J-S64036-17 & J-S64037-17

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: ADOPTION OF: I.M.

APPEAL OF: R.M., FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 932 MDA 2017

Appeal from the Decree Entered May 3, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County Orphans' Court at 

No(s): 17-ADOPT-2017

IN THE INTEREST OF: I.M., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: R.M., FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 933 MDA 2017

Appeal from the Order Entered May 3, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): CP-28-DP-0000043-2016

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., SHOGAN, J., and FITZGERALD*, J.

MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.: FILED DECEMBER 11, 2017

In these related appeals, R.M. (“Father”), appeals from the decree and 

order of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas that involuntarily 

terminated his parental rights to his daughter, I.M. (“Child”), born in May of 
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2016, and changed Child’s permanency goal from reunification to adoption.

1

 

We affirm.

On May 16, 2016, Franklin County Children and Youth Services (“CYS”) 

filed an application for Emergency Protective Custody of Child. Petitioner’s 

Exhibit 1. In its application, CYS averred that it had an extensive history with 

Mother spanning over 24 months, which involved Mother’s two older children 

who had already been removed from her care. Id. The orphans’ court granted 

the application and Child was placed in foster care after Child’s birth. Child 

remained in foster care following an adjudication and disposition hearing on 

June 13, 2016. Petitioner’s Exhibit 4. 

When Child initially came into care, the identity of Child’s biological 

Father was unknown. Although Father had signed an Acknowledgement of 

Paternity at the hospital following Child’s birth, Mother later suggested that 

her husband, and not Father, was Child’s biological Father. Mother later 

indicated that Father was actually Child’s biological Father, and Father 

____________________________________________

1 Father’s appeal from the decree terminating his parental rights is docketed 

at 932 MDA 2017, and his appeal from the order changing Child’s goal is 

docketed at 933 MDA 2017. 

A.L. (“Mother”) signed a waiver to voluntarily terminate her parental rights to

Child. However, after a colloquy, the orphans’ court questioned the 

voluntariness of her relinquishment and held a hearing on the petition to 

terminate Mother’s parental rights. The orphans’ court found clear and 

convincing evidence to support the involuntary termination and, by separate 

decree, terminated the parental rights of Mother. Mother did not file a brief 

in connection with this appeal, nor did she file her own separate appeal. 
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acknowledged paternity of Child through a support action filed with the 

Franklin County Domestic Relations office. 

On April 12, 2017, CYS filed petitions to involuntarily terminate Father’s 

parental rights to Child and to change Child’s permanency goal to adoption. 

The orphans’ court conducted a combined termination and goal change 

hearing on May 2, 2017. At the hearing, CYS presented the testimony of Emily 

Beckner, program director at Alternative Behavioral Consultants (“ABC”), and 

Elizabeth Johnston, the caseworker assigned to Father’s case. Father testified 

on his own behalf. Following the hearing, the orphans’ court terminated

Father’s parental rights and changed Child’s permanency goal to adoption,

and on May 3, 2017, entered its decree and order. On June 1, 2017, Father 

timely filed separate notices of appeal and concise statements of matters 

complained of on appeal pursuant to 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).

Father, in his appeal from the decree terminating his parental rights,

raises the following issues for our review:

I. Was there clear and convincing evidence presented at trial 

to establish that Father had evidenced a settled purpose of 

relinquishing parental claim to [Child] or that he refused or 

failed to perform parental duties for six months immediately 

prior to the [p]etition?

II. Was there clear and convincing evidence to show that 

there was a repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal of Father that has caused Child to be 

without essential care, control or subsistence necessary for 

[Child’s] physical or mental well-being and the conditions 

and causes of the incapacity, abuse or neglect or refusal 

cannot or will not be remedied by Father[?]
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III. Was there clear and convincing evidence to determine 

that the child will not be harmed by the severing of the bond 

with Father?

Father’s Brief, 932 MDA 2017, at 14. 

Our standard of review is well-settled. 

The standard of review in termination of parental rights 

cases requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact 

and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are 

supported by the record. If the factual findings are 

supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial 

court made an error of law or abused its discretion. A 

decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only 

upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, 

partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial court’s 

decision, however, should not be reversed merely because 

the record would support a different result. We have 

previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that 

often have first-hand observations of the parties spanning 

multiple hearings.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks 

omitted). 

Termination of parental rights is governed by section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated analysis. 

