*

 After an examination of the briefs and the record, we have concluded that

oral argument is unnecessary. Thus the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the

record. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted November 29, 2007*

Decided December 13, 2007

Before

Hon. JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge

Hon. DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge

Hon. DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

No. 06-4236

JACK JERVIS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

MICHAEL MITCHEFF,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Indiana,

South Bend Division

No. 3:05-CV-602 RM

Robert L. Miller, Jr.,

Chief Judge.

O R D E R

Jack Jervis, an inmate at the Indiana State Prison, claims in this action

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that prison doctor Michael Mitcheff refused to treat knee

and back injuries he suffered during an assault by another prisoner. The district

court screened Jervis’s amended complaint, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, and dismissed it

on the ground that it fails to state a claim. We vacate the judgment and remand for

further proceedings.

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 06-4236 Page 2

For purposes here we accept as true the allegations in the amended

complaint. See Westefer v. Snyder, 422 F.3d 570, 574 (7th Cir. 2005). According to

Jervis, another prisoner shoved him down a flight of stairs on August 2, 2003, and

he landed on a cement floor with his left leg pinned beneath him. Afterward he

experienced extreme pain in his left knee. The fall also reinjured a herniated disc

in his back that had required surgery in 1999, which caused additional pain. Jervis

has been confined to a wheelchair since the fall.

Jervis saw Dr. Mitcheff on September 2, 2003. Mitcheff told Jervis that he

did not need the wheelchair because there was nothing wrong with him. Mitcheff

also accused Jervis of lying about his previous back surgery and made no effort to

obtain the medical records from that surgery. During the examination, Mitcheff

grabbed and twisted Jervis’s left knee, causing him excruciating pain. Despite the

pain, Jervis was placed in a hospital segregation cell for six months, during which

time he did not receive medical care. 

For the next 24 months until Jervis filed suit (he signed his original

complaint in August 2005, but it did not reach the district court until September),

he continued directing complaints to Dr. Mitcheff about the pain in his knee and

back but was never examined again. Jervis also asked to be evaluated by an

orthopedic specialist, but Mitcheff refused to order a consult or even give him pain

medication for his injuries. As far as we can discern, Jervis has not yet received

treatment for his knee or back injuries.

Jervis claims in his amended complaint that Dr. Mitcheff displayed

deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs over an extended period of time

by refusing to investigate, diagnose, or treat his knee and back injuries. Although

Jervis grouped his allegations into a single claim, the district court separated them

into several parts. First, the court stated incorrectly that Jervis was seen by

Dr. Mitcheff on August 2, 2003, instead of September 2, and thus the court

concluded that any claim against Mitcheff for the pain he inflicted at that

appointment was barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations. See IND.

CODE § 34-11-2-4; Hoagland v. Town of Clearlake, 415 F.3d 693, 700 (7th Cir. 2005). 

Second, the court held that Jervis’s allegations of inadequate treatment and lack of

access to a specialist could not amount to deliberate indifference because Mitcheff

had provided some treatment and a prisoner is not entitled to “specific” treatment

or the “best care possible.” Finally, the court concluded that while failure to request

Jervis’s previous medical records “may have been negligent, even medical

malpractice,” it was “not the functional equivalent of wanting harm to come to”

Jervis and, therefore, did not amount to deliberate indifference.

On appeal Jervis argues that the district court erred in holding that his

amended complaint fails to state a claim for deliberate indifference. We review
No. 06-4236 Page 3

de novo a dismissal under § 1915A for failure to state a claim. Westefer, 422 F.3d at

574. To satisfy the notice-pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 8(a)(2), a complaint need only include “a short and plain statement of the

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2); see Bell

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964 (2007). A plaintiff must “provide

the grounds of his entitlement to relief” by saying enough to “raise a right to relief

above the speculative level,” Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1965-66 (internal quotation

marks, brackets, and citation omitted), though “[s]pecific facts are not necessary,”

Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007). See Airborne Beepers & Video,

Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 499 F.2d 663, 667 (7th Cir. 2007). Pro se complaints

are liberally construed and held to less-exacting standards than those drafted by

counsel. Alvarado v. Litscher, 267 F.3d 648, 651 (7th Cir. 2001).

 The district court erred in concluding that Jervis’s suit against Dr. Mitcheff

is partly barred by the statute of limitations. Unlike the district court, we do not

read the amended complaint to include multiple, discrete claims. Rather, Jervis

alleges that ever since he first met with Mitcheff in September 2003, he has not

received medical treatment for his knee and back injuries. Deliberate indifference

to a serious medical need is a continuing violation that accrues when the defendant

has notice of the untreated condition and ends only when treatment is provided or

the inmate is released. See Heard v. Sheahan, 253 F.3d 316, 318-19 (7th Cir. 2001). 

The statute of limitations commences anew every day that treatment is withheld,

see id. at 318, so in this case it does not matter whether Jervis sued more than two

years after he saw Mitcheff for the first and only time. In any event, the district

court should not have undertaken to address the statute of limitations at the

screening stage. A district court should not raise and resolve affirmative defenses

at screening unless the outcome is obvious and would render the suit frivolous,

see, e.g., Gleash v. Yuswak, 308 F.3d 758, 760 (7th Cir. 2002), and here the court

both misstated the date when Mitcheff examined Jervis and overlooked that the

“mailbox rule” governs the filing date of this lawsuit for limitations purposes,

see Edwards v. United States, 266 F.3d 756, 758 (7th Cir. 2001). 

As to the entirety of Jervis’s amended complaint, we conclude that it satisfies

notice-pleading standards. To state an Eighth Amendment claim, an inmate need

allege only that a prison official responded with deliberate indifference to a serious

medical need. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). A deliberate indifference

claim includes both an objective and a subjective component. Farmer v. Brennan,

511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). To prevail an inmate must first show that his medical

condition is “objectively, sufficiently serious,” id., which, in this context, means that

the medical condition “has been diagnosed by a physician” or “is so obvious that

even a lay person would perceive the need for a doctor’s attention,” Greeno v. Daley,

414 F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 2005). Second, the inmate must show that the officials

knew of and disregarded “an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Farmer,
No. 06-4236 Page 4

511 U.S. at 837. A disagreement with a doctor’s medical judgment or even evidence

of malpractice generally will not establish deliberate indifference, Estelle, 429 U.S.

at 106, but neither will dispensing a modicum of treatment automatically preclude

a deliberate indifference claim if a finder of fact could infer that the care provided

was so inadequate as to constitute intentional mistreatment, Edwards v. Snyder,

478 F.3d 827, 831 (7th Cir. 2007); Gil v. Reed, 381 F.3d 649, 664 (7th Cir. 2004);

Sherrod v. Lingle, 223 F.3d 605, 611-12 (7th Cir. 2000); Snipes v. DeTella, 95 F.3d

586, 592 (7th Cir. 1996).

The district court dismissed Jervis’s amended complaint with the explanation

that his allegations do not amount to deliberate indifference. As to the objective

prong, the district court did not question, and neither do we, that a knee injury and

herniated disc that required Jervis to use a wheelchair could constitute a serious

medical condition. See Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1370-71 (7th Cir. 1997)

(holding that “medical conditions far less critical than ‘life-threatening’” are

sufficient if denial of care results in pain and suffering that serve no penological

purpose). As to the subjective prong, however, we disagree with the court’s

conclusion that Jervis’s complaint cannot be read to allege indifference to his

injuries. Jervis alleges that Dr. Mitcheff knew of his injuries and pain from the

time the two met on September 2, 2003. Jervis also alleges that Mitcheff has

blinded himself to those injuries by refusing to adequately investigate and diagnose

the source of his pain, insisting there was nothing wrong with him, and by denying

his requests to see an orthopedic specialist. A fact finder could conclude that these

allegations, if true, evidence more than disagreement about the course of treatment

or Jervis’s disappointment with not receiving the “best care possible,” as the district

court concluded. Furthermore, the district court held that Mitcheff’s refusal to

obtain Jervis’s previous medical records did not show that Mitcheff intended to

harm Jervis, but deliberate indifference does not require intentional harm. See

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Thus, Jervis’s allegations are sufficient to state a claim

against Mitcheff for deliberate indifference.

Accordingly, the judgment is VACATED, and the case is REMANDED for

further proceedings.