If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

UNPUBLISHED

In re WEEMS/MCDANIEL/HILL/HUNTER, Minors. April 18, 2024

No. 368408

Washtenaw Circuit Court

Family Division

LC Nos. 21-000004-NA; 

21-000005-NA; 

21-000006-NA; 

21-000014-NA; 

22-000025-NA

Before: GADOLA, C.J., and BORRELLO and PATEL, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

In this interlocutory appeal arising from child protective proceedings, appellant Michigan 

Department of Corrections (MDOC) Director Heidi Washington, appeals by leave granted1the 

trial court’s October 10, 2023 order that, in relevant part, ordered appellant to “allow supervised, 

video visitation” two times per month between respondent-mother and four of her seven minor 

children while respondent-mother was incarcerated in the Huron Valley Women’s Correctional 

Facility (HVWCF). For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we vacate the trial court’s order and 

remand for further proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND

The few underlying facts relevant to the narrow issue before us on appeal are undisputed. 

Respondent-mother’s minor children were removed from her care, and she was subsequently 

 

1 See In re Weems/McDaniel/Hill/Hunter, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered 

November 14, 2023 (Docket No. 368408).
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convicted of first-degree criminal sexual conduct against one of her minor children. Respondentmother was sentenced2

and then incarcerated in the HVWCF.

Following her criminal conviction, the trial court in the child protective proceedings that

are the subject of the present appeal entered orders that respondent-mother was to have supervised 

parenting time, once per week, either in person or by video, with five of her minor children. Her 

parenting time with the other two children, which included the victim of her criminal conduct, was 

suspended.

It is undisputed that respondent-mother never received parenting time with any of her 

children while incarcerated in the HVWCF. Respondent-mother subsequently filed a motion in 

the trial court seeking an order to require the MDOC and HVWCF to show cause why they should 

not be held in contempt for failing to arrange visitation between respondent-mother and her 

children pursuant to the court’s order regarding parenting time. The MDOC and the warden for 

the HVWCF appeared as nonparties in this action. As relevant to the arguments presented to this 

Court on appeal, the MDOC and the HVWCF warden argued in the trial court that the court did 

not have subject-matter jurisdiction over its administrative rules regarding visitation in its penal 

institutions.

The trial court held a hearing on the motion to show cause. Notably, at the time the trial 

court entertained a motion to show cause, it had yet to hold an adjudication hearing and

accordingly, the minor children had not yet been found to be within the court’s jurisdiction under 

MCL 712A.2(b). However, despite failing to hold an initial adjudication hearing, the trial court 

nonetheless went ahead with a hearing on the show cause and subsequently entered an order

requiring appellant to “allow supervised, video visitation” two times per month between 

respondent-mother and four of her seven minor children while respondent-mother was incarcerated 

in the HVWCF. The trial court relied on MCL 712A.6 as authority for entering the order and for 

exercising jurisdiction over appellant. Additionally, the trial court declined to hold any person or 

entity in contempt. We granted the director’s application for leave to appeal and stayed 

enforcement of the trial court’s order pending resolution of this appeal.

II. ANALYSIS

The issue before this Court is whether the trial court was authorized under MCL 712A.6 to 

enter the order requiring appellant, the director of the MDOC, to permit respondent-mother’s 

supervised parenting time while respondent-mother was incarcerated.

This issue presents a question of law, which this Court reviews de novo. In re PAP, 247 

Mich App 148, 152; 640 NW2d 880 (2001).

MCL 712A.6 provides in relevant part as follows:

 

2 Respondent was sentenced to 25 to 50 years’ imprisonment for that conviction. Her appeal from 

that conviction is also pending in this Court in Docket No. 365866.
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The court has jurisdiction over adults as provided in this chapter . . . and 

may make orders affecting adults as in the opinion of the court are necessary for 

the physical, mental, or moral well-being of a particular juvenile or juveniles under 

its jurisdiction. However, those orders must be incidental to the jurisdiction of the 

court over the juvenile or juveniles. [Emphasis added.]

Although MCL 712A.6 grants the court “broad authority” to enter dispositional orders, that 

authority is only applicable after the court has found that the child is within the court’s jurisdiction 

under MCL 712A.2(b). In re Sanders, 495 Mich 394, 404-406; 852 NW2d 524 (2014); see also 

MCL 712A.6. 

There are two phases to child protective proceedings: the adjudicative phase, during which 

the court “determines whether it can take jurisdiction over the child in the first place,” and the 

dispositional phase, during which the court determines the “course of action” that will “ensure the 

child’s safety and well-being.” Id. at 404. A court can only enter dispositional orders under its 

authority in MCL 712A.6 “[o]nce [the] court assumes jurisdiction over a child.” Id. at 406. 

Assuming jurisdiction over the child requires proof by a preponderance of the evidence that one 

or more of the allegations in the petition are true and fall within MCL 712A.2(b), which may be 

established by plea or by a trial at which the rules of evidence are generally applicable. Id. at 404-

406; see also In re Ferranti, 504 Mich 1, 15; 934 NW2d 610 (2019).

In this case, as the trial court should have been aware, it had not yet conducted an 

adjudication and therefore had not found by a preponderance of the evidence that the minor 

children were within the court’s jurisdiction under MCL 712A.2(b). Notably, we deem it 

necessary to remind the trial court that its decision following a preliminary hearing to authorize 

the petition for filing, which only requires a finding of probable cause, is not equivalent to an 

adjudication and does not establish the court’s jurisdiction over the minor children. In re Ferranti, 

504 Mich at 15 (“After receiving the petition, the trial court must hold a preliminary hearing and 

may authorize the filing of the petition upon a finding of probable cause that one or more of the 

allegations are true and could support the trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction under MCL 

712A.2(b).”).

Therefore, the court could not rely on MCL 712A.6 as authority for entering the order at 

issue in this case because the court had not yet obtained jurisdiction over the children under MCL 

712A.2(b). The trial court erred as a matter of law by putting the cart before the horse and acting 

as if it were in the dispositional phase without first properly obtaining jurisdiction over the 

children, thereby skipping the adjudicative phase. We therefore vacate the trial court’s order 

requiring appellant to permit respondent-mother parenting time. In light of our disposition of this 

matter, we need not address the parties’ additional arguments generally involving the alleged 

conflict between the trial court’s authority in child protective proceedings and the MDOC’s 

authority over penal institutions. We leave these questions to be answered should they arise in an 

appropriate case, and we express no opinion on those questions here.

Vacated and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not 
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retain jurisdiction.

/s/ Michael F. Gadola 

/s/ Stephen L. Borrello

/s/ Sima G. Patel