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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

 

UNPUBLISHED 

In re L. COSELMAN, Minor. February 28, 2017 

No. 333536 

Livingston Circuit Court 

 Family Division 

LC No. 14-013254-NA 

 

Before: HOEKSTRA, P.J., and SAAD and RIORDAN, JJ 

PER CURIAM. 

 Respondent-father appeals as of right the trial court order terminating his parental rights 

to the minor child under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j). We affirm. 

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

 Respondent and his former girlfriend, the child’s mother, had an extensive history of 

substance abuse and illegal activity. The child’s mother became pregnant while the couple 

continued to struggle with significant drug addictions. Soon afterward, however, the child’s 

mother was incarcerated, and respondent sought drug treatment, beginning sobriety in June 2014 

and subsequently living in a three-quarter house with other recovering addicts. 

 In November 2014, the minor child was born while his mother remained incarcerated.1

 

Initially, the child was placed in the custody of his maternal grandparents, but he was removed 

and placed in foster care when he was five weeks old. At the time, respondent was known to be 

the putative father. Respondent later signed an affidavit of parentage in February 2015. 

 In February 2015, petitioner, the Department of Health and Human Services (“DHHS”), 

filed an amended petition requesting that the trial court exercise jurisdiction over the child based 

on respondent’s initial failure to sign an affidavit of parentage or establish paternity; the fact that 

respondent was currently living in transitional housing; respondent’s history of substance abuse; 

respondent’s criminal history; and the fact that respondent had reported that he was unable to 

 

1

 In an earlier order, the trial court terminated the parental rights of the child’s mother. This 

Court affirmed that decision in In re Coselman, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of 

Appeals, issued October 20, 2015 (Docket No. 326497). 
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care for the child at that time. The trial court accepted respondent’s plea to the allegations in the 

petition and exercised jurisdiction over the child pursuant to MCL 712A.2(b). Later, the trial 

court ordered supervised parenting time and adopted the parent-agency treatment plan, which 

required that respondent participate in parenting classes, among other things. 

 Over the next year, respondent consistently participated in supervised parenting time with 

the child, canceling only a few visits. He also remained extremely active in programs and 

services aimed at strengthening his sobriety, and he never relapsed. 

 However, respondent did not consistently bring essential supplies—including a diaper 

bag with necessities for the child’s care, age-appropriate food, and a stroller—to his visits with 

the child until December 2015, believing it was unnecessary to do so if the foster parents were 

providing those items or if those items were available at the visit locations. Additionally, 

although he was instructed to purchase a crib and car seat in order to demonstrate that he was 

prepared to care for the child in his own home, respondent did not obtain these items until May 

2016, after the first day of the termination hearing. He expressed confusion or a lack of initiative 

throughout the proceedings with regard to the child’s medical history and his role in participating 

in the child’s medical care. Additionally, despite the clear requirement under the parent-agency 

agreement that he participate in parenting classes, respondent did not participate in structured 

parenting classes until early 2016. 

 In December 2015, respondent moved from the three-quarter house where he had been 

living into a sobriety-focused home with other former addicts and transitional housing managers. 

Although the home had a spare bedroom that was intended for the minor child, respondent never 

gave his caseworker the names and birthdates of the other men living in the home so that 

petitioner could perform background checks and approve the residence as a suitable home for the 

child. 

 In January 2016, respondent left a full-time job at the University of Michigan, which was 

scheduled to end in a few months, in order to pursue a full-time career as a personal trainer. 

However, by March 2016, he had not passed the certification exam and was only making a few 

hundred dollars per month. Throughout the proceedings, respondent continued to work toward 

his goal of becoming a personal trainer and to take online college courses, but he never secured 

additional employment. Instead, he relied on student loans and supplemental financial assistance 

from his mother in order to meet his monthly expenses. 

