. 

. , 

Honorable Justin A. Kever 

District Attorney 

Tom Green County 

San Angelo, Texas 

Opinion No. WW-1219 

Re: Whether a Commissioners 

Court is authorized 

to discontinue the 

Veterans Service 

Office under Article 

5798a-2, V.C.S., and 

the facts stated. 

Dear Mr. Kever: 

You have requested an opinion of this office 

the following two questions: 

(1) "18 the Commissioners Court authorized 

under article 5798a-2 to discontinue the Veterans 

Service Office upon the expiration of the date 

of the term for which the incumbent is appointed 

when said Court has determined that such office 

is no longer a public necessity?" 

(2) "Is the Commissioners Court authorized 

to discontinue the services of the Veterans 

Service Officer upon completion of his two year 

term when the office is determined to be no 

longer a public necessity?" 

on 

The oLinion request further states that the 

Commissioners Court of Tom Green County with all members 

present on September 11, 1961, voted to discontinue the 

Veterans Service Office effective January 1, 1962, which 

is the expiration date of the two year term for which the 

present incumbent has been appointed. 

Section 1 of Article 5798a-2, Vernon's Civil 

Statutes, to which you refer, gives the Commissioners Court 

the xuthoritv to effectuate a Veterans County Service Office. 

This statute reads in part as follows: 

"Section 1. The office of Veterans County 

Service Office is hereby created. When the 

Commissioners Court of a county shall determine 

that such an office is a public necessity in 

order that those residents of a county who have 
Honorable Justin A. Kever, page 2 (WW-1219) 

served in the armed forces may promptly, 

wrowerlv and rightfullv obtain the benefits 

to which they are entitled, it shall by a 

majority v,ote of the _ ___ full membership ~.~._~~_ thereof, 

maintain and operate such an office and shall 

appoint a Veterans County S 

..~- 

ervice Officer 

. . . (Emphasis supplied) 

From the above quoted statute, it can be 

observed that this office was created by the Legislature. 

However, the maintenance and operation of the office was 

placed at the discretion of the Commissioners Court, upon 

a determination by that body of a public necessity for the 

operation of that office under the criteria set out. Consequently, it is our opinion that although the office itseli' 

could not be abolished or discontinued per se by the 

Commissioners Court (it being a statutory office set up 

by the Legislature), the court could, upon a determination 

that a public necessity for such office no longer exists, 

suspend the operation of the office by a majority vote 

of the full membership of the court. 

We do not believe that it was the intention of 

the Legislature to do a useless thing in this instance 

by giving the Commissioners Court the authority to use 

their discretion in determining a public necessity for the 

operation of this office, and then, on the other hand, 

denying all means of the court to use its discretion to 

suspend the operation when a public necessity was found 

to have ceased to exist. A primary rule of construction 

of statutes is to ascertain and give effect to the intent 

of the legislative body. Morrisv. Calvert, 320 S.W.2d 

117 (Civ. App. 1959, err. ref., n.r.e.). 

The Court in the case of Wood v. State, 133 Tex. 

110, 126 S.W.2d 4 (1939) spelled out this point in the 

following language: 

"It is the settled law that statutes 

should be construed so as to carry out the 

legislative intent, and when such intent 

is once ascertained, it should be given 

effect, even though the literal meaning 

of the words used therein is not followed. II 

. . . 

In arriving at legislative intent it is of primary 

imnortance to ascertain the purpose for which the statute 

was enacted. Harris County v. Tennessee Products Pipe Line 

co., 332 S.W.2d 77'/ (Civ. App. 196C-)-. Since the obvious 
.- .- 

Honorable Justin A. Kever, page 3 (WW-1219) 

purpose of this statute is to provide for the operation of 

this agency when a public necessity for such is found to 

exist, it seems entirely logical to us that when such 

public necessity is found to have become non-existent, 

it is within the power of the Commissioners Court to 

suspend the operation of that office. Looking to the 

subject matter and purpose here, we believe that our 

construction is in accord with the purposes for which 

this statute was passed, that it meets the criterion 

of reasonableness demanded in statutory interpretation. 

Southwest Sav. and Loan AssIn of Houston v. Falkner, 

331 S.W.2d 917 (1960). 

- 

In reference to your second question, we believe 

in accordance with the above, that the Commissioners Court 

is also authorized to discontinue the services of the 

Veterans Service Of 

finds a public 2 

icer at the end of his term if the Court 

nece sity for such office no longer exists. 

The officer here in question is subject to the general 

rule that in the absence of legal inhibition the governing 

body under which an officer holds may abolish the office, and 

in a statutory office, the Legislature may also authorize 

the Commissioners Court of any county to abolish an office 

insofar as that county is concerned, where the matter of 

filling such office in the first instance is left to the 

Court's discretion. 

S.W. 577 (1892). 

Stanfield v. State, 83 Tex. 317, 1.8 

We think it a reasonable interpretation 

that since the filling of the Veterans County Service Office 

in the first place was left to the Commissioners Court, upon 

a discretionary finding of a public necessity, the Court 

is authorized to discontinue the services of the officer 

in its discretion. 

Sec. 381. 

(See 34 Tex. Jur. 387, Public Officers, 

SUMMARY 

The Commissioners Court of Tom Green County 

is authorized to discontinue both the operation 

of the Veterans County Service Office and the 

services of the Veterans County Service Officer 

upon a determination by a majority vote of the 

full membership of the Court that a public necessity for such office under the criteria set 

out in Article 5798a-2, no longer exists. 
. . ‘. 

Honorable Justin A. Kever, Page 4 (WW-1219) 

Very truly yours, 

EBS:dhs:kh 

APPROVED: 

OPINION COMMITTEE 

W. V. Geppert, Chairman 

Pat Bailey 

William Colburn 

Howard Mays 

Dudley McCalla