22-6373 

Singh v. Garland

BIA

Thompson, IJ

A202 037 028 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY 

ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF 

APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY 

ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL 

APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY 

CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY 

COUNSEL. 

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 

Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley 

Square, in the City of New York, on the 20th day of August, two thousand

twenty-four. 

PRESENT: 

JON O. NEWMAN,

RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,

MYRNA PÉREZ,

Circuit Judges. 

_____________________________________

SHIVJI SINGH, 

 Petitioner, 

v. 22-6373

NAC

MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED 

STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,

 Respondent. 

_____________________________________
2 

FOR PETITIONER: Jaspreet Singh, Law Office of Jaspreet Singh, 

Richmond Hill, NY. 

FOR RESPONDENT: Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant 

Attorney General; Julie M. Iversen, Senior 

Litigation Counsel; Lynda A. Do, Trial 

Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, 

United States Department of Justice, 

Washington, DC.

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of 

Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND 

DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED. 

Petitioner Shivji Singh, a native and citizen of India, seeks review of a July

27, 2022 decision of the BIA affirming a June 18, 2019 decision of an Immigration 

Judge (“IJ”) denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief 

under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Shivji Singh, No. A202 037 

028 (B.I.A. July 27, 2022), aff’g No. A202 037 028 (Immigr. Ct. N.Y.C. June 18, 2019). 

We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural 

history. 

We have considered both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions. See Wangchuck v. 

Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). We review the agency’s 

“legal conclusions de novo, and its factual findings, including adverse credibility 
3 

determinations, under the substantial evidence standard.” Y.C. v. Holder, 741 

F.3d 324, 332 (2d Cir. 2013) (quotation marks omitted). “[T]he administrative 

findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be 

compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). 

“Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all relevant factors, a 

trier of fact may base a credibility determination on . . . the consistency between 

the applicant’s or witness’s written and oral statements (whenever made and 

whether or not under oath, and considering the circumstances under which the 

statements were made), the internal consistency of each such statement, the 

consistency of such statements with other evidence of record . . . , and any 

inaccuracies or falsehoods in such statements, without regard to whether an 

inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim, 

or any other relevant factor.” Id. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). “We defer . . . to an IJ’s 

credibility determination unless, from the totality of the circumstances, it is plain 

that no reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility ruling.” 

Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2008); accord Hong Fei Gao v. 

Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018). 
4 

Here, substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility 

determination. The agency reasonably concluded that Singh was not credible 

given inconsistencies between his testimony and evidence and his admission that 

some information in initial corroborating affidavits was false. Singh’s original 

asylum application, along with identity and corroborating documents, was 

admitted into evidence without objection, and Singh testified that he reviewed his 

asylum application and written statement, and that all information therein was 

true. He did not disavow any evidence in the record. He testified that his father 

had a heart attack because the police harassed and pushed him, but that his father

was not beaten and had never been in a coma. His original application, however, 

included both a hospital letter stating that his father was in a coma and had lost 

85% of his brain function because of police torture, and affidavits from people 

Singh knew in India reporting that the police had harassed his family and that his 

father was in a coma. This inconsistency alone constitutes substantial evidence 

for the adverse credibility determination. See Likai Gao v. Barr, 968 F.3d 137, 145 

n.8 (2d Cir. 2020) (“[E]ven a single inconsistency might preclude an alien from 

showing that an IJ was compelled to find him credible. Multiple inconsistencies 

would so preclude even more forcefully.”); Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 170 (2d 
5 

Cir. 2007) (“[A] single false document or a single instance of false testimony may 

(if attributable to the petitioner) infect the balance of the alien’s uncorroborated or 

unauthenticated evidence.”). 

Moreover, the agency was not required to credit Singh’s explanations that 

his family obtained the evidence and he knew the affiants, but that he had never 

seen the documents and had only given the names of the affiants to his former 

attorney, who must have written or obtained the documents without his 

knowledge. Singh subsequently proffered that his family may not have told him 

about his father’s beating and coma. The agency was not required to accept these 

shifting and speculative explanations. See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d 

Cir. 2005) (“A petitioner must do more than offer a plausible explanation for his 

inconsistent statements to secure relief; he must demonstrate that a reasonable 

fact-finder would be compelled to credit his testimony.” (quotation marks 

omitted)). In addition, although Singh placed the blame on his original attorney, 

he did not comply with the procedural requirements for an ineffective assistance 

claim by submitting his own affidavit and evidence that he had informed his 

former counsel of the allegations or allowed counsel an opportunity to respond, 

or by filing a complaint against counsel. See Twum v. INS, 411 F.3d 54, 59 (2d Cir. 
6 

2005) (citing Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637, 639 (B.I.A. 1988)). Thus, he has 

“forfeit[ed] [his] ineffective assistance of counsel claim in this Court.” Jian Yun 

Zheng v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 409 F.3d 43, 47 (2d Cir. 2005). Absent compliance with 

the requirements for an ineffective assistance claim, there is no basis, other than 

Singh’s unsupported allegations, to conclude that counsel, rather than Singh, was 

responsible for the false information. And while Singh alleges that compliance 

was impossible because his initial attorney died in 2020, he does not explain why 

he could not have pursued the claim between the hearing and IJ’s decision in June 

2019 and counsel’s death or why he could not have submitted his own 

affidavit. 

Lastly, the agency reasonably relied on the lack of reliable corroboration as 

further evidence of a lack of credibility. “An applicant’s failure to corroborate his 

or her testimony may bear on credibility, because the absence of corroboration in 

general makes an applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony that has already been 

called into question.” Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007). 

Singh submitted affidavits from his father, neighbors, and friends to corroborate 

his arrest and abuse by the police. First, as discussed, his father’s affidavit 

contradicts the earlier hospital letter and affidavits. Moreover, the IJ did not err 
7 

in giving diminished weight to affidavits from friends and family who were not 

available for cross-examination. See Likai Gao, 968 F.3d at 149 (holding that “the 

IJ acted within her discretion in according . . . little weight [to letters] because the 

declarants (particularly [petitioner]’s wife) were interested parties and neither was 

available for cross-examination”); Y.C., 741 F.3d at 332 (“We generally defer to the 

agency’s evaluation of the weight to be afforded an applicant’s documentary 

evidence.”). The IJ also reasonably declined to credit these submissions given the 

admission that other affidavits contained false allegations. See Siewe, 480 F.3d at 

170. 

In summary, substantial evidence supports the adverse credibility 

determination given the inconsistent statements, Singh’s admission that affidavits 

contained false information, and the lack of other reliable corroboration to 

rehabilitate Singh’s credibility. See Likai Gao, 968 F.3d at 145 n.8; Siewe, 480 F.3d 

at 170; Biao Yang, 496 F.3d at 273. The adverse credibility determination is 

dispositive of asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief because all three 

forms of relief were based on the same facts. Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 76. 
8 

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. All pending 

motions and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED.

FOR THE COURT: 

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, 

Clerk of Court