NO. 90-440 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

19 9 1 

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF: 

WENDELYN HOLMQUIST RUFF, 

Petitioner and Respondent, 

and 

JOHNNY LANCE RUFF, 

Respondent and Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Gallatin, 

The Honorable Nat Allen, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

John P. Atkins, Esq., Bryan & Atkins, Bozeman 

Montana 

For Respondent: 

Michael J. Lilly, Esq., Berg, Lilly, Stokes, 

Andriolo, Tollefsen & Schraudner, Bozeman, Montana 

Submitted on Briefs: January 31, 1991 

MAR 1 9 1991 Decided: March 19, 1991 
Chief Justice J. A. Turnage delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

This dissolution of marriage was entered in the District Court 

for the Eighteenth Judicial District, Gallatin County. The husband 

appeals from the property distribution. We affirm. 

The issues are: 

1. Did the District Court err by including in the parties1 

marital estate a 1979 mobile home, a 1986 Pontiac Grand Am 

automobile, and a 1977 Freuhauf flatbed trailer? 

2. Did the court err in valuing the parties1 portable hoist, 

known as a "cherry picker?" 

3. Did the court err by failing to recognize all of the 

partiesv marital debts? 

4. Did the court err in computing the net worth of the 

marital estate and in the distribution thereof? 

The parties were married in October of 1983 in Elko, Nevada. 

They have one minor child, a son born on May 12, 1986. The wife 

filed a petition for dissolution of marriage in August 1989. The 

parties stipulated that they would share joint custody of their son 

and the court adopted that stipulation in its judgment. Property 

division was not so smoothly resolved. There was considerable 

disagreement at the property division hearing not only about the 

division of the marital estate, but also about what property was 

included in the marital estate. At the time of hearing, the 
husband was a self-employed truck driver earning $1,000 per month. 

The wife was a travel agent earning $650 per month. 

In general, the District Court accepted the wife's testimony 

concerning the marital estate and debts. It awarded the wife a 

1986 Grand Am automobile and a 1981 Toyota. It awarded husband a 

1981 Jeep, a 1972 Freightliner, a 1977 Freuhauf flatbed trailer, 

a 1979 farm trailer, a "cherry picker," a 1979 mobile home, the 

parties1 joint checking account, husband's individual checking 

account, a 1981 Honda, and a 1982 Magna Honda. It also ordered 

husband to pay liabilities to VISA, Sears, Glen Hargrove on a 

contract to buy the mobile home, and GMAC on a loan for the Grand 

Am, and to pay the wife $10,117. Husband appeals. 

I 

Did the District Court err by including in the parties1 

marital estate a 1979 mobile home, a 1986 Pontiac Grand Am 

automobile, and a 1977 Freuhauf flatbed trailer? 

At trial, the husband presented his testimony, his father's 

testimony, and title certificates indicating that these three items 

belonged to the husband's father. Husband introduced into evidence 

a lease for the mobile home dated June 1, 1986, signed by himself 

and his father, and a lease for the Grand Am dated September 8, 

1986, also signed by himself and his father. 

In contrast, the wife testified that she and the husband had 

treated these three items of property as their own and that she had 
never seen any of the title certificates or known about the lease 

agreements introduced into evidence by the husband. She introduced into evidence copies of cancelled checks by which she and 

husband had made payments directly to the lienholders on the mobile 

home and the Grand Am. Her evidence showed that husband and wife 

had also paid for licenses, taxes, and insurance on these items. 

Husband's father was not listed as an insured party on the 

insurance for the Grand Am. The wife also introduced into evidence 

records showing that husband and wife had taken income tax 

deductions for depreciation on the Freuhauf trailer and interest 

expenses on the Grand Am and the mobile home. 

The court found that husband and wife are the "real owners1' 

of this property and that Itthe vehicles and trailers were the 

property of the parties and were treated as such both in the 

practical sense and for income tax purposes." Although the court 

did not explain its reasoning, we conclude that it was correct, 

under a theory of resulting trust. 

A resulting trust occurs where, as a result of 

certain acts, a court finds that there is an 

implied intent to create a trust and imposes 

a trust to achieve an equitable result. 

Usually resulting trusts involve cases where 

the parties have used ambiguous language which 

the court construes as showing a trust intent, 

or where the parties have expressed no intent 

to create a trust by words, but have performed 
acts from which the court infers that a trust 

was intended. [Citation omitted.] 

Eckart v. Hubbard (1979), 184 Mont. 320, 326-27, 602 P.2d 988, 991. 

Here, the parties acted for all intents and purposes as though 

title to these pieces of property was held by the husband and wife. 

The actions of the husband's father and of the husband and wife 

indicate that the husband's father was holding the property in 

trust for husband and wife. 

We hold that substantial evidence supports the findings of the 

court that the 1979 mobile home, the 1986 Pontiac Grand Am 

automobile, and the 1977 Freuhauf flatbed trailer were part of the 

marital estate. 

I1 

Did the court err in valuing the parties1 portable hoist, 

known as a Ifcherry picker?" 

Attached to the court's findings and conclusions is "Exhibit 

A," in which the court listed the marital assets. One item on that 

list is "1979 Farm Trailer (cherry picker)" valued at $7,000. It 

appears from the husband's testimony that these were actually two 

separate items. There was evidence that the trailer had a depreciated value of $6,514 and the cherry picker was worth $350. Our 

standard of review is whether the District Court acted arbitrarily 

or clearly abused its discretion so as to create substantial 

injustice. In re Marriage of Hockaday (1989), 237 Mont. 413, 418, 
773 P. 2d 1217, 1221. Because the combined value of these two items 

is so close to $7,000, we uphold the court's valuation. 

Did the court err by failing to recognize all of the parties' 

marital debts? 

The husband argues that the debts owed to Glen Hargrove and 

GMAC are not marital debts. He also maintains that a number of the 

parties' debts were left out of the court's findings. 

Because we have held that the mobile home and the Grand Am 

were properly included as marital assets, it follows that the Glen 

Hargrove and GMAC debts against them were properly included as 

marital debts. The debts which the husband argues should have been 

included were bills in husband's father's name. The court was 

correct in not including those as liabilities of the marital 

estate. Also, there was a $10,000 promissory note to husband's 

father, signed by husband alone and not wife. The wife testified 

that she had no knowledge of the $10,000 note. Obviously, the 

trial court did not believe the $10,000 note was legitimate. That 

was within its discretion as the assessor of credibility of 

witnesses. Marriage of Gerhart (Mont. 1990), 800 P.2d 698, 700, 

47 St.Rep. 2106, 2108. 

We hold that the District Court did not err in determining 

the parties' marital debts. 
Did the court err in computing the net worth of the marital 

estate and in the distribution thereof? 

This argument results from the arguments raised under the 

issues discussed above, as to which we have held for the wife on 

all counts. Under the court's distribution of the marital estate, 

the husband received property with a net value of $30,134 and the 

wife received property valued at $9,900. The court ordered the 

husband to pay the wife the sum of $10,117 in order to equitably 

divide the marital estate. We hold that this was within the 

court's discretion and does not constitute reversible error. 

Affirmed. 

concur: