______________________________________ 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS 

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
 State of California
 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN
 Attorney General
 

OPINION :
 

: No. 91-804
 of :
 

:
 DANIEL E. LUNGREN : April 14, 1992

Attorney General :
 

:
 GREGORY L. GONOT :
 Deputy Attorney General :
 

:
 

THE HONORABLE M. J. HANNIGAN, COMMISSIONER OF THE CALIFORNIA 

HIGHWAY PATROL, has requested an opinion on the following question: 

May a citation be issued to a county as the owner of a vehicle being operated by a

county employee in a manner contrary to law? 

CONCLUSION 

A citation may be issued to a county as the owner of a vehicle being operated by a

county employee in a manner contrary to law. However, the county may not be held liable if the

driver or the person directing the operation of the vehicle is held solely responsible for the violation. 

ANALYSIS 

It is unlawful for the owner of a vehicle, or any other person employing or otherwise

directing the driver of a vehicle, to cause the operation of the vehicle upon a highway in any manner

contrary to law. Vehicle Code section 400011 provides: 

"(a) It is unlawful for the owner, or any other person, employing or otherwise

directing the driver of any vehicle to cause the operation of the vehicle upon a

highway in any manner contrary to law. 

"(b) It is unlawful for an owner to request, cause, or permit the operation of

any vehicle: 

"(1) Which is not registered or for which any fee has not been paid under this 

code. 

1

All section references are to the Vehicle Code unless otherwise specified. 
"(2) Which is not equipped as required in this code. 

"(3) Which does not comply with the size, weight, or load provisions of this 

code. 

"(4) Which does not comply with the regulations promulgated pursuant to

this code, or with applicable city or county ordinances adopted pursuant to this code. 

"(5) Which is not in compliance with the provisions of Part 5 (commencing

with Section 43000) of Division 26 of the Health and Safety Code and the rules and

regulations of the State Air Resources Board. 

"(c) Whenever a violation is chargeable to the owner or lessee of a vehicle

pursuant to subdivision (a) or (b), the driver shall not be arrested or cited for the

violation unless the vehicle is registered in a state or country other than California,

or unless the violation is for an offense that is clearly within the responsibility of the

driver. 

"(d) Whenever the owner or lessee is prosecuted for a violation pursuant to

the provisions of this section the court, may, on the request of the owner or lessee,

take appropriate steps to make the driver of the vehicle, or any other person who

directs the loading, maintenance or operation of the vehicle, a codefendant. In the 

event the codefendant is held solely responsible and found guilty, the court may

dismiss the charge against the owner or lessee." 

Section 40001 thus allows the issuance of a citation to the owner of a vehicle who causes a violation 

of law when the offense is not clearly within the responsibility of the driver. 

We are asked to determine whether a county, as the actual owner of a vehicle, may

be charged with various violations of the Vehicle Code under the provisions of section 40001. As 

examples, the violations might be for transporting an uncovered load of aggregate material (§

23114), in an overweight vehicle (§ 35550), with exhaust pipes mounted improperly (§ 27152). We 

conclude that a county may be so cited under the terms of section 40001. 

Does the term "owner" in section 40001 include public entities such as a county?

With respect to the general concept of "ownership" of vehicles, the court in Sadberry v. Griffiths 

(1961) 191 Cal.App.2d 610, 616, stated: 

"Vehicle Code, section 66 (now § 460), defines an `owner' as a person having

all the incidents of ownership, including legal title. Obviously `owner' is the broad 

and inclusive term. Depending upon the context of the discussion in which it is used,

it may and often does include the `legal owner' defined by section 67 (now § 370),

or `registered owner' defined by section 68 (now § 505)." 

As explained by the Court of Appeal in Martin v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. (1962) 200

Cal.App.2d 459, 469: 

"The word `owner,' as applied to motor vehicles, is commonly understood to

designate the person in whom title is vested either as legal owner or as registered 

owner. [Citations.]" 

