NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

EDWARD FOGG; MARIA FOGG,

Plaintiffs

- Appellants,

v.
SELENE FINANCE LP, a foreign limited liability company; WILMINGTON SAVINGS FUND SOCIETY FSB, trustee for Premium Mortgage Acquisition Trust doing business as Christina Trus,

Defendants

- Appellees. No. 23

- 35289

D.C. No. 3:21

- cv

- 05351

- JHC

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington John H. Chun, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted September 9, 2024 * * San Francisco, California

Before: BEA and MENDOZA, Circuit Judges, and M. FITZGERALD, ** * District Judge.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable Michael W. Fitzgerald, United States District Judge for the Central District of California, sitting by designation. 

# FILED

SEP 11 2024

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2

Plaintiffs

- Appellants Edward and Maria Fogg (“Plaintiffs”) appeal the district

court’s order that granted summary judgment on their claims brought under the Real

Estate Settlement and Procedures Act (“RESPA”), 12 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq

. , in favor

of Defendants

- Appellees Selene Finance LP and Wilmington Savings Fund Society

FSB (“Defendants”)

. Because the parties are familiar with the facts, we recount them

only as relevant to our decision. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 , and

reviewing the distr ict court’s grant of summary judgment de novo
, Bravo v. City of

Santa Maria , 665 F.3d 1076, 1083 (9th Cir. 2011)
, we affirm.

Summary judgment is permissible only if there is “no genuine dispute as to

any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(a). Here, Plaintiffs have failed to create a genuine dispute of fact that they

suffered any “actual damages

. . . as a result of” Defendants’ alleged failure to

comply with RESPA
, a required element of a RESPA claim

. See 12 U.S.C.

§ 2605(f)(1). On appeal, they conten d that they paid late fees, attorneys’ fees, and

postage costs due to Defendants’ alleged RESPA violations . B ut the y do not provide

any citations to the record to support these claimed damages

. See Fed. R. App. P.

28(a)(8)(A) (explaining that a n appellant’s brief must contain the “appellant’s

contentions and the reasons for them, with citations to the authorities and parts of

the record on which the appellant relies”). Moreover, a review of the record does not

reveal that Plaintiffs submitted any evidence in the district court to support the3

damages they claim to have suffered

. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A) (explaining

that a party asserting that a fact is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by

“citing to particular parts of materials in the record”). Accordingly, t here is no

evidence in the record that Plaintiffs suffer ed actual damages due to Defendants’

alleged ly inadequate responses to their qualified written requests

. Moreover, although Plaintiffs have been subjected to foreclosure, there is no

evidence that this action was the “result of” Defendants’ alleged failures to comply

with RESPA. See 12 U.S.C. § 2605(f)(1). The foreclosure was not caused by

Defendants’ alleged failure to correct Plaintiffs’ account or to conduct an

investigation in response to Plaintiffs’ qualified written requests. See id.

§ 2605(e)(2)(A)

– (B). Rather, it was caused by Selene ’s refus al to allow Plaintiffs to

tender their monthly payment with two checks rather than one

. But Selene’s refusal

to accept Plaintiffs ’ checks is unrelated to Plaintiffs’ RESP A claims, which are

limited to the adequacy of Defendants’ responses to their qualified written requests.

Indeed, Selene had already corrected the loan balances and monthly payments to

reflect the bankruptcy court’s order

— the precise relief Plaintiffs sought when they

sent their qualified written requests

— in June 2020, long before the initiation of

foreclosure proceedings in April 2021. Hence, Plaintiffs have not proffered evidence

to show that any damages they suffered from the foreclosure action were the “result

of” any alleged RESPA violation. See id. § 2605(f)(1).4

Because Plaintiffs’ failure to create a triable issue regarding actual damages

is fatal to their RESPA claim s , we decline to address any other arguments raised on

appeal. 1

AFFIRMED. 2

1 We express no view as to whether Plaintiffs can prove that they suffered actual damages with respect to their state law claims, which are not the subject of the present appeal

. 2 Plaintiffs ’ motions for an extension of time to file a reply brief (Dkt. No s. 48, 52, 55, 56) are DENIED

.