### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-04-00082- CR

Cha r le s A bla ne do, App e lla nt

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 331ST JUDICI AL DISTRICT

NO. 20211 96, H ONO RAB LE BO B PERK INS, JUDGE P RESIDING

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N This appeal arises fr om appellant Charle s Ablanedo’ s conviction for posse ssion of more than 28 g rams of a

controlled substanc e, dihy drocode inone, the g ener ic form of Vicodin. See Tex. Health & Safety

Code Ann. §§ 481.104(a )(4) , 481.117(c) (West 2003)
. Acc ording to the State,
e ig hty -f ive of the se pil ls w e re dis c ov e re d in a pp e lla nt’ s p os se ssi on

wh e n h e wa s st op pe d f

or a tr a ff ic vio la tio n. Ap pe lla

nt u rg e s tha t his co nv ic tio n sho uld be re ve rs e d be c a us e (1 ) the e vid e nc e is l e g a lly ins uf fi c ie nt a nd (2 ) the tr ia l c ourt

e rr e d in a dmi tti ngthe pil ls a

nd the c he mic a l ana ly sis of

the pil ls. Appellant’s issues a

re ba sed on his claims that (a) the State failed to “af firmatively

link” appellant to the pi lls beca

use i t failed to establish that appellant had owne rship of, knowledg e of, or controlBozell testified that he be lieved he kne w appe llant’s ag e based on a revie w of his driver’ s 1 license, but that he might have obtained thi s knowledg e through questioning appellant. Appellant does not dispute that he wa s only twenty y ear s old on the date in question. Appellant does not c halleng e the leg ality of the sea rch. F acts reg arding the eve nts leading 2 up to and during the sea

rch, inc luding state ments made by appellant a

bout the contents of B ozell’s dis c ov e ry , w e re su

pp re sse d a s imp ro pe r c us tod ia l int e rr og a tio n be c a us e a pp e lla nt w a s n ot r e a d h is Miranda rig hts. See M

iranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The State does not cha lleng e the propriety of this suppression. Acc ording ly , we do not conside r this evidence
. 2 ov e r t he pil ls, (b ) t

he arr e sti ngof

fi c e r w a s una

ble to t e sti fy

that th e pil ls d isc ov e re d in the ve hic le
we re the same pil ls int

ro du c e d a t tr ia l, and (c ) the State ’s c he mis t la c ke d the re qu isi te kn ow le dg e to sh owthat th e me tho do log y us e d f or te sti ngthe pil ls w a s r e lia ble . We wi ll a ff

ir m.
BACK GR OUND On Marc h 3 1, 20 02 , Sh e ri ff

’s De pu ty Mic ha e l B oz e l l o b s e r

v e d a p p e l lant d ri vin g wi th an inoper ative taillight a

nd initiated a t raf

fic stop on that basis. While speaking with appellant, who was the sole oc cupant of the vehicle, Bozell saw in pla in vie w a par tially empty Crown Roy al bottle. Be cause Bozell knew that appellant was not y et t wenty -one y ear s old, and appe llant admitted that 1 the bottle was his, B ozell detained him for beinga minor in possession of alcohol. See Tex. Alco. Be v. Co d e Ann. § 106.05 (West S upp. 2005). Upon c onducting a sea rch of the vehicle ’s ce nter console, B ozell located and r etrieve d a plastic ba g filled with a g ree n leaf y substance a

nd an unlabeled pr escr iption bott le containingmany white pills. Appellant wa s then arr ested, a nd the 2 automobile was impounded. Be fore turning the pills in t o the evidenc e sec tion of the Sheriff’ s Depa rtment, Bozell counted that there w ere eig hty -five pills.3 The pills were subseq u en tly analy zed by J oel B udg e, a c hemist for the Te x as Depa rtment of Public Saf

ety
. Budg e testified that he retrie ved the pills from their se cure d location in the Depa

rtment’s evide nce va

ult. He conf

irmed that th e ev idence he re trieved w as a se aled envelope , which wa s m arke d with the unique laboratory number a ssigne d to appellant’s c ase a nd contained a

n unlabeled pr escr iption bott le that had eighty -five white pills i nside. Budg e subjec ted these pills to a “ga s chromatogr aph mass spectrometer ” test, which br eaks dow n the components of the substance and cr eate s a che mical spect ru m . The re sulting spec trum is then compare d to the “known spe ctrum” of

the che mical that the at- issue substance is suspe cted to be
. Budg e re ported that the che mical spec trum of the tested pills matched the known spec trum of dihy dro co d einone, the g ener ic form of

Vicodin. Ap pe lla nt wa s indi c te d for the thi rd -d e g re e of fe ns e of “ int e nti on a lly

and kn ow ing ly possess[i ng ] a controlled substance , namely , . . . dihy drocode inone . . . in an amount of 28 g rams or more.” See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. §§ 4 8 1
. 1 0 4 (a) (4), 481.117( c). A ppellant pled not g uilty and wai v ed h i s rig ht to a jury trial. A benc h trial occ urre d in which appe llant presente d no witnesses and the State prese nted t wo wit nesses, Deputy Bozell and State c hemist Budg e. The trial court a djudge d appellant guilty of the c harg ed off

ense a nd sentenc ed app el l ant to six y ear s confine ment, which wa s probated f or that time period. See Tex. Code Crim. P roc. A nn. art. 42.12 (West Supp. 2005) (“Community Supervision”). Appe llant filed a motion for new trial, which wa s
overr uled, and then a

ppeale d to this C ourt.4 AN AL YSI S Legal Su ff

iciency I n h is f ir st i ssu e , a

pp e lla nt c on te nd s th a t th e re wa s n ot l e g a lly su ff ic ie nt e vid e nc e to support his conviction for possession of a controlled substanc e b ec ause the State could neither
a ff ir mativ e ly lin k a pp e lla nt t o th e pil ls no r e sta

bli sh that the pil ls i ntr od

uc e d at tr ia l w e re the same ones discover ed in his possession.

Whe n d e c i d ingwh e the r e vid e nc e is s uf fi c ie nt t o s up po rt

a c on vic tio n, we mus t a sse ss all the evidenc e in the light most fa vorable to the verdic t to determine whe ther a ny rational trier

of fac t could find the essential elements of the c rime beyond a re asonable doubt. Po ind e x te r v . S tate , 153 S.W .3 d 402, 405 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). To prove unla wful possession of a c ontrolled substance, the State m u s t prove that: (1) the ac cused e x erc ised control, mana g ement, or c are over the substance ; and (2) the acc used knewthe matter p o s s es s ed was c ontraba nd. Id . Wh e the r t

his evidenc e is direc t or circ umstantial, “ it must establish, to the requisite leve l of confide nce, that the
acc used’s c onnection with the drug was more than just fortuitous. This is the whole of the so-ca lled ‘af firmative links’ rule .” Id
. at 4 0 5 -0 6 (q u o t i n g Br own v . S tate , 911 S.W. 2d

74 4, 74 7 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 95 )) . Su c h a ff

ir mativ e lin ks ne e d to be e sta bli sh ed on ly

wh e n th e a c c us e d w a s “ no t in exclusive posse ssion of the place wher e the substanc e is found.” Id . at 40 6 & n. 18 ; Ma rti n v . S tate , 753 S.W .2d 384, 387 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).

The intentional and know ing posse ssion of a controlled subst ance does not turn on whether the controlled substanc e is in plain view. J os e ph v . S tate , 897 S.W. 2d

37 4, 37 6 ( Te x. Cr im. App. 1995). This af

firmative link c an be established by showing additional fac ts and circ umstances5

that demonstrate the acc used’s knowle dg e and c ontrol of the contraband, Nor ma n v . S tate , 588 S.W. 2d 34 0, 34 2- 43 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 79 ), inc lud ing that the na rc oti c wa s c on ve nie ntl y

a c c e ssi ble to the acc used, Ha hn v . S tate , 502 S.W .2d 724, 725 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) ; that the acc used wa s the driver of t he automobil e in which the contra band wa s found, Al

dr idge v . S

tate , 482 S.W .2d 171, 173 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972); and that the contraband was found on the s ame side of the ca r seat as the acc used was sitting, De sh on g v . S tate , 625 S.W .2d 327, 329 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981), and Orosco

v . S tat e , 2 98 S.W. 2d

13 4, 13 6 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 57 ). I n de c idi ngwh e the r t he e vid e nc e su ff

ic ie ntl y
e sta bli sh e s an a ff

ir mativ e lin k be tw e e n the a c c us e d and the c on tr a ba nd , the tr ie r of

fa c t—whic h is the district c ourt in a bench trial—is the exclusive judge of the c redibility of the witnesse s and the weig ht to be given to their testimony
. Poindexte r , 15 3 S.W. 3d a t 40 6; see also State v. Taylor , 886 S.W .2d 262, 265 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (cour t is trier of fa ct in bench tr ial). Th e e vid e nc e in t

his c a se wa s su ff

ic ie nt t o permit

a re a so na ble tr ie r o f f

a c t to conclude bey ond a re asonable doubt that appellant intentionally and knowing ly

possessed more than 28 g ra ms o f d ihydr oc od e ino ne . App e lla nt wa s the dr ive r a

nd so le oc c up ant o f t

he ve hic le a t th e tim e of the of f e n s e . A lt h o u g h h e p r e s e n te d a c e rti f ic a te o f ti tl e s h o w in g h e w a s n o t th e o w n e r o f the vehicle, a ppellant conc edes that he wa s in ex clusive possession and c ontrol of the vehic le duringthe tim e in q ue sti on . Sig nif

ic antl y , a pp e lla nt d oe s n ot a sse rt

that any oth e r p e rs on

ha d b e e n in possession or control of the vehicle or even that any one else had re ce n t l y been a passeng er in the
ve h i c l e . A n d , w h e n t h e v e h i c l e w a s i mp o u n d e d , a p p e l l an t d i d n o t r e qu e s t t h a t i t b e r e l e a se d to any one else , althoug h this opti on was ex p re s s l y provided on the impoundment for m that he filled
ou t. T he bo ttl e of

pil ls w a s d isc ov e re d in

the c e nte r c on so le , w hic h w a s im me diate ly a c c e ssi ble toAdmitted ly , chain of custody issues prese nt mix ed questions of leg al suffic iency and 3 admissibili ty

beca use the que stion of whether the evidence is admissible depe nds on the proof offe red to sup port its authenticity
. See Ga rn e r v . S tate , 939 S.W .2d 802, 805 (Tex. App.—For t Wor th 1 99 7, pe t. re f’ d)
. Th is do e s no t re qu ir e the same iss ue to be ana ly zed tw ic e , h ow e ve r, be c a

us e on e dis c us sio n s a tis fi e s b oth inq uir ie s. 6 appellant f

rom his driver’ s seat. Additionally , appellant does not c laim that he was una war e that the pills were a

controlled substance. These f acts a nd circ umstances de monstrate an a ffirmative link betwee n appellant a

nd the unlabele d presc ription bottl e conta ining e ighty -five w hite pills t hat was found in his possession. See H ahn , 5 02 S.W. 2d

a t 72 5; Aldridge , 48 2 S.W. 2d a t 17 3; Orosco , 298 S.W .2d at 136. Appellant also c halleng es hi s conviction on the grounds that, even if an a ffirmative lin k e xists be tw e e n h ims e lf and the se pil ls, the e vid e nc e do e s not s uf fi c ie ntl y e sta bli shthat th e pil ls dis c ov e re d in

his po sse ssi on

we re the same on e s th a t the State int ro du c e d at tri a l. Th is a

rgume nt, howeve r, is duplicative of a ppellant’s sec ond issue, which cha lleng es the a dmissibi lity of the evidenc e base d on its chain of custody
. We theref ore r eser ve discussion o f t his issue for the 3 following section.

Appellant’s f

irst issue is overruled.
Adm ission of E vidence

Appellant asse rts in his second and third issues that the trial cour t erre d in admitting the bottle of pi l l s an d t he che mical ana ly sis of those pills because the chain of custody was not suffic i en t l y est ablished and be cause the che mist l acke d the re quisite knowledg e to show the reliability of the a naly sis he perf

ormed. We consider

eac h issue in turn.7

Chain of custody

As a condition pr ece dent to the admission of evidenc e, Te x as Rule of Evidenc e 901 require s that evidenc e be authenticate d— i.e. , that sufficie nt proof be of fer ed “to support a

finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.” Te x . R. Evid. 901. Rul e 901 does not require any

particula r standar d of proof

but instead requir es only

that the trial cour

t be satisfied that the evidenc e is ge nuine. Ga rn e r v . S tate , 939 S.W. 2d 80 2, 80 5 (T e x. Ap p. —F or t Worth 19 97 , p e t.
re f’ d) . T he su ff

ic ie nc y of an e vid e nti ary

pr e dic a te is w ith in t

he tr ia l c ourt ’s dis c re tio n, and we wi ll
no t ov e rt ur n the c ourt ’s de c isi on to a dmi t the e vid e nc e un le ss w e fi nd that th e tr ia l c ourt

a bu se d it s discretion. Mo ntgom e ry

v . S tate , 8 10 S.W. 2d

37 2, 37 8 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 90 ); Sm ith v . S tate , 683 S.W .2d 393, 405 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984).

As the propone nt, the State may authenticate an item of evide nce that lacks unique or distinctive char acte ristics by establishing its cha in of custody , which shows that t h e it e m pr esente d at t rial i s the s ame one that play ed a r ole in the eve nts at issue. Mo or e v . S tate , 821 S.W .2d 429, 431 (Tex. App.—Waco 1991, no pet.). To suppor t admission, the St ate must prove only the beg inning and end of

the cha in of custody , particula rly when the c hain ends at a laboratory
. Ma rti ne z v . S tate , No. 01-04-00715- CR, 2005 Tex . App. L EXI S 8678, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] , Oct. 20, 20 05 , n o p e t. h .) ; Po rte r v . S tate , 9 69 S.W. 2d

60 , 6 6 ( Te x. Ap p. —Aus tin 19 98 , p e t. r e f’ d)
. Th e State is not required to provide a moment-by -moment ac count of the wher eabouts of evidenc e from the instant it i s seiz ed until itis introduced at tria l. Re e d v . S tate , 1 5 8 S. W. 3 d

4 4 , 5 2 ( T e x. App.—Houston [14th Dis t.] , pet. re f’ d ). Absent evide nce of tampering , any

g aps or minor8

theore tical bre ache s in the chain g o to the weig ht, rather t h an the admissibilit y , of the e vidence
. Lag ro ne v . S tate , 942 S.W .2d 602, 617 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Moreove r, conf licting testimony as to the ty

pe of container the evidenc e is place d in does not amount to a brea k in the chain. Stoker

v . S tat e , 788 S.W .2d 1, 10 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989)

.

Deputy Bozell testified that he se ized from appellant e ighty -five wh i t e p i l ls in an
un la be le d p re sc ri pti on

bo ttl e and , f

oll ow ing a

pp e lla nt’ s ar re st that eve nin g , tu

rn e d th e e vid e nc e in t o t h e “ ev i d en ce s e ct i o n ” o f t h e S h er i ff ’s De p ar t m en tat i t s p ri m ary l o ca t i o n , t h e G au l tb u i l d i n g. Bozell g ener ated a

n offe nse repor

t, which listed the same identifying information as the submission sh eet th a t w a s atta c he d to the e vid e nc e a dmi tte d at tr ia l, i nc lud inga sp e c if ic numbe r a ssi g ne d to appellant’ s case . The State’s c hemist, Budg e, testified that he retrie ved the unlabe led pre scription bottle containing eig hty -five w hite pills from the Department’s secure d vault and that the e vidence
was sea led an d m ar k ed with t he unique identify ing inf ormation when he retrie ved it. There afte r, Bud ge re s eale d the evidenc e and la beled the oute r enve lope with his init ials, the date, a nd the assign ed l ab o ra t ory

number. When the pills were prese nted at trial, B udg e testified that he
rec og nized the envelope ba sed on these ma rking s that were m ad e in hi s handwriting . When the
e nv e lop e wa s un se a le d, De pu ty B oze ll te sti fi e d that its c on te nts —th e un la be le d pr e sc ri pti on

bo ttl e with eig hty -five w hite pills i nside—ap p ea re d t o b e the same bottle and pills that he seized from appellant on the nig ht of t h e o ff en s e. Appellant does not claim that any tamperinghad occ urre d. Throug h the testimony

of B ozell and Budg e, the State established the chain of custody by proving both its beginningand its end, which w as at the State’ s laborator y . See M artinez , 2005 Tex. App. L EX I S 86 78 , at *5 ; Porter , 969 S.W .2d at 66.9 N o n e t h e l e s s , a

p p e l l an tr a i s e s s e v e r a l c h a l l e n g e s t o t h e a d e qu a c y o f t h e i r t e s t i m o n y. First, appellant urg es that Bozell could not establish the cha in of custody based on his testimony

that the e nv e lop e tha

t th e pil l bo ttl e a

pp e are d in

a t tr ia l w a s n ot t

he same c on tai ner

in whic h B oze ll submitt ed the e vidence
. This argument is without merit beca use conf licting testimony

as to the ty

pe of conta iner the e vidence is placed in doe s not amount to a brea k in the chain. Stoker , 788 S.W .2d at 10. T h e record de monstrates that it is standard proc edure for e vidence to be submitted in one container an d t h en plac ed in a ne w containe r upon laboratory proce ssing. Unique identification
nu mb e r s ar e a s s i g n e d t o e a c h i t e m o f e v i d e n c e i n t h e S t a t e ’ s s ys t e m s o t h a tt h e e v i d e n c e m ay a l w ays be tra cked a

nd identi fi ed wi t h a particula r ca se. B oth Bozell and B udg e testified that suc h identification numbers wer e marke d on the various container s used in this case . Thus, the fa ct that the or i gi n al co n tainer w as re place d with a new one at the labor atory does not ca st doubt on the authenticity

of the e vidence
. A p p e l l an ta l s o c h a l l e n g e s B o z e l l ’ s t e s t i m o n y b e c a u s e h e c o u l d

n o ts ay “ p o s i t i v e l y” that the pills at trial were the same one s he seized from a p p el l an t, although he testified that the unlabeled prescr iption bottle containing eig hty -five white pills presented at trial appea red to be the
same one that he had se ized from appellant a nd submitt ed to the De partment. Nothingin Rule 901 require s that a si ng le wit ness testify with absolute ce rtainty

that the evidenc e is authentic. See T e x. R. Evid. 901 (providing “ illust rations” of authentication procedur es ). Boz ell testified about the evidenc e as it wa s seized and submitted. Budg e testified about the evidence a fter it wa s submitt ed until it was a

naly zed and then presented in court. The identifying numbe r assig ned to the evide nce upon submissi on connec ts the beg inning a nd end of this cha in beca

use, at e ach stag e, the container10

holding the e vidence was mar ked with this i dentifier. It is irreleva nt that the orig inal container was marke d by

the intake of

fice r rather than Bozell. Even if this we re considere d a brea k in the chain,
no a lle g a tio ns of

tampe ri nghave be e n ma de and , th us , it wo uld imp a c t on ly the we ig ht a ff or de d to the evidenc e, not its admissibi lity
. Lagrone , 9 42 S.W. 2d a t 61 7; Ree d , 158 S.W .3d at 52. The trial c ourt did not abuse its discretion in deter mining that B ozell’s and Budg e’s te sti mony satis fi e d th e te st f

or a uth e nti c a tio n under Ru le 90 1; g ive n th e ir te sti mony , a

re a so na ble fa c t- fi nd e r c ou ld c on c lud e that th e pil ls s e ize d f ro m a pp e lla nt w e re the same on e s in tr od uc e d at tr ia l. T h u s , i tw a s n o te r

r o r f o r t h e t r i a l c o u rt t o a dm i tt h e u n l a b e l e d p r e s c r i p t i o nb o t t l e c o n t a i n i n g e i g h t yfive white pills and the chemica l a naly sis showing those pills to be dihy drocode inone. Appellant’ s second issue is over

ruled.
Re lia bil ity of e xp e rt t esti mony Appellant further challeng es the admission of this e vidence on the g rounds that the State’s chemist, Budg e, was unable to e stablish the reliability of the c hemical a

naly sis because he did not know t he original source of the “known spectrum” that was used to identify the substance as dihy drocode inone.

Te xas Rul e of Ev ide nc e 70 2 g ov e rn s the a dmi ssi bil ity of e xpe rt te sti mony . T e x. R. Evid. 702. As a thre shold require ment to the admission of expert tes t imony , the cour t must be satisfied that the e vidence is releva nt and re liable. Ru sse au v . S tate , 1 7 1 S. W.3d 87 1 , 8 7 4 ( T e x. Crim. App. 2005). I n a cr i m i n al ca s e, the level of proof require d of the e vidence ’s re levanc e and reliability is “clea r and c onvincing .” Id
. at 875. Through the “ Da ub e rt , Robinson , and Ke lly ” t ri l o gy of ca ses, the hig h courts have develope d several n o n -e x clusive fa ctors to ana ly ze whether

theSuch fac tors include (a) the extent to which the under ly ing sc ientific theory and tec hnique 4 are acc epted a s valid by

the re levant scie ntific community ; (b) the e x pert’s qua lificati o n s ; (c) the exis tence of literatur e supporting or re jecting the under ly ing sc ientific theory and tec hnique; (d) the po te nti a l r a te of

e rr or of the te c hn iqu e ; and

(e) th e cla rity

wi th whic h th e un de rl yingsc ie nti fi c t e c h n i qu e c anb e e xp l a i n e d t o t h e c o ur t. Ke ll

y v. Sta te , 824 S.W .2d 568, 573 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). 11 evidenc e meets this s t an d ard. See D aubert v. Me rrell Dow Pharm., Inc ., 509 U.S. 579, 593-95 4 (1993); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., Inc., v. R obinson , 923 S.W. 2d 54 9, 55 7 ( Te x. 19 95 ); Ke lly

v . S tat e , 8 24 S.W. 2d

56 8, 57 3 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 92 ). Es se nti a lly , th e pr op on e nt i s r e qu ir e d to convince the court, as t he gate keepe r, t hat: (1) the scientific theor y upon which the e vidence is based is valid, (2) the tec hnique applying the theory is valid, and (3) the technique w as prope rly applied in thi s i n s t an ce . State v. Me drano , 127 S.W .3d 781, 784 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). A trial cour t’s ruling on the admis s i b i l i t y of scientific expert testimony will not be reve rsed a

bsent an a

buse of discretion. W

e ath e rre d v . S

tate , 15 S.W .3d 540, 542 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Her e, appe llant do es n o t ch all eng e the e x pert’s qua lifications or the va lidity of the expert’s theory

or methodolog y . Rather, a ppellant’s challeng e to the expert’s testimony is confined to the third prong of t he inquiry —whether

the expert proper ly

applied the tec hnique in this case. B ud g e e mpl oy e d th e fo llo wi ngte c hn iqu e to i de nti fy the c he mic a l natur e of

the pil ls f

ound in
a pp e lla nt’ s p os se ssi on : A ft e r a

na ly zingthe pil ls’ ph y sic a l c ha ra c te ri sti c s (th a t the y we re wh ite wi th some unique marking s), B udg e used the Poison C ontrol Boa rd’ s d at ab ase to identify dihy dr oc od e ino ne a s th e lik e ly matc h. B ud g e the n s ub

je c te d the pil ls to a “ g a s c hr omatog ra phma ss12

spectrome ter test,” w hich bre aks down the substance’ s components, demonstratingthe substance ’s “che mical s pectr

um.” Budg e obtained the “known spectrum” of dihy drocode inone and c ompare d i tt o t h e re s u l t i n g s p ec t ru m . Be cau s e th e kn o wn s p ec t ru m m at ch ed t h e re s u l t i n g s p ec t ru m , Bu d ge conclude d the pills were dihydrocode inone, a g ener ic form of Vicodin. Budg e testi fied that he obtained the known spectrum “in house,” me aning that it was
cre ated in the Depar

tment’s laboratory

from a substanc e known to be dihydrocode inone. The Depa rt m en tp u rc h as es t h e s u b s t an ce s fr o m re p u t able pharmac eutical c ompanies that have established business relationships with the Depa rtment. He e x plained that whe n th e la boratory initially develops
a k n o wn spectrum, it conduc ts an “e x tensive literar y sear ch to make sur e that’s what it is .” Onc e the laboratory

