COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Chief Judge Felton, Ju dge Haley and Senior Judge Coleman

DUDLEY A. CASH MEMORANDUM OPINION * v. Record No. 0170-07-3 PER CURIAM NOVEMBER 13, 2007 BARBARA CLARK, F/K/A BARBARA C. CASH

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ROCKBRIDGE COUNTY Michael S. Irvine, Judge (Linda J. Woods; Woods & Ch ristensen, P.C., on brief), for appellant. (Thomas W. Dixon, Jr.; Nels on, McPherson, Summers & Santos, L.C., on brief), for appellee.
Dudley A. Cash appeals from the circuit court’s D ecember 19, 2006 order finding a change in circumstances warranted a reduc tion in the spousal support he ow ed Barbara Clark. On appeal, Cash lists twenty-three qu estions presented, but appears to conten d only that the trial court erred in (1) employing an incorrect standard of review, (2 ) imputing income to hi m, (3) making certain evidentiary rulings, (4) dete rmining the parties’ incomes, and (5) “declining to consider” findings of the Social Security Admi nistration regarding his disability. Upon reviewi ng the record and briefs, we conclude that this app eal is without merit. We summarily affi rm the decision of the trial court in part, see Rule 5A:27, a nd we dismiss the appeal in part.

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opin ion is not designated for publication.- 2 - BACKGROUND “On appeal, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to [Clark], the prevailing party below, granting to [her] evidence all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom.” Donnell v. Donnell , 20 Va. App. 37, 39, 455 S.E.2d 256, 257 (1995). The parties were divorc ed by final decree da ted March 27, 2002. Th e decree ordered Cash to pay Clark $1,400 in monthly sp ousal support and an additional $1 0,750 annually as her share of Cash’s annual lo ttery payment. On August 14, 2003, Ca sh sought a reduction in his spousa l support obligation, alleging he had a “substantial decrease” in his income. Fi nding Cash was voluntarily unemployed, the court denied the motion. In February 2004, Cash again petitioned the court for a reducti on of spousal su pport, arguing a shoulder injury prevented him fro m working. After a series of continuances, a non-suit, and the re-filing of his request for a chan ge in support, the c ourt heard evidence on the matter. In a December 19, 2006 final or der, the trial court reduced Cash’s monthly spousal support obligation to $750. The court also denied Cash’s motion fo r reconsideration. This appeal followed.
ANALYSIS Standard of Review Cash argues the trial court “er red in its standard of review of a motion to reduce spousal support.” Code § 20-109 provides that “[u]pon [the] petition of either party the court may increase, decrease, or terminate . . . spousal support and ma intenance . . . as the circumstances may make proper.” “The party moving for a modification of support payments must prove ‘both a material change in circumstances and that this ch ange warrants a modification of support.’” Furr v. Furr ,- 3 - 13 Va. App. 479, 481, 413 S.E.2d 72, 73 (1992) (quoting Schoenwetter v. Schoenwetter , 8 Va. App. 601, 605, 383 S.E.2d 28, 30 (1989)). Cash fails to explain how the court misapp lied the standard of review, and instead appears to challenge the court’s c onclusions. In fact, the court not ed in its order that it found a change in circumstances which warranted a re duction in husband’s s pousal support obligation and reduced spousal support to $750 monthly. The record indicates the court applied the proper standard. The trial court considered the evidence and the relevant statut ory factors in its finding. Imputation of Income Cash challenges the court’s finding that he is voluntarily unemployed and its imputation of income to him in the amount of $2 ,000 per month. “[A] court may impute income to a pa rty who is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed. Imputation of income is based on the principle that a spouse should not be allowed to choose a low paying position that penalizes the other spouse . . . .” Calvert v. Calvert , 18 Va. App. 781, 784-85, 447 S.E.2d 875, 876-77 (1994) (citations omitted). Whether a person is volunt arily unemployed or underemployed is a factual determination. In evaluating a request to impute income, the trial court must “consider the [parties’] earning capacity, financial resources, edu cation and training, ability to secure such education and traini ng, and other factors relevant to the equities of the pare nts and the children.” Blackburn v. Michael , 30 Va. App. 95, 102, 515 S.E.2d 780, 784 (1999) (citation omitted). “Imputation of income is within the trial [court]’s discretion . . . .” Sargent v. Sargent , 20 Va. App. 694, 704, 460 S.E.2d 596, 601 (1995). The evidence demonstrated that although Ca sh suffered shoulder and back injuries, he was physically capable of performing “light duty wo rk.” Nevertheless, Cash has failed to seek any employment whatsoever. Relying on Cash ’s prior employment, the medical evidence concerning the extent of his inju ries, testimony regarding Cash’s sk ills, and Cash’s demonstrated- 4 - ability to perform certain work-related activities, the court permissibly concluded appellant was voluntarily unemployed. The court’s imputation of $2,000 monthly in come was likewise within the court’s discretion and supported by the ev idence of Cash’s past employment and experience. The evidence must be sufficient to “enable the trial ju dge reasonably to project what amount could be anticipated.” Hur v. Virginia Dep’t of Soc. Servs. , 13 Va. App. 54, 61, 409 S.E.2d 454, 459 (1991). Considering the medical testimony, Cash ’s evidence of his physical limitations, his recent earning capacity, and the demonstration of hi s work-related skills, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by imputing $2,000 in monthly income to Cash. In modifying a spousal support order, Code § 20-109 instructs the tria l court to consider the factors set forth in subs ection (E) of Code § 20-107.1. These include earning capacity, education, skills, training, and age. See Code § 20-107.1. The evidence was sufficient for the trial court, by applying the factors of Code § 20-107.1 to impute $2,000 of income to Cash. Furthermore, “[t]he determination whether a s pouse is entitled to s upport, and if so how much, is a matter within the discretion of the cour t and will not be disturbe d on appeal unless it is clear that some injus tice has been done.” Dukelow v. Dukelow , 2 Va. App. 21, 27, 341 S.E.2d 208, 211 (1986). Moreover, “‘[w]here, as here, the court hears the evidence ore tenus , its finding is entitled to great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.’” Pommerenke v. Pommerenke , 7 Va. App. 241, 244, 372 S.E.2d 630, 631 (1988) (quoting Martin v. Pittsylvania County Dep’t of Soc. Servs. , 3 Va. App. 15, 20, 348 S.E.2d 13, 16 (1986)). The record suppor ts the court’s s pousal support award.- 5 - Evidentiary Rulings Cash asserts the trial court e rred “in not allowing Dr. Grice, expert witness, to testify regarding his knowledge of the availability of ‘light duty’ jobs in the area where Mr. Cash lived.” He also contends the “court erred when it sustained obje ctions 2 & 3 in the motion in limine by finding they were leading questions.” Rule 5A:20(e) mandates that the opening brief include “[t]he principles of law, the argument, and the authorities relating to each question presented . . . .” Cash has the burden of showing that reversible error was committed. See Lutes v. Alexander , 14 Va. App. 1075, 1077, 421 S.E.2d 857, 859 (1992) . Mere unsupported assertions of error “do not merit ap pellate consideration.” Buchanan v. Buchanan , 14 Va. App. 53, 56, 415 S.E.2d 237, 239 (1992). Furthermore this Court “will no t search the record for errors in order to interpret the appellant’s contention and correct deficiencies in a brief.” Id. Nor is it this Court’s “function to comb through the record . . . in or der to ferret-out for ourselves the validity of [appellant’s] claims.” Fitzgerald v. Bass , 6 Va. App. 38, 56 n.7, 366 S.E.2d 615, 625 n.7 (1988) ( en banc ). Here, Cash did not comply with Rule 5A:20(e); the opening brief does not contain sufficient principles of law, argument, or citation to legal authorities or the record to fully develop Cash’s arguments. Thus, we need not consider Cash’s arguments, Theisman v. Theisman , 22 Va. App. 557, 572, 471 S.E.2d 809, 816, aff’d on reh’g en banc , 23 Va. App. 697, 479 S.E.2d 534 (1996), and dismiss the appeal as to these issues. Clark’s Income Cash asserts the trial court incorrectly de termined Clark’s income. Specifically, he contends the court erred in computing her inco me based on a thirty-six-hour-work week instead- 6 - of a forty-hour work week and by failing to include as income money Clark received from selling her stock. In its ruling, the trial court noted that Cl ark currently works approximately thirty hours per week. The court had previously opined th at Clark could work fo rty hours per week, but accepted Clark’s testimony that her current job is more strenuous than her previous employment and calculated her salary based on a thirty-six-hour work week, thus imputing income to her. As noted above, the decision to impute income is within the sound di scretion of the trial

