alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
1

The Honorable Nanette K. Laughrey, United States District Judge for the

Western District of Missouri.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 08-3724

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the

v. * Western District of Missouri.

*

Jose Estrada, * [UNPUBLISHED]

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: October 20, 2009

Filed: December 18, 2009

___________

Before MURPHY, COLLOTON, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

In this direct criminal appeal, Jose Estrada challenges the below-Guidelinesrange sentence the district court1

 imposed after he pleaded guilty to conspiring to

distribute 5 kilograms or more of a substance containing cocaine, in violation of 21

U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and 846; possessing with the intent to distribute 5

kilograms or more of a substance containing cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and 18 U.S.C. § 2; conspiring to conduct financial transactions

affecting interstate or foreign commerce with the intent to promote unlawful activity
-2-

and to disguise the nature, location, source, ownership or control of the proceeds, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(1)(A)(i), (a)(1)(B)(i), (a)(1)(B)(ii), 1956(h), and

1957; and aiding and abetting the delivery of the proceeds from the unlawful

distribution of cocaine, knowing that the transaction was designed to conceal the

course of the proceeds, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1956(a)(1)(A)(i), and

(a)(1)(B)(i). On appeal, his counsel has moved to withdraw and has filed a brief under

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), arguing that Estrada’s sentence is

unreasonable because he had no criminal history.

We review the imposition of sentences under a deferential abuse-of-discretion

standard, first ensuring that the district court committed no significant procedural

error, and then considering the substantive reasonableness of the sentence. See United

States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (listing factors that

constitute abuse of discretion); United States v. Haack, 403 F.3d 997, 1003-04 (8th

Cir. 2005) (standard of review). We find no abuse of discretion here.

After reviewing the record independently under Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75

(1988), we have found no nonfrivolous issues for appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the

judgment of the district court, and we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw, subject to

counsel informing Estrada about procedures for seeking rehearing or filing a petition

for certiorari.

______________________________
Exhibit 32.1

Certification of Chief Executive Officer

Pursuant to

Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. 1350)

In connection with this Annual Report on Form 10-K (the Report) of Investcorp
Credit Management BDC, Inc. (the Registrant), as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof, I, Michael C. Mauer, the Chief Executive Officer of the Registrant, hereby certify, to the best of my knowledge, that:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
as amended; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
condition and results of operations of the Registrant.



/s/    Michael C.
MauerName:

Michael C. MauerDate:

September 13, 2019
*This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of

law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the

citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under

the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

F I L E D

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

FEB 7 2002

PATRICK FISHER

Clerk

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

RONALD EDWARD GILLETTE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. No. 01-2119

ROBERT PERRY, Secretary of

Corrections; NEW MEXICO

CORRECTIONS DEPARTMENT;

BERNALILLO COUNTY, New Mexico;

JACK L. LOVE, District Court Judge,

Defendants-Appellees.

(D.C. No. CIV-01-14 LH/KBM)

(D. N.M.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

Before HENRY, BRISCOE and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this

appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered

submitted without oral argument.

Plaintiff Ronald Edward Gillette, a state prisoner appearing pro se, filed a false
2

imprisonment claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the district court on January 2, 2001. On

February 9, 2001, the district court dismissed the complaint, finding the claim was barred

by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) (holding a convicted defendant may not bring

an action for damages under § 1983 unless and until his sentence is set aside). Gillette

filed his objections to the order on March 5, 2001 (the certificate shows it was placed in

prison mail on February 27). The district court considered the objections as a motion for

relief from judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) and denied the motion

on March 20, 2001. Gillette filed his notice of appeal on April 5, 2001.

The motion for relief from judgment was not filed within ten days of the district

court's judgment. Therefore, the motion must be construed as one pursuant to Rule 60(b). 

See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A); Van Skiver v. United States, 952 F.2d 1241, 1243 (10th

Cir. 1991). Gillette's appeal from the denial of the motion raises for review only the

district court's order of denial and not the underlying judgment. Id. We review the denial

of a Rule 60(b) motion for abuse of discretion. See White v. American Airlines, Inc., 915

F.2d 1414, 1425 (10th Cir. 1990).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Gillette's motion. The

district court found that “even assuming the validity of Plaintiff's underlying premise for

purposes of this order, he may not bring a claim of illegal sentence under § 1983 unless

and until his sentence [is] set aside.” ROA, Doc. 11. Gillette has failed to demonstrate

any basis for relief under Rule 60(b).
3

AFFIRMED. The mandate shall issue forthwith. Gillette's motion to proceed on

appeal in forma pauperis is DENIED.