 In March 2016, respondent moved into an apartment with his girlfriend, who had been 

very involved during the child protective proceedings and was willing to assist with caring for 

the minor child. However, the apartment was under a sublease that was set to expire in August 

2016, at which time the rent would increase substantially. 

 On March 17, 2016, petitioner filed a supplemental petition seeking termination of 

respondent’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j). In April and May 2016, 

the referee conducted a six-day termination hearing that began on April 29, 2016, and concluded 

on May 26, 2016. 
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 In the meantime, the DHHS caseworker discovered a record indicating that the child’s 

mother had an active Hepatitis C infection while she was pregnant with the child. Testing in 

May 2016 revealed that the minor child had an active Hepatitis C infection. During the 

termination hearing, respondent acknowledged that he was tested for Hepatitis C in 2014 and 

found to have reactive Hepatitis C antibodies, and that he had been tested again in January 2016. 

He explained that he did not mention this information to the caseworker because it was his 

understanding that Hepatitis C could not be contracted through a male. He could not recall if he 

had discussed any of this with the foster parents, and the foster father testified that he was not 

aware that the child had been exposed to Hepatitis C until the caseworker contacted him in May 

2016. Respondent denied that he was previously aware that the child’s mother had Hepatitis C, 

but the mother testified at the termination hearing that she, at the least, informed respondent by 

phone while she was incarcerated that she had an active Hepatitis C infection, believing that it 

was important for him to know that information if he would be caring for the minor child. 

 On June 9, 2016, the referee issued a 25-page, single-spaced opinion, concluding that 

petitioner had established, by clear and convincing evidence, a statutory basis for termination of 

respondent’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j), and that termination was 

in the best interests of the child. On June 10, 2016, the trial court entered an order adopting the 

referee’s recommendation and terminating respondent’s parental rights. 

II. STATUTORY GROUNDS 

 Respondent argues that the trial court erred in finding that the statutory grounds for 

termination were established by clear and convincing evidence. We disagree. 

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

In order to terminate parental rights, the trial court must find that a statutory basis for 

termination under MCL 712A.19b(3) has been established by clear and convincing evidence. In 

re Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 80; 836 NW2d 182 (2013). 

Evidence is clear and convincing when it produce[s] in the mind of the trier of 

fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be 

established, evidence so clear, direct and weighty and convincing as to enable [the 

factfinder] to come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the 

precise facts in issue. [In re Martin, 450 Mich 204, 227; 538 NW2d 399 (1995) 

(quotation marks and citation omitted; alteration in original).] 

“This Court reviews for clear error the trial court’s factual findings and ultimate determinations 

on the statutory grounds for termination.” In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 709; 846 NW2d 61 

(2014). “A finding is clearly erroneous [if] although there is evidence to support it, the 

reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake 

has been made.” In re Mason, 486 Mich 142, 152; 782 NW2d 747 (2010) (quotation marks and 

citation omitted; alteration in original). We must give due regard “to the special opportunity of 

the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses who appeared before it.” In re Ellis, 294 

Mich App 30, 33; 817 NW2d 111 (2011). 

B. ANALYSIS 
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 As an initial matter, it is important to note that both parties presented an unusually large 

amount of testimony and documentary evidence during the six-day termination hearing in this 

case. Although many aspects of the testimony provided by respondent’s and petitioner’s 

witnesses were consistent, significant portions of the testimony were not, especially in terms of 

whether respondent had demonstrated that he was prepared to care for the child and whether 

respondent had shown that he was willing and able to prioritize the child’s needs over his own. 

