alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Unassociated Document




Exhibit 10.14







First Amendment


Franklin Financial Corporation Employment Agreement


(Barry R. Shenton)







WHEREAS, Franklin Financial Corporation, (the “Company”), has previously entered into an employment agreement (the “Agreement”) with Barry R. Shenton (the “Executive”); and







WHEREAS, the Company and the Executive have determined that a modification to the Agreement is necessary and appropriate, and desire to enter into this First Amendment (the “Amendment”) on the terms and conditions set forth herein.







NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants herein contained, and for other good and valuable consideration, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, the Company and the Executive hereby amend Section 5.1, effective as of the Effective Date of the Agreement (as defined therein),  to read as follows:







“5.1           Change in Control Benefits. If a Change in Control occurs during the term of this Agreement and, thereafter, the Executive’s employment terminates involuntarily but without Cause or if the Executive voluntarily terminates employment with Good Reason, the Company shall make or cause to be made a lump-sum payment to the Executive in an amount in cash equal to three (3) times the Executive’s average annual compensation.  For this purpose, average annual compensation means the Executive’s average annual taxable income reported by the Company (or any affiliate of the Company) for the five (5) calendar years immediately preceding the calendar year in which the Change in Control occurs, provided, however, that such average annual taxable income shall not include any amount reported in the Executive’s Corrected Wage and Tax Statement on Form W-2c, Box 11, relating to distributions received by the Executive from the 2001 Amended and Restated Franklin Federal Savings Bank Deferred Compensation Plan for Directors and Senior Officers.  The payment required under this paragraph is payable no later than five (5) business days after the Executive’s termination of employment.  If the Executive receives payment under Section 5.1, the Executive shall not be entitled to any additional severance benefits under Section 4.1 of this Agreement.  In addition to the cash severance benefit provided for under this Section 5.1, the Company shall provide the Executive with the post-termination insurance coverage described in Section 4.2(a) of this Agreement, subject to the provisions of Section 4.2(b) of this Agreement.”







*     *     *     *     *







In all other respects, the parties hereby ratify and affirm the terms of the Agreement.






  





  











  








IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Company has caused this Amendment to be executed by duly authorized officers, and the Executive has signed this Amendment, as of the 21 day of December, 2011.








	  	
FRANKLIN FINANCIAL CORPORATION


	  	  
	  	
By:

	
/s/ Richard T. Wheeler, Jr.


	  	  
	  	
/s/ Barry R. Shenton


	  	
Barry R. Shenton
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE BALANCE
SHEET AS OF MAY 31, 1999 AND INCOME STATEMENT FOR THE THREE MONTHS ENDED MAY 31,
1999 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FORM 10-Q FILING.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1
<CURRENCY> US DOLLARS

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          FEB-28-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             MAR-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               MAY-31-1999
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                      1
<CASH>                                       8,719,000
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                               12,208,000
<ALLOWANCES>                                   900,000
<INVENTORY>                                  4,357,000
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            25,806,000
<PP&E>                                               0
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              39,658,000
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        5,962,000
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        40,000
<OTHER-SE>                                  33,656,000
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                39,658,000
<SALES>                                      6,458,000
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            13,242,000
<CGS>                                        5,362,000
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                1,959,000
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             5,020,000
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                951,000
<INCOME-TAX>                                   352,000
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            599,000
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   599,000
<EPS-BASIC>                                       0.17
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.16


</TABLE>
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-1993

SABRINA D. DAVIS,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

KIA MOTORS AMERICA, INC.,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at 

Greenville. R. Bryan Harwell, District Judge. (6:08-cv-01937-RBH)

Submitted: January 17, 2019 Decided: January 22, 2019

Before WILKINSON and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit 

Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Sabrina D. Davis, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Sabrina D. Davis appeals the district court’s text order denying her Fed. R. Civ. P. 

60(d)(3) motion to vacate the court’s 2009 order dismissing her civil action for lack of 

jurisdiction. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we 

affirm the district court’s order. Davis v. Kia Motors America, Inc., No. 6:08-cv-01937-

RBH (D.S.C. Aug. 10, 2018). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument 

would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
```

[Congressional Bills 114th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. Res. 192 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

114th CONGRESS
  1st Session
S. RES. 192

 Requiring that legislation considered by the Senate be confined to a 
                             single issue.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                              June 4, 2015

Mr. Enzi submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the 
                 Committee on Rules and Administration

_______________________________________________________________________

                               RESOLUTION

 
 Requiring that legislation considered by the Senate be confined to a 
                             single issue.

    Resolved,

SECTION 1. SINGLE-ISSUE REQUIREMENT.

    (a) Point of Order.--It shall not be in order in the Senate to 
consider a bill or resolution that is not confined to a single subject.
    (b) Supermajority Waiver and Appeals.--
            (1) Waiver.--This section may be waived or suspended in the 
        Senate only by the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the 
        Members, duly chosen and sworn.
            (2) Appeals.--Appeals in the Senate from the decisions of 
        the Chair relating to any provision of this section shall be 
        limited to 30 minutes, to be equally divided between, and 
        controlled by, the appellant and the manager of the bill or 
        resolution. An affirmative vote of two-thirds of the Members of 
        the Senate, duly chosen and sworn, shall be required to sustain 
        an appeal of the ruling of the Chair on a point of order raised 
        under this section.
                                 <all>
```
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jeffery Pedro STIVENDER, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 07-4610.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: Dec. 14, 2007.

Decided: Jan. 10, 2008.

Allen B. Burnside, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. Kevin F. McDonald, Office of the United States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

*499Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Jeffery Pedro Stivender pled guilty to one count of making false claims to the Internal Revenue Service, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 287, 2 (2000). The district court imposed a forty-one-month sentence. Stivender timely appealed.

Stivender’s attorney has filed a brief in accordance with *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), questioning whether the district court erred by considering the intended loss, rather than the actual loss, in calculating Stivender’s guideline range. Counsel states, however, that he has found no meritorious grounds for appeal. Stivender was advised of his right to file a pro se supplemental brief, but he did not file one. Finding no meritorious grounds for appeal, we affirm.

Stivender argues that the court should have considered the actual loss, rather than the intended loss, in calculating his guideline range. However, the guidelines authorize the district court to increase the offense level based on the greater of the actual or intended loss, *U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual*§ 2B1.1 cmt. n. 3(A) (2006), and in this case, the intended loss was greater than the actual loss. We therefore conclude that Stivender’s claim is without merit.

In accordance with *Anders,*we have reviewed the record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. Accordingly, we affirm Stivender’s conviction and sentence.

This court requires that counsel inform Stivender, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Stivender requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Stivender. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*
II 

114TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 96 

To amend the Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010 to provide consumers with a free annual disclosure of information the Bureau of 

Consumer Financial Protection maintains on them, and for other purposes. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

JANUARY 7, 2015 

Mr. VITTER introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred 

to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs 

A BILL 

To amend the Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010 

to provide consumers with a free annual disclosure of 

information the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection maintains on them, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. ANNUAL DISCLOSURE TO CONSUMERS. 

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 1022(c)(9) of the Con5 sumer Financial Protection Act of 2010 (12 U.S.C. 

6 5512(c)(9)) is amended by adding at the end the fol7 lowing: 


smartinez on DSK4TPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 96 IS

1 ‘‘(C) ANNUAL DISCLOSURE TO CON2 SUMERS.— 

3 ‘‘(i) IN GENERAL.—Once during any 

4 12-month period, upon request of a con5 sumer and without charge to the con6 sumer, the Bureau shall clearly and accu7 rately disclose to the consumer, before the 

8 end of the 15-day period beginning on the 

9 day the request is made, the following: 

10 ‘‘(I) All information with respect 

11 to the consumer held by the Bureau 

12 at the time of the request, except that 

13 if the consumer to whom the informa14 tion relates requests that the first 5 

15 digits of the social security number 

16 (or similar identification number) of 

17 the consumer not be included in the 

18 disclosure, and the Bureau has re19 ceived appropriate proof of the iden20 tity of the requester, the Bureau shall 

21 so truncate such number in such dis22 closure. 

23 ‘‘(II) The sources of the informa24 tion. 


smartinez on DSK4TPTVN1PROD with BILLS
3 

•S 96 IS

1 ‘‘(III) Any person or other Fed2 eral department or agency to which 

3 the Bureau disclosed information de4 scribed under subclause (I). 

5 ‘‘(ii) METHOD OF REQUEST.—The 

6 Bureau shall allow consumers to make a 

7 request under clause (i)— 

8 ‘‘(I) online, with a link promi9 nently displayed on the Bureau’s 

10 website; 

11 ‘‘(II) via United States mail; and 

12 ‘‘(III) via a toll-free telephone 

13 number established by the Bureau for 

14 such purpose.’’. 

