T he C l erk of C o urt i s d i rect ed t o am end t he o f f i ci al cap t i o n t o co nf

o rm t o t he l i st i ng of t he p art i es s t at ed ab o ve . * 1 08

- 27 99

- cv B rzak v. U ni t ed N at i o ns

1 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS 2 3 F OR THE SE CO ND CI RC UI T 4 5 6 7 August Term, 2008 8 9 (Argued: May 29, 2009 Dec ided: Marc h 2, 2010) 10 11 Docke t No. 08-2799-c v 12 13 14 15 16 17 C YNTHI A B R Z AK , N A SR I S HAK , 18 19 Plain tif fs- Ap pe lla nts , 20 21 – v. – 22 23 U NI TED N ATI ONS , K O FI ANNAN , R UND LU BBERS , W EN DY C H A M B E R LIN , 24 25 Defendants-A ppellees

. * 26 27 28 29 30 31 B e fo re : L EV AL , P OOLE R , AND B.D
. P ARKE R , Circuit Judges

. 32 33 Appea l from a judg ment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of 34 New Y ork (Swee t, J. ) dismissing plaintiffs’ c laims for lac k of subject- matter jurisdiction on the 35 g rounds that the United Nations is absolut ely immune and its former e mploy ees who are the 36 individual defenda nts are f unctionally

immune. AFF I RMED. 372 1 E DW AR D P A T RI CK F L AH E R TY , S c h w a b , F l ah e rty & 2 Associes, Ge neva, Switzerland, for Plainti ffs-Appellees

. 3 4 D ONAL D F RA N CI S D ONOVAN , (Cather ine M. Amirfa r, 5 Semra A. Me sulam, Natalie L . Reid, on the brief ), 6 Debe voise & Plim pton L L P, New Yor k, New Y ork, for 7 Defendant- Appellant United Nations

. 8 9 10 11 Ba

rring ton D. Parker , Circuit J udg e: 12 Cy

nthia Br zak and Nasr I shak appeal from a judgment of the U nited States District Court 13 for the Southern District of Ne w York ( Sweet, J. ) di smissi ng claims ag ainst the United Nations and 14 various United Nations officials. The c omplaint charg es def endants with sex discrimination under 15 sever al fe dera l statutory and state c ommon law theories. The district court dismissed the claims for 16 lack of

subject-matter

jurisdiction on the gr ounds that the Un i t ed Nations and the individual 17 defe ndants enjoy absolute and f

unctional immunity , respe ctively

. Brzak v. U nited Nations , 5 51 F. 18 Sup p. 2d 31 3, 31 8 (S.D .N. Y. 2 00 8); see Fe d. R. Civ. P . 12(b)( 1). On a ppeal, B rzak and I shak 19 c ha lle ng e the fi nd ing s o f i mmunit y and a lso c on te nd that, if the y

are c or re c t, t he g ra nts of immun ity 20 violate the Constituti on. We affir m. 21 BACK GR OUND 22 Exc e pt a s n ote d, the fa c ts a re no t con tested . B rza

k is an A me ri c an c iti zen

wh o w or ke d in 23 Gene va, S witzerland, for the United Nations Hig h Commi ssioner for Refug ees ( “UNH CR”). I shak 24 is a Fr ench a

nd Eg y ptian national who also wor ked in Gene va for

the UNHCR. Def

endant Kof

i 2 5 A n n anw a s f

o r m e r l y t h e S e c r e t ar

y- G e n e r a l f

o r th e U n i t e d

N a t i o n s , an d w o r

k e d i nN e w Y o r

k C i ty. 26 Def

endant L ubbers wa s the United Nations Hig h Commi ssioner for Refug ees, a

nd defe ndant Wendy3 1 Chamberlin was a deputy to the Commi ssioner. Both worke d in Geneva . Brzak contends that during 2 the course of a meeting of UNHCR staff members in Ge neva in 2003, L ubbers imprope rly

touched 3 her. On the advic e of I shak, B rzak filed a complaint ag ainst Lubbers with the Unit ed Nations’ Office 4 of Interna l Oversig ht Services ( “OI OS”). The OI OS issued a re port confir ming B rzak’s complaint 5 and re commendingthat the United Nation s d i s ci p l ine L ubbers. B rzak alleg es that Anna n 6 disreg arde d the finding and eve ntually exonerated Lubbers. Brzak then appe aled throug h the United 7 Nations’ interna l complaint adjustment process. T h e p l ai n t i ffs a lleg e that, as a conseque nce of 8 Br z ak ’s compl aint, and I shak’s a ssistance pursuingit, United Nations officia ls and employ ees 9 reta liated ag ainst them by taking steps such as manipulatingBrzak’s work a ssignments a nd denying 10 I shak merited pr omotions. 11 The plaintiffs sue d the United Nations an dthe individual defe ndants in the United States 12 Di str ic t Co ur

t f or the Southe rn Di str ic t of Ne w Yo rk , a lle g ingse x disc ri min a tio n a nd re ta liatio n in 13 violation of Title VI Iof the Civil Ri g hts Act of 1 9 6 4 , 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. , violations of the 1 4 Ra c k e te e r

I n f lu e n c e d an d Co r r u p t O r g an iz a ti o n s A c t ( “ RI CO ” ) , 1 8 U
. S. C. § 1 961 et seq. , and 15 various state common law torts (br oug ht in feder al cour t throug h supplemental jurisdiction). The 16 United Nations formally returne d the complaint to the Amer ican ambassador to the U nited Nations 17 and moved to dismiss on the gr o u n d s o f immunity , a motion supported by the United States 18 Attorney ’s Off

ice f or the Southern District of New Y ork. Brzak , 5 51 F . Su pp . 2 d at 31 6; seeL etter 19 of Unit ed S tates Att orney for the Southern District of New York, Brzak v. U nited Nations , 06-Civ. 20 3432 (S.D.N.Y., Oct. 2, 2007). The dist rict court g rante d the m otion. J udg e Swee t concluded that 21 the Convention on Privileges and Immuniti es of the United Nations, Fe b. 13, 1946, e nte re d in to4 1 forc e with re

sp e c t to theUn ite d S

tates Apr. 29, 1970, 21 U.S.T. 1418, (the “CPI UN”) , g rante d the 2 Un ite d N a tio ns a

bs olute immun ity , w hic h it ha d n ot w a ive d, and

dis mis sed th e c omp la int . With 3 re g ard to the ind ivi du a l def e nd ants , J ud g e Swe e t con c lud e d that th e CPIUNg ra nte d th e m th e same 4 form o f fu nctional immunity former diplomats enjoy

under inter

national law. This func tional 5 immunit y , J udg e Swee t held, applied to employ ment-re lated suits. Brzak , 551 F. Supp. 2d at 318-20. 6 This appea l followed. We revie w de novo a dis tr ic t c ourt ’s dis mis sa l of a c la im f or la c k o f s ub

je c t7 matter jurisdiction. Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp. , 4 1 4 F
. 3 d 2 3 3 , 2 4 1 ( 2 d Ci r . 2 0 0 3 )

. We 8 also revie w de novo leg al conc lusions which gr ant or de ny immunit y . Au re lie us Cap ita l P ar tne rs, 9 LP v

. Republic of Argentina , 5 84 F .3 d 1 20 , 1 29 (2 d Ci r. 20 09 ); Gollomp v. Spitzer , 568 F.3d 355, 10 365 (2d Cir. 2009) . 11 DI SCU SSIO N 12 As the District Court corr ectly conclude d, the United States has ratified the CPI UN which 13 extends absolute im m u nity to the United Nations. Specific ally , the CPI UN provide s that “[t] he 14 United Nations .

. . shall enjoy immunit y from eve ry form of le g al proc ess except insofar as in any 15 particula

r ca se it has expressly

waived its immunity .” Id. art. I I , § 2. I f t h e C P I UN ap p lies, then 1 6 ap p el l an t s ’ c l ai m s fa i l

