### COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND FILED April 28, 2022

Sheila T. Reiff Clerk of Court of Appeals NOTICE This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of Appeals. See W IS . S TAT . § 808.10 and R ULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2021AP1163
- CR Cir. Ct. No. 2019CT34 STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT IV

S TATE OF W ISCONSIN , P LAINTIFF - R ESPONDENT ,
V . D OMINIC A. C ALDIERO , D EFENDANT - A PPELLANT .

APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the circuit court for Waupaca County: RAYMOND S. HUBER , Judge. Affirmed

. ¶ 1 GRAHAM, J. 1 Dominic Caldiero was arrested for his third operating while intoxicated (OWI)

- related offense in January 2019. Caldiero provided a blood sample , and chemical test ing revealed an alcohol concentration

1 This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to W IS

. S TAT

. § 752.31(2)(f) (201 9

- 20 )

.No. 2021AP1163

- CR

2 of 0.072 grams per 100 millil iters

. The State determined that , at the time of his January 2019 arrest , Cal diero wa s subject to a n ignition interlock device order , which had been issued in S eptember 2015 following his second conviction of an OWI

- related offense. Therefore, the State determined that Caldiero’s maximum allowable b lood alcohol concentration was 0.02 pursuant to W IS

. S TAT

. § 340.01(46m) (2019

- 20) and W IS

. S TAT

. § 343.301 (2013

- 14 )

. 2 Caldiero was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited blood alcohol concentration, third offense, and he was convicted following a jury trial

. ¶ 2 Caldiero argues that the circuit court should have granted his pre trial motion to dismiss the p rohibited blood alcohol concentration charge , or alternatively, his pos tconviction mot ion to vacate his conviction of that offense

. H e contends that, at the time of his arrest in January 2019 , h e was no longer subject to the September 2015 ignition interlock device order

. According to Caldiero , th at order had expired , and therefore the prohibited alcohol

conce ntration that applie d to him at the time of his arrest was actually the default prohibited alcohol concentration, 0.08.

2 W ISCONSIN S TAT

. § 343.301, which pertains to court orders relating to ignition interlock devices , was amended in 2016 and 2017. See 2016 Wis. Act 389 (effective Oct. 2, 2016) and 2017 Wis. Act 124 (effective Dec. 9, 2017)

. These amendments are reflected in the 2015

- 16 version of the statutes, published in January 2017 , but they were not in effect in September 2015, when the ignition interlock device order at issue in this case was issued. Caldiero and the State both rely on the 2013

- 14 version of § 343.301 , which was in effect in September 2015 , for their substantive analysis in this appeal, and I follow their lead. Accordingly, alt hough sometimes I discuss that statute using the present tense, a ll references to § 343.3 01 are to the 2013

- 14 version. Apart from the amendments to W IS

. S TAT

. § 343.301, there have been no material changes to the applicable statutory provisions during the relevant time periods. Accordingly, for ease of reference, all referen ces to provisions in the Wisconsin Statutes other than § 343.301 are to the 2019

- 20 version.No. 2021AP1163

- CR

3 ¶ 3 For the reasons explained below, I conclude that the September 2015 order had not expired

— and that Ca ldiero continued to be subject to th at order

— when he was a rrested in January 2019. Therefore, I conclude that the circuit court properly denied Caldiero’s pretrial motion to dismis s and his post con viction motion to vacate his conviction of the prohibited alcohol concentration charge. I also reject Caldiero ’s alternative argument that he is entitled to additional sentence credit. Accordingly , I affirm the judgment of conviction and the order denying Caldiero’s postconviction motion

.
BACKGROUND
¶ 4 Caldiero had two prior OWI

- related offenses in January 20 19 when he was arrested for his third such off ense , which is the subject of this appeal. 3 T he parties’ arguments turn on the legal consequences of Caldiero ’s conviction for his second OWI

- related offense, Waupaca County Case No. 2015CT 55

. ¶ 5 Caldiero was convicted and sentenced in Case No. 2015CT 55 on September 21, 2015

. During sentencing , the circuit court revoked Ca ldiero’s operating privilege for a period of 13 months, effective immediately. Additionally , t he parties agree that , consistent with W IS

. S TAT

. § 343.301(1g) (201 3

- 1 4 ) , the court was required to order that Caldiero’ s operating privilege would be subject to a restriction lasting at least one year, during which Caldiero

3 Throughout this opinion, I use the term “OWI

- related offenses” to refer to convictions, suspensions, and revocations that are enumerated in W IS

. S TAT

. § 343.307(1).No. 2021AP1163

- CR

4 could only drive vehicle s that were equipped wi th an ignition interlock device

. 4 Although the transcript is not entirely clear on this point , the parties ap pear to agree that the court

- ordered restr iction on Caldiero’s operating privilege would last 13 months. Thro ughout this opinion, I refer to t he ignition

- inter lock

- related order issued at sentencing in Case No. 2015CT55 as the “ September 201 5 order. ”
¶ 6 It is undisputed that Caldiero never sought to re instate his operating privilege with the state de partment of transportation , an d that his operating privilege was still revoked at the time he was arrested for the current offense . It is not clear from the record whethe r Caldiero ever installed an ignition interlock device on any vehicle titled or registered in his name

. However, the vehicle Caldiero was driving in when he was pulled over in January 2019 did not have any such device.
¶ 7 T he State charged Caldiero with several offenses stemming from the events of January 11, 2019. The charges included one count of ope rating a motor vehicle with prohibited alcohol concentration, third offense (hereinafter, the “ PAC

4 T he transcript of Caldiero’s sentencing in Case No. 2015CT55 does not expressly mention any restriction on his operating privilege . The circuit court stated, “I will make the revocation effective forthwith giving [Caldiero] credit for any period of administrative suspension that may have been put into place. ” The court continued , “ I will revok e your driving privileges for a period of 13 months. If I didn ’ t indicate, the revocation is 13 months. I will direct that during that period of revocati on you operate vehicles equipped with ignition interlock devices. ” Although the transcript is unclear in certain respects, Caldiero does not argue that the circuit court failed to restrict his operating privilege as required by W IS

. S TAT

. § 343.301(1g) (2013

- 14) . Instea d, as discussed below, Caldiero’s argument is that the 2013

- 2014 version of § 343.301(2m) allowed the court to order that the 13

- month restr iction on his operating privilege would run “alongside [the] 13

- month revocation of his driver’s license,” and , according to Caldiero, that was wha t the circuit court ordered in Case No. 2015CT55

.No. 2021AP1163

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5 charge”) and one count of operatin g a motor vehicle while revoked

. 5 As it relates to the PAC charge, the complaint alleged that Caldiero operated a motor ve hicle with a n alcohol concentration of 0.072 at a time in which he was “subject to” an ignition interlock order under W IS

. S TAT

. § 343.301 . Thus , the complaint alleged that his maximum allowable alcohol concentration was 0.02 by operation of W IS

. S TAT

. § 340.01(46m)

. ¶ 8 Caldiero moved to dismiss the PAC charge on the grou nd that he was not “subject to” an ignition interlock device order under W IS

. S TAT

. § 343.301 (2013

- 14)

. He initially argued that, based on the language of the 2013

- 14 statute , the September 2015 order “ would not have yet started to run ” until such time his driver’s license was reinstated by the department of transportation , which had not yet occurred. Later, he argued that the 13

- month restric tion on his operating priv ilege had been effective immediately, and therefore, that the r estriction had long since expired. Either way, he contended , he was not subject to the September 2015 order , and therefore, he was not subject to a maximum allowable alcohol concentration of 0.02 . The circuit cour t denied the motion.
¶ 9 Caldiero pled guilty to operating a motor vehicle while r evoked. T he case proceeded to trial on the PAC char ge , and t he jury re turned a guilty verdict. The circuit court sentenced Caldiero to 60 days confinement in the county jail. It stayed all but 14 of those days pending Caldiero’s completion of a

5 The State also charged Caldiero with one count of operat ing a motor vehicle while intoxicated and one count of failing to install an ignition interlock device. Both of these counts were dismissed before trial, and neither party challenges the dismissal of either count on appeal. As a result, I discuss these t wo counts no further.No. 2021AP1163

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6 diversion program, and it stayed all but the first 48 hours of his jail sentence pending appe al

. ¶ 10 Caldiero filed a postconviction motion to vacate his conviction of the PAC charge

. In the motion, Caldiero renewed his argument that the September 2015 order expired 13 months after it was issued , and therefore, that the prohibited alcohol concentration that applied to him when he was arrested in January 2019 was actually 0.08. Separately, Caldiero sought 14 days of sentence credit

. I present additional information regarding the motion for senten ce credit i n the discussion section below.
¶ 11 The circuit court denied Caldiero’s p ostconviction motion to vacate the conviction of the PAC charge

. Regarding sentence credit, t he court granted four days of credit but denied his request fo r 10 additional days. Caldier o appeals

.
DISCUSSION
¶ 12 On appeal , Ca ldiero renews his argument that he should not have been convicted of operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited alcohol concentration

. I n the alternative, Caldiero argues that he is entitled to 10 additional days of sentence credit

. I address each of these argument s in turn , ultimately reje cting both

.
I
¶ 13 Caldiero maintains that when he was pulled over in January 2019, he was not driving with a p rohibited alcohol concentration. He argues that , based on his interpretation of two interrelated statutes, W IS

. S TAT

. § 340.01(46m ) and W IS

. S TAT

. § 343.301 (2013

- 14) , the prohibited alcohol concentration that applied toNo. 2021AP1163

- CR

7 him was 0.08. Statutory interpretation presents a question of law, which I review de novo. State v. Arberry , 2018 WI 7, ¶14, 379 Wis. 2d 254, 905 N.W.2d 832. 6
¶ 14 W ISCONSIN S TAT

. § 340.01 (46m)(a) sets forth a default prohibite d alcohol concentration o f 0.08 for most Wisconsin drivers. H oweve r, under certain circumstances , a person is prohibited from driving with “an alcohol concentration of more than 0.02.” See § 340.01(4 6 m)(c). One such circumstance is if the person is “subject to an order under s. 343.301

. ” Id. If so, the person ’s maximum allowable alcohol concentration is 0.02. Id.
¶ 15 Accordingly, t his case turns on whether, as a co nsequence of his second OWI

- related conviction in September 2015 , Caldiero was “subject to an order under s. 343.301 ” (2013

- 14) at the time he was arrested in January 2019. If so, he was pro perly charged with and convicted of the PAC charge . But if not, the cri minal complaint failed to allege that Caldiero operated a motor vehicle with a proh ibited alcohol concentration , and the ju ry instructions did not accurately inform the jury of the prohibited alcohol concentration that applied to Caldiero

. ¶ 16 In addressing Caldiero’s argument that he was not “subject to an order under s. 343.301 ” in January 2019, I begin by summarizing some of the statutory consequences of OWI

- related offenses

. Wisconsin Statutes impose

c onsequences beyond jail time and fines for such offenses , and the consequences escalate with each subsequent offense. Among other things, when sentencing a

6 When I interpret a statute, I begin with its plain language. State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit C t. for Dane Cnty. , 2004 WI 58, ¶4 5 , 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110. I give that language

“ its common, ordinary, and accepted meaning, except that technical or specially

- defined words or phrases are given their technical or special definitional meaning.” Id. I interpret statutory language in the context in which it is used, in relation to the language of surrounding or closely related statutes, and in a reasonable manner, to avoid absurd or unreasonable results. Id. , ¶46.No. 2021AP1163

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8 person for their second OWI

- related offense , “the court shall revoke the person’s operating privilege for not less than one year nor more than 18 months.” W IS

. S TAT

. § 343.30(1q)(b)3. Additionally, t he court must ma ke orders restricting the person’s operating privilege to vehicles equipped with an ignition interlock device , and requiring the person to install such devices on certain vehicles

. The requirements related to ignition interlock device s are found in W IS

. S TAT

. § 343.301 (2013

- 14) and are the focus of this appeal.
¶ 17 W ISCONSIN S TAT

. § 343 .301 (2013

- 14) provides in relevant part:

(1g) A court shall order a person’s operating privilege

... be restricted to operating vehicles that are equipped with an ignition interlock device and , [with exceptions that are inapplicable here,] shall order that each motor vehicle for which the person’s name appears on the vehicle’s certificate of title or registration be e quipped with an ignition interlock device

....

... . (2m) The court shall restrict the operating privilege under sub. (1g) for a period of not less than one year nor more than the maximum operating privilege revocation period permitted for the refusal or viola tion, beginning on the date the department issues any license granted under this chapter, [with exceptions that are inapplicable here] . The court may order the installation of an ignition interlock device under sub. (1g) immediately upon issu ing an order under sub. (1g). (Emphasis added.)
¶ 18 Plainly , W IS

. S TAT

. § 343.301 (1g) (2013

- 14) imposes two separate requireme nts. I t requires that , at the time the person’s driver’s license is reinstated following revocation , the operating privilege will come with a restriction

— the
person will only be allowed to operate vehicl es that are equipped with an ignitionNo. 2021AP1163

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9 interlock device

. Id. Separately, it also requires that the person ins tall an ignition interlock device on any vehicle that is titled or r egistered in the person’s name. Id.
¶ 19 Turning to W IS

. S TAT

. § 343.301 (2m) (2013

- 14) , that subsection plainly provides separate timelines for these two requirements . T he restriction on the person’ s operating privilege “begin[s] on the da te the department [of transportation] issues any license.” Id. A s for the order requiring the installation of an ignition interlock device , the court may, in its discretion, or der installation to happen “ immediately ” upon issuance of the sub sec tion (1g) order. Id. In other words , under sub sec tion (2m), the court may require a person to immediately install ignition interlock devices on vehicl es titled or registered in the person’s

name

— even though the person should not be driving at all during this period because their operating privilege has been revoked pursuant to W IS

. S TAT

. § 343.30(1q)(b)3.
¶ 20 During the circuit court proceedings, Caldiero argued that he was n ot subject to an order under W IS

. S TAT

. § 343.301 (2013

- 14 ) because he had not yet sought reins tatement of his driver’s license . This court rejected an identical
arg ument in State v. Quisling , No. 2017AP1658 , unpublished slip op. (WI App April 12, 2018 )

. 7 In that case, Quisling argued that he was not “subject to an order under § 343.301” at the ti me of his most recent arrest for an OWI

- related offense because the order requiring him to install a device was contingent on the department of transportation issuing him a Wisconsin dr iver ’ s license, which had not yet occurred

. Id. , ¶¶ 8, 21. This court interpreted W IS

. S TAT

. § 343.301

7 W ISCONSIN S TAT

. R ULE 809.23(3)(b) allows the citation of an unpublished , authored opinion issued after July 1, 2009, for its persuasive value.No. 2021AP1163

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10 (2013

- 14) and concluded that, based on its “plain meaning , ” Quisling was

“‘ subject to an order under s. 343 .301’ ” when the circuit court issued the orde r under that section, and that Quisling “remained a ‘person subject’ to that order ” when he was arrested 18 months later, “ even though the department had not yet issued a Wisconsin license to him, and perhaps never would. ” Id. , ¶ 22.
¶ 21 Th e Quisling opinion was issued by one judge, and therefore , it has no precedential value. W IS

. S TAT

. R ULE 809.23(3)(b ). However, it may be cited for persuasive value, and , in my view, it persuasively interprets the statutes at issue in this case. If , in his opening appellate brief , Caldiero had renewed his argument that he was not yet “ subject to an order under s. 343.301 ” (2013

- 14) beca use he had not sought reinstatement of his driver’s license , I would have rejected that argument for the same reasons th is court rejected the arguments advanced in Quisling

. ¶ 22 I now turn to the argument that C aldiero has renewed on appeal

— that the requirements of the September 2015 order had already expired when Caldiero was arrested in January 2019

. Cald iero bases this argument on his interpretation of W IS

. S TAT

. § 343.301(2m) (2013

- 14). According to Caldiero, “the la w in effect at the time ” he was sentenced in September 2015 “ provided that the restriction(s) on driving privileges would begin on the date that a license was later issued, unless the trial court had immediately ordered the installation of an ignition interlock device .” (Emphasis added.) In other words, Caldiero a rgues that the 2013

- 14 statute provided a “default start date of the ignition interlock requirement,” but that the statute also gave the court discretion to order the immediate installation of the device. Caldiero contends that the court ordered h im
to in stall an ignition interlock device during the 13

- month period in which his

o perating privilege was revoked . T herefore, he contends, the requirement that heNo. 2021AP1163

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11 install an ignition interlock device , which began in September 20 15 , expire d no more than 13 months later in October 2016

. ¶ 23 I reject Caldiero’s interpretation because it improperly conflates the two separate requirements in W IS

. S TAT

. § 343.301 (2013

- 14)

. Caldiero is correct insofar as he argues that the court had discretion under th e 2013

- 14 statute to order the immediate installation of an ignition interlock device. However, even if the court ordered him to immediately install a device , that does not mean that the restriction on his operating privilege began to run on the date the court issued the September 2015 order

. The September 2015 order revoked Caldiero’s operating privilege f

or 13 months ; therefore, he had no operat ing privilege to restrict at that time. Caldiero’s argument that the restriction on his operating privil ege ran alongside the revocation of his operating privilege defies any reasonable interpretation of the statute

— a driver cannot have his operating privilege revoked and, at the same time, have an operating privilege tha t is subject to a restriction.
¶ 24 As stated above, and c ontrary to Caldiero’s interpretation, the plain language of W IS

. S TAT

. § 343.301(1g) (2013

- 14) demonstrates that the restriction on Caldiero’s license is separate from the requirement that he install an ignition interloc k device on vehicles titled or registered in his name

. In other words, i t does not matter whether or not the court ordered Caldiero to immediately install such a device

— under (2m), the restriction on Caldiero’s operating privilege will “begin[] on the dat e the department [of transportation] issues any license.” Id. A nd, a s in Quisling , the fact that Caldiero had not yet sought reinstatement of his operating privilege has no bearing on the application of the statute. Quisling , No. 2017AP1658, ¶22

. Therefore, C aldiero continues to be “ subject to an order under

s. 343.301 ” (2013

- 14) until the department reinstates his license and the period of restriction runs its course.No. 2021AP1163

- CR

12 ¶ 25 Before concluding, I pause to acknowled ge that , as mentioned above, t he transcri p t from Caldiero’s sentencing in 2015TR 55 is less than clear on several point s
. See supra n.4

. H owever, Caldiero ’s sole argument is based on his interpretation of the 2013

- 14 version of the statute , a nd I have rejected that interpreta tion . Caldiero has not argue d that the court failed to issue an order required by W IS

. S TAT

. § 343.301(1g) (2013

- 14)

. N or has he argue d that any failure to do so would override the mandatory language of that statute. See Schill v. Wisconsin Rapids Sch. Dist. , 2010 WI 86, ¶45 & n.21 , 327 Wis. 2d 572, 786 N.W.2d 177 (explaining that issues not raised in the circuit court are forfeited); State v. Pettit , 171 Wis. 2d 627, 646

- 47, 492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992) (an appellate court “cannot serve as both advoca te and judge” and will not develop arguments on an appellant’s behalf).
¶ 26 In sum , I conclude that Caldiero became a person “ subject to ” an order under W IS

. S TAT

. § 343.301 (2013

- 14) upon issuance of the September 2015 order, and that he remained a “person subject” to that order when he was arrested in January 2019

. Therefore, his maximum allowable prohibited alcohol concentration was 0.02 at the time of his arrest , and Caldiero has not established grounds to vacate his conviction of the PAC offense. 8

8 Given my conclusion about the proper interpretation of W IS

. S TAT

. § 343.301 (2013

- 14), I need not address the parties’ additional argum ents about policy considerations and the subseque nt amendments to that statute. Lakeland Area Prop. Owners Assoc
. , U.A. v. Oneida Cnty
. , 2021 WI App 19, ¶17, 396 Wis. 2d 622, 957 N.W.2d 605 (a court “need not address all arguments raised by the parties if one of those arguments is dispositive”).No. 2021AP1163

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13 II
¶ 27 In the alternative, Caldiero contends that he is entit l ed to 10 add itiona l days of sentence credit. The State contends that Caldiero is not entitled
to any additional credit. T o resolve this dispute, I apply W IS

. S TAT

. § 973.155 and existing case law to undisputed facts. This presents a question of law, which I review de novo. State v. Tuescher , 226 Wis. 2d 465, 468, 595 N.W.2d 443 (Ct. App. 1999).
¶ 28 W ISCONSIN S TAT

. § 973.155(1)(a) provides that “[a] convicted offender shall be given credit toward the service of his or her sentence for all days spent in custody in connection with the course of conduct for which sentence was imposed.” 9 The offender is entitled to one day of sentence credit for each day served, but credit “is not to be duplicatively [given] to more than one of the sentences imposed to run consecutively.” State v. Boettcher , 144 Wis. 2d 86, 87, 423 N.W.2d 533 (1988). As our supreme court has explained, “[t] he total time in

9 W ISCONSIN S TAT

. § 973.155( 1 )(a) provides in its en tirety:

A convicted offender shall be given credit toward the service of his or her sentence for all days spent in custody in connection with the course of conduct for which sentence was imposed. As used in this subsection , “actual days spent in custody” includes, without limitation by enumeration, confinement related to an offense for which the offender is ultimately sentenced, or for any other sentence arising out of the same course of conduct, which occurs:
1. While the offender is awaiting trial;
2. While the offender is being tried; and
3. While the offender is awaiting imposition of sentence after trial.No. 2021AP1163

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14 custody should be credited on a day

- for

- day basis against the total days imposed in the consecutive sentences. ” Id. at 100.
¶ 29 The parties agree that Caldiero was arrested on January 11, 2019 , and , at that time, he was also on probation for a pri or 2018 conviction for battery in Waupaca County Case No. 2018CM 204. Caldiero remained in custody for four days (from January 11

- 14) in connection with the PAC charge . Then, on January 14, Caldiero signed a s ignature bond releasing him from custody for the charges in the present case. He nevertheless remaine d in custody for ten days ( from January 15

- 24 ) as a result of the probation hold in Case No

. 2018CM 204. Caldiero was released from custody on January 24

. ¶ 30 In his postconviction motion, Caldiero argues that he was in custody f or a total of 14 days in connec tion with the course of conduct for which his sentence for the PAC convictio n was imposed. The State stipulated that Caldiero was entitled to four days of sentence credit, and the circuit court granted credit for four days , corresponding with January 11

- 14 , 2019

. However, the court denied sentence credit for the 10 days starting with January 15 tha t he remained in custody on the probation hold in Case No. 2018CM 204.
¶ 31 The State does not appeal the circuit court’s decision, consistent with its stipulation, to award four days of sentence credit corresponding with Caldiero’s pretrial custody from January 11

- 14 , 2019 ; therefore, I do not weigh in on whether those four days of credit were properly awarde d. As to Caldiero’s argument in favor of an additional 10 days of credit corresponding to his pretrial custody from January 15

- 24 , 2019 , I conclude that Caldiero is not entitled to sentence credit

. ¶ 32 Caldiero does not dispute the State’s assertion s that he finished serving his sentence in Case No. 2018CM 204 no later than December 2019, andNo. 2021AP1163

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15 that he did not start serving any portion of his sentence for the current PAC offense until after he was sentenced in January 2020. Ac cordingly, Caldiero does not meaningfully argue that he serve d any portion of his sentence in Case No

. 2018CM 204 concurrently with the sentence he has yet to serve in this case. Nor does he dispute the State’s contention that the circuit court awarded him 14 days of credit, corresponding with January 11

- 25, 2019, when it sentenced him to time served in Case No. 2018CM204.
¶ 33 Instead, Ca ldiero contends that this is not a case where t he general prohibition against dual credit for consecutive sentences would apply. His argument appears to be based on an assertion that the circuit court did not specifically designate the sentence in this ca se as “ consecutive ” to his sentence in Case No. 2018CM 204

. Therefore, he contends, his sentence in this case is concurrent to any other sentence “by default , ” and he should be given dual credit

. ¶ 34 This court rejected a similar argument in State v. Morrick , 147 Wis. 2d 185, 188

- 89 , 432 N.W.2d 654 (Ct. App. 1988). In that case, Morrick likewise sought dual credit for two sentences that were separately imposed

. And, as here, Morrick argued that the s entences could not be considered “consecutive” for purposes of determining sentence credit because there was a gap between when he finished serving the first

- imposed sentence and when he started serving the later

imposed sentence

. Id. at 188. This court flatly rejected that argument. Id. We acknowledged that Morrick’s two sentences were not “consecutive” in the technical sense of the term , given the gap between the sentences

. Id. at 187. However , we concluded that , with respect to sentence credit, the re was “no difference in principle” between “consecutive sentences and the two separate and distinct sentences at issue [in Morrick’s case] .” Id. at 191. We emphasized that Boettcher requires “day

- for

- day credit for the time served, no more and no less;No. 2021AP1163

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16 and that is what [Morrick] received.” Id. By contrast, i f we were to award dual credit, it “ would be authorizing double credit for time served ... in violation of the spirit, if not the letter, of Boettcher

. ” Id.
¶ 35 Likewise, in State v. J ackson , 2000 WI App 41, 233 Wis. 2d 231, 607 N.W.2d 338 , this court was presented with a similar fact pattern , and we again rejected the defendant’s request for dual credit. As we explained, “[t]he core idea of Boettcher is that ‘dual credit is not permitted’ where a defendant has already received credit against a sentence which has been, or will be, separately served.” Id. , ¶19

. ¶ 36 So to o here. Caldiero does not dispute that he ha s already received

cre dit in Case No. 2018CM204 f or his time spent in pretrial custody from January 15

- 24, 2019 . If I were to conclude that Caldiero should be awarded additional credit for those days in pretrial custody , I would be authorizing dual credit in violation of Boett

cher , Mo rrick , and Jackson

. 10

10 I recognize that the circuit court did not employ this reasoning when it determined that Caldiero was not entitled to 10 days credit to c orres pond with the time he spent in custody from January 15

- 24, 2019

. Regardless, as noted above, the p roper amount of sentence credit is a n issue subject to de novo review

. Finally, I note that the state advances a confusing argument on appeal . The State rel ies on State v. Beets , 124 Wis. 2d 372, 379, 369 N.W.2d 382 (1985), for the proposition t hat “the connection” between Caldiero’s arrest for the PAC offense and his custody on the probation hold

“ was severed when the custody resulting from the probation hold was converted into a revocation and fully completed jail sentence in the battery case.” I need not consider this argument because Caldiero is not entitled to any additional credit for the reas ons explained above

. See supra , ¶¶31

- 36

.No. 2021AP1163

- CR

17 By the Court.

— Judgment and order affirmed.
This opinion will not be published. See W IS

. S TAT

. R ULE 809.23(1)(b)4

.