In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 15‐2172

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

GEORGE E. ROBEY,

Defendant‐Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

No. 12 CR 00027‐001 — Sarah Evans Barker, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED APRIL 7, 2016 — DECIDED AUGUST 3, 2016

____________________

Before EASTERBROOK, KANNE, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

KANNE, Circuit Judge. Defendant George Robey operated a

modern‐day “chop shop”—he and his associates stole cars, al‐

tered their identities using office and computer equipment,

and then sold them. He was convicted by a jury, and the dis‐

trict court sentenced him to 110 months’ imprisonment and

three years of supervised release.
2 No. 15‐2172

Robey appeals his conviction and sentence on three

grounds. First, he argues that he did not receive a speedy trial,

in violation of the Speedy Trial Act and the Sixth Amendment.

Second, Robey contends that the district court erred in allow‐

ing the government to amend the indictment by dropping

nineteen of the twenty‐five charges. Third, he argues that the

district court erred at sentencing by finding that Robey’s theft

of ten vehicles, in addition to the four vehicles forming the

basis of his conviction, constituted relevant conduct. We af‐

firm.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

From 2009 until 2011, Robey and his associates stole cars

from lots around Indianapolis, altered the cars’ identities, and

then sold them. As part of this operation, Robey would

change a stolen car’s identity by giving it a new Vehicle Iden‐

tification Number (“VIN”), a unique 17‐digit identification

code. Robey would also create counterfeit documents to sup‐

port a stolen car’s new identity, which included generating a

title, insurance card, sales contract, and temporary license

plate. Robey created these counterfeit VINs and documents

using a computer, scanner, printer, and digital image editing

software.

B. Procedural History

Robey was arrested on a criminal complaint on December

6, 2011. Between Robey’s arrest and indictment, Robey and

the government jointly requested and were granted two ends‐

of‐justice continuances to extend the pre‐indictment period.
No. 15‐2172 3

On February 23, 2012, a grand jury returned a 25‐count in‐

dictment against Robey, alleging conspiracy to identify, steal,

and sell stolen vehicles for profit; trafficking in vehicles with

altered VINs; making, uttering, and possessing counterfeit

state securities; and identification document fraud.

Robey made an initial appearance on the indictment on

March 1, 2012. Between Robey’s initial appearance and trial

start date of February 10, 2015, Robey requested and was

granted ten ends‐of‐justice continuances. Additionally, he

filed several pre‐trial motions, requested and received new

counsel twice, underwent a psychological examination, and

entered and withdrew from a plea agreement. During this pe‐

riod, the government also was granted one ends‐of‐justice

continuance.

On December 29, 2014, the government moved to dismiss

nineteen of the twenty‐five counts in the indictment,reducing

the charges against Robey to six remaining counts—four

counts of trafficking in vehicles with altered VINs, in viola‐

tion of 18 U.S.C. § 2321; and two counts of making, uttering,

and possessing counterfeit state securities, in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 513(a). The district court granted this motion.

Robey also filed two motions to dismiss. On December 31,

2014, Robey filed his first motion to dismiss, arguing that his

speedy trial right had been violated, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.

§§ 3161(c)(1), 3162, because his case had not been tried within

70 days of his initial appearance. The district court denied

Robey’s motion on January 5, 2015, finding that only 28 days

had elapsed on Robey’s pre‐trial speedy trial clock. On Janu‐

ary 28, 2015, Robey filed his second motion to dismiss, again

alleging violation of his right to a speedy trial. The district

court denied this motion on February 6, 2015.  
4 No. 15‐2172

Robey’s three‐day trial began on February 10, 2015. The

jury saw and heard evidence that Robey had, for four stolen

vehicles, altered the VINs, created counterfeit vehicle docu‐

ments, and sold the vehicles, including one sale to an under‐

cover agent. The jury convicted Robey of all six counts on Feb‐

ruary 12, 2015.

On May 20, 2015, the district court held Robey’s sentenc‐

ing hearing. The revised presentence investigation report

(“PSR”) concluded that, in addition to the four vehicles that

were the focus of the trial, another ten stolen vehicles consti‐

tuted “relevant conduct.” The evidence found in Robey’s

home showed that, as with the four cars that made up his con‐

viction, he had altered the VINs and created counterfeit doc‐

uments for these other ten cars. The total value of the fourteen

cars—four that constituted Robey’s conviction and ten

deemed relevant conduct—exceeded $400,000. This loss

amount increased Robey’s offense level by 14, pursuant to

U.S.S.G. §§ 2B1.1(b)(1), (H) (2014).

At sentencing, Robey contested the total value of the cars,

arguing that the ten uncharged cars should not be considered

relevant conduct. The district court ruled that the evidence

found during the search of Robey’s home confirmed a pattern

of common conduct sufficient to establish the ten additional

vehicles as relevant conduct. Adopting the PSR, the district

court determined Robey’s guidelines range was 110 to 137

months’ imprisonment, based on an adjusted offense level of

26 and criminal history category of V. After taking into ac‐

count Robey’s age and infirmity, the court imposed a within‐

guidelines sentence of 110 months’ imprisonment and three

years of supervised release, with the standard conditions and
No. 15‐2172 5

some discretionary conditions. Judgment was entered against

Robey on May 27, 2015. Robey appealed.

II. ANALYSIS

Robey appeals his conviction and sentence on three main

grounds. First, he claims that he did not receive a speedy trial,

in violation of the Speedy Trial Act and Sixth Amendment.

Second, Robey contends that the district erred in allowing the

government to amend the indictment by dropping nineteen

of the twenty‐five charges. Third, he argues that the district

court erred at sentencing by ruling that Robey’s theft of ten

vehicles, in addition to the four vehicles that form the basis of

his conviction, constituted relevant conduct.

A. Speedy Trial Violations

Robey claims that his right to a speedy trial was violated

under the Speedy Trial Act and the Sixth Amendment. Robey

first argues that his speedy trial right under the Speedy Trial

Act was violated by: (1) the 79 days that elapsed between his

arrest and indictment and (2) the 1076 days that elapsed be‐

tween his initial appearance and trial commencement. Robey

then contends his speedy trial right under the Sixth Amend‐

ment was violated by the 1076 days that elapsed between his

initial appearance and trial commencement.

1. Speedy Trial Act

This court reviews “the district court’s legal interpretation

of the [Speedy Trial Act] de novo, and its decisions to exclude

time for an abuse of discretion.” United States v. Ramirez, 788

F.3d 732, 735 (7th Cir. 2015).

The Speedy Trial Act generally requires that a criminal in‐

dictment be filed within 30 days of a defendant’s arrest. 18
6 No. 15‐2172

U.S.C. § 3161(b). Furthermore, the Speedy Trial Act generally

requires that a criminal trial begin within 70 days of an indict‐

ment or a defendant’s initial appearance, whichever is later.

Id. § 3161(c)(1). The Speedy Trial Act provides exceptions,

however, which allow certain periods of delay to be “ex‐

cluded” from the relevant speedy trial clock. Id. § 3161(h).

Some of these exceptions, such as consideration of plea agree‐

ments, are automatically excludable. Id. § 3161(h)(1)(G); see

United States v. O’Connor, 656 F.3d 630, 642 (7th Cir. 2011)

(holding that “periods of delay excludable under

§ 3161(h)(1)–(6) may be automatically excluded if the specified

conditions are present”). In addition to the enumerated auto‐

matic exclusions, a judge may exclude any period of delay re‐

sulting from a continuance if the judge finds “the ends of justice

served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the

public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” 18 U.S.C.

§ 3161(h)(7)(A) (emphasis added).

In granting an ends‐of‐justice continuance, the judge shall

consider the factors listed in § 3161(h)(7)(B) and must “set[]

forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its

reasons for finding that the ends of justice would be served.”

Id. § 3161(h)(7)(A). The district court’s decision “need not be

lengthy and need not track the statutory language,” but it

should provide this court with an adequate record to review

the district court’s consideration of the relevant factors.

O’Connor, 656 F.3d at 643 (internal quotation marks omitted).

In reviewing an ends‐of‐justice decision, this court examines

not only the district court’s order on a particular motion but

also “the sequence of events leading up to the continuance

followed by the courtʹs later explanation.” United States v.

