Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-186 | June 18, 2019 Page 1 of 8

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Nicole A. Zelin

Pritzke & Davis, LLP

Greenfield, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Matthew B. MacKenzie

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Dustin Lee Fisher,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

June 18, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-CR-186

Appeal from the Hancock Circuit 

Court

The Honorable R. Scott Sirk, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

30C01-1802-F5-419

Bailey, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-186 | June 18, 2019 Page 2 of 8

Case Summary

[1] Dustin Lee Fisher (“Fisher”) pleaded guilty to Failure to Register as a Sex 

Offender, as a Level 5 felony,

1 without the benefit of a plea agreement. The 

trial court sentenced him to four years in the Indiana Department of Correction

(“DOC”), with one year suspended to probation. Fisher now appeals his 

sentence. We affirm.

Issues

[2] Fisher presents the following two issues for our review:

I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by relying on 

Fisher’s history of criminal and delinquent behavior when 

imposing a sentence greater than the advisory term; and

II. Whether Fisher’s sentence is inappropriate in light of the 

nature of his offense and his character. 

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In 2014, under trial court cause number 30C01-1404-FD-613, Fisher pleaded 

guilty to Criminal Confinement, as a Class D felony,2 and was sentenced to 

 

1

Ind. Code §§ 11-8-8-17(a)(1) & (b)(1). 

2

I.C. § 35-42-3-3(a)(1).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-186 | June 18, 2019 Page 3 of 8

three years in the DOC. Fisher was also required to register as a sex offender 

for a ten-year period. 

[4] In 2015 and 2016, Fisher pleaded guilty to two separate counts of Failure to 

Register as a Sex Offender, as Level 6 felonies, under trial court cause numbers

30C01-1506-F6-802 (“cause number F6-802”) and 49G09-1506-F6-20020. 

[5] In early 2018, Fisher failed to timely notify the Hancock County Sheriff’s 

Department that he had changed his place of employment. As a result, Fisher 

was charged with Failure to Register as a Sex Offender, this time as a Level 5 

felony due to his prior convictions for Failure to Register.3 On November 9, 

2018, Fisher pleaded guilty as charged in open court, without the benefit of a 

plea agreement. The trial court held a sentencing hearing on January 3, 2019, 

and sentenced Fisher to four years in the DOC, with three years executed and 

one year suspended to probation. Fisher now appeals his sentence. 

Discussion and Decision

Sentencing Discretion

[6] Fisher first argues that the trial court abused its discretion by improperly 

considering his criminal history as an aggravating circumstance when imposing 

a sentence greater than the advisory term. 

 

3

In the charging information, the State relied only on the conviction under cause number F6-802.
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[7] Sentencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court and are 

reviewed only for an abuse of discretion. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 

490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). An abuse of 

discretion occurs if the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts 

and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual 

deductions to be drawn therefrom. Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). 

Trial courts must enter a sentencing statement whenever imposing a sentence 

for a felony offense, and the statement must include a reasonably detailed 

recitation of the court’s reasons for imposing a particular sentence. Id. “If the 

recitation includes a finding of aggravating or mitigating circumstances, then 

the statement must identify all significant mitigating and aggravating 

circumstances and explain why each circumstance has been determined to be 

mitigating or aggravating.” Id. 

[8] A trial court abuses its discretion if it (1) does not enter a sentencing statement, 

(2) enters a sentencing statement that explains reasons for imposing a sentence 

– including a finding of aggravating and mitigating factors if any – but the 

record does not support the reasons, (3) enters a statement that omits reasons 

that are clearly supported by the record and advanced for consideration, or (4) 

considers reasons that are improper as a matter of law. Jackson v. State, 973 

N.E.2d 1123, 1130 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (citing Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 490-

91), trans. denied. 

[9] A Level 5 felony carries a sentencing range of one to six years, with the 

advisory sentence being three years. I.C. § 35-50-2-6. At the sentencing 
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hearing, the trial court considered as a mitigating circumstance that Fisher took 

responsibility for his offense. As aggravating circumstances, the trial court 

found that Fisher (1) has “a history of criminal delinquent behavior” and (2) 

had recently violated the rules of probation, parole, and community corrections. 

(Tr. Vol. II 72.) Finding that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the 

mitigating circumstance, the trial court sentenced Fisher to four years in the 

DOC, with three years executed and one year suspended to probation.4

[10] Fisher argues that by identifying his criminal history as an aggravating 

circumstance, the trial court relied on Fisher’s prior convictions for failure to 

register as a sex offender, and that this reliance was improper because his prior 

convictions comprised a material element of the offense for which he was being 

sentenced. (Appellant’s Br. 8.) Our supreme court has explained that “[w]here 

a trial court’s reason for imposing a sentence greater than the advisory sentence 

includes material elements of the offense, absent something unique about the 

circumstances that would justify deviating from the advisory sentence, that 

reason is ‘improper as a matter of law.’” Gomillia v. State, 13 N.E.3d 846, 852-

53 (Ind. 2014) (quoting Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491).

[11] In sentencing Fisher, the trial court made no specific reference to Fisher’s two 

prior convictions for failure to register as a sex offender, instead identifying only 

 

4 The State mischaracterizes Fisher’s sentence as “the advisory sentence” (Appellee’s Br. 4) and later as “the 

advisory executed sentence of three years, with one additional year suspended to probation.” (Appellee’s Br. 

9.) Fisher was sentenced to an aggregate of four years, a deviation from the advisory sentence of three.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-186 | June 18, 2019 Page 6 of 8

Fisher’s “history of criminal delinquent behavior” as one of two aggravating 

circumstances it considered. (Tr. Vol. II 72.) We thus disagree with Fisher that 

the trial court’s general reference to Fisher’s criminal history equated to an 

improper reliance on a material element of the crime for which he was being 

sentenced. While Fisher’s two prior convictions for failure to register certainly 

fall under the general category of Fisher’s past criminal behavior, he has 

additional criminal history wholly unrelated to the instant and underlying 

offenses, including at least four adult convictions and four juvenile 

adjudications. The trial court could properly have relied on these unrelated

convictions and adjudications under the category of “history of criminal 

delinquent behavior” to justify a sentence greater than the advisory term. See 

Gomillia, 13 N.E.3d at 853 (citing McCann v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1116, 1120 (Ind. 

2001)) (holding that even if the trial court relied on an improper factor under 

the aggravating circumstance of ‘nature and circumstances of a crime,’ the 

sentence may be upheld so long as the remaining components of the aggravator 

were proper); Shotts v. State, 53 N.E.3d 526, 538-39 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)

(holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in considering the

defendant’s criminal history as an aggravating circumstance where his criminal

history included the robbery conviction that was an element of the crime for 

which the defendant was being sentenced).

[12] The trial court did not abuse its discretion in relying on Fisher’s history of 

criminal and delinquent behavior in imposing a sentence greater than the 

advisory term.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-186 | June 18, 2019 Page 7 of 8

Independent Sentence Review

[13] We turn now to Fisher’s contention that his sentence was inappropriate in light 

of the nature of his offense and his character. Article 7, Section 6 of the Indiana 

Constitution grants this Court authority to independently review and revise a 

sentence imposed by the trial court. To implement this grant of authority, 

Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) provides: “The Court may revise a sentence 

authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, the 

Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense 

and the character of the offender.” Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B). The analysis is 

not whether another sentence is more appropriate, but whether the sentence 

imposed is inappropriate. Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864, 876 (Ind. 2012). The 

principal role of our review is to leaven the outliers, and our review is very 

deferential to the trial court. Id. The defendant bears the burden of persuading 

the appellate court that his or her sentence is inappropriate. Id.

[14] As to the nature of the offense, there is nothing remarkable about Fisher’s 

failure to register. Fisher was required to timely inform the Hancock County 

Sheriff’s Department of a change in his place of employment, but did not.

[15] As to the character of the offender, at the time of sentencing, twenty-three-yearold Fisher had accumulated a criminal history including ten juvenile cases and 

referrals, resulting in at least four adjudications, and eight adult cases (one 

waived from juvenile court), resulting in six felony and two misdemeanor 

convictions (including the instant and underlying convictions). He has a welldocumented history of noncompliance with the rules of probation and 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-186 | June 18, 2019 Page 8 of 8

community corrections. And as both the probation officer who prepared the 

presentence investigation report and the trial court acknowledged, Fisher had 

been “given chances other offenders are never offered” (Tr. Vol. II 71), such as 

being permitted to return to community corrections work release twice outside 

the normal operating procedures. Nevertheless, the record reveals that Fisher 

failed to take advantage of these alternatives to incarceration, instead engaging 

in a pattern of rule noncompliance. 

[16] Fisher has not demonstrated that a sentence of four years in the DOC, with one 

year suspended to probation, is inappropriate in light of the nature of his offense 

and his character.

Conclusion

[17] The trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Fisher. Fisher’s 

sentence is not inappropriate.

[18] Affirmed.

Riley, J., and Pyle, J., concur.