Entered for the Court

Mary Beck Briscoe

Circuit Judge
Exhibit 35.1

 

ANNUAL SERVICER’S COMPLIANCE CERTIFICATE

 

This ComplianceCertificate is furnished pursuant to Section 4.10 of the Sale and Servicing Agreement (the “Agreement”), dated asof June 27, 2013, by and among Hyundai Auto Receivables Trust 2013-B, Hyundai Capital America, as seller and servicer (the“Servicer”), Hyundai ABS Funding Corporation, as depositor, and U.S. Bank National Association, as indenturetrustee and Item 1123 of Regulation AB. The undersigned hereby certifies that:

 

1)        Iam a duly authorized officer of the Servicer.

 

2)        Areview of the activities of the Servicer from June 27, 2013 through December 31, 2013 (the “Relevant Period”)and of the Servicer’s performance under the Agreement during the Relevant Period has been made under my supervision.

 

3)        Basedon such review, the Servicer has, to the best of my knowledge, fulfilled all of its obligations under the Agreement in all materialrespects throughout the Relevant Period.

 

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have duly executed thisCompliance Certificate this 28th day of March, 2014.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                            FEB-28-2001
<PERIOD-END>                                 AUG-31-2000
<CASH>                                            12,589
<SECURITIES>                                           0
<RECEIVABLES>                                     19,179
<ALLOWANCES>                                           0
<INVENTORY>                                            0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                  44,923
<PP&E>                                            98,890
<DEPRECIATION>                                   (33,876)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                   822,919
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            383,598
<BONDS>                                          266,526
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                  0
<PREFERRED>                                            0
<COMMON>                                          26,736
<OTHER-SE>                                       146,059
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                     822,919
<SALES>                                                0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                  20,194
<CGS>                                                  0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                      5,703
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 312,117
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                       0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 6,685
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 (302,227)
<INCOME-TAX>                                     311,715
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                    0
<DISCONTINUED>                                         0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                        0
<CHANGES>                                              0
<NET-INCOME>                                       9,488
<EPS-BASIC>                                         .000
<EPS-DILUTED>                                       .000


</TABLE>
FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

_____________________________

No. 1D2022-4022

_____________________________

MICHAEL CAMPBELL,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County.

Kevin J. Carroll, Judge.

November 28, 2023

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

B.L. THOMAS, ROWE, and BILBREY, JJ., concur.

_____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

_____________________________
2

Michael Campbell, pro se, Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
#### Emma T. CAVAZOS, Claimant-Appellant, v. Gordon H. MANSFIELD, Acting Secretary of Veterans Affairs, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 2007-7289.

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

Dec. 20, 2007.

Emma T. Cavazos, pro se.

*266Before RADER, SCHALL, and PROST, Circuit Judges.

ON MOTION

*ORDER*

PER CURIAM.

The Acting Secretary of Veterans Affairs moves to waive the requirements of Fed. Cir. R. 27(f) and to dismiss Emma T. Cavazos’ appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims’ judgment in *Cavazos v. Nicholson,*05-1507, for lack of jurisdiction. Cavazos has not responded.

Cavazos, through counsel, sought review by the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims of a Board of Veterans’ Appeals decision that denied her motion for revision based on clear and unmistakable error in a July 1978 Board decision. In the 1978 decision, the Board found that the cause of Cavazos’ husband’s death did not have any relationship to his service in the United States Navy. The Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims affirmed the Board’s decision, finding that, based on the record, the Board’s decision was not “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.” Cavazos appeals to this court.

Under 38 U.S.C. § 7292, this court has limited jurisdiction over appeals from decisions of the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims. *See Forshey v. Principi,*284 F.3d 1335, 1338 (Fed.Cir.2002) (en banc). This court “may not review (A) a challenge to a factual determination, or (B) a challenge to a law or regulation as applied to the facts of a particular case.” 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2).

