### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs D ec em be r 7, 200 4

STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. THOM AS D. STA NTO N

Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Davidson Coun ty

No. 2003-A- 654 Seth Norm an, Jud ge

No. M2003- 03049-CCA -R3-C D - F iled March 17, 2005

The De fenda nt, Thomas D. Stanton, was convicte d by a jury of one c ount of ag g ravated robbe ry , one

c ou nt o f c arj a c kin g , o ne c ou nt o f a g g ra vated bu rg lary , o ne c ou nt o f the ft , o ne c ou nt o f C la ss D fe lon y e va din g arr e st, a ndon e c ou nt o f m isd e me a no r e va din g arr e st. Th e tr ia l c ou rt se nte nc e d h im to life imprisonment for the robbe ry offe nse; twenty -five y ear s for the c arja cking , to run

c on s e c u t i v e l y ; t w e l v e y e ar s f o r t h e b u r g l ar y

o f f e n s e , t o ru n c o n s e c u t i v e l y ; f i v e y e ar s f

o r t h e t he ft
, to r un c on c ur re ntl y ; ten y e ars fo r the fe lon y e va din g arr e st, to r

un c on c ur re ntl y ; a nde le ve n mo nth s, twenty -nine da y s for the misdemeanor evading arr est, to run concurre ntly ; for an e ffe ctive sente nce of life plus thirty -seve n y ear s. I n this direct appeal, t he Defenda nt contends that the e vidence does

no t su pp ort hi s a g g ra vate d robbe ry c on vic tio n; that th e tr ia l c ou rt c omm itt e d r e ve rs ibl e e rr or in failing to char g e the jury

on certain lesser- included off enses; that the trial court erre d in permitting the State to impea ch him on the basis of a prior conviction; and that his sentenc es ar e excessive. The State also filed a direc t a

ppeal, arg uing that the Def endant’ s sentence of life imprisonment for the ag g ravated robbe ry

conviction is illega l and should be modified to a sentenc e of life imprisonment without the possibili ty of parole

. We r ever se and r emand f or a ne w trial the De fenda nt’s conviction of Class D felony evading arr est. We modify the Def endant’ s sentenc e for his ag g ravated robbe ry conviction to life imprisonment without the possibi lityof par ole. We rema nd for a corr ection of the judgme nt refle cting the Def endant’ s car

jacking convi ct i o n

. I n all other re spects, we aff irm the judgme nts of the trial court.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Cr im inal Cou rt A ff irm ed in Par t; Reve rsed in Par t; Re m anded

D AVI D H. W EL L ES , J.
, d e li v e r e d th e o p in io n o f th e c o urt, in which T H O M A S T. W O O D A LL , J
., concur red in re sults onlyand R OB E R T W. W EDEMEYER , J ., joined.

Emma Tenne nt, Nashville, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellant, Thomas D. Stanton.-2-

Paul G. Summers, Attorney Gene ral and Reporter ; H elena Walton Yarbroug h, Assistant Attorney Gene ral; Victor S. Johnson, Dis trict Attorney Gene ral; and Renee Erb, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.

OP IN ION

F AC TS Th e vic tim , St e ve Spring e r, te sti fi e d th a t he mov e d to Na sh vil le in M arc h 2 00 2 in or de r t o seek e mploy ment in the music industry

. He a rrived in his van a nd broug ht with him a key board, two g uitars, and some r ecor ding e quipment. He chec ked into a motel on Dicker son Road and wa s living there at the time he met the D efe ndant and Ta mika Frierson. Mr. Spring er te stified that the Def endant a nd M s. Frie rson wer e loitering about the motel g rounds and they struck up a

conver sation. The De fenda nt introduced himself a nd Ms. Frierson and asked Mr. Spring er to drive them to the Def

endant’ s mother’s house s o t hat they could g et something to eat. Mr. Spring er complied. At the residenc e, Mr. Springe r and Ms. Frierson rema ined in the car while the De fenda nt enter ed the house . The Defendant returne d with a plate of food for Ms. Frierson and a small rock of c ra c k c oc a ine . M r. Spring e r andMs. F ri e rs on smo ke d th is c oc a ine tog e the r; the De fe nd a nt d id

n o tp ar t ak e o f t h e d ru g.

The thre esome then le ft the re sidence and hea ded back t o the motel. On the way , they stopped at a liquor store wher e the De fenda nt p urcha sed some alc ohol. Upon their re turn to the motel, the Def

endant a nd Mr. Spring er dr ank vodka and bourbon, with Mr. Spring er be coming intox icated. T hey

di s cu s sed obtaining some more c ocaine for Mr. Spring er to c onsume. Mr. Springe r o ff

er ed h i s co ff

ee maker a s an item to trade f or the drug . All three the n left in the van, ostensibly

to go g et more c ocaine

. Mr. Spring er te stified that h e wa s too drunk to drive, so he g ave the van key s to the Def endant a nd let him drive; Mr. Springe r sat in the bac k of the va n. Mr. S pring er e x plained what ha pp e ne d n e xt:

And next thi ng I

know we stopped somewher e and I g ot jumped inside the van and they kept asking me for my

hotel key and I tried to put them off, y ou know. What are
y ou doing? And I basica lly g ot the cra p beat out of me and I

seriously thought I was go i n g t o d i e t h at ev en i n g.

. . . [The Defe ndant] clobbered me first and knoc ked me silly , and then I was drag g ed out of the van and beat re peate dly . And then I was stripped, both my

ey es

wer e pre tty

much swollen shut at this point, I couldn’t see a whole lot. I could hea

r the m ta lki ng a nd he wa s d ir e c tin g Ta mik a to t ake of

f m y c lothe s, I g ue ss t o impa ir me or, I seriously thought the g uy

was g oing to k i l l m e. He was be ating me in the fac e, in the leg s, drag g ing me throug h the m ud and in t he for est, in the woods her e. Be ating me on my back with, kicking me or with a st ick or something, just non-stop.-3- And I must have lost c onsciousness a couple of times. And next thing I know I ’m nake d except for my

underw ear and it ’s cold, it’s wet a nd I walked a way

from the so me wh a t f

or e st a re a that I was in , b ut I

c ou ld b are ly

se e . A ndc a me a c ro ss a

c ou ple of ho me s a ndsta

rt e d p ou nd ing on do or s a nda skin g fo r help. A ndsh ortly there afte r the police came and took me to the hospital.

The victim testified further a bout his injuries. He state d that he still has a sca r under his left ey e, and it wa s a we ek and a half following the assault befor e he could use that ey e. He ha d “a sha rp pa in” in h is b a c k f

or tw o mo nth s. He de sc ri be d th is p a in a s “ e xcruc ia tin g .” Hi s k ne e s b e c a me so scabbe d during the hea ling pr ocess that it wa s very painful for him to bend his knee s, because the

s c ab s w o u l d b r e ak

o p e n a n d b l e e d i n g w o u l d o c c u r

. M r

. S p r i n g e r d e s c r i b e d h i s i n

j u r i e s a s “ v e r y, very pai nf

ul” a nde xpla ine d th a t, d uring his re c ov e ry , h e ha d to wa lk v e ry slo wl y , w a s u na

ble to

car ry anything, a nd the “[b]est [ he] could do for seve ral we eks wa s to lay in one position.”

M r

. S p r i n g e r

e m p h a s i z e d t h a th e d i d n o t g i v e t h e D e f e n d a n tp e r m i s s i o n t o t ak e h i s r o o mk e y, his mon e y , h is v a n o r any of his mus ic a l e qu ipm e nt.

Offic er Jason Moy er testified that he was the first office r on the scene of the assault. Offic er Moy er state d that, when he arrived, the victim “wa s running around hy sterica l in his underwea r. He ha d o bv iou sly

be e n b e a te n u p. Hi s e y e s w e re sta rt ing to s we ll s hu t .

. . [h]e wa s b le e din g fr om h is nose, his mouth, he had multiple abra sions a nd scra pes all over his body .” Of fice r Moy er de scribed the lace rations to the victim’s fac e as “seve re,” and st ated that the vi ctim had bee n “seve rely beate n.” The victim told Office r Moy er tha t “they ” had “ taken his van a nd . . . all his possessions and stripped him naked and ha d left him in th e road for de ad.” T he victim described his van and a lso told t he of fi c e r that hi s a ssaila nts ha d th e ke y to h is m ote l r oo m. A c c or din g to O ff ic e r M oy e r, the c ri me

scene and the motel we re only about four to f

ive minutes apart. Rely ing on the victim’s description, Offic er Moy er put out a “ BO L O” on the van.

I n response to the BO L O, Off icer Wil liam B ishop stationed himself at the motel w here the victim had been st ay i n g. When the victim’s van pulled past him, he followed it down Dic kerson Roa d. Whe n h e turne d o n h is l ig hts a ndsir e n, the va n “ too k o ff .” Of fi c e r B ish op test if

ie d th a t a “very dang erous” pursuit ensued. Eve ntually , the van hit a c urb, lost a tire and ra n into a ditch. At that point, th e D e f

e n d a n t g o t o u t o f

th e v a n a n d b e g a n ru n n in g a w a y

. Wi tha s s is tan c e , O ffice r Bishop wa s able to subdue the D efe ndan t an d t ak e him into custody . He subseque ntly took the De fe nd a nt t o th e ho sp ita l be c a us e the De fe nd a nt’ s rig ht ha nd a nd wrist we re “ a ll s we lle d u p. ” Whil e at the hospital, the De fenda nt was put in the same room with the victim. Off icer Bishop stated tha t the vic tim

wa s “ sh ow ing sig ns of e xtre me ph y sic a l pai n, ” wa s “y e lli ng a nd sc re a min g ,” a ndc ou ld walk only with assistance.

Offic er Jamie Under wood assisted in the pursuit of the van and se cure d it after the Def endant ran of f. She took custody

of T am i ka Frierson, w ho was a lso in the van, and found a cre dit card be lon g ing to the vic tim

in M s. F ri e rs on ’s po c ke t.-4-

Detec tive Mike Chastain interviewe d the victim in the hospital. Det. C hastain st ated that the victim appear ed to be in a “conside rable amount of pain.” The victim told him specifically that the Def endant a nd Ms. Frie rson had a ssaulted him and taken his van, debit and cr edit car ds, motel key and a sma ll amount of money

. The victim subsequently identified t he Defenda nt and Ms. Frierson from photog raphic line-ups. A couple of day s after the attac k, Det. Chastain took the victim to the Metro impound lot to identifyhis van, which he did. I nside the van we re the victim’s bicy cle, two g uitars, a ke y

board a nd various other

items. Not recove red w ere the vi ctim’s money clip or his motel key car d.

Tam i k a F ri er s o n t es t i fi ed
, ex p l ai n i n g t h ats h e h ad p l ed gu i l t y t o aggr av at ed b u rgl ar y

an d t heft

as a r esult of the attac k on Mr. Spring er. She stated that she and the Defe ndant had spe nt the night toge ther at the motel the night be fore the attac k. As they wer e checking out, it was raining . They had no ca r and notice d the victim beca use he ha d a v eh i cl e. T hey beg an a c onversation with the vic tim a nda sk e d him to dri ve the m to the De fe nd a nt’ s mo the r’ s h ou se . T he vic tim a g re e d a ndwh ile they wer e there, she and the victim smoked some cra ck cocaine in the van. The y all then re turned to the motel and all went into t h e v i ct i m’s motel room. There , she saw the victim’s musical

e qu ipm e nt. She state d th a t th e thr e e of the m sat a ro un d in the vic tim ’s ro om, a te , a nddr a nk a lc oh ol. Th e vic tim

play e d h is m us ic a l in str

ume nts

.

L ater , she testified, the vic tim decide d he wanted m ore coca ine. The thre e of the m left in the vic tim ’s va n a nd re turne d to the De fe nd a nt’ s mothe r’ s ho us e , wh e re the y tr ie d u ns uc c e ssf ull y to s e ll the victim’s coff

ee ma ker to the D efe ndant’s mother. The y then drove t o an o t her loc ation wher e they parke d and, ac cording to Ms. Frie rs o n , t h e Defenda nt “g ot out of the ca r and w ent on [the victim’s] side . . . and pulled him out of t he car and beg an beating him.” Ms. Frierson stated that the Def endant beat t he victim with his fist. The Defe ndant was a sking the victim for the key to his room and whe n the victim t o l d t h e De fe n d ant t hat he did not have it, the Defe ndant “just kept beating him.”

During the beating, the D efe ndant told Ms. Frier son to strip the vi ctim, which Ms. Frierson did. She also place d her foot on the victim’s ne ck. After war d, she found the vic tim’s motel key car d on the g round. S he also took the vi ctim’s money clip and a “ca rd.” She and the De fenda nt then g ot back in the vic tim’s van and re turned to t he mot el. There
, they “we nt and g ot all the equipment out of the room a nd loaded it up in the van.” The police chase ensued.

M s

. Fr i er s o n t es t i fi ed t h at s h e a n d t h e D ef en d an td et er m i n ed t o t ak e t h e v i ct i m ’s b el o n gi n gs while t hey wer e vis iting with the vi ctim in his room afte r t heir ini tial return from the De fenda nt’s mother’s house. She sta ted, howeve r, that she did not know the victim was g oing to be beate n.

Th e De fend ant als o test if ie d. He e xpla ine d th a t he a ndMs. F ri e rs on ha d b e e n s ta y ing in motels along Dicker son Road “on and off” for two to thre e we eks. As they wer e che cking out of a motel on March 17, 2002, he saw the vic tim. He approa ched the vi ct i m an d struck up a

conver sation. He introduce d himself and Ms. Frierson, even s howing the victim his identification

car d. He a sked the victim for a ride but the victim initially declined. Their c onversation continued-5-

and the De fenda nt repe ated his re quest for a ride, this time offering the victim some food and alcohol. The victim a sked if the Def endant could g et him some cra ck. When the Def endant r eplied in the aff irmative, the victim ag ree d to give him and Ms. Frie rson a ride.

The victim drove the m to the Defe ndant’s mother’ s house. Ther e, th e De fendant went in, g ot s ome fo od , a nd a lso g ot so me c ra c k c oc a ine fr om his ne ph e w. He g a ve the c ra c k to the vic tim

. Th e De fe nd a nt the n r a n i nt o some on e that ow e d h im m on e y , b ut the De fe nd a nt t oo k p a y me nt i n

cocaine, instead. The Def endant, the vic tim and Ms. Frierson then left i n the van. Accor ding to the Def endant, the vic tim was try ing to drive and smoke the cra ck at the sa me tim e. The Defe ndant

vo lun te e re d to drive a ndthe vic tim a c qu ie sc e d. On the ir way ba c k to the mot e l, the y sto pp e d a t a “bootleg house” w here the Def endant boug ht some alcohol. The thr eesome then re turn ed to the vic tim ’s ro om.

There , they

all beg an drinking

. The Defendant asked the victim if he wante d more c rac k and the victim said y es. They beg an neg otiating a

price . The Defendant told the victim t hat he wa nted the vic tim ’s g uit ar andke y bo ard . T he vic tim

re fu se d th is t

ra de . T he De fe nd a nt the n o ffered to double the amount of c ocaine in ex ch an ge for these items, and the vic tim then ag ree d. The Def endant then g ave to the vic tim the c ocaine that he had e arlier taken in payment for the de bt owed him, which was about one-ha lf the amount of cocaine that the victim a g ree d to tr ade f or his musical

e qu ipm e nt. Th e vic tim smo ke d thi s a mou nt a nd the n wa nte d the re st. Th e De fe nd a nt t e sti fi e d th a t, afte r smoking this sec ond amount of cocaine, the victim was ha llucinating and “ac ting we ird.” The Def endant a lso stated that all three of them we re dr unk.

I n order to g et t he victim the rest of hi s cocaine, t hey left aga in in the van, with the De fenda nt driving . T h e De fenda nt scored the rest of the victim’s coca ine and g ave it to him. They all then

re turne d to the vic tim ’s ro om. Th e vic tim wa s “a c tin g c ra zy ” a nd op e ne d the do or to h is m ote l r oo m, stating that he was hot. While the doo r wa s open, the De fenda nt saw three men walk by , one of whom appea

red to be arme d. The Defendant told the vi ctim to shut the door, which the victim di d. The victim then beg an showing the Def endant how to use the key board.

Acco rd ing to the De fe nd a nt, the vic tim wa nte d s til l mo re c ra c k andof fe re d to tr a de his bicy cle a nd coff

ee maker for it. The Def

endant told the victim that they could take the c offe e make r to his mot her’ s house, and they ag ree d to do so. Ag ain, the Def endant drove. On their way back,

a s th e De fe nd a nt w a s ma ne uv e ri ng the va n th ro ug h a tig ht turn and goin g ve ry slo wl y , th e vic tim opened the slid i n g d o o r o f the van a nd g ot out. The Def endant testified that the victim then “g ot jumped.” The De fenda nt did not know who jumped the victim or how many persons we re involved. He state d that he “se en a c ouple of . . . figur es” beating the vi ctim. The Defendant g ot out of the va n to s e e if he c ou ld h e lp. Whe n h e he arda g un sh ot, heg ot b a c k in the va n a ndle ft

.

The De fenda nt returne d to the motel, took the car d key that was in the c onsol e o f t he van,

an d we nt into the victim’s room. He retrieved the ke y board a nd g uitar that the victim had a g ree d to trade f or the c ocaine . He put these items in the van. Ms. Frierson then c onvinced the D efe ndant that they neede d to return to whe re the y had lef t the victim. On t heir way
, the pol ice beg an following them. The De fenda nt beca me “sc are d” and f led.-6-

The De fenda nt claimed that his hand a nd wrist became swollen beca use he was ha ndcuff

ed too tightly during his a

rre st. The Def

endant maintained that he wa s not try ing to stea l anything f rom the vic tim

. Following the pre sentation of this proof, th e jury convicted the Def

endant of ag g ravated robber y , car

jacking , ag g ravated burg lary , theft, Class D fe lony evading arr est and misdemea nor

e va din g arr e st.

AN AL YSI S

I. SUFF ICIENCY OF THE E VIDENCE I n h is f ir st i ss ue, th e Defe nd a nt c on te nd s th a t th e pr oo f i s n ot s uf fi c ie nt t o s up po rt

his conviction of a g g ravated robbery

. Ag g ravated robbery is define d as the intentional or knowing theft of pr op e rt y fr om the pe rs on of

a no the r by vio le nc e or

pu tti ng the pe rs on in f

e ar, wh e re by

the vic tim

su ff e rs se ri ou s b od ily inj ury

. Se e Te nn . Co de An n. § 3 9- 13 -4 02 (a )( 2) . “ Se ri ou s b od ily inj ury ” is, in turn, define d as bodily injury which involves a substantial risk of dea t h ; p ro t rac ted

un c on sc iou sn e ss; e xtre me ph y sic a l pain; pr otr a c te d or ob vio us dis fi g ur e me nt; or the pr otr a c te d lo ss or substantial impairment of a function of a bodily member, org an or mental fa culty . See id. § 39- 11-106(a )(34) . The De fenda nt arg ues that the proof did not establish bey ond a re asonable doubt that
t h e v i c t i ms u f

f e r e d s e r i o u s b o d i l y i n

j u r y.

Tenne ssee Rule of A ppellate Procedure 13(e) presc ribes that “[f]indings of g uilt in criminal actions whether bythe trial court or jury shall be set aside if the evide nce is insuffic ient to support the finding s by

the trier of

fac t of g uilt bey ond a re asonable doubt.” A convicted criminal defenda nt who cha lleng es the sufficie ncy of the evidenc e on appea l be ars the burden of demonstrating why the evidenc e is insufficient to support the ve rdi ct , beca use a ve rdict of g uilt destroy s the presumption of innoce nce and imposes a pre sumption of guilt. See S tate v. Eva ns, 108 S.W .3d 231, 237 (Tenn. 2003); State v. Carruthe rs, 35 S.W.3d 516, 557-58 (Tenn. 2000); State v. Tug g le, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982) . This Court must reje ct a c onvi ct ed cr iminal defenda nt’s challeng e to the sufficie ncy

of the e vidence if, afte r considering the evidenc e in a light most favora ble to the prosec ution, we determine that any rational trier of fac t c ould have found the e ssential elements of the crime bey ond a re asonable doubt. See J ackson v. V irg inia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); State v. Hall, 8 S.W.3d 593, 599 (Tenn. 1999).

On app eal , th e Sta te is e nti tle d to the str on g e st l e g iti ma te vie w o f the e vid e nc e a nda ll

rea sonable a nd leg itimate infere nces which may be dra wn there from. See Ca rruther s, 35 S.W .3d at 558; Hall, 8 S.W .3d at 599. A g uilty verdic t by the trier of fac t a ccr edits the testimony of the State’s wi tne sse s and re so lve s all c on fl ic ts in the e vid e nc e in fa vo r of the pr os e c uti on ’s the ory . Se e Sta te v. Bla nd, 958 S.W .2d 651, 659 (Tenn. 1997)

. Qu es tions about the cre dibilit y of witnesses, the weig ht and value of t he evidence, as well as all fac tual issues raised by the evidenc e ar e re solved by the trier of fac t, and this Court will not re- weig h or re- evaluate the evidenc e. See Eva ns, 108 S.W .3d at 236; Bla nd, 958 S.W .2d at 659. Nor w ill thi s Cour t s u b s t i tute its own infere nces dr awn f rom circ umstantial evidence for those dr awn by the trier of

fac t. See Evans, 108 S.W .3d at 236-37; Carruthe rs, 35 S.W.3d at 557.A ccor di ng t o t he M edi cal D i ct i onar y O nl i ne, T oradol i s a non- s t er oi dal ant i

- i nf l amm at ory dru g u s ed t o t r eat 1

p ai n.

-7- I n making his arg ument, the Def endant r elies upon this Court’s opinion in S tate v. Sims, 909 S.W. 2d46 (T e nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 95 ). I n th a t c a se, the de fe nd a nt w a s c on vic te d o f e sp e c ia lly ag g ravated robbe ry

on the ba s is that he robbed the victim using a de adly wea pon and ca

used the victim to suffer se rious bodily injury . See Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-13- 403(a) . The pr o of demonstrated that, during the cour se of the robbery , the def endant struc k the victim once in the f ace with a pistol. From this blow, she suffe re d a broke n and lac erated nose a nd a bruised c heekbone

. She spent about two hours in the hospital r ece iving immediate treatment for these wounds. She was not prescribed any

pain medicat i o n

. On appeal, the def endant c ontended that the vic tim had not suffe red the “serious bodily injury ” require d to support a conviction of espec i al l yaggra vated

ro bb e ry

. Th is Cou rt a g re e d. Us ing the c a no n of statut ory c on str uc tio n kno wn a s e

jus de m g e ne ri s, thi s Court hel d tha t “th e pa in co mmo nly a sso c ia te d with a br ok e n n os e is [n ot] e xtre me e no ug h to be in the same class as a n injury which in v o l v es a substantial risk of de ath, protra cted unconsciousness, pr otrac t ed o r p er m anent disfig ureme nt or the loss or impairment of the use of a bodily member, or g an or mental faculty .” Sims
, 909 S.W .2d at 49. Acc ording ly , the Court modified the def endant’ s conviction to ag g ravated robbe ry . See Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-13- 402(a) (1).

The Defendant now arg ues t hat, l ike t he victim in Sims
, Mr. Spring er did not suffe r fr om the ty p e o f “ e x treme phy s ic a l p a in ” n e c e s s ar y to s u p p o r t a

f in d in g o f “ s e r io u s b o d il y

in ju r y

. ” We disag ree

. The proof at t rial established that the Defenda nt beat the victim severely . Photogra phs of the victim depicting his injuries we re introduc ed at trial and are included in the record on appea l. The vic tim su ff e re d n ume ro us blo ws to h is face, back a ndle g s. He wa s d ra g g e d in su c h a way a s to

cause larg e abr asions on both knees. The victim testified t hat t he pain in his back f rom the beating was “ excruci at i n g, ” and that his injuries wer e “ve ry , very painful.” The victim’s medical re cords from his admission in t o t h e em erge ncy room indicate that the victim’s “lower back pain is a 9 on scale of 1-10.” The victim was a dminist ere d an injection of Tor adol for his pa in. 1

I n addition to the pain that he suffere d, Mr. S pring er testified that he could not use his lef t ey e for a week and a half afte r t he assault. We have no difficulty concluding that the loss of vision from one e y e for over a wee k constitutes a “protra cted loss or substantial impairment of a f unction of a bodily

. . . org an.” Mor eover , the victim also test i fied that his mobilitywas seriouslylimit ed during the seve ral we eks following t h e as s au l t

. This, too, constitut es “the protrac ted loss or substantial impairm en t o f a function of a bodily member,” that is, the victim’s leg s and bac k. Finally
, the vi ctim testified t hat he suffe red permane nt scar ring below his left ey e, and the jury had the opportunity

to view the victim’s fa ce

. A sca r on the fa ce is a n “obvious disfig ureme nt.” See State v. Anthony

D. For ster, No. M2002-0 0 0 0 8 -C CA-R3-CD, 2003 WL 1715922, at *10 (Te nn. Crim. App., Nashville, April 1, 2003).-8-

This Court has previously

rec og n i z ed t h at “[ t ] h e d i s t i n ct i o n b et we en b o d i l y i n j u ryan d s er ious bo dil y inj ury is g e ne ra lly a qu e sti on of fa c t f or the jury to d e te rm ine .” I d. ; se e a lso Sta te v. B arn e s, 954 S.W .2d 760, 765-66 (Te nn. Crim. App. 1997). Her e, we are satisfied that the proof of the vic tim ’s bo dil y

inj urie s is su ff

ic ie nt t o sat isf

y the de fi nit ion of “ se ri ou s” in mor e than o ne re sp e c t. Ac cordingly , we hold that the e vidence is sufficient to support the De fenda nt’s conviction of ag g ravated robbe ry

as cha rg ed, and this issue is there fore without merit.

II. LESSER -I NC LU DE D O F F EN SES I n his nex t issue, the Defenda nt contends that the trial c ourt err ed by failing to char g e the jury

on c e rt a in l e sse r- inc lud e d o ff e ns e s. Spe c if

ic a lly
, he state s that the tr ia l c ou rt e rr on e ou sly faile d to

c h ar g e t h e j u r y o n t h e c r i m e o f c r i m i n a l tr e s p a s s a s a l e s s e r

- i n c l u d e d o f f e n s e o f a g g r a v a t e d b u r g l ar y, and on the c rime of Class E fe lony evading arr est as a le sser-inc luded offe nse of Class D fe lony evading arr est. The State c oncede s that both of these offenses a re “ lesser- includeds,” but a rg ues that
t h e D e f e n d a n ti s n o te n t i t l e d t o r e l i e f o n t h e tr i a l c o u r t ’ s f

a i l u r e t o c h ar g e t h e mt o t h e j u r y.
The que stion of whether

a g iven offe nse should be submitted to the jury as a le sser-inc luded offe nse is a mi x ed question of l aw and fac t. See State v. Rush, 50 S.W .3d 424, 427 (Tenn. 2001)

. Our standa

rd of r eview f

or mix ed questions of law and fa ct is de novo with no pres u m p tion of

corr ectne ss. See id.

Both the U nited States and Tennessee Constit utions require tha t one ac cused of a crime be g iven fair and reasonable notice of the charg es t o be defende d. See U. S. Const. amend. VI ; Tenn. Const. art. I
, § 9; Rush, 50 S.W .3d at 427. Concomitant with this right, a c riminal defe ndant may be c on vic te d o nly

of a c ri me wh ic h is raise d b y

the ind ic tme nt o r wh ic h is a le sse r- inc lud e d o ff

e ns e the re of . Se e Rus h, 50 S.W. 3da t 42 7; s e e a lso Ha g ne r v . U nit e d St a te s, 28 5 U .S. 42 7, 43 1, 52 S.Ct

. 417, 419, 76 L .Ed. 861 (1932). I n order to determine what is a lesser-included of fense of any

g iven ind ic te d o ff

e ns e , w e uti lize the fo rmula se t f orth b y ou r s up re me c ou rt

in S ta te v. B urns :

An offe nse is a lesser -included of fense if:

(a) all of its statutory

elements a

re inc luded within the statutory elements of the offe nse cha rg ed; or (b ) i t f a ils to m e e t th e de fi nit ion in p art (a ) o nly in the re sp e c t th a t it

co n t ai n s a s t at u t o ryel em en to r e l em en t s es t ab l i s h i n g (1) a differ ent m ental st ate indicating a lesser kind of culpability ; and/or (2 ) a le ss s e ri ous harm or

ri sk of ha rm to the sa me person, pr operty

or public intere st; or (c) it consists of (1 ) f a c ili ta tio n of the of

fe ns e c ha rg e d o r o f an o ff

e ns e that otherwise me ets the def inition of lesser-include d offe nse in part ( a) or

(b); orT he St at e a r gu es t hat t he t r i al cour t di d n ot er r i n fai l i ng t o i ns t r uct t he j ur y on cr i mi nal t r es pas s becau s e, at 2

t he t i me of

t he D ef endan t ’ s t r i al
, i t was not y et cl ear t hat cr i mi nal t r es pas s was a l es s er

- i ncl uded offens e of ag gr ava t ed b urgl ary

. T he Stat e b ases i t s argum ent on o ur s up rem e co u rt’s a n a l y si s o f plai n err o r i n T erry

. H ere, be cause t he D e fen d a n t b o th re q u e ste d the ins tru c tio n a t tria l a n d ra ise d the issu e in his m o tio n fo r n e w trial, a p la in e rr o r a n a lysis is i napposi t e. -9-

(2) a n attempt to commit the offense char g ed o r an offe nse that otherw ise meets the de finition of lesserincluded off

ense in pa rt (a) or (b) ; or (3) soli citation to commit the offense char g ed or a n offe nse that otherw ise meets the de finition of lesserincluded off

ense in pa rt (a) or (b)

.

6 S.W .3d 453, 466-67 (Te nn. 1999).

The de termination that an off ense is a “ lesser- included” one under this par ad i gm d o es not automatically

entitle the def

endant to an instruction, howeve r. See id. at 468 (“[t] he mere existence of a lesser offe nse to a char g ed offe nse is not sufficie nt a lone to w arr ant a c harg e on that off ense.” ) Ra the r, the tr ia l c ou rt

mus t c on tin ue its inq uiry wi th t wo mor e qu e sti on s:

F ir st, th e tr ia l c ou rt

mus t de te rm ine wh e the r any e vid e nc e e xists that r e a so na ble minds could acc ept as to the lesser- included offe nse. I n making this determination, the trial court must view the evidenc e liberally in the light most fa vorable to the exis tence of the lesse r-includ ed off ense w ithout making any judgme nts on the

cre dibilit y of such evide nce. Sec ond, the trial court must determine if the e vidence
, viewed in this light
, i s leg ally sufficie nt to support a conviction for the lesserincluded off

ense.

I d. at 469. “I f the trial court finds that the offe nse is le sser-inc luded and the evidenc e would support a convic t i o n fo r t hat offe nse, then it has a duty to instruct the jury

reg arding the lesser -included offe nse.” Rush, 50 S.W.3d at 429.

Criminal tre spass is a lesser- included offe nse of ag g ravated burg lary . See State v. Te rry , 118 S. W. 3 d 3 5 5
, 3 5 9 ( T e n n

. 2 0 0 3 ) ; St a te v

. G e o r g e Re d d
, N o

. W2 0 0 0

- 0 1 6 2 0

- CC A

- R3

- CD
, 2 0 0 1 WL 912718, at *4 (Te nn. Crim. App., J ackson, A ug . 9, 2001). The Def endant filed a written reque st that the jury be charg ed on this offe nse. See Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-18- 110(a) . Neve rtheless, the tria l court de clined to instruct the jury on this crime. The D efe ndant now ar g ues that t he trial c ourt committed reve rsible er

ror in this reg ard.

Our c riminal code pr ovides that “[a] person commits criminal trespass wh o , k n o wi ng the person doe s not have the own er ’s ef fe ct ive conse nt to do so, enters or r emains on prope rty , or a po rt ion the re of .” Te nn . Co de Ann

. § 39-1 4- 40 5( a ). Ce rt a inl y , th e pr oo f a dd uc e d in thi s c a se supported a jury instruction on this off ense. Thus, we have no difficulty in concluding that the trial
court e rre d in refusing to include this jury instruction in its char g e. 2-10-

We review a trial court’s err oneous failure to pr ovide a lesser- included off ense instruc tion

un de r the c on sti tut ion a l ha rm le ss e rr or sta nd ard : that is, in or de r to a vo id re ve rsa l, we m ust determine that the er

ror wa s harmless bey ond a re asonable doubt. See State v. Ely , 48 S.W .3d 710, 72 7 ( Te nn . 2 00 1) . Se e a lso Sta te v. B ow le s, 52 S.W. 3d 69
, 77 (T e nn . 2 00 1) (“ be c a us e a failu re to g ive lesser -included of

fenseins tru ct i o n s i s o f c o n s t i t u t i o n al d i m en s i o n s , i t‘i s “p re s u m ed ” r ev er s i b l e; it will result in reversa l unless the State convince s the re viewing court be y ond a re asonable doubt that the er

ror did not af

fec t the outcome of the trial.’”) I n conducting this inqui ry , “the r eviewing court must determine whether a re asonable jury would have convicted the def endant of the lesser

included off

ense instea d of the c harg ed off ense.” Sta t e v. R ichmond, 90 S.W .3d 648, 662 (Tenn. 2002). That is, “ the revie wing court must de termine whether it a ppear s bey ond a re asonable doubt that the trial court’s failure to instruct on the lesser- included off ense did not affe ct the outcome of
t h e t ri al

. ” Id. “ In m a k i n g t h i s d et er m i n at i o n , a r ev i ew i n g co u rt s h o u l d co n d u ct a t h o ro u gh examination of the rec ord, including the evidenc e pr es en t ed at trial, the def endant’ s theory

of defe nse, and the verdic t returne d by the jury .” State v. Allen, 69 S.W.3d 181, 191 (Tenn. 2002).

The De fenda nt was cha

rg ed in this c ase with a g g ravated burg lary on the basis that he ente red the victim’s habitation with the intent to commit a theft. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-403( a). The Def endant a rg ues that the jury

could have convicted him of criminal trespass instea d of ag g ravated burg lary on a finding “that the State f ailed to establish bey ond a re asonable doubt that [ he] entere d the victim’s motel room intending to steal t he victim ’s property .” Howeve r, the jury convicted the Def endan t n o t o n l y of ag g ravated burg lary , but also of theft. Give n that the jury convicted the Def endant of t h ef

t , we conclude bey ond a re asonable doubt that it would not have convicted the De fe nd a nt o f c ri min a l tr e sp a ss r a the r tha n a g g ra vate d b ur g lary ha d it be e n g ive n th e op po rtun ity to do so. I n other words, we have determined bey ond a reasonable doubt that the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury

on the lesser -included offense of criminal trespass did not aff ect the outcome of the Def endant’ s trial. The De fenda nt is therefor e entitled to no re lief on this issue.

Th e De fe nd a nt a lso c on te nd s th a t th e tr ia l c ou rt c omm itt e d r e ve rsi bl e erro r b y faili ng to char g e the jury

proper ly with respec t to his charg e of Class D felony evading arr est. Our c riminal

c od e pr ov ide s th a t “ [i]t is un la wf ul f or a ny pe rs on , w hil e op e ratin g a mo to r ve hic le on a ny str e e t, road, alley or highw ay in this state, to intentionally flee or attempt to e lude anyl aw en fo rc em ent office r, af ter ha ving r ece ived any

signa l from such off

icer to bring the vehicle to a

stop.” I d. § 39- 16-603(b) (1). Where the fli gh t o r attempt t o elude c reates a risk of de ath or injury to innocent by standers or other third parties, the of fense of eva ding a

rre st is a Class D felony . See id. § 39-16- 60 3( b) (3 ). I f the fl ig ht o r atte mpt to e lud e do e s no t c re a te su c h a ri sk of de a th o r i nju ry , th e of

fe ns e of eva ding ar re s t i s a C lass E felony . See id. The D efe ndant was c harg ed with Class D eva ding

arr est. As re c og nize d b y

the S tat e, Class E e va din g arr e st i s a le sse r- inc lud e d o ff

e ns e of Cla ss D evading arr est. See State v. Ke rry L

. Dowell, No. M2002-00630-CCA-R3-CD, 2003 WL 21486978, at *16 (Te nn. Crim. App., Nashville, June 27, 2003); St ate v. Gr eg ory Dunnorm, No. E2001- 00566- CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL1298770, at *10 (Te nn. Crim. App., Knox ville, J une 12, 2002). The

e vid e nc e in this c a se wa s suc h tha t re a so na ble min ds c ou ld fi nd that the De fe nd a nt c omm itt e d Cl a ss E eva ding a

rre st, and that evidenc e is lega l l y sufficie nt to support a conviction of same

. Ac c or din g ly , th e tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d in faili ng to i ns truc t th e jury on Cla ss Ee va din g arr e st.-11-

Th e Sta te arg ue s th a t, n otw ith sta nd ing the tr ia l c ou rt ’s e rr or , th e De fe nd a nt i s n ot e nti tle d to

re lie f b e c a us e he faile d to ra ise thi s issu e in his mot ion fo r ne w tri a l. Se e Te nn . R. App . P. 3( e ) ( “ in all case s tried by a jury
, no issue prese nted for revie w shall be pre dicated upon e rror in the . . . jury ins truc tio ns g rante d or re fu se d .

. . un le ss the sa me wa s spe c if ic a lly state d in a motio n for a ne w t ri a l; otherwise suc h issues will be treated as waived.” ) The De fenda nt responds that we should review the t ri al co urt’s er

ror unde r the doc trine of “ plain err or.” See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 52(b) (“A n err or which has affe cted the substantial rig hts of an acc used m ay be noti ced at any time, even thoug h not

raise d in the mot ion fo r a

ne w t ri a l or as sig ne d as er

ro r on ap pe a l, in the dis c re tio n o f the app e llate court whe re ne cessa

ry to do substantial just ice.” )

I n o rd e r t o f

indplain e rr or , w e mus t c on sid e r f ive fa c tor s: (a) the re cord must clea

rly establish what occurre d in the t rial court; (b) a c lear and unequivoca l ru l e o f law must have been br eac hed; c) a substantial rig ht of the

acc used must have be en adversely aff ecte d; (d) the a ccuse d [m ust not have wa ived] the issue for ta ctical r easons; and ( e) c onsideration of the err or [m ust be] “nece ssary to do substantial just ice.”

Sta te v. Ad kis so n, 89 9 S. W.2 d 6 26 , 6 41 -4 2 ( Te nn . Crim . App . 1 99 4) . T akin g the se fa c tor s in sequen c e , th e re c or d, wh ic h c on ta ins a tr a ns c ri pti on of

the tr ia l c ou rt ’s c ha

rg e to the jury , c le arl y establishes that the trial c ourt did not charg e the jury on the l esser -included offense of C lass E felony evading arr est. Second, the failure to char g e a jury with all lesser-inc luded offe nses re quired unde r the e vid e nc e br e a c he s a

c le ar andun e qu ivo c a l rule of la w. Th ir d, a

c ri min a lly

a c c us e d’ s r ig ht t o ha ve the jury

c ha rg e d o n a ll le sse r- inc lud e d of fe ns e s e mbr a c e d b y

the e vid e nc e is a

c on sti tut ion a lly protec ted rig ht, and is adver sely aff ecte d when the jury

is not given the opportunity to convict on a lesser r ather

than on a g reater off

ense. F ourth, the re cord is de v o i d o f an yevidenc e that the Def endant waived his rig ht to a complete jury instruction for tactical re asons. Fif th, we conside r the trial court’ s infring ement on the Defenda nt’s rig ht to a complete jury char g e to be suff

iciently serious as to requir e our r eview in or der to do substantial justice. Ac cording ly , we will re view the tria l

c ou rt ’s e rr or

in this re g ard in sp ite of the De fe nd a nt’ s failu re to raise it i n h is m oti on fo r n e w t ri a l.

We h a ve a lr e a dy

c on c lud e d th a t th e tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d in faili ng to i ns truc t th e jury on Cla ss E felony evading arr est. We must now determine whe ther t h at er ro r was harmless bey ond a

rea sonable doubt. We conc lude that it was not.

Of fi c e r B ish op te sti fi e d th a t, af te r he turne d on his blu e lig hts wh ile fo llo wi ng the De fe nd a nt, the Def endant turne d onto a city

street a nd “ac cele rate d away ,” re aching speeds of “up to may

be 60 miles an hour.” O ffice r B ishop stated that the Def endant “ ran throug h at least one four- way stop,” and that he c onsidered te rminating the pursuit beca use “i t h ad b ee n raining heavily and the r oads

wer e extremely

wet and it wa s very

dang erous to be c hasing him and he wasn’t, ha d no reg ard f or the public at lar g e at a ll.” Offic er B ishop continued his description of the c hase:

We g ot t o G a llatin Pik e , h e we nt rig ht thr ou gh a re d li g ht a c ro ss G a llatin Pike, didn’t slow down. Nearly hit a car driving up Gallatin. We crosse d Gallatin,-12-

he hit a cur

b on the fa

r side and w hen he hit th e cu rb
, t h e right fr ont rea r, the tire completely

came off the vehicle. He went down on three whee ls, ke pt on driving on
t h re e w h ee l s

. W e c h as ed h i mfo r a p p ro x i m at el y an o t h erm i l e. H e w en tt h ro u gh another four- way stop there . . . .

Offic er B ishop stated later that, in c onjunction w ith his running the re d light ac ross Gallatin Pike, the Def endant “ nearly

killed” someone.

Th is t e sti mon y

c e rt a inl y of fe re d s u f f i c i e n t pr oo f f

or the jury to c on vic t th e De fe nd a nt o f C la ss D fe lony evading arr est. Moreove r, this proof wa s uncontroverted. Howe ver, our supreme c ourt has made c lear

that

[t ]he trial court must provide an instruc tion on a lesser- included off ense supported by the e vid e nc e e ve n if

su c h in str

uc tio n is no t c on sis te nt w ith the the ory of the Sta te or of the defe nse. The evidence , not the theories of the parties, controls whethe r an instruction is required.

Al le n, 69 S.W. 3da t 18 7- 88 . T he Cou rt c on tin ue d:

T h e ju r y i s n o t r e q u i r e d t o b e l i e v e a n y e v i d e n c e o f f e r e d b y t h e S t a t e

. . . . We there fore cannot a g ree that the dec ision to convic t on a lesser- included off

ense ma y be take n away

from the jury

whene ver pr oof supporting the eleme nt disti ng uishing the g re a te r o ff

e ns e fr om the le sse r of

fe ns e is u nc on tr ov e rt e d. As we state d in B urns , “the jury , not the judge , perf orms the func tion of fac t-finder .”

I d. at 189.

Th e jury in this c a se wa s g ive n n o o pp ortun ity to de te rm ine that th e De fe nd a nt e va de d a rr e st in a manner

that did not create a risk of death or i n j u ryto third parties. Althoug h three witnesses—Off

icer Bishop, Ms. Frierson and the Def endant himself—testified that the Def endant fled fr om the police, only one witne s s t es t i fi ed as to the a lleg ed dang ers the D efe ndant there by

c re a te d. Ye t, the j ury

wa s g ive n n o o pp ortun ity to b e lie ve the te sti mon y abo ut the c ha se wh ile reje cting the testimony

about t he alleg ed dang ers. F urther, unlike the Def endant’ s conviction of ag g ravated burg lary

which is supported by

the independe nt conviction of theft, the jury ’s ver dict contains no sepa

rate indication that it acc epted Office r Bishop’s testimony about the risks cr eate d by the Def endant’ s flig ht. To the contra ry , the jury ’s verdic t c ontains a clea r indication that it found Of fi c e r B ish op le ss tha n o ne hu nd re d p e rc e nt c re dib le . T he De fe nd a nt w a s c ha rg e d in thi s c a se wi th

re sis tin g arr e st. Of

fi c e r B ish op te sti fi e d that, a ft e r he a nd his a ssi sti ng of fi c e r c aug ht the De fe nd a nt, they “still had to fight him to the g round. Fig ht him in the handcuffs and he resisted being led bac k to [ the] patrol car .” The only other testimony

on this iss ue wa s the Def endan t’s. The De fenda nt denied that he foug ht or wrestled with Offic er Bishop. The jury acquitted the Def endant of resisting

arr e st, app are ntl y

a c c redi ti ng the De fe nd a nt’ s te sti mon y on thi s matte r o ve r O ff ic e r B ish op ’s

. Th e re fo re , we are un able to c on c lud e be y on d a re a so na ble do ub t th a t th e tr ia l c ou rt ’s failu re to instruct on the offe nse of Class E felony evading arr est did not affe ct the outcome of the Def endant’ s-13-

trial. Acc ording ly , we must reve rse the Def endant’ s conviction of Class D felony evading arr est and

re ma ndthi s c ha

rg e fo r a ne w t ri a l.

III . I M P EA CH M EN T BY P RI ORCO NV IC TIO N I n h is thir d is su e , th e De fe nd a nt a sse rt s th a t th e tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d b y perm it ti ng th e Sta te to impeach him with proof of a 1996 convic tion for attempted espec ially ag g ravated robbery

. Rule 609 of ou r Rul e s of Ev ide nc e g ov e rn s the a dmi ssi bil ity of prior c on vic tio ns fo r i mpe a c hme nt p ur po se s. I n pertinent pa

rt, the R ule provides that, prior to the accused taking the witness stand, the trial court

“ up on re qu e st m us t de te rm ine that th e c on vic tio n’ s p robat iv e va lue on c re dib ili ty ou tw e ig hs its

un fair pr e jud ic ia l e ff

e c t on the su bs ta nti ve iss ue s. ” Te nn . R. Ev id. 60 9( a )( 3) . With r e sp e c t to thi s provision, our supreme court instructs us that,

[i ]n determining whe ther the pr obative value of a conviction on the issue of

cre dibilit y

outweig hs its unfair pre

judicial eff

ect upon the substantive issues, two criteria ar e espe cially

relev an t

. A t rial court should first analy ze the rele vance the impeaching conviction has to the issue of cre dibilit y

. Trial courts should ex plain on
t h e r e c o r d h o w t h e i m p e a c h i n g c o n v i c t i o n i s r e l e v a n tt o t h e d e f e n d a n t ’ s c r e d i b i l i t y. I f the c on vic tio n is pr ob a tiv e of th e de fe nd a nt’ s c re dib ili ty , th e tr ia l c ou rt sh ou ld secondly “asse ss the simil arity

betwee n the crime on trial and the crime under ly ing the impeac hing c onviction.” When an im peac hing c onviction is subst antially simil ar to the c ri me fo r w hic h th e de fe nd a nt i s b e ing tr ie d, the re is a da ng e r that ju ro rs wi ll

err oneously

utiliz e the i m p eaching conviction as prope nsityevidenc e of g uilt and

c on c lud e that si nc e the de fe nd a nt c omm itt e d a sim ila r o ff e ns e , h e or

sh e is p ro ba

bly g uiltyof the off

ense c harg ed. Ac cording ly
, t h e unfairly prejudicia l effe ct of a n impeaching conviction on the s ubstantive issues g reatly incre ases if the impeaching conviction is substantiallysimil ar to the c rime for which the def endant is being tried. There fore , trial courts should caref ully balanc e the probative value of the impeaching

c on vic tio n on c re dib ili ty a g a ins t its un fair ly pr e jud ic ia l e ff

e c t on su bs ta nti ve iss ue s.

Sta te v. Mixon , 983 S.W. 2d 66 1, 67 4 (T e nn . 199 9) (c itatio ns omi tte d)

. Ou r s up re me c ou rt ha s a lso

re c og nize d th a t r ob be ry

is a c ri me inv olv ing dis ho ne sty that ma y be us e d fo r i mpe a c hme nt p ur po se s. See State v. Ga lmore, 994 S.W.2d 120, 122 (Tenn. 1999). Moreover, “ the fa ct that a prior

c on vic tio n in vo lve s a

sim ila r c ri me fo r w hic h th e de fe nd a nt i s b e ing tr ie d d oe s n ot a uto ma tic a lly require its ex clusion.” State v. B levins, 968 S.W .2d 888, 893 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997)

.

I n this case, the trial court fir st determined that c redibility was a key issue becau s e the Def endant c laimed during opening statement that other pe rsons had be at the victim. The c ourt then de te rm ine d th a t “ the pr ob a tiv e va lue of the [pr ior ] c on vic tio n wi th re g ard to c re dib ili ty

. . . w ou ld outweig h the pre

judicial eff

ect.” Acc ording ly
, the trial court rule d that the State would be a llowed to impeach the D efe ndant with proof of his 1996 conviction for a ttempted espec ially ag g ravated

ro bb e ry . We re vie w thi s de c isi on by the tr ia l c ou rt un de r a n abu se of dis c re tio n sta nd ard

. Se e Sta te v. Waller, 118 S.W .3d 368, 371 (Tenn. 2003)

.-14-

The trial c ourt’s ruling contains an implied finding that the Def endant’ s prior convic tion of attempted espe cially

ag g ravated robbery was highly rele vant as to his cre dibilit y

. We ag ree with the trial court in this reg ard. A s set forth above , robbery offe nses involve dishonesty and ar e ther efor e probative of

the per petrator’s cr edibility . See S tate v. Stout, 46 S.W .3d 689 app. at 716 (Tenn. 2001) (n oti ng that th e tr ia l c ou rt , in makin g a Rul e 60 9 r uli ng , “ c or

re c tly de te rm ine d th a t e sp e c ia lly ag g r a v a te d r o b b e ry

is a c r im e o f

d is h o n e s ty , a n d is th e r e f o r e p r o b a ti v e o f

th e d e f e n dant’s

cre dibil i t y

. ”) As pointed out by the Def endant, the trial judge then simplyconclude d that the probative va lue of the prior conviction out weig hed it s prejudicia l effe ct, without expl icitly assessing the similarity

betwee n the prior conviction and the crime for which the De fenda nt was being tried, and without setting forth on the rec ord the balanc ing proce ss he utiliz ed or the rea sons underpinning his conclusion.

Th e re is, ob vio us ly , a hig h de g re e of sim ila ri ty be tw e e n th e c ri me s o f atte mpt e d e sp e c ia lly ag g ravated robbe ry

and ag g ravated robbery , the crime for whic h the Def endant wa s being tried. Thus, the risk of the juror s using the prior conviction as pr opensity evidenc e wa s highe r than if the De fe nd a nt h a d b e e n p re vio us ly c on vic te d o f, fo r i ns ta nc e , f ra ud . N e ve rthe le ss, we de c lin e to h old that the trial c o u rt abused its discre tion by allowing the Def

endant to be impea ched w ith his prior conviction. This Court has previously found no abuse of discre tion where the trial court admitted evidenc e of prior convictions for simil ar crimes wher e the acc used made his cr edibilityan important issue by deny ing any

wrong doing and asserting leg itimate conduct. See B levins, 968 S.W .2d at 893. I n this case, the D efe ndant claimed both that he did not beat the victim, and that he ha d the victim’s property under a claim of rig ht. The Def

endant put his cre dibilit y square ly on the line by deny ing that he ha d co mmi tte d the c ri me s w ith wh ic h h e wa s c ha rg e d, a ndhis prior

c on vic tio n w a s h ig hly indic a ti v e o f h is w il li n g n e s s to e n g a g e in d is h o n e s t b e h a v io r

. A c c o r d in g ly
, w h il e th e tr ial court should have set f

orth the rea sons f

or its ruling with mor e car e and e x plicitness, we hold that the trial

c ou rt didno t a bu se its dis c re tio n in a llo wi ng the Sta te to i mpe a c h the De fe nd a nt w ith pr oo f o f h is 19 96 c on vic tio n f

or a tte mpt e d e sp e c ia lly

a g g ra vate d r ob be ry . T his iss ue is w ith ou t me ri t.

The De fenda nt also complains that the trial court did not instruct the jury that proof of

the D e f e n d a n t ’ s p r i o r

c o n v i c t i o n w a s t o b e c o n s i d e r e d o n l y f o r i t s i m p a c to n t h e D e f

e n d a n t ’ s c r e d i b i l i t y. H o w e v e r , t h e D e f

e n d a n tm a d e n o c o m p l a i n t ab o u t t h i s o m i s s i o n a t tr i a l

. T h i s i s s u e i s , a c c o r d i n g l y, waived. See Tenn. R. A pp. P. 36(a) ( “Nothing in this rule shall be construe d as re quiring relief be g rante d to a

pa rt y re sp on sib le fo r an e rr or

or wh o f a ile d to take wh a te ve r a c tio n was re a so na bly available to preve nt or nullify the harmful eff

ect of an er ror.” )

IV. SENTE NCING Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Def endant to twenty -five y ear s for the c arja cking off

en s e; “life” for

the ag g ravated robbe ry ; twelve y ear s for the a g g ravated bu rg lary ; f

ive y e ars fo r the the ft ; te n y e ars fo r the Cla ss D fe lon y e va din g arr e st; a nde le ve n mo nth s, twenty -nine da y s for the Class A misdemeanor eva ding a rre st. The sente nces f

or the fir st three of
t h e s e c r i m e s w e r e o r d e r e d t o b e s e r v e d c o n s e c u t i v e l y, f o r a n e f f e c t i v e s e n t e n c e o f “ l i f

e ” p l u s t h i r t yseven y ear s. Both the State and the Def endant have appealed aspec ts of the De fenda nt’s sentenc e.-15-

A. Re pe at

vio le nt offe nde rst at us. We will first address that portion of t he Defenda nt’s sentenc e which ha s been a ppeale d by both pa rties: the trial court’s imposit ion of a “life” sentenc e for the ag g ravated robbe ry

conviction. Th e De fe nd a nt c on te nd s th a t he sh ou ld not be se nte nc e d to any fo rm of a “ lif e ” se nte nc e . T he Sta te

asserts that this s entenc e is void and illeg al bec ause it direc tly contra venes a

statutory require ment that the Def

endant be sentenc ed to “life without the pos sibili ty of par ole” f

or his ag g ravated robbe ry

c on vic tio n. Th e Sta te re lie s o n T e nn e sse e Cod e Annot ate d section 4 0- 35 -1 20 , w hic h d e a ls w ith repe at violent offe nders. Ac cording to that provisio n o f o ur criminal code, a “ repe at violent of fe nd e r” inc lud e s a

de fe nd a nt wh o h a s b e e n c on vic te d o f a g g ra vate d r ob be ry , a ndwh o h a s a t le a st two prior convic tions that are classified as violent of fense s. See Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 120(a)
, (b)( 1)(I ). At the De fenda n t ’s s entenc ing he aring , the State introduce d certified copies of a 1986 jud g me nt o f c on vic t i o na g ai n s t the De fe nd a nt f

or ra pe ; a se c on d 1 98 6 ju dg me nt o f c on vic tio n a g a ins t the Def endant for ra

pe; and a 1996 judgme nt of conviction ag ainst the Def endant f or attempted espec ially ag g ravated robbe ry . Rape a nd attempted espe cially ag g ravated robbe ry

are both classified as violent offe nses for the purposes of determining repe at violent of fende r status. See id. § 40-35- 120(b)( 1)(D) , (J). According ly , the State ar g ues, the De fenda nt s at i s fi es the de finition of “re peat violent offende r.” A s such, the State conte nds, the t ri al court was statutorily require d to sentence the Def end a nt f or his a g g ra vate d r ob be ry

c on vic tio n “ to i mpriso nme nt f or lif e wi tho ut p os sib ili ty of par ole.” I d. § 40-35-120( g ).

Following the trial court’s imposit ion of a “ life” se ntence for the D efe ndant’s ag g rav ated robbery conviction, the State filed a motion “to co rre ct void and illeg al sentenc e” ba sed upon the

abo ve re a so nin g . T he tr ia l c ou rt de nie d th e Sta te ’s mot ion , f ind ing it

ha s n e ve r f

ou nd that the de fe nd a nt i s a re pe a t vi ole nt o ff

e nd e r b y [sic ] a r e a so na

ble doubt as re q uired unde r T.C.A. 40-35- 120(g ), and thus is not require d to sentence him to lif e wi tho ut the po ssi bil ity

of pa ro le . F urthe rm or e , th e de fe nd a nt i s f a c e d w ith an ef fec tive sentenc e of life plus 37 y ear s. He is almost 37 y ear s old at the prese nt time, thus making the diff ere nce be tween a

life sentenc e and a

sentenc e of life wi tho ut thepo ssi bil ity

of pa ro le inc on se qu e nti a l.

I n this Court, the State contends that, in so ruling the trial court a bused its discretion. The D efe ndant responds that, be cause the trial court failed to find him to be a r epeat v i o l en t o ff en d er, he is not subject t o any sort of “life ” sente nce, but must be sente nced w ithin his appropriate ra ng e, which he

asserts is R ang e I I , multipl e off ender . This status would subject th e De fe n d ant t o a sente nce of betwee n twelve and twenty y ear s for the Class B felony of ag g ravated robbery

. See Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35-112( b)(2)

.

I nitially , we note that the disputed section of our criminal code pr ovides that a trial c ourt’s finding of whe ther a

defe ndant is or is not a repe at violent of fende r is appea lable by

either pa rty . See id. § 40- 35-120(h)

. Clearly
, then, this Court has the authority to de termine the Def endant’ s status notw ith s tan d in g th e tria l c o u r t’ s p r e v io u s f a il u r e to f

in d b e y o n d a r e a s o n ab le d o u b t th at the Def endant is a r epeat violent offende r.-16-

The State introduce d certified copies of the Def en d ant’s prior violent f

elonies at the
sentenc ing he aring . The De fenda nt did not object to th is proof; moreove r, def ense c ounsel stated
on two occa sions that the defe nse would not be putt ing on any rebuttal proof . As a re sult, the St ate’ s evidenc e of t h e De fenda nt’s repe at violent offe nder status wa s uncontroverted and more than sufficie nt to support a finding bey ond a re as o n able doubt that the Defe ndant is a re peat violent of fe nd e r a s d e fi ne d in th e rel evant statut ory pr ov isi on . A s su c h, the tr ia l c ou rt wa s r e qu ir e d to impose a sentenc e of life imp ri sonment without the possibi lityof par ole as to the De fenda nt’s ag g ravated robbe ry

conviction. The tria l court erred in failing to do so, and we there fore modify the Def endant’ s sentence for his ag g ravated robbe ry convicti o n to life imprisonment without t he possibili ty

of par ole.

B. Length of

sentence s The De fenda nt also complains that his r emaining sentenc es are too long as a r esult of the trial court’s misapplication of enhanc ement fa ct o rs

. Be fore a trial c ourt imposes a sentenc e upon a

conv i cted c riminal defe ndant, it must consider (a) the evidenc e adduc ed at the trial and the

se nte nc ing he ari ng ; (b) the pr e se nte nc e re po rt ; (c ) the princ ipl e s of se nte nc ing a nd arg ume nts a s to sentenc ing a lternatives; (d) the nature and cha rac teristics of the c riminal cond u ct i n v o l ved; (e )

e vid e nc e a ndinf

orma tio n o ff

e re d b y the pa rt ie s o n th e e nh a nc e me nt andmit ig a tin g fa c tor s se t f orth in Tennesse e Code Annotated s ections 40-35- 113 and 40-35- 114; and (f) any statement the defe ndant wishes to make in the def endant’ s own beha lf about sentenc ing. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210( b); State v. I mfeld, 70 S.W .3d 698, 704 (Tenn. 2002). To fa cilitate appe llate re view, the trial court is re quired to pl ace on the record its rea sons for impos ing the specific sentenc e, including the identification of the mitigating and enhanc ement fac tors found, the spec ific fa cts supporting eac h enhanc ement factor found, and the method by which the mitigating a nd enhanc ement fa ctors have been e valuated and balanc ed in determining the se ntence . See State v. Samuels, 44 S .W.3d 489, 492 (Tenn. 2001)

. Upon a c halleng e to t he sente nce imposed, this court has a duty to conduct a de novo revie w of the sente nce with a presumption that the determinations made by the trial court are corr ect. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-401(d) . Howeve r, this presumption “is conditioned upon the af firmative sh ow ing in the re c or d th a t the tr ia l c ou rt c on sid e re d th e se nte nc ing princ ipl e s a nda ll r e le va nt f a c ts and cir cumstance s.” State v. Ashby
, 823 S.W .2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991) . I f our r eview r efle cts that the trial court followed the statutory sentenc ing pr ocedur e, that the c ourt imposed a lawf ul sentence afte r having g iven due consideration a nd proper weig ht to the fac tors and principles set out u n d er the sentenc ing la w, and that the t rial court’s finding s of fact ar e ade quately supported by

the re cord, then t he pre s u mp ti o n is ap p li c ab le
, a n d w e may n o t m o d if

y th e s e n te n c e e v e n if

w e w o u ldhave pref err ed a dif

fer ent re sult. S ee State v. Fletc her, 805 S.W .2d 785, 789 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991)

. We will uphold t he sente nce imposed by the trial court if (1) the sentenc e complies with the purposes and princ iples of the 1989 Sentencing Act, and ( 2) the trial c ourt’s finding s are adequately supported by the re cord. See State v. Arne tt, 49 S.W .3d 250, 257 (Tenn. 2001) . The burde n of showing that
a sente nce is improper

is upon the appea ling pa

rty . See Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401 Sentencing Commi ssion Com ments; Arnett, 49 S.W.3d at 257.T h e D e fen d a n t d o e s n o t co m p la in a b o u t his m isd e m e a n o r se n te n c e a n d w e the re fo re ne e d no t ad d re ss it. 3 -17- Whil e not re lied upon by the Def endant, we are compelled to addr es s t h is issue in li g ht of the Un ite d Stat e s Supr e me Cou rt ’s re c e nt opi nio n in B lake ly v. Was hin g ton , 542 U. S. , 12 4 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). In Blakely , the hig h court struck down a provision of the Washington state sente ncing g uidelines, quite similar to the one in Tenne ssee, t h at p er m i t ted the trial judg e to impose an “e x ceptional sentence ” af ter the c ourt made a

post-trial determination that certa in statutory enhanc ement fa ctors existed. The Supreme Court de termined that, other than upon t he basis of a defe ndant’s prior convictions, the protections in the S ix th Amendment to the fe dera l constituti on allow a de fenda nt’s sentenc e to be incre ased by the trial court only wher e the e nhance ment fac tors

are based on f

acts ref lected in the jury

verdic t or admitted by

the def endant. See id., 124 S.C t. at 2537. T h e C ourt conc luded that “e very defe ndant has the right to insist that the prosecutor prove to a jury a ll fa c ts l e g a lly

e sse nti a l to the pu nis hme nt. ” I d. , a t 25 43 . T he B lake ly de c isi on c a lls int o qu e sti on the va lid ity of Te nn e sse e ’s se nte nc ing statut e s, ins of ar a s the y pe rm it tri a l c ou rt s to inc re a se a def endant’ s presumptive sentenc e base d upon enhanc ement fa ctors found b y a t ri al j udg e as opposed to finding s made by a jury

.

We turn now to the Def

endant’ s specific felony sentenc es. As to the Def endant’ s car

jacking 3 conviction, we f

irst note t hat there is significa nt confusion in the re cord c oncer ning the Def

endant’ s sentenc e for this off

ense. The prosec uting attorney repr esente d to the trial court that the D efe ndant

was a “multiple offende r” a s to this offe nse on the basis of his prior convictions. See Te nn. Code An n. § 40 -3 5- 10 6( a )( 1) . In th is, the a ssi sta nt d ist ri c t a tto rn e y

wa s mi sta

ke n. Carj a c kin g is a

Cla ss B felony

. See id. § 39-13-404( b). The Def endant has three prior Class B felony convictions: two rape s and one attempted espec ially ag g ravated robbery

. See id. §§ 40-35-118; 39- 13-403(b) ; 39-12- 10 7( a ). A c ri min a l de fe nd a nt b e ing se nte nc e d f or a Cla ss B fe lon y

wh o h a s th re e prior

Cla ss B felony convictions is a “pe rsistent offe nder.” See id. § 40-35-107( a)( 2); S t ate v. Blouvet, 965 S.W. 2d48 9, 49 4 (T e nn

. Cr im. Ap p. 19 97 ). A p e rs ist e nt o ff e nd e r “ sh a ll r e c e ive a

se nte nc e wi thi n Ra ng e I I I .” Se e Te nn . Co de An n. § 4 0- 35 -1 07 (c ). Th e Ra ng e I I I se nte nc e fo r a

Cla ss B fe lon y

is twenty to thirty y ear s, see id. § 40-35-112( c), and the presumptive sentenceis the minim um in the rang e. See id. § 40- 35-210(c ).

During the sentenc ing he aring , the trial judg e initially stated that h e wa s s entencing the Def endant a s a per sistent offende r to twe nty -five y ear s for the c arja cking offe nse. The pr osecuting attorney then told the court that the Def endant was a multipl e, Rang e I I offe nder, a nd the trial court then re vised the De fenda nt’s sentenc e to fiftee n y ear s at thirty -five pe rce nt: a Rang e I I sentenc e. See id. § 40-35-112( b)(2)

. Neve rtheless, the written j udg ment enter ed ag ainst the Def endant on the

c arj a c kin g of

fe ns e ind ic a te s th a t he wa s se nte nc e d to tw e nty -fi ve y e ars a t th irty -f ive pe rc e nt a s a “multiple” offe nder.

As se t f orth a bo ve , th e De fe nd a nt i s p ro pe rl y c la ssi fi e d a s a

“ pe rs ist e nt” of

fe nd e r a s to his

c arj a c kin g c on vic tio n. He is the re fo re su bje c t to a se nte nc e of

tw e nty y e ars , e nh a nc e d a s a

pp ro pr ia te up to the maxi mum of thirty y ear s. See id. § 40-35-210( d). The trial court found that two enhanc ement fa ctors apply : the Def endant’ s “pre vious history of criminal convictions or criminal behavior in a ddition to those nece ssary to e stablish the appropriate rang e,” and his “pre vious historyT he cert i f i ed co p y of t he judgm ent of t hi s co nvi ct i o n pro vi d es t hat t he D efend ant was s ent enced t o el even y ears 4
in t h e D e p a rtm e n t o f C o rr e c tio n o n F e b ru a ry 2
, 1 9 9 6
, a n d w a s a c c o rd e d a p p ro x im a te ly six m o n ths o f p re tria l ja il c re d it. T h e i n s t an t of

fen s es w er e commi t t ed i n M ar ch 2002, l on g be for e t h e D ef en dan t ’ s s en t en ce e x pi r ed.

-18- of unwillingne ss to comply with the conditions of a sentenc e involving r elea se in the community .” I d. § 40-35-114( 2), (9). Wit h respe ct t o fac tor (2), the Def endant’ s criminal convictions other than those nec essary

to establish hi s ra n ge co nsist of the fraudulent use of a cre dit card, two c ounts of

u n law f u l posse ssion of a we apon, and nume rous misdemeanor s. The De fenda nt also admitted at trial that he had eng ag ed in dr

ug traff icking

. The trial court made no finding s with respec t to the amount of we ight it ac corde d this enhance ment fac tor.

Wit h respe ct to fac tor (9), th e De fe n d ant ar g ues that the trial c ourt misapplied this factor under this Court’s opinion in St ate v. Hay es, 899 S.W.2d 175 (Tenn. Crim. App

. 1 9 9 5). We find it unnecessa

ry to addre ss this contention because the re cord de monstrates bey ond a re asonable doubt that the Def

endant c ommitt ed the instant off enses while on pa

role fr om his sentenc e for his 1996 attempted espe cially

ag g ravated robbe ry

conviction. Ac co rd i n gl y , the trial court should have

4 applied this fac tor to enhanc e the De fenda nt’s sentenc e. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 114(14)( B)

.

We rec og nize, of course , th at t h e ap plication of this fac tor might be cause for a finding of

err or under

Blakely , becaus e i t i s based on f acts ne ither found by

the jury nor admitted by

the Def endant. How ever , this Court has previously held that Bl ak ely

violations are subjec t to a constitutional harmless err or ana ly sis. See S t at e v

. C h ester Wayne Walters, No. M2003-03019- CCA-R3-CD, 2004 WL

2726034, at *24 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashvill e, Nov. 30, 2004). That is, a court’s application of a n enhanc ement fa ctor may stand, eve n when it is based on f acts not found by the jury or admitted by the defendant, where we are convinced bey ond a reasonable doubt that a jury would have f

ound the ex istence of the enhanceme nt fac tor, had it been presente d with the proof of same. He re, we have no difficulty in concluding bey ond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have conclude d that the Def

endant committed the instant offense s while on parole . The e vidence of the Def endant’ s prior convic tion and sentenc e wa s uncontr o v e r te d an d p r o v e s b e y o n d

a r e a s onable doubt that th e De fe nd a nt w a s o n pa ro le a t the tim e he c omm itt e d the ins ta nt c ri me s. Ap pli c a tio n o f this fac tor there fore entitles the Def endant to no re lief.

Acc ording ly , the Def

endant’ s sentenc e for

car jacking was prope rly

enhanc ed on the ba sis of
tw o f a c tor s. Th e tr ia l cou rt fo un d no mi tig a tin g fa c tor s, a ndthe De fe nd a nt d oe s n ot a rg ue e rr or in this reg ard. We find that the D ef en d an t’s midrang e sente nce f or this offense is appropriate under the c ir c ums ta nc e s. Ac c or din g ly , w e a ff ir m th e De fe nd a nt’ s tw e nty -f ive y e ar se nte nc e fo r h is

car jacking conviction. We further rema nd this matter to the trial court to correc t the judgme nt ref lecting the Def

endant’ s car

jacking conviction s o as t o indicate that the D efe ndant is a per sistent offe nder w ith a rele ase e ligibility of forty -five pe rce nt.

We turn n ow to the De fe nd a nt’ s se nte nc e fo r a g g ra vate d b ur g lary . A g g ra vate d b ur g lary is

a Cla ss C fe lon y . Se e Te nn . Co de An n. § 39- 14 -4 03 (b ). B a se d on all of his prior fe lon y c on vic tio ns , the Def endant is a “per sistent of

fende r” with r espec t to this off ense, see id. § 40-35- 107(a) (1), a nd is the r e f o r e s u b je c t to a Ra n g e I I I s e n te n c e

. Se e id

. § 4 0

- 3 5

- 1 0 7 ( c )

. T h e Ra n g e I I I s e n te n c e f or aT h e D ef en dan t h as a t ot al of

s i x pr i or f

el on i es : on e f

r au du l en t u s e o f

a c redit c ar d, t wo u n l aw f u l w ea pon 5

p o ss ess i o ns, t wo rapes, a n d on e at t em p t ed especial l y aggravat ed rob b ery

. H o wever, be cause t he t wo weap o n po ss ess i o ns

o c c u rr e d o n the sa m e d a y, t h e se two c o n v ic tio n s a r e c o u n te d a s o n e fo r p u rp o se s o f d e te rm inin g the D e fen d a n t’s
sent enci ng s t at us. See T enn. C o d e A nn. § 4 0

- 3 5

- 1 0 7 (b)(4).

-19- Class C felony

is ten t o fi ft ee n y ear s. See id. § 40-35-112( c)( 3). The trial court sente nced the Def endant f or this c rime to a term of twelve y ear s, using the sa me enha nceme nt fac tors as it applied to the car j ac k i n g offe nse. The pr esumptive sentenc e for a Class C felony

is the minim um in the rang e, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210( c), in this case , ten y ear s. The pre sumptive sentence may be incr ease d as appr opriate upon a finding of applica

ble e n hance ment fac tors. See id. § 40-35- 20 1( d) . He re , altho ug h all of the De fe nd a nt’ s pri or fe lon y c on vic tio ns are ne c e ssa

ry to e sta bli sh his 5
rang e st atus of persistent offe nder, see id. § 40-35-107( a)( 1), further enhance ment of hi s sentence i s ap p ro p ri at e o n t h e basis of h i s n u m er o u s p re v i o u s m i s d em ea n o rs an d h i s ad m i t t ed d ru g tra ff i ck i n g. En ha nc e me nt o n th e ba sis of his pa ro le status a t th e tim e he c omm itt e d th e of fen se is a lso appropriate. A two y ear incre ase over the minimum sentenc e is, we hold, a proper enhanc ement on the basis of two en h ance ment fac tors and no mitigating f actor s. Acc ording ly , we a ffirm the Def endant’ s sentence for his ag g ravated burg lary conviction.

The Def endant was also convicted of theft over $500 and under $1000, a Class E fe lony . See id. § 39-14-105(2) . Wit h respe ct to this conviction, the Defe ndant is also a per sistent offende r. See id. § 40-35-107(a )(1) . The Rang e I I I sentenc e for a Class E felony is f our to six y ear s. See id. § 40- 35 -1 12 (c )( 5)

. Th e tr ia l c ou rt imp os e d a

mid rang e se nte nc e of

fi ve y e ars , a

pp a re ntl y re ly ing a g a in

o n e n h a n c e m e n tf

a c t o r s ( 2 ) a n d ( 9 )

. A s w i t h t h e D e f e n d a n t ’ s c o n v i c t i o n f

o r a g g r a v a t e d b u r g l ar y, all of his pr evious felony convictions are nece ssary to e stablish his status a s a persi s t en t o ff en der with respe ct to his theft conviction. Some further enhanc ement on that basis is appropriate base d

on his oth e r crimi na l histo ry

. F urthe r, e nh a nc e me nt on the ba sis of the De fe nd a nt’ s sta tus a t the tim e he committed the crime is also appropriate. We there fore aff irm the Def

endant’ s mid-rang e sente nce for his theft c onviction.

Be cause we ha ve re verse d and re manded for r etrial the D efe ndant’s Class D fe lony evading

arr est conviction, we need not a ddress the se ntence he re ceive d for that of fense

.

3. Co nse c ut ivese nt e nc ing Finally , the Defenda nt complains that the trial court erre d in ordering partially consec utive
sentenc es. The trial court orde red the Def endant’ s sentence s fo r h i s car jacking and ag g ravated burg lary convictions to run conse cutively t o ea ch other a nd to the sentenc e for his ag g ravated robbery conviction on the basis of the following five statutory criteria:

[a] [t ]he defendant is a p rofe ssional criminal who has knowing ly devoted suc h defe ndant’s life to c riminal acts as a major sourc e of livelihood; [b] [t ]he defendant is an offe nder w hose re cord of criminal ac tivityis ex tensive; [ c ] [ t ] h e d e f

e n d a n ti s a

d a n g e r o u s m e n t a l l y ab n o r m a l p e r s o n s o d e c l ar e d b y a

c omp e te nt p sy c hiatr ist

wh o c on c lu de s a s a

re su lt o f an in ve sti g a tio n p ri or to-20-

sentenc ing that the defendant’s criminal conduct has been char acte rized by a pattern of re pe tit ive or c omp uls ive be ha vio r wi th he e dle ss ind if fe re nc e to the c on se qu e nc e s;

[d] [ t ] h e d efendant is a dang erous of fende r whose be havior indicates littl e or no

re g ardfo r h uman li fe , a ndno he sit a tio n a bo ut c omm itt ing a c ri me in w hic h th e ri sk to human life is high; a nd [e] [t ]he defendant is sentenced f or an of fense committed while on probation.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-115( b)(1)
, (2), (3), (4), (6). Consecutive sentenc es may be order ed whe re the co u rt fi n d s an yof these c riteria to e x ist “by a pre pondera nce of

the evidenc e.” I d. § 40-35- 115 (b ). I n this case, ther e is no proof in the r ecor d to support application of the third a nd final of th e s e f iv e c r it e r ia
, a n d th e tria l c o u r t e rr e d in o r d e r in g c o n s e c u ti v e s e n te n c in g o n th e s e b a s e s

. We further find insufficient pr oof to support applica tion of the first of these criteria.

We turn now to the propriety of t he second of t hese factor s, that the defendant is an off ender whose re cord of

criminal activityis ex tensive. We hold that the rec ord conta ins sufficient evide nce to support consec utive sentenc es on this basis. Prior to committ ing the instant o ff enses, the De fe nd a nt ha d be e n co nv ic te d of six fe lon ie s, thr e e of the m vi ole nt. Th e De fe nd a nt’ s r e c or d a lso contains numerous mis d e me an o rs. The D efe ndant also admitted at trial that he sold drug s, additional criminal ac tivitythat is not otherwise reflec ted i n the Def endant’ s history

of convic tions. Com bined

w i t h t h e i n s t a n ts i x o f

f e n s e s , t h e D e f

e n d a n th a s a

r e c o r d o f e x t e n s i v e c r i m i n a l a c t i v i t y.

We also conclude that the Def endant mee ts the definition of “dan ger o u s offe nder.” The Def endant se vere ly

beat Mr. Spring er and left hi m stripped and virtually naked on the side of a road. This is conduct which indicates littl e or no reg ard for hum an li fe. Moreove r, t he De fenda nt showed no hesitation whatsoeve r in assaulting Mr. Spring er in such ma nner a s to create a high risk to his l ife.

We r e c og nize , o f c ou rs e , th a t e ve n w he rethe imp osit io n of c on se c uti ve se nte nc e s is

su p p o r te d b y th e p r o o f
, a d d it io n a l c o n s id e r a ti o n s mu s t b e ta k e n in to a c c o u n t. Sp e c if ic ally , the Criminal Sentencing Reform Ac t of 1989 provides that the overall sentenc e im posed “should be no g reater than that deserve d for the offe nse[s] committed,” that it “should be the lea st severe measure

nece ssary to achieve the purposes f or which the sentenc e is imposed,” and that the defe ndant’s potential for rehabilitation must be taken into ac count. Tenn. Code A nn. § 40-35-103( 2), (4) , (5). Se e a lso Sta te v. L a ne , 3 S.W. 3d 45 6, 46 0 (T e nn

. 19 99 ). We are fu rthe r a dv ise d that “ the a g g re g a te maxi mum of consec utive terms must be rea sonably rela ted to the seve rity of the off enses involved.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-115 Sentencing Commi ssion Comments. Wit h respe ct to the Def endant’ s status as a “ dang erous of

fende r,” the proof must also establish that the ef fec tive sentenc e is nec essary in order to pr otect the public f rom furthe r criminal acts by the Def endant. See S tate v. W ilkerson, 905 S.W .2d 933, 938 (Tenn. 1995)

.

H e r e , t h e D e f

e n d a n t ’ s e f

f e c t i v e s e n t e n c e i s l i f

e w i t h o u t t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f p ar o l e p l u s t h i r t yseven y ear s. This se ntence is the result of the Def endant’ s ong oing course of extrem el yv i o lent crimes a g ain s t multi ple per sons and his obvious unwilli ng ness to abandon his a nti-social conduc t

e ve n d uring a nda ft e r r e ha bil itatio n atte mpt s. Th e De fe nd a nt’ s att a c k ag a ins t his most re c e nt v ic tim-21-

was vicious and unprovoked. Clearly
, the g ener al public nee ds protection fr om the Def endant, a nd he ther efor e nee ds to be isolated from the g ener al publ ic for the rest of his life. The seve rity of the Def endant’ s crimes, a nd his total lack of re h ab i l i t ati ve potential, dema nd a seve re se ntence

. Ac c or din g ly , w e a ff

ir m th e tr ia l c ou rt ’s imp os iti on of pa rt ia lly c on se c uti ve se nte nc e s.

CO NC LU SION We reve rse the D efe ndant’s convic tion for C l as s D felony evading arr est and re mand that char g e for a new trial. We modify the Def endant’ s sentence for his ag g ravated robbe ry conviction to life without the pos sibili ty of parole. We direc t the t rial court to corre ct the judg ment ref lecting the Def endant’ s car

jacking conviction to indicate that he i s a per sistent offende r as to that crime, with a re lease elig ibilit y

of forty -five perc ent. I n all other re spects, we aff irm the judg ments of the trial court.

___________________________________ DAVID H. WELLES, J UDGE