As a result, given the conflicting evidence in the record, the trial court was necessarily required 

to make credibility determinations in order to determine whether petitioner had established a 

statutory basis for termination by clear and convincing evidence. Correspondingly, the referee’s 

lengthy opinion, adopted by the trial court, contains numerous implicit credibility determinations 

that directly shaped the court’s decision in this case. Therefore, it is apparent that the outcome of 

this case was directly dependent on the trial court’s opportunity to observe the witnesses before it 

and make critical credibility determinations. MCR 2.613(C); In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 

445 NW2d 161 (1989).2

 As the Michigan Supreme Court remarked in In re Miller, 433 Mich at 

337, “The deference required by MCR 2.613(C) can make a critical difference in difficult cases 

such as the one before us. In contrast to the reviewing court, the trier of fact has the advantage of 

being able to consider the demeanor of the witnesses in determining how much weight and 

credibility to accord their testimony.” It is with this foundation that we review the trial court’s 

findings and conclusions in this case. 

The trial court terminated respondent’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), 

and (j), which permit termination under the following circumstances: 

 (c) The parent was a respondent in a proceeding brought under this 

chapter, 182 or more days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial 

dispositional order, and the court, by clear and convincing evidence, finds either 

of the following: 

 (i) The conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there is 

no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable 

time considering the child’s age. 

* * * 

 (g) The parent, without regard to intent, fails to provide proper care or 

custody for the child and there is no reasonable expectation that the parent will be 

able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time considering the 

child’s age. 

* * * 

 

2

 It is especially noteworthy that the referee who presided over the six-day terminating hearing 

also presided over all but one of the hearings in this case. See In re Miller, 433 Mich at 337-338. 
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 (j) There is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or the capacity 

of the child’s parent, that the child will be harmed if he or she is returned to the 

home of the parent. 

 First, we conclude that the evidence supported termination of respondent’s parental rights 

under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g). Compliance with a treatment plan is evidence of a parent’s ability 

to provide proper care and custody for a child. In re JK, 468 Mich 202, 214; 661 NW2d 216 

(2003). However, “it is not enough to merely go through the motions; a parent must benefit from 

the services offered so that he or she can improve parenting skills to the point where the children 

would no longer be at risk in the parent’s custody.” In re Gazella, 264 Mich App 668, 676; 692 

NW2d 708 (2005), superseded in part on other grounds as stated in In re Hansen, 285 Mich App 

158, 163; 774 NW2d 698 (2009), vacated on other grounds 486 Mich 1037 (2010). Here, it is 

apparent that respondent was tremendously dedicated to programs and services targeted at 

maintaining his sobriety and that he sustained a lasting benefit from these services, but the record 

supports the trial court’s finding that he did not benefit to the same extent from parenting-related 

services. While we recognize the importance of maintaining sobriety in order to safely and 

effectively care for a child, the trial court did not clearly err in concluding that the record shows 

that respondent failed to demonstrate a simultaneous commitment to providing proper care and 

custody for the child. 

Given the trial court’s credibility determinations, the record confirms that respondent 

resisted bringing necessary supplies to parenting time visits despite receiving written and verbal 

directions to do so. He reasoned that it was illogical to bring duplicate items if supplies were 

provided by the foster family or available at the site. Likewise, he resisted purchasing items such 

as a crib and a car seat because he did not believe that doing so was necessary until he was 

granted unsupervised parenting time. As the trial court noted, instead of purchasing these 

required items, respondent chose to purchase items like an $80 purse for his girlfriend and a 

couch on a monthly payment plan for their new apartment, which were purchases outside of their 

means based on their monthly budget. 

Furthermore, the trial court was especially troubled by respondent’s claims that he was 

confused about nearly every aspect of the child protective proceedings, including the 

expectations of the parent-agency treatment plan, even though respondent indicated his ability to 

succeed without “hands-on direction” in college and employment settings. The record supports 

the trial court’s finding that respondent did not have a cognitive impairment or any other issues 

that would impede his understanding of the expectations in this case, or prevent him from 

understanding the gravity of the situation, such that respondent’s failure to obtain and bring the 

requisite supplies demonstrated that he would not be prepared to provide proper care and custody 

of the child in a reasonable time. 

 In addition, respondent did not have stable housing or an income sufficient to support a 

child, and he did not demonstrate that he could achieve either of those things within a reasonable 

time. Although respondent ultimately secured housing in which the child could live in March 

2016, when he moved into a new apartment with his girlfriend, the sublease was due to expire in 

August 2016. Respondent did not demonstrate with any certainty when his income would 

increase, and he failed to show that he and his girlfriend would be able to maintain their 

apartment at the increased rental rate. Likewise, the trial court recognized that respondent’s 
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current housing may have been suitable for the child, but it emphasized that the primary issue in 

this case was respondent’s failure to demonstrate any permanence or enduring stability. 

Moreover, instead of taking steps to secure sufficient employment to support the child as soon as 

possible, respondent prioritized his interest in pursuing a career as a personal trainer—which had 

proven not to generate sufficient income in the immediate future, despite its future potential—

and taking college courses. Given the unwillingness of respondent’s mother to provide 

assistance to respondent earlier in the proceedings, the trial court expressed significant doubts 

regarding her newly stated willingness, during the termination hearing, to supplement 

respondent’s income by as much as $1,300 per month. As the court noted, reliance on public or 

familial support to maintain housing does not, by itself, constitute grounds for termination, but 

the evidence in this case did not show that respondent, either alone or with the assistance of his 

girlfriend or his mother, had the ability to continue maintaining appropriate housing for the child 

or provide for all of his needs. 

At the time of the termination hearing, the child had been in foster care for nearly 18 

months. The statutory framework does not require the child to wait indefinitely for respondent to 

be prepared to provide appropriate care. Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not clearly err 

in finding that clear and convincing evidence supported termination of respondent’s parental 

rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g). 

 Next, to demonstrate a statutory basis for termination under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j), the 

likelihood of harm may be physical or emotional harm, including neglect. See In re Hudson, 294 

Mich App 261, 268; 817 NW2d 115 (2011). The evidence showed that respondent was 

extremely committed to his sobriety throughout the course of the proceedings, but it did not 

show that he was prepared to prioritize the child’s needs over his own. Likewise, despite 

numerous discussions with agency workers and his attendance at parenting classes, respondent 

admitted that he did not understand the need for him to come to parenting time visits prepared to 

care for the child’s physical needs. Notably, he expressed hesitation himself regarding whether 

he was able to care for the child independently. Consistent with this stated hesitation, the trial 

court noted the numerous instances in respondent’s testimony when he expressed an inability or 

reluctance to take the initiative to determine what his child’s needs were and how to provide for 

the child on his own, even though he had demonstrated an ability to work independently and 

successfully at previous jobs without hand-holding or constant supervision and an ability to 

complete college-level coursework. 

Respondent also demonstrated that he did not know the child’s medical history—despite 

the child’s unique medical issues—and that he preferred to defer to the foster parents when the 

child received medical treatment. Further, respondent failed to report to the agency workers 

assisting him, the foster parents, or the child’s doctor that he had tested positive for reactive 

Hepatitis C antibodies, and that the child’s mother had tested positive for Hepatitis C,3

 

3

 The referee implicitly credited the biological mother’s testimony and rejected respondent’s 

claims, finding, “He knew the child’s biological mother had tested positive for Hepatitis C[,] but 

did not mention this at the sick visit or emergency room visits he attended.” 
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demonstrating significant concerns about respondent’s ability to recognize and attend to the 

child’s medical issues and physical well-being in the future. 

Given the trial court’s credibility determinations, the evidence established that, at a 

minimum, the child would be at a risk of harm from neglect if he were placed in respondent’s 

custody. Thus, we conclude that clear and convincing evidence supported termination of 

respondent’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j).4

III. BEST INTERESTS 

 Respondent contends that the trial court clearly erred in determining that termination of 

his parental rights was in the child’s best interests. We disagree. 

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE LAW 

We review for clear error a trial court’s best-interest determination. In re White, 303 

Mich App at 713, citing MCR 3.977(K). Pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(5), “[t]he trial court must 

order the parent’s rights terminated if the [petitioner] has established a statutory ground for 

termination by clear and convincing evidence and it finds from a preponderance of the evidence 

on the whole record that termination is in the child[’s] best interests.” In re White, 303 Mich 

App at 713 (footnotes omitted). When a court makes a best-interest determination, it should 

weigh all available evidence, id., and its focus should be on the child rather than the parent, In re 

Moss, 301 Mich App at 86-87. 

To determine whether termination of parental rights is in a child’s best interests, 

the court should consider a wide variety of factors that may include “the child’s 

bond to the parent, the parent’s parenting ability, the child’s need for permanency, 

stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the parent’s 

home.” The trial court may also consider a parent’s history of domestic violence, 

the parent’s compliance with his or her case service plan, the parent’s visitation 

history with the child, the children’s well-being while in care, and the possibility 

of adoption. [In re White, 303 Mich App at 713-714 (footnotes omitted); see also 

In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App 35, 41-42; 823 NW2d 144 (2012).] 

B. ANALYSIS 

 The evidence showed that at the time of the termination hearing, the child had lived with 

the same foster parents since the age of five weeks; that the foster parents had provided excellent 

care for the child, even in the face of significant medical issues; and that the child was strongly 

bonded to them. Oppositely, the child has never lived with respondent and never participated in 

 

4

 Because “[o]nly one statutory ground need be established by clear and convincing evidence to 

terminate a respondent’s parental rights,” In re Ellis, 294 Mich App at 32, we need not separately 

consider whether the trial court properly terminated respondent’s parental rights under MCL 

712A.19b(3)(c)(i). 
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overnight or unsupervised visits with him. Although the record shows that respondent’s visits 

with the child were consistently appropriate and positive, and that respondent had developed a 

bond with the child, the witnesses’ testimony clearly indicates that the child shared a stronger 

bond with the foster parents. 

With regard to respondent’s parenting skills, the trial court credited the testimony of 

agency workers who noted that respondent’s protracted reluctance to consistently participate in 

parenting classes or obtain the requisite supplies indicated an inability or lack of preparedness to 

care for the child outside of the structured environment of supervised visits. Likewise, the record 

supports the trial court’s finding that respondent failed to demonstrate a willingness to seek out 

or learn basic information crucial to the child’s well-being, including his medical history and the 

name and address of the child’s pediatrician, even though he had attended at least one visit to the 

pediatrician’s office and a visit to the emergency room when the child was exhibiting breathing 

difficulties. 

Respondent undoubtedly expressed good intentions and a strong interest in being a father 

throughout the proceedings, but the evidence in the record raises significant doubts with regard 

to respondent’s ability or willingness to properly care for the child without direct oversight and 

prompting. Further, the evidence established that stability and permanence were imperative at 

this point in the child’s life, and the trial court properly concluded that the child deserved 

permanence and stability, and could not be expected to wait an uncertain length of time for 

respondent to develop the motivation and skills necessary to be a parent. 

“After [a parent’s] children have come within the jurisdiction of the family court, [the] 

parent, whether disabled or not, must demonstrate that [he or] she can meet their basic needs 

before they will be returned to [his or] her care. If a parent cannot or will not meet [his or] her 

irreducible minimum parental responsibilities, the needs of the child must prevail over the needs 

of the parent.” In re Terry, 240 Mich App 14, 28; 610 NW2d 563 (2000). 

 The trial court did not clearly err in finding by a preponderance of the evidence that 

termination of respondent’s parental rights was in the child’s best interests. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

 Although we applaud respondent’s efforts to achieve and maintain sobriety, we conclude 

that respondent has failed to establish that the trial court clearly erred in finding that a statutory 

basis for termination of his parental rights had been established by clear and convincing 

evidence, and that termination was in the best interests of the child. 

 Affirmed. 

/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra 

/s/ Henry William Saad 

/s/ Michael J. Riordan