COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Coleman, Bumgardner and Lemons 

Argued at Salem, Virginia 

DENNIS JAMES OWEN 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 1448-97-3 JUDGE SAM W. COLEMAN III 

 NOVEMBER 10, 1998 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PITTSYLVANIA COUNTY 

William N. Alexander, II, Judge 

 John S. Edwards for appellant. 

 Richard B. Smith, Assistant Attorney General 

(Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief), 

for appellee. 

 Dennis James Owen was convicted by a jury of arson in 

violation of Code § 18.2-77. On appeal Owen contends: (1) the 

trial court should have disqualified the entire Pittsylvania 

County Commonwealth's Attorney's Office because he had talked 

with the Commonwealth's Attorney about the case before the 

Commonwealth's Attorney was elected; (2) the facts used to obtain 

the November 9, 1995 search warrant were stale and, therefore, 

did not provide probable cause for issuance of the warrant; 

(3) the trial court should have suppressed certain fruits of the 

July 24, 1995 search because the investigators expanded the scope 

of the search beyond Owen's consent; and (4) the trial court 

should have granted a mistrial because the Commonwealth's expert 

witness twice testified that the fire was deliberately set, after 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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being twice instructed by the court not to so testify. Because 

Owen is procedurally barred from appealing issues one and two, 

and because issues three and four lack merit, we affirm the 

conviction. 

I. BACKGROUND

 On March 9, 1991, Owen's home, outbuilding, and boat burned. 

 As a result of the fire, Owen reported numerous items that had 

been destroyed during the fire or stolen at the time of the fire. 

 On July 24, 1995, investigators executed a search warrant 

for Owen's residence to search for items that Owen reported to 

have been stolen from his home on May 6, 1995. Although the 

warrant did not specify to search for firearms, during the search 

the investigators discovered a cache of firearms, several of 

which appeared to match rifles that Owen had reported missing 

after the fire. According to an investigator's testimony, when 

asked if the investigators could photograph and record serial 

numbers from the firearms, Owen consented. Owen told 

investigators that he had acquired the guns after the 1991 fire. 

 However, after tracing the serial numbers investigators 

discovered that Owen had purchased four of the firearms prior to 

the 1991 fire. Based in part on this information, investigators 

obtained another search warrant, which they executed on November 

9, 1995, during which they seized, among other things, two 

firearms that matched weapons Owen claimed to have lost in the 

1991 fire. 
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 Prior to trial, Owen made a motion to suppress the fruits of 

the July 24 search warrant claiming that the investigators 

expanded the search beyond the warrant's authority or his 

consent. Because the July 24 search produced the probable cause 

that led to the issuance of the November 9, 1995 search warrant, 

Owen also made a motion that the fruits of the subsequent search 

be suppressed. The trial court found, however, that Owen 

voluntarily consented to the scope of the July 24 search and 

denied the motion. 

 During trial, the Commonwealth's expert witness testified 

that there had been three "set" fires in 1991. The trial court 

ruled, in response to Owen's objection, that the expert could not 

testify by giving an opinion that the fire was intentionally or 

deliberately set. The trial court instructed the jury to 

disregard the witness' statement. Subsequently, the expert 

testified that "human action" caused the fire. Again the trial 

court sustained defense counsel's objection and admonished the 

jury to disregard the statement. The trial court denied Owen's 

motion for a mistrial. 

 After the jury found Owen guilty, he filed a motion to set 

aside the verdict and to dismiss the indictment, or, in the 

alternative, to order a new trial. Owen asked the court to 

reconsider its refusal to suppress the fruits of the November 9, 

1995 search, assigning as a new and additional ground that the 

facts were stale because they were based on events that had 
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occurred 108 days earlier and, therefore, did not provide 

probable cause to believe the items were still there. The trial 

court refused to reconsider the suppression issues, citing Owen's 

failure to argue the staleness issue before trial. 

 Also, in the motion to set aside, Owen asked for the first 

time that the trial court disqualify the Pittsylvania County 

Commonwealth's Attorney's Office from prosecuting the case based 

on an alleged conflict of interest and to dismiss the indictment. 

 Owen presented evidence that shortly after the fire he had 

briefly met with David Grimes, explained to Grimes that his house 

had burned and that he was having trouble with his insurance 

company, that the insurance company and the sheriff's office were 

investigating him, and that he thought he needed a lawyer. 

Grimes concurred. Owen made an appointment to follow up on the 

matter, but later retained other counsel and never met again with 

Grimes. Grimes was later elected Commonwealth's Attorney for 

Pittsylvania County. The trial court refused to disqualify the 

Commonwealth's Attorney or to dismiss the indictment, based in 

part on Owen's failure to raise the issue until after trial. 

II. ANALYSIS

A. Conflict Of Interest

 Owen contends that the trial court should have disqualified 

the entire Pittsylvania County Commonwealth's Attorney's Office 

because the limited contact between the Commonwealth's Attorney 

and Owen before trial created an attorney-client relationship and 
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therefore, a conflict of interest. Although Owen knew of his 

claimed conflict before trial, he first presented the issue to 

the court six months after the jury returned its guilty verdict. 

 As with a juror's misconduct or a judge's disqualifying bias, a 

party with prior knowledge of the facts he claims to constitute 

misconduct who proceeds to verdict without raising an objection 

will not thereafter be heard to complain about the matter. See

Mason v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 1091, 1098, 254 S.E.2d 116, 120 

(1979) (regarding disqualification of a judge); Wilson v. 

Commonwealth, 157 Va. 962, 970, 162 S.E. 15, 17 (1932) (regarding 

prosecutorial misconduct and referring to juror misconduct); 

Tickel v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 558, 563-64, 400 S.E.2d 534, 

537-38 (1991) (regarding prosecutorial misconduct). The 

contemporaneous objection rule, Rule 5A:18, prevents our 

considering issues on appeal that were not "timely" raised in the 

trial court. One purpose of the rule is to enable errors to be 

corrected at the time to avoid retrials. A party does not make a 

contemporaneous objection in accordance with Rule 5A:18 where he 

complains for the first time in a motion to set aside a verdict 

that a prosecutor should have been disqualified. To hold 

otherwise would permit -- indeed would encourage -- defendants to 

sit on their rights when error occurs and withhold it from the 

trial court's consideration only to raise the issue in the event 

of an adverse verdict. We cannot condone such a practice. 

Because Owen did not assert a timely objection, he is barred from 
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raising the issue on appeal. Rule 5A:18. 
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B. Suppression of Evidence: Staleness of Probable Cause

 Investigators obtained the facts during the July 24, 1995 

search that were the basis for the November 9, 1995 search. 

Thus, by the time the November 9, 1995 search was conducted, the 

facts were 108 days old. Owen contends those facts, which 

consisted of guns observed during the first search, were too 

stale to support probable cause. 

 Owen did not raise the staleness issue prior to trial. 

Again, he waited until six months after the verdict to raise the 

issue, even though he was aware of the situation before trial. 

The trial judge did not err in refusing to grant the post-trial 

motion. Code § 19.2-266.2 provides that motions to suppress 

evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment are to be 

made prior to trial. Regardless of whether the requirement is 

mandatory, a defendant must at least make a contemporaneous 

objection. The defendant cannot await the determination of an 

adverse verdict and then raise the issue to obtain a new trial. 

C. Suppression of Evidence: Consent to Expand Search

 The issue here is whether the officers conducting the search 

obtained Owen's voluntary and informed consent to photograph and 

record the serial numbers of guns that were observed during the 

July 24, 1995 search, when the guns were not designated in the 

search warrant. Whether Owen voluntarily consented "`is a 

question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the 

circumstances.'" Deer v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 730, 735, 441 
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S.E.2d 33, 36 (1994) (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 

218, 227 (1973)). On appeal the trial court's finding of 

voluntary consent must be accepted unless plainly wrong. See

Limonja v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 532, 540, 383 S.E.2d 476, 481 

(1989). 

 "[W]e review the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable inferences fairly 

deducible therefrom." Martin v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 438, 

443, 358 S.E.2d 415, 418 (1987). The evidence showed that Owen 

did not sign a consent to search form. Nevertheless, the trial 

court found that the investigators told Owen that they had 

discovered the guns and asked his permission to inspect them. 

The investigators informed Owen that he was not required to 

consent to their request. Nonetheless, after seeking assurances 

that the guns would not leave the premises, Owen said "well go 

ahead" and thereby consented to the investigators' request. 

 Owen asks this Court to find, despite the trial court's 

ruling, that the totality of the circumstances coerced his 

"consent." We decline to do so. Owen's reliance on Bumper v. 

North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968), is misplaced. In Bumper, 

officers obtained consent to search the premises by falsely 

claiming to have a warrant authorizing the search. See Bumper

391 U.S. at 546-48. In contrast, these investigators explained 

to Owen that the search warrant did not authorize them to expand 

the search to examine the guns and that he was not required to 
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consent to the expansion. Owen argues, however, that the 

presence of numerous armed investigators "swarming all over his 

home" was inherently coercive. The trial court was not persuaded 

that the circumstances of the search coerced the consent. We 

cannot say that the trial court's ruling was wrong as a matter of 

law. See e.g., United States v. Elie, 111 F.3d 1135, 1145 (4th 

Cir. 1997) (finding no coercive environment despite the presence 

of six armed officers who had earlier ordered defendant to the 

floor at gunpoint). Furthermore, Owen's failure to sign a 

consent to search form does not render his oral consent 

involuntary. See e.g. United States v. Lattimore, 87 F.3d 647, 

651 (4th Cir. 1996) ("refusal to execute a written consent form 

subsequent to a voluntary oral consent does not act as an 

effective withdrawal of prior consent"). 

D. Mistrial: Expert Witness Testimony

 Owen argues that the trial court erred in refusing to grant 

a mistrial after the expert witness testified twice that the fire 

resulted from human action. 

 The Commonwealth concedes, and we concur, that the expert's 

testimony was inadmissible. See Callahan v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. 

App. 135, 139, 379 S.E.2d 476, 478-79 (1989). However, the trial 

judge promptly instructed the jury to disregard the statements. 

 "A trial court exercises its discretion when it determines 

whether it should grant a motion for a mistrial." Beavers v. 

Commonwealth, 245 Va. 268, 280, 427 S.E.2d 411, 420 (1993). 
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"When a motion for a mistrial is made, based upon an allegedly 

prejudicial event, the trial court must make an initial factual 

determination, in the light of all the circumstances of the case, 

whether the defendant's rights are so `indelibly prejudiced' as 

to necessitate a new trial." Spencer v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 

78, 95, 393 S.E.2d 609, 619 (1990) (quoting LeVasseur v. 

Commonwealth, 225 Va. 564, 589, 304 S.E.2d 644, 657 (1983)). 

Because juries are presumed to follow prompt, explicit curative 

instructions, a judgment will not be reversed for the improper 

admission of evidence that a trial judge subsequently directs a 

jury to disregard unless a manifest probability exists that the 

evidence is so prejudicial that the fact finder could not 

disregard the evidence. See Beavers, 245 Va. at 280, 427 S.E.2d 

at 420. Here, the expert witness testified that the fire was 

"set." Although the testimony may have exceeded the permissible 

scope of the expert's opinion, the defendant concedes that the 

evidence shows that the fire was "set" and the only issue was 

whether the evidence proved that the defendant "set" the fire. 

The other evidence proved that the fire originated in three 

separate locations by the use of an accelerant, which tends to 

prove that the fire was set. The expert's testimony was not so 

prejudicial in nature that the jury could not disregard it. 

Accordingly, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in 

denying the motion for a mistrial. 

 For the reasons stated, Owen's conviction is affirmed. 
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 Affirmed.