has complete d this process, the known spe ctrum i s cata logue d “in hous e” and ca n be used as a “standa rd” in late r ca ses. Althoug h Budg e testi fied that he did not cre ate the la boratory ’s known spec trum for dihy drocode inone, he wa s confident in its acc urac y beca use the proc edure s he de sc ri be d a

re sta nd ard op e ratin g pr oc e dure s u se d in the De pa rtme nt’ s r e g ula

r c ours e of bu sin e ss “ in
ever y case wher e [there is] a possibili ty of [the spectrum] coming up a s a controlled substanc e.” Appellant attac ks the reliability of B udg e’s opinion by

claiming that Budg e lac ked sufficie nt personal knowle dg e about the known spectrum. The reliability standard, how ever , does
no t r e qu ir e that th e e xpe rt have pe rs on a l kn ow le dg e of e a c h p ie c e of in for mat io n use d in his methodology ; an expert may “re l[ y ] in whole or in part on information of which he has no personal knowledg e” as long as he “ha s a suffic ient basis for his opinion.” Aguil ar v . S tate , 887 S.W .2d 27, 29 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 94 ); Ke lly , 8 24 S.W. 2d a t 57 3. Rul e 70 3 e xpre ssl y pe rm its an e xpe rt to b a se his opinion on fac ts or data made known to him by

another source and, if such f

acts or data ar e “of13

a ty pe reasonably relied on by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or i nfer ence s on the subject,” the expert can r ely on them even if

they are inadmissible. Tex . R. Evid. 703. The court may consider the expert’s own t estimony about t he data rea sonably relied on by other e x perts in the field. See Souris v. Robinson , 725 S.W .2d 339, 341-42 (Te x . App.—Houston [14th Dis t.] 1987, no pe t. )
. T h e c o u rt o f c r im in a l a p p e a ls h a s n o te d th a t “ [i ]t is r ar e in d e e d th a t an e xp e rt c an g ive an op ini on wi tho ut r e lyingto s ome e xten t up on inf or matio n f ur nis he d h im b y

oth e rs . M or e ov e r, ‘i t is qu ite re a so na

ble fo r a ch e mis t to re vie w an oth e r ch e mis t’ s ana ly sis wh e n f or min g an o pin ion

a s to the ver acity

of the latter ’s test results.’” Col e v . S tate , 839 S.W .2d 798, 814-15 n.3 (Te x . Crim. App. 1992) (Ma loney , J ., concur ring ) (c itations omi tted). Bu d ge e x p l ai n edt h at t h e k n o wn s t an d ar d h e u s edi n t h i s ca s e w as cr ea t edu s i n g a substance f

rom a re liable company , p u rsuant to the De partment’s standa rd proc edure s, and wa s cata loge d in the Depa

rtment’s lab to be use d in the chemists’ regular course of busine ss of testing chemica l spectrums. Given this testimony and the authority interpre ting Rules 702 and 703, it was not an abuse of discre tion for the trial c ourt to determine that Budg e’s testimony was re liably

based
on the pr op e r a

pp lic a tio n o f c he mic a l te sti ngte c hn iqu e s a nd , the re fo re , to a dmi t th e bo ttl e of pil ls and the c hemical a

naly sis of those pills. Appellant’s third issue is overruled.

CO NC LU SION Havingdeter

mined that (1) the e videnc e wa s l egally sufficie nt to establish an aff irmative l ink betwee n appellant and the eighty -five white pills found in his possession and that (2 ) t he tr ial cou rt did no t e rr in a dmi tti ngthe pil ls o r t he ir c he mic a l a

na ly sis be c a

us e the State14

established the c hain of c ustody and bec ause the expert’s testimony was re liable, we a ffirm
a pp e lla nt’ s c on vic tio n f

or po sse ssi on

of a c on tr oll e d s ub sta

nc e we ig hin g mor e tha

n 2 8 g ra ms.

W. Kenneth L aw, Chief Justice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces B . A. Smith and Pury ear Affir med Filed: De cembe r 1, 2005 Do No t Pu

bli sh