2. 91-804
 
Several statutes concern the ownership of vehicles for purposes of the Vehicle Code.

Section 460 defines an "owner" as follows: 

"An `owner' is a person having all the incidents of ownership, including the

legal title of a vehicle whether or not such person lends, rents, or creates a security

interest in the vehicle; the person entitled to the possession of a vehicle as the

purchaser under a security agreement; or the State, or any county, city, district, or

political subdivision of the State, or the United States, when entitled to the 

possession and use of a vehicle under a lease, lease-sale, or rental-purchase

agreement for a period of 30 consecutive days or more." 

Section 370 defines a "legal owner" as follows: 

"A `legal owner' is a person holding a security interest in a vehicle which is

subject to the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, or the lessor of a vehicle

to the State or to any county, city, district, or political subdivision of the State, or to

the United States, under a lease, lease-sale, or rental-purchase agreement which

grants possession of the vehicle to the lessee for a period of 30 consecutive days or

more." 

Section 505 provides: 

"A `registered owner' is a person registered by the department as the owner of a

vehicle." 

Publicly owned vehicles and their operators are expressly mentioned throughout and

made subject to various requirements of the Vehicle Code. "Registration under this code shall apply

to any vehicle owned by the United States government, the state, or any city, county, or political

subdivision of the state . . . ." (§ 4155.) Public entities are exempt from the usual vehicle 

registration and licensing fees. (§§ 9101, 9103.) The statutory requirements for vehicle equipment

(§§ 24000-28114, 29000-31540) are made applicable "to all vehicles whether publicly or privately

owned when upon the highways, including all authorized emergency vehicles." (§ 24001.) Public 

entities are liable for injuries caused by their employees "in the operation of any motor vehicle."

(§ 17001; see §§ 17002-17004.) The requirements applicable to the driving of vehicles apply 

equally to drivers "while engaged in the course of employment by this State, any political

subdivision thereof, any municipal corporation, or any district, including authorized emergency

vehicles subject to those exemptions granted such authorized emergency vehicles in this code." (§

21052.) 

In analyzing these various statutes so as to resolve the question presented, we are

cognizant of several well established principles of statutory construction. As summarized by the 

Supreme Court in Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1379,

1386-1387: 

"Pursuant to established principles, our first task in construing a statute is to

ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law. In 

determining such intent, a court must look first to the words of the statute

themselves, giving to the language its usual, ordinary import and according

significance, if possible, to every word, phrase and sentence in pursuance of the

legislative purpose. A construction making some words surplusage is to be avoided.

The words of the statute must be construed in context, keeping in mind the statutory 

3. 91-804
 
 

purpose, and statutes or statutory sections relating to the same subject must be

harmonized, both internally and with each other, to the extent possible. [Citations.]" 

We are also directed "to produce a reasonable result," while "avoiding those constructions which

lead to mischief or absurdity." (People v. Jeffers (1987) 43 Cal.3d 984, 997-998.) Finally, special

rules apply when considering whether governmental entities are to be included within the scope of

a particular statute. In City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando (1975) 14 Cal.3d 199, 276-297,

the Supreme Court observed: 

"[I]n the absence of express words to the contrary, neither the state nor its

subdivisions are included within the general words of a statute. [Citations.] But this 

rule excludes governmental agencies from the operation of general statutory

provisions only if their inclusion would result in an infringement upon sovereign

governmental powers. `Where . . . no impairment of sovereign powers would result,

the reason underlying this rule of construction ceases to exist and the Legislature

may properly be held to have intended that the statute apply to governmental bodies

even though it used general statutory language only.' [Citations.]" 

Pursuant to these latter principles, governmental entities have been held subject to legislation which

by its terms applies simply to any "person." (City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, supra,

14 Cal.3d 199, 277; Bing v. City of Duarte (1967) 65 Cal.2d 627, 631-632; Flournoy v. State of 

California (1962) 57 Cal. 2d 497, 498-499; Hoyt v. Board of Civil Service Commrs. (1956) 21 Cal.

