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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA 

YODER AUSTIN BLALOCK, 

Appellant/Cross-Appellee, 

v. 

STATE OF ALASKA, 

Appellee/Cross-Appellant. 

Court of Appeals Nos. A-12282 & A-12301
 


Trial Court No. 3AN-11-12129 CR
 


O P I N I O N 


No. 2656 — September 27, 2019 


Appeal from the Superior Court, Third Judicial District, 

Anchorage, Jack W. Smith, Judge. 

Appearances: Elizabeth D. Friedman, Law Office of Elizabeth 

D. Friedman, Redding, California, under contract with the 

Office of Public Advocacy, Anchorage, for the Appellant/CrossAppellee. Ann B. Black, Assistant Attorney General, Office of 

Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Jahna Lindemuth, Attorney 

General, Juneau, for the Appellee/Cross-Appellant. 

Before: Allard, Chief Judge, and Wollenberg and Harbison, 

Judges. 

Judge HARBISON. 

Following a jury trial, Yoder Austin Blalock was convicted of seconddegree murder for killing Nathan Tanape. Blalock was sentenced to 60 years with 15 

years suspended (45 years to serve) and was placed on probation for a period of 10 years. 
Prior to trial, Blalock moved to suppress the statements he made to the 

police, both at the scene of his arrest and later at the police station. Blalock argued that, 

because he had requested an attorney at the scene, any subsequent questioning by the 

police in the absence of an attorney violated the United States Supreme Court’s decision 

in Edwards v. Arizona.

1 Under Edwards, the police are precluded from initiating further 

interrogation of a suspect who has invoked his right to counsel, until counsel has been 

made available.2 

At an evidentiary hearing, the trial court agreed with Blalock and precluded 

the prosecutor from introducing Blalock’s statements as part of the State’s case-in-chief. 

But the court later found that the officers’ conduct was neither intentional nor egregious. 

Accordingly, applying Alaska Evidence Rule 412 (as interpreted by this Court in State 

v. Batts3

), the trial court allowed the prosecutor to impeach Blalock’s testimony with his 

statements to the police. 

On appeal, Blalock challenges the trial court’s ruling permitting the State 

to use his statements to impeach him during cross-examination. The State cross-appeals, 

arguing that the trial court erred in granting Blalock’s motion to suppress. In particular, 

the State argues that Blalock was not subject to a custodial interrogation at the time he 

asked for a lawyer and that he was not entitled to anticipatorily invoke his Miranda 

rights. Because we conclude that the trial court did not err in allowing the impeachment 

use of Blalock’s statements and because we otherwise affirm Blalock’s conviction, we 

need not decide the issues raised in the State’s cross-appeal. 

1 See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-86 (1981).
 

2 Id. at 484-85.
 

3 See State v. Batts, 195 P.3d 144, 151-52 (Alaska App. 2008).
 

– 2 – 2656

At trial, Blalock defended on the ground of self-defense, and the trial court 

instructed the jury on this defense. Blalock asked the trial court to instruct the jury on 

the “Stand Your Ground” amendment — a 2013 statutory enactment that narrowed a 

person’s duty to retreat before using deadly force in self-defense. Under this 

amendment, there is no duty to retreat if the person is “in any . . . place where the person 

has a right to be.”4 The trial court concluded that the “Stand Your Ground” law was not 

retroactively applicable to Blalock’s case, which was based on events occurring in 2011, 

and the trial court declined to instruct the jury on it. 

Blalock now challenges the trial court’s decision. For the reasons explained 

here, we agree with the trial court that the statutory amendment did not apply 

retroactively to Blalock’s case. We therefore uphold the trial court’s decision declining 

to instruct the jury on the 2013 law. 

Finally, Blalock raises several challenges to his sentence. We have 

reviewed his claims, and we find no merit to them. 

Factual background 

One night in October 2011, Blalock drove to Tanape’s apartment where 

Blalock’s acquaintance, Charles Alexie, and several other people were partying. Outside 

of the apartment, Blalock encountered Tanape. When Blalock was standing about ten 

feet away from Tanape, Tanape yelled at him to leave. 

Blalock began walking back to his truck, saying, “Just wait right there, I got 

something for you.” Blalock took something out of his truck and walked back toward 

Tanape. Blalock and Tanape faced off. Blalock sprayed Tanape with pepper spray and 

4 AS 11.81.335(b)(5) (enacted by SLA 2013, ch. 51, § 1). 

– 3 – 2656

slashed him with a knife. Tanape went to the ground; he then grabbed Blalock by the 

legs, picked him up, and slammed him to the ground. 

Alexie ran toward Blalock and Tanape to intervene, but Blalock sprayed 

Alexie with pepper spray, causing Alexie to fall to the ground and have difficulty 

breathing. Tanape and Blalock struggled, and then Blalock got up, ran back to his truck, 

and drove away, leaving Tanape lying in the middle of the alley. 

Alexie ran back inside the apartment, covering his eyes, and yelling for 

someone to call 911. Tanape came inside soon after Alexie, covered in blood and unable 

to speak. 

Police officers responded to the apartment. When they arrived, they noticed 

an overwhelming smell of pepper spray and observed Tanape sitting in a chair. He had 

wounds on his legs and knees, a large laceration on his head, and what appeared to be 

a stab wound to the back of his neck. 

Shortly after the officers arrived, Tanape was transported to the hospital 

where he was pronounced dead. The medical examiner determined that Tanape had 

suffered over twenty stab wounds, including one that was fatal. 

After Blalock fled the scene, he called 911 several times to report that he 

was involved in the incident. Officers located Blalock and arrested him. They then took 

him to the Anchorage Police Department where detectives read him a Miranda warning.5 

Blalock agreed to be interviewed by the detectives, and he made incriminating statements 

during the interview. 

5 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). 

– 4 – 2656

Blalock was subsequently charged with second-degree murder for stabbing 

Tanape to death.6 The case proceeded to trial, and Blalock was convicted of seconddegree murder. 

Litigation of Blalock’s motion to suppress and the use of his statements as 

impeachment evidence 

Prior to trial, Blalock moved to suppress the statements he made during his 

arrest and subsequent interview. Blalock asserted that he had clearly invoked his right 

to counsel during his arrest and that the on-scene police officers did not report the 

invocation to the detectives who later interrogated him. He contended that once he 

invoked his right to counsel, the Supreme Court’s decision in Edwards v. Arizona 

precluded the police from initiating an interrogation with him until an attorney was 

present.7 Although the detectives read him his Miranda rights prior to interrogating him 

at the station, Blalock asserted that his statements had to be suppressed because they 

were obtained in violation of the Edwards rule. 

The evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing on Blalock’s motion 

showed that when the officers first confronted Blalock, he made statements about the 

incident. In response, one of the officers activated his recorder. 

The recording captured the conversations between Blalock and the officers 

as follows: Blalock initially made a variety of spontaneous statements, including 

repeatedly asking, “Is he okay?” At one point, an officer asked Blalock where his truck 

was located. Blalock responded, “Oh, it’s safe. I want to talk to a lawyer.” The officer 

replied, “What’s that?” Blalock did not repeat his request for a lawyer. 

6 AS 11.41.110(a)(1) and/or (a)(2).
 

7 See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-86 (1981).
 

– 5 – 2656

Instead, Blalock continued making rambling statements. For example, he 

said, “Well . . . is (indiscernible) going to be okay or not? Fuck, when I — And when 

I first got away, the last time I hit him, I — something happened to his eye.” 

During the evidentiary hearing, the officer who made the recording testified 

that he did not hear Blalock state that he wanted to talk to a lawyer. The officer was 

aware that Blalock said something, which is why he asked Blalock to repeat himself. But 

the officer did not hear Blalock say anything in response. 

The officer testified that during his contact with Blalock, his radio was 

active, so he was hearing radio traffic as well as trying to talk to Blalock. Additionally, 

he reported that he had significant hearing loss in certain frequencies, likely due to his 

experience as a firefighter and a police officer. 

One of the other officers who initially contacted Blalock also testified at the 

hearing. He explained that, as the cover officer, he was responsible for making sure that 

the scene was safe until other officers arrived to help take Blalock into custody. His 

main concern was safety, and he was concentrating on watching Blalock’s behavior to 

ensure there was no threat. 

The detective who later interviewed Blalock testified that he did not speak 

with the arresting officers or listen to the recordings of their contact with Blalock before 

the interview. 

Based on this evidence, the trial court granted Blalock’s motion to suppress 

and excluded Blalock’s statements from being used during the State’s case-in-chief. The 

trial court found that Blalock clearly and audibly invoked his right to counsel. The trial 

court concluded that a reasonable officer should have heard Blalock’s clear invocation 

because “a reasonable officer would be paying attention to statements made by the 

defendant, especially when he had a recording device going and was asking questions 

– 6 – 2656

of the defendant.” The trial court therefore suppressed all statements Blalock made to 

the on-scene officers after he invoked his right to counsel. 

The court also suppressed Blalock’s later statements to the detectives at the 

police station. The trial court found that Blalock’s waiver of his Miranda rights at the 

police station was invalid under Edwards because the police, not Blalock, initiated the 

questioning.8 

In its written order granting Blalock’s motion to suppress, the trial court 

ruled that Blalock’s statements could not be used for any purpose during the trial “except 

to impeach the Defendant’s contradictory testimony at trial.” Blalock did not object to 

this ruling at that time. 

The case proceeded to trial. After the State rested and the defense had 

begun to present its case, Blalock’s attorney indicated that Blalock would testify. 

Blalock’s attorney then asserted for the first time that the Miranda violation was 

“egregious” and “intentional” and was therefore inadmissible even for impeachment 

purposes under Alaska Evidence Rule 412 and this Court’s decision in State v. Batts.

9 

After reviewing its original order and the Batts decision, but without 

hearing any additional evidence, the trial court concluded that the violation was 

egregious and that Blalock’s statements in response to police questioning could not be 

used for any purpose. 

The State petitioned for review, and this Court granted the State’s petition. 

Because the Batts issue had not been litigated as part of the original suppression 

8 See Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85. 

9 See State v. Batts, 195 P.3d 144, 151-52, 157-58 (Alaska App. 2008) (holding that a 

defendant may be impeached with statements made in violation of his Miranda rights where 

“the violation consisted of a failure . . . to honor the defendant’s invocation of the right to . . . 

counsel,” unless the Miranda violation was either intentional or egregious). 

– 7 – 2656

proceedings, this Court vacated the trial court’s ruling that the Miranda violation in 

Blalock’s case was egregious. We held that “the State was entitled to notice and a proper 

opportunity to litigate the [Batts] issue before the [superior] court made new findings that 

affected the admissibility of this evidence.” 

Based on this ruling, the trial court conducted a second evidentiary hearing 

in order to address the Batts issue. 

Some of the evidence presented at this second evidentiary hearing mirrored 

the evidence that had been presented to the trial court at the first evidentiary hearing. 

The trial court again heard that Blalock clearly announced that he wanted to talk to a 

lawyer. The trial court again heard officers testify that they did not hear this statement. 

But the State also presented new evidence from a clinical 

neuropsychologist. The neuropsychologist, Paul Craig, testified about how the brain 

processes auditory information, and specifically how the brain suppresses some input in 

order to focus on relevant stimuli. Based on his review of the recording which 

documented Blalock’s arrest, Craig concluded that what could be heard on the recording 

was not necessarily the equivalent of what ended up in the listeners’ minds. Craig 

explained that other input (such as the radio traffic) would have been competing with 

Blalock’s voice, and this impacted the ability of at least some of the officers to hear what 

Blalock was saying. 

Craig also noted that when Blalock invoked his right to counsel, the officer 

closest to him had just asked him about the location of his vehicle and he was listening 

for an answer to that question. According to Craig, Blalock’s response, asking for a 

lawyer, “conceptually didn’t fit in” and therefore an officer might not process, hear, and 

comprehend that answer. 

– 8 – 2656


The trial court also heard from a police lieutenant who had not testified at 

the first hearing. The lieutenant explained that during high-risk arrests, officers are 

experiencing sensory overload, and their attention is consistently divided. A cover 

officer’s primary focus is generally on the suspect’s actions, specifically the hands; cover 

officers are watching for threatening movements or attempts to reach for weapons. 

Arresting officers are generally focused on the arrest itself, to make sure there is no 

struggle during the handcuffing process and to ensure that the suspect is secured in the 

patrol vehicle. 

After hearing this additional evidence, the trial court issued a new ruling, 

this time concluding that the Miranda violation was neither intentional nor egregious. 

The trial court found that the officers were credible when they testified that 

they did not hear or comprehend Blalock’s request for an attorney, and it accordingly 

found that the officers did not act intentionally when they questioned him after he asked 

for an attorney. 

Noting that an egregious violation is one that would be apparent to any 

reasonable officer, the trial court found that the violation by the officers in this case was 

not egregious because it was caused by natural psychological reactions and tunnel vision 

caused by the anxiety of a high-stress situation. The trial court also observed that this 

was not the type of situation where application of the exclusionary rule could have an 

influence on police behavior and policies. 

The trial court similarly found that the detectives’ interrogation of Blalock 

at the police station was not an egregious violation of Miranda. In order for the 

detectives to have discovered that Blalock had previously invoked his right to counsel, 

they would have had to listen carefully to the audio and any video recording prior to 

conducting the interrogation. The trial court found that requiring detectives to listen 

– 9 – 2656

carefully to audio and video recordings of the arrest prior to interrogating a homicide 

suspect is “simply too high a burden to impose on the police” and is “unreasonable.” 

Blalock testified, and the State introduced his statements for impeachment 

purposes. 

Alaska law regarding the impeachment use of statements obtained in 

violation of Miranda 

In Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court held that the privilege against 

self-incrimination applies to questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a 

person has been taken into custody and that “prior to any questioning, the person must 

be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statements he does make may be 

used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either 

retained or appointed.” 10 When a suspect in custody invokes his right to counsel, the 

police must stop all questioning until counsel is present, unless the defendant initiates the 

discussion.11 

Generally, a defendant’s statements obtained in violation of Miranda are 

inadmissible except to impeach the defendant’s inconsistent statements at trial.12 In 

Harris v. New York, the Supreme Court explained this exception, concluding that a 

defendant’s privilege to testify should not be construed to include the right to commit 

perjury: “The shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use 

10 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). 

11 Tagala v. State, 812 P.2d 604, 609 (Alaska App. 1991) (citing Arizona v. Roberson, 

486 U.S. 675, 677 (1988)). 

12 See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 

723-24 (1975). 

– 10 – 2656

perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent 

utterances.”13 

Alaska Evidence Rule 412 similarly allows a defendant to be impeached 

with certain statements obtained in violation of Miranda, regardless of whether the 

Miranda violation consisted of a failure to give proper warnings or a failure to honor the 

defendant’s invocation of the right to silence or the right to counsel.14 

In State v. Batts, we considered the question of whether Evidence Rule 412 

is unconstitutional under the Alaska Constitution. In particular, we considered whether 

the Alaska exclusionary rule should be applied to prohibit even the impeachment use of 

statements obtained in violation of Miranda.

15 

We concluded that the application of Evidence Rule 412 is constitutional 

only when the Miranda violation was neither “intentional” nor “egregious.”16 We 

explained that a Miranda violation is “intentional if the officer conducting the 

interrogation knew that further questioning would violate Miranda[,] but the officer 

consciously chose to continue” questioning. 17 We also explained that a Miranda 

violation is “egregious if the violation would have been apparent to any reasonable 

police officer.”18 

13 Harris, 401 U.S. at 225-26.
 

14 See State v. Batts, 195 P.3d 144, 151-52 (Alaska App. 2008).
 

15 Id. at 155-58.
 

16 Id. at 158.
 

17 Id.
 

18 Id.
 

– 11 – 2656

Why we conclude that the trial court did not err when it allowed the State 

to use Blalock’s statements for impeachment purposes 

On appeal, Blalock argues that the trial court mistakenly applied a 

subjective standard in analyzing whether the police conduct was egregious when it 

should have applied an objective standard. That is, he contends that the question of 

whether a Miranda violation was egregious should not hinge on whether the officers 

actually heard Blalock’s invocation but rather on whether a “reasonable police officer” 

would have heard Blalock’s statement. Blalock also argues that, even if the arresting 

officers’ violation of Miranda was not egregious, the detectives who interrogated 

Blalock at the police station subsequently committed an egregious violation of Miranda 

by not investigating whether or not he had invoked his right to counsel before they 

conducted their interview. 

We agree that the question of whether a Miranda violation is “egregious” 

under Batts is an objective test. A violation is “egregious” if “the violation would have 

been apparent to any reasonable police officer.” 19 As we said in Batts, “[T]he police 

must not be allowed to make violation of Miranda a tactic, nor should the government 

be allowed to profit from a Miranda violation that no reasonable police officer would 

have committed.”20 

Here, in analyzing whether the Miranda violation was egregious, the trial 

court correctly applied an objective test. Even though the court found, based on the 

testimony presented at the suppression hearing, that a reasonable officer should have 

heard Blalock’s invocation of the right to counsel and therefore precluded the State from 

relying on Blalock’s statements in its case-in-chief, the new evidence presented at the 

19 Batts, 195 P.3d at 158. 

20 Id. 

– 12 – 2656

 

 

 

 

Batts hearing led the court to conclude that the Miranda violation was caused by “natural 

neuropsychological reactions to stress, multitasking, multiple streams of communication, 

and focused operation by each officer.” The trial court noted that Blalock’s statement 

was a single non sequitur statement that did not conceptually fit in to the conversation 

between Blalock and the officers. It also found that a reasonable officer focused on 

safety concerns and distracted by radio traffic during an ongoing homicide investigation 

and arrest would not necessarily have heard or immediately internalized a request for 

counsel. 

The trial court recognized the improbability that none of the arresting 

officers would have heard Blalock’s request for counsel. But the trial court found that 

the officers’ testimony was credible, and the court expressly concluded that “no officer 

heard or comprehended” the defendant’s request for counsel. The trial court noted that 

the officer closest to Blalock clearly understood that Blalock had said something because 

he attempted to clarify Blalock’s statement by asking, “What’s that?” But Blalock did 

not repeat his request. Instead, Blalock continued talking about the crime. 

After analyzing the totality of the circumstances, the trial judge found that 

the purpose of the exclusionary rule — i.e., to deter police misconduct — would not be 

furthered by excluding Blalock’s statements for impeachment purposes. Given the 

court’s factual findings, which are not clearly erroneous, we conclude that the trial court 

did not err by finding that the arresting officers’ Miranda violation was not egregious. 

We recognize that this finding is in tension with the court’s earlier finding that a 

reasonable officer should have heard Blalock’s request for counsel. But that tension 

serves to undermine the court’s original decision to suppress Blalock’s statements — not 

the use of Blalock’s statements for impeachment purposes. 

– 13 – 2656


To the extent Blalock is also arguing that the trial court erred in finding that 

the Miranda violation was not “intentional,” we reject this argument. We held in Batts 

that a Miranda violation is “intentional” if the officer consciously decides to continue 

questioning while knowing that such questioning violates Miranda.

21 This is necessarily 

a subjective test. 

As we noted earlier, the trial court found credible the officers’ testimony 

that they did not hear Blalock’s request for counsel. This finding of credibility is entitled 

to broad deference.22 The record supports the trial court’s finding, and we therefore 

conclude that the trial court did not err in ruling that the officers did not intentionally 

violate Miranda. 

Blalock also contends that, even if the arresting officers’ conduct did not 

amount to an egregious Miranda violation, the conduct of the detectives who 

subsequently interviewed him was egregious, because the detectives did not investigate 

whether or not Blalock had invoked his right to counsel. 

The officers in this case were interrogating Blalock shortly after he was 

taken into custody. The on-scene officers had not yet prepared a written report. If the 

detectives had asked the on-scene officers whether Blalock had requested counsel, based 

on their testimony the officers would honestly, but mistakenly, have responded that 

Blalock had not asked for a lawyer. 

It is reasonable to require detectives to check with on-scene officers prior 

to conducting an interrogation in order to determine whether the suspect has invoked the 

21 Id. 

22 See, e.g., Rausch v. Devine, 80 P.3d 733, 737 (Alaska 2003) (“The trial court’s 

findings regarding the credibility of witnesses . . . may be reversed only if clearly 

erroneous.”). 

– 14 – 2656

 

 

 

 

right to counsel. But Blalock’s proposed rule would deem egregious a detective’s failure 

to listen to every available audio recording before conducting a first interview with a 

suspect, even when, as here, the interrogation takes place during a dynamic, ongoing 

investigation and shortly after a suspect is brought into custody.23 This proposed rule is 

inconsistent with the practical realities of police investigations. 

We therefore affirm the trial court’s ruling allowing the State to impeach 

Blalock’s testimony with the statements he made to the police. 

Given our ruling, and because we affirm Blalock’s conviction, the State’s 

cross-appeal challenging Blalock’s motion to suppress is moot, and we do not address 

it further. 

Applicability of the 2013 amendment to the self-defense justification statute 

Prior to his trial, Blalock filed notice that he intended to rely on the 

justification of self-defense. He also asked the trial court to instruct the jury that he had 

no duty to retreat before using self-defense due to the recently enacted “Stand Your 

Ground” amendment to the self-defense statute. Under this amendment, a person who 

23 We note that a portion of Blalock’s argument is based on the United States Supreme 

Court decision Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 687-88 (1988). But Roberson is not 

directly applicable to this case. In Roberson, the Supreme Court held that the Edwards rule 

bars police-initiated interrogation following a suspect’s request for counsel, even when the 

interrogation is regarding a separate investigation. Id. at 682-85. The Supreme Court stated 

that it attached no significance to the fact that the officer who conducted the second 

interrogation did not know that the defendant had made a request for counsel. Id. at 687. 

This is a different situation than is presented in Blalock’s case, where the question is not 

whether Blalock’s Miranda rights were violated, but whether the officers’ conduct was 

intentional and egregious such that Blalock’s statements could not be used even to impeach 

him. 

– 15 – 2656

is in a place where they have the right to be does not have a duty to retreat before using 

deadly force in self-defense.24 

The trial court ruled that the legislative change did not apply retroactively 

to Blalock’s case, and it declined to instruct the jury on “Stand Your Ground.” Blalock 

now challenges this ruling. 

Legislative changes to the duty to retreat prior to the use of deadly force 

in self-defense 

As originally enacted in 1978, the self-defense statute provided, in pertinent 

part, that a person may not use deadly force in self-defense if the person knows that with 

complete safety, the person can avoid the necessity of using deadly force by retreating.25 

But the statute included an exception to the duty to retreat, explaining that it was not 

necessary to retreat when a person was in a premises that the person owned or leased.26 

Through an amendment in 2006, other exceptions were added, including that a person 

had no duty to retreat before using deadly force when in the person’s temporary or 

permanent residence or in a building where the person worked in the ordinary course of 

employment.27 

In 2013, the legislature added yet another exception to the self-defense 

statute. This exception, commonly called the “Stand Your Ground” amendment, was 

added by House Bill 24, and it provided that there is no duty to retreat before using 

24 See AS 11.81.335(b)(5). 

25 See SLA 1978, ch. 166, § 10; former AS 11.81.335(b) (1978). 

26 See former AS 11.81.335(b)(1) & (2) (1978). 

27 SLA 2006, ch. 68, § 3. 

– 16 – 2656

deadly force in self-defense if the person is “in any other place where the person has a 

right to be.”28 

The question raised by Blalock is whether the 2013 “Stand Your Ground” 

amendment applied to his 2011 killing of Nathan Tanape. 

Why we conclude that the “Stand Your Ground” amendment is not 

retroactive 

A statute will not be given retroactive effect unless it clearly appears that 

it was the legislature’s intent.29 The legislature passed the “Stand Your Ground” 

amendment in 2013, and it became effective on September 18, 2013, ninety days after 

the governor signed the bill.30 The legislature did not set out an applicability provision 

as part of the legislation and therefore did not make an explicit statement that the “Stand 

Your Ground” amendment would apply retroactively. 

Blalock argued in the trial court that the “Stand Your Ground” amendment 

was not a substantive change in the law but rather was simply a “clarification” of existing 

law, and that therefore due process required that the effective date of the “clarification” 

was the date of the enactment of the original statute, AS 11.81.335. As a result, he 

claims that the 2013 “Stand Your Ground” amendment applied to his 2011 crime. 

28 SLA 2013, ch. 51, § 1; see also AS 11.81.335(b)(5). 

29 AS 01.10.090; see also Herscher v. State Dept. of Commerce, 568 P.2d 996, 1001 

(Alaska 1977); State v. Kaatz, 572 P.2d 775, 779 (Alaska 1977). 

30 SLA 2013, ch. 51, § 1; see also Alaska Constitution art. II, § 18 (“Laws passed by the 

legislature become effective ninety days after enactment.”); AS 01.10.070 (“Acts become 

effective 90 days after becoming law, unless the legislature . . . provides for another effective 

date.”). 

– 17 – 2656

Before the “Stand Your Ground” amendment was passed in 2013, a person 

ordinarily had a duty to retreat before using deadly force to defend themselves; there 

were four specifically delineated exceptions to this rule.31 But now the law of selfdefense is that there is no duty to retreat before using deadly force, as long as the person 

using the force is in a place where they have a right to be.32 This is a substantive change 

in the law, not merely a clarification of the existing law. 

The legislative history of the amendment supports our interpretation of its 

effect on the law of self-defense. For example, Rex Shattuck, staff member to the bill’s 

sponsor, Representative Mark Neuman, testified during the House Judiciary Committee 

meeting that the “Stand Your Ground” amendment expanded locations from which there 

was no duty to retreat. He pointed out that the amendment eliminated the need to retreat 

from any location where a person has the legal right to be — such as “out camping, if 

you’re on public land” or “outside your home.”33 

That the amendment was an expansion of the law, rather than a 

“clarification,” also was made clear from an exchange between Representative Les Gara 

and Representative Neuman during the House Finance Committee meeting. During that 

exchange, Representative Gara expressed concern that if there was no difference between 

the bill and the current law, then they were “wasting” their time.34 In response, 

Representative Neuman explained that, in general, existing Alaska law required persons 

31 Former AS 11.81.335(b) (1)-(4) (pre-Sept. 2013 version). 

32 AS 11.81.335(b)(5); see also SLA 2013, ch. 51, § 1. 

33 Minutes of House Judiciary Comm., House Bill 24, statement by Rex Shattuck, 

1:12:18-1:12:24 p.m. (Feb. 6, 2013). 

34 Minutes of House Finance Comm., House Bill 24, statement by Representative Les 

Gara, 1:48:07-1:48:15 p.m. (Feb. 28, 2013). 

– 18 – 2656

to retreat, if they could do so safely, but that the proposed amendment changed the law 

by giving more weight to the right to defend oneself and others than to the duty to 

retreat.35 

Blalock argues that because certain sponsors of the amendment stated that 

the amendment “clarifies” the law, this Court should find that the amendment was not 

a substantive change to the law of self-defense. For example, during the House Judiciary 

Committee meeting, Representative Neuman explained that House Bill 24 was necessary 

in light of citizens’ concerns about the right to use self-defense without the courts 

second-guessing their decisions.36 Representative Neuman stated that Alaska statutes 

already recognize a r ight to use force, and that House Bill 24 “clarifies that right exists 

not only in our home, but also in . . . any place that we have a right to be.”37 And 

Neuman’s staffer, Rex Shattuck, reiterated that the bill was not changing justification, 

but rather “add[ing] clarification” to the law.38 

Blalock’s argument is unconvincing. The use of the word “clarify” by 

some legislators and staffers does not change the fact that the legislature’s purpose in 

enacting the “Stand Your Ground” amendment was to expand, not clarify, the right to 

use deadly force in self-defense. 

35 See Minutes of House Finance Comm., House Bill 24, statement by Representative 

Mark Neuman, 1:52:57-1:53:39 p.m. (Feb. 28, 2013). 

36 Minutes of House Judiciary Comm., House Bill 24, statement by Representative Mark 

Neuman, 1:07:37-1:08:28 p.m. (Feb. 6, 2013). 

37 Minutes of House Judiciary Comm., House Bill 24, statement by Representative Mark 

Neuman, 1:08:40-1:08:47 p.m. (Feb. 6, 2013). 

38 Minutes of House Judiciary Comm., House Bill 24, statement by Rex Shattuck, 

1:15:30-1:16:37 p.m. (Feb. 6, 2013). 

– 19 – 2656

We also note that other jurisdictions have concluded that similar 

amendments to their self-defense statutes were substantive changes to the law and that 

the presumption of prospective application applied in the absence of legislative intent to 

the contrary.39 We agree with this conclusion. 

Accordingly, because Alaska’s “Stand Your Ground” amendment was not 

retroactively applicable to Blalock’s case, the superior court did not err by refusing to 

instruct the jury on this portion of the self-defense statute. 

Blalock’s claims regarding his sentence 

Blalock was convicted of second-degree murder, which is an unclassified 

felony. At the time of Blalock’s offense, a person convicted of second-degree murder 

was subject to a sentence of not less than 10 years and not more than 99 years.40 The 

court sentenced Blalock to 60 years with 15 years suspended (45 years to serve). 

Blalock now appeals this sentence. 

At sentencing, Blalock conceded, and the court found, three aggravating 

factors: (1) that Blalock employed a dangerous instrument in furtherance of the offense; 

(2) that Blalock’s criminal history included conduct involving repeated instances of 

assaultive behavior; and (3) that Blalock was on parole or probation for another felony 

charge at the time of the current crime.41 But the court rejected Blalock’s proposed 

mitigator — AS 12.55.155(d)(3) (“the defendant committed the offense under some 

39 See, e.g., Smiley v. State, 966 So.2d 330, 334-36 (Fla. 2007); Commonwealth v. Stone, 

291 S.W.3d 696, 703-04 (Ky. 2009); People v. Conyer, 762 N.W.2d 198, 200-01 (Mich. 

App. 2008); Anderson v. State, 46 So.3d 835, 838 (Miss. App. 2010). 

40 Former AS 12.55.125(b) (2011). 

41 See AS 12.55.155(c)(4), (8), and (20), respectively. 

– 20 – 2656

degree of duress, coercion, threat, or compulsion insufficient to constitute a complete 

defense, but that significantly affected the defendant’s conduct”).42 

Blalock’s first argument regarding his sentence is that the trial court erred 

in rejecting his proposed mitigator. But the aggravating and mitigating factors listed in 

AS 12.55.155(c) and (d) apply only to cases governed by presumptive sentencing.43 

Blalock was convicted of second-degree murder, a crime that is not governed by 

presumptive sentencing.44 When a defendant is sentenced for second-degree murder, the 

judge is authorized to impose any sentence within the range of imprisonment that the 

legislature has established for that offense, regardless of whether aggravating or 

mitigating factors are proved.45 

Although the presence or absence of statutory aggravating and mitigating 

factors does not control a court’s sentencing authority for second-degree murder, 

applying the factors by analogy provides appropriate “points of reference” for 

determining “how a particular defendant’s crime should be viewed in comparison” to 

similar crimes.46 

In this case, because the aggravating and mitigating factors applied only by 

analogy, the judge’s authority to consider this factor was not affected by whether it was 

proved by clear and convincing evidence (as would be required if the factors were being 

42 AS 12.55.155(d)(3).
 

43 Allen v. State, 56 P.3d 683, 684 (Alaska App. 2002).
 

44 See AS 12.55.125(b).
 

45 Allen, 56 P.3d at 684.
 

46 Id. at 685.
 

– 21 – 2656

used to increase or reduce a presumptive term). Blalock’s arguments regarding the 

proposed mitigating factor are therefore moot.47 

In any event, in ruling on Blalock’s proposed mitigator, the trial court found 

that Blalock disengaged from the argument, went back to his vehicle to arm himself, and 

then re-engaged. The court further found that Blalock’s claim that he had been pinned 

to the ground when he slashed and stabbed Tanape was not credible in light of Tanape’s 

injuries. The trial court’s characterization of the offense, and its rejection of the 

mitigator, were based on reasonable conclusions from the evidence. 

Blalock’s second contention is that his sentence is excessive because it 

exceeded the Page benchmark for first felony offenders convicted of second-degree 

murder. 48 Blalock notes that the Page benchmark is 20-30 years and that he received 15 

years of active time above that benchmark. 

But the Page benchmark applies only to first felony offenders.49 Blalock 

had previously been convicted of felony assault, and he was on probation for that offense 

when he killed Tanape. In fact, Blalock himself conceded at his sentencing that the 

benchmark does not apply to his case. Accordingly, we reject this claim. 

Blalock’s final contention regarding his sentence is that the trial court failed 

to properly weigh the applicable aggravating factors and that it failed to consider 

Blalock’s rehabilitation and mental health history. As we have explained, the judge’s 

sentencing authority was not affected by the judge’s findings on the aggravating or 

47 See id. at 685.
 

48 See Page v. State, 657 P.2d 850, 855 (Alaska App. 1983). 
 

49 Felber v. State, 243 P.3d 1007, 1010 (Alaska App. 2010).
 

– 22 – 2656

mitigating factors, and the aggravators applied only by analogy. But in any event, we 

conclude that the court adequately assessed the weight to give the aggravating factors.50 

Determination of an appropriate sentence involves the judicial balancing 

of potentially competing factors, of which primacy cannot be ascribed to any particular 

factor.51 The “sentencing judge has substantial discretion when evaluating the priority 

of the various sentencing goals and assessing the weight they should receive under the 

facts of a particular case.”52 

In crafting Blalock’s sentence, the trial court recognized that Blalock had 

identified mental health issues, and it considered that factor in fashioning the appropriate 

sentence. But the trial court also found that isolation was important because of Blalock’s 

“significant” criminal and assaultive history. Blalock’s criminal history included 

numerous misdemeanor assault convictions, a conviction for felony assault, several 

harassment convictions, two convictions for criminal mischief, a conviction for child 

abuse, and a conviction for violating a protective order. 

The trial court found that Blalock’s criminal history demonstrated that 

rehabilitation was unlikely. But because Blalock had done well in confinement by 

50 The trial court specifically stated that it was giving aggravator (c)(4), the dangerous 

instrument factor, “marginal” weight. The trial court considered Blalock’s probation status 

under aggravator (c)(20) by imposing all the remaining suspended time — almost 2 years — 

in the case for which Blalock was in violation of his probation. And the court discussed the 

importance of Blalock’s prior assaultive history (aggravator (c)(8)) while evaluating the 

Chaney criteria. 

51 Id. (holding that a court must balance multiple objectives when sentencing a 

defendant, including the goals of rehabilitation, isolation, deterrence, and community 

condemnation). 

52 Evan v. State, 899 P.2d 926, 931 (Alaska App. 1995) (citing Asitonia v. State, 508 

P.2d 1023, 1026 (Alaska 1973)). 

– 23 – 2656

having no documented disciplinary actions for the four years preceding sentencing, the 

trial court also stated that it had “some marginal hope” for Blalock’s rehabilitation. 

In reviewing a sentencing decision, this Court applies the “clearly 

mistaken” standard of review. This test is based on the premise that reasonable judges, 

confronted with identical facts, can and will differ on what constitutes an appropriate 

sentence, and, so long as that sentence is within the permissible range of reasonable 

sentences, it will not be modified by a reviewing court.53 

After independently reviewing the record, we conclude that the sentence 

imposed is not clearly mistaken. 

Conclusion 

The judgment of the superior court is AFFIRMED. 

53 Erickson v. State, 950 P.2d 580, 586 (Alaska App. 1997). 

– 24 – 2656

In the Court of Appeals of the State of Alaska
 


Yoder Austin Blalock,

 Appellant/Cross-Appellee, 

 v. 

State of Alaska,

 Appellee/Cross-Appellant. 

Court of Appeals Nos. 
 

A-12282 & A-12301
 


Order 

Petition for Rehearing 

Date of Order: 12/10/2019 

Trial Court Case No. 3AN-11-12129 CR 

Before: Allard, Chief Judge, and Wollenberg and Harbison, Judges. 

The Appellant, Yoder Austin Blalock, seeks rehearing of our decision in 

his case: Blalock v. State, ___ P.3d ___, Op. No. 2656, 2019 WL 4725166 (Alaska 

App. Sept. 27, 2019). Blalock raises three claims. 

First, Blalock argues that the Court’s opinion set out an incomplete 

summary of the underlying facts. As part of this claim, Blalock contends that the Court 

mistakenly stated, on page 4 of our slip opinion, that Nathan Tanape’s death was caused 

by over twenty stab wounds, when (according to Blalock) the cause of death was a single 

stab wound to Tanape’s lung. 

The record supports our a ssertion regarding Tanape’s cause of death. The 

medical examiner testified that Tanape’s cause of death was multiple sharp force injuries, 

and that Tanape suffered over twenty different wounds. The medical examiner also 

testified, however, that the stab wound through Tanape’s left lung was the “fatal injury.” 

We are willing to amend our opinion to reflect this fact. 
 

Second, Blalock contends that the Court mistakenly stated, on page 14 of 

our slip opinion, that the on-scene officers had not yet downloaded the audio on their 

recorders when the detectives began interviewing Blalock. Blalock suggests that this 

misstatement materially affected our decision to reject his proposed rule that would have 

required an interrogating officer, prior to undertaking an interrogation, to review every 

audio and video recording made by other officers in the case. 

We acknowledge that we were mistaken about the timing of the officers’ 

download. But this fact is not material to our decision. Accordingly, we will strike this 

statement from our opinion. 

Finally, Blalock argues that we should revisit our rejection of his proposed 

rule requiring interrogating officers to review the prior recordings made by other officers 

prior to an initial interrogation. Having reviewed Blalock’s petition and the State’s 

opposition, we decline to alter our conclusion. 

IT IS ORDERED: 

1. The Petition for Rehearing is GRANTED IN PART. 

(a) 	 The fourth full paragraph at page 4 of our decision is amended as follows: 

Shortly after the officers arrived, Tanape was transported to 

the hospital where he was pronounced dead. An autopsy 

revealed that his death was caused by over twenty stab 

wounds. The medical examiner determined that Tanape had 

suffered over twenty stab wounds, including one that was 

fatal. (b) The fourth paragraph at page 14 of our decision is 

amended by striking the words “or even downloaded the 

audio on their recorders”: 

The officers in this case were interrogating Blalock shortly 

after he was taken into custody. The on-scene officers had 

not yet prepared a written report or even downloaded the 

audio on their recorders. If the detectives had asked the onscene officers whether Blalock had requested counsel, based 
on their testimony the officers would honestly, but 

mistakenly, have responded that Blalock had not asked for a 

lawyer. 

2. In all other respects, the Petition for Rehearing is DENIED. 

Entered by direction of the Court. 

Clerk of Appellate Courts

 /s/ 

______________________ 

Meredith Montgomery 

cc: Court of Appeals Judges 

Judge Jack W. Smith 

Central Staff 

Trial Court Appeals Clerk - Anchorage 

Publishers 

Distribution: 

Elizabeth Friedman 

2773 Carolee Court 

Redding, CA 96002 

Ann Black 

Office of Criminal Appeals 

1031 W. 4th Ave, Suite 200 

Anchorage, AK 99501