Motion Granted; Appeal Dismissed and Memorandum Opinion filed 

November 25, 2014.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-14-00620-CR

EX PARTE VECTOR THORN, Appellant

On Appeal from the 177th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 1431849

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Appellant Vector Thorn appeals from the trial court’s order denying his 

pretrial application for writ of habeas corpus.

Appellant was indicted for fraudulent use or possession of identifying 

information. He filed a pretrial application for writ of habeas corpus challenging 

the constitutionality of the charges against him and Texas Penal Code section 

32.51. On October 21, 2014, the trial court granted the State’s motion to dismiss 
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the indictment.

On November 14, 2014, the State filed a motion to dismiss this appeal. 

Appellant responded to the motion arguing that this court retain the appeal and 

address the merits of appellant’s constitutionality arguments because his claim 

warrants an exception to the mootness doctrine.

The mootness doctrine limits courts to deciding cases in which an actual 

controversy exists. Ex parte Flores, 130 S.W.3d 100, 104–05 (Tex. App.—El Paso 

2003, pet. ref’d). When there has ceased to be a controversy between the litigating 

parties, which is due to events occurring after judgment has been rendered by the 

trial court, the decision of an appellate court would be a mere academic exercise 

and the court may not decide the appeal. Id. A case that is moot is normally not 

justiciable. Pharris v. State, 165 S.W.3d 681, 687–88 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). 

One of the exceptions to the general rule is when a claim is “capable of 

repetition, yet evading review.” The United States Supreme Court has said that 

“the ‘capable of repetition but evading review’ doctrine [is] limited to the situation 

where two elements combine: (1) the challenged action was in its duration too 

short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there was a 

reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would be subjected to the 

same action again.” Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975). The Texas 

Court of Criminal Appeals has adopted and applied this doctrine. See Pharris, 165 

S.W.3d at 688.

Assuming arguendo that the challenged action here was too short in duration 

to be fully litigated prior to the State’s dismissal of the charges, appellant cannot 

show that he would be subjected to the same action again because the State 

dismissed all criminal charges that were filed against him in this case. Cf. id. at 

688–89 (holding Pharris would be likely subjected to same no bond condition 
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again because State had filed multiple charges against him and represented that it 

would be filing more charges against him in that case). We conclude the capable of 

repetition but evading review exception does not apply to this case.

Appellant further argues that his appeal is not moot due to the collateral 

consequences he faces having been indicted. This exception is invoked only under 

narrow circumstances when vacating the underlying judgment will not cure the 

adverse consequences suffered by the party seeking to appeal the judgment. 

Marshall v. Hous. Auth. of City of San Antonio, 198 S.W.3d 782, 789 (Tex. 2006). 

In order to invoke the collateral consequences exception, appellant must show (1) a 

concrete disadvantage resulted from the judgment or order; and (2) the 

disadvantage will persist even if the order is vacated. Id. Appellant does not 

specify a “concrete disadvantage” resulting from the denial of his pretrial writ of 

habeas corpus in light of the State’s dismissal of all charges. Appellant admits this 

doctrine has not been applied “on the question of whether an arrest or indictment 

can sufficiently stigmatize a defendant to allow invocation of the protection of this 

exception to the mootness doctrine.” We conclude the “collateral consequences” 

exception to mootness does not apply to this case.

We grant the State’s motion to dismiss and order the appeal dismissed.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Justices Boyce, Jamison, and Donovan.

Do Not Publish — Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).