officer has a “reasonable suspicion” that the person is armed and

dangerous. Id. at 30. Terry did not approve a “pat-down” for weapons as standard procedure. See

id. Assuming for the sake of argument that Officer Archie did have probable cause to believe the

Defendant committed a traffic violation, that still did not give him a reasonable suspicion that the

Defendant was armed and dangerous. If the Defendant had consented to a search upon questioning
-8-

by the officer, that would present a different issue; but where the only lawful reason to stop a vehicle

is because of a traffic violation, there must be other circumstances giving rise to a reasonable

suspicion that the occupant is armed and dangerous before a “pat-down” for weapons will be

justified.

CONCLUSION

We conclude that the trial court erred in finding that the police officers had probable cause

to stop the Defendant’s vehicle based on the tip from the informant. We further conclude that the

stop was not justified based on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity or probable cause to believe

the Defendant had committed a traffic violation. Therefore, the seizure of the Defendant was

unlawful, and the evidence obtained as a result of that seizure must be suppressed. The order of the

trial court overruling the Defendant’s motion to suppress is reversed, and the case is dismissed.