2d 399, 402; State of California v. Marin Mun. Water District (1941) 17 Cal. 2d 699, 704-705; Fair 

Political Practices Com. v. Suitee (1979) 90 Cal.App.3d 125, 132-133; Siegel v. City of Oakland

(1978) 79 Cal.App.3d 351, 356-357; Estate of Cooke (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 595, 602; see also 

Regents of University of California v. Superior Court (1976) 17 Cal.3d 533, 536-537.) 

For purposes of the Vehicle Code, a "person" is defined in section 470 as follows:

"`Person' includes a natural person, firm, copartnership, association, or corporation." We have 

previously determined, after applying the governing principles of statutory construction, that a

"person" (§ 470) includes a public entity. (64 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 94, 102-103 (1981) [state

legislative committee is a "person" under section 470].) Accordingly, a county would be a "person"

(§ 470) and thus an "owner" (§ 460), a "registered owner" (§ 505), and an "owner" (§ 40001) when

it has all the incidents of ownership, including legal title, and is registered with the Department of

Motor Vehicles as the registered owner. 

We reject the suggestion that a public agency is an owner of a vehicle only when it

leases the vehicle for "30 consecutive days or more." (§ 460.) This statutory language regarding

leases is traceable back to 1940. (Stats. 1941, First Ex. Sess. 1940, ch. 1, § 1.) It is apparent that

the language was intended to expand the definition of "owner" to cover public entities when they

did not actually own but merely leased a vehicle.2 It was not intended to cover solely their leased

vehicles to the exclusion of their other vehicles in which they had all the incidents of ownership,

including legal title. If a public agency is not the "owner" (§ 460) when it has all the incidents of

ownership, then the vehicle would have no owner for purposes of the Vehicle Code. Such 

construction of section 460 would "lead to mischief and absurdity" (People v. Jeffers, supra, 43 

Cal.3d at 998) and impermissibly conflict with the other statutory provisions, notably section 505.

Surely the Legislature intended public entities to be considered the owners of vehicles they actually

own if they are so considered when they merely lease vehicles. 

2

Under the 1940 legislative amendment, a political entity was considered the owner when it

leased the vehicle "for a period of twelve months or more." 

4. 91-804 
Returning to section 40001, then, we find that its apparent purpose is to create

accountability on the part of those who, because they employ or direct drivers, exercise a significant

degree of control over the operation of vehicles on the public highways and are in the best position

to ensure that the laws pertaining to vehicular fitness are observed. The statute on its face does not 

exempt any classification of employer. Except where the offense "is clearly within the responsibility

of the driver," the "owner" or "other person" who employs or directs the driver may be held

accountable. Subdivision (d) of the statute, however, allows the vehicle owner to shift responsibility

back to the driver or to the "person who directs the loading, maintenance or operation of the vehicle"

if so warranted. Taken as a whole, we find that section 40001 may be applied to public entities as

the owners of vehicles, as when they have all the incidents of ownership, including legal title. 

Although public entities are not commonly thought of in terms of being a defendant

in a criminal action, there is precedent for this particular type of prosecution. For example, under

the Hazardous Waste Control Act (Health & Saf. Code, § 25100 et seq.), a $25,000 per day fine and

imprisonment in the county jail may be imposed on the owner of a vehicle who engages in the

transportation of hazardous waste without a valid registration issued by the Department of Health

Services. Cities and counties have been subjected to the payment of fines under this statutory 

scheme. The issue here is the same; county funds may be required to pay the fine for the citation

issued rather than the county employee who happens to be the vehicle driver. 

Given all of the foregoing circumstances, we conclude that a citation may be issued

under the terms of section 40001 to a county as the owner of a vehicle being operated by a county

employee in a manner contrary to law. However, the county will not be held liable if the driver or

the person directing the operation of the vehicle is held solely responsible for the violation. 

* * * * * 

5. 91-804