FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

TINIAN WOMEN ASSOCIATION;

GUARDIANS OF GANI; PAGANWATCH;

CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE 

NAVY; RAY MABUS, Secretary of the 

Navy; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT 

OF JUSTICE; UNITED STATES 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; PATRICK 

SHANAHAN, Acting United States 

Secretary of Defense,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 18-16723

D.C. No.

1:16-cv-00022

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of the Northern Mariana Islands

Ramona V. Manglona, Chief District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted February 3, 2020

Honolulu, Hawaii

Filed September 18, 2020
2 TINIAN WOMEN ASS’N V. U.S. DEP’T OF THE NAVY

Before: M. Margaret McKeown, Andrew D. Hurwitz,* and 

Bridget S. Bade, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge McKeown

SUMMARY**

Environmental Law / Standing

In an action challenging the U.S.-Japan Alliance 

Agreement, concerning the relocation of troops from 

Okinawa, Japan to Guam, and the mandated environmental 

reviews, the panel: (1) affirmed the district court’s summary 

judgment in favor of the U.S. Department of the Navy on 

plaintiffs’ procedural claim under the National 

Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”); and (2) affirmed the 

dismissal, but for lack of standing, rather than on the basis 

of political question, of plaintiffs’ claim that the Navy failed 

to consider relocation alternatives beyond Guam and the 

Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (“CNMI”).

Plaintiffs alleged two procedural claims under NEPA 

with respect to the Navy’s decision to relocate troops to 

Guam and to construct training facilities on the CNMI. First, 

plaintiffs argued that the two decisions were “connected 

actions” that must be assessed in a single environmental 

* Judge Hurwitz was drawn to replace Judge Farris. He has read the 

briefs, reviewed the record, and listened to the audio of the oral 

argument.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It 

has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
TINIAN WOMEN ASS’N V. U.S. DEP’T OF THE NAVY 3

impact statement (“EIS”). Second, plaintiffs argued that 

“cumulative impacts” must be addressed in the Relocation 

EIS. The panel affirmed the district court’s rejection of these 

claims.

First, the panel held that the Marines’ relocation and the 

placing of training facilities on Tinian Island in the CNMI 

were not connected for the purposes of an EIS. Although the 

two actions have overlapping goals, where Marines on 

Guam will certainly take advantage of the training ranges 

and facilities in the CNMI, they also have independent 

utility. 

Second, the panel held that the Navy’s deferral of 

consideration of the cumulative impacts to a future EIS was 

not error. By issuing a notice of intent to prepare an EIS for 

the training and ranges in the CNMI, the Navy has impliedly 

promised to consider the cumulative effects of the 

subsequent action in the future EIS and the Navy should be 

held to that promise. 

The panel held that plaintiffs’ remaining claim – that the 

Navy failed to consider stationing alternatives beyond Guam 

and the CNMI for Marines relocating out of Okinawa – also 

failed. Specifically, the panel held that plaintiffs’ claim was 

not redressable by the judicial branch and must be dismissed 

for lack of standing. Plaintiffs correctly identified the right 

to a procedurally-sound EIS that serves as a safeguard to its 

numerous interests on Guam and the CNMI; but plaintiffs 

did not – and could not – show that this right, if exercised, 

could protect its concrete interests, because doing so would 

require the panel to order the Navy to modify or set aside the 

Agreement between the United States and Japan. 
4 TINIAN WOMEN ASS’N V. U.S. DEP’T OF THE NAVY

Finally, the panel held that the district court did not err 

in concluding that plaintiffs waived a third claim – that 

defendants failed to supplement the Relocation Final EIS.

COUNSEL

David L. Henkin (argued), Earthjustice, Honolulu, Hawaii, 

for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Thekla Hansen-Young (argued), Andrew C. Mergen, Joshua 

Wilson, and Taylor Ferrell, Attorneys; Eric Grant, Deputy 

Assistant Attorney General; Jeffrey Bossert Clark, Assistant 

Attorney General; Environment and Natural Resources 

Division, United States Department of Justice; Craig D. 

Jensen, Associate General Counsel (Litigation); Cara M. 

Johnson, Attorney; United States Department of the Navy, 

Washington, D.C.; for Defendants-Appellees.

OPINION

McKEOWN, Circuit Judge:

This case surfaces in the wake of the Navy’s decision to 

relocate troops from Okinawa, Japan to Guam, pursuant to 

treaty obligations with Japan. In October 2005, the United 

States and Japan signed the U.S.-Japan Alliance Agreement 

(the “Agreement”) to “adapt [their] alliance to the changing 

regional and global security environment,” resulting in the 

determination to move Marine troops from Okinawa to 

Guam. The Agreement was followed by a series of 

mandated environmental reviews, challenged here by the 

Tinian Women Association and other environmental groups 

(collectively, “TWA”). The district court properly granted 
TINIAN WOMEN ASS’N V. U.S. DEP’T OF THE NAVY 5

summary judgment in favor of the Navy on TWA’s 

procedural claim under the National Environmental Policy 

Act (“NEPA”) because the Navy’s action was not arbitrary, 

capricious, or otherwise an abuse of discretion. The district 

court dismissed as a political question TWA’s claim that the 

Navy failed to consider relocation alternatives beyond Guam 

and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands 

(“CNMI”). We affirm that dismissal, but for lack of 

standing, concluding that the claim is not redressable 

because it would require renegotiation of the treaty.

BACKGROUND

The U.S.-Japan Alliance Agreement. The Agreement 

aims to strengthen the countries’ long-standing security 

alliance by realigning American forces in Japan to reduce 

“burdens on local communities, including those in 

Okinawa.” Consequently, the United States agreed to 

relocate approximately 8,000 Marines—including relocating 

the headquarters of the III Marine Expeditionary Force to 

Guam, with Japan providing more than $6 billion in 

funding.1 The two countries also planned to expand bilateral 

training throughout Japan and the Pacific. The United States 

and Japan memorialized these commitments in a February 

2009 treaty that specifically provides that the “Government 

of the United States of America shall consult with the 

Government of Japan in the event that the Government of 

the United States of America considers changes that may 

1 A Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) is the largest Marine Air 

Ground Task Force group, and is comprised of a MEF Headquarters 

Group, Marine Division, Marine Air Wing, and Marine Logistics Group. 

Over time the number of Marines fluctuated between 8,000–8,500.
6 TINIAN WOMEN ASS’N V. U.S. DEP’T OF THE NAVY

significantly affect facilities and infrastructure funded by 

Japanese cash contributions.”

In preparation for relocation of the Marines forces, the 

Navy established the Joint Guam Program Office (“JGPO”) 

to “facilitate, manage, and execute requirements associated 

with the rebasing of Marine Corps assets from Okinawa to 

Guam.” Meanwhile, the Department of the Navy instructed 

the Marines to identify operational and training requirements 

for the relocating troops, both on Guam and the CNMI.

Environmental Impact Statements. Before moving 

forward with projects that can significantly alter the 

environment, federal agencies are obligated to produce an 

environmental impact statement (“EIS”). With these 

requirements in mind, the JGPO began defining the EIS’s 

scope: to study the effects of relocating approximately 8,000 

Marines and their dependents from Okinawa to Guam 

(“Relocation EIS”). In 2007, the Navy published a notice of 

intent to prepare an EIS, explaining that “[t]he purpose and 

need of the proposed action is to fulfill U.S. government 

national security and alliance requirements in the Western 

Pacific Region.”

Internal debate about the scope of the relocation roiled, 

as the Marine Corps and the United States Pacific Command 

consistently emphasized that individual and small unit 

training facilities were inadequate for the Marines to meet 

training requirements. But the JGPO believed that larger 

scale combined-level training was “beyond the scope of 

what [it] [wa]s required to build for the relocating forces,” 

and declined to plan for such training unless it would not 

materially impact the environmental review process.

The Secretary of the Navy resolved the clash in 2009. 

He acknowledged that “[t]he current scope of the 
TINIAN WOMEN ASS’N V. U.S. DEP’T OF THE NAVY 7

[Relocation] EIS is unacceptable, does not meet USMC 

requirements, and potentially jeopardizes USMC Core 

Competencies in the Pacific.” But the Secretary ultimately 

concluded that the Marines’ proposal to establish expanded 

training capabilities in the region required a “holistic 

assessment” of troop levels that should not be undertaken “in 

a series of ‘knee-jerk’ decisions that may not necessarily be 

tied together or complementary with long term U.S. 

strategy.”

The Navy issued the Relocation EIS in July 2010, which 

addressed the relocation of approximately 8,000 Marines to 

Guam, including the development and construction of 

training facilities on Guam and Tinian, one of the three 

principal islands of the CNMI. The EIS analyzed several 

proposed training facilities, including one live-fire training 

range complex on Guam, and four training ranges on Tinian. 

The five ranges met individual and small unit training needs, 

“replicat[ing] existing individual-skills training capabilities 

on Okinawa.” Because the ranges “[did] not provide for all 

requisite collective, combined arms, live, and maneuver 

training,” the relocated Marines would need to travel to 

“sustain core competencies.” Noting that the Marine Corps 

ultimately hoped to conduct integrated core competency 

training, the EIS explained that such a decision, along with 

the “suitability of CNMI to meet” this need, would be 

reviewed in 2010 during the Quadrennial Defense Review.

Two months later, the Navy published its 2010 Record 

of Decision declaring its intent to proceed with the relocation 

to Guam and associated training on Tinian. The Navy 

deferred its decision to construct the live-fire training facility 

on Guam until it completed analysis under the National 

Historic Preservation Act.
8 TINIAN WOMEN ASS’N V. U.S. DEP’T OF THE NAVY

In February 2012, the Navy issued an additional Notice 

of Intent for a supplemental EIS (“Relocation SEIS”) to 

“evaluate the potential environmental consequences that 

may result from construction and operation of a live-fire 

training range complex and associated infrastructure on 

Guam.” The Relocation SEIS was to address five alternative 

sites for the live-fire training range complex on Guam, 

though its scope was modified in October 2012 to 

accommodate a reduction in the number of Marines 

relocating to Guam. In 2015, the Navy issued a Record of 

Decision for the Relocation SEIS that approved the 

construction of a live-fire training range complex on Guam 

at a different location.

While the Navy analyzed new challenges to the Guam 

relocation, it published yet another Notice of Intent, the 

CNMI Joint Military Training Environmental Impact 

Statement/Overseas Environmental Impact Statement 

(“CJMT Draft EIS”). The draft proposed creating additional 

range and training areas within the CNMI to address 

“unfilled unit level and combined level military training 

requirements in the Western Pacific.” Although the Pacific 

Command previously determined that the CNMI was the 

“prime location to support forces” throughout the Pacific 

Command Area of Responsibility, it also concluded that the 

CNMI had the “greatest number of training deficiencies.” 

The Pacific Command proposed four training range 

complexes on Tinian and two training range complexes on 

Pagan, a volcanic island to the north. A deluge of comments 

followed, and the Navy decided to issue a revised draft with 

new alternatives and studies. At the time of this appeal, the 

CJMT Draft EIS was undergoing revision.

Challenges to the Records of Decision (“ROD”). TWA 

filed suit to challenge two final agency actions: the 
TINIAN WOMEN ASS’N V. U.S. DEP’T OF THE NAVY 9

Relocation EIS, memorialized in the 2010 ROD, and the 

Relocation SEIS, memorialized in the 2015 ROD. Seeking 

declaratory and injunctive relief, TWA alleged the Navy 

violated NEPA and the Administrative Procedure Act 

(“APA”) by failing to consider (1) the impact of all mission 

essential training for Guam-based Marines and (2) stationing 

alternatives beyond Guam and the CNMI. The district court 

granted summary judgment on the first claim in favor of the 

Navy and dismissed TWA’s second claim. The court also

concluded that the group waived a third claim challenging 

the Relocation EIS, and denied leave to amend.

ANALYSIS

I. TWA’s Procedural Claims Under NEPA

TWA launched a two-pronged attack on the Navy’s 

decision to relocate troops to Guam and construct training 

facilities on the CNMI. First, it argues the two decisions are 

“connected actions” that must be assessed in a single EIS. 

See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(a)(1).2 Alternatively, TWA 

contends that because the proposed training sites discussed 

2 In a footnote, TWA argued that the district court erred in not 

considering the Siting Study as either part of the administrative record 

or as extra-record evidence to support this part of its claim. The district 

court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the administrative 

record is complete and excluding this extra-record evidence. See Sw. Ctr. 

for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Forest Serv., 100 F.3d 1443, 1447 (9th 

Cir. 1996). TWA failed to demonstrate that the Navy actually considered 

the Siting Study; the passing reference in the notice of intent is 

insufficient. See Pinnacle Armor, Inc. v. United States, 923 F. Supp. 2d 

1226, 1241 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (“[A]n extra-record document that is cited 

in the agency’s actual decision document indicates consideration of the 

contents of the extra-record document by the decision-maker. 

Otherwise, a mere reference in the administrative record is insufficient.” 

