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Filed 8/26/15

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

APPELLATE DIVISION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

THE PEOPLE, ) BR 051941

)

Plaintiff and Respondent, ) Pasadena Trial Court

)

v. ) No. LU21108

)

JOHN LOUIS OVERING, )

)

Defendant and Appellant. ) OPINION

 )

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Pasadena Trial 

Court, Mary L. Byrne, Commissioner. Affirmed.

Michael S. Overing, Esq., for Defendant and Appellant.

No appearance by Plaintiff and Respondent People of the State of California. 

* * *

I. INTRODUCTION

Defendant John Louis Overing appeals the judgment following a court trial wherein he 

was found guilty of failing to stop in violation of Vehicle Code section 22450, subdivision (a). 

Defendant contends there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction because he 

complied with the statute by stopping approximately 10 feet before entering the crosswalk, prior 

to proceeding past the crosswalk and into the intersection. 
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Vehicle Code section 22450, subdivision (a), indicates a vehicle must stop “before 

entering the crosswalk on the near side of the intersection” without specifying the precise place 

where the stop should occur. We determine a driver must stop at a spot before entering a 

crosswalk that enables the driver and other motorists and pedestrians to safely obey the right-ofway laws (see Veh. Code, §§ 21800, subds. (a) & (c), 21950, subd. (a)).

In the present case, there was substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s implied 

finding defendant did not stop at the requisite spot. We thus affirm the judgment.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The violation occurred on July 13, 2014, at the intersection of Sierra Madre Boulevard 

and Sunnyside Avenue. The intersection is governed by stop signs upon all its approaches. 

When traveling eastbound on Sierra Madre, there is a marked crosswalk at its intersection with 

Sunnyside. The stop sign for eastbound traffic is located approximately 10 feet west of the 

crosswalk and the word “STOP” is also written on the roadway. The placement of the word 

“STOP” is aligned with the stop sign. There are bushes located on the southwest corner of 

Sunnyside and Sierra Madre. 

Defendant was driving his vehicle east on Sierra Madre approaching Sunnyside. 

Sierra Madre Police Department Officer Fernandes was in his patrol vehicle parked on 

Sunnyside facing north, south of Sierra Madre. Fernandes observed defendant driving east on 

Sierra Madre through the crosswalk without stopping. Because his view of the crosswalk was 

obstructed by the previously mentioned bushes, he was unable to see whether defendant stopped 

at the stop sign. He effectuated a traffic stop and issued defendant a citation for violating 

Vehicle Code section 22450, subdivision (a).

Defendant testified he stopped within one foot of where the word “STOP” was written on 

the roadway. He remained stopped until after the vehicles traveling on Sunnyside cleared the 

intersection. He then proceeded through the crosswalk, entered the intersection, and turned left 

onto northbound Sunnyside. 
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The trial court determined defendant stopped his vehicle at the stop sign, but that he 

stopped “too far back” from the crosswalk. The court found defendant guilty of the charged 

infraction and ordered him to pay a fine. 

III. DISCUSSION

As stated ante, Vehicle Code section 22450, subdivision (a), requires a vehicle at an 

intersection with a crosswalk and controlled by a stop sign to stop “on the near side of the 

intersection” without specifying a precise location for the stop. Our primary task is to determine 

whether stopping one foot from the stop sign and 11 feet from the crosswalk constitutes 

substantial evidence to support the judgment. In order to answer this question, we must first 

determine what the Legislature meant by the words “on the near side of the intersection.”

We review the proper interpretation to be given to the statute at issue de novo. (People v. 

Kurtenbach (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1264, 1276.) With respect to whether there was sufficient 

evidence to support the judgment given our construction of the statute, “‘“we review the entire 

record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains substantial 

evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a 

reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” [Citation.]’” 

(People v. McCurdy (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1063, 1104.) 

A. Construction of the Statute

Vehicle Code section 22450, subdivision (a), provides, “The driver of any vehicle 

approaching a stop sign at the entrance to, or within, an intersection shall stop at a limit line, if 

marked, otherwise before entering the crosswalk on the near side of the intersection. [¶] If there 

is no limit line or crosswalk, the driver shall stop at the entrance to the intersecting roadway.”

To interpret the law, we “scrutinize the actual words of the statute, giving them a plain 

and commonsense meaning.” (People v. Valladoli (1996) 13 Cal.4th 590, 597.) If the statutory 

language can be given more than one interpretation, in determining the Legislature’s intent we 

“‘“‘may consider various extrinsic aids, including the purpose of the statute, the evils to be 
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remedied, . . . and the statutory scheme encompassing the statute.’”’ [Citations.]” (People v. 

King (2006) 38 Cal.4th 617, 622.)

In interpreting Vehicle Code section 22450, subdivision (a), we look to associated

right-of-way statutes which shed light on the Legislature’s intent regarding the meaning to be 

ascribed to the law. (See Robert J. v. Catherine D. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1500, 1519 [court in 

construing a law must “examine the context in which the statute appears, ‘“adopting the 

construction that best harmonizes the statute internally and with related statutes”’”].)

“‘Right-of-way’ is the privilege of the immediate use of the highway.” (Veh. Code, 

§ 525.) Vehicle Code section 21800, subdivision (a), provides: “The driver of a vehicle 

approaching an intersection shall yield the right-of-way to any vehicle which has entered the 

intersection from a different highway.” Vehicle Code section 21800, subdivision (c), provides: 

“When two vehicles enter an intersection from different highways at the same time and the 

intersection is controlled from all directions by stop signs, the driver of the vehicle on the left 

shall yield the right-of-way to the vehicle on his or her immediate right.” Vehicle Code 

section 21950, subdivision (a), provides, in relevant part, “The driver of a vehicle shall yield the 

right-of-way to a pedestrian crossing the roadway within any marked crosswalk or within any 

unmarked crosswalk at an intersection . . . .”

As the right-of-way laws recognize the need of persons and motorists in intersections to 

assess the proximity of vehicles and pedestrians before proceeding, so, too, does Vehicle Code 

section 22450, subdivision (a). We conclude the stop, pursuant to Vehicle Code section 22450, 

subdivision (a), must therefore occur at a location where the driver and other motorists and 

pedestrians can safely determine who has the right-of-way.

The Court of Appeal considered the relationship between a predecessor of Vehicle Code

section 22450, subdivision (a) (former Veh. Code, § 22 1/2), and the right-of-way law (former 

Veh. Code, § 131, subd. (c)) in Elmore v. County of Lassen (1935) 10 Cal.App.2d 229 (Elmore) 

(disapproved on another ground by the Cal. Supreme Court in denying rehearing in Pattison v. 
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Cavenagh (1936) 18 Cal.App.2d 123, 130). As we do here, Elmore looked to the right-of-way 

law to determine where a vehicle should stop.

Elmore determined there was evidence that plaintiff driver was contributorily negligent in 

causing an auto collision, notwithstanding her stop before entering an intersection. Elmore

noted that, although former Vehicle Code section 22 1/2 specified a vehicle must stop “before 

entering” a through highway, “The exact spot to stop is made clear by the provisions of 

another . . . statute (sec. 131, subd. [c]) which clearly implies that it will be at a point where the 

driver has a view of the ‘vehicles within the intersection or approaching so closely from the left 

as to constitute an immediate hazard.’” (Elmore, supra, 10 Cal.App.2d at p. 232.) The spot 

where the plaintiff stopped, which was 86 feet from the intersecting highway, was not such as to 

afford her the requisite view, because from that spot, “one’s view of the highway to the left was 

so obstructed that only a very small portion of it could be seen and one could not ascertain if a 

vehicle was approaching so closely from the left as to constitute an immediate hazard.” (Ibid.)

Elmore did not deal with the requirement to stop before entering a crosswalk and, in its 

case, stop signs were not erected upon all the approaches to the intersection. Nonetheless, the 

opinion explains how a stop sign statute may be harmonized with the law dealing with the rightof-way.

B. Defendant’s Interpretation of the Law 

Defendant argues that, so long as he stopped where the stop sign was located, he 

complied with Vehicle Code section 22450, subdivision (a). Yet, the statute only indicates that 

when the driver approaches “a stop sign at the entrance to, or within, an intersection,” the driver 

must stop as indicated in the statute, i.e., if there is a limit line, where the limit line is located; if 

there is no limit line or crosswalk, where the entrance to the intersection roadway is located; and 

finally, when there is only a crosswalk, “before entering the crosswalk on the near side of the 

intersection.” 

Citing Greene v. M. & S. Lumber Co. (1951) 108 Cal.App.2d 6 (Greene), defendant 

further argues Vehicle Code section 22450, subdivision (a), should be interpreted to give drivers 
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discretion with regard to where to stop. Greene considered a former version of the statute which 

required that a motorist “stop before entering the nearest crosswalk or, if none, then at a limit 

line when marked, otherwise before entering such highway or intersection.” (Former Veh. 

Code, § 577.) The Court of Appeal determined a motorist was negligent in an accident that 

ensued after the motorist stopped some distance back from a limit line at an intersection 

regulated by a stop sign because he failed to stop at the limit line. (Greene, supra, 108 

Cal.App.2d at pp. 9-10.)

In making this determination, Greene contrasted the place where a motorist must stop 

when there is a limit line to the place where he must stop when there is a crosswalk. Greene

noted that, “It is easy to ascribe a sound reason why considerable latitude should be allowed as 

to the stopping point when approaching a crosswalk or intersection, whereas the requirement is 

more strict as to a limit line. There are situations where it is material to the safety of the 

traveling public that a vehicle be brought approximately to a definite point and stopped there in 

order to assure a better view and a shorter time after starting to attain a position of safety; and 

further to assure observation of the vehicle about to enter the favored traffic lane by those 

approaching its projected path. In many situations it would make little difference whether the 

stop was made at the stop sign or anywhere between the stop sign and the intersection, but there 

are other situations in particular localities where maximum safety requires that the point where 

the stop shall be made be indicated.” (Greene, supra, 108 Cal.App.2d at pp. 9-10.)

The “‘language of a statute should not be given a literal meaning if doing so would result 

in absurd consequences which the Legislature did not intend.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Pieters

(1991) 52 Cal.3d 894, 898-899.) Since the words of Vehicle Code section 22450, 

subdivision (a), do not denote the precise place where a vehicle must stop when there is only a 

crosswalk, read literally, one interpretation of the law is that a vehicle could stop 100 feet, or 

more, “before entering the crosswalk on the near side of the intersection,” and be in compliance 

with the statute. This would be absurd. “[T]he apparent purpose of [Vehicle Code 

section 22450, subdivision (a)] is to require a vehicle to stop before it is in a position where it 
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could impede or hit pedestrians who could be in a crosswalk, or cross-traffic that could be in an 

intersection.” (People v. Binkowski (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1, 5, italics omitted.) 

Allowing a stop at a distance too far from the crosswalk would be dangerous if motorists could 

not see other vehicles in the approaching intersection or pedestrians in the crosswalks.

C. Application of the Statute

Defendant contends the judgment should be reversed because there were bushes 

obstructing Fernandes’s line of sight, and he could not testify as to how far back defendant 

stopped prior to entering the crosswalk; hence there was no evidence defendant failed to make 

the required stop. But, defendant did not move for an acquittal after Fernandes testified, thus the 

trial court could properly consider defendant’s testimony in determining whether to find him 

guilty. (See People v. Ceja (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1296, 1301; People v. Smith (1998) 64 

Cal.App.4th 1458, 1468.) Defendant’s testimony that he stopped within one foot of the word 

“STOP” on the roadway, which was 10 feet west of the crosswalk, constituted substantial 

evidence regarding the spot where the stop occurred.

The court found the spot where defendant stopped was “too far back” to comply with the 

statute. On appeal, we imply any findings necessary to support the court’s determination. (See 

People v. Fulkman (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 555, 560 [“‘[w]here there are no express findings of 

fact, it is implied that the trial court . . . made whatever findings were necessary to support the 

judgment or order’”].) We review the record to determine if there is substantial evidence in the 

record to support the court’s implied findings. (See People v. Francis (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 

873, 878.)

There is substantial evidence indicating defendant did not stop at a place where the 

right-of-way laws could be safely respected. Bushes obstructed Fernandes’s view of defendant 

until just before he crossed the westerly side of the crosswalk across Sierra Madre, and it was 

reasonable for the court to find the same bushes obstructed defendant’s view of vehicles and 

pedestrians. The layout of the intersection was such that, from the place where defendant 

stopped, he could not see whether any pedestrians had entered the crosswalks crossing 
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Sunnyside to his immediate right or left, or whether any vehicles had entered the intersection 

after stopping for the stop signs for traffic crossing Sierra Madre. Likewise, he could not be 

seen by these other motorists and pedestrians. Given that the right-of-way laws could not be 

safely respected from the location where defendant stopped, there was substantial evidence 

supporting his conviction.

IV. DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. 

_________________________

RICCIARDULLI, J.

We concur:

_________________________

P. McKAY, P. J.

_________________________

KUMAR, J.