United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 21-40235

Marin Lopez; Pedro Bermea; Trinidad Lopez; Arturo 

Menchaca; Eladio Bermudez; Javier Garcia; Robert 

Guerra; Luis Carlos Gonzalez; Epigmenio “TJ” 

Gonzalez; Juan Garcia, Jr.; Julio Eguia; Aaron Garcia, 

Plaintiffs—Appellees,

versus

Eduardo Ramirez; Noe Castillo; Basilio D. Villareal, 

Jr.; Roel Gonzalez, 

Defendants—Appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 7:20-CV-33

Before Richman, Chief Judge, and Higginbotham and Elrod, 

Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

* Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this 

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited 

circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

August 10, 2022

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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No. 21-40235

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This is an interlocutory appeal from a district court order that 

summarily denied defendants–appellants’ motion to dismiss. We VACATE

that order and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this 

opinion.

Twelve employees of Rio Grande City Consolidated Independent 

School District sued the school district and four members of the school board 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging First Amendment retaliation. The Board 

Members moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6)

and asserting legislative and qualified immunity. In a minute-entry order

without any reasons given, the district court summarily denied the 

defendants’ motion without prejudice to refile as a motion for summary 

judgment. The individual board-member defendants filed this interlocutory 

appeal.1

When multiple plaintiffs each lodge claims against multiple 

defendants, the complaint must allege sufficient facts to state plausible claims 

to relief as to each plaintiff’s claim against each defendant. See Lynch v. 

Cannatella, 810 F.2d 1363, 1377 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that “individual

[defendants] are entitled to specific recitals of the wrong each is alleged to 

have perpetrated on each plaintiff” (emphases added)). And “to overcome 

[an] immunity [defense],” a plaintiff “must plead specific facts that both 

allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 

for the harm he has alleged and that defeat [the] immunity defense with equal 

specificity. See Backe v. LeBlanc, 691 F.3d 645, 648 (5th Cir. 2012) (emphasis 

added).

1 We have jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal under the collateral order 

doctrine. See Carroll v. Ellington, 800 F.3d 154, 167–68 (5th Cir. 2015); Keko v. Hingle, 318 

F.3d 639, 642 n.3 (5th Cir. 2003) (“The denial of an immunity defense may be subject to 

interlocutory appeal.”).

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In this appeal, not only do we not have the benefit of granular plaintiffby-plaintiff and defendant-by-defendant analysis from the district court; we 

have no analysis or reasons given at all. When a district court’s order or 

opinion is not sufficiently reasoned for this court to review on appeal, we may 

vacate and remand for the district court to reassess the issue and offer reasons 

for its conclusion.

2 We do so here.

In returning this case, we note that among the chief benefits of an 

immunity defense is “protection from pretrial discovery, which is costly, 

time-consuming, and intrusive.” Backe, 691 F.3d at 648. For this reason, “a

defendant’s entitlement to . . . immunity should be determined at the earliest 

possible stage of the litigation.” Ramirez v. Guadarrama, 3 F.4th 129, 133 

(5th Cir. 2021) (ellipses added)).

Because we cannot ascertain the grounds for the district court’s

decision to allow discovery to proceed notwithstanding defendant–appellant 

Board Members’ immunity defenses, we VACATE and REMAND to

allow the district court to reassess Board Members’ motion on a plaintiff-byplaintiff, defendant-by-defendant basis and assign reasons for its subsequent 

decision.

2 See, e.g., Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Brown, 86 F. App’x 718, 719 (5th Cir. 2004) 

(remanding to the district court “for the limited purpose of permitting that court to state 

the reasons for its decision,” and noting that “[w]hen we have no notion of the basis for a 

district court’s decision because its reasoning is vague or simply left unsaid, there is little 

opportunity for effective review”); Thule Drilling ASA v. Schimberg, 290 F. App’x 745, 747 

(5th Cir. 2008) (“Because we are uncertain about the rationale for the district court’s 

decision, we VACATE and REMAND for entry of reasons in support of the granting of 

summary judgment . . . .”); Westwego Citizens for Better Gov’t v. City of Westwego, 872 F.2d 

1201, 1213 (5th Cir. 1989) (similar); cf. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 718 n.7 (2005) 

(“[W]e are a court of review, not of first view.”).

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