alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>                     <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUL-31-1997             JUL-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             AUG-01-1996             AUG-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               OCT-31-1996             OCT-31-1997
<CASH>                                               0               1,497,965
<SECURITIES>                                         0                       0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0               1,800,075
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0                 162,017
<INVENTORY>                                          0                       0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0               3,884,713
<PP&E>                                               0               8,867,923
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0               1,215,790
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                       0              17,500,204
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0               6,407,417
<BONDS>                                              0                       0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0                       0
<PREFERRED>                                          0                       0
<COMMON>                                             0              17,465,538
<OTHER-SE>                                           0            (10,577,879)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                         0              17,500,204
<SALES>                                      2,968,450               6,031,319
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             2,968,450               6,031,319
<CGS>                                        2,594,083               3,876,081
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                3,877,798               7,007,165
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               (2,078)                (43,257)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0                       0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              43,697                 364,960
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (950,967)             (1,297,549)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0                       0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (950,967)             (1,297,549)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0                       0
<CHANGES>                                            0                       0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (950,967)             (1,297,549)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.04)                   (.04)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.04)                   (.04)
        

</TABLE>
#### In re: Melvin Raynard JONES; Monica Alexander Jones, Debtors. Melvin Raynard Jones, Debtor—Appellant, v. North Carolina Department of Child Support Enforcement, c/o Virginia Division of Child Support Enforcement, Defendant—Appellee.

No. 08-1354.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: May 29, 2008.

Decided: June 4, 2008.

Melvin Raynard Jones, Appellant Pro Se. Brian Randall Jones, Virginia Department of Social Services, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee.

Before TRAXLER, GREGORY, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

*299PER CURIAM:

Melvin Raynard Jones appeals the district court’s order affirming the bankruptcy court’s decision denying Jones’ motion to reopen his bankruptcy case and permit him to file an adversary proceeding. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. *Jones v. North Carolina Dep’t of Child Supp. Enforcement,*No. 7:07-cv-00564-SGW, 2008 WL 523857 (W.D.Va. Feb. 26, 2008) & (Mar. 4, 2008). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*
# U nit edStates C ou rt o f App eal s For t h e Firs t C ircu it

No. 05-2522 ADAM JENNINGS, Plaintiff, Appellant,

v. KENNETH JONES, Defendant, Appellee.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND [Hon. Ernest C. Torres, U.S. District Judge]

Before Torruella, Lynch and Lipez, Circuit Judges.

ORDER OF COURT Entered: August 17, 2007 Appellee Kenneth Jones filed a petition for rehearing en banc in this case, which, under our Internal Operating Procedure X, encompasses a petition for panel rehearing. Th e p etition for rehearing is granted. Accordingly, the panel's March 7, 2007, opinion is withdrawn and the judgment of even date vacated. The panel majority now issues a new opinion, which eliminates the po r t i o n of the original panel opinion concluding that the defendant had abandoned his motions for a new trial and a remittitur. Instead, the new opinion orders a remand so that the district court may address these motions. However, the portion of the decision concluding that the district court erred in vacating the jury verdict on the basis of qualified immunity remains intact. Hence, we once again order reinstatement of the jury verdict.In conjunction with the issuance of the majority opinion this

day, Judge Lynch files her dissent to the majo r i t y ' s decision vacating the judgment of the district court. By the Court: Richard Cushing Donovan, Clerk. _____/s/_________________________ By: Margaret Carter, Chief Deputy Clerk

[Certified copies to Hon. Ernest C. Torres and Mr. David DiMarzio, Clerk, United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island. Copies to Mr. Bradley and Ms. Partington.]
FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

_____________________________

No. 1D20-3115

_____________________________

GUARDIANSHIP OF MARGARET 

SANDERS and the Guardian,

CLEDITH SANDERS,

Appellant,

v.

JUDITH L. COWART, Esquire,

Appellee.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County.

Jack Schemer, Judge.

September 8, 2021

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

RAY, MAKAR, and M.K. THOMAS, JJ., concur.

_____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

_____________________________
2

Kevin S. Sanders, Kevin S. Sanders, LLC, Jacksonville, for 

Appellant.

Judi Cowart, Atlantic Beach, Appellee.
Exhibit 10.1

 

ACCESSION AGREEMENT

 

 

THIS ACCESSION AGREEMENT, dated as of December 1, 2011, is entered into by SNH CALI TENANT LLC, a Delaware limited liability company (the “Company”).

 

RECITALS:

 

The Company has entered into a Management Agreement (the “Management Agreement”) with FVE Managers, Inc., a Maryland corporation (“Manager”), dated as of December 1, 2011, with respect to the assisted living facility known as Tiffany Court and located at 1866 San Miguel Drive, Walnut Creek, California (“Tiffany Court”).

 

Manager and certain affiliates of the Company are parties to that certain Pooling Agreement, dated as of May 12, 2011, by and among the Manager and the parties listed on Schedule A thereto (the “Pooling Agreement”).  Capitalized terms used in this Accession Agreement without definition shall have the meanings given to such terms in the Pooling Agreement.

 

The Company desires to become a party to the Pooling Agreement with respect to Tiffany Court.

 

NOW, THEREFORE:

 

The Company hereby accedes and becomes a party to the Pooling Agreement as an Additional TRS, agrees to be bound by the provisions of the Pooling Agreement with respect to Tiffany Court, and acknowledges that provisions of the Management Agreement will be superseded as provided therein, on and after the date first above written.

 

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this Accession Agreement has been duly executed and delivered by the Company with the intention of creating an instrument under seal.

 

 

	
 
    	
COMPANY:
    
	
 
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
SNH CALI TENANT LLC,
    
	
 
    	
a Delaware limited liability   company
    
	
 
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
By: 
    	
/s/ Richard A. Doyle
    
	
 
    	
 
    	
 Richard A. Doyle
    
	
 
    	
 
    	
 President
    


 











 

ACCEPTED:

 

	
FVE   MANAGERS, INC.,
    	
 
    
	
a Maryland corporation
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
 
    
	
By: 
    	
/s/ Bruce J. Mackey Jr.
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
 Bruce J. Mackey Jr.
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
 President
**UN PUBLISHED** 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 16** 
**- 7532** 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ,
Plaintiff

- Appellee ,

v.

LEWIS THOMAS CORNELL ,
Defendant

- Appellant

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina , at Greensboro

. Catherine C. Eagles , District Judge. ( 1:00

- cr
- 00204

- CCE

- 3 )

Submitted : February 16 , 2017 Decided: February 22, 2017

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, DUNCAN, Circuit Judge, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge

.

Affirmed by un published per curiam opinion

.

Lewis Thomas Cornell, Appellant Pro Se. Robert Michael Hamilton, Angela Hewlett Miller, Assistant United States Attorneys, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM:

Lewis Thomas Cornell appeals from the district court’ s order
denying his motion for reconsideration of the court’ s order
granting his 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (2012) motion for reduction of

his sentence based on an amendment to the U.S. Sentencing

Guidelines Manual

. We have reviewed the record and find no

reversible error. Accordingl y, we affirm the district court’ s

order. See United States v. Goodwyn , 596 F.3d 233, 234 (4th Cir.

2010) (a district court has no authority to reconsider its decision

on a sentence reduction motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)). We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions

are ade quately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 98-41115

Conference Calendar

 

DALE N. SMITH,

Petitioner-Appellant,

versus

R.E. HOLT, WARDEN; BUREAU OF PRISONS;

UNITED STATES PAROLE COMMISSION; US GOVERNMENT,

Respondents-Appellees.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas

USDC No. 1:98-CV-1489

- - - - - - - - - -

June 17, 1999

Before EMILIO M. GARZA, BENAVIDES, and PARKER, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:*

Dale Noel Smith, federal inmate # 90045-132, appeals the

district court’s dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition for

failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Smith moves for

leave to supplement his brief on appeal and for an expedited

ruling on his appeal. The motions are DENIED.

Federal prisoners must exhaust “administrative remedies

before seeking habeas relief in federal court under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2241.” Fuller v. Rich, 11 F.3d 61, 62 (5th Cir. 1994). We 
No. 98-41115

-2-

review the dismissal of a § 2241 petition for failure to exhaust

for an abuse of discretion. Id. 

Smith contends that he exhausted his administrative remedies

and that he should not be held responsible for Respondents’

failure to follow the proper procedure. The doctrine of

exhaustion of administrative remedies requires a prisoner to

pursue all “prescribed administrative remedies which might

provide appropriate relief . . . prior to seeking relief in the

federal courts.” Smith v. Thompson, 937 F.2d 217, 219 (5th Cir.

1991)(internal quotation and citation omitted). The record shows

that Smith did not complete the administrative appeals procedure. 

The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing

Smith’s petition. Accordingly, the district court’s judgment is

AFFIRMED.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-30-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             DEC-26-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-2000
<CASH>                                           4,084
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  123,152
<ALLOWANCES>                                     9,289
<INVENTORY>                                     23,493
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               167,022
<PP&E>                                          54,939
<DEPRECIATION>                                  28,197
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 448,130
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           91,587
<BONDS>                                        346,887
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           320
<OTHER-SE>                                    (33,478)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   448,130
<SALES>                                        555,724
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               555,724
<CGS>                                          312,603
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  312,603
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                10,474
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              26,594
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (9,887)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   (1,337)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (8,550)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (8,550)
<EPS-BASIC>                                          0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0


</TABLE>
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision **

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

GABRIEL MINASYAN; HASMIK

MINASSIAN; HAKOB MINASYAN,

 Petitioners,

 v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,

 Respondent.

No. 11-70743

Agency Nos. A075-648-887

A075-648-888

A075-648-890

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted July 24, 2013** 

Before: ALARCÓN, CLIFTON, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.

Gabriel Minasyan, Hasmik Minassian, and Hakob Minasyan, natives and

citizens of Armenia, petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’

(“BIA”) March 15, 2011, order denying their motion to reconsider and/or reopen. 

Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for abuse of

FILED

JUL 31 2013

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 11-70743

discretion denials of motions to reconsider and motions to reopen. Mohammed v.

Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 791 (9th Cir. 2005). We deny in part and dismiss in part

the petition for review.

In their motion to the BIA, petitioners argued the BIA erred previously by

not considering all the evidence they submitted. The BIA did not abuse its

discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reconsider where the motion did not

establish any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior order. See 8 C.F.R. §

1003.2(b)(1). 

We lack jurisdiction to address petitioners’ contentions related to the BIA’s

2010 decision denying their prior motion to reopen because the petition for review

is untimely as to that order. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1); Singh v. Mukasey, 533

F.3d 1103, 1110 (9th Cir. 2008) (an untimely petition for review must be dismissed

for lack of jurisdiction).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.
IIA 

114TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. J. RES. 35 

Providing for congressional disapproval under chapter 8 of title 5, United 

States Code, of the final rule of the Department of Labor relating 

to ‘‘Interpretation of the ‘Advice’ Exemption in Section 203(c) of the 

Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act’’. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

JUNE 9, 2016 

Mr. FLAKE (for himself and Mr. ALEXANDER) introduced the following joint 

resolution; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on 

Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions 

JOINT RESOLUTION 

Providing for congressional disapproval under chapter 8 of 

title 5, United States Code, of the final rule of the 

Department of Labor relating to ‘‘Interpretation of the 

‘Advice’ Exemption in Section 203(c) of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act’’. 

1 Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives

2 of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 That Congress disapproves the rule submitted by the De4 partment of Labor relating to ‘‘Interpretation of the ‘Ad5 vice’ Exemption in Section 203(c) of the Labor-Manage6 ment Reporting and Disclosure Act’’ (81 Fed. Reg. 15923 


smartinez on DSK3GLQ082PROD with BILLS
2 

•SJ 35 IS 

1 (March 24, 2016)), and such rule shall have no force or 

2 effect. 

Æ 


smartinez on DSK3GLQ082PROD with BILLS
Exhibit 32.2








CERTIFICATION OF CFO PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350





In connection with the annual report on Form 10-K of ClubCorp Holdings, Inc. (the “Company”) for the fiscal year ended December 27, 2016 , as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Curtis D. McClellan, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, that:





(1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company at the dates and for the periods presented.








/s/ Curtis D. McClellanCurtis D. McClellanChief Financial Officer and Treasurer(principal financial officer)





Date: April 26, 2017





A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to ClubCorp Holdings, Inc. and will be retained by ClubCorp Holdings, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.





This Certification is not deemed filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission and is not to be incorporated by reference into any filing of the registrant under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (whether made before or after the date of the Report), irrespective of any general incorporation language contained in such filing.
#### BARGER v. SOUTHEASTERN GREYHOUND LINES and eight other cases.

Nos. 1659-1667..

United States District Court E. D. Tennessee, S. D.

Feb. 6, 1951.

Graham & Van Derveer, Chattanooga, Tenn., for plaintiff.

Strang, Fletcher & Carriger, Chattanooga, Tenn., for defendant.

DARR, Chief Judge.

In each of the above cases, the defendant has moved for a more definite statement of the case pursuant to the provisions of Rule 12(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A.

In view' of the provisions of Rule 8(a) that the pleading shall contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”, and" in view of the provisions for discovery which the Rules afford, the Court considers that the complaints are sufficient with one exception.

*180There is want of clarity as to whether the second count (so-called) is intended to present a claim for libel or for false imprisonment.

The statement of- facts at the commencement of the complaint outlining an alleged false imprisonment is by reference made a part of the second count, whereas the second count, taken by itself, seems grounded on libel.

The plaintiffs are therefore required to clarify the allegations of the second count to indicate clearly whether it is intended to set up a cause of action for false imprisonment or for libel.

In other respects the defendants’ motions are overruled. ■

Order accordingly.
<PAGE>
                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.1


                CERTIFICATION REQUIRED BY 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
     (AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002)

I, Charles R. Eitel, as Chief Executive Officer of Simmons Company (the
"Company"), certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 (as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002), that to my knowledge:

            (1) the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the quarter
      ended March 27, 2004 (the "Report"), being filed with the U.S. Securities
      and Exchange Commission on the date hereof, fully complies with the
      requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of
      1934, as amended; and

            (2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
      material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
      the Company.

Date: May 12, 2004                  /s/ Charles R. Eitel
                                    ---------------------------------
                                    Name: Charles R. Eitel
                                    Title:   Chief Executive Officer

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
provided to Simmons Company and will be retained by Simmons Company and
furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
Second Amendment to the Employment  Agreement - Bradley M. Robinson



 Exhibit 10.15 
 SECOND AMENDMENT TO EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT 
 This Second Amendment (the
“Amendment”) to that certain employment agreement between Matador Resources Company, a Texas corporation (“Matador”), acting through its Board of Directors, and Bradley M. Robinson (“Employee”)
dated August 9, 2011, as previously amended (collectively, with the prior amendment, the “Agreement”) is entered into and effective as of December 1, 2011. 

WHEREAS, Matador and Employee previously entered into the Agreement; and 

WHEREAS, Matador and Employee desire to modify the timing of any payment to be made pursuant to Section 14(b) of the
Agreement. 
 NOW, THEREFORE, Matador and Employee hereby agree to amend the Agreement as follows, effective as of the
date hereof: 
 1. Section 14(b) of the Agreement is restated in its entirety to provide as follows: 

(b) If Employee’s employment is terminated by the Company for a reason other than as described
in Section 14(a) or (c), or is terminated by Employee for Good Reason pursuant to Section 12(g), the Company shall (i) pay to Employee all Accrued Obligations as required under applicable wage payment laws and in accordance with the
Company’s customary payroll practices, and (ii) subject to Employee’s compliance with Sections 8 and 9, pay to Employee severance pay in an amount equal to one (1) times his then-current Base Salary as of the Date of Termination,
plus one (1) times an amount equal to the average annual amount of all bonuses paid to Employee with respect to the prior two (2) calendar years, in a lump sum, subject to Section 16(b), on the sixtieth (60th) day following the Date of Termination. Employee shall have no
obligation to seek other employment, and any income so earned shall not reduce the foregoing amounts. 
 [REMAINDER OF PAGE
INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK.] 







 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Matador and Employee have duly executed this Amendment to be effective
as of the date set forth above. 
  

			
	MATADOR RESOURCES COMPANY
		
	By:	 	/s/ Joseph Wm. Foran
		 	 Joseph Wm. Foran
 Chairman of Board and Chief
 Executive Officer



  

			
	EMPLOYEE
	
	/s/ Bradley M. Robinson
	Bradley M. Robinson, individually


 Signature Page 

  
 2