MISSOURI COURT OF APPEALS

WESTERN DISTRICT

MICHAEL SHIPLEY,

 Appellant,

 v.

STATE OF MISSOURI 

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL 

SERVICES, FAMILY SUPPORT 

DIVISION,

 Respondent.

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WD81892

OPINION FILED:

January 29, 2019

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri 

Honorable Jalilah Otto, Judge

Before Division One: 

Cynthia L. Martin, P.J., Victor C. Howard, and Thomas H. Newton, JJ.

Mr. Michael Shipley appeals a Jackson County Circuit Court judgment 

dismissing with prejudice his most recent effort to enforce what he believes are 

properly registered foreign judgments consisting of two Eighth Circuit Court of 

Appeals procedural orders which submitted his motions for a cease and desist 

order and for default judgment to the panel assigned to his appeal. We affirm 

and remand for the circuit court to determine the costs and fees incurred by the 

Family Support Division.
2

Mr. Shipley’s four prior attempts to enforce the Eighth Circuit’s procedural 

orders as judgments are detailed in In re Shipley, 472 S.W.3d 609 (Mo. App. 

W.D. 2015).1 This time, he filed a “memorandum providing reasons for granting 

a summary judgment” in January 2018 under Rule 74.04, seeking to enforce the 

orders, which he contends were registered as foreign judgments in Jackson 

County in 2014. These orders were entered in a 42 U.S.C.A. section 1983 action 

Mr. Shipley filed in federal district court against the Family Support Division, 

claiming that its efforts to collect in Missouri child support that he had been 

ordered to pay in Kansas were fraudulent and seeking $66.675 million in 

damages. Id. at 610-11. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal 

of Mr. Shipley’s federal fraud action in October 2012.2 Id. at 611. Citing our 

2015 ruling, the Jackson County Circuit Court, treating his memorandum as a 

petition and dismissing it with prejudice, ruled that he “is seeking relief that 

cannot be granted. Due to [Mr. Shipley’s] failure to state a claim upon which 

relief can be granted, [the Family Support Division’s] Motion to Dismiss is 

GRANTED.” Mr. Shipley appeals.

 

1 Because Mr. Shipley’s pro se brief is difficult to understand, we have relied on the facts of the case 

reported in our 2015 opinion and the circuit court’s June 2018 judgment in this appeal. 

2 The October 2012 judgment disposes of an appeal from the district court’s Case No. 4:11-cv-00675-

FJG, but it was issued under Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals Docket No. 12 -3046. Eighth Circuit 

Court of Appeals Docket No. 11-3856, which also appears to arise from district court Case No. 4:11-

cv-00675-FJG, indicates that the case was disposed of in February 2012, with the mandate issuing in 

March 2012. We will consider the documents Mr. Shipley has appended to his brief or included in the 

legal file pertaining to Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals Docket No. 11-3856, given that this was the 

matter addressed in the Jackson County Circuit Court’s ruling.
3

Legal Analysis

Mr. Shipley’s appeal raises four points relied on and includes seven pages 

setting forth various standards of review, including a few interspersed paragraphs 

purporting to be statements of facts. We observed in our 2015 opinion that his 

briefs did not comply with Rule 84.04 in significant respects, but we addressed 

his “essential complaint” on the merits “notwithstanding his woeful lack of 

compliance.” Shipley, 472 S.W.3d at 612 n.9. We allowed him to file an 

amended brief in this appeal, because his initial brief did not comply with Rule 

84.04. We could dismiss this appeal for failure of the amended brief to comply 

with Rule 84.04. We will address the points ex gratia in the hope that we will 

be able to explain, in a way that Mr. Shipley will understand, why this Court 

cannot and will not grant him the relief he has requested. 3

In the first point, Mr. Shipley appears to argue that the trial court erred in 

ruling that the “clerk order,” entered January 10, 2012, on the Eighth Circuit’s 

docket was not a judgment that can be enforced as a foreign judgment in Jackson 

County Circuit Court. The clerk’s order stated, “The motion for a cease and 

 

3

In discussing Mr. Shipley’s previous unsuccessful attempt to enforce one of the Eighth Circuit clerk’s 

orders as a foreign judgment in Missouri when the Family Services Division filed an action to register 

the Kansas judgment, we observed that claim preclusion barred each of his three subsequent efforts to 

register the orders as foreign judgments. In re Shipley, 472 S.W.3d 609, 613 (Mo. App. W.D. 2015). 

The Family Services Division echoes this conclusion by arguing that res judicata and collateral estopp el 

prevent Mr. Shipley from registering or enforcing the orders as a foreign judgment in any Missouri 

court. The division also argues that the law of the case prohibits his current claim. We agree. We 

further determined that Mr. Shipley’s filings were frivolous and that he was “now on plain and clear 

notice that any further efforts to register either of the Eighth Circuit Orders as a foreign judgment, or 

to collect or execute on either of the Eighth Circuit Orders as if either is a money judgment, will b e 

viewed as frivolous and in willful disregard of the law.” Id. at 613 n. 11. Under Rule 84.19, we may 

award damages to the respondent if we determine that an appeal is frivolous. This appeal is frivolous; 

accordingly, we order Mr. Shipley to pay all of the division’s costs and fees on this appeal.
4

desist order and other relief filed by Appellant Mr. Michael Shipley in 11-3856, 

[3867376-21] is hereby ordered taken with the case for consideration by the 

panel to which this case is submitted for disposition on the merits.” Mr. Shipley 

claims that this order was a directive in writing to the parties and the court “to 

cease and desist and other relief,” and they were “derelict in carrying out those 

duties.” 

This order was no such directive. No one was ordered to cease and desist; 

a motion does not have that effect unless it is granted by the court. The court 

clerk simply ordered that Mr. Shipley’s motion asking the court to order such 

relief be submitted to and considered by the court along with the questions raised 

by Mr. Shipley’s appeal. 

According to Mr. Shipley, the Eighth Circuit subsequently denied the 

Family Support Division’s motion to dismiss the appeal thus rendering the 

clerk’s order a final judgment entitled to full faith and credit. What he apparently 

overlooks is that the same day the motion to dismiss was denied, the court 

vacated the order denying the motion to dismiss and filed a judgment summarily 

affirming the district court’s ruling “in accordance with Eighth Circuit Rule 

47A,” as well as again denying the motion to dismiss. Local Rule 47A allows 

the court to dismiss an appeal “if it is not within the court’s jurisdiction or is 

frivolous and entirely without merit. The court may affirm or reverse when the 

questions presented do not require further consideration.” Eighth Cir. Local Rule 

47A(a). By affirming the lower court’s ruling, the Eighth Circuit effectively 
5

rejected Mr. Shipley’s motion asking the court to issue a cease and desist order. 

The Eighth Circuit’s judgment did not give him any basis for claiming that the 

clerk’s order then became a judgment that could be enforced by a Missouri court. 

As Mr. Shipley has been informed repeatedly by the courts, the clerk’s order did 

not grant him the relief he requested in his motion. It was a procedural order 

that did one thing and one thing only: it transmitted the motion to the Eighth 

Circuit court for it to consider. Mr. Shipley has not prevailed on the merits before 

any court and, thus, has nothing to enforce under the Full Faith and Credit 

Clause.

He also appears to argue that when he registered the January 10, 2012, 

order in Jackson County it became enforceable “as a matter of law” under Rule 

74.14. That rule gives a foreign judgment the “same effect” as a Missouri circuit 

court judgment and allows it to “be enforced or satisfied in like manner.” Rule 

74.14(b); see also Flexter v. Flexter, 684 S.W.2d 589, 591 (Mo. App. E.D. 1985) 

(“The registering state can give the foreign judgment no greater effect than it 

would receive from courts in its rendering state.”). The only effect of the clerk’s 

order submitting Mr. Shipley’s motion for a cease and desist order to the Eighth 

Circuit court for its consideration was to submit the motion to that court. It was 

submitted to the Eighth Circuit and disposed of. Even if a Missouri state court 

could order the submission of a motion to a federal appeals court, the case has 

been disposed of on the merits, making the motion moot, i.e., irrelevant because 

it is no longer able to affect the case. This point is denied.
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In the second point, Mr. Shipley appears to argue that the trial court erred 

in ruling that the “clerk order,” entered January 23, 2012, on the Eighth Circuit’s 

docket was not a judgment that can be enforced as a foreign judgment in Jackson 

County Circuit Court. The clerk’s order stated in relevant part, “Appellant’s 

motion for default judgment is hereby ordered taken with the case for 

consideration by the panel to which this case is submitted for disposition on the 

merits.” As noted above, the motion was submitted to the Eighth Circuit panel 

and was effectively denied when that court affirmed the district court judgment 

dismissing Mr. Shipley’s section 1983 action. Mr. Shipley claims that this order 

was a directive in writing to the parties and the court “for a default judgment,” 

and they were “derelict in carrying out those duties.” 

This order was no such directive. No one was ordered to enter a default 

judgment; a motion does not have that effect unless it is granted by the court. 

The court clerk simply ordered that the motion requesting the court to enter a 

default judgment be submitted to and considered by the court along with the 

questions raised by Mr. Shipley’s appeal. By affirming the lower court’s ruling, 

the Eighth Circuit rejected Mr. Shipley’s motion for a default judgment. The 

Eighth Circuit’s judgment did not give him any basis for claiming that the clerk’s 

order was a judgment that can be enforced by a Missouri court. 
7

Mr. Shipley also asserts that a local Eighth Circuit court rule allows a party 

to seek reconsideration of a clerk’s order. Eighth Cir. Local Rule 27A(a). 