Wasson, 679 F.3d 938, 946 (7th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation

marks omitted).
No. 15‐2172 7

In the present case, we begin by addressing Robey’s pre‐

indictment period of delay and then turn to his pre‐trial pe‐

riod of delay.

Robey first argues that the 79 days that elapsed between

his arrest on December 6, 2011, and his indictment on Febru‐

ary 23, 2012, violated the Speedy Trial Act’s 30‐day pre‐indict‐

ment requirement. However, during this period, Robey and

the government jointly requested and were granted two ends‐

of‐justice continuances. Excluding these periods of times

leaves only 13 days on Robey’s pre‐indictment speedy trial

clock.

In this case, Robey’s pre‐indictment delay argument fails

because the district court did not abuse its discretion in grant‐

ing the two ends‐of‐justice continuances. Both of the district

court’s decisions were supported by an order articulating ad‐

equate justification, as well as by the relevant sequence of

events. The court granted the two ends‐of‐justice continu‐

ances because both Robey and the government needed addi‐

tional time to attempt to negotiate a resolution to the matter

without a trial. These were reasonable decisions because they

allowed both parties, at an early stage in the case, to pursue

the option of resolving the case without a trial.

Robey next argues that the 1076 days that elapsed between

his initial appearance on March 1, 2012, and his trial com‐

mencement on February 10, 2015, violated the Speedy Trial

Act’s 70‐day pre‐trial requirement.

Again, most of this time is excludable. First, the period of

time in which Robey was negotiating his withdrawn plea

agreement is automatically excluded. § 3161(h)(1)(G); O’Con‐

nor, 656 F.3d at 642. Second, the district court granted ten
8 No. 15‐2172

ends‐of‐justice continuances for Robey.1 Excluding these time

periods leaves only 60 days on Robey’s pre‐trial speedy trial

clock. Third, the district court granted one ends‐of‐justice con‐

tinuance for the government. Further excluding this time pe‐

riod leaves only 50 days on Robey’s pre‐trial speedy trial

clock. Therefore, if the district court did not abuse its discre‐

tion in granting Robey’s ten ends‐of‐justice continuances, his

argument fails.

Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in

granting ten ends‐of‐justice continuances for Robey. Each of

the district court’s decisions was supported by an order artic‐

ulating adequate justification, as well as by the relevant se‐

quence of events. We discuss each briefly.

The court granted Robey’s first, second, and third ends‐of‐

justice continuances because Robey required additional time

to evaluate discovery, explore the possibility of a plea agree‐

ment, and effectively prepare for trial if the plea negotiations

proved unsuccessful. These were reasonable decisions be‐

cause they allowed Robey, at an early stage in the case, to pur‐

sue the option of a plea agreement and still prepare for trial.

The court granted Robey’s fourth ends‐of‐justice continu‐

ance because Robey required additional time to undergo a

psychological evaluation, evaluate discovery, explore the

possibility of a plea agreement, and effectively prepare for

trial if the plea negotiations proved unsuccessful. This was a

reasonable decision because Robey did eventually undergo a

                                                 

1 The district court granted ten ends‐of‐justice continuances for Robey on

the following dates: (1) April 12, 2012, (2) June 12, 2012, (3) August 7, 2012,

(4) November 28, 2012, (5) March 1, 2013, (6) May 1, 2013, (7) September 9,

2013, (8) November 21, 2013, (9) July 3, 2014, and (10) August 20, 2014.
No. 15‐2172 9

psychological evaluation. This reasonable decision also al‐

lowed Robey to pursue the option of a plea agreement and

still prepare for trial.

The court granted Robey’s fifth ends‐of‐justice continu‐

ance to allow his new counsel to prepare for trial. This was a

reasonable decision given that Robey had been appointed a

new lawyer, at Robey’s request, two weeks earlier.

The court granted Robey’s sixth, seventh, and eighth ends‐

of‐justice continuances because of delays in trial preparation

arising from Robey’s psychological evaluation. These were

reasonable decisions in light of Robey’s psychological evalu‐

ation.

The court granted Robey’s ninth ends‐of‐justice continu‐

ance in orderto prepare fortrial. This was reasonable decision

given that he had recently withdrawn from a plea agreement.

The court granted Robey’s tenth ends‐of‐justice continu‐

ance to evaluate discovery, explore a plea agreement, and pre‐

pare for trial. This was a reasonable decision because Robey

had been appointed new counsel again, at Robey’s request,

two weeks earlier.

For the sake of completeness, we also review the govern‐

ment’s one ends‐of‐justice continuance, which the court

granted because the government had recently changed coun‐

sel and the leading case agent was unavailable for the trial

due to the expected birth of his child. This was a reasonable

decision because, in fact, the government’s new counsel was

heavily involved in pending litigation and the leading case

agent was unavailable for the trial because of paternity leave.

Accordingly, Robey did not suffer violation of his speedy

trial right under the Speedy Trial Act.
10 No. 15‐2172

2. Sixth Amendment

Robey also argues that the 1076 days that elapsed between

his initial appearance and his trial violated his right to a

speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment, which is related to

but independent of his Speedy Trial Act claim. OʹConnor, 656

F.3d at 643. Because Robey did not raise this argument below,

we review for plain error. Id.

The Sixth Amendment guarantees an accused “the right to

a speedy and public trial.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. This court

examines the following factors in assessing a speedy‐trial

claim under the Sixth Amendment: “‘[W]hether [the] delay

before trial was uncommonly long, whether the government

or the criminal defendant is more to blame for that delay,

whether, in due course, the defendant asserted his right to a

speedy trial, and whether he suffered prejudice as the delay’s

result.’” OʹConnor, 656 F.3d at 643 (alteration in original)

(quoting Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651 (1992)).

In the case at hand, the pretrial period did not violate the

Sixth Amendment. On one hand, Robey did timely assert his

right, and he is entitled to a presumption of prejudice. See id.

(“Delays of more than one year are considered presumptively

prejudicial.”). On the other hand, Robey bears “primary re‐

sponsibility” for the years of pretrial delay, and he was not

actually prejudiced. Id. He filed a motion to suppress, sought

ten ends‐of‐justice continuances, and entered and withdrew

from a plea agreement. He underwent a psychological exam‐

ination. He also changed lawyers twice. Furthermore, it ap‐

pears that Robey was uncooperative with his appointed coun‐

sel, as indicated by his pro se letters to the court and change‐

of‐counsel hearings. As a result, while the pretrial delay in
No. 15‐2172 11

Robey’s case was lengthy, there was no Sixth Amendment vi‐

olation. See id. (holding no constitutional violation because

defendant “bears primary responsibility for many of the pre‐

trial delays and did not suffer actual prejudice”).

B. Amending the Indictment

Robey next claims that the district erred in allowing the

government to amend the indictment by dismissing nineteen

of the twenty‐five counts prior to trial. Specifically, Robey

contends that “[b]ecause the modification was made without

the oversight of a grand or petit jury, the amendment violated

Robey’s constitutional rights.” (Appellant Br. 33–34.) Robey

raises his claim under the Fifth Amendment, which provides,

“[n]o person shall be held to answer for a ... crime, unless on

a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury.” U.S. Const.

amend V; see also United States v. Soskin, 100 F.3d 1377, 1380

(7th Cir. 1996) (“Under the Grand Jury Clause of the Fifth

Amendment, the possible bases for conviction are limited to

those contained in the indictment.”) (internal quotation

marks omitted).

Because Robey did not preserve this claim in district court,

it is forfeited, and we review only for plain error. United States

v. Perez, 673 F.3d 667, 669 (7th Cir. 2012). For plain error, a

defendant must show the following: “(1) an error or defect (2)

that is clear or obvious (3) affecting the defendant’s substan‐

tial rights (4) and seriously impugning the fairness, integrity,

or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (internal

quotation marks omitted).

Here, Robey cannot show error, plain or otherwise, be‐

cause the district court’s dismissal of nineteen of twenty‐five
12 No. 15‐2172

counts of the indictment prior to trial only narrowed the in‐

dictment against him, a practice that has been expressly up‐

held by the Supreme Court and this court.

In United States v. Miller, the Supreme Court held that

“where an indictment charges several offenses, or the com‐

mission of one offense in several ways, the withdrawal from

the jury’s consideration of one offense or one alleged method

of committing it does not constitute a forbidden amendment

of the indictment.” 471 U.S. 130, 145 (1985) (internal quotation

marks omitted). In the same vein, this court has also explicitly

stated, “[n]arrowing the indictment so that the trial jury de‐

liberates on fewer offenses than the grand jury charged does

not constitute amendment.” Soskin, 100 F.3d at 1380 (altera‐

tion in original and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus,

under the precedent of the Supreme Court and this court, the

district court’s dismissal of nineteen counts of Robey’s indict‐

ment prior to trial was not a forbidden amendment.

In fact, Robey’s argument is the same as the one expressly

rejected by the Miller Court. Robey claims a constitutional vi‐

olation because the court dismissed nineteen counts of the in‐

dictment prior to trial. In other words, Robey is contending

“not that the indictment failed to charge the offense for which

he was convicted, but that that the indictment charged more

than was necessary.” Miller, 471 U.S. at 140. The Miller Court

rejected this argument, declaring that the defendant “was

tried on an indictment that clearly set out the offense for

which he was ultimately convicted,” and consequently, there

was “no deprivation of [the defendant’s] substantial right to

be tried only on charges presented in an indictment returned

by a grand jury.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The
No. 15‐2172 13

Miller Court’s response, which this court has applied consist‐

ently, defeats Robey’s claim. See e.g., Perez, 673 F.3d at 669 (cit‐

ing Miller, 471 U.S. at 144).

Robey’s attempts to distinguish Miller from the present

case are unpersuasive. Robey argues that the entire indict‐

ment in Miller was sent to the petit jury and asks this court to

“draw [a distinction] between indictment modifications that

occur with jury oversight and those that occur without.” (Ap‐

pellant Reply. Br. 13.) Robey’s argument is meritless and un‐

dermined by his own reply brief. As Robey concedes, this

court has allowed modified indictments to be presented to a

petit jury without resubmission to a grand jury. See e.g., Perez,

673 F.3d at 669; United States v. Graffia, 120 F.3d 706, 711 (7th

Cir. 1997); Soskin, 100 F.3d at 1381.

Robey subsequently argues that this court allows presen‐

tation of a modified indictment to a petit jury without resub‐

mission to a grand jury “only when the modifications do not

materially affect the substance or scale of the charges al‐

leged.” (Appellant Reply Br. 13 (emphasis added).)

Robey misstates the law. Instead, this court has clearly ar‐

ticulated what does and does not constitute an impermissible

amendment—“[n]arrowing the indictment so that the trial

jury deliberates on fewer offenses than the grand jury charged

does not constitute amendment. But the indictment may not

be broadened so as to present the trial jury with more or dif‐

ferent offenses than the grand jury charged.” United States v.

Crockett, 979 F.2d 1204, 1210 (7th Cir. 1992) (citations and in‐

ternal quotation marks omitted). In the present case, the dis‐

trict court’s dismissal of nineteen of twenty‐five counts of the

indictment prior to trial narrowed, rather than broadened, the
14 No. 15‐2172

indictment such that the trial jury deliberated on fewer of‐

fenses than charged by the grand jury. Accordingly, the in‐

dictment was not impermissibly amended.

C. Relevant Conduct at Sentencing

Finally, Robey argues that the district court erred at sen‐

tencing by ruling that Robey’s theft of ten uncharged vehicles,

in addition to the four charged vehicles from his conviction,

constituted relevant conduct.

A district court must find relevant conduct by a prepon‐

derance of the evidence. United States v. Baines, 777 F.3d 959,

963 (7th Cir. 2015). “Whether uncharged offenses amount to

relevant conduct under the Sentencing Guidelines is a factual

determination, which we review for clear error.” Id. This court

will not “second guess the district court unless, after review‐

ing the record as a whole, we are left with a definite and firm

conviction that a mistake has been made.” Id. (internal quota‐

tion marks omitted).  

