[Cite as State v. Turpin, 2017-Ohio-7435.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

MONTGOMERY COUNTY 

STATE OF OHIO 

Plaintiff-Appellee

v. 

CHAD TURPIN 

Defendant-Appellant

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Appellate Case No. 27453 

Trial Court Case No. 2016-CRB-5125 

(Criminal Appeal from Municipal Court) 

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O P I N I O N 

Rendered on the 1st day of September, 2017. 

. . . . . . . . . . . 

TROY B. DANIELS, Atty. Reg. No. 0084957, Assistant City of Dayton Prosecutor, 335 

West Third Street, Room 372, Dayton, Ohio 45402 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee 

 

ANGELINA N. JACKSON, Atty. Reg. No. 0077937, 117 South Main Street, Suite 400, 

Dayton, Ohio 45422 

 Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 

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TUCKER, J. 
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{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Chad E. Turpin, appeals from his convictions in Dayton 

Municipal Court Case No. 2016-CRB-5125, arguing that the court erred by overruling his 

motion to suppress evidence obtained as the result of a warrantless search in violation of 

his Fourth Amendment rights. In response, the State argues that Turpin’s Fourth 

Amendment rights were not violated, but that even if his rights were violated, the 

exclusionary rule should not apply in this case pursuant to the attenuation doctrine. We 

find that the trial court erred by overruling Turpin’s motion to suppress, and therefore, we 

reverse. 

I. Facts and Procedural History 

{¶ 2} On July 28, 2016, an officer with the Dayton Police Department received a 

dispatch directing him to a residence on Haverfield Road in Dayton in response to a report 

of a recovered stolen vehicle. Decision & Entry Overruling Def.’s Mot. to Suppress 1, 

Dec. 29, 2016 [hereinafter Decision]; Tr. of Hr’g on Def.’s Mot. to Suppress 5, Aug. 31, 

2016 [hereinafter Tr. of Hr’g]. The dispatch identified a suspect, James Delecce, and 

reported an active warrant for his arrest. Tr. of Hr’g 6. Turpin resided at the Haverfield 

Road location at that time; Delecce apparently did not.1 Id. at 3-4 and 19. 

{¶ 3} When the officer arrived, he found the stolen vehicle in the driveway. 

Decision 1; Tr. of Hr’g 6. The vehicle-owner’s mother arrived shortly afterward to have 

it towed, and she told the officer that she had received a telephone call from the Haverfield 

Road residence informing her that the vehicle could be found there. Tr. of Hr’g 6-7. 

 

1 The Dayton Police Department officer testified that the dispatch did not list the 

Haverfield Road residence as Delecce’s address. Tr. of Hr’g 19. 
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Having verified that the vehicle was unoccupied, the officer decided to determine whether 

the same was true of the residence. See id. at 7 and 17. 

{¶ 4} The officer tried knocking on the front door while shouting “Dayton Police,” 

as well as on an adjacent window, but nobody answered. Id. at 7-8. He then walked 

around to an entrance on the right side of the house, a solid white door that he found 

slightly ajar. See id. at 8 and 20-22. After knocking again without response, the officer 

pushed the door open, stepped into the house, and called out to identify himself. See id.

at 9 and 22. Still receiving no response, the officer walked into the adjoining room and 

saw a man, later identified as Turpin, sleeping on a sofa roughly 15 to 20 feet away. Id.

at 22-23. 

{¶ 5} From this vantage point, the officer observed Turpin’s trousers or shorts 

around his ankles, and in light of his unresponsiveness, the officer suspected that Turpin 

might have overdosed after injecting heroin into his groin. Id. at 9-10 and 23. Turpin 

continued to be unresponsive to the officer’s shouts, so the officer moved closer. Id. at 

11 and 24. Standing within a foot or two of Turpin, the officer saw “two syringes right 

next to him” along with a “significant amount of cash.” Id. at 11. Eventually, Turpin 

awoke and identified himself, after which the officer discovered an active warrant for his 

arrest and took him into custody. Id. at 11 and 27. 

{¶ 6} On August 15, 2016, Turpin moved the trial court to suppress all evidence 

obtained as a result of the officer’s warrantless search of his residence. Decision 1. 

The court held a hearing on Turpin’s motion on August 31, 2016, and in the Decision, 

docketed on December 29, 2016, determined that although the “officer’s initial entry was 

a constitutional violation,” the “existence of a preexisting warrant was an intervening 
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circumstance that interrupted the connection between the unconstitutional police conduct 

and the discovery of [the] evidence.” Decision 3. Turpin commenced the instant appeal 

on February 7, 2017. 

