Filed 8/30/24 P. v. Yancy CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or 

ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for 

purposes of rule 8.1115. 

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JAMEL YANCY,

Defendant and Appellant.

 D081382

 (Super. Ct. No. SCE403243)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, 

John M. Thompson, Judge. Affirmed in part, reversed in part.

Denise M. Rudasill, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant 

Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Laura G. 

Baggett and Robin Urbanski, Deputy Attorneys General for Plaintiff and 

Respondent.

Jamel Yancy and another man entered the apartment of a woman 

Yancy knew and robbed her at gunpoint, taking an Xbox video-gaming 
2

system. Sometime after the robbery, Yancy was spotted by police while he 

was driving and officers initiated a traffic stop. Yancy, however, evaded the 

officers after leading them on a high-speed chase. When Yancy was 

eventually arrested, police discovered photographs and videos on his phone 

showing him in possession of various guns. Yancy was brought to trial, and a 

jury convicted him of robbery, evading law enforcement while driving 

recklessly, and 15 counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm. The jury 

acquitted Yancy of two additional counts of being a felon in possession of a 

firearm.

On appeal from the judgment of conviction, Yancy argues the trial 

court erred by (1) consolidating the robbery case with the separate felon in

possession case related to the images on his phone and (2) by admitting 

evidence concerning his involvement with a gang, child protective services, 

human trafficking, and illicit drug sales. In addition, he asserts insufficient 

evidence supports several of the felon in possession of a firearm convictions. 

As we shall explain, we reject the majority of Yancy’s appellate contentions, 

with the exception of his assertion that insufficient evidence supported one of 

the felon in possession of a firearm charges. Accordingly, that conviction, 

count 14, is reversed and the judgment is otherwise affirmed.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Prosecution Case

The victim of the robbery, P.R., testified that she met Yancy about a 

month before the robbery as she was walking near her home.1 She and 

Yancy hung out a couple of times and had a sexual relationship. On the 

1 P.R. was in custody when she testified at Yancy’s trial. The court 

informed the jury of this fact and instructed that it was not to consider or 

speculate about. In addition, she was compelled to testify, and did so 

pursuant to a grant of immunity by the court. 
3

night of the robbery, October 9, 2020, P.R. was on the phone with her 

boyfriend when she heard banging on her door. She went to see who it was 

and opened the door, but not the outer screen door. She heard Yancy, who 

was with codefendant Jeandor Dormevil, say “open up the door.” P.R. was 

surprised to see them. 

When P.R. opened the door, Yancy and Dormevil barged in, and Yancy 

began looking around the apartment. Yancy asked if anyone was there and 

appeared to be in a rush. Both men were armed with guns. Yancy looked in 

P.R.’s living room, bathroom, and bedroom. P.R. angrily asked Yancy what 

he was doing, and Yancy said that “if you’re not going to be my bitch, it’s 

going to be bad for you.” Yancy then grabbed P.R.’s Xbox and unhooked it 

from her television over P.R.’s demands not to touch her things. 

After the men left P.R.’s apartment with her Xbox, P.R. used her phone 

to film them driving away and called 911. She told the 911 operator the men 

were armed with guns and one had tried to hit her with his weapon. She also 

said she knew Yancy and the two men seemed like they were high on cocaine. 

Police arrived while P.R. was still on the phone with the 911 operator. 

A body-worn camera of one of the responding police officers recorded 

his interview of P.R. She told the officers that she knew Yancy, but at first 

downplayed their relationship. She then showed officers a video of Yancy on 

her phone suggesting she and Yancy had a sexual relationship and that she 

had known him for months. P.R. explained to the officers that she had let the 

two men into her apartment, that they were both armed, and that they had 

threatened her with their guns when she tried to stop them from taking her 

television by picking up a knife from her kitchen. 

After the police left, P.R. Facetimed Yancy and told him to return the 

Xbox. P.R. recorded the Facetime call, and in the video Yancy is seen with 
4

two firearms. At the time of trial, P.R. testified that she could not remember 

if the guns in the video were the same ones that Yancy and Dormevil used in 

the robbery. 

After the robbery, P.R. texted Yancy and asked him when he was going 

to return her Xbox. In the weeks after the robbery, P.R. continued to have 

contact with Yancy. She told the jury that she was talking to him because 

she wanted him to return the gaming system. At one point, P.R. offered 

Yancy $2,000 and marijuana in exchange for the Xbox. She also testified she 

had sex with Yancy after the robbery because she thought he was going to 

return the Xbox and she “felt ... some type of way about him.” Sometime 

thereafter, a woman that P.R. believed was Yancy’s sister, called P.R. and 

told her that if P.R. dropped the charges, the Xbox would be returned to her. 

P.R. told the woman she would drop the charges, but testified that she only 

made that statement to get her Xbox back. On November 24, 2020, after 

Yancy had been taken into police custody, three men P.R. did not know 

returned the Xbox to her. 

On October 29, 2020, a San Diego police officer was on patrol when he 

observed a black SUV driven by Yancy. The officer identified Yancy; the 

window of the SUV was down and the officer testified that Yancy stared 

directly at him with an “angry face.” The officer knew Yancy was wanted for 

a home-invasion robbery, so he made a U-turn to get behind Yancy to initiate 

a stop. Yancy pulled into a nearby parking lot, made eye contact with the 

officer through his rear view mirror, and began rummaging through his 

center console. 

The officer then turned on his lights and siren. Yancy slowed down, 

but then “aggressively” sped through the parking lot and back onto the street. 

Yancy then ran a red light, swerved, and fishtailed as he increased his speed 
5

to about 50 miles per hour in a 30 mile per hour zone, and drove through a 

four-way stop at more than 70 miles per hour. Law enforcement officers lost 

sight of him. 

Yancy was eventually arrested on November 17, 2020 when law 

enforcement officers were investigating illicit fentanyl activity at a home 

where Yancy’s girlfriend was living. At the time of his arrest, Yancy was 

holding a cellphone that he admitted was his. The phone contained 

numerous photographs and videos of guns and of Yancy holding guns. In 

addition, three guns were seized from the home where Yancy was arrested 

after officers served a search warrant there. Testing of the DNA collected 

from the three guns showed that Yancy handled the weapons. 

B. Defense Case

Dormevil testified in his own defense. On the stand he claimed that 

P.R. let him and Yancy inside of her apartment, they asked P.R. if they could 

borrow the Xbox, and she gave them permission to take it. Dormevil also 

testified that he and Yancy were unarmed and had no intention to rob P.R.

Yancy did not present any affirmative evidence in his defense. During 

closing argument, his trial counsel did not dispute the firearm charges that 

were proven by DNA evidence. His counsel, however, questioned the 

authenticity of the guns depicted in the photographs that supported some of 

the felon in possession charges. Yancy’s counsel also argued that P.R. was 

not a credible witness based on the inconsistencies in her testimony and her

statements to law enforcement. 

C. Verdict and Sentencing

Yancy and Dormevil were charged together in one information. Both 

were charged with home-invasion robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 212.5, 
6

subd. (a)2; count 1) and first-degree burglary (§§ 459, 460; count 2). As to 

each of those offenses, the information also alleged both men personally used 

a firearm (§§ 12022.53, subd. (b); 12022.5, subd. (a)). Yancy was also charged 

with three counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm (§ 29800, 

subd. (a)(1); counts 3–5) and evading an officer while driving recklessly (Veh. 

Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a); count 6). 

The district attorney filed an amended consolidated information before 

trial containing the same charges as the original information, and adding 15 

additional counts against Yancy for felon in possession of a firearm (§ 29800, 

subd. (a)(1); counts 5-21). The amended consolidated information also 

included counts against Yancy for animal cruelty and animal abuse and 

neglect; the trial court denied the prosecution’s motion to try these two 

charges with the others.3

At the conclusion of trial, the jury found Yancy not guilty of residential 

burglary as alleged in count 2 and being a felon in possession of a firearm as 

alleged in counts 5 and 9, but otherwise convicted him as charged.4

Thereafter, the trial court sentenced Yancy to 14 years and four months in 

state prison. 

Yancy filed a timely notice of appeal from the judgment. 

2 Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 

3 The amended consolidated information also charged Dormevil with 

three additional charges of unlawful weapon and ammunitions possession

(§§ 30305, subd. (a)(1), 29800, subd. (a); counts 22–24). 

4 Dormevil was tried jointly with Yancy. The jury found Dormevil not 

guilty of robbery and burglary, but guilty of the firearms and ammunition 

charges. 
7

DISCUSSION

I

Yancy first asserts that the court committed prejudicial error by joining 

the robbery and burglary charges with the charges for felon in possession of a 

firearm. The Attorney General responds that there was no error because the 

crimes at issue “were of the same class, and the potential prejudice from 

consolidation was substantially outweighed by the practical benefits.” 

A

Additional Background

In his trial brief, the prosecutor requested to consolidate the 

defendants’ robbery and burglary case, which also included three charges for 

felon in possession against Yancy and the charge for evading arrest (Case No. 

SCE403243/MBV510), with two additional cases. The second case charged 

Yancy with 15 additional counts of felon in possession of a firearm, animal 

abuse and animal cruelty (Case No. SCE404491/MBV593), and the third

charged Dormevil with two additional counts of felon in possession of a 

firearm and one count of unlawful possession of ammunition (Case No. 

SCE406974/MBW850). Dormevil’s counsel filed a written opposition 

requesting the cases be severed, and the trial court presumed that Yancy

joined that motion. 

At the hearing on the consolidation request, the prosecutor argued that 

evidence would be cross-admissible between the robbery/burglary and felon in

possession cases because evidence seized from Yancy’s phone was important

in both cases. Additionally, the prosecutor anticipated that the defendants 

would argue in the robbery case that there was no proof the firearms used 

were real. Thus, he contended, the photo and video evidence from the cell 

phone depicting Yancy with firearms clearly loaded with ammunition was 
8

relevant to prove that he used a real weapon in the robbery. The prosecutor 

further asserted the crimes alleged in both cases were of the same class, and 

there was nothing unduly prejudicial about either case warranting severance. 

Dormevil’s counsel argued the crime of being a felon in possession of a 

firearm was not in the same class of assaultive crimes as robbery and 

residential burglary, and that evidence of the robbery and residential 

burglary would not be admissible in a separate trial on the felon in

possession charges. Yancy’s counsel asserted that prejudice would result 

from consolidation, particularly in light of P.R.’s inconsistent statements 

about the robbery. Yancy’s counsel also argued the prosecution should not be 

permitted to bolster its weak robbery evidence with the relatively stronger 

case that he unlawfully possessed firearms. 

In response to the defense arguments, the prosecutor reiterated that 

the charges were all of the same class. He also explained that all of the 

charges arose out of the same investigation, but they were not filed in a 

single complaint due to a “procedural hiccup” caused by the pandemic. In 

terms of the probative value and cross-admissibility of the evidence, the 

prosecutor stated that the defendants’ relationship to each other was a 

critical part of the theory of the case. He stated that the evidence from 

Yancy’s cell phone suggested they were involved in trafficking weapons 

together and suggested that they were robbing P.R. “because she’s selling 

drugs for them and she didn’t cover whatever she owed, or she’s not working 

the blade as a human trafficking victim, or she’s taking something and 

they’re holding the Xbox hostage.” 

The court granted the prosecutor’s motion to consolidate the weapons 

cases with the robbery/burglary case. The court found all of the crimes were 

within the same class of crimes, and that the evidence could be presented in a 
9

manner that was not unduly prejudicial to the defendants. The court noted it 

was “hopeful that [the parties could] tailor presentation of evidence as to the 

felon in possession counts in such a way that the jury will be simply called 

upon to determine whether or not these are, in fact, real guns.” 

B

Legal Standards

“ ‘The law prefers consolidation of charges.’ ” (People v. Manriquez

(2005) 37 Cal.4th 547, 574.) “[J]oint trial has long been prescribed—and 

broadly allowed—by the Legislature’s enactment of section 954. The purpose 

underlying this statute is clear: joint trial ‘ordinarily avoids the increased 

expenditure of funds and judicial resources which may result if the charges 

were to be tried in two or more separate trials.’ [Citation.] ‘A unitary trial 

requires a single courtroom, judge, and court attach[és]. Only one group of 

jurors need serve, and the expenditure of time for jury voir dire and trial is 

greatly reduced over that required were the cases separately tried. In 

addition, the public is served by the reduced delay on disposition of criminal 

charges both in trial and through the appellate process.’ ” (People v. Soper

(2009) 45 Cal.4th 759, 771–772 (Soper).)

Charges may be consolidated under two circumstances: (1) when they 

are connected together in their commission; or (2) when they are of the same 

class of crimes. (§ 954.) Offenses are of the same class of crimes or offenses if 

they “possess common characteristics or attributes.” (People v. Moore (1986) 

185 Cal.App.3d 1005, 1012.) Offenses are connected in their commission if 

there is a common element of substantial importance in their commission, 

including the intent or motivation with which different acts are committed. 

(Alcala v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1205, 1219.) Whether the charges 
10

are properly consolidated under section 954 is a question of law subject to 

independent review on appeal. (People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 188.) 

If the charges are properly joined, “[t]o demonstrate that a denial of 

severance was reversible error, defendant must ‘ “clearly establish that there 

[was] a substantial danger of prejudice requiring that the charges be 

separately tried.” ’ [Citations.] [¶] Refusal to sever charges on a defendant’s 

motion may be an abuse of discretion where: ‘ “(1) evidence on the crimes to 

be jointly tried would not be cross-admissible in separate trials; (2) certain of 

the charges are unusually likely to inflame the jury against the defendant; 

(3) a ‘weak’ case has been joined with a ‘strong’ case, or with another ‘weak’

case, so that the ‘spillover’ effect of aggregate evidence on several charges 

might well alter the outcome of some or all of the charges; and (4) any one of 

the charges carries the death penalty.” ’ ” (People v. Smith (2007) 40 Cal.4th 

483, 510–511.)

“Unlike what occurs in situations involving the admissibility of 

uncharged misconduct—in which the People bear the burden of establishing 

that the evidence has substantial probative value that clearly outweighs its 

inherent prejudicial effect—[] in the context of properly joined offenses, ‘[t]he 

burden is reversed.’ [Citations.] In the latter setting, ‘[t]he ... burden is on 

the party seeking severance to clearly establish that there is a substantial 

danger of prejudice requiring that the charges be separately tried. 

[Citations.] When the offenses are [properly] joined for trial the defendant’s 

guilt of all the offenses is at issue and the problem of confusing the jury with 

collateral matters does not arise. ... That the evidence would otherwise be 

inadmissible [under Evidence Code section 352] may be considered as a factor 

suggesting possible prejudice, but countervailing considerations [of efficiency 

and judicial economy] that are not present when evidence of uncharged 
11

offenses is offered must be weighed in ruling on a ... motion [to sever properly 

joined charges]. The burden is on the defendant therefore to persuade the 

court that these countervailing considerations are outweighed by a 

substantial danger of undue prejudice.’ ” (Soper, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 773, 

italics omitted.)

Additionally, section 954.1 “provides that when, as here, properly 

joined charges are of the same class, the circumstance that evidence 

underlying those charges would not be cross-admissible at hypothetical 

separate trials is, standing alone, insufficient to establish that a trial court 

abused its discretion in failing to sever those charges. Accordingly, the 

assumed absence of cross-admissibility ... in the present case is simply one 

factor to be weighed against the benefits of joinder.” (Soper, supra, 45

Cal.4th at pp. 779–780.) 

“A trial court’s denial of a motion to sever properly joined charged 

offenses amounts to a prejudicial abuse of discretion only if that ruling 

‘ “ ‘ “ ‘falls outside the bounds of reason.’ ” ’ ” ’ ” (Soper, supra, 45 Cal.4th at 

p. 774.)

C

Analysis

Yancy agrees the charges at issue against him were of the same class 

and thus properly joined under section 954. He argues, however, that the 

court abused its discretion by consolidating the 15 additional firearm charges 

with the initial charges brought against him. Specifically, he contends that 

evidence from the second case would not be admissible in the trial of the first 

case, except with respect to that case’s felon in possession of a firearm charge, 
12

because it would be excluded as improper propensity evidence under 

Evidence Code section 1101.5

Yancy also argues that the evidence concerning the later weapons 

charges would have been excluded in a separate trial of the robbery charges 

because there would be “a ‘substantial likelihood the jury’ ... would use the 

evidence from the possession of so many guns for the ‘illegitimate purpose’ of 

finding [him] guilty of the robbery.” Yancy asserts the charges contained in 

the second-filed case were particularly inflammatory because of the large 

number of charges. Finally, he contends the two cases alone were both 

relatively weak, and thus joining them together likely altered the outcome to 

his detriment in both cases. We reject these arguments and agree with the 

Attorney General that Yancy has not shown the trial court abused its 

discretion by finding the significant benefits of trying the cases together 

outweighed the potential prejudice of one proceeding. 

“When a trial court considering a defendant’s motion for severance of 

unrelated counts has determined that the evidence of the joined offenses is 

not ‘cross-admissible,’ it must then assess the relative strength of the 

evidence as to each group of severable counts and weigh the potential impact 

5 Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (a) requires the exclusion of 

evidence of a “person’s character or a trait of his or her character (whether in 

the form of an opinion, evidence of reputation, or evidence of specific 

instances of his or her conduct) ... to prove his or her conduct on a specified 

occasion.” Subdivision (b), however, permits “the admission of evidence that 

a person committed a crime, civil wrong, or other act when relevant to prove 

some fact (such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 

identity, absence of mistake or accident ... ) other than his or her disposition 

to commit such an act.” Evidence of an uncharged crime, therefore, is 

admissible as long as it is relevant to prove a fact such as motive, 

opportunity, intent, plan, or knowledge. (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (b); People 

v. Davis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 539, 602.)
13

of the jury’s consideration of ‘other crimes’ evidence. I.e., the court must 

assess the likelihood that a jury not otherwise convinced beyond a reasonable 

doubt of the defendant’s guilt of one or more of the charged offenses might 

permit the knowledge of the defendant’s other criminal activity to tip the 

balance and convict him. [Citation.] If the court finds a likelihood that this 

may occur, severance should be granted.” (People v. Bean (1988) 46 Cal.3d 

919, 936.) 

In this case, with respect to the cross-admissibility of the evidence, it is 

true the evidence relating to Yancy’s possession of 18 guns at various times 

was probative of his character to own weapons generally, and thus 

potentially prejudicial. However, the evidence was not so inflammatory that 

it prevented the jury from assessing Yancy’s guilt on the robbery charge. 

Specifically, the possession evidence consisted of photos and videos from 

Yancy’s phone showing various weapons and their sale prices, as well as the 

DNA linking Yancy to the three weapons found at the house that was 

searched after his arrest. This evidence was simple and distinct from the 

evidence supporting the armed robbery conviction (and a relatively small part 

of the trial evidence), neutralizing any prejudicial effect. (See Soper, supra, 

45 Cal.4th at p. 784 [“Appellate courts have found ‘ “no prejudicial effect from 

joinder when the evidence of each crime is simple and distinct, even though 

such evidence might not have been admissible in separate trials.” ’ ”].)

With respect to the other factors—whether certain charges were 

unusually likely to inflame the jury and whether two weak cases were joined, 

or one weak case joined with a much stronger one—we also do not agree with 

Yancy that they show the court’s decision to try the two cases together was 

an abuse of discretion. As the Attorney General points out, neither set of 

charges was particularly more inflammatory than the other. P.R. testified 
14

that Yancy was armed when he entered her home and he used the gun to 

threaten her after she tried to get Yancy and Dormevil to leave her 

apartment. The fact that Yancy faced separate charges for firearm 

possession was consistent with his use of a firearm in the robbery. Neither 

case was more likely to inflame the jury than the other. 

Likewise, the evidence supporting each case was not comparatively 

weak in relation to the other. The robbery was supported by P.R.’s direct 

accounts of the events at trial, and her statements to police and the 911 

dispatch operator. Although those statements contained some 

inconsistencies about her relationship with Yancy, P.R. was consistent in her 

account of the robbery. Further, the defense effectively pointed out the 

problems with P.R.’s consistency and credibility. The felon in possession of 

firearm charges also faced weakness since not all of the photographic 

evidence showed Yancy with the firearms. Neither case was so 

overwhelmingly strong that it could influence the jury’s perception of the 

other.6 

On the other side of the balancing test, the benefits of joining the cases 

were significant. Instead of separate trials, Yancy’s case required a single 

courtroom, judge, jury panel, and appeal. These benefits outweigh any 

potential prejudice that resulted from trying the cases together. (See Soper, 

supra, 45 Cal.4th at pp. 771–772.) Accordingly, we reject Yancy’s assertion 

that the court abused its discretion by allowing a joint trial of the charges 

against him. 

Although we find the trial court’s decision to allow a joint trial was 

proper at the time it was made, “[b]ecause the issue is raised on appeal 

6 The fourth factor, whether one of the charges is a capital offense, is not 

relevant here.
15

following trial” and Yancy asserts he was denied a fair trial by the denial of 

his severance motion “we must also consider whether ‘despite the correctness 

of the trial court’s ruling, a gross unfairness has occurred from joinder such 

as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial or due process of law.’ ” (People v. 

Sandoval (1992) 4 Cal.4th 155, 174.) In this regard, Yancy has not 

demonstrated any actual prejudice from any “spillover” effect of the joinder of 

the charges for trial. (People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1315

(Bradford).) 

As noted, the evidence regarding the robbery was distinct from that 

regarding the 15 additional charges of felon in possession of a firearm. In 

addition, the court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 3515 that “[e]ach 

of the counts charged in this case is a separate crime. You must consider 

each count separately and return a separate verdict for each count.” Further, 

the jury’s acquittal on the burglary charge and two of the firearm offenses 

shows it independently evaluated the evidence on each count and was not 

unduly inflamed. Yancy has not demonstrated that prejudice actually 

resulted from joinder of the charges at trial. (Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th at

p. 1318.) Thus, we conclude that Yancy has not met the “high burden of 

establishing that the trial was grossly unfair and that he was denied due 

process of law.” (Soper, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 783.)

II

Yancy next contends that the trial court abused its discretion by 

allowing witness testimony that he “was selling drugs, was a gang member, 

was pimping women out, and had his child taken by [Child Protective 

Services] for endangerment.” He argues the evidence was highly 

inflammatory and more prejudicial than probative, and thus should have 

been excluded under Evidence Code sections 352 and 1101. The Attorney 
16

General responds that all of the evidence that Yancy identifies was properly 

admitted, that Yancy forfeited his challenge to some of the evidence by failing 

to object at trial, and that even if the evidence was improperly admitted, any 

error was harmless.

A

Legal Standards

“No evidence is admissible except relevant evidence.” (Evid. Code, 

§ 350.) “ ‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence, ... having any tendency in 

reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the 

determination of the action.” (Id., § 210.) Evidence Code section 1101 

provides: “(a) Except as provided in this section and in Sections 1102, 1103, 

1108, and 1109, evidence of a person’s character or a trait of his or her 

character ... is inadmissible when offered to prove his or her conduct on a 

specified occasion. [¶] (b) Nothing in this section prohibits the admission of 

evidence that a person committed a crime, civil wrong, or other act when 

relevant to prove some fact (such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, 

plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident ...) other than his or 

her disposition to commit such an act. [¶] (c) Nothing in this section affects 

the admissibility of evidence offered to support or attack the credibility of a 

witness.”

Under Evidence Code section 352, a trial court “may exclude evidence if 

its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its 

admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create 

substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of 

misleading the jury.” Reviewing courts will not disturb a trial court’s 

admission of evidence “ ‘over an Evidence Code section 352 objection ... unless 
17

the trial court’s decision exceeds the bounds of reason.’ ” (People v. Montes 

(2014) 58 Cal.4th 809, 859 (Montes).)

B

Gang Evidence

Yancy argues that certain statements made by P.R. and the 

prosecution’s gang expert, San Diego Sheriff’s Department Detective Troy

Conrad, about Yancy’s gang affiliation were improperly admitted. 

Specifically, he challenges: (1) Conrad’s testimony that Yancy was a member 

of the Emerald Hills street gang and was known by the moniker “Baby Joe 

90Z”; (2) Conrad’s statement about, and images from, Yancy’s phone showing 

his gang moniker; (3) Conrad’s explanation of the meaning of gang lingo 

Yancy used in several jail calls to Dormevil; (4) Conrad’s statement that no 

gang offense was alleged against Yancy in this case; and (4) P.R.’s statement 

to the officers responding to her 911 call, introduced through an officer’s 

body-worn camera footage, that Yancy was a “gang banger.”

1. Additional Background

During a pretrial conference, in which the parties were discussing the 

admissibility of phone calls between Yancy, who was in jail at the time, and 

Dormevil, Dormevil’s counsel noted that he anticipated the prosecutor would 

call a gang expert to explain the slang words used in the calls. Dormevil’s 

counsel objected that no one should explain what the defendants were saying; 

rather, the calls should stand for themselves. The prosecutor responded that 

he did plan to call a gang expert to interpret the words used on the jail calls 

because it was necessary for the jury’s understanding of those conversations, 

but the prosecutor assured the court that it was not his intention to “parade” 

gang evidence in front of the jury. The parties then agreed to conduct an 
18

Evidence Code section 402 hearing on the gang expert’s experience and 

qualifications to explain the language used in the jail calls. 

The parties also discussed the fact that P.R. would likely testify that 

she knew Yancy was a gang member and that she had seen his gang tattoos, 

which are visible in the pictures of Yancy from his social media account, and 

that this information formed part of the basis for her identification of Yancy 

as one of the two men who robbed her. Yancy’s counsel wanted to ensure that 

the testimony was limited, and alternatively offered to stipulate to the fact 

that Yancy was a gang member. At that juncture, the court stated that it did 

not think a stipulation was necessary, and that it might “cause greater harm 

than it would be intended to achieve.” The court ruled that the evidence 

could “come in for a very limited purpose” of explaining to the jury the 

meaning of the jail calls and the tattoos in the photos. 

Following the Evidence Code section 402 hearing at which Conrad 

testified, defense counsel stated, “I just want to be sure that, based on the 

filings of the People that I understand those purposes, which are to explain 

the jail calls and that he identified himself as Emerald Hills to [P.R.]. And 

outside that, there’s not going to be a discussion of any gang stuff.” The 

prosecutor clarified that he would also use the detective for “laying the 

foundation for all [of Yancy’s] social media,” including that he labeled himself 

by his gang moniker on social media posts and the victim used his gang 

moniker as his contact information in her phone, as well as to explain his 

gang tattoos. 

The prosecutor argued that some basic explanation was necessary to 

provide the jury with context for things discussed between the victim and the 

responding officers, which the jury would see and hear through body-worn 

camera footage. Defense counsel responded that the way Yancy was labeled 
19

in P.R.’s phone and whether that label was a gang moniker was irrelevant 

and unduly prejudicial. The court ultimately ruled that it would allow the 

expert testimony about Yancy’s gang moniker. 

At trial, Conrad testified that P.R. knew Yancy was affiliated with the 

Emerald Hills criminal street gang, and that Yancy was known by the gang 

moniker “Baby Joe 90Z.” Conrad also testified that some of the photos on 

Yancy’s social media postings contained that moniker. Conrad explained the 

meaning of words used during the jail calls between Yancy and Dormevil, 

including that “blood” referred to a blood set of the Emerald Hills gang, 

explained that members of a blood set gang would typically replace the letter 

“c” at the start of words with the letter “b,” and explained some of the other 

slang words used in the calls. Conrad also stated during cross-examination 

that no gang offense was alleged in the case. Finally, the jury was shown 

video recorded on an officer’s body-worn camera of P.R. stating that Yancy 

was a “gang banger” with the Emerald Hills gang. 

2. Analysis

As an initial matter, Yancy’s trial counsel agreed that Conrad’s 

testimony explaining the jail calls and P.R.’s identification of Yancy as an 

Emerald Hills gang member on the body-worn camera footage was relevant 

and admissible. Accordingly, Yancy’s challenge to this evidence as 

improperly admitted under Evidence Code section 352 is forfeited. (See Evid. 

Code, § 353; People v. Clark (1992) 3 Cal.4th 41, 125‒126 [“In the absence of a 

timely and specific objection on the ground sought to be urged on appeal, the 

trial court’s rulings on admissibility of evidence will not be reviewed.”].) 

Thus, the only portion of Yancy’s claim that is reviewable is his challenge to 

Conrad’s testimony explaining Yancy’s gang moniker and its presence on his 

social media posts. 
20

But even if Yancy had preserved the entirety of his claim, it 

nevertheless fails because the trial court’s admissibility rulings were not an 

abuse of discretion. First, any prejudice stemming from the minimal gang 

evidence was not so substantial as to outweigh its probative value. The 

testimony was relevant because it explained the photographic and video 

evidence that supported the charges for felon in possession of a firearm, 

specifically the images showing Yancy holding the guns that formed the basis 

for those charges, and the testimony explained the incriminating jail phone 

calls between Yancy and Dormevil about the Xbox. The testimony also 

helped explain P.R.’s inconsistent testimony, which the prosecution asserted

was colored by her fear of gang retaliation. 

Moreover, and as Yancy’s trial counsel agreed, the minimal testimony 

was admissible because it was part and parcel of P.R.’s identification of 

Yancy as the person who robbed her. In addition, and importantly, Conrad’s 

testimony on the subject of Yancy’s gang affiliation was relatively brief and 

did not suggest the crimes in the case were gang related. Under the 

circumstances, the trial court did not exceed the bounds of reason or 

otherwise abuse its discretion in admitting the minimal gang evidence Yancy 

now challenges.7

7 Yancy contends that his case is similar to People v. Avitia (2005) 127 

Cal.App.4th 185 (Avitia), which reversed a conviction for grossly negligent 

discharge of a firearm based on the admission of evidence suggesting the 

defendant was a gang member. Unlike Avitia, in which the prosecution’s

case was far weaker without the evidence of the defendant’s gang 

involvement that carried no probative value, the case against Yancy was not 

notably strengthened by the fact that he was a gang member. (Id. at pp. 193‒

195.) Further, the challenged evidence was relevant to the prosecution’s 

case. For these reasons, we do not agree with Yancy that Avitia supports 

reversal of his convictions.
21

However, even if the evidence was improperly admitted, we agree with 

the Attorney General that it was not prejudicial. “The erroneous admission 

of gang or other evidence requires reversal only if it is reasonably probable 

that appellant would have obtained a more favorable result had the evidence 

been excluded.” (Avitia, supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at p. 194.) Here, the 

evidence connecting Yancy to the crimes at issue was overwhelming. P.R. did 

not waiver in her identification of Yancy as one of the men who robbed her. 

In addition, the photographic and video evidence taken from Yancy’s phone 

and the DNA found on the confiscated firearms was not called into question 

by any defense evidence. Even if Yancy’s gang affiliation had been obscured, 

it is not reasonably probably that he would have obtained a more favorable 

result. Accordingly, any error with respect to the gang evidence was 

harmless.

C

Child Protective Services Evidence

Yancy next contends that the court erred by admitting statements 

between Yancy and his child’s mother, R.R., concerning Child Protective 

Services (CPS). During a motion in limine conference, Yancy’s counsel 

objected to admitting portions of a jail call made by Yancy to Dormevil in 

which Yancy mentioned R.R. was trying to get their child out of protective 

custody. Yancy’s counsel argued the statements were irrelevant and highly 

prejudicial. The prosecutor stated that the information was relevant to give 

context to Yancy’s arrest, explaining that the arrest occurred after a traffic 

stop the day before, unrelated to Yancy, led the police to the home where he

was arrested. According to the prosecutor, when officers arrived at the home, 

they believed there was a child inside, causing them to conduct a protective 
22

search of the home that revealed some of the firearms giving rise to charges 

in the instant case. 

The court questioned the relevance of the statements about CPS, since 

the defense raised no issue as to why there had been a search of the home. 

The prosecutor responded that might be the case if the defense were willing 

to stipulate to the lawfulness of the search, and asserted there was nothing 

unduly prejudicial about the evidence. Yancy’s counsel argued the statement 

was highly inflammatory since Yancy was not charged with child 

endangerment, and stated he would stipulate to the fact that the home was

searched. The court initially ruled that the transcripts of the jail calls should 

be redacted to remove reference to CPS and child endangerment because they 

were prejudicial and not probative, and instructed Yancy’s counsel to identify 

statements in the transcript that required redaction. 

The next day, however, the court reconsidered and denied Yancy’s

request to redact the jail calls. The following day, Yancy’s counsel asked for 

clarification as to the ruling. Defense counsel noted that the court had 

initially ruled in her favor and agreed that the jail calls should be redacted. 

The court responded that it was denying the request to redact the jail call, 

and that it found the statements were relevant because Yancy and R.R. were 

discussing what to do with the stolen Xbox, which had not been collected 

during the search of the home. 

At trial, the jury was played a jail call between Yancy and Dormevil. In 

that call, Yancy stated that CPS took his child when law enforcement served 

a search warrant at a home based on events that had nothing to do with him. 

He stated that “they” were trying to figure out who was going to get the child 

out of CPS custody, and that law enforcement was trying to use the CPS 

proceeding as a means to increase his bail. 
23

The jury was also played a recording of a call between Yancy and R.R. 

During that call, Yancy and R.R. discuss child custody issues and Yancy’s 

stress over removal of the child from R.R. They also discuss the return of the 

Xbox to P.R. Specifically, R.R. mentions the idea of contacting P.R, but 

decides they would be accused of intimidating P.R. and that a third party, 

possibly R.R.’s son, should check in on P.R. instead. In a third jail call 

recording played for the jury between Yancy, R.R and another man, R.R. 

discusses missing her child, states that CPS was being “super strict” and that 

they thought she was a “brandishing kingpin operating [a] drug house,” and 

that her child had been drug tested. In the call, Yancy and R.R. also briefly

discuss returning the Xbox to P.R. 

We agree with the Attorney General that the content of these three

calls was probative to show Yancy’s consciousness of guilt because he was 

attempting to orchestrate a way to return P.R.’s Xbox. The statements 

suggest Yancy thought he could avoid criminal liability by returning the 

stolen item. The conversations also suggest that because R.R. was being 

closely monitored by CPS, she and Yancy orchestrated a plan to have her 

sons return the Xbox, which was consistent with P.R.’s testimony that three 

men eventually returned it to her. 

On the other side of the balancing test, the evidence was not so 

prejudicial that the trial court’s decision to allow it constituted an abuse of 

discretion. The fact that Yancy had a child, who was living where weapons 

and drugs were found, leading to removal and involvement by child protective 

services—a logical outcome of the events leading to Yancy’s arrest—is not so 

inflammatory that allowing the evidence exceeded the bounds of reason. (See 

Montes, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 859.)
24

Further, as with the gang evidence, the limited evidence admitted in 

the trial concerning CPS involvement with Yancy’s child was not highly 

prejudicial. As discussed, the evidence connecting Yancy to the crimes with 

which he was charged was overwhelming. Even if the statements concerning 

CPS had been excluded from the trial, it is not reasonably probable that 

Yancy would have obtained a more favorable result. Accordingly, any error 

with respect to this evidence was harmless. (See Avitia, supra, 127 

Cal.App.4th at p. 194)

D

Human Trafficking Evidence

1. Additional Background

The next category of evidence Yancy challenges are statements by P.R. 

and Detective Conrad suggesting that Yancy was a pimp. Specifically, during 

her direct examination, the prosecutor asked P.R. if she knew if Yancy “was 

pimping girls out?” P.R. responded that she did not know, Yancy’s counsel 

objected to the question as leading, and the court overruled the objection. At 

a subsequent break outside the jury’s presence, Yancy’s counsel elaborated on 

her objection, asserting the question also assumed facts not in evidence. The 

court responded that its ruling allowing the question would stand. 

After questioning of P.R. resumed, the prosecutor asked P.R. if she was 

working for Yancy; P.R. responded she was not. Yancy’s counsel did not 

object and the court immediately recessed for its lunch break. Once the jury 

exited the courtroom, defense counsel complained that the question also 

assumed facts not in evidence. The prosecutor responded that he would be 

presenting additional evidence that suggested P.R. was working as a 

prostitute for Yancy in the form of text messages between them and also 

P.R.’s statements to a detective that investigated the robbery. The court 
25

overruled the objection. Then, during cross-examination, P.R. testified she 

never prostituted, sold drugs, or sold guns for Yancy. She also clarified that 

she thought he was a pimp, but she was not sure. 

During his direct examination, Conrad testified P.R. told him that 

during the robbery, Yancy said, “If you’re not going to be my bitch, it’s going 

to be bad for you.” Conrad told the jury this statement was consistent with 

human trafficking behavior. Conrad further testified that P.R. denied being 

pimped, but told him she believed Yancy was “pimping out” other women. In 

addition, while explaining the slang language used in text messages and 

images between Dormevil and Yancy in which they were communicating 

about drug and gun sales, Conrad explained that some of the texts suggested 

that the men were also engaging in human trafficking behavior. 

During his closing argument, the prosecutor argued that the evidence 

suggesting Yancy was engaging in human trafficking activity, including 

trafficking, or attempting to traffic P.R., explained the inconsistencies in 

P.R.’s statements to police and during trial, and also explained Yancy’s 

motive to take her Xbox. The prosecutor asserted that Yancy and Dormevil’s 

robbery was an exertion of power over her, not because they needed the Xbox, 

but because they wanted to control her. 

2. Analysis

As an initial matter, as the Attorney General contends, Yancy’s 

challenge to this evidence on appeal as improperly admitted under Evidence 

Code section 352 is forfeited by his counsel’s failure to object on this basis 

during trial. (See People v. Pearson (2013) 56 Cal.4th 393, 416 [“failure to 
26

make a timely and specific objection on the ground [raised on appeal] forfeits 

the claim on appeal”].) 

However, even if we reach the merits of the arguments, we agree with 

the Attorney General that this limited evidence about Yancy engaging in 

pimping activity was relevant to the prosecution’s case and not unduly 

prejudicial. It provided context to the communications that evidenced both

the robbery and Yancy’s possession of various firearms, and explained the 

motive for the robbery. On the other side of the Evidence Code section 352 

analysis, while the evidence was prejudicial—certainly the jury would be 

more inclined to think a pimp could commit robbery—given its relevance to 

the case, it was not so inflammatory that the trial court’s decision to allow it 

exceeded the bounds of reason. 

Further, like Yancy’s other evidentiary challenges on appeal, even if 

the decision to allow the human trafficking evidence was error, the error was 

harmless. As stated, the evidence against him with respect to each charge 

was strong. Had P.R.’s statements indicating she thought Yancy was a pimp 

been excluded, it is not reasonably probable the jury would have reached a 

more favorable result on any of the charges levied against Yancy. 

E

Drug Sales Evidence

Yancy also argues that the court’s admission of evidence showing his 

involvement in drug sales was unduly prejudicial under Evidence Code 

section 352 and, thus, improperly admitted. Specifically, Yancy asserts the 

court improperly admitted: (1) a video of someone holding nuggets of 

marijuana that was taken from Dormevil’s cell phone; (2) a video taken from 

Dormevil’s phone showing 3.114 grams of cocaine on a scale, with plastic bags 

and other indicia of illegal narcotics also taken from Dormevil’s phone; and 
27

(3) various text messages and photos between Dormevil and Yancy 

suggesting drug sales and drug use. 

Before trial, Dormevil’s counsel moved in limine to exclude any drug 

sale evidence as irrelevant and substantially more prejudicial than probative. 

In response, the prosecutor asserted the evidence was relevant to show the 

general criminal enterprise Yancy and Dormevil were engaged in at the time,

and also argued that P.R. may have stolen drugs from the defendants and 

that the Xbox was taken in retribution. The trial court ruled the evidence 

was admissible, explaining that “the People are allowed to present the larger 

picture to support their theory as to what was taking place between the 

alleged victim and these two gentlemen.” At the conclusion of the discussion, 

the court stated that for purposes of appellate review, despite Yancy’s 

counsel’s silence, the court was joining Yancy in all objections to evidence 

that concerned him. 

We agree with the Attorney General that the trial court did not err in 

admitting this evidence. As both the prosecutor and the court observed, the 

evidence was relevant to show that Yancy and Dormevil were involved in a 

criminal enterprise at the time of the robbery. Further, even if the evidence 

was improperly admitted, the majority concerned Dormevil, not Yancy, 

making it unlikely the jury drew adverse inferences about Yancy with respect 

to the evidence. Finally, the evidence at issue was minimal, especially in 

relation to the significant evidence presented concerning the charges against 

Yancy. It is not reasonably probable that the jury would have reached a more 
28

favorable conclusion absent the evidence connecting him to drug sales.8

(People v. McNeal (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1183, 1203; People v. Watson (1956) 46 

Cal.2d 818, 836.)

III

Sufficiency of the Evidence Supporting the Felon in Possession Convictions

Yancy’s final contention on appeal is that there was not sufficient 

evidence to convict him of several of the felon in possession of a firearm 

charges (counts 6 through 8 and 10 through 21) and that the trial court 

improperly denied his motion under section 1181.1 for acquittal of the 

charges. He argues that evidence of the same guns was improperly used to 

support multiple convictions, and also contends the convictions must be 

reversed because there was no proof the guns at issue were real. The 

Attorney General responds that the photographs and videos entered into 

evidence establish that Yancy was liable for 15 counts of violating section 

29800, and expert testimony and other evidence sufficiently established that 

the firearms were real. We agree with Yancy that insufficient evidence 

supports one of the convictions (count 14) because the same weapon was 

improperly used by the prosecution to support two separate charges. We 

8 We also reject Yancy’s assertion that even if the evidentiary errors he 

asserts alone do no warrant reversal, their cumulative effect does. “Under 

the cumulative error doctrine, the reviewing court must ‘review each 

allegation and assess the cumulative effect of any errors to see if it is 

reasonably probable the jury would have reached a result more favorable to 

defendant in their absence.’ ” (People v. Williams (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 

587, 646.) “The ‘litmus test’ for cumulative error ‘is whether defendant 

received due process and a fair trial.’ ” (People v. Cuccia (2002) 97 

Cal.App.4th 785, 795.) Finding no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s 

evidentiary rulings, we conclude Yancy’s claim of cumulative error also fails.
29

reject Yancy’s assertion that there was insufficient evidence to support the 14 

other convictions for felon in possession of a firearm. 

A

No one who has been convicted of a felony may lawfully own, purchase, 

receive, possess, or have custody or control of any firearm. (§ 29800.) The 

possession, custody, or control of the firearm must be with the defendant’s 

knowledge. (People v. Snyder (1982) 32 Cal.3d 590, 592 [analyzing former 

§ 12021, subd. (a)(1), the predecessor statute to § 29800].) “Possession may 

be physical or constructive, and more than one person may possess the same 

contraband. [Citation.] Possession may be imputed when the contraband is 

found in a place which is immediately accessible to the joint dominion and 

control of the accused and another.” (People v. Miranda (2011) 192 

Cal.App.4th 398, 410 (Miranda).)

In assessing whether there is sufficient evidence to sustain a criminal 

conviction, we apply the substantial evidence standard of review. (People v. 

Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1212.) Under that standard, “ ‘ “we review 

the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine 

whether it contains substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is 

reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a reasonable trier of fact 

could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” ’ ” (People v. 

Garcia (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 123, 144.) We “ ‘presume[] in support of the 

judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from 

the evidence[,]’ ” and we “ ‘may not substitute [our] judgment for that of the 

jury.’ ” (Ibid.) “We do not reweigh the evidence or resolve conflicts in the 

testimony when determining its legal sufficiency. [Citation.] Rather, before 

we can set aside a judgment of conviction for insufficiency of the evidence, ‘it 
30

must clearly appear that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient 

evidence to support [the jury’s finding].’ ” (Id. at p. 145.)

“Given this deferential standard of review, a ‘defendant bears an 

enormous burden in claiming there is insufficient evidence’ to support a 

conviction. [Citation.] Nevertheless, ‘substantial evidence,’ that is, evidence 

that is ‘ “ ‘reasonable ..., credible, and of solid value’ ” ’ is required, not just 

any evidence. [Citation.] In particular, a reasonable inference from the 

evidence ‘ “ ‘may not be based on suspicion alone, or on imagination, 

speculation, supposition, surmise, conjecture, or guess work. [¶] ... A finding 

of fact must be an inference drawn from evidence rather than ... a mere 

speculation as to probabilities without evidence.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Sanford 

(2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 84, 91–92; see also People v. Davis (2013) 57 Cal.4th 

353, 360 [“ ‘An inference is a deduction of fact that may logically and 

reasonably be drawn from another fact or group of facts found or otherwise 

established in the action.’ (Evid. Code, § 600, subd. (b).)”].) “An appellate 

court reviews the denial of a section 1118.1 motion [for a judgment of 

acquittal for insufficient evidence] under the standard employed in reviewing 

the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction.” (People v. Houston

(2012) 54 Cal.4th 1186, 1215.)

B

Yancy asserts that two of his convictions for felon in possession of a 

firearm must be reversed because the sole evidence supporting them is 

photographs of the same firearms used to support other counts of the same 

charge. Specifically, he argues that the evidence of counts 4 and 16 consisted 

of photographs of the same firearm such that only one of the two convictions 

should stand. Likewise, he argues that the photograph of the firearm giving 

rise to count 10 appeared to depict one of the same firearms that the 
31

prosecutor used to support counts 20 and 21, such that either the conviction 

for count 10 should be reversed or his convictions for counts 20 and 21 should 

be reversed. The Attorney General responds that because nothing in the 

record suggests Yancy’s possession of these different firearms was 

continuous, the convictions should stand.

To support his argument, Yancy relies on this court’s decision in People 

v. Mason (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 355 (Mason). In Mason, the defendant was 

convicted of four counts of possession of a firearm by a felon under former 

section 12021, subdivision (a)(1). (Mason, at p. 364.) Each possession count 

corresponded to the date of a different shooting or the date a police chase led 

to the recovery of the firearm used in the shootings. (Ibid.) The prosecution’s 

theory was that the defendant possessed the firearm on each of these 

occasions such that each occasion gave rise to a separate offense. (Ibid.) 

Accordingly, this court reversed all but one of the convictions. (Id. at p. 367.)

In Mason, we stated “[t]he Supreme Court has recognized that 

possession of a firearm by a felon is a continuing offense.” (Mason, supra, 232 

Cal.App.4th at p. 365.) “ ‘ “Ordinarily, a continuing offense is marked by a 

continuing duty in the defendant to do an act which he [or she] fails to do. 

The offense continues as long as the duty persists, and there is a failure to 

perform that duty.” [Citations.] Thus, when the law imposes an affirmative 

obligation to act, the violation is complete at the first instance the elements 

are met. It is nevertheless not completed as long as the obligation remains 

unfulfilled. “The crime achieves no finality until such time.” ’ ” (Ibid.) In 

other words, “ ‘only one violation occurs even though the proscribed conduct 

may extend over [an] indefinite period.’ ” (Ibid.)

Applying this concept, we reasoned in Mason that, “[a]lthough the 

evidence showed that Mason possessed the firearm on each of the dates, there 
32

was no evidence that Mason’s possession of the firearm was anything but 

continuous over the period encompassing the four dates. The prosecution did 

not present evidence, for example, showing that Mason had relinquished 

possession of the gun for a period between the specified dates. Mason’s crime 

was complete at the time he first possessed the gun because he violated the 

duty imposed by the statute not to do so. [Citation.] But the crime 

continued—as a single offense—for as long as the same possession continued, 

i.e., so long as Mason continued to violate his duty under the statute.” 

(Mason, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 366.)

Like Mason, in which the evidence showed the defendant possessed the 

same firearm without interruption at the time of each charged offense (a 

series of four separate shootings), there was insufficient evidence to support 

the jury’s finding that possession of one of these weapons underlying the 

felon in possession charges was not continuous. Specifically, in support of the 

charge set forth in count 6, the prosecutor offered a photograph from 

March 11, 2020, and to support count 14, the prosecutor offered a video from 

October 21, 2020. However, the weapon in both of these depictions appears 

to be the same, and very distinctive, black and pink gun. As the Attorney 

General acknowledges, it was the prosecution’s burden to prove that the 

weapons were different, or that Yancy’s possession of the weapon was not 

continuous over the entire time period. Here, the prosecutor did not 

distinguish the guns in these photos at all. Accordingly, we agree with Yancy 

that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for both counts 6 

and 14 and, thus, we conclude that count 14 must be reversed for lack of 

evidence. 

The guns at issue in count 10 and counts 21 and 22 (two of the three

guns seized from the home where Yancy was arrested), however, do not 
33

appear to be the same weapon. The photos identifying the weapon 

corresponding to count 10, and those corresponding to counts 21 and 22 do 

not appear to depict the same gun (though the style of weapons is similar, the 

handgrip is different). It is not this court’s role to reassess the evidence 

presented to the jury and, as the Attorney General asserts, Yancy did not 

raise this issue in the trial court. Accordingly, we conclude the evidence 

supporting counts 10, 21, and 22, establishing different weapons underlying 

each charge, was sufficient to support the jury’s corresponding convictions. 

Yancy next contends insufficient evidence supports counts 6 through 8 

and 10 through 19 because no gun was found to support the charges, and 

instead they were based solely on photographic evidence, some of which did 

not depict Yancy with the weapons. We disagree with Yancy’s argument and 

conclude substantial evidence also supported the jury’s conviction on each of 

these counts. 

Each count was supported by photographic evidence of weapons taken 

directly from Yancy’s cell phone. All of the photographs were in Yancy’s 

camera roll on his phone, and not images sent to him via text message or 

otherwise. Further, the prosecution presented evidence suggesting Yancy 

was selling these firearms. This evidence included photographs of the 

various weapons with sales prices listed, text message exchanges between 

Yancy and Dormevil discussing the price of firearms, photographs of Yancy 

with the weapons, and expert testimony opining that the images showed 

Yancy was in possession of these guns and was selling them. Finally, the 

prosecution presented evidence of three actual firearms seized on November 

17, 2020, which had DNA connecting the weapons to Yancy. From this 

evidence, a trier of fact could reasonably infer that Yancy possessed all of the 

firearms at issue, including those depicted in photographs and videos on his 
34

phone, regardless of whether he was in the picture with the weapons or not. 

(See Miranda, supra, 192 Cal.App.4th at p. 410 [“Possession may be physical 

or constructive, and more than one person may possess the same 

contraband.”].)

Finally, Yancy argues that there was insufficient evidence showing that 

the guns were real. This assertion is also not well-taken. Rather, ample 

evidence in the trial court showed the firearms were real. The photographs 

found on Yancy’s phone of the firearms and their sale prices strongly 

suggested he was selling the guns. Text messages exchanged between Yancy 

and Dormevil discussing the price of firearms also showed the guns were for 

sale. Importantly, Detective Conrad opined that the firearms in the 

photographs and videos were real because real firearms and ammunition 

were found at the home where Yancy was arrested and because the guns’ 

prices were consistent with those of actual firearms, not prices of replicas or 

fake weapons. 

Accordingly, substantial evidence showed that the guns at issue, as 

depicted in the photographs and videos, were real firearms. Reversal on this 

basis, therefore, is not warranted. (See People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 

331 [a conviction can be reversed only where there is “ ‘no hypothesis 

whatever’ ” upon which the evidence can be deemed sufficient to support it].)
35

DISPOSITION

The judgment is reversed as to count 14 and otherwise affirmed in its 

entirety.

McCONNELL, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

HUFFMAN, J.

RUBIN, J.