[Cite as State v. Williams, 2020-Ohio-1519.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

State of Ohio, : 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, : 

 No. 19AP-648 

v. : (C.P.C. No. 97CR-5311)

Christopher A. Williams, : (ACCELERATED CALENDAR) 

 Defendant-Appellant. : 

 

D E C I S I O N 

Rendered on April 16, 2020 

 

On brief: Ron O'Brien, Prosecuting Attorney, and Seth L. 

Gilbert, for appellee. 

On brief: Christopher A. Williams, pro se. 

 

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas 

SADLER, P.J. 

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Christopher A. Williams, appeals from a decision of the 

Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, which denied appellant's June 12, 2019 motion 

to vacate post-release control as moot. For the following reasons, we affirm. 

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

{¶ 2} On September 25, 1997, a Franklin County Grand Jury indicted appellant on 

charges of aggravated robbery, a violation of R.C. 2911.01, a felony of the first degree; 

robbery, a violation of R.C. 2911.02, a felony of the second degree; assault on a peace officer, 

a violation of R.C. 2903.13, a felony of the fourth degree; and failure to comply, a violation 

of R.C. 2921.331, a felony of the fourth degree. On March 24, 1998, appellant, represented 

by counsel, entered a guilty plea to robbery and assault on a police officer. (May 18, 1998 
No. 19AP-648 2 

Jgmt. Entry.) On application of the prosecutor, the trial court ordered a nolle prosequi be 

entered for the remaining charges. The trial court ordered and received a pre-sentence 

investigation. 

{¶ 3} On May 6, 1998, the trial court imposed a prison term of three years and postrelease control. The entry states the court notified appellant of "the applicable periods of 

post-release control pursuant to R.C. 2929.19(B)(3)(c)(d) and (e)." (May 18, 1998 Jgmt. 

Entry at 2.) 

{¶ 4} On or about April 28, 2002, appellant was residing in a halfway house after 

violating the terms of his post-release control. While in the halfway house, appellant was 

indicted in the Licking County Court of Common Pleas for aggravated murder, aggravated 

robbery, aggravated burglary, and escape. The escape charge arose from appellant's 

unauthorized absence from the halfway house while on post-release control. Appellant was 

found guilty by jury trial on all counts and was sentenced to serve a prison term of 20 years 

to life on Count 1; 10 years on Count 2; 10 years on Count 3; and 8 years on Count 4. State 

v. Williams, Licking C.P. No. 04CR-219 (Mar. 30, 2005). The trial court further ordered 

all four sentences be served consecutively with one another. Appellant's conviction was 

later affirmed by the Fifth District Court of Appeals. State v. Williams, 5th Dist. No. 05-

CA-36, 2006-Ohio-1381.1

{¶ 5} On June 12, 2019, over 20 years after conviction, appellant filed a motion to 

vacate his post-release control with the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas. Appellant 

argued that his post-release control should be vacated because "he has been illegally placed 

on [post-release control] and indicted for escape from [post-release control], which is now 

known to be improper." (June 12, 2019 Mot. to Vacate at 4.) On June 20, 2019, plaintiffappellee, State of Ohio, filed a combined motion to strike and memorandum in opposition 

to the motion arguing the matter was moot as appellant has completed post-release control, 

and appellant's motion amounted to a collateral attack on his escape conviction in Licking 

County. A reply brief was filed on July 17, 2019. On August 29, 2019, the trial court denied 

 

1 Appellant has filed four appeals originating out of the Licking County case. State v. Williams, 5th Dist. No. 

05-CA-36, 2006-Ohio-1381 (direct appeal); State v. Williams, 5th Dist. No. 08-CA-23, 2008-Ohio-6842 

(postconviction petition denied); State v. Williams, 5th Dist. Licking No. 14-CA-13 (July 21, 2014) (dismissed 

appeal of denial of motion to vacate void sentence for lack of prosecution); and State v. Williams, 5th Dist. 

No. 14-CA-82, 2015-Ohio-1125 (affirmed modification of post-release control by the trial court). 
No. 19AP-648 3 

the motion to vacate "as moot given that the Defendant has already served his [post-release 

control] period in this case." (Aug. 29, 2019 Decision & Entry at 1.) 

{¶ 6} Appellant filed a timely appeal. 

II. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 

{¶ 7} Appellant assigns the following as trial court error: 

The Trial Court erred in finding the Appellants [sic] motion to 

vacate Post Release Control moot. 

III. LEGAL ANALYSIS 

{¶ 8} In his sole assignment of error, appellant argues the trial court erred in 

denying his motion to vacate post-release control as moot. Appellant argues that because 

the previous term of post-release control was invalid, he suffered from a collateral disability 

when he was convicted of escape in Licking County. For the following reasons, we disagree. 

{¶ 9} A case is deemed moot when the result provides no practical legal effect. 

State v. Coogan, 10th Dist. No. 18AP-829, 2019-Ohio-3016, ¶ 15, citing Grove City v. Clark, 

10th Dist. No. 01AP-1369, 2002-Ohio-4549, ¶ 11. "The role of courts is to decide adversarial 

legal cases and to issue judgments that can be carried into effect." Cyran v. Cyran, 152 

Ohio St.3d 484, 2018-Ohio-24, ¶ 9. A case is moot when it has "become fictitious, colorable, 

hypothetical, academic or dead. The distinguishing characteristic of such issues is that they 

involve no actual genuine, live controversy, the decision of which can definitely affect 

existing legal relations." (Citation omitted.) In re Betsacon, 10th Dist. 18AP-515, 2018-

Ohio-5367, ¶ 13, quoting State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Hunter, 141 Ohio St.3d 419, 

2014-Ohio-5457, ¶ 4. 

{¶ 10} Under Ohio law, " '[w]here a defendant, convicted of a criminal offense, has 

voluntarily paid the fine or completed the sentence for that offense, an appeal is moot when 

no evidence is offered from which an inference can be drawn that the defendant will suffer 

some collateral disability or loss of civil rights from such judgment or conviction.' " State 

v. Montavon, 10th Dist. No. 12AP-631, 2013-Ohio-2009, ¶ 6, quoting State v. Wilson, 41 

Ohio St.2d 236 (1975), syllabus. "However, because a person convicted of a felony has a 

'substantial stake in the judgment of conviction' that survives satisfaction of the judgment, 

'an appeal challenging a felony conviction is not moot even if the entire sentence has been 

satisfied before the matter is heard on appeal.' " Montavon at ¶ 6, quoting State v. Golston, 

71 Ohio St.3d 224 (1994), syllabus. If a defendant has completed his term of incarceration 
No. 19AP-648 4 

and is simply challenging the length of the sentence, there is no remedy that could benefit 

the defendant outside a reversal of the conviction. State v. Jama, 10th Dist. No. 17AP-569, 

2018-Ohio-1274, ¶ 14. 

{¶ 11} In the present case, appellant has served his entire sentence originating from 

the 1998 conviction. While appellant was convicted of multiple felony offenses, because he 

is not challenging the conviction, there is no actual legal controversy and appellant's motion 

is deemed moot. Id.

{¶ 12} Appellant argues the escape conviction constitutes a collateral disability 

because "Appellant has been enhanced for being on Post Release Control, and convicted for 

Escape from the halfway house resulting from Post Release Control, where the Appellant is 

serving an eight (8) years [sic] sentence." (Appellant's Brief at 5.) Appellant argues that 

because his sentence for post-release control was invalid, "this matter should be reversed 

and remanded to vacate Post Release Control." (Appellant's Brief at 6.) 

{¶ 13} A collateral disability is "an adverse legal consequence of a conviction or 

judgment that survives despite the court's sentence having been satisfied or served." In re 

S.J.K., 114 Ohio St.3d 23, 2007-Ohio-2621, ¶ 10. " '[A] collateral legal disability implies a 

separate and distinct consequence from the original criminal prosecution, that is, there 

must be some other effect, adverse to the defendant beyond expected punishment for his 

current offense.' " (Citation omitted.) State v. Smith, 2d Dist. No. 27981, 2019-Ohio-3592, 

¶ 12, quoting State v. McCarty, 2d Dist. No. 20581, 2005-Ohio-4031, ¶ 4. A collateral 

disability does not have to be immediately evident but could occur in the future. Smith at 

¶ 12. 

{¶ 14} After a review of the facts and applicable law, we find appellant's escape 

conviction does not constitute a collateral disability. Appellant failed to abide by the terms 

of post-release control and committed several new offenses wholly unrelated to the 1998 

case in Franklin County. Appellant's behavior outside the law brought about the new 

charges, not his term of post-release control. To consider the escape conviction as a 

collateral disability of the original offense and allow appellant to collaterally attack the 

conviction would, in effect, reward offenders for subsequent offenses and punish offenders 

that choose to follow the law. See Smith at ¶ 15 (finding a subsequent indictment for a 

repeated violation of a civil stalking protection order was not a collateral disability). 
No. 19AP-648 5 

{¶ 15} Finally, appellant argues he was subject to an unspecified term of post-release 

control and, as such, his escape conviction in Licking County is invalid. Appellee contends 

that any attack on the escape conviction must be brought in Licking County and argues that 

the holding in State v. Billiter, 134 Ohio St.3d 103, 2012-Ohio-5144, is inapplicable to the 

instant case. While appellant does not cite the case directly, Billiter considers several 

analogous issues to the present case. A brief review of the case is instructive. 

{¶ 16} In Billiter, the defendant was convicted of aggravated burglary and domestic 

violence and sentenced to a term of imprisonment and post-release control. Id. at ¶ 2. 

While on post-release control, Billiter was charged and ultimately convicted of escape. Id. 

at ¶ 3. Several years later, Billiter filed a motion to vacate the escape conviction arguing the 

trial court had imposed up to three years of post-release control instead of five years. Id. at 

¶ 5, 8. Like appellant, the Billiter defendant argued since the court's prior post-release 

control was void, his escape conviction was a legal nullity. Id. at ¶ 9. The trial court denied 

the motion, and the case was ultimately appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio, which

considered whether the defendant could challenge his guilty plea to the offense of escape 

on the grounds that his prior post-release control order was void. Id. at ¶ 8. The Billiter

court concluded res judicata did not bar the defendant from filing his motion due to a prior 

post-release control sentencing error. Id. at ¶ 14. The court wrote that " '[a] sentence that 

does not include the statutorily mandated term of postrelease control is void, is not 

precluded from appellate review by principles of res judicata, and may be reviewed at any 

time, on direct appeal or by collateral attack.' " Id. at ¶ 7, quoting State v. Fischer, 128 Ohio 

St.3d 92, 2010-Ohio-6238, paragraph one of the syllabus. 

{¶ 17} There are two critical distinctions between Billiter and the instant case. First, 

the defendant in Billiter filed a motion to vacate the escape conviction, not to vacate postrelease control. Unlike the court in Billiter, we cannot reverse and remand this matter to 

the trial court to vacate post-release control since it has already been terminated. Second, 

the Franklin County trial court, unlike the county in Billiter, lacks jurisdiction to vacate the 

escape conviction. A court's jurisdiction is its "statutory or constitutional power to 

adjudicate the case." (Citations omitted.) Pratts v. Hurley, 102 Ohio St.3d 81, 2004-Ohio1980, ¶ 11. A court's jurisdiction extends over the subject matter and person. Id. Any 

attempts to vacate the escape conviction must be brought in Licking County. 
No. 19AP-648 6 

{¶ 18} Based on the foregoing, we agree with the trial court that appellant has 

already served his period of post-release control in this case, and appellant's motion to 

vacate post-release control is moot. 

{¶ 19} Accordingly, appellant's sole assignment of error is overruled. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

{¶ 20} Having overruled appellant's sole assignment of error, we affirm the 

judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas. 

Judgment affirmed.

KLATT and BRUNNER, JJ., concur. 

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