### RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2486- 21 M.L., Plaintiff-Respondent,

v. D. J. W. , Sr ., Defendant-Appellant.

__________________________

Submitted March 4, 2024

– Decided March 21, 2024 Before Judges Mawla and Chase. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Ocean County, Docke t No. FV- 15

- 0886 -22.
D. J. W. , Sr., appellant pro se. M.L., respondent pro se.
PER CURIAM NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court. " Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parti es in the case and its use in other cases is limite d. R. 1:36- 3.2 A- 2486 -21

Defendant D.W., Sr

. 1 appeals from a March 2, 2022 final restraining ord er ("FRO") entered pursuant to the Prevention of Domes tic Violence Act ("PDVA"), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35, in favor of his ex-girlfriend, plaintiff M.L. We affirm.
I. The FRO judge conducted a two -day hearing and took testimony from both parties, plaintiff's sister, and the two responding officers. The judge found defendant committed the predicate acts of simple as sault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1, and terroristic threats, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3. He then con cluded the FRO was necessary to protect plaintiff from further acts of domestic violence. Plaintiff testified she dated defendant for approximately fourteen months. She explained that on November 22, 2021, she and defendant were in her car together when he became "enraged," drove dangerousl y, threatened to wreck the vehicle to kill them both, hit her over one dozen t imes with a wrench that was stored in the glove box, fractured her nose by stri king her with the wrench, and grabbed her throat. Plaintiff explained she told p olice about defendant's use of the wrench and was not sure why the officers did no t include that detail in the temporary restraining order (" TRO ") . She agreed she failed to mention

1 We use initials to protect the confidentiality of t he victim. R. 1:38 -3(d)(10).3 A- 2486 -21

defendant grabbed her by the throat due to being in shock at the time she made the report to police. Nevertheless, plaintiff's te stimony was consistent with the TRO regarding defendant threatening to cut her to p ieces; possessing a gun in the trunk; and accelerating the car while she was s till exiting. Plaintiff also testified defendant demanded to see her cell phone due t o jealousy and stole her purse because it contained her cell phone. Plaintiff further testified that after defendant le ft the scene, she called 9-1-1, filed for a restraining order, and allowed t he responding officers to take photographs of her injuries. She provided the cour t with additional photographs of her injuries that she took over the course of se veral days after the incident. Regarding the evidence adduced at trial, the court exclude d certain photographs and text messages that were not referenced in the o riginal TRO. During crossexamination, plaintiff disagreed with defendant's a llegations that she was jealous of defendant dating other women and that sh e hit him. S.L., plaintiff's sister, testified defendant made a poor impression on her when she met him. For example, he was drunk, made inappropriate jokes in front of her parents, and became hostile when peopl e disagreed with his political views. S.L. explained defendant previously accused plaintiff of cheating on him and admitted he logged into her social media accoun ts. She believed defendant4 A- 2486 -21

was unhappy when plaintiff ended their romantic rel ationship and threatened to destroy her personal property. On the night the TR O was entered, plaintiff told S.L. that defendant drove erratically, threatened t o kill her, hit her with a wrench, and had a gun in the trunk. S.L. testified she obs erved plaintiff's injuries and fu rther noted plaintiff was traumatized mentally and was fearful of defendant afterward. S he showed the court screenshots of a text message exchange with plaintiff made shortly after the incident, in which plaintiff described the night of the TRO

. Officer Kristopher Burke of the Barnegat Township P olice Department testified he responded to plaintiff's 9-1-1 call. He testified plaintiff reported defendant drove erratically, threatened to kill the m both, brandished a wrench, threatened to "chop her up into pieces," and claime d he possessed a gun in the trunk that he would use on her. He observed injuries sustained by plaintiff when defendant accelerat ed his vehicle as she tried to exit. According to Officer Burke, plaintiff did not repor t being hit with the wrench. While Officer Burke did not notice any inj uries to her face or neck, he conceded during cross-examination plaintiff was wea ring a scarf and turtleneck, which made it hard to see. He further conceded pla intiff may have mentioned defendant's use of the wrench to one of the other r esponding officers.5 A- 2486 -21

Officer Burke confirmed plaintiff emailed him sever al weeks later to mention defendant threatened her with a box cutter and hit her with a wrench. Plaintiff did not mention defendant choked her. Al though no gun was found in defendant's vehicle, defendant cooperated with poli ce in surrendering his
weapons. Later, Officer Burke prepared a supplemental report re garding the theft of plaintiff's purse. Alth ough defendant claimed he did not have plaintiff's purse and threw it from the car while driving down a spec ific street, another patrolman looked for the purse in the stated location to no a vail. Officer Burke also noted it was strange that defendant later produced the pu rse. He further concluded defendant attempted to access plaintiff's accounts on her phone. Officer Daniel Dugan, a patrolman in Barnegat Towns hip, testified he also responded to plaintiff's 9-1-1 call. He stated plaintiff did not mention the wrench, the box cutter, or being choked. Defendant testified he was an electrician and owned three businesses. He explained plaintiff worked for him and started livi ng with him soon after they began dating. He also mentioned they spent two vac ations together. He implied the decision to end their relationship was mutual a nd he started dating approximately ten women soon afterwards.6 A- 2486 -21

