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Volume 598 U. S. Part 1 

Pages 230–263 

OFFICIAL REPORTS 

OF 

THE SUPREME COURT 

April 19, 2023 

REBECCA A. WOMELDORF 

reporter of decisions 

NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before 

the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter 

of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D.C. 20543, 

pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors. 
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230 OCTOBER TERM, 2022 

Syllabus 

REED v. GOERTZ 

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for 

the fth circuit 

No. 21–442. Argued October 11, 2022—Decided April 19, 2023 

A Texas jury found petitioner Rodney Reed guilty of the 1996 murder of 

Stacey Stites. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affrmed Reed's 

conviction and death sentence. In 2014, Reed fled a motion in Texas 

state court under Texas's post-conviction DNA testing law. Reed requested DNA testing on certain evidence, including the belt used to 

strangle Stites, which Reed contended would help identify the true perpetrator. The state trial court denied Reed's motion, reasoning in part 

that items Reed sought to test were not preserved through an adequate 

chain of custody. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affrmed, and 

later denied Reed's motion for rehearing. Reed then sued in federal 

court under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, asserting that Texas's post-conviction 

DNA testing law failed to provide procedural due process. Reed argued that the law's stringent chain-of-custody requirement was unconstitutional. The District Court dismissed Reed's complaint. The Fifth 

Circuit affrmed on the ground that Reed's § 1983 claim was fled too 

late, after the applicable 2-year statute of limitations had run. The 

Fifth Circuit held that the limitations period began to run when the 

Texas trial court denied Reed's motion, not when the Texas Court of 

Criminal Appeals denied rehearing. 

Held: When a prisoner pursues state post-conviction DNA testing through 

the state-provided litigation process, the statute of limitations for a 

§ 1983 procedural due process claim begins to run when the state litigation ends, in this case when the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied 

Reed's motion for rehearing. Pp. 234–237. 

(a) Texas's three threshold arguments lack merit. First, Reed has 

standing because Reed suffciently alleged an injury in fact: denial of 

access to the requested evidence by the state prosecutor (the named 

defendant). A federal court conclusion that Texas's post-conviction 

DNA testing procedures denied Reed due process would “amount to a 

signifcant increase in the likelihood” that Reed “would obtain relief that 

directly redresses the injury suffered.” Utah v. Evans, 536 U. S. 452, 

464. Second, Texas's invocation of the State's sovereign immunity fails 

because the Ex parte Young doctrine allows suits like Reed's for declaratory or injunctive relief against state offcers in their offcial capacities. 

209 U. S. 123, 159–161. Third, Reed's procedural due process claim does 

not contravene the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Pp. 234–235. 
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Syllabus 

(b) The sole question before the Court is whether Reed's § 1983 suit 

raising a procedural due process challenge to Texas's post-conviction 

DNA testing law was timely under the applicable 2-year statute of limitations. The statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff has 

a “complete and present cause of action,” Bay Area Laundry and Dry 

Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal., 522 U. S. 192, 

201, a determination the Court makes by focusing frst on the specifc 

constitutional right alleged to have been infringed. See McDonough v. 

Smith, 588 U. S. –––, –––. Here, that right is procedural due process. 

A procedural due process claim is complete not “when the deprivation 

occurs” but only when “the State fails to provide due process.” Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U. S. 113, 126. Texas's process for considering a 

request for DNA testing in capital cases includes both trial court proceedings and appellate review, which under Texas Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 79.1 encompasses a motion for rehearing. In Reed's case, 

the State's alleged failure to provide Reed with a fundamentally fair 

process was complete when the state litigation ended—when the Texas 

Court of Criminal Appeals denied Reed's motion for rehearing. Therefore, the statute of limitations began to run on Reed's § 1983 claim when 

Reed's motion for rehearing was denied. Pp. 235–237. 

995 F. 3d 425, reversed. 

Kavanaugh, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, 

C. J., and Sotomayor, Kagan, Barrett, and Jackson, JJ., joined. 

Thomas, J., fled a dissenting opinion, post, p. 237. Alito, J., fled a dissenting opinion, in which Gorsuch, J., joined, post, p. 256. 

Parker Rider-Longmaid argued the cause for petitioner. 

With him on the briefs were Kyser Blakely, Cliff C. Gardner, 

Michelle L. Davis, Barry C. Scheck, and Jane Pucher. 

Judd E. Stone II, Solicitor General of Texas, argued the 

cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Ken Paxton, Attorney General of Texas, Brent Webster, First Assistant Attorney General, Ari Cuenin and Bill Davis, Deputy 

Solicitors General, Michael R. Abrams and Kyle D. Highful, 

Assistant Solicitors General, and Cody Coll, Assistant Attorney General.* 

*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the Constitutional 

Accountability Center by Elizabeth B. Wydra, Brianne J. Gorod, and 

Brian R. Frazelle; for Eight Retired Judges by Jessica L. Ellsworth and 

Jo-Ann Tamila Sagar; for Federal Courts Scholars by Meaghan VerGow; 
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232 REED v. GOERTZ 

Opinion of the Court 

Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court. 

In many States, a convicted prisoner who still disputes 

his guilt may ask state courts to order post-conviction DNA 

testing of evidence. If the prisoner's request fails in the 

state courts and he then fles a federal 42 U. S. C. § 1983 procedural due process suit challenging the constitutionality of 

the state process, when does the statute of limitations for 

that § 1983 suit begin to run? The Eleventh Circuit has held 

that the statute of limitations begins to run at the end of 

the state-court litigation denying DNA testing, including the 

state-court appeal. See Van Poyck v. McCollum, 646 F. 3d 

865, 867 (2011). In this case, by contrast, the Fifth Circuit 

held that the statute of limitations begins to run when the 

state trial court denied DNA testing, notwithstanding a subsequent state-court appeal. See 995 F. 3d 425, 431 (2021). 

We conclude that the statute of limitations begins to run at 

the end of the state-court litigation. 

I 

In 1996, Stacey Stites was strangled to death in Bastrop 

County, Texas. The State charged Rodney Reed with murfor the Law Enforcement Action Partnership et al. by Jim Davy; for the 

NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc., by Janai Nelson, Sam 

Spital, and Adam Murphy; for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. by Barbara E. Bergman, Clark M. Neily III, Jay R. 

Schweikert, John W. Whitehead, Sean M. SeLegue, and David D. Cole; and 

for Texas Exonerees et al. by Craig E. Stewart. 

Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the State of 

Montana et al. by Austin Knudsen, Attorney General of Montana, David 

M. S. Dewhirst, Solicitor General, and Kathleen L. Smithgall, Assistant 

Solicitor General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States 

as follows: Steve Marshall of Alabama, Treg Taylor of Alaska, Leslie Rutledge of Arkansas, Lawrence Wasden of Idaho, Jeff Landry of Louisiana, 

Lynn Fitch of Mississippi, John M. O'Connor of Oklahoma, Alan Wilson 

of South Carolina, and Sean D. Reyes of Utah. 

Briefs of amici curiae were fled for Chase Baumgartner by Michael L. 

Ware; and for Fred Smith, Jr., by Gregory Dubinsky. 
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Opinion of the Court 

dering Stites. At trial, Reed claimed that he was innocent 

and that Stites's fancé or another acquaintance had committed the murder. A jury rejected that defense theory 

and found Reed guilty. Reed was sentenced to death. The 

Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affrmed the conviction and 

death sentence. Reed's state and federal habeas petitions 

were unsuccessful. 

Then in 2014, Reed fled a motion in state court under 

Texas's post-conviction DNA testing law. See Tex. Code 

Crim. Proc. Ann., Arts. 64.01–64.05 (Vernon 2018). Reed requested DNA testing on more than 40 pieces of evidence, 

including the belt used to strangle Stites. Reed contended 

that DNA testing would help identify the true perpetrator. 

The state prosecutor, respondent Bryan Goertz, agreed to 

test several pieces of evidence, but otherwise opposed the 

motion and refused to test most of the evidence. 

The state trial court denied Reed's motion. The court 

reasoned in part that (i) many items Reed sought to test— 

including the belt—were not preserved through an adequate 

chain of custody and (ii) Reed did not demonstrate that he 

would have been acquitted if the DNA results were exculpatory. On appeal, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affrmed the trial court and later denied Reed's motion for 

rehearing. 

Reed next sued in federal court under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, 

asserting that Texas's post-conviction DNA testing law 

failed to provide procedural due process. Among other 

things, Reed argued that the law's stringent chain-of-custody 

requirement was unconstitutional and in effect foreclosed 

DNA testing for individuals convicted before “rules governing the State's handling and storage of evidence were put in 

place.” App. 39. 

The U. S. District Court for the Western District of Texas 

dismissed Reed's complaint. The U. S. Court of Appeals for 

the Fifth Circuit affrmed on the ground that Reed's § 1983 

suit was fled too late, after the applicable 2-year statute of 
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234 REED v. GOERTZ 

Opinion of the Court 

limitations had run. The Fifth Circuit ruled that the statute of limitations began to run when the Texas trial court 

denied Reed's motion (which occurred more than two years 

before Reed fled his § 1983 suit in federal court), not when 

the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied rehearing. 

Because the federal Courts of Appeals disagree about 

when the statute of limitations begins to run for a § 1983 suit 

regarding a State's post-conviction DNA testing procedures, 

we granted certiorari. 596 U. S. ––– (2022). 

II 

Texas raises three threshold arguments. 

First, Texas argues that Reed lacks standing. We disagree. Reed suffciently alleged an injury in fact: denial of 

access to the requested evidence. The state prosecutor, who 

is the named defendant, denied access to the evidence and 

thereby caused Reed's injury. And if a federal court concludes that Texas's post-conviction DNA testing procedures 

violate due process, that court order would eliminate the 

state prosecutor's justifcation for denying DNA testing. It 

is “substantially likely” that the state prosecutor would 

abide by such a court order. Utah v. Evans, 536 U. S. 452, 

464 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). In other 

words, in “terms of our `standing' precedent, the courts 

would have ordered a change in a legal status,” and “the 

practical consequence of that change would amount to a signifcant increase in the likelihood” that the state prosecutor 

would grant access to the requested evidence and that Reed 

therefore “would obtain relief that directly redresses the injury suffered.” Ibid. 

Second, Texas invokes the State's sovereign immunity. 

But the Ex parte Young doctrine allows suits like Reed's for 

declaratory or injunctive relief against state offcers in their 

offcial capacities. 209 U. S. 123, 159–161 (1908). 

Third, Texas contends that Reed's procedural due process 

claim contravenes the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See 
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Opinion of the Court 

Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U. S. 413 (1923); District of 

Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U. S. 462 (1983). 

That doctrine prohibits federal courts from adjudicating 

cases brought by state-court losing parties challenging statecourt judgments. But as this Court explained in Skinner v. 

Switzer, even though a “state-court decision is not reviewable by lower federal courts,” a “statute or rule governing 

the decision may be challenged in a federal action.” 562 

U. S. 521, 532 (2011). Here, as in Skinner, Reed does “not 

challenge the adverse” state-court decisions themselves, but 

rather “targets as unconstitutional the Texas statute they 

authoritatively construed.” Ibid. 

III 

This Court's case law “severely limits the federal action 

a state prisoner may bring for DNA testing.” Skinner v. 

Switzer, 562 U. S. 521, 525 (2011). The Court has “rejected 

the extension of substantive due process to this area, and 

left slim room for the prisoner to show that the governing 

state law denies him procedural due process.” Ibid. (citation omitted); see District Attorney's Offce for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U. S. 52, 69, 72 (2009). 

Seeking to ft his § 1983 suit within the “slim room” left by 

this Court's precedent, Reed raised a procedural due process 

challenge to Texas's post-conviction DNA testing law. The 

sole question now before this Court is whether Reed's § 1983 

suit was timely. The parties agree that the statute of limitations for Reed's claim is two years. But the parties disagree about when that 2-year limitations period began to 

run. That question is one of federal law. See Wallace v. 

Kato, 549 U. S. 384, 388 (2007). 

As a general matter, the statute of limitations begins to 

run when the plaintiff has a “complete and present cause 

of action.” Bay Area Laundry and Dry Cleaning Pension 

Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal., 522 U. S. 192, 201 (1997) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). To determine when a 
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Opinion of the Court 

plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action, the 

Court focuses frst on the specifc constitutional right alleged 

to have been infringed. See McDonough v. Smith, 588 U. S. 

–––, ––– (2019). 

Here, the specifc constitutional right allegedly infringed 

is procedural due process. A procedural due process claim 

consists of two elements: (i) deprivation by state action of a 

protected interest in life, liberty, or property, and (ii) inadequate state process. See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U. S. 113, 

125 (1990). Importantly, the Court has stated that a procedural due process claim “is not complete when the deprivation occurs.” Id., at 126. Rather, the claim is “complete” 

only when “the State fails to provide due process.” Ibid. 

Reed contends that the State's process for considering his 

DNA testing request was fundamentally unfair in violation 

of the Due Process Clause. Texas's process for considering 

a request for DNA testing in capital cases includes not only 

trial court proceedings, but also appellate review by the 

Court of Criminal Appeals. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., 

Art. 64.05. And under longstanding Texas rules of appellate 

procedure, the Court of Criminal Appeals's appellate review 

process encompasses a motion for rehearing. Tex. Rule 

App. Proc. 79.1 (2022). 

In Reed's case, the State's alleged failure to provide Reed 

with a fundamentally fair process was complete when the 

state litigation ended and deprived Reed of his asserted 

liberty interest in DNA testing. Therefore, Reed's § 1983 

claim was complete and the statute of limitations began to 

run when the state litigation ended—when the Texas Court 

of Criminal Appeals denied Reed's motion for rehearing. 

The soundness of that straightforward conclusion is “reinforced by the consequences that would follow” from a contrary approach. McDonough, 588 U. S., at –––. If the statute of limitations for a § 1983 suit like Reed's began to run 

after a state trial court's denial of a plaintiff 's motion for 

DNA testing (or even after the appeal before the plaintiff's 
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Thomas, J., dissenting 

rehearing proceedings), the plaintiff would likely continue to 

pursue relief in the state system and simultaneously fle a 

protective federal § 1983 suit challenging that ongoing state 

process. That parallel litigation would “run counter to core 

principles of federalism, comity, consistency, and judicial 

economy.” Id., at –––. We see no good reason for such 

senseless duplication. 

Moreover, signifcant systemic benefts ensue from starting the statute of limitations clock when the state litigation 

in DNA testing cases like Reed's has concluded. If any due 

process faws lurk in the DNA testing law, the state appellate 

process may cure those faws, thereby rendering a federal 

§ 1983 suit unnecessary. And if the state appellate court 

construes the DNA testing statute, that construction will 

streamline and focus subsequent § 1983 proceedings. 

In sum, when a prisoner pursues state post-conviction 

DNA testing through the state-provided litigation process, 

the statute of limitations for a § 1983 procedural due process claim begins to run when the state litigation ends. 

In Reed's case, the statute of limitations began to run when 

the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied Reed's motion 

for rehearing. Reed's § 1983 claim was timely.1 

We reverse the judgment of the U. S. Court of Appeals for 

the Fifth Circuit. 

It is so ordered. 

Justice Thomas, dissenting. 

The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (CCA) affrmed the 

denial of petitioner Rodney Reed's state-law motion for post1 According to Reed, a plaintiff may forgo full appellate review in the 

state-court system and still bring a procedural due process suit challenging a State's post-conviction DNA testing law. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 9–14. 

As this Court indicated in District Attorney's Offce for Third Judicial 

Dist. v. Osborne, it may be “diffcult” as a practical matter “to criticize the 

State's procedures when [the prisoner] has not invoked them.” 557 U. S. 

52, 71 (2009). In any event, we need not address that hypothetical 

scenario. 
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Thomas, J., dissenting 

conviction DNA testing. Reed petitioned this Court for certiorari, arguing that the CCA's interpretation and application of the relevant state law violated his federal due process 

rights. After we denied his petition, Reed repackaged it as 

a complaint in Federal District Court, naming respondent 

(the Bastrop County District Attorney) as a placeholder defendant. Like his earlier certiorari petition, Reed's complaint assails the CCA's state-law reasoning as inconsistent with due process, and it seeks a declaration that the 

CCA's interpretation and application of state law was 

unconstitutional. 

Reed's action should be dismissed for lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction. Federal district courts lack appellate 

jurisdiction to review state-court judgments, and Reed's 

action presents no original Article III case or controversy 

between him and the district attorney. Because the Court 

erroneously holds that the District Court had jurisdiction 

over Reed's action, I respectfully dissent. 

I 

A 

On April 23, 1996, 19-year-old Stacey Stites failed to report for her 3:30 a.m. shift at the H.E.B. grocery store in 

Bastrop, Texas. The truck Stites drove to work was found 

abandoned in the Bastrop High School parking lot a couple 

of hours later. That afternoon, a passerby discovered Stites' 

body in a ditch by a country road, her clothing disturbed 

in a manner suggesting sexual violence. Medical examiners 

determined that Stites had been strangled to death with her 

own belt, which was found in two pieces—one near the truck, 

the other near Stites' body. There was semen in Stites' vagina and rectum and saliva on her breasts. The police concluded that Stites had been raped and murdered. 

Despite a wide-ranging investigation, the police were initially unable to fnd a DNA match for the bodily fuids recovered from Stites' corpse. Then, about six months after 
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Thomas, J., dissenting 

Stites' death, Reed was arrested for kidnaping and attempting to rape and murder another young woman near the route 

Stites typically took to work and around the same time of 

night when Stites had gone missing. Reed lived near the 

high school and was often seen walking the surrounding area 

at night. Intrigued, the police checked Reed's DNA profle, 

which Texas had on fle from an earlier sexual-assault case 

against him. A series of tests established a conclusive, onein-the-world-population match between Reed and the fuids 

recovered from Stites' corpse. 

When frst questioned, Reed insisted that he did not know 

Stites at all, unaware that the police had DNA evidence disproving that claim. By the time of his trial, he had changed 

his story: He and Stites were having a consensual affair, and 

someone else—perhaps her jealous fancé—had committed 

the murder. The jury rejected that post hoc narrative and 

found Reed guilty. In the separate penalty phase, Reed's 

kidnaping victim testifed about how Reed had abducted, 

threatened, and attempted to rape her before she was fortuitously able to escape. Four other women—and one underage girl—also testifed that Reed had brutally beaten and 

raped them in the past. Reed was sentenced to death. 

The CCA affrmed Reed's conviction and sentence in 2000. 

In the 23 years since, he has kept up a constant stream of 

postconviction flings asserting his innocence. Every few 

years, Reed's lawyers have produced a new theory and a new 

purportedly exculpatory affdavit. With the patience of Job, 

the Texas courts have duly considered them all. On one 

such occasion, the CCA noted “the complete lack of a cohesive theory of innocence” across Reed's unending series of 

attempts to relitigate his guilt. Ex parte Reed, 271 S. W. 3d 

698, 746 (2008).1 

1 One example encapsulates the meritlessness of those attempts. In one 

of his many state postconviction proceedings, Reed submitted an affdavit 

from his own father, Walter, stating that an acquaintance had told him 

that he knew where Stites was the night she died. Reed submitted no 
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240 REED v. GOERTZ 

Thomas, J., dissenting 

B 

In Texas, a convict has two distinct avenues to obtain postconviction DNA testing of evidence—one executive and discretionary, the other judicial and legal. As for the frst, the 

convict can attempt to reach an agreement with the district 

attorney, who has broad discretion to order or allow DNA 

testing. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 39–40. In the case of the second, the convict can fle a motion under Tex. Code Crim. 

Proc. Ann., Arts. 64.01 through 64.05 (Vernon 2018) (Chapter 

64), which requires “the convicting court” to “order testing” 

if the movant establishes certain requirements. Ex parte 

Gutierrez, 337 S. W. 3d 883, 889–890 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). 

In 2014, on the same day that the trial court held a hearing 

to set Reed's execution date, Reed fled a Chapter 64 motion 

for DNA testing of a large number of items. The district 

attorney consented to test some of the items outside of the 

Chapter 64 framework, but he otherwise opposed Reed's request. The trial court denied the motion, fnding that Reed 

had not established two necessary elements for Chapter 64 

testing: (1) that he “would not have been convicted if exculpatory results had been obtained through DNA testing,” 

Art. 64.03(a)(2)(A); and (2) that his Chapter 64 motion was 

“not made to unreasonably delay the execution of sentence 

or administration of justice,” Art. 64.03(a)(2)(B). Reed appealed, and the CCA remanded for the trial court to address 

the other elements of the Chapter 64 rubric. After making 

supplemental fndings, the trial court again denied Reed's 

motion, and Reed again appealed. 

In April 2017, the CCA issued an opinion affrming the 

trial court. First, the CCA held that the record supported 

the trial court's fnding that many of the items had not “been 

affdavit from the acquaintance. The State then obtained an affdavit 

from the acquaintance, in which he swore that he “ `never told Walter Reed 

that I knew where Stacey Stites was on the night she was killed. All I 

ever told Walter was that Rodney Reed was a crackhead who raped girls 

on the [railroad] tracks. I have no idea where Stacey Stites was when 

she died.' ” 271 S. W. 3d, at 736. 
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Thomas, J., dissenting 

subjected to a chain of custody suffcient to establish that 

[they had] not been substituted, tampered with, replaced, or 

altered in any material respect.” Art. 64.03(a)(1)(A)(ii); see 

Reed v. State, 541 S. W. 3d 759, 769–770. Second, it held 

that Reed had not shown “a reasonable likelihood” that many 

of the items “contain[ed] biological material suitable for 

DNA testing.” Art. 64.03(a)(1)(B); see 541 S. W. 3d, at 772. 

Third, addressing only the items that survived the previous 

two holdings, the CCA held that Reed had not established 

that exculpatory results from DNA testing of those items 

would have prevented his conviction. See id., at 773–777. 

Finally, the CCA held that Reed had failed to establish that 

his Chapter 64 motion was not made for purposes of delay. 

See id., at 777–780. The CCA noted that “Chapter 64 had 

existed with only slight variations for over thirteen years at 

the time Reed fled his motion,” and that Reed's motion was 

suspiciously fled “on the same day the judge heard the 

State's motion to set an execution date.” Id., at 779. 

Reed moved for rehearing, arguing that the CCA had misapplied the Chapter 64 elements and asserting, in broad 

terms, that those errors violated his due process rights. 

See App. to Pet. for Cert. in Reed v. Texas, O. T. 2017, No. 

17–1093, pp. 263a–272a. The CCA denied rehearing by summary order in October 2017. 

Reed then timely petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari to review the CCA's judgment. His petition contended 

that the CCA's judgment “violate[d his] due process rights” 

because it was based on “arbitrary and fundamentally unfair interpretation[s]” of Chapter 64's chain-of-custody and 

unreasonable-delay elements. Pet. for Cert. in No. 17–1093, 

pp. i–ii. We denied certiorari. See Reed v. Texas, 585 

U. S. ––– (2018). 

C 

In August 2019, Reed sued the district attorney under 

Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, in the U. S. District 

Court for the Western District of Texas. As relevant here, 

Reed's complaint alleges that he successfully “proved each 
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242 REED v. GOERTZ 

Thomas, J., dissenting 

of the statutory requirements of [Chapter] 64” in the statecourt proceedings, App. 31, ¶52, but that “the CCA's adoption of non-statutory criteria to preclude . . . Reed from testing key trial evidence to prove his innocence violate[d] fundamental notions of fairness and denie[d] him due process of 

law,” id., at 14, ¶2. Reed proceeds to allege “several ways” 

in which “[t]he CCA's interpretation and application of 

[Chapter] 64 violate[d] fundamental fairness,” id., at 41, ¶79, 

with particular focus on the CCA's allegedly arbitrary constructions of the chain-of-custody, unreasonable-delay, and 

exculpatory-results elements, see id., at 41–42, ¶¶79–81; 43– 

45, ¶¶84–87. For relief, “Reed seeks a declaration that 

[Chapter] 64, as interpreted, construed and applied by the 

Texas courts to deny his motion for DNA testing, violates 

his rights under” the Constitution. Id., at 14, ¶3; see also 

id., at 49 (prayer for relief ). 

The district attorney moved to dismiss Reed's complaint 

for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and for failure to state 

a claim. See Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 12(b)(1) and (b)(6). The 

District Court held that it had jurisdiction but dismissed 

Reed's complaint on the merits, concluding that Reed had 

alleged only “that he disagree[d] with the state court's construction of Texas law” and that none of the issues in the 

complaint “r[ose] to the level of a procedural due-process violation.” 2019 WL 12073901, *7 (WD Tex., Nov. 15, 2019). 

The Fifth Circuit affrmed on the alternative ground that 

Reed's claim was untimely: Applying Texas' 2-year statute 

of limitations for personal-injury claims, it reasoned that 

Reed's due process claim accrued when the trial court frst 

denied his Chapter 64 motion, rendering his complaint several years too late. 995 F. 3d 425, 431 (2021). 

II 

Two intertwined principles of federal jurisdiction—Article 

III standing and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine2

—mandate a 

2 See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U. S. 462 

(1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U. S. 413 (1923). 
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Thomas, J., dissenting 

fnding that the District Court lacked jurisdiction over this 

action. The majority gives short shrift to these principles, 

and its holding that Reed's claim was timely serves only to 

underscore its antecedent jurisdictional errors. 

A 

The Constitution limits the federal courts' jurisdiction to 

“Cases” and “Controversies,” Art. III, § 2, cl. 1, constraining 

judicial power to “the determination of real, earnest and 

vital controvers[ies] between” contending litigants. Chicago & Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Wellman, 143 U. S. 339, 345 

(1892). “[A]n essential and unchanging part of [this] caseor-controversy requirement” is the doctrine of Article III 

standing. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560 

(1992). Under that doctrine, any party requesting relief 

from a federal court must assert “an injury” that is “concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent,” and he must 

show that his injury is both “fairly traceable to the challenged action” and “redressable by a favorable ruling.” 

Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U. S. 139, 149 

(2010); see also Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates, Inc., 581 

U. S. 433, 438–439 (2017). Absent that showing, the court 

has no jurisdiction and thus no “power to adjudicate the 

case.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 

U. S. 83, 89 (1998) (emphasis deleted). 

Jurisdiction, moreover, comes in two types—original and 

appellate—and the application of the Article III standing elements is interwoven with that constitutionally grounded 

distinction. See Art. III, § 2, cl. 2. In an original case or 

controversy, the plaintiff traces his injury “to the defendant's 

allegedly unlawful conduct,” Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S. 737, 

751 (1984), and, correspondingly, seeks a remedy that runs 

against the defendant and determines that defendant's duties 

or liabilities (e. g., a judgment for money damages or an injunction). On the other hand, “[t]he criterion which distinguishes appellate from original jurisdiction, is that it revises 

and corrects the decisions of another tribunal.” Ex parte 
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Thomas, J., dissenting 

Bollman, 4 Cranch 75, 86 (1807); see also Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 175–176 (1803). As such, a case or controversy is appellate in nature when the relief-seeking party's 

injury is traceable to the allegedly erroneous action of another court and requires a remedy correcting that judicial 

action (e. g., reversal or vacatur of the challenged judgment).3 

See, e. g., Food Marketing Institute v. Argus Leader Media, 

588 U. S. –––, ––– – ––– (2019); Monsanto, 561 U. S., at 150– 

153. Thus, whenever a party seeks relief from a federal 

court, the elements that bring his claim within Article III in 

the frst place—the nature and source of his injury and the 

remedy needed to redress it—also dictate whether his claim 

invokes original or appellate jurisdiction. 

The conceptual distinction between original and appellate 

jurisdiction also animates the Rooker-Feldman doctrine— 

which, despite its name, is not so much a “doctrine” as a basic 

fact of federal statutory law. This Court has discretionary 

appellate jurisdiction to review certain state-court judgments by certiorari. 28 U. S. C. § 1257(a). But no other 

federal court has appellate jurisdiction over state-court judg3 The limited exceptions to these generalizations only prove the rules. 

Appellate courts sometimes issue remedies that operate directly on the 

parties (e. g., injunctions pending appeal), but such remedies are “extraordinary” and appropriate only when “ `in aid of ' ” the court's primary appellate jurisdiction. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. v. Federal Election 

Comm'n, 542 U. S. 1305, 1305–1306 (2004) (Rehnquist, C. J., in chambers) 

(quoting 28 U. S. C. § 1651(a) (2000 ed.)). And, while certain original remedies, like declaratory judgments and quiet title decrees, do not necessarily 

impose new duties on the losing defendant, they conclusively establish the 

parties' legal relations from which such duties fow. See Nashville, C. & 

St. L. R. Co. v. Wallace, 288 U. S. 249, 261–265 (1933). Signifcantly, this 

Court has long held that an action for declaratory relief alone implicates 

the same constitutional “case or controversy” as would an action for coercive relief involving the same parties and subject matter, see ibid., and 

that declaratory relief “cannot alone supply jurisdiction otherwise absent,” 

California v. Texas, 593 U. S. –––, ––– (2021); see also R. Fallon, J. Manning, D. Meltzer, & D. Shapiro, Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts 

and the Federal System 841 (7th ed. 2015). 
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Thomas, J., dissenting 

ments, and, in particular, “[t]he jurisdiction possessed by the 

District Courts is strictly original.” Rooker v. Fidelity 

Trust Co., 263 U. S. 413, 416 (1923); see, e. g., 28 U. S. C. § 1331 

(“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all 

civil actions arising under [federal law]”). Thus, if the losing party in a state judicial proceeding “claim[s] that the 

state judgment itself violates [his] federal rights”—a claim 

that calls for an exercise of appellate jurisdiction—his only 

remedy in the federal system is certiorari in this Court. 

Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U. S. 997, 1006 (1994). He may 

not “see[k] what in substance would be appellate review of 

the state judgment” under the guise of an original action in 

federal district court. Id., at 1005–1006; see also Exxon 

Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U. S. 280, 

284–285 (2005); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. 

Feldman, 460 U. S. 462, 482–488, and nn. 15, 16 (1983). 

Yet, that is precisely what Reed has done here. While his 

complaint purports to bring an original action against the 

district attorney, in reality, it seeks appellate review to redress an alleged injury inficted by the CCA's adverse decision “in [his] particular cas[e].” Id., at 487, n. 18. The 

gravamen of Reed's claim—made clear again and again 

throughout his complaint—is that the CCA violated his due 

process rights through its reasoning in his case. See, e. g., 

App. 14, ¶2; 31–33, ¶¶53–57; 38, ¶69; 39–40, ¶¶71, 74; 41, 

¶79; 42–43, ¶¶83–84; 44–45, ¶¶86–87. All of those alleged 

injuries are traceable to the CCA, not the district attorney. 

And, redressing them would require an exercise of appellate 

jurisdiction over the CCA—jurisdiction that the District 

Court does not have. Confrming the point, Reed's complaint does not ask the District Court to control the district 

attorney's actions at all. Instead, the only relief it requests 

is “[a] declaration that the CCA's interpretation and application of [Chapter] 64 . . . is unconstitutional.” Id., at 49. The 

complaint transparently seeks nothing more than the District Court's “review and rejection” of the CCA's judgment. 
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Thomas, J., dissenting 

Exxon Mobil, 544 U. S., at 284. As such, it founders upon 

the Rooker-Feldman doctrine as well as the Article III 

traceability and redressability requirements with which that 

doctrine is intertwined. 

Any doubt that Reed seeks de facto appellate review 

should be dispelled by one undisputed fact: Every due process violation that Reed alleges could have been considered 

on direct review of the CCA's judgment in this Court. 

After all, determining whether state-court judgments applied unconstitutional constructions of state law is a classic 

use of this Court's appellate jurisdiction under § 1257(a). 

See, e. g., Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U. S. 451, 453 (2001); 

Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U. S. 347, 349 (1964); 

Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Sav. Co. v. Hill, 281 U. S. 673, 678 

(1930). That is why Reed originally petitioned this Court 

for certiorari to review the CCA's judgment. And it is why 

he agreed at oral argument that we could have granted that 

petition. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 32–33. 

Yet, even after repackaging his failed certiorari petition 

as an original § 1983 complaint, Reed not only concedes but 

affrmatively argues that his claim is analogous to the due 

process arguments presented in Rogers, Bouie, and 

Brinkerhoff-Faris. See Brief for Petitioner 33–34. That 

he is correct on that front should be fatal to his complaint. 

Like the petitioners in those cases, Reed contends that the 

rules of decision applied against him in a state-court proceeding violated his due process rights. Because those contentions would have been appropriate subjects for this 

Court's appellate review, it follows that Reed cannot press 

the same due process challenges and seek the same relief in 

an original action in the District Court. See Feldman, 460 

U. S., at 482–486, and n. 15; accord, id., at 489 (Stevens, J., 

dissenting). 

In holding otherwise, the majority improperly separates 

the Rooker-Feldman and Article III inquiries and applies a 

different theory of Reed's claim to each. But, Reed's claim 
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Thomas, J., dissenting 

must satisfy two conditions at once: It must implicate an Article III case or controversy between the parties to this action, and that case or controversy must fall within the District Court's “strictly original” jurisdiction. Rooker, 263 

U. S., at 416. The majority articulates no theory of how 

Reed's claim can satisfy both conditions. That is because 

there is no such theory. 

A useful way to view this is to work backwards from the 

majority's Rooker-Feldman holding. The majority accepts 

Reed's representation that he “does `not challenge the adverse' state-court decisions themselves,” but only “ `targets 

as unconstitutional the Texas statute [Chapter 64] they authoritatively construed.' ” Ante, at 235 (quoting Skinner v. 

Switzer, 562 U. S. 521, 532 (2011)). But this workaround to 

Rooker-Feldman raises a glaring Article III problem: As 

this Court has repeatedly explained, a federal court may not 

entertain a free-foating challenge to a statute unmoored 

from a concrete case or controversy. See, e. g., California v. 

Texas, 593 U. S. –––, ––– – ––– (2021); Valley Forge Christian 

College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and 

State, Inc., 454 U. S. 464, 471–472 (1982); Massachusetts v. 

Mellon, 262 U. S. 447, 488 (1923); Muskrat v. United States, 

219 U. S. 346, 360–362 (1911). Unless Reed merely seeks an 

advisory opinion, his due process challenge to Chapter 64 

must seek relief from some concrete enforcement or application of that law that affects him. More specifcally, Reed 

must be challenging either (1) some conduct of the district 

attorney constituting enforcement of Chapter 64 against him 

or (2) the CCA's application of Chapter 64 as a rule of decision in his case.4 If it is the former, Reed's suit is origi4 I acknowledge that our most recent DNA-testing precedent, Skinner 

v. Switzer, 562 U. S. 521 (2011), contains loose language suggesting that 

Skinner's due process claim challenged neither “the [defendant] prosecutor's conduct [n]or the decisions reached by the CCA” in his case, but only 

“Texas' postconviction DNA statute `as construed' by the Texas courts.” 

Id., at 530. But, the majority surely cannot think that federal courts have 
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Thomas, J., dissenting 

nal; if it is the latter, it requires an exercise of appellate 

jurisdiction. 

So, which is it? As already indicated, the correct answer 

is the latter: Fundamentally, Reed's complaint—like his certiorari petition before it—contests how “the Texas courts” 

“interpreted, construed[,] and applied” Chapter 64 “to deny 

his motion for DNA testing,” App. 14, ¶3, which is why the 

only relief he requests is an abstract “declaration that the 

CCA's interpretation and application of [Chapter] 64 . . . is 

unconstitutional.” Id., at 49. The idea that his claim “does 

not challenge the adverse state-court decisions,” ante, at 235 

(internal quotation marks omitted), cannot survive even a 

cursory examination of his complaint. See supra, at 245. 

Nor would the other possibility make any sense. Reed 

cannot be seeking relief from the district attorney's enforcement of Chapter 64, because the district attorney has not 

enforced that law against Reed at all. The sum total of the 

district attorney's relevant conduct is as follows. First, he 

declined to order Reed's desired testing in his executive discretion, independent of Chapter 64. Next, when Reed asked 

the Texas courts to grant testing under Chapter 64, the district attorney opposed his motion. Finally, after Reed's motion proved unsuccessful, the district attorney continued to 

subject-matter jurisdiction over challenges to statutes in the abstract, nor 

does Skinner actually stand for that proposition. Skinner's only jurisdictional holding was that the petitioner's claim was not barred by RookerFeldman. See 562 U. S., at 532–533. Skinner did not address Article III 

standing and thus has “ `no precedential effect' ” on that issue. Arbaugh 

v. Y & H Corp., 546 U. S. 500, 511 (2006). Yet, for the curious, Skinner's 

complaint did in fact allege that the defendant prosecutor was violating 

his due process rights through her conduct, and it expressly requested 

injunctive relief against her. See App. in Skinner v. Switzer, O. T. 2010, 

No. 09–9000, pp. 5–6, ¶¶1–2; 20–21, ¶33; 22, ¶37. Thus, Skinner's claim 

as pleaded clearly was original in nature, but for precisely the same reasons that Reed's is not: Where Skinner claimed injury from and sought 

relief against the party whom he had sued, Reed claims injury from and 

seeks relief against an adverse judicial decision. 
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Thomas, J., dissenting 

decline to order Reed's desired testing. To say that this 

conduct amounts to enforcing Chapter 64 makes as much 

sense as saying that a party to a discovery dispute, who defeats a motion to compel, in effect, “enforces” the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure by continuing not to turn over the 

demanded documents. Again, any due process injury that 

Chapter 64 has caused Reed is traceable to the CCA's judicial 

application of that law in his case, not to any executive acts 

or omissions of the district attorney. 

The majority permits Reed to evade that problem by framing his Article III injury as the mere lack of access to his 

desired evidence, independent of any alleged due process denial. See ante, at 234. But, if framing Reed's injury that 

way helps with traceability, it only worsens his redressability problem. Suppose that the District Court accepted 

Reed's due process arguments and issued his requested relief: an abstract declaration that the interpretation of Chapter 64 that the CCA applied in his case is unconstitutional. 

How, exactly, would that redress Reed's injury of not having 

the evidence tested? The CCA's Chapter 64 judgment 

would remain untouched; Reed would have obtained an opinion disapproving its reasoning, but without any appellate 

“revis[ion] and correct[ion]” to disturb its fnality. Bollman, 

4 Cranch, at 86. Nor would a declaration that the CCA's 

construction of Chapter 64 was unconstitutional imply anything about the district attorney's duties or liabilities. 

The majority asserts that such a declaration would cause 

“ `a signifcant increase in the likelihood' ” that the district 

attorney would grant Reed's desired testing. Ante, at 234 

(quoting Utah v. Evans, 536 U. S. 452, 464 (2002)). But the 

district attorney has made clear that he does not understand 

Reed's requested relief to “require any change in conduct” 

from him and that it is not “likely to bring about such 

change.” Brief for Respondent 38–39. If the majority 

thinks the district attorney is wrong about that, it would 

only be fair to explain exactly what change in conduct would 
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Thomas, J., dissenting 

be legally required of him if Reed prevailed on his due process claim. The majority fails to do so.5 

Instead, it offers a number of vague pronouncements, all of 

which wilt under scrutiny. Consider the claim that Reed's 

victory in this action would “eliminate the [district attorney's] justifcation for denying DNA testing.” Ante, at 234. 

If this means that Reed's requested relief would entitle him 

to testing under Chapter 64, it is wrong because the CCA's 

unreversed judgment would stand as a fnal, binding determination of Reed's Chapter 64 rights even if the District 

Court were to declare that, in its opinion, the CCA had applied that law unconstitutionally in Reed's case. Alternatively, if the majority means that the success of Reed's due 

process claim would require the district attorney to permit 

testing in his independent executive discretion, it is also 

wrong because Reed is not challenging the district attorney's 

denial of discretionary testing as unlawful—only the CCA's 

“interpretation and application of [Chapter] 64.” App. 49. 

The majority also misses the mark when it asserts that it 

is “substantially likely that the [district attorney] would 

abide by [Reed's requested] court order.” Ante, at 234 (internal quotation marks omitted). Again, the only “court 

order” Reed seeks is a declaration disapproving the legal underpinnings of the CCA's judgment. Such an “order” would 

have no bearing on the district attorney's future conduct; in a 

literal sense, there would be nothing for him to “abide by.” 

Finally, the majority says that the District Court “ `would 

have ordered a change in a legal status' ” were it to grant 

5 This failure will have troubling consequences if Reed's claim ever progresses beyond the pleading stage. To survive summary judgment, Reed 

cannot “rest on mere allegations, but must set forth by affdavit or other 

evidence specifc facts” showing that his requested relief will make it likelier that he obtains the desired testing. Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 

568 U. S. 398, 412 (2013) (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). 

It is far from clear what such a showing would entail, and the majority 

leaves the parties in the dark. 
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Thomas, J., dissenting 

the declaration Reed seeks. Ibid. (quoting Utah, 536 U. S., 

at 464). The intended meaning of this statement is completely obscure. The “status” that the majority has in mind 

cannot be that of Chapter 64 itself. See California, 593 

U. S., at ––– (explaining that judicial remedies “ `operate with 

respect to specifc parties,' ” not “ `on legal rules in the abstract' ”); see also Mellon, 262 U. S., at 488 (explaining that 

courts “have no power per se to review and annul [statutes] 

on the ground that they are unconstitutional,” only “the negative power to disregard an unconstitutional enactment” 

when “declaring the law applicable to [a justiciable] controversy”). Nor can the majority mean that the District Court 

could change the “status” of the CCA's judgment. In reality, the only way that the District Court could possibly help 

Reed obtain DNA testing is by directly controlling the district attorney's actions. But, again, Reed's complaint neither requests nor sets forth a basis for any such relief.6 

6 This case is thus very different from Utah v. Evans, 536 U. S. 452 

(2002), on which the majority relies heavily (indeed, exclusively). There, 

as earlier in Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U. S. 788 (1992), we held that 

a State had standing to sue the Secretary of Commerce for injunctive and 

declaratory relief against an allegedly improper census report that would 

have diminished the State's congressional delegation. See Utah, 536 

U. S., at 459–464; Franklin, 505 U. S., at 801–803 (plurality opinion). In 

both cases, Justice Scalia argued in dissent that redressability was lacking 

because the causal link between the Secretary's preparation of a new report and redress of the States' apportionment injuries depended on the 

actions of other offcials not bound by the court's judgment. See Utah, 

536 U. S., at 511; Franklin, 505 U. S., at 824–825. The Court answered 

that objection by “assum[ing]”—in large part because “the Solicitor General ha[d] not contended to the contrary”—that it was “substantially 

likely” that those other offcials would cooperate with a judgment in the 

suing State's favor. Id., at 803 (plurality opinion); see Utah, 536 U. S., at 

460–461, 463–464. Utah and Franklin thus represent nothing more than 

a context-specifc application of the settled rule that “standing is not precluded” (although it is “more diffcult to establish”) when the connection 

between the defendant's court-ordered remedial conduct and ultimate redress of the plaintiff 's injury partly depends on the actions of third parties. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 562 (1992) (internal 
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252 REED v. GOERTZ 

Thomas, J., dissenting 

In sum, there is no getting around the essential problem 

with Reed's due process claim: To the extent he is not merely 

seeking an advisory opinion, he is complaining about a courtinficted injury, and redressing that injury would require an 

exercise of appellate jurisdiction that the District Court does 

not possess. In substance, his complaint in this action is a 

mere reprise of his prior certiorari petition, camoufaged as 

an original action against the district attorney. Thus, I 

would vacate the Fifth Circuit's judgment and remand this 

case to the District Court with instructions to dismiss the 

complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. 

B 

The majority next holds that Reed's § 1983 due process 

claim was timely because it did not accrue until the CCA 

denied rehearing. The little reasoning the majority offers 

for this conclusion helpfully accentuates its antecedent jurisdictional errors. 

First, the majority points out that a procedural due process claim is not necessarily “ `complete when the deprivation 

occurs,' ” but “only when `the State fails to provide due process.' ” Ante, at 236 (quoting Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U. S. 

113, 126 (1990)). Yet, “the general rule” is that due process 

itself “requir[es] predeprivation notice and hearing,” so the 

truism for which the majority quotes Zinermon matters only 

in those “extraordinary situations” in which “[w]e tolerate” postdeprivation process as suffcient. United States v. 

James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U. S. 43, 53 (1993) 

(internal quotation marks omitted); see Zinermon, 494 U. S., 

at 127–130. The majority proceeds to show, however, that 

it does not regard this case as a postdeprivation case at all, 

quotation marks omitted). Here, by contrast, the majority fnds redressability in an abstract declaration—in truth, an advisory opinion—that 

would not require any change in conduct on the part of the only defendant 

in this case. Nothing in our precedents supports that holding. 
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Thomas, J., dissenting 

for it says that the State “deprived Reed of his asserted 

liberty interest in DNA testing” at the very moment when 

“the State's alleged failure to provide Reed with a fundamentally fair process was complete.” Ante, at 236. Given this 

understanding of Reed's claim, the “[i]mportan[t]” proposition with which the majority begins its analysis is doctrinally 

irrelevant. Ibid. 

After that red herring, the majority engages in an obvious 

equivocation, confating the Chapter 64 “process” that Reed 

challenges as “fundamentally unfair” with the Texas courts' 

generally applicable decisional procedures. Ibid. But of 

course, those procedures are not what Reed challenges. Instead (and, again, exactly like the arguments in his prior 

certiorari petition), his due process claim “ `targets as unconstitutional' ” the substantive requirements of Chapter 64 as 

construed. Ante, at 235. His claim plainly would be no different if the CCA did not entertain rehearing motions. 

Still, the majority's confused accrual reasoning is useful 

for the added light that it shines on Reed's jurisdictional 

problems. As the majority says, a procedural due process 

claim has two elements: (1) a deprivation and (2) inadequate 

process. The majority then acknowledges that the state 

courts effectuated Reed's deprivation, and it treats the state 

courts' ordinary decisional mechanics as the allegedly inadequate process. But, after both elements of Reed's claim are 

thus laid at the feet of the state courts, what role is left 

for the nominal defendant here, the district attorney? What 

part did he play in violating Reed's procedural due process 

rights, and what makes him a proper defendant to Reed's 

§ 1983 claim? 

The majority has no answer. At bottom, its approval of 

Reed's claim is intelligible only upon the supposition that the 

district attorney may be sued as a mere stand-in for the 

State as a whole, such that Reed can urge against him the 

due process violations that the State allegedly committed 

through its courts. That is a profound mistake. True, the 
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254 REED v. GOERTZ 

Thomas, J., dissenting 

district attorney and the CCA are both state actors. But, 

States act in different ways through their different entities 

and offcers, and the nature of a challenged state action determines what federal-court remedy may be available. 

As this Court has explained, “[a] State acts by its legislative, its executive, or its judicial authorities,” and “in no 

other way.” Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339, 347 (1880). 

The Due Process Clause applies to action through any of 

these agencies, ibid., but not every alleged due process violation may be asserted in an original § 1983 action. By itself, 

a State's legislative enactment of an unconstitutional law 

does not give rise to a justiciable case or controversy. See 

California, 593 U. S., at ––– – –––; Muskrat, 219 U. S., at 361. 

Next, when a State allegedly violates due process through 

executive action, the aggrieved party may bring an original 

action for appropriate relief against the relevant executive 

offcer. See Mellon, 262 U. S., at 488; Ex parte Young, 209 

U. S. 123 (1908).7 And, when a State allegedly violates due 

7 Young cautioned that, 

“[i]n making an offcer of the State a party defendant in a suit to enjoin 

the enforcement of an act alleged to be unconstitutional[,] it is plain that 

such offcer must have some connection with the enforcement of the act, 

or else it is merely making him a party as a representative of the State, 

and thereby attempting to make the State a party.” 209 U. S., at 157 

(emphasis added). 

Invoking this language, the district attorney argues that Reed's suit is 

independently barred by state sovereign immunity, in addition to Article 

III and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. It appears fairly debatable 

whether the “connection” requirement described in Young is best understood as a precondition to Young's sovereign-immunity exception or as a 

simple application of Article III traceability. Compare Okpalobi v. Foster, 244 F. 3d 405, 410–424 (CA5 2001) (en banc) (plurality opinion) (taking 

the former view), with id., at 439 (Benavides, J., concurring in part and 

dissenting in part) (arguing that “modern standing doctrine has subsumed 

the connection inquiry”). I see no need to tackle that question here, since 

Article III and Rooker-Feldman amply establish the jurisdictional impropriety of Reed's suit. I add only that, on either interpretation, Young 

makes it clear that a state offcer cannot be sued “as a representative of 

the State” writ large—rather, he can only be sued for legal violations 

attributable to his own offce. 
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Thomas, J., dissenting 

process through its judicial actions—be it through the denial 

of a fundamentally fair judicial procedure or through the application of a rule of decision that itself violates due process—the remedy that Congress has provided is appellate 

“review of the [challenged] judgmen[t] in this Court.” Feldman, 460 U. S., at 482; see, e. g., Rogers, 532 U. S., at 453; 

Bouie, 378 U. S., at 349; Brinkerhoff-Faris, 281 U. S., at 678; 

cf. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Dept. of 

Environmental Protection, 560 U. S. 702 (2010) (reviewing 

judicial-taking claim on certiorari to the challenged statecourt judgment). But, if that remedy proves unsuccessful— 

as it did for Reed—the aggrieved party cannot simply substitute an executive offcer as a defendant, charge the state 

court's errors to that offcer, and seek redress for a courtinficted injury in a purported original action. 

Properly understood, therefore, Article III, the RookerFeldman doctrine, and procedural due process principles 

work in harmony. The majority's piecemeal analysis replaces this natural coherence with chaos. It dilutes Article III's traceability and redressability requirements to the 

point of irrelevance. It creates a system in which the same 

state-court actions simultaneously give rise to identical original and appellate claims for relief. See this Court's Rule 

13.3 (“[T]he time to fle [a] petition for a writ of certiorari 

. . . runs from the date of the denial of rehearing” by the 

lower court). It allows Reed to convert his failed certiorari 

petition into a § 1983 complaint. And, in doing so, it authorizes a proceeding in which the District Court can do nothing 

except opine on the constitutional merits of a state-court 

adjudication. 

* * * 

If there is a mitigating factor to today's decision, it is that 

the § 1983 action that the Court misguidedly allows to proceed is no barrier to the prompt execution of Reed's lawful 

sentence. See Hill v. McDonough, 547 U. S. 573, 583–584 

(2006). Indeed, Reed conceded at oral argument “that you 

do not get a stay of execution just because you brought [a 
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256 REED v. GOERTZ 

Alito, J., dissenting 

Chapter] 64 proceeding or just because you're in [§ ]1983 proceedings . . . challenging the adequacy of the procedures 

available to you from the state.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 68. Texas 

is free to take him at his word. But, because the majority 

undermines vital principles of federal jurisdiction and destabilizes the orderly working of our judicial system, I respectfully dissent. 

Justice Alito, with whom Justice Gorsuch joins, 

dissenting. 

This case involves a suit brought by petitioner Rodney 

Reed under Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, against 

Bryan Goertz, the District Attorney of Bastrop County, 

Texas. Reed claims that Goertz violated his due process 

rights when, based on the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals' 

interpretation of the Texas statute that allows post-trial 

DNA testing under specifed circumstances, Article 64 of the 

Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Goertz continued to deny 

Reed's request for DNA testing of certain items found near 

the scene of the murder for which he was convicted 25 

years ago. 

As the Court notes and the parties agree, the statute of 

limitations for Reed's claim is two years. Ante, at 235; Brief 

for Petitioner 17; Brief for Respondent 17. Reed fled his 

complaint on August 8, 2019, and the lower courts held that 

this was too late. The question before us is when the 2-year 

statute of limitations began to run, that is in legal parlance, 

when Reed's claim “accrued.” As the parties agree, the 

general rule is that a claim accrues when the plaintiff has “a 

complete and present cause of action,” Wallace v. Kato, 549 

U. S. 384, 388 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Reed contends that his claim did not accrue until the Texas 

Court of Criminal Appeals (CCA) denied his petition for rehearing on October 4, 2017, and thus refused to retract the 

interpretation of Article 64 that the court had unanimously 

adopted on April 12, 2017. Goertz, on the other hand, ar-
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Alito, J., dissenting 

gues that Reed's claim accrued no later than the date of the 

CCA's April 12 decision, and because that date preceded the 

federal lawsuit by more than two years, Goertz maintains 

that we should affrm the Fifth Circuit's decision that Reed's 

complaint was fled too late. 

As I will explain, there is room for debate about exactly 

when Reed's DNA testing claim accrued, but in my view, the 

notion that this did not take place until rehearing was denied 

is clearly wrong. 

I 

Before getting to the nub of this case, I briefy explain 

why Reed's claim might have accrued even earlier than April 

12, 2017. First, it can be argued that Reed's claim against 

Goertz accrued on or before July 2014, when Goertz initially 

refused Reed's testing request.1 The general rule is that a 

plaintiff 's § 1983 claim against a state offcial for violating a 

constitutional right accrues when the alleged violation takes 

place. See Wallace, 549 U. S., at 388 (§ 1983 claim “normally 

commence[s] to run” from when wrong occurs). And the 

Court does not disclaim the possibility that a plaintiff could 

fle a § 1983 claim as soon as a state prosecutor denies a DNA 

testing request. See ante, at 237, and n. 1. 

Another possibility is that the particular claim Reed now 

asserts did not accrue until the state trial court held that 

Goertz had properly denied Reed's testing request. Reed 

does not claim that the bare text of Article 64 is unconstitutional. (Had he done so, he could hardly argue, as he does 

now, that his claim did not accrue until the end of the appellate process.) Instead, he stresses that his claim concerns 

the state courts' construction of that statute and in particu1 We are told that Reed and Goertz engaged in lengthy negotiations 

about the testing of certain items prior to the date in July 2014 when Reed 

fled his claim in the District Court of Bastrop County under Article 64. 

Brief for Petitioner 13; Brief for Respondent 5–6; see Reed v. State, 541 

S. W. 3d 759, 779 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). 
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258 REED v. GOERTZ 

Alito, J., dissenting 

lar, their holding that the evidence for which testing is 

sought must not be contaminated. Brief for Petitioner 3, 15, 

29. In response to this argument, Goertz contends that 

every allegedly unconstitutional aspect of the judicial interpretation of the statute was adopted by the time the state 

trial court issued amended fndings of fact and conclusions of 

law in 2016, and Goertz therefore takes the position that 

Reed's unconstitutional-construction claim accrued at that 

time. Brief for Respondent 18–19. 

II 

A 

For present purposes, it is not necessary to decide whether 

Reed's claim accrued on either of these two dates. We need 

only decide whether accrual was put off until the CCA denied rehearing, and it is clear to me that this delayed accrual 

date is wrong.2 As noted, the claim that Reed asserts is not 

based on the bare text of Article 64, but on what he claims 

is an erroneous interpretation of that provision by the Texas 

courts. He thus submits that his claim accrued when the 

“authoritative construction of Article 64” that he challenges 

was pronounced by the CCA. Brief for Petitioner 17. 

I will assume for the sake of argument that Reed's claim 

accrued when the CCA issued its “authoritative construction 

of Article 64,” but I cannot agree with Reed's argument— 

2 We have noted that a couple special cases can displace that “presumptiv[e]” accrual rule, such as where “a particular claim may not realistically 

be brought while a violation is ongoing,” or where a special accrual rule 

governed “the most natural common-law analogy.” McDonough v. Smith, 

588 U. S. –––, ––– – ––– (2019). But the majority (correctly) does not 

adopt Reed's view, see Brief for Petitioner 32–39, that this matter raises 

one of those special cases. Under Reed's theory as expressed as argument, he could have proceeded with a claim under Skinner v. Switzer, 562 

U. S. 521 (2011), at any time in the process. Tr. of Oral Arg. 12 (stating 

that “a prisoner could exit the state court procedures at any point” and 

bring a challenge). 
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Alito, J., dissenting 

which the Court conspicuously declines to defend—that the 

CCA's interpretation did not become “authoritative” until rehearing was denied. 

Reed cites no authority for the proposition that the fling 

of a petition for rehearing typically suspends the authoritative force of an appellate court's decision, and in fact, it appears that the opposite is true—as this Court's “GVR” practice illustrates. On or shortly after the day when we hand 

down a decision, we often “GVR” cases in which petitions 

raising similar issues are pending before us. (That is, we 

grant the petition, vacate the decision below, and remand 

the case for reconsideration in light of the decision we have 

handed down.) On June 30, 2022, for example, we did this 

in no fewer than 33 cases.3 We do not wait to see if a petition for rehearing will be fled; nor do we hold off until a 

mandate is issued or a certifed copy of the judgment is prepared. See this Court's Rules 45.2 and 45.3. If our decisions did not become authoritative and binding as soon as 

they are issued, this practice would be impermissible. 

There is no reason why decisions of the CCA should be 

viewed any differently. On the contrary, it appears that the 

CCA has followed a practice similar to our GVR practice. 

See Oliver v. State, 872 S. W. 2d 713, 716 (Tex. Crim. App. 

1994) (vacating judgment and remanding for reconsideration 

in light of decision on same day). And neither Reed nor the 

Court has cited any contrary Texas authority. Accordingly, 

Reed's “authoritative construction” argument became complete, at the latest, when the CCA adopted that construction 

on April 12, 2017, two years and 11 months before Reed fled 

his § 1983 complaint. 

B 

Unlike Reed, the Court does not contend that the CCA's 

interpretation lacked “authoritative” status until rehearing 

3 Journal of the Supreme Court 711–716 (June 30, 2022); see, e. g., id., at 

685–689 (June 27, 2022) (granting, vacating, and remanding 28 cases). 
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260 REED v. GOERTZ 

Alito, J., dissenting 

was denied. Instead, the Court merely proclaims that the 

State, acting through Goertz, did not deny Reed due process 

of law until “the state litigation ended.” Ante, at 236.4 I 

certainly see the logic in this view: until the process afforded 

by a State has been exhausted, it may be said that the State 

has not defnitively denied the process that the Constitution 

is alleged to demand. This logic leads to the conclusion that 

a prisoner like Reed should exhaust state remedies—something that would generally be required if the proper vehicle 

for contesting the denial of a DNA testing claim were a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. See 28 U. S. C. § 2254(b)(1). 

But the Court rejected that proposition in District Attorney's Offce for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U. S. 52 

(2009), and it is well-established that a § 1983 plaintiff need 

not exhaust state remedies. Patsy v. Board of Regents of 

Fla., 457 U. S. 496, 500–501 (1982); Edwards v. Balisok, 520 

U. S. 641, 649 (1997). Not only is this the general rule, but 

the Osborne Court found that the rule applies in cases involving constitutional challenges to the denial of requested 

DNA testing. 557 U. S., at 71. Thus, the Court's reasoning 

collides with precedent. 

On top of this, the Court's reasoning, if taken to its logical conclusion, points to a result that neither Reed nor the 

Court is willing to embrace: namely, that a due process challenge to the denial of a request for DNA testing is not ripe 

until state remedies have been exhausted. (Reed squarely 

rejects that conclusion, Brief for Petitioner 48; Tr. of Oral 

Arg. 12–13, and the Court reserves judgment. Ante, at 237, 

n. 1.) But that is where the Court's reasoning is likely to 

lead. 

4 Even the CCA's denial of rehearing in a DNA testing case may not 

mark the end of state court litigation on that issue, to the extent that the 

issue may be taken up again in a state collateral review proceeding or 

otherwise renewed. Cf. Darnell v. State, 2004 WL 1088755, *1 (Tex. App., 

May 13, 2004) (discussing “reconsider[ation]” granted in DNA-testing action “after submission of additional information”). 
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Alito, J., dissenting 

Reed tries to circumvent this problem by distinguishing 

between a claim that challenges the literal terms of a state 

law and one that challenges the law as authoritatively interpreted by the State's highest court. Brief for Petitioner 30, 

48. On this view, only claims of the latter type would have 

to proceed through the entire state court appellate process 

before a § 1983 challenge could be brought. But this categorization of DNA-testing claims is problematic. When a 

State's high court interprets a state law, it generally settles 

what the law always meant, and therefore it is hard to see 

the difference between a claim that the text of a state statute 

is unconstitutional and a claim that the text is unconstitutional as interpreted by the State's highest court. In 

the case of a state law like Article 64, which permits DNA 

testing under limited circumstances, the court may interpret 

the statute to impose requirements that are not expressly 

spelled out in the statutory text. (That is what happened 

here.) Or the state high court may interpret requirements 

in the text more leniently than a literal reading of the text 

would demand. In either event, the statute means what the 

state high court says it means, and if accrual in the frst of 

these situations does not take place until the end of appellate 

review, it is hard to see why the same should not be true in 

the second as well. 

In light of these problems, it is not surprising that the 

Court declines to say anything about whether prisoners who 

wish to challenge a state DNA testing law may sue as soon 

as their testing requests are denied. The Court says only 

that it “need not address th[e] hypothetical scenario” of a 

plaintiff who declines “full appellate review,” ante, at 237, 

n. 1, but what does that mean? Does it mean that such a 

plaintiff must exhaust state remedies at the trial level but 

need not appeal? Does it mean that such a plaintiff must 

pursue some (but not “full”) appellate review? Litigants 

and the lower courts are left to guess. Instead of clarifying 

the law, the Court's decision may sow confusion. 
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262 REED v. GOERTZ 

Alito, J., dissenting 

C 

Much of Reed's argumentation is not aimed at the argument that his claim accrued when the CCA issued its contested interpretation of Article 64. Instead, Reed directs 

his attack on the earlier possible accrual dates discussed in 

Part I of this opinion and in particular the Fifth Circuit's 

holding that a claim like Reed's accrues when testing is denied at the trial level. He says that this rule is unfair because he “isn't Nostradamus,” lacks “supernatural foresight,” and therefore could not have predicted at the time of 

the trial court decision whether the CCA would ultimately 

agree. Brief for Petitioner 26, 32. He argues that his rule 

promotes federalism (because it encourages resort to state 

court litigation before turning to the federal courts), judicial 

economy (because it tends to avoid contemporaneous litigation in both state and federal court), comity (because it 

allows state courts to adopt interpretations of their statutes 

that avoid federal constitutional problems), and practical reality (because a prisoner bringing an authoritativeconstruction claim cannot know in advance how a State's 

high court will interpret the relevant statute). Id., at 36– 

39. The Court makes related arguments. Ante, at 236–237. 

Whatever merit these arguments might have in relation 

to the accrual date adopted by the Fifth Circuit, they ring 

hollow as applied to the choice between the date when a state 

high court issues a decision interpreting the state testing 

statute and the date when that court refuses to rehear and 

overturn that interpretation. One need not have “supernatural foresight” in order to predict that rehearing is unlikely 

to be granted. And it is hard to see how requiring a § 1983 

plaintiff to sue within two years after a state high court decision is issued is unfair or does any damage to federalism, 

comity, or judicial economy. 

Reed has provided no explanation why he could not have 

fled his § 1983 action within two years after the CCA's decision. Instead, he waited until an execution date was set. 
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Alito, J., dissenting 

While that event may have “concentrate[d] his mind wonderfully,” that is not an excuse for the basic mistake of missing 

a statute of limitations.5 

* * * 

For these reasons, I would affrm the judgment below, and 

I therefore respectfully dissent. 

5 J. Boswell, Life of Samuel Johnson, LL.D., in 44 Great Books of the 

Western World 351 (R. Hutchins & M. Adler eds. 1952) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). 
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Reporter’s Note 

The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication 

and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination 

makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of 

publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions 

for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of 

the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and 

who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was 

argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may 

include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant 

punctuation. The following additional edits were made: 

p. 243, line 3, “serve” is changed to “serves”