UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

No. 99-4039

LADI DAWODU, a/k/a Brian Sunshine,

a/k/a John Doe, a/k/a Craig

Muraskin,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Durham.

N. Carlton Tilley, Jr., District Judge.

(CR-98-131)

Submitted: July 20, 1999

Decided: September 17, 1999

Before HAMILTON and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges,

and PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

Louis C. Allen, III, Federal Public Defender, William C. Ingram, First

Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greensboro, North Carolina, for

Appellant. Walter C. Holton, Jr., United States Attorney, Harry L.

Hobgood, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

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OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Pursuant to his guilty pleas, Ladi Dawodu was convicted of two

counts each of using false social security numbers in violation of 42

U.S.C. § 408(a)(7)(B) (1994) and making false statements to financial

institutions in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (1994). On appeal,

Dawodu alleges that the district court erroneously enhanced his

offense level for obstruction of justice.1 Finding no reversible error,

we affirm.

The basic facts are undisputed. From December 1996 until May

1998, Dawodu used names, social security numbers, and other identifying data he stole from various people to open fraudulent checking

and savings accounts at several banks in North Carolina. Dawodu

would deposit counterfeit and stolen checks into the accounts and

then withdraw cash, and he was able to obtain over $100,000 prior to

his arrest. He was arrested by airport police at the Piedmont Triad

International Airport after an officer recognized him from a wanted

poster. Dawodu identified himself as "Craig Muraskin" and produced

a North Carolina driver's license in that name. Officers also discovered a California driver's license in the name of a different alias and

a sheet of paper containing several people's names, social security

numbers, dates of birth, and other identifying data. 2

Dawodu continued to use the name "Craig Muraskin" while in pretrial custody. He also refused to provide fingerprints or a handwriting

sample to a postal inspector, and he gave the inspector a false address,

social security number, date of birth, and other identifying data. In

addition, Dawodu initially refused to be interviewed by a pretrial ser-

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1 See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3C1.1 (1998) ("USSG").

2 Dawodu attempted to destroy the sheet of paper at one point during

the interview with airport police.

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vices officer, whose function was to determine Dawodu's eligibility

for bond and court-appointed counsel. Although Dawodu ultimately

consented to the interview, he continued to provide false information

concerning his name, address, and social security number. During his

arraignment, the district court addressed Dawodu several times as

"Mr. Muraskin." Although Dawodu did not expressly identify himself

as "Muraskin," he responded to the court's inquiries and did not

inform the court of his true identity. Dawodu eventually agreed to

plead guilty but did not inform the court of his correct name until his

Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 hearing. Finally, Dawodu provided false information to the probation officer assigned to prepare his presentence report.3

Dawodu alleges that the district court erred in finding that his conduct, both individually and collectively, constituted obstruction of justice. We disagree. A two-level enhancement for obstruction is proper

where a defendant provides "materially false information" to a judge,

magistrate, or probation officer. See USSG§ 3C1.1, comment. (n.4(f),

(h)); see also United States v. McDonald, 964 F.2d 390, 392-93 (5th

Cir. 1992) (finding that enhancement was warranted where defendant

used an alias before a magistrate judge during arraignment); United

States v. Montano-Silva, 15 F.3d 52 (5th Cir. 1994) (finding enhancement proper where defendant provided false information to law

enforcement authorities); United States v. Magana-Guerrero, 80 F.3d

398, 401 (9th Cir. 1996) (upholding enhancement where defendant

lied to pretrial services officer).

Contrary to Dawodu's assertions, the focus for these instances of

misconduct is on the materiality of the false representations; not

whether they significantly hindered the administration of justice. For

information to be material, it need only have the potential to affect the

issue under determination, including the term of incarceration or conditions of release. See USSG § 3C1.1, comment. (n.6). In the present

case, the district court properly found that Dawodu's continuous use

of false information was material because it prevented the court from

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3 Dawodu gave the probation officer a nonexistent social security number and false information concerning his employment history. The probation officer eventually determined that Dawodu had no social security

number and had re-entered the country illegally after having been previously deported.

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knowing with whom it was dealing. At the very least, had the court

known Dawodu's true identity and the fact that he had re-entered the

United States illegally, it could have affected the court's decisions

concerning bond or an upward adjustment under USSG§ 4A1.3, p.s.

(Adequacy of Criminal History Category).

We therefore find that Dawodu's misrepresentations to the district

court at arraignment, the pretrial services officer, and the probation

officer provided adequate support for the court's decision to enhance

Dawodu's base offense level for obstruction of justice. Because we

find that any one of these three instances of misconduct were sufficient to apply the enhancement, we decline to address Dawodu's

claim that the district court improperly considered the totality of his

actions.4

Accordingly, we affirm Dawodu's sentence. We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the

decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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4 Dawodu cites no authority for his position, nor can we find any. There

is nothing in the Guidelines which either requires or prohibits the consideration of the cumulative effect of a defendant's actions. In addition, at

least one circuit has endorsed such an approach. See United States v.

Walcott, 61 F.3d 635, 639 (8th Cir. 1995) (applying enhancement based

on the totality of the circumstances even though individual acts may not

be sufficient).

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