court. See Saleem v. Saleem , 26 Va. App. 384, 393, 494 S.E.2d 883, 887 (1998). Employing the most deferential standard of appellate review, we reverse such findings “only if plainly wrong or not supported by credible evidence.” Budnick v. Budnick , 42 Va. App. 823, 841, 595 S.E.2d 50, 59 (2004). Clark’s testim ony regarding the change in the type of work she performs supports the court’s decision to calculate he r employment income based on working only thirty-six ho urs per week. Cash asserts Clark withdrew $20,000 from her stock portfolio in 2003 and an additional $22,000 in 2004. He contends that “[w]hile the stoc k themselves should not be calculated as her income, once they are liquidated and used with her general income, they should be considered the same way interest is calculated . . . .” Earnings on assets received in equitable di stribution must be cons idered in determining spousal support, but it is error to cons ider assets themselves as income. See Barker v. Barker , 27 Va. App. 519, 529-30, 500 S.E.2d 240, 245 (1998). Here, the trial court spec ifically found there was no evidence suggesting Clark sold the stock for a profit, and Cash does not contest that finding. That Clark may have used the money to meet her living expenses does not alter the fact that she merely liquidated an a sset. Credible evidence support s the court’s finding, and we find no abuse of discretion in its refusal to include the figures in the calculation of her income.- 7 - Cash’s Income Cash challenges the court’s de termination of his income. He first argues the trial court incorrectly included the gross amount of the full $50,000 of his annual lottery award as his income. Cash reasons that because “the lo ttery funds were considered a prop erty settlement with Mr. Cash paying to Ms. Clark a net paymen t of $10,750.00 per y ear,” the entire amount of the award should not be counted as his income. In determining the am ount of Cash’s spousal support obligation, the tr ial court specifically noted that it considered the annual payment of $10,7 50 Cash made to Clark and factored into the support amount the tax benefits Cl ark received by the fact that Ca sh paid the taxes on the full amount of the annual lottery payout. The record supports the court’s ruling. Citing only Code § 20-108.2, the guidelines for th e determination of child support, Cash asserts the trial court improperly considered as hi s income $650 he receive s in monthly rent on property he owns. Without citati on to the appendix, he asserts the evidence proved his mortgage obligation on the property is ov er $900 monthly and that, theref ore, the court should not have calculated the rental payments as his income. “‘Statements unsupported by argument, authority, or citations to the record do not merit appellate consideration.’” Budnick , 42 Va. App. at 833, 595 S.E.2d at 55 (quoting Roberts v. Roberts , 41 Va. App. 513, 527, 586 S.E.2d 290, 297 (2003)); see Rule 5A:20 (requiring appellants to brief th e “principles of law, the argument, and the authorities relating to each question presented”). Because Cash has failed to properly develop this argument with pertin ent authority, we decline to addr ess it, and dismiss the appeal as to that issue. See Rule 5A:20(e). Spousal Support Cash asserts the trial court erred by increasing the initial amount of spousa l support from $675 to $750 after Clark alerted th e court to an error in the calcula tion of her income, “in not giving- 8 - a rationale for granti ng” Clark support, and “utilizing gross income for Mr. Cash while utilizing net income for Ms. Clark . . . .” Again, as Cash presented no authority to support these clai ms, we need not address them and dismiss the appeal as to those issues. See Rule 5A:20(e). Social Security Ad ministration Evidence Cash argues the trial court erred by refusing to allow th e admission of new evidence at the hearing on the motion to reconsid er. Specifically, Cash sought to present evidence that the Social Security Administration foun d he was disabled and approved his disability claim. In its opinion letter, denying Cash’s reconsideration motion, th e court noted simply that the Social Security approval was “not before the co urt when the court heard the case in October of 2005.” “Motions to reopen a hearing to take further evidence are matters within the [trial judge’s] discretion.” Shooltz v. Shooltz , 27 Va. App. 264, 269, 498 S.E.2d 437, 439 (1998). At the time Cash filed his motion, he did not know th e amount of his projected disability payment, although he asserted he believed it would be less than the $2,000 a month the court imputed to him. As the evidence Cash submitted was incomplete, referred to events occurring well after the court’s ruling, and would not necessarily require the court to alter its ruling, we cannot say the trial judge abused his discretion. No evidence in the record indicates that this finding was plainly wrong. Accordingly, the judgment of th e trial court is summarily affi rmed in part and dismissed in part.
Affirmed in part and dismissed in part.