The C l er k of C our t i s i ns t r uct ed t o a m end t he o ff i ci al ca pt i on i n t hi s ca s e t o co nf or m t o t he li s t i ng of

pa r t i es * abo ve. The H onor abl e Edw ar d R
. K or m an, of t he U ni t ed St at es D i s t r i ct C our t f or t he Eas t er n D i s t r i ct of N ew ** York, s i t t i ng by des i gn at i on. 1 07- 2076- cv M ot or ol a Credi t C or p. v. U z an UN ITED STA TES CO URT OFAP P EALS F OR TH E S ECO N D CI RCU IT Aug us t T erm, 200 8 (A rgue d: Fe bruar

y 9, 200 9 Dec id ed: M ar ch 3 1, 2 009 )

Do cket No . 07 -2 076 -cv M O TORO LA C RE D I T C OR P OR A T I ON and N O KI A C OR P OR A T I ON , Plainti ffs-Appellees, -v .- K EM AL U ZAN , C EM C ENGI Z U ZAN , M UR AT H A K A N U ZAN , M ELA H AT U ZAN , AYS EG UL A KAY , and A NT ONI O LUN A B ETANCO URT , Defenda nts-App ellants
. * B ef or e: C AB R ANES , W ES L EY , Circuit Jud ges , and K O RMAN , District Judge
. ** App eal f r oma f in al o r der of th e Unit ed S tat es Di s tr

ict Cou r t f or th e So uthern D is tr

ict of New York ( J ed S . Rak of

f, Judge ), denying a m ot

io n f or po s t- ju dgm ent

r eli ef un der Rul e 60 (b) o f the F ede r al Rul es o f C iv

ilProc ed ure . W e h ol d th a t Rul e 6 0(b) p rov id es f or e quit a bl e r elie f a ndtha t de fe nd a ntsapp ell ees di d n ot

pr oce ed w

ith “c leanhan ds .” A cco r di ngl y, they ar e no t e nt

it ledto r eli ef

un der Rul e 60(b). Af fi rmed
.2 H OWA R D H. S TA HL (Stephen K. Davi dson and Bruce C . Bishop, on the brief ), St ept oe &J oh ns onLLP, Was hi ngt on , D .C., fo r P lai nti ff- Appellee M

o to ro la Cr edi t Co rp. J as onB r own , Ro pes & G r ay L LP , N ew Yo r k, N Y, an d D avi d D. Ho we, H ollan d &Knigh t L LP , N ew Yo r k, N Y, for Pl aint iff -A ppellee N o ki a Co rp. M AY O R E N ST E IN , Brown Rudnick LLP, New York, NY (D avi d Molton, B rown RudnickLLP , New Y ork, NY andR. St an M or te ns on , B aker

B otts LLP, Was hi ngt on , D C, on the brief ) for Defendants-Ap

pellan ts. J OS É A. C AB R ANES , Circuit Jud ge : T he p r in cip al ques ti oninthis app eal i s whe th er a ju dgm ent

fo r dam ages mu s t b e am end ed pu r s uan t t o Rule 6 0(

b) of th e F ede r al Rules of

Civil P r oce du r e wh er e pl ain ti ff s hav e parti ally r eco ver ed from other sour ces and have agreed to use this part ial recov ery as a “set-off” against the judgment. For the reasons s tated below , we hold tha t the relief available under Rule 6 0(b) is both discretionary and equitable , and that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying de fendants’ motion for post- judgment relief. BAC KGROUND Def end ant s -app ell ant s —m emb er s of th e Uza n f

amily o f Tur key a nda clo s e as s oci ate , An to ni o Luna Betancourt (collective ly, the “U zans” or “defenda nts”)—are the former, controlling shareholders of Te lsi m Te ke lo mu ni ka yso n Mo bi l H iz me tl eri A .S . ( “Te lsi m” ), ano w- de fun ctTurk ish telecommunic ations company. The Uz ans are well known to the courts of our Circuit, a s there are already ten published decisions in this Circuit chronicling the ba ckground of this case and “the
extr aor di nar

y natur e of

th e Uza ns ’ wr ongf

ul beh avi or .” Mo to ro la Cr

edi t Co rp. v. Uz

an , 50 9 F .3d74, 88 (2d Cir. 2007) (“ Uzan

X ”) ; se e al so id. at 77-80 (summarizing the histor y of this litigation); Mo to ro la Cr edi t Co rp. v. Uz

an , 38 8 F .3d39, 42- 44 (

2dCir . 20 04) (“ UzanVII

”) (explaini ng the underlying fraudT h e o th e r p u b li sh e d d e c isi o n s in th is m a tter
— li ste d i n c h ro n o log ica l o rd e r— a re re p o rte d at M oto rola C red it 1 C o r p. v . U zan , 2 0 2 F
. S u p p . 2 d 2 3 9 (S
. D
. N
. Y
. 2 0 0 2 ) ( “ U za n I ” ) (p r e lim in a r y in ju n c tio n ), a f f ’ d in p a rt, rem a nded in p a rt

, 322 F .3 d 1 3 0 (2 d C ir. 2 0 0 3 ); M o to r o l a Cr e di t C o r p. v . U zan , 3 2 2 F
. 3 d 1 3 0 (2d C ir. 2 0 0 3 ) ( “ U za n II ” ); M o to r o l a C r e dit C o r p. v. U zan , 2 7 4 F
. S u p p . 2 d 4 8 1 (S
. D
. N
. Y
. 2 0 0 3 ) ( “ U za n III ” ), a f f ’ d in p a rt, va ca ted in pa rt

, 3 8 8 F
. 3 d 3 9 (2d C ir. 2 0 0 4 ); M oto rola C r e di t C o r p. v . U zan , 2 7 5 F
. S u p p . 2 d 5 1 9 (S
. D
. N
. Y
. 2 0 0 3 ) ( “ U za n IV ” ); M o to r o l a Cr e di t C o r p. v . U zan , 282 F. Supp. 2d 133 (S
. D
. N
. Y
. 2 0 0 3 ) ( “ U za n V ” ); M o to r o l a Cr e di t C o r p. v . U zan , 2 8 8 F
. S u p p . 2 d 5 5 8 (S
. D
. N
. Y
. 2 0 0 3 ) ( “ U z a n VI ” ); N o ki a Co r p. v. U zan , 4 2 5 F
. 3 d 1 0 0 5 (2d C ir. 2 0 0 5 ) ( “ U za n V III ” ); M o to r o l a Cr e di t C o r p. v . U zan , 413 F. Supp. 2d 346 ( S. D
. N
. Y. 2006 ) (“ U za n IX” ), a

ff ’d , 5 0 9 F
. 3 d 7 4 (2d C ir. 2 0 0 7 ). R u l e 6 0(b) of t he F ed era l R u l es o f C i vil P roc ed u re st ates: 2 O n m oti on an d j u st t erm s, t he co u rt m ay reli ev e a pa rt y o r i t s l eg al rep rese ntati ve from a fi na l j u d gm en t , ord er, or p roc ee d i ng for t he fol l ow i ng rea son s:

(1 ) m ist a k e , i n a d v e rte n c e , su rp rise , o r e x c u sa b le n e g lec t; ( 2 ) n e w l y d i s c o v e r e d e v i d e n c e t h a t , w i t h r e a s o n a b l e d i l i g e n c e , c o u l d n o t h a v e b e e n d i s c o v e r e d i n t i me to m o v e fo r a n e w tri a l u n d e r R u le 5 9 (b ); ( 3) f r aud (w het her pr evi ous l y ca l l ed i nt r i ns i c or ex t r i ns i c) , m i s r epr es ent at i on, or m i s conduct by an oppo s i ng pa r t y; ( 4) t he j udg m en t i s v oi d; ( 5) t he j udgm ent ha s bee n s at i s f i ed, r el eas ed, or di s cha r ge d; i t i s ba s ed on a n ea r l i er j udgm ent t hatha s been r ever s ed or va cat ed; or ap pl yi ng i t pr os pecti vel y i s no l ong er equi t abl e; or ( 6) an y o t he r rea son t ha t j u st i fi es reli ef. 3 perpetrated by the Uz ans). Br iefly, in July 20 03 the United Sta tes Dis trict Court for the Southern 1 Di s tr ict of New York ( J ed S . Rak of

f, Judge ) f ou ndth at the U zans def

r aud ed p lai nt

if fs M ot or ol a Cr edi t Corpo r ati on(“ M ot or ol a”) andNo kiaCorpo r ati on(“ No kia ”) ou t o f m or e than$ 2 b ill io n. Se e U

zan VII , 38 8 F .3dat 4 2. The D is tr ict Cou r t aw ar dedcom pen s ato ry dam ages inexce s s of $2 b ill io n an d an equ al s uminpu ni ti

ve d amag es , see Uzan III

, 274 F. Supp. 2d a t 580-81, but later reduced the award of pu ni ti ve d amag es to $1 b ill

io n, se e U zan IX , 413 F. Supp. 2d a t 353, following aremand by apanel of this Cou r t, see Uzan VII

, 38 8 F .3dat 6 5. T he i ns tan t ap peal

con cerns th e de ni al b y the D is tr ict Cou r t, inan unp ub lis hedor der ent er ed Apr il 1 1, 2 007 , o f the U zans ’ m ot io n f or po s t- ju dgm ent

r eli ef pu r s uan t t o Rule 6 0(

b) of th e F ede r al Rul es of Civil P r oce du r e. Se e M

o to ro la Cr edi t Co rp. v. Uz

an , No. 02 Civ. 0666, 20 07 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2 27377 (S.D.N.Y . Apr. 11, 2007). The Uz ans sought thr ee forms of relief from the District Court: (1) a reduction in the judgment for compensatory damag es awa rded to Mot orola and Nokia , equalto the
s um s pl ain ti ff

s hav e r eco ver ed i n s et tl eme nt agr eem ent s with the Tur kis h S avi ngs Dep os it I ns ur ance4

Fund(“ SD I F”), whi ch s eize d co ntr ol of T els imin200 4; (

2) a di s char

ge o f the c om pen s ato ry dam ages
awar dedto M ot or ol a bec aus e M ot or ol a has as s ign ed i ts con tr act clai ms agai ns t T els imto B ayin di rban k, a ban k co ntr olledby the Re pu bl ic o f Tur key; and(3 ) anendto a perman ent in ju nct io n, im po s ed pu r s uan t t o the D is tr

ict Cou r t’ s J uly 31 , 20 03 O pi ni onandOr der , see Uzan III , 27 4 F . Supp . 2dat 5 81- 82. On appe al, the Uz ans argue that the District Court err ed in deny ing allthree forms of relief. DISCUSSI ON Rule 60(b) provides “a mecha nism for extraordinary judicia l relief [available] only if the moving par ty dem on s tr ate s exce pt

io nal cir cum s tan ces ,” Ruotolo v. City of New York , 514 F.3d 184, 19 1 (2d Cir. 200 8) (i nt ernal

qu ot ati onmarks omit te d) , an d r eli ef un der th e rul e is di s cr et

io nar y, see Fed. R. C iv. P. 60(b)(5) (“On mot

ion and just terms , the court may r eli eve apar ty

or it s legal r epr es ent ati

ve f r oma f in al judgment, order, or proceeding, for the following reasons: . . . (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged; it is based on an e arlier judgment that has bee n reversed or vacated; or apply ing it pr os pec ti vely is no lo nge r

equ it abl e.” (e mp has is add ed) ). We ther ef or e r evi ew the d eni al o f aRul e 60( b) mo ti onfo r

abu s e of di s cr et io n. See, e.g. , Ruo to lo , 51 4 F .3dat 1 91; cf. Sims v. Blot , 53 4 F .3d117 , 13 2 (2d Cir. 2008) (“A district court has abused its discretion if it based its ruling on an erroneous view of the lawor on a clea rly erroneous ass essment of the evide nce, or rendered a de cision that cannot be lo cat ed w ithi n the r ang e of

permi s s ib le d ecis io ns .” (cit ati on s andin te rnal qu ot ati onmarks omit te d) ). A. Red uc ti onof

Jud gm en t f

or Com pe ns at or y D am ag es As the Distr

ict Court found, Motor ola a nd Nokia have settled certain c ontractual cla ims with Telsim, acting through SDIF, and each pla intiff has r ece ived ca sh payments fr om Telsim that, together,
exce ed $ 1.2 billi on . P lai nt if fs hav e “s et

of f” th es e am ou nt s agai ns t thei r ju dgm ent s , “r es ul ti ng in a pro tantoreduction in the amounts owed by the Individual Defenda nts,” who still owe “hundreds of milli on s ” indam ages . Mo to ro la Cr edi t Co rp. , 20 07 U .S. Di s t. LE XI S 27 377 , at *2. T he U zans argue th at “[a] district court must

r edu ce a j udgm ent

un der
. . . Rul e 60 (b)( 5)
. . . if

th e pl ain ti ff

’s in ju ry has bee n5

fully or par ti ally s ati s fi ed b y ano th er ju dgm ent or s et tl eme nt .” App ell ant ’s B r . at 25 (emp has is add ed)
. T hey fur th er po s it th at p lai nt

if fs ’ s et -o ff is un r eli abl e be caus e ther e is a r is k that pl ain ti ff s will ap ply their settlement compensation to the punitive, instead of compensatory, portions of the judgment
en te re d a gain st th e U za ns. T he dis cr et

io nar y r eli ef availab le und er

Rul e 60 (b) i s equ

it abl e. See Fe d. R. Civ . P . 60 (b)( 5) (s tat ing that a “co ur t m ay r eli eve apar ty or it s legal r epr es ent ati

ve f r oma f in al j udgm ent

. . . [wh er e, int er ali a ,] applyi ng it prospectively is no longer equit able” (emp has is add ed) ); 12 J ame s Wm. M oo r e et al. , Moo re’s Federal Practice § 60.22[5] (3d e d. 2008) (“The relief provided by Rule 60(b) is equitable i n nature and, in e xercising its discr etion under Rule 60(b), a court may a lway s consider whether the moving party has acted e quitably.” ) (collecting c ases); 11 Charles Alle n Wright et al. , Federal Practice and Pr oce du r e § 28 57, at 2 55 ( 2ded. 199 5) (“ Equit abl e pr in cip les may

be t akenin to acco un t b y a co ur t in th e exe r cis e of

it s di s cr et io n u nd er Rul e 60 (b). ”) . T he r eco r d b ef or e us —an d the r eco r d d es cr ib ed in th e t en p ub lis heddec is io ns pr edat ing thi s op inio n, of

whi ch w e t ake j udici al n ot ice, see, e.g . , New York v. Ope rat io n Re sc ue Nat ’l , 273 F.3d 184, 19 8 (2d Cir. 2001) (taking judicia l notice of factua l findings in a
r elat ed c on te mp t p r oce edi ng) —d emo ns tr ate th at the U zans hav e no t ac te d equi tab ly b ecau s e they hav e
no t p ur s uedth eir

def ens e with “c leanhan ds ,” Pr ec is io n I ns tr ument M fg . Co . v . A utomo ti ve M aint en anc e M ach
. Co. , 3 24 U. S. 80 6, 81 4 ( 19 45 ) (st a ti ng tha t “ he wh o c om es i nto equi ty mu st c om e with c le a n h a nd s” (i nt ernal qu ot ati onmarks omit te d) ). Se e g en er all y Shondel v. McDermott

, 775 F.2d 859, 86 7-68 (7th Cir. 198 5) (P os ner , J

.) (no ti ng tha t th e c on ce pt o f “ cl ea n h a nd s” o rig in a te d i n “ the mo rali sti c, rul e- le ss, natural-law c haracter of the equity jurisprudence crea ted by the Lord Chanc ellors of England whe n the office was filled by

clerics,” a nd observing that “[t]oday, ‘uncl ean ha nds’ really just means that in equity as in law the plaintiff’s fault, like the defenda nt’s, may be releva nt to the question of what if any

remedyA l t houg h t he D i s t r i ct C our t di d not con s i der “c l ean ha nds ” i n i t s deni al of r el i ef , we “m ay af

f i r m t he 3 j ud gm ent of t he d i s t ri ct cou rton any groun d appeari ng i n t he record, ” Shu mwayv . U PS , 1 1 8 F .3 d 6 0 , 6 3 (2 d C ir. 1 9 9 7 ).

T h e re c o r d o n a p p e a l c o n ta in s a d d itio n a l e v id e n c e o f th e U z a n s’ o n g o in g d isr e g a r d o f th e D istr ic t C o u r t’s 4 ju r isd ic tio n a n d o r d e r s. S e e , e .g. , J
. A
. 1127 (L et t er of R
. St an M or t ens on, couns el f or U z an def

endant s , dat ed J ul y 1, 2 0 0 5 ) ( n o ti n g tha t co u n se l “ h a [s] re c e ive d n o i n d ica ti o n tha t t h e [ ] d e fe n d a n ts w o u ld ap p e a r fo r v id e o tap e d e p o sition s” ); J
. A
. 203 (T r . of

Proc eedi ng s , M ar . 12, 2002 , at24: 23- 25: 2) ( St at em ent of R
. St an M or t ens on, couns el f or U z an def endant s ) ( “Sho ul d t hi s cour t ul t i m at el y en t er j udgm ent i n t hi s ca s e, t he def endant s . . . i nt end t o r es i s t eve r y way t hey can t he f or ei gn enf

or cem ent of

t hos e m at t er s bec aus e t hey do not beli eve t hatt hi s cour t [ has ] t he k i nd of j uri s di ct i on n e c e ssa ry to e n ter tho se j u d g m e n ts i n an e n fo rc e a b le w a y . ” ). 6 the plaintiff is entitled to”). 3 Relying on their va st pers onal we alth, the Uz ans have time a nd again deploye d their lawy ers to
r ais e legal r oad bl ock s to th e en fo r cem ent of th e ju dgm ent

agai ns t them . T hey

hav e pe r s is te nt

ly endeavored to evade the law ful juris diction of the Distr ict Court and undermine its careful a nd det ermi nedwork. See, e.g. , Mo to ro la Cr edi t Co rp. , 20 07 U .S. Di s t. LE XI S 27 377 , at *11 (“ [T ]h e I ndivi du al Defendants’ willful failure to comply with this Court’s order that they provide post- judgment discovery mak es th e arr es t o r der s s till app lic abl e.”); UzanIX , 41 3 F . Supp . 2dat 3 50 (“[ T ]h e in di vid ual def end ant s , d es pi te r epe ate d dis cov ery or der s , h ave r ef us ed t o p r od uce evi den ce o f thei r finan cial
s ituat io n— evi den ce la rgely or

exclus ive ly i n thei r

con tr ol .”) ; UzanIII

, 274 F. Supp. 2d a t 491 (“The defendants contemptuously refus ed to obey the C ourt’s orders , in one ca se even breaking their sworn promis e not to further eviscerate the c ollateral. The defendants also repeatedly reneged on promises to pr ov id e di s cov ery . . . an d i ns truct ed thei r couns el n ot

to r eveal t o thi s Cou r t o r

th e Cour t o f App eals secret st eps they were ta king in Turkey to obtain ex parte or der s un der cutti ng the p r io r or der s of this Cou r t. ”) ; id. at 4 94 (“M or eov er , d ef end ant s hav e r epe ate dly r es is te d, andgon e in to con te mp t o f, this Cou r t’ s or der s to tr ans fe r

th e co lla te r al (or

it s funct io nal equ ivalen t) to th e r egi s tr

y of this Cou r t s o that it couldbe u s ed t o s ati s fy

any j udgm ent . T hey

hav e als o d eclinedth e pr of fe r ed al te rnat

ive of po s ting a bo ndinlie u o f the c ollat er al, pr ef err ing t o r emainincon te mp t. ”)
. As couns el co nf irmedat o r al 4 argument, the Uza ns r emain in c ontempt of court f or failure to comply with the District Court’s orders th at they tr ans fe r s to ck h ol di ngs to th e Cour t’ s r egi s tr y, an d they

r emains ub ject

to arr es t s ho ul d they“ C h u tz p a h ” a s a le g a l te r m o f a r t is a n a ly tic a lly sim ila r to “ u n c le a n h a n d s,” th o u g h n o t n e c e ss a r ily 5 cot er m i nous wi t h t hatcon ceptas under s t ood i n t he l aw of cha ncer y. The “ cl as s i c def i ni t i on” of

chut z pah ha s bee n des cr i bed as “ t hatqual i t y en s hr i ned i n a m an w ho, ha vi ng ki l l ed hi s m ot her an d f at her , t hr ows hi m s el f

on t he m er cy o f th e c o u r t b e c a u se h e is a n o r p h a n .” L e o R o ste n , TheJ o y s o f Y idd i s h 9 2 (1 9 6 8 ); s e eal

s o Th al e r v. S e co nd N e wH aven B ank , C i v. N o . B -7 1 3 , slip o p . a t 1 (D . C o n n . A p r . 1 0 , 1 9 7 4 ) (J o n O . N e w m a n , J .) (“ W h e n th e a p o c r y p h a l c h ild m u r d e r e d h is p a r e n ts a n d th e n so u g h t m e r c y a s a n o r p h a n , h e se t a sta n d a r d fo r c o u r tr o o m c h u tz p a h th a t h a s n o t b e e n riv a le d u n til th e filin g o f th is la w su it.” ); S ch er v . N a t’l A ssoc . of S ec. D ea lers, 3 8 6 F. S up p . 2 d 4 0 2 , 4 0 4 ( S
. D
. N
. Y. 2 0 0 5 ) (M i c h a e l B. M u k a se y , J. ) ( q u oti ng t he u np u bli she d op i nion by t he n-D i st ri ct Jud ge N ew m an an d ex plai ning the ex t rao rd i na ry c irc u m sta n c e s o f th e c iv il su it b r o u g h t b y S e y m o u r T h a le r , a c o n v ic te d fe lo n a n d fo r m e r N e w Y o r k sta te se n a to r ). C f. Y a tes v. C it y of N ewYork , N o. 04 C i v. 9928 , 2006 U
. S. D i s t . LE X I S 5419 9, at* 1 ( S. D
. N
. Y. A ug. 4, 2006 ) ( Si dney H
. St ei n, J
. ) ( us i ng t hi s “ vas t l y ov er us ed” b ut non et hel es s “ m os t ap pr opr i at e” t er m t o des cr i be “ an i ndi vi dual , [ w ho] af t er bei ng m a ul ed by t he 4 50

- po un d Si be r i a n t i g er h e ha d b ee n r a i s i ng i ns i de hi s f i f t h- f l oo r a pa r t m en t a l on g wi t h a n a l l i g a t or , s ue [ d] t he c i t y a nd t he p ol i ce who e nt er ed t he a par t m ent i n a n ef f or t t o r es cue t he a ni m al s f or doi ng s o wi t hout a s ear ch w a rr a n t”). 7 s et fo ot inth e Unit ed S tat es . Se e M o to ro la Cr edi t Co rp. , 20 07 U .S. Di s t. LE XI S 27 377 , at *10 -1 1. Despite their flat-out r efusal to comply with the District Court’s lawful orders , the Uza ns now have the ch utz pa h to see k p ost- ju dgme nt, equi ta bl e r elie f fro m c om plyi ng wi th t ho se o rde rs. 5 Ho weve r , thei r

con du ct bef or e thi s Cou r t, andes pec ially b ef or e the D is tr

ict Cou r t, weig

hs heav ily against granting the relief they seek. A s the Supreme Court st ated long a go, the “c lean ha nds” doctrine “is far mor e than amere bana lity. It is a self- imposed ordinance that cl oses the doors of a court of equity to one tai nted with inequita bleness or bad faith relative to the matter in whic h he seeks relief, ho weve r im pr op er may hav e be en the b ehav

io r of th e de fe nd ant .” Precisio n Instrument Mfg. C o. , 32 4 U. S. at 8 14. We ther ef

or e co nclud e that

th e Uza ns ’ u tt er

di s r egar d f

or th e Di s tr ict Cou r t’ s or der s pr eclu des th e r eli ef th at they ar e s eeking, andth e Di s tr ict Cou r t didno t e rr

indenying it
. Ou r de ci sio n to da y d oe s no t c on fli ctwi th o ur C ou rt’ s pri or h ol di ng tha t apl ain ti ff ma y n ot, a s a matte r of law, r eco ver

tw ice f or th e s ame in ju r

ies , see Singer

v. Olympia Brewing Co. , 87 8 F .2d596 , 60 0 ( 2d Cir . 19 89) (“ [W] hena pl ain ti ff r ecei ves a s et tl eme nt

fr omon e de fe nd ant , a n on s et tl ing de fe nd ant

is entitled to a c redit of the s ettlement amount ag ainst any judgme nt obtained by the pl aintiff agai nst the nonsettling defendant as long a s both the settlement and judgme nt repres ent common dama ges.”). In this case, the Distr

ict Court assess ed the risk of excessive recovery and de termined that, in light of pl ain ti ff s ’ as s ur ance s th at they

wouldno t s eek t o r eco ver fr omth e Uza ns th e am ou nt alr eady r eco ver edW e a l s o r ecog ni z e t hatot her cour t s ha ve c oncl uded t hati t woul d be a p er s eab us e of di s cr et i on t o deny r el i ef 6 u n d e r R u le 6 0 (b ) u n d e r d iffe r e n t c irc u m sta n c e s. S e e , e .g. , B l a ney v . West

, 209 F. 3d 1027, 1031 ( 7t h C i r . 2000 ) ( “I t i s a p er s e ab u se o f d i scre t i on t o d en y a R u l e 6 0(b)( 4) m oti on w he n the t ri al co u rt ha s no j u ri sd i cti on ov er the ac t i on . ”) H ow ev er, w e a r e no t con f

r ont ed her e wi t h a ny c i r cum s t anc es — j uri s di ct i ona l or ot her w i s e— s ugg es t i ng a need t o m odi f y t he ju d g m e n t. 8 through SDIF , a formal modification of the judgme nt was unnece ss ary. Although w e adhe re to our
rul e agai ns t d ou bl e r eco ver ies , we als o n ot e that

we h ave n ever

hel d that ju dgm ent -d ebt or s ar e en ti tl ed
to an am end ed j udgm ent

eachti me thei r

ju dgm ent is “cr edi te d” o r

s et -o ff by a s et tl ing co -d ef end ant . Acco r di ngl

y, tho ughwe af

fi rm the D is tr

ict Cou r t’ s dec is io n o n the gr ou ndth at the U zans lack “cl ean hands,” we c annot say that the District Court’s reasoning was leg ally erroneous or

outside “the range of permi s s ib le d ecis io ns ,” Si

ms, 53 4 F .3dat 1 32. In addition, today’s deci sion does not conflict with our Court’s previous obs ervation that the “cle an hands” doctrine might not apply whe re a Rul e 60(b) motion is br ought on the basis of a “fraud
onth e co ur t. ” See Martina Theatre Corp. v. Schine C hainTheatres, Inc. , 27 8 F .2d798 , 80 1 ( 2dCir . 19 60) (F r ien dly, J .) (suggesting that “[a] defrauded district court would hav e bee n empowered to take action sua sponte to exp unge the j udgm ent , an d we woulds up po s e that anyo ne, whe th er

hi s han ds wer e cle an
or di r ty , co ul d s ugg es t that

it do s o”) . T he ap pl

icat io n o f a ny e quit abl e do ctr

in e will, q ui te natur ally, dep endonth e cir cum s tan ces pr es ent ed, andwe d o n ot to day h ol d that

“cl ean h and s ” ar e the si

ne qua
non of every Rul e 60(b) motion. 6 T he U zans als o p os it

th at M ot or ol a has wr ongf ully atte mp te d t o u s e it s s har e of th e T els im settlement to off

set both compensatory and punitive dama ges even though Telsim was not liable for punitive dama ges. In the Uzan’s view , any “ set off ” should only apply

to the Distr

ict Court’s award of
com pen s ato ry dam ages , b ecau s e tho s e dam ages ar e s har ed b y bo thth e Uza ns andT els im . M ot or ol a do es no t dis pu te th at p unit ive dam ages wer e awar dedagai ns t the U zans andno t again s t T els im
. See UzanIX , 41 3 F . Supp . 2dat 3 53 (awar di ng M ot or ol a “$ 1 billi oninpu ni ti ve d amag es fr omth e indi

v idual defenda nts, jointly a nd severally” (emphasis added)). Nonetheless, Mot orola argues that it may a pply itsAt o r a l a r g um en t , we r a i s ed nostra sp ontet he p os s i bi l i t y t hatt he s o- cal l ed “f ugi t i ve di s ent i t l em ent doct r i ne” 7 m ig h t p r o v id e a n in d e p e n d e n t b a sis fo r re so lv in g th is a p p e a l. S ee genera l l y S E C v. B erger , 322 F. 3d 187, 191 ( 2d C i r . 2003 ) (“ [F ]e d e r a l c o u r ts ‘h a v e a u th o r ity to d ism iss a n a p p e a l .
. . i f th e p a r ty se e k in g re lie f is a fu g itiv e w h ile th e m a tte r is pend i ng. ’ ” ( qu ot i ng D egen v. U nite d S tates , 5 1 7 U
. S
. 8 2 0 , 8 2 4 (19 9 6 )))
. S e v e ra l y e a rs a g o , w e d e c li n e d p lain ti ffs’ re q u e st t o app l y t he “ f

ugi t i ve di s ent i t l em ent doct r i ne” i n a n unpubli s hed s um m ar y or der, pr i nci pal l y on t he g r ound t hat , unt i l t hat t i m e, “ [ t he U z an’ s ] ac t i ons ha [ d] not bee n s uff i ci ent l y di s r upt i ve o f

t he a ppel l at e pr oces s t hatdi s m i s s al woul d be a reas onabl e res ponse. ” M o to r o l a Cr e di t C o r p. v . U zan , 115 Fed
. A ppx . 473, 475 ( 2d C i r . 2004 ) (i nt er nalquot at i on m ar ks o m itte d ). W e n o te th a t th e c irc u m sta n c e s th a t c o u n se le d re str a in t in 2 0 0 4 m a y n o lo n g e r e x ist n o w o r in th e fu tu r e . T her ef or e, i n deci di ng f

ut ure cha l l eng es by t he U z ans t o t he e nf or cem ent of

t he j udgm ent s ag ai ns t t hem , we do not pr ecl ude t he D i s t r i ct C our t f r om con s i deri ng , i n i t s i nf or m ed di s cr et i on, whet her t he “ f ugi t i ve di s t ent i t l em ent doct r i ne” m ay pro vid e a n a pp rop ri ate b asi s f or d i spo si ng of fu t u re m oti on s and pe t i t i on s by t he U zan s.

9 s har e of th e s et tl eme nt

to th e to tal amo un t o f d amag es owe d b y the U zans —ap pr oxim ate ly $ 3.1 billion—bec ause the Uza ns “hope to reduce [Motorola’s] ability to recover abroad by reduc ing the amount of the compensatory awa rd, and then plac ing their assets in jurisdictions where the enf or cem ent of pu ni ti ve d amages is pr ohib it ed. ” Ap pellees ’ B r . 47
. T he D is tr ict Cou r t didno t ad dr es s th e all ocat io n o f the s et tl eme nt

pr oce eds bet

ween
com pen s ato ry andpu ni ti

ve d amag es , an d i t i s un nec es s ary f or us to do s o i n o r der

to r es ol ve thi s appea l. Nothing in the record indica tes that the Uzans are eve n remotely close to full payment of
com pen s ato ry dam ages . T o the c on tr ary, ther e is ever y in di cat io n that th e Uza ns hav e no in te r es t in voluntarily pa ying a ny part of the judgment aga inst them. T he question of applying a “set off” to compensatory damag es or punitive damage s is therefore unripe for adjudic ation. W e note, howe ver, th at s ho ul d the U zans att emp t t o u s e thei r s et tl eme nt

cr edi t t o f

rus tr ate th e en fo r cem ent

of pu ni ti ve damag es overseas, the District Court is well-equipped to order appropriate relief to protect its lawful judgment and jurisdiction. Se e K araha B o das

Co ., L. L.C. v

. Per us ahaan Per tamban ga n M inyak D an Gas

Bu mi Negara , 500 F.3d 111, 11 3 (2d Cir. 2007) (conc luding that district courts “maintai n[ ] juris diction to protect . . . federal judgme nts even after the money judgme nt . . . was satisfied”). 7 B. Motorola’s Assignment of Claims The Uzans also argue that the judgment against them s hould be modified to discharge the
awa rd of compensator

y dama ges to Motor ola—a pproximately $2 .1 billion—pursuant to the “doctrine of election of remedies” bec ause Motorola ass igned c ertain contractualclai ms to B ayindi rbank as part10

of th e T els ims et tl eme nt

agr eem ent , ther eby

fo r fe it ing it s abilit

y t o co lle ct

ona f r audju dgm ent

th at
s ati s fi es th e s ame in ju ry. The D is tr ict Cou r t r ejec te d thi s argum ent fo r s ever al r eas on s , p r

in cip ally bec aus e the d octr

in e of elec ti onof

r eme di es only ap pl

ies “wh er e the s eco ndr eme dy i s clea rly in con s is te nt

with the f ir s t. ” Mo to ro la Cr

edi t Co rp. , 20 07 U .S. Di s t. LE XI S 27 377 , at *6 (qu ot ing Equi tabl e T ru st Co . v . Co nne ct ic ut B ras s & M fg . Co rp. , 10 F.2d 913, 916 (2d Cir. 1926)). The Distr ict Court
con clu dedth at ther e was no thing in con s is te nt abo ut r eli nqui s hi ng c er tain cl aim s inr eturn f or a par ti al recovery whi le reserving the right to recover the bala nce from defendants. The Court also noted that,
as a matte r

of com mo n s ens e, a d ou bl e r eco ver y is im po s s ib le b ecau s e T els imop er ate s as a s hell
corpo r ati onandhas no as s et s . We f ully agr ee wi thth e Di s tr

ict Cou r t’ s det ermi nat

io ns . C. Perm anent Injunction Finally, th e Uza ns argue th at the D is tr ict Cou r t e rr ed i n n ot

vacat ing the J uly 31 , 20 03 perman ent

in ju nct io n r equ ir ing themto di s gor

ge thei r s har es inT els imto th e Di s tr ict Cou r t’ s r egi s tr

y. See UzanIII

, 27 4 F . Supp . 2dat 5 81- 82. Acco r ding t o the U zans , the i nj un ct io n i s mo ot

bec aus e ( 1) pl ain ti ff s hav e r eli nqui s hedth eir

r igh ts to T els ims har es as par t o f the T els ims et tl eme nt and(2) pl ain ti ff s no lo nge r

hav e co ntr ol

ov er th eir T els ims har es . T he D is tr ict Cou r t d eclinedto gr ant

r eli ef beca use the Uzans had not shown good faith in comply ing with the injunc tion, and al so declined to vacat e the arr es t o r der s agai ns t the U zans bec aus e of th eir “willf ul failur e t o co mp ly wi ththis Cou r t’ s
or der th at they pr ov id e po s t- ju dgm ent

di s cov ery.” Mo to ro la Cr

edi t Co rp. , 20 07 U .S. Di s t. LE XI S 27 377 , at * 10- 11; see also Uzan III

, 27 4 F . Supp . 2dat 5 82 (“ T he Co ur t . . . o r der s th at unl es s andun til defendants purge their contempts, the individual de fendants, if found within the juris diction of the United States, willbe immedia tely a rres ted and hel d in confinement until such time as they c omply with th e di r ect ive s of th e Cour t’ s J anu ary 6 an d M ay 9 O r der s . . . .”) . F or th e r eas on s exp lai nedabo ve, we agr ee.11 * * * A final w ord is in or der: the record of these pr ocee dings reveals a prolonged, de termined effort by the U zans to avo idcom pl ian ce wi thth e de cr ees andju dgm ent s of th e Di s tr ict Cou r t. I n o th er circumstances—where smaller sums are involved, and rec alci trant defendants/judgment debtors are not in a position to retain skilled counsel endle ss ly to devise le gal strategies for non-compliance with judicia l orders —it is pr obable tha t this litigation would have been ove r long ago. W e take this occasion to agai n compliment the a ble District J udge, whose conduct of these complex procee dings over many yea rs has been cha racterized by admirable c are, dilig ence , and tena city. W e also serve notice on the Uzans and thei r counsel that the patience of the courts is not without limits . In the absence of a
s ho wing of

goo d f aith ef fo r ts to comply with the o r der s andju dgm ent s of th e Di s tr ict Cou r t, fur th er legal m aneu

ver s des ign ed t o f

rus tr ate th e or der

ly m anag eme nt

of po s t- ju dgm ent

pr oce edi ngs will properly raise the question of whether the imposit ion of sanctions on counsel as well as defenda nts are app r op r iat e or nec es s ary t o v

in di cat e the i nt er es ts of

ju s ti ce. CONCLUSI ON Fo r th e f or ego ing r eas on s , we AF F IRM th e Ap r il 1 1, 2 007 or der

of th e Di s tr ict Cou r t. Purs uant to Rule 39(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, the costs of this appea l will be
ta xe d a gain st th e U za ns.