alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
### NUMBER 13
- 1 6
- 00 058
- CR


## COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI
- EDINBURG

MICHAEL DEWAYNE DIAZ , A ppellant ,

v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, A ppellee

.

On a ppeal from the 1 30 th District Court of Matagorda County, Texas.



## MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Benavides, Perkes, and Longoria Memorandum Opinion Per Curiam This appeal was abated by this Court on February 10, 2016 , and remanded to the trial court for a determination of whether appellant is indigent and entitled to appointed

counsel. The trial court made findings of fact and conclusions of law and this Court

ordered the Honorable Bill Leathers to notify this Court o f the status of his representation.2

The Honorable Bill Leathers has notified this Court that he is appellant’s counsel. Accordingly this appeal is REINSTATED. Appellant, Michael Dewayne Diaz , attempts to appeal a conviction for escape

. The trial court has certified that “ the defendant has waived the right of appeal. ” See T EX

. R. A PP

. P . 25.2(a)(2). On March 4, 2016, t his Court notified appellant ’ s counsel of the

trial court ’ s certification and ordered counsel to: (1) review the record; (2) determine

w hether appellant has a right to appeal; and (3) forward to this Court, by letter, counsel ’ s findings as to whether appellant has a right to appeal, or, alternatively, advise this Court as to the existence of any amended certification.
On March 28, 2016 , counsel responded by filing an affidavit with this Court.
Counsel ’ s response does not establish that the certification currently on file with this Court is incorrect or that appellant otherwise has a right to appeal. The Texas Rules of Appellate Proce dure provide that an appeal must be dismissed
if the trial court ’ s certification does not show that the defendant has the right of appeal.

T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 25.2(d); see T EX

. R. A PP

. P . 37.1, 44.3, 44.4. Accordingly, this appeal is
DISMISSED.
PER CURIAM

Do not publish. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P . 47.2(b).

D elivered and filed the 19th day of May, 2016

.
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-13-00045-CV

Jeanine DOMINGUEZ,

Appellant

v.

BANK OF AMERICA,

Appellee

From the County Court at Law No. 10, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 381930

Honorable Irene Rios, Judge Presiding

PER CURIAM

Sitting: Catherine Stone, Chief Justice

Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

Delivered and Filed: March 6, 2013

DISMISSED

Appellant filed a motion to dismiss this appeal. The appellee was served with a copy of 

Appellant’s motion; Appellee has not filed a response. Therefore, we grant the motion and 

dismiss the appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.1(a)(1). Costs of this appeal are taxed against 

Appellant. See id. R. 42.1(d).

PER CURIAM
Exhibit 32.2
 CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
 PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANESOXLEY ACT OF 2002
  (a)
    
    the Form 10Q of the Company for the quarter ended September 30, 2010 filed on the
date hereof with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the Report) fully complies with
the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934; and(b)
    
    the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
 By:
    /s/ John R. Troka, Jr.John R. Troka, Jr.Interim Chief Financial Officer
United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

_____________ No. 97-2470

_____________ Joseph W. Marti, Jr.; Mike Alsop; * Greg McDonald; Ray Powers; James E. * Swift; Steve Nelson; Milton Jones; * Eric Cole, Jr.; Robert Edmound; Fred * Hodges, Jr.; Mike Jablonowski; David * First; Martin Hooper; * * Plaintiffs - Appellants, * * George Petsoff; * * Plaintiff, * * Mike Abernathy; Rick A. Atchley; * John J. Caswell, Jr.; Maury Weiner; * Appeal from the United States Paul Diecker; Joe Gaeta; Chris Cannon; * District Court for the Henry Meyers; Barry McClintock; * Eastern District of Missouri. Jerry Holloway; Nick Millick; Patrick * Dougherty; Chris Schenk; * [UNPUBLISHED] * Plaintiffs - Appellants, * * Keith Lombardo; * * Plaintiff, * * Dan Hensley; Joe Insalaco; * * Plaintiffs - Appellants, * * John Doe, I through XX; Salvatore *The H onorable Stephen N. Limbaugh, United States District Judge for th e 1 Eastern District of Missouri. -2- Orlando; Byron Carson; * * Plaintiffs, * * Keith Moorehead; Daniel Murphy; * Chris Cannon; Henry Meyers; Raymond * Marti, III; John W. Turner; Clarence * Aulbach, Jr.; * * Plaintiffs - Appellants, * * v. * * Grey Eagle Distributors, Inc.; * * Defendant - Appellee. *

