## I L L I N O I S 

## O F F I C I A L 

## RE P O R T S Appellate Court

Hocraffer v. Trotter General Contracting, Inc. , 2013 IL App (3d) 120539

Appellate Court Caption J OSIAH HOCRAF FER, Plaintiff-Appe llant, v. TROTTER GENERAL CONTRACTI

NG, I NC., an I llinois Corporation, De fenda nt-Appellee

.

District & N o. Third District Docke t No. 3-12-0539

Rule 23 Order

filed Motion to publ ish allowed Opinion filed April 18, 2013

May 24, 2013 May 24, 2013

Held (Note : This sy ll abus

con st it ute s no par t of the opi nio n of the cour t but has bee n pre

par ed by the Rep o rt er of D e c i s i o n s f

o r t h e

c o n v e n i e n c e o

f t h e

rea der

. ) Plaintiff’s action alleg ing that defe ndant contra ctor failed to pay him the
preva iling wag e for work h e perf ormed was properly dismiss ed, since plaintiff’s work was perf ormed at defe ndant’s shop and the Prevailing Wage Act only applies to work perf ormed “on the site of the building or construction job.”

Dec ision Under Review Appea l from the Circuit Court of M cD onough County
, No. 11-L M-57; the Hon. Patricia

A. Walton, J udg e, pre siding.

J udg ment Affir med.Counsel on

Appea l Geor g e Petrilli and Br uce Stratton, both of Strat t o n , Gig anti, Stone, Moran & Radkey , of Spring field, for appellant.

Michae l L

. Resis and Ell en L

. Gre en, both of S mithAmundsen L L C, of Ch i cag o, and J eff

rey Risch and J onathan D. Hoag
, both of Smit hAmundsen LL C, of St. C harle s, for a ppellee.

Panel J USTI CE LYTTON de livered thejudgme nt of the cour t, with opinion.
J ustices Holdridg e and Schmidt concur red in the judgme nt and opinion.

OP INION

¶ 1 Plaintiff, J osiah Hocr aff er, filed suit ag ainst defe ndant, Trotter Gene ral Contractin g , I n c ., fo r failing to pay him the prevailing wag e for work he perf ormed while under defenda nt ’s employ

. The trial court dismiss ed the claim on the ground that Hocr aff er’ s service s wer e not perf ormed “ on the job site.” We aff irm. ¶ 2 In May of 2011, Hocr aff er filed a complaint ag ainst Trotter, seeking wage s , b en ef its, interest and attorney fee s for alleg ed violations of the I llinois Prevailing Wage Act (Ac t) (820 I L CS 130/1 et seq. (West 2010)). In the compl ai n t , Ho cra ffe r alleg ed that Trotter was a g ener al construction company that perfo rm ed co n trac t work for private and public works projec ts in the McDonough County are a and that he was employed as a car penter for Trotter betwee n Fe bruar

y 2009 and Marc h 2010. He further alleg ed that during his employ ment, Trotter dire cted him to fabricate a nd construct c erta in portions of its publi c works projec ts in its shop and then it transporte d the items to the sites to be used in the construction of the projec ts. Hocr aff

er claimed that he was paid less than the preva iling wag e as require d under the Act f or the wor

k he per formed. ¶ 3 Trotter filed a mot ion to dismiss under section 2-619.1 of the C ode of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 I L CS 5/2-619.1 (West 2010)). The trial court grante d the motion and g ave Hocr aff er le ave to f

ile an ame nded complaint. ¶ 4 In his amende d pleading
, Hocr aff er alleg ed, more specific ally
, that Trotter direc ted him “to fabricate, construct, or paint windows and door units, gutters, and concr ete forms for use in the Def endant’ s public works projec ts then underw ay in its shop and then transport them
to the job site for installation or use on and in said projec t.” He further claimed that the work
per fo rm ed i n Trotter’ s shop was perf ormed by the same persons as would have otherwise perf ormed the same work on the j obsite and that t h o s e s am e persons performing the work transporte d t h e d escribed items from Trotter’ s shop in Macomb to a construction site at Western I llinois University and to public works pr ojects in Hava na and Cuba , I llinois

. ¶ 5 Trotter filed a motion to d i s m i s s t h e am en d ed complaint, arguing that the Act limits
pay ment o f t h e p re vailing wag e to only those labore rs and worke rs who are direc tly

-2-employed by co n t ractors or subcontrac tors in actua l construction work on the site of the

b uilding or construction job, and labore rs or worke rs eng ag ed in the transportat i o n o f materia ls and equipment to or fr om the site. ¶ 6 After considering arguments from b o th p a r ti e s , th e trial c o u

r t gr a nted defe ndant’s motion, finding that “only work perf ormed on the job site is cover ed by the I llinois Prevailing Wage Act (IPW A) a

nd work pe rfor

med at De fenda

nt’s shop, as alleg ed, is not cover ed under the I PW A.” The court g ave Hocr aff er 28 day s to file an amende d complaint. Hocr aff er declined to file a sec ond amende d complaint. ¶ 7 On appeal, Hocr aff er a rgues that t he trial court erre d in construing the Act as applying only to work completed by labore rs and worke rs direc tly employed on the site of the public works projec t, there by ex cl u d i n g the same work done by the same employees at the
contra ctor’s of