In assessing whether uncharged activities constitute rele‐

vant conduct, this court has applied the advisory sentencing

guidelines. E.g., id. Under the sentencing guidelines, in theft

cases, a defendant’s offense level is based in part on the “loss”

caused by the defendant’s conduct. U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1); see

also United States v. Hill, 683 F.3d 867, 869 (7th Cir. 2012). This

includes the loss caused by the offenses of conviction, as well

as “all acts and omissions ... that were part of the same course

of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of convic‐

tion.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(2) (emphasis added); see also Baines,

777 F.3d at 963. A “common scheme or plan” requires that two

or more offenses be “substantially connected to each other by
No. 15‐2172 15

at least one common factor; such as common victims, com‐

mon accomplices, common purpose, or similar modus op‐

erandi.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 n.9(A); see also Baines, 777 F.3d at 963.

Additionally, even if they do not meet the requirements of a

common scheme or plan, offenses may still qualify as part of

the “same course of conduct” if they are “sufficiently con‐

nected or related to each other as to warrant the conclusion

that they are part of a single episode, spree, or ongoing series

of offenses.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 n.9(B); see also Baines, 777 F.3d at

963.

In the present case, at sentencing, the district court did not

commit clear error in finding that the ten uncharged vehicles

constituted relevant conduct.

The evidence at trial and sentencing support a finding of

a “common scheme or plan,” § 1B1.3(a)(2) n.9(B), because

there were multiple commonalities that substantially con‐

nected the charged and uncharged vehicles. There was a com‐

mon purpose behind stealing and altering the identities of all

fourteen vehicles—selling them. Furthermore, there was a

common modus operandi applied to both the charged and un‐

charged vehicles. At trial, the jury heard how Robey altered

the identities of the four charged vehicles with counterfeit

VINs and supporting documents. The jury also was shown

evidence that Robey created this false identity using comput‐

ers, printers, a scanner, photo paper, vehicle title and license

plate templates, carbon paper sales contracts, and a type‐

writer. In particular, the jury was shown typewriter ribbon

from Robey’s home that contained identifying information

for the four charged vehicles, including make, model, year,

color, mileage, and counterfeit VIN that matched stickers af‐

fixed to the stolen vehicles. At sentencing, the government
16 No. 15‐2172

proffered evidence of the same modus operandi for the ten un‐

charged vehicles, including counterfeit documents and type‐

writer ribbon containing the make, model, year, color, mile‐

age, and counterfeit VIN. As a result, at sentencing, the court

confirmed that “all the 14 [charged and uncharged] vehicles

... [were] identified by reviewing the documents and materi‐

als and the typewriter ribbon in Mr. Robey’s possession pur‐

suant to the search warrant[.]” (Sent. Tr. 19, May 20, 2015.)

The evidence presented at trial and sentencing is more

than sufficient to support the district court’s finding of a “pat‐

tern of relevant conduct that far exceeded in its details the

four cars that were stolen that were before the jury.” (Id. at

20.) As such, the district court did not commit clear error in

finding that the ten uncharged vehicles constituted relevant

conduct.  

Robey’s main argument against a “common scheme or

plan,” focuses on the temporal “gap” between the charged

and uncharged vehicles. Robey’s assertion is belied by the rec‐

ord—there was only a four‐month “gap” between the latest

uncharged vehicle stolen on December 16, 2010 and the earli‐

est charged vehicle on April 17, 2011. (PSR ¶ 21.) Further‐

more, the multiple commonalities discussed above “more

than suffice” to overcome any alleged temporal “gap” and

support the court’s relevant conduct determination. Baines,

777 F.3d at 963–64 (rejecting defendant’s temporal gap argu‐

ment as “hollow” because the offenses were connected by

“multiple common factors”)

Robey’s remaining arguments assert that the additional

vehicles did not arise from “the same course of conduct,”

§ 1B1.3(a)(2) n.9(B). However, we need not address these ar‐

guments because as discussed, the court’s relevant conduct
No. 15‐2172 17

determination was adequately based on a finding of a “com‐

mon scheme or plan,” § 1B1.3(a)(2) n.9(A). See § 1B1.3(a)(2)

n.9(B) (“Offenses that do not qualify as part of a common

scheme or plan may nonetheless qualify as part of the same

course of conduct.”).

Therefore, the district court did not commit clear error.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Robey’s conviction and sen‐

tence are AFFIRMED.