15 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—Section 1022(c)(9)(C) of the 

16 Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010 (12 U.S.C. 

17 5512(c)(9)(C)), as added by subsection (a), shall take ef18 fect with respect to consumer requests made after the 1- 

19 year period beginning on the date of the enactment of this 

20 Act. 

Æ 


smartinez on DSK4TPTVN1PROD with BILLS
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No 21-7741

EDWARD WITHERSPOON,

Petitioner - Appellant,

v.

FRANK B. BISHOP; MARYLAND ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Respondents - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt. 

Theodore D. Chuang, District Judge. (8:19-cv-00544-TDC)

Submitted: March 24, 2022 Decided: March 29, 2022

Before MOTZ, WYNN, and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Edward Witherspoon, Appellant Pro Se. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM: 

Edward Witherspoon seeks to appeal the district court’s order dismissing without 

prejudice his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition, pursuant to Witherspoon’s request to voluntarily 

withdraw his claims so that he could exhaust his state remedies. A Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2) 

voluntary dismissal without prejudice is not appealable. See Unioil, Inc. v. E.F. Hutton & 

Co., 809 F.2d 548, 555 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that a plaintiff generally may not appeal a 

voluntary dismissal without prejudice because it is not an involuntary adverse judgment 

against him), overruled in part on other grounds by In re Keegan Mgmt. Co., 78 F.3d 431, 

434-35 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Accordingly, we deny Witherspoon’s motion for a certificate of appealability and 

dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions 

are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process. 

DISMISSED
EXHIBIT 99.3

CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM

We
consent to the use of our reports dated March 1, 2007 with respect to the consolidated financial statements of Talisman Energy Inc. as at December 31, 2006 and 2005 and for the
years ended December 31, 2006, 2005 and 2004, Talisman Energy Inc. management's assessment of the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting, and the effectiveness of
internal control over financial reporting of Talisman Energy Inc., included in an exhibit to the Annual Report (Form 40-F) for the year ended
December 31, 2006.

We
also consent to the incorporation by reference in the following Registration Statements:



of
our reports dated March 1, 2007, with respect to the consolidated financial statements of Talisman Energy Inc. as at December 31, 2006 and 2005 and for the years ended
December 31, 2006, 2005 and 2004, Talisman Energy Inc. management's assessment of the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting and the effectiveness of internal control
over financial reporting of Talisman Energy Inc., included in the Annual Report (Form 40-F) of Talisman Energy Inc. for the year ended December 31, 2006.

|Calgary, Canada |  | /s/ ERNST & YOUNG LLP
|--------------- |  | ---------------------
|March 13, 2007  |  | Chartered Accountants

1

---



QuickLinks
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

No. DA 23-0015

STATE OF MONTANA, 

Plaintiff and Appellee, 

v. 

ELIZABETH MARGARET HOSCHOUER,

Defendant and Appellant.

ORDER

Upon consideration of Appellant’s motion for extension of time, 

and good cause appearing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant is granted an extension 

of time to and including April 24, 2023, within which to prepare, file, 

and serve Appellant’s opening brief on appeal.

Electronically signed by:

Mike McGrath

Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

March 15 2023

03/15/2023

Case Number: DA 23-0015
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision **

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CESAR GOMEZ-RIVAS,

 Petitioner,

 v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,

 Respondent.

No. 10-70197

Agency No. A041-830-317

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted May 24, 2011** 

Before: PREGERSON, THOMAS, and PAEZ, Circuit Judges.

Cesar Gomez-Rivas, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions pro se for

review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal

from an immigration judge’s removal order. Our jurisdiction is governed by

8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review de novo questions of law, Cerezo v. Mukasey, 512

FILED

JUN 06 2011

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 10-70197

F.3d 1163, 1166 (9th Cir. 2008), and we deny in part and dismiss in part the

petition for review.

We agree with the agency’s conclusion that Gomez-Rivas’ 2009 controlled

substance offense is not amenable to treatment under the Federal First Offender

Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3607. See de Jesus Melendez v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 1019,

1025-27 (9th Cir. 2007). 

