1 Filed 6/12/14 In re Gemma K. CA1/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re Gemma K., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

SAN FRANCISCO COUNTY HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. R.C., Defendant and Appellant. A140505
(San Francisco City and County Super. Ct. No. JD11-3076)

R.C. (appellant), mother of three-yea r-old Gemma K., appeal s from the juvenile court’s order, pursuant to Welfare a nd Institutions Code section 366.26, 1 terminating her parental rights and ordering adoption as the permanent plan. Appellant contends the juvenile court improperly found that she had failed to establish the applicability of the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to adoption. We shall affirm the juvenile
court’s order.
FACTUAL AND PROCED URAL BACKGROUND On March 11, 2011, the San Francisco Co unty Human Services Agency (Agency) filed a petition alleging that seven-m onth-old Gemma came under section 300,

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.2 subdivision (b), as a result of appellant’s in ability to provide her with adequate care, supervision and protection. 2 Gemma was detained. The detention report filed by the Agency described the circumstances leading to detention. Appellant and Gemma’s father had a relationship characterized by domestic violence. On March 4, 2011, appellant and Gemma’s father began to argue about appellant’s level of in toxication. Appellant pushed the father on the bed and began to punch him in the face with closed fists. The father reacted by scratching appellant’s face and neck. The father called the police, appellant was arrested, and an emergency protective orde r issued. After appellant’s incarceration, the Agency met with Gemma’s maternal grandmother to develop a safety plan for the baby’s care, while child protective se rvices investigated the referral. Gemma was born premature and had seve re medical problems, including chronic lung disease. She required daily nebulizer and oxygen treatment. Because of her severe medical and respiratory problems, she was no t able to come into contact with sick children or adults. She required supervised visitation where she would not come into
contact with numerous individuals. Before the detention hearing, the social worker met with the maternal grandmother to create a safety plan for her care for Gemm a and for her older brother (who was already living with the maternal gra ndmother) while CPS continued its investigation. A team decision-making meeting was held March 9, 2011, and appellant agreed to meet with the domestic violence specialist fro m Positive Directions. Th e social worker referred appellant to Homeless Prenatal Program (HPP ) for a substance abuse assessment and to
the National Council on Alcoholism and Other Drug Addictions-Bay Area for drug testing. The social worker also referred th e parents and Gemma to Foster Care Mental Health for counseling, medication evaluation, and therapeutic visits. At the continued detention hearing on March 17, 2011, Gemma was detained in foster care.

2 Most of the facts regarding events occurring before the se ction 366.26 hearing are taken from our prior nonpub lished opinion in this matte r, filed on May 9, 2013, in which we denied appellant’s petition for extr aordinary writ, pursuan t to California Rules of Court, rule 8.452 (rule 8.452). ( R.C. v. Superior Court (A137894).)3 The disposition report, filed on April 21, 2011, related that issues around violence
and substance abuse had caused the removal of Gemma from appellant. Upon meeting the social worker, appellant presented as “ver y depressed.” She had a history of mental illness and had been hospitaliz ed for depression. Appella nt did not admit to any substance abuse. However, she was testing a nd attending services. She was also in a domestic violence class at the Riley Center. Although the violence between appellant and the father was severe, appellant refused to discuss it at all. The Agency had made referrals for individual therapy and a ps ychological evaluation and was waiting for appellant to be assigned. Appellant was rece iving therapeutic visits with Gemma twice a week at A Better Way. The Agency also had obtained and delivered a Fast Pass to appellant and, when she stated she lost the pass, she was given tokens. The child remained medically fragile. Sh e required oxygen at night, along with a medication for lung distress. She used Pu lmicort for her nebulizer twice daily. She appeared alert and had a good appetite. Sh e was receiving services from Golden Gate Regional Center for gross motor skill delays. On June 20, 2011, at the conclusion of the combined jurisdiction/disposition hearing, the court declared a dependency for Gemma and found true the following: “B1—The mother has a substance abuse prob lem for which she requires assessment and treatment and which impe des her ability to safely parent th e child. [¶] . . . [¶] B5—The
mother has mental health i ssues, including psychiatric hos pitalizations, for which she requires assessment and treatment and which impede her ability to safely parent the child. [¶] . . . [¶] B9—The child is at risk of physical harm in that the parents have a relationship in which they have engaged in do mestic violence with the child present. Further, both the mother and father have su stained injuries during these incidents.” Other allegations regarding the father alone were also sustained. The court struck several other allegations, including Coun t B6, which had alleged appellant had developmental delays requiring assessment and treatment and whic h impeded her ability to safely parent Gemma.4 The court found the Agency had made “rea sonable efforts” to prevent or eliminate
the removal of Gemma from the home. Se rvices recommended by the Agency and ordered by the court for appellant incl uded: That she undergo “individual counseling/Therapy which addresses Do mestic Violence, Trauma, Effective Communication, Self-Esteem and the Effects of Violence on Children”; that she “remain under the care of a qualified mental health professional and comply with the mental health professional’s recommendations for psyc hotherapy and/or prescribed medication”;
that she “maintain a clean and safe home fo r the child[]”; and th at she “refrain from substance abuse and particip ate in services recommende d from the substance abuse assessment.” The court ordered the father, bu t not appellant, to “actively participate in a 52-week DV [domestic violence] program.” In the six-month review report, filed on January 30, 2012, the Agency reported that appellant was engaged in services, a ppeared to be maturing, and was working towards completing her requirements to reun ify with Gemma. The Agency reported it
intended to move visitation to appellant’s home in an effort to advance her progress
toward reunification. The so cial worker reported that a ppellant’s home appeared neat and clean and that appellant had worked ha rd to clean her home in preparation for Gemma’s return. Appellant ha d been working closely and consistently with A Better Way to improve her parenti ng skills and had visited co nsistently, demonstrating improved parenting skills. All appellant’s drug tests had been po sitive for marijuana. Appellant had a
cannabis card and tested within the limits acco rding to California law. Appellant stated she was making efforts to reduce her use and he r test levels were initially high, but were down recently. Appellant had been referred to Jane Christmas for psychological testing on March 30, 2011. Appellant reported she had completed the testing over the summer, but
when the worker contacted Christmas to obt ain a copy of the report in October, she learned that appellant had started the testing but never finished it. The worker arranged a follow up appo intment with Christmas.5 Appellant was being seen by Lindsey Ewic k, a therapist at Bayview Mental Health for therapeutic services. Ho wever Ewick had not responded to the worker’s November request for information. Ewick stated sh e needed to confirm she had a release of information from appellant. As of January 5, 2012, she had not re turned the worker’s phone calls. There had been no reported in stances of domestic violence during the reporting period. The report expressed the concerns of Ge mma’s doctor that she not be exposed to second hand smoke, given her chronic lung di sease. Appellant reported she did not smoke in the house. According to Gemma’s physical therapist, sh e needed more tummy time to start crawling and her fine motor skills were also delayed. At the March 1, 2012 hearing on the si x-month status review, the court found a substantial probability Gemma w ould be returned to the phys ical custody of the parent
within six months. It found the Agency had made “reasonabl e efforts” to aid the parent to overcome the problems leading to the initial remova l and continue d custody of Gemma. It also found appellant’s progress had been “substantial.” The court ordered continued services to be provided to appella nt and set the 12-month hearing for April 26,
2012.
The court also found the father had made no progress and terminated the supportive services the Ag ency had been providing. The status review report for the 12-m onth hearing, filed on April 9, 2012,
recommended an additional six months of serv ices be provided appellant. The report related that in December 2011 and January 2012, appellant wa s “5150’d due to depression[;] however she was discharged ri ght away.” At the time of the report, appellant was on medication. She continued to see Ewick for ther apeutic services.
Ewick told the worker on April 4, 2012, that she could not provide an update on therapy without first reviewing the consent forms. Ewick did not thereafter provide a progress report. Appellant completed her psychologica l evaluation with Christmas and “the evaluation indicated the presence of signi ficant mental health problems, for which6 [appellant] needs intensive sup port to address.” Appellant had a dual diagnosis of depression, not otherwise sp ecified; alcohol abuse, and a personality disorder characterized by paranoid an d narcissistic traits; and limited cognitive capabilities. Insofar as appellant’s ability to care for Gemma was concerned, Christmas recommended that appellant attend regular alcohol trea tment, ongoing anger ma nagement, parenting classes, and intensive individual therapy. Appellant continued to use and test positive for marijuana. She denied usi ng alcohol or marijuana at th e time the report was prepared; however, Christmas found that appellant mini mized her alcohol abuse and diagnosed her with alcohol abuse. Appellant was receivi ng twice-a-week visits with Gemma, in her home, supervised by A Better Way. At the 12-month review hearing held Ap ril 26, 2012, the court found appellant’s progress “substantial,” ordered an additional si x months of reunifica tion services, and set the 18-month review hearing for September 27, 2012.
In addition to the inform ation set forth above, the September 12, 2012 report, prepared for the 18-month review, related that the early intervention ist with the Golden Gate Regional Services expressed concern regarding appellant’s smoking habits and reported her home smelle d of smoke. Appellant admitted sh e continued to use marijuana, despite expiration of her card. She again clai med to be in the process of quitting. She
claimed she had discontinued he r alcohol use and her test re sults showed no record of alcohol abuse. She was continuing individua l therapy with Ewick, but the therapy had
been reduced to once-a-month sessions. Ewick told the social worker that appellant was no longer benefitting from the weekly sessions and did not have much to talk about. Ewick had worked with appellant for more than a year. The therapis t stated it was a joint decision to move to monthly visits and reported that sh e did not believe it would be therapeutically appropriate to expand visits to more than once a month. Ewick would not elaborate on appellant’s therapeutic services , stating that the only release appellant had authorized was to give the work er a record of appellant’s a ttendance. She did inform the worker that appellant was diagnosed with majo r depressive disorder recurrent in partial7 remission. She reported appellant was con tinuing to work on managing her depression and that she was taking her medication regularly. The Agency was concerned about appellant ’s relationship with the father, since it appeared appellant was not en gaging in protective measures to address the hostile and violent nature of their relationship. In Ma y 2012, the therapeutic visitation worker told the worker that the maternal grandmother ha d reported she thought that the father might have been at the home during a visit. A se rvice tech responsible for transportation had reported that on one occasion appellant would not allow her in the house during drop off and the service tech thought th is behavior was odd. Appella nt denied this had happened and denied that the father had ever been pr esent during a visit. The social worker met with appellant to discuss this information a nd made it clear to appellant that the father
could not be around when Gemma is visiting and that his presence created a safety threat for Gemma. Appellant stated th at she and the father continued to see each other, but are not in a relationship and that she had no desire to get ba ck together. The worker discussed the police service ca lls to appellant’s residence (five between January and May 2012) and offered a referral to appellant to u ndergo a domestic violence intake with the Agency’s domestic violence speci alist, Christine Leon, to addr ess this continued issue. Appellant asked if she and the father could just sign something saying they would stay away from each other. On June 1, 2012, appellant reported the father had tried again to come into the house and she had refused. The worker suggest ed she call Leon and discuss strategies for dealing with the relationship. The worker also gave appellant the number of the Riley
Center Crisis Line in the event the father attempted to come to the house again. In a conference call with appellant and Leon, th ey discussed her on going relationship and strategies for being proactive and dealing with the relationship. Leon stated that appellant had previously participated in eight weeks of domestic violence classes and had transitioned to individual therapy to address issues related to domestic violence existing in her relationship with the father. Leon stated that she and Ap pellant had contacted appellant’s counsel to obtain a restraining orde r against the father. On June 18, appellant8 admitted that the father might still have a ke y to the home and that she would put in a request to have the locks changed. A day la ter, appellant stated she was backing off on requesting the restraining order because she did not want to cause any more drama in her life. She said she had put in the request to ch ange the locks. On Ju ly 23, 2012, appellant stated in response to the social worker’s inquiry that sh e did not think it was necessary to change the locks. Th e worker discussed with appellant the importance of this safety measure for Gemma. Appellant was told the most recent call on the police log was July 13, 2012, and appellant denied the police ca me out that day. The worker informed appellant that she would no longer be able to have unsupervise d visits due to the Agency’s concerns about her interaction with the father. She was encouraged to follow through with the various suggestions to chan ge the locks, get a restraining order, follow through with her therapy and with domestic violence services. The Agency referred appellant to another domestic violence program, Casa De Las Madres, for a domestic violence support group. Appellant reported that she had completed intake there and would begin a domestic violen ce group the week of August 27, 2012. She reported she had had her locks changed. Two-year-old Gemma was reported to be in the 12- to 18-month range in all developmental domains. She had a significa nt expressive language delay and used approximately 10 words. She had failed all developmental milestones for two-year-olds, except her ability to imita te adults, which she passed. She was not walking yet, but had learned to pull herself up over the last c ouple of months and wa s very mobile. Her breathing condition was getting better, although there were ongoing concerns regarding appellant’s cigarette and marijuana smoki ng and the effects on Gemma’s chronic lung disease. Although there was no direct evid ence that appellant was smoking in the home, the social worker and another service pr ovider each reported the home had a stale smokiness present during their visits. The Agency recommended termination of reunification services to appellant and the setting of a section 366.26 selection and implementation hearing to implement a permanent plan.9 In August 2012, a dispute over visitation arose when the Agen cy, which in July
2012 had exercised its court-authorized discre tion to move to unsupervised visits between appellant and Gemma, required th at visits again be supervis ed. The Agency required supervision upon discovering appellant had continued her volatile relationship with the father, inviting him to her home, resulting in conflict between the pair and police
intervention. A hearing on the visitation dispute was se t for August 15, 2012 . The attorney for Gemma filed a declaration in support of an ex parte hearing on the request for a formal order for supervised visits only, stating: “Mother misrepresented her continued
involvement with Father to both the Agency and to the Agency’s domestic violence specialist. San Francisco Police Department records of calls for service to appellant’s home indicate that contrary to appellant’s re presentations, the police have been called to
Mother’s home on eight occasions since January 2012 to separate Mother and Father. By her own declaration, Mother states that sh e has not sought police assistance but rather that Father has sought police assistance following Mother’s visit with Father and dispute or conflict arising during the interaction.” (Italics added.) Appellant admitted that the father came to her home unannounced and poli ce records reflected calls for service at all different times of the day a nd on different days of the we ek. Appellant admitted the father had keys to her home an d continued to have those keys . Police officers reported they had regular contact with appellant and the father and, on at least one occasion in the previous two months, the officers smelled alcohol on both parents’ breath while confronting them about a conflic t. Appellant had consistently been admonished that her continued relationship w ith the father would jeopardize reunification. On August 10, 2012, after the Agency discover ed this information and moved to reinstate supervised visits, appellant’s attorn ey requested a restraining order against the father. Appellant’s declaration stated the fa ther had a “habit of coming by my apartment
uninvited and unannounced.” Sh e admitted she sometimes let hi m in, but stated he often
refused to leave. She stated th at the father had made the calls to the police, falsely stating that she was being violent with him. She stated that he was trying to jeopardize her10 efforts to reunify with Gemma and that he had told her so directly. Appellant maintained there was no current physical violence between the pair. She also maintained that the father had not been present during any of her unsupervise d visits with Gemma. She
admitted she had allowed him into her home and that she had not been “entirely truthful with my social worker abou t my contact with him.” Sh e also admitted the police repeatedly had advised her not to let the father into her hom e. On August 13, 2012, the court denied the temporary restraining order ag ainst the father. On August 15, the court confirmed that appellant’s visits were to be supervised by the maternal greatgrandmother. The Agency was given discreti on to move to unsupervised visitation with
24 hours notice to Gemma’s counsel. On September 18, 2012, appellant filed a section 388 request to change court order, seeking to return to unsupervised vis its with Gemma, and describing the steps she had taken to follow up with regard to the re lationship with the father, including changing her locks, not allowing the fa ther into the home and enga ging in domestic violence services. The hearing on the section 388 petition was schedule d and later continued to be
combined with the 18-month re view hearing that was contin ued to November 16, 2012. Three days before the review hearing, appella nt moved to continue it pursuant to section 352, arguing she was doing very well, that she had not shown any record of alcohol use and her marijuana levels had dr opped to zero recently. Sh e had attempted to obtain a restraining order against the father, had attend ed eight weeks of domestic violence classes and transitioned to individual therapy to addre ss issues related to domestic violence. She maintained that the therapy ha d been reduced to monthly, de spite her need for intensive therapy. Relying on In re Elizabeth R. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 17 74, appellant’s counsel requested a continuance in order to “clari fy the relationship between the parents and allow the appellant . . . time to engage in intensive therapy.” The court approved a continuance to January 7, 2013. On January 3, 2013, Gemma’s counsel soug ht an order that appellant’s visits be supervised by the Agency, rath er than the maternal grandm other, and that visits be reduced from 11 hours per week (two 5.5 hour visits) to two 3-hour visits per week.11 Counsel did so after receiving documentary pr oof on January 2, 2013, that appellant’s recent urinalysis tests established that she c ontinued to use alcohol and that she had seven positive results over the preceding two months, one of which indicated use within eight hours of testing. Appellant admitted she ha d resumed drinking becaus e of “stress.” Six of the seven positive tests indica ted appellant drank at or near the time of her visits with Gemma. The police made two service calls to appellant’s home in November (after appellant had filed the section 388 petition to ch ange the order to unsupervised visits and overnight visits) to address conflicts betwee n appellant and the father. Contrary to appellant’s August 2012 statements that she was finished with her violent and unhealthy relationship with the father, she admitted they had been attempting to reconcile. Further, appellant’s use of alcohol was particularly tr oubling, as in the past she had been involved
in violent altercations while under the influence of alcohol. Counsel for Gemma argued that supervision by Gemma’s elderly grea t-grandmother was insufficient to assure Appellant had not consumed alcohol before a visit and that the maternal greatgrandmother was under no duty to report to the court on such matte rs. On January 4, 2013, the court granted the requ est to have appellant’s vis its supervised by the Agency, but denied the request for a reduction in du ration of the visits. The 18-month review hearing was again continued. An addendum report filed in advance of the 18-month review hearing set for February 8, 2013, confirmed many details set forth in Gemma’s counsel’s request to change appellant’s supervised visits. Appella nt admitted she had been drinking, that she had tested positive for alcohol use on seven occasions since Oc tober, that she had invited
the father to her home to “w ork on” the relationship, and that police were called on two occasions in November in response to alterc ations between the couple at appellant’s home. Appellant informed the worker she wa s now staying away from the father, that she had changed her phone numbe r and had put in a request to the housing authority to move her residence. She said she had begun participating in weekly domestic violence
classes with a local domestic violence su pport group and with the Riley Center. Appellant reported that she had recently re sumed weekly therapy with Ewick, after12 having once monthly therapy for a period of about five months . The therapist informed the worker that appellant was working on domestic violence issues, parenting topics, and managing her depression. The therapist repor ted appellant had dem onstrated progress in that she left the relationship with the father, st ayed on her medicati on and had not had a major depressive episode in some time. Appellant had been referred to HPP fo r substance abuse at the outset of the dependency. According to the initial assessment, she ha d been drinking alcohol for 11 years, and had periods of heavy drinking for the last tw o years. Appellant did not start case management with HPP until 2012, and attended regularly for a brief period until July 2012, at which point she began can celing appointments and did not return. Appellant was provided with relapse preven tion counseling during the monthly meetings and was encouraged to continue going to AA meetings on a re gular basis. Appellant only participated in AA for a two-month period and was not attending at the date of the report. The 18-month review hearing was held on February 8, 2013, some 23 months after
Gemma’s initial detention. Social Worker Ca ndace Seagrove was the only witness. The status review report and the addendum were admitted into evidence. Seagrove confirmed the Agency’s recommendation to terminate reunification serv ices, despite the Agency’s extensive work with appe llant to resolve the safety issues giving rise to the dependency. The primary concern was appella nt’s continued involvement in the volatile relationship
with the father. Notwiths tanding more than 18 months of services and continued admonitions that the volatile relationship wa s putting her reunification at risk, appellant
admitted she had invited the father to he r home and was trying to work on the relationship. The worker testified there had been numerous 911 calls involving disputes between the pair, but conceded she was unawa re of any arrests fo r domestic violence since the March 2011 incident that precipitate d the dependency. Seagrove testified that appellant reported the two wo uld argue and the argument would escalate to either her calling the police to get the fath er to leave or he would end up calling the police because she was asking him to leave.13 With respect to the requirement that a ppellant participate in intensive individual therapy services, Seagrove testified that appe llant’s therapist was in the best position to implement the recommendations set forth in th e psychological evalua tion. Appellant was referred for weekly individual therapy with Ewick, in whic h appellant had participated for a substantial amount of time. However, for a period of approximately five months the weekly therapy transitioned to once monthly se ssions because, according to the therapist, appellant was not benefitting from the weekly sessions and did not have much to discuss during their therapy sessions. The decision to reduce the frequency of sessions was a joint decision by appellant and the therapist. Seagrove tes tified that one of the issues addressed in appellant’s ther apy was domestic violence. Seagrove disputed Ewick’s view that appellant had made progress in the relationship with the father. The Agency worked with appella nt over the course of the dependency to address the domestic violen ce and social workers had repeatedly explained to appellant that Ge mma could not be exposed to that relationship due to the history of violence and the nature of the vi olence. They had belie ved appellant was “on track” to unsupervised overnight visits when everything halted in August due to discovery of appellant’s reengagement with the father and her admission that she had not been truthful with the Agency about that relationship. Appellant had been receiving
domestic violence services from the Riley Center since August 2012, as well as through the Agency’s domestic violence specialist. Upon referral by the Agency, appellant had also participated in an eight -week domestic violence group at the beginning of the case. Seagrove also testified th at in addition to the domestic violence issues, the Agency had ongoing concerns about appellant’s s ubstance abuse issues, particularly her
continuous use of alcohol an d her smoking habits. Seagrove related that appellant had recently begun testing positive fo r alcohol beginning in Octobe r 2012, and as recently as January 2013, one month befo re the 18-month review hearing. Appellant never completed a program or committed to AA, even after numerous referrals issued to HPP to assist her in overcoming her substance abus e. Asked why the Agency did not provide alternative services, the social worker explai ned that appellant was not testing positive for14 alcohol before her relapse in October 2012, and there was no indication that she needed a more rigid program. Seagrove testified appe llant tested positive for marijuana on at least one occasion since September, although her mo st recent tests had been negative. The worker described the Agency’s concern about appellant’s use of alcohol and marijuana to cope with stress and about the impact on ap pellant’s cognitive abilities when she is under the influence of these substances, insofar as he r ability to care for th is special needs child
was concerned. The Agency was also c oncerned about appellant’s smoking cigarettes and her minimizing the importance of her smoking in light of the inform ation provided by Gemma’s doctors and the Agency regarding th e detrimental effects her smoking had on Gemma, whose lung function was already seri ously compromised and the referral to HPP to receive support to stop smoking. A pul monary specialist was monitoring Gemma and in light of her condition, a smoke-free home was essential “so as not to trigger any kind of asthma conditions relating to the chroni c lung disease.” Appellant indicated she wanted to stop smoking only a few weeks be fore the 18-month review hearing. The social worker again referred appellant to HPP to assist her with smoking cessation. The social worker opined that in light of Gemma ’s multiple medical a nd developmental needs and appointments, it was extremely important that her caretaker be drug free, very organized and very pr esent and aware. At the end of the hearing, the court termin ated reunification services to appellant.
It found that she had made some effort to comply with reunification requirements, but that she had not reached a point where she c ould be entrusted to provide the necessary protective measures Gemma required. The cour t also rejected appellant’s argument that she had not received sufficient therapeutic se rvices, finding “the therapist herself had assessed that mom wasn’t benefiting from th e therapy sessions, and that they jointly decided that they would go to monthly sessi ons and that mom didn’t have much to talk about and things were just not moving.” The court found by clear and convincing evidence that appellant did not and was not able to participate fully in the court-ordered treatment plan, that the Agency had made reasonable efforts to provide or offer services15 designed to overcome the obstacles leading to the dependency, an d that the Agency complied with the case plan by making reason able efforts to retu rn Gemma to a safe
home. The court further found that return of Gemma to the parents would create a substantial risk of detriment to the safety, pr otection, emotional or physical well being of Gemma. The court set a section 366.26 hearing. On May 8, 2013, we denied appellant ’s petition for extraordinary writ, filed pursuant to rule 8.452, in which she sought review of the juvenile court’s findings and orders terminating her reunification services and setting a section 366.26 hearing. In the June 11, 2013 sec tion 366.26 report, the Agency related that Gemma, who was now nearly three years old, had been di agnosed with chronic lung disease, though
her asthmatic condition continue d to improve. She had made impressive developmental strides, but continued to demonstrate de ficits in all developmental areas.
Gemma was “social and frie ndly” and had bonde d closely with her foster/adoptive parents, with whom she had lived since Au gust 2012. The foster/adoptive parents had expressed “a willingness for an open adoption and for Gemma to con tinue to know and have a relationship with her biological fami ly, per their parental discretion.” They wanted to focus on establishing a relationshi p with appellant and to then let appellant
decide which relatives she wo uld like to include in ongoing contact with Gemma. The
social worker had submitted a referral to the Consortium for Child ren to assist in mediating future visitation. The social worker believed that adoption with these prospective parents was in Gemma’s best in terest. “Gemma receives devoted care and attention to her many needs in this home. Gemma’s foster dads have demonstrated a commitment to permanency fo r Gemma and have been ex ceptional in managing her multiple care needs. . . . Gemma has progre ssed markedly well in this home in all her areas of development and continue s to thrive in this home.” Since the last court date in February, appellant had participated in supervised visitation with Gemma every other week. Ap pellant and other relatives, such as the great-grandmother and Gemma’s brother, were “appropriate and caring” during visits.16 The Agency recommended termination of parental rights and approval of adoption as the permanent plan. At the November 6, 2013 section 366.26 hearing, Ronda Johnson, a child welfare supervisor for the Agency, tes tified that the permanent plan for Gemma continued to be adoption with her current caret akers, with whom she had lived for 15 months and to whom she looked for provision of her day- to-day needs. The prospective adoptive parents had completed an adoptive home stud y, were committed to adopting Gemma, and were able to meet her special needs. Arlette Smith, a social worker in the Agency’s adoptions unit, testified that appellant participated in supervised visitati on once every other week for three hours. She had not observed any of the vis its, but the supervisor of the visits had informed her that appellant attended the visits regularly a nd that they were “going fine” and were “unremarkable.” Nothing detrimental to Gemma was taking place at the visits, although the supervisor was encouraging appellant to be more physically active with Gemma during visits. Smith testified that Gemma had special needs, including a chronic lung condition and asthma, endocrinological and neurological issues, as well as developmental delays that required physical and occu pational therapy. The pros pective adoptive parents had been able to meet Gemma’s special needs a nd Smith believed they would continue to do so in the future. Gemma had progresse d developmentally wh ile living with the prospective adoptive parents. Appellant testified that since she had be gun visiting with Gemma in 2011, she had missed only two or three visits. Appellant’s mother, grandmother, and son also attended some visits. Appellant had pr eviously visited Gemma three ti mes a week, but visits were now once every other week. During the vis its, appellant would make Gemma breakfast and lunch, play and read with her, and fix her hair. Appellant believed that she had a beneficial relationship with Gemma that s hould continue because she took care of Gemma and did not harm her, a nd they love each other.17 At the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court found that Gemma’s best interests would be served by adoption by he r current caretakers, with whom she could “have stability and perm anency through a loving home.” The court also found that the benefit of a continued relationship with ap pellant did not outweig h the benefits that adoption with her prospective adoptive parents would provide her. 3 The court therefore terminated appellant’s parental rights. 4

DISCUSSION Applicability of the Beneficial Pa rent-Child Excep tion to Adoption
“Once reunification services are ordered te rminated, the focus sh ifts to the needs of dependent children for permanen cy and stability. [Citation.]” ( In re A.A. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1292, 1320.) “At a hearing under section 366.26, the court must select and implement a permanent plan fo r a dependent child. Where there is no probability of reunification with a parent, adoption is the preferred permanent plan. [Citation.]” ( In re
K.P. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 614, 620.) When the court finds that the child is likely to be adopted if parental rights are terminated, it must select adoption as the permanent plan unless it finds by clear and convincing evid ence, pursuant to one of the statutorilyspecified exceptions, “compelli ng reason[s] for determining that termination would be detrimental to the child.” (§ 366.26, s ubd. (c)(1)(B).) The parent has the burden of proving that termination of parental rights wo uld be detrimental to the child under any of these exceptions. ( In re C.F. (2011) 193 Cal.Ap p.4th 549, 553.)

3 The court observed that the prospective adoptive parents had indicated that they were open to an open adoption with appellant and perhaps other fa mily members. But the court also made clear that the prosp ective adoptive parents’ potential willingness for appellant to have contact with Gemma played no part in its finding Gemma adoptable and the beneficial parent-child rela tionship exception inapplicable. The court did state that visitation woul d “be arranged between the adoptive parents and [appellant].”

4 The court also terminated the parental rights of Gemma’s father, who is not a party to this appeal.18 At issue here is the beneficial-parent ch ild relationship exception, which applies if the juvenile court finds, by clear and conv incing evidence, that “[t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the ch ild would benefit from continuing the relationship.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) Appellate courts have differed on the co rrect standard of review for determining the applicability of a statutory exception to term ination of parental rights. (Compare, e.g.
In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 576 [applying substantial evidence standard]; In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1351 [applying abuse of discretion standard]; In re K.P. , supra , 203 Cal.App.4th at pp. 621-622 [applying
substantial evidence standard of review to whether beneficial parent-child relationship exists and applying abuse of discretion to sta ndard to whether that relationship provides a compelling reason to appl y exception]; accord, In re Bailey J. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1314.) The “practical differences” am ong these various standards of review “are not significant” ( In re Jasmine D. , at p. 1351), and our conclu sion ordinarily would be the same under any one of them. Because, in th is case, both parties apply the standard of
review articulated in In re Bailey J. and In re K.P. , we shall do the same. Here, appellant contends the juvenile cour t wrongly concluded that the benefit of a continued relationship with ap pellant did not outwe igh the stability and permanency that adoption with her prospective adoptive parents would afford Gemma Respondent, while acknowledging that appellant regularly vis ited with Gemma and th at Gemma apparently enjoyed the visits, argues that appellant did not satisfy the additional requirements of the beneficial parent-child relations hip exception to adoption.
In In re C.F. , supra , 193 Cal.App.4th at page 555, the appellate court explained that it had “interpreted the phrase ‘benefit from continuing the rela tionship’ in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) to refer to a ‘parent-child’ relationshi p that ‘promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents. In other words, the court balances the strength and quality of the natural parent [-]child relationship in a tenuous placement against the security and the sense of belong ing a new family would confer. If severing19 the natural parent[-]child rela tionship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive
emotional attachment such th at the child would be greatly harmed, the preference for adoption is overcome and the natural parent’s rights are not terminated.’ [Citation.] “A parent must show more than frequent and loving contact or pleasant visits. [Citation.] ‘Interaction between natural pa rent and child will always confer some incidental benefit to the child. . . .’ [Citation. ] The parent must show he or she occupies a parental role in the child’s life, resulting in a significant, positive emotional attachment between child and parent. [Cita tions.] Further, to establish the section 366.2, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) exception the parent must show the child would su ffer detriment if his or her relationship with the parent were terminated. [Citation.]” ( In re C.F. , supra , 193 Cal.App.4th at p. 555, quoting In re Autumn H. , supra , 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575, fn. omitted.) “Because a section 366.26 hearing occurs on ly after the court has repeatedly found the parent unable to meet th e child’s needs, it is only in an extraordinary case that preservation of the parent’s rights will prev ail over the Legislature’s preference for adoptive placement.” ( In re Jasmine D. , supra , 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1350.) “Application of this exception is decided on [a] case-by-cas e basis and a court takes into account such factors as the minor’s age, the portion of th e minor’s life spent in the parent’s custody, whether interaction between pa rent and child is positive or negative, and the child’s particular needs.” ( In re Scott B. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 452, 471.) In the present case, the evidence shows that appellant regularly visited with Gemma during the years of the dependency. It also shows that appellant cared about Gemma and that they had a positive relationshi p. The record further reflects, however, that appellant was not able to resolve the i ssues leading to dependency or to meet the special needs of three-year-o ld Gemma, who has remained ou t of appellant’s custody for more than half of her young life. (See In re Scott B. , supra , 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 471.) In short, substantial evidence supports th e juvenile court’s implied finding that a beneficial parent-child relationship does not exist between appellant and Gemma. (See In
re K.P. , supra , 203 Cal.App.4th at pp. 621-622; see also In re C.F. , supra , 19320 Cal.App.4th, at p. 555 [parent must show she “occupies a parental role in the child’s life, resulting in a significant, positive emotional a ttachment between child and parent”].) Moreover, even assuming appellant did dem onstrate that a beneficial parent-child relationship existed between her and Gemma, we find no abuse of discretion in the juvenile court’s determination that appellant has not shown th at termination of parental rights would be detrimental to Gemma, i.e., th at the benefit of a continued relationship with appellant outweighs the well-being Ge mma would gain from a permanent adoptive placement. (See In re C.F. , supra , 193 Cal.App.4th, at p. 555.) The evidence shows that, for Gemma, it is her prospective adoptive parents who provide her with the on going parental guidance, nurturance, and stability that she needs.
As the social worker related in the sec tion 366.26 report, Gemma had “bonded closely with her foster/adoptive parents, looking to them as her ‘secure base.’ ” The social
worker further related that Gemma was receivi ng “devoted care and attention to her many needs” and that the prospective adoptive parents had “demonstrated a commitment to permanency for Gemma and have been exce ptional in managing her multiple care needs. . . . Gemma has progressed markedly well in this home in all her areas of development and continues to thrive in this home.” In addition, multiple therapists and service providers who made home visits had “observed collectively that Gemma’s foster dads . . . are nurturing, committed, and involv ed in every aspect of helping Gemma to learn and grow . . . .” In addition, at the secti on 366.26 hearing, Ronda Johnso n, social work supervisor,
testified that it was Gemma’s current caret akers—with whom sh e had lived for 15
months at the time of the section 366.26 heari ng and who were committed to adopting her—to whom she turned for provision of her day-to-day needs. Arlette Smith, Agency adoptions social worker also testified that the prospective adoptive parents were able to meet Gemma’s special medical and deve lopmental needs and that Gemma had progressed developmentally while in their care. In light of all of this evidence, the juvenile cour t plainly did not abuse its
discretion when it concluded that Gemma’s relationship with appellant was not so21 important to her well-being as to outweigh the well-being she will gain in a secure, permanent adoptive home with he r current caretakers. (See In re K.P. , supra , 203 Cal.App.4th at pp. 621-622; see also In re C.F. , supra , 193 Cal.App.4th, at p. 555;

compare In re Brandon C. (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1530, 1537-1538 [mother had been permitted only limited visitation, but evidence of benefit of conti nued contact between her and children was sufficient to support juvenile court’s decision to order guardianship].) 5 In sum, this is not the sort of “ extraordinary case” in wh ich the “preservation of the parent’s rights will prevail over the Legi slature’s preference for adoptive placement.” ( In re Jasmine D. , supra , 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1350; s ee § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).)

5 To support her argument that guardianshi p was the proper permanent plan in this case, appellant cites a treatise and several law review articles, as well as cases from other jurisdictions, regarding the valu e to children of maintaining re lationships with their birth families. Appellant makes a worthwhile ge neral point but, as a practical matter, as respondent observes, “Had the Legislature intended to allow dependency courts the discretion to choose among variou s permanent plans, despite the child’s adoptability and the inapplicability of any exceptio ns, it certainly had th e means to create su ch legislation. It did not.” Here, because the juvenile court reasona bly found that Gemma is adoptable and that none of the statutory exceptions to adopt ion apply, it properly terminated appellant’s parental rights. We also observe, however, th at there is a real po ssibility that Gemma and appellant will continue to have some posta doption contact, given that the prospective adoptive parents appear to appreciate the lik ely benefit to Gemma of continuing contact with her birth mother.22 DISPOSITION The juvenile court’s order terminating ap pellant’s parental rights with respect to
Gemma K. is affirmed.

_ ____________ ____________ Kline, P.J.

We concur:

_____________ ____________ Richman, J.

_____________ ____________ Brick, J.*

* Judge of the Alameda County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.