IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Respondent,

v.

HEATHER D. TROUTMAN,

Appellant.

No. 84054-1-I

DIVISION ONE

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

CHUNG, J. — Heather Troutman was convicted of felony driving under the 

influence (DUI) following a trial in which the key issue was whether she was the 

driver of a car that was found off the road. On appeal, she challenges the 

admission of her statements in violation of the doctrine of corpus delicti, the 

sufficiency of the evidence to support her conviction, and the admission of 

evidence that she refused to take a breath test in violation of CrR 3.1 and article 

I, section 7 of Washington’s Constitution. She also challenges her sentence

based on the imposition of supervision fees, the calculation of her offender score 

because it included her juvenile dispositions, and the imposition of the Victim 

Penalty Assessment (VPA). We affirm her conviction. However, we remand to 

the trial court to strike the supervision fees and the VPA from her sentence.

FACTS

Sometime after 11 p.m. on May 30, 2019, Jennifer Moldver took the North 

Lake Samish exit off Interstate 5 near Bellingham and encountered a car that had 
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gone “off the off ramp into the brush and woods,” still running, with its lights still 

on. Moldver immediately pulled over, called 911, and walked toward the car, 

where she watched “one person in the car in the driver’s seat . . . rummage 

around a little bit and then climb over to the passenger seat and exit the vehicle.” 

While she was on the phone, the person who had exited the car, Troutman, 

approached her and “begg[ed]” Moldver not to call 911. Moldver testified that “the 

alcohol smell coming off her was very, very powerful.” 

An emergency medical technician (EMT) who responded to the scene two 

minutes later could smell alcohol on Troutman. Troutman told the EMT “I wasn’t 

driving,” “I’m not supposed to be driving,” and “Please don’t tell them I was 

driving.” 

A Washington State Patrol trooper, Officer Lipton, responded to the scene

approximately ten or fifteen minutes after the 911 call was made. It appeared to 

Lipton that the car had skidded off the roadway, slid though grass, and ended up 

in roadside brush. Lipton testified that when he asked her what happened,

Troutman immediately told him “she wasn’t driving.” Lipton further testified that

Troutman failed seventeen of eighteen field sobriety test clues, and she told him 

that she thought if she took a breath test, her score would be “very high.” Lipton

placed Troutman under arrest and apprised her of her Miranda1 rights at the 

scene. 

 1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).
No. 84054-1-I/3

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The accident occurred in a “fairly remote” part of the county with “no 

houses in the immediate area” and only a park and ride lot and a gas station on 

the other side of the freeway. Moldver, the EMT, and Lipton did not see anyone 

else at the scene. The keys were still in the car’s ignition, and Lipton observed 

the driver’s seat was in a position consistent with a driver of Troutman’s height, 

which was five feet, four inches. 

After transporting her to jail, Lipton began the breath test procedure, but 

Troutman said she did not want to answer any further questions and asked for an 

attorney. After Lipton attempted to put her in touch with an attorney, he resumed 

the breath test procedure. Troutman refused to take the test. 

In June 2019, the State charged Troutman with several crimes, including 

felony DUI. Later that year, her first trial ended in a mistrial. 

In February 2022, the State amended the information to a single count of 

felony DUI. Before her second trial, Troutman stipulated to prior convictions that 

would elevate the charge to felony DUI. See RCW 46.61.5055. The State moved 

to admit several statements by Troutman under CrR 3.5. Following the CrR 3.5

hearing,2 the court entered a written order admitting Troutman’s statements to 

the EMT and Lipton prior to her arrest, but excluding her statements at jail except 

for the fact of her refusal to take a breath test. 

 2 The court’s written findings of fact and conclusions of law from the CrR 3.5 hearing 

were not filed until after the trial, the same day as the judgment and sentence, on March 23, 

2022. 
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At trial, after the State rested, Troutman moved to dismiss the charges 

against her based on the insufficiency of its evidence against her and the corpus 

delicti doctrine. The court denied the motion. 

