COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Kelsey, Petty and Seni or Judge Bumgardner

BARRY JACKSON, SR. MEMORANDUM OPINION * v. Record No. 2546-07-2 PER CURIAM APRIL 22, 2008 LANCASTER COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES

FROM THE CIRCUIT COUR T OF LANCASTER COUNTY Harry T. Taliaf erro, III, Judge (Laurence M. Dickinson, on briefs), for appellant. (Michael L. Donner, Sr.; Matthew R. Kite, Guardian ad litem for the minor children; Hubbard Terry & Kopcsak, P.C.; Dillard and Katona, on brief), for appellee.
Barry Jackson, Sr. contends the evidence was insufficient to sup port the trial court’s decision terminating his residual parental rights to his three minor childr en, B.J., M.J., and I.J. (referred to hereafter individually or collect ively as “the children”), pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(C)(1) and 16.1-283(C)(2). 1 Upon reviewing the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the trial court’s decision. See Rule 5A:27.

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opin ion is not designated for publication.

1 The termination hearing also dealt with another child, A.J. However, DNA testing showed that Jackson was not A.J. ’s biological father, and, therefor e, this appeal does not pertain to A.J. Accordingly, we mention A.J. in this opinion only to the extent necessary to explain the procedural or factual history su rrounding the termination of Jack son’s parental rights to B.J., M.J., and I.J. As of the August 1, 2007 terminat ion hearing, B.J. was nine years old, M.J. was eight years old, and I.J. was five years old.- 2 - We view the evidence in the light most favorab le to the prevailing party below and grant to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom. See Logan v. Fairfax County Dep’t of
Human Dev. , 13 Va. App. 123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 462 (1991). So viewed, the evidence proved that on September 29, 2005, the Lancaster Department of Social Services (LDSS) received a complaint that Iliana Melendez, the chil dren’s mother, had left B.J, M.J, and I.J. with relatives for days without any indication of her wherea bouts. On that same day, LDSS received another call reporting Mele ndez’s whereabouts. Thereafter, LDSS found Melendez with her youngest chil d, A.J., in a house that did no t contain any food for the child. Melendez, a cocaine addict, appeared intoxicated. A.J. was soaked in urine, and th ere were no clean diapers for the child. Me lendez agreed she needed help for her drug addiction, and on that date voluntarily agreed to entrust B.J., M.J., I.J., and A.J. to LDSS. At that time , Jackson was in jail. On October 20, 2005, LDSS filed a Child In Need of Se rvices (CHINS ) petition with respect to the children. As a re sult of a hearing held on Octobe r 25, 2005, the La ncaster County Juvenile and Domestic Re lations District Court (J&DR court) transferred custody of all four children to LDSS. At an adjudi catory hearing on November 1, 2005, the J&DR court found the children in need of services. On November 21, 2005, after LDSS completed certain home studies, B.J. and M.J. were placed with Stacy Taylor and James Muhammad, Jack son’s relatives, and A.J. and I.J. were placed with Wayn e and Mildred Ransome, also Jackson’s relativ es. Those relatives lived close to where Jackson and Me lendez were living at the time. Approximately three months later, Taylor an d Muhammad petitioned the J&DR court to be relieved of custody of B. J. and M.J. Taylor and Muhammad re ported being constantly harassed by and having confrontations with Melendez and Jackson, and did not believe they coul d deal with B.J. and M.J. any longer. As a result, on February 28, 2006, B.J. and M. J. were placed with Braley and Thompson, a therapeutic fo ster agency located in Richmond, Virginia. In April 2006, the J&DR- 3 - court approved LDSS’s foster care service plans fo r B.J. and M.J. and c ontinued custody of the children with LDSS. On August 8, 2006, the J&DR court relieved the Ransomes of custody of A.J. and I.J. based on their petition alleging they had a physical alter cation with Jackson. I.J. and A.J. were also placed with Braley and Thompson. 2 At the August 2006 hear ing, Jackson and Melendez were screened for drugs and both tested positive for cocaine, after having previously stated that they had not recently used drugs. Michele Simmons, an LDSS social worker and the children’s casewor ker, testified that Jackson told her his substance abus e and cocaine addiction dated to the 1980’s. LDSS offered both parents counseling services. Howeve r, Jackson failed to keep an intake appointmen t on June 26, 2006. He did keep an intake appointment on September 14, 2006 , wherein he agreed to attend intensive substance abuse group services, but then, subsequently failed to attend group therapy on September 28, 2006. On October 3, 2006, the J&DR court held a di spositional hearing with respect to I.J and A.J. and a foster care review hearing with resp ect to B.J. and M.J. The J&DR court approved foster care service plans for I.J. and A.J. At that hearing, Melendez appear ed to be intoxicated. As a result, the J&DR court ordered th at both parents be screened for drugs. After the October 3, 2006 hearing, LDSS lo st contact with Jacks on and Melendez. LDSS tried to contact Jackson without success, and neither parent contacted LDSS. Eventually, LDSS learned that on January 10, 2007, Melendez wa s sentenced to 120 da ys incarceration in Massachusetts for possession of cocaine on an outst anding 2005 warrant and that in February 2007, Jackson was arrested in Massachusetts for failing to appear at his schedule d criminal sentencing hearing in Virginia. The authorities eventually return ed Jackson to Virginia.

2 All four children were placed with foster care families by Braley and Thompson.- 4 - On March 6, 2007, the J&DR co urt held a permanency planni ng hearing for the children. At that time, the foster care plan goal was changed to adoption and was ap proved by the J&DR

court. By orders dated April 27, 2007 and June 8, 2007, the Lancaster Circuit Court sentenced Jackson to a total of fift een years and six months in the penite ntiary for two coun ts of distributing cocaine and one count of failure to appear, with ten years suspended, for an active sentence of five years and six months. In May 2007, LDSS file d petitions to terminate the residual parental rights of Melendez and Jackson as to all four children . The J&DR court subsequently granted those petitions. Jackson appealed that order to the trial court for a de novo hearing. With respect to the parents’ visitation with the children since being placed in foster care, Dawn Mulrain, the Braley and Thompson case ma nager for the children since May 2007, testified that the first visit scheduled for June 2, 2006 was can celled due to “conflict wi th transportation from Mr. Jackson.” On June 14, 20 06, Jackson visited B.J. and M. J. at Braley and Thompson in Richmond. On August 2 2, 2006, Jackson and Melendez failed to attend a scheduled visit. On August 29, 2006, Jackson and Melendez visited the children, and then on September 14, 2006, both parents visited B.J. and M.J. I.J. and A.J. had a schedule conflict th at day. On Se ptember 28, 2006 and October 24, 2006, Jackson and Melendez failed to atte nd scheduled visits with the children, who were at Braley and Thompson waiting for them. Th e visits that occurr ed were normally one hour in duration. After September 14, 20 06, Jackson never visited the children. Mulrain acknowledged that si nce May 2007, while Jackson ha d been incarcerated, he had sent the children one card and approximately four letters. He had also sent a check for I.J.’s birthday, which Braley and Thomps on had not cashed. Mu lrain acknowledged th at some letters had been sent to the children beforeMay 2007, but she did not know ho w many or if they were from- 5 - Jackson or Melendez. Simmons al so acknowledged that Jackson “had written to the children on several occasions.” However, she testified th at she was not aware of anything Jackson had contributed to the development of the children sin ce they were placed in foster care in September 2005. Mulrain testified that the children are doing we ll in their pre-adoptive homes, their schools, and in their community. They have therapy twice a month. They have a sense of safety and security now that they did not ha ve when they first ca me under the care of Br aley and Thompson. The children have told Mulr ain they are happy where they live an d that they feel safe, loved, and well taken care of. The children related informat ion to therapists indicating they had witnessed domestic violence and drug use wh en living with their parents. Jackson, incarcerated in Virginia since February 2007 , testified at the August 2007 termination hearing that he had serv ed seven months of hi s five and one-half year sentence. Jackson admitted he had been in drug rehab in 19 88 for heroin, in 1993 for cocain e, and most recently from 2006 to February 2007 for cocaine. He claimed he had not used co caine since a few weeks after the October 2006 J&DR court hearing. He admitted he was in jail in September 2005, when Melendez entrusted the children to LDSS, but that he was released from incarcerati on November 6, 2005, and remained out of jail until February 2007. He clai med he had da ily contact with th e children while they were with his relatives pr ior to B.J.’s and M.J. ’s placement with Braley and Thompson in February 2006, and A.J.’s and I.J. ’s placement with Braley and Thom pson in August 2006. He also asserted that he sent a card to B. J. for his October birthday, a card and money to M.J. for his January birthday, and money to I.J. for her June birthday. Jackson acknowledg ed that he left Virginia after the October 3, 2006 J&DR court h earing, but claimed he did so in order to take Melendez to Massachusetts for detox and to obta in drug rehabilitation, even though he knew he had an upcoming sentencing hearing scheduled in Vi rginia. He stated that he did not attend the October 24, 2006- 6 - scheduled visit with the children because he was in Massachusetts. He claimed he missed the other scheduled visits with the children at Braley and Thompson because he got lost, his car battery died, and he had other transportation issu es, while admitting that LDSS had told him that they would pay for a taxi or gas vouchers for tr ansportation to Braley and Thompson fo r those visits. He admitted to three prior felony burglary convictions. Based upon this record, the trial court f ound clear and convincing evidence supported termination of Jackson’s residual parental rights pursuant to C ode § 16.1-283(C)(1) and 16.1-283(C)(2). “In matters of a child’s welfare, trial courts are vested with broad discretion in making the decisions ne cessary to guard and to foster a child’s best interests.” The tr ial court’s judgment, “when based on evidence heard ore tenus , will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.” Logan , 13 Va. App. at 128, 409 S.E.2d at 463 (citati ons omitted). Recognizing that “‘[t]he termination of [residual] parental rights is a grave, drastic and irreversible action,’” Helen W. v. Fairfax County Dep’t of Human Dev. , 12 Va. App. 877, 883, 407 S.E.2d 25, 28-29 (1991) (citation omitted), we, nevertheless, “‘presume[] [the trial court has] thoroughly weighed all the evidence [and] considered the statutory requirements,’” Logan , 13 Va. App. at 128, 409 S.E.2d at 463 (citation omitted). Code § 16.1-283(C)(1) provides in pertinent part as follows: The residual parental rights of a parent . . . of a child placed in foster care as a result of court commitment, an entrustment agreement entered into by the parent . . . or other voluntary relinquishment by the parent . . . may be terminated if the court finds, based upon clear and convinci ng evidence, that it is in the best interests of the child and that: The parent . . . [has], without good cause, failed to maintain continuing contact with and to prov ide or substantially plan for the future of the child for a period of six months after the child’s placement in foster care notw ithstanding the reasonable and appropriate efforts of social, me dical, mental health or other- 7 - rehabilitative agencies to communi cate with the parent . . . and to strengthen the parent-child relations hip. Proof that the parent . . . [has] failed without good cause to communicate on a continuing and planned basis with the child for a period of six months shall constitute prima facie evidence of this condition . . . . Thus, to grant LDSS’s petition for termina tion pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(C)(1), the trial court was required to find by clear and conv incing evidence that (1) termination was in the best interests of the children; (2) LDSS ma de “reasonable and appropriate” efforts to communicate with Jackson and strengthen Jackson’ s relationship with the children; (3) Jackson failed, without good cause, to maintain continuing contact with the children for a six-month period following their placement in foster care; and (4) Jackson failed, without good cause, to provide or substantially plan for the children’s future for a six-month period following their placement in foster care. On appeal, Jackson’s sole argument with resp ect to the trial court’s termination of his parental rights under Code § 16.1-283(C)(1) is that LDSS failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Jackson failed, without good cause , to maintain continuing contact with the children for a period of six months following their placement in fo ster care. His argument does not address the other elements contained in Code § 16.1-283(C)(1), as cited above, and therefore, we will not address them. This record shows that Jackson made little or no effort to maintain continuing contact with the children. He visited B.J. and M.J. on three occasions betw een February 2006 and his incarceration in February 2007. In addition, he vi sited I.J. on only one occasion between early August 2006 and February 2007. Jackson’s only c ontact with the children between October 2006 and August 2007, consisted of, at most, a birthd ay card or total of f our letters. Jackson failed to keep four scheduled visits with th e children, even though LDSS had offered Jackson assistance with transportation. After October 3, 2006, Jackson left Virginia and went to- 8 - Massachusetts. Thereafter, he failed to maintain any face-to-face or verbal contact with LDSS or the children. Jackson offered no good cause for hi s lack of continuing cont act with the children. Thus, based upon this record, we cannot say th e trial court was plainly wrong or without evidence to conclude that Jackson failed to main tain continuing contact with B.J, M.J., and I.J. for a period of six months after their placement in foster care. Accordingly, we find no merit in Jackson’s argument and, therefor e, conclude the trial court’s decision terminating Jackson’s parental rights pursuant to Code § 16.1-283( C)(1) was supported by clear and convincing evidence. Jackson also contends the trial court erred in terminating his resi dual parental rights pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(C)(2). However, where a trial court’s judgment is made on alternative grounds, we need only consider whether any one of the alterna tives is sufficient to sustain the judgment of the tria l court and, if we so find, need not address the other grounds. See Boone v. C. Arthur Weaver Co. , 235 Va. 157, 161, 365 S.E.2d 764, 766 (1988). Thus, because we find that clear and convinci ng evidence supported the trial c ourt’s termination of Jackson’s residual parental rights under Code § 16.1-283(C)(1), we need not a ddress the trial court’s ruling terminating Jackson’s residual parent al rights under Code § 16.1-283(C)(2). Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decision of the trial court. See Rule 5A:27. Affirmed.