1

Filed 3/14/22 Gossett v. Jackson CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a) , prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.11 15. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

RACHEL GOSSETT as Co

- trustee, etc. et al.,
P etitioners and Respondents,

v. CHRISTOPHER ADAM JACKSON as Co

- trustee, etc. et al. , Objector s and Appellant s . E073838 (Super.Ct.No. MCP1300789)
OPINION

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. John G. Evans, Judge. As to Chapter Jackson, judgment affirmed; as to Christopher Adam Jackson, appeal dismissed, motion for sanctions granted, and remanded with directions

. Law Office of Angela Swan, and Angela Swan for Objectors and Appellants. The Grossman Law Firm, Scott M. Grossman; Jeff Lew is Law, Jeffrey Lewis and Sean C. Rotstan for Petitioners and Respondents.
Th e ongoing probate dispute that forms the basis of this appeal involves three siblings

— Christopher Adam Jackson, Jordan Beswick, and Rachel Gossett

— whose2

mother passed away in 2013 . Shortly after his mother died, Christopher petitioned the probate court to c ontest the validity of amendments she had made to The Jackson Family Trust (the trust) , disinheriting Christopher. Beswick and Gossett (collectively, the S iblings) then petitioned the probate court to challenge the validity of asset transfers Christopher made from the trust after their mother passed away, including the transfer of a residential property to Christopher’s former wife, Chapter Jackson , and the taking of money from two bank accounts belonging to the trust

. 1
In a prior appeal , we affirmed t he trial court’s granting of summary adjudication in favor of the Siblings on certain claims in their amended petition , including removing Christopher as co

- trustee , imposing a constructive trust in favor of the trust on the residential property, and surch arging Christopher for the money taken from the two bank
accounts. After the remittitur from that appeal issued, the trial court granted the Siblings’ motion to file a second amended petition under Probate Code section s 850 and 17200 to include new allega tions against Christopher and Chapter , which the Siblings filed along with supporting evidence

. The Siblings served Christopher and Chapter by mail with notice of the hearing on the second amended petition. Christopher and Chapter did not appear at the hearing on the petition, nor did any attorney representing them

. T hey also did not file any response. The trial court granted the second amended petition , entered default against Christopher , and ordered a prove

- up hearing as to Christopher. As to Chapter, the trial court entered

1 Because Christopher and Chapter have the same last names, we refer to them by their first names. No disrespect is intended.3

default judgment, awarding damages as requested in the second amended petition. Christopher and Chapter both appealed from the default judgment entered against Chapt er. On appeal, Christopher and Chapter raise numerous issues. We dismiss Christopher’s appeal because he has not demonstrated that he was aggrieved by the default judgment entered against Chapter

. We grant the Siblings’ motion for sanctions against Chris topher and his attorney and remand to the trial court to determine the
amount

. We deny the Siblings ’ request to dismiss the appeal as to Chapter on the basis of the disentitlement doctrine. We reject all of Chapter’s arguments on appeal because they lack merit or were forfeited

. We accordingly affirm the judgment

.
BACKGROUND 2
A. The Siblings’ First Amended Petition On December 23, 2013, the Siblings filed an amended petition in probate court under Probate Code sections 850 and 17200 against Christopher and Chapter, seeking to remove Christopher as co

- trustee, to determine title to a residential property he had conveyed to Chapter , to recover trust property, and to recover money damages against Christopher based on money he allegedly took from two bank a ccounts belonging to the
trust

. The Siblings alleged that on November 6, 2013, Christopher had a $152,251.61

2 In her opening brief, Chapter makes various fact ual assertion s that are not supported by citations to the record. We disregard such assertions. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C) [ in a brief, any reference to a matter in the record must be supported “ by a citation to the volume and page number of the record where the matter appear ”].)4

cashier’s check issued to himself personally from a bank account at Wells Fargo Bank (Wells Fargo) held by the trust. They also alleged that on the same day , Christopher took

over $80,000 from another bank account held by the trust at Mission Oaks Bank (Mission Oaks) . The Siblings sought to surcharge Christopher for an amount to be determined at trial. The Siblings moved for summary judgment or summary adjudication in the alternative , and the trial court partially granted the motion for summary adjudication

. The court denied summary judgment because it concluded that factual issues remained as
to whether the amendments to the trust were the inv alid result of undue influence exerted

over the Siblings’ and Christopher’s mother

. Assuming the amendments were invalid, the court concluded that Christopher acted in excess of his authority as co

- trustee by transferring the residential property to himse lf and then to Chapter and by distributing to himself $30 4 , 278.08 from the trust’s bank accounts at Wells Fargo and Mission Oaks

. A constructive trust was imposed on the real and personal property invalidly distributed from the trust until Christopher or Chapter returned the property to the interim trustee. Christopher was removed as co

- trustee and surcharged $304,278.08 for the money taken from the bank accounts

. Chapter and Christopher appealed. In an unpublished opinion filed in April 2019, we affirmed the trial court’s order granting summary adjudication against Christopher and Chapter. On June 27, 2019 , the remittitur issued

.5

B. The Siblings’ Second Amended Petition In October 2018, w hile the prior appeal was pending, the Siblings mov ed to file a second amended petition. They argued that amendment was necessary to correct the previous pleading and to “plead new allegations supported by information obtained through discovery responses gathered by business records[,] deposition subpoena s, and litigation in [Christopher’s] bankruptcy case, and the interim trustee’s report in this case as recently as March 2018.” The new information related to Christopher’s and Chapter’s taking and conceal ment of funds belonging to the trust, including fr om the bank accounts
at Wells Fargo and Mission Oaks and a Mutual of Omaha life insurance policy. The Siblings also claimed that Christopher and Chapter used the life insurance proceeds to purchase real estate in another state , which was then transferred to Chapter. Two weeks a fter the remittitur issued in the prior appeal, the trial court held a hearing on the motion to amend the petition

. Chapter and Christopher did not appear, and no attorney appeared on behalf of either of them

. The court granted the motion, and on July 11, 2019, the Siblings filed the second amended petition. The Siblings attached over 200 pages of supporting evidence to the petition. In the second amended petition, the Siblings again alleged that on November 6, 2013, Christopher had a $152,251.61 cashier’s check issued to himself personally from a Wells Fargo account held by the trust. The Siblings newly alleged that Christopher then transferred to Chapter $140,000 of proceeds from that account. The Siblings amended the allegation regarding the trust’s account at Mission Oaks to claim that on6

November 1 2 , 2013, Christopher emptied the account of $152,026.47 and then transferred the money to himself and to Chapter

. The Siblings also newly allege d that in
Janu ary 2014 , Mutual of Omaha , at Christopher’s request , paid the trust approximately $225,000 on a life insurance policy for the Siblings’ and Christopher’s mother , which Christopher proceeded to distribute to accounts belonging to him self and Chapte r . As to Chapter, the Siblings requested the following relief: (1) $140,158.31 plus interest for converting funds from the trust’s account at Wells Fargo , (2) $94,441.80 plus interest for converting funds from the trust’s account at Mission Oaks , (3) $120,105.57 plus interest
f or converting funds from the Mutual of Omaha life insurance policy , and (4) $709,094.74 in double damages. On July 12, 2019, the S iblings served Chapter and Christopher by mail with the second amended petition and the notice of the hearing on that petition , which was set for August 13, 2019. The notice stated that any interested person could file a response , and it specified the amo unt of double damages that the Siblings sought to recover from Chapter

. At the hearing on the second amended petition on the scheduled date , neither Chapter nor Christopher nor any attorney representing either of them appeared

. The Siblings’ counsel represented that Chapter was not represented by an attorney. The Siblings’ counsel acknowledged that some of the Siblings’ requests for relief in the second amended petition we re rendered moot by the prior appeal, stating “I don’t get the same relief twice.” The court granted the second amended petition and entered default against Christopher and Chapter. T he court set a prove

- up hearing as to Christopher in7

December 2019. As to Chapter, the court directed the Siblings’ counsel to pr epare an appropriate judgment , which counsel had earlier stated was possible because of the specifi city of the damages pled a gainst Chapter

. On August 26, 2019, the court entered default judgment against Chapter on the second amended petition . The judgment provides that Chapter is liable to the Siblings, as

co - trustees of the trust, in the amount o f $1,063,800.4 2

. In October 2019, Christopher and Chapter separately appealed from that judgment

. DISCUSSION
A. Appellate Jurisdiction

— Christopher The Siblings argue that we must dismiss Christopher’s appeal . We agree. In his notice of appeal, Christopher states that he is appealing from a default judg ment entered on August 26, 2019. Christopher attached the default judgment entered against Chapter to his notice of appeal. The judgment provides that the Siblings, as co

trustees of the trust, can “recover judgment on the merits against Chapter Jackson [who] is liable in the amount” of over $1 million. (Italics added.) In order to have standing to appeal, a party must be aggrieved by the judgment or order at issue . (Code Civ. Proc, § 902; In re Tobacco Cases I (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 42, 53.) “ One is considered , ‘ aggrieved ’ whose rights or interests are injuriously affected by the judgment. ” ( County of Alameda v. Carleson (1971) 5 Cal.3d 730, 737.) The affected

“ interest ‘ “ must be immediate, pecuniary, and su bstantial and not nominal or a remote consequence of the judgment.”’ ” ( Ibid. ) An appellant lacks standing to raise issues8

affecting only other parties

. ( Six4Three, LLC v. Facebook, Inc. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 109, 115 ; see also Diamond Springs Lime Co. v . American River Constructors (1971) 16 Cal.App.3d 581, 608 [“[A] defendant having independent liability has no standing to appeal from a judgment exonerating his codefendant, even where a potential right of contribution exists” ].) Christopher claims tha t he has standing to appeal from the default judgment because he “ is an aggrieved party, and , any aggrieved party may appeal from an adverse judgment.” Christopher does not support that conclusory assertion with any explanation of how his interests were i njured by the judgment against Chapter , let alone how he was injured in an immediate, pecuniary, and substantial way. Given that the judgment by its terms was entered against Chapter alone , we do not perceive how the judgment aggrieved Christopher

. On the contrary , given that the Siblings recovered damages against Chapter as a joint tortfeasor, the judgment against Chapter actually helps Christopher insofar as
any amount of damages Chapter pays to satisfy the award for damages based on her liability as a joint tortfeasor would be deducted from the damages Christopher owes for the same wrong s . (See May v. Miller (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 404, 410 ( May ).) For all of these reasons, w e conclude tha t Christopher does not have standing to appeal from the default judgment entered against Chapter. We accordingly dismiss Christopher’s appeal. 3

3 We note that the Siblings did not frame the arguments in their motion to dismiss in terms of standing. Christopher did, however, address standing in his opposition to the Siblings’ motion for sanctions. Because standing is jurisdictional ( Marsh v. Mountain Zephyr, Inc. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 289, 295 ) , we have no discretion to ignore the issue.9

B. Disentitlement Doctrine

— Chapter The Siblings moved to dismiss Chapter’s appeal on the basis of the disentitle ment doctrine because in a related criminal case Chapter allegedly failed to pay any of the victim restitution that was ordered . We are not persuaded. Under the disentitlement doctrine, we may dismiss an appeal if an appellant has failed to comply with a lower court order

. ( Stoltenberg v. Ampton Investments, Inc. (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1225, 1229 ; MacPherson v. MacPherson (1939) 13 Cal.2d 271, 277.) The Siblings contend that Chapter failed to comply with an order directing her to pay over $200,000 to the trust in victim restitution . The record does not support that argument. In 2016, Chapter pled guilty to one count of forgery (Pen. Code, § 470, subd. (c)) and to one count of grand theft (Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (a)) for taking “money belonging to the [trust] in an amount more than $950.” After Chapter pled guilty, the trial court granted the prosecution’s request to modify the terms of her probation to include an order to pay victim restitution to the trust . Ch apter appealed from that order. The appellate division of the superior court reversed and remanded the matter to the trial court to allow Chapter to move to withdraw her plea and, if she did not, for the trial court to determine whether compelling and ext raordinary reasons justified awarding “less than full victim restitution.” The record does not include any information about what transpired on remand

.10

Given that the only order for victim restitution against Chapter in the record on this appeal was reversed, there is no basis for applying the disentitlement doctrine. We accordingly deny the Siblings’ motion to dismiss Chapter’s appeal on that basis.
C. Per sonal Jurisdictio n over Chapter Chapter argues that the judgment is void because the court did not have personal jurisdiction over her. She contends that the court lost personal jurisdiction over her after it allegedly issued a “ final judgment” against h er in 2016 when it granted the Siblings’ motion for summary adjudication

. Chapter claims that the trial court did not regain personal jurisdiction over her because the Siblings did not personally serve her with a

new summons and the second amended petitio n . This argument fails for several reasons . First, Chapter appealed from th e 2016 order granting summary adjudication on the first amended petition. She does not provide any au thority for the proposition that the court lost jurisdiction over her while she was actively pursuing an appeal

. Second , i n the prior appeal , we held that the court had personal jurisdiction over Chapter because she had generally appeared in the matter. The remittitur issued on June 2 7 , 2019. According to the register of action s , no j udgment against Chapter was entered between the issuance of the remittitur and the Siblings ’ filing of the second amended petition two weeks later

. Chapter therefore remained a party to the probate proceed ing. Thus, nothing has happened to affect our previous holding about personal jurisdiction , which therefore operates as the law of the case. (See Nally v. Grace Community Church (1988) 47 Cal.3d 278, 301 [explaining law of the case doctrine].) Third, be cause Chapter ha s generally11

appeared in the probate proceeding , the Siblings were not required to serve Chapter personally with the amended pleading. (See Engebretson & Co. v. Harrison (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 436, 441 [ mail service of an amended complaint “ is sufficient where the defendant has made an appearance in the action ”].) For all of these reasons, we conclude that the trial court had personal jurisdiction over Chapter when it entered default judgment against her.
D. Service of the Notice of Hearing

— Chapter Chapter argues that the Siblings did not properly notify her of the hearing. She argues that mail service was not allowed by statute and that, if it was allowed, the 30 days ’ notice prescribed by Probate Code sec tion 851 should have been extended by 10 days for mail service under Code of Civil Procedure section 1013. Both arguments fail. Probate Code section 851 provides that a t least 30 days before the hearing on a petition under section 850 of the Probate Code, the petitioner must serve all interested
person s with notice of the hearing and a copy of the petition in the manner prescribed for service of a civil summons under Code of Civil Procedure section 413.10 , et. seq . ( Prob. Code, § 851, subd. (a).) Code of Civil Procedure section 413.20 provides: “ If a summons is served by mail pursuant to this chapter, the provisions of [Code of Civil Procedure s] ection 1013 that extend the time for exercising a right or doing an act shall not extend any time specified in this title

. ” We independently review issues of statutory construction and application of the law to undisputed facts. ( Count y Sanitation Dist.
No. 2 v. Cou nty of Kern (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1544, 1616.)12

On July 12, 2019, Chapter was served by mail with notice of the hearing on the Siblings’ second amended petition , which was set for August 13, 2019. As Chapter acknowledges, this amounts to 32 days of notice

. Chapter does not deny that service of the second amended petition was governed by Code of Civil Procedure section 413.10 , et.
seq. She nevertheless argues that Code of Civil Procedure section 1013 applies to extend service by mail. The argument fails as a matter of law because of Code of Civil Procedure section 413.20. Be c ause Probate Code section 851 required a minimum of 30 days ’ notice by mail , and because the additional 10 days ordinarily required for service by mail is inapplicable pursuant to se ction 413.20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, we conclude that the 32

- day notice afforded Chapter complie d with the applicable statutes. Chapter’s claim that service by mail was not permissible also fails. To support her argument , she cites California Rule s of Court, rule 7.53(a), which provides that in a probate matter “[a] n amended pleading or an amendment to a pleading requires the same notice of hearing (including publication) as the pleading it amends. ” But she does not explain how that rule prohibit s service by mail. It does not. Service of a petition under Probate Code section 850 is governed by Code of Civil Procedure section 4 13 .10 et seq

. (Prob. Code, § 851, subd. (a)), and Code of Civil Procedure section 415.30 , subdivision (a), provides for service by mail. For all of these reasons, we reject Chapter’s arguments that service by mail was improper and that the 30

- day notice period was extended by 10 days

.13

E. Sufficiency of the Notice of Hearing

— Chapter Chapte r also claims that the notice “failed to provide a statement advising any person interested in the property that he or she may file a response to the petition , ” which is statutorily required (Prob. Code, § 851, subd. (c)(3)). (Underlining omitted.) First , Chapter makes that argument in a sing le, conclusory sentence without providing any legal analysis or citing any legal authority or support in the record. The argument is therefore forfeited. ( United Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC (2019) 36 Cal. App.5th 142, 153 ( United Grand ) .) Second, the argument fails because the record refutes it . The notice includes this statement : “ANY PERSON INTERESTED IN THE PROPERTY MAY FILE A RESPONSE TO THE PETITION.” Without citing any authority, Chapter also seems to argue that the notice of hearing was insufficient because it did not includ e th e total amount of damages sought by the Siblings and instead only notified her that the Siblings “were seeking a judgment
aga inst [ her ] for $709,094.74.” This argument too is forfeited because it is not supported by any legal analysis or authority. ( United Grand , supra , 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 153.) In any event , the argument fails on the merits

. T he notice provides: “Double d amages are sought against [Chapter] in the amount of $709,094.74.” That complies with the statutory requirement that the notice include any amount of double damages sought under Probate Code section 859

. The Siblings were not otherwise required to includ e in the notice the amount of any other monetary damages they sought to recover. (Prob. Code, § 851, subd. (c).)14

F. Claim and Issue Preclusion

— Chapter Chapter argues that the second amended petition is precluded in its entirety under the doctrines of claim preclusion and issue preclusion. The arguments are forfeited.

“ The preclusive effects of a prior judgment or similar adjudication

— traditionally known as res judicata

— are of two distinct kinds: ” (1) the narrow form of res judi cata known as claim preclusion and (2) collateral estoppel, also known as issue preclusion. ( Ferraro v. Camarlinghi (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 509, 530; Vandenberg v. Superior
Court (1999) 21 Cal.4th 815, 828.) “ Res judicata, or claim preclusion, prevents

re litigation of the same cause of action in a second suit between the same parties or parties in privity with them. ” ( Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 888, 896.) “ Claim preclusion arises if a second suit involves (1) the same cause of action (2) between the same parties (3) after a final judgment on the merits in the first suit. ” ( DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber (2015) 61 Cal.4th 813, 824.) Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, “ prohibits the relitigation of issues argued and decided in a p revious case, even if the second suit raises different causes of action. ” ( Ibid. ) I ssue preclusion

“ applies (1) after final adjudication (2) of an identical issue (3) actually litigated and necessarily decided in the first suit and (4) asserted against o ne who was a party in the first suit or one in privity with that party. ” ( Id. at p. 825.) We independently review whether claim preclusion or issue preclusion appl ies . ( Samar v. Matar (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 796, 803.)15

Chapter fails to identify with any specificity the causes of action or issues that she believes were previously litigated

. In her opening brief, Chapter identifies the causes of action in the first amended petition as: “Amended Petition to Determine Title to Real Proper ty; Impose Constructive Trust ; Cancel Instruments; Surcharge Co

- Trustee; Double Damages; Remove Co

- Trustee; and Suspend Co

- Trustee, And Determine Construction of Trust. (Probate Code §§ 850 and 17200.)” (Underlining omitted.) She identifies the

causes o f action in the second amended petition as: “Second Amended Petition to Determine Title to Real Property; Impose Constructive Trust; Cancel Instruments; Surcharge Co

- Trustee; Double Damages; Remove Co

- Trustee; and Suspend Co

- Trustee, Determine Constructio n of Trust; And Conversion. (Probate Code §§ 850 and 17200.)” (Underlining omitted.) Those are merely the titles from the caption pages of the respective pleadings , and they do not specify the claims brought against each party

. Chapter does not list th e specific claims brought in either pleading , nor does she identify the particular issues that she believes were necessarily litigated when the trial court granted partially summary adjudication on the first amended petition. Chapter’s comparison of the t itles from the caption pages of the pleadings shed s no light on whether the necessary elements for claim preclusion or issue preclusion are satisfied. 4

4 In her reply brief, Chapter does identify some specific issues or claims for damages that she alleges were decided in both the summary adjudication order and the default judgmen t. Because Chapter does not show good cause for having fail ed to raise those arguments in her opening brief, we decline to address them. ( Holmes v. Petrovich Development Co ., LLC (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1047 , 1064, fn. 2. ) In addition, in Part G, post , w e address Chapter’s argument concerning double recovery.16

Because Chapter has not adequately developed her arguments on claim preclusion and issue preclusion , we conclude that the arguments are forfeited.
G. Double Recovery

— Chapter Chapter argues that the default judgment against her is voidable because it permits the Siblings to recover doubly for the money taken from the trust’s accounts at Wells Fargo and Mission Oaks

. She contends that because the summary adjudication order surcharged Christopher for the money taken from those accounts , the Siblings cannot seek or recover damages against Chapter for the same money taken from the same
accounts

. The argument lacks merit. The rule against double recovery prevents an injured party from recovering twice for the same injury by providing that any “amount of the compensation paid to an injured victim by one joint tortfeasor is deducted from the award obtained from another. ” ( Ma y , supra , 228 Cal.App.3d at p. 410.) “ It is a just and well

- established doctrine that there shall be but one satisfaction accorded for the same wrong. If one be injured by a tortious act, he is entitled to compensation for the injury suffered, and, if se veral persons are guilty in common of the tort, the injured one has his right of action for damages against each and all of the joint tort

- feasors, and may at his election sue them individually or together. But when the injury arises from a single act, he cannot, by suing each wrongdoer alone, convert a joint into a several trespass, and thereby secure more than one compensation for the same injury. If he sue one alone, and is paid damages for the
wrong , his remedy is at an end, and he is barred from furt her recovery against the others. ”17

( Butler v. Ashworth (1895) 110 Cal. 614, 618

- 619 , italics added .) The rule against double recovery does not prevent an injured party from pursuing a claim of damages against a joint tortfeasor. ( Neubauer v. Goldfarb (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 47, 52 ( Neubauer ) .) Here, the Siblings obtained a damages award (which we affirmed) against Christopher for the money he took from the trust’s accounts at Wells Fargo and Mission
Oaks. The second amended petition added alle gations against Chapter based on her liability for converting some of the funds from th e same bank accounts. The Siblings were entitled to s eek a damage s award and obtain a judgment against Chapter as a joint tortfeasor for the same wrong. ( Neubauer , sup ra , 108 Cal.App.4th at p. 52

. ) The prohibition against double recovery prevents the Siblings from collecting the full judgment against both Chapter and Christopher for the same injury

. ( Ibid. ) But Chapter does not argue that Christopher in any way satis fied the order surcharging him for the
money taken from the bank accounts

. We conclude that t he judgment against Chapter for money taken from th e same bank accounts based on her liability as a joint tortfeasor did not violate the rule against double recovery. 5

5 Chapter also claims that the $1,063,800.42 judgment against her exceeds the damages alleged in the second amended petition

. Her claim is not supported by the record. The Siblings’ second amended petition alleged damages of $140,158.31 for converting funds from the trust’s account at Wells Fargo, $94,441.80 for converting funds from the trust’s account at Mission Oa ks , $120,105.57 for converting funds from the life insurance policy, and $709,094.74 in double damages. Those amounts add up to $1,063,800.42.18

H. Statute of Limitations

— Chapter In her opening brief, Chapter claims that the Siblings’ “pleadings for conversion
are barred [ by ] statute of limitat ions and is the same claim for the same issues pled under a different theory of law.” That conclusory assertion is not supported by any legal authority or analysis. We consequently consider the argument forfeited. ( United Grand , supra , 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 153.)
I. Right to Jury Trial

— Chapter Chapter argues that “[t]he void/voidable default Judgment entered by trial court would deny [her] rights to a trial by jury for the civil cause of action for conversion if the cause of action was allowable after final judgment.” The argument fails. There is no constitutional right to a jury trial in probate proceedings. ( Estate of Gardner (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 995, 999 ( Gardner ).) In addition, by statute there is no right to a jury trial in probate proceedings, subje ct to exceptions. (Prob. Code, § 825 ; Estate of Beach ( 1975) 15 Cal.3d 623, 642 ; Gardner , supra , at p. 999 .) There is no exception for petitions under Probate Code section 850. ( Ross & Cohen , Cal. Practice Guide: Probate (The Rutter Group 20 21 ) ¶ 15.618. ) But it is sometimes permissible to bring nonprobate civil claims, as to which jury trial rights might attach, in a probate case. (See Prob. Code , § 855 .) Jury trial rights are forfeited if they are not timely asserted. ( Estate of Bell (1943) 58 Cal.App.2d 333, 339. ) Chapter never requested a jury trial in the probate court. She consequently forfeited any jury trial rights that she may have had. ( Estate of Bell , supra , 5819

Cal.App.2d at p. 339. ) Indeed, Chapter did not appear (either personal ly or through counsel) at the hearing on the Siblings’ second amended petition, so it is not clear why she believes the court should have conducted a jury trial in her absence. For all of these reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not violate Chap ter’s right to a jury trial by entering the default judgment against her.
J. Sanction s Against Christopher and His Attorney The Siblings move for sanctions against Christopher and his attorney for pursuing

a frivolous appeal

. We grant the motion. California Rules of Court, rule 8.276(a), gives us the authority to “impose
sanctions ” “ on a party or an attorney for: [¶] (1) Taki ng a frivolous appeal or appealing solely to cause delay

. . . .” Code of Civil Procedure section 907 likewise provid es that “[w]hen it appears to the reviewing court that the appeal was frivolous or taken solely for delay, it may add to the costs on appe al such damages as may be just.” “[A]n appeal should be held to be frivolous only when it is prosecuted for an improper motive

— to harass the respondent or delay the effect of an adverse judgment

— or when it indisputably has no merit

— when any reasonable att orney would agree that the appeal is totally and completely without merit.” ( In re Marriage of Flaherty (1982) 31 Cal.3d 637, 650.)

“ The two standards are often used together, with one providing evidence of the other. Thus, the total lack of merit of an appeal is viewed as evidence that appellant must have intended it only for delay.” ( Id. at p. 649.)20

We conclude that sanctions are warranted here because any reasonable attorney would agree that Christopher’s appeal is totally and completely without meri t. Christopher appealed from a default judgment entered against Chapter , which any reasonable attorney would know did not aggrieve Christopher

. Christopher has failed to make any argument in his opening brief or his reply brief explaining how he has standing to appeal from the judgment entered against Chapter or how that judgment aggrieves him

. It is only in his opposition to the Siblings’ motion for sanctions that he claims that he was aggrieved. But he still fails to explain how the judgment against Chapter aggrieved him. In fact, a s we have explained, the default judgment against Chapter actually benefits Christopher by making Chapter jointly liable for some of the amounts previously surcharged against Christophe r in the summary adjudication ruling. Any reasonable attorney would agree that under these circumstances Christopher was not aggrieved by the default judgment entered against Chapter and therefore did not have standing to appeal

. We accordingly grant the motion for sanctions against Christopher and his attorney, Angela Swan . The trial court is directed on remand to calculate and to award to the Sibling s reasonable attorney fees incurred in responding to the appeal by Christopher and in seeking appellate sanctions against him and Ms. Swan . ( In re Marriage of Gong & Kwong (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 510, 521.) The sanctions award shall not include any attorney fees incurred in responding to (or moving to dismiss) Chapter’s appeal.21 DISPOSIT ION The default judgment against Chapter is affirmed. Christopher’s appeal is
dismissed. The Siblings shall recover their costs of appeal. As sanctions for pursuing a frivolous appeal, Christopher and his attorney, Angela Swan, shall pay to the Sibling s the reasonable attorney fees they incurred in responding to Christopher’s appeal and in seeking appellate sanctions, in an amount to be determined by the trial court on remand.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS MENETREZ J.

We concur: RAMIREZ P. J. MILLER J.