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*********************************************** 
JACEK SUPRONOWICZ ET AL. v.

MICHAEL EATON ET AL.

(AC 45508)

Elgo, Cradle and Westbrook, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiffs sought to quiet title by adverse possession to certain of the

defendants’ property that was adjacent to their own. The plaintiffs

acquired title to their property in 2011 and claimed that they had used

a portion of the defendants’ property, which was located between the

plaintiffs’ home and a creek set inside of a shallow ravine, in various

ways since that time. The plaintiffs also asserted that their predecessors

in title had used the disputed area continuously from 1961 to 2011. The

disputed area consisted predominantly of a grassy side yard, which the

plaintiffs maintained, and included a small corner of the plaintiffs’ paved

driveway. Shortly after purchasing their property, the plaintiffs sought

and received permission from the defendants’ predecessor in title to

install drains in the disputed area to divert water from the roof and

foundation of their residence into the creek. The defendants purchased

their property in 2017. Approximately one year later, they had the property surveyed and determined that they were the record title holders

of the disputed area. Thereafter, the defendants began to use and maintain the disputed area and asked the plaintiffs to stop entering it. The

plaintiffs ignored the defendants’ request and continued to use the disputed area until 2019, when the defendants erected a plastic fence along

the border of their property as it was reflected in the survey. The

plaintiffs commenced the underlying action, alleging that they and their

predecessors in title had been in open, exclusive, hostile, adverse and

actual possession under a claim of right of the disputed area for more

than fifteen years, as required by the applicable statute (§ 52-575 (a)).

The defendants filed a counterclaim seeking a declaratory judgment

affirming their ownership of the disputed area and to quiet title. Thereafter, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing

that the plaintiffs could not demonstrate that the essential elements of

adverse possession had been met. The trial court granted the defendants’

motion, and the plaintiffs appealed to this court. Held:

1. The trial court improperly rendered summary judgment for the defendants

because there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether privity

existed between the plaintiffs and their predecessors in title: the plaintiffs were required to demonstrate privity between themselves and their

predecessors in title in order to tack the adverse use of their predecessors to their own use to satisfy the fifteen year period set forth in § 52-

575 (a) and to acquire title to the disputed area because they purchased

their property and began using the disputed area only eight years prior

to the commencement of the action; moreover, although the plaintiffs’

predecessors in title never expressly conveyed the disputed area to the

plaintiffs, there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether privity

existed between the plaintiffs and their predecessors in title under the

theory of implied conveyance; furthermore, several courts in other jurisdictions have found an implied transfer of a disputed area on the basis

of the existence of a natural boundary that appeared to enclose the

property, and the disputed area in the present case was bounded by a

ravine and a creek, and the plaintiffs’ predecessors in title believed that

the creek was the boundary line of their property and that they owned the

disputed area until they sold their property to the plaintiffs; accordingly,

whether an implied transfer could be inferred from the evidence raised

a question of fact that could not properly be resolved by the trial court

on a motion for summary judgment.

2. The trial court improperly rendered summary judgment for the defendants

because there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the

plaintiffs recognized the defendants’ superior title to the disputed area:

although it was undisputed that the plaintiffs asked the defendants’

predecessor in title for permission to install drains in the disputed

area shortly after the plaintiffs had purchased their property, there was
conflicting evidence regarding whether the permission sought was for

the use of the disputed area or for the resulting increase in water into

the creek, which the plaintiffs believed was owned by the defendant’s

predecessors in title and which marked the then supposed boundary

line, and that factual dispute was required to be resolved by the fact

finder, not by the trial court at summary judgment.

3. The trial court improperly rendered summary judgment for the defendants

because there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding the exclusivity of the plaintiffs’ use of the disputed area: there was a genuine issue

of material fact as to whether adverse possession had been established

prior to the defendants’ entry into the disputed area in 2018, as the

plaintiffs presented evidence that they and/or their predecessors in title

had used the disputed area continuously from 1961 until the defendants

erected a fence around it in 2019; moreover, to the extent that the

plaintiffs did not establish adverse possession prior to 2018, it was the

role of the fact finder to determine whether the plaintiffs’ use was

sufficient to satisfy the exclusivity requirement needed to establish

adverse possession despite the defendants’ use of the disputed area

beginning in 2018.

Argued November 9, 2023—officially released March 5, 2024

Procedural History

Action seeking to quiet title to certain real property,

and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the

judicial district of Ansonia-Milford, where the named

defendant et al. filed a counterclaim; thereafter, the

court, Hon. Irene P. Jacobs, judge trial referee, granted

the motion for summary judgment filed by the named

defendant et al. and rendered judgment thereon, from

which the plaintiffs appealed to this court. Reversed;

further proceedings.

Ian A. Cole, for the appellants (plaintiffs).

Arthur C. Zinn, for the appellees (named defendant

et al.).
Opinion

WESTBROOK, J. In this action to quiet title alleging

ownership by adverse possession, the plaintiffs, Jacek

Supronowicz and Iwona Supronowicz, appeal from the

summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor

of the defendants Michael Eaton and Stephanie

Hawker.1 The plaintiffs claim that the court improperly

concluded that they could not establish their claim of

adverse possession as a matter of law because they

(1) failed to demonstrate that privity existed between

themselves and their predecessors in title for purposes

of tacking periods of possession, (2) acknowledged the

defendants’ superior title to the disputed area, and (3)

failed to show that their use of the disputed area was

exclusive. The plaintiffs assert that genuine issues of

material fact remain as to each of these issues and that

the court therefore improperly granted the defendants’

motion for summary judgment. We agree with the plaintiffs as to each of their claims and, for the reasons that

follow, reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, and procedural history are relevant

to our resolution of this appeal. The parties are the

owners of adjoining parcels of land on Fair Oaks Drive

in Shelton. The plaintiffs are the record owners of the

parcel at 16 Fair Oaks Drive. Jacek Supronowicz

acquired title to this property by warranty deed from

John Nangle and Melissa Nangle (collectively, Nangles)

in 2011.2 The plaintiffs claim that they have used a

portion of the property located between their home and

a creek set inside of a shallow ravine—the disputed

area—in various ways since they purchased their property. Following the natural path of the creek, the disputed area extends perpendicular to Fair Oaks Drive

for more than two hundred feet.3

It is widest along Fair

Oaks Drive, extending, at its greatest width, about fifty

feet into the defendants’ titled property. Although a

small corner of the plaintiffs’ paved driveway lies on

the disputed area, it is predominately a grassy side yard

populated with trees, shrubs, and a utility pole. The

plaintiffs ‘‘have used a portion of the [disputed] area

as their driveway and have maintain[ed] a lawn, trees,

shrubs and a utility pole on the other portions of the

[disputed] area.’’ On June 1, 2011, shortly after purchasing their property, the plaintiffs sought permission from

the town of Shelton to install drains to divert water

from the roof and foundation of their residence to the

creek. In connection with the permit application, the

plaintiffs sought and received permission from the

defendants’ predecessor in title to install the drains in

the disputed area.4 The plaintiffs’ predecessors in title

also used the disputed area in various ways from 1961

to 2011.5

The defendants are the record owners of the parcel

at 12 Fair Oaks Drive, which is adjacent to the plaintiffs’
property. They acquired title to this property by warranty deed on May 15, 2017. Approximately one year

after the conveyance, the defendants had the property

surveyed, which revealed that the defendants are the

record title holders of the disputed area. In the months

following the survey, the defendants spoke with one or

more of the plaintiffs to request that the plaintiffs not

enter the disputed area and to inform the plaintiffs

that the defendants were the record title holder of the

disputed area. The plaintiffs, however, continued to

enter the disputed area until, in August, 2019, the defendants erected an orange plastic fence along the border

of the plaintiffs’ property line as reflected in the defendants’ survey.

The plaintiffs filed the underlying action in November, 2019, seeking to quiet title by adverse possession to

the disputed area. The plaintiffs allege in their operative

complaint6

that they and their predecessors in title have

been in ‘‘open, exclusive, hostile, adverse, and actual

possession under a claim of right’’ of the disputed area

for more than fifteen years, as required by General

Statutes § 52-575 (a).7 The plaintiffs allege that they and

their predecessors in title had used a portion of the

disputed area continuously as their driveway and had

maintained the lawn, trees, shrubs, and a utility pole

in the disputed area for more than fifteen years before

the defendants put up the fence. The defendants filed

an answer denying the essential allegations of the complaint and a counterclaim seeking a declaratory judgment affirming their ownership of the disputed area

and quieting title in them.

The defendants subsequently filed a motion seeking

summary judgment on the complaint and on their counterclaim and a memorandum of law in support thereof

in which they argued that the plaintiffs could not demonstrate that the essential elements of adverse possession were met. The plaintiffs filed an objection to the

defendants’ motion for summary judgment, arguing that

they and their predecessors in title had continuously

and openly possessed the disputed area for more than

the requisite fifteen year period.

The trial court, Hon. Irene P. Jacobs, judge trial referee, issued a memorandum of decision on the motion

for summary judgment on April 6, 2022. The court held

that, although the evidence suggests that both the plaintiffs and their predecessors in title had used the disputed area, the plaintiffs were not in privity with their

predecessors in title because the plaintiffs’ predecessors did not expressly convey to them the disputed area

either orally or by deed and, thus, the plaintiffs could

not tack their successive periods of adverse possession

for purposes of satisfying the fifteen year statutory

period. The court additionally held that ‘‘[t]he plaintiffs

previously offered to purchase the disputed property

from the defendants and therefore have acknowledged
the defendants’ superior title.’’8 The court further held

that ‘‘the evidence shows that the plaintiffs did not

exclusively possess the disputed area. Rather, both parties testified to using and maintaining the area.’’ Regarding the defendants’ counterclaim, the court held that

the defendants had shown that ‘‘they solely possess the

disputed area. Accordingly, no genuine issue of material

fact exists with respect [to] the defendants’ counterclaim.’’ The court granted the defendants’ motion for

summary judgment.9

The plaintiffs subsequently filed a motion for reargument and reconsideration. The plaintiffs argued that

the court had ‘‘erred in concluding that, as a matter of

law, the [plaintiffs] could not tack the adverse use by

their predecessor[s] in title to their own adverse use

to meet the fifteen year limitations period.’’ In support

of their argument, the plaintiffs asserted that the intent

of their predecessor in title to convey the disputed area

‘‘may be implied from the circumstances and need not

be express . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

The court denied the plaintiffs’ motion on May 9, 2022.

This appeal followed.

On appeal, the plaintiffs argue that the court improperly concluded as a matter of law that (1) there was

no privity between the plaintiffs and their predecessors

in title for purposes of tacking periods of possession,

(2) no genuine issue of material fact remained regarding

whether the plaintiffs admitted superior title in the

defendants, and (3) no genuine issue of material fact

remained regarding whether the defendants’ repeated

entry into the disputed area beginning in July, 2018,

defeated the exclusivity of the plaintiffs’ use. The defendants respond that the court properly determined that

there were no genuine issues of material fact and that

they were entitled to summary judgment as a matter

of law. For the reasons that follow, we agree with the

plaintiffs that the evidence, construed in the manner

most favorable to them, supports that there is a genuine

issue of material fact as to each of the three claims

raised by the plaintiffs.

As a preliminary matter, we set forth our standard

of review and other relevant legal principles. ‘‘Practice

Book § 17-49 provides that summary judgment shall be

rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any

other proof submitted show that there is no genuine

issue as to any material fact and that the moving party

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In deciding

a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must

view the evidence in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party. . . . The party moving for summary

judgment has the burden of showing the absence of

any genuine issue of material fact and that the party

is, therefore, entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

. . . On appeal, we must determine whether the legal

conclusions reached by the trial court are legally and
logically correct and whether they find support in the

facts set out in the memorandum of decision of the

trial court. . . . Our review of the trial court’s decision

to grant the defendant’s motion for summary judgment

is plenary.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Bellemare v. Wachovia Mortgage Corp., 284 Conn. 193,

198–99, 931 A.2d 916 (2007).