The agency properly determined that Gomez-Rivas was ineligible for

cancellation of removal because he had previously received that form of relief. See

8 U.S.C. § 1229b(c)(6). 

In his opening brief, Gomez-Rivas fails to address, and therefore has waived

any challenge to, the agency’s determination that his convictions for being under

the influence of a controlled substance involved federally-defined controlled

substances. See Martinez–Serrano v. INS, 94 F.3d 1256, 1259-60 (9th Cir. 1996)

(issues not specifically raised and argued in a party’s opening brief are deemed

waived).

We lack jurisdiction to review Gomez-Rivas’ contention that his 2009

conviction was not a “conviction” as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48) because he

failed to exhaust this claim before the BIA. See Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674,

677-78 (9th Cir. 2004).
3 10-70197

Gomez-Rivas’ remaining contentions are not persuasive. 

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.
#### R.I.T.A. CHEMICAL CORP., Plaintiff, v. MALMSTROM CHEMICAL CORP., Ivar Wm. Malmstrom and Richard A. Malmstrom, co-partners d/b/a N. I. Malmstrom *&*Co., Defendants.

No. 60 C 1845.

United States District Court N. D. Illinois, E. D.

Sept. 6, 1962.

John O’C. Fitzgerald, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff.

Joseph D. Block, Chicago, Ill., for defendants.

WILL, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on the motion of the individual defendants Ivar and Richard Malmstrom to vacate that part of the order of January 3, 1962, which denied the motion to quash the return of service of summons as to each of them. In their motion to vacate, the individual defendants press the argument, not made in the original motion, that the service effected upon them personally in New York and New Jersey is not authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, specifically, Rule 4, 28 U.S.C.A.

In the written opinion accompanying the order of January 3, the Court found that the complaint alleged sufficient activity within the State of Illinois by *214the individual defendants to subject them to service under sections 16 and 17 of the Illinois Civil Practice Act, Ill.Rev. Stat.1961, c. 110, §§ 16, 17. The present motion questions the propriety of resorting to the Illinois statute.

 It is well settled that in original diversity actions recourse is permitted to a state statute (such as the Illinois Motor Vehicle Law) for purposes of the service of process where a nonresident defendant, who has allegedly performed sufficient activity within the state to bring him under its jurisdiction, has appointed or been deemed to appoint an agent in the state through whom service may be made. The rationale for this procedure is the fiction that service is made at the time the process is received by the agent within the state, not at the time notice is sent by registered mail to the out-of-state defendant.

In order to avoid the inconsistency and illogie of refusing, often in the same case, to permit recourse to another state statute (such as the Illinois Civil Practice Act) where summons is sought to be sei'ved personally beyond the territorial limits of the state on a nonresident defendant who, under the applicable state law, is subject to its jurisdiction, the Court adopts as its interpretation of the appropriate subsections of Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure the holding and accepts the reasoning of those cases which have sanctioned the availability of the state statute in either of the foregoing instances. See Giffin v. Ensign, 3 Cir. 1956, 234 F.2d 307; Star v. Rogalny, D.C.E.D.Ill. 1957, 162 F.Supp. 181; Farr & Co. v. Cia. Intercontinental De Navegacion De Cuba, 2 Cir. 1957, 243 F.2d 342 and Kappus v. Western Hills Oil, Inc., D.C.E.D. Wis.1959, 24 F.R.D. 123. Accordingly, the motion to vacate is denied.

An order consistent with the above will be entered.
[Federal Register Volume 82, Number 171 (Wednesday, September 6, 2017)]
[Notices]
[Page 42121]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2017-18962]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Foreign Claims Settlement Commission

[F.C.S.C. Meeting and Hearing Notice No. 8-17]


Sunshine Act Meeting

    The Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, pursuant to its 
regulations (45 CFR part 503.25) and the Government in the Sunshine Act 
(5 U.S.C. 552b), hereby gives notice in regard to the scheduling of 
open meetings as follows:

DATES: Thursday, September 14, 2017: 10:00 a.m.--Issuance of Proposed 
Decisions in claims against Iraq.

Status:  Open.
    All meetings are held at the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, 
600 E Street NW., Washington, DC. Requests for information, or advance 
notices of intention to observe an open meeting, may be directed to: 
Patricia M. Hall, Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, 600 E Street 
NW., Suite 6002, Washington, DC 20579. Telephone: (202) 616-6975.

Brian M. Simkin,
Chief Counsel.
[FR Doc. 2017-18962 Filed 9-1-17; 11:15 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-BA-P