[Federal Register Volume 82, Number 170 (Tuesday, September 5, 2017)]
[Notices]
[Pages 41951-41959]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2017-18705]


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FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM

[Docket No. OP-1557]


Final Guidelines for Evaluating Joint Account Requests

SUMMARY: Under the Federal Reserve Act (FRA), the Federal Reserve Banks 
(Reserve Banks) have the authority to open accounts for member banks 
and other eligible depository institutions (collectively, depository 
institutions). The Reserve Banks routinely open and maintain individual 
Federal Reserve accounts for eligible institutions. Joint accounts--
those where the rights and liabilities are shared among multiple 
depository institution account-holders--have not in the past been 
available as a standard account option, but in limited cases the 
Reserve Banks have opened such accounts for specific purposes. The 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Board) has approved 
final guidelines for evaluating requests for joint accounts at Reserve 
Banks intended to facilitate settlement between and among depository 
institutions participating in private-sector payment systems (private-
sector arrangements). The guidelines broadly outline factors that will 
be considered in evaluating such requests, but are not intended to 
provide assurance that any specific arrangement would be granted a 
joint account. Requests will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, with 
the type and extent of information necessary to evaluate a particular 
request likely dependent on the complexity of the arrangement.

DATES: September 5, 2017.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Susan V. Foley, Senior Associate 
Director (202-452-3596), Kylie Stewart, Manager (202-245-4207), or Ian 
C.B. Spear, Senior Financial Services Analyst (202-452-3959), Division 
of Reserve Bank Operations and Payment Systems; Gavin Smith, Counsel 
(202-452-3474), Legal Division; for users of Telecommunications Device 
for the Deaf (TDD) only, contact 202-263-4869.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

[[Page 41952]]

I. Background

    On December 22, 2016, the Board requested comment on proposed 
guidelines for evaluating requests for joint accounts at Federal 
Reserve Banks intended to facilitate settlement between depository 
institutions participating in private-sector arrangements within the 
U.S. payment system.\1\ The Reserve Banks routinely open and maintain 
individual Federal Reserve accounts for depository institutions. Joint 
accounts have not been available in the past as a standard account 
option, but in limited cases the Reserve Banks have opened such 
accounts for specific purposes.\2\ Currently, the Reserve Banks 
maintain joint accounts to facilitate settlement between users of two 
private-sector arrangements.\3\ Both of these joint accounts are long-
standing, with the more recent account being established approximately 
15 years ago.
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    \1\ 81 FR 93923 (Dec. 22, 2016).
    \2\ Section 13(1) of the FRA authorizes each Reserve Bank to 
receive deposits from its member banks or other depository 
institutions (12 U.S.C. 342). In addition, section 16(14) of the FRA 
authorizes the Board to direct a Reserve Bank to exercise the 
functions of a clearinghouse for depository institutions (12 U.S.C. 
248-1).
    \3\ The two joint accounts currently used to facilitate 
settlement are operated by The Clearing House (TCH): One to 
facilitate wholesale payments through the Clearing House Interbank 
Payments System (CHIPS) and another to facilitate TCH's Universal 
Payment Identification Code (UPIC) service for ACH payments.
    CHIPS is a multilateral netting system that continuously settles 
wholesale payments between two or more participating institutions.
    TCH offers a UPIC service that enables its customer's end users 
to provide payment instructions to third parties without disclosing 
their bank account information and enables such end users to change 
banking relationships without needing to notify each payor of the 
change (the UPIC remains the same). The joint account for UPIC 
transactions enables the settlement of ACH credit transactions using 
UPICs when the transactions are sent by customers of the Reserve 
Banks' FedACH service and destined for participants in TCH's UPIC 
service.
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    For purposes of these guidelines, a joint account is an account at 
a Reserve Bank where the rights and liabilities are shared among 
multiple account-holders (joint account holders), that is, institutions 
that are eligible to open an account with a Reserve Bank. The Board 
contemplates that under these arrangements, the joint account holders 
will authorize a single entity to serve as their ``agent'' in providing 
instructions to the Reserve Bank at which the account would be held 
(the account-holding Reserve Bank) with respect to the account. The 
account-holding Reserve Bank would be authorized to act on any 
instruction provided by the agent, consistent with the provisions of 
the joint account agreement. The Board also contemplates private-sector 
arrangements using joint accounts might also use an ``operator'' (which 
could be the agent of the joint account or a separate entity) for the 
running of the arrangement, which might include undertaking various 
steps in the payment process such as initiation, clearing, settlement, 
and reconciliation, or establishing rules and governance. 
``Participants'' in the arrangement might include joint account 
holders, as well as other depository institutions and nondepository 
institutions that are directly part of the payment system established 
by the private-sector arrangement.
    In 2016, Board and Reserve Bank (collectively, Federal Reserve) 
staff received a request from an organization to open a new joint 
account for that organization's proposed real-time payment system. 
Given the ongoing evolution of the U.S. payment system, the Board 
believes that other potential providers may contemplate joint account 
arrangements, or may reconsider their options for settlement 
capabilities if they understand better the availability of joint 
accounts at Reserve Banks.\4\
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    \4\ A Faster Payments Task Force (Task Force) was established in 
2015 to help foster a desired outcome set forth as part of the 
Federal Reserve's Strategies for Improving the U.S. Payment System 
efforts for ``a ubiquitous, safe, faster electronic solution.'' The 
Strategies for Improving the U.S. Payment System paper is available 
at https://fedpaymentsimprovement.org/wp-content/uploads/strategies-improving-us-payment-system.pdf. The Task Force developed a process 
to assess proposals for faster retail payment systems. As part of 
the process, proposers were made aware that they could discuss 
Reserve Bank services, such as settlement options, with Federal 
Reserve representatives if they had an interest in using those 
services to facilitate their proposed faster retail payment systems.
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    The Board therefore proposed to establish a set of guidelines that 
would be considered in evaluating requests for joint accounts intended 
to facilitate settlement between depository institutions participating 
in private-sector arrangements. The Board proposed guidelines based on 
the following six principles:

    (1) As a necessary condition for evaluating a joint account 
request, each joint account holder should meet all applicable legal 
requirements to have a Federal Reserve account, and the Reserve Bank 
will not have any obligation to any non-account holder with respect 
to the funds in the account.
    (2) The private-sector arrangement should demonstrate that it 
has a sound legal and operational basis for its payment system, 
including an effective legal framework for achieving settlement 
finality.
    (3) The design and rules of the private-sector arrangement 
should be consistent with the Federal Reserve's policy objectives to 
promote a safe, efficient, and accessible payment system for U.S. 
dollar transactions and be consistent with the intended use of the 
arrangement.
    (4) The provision of the joint account should not create undue 
credit, settlement, or other risks to the Reserve Banks.
    (5) The provision of a joint account should not create undue 
risk to the overall payment system.
    (6) The provision of a joint account should not adversely affect 
monetary policy operations.

    The Board requested comment on all aspects of the proposed 
guidelines, including whether the scope and application were 
sufficiently clear and appropriate to achieve their intended purpose 
and any other criteria or information that commenters believed may be 
relevant to evaluate joint account requests. The Board further sought 
comment specifically on the following:
    <bullet> What information, if any, about the establishment of an 
individual joint account should be made public?
    <bullet> How, if at all, would the possibility (1) that the account 
agreement with the account holding Reserve Bank may include limits on 
balances, require information on projected balances or volatility of 
balances, or restrict further joint accounts; or (2) that the joint 
account may be closed if warranted affect interest in establishing a 
joint account, or use of such an account once opened? Are there other 
types of restrictions or conditions that, while equally effective in 
attaining the same objectives, might be less burdensome if placed on 
joint accounts once in use?
    <bullet> Are there additional criteria or information that may be 
relevant to evaluate joint account requests for U.S. depository 
institutions to provide services to foreign clearing and settlement 
arrangements?
    <bullet> Should the Board or the Reserve Banks consider other steps 
or actions to facilitate settlement in light of market participants' 
efforts to develop faster retail payment solutions?

II. Summary of Comments and Analysis on the Proposed Guidelines

    The Board received nine comments in response to its request. 
Comments were submitted by depository institutions, depository 
institution trade associations, a national payments association, 
service providers and payment system operators, and an individual. All 
nine commenters supported establishment of the guidelines. No commenter 
expressed opposition to any of the six proposed principles or the 
guidelines more broadly. Five commenters requested that the Board 
clarify certain aspects or

[[Page 41953]]

consider additional elements as part of the final guidelines.
    Each of the proposed principles, the comments received, and the 
Board's final guidelines are described in additional detail below. 
Throughout the final guidelines, the Board has made changes to clarify 
the application of the final six principles and more specifically 
identify the parties to a private-sector arrangement for which 
individual principles and evaluation factors are relevant.
    1. Each joint account holder must meet all applicable legal 
requirements to have a Federal Reserve account, and the Reserve Bank 
will not have any obligation to any non-account holder with respect to 
the balance in and operation of the account.
    Unless otherwise specified by statute, only those entities that are 
member banks or other depository institutions are legally able to 
obtain Federal Reserve accounts and payment services.\5\ Therefore, 
under the first proposed principle, only an institution eligible to 
have a Federal Reserve account under the applicable federal statute and 
Federal Reserve rules, policies, and procedures is able to be a joint 
account holder. Consistent with Federal Reserve policies and 
procedures, under the first proposed principle the account-holding 
Reserve Bank must approve all joint account holders that are part of a 
proposed private-sector arrangement.\6\ The Board also explained that, 
consistent with the limits on the Reserve Banks' deposit-taking 
authority, an account-holding Reserve Bank's obligation with respect to 
any funds in a joint account will be limited to the joint account 
holders, and non-account holders will not have any rights against the 
Reserve Bank with respect to those funds.
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    \5\ Section 13(1) of the FRA permits Reserve Banks to receive 
deposits from member banks or other depository institutions. 12 
U.S.C. 342. Section 19(b)(1)(A) of the FRA includes as depository 
institutions any federally insured bank, mutual savings bank, 
savings bank, savings association, or credit union, as well as any 
of those entities that are eligible to make application to become a 
federally insured institution. 12 U.S.C. 461(b). In addition, there 
are certain statutory provisions allowing Reserve Banks to act as a 
depository or fiscal agent for the Treasury and certain government-
sponsored entities (See i.e. 12 U.S.C. 391, 393-95, 1823, 1435) as 
well as for certain international organizations (See i.e. 22 U.S.C. 
285d, 286d, 290o-3, 290i-5, 290l-3). In addition, Reserve Banks are 
authorized to offer deposit accounts to designated financial market 
utilities (12 U.S.C. 5465), Edge and Agreement corporations (12 
U.S.C. 601-604a, 611-631), branches or agencies of foreign banks (12 
U.S.C. 347d), and foreign banks and foreign states (12 U.S.C. 358).
    \6\ Under the first proposed principle, the designated agent or 
operator of the private-sector arrangement would not need to be a 
depository institution.
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    Three commenters addressed the first proposed principle and 
supported the proposed principle as consistent with existing account 
policies regarding Federal Reserve accounts. Two of the three 
commenters further stated that the first proposed principle would 
ensure the integrity of the payment system. None of the three 
commenters proposed changes to the first proposed principle or its 
considerations.
    In the final guidelines, the Board has adopted the first principle 
as proposed with minor technical changes for clarity. As proposed, only 
an institution eligible to have a Federal Reserve account under 
applicable federal statute and Federal Reserve rules, policies, and 
procedures is able to be a joint account holder. Some institutions may 
be eligible for a Federal Reserve account but may present atypical risk 
profiles, such as uninsured institutions. In these cases, a heightened 
analysis of that institution's participation as a joint account holder 
may be performed under one or more of the other guidelines. The final 
guidelines now provide further clarification that under the first 
principle, the designated agent or operator of the private-sector 
arrangement would not need to be eligible for a Federal Reserve 
account, assuming it is not a joint account holder.\7\ In the final 
guidelines, the first principle also clarifies that no party other than 
an account holder shall have a claim against the account-holding 
Reserve Bank in connection with operation of the joint account, 
including any decision related to opening or refusing to open the 
account.
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    \7\ The designated agent would need to enter into an agreement 
with the account-holding Reserve Bank.
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    2. The private-sector arrangement should demonstrate that it has a 
well-founded, clear, transparent, and enforceable legal basis in all 
aspects of its proposed arrangement.\8\
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    \8\ As described below, in the final guidelines the Board has 
clarified certain aspects of the second proposed principle. 
Significant changes from the proposed language are indicated in 
italics: The private-sector arrangement should demonstrate that it 
has a well-founded, clear, transparent, and enforceable legal basis 
in all aspects of its proposed arrangement (the second principle as 
proposed read ``The private-sector arrangement must demonstrate that 
it has a sound legal and operational basis for its payment system, 
including an effective legal framework for achieving settlement 
finality'').
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    Under the second proposed principle, the Board proposed that a 
private-sector arrangement seeking a joint account should have a sound 
legal and operational basis for its payment system, including an 
effective legal framework for achieving settlement finality. The Board 
explained that under the second proposed principle, requestors of a 
joint account would be expected to provide supporting legal analysis as 
well as the system's rules, agreements, and other governing 
documents.\9\ The Board also proposed that the private-sector 
arrangement should have established appropriate compliance procedures 
and have policies and procedures to minimize disruption to its system 
when one of its participants, the agent, or the operator fails, when 
fraudulent activity occurs, or in the event of operational failures. 
Evaluation under the second proposed principle would further consider 
the applicable supervisory framework for all parties to the private-
sector arrangement, with the expectation that the agent and operator 
should be subject to the examination authority of a federal or state 
supervisory agency.
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    \9\ For example, the Board explained that requestors would be 
expected to analyze the application of laws and regulations, such as 
U.C.C. 4A, the Electronic Funds Transfer Act, U.S. sanction 
programs, Bank Secrecy Act and anti-money-laundering requirements or 
regulations, and other relevant laws and regulations. In addition, 
the arrangement would be expected to analyze significant matters 
that may pose legal risks, such as the attachment risk related to 
the funds in the joint account and the impact of participant 
insolvency on the account.
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    Three commenters addressed the second proposed principle. All three 
commenters were generally supportive, stating that the expectations 
described under the second proposed principle reduce risks to 
participants and the broader payment system. Only one of the 
commenters, a payment system operator, suggested modifications. 
Specifically, the commenter suggested that joint account requests only 
be approved if the agent and operator are subject to federal 
examination authority, in particular the Federal Financial Institutions 
Examination Council's significant service provider or technology 
service provider programs.\10\
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    \10\ The significant service provider program was formerly known 
as the Multi-Regional Data Processing Servicers program.
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    In considering the appropriate level of supervision for an 
arrangement whose participants use a joint account at a Reserve Bank, 
the Board seeks to reduce risks for the Reserve Banks and the payment 
system as a whole while at the same time avoiding posing unwarranted 
access barriers. However, the Board does agree that, at some point in 
the maturity of a private-sector arrangement, federal supervision or 
examination may be important. For example, a successful private-sector 
arrangement is likely to grow over time

[[Page 41954]]

in terms of number of participants and geographic reach (interstate or 
international), which may pose increasing risks to the overall payment 
system in light of the potential to operate on a 24/7/365 basis. The 
Board sees benefit in uniform supervision and examination authority for 
private-sector arrangements that have reached this point of maturity.
    Therefore, the Board has added to the provision that the private-
sector arrangement be subject to federal or state supervision an 
expectation that the payment system established by a private-sector 
arrangement (including the operator) is also subject to the 
jurisdiction of a federal banking agency with the authority to examine 
or inspect the private-sector arrangement and take supervisory actions 
against the arrangement or its participants.\11\ This means for a 
payment system established by a private-sector arrangement and 
supervised by a state regulatory body, a federal banking agency need 
not be engaging in active supervision or examination, but should have 
the authority to do so when the risk, scope, and operations call for 
such supervision or examination. For example, under the Bank Service 
Company Act, federal banking agencies have the authority to examine 
third-party service providers that perform services for depository 
institutions that the depository institution could otherwise do itself.
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    \11\ A federal banking agency would include the Board; the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC); and the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC).
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    The Board also believes that consideration of those supervisory 
factors, as well as consideration of issues related to the operational 
soundness of the private-sector arrangement, would be more 
appropriately addressed under the final guidelines' third principle as 
part of considering the Federal Reserve's objectives to promote a safe, 
efficient, and accessible payment system for U.S. dollar transactions. 
In the final guidelines, the Board has therefore identified those 
elements as considerations under principle three.
    Finally, as part of the final guidelines, and as indicated above, 
the Board has clarified the phrase ``sound legal basis'' in the second 
principle to mean a well-founded, clear, transparent, and enforceable 
legal basis in all aspects of the proposed arrangement. The Board has 
also made other minor technical changes for clarity.
    3. The design and rules of a private-sector arrangement should be 
consistent with the Federal Reserve's policy objectives to promote a 
safe, efficient, and accessible payment system for U.S. dollar 
transactions.
    As explained under the third proposed principle, a private-sector 
arrangement using a joint account to facilitate settlement would be 
expected to manage risks consistent with Part I of the Board's Policy 
on Payment System Risk (PSR Policy), even if the private-sector 
arrangement is not otherwise subject to the PSR Policy. Also of 
relevance was (1) whether the system is widely available for use by its 
intended end users and is designed to minimize the risk of disruption 
(rejection or delay of payments) to end users and (2) whether the 
system creates undue inefficiencies in the payment process or undue 
barriers to interoperability within the U.S. dollar payment system. The 
Board also explained that evaluation of a joint account request would 
assess whether the private-sector arrangement promotes payment system 
improvements and innovations and the extent to which the arrangement 
fosters competition in the payment system. The design and rules of the 
private-sector arrangement, including rules relating to the funding of 
and disbursements from the joint account, should also be consistent 
with the intended use of the account. For example, the rules should not 
provide an incentive for a participant that is not a joint account 
holder and not eligible for its own individual Federal Reserve account 
to use its participation in the arrangement, including the funding of 
its obligations under the arrangement through a joint account holder, 
to inappropriately take advantage of the credit-risk-free nature of the 
joint account for purposes other than settling payments through the 
arrangement.
    The Board did not receive any comments suggesting modifications 
under the third proposed principle but did receive one comment from a 
national payments association related to principle five that the Board 
believes has implications for principle three. The commenter suggested 
that it would be relevant for the Board to consider the extent to which 
a private-sector arrangement facilitates payments as part of a 
transparent payment system, noting that less transparent mechanisms 
could reduce effective risk management of participants by providing 
inadequate visibility for all parties to sufficiently monitor and 
manage risks, which may affect the payment system more broadly. The 
Board believes that effective risk management will be adequately 
considered in the final guidelines but agrees that promoting 
transparency in the overall payment system is also an important policy 
objective. Therefore the final guidelines include under the third 
principle a consideration of the extent to which a private-sector 
arrangement promotes transparency for end users and the public more 
broadly (for example by making operating rules, rulemaking processes, 
list of participants, or certain network statistics publicly 
available).
    As described in the discussions regarding the Board's second and 
fourth proposed principles, the Board believes, based on the comments 
received, that several considerations proposed under those principles 
would be more appropriately evaluated as part of principle three, 
specifically factors related to supervision, operational soundness 
(such as policies and procedures to minimize disruption when one of its 
participants, the agent, or the operator fails or in the event of 
operational failures), and financial soundness of the operator (such as 
financial statements and cash flow projections). The third principle of 
the final guidelines also provides greater clarity on the consideration 
of the Board's PSR Policy, specifically that a private-sector 
arrangement would be expected to comply with the general policy 
expectations for payment systems outlined within Part I of the PSR 
Policy at a minimum, even if it is not otherwise subject to the policy, 
in addition to any supervisory obligations.\12\
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    \12\ Those expectations are identified in Part I, section C of 
the PSR Policy, ``General policy expectations for other payment 
systems within the scope of the policy'' (as amended effective 
September 23, 2016). The PSR Policy is available at https://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/files/psr_policy.pdf.
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    The Board has also clarified that as part of the third principle, 
the arrangement's rules should sufficiently address the 
responsibilities and liabilities of the participants, agent, and 
operator in cases of operational disruption, or erroneous or fraudulent 
conduct. Lastly, the final guidelines provide additional clarity 
related to consideration under the third principle of the extent to 
which the design and rules of the arrangement are consistent with the 
intended use of the arrangement.
    4. Provision of a joint account should not create undue credit, 
settlement, or other risks to the Reserve Banks.
    The Board in its proposal explained under the fourth proposed 
principle that granting a request for a joint account should not create 
undue risks to a Reserve Bank. For instance, the Board proposed that an 
operator for an arrangement must be financially sound and that the 
agent should demonstrate

[[Page 41955]]

an ongoing ability to meet all obligations under the joint account 
agreement with the account-holding Reserve Bank. Evaluation under this 
proposed principle would consider the manner in which the joint account 
will be used, including any anticipated use of Reserve Bank services 
and methods in place by the private-sector arrangement to avoid 
overnight and intraday overdrafts, which would not be permitted in a 
joint account. Under the fourth proposed principle, the agent would 
also need to demonstrate that it has ways to monitor the joint account 
and transactions into and out of the account, including the ability to 
avoid overdrafts and promptly cover any inadvertent overdrafts.
    One commenter, a depository institution, addressed the fourth 
proposed principle. The commenter suggested that evaluation under the 
principle should consider the contingency processing capabilities of 
owners, participants and operators of a private-sector arrangement. The 
Board agrees that contingency processing capabilities will be important 
when evaluating joint account requests and believes that such 
considerations are already accounted for under several of the 
principles, including consideration of the private-sector arrangement's 
ability to minimize disruption to its system and to meet the 
requirements of the PSR Policy (principle three), the agent's ability 
to monitor transactions originated and received by the account 
(principle four), and whether the arrangement poses undue risk to the 
overall payment system (principle five). As those considerations are 
included in the final guidelines, the Board does not intend to include 
a separate contingency assessment as part of principle four.
    The same commenter asked that the guidelines set forth a clearly 
defined review process for assessing the financial soundness of 
operators. The Board agrees that providing further information may be 
helpful to requestors and the final guidelines clarify that it will 
likely be necessary to review (among other things) the financial 
statements of operators, as well as cash flow projections (including 
capital and operating expenses). The Board also believes that those 
financial soundness factors would be more appropriately addressed under 
the final guidelines' third principle when considering the Federal 
Reserve's objectives to promote a safe, efficient, and accessible 
payment system for U.S. dollar transactions. In the final guidelines, 
the Board has therefore identified those elements as considerations 
under principle three. The Board does not believe, however, it would be 
appropriate to create a standardized review process for assessing the 
financial soundness of every operator, or to establish expectations 
that only certain information related to the financial condition of the 
operator will be relevant as part of assessing a joint account request. 
Ultimately, the specific considerations necessary to determine whether 
an operator is financially sound will vary depending on the nature of 
the private-sector arrangement and the individual entity.
    The final guidelines no longer discuss an assessment of the 
financial soundness of each participant under principle four (absent a 
potential for further analysis of any atypical risk presented by a 
potential joint account holder, as discussed under the first 
guideline). The Board believes that the Reserve Banks already apply 
appropriate controls to account holders as necessary to mitigate risks 
that may result from financially unsound institutions. Moreover, the 
financial soundness of participating depository institutions is already 
considered by a depository institution's supervisor. In light of these 
various factors, the Board does not believe it is necessary to assess 
each individual joint account holder's financial soundness as part of 
evaluating a request.
    Lastly, the explanatory paragraphs to the final guidelines provide 
that the account agreement with the account-holding Reserve Bank at the 
time of account opening, or any time thereafter, may include 
obligations relating to, or conditions or limitations on, use of the 
joint account as necessary to limit any operational, credit, legal, or 
reputational risks posed to the Reserve Banks.
    5. Provision of a joint account should not create undue risk to the 
overall payment system.
    Under the fifth proposed principle, a private-sector arrangement 
should not cause undue credit, settlement, or other risks to the 
efficient operation of other payment systems or the payment system as a 
whole. In evaluating a joint account request under this proposed 
principle, the Board proposed that the operational and financial 
interaction with, and use of, other payment systems would be relevant, 
as would the extent to which use of the joint account may restrict a 
portion of funds from being available to support intraday liquidity 
needs of depository institutions for other payment and settlement 
activity.
    Three commenters addressed the fifth proposed principle. While all 
three commenters were generally supportive, two of the commenters 
suggested modifications to the proposed principle and its 
considerations. As discussed above, the Board received one comment from 
a national payments association under principle five that the Board 
believed was relevant for evaluation under principle three. One 
depository institution commenter suggested that the principle should 
include an assessment of individual joint account holders' liquidity 
needs to ensure that the private-sector arrangement does not negatively 
impact the ability to meet further obligations. The Board does not 
believe, however, that it would be appropriate to assess the liquidity 
needs of each individual account holder in considering a joint account 
request. Joint account holders should be effectively managing their 
unique liquidity needs, which may change over time. Institutions 
participating in private-sector arrangements should ensure liquidity 
management is appropriately robust and quantitative in light of the 
nature of the arrangement, particularly where its objective is to 
facilitate faster payments. Moreover, the liquidity of participating 
depository institutions will likely already be considered by a 
depository institution's supervisor. However, the Board agrees that 
issues of liquidity will be a critical consideration in evaluating 
joint account requests and believes that the overall impact of the 
private-sector arrangement on liquidity should already be adequately 
assessed as part of the fifth principle, which includes consideration 
of the extent to which the use of the joint account may restrict a 
portion of funds from being available to support liquidity needs of 
depository institutions for other payment and settlement activity.
    In addition, the explanatory paragraphs of the final guidelines 
provide that the account agreement with the account-holding Reserve 
Bank at the time of account opening or any time thereafter may include 
obligations relating to, and conditions or limitations on, use of the 
joint account to limit risks to financial stability and the 
implementation of monetary policy (see principle six), as well as other 
risks that may arise.
    6. Provision of a joint account should not adversely affect 
monetary policy operations.
    Finally, the provision of a joint account could have important 
implications for monetary policy implementation, particularly if the 
end-of-day balances in a joint account or joint accounts in the 
aggregate fluctuate to the extent that they materially affect the 
demand for or supply of reserve

[[Page 41956]]

balances.\13\ Such fluctuations would be a concern in a monetary policy 
framework that relies on controlling the supply of reserves and in 
which reserve balances are relatively scarce. Under the sixth proposed 
principle, a joint account would not be opened if it would adversely 
affect the conduct of monetary policy. The Board explained that 
evaluation of the potential monetary policy implications would include 
whether the balance in the joint account would be treated as reserves 
(that is, would either be available to satisfy any joint account 
holder's reserve balance requirement or be treated as excess reserves), 
the expected predictability and volatility of the aggregate end-of-day 
balance of the joint account, and the potential for a Reserve Bank to 
impose limitations on account volatility without affecting the intended 
function of the arrangement. The Board further identified several areas 
where it may be necessary for the account agreement with the account-
holding Reserve Bank to include limits or controls, such as limiting 
account volatility and account size or requiring a private-sector 
arrangement to provide information related to such issues.\14\ The 
Board requested comment on (1) how, if at all, the possibility of such 
limits affected interest in establishing a joint account or use of such 
an account once opened and (2) whether commenters believed other types 
of restrictions or conditions might be less burdensome, while being 
equally effective in attaining the same objectives.
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    \13\ End-of-day balances refers to the balances in joint 
accounts at the time the Federal Reserve's accounting system closes 
for a given day.
    \14\ An information requirement might include a notice period 
within which the agent must notify the Reserve Bank of shifts in 
account balances greater than a designated threshold. The Board 
further explained that if other potential conditions discussed above 
are ineffective at mitigating the risks identified or if the 
obligations, limits or controls are breached, the account agreement 
with the account-holding Reserve Bank might be restricted further or 
the joint account may be closed if warranted.
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    Four commenters addressed these issues. One commenter suggested 
that the Board treat balances held in a joint account as reserves. The 
treatment of joint account balances, however, will depend on the nature 
of the private-sector arrangement, including the rights and obligations 
of the parties involved. Determining whether balances held in a joint 
account qualify as reserves therefore will be assessed for each request 
individually. Moreover, the determination of whether balances in joint 
accounts are treated as reserves will not affect the potential need to 
predict and limit the volatility in the joint accounts. If joint 
account balances are determined to be reserve balances, then these 
balances will affect the demand for such balances, which is closely 
monitored and supplied by the Federal Reserve in a scarce reserve 
regime. Likewise, if joint account balances are not treated as 
reserves, they are a factor affecting the supply of reserve balances, 
meaning, all else equal, movements in joint account balances have 
similarly sized but opposite effects on the supply of reserve balances, 
which the Federal Reserve will need to offset to provide the 
appropriate level of reserves in a scarce reserve regime.
    None of the commenters opposed the principle or objected to the 
potential imposition of limits or controls. One commenter stated that 
institutions would be able to adequately adjust to any necessary limits 
or controls placed on the account. Two commenters suggested that any 
limits or controls be identified prior to opening a joint account, or 
be included in the account agreement with the account-holding Reserve 
Bank to provide clarity and certainty to private-sector arrangements. 
While the Board agrees that providing certainty would be beneficial to 
private-sector arrangements, limits or controls placed on joint 
accounts to mitigate monetary policy implications will necessarily 
depend on the framework in which the Federal Reserve is conducting 
monetary policy. Under a monetary policy framework where the policy 
rate is targeted by tightly managing the supply of reserves balances, 
the magnitude and predictability of daily changes in joint account 
balances would become important for monetary policy operations, and 
therefore it may be necessary to limit the volatility or size of a 
joint account or require advance notice of significant daily changes. 
However, under a monetary policy framework where the supply of reserve 
balances far exceeds the demand for reserve balances, joint account 
balances are likely to have a negligible effect on monetary policy 
operations, and such controls may not be necessary. The Board does not 
believe it would be possible to identify the exact limitations and 
controls that will be needed in all future policy frameworks.
    As explained previously, the explanatory paragraphs of the final 
guidelines provide that the account agreement with the account-holding 
Reserve Bank at the time of account opening or any time thereafter may 
include obligations relating to, or conditions or limitations on, use 
of the joint account to limit risks to financial stability and the 
implementation of monetary policy, as well as other risks that may 
arise. Accordingly, the final guidelines have been modified to include 
only the evaluation considerations under principle six. Finally, the 
Board has made minor technical changes under principle six for clarity.
    7. Responses to Additional Questions Posed by the Board.
    In response to the Board's request for comment on any other 
criteria or information that commenters believed may be relevant to 
evaluate a joint account request, one national payments association 
commenter suggested that the final guidelines include separate elements 
to evaluate a designated agent or operator of a joint account.\15\ The 
Board agrees that evaluation of the agent and operator is important. 
The Board does not believe, however, that it would be appropriate to 
establish separate, distinct criteria to evaluate the agent and 
operator apart from the private-sector arrangement, because the roles 
(and corresponding risks) of an agent or operator may vary depending on 
the specific design of a private-sector arrangement. Evaluating a 
private-sector arrangement's joint account request will necessarily 
consider the agent and operator, and the Board believes that both 
entities will be appropriately evaluated as part of that process under 
the final guidelines. For example, the risks posed to the participants 
of the private-sector arrangement will be necessarily considered in 
determining whether the private-sector arrangement has a sound legal 
and operational basis under principles two and three respectively, and 
the risks posed to the payment system as a whole would be considered 
under principle five.
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    \15\ The commenter suggested that such separate criteria 
include, among other things, an appropriate risk assessment 
addressing the risks posed to the participants of the private-sector 
arrangement, the safety and integrity of the particular payment 
system established by the private-sector arrangement, and risks 
posed to the payment system as a whole, and an assessment of the 
agent's or operator's compliance with legal requirements and 
regulatory oversight.
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    Three commenters supported making some level of information public 
about joint accounts established under the final guidelines. Two 
commenters noted that certain information should not be made public. 
One payment system operator commenter stated that confidential 
information (such as functional, technical, or operational details) 
should not be made public as it may result in risk or harm to the 
private-sector arrangement or its participants. Another commenter, a 
depository institution trade association, stated that

