RECORD IMPOUNDED 

 SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY 

 APPELLATE DIVISION 

 DOCKET NO. A-2486-21 

M.L., 

 Plaintiff-Respondent, 

v.

D.J.W., Sr.,

 Defendant-Appellant. 

__________________________

Submitted March 4, 2024 – Decided March 21, 2024 

Before Judges Mawla and Chase. 

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Ocean County, Docket 

No. FV-15-0886-22. 

D.J.W., Sr., appellant pro se. 

M.L., respondent pro se. 

PER CURIAM 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE 

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION 

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2 A-2486-21 

Defendant D.W., Sr.

1

 appeals from a March 2, 2022 final restraining order 

("FRO") entered pursuant to the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act 

("PDVA"), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35, in favor of his ex-girlfriend, plaintiff M.L. 

We affirm. 

I.

The FRO judge conducted a two-day hearing and took testimony from 

both parties, plaintiff's sister, and the two responding officers. The judge found 

defendant committed the predicate acts of simple assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1, and 

terroristic threats, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3. He then concluded the FRO was necessary 

to protect plaintiff from further acts of domestic violence. 

Plaintiff testified she dated defendant for approximately fourteen months. 

She explained that on November 22, 2021, she and defendant were in her car 

together when he became "enraged," drove dangerously, threatened to wreck the 

vehicle to kill them both, hit her over one dozen times with a wrench that was 

stored in the glove box, fractured her nose by striking her with the wrench, and 

grabbed her throat. Plaintiff explained she told police about defendant's use of 

the wrench and was not sure why the officers did not include that detail in the 

temporary restraining order ("TRO"). She agreed she failed to mention 

1

 We use initials to protect the confidentiality of the victim. R. 1:38-3(d)(10). 
3 A-2486-21 

defendant grabbed her by the throat due to being in shock at the time she made 

the report to police. Nevertheless, plaintiff's testimony was consistent with the 

TRO regarding defendant threatening to cut her to pieces; possessing a gun in 

the trunk; and accelerating the car while she was still exiting. Plaintiff also 

testified defendant demanded to see her cell phone due to jealousy and stole her 

purse because it contained her cell phone. 

Plaintiff further testified that after defendant left the scene, she called 

9-1-1, filed for a restraining order, and allowed the responding officers to take 

photographs of her injuries. She provided the court with additional photographs 

of her injuries that she took over the course of several days after the incident. 

Regarding the evidence adduced at trial, the court excluded certain photographs 

and text messages that were not referenced in the original TRO. During crossexamination, plaintiff disagreed with defendant's allegations that she was 

jealous of defendant dating other women and that she hit him. 

S.L., plaintiff's sister, testified defendant made a poor impression on her 

when she met him. For example, he was drunk, made inappropriate jokes in 

front of her parents, and became hostile when people disagreed with his political 

views. S.L. explained defendant previously accused plaintiff of cheating on him 

and admitted he logged into her social media accounts. She believed defendant 
4 A-2486-21 

was unhappy when plaintiff ended their romantic relationship and threatened to 

destroy her personal property. On the night the TRO was entered, plaintiff told 

S.L. that defendant drove erratically, threatened to kill her, hit her with a wrench, 

and had a gun in the trunk. S.L. testified she observed plaintiff's injuries and 

further noted plaintiff was traumatized mentally and was fearful of defendant 

afterward. She showed the court screenshots of a text message exchange with 

plaintiff made shortly after the incident, in which plaintiff described the night 

of the TRO. 

Officer Kristopher Burke of the Barnegat Township Police Department 

testified he responded to plaintiff's 9-1-1 call. He testified plaintiff reported 

defendant drove erratically, threatened to kill them both, brandished a wrench, 

threatened to "chop her up into pieces," and claimed he possessed a gun in the 

trunk that he would use on her. He observed injuries sustained by plaintiff when 

defendant accelerated his vehicle as she tried to exit. 

According to Officer Burke, plaintiff did not report being hit with the 

wrench. While Officer Burke did not notice any injuries to her face or neck, he 

conceded during cross-examination plaintiff was wearing a scarf and turtleneck, 

which made it hard to see. He further conceded plaintiff may have mentioned 

defendant's use of the wrench to one of the other responding officers. 
5 A-2486-21 

Officer Burke confirmed plaintiff emailed him several weeks later to 

mention defendant threatened her with a box cutter and hit her with a wrench. 

Plaintiff did not mention defendant choked her. Although no gun was found in 

defendant's vehicle, defendant cooperated with police in surrendering his 

weapons. 

Later, Officer Burke prepared a supplemental report regarding the theft of 

plaintiff's purse. Although defendant claimed he did not have plaintiff's purse

and threw it from the car while driving down a specific street, another patrolman 

looked for the purse in the stated location to no avail. Officer Burke also noted 

it was strange that defendant later produced the purse. He further concluded 

defendant attempted to access plaintiff's accounts on her phone. 

Officer Daniel Dugan, a patrolman in Barnegat Township, testified he also 

responded to plaintiff's 9-1-1 call. He stated plaintiff did not mention the 

wrench, the box cutter, or being choked. 

Defendant testified he was an electrician and owned three businesses. He 

explained plaintiff worked for him and started living with him soon after they 

began dating. He also mentioned they spent two vacations together. He implied 

the decision to end their relationship was mutual and he started dating 

approximately ten women soon afterwards. 
6 A-2486-21 

Defendant stated on the night the TRO was entered against him, plaintiff 

repeatedly struck him five or six times over the course of thirty seconds because 

she was worried he infected her with a sexually transmitted disease. As a result, 

he decided to take her home instead of going to the movies as planned. Once 

they returned to her home, he alleged plaintiff punched him several times before 

exiting the car. He denied stealing her purse, threatening her with a wrench or 

box cutter, or hitting or choking her. He stated she left her purse in the car, and 

she acted like she was going to "smash" his car after exiting it. He threw her 

purse from the vehicle in response. He also claimed the photographs of her 

injuries were "fabricated." 

On cross-examination, defendant stated he did not pursue a claim against 

plaintiff for striking him because he "didn't want to throw gasoline on the fire." 

Contradicting his testimony on direct examination, he claimed he kept the purse 

and threw it into a wooded area where it stayed until he was released from jail, 

retrieved it, and turned it into the police. When confronted with the fact the 

purse was not dirty despite allegedly having been thrown into the woods, 

defendant stated he cleaned the purse, so it looked the same as it did on the night 

the TRO was entered against him. 
7 A-2486-21 

Defendant admitted he possessed plaintiff's cell phone but claimed it fell 

from her purse and was in his vehicle. Although he claimed he turned her phone 

on, he denied logging into her Facebook, Facebook Messenger, or Gmail 

accounts. However, he could not explain the discrepancy between his prior 

statement that he turned on plaintiff's phone and his later claim that only his 

child turned on the phone. 

Defendant denied a text message he sent on the day of the incident 

professing his continued love for plaintiff was intended to be romantic. Rather, 

he contended any text messages he wrote about the two "try[ing] again" were 

meant to reference a platonic friendship. Defendant maintained plaintiff was 

angry at him for dating other women. Upon further questioning, defendant 

admitted he threatened suicide to plaintiff during their relationship. 

On March 2, 2022, the court entered an FRO against defendant and placed 

its reasoning on the record that same day. It concluded defendant lacked 

credibility in his claim that plaintiff was simply a "scorned" woman who was 

angry he was dating someone else. Plaintiff produced text messages 

demonstrating defendant wanted to pursue a romantic relationship with her. 

Defendant also provided incredible testimony that he never threatened suicide, 

which was disproven by text messages. Further, the court found defendant's 
8 A-2486-21 

testimony regarding his taking of plaintiff's purse lacked credibility because he 

made conflicting statements. The court concluded defendant took plaintiff's 

purse to access her cell phone. 

The court also expressed concern about plaintiff's credibility with regard 

to being struck repeatedly with a wrench, but held even without being struck 

with a wrench, there was enough evidence to support the issuance of a 

restraining order. Further, the court believed defendant accelerated the vehicle 

while plaintiff was exiting to take her purse and cell phone. Overall, the court 

determined plaintiff was more credible throughout the trial. 

II. 

Our review of a court's decision after a bench trial in the Family Part is 

limited. C.C. v. J.A.H., 463 N.J. Super. 419, 428 (App. Div. 2020). In reviewing 

"a trial court's order entered following trial in a domestic violence matter, we 

grant substantial deference to the trial court's findings of fact and the legal 

conclusions based upon those findings." J.D. v. A.M.W., 475 N.J. Super. 306, 

312-13 (App. Div. 2023) (quoting N.T.B. v. D.D.B., 442 N.J. Super. 205, 215 

(App. Div. 2015)). Trial court findings are "binding on appeal when supported 

by adequate, substantial, credible evidence." G.M. v. C.V., 453 N.J. Super. 1, 

11 (App. Div. 2018) (quoting Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998)). 
9 A-2486-21 

"We defer to the credibility determinations made by the trial court because the 

trial judge 'hears the case, sees and observes the witnesses, and hears them 

testify,' affording it 'a better perspective than a reviewing court in evaluating the 

veracity of a witness.'" Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414, 428 (2015) (quoting 

Cesare, 154 N.J. at 412). Deference is particularly appropriate "when the 

evidence is largely testimonial and involves questions of credibility." In re 

J.W.D., 149 N.J. 108, 117 (1997) (citing Bonnco Petrol, Inc. v. Epstein, 115 N.J. 

599, 607 (1989)). 

We do not disturb a trial judge's factual findings unless they are "so 

manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant[,] and 

reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice." S.D. v. 

M.J.R., 415 N.J. Super. 417, 429 (App. Div. 2010) (quoting Cesare, 154 N.J. at 

412). "We accord substantial deference to Family Part judges, who routinely 

hear domestic violence cases and are 'specially trained to detect the difference 

between domestic violence and more ordinary differences that arise between 

couples.'" C.C., 463 N.J. Super. at 428 (quoting J.D. v. M.D.F., 207 N.J. 458, 

482 (2011)). 

The purpose of the PDVA is to "assure the victims of domestic violence 

the maximum protection from abuse the law can provide." G.M., 453 N.J. Super. 
10 A-2486-21 

at 12 (quoting State v. Brown, 394 N.J. Super. 492, 504 (App. Div. 2007)); see 

also N.J.S.A. 2C:25-18. Consequently, "'[o]ur law is particularly solicitous of 

victims of domestic violence,'" J.D., 207 N.J. at 473 (alteration in original) 

(quoting State v. Hoffman, 149 N.J. 564, 584 (1997)), and courts liberally 

construe the PDVA "to achieve its salutary purposes." Cesare, 154 N.J. at 400. 

Domestic violence occurs when an adult or emancipated minor commits a 

predicate act upon a person protected by the PDVA. N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a). A 

judge must engage in a two-step analysis when determining whether to grant an 

FRO under the PDVA. Silver v. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. 112, 125 (App. Div. 

2006). First, the judge must be satisfied, by a preponderance of the credible 

evidence, the plaintiff has proven the occurrence of one or more of the predicate 

acts enumerated in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a). Ibid. See also N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a) 

(providing an FRO may only be granted "after a finding or an admission is made 

that an act of domestic violence was committed"); R. 5:7A(d) (mirroring the

language of N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)). 

Only if the plaintiff first proves one of the predicate acts does the judge

then consider whether an FRO is warranted to protect the plaintiff. Silver, 387 

N.J. Super. at 126; see also J.D., 207 N.J. at 476 (quoting N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(b) 

and explaining the judge must find "relief is necessary to prevent further 
11 A-2486-21 

abuse"). While this second inquiry "is most often perfunctory and self-evident, 

the guiding standard is whether a restraining order is necessary, upon an 

evaluation of the factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)(1) to -29(a)(6), to 

protect the victim from an immediate danger or to prevent further abuse." Id. at 

475-76 (quoting Silver, 387 N.J. Super. at 127). 

III. 

On appeal, defendant argues the trial court's factual findings and 

conclusions of law were not supported by credible evidence. Even if they were, 

he claims the FRO was unnecessary to protect plaintiff. 

A.

Defendant disagrees with the court's conclusions that he: wanted to 

rekindle his romantic relationship with plaintiff; previously threatened suicide; 

intentionally took plaintiff's purse; and wanted to look at the contents of her 

phone. He further disagrees with the court's finding that plaintiff was more 

credible. Overall, he contends the domestic violence complaint should have 

been dismissed because he was the more credible witness. 

There is ample credible evidence in the record to support the court's 

conclusions. The trial court noted plaintiff's testimony was more credible 

regarding defendant's desire to continue their romantic relationship and
12 A-2486-21 

threatening self-harm. Defendant provided conflicting and nonsensical 

statements about his continued romantic interest in plaintiff. For example, he 

denied a text message he sent on the day of the incident professing his continued 

love for plaintiff was intended to be romantic and, also, claimed any text 

messages that he wrote about the two "try[ing] again" were meant to reference 

a platonic friendship. Further, he admitted he threatened suicide to plaintiff 

during their relationship. Although the parties have not supplied us with copies 

of the text messages, the trial testimony of both parties supports the court's 

credibility determinations. 

The court also concluded, and the record on appeal supports, defendant 

provided conflicting stories about taking plaintiff's purse and accessing her cell 

phone. Further, the court found plaintiff to be the more credible of the two and, 

even setting aside her claims about the wrench, the court believed her recounting 

of the events was credible. 

There is support for the court's conclusion that plaintiff's testimony, 

excluding defendant's alleged use of the wrench, was sufficient to satisfy the 

legal standards for an FRO. Defendant's other conduct on the night in question, 

including his erratic driving, his claims that he would kill both himself and 
13 A-2486-21 

plaintiff, and his decision to accelerate the car as plaintiff tried to exit, were 

sufficient for the court to grant the FRO. 

In sum, the trial court's credibility determinations were not manifestly 

unsupported or inconsistent with the evidence in such a way that the interests of 

justice were offended. Rather, the court's finding as to the predicate act of 

domestic violence was proper based on the testimonial evidence adduced. 

B.

Defendant further contends the court erred in granting the FRO because it 

did not need to protect plaintiff from immediate danger or protect her from 

further abuse. He alleges plaintiff lives in another country where the FRO will 

not protect her, and so the FRO unnecessarily deprives him of his freedoms. 

The court concluded defendant repeatedly threatened plaintiff to put her 

in fear of bodily injury and made terroristic threats when he referenced a gun 

and drove erratically. It found an FRO was necessary to protect plaintiff and 

she credibly testified she suffered injuries from defendant. The court rejected 

defendant's claims that plaintiff lived abroad and the two would not cross paths. 

It ordered defendant to avoid plaintiff when she returned to the United States 

and to avoid her place of employment in the United States. The record also 

reflects plaintiff was a permanent U.S. citizen working in the United States. 
14 A-2486-21 

There was substantial credible evidence in the record to support the court's 

determination that the second prong of Silver was satisfied. The record supports 

the court's conclusion that plaintiff needed protection from further abuse by 

defendant, who committed severe acts of violence and threatened to kill 

plaintiff. The trial court's findings are adequately supported by the substantial, 

credible evidence in the record, and we discern no basis to disturb them. 

 To the extent we have not specifically addressed defendant's remaining 

claims, we conclude they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written 

opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). 

Affirmed.