[Cite as Talarek v. Walls, 2018-Ohio-1174.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

 )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF LORAIN ) 

DANIEL J. TALAREK, LORAIN 

COUNTY TREASURER 

 Appellee 

 v. 

JOHN D. WALLS, et al. 

 Appellants 

C.A. No. 17CA011158 

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT 

ENTERED IN THE 

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

COUNTY OF LORAIN, OHIO 

CASE No. 16TX006744 

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY 

Dated: March 30, 2018 

 

TEODOSIO, Presiding Judge. 

{¶1} John D. Walls appeals the judgment of the Lorain County Court of Common 

Pleas granting summary judgment in favor of Daniel Talarek, as Treasurer of Lorain County, 

Ohio (“Lorain County”). We affirm. 

I. 

{¶2} In August 2016, Lorain County filed its complaint for collection of delinquent 

taxes and foreclosure against Mr. Walls. We have previously reviewed Mr. Walls’ appeal from 

the decision of the Ohio Board of Tax Appeals (“BTA”) that determined the tax value of the 

subject property in Walls v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Revision, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 14CA010682, 

2015-Ohio-5448, which provides the following background: 

Walls bought the subject property, which was formerly a YMCA, for 

$90,000 in January 2009. The six-year reappraisal in Lorain County occurred for 

tax year 2012. At that point, the county auditor decreased the value on the subject 

property from $610,900 to $303,500. Walls filed a complaint with the Lorain 

County Board of Revision (“BOR”) seeking a reduction in value to $90,000. 
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At the BOR hearing, Walls testified and presented the testimony of the 

real estate broker from the 2009 sale. In addition, a one-page “report” from the 

broker discussing the sale of the subject property and another YMCA was 

submitted. It is undated, but states that the value should be adjusted to the 

$90,000 purchase price. Finding the evidence insufficient to support a value 

change, the BOR maintained the county auditor’s value. 

Walls appealed to the BTA. The BTA held an evidentiary hearing at 

which Walls testified. The BTA approved the BOR’s value for the property. 

Id. at ¶ 2-4. Upon review, we affirmed the decision of the BTA. Id. at ¶ 25. 

{¶3} In December 2016, Lorain County filed its motion for summary judgment in the 

present foreclosure action. In his brief in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, Mr. 

Walls continued to argue that the value of the subject property for real estate tax purposes was 

$90,000.00, and that he has timely paid taxes upon that value. The trial court granted summary 

judgment in favor of Lorain County in June 2017. Mr. Walls now appeals, raising one 

assignment of error. 

II. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN 

FAVOR OF THE APPELLEE DEPENDENT UPON THE DOCTRINE OF 

EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES, WHEN THE RECORD 

REFLECTS, AND THE LOWER COURT NOTED, THAT APPELLEE HAD 

AVAILED HIMSELF OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES BY FILING A 

COMPLAINT AGAINST THE VALUATION OF REAL ESTATE, WHICH 

RESULTED IN A DECISION RENDERED BY THE LORAIN COUNTY 

BOARD OF REVISION, FINDING THE FAIR MARKET VALUE OF THE 

SUBJECT PREMISES OF $90,000.00. 

{¶4} Mr. Walls argues the trial court erred as a matter of law when it determined that 

no genuine issue of material fact existed and granted Lorain County’s motion for summary 

judgment based upon the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine. We disagree. 

{¶5} Appellate review of an award of summary judgment is de novo. Grafton v. Ohio 

Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105 (1996). Summary judgment is appropriate under Civ.R. 56 
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when: (1) no genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated; (2) the moving party is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) viewing the evidence most strongly in favor of 

the nonmoving party, reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is 

adverse to the nonmoving party. Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327 (1977), 

citing Civ.R. 56(C). A court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving 

party and must resolve any doubt in favor of the non-moving party. Murphy v. Reynoldsburg, 65 

Ohio St.3d 356, 358–359 (1992). A trial court does not have the liberty to choose among 

reasonable inferences in the context of summary judgment, and all competing inferences and 

questions of credibility must be resolved in the nonmoving party’s favor. Perez v. Scripps–

Howard Broadcasting Co., 35 Ohio St.3d 215, 218 (1988). 

{¶6} The Supreme Court of Ohio has set forth the nature of this burden-shifting 

paradigm: 

[A] party seeking summary judgment, on the ground that the nonmoving party 

cannot prove its case, bears the initial burden of informing the trial court of the 

basis for the motion, and identifying those portions of the record that demonstrate 

the absence of a genuine issue of material fact on the essential element(s) of the 

nonmoving party’s claims. The moving party cannot discharge its initial burden 

under Civ.R. 56 simply by making a conclusory assertion that the nonmoving 

party has no evidence to prove its case. Rather, the moving party must be able to 

specifically point to some evidence of the type listed in Civ.R. 56(C) which 

affirmatively demonstrates that the nonmoving party has no evidence to support 

the nonmoving party’s claims. If the moving party fails to satisfy its initial 

burden, the motion for summary judgment must be denied. However, if the 

moving party has satisfied its initial burden, the nonmoving party then has a 

reciprocal burden outlined in Civ.R. 56(E) to set forth specific facts showing that 

there is a genuine issue for trial and, if the nonmovant does not so respond, 

summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the nonmoving party. 

Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 293 (1996). 

{¶7} In its order granting summary judgment, the trial court noted that a property 

owner has an established process pursuant to R.C. 5715.19 to challenge the valuation of a parcel 
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and recognized that Mr. Walls had unsuccessfully challenged the valuation of his property for 

the 2012 tax year. The trial court stated: “There is no indication that [Mr. Walls] has challenged 

the value of the [p]roperty since then and based upon the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative 

remedies, he and this [c]ourt must accept the value of the [p]roperty as assessed by the auditor 

for purposes of tax calculation.” 

{¶8} The trial court further stated that Mr. Walls’ attempt to challenge the valuation of 

the property in the tax foreclosure action was not the appropriate action to do so and was not a 

defense to the complaint. The court then noted that Mr. Walls did not make any other legal 

argument in his brief in opposition outside of those stemming from his contention that the 

valuation of the property was incorrect and had therefore failed to rebut the evidence presented 

by Lorain County or show that an issue of material fact remained that would preclude the 

granting of summary judgment. 

{¶9} “The exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine is a well-established 

principle of Ohio law.” Waliga v. Coventry Twp., 9th Dist. Summit No. 22015, 2004-Ohio-5683, 

¶ 12. “[T]he doctrine requires that a party exhaust available administrative remedies prior to 

seeking court action in an administrative matter.” Id. 

{¶10} In the tax foreclosure action before the trial court, Mr. Walls was not directly 

seeking court action in an administrative matter; rather, he had previously sought such court 

action in his prior appeal from the decision of the BTA, which was ultimately reviewed by this 

Court and affirmed. It is for this reason the trial court’s reference to “the doctrine of exhaustion 

of administrative remedies” was an inaccurate usage (i.e., the fact of having exhausted an 

administrative remedy is a different concept from the doctrine of exhaustion). The misstatement, 

however, was harmless error, as we discern no violation of a substantial right as a result. See 
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Beck Energy Corp. v. Zurz, 9th Dist. Summit No. 27393, 2015-Ohio-1626, ¶ 13. Although the 

trial court’s reference to the “doctrine of exhaustion” was inaccurate, the trial court was correct 

in stating that it must accept the valuation as assessed by the auditor and that the foreclosure 

action was not the proper action for challenging that valuation. See Hamilton v. Mansfield 

Motorsports Speedway, LLC, 5th Dist. Richland No. 11 CA 103, 2012-Ohio-2446, ¶ 44. See 

also Zier v. Bur. of Unemp. Comp., 151 Ohio St. 123 (1949), paragraph one of the syllabus (“An 

appeal, the right to which is conferred by statute, can be perfected only in the mode prescribed 

by statute.”); Musial Offices, Ltd. v. Cty. of Cuyahoga, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99781, 2014-

Ohio-602, ¶ 11 (“[C]ourts of common pleas do not have original jurisdiction to hear property tax 

valuation cases and have only appellate jurisdiction conferred on them by statute.”). 

{¶11} Mr. Walls’ argument continues to be based on his assertion that the Lorain 

County Auditor’s valuation of the property is incorrect. This issue has previously been reviewed 

and determined. In Walls v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Revision, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 14CA010682, 

2015-Ohio-5448, this Court affirmed the judgment of the Ohio Board of Tax Appeals that had 

approved the Board of Revision’s valuation of the property as $303,500.00. The trial court was 

therefore correct in determining that there was no genuine issue of material fact with regard to 

the valuation of Mr. Walls’ property. 

{¶12} Although his assignment of error, as stated, makes no reference to it, Mr. Walls 

also argues the collection of taxes as assessed on the property amounts to an unlawful taking in 

violation of his constitutional rights. Mr. Walls did not raise this issue at the trial court level. 

“Issues that were not raised to the trial court may not be considered for the first time on appeal.” 

Rozhon v. Rozhon, 9th Dist. Medina No. 05CA0075-M, 2006-Ohio-3118, ¶ 18. Accordingly, 

this Court will not address this line of argument. 
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{¶13} Mr. Walls’ assignment of error is overruled. 

III. 

{¶14} Mr. Walls’ assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of the Lorain County 

Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. 

Judgment affirmed. 

 

 There were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

 We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common 

Pleas, County of Lorain, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of 

this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27. 

 Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of 

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the 

period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is 

instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the 

mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30. 

 Costs taxed to Appellant. 

 

 THOMAS A. TEODOSIO 

 FOR THE COURT 

CARR, J. 

CALLAHAN, J. 

CONCUR. 
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APPEARANCES: 

GINO PULITO, Attorney at Law, for Appellant. 

DENNIS P. WILL, Prosecuting Attorney, and CHRIS A. PYANOWSKI, Assistant Prosecuting 

Attorney, for Appellee.