alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE INTERIM
CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF DAISYTEK INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION AND
SUBSIDIARIES FOR THE QUARTER ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 1996 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS
ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          MAR-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1996
<CASH>                                             351
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   72,644
<ALLOWANCES>                                     1,259
<INVENTORY>                                     44,691
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               118,357
<PP&E>                                          18,835
<DEPRECIATION>                                   7,755
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 131,348
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           51,696
<BONDS>                                         21,314
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            65
<OTHER-SE>                                      58,943
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   131,348
<SALES>                                        275,042
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               275,042
<CGS>                                          247,783
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  247,783
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                   566
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 845
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  9,711
<INCOME-TAX>                                     3,715
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              5,996
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     5,996
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.87
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the
Balance Sheet at September 30, 1999 (Unaudited) and the Statement of
Operations for the Nine Months Ended September 30, 1999 (Unaudited) and is
qualified in its entirety by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1999
<CASH>                                          13,097
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   24,842
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                37,939
<PP&E>                                       1,071,632
<DEPRECIATION>                                 742,555
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 313,016
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                     313,016
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   313,016
<SALES>                                        147,972
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               148,715
<CGS>                                           82,470
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   82,470
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                37,917
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 28,328
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             28,328
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    28,328
<EPS-BASIC>                                       8.26
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     8.26


</TABLE>
Exhibit 35.3

OFFICERS CERTIFICATE

I, Karen Montbach, a
Managing Director of Citibank, N.A. (the Company), hereby certify, with respect to the Pooling and Servicing Agreement, dated as of April 1, 2013 (the Agreement), by and among Citigroup Commercial Mortgage Securities
Inc., as depositor, Wells Fargo Bank, National Association, as master servicer, LNR Partners, LLC, as special servicer, Pentalpha Surveillance LLC, as operating advisor, Citibank, N.A., as certificate administrator (the Certificate
Administrator), and U.S. Bank National Association, as trustee, the following:

1. A review of the Companys activities as Certificate
Administrator during the reporting period ending December 31, 2016 and its performance under the Agreement has been made under my supervision.

2. To the best of my knowledge, based on such review, as of and for the reporting period ending December 31, 2016, the Company has
fulfilled all of its obligations under the Agreement in all material respects throughout the reporting period.

This statement is given by the undersigned
as an authorized officer of the Company and not in the undersigneds individual capacity.

Date: February 27, 2017



Citibank, N.A.By:

/s/ Karen MontbachName:

Karen MontbachTitle:

Managing Director


CGCMT 2013-GCJ11
| (logo) WELLS FARGO | **Corporate Trust Services**

  MAC R1204-010  9062 Old Annapolis Road  Columbia, MD 21045  Tel: 410 884 2000  Fax: 410 715 2380 |
|--------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

 

J.P. Morgan Chase CommercialMortgage Securities Corp. 

383 Madison Avenue

31st Floor

New York, New York 10179

 

Re: Annual Statement ofCompliance for J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage  Securities Trust2013-C13, Commercial  Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,  Series2013-C13

 

 

Per the Pooling and ServicingAgreement dated as of July 1, 2013 (the "Agreement"), theundersigned, a duly authorized officer of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., asCertificate Administrator ("Wells Fargo"), hereby certifies as followsas of and for the year ending December 31, 2016 (the "ReportingPeriod"):

 

(a) A review of Wells Fargo'sactivities during the Reporting Period and of its performance under theAgreement has been made under such officer's supervision; and

 

(b) To the best of suchofficer's knowledge, based on such review, Wells Fargo has fulfilled all of itsobligations under the Agreement in all material respects throughout theReporting Period.

 

 

February 27, 2017

 

/s/ Brian Smith

BRIAN SMITH

Vice President

 

 

| Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. | (logo) Together we’ll  go far |
|------------------------|-------------------------------------|
#### Carlos Alberto Lopez MOLINA; Leticia Arellano Pliego, Petitioners, v. Michael B. MUKASEY, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 06-73329.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

*63Submitted Dec. 20, 2007 *.

Filed Dec. 28, 2007.

Carlos Alberto Lopez Molina, Azusa, CA, pro se.

Leticia Arellano Pliego, Azusa, CA, pro se.

CAC-District Counsel, Esq., Office of the District Counsel Department of Homeland Security, Los Angeles, CA, Ronald E. Lefevre, Chief Counsel, Office of the District Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, Hillel Smith, Aram A. Gavoor, DOJ-U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Div./Office of Immigration Lit., Washington, DC, for Respondent.

Before: GOODWIN, WALLACE, and HAWKINS, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Carlos Alberto Lopez Molina and Leticia Arellano Pliego petition pro se for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denying their motion to reopen removal proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to reopen. *Konstantinova v. INS,*195 F.3d 528, 529 (9th Cir.1999). We deny the petition for review.

The BIA considered the evidence petitioners submitted regarding one of their daughters and acted within its broad discretion in determining that the evidence

was insufficient to warrant reopening. *See Singh v. INS,*295 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir.2002) (BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen shall be reversed only if it is “arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law”) (internal citation and quotation omitted). Contrary to petitioners’ contention, the IJ’s interpretation of the hardship standard falls within the broad range authorized by the statute. *See Ramirez-Perez v. Ashcroft,*336 F.3d 1001, 1004-1006 (9th Cir.2003).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
#### Cloyce CULVER, Petitioner—Appellant, v. Jay SHELDON, Warden, Norton Correctional Facility; State of Kansas; Phill Kline, Attorney General of Kansas, Respondents-Appellees.

No. 07-3248.

United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

Jan. 15, 2008.

Cloyce Culver, Norton, KS, pro se.

Jared S. Maag, Office of the Attorney General, Topeka, KS, for RespondentsAppellees.

Before KELLY, ANDERSON, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

*93ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

STEPHEN H. ANDERSON, Circuit Judge.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.

Cloyce Culver pled guilty to one count of aggravated indecent liberties with a minor, in violation of Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-3504. He moved to withdraw his plea, but that request was denied. Culver was subsequently sentenced to eighty-eight months’ imprisonment. He appealed, alleging error in the denial of his request to withdraw his guilty plea, but his conviction was affirmed by the Kansas Court of Appeals. *State v. Culver,*No. 90,456, 2004 WL 1176619 (Kan.Ct.App. May 21, 2004). The Kansas Supreme Court denied his petition for review.

Culver thereafter filed a motion for post-conviction relief under Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-1507. The motion was denied and that decision was affirmed by the Kansas Court of Appeals. *Culver v. State,*No. 95,296, 2006 WL 1237272 (Kan.Ct.App. May 5, 2006). The Kansas Supreme Court denied Culver’s petition for review.

Proceeding *pro se,*Culver subsequently filed this petition for federal habeas relied pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He alleged that he was denied effective assistance of counsel, that he was denied a fair trial and that he was subjected to prosecutorial misconduct. After concluding that an evidentiary hearing was not necessary to resolve Culver’s petition, the district court found his claims were without merit and denied his petition. The district court also denied Culver’s motion for a certificate of appeal-ability (“COA”) and denied his request for appointed counsel. Culver seeks a COA to appeal the district court’s denial of his habeas petition.

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) governs this appeal. For substantially the reasons set forth in the district court’s memoranda and orders dated July 25, 2007, and August 9, 2007, we conclude that Culver has failed to make “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right” and we deny his request for a COA and dismiss this appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).

*

 This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R.App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
CIRCUIT COURT OF ROANOKE COUNTY

#### Charles E. Goff et ux. et al. v. Brian K. Hooker et ux.

July 22, 2003

Case No. CH02-237

By judge Robert P. Doherty, Jr.

Plaintiffs filed their Bill of Complaint requesting injunctive relief to prevent the Defendants from closing, restricting, or otherwise obstructing a portion of an unpaved and poorly maintained road that is shown on a subdivision plat, which plat was recorded in the Clerk’s Office of the Circuit Court for the County of Roanoke in November 1951. Defendants responded that the road in question was a private road and not a public road, that it had never been dedicated for public use, and that, if the Court were to find that the Plaintiffs had a right to use the private road, Plaintiffs should be required to bear a portion of the cost of maintaining the road. The Court ruled, pursuant to § 15-792, Code of Virginia (1950), as amended, that the recordation of the subdivision plat transferred the fee simple in the road to the county, thereby creating a public right of passage over the same. Plaintiffs, being the prevailing parties, now request attorney’s fees. After hearing evidence *ore terms*concerning the actions taken by each party and their motivations for those actions with regard to the road, the court denies the Plaintiffs’ request for attorney’s fees.

In reaching this conclusion, the Court found that neither party proceeded in this lawsuit for improper purposes. Each party thought it was right. The litigation was not filed in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons. The Defendants in this action did not proceed until they sought *339advice from county officials, and they relied on the long-standing county practice of treating roads such as the one in question as private roads. In addition to these facts, when considering the payment of an opponent’s legal costs, Virginia has “consistently adhered to the ‘American Rule;’ ordinarily, attorney’s fees are not recoverable by a prevailing litigant in the absence of a specific contractual or statutory provision to the contrary.” *Lannon*v. *Lee Conner Realty Corp.,*238 Va. 590, 594 (1989). There being no contractual provision or statutory authority to the contrary and there being no bad faith, Plaintiffs’ request for attorney’s fees is denied.
# United States Court **of Appeals**  **f or the Fifth Circuit** 

**____________** No. 23

- 10228 Summary Calendar

**____________ United States of America,**  Plaintiff

— Appellee **,**

versus **Jonathan Jamal Bangash,** Defendant

— Appellant

**.**

**______________________________** Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas USDC No. 3:22

- CR

- 11

- 1

**_______________ _______________**  Before **Wiener, Stewart,** and **Douglas,** Circuit Judges

**. Per Curiam**  **:** *****
Defendant

- Appellant Jonathan Jamal Bangash appeals his conviction for illegal receipt of a firearm by a person under indictment, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(n) and 924(a)(1)(D). He argues that (1) § 922(n) violates the Second Amendment in light of the Supreme Court’s dec ision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen , 142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022) ;

**_____________________**

* This opinion is not designated for publication. See **5th Cir**

**. R** 

**.** 47.5. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED March 12, 2024 Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 23-10228 Document: 71-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/12/2024No. 23

- 10228

2 (2) Congress exceeded its powers under the Commerce Clause when it enacted § 922(n); and (3) because of the above errors, the district court misadvised him of the na ture of his offense and erroneously accepted the factual basis of his guilty plea, in violation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11

. W e review Bangash’s first and third claims for plain error because he did not raise either argument before the distr ict court. See Puckett v. United States , 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009). He did, however, preserve his Commerce Clause argument. We review t he constitutionality of federal statutes de novo. United States v. Bailey , 115 F.3d 1222, 1225 (5th Cir. 1997).
Each of Bangash’s arguments is unavailing. First, a ny error regarding whether § 922(n) violates the Second Amendment in light of the Court’s decision in Bruen was not clear or obvious. See United States v. Jones , 88 F.4th 571 , 574 (5th Cir. 2023 ); United S tates v. Sanches , 86 F.4th 680 , 687 (5th Cir. 2023) ; United States v. Avila , No. 22

- 50088, 2022 WL 17832287, at * 1

– 2 (5th Cir. Dec. 21, 2022) (unpublished) , cert. denied , 143 S. Ct. 2512 (2023 ). Second , as Bangash himself concedes, his Commerce Clause argument is unpersuasive

. See United States v. Alcantar , 733 F.3d 143, 145

– 46 (5th Cir. 2013). Lastly, given our disposition of the underlying arguments, it follows that the district court committed no Rule 11 plain error. **AFFIRMED**

. Case: 23-10228 Document: 71-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 03/12/2024
Order entered July 14, 2014

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-14-00531-CV

JUAN CARLOS FLORES, Appellant

V.

CHASCO, INC. A/K/A CHASCO INTERIORS, INC., ET AL., Appellees

On Appeal from the 160th Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. DC-09-14912-H

ORDER

The reporter’s record in this case is overdue. By postcard dated June 3, 2014, we notified 

the official court reporter for the 160th Judicial District Court that the reporter’s record was 

overdue. We directed the court reporter to file the record within thirty days. To date, we have 

not received any response. 

Accordingly, we ORDER court reporter Sharron Rankin to file, within FIFTEEN

DAYS of the date of this order, either (1) the reporter’s record; (2) written verification that no 

hearings were recorded; or (3) written verification that appellant has not requested or made 

payment arrangements for the record. We notify appellant that if we receive verification it has 

not requested, paid for, or made arrangements to pay for the reporter’s record, we will 
order the appeal submitted without the reporter’s record. See TEX. R. APP. P. 37.3(c) 

/s/ CAROLYN WRIGHT

CHIEF JUSTICE
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-7532

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

LEWIS THOMAS CORNELL,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle 

District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Catherine C. Eagles, 

District Judge. (1:00-cr-00204-CCE-3)

Submitted: February 16, 2017 Decided: February 22, 2017

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, DUNCAN, Circuit Judge, and HAMILTON, 

Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Lewis Thomas Cornell, Appellant Pro Se. Robert Michael Hamilton, 

Angela Hewlett Miller, Assistant United States Attorneys, 

Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Lewis Thomas Cornell appeals from the district court’s order 

denying his motion for reconsideration of the court’s order 

granting his 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (2012) motion for reduction of 

his sentence based on an amendment to the U.S. Sentencing 

Guidelines Manual. We have reviewed the record and find no 

reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s 

order. See United States v. Goodwyn, 596 F.3d 233, 234 (4th Cir. 

2010) (a district court has no authority to reconsider its decision 

on a sentence reduction motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)). We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions 

are adequately presented in the materials before this court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 06-6289

WILLIE ERVIN, Petitioner - Appellant, versus COLIE RUSHTON, Warden; HENRY MCMASTER, Attorney General for South Carolina, Respondents - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Greenville. G. Ross Anderson, Jr., District Judge. (6:04-cv-23176-GRA) Submitted: July 25, 2006 Decided: August 1, 2006 Before WILLIAMS, MOTZ, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Willie Ervin, Appellant Pro Se. Samuel Creighton Waters, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF SOUTH CAROLINA, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellees. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).- 2 - PER CURIAM: Willie Ervin seeks to appeal the district court’s order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and dismissing as untimely his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000) petition. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that any assessment of the constitutional claims by the district court is debatable or wrong and that any dispositive procedural ruling by the district court is likewise debatable. Miller-El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th Cir. 2001). We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Ervin has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED