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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

TRACEY SMITH,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

UNPUBLISHED

February 20, 2018

v No. 335988

Genesee Circuit Court

CRIM FITNESS FOUNDATION, LC No. 16-107606-NZ

Defendant-Appellee.

Before: JANSEN, P.J., and SERVITTO and SHAPIRO, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

In this wrongful termination and defamation action, plaintiff appeals, as of right, an order 

granting summary disposition in favor of defendant pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8). We affirm. 

On August 17, 2015, plaintiff began serving as an AmeriCorps VISTA member in two 

Flint-area schools. Plaintiff’s status as an AmeriCorps VISTA member was managed through 

the Corporation for National and Community Services (CNCS), a federal organization. 

However, United Way Worldwide, through its local affiliate United Way of Genesee County, 

oversaw plaintiff’s placement on a local level. Additionally, one of defendant’s employees, who 

also served as the community school director at two schools where plaintiff was placed, reported 

on plaintiff’s performance to United Way of Genesee County. 

On November 13, 2015, plaintiff was dismissed from her service placement, and placed 

on administrative leave with pay, pending plaintiff finding another service placement. CNCS 

sent plaintiff a letter on November 19, 2015, informing her that her placement had been 

terminated, per United Way Worldwide’s request, due to plaintiff’s “failure to meet the service 

hour requirement and communication challenges with partnering site staff members.” Plaintiff 

was officially terminated from the AmeriCorps VISTA program on December 7, 2015. 

Acting in propria persona, plaintiff filed a complaint alleging wrongful termination, 

slander, and defamation of character solely against defendant. Plaintiff claimed that despite 

performing excellent work, she was dismissed from her service placement without being 

disciplined. Plaintiff alleged that her worksite supervisor, defendant’s employee, was “not a very 

honest individual,” and had told fabricated stories about plaintiff’s performance to United Way 

of Genesee County. Further, plaintiff alleged that defendant’s employee would initiate “false 

issues [between herself and plaintiff] at the worksite.” 
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In lieu of filing an answer, defendant moved, pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8), to dismiss 

plaintiff’s complaint on the basis that plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief could be 

granted. Defendant’s motion was granted during a hearing on November 14, 2016. An order 

dismissing plaintiff’s complaint, with prejudice, was entered the same day. 

Plaintiff now argues that the trial court committed error requiring reversal by dismissing 

her complaint, with prejudice. This Court reviews a trial court’s decision on a motion for 

summary disposition de novo. Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 118; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). 

A motion for summary disposition brought under MCR 2.116(C)(8) tests the legal sufficiency of 

the pleadings, and should be granted when the complaint is so legally deficient that recovery 

would be impossible, even if all well-pleaded facts are taken as true and viewed in the light most 

favorable to the non-moving party. Id. at 119. Accordingly, only the pleadings may be 

considered by the trial court when deciding a motion for summary disposition under MCR 

2.116(C)(8). Id. at 119-120. 

As an initial matter, we note that plaintiff fails to support her claims on appeal with either 

statutes or case law. In fact, plaintiff does not cite even one statute or case, published or 

unpublished, in her entire brief on appeal. Indeed, in her brief, plaintiff merely reiterates her 

conclusory, nonspecific allegations against defendant. An appellant may not merely announce 

[her] position and leave it to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for [her] claims, nor 

may [she] give only cursory treatment with little or no citation of supporting authority.” Kubicki 

v Mtg Electronic Registration Sys, 292 Mich App 287, 291; 807 NW2d 433 (2011) (citation and 

quotation marks omitted). Therefore, plaintiff has abandoned her claims on appeal. Regardless, 

we address plaintiff’s claims on the merits, although we do not find them to be persuasive. 

Plaintiff first argues that the trial court erroneously dismissed her wrongful termination 

claim. Plaintiff claims that pursuant to the Flint Community Schools Corps Member Handbook, 

she should have been disciplined for any wrongdoing prior to being terminated. 

However, plaintiff conceded before the trial court that she was not employed by 

defendant. Rather, plaintiff admitted that CNCS was the only entity with the authority to 

terminate her status as an AmeriCorps VISTA member.1 Indeed, plaintiff’s claim for wrongful 

termination rested on the nonlegal theory that “[s]omebody have [sic] to communicate with 

[CNCS] and give them some negative feedback in order for them to terminate me.” Further, it is 

well established in Michigan jurisprudence that to sustain a wrongful termination action, some 

employment relationship must have existed. See, for example, Wurtz v Beecher Metro Dist, 495 

Mich 242, 249-250; 848 NW2d 121 (2014) (a contract employee cannot make a wrongful 

discharge claim after the contract lapsed because no employment relationship exists); Landin v 

Healthsource Saginaw, Inc, 305 Mich App 519, 523; 854 NW2d 152 (2014) (when an at-will 

 1 We note that although plaintiff argues that the Flint Community Schools Corps Member 

Handbook “confirms” that defendant was “responsible for termination,” the Handbook actually 

states, in no uncertain terms, that “only CNCS reserves the right to remove members from 

service.” 
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employment relationship is terminated, recovery for wrongful termination is available only upon 

a showing that discharge was a flagrant violation of public policy).

Michigan courts must look past procedural labels, and instead, determine the gravamen of 

an action by evaluating plaintiff’s claim as a whole. David v Sternberg, 272 Mich App 377, 381; 

726 NW2d 89 (2006) (citations omitted). Given plaintiff’s concession, that she was never 

employed by defendant, and that likewise, defendant did not have the authority to terminate 

plaintiff’s status as an AmeriCorps VISTA member, the trial court properly granted defendant’s 

motion for summary disposition. 

Next, plaintiff argues that the trial court erroneously dismissed her defamation claim. For 

plaintiff’s defamation claim to have survived defendant’s motion for summary disposition, 

plaintiff must have proved the existence of:

(1) a false and defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff, (2) an unprivileged 

communication to a third party, (3) fault amounting at least to negligence on the 

part of the publisher, and (4) either actionability of the statement irrespective of 

special harm (defamation per se) or the existence of special harm caused by the 

publication. [Edwards v Detroit News, Inc, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW2d 

___ (2017) (Docket No. 334058); slip op at 6, quoting Lakin v Rund, 318 Mich 

App 127, 133; 896 NW2d 76 (2016).]

“A plaintiff claiming defamation must plead a defamation claim with specificity by identifying 

the exact language that the plaintiff alleges to be defamatory[.]” Sarkar v Doe, 318 Mich App 

156, 179 n 13; 897 NW2d 207 (2016) (citation omitted). This Court is required to analyze each 

“allegedly defamatory statement identified in” the complaint. Id. at 179. 

Plaintiff failed to plead her defamation claim with the specificity required by Michigan 

law. In her complaint, plaintiff failed to identify any specific statement, false, defamatory, or 

otherwise, made by defendant, or by an employee of defendant. Plaintiff specifically claimed 

her supervisor at her service placements, who was an employee of defendant, was “not a very 

honest individual,” had fabricated stories about plaintiff’s work performance, and would initiate 

“false issues [between herself and plaintiff] at the work sites.” Plaintiff alleged that this 

employee’s actions resulted in plaintiff’s termination as an AmeriCorps VISTA member. 

However, the complaint fails to specifically identify “the exact language that the plaintiff 

alleges to be defamatory[.]” Sarkar, 318 Mich App at 179 n 13. Plaintiff does not articulate 

what story was fabricated or what “false issue” was initiated that directly resulted in plaintiff’s 

termination. In support of her position, plaintiff cites the November 19, 2015 letter from CNCS, 

which states that plaintiff had been terminated from her service placement, at the request of 

United Way Worldwide, due to “[plaintiff’s] failure to meet the service hour requirement and 

communication challenges with partnering site staff members[.]” Plaintiff argues that her 

service placement supervisor had complained to United Way of Genesee County, who in turn, 

communicated with United Way Worldwide, who ultimately requested that plaintiff be removed 

from her service placement. But plaintiff provides no evidence to support her theory that this 

chain of communication began with defendant, or even existed. Without explicitly stating the 

who, what, where, and when of her defamation claim, plaintiff cannot meet the specific pleading 
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requirements of Michigan law. Therefore, the trial court did not commit error requiring reversal 

by summarily dismissing plaintiff’s defamation claim, pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8). 

Affirmed. 

/s/ Kathleen Jansen

/s/ Deborah A. Servitto

/s/ Douglas B. Shapiro