In her informal brief, Cavazos argues only that Board “did not provide adequate reasons or bases for its decision,” and erred in finding that her husband’s death was unrelated to a service-connected disability. Cavazos challenges the factual determinations in her case and the Board’s application of law to her case. Because Cavazos fails to raise an issue within our jurisdiction, we must dismiss this appeal.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED THAT:

(1) The Acting Secretary’s motions are granted. The appeal is dismissed.

(2) Each side shall bear its own costs.
```

[Congressional Bills 112th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2395 Introduced in House (IH)]

112th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 2395

      To amend the Workforce Investment Act of 1998 to permit the 
   establishment of Jobs Corps centers in territories of the United 
                                States.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             June 24, 2011

   Mr. Sablan (for himself, Mr. Faleomavaega, Mrs. Christensen, Ms. 
 Richardson, Ms. Norton, Ms. Chu, Mr. Wu, Mr. Kucinich, Ms. Bordallo, 
Mr. Pierluisi, Mr. Hinchey, Mr. Towns, Ms. Wilson of Florida, Mr. Lewis 
    of Georgia, Mr. Conyers, Ms. Brown of Florida, Mr. Boswell, Mr. 
Serrano, Mr. Bishop of Georgia, Ms. Hirono, Mr. Grijalva, Mr. Pastor of 
Arizona, Mr. Butterfield, Ms. Fudge, Mr. Polis, Ms. Clarke of New York, 
 and Mr. Kildee) introduced the following bill; which was referred to 
              the Committee on Education and the Workforce

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
      To amend the Workforce Investment Act of 1998 to permit the 
   establishment of Jobs Corps centers in territories of the United 
                                States.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. ELIGIBILITY OF TERRITORIES FOR JOBS CORPS CENTERS.

    Section 147(a) of the Workforce Investment Act of 1998 (29 U.S.C. 
2887(a)) is amended--
            (1) in paragraph (1)(A), by inserting ``or similar agency 
        of an outlying area,'' after ``local agency''; and
            (2) in paragraph (2)(B)(i)(III), by inserting ``(or 
        outlying area)'' after ``State''.
                                 <all>
```
[Cite as State v. Rippey, 2016-Ohio-7361.]

 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

 TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO 

 BUTLER COUNTY 

STATE OF OHIO, : 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, : CASE NO. CA2016-01-021 

 : D E C I S I O N 

 - vs - 10/17/2016 

 : 

DESHAWN DAJUAN RIPPEY, : 

 Defendant-Appellant. : 

CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM BUTLER COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

Case No. CR2015-07-1023 

Michael T. Gmoser, Butler County Prosecuting Attorney, Lina N. Alkamhawi, Government 

Services Center, 315 High Street, 11th Floor, Hamilton, OH 45011-6057, for plaintiff-appellee 

Scott N. Blauvelt, 315 South Monument Avenue, Hamilton, OH 45011, for defendantappellant 

 Per Curiam.

{¶1} This cause came on to be considered upon a notice of appeal, the transcript of 

the docket and journal entries, the transcript of proceedings and original papers from the 

Butler County Court of Common Pleas, and upon the brief filed by appellant's counsel. 

{¶2} Counsel for defendant-appellant, Deshawn Rippey, has filed a brief with this 

court pursuant to Anders v. California (1967), 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, which (1) 
Butler CA2016-01-021 

 - 2 - 

indicates that a careful review of the record from the proceedings below fails to disclose any 

errors by the trial court prejudicial to the rights of appellant upon which an assignment of 

error may be predicated; (2) lists two potential errors "that might arguably support the 

appeal," Anders, at 744, 87 S.Ct. at 1400; (3) requests that this court review the record 

independently to determine whether the proceedings are free from prejudicial error and 

without infringement of appellant's constitutional rights; (4) requests permission to withdraw 

as counsel for appellant on the basis that the appeal is wholly frivolous; and (5) certifies that 

a copy of both the brief and motion to withdraw have been served upon appellant. 

{¶3} Having allowed appellant sufficient time to respond, and no response having 

been received, we have accordingly examined the record and find no error prejudicial to 

appellant's rights in the proceedings in the trial court. The motion of counsel for appellant 

requesting to withdraw as counsel is granted, and this appeal is dismissed for the reason that 

it is wholly frivolous. 

