alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
NO. 07-03-0511-CR IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TE XAS

AT AMARILLO PANEL D AUGUST 31, 2005

______________________________ GUSTAVO PENA, JR., APPELLANT

V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLE E

_________________________________ FROM THE 31 ST DISTRICT COURT OF GRAY COUNTY; NO. 6284; HONORAB LE STEV EN R. EMM ERT, JUD GE

_______________________________ Before QUINN, C.J., and REAVIS and CAMPBELL, JJ. MEMORAND UM OPINION Appellant

Gustavo Pena, Jr. appeals the adjudication of his guilt for the offense of possession of a cont rolled s ubstance . I n two issu es, he contends the evidence is insufficientto establish his guilt for the original ch arge and the trial court erred in admitting hearsay statements at the adjudication hearing. We dismiss for want of jurisdiction. Appellant

originally pled guilty to the charge of possessing a controlled substance. The trial court found the evidence sufficient to su pport a finding of guilt but deferred2

adjudication of gui lt and placed him on community supervision for ei ght years. Subsequently, the Statemoved toadjudicate appellant’s guilt. The trial cou rt granted the motion, adjudicated appellant guilty and assessed pu nishment of five years in prison. To the extent that appellant now questions the evidence underlying the evidence of his guilt for the original charge, establishe d law bars us fr om consid ering thematter. According to Manuel v

. State , 994 S.W.2d 658, 661-662 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999), one cannot appeal issues related to the original plea hearing after his gu ilt has been ad judicated

. Id. at 662; Vidaurri

v. State , 49 S.W.3 d 880, 88 4 (Tex.C rim.App. 2 001). Nor can one appeal the deci sion toadjudica te guilt. Tex. Co de Crim. P roc. Ann. art. 42.12 § 5(b) (Vernon Supp. 2004). Additionally, the scope of that rule encompasses e rror arising “in the a dju dicat ion of gu ilt proce ss.” Connoll y v. State , 983 S.W.2d 738 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999). S ince theadmissi bility of the evi dence co nsidered by the tri al court atthe adjud i cation h earing i s a matter arising in that p rocess, we have no jurisdic tion to consider it. Having no jurisd iction o ver eithe r i ssue, we mu st dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. Phynes v

. State , 828 S.W. 2d 1, 2 (T ex.Cri m .App. 199 2); Drew v. S tate , 942 S.W.2d 98 , 99 (Tex .App.–Ama rillo 19 97, no pe t.). James T. Campbell Justice Do not pu blish.
EXHIBIT 13.1

Certification by the Chief Executive Officer pursuant to

18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to

Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of Criteo S.A. (the Company) on Form 20-F for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2013 as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Jean-Baptiste Rudelle, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:



| | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                              
|------------------------------
|Date: March 5, 2014           
|                              
|/s/ Jean-Baptiste Rudelle     
|Name: Jean-Baptiste Rudelle   
|Title: Chief Executive Officer
#### Lawrence Watson vs. Appeals Court.1

March 26, 2008.

*Supreme Judicial Court,*

Appeal from order of single justice.

1

The real party in interest, Sherry Walker, was not named as a respondent in this case, as she should have been. S.J.C. Rule 2:22, 422 Mass. 1302 (1996).

Since at least 2004, the petitioner, Lawrence Watson, has been a frequent litigant in the Massachusetts appellate courts. See, e.g., *Watson*v. *Walker,*447 Mass. 1014, 1015 (2006). This appeal, like others that preceded it, has its roots in the petitioner’s challenge to a G. L. c. 209A order that was entered *1035against him in the District Court. On December 14, 2006, the District Court assembled the record for his appeal from that order, and the appeal subsequently was entered in the Appeals Court. Walker vs. Watson, Appeals Court No. 2006-P-1945. The petitioner’s requests in the Appeals Court to file fewer briefs than the appellate rules require was denied by that court, as were his motions for discovery, to extend for a second time the date for filing his brief, and for other interlocutory relief; his appeals from those rulings were consolidated with the underlying appeal from the G. L. c. 209A order. After notice, on June 20, 2007, the Appeals Court dismissed the appeal pursuant to its standing order concerning dismissal of appeals for lack of prosecution.2

*Lawrence Watson,*pro se.

*Annapurna Balakrishna,*Assistant Attorney General, for the defendant.

On June 22, 2007, the petitioner filed a petition, pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, in the county court challenging the dismissal of Appeals Court No. 2006-P-1945, as well as the denial of his various motions filed in that court. A single justice of this court denied the petition without a hearing, and the petitioner appealed. We affirm.

The single justice properly denied relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3, because adequate alternative remedies were available. See *Watson*v. *Walker, supra*at 1014; *Rasheed*v. *Appeals Court,*434 Mass. 1012, 1013 (2001). When the Appeals Court dismissed his appeal, the petitioner could have, pursuant to the terms of the standing order governing dismissals for lack of prosecution, sought relief (reinstatement of the appeal) from a single justice of that court. See Appeals Court Standing Order Concerning Dismissal of Appeals and Reports in All Cases for Lack of Prosecution. He also could have sought further appellate review of that dismissal pursuant to Mass. R. A. P. 27.1 (a), as amended, 367 Mass. 920 (1975). *Rasheed*v. *Appeals Court, supra.*We therefore discern no error in our single justice’s denial of extraordinary relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3.

*Judgment affirmed.*

2

On July 30, 2007, the petitioner filed a notice of appeal from the order of dismissal. Citing *Rasheed*v. *Appeals Court,*434 Mass. 1012 (2001), the Appeals Court ruled that no action was necessary. The petitioner did not file an application for further appellate review. See *id.*at 1013.
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

609 

CA 12-01476 

PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., FAHEY, CARNI, VALENTINO, AND WHALEN, JJ. 

 

JOANNE N. STUBBS, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, 

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JOHN A. CAPELLINI, III, RALPH J. FREETLY AND 

ABF FREIGHT SYSTEM, INC., DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.

(APPEAL NO. 2.) 

 

HOGAN WILLIG, PLLC, AMHERST (STEVEN M. COHEN OF COUNSEL), FOR

PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT. 

SUGARMAN LAW FIRM, LLP, BUFFALO (CARLTON K. BROWNELL, III, OF

COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT JOHN A. CAPELLINI, III. 

ANSPACH MEEKS ELLENBERGER LLP, BUFFALO (DAVID M. STILLWELL OF

COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS RALPH J. FREETLY AND ABF FREIGHT

SYSTEM, INC.

 

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Niagara County (Ralph

A. Boniello, III, J.), entered February 21, 2012. The order denied

the motion of plaintiff to set aside a jury verdict. 

It is hereby ORDERED that said appeal is unanimously dismissed

without costs.

Same Memorandum as in Stubbs v Capellini ([appeal No. 1] ___ AD3d

___ [July 5, 2013]).

Entered: July 5, 2013 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court
Exhibit 13.01

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE U.S. SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of Graña y Montero S.A.A. (the Company) on Form 20-F for the fiscal year ended
December 31, 2015, as filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Mario Alvarado Pflucker, Chief Executive Officer, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
section 906 of the U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:



| | (i) | the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the U.S. Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (ii) | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | ---- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                              
|------------------------------
|/s/ Mario Alvarado Pflucker   
|Name: Mario Alvarado Pflucker 
|Title: Chief Executive Officer

May 2, 2016
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Small Business Administration

          - [Disaster Declaration #15274 and #15275; Texas Disaster Number TX-00487]

# AGENCY:

U.S. Small Business Administration.

# ACTION:

Amendment 2.

# SUMMARY:

This is an amendment of the Presidential declaration of a major disaster for the State of Texas (FEMA-4332-DR), dated 08/25/2017. 

*Incident:*                         Hurricane Harvey.                    

*Incident Period:*                         08/23/2017 and continuing.                    

# DATES:

Issued on 08/30/2017.

*Physical Loan Application Deadline Date:*                         10/24/2017.                    

*Economic Injury (EIDL) Loan Application Deadline Date:*                         05/25/2018.                    

# ADDRESSES:

Submit completed loan applications to: U.S. Small Business Administration, Processing and Disbursement Center, 14925 Kingsport Road, Fort Worth, TX 76155.

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

A. Escobar, Office of Disaster Assistance, U.S. Small Business Administration, 409 3rd Street SW., Suite 6050, Washington, DC 20416, (202) 205-6734.

# SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

The notice of the President's major disaster declaration for the State of Texas, dated 08/25/2017, is hereby amended to include the following areas as adversely affected by the disaster:

*Primary Counties (Physical Damage and Economic Injury Loans):*

Colorado, Fayette, Hardin, Jasper, Jefferson, Montgomery, Newton, Orange, Sabine, San Jacinto, Waller

*Contiguous Counties (Economic Injury Loans Only):*      ( print page 42568)    

Texas: Angelina, Bastrop, Caldwell, Gonzales, Grimes, Lee, San Augustine, Shelby, Trinity, Tyler, Walker, Washington

Louisiana: Beauregard, Calcasieu, Cameron, Sabine, Vernon

All other information in the original declaration remains unchanged.

(Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance Number 59008)

James E. Rivera,

Associate Administrator for Disaster Assistance.

[FR Doc. 2017-19022 Filed 9-7-17; 8:45 am]

 BILLING CODE 8025-01-P
<PAGE>

                                                                   EXHIBIT 11.1


                             THE NORTH FACE, INC.
                                           
                      COMPUTATION OF EARNINGS PER SHARE
                  (In thousands, except per share amounts)


                                                          Three Months Ended
                                                               March 31,
                                                          ------------------ 
                                                            1997      1996
                                                          -------   --------  
                                                                  (pro forma)(1)
Weighted average shares outstanding during the period:

Weighted Average Shares Outstanding ..................... 11,205     2,902

Incremental shares from assumed 
 exercise of stock options (2)...........................    433       491

Shares issued upon conversion of Series A
 Preferred Stock.........................................      0     4,008
                                                           -----    ------

Weighted average common and common
 equivalent shares outstanding...........................  11,638    7,401
                                                           ------   ------
                                                           ------   ------

Net Income ..............................................    $235    $(629)
                                                           ------   ------
                                                           ------   ------

Earnings per Share (1996, pro forma):....................   $0.02  $(0.085)
                                                           ------   ------
                                                           ------   ------


(1) Pro forma due to the assumed conversion, as of the beginning of the 
    period, of all outstanding shares of Preferred Stock into Common Stock in 
    conjunction with the Company's initial public offering in July 1996.

(2) In accordance with the rules of the Securities and Exchange Commission,
    common stock and common stock equivalents issued  within one year to the
    initial public offering effective July 8, 1996, have been considered as
    outstanding for all periods using the treasury stock method (assuming a
    market price of $14.00 in prior years), even though they are anti-dilutive
    in loss periods.


                                      -15-
1 The Honorable Dean Whipple, United St ates District Judge for the Western District of Missouri. 

## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 07-1737

___________ United States of America, * * Appellee, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the Western * District of Missouri. Benjamin J. Larue, also known * as hardhornyguy24, * [UNPUBLISHED] * Appellant. *

___________ Submitted: April 29, 2008 Filed: May 2, 2008

___________ Before WOLLMAN, RILEY, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM. A jury found Benjamin J. Larue guilty of using interstate commerce to attempt to entice a minor to engage in sexual activity for which he could be criminally charged (Count One), and traveling in interstate commerce to attemp t to engage in illicit sexual conduct (Count Two), in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2422(b) and 2423(b). The district court 1 sentenced him to 60 months in pris on, which was the statutory minimum in effect for Count One when Larue committed the crimes in June 2004, and 5 years of-2- supervised release. On appeal, counsel ha s moved to withdraw and has filed a brief under Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967), arguing that there was no evidence presented that Larue would have actually engaged in sexual activity with a minor.
We review the sufficiency of the eviden ce in the light most favorable to the government, resolving evidentiary conflicts in favor of the government, and accepting all reasonable inferences that s upport the jury’s verdict. SeeUnited States v. Birdine , 515 F.3d 842, 844 (8th Cir. 2008). We hold th at the evidence was sufficient to find Larue guilty on both counts. The government introduced at trial evidence of online conversations between Larue and an individual who purported to be a 14-year-old girl, in which Larue suggested that they engage in various sexual acts when her mother was not home, and obtained directions from a town in Kansas to her apartment in Missouri. The evidence further showed th at he then drove to the apartment and knocked on the door. SeeUnited States v. Patten , 397 F.3d 1100, 1102-03 (8th Cir. 2005) (for § 2422(b) conviction, jury could reasonably infer from defendant’s online conversation and travel to meet minor that he intended to pers uade minor to engage in sexual activity); United States v. Blazek , 431 F.3d 1104, 1108 (8th Cir. 2005) (for § 2423(b) conviction, governme nt had to show defendant traveled in interstate commerce with intent to engage in illicit sexual conduc t as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2423(f)).
We have carefully reviewed the reco rd in accordance with Penson v. Ohio , 488 U.S. 75 (1988), and have found no frivolous issu es. Accordingly, we affirm, and we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.

______________________________
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-10486

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.

EDDIE LEE FINLEY,

Defendant–Appellant.

______________________

Cons w/ 10-10489

Summary Calendar

______________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant-Appellee,

v.

EDDIE LEE FINLEY, JR.

Plaintiff-Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 3:09-CR-232-1 and 3:09-CR-115-1

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

March 15, 2011

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk
No. 10-10486 c/w 10-10489

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

2

Before WIENER, PRADO, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Eddie Lee Finley has

moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with Anders v.

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and United States v. Flores, ___ F.3d ___, No. 09-

41281, 2011 WL 309173 (5th Cir. Jan. 31, 2011). Finley has not filed a response.

We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record

reflected therein. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents

no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for

leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities

herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. See 5TH CIR. R. 42.2.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 05-6793

JOSE FRANCISCO NOESI,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

B. A. BLEDSOE; MICHAEL MCCLAIN,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western

District of Virginia, at Roanoke. Samuel G. Wilson, District Judge.

(CA-05-141-7-SGW)

Submitted: November 22, 2005 Decided: December 5, 2005

Before MOTZ, TRAXLER, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Jose Francisco Noesi, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Jose Francisco Noesi appeals the district court’s order

dismissing his Bivens v. Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of

Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) complaint as frivolous under 28

U.S.C. § 1915A (2000). We have reviewed the record and find no

reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by

the district court. See Noesi v. Bledsoe, No. CA-05-141-7-SGW

(W.D. Va. Mar. 14, 2005). We dispense with oral argument because

the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the

materials before the court and argument would not aid the

decisional process.

AFFIRMED
### C OURT OF 

### A PPEALS FOR THE



### F IRST 

### D ISTRICT OF 

### T EXAS AT 

### H OUSTON

O RDER ON M OTION FOR E N B ANC R ECONSIDERATION

Appellate case name: Jasmine Laura Maynes v. The State of Texas

Appellate case number s : 01

- 1 8

- 00354

- CR

, 01

- 1 8

- 00355

- CR & 01

- 1 8

- 00356

- CR

Trial court case number s : 10CR0891, 16CR2585 & 16CR2586

Trial court: 122nd District Court of Galveston County

Party filing motion: Appell ant

It is ordered that the motion for en banc reconsideration is DENIED

.

Judge’s signature: /s/ Russell Lloyd

___________________________  Acting for the Court

The en banc court consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Keyes, Lloyd, Kelly, Landau,

Goodman, Hightower, and Countiss.

Justice Higley , not participating.

Date: October 15 , 201 9
Exhibit 32.1


        CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO RULE 13a-14(b) OF THE EXCHANGE ACT AND
         18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ENACTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF
                         THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

         In connection with the filing of Zunicom, Inc. and Subsidiary (the
"Company") Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the period ended September 30, 2008
as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
"Report"),I, William Tan, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company,
certify, pursuant to Rule 13a-14(b) of the Exchange Act and 18 U.S.C. (SS) 1350,
as enacted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

                (1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of
                     section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Act of 1934;
                     and

                (2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
                     all material respects, the financial condition and results
                     of operations of the Company,


/s/ William Tan
--------------------
William Tan
President and Chief Executive Officer
(principal executive officer)

November 13, 2008


























                                Exhibit 32.1 - 1
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-1066

WILLIAM H. BRAMBLE, SR.,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

TOGO D. WEST, JR., Secretary of the Army;

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

Maryland, at Baltimore. William M. Nickerson, District Judge.

(CA-95-2698-WMN)

Submitted: April 17, 1997 Decided: April 30, 1997

Before NIEMEYER and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

William H. Bramble, Sr., Appellant Pro Se. George Levi Russell,

III, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for

Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Appellant appeals the district court's order dismissing Appellant's civil action. We have reviewed the record and the district

court's opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we

affirm on the reasoning of the district court. Bramble v. West, No.

CA-95-2698-WMN (D. Md. Dec. 17, 1996). We further find that the

district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant's

motion for relief from judgment and various motions for reconsideration. See Collision v. International Chem. Workers Union, 34

F.3d 233, 236 (4th Cir. 1994); United States v. Williams, 674 F.2d

310, 312 (4th Cir. 1982). Appellant's motion to issue a subpoena is

denied. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED