Opinion issued June 25, 2013.

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The 

First District of Texas 

————————————

NO. 01-13-00023-CV

NO. 01-13-00024-CV

———————————

IN THE INTEREST OF B.R., A CHILD

IN THE INTEREST OF I.R., A CHILD

On Appeal from the 315th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Case Nos. 2010-05141J and 2011-00845J

MEMORANDUM OPINION

These parental termination appeals involve two young children: I.R., whom 

the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (Department) removed 

from his parent’s care when he was approximately seven months old, and B.R., 

whom the Department took into custody at birth. After a bench trial, the trial court 
2

terminated the rights of the mother and the father to both children. The parents, 

who no longer live together, appeal. Each contends that the evidence is legally and 

factually insufficient to support the findings that they each engaged in conduct or 

knowingly placed the children with persons who engaged in conduct that 

endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the children. See TEX. FAM.

CODE ANN. § 161.001(1)(E) (West Supp. 2012). They also contend that the 

evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the finding that either 

parent knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the children to remain in conditions 

or surroundings which endangered the children’s physical or emotional well-being. 

See id. § 161.001(1)(D). Finally, they contend that the evidence does not support 

the trial court’s findings that termination of their parental rights is in the children’s 

best interests. We hold that legally and factually sufficient evidence supports the 

trial court’s findings; we therefore affirm the terminations.

Background

I.R.’s birth.

I.R. was born in early March 2010. The mother had complications during 

pregnancy that caused her to give birth to I.R. at twenty-nine weeks. I.R. weighed 

two pounds at birth. He was born with underdeveloped lungs, a condition 

associated with prematurity. As a result of his breathing problems, I.R. spent much 

of his first ten weeks of life in the neonatal intensive care unit at Ben Taub 
3

Hospital in Houston. In mid-May, the hospital released I.R. to his parents in stable 

condition; he did not require any medication. 

I.R.’s parents’ relationship.

I.R.’s parents lived together but were not married. Before I.R.’s birth, the 

mother had worked as a cashier, but she did not return to her job. When the 

hospital released I.R. to go home, the mother was I.R.’s primary caregiver. The 

father worked for a construction company, where he did odd jobs whenever they 

needed him, but but he did not have a long-term assignment. The father testified 

inconsistently about the amount of time he worked outside of the home: he initially 

told the authorities that he worked long hours and thus did not spend much time 

with I.R., but later recounted that he had cared for I.R. about forty percent of the 

time. The mother and father were I.R.’s only caregivers. 

The father and mother disagreed about whether the father drank alcohol, as 

well as to what extent. The father testified that he did not currently drink alcohol. 

He admitted to drinking alcohol in the past, but he stated that he did not recall 

when he had last had a drink. The mother, however, testified that while they lived 

together, she was concerned about the extent of the father’s drinking; it made her 

angry when he would leave her alone with the baby to go out drinking with his 

friends. He would come home drunk. The father denied arguing with the mother 

about his drinking. 
4

The mother also testified that, after she gave birth to I.R., but before she 

brought him home from the hospital, the mother and the father had an argument. 

During this argument, the father grabbed the mother and pushed her. She described 

the father’s behavior as inappropriate, but added that she was not afraid of him. 

The father did not recall pushing the mother.

I.R.’s life with his parents.

I.R. remained in his parents’ care from May 17 until the mother took I.R. for 

a shoulder x-ray on July 22. While in his parents’ care, I.R. sustained multiple 

serious injuries. Bilateral subdural hemorrhages appeared in the top portion of his 

cranium; both of his femurs fractured near the growth plate at the knees; the 

scapula in his left shoulder also was fractured; and he experienced trauma causing 

extensive bruising across his shoulders and back and on his legs. 

The Department’s expert witness, a Texas Children’s Hospital pediatrician 

with seven years’ experience and expertise in diagnosing child abuse, estimated 

that the earliest of I.R.’s injuries—the bleeding on his brain and the broken 

femurs—occurred within the first six weeks that I.R. was in his parents’ care. The 

subdural hemorrhages may have resulted from multiple incidents, because, the 

expert noted, fresh blood was visible in I.R.’s x-rays. She testified that the type of 

femur fractures and the subdural hemorrhages presented in I.R. are consistent with 
5

a caretaker’s non-accidental whiplash motion, commonly referred to as “shaken 

baby.” 

The expert testified that babies with these types of femur fractures usually 

react with obvious pain and fussiness. The bleeding in the head, she explained, can 

cause a baby to go into a different state of consciousness; he would become quieter 

and sleepier, and possibly lose consciousness. A baby also might have had 

vomiting, fussiness, or poor feeding as a result of subdural hemorrhaging. Subdural 

hemorrhaging is extremely dangerous; it can cause developmental delay or death, 

because blood can pool at the base of the cranium, where it can pressure the brain 

stem and cause the baby to stop breathing. 

I.R. also suffered a later-dated broken scapula in his right shoulder. Baby’s 

bones are not easily broken: a baby’s scapula can break from a fast and forceful 

blow to the back, from jerking the baby’s arm in the direction opposite the deltoid 

muscle, or as a result of the same whiplash motion that causes shaken baby 

syndrome. A typical baby would react to that type of shoulder injury by becoming 

very irritable and by holding his arm still. 

The mother testified that, in early July, I.R. started crying whenever she 

picked him up, and his left shoulder appeared to hurt him. She explained that she 

not immediately seek medical attention, because after a few days, the baby seemed 

to be “over it.” But, in mid-July, I.R. started crying again, so the mother took him 
6

to see his pediatrician. The mother later testified that, at our around the time the 

baby first showed difficulty using his right arm, she had left I.R. alone with his 

father—the only time she did so—to attend a doctor’s appointment. 

The pediatrician examined I.R. and prescribed an X-ray to be done at Ben 

Taub Hospital. According to the mother, the pediatrician told her that the mother 

could decide on her own whether or not to take I.R. for an x-ray. The mother, who 

by then was two months’ pregnant with B.R., had an obstetric appointment at Ben 

Taub about a week later. She waited and brought I.R. for his x-ray that day. 

The Department takes I.R. into custody.

When the mother brought I.R. for the x-ray, the extensive bruising on his 

body was still fairly fresh. The Ben Taub doctors examined the x-rays and 

discovered I.R.’s multiple serious injuries. They observed that the subdural 

hemorrhaging had filled I.R.’s fontanelle with blood. Because that condition might 

have developed into a situation that would require emergency surgery, the doctors 

transferred I.R. to Texas Children’s Hospital, where a neurosurgery team would be 

available. An ambulance transported I.R. to Texas Children’s, and he was admitted 

to the intensive care unit. 

The hospital staff and the Department questioned the mother and father 

about the circumstances that led to I.R.’s hospitalization. The parents did not point 

to any history of trauma to explain subdural hemorrhaging or fractures. The father 
7

testified that he had no idea that I.R. had those injuries until I.R. was taken to the 

hospital. Both parents mentioned that I.R. bruised easily. Both denied that they 

knew the causes of I.R.’s injuries, and neither implicated the other. 

After the mother was told that the hospital had referred I.R.’s case to the 

Department because of his unexplained injuries, the mother and father 

brainstormed about how I.R.’s injuries could have occurred. In a later interview, 

the mother speculated that I.R. could have hit his head on the crib. She also 

recalled that I.R.’s six- and four-year-old cousins had visited and may have hurt 

I.R., although she conceded that the children had never been left alone with I.R. 

The expert witness ruled out the possibility that these kinds of incidents 

could have caused the types of injuries that I.R. had. She also eliminated the 

possibility that any underlying medical condition could have caused I.R.’s injuries. 

The Department took I.R. into custody and determined that, due to the severity of 

I.R.’s injuries and the length of time over which the injuries occurred, the goal for 

him would be termination of parental rights and adoption.

The parents’ subsequent conduct.

