NUMBER 13-17-00268-CR

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellant,

v.

CESAR RAMIRO ARELLANO, Appellee.

On appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2

of Victoria County, Texas.

OPINION

Before Justices Benavides, Longoria, and Hinojosa

Opinion by Justice Longoria

Appellant the State of Texas charged appellee Cesar Ramiro Arellano with a 

driving while intoxicated Class A Misdemeanor because he had previously been 

convicted of the same offense. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.09(a) (West, Westlaw 

through 2017 1st C.S.). Arellano filed a motion to suppress. After the trial court 

conducted a hearing on the matter, it granted Arellano’s motion. By four issues, which 
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we have reorganized, the State contends the trial court erred in: (1) concluding the 

warrant was “facially invalid”; (2) concluding the State was barred from invoking the good 

faith exception; (3) refusing to consider documentary evidence presented by the State; 

and (4) failing to provide adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law.1 We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Arellano was arrested for the offense of driving while intoxicated. See id. § 49.04

(West, Westlaw through 2017 1st C.S.). Officer Phillip Garcia of the Victoria Police 

Department obtained a specimen of Arellano’s blood after applying for a search warrant. 

Arellano filed a motion to suppress, alleging that the warrant was facially invalid because 

it failed to meet the statutory requirements of Article 18.04 of the Texas Code of Criminal 

Procedure. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 18.04 (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st 

C.S.). At the motion to suppress hearing, Arellano offered an eleven-page document 

entitled “Affidavit for Search Warrant” into evidence without objection. The State 

responded to Arellano’s argument by invoking the good faith exception contained within 

Article 38.23(b) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.

ANN. art. 38.23 (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st C.S.). 

The trial court expressed concern about whose signature was on the warrant. The 

State indicated a willingness to resolve that issue and offered to call in a witness. Instead, 

the trial court instructed both parties to submit a brief summarizing their arguments. The 

State submitted several documentary exhibits attached to their brief including a separate 

affidavit from Officer Garcia where he attested to the identity of the magistrate and the 

 1 After filing Arellano’s brief, on January 28, 2019, Arellano’s counsel filed her motion to withdraw, 

stating that she was sworn in as the Criminal District Attorney of Victoria County, Texas, and is thereby 

disqualified from representing Arellano in this matter. After considering her motion, we hereby GRANT 

counsel’s motion to withdraw. 
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offense report.2 Thereafter, the trial court granted Arellano’s motion to suppress. In 

response to the State’s request, the trial court made the following findings of fact and 

conclusions of law to support its ruling:

I. Findings of Fact

. . . .

g. The Trial Court reviewed [Arellano’s] Exhibit 1 and found that 

the signature above the line indicating ‘Magistrate, Victoria 

County’ was not in legible handwriting, nor was it 

accompanied by any name identifying the magistrate in either 

clearly legible handwriting or in typewritten form.

h. During the hearing, neither the Trial Court nor the State could 

identify the magistrate by the signature on the warrant in this 

matter. The State offered no evidence on this issue. 

i. During the hearing, the State called no witnesses. More 

specifically, the State did not elicit any testimony from Officer 

Garcia during the hearing . . . 

II. Conclusions of Law

. . . .

d. The Court finds that the signature on the search warrant 

seeking Defendant’s blood is not legible and is not 

accompanied by the magistrate’s name in either clearly 

legible handwriting or in typewritten form.

e. The warrant in this case obtained by Officer Garcia is not 

facially valid because it fails to comply with the requisites of 

Tex. Code of Crim. Proc. 18.04. 

f. In order to rely on the “good faith exception” to the 

exclusionary rule codified in Tex. Code of Crim. Proc. 

38.23(b), an officer must rely on a facially valid warrant. see

[sic] Miller v. State, 703 S.W.3d 352 (Tex. App.—Corpus 

Christi, 1985); McClintock v. State, 2017 WL 1076289 (Tex. 

Crim. App., March 22, 2017). 

. . . 

 2 This affidavit is separate from the probable cause affidavit attached to the search warrant. 
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h. Officer Garcia did not testify during the hearing, and thus 

presented no evidence to show whether he relied in “good 

faith” upon the warrant in this case. 

i. Although Officer Garcia did not testify at the hearing, the State 

attached Officer Garcia’s affidavit to their brief to the Court. 

j. Even if the Trial Court wished to consider the affidavit, as 

within its discretion, the statements in the affidavits provide a 

recitation of the statutory requirements for the “good faith 

exception” with respect to a warrant.

This appeal followed. 

II. MOTION TO SUPPRESS

A. Standard of Review

A trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, like any ruling on the admission of 

evidence, is subject to review for abuse of discretion. State v. Dixon, 206 S.W.3d 587, 

590 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). “We view the record in the light most favorable to the trial 

court’s conclusion and reverse the judgment only if it is outside the zone of reasonable 

disagreement.” Id. Its ruling will be upheld if it is reasonably supported by the record and 

is correct under any theory of law applicable to the case. Ramos v. State, 245 S.W.3d 

410, 417–18 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). We give almost total deference to a trial court’s 

express or implied determination of historical facts and review de novo the court’s 

application of the law of search and seizure to those facts. State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 

856 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)

B. Warrant Requirements

By its first issue, the State argues that the trial court erroneously concluded that 

the warrant was facially invalid in violation of Article 18.04(5) of the Texas Code of 

Criminal Procedure. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 18.04. 

