[Cite as State v. Lloyd, 2022-Ohio-3760.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

MONTGOMERY COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

DERRELL LAMONTE LLOYD

Defendant-Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

Appellate Case No. 29407

Trial Court Case No. 2021-CR-1932

(Criminal Appeal from

Common Pleas Court)

. . . . . . . . . . .

O P I N I O N

Rendered on the 21st day of October, 2022.

. . . . . . . . . . . 

MATHIAS H. HECK, JR. by ELIZABETH A. ELLIS, Atty. Reg. No. 0074332, Assistant 

Prosecuting Attorney, Montgomery County Prosecutor’s Office, Appellate Division, 

Montgomery County Courts Building, 301 West Third Street, 5th Floor, Dayton, Ohio 

45422

 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee

 

DAVID R. MILES, Atty. Reg. No. 0013841, 1160 East Dayton-Yellow Springs Road,

Fairborn, Ohio 45324

Attorney for Defendant-Appellant

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

LEWIS, J.
-2-

{¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant Derrell Lamonte Lloyd appeals from his conviction 

following a plea of guilty to one count of aggravated robbery. Lloyd contends that the 

trial court erred in overruling his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. In particular, Lloyd 

contends that the trial court should have applied the more lenient presentence standard 

to his motion instead of the more stringent post-sentence standard ultimately applied by 

the trial court. According to Lloyd, he did not understand the mandatory nature of his 

expected sentence, but his trial counsel’s ineffectiveness forced him into pleading guilty. 

For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

I. Facts and Course of Proceedings

{¶ 2} On June 23, 2021, a Montgomery County grand jury indicted Lloyd on one 

count of aggravated robbery (deadly weapon), a first-degree felony in violation of R.C. 

2911.01(A)(1), and one count of robbery (deadly weapon), a second-degree felony in 

violation of R.C. 2911.02(A)(1). The indictment involved events that occurred on June 

13, 2021.

{¶ 3} A jury trial commenced on October 13, 2021. During a break that occurred 

on the second day of trial, as the State was presenting its last witness, Lloyd decided to 

change his plea to guilty to aggravated robbery. Transcript of Proceedings (“Tr.”), p. 

352. After a plea colloquy, the trial court accepted the plea and found Lloyd guilty of 

aggravated robbery. Tr. p. 354, 366-367. Lloyd responded in the affirmative when he 

was asked by the trial judge whether he was satisfied with his trial counsel. Tr. p. 365. 

The trial court requested a presentence investigation and scheduled the matter for 
-3-

sentencing.

{¶ 4} On October 28, 2021, prior to the sentencing hearing, Lloyd filed a motion to 

withdraw his guilty plea. According to the motion, Lloyd wanted to withdraw his plea 

because (1) his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to prove all the lies that the 

complaining witness told the jury; (2) Lloyd was not aware that he could have pled to a 

lesser-included offense; and (3) Lloyd did not understand that his prison sentence would 

be mandatory. Trial counsel moved to withdraw as Lloyd’s counsel due to the conflict of 

interest arising from the ineffective assistance of counsel claim in the motion to withdraw 

the guilty plea.

{¶ 5} Lloyd was appointed new counsel and a hearing on his motion was held on 

January 3, 2022. Lloyd and his original trial counsel, Lucas Wilder, testified at the 

hearing. Lloyd explained at the hearing that he only saw his trial counsel a couple of 

times before his trial began. Tr. p. 385. He testified that Wilder promised him that he 

would be acquitted. Tr. p. 389, 397. According to Lloyd, his trial counsel did not ask 

the numerous questions that Lloyd had written for the cross-examination of the State’s 

complaining witness. Rather, his counsel only asked four or five questions in total of the 

witness. Tr. p. 392, 395, 406. Lloyd repeated over and over that his trial counsel did 

nothing at the trial. Tr. p. 389, 393-394, 397, 400-401, 405. Therefore, Lloyd felt 

pressured to enter a guilty plea in order to eliminate the risk of going to prison for 11

years. Tr. p. 393-394, 396, 400-401. Lloyd testified that he did not understand what 

mandatory meant when he agreed to plead guilty. Tr. p. 398. He stated that his trial 

counsel explained it to him by saying “you just got to do three years no matter what.” Tr. 
-4-

p. 387. Lloyd also noted that his trial counsel told him several times that he would not 

have to do three years, because the trial judge was retiring and likely would grant him 

judicial release. Tr. p. 387-388. 

{¶ 6} Attorney Wilder also testified at the hearing. According to Wilder, he met 

with Lloyd approximately five times before the trial began. Tr. p. 418, 431. Wilder 

presented Lloyd with the paper discovery and reviewed the video discovery with Lloyd in 

person on Wilder’s laptop or cell phone. Tr. p. 418. Wilder conceded that there initially 

had been some confusion regarding the mandatory nature of the sentence resulting from 

his client’s plea, because they were unsure whether Lloyd had a prior felony. But this 

confusion was cleared up by the prosecutor and judge during the plea hearing. Tr. p.

422, 443. Wilder explained that prior to the second day of the trial, Lloyd was insistent 

that there would be no plea deal. But then Lloyd brought up the idea of pleading guilty 

during the second day of the trial. Tr. p. 420-421, 428-429, 438. Wilder discussed this 

possibility with him and then approached the State and trial court about the change in 

plea. Wilder stated that he did not guarantee an acquittal to Lloyd and that he would 

never promise judicial release unless that information came directly from the judge. Tr. 

p. 423, 426, 442.

{¶ 7} On January 14, 2022, the trial court issued a written decision overruling 

Lloyd’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The matter proceeded to a sentencing 

hearing. On February 24, 2022, the trial court sentenced Lloyd to a minimum prison term 

of three years and a maximum term of four and one-half years. Lloyd filed a timely notice 

of appeal.
-5-

II. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Overruling Lloyd’s Motion To 

Withdraw His Guilty Plea

{¶ 8} Lloyd’s first assignment of error states:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING APPELLANT’S 

MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA.

{¶ 9} We review a trial court’s decision on a motion to withdraw a plea for an abuse 

of discretion. State v. Straley, 159 Ohio St.3d 82, 2019-Ohio-5206, 147 N.E.3d 623, 

¶ 15, citing State v. Smith, 49 Ohio St.2d 261, 361 N.E.2d 1324 (1977), paragraph two of 

the syllabus. In order to find an abuse of discretion, “[w]e must find that the trial court’s 

ruling was ‘unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.’ ” State v. Xie, 62 Ohio St.3d 521, 

527, 584 N.E.2d 715 (1992), quoting State Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157, 404 N.E.2d 

144 (1980).

{¶ 10} Before analyzing the trial court’s decision for an abuse of discretion, 

however, we must determine which of two standards apply to his motion. Crim.R. 32.1 

provides: 

A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest may be made only 

before sentence is imposed; but to correct a manifest injustice the court 

after sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the 

defendant to withdraw his or her plea.

{¶ 11} Under the foregoing rule, a presentence motion to vacate a guilty plea 

“should be freely and liberally granted.” Xie at 527. Nevertheless, even under the 
-6-

presentence standard, the right to withdraw a plea is not absolute and a trial court retains 

discretion to overrule a presentence plea-withdrawal motion. Id. The presentence

standard, however, is far more lenient than the “manifest injustice” standard applicable to 

post-sentence motions. State v. Fugate, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 21574, 2007-Ohio26, ¶ 10. A “manifest injustice” is a “clear or openly unjust act,” State ex rel. Schneider 

v. Kreiner, 83 Ohio St.3d 203, 208, 699 N.E.2d 83 (1998), and relates to a fundamental 

flaw in the plea proceedings resulting in a miscarriage of justice. State v. Tekulve, 188 

Ohio App.3d 792, 2010-Ohio-3604, 936 N.E.2d 1030, ¶ 7 (1st Dist.), citing Kreiner at 208. 

The term “has been variously defined, but it is clear that under such standard, a 

postsentence withdrawal motion is allowable only in extraordinary cases.” (Citation 

omitted.) Smith at 264.

{¶ 12} Lloyd filed his motion before the trial court sentenced him, which normally 

would result in the application of the presentence standard. But “[w]hen a defendant 

discovers before sentencing the particular sentence a trial court intends to impose, we 

have held that a pre-sentence motion to vacate his plea ordinarily should be treated as a 

post-sentence motion. This is so because a defendant cannot test the sentencing waters 

and then move to vacate his plea just before sentencing if he receives an unpleasant 

surprise.” State v. Simpson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24266, 2011-Ohio-6181 ¶ 8, citing 

State v. Wallen, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 21688, 2007-Ohio-2129, ¶ 22.

{¶ 13} The trial court clearly informed Lloyd at the plea hearing what his sentence 

would be. The State did not agree to this sentence. Therefore, the trial court applied 

the more stringent test for post-sentence motions. Lloyd contends that the “trial court 
-7-

erred in determining that motions to withdraw a plea after a defendant learns of his 

probable sentence should be weighed under the more stringent ‘manifest injustice’ 

standard of Crim.R. 32.1.” Appellant’s Brief, p 5. While noting that the trial court’s 

decision was in accordance with prior appellate decisions in this district, Lloyd urges us 

to reconsider and reverse the prior holdings of this Court. We decline Lloyd’s invitation 

to revisit our precedent on this issue. 

{¶ 14} In Lloyd’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, he stated that (1) his trial 

counsel was ineffective by failing to prove all the lies that the complaining witness told the 

jury; (2) Lloyd was not aware he could have pled to a lesser-included offense; and (3) 

Lloyd did not understand that his prison sentence would be mandatory. In rejecting 

Lloyd’s argument that his trial counsel was ineffective, the trial court specifically found 

that Lloyd was not credible “because his testimony during the hearing * * * was often 

contradictory or was later determined to be untruthful.” The trial court continued:

Notably, in reviewing the video footage of Wilder’s cross-examination 

of the victim, the Court noted that Wilder spent forty minutes on his initial 

cross examination of the victim and even asked the victim follow-up 

questions after the State’s re-direct. During the initial cross-examination of 

the victim, Wilder asked dozens of questions. This starkly contradicts 

Lloyd’s testimony that Wilder only asked the victim four questions and that 

the cross-examination only lasted five to six minutes. Further, the Court 

found that Lloyd’s testimony about a lack of a criminal record troubling as 

Lloyd has a prior first or second-degree felony conviction in another state 
-8-

and Lloyd confirmed this conviction during the plea colloquy hearing in 

October 2021. * * * Additionally, when reviewing the trial footage, it was 

apparent that Wilder had a case strategy and prepared and utilized exhibits 

when he cross-examined the victim and the State’s other witnesses in a 

very organized approach. The Court points out that Lloyd even told the 

Court that he was satisfied with Wilder’s representations at the plea colloquy 

hearing. * * * Further, Lloyd admits that he waited until almost all of the 

State’s case was presented to the jury and that he knew from observing the 

jury that the jury would convict him. * * *

January 14, 2022 Decision, p. 14.

{¶ 15} The trial court also rejected Lloyd’s assertions that he did not understand 

the mandatory component of the sentence. The court explained:

While Wilder admitted that there was some initial confusion over the 

mandatory sentence because it was unclear whether Lloyd’s prior felony in 

another state would apply to this sentence, this was resolved during the 

plea hearing. Importantly, this Court gave ample explanation regarding 

Reagan-Tokes and informed Lloyd that a mandatory sentence meant that 

he would be ineligible for judicial release, furlough, or earned credit. 

Moreover, Lloyd stated that when he asked Wilder what this meant, Wilder 

told him that * * * it meant Lloyd would have to serve three years in prison 

no matter what. The Court believes that Lloyd’s articulation of what Wilder 

communicated to him contradicts Lloyd’s position that he did not understand 
-9-

his mandatory sentence. Further, after explaining the meaning of a 

mandatory sentence to Lloyd in the plea hearing, the Court asked Lloyd if 

he still wished to continue with the plea. Lloyd verbalized to this Court that 

he wished [to] proceed with the plea. Accordingly, this Court believes that 

Lloyd actually understood the mandatory nature of his sentence at the time 

he signed the plea form and that Lloyd merely changed his mind a few 

weeks later. * * * 

Id. at 15.

{¶ 16} The trial court concluded by noting that sustaining Lloyd’s motion would be 

highly prejudicial to the State and would thwart the jury system. According to the trial 

court, many individuals spent a significant amount of time on the trial, and Lloyd was able 

to obtain the benefits of viewing the State’s case strategy and observing how the 

witnesses actually performed. Id. at 15-16. Further, sustaining Lloyd’s motion would 

set a damaging precedent of allowing defendants to use a plea withdrawal as an attempt 

to “cherry-pick” a more favorable jury. Id. at 16.

{¶ 17} The trial court’s findings and conclusions are supported by the record. The 

trial court did not find credible Lloyd’s testimony regarding his attorney’s effectiveness or 

his testimony that he did not understand what mandatory meant at the time he entered 

his guilty plea. We defer to the trial court on credibility determinations. Further, the 

written plea form signed by Lloyd stated that the prison term for aggravated robbery was

“mandatory and cannot be reduced by judicial release, earned credit, or furlough[.]” 

Lloyd also conceded that his attorney had explained to him that mandatory meant “you 
-10-

just got to do three years no matter what.” Finally, a review of the trial transcript reveals 

that Wilder’s representation of Lloyd went well beyond what Lloyd testified to at the 

hearing on his motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

{¶ 18} The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Lloyd’s motion to 

withdraw his guilty plea. The first assignment of error is overruled.

III. A Stipulation of the Parties Renders The Second Assignment of Error Moot

{¶ 19} Lloyd’s second assignment of error states:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ACCEPTING APPELLANT’S GUILTY PLEA

{¶ 20} In his appellate brief, Lloyd contended that “[t]he trial court made a finding 

that the plea was ‘involuntarily.’ (Tr. 367) Accordingly, appellant’s guilty plea runs afoul 

of the United States and Ohio Constitution.” Appellant’s Brief, p. 7. Lloyd’s second 

assignment of error relies completely on his citation to page 367 of the Transcript.

{¶ 21} On September 6, 2022, Lloyd and the State filed a “STIPULATION TO 

CORRECT RECORD PURSUANT TO APP.R. 9(E).” In that filing, the parties stipulated 

and agreed, based on a review of the official video from October 14, 2021, that page 367, 

lines 8-10, of the written transcript should be corrected to read as follows:

The Court further finds Mr. Lloyd understood the effect of his guilty 

plea, that said plea was made voluntarily, and that there is a factual basis 

for this guilty plea.

{¶ 22} Based on the parties’ stipulation, the second assignment of error is 

overruled.
-11-

IV. Conclusion

{¶ 23} Having overruled both of Lloyd’s assignments of error, the judgment of the 

trial court is affirmed.

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

DONOVAN, J. and WELBAUM, J., concur. 

Copies sent to:

Mathias H. Heck, Jr.

Elizabeth A. Ellis

David R. Miles

Hon. Kimberly Melnick