[Cite as State v. Hammond, 2015-Ohio-4156.]

COURT OF APPEALS 

KNOX COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

STATE OF OHIO : JUDGES: 

 : Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J. 

 Plaintiff - Appellee : Hon. Sheila G. Farmer, J. 

 : Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J. 

-vs- : 

 : 

JAMES L. HAMMOND : Case No. 15CA02 

 : 

 Defendant - Appellant : O P I N I O N 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Mount Vernon 

Municipal Court, Case No. 

14TRC1696A-B 

JUDGMENT: Affirmed 

DATE OF JUDGMENT: October 5, 2015 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant 

P. ROBERT BROERN, JR. DAVID H. BIRCH 

Mount Vernon City Law Director STUART A. BENIS 

5 N. Gay Street, 2nd Fl. 286 Liberty Street 

Mount Vernon, OH 43050 Powell, OH 43065 
Knox County, Case No. 15CA02 2 

Gwin, P. J.

{¶1} Appellant James L. Hammond ["Hammond"] appeals a judgment of the 

Mount Vernon Municipal Court convicting him of operating a motor vehicle under the 

influence of alcohol (R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a)) and driving under suspension (R.C. 

4510.14(A)). Appellee is the State of Ohio. 

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND CASE 

{¶2} Hammond was arrested for operating a motor vehicle while under the 

influence (OVI) on April 13, 2014, and held in jail for one day. He was formally charged 

with OVI and driving under suspension in Case No. 14TRC01272A-B on April 15, 2014. 

On April 18, 2014, counsel entered an appearance on his behalf, and filed a motion to 

preserve evidence, a demand for discovery, a jury demand, and a time waiver. 

{¶3} On April 21, 2014, appellee filed a motion to enter a nolle prosequi to 

allow refiling of a corrected ticket. On April 22, 2014, the court granted leave to enter a 

nolle prosequi and dismissed the case. 

{¶4} Appellee filed a new complaint on May 14, 2014, charging Hammond with 

OVI pursuant to R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a) and driving under suspension pursuant to R.C. 

4510.14(A). Hammond filed a motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds on September 

16, 2014. 

{¶5} Hammond argued that the nolle prosequi was void because it was not 

entered in open court, and he did not receive notice. He calculated that 159 days had 

elapsed, counting the days between the dismissal of the first case and the refiling of the 

complaint. Appellee argued that the time was tolled between the filing of the nolle 

prosequi and the refiling of the case, and thus 86 days of the 90 days within which 
Knox County, Case No. 15CA02 3 

Hammond must be brought to trial had elapsed. The trial court accepted appellee’s 

calculation of time and overruled the motion to dismiss. 

{¶6} The case proceeded to jury trial and Hammond was convicted as charged. 

He assigns a single error on appeal: 

{¶7} “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT GRANTING THE APPELLANT’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS AND THUS DENIED THE APPELLANT HIS CONSTITUTIONAL 

AND STATUTORY RIGHTS TO A SPEEDY TRIAL.” 

Analysis 

{¶8} Hammond specifically argues that the court erred in finding that the 

speedy trial time was tolled between the nolle prosequi and the refiling of the complaint 

against him. He argues that the nolle prosequi was void because it was not heard in 

open court as required by Crim. R. 48 and R.C. 2941.33. 

{¶9} Pursuant to R.C. 2945.71(B)(2), the state had 90 days within which to 

bring appellant to trial. Hammond argues that 159 days elapsed before he was brought 

to trial. 

{¶10} In State v. Bonarrigo, the Ohio Supreme Court noted, 

In State v. Spratz (1979), 58 Ohio St.2d 61, 62, at fn. 2, 388 N.E.2d 

751, we expressly noted that the entry of a nolle prosequi on a felony 

charge tolled the running of statutory speedy trial time until such time as 

the accused was re-indicted. Similarly, in Westlake v. Cougill (1978), 56 

Ohio St.2d 230, 383 N.E.2d 599, we excluded from the computation of 

speedy trial time a period between a nolle prosequi of misdemeanor 

charges and the service of summons of a second filing of misdemeanor 
Knox County, Case No. 15CA02 4 

charges arising out of the same conduct. In both cases, credit was given 

the accused for the period of time the charges based on the same conduct 

were pending prior to entry of the nolle prosequi. 

62 Ohio St.2d 7, 9-10, 402 N.E.2d 530(1980). It is well-established that for purposes of 

computing how much time has run against the state under R.C. 2945.71 et seq., the 

time period between the dismissal without prejudice of an original indictment and the 

filing of a subsequent indictment, premised upon the same facts as alleged in the 

original indictment, shall not be counted unless the defendant is held in jail or released 

on bail pursuant to Crim.R. 12(I). State v. Broughton, 62 Ohio St.3d 253, 581 N.E.2d 

541 (1991), paragraph one of the syllabus. 

{¶11} R.C. 2941.33, Nolle prosequi, which was enacted October 1, 1953 states, 

"The prosecuting attorney shall not enter a nolle prosequi in any cause without leave of 

the court, on good cause shown, in open court. A nolle prosequi entered contrary to this 

section is invalid."(Emphasis added). In State v. Mucci, the Court noted, 

These rules and statutes have been promulgated and enacted in 

order to curb abuses of executive prerogative. Under the common-law 

rule, a prosecutor had unlimited discretion to enter a nolle prosequi 

without any court involvement; however, the legislators and courts of this 

state and the federal government have acted to take this unlimited 

postindictment discretion away from the prosecutor. See 1944 Advisory 

Committee Notes to Fed.Crim.R. 48(A). See, also, Restatement of the 

Law, Contracts (1932), Section 549 (the prosecutor can bargain to 

recommend dismissal but not to secure dismissal). Therefore, a court in 
Knox County, Case No. 15CA02 5 

this state functions as a check and balance to the discretion of a 

prosecutor to dismiss an indictment. 

150 Ohio App.3d 493, 2002-Ohio-6896, 782 N.E.2d 133, ¶27. Accord, State v. Neely, 

11th Dist. Lake No. 2004-L-197, 2005-Ohio-7045, ¶42. 

{¶12} Crim.R. 48(A) provides, “The state may by leave of court and in open 

court file an entry of dismissal of an indictment, information, or complaint and the 

prosecution shall thereupon terminate.” (Emphasis added). Crim.R. 48 was adopted 

July 1, 1973, nearly 20 years after R.C. 2941.331. 

{¶13} In State v. Pendleton, this Court found, 

[T]he term ‘open court’ means that court is in session and the judge 

is on the bench.” State v. Monroe, (June 14, 2000) 4th Dist. No. 99CA632, 

(citing Linden v. Bates Truck Lines Inc., (1982) 4 Ohio App.3d 178, 180, 

446 N.E.2d 1139). 

5th Dist. Licking Nos. 10 CA 81, 10 CA 82, 2011-Ohio-2024, ¶39. We note in the case at 

bar the trial court approved the state's dismissal of the charges. 

{¶14} In addressing this issue in the context of the federal counterpart to Civ.R. 

48(A) the Fifth Circuit has stated, 

 [I]t seems altogether proper to say that the phrase “by leave of 

court” in Rule 48(a) was intended to modify and condition the absolute 

power of the Executive, consistently with the Framer’s concept of 

Separation of Powers, by erecting a check on the abuse of Executive 

prerogatives. But this is not to say that the Rule was intended to confer on 

 

1 Statutes in conflict with the rules promulgated by the Ohio Supreme Court have been declared invalid 

and to have no force and effect. Hiatt v. Southern Health Facilities, Inc., 68 Ohio St.3d 236, 626 N.E.2d 

71(1994); In re Coy, 67 Ohio St.3d 215, 616 N.E.2d 1105(1993). 
Knox County, Case No. 15CA02 6 

the Judiciary the power and authority to usurp or interfere with the good 

faith exercise of the Executive power to take care that the laws are 

faithfully executed. The rule was not promulgated to shift absolute power 

from the Executive to the Judicial Branch. Rather, it was intended as a 

power to check power. The Executive remains the absolute judge of 

whether a prosecution should be initiated and the first and presumptively 

the best judge of whether a pending prosecution should be terminated. 

The exercise of its discretion with respect to the termination of pending 

prosecutions should not be judicially disturbed unless clearly contrary to 

manifest public interest. 

United States v. Cowan, 524 F.2d 504, 513 (5th Cir.1975). 

{¶15} In Rinaldi v. United States, 434 U.S. 22, 29–30, 98 S.Ct. 81, 54 L.Ed.2d 

207 (1977), the Supreme Court observed, 

 The words “leave of court” were inserted in Rule 48(a) without 

explanation. While they obviously vest some discretion in the court, the 

circumstances in which that discretion may properly be exercised have not 

been delineated by this Court. The principal object of the “leave of court” 

requirement is apparently to protect a defendant against prosecutorial 

harassment, e.g., charging, dismissing, and recharging, when the 

Government moves to dismiss an indictment over the defendant’s 

objection....But the Rule has also been held to permit the court to deny a 

Government dismissal motion to which the defendant has consented if the 
Knox County, Case No. 15CA02 7 

motion is prompted by considerations clearly contrary to the public 

interest. 

Rinaldi, 434 U.S. at 30, note 15, 98 S.Ct. 81 (internal citations omitted). 

{¶16} Crim.R. 48 does not require that the state file a motion; rather the rule 

dictates that the state request leave of court to file "an entry of dismissal." Nor does the 

Rule specify that the nolle is invalid if entered contrary to this section. 

{¶17} The state is not required to obtain the defendant's consent prior to 

dismissing the case. U.S. v. Delagarza, 650 F.2d 1166, 1167(10th Dist. 1981); U.S. v. 

Valencia, 492 F.2d 1071, 1074(9th Cir. 1974); U.S. v. Manbeck, 514 F.Supp. 152(S.C. 

1981). Rather the question that the court must consider when the state requests leave 

to file an entry of dismissal is whether the prosecutor has abused the prosecutorial 

discretion afforded him or whether the dismissal is clearly contrary to the public interest. 

Accordingly, in the case at bar, it cannot be said that the state's motivation for 

dismissing the charges while issuing a corrected ticket discloses an improper motive on 

the state's part or that the dismissal is contrary to manifest public interest. Hammond 

has neither argued nor suggested either in his brief. Hammond has failed to assert 

before this Court any legal argument, meritorious or otherwise, in opposition to the 

granting of the nolle prosequi. 

{¶18} If consent of a defendant prior to dismissal is not necessary, Hammond 

cannot show he was prejudiced by the failure of the court to notify him prior to 

dismissing the charges. Hammond did not lose his right to raise his speedy trial 

challenge when the corrected ticket was subsequently issued. Hammond has not 

separately briefed and argued that any other delay is chargeable to the state under the 
Knox County, Case No. 15CA02 8 

statute. Nor has Hammond briefed and argued that his constitutional right to a speedy 

trial under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 

10 of the Ohio Constitution, his right to due process under the Fifth Amendment to the 

United States Constitution and Article I, Section 16 of the Ohio Constitution have been 

abrogated by the delay between his initial arrest and this issuance of a correct ticket. 

See generally, Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101(1972).

{¶19} However, in the case at bar even if Hammond was correct that the time 

continued to run after the state's nolle pursuant to R.C. 2945.71, he would not prevail. 

We find that the speedy trial time of ninety days had not expired when Hammond was 

brought to trial on October 16, 2014 even if the time had continued to run after the state 

file its nolle prosequi. 

{¶20} Hammond was arrested on April 13, 2014, held in jail for one day, and 

released on April 14, 2014. Pursuant to R.C. 2945.71(E), this day counts as three days. 

{¶21} The ticket was filed on April 15, 2014. On April 18, 2014, Hammond filed 

a time waiver and a demand for discovery. When a defendant waives the right to a 

speedy trial as to an initial charge, such waiver is not applicable to additional charges 

arising from the same set of circumstances that are brought subsequent to the 

execution of the waiver. State v. Adams, 43 Ohio St. 3d 67, 538 N.E.2d 1025, syllabus 

(1989). However, periods of delay resulting from motions filed by the defendant in a 

previous case also apply in a subsequent case in which there are different charges 

based on the same underlying facts and circumstances of the previous case. State v. 

Blackburn, 118 Ohio St. 3d 163, 887 N.E.2d 319, 2008-Ohio-1823, syllabus. 
Knox County, Case No. 15CA02 9 

{¶22} A demand for discovery or a bill of particulars is a tolling event pursuant to 

R.C. 2945.72(E). State v. Brown, 98 Ohio St.3d 121, 2002-Ohio-7040, 781 N.E.2d 159, 

syllabus. Therefore, the speedy trial time was tolled when Hammond filed his discovery 

demand on April 18, 2014, until the demand was answered by the prosecutor on June 

20, 2014. Three days expired from the time the complaint was filed on April 15 until the 

time was tolled on April 18, bringing the total days that had expired to six days when 

time began to run again on June 20, 2014. 

{¶23} Hammond's trial was scheduled to begin on August 14, 2014. Fifty-five 

days expired between June 20, 2014 and August 14, 2014, bringing the total to 61 days 

that had expired. The case was continued to September 25, 2014, on motion of the 

prosecutor, to allow an older case to go forward. Pursuant to R.C. 2945.72(H), the time 

within a defendant must be brought to trial may be extended by “the period of any 

reasonable continuance granted other than upon the accused's own motion.” The 

continuance must be accompanied by a journal entry which is made prior to the 

expiration of the statutory time limit and explains the reasons for the continuance. State 

v. King, 70 Ohio St.3d 158, 1994-Ohio-412, 637 N.E.2d 903. The court journalized the 

continuance to allow an older case to go forward on August 28, 2014, before the time 

within which Hammond must be brought to trial had expired. This Court has previously 

found that a continuance to allow an older case to go forward is reasonable. See State 

v. Dailey, 5th Dist. Richland No. 2005 CA 052, 2006-Ohio-5865. 

{¶24} Hammond filed his motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds on 

September 16, 2014, which again tolled the time within which he must be brought to 

trial. Because of the time required to allow the parties to address the motion, the court 
Knox County, Case No. 15CA02 10 

sua sponte continued the case to October 16, 2014. Hammond concedes in his brief 

that the speedy trial time calculation stopped running when he filed his motion to 

dismiss on September 16, 2014. [Appellant Brief at 5] Accordingly, Hammond was 

brought to trial within 90 days, as required by R.C. 2945.71(B)(2).

{¶25} The assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of the Mount Vernon 

Municipal Court is affirmed. Costs are assessed to appellant.

By: Gwin, P.J. and 

Farmer, J. concur; 

Baldwin, J., concurs separately. 

Baldwin, J., concurring separately, 
Knox County, Case No. 15CA02 11 

{¶26} I concur in the judgment affirming the decision of the trial court on the 

basis that the discovery motion tolled the time within which appellant must be brought to 

trial, and he therefore was tried within 90 days. However, I would find that the nolle 

prosequi was invalid and therefore did not toll the time between its filing and the refiling 

of the complaint. 

{¶27} Crim. R. 48(A) provides that, “[t]he state may by leave of court and in open 

court file an entry of dismissal of an indictment, information, or complaint and the 

prosecution shall thereupon terminate.” Similarly, R.C. 2941.33 provides, “The 

prosecuting attorney shall not enter a nolle prosequi in any cause without leave of the 

court, on good cause shown, in open court. A nolle prosequi entered contrary to this 

section is invalid.” 

{¶28} Under both the rule and the statute, a hearing on a motion of this type, 

made by the prosecution, is available upon request by the defense for such a hearing. 

State v. Monroe, 4th Dist. Pike No. 99CA 632, 2000 WL 807228 (June 14, 2000). In 

most cases, the defendant is not prejudiced by the dismissal of charges against him, 

and dismissal may be entered in chambers, or by entry, with the knowledge of 

defendant, or defendant's counsel. Id. Therefore, when the defendant does not have 

notice of the nolle prosequi, the dismissal is invalid and the speedy trial time continues 

to run. Id. Based on the reasoning in Monroe, the Ninth District similarly concluded that 

a nolle prosequi entered without notice to the defendant is null and void, and the 

dismissal does not toll the time within which the defendant must be brought to trial for 

speedy trial purposes. State v. Davis, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 08CA009412, 2008-Ohio6741, ¶20. 
Knox County, Case No. 15CA02 12 

{¶29} In order for the "open court" requirement set forth in the statute and the 

rule to have meaning, the defendant must be notified of the motion and be given an 

opportunity respond or to request a hearing. The record does not reflect that appellant 

was notified of either the motion or the judgment granting the motion in the instant 

case, and I would therefore conclude that the nolle prosequi was invalid and did not toll 

the time within which appellant must be brought to trial. 

 HON. CRAIG R. BALDWIN 
[Cite as State v. Hammond, 2015-Ohio-4156.]