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory 

grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only 

if the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants 

termination of his or her parental rights does the court 

engage in the second part of the analysis pursuant to 

Section 2511(b): determination of the needs and welfare of 

the child under the standard of best interests of the child. 

One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis

concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond 
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between parent and child, with close attention paid to the 

effect on the child of permanently severing any such bond.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).

In this case, the orphans’ court terminated Father’s parental rights 

pursuant to sections 2511(a)(1), (2), (5) and (b). We need only agree with 

the court as to any one subsection of section 2511(a), as well as section 

2511(b), in order to affirm. In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 

2004) (en banc). Here, we analyze the orphans’ court’s decision to terminate 

under section 2511(a)(1) and (b), which provides as follows.

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a 

child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the 

following grounds:

(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at 

least six months immediately preceding the filing of the 

petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of 

relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or 

failed to perform parental duties.

***

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the 

rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare 

of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated 

solely on the basis of environmental factors such as 

inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and 

medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. 

With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection 

(a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by 

the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which 

are first initiated subsequent to the giving notice of the filing 

of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (b). 
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To satisfy Section 2511(a)(1), the moving party must 

produce clear and convincing evidence of conduct sustained 

for at least the six months prior to the filing of the 

termination petition, which reveals a settled intent to 

relinquish parental claim to a child or a refusal or failure to 

perform parental duties. . . . Section 2511 does not require 

that the parent demonstrate both a settled purpose of 

relinquishing parental claim to a child and refusal or failure 

to perform parental duties. Accordingly, parental rights may 

be terminated pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1) if the parent 

either demonstrates a settled purpose of relinquishing 

parental claim to a child or fails to perform parental duties. 

In re D.J.S., 737 A.2d 283, 285 (Pa. Super. 1999) (citation omitted). 

Although the six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition are 

the most critical to the analysis, “the trial court must consider the whole 

history of a given case and not mechanically apply the six-month statutory 

provision.” In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation 

omitted). Additionally, to the extent that the orphans’ court based its decision 

to terminate parental rights pursuant to subsection (a)(1), “the court shall not 

consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein 

which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the 

petition.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). We explained that “[a] parent is required to 

exert a sincere and genuine effort to maintain a parent-child relationship; the 

parent must use all available resources to preserve the parental relationship 

and must exercise ‘reasonable firmness’ in resisting obstacles placed in the 

path of maintaining the parent-child relationship.” In re C.M.S., 832 A.2d 

457, 462 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation omitted).
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Once the evidence establishes a failure to perform parental duties or a 

settled purpose of relinquishing parental rights, the orphans’ court must then 

engage in three additional lines of inquiry: “(1) the parent’s explanation for 

his or her conduct; (2) the post-abandonment contact between parent and 

child; and (3) consideration of the effect of termination of parental rights on 

the child pursuant to Section 2511(b).” In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 730 (Pa. 

Super. 2008) (citation omitted).

In the instant matter, the orphans’ court found that CYS presented clear 

and convincing evidence in support of its petition to terminate Father’s 

parental rights pursuant to section 2511(a)(1). Orphans’ Ct. Op., 7/5/17, at 

27-28. The court reasoned that the conditions requiring Child’s placement in 

foster care continued to exist and emphasized Father’s instability and lack of 

progress during Child’s dependency. Id. at 23-28. The court questioned 

Father’s effort and commitment to Child and expressed concern over “Father’s 

ability or desire to overcome obstacles to parenting Child.” Id. at 27.

Father asserts that the evidence presented did not demonstrate that 

termination of his parental rights was appropriate. In particular, Father 

argues that he has remedied the facts and circumstances that rendered him 

incapable of parenting Child, and that he has remained in full compliance with 

the permanency plan put in place by CYS. Father’s Brief, 932 MDA 2017, at 

20-21. Father alleges that, to the extent some goals may remain 
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unaddressed, his limited resources “limit his ability to address some of the 

concerns” and are “something that is out of his control.” Id. at 20. 

Our review of the record supports the orphans’ court’s findings. Father’s 

permanency plan required him to participate in medication management, 

complete a parental fitness assessment, obtain and maintain financial 

stability, visit with Child, comply with the terms of his probation, refrain from 

further criminal charges, participate in the Non-Violence Intervention Services 

(“NOVIS”) program, complete a drug and alcohol evaluation and follow 

through with any recommendations, and participate in random drug screens. 

N.T., 5/2/17, at 55. 

Regarding Father’s goal to participate in medication management, CYS 

caseworker, Elizabeth Johnston, testified that although Father was initially 

consistent with his mental health treatment, Father’s last confirmed 

medication management appointment was December 16, 2016. While Father 

alleged that he was consistent in attending his treatment sessions, Father was 

unable to provide any documentation to the court confirming his attendance.

Moreover, Father failed to complete the parental fitness assessment. 

Emily Beckner, program director at ABC, testified that Father was scheduled 

to participate in a parental fitness assessment at ABC on January 6, 2017. Id.

at 16. However, despite repeated attempts to confirm the assessment, Father 

never confirmed that he would attend the appointment and the assessment 
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was cancelled. Id. at 17. Father alleged that he attempted to reschedule the 

appointment with Ms. Johnston, but that Ms. Johnston never got back to him. 

Further, Ms. Beckner testified that the assessment consisted of two 

components: a psychological portion and a parent/child observation. Id. at 

19. Ms. Beckner noted that the parent/child observation had to be completed 

in a private setting in order to see a true picture of [Father’s] parental abilities. 

Id. at 20. In that regard, ABC requested that Father provide them with 

documentation that his home was not infested with bed bugs before it could 

conduct the assessment in Father’s home. Father denied having bed bugs in 

his home and further claimed that his mother, Paternal Grandmother,

arranged for Ehrlich Pest Control to inspect the home for bed bugs. Id. at 93-

94. When ABC asked Father to provide them with documentation that Ehrlich 

had inspected the home, Father alleged that it was against Ehrlich’s policy to 

provide them with the requested documentation. Id. at 111, 114. Father 

later signed a release to permit CYS to contact Ehrlich, who indicated that they 

had no record of ever being at Father’s residence. Id. at 61.

Likewise, Father also failed to comply with the terms of his parole, which 

stemmed from a domestic violence incident involving Mother.

2

 Father pled 

guilty to simple assault and was sentenced to time served (sixty-three days) 

____________________________________________

2 At the time of the incident, Mother was pregnant with Child. 
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to twenty-three months in Franklin County Jail. Petitioner’s Exhibit 17. Father 

was also ordered to have no contact with Mother. Id. 

On July 4, 2016, Father violated his parole for the first time when he 

contacted Mother and assaulted her. Petitioner’s Exhibit 16. Father pleaded 

nolo contendere to simple assault and was incarcerated for four months. Id.; 

N.T., 5/2/17, at 98-99. In February of 2017, Father, again, violated his parole 

and contacted Mother. N.T., 5/2/17, at 99. 

Finally, Father has failed to demonstrate that he can maintain safe and 

stable housing. Father currently resides with Paternal Grandmother in a onebedroom home. Id. at 92. Father acknowledged that the home was not a 

permanent residence. Nonetheless, the only attempts Father made to find 

suitable housing included submitting an application for public housing and 

walking around downtown Chambersburg. Id. at 92, 115.

The orphans’ court, as the trier of fact, had no obligation to credit 

Father’s testimony regarding his compliance with CYS’s permanency plan. The 

orphans’ court was free to make credibility determinations, accept or reject 

the testimony of the witnesses in whole or in part, and make reasonable 

inferences from the evidence it considered credible. See In re M.G., 855 

A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa. Super. 2004). The fact that Father has been unable to 

complete his parental fitness assessment, maintain safe and stable housing, 

and comply with the terms of his parole for any appreciable amount of time 

supports the orphans’ court’s conclusion that Father refuses and fails to 
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perform his parental duties. Moreover, the trial court had ample basis to reject

Appellant’s explanations for his failure to comply. Accordingly, we discern no 

abuse of discretion by the orphans’ court in terminating Father’s parental 

rights pursuant to section 2511(a)(1).

Next, Father argues that the orphans’ court erred in finding termination 

of his parental rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and 

emotional needs and welfare of Child under section 2511(b). We have 

discussed our analysis under section 2511(b) as follows.

Section 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental 

rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and 

emotional needs and welfare of the child. As this Court has 

explained, Section 2511(b) does not explicitly require a 

bonding analysis and the term bond is not defined in the 

Adoption Act. Case law, however, provides that analysis of 

the emotional bond, if any, between parent and child is a 

factor to be considered as part of our analysis. While a 

parent’s emotional bond with his or her child is a major 

aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it is 

nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by 

the court when determining what is in the best interest of 

the child.

[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can 

equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, and 

should also consider the intangibles, such as the love, 

comfort, security, and stability the child might have 

with the foster parent. Additionally, this Court stated 

that the trial court should consider the importance of 

continuity of relationships and whether any existing 

parent-child bond can be severed without detrimental 

effects on the child.

In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citations 

and quotation marks omitted).
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In addressing the best interests and welfare of Child, the orphans’ court 

found:

In consideration of the emotional bond between Father and 

[Child], it seems that the present relationship is marginal, 

even superficial, at best. The existence of some bond 

between [Child] and Father does not necessarily defeat 

termination. The question is whether the bond between 

[Child] and Father is the one worth saving or whether the 

bond could be sacrificed without permanent harm to [Child]. 

[Child] has become familiar with Father, based on the 

number of visits the two have shared, but this level of 

comfort and familiarity does not equate to a true 

parent/child bond. No evidence suggests that Father has a 

strong bond with [Child] equal to her bond with her foster 

parents, that terminating Father’s parental rights will sever 

an existing beneficial relationship, or that terminating 

Father’s parental rights will result in irreparable harm to 

[Child].

In contrast, the relationship between [Child] and the preadoptive foster parents has proven beneficial to [Child]. 

[Child] has been in the care of her foster parents since just 

after her birth. [Child] sees a specialist for concerns of a 

hole in her heart and her foster parents have appropriately 

scheduled medical appointments and monitor her. [Child]

is very active in her foster home and she is a happy baby. 

[Child] plays with toys and plays with her brother, who also 

resides at the foster home.

Orphans’ Ct. Op. at 36. 

The record supports the orphans’ court’s finding that Child’s primary 

bond is with her foster family, rather than Father. Further, the record supports 

the finding that Child will not suffer irreparable harm if Father’s parental rights 

are terminated. It was within the orphans’ court’s discretion to accept the 

testimony of Ms. Johnston and Ms. Beckner, and to conclude that the benefits 

of a permanent home with her foster family would outweigh any emotional 
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distress Child might experience if Father’s parental rights were terminated. 

While Child has a relationship with Father, it was within the orphans’ court’s 

discretion to conclude that this bond is outweighed by her need for 

permanence and stability. Child is closely bonded with her foster parents, and 

the record reveals that Child’s half-brother3 also resides in the foster home. 

Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the orphans’ court’s conclusion 

regarding subsection (b) that Child’s developmental, emotional, and physical 

needs and welfare are best met by terminating Father’s parental rights. 

We next address Father’s claim that the orphans’ court erred and/or 

abused its discretion by changing Child’s permanency goal from reunification 

to adoption. Father raises the following question in his appeal from the goal 

change order: 

I. Did the [orphans’ court] abuse its discretion when it 

changed the goal for [Child] from reunification to adoption 

when Father presented evidence that he would be able to 

remedy the conditions that lead [sic] to the removal of 

[Child] within a short period of time and when [Child] had 

only been in placement for less [sic] one year?

Father’s Brief, 933 MDA 2017, at 8. Father argues that the goal change to 

adoption was not in Child’s best interest. Father asserts that he has “a great 

relationship” with Child and that Child will “be negatively affected by no longer 

seeing Father.” Id. at 13-14. 

____________________________________________

3 Mother has two older children from other relationships. Dependency Petition, 

5/17/16, at 3-5.
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[T]he standard of review in dependency cases requires an 

appellate court to accept the findings of fact and credibility 

determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the 

record, but does not require the appellate court to accept 

the lower court’s inferences or conclusions of law. 

Accordingly, we review for an abuse of discretion.

In re R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010) (citation omitted).

Goal change proceedings are governed by the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S.

§§ 6301–6375. This Court has summarized the requisite analysis as follows:

Pursuant to [42 Pa.C.S.] § 6351(f) of the Juvenile Act, when 

considering a petition for a goal change for a dependent 

child, the juvenile court is to consider, inter alia: (1) the 

continuing necessity for and appropriateness of the 

placement; (2) the extent of compliance with the family

service plan; (3) the extent of progress made towards 

alleviating the circumstances which necessitated the original 

placement; (4) the appropriateness and feasibility of the 

current placement goal for the children; (5) a likely date by 

which the goal for the child might be achieved; (6) the 

child’s safety; and (7) whether the child has been in 

placement for at least fifteen of the last twenty-two months. 

