IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING

2014 WY 123

APRIL TERM, A.D. 2014

October 3, 2014

SHEILA RENEE MCADAM,

Appellant

(Plaintiff),

v.

DOUGLAS RAYMOND MCADAM,

Appellee

(Defendant).

S-14-0044

Appeal from the District Court of Natrona County

The Honorable Catherine E. Wilking Judge

Representing Appellant:

Devon P. O’Connell and Dustin J. Richards of Pence and MacMillan LLC, Laramie, 

Wyoming.

Representing Appellee:

Richard H. Peek, Casper, Wyoming.

Before BURKE, C.J., and HILL, KITE*, DAVIS, and FOX, JJ.

*Chief Justice at time of expedited conference.

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. 

Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, 

Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made 

before final publication in the permanent volume.
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KITE, Justice.

[¶1] Shelia Renee McAdam (Wife) and Douglas Raymond McAdam (Husband) were 

divorced by stipulated decree. Both parties later claimed the other party was in contempt 

for failing to list the marital residence for sale as required by the decree. Wife also 

claimed Husband was in contempt for failing to transfer half of his investment accounts 

and stock options to her.

[¶2] The district court found both parties in contempt with regard to the listing and sale 

of the home and again ordered it listed by a specified date. If it sold, the district court 

ordered the parties to share any profit or loss; if it did not sell, the court ordered Wife to 

pay one-half of the mortgage payment. The district court concluded Husband had not 

willfully violated the decree with regard to the investment account and stock options but 

ordered him to transfer an investment account and three stock options to Wife. The 

district court further ordered the parties to bear their own fees and costs resulting from 

the post-divorce contempt proceedings.

[¶3] On appeal, Wife claims the district court improperly modified the stipulated divorce 

decree when it ordered her to share any loss on the home or, if it did not sell, pay one-half 

of the mortgage payment until it did sell. She also contends the district court erred in not 

ordering Husband to pay her fees and costs after he violated the decree by failing to 

transfer the investment accounts and stock options. We conclude the district court 

properly exercised its discretion and affirm. 

ISSUES

[¶4] Wife asserts the district court improperly modified the divorce decree contrary to 

the doctrine of res judicata by: 1) ordering the parties to share in any loss on the marital 

home if it sold; 2) ordering her to pay one-half of the mortgage payments if the home did 

not sell; and 3) failing to award her attorney fees and costs resulting from Husband’s 

failure to transfer the investment accounts and stock options. Husband asserts no error 

occurred. 

FACTS

[¶5] Wife and Husband were divorced pursuant to a stipulated decree on May 9, 2011. 

The parties agreed to list the marital residence in Gillette, Wyoming for sale with a 

licensed realtor within thirty days after entry of the decree. They further agreed to 

cooperate with the realtor and comply with reasonable requests associated with selling 

the residence. The stipulated decree provided that written consent of both parties was 

required for acceptance or countering any offer to purchase the home. They agreed that 
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after sale of the home, they would equally divide any proceeds remaining after payment 

of costs, commissions or amounts owing on the mortgage. The decree stated:

[Husband] shall enjoy exclusive possession of the residence 

pending sale of it and shall timely [sic] the monthly mortgage 

payment and utilities until closing is completed. [Husband] 

shall be entitled to claim all payments associated with the 

residence as deductions on his federal income tax returns.

The stipulated decree also awarded Wife one-half of Husband’s investment accounts and 

stock options. The decree further provided:

In the event either party shall fail to perform, in whole or in 

part, any obligation or duty imposed by the terms of this 

Order, the defaulting party shall be responsible for the 

payment of all attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses incurred 

by the other party as a result of such default.

[¶6] In January 2012, Wife filed a motion for order to show cause claiming Husband was 

in contempt of court for violating the decree in several respects including that he had not 

listed the residence for sale within the time required and had allowed it to become flood 

damaged, causing a substantial decrease in its value. She sought an order requiring 

Husband to repair the damage done to the home and list it for sale. Husband 

subsequently filed a motion for order to show cause claiming Wife was in contempt of 

court for violating the decree in several respects including that she was at fault for the 

fact that the residence was not listed for sale. After a hearing, the district court found 

both parties in contempt with regard to the listing and sale of the residence and again 

ordered that it be listed for sale within thirty days and sold “as is.” The district court 

further ordered that the parties “shall equally share any equity or loss in the sale” and 

declined to award attorney fees and costs to either party based upon its finding that 

neither of them had complied with the decree. 

[¶7] In March 2013, Wife filed another motion for order to show cause claiming the 

residence still had not been listed and Husband had prevented her from having it listed. 

She also claimed Husband had not transferred her share of the stock options and 

investment accounts as the decree required. Husband filed a response claiming that he 

had complied with the decree and subsequent order and Wife had failed to comply with 

the provision requiring sale of the home. 

[¶8] After a hearing, the district court again ruled that both parties were in contempt of 

the decree and subsequent order with regard to the home. The court ruled that the parties 

could purge their contempt by executing a listing agreement within thirty days with the 

real estate agent who had testified at the hearing. If the home was not sold within ninety
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days, the district court ordered that Wife would become responsible for one-half of the 

mortgage payment. Addressing the stock options, the district court concluded Husband 

did not commit a willful violation of the decree but ordered him to transfer three stock 

options and an investment account to Wife. Finally, the district court ordered the parties 

to pay their own fees and costs. Wife timely appealed the district court order. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶9] Under our established standard for reviewing contempt orders in domestic relations 

cases, we will not disturb the decision of the district court absent a serious procedural 

error, a violation of a principle of law, or a clear and grave abuse of discretion. Greene v. 

Finn, 2007 WY 47, ¶ 5, 153 P.3d 945, 948 (Wyo. 2007). The inherent power to punish 

contempt of court is firmly vested in the district court’s broad discretion, and we will not 

intrude upon its decision unless it commits a clear and grave abuse of that discretion. 

Meckem v. Carter, 2014 WY 52, ¶ 18, 323 P.3d 637, 644 (Wyo. 2014). In reviewing the 

exercise of a district court’s broad discretion under its contempt powers, we determine 

whether the court reasonably could have concluded as it did. Shindell v. Shindell, 2014 

WY 51, ¶ 7, 322 P.3d 1270, 1273 (Wyo. 2014). We review questions of law de novo, 

giving no deference to the district court’s decision. Greene, ¶ 15, 153 P.3d at 948. 

DISCUSSION

[¶10] Wife claims the district court had no authority in the contempt proceedings to 

modify the terms of the stipulated property division in the decree. First, she claims the 

district court erred when it ordered her to share in any loss on the sale of the marital home 

or, if it did not sell, pay one-half of the mortgage payments. She asserts this is contrary 

to the decree which required the home to be listed for sale, gave Husband possession of 

the home pending sale and made him responsible for the mortgage payments. 

[¶11] Husband argues that upon finding both parties in contempt with regard to sale of 

the home, the district court properly ordered them to share any loss equally or, if the 

home did not sell, to each pay half of the mortgage payment. Husband asserts the district 

court had the inherent authority to enforce its own judgment and, upon finding that the 

parties were in contempt for failing to comply with the home sale provision of the decree, 

had the discretion to impose punishment. He argues the district court’s decision to make 

them share equally in any loss or jointly pay the mortgage as punishment was 

appropriate. Husband also argues that Wife did not appeal the first contempt order 

requiring the parties to share in any loss from sale of the home and she is barred from 

appealing it now. 

[¶12] Husband is correct that Wife did not appeal the first contempt order. However, in 

the second contempt order, the district court again ordered the parties to share equally 

any profit or loss on the home. Because the district court’s second order also required the 
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parties to share any profit or loss, we conclude the issue is properly before us for 

consideration. We, therefore, consider Wife’s contention that the district court erred 

when it ordered her to share in the profit or loss on the sale of the home or, in the event it 

did not sell, pay half the mortgage. 

[¶13] This Court has said that upon entry of a decree dividing marital property the 

division is final and not subject to revision because of a change in circumstances. 

Broadhead v. Broadhead, 737 P.2d 731, 733 (Wyo. 1987), citing Barnett v. Barnett, 704 

P.2d 1308, 1309 (Wyo. 1985) and Paul v. Paul, 631 P.2d 1060 (Wyo. 1981). We have 

also said, however, that district courts have jurisdiction to modify a judgment resulting 

from a property division when the facts in a particular case establish the requisite 

circumstances to permit modification. Barnett, 704 P.2d at 1309-1310. More 

importantly for purposes of the present case, district courts have continuing jurisdiction 

to enforce the provisions of the original divorce decree and contempt proceedings are the 

appropriate mechanism for doing so. Dorr v. Newman, 785 P.2d 1172, 1179 (Wyo. 

1990). 

[¶14] Civil contempt must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. Shindell, ¶ 10, 

322 P.3d at 1274. Clear and convincing evidence is evidence that would persuade a 

finder of fact that the truth of the contention is highly probable. Id. The elements of civil 

contempt include: 1) an effective court order that required certain conduct by the alleged 

contemnor; 2) the contemnor had knowledge of the order; and 3) the alleged contemnor 

disobeyed the order. Id. Once those elements are proven, the burden shifts to the person 

charged with contempt to show he or she was unable to comply. 

[¶15] The divorce decree the district court entered in this case required the parties to list 

the home for sale within thirty days. The parties stipulated to the property division 

provisions contained in the decree. Presumably, they familiarized themselves with the 

contents of the decree before they agreed to it. Regardless, their show cause motions and 

testimony at the hearing reflect that they knew the decree required the home to be listed 

within thirty days. The decree requiring the parties to list the home for sale within thirty 

days was entered in May of 2011. The parties did not contact a realtor until 2012. 

Husband signed a listing agreement sometime in June 2012; Wife signed the listing 

agreement on July 9, 2012. 

[¶16] After the parties signed the listing agreement, the realtor learned the parties were 

attempting to work out an agreement whereby Wife would transfer her ownership interest 

in the home to Husband in exchange for Husband taking her name off the mortgage. The 

realtor “fell out of the loop,” stopped trying to contact the parties and received no 

communication from them until sometime in mid-2013. By the time of the second 

contempt hearing in September 2013, the realtor still did not have full authority from the 

parties to move forward with listing the home and the thirty day deadline to list the home 
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for sale imposed in the district court’s first contempt order of May 16, 2012, had long 

since passed. 

[¶17] Based upon this evidence, the district court was persuaded that neither party had 

obeyed the order contained in the May 2011 stipulated decree requiring them to list the 

home within thirty days. Although they signed a listing agreement in the summer of 

2012, their actions thereafter caused the realtor to believe he did not have the authority to 

move ahead with the listing. The parties did nothing to follow up with the realtor for 

nearly a year. By September 2013, nearly two and a half years after they were first 

ordered to list the home for sale, the documentation necessary to formally list it still was 

not in place. Although each party attempted to show the other was at fault for the home 

not being listed, the district court apparently found their testimony unpersuasive and 

concluded neither of them had taken the steps required to get the home listed and sold. 

Clear and convincing evidence supported the district court’s determination that the 

parties disobeyed the orders to list the home for sale within thirty days and the court’s 

determination that they were in contempt was reasonable. 

[¶18] Having concluded both parties were in contempt for failing to obey its earlier 

order, the district court then ordered that they could purge the contempt by executing the 

documentation necessary to give the realtor the authority to sell the home and filing it 

with the court within twenty days. As it had done in its earlier order, the district court 

exercised its inherent power to punish the contempt by directing that the home be sold 

“as is” with the parties sharing equally in any profit or loss from the sale and, in the event 

the home was not sold within ninety days, directing Wife to pay half the mortgage 

payment until it did sell. 

[¶19] We find no clear and grave abuse in the district court’s exercise of its discretion to 

punish the contemptuous conduct. Evidence was presented that by the time the district 

court entered its second contempt order, the value of the house was less than the 

outstanding mortgage. Given its finding that both parties were to blame for not getting 

the house on the market as the original decree required, it was reasonable for the district 

court to conclude the parties should share the loss on the sale. By the time the district 

court entered its second contempt order, Husband had been paying the mortgage of $2000 

per month on the marital home for nearly two and a half years. Given the finding that 

Wife was equally at fault for not getting the home listed and sold, it was reasonable for 

the district court to require her to pay half the mortgage from that point until the home 

sold. The district court did not abuse its discretion in fashioning a remedy for the parties’ 

contempt. 

 

[¶20] Wife also claims the district court erred in failing to award her attorney fees and 

costs resulting from Husband’s failure to transfer the investment accounts and stock 

options. She points to the provision in the stipulated decree requiring a party who fails to 

perform an obligation required by the decree to pay all fees and costs the other party 
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incurs as a result of the failure. She argues all that is required under the provision is 

failure to perform and the district court’s finding that Husband’s failure to transfer the 

accounts was not willful is irrelevant given the express language in the decree. Among 

other arguments, Husband asserts that the district court’s order requiring the parties to 

bear their own fees and costs was proper given his testimony that when he changed 

employment in January 2012 his accounts were zeroed out, he believed he had lost the 

stock options with his former employer and he also believed the stock options issued by 

his new employer were not covered by the decree. 

[¶21] The relevant provision of the decree stated:

[Wife] shall be, and she hereby is, awarded, as her sole and 

separate property, the following:

. . . .

ii. 1⁄2 of [Husband]’s investment accounts, pension 

plans, retirement accounts, 401K accounts, IRA accounts 

and/or stock options, as of the date of the entry of the within 

decree, to be divided by QDRO, as necessary. The Stock 

Options when they vest shall be equally divided between the 

parties in the same manner as the parties divided the vesting 

stock options in November, 2010, based on the value of the 

vesting stock options at the time of the entry of the Decree, 

less 28% of the value to cover [Husband]’s tax liability 

thereon. 

[¶22] In her second motion for order to show cause, Wife claimed at the time of the 

divorce Husband had in his account 8,411 unvested shares of stock having a combined 

value of $278,992.87 as of April 30, 2011, and had not transferred any of those shares to 

her. She further claimed that on December 31, 2011, a stock split occurred and the above 

shares were reissued as 15,193 shares, with a total value of $250,380.64, in a spin-off 

company. She asserted that 8,555 of those shares vested on February 28, 2012, at a 

combined value of $159,123.00. After subtracting the 28% for taxes as the decree 

provided, Wife claimed she was entitled to $57,284.28 worth of the vested shares. Wife 

further asserted 1,595 shares had vested in February 2013 and the remaining 5,043 shares 

would vest in February 2014 and, while she did not know the value of those shares, she 

was entitled to half of the value after accounting for taxes.

[¶23] At the time of the divorce, Husband worked for Williams Energy and Production 

(Williams). At the hearing, Husband testified that at the end of 2011 he left his 

employment with Williams and went to work for WPX Energy (WPX), a spin-off 

company of Williams. He testified that in early 2012 he checked the account containing 

the stock options he had received from Williams and it showed “zero” stock options. He 

further testified that WPX later issued stock options to him but to his knowledge they had 
7

nothing to do with his former employment. He testified that no stock options rolled over 

from Williams to WPX. Because none of the stock options from Williams ever vested, 

his account showed zero after he left Williams and WPX did not issue stock options to 

him until 2012, he believed he owed Wife nothing in the way of stock options under the 

terms of the decree. 

[¶24] Based upon Husband’s testimony, the district court “opted to [give] him the benefit 

of the doubt” that he did not understand the stock options WPX re-issued were the same 

stock options issued to him by Williams. The district court held that they were in fact the 

same stock options and ordered Husband to pay Wife one-half of the funds that had 

vested (less the 28% for taxes) within sixty days of the ruling and to transfer one-half of 

the remaining funds (again less the tax amount) within thirty days after they vested. The 

district court declined to order Husband to pay Wife’s fees and costs related to the stock 

options, concluding that the evidence did not show he acted willfully.

[¶25] Wife argues the decree does not require a finding of willfulness before payment of 

fees and costs is ordered; rather, the decree simply requires a failure to perform. She 

asserts Husband failed to transfer one-half the stock options; therefore, he was required to 

pay her fees and costs. She also argues Husband knew the stock options re-issued by 

WPX were the same as those issued by Williams and his testimony to the contrary was 

not given in good faith.

[¶26] Addressing the last argument first, the district court had been dealing with the 

parties for over two years and was familiar with them and how they dealt with each other. 

Our rule is that the credibility of witnesses, the weight of the evidence, and conflicts in 

the evidence must be resolved by the finder of fact. Olsen v. Olsen, 2013 WY 115, ¶ 32, 

310 P.3d 888, 895 (Wyo. 2013). We will not disturb the district court’s findings 

concerning the credibility of the witnesses.

[¶27] We turn to Wife’s assertion that a finding of willfulness was not required for the 

district court to order Husband to pay attorney fees and costs. In Bowker v. Bowker, 795 

P.2d 1215, 1219 (Wyo. 1990), the property settlement agreement provided that a party 

who failed to perform an obligation imposed by the agreement would be responsible for 

the payment of attorney fees and costs incurred by the other party as a result of the failure 

or default. The post-decree proceeding in that case was caused by the husband’s failure 

to perform his obligations under the property settlement agreement. This Court enforced 

the attorney fees provision of the agreement and awarded wife reasonable fees and costs 

because husband had “failed to demonstrate any justification for his conduct.” Id. “[I]n 

the absence of such justification,” we concluded, wife was entitled to payment of her fees 

and costs. 

[¶28] In the present case, the district court declined to order Husband to pay attorney 

fees and costs mostly because it found that both parties were at fault for the house not 
8

being listed. With regard to the stock options, the district court gave Husband the benefit 

of the doubt and accepted his explanation that he did not know the Williams and WPX 

stock options were one and the same. Thus, the district court was satisfied with the 

justification Husband gave for his failure to perform. The district court’s decision not to 

award Wife attorney fees and costs was proper under Bowker because it found that 

Husband did not understand he was obligated to transfer stock options to Wife. 

[¶29] Affirmed.