. T h e a n s we r t o t h i s qu es t i o nturn s o nwh et h er th e C P IUN i s s el f- ex ec u t i n g. 17 T h e p ar t i es do not dispute that the CPI UN is binding on the United States as a matter of 18 international law . Howeve r, they disag ree about whethe r Amer i ca n courts mus t rec og nize the 19 i m m u n i t y i t adopts in domestic litigation. Cf. Medellin v. Texas , 552 U.S. 491, 504, 506 (2008) 20 (a c kn ow le dg ing that an I nte rn a tio na l Court of Justi c e op ini on

is b ind ingon

the Un ite d St a te s a s a 21 matter of inter

national law, while holdingthat the same opinion lac ks domestic leg al ef fec t).5 1 B rza

k a nd I sh ak c on te nd

that the CPIUN sh ou ld not be e nf or c e d by Am e ri c an c ourt s b e c a us e 2 it is not self-e x ecuting , and conse quently cannot be enfor ced absent additi onal leg islation which was 3 never

passed. Se e Me de lli n , 552 U.S. at 505. Whether a treaty is self-e x ecutingdepends on whether 4 “the tre aty

contains stipulations which . . . require no leg islation to make them ope rative;” if so, “they 5 have the forc e and effe ct of a leg islative enac tment.” Id. at 5 0 5 -0 6 (q u o t i n g W hitney v. R obertson , 6 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888)). 7 I n deter

mining whe ther a

treaty is self-executing , we look to the text, the neg otiation and 8 draf

ting history , and the postratification understanding of t he si g natory nations. Me de lli n , 5 52 U. S. 9 at 506-07. Additionally , the executive branc h’s interpre tation of a treaty “is entitled to gr eat we ight.” 10 Id. at 5 1 3 (q u o t i n g Sumitomo Shoji America, inc. v . Avagliano , 457 U.S. 176, 184-85 (1982)) . Ba sed 11 on these c riteria, w e have littl e diffic ulty concludingthat the CPI UN is self-e x ecuting

. 12 CPIUNSe c tio n 3 4 s tate s “ [i]t is un de rs too d th a t, whe n a n in st rum ent of a c c e ssi on is 13 deposited on beha lf of any Member, the Member w ill be in a p o s i t i o n u n d er i t s own law to g ive 14 eff

ect to the ter

ms of this convention.” When the United States ac cede d to the CPI UN in 1970 (by 15 the President’s r atification, with the advice a nd consent of the Senate) , it was a ffirmingthat it was 16 “in a position under its own l aw to g ive effec t” t o the C PI UN’s terms at that time. This means that 17 the treaty

beca me ef fec tive at ratification, an dthere fore , is self-executing . “[T] he labe l ‘self18 executing’ usually is applied to any

treaty that acc ording to its t erms take s eff ect upon ratification.” 19 Mo ra v . New York , 5 2 4 F. 3 d 1 8 3 , 1 9 3 n . 1 6 (2 d

C i r. 2 0 0 8 ) ( qu o t i n g Un ite d S tates v . Li , 206 F.3d 56, 20 67 (1st Cir. 2000) (en ba nc) ( Sely a & Boudin, JJ ., concur ring )).6 1 The ratification history of the CPI UN re inforce s this conclusion. Duringtestimony befor e 2 the S e n a t e F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s C o m m i t t e e a s i t c o n s i d e r e d w h e th e r t o r e c o m m e n d th a t th e Se na te 3 ratify

the CPI UN, the L eg al Advisor to the State De partment stated that: “I t is clea r fr om the 4 lang uag e of the convention . . . that the c onvention is self-executingand no implementing leg islation 5 is nece ssary .” S. Ex ec. Re p. No. 91-17, App. at 16 (S tatement of John R. S tevenson, L eg al Advisor, 6 De pa

rtme nt o f S tate ); see also id. at 13 (“I would like to have the r ecor d ref lect[] that we r eg ard the 7 c on ve nti on

a s se lf -e xec uti ng .” ). Th e F or e ig n Re latio ns Committe e ’s repo rt on the CPIUNa lso 8 expre s s ed t h e view that “the conve ntion is self-executing a nd will require no implementing 9 leg islation.” Id. at 5. 10 Finally , the executive branch continues to asser t that the CPI UN is self-e x ecuting