Because the Family Support Division filed a motion to dismiss the same day that 

the clerk entered an order submitting Mr. Shipley’s motion for default judgment 

to the Eighth Circuit panel for disposition, Mr. Shipley contends that the court’s 

denial of the motion to dismiss rendered the clerk’s order on his motion 

conclusive and entitled to full faith and credit. The Family Support Division did 

not ask the court clerk under Local Rule 27A to reconsider its order that 

submitted Mr. Shipley’s motion for default judgment to the Eighth Circuit panel. 

The Family Support Division filed a motion to dismiss the entire appeal. While 

the Eighth Circuit denied that motion, it nevertheless did not rule in Mr. Shipley’s 

favor; it affirmed the district court’s ruling dismissing the section 1983 action. 

And that ruling did not convert the clerk’s order into a judgment entitled to full 

faith and credit in a Missouri court. Hopefully, it is clearly stated one more time: 

the clerk’s order did not grant him the relief he requested in his motion; it was a 

procedural order that transmitted the motion to the Eighth Circuit court for it to 

consider.

He also appears to argue that when he registered the January 23, 2012, 

order in Jackson County it became enforceable “as a matter of law” under Rule 

74.14. The only effect of the clerk’s order submitting Mr. Shipley’s motion for 

a default judgment to the Eighth Circuit court for its consideration was to submit 

the motion to that court. It was submitted to the Eighth Circuit and disposed of 
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in a manner that effectively denied him the relief he had requested. Even if a 

Missouri state court could submit a motion to a federal appeals court, which is 

all a Missouri court could do to enforce the order, the case has been disposed of 

on the merits, making the motion moot. This point is denied.

The third point challenges a footnote in the trial court’s judgment, claiming 

that it erred in noting that the Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Mr. 

Shipley’s complaint on October 26, 2012, “thereby denying Mr. Shipley’s motion 

to cease and desist and his motion for default judgement.” According to Mr. 

Shipley, the October 2012 judgment is irrelevant, because it involves a different 

case. The Eighth Circuit’s October 2012 order affirmed the district court’s ruling 

in No. 4:11-cv-00675-FJG, albeit, as noted above, under a different docket

number. The orders that Mr. Shipley claims are entitled to enforcement in 

Missouri’s courts were entered in the appeal from the district court’s ruling in 

No. 4:11-cv-00675-FJG. Even if the trial court had erred in referencing the 

October 2012 order, Mr. Shipley has failed to explain how that error led to an 

erroneous disposition of his case. This point is denied.

In the fourth point, Mr. Shipley argues that the trial court erred in quoting 

from our 2015 disposition of an earlier appeal: “Eighth Circuit Orders are not 

judgments. They do not award relief of any kind to any party, let alone monetary 

relief.” Shipley, 472 S.W.3d at 613. In his view, this statement “refers to the 

validity of the judgments.” He cites case law indicating that a foreign judgment 

“is entitled to a strong presumption that the court had jurisdiction over the parties 
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and the subject matter and that it followed its laws and entered a valid judgment.” 

See Wheeler v. Winters, 134 S.W.3d 774, 777 (Mo. App. W.D. 2004) (“Absent a 

showing to the contrary, a judgment of a court of a sister state is entitled to a 

strong presumption that the court had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject 

matter and that it followed its laws and entered a valid judgment.”). In Mr. 

Shipley’s view, orders submitting motions to the Eighth Circuit for its 

consideration became judgments that could be registered under Rule 74.14 

because the Family Support Division filed a motion to dismiss, which was 

denied, and then the Eighth Circuit filed its judgment in the case, thus making 

the clerk’s procedural orders judgments entitled to full faith and credit. Even if 

he were correct, and he is not, we can give foreign judgments only that effect 

which they would have been given in the rendering jurisdiction. The orders 

sending his motions to the Eighth Circuit panel did not decide the case in his 

favor; they sent his motions to the Eighth Circuit panel for its decision. That 

would be all that a Missouri court could do. By affirming the district court, 

however, the Eighth Circuit decided the case against him, including his motions. 

He has nothing to enforce in the Missouri courts. This point is denied.
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Conclusion

Because the circuit court did not err in dismissing Mr. Shipley’s “petition” 

for summary judgment with prejudice, we affirm. Because this appeal was 

frivolous and Mr. Shipley was on notice that such an appeal would be frivolous, 

we impose damages against him under Rule 84.19, awarding the Family Support 

Division its costs and fees on this appeal. On remand to the circuit court, the 

Family Support Division shall submit the costs and fees to be paid by Mr. 

Shipley.

/s/ Thomas H. Newton

Thomas H. Newton, Judge

Cynthia Martin, P.J., and Victor Howard, J. concur.