FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

TONYA HELMAN, individually and 

as Personal Representatives of and

Successors-In-Interest to the

Successor Estate of Cory Helman,

deceased; JIM HELMAN,

individually and as Personal

Representatives of and SuccessorsIn-Interest to the Successor/Estate

of Cory Helman, deceased; SANDY

HELMAN, individually and as

Personal Representatives of and

Successors-In-Interest to the

Successor/Estate of Cory Helman,

No. 09-56501 deceased; B.W., a female minor,

by and through their Guardian Ad D.C. No.

Litem, Victoria Will; B.W., male  2:09-cv-01353-

minor, by and through their SVW-FFM

Guardian Ad Litem, Victoria Will; OPINION

VICTORIA WILL, individually and as

Personal Representatives of and

Successors-In-Interest to the

Successor/Estate of Christopher

Will, deceased; CRAIG WILL,

individually and as Personal

Representatives of and SuccessorsIn-Interest to the Successor/Estate

of Christopher Will, deceased;

DAVID DYER, individually and as

Personal Representatives of and

Successors-In-Interest to the

Successor/Estate of Adam Dyer, 

3529
deceased; STEPHANIE DYER, 

individually and as Personal

Representatives of and SuccessorsIn-Interest to the Successor/Estate

of Adam Dyer, deceased,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

ALCOA GLOBAL FASTENERS, INC., a

California Corporation; PACIFIC 

SCIENTIFIC, a Corporation; HISHEAR CORPORATION, a California

Corporation; SIKORSKY AIRCRAFT

CORPORATION, a Corporation;

SIKORSKY SUPPORT SERVICES, INC., a

Corporation; PARKER-HANNIFIN

CORPORATION, a Corporation;

GENERAL ELECTRIC, a Corporation,

Defendants-Appellees. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Stephen V. Wilson, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

December 6, 2010—Pasadena, California

Filed March 14, 2011

Before: Betty B. Fletcher, Marsha S. Berzon, and

Consuelo M. Callahan, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge B. Fletcher

3530 HELMAN v. ALCOA GLOBAL FASTENERS, INC.
COUNSEL

James Paul Collins, John P. Kristensen, Terry O’Reilly, Nina

Shapirshteyn, Gary Lynn Simms, O’Reilly Collins, San

Mateo, California, for the plaintiffs-appellants.

Kevin Sutherland, Clyde and Co US, San Francisco, California, Stephen Brunk, Law Office of Stephen K. Brunk, La

3532 HELMAN v. ALCOA GLOBAL FASTENERS, INC.
Jolla, California, Timothy J. Ryan, Rebekka Martorano, The

Ryan Law Group, Sacramento, California, Gregory L. Anderson, Dwyer Daly Brotzen & Bruno, Los Angeles, California,

James William Hunt, Darrell Padgette, Fitzpatrick & Hunt,

Tucker, Collier, Pagano, Aubert, LLP, Los Angeles, California, Richard Anthony Lazenby, Condon & Forsynth, Los

Angeles, California, for the defendants-appellees.

OPINION

B. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge:

Appellants bring this interlocutory appeal challenging the

district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss and a motion for

judgment on the pleadings in Appellees’ favor based on its

conclusion that Appellant’s state law claims are preempted by

the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA). On September 16,

2009, we granted the petition for permission to appeal under

28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), giving us jurisdiction to consider this

issue. We now affirm.

I.

Appellants are the personal representatives and successors

in interest to three United States Navy crewmen killed in a

helicopter crash. In 2007, while performing training exercises

from the USS Bonhomme Richard, the helicopter lost control

and crashed into the Pacific Ocean approximately 9.5 nautical

miles off the coast of Catalina Island, California. 

Appellants filed a complaint in the Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles, alleging that defects in the

helicopter and its component parts caused the accident, and

seeking damages for wrongful death. The complaint asserts

causes of action for strict products liability, negligence, failure to warn, breach of warranty, and wrongful death and surHELMAN v. ALCOA GLOBAL FASTENERS, INC. 3533
vival under California law and general maritime law. The case

was then removed to federal court by Appellees Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation and Sikorsky Support Services, Inc. (collectively “Sikorsky”). Sikorsky filed a Rule 12(c) motion for

judgment on the pleadings, asserting that DOHSA preempts

certain causes of action brought by Appellants because the

accident occurred “on the high seas beyond three nautical

miles from the shore of the United States.” See Fed. R. Civ.

Pro. 12(c). The remaining Appellees filed a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion to dismiss, alleging that certain of Appellants’ claims

failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted

based on DOHSA preemption. 

The district court issued a ruling granting these motions,

holding that DOHSA preempts Appellants’ state law and general maritime causes of action for wrongful death. More specifically, the district court held that DOHSA applies to noncommercial aircraft accidents “beyond three nautical miles

from shore,” and that Presidential Proclamation No. 5928, 54

Fed. Reg. 777 (Dec. 27, 1988) (“Proclamation 5298”), which

extended the territorial sea of the United States from three to

twelve nautical miles from shore, did nothing to alter

DOHSA’s applicability. In its holding, the district court relied

on then-Judge Sotomayor’s dissent in the seminal case of In

re Air Crash Off Long Island, New York, on July 17, 1996,

209 F.3d 200 (2d Cir. 2000) (hereinafter the “TWA Flight 800

Case”), and declined to follow the majority opinion. Pursuant

to Appellants’ request, the district court certified the decision

for interlocutory appeal, as a case of first impression in our

circuit. 

II.

We review the district court judgment de novo. See Knieval

v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2005) (dismissal for

failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is reviewed

de novo); Dunlap v. Credit Protection Ass’n, L.P., 419 F.3d

3534 HELMAN v. ALCOA GLOBAL FASTENERS, INC.
1011, 1012 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005) (dismissal on the pleadings

pursuant to Rule 12(c) is reviewed de novo).

A.

[1] DOHSA provides a federal statutory remedy for

wrongful death occurring at sea. The current version of the

statute reads: 

When the death of an individual is caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default occurring on the high seas

beyond 3 nautical miles from the shore of the United

States, the personal representative of the decedent

may bring a civil action in admiralty against the person or vessel responsible. The action shall be for the

exclusive benefit of the decedent’s spouse, parent,

child, or dependent relative.

46 U.S.C. § 30302 (2006).1

[2] The parties do not dispute that, under this provision,

any accident occurring within three nautical miles from the

shore of the United States is not subject to DOHSA’s remedial scheme. Nor do the parties dispute that DOHSA is applicable to all accidents occurring more than twelve nautical

miles from the shore of any State. The parties disagree, however, as to whether DOHSA applies to the intermediate area

between three and twelve nautical miles from United States

shores, where the helicopter accident in this case occurred.2

1As originally enacted in 1920, DOHSA created a statutory remedy for

wrongful deaths occurring “on the high seas beyond a marine league from

the shore of any State, or the District of Columbia, or the territories or

dependencies of the United States.” 46 U.S.C. app. § 761 (1920) (current

version at 46 U.S.C. § 30302 (2006)). A marine league is three nautical

miles. See TWA Flight 800 Case, 209 F.3d at 201 n.2. 

2The accident took place 9.5 miles off the coast of Catalina Island, California, placing it within the disputed area between three and twelve miles

from California’s shore. 

HELMAN v. ALCOA GLOBAL FASTENERS, INC. 3535
Because DOHSA has been held to preempt all other remedies

for wrongful death occurring on the high seas, Dooley v.

Korean Air Lines Co., 524 U.S. 116 (1998), this issue is of

considerable importance to future victims of accidents occurring in this area. 

Only one of our sister circuits has squarely addressed the

issue of DOHSA’s applicability to this area. In the TWA

Flight 800 Case, the Second Circuit held that “high seas” as

used in DOHSA refers to “those waters that lie beyond United

States territorial waters, that is, international waters,” 209

F.3d at 205, and that Proclamation 5928, by extending U.S.

territorial waters from three to twelve nautical miles from

shore, effectively changed the inner-boundary of DOHSA’s

applicability to twelve nautical miles from shore. Id. at 202,

215. Then-Judge Sotomayor, however, dissented, reasoning

that Congress had no intention of imputing the definition of

“high seas” as it was used for purposes of international law

into the statute, but rather used the term in connection with

“beyond a marine league” to make clear the geographical

boundary (three nautical miles from shore) beyond which

DOHSA should apply. Id. at 224. Under then-Judge Sotomayor’s reasoning, DOHSA’s scope was unaffected by Proclamation 5928, and its boundary remains at three nautical miles

from U.S. shores. 

The issue on which the TWA Flight 800 Case majority

mainly relied, and which primarily divides the parties in our

case, is the definition of the term “high seas” as it is used in

DOHSA’s text. Appellants argue that “high seas” is a political

term that excludes all United States territorial waters. Appellees, on the other hand, argue that “high seas” is a geographical boundary referring to all waters beyond the low-water

mark.

Unfortunately, the text of DOHSA does not reveal how

“high seas” is defined for purposes of the statute, leaving it

subject to different interpretations. Indeed, both sides find

3536 HELMAN v. ALCOA GLOBAL FASTENERS, INC.
support for their proffered definition in the relevant, preenactment case law. Compare U.S. v. Scotland, 105 U.S. 24,

29 (1881) (defining “high seas” as “where the law of no particular State has exclusive force, but all are equal”); Deslions

v. La Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 210 U.S. 95, 115

(1908) (same); Old Dominion S.S. Co. v. Gilmore, 207 U.S.

398, 403 (1907) (stating that “high seas” are “outside the territory, in a place belonging to no other sovereign”); American

Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 355 (1909)

(stating “high seas” are “subject to no sovereign”) with Ross

v. McIntyre, 140 U.S. 453, 471 (1891) (noting that the “ ‘high

seas’ includes waters on the sea-coast without the boundaries

of low-water mark,” but also equating the term with the area

“out of the jurisdiction of any particular state”); The Manila

Prize Cases, 188 U.S. 254, 271 (1903) (same).

We conclude that we need not resolve this disagreement

and assign a firm meaning to the term “high seas” in order to

decide the issue of DOHSA’s applicability. Instead, the question before us can be solved by looking to the plain text of the

current statute.

B.

[3] A plain reading of the statutory text leads to the conclusion that the boundary beyond which DOHSA applies remains

at three nautical miles from U.S. shores. To review, the current version of DOHSA reads: “When the death of an individual is caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default occurring on

the high seas beyond 3 nautical miles from the shore of the

United States, the personal representative of the decedent may

bring a civil action in admiralty against the person or vessel

responsible.” 46 U.S.C. § 30302 (2006) (emphasis added).

The intended boundary of DOHSA’s applicability, then, is

plainly stated within the statute’s text: DOHSA applies “beyond 3 nautical miles from the shore of the United States.”

Although the statute also uses the term “high seas” to describe

the scope of the enacted remedial scheme, there is no indicaHELMAN v. ALCOA GLOBAL FASTENERS, INC. 3537
tion that this term was meant to incorporate into the statute

the independent and fluid political concept of U.S. territorial

waters. Instead, a more natural reading indicates that the term

“high seas” is defined for purposes of the statute by the

explicitly stated geographic boundary of “beyond three nautical miles” from shore. Because the precise starting point of

the “high seas” was apparently subject to dispute when

DOHSA was enacted, see supra, it makes sense for us to construe the term in conjunction with the stated geographic

boundary, or three nautical miles from shore. “High seas,”

however, has no apparent, independent geographical significance, other than perhaps to emphasize that the boundary

beyond which DOHSA applies is the point where U.S. territorial waters ended at the time of enactment. 

[4] Recent Congressional action amending the text of

DOHSA lends further support to this interpretation. First,

DOHSA was amended in 2006 so that the phrase “beyond a

marine league” became “beyond three nautical miles,” presumably to clarify the meaning of this somewhat archaic term.

See Pub. L. 109-304, § 6 (Oct. 6. 2006), 46 U.S.C. § 30302

(2006). Notably, then, Congress reinforced the geographic

boundary specified within DOHSA’s text even after Proclamation 5928’s extension of the U.S. territorial waters to

twelve nautical miles from shore. Had Congress intended for

the boundary of the statute to shift with the extension of territorial waters, the 2006 amendment clarifying DOHSA’s

boundary presumably would have reflected this shift. Instead,

Congress reaffirmed that the geographic boundary of DOHSA

remained at three nautical miles from shore, or where it was

placed in the statute as originally enacted. 

Second, even before the 2006 amendment, Congress

amended DOHSA to exempt from its reach accidents involving commercial airlines. This amendment was signed into law

on April 5, 2000, and is codified in 46 U.S.C. § 30307 (2006).

It provides that DOHSA “does not apply if the death resulted

from a commercial aviation accident occurring on the high

3538 HELMAN v. ALCOA GLOBAL FASTENERS, INC.
seas 12 nautical miles or less from the shore of the United

States.” Id. at § 30307(c).3 This amendment was made retroactive to the day before the TWA Flight 800 accident

occurred. 

Notably, the wording of the amended statute, excepting

from DOHSA’s coverage all commercial accidents occurring

“12 nautical miles or less” from shore, can be interpreted only

to mean that a portion of the “high seas” as used in DOHSA

lies within twelve nautical miles from shore. Otherwise, the

phrase “on the high seas twelve nautical miles or less from the

shore of the United States” would be entirely non-sensical.

Moreover, a Congressional amendment exempting commercial airline accidents from DOHSA’s reach would be wholly

unnecessary unless DOHSA was otherwise applicable to the

area specified in the amendment. Congress’s decision to enact

this change is therefore highly persuasive that DOHSA should

be read to apply to the area between three and twelve nautical

miles from U.S. shores. 

In opposing this interpretation of DOHSA’s text, Appellants recite the principle of statutory construction that “no

clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.” See TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001).

According to Appellants, “high seas” and “beyond a marine

league” must be given independent meaning and interpreted

as two separate conditions, each of which must be met in

order to trigger DOHSA’s remedial scheme. This argument,

however, is belied by the fact that, under Appellants’ proffered definition, the DOHSA Congress understood “beyond a

marine league” and “high seas” to be functionally equivalent.

We cannot assume, therefore, that Congress intended the term

“high seas” to impose a requirement independent of the clarifying geographic phrase that immediately follows it. Furthermore, the interpretation of “high seas” for which Appellants

3Congress also amended available remedies for commercial aviation

accidents beyond twelve nautical miles. 46 U.S.C. § 30307(b). 

HELMAN v. ALCOA GLOBAL FASTENERS, INC. 3539
advocate would subsume and render meaningless the geographic term “beyond three nautical miles”. Thus, not only

does such a reading fail to give the geographic phrase any

independent meaning, but it also leads to an illogical result,

as three nautical miles from shore is the only geographic

boundary explicitly contained within the statute’s text.

Therefore, a plain reading of DOHSA’s current text,

including the recently enacted amendments, compels the conclusion that DOHSA’s boundary remains at three nautical

miles from the shore of the United States. While acknowledging that this is the opposite conclusion from that reached by

the Second Circuit, we note that the TWA Flight 800 Case

came down before the 2000 and 2006 DOHSA amendments

were enacted. That court did not have the benefit of the clarity

that these amendments brought to our interpretation of the

statute. Accordingly, both the majority and the dissent relied

heavily on legislative history and Congressional purpose to

reach their conclusions. Because subsequent amendments

have further clarified how DOHSA’s text should be read, we

find such analysis to be unnecessary. BedRoc Ltd. v. United

States, 541 U.S. 176, 187 n.8 (2004) (courts “resort to legislative history only when necessary to interpret ambiguous statutory text”); Davis v. Michigan Dep’t of Treasury, 489 U.S.

803, 808 n.3 (1989) (“Legislative history is irrelevant to the

interpretation of an unambiguous statute.”).

C.

Even if a plain reading of the current statute did not yield

such a clear result, we are not persuaded that Proclamation

5928 was intended to alter DOHSA’s original boundary. In

1988, President Ronald Reagan issued Proclamation 5928,

which stated “[t]he territorial sea of the United States henceforth extends to 12 nautical miles from the baselines of the

United States determined in accordance with international

law.” Proclamation No. 5928, 54 Fed. Reg. 777 (Dec. 27,

1988). According to Appellants, this Proclamation effectively

3540 HELMAN v. ALCOA GLOBAL FASTENERS, INC.
altered the scope of DOHSA and shifted its geographical trigger from three nautical miles to twelve nautical miles from

shore. There are, however, several problems with this theory.

[5] First, the Proclamation explicitly states that it does not

“extend[ ] or otherwise alter[ ] existing Federal or State law

or any jurisdiction, rights, legal interests, or obligations

derived therefrom.” Id. Indeed, the legal opinion issued by the

Department of Justice Office of the Legal Counsel (“OLC”)

in connection with Proclamation 5928 highlights this limitation. According to the OLC, in determining whether a Presidential Proclamation affects a particular statute, one must

determine whether Congress “intended” the statute to be so

affected. Douglas W. Kmiec, Legal Issues Raised by the Proposed Presidential Proclamation to Extend the Territorial

Sea, 1 TERR. SEA. J. 1, 23 (1990). Notably, the OLC opined

that those statutes “that use[ ] the term ‘territorial sea’ but

then define[ ] it as ‘three miles seaward from the coast of the

United States’ ” remain unaffected by Proclamation 5928. Id.

Because DOHSA defines its boundary as “three nautical

miles” from U.S. shores, there is, under the OLC’s reasoning,

a presumption that Proclamation 5928 did nothing to alter it.

Second, Congress specifically chose to amend certain maritime statutes to incorporate the extension of U.S. territorial

waters enacted through Proclamation 5928. See Coast Guard

Authorization Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-383, § 301 (1998)

(amending the Ports and Waterways Safety Act to comport

with Proclamation 5928). DOHSA, however, is notably

absent from mention as one of the congressionally amended

statutes.

[6] Finally, though we do not decide the issue, we remain

doubtful that the President would have the authority to alter

the remedial scheme set forth in DOHSA through a proclamation. The President has the authority to extend or contract the

territorial sea pursuant to his constitutionally delegated power

over foreign relations. See Kmiec, supra, at 3541. The power

HELMAN v. ALCOA GLOBAL FASTENERS, INC. 3541
to create and alter the scope of federally-created remedies for

victims of wrongful acts, however, remains squarely within

Congress. There is nothing in the record suggesting that Congress intended to delegate to the executive branch the power

to determine the scope of DOHSA, nor did Congress itself act

to alter DOHSA’s scope in accordance with the Proclamation

5928. Therefore, basic principles of separation of powers

counsel against the conclusion that Proclamation 5928 implicitly altered the scope of a congressionally defined remedial

scheme.

III.

The precise question before us, whether DOHSA applies to

the area between three and twelve nautical miles from United

States shores, can be resolved by looking at the text of

DOHSA, which explicitly places its boundary at three nautical miles from United States shores. Congressional action

amending DOHSA also reveals Congress’s continuing understanding that DOHSA applies to the area between three and

twelve nautical miles from shore, even after the extension of

U.S. territorial waters. Therefore, we conclude that DOHSA

applies to all waters beyond three nautical miles from United

States shores. The helicopter crash in this case is governed by

DOHSA’s remedial scheme. 

AFFIRMED. 

3542 HELMAN v. ALCOA GLOBAL FASTENERS, INC.