(internal quotation marks, emphasis, and alteration omitted)).
10 TINIAN WOMEN ASS’N V. U.S. DEP’T OF THE NAVY

in the CJMT Draft EIS will magnify the environmental 

effect of relocating Marines to Guam, these “cumulative 

impacts” must be addressed in the Relocation EIS. See id. 

§ 1508.25(a)(2).

We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment. See Lands Council v. McNair, 629 F.3d 1070, 

1074 (9th Cir. 2010). We must uphold the agency’s action 

“unless it is ‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or 

otherwise not in accordance with law.’” Id. (quoting 

5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)).

TWA is correct that connected actions must be 

considered in a single EIS. Actions are connected if they 

“[a]utomatically trigger other actions which may require 

environmental impact statements,” “[c]annot or will not 

proceed unless other actions are taken previously or 

simultaneously,” or “[a]re independent parts of a larger 

action and depend on the larger action for their justification.” 

40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(a)(1). However, NEPA does not 

require an agency to treat actions as connected if they have 

independent utility and purpose. Great Basin Mine Watch v. 

Hankins, 456 F.3d 955, 969 (9th Cir. 2006). For instance, 

“[w]hen one of the actions might reasonably have been 

completed without the existence of the other, the two actions 

have independent utility and are not ‘connected’ for NEPA’s 

purposes.” Id. This is true even where each action might 

“benefit from the other’s presence,” Nw. Res. Info. Ctr. v. 

Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 56 F.3d 1060, 1068 (9th Cir. 

1995) (citation omitted), or where the actions have 

“overlapping, but not co-extensive goals,” Pac. Coast Fed’n

of Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. Blank, 693 F.3d 1084, 1098 (9th 

Cir. 2012).

We conclude that the Marine relocation and the placing 

of training facilities on Tinian are not connected for the 
TINIAN WOMEN ASS’N V. U.S. DEP’T OF THE NAVY 11

purposes of an environmental impact statement. The 

Relocation EIS lays out multiple reasons for the relocation 

of Marines from Okinawa to Guam: positioning troops to 

defend the United States and its Pacific territories, providing 

a powerful presence in the Pacific region, fulfilling a 

commitment to Japan, and defending American, Japanese, 

and other allies’ interests. Meanwhile, the CJMT Draft EIS 

explains the rationale for placing range and training facilities 

on Tinian and Pagan: they would “reduce joint training 

deficiencies for military services” and be able to “support 

ongoing operational requirements, changes to U.S. force 

structure, geographic repositioning of forces, and U.S. 

training relationships with allied nations.”

Although the two actions have overlapping goals—

Marines on Guam will certainly take advantage of the 

training ranges and facilities in the CNMI—they also have 

independent utility. As the district court noted, “the national 

security and defense goals of the Guam relocation and CJMT 

proposals are ‘overlapping,’ but they are not ‘co-extensive.’” 

See Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns, 693 F.3d 

at 1098. Nor can we conclude that it would be arbitrary or 

irrational for the Marines to relocate to Guam and receive 

part of their required training elsewhere—especially given 

the current nature of the Marines’ training in Okinawa. 

While it may be more convenient for the Marines to have 

these training facilities closer, there is no evidence showing 

they must be.

TWA also argues the Navy violated NEPA’s mandate 

that an EIS must consider cumulative impacts. A 

“cumulative impact” is “the impact on the environment 

which results from the incremental impact of the action 

when added to other past, present, and reasonably 

foreseeable future actions regardless of what agency 
12 TINIAN WOMEN ASS’N V. U.S. DEP’T OF THE NAVY

(Federal or non-Federal) or person undertakes such other 

actions.” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7; see Ecology Ctr. v. 

Castaneda, 574 F.3d 652, 666 (9th Cir. 2009). The rationale 

for evaluating cumulative impacts together is to prevent an 

agency from “dividing a project into multiple actions” to 

avoid a more thorough consideration of the impacts of the 

entire project. Native Ecosystems Council v. Dombeck, 

304 F.3d 886, 894 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). TWA 

does not face an “onerous” burden and “need not show what 

cumulative impacts would occur.” Te-Moak Tribe of W. 

Shoshone of Nev. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 608 F.3d 592, 605 

(9th Cir. 2010). Instead, it needs to show “only the potential 

for cumulative impact.” Id.

The district court found TWA met this low burden, but

rather than forcing the Navy “to reopen the environmental 

impact statements related to the relocation efforts,” the 

district court reasonably concluded that the Navy “may 

address any cumulative impacts in the environmental impact 

statement for the proposed range and training areas on 

Tinian and Pagan in [the CJMT Draft EIS].” TWA argues 

this deferral to a future EIS was in error. We disagree.

We have consistently held that agencies can consider the 

cumulative impacts of actions in a subsequent EIS when the 

agency has made clear it intends to comply with those 

requirements and the court can ensure such compliance. For 

example, in Northern Alaska Environmental Center v. 

Kempthorne, we concluded an agency did not violate NEPA 

even where it failed to consider the cumulative impacts of an 

action for which it had previously issued a notice of intent. 

See 457 F.3d 969, 980 (9th Cir. 2006). Because the notice 

of intent had “in effect given notice that [the agency would] 

consider all impacts,” and would include cumulative impacts 

as part of the future EIS, and because the court could hold 
TINIAN WOMEN ASS’N V. U.S. DEP’T OF THE NAVY 13

the agency to that promise, it was sufficient for the agency 

to address the impacts of the future project “at a later stage.” 

Id.; see also Salmon River Concerned Citizens v. Robertson, 

32 F.3d 1346, 1357–58 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Having persuaded 

the district court that it understands its duty to follow NEPA 

in reviewing future site-specific programs, judicial estoppel 

will preclude the [agency] from later arguing that it has no 

further duty to consider the cumulative impact of [those] 

programs.”). By issuing a notice of intent to prepare an EIS 

for the training and ranges in the CNMI, the Navy has 

“impliedly promised” to consider the cumulative effects of 

the subsequent action in the future EIS and the Navy should 

be held to that promise. Ctr. for Env’t L. & Pol’y v. U.S. 

Bureau of Reclamation, 655 F.3d 1000, 1010 (9th Cir. 2011). 

For this reason, we conclude that the Navy’s deferral of 

consideration of the cumulative impacts to a future EIS was 

not error.

II. TWA’s Claim re Alternatives Beyond Guam and the 

CNMI

TWA’s remaining claim—that the Navy failed to 

consider stationing alternatives beyond Guam and the CNMI 

for Marines relocating out of Okinawa—also fails. Relying 

on both constitutional standing and the political question 

doctrine, the district court dismissed this claim for a lack of 

jurisdiction. Reviewing de novo, we affirm. Corrie v. 

Caterpillar, Inc., 503 F.3d 974, 979 (9th Cir. 2007).

Because we resolve this claim on the basis of standing, 

we need not reach the political question doctrine. See No 

GWEN All. of Lane Cnty., Inc. v. Aldridge, 855 F.2d 1380, 

1382 (9th Cir. 1988) (“When both standing and political 

question issues are before the court, the court should 

determine the question of standing first.”). We note, 

however, that there is significant overlap between the 
14 TINIAN WOMEN ASS’N V. U.S. DEP’T OF THE NAVY

principles underpinning the redressability prong of our 

standing inquiry and the overarching purpose of the political 

question doctrine. See Republic of Marshall Islands v. 

United States, 865 F.3d 1187, 1192 (9th Cir. 2017) 

(“Whether examined under . . . the redressability prong of 

standing, or the political question doctrine, the analysis 

stems from the same separation-of-powers principle—

enforcement of this treaty provision is not committed to the 

judicial branch. Although these are distinct doctrines . . .

there is significant overlap.”).

Article III standing demands that TWA establish: (1) it 

has suffered an injury in fact that is concrete and 

particularized, and actual or imminent; (2) the injury is fairly 

traceable to the challenged conduct; and (3) the injury is 

likely to be redressed by a favorable court decision. Lujan 

v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).

TWA asserts various “cultural, social, economic, 

recreational, spiritual, education, and other interests” on 

Guam and the CNMI that will be adversely affected by the 

Marines relocation to those areas. The procedural 

requirements that are the cornerstone of NEPA protect these 

cognizable interests. See Robertson v. Methow Valley 

Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 348 (1989) (“NEPA declares 

a broad national commitment to protecting and promoting 

environmental quality.” (citing 42 U.S.C. § 4331)). In 

particular, NEPA requires that agencies analyze reasonable 

alternatives to a proposed action in an EIS, see 40 C.F.R. 

§ 1502.14, so that public officials can “make decisions that

are based on understanding of environmental consequences, 

and take actions that protect, restore, and enhance the 

environment,” id. § 1500.1(c).

TWA’s successful showing of a procedural injury 

lightens its burden on the remaining Article III standing 
TINIAN WOMEN ASS’N V. U.S. DEP’T OF THE NAVY 15

requirements. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7 (The “person 

who has been accorded a procedural right to protect his 

concrete interests can assert that right without meeting all the 

normal standards for redressability and immediacy.”). As a 

plaintiff alleging procedural injury, TWA “need[s] to show 

only that the relief requested—that the agency follow the 

correct procedures—may influence the agency’s ultimate 

decision of whether to take or refrain from taking a certain 

action.” Salmon Spawning & Recovery All. v. Gutierrez, 

545 F.3d 1220, 1226–27 (9th Cir. 2008). But even under this 

more lenient standard, TWA is unable to meet its burden.

TWA correctly identifies its right to a procedurallysound EIS that serves as a safeguard to its numerous interests 

on Guam and the CNMI. But it does not—and cannot—

show that this right, if exercised, could protect its concrete 

interests, because doing so would require us to order the 

Navy to modify or set aside the Agreement between the 

United States and Japan. Regardless of the Navy’s analysis 

of alternate stationing locations for the Marines, it cannot 

upend that agreement. Accordingly, we cannot grant relief 

to TWA without upsetting the agreement to relocate troops 

from Okinawa to Guam. Compare Ctr. for Biological 

Diversity v. Mattis, 868 F.3d 803, 819 (9th Cir. 2017) 

(concluding environmental group’s claims that Navy should 

consider modifying base replacement plan were “forwardlooking” and did not “hinge on upsetting” bilateral 

agreement with Japan), with Salmon Spawning, 545 F.3d 

at 1227 (“[I]f a court were to give the groups the remedy that 

they seek . . . the ultimate agency decision of whether to 

enter into the Treaty . . . could never be influenced.”).

TWA’s argument is predicated on the belief that its 

proposed relief would not discharge the treaty itself, but 

rather would alter the United States’ actions within the 
16 TINIAN WOMEN ASS’N V. U.S. DEP’T OF THE NAVY

treaty’s bounds. Although the agreement between the 

United States and Japan has been amended in the past to 

decrease the number of troops relocated to Guam, the 

resolution TWA seeks would stretch the agreement beyond 

recognition. The treaty provides that the Marines “and their 

approximately 9,000 dependents will relocate from Okinawa 

to Guam.” Granting the relief TWA seeks would necessarily 

rescind the decision to relocate the troops to Guam, resulting 

in an order to the executive branch to rescind or modify the 

agreement. Indeed, even the amended agreement maintains 

the relocation of thousands of Marines from Okinawa to 

Guam. As in Salmon Spawning, even if the Navy’s action 

was procedurally flawed, “a court could not set aside the 

next, and more significant, link in the chain—the United 

States’ entrance into the Treaty.” 545 F.3d at 1227. TWA’s 

second claim is not redressable by the judicial branch and 

must be dismissed for lack of standing.

III. Failure to Supplement Claim

Finally, the parties dispute whether the TWA waived a 

third claim—that “[d]efendants failed to supplement the 

Relocation Final EIS after the 2012 Roadmap Adjustments 

that created ‘substantial changes’ to the proposed action, 

such as changes to the exact Marine Corps units that would 

be relocated and the full-range of weapons, and training in 

the CNMI, that they would need.”

Where a “complaint does not include the necessary 

factual allegations to state a claim, raising such a claim in a 

summary judgment motion is insufficient to present the 

claim to the district court.” Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest 

Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1080 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). The 

district court did not err in concluding that TWA waived this 

claim. Potentially relevant facts and regulations are 

scattered in different parts of the complaint, and a district 
TINIAN WOMEN ASS’N V. U.S. DEP’T OF THE NAVY 17

court’s job is not to piece together a jigsaw puzzle of claims. 

The ultimate proof is in the pudding: in the delineation of 

claims for relief at the end of the complaint, TWA lists only 

two—neither of which is a failure to supplement the 

Relocation Final EIS.

Because TWA explicitly raised the failure to supplement 

claim for the first time in summary judgment briefing, more 

than two years after the litigation commenced and six 

months after the administrative record was filed, and 

because it gave no prior notice to the Navy and requested 

leave to amend only after moving for summary judgment, 

the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying 

TWA’s request for leave to amend. See William Inglis & 

Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Cont’l Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014, 

1053 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that notice is an important 

factor in considering whether a late shift in the thrust of the 

case prejudices the other party).

AFFIRMED.