[Cite as State v. Lewis, 2019-Ohio-3630.]

COURT OF APPEALS 

KNOX COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

STATE OF OHIO 

 Plaintiff-Appellee 

-vsFRANK L. LEWIS 

 Defendant-Appellant 

JUDGES: 

Hon. John W. Wise, P. J. 

Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J. 

Hon. Earle E. Wise, Jr., J. 

Case No. 19 CA 000001 

O P I N I O N 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Criminal Appeal from the Court of Common 

Pleas, Case No. 17CR11-0295 

JUDGMENT: Affirmed 

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: September 9, 2019 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant 

CHARLES T. McCONVILLE JOHN S. PYLE 

PROSECUTING ATTORNEY PUBLIC DEFENDER 

117 East High Street, Suite 234 110 East High Street 

Mount Vernon, Ohio 43050 Mount Vernon, Ohio 43050 
Knox County, Case No. 19 CA 000001 2

Wise, John, P. J. 

{¶1} Defendant-Appellant Frank L. Lewis appeals his sentence entered in the 

Knox County Common Pleas Court following a guilty plea to one count of Possession of 

Drugs. 

{¶2} Appellee is the State of Ohio. 

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE 

{¶3} The relevant procedural facts leading to this appeal are as follows. 

{¶4} On November 21, 2017, the Knox County Grand Jury indicted Frank L. 

Lucas on one count of Possession of Drugs, a felony of the third degree, in violation of 

R.C. §2925.11(A). 

{¶5} On April 16, 2018, Appellant, through counsel, filed a motion to suppress. 

{¶6} On May 18, 2018, the trial court conducted a hearing on Appellant’s motion 

to suppress. 

{¶7} At the suppression hearing, the trial court heard testimony from Patrolman 

Joshua Kirby of the Mount Vernon Police Department, who testified that on November 

12, 2017, sometime after 1:00 a.m., he initiated a traffic stop on a maroon Cadillac 

travelling on Howard Street in the City of Mount Vernon, Ohio. (T. at 12-14). The Cadillac 

was being driven by Appellant Frank Lewis. (T. at 14). The speed limit on Howard Street 

is 25 miles per hour. (T. at 12-17). 

{¶8} Ptl. Kirby stated that before initiating the stop, he made two observations. 

First, he visually estimated the speed of Mr. Lewis' vehicle at 30 miles per hour. (T. at 

12). Ptl. Kirby explained that he had been trained in the visual estimation of vehicle speed 

at the Ohio State Highway Patrol Academy in 2016. (T. at 5- 6). Ptl. Kirby also used the 
Knox County, Case No. 19 CA 000001 3

Python 3 radar unit in his cruiser to measure the Cadillac's speed at 29 miles per hour. 

(T. at 13). Ptl. Kirby stated that pursuant to his training, he tracked the vehicle for four (4) 

seconds with the radar unit, confirming the 29 mph speed. (Id.) Ptl. Kirby had likewise 

been trained in the use of speed measuring devices at the OSP Academy. (T. at 5). 

{¶9} Patrolman Kirby also testified that he knew about "several reports of drug 

activity in and around" Appellant’s residence. (T. at 18). He testified that he had gotten 

this information on various calls that he had handled as well as information from fellow 

officers, including one of his shift supervisors, Corporal Young. Ptl. Kirby also knew that 

Appellant was in the vehicle based on his prior observation of Appellant and the vehicle 

at a Speedway station earlier. (T. at 17). 

{¶10} When Ptl. Kirby pulled Appellant over, he requested assistance from Ptl. 

Wheeler, a MVPD K9 officer, who arrived less than four minutes later. (T. at 18). He also 

stated that it was his intention to issue Appellant a warning for his speed. (T. at 19). Ptl 

Kirby testified "unless it's an excessive speed I'll issue a warning ticket first for a first 

offense." (Id.) 

{¶11} MVPD Patrolman Nicholas Myrda, who also responded to the scene, 

testified that when he arrived Ptl. Wheeler was at the scene and performing a K9 sniff of 

the vehicle. (T. at 33). After the K9 sniff, Appellant was discovered to be in possession 

of 3.2 grams of methamphetamine, which exceeds the bulk amount. (Plea T. at 10). 

{¶12} By Judgment Entry filed May 31, 2018, the trial court denied Appellant’s 

motion to suppress. 

{¶13} On October 31, 2018, Appellant entered a plea of no contest to the charge. 
Knox County, Case No. 19 CA 000001 4

{¶14} On January 22, 2019, at the sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced 

Appellant to a prison term of thirty (30) months. 

{¶15} Appellant now appeals, raising the following Assignment of Error: 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 

{¶16} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING THE APPELLANT'S 

MOTION TO SUPPRESS, IN VIOLATION OF MR. LEWIS' RIGHTS UNDER THE 

FORTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, § 

14 OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION BECAUSE THE ARRESTING OFFICER COULD 

NOT POINT TO ANY SPECIFIC AND ARTICULABLE FACTS WHICH WOULD LEAD 

HIM TO BELIEVE THAT THE APPELLANT WAS DRIVING IN A MANNER THAT 

VIOLATED OHIO R.C. §4511.21 (A).” 

I. 

{¶17} In his sole Assignment of Error, Appellant argues the trial court erred in 

denying his motion to suppress. We disagree. 

{¶1} There are three methods of challenging on appeal a trial court's ruling on a 

motion to suppress. First, an appellant may challenge the trial court's findings of fact. 

Second, an appellant may argue the trial court failed to apply the appropriate test or 

correct law to the findings of fact. Finally, an appellant may argue the trial court has 

incorrectly decided the ultimate or final issue raised in the motion to suppress. When 

reviewing this third type of claim, an appellate court must independently determine, 

without deference to the trial court's conclusion, whether the facts meet the appropriate 

legal standard in the given case. See State v. Fanning (1982), 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 437 

N.E.2d 583; State v. Williams (1993), 86 Ohio App.3d 37, 619 N.E.2d 1141; State v. Curry
Knox County, Case No. 19 CA 000001 5

(1994), 95 Ohio App.3d 93, 96, 641 N.E.2d 1172; State v. Claytor (1993), 85 Ohio App.3d 

623, 627, 620 N.E.2d 906; State v. Guysinger (1993), 86 Ohio App.3d 592, 621 N.E.2d 

726. The United States Supreme Court has held that as a general matter determinations 

of reasonable suspicion and probable cause should be reviewed de novo on appeal. See

Ornelas v. United States (1996), 517 U.S. 690, 699, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 1663, 134 L.Ed.2d 

911. 

{¶2} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 14, 

Article I, Ohio Constitution, prohibit the government from conducting unreasonable 

searches and seizures of persons or their property. Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1, 88 

S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889; State v. Andrews (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 86, 87, 565 N.E.2d 

1271. 

{¶3} As we have previously recognized, “[t]he Ohio Supreme Court has 

emphasized that probable cause is not required to make a traffic stop; rather the standard 

is reasonable and articulable suspicion.” State v. Lewis, 5th Dist. Licking No. 18-CA-17, 

2018-Ohio-3681, ¶ 21, citing State v. Mays, 119 Ohio St.3d 406, 2008-Ohio-4539, 894 

N.E.2d 1204, ¶ 23. Concisely stated, “[u]nder Terry [supra], police officers may briefly 

stop and/or temporarily detain individuals in order to investigate possible criminal activity 

if the officers have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity may be afoot, 

including a minor traffic violation.” State v. Saunders, 5th Dist. Muskingum No. CT2017-

0052, 2018-Ohio-2624, ¶ 27, quoting State v. Swift, 2nd Dist. Montgomery No. 27036, 

2016–Ohio–8191, ¶ 10 (internal quotations omitted). 

{¶4} Reasonable suspicion constitutes something less than probable cause. 

State v. Logan, 5th Dist. Richland No. 07–CA–56, 2008–Ohio–2969, ¶ 15, citing State v. 
Knox County, Case No. 19 CA 000001 6

Carlson (1995), 102 Ohio App.3d 585, 590. A single suspected traffic violation provides 

reasonable suspicion for an officer to stop a vehicle. See State v. Panaro, 9th Dist. Medina 

No. 16CA0067-M, 2018-Ohio-1005, 108 N.E.3d 1187, ¶ 15 (citations omitted). 

{¶18} In the instant case, the trial court found Ptl. Kirby had reasonable, articulable 

suspicion to stop Appellant based on his visual estimation of Appellant doing 30 mph and 

the radar-measured speed of 29 mph in a 25 mph speed zone. 

{¶19} Appellant herein argues that the State was also required to show that 

Appellant was driving unsafely because the speeding violation occurred on a city street 

where driving in excess of the posted speed limit was prima facia violation and not a per 

se violation. 

{¶20} In rejecting such argument, the Ohio Supreme Court noted, “the question 

of whether appellant might have a possible defense to a charge of speeding is irrelevant 

in our analysis of whether an officer has a reasonable and articulable suspicion to initiate 

a traffic stop. An officer is not required to determine whether someone who has been 

observed committing a crime might have a legal defense to the charge.” State v. Mays,

119 Ohio St.3d 406, 2008-Ohio-4538 at ¶ 23. 

{¶21} Further, it is well-established that an officer's reasonable articulable 

suspicion does not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's conduct 

has satisfied the elements of the offense. State v. Willis, 5th Dist. Licking No. 14 CA 103, 

2015-Ohio-3739, ¶ 25 

{¶22} We accept the trial court's conclusion that Appellant's violation of the traffic 

laws gave Ptl. Kirby reasonable suspicion to stop Appellant's vehicle as the factual 

findings made by the trial court are supported by competent and credible evidence. 
Knox County, Case No. 19 CA 000001 7

{¶23} Appellant’s assignment of error is overruled.

{¶24} For the reasons stated in the foregoing opinion, the decision of the Knox 

Count Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.

By: Wise, John, P. J. 

Delaney, J., and 

Wise, Earle, J., concur. 

JWW/d 0827