IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 17-60845

BOARD OF ALDERMEN OF THE TOWN OF TUTWILER, MISSISSIPPI, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI, OFFICE OF THE STATE AUDITOR; BO 

HOWARD, in his official capacity; ROBERT DAVIS, in his official capacity, 

 Defendants - Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Mississippi

USDC No. 3:17-CV-544

Before JONES, BARKSDALE, and WILLETT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Underlying this action’s being dismissed for lack of standing is the claim 

by the Board of Aldermen for the Town of Tutwiler, Mississippi, that

Mississippi Code Annotated § 45-6-3(d) conflicts with the Fair Labor Standards 

Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 206 et seq., concerning payment for the town’s parttime law-enforcement officers. AFFIRMED.

 

* Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. 

R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

October 1, 2018

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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I.

In Mississippi, a part-time law-enforcement officer is defined as, and 

limited to, receiving compensation of less than $250 a week, or $1,075 a month. 

Miss. Code Ann. § 45-6-3(d) (statutory maximum). This compensation limit 

effectively restricts a part-time law-enforcement officer’s maximum workweek 

to less than 40 hours. Violations of this restriction result in personal liability 

for the aldermen voting to cause the violation, § 45-6-17(2); and they are 

required to replenish the town’s treasury for any costs suffered as a result of 

the violation, §§ 45-6-17(2), 31-7-57(1). The State of Mississippi, Office of the 

State Auditor (OSA), must make a demand upon the malfeasant aldermen and 

their sureties to replenish the town’s treasury. Id. § 7-7-211(g). 

In 2012, Tutwiler’s police department consisted of two officers; each held 

a full-time law-enforcement certificate. In 2013, the police department was 

increased to seven officers, with only six holding such certificates; the other 

officer held a part-time law-enforcement certificate. Also beginning in 2013, 

Tutwiler began the practice of paying a part-time officer more than the 

statutory maximum. That practice continued until February 2017. 

An investigation by OSA determined current and former aldermen 

caused compensation overpayments to several certified part-time lawenforcement officers for Tutwiler. Accordingly, in May 2017, OSA sent demand

letters to those current and former aldermen for recovery of the costs stemming 

from the violations, pursuant to § 45-6-17(2). OSA also submitted proofs of loss 

to the surety on the subject public-official bonds. 

In response, the board filed this action, seeking declaratory and 

injunctive relief based on its claim that the statutory maximum, under § 45-6-

3(d), as enforced, violates the minimum-wage provision of the FLSA, and is, 

therefore, void. Following removal to district court, the board filed two

amended complaints. The first eliminated the request for injunctive relief; the 

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second added a request for a declaration, under state law, “that the Plaintiff 

and/or its officers, in their official capacities, acted in good faith” in paying 

certified part-time police officers more than the statutory maximum. 

OSA moved to dismiss. As a result, the board moved for sanctions under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 (district court may sanction attorneys or 

parties who submit pleadings for an improper purpose or that contain frivolous 

arguments). 

The court granted the motion to dismiss, concluding, “[p]laintiff has not 

demonstrated an actual controversy as would permit this court to exercise 

jurisdiction”, because: OSA was acting on behalf of Tutwiler in accordance with 

state law and had not demanded repayment from the board itself or the town; 

there was no merit to the board’s claim it was being forced to violate federal 

minimum-wage law in order to comply with state law; and there was no 

causation between OSA’s enforcement of state law and the board’s asserted 

injury of “being forced to insufficiently staff its police force”. Bd. of Aldermen 

v. Miss., Office of the State Auditor, No. 3:17-CV-544-TSL-LRA, 2017 WL 

8788322, at *4–5 (S.D. Miss. 21 Nov. 2017). In addition, the court summarily

denied the motion for sanctions as “patently without merit”. Bd. of Aldermen, 

2017 WL 8788322, at *5 n.7. The court ordered this action remanded to state 

court on the board’s state-law claim concerning the good faith of its members. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (district court may decline to exercise supplemental 

jurisdiction over a claim if it has dismissed all claims over which it has original 

jurisdiction). 

II.

Primarily at issue is whether the board has standing to pursue this 

action. Also at issue is the denial of the board’s motion for sanctions. 

Neither issue has merit. 

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A.

An action “is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 

when the court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate” it. 

Home Builders Ass’n of Miss., Inc. v. City of Madison, Miss., 143 F.3d 1006, 

1010 (5th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). Federal courts have subject-matter 

jurisdiction only over a “case” or “controversy”. See U.S. Const. Art. III, § 2, cl. 

1. “To establish a ‘case or controversy,’ a plaintiff must show that he has 

standing to sue.” Deutsch v. Annis Enters., Inc., 882 F.3d 169, 173 (5th Cir. 

2018) (quoting Lujan v. Defs. Of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)). And

to establish standing, the board must satisfy the well-known requirements of 

Lujan:

First, the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact”—an 

invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and 

particularized; and (b) “actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or 

‘hypothetical.’” Second, there must be a causal connection between 

the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury has to be 

“fairly ... trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and 

not ... th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party 

not before the court.” Third, it must be “likely,” as opposed to 

merely “speculative,” that the injury will be “redressed by a 

favorable decision.” 

Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61 (internal citations omitted). Dismissal for lack of 

standing is reviewed de novo. OCA-Greater Hous. v. Tex., 867 F.3d 604, 610 

(5th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted).

The board contends the requisite injury stems from § 45-6-3(d)’s conflict 

with the FLSA because it results in either the failure to compensate part-time 

police officers for time worked, in violation of the FLSA, or an inadequately 

staffed police department, in violation of Mississippi Code Annotated § 21-21-

3 (“municipalities shall have the power and authority to employ, regulate and 

support a sufficient police force . . . .”). OSA counters: the board cannot 

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establish any concrete and particularized invasion of a legally-protected 

interest without demonstrating FLSA violations have occurred; and the board 

admitted it “compli[ed] with the current law [both federal and state] as applied 

and enforced”. 

The board has set up a false dilemma in asserting it cannot comply with 

both the FLSA and Mississippi Code Annotated §§ 45-6-3(d) and 21-21-3. The 

board admitted it can comply, and has complied, with both laws. All other 

asserted injuries arising from compliance with state and federal laws are 

hypothetical, and, in any case, could be remedied through proper budgeting 

and scheduling (e.g., more part-time certified police officers may be hired and 

paid according to Mississippi Code Annotated § 45-6-3(d); full-time certified 

police officers may be scheduled differently to address the deficiencies caused 

by scheduling the part-time officers to work less; or the town could coordinate 

with the sheriff’s department to resolve any deficiencies caused by shortstaffing). 

Along that line, the district court correctly concluded there is no 

causation between the board’s asserted injury of being forced to insufficiently 

staff a police force and the enforcement of a state law which is claimed to be 

preempted by the FLSA. It stated: “Rather, the cause of this injury, if any, is 

the economic reality that a municipality, though its resources and potential 

applicant pool are limited, must still comply with state law.” Bd. of Aldermen, 

2017 WL 8788322, at *5. 

In short, the board has failed to establish injury-in-fact or causation. 

Accordingly, the requisite controversy and, hence, jurisdiction are lacking. 

B.

Regarding the denial of the board’s motion for sanctions, rulings under

Rule 11 are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Whitehead v. Food Max of Miss., 

Inc., 332 F.3d 796, 802 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing Lulirama Ltd., Inc. v. Axcess 

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Broad. Servs., Inc., 128 F.3d 872, 884 (5th Cir. 1997)). In that regard, factual 

findings are reviewed for clear error. Id. 

The board’s motion for sanctions asserted OSA acted in a “malicious, 

deceptive, unethical”, and harassing manner to intimidate the board, violating 

all provisions of Rule 11(b). In support, the board alleged OSA: “improperly”

and “unlawfully” utilized its power to obtain the payment records of the board’s 

counsel in violation of Rule 26 (discovery scope and procedures); “grossly 

misrepresented its communication with the [board] to the [c]ourt”; “without 

sufficient factual or legal basis”, accused the town’s officials of being “corrupt” 

and “unfaithful”; raised frivolous immunity claims in its motion to dismiss; and 

“blatantly misstate[d] well-defined law to [the] [c]ourt”. In response, OSA 

denied all allegations, and stated the board had failed to identify any “pleading, 

written motion or other paper” presented to the court, as required by Rule 11. 

The board asserts the district court abused its discretion by dismissing, 

in a footnote, the board’s motion for sanctions, without providing any factual 

findings or legal conclusions. OSA counters that there is no authority to 

support the board’s claim that a district court cannot deny the motion in that 

fashion. 

Because “[t]he [district] court is not required to state findings or 

conclusions when ruling on a motion”, the court did not abuse its discretion by 

refusing to provide a legal and factual analysis of the motion for sanctions. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(3). In that regard, 

we do not require district courts to make specific findings of fact 

and conclusions of law in every sanctions case. The degree and 

extent to which a specific explanation must be contained in the 

record on appeal will vary according to the particular 

circumstances of the case, including the severity of the violation, 

the significance of the sanctions, and the effect of the award.

Copeland v. Wasserstein, Perella & Co., Inc., 278 F.3d 472, 485 (5th Cir. 2002)

(footnote omitted). 

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In the light of the above, the board fails to demonstrate why the court 

was required to provide findings and conclusions. Therefore, its denying the

motion as “patently without merit” was not an abuse of discretion. 

III.

For the foregoing reasons, as well as essentially for the reasons stated 

by the district court in its comprehensive and well-reasoned opinion, Bd. of 

Aldermen v. Miss., Office of the State Auditor, No. 3:17-CV-544-TSL-LRA, 2017 

WL 8788322 (S.D. Miss. 21 Nov. 2017), the judgment is AFFIRMED.

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