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2022 IL App (1st) 210400 

No. 1-21-0400 

Third Division 

July 27, 2022 

IN THE 

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS 

FIRST DISTRICT 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court 

) of Cook County. 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

v. ) No. 12 CR 18726 (02) 

) 

DANIEL GUERRERO, ) 

) The Honorable 

Defendant-Appellant. ) William Raines, 

) Judge Presiding. 

PRESIDING JUSTICE GORDON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 

Justices Burke and McBride concurred in the judgment and opinion. 

OPINION 

¶ 1 In the instant appeal, defendant Daniel Guerrero challenges the trial court’s decision 

denying his postconviction petition at the first stage. This is the second time this defendant has 

appealed to this court. In his prior appeal, which was a direct appeal, defendant argued (1) that 

certain remarks made by the prosecutor during the State’s rebuttal closing argument constituted 

prosecutorial misconduct and (2) that his sentence is excessive when compared to the lesser 
 

 

 

 

 

 

No. 1-21-0400 

sentence of a codefendant. We affirmed his conviction and sentence. See People v. Guerrero, 

2020 IL App (1st) 172156. 

¶ 2 In this appeal, defendant argues that his postconviction petition established the gist of his 

claim that the imposition of a 45-year sentence for his crime of murder in the first degree 

violates the Illinois Constitution’s proportionate penalties clause (Ill. Const. 1970, art. 1, § 11) 

as applied to him. The trial court dismissed defendant’s postconviction petition. For the 

following reasons, we affirm the trial court’s decision. 

¶ 3 BACKGROUND 

¶ 4 The State’s evidence at trial established that, on May 29, 2010, at midnight, a group of 

men, who belonged to the same gang, approached two men on a street because one of the two 

men was wearing a red shirt, which was the color of a rival gang. One of the two men, Mario 

Gallegos, was able to escape, and he testified at trial as an eyewitness. The other man, Alan 

Oliva, who was wearing the red shirt, was beaten and stabbed to death. Gallegos identified 

defendant as the first person to strike the victim. Gallegos testified that defendant swung a 

baseball bat at the victim, thereby knocking the victim to the ground, whereupon the other men 

beat and stabbed the victim until he stopped moving. The victim later died from his wounds. 

Defendant was 22 years and two months old at the time of the killing. 

¶ 5 On April 6, 2017, defendant was convicted of gunrunning. See 720 ILCS 5/24-3A(a) (West 

2014) (“A person commits gunrunning when he or she transfers 3 or more firearms in violation 

of any of the paragraphs of Section 23-4 of this Code.”). The underlying events giving rise to 

this conviction occurred in April 2012, almost two years after the killing of Oliva. Defendant 

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was sentenced to seven years and seven months with the Illinois Department of Corrections 

(IDOC) for this conviction. 

¶ 6 Defendant’s murder trial was held about two months after defendant’s conviction for 

gunrunning. On June 8, 2017, a jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder. On July 11, 

2017, the trial court, after considering the aggravating and mitigating factors, sentenced 

defendant to 45 years with the IDOC. The trial court considered the defendant’s criminal 

history, his social history, his education, his background, his family history, and his physical 

health. More specifically, it considered defendant’s participation in gang involvement in 

aggravation, as well as defendant’s role as “leader of the pack”, as he was armed with the bat 

that struck the first blow, allowing the others to continue the attack. The court also considered 

in aggravation the fact that defendant continued being involved in gang activity even after the 

murder, as evidenced by the gunrunning conviction just a couple months prior to the murder 

trial. In sum, “the defendant’s primary roll [sic] in this incident, this senseless killing of 

certainly an innocent individual Mr. Oliva, who had a bright future in front of him require[d] 

[in] the Court’s discretion a sentence greater than the minimum, and greater commensurate 

with the other individuals based on their level of participation.” 

¶ 7 On August 10, 2017, defendant filed a notice of appeal.1 On June 4, 2020, this court issued 

its decision on defendant’s direct appeal. We held that the State’s remarks during the trial did 

not constitute error and certainly did not rise to the level of clear and obvious error as required 

1

Our earlier opinion in this matter (Guerrero, 2020 IL App (1st) 172156) incorrectly stated that 

the notice of appeal was filed on July 11, 2017. 

