No. 1--95--4330GUSTAV KOEHLER, IDA KOEHLER        )    Appeal from the and REIMUND KOEHLER,               )    Circuit Court of                                   )    Cook County.     Plaintiffs-Appellants,        )                                   )               v.                  )                                       )SCANDINAVIAN AIRLINES SYSTEMS,     )    Honorable                                                   )    Kathy Flanagan,     Defendant-Appellee.           )    Judge Presiding.       JUSTICE BURKE delivered the opinion of the court:     Plaintiffs Gustav Koehler, Ida Koehler, and Reimund Koehler(the Koehlers) appeal from an order of the circuit court grantingdefendant Scandinavian Airlines Systems (SAS) summary judgmentpursuant to section 2--1005(b) of the Illinois Code of CivilProcedure (735 ILCS 5/2--1005(b) (West 1992)).  On appeal, theKoehlers contend that the trial court erred in granting SAS summaryjudgment based on its determination that it lacked subject matterjurisdiction pursuant to the Warsaw Convention (Convention) and,"assuming arguendo" that they were engaged in "internationaltransportation" as defined by the Convention, their common lawState causes of action were not preempted by the Convention.  Forthe reasons set forth below, we reverse.     SAS is a consortium formed by Aero-transport AB, Sweden (ABA),Det Danske Luftfartselskab, A/S, Denmark (DDL), and Det NorskeLuftfartselskab A/S, Norway (DNL).  The consortium owns SASaccording to the following division:  ABA 3/7, DDL 2/7, and DNL2/7.  ABA is incorporated and has its principal place of businessin Sweden, DDL is incorporated and has its principal place ofbusiness in Denmark, and DNL is incorporated and has its principalplace of business in Norway.  SAS admits that it does business inIllinois.       On or about January 15, 1994, the Koehlers bought tickets totravel from Germany to Chicago and back to Germany.  They purchasedtheir tickets in Augsburg, Germany, through a travel agent, AstaReisen, who ticketed them to fly on defendant SAS.  According tothe Koehlers, they obtained SAS's consent to have their dog "Terry"accompany them in the cabin of the plane in lieu of one piece ofcarry-on luggage.     On the return trip from Chicago to Germany, the Koehlersstopped in Copenhagen, Denmark to make a connecting flight.  Theyhad traveled from Germany to Chicago and Chicago to Copenhagentransporting Terry in the cabin of the plane.  After arriving inCopenhagen, the Koehlers went to check in for their flight toGermany.  They walked for 10 or 15 minutes to a SAS ticket counterwhich was located in a common area of the terminal.  Upon checkingin, they were told that they would have to pay extra to take thedog with them on their flight to Germany.  When they refused to paythe additional amount, SAS directed the Danish police to arrestthem, and they were denied access to telephones and the airport. (The record does not indicate how long or where they weredetained.)  The Koehlers subsequently left the airport, rented acar and returned to Germany.     On June 19, 1995, the Koehlers filed a complaint against SASalleging false arrest and imprisonment, defamation, intentionalinfliction of emotional distress, and breach of contract.  In itsanswer, SAS asserted eight affirmative defenses:  (1) failure tostate a cause of action upon which relief could be granted; (2)lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Article 28 of theConvention; (3) contributory negligence of the Koehlers pursuant toArticle 21 of the Convention; (4)  lack of liability or limitationof liability "pursuant to its [SAS's] Tariffs on file with theDepartment of Transportation of the United States and pursuant toits Conditions of Carriage as set forth in the relevant contract oftransportation"; (5) lack of proximate cause or culpable conduct onthe part of SAS; (6) complete performance of all the terms andconditions of the contract between the Koehlers and SAS; (7)dismissal pursuant to the Act of State Doctrine; and (8) dismissalpursuant to the doctrine of forum non conveniens.     On July 31, 1995, SAS filed a motion for summary judgmentbased on lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Articles1(2) and 28 of the Convention.  Article 1(2) defines "internationaltransportation" as follows:               "For the purposes of this convention the          expression 'international transportation'          shall mean any transportation in which,          according to the contract made by the parties,          the place of departure and the place of          destination, whether or not there be a break          in the transportation or a transshipment, are          situated either within the territories of two          High Contracting Parties, or within the          territory of a single High Contracting Party,          if there is an agreed stopping place within a          territory subject to the sovereignty,          suzerainty, mandate or authority of another          power, even though that power is not a party          to this convention.  (Emphasis added.) 49          U.S.C.A. �1502 (note) (1988).          According to SAS, because the Koehlers were involved in"international transportation," as defined in Article 1, the"Warsaw Convention applied to plaintiffs' claims and the courtlacked subject matter jurisdiction over the action becauseplaintiffs had failed to bring the action in a proper forum underArticle 28 of the Convention," which "restricts the forums in whichdamages actions may be brought" to four possible fora:  thecarrier's domicile; the carrier's principal place of business;where the contract was formed; or the place of final destination. SAS further maintained that none of these enumerated fora werelocated in the United States based on the following:  (1) thedomicile of the carrier within the meaning of the Convention is thecarrier's place of incorporation, and SAS is domiciled in eitherSweden, Denmark, or Norway, or all three; (2) the principal placeof business of the carrier excludes the United States because SAS'scorporate headquarters are located in Sweden; (3) the relevantcontract of transportation in the transportation of passengers isthe passenger ticket, and the contract between the Koehlers and SASwas made in Germany; and (4) the place of destination for purposesof Article 28 is the ultimate destination of transportation asindicated on the passenger ticket, and the Koehlers' finaldestination was Germany.  SAS therefore argued that the UnitedStates is not the proper forum for the Koehlers' action againstSAS, and their complaint should be dismissed.     In response to SAS's motion, the Koehlers contended that SASmissed a step in its analysis of the application of the Convention,arguing that Article 1 of the Convention only defines"international," and in order to define "transportation," the courtmust look to Article 17, which provides:               "The carrier shall be liable for damage          sustained in the event of the death or          wounding of a passenger or any other bodily          injury suffered by a passenger, if the          accident which caused the damage so sustained          took place on board the aircraft or in the          course of any of the operations of embarking          or disembarking."  Note following 49 U.S.C.A.          �1502 (1988).          Based upon this provision, the Koehlers argued that because they were not on board the aircraft or in the course of embarking ordisembarking, the Convention did not apply and thus did notpreclude the trial court's jurisdiction.     In reply, SAS claimed that the Koehlers misconstrued theproper application of Article 17, which provides a plaintiff witha cause of action arising from personal injuries or death, indetermining whether the Convention applies.  SAS maintained that acourt must first determine whether the  Convention applies underArticle 1 and then determine whether the court has proper subjectmatter jurisdiction under Article 28 before reviewing therequirements and restrictions of Article 17.     SAS further argued that notwithstanding some courts have foundthat even if the Convention applies, a plaintiff's state law claimswould not be preempted thereunder, there is a split in the federalcircuits regarding this approach.  Accordingly, SAS argued that ifthe trial court found the Convention applied to the Koehlers'complaint and it did not preempt their State law claims, the trialcourt would still have to dismiss the complaint due to lack ofsubject matter jurisdiction pursuant to article 28 of the Convention.     On November 17, 1995, the trial court held that the Convention applied to the Koehlers' complaint, and granted SAS'smotion for summary judgment because, pursuant to Article 28, thecourt lacked subject matter jurisdiction.  This appeal followed.     On appeal, the Koehlers contend that the trial court erred ingranting SAS's motion for summary judgment based on lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction, arguing the Convention should never have beenapplied to the instant case because the Koehlers were not involvedin "international transportation" as defined in Article 1 of theConvention.  They further argue that a court must look to bothArticles 1 and 17 of the Convention to determine what activityconstitutes "international transportation."  According to theKoehlers, they were not in the course of any of the operations ofembarking or disembarking and thus were not engaged in"international transportation."  More specifically, they werenowhere near the gate, were not under the control of SAS, and weremerely checking in at the time their injury occurred.  Accordingly,the Koehlers argue, they were not engaged in "transportation" atthe time of the injury, and thus the Convention and itsjurisdictional limitations do not apply to their claims.     SAS argues, as it did in the trial court, that a court mustfirst look to Article 1 of the Convention and its definition of"international transportation" to determine if the Conventionapplies.  If the Convention does apply, the court must then look toArticle 28's jurisdictional requirements to determine if theplaintiff has filed in the proper forum and, if so, only then canit look to Article 17, which provides a plaintiff with a cause ofaction for damages if the plaintiff was on board the aircraft orembarking or disembarking at the time of the accident.  SAS assertsthat any other interpretation in determining whether the conventionapplies is contrary to the plain meaning of the Convention.     The standard of review for summary judgment is de novo.  Urbanv. Village of Lincolnshire, 272 Ill. App. 3d 1087, 1094, 651 N.E.2d683 (1995).  A reviewing court must determine whether the trialcourt correctly ruled that no genuine issue of material factexisted, and that judgment was correctly entered for the movingparty as a matter of law.  Urban, 272 Ill. App. 3d at 1094.  Thereviewing court must view the evidence in a light most favorable tothe nonmoving party.  Turner v. Roesner, 193 Ill. App. 3d 482, 549N.E.2d 1287, cert. denied, 140 Ill. 2d 555 (1990).     "The scope of the Warsaw Convention is a matter of federal lawand federal treaty interpretation, and must be determined from anexamination of the 'four corners of the treaty.'"  Maugnie v.Compangie Nationale Air France, 549 F.2d 1256, 1258 (1977).  Treatyinterpretation necessarily requires an evaluation of legislativehistory and the intent of all parties involved in the contract. Maugnie, 549 F.2d at 1258; Wolgel v. Mexicana Airlines, 821 F.2d442, 444 (1987).       A reading of the legislative history of the Convention revealsits purpose is to protect airlines from huge damage claims due tomass air disasters, and to establish a system of uniformityregarding claims and the applicable substantive law.  In re AirDisaster at Lockerbie, Scotland v. Pan American World Airways,Inc., 928 F.2d 1267, 1270 (1991), citing Lowenfeld & Mendelson, TheUnited States and the Warsaw Convention, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 497, 498-99 (1967).  Section 22 of the Convention limits the liability ofthe airlines in order to allow them to establish insurance ratesand to lessen potential litigation against the airlines.  In re AirDisaster at Lockerbie, Scotland, 928 F.2d at 1271.     Initially, the Convention limited a plaintiff's recovery toapproximately $8,000, however, in 1966, the Montreal Agreementmodified this amount.  CAB Agreement 18900, reprinted in 49U.C.S.A. �1502 (note) (1988).  The Montreal Agreement adopted atrade-off:  Air carriers would be strictly liable, thus eliminatingthe requirement of proving fault, in exchange for a damage cap of$75,000.  Beaudet v. British Airways, PLC, 853 F. Supp. 1062, 1065(1994).  Articles 1 and 17 of the Convention indicate that itapplies to all international air flights and creates liability inthe event of death or bodily injury sustained while on board theaircraft, or in the course of the operations of embarking ordisembarking.     SAS seeks to have this court rule that whenever a passengerholds a ticket for international travel between signatorycountries, any claim against the airline must be controlled by theprovisions of the Convention.  We cannot agree, however, with thisproposition.  To do so would mean that once a passenger purchasesa ticket for international transportation, the Convention and itsjurisdictional requirements apply to any negligent actions of theairline.  Such a conclusion would render airlines immune from theirnegligent acts occurring within the terminal when the passenger isnot involved in an "accident," not on board the airplane, or not inthe course of the operations of embarking of disembarking.  This isclearly not the intent of the drafters of the Convention.  Indeed,Illinois federal courts have recognized this as an untenable"position."  Specifically, in Beaudet, 853 F. Supp. at 1070, thecourt stated:          "Under this position, an air carrier's          negligence against a passenger having a ticket          on one of that carrier's international flights          is entirely excused by the Warsaw Convention          if the passenger is not 'on board the aircraft          or in the course of any of the operations of          embarking or disembarking.'  In the opinion of          the Court, this conclusion demonstrates the          absurdity of Defendant's position.  One thing          that the Warsaw Convention did not mean to do          was to grant international air carriers          absolute immunity from their negligence inside          the terminal."               We agree with plaintiffs here that the Convention does notcreate an exclusive cause of action for any injury incurred by apassenger holding a ticket for international travel.  See Abramsonv. Japan Airlines Co., Ltd., 739 F.2d 130, 134 (1984) ("[T]heWarsaw Convention's limitation and theory of liability is exclusivewhen it applies *** but it does not preclude alternative theoriesof recovery"); Tandon v. United Air Lines, 926 F. Supp. 366, 370(1996) ("Courts addressing the issue have held that, although theWarsaw Convention preempts state law claims falling within itsscope, it does not preempt claims that are not covered by itprovisions"); In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland, 928 F.2dat 1273 ("[The issue is not] whether a plaintiff may bring a statecause of action when the claim does not arise under the WarsawConvention, which a plaintiff plainly may institute"); Walker v.Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 1168, 1170 (1992) ("[N]othingin the text of the Warsaw Convention precludes the plaintiff frominstituting an action against the air carrier to recover for ***death or bodily injury under state law").  Clearly, the drafters ofthe Convention "intended to ensure uniformity in air carriers'liability for death or bodily injury in the event of accidents,rather than uniformity in air carriers' liability for death orbodily injury generally."  Walker, 785 F. Supp. at 1171.     This analysis is consistent with the intent of the drafters ofthe Convention, who clearly did not intend for the Convention topreclude all claims not described within the text of the treaty. In discussing whether Article 19 of the Convention, which pertainsto "damages occasioned by delay in the transportation by air ofpassengers, baggage, or goods," would bar a claim for totalnonperformance of a contract between a ticket holder and theairline, Mr. Ambrosini, the delegate from Italy, noted that Article[19] did not provide a remedy for nonperformance.  Wolgel, 821 F.2dat 444.  Mr. Ambrosini suggested that the treaty be amended toinclude a provision for total nonperformance; however, the draftersdetermined that there "was no need for a remedy in the Conventionfor total nonperformance of the contract, because in such a casethe injured party has a remedy under the law of his or her homecountry."  Wolgel, 821 F.2d at 444.  Similarly, in the presentcase, no provision exists covering the Koehlers' noncontractualclaims against SAS.  As in the case of nonperformance of thecontract, the Koehlers' noncontractual claims may be remedied underthe law of their home country if they can establish jurisdiction.     We briefly observe that SAS's reliance on Duff v. VarigAirlines, Inc., 185 Ill. App. 3d 992, 542 N.E.2d 69 (1989), insupport of their argument that courts must determine theapplication of the Convention by looking to Article 1 for thedefinition of "international transportation" and then apply thejurisdictional limitations enumerated in Article 28 beforeevaluating the liability provision in Article 17, is misplaced. Duff is not inconsistent with our decision in the present case.  InDuff, the defendant airline incorrectly advised the plaintiff, whowas traveling from Brazil to South Africa, of his departure time. As a result, the plaintiff missed his flight, and incurred expensesof $2,500.  The Duff court held:          "If the passenger's ticket provides for          international transportation as defined above          [Article 1], 'this is sufficient to invoke the          Warsaw Convention.'  Accordingly, '[w]hen the          contract of the parties provide for          transportation between certain designated          termini, the provisions of the Convention          automatically apply and exclusively govern the          rights and liabilities of the parties.'"          The Duff court reasoned that because the Warsaw Convention appliedunder Article 1, the plaintiff was required to meet thejurisdictional restrictions enumerated in the Convention.  Becausethe plaintiff had not brought the suit in one of the four foralisted in the Convention, the court dismissed the case for lack ofsubject matter jurisdiction.     Duff is distinguishable from the case at bar, however.  Theissue in Duff was whether the Convention applied to the defendantairline's breach of its contractual duties.  Clearly, under Article1, a contract claim based on the ticket which provided forinternational transportation falls within the scope of theConvention.  Here, although one of the Koehlers' claims is acontract claim which is subject to the Convention, their claims forfalse arrest and imprisonment, defamation, and intentionalinfliction of emotional distress clearly do not fall within thescope of the types of injuries the Convention was intended tocover.     For the reasons stated, therefore, we affirm the circuitcourt's grant of summary judgment on plaintiffs' breach of contractclaim, but reverse the grant of summary judgment as to plaintiffs'claims alleging false arrest and imprisonment, defamation, andintentional infliction of emotional distress, and remand the causeto the circuit court for consideration of these claims, providedthat plaintiffs can establish jurisdiction under the laws of thisState.     Affirmed in part and reversed in part; cause remanded.     HARTMAN, P.J., and SCARIANO, J., concur.