United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit 

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No. 21-1243

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United States of America

 Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Jaamil Demonta Owens

 Defendant - Appellant

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Missouri - Cape Girardeau

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Submitted: April 14, 2022

Filed: June 28, 2022

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Before LOKEN, KELLY, and KOBES, Circuit Judges. 

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KOBES, Circuit Judge. 

Jaamil Owens pleaded guilty to distributing 50 grams or more of 

methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. § 841. The district court1 imposed a bottom-of1

The Honorable Stephen R. Clark, United States District Judge for the Eastern 

District of Missouri.
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Guidelines sentence of 87 months in prison. Owens challenges his sentence as 

procedurally and substantively unreasonable. We affirm.

I. 

Owens moved back home to Missouri after he was laid off from his job. His 

older brother, the leader of a meth distribution operation, helped him pay his bills. 

Owens returned the favor by distributing for his brother and flying to California to 

deliver cash to the drug supplier. Once, he sold about a pound of meth to a 

confidential informant for $4,000. Another time, he was caught at the Phoenix 

airport bringing $51,950 to the supplier. Eventually, Owens was indicted and 

pleaded guilty to distributing meth.

The Presentence Report recommended a Guidelines range of 87–108 months. 

It also noted that the 60-month statutory minimum did not apply because Owens met 

the criteria for safety valve relief. The district court adopted the PSR. Defense 

counsel argued for a sentence as low as time served—seven days—and talked at 

length about mitigating factors, including Owens’s lack of criminal history, 

significant support system, strong family ties, exemplary work history, and the 

detrimental effects that a significant prison sentence would have on him. The district 

court considered this, as well as Owens’s role in distributing 441.8 grams of meth 

and ferrying over $51,000 in drug proceeds, his mid-tier culpability in the 

conspiracy, and that he was a drug user for his entire adult life. Although it found 

that the safety valve applied—meaning it had the discretion to sentence Owens 

below the 60-month statutory minimum—the district court declined to do so, 

imposing a sentence of 87 months in prison and 4 years of supervised release. 

Owens appeals, claiming that his sentence is both procedurally and substantively 

unreasonable. 
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II. 

“Procedural error includes failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the 

Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the 

§ 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to 

adequately explain the chosen sentence—including an explanation for any deviation 

from the Guidelines range.” United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir. 

2009) (en banc) (quotation omitted) (cleaned up). Where, as here, the defendant 

fails to object at sentencing, we review for plain error. United States v. Wise, 17 

F.4th 785, 788 (8th Cir. 2021). Plain error is (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that 

affects substantial rights. Id. 

Owens first argues that the district court erred by failing to acknowledge its 

authority to sentence below the mandatory minimum, and by failing to explain why 

it did not apply the safety valve. The “safety valve” provision, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f), 

allows the court to disregard an applicable statutory minimum if it finds certain 

criteria. Contrary to Owens’s argument, the court found that the safety valve 

applied. But safety valve eligibility does not guarantee Owens a below-statutory 

minimum sentence; it just gives the court the opportunity to sentence below the 

minimum if it believes it is appropriate. Owens argues that the court needed to 

specifically explain why it decided not to impose a below-minimum sentence—

beyond the usual explanation for choosing a particular sentence. But he does not 

cite any cases from this circuit announcing such a rule, and the out-of-circuit cases 

he cites do not support his argument. See, e.g., United States v. Real-Hernandez, 90 

F.3d 356, 361–62 (9th Cir. 1996) (safety valve eligibility “does not require the court 

to sentence a defendant to a term less than the mandatory minimum” but “[a]s in all 

other cases, the court must state its reasons for imposing a particular sentence”); 

United States v. Feliz, 453 F.3d 33, 36 (1st Cir. 2006) (error not to explain why 

defendant was ineligible for safety valve). The district court did not err—plainly or 

otherwise—in explaining why its 87-month sentence was appropriate without also 

explaining why a below-60-month sentence was inappropriate. 
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Owens next argues that the district court failed to weigh the mitigating 

factors—his support system, lack of prior convictions, family ties, work history, and 

work ethic—in its 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) analysis. But the district court explicitly 

considered these exact factors, alongside other relevant non-mitigating factors. 

III. 

Finally, we review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of 

discretion. United States v. Miner, 544 F.3d 930, 932 (8th Cir. 2008). “A district 

court abuses its discretion when it (1) fails to consider a relevant factor that should 

have received significant weight; (2) gives significant weight to an improper or 

irrelevant factor; or (3) considers only the appropriate factors but in weighing those 

factors commits a clear error of judgment.” Feemster, 572 F.3d at 461 (citation 

omitted). A within-Guidelines sentence like Owens’s is presumptively reasonable. 

United States v. Peithman, 917 F.3d 635, 653 (8th Cir. 2019). And the court’s 

§ 3553(a) analysis was proper. It addressed aggravating factors—the large amount 

of meth and cash involved, Owens’s history of drug use, and his mid-tier conspiracy 

culpability—alongside the mitigating factors. Owens argues that the district court’s 

reference to him being “a drug user his entire adult life” improperly exaggerated his 

minor drug use. But the facts show that he used alcohol and marijuana daily, and 

had taken about five illegally-obtained Xanax pills per week since he was 22 years 

old. The court neither exaggerated nor harped on this fact. 

IV. 

 We affirm.

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