J-S52034-16

*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

 Appellee

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MICHAEL ANGELO PICCARRETA,

 Appellant

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 3398 EDA 2015

Appeal from the PCRA Order November 5, 2015

in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-46-CR-0004746-2011

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., STABILE, and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED AUGUST 24, 2016

Michael Angelo Piccarreta (Appellant) appeals from the November 5, 

2015 order which denied his petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction 

Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. Counsel has filed a petition to 

withdraw and a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 

(1967), and Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009).1

 

1 Counsel has confused the required procedures for withdrawing from 

representation on direct appeal and withdrawing on a PCRA appeal. Direct 

appeal counsel seeking to withdraw from representation must comply with 

the requirements set forth in Anders and Santiago. The procedural 

requirements set forth in Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 297 (Pa. 

1998), and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1998) (en 

banc), govern withdrawal by counsel from representation on PCRA appeals. 

See Commonwealth v. Wrecks, 931 A.2d 717, 721 (Pa. Super. 2007). 

However, an Anders brief which complies substantially with the 

requirements of Turner/Finley is sufficient to allow withdrawal. 

Commonwealth v. Daniels, 947 A.2d 795, 798 (Pa. Super. 2008). 
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Upon review, we affirm the order of the PCRA court and grant counsel’s 

petition to withdraw.

On June 13, 2011, Appellant and several co-defendants were charged 

with numerous drug-related offenses arising out of their involvement in a 

drug distribution ring. Appellant posted bail in this matter on June 15, 2011.

On April 9, 2013 Appellant filed a motion to dismiss his case pursuant to 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(A)(3) alleging violation of his right to a prompt trial.2 A 

hearing was held on this motion on April 24, 2013, and the trial court denied 

the motion at the conclusion of the hearing. 

On July 12, 2013, following a joint stipulated bench trial, the trial court 

convicted Appellant of six counts of possession with intent to deliver (PWID) 

and one count of criminal conspiracy. Appellant was sentenced to a term of 

four to twelve years of incarceration. Appellant timely filed a notice of 

appeal to this Court arguing that the trial court erred in denying his Rule 600 

motion. Specifically, Appellant argued that the trial court erred: 1) by 

calling its own witnesses at the Rule 600 hearing, 2) in finding the time 

period between October 20, 2011 and July 20, 2012 excludable, and 3) by 

denying the Rule 600 motion after he established 404 days of nonexcludable time.

 

2 This rule provides that “[t]rial in a court case in which a written complaint 

is filed against the defendant, when the defendant is at liberty on bail, shall 

commence no later than 365 days from the date on which the complaint is 

filed.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(A)(3). Effective July 1, 2013, a new version of Rule 

600 was adopted; however, that does not affect our analysis herein.
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On July 14, 2014, a panel of this Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment 

of sentence. Commonwealth v. Piccarreta, 105 A.3d 790 (Pa. Super. 

2014) (unpublished memorandum). In so doing, the panel concluded that 

the trial court did not commit legal error in the way it conducted the Rule 

600 hearing. The panel further concluded that Appellant waived his claims 

regarding the calculation of excludable time by failing to include them in his 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement.3

On June 26, 2015, Appellant timely filed pro se a PCRA petition. 

Counsel was appointed and an amended petition was filed. In that petition, 

Appellant argued that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve his 

appellate rights as to the two issues this Court held were waived for failure 

to include them in the Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. On October 7, 2015, 

the PCRA court issued a notice of its intent to dismiss the petition without a 

hearing pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. Appellant did not respond, and on 

November 5, 2015, the PCRA court dismissed the petition. Appellant timely 

filed a notice of appeal, and both Appellant and the PCRA court complied 

with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. 

 

3 The only other issue presented in Appellant’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement 

was that the “trial court erred as a matter of law ... by finding that 

[Appellant] waived his Rule 600 rights on various dates when there was no 

record evidence of any such waiver.” Statement of Matters Complained of on 

Appeal, 9/3/2013, at ¶ 2.
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Before we may address the potential merit of Appellant’s claims, we 

must determine if counsel has complied with the technical requirements of 

Turner and Finley. 

... Turner/Finley counsel must review the case zealously. 

Turner/Finley counsel must then submit a “no-merit” letter to 

the trial court, or brief on appeal to this Court, detailing the 

nature and extent of counsel’s diligent review of the case, listing 

the issues which the petitioner wants to have reviewed, 

explaining why and how those issues lack merit, and requesting 

permission to withdraw. 

Counsel must also send to the petitioner: (1) a copy of 

the “no-merit” letter/brief; (2) a copy of counsel’s petition to 

withdraw; and (3) a statement advising petitioner of the right to 

proceed pro se or by new counsel. 

If counsel fails to satisfy the foregoing technical 

prerequisites of Turner/Finley, the court will not reach the 

merits of the underlying claims but, rather, will merely deny 

counsel’s request to withdraw. Upon doing so, the court will 

then take appropriate steps, such as directing counsel to file a 

proper Turner/Finley request or an advocate’s brief. 

However, where counsel submits a petition and no-merit 

letter that do satisfy the technical demands of Turner/Finley, 

the court—trial court or this Court—must then conduct its own 

review of the merits of the case. If the court agrees with 

counsel that the claims are without merit, the court will permit 

counsel to withdraw and deny relief. By contrast, if the claims 

appear to have merit, the court will deny counsel’s request and 

grant relief, or at least instruct counsel to file an advocate’s 

brief.

Wrecks, 931 A.2d at 721 (citations omitted).

We are satisfied that counsel has complied with the technical 

requirements of Turner and Finley. Therefore, we will consider the 

substantive issues contained in counsel’s brief. 
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“Our standard of review of a [] court order granting or denying relief 

under the PCRA calls upon us to determine ‘whether the determination of the 

PCRA court is supported by the evidence of record and is free of legal error.’” 

Commonwealth v. Barndt, 74 A.3d 185, 192 (Pa. Super. 2013) (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Garcia, 23 A.3d 1059, 1061 (Pa. Super. 2011)). 

In his PCRA petition, Appellant raises a claim of ineffective assistance 

of counsel. “It is well-established that counsel is presumed effective, and 

the defendant bears the burden of proving ineffectiveness.” 

Commonwealth v. Martin, 5 A.3d 177, 183 (Pa. 2010). To overcome this 

presumption, Appellant must show each of the following: “(1) the 

underlying substantive claim has arguable merit; (2) counsel whose 

effectiveness is being challenged did not have a reasonable basis for his or 

her actions or failure to act; and (3) the petitioner suffered prejudice as a 

result of counsel’s deficient performance.” Id. Appellant’s claim will be 

denied if he fails to meet any one of these three prongs. Id. 

In this case, Turner/Finley counsel concedes that appellate counsel 

was deficient by failing to preserve Appellant’s Rule 600 claims in his 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement filed for the direct appeal. Appellant’s Brief at 

15. However, at this juncture, “[i]n order to determine whether there is 

arguable merit to the claim of appellate counsel ineffectiveness, we examine 

the substance of the underlying claim.” Commonwealth v. Williams, 980 
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A.2d 510, 521 (Pa. 2009). Accordingly, we analyze the merits of Appellant’s 

Rule 600 motion.

“In evaluating Rule 600 issues, our standard of review of a trial court’s

decision is whether the trial court abused its discretion.” Commonwealth v. 

Hunt, 858 A.2d 1234, 1238 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). Furthermore, 

[t]he proper scope of review ... is limited to the evidence on the 

record of the Rule 600 evidentiary hearing, and the findings of 

the trial court. An appellate court must view the facts in the light 

most favorable to the prevailing party. Additionally, when 

considering the trial court’s ruling, this Court is not permitted to 

ignore the dual purpose behind Rule 600. Rule 600 serves two 

equally important functions: (1) the protection of the accused’s 

speedy trial rights, and (2) the protection of society. In 

determining whether an accused’s right to a speedy trial has 

been violated, consideration must be given to society’s right to 

effective prosecution of criminal cases, both to restrain those 

guilty of crime and to deter those contemplating it. However, the 

administrative mandate of Rule 600 was not designed to insulate

the criminally accused from good faith prosecution delayed 

through no fault of the Commonwealth. 

* * *

So long as there has been no misconduct on the part of the 

Commonwealth in an effort to evade the fundamental speedy 

trial rights of an accused, Rule 600 must be construed in a 

manner consistent with society’s right to punish and deter crime.

Id. at 1238-39 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 

In determining whether Rule 600 was violated, “[c]ase law [] provides 

that a court must account for any ‘excludable time’ and ‘excusable delay.’ 

Excludable time is delay that is attributable to the defendant or his counsel. 

Excusable delay is delay that occurs as a result of circumstances beyond the 
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Commonwealth’s control and despite its due diligence.” Commonwealth v. 

Goldman, 70 A.3d 874, 879 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citations omitted).4

Instantly, the Commonwealth filed the criminal complaint on June 13, 

2011, and the Rule 600 motion was filed on April 9, 2013, well outside of the 

365 day timeframe. Appellant’s concerns center around the time period 

between October 20, 2011 and July 20, 2012.5 Specifically, Appellant 

 

4

In this regard, Pa.R.Crim.P. 600 provides, in relevant part, as follows.

(C) In determining the period for commencement of trial, there 

shall be excluded therefrom:

(1) the period of time between the filing of the 

written complaint and the defendant’s arrest, 

provided that the defendant could not be 

apprehended because his or her whereabouts were 

unknown and could not be determined by due 

diligence;

(2) any period of time for which the defendant 

expressly waives Rule 600;

(3) such period of delay at any stage of the 

proceedings as results from:

(a) the unavailability of the defendant or the 

defendant’s attorney;

(b) any continuance granted at the request of 

the defendant or the defendant’s attorney.

Commonwealth v. Ramos, 936 A.2d 1097, 1101 (Pa. Super. 2007).

5 There is no dispute that the time period between June 13, 2011 and 

October 20, 2011 is neither excludable time nor excusable delay. Moreover, 

there does not appear to be a dispute as to how the time between July 20, 

2012, and April 9, 2013, should be counted. 
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suggests he was not represented by an attorney and did not consent to the 

postponement of his case at any point during that period of time. See

Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 600(A)(3), 4/9/2013, at ¶ 6. 

At the Rule 600 hearing, Christine Sanchez, Deputy Court 

Administrator, testified.6 She reviewed and produced the records kept by 

Court Administration. She testified that on October 20, 2011, defense 

counsel, Vince Cirillo, Esquire, requested the pre-trial conference be 

rescheduled by Court Administration.7 Sanchez testified that Court 

Administration therefore rescheduled the pre-trial conference to November 

10, 2011. N.T., 4/24/2013, at 11. With respect to what happened on 

November 10, 2011, Sanchez testified that there was no specific order for 

Appellant’s case, but that notes from Court Administration indicate that 

defense counsel requested a continuance of the pre-trial conference.8 Her 

 

6 We point out that the Rule 600 hearing was held on cases that applied to 

both Appellant and a co-conspirator, Victoria Santino. Moreover, both 

individuals had numerous cases pending during this period, and there was 

some confusion throughout the hearing about the various docket numbers. 

7 While the order shows that this was done “orally in open [c]ourt on the 

record,” no transcript is included in the certified record. Order 10/20/2011. 

In addition, the Commonwealth concedes that no transcripts are available 

for this or any other continuance request that took place orally on the record 

in this case. N.T., 4/24/2013, at 38-39.

8 Sanchez testified that Court Administration wrote “Defense rescheduled, 

P.T.C.” N.T., 4/24/2013, at 12.
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records also indicated that the trial court issued a bench warrant for 

Appellant. Id. at 12.9 

The next docket entry does not appear until April 10, 2012, and shows 

that Court Administration rescheduled the pre-trial conference for May 2, 

2012.10 Defense counsel requested for it to be re-listed to May 3, 2012. On 

May 3, 2012, defense counsel requested the case be continued and re-listed 

within 60 days by Court Administration. The case was re-listed again for 

July 20, 2012. 

The PCRA court offered the following analysis as to why it concluded 

that the time period between November 10, 2011, and April 10, 2012, is 

excludable. 

As to the November 10, 2011 continuance request, 

maintaining the assumption that the transcript does not show 

[Appellant] or anyone on his behalf requested a continuance, the 

lack of a request by [Appellant] for a continuance in the 

transcript does not refute [Sanchez’s] testimony regarding the 

November 10, 2011 continuance, which she testified it was due 

to a defense reschedule. As noted, not everything that happens 

at a pre-trial conference is reflected in a transcript. So even if a 

 

9 By way of background, on October 11, 2011, the Commonwealth had filed 

a motion to revoke Appellant’s bail as he had been arrested on July 19, 

2011, and again on August 3, 2011, which violated the conditions of his bail. 

On November 21, 2011, the Commonwealth’s motion to revoke bail was 

granted, and Appellant’s bail was reset. He posted new bail on November 

23, 2011.

 

10 “Appellant’s counsel admitted in his Rule 600 motion that a pre-trial 

conference was scheduled for April 11, 2012, but that appellant failed to 

appear and a bench warrant was issued.” PCRA Court Opinion, 12/18/2015, 

at 11 n. 3.
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transcript is silent on the matter, [the trial court’s] credibility 

determination as to [] Sanchez would not be disturbed. 

PCRA Court Opinion, 12/18/2015, at 13.

The PCRA court’s determination is supported by the record. 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C)(3)(b) is clear that “any continuance granted at the 

request of the defendant or the defendant’s attorney” is excludable. The 

PCRA court believed Sanchez’s testimony that defense counsel requested 

continuances on October 20, 2011 and November 10, 2011, and we will not 

disturb that credibility determination.11 See Commonwealth v. Burton, 

121 A.3d 1063, 1067 (Pa. Super. 2015) (“The PCRA court’s credibility 

determinations, when supported by the record, are binding on this 

Court.”).12

Thus, we agree with the PCRA court that Appellant has not established 

that the underlying issue has merit, and therefore counsel could not have 

been ineffective by failing to pursue these issues on appeal. Moreover, 

because we agree with Appellant’s counsel that the issue Appellant raised in 

 

11 The Honorable William R. Carpenter has presided over all relevant 

hearings and motions in this case, as well as the PCRA petition at issue. 

12 Moreover, even assuming arguendo that the 152 days between November 

10, 2011 (when counsel asked for the second continuance) and April 10, 

2012 (when a bench warrant was issued for Appellant) is not excludable 

time, the adjusted run date becomes April 15, 2013 (taking into account the 

fact that there is no dispute as to how to account for the other time), which 

made Appellant’s April 9, 2013 Rule 600 motion premature.
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his PCRA petition does not have merit, we grant his petition to withdraw and 

affirm the order dismissing Appellant’s PCRA petition.

Petition to withdraw granted. Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/24/2016