SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1863-18T3

PC II REO, LLC,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

JERILEAN ROBERTS,

Defendant-Appellant,

and

MR. ROBERTS, spouse of JERILEAN

ROBERTS, ANDREWS FEDERAL 

CREDIT UNTION, s/b/m/t MCGUIRE

FEDERAL CREDIT UNION, and

NEW CENTURY FINANCIAL 

SERVICES INC.,

Defendants.

__________________________________

Submitted December 9, 2019 – Decided

Before Judges Fasciale and Moynihan.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Mercer County, Docket No. F017984-16.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

December 19, 2019
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A-1863-18T3

Jerilean Roberts, appellant pro se.

Gary C. Zeitz LLC, attorneys for respondent (Gary C. 

Zeitz and Amber Jean Monroe, on the brief). 

PER CURIAM 

In this tax foreclosure case, defendant appeals an October 26, 2018 order 

denying her reconsideration of motion to vacate a March 19, 2018 final 

judgment. The motion that led to the order under review—although 

characterized as a motion to vacate—was essentially a motion for 

reconsideration of two earlier motions to vacate the judgment. Judge Paul Innes 

entered the order and thoroughly explained that there was no basis to grant 

reconsideration or vacate the judgment. 

On appeal, defendant argues: 

POINT I 

THE JUDGE'S DECISION WAS ARBITRARY AND 

CAPRICIOUS WHEN THE [JUDGE] MADE AN 

ISSUE ABOUT DEFENDANT'S ABSENCE AFTER 

SHE WAS INSTRUCTED NOT TO COME TO 

COURT.

POINT II

THE [JUDGE] NEVER TOOK THE TIME TO HEAR 

FROM THE APPELLANT-DEFENDANT.[1]

1

 This court also considered the arguments raised by defendant in her reply 

brief.
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We conclude that defendant's contentions are without merit to warrant attention 

in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). We affirm substantially for the reasons 

expressed by the judge, and add these brief remarks. 

In December 2013, plaintiff purchased a tax sales certificate (the Tax 

Lien) for the property. In June 2016, defendant received notice of intent to 

foreclose on the property, and later that month, plaintiff filed its foreclosure 

complaint. Defendant filed her answer in February 2017. In June 2017, plaintiff 

obtained summary judgment. The court set January 12, 2018 as the last date to 

redeem the Tax Lien. Defendant received the order setting that date, but did not 

redeem the property. On March 20, 2018, defendant received the final 

judgment.

2

 Thereafter, defendant filed three motions.

The first two motions—filed on April 27, 2018 and May 10, 2018

respectively—sought to vacate the final foreclosure judgment. The Foreclosure 

Unit denied the first motion because it "must be noticed to the vicinage of the 

court." The judge denied the second motion because defendant failed to appear 

for oral argument. The judge denied the first two motions to vacate judgment 

in one order dated May 25, 2018. 

2

 The property has since been sold. 
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On October 4, 2018, defendant filed her third motion, more than six 

months later, which led to the order under review. She entitled that motion as 

an application seeking to vacate the judgment, but as the judge observed, the 

third motion sought reconsideration of the May 25, 2018 order. That order led 

to this appeal. 

The judge correctly denied reconsideration. A motion for reconsideration 

is committed to the sound discretion of the court, which should be "'exercised 

in the interest of justice.'" Cummings v. Bahr, 295 N.J. Super. 374, 384 (App. 

Div. 1996) (quoting D'Atria v. D'Atria, 242 N.J. Super. 392, 401 (Ch. Div. 

1990)). Reconsideration is appropriate only when a court has rendered a 

decision "'based upon a palpably incorrect or irrational basis,'" or failed to 

consider or "'appreciate the significance of probative, competent evidence.'"

Ibid. (quoting D'Atria, 242 N.J. Super. at 401). This court reviews the denial of 

a motion for reconsideration to determine whether the judge abused his 

discretionary authority. Id. at 389. This court "may only disturb the decision 

below if it finds error which is 'clearly capable of producing an unjust result.'" 

Casino Reinvestment Dev. Auth. v. Teller, 384 N.J. Super. 408, 413 (App. Div. 

2006) (quoting R. 2:10-2). 
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Contrary to the twenty-day deadline imposed by Rule 4:49-2, defendant 

waited until October 2018 to file the third motion. Defendant specifically 

requested oral argument on her third motion only if plaintiff filed an opposition. 

Consequently, the day after defendant filed her third motion, the foreclosure unit 

notified her not to go to the courthouse and that her third motion would be 

decided on October 26, 2018. That notice went out a day after she filed her 

motion and before plaintiff filed an opposition. 

Once plaintiff opposed defendant's motion, the parties were notified there 

would be oral argument. In fact, the transcript containing the judge's oral 

decision reflects that "[n]otice of oral argument [on the third motion] was given 

to counsel[] and the self-represented individual. The matter was schedule[d] for

nine o'clock. It's now 9:37. There's been no appearance by [defendant]." 

Even though the reconsideration motion was untimely, which could have 

been a basis to deny it, the judge denied reconsideration on the merits by 

adhering to the correct standard of review. Defendant provided no new 

information, and the judge's earlier order was not palpably incorrect, irrational, 

or the result of a failure to consider or "'appreciate the significance of probative, 

competent evidence.'" Cummings, 295 N.J. Super. at 384 (citation omitted).
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Importantly, the judge also correctly found that defendant failed to 

provide any basis to vacate the final judgment. A motion to vacate final 

judgment must meet the standard of Rule 4:50-1:

On motion, with briefs, and upon such terms as are just, 

the court may relieve a party or the party's legal 

representative from a final judgment or order for the 

following reasons: (a) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, 

or excusable neglect; (b) newly discovered evidence 

which would probably alter the judgment or order and 

which by due diligence could not have been discovered

in time to move for a new trial under R[ule] 4:49; (c) 

fraud . . . , misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an 

adverse party; (d) the judgment or order is void; (e) the 

judgment or order has been satisfied, released or 

discharged, or a prior judgment or order upon which it 

is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is 

no longer equitable that the judgment or order should 

have prospective application; or (f) any other reason 

justifying relief from the operation of the judgment or 

order.

A trial judge's determination under this rule "warrants substantial deference, and 

should not be reversed unless it results in a clear abuse of discretion." US Bank 

Nat'l Ass'n v. Guillaume, 209 N.J. 449, 467 (2012) (citations omitted). "The 

[c]ourt finds an abuse of discretion when a decision is made without a rational 

explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an 

impermissible basis." Ibid. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
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There is no abuse of discretion. The judge, relying on motion papers,

entered the May 25, 2018 order denying defendant's earlier two motions to 

vacate, and concluded defendant was unable to satisfy Rule 4:50-1(a) or (f). He 

also determined that she failed to demonstrate—on her third motion—excusable 

neglect or a meritorious defense, or that she could have redeemed the property. 

Indeed, even on this appeal, defendant does not argue to the contrary. 

Affirmed.