Defendant stated on the night the TRO was entered a gainst him, plaintiff repeatedly struck him five or six times over the co urse of thirty seconds because she was worried he infected her with a sexually transmitted disease. As a result, he decided to take her home instead of going to the movies as planned. Once they returned to her home, he alleged plaintiff pun ched him several times before exiting the car. He denied stealing her purse, thr eatening her with a wrench or box cutter, or hitting or choking her. He stated s he left her purse in the car, and she acted like she was going to "smash" his car aft er exiting it. He threw her purse from the vehicle in response

. He also claimed the photographs of her injuries were "fabricated." On cross-examination, defendant stated he did not p ursue a claim against plaintiff for striking him because he "didn't want to throw gasoline on the fire." Contradicting his testimony on direct examination , he claimed he kept the purse and threw it into a wooded area where it stayed unt il he was released from jail, retrieved it, and turned it into the police. When confronted with the fact the purse was not dirty despite allegedly having been t hrown into the woods, d ef endant stated he cleaned the purse, so it looked th e same as it did on the night the TRO was entered against him.7 A- 2486 -21

Defendant admitted he possessed plaintiff's cell ph one but claimed it fell from her purse and was in his vehicle. Although he claimed he turned her phone on, he denied logging into her Facebook, Facebook M essenger, or Gmail accounts. However, he could not explain the discre pancy between his prior statement that he turned on plaintiff's phone and h is later claim that only his child turned on the phone. Defendant denied a text message he sent on the day of the incident professing his continued love for plaintiff was int ended to be romantic. Rather, he contended any text messages he wrote about the t wo "try[ing] again" were meant to reference a platonic friendship. Defendant maintained plaintif f was angry at him for dating other women. Upon further questioning, defendant admitted he threatened suicide to plaintiff during their relationship. On March 2, 2022, the court entered an FRO against defendant and placed its reasoning on the record that same day. It concluded defendant lacked credibil it y in his claim that plaintiff was simply a "scorned " woman who was angry he was dating someone else. Plaintiff produc ed text messages demonstrating defendant wanted to pursue a romantic relationship with her. Defendant also provided incredible testimony that h e never threatened suicide, which was disproven by text messages. Further, the court found defendant's8 A- 2486 -21

testimony regarding his taking of plaintiff's purse lacked credibility because he made conflicting statements. The court concluded d efendant took pl aintiff's purse to access her cell phone. The court also expressed concern about plaintiff's credibility with regard to being struck repeatedly with a wrench, but held even without being struck with a wrench, there was enough evidence to support the issuance of a restraining order. Further, the court believed def endant accelerated the vehicle while plaintiff was exiting to take her purse and c ell phone. Overall, the court determined plaintiff was more credible throughout t he trial.
II. Our review of a court's decision after a bench tria l in the Family Part is limited. C.C. v. J.A.H., 463 N.J. Super. 419, 428 (App. Div. 2020). In reviewing "a trial court's order entered following trial in a domestic violence matter, we grant substantial deference to the trial court's fi ndings of fact and the legal conclusions based upon those findings." J.D. v. A. M.W., 475 N.J. Super. 306,
312 -13 (App. Div. 2023) (quoting N.T.B. v. D.D.B., 442 N.J. Super. 205, 215 (App. Div. 2015)). Trial court findings are "bindi ng on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence." G.M. v. C.V., 453 N.J. Super. 1, 11 (App. Div. 2018) (quoting Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998)).9 A- 2486 -21

"We defer to the credibility determinations made by the trial court because the trial judge 'hears the case, sees and observes the witnesses, and hears them testify,' affording it 'a better perspective than a reviewing court in evaluating the veracity of a witness.'" Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414, 428 (2015) (quoting Cesare, 154 N.J. at 412). Deference is particularl y appropriate "when the evidence is largely testimonial and involves questi ons of credibility." In re J.W.D., 149 N.J. 108, 117 (1997) (citing Bonnco Pet rol, Inc. v. Epstein, 115 N.J. 599, 607 (1989))

. We do not disturb a trial judge's factual findings unless they are "so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant[,] and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the inter ests of justice." S.D. v. M.J.R., 415 N.J. Super. 417, 429 (App. Div. 2010) ( quoting Cesare, 154 N.J. at 412). "We accord substantial deference to Family P art judges, who routinely hear domestic violence cases and are 'specially tra ined to detect the difference between domestic violence and more ordinary differe nces that arise between couples.'" C.C., 463 N.J. Super. at 428 (quoting J .D. v. M.D.F., 207 N.J. 458, 482 (2011)). The purpose of the PDVA is to "assure the victims o f domestic violence the maximum protection from abuse the law can provi de." G.M., 453 N.J. Super.10 A- 2486 -21

