1

Filed 4/24/14

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re A.M., a Person Coming Under the 

Juvenile Court Law.

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

A.M.,

Defendant and Appellant.

E057355

(Super.Ct.No. J245467)

OPINION

APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Brian Saunders, 

Judge. Affirmed as modified.

Robert Angres, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney 

General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Lise Jacobson, Michael T. 
2

Murphy, and Warren J. Williams, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and 

Respondent.

Following a jurisdictional hearing, the juvenile court found true that defendant and 

appellant A.M. (minor) committed battery by gassing while confined in juvenile hall 

(Pen. Code, § 243.9)1 and resisting an executive officer (§ 69).2 Minor was subsequently 

declared a ward of the court and placed in a suitable foster care facility. On appeal, 

minor contends (1) there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for battery 

by gassing because the juvenile hall where he was confined did not qualify as a “local 

detention facility” within the meaning of section 243.9; and (2) the juvenile court failed 

to calculate his predisposition custody credits at the dispositional hearing. We agree with 

the parties that the record should be modified to reflect minor’s predisposition custody 

credits. We, however, reject minor’s remaining contention for the reasons explained 

below. 

I

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Minor has been the subject of two juvenile delinquency petitions—one in Orange 

County and one in San Bernardino County. In regard to the Orange County case, on 

July 30, 2012, minor admitted to committing oral copulation on an incompetent person in 

a mental health facility (§ 288a, subd. (h)). In return, the remaining allegations were 

 

1

 All future statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.

2

 The simple battery (§ 242) allegation was dismissed.
3

dismissed. Because minor’s adoptive mother resided in San Bernardino County, the 

matter was thereafter transferred to San Bernardino County3for disposition.

On August 9, 2012, the San Bernardino County Juvenile Court accepted the case, 

and ordered minor be detained in juvenile hall pending further proceedings.

Minor was housed at the Central Valley Juvenile Detention and Assessment 

Center, a detention facility operated by the San Bernardino County Probation 

Department. The facility is used for the detention and confinement of minors and 

wards of the juvenile court. The facility could be used to detain minors and wards for 

over 24 hours. 

On August 26, 2012, San Bernardino County Probation Officer Ana AmezcuaAmador was on duty at the detention facility. She was supervising minor, and directed 

minor to walk for physical exercise during his outdoor activity time. Minor reluctantly 

complied at first, but then stopped walking. Amezcua-Amador again told minor to walk; 

however, minor raised his middle finger at her. Amezcua-Amador told minor his 

behavior was unacceptable, and ordered him to return to his room. Minor spat on the 

ground and said, “‘That’s what I think of you, bitch.’” As Amezcua-Amador escorted 

minor back to his room, minor continued to spit on the ground and yell obscenities at her. 

When they arrived at minor’s room, minor refused to enter his room and continued 

to act aggressively. Amezcua-Amador called for assistance. Minor eventually entered 

 

3

 Within the reporter’s transcript, the reporter erroneously referred to the county 

being transferred to as “San Diego,” not “San Bernardino.”
4

his room, and as Amezcua-Amador attempted to close the room door, minor quickly 

turned around and spat on her. Minor’s spit landed on her sunglasses and cheek. Minor 

admitted to spitting on Amezcua-Amador because he was angry at her, but denied that 

the spit hit her face, claiming it had landed on her jeans. 

On September 24, 2012, a subsequent petition was filed alleging that minor had 

committed battery by gassing (§ 243.9, subd. (a)), simple battery (§ 242), and resisting an 

executive officer (§ 69). 

Following a jurisdictional hearing, the juvenile court found true the allegations 

that minor committed a battery by gassing and resisting an executive officer; the simple 

battery allegation was dismissed. 

At the dispositional hearing, minor was declared a ward of the court, placed in the 

custody of the probation department, and confined in juvenile hall pending placement in a 

suitable foster care facility. The court declared minor’s maximum aggregate period of 

confinement for both petitions to be five years four months. The court did not indicate 

any predisposition custody time to be credited against minor’s maximum aggregate 

period of confinement. 
5

II

DISCUSSION

A. Battery by Gassing Conviction

Minor contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the finding that he 

violated section 243.9 because the Central Valley Juvenile Detention and Assessment 

Center where he was detained at the time of the offense does not constitute “any local 

detention facility” within the meaning of that statute. The People disagree, arguing that 

the plain meaning of the words “local detention facility” and the legislative history of 

section 243.9 includes a county juvenile hall facility. 

Section 243.9 provides in relevant part: “Every person confined in any local 

detention facility who commits a battery by gassing upon the person of any peace 

officer . . . or employee of the local detention facility is guilty of aggravated battery and 

shall be punished by imprisonment in a county jail or by imprisonment in the state prison 

for two, three, or four years.” (Italics added.)