[[Page 41957]]

unsuccessful joint account applications should not be made public.
    In considering these comments, the Board believes that public 
announcement of joint accounts could be interpreted by some as an 
endorsement by the Federal Reserve of the private-sector arrangement or 
of its safety and soundness. The Board believes it is necessary to 
avoid any appearance of endorsing a private entity or arrangement using 
a joint account. The Board also believes that making the disapproval of 
a joint account arrangement public could result in competitive harm to 
the entities involved. Therefore, the Board has determined that neither 
it nor the Reserve Banks intend to announce the opening of individual 
joint accounts or the corresponding individual private-sector 
arrangements. The Board believes that the private-sector arrangement 
will provide sufficient transparency to participants and end users 
about the method of settlement, including the use of a joint account. 
This approach is generally consistent with the treatment of other 
Federal Reserve accounts, for which neither the Board nor the Reserve 
Banks publish information upon account openings, with limited 
exceptions.\16\
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    \16\ For example, the Board's H2 release publishes actions of 
the Board and the Reserve Banks, including authorizations to 
establish accounts for designated financial market utilities in 
accordance with the Dodd-Frank Act.
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    Consistent with the foregoing, the Board has clarified in the final 
guidelines that establishment of a joint account by the Reserve Banks 
is not intended as an endorsement or approval by the Federal Reserve of 
the payment system established by the private-sector arrangement and 
does not relieve any party to the private-sector arrangement or end 
user from conducting its own diligence on the arrangement generally, 
the associated risks of using the system established by the 
arrangement, or the acceptability of such risks.
    Commenters were generally silent as to additional criteria or 
information that may be relevant to evaluating joint account requests 
for U.S. depository institutions to provide services to foreign 
clearing and settlement arrangements. The final guidelines will 
generally apply in the event that a request is received related to a 
foreign clearing or settlement arrangement, but the level of scrutiny 
and information necessary may vary from domestic arrangements.\17\
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    \17\ Like domestic arrangements, requests will be evaluated on a 
case-by-case basis; the considerations and information to evaluate a 
particular request will likely be based on the complexity of the 
arrangement and other factors. For example, in considering a request 
related to a foreign clearing or settlement arrangement, the 
relevant supervisory and examination framework under principle three 
may be whether the payment system established by the private-sector 
arrangement is subject to a level of supervision and examination 
commensurate with those of domestic arrangements.
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    Finally, the Board requested comment on other steps or actions the 
Federal Reserve should consider to facilitate settlement in light of 
market participants' efforts to develop faster retail payment 
solutions. One commenter, a payment system operator, suggested that the 
Board coordinate with the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency's 
initiative on evaluating national bank charter applications from 
financial technology companies that engage in the business of banking. 
The Board does collaborate with other federal banking agencies on 
efforts to improve the payment system. Another depository institution 
trade association commenter recommended that the Federal Reserve 
continue to foster collaboration among a wide range of payments 
stakeholders across a broad range of issues in the same model as the 
Faster Payments Task Force to facilitate payment system improvements. 
The Board agrees that a collaborative approach has been productive and 
believes that it will continue to be valuable as the Federal Reserve 
and industry work to achieve the desired outcomes set forth in the 
Strategies for Improving the U.S. Payment System paper.
    Another payment service provider commenter suggested that the final 
guidelines be applied using a risk-based approach to evaluating joint 
account requests so that smaller private-sector arrangements or new 
entrants are evaluated in light of their specific volumes and risks. 
The Board does not believe that it would be prudent to evaluate smaller 
arrangements or new entrants under less-stringent criteria; an 
evaluation under the final guidelines should necessarily consider the 
specific risks posed by each private-sector arrangement. In certain 
instances, that may mean a smaller private-sector arrangement presents 
less risk by nature of its size. In other instances, a smaller private-
sector arrangement may present significant risks in spite of its size. 
For these reasons, evaluation under the final guidelines will consider 
the specific risks posed by a joint account request, regardless of 
size.
    One commenter, a depository institution, asked the Federal Reserve 
to study how new payment methods have affected the payment system. Two 
other commenters recommended that the Board strive to balance burdens 
imposed by the final guidelines against the importance of payment 
system developments. The Board agrees that ensuring balanced guidelines 
is important to further the Federal Reserve's objectives of a safe, 
efficient, and accessible payment system, while avoiding undue burdens 
that lead to unintended consequences. The Board also agrees that 
monitoring existing and emerging payment methods provides useful 
information for achieving those objectives, and Federal Reserve staff 
will continuously consider developments in the payment system and any 
corresponding implications.\18\
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    \18\ Including, for example, as part of the Federal Reserve 
Payments Study and through the Reserve Banks' payment research 
groups. https://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/payres_about.htm.
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II. Final Guidelines for Evaluating Joint Account Requests

    The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Board) has 
adopted six principles and corresponding considerations (collectively, 
the guidelines) to be used in evaluating requests to the Federal 
Reserve Banks (Reserve Banks) for joint accounts intended to facilitate 
settlement between and among member banks and other eligible depository 
institutions (collectively depository institutions) participating in 
private-sector payment systems (private-sector arrangements).
    For purposes of these guidelines, a joint account is an account at 
a Reserve Bank where the rights and liabilities are shared among 
multiple account holders (joint account holders), that is, institutions 
that are eligible to open an account with a Reserve Bank. The Board 
contemplates that under these arrangements, the joint account holders 
will authorize a single entity to serve as their ``agent'' in providing 
instructions to the Reserve Bank at which the account would be held 
(the account-holding Reserve Bank) with respect to the account. The 
account-holding Reserve Bank would be authorized to act on any 
instruction provided by the agent, consistent with the provisions of 
the joint account agreement. The Board also contemplates that private-
sector arrangements using joint accounts might also use an ``operator'' 
(which could be the agent of the joint account or a separate entity) 
for running the arrangement, which may include undertaking various 
steps in the payments process such as initiation, clearing, settlement, 
and reconciliation, or establishing rules and governance. 
``Participants'' in the arrangement might

[[Page 41958]]

include joint account holders, as well as other depository institutions 
and nondepository institutions that are directly part of the payment 
system established by the private-sector arrangement.
    The guidelines broadly outline considerations necessary for 
evaluating requests, but are not intended to provide assurance that any 
specific arrangement would be granted a joint account. Every request 
will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, with the type and extent of 
information necessary to evaluate a particular request likely dependent 
on the complexity of the arrangement. The guidelines apply to both 
domestic private-sector arrangements and foreign clearing or settlement 
arrangements. In the event that a request is received related to a 
foreign clearing or settlement arrangement, the level of scrutiny and 
information necessary may vary from domestic arrangements.
    In addition to the evaluation under the guidelines, the account 
agreement with the account-holding Reserve Bank may include (at the 
time of account opening or any time thereafter) obligations relating 
to, or conditions or limitations on, use of the joint account as 
necessary to limit operational, credit, legal, or reputational risks 
posed to the Reserve Banks. The account agreement may also impose 
obligations relating to, or conditions or limitations on, use of the 
joint account to limit risks to financial stability and the 
implementation of monetary policy, as well as other risks that may 
arise. Obligations, limitations or conditions to limit risks to 
financial stability, the implementation of monetary policy, or other 
risks that may arise would be used only as deemed necessary and may 
include, for example, limits on the level or volatility of account 
balances and requirements for information on projected balances or 
volatility of balances. An information requirement might include a 
notice period within which the agent must notify the account-holding 
Reserve Bank of shifts in the end-of-day account balances greater than 
a designated threshold. If the obligations, limitations, or controls 
are ineffective at mitigating the risks identified or if the 
obligations, limitations, or controls are breached, the account 
agreement with the account-holding Reserve Bank might be restricted 
further or the joint account may be closed if warranted.
    Establishment of a joint account by the Reserve Banks under these 
guidelines does not relieve any participant in the private-sector 
arrangement or any end user from conducting its own diligence on the 
arrangement generally, on any associated risks of using the payment 
system established by the private-sector arrangement, or on the 
acceptability of such risks. Establishment of a joint account by the 
Reserve Banks under these guidelines is not an endorsement or approval 
by the Board or Reserve Banks (collectively the Federal Reserve) of the 
payment system established by the private-sector arrangement. Moreover, 
nothing in the Board's guidelines relieves any institution from 
compliance with obligations imposed by an institution's supervisor.
    The following will be used in evaluating requests to the Reserve 
Banks for joint accounts intended to facilitate settlement between 
depository institutions participating in private-sector arrangements:

    1. Each joint account holder must meet all applicable legal 
requirements to have a Federal Reserve account, and the Reserve Bank 
will not have any obligation to any non-account holder with respect 
to the balance in and operation of the account.
    [cir] Only an institution that is eligible to have a Federal 
Reserve account under applicable federal statute and Federal Reserve 
rules, policies, and procedures is able to be a joint account 
holder. Unless otherwise specified by statute, only those entities 
that are member banks or meet the definition of a depository 
institution under section 19(b) of the Federal Reserve Act are 
legally able to obtain Federal Reserve accounts and payment 
services.\19\
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    \19\ There are certain statutory provisions allowing Reserve 
Banks to act as a depository and fiscal agent for the Treasury and 
certain government-sponsored entities (See i.e. 12 U.S.C. 391, 393-
95, 1823, 1435) as well as for certain international organizations 
(See i.e. 22 U.S.C. 285d, 286d, 290o-3, 290i-5, 290l-3). In 
addition, Reserve Banks are authorized to offer deposit accounts to 
designated financial market utilities (12 U.S.C. 5465), Edge and 
Agreement corporations (12 U.S.C. 601-604a, 611-631), branches or 
agencies of foreign banks (12 U.S.C. 347d), and foreign banks and 
foreign states (12 U.S.C. 358).
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    [cir] As part of evaluating any joint account requests, and 
consistent with Federal Reserve policies and procedures, the 
account-holding Reserve Bank must approve all joint account holders 
that are part of a proposed private-sector arrangement. Some 
institutions may be eligible for a Federal Reserve account but may 
present atypical risk profiles, such as uninsured institutions. In 
these cases, a heightened analysis of that institution's 
participation as a joint account holder may be performed under one 
or more of the other guidelines.
    [cir] The designated agent or operator of the private-sector 
arrangement would not need to be a depository institution, assuming 
it is not a joint account holder.
    [cir] Consistent with the Reserve Banks' deposit-taking 
authority, a Reserve Bank's obligation with respect to any balance 
in a joint account will be owed solely to the joint account holders, 
and no non-account holders may have any rights against the Reserve 
Bank with respect to the balance. No party other than an account 
holder shall have a claim against the account-holding Reserve Bank 
in connection with the operation of the joint account, including any 
decision related to opening or refusing to open the account.
    2. The private-sector arrangement should demonstrate that it has 
a well-founded, clear, transparent, and enforceable legal basis in 
all aspects of its proposed arrangement.
    [cir] Requestors of a joint account should provide supporting 
legal analysis as well as the system's rules, agreements, and other 
governing documents. The legal analysis should consider the 
application of applicable laws and regulations, such as U.C.C. 4A, 
the Electronic Funds Transfer Act, U.S. sanction programs, Bank 
Secrecy Act and anti-money-laundering requirements or regulations, 
and other relevant laws and regulations; the attachment risk related 
to the account; and how the operation of the account would be 
affected by a participant's insolvency.
    3. The design and rules of the private-sector arrangement should 
be consistent with the Federal Reserve's policy objectives to 
promote a safe, efficient, and accessible payment system for U.S. 
dollar transactions.
    [cir] In addition to any party's supervisory obligations, a 
private-sector arrangement that uses a joint account approved under 
these guidelines will be expected to manage risks consistent with 
the general policy expectations for payment systems outlined within 
Part I of the Board's Federal Reserve Policy on Payment System Risk 
(PSR Policy) at a minimum.\20\ These policy expectations apply even 
if the private-sector arrangement is not otherwise subject to the 
PSR Policy.\21\ Thus, before authorizing the establishment of a 
joint account, the private-sector arrangement would be expected to 
demonstrate that it has a general risk-management framework 
appropriate for the risks the system poses to the operator, agent, 
participants, the Reserve Bank granting the joint account, and other 
relevant parties and payment systems.
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    \20\ As of the date of publication of the final guidelines, 
those expectations are identified in Part I, section C of the PSR 
Policy, ``General policy expectations for other payment systems 
within the scope of the policy'' (as amended effective September 23, 
2016). The PSR Policy is available at https://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/files/psr_policy.pdf.
    \21\ The Board's PSR Policy sets forth standards regarding the 
management of risks that financial market infrastructures (FMIs) 
present to the financial system when an FMI expects to settle a 
daily aggregate gross value of $5 billion on a given day and when 
providing accounts and services to FMIs. Generally, FMIs are 
multilateral systems among participating financial institutions, 
including the system operator, used for the purposes of clearing, 
settling, or recording payments, securities, or other financial 
transactions. For the purposes of a system that uses a joint account 
to facilitate settlement, the standards would be applicable 
regardless of the daily aggregate gross value in a given day.
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    [cir] The private-sector arrangement should have policies and 
procedures to minimize disruption to its system when one of its 
participants, the agent, or the operator fails or in the event of 
operational failures. The arrangement's rules should also 
sufficiently

[[Page 41959]]

address the responsibilities and liabilities of the participants, 
agent, and operator in cases of operational disruption, or erroneous 
or fraudulent conduct.
    [cir] Requests for joint accounts involving a financially 
unsound operator would not be approved. Evaluation may include, 
among other things, reviewing financial statements of the operator, 
as well as cash flow projections (including capital and operating 
expenses).
    [cir] Evaluation under this principle will take into account the 
applicable supervisory framework for the private-sector 
arrangement.\22\ The payment system established by a private-sector 
arrangement (including the operator) should be subject to federal or 
state supervision and should also be subject to the jurisdiction of 
a federal banking agency with the authority to examine or inspect 
the private-sector arrangement and take supervisory actions against 
the arrangement or its participants.\23\ This means for a payment 
system established by a private-sector arrangement and supervised by 
a state regulatory body, a federal banking agency need not be 
engaging in active supervision or examination, but should have the 
authority to do so when the risk, scope, and operations call for 
such supervision or examination. For example, under the Bank Service 
Company Act, federal banking agencies have the authority to examine 
third-party service providers that perform services for depository 
institutions that the depository institution could otherwise do 
itself.
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    \22\ Nothing in the Board's guidelines should be interpreted to 
relieve any participant in the private-sector arrangement from 
compliance with obligations imposed by an institution's supervisor, 
including for example related to financial resources, liquidity, 
participant default management, and other aspects of risk 
management.
    \23\ A federal banking agency would include the Board; the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC); and the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC).
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    [cir] An evaluation under this principle would assess whether 
the system is widely available for use by its intended end users, is 
designed to minimize the risk of disruption (rejection or delay of 
payments) to end users, and promotes transparency for end users and 
the public more broadly (for example, by making its operating rules, 
rulemaking processes, list of participants, or certain network 
statistics publicly available). Evaluation under this guideline 
would also assess whether the system creates inefficiencies in 
payment processes or barriers to interoperability within the U.S. 
dollar payment system. Also of relevance is whether the private-
sector arrangement promotes payment system improvements and 
innovations and the extent to which the arrangement fosters 
competition in the payment system (for example between providers of 
payment services).
    [cir] Finally, the design and rules of the private-sector 
arrangement, including rules relating to the funding of and 
disbursements from the joint account, should be consistent with the 
intended use of the account, such that a participant can only use 
the balances for the intended purpose of settling payments in the 
associated system.
    4. The provision of the joint account should not create undue 
credit, settlement, or other risks to the Reserve Banks.
    [cir] The agent and the joint account holders should demonstrate 
an ongoing ability to meet all obligations under the joint account 
agreement with the account-holding Reserve Bank.
    [cir] The manner in which the joint account will be used in 
support of the private-sector arrangement and any anticipated use of 
Reserve Bank services should be identified.
    [cir] Reserve Banks will not extend overnight or intraday credit 
to a joint account. The private-sector arrangement should structure 
its use of the joint account and Reserve Bank services in a manner 
that seeks to avoid intraday overdrafts. The agent also should 
demonstrate ways to monitor the joint account on an ongoing basis to 
avoid overdrafts and to promptly cover any inadvertent overdrafts.
    [cir] Further, the agent should demonstrate the ability to 
appropriately monitor transactions into and out of the joint 
account.
    5. The provision of a joint account should not create undue risk 
to the overall payment system.
    [cir] The private-sector arrangement should not cause undue 
credit, settlement, or other risks to the efficient operation of 
other payment systems or the payment system as a whole.
    [cir] The operational and financial interaction with and use of 
other payment systems should be identified.
    [cir] The extent to which the use of the joint account may 
restrict a portion of funds from being available to support 
liquidity needs of depository institutions for other payment and 
settlement activity will also be considered.
    6. The provision of a joint account should not adversely affect 
monetary policy operations.
    [cir] Evaluation of the potential monetary policy implications 
of the use of a joint account will include whether the balance in 
the joint account would be treated as reserves (that is, treated as 
available to satisfy any joint account holder's reserve balance 
requirements or as excess reserves), the expected predictability and 
volatility of the end-of-day joint account balances, and the 
potential for the account agreement with the account-holding Reserve 
Bank to impose limitations on account volatility without affecting 
the intended function of the arrangement. This evaluation will occur 
regardless of the current monetary policy implementation framework 
in place.

    By order of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, August 9, 2017.
Ann E. Misback,
Secretary of the Board.
[FR Doc. 2017-18705 Filed 9-1-17; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE P