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*********************************************** 
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ROBERT R.*

(SC 20355)

Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria,

Kahn, Ecker and Keller, Js.

Syllabus

Convicted of sexual assault in the first degree in connection with the sexual

abuse of M, the stepsister of the defendant’s girlfriend, S, the defendant

appealed. At trial, M testified that the defendant had sexually assaulted

her on four occasions, the first three of which occurred when M was

a minor and the defendant was in his twenties. The fourth incident,

which led to the defendant’s conviction, occurred when M was eighteen

years old. With respect to the latter incident, M testified that she was

home alone when the defendant knocked on the door and that, after

she asked him to leave, the defendant entered the home, grabbed her

arm, pushed her toward the living room couch, and sexually assaulted

her. M further testified that, after the defendant was startled by an

outside noise, he went into the kitchen, where he ejaculated into a paper

towel that he threw into a garbage can. At trial, the defendant denied

that he ever sexually assaulted M, but he admitted to having consensual

sex with her during that incident. He also denied that he ejaculated into

a paper towel and threw it in the garbage. N, a forensic biologist, testified

at trial regarding tests she conducted on the paper towel, which M had

provided to the police shortly after the incident. N testified that those

tests revealed the presence of semen but were negative for spermatozoa.

P, a forensic science examiner, testified that tests she performed on

the paper towel revealed the presence of the defendant’s skin cells but

were inconclusive as to whether his sperm cells were also present.

Neither N nor P could indicate how the various substances came to be

on the towel. During closing arguments, defense counsel focused on

attacking M’s credibility and exposing her motive to falsely accuse the

defendant. Specifically, defense counsel attempted to present the defendant’s theory of the case that M had planted evidence by wiping herself

with the paper towel after engaging in a consensual sexual encounter

with the defendant and then presenting that paper towel to the police.

The trial court nevertheless sustained the prosecutor’s objection and

precluded defense counsel from making that argument, concluding that

it was not supported by any evidence in the record. On appeal, the

defendant contended, inter alia, that the trial court had violated his

constitutional right to the assistance of counsel by precluding defense

counsel from arguing to the jury that M had planted physical evidence

on the paper towel in an effort to falsely accuse the defendant. Held:

1. The trial court improperly precluded defense counsel from arguing to the

jury during closing argument that M had planted physical evidence on

the paper towel in an effort to substantiate her false allegations against

the defendant, in violation of the defendant’s constitutional right to the

assistance of counsel, and, accordingly, this court reversed the judgment

of conviction and remanded the case for a new trial:

a. The trial court improperly restricted the scope of defense counsel’s

closing argument by barring him from presenting the defendant’s theory

of the case, as there was sufficient evidence in the record from which

the jury reasonably could have inferred that M planted the evidence on the

paper towel to substantiate her false allegations against the defendant:

defense counsel relied on reasonable inferences from the facts in evidence, including the conflicting testimony of M and the defendant regarding the incident and whether the defendant ejaculated into the paper

towel, testimony that it was M who provided the paper towel to the police,

the testimony of N and P regarding their findings, and the testimony of

one of M’s stepsisters that M had a history of making false claims;

moreover, the evidence presented at trial, namely, that M had a tumultuous relationship with her family, that she had a history of making false

claims, and that she had been engaged in a consensual romantic relationship with the defendant, who married S only months after the incident

in question, provided a basis for the jury to reasonably infer that M had
a motive for planting evidence of the defendant’s DNA on the paper towel.

b. The trial court’s improper limitation on the scope of defense counsel’s

closing argument deprived the defendant of his constitutional right to

the assistance of counsel, and, accordingly, the defendant was entitled

to a new trial; M’s testimony was the only source of evidence from which

the jury reasonably could have concluded that the sexual encounter

with the defendant was not consensual, the only argument presented by

defense counsel to establish reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt

concerned M’s credibility, and, because the evidence regarding the paper

towel provided the strongest evidence, from the defendant’s perspective,

that M lied about the incident, depriving defense counsel of the opportunity to make that argument was to deprive the defendant of the full and

fair participation of his counsel in the adversary process.

2. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the evidence was

insufficient to support his conviction of sexual assault in the first degree

on the ground that the state failed to prove that he used force or the

threat of force; M’s testimony with respect to the alleged sexual assault,

including that the defendant grabbed her arm, pushed her toward the

couch, removed her underwear, and inserted his penis inside of her as

she tried to push him off and protested, was sufficient to establish the

force element required for a conviction of first degree sexual assault.

3. This court declined to address the defendant’s claim that the trial court

had abused its discretion in admitting the testimony of an expert in

the field of child and adolescent sexual abuse, insofar as the expert’s

expertise was in child sexual abuse and M was eighteen years old

when the incident at issue occurred; although it was possible that the

defendant’s claim would arise during the defendant’s new trial if the

prosecutor elected to call the same expert, the trial court may further

evaluate the issue on remand, as the prosecutor may call that expert

and probe her experience in working with eighteen year olds or may

call a different expert, in which case the record would look different

from the one presently before this court.

Argued May 6—officially released August 6, 2021**

Procedural History

Substitute information charging the defendant with

three counts of the crime of risk of injury to a child,

and with one count each of the crimes of sexual assault

in the first degree and sexual assault in the second

degree, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial

district of Fairfield and tried to the jury before Russo,

J.; verdict and judgment of guilty of sexual assault in

the first degree, from which the defendant appealed.

Reversed; new trial.

Cameron L. Atkinson, with whom, on the brief, were

Norman A. Pattis, Kevin Smith and Zachary Reiland,

for the appellant (defendant).

Matthew A. Weiner, assistant state’s attorney, with

whom, on the brief, were Joseph T. Corradino, state’s

attorney, and Ann F. Lawlor, supervisory assistant

state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion

McDONALD, J. The defendant, Robert R., appeals

from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury

trial, of one count of sexual assault in the first degree.

On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the trial court

violated his sixth amendment right to the assistance of

counsel by precluding defense counsel during closing

argument from arguing to the jury that the complainant,

M, had planted physical evidence on a paper towel in

an effort to substantiate her false allegations against

the defendant, (2) there was insufficient evidence to

prove that the defendant used force or the threat of

force, as required to sustain his conviction of sexual

assault in the first degree, and (3) the trial court improperly admitted expert testimony from a witness who

specializes in child and adolescent sexual abuse. We

agree with the defendant with respect to his first claim

and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of conviction.

The jury reasonably could have found the following

relevant facts. When M was twelve years old, she moved

to Bridgeport to live with her father, Louis, stepmother,

Dora, and stepsister, Isabelle. Another of M’s stepsisters, Stephanie, was dating the defendant. Stephanie

and the defendant lived together down the street from

Louis and Dora. At the time M moved to Bridgeport,

the defendant was in his mid-twenties. M testified that

the defendant sexually assaulted her on multiple occasions and exposed her to sexually inappropriate situations when she was between the ages of thirteen and

eighteen years old. Specifically, M testified to four

incidents.

The first incident described by M occurred when she

was thirteen years old. One evening, the defendant came

to M’s house because he had an argument with Stephanie. Louis told the defendant that he could ‘‘stay on

the couch.’’ M testified that, when she brought the

defendant a blanket, he ‘‘touch[ed] [her] butt,’’ followed

her to her bedroom, and sexually assaulted her. M testified that, the next morning, the defendant sexually

assaulted her a second time in her bedroom. M told

Louis about the sexual assaults, and Louis and Dora

then took her to Bridgeport Hospital. M ultimately left

the hospital before being examined by a physician.

Louis’ testimony regarding this incident, however, varied from M’s. He testified that, on the evening in question, he and the defendant were watching wrestling and

drinking beer in the living room. The defendant went

upstairs to use the bathroom. Louis recalled that he

went upstairs and found the defendant, fully clothed,

looking in on M while she slept. He then told the defendant to ‘‘get the hell out,’’ and the defendant left the

house. Louis also testified that he found the defendant

hiding in the closet in M’s bedroom one morning but

could not recall if it was the morning after he first found

the defendant looking in on M.
M also recounted a second incident. She testified

that, when she was thirteen years old, the defendant

asked her to send him nude pictures of herself. M testified that she complied and that the defendant then

sent her a nude picture of himself. Isabelle, however,

testified that she was present when the defendant and

Stephanie informed Louis that M had been sending the

defendant nude pictures of herself. Isabelle also testified that she did not know anything about the defendant

sending pictures to M. Finally, Isabelle recalled that M

had a history of ‘‘making false claims.’’

M described a third incident that occurred when she

was fourteen or fifteen years old. M testified that, one

night, when her friend, V, slept over at her house, the

defendant came into M’s bedroom, removed her clothes,

and sexually assaulted her. V confirmed that she regularly slept over at M’s house. She stated that, during

the sleepovers, she would sleep in M’s twin bed with

M. V testified, however, that she did not recall the defendant ever entering M’s bedroom while she slept over.

Finally, M testified that a fourth incident occurred

on July 28, 2016, when M was eighteen years old. Specifically, M recounted that, after returning home from a

summer program at a nearby university, she let her dog

out into her fenced in backyard. Shortly thereafter, the

defendant knocked on the front door. When M opened

the door, she saw the defendant holding her dog, and

he explained that he found the dog down the street

from M’s house. M took the dog from the defendant,

and the defendant asked M where Louis was. M

responded that he had not arrived home from work. M

then asked the defendant to leave because Louis did

not want him there when M was home alone. M testified

that the defendant, instead of leaving, kept inching into

the home, until he grabbed M’s arm, pushed her toward

the living room couch, and sexually assaulted her. M

testified that, during the assault, ‘‘I was trying to push

him off me with my arms, but he kept holding [them]

down, so I kept turning my body like this, with my

knees, trying to push him off me, and he didn’t want

to get off. And I was yelling, help, can you stop, can

you get off me, and then he didn’t want to get off me.’’ M

testified that the defendant ended the assaultive sexual

intercourse with her suddenly when he was startled by

a car pulling out of a neighbor’s driveway. According

to M, the defendant got off of her, went into the kitchen,

began to masturbate, ejaculated into a paper towel,

threw the paper towel into a garbage can, and left.

Following the assault, M called Louis and told him

what had just transpired. She also texted Isabelle that

the defendant had ‘‘touched’’ her and that she ‘‘fe[lt]

disgusted.’’ The police were subsequently called, and

M reported the incident to officers on the scene and

provided them with the paper towel into which she

claimed the defendant had ejaculated. M was then taken
by ambulance to the hospital, where medical personnel

performed a physical examination and administered a

sexual assault evidence collection kit. The defendant

was interviewed by the police and denied having any

sexual contact with M.

In connection with the allegations made by M, the

state charged the defendant with one count of sexual

assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-70 (a) (1), one count of sexual assault in the

second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-71

(a) (1), one count of risk of injury to a child in violation

of General Statutes § 53-21 (a) (2), and two counts of

risk of injury to a child in violation of § 53-21 (a) (1).

At trial, the defendant testified in his own defense.

He denied each allegation, stating that he never sexually

assaulted M. The defendant, however, did admit to having consensual sex with M on July 28, 2016, when she

was eighteen years old, a claim that he denied when

he was initially questioned by the police. He explained

to the jury that he lied to the police initially because

he was being interviewed within earshot of Stephanie,

and she did not know at that point that he had ‘‘cheat[ed]

on’’ her with M. The defendant testified that he began

having consensual, physical encounters with M in

March, 2016. He stated that the encounters began with

‘‘romantic conversations’’ in the car, then progressed

to making out, and eventually led to the two having

consensual sex. The defendant testified that they had

consensual sex on two occasions: first, approximately

one week prior to the July, 2016 incident in M’s home,

and, the second time, on July 28, 2016.

With respect to the July 28, 2016 incident, the defendant testified that he had found M’s dog on the street

and took it back to her house. When M opened the

door, she hugged him, and they began to kiss. According

to the defendant, things quickly progressed, and the two

began having sex against the doorway. The defendant

testified that, shortly after moving to the couch, he

became self-conscious, realizing that this was the time

that Louis typically arrived home from work, and he

was worried that Louis would walk in on them. The

defendant further testified that, as a result, he ended

the encounter, left the house, and went home. The

defendant specifically denied M’s claim that he ejaculated into a paper towel and threw it in the garbage

can, explaining that, after he stopped having sexual

intercourse, he just pulled up his pants and left. He

also testified that M did not seem upset when he left

the house.

Jennifer Nelson, a forensic biologist, also testified at

trial. Nelson testified that she analyzed the bodily fluids

found on the paper towel at the state forensic laboratory. Specifically, she conducted tests on the paper

towel, looking for the presence of semen and spermatozoa.1 These tests revealed the presence of semen on
the paper towel but were negative for spermatozoa.

Nelson testified that she did not know how the substances came to be on the paper towel. Angela Przech,

who works as a forensic science examiner at the state

forensic laboratory, testified that she performed DNA

testing on a stain found on the paper towel. Przech’s

testing revealed that the defendant’s DNA profile was

included in a DNA mixture found in an epithelial fraction sample of the stain.2 Przech testified that she

assumed that M was the other DNA contributor. Regarding the DNA profile found in the sperm-rich fraction

sample, M was eliminated as a source, and the defendant’s ‘‘profile was inconclusive when compared to the

evidentiary sample.’’ In short, Przech’s testing revealed

that the defendant’s skin cells were on the paper towel,

but her testing was inconclusive as to whether his sperm

cells were also present. Przech also testified that she

did not know how the substances came to be on the

paper towel.

The jury ultimately found the defendant guilty of sexual assault in the first degree in connection with the

events of July 28, 2016, and not guilty of the remaining

charges. The court sentenced the defendant to a total

effective sentence of twenty years’ incarceration, two

of which are the mandatory minimum, suspended after

eight years, and ten years of supervised probation. This

appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as

necessary.

I

We first consider the defendant’s claim that the trial

court improperly precluded defense counsel during

closing argument from arguing to the jury that M had

planted physical evidence on the paper towel in an

effort to substantiate her false allegations against the

defendant, thereby violating the defendant’s right to the

assistance of counsel under the sixth amendment to

the United States constitution.

During closing argument, defense counsel focused

on attacking M’s credibility and exposing her motive

to falsely accuse the defendant. Specifically, with

respect to the events of July 28, 2016, defense counsel

‘‘attempted to present [his] theory that [M] wiped her

genitals with the paper towel after the defendant left

. . . following their consensual, sexual encounter, and

then presented that paper towel to the police in an

effort to manufacture evidence to support her false

claim that the intercourse was not consensual, but sexual assault.’’ Specifically, the following exchange transpired:

‘‘[Defense Counsel]: So, when you look at that event,

you know, July 28, 2016, [M’s] version is—is not—is

not credible. And I should say it isn’t a competition

between which version you find more credible. It is

whether . . . the evidence that’s presented here con-
vinces you beyond a reasonable doubt. And, again, the

judge will instruct you as to what that means, but it

means more than possibly or probably.

‘‘And with respect to the evidence with the paper

towel, you heard . . . Nelson testify that they did not

find sperm on that towel, they found components of

semen. And I did ask her, wouldn’t you expect to find

sperm on there if there was ejaculate on there? She

said, well, not necessarily, or something along those

lines. But—and you heard [the defendant] testify, I

never touched a paper towel, he doesn’t know what

they’re talking about. Well, then, how does [his] DNA

get on the paper towel? And the answer is it comes

from [M]. That’s her house, her kitchen. And—

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: I’m going to object, Your Honor;

there was no evidence to that.

‘‘The Court: [Defense counsel]?

‘‘[Defense Counsel]: It’s argument, Your Honor.

‘‘The Court: I don’t think there was any evidence in

the record of what you are explaining to the jury now.

I’m going to sustain the state’s objection.

‘‘[Defense Counsel]: Very good, Your Honor. So, again,

the case comes down to credibility, and the center of

the state’s case is the complaining witness, [M], and

her testimony is not credible, certainly not credible

enough to remove the state’s burden of [proof] beyond

a reasonable doubt.’’ (Emphasis added.)

During the state’s rebuttal closing argument, the prosecutor focused on bolstering M’s credibility and attacking

the defendant’s credibility. The prosecutor also highlighted M’s testimony regarding the paper towel. Specifically, the prosecutor stated: ‘‘[M] told us how a

neighbor was pulling out of the driveway, [she and the

defendant] could hear the neighbor pulling out of the

driveway. The driveway, according to [M], was right

next to the—or abutted the living room in the home.

And the defendant heard that, jumped up, ejaculated

into a paper towel in the kitchen, which is a big, open

room, and left.’’

The defendant contends that defense counsel’s argument, that M planted the defendant’s DNA on the paper

towel, was consistent with the physical evidence collected from the paper towel and the defendant’s testimony. Had defense counsel been allowed to argue that

M planted the evidence on the paper towel, the defendant claims, M’s ‘‘credibility would have been further

challenged.’’ In short, the defendant contends that the

state had the opportunity to fully present its theory of

the case to the jury but that he was not afforded the

same opportunity.

The state disagrees and contends that the defendant’s

claim on appeal ‘‘is meritless because there was no

evidence before the jury from which it reasonably could
have concluded that the semen stains found on the

paper towel were put there by M.’’ Therefore, the state

argues, ‘‘the trial court properly precluded [defense

counsel] from urging the jury to reach a conclusion

based solely on speculation.’’ Alternatively, the state

contends that, even if the trial court’s ruling was

improper, it did not deprive the defendant of his sixth

amendment right to the assistance of counsel.

We begin with the standard of review and relevant

legal principles. ‘‘The sixth amendment guarantee in

the federal constitution of the right to assistance of

counsel has been held to include the right to present

closing arguments.’’3

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ames, 171 Conn. App. 486, 516, 157 A.3d

660, cert. denied, 327 Conn. 908, 170 A.3d 679 (2017).

As the United States Supreme Court has explained,

‘‘[t]here can be no doubt that closing argument for the

defense is a basic element of the adversary [fact-finding]

process in a criminal trial. Accordingly, it has universally been held that [defense counsel] has a right to

make a closing summation to the jury, no matter how

strong the case for the prosecution may appear to the

presiding judge.’’ Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853,

858, 95 S. Ct. 2550, 45 L. Ed. 2d 593 (1975).

‘‘In general, the scope of final argument lies within

the sound discretion of the court . . . subject to appropriate constitutional limitations. . . . It is within the

discretion of the trial court to limit the scope of final

argument to prevent comment on facts that are not

properly in evidence, to prevent the jury from considering matters in the realm of speculation and to prevent

the jury from being influenced by improper matter that

might prejudice its deliberations. . . . [Although] we

are sensitive to the discretion of the trial court in limiting argument to the actual issues of the case, tight

control over argument is undesirable when counsel is

precluded from raising a significant issue.’’ (Citations

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.

Arline, 223 Conn. 52, 59–60, 612 A.2d 755 (1992).

Although defense counsel may not make speculative

arguments to the jury, we have explained that ‘‘counsel

may comment [on] facts properly in evidence and [on]

reasonable inferences drawn therefrom.’’ (Emphasis

added.) State v. Kinsey, 173 Conn. 344, 348, 377 A.2d

1095 (1977).

It is beyond dispute that, ‘‘[i]f the trial court denies

the defendant an opportunity to give closing arguments,

the reviewing court should grant a new trial.’’ State v.

Plaskonka, 22 Conn. App. 207, 211, 577 A.2d 729, cert.

denied, 216 Conn. 812, 580 A.2d 65 (1990). We have

gone further and held that ‘‘[t]he right to present a

closing argument is abridged not only when a defendant

is completely denied an opportunity to argue before

the court or the jury after all the evidence has been

admitted, but also when a defendant is deprived of the
opportunity to raise a significant issue that is reasonably

inferable from the facts in evidence. This is particularly

so when . . . the prohibited argument bears directly

on the defendant’s theory of the defense.’’ State v.

Arline, supra, 223 Conn. 64.

Here, defense counsel’s closing argument focused on

attacking M’s credibility and exposing her motive to

falsely accuse the defendant of sexual assault. Defense

counsel sought to present his theory of the case to the

jury—that M had planted the evidence on the paper

towel by wiping herself following a consensual, sexual

encounter with the defendant. It is clear to us that this

argument was proper because it is based on reasonable

inferences from facts in evidence. Contrary to the trial

court’s conclusion that there was no evidence in the

record to support the argument, we conclude that

defense counsel’s argument relied on reasonable inferences from the following evidence: (1) M’s testimony

that the defendant ejaculated into the paper towel following the alleged sexual assault; (2) testimony from

both M and an officer who responded to the scene that

M provided the paper towel to the police; (3) Nelson’s

testimony that no spermatozoa were present on the

paper towel; (4) Przech’s testimony that she assumed

that the DNA found on the paper towel matched M’s;

(5) the defendant’s testimony denying M’s claim that

he ejaculated into a paper towel and his version of

events that, after he stopped having sex, he just pulled

up his pants and left; (6) the fact that only M and the

defendant were home at the time of the incident; and

(7) according to at least one witness, M had a history

of ‘‘making false claims.’’

Moreover, the jury reasonably could have concluded,

on the basis of various testimony throughout trial, that

M’s relationship with her family was strained and that

M and the defendant were engaged in a romantic, consensual relationship. For example, M testified that she

was worried that Louis would not believe her about the

July 28, 2016 assault because she and Dora did not

have a good relationship. The nature of M and Dora’s

relationship was confirmed by Dora, who testified that

she ‘‘tried to have a relationship with [M], but she never

let me in,’’ and that M told her many times, ‘‘you’re not

my mother.’’ Dora also told the police that M was ruining

her relationship with Louis. Additionally, Isabelle testified that she was aware of ‘‘a history of [M] making

false claims.’’ For her part, Stephanie testified that she

does not speak to Louis and they are not on good terms

as a result of the July 28, 2016 incident. These facts

provided a basis for the jury to reasonably infer that

M had a motive for planting the defendant’s DNA on

the paper towel.

As to the nature of the relationship between M and

the defendant, the defendant testified that, in March,

2016, he and M began ‘‘having romantic conversations,’’
they began ‘‘getting intimate,’’ and were in a ‘‘romantic

relationship . . . .’’ The defendant also testified that,

by July, 2016, he and M ‘‘were already in a relationship,

and not a relationship as boyfriend and girlfriend, more

as we were making out type stuff.’’ Indeed, during her

rebuttal closing argument, the prosecutor emphasized

the defendant’s characterization of the nature of his

relationship with M as a ‘‘love affair . . . .’’ Finally, the

defendant testified that he was engaged to Stephanie

and ultimately married her just three months after M

alleged that he had sexually assaulted her. Again, these

facts tended to make reasonable the defendant’s theory

regarding the paper towel.

It would not have been an unreasonable inference

for the jury to conclude that M had planted the evidence

on the paper towel after the sexual encounter with the

defendant ceased, either because of her tumultuous

relationship with her family or because she was romantically interested in the defendant and was not happy

that he was engaged to Stephanie. Moreover, regardless

of her motive for allegedly planting the evidence, the

jury was presented with two versions of events based

solely on the testimony of M and the defendant. M

testified that the defendant ejaculated into a paper

towel. The defendant testified that he did not. Given

that it is undisputed that the only two people in the

home at the time of the alleged sexual assault were M

and the defendant, if the jury accepted the defendant’s

testimony that he did not ejaculate into a paper towel,

it would not have been an unreasonable inference to

conclude that the only other way the defendant’s DNA

could have gotten on the paper towel was by M’s act

of placing it there. To be sure, it is no less reasonable

than an inference that the defendant ejaculated into

the paper towel. As the prosecutor conceded at oral

argument, Nelson and Przech did not testify that it was

more likely than not that the defendant’s DNA ended

up on the paper towel as a result of the defendant’s

ejaculating into it. They both testified that they did not

know how the defendant’s DNA came to be on the

paper towel. Thus, the jury’s determination as to how

the defendant’s DNA came to be on the paper towel was

based solely on the testimony of M and the defendant.

Defense counsel’s argument was not ‘‘sheer speculation’’

or ‘‘rhetorical advocacy’’; (internal quotation marks

omitted) State v. Manley, 195 Conn. 567, 580, 489 A.2d

1024 (1985); rather, it was based on logical inferences

from the facts as presented to the jury if it credited the

defendant’s testimony.

In Arline, we ‘‘agree[d] with the reasoning of the

Maine Supreme [Judicial] Court in State v. Liberty, 498

A.2d 257 (Me. 1985).’’ State v. Arline, supra, 223 Conn.

65 n.11. In Liberty, the Maine high court concluded that

the trial court erred in restricting defense counsel from

arguing in summation certain evidence that had been

admitted without objection. State v. Liberty, supra, 258.
The court explained: ‘‘In a closing argument each party

should be permitted to summarize the case from the

perspective of that party’s interpretation of all the evidence in the case and the inferences to be drawn therefrom. It is not for the presiding [judge] to proscribe

argument as to a portion of the evidence which the

jury has heard.’’ Id., 259. Likewise, in the present case,

defense counsel should have been permitted to present

the defendant’s theory of the case to the jury, just as

the state did, given that there was sufficient evidence

in the record from which the jury reasonably could

have inferred that M planted the evidence on the paper

towel to substantiate her false allegations against the

defendant.

The state nevertheless contends that the defendant’s

argument relies on ‘‘the assumption that, if the jury

credited the defendant’s testimony, the only way it

could have reconciled that testimony with the lab

results was by concluding that M had wiped her genitals

after a consensual encounter’’ with the defendant. The

state purports to negate that assumption by speculating

about other possible conclusions the jury could have

reached on the basis of the defendant’s testimony and

the other evidence in the record. We are not persuaded.

The defendant is not required to prove that the only

way the jury could have reconciled the testimony and

other evidence was by concluding that M wiped herself

with the paper towel. The defendant need only establish

that one way the jury could have reconciled all the

testimony and other evidence was by concluding that

M wiped herself. In other words, the defendant does

not have to conclusively establish that the jury would

have accepted his argument; he need only establish that

it was a reasonable inference for the jury to make on

the basis of the evidence. See, e.g., State v. Kinsey,

supra, 173 Conn. 348 (‘‘counsel may comment [on] facts

properly in evidence and [on] reasonable inferences

drawn therefrom’’).

Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court improperly restricted the scope of defense counsel’s closing

argument when it barred counsel from arguing to the

jury that M had planted physical evidence in an effort to

substantiate her false allegations against the defendant.

We next consider whether the trial court’s action in

denying the defendant the opportunity to present his

theory of the case to the jury denied him the right to

the assistance of counsel.

The right to the assistance of counsel ensures an

‘‘opportunity to participate fully and fairly in the adversary [fact-finding] process.’’ Herring v. New York,

supra, 422 U.S. 858. ‘‘It can hardly be questioned that

closing argument serves to sharpen and clarify the

issues for resolution by the trier of fact in a criminal

case. For it is only after all the evidence is in that

counsel for the parties are in a position to present their
respective versions of the case as a whole. Only then

can they argue the inferences to be drawn from all

the testimony, and point out the weaknesses of their

adversaries’ positions. And for the defense, closing

argument is the last clear chance to persuade the trier

of fact that there may be reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt.’’ Id., 862. ‘‘In a criminal trial, which is in

the end basically a [fact-finding] process, no aspect of

[partisan] advocacy could be more important than the

opportunity finally to marshal the evidence for each

side before submission of the case to judgment.’’ Id.

Our appellate courts have previously found reversible

error when the trial court precluded defense counsel

from discussing certain issues during closing argument,

particularly when an issue was significant and ‘‘[bore]

directly on the defendant’s theory of the defense.’’ State

v. Arline, supra, 223 Conn. 64. For example, in Arline,

this court reversed the judgment of the Appellate Court

and remanded the case for a new trial when the trial

court improperly precluded defense counsel from questioning the credibility of the complainant during closing

argument. Id., 64–65. Specifically, we concluded that

the trial court improperly precluded defense counsel

during closing argument from commenting on certain

facts that had been elicited from the complainant on

cross-examination that tended to establish her motive

or bias. Id., 55–56, 62–63. We explained that the defendant’s theory of defense was centered on attacking the

complainant’s credibility, and, although there were other

pieces of evidence that called the complainant’s credibility into question, the testimony elicited on crossexamination provided the only evidence of motive or

bias. Id., 64. Given the centrality of the issue to the

case, we concluded that preventing defense counsel

from arguing motive or bias of the state’s chief witness

deprived the defendant of his sixth amendment right

to the assistance of counsel. Id., 64–65; see, e.g., State

v. Ross, 18 Conn. App. 423, 433–34, 558 A.2d 1015 (1989)

(defendant was entitled to new trial when trial court

prohibited defense counsel from commenting on fact

that sole eyewitness to shooting, under state’s theory

of case, did not testify at trial).

Here, M’s testimony was the only source of evidence

from which the jury reasonably could have concluded

that the defendant sexually assaulted her.4 The results

of the forensic testing and the sexual assault evidence

collection kit did not establish that the July 28, 2016

sexual encounter, which the defendant admitted occurred,

was nonconsensual.5 The only argument presented by

defense counsel to establish reasonable doubt of the

defendant’s guilt was directed at M’s credibility.

Although there were numerous evidentiary bases from

which M’s credibility could be challenged,6

the testimony and other record evidence regarding the paper

towel provided the strongest evidence, from the defendant’s perspective, that M lied about the July 28, 2016
encounter. To deprive defense counsel of the opportunity to argue that the state’s chief witness lied, when

the linchpin of the defense was attacking the credibility

of that witness, is to deprive the defendant of the full

and fair participation of his counsel in the adversary

process. See, e.g., State v. Arline, supra, 223 Conn. 64

(‘‘The right to present a closing argument is abridged

. . . when a defendant is deprived of the opportunity

to raise a significant issue that is reasonably inferable

from the facts in evidence. This is particularly so when

. . . the prohibited argument bears directly on the

defendant’s theory of the defense.’’).

The trial court’s restriction on defense counsel’s closing argument was particularly significant in this case

because the state argued that M’s testimony was credible because she had no motive to fabricate her testimony. During the state’s rebuttal closing argument, the

prosecutor argued: ‘‘Why on earth, if [M and the defendant] are in a sexual relationship, would [M] call [Louis]

and call and text Isabelle about the defendant sexually

assaulting her, and then [talk] to the police about it,

[talk] to the people at the hospital about it? Why would

she do that? How does [M’s] life get any better by

making this up? Ask yourselves that.’’ What’s more, the

prosecutor emphasized to the jury that the defendant

had lied to the police when he was initially questioned.

Specifically, the prosecutor stated: ‘‘In assessing the

defendant’s credibility, I would ask—I would urge you

to consider the lies that the defendant told, that he

admitted he told while he was—when he was testifying

here. We know that he lied to the police about being

in the house on July 28, 2016. He lied. He was in the

house. . . . We know that he lied to the police about

not having sexual contact with [M] on that date. . . .

He lied to [Stephanie]. He admitted to lying about that.’’

This case turns on questions of credibility, and we

find it disconcerting that the defendant was not afforded

an equal opportunity to emphasize his theory that M

also lied about the July 28, 2016 incident. The entire

case with respect to the July 28, 2016 incident centered

on the credibility of the only two eyewitnesses to that

incident. The effectiveness of the defendant’s arguments regarding M’s credibility was critical to the outcome, particularly when there was other testimony

from M’s stepsister, Isabelle, that M had a history of

‘‘making false claims.’’ Indeed, this is particularly noteworthy because the jury did not credit M’s version of

events with respect to the other instances of alleged

misconduct given that it found the defendant not guilty

of the remaining charges. Accordingly, we conclude

that the trial court’s limitation of the scope of defense

counsel’s closing argument was improper and deprived

the defendant of his constitutional right to the assistance of counsel.

Once a violation of the sixth amendment right to the
assistance of counsel has been established, we need

not inquire as to whether the error resulted in prejudice

to the defendant. ‘‘[A] per se rule of automatic reversal

more properly vindicates the denial of the defendant’s

fundamental constitutional right to assistance of counsel guaranteed by the sixth amendment.’’ State v. Mebane, 204 Conn. 585, 595, 529 A.2d 680 (1987), cert.

denied, 484 U.S. 1046, 108 S. Ct. 784, 98 L. Ed. 2d 870

(1988); see, e.g., State v. Arline, supra, 223 Conn. 65.

We, therefore, reverse the judgment of the trial court

and remand the case for a new trial.

II

We next turn to the defendant’s contention that the

evidence presented at trial was insufficient to prove

that he used force or the threat of force, as required

to sustain his conviction of sexual assault in the first

degree. Although we have determined that the defendant is entitled to a new trial, we address this claim

because, if it is meritorious, a retrial would be barred

by principles of double jeopardy. See, e.g., State v.

Hedge, 297 Conn. 621, 655, 1 A.3d 1051 (2010).

The defendant concedes that this claim was not properly preserved at trial. It is well established, however,

that ‘‘any defendant found guilty on the basis of insufficient evidence has been deprived of a constitutional

right, and would therefore necessarily meet the four

prongs of [State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239–40, 567

A.2d 823 (1989), as modified by In re Yasiel R., 317

Conn. 773, 781, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015)]. . . . Accordingly, because there is no practical significance . . .

for engaging in a Golding analysis, we review an unpreserved sufficiency of the evidence claim as though it had

been preserved.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) State v. Revels, 313 Conn. 762, 777, 99

A.3d 1130 (2014), cert. denied, 574 U.S. 1177, 135 S. Ct.

1451, 191 L. Ed. 2d 404 (2015).

To establish that the defendant violated § 53a-70 (a)

(1), the state was required to prove that the defendant

‘‘compel[led] another person to engage in sexual intercourse by the use of force against such other person

. . . or by the threat of use of force against such other

person . . . .’’ The defendant contends that the state’s

evidence of force or threat of force was improbable and

unconvincing, and that the state presented no physical

evidence to support M’s allegation of sexual assault

by force.

‘‘The standard of review [that] we [ordinarily] apply

to a claim of insufficient evidence is well established.

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support

a criminal conviction we apply a [two part] test. First,

we construe the evidence in the light most favorable

to sustaining the verdict. Second, we determine whether

[on] the facts so construed and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom the [finder of fact] reasonably
could have concluded that the cumulative force of the

evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Cook, 287

Conn. 237, 254, 947 A.2d 307, cert. denied, 555 U.S. 970,

129 S. Ct. 464, 172 L. Ed. 2d 328 (2008). Importantly,

we have previously held that ‘‘a single witness is sufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt.’’ State v. Whitaker, 215 Conn. 739, 757 n.18, 578

A.2d 1031 (1990).

Here, with respect to the July 28, 2016 incident, M

testified: ‘‘[The defendant] grabbed my arm, and I told

him to let me go, and he did not want to release me.

And then I ended up tripping toward the couch, where

he pushed me toward . . . . I was wearing a dress,

and I had shorts underneath, and he ended up pulling

down my pants and my underwear and inserting his

penis inside me. . . . I was pushing him off, yelling,

telling him to stop and get off me. . . . He kept forcing

himself on me.’’ She also testified that, during the

assault, ‘‘I was trying to push him off me with my arms,

but he kept holding [them] down, so I kept turning my

body like this, with my knees, trying to push him off

me, and he didn’t want to get off. And I was yelling,

help, can you stop, can you get off me, and then he didn’t

want to get off me.’’ This testimony alone is sufficient

to establish the force element required for a conviction

of sexual assault in the first degree in violation of § 53a70 (a) (1).7 See, e.g., State v. White, 139 Conn. App.

430, 436–37, 55 A.3d 818 (2012) (rejecting sufficiency

challenge to first degree sexual assault conviction when

complainant’s testimony, if credited, satisfied all elements of § 53a-70 (a) (1)), cert. denied, 307 Conn. 953,

58 A.3d 975 (2013); see also, e.g., State v. Antonio W.,

109 Conn. App. 43, 52–53, 950 A.2d 580, cert. denied,

289 Conn. 923, 958 A.2d 153 (2008).

This evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to

sustaining the guilty verdict, is sufficient to support the

defendant’s conviction of sexual assault in the first

degree.

III

The defendant’s final claim is that the trial court

abused its discretion by admitting the testimony of

Janet Murphy, an expert in the field of child and adolescent sexual abuse. Specifically, the defendant contends

that the trial court improperly admitted Murphy’s testimony given that her expertise was in child sexual abuse

and that M was an adult when the July 28, 2016 incident

occurred. The defendant further contends that ‘‘[t]he

state failed to show that Murphy had sufficient knowledge from her experience, training, or education to

testify as an expert in the field of adult sexual abuse

. . . .’’ (Emphasis omitted.) As such, the defendant

claims that Murphy’s expertise was inapplicable to the

present case. The state contends that this argument is

unpreserved. Alternatively, the state contends that the
claim is substantively meritless because M was eighteen

at the time of the July 28, 2016 incident and Murphy

testified that she ‘‘see[s] kids really up into the early

twenties, more up to eighteen, but some delayed adults

we’ll see into the early twenties . . . .’’

As a general matter, when our appellate courts reverse

a judgment and remand the case for a new trial, only

claims likely to arise on retrial are addressed by the

reviewing court. See, e.g., State v. T.R.D., 286 Conn.

191, 195, 942 A.2d 1000 (2008). In this case, we are

remanding the case for a new trial with respect to the

charge of sexual assault in the first degree in connection

with the July 28, 2016 incident. It is undisputed that, at

the time of this incident, M was eighteen years old.

Although we cannot say that the claim relating to Murphy’s expert testimony is unlikely to arise on remand,

because the state may elect to call Murphy and further

probe her experience working with eighteen year olds,

or it may call another expert, that evidentiary presentation would involve a record different from the one presently before us, and, accordingly, we decline to address

this claim at this time. See, e.g., State v. Jackson, 334

Conn. 793, 822, 224 A.3d 886 (2020); State v. Rizzo, 266

Conn. 171, 250–51 n.44, 833 A.2d 363 (2003). We leave

it to the trial court to further evaluate the issue if Murphy is called to testify at the defendant’s new trial.

The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded

for a new trial.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

* In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of the

victims of sexual assault and the crime of risk of injury to a child, we decline

to identify the victim or others through whom the victim’s identity may be

ascertained. See General Statutes § 54-86e.

** August 6, 2021, the date that this decision was released as a slip opinion,

is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.

1 Nelson testified that spermatozoa are ‘‘sex cell[s] that [are] deposited

in semen when ejaculated from a male.’’

2 Przech explained that sperm cells and epithelial cells are different: ‘‘[E]pithelial cells are like your skin cells, and the sperm cells are from sperm.’’

3 The sixth amendment to the United States constitution provides in relevant part: ‘‘In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right

. . . to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.’’

The sixth amendment right to the assistance of counsel applies to state

criminal proceedings by incorporation through the due process clause of

the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335,

342, 83 S. Ct. 792, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799 (1963).

4 As defense counsel emphasized during closing argument, ‘‘[t]his case

essentially comes down to one witness. All of these accusations stem from

one individual, the complaining witness, [M]. There are medical reports

and—and other reports that are there, but she is the source of that information. There isn’t any independent information in those reports. So, we should

look at her testimony and her credibility and assess [that evidence] to see

if it supports a finding of [guilt] beyond a reasonable doubt . . . .’’

5 Although the results of the sexual assault evidence collection kit established that the defendant’s DNA was included in the sperm-rich fraction

sample of the vaginal swab, they contained no evidence that the July 28,

2016 incident was nonconsensual. Indeed, the nurse who administered the

sexual assault evidence collection kit testified that there was no evidence

of trauma, scratches, or bruises, and no physical injuries were noted in

the report.

6 For example, although M testified that she was violently sexually

assaulted, her text to Isabelle indicated that the defendant had ‘‘touched’’
her. Additionally, the state did not introduce any evidence of physical injuries

or ripped clothing.

7

In addition to M’s testimony, the emergency medical technician (EMT)

who responded to M’s house on July 28, 2016, testified that M was ‘‘visibly,

tearfully upset’’ and was ‘‘very . . . uncomfortable . . . .’’