‘‘When title is claimed by adverse possession, the

burden of proof is on the claimant. . . . The essential

elements of adverse possession are that the owner shall

be ousted from possession and kept out uninterruptedly

for fifteen years under a claim of right by an open,

visible and exclusive possession of the claimant without

license or consent of the owner. . . . The use is not

exclusive if the adverse user merely shares dominion

over the property with other users. . . . Such a possession is not to be made out by inference, but by clear

and positive proof.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Dowling v. Heirs of Bond, 345 Conn. 119, 143, 282 A.3d

1201 (2022).

‘‘It is sufficient if there is an adverse possession continued uninterruptedly for fifteen years whether by one

or more persons. . . . [T]he possession [however]

must be connected and continuous . . . .’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Har v. Boreiko, 118 Conn.

App. 787, 799, 986 A.2d 1072 (2010). ‘‘If one party’s

period of use or possession is insufficient to satisfy the

fifteen year requirement, that party may tack on the

period of use or possession of someone who is in privity

with the party, a relationship that may be established

by showing a transfer of possession rights.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Caminis v. Troy, 300 Conn.

297, 310 n.14, 12 A.3d 984 (2011).

‘‘The authoritative rule of tacking successive possessions for the acquisition of title after fifteen years is

found in Smith v. Chapin, 31 Conn. 530 [531–32] (1863).

. . . Privity of estate is not necessary, but rather, privity

of possession. It is sufficient if there is an adverse possession continued uninterruptedly for fifteen years

whether by one or more persons. This was settled in

Fanning v. Willcox, 3 Day [Conn.] 258 [1808]. Doubtless

the possession must be connected and continuous, so

that the possession of the true owner shall not constructively intervene between them; but such continuity and

connection may be effected by any conveyance agreement or understanding which has for its object a transfer of the rights of the possessor, or of his possession,

and is accompanied by a transfer of possession in fact.

. . . Privity of possession is defined as a continuity of

actual possession, as between prior and present occupant, the possession of the latter succeeding the possession of the former under deed, grant, or other transfer

or by operation of law.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Matto v.

Dan Beard, Inc., 15 Conn. App. 458, 479–80, 546 A.2d
854, cert. denied, 209 Conn. 812, 550 A.2d 1082 (1988).

‘‘[T]he failure of a predecessor in title to convey the

disputed area, either orally or by deed, destroys the

connection between successive adverse claimants

which is necessary to the successful acquisition of title

by tacking successive adverse possessions . . . . See

also 16 R. Powell, Real Property (2005) § 91.10 [2] (tacking not permitted when it is shown that the claimant’s

predecessor in title did not intend to convey the disputed [area]).’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Durkin Village Plainville, LLC v. Cunningham, 97 Conn.

App. 640, 652, 905 A.2d 1256 (2006).

To reverse the court’s grant of summary judgment,

there must be a genuine issue of material fact as to

each of the issues raised, as ‘‘[a] defendant’s motion

for summary judgment is properly granted if it raises

at least one legally sufficient defense that would bar

the plaintiff’s claim . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Costello & McCormack, P.C. v. Manero, 194

Conn. App. 417, 430, 221 A.3d 471 (2019). We accordingly address each issue in turn, first addressing the

issue of privity, then turning to the issue of recognition

of superior title, and, last, addressing the issue of exclusivity. We conclude that there is a genuine issue of

material fact as to each issue.

I

The plaintiffs first argue that the court improperly

concluded that, for purposes of satisfying the fifteen

year statutory period by tacking on their predecessors

in title’s period of adverse possession of the disputed

area, there was no genuine issue of material fact that

the plaintiffs lacked the requisite privity with their predecessors in title because the predecessors never

expressly conveyed the disputed area to the plaintiffs.

The plaintiffs argue that the evidence, construed in the

manner most favorable to them, supports that their

predecessors impliedly conveyed to them the disputed

area and that, therefore, there is a genuine issue of

material fact as to whether privity exists. We agree that

there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether

privity exists in this case.

It is undisputed that the plaintiffs have not themselves

adversely held the disputed area for the fifteen years

required under § 52-575 (a) to acquire title by adverse

possession. They therefore must tack the adverse use

of their predecessors in title to their own use to satisfy

the statutory period and acquire title to the disputed

area. To do so, they are required to show that there

was privity between themselves and their predecessors

in title. ‘‘It is sufficient if there is an adverse possession

continued uninterruptedly for fifteen years whether by

one or more persons. . . . [T]he possession [however]

must be connected and continuous . . . .’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Har v. Boreiko, supra, 118
Conn. App. 799. ‘‘If one party’s period of use or possession is insufficient to satisfy the fifteen year requirement, that party may tack on the period of use or possession of someone who is in privity with the party, a

relationship that may be established by showing a transfer of possession rights.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Caminis v. Troy, supra, 300 Conn. 310 n.14.

In their brief in response to the defendants’ motion

for summary judgment, the plaintiffs argued that ‘‘the

intent of the grantor to transfer possession of an area

not specifically referenced in the deed of conveyance,

but contiguous with it, may be [inferred] from all the

surrounding circumstances and an express written or

oral statement of intent is not necessary.’’ Specifically,

the plaintiffs argued that ‘‘the intent of the Nangles [the

plaintiffs’ predecessors in title] to transfer any interest

that they may have had in the disputed parcel may

be inferred from the surrounding circumstances. Their

testimony shows that they absolutely believed that the

disputed parcel was part of 16 Fair Oaks Drive, which

they conveyed by deed to the plaintiffs.’’

The trial court granted the defendants’ motion for

summary judgment without addressing this argument in

its memorandum of decision. Relying on Har v. Boreiko,

supra, 118 Conn. App. 787, it held that there could be

no privity as a matter of law because the plaintiffs’

predecessors in title did not convey the disputed area

either orally or by deed.10 In reaching this conclusion,

the court relied on the following passage from Har:

‘‘[T]he failure of a predecessor in title to convey the

disputed area, either orally or by deed, destroys the

connection between successive adverse claimants

which is necessary to the successful acquisition of title

by tacking successive adverse possessions . . . . See

also 16 R. Powell, [supra] § 91.10 [2] (tacking not permitted when it is shown that the claimant’s predecessor

in title did not intend to convey the disputed parcel).’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Har v. Boreiko,

supra, 800, quoting Durkin Village Plainville, LLC v.

Cunningham, supra, 97 Conn. App. 652.

The court’s reliance on Har and related case law,

however, is misplaced. The passage from Har quoted

in the preceding paragraph comes from Durkin Village

Plainville, LLC; see Har v. Boreiko, supra, 118 Conn.

App. 800; which in turn quoted Marquis v. Drost, 155

Conn. 327, 332, 231 A.2d 527 (1967). See Durkin Village

Plainville, LLC v. Cunningham, supra, 97 Conn. App.

652. These cases all involve different factual circumstances than those present here. In Marquis, the predecessor in title had expressly excluded the disputed area

from the deed. Marquis v. Drost, supra, 329 (‘‘[i]t is

undisputed that each deed in the plaintiffs’ chain of

title to lot 16 expressly excluded and excepted [the

disputed area] from the conveyance of the lot’’). Our

Supreme Court additionally noted that the predecessor
in title in that case had not adversely used the disputed

area, making the issue of tacking moot, because there

was no prior period of adverse use onto which the

claimant could tack their own use. Id., 331–32. Our

Supreme Court nevertheless went on to say in dicta

that a ‘‘connection between successive adverse claimants . . . is necessary to the successful acquisition of

title by tacking successive adverse possessions under

the rule noted in such cases as Smith v. Chapin, [supra]

31 Conn. 530.’’ Marquis v. Drost, supra, 332. Although

our Supreme Court did state in Marquis that there was

no oral conveyance of the disputed area and that the

deed had expressly excluded the disputed area, it did

not, as paraphrased by Durkin Village Plainville, LLC,

expressly limit the required connectivity between successive adverse claimants to an oral or written conveyance of the disputed area. Id.; see also Durkin Village

Plainville, LLC v. Cunningham, supra, 652.

The question, therefore, is what evidence is sufficient

to find that a grantor intended to convey the disputed

area to the grantee, thereby establishing the continuous

connection between successive adverse claimants

required to find privity and tack the successive adverse

uses. It is clear from our case law; see Marquis v. Drost,

supra, 155 Conn. 332; Har v. Boreiko, supra, 118 Conn.

App. 800; Durkin Village Plainville, LLC v. Cunningham, supra, 97 Conn. App. 652; that an express conveyance of the disputed area either orally or by deed is

sufficient to establish that the grantor intended to convey the disputed area. Neither this court nor our

Supreme Court, however, has addressed whether a

grantor’s intent to convey a disputed area may be established by implication.

This issue was, however, addressed by the Superior

Court in Zhang v. 56 Locust Road, LLC, Docket No. CV12-6015791-S, 2016 WL 624045 (Conn. Super. January

13, 2016), aff’d, 177 Conn. App. 420, 172 A.3d 317, cert.

denied, 327 Conn. 986, 175 A.3d 44 (2017). Although

not binding on this court, Zhang is persuasive, particularly in light of the majority rule in other jurisdictions

discussed subsequently in this opinion. See annot., 17

A.L.R.2d 1160, § 8 (1951).

In Zhang, the adverse claimants argued that they may

tack their adverse use of the disputed area to that of

their predecessors in title. Zhang v. 56 Locust Road,

LLC, supra, 2016 WL 624045, *8. Although there was

no express conveyance of the disputed area, either

orally or by deed, the court found that the facts and

circumstances of the use of the disputed area leaves

‘‘no doubt that the [predecessors in title] intended to

convey the disputed area along with the deed-described

property, in the transactions leading to ownership of

40 Locust Road by the plaintiffs.’’ Id., *12.

The property at issue in Zhang included a horse riding

ring with ancillary structures that were partially on the
claimant’s property and partially on the disputed area.

Id., *4. The court reasoned that ‘‘the discussions, marketing materials, etc., as well as the layout of the property with the riding ring and fencing all facially

appearing to be part of the conveyed property, leave

the court with the firm impression that there was an

intent to convey the entirety of 40 Locust Road, including all ancillary or appurtenant interests . . . .’’ Id.,

*10. The court emphasized that it ‘‘believe[d] that the

physical layout virtually mandates such a conclusion.

The riding ring . . . is essentially indivisible in a structural sense and a usage sense. The same can be said

(albeit to a lesser extent) about the fence that . . .

almost completely surrounds that entire end of the

property including the riding ring, providing an enclosure for horses . . . . Quite simply, it would be irrational to convey part of a riding ring or paddock to a

buyer of the property, leaving the remainder of the

enclosed oval area out of the transaction.’’ (Citation

omitted; emphasis in original; footnote omitted.) Id.,

*11. The court therefore found an implied intent to

convey the disputed area along with the property

described in the deed and found that the claimant could

therefore tack their predecessor’s adverse use of the

disputed area to their own. Id., *11–12, 16. For the

following reasons, we conclude that the approach

employed in Zhang is best suited to resolving the issue

of privity and that, applying that approach, there is a

genuine issue of material fact as to whether privity

exists in this case under a theory of implied conveyance.

As outlined by the American Law Reports, which

attempts to compile the decisional law of other jurisdictions, ‘‘the doctrine which appears generally to prevail

is that a transfer in fact of adverse possession, or of

the adverse possession and claim of an area not within

the description of the deed or contract, will be effective

for tacking purposes though the same appears to have

occurred by implication only, by force of the circumstances and acts of the parties, and is not shown to

have been evidenced by any declaration of transfer or

other direct words. . . . A requirement of express

delivery of possession would be not only illogical but

exceedingly burdensome in view of the numerous cases

in which the parties though claiming all of the land in

question, and in a manner characterizing their holdings

as adverse to the whole world, were not aware that

any of it was not within the deed or contract. The

circumstances generally are to be considered in

determining whether possession of the disputed area

was transferred to the grantee.’’ Annot., 17 A.L.R.2d,

supra, § 8, pp. 1160–61.

‘‘[W]here title by adverse possession is claimed to an

area contiguous to that described in the deed or contract, and the whole property, described and not

described, was in use by the vendor as a unit, and the

fact thereof was apparent by reason of the position of
fences, hedges, buildings, etc., the instrument instead

of operating to negative the element of privity, seems

to possess, as conjoined with such circumstances, an

evidentiary value in support of privity, and this is most

noticeable in instances in which the description used

was such that it might reasonably have been supposed

to include the whole property.’’ (Footnote omitted.) Id.,

§ 1, p. 1131.

