FI L ED U.S. COURT OF A P P E A LS E LE V E N T H C IR C U IT FEB RUARY 27, 2007 THOMAS K. KAH

N CL ERK [ DO NOT PUBLISH ] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ N o. 06- 1352 5 Non-A rgum ent Calendar

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ D
. C. D oc ke t N o. 05- 0291 8- CV -J T C- 1 J.P., a m in orby his ne xt fri en d M art in Po pe hi s fa th er, MARTIN POPE , Pl ai nti ff s- Appe llants , v e r s u s CHEROKEE COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, DR. FRANK R. PETRUZIELO, in di vi du al ly andas S up eri nt en de nt of C he ro ke e Co un ty Scho ol Dis tri ct , SARAH HOSKINS, in di vi du al ly andas S pe ci al Edu cat io n Di rect or , HAM KIMZEY, in di vi du al ly, an d a s fo rm er Sp eci al Edu cat io n Di rect or , SHERRY GREEN, in di vi du al ly andas S pe ci al Edu cat io n S up erv is or , et al
. , D ef en da nts -Appe lle es .

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ Appeal f rom the United State s District Court for the NorthernDistrict of Ge orgia

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ (F eb ru ar y 27 , 200 7) Be fo re MA RC U S , W IL SO N a nd PR Y O R , Ci rc uit

Jud ge s. PE R CU RIA M:Gi ve n th e sti ll- pe nd ingnatur e of the a dmi nis tr ativ e proce e din g s, we DENYAp pe lle e s’ 1 motion to di s m i s s t h i s ap p eal as moot. Cf. DeSimone v. L inford, 494 F .2d 1186 (5th Cir. 1974) (appe al from de nial of pre limin ar y injunction pending a dminist rative a ppeal wa s moot after completion of administrative a ppeal)
. 2 Pl ai n t i ff s J .P ., a m i n o r, an dh i s fa th er , M ar t i n Po p e, ap p ea l t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt ’s dis m iss al of

the ir c la im s f or vio la tio ns of the In div idu al s wi th D isa bil iti es E duc at ion A ct ( “ ID E A ”) , 20 U. S. C. §§ 1400 et se q. ; § 504 of the Re habil itatio n A ct of 197 3, 29 U
. S. C. § 794a ; the A m er ic an s wi th D isa bil iti es A ct (“ A D A ”) , 42 U. S. C. § 12 101 et se q. ; 42 U
. S. C. § 1983; a nd v ar iou s pr ovi sio ns o f G eo rg ia law . P la int if

fs sue d th e Cherokee County School District, Superintendent Frank Petruzielo, and severa l other
em plo y ee s of the Sc hool D istri ct fo r m one tary da m ag es re sul tin g fr om ph y sic al , em oti ona l, an d educ at ion al inj ur ie s Pla int if fs al le ge J. P. suf

fe re d at the ha nds of

the De fendants in Novem

ber 2003, while he w as attending an after-school pr o g ra m at Ch ap m anI nte rm ed ia te S ch ool
. T he dis tr ic t co urt dis m iss ed the co m pla int ba se d on Pl ai nti ff s’ f ai lur e to exh au st adm ini str at ive re m ed ie s unde r the ID E A be fo re br ing ing thi s law sui t. W e re vie wthe dis tr ic t c ourt’ s di sm iss al f or fai lu re t o e xhaust

the ID EA ’ s adm inistrative rem edies de novo
. See Babicz v. School Bd. of B roward C o u n t y, 1 3 5 F
. 3 d1 4 2 0 , 1 4 2 1 ( 1 1 t h C i r . 1 9 9 8 )
. A f t e r c a r e f u l r e v i e w , w e a f

f i rm. 1 The par ties are f am iliar w ith the relevan t facts, which the district court
en um erat edin it s d is m is sa l o r d e r , a n d we do no t re co un t t he m he re. The IDEAIn Ge or g ia , the se he ari ng s ar e c on du c te d by the Of fi c e of State Ad min ist rativ e He ari ng s. 2 See Ga . Comp. R. & Reg s. 160-4-7-.18( 1)(e ). The e x haustion require ment applies to claims asser ting the r ights of disa

bled childre n under 3 not only the I DEA, but also the ADA, § 504 of t he R ehabilitation Act of 1973, a nd the Constitut ion. See M.T.V. v. De kalb County Sch. Dist., 446 F.3d 1153, 1158 (11th Cir. 2006).

3 guara nte es that di sa

ble d st ude nts r ec ei ve a“ fr ee a nd a ppr opr ia te p ub lic e duc at ion ” (“ FA PE ”) throu gh the provisi on of various sp ecial education services, includin g an

“ indiv idualized education p rogram ” (“ IE P”), as defined in 20 U. S. C. § 141 4(d). See Lore n F. ex rel. Fisher v. Atlanta I ndep. Sch. Sy s., 349 F. 3 d 1 3 09, 1311 (11t h Cir. 2003 ). Apare nt who w ish es to ch al le nge a n I E P, or a ny m at te r re la ting to the pr ovi sio n of a FA PE , m ay re que st an “ im pa rt ia l due pr oc es s he ar ing ” be fo re a n A L J. 2 See 2 0 U.S.C. § 14 15 (f); 34 C.F.R. § 30 0.4 03 (b ). Once the adm inistrative proceedings are com plete, the I DE A pr ovid es that either party m ay

challenge those proceedings in state or feder al court. See 20 U. S. C. § 141 5(i)(2)( A)
. In order to bring such a cou rt challenge, however, the ID EArequires tha t a pla int if f fi rs t e xhaust

a dm ini str at ive r em ed ie s: “be fo re the f ili ng o f a ci vil
ac tio n un de r suc h law s se ek ing r el ie f tha t i s a lso a va ila ble und er thi s su bc ha pte r, the p r o c e du r e s u n d e r

s ub s e c t i o n s ( f

) a n d( g ) o f

t h i s s e c t i o n s h a l l b e e x h au s t e dt o t h e s a me
ex te nt a s w oul d be r equir ed ha d th e ac tio n be enbr ough t un de r thi s su bc ha pte r. ” 20 U
. S. C. § 14 15( l)
. “ T he phi los ophy of the I D E A is tha t pl ai nti ff s are r equir ed

to 3 uti liz e the e la

bor at e adm ini str at ive sc he m e es ta bli she d by the ID E A be fo re r es ortin g4

to the c ourts t o c ha lle nge the ac tio ns o f the loc al sc hool auth or iti es . ” N
. B. v. A la chua Co unty S ch
. Bd
. , 84 F
. 3d 1 376, 137 8 ( 11th C ir
. 199 6) ( quot at ionom itt ed ) (e m pha sis added). Thus, because exhaustio n is a prerequisite to the c ivil action con tem plated by § 14 15( l) , apare nt’ s f

ai lur e to exh au st a dm ini str at ive r em ed ie s by r eque sti ng and pa rti ci pa ti ng in a du e-p ro ces s h eari ng wil l res ul t in di sm is sa l of th e ci vi l ac ti on . Id.; see also Ass’ n for Retarded Citizens of Ala. v. Te ague, 830 F. 2d 15 8, 160 (11th Cir. 19 87 ). Co nsi ste nt w iththe unam

big uous statut or

y langua ge , w hic h pr ovi de s th at “ an y
m atte r re la tin g to the ide nti fi ca tio n, e va lua tio n, or e duc at ion al pla ce m en t of the c hil d,
or the pr ovi sio n of

a[ FA PE ] to suc h c hil d, ” 20 U
. S. C. § 14 15( b) (6 ) (e m pha sis ad d e d ) , w e h a v e i n t e r

p r e t e d t h e I D E A ’ s e x h au s t i o n r e qu i r e m e n t a s ap p l y i ng t o a

“ br oa d” spe ctru m

of c la im s. M. T
. V
. , 446 F
. 3d a t 11 58. T hu s, M. T
. V
. ’ s pare nts ’ cl ai m s b as edon pa st ret al ia ti on , whi ch in cl ud edall eg at io ns o f h a ras sm en t at IEP
m ee tings , intim idating letters, and needless and ins tructive testing o f M. T. V. , w ere

“ rel a t e d t o” M
. T
. V
. ’ s e du c a t i on , w i t hi n t he m e a ni ng o f t he I D E A , a nd

t he r e f ore subj ec t t o th e ex haust ionr equir em en t. S ee a lso Ba bic z, 135 F
. 3d a t 14 20. H er e, the dis tr ic t c ourt di sm iss ed Pl ai nti ff s’ c la im s be ca

use the y r el at ed to the FA PE provided to J.P
. pursuant to the requirem ents of the ID EA
. It w as undis puted tha t the onl y

r eque st f or adue -p ro ce ss h eari ng r el at ing to J. P. ’ s F A PE oc curr ed inNeither the § 504 committee mee ting in the month foll owingthe Novembe r incident, nor 4 the two I EP me eting s in January and Fe bruar y 2004 constitute (or c an be c onstrued as the functional equivalent of

) a r equest for

a due- proce ss hear ing, w ithin the meaning o f t he I DEA. While one provision of the I DEA provides for a pare nt’s participation in cer tain meeting s conce rning his or her child’s FA PE, 20 U.S. C
. § 1415(b)( 1), a c ompletely differ ent sec tion addresse s, and lay s out the require ments for, the a dminist rative he aring s that must take place upon the filing of a r equest for a due-pr ocess he aring , id. §§ 1415(f), ( i)(2). I n short, we a

re unpersua ded by

Plaintiffs’ argument that att en d an ce at § 1415(b)( 1) mee tings satisfies the I DEA’s “ due proc ess hea ring ” re quirement for administrative exhaustion. We have c onsidered, a

nd are unpersua ded by , Plaintiffs’ argument that exhaustion of 5 a dmi nis tr ativ e re me die s w ou ld b e futil e be c a us e the mon e y

dama g e s th e y

se e k r e late to o nly

pa st injuries. See N.B ., 84 F.3d at 1379 (re j ec t i n g I DEA plaintiff’ s argument that exhaustion of administrative re medies would be f utile beca use t he defenda

nt school districts lack authority to gr ant the re lief re quested, namely money damag es). In N.B ., we observe d that “if the plaintiff’s a rgument is to be acc epted, then future litiga nts could avoid the exhaustion requireme nt simpl y by askingfor relief that administrative authorities could not g rant. This g oes ag ainst the very rea son that we have the exhaustion requirement, whic h is ‘[t o preve nt] deliberate disreg ard a nd circ umvention of ag ency proce dures e stablished by Congr ess.’” I d. (quoting Tea g ue, 830 F .2d at 160).

5 pr oc ee din gs tha t t ook pla ce in 2001 a nd r es ult ed in a se ttl em en t a gr ee m en t a s to the claim s asserted in the 2001 com plaint. T he i n s t an t cl aim s, by contrast, c oncern 4 whether De fendants’ actions in Novem ber 2003 violated the ID EA an d constitu ted a brea ch of the provisi ons of the settlem ent agreem ent. The district court noted that the instant d isput e “ [a] t its heart,
. . . is about a fai l u re t o s u ff i ciently provide a [F A PE ] to [J
. P. ] a nd the adve rs e ed uc at ion al co nse que nc es of that f ai lur e. ” Be ca

use J. P. ’ s a lle ge d in

j ur ie s pr im ar ily

r el at e to the pr ovi sio n of his F A PE , a nd thus constitu te educational injuries (as opposed to phy sical injurie s), Plaintiffs w ere
re qui re d to e xhaust

a dm ini str at ive r em ed ie s be fo re f ili ng t hi s co urt a ct ion
. T he 5 dis tr ic t c ourt pr ope rl y dis m iss ed the m at te r sin ce it la ck ed sub j ec t m at te r j ur isd ic tio n.6

AFFIRMED.