alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Global Amendment



 Exhibit 4.6 
 SECURED TERM LOAN A PROMISSORY NOTE 
  

			
	 $10,000,000
	  	Advance Date: December 20, 2011
		
		  	Maturity Date: December 1, 2015

 FOR VALUE RECEIVED, CEMPRA HOLDINGS, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, for itself and each of
its Subsidiaries signatory hereto (herein after referred to individually as a “Borrower” and collectively, as “Borrowers”) hereby promise to pay to the order of Hercules Technology Growth Capital, Inc., a Maryland corporation or
the holder of this Note (the “Lender”) at 400 Hamilton Avenue, Suite 310, Palo Alto, CA 94301 or such other place of payment as the holder of this Secured Term Loan A Promissory Note (this “Promissory Note”) may specify from time
to time in writing, in lawful money of the United States of America, the principal amount of Ten Million Dollars ($10,000,000) or such other principal amount as Lender has advanced to Borrowers, together with interest at the Term Loan A Interest
Rate specified in the Loan Agreement (as defined below). 
 This Secured Term Loan A Promissory Note is the Term Loan A Note
referred to in, and is executed and delivered in connection with, that certain Loan and Security Agreement dated December 20, 2011, by and between Borrowers and Lender (as the same may from time to time be amended, modified or supplemented in
accordance with its terms, the “Loan Agreement”), and is entitled to the benefit and security of the Loan Agreement and the other Loan Documents (as defined in the Loan Agreement), to which reference is made for a statement of all of the
terms and conditions thereof. All payments shall be made in accordance with the Loan Agreement. All terms defined in the Loan Agreement shall have the same definitions when used herein, unless otherwise defined herein. An Event of Default under the
Loan Agreement shall constitute a default under this Secured Term Loan A Promissory Note. 
 Borrowers waive presentment and
demand for payment, notice of dishonor, protest and notice of protest under the UCC or any applicable law. Borrowers agree to make all payments under this Secured Term Loan A Promissory Note without setoff, recoupment or deduction and regardless of
any counterclaim or defense. This Secured Term Loan A Promissory Note has been negotiated and delivered to Lender and is payable in the State of California. This Secured Term Loan A Promissory Note shall be governed by and construed and enforced in
accordance with, the laws of the State of California, excluding any conflicts of law rules or principles that would cause the application of the laws of any other jurisdiction. 
 (Signatures to follow) 








							
	BORROWERS:	 		 	CEMPRA HOLDINGS, LLC
				
		 		 	By:	 	/s/ Prabhavathi Fernandes
		 		 	Title:	 	President and CEO
			
		 		 	CEMPRA PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.
				
		 		 	By:	 	/s/ Prabhavathi Fernandes
		 		 	Title:	 	President and CEO
			
		 		 	CEM-102 PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.
				
		 		 	By:	 	/s/ Prabhavathi Fernandes
		 		 	Title:	 	President and CEO
United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit ____________

No. 23-10228

Summary Calendar

____________

United States of America, 

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

Jonathan Jamal Bangash, 

Defendant—Appellant.

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 3:22-CR-11-1

______________________________

Before Wiener, Stewart, and Douglas, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Defendant-Appellant Jonathan Jamal Bangash appeals his conviction 

for illegal receipt of a firearm by a person under indictment, in violation of 18 

U.S.C. §§ 922(n) and 924(a)(1)(D). He argues that (1) § 922(n) violates the 

Second Amendment in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in New York 

State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022); 

_____________________

* This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

March 12, 2024

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Case: 23-10228 Document: 71-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/12/2024
No. 23-10228

2

(2) Congress exceeded its powers under the Commerce Clause when it 

enacted § 922(n); and (3) because of the above errors, the district court 

misadvised him of the nature of his offense and erroneously accepted the 

factual basis of his guilty plea, in violation of Federal Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 11. 

We review Bangash’s first and third claims for plain error because he 

did not raise either argument before the district court. See Puckett v. United 

States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009). He did, however, preserve his Commerce 

Clause argument. We review the constitutionality of federal statutes de novo.

United States v. Bailey, 115 F.3d 1222, 1225 (5th Cir. 1997).

Each of Bangash’s arguments is unavailing. First, any error regarding 

whether § 922(n) violates the Second Amendment in light of the Court’s 

decision in Bruen was not clear or obvious. See United States v. Jones, 88 F.4th 

571, 574 (5th Cir. 2023); United States v. Sanches, 86 F.4th 680, 687 (5th Cir. 

2023); United States v. Avila, No. 22-50088, 2022 WL 17832287, at *1–2 (5th 

Cir. Dec. 21, 2022) (unpublished), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 2512 (2023). 

Second, as Bangash himself concedes, his Commerce Clause argument is 

unpersuasive. See United States v. Alcantar, 733 F.3d 143, 145–46 (5th Cir. 

2013). Lastly, given our disposition of the underlying arguments, it follows 

that the district court committed no Rule 11 plain error. 

AFFIRMED. 

Case: 23-10228 Document: 71-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 03/12/2024
#### CHARLES I. PARKER AND LEWIS L. PARKER v. JOSEPH C. THOMPSON.

X. It seems that the representatives of one of the defendants in a joint judgment vito has died may be sued, although the other defendant is living.

2. The plaintiff in an action against executors of their own wrong is not a competent witness.

8. The judgment against executors of their own wrong should be special, and not general.

This was a *certiorari*to it justice of the peace, before whom the action was tried, and judgment rendered in the absence of the defendants. Argued before Justices Haines and Elmer, by *J. D. Bedle,*for the plaintiffs in this court, and by *F.*Kingman, for the defendants.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Elmer, J.

The plaintiff in the justice’s court, who is the defendant in this *certiorari,*sued the defendants, as executors of tlieir own wrong of Mary Parker, deceased, to recover the' *312•amount of a judgment obtained by liim against Joseph Parker, who is still living, and the said Mary Parker.

It is now objected that this action cannot be sustained. I am not satisfied, however, notwithstanding what was said by one ■of the judges in the case of *Wade*v. *Potter,*2 *Oreen*278, that our statute does not cover this case. *Nix. Dig.*542, § 4.* The words are, that the representatives of one jointly bound with another for the payment of any debt may be charged, by virtue •of such obligation, as if the obligators had been bound sever•ally as well as jointly, and are, in my opinion, broad enough to cover the case of two or more jointly bound by a judgment. There is no force in the objection, that if a new judgment may be obtained against the representatives of one who is deceased, there will be two judgments for the *same'debt;*this being no more than what may happen in any case where two or more are bound severally. But it is not necessary to decide this question.

The judgment is erroneous for other reasons. It appears, by the transcript of the justice, that the only evidence of the plaintiff's demand was his own testimony and the record of the original judgment. The defendants being sued in a representative capacity, the plaintiff ivas not a competent witness. There was therefore no legal evidence to charge the ■defendants as executors of their own wrong.

The judgment against executors must be special, and not .general. *Penn.*457; *South.*686; 1 Wm's *Ex’rs*142. Our statute, *Nix. Dig.*255, § 9,† provides that executors of their own wrong shall be answerable so far only as the goods and •debts coming to their hands will satisfy. If facts are proved in a justice's court to render them liable, the judgment should be that the plaintiff recover the debt and costs, to be levied out of the assets of the testator, if the defendant have so much, but if not, then to levy so much as they are liable for and the costs out of their own goods.

The judgment must be reversed.

Cited in *Thompson*v. Johnson, 11 *Vroom*222.

*

*Rev., p.*742, § 3.

†

*Rev., p.*396, *§*3.
EXHIBIT 31.1




RULE 13a-14(d)/15d-14(d) CERTIFICATION




I, Julia A. Sloat, Treasurer of Ohio Power Company, as servicer (the "Servicer"), certify that:




1. I have reviewed this report on Form 10-K and all reports on Form 10-D required to be filed in respect of the period covered by this report on Form 10-K of Ohio Phase-In-Recovery Funding LLC (the "Exchange Act periodic reports");




2. Based on my knowledge, the Exchange Act periodic reports, taken as a whole, do not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;




3. Based on my knowledge, all of the distribution, servicing and other information required to be provided under Form 10-D for the period covered by this report is included in the Exchange Act periodic reports;




4. I am responsible for reviewing the activities performed by the Servicer, and based on my knowledge and the compliance review conducted in preparing the servicer compliance statement required in this report under Item 1123 of Regulation AB, and except as disclosed in the Exchange Act periodic reports, the servicer has fulfilled its obligations under the Servicing Agreement dated as of August 1, 2013 between Ohio Phase-In-Recovery Funding LLC, as the Issuing Entity, and the Servicer, in all material respects; and




5. All of the reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed securities and the related attestation reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed securities required to be included in this report in accordance with Item 1122 of Regulation AB and Exchange Act Rule 13a-18 and 15d-18 have been included as an exhibit to this report, except as otherwise disclosed in this report. Any material instances of noncompliance described in such reports have been disclosed in this report on Form 10-K.




6. In giving the certifications above, I have reasonably relied on information provided to me by the following unaffiliated parties: U.S. Bank National Association, as Indenture Trustee.





Date: March 28, 2014/s/ Julia A. SloatName:  Julia A. Sloat

Title: Treasurer and Senior Officer in Charge of the Servicing Function, Ohio Power Company, as Servicer
#### David S. Pultz et al., Appellants, v Catherine Economakis et al., Respondents.

Submitted February 11, 2008;

decided February 14, 2008

Motion by the Rent Stabilization Association of New York City, Inc. for leave to appear amicus curiae on the appeal herein granted only to the extent that the proposed brief is accepted as filed. Two copies of the brief must be served and 24 copies filed within seven days.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT JAMES BENJAMIN DAVIS, JR., Petitioner-Appellant, v. No. 95-8577 FRANKLIN E. FREEMAN, JR., Respondent-Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle, District Judge. (CA-95-129-5-BO) Submitted: April 30, 1996 Decided: May 24, 1996 Before MURNAGHAN, NIEMEYER, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________ Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________ COUNSELJames Benjamin Davis, Jr., Appellant Pro Se. Clarence Joe DelForge, III, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NORTH CAROLINA, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________ Unpublished opinions are not binding pr ecedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________OPINION PER CURIAM: James B. Davis appeals from the district court's order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1988) petition. We affirm. Davis contends that he has been denied the application of gain timecredits towards his parole eligibility date. A review of North Carolina's rules governing gain time credits reveals that the Department of Corrections is under no statutory obligation to apply these credits in such a manner. This Court will not disturb these state rules unless they are clearly arbitrary or capricious. Ham v. North Carolina , 471 F.2d 406, 407 (4th Cir. 1973). Davis has attempted to demonstrate such capriciousness through an Equal Protection Clause claim. Davis explains that the DOC's present system treats inmates sentenced to pre-Fair Sentencing Act natural life terms differently than inmates sentenced to a term of years underthe Fair Sentencing Act. Neither parole nor gain time credits are fundamental rights. Further, inmates serving life sentences are not a suspect class. Accordingly, we review any discriminatory treatment in the applicability of gain time between life and non-life inmates under the rational relation test. Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch. , 487 U.S. 450, 457-58 (1988). Not advancing the parole eligibility date of inmates serving life sentences through the application of gain time credits arguably serves a legitimate government penological interestin ensuring that inmates convicted of crimes warranting a life sentence serve a significant portion of their sentence. Accordingly, we find Davis' equal protection argument to be without merit.Davis also makes a due process claim. We find that the broad discretion afforded states in the administration of such matters warrants dismissal of this claim as well. There being no other showing that the North Carolina rules governing gain time are arbitrary or capricious, we will not disturb those rules. We therefore affirm the district court's dismissal of Davis' petition. We dispense with oral argument becausethe facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process. AFFIRMED
2
```

[Congressional Bills 114th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. Con. Res. 37 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

<DOC>

114th CONGRESS
  2d Session
S. CON. RES. 37

   Recognizing the George C. Marshall Museum and George C. Marshall 
  Research Library in Lexington, Virginia, as the National George C. 
                      Marshall Museum and Library.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                              May 12, 2016

    Mr. Kaine (for himself and Mr. Warner) submitted the following 
 concurrent resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Energy 
                         and Natural Resources

_______________________________________________________________________

                         CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

 
   Recognizing the George C. Marshall Museum and George C. Marshall 
  Research Library in Lexington, Virginia, as the National George C. 
                      Marshall Museum and Library.

Whereas General George C. Marshall served as Army Chief of Staff during World 
        War II, Special Ambassador to China, Secretary of State, and Secretary 
        of Defense;
Whereas General George C. Marshall was promoted to General of the Army in 1944, 
        one of only five Army five-star generals in the history of the United 
        States;
Whereas General George C. Marshall was awarded the Congressional Gold Medal in 
        1946 for his military strategy and vital role during World War II;
Whereas General George C. Marshall was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1953 for 
        developing the European economic recovery strategy known as the Marshall 
        Plan;
Whereas the George C. Marshall Foundation was established in 1953 and is devoted 
        to preserving the legacy of General George C. Marshall through 
        educational scholarship programs and facilities;
Whereas the George C. Marshall Foundation opened the George C. Marshall Museum 
        and George C. Marshall Research Library in 1964 in Lexington, Virginia, 
        on the post of the Virginia Military Institute, which is the alma mater 
        of General George C. Marshall;
Whereas the George C. Marshall Museum educates the public about the military and 
        diplomatic contributions of General George C. Marshall through extensive 
        exhibits; and
Whereas the George C. Marshall Research Library maintains the most comprehensive 
        collection of records documenting the life and leadership of General 
        George C. Marshall: Now, therefore, be it
    Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), 
That Congress recognizes the George C. Marshall Museum and George C. 
Marshall Research Library in Lexington, Virginia, as the National 
George C. Marshall Museum and Library.
                                 <all>
```
CERTIFICATION
  1.
    
    I have reviewed this Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q/A of Aastrom Biosciences, Inc. for the
quarter ended September 30, 2010;2.
    
    Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material
fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the
period covered by this report;3.
    
    Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included
in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of
operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this
report;4.
    
    The registrants other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing and
maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e)
and 15d-15(e)) and internal control over financial reporting (as defined in Exchange Act
Rules 13a-15(f) and 15d-15(f)) for the registrant and have:
     5.
    
    The registrants other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most
recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrants auditors
and the audit committee of the registrants board of directors (or persons performing the
equivalent functions):
    /s/Scott C. DurbinScott C. DurbinChief Financial Officer

(Principal Financial and Accounting Officer)
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-7363

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

FITZROY GUNTER,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

Maryland, at Greenbelt. Richard D. Bennett, District Judge.

(8:01-cr-00514-RDB; 8:05-cv-02136-RBD)

Submitted: June 15, 2007 Decided: June 19, 2007

Before WIDENER, MICHAEL, and KING, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Fitzroy Gunter, Appellant Pro Se. Barbara Suzanne Skalla, Assistant

United States Attorney, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Fitzroy Gunter seeks to appeal the district court’s order

denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000) motion. The order is

not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a

certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A

certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial

showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by

demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that any

assessment of the constitutional claims by the district court is

debatable or wrong and that any dispositive procedural ruling by

the district court is likewise debatable. Miller-El v. Cockrell,

537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484

(2000); Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th Cir. 2001). We have

independently reviewed the record and conclude Gunter has not made

the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of

appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

presented in the materials before the court and argument would not

aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
#### Richardson v. Croft and another.

*(Circuit Court, S. D. New York.*

November 29, 1880.)

Injunction — When not Dissolved.

If, upon the state of facts appearing on a consideration of all -the affidavits it is shown on a final hearing that the plaintiff’s patent would not be defeated, the motion to amend the answer and to dissolve the injunction will be denied.

*George Gifford,*for complainant.

*George Bliss*and *A. Bell Maleomson, Jr.,*for defendants.’

Blatchford, C. J.

Waiving the question as to whether the defendants have shown the diligence which is required, it does not appear satisfactorily that the' matters now sought to be set up are relevant or material. If the state of facts now appearing on a consideration of all the affidavits were shown on a final hearing, the plaintiff’s patent would not be defeated. The Tyrrel device for reflecting figures attached to slides running in grooves in the table does not suggest or meet the plaintiff’s invention. Mr. Boyd Elliot’s affidavit leaves it not at all clear that the Castner mirrors were adjustably connected to each other, or that they were publicly used. There is nothing to show that the two book references have any relevancy. The motion to amend the answer and the motion to dissolve the injunction are denied-