The question before us is whether section 243.9, battery by gassing of peace 

officer or local detention facility employee, applies to a battery committed upon a local 

detention facility employee when a minor is confined in a juvenile hall. Specifically, we 

must decide whether a juvenile hall comes within the definition of “any local detention 

facility” as that term is used in section 243.9. There is no dispute here that minor was 

being detained at a juvenile hall at the time of the offense. Accordingly, our task here is 
6

to ascertain the intent of the Legislature as to whether it intended to include a juvenile 

hall as it pertains to section 243.9.

4

 

1. Principles of statutory interpretation

Statutory interpretation is a question of law. (Reno v. Baird (1998) 18 Cal.4th 

640, 660.) Consequently, appellate courts apply their independent judgment when 

interpreting a legislative act. (California Teachers Assn. v. San Diego Community 

College Dist. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 692, 699.) “Thus, the first step in statutory construction is 

to examine the statutory language and give it a plain and commonsense meaning.” 

(People v. Verduzco (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1406, 1414.) In other words, “We must 

give the statutory provisions at issue a reasonable and common sense interpretation, 

consistent with the apparent purpose and intention of the Legislature. If possible, we will 

give significance to the plain meaning of every word, phrase, and sentence of a statute in 

pursuance of the legislative purpose, harmonizing the various parts of an enactment by 

considering each particular clause or section in the context of the statutory framework as 

a whole. In this process, we must take into account the context, object, and history of the 

legislation, as well as public policy and contemporaneous construction in our attempt to 

arrive at a construction that is practical rather than technical in nature. [Citations.]” (In 

re Rochelle B. (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1212, 1216.) 

 

4

 We have discovered no cases addressing the applicability of section 243.9 to

minors who commit gassing in juvenile halls.
7

If the plain language of the statute does not resolve the inquiry, as a second step, 

we may turn to maxims of construction, “‘which serve as aids in the sense that they 

express familiar insights about conventional language usage.’” (Mejia v. Reed (2003) 31 

Cal.4th 657, 663.) Where the language of a statute is susceptible to more than one 

reasonable interpretation, we may look “‘“to a variety of extrinsic aids, including the 

ostensible objects to be achieved, the evils to be remedied, the legislative history, public 

policy, contemporaneous administrative construction, and the statutory scheme of which 

the statute is a part.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Zambia (2011) 51 Cal.4th 965, 

972.) 

“If the meaning of the statute remains unclear after examination of both the 

statute’s plain language and its legislative history, then we proceed to the third and final 

step of the interpretive process. We apply ‘reason, practicality, and common sense to the 

language at hand.’ [Citation.] The words of the statute should be interpreted ‘to make 

them workable and reasonable.’ [Citation.] We will also consider the consequences that 

will flow from a particular statutory interpretation. ‘“In determining what the Legislature 

intended we are bound to consider not only the words used, but also other matters, ‘such 

as context, the object in view, the evils to be remedied, the history of the times and of 

legislation upon the same subject, public policy and contemporaneous construction. 

[Citation.]’ [Citation.]” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Verduzco, supra, 210 

Cal.App.4th at p. 1414.)
8

2. Analysis

We find that the language of section 243.9 applies to minors confined in juvenile 

hall based on the plain meaning of the words of the statute, given its ordinary meaning. 

The statute at issue here states, “Every person confined in any local detention facility

who commits a battery by gassing upon the person of any peace officer . . . or employee 

of the local detention facility is guilty of aggravated battery.” (Italics added.) The plain 

meaning of the words “every person” includes both adults and juveniles. Additionally, 

the plain, commonsense meaning of “any local detention facility” is a facility used for 

detaining persons operated by a county or city government as opposed to the state 

government. (See City of Riverside v. Inland Empire Patients Health and Wellness 

Center, Inc. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 729.) As such, the plain meaning of the language in 

section 243.9 indicates the statute applies to any person confined in any local detention 

facility run by a county or city government, such as a juvenile hall. 

The Welfare and Institutions Code provides additional support to our conclusion 

that “any local detention facility” includes a juvenile hall. Welfare and Institutions Code 

section 202 allows a juvenile court to commit a minor “to a local detention or treatment 

facility, such as a juvenile hall, camp, or ranch.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 202, 

subd. (e)(4), italics added.) Welfare and Institutions Code section 850 specifies that the 

place of detention of juvenile wards in a county “shall be known as the ‘juvenile hall’ of 

the county.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 850.) Welfare and Institutions Code section 850 

describes juvenile halls as a “place for the detention of wards and dependent children of 
9

the juvenile court and of persons alleged to come within the jurisdiction of the juvenile 

court.” (Ibid.) Welfare and Institutions Code section 852 states that juvenile halls are 

under the management and control of the probation officer. The probation officer shall 

appoint the superintendent and other employees of the juvenile hall; and the board of 

supervisors shall provide for payment for suitable salaries for such superintendent and 

other employees out of the general fund of the county. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 853, 

854.) Here, Amezcua-Amador testified that the Central Valley Juvenile Detention and 

Assessment Center is a detention facility operated by the San Bernardino County 

Probation Department, and that it is used for the detention and confinement of minors and 

wards of the juvenile court. 