The best interests of the child, and not the interests of the 

parent, must guide the trial court. As this Court has held, a 

child’s life simply cannot be put on hold in the hope that the 

parent will summon the ability to handle the responsibilities 

of parenting.

In re A.B., 19 A.3d 1084, 1088-89 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations and quotation 

marks omitted).

In support of its decision to change Child’s permanency goal from 

reunification to adoption, the orphans’ court stated as follows:

As discussed above, Father was not in compliance with the 

family service plan. We agree that Father has consistently 

visited with [Child] after her birth, upon his release from 

incarceration. Unfortunately, his failure to address the bed

bug issue ruined his opportunity to learn and develop his 
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parenting skills with the assistance of parent educators at 

ABC. He squandered this very valuable opportunity to visit 

with [Child] in a home-like setting where he could 

demonstrate growth and improvement in his parenting 

skills. We don’t view having to deal with a bed bug 

infestation as an insurmountable obstacle outside of 

Father’s control. He either could not—through lack of 

problem-solving abilities, or would not—because of defiance 

or lack of interest—address the issue.

Similarly, Father’s periods of incarceration also hindered his 

ability to develop his parenting skills and his bond with his 

daughter. During the pendency of this case, Father 

committed new criminal offenses, as well as failed to abide 

by the terms of his prior sentence, resulting in incarceration. 

Father’s choices again thwarted reunification efforts.

Father did not have suitable housing, did not completed [sic] 

a parental fitness assessment, and did not provided [sic] 

documentation of compliance with mental health services, 

parole supervision, or NOVIS. The goal of reunification was 

not feasible in a reasonable period of time given Father’s 

demonstrably lax effort at compliance.

Even if Father had agreed to submit to the parental fitness 

assessment immediately after the TPR hearing, this Court 

believes it very likely that additional services would have

been required before reunification could have been seriously

considered. We base this conclusion on the observations of 

Balmer [sic] and Johnston who both testified to Father’s lack 

of parenting abilities and lack of engagement and bond with 

[Child].

Conversely, [Child] is safe, secure, and thriving in the preadoptive foster home she has known since just after her 

birth. The evidence supports a finding that [Child] enjoys a 

significant bond with her foster family. While she may have 

grown comfortable and familiar with Father, this is simply

not the same thing as a parent-child bond. [Child] will likely 

suffer no lasting ill-effects from severing her relationship 

with Father.

Orphans’ Ct. Op. at 40-42.
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Father fails to support his argument with regard to this issue with any 

citation to legal authority. Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a), “The argument shall 

be divided into as many parts as there are questions to be argued . . . followed 

by such discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent.” 

Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). “Arguments not appropriately developed include those 

where the party has failed to cite any authority in support of a contention.” 

Lackner v. Glosser, 892 A.2d 21, 29-30 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citations 

omitted).

The closest Father comes to making an argument appears in his 

Summary of Argument and Standard of Review, where he states that the 

standard of review for goal change proceedings is an abuse of discretion and 

that court must determine whether the goal change is in the best interest of 

the child. The lack of any legal analysis or citation to case law to support his 

argument, and any explanation of Father’s argument in relation to that case 

law, precludes our meaningful appellate review of Father’s challenge to the 

change in permanency goal. 

Even if we did not find Father’s argument waived, we likewise would 

conclude that his claim does not merit any relief, as the record supports the 

orphans’ court’s findings. Throughout the history of this case, Father has had 

the same permanency goals. At every review hearing, the court has reiterated 

Father’s need to participate in medication management, find suitable and 

stable housing, and comply with the terms of his parole. Father, however,
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remained noncompliant with these goals and unable to parent Child. By the 

time of the termination and goal change hearing, Child had been in the care 

of foster parents for her entire life, and it was not clear when, if ever, Father 

would be in a position to care for her. While it is true that Father maintains a 

relationship with Child by regularly attending his visits, it was within the 

orphans’ court’s discretion to conclude that this relationship is outweighed by 

Child’s need for permanence and stability.

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the orphans’ court did not 

commit an error of law or abuse its discretion by terminating Father’s parental 

rights and changing Child’s permanency goal from reunification to adoption. 

Therefore, we affirm the court’s decree and order. 

Decree affirmed. Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/11/2017