SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY 

 APPELLATE DIVISION 

 DOCKET NO. A-2138-22 

CASSANDRA GIGI SMITH, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v.

NEWARK COMMUNITY 

HEALTH CENTERS, INC., 

 Defendant-Respondent. 

 

Argued April 16, 2024 – Decided July 30, 2024 

Before Judges Rose, Smith and Perez Friscia. 

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Essex County, Docket No. L-0547-21.

Margaret E. Quinlan argued the cause for appellant 

(Lowenthal & Abrams, PC, attorneys; Margaret E. 

Quinlan, on the brief). 

Samuel P. Reisen argued the cause for respondent (Law 

Offices of James H. Rohlfing, attorneys; Samuel P. 

Reisen, on the brief). 

PER CURIAM 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE 

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION 

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2 A-2138-22

 Plaintiff Cassandra Gigi Smith appeals from a February 9, 2023 Law 

Division order granting the summary judgment dismissal of her negligence 

claim against defendant Newark Community Health Centers, Inc. pursuant to 

the New Jersey Charitable Immunity Act (CIA), N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-7 to -11. 

Plaintiff asserted she was seriously injured on February 14, 2019, when she 

slipped and fell on a wet floor outside an examination room at defendant's East 

Orange facility after receiving an injectable medication paid by Medicare. 

Defendant raised several affirmative defenses, including immunity from suit 

pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-7 (Section 7), based on its status as "a nonprofit 

corporation, society[,] or association organized exclusively for religious, 

charitable, educational[,] or hospital purposes." 

On appeal, plaintiff maintains the CIA's immunity does not apply to her 

claim, asserting defendant neither was organized exclusively for educational 

purposes nor demonstrated it received sufficient funding to qualify for charitable 

immunity under Section 7. Contending defendant was organized for hospital 

purposes, plaintiff asserts defendant's immunity is circumscribed by the 

$250,000 cap on damages under N.J.S.A. 2A-53A-8 (Section 8). Finally, 

plaintiff argues the CIA's immunity does not apply to her claim because she was 

not a beneficiary of defendant's charitable activities at the time of the incident. 
3 A-2138-22

For the reasons that follow, we conclude Section 7 applies to plaintiff's 

claims and immunizes defendant from her suit. Accordingly, we conclude 

summary judgment was properly granted. 

We review the trial court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Conforti 

v. County of Ocean, 255 N.J. 142, 162 (2023). Employing the same standard as

the trial court, we review the record to determine whether there are material 

factual disputes and, if not, whether the undisputed facts viewed in the light

most favorable to the non-moving party, nonetheless entitle the movant to

judgment as a matter of law. See Samolyk v. Berthe, 251 N.J. 73, 78

(2022); Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995); see 

also R. 4:46-2(c). We focus only on the motion record before the judge. See Ji 

v. Palmer, 333 N.J. Super. 451, 463-64 (App. Div. 2000). 

We owe no deference to the trial court's legal analysis or interpretation of

a statute. Palisades at Fort Lee Condo. Ass'n v. 100 Old Palisade, LLC, 230 N.J. 

427, 442 (2017). Accordingly, "a trial court's determination of the applicability 

of charitable immunity is reviewed de novo because an organization's right to 

immunity raises questions of law." Green v. Monmouth Univ., 237 N.J. 516,

529 (2019). 
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I.

In his written decision accompanying the February 9, 2023 order, the 

motion judge set forth the governing sections of the CIA and summarized the 

policy underlying the CIA. Quoting our decision in Estate of Komninos v. 

Bancroft Neurohealth, Inc., 417 N.J. Super. 309, 319 (App. Div. 2010), the judge 

recognized the legislative intent behind the act "foster[s] the private provision 

of services that benefit the general welfare, thus relieving the government of the 

obligation to provide those services." Further, the CIA's "strong public policy 

. . . compels its liberal construction." Id. at 320; see also N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-10 

(providing the CIA "shall be deemed to be remedial and shall be liberally 

construed"). 

The judge correctly stated the three-prong test to determine immunity 

under the CIA. Applying the language of Section 7, our Supreme Court 

reiterated in Green, "an entity qualifies for charitable immunity when it (1) was 

formed for nonprofit purposes; (2) is organized exclusively for religious, 

charitable[,] or educational purposes; and (3) was promoting such objectives and 

purposes at the time of the injury to plaintiff who was then a beneficiary of the 

charitable works." Id. at 530-31 (quoting Ryan v. Holy Trinity Evangelical 

Lutheran Church, 175 N.J. 333, 342 (2003)); see also N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-7(a). 
5 A-2138-22

"Charitable immunity is an affirmative defense, as to which, like all affirmative 

defenses, defendants bear the burden of persuasion." Abdallah v. Occupational 

Ctr. of Hudson Cnty., Inc., 351 N.J. Super. 280, 288 (App. Div. 2002); see also 

F.K. v. Integrity House, Inc., 460 N.J. Super. 105, 116 (App. Div. 2019). 

A.

The motion judge found defendant satisfied the three-prong test. 

Although the first prong was not in dispute, the judge found defendant was 

incorporated under New Jersey law as a nonprofit corporation. Plaintiff does 

not challenge this finding on appeal. 

B. 

Turning to the second prong, the judge initially found defendant's 1986 

certificate of incorporation (COI) demonstrated the entity was formed 

"exclusively [for] charitable and educational purposes." As further support, the 

judge also cited the deposition testimony of defendant's Chief Operating Officer, 

Bridget Hogan. According to Hogan, as a federally qualified health center, 

defendant "deliver[ed] primary care to patients, regardless of their ability to 

pay." Further, defendant's "populations are insured, uninsured, underinsured" 

and services are performed regardless of the patient's ability to pay. Defendant 

utilized a sliding fee scale for uninsured patients. Regarding plaintiff's $281.16 
6 A-2138-22

fee for services performed on February 14, 2019, Hogan testified plaintiff 

"wasn't billed. The insurance company was billed." As the judge noted 

elsewhere in his opinion, it was undisputed that plaintiff's bill was paid by

Medicare. Further, in her answers to defendant's statement of undisputed 

material facts supporting its summary judgment motion, plaintiff admitted 

"there was no co[-]pay." 

Plaintiff challenges the judge's prong two determination, arguing 

defendant neither is a traditional educational institution, such as "schools of all 

sorts," nor provided "education" as defined in Pomeroy v. Little League 

Baseball, 142 N.J. Super. 471, 474 (App. Div. 1976), that is, "discipline of mind 

or character through study or instruction." As plaintiff correctly recognizes, in 

Pomeroy, we concluded Little League Baseball was organized exclusively for 

educational purposes where 

[t]he only proof presented on the summary judgment 

motion was that [the] defendant's exclusive purpose

was the education of young people in the ideals of good 

sportsmanship, honesty, loyalty, courage and 

reverence, to the end that they may be stronger and

happier, and that they may grow to be productive 

citizens. The fact that the objective was accomplished 

through the teaching and supervision of baseball skills 

d[id] not vitiate the purpose. 

[Ibid.] 
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We were persuaded the defendant in Pomeroy was indistinguishable from other 

organizations, including the Young Women's Christian Association and the Boy 

Scouts, which were found to have an educational purpose. Ibid. 

However, plaintiff attempts to distinguish the "discipline of the mind or 

character" afforded by "athletic clubs, little league organizations, [and] boys and 

girls clubs" from defendant's "primary objective" in the present matter, deemed 

by plaintiff as "medical exams and treatment." Plaintiff's argument is misplaced. 

As used in the CIA, "education" broadly defines instructional pursuits and 

is not limited to scholastic institutions. See Estate of Komninos, 417 N.J. Super. 

at 320. Indeed, citing our decision in Pomeroy, the Court in Ryan noted the 

phrase, "organized exclusively for educational purposes" has been broadly 

construed.175 N.J. at 347; see also Roberts v. Timber Birch-Broadmoore 

Athletic Ass'n, 371 N.J. Super. 189, 194 (App. Div. 2004) (recognizing the 

"[defendant]'s purpose of teaching and promoting good citizenship and 

sportsmanship and assembling teams and groups for participation in sports 

qualifie[d] it as a non[]profit organization within the scope of the charitable 

immunity statute"); Auerbach v. Jersey Wahoos Swim Club, 368 N.J. Super. 

403, 413 (App. Div. 2004) (holding the defendant, a nonprofit corporation 

organized to train swimmers at various competitive levels, was organized 
8 A-2138-22

exclusively for educational purposes and entitled to invoke charitable 

immunity); Morales v. N.J. Acad. of Aquatic Sciens., 302 N.J. Super. 50, 54 

(App. Div. 1997) (recognizing "a non[]profit corporation may be organized for 

'exclusively educational purposes' even though it provides an educational 

experience which is 'recreational' in nature"). 

A nonprofit organization exclusively dedicated to religious or educational 

purposes is afforded "substantial latitude in determining the appropriate avenues 

for achieving [its] objectives." Bloom v. Seton Hall Univ., 307 N.J. Super. 487, 

491 (App. Div. 1998). Thus, engaging in other activities or services will not 

necessarily "eviscerate[]" charitable status "as long as the services or activities 

further the charitable objectives the [entity] was organized to advance." 

Kuchera v. Jersey Shore Family Health Ctr., 221 N.J. 239, 252-53 (2015) (citing 

Bieker v. Cmty. House of Moorestown, 169 N.J. 167, 176 (2001)); see, e.g., 

Bloom, 307 N.J. Super. at 491-92 (concluding operation of an on-campus pub 

did not alter the fundamental educational nature of the college); Rupp v. 

Brookdale Baptist Church, 242 N.J. Super. 457, 465 (App. Div. 1990) (noting 

utilization of crafts and games to "foster sportsmanship, honesty and creativity" 

did not thwart religious day camp's educational purpose). 
9 A-2138-22

Although we agree with the motion judge's conclusion that defendant 

satisfied the second prong, further analysis is required. We must review the 

extent and nature of defendant's non-educational activities and distinguish 

whether they have supplanted or furthered the educational objectives of the 

organization. 

Having conducted "a fact-sensitive" review of the record, Kuchera, 221 

N.J. at 252, we are satisfied defendant provides more than "medical exams and 

treatment," and its health care services foster its educational objectives. 

According to its COI, defendant "[wa]s formed for scientific, educational, and 

charitable purposes within the meaning of Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal 

Revenue Code" and designed to: provide "health education services and 

services which promote optimal use of primary and supplemental health services 

including as necessary and appropriate services of bi-lingual outreach workers"; 

"serve as an active partner with the consumer, business labor, professional and 

political groups and leaders to identify, address and take action on the region's 

short and long term public health, environmental, and medical problems"; 

"advance the health status of the region's population through the provision of 

appropriate health and medical care, programs of education, and research 

activity"; "conduct and support research in the area of health services delivery 
10 A-2138-22

and health education"; "provide information on the availability and proper use 

of health services"; "conduct or support health care educational programs for 

health care providers, health care managers and [the] general public"; and 

"engage in or support scientific, clinical and health systems research and 

disseminate the results thereof." 

The parties have not cited, nor has our research revealed, binding authority 

addressing a nonprofit medical center's non-educational activities. As stated in 

the COI, those activities include the provision of "comprehensive primary health 

services" and "supplemental health services." Much the same way the operation 

of an on-campus pub in Bloom, and the provision of crafts and games in Rupp 

did not eviscerate the educational nature of the defendants in those cases, we 

conclude the medical services rendered in this case did not thwart defendant's 

educational purpose. Rather, as evidenced by defendant's mission statement, its 

mission is consistent with that purpose: 

The mission of Newark Community Health 

Centers is to provide affordable, high quality, and

accessible healthcare to the communities that we serve. 

As one of the largest providers of comprehensive 

primary care services for uninsured and medically 

underserved populations in one of the country's most 

populated areas, our primary goal is to eliminate health 

disparities and help people live stronger, healthier, and 

happier lives. 
11 A-2138-22

Because we conclude defendant was organized exclusively for educational 

purposes, as broadly construed by our jurisprudence, we need not conduct the 

source-of-funds assessment required when an entity is organized exclusively for 

charitable purposes. "Entities that can prove they are organized exclusively for 

educational or religious purposes automatically satisfy the second prong of the 

charitable immunity standard"; that is, "no further financial analysis is 

required." Ryan, 175 N.J. at 346; see also O'Connell v. State, 171 N.J. 484, 491 

(2002). 

C.

As to the third prong, the motion judge correctly recognized the court must 

make successive inquiries: whether, at the time in question, defendant was 

promoting the objectives it was organized to advance; and whether plaintiff was 

a "direct recipient of those good works." Green, 237 N.J. at 531. On appeal, 

plaintiff only challenges the second inquiry. Contending she "did not need the 

charity," plaintiff asserts she "presumably pa[id] full price for [her treatment]" 

and, as such, "derived no benefit from . . . [d]efendant's non[]profit, charitable[] 

practice." We are unpersuaded. 

A party is a beneficiary of good works when he or she receives, in some 

way, a benefit from the "charitable activities at the time of the accident." Hehre 
12 A-2138-22

v. DeMarco, 421 N.J. Super. 501, 508 (App. Div. 2011). Thus, immunity from 

liability does not extend to any person who is "unconcerned in and unrelated to 

and outside of the benefactions" of the charitable corporation. N.J.S.A. 2A:53A7(a); see also Ryan, 175 N.J. at 353. However, a plaintiff's individual motivation 

is not relevant to whether he or she was a "direct recipient" of the charity. See 

Ryan, 175 N.J. at 350. 

The second inquiry "is to be interpreted broadly, as evidenced by the use 

of the words 'to whatever degree' modifying the word 'beneficiary' in the 

statute." Id. at 353. That is, "[t]o be deemed a beneficiary, [the] plaintiff need 

not have personally received a benefit." Auerbach, 368 N.J. Super. at 414; see 

also Hehre, 421 N.J. Super. at 508. Thus, the third prong is satisfied where the 

plaintiff's "'presence was clearly incident to accomplishment' of [the] 

defendant's charitable purposes." Bieker, 169 N.J. at 180 (quoting Gray v. St. 

Cecilia's Sch., 217 N.J. Super. 492, 495 (App. Div. 1987)).

Here, plaintiff's presence at defendant's premises – to receive an injectable 

medication – was as a beneficiary of defendant's charitable works and in 

accordance with defendant's mission statement: "to provide affordable, high 

quality, and accessible healthcare to the communities" served by defendant. 

Although plaintiff was charged a fee for the service, as Hogan acknowledged at 
13 A-2138-22

deposition, Medicare paid less than the amount billed and plaintiff was not 

required to pay the difference. Nor was plaintiff charged a co-payment. We 

afford "substantial latitude" to the manner defendant advances its charitable 

objectives. Bloom, 307 N.J. Super. at 491. We conclude plaintiff's treatment 

fell within the scope of effectuating defendant's charitable purpose. 

II. 

 Having concluded defendant is entitled to absolute immunity under 

Section 7, we need not address plaintiff's alternate argument under Section 8. 

We briefly do so for the sake of completeness. 

Contending defendant was organized exclusively for hospital purposes, 

plaintiff argues "a cap on damages rather than full immunity is applicable" under 

Section 8, which provides, in pertinent part: 

Notwithstanding the provisions of [Section 7], 

any nonprofit corporation . . . organized exclusively for 

hospital purposes shall be liable to respond in damages 

to such beneficiary who shall suffer damage from the 

negligence of such corporation . . . to an amount not 

exceeding $250,000, together with interest and costs of 

suit, as the result of any one accident. 

To support her argument, plaintiff cites our Supreme Court's decision in 

Kuchera. Similar to the present matter, in Kuchera, the "[p]laintiff slipped and 

fell on a wet spot on a floor in an outpatient health care facility," 221 N.J. at 
14 A-2138-22

241, and the facility "provides medical care for those 'who are uninsured, 

underinsured, without a primary care physician and/or who lack access to 

regular medical care,'" id. at 243. Unlike the present matter, however, the 

defendant facility was "owned and operated by a nonprofit hospital." Id. at 241. 

We upheld the summary judgment dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint, 

"rejecting [her] argument that the health care entity that owned and operated the 

facility was 'organized exclusively for hospital purposes,' and, therefore, [wa]s 

entitled to the protections of [Section 8]." Id. at 241-42. Instead, we concluded 

"the parent-hospital's provision of charity care and medical education rendered 

the hospital a hybrid nonprofit institution organized exclusively for charitable 

and educational purposes," thereby affording the hospital absolute immunity 

under Section 7. Id. at 242. 

The Court disagreed, stating: "Whether a nonprofit organization is 

entitled to charitable immunity or subject to the limitation on damages afforded 

to those institutions organized exclusively for hospital purposes turns on the 

purpose of the institution, not the use to which the facility is put on any given 

day." Ibid. Noting the outpatient health care facility was "an integral unit of 

the [hospital] system," id. at 254, the Court concluded our decision failed to
15 A-2138-22

"account for the multi-function nature of the modern hospital and its role in the 

provision of health care in this society," id. at 255. 

 Simply stated, unlike the health care facility in Kuchera, defendant is

neither owned nor operated by a nonprofit hospital. Rather, as stated above, 

defendant was organized exclusively for educational purposes. We therefore 

conclude defendant is not subject to the $250,000 limit set forth in Section 8. 

To the extent not addressed, plaintiff's remaining contentions lack 

sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). 

Affirmed.