fsite shop. ¶ 8 Section 3 of the Act states that the preva iling wag e rate shall be paid to worke rs eng ag ed in the construction of public w orks. 820 I L CS 130/ 3 (West 2010). The statute pr ovides:
“Not less than the g ener al preva iling rate of hourly wag es for work of a simil ar char acte r

on public works in the locality in which th e work is perf ormed, and not less than the
g ener al preva iling rate of hourly wag es for leg al holiday and overtime work, shall be paid
to all labore rs, worke rs and mecha nics employed by or on behalf of any public body
eng ag ed in t h e const ruction or demolition of public works. This includes any

m aint enanc e, repa ir, assembly or disassembly work pref ormed on equipment whether owned, lease d or re nted. Only such labore rs, worke rs and mecha nics as are direc tly employed by contra ctors or subcontrac tors in actua l construction work on the site of the building or construction job, and l ab o re rs , worke rs and mecha nics eng ag ed in the transportation of m ater ials and equipment to or from the site, but not including the transportation by the sellers and suppliers or the manufa cture or proce ssing of materia ls

or equipment *** shall be deeme d to be employed upon public works.” 820 I L CS 130/3 (West 2010). ¶ 9 The fundame ntal principle of statutory construction is to asce rtain and g ive eff ect to the intent of the leg islature. Town & Country Utiliti es, Inc. v. Illinois Pollution Control Board
, 225 I ll. 2d 103 (2007). The best evidenc e of leg islative intent is the languag e of the statute. Lulay v. Lulay
, 193 I ll. 2d 455 (2000). When possible, courts should inter pret the statutory l anguag e acc ording to its plain and ordinary meaning

. In re Estate of Ellis
, 236 I ll. 2d 45 (2009). I f i ntent can be determined from the plain languag e of the st atute, there i s no need to resort to extrinsic aids. Poris v. L ake Holiday Property Owners Ass’n , 2013 I L113907. Where the statutory languag e is clea r and unambiguous, we may not depar t from the statute’s plain meaning by rea ding into it exceptions, limit ations, or conditions the leg islature did not express. Ellis
, 236 I ll. 2d at 51. The interpre tation of a statute is a qu es t i o n of law that is subject to de novo revie w. Alvarez v . Pappas , 229 I ll. 2d 217 (2008). ¶ 10 By its plain terms, s ection 3 only applies t o those worke rs who “ar e directly employed by contra ctors or subcontrac tors in actua l construction work o n the site of the building or construction job.” 820 I L CS 130/3 (West 2010). The leg islature specific ally chose to use the words “on the site of the building or co n s t ruction job.” We find those words, althoug h

-3-undefine d in the statute, to be clea r and unambiguous. The dictionary define s the word “site”

as “the local position of building, town, monument, or simil ar work either constructe d or to be constructe d esp. in connec tion with its surrounding s.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2128 (1981). The ordinary meaning of “on the s i t e” i n the textual format of section 3 is consistent with that definition. It is the location wher e the public works projec t, the public building or structure , is being ere cted. Thus, only those worke rs who are employed and working at the location wher e the public works building is being ere cted are require d to

rec eive the preva iling wag e under the Act. The plain languag e of section 3 is dispositi ve of this case. ¶ 11 Hocr aff

er insists that our construction of the statute li m i t s t h e o t h erwi s e i n cl u sive
p u rp o se of the Act to pay labore rs involved in a public works projec t a fair wa ge. He
sug g ests that a more rea sonable interpre tation of the term “on the site” would include the rea l estate upon which the public building or other public works is being constructe d and such other land, buildings and worksho p s where the same worke rs, working for the same contra ctor for the public works projec t, are eng ag ed in the fabrication of elements of the public building or public w orks. ¶ 12 No rule of statutory construction authorizes a court to decla re that the leg islature did not

m ean what it say s. We cannot simply cre ate additional cate g ories of cover ag e. Whe re , as here
, the statute provides specific limit ations and exceptions to its application, the infere nce is that all other om i s s i o n s should be interpre ted as exclusions. See Mattis v. State Universities Retireme nt System
, 212 I ll. 2d 58 (2004). In this case , fabrication and other jobs perf ormed offsite are not inc luded in the list of work contained in se ction 3. There fore
, the
preva iling wag e require m ents do not apply to the work Hocr aff er completed in Trotter’ s shop. ¶ 13 Ho cr aff

er also argues that a limit ed interpre tation of section 3 g iv es co n t ra ct o rs an incentive to evadethe Act’ s impact by transfe rringcer

tain tasks from the rea l e state or site wher e the work is being constructe d to a “shop” at another location. Howeve r, the languag e of section 3 is una

mbiguous; we cannot rely on extrinsi c aids or interpre tations to construe the statute in a more inclusive manner

. Even if the statutory languag e was ambiguous, we cannot add a provision t h at wo u l d reduc e the incentive to evade the preva iling wag e require ment; that is a matter best left to the leg islature. See Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Ade lman
, 215 I ll. App. 3d 561 (1991) (the court’s job is to construe the statue as written, not to add to its provisions under the guise of construction). Moreove r, we note that the rec ord in this case does not sug g est that Trotter’ s act i o n s we re based on intentional avoidanc e or fra ud. There fore
, we aff

irm the trial court’s order granting defe ndant’s moti o n to dismiss under section 3 of the A ct.

¶ 14 CONCLUSI ON ¶ 15 The judgment of the c ircuit court of McDonough County

is affirme d.

¶ 16 Affir

med.

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