### IN THE TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10
- 19
- 00425
- CV JAMES B. BONHAM CORPORATION , Appellant v. W.W. WEBBER, INC. AND W.W. WEBBER, LLC , Appellee

From the 13th District Court Navarro County, Texas Trial Court No. 11
- 19920
- CV

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The James B. Bonham Corporation sued W. W. Webber, Inc

. and W. W. Webber,
LLC , 1 for breach of a commercial lease agreement. Webber as serted that Bonha m did not have standing to bring the claim because Bonham was not the owner of the
p roperty the subject of the le ase
. The trial court granted Webber's plea to the

1 S uccessor entity Webber, LLC answered on behalf of W. W. We bbe r, Inc

. and W. W. Webber, LLC

.Bonham v. Webber Page 2 jurisd iction and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction

. Bon ham instituted this appeal

. We will reverse and remand.
F actua l B ackground On August 9, 2005, Bonham leased ten acres of land to Webber for the term of three ye ars . Webber leased the premises to operate a concrete crushing plant in
connection with an interstate 45 constr uction p roject

. The lease terminated on August 9, 2008, and upon termination of t he lease Webber was required to remove all material and equipment from the premises except the original plant base surfacing. On August 9, 2010, Bonham filed suit alleging W ebber br eached the lease agreement when it did

not remove all material from the premises and did not leave the original plant base surfacing on the premises

. Before entering into the lease agreement Bonham purportedly conveyed the leased premises by warra nty deed to the Un ited Stat es Invention Corporation by a deed dated March 7, 2003

. T he warr anty deed was subsequently recorded with the Navarro County Clerk on May 1, 2008

. Because of the purported conveyance Webber takes the position that Bo nham does not have s tanding to bring suit as a non

- owner of the premises the subject of the lease. Webber filed a plea to the jurisd iction which the trial court granted

. Issue One In one issue Bonham arg ues that the trial court erroneously granted Webber ’s plea to the jur isdiction because fact issues w ere raised by B onham

.Bonham v. Webber Page 3 A UTHORITY

" Standing is a thr eshold requirement to maintaining a lawsuit. " Farmers Tex. County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Beasley , 598 S.W.3d 237, 240 (Tex. 2020) (citations omitted)

. " To establish standing in Tex as, a plaintiff must allege a c oncrete injury .

. . and a real controversy between the parties that will be resolved by the court. " Id. at 24 1 ( internal quotes and citations omitted)

. " Specifically, the plaintiff must al lege a threatened or

a ctual injury

— it may not be hypothetical. " I d

. (c itations omitted)

. A plaintiff 's " alleged injury must be concrete and particularized, actual or imminent, not hypothetical. " DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Inman , 252 S.W.3d 299, 304

– 05 (Tex. 2008) (internal footnotes
omitt ed).
When a plea to the jurisdiction raises a question of standing, we review its g rant or denial de novo because standing is a component of subject matter jurisdiction.
Farmers , 598 S.W.3d at 240

. Subject matter jurisdiction is essential to the authorit y of a
court to decide a case and as such is never presumed and cannot be waived. Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd. , 852 S.W.2d 440, 443

– 44 (Tex. 1993)

. " In applying a de novo
standard of review to a standing determination, reviewing courts cons true the pleadings in the plaintiff's favor, but w e also cons ider relevant evidence offered by the parties. " Farmers , 598 S.W.3d at 240 ( citing In re H.S. , 550 S.W.3d 151, 155 (Tex. 2018) ) ( internal quotes omitted )

. “ [I] f a plea to the jurisdiction chall enges the e xistence of jurisdictional facts, we consider relevant evidence submitt ed by the parties when necessary to resolve the jurisdictional issues rais ed.” Farmers , 598 S.W.3d at 24 1 ( citing Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda , 133 S.W.3d 217, 227 (Tex. 2004) )

. WhenBonham v. Webber Page 4 cons idering this evidence, we “take as true al l evidence favorable to the nonmova nt” and “indulge e very reason able inference and resol ve any doub ts in the nonmovant's
favor. ” Miranda , 133 S.W.3d at 228. If evidence does create a f act question on a jurisdictional issue the trial court cannot grant the p lea to t he jurisdiction

. Id. at 227

– 28

. The fact issues will then need to be resolved by the f inder o f fa c t. Id. at 22 8

. " If , after examining the pleadings and any undisputed st an ding evid ence, the court concludes that standing does not exist, the case must be dismissed. " Farmers , 598 S.W.3d at 241

. D ISCUSSION Webber ' s plea to the jurisdictio n asserts that Bonham does not have standing to bring its claim because Bonh am did not ow n the property the subject of the commercial
leas e agreement. Webber makes this argument becau se the warranty deed that
p urport s to convey the subject property from B onham as grantor to the United States Invention Corporation as grantee has been present ed , along w ith other evidence, in

conn e ction with Webber 's plea to the jurisdiction . The warranty deed reflects that it

was filed with the Navarro County Clerk on May 1 , 2008 , and further ref lects that it was
executed on March 7, 2003, by Tom Bennett, Jr. 2 Below Mr. Bennett's signature line his

name "Tom Bennett, Jr." is ty pe written with no i ndication of the c apacity in which he

execut ed the warranty deed . The cor porate acknowledgement above the notary 's signature reflects that the deed was acknowledged b efore the notary by " Tom Bennett , Jr., of United States Invention, a Texas Corporation , on behalf of said corporation

. " " The

2 At the time Tom Bennett, Jr. signed the warranty deed h e was president of the James Bonham Corporation and United States Invention Corporation

.Bonham v. Webber Page 5 general purpose of an acknowledgment is to authenticate an instrument as being the act of the person executing the instrument. " O nwuteaka v. Cohen , 846 S.W.2d 889, 894 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied) (citing Punchard v. Masterson , 100 Tex. 479, 101 S.W. 204, 205 (1907) ) ; She lton v. Swift Motors, Inc. , 674 S.W.2d 337, 342 (Tex. App.

— S an Antonio 1984, writ ref'd n. r. e.). T he deed does not reflect that it was executed by a representative of the grantor , the James B. Bonham Corporation. Section 5.021 of the property code requir es that an i nstrument of c onveyance " must be in writ ing and must
be subscribed and deliver ed by the conveyor or by the conveyor's agent authorized in writing. " T EX
. P ROP

. C ODE A NN . § 5.021 (emphasis added) ; see Green v. Canon , 33 S.W.3d 855, 858 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied)

. The Texas Supreme Court has recognized that a d ee d without a valid acknowledgement is still valid between the grantor and grantee. Haile v. Holtzclaw , 414 S.W.2d 916, 928 (Tex. 1967)

. The record before us does n ot address the warranty deed's acknowledgement on
behalf o f the grantee or the capacity i n which Tom Bennett, Jr. signed the warranty
deed

. Furthermore, whether the warranty deed constituted an actu a l convey ance was
not addressed or developed in the trial court

. Based on the evidence presented in the
record before us th e re are fact issues re ga rding ownership of the subject property that

create a fact question on the jurisdictional issue o f standing. We sustain Bonham 's sole
issue on appeal.
ConclusionBonham v. Webber Page 6 We reverse the trial court's grant of Webber's plea to the jurisdic tion and remand
this ca use to the trial court for further proc eedings

.

MATT JOHNSON Justice Before Chief Ju stic e Gray, J ustice Johnson , a nd Justice Smith Rever sed and r emanded Opinion delivered and f iled Dec ember 22, 2021 [CV06]