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No. 1-21-0400 

for reversal under the plain error doctrine. We also held that defendant’s sentence was not 

excessive, as defendant was not similarly situated as his codefendants because he was the 

leader of the pack and, after the murder, was convicted of another crime. 

¶ 8 On December 30, 2020, defendant filed his pro se postconviction petition alleging that (1) 

his 45-year sentence was unconstitutional under the eighth amendment (U.S. Const., amend. 

VIII), (2) his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the State’s use of certain 

testimony, and (3) the trial court violated Illinois Supreme Court Rule 431(b) (eff. July 1, 

2012).2 On March 2, 2021, the trial court issued a written order summarily dismissing the 

petition as frivolous and without merit. Subsequently, defendant filed a notice of appeal that 

substantially complied with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 12(b)(6) (eff. July 1, 2017), which 

sets forth notice requirements for incarcerated individuals filing documents with a court.3 

2

Rule 431(b) reads as follows: 

“The court shall ask each potential juror, individually or in a group, whether that juror understands 

and accepts the following principles: (1) that the defendant is presumed innocent of the charge(s) 

against him or her; (2) that before a defendant can be convicted the State must prove the defendant 

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; (3) that the defendant is not required to offer any evidence on his or 

her own behalf; and (4) that if a defendant does not testify it cannot be held against him or her; 

however, no inquiry of a prospective juror shall be made into the defendant’s decision not to testify 

when the defendant objects. 

The court’s method of inquiry shall provide each juror an opportunity to respond to specific 

questions concerning the principles set out in this section.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 431(b) (eff. July 1, 2012). 

3

Rule 12(b)(6) reads as follows: 

“Manner of proof. Service is proved: 

* * * 

*** in case of service by mail by a self-represented litigant residing in a correctional facility, by 

certification under section 1-109 of the Code of Civil Procedure of the person who deposited the 

document in the institutional mail, stating the time and place of deposit and the complete address to 

which the document was to be delivered.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 12(b)(6) (eff. July 1, 2017). 

In this case, defendant did not note the time of the deposit. However, defendant’s failure to adhere to 

this formality is not fatal to the sufficiency of his notice. See, e.g., People v. Smith, 228 Ill. 2d 95, 105 

(2008); People v. Humphrey, 2020 IL App (1st) 172837, ¶¶ 18-21. 

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No. 1-21-0400 

¶ 9 ANALYSIS 

¶ 10 On appeal, defendant argues that his 45-year sentence for his murder conviction violates 

the Illinois Constitution’s proportionate penalties clause as applied to him. 

¶ 11 I. Standard of Review 

¶ 12 Defendant’s petition was dismissed at the first stage of postconviction proceedings. “ ‘At 

the first stage of postconviction [proceedings] there are no hearings, no arguments, and no 

introduction of evidence.’ ” People v. Savage, 2020 IL App (1st) 173135, ¶ 48 (quoting People 

v. Johnson, 2018 IL 122227, ¶ 21). “ ‘Instead, there is only a pleading, the postconviction 

petition, that the circuit court must independently consider to determine whether it is frivolous 

or patently without merit.’ ” Savage, 2020 IL App (1st) 173135, ¶ 48 (quoting Johnson, 2018 

IL 122227, ¶ 21). 

¶ 13 “Where the issue on review is limited to the sufficiency of the allegations in a 

postconviction petition, there is little justification for affording deference to the circuit court’s 

decision.” People v. Robinson, 2020 IL 123849, ¶ 39. “Given that no factual findings or 

credibility determinations are required at the pleading stage of postconviction proceedings, a 

reviewing court is as capable as the circuit court of determining whether a petition and 

supporting documents contain adequate allegations.” Robinson, 2020 IL 123849, ¶ 39. Thus, 

a reviewing court’s standard of review is de novo. Savage, 2020 IL App (1st) 173135, ¶ 49. De 

novo consideration means that we perform the same analysis that a trial judge would perform. 

People v. Carrasquillo, 2020 IL App (1st) 180534, ¶ 107. 

¶ 14 II. Postconviction Hearing Act 

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¶ 15 Defendant seeks relief under the Postconviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 

et seq. (West 2014)). 

¶ 16 The Act provides a statutory remedy for criminal defendants who claim their constitutional 

rights were violated at trial. People v. Edwards, 2012 IL 111711, ¶ 21. It is not a substitute for 

an appeal but, rather, a collateral proceeding that attacks a final judgment. Edwards, 2012 IL 

111711, ¶ 21. 

¶ 17 The Act provides for three stages of review by the trial court. People v. Domagala, 2013 

IL 113688, ¶ 32. At the first stage, the trial court may summarily dismiss a petition only if it is 

frivolous or patently without merit. 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 2014); Domagala, 2013 

IL 113688, ¶ 32. 

¶ 18 At the second stage, counsel is appointed if a defendant is indigent. 725 ILCS 5/122-4 

(West 2014); Domagala, 2013 IL 113688, ¶ 33. After counsel determines whether to amend 

the petition, the State may file either a motion to dismiss or an answer to the petition. 725 ILCS 

5/122-5 (West 2014); Domagala, 2013 IL 113688, ¶ 33. At the second stage, the trial court 

must determine “whether the petition and any accompanying documentation make a substantial 

showing of a constitutional violation.” People v. Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d 239, 246 (2001). 

¶ 19 If the defendant makes a “substantial showing” at the second stage, then the petition 

advances to a third-stage evidentiary hearing. Domagala, 2013 IL 113688, ¶ 34. At a thirdstage evidentiary hearing, the trial court acts as fact finder, determining witness credibility and 

the weight to be given particular testimony and evidence and resolving any evidentiary 

conflicts. Domagala, 2013 IL 113688, ¶ 34. 

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¶ 20 In the case at bar, defendant appeals the trial court’s order summarily dismissing his 

postconviction petition as frivolous and without merit at the first stage. He argues that his 

postconviction petition established the gist of a claim that his 45-year sentence, of which he 

must serve 100% under the truth-in-sentencing provisions of the Unified Code of Corrections 

(730 ILCS 5/3-6-3 (West 2014)), violates the Illinois constitution’s proportionate penalties 

clause “in light of recent changes in the research and jurisprudence surrounding emerging 

adults.” The proportionate penalties clause provides that “[a]ll penalties shall be determined 

both according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender 

to useful citizenship.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. 1, § 11. 

¶ 21 As noted above, a postconviction petition may be dismissed at the first stage only if it is 

frivolous or patently meritless. Domagala, 2013 IL 113688, ¶ 32. This is admittedly a low 

threshold. People v. Allen, 2015 IL 113135, ¶ 24. However, “[t]his low threshold does not 

excuse the pro se petitioner from providing factual support for his claims; he must supply 

sufficient factual basis to show the allegations in the petition are ‘capable of objective or 

independent corroboration.’ ” Allen, 2015 IL 113135, ¶ 24 (quoting People v. Collins, 202 Ill. 

2d 59, 67 (2002)). Moreover, a pro se petition seeking postconviction relief may be dismissed 

“if the petition has no arguable basis either in law or in fact. A petition which lacks an arguable 

basis either in law or in fact is one which is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or 

a fanciful factual allegation.” People v. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d 1, 16 (2009). 

¶ 22 As mentioned above, defendant was just over 22 years old when he murdered Oliva. Our 

supreme court’s decision in People v. Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 61, foreclosed the possibility 

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of offenders aged 18 and over to rely on the eighth amendment’s prohibition against cruel and 

unusual punishment in challenging the length of their prison sentences. However, the Harris 

court reiterated its earlier decision in People v. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, which held that a 

defendant is not necessarily foreclosed from raising a constitutional claim in another 

proceeding, such as this Act. Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 48 (citing Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, 

¶ 44). Since the Harris decision, Illinois courts have considered the sentencing mitigation 

claims of incarcerated offenders aged 18 and older under the proportionate penalties clause of 

the Illinois Constitution rather than the eighth amendment. E.g., People v. Minniefield, 2020 

IL App (1st) 170541, ¶¶ 37-38 (considering a 19-year-old defendant’s as-applied sentencing 

claim under the proportionate penalties clause rather than the eighth amendment); People v. 

Franklin, 2020 IL App (1st) 171628, ¶ 51 (18-year-old defendant); People v. Johnson, 2020 

IL App (1st) 171362, ¶¶ 13-31 (19-year-old defendant); Savage, 2020 IL App (1st) 173135, 

¶ 61 (22-year-old defendant); People v. Ross, 2020 IL App (1st) 171202, ¶ 20 (19-year-old 

defendant). 

¶ 23 At this first stage, we must consider whether defendant’s claim has an arguable basis in 

law or fact. Defendant has cited only one legal precedent in which this court allowed a 

defendant aged 21 or over to advance from the first to the second stage of proceedings under 

the Act.4 We therefore look to that decision, and all other relevant decisions, for guidance in 

the case at bar. 

4

Moreover, defendant fails to explain how his case is different from the litany of decisions in 

which we have not allowed claims by petitioners aged 21 and over to go forward. See, e.g., People v. 

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¶ 24 In Savage, we considered the postconviction appeal of a defendant (Savage) who was 22 

years old at the time he committed the murder and was sentenced to 85 years with IDOC. 

Savage, 2020 IL App (1st) 173135, ¶¶ 2, 67. In that case, the State’s evidence established that 

Savage had shot two men, killing one of them, in a bungled attempt to rob one of the men of 

drugs. Savage, 2020 IL App (1st) 173135, ¶ 15. In his petition, Savage argued that his life-long 

drug addiction from the age of nine made him the functional equivalent of a younger man. 

Savage, 2020 IL App (1st) 173135, ¶ 67. This allegation was corroborated by a hospital 

discharge report from when Savage was 15 years old, which indicated that Savage had begun 

using drugs at the age of nine. Savage, 2020 IL App (1st) 173135, ¶ 72. Savage further alleged 

that he was using drugs every day at the time of the offense, and that he was attempting to rob 

a drug house at the time of the murder. Savage, 2020 IL App (1st) 173135, ¶ 71. He alleged 

that his long-term addiction from a young age left him susceptible to peer pressure and more 

volatile in emotionally charged settings. Savage, 2020 IL App (1st) 173135, ¶ 71. Savage also 

averred to having “ ‘conquered [his] drug habit,’ ” as corroborated by never having tested 

positive for drugs while in prison, and was therefore a candidate for rehabilitation. Savage, 

2020 IL App (1st) 173135, ¶ 9. Finally, nothing in the facts of that case indicated that Savage 

committed crimes after the murder, and he contended that his drug use stunted his brain 

development and rendered his maturity level similar to that of a juvenile. On these facts and 

Williams, 2021 IL App (1st) 190535, (22-year-old defendant); People v. Green, 2022 IL App (1st) 

200749 (21-year-old defendant); People v. Suggs, 2020 IL App (2d) 170632 (23-year-old defendant); 

People v. Rivera, 2020 IL App (1st) 171430 (23-year-old defendant); Humphrey, 2020 IL App (1st) 

172837 (21-year-old defendant); and People v. Robinson, 2021 IL App (1st) 192289 (24-year-old 

defendant). 

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allegations, we allowed Savage to proceed to the second stage of proceedings under the Act. 

No later opinion has allowed a person aged 21 or over to proceed to the second stage of 

proceedings under the Act. 

¶ 25 In this case, there is nothing in the record to indicate that defendant’s upbringing would 

have somehow increased his propensity for, or even explained his participation in, a gang 

lifestyle. There is nothing to show that his cognitive abilities were somehow affected or 

lessened by the circumstances of his upbringing. Rather, he was described as a smart 

individual, which would suggest that defendant knew what he was doing when he murdered 

Oliva. 

¶ 26 Apart from citing literature on the cognitive development of emerging adults in their early 

twenties, defendant here does not include any additional facts in support of his contention that 

his sentence violates his rights under our constitution’s proportionate penalties clause. In other 

words, he does not allege that his cognitive development was that of a juvenile at the time of 

his crimes. 

¶ 27 The case at bar is readily distinguishable from Savage. There is no indication that 

defendant’s upbringing caused or influenced him to kill Oliva. He was raised by both parents 

and had a loving sister who testified on his behalf. There is no indication that he was addicted 

to any substances that may have influenced his behavior, whereas Savage had been allegedly 

using hard drugs on a regular basis—including cocaine, crack cocaine, and PCP—since the 

age of nine, which, according to Savage, altered his behavior significantly. Moreover, there is 

no indication that defendant was in any way cognitively impaired at the time that he killed 

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No. 1-21-0400 

Oliva. Savage, on the other hand, had well-documented allegations indicating serious mental 

health problems, as evidenced by a four-month stay in a psychiatric hospital during his teenage 

years. There is also no palpable indication that defendant felt any sense of remorse or 

willingness to rehabilitate, as he committed at least one serious offense after the murder of 

Oliva—gunrunning, a gang-related activity. In fact, in allocution, he indicated he was not 

guilty of the offense, contrary to eyewitness testimony. Savage, on the other hand, alleged to 

have conquered his drug habit while serving his sentence, as evidenced by his repeated 

negative drug tests. 

¶ 28 Based on the foregoing, there can be no dispute that defendant was a mature individual, 

perhaps even older than his chronological years, at the time he murdered Oliva. He knew 

exactly what he was doing, and he knew the potential consequences of his actions—not only 

on his own life but on the lives of the surviving family members of Oliva. There is nothing in 

the record to suggest that defendant’s cognitive age was below that of his chronological age. 

He continued to be involved in gang activity after he killed Oliva. Defendant’s petition is 

wholly devoid of anything—fact or allegation—that could support his constitutional claim that 

the sentence which was imposed on him was disproportionate. 

¶ 29 The Savage decision was published on September 30, 2020, at a time when the law on this 

subject was still in the infant stage, and that decision appears to be the only reported decision 

of this court extending Miller-based sentencing protections (see Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 

460 (2012)) to a defendant over 21 years of age. Numerous cases decided after Savage have 

either distinguished it or rejected its reasoning entirely. See, e.g., People v. Montanez, 2022 IL 

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No. 1-21-0400 

App (1st) 191930, ¶¶ 57-62; People v. Gholston, 2021 IL App (1st) 200188-U, ¶ 34; People v. 

Kruger, 2021 IL App (4th) 190687, ¶¶ 30-31; People v. Williams, 2021 IL App (1st) 190535, 

¶¶ 28-32. This court, in cases decided after Savage, has drawn a line for “young adult 

offenders” ending at 21 years of age. See, e.g., People v. Green, 2022 IL App (1st) 200749, 

¶ 42; People v. Humphrey, 2020 IL App (1st) 172837, ¶ 33 (“[I]ndividuals who are 21 years 

or older when they commit an offense are adults for purposes of a Miller claim.”); People v. 

Suggs, 2020 IL App (2d) 170632, ¶ 35 (“[S]ociety has drawn lines at ages 18 and 21 for various 

purposes. Defendant cannot point to any line, societal, legal, or penological, that is older than 

21 years” other than Savage.). 

¶ 30 We recognize that research has found that brain development can continue into a person’s 

mid-twenties, and we really do not know what effect, if any, that has on an offender’s reasoning 

process. However, both our supreme court and the United States Supreme Court recognize that 

a court must determine whether an offender is a juvenile offender or an adult offender for 

sentencing purposes. The United States Supreme Court chose to draw the line, under the eighth 

amendment, at 18 years old because that “is the point where society draws the line for many 

purposes between childhood and adulthood.” Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005). 

¶ 31 Our supreme court recognized the line drawn by the United States Supreme Court but has 

suggested that defendants over the age of 18 may have cognizable Miller-based sentencing 

claims under the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, 

art. I, § 11). Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶¶ 48, 60. Recently, in People v. House, 2021 IL 125124, 

the supreme court remanded for further second-stage proceedings under the Act where the 19-

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year-old defendant raised a Miller-based challenge to his sentence. The House court did not 

determine that the defendant’s sentence was unconstitutional but found that the record was not 

adequately developed on the defendant’s specific facts and circumstances to make such a 

determination. House, 2021 IL 125124, ¶¶ 29-32. Our supreme court has not yet drawn a 

definite age limit for Miller-based claims under the proportionate penalties clause. Nor has it 

found that offenders over the age of 18 are entitled to Miller-based sentencing protections. This 

does not imply, however, that there is no upper age limit for a defendant to pursue Miller-based 

sentencing protections. Notably, the defendant in Harris argued that eighth amendment Miller 

protections for juveniles should be applied to all “young adults under the age of 21.” Harris, 

2018 IL 121932, ¶ 53. 

¶ 32 Although some cases have extended juvenile sentencing guidelines to offenders under 21 

years old, if those same extensions are to be made to offenders over 21 years old, “it should be 

made by our legislature or our highest court.” People v. Rivera, 2020 IL (1st) 171430, ¶ 27. As 

noted, our supreme court has not yet delineated a bright line age limitation for Miller-based 

protections, but the court has stated that the legislature is “better equipped to gauge the 

seriousness of various offenses and to fashion sentences accordingly.” People v. Buffer, 2019 

IL 122327, ¶ 35. The legislature, in turn, has recently enacted several statutes indicating that it 

has determined that 21 years of age is the line between adults and juveniles for sentencing 

purposes. 

¶ 33 For instance, section 5-4.5-115(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections provides for parole 

review, “after serving 20 years or more” of their sentence, for defendants who were under the 

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age of 21 when they committed first degree murder. See Pub. Act 100-1182 (eff. June 1, 2019) 

(adding 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-110); Pub. Act 101-288 (eff. Jan. 1, 2020) (renumbering 730 ILCS 

5/5-4.5-110 to 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-115). Furthermore “[i]n considering the factors affecting the 

release determination ***, the Prisoner Review Board panel shall consider the diminished 

culpability of youthful offenders, the hallmark features of youth, and any subsequent growth 

and maturity of the youthful offender during incarceration.” Pub. Act 101-288 (eff. Jan. 1, 

2020) (renumbering 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-110(j) to 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-115(j)). These 

considerations mirror those identified by the Supreme Court in Miller. The Illinois legislature 

has also prohibited the sale of nicotine and tobacco products to persons under 21 (720 ILCS 

675/1 (West 2020)), prohibited the sale of alcohol products to persons under 21 (235 ILCS 5/6-

16 (West 2020)), and made possession of a firearm by those under the age of 21 an aggravating 

factor for aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(I) (West 

2020)). 

¶ 34 Finally, our supreme court has held that a sentence of 40 or more years imposed on a 

juvenile amounts to a de facto life sentence. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 40. Before sentencing 

a juvenile to life imprisonment without parole, the trial court must determine that the 

“defendant’s conduct showed irretrievable depravity, permanent incorrigibility, or irreparable 

corruption beyond the possibility of rehabilitation.” People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 46. 

In this case, defendant was not a juvenile at the time he murdered Oliva—he was 22 years and 

two months old. As discussed above, there is nothing in the record to support the notion that 

defendant’s actual mental age was younger than his chronological age. However, even if we 

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were to treat defendant as a juvenile, his claim remains meritless. Defendant has submitted 

nothing to demonstrate that he is not permanently incorrigible. Defendant has not even alleged 

any facts that may indicate corrigibility. There is no indication that defendant has shown a 

willingness or ability to rehabilitate. To the contrary, the record shows that defendant has 

committed at least one serious offense after he murdered Oliva. 

¶ 35 CONCLUSION 

¶ 36 For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s summary dismissal of defendant’s 

postconviction petition at the first stage is affirmed. 

¶ 37 Affirmed. 

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No. 1-21-0400 

People v. Guerrero, 2022 IL App (1st) 210400 

Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 12-CRAttorneys 

for 

Appellant: 

Attorneys 

for 

Appellee: 

18726(02); the Hon. William Raines, Judge, presiding. 

James E. Chadd, Douglas R. Hoff, Chan Woo Yoon, and Hannah 

Lazar Pieterse, of State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Chicago, 

for appellant. 

Kimberly M. Foxx, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Enrique 

Abraham, Tasha-Marie Kelly, and Hareena Meghani-Wakely, 

Assistant State’s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People. 

16