[Cite as State v. Torres, 2018-Ohio-1173.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

 )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF MEDINA ) 

STATE OF OHIO 

 Appellee 

 v. 

ANGEL TORRES 

 Appellant 

C.A. No. 17CA0038-M 

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT 

ENTERED IN THE 

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

COUNTY OF MEDINA, OHIO 

CASE No. 16CR0361 

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY 

Dated: March 30, 2018 

 

SCHAFER, Presiding Judge. 

{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Angel Torres, appeals his conviction in the Medina County 

Court of Common Pleas. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. 

I. 

{¶2} On June 21, 2016, Trooper Baker of the Ohio State Highway Patrol stopped 

Torres for having excessively dark window tint. During the stop, Trooper Baker conducted an 

exterior sniff of Torres’ vehicle using his canine partner. The canine alerted to the passengerside door. During a search of the vehicle, troopers discovered 110 grams of cocaine inside the 

vehicle. 

{¶3} The Medina County Grand Jury subsequently indicted Torres on one count of 

possession of cocaine in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A) and (C)(4)(f), a felony of the first degree. 

The indictment included a major drug offender specification pursuant to R.C. 2941.1410 and a 
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forfeiture specification pursuant to R.C. 2981.04. Torres pleaded not guilty and the matter 

proceeded through the pretrial process. 

{¶4} Torres ultimately filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized and any 

statements made by Torres as a result of the traffic stop. Following a hearing, the trial court 

denied the motion. Torres changed his plea to no contest to the sole charge in the indictment and 

the related specifications. The trial court then found Torres guilty of the charge and 

specifications and sentenced him according to law. 

{¶5} Torres filed this timely appeal, raising one assignment of error for our review. 

II. 

Assignment of Error 

The trial court erred in denying Mr. Torres’s motion to suppress, thereby 

violating his right to be secure from an unreasonable search and seizure 

under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 

Constitution, and Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution. 

{¶6} In his sole assignment of error, Torres argues that the trial court erred by denying 

his motion to suppress. We disagree. 

{¶7} A motion to suppress evidence presents a mixed question of law and fact. State v. 

Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8. “When considering a motion to suppress, 

the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact and is therefore in the best position to resolve 

factual questions and evaluate the credibility of witnesses.” Id., citing State v. Mills, 62 Ohio 

St.3d 357, 366 (1992). Thus, a reviewing court “must accept the trial court’s findings of fact if 

they are supported by competent, credible evidence.” Id. at ¶ 8. “Accepting these facts as true, 

the appellate court must then independently determine, without deference to the conclusion of 

the trial court, whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard.” Id., citing State v. 

McNamara, 124 Ohio App.3d 706 (4th Dist.1997). 
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{¶8} Following the hearing on Torres’ motion to suppress, the trial court made the 

following factual findings. Trooper Jim Baker of the Ohio State Highway Patrol was on duty 

stopped in his patrol vehicle in the median of I-71 at milepost 203 watching northbound traffic. 

Trooper Baker observed a vehicle with window tint he believed was excessively dark because he 

could not see inside the vehicle. Trooper Baker also observed the vehicle to be driving slower 

than the maximum speed limit of 70 miles per hour. Trooper Baker subsequently used his radar 

gun and clocked the vehicle traveling at 59 miles per hour. Trooper Baker then pulled his patrol 

vehicle on to the roadway and began to follow the vehicle. Trooper Baker followed the vehicle 

as it exited I-71 and turned left at State Route 83. After the vehicle made the turn, Trooper 

Baker activated the overhead lights on his patrol vehicle and initiated a traffic stop at 10:55:30 

a.m. for excessive window tint in violation of R.C. 4513.241. 

{¶9} Trooper Baker approached the vehicle and asked Torres for his driver’s license 

and vehicle registration and advised him of the reason for the stop. Trooper Baker then asked 

Torres several questions. While questioning Torres, Trooper Baker observed that Torres 

appeared nervous while answering questions because his hands were shaking and he was hesitant 

to make eye contact. At 10:59 a.m., Trooper Baker asked Torres to exit the vehicle. Trooper 

Baker observed that while Torres was outside the vehicle he was drinking a lot of water and 

believed this was because Torres was nervous. 

{¶10} While Torres was outside the vehicle, Sargent Laughlin of the Ohio State 

Highway Patrol arrived on the scene as back up for Trooper Baker. At 11:00 a.m., Trooper 

Baker explained to Torres that he had his canine partner, Paco, with him and that he was going to 

walk the dog around Torres’ vehicle. At 11:01:35, Trooper Baker began a canine sniff for 

narcotics. Contemporaneous to Trooper Baker conducting the canine sniff, Sgt. Laughlin was 
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completing the paperwork to issue a warning to Torres for having excessively tinted windows in 

violation of R.C. 4513.241. The canine alerted to the odor of narcotics near the passenger side 

doors of Torres’ vehicle. A subsequent search of the vehicle by the troopers found 110 grams of 

cocaine in a plastic bag stuffed into a rear passenger seat. 

{¶11} Based on the evidence presented at the hearing, the trial court determined that the 

canine sniff began before Sgt. Laughlin had completed the warning and that the canine sniff was 

therefore finished before the traffic stop was completed. A review of the record shows that the 

trial court’s findings are based on competent credible evidence. 

{¶12} Nonetheless, Torres contends that “[t]he scope of his extended detention was 

unreasonable and constitutionally impermissible because there was no reasonable articulable 

suspicion of any additional crime.” However, “when detaining a motorist for a traffic violation, 

an officer may delay the motorist for a time period sufficient to issue a ticket or a warning. This 

measure includes the period of time sufficient to run a computer check on the driver’s license, 

registration, and vehicle plates.” (Internal citations and quotations omitted.) State v. Ross, 9th 

Dist. Lorain No. 12CA010196, 2012-Ohio-6111, ¶ 8, quoting State v. Davenport, 9th Dist. 

Lorain No. 11CA010136, 2012-Ohio-4427, ¶ 6, quoting State v. Batchili, 113 Ohio St.3d 403, 

2007-Ohio-2204, ¶ 12; see Rodriguez v. United States, U.S. , 135 S.Ct. 1609, 1612, 191 L. 

Ed. 2d 492 (2015) (“A seizure justified only by a police-observed traffic violation, * * * 

become[s] unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete th[e] 

mission of issuing a [warning] ticket for the violation.”) (Internal quotations and citation 

omitted.) “In determining if an officer completed these tasks within a reasonable length of time, 

the court must evaluate the duration of the stop in light of the totality of the circumstances and 

consider whether the officer diligently conducted the investigation.” Ross at ¶ 8, 
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quoting Davenport at ¶ 6, quoting Batchili at ¶ 12. “[I]f during the limited scope and duration of 

the initial stop an officer encounters additional specific and articulable facts that give rise to a 

reasonable suspicion of criminal activity beyond that which prompted the stop, the officer may 

continue to detain the defendant to investigate those new concerns.” Ross at ¶ 8, quoting State v. 

Shook, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 93CA005716, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 2631, *10 (June 15, 1994). 

{¶13} In this case, the record indicates that Trooper Baker effectuated the traffic stop at 

10:55:30 a.m. with his canine already in the vehicle. Shortly thereafter, Torres handed Trooper 

Baker his driver’s license but could not locate his registration or insurance. Less than three 

minutes after effectuating the stop, at approximately 10:59:16, Trooper Baker asked Torres to 

exit the vehicle and stand by Sgt. Laughlin. Trooper Baker testified that while Sgt. Laughlin 

began filling out the paperwork to give Torres a warning for excessive window tint, Trooper 

Baker began a canine sniff. The record shows that the canine sniff began at 11:01:35, 

approximately six minutes after Trooper Baker effectuated the traffic stop. The record further 

shows that the canine alerted to the odor of narcotics at approximately 11:02:29, seven minutes 

after Trooper Baker effectuated the stop. Trooper Baker testified that the official business of the 

traffic stop “was ongoing” at the time he conducted the canine sniff, that the dog sniff did not 

delay the stop, and that the presence of a second officer helped to speed up the stop. 

Additionally, Trooper Baker testified that since Torres did not have proof of insurance or his 

registration that Sgt. Laughlin would have had to check that information in LEADS. Trooper 

Baker further testified that the time necessary to conduct the traffic stop in this case was 

“average” and there was no evidence that Sgt. Laughlin was not diligent or untimely in 

completing the warning. 
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{¶14} Therefore, under the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the duration 

of the stop in this case was not constitutionally unreasonable since the dog sniff was completed 

within the time period sufficient for the warning. See Ross at ¶ 8; see also Batchili at ¶ 14 

(concluding that there “simply [was] no evidence to suggest that [the defendant]’s detention for 

the traffic violation was of sufficient length to make it constitutionally dubious” where the drug 

dog alerted approximately nine minutes into the stop and the traffic citation had not yet been 

completed); State v. Jackson, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 14CA010555, 2015-Ohio-2473, ¶ 29-30 

(determining that a traffic stop of eight minutes was not impermissibly extended for dog sniff 

that occurred after the defendant was removed from the vehicle, searched for weapons, and 

placed in the back of the police cruiser). 

{¶15} Torres’ assignment of error is overruled. 

III. 

{¶16} Torres’ sole assignment of error is overruled. Therefore, the judgment of the 

Medina County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. 

Judgment affirmed. 

 

 There were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

 We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common 

Pleas, County of Medina, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy 

of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27. 

 Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of 

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the 
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period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is 

instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the 

mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30. 

 Costs taxed to Appellant. 

 

 JULIE A. SCHAFER 

 FOR THE COURT 

TEODOSIO, J. 

CALLAHAN, J. 

CONCUR. 

APPEARANCES: 

ASHLEY L. JONES, Attorney at Law, for Appellant. 

S. FORREST THOMPSON, Prosecuting Attorney, and VINCENT V. VIGLUICCI, Assistant 

Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.