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Honorable JustinA. Kever

District Attorney Tom Green County San Angelo, Texas OpinionNo. WW-1219

Re: Whether a Commissioners Court is authorized to discontinue the Veterans Service Office underArticle 5798a-2, V.C.S., and the facts stated.

Dear Mr. Kever:

You have requested an opinion of this office the following two questions:

(1) "18 the CommissionersCourt authorized under article 5798a-2 to discontinue theVeterans Service Office upon the expirationof the date of the term for which the incumbent is appointed when said Court has determined that such office is no longer a public necessity?"
(2) "Is the CommissionersCourt authorized to discontinue the services of theVeterans Service Officerupon completionof his twoyear termwhen the office is determined to be no longer a public necessity?" on

The oLinion request further states that the CommissionersCourt of Tom Green Countywith all members present on September 11, 1961, voted to discontinue the Veterans Service Office effective January 1, 1962, which is the expirationdate of the twoyear term for which the present incumbenthas been appointed.

Section 1 of Article 5798a-2, Vernon's Civil Statutes, to which you refer, gives the CommissionersCourt the xuthoritv to effectuatea Veterans CountyService Office. This statutereads in part as follows:

"Section 1. The office of Veterans County Service Office is hereby created. When the CommissionersCourt of a county shall determine that such an office is a public necessity in order that those residents of a countywho haveHonorable JustinA. Kever, page 2 (WW-1219)

served in the armed forces may promptly, wrowerlv and rightfullv obtain the benefits to which they are entitled, it shallby a majorityv,oteof the full membership thereof,

_ ___ ~.~._~~_ maintain and operate such an office and shall appoint a Veterans County S ..~- ervice Officer

. . . (Emphasissupplied)

From the above quoted statute, it can be observed that this officewas createdby the Legislature. However, the maintenanceand operation of the officewas placed at the discretion of the CommissionersCourt, upon a determinationby thatbody of a public necessity for the operation of that office under the criteria set out. Consequently, it is our opinion that although the office itseli' could not be abolished or discontinuedper se by the CommissionersCourt (itbeing a statutoryoffice set up by the Legislature), the court could, upon a determination that a public necessity for such office no longer exists, suspend the operation of the office by a majority vote of the full membership of the court.

We do not believe that it was the intention of the Legislature to do a useless thing in this instance by giving the CommissionersCourt the authority to use their discretion in determininga public necessity for the operation of this office, and then, on the other hand, denying all means of the court to use its discretion to suspend the operationwhen a public necessitywas found to have ceased to exist. A primary rule of construction of statutes is to ascertainand give effect to the intent of the legislativebody. Morrisv. Calvert, 320 S.W.2d 117 (Civ.App. 1959, err. ref., n.r.e.).

The Court in the case of Wood v. State, 133 Tex. 110, 126 S.W.2d 4 (1939) spelled out thispoint in the following language:

"It is the settled law that statutes shouldbe construed so as to carry out the legislative intent, and when such intent is once ascertained, it shouldbe given effect, even though the literalmeaning of thewords used therein is not followed. II

. . . In arriving at legislative intent it is of primary imnortance to ascertain the purpose forwhich the statute was enacted. Harris County v. Tennessee Products Pipe Line co., 332 S.W.2d 77'/ (Civ.App. 196C-)-. Since the obvious.- .-

Honorable JustinA. Kever, page 3 (WW-1219)

purpose of this statute is to provide for the operation of this agencywhen a public necessity for such is found to exist, it seems entirely logical to us thatwhen such public necessity is found to have become non-existent, it is within thepower of the CommissionersCourt to suspend the operation of that office. Looking to the subjectmatter and purposehere, we believe that our construction is in accordwith the purposes for which this statutewas passed, that it meets the criterion of reasonablenessdemanded in statutory interpretation. Southwest Sav. and Loan AssIn of Houston v. Falkner, 331 S.W.2d 917 (1960). -

In reference to your secondquestion,we believe in accordancewith the above, that the CommissionersCourt is also authorized to discontinue the services of the Veterans Service Of finds a public 2icer at the end of his term if the Court

nece sity for such office no longer exists. The officerhere in question is subject to the general rule that in the absence of legal inhibition the governing body underwhich an officerholds may abolish the office, and in a statutoryoffice, the Legislaturemay also authorize the CommissionersCourt of any county to abolish an office insofar as that county is concerned,where thematter of filling such office in the first instance is left to the Court's discretion. S.W. 577 (1892). Stanfieldv. State, 83 Tex. 317, 1.8 We think it a reasonable interpretation that since the filling of theVeterans County Service Office in the first placewas left to the CommissionersCourt, upon a discretionaryfinding of a public necessity, the Court is authorized to discontinue the services of the officer in its discretion. Sec. 381. (See 34 Tex. Jur. 387, Public Officers,

SUMMARY
The CommissionersCourt of Tom Green County is authorized to discontinueboth the operation of theVeterans County Service Office and the services of theVeterans County Service Officer upon a determinationby a majorityvote of the full membership of the Court that a public necessity for such office under the criteria set out in Article 5798a-2, no longer exists.. . ‘

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Honorable JustinA. Kever, Page 4 (WW-1219)

Very trulyyours,

EBS:dhs:kh

APPROVED:
OPINION COMMITTEE W. V. Geppert, Chairman

Pat Bailey William Colburn Howard Mays Dudley McCalla