M. POWELL, P.J., S. POWELL and RINGLAND, JJ., concur.
**Exhibit
        32.1**
 
 CERTIFICATION
        OF PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
 PURSUANT
        TO 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350,
 AS
        ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
 SECTION
        906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
 
 In
        connection with the Annual Report of ATSI Communications, Inc. on Form 10-QSB
        for the period ending January 31, 2008, as filed with the Securities and
        Exchange Commission on the date hereof, I, Arthur L. Smith, President and
        Chief
        Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C, ss. 1350,
        as
        adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that,
 
 1)
              the
                  Report complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d)
                  of the
                  Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
 
 2)
              the
                  information in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
                  the
                  financial condition and result of operations of the
                  Company.
 
 By
        /s/
        Arthur L. Smith
 Arthur
        L.
        Smith
 President
        and
 Chief
        Executive Officer
 March
        13,
        2008
Exhibit 31.1



CERTIFICATION



I, Michael C. Forman, certify that:



| | 1. | I have reviewed this Amendment No. 1 to the annual report on Form 10-K of FS Investment Corporation III; and
| | -- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2. | Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact
necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with
respect to the period covered by this report.
| | -- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



Date: April 24, 2019



|                        | 
|----------------------- | 
|/s/ MICHAEL C. FORMAN   | 
|                        | 
|Michael C. Forman       | 
|Chief Executive Officer |
#### THE STATE, THOMAS WINSOR AND OTHERS, PROSECUTORS v. JOSEPH DONAHAY, COLLECTOR OF THE TOWNSHIP OF HOWELL.

1. On a *certiorari*to set aside an assessment imposed by a meeting of the taxable inhabitants of a school district, *(Nix. Dig.*780) the court will not decide the legal existence of such corporation, or the legality of the election or appointment of the persons who acted as trustees to incorporate the district.

2. The certificate of the trustees of the proceedings of a meeting to order-money to be raised by taxation, need not set forth the places at which the notices of the meeting were set up; if in the words of the act, “ in. at least three public places in said district,” it is sufficient.

On *certiorari.*In matter of assessment for schools in. school district No. 6, in the township of Howell.

For the prosecutors, *A. C.*McLean.

For defendant,--.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Elmer, J.

This *certiorari*is prosecuted to procure a. reversal of the tax imposed by a meeting of the taxable in*405habitants of West Farms school district, No. 6, held on the twenty-fourth day of May, 1862. The district, it appears, was incorporated by means of a certificate of three person,, acting as trustees, and the town superintendent, dated May 13th, filed and recorded on the same day. It is now objected that one of these trustees was not elected by the inhabitants of the district, but was appointed by the other two to fill a vacancy. This involves the question, whether the corporation had a legal existence, and cannot be tried in this collateral way. *State*v. *Van Winkle,*1 *Dutcher*73.

Another objection to the proceeding is, that the certificate, signed and sworn to by the trustees, and delivered to the assessor, does not set forth the places at which the notices of the meeting were set up, but only, in the words of the act, *“*in at least three public places in said district.” This ivas, in my opinion, a sufficient compliance with the act, and brings the case within the decision of the Court of Errors in. *Hardcastle*v. *The State,*3 *Dutcher*352. It is also shown, by the proof, at what places the notices were in fact set up, and. that they were the three most public places in the district.

The assessment must be affirmed.

Cited in *State, ex rel. Mitchell,*v. *Tolan,*4 *Vroom*202.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE INTERIM
CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF DAISYTEK INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION AND
SUBSIDIARIES FOR THE QUARTER ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1996 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS
ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          MAR-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1996
<CASH>                                             557
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   80,647
<ALLOWANCES>                                     1,380
<INVENTORY>                                     57,452
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               139,628
<PP&E>                                          19,646
<DEPRECIATION>                                   8,671
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 156,120
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           66,903
<BONDS>                                         26,764
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            65
<OTHER-SE>                                      63,054
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   156,120
<SALES>                                        429,471
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               429,471
<CGS>                                          387,008
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  387,008
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                   908
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               1,220
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 15,165
<INCOME-TAX>                                     5,805
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              9,360
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     9,360
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     1.35
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>