at 12 (quoting State v. Brown, 394 N.J. Super. 492, 5 04 (App. Div. 2007)); see also N.J.S.A. 2C:25-18. Consequently, "'[o]ur law is particularly solicitous of victims of domestic violence,' " J.D., 207 N.J. at 473 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Hoffman, 149 N.J. 564, 584 (1997) ), and courts liberally construe the PDVA "to achieve its salutary purposes ." Cesare, 154 N.J. at 400. Domestic violence occurs when an adult or emancipated minor commits a predicate act upon a person protected by the PDVA. N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a). A judge must engage in a two -step analysis when determining whether to grant an FRO under the PDVA. Silver v. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. 112, 125 (App. Div. 2006) . First, the judge must be satisfied, by a preponderance of the credible evidence, the plaintiff has proven the occurrence of one or more of the predicate acts enumerated in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a). Ibid. S ee also N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a) (providing an FRO may only be granted "after a finding or an admission is made that an act of

domestic violence was committed"); R. 5:7A(d) (mir roring the language of

N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a) ). Only if the plaintiff first proves one of the predicate acts does the judge then consider whether an FRO is warranted to prote ct the plaintiff. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. at 126; see also J.D., 207 N.J. at 476 (quoting N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(b) and explaining the judge must find "relief is necessary to prevent further11 A- 2486 -21

abuse"). While this second inquiry "is most often perfunctor y and self-evident, the guiding standard is whether a restraining order is necessary, upon an evaluation of the factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C: 25-29(a)(1) to -29(a)(6), to protect the victim from an immediate danger or to prevent fu rther abuse ." Id. at 475 -76 (quoting Silver, 387 N.J. Super. at 127).
III. On appeal, defendant argues the trial court's factu al findings and conclusions of law were not supported by credible e vidence. Even if they were, he claims the FRO was unnecessary to protect plaint iff.
A. Defendant disagrees with the court's conclusions th at he : wanted to rekindle his romantic relationship wi th plaintiff; previously threatened suicide; intentionally took plaintiff's purse; and wanted to look at the contents of her phone

. He further disagrees with the court's finding that plaintiff was more credible. Overall, he contends the domestic violence complain t should have been dismissed because he was the more credible wit ness. There is ample credible evidence in the record to s upport the court's conclusions. The trial court noted plaintiff's tes timony was more credible regarding defendant 's desire to continue their romantic relationship and12 A- 2486 -21

threatening self-harm. Defendant provided conflict ing and nonsensical statements about his continued romantic interest in plaintiff. For example, he denied a text message he sent on the day of the inc ident professing his continued love for plaintiff was intended to be romantic and, also, claimed any text messages that he wrote about the two "try[ing] agai n" were meant to reference

a platonic friendship. Further , he admitted he threatened suicide to plaintiff during their relationship. Although the parties have not s upplied us with copies of the text messages, the trial testimony of both parties supports the court's credibility determinations. The court also concluded, and the record on appeal supports, defendant provided conflicting stories about taking plaintiff 's purse and accessing her cell phone. Further, the court found plaintiff to be the more credible of the two and, even setting aside her claims about the wrench, the court believed her recounting of the events was credible. There is support for the court's conclusion that pl aintiff's testimony, excluding defendant's alleged use of the wrench, wa s sufficient to satisfy the legal standards for an FRO. Defendant's other conduct on the night in question, including his erratic driving, his claims that he w ould kill both himself and13 A- 2486 -21

plaintiff, and his decision to accelerate the car a s plaintiff tried to exit, were sufficient for the court to grant the FRO. In sum, the trial court's credibility determination s were not manifestly unsupported or inconsistent with the evidence in such a way that the interests of justice were offended. Rather, the court's finding as to the predicate act of domestic violence was proper based on the testimoni al evidence adduced.
B. Defendant further contends the court erred in granting t he FRO because it did not need to protect plaintiff from immediate da nger or protect her from further abuse

. He alleges plaintiff lives in another country where t he FRO will not protect her, and so the FRO unnecessarily depri ves him of his freedoms. The court concluded defendant repeatedly threatened plaintiff to put her in fear of bodily injury and made terroristic threa ts when he referenced a gun and drove erratically

. It found an FRO was necessary to protect plaintiff and she credibly testified she suffered injuries from d efendant. The court rejected defendant's claims that plaintiff lived abroad and the two would not cross paths.
It ordered defendant to avoid plaintiff when she retu rned to the United States and to avoid her place of employment in the United States. The record also reflects plaintiff was a permanent U.S. citizen wor king in the United States.14 A- 2486 -21

There was substantial credible evidence in the reco rd to support the court' s determination that the second prong of Silver was s atisfied. The record supports the court's conclusion that plaintiff needed protec tion from further abuse by defendant, who committed severe acts of violence an d threatened to kill plaintiff. The trial court's findings are adequate ly supported by the substantial, credible evidence in the record, and we discern no basis to disturb them. To the extent we have not specifically addressed d efendant's remaining claims, we conclude they lack sufficient merit to wa rrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11 -3(e)(1)(E). Affirmed.