Minor offers no explanation for how the words of the statute, given their plain, 

commonsense ordinary meaning, could be interpreted to exclude juvenile halls. In fact, it 

would simply be absurd and unreasonable to exclude juvenile halls from the words “any 

local detention facility.” We apply “reason, practicality, and common sense to the 

language at hand.” (People v. Verduzco, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 1414.) Minor’s 

interpretation of the statute would require this court to rewrite the statute by excluding a 

juvenile hall from the words “any local detention facility.” This, however, is 

impermissible under the guise of statutory construction. (See People v. Massicot (2002) 

97 Cal.App.4th 920, 925.) “In construing a statute, it is the role of the judiciary to simply 

ascertain and declare what is in terms or in substance contained in the statute, not to 

insert what has been omitted or omit what has been included. In other words, the courts 
10

‘may not, under the guise of construction, rewrite the law or give the words an effect 

different from the plain and direct import of the terms used.’” (Ibid., citing and quoting

California Fed. Savings & Loan Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (1995) 11 Cal.4th 342, 349.) 

“‘It is axiomatic that in the interpretation of a statute where the language is clear, its plain 

meaning should be followed.’” (Droeger v. Friedman, Sloan & Ross (1991) 54 Cal.3d 

26, 38.) Nothing in the context of section 243.9 justifies an interpretation of the phrase 

“any local detention facility” in any manner contrary to its plain meaning. Accordingly, 

we conclude that the words “any local detention facility” found in section 243.9 include 

juvenile halls. 

Analysis of extrinsic factors, such as legislative history, public policy, and the 

statutory scheme of which the statute is a part, also supports our conclusion. 

Section 243.9 was added to the Penal Code in 2001 by Chapter 627, Assembly Bill 1449 

(AB 1449), entitled “Correctional Institutions—Battery by Gassing.” (Stats. 2000, 

ch. 627, § 1.) AB 1449 also amended section 4501.1, and added section 1768.85 to the 

Welfare and Institutions Code. (Stats. 2000, ch. 627, §§ 2, 3.) Together, these three 

provisions identify gassing as an aggravated battery when it is committed by any person 

while confined in a state prison (§ 4501.1), a facility of the Division of Juvenile 

Facilities, formerly known as the Department of the Youth Authority (DYA) (Welf. & 

Inst. Code, §§ 1768.85, 1703, subd. (c), 1710), or a local detention facility (§ 243.9). 

Prior to the enactment of AB 1449, gassing was recognized as an aggravated battery only 
11

when it was committed by a person detained in a state prison. (Stats. 1997, ch. 591, 

§ 1(AB 995), adding section 4501.1 to the Penal Code.) 

The Legislative Counsel’s Digest notes: “This bill would provide that the abovedescribed provisions of law are applicable to any ‘peace officer’ rather than ‘officer of 

the state prison,’ extend the prohibition in those provisions to any person confined in an

institution under the jurisdiction of the Department of the Youth Authority or a local 

detention facility, require a report by the Department of the Youth Authority, as specified, 

and would delete the provisions that would repeal these provisions of law after January 1, 

2001, thereby continuing those provisions indefinitely. This bill would additionally 

require actual contact with the victim’s skin or membranes in order to constitute the 

offense. This bill would also make the offense punishable as a misdemeanor or a felony, 

as specified. The bill would make related changes.” (Legis. Counsel’s Dig., AB 1449 

(1999-2000 Reg. Sess.), italics added.) 

The apparent intent of this legislation was to expand the scope of gassing by 

battery to include facilities other than a state prison, including the DYA and a local 

detention facility, and to impose increased punishment for minors who commit battery by 

gassing. Although the legislative history of section 243.9 does not specifically mention 

juvenile halls, section 243.9 was clearly expanded to include gassings committed by 

minors in state and local detention facilities. Indeed, when the Legislature extended the 

gassing provision to local detention facilities, it did not indicate it would exclude local 

detention facilities that were used for the confinement of minors, such as juvenile halls. 
12

We also note that the legislative analysis of AB 1449 shows that the issue of 

gassing by minors in local juvenile facilities was pointed out during discussions of the 

bill. The comment in the bill analysis prepared by chief counsel for the Assembly 

Committee on Public Safety states: “Although there is no material presented to 

document that gassing is a problem at local juvenile detention facilities, the possibility 

exists. The author may wish to consider an amendment to include juvenile detention 

facilities expressly in the language of this bill.” (Assem. Com. on Public Safety, analysis 

of Assem. Bill No. 1449 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.), pp. 2-3.) However, as pointed out by

minor, that amendment was never added, and when the bill reached the Senate for its 

third and fourth reading, it omitted any mention of minors in juvenile hall. A reasonable 

conclusion could be that the Legislature believed the broad language of the phrase “any 

local detention facility” adequately encompassed and expressed that a juvenile detention 

facility would be included in the phrase “any local detention facility” without specifically 

mentioning juvenile halls. Moreover, to exclude juvenile halls in interpreting the phrase 

“any local detention facility” as used in section 243.9 would lead to absurd results and 

defy reason and common sense. 

Minor argues that the term “local detention facility” is defined in section 6031.4, 

subdivisions (a) and (b), which state as follows: “(a) For the purpose of this title, ‘local 

detention facility’ means any city, county, city and county, or regional facility used for 

the confinement for more than 24 hours of adults, or of both adults and minors, but does 
13

not include that portion of a facility for the confinement of both adults and minors which 

is devoted only to the confinement of minors. 

“(b) In addition to those provided for in subdivision (a), for the purposes of this 

title, ‘local detention facility’ also includes any city, county, city and county, or regional 

facility, constructed on or after January 1, 1978, used for the confinement, regardless of 

the length of confinement, of adults or of both adults and minors, but does not include 

that portion of a facility for the confinement of both adults and minors which is devoted 

only to the confinement of minors.” (Italics added.)

Relying on the italicized language above of section 6031.4 and the legislative 

history of section 243.9, minor claims that “any local detention facility” cannot logically 

include a juvenile hall because the sole purpose of a juvenile hall is to “house suspected 

juvenile delinquents or wards of the court.” The People respond that the definition of 

“local detention facility” found in section 6031.4 does not specifically apply to 

section 243.9 because that section appears in Title 7 of Part 3 of the Penal Code, which 

addresses the composition, powers, duties, and administration of the newly established 

Corrections Standards Authority within the Department of Corrections and 

Rehabilitation. (See § 6024 et seq.) We are inclined to agree with the People. 

Section 6031.4 specifically states, “[f]or the purpose of this title.” By prefacing the 

definition of the phrase “local detention facility” with the words “[f]or the purpose of this 

title,” the Legislature expressly limited the application of that definition to Title 7 of 

Part 3 of the Penal Code, and thereby did not intend for that definition to apply to the 
14

phrase “local detention facility” when used in other titles of the Penal Code. 

Section 243.9 is found in Title 8 of Part 1 of the Penal Code. Therefore, the definition of 

“local detention facility” found in Title 7 of Part 3 of section 6031.4 does not apply to 

section 243.9. 

Having examined the parties’ arguments, in their briefs and at oral argument, and 

based on the foregoing, we conclude that the phrase “any local detention facility” as used 

in section 243.9 includes juvenile halls. 

B. Predisposition Custody Credits

Minor also contends, and the People correctly agree, that the juvenile court failed 

to calculate his predisposition custody credits at the dispositional hearing. We also agree.

In a juvenile delinquency proceeding, “a minor is entitled to credit against his or 

her maximum term of confinement for the time spent in custody before the disposition 

hearing. [Citations.] It is the juvenile court’s duty to calculate the number of days 

earned, and the court may not delegate that duty. [Citations.]” (In re Emilio C. (2004) 

116 Cal.App.4th 1058, 1067.) “[W]hen a juvenile court elects to aggregate a minor’s 

period of physical confinement on multiple petitions . . . , the court must also aggregate 

the predisposition custody credits attributable to those multiple petitions.” (Ibid.; see also 

Welf. & Inst. Code, § 726, subd. (c) [“If the court elects to aggregate the period of 

physical confinement on multiple counts or multiple petitions, including previously 

sustained petitions adjudging the minor a ward within Section 602, the ‘maximum term 
15

of imprisonment’ shall be the aggregate term of imprisonment specified in [Pen. Code, 

§ 1170.1, subd. (a)] . . . .”].)

Here, there is no evidence in the record to suggest that the juvenile court 

calculated minor’s predisposition custody credits for the Orange County case and the 

instant case, which should have been aggregated with a credit for time spent in custody 

pursuant to the sustained petitions. Minor was taken into custody on the Orange County 

case on November 10, 2011, and he remained in custody until the dispositional hearing in 

the instant matter on October 4, 2012, for a total of 330 days. Thus, minor is entitled to 

330 days of predisposition custody credits against minor’s maximum aggregate period of 

confinement. 

III

DISPOSITION

The adjudication order is affirmed but remanded to the juvenile court with 

directions to modify the order to reflect 330 days of actual predisposition custody credit 

to be credited against minor’s maximum period of physical confinement.

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

RAMIREZ

P. J.

We concur:

RICHLI

J.

KING

J.