During the criminal investigation into the circumstances that led to I.R.’s 

injuries, the mother admitted to an investigating officer that she had used force at 

one point to pull on I.R.’s leg. A Harris County grand jury indicted the mother on a 

charge of serious bodily injury of a child. The mother remained in Harris County 
8

jail from the fall of 2010 until the spring of 2012, when the district attorney 

dismissed the charge. While the mother was in jail, she gave birth to B.R., a girl. 

Four days after her birth, the Department placed B.R. in the foster home where her 

brother lived. During the mother’s incarceration, the father became involved with 

another woman. By the time of trial, they were living together and engaged to be 

married. 

Both parents completed the court-ordered family service plan requirements. 

The children’s foster mother intervened in the proceeding. She testified that, since 

I.R.’s placement with her, she has taken him to over fifty medical appointments, 

including doctor visits, therapeutic treatment, and early childhood intervention. In 

her home, I.R. has made substantial progress in overcoming his physical 

developmental delays, but continues to have some cognitive developmental delay. 

Lung problems, such as pneumonia and asthma, persist: he regularly sees a 

pulmonologist and had five bouts of pneumonia during the winter. B.R. has no 

developmental concerns and has met all of her pediatric milestones. 

Discussion

I. Standard of Review.

A parent’s rights to the “companionship, care, custody, and management” of 

his or her children are constitutional interests “far more precious than any property 

right.” Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758–59, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 1397 (1982); 
9

see In re M.S., 115 S.W.3d 534, 547 (Tex. 2003). A termination decree is 

complete, final, irrevocable, and divests for all time that natural right as well as all 

legal rights, privileges, duties, and powers with respect to each other except for the 

child’s right to inherit. Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985). We strictly 

scrutinize termination proceedings and strictly construe the involuntary termination 

statutes in favor of the parent. Id. However, “the rights of natural parents are not 

absolute” and “the rights of parenthood are accorded only to those fit to accept the 

accompanying responsibilities.” In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 361 (Tex. 2003). 

Recognizing that a parent may forfeit his or her parental rights by their acts or 

omissions, the primary focus of a termination suit is protection of the child’s best 

interests. Id.

In a case to terminate parental rights under section 161.001, the Department 

must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, (1) that the parent committed one or 

more of the enumerated acts or omissions, justifying termination and (2) that 

termination is in the best interest of the child. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001; In 

re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 345 (Tex. 2009). Clear and convincing evidence is 

“proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction 

as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.” In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 

at 344. “Only one predicate finding under section 161.001(1) is necessary to 

support a judgment of termination when there is also a finding that termination is 
10

in the child’s best interest.” In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d at 362. Thus, if the trial court’s 

judgment relies on multiple predicate grounds, we may affirm on any one of those 

grounds. In re D.S., 333 S.W.3d 379, 388 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, no pet.); In 

re S.N., 272 S.W.3d 45, 49 (Tex. App.—Waco 2008, no pet.).

In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence in a parental-rightstermination case under section 161.001, we look at all the evidence to determine 

whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the finding, is such that 

the factfinder could reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction about the 

truth of the issues on which the Department bore the burden of proof. In re J.P.B., 

180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005) (per curiam); In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 

(Tex. 2002). We defer to the trial court as fact-finder, and resolve disputed facts in 

favor of its finding if a reasonable factfinder could do so. In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 

at 573; In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266; Jordan v. Dossey, 325 S.W.3d 700, 712–13 

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. denied). 

Termination findings withstand a factual sufficiency challenge if the 

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could form a firm belief or conviction that 

the statutory grounds for termination exist. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 18–19 (Tex. 

2002). To reverse a case on factual insufficiency grounds, “the reviewing court 

must detail the evidence relevant to the issue of parental termination and clearly 
11

state why the evidence is insufficient to support a termination finding by clear and 

convincing evidence.” Id. at 19. 

II. Evidentiary sufficiency.

In their separate appeals, the mother and the father each contend that the 

evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support termination of their 

parental rights under Texas Family Code sections 161.001(1)(D) and (E). Section 

161.001(1)(D) provides that a “court may order termination of the parent-child 

relationship if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence . . . that the parent 

has . . . knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child to remain in conditions 

or surroundings which endanger the physical or emotional well-being of the child.” 

TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(1)(D). Subsection 161.001(1)(E) provides that a 

parent’s rights can be terminated when she has “engaged in conduct or knowingly 

placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the 

physical or emotional well-being of the child.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. 

§ 161.001(1)(E). “‘To endanger’ means to expose a child to loss or injury or to 

jeopardize a child’s emotional or physical health.” Jordan, 325 S.W.3d at, 723; see

also In re T.N., 180 S.W.3d 376, 383 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2005, no pet.) (citing 

In re M.C., 917 S.W.2d 268, 269 (Tex. 1996)). A child is endangered when the 

environment creates a potential for danger that the parent disregards. Jordan, 325 
12

S.W.3d at 721; In re M.R.J.M., 280 S.W.3d 494, 502 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 

2009, no pet.).

“Although ‘endanger’ means more than a threat of injury or the possible ill 

effects of a less-than-ideal environment, it is not necessary that the conduct be 

directed at the child or that the child actually suffers injury.” In re T.N., 180 

S.W.3d at 383 (citing In re M.C., 917 S.W.2d at 269); see also In re J.O.A., 283 

S.W.3d 336, 345 (Tex. 2009) (holding that endangering conduct is not limited to 

actions directed toward child); Jordan, 325 S.W.3d at 723 (holding that danger to 

child need not be established as independent proposition and may be inferred from 

parental misconduct even if conduct is not directed at child and child suffers no 

actual injury); Walker v. Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 312 S.W.3d 

608, 616–17 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied) (explaining that 

relevant conduct may occur either before or after child’s removal from home).

Inappropriate, abusive, or unlawful conduct by persons who live in the 

child’s home or with whom the child is compelled to associate on a regular basis in 

his home is a part of the “conditions or surroundings” of the child’s home under 

section 161.001(1)(D). Jordan, 325 S.W.3d at 721; In re M.R.J.M., 280 S.W.3d at 

502. Thus, although the focus of subsection (D) is on the child’s living 

environment and not on the parent’s conduct, parental conduct may produce an 

endangering environment. See Jordan, 325 S.W.3d at 721. Placement with an 
13

abusive parent or relative is endangerment under either provision of the statute. See

In re J.M.C.A., 31 S.W.3d 692, 698 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.) 

(terminating parental rights of mother who allowed children to remain with abusive 

father).

Under subsection (E), the relevant inquiry is whether evidence exists that the 

parent’s conduct—including acts, omissions, and failures to act, both before and 

after the birth of the child—directly endangered the child’s physical well-being. In 

re J.W., 152 S.W.3d 200, 205 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, pet. denied); see Tex. 

Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533–34 (Tex. 1997); In re D.M., 

58 S.W.3d 801, 812 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, no pet.). Parental conduct may 

be relevant even if it does not involve the child or result in actual harm to the child. 

In re D.M., 58 S.W.3d at 811; see also Jordan, 325 S.W.3d at 723 (“The relevant 

inquiry is whether evidence exists that a parental course of conduct endangered the 

child’s physical or emotional well-being.”); Cervantes-Peterson v. Tex. Dep’t of 

Family and Protective Servs., 221 S.W.3d 244, 253 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st 

Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (explaining that “the manner in which a parent treats other 

children in the family can be considered in deciding whether that parent engaged in 

a course of conduct that endangered the physical or emotional well-being of a 

child”). Termination under subsection (E) must be based on more than a single act 

or omission: the evidence must demonstrate a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious 
14

course of conduct by the parent. Jordan, 325 S.W.3d at 723; In re J.T.G., 121 

S.W.3d 117, 125 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet). 

A. I.R.’s endangerment.

The parents contend that no record evidence shows that either parent was the 

one who injured I.R., and they also point to the testimony of the Department 

caseworker, who stated that she did not know who caused his injuries. Thus, the 

parents contend, the evidence is legally insufficient both under subsection (D), 

which requires a showing that the environment or conditions in which the child is 

placed endangered the child’s physical or emotional well-being, and under 

subsection (E), which requires a parent’s conduct to cause the endangerment, as 

evidenced by the parent’s actions but also by the parent’s omissions or failure to 

act. 

It is true that no direct evidence identifies one parent as the perpetrator of the 

injuries to I.R. Strong circumstantial evidence, however, supports the trial court’s 

findings on these issues. Both parents cared for I.R., and they were I.R.’s sole 

caregivers. I.R. suffered multiple serious injuries—fractures to both legs, one 

shoulder and skull fractures—inflicted on different occasions while in the parents’ 

care. The medical expert opined that I.R.’s injuries were non-accidental and that

I.R. would have exhibited symptoms of considerable discomfort and pain, as well 

as other symptoms, from these injuries. A reasonable caregiver, she observed, 
15

would not have ignored I.R.’s symptoms and complaints but instead would have 

sought prompt medical treatment. 

The parents both denied harming I.R., denied any knowledge of the other 

parent harming I.R., and denied any awareness of most of his injuries before he 

arrived at the hospital. But the medical expert testified that the parents’ 

explanations for the possible causes of I.R.’s injuries and their proffered reasons 

for delay in seeking medical treatment were implausible. The trial court reasonably 

could have resolved this controverted evidence by not crediting the parents’ 

explanations. We conclude that the trial court reasonably could have formed a firm 

belief or conviction that both the mother and the father knowingly placed I.R. or 

allowed him to remain in conditions that endangered his physical and emotional 

well-being. This single ground is enough to support the termination of the mother’s 

and father’s parental rights to I.R. See D.S., 333 S.W.3d at 388; S.N., 272 S.W.3d 

at 49; see also In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 574 (Tex. 2005) (holding that 

evidence that parents were child’s only caregivers and that injuries did not occur 

all at once and were the result of ongoing mistreatment was legally sufficient to 

support termination of parents’ rights). 
16

B. B.R.’s endangerment.

The mother argues that the evidence is insufficient to support the termination 

of her parental rights to B.R., because the endangerment finding pertains only to 

her conduct toward I.R. In Boyd, however, the Texas Supreme Court rejected the 

notion that “danger cannot be inferred from parental misconduct,” and emphasized 

that, for termination under subsection (E), “it is not necessary that the conduct be 

directed at the child or that the child actually suffers injury.” 727 S.W.2d at 533; 

accord Allred v. Harris Cnty. Child Welfare Unit, 615 S.W.2d 803, 806 (Tex. Civ. 

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, writ ref’d n.r.e.). A factfinder may consider the 

parent’s conduct toward the other parent or other children to find endangerment of 

a child who was not born at the time of the conduct. See In re W.J.H., 111 S.W.3d 

707, 716 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied); In re D.T., 34 S.W.3d 625,

637 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2000, pet. denied). The abuse that I.R. suffered while 

in his mother’s care is sufficient to support termination of her parental rights to 

B.R. See Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533.

Pointing to the Fort Worth Court of Appeals’ decision in In re A.B., the 

father contends that the evidence does not support termination of his parental rights 

to B.R, because none of the evidence directly connected him to the harm of the 

children. No. 02-11-00029-CV, 2012 WL 4010404, at *19 (Tex. App.—Fort 

Worth Sept. 13, 2012, no pet.). In re A.B. involved whether the father’s hostile 
17

conduct toward police officers and Department employees supported a finding that 

his conduct endangered the well-being of his children. Id. at *19–20. In finding the 

evidence factually insufficient, the appellate court observed that the father never 

directed his hostility toward his children or the children’s mother. Id. at *20.

In contrast, the record before us contains evidence that the father knowingly 

placed or allowed B.R.’s brother, I.R., to remain in conditions that endangered his 

physical and emotional well-being. That evidence is, in turn, is sufficient to 

support termination of the father’s parental rights to B.R. See In re Baby Boy R., 

191 S.W.3d 916, 925 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, pet. denied) (affirming trial court’s 

finding that defendant’s abuse of his stepdaughter constituted conduct that 

endangered the physical or emotional well-being of his unborn son).

C. Best interests of I.R. and B.R.

A strong presumption exists that a child’s best interests are served by 

maintaining the parent-child relationship. In re L.M., 104 S.W.3d 642, 647 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.). In Holley v. Adams, the Texas Supreme 

Court provided a nonexclusive list of factors that the trier of fact in a termination 

case may use in determining the best interests of the child. 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–

72 (Tex. 1976). These factors include (1) the desires of the child; (2) the emotional 

and physical needs of the child now and in the future; (3) the emotional and 

physical danger to the child now and in the future; (4) the parental abilities of the 
18

individuals seeking custody; (5) the programs available to assist these individuals 

to promote the best interest of the child; (6) the plans for the child by these 

individuals or by the agency seeking custody; (7) the stability of the home or 

proposed placement; (8) the acts or omissions of the parent that may indicate that 

the existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one; and (9) any excuse for the 

acts or omissions of the parent. Id. These factors are not exhaustive, and there is no 

requirement that DFPS prove all factors as a condition precedent to parental 

termination. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27; Adams v. Tex. Dep’t of Family & 

Protective Servs., 236 S.W.3d 271, 280 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no 

pet.). 

1. The children’s desires.

At the time of trial, I.R. and B.R. were toddlers and could not directly 

express their desires. The evidence shows that the children were happy and 

thriving in their foster home, but also enjoyed their visits with their parents. This 

factor does not weigh either for or against a finding that termination is in the 

children’s best interest.

2. The children’s physical and emotional needs, 

and the emotional and physical danger to the 

children, now and in the future.

The foster mother, who is also an elementary school teacher, has been 

diligent in seeking medical care and therapeutic intervention to help I.R. overcome 
19

his physical and cognitive delays. The record shows that I.R.’s lung condition 

requires regular, and sometimes urgent, medical care, and the Department 

expressed concern about the parents’ ability to respond to these needs. B.R. plays 

well with her brother, and they appear to share a strong sibling bond. The evidence 

regarding endangerment is probative in determining the child’s best interest. See In 

re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28; Walker, 312 S.W.3d at 616–17. The parents’ inability or 

failure to explain or take responsibility for I.R.’s injuries leaves open the 

possibility of future similar mistreatment if the children were left unsupervised in 

the care of either parent. This factor strongly supports the conclusion that 

termination is in the children’s best interest.

3. The parental ability and programs available to 

assist in promoting the children’s best interests.

The parents completed classes and the other terms of the family service 

plans. Neither, however, explained how they would meet I.R.’s health and 

educational needs, and neither supported a ruling that would have preserved the 

other’s parental rights to the children. The foster parent has worked with numerous 

medical and other health care professionals to ensure that I.R. is receiving 

interventions that will optimize his abilities. This factor weighs in favor of a 

finding that termination is in the children’s best interest. 
20

4. Stability of the home or proposed placement.

The mother currently has no independent means of support, and is living 

with other family members. She would apply for public assistance to help support 

the children. The father would have the children live with him, his fiancée, and her 

two children. The foster parent wishes to adopt the children, a plan endorsed by the 

Department. The foster parent has been the primary caregiver for the children from 

a very young age and offers them stability. This factor also favors termination.

5. The acts or omissions of the parents and any 

excuse for such acts or omissions.

The parents continue to be unable to explain how I.R. became injured. His 

injuries were serious and numerous and occurred on more than one occasion, over 

the time he was in his parents’ care. Neither parent showed any insight into how 

the circumstances that caused I.R.’s serious injuries arose. Both had troubling 

inconsistencies in their testimony concerning those circumstances. In short, neither 

parent offered a reason for the trial court to have any confidence that either parent 

would protect their children from the same kind of abuse, endangerment, and 

serious medical neglect that I.R. suffered while once in their care. This factor 

weighs in favor of termination. 
21

Conclusion

The evidence supporting the trial court’s endangerment findings, as well as 

that relating to the Holley factors, supports a firm belief or conviction that the trial 

court reasonably could have concluded that termination of the parents’ rights was 

in the children’s best interest. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Jane Bland

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Higley, and Bland.