. SeeL etter 11 of Unit ed S tates Att orney for the Southern District of Ne w York, Brzak v. United Nations , 06-Civ. 12 3432 (S.D. N. Y. , Oc t . 2, 2007). These views, as we have se en, ar e entitled to “g reat weig ht.” 13 Me de lli n , 5 52 U. S. at 51 3; Mo ra , 524 F.3d at 204. Consequently , we hold that the CPI UN is self14 executing a

nd applies in Americ an cour ts without i mplementing le g islation. 15 As the CPIUNmake s c le ar, the Un ite d N a tio ns e njo y s a bs olute immun ity fr om s uit un le ss 16 “it has ex pressly

waived its immunity .” Id. art. I I , § 2. Although the plaintiffs argue that purpor ted 17 inadequa cies with the United N ations’ i nterna l dispute resolution mecha nism indicate a waiver

of 18 immunit y , cre diting this argument would rea d the word “expressly ” out of the CP IUN. The United 19 Nations has not waiv ed i t s i m munity

. See L etter f rom Nicolas Miche l, United Nations Under

20 Secre tary -Ge nera l f or L eg al Aff

airs, to Alejandr o D. Wolff, Deputy Permane nt Represe ntative of the 21 United States of America to the Unit ed Nations (May 15, 2006); L etter from Nicolas Miche l, United7 1 Nati ons Under- Secre tary -Ge nera l for L eg al Aff airs, to J ohn R. Bolton, Permane nt Represe ntative 2 o f t h e U n i t e d

S t a t e s , t o t h e U n i t e d

N a t i o n s ( O c t . 1 9 , 2 0 0 6 )

. C o n s e qu e n t l y, th e U n i t e d N a t i o n s e n

j o ys 3 absolute immunity and the district cour

t’s decision to dismiss the claims ag ainst the United Nations 4 was c orre ct. 5 Our c onclusion is further c onfirmed by the International Org anizations I mmuniti es Ac t of 6 1945, 22 U.S.C. § 288a(b) (the “I OI A”) , which provides that international org anizations designated 7 by the President should rec eive the “ same immunity from suit and eve ry form of judicia l proce ss as 8 is enjoy ed by fore ign g overnme nts.” The United Nations has bee n so desig nated. See Ex ec. O rd. 9 No. 9698, 11 Fe d. Reg . 1809 (F eb. 19, 1 9 4 6 ). T h e plaintiffs a rgue that desig nated inter national 10 org anizations no longe r have absolute immunit y in a ll c ases, beca use, since that ac t wa s p assed, 11 Congr ess has pa ssed the F oreig n Sovereig n I mmuniti es Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1602-11( “F SI A”) , which 12 str ips fo re ig n s ov e re ig ns of the ir immun ity in c e rt a in c ir c ums tanc e s. Pla int if fs argue that it

is this 13 narr ower

definition of sovere ign immunit y that now define s what sort of immunity the I OIA applies 14 to international org anizations. Although t his argument has been reje cted by at least one other Court 15 of Appe als, see Atki nson v. Inter- American D ev. B ank, 156 F.3d 1335, 1340- 42 (D.C. Cir. 1998), 16 we ne e d not r e so lve wh e the r p la int if fs ’ a rgume nt i s c or

re c t f or a t le a st t wo re a so ns . T he fi rs t is that, 17 wh a te ve r i mmunit ie s are po sse sse d by oth e r int e rn a tio na l org anizatio ns , the CPIUNun e qu ivo c a lly 18 g rants the United N ations absolute immunity without ex ception. The second is that the plai ntiffs 19 have not presented any argument, either at the di strict level or to us, which would sug g est that one 20 of F SI A’s exceptions to immuni ty would apply

. There fore , even unde r the plaintiffs’ interpre tation 21 of the I OI A, the United Nations would sti ll be immune from suit.8 1 The plaintiffs a lso sued three former United Nations off

icials. The CPI UN also addresses 2 their immunity : “The Sec reta ry -Ge nera l and all Assistant Sec reta ries-G ener al shall be acc orded . . 3 . the privileg es and immunities . . . acc orded to diplomatic e nvoy s, in acc ordanc e with international 4 law.” Id. art . v , s e c t . 1 9
. A s w e h av e d e t e r m i n e d a b o v e th a t th e C P IUN i s a

s e l f

- e x e c u t i n g t r e a ty, 5 this p ro v i s i o n is binding on Amer ican c ourts. International law provides e x tensive protec tion for 6 diplomatic envoy s. SeeThe Vienna Conve ntion on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, entere d 7 into force wi th respec t to the Unit ed States De c. 1 3 , 1 9 7 2 , 2 3 U. S
. T
. 3 2 2 7 (t h e “ VC DR ”)

. Al th o u gh 8 curr ent diplomatic e nvoy s enjoy absolute immunit y from civil and cr iminal process, see id. art. 31, 9 fo rm e r dip lom a tic e nv oy s re ta in i mmunit y on ly “ wi th r e sp e c t to a c ts p e rf or me d b y su c h a pe rs on in 10 the exercise of

his functions” as a

diplomatic envoy

. Id. art. 39, para . 2. As the plaintiffs have sued 11 former

United Nations off

icials, ea ch of whom held a ra nk of Assistant Secre tary -Ge nera l or hig her, 12 it is t his functional immunity , wh i ch t h e C P I UN incor porate s by

ref ere nce, that is relevant. The 13 Di plo matic Relat io ns Act of 19 78 , 2 2 U .S. C. § 25 4d , ma ke s p e llu c id t

hat A me ri c an c ourt s mu st 14 dismiss a suit against any one who is entitled to immunit y under e ither the VCDR or other laws 15 “e x t en d i n g diplomatic privileg es and immunities.” As CPI UN sec tion 19 is such a law, the 16 rema ining que stion is whether the plainti ffs’ alleg ations ag ainst the individual defenda nts involve 17 acts that the de fenda nts perfor med in the exercise of

their United Nations functions. 18 When a court attempts to deter mine whether a defe ndant is seeking immunit y “with re spect 19 to acts per formed by such a pe rson in the exercise of his functions,” VCDR art. 39, para. 2, the court 20 must do so without judgingwhether the under lying c onduct ac tually occ u rr ed , o r whether it wasT h is tes t p a ra llels th e o b je c tive tes ts w e ha v e a d o p te d in a p p lying o the r fo rm s o f i m m u n ity. F o r in sta n c e , a ** pros ecu t or i s i mm un e f r om s ui t un der 42 U
. S. C
. § 19 83 “ f or v i r t ual l y al l ac t s . . . as s oci at ed wi t h h i s f un ct i on as an advocat e. ” D or

y v. Ryan , 25 F.3d 81 , 83 (2d C i r. 19 9 4 ). I n ap p l y i ng t hat f unct i o nal t est , we have l o o ked t o t he o b je c tive a c ts o f t h e p ro se c u to r in q u e stio n , no t t o the typ e o f i n ju ry a lleg e d

. D oe v. Phi l l i ps , 81 F. 3d 1204, 1209 (2 d C ir. 1 9 9 6 ). 9 1 wr on g fu l. Of

the pla int if

fs ’ se ve n c la ims , a ll e xce pt the fo ur th m ake a lle g a tio ns wi th r e sp e c t to a c ts ** 2 that the def

endants pe rfor

med in exercise of their officia l f unctions, namely , their mana g ement of 3 the offic e in which the pla intiffs worked. T he first two claims alleg e that def endants discr iminated 4 ag ainst Brzak in the conditions of her e mploy ment and re taliated aga i nst her, both in violation of 5 T i t l e V II. T h e f

i f t h c l a i m a l l e g e s t h a t t h e d e f e n d an t s r e t a l i a t e d

a g a i n s tIs h ak

i nv i o l a t i o no f

T i t l e V II 6 as well. These a lleg ations involve personne l manag ement dec isions falling within the ambit of the 7 defe ndants’ prof

essional re sponsibili ties. Brzak’s third claim, for intentional infliction of e motional 8 distress, also relates to the m anag ement of the office, because it challeng es t he def endants’ c onduct 9 in inv e sti g a tin g B rza k’ s c la ims , a

nd c ha rg e s r e ta liatio n thro ug h c ha ng e s o f h e r w or

k a ssi g nme nts . 10 Th e sixthand

se ve nth c la ims , whi c h all e g e vio latio ns of RI CO , als o re late to Ann an’ s a nd Lub be rs ’ 11 roles as U nited Nations offic ials. 12 Th e on ly

re ma ini ng c la im is the fo ur th, in wh ic h B rza

k a lle g e s L

ub be rs c omm itt e d th e state 13 law tort of battery . We have sa id that if a plainti ff’ s fede ral claims are dismiss ed bef ore tria l, “the 14 state cla ims should be dism issed as we ll.” Cav e v . E. M e ad ow U nio n F re e Sc h. Di

st. , 514 F.3d 240, 1 5 2 5 0 (2 d

C i r. 2 0 0 8 ) ( qu o t i n g United Mine W orkers of Am. v . Gibbs , 383 U.S. 71 5 , 7 2 6 (1966))

. 16 Be cause Bzrak’ s fede ral c laims were dismiss ed on jurisdictional g rounds at the very beg inning of 17 the ca se, there was no colora ble basis for the district court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over 18 her state law cla im. We thus aff irm the di strict court’s dismissal without reac hing B zrak’s ar g ument 19 that the claim involves conduc t outside the scope of the defendant’s imm unity

. Bzrak is fre e to re-10 1 fi le he r b a tte ry

c la im i n th e state c ourt s. I f she do e s so, t he state c ourt

wo uld ne e d to a dju dic a te in 2 the first instance the def endant’ s claim of immunity

. 3 The a

ppellants ra i s e s ever al constitutional objections to the proposition that the United 4 Nations and its former officia ls enjoy

immunit y . Specifica lly , they contend that suc h a grant of 5 immun ity

wo uld vio late the ir pr oc e dura l due pr oc e ss r ig ht t o li tig a te the me ri ts o f t he ir c a se , th e ir 6 substantive due proc ess rig h t t o ac ce ss the courts, their F irst Amendment rig ht to petition t he 7 g ov e rnme nt f

or re dr e ss o f gri e va

nc e s, and their Sev e nth

Am e ndme nt r ig ht t o a

jur y tr ia l on the ir 8 common law cla ims. Each of the se ar g um en t s fa i l s , as ea ch does no more than question why 9 immunit ies in g ener al should exi st. 10 The short – and conclusive – answe r is that le g islatively and judicially cra fted i m m unities 11 of one sor

t or another

have ex i sted since we ll before the fra ming of the Constitut ion, have be en extended and modified over time, a nd are firmly embedde d in America n law. See, e .g. , 12 Act for the 13 Pun ish me nt o f C e rt a in C ri me s A g a ins t th e Un ite d St a te s, 25 , 1 Stat. 1 12 , 1 17 -1 8 ( 17 90 ) ( dip lom a tic 1 4 i m m u n i t y) ; The Schoone r Exchangev. Mc Fadden , 1 1 U. S
. (7 C ra n ch ) 1 1 6 (1 8 1 2 ) ( fo re i gns o v er ei gn 15 immunit y

); Tenney v . Brandhove , 3 4 1 U
. S
. 3 6 7 , 3 7 6

- 7 7 ( 1 9 5 1 ) ( l e g i s l a t i v e i m mun ity); B a rr v. 16 Matteo , 36 0 U. S. 56 4, 57 3 ( 19 59 ) ( plu ra lity ) ( e xec uti ve of

fi c ia l im mun ity

); Pierson v. Ray , 3 86 U. S. 17 54 7, 55 4- 55 (1 96 7) (j ud ic ia l im mun ity ); Imbler v . Pachtman , 424 U. S . 409, 424 (1976) 18 (p ro se c uto ri a l im mun ity ); National

City Bank of New Y

ork v. Republic of China , 348 U.S. 356, 358- 19 60 (1955) ( discussing the history of for eig n sovere ign immunity since S c h o o n e r E xchange ); See 20 generally L inda S. F rey & Marsha L . Fr ey , The History

of Diplomatic Immunity

(1999) ( trac ing the 2 1 c o n c e p to f

d i p l o m a t i c i m m u n i t y

f r o man c i e n tG r e e k

s o c i e ty f o r w ar d t o th e tw e n t i e thc e n t u r

y )

. If11 1 appellants’ c onstitut ional argument wer e cor rec t, judicial immuni ty , p ro s ecutorial immuni ty , and 2 l egi s l at i v e immunit y , for e x ample, could not exist. S uffice it to say , they offe r no principled 3 arguments as to why the continuing exis tence of immuniti es violates the Constitution. 4 CO NC LU SION 5 The judg ment of the district cour t is affirmed. 6