1. Applicable Law
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In September 2015, the Legislature amended Article 18.04 of the Texas Code of 

Criminal Procedure by adding a fifth element to the list of requisites for a valid search 

warrant. This additional requirement requires the warrant to contain the name of the 

issuing magistrate in clearly legible handwriting or in typewritten form along with the 

magistrate’s signature. HOUSE COMM. ON CRIMINAL JURISPRUDENCE, Bill 

Analysis, Tex. H.B. 644, 84th Leg. R.S. (2015).3 

A search warrant shall be sufficient under article 18.04 of the code of criminal 

procedure if it contains the following requisites: 

1. that it run in the name of “The State of Texas”; 

2. that it identify, as near as may be, that which is to be seized and

name or describe, as near as may be, the person, place, or thing to

be searched;

3. that it command any peace officer of the proper county to search 

forthwith the person, place, or thing named; 

4. that it be dated and signed by the magistrate; and 

5. that the magistrate’s name appear in clearly legible handwriting or in 

typewritten form with the magistrate’s signature 

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 18.04 (emphasis added). A search warrant must be 

“clearly sufficiently specific to meet the mandates of the Fourth Amendment, the Texas 

Constitution, and article 18.04 of the Code.” Ramirez v. State, 345 S.W.3d 631, Tex. 

App.—San Antonio 2011, no pet.); Miller v. State, 703 S.W.2d 352, 353 (Tex. App.—

Corpus Christi 1985, pet. ref’d) (holding that a search warrant lacking any of the required 

elements of article 18.04 is facially invalid). However, “[a] warrant that does not contain 

 3 The amendment “would add to existing search warrant requirements that the name of the 

magistrate issuing the warrant appear in clearly legible handwriting or in typewritten form on the warrant” 

because “[a] magistrate’s signature on such warrants may not always be clearly legible, which can increase 

the risk of forgery or inadequately informing individuals of who has authorized the search warrant.” HOUSE 

COMM. ON CRIMINAL JURISPRUDENCE, Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 644, 84th Leg. R.S. (2015).
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the basic information required by art. 18.04 can nevertheless be valid so long as the 

warrant incorporates by reference [an] affidavit and said affidavit does contain all of the 

information required by art. 18.04.” Turner v. State, 886 S.W.2d 859, 864 (Tex. App.—

Beaumont 1994, pet ref’d). 

2. Discussion 

Here, the search warrant was signed by a magistrate; however, the magistrate’s 

name does not appear in clearly legible handwriting or in typewritten form with the 

magistrate’s signature as required by article 18.04(5). See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.

art. 18.04(5). Moreover, the attached affidavit incorporated in the warrant also lacks the 

magistrate’s name in clearly legible handwriting or typewritten form. Because article 

18.04(5) requires that the “magistrate’s name appear in clearly legible handwriting or in 

typewritten form with the magistrate’s signature,” and the search warrant before us does 

not meet this requirement, we conclude the warrant does not comply with the 

requirements of 18.04 and is therefore facially invalid. See Turner, 886 S.W.2d at 864;

Miller, 703 S.W.2d at 353. Accordingly, we overrule the State’s first issue. 

C. Good Faith Exception 

By its second issue, the State claims that the trial court erred by concluding the 

State was prevented from invoking the good faith exception of article 38.28 of the code 

of criminal procedure. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.23. 

The Texas good faith statutory exception provides an exception to the exclusion 

of unlawfully obtained evidence only if the law enforcement officer was acting in good 

faith reliance upon a warrant. State v. Molden, 484 S.W.3d 602, 610 (Tex. App.—Austin 

2016, pet ref’d). In executing a warrant, that officer “act[s] in objective good faith reliance 

upon” the warrant, “as long as the warrant is facially valid.” McClintock v. State, 541 
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S.W.3d 63, 73 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). In this case, Arellano’s blood was obtained as a 

result of a facially invalid warrant in violation of article 18.04 of the code of criminal 

procedure. See Molden, 484 S.W.3d at 610. Because the “good faith exception” requires 

a facially valid warrant, and here, by contrast, no valid search warrant existed, the “good 

faith exception” is inapplicable to this case. See id.; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 

38.23. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err in applying the exclusionary 

rule in this case. We overrule the State’s second point of error. 

D. State’s Documentary Evidence 

By its third issue, the State contends that it was plain error for the trial court to fail 

to consider “any of the documentary evidence offered by the State” following the motion 

to suppress hearing. According to the State, “if [Arellano] is allowed to submit 

documentary evidence then the State must be allowed to do so as well.” 

Here, the trial court made it clear that it did not consider the State’s documentary 

evidence when it concluded that the warrant was facially invalid. However, because the 

warrant was facially invalid, it was unnecessary for the trial court to consider any of the 

State’s evidence. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 18.04(5). Nonetheless, “a trial 

judge may use its discretion in deciding what type of information he considers appropriate 

and reliable in making his pre-trial ruling.” Ford v. State, 305 S.W.3d 530, 539 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2009). Accordingly, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion when it 

rejected the State’s documentary evidence. Id. We therefore overrule the State’s third

issue.4

 4 Additionally, in its fourth issue, the State complains that the trial court’s findings of fact and 

conclusions of law are “wholly inadequate on the potentially dispositive issue in this case” as the trial court 

failed to address: (1) whether it believed Officer Garcia’s testimony through his affidavit; (2) the offense 

report; (3) whether it believed the magistrate was a neutral and detached magistrate, or (4) whether the 

warrant was issued on probable cause. Because we determined that the warrant was facially invalid, this 

issue is not dispositive. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4. 
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III. CONCLUSION

Having overruled the State’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

NORA L. LONGORIA 

Justice

Publish.

TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Delivered and filed the

21st day of February, 2019.