II. Analysis 

{¶ 7} Turpin’s sole assignment of error is the following: 

 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING MR. TURPIN’S MOTION 

TO SUPPRESS BY FINDING THAT THE ATTENUATION DOCTRINE 

RENDERED THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE INAPPLICABLE TO EVIDENCE 

SEIZED AS A RESULT OF THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL WARRANTLESS 

ENTRY INTO HIS HOME. 

{¶ 8} Turpin argues that the trial court erred by applying the attenuation doctrine 

to “primary evidence” that was “seized as a direct result” of the warrantless search of his 

residence because the doctrine applies only to “derivative evidence.” Appellant’s Br. 5. 

Further, Turpin argues that, regardless of the distinction between primary evidence and 

derivative evidence, the discovery of an active warrant for his arrest was not an 

“intervening circumstance” for purposes of the attenuation doctrine. Id. at 9. In 

opposition, the State argues that the initial entry into Turpin’s residence was 

constitutionally permissible, but that even if it were not, the attenuation doctrine should 

apply in this case. Appellee’s Br. 4-5 and 7-9. 

{¶ 9} Appellate “review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law 

and fact.” State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8. 

An “appellate court must accept the trial court’s findings of fact if they are supported by 

competent, credible evidence.” Id., citing State v. Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 437 N.E.2d 
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583 (1982). Accepting “these facts as true,” assuming that they are properly supported, 

“the appellate court must then independently determine, without deference to the [legal] 

conclusion[s] of the trial court, whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard.” 

Id., citing State v. McNamara, 124 Ohio App.3d 706, 707 N.E.2d 539 (3d Dist.1997). 

{¶ 10} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits 

unreasonable searches and seizures. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8, 88 S.Ct. 

1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Warrantless searches and seizures violate this prohibition 

unless conducted pursuant to one of the “few specifically established and well-delineated 

exceptions.” (Citations omitted.) See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 

88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). 

{¶ 11} The “ ‘exclusionary rule’ serves as the primary means for deterring 

violations of the Fourth Amendment.” See, e.g., United States v. Pacheco-Alvarez, 227 

F.Supp.3d 863, 894 (S.D.Ohio 2016), citing Utah v. Strieff, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S.Ct. 2056, 

2061, 195 L.Ed.2d 400 (2016). When “applicable, the exclusionary rule bars use of both 

‘primary evidence’ obtained as a direct result of an illegal search[, as well as] evidence 

later discovered and found to be derivative” of the search. Id., citing Strieff, 136 S.Ct. at 

2061. This rule itself has exceptions, one of which is the attenuation doctrine at issue 

here. 

{¶ 12} According to the attenuation doctrine, evidence “is admissible when the 

connection between unconstitutional police conduct and the evidence [obtained as a 

result] is remote or has been interrupted by some intervening circumstance,” such that 

“ ‘the interest protected by the constitutional guarantee that has been violated would not 

be served by suppression of the evidence.’ ” Strieff, 136 S.Ct. at 2061, quoting Hudson 
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v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 593, 126 S.Ct. 2159, 165 L.Ed.2d 56 (2006). Application of 

the attenuation doctrine entails consideration of three factors: first, the “ ‘temporal 

proximity’ between the unconstitutional [search] and the discovery of evidence to 

determine how closely the discovery of [the] evidence followed the * * * search”; second, 

the “ ‘presence of intervening circumstances’ ”; and third, the “ ‘purpose and flagrancy of 

the official misconduct.’ ” Id. at 2061-2062, quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-

604, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975). 

{¶ 13} As a threshold matter, we concur with the trial court’s finding that the 

warrantless entry into Turpin’s residence violated the Fourth Amendment.2 Decision 3. 

An “arrest warrant is sufficient [authorization] to enter a * * * residence to effectuate the 

warrant if [a] police [officer] has reason to believe that the suspect lives in the [residence] 

and is in fact [there] at the time the arrest warrant is executed.” (Emphasis added.) 

State v. Cooks, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2016-CA-40, 2017-Ohio-218, ¶ 10. In other words, 

“police officers do not need probable cause to enter a residence to execute an arrest 

warrant provided they have a reasonable belief, founded in common sense and based on 

the totality of the circumstances, that the suspect resides in the home and that he is 

present at the time.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at ¶ 11. 