_____________ Submitted: January 16, 1998 Filed: February 2, 1998

_____________ Before BOWMAN, WOLLMAN, and HANSEN, Circuit Judges.

_____________ PER CURIAM. The pla intiffs in this lawsuit alleged violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act an dasserted other claims against their employer, Grey Eagle Distributors, Inc. Th e District Court, having granted Gr ey Eagle's motion to reconsider a previously granted 1 motion by the plaintiffs to amend the complaint by interlineation to add approximately thirty new plaintiffs, then granted summary judgment for Grey Eagle on statute-of--3-

limitations grounds. In granting Grey Eagle's motion for reconsideration, the court fo und that the addition of the approximately thirty new plaintiffs would be in direc t contravention of the court's order establishing a cut-off date for adding plaintiffs.
I n this appeal, the plaintiffs contend the District Court abused its discretion by granting Gr

ey Eagle's motion for reconsideration. Having reviewed the case, we find no abuse of discretion. We further find that the issues do not warrant extende d discussion. See 8th Cir. R. 47B. Grey Eagle characterizes the appeal as frivolous and requests an award o f at torney fees incurred in its defense of the appeal. The plaintiffs' arguments are convoluted and confusing, and some of them, we agree, are plainly frivolous. But even though w e discern no merit in any of the plaintiffs' arguments, we are not prepared to say that th e appeal as a whole is entirely frivolous. Accordingly, the request fo r attorney fees is denied. Grey Eagle is, of course, entitled torecover its costs. See Fed. R. App. P. 39; 8th Cir. R. 39A.
The decision of the District Court is affirmed. A true copy.
Attest: CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
```

[Congressional Bills 114th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 984 Referred in House (RFH)]

114th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 S. 984

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             April 22, 2015

 Referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce, and in addition to 
   the Committee on Ways and Means, for a period to be subsequently 
   determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such 
 provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 
  To amend title XVIII of the Social Security Act to provide Medicare 
 beneficiary access to eye tracking accessories for speech generating 
  devices and to remove the rental cap for durable medical equipment 
 under the Medicare Program with respect to speech generating devices.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Steve Gleason Act of 2015''.

SEC. 2. PROVIDING MEDICARE BENEFICIARY ACCESS TO EYE TRACKING 
              ACCESSORIES FOR SPEECH GENERATING DEVICES.

    (a) In General.--Section 1861(n) of the Social Security Act (42 
U.S.C. 1395x(n)) is amended by inserting ``and eye tracking and gaze 
interaction accessories for speech generating devices furnished to 
individuals with a demonstrated medical need for such accessories'' 
after ``appropriate organizations)''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) shall 
apply with respect to devices furnished on or after January 1, 2016.

SEC. 3. REMOVING THE RENTAL CAP FOR DURABLE MEDICAL EQUIPMENT UNDER 
              MEDICARE WITH RESPECT TO SPEECH GENERATING DEVICES.

    Section 1834(a)(2)(A) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 
1395m(a)(2)(A)) is amended--
            (1) in clause (ii), by striking ``or'' at the end;
            (2) in clause (iii), by adding ``or'' at the end; and
            (3) by inserting after clause (iii) the following new 
        clause:
                            ``(iv) in the case of devices furnished on 
                        or after October 1, 2015, and before October 1, 
                        2018, which serves as a speech generating 
                        device or which is an accessory that is needed 
                        for the individual to effectively utilize such 
                        a device,''.

            Passed the Senate April 22, 2015.

            Attest:

                                                JULIE E. ADAMS,

                                                             Secretary.
```
Exhibit 31.1

CERTIFICATION

I, Andrew
Kang, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this report on Form 10-K and all reports on Form 10-D required to be filed in respect of the period
covered by this report on Form 10-K of Santander Drive Auto Receivables Trust 2013-3 (the Exchange Act periodic reports);

2.
Based on my knowledge, the Exchange Act periodic reports, taken as a whole, do not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such
statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3. Based on my knowledge, all of the distribution,
servicing and other information required to be provided under Form 10-D for the period covered by this report is included in the Exchange Act periodic reports;

4. Based on my knowledge and the servicer compliance statements required in this report under Item 1123 of Regulation AB, and except
as disclosed in the Exchange Act periodic reports, the servicers have fulfilled their obligations under the servicing agreements in all material respects; and

5. All of the reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed securities and their related attestation reports on
assessment of compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed securities required to be included in this report in accordance with Item 1122 of Regulation AB and Exchange Act Rules 13a-18 and 15d-18 have been included as an exhibit to this
report, except as otherwise disclosed in this report. Any material instances of noncompliance described in such reports have been disclosed in this report on Form 10-K.

In giving the certifications above, I have reasonably relied on information provided to me by the following unaffiliated parties: Wells Fargo
Bank, National Association.



By:

/s/ Andrew KangName:

Andrew KangTitle:

President and Chief Executive OfficerSantander Drive Auto Receivables LLC, as
Depositor(senior officer in charge of securitization ofthe depositor)Date:

March 30, 2017
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 98-60156

 Conference Calendar

 

JERRY W. WASHINGTON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

EARNEST DAWSON; DEBBIE HUGGINS; JEFFERY CAIN,

Defendants-Appellees.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Mississippi

USDC No. 4:97-CV-30-D-A

- - - - - - - - - -

August 19, 1998

Before KING, HIGGINBOTHAM, and JONES, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:*

Jerry W. Washington, a Mississippi inmate (# 82762), appeals

the dismissal of his civil rights complaint for failure to state

a claim on which relief may be granted, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Washington argues that the district court

erred in determining that he had failed to state a cognizable 42

U.S.C. § 1983 claim that the defendants had failed to protect him

from an assault by another inmate. We have reviewed the record

and Washington’s brief and find no reversible error. We 
No. 98-60156

-2-

therefore AFFIRM for essentially the same reasons stated by the

magistrate judge in his report and recommendation, which was

adopted by the district court. See Washington v. Dawson, No.

4:97-CV-30-D-B (N.D. Miss. Oct. 9, 1997); see also Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833-34, 842-43 (1994).

AFFIRMED.
Margaret Griffith #1998464

742 F.M. 712

Marlln, 76661

05/29/2016

Dear Cierk,

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Irecently received your letter dated May 3, 2016 informing me Of-a-^form|^ *

submission ON BRIEFS ONLY" set for June 8, 2016.1 did not receive this letter until

Tuesday May 24*^. When Ilooked more closely Irealized that the address on the

clerk's response is incorrect.

Wouid you please correct my address to read:

Margaret Griffith 1998464

742 FM 712

Marlin, TX 76661

Thank you very much.

Respectfully,

Margaret Griffith
MargaretGriffith 1998464

742 FM 712

Martin, TX 76661

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PJODISTfSISCT

31 MAY2SD<1£.PM31

Fourth Court of Appeals

Cadena-Reeves Justice Center

300 Dolorosa, Suite 3200

San Antonio, TX 7.8205

7B20S-3i3000
United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

No. 05-2522

ADAM JENNINGS,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

KENNETH JONES,

Defendant, Appellee.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

[Hon. Ernest C. Torres, U.S. District Judge]

Before

 Torruella, Lynch and Lipez, Circuit Judges.

ORDER OF COURT

Entered: August 17, 2007

Appellee Kenneth Jones filed a petition for rehearing en banc

in this case, which, under our Internal Operating Procedure X,

encompasses a petition for panel rehearing. The petition for

rehearing is granted. Accordingly, the panel's March 7, 2007,

opinion is withdrawn and the judgment of even date vacated.

The panel majority now issues a new opinion, which eliminates

the portion of the original panel opinion concluding that the

defendant had abandoned his motions for a new trial and a

remittitur. Instead, the new opinion orders a remand so that the

district court may address these motions. However, the portion of

the decision concluding that the district court erred in vacating

the jury verdict on the basis of qualified immunity remains intact.

Hence, we once again order reinstatement of the jury verdict.
In conjunction with the issuance of the majority opinion this

day, Judge Lynch files her dissent to the majority's decision

vacating the judgment of the district court.

By the Court:

Richard Cushing Donovan, Clerk.

_____/s/_________________________

By: Margaret Carter, Chief Deputy Clerk

[Certified copies to Hon. Ernest C. Torres and Mr. David DiMarzio,

Clerk, United States District Court for the District of Rhode

Island. Copies to Mr. Bradley and Ms. Partington.]
EXHIBIT 32.1

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
  AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER

Ludwig Kuttner, Chief Executive Officer, and Charles W. Clayton, Chief Financial
Officer of Hampshire Group, Limited, each hereby certify that:

1)   The  Quarterly  Report of  Hampshire  Group,  Limited  on Form 10-Q for the
     period  ended  April 2,  2005 as filed  with the  Securities  and  Exchange
     Commission  on the date  hereof  (the  "Report")  fully  complies  with the
     requirements  of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the  Securities  Exchange Act of
     1934, and

2)   The information  contained in the Report fairly  presents,  in all material
     respects,  the  financial  condition and results of operations of Hampshire
     Group, Limited.




                                            /s/ Ludwig Kuttner
                                            --------------------------
Date:  May 6, 2005                          Ludwig Kuttner
------------------                          Chief Executive Officer




                                            /s/ Charles W. Clayton
                                            ---------------------------
Date:  May 6, 2005                          Charles W. Clayton
------------------                          Chief Financial Officer
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM FORM 10-Q,
FOR THE THREE MONTHS ENDED MARCH 31, 2000 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY
REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-2000
<CASH>                                           2,501
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   50,599
<ALLOWANCES>                                   (3,402)
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0
<PP&E>                                       2,699,107
<DEPRECIATION>                               (176,545)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               2,614,660
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           75,697
<BONDS>                                      1,093,100
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           633
<OTHER-SE>                                   1,369,097
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 2,614,660
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                89,678
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                 (47,315)
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                   855
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              17,852
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 23,491
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             23,491
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    23,491
<EPS-BASIC>                                       0.37
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.37


</TABLE>
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1998
<CASH>                                           6,826
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   26,101
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                23,884
<PP&E>                                       2,293,567
<DEPRECIATION>                                (71,174)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               2,316,298
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           56,259
<BONDS>                                        819,037
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           623
<OTHER-SE>                                   1,370,503
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 2,316,298
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               204,833
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               135,259
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              31,139
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 65,386
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    65,386
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     1.14
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     1.14
        

</TABLE>
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING 

MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED 

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL 

OF FLORIDA 

SECOND DISTRICT 

CHARLES E. HARRIS, ) 

 ) 

 Appellant, ) 

 ) 

v. ) Case No. 2D14-3281 

 ) 

STATE OF FLORIDA, ) 

 ) 

 Appellee. ) 

___________________________________ ) 

Opinion filed April 22, 2015. 

Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 

9.141(b)(2) from the Circuit Court for Polk 

County; Reinaldo Ojeda, Judge. 

Charles E. Harris, pro se. 

MORRIS, Judge. 

Charles E. Harris appeals the summary denial of his motion for 

postconviction relief filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.853. We reverse 

and remand for further proceedings because the postconviction court failed to follow the 

procedures required by rule 3.853. 

 In 1983, Harris was found guilty of first-degree premeditated murder, 

attempted first-degree premeditated murder, armed burglary, and armed robbery. After 
filing two previous facially insufficient rule 3.853 motions, Harris filed the motion at issue 

here requesting a court order for the examination of several items of physical evidence 

that he alleged would exonerate him. 

 The postconviction court examined the record and denied Harris's motion 

on its merits. But if a postconviction court finds that a rule 3.853 motion is facially 

sufficient,1 it must order a response from the State. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.853(c)(2); 

Zollman v. State, 820 So. 2d 1059, 1063 n.2 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). A response is 

required even when an examination of the record conclusively shows that the defendant 

is not entitled to relief. Id. at 1063 n.2. Only after the response is received and 

reviewed is the court to enter an order on the merits of the motion or set the motion for 

hearing. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.853(c)(3). 

 Accordingly, we reverse the order denying Harris's rule 3.853 motion and 

remand for the postconviction court to comply with the procedural requirements of rule 

3.853. 

 Reversed and remanded with directions. 

 

WALLACE and KHOUZAM, JJ., Concur. 

 1See generally Saffold v. State, 850 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) 

(discussing the requirements for a facially sufficient rule 3.853 motion).