ORI L 

3Jn tbe Wniteb ~tates qcourt of jf eberal <!Claims 

No. 15-1584C 

(Filed June 20, 2016) 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION 

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JENNIFER ROSE CLARKE, * 

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Plaintiff, * 

v. * 

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THE UNITED STATES, * 

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Defendant. * 

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ORDER 

FILED 

JUN 2 0 2016 

U.S. COURT OF 

FEDERAL CLAIMS 

On December 29, 2015, plaintiff Jennifer Rose Clarke, representing herself, 

filed a complaint in this court, naming as defendants Lanier County Department of 

Family and Children Services, CPS Supervisor Rhonda Fletcher, and Social 

Services Case Managers Dymond Brown and Lasheena Littleton. Compl. iii! 2-5. 

The complaint concerns a custody dispute over Ms. Clarke's two daughters. Id. iii! 

6-24. Plaintiff alleges deprivation of civil liberties and due process, as well as 

various violations of the Fourth Amendment. Id. iii! 14, 16, 20, 24. Plaintiff 

requests the following relief: (1) a cease and desist order; (2) all documents with 

plaintiff's name and her children's names, pictures, recordings, and interviews; and 

(3) $5,000,000 in emotional damages for plaintiff and her children. Id. iii! 25-29. 

In response, defendant filed a motion to dismiss this case for lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(l) of the Rules of the Court of Federal Claims 

(RCFC). Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss. at 1. Defendant raises three independent grounds 

for dismissal: first, plaintiff's failure to assert any allegation or claim against the 

United States; second, plaintiff's failure to identify a money-mandating provision or 

other basis for jurisdiction; and finally, that plaintiffs claims and requests for relief 

sound entirely in tort. Id. at 4. Plaintiff failed to file a response to the 

government's motion. 

Under RCFC 12(b)(l), this court must dismiss claims that do not fall within 

its subject-matter jurisdiction. When considering a motion to dismiss a case for lack 
of subject-matter jurisdiction, courts will accept as true all factual allegations the 

non-movant made and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to 

that party. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); Pixton v. B & B 

Plastics, Inc., 291 F.3d 1324, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (requiring that on a motion to 

dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction this court views "the alleged facts in 

the complaint as true, and if the facts reveal any reasonable basis upon which the 

non-movant may prevail, dismissal is inappropriate"); CBY Design Builders v. 

United States, 105 Fed. Cl. 303, 325 (2012). 

Although a pro se plaintiff's filings are to be liberally construed, see Erickson 

v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), this lenient standard cannot save claims which 

are outside this court's jurisdiction from being dismissed. See, e.g., Henke v. United 

States, 60 F.3d 795, 799 (Fed. Cir. 1995). The party invoking a court's jurisdictionhere, Ms. Clarke-bears the burden of establishing it and must ultimately do so by 

a preponderance of the evidence. See McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. of 

Ind., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936); Reynolds v. Army & Air Force Exch. Serv., 846 F.2d 

746, 748 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Rocovich v. United States, 933 F.2d 991, 993 (Fed. Cir. 

1991). 

Plaintiff seems to be confused about the jurisdiction of our court. We have 

the power to hear only cases brought against the United States government, 

primarily money claims based on grounds other than torts. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491; 

RCFC lO(a); see also Stephenson v. United States, 58 Fed. Cl. 186, 190 (2003). 

Plaintiff's complaint contains no factual allegations concerning the United States 

government, much less anything related to our subject-matter jurisdiction (such as 

a federal contract or a money-mandating statute). See Smith v. United States, 709 

F.3d 1114, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (holding that the Due Process Clauses of both Fifth 

and the Fourteenth Amendments are not money-mandating); Brown v. United 

States, 105 F.3d 621, 623-24 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (holding that the Fourth Amendment 

is not money-mandating). Moreover, Ms. Clarke seeks monetary and injunctive 

relief based on tort, which is not within our power to grant because the Tucker Act 

expressly limits our jurisdiction to "cases not sounding in tort." 28 U.S.C. § 

1491(a)(l); see also Sellers v. United States, 110 Fed. Cl. 62, 66 (2013). 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS defendant's motion to dismiss 

this case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to RCFC 12(b)(l). The 

Clerk shall close the case. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

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