{¶ 14} Here, the Dayton Police Department officer who responded to the 

Haverfield Road location had no reason to believe that the suspect in the vehicle theft 

resided there; in fact, the officer testified at the hearing on Turpin’s motion to suppress 

 

2 Turpin asserts that we “lack[] jurisdiction to consider [this] issue” because the State did 

not request leave to offer argument on “the constitutionality of the officer’s initial entry into 

the home.” Appellant’s Reply Br. 1. The trial court ruled on the issue in its decision, 

however, and we review the court’s legal conclusions essentially de novo. See, e.g.,

State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8. 
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that the dispatch did not list the Haverfield Road address as the suspect’s residence. Tr. 

of Hr’g 19. The officer otherwise did not comment on the specific issue of why, or even 

whether, he expected to find the suspect inside the house. See generally id. at 5-29. 

{¶ 15} In its brief, the State posits that the officer reasonably believed “that 

someone was presently inside the home” because “there was a car parked in the 

driveway[,] and [the side] entry door was ajar.” (Emphasis added.) Appellee’s Br. 5. 

Yet, as we held in Cooks, the officer would have been justified in entering the residence 

to execute the arrest warrant for Delecce—the suspect in the vehicle theft—only if he had 

a reasonable belief that Delecce not only resided there, but was actually present at that 

moment. The officer’s mere suspicion that “someone” was present would not have 

justified his nonconsensual intrusion. Furthermore, a number of other, equally likely 

explanations for the presence of the stolen car and the slightly ajar side-entry door could 

be proposed, and the State’s position fails to account for the fact that the vehicle-owner’s 

mother received a telephone call from the Haverfield Road residence informing her that 

she could find the vehicle there.3 Tr. of Hr’g 6 (describing the source of the information); 

Appellee’s Br. 4-6. We hold that the information available to the officer when he 

responded to the location supported only an inchoate suspicion that Delecce could be 

found there at that time, meaning that the outstanding arrest warrant did not justify the 

officer’s nonconsensual entry. Thus, we find that the officer’s entry into the residence 

was constitutionally impermissible under the circumstances. 

 

3 The State did suggest during oral arguments that the telephone call could have 

supported a reasonable belief on the officer’s part that Delecce resided at the Haverfield 

Road location or was, at least, on the premises. In the absence of any detailed 

explication, this suggestion seems unlikely. 
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{¶ 16} Additionally, we note that the trial court found as a matter of fact that the 

officer “went to * * * Haverfield [Road] to investigate the stolen vehicle because he 

believed that the resident [might have been] Delecce or that the resident [might have 

known Delecce’s] whereabouts.” Decision 1-2. We overrule this finding of fact because 

it is unsupported by the evidence. The officer himself testified that he went to Haverfield 

Road because he received a dispatch directing him to respond to that location to recover 

a stolen vehicle, and he made no reference to having knowledge or suspecting, before 

he arrived, that Delecce would be there. See Tr. of Hr’g 4-7. 

{¶ 17} Although we concur with the trial court regarding the unlawfulness of the 

officer’s initial entry into the residence, we find that the court erred when it determined 

that the evidence against Turpin should be admitted pursuant to the attenuation doctrine. 

First, the officer discovered the evidence against Turpin almost immediately after his 

unconstitutional entry into the Haverfield Road residence. The rapidity with which the 

officer discovered the evidence following his entry into the residence supports 

suppression. Utah v. Strieff, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S.Ct. 2056, 2063, 195 L.Ed.2d 400 

(2016). Second, the entirety of the officer’s unconstitutional conduct was completed 

before he discovered the arrest warrant for Turpin; consequently, the discovery of the 

warrant cannot be said to have been an “intervening circumstance” with respect to the 

unconstitutional conduct. See State v. Hines, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24346, 2012-

Ohio-207, ¶ 3-7 and 15. 

{¶ 18} Third, the officer’s entry into the residence, under the circumstances, 

constituted a purposeful or flagrant violation of the Fourth Amendment, conduct that the 

exclusionary rule is intended to deter. Before he arrived at Haverfield Road, the officer 
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had little or no information from which he could have formed a reasonable belief that 

Delecce either resided there or was present at the time, nor did the officer’s investigations 

outside of the residence support such a belief. 

{¶ 19} Moreover, the officer had only a modest description of Delecce as “a white 

male, about thirty years old,” along with Delecce’s height and weight. Tr. of Hr’g 6 and 

19. When the officer first caught sight of Turpin on the sofa, the sofa itself was “turned 

to the side,” affording the officer only an indirect view; in fact, even though the officer 

could see that Turpin’s trousers or shorts were around his ankles, the officer could not 

see whether Turpin was wearing undergarments. Id. at 23-24. The officer, then, had 

almost no objective basis for suspecting that the man on the sofa was Delecce, apart 

from the fact that Turpin is also “a white male.” See id. at 9-10. 

{¶ 20} In its brief, the State argues that because the officer mistook Turpin for 

Delecce, the discovery of the arrest warrant for Turpin did constitute an intervening 

circumstance because the officer would, at that point, have been entitled to approach 

Delecce (i.e., had Delecce actually been the man on the sofa, instead of Turpin) and place 

him under arrest. See Appellant’s Br. 6. The logic of this argument notwithstanding, 

the United States Supreme Court has described the third factor in the attenuation doctrine 

analysis as “ ‘particularly’ significant,” and as a general principle of Fourth Amendment 

jurisprudence, “the right of [persons] to retreat into [their] own home[s] and there be free 

from unreasonable governmental intrusion” is “[a]t the very core” of that which the Fourth 

Amendment is intended to protect. Strieff, 136 S.Ct. at 2062, quoting Brown v. Illinois, 

422 U.S. 590, 604, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975); Silverman v. United States, 

365 U.S. 505, 511, 81 S.Ct. 679, 5 L.Ed.2d 734 (1961). Hence, we reject the foregoing 
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argument in light of the flagrancy of the officer’s unconstitutional entry into the Haverfield 

Road residence. We find accordingly that all three factors weigh strongly in favor of 

suppression, and we hold that the trial court erred by overruling Turpin’s motion to 

suppress. 

{¶ 21} Finally, we note that State offers several alternative arguments in favor of 

affirming the trial court: that the officer’s entry was justified by exigent circumstances, and 

that the evidence against Turpin was properly admitted pursuant to either the plain view 

doctrine or the doctrine of inevitable discovery. Tr. of Hr’g 30; Appellee’s Br. 6, 9 and 

30. Regarding the first of these alternative arguments, “police may enter a home without 

a warrant where they have probable cause to search and exigent circumstances exist.” 

(Emphasis added.) State v. Carr, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 19121, 2002-Ohio-4201, 

¶ 15, citing Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 100, 110 S.Ct. 1684, 109 L.Ed.2d 85 (1990). 

This argument is unavailing because the officer did not have probable cause to search 

the premises. The remaining alternative arguments are res judicata because the State 

did not raise them before the trial court.4 Turpin’s sole assignment of error is sustained. 

 

4 These arguments would seem to have been unavailing in any event. The inevitablediscovery doctrine applies when “illegally obtained evidence * * * would have ultimately 

or inevitably been discovered during the course of a lawful investigation.” State v. Pippin, 

1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-160380 and C-160381, 2017-Ohio-6970, ¶ 19, citing Nix. v. 

Williams, 46 U.S. 431, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984), and State v. Perkins, 18 

Ohio St.3d 193, 480 N.E.2d 763 (1985), syllabus. As the record includes no evidence 

that Turpin was actively being investigated, or that the Dayton Police Department 

responded to Haverfield Road to execute the warrant for his arrest, the inevitablediscovery doctrine appears to be inapplicable in this case. Further, the plain view 

doctrine “is grounded on the proposition that once police are lawfully in a position to 

observe an item first-hand, its owner’s privacy interest in that item is lost * * *.” (Ellipsis 

in original.) State v. Halczyszak, 25 Ohio St.3d 301, 303, 496 N.E.2d 925 (1986), citing 

Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771, 103 S.Ct. 3319, 77 L.Ed.2d 1003 (1983). The 

officer in the instant case was not “lawfully in a position” to view anything when he 

encountered Turpin, rendering the plain view doctrine likewise inapplicable. 
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III. Conclusion 

{¶ 22} We hold that the trial court erred by overruling Turpin’s motion to suppress 

in accord with the attenuation doctrine. Therefore, we reverse the court’s decision and 

remand the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . 

HALL, P.J. and FROELICH, J., concur. 

Copies mailed to: 

Troy B. Daniels 

Angelina N. Jackson 

Hon. Mia Wortham Spells