From our review of the law of other jurisdictions, it

is apparent that the majority rule is that privity can be

established by an implied conveyance of the disputed

area.11 Implication of a transfer of possession of the

disputed area is most commonly found in two circumstances: (1) when the disputed area is enclosed within

the deed described property12 or (2) when a building

or other structure stands in part on the disputed area.13

There are, additionally, a few cases that find that the

disputed area was impliedly conveyed because a natural

boundary appeared to enclose the property. In Freed

v. Cloverlea Citizens Assn., Inc., 246 Md. 288, 291–92,

228 A.2d 421 (1967), the adverse claimants and their

predecessors in title maintained an area to the south

of their property that abutted a naturally formed ditch.

The claimants were told by their predecessors in title

that the property line went to the ditch, although the

real property line was several feet to the north of it.

Id., 291, 294. The claimants and their predecessors maintained the disputed area by cultivating a garden, as

well as planting trees, cleaning the ditch of debris, and

mowing the lawn. Id., 292–94. One of the claimants’

predecessors in title said that he never erected a fence

to enclose the property because the ditch acted as a

natural boundary. Id., 292. After reviewing persuasive

law from other jurisdictions, the court in Freed analogized the circumstances of the case to cases in which

the disputed area had been enclosed by a fence and

concluded that the claimants could tack the adverse

use of their predecessors to their own use.14 Id., 301–304.

In Clithero v. Fenner, 122 Wis. 356, 360, 99 N.W. 1027

(1904), the Supreme Court of Wisconsin similarly found

privity sufficient to tack successive adverse uses when

a creek enclosed the disputed area with the property

transferred by deed. The court stated: ‘‘It is . . . apparent from the evidence that [the] respondent took possession of the whole, by occupying it, [enclosing] it,

and using the part specified in the deed and this adjoining strip as an entirety. In the light of these circumstances, the presumption that the conveyance must be

limited to the calls of the deed is overcome by the

established facts that [the] respondent obtained possession of the tract outside of the description as a part of

the premises purchased under the deed. Such a transfer

establishes a successive relationship to the tract in controversy, making the parties to the transfer privies in

possession; thus conferring all the legal rights of the
father, as vendor, on [the] respondent, as his vendee.’’

Id., 361.

Whether privity exists in cases of implied transference is inherently a fact dependent inquiry. In the present case, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to

whether privity exists. This is based on whether the

plaintiffs’ predecessors in title impliedly transferred the

disputed area to the plaintiffs. Although there is no

fence or building on the disputed area in this case, the

disputed area is bound by a ravine and a creek. Several

cases have analogized natural boundaries to cases

involving fences and have found an implied transfer on

the basis of the existence of a natural boundary. The

plaintiffs’ predecessors in title, additionally, believed

that the creek was the boundary line and that they

owned the disputed area up until the time they sold the

property to the plaintiffs.15 Whether an implied transfer

of the disputed area may be inferred from the evidence

in the present case raises a question of fact that cannot

properly be resolved by the court at summary judgment.

II

The plaintiffs next claim that the court improperly

rendered summary judgment because there is a genuine

issue of material fact as to whether the plaintiffs recognized the defendants’ superior title16 to the disputed

area by asking the defendants’ predecessor in title for

permission to install drains on the disputed area three

months after the plaintiffs purchased their property.17

We agree.

Although summary judgment is certainly not precluded in adverse possession cases, adverse possession

raises predominantly fact intensive issues that generally

must be resolved at trial. Our Supreme Court has stated

that ‘‘[i]t is the province of the jury, or court sitting

as a jury, to determine from conflicting or doubtful

evidence the existence of facts necessary to constitute

adverse possession . . . . If there is at least some evidence, although slight, which is sufficient to be submitted to the jury, and which tends to show the existence

of the essential facts alleged to constitute adverse possession, and such evidence is disputed, or, if undisputed, is of a doubtful character, the question as to the

existence of such facts is one of fact for the jury and

should be submitted to [it] for determination, under

proper instructions from the court; or in case of a trial

by the court alone, the question is one of fact for the

court sitting as a jury.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) O’Connor v. Larocque, 302 Conn.

562, 573, 31 A.3d 1 (2011).

Here, the defendants submitted undisputed evidence

that the plaintiffs had asked the defendants’ predecessor in title for permission to install drains on the disputed area shortly after the plaintiffs purchased their

property. According to the defendants, this evidence is
an acknowledgement by the plaintiffs that the defendants hold superior title to the disputed area. The signed

document provides in relevant part that the defendants’

predecessors ‘‘hereby give permission to the present

owners of 16 Fair Oaks Drive, Shelton, Connecticut, to

install one (1) curtain drain and one (1) footing drain,

both of which will drain into the water course channel

that runs parallel to the boundary of our properties.

The present owners of 16 Fairs Oaks Drive shall be

responsible for all costs related to the installation and

maintenance of both drains. This agreement is limited

to the installation of these two drains and nothing additional.’’

The defendants argue that, by seeking this permission, the plaintiffs unequivocally have recognized the

defendants’ superior title to the disputed area.

According to the defendants, the language of the document was unambiguous and clearly shows that permission was sought to enter the disputed property, as the

document specifically refers to the construction and

maintenance of the drains. They claim that ‘‘[t]he letters

specifically limited permission to the installation of the

drains and imposed an affirmative obligation on the

plaintiffs to maintain them at the plaintiffs’ own cost,

neither of which permissions would have been necessary if the plaintiffs’ actions were limited to improvements conducted on their own property. This evidence

alone decisively demonstrates [that] the plaintiffs were

aware of the need for, and actively sought, the defendants’ predecessors’ consent to enter the disputed area

and is fatal to the plaintiffs’ claim.’’ In so arguing, the

defendants characterize the permission granted as permission to use the disputed area.

The plaintiffs, in their depositions, counter that they

sought permission from their neighbors because the

proposed drains would increase the flow of water into

the creek they believed to be owned by the defendants’

predecessor in title and which marked the boundary

between their properties.18 They believed that the city

of Shelton required this document because the installation of the drains would increase the water draining

into the creek owned by the defendants’ predecessors.19

There is therefore conflicting evidence regarding

whether the permission sought was for the use of the

disputed area or for the increase in water to the creek

along the then supposed boundary line. Consequently,

we conclude that there is a genuine issue of material

fact as to whether the plaintiffs ever recognized a claim

of superior title to the disputed area that would defeat

their adverse possession claim. This factual dispute

must be resolved by the fact finder, not by the court

at summary judgment.

III

Last, the plaintiffs claim that the court improperly
concluded that the defendants’ entry into the disputed

area defeated the exclusivity of the plaintiffs’ use. We

conclude for the following reasons that there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding the exclusivity of

the plaintiffs’ use of the disputed area.

The defendants submitted evidence to the court that

they began to use and maintain the disputed area in

2018 and, thus, the plaintiffs’ use of the disputed area

was not exclusive as required to establish adverse possession. Specifically, the defendants rely on the deposition of Jacek Supronowicz in making this argument. In

his deposition, Jacek Supronowicz said that he had

observed the defendants mowing the lawn and weed

whacking the disputed area.20 Although he believed this

use happened more than ten times, he could not recall

how frequent this use was.21 The defendants did not

themselves testify as to this use.

There is, under the issue of privity discussed in part

I of this opinion, a genuine issue of material fact as to

whether adverse possession was established prior to

the defendants’ entry into the disputed area in 2018.

The plaintiffs presented evidence that the Nangles, their

predecessors in title, had used the disputed area since

2007 and that the Nangles’ parents had used the disputed area since they purchased the property in 1961.

In Roche v. Fairfield, 186 Conn. 490, 503, 442 A.2d 911

(1982), our Supreme Court held that, even if the title

owner of a disputed area acts in a manner to try to toll

the period of adverse use, if the statutory period of

adverse use and all of the other elements of adverse

possession had previously been established by the

claimant, then the claimant nevertheless has obtained

title by adverse possession. Similarly, in Boccanfuso v.

Green, 91 Conn. App. 296, 303–304, 880 A.2d 889 (2005),

the plaintiffs had used the disputed area for more than

fifteen years before the defendants purchased their

property. This court held that ‘‘any claim of ownership

that the defendants asserted on the basis of their use

of the property was too late to affect the exclusivity of

the plaintiffs’ use during the period within which

adverse possession was established initially.’’ Id., 308.

If privity exists between the plaintiffs and their predecessors in title, then it is possible that, if the fact finder

determines that all of the requisite elements of adverse

possession have been met, title by adverse possession

had already been established before the alleged shared

use of the disputed area.

There is additionally a factual question as to whether

the plaintiffs’ use of the disputed area could nevertheless be considered exclusive, even if the defendants

began entering the disputed area in 2018. ‘‘In general,

exclusive possession can be established by acts, which

at the time, considering the state of the land, comport

with ownership; viz., such acts as would ordinarily be

exercised by an owner in appropriating land to his own
use and the exclusion of others. . . . Thus, the claimant’s possession need not be absolutely exclusive; it

need only be a type of possession which would characterize an owner’s use. . . . It is sufficient if the acts of

ownership are of such a character as to openly and

publicly indicate an assumed control or use such as is

consistent with the character of the premises in question.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal

quotation marks omitted.) Roche v. Fairfield, supra,

186 Conn. 502–503. ‘‘In adverse-possession doctrine, the

exclusivity requirement describes the behavior of an

ordinary possessor and serves to give notice to the

owner.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Boccanfuso v. Conner, 89 Conn. App. 260, 289 n.23, 873 A.2d

208, cert. denied, 275 Conn. 905, 882 A.2d 668 (2005),

and cert. denied, 275 Conn. 905, 882 A.2d 668 (2005).

Whether the plaintiffs’ activities in the disputed area

are consistent with open acts of ownership is a factual

determination. To the extent the defendants’ activities

beginning in 2018 are relevant, we acknowledge that

the defendants’ repeated entry into the disputed area

to mow and weed whack brings into doubt whether the

plaintiffs’ actions were acts of ownership sufficient to

establish the exclusivity element of adverse possession.

However, ‘‘[e]ven assuming that the plaintiff faces a

difficult challenge in ultimately proving its case at trial,

that assumption cannot form the basis for granting a

motion for summary judgment. So extreme a remedy

as summary judgment should not be used as a substitute

for trial or as a device intended to impose a difficult

burden on the non-moving party to save his [or her]

day in court unless it is clear that no genuine issue of

fact remains to be tried. . . . A judge’s function when

considering a summary judgment motion is not to cull

out the weak cases from the herd of lawsuits waiting

to be tried; rather, only if the case is dead on arrival,

should the court take the drastic step of administering

the last rites by granting summary judgment.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Mott v. Wal-Mart Stores East,

LP, 139 Conn. App. 618, 631, 57 A.3d 391 (2012).

Because a ‘‘claimant’s possession need not be absolutely exclusive’’ but, rather, needs to be only the ‘‘type

of possession [that] would characterize an owner’s

use’’; (internal quotation marks omitted) Roche v. Fairfield, supra, 186 Conn. 502; it is the role of the fact

finder to determine whether the claimant’s use, even if

not absolutely exclusive, is nevertheless the type of

ownership sufficient to find the exclusivity required

to establish adverse possession. There is, therefore,

a genuine issue as to whether the plaintiffs’ use was

nevertheless sufficiently exclusive, despite the defendants also entering the area after 2018.

In summary, we conclude that the court improperly

granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

As outlined previously in this opinion, contrary to each
of the defendants’ three arguments, there remain genuine issues of material fact.

The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 The complaint also named Village Mortgage Company as an additional

defendant, but it failed to appear. Accordingly, we refer to Michael Eaton

and Stephanie Hawker as the defendants.

2

Jacek Supronowicz subsequently quitclaimed his interest in the property

with right of survivorship to himself and his wife, Iwona Supronowicz.

3 The disputed area, according to the complaint, ‘‘[c]ommenc[es] at a point

where a creek crosses from land designated as Lot 4 to [l]and designated

as Lot 3 on a certain map entitled, ‘final Plan of Woodland Park, Section

1,’ dated April 1960, [r]evised January 1961, made by Richard J. Nowakowski

and on file in the Shelton Town Clerk’s office, then;

‘‘EASTERLY: along the northerly side of the creek a distance of 245 ±

feet then;

‘‘NORTHERLY by Fair Oaks Drive 50 . . . ± feet, then 90 degrees;

‘‘WESTERLY along the northerly boundary of land designated as Lot No.

3 on a map entitled ‘final Plan of Woodland Park, Section 1,’ dated April

1960, [r]evised January 1961, made by Richard J. Nowakowski and on file

in the Shelton Town Clerk’s office, a distance of 240 ± feet to the point of

beginning.’’

4 The permission read: ‘‘I hereby give permission to the present owners

of 16 Fair Oaks Drive, Shelton, Connecticut, to install one (1) curtain drain

and one (1) footing drain, both of which will drain into the water course

channel that runs parallel to the boundary of our properties. The present

owners of 16 Fair Oaks Drive shall be responsible for all costs related to

the installation and maintenance of both drains. This agreement is limited

to the installation of these two drains and nothing additional.’’

5 The plaintiffs’ predecessors in title maintained the disputed area by

mowing grass, plowing snow, raking leaves, and fertilizing the lawn, as well

as planting trees in the disputed area.

6 The defendants filed a request to revise on December 18, 2019. The

defendants requested that the plaintiffs, in relevant part, revise their complaint to clarify what actions were taken by the plaintiffs and their predecessors in title to evidence the ‘‘ ‘open, exclusive, hostile, adverse, and actual

possession’ ’’ of the disputed area. The court, Tyma, J., overruled the plaintiffs’ objection to the relevant requested revision, and the plaintiffs filed

their revised complaint on October 27, 2020. The revised complaint is the

operative complaint in this action.

7

‘‘[Section] 52-575 (a) establishes a fifteen year statute of repose on an action

to oust an adverse possessor.’’ (Footnote omitted.) O’Connor v. Larocque,

302 Conn. 562, 578–79, 31 A.3d 1 (2011). Specifically, General Statutes § 52-

575 (a) provides in relevant part that ‘‘[n]o person shall make entry into

any lands or tenements but within fifteen years next after his right or title

to the same first descends or accrues or within fifteen years next after

such person or persons have been ousted from possession of such land or

tenements; and every person, not entering as aforesaid, and his heirs, shall

be utterly disabled to make such entry afterwards; and no such entry shall

be sufficient, unless within such fifteen-year period, any person or persons

claiming ownership of such lands and tenements and the right of entry

and possession thereof against any person or persons who are in actual

possession of such lands or tenements, gives notice in writing to the person

or persons in possession of the land or tenements of the intention of the

person giving the notice to dispute the right of possession of the person or

persons to whom such notice is given and to prevent the other party or

parties from acquiring such right, and the notice being served and recorded

as provided in sections 47-39 and 47-40 shall be deemed an interruption of

the use and possession and shall prevent the acquiring of a right thereto by

the continuance of the use and possession for any length of time thereafter,

provided an action is commenced thereupon within one year next after the

recording of such notice. . . .’’

8

In so holding, the court relied on Allen v. Johnson, 79 Conn. App. 740,

746–47, 831 A.2d 282, cert. denied, 266 Conn. 929, 837 A.2d 802 (2003). The

defendants concede on appeal that the court’s reliance on Allen and ‘‘reliance

on [the plaintiffs’] offers to purchase an easement to the disputed area and/

or swap land as evidence of the plaintiffs’ acknowledgment of the defendants’
superior rights was misplaced,’’ but they argue that the court’s legal conclusion was nevertheless correct. The defendants instead argue before this

court that the plaintiffs recognized the defendants’ superior title by obtaining

the permission of the defendants’ predecessor in title to install drains in the

disputed area and, therefore, that the court’s conclusion may nevertheless

be affirmed.

9

In its original memorandum of decision, the court stated that, ‘‘[f]or the

foregoing reasons, the defendants’ motion for summary judgment is denied.’’

The defendants thereafter filed a motion to reconsider, arguing that there

appeared to be a scrivener’s error as to the court’s ultimate conclusion

because the substance and weight of the court’s findings and legal conclusions did not align with the court’s conclusion. The plaintiffs objected to

the motion to reconsider, arguing that ‘‘the court’s order denying the motion

for summary judgment is consistent with both the factual record as well as

the law.’’ The court agreed with the defendants that a scrivener’s error

had occurred and granted the defendants’ motion to reconsider. The court

corrected the last sentence of the decision to read, ‘‘For the foregoing

reasons, the defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted.’’

10 Specifically, the court stated that, ‘‘[w]hile the evidence suggests that

the plaintiffs’ predecessor in title did use the dispute[d] area, the evidence

conclusively shows that the plaintiffs were not conveyed the disputed area,

either orally or by deed, and therefore cannot claim successive adverse

possession from their predecessors in title.’’

11 North Carolina is firmly in the minority in expressly limiting tacking to

cases of express conveyance. See N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 1-40 (2021); Ramsey

v. Ramsey, 229 N.C. 270, 273, 49 S.E.2d 476 (1948) (‘‘[t]he privity necessary

to warrant the tacking of the possession of successive claimants by adverse

possession must be created by grant, devise, purchase, or descent’’).

A minority of other jurisdictions have similarly held that ‘‘a transfer sub

silentio is insufficient to permit the tacking of the possessions of the undescribed area.’’ Annot., 17 A.L.R.2d, supra, § 8, p. 1160; see also id., § 10,

pp. 1171–74 (collecting cases from Michigan, New York, Tennessee, and

Wisconsin, but noting they are now of ‘‘doubtful authority’’ in light of more

recent case law in those states).

The American Law Reports concludes that, ‘‘[e]xcept for those few, sometimes uncertain, authorities . . . the doctrine which appears generally to

prevail is that a transfer in fact of adverse possession, or the adverse possession and claim of an area not within the description of the deed or contract,

will be effective for tacking purposes though the same appears to have

occurred by implication only, by force of the circumstances and acts of the

parties, and is not shown to have been evidenced by any declaration of

transfer or other direct words.’’ Id., § 8, p. 1160.

12 ‘‘In most jurisdictions, and under the circumstances of most cases, the

successive adverse possessions of vendor and purchaser of an area not

within the description of the deed or contract but lying along and extending

up to a fence apparently marking the boundary line between the land sold

and neighboring land may be tacked upon the theory of an implied delivery

of possession of such area.’’ Annot., 17 A.L.R.2d, supra, § 10, p. 1168; see

Ringstad v. Grannis, 12 Alaska 190, 197, 171 F.2d 170 (1948); St. Louis

Southwestern Railway Co. v. Mulkey, 100 Ark. 71, 75, 139 S.W. 643 (1911);

Cooper v. Tarpley, 112 Ind. App. 1, 10, 41 N.E.2d 640 (1942); Howind v.

Scheben, 233 Ky. 139, 141, 25 S.W.2d 57 (1930); Wishart v. McKnight, 178

Mass. 356, 361–62, 59 N.E. 1028 (1901); Davock v. Nealon, 58 N.J.L. 21, 25,

32 A. 675 (1895).

13 ‘‘Ordinarily, the fact that the vendor and purchaser were successively

in adverse possession of buildings or other structures encroaching on land

adjoining that described in the deed or contract is convincing evidence of

a transfer to the purchaser of possession of the area so appropriated.’’

Annot., supra, 17 A.L.R.2d § 12, p. 1176; see also Belotti v. Bickhardt, 228

N.Y. 296, 308–309, 127 N.E. 239 (1920); Peoples v. Hagaman, 31 Tenn. App.

398, 407, 215 S.W.2d 827 (1948).

14 The court in Freed cited to several cases, including the New Hampshire

case of Alukonis v. Kashulines, 96 N.H. 107, 109, 70 A.2d 202 (1950), which

held that ‘‘there was evidence [that] the plaintiff was shown the bounds,

which included the [disputed area], by her predecessor in title and that this

tract had been [enclosed] and cultivated for many years by the plaintiff and

her predecessors. This appears sufficient to support the plaintiff’s right to

tack.’’ See Freed v. Cloverlea Citizens Assn., Inc., supra, 246 Md. 302.

15 At a deposition, the plaintiffs’ attorney questioned Melissa Nangle, one

of the plaintiffs’ predecessors in title, as follows:
‘‘Q. You testified there’s a brook line between [the defendants’ predecessors in title’s] house and 16 Fair Oaks Drive?

‘‘A. Yes.

‘‘Q. Okay. And can you tell me when—in the 1960s, do you know what—

where the boundary—or did you have any conception of where the boundary

lay between the [defendants’ predecessors in title’s] house and 16 Fair

Oaks Drive?

‘‘A. It was the brook; that one side was theirs and the other side was ours.

‘‘Q. So, as growing up, that was your understanding?

‘‘A. Absolutely.

‘‘Q. Where did you get that understanding?

‘‘A. I just—it was just a natural belief. It just looked—that’s how it was.

I was never told otherwise.

‘‘Q. Okay. And since 1961 to 2011, did you or your family use the area

between the brook and your house and driveway at 16 Fair Oaks Drive?

‘‘A. We always maintained all that property. My father may have used it

for things that I’m not aware of or don’t remember, but we always maintained

that property from the brook on.

* * *

‘‘Q. When [John Nangle] mowed the lawn—as far as the edge of the brook?

‘‘A. Oh, yes, the whole property. That was considered our property, to

my knowledge.’’

16 Recognition of superior title implicates the continuous element of

adverse possession. See Allen v. Johnson, 79 Conn. App. 740, 746, 831 A.2d

282, cert. denied, 266 Conn. 929, 837 A.2d 802 (2003). ‘‘An adverse possessor

may interrupt his or her continuous possession by acting in a way that

acknowledges the superiority of the real owner’s title. . . . [T]he possession

of one who recognizes or admits title in another, either by declaration or

conduct, is not adverse to the title of such other. . . . Occupation must

not only be hostile in its inception, but it must continue hostile, and at all

times during the required period of fifteen years challenge the right of the

true owner, in order to found title by adverse use upon it. . . . Such an

acknowledgment of the owner’s title terminates the running of the statutory

period, and any subsequent adverse use starts the clock anew.’’ (Citation

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

17 See footnote 8 of this opinion.

18 The defendants’ attorney questioned Jacek Supronowicz as follows:

‘‘Q. Okay. Why do you think these [permissions] were required?

‘‘A. Because—I told you before [in] the beginning, we know that the brook

is on their side. That’s why we asking them if we can do it and dump the

water in the brook.

‘‘Q. Because presumably dumping water in the brook would have some

effect on the way the water flows in the brook?

‘‘A. Everything is possible.

‘‘Q. And all of the individuals who said that they were all co-owners of

12 Fair Oaks Drive all gave you consent to install the drains; that’s correct?

‘‘A. Yes.

‘‘Q. Which means they didn’t object to having additional water go into

the brook; is that right?

‘‘A. I think so.’’

19 The defendants’ attorney cross-examined Iwona Supronowicz as follows:

‘‘Q. Okay. Do you know who prepared the documents?

‘‘A. They were presented to me, and they’ve been already signed. And

they give it to me so I can give them to the city of Shelton because I need

to have that because Mr. John Cook [an individual with the city’s Inland/

Wetland Commission] said that I need to have a statement from 12 Fair

Oaks Drive about water coming in from our drains to the watercourse, to

the brook.

* * *

‘‘Q. . . . And you just mentioned that the reason that [Cook] told you

you needed these letters was because of water that was going to drain into

the watercourse.

‘‘A. Yes.

‘‘Q. Is that correct?

‘‘A. Yes. Because in the drain you have water, and you have to dump it

someplace. So, we decided to dump it to the brook.’’

20 The defendants’ attorney questioned Jacek Supronowicz as follows:

‘‘Q. In your interrogatory responses you mentioned that the defendants

had been observed by you or your wife in the disputed area mowing the
lawn and weed whacking.

‘‘A. Yes.’’

21 The defendants’ attorney questioned Jacek Supronowicz as follows:

‘‘Q. Okay. Could you give me a range of how many times you think

you might have observed [the defendants mowing and weed whacking the

disputed area]?

‘‘A. I don’t remember.

‘‘Q. Okay. Would it be more than ten times?

‘‘A. Yes.

* * *

‘‘Q. All right. Would you say that the number of times you observed either

of the defendants in the disputed area was more than fifty times?

‘‘A. Maybe.’’