The jury found Troutman guilty as charged. Troutman timely appealed. 

DISCUSSION

I. Admission of Statements and Corpus Delicti Doctrine

Troutman argues that her statements were not admissible under the 

corpus delicti doctrine. We disagree.

“Corpus delicti means the ‘body of the crime.’ ” State v. Brockob, 159 

Wn.2d 311, 327, 150 P.3d 59 (2006) (quoting State v. Aten, 130 Wn.2d 640, 655, 

927 P.2d 210 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted)). “[T]he underlying 

purpose of corpus delicti is to prevent convictions based solely on confessions.”

State v. Cardenas-Flores, 189 Wn.2d 243, 260, 401 P.3d 19 (2017).

“The corpus delicti ‘must be proved by evidence sufficient to support the 

inference that’ a crime took place, and the defendant’s confession ‘alone is not 

sufficient to establish that a crime took place.’ ” Cardenas-Flores, 189 Wn.2d at 

252 (quoting Brockob, 159 Wn.2d at 327-28). “Washington case law treats 

corpus delicti as a rule of sufficiency, not merely a rule of evidence.” CardenasFlores, 189 Wn.2d at 257. We review de novo the sufficiency of the evidence for 

purposes of corpus delicti. State v. Sprague, 16 Wn. App. 2d 213, 226, 480 P.3d 

471 (2021). “In determining whether there is sufficient evidence of the corpus 

delicti independent of the defendant’s statements, we assume the ‘truth of the 

State’s evidence and all reasonable inferences from it in a light most favorable to 
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the State.’ ” Cardenas-Flores, 189 Wn.2d at 264 (quoting Aten, 130 Wn.2d at 

658).

For the charge of driving while intoxicated, the corpus delicti “is met by 

proof that petitioners were driving or in actual physical control of a vehicle while 

intoxicated.” City of Bremerton v. Corbett, 106 Wn.2d 569, 578, 723 P.2d 1135 

(1986). “Inherent in the offense is the requirement that the intoxicated person 

was the driver . . . the corpus delicti of the offense[ ] . . . cannot be established 

absent proof connecting [a defendant] with operation or control of a vehicle while 

intoxicated.” Id. at 574.

“Under the Washington rule . . . the evidence must independently 

corroborate, or confirm, a defendant’s” confession. Brockob, 159 Wn.2d at 328-

29. “The independent evidence need not be of such a character as would 

establish the corpus delicti beyond a reasonable doubt, or even by a 

preponderance of the proof. It is sufficient if it prima facie establishes the corpus 

delicti.” State v. Meyer, 37 Wn.2d 759, 763-64, 226 P.2d 204 (1951), quoted in

Cardenas-Flores, 189 Wn.2d at 258. “Prima facie corroboration . . . exists if the 

independent evidence supports a ‘logical and reasonable inference of the facts’ ” 

that the State seeks to prove. Brockob, 159 Wn.2d at 328 (internal quotation 

marks omitted) (quoting Aten, 130 Wn.2d at 656). The independent evidence 

also “ ‘must be consistent with guilt and inconsistent with a[ ] hypothesis of 

innocence.’ ” Cardenas-Flores, 189 Wn.2d at 264 (quoting Brockob, 159 Wn.2d 

at 329).
No. 84054-1-I/6

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At trial, Troutman testified that she was not the driver, her friend Noell 

was. Troutman argues there is no direct evidence she was the driver because no 

one saw her driving that night. But “[t]he corpus delicti can be proved by either 

direct or circumstantial evidence.” Aten, 130 Wn.2d at 655. Troutman further 

argues the evidence did not establish the corpus because the car’s driver seat 

position was not measured and no dog was called to search the area for Noell 

and his friend, who she testified had joined them on the way back from Seattle 

and was in the back seat. She also points to the lack of evidence that she was 

the car’s registered owner, distinguishing Corbett and other cases where the 

defendants were the registered owners. However, none of these specific types of 

evidence is needed, as long as other independent evidence is sufficient to 

support a “logical and reasonable inference” that Troutman was the car’s driver.

Brockob, 159 Wn.2d at 328.

Troutman relies primarily on Sprague, 16 Wn. App. 2d at 213, to argue

that the independent evidence is “not inconsistent with a hypothesis of 

innocence,” and it would not be “an unreasonable hypothesis to conclude that 

Ms. Troutman was not the driver.” In Sprague, the defendant was found guilty of 

one count of possession with intent to deliver methamphetamine. Id. at 225. At 

the scene, Sprague was in possession of nine to 10 grams of methamphetamine, 

and officers found a homemade pipe, a weighing scale, and “a bundle of plastic 

grocery bags.” Id. at 230. That amount of methamphetamine was not sufficient to 

support an inference of intent to deliver. Id. The State argued the evidence of

intent was the scales and the grocery bags. Id.
No. 84054-1-I/7

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The Sprague court reasoned the scales could be consistent with both an 

intent to deliver and personal use. Id. As for the bags, officers testified that while 

methamphetamine is typically packaged in small ziplock-style bags, plastic 

grocery bags were also commonly used and are torn or cut and tied or melted 

around the methamphetamine. Id. However, the plastic grocery bags in 

Sprague’s apartment were not torn into small pieces or wrapped around 

methamphetamine. Id. at 231. Moreover, “Sprague was using one of the grocery 

bags as a garbage can liner.” Id. Thus, the court reasoned that the presence of 

the scale and grocery bags “is ‘no more indicative of an intent to deliver than . . . 

mere possession,’ ” so the evidence was “insufficient to establish corpus delicti of 

the specific crime of possession with intent to deliver.” Id. at 231-32 (quoting 

State v. Cobelli, 56 Wn. App. 921, 925, 788 P.2d 1081 (1989)).

Unlike the independent evidence in Sprague, which was consistent with 

both mere possession and with possession with intent to deliver, here, the 

independent evidence is inconsistent with the conclusion that Troutman was not 

the driver. Moldver observed a single person, Troutman, in the car’s driver’s seat.

The car was still running, and the keys were still in the car’s ignition, so the

logical and reasonable inference is that the accident had just happened when 

Moldver encountered the car. Moldver and the EMT, who arrived within two 

minutes of the 911 call, observed no other persons at the scene. Though 

Troutman testified Noell and his friend had been in the car, she did not ask for 

help finding them at the scene. As the area was remote, it was a reasonable 

inference that no one else had been the driver and had left the scene. Lipton, 
No. 84054-1-I/8

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who arrived ten or fifteen minutes after the 911 call, found the keys still in the car 

and observed that the car’s seat was adjusted to fit a person of Troutman’s 

height. Lipton also observed no other people at the remote scene who could 

have been the car’s driver.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence independent 

of Troutman’s statements supports a logical and reasonable inference that 

Troutman was the car’s driver. Therefore, we conclude that the corpus delicti rule 

is satisfied.

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Troutman argues that the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction 

“for the same reason the evidence was insufficient to corroborate Ms. Troutman’s 

statements.” We disagree and conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support 

her conviction. 

“Evidence is sufficient to support a guilty verdict if any rational trier of fact, 

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, could find the 

elements of the charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Cardenas-Flores, 

189 Wn.2d at 265. “A claim of evidentiary insufficiency admits the truth of the 

State’s evidence and all reasonable inferences from that evidence.” State v. 

Rodriquez, 187 Wn. App. 922, 930, 352 P.3d 200 (2015). “[U]nlike the corpus 

delicti analysis, the sufficiency of the evidence analysis does not involve 

evaluation of hypotheses of innocence.” Sprague, 16 Wn. App. 2d at 235.

To prove the crime of felony DUI, the State had to prove that Troutman 

drove a motor vehicle while under the influence of or affected by intoxicating 
No. 84054-1-I/9

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liquor and had three or more prior offenses within 10 years. RCW 46.61.502(1), 

(6)(a). Troutman stipulated to the prior convictions necessary for a felony DUI 

charge under RCW 46.61.502(6)(a). She testified that she had four cups of a 

“strong” drink with fruit in it from a punchbowl before leaving a party around 11 

p.m. and was intoxicated on the night in question. Further, Moldver and the EMT 

testified that Troutman smelled of alcohol. 

The key contested issue was whether Troutman was the driver. Troutman 

testified that “[she] was not” the car’s driver, that the car was her godfather’s, and 

that she allowed her friend Noell to drive the car. But on review for sufficiency of 

the evidence, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. 

See Cardenas-Flores, 189 Wn.2d at 265. As discussed above, not only 

Troutman’s statements, but independent corroborating evidence supported the 

inference that Troutman was the car’s driver. We conclude that any rational trier 

of fact viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State would find the 

elements of the charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

III. CrR 3.1 Right to Counsel

Troutman argues the trial court violated her CrR 3.1 right to an attorney by 

admitting evidence that she refused to take a breath test after Lipton failed to 

make reasonable efforts to put her in contact with an attorney. The State 

counters that the issue is not properly before this court under RAP 2.5 because 

Troutman did not raise CrR 3.1 below, and the violation of a court rule cannot be 

manifest error affecting a constitutional right. We agree with the State.
No. 84054-1-I/10

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CrR 3.1 provides a statutory right to counsel that extends “beyond the 

requirements” of our federal or state constitutions. State v. Templeton, 148 

Wn.2d 193, 211, 59 P.3d 632 (2002) (quoting Heinemann v. Whitman County,

105 Wn.2d 796, 802, 718 P.2d 789 (1986)). The rule-based right to an attorney 

accrues “as soon as feasible after the defendant is taken into custody.” CrR 

3.1(b)(1). “At the earliest opportunity a person in custody who desires a lawyer 

shall be provided access to a telephone, the telephone number of the public 

defender or official responsible for assigning a lawyer, and any other means 

necessary to place the person in communication with a lawyer.” CrR 3.1(c)(2).

The rule does not require police to actually connect the accused with an attorney, 

but it does require the police to make reasonable efforts to assist the person in 

contacting an attorney at the earliest opportunity. State v. Pierce, 169 Wn. App. 

533, 548, 280 P.3d 1158 (2012).

At the CrR 3.5 hearing, Troutman argued that “although [Lipton] did make 

his best efforts to contact an attorney[,] they were ultimately not successful, [and] 

at that point she had invoked her right to an attorney and the questioning needed 

to stop” because “her right to counsel is a constitutional right.” But Troutman 

never cited CrR 3.1; she argued that Lipton “violate[d] her constitutional right to 

counsel.” Rep. of Proc. at 53 (emphasis added).

The court concluded that Troutman “invoked her right to an attorney when 

she requested to speak to a public defender at the station.” It further concluded 

her statements “made in response to questions on the ‘DUI packet’ ” after she 

invoked her right to counsel were inadmissible, except for her refusal to take the 
No. 84054-1-I/11

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breath test.3 The court’s written findings of fact and conclusions of law following 

the hearing are silent about CrR 3.1.

RAP 2.5 generally prohibits our review of errors not raised below. RAP 

2.5(a). However, this court has discretion to reach an issue not raised at trial if 

the party seeking review demonstrates manifest error affecting a constitutional 

right. RAP 2.5(a)(3). The defendant has the burden to identify the constitutional 

error and how it actually prejudiced their defense. State v. McDonald, 138 Wn.2d 

680, 691, 981 P.2d 443 (1999). “Manifest” means actual prejudice. State v. 

Walsh, 143 Wn.2d 1, 8, 17 P.3d 591 (2001).

A violation of CrR 3.1 is not of “constitutional dimension” for the purposes 

of RAP 2.5(a)(3). State v. Guzman-Cuellar, 47 Wn. App. 326, 334, 734 P.2d 966 

(1987) (CrR 3.1 is a court rule “not of constitutional origin”); State v. Clark, 48 

Wn. App. 850, 863, 743 P.2d 822 (1987) (same). Because Troutman did not 

raise CrR 3.1 below and it is not manifest constitutional error, we decline to 

review Troutman’s claim of a CrR 3.1 violation.

4

 3 Here, as Troutman notes, “[t]he trial court excluded Ms. Troutman’s responses to other 

questions . . . because she had invoked her right to counsel under Miranda,” and Miranda

protections do not extend to refusals to take breath tests because refusal is a non-testimonial act. 

See South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 564 n.15, 103 S. Ct. 916, 74 L. Ed. 2d 748 (1983) (“In 

the context of an arrest for driving while intoxicated, a police inquiry of whether the suspect will 

take a blood-alcohol test is not an interrogation within the meaning of Miranda.”); State v. 

Zwicker, 105 Wn.2d 228, 243, 713 P.2d 1101 (1986) (“[T]here is no coercion in obtaining refusal 

evidence where the accused is fully informed of the consequences of exercising the statutory 

right of refusal.”).

4 While we decline to review this claim, we note that Troutman does not assign error to 

the court’s failure to include a conclusion of law regarding CrR 3.1. Moreover, a violation of a 

court rule such as CrR 3.1 is harmless if there is no reasonable probability that the error 

materially affected the outcome of the trial. Templeton, 148 Wn.2d at 220. In this case, Troutman 

failed seventeen of eighteen field sobriety test clues, she told Lipton at the scene voluntarily that if 

she took a breath test, the result “would be very high,” and she testified that she was intoxicated 

that night, so there is no reasonable probability of a materially different outcome had the evidence 

of her refusal to take the breath test been excluded.
No. 84054-1-I/12

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IV. Article I, Section 7

Washington’s implied consent statute provides that any person who 

operates a motor vehicle within this state is deemed to have given consent to 

breath tests to determine alcohol concentration if the arresting officer has 

reasonable grounds to believe the person has been driving under the influence. 

RCW 46.20.308(1). Prior to obtaining a breath sample, the officer must advise 

the driver that he or she still has the right to refuse to consent to the test, but that 

license revocation and use of that refusal at trial are among the consequences 

that follow if the driver declines the test. RCW 46.20.308(2).

Troutman argues that the admission of her refusal to take a breath test 

violates article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution.

5 The State argues 

Troutman did not raise this issue below and cannot meet her burden under RAP 

2.5(a)(3) to show manifest error affecting a constitutional right. We agree with the 

State.

At her CrR 3.5 hearing, Troutman did not challenge the implied consent 

statute’s authorization of a warrantless breath test as a violation of article I, 

section 7. Under RAP 2.5(a), we will not review claims not raised before the trial 

court unless the party seeking review demonstrates a manifest error affecting a 

constitutional right. 

 5 Troutman correctly notes that she did not need to brief an analysis under State v. 

Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d 54, 720 P.2d 808 (1986), because the Washington Supreme Court has 

already held that article I, section 7 provides privacy protection more extensive than the Fourth 

Amendment. See State v. Mayfield, 192 Wn.2d 871, 880, 434 P.3d 58 (2019). 
No. 84054-1-I/13

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Troutman makes only a conclusory statement that “[t]he record is 

adequate to address the claim and the claimed error is of constitutional 

dimension. Therefore, the issue is properly before this Court.” But Troutman does 

not provide argument demonstrating a manifest constitutional error under RAP 

2.5(a)(3). “This court will not consider claims insufficiently argued by the parties.”

State v. Elliott, 114 Wn.2d 6, 15, 785 P.2d 440 (1990). We decline to reach the 

claim that admission of Troutman’s refusal to take a breath test, as allowed under 

the implied consent statute, violates article 1, section 7.6

V. Supervision Fees 

Troutman argues her judgment and sentence includes community custody 

supervision fees that the court intended to waive. When she was sentenced in 

March 2022, Troutman asked the court to find her indigent and waive nonmandatory fines and fees. The State did not object. The court found her indigent 

and stated, “My intent is to waive whatever I can.” The statute in effect at the 

time, former RCW 9.94A.703(2)(d) (2018), allowed courts to waive supervision 

fees for community custody.7 Regardless, Troutman’s judgment and sentence 

 6 We note that even if we were to reach her claim, this court has already addressed this 

precise issue in State v. Nelson, 7 Wn. App. 2d 588, 605, 434 P.3d 1055 (2019). Nelson

examined State v. Baird, 187 Wn.2d 210, 386 P.3d 239 (2016), in which a majority of the court 

concluded that a breath test conducted under Washington’s implied consent law is a valid search 

incident to arrest. Nelson, 7 Wn. App. 2d at 600. After conducting an analysis under State v. 

Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d 54, 720 P.2d 808 (1986), the Nelson majority held that, “in light of the long 

history of both our implied consent statute and of our case law rejecting arguments for giving art. 

I, § 7 an expanded interpretation . . . [w]e therefore conclude that the implied consent law 

provides authority of law to conduct a warrantless breath test as a search incident to arrest.” Id. at 

605. 

7 The current RCW 9.94A.703(2), which went into effect in June 2022, omits those fees 

altogether.
No. 84054-1-I/14

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included a provision that she “pay supervision fees as determined by” the 

Department of Corrections while on community custody. 

The State concedes remand is appropriate because the trial court did not 

intend to impose supervision fees. We accept the State’s concession and

remand to the trial court to strike the community custody supervision fee. 

VI. Inclusion of Juvenile Dispositions in Offender Score Calculation

Troutman’s statement of additional grounds states her belief that her 

“juv[enile] record should not have been counted against me as points.” She 

attaches her criminal history and the court’s sentencing data showing an offender 

score of six. The standard range for her level IV offense is 33 to 48 months, and 

the court sentenced her to 35 months. Her juvenile dispositions contributed two 

points to her offender score.WASH. STATE CASELOAD FORECAST COUNCIL, 2022

WASHINGTON STATE ADULT SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 311 (2022),

https://cfc.wa.gov/sites/default/files/Publications/Adult_Sentencing_Manual_2022

.pdf [https://perma.cc/9ZJX-45RC]. Removing her juvenile dispositions would 

reduce her offender score to four and the standard range to fifteen to twenty 

months. Id.

At the time of Troutman’s sentencing, the Sentencing Reform Act (SRA), 

RCW 9.94A.589(1)(a), required juvenile dispositions to be counted when 

calculating an offender score subject only to the same limitations that apply to 

adult convictions. But pursuant to Engrossed House Bill (EHB) 1324, 68th Leg. 

(Wash. 2023), a new provision effective July 23, 2023, states: “For the purposes 
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of this section, adjudications of guilt pursuant to Title 13 RCW[8] which are not 

murder in the first or second degree or class A felony sex offenses may not be 

included in the offender score.” LAWS OF 2023, ch. 415, § 2 (codified at RCW 

9.94A.525(1)(b)).

Sentences imposed under the SRA of 1981, ch. 9.94A RCW, “are 

generally meted out in accordance with the law in effect at the time of the 

offense. See RCW 9.94A.345[9]; RCW 10.01.040.[10]” State v. Jenks, 197 Wn.2d 

708, 714, 487 P.3d 482 (2021). Because “ ‘the fixing of legal punishments for 

criminal offenses is a legislative function,’ . . . [i]t is therefore ‘the function of the 

legislature and not the judiciary to alter the sentencing process.’ ” Id. at 713 

(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Ammons, 105 Wn.2d 175, 

180, 713 P.2d 719 (1986), abrogated on other grounds by Washington v. 

 8 The title of Title 13 RCW is “Juvenile Courts and Juvenile Offenders.” 

9 RCW 9.94A.345 states, “Any sentence imposed under this chapter shall be determined 

in accordance with the law in effect when the current offense was committed.”

10 RCW 10.01.040 states in relevant part:

Whenever any criminal or penal statute shall be amended or repealed, all 

offenses committed or penalties or forfeitures incurred while it was in force shall 

be punished or enforced as if it were in force, notwithstanding such amendment 

or repeal, unless a contrary intention is expressly declared in the amendatory or 

repealing act, and every such amendatory or repealing statute shall be so 

construed as to save all criminal and penal proceedings, and proceedings to 

recover forfeitures, pending at the time of its enactment, unless a contrary 

intention is expressly declared therein.

This “savings clause” was enacted to “ ‘render[] unnecessary the incorporation of an individual 

saving clause in each statute which amends or repeals an existing penal statute.’ ” Jenks, 197 

Wn.2d at 719 (quoting State v. Hanlen, 193 Wash. 494, 497, 76 P.2d 316 (1938)) (internal

quotation marks omitted). Thus, in Jenks, the court held that where the plain language—there, an 

amendment to the Persistent Offender Accountability Act, LAWS OF 2019, ch. 187, § 1(33)(o), part 

of the SRA—did not convey the intent for the bill to be retroactive, or to be excluded from the 

savings clause, the amendment applied only prospectively. Id. at 714, 720. Similar to the 

amendment at issue in Jenks, here, where the amendment to the SRA includes no contrary 

intent, the savings clause applies. 
No. 84054-1-I/16

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Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212, 126 S. Ct. 2546, 165 L. Ed. 2d 466 (2006)). Thus, to 

determine whether the newly amended statute relating to Troutman’s sentence 

applies, we must interpret the statute based on its plain language, including that 

of the amendments. Jenks, 197 Wn.2d at 714. If unambiguous, the plain 

language provides “the beginning and the end of the analysis.” Id.11

The amendment has the effect of removing a person’s prior juvenile 

dispositions from use when calculating a person’s offender score for any 

subsequent adult convictions, except for juvenile adjudications of guilt for murder 

in the first degree, murder in the second degree, and class A felony sex offenses. 

Troutman points to the intent section of the amending law to support her 

argument that the plain language “expresses an intent to apply to pending cases 

that are not final.” The intent section states

The legislature intends to:

(1) Give real effect to the juvenile justice system’s express 

goals of rehabilitation and reintegration;

(2) Bring Washington in line with the majority of states, 

which do not consider prior juvenile offenses in 

sentencing range calculations for adults;

(3) Recognize the expansive body of scientific research on 

brain development, which show that adolescent’s 

perception, judgment, and decision making differs 

significantly from that of adults;

 11 Troutman also argues that the statute is remedial, and thus requires liberal 

construction to effectuate the remedial purpose of the statute. While the Jenks court did not 

address this argument, it did nevertheless interpret the statute at issue in that case not to express 

an intent to apply retroactively. And as the State notes, this court in Jenks at the appellate level 

rejected a similar argument, holding that the general rule that a remedial statute applies 

retroactively “does not apply when a statute is subject to RCW 10.01.040,” and “ ‘[a]bsent 

language indicating a contrary intent, an amendment to a penal statute – even a patently 

remedial one – must apply prospectively under RCW 10.01.040.’ ” State v. Jenks, 12 Wn. App. 2d 

588, 600, 459 P.3d 389 (2020) (quoting State v. McCarthy, 112 Wn. App. 231, 237, 48 P.3d 1014 

(2002)), aff’d, 197 Wn.2d 708, 487 P.3d 482 (2021).
No. 84054-1-I/17

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(4) Facilitate the provision of due process by granting the 

procedural protections of a criminal proceeding in any 

adjudication which may be used to determine the 

severity of a criminal sentence; and

(5) Recognize how grave disproportionality within the 

juvenile legal system may subsequently impact 

sentencing ranges in adult court.

LAWS OF 2023, ch. 415, § 1. Troutman argues that this section “uses strong

words that convey an intent” for the law to apply to all pending cases. But the 

plain language says nothing about retroactivity. 

Because the plain language is unambiguous and does not evince a 

legislative intent for EHB 1324 to apply retroactively, we conclude that under the 

SRA, RCW 9.94A.345, and the savings clause, RCW 10.01.040, the law in effect 

at the time of the offense applies to Troutman’s sentence. 

Finally, Troutman argues that EHB 1324 should apply prospectively. “ ‘[A] 

statute applies prospectively,’ rather than retroactively, ‘if the precipitating event 

under the statute occurred after the date of enactment.’ ” Jenks, 197 Wn.2d at 

722 (quoting In re Pers. Restraint of Carrier, 173 Wn.2d 791, 809, 272 P.3d 209 

(2012)). “To determine what event precipitates or triggers application of the 

statute, we look to the subject matter regulated by the statute.” Carrier, 173 

Wn.2d at 809, quoted in Jenks, 197 Wn.2d at 722.

In support of her argument, Troutman cites to State v. Ramirez, in which 

the court held that an amendment to the criminal filing fee statute applied 

prospectively because the precipitating event was “the termination of all appeals, 

at which point the costs were finalized. 191 Wn.2d 732, 749, 426 P.3d 714 

(2018). But in Ramirez, the subject matter was “costs imposed upon conviction.” 
No. 84054-1-I/18

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191 Wn.2d at 749. The Jenks court “decline[d] to expand Ramirez” as it was “not 

analogous to the determination of whether a defendant qualifies as a persistent 

offender,” Jenks, 197 Wn.2d at 723, a determination that is regulated by the 

Persistent Offender Accountability Act and the SRA. Id. at 722.

Here, the statute at issue regulates which prior offenses are included in an 

offender score calculation, so the triggering event is sentencing. See State v. 

Jefferson, 192 Wn.2d, 225, 247-49, 429 P.3d 467 (2018). Because Troutman’s 

sentence is still on direct appeal, the amendment would apply prospectively if the 

savings clause did not apply. But the plain language of EHB 1324 conveys no 

intent that it applies retroactively. See Jenks, 197 Wn.2d at 715-19. Thus, as 

analyzed above, we hold that the amendment does not apply to the calculation of 

Troutman’s offender score.

VII. Victim Penalty Assessment (VPA)

After Troutman appealed and filed her opening brief, the Legislature 

passed Engrossed Substitute House Bill (ESHB) 1169. LAWS OF 2023, ch. 449. 

The court in State v. Ellis described this new law as follows:

ESHB 1169 added a subsection to RCW 7.68.035 that prohibits 

courts from imposing the VPA on indigent defendants as defined in 

RCW 10.01.160(3). LAWS OF 2023, ch. 449 § 1; RCW 7.68.035(4). 

The amended statute also requires trial courts to waive any VPA 

imposed prior to the effective date of the amendment if the offender 

is indigent, on the offender’s motion. LAWS OF 2023, ch. 449 § 1; 

RCW 7.68.035(5)(b). This amendment will take effect on July 1, 

2023. LAWS OF 2023, ch. 449 § 1.

27 Wn. App. 2d 1, 16, 530 P.3d 1048 (2023). The new provision applies to cases 

pending on direct appeal. Id. (citing Ramirez, 191 Wn.2d at 748-49).
No. 84054-1-I/19

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The trial court found Troutman indigent. Based on ESHB 1169, Troutman 

moves this court to strike the VPA from her sentence. The State has indicated it 

has “no objection to striking the [VPA] during the course of Troutman’s appeal 

rather than requiring her to file a motion.” We remand with instructions to strike

the VPA. 

CONCLUSION

We affirm Troutman’s felony DUI conviction and remand to the trial court 

to strike from her sentence the community custody supervision fee and the VPA.

 

WE CONCUR: