Filed 5/8/14 P. v. Phung CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. TIEN PHUOC PHUNG, Defendant and Appellant. G048108

(Super. Ct. No. 11WF0963)

O P I N I O N

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, James A. Stotler, Judge. Affirmed as modified. Athena Shudde, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney Genera l, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistan t Attorney General, Ly nne G. McGinnis and Eric A. Swenson, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

* * *2 A confrontation between rival gang me mbers outside a pool hall led to a brief car chase, which culminated when a pa ssenger in a pursuing vehicle fired a gun out of the window at the fleeing vehicle. The gu nshots resulted in the death of one victim and the serious injury of another. A jury convicted defendant Tien Phuoc Phung (who was not the shooter, or even in the vehicle from which the bullets issued) of all four

counts with which he was char ged: (1) first degree murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 189); 1 (2) attempted murder (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664); (3) shooting at an occupied motor vehicle (§ 246); and (4) street terrorism (§ 186. 22, subd. (a)). As to each of the first three counts, the jury found it to be true that de fendant committed the offe nse for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)) and that defendant vicariously discharged a firearm causing gr eat bodily injury and death (§ 12022.53, subds. (d), (e)(1)). The court sentenced defendant to 50 years to life in state prison. Other than modifying the judgment to remedy an inconsequential error (the court should not have imposed § 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C), enhancements that it ultimately stayed), we affirm.

FACTS

Background Detective Peter Vi testified as an expe rt witness on the subject of criminal street gangs. Vi had been assigned to the ga ng unit of his department for 18 years. Vi talked about gangs generally, indicating “[t]hey use violence, intimidation to gain . . . respect.” Firearms “elevate th e status” of the individual employing them because it gives the individual more power. A “hit-up” occurs when a gang member asks another individual a question (such as “whe re are you from, what gang you claim, do you

1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code.3 bang”), which oftentimes serves as an invita tion or prelude to a violent confrontation. Gang members “claim” their me mbership in the gang during confrontations because of pride in their gang and to in form the victims of who is behind the attack. If a gang member or gang has been disrespected by a ri val, retaliation of equal or greater measure must occur to regain the lost respect. Ga ng members are expected to support each other

in violent confrontations and are subjected to punishment fro m their own gang if they fail to live up to their responsibilitie s. “Backup” in confrontations with rival gangs is very important because there is strength in number s, both in actual fights and for intimidation

purposes. Vi opined that Tiny Rascals Gang (Tin y Rascals or T.R.G.) was a criminal street gang on the date of the incident in question. Based on defe ndant’s numerous prior interactions with police in which he adm itted to his membership in Tiny Rascals,

defendant’s tattoo with T.R.G. symbolism, Vi’s personal in teractions with defendant, defendant’s videotaped participation in “jum ping in” gang ceremonies (pursuant to which the new member is beaten up by existing members), photographs depicting defendant displaying T.R.G. hand signs, an d the investigation of this ca se, Vi opined that defendant was an active participant in Tiny Rascals when the crimes at issue occurred. Indeed,

defendant admitted to another officer that he was a “lieutenant” in Tiny Rascals (i.e., in

between the “shot callers” at the top and younger members ). And a nonpolice witness

testified defendant was a T.R.G. member. Vi also opined that a hypo thetical crime, like

the actual crime described belo w, would have been committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, and in association with a criminal street gang. The pa rties stipulated that Tiny Rascals had engaged in a pattern of crimin al activity prior to th e crimes at issue. Two allied gangs were involved in th e pursuit of the victims’ car, Tiny Rascals and Hellside (T.R .G.’s ally since 2009). The victims in this case were linked to three allied gangs, all rivals of Tiny Rascals and Hellside: Viet Together (also known as V.T.), Power of Viet (also known as P.O.V .), and Asian Family (also known as A.F.).4 Antipathy characterized the relations between, on the one hand, Tiny Rascals and Hellside, and, on the other hand, their rivals Viet Together, Asian Family,

and Power of Viet. Prior to the incident in question, the gangs had perpetrated acts of vandalism against their rivals’ residences (c leverly referred to as “playing house”). The week before the incident, a fi stfight occurred at a karaoke restaurant. Defendant stared menacingly (“mad dogged”) and p unched an individual in the face. Someone said, “This is T.R.G. You guys got shit.” Someone else said, “Fuck Asian Family.” According to defendant (speaking in another context), one of Tiny Rascals’ goals was to make Viet Together “die out.” Phi Hong Pool Hall (the pool hall) was a hangout for members of Viet Together, Asian Family, and Power of Viet. Defendant a nd the other Tiny Rascals were aware that the pool hall was an area claimed by those rival gangs. Defendant did not like to go there; he had been jumped (i.e., physica lly attacked) at this location by members of a different gang (not the gangs at issue in this case) in the past.

Violence Leading to Charges On the night of the incident in ques tion, there was a party at the home of Andrew Tran, an individual with ties to Tiny Rascals. Approximately 15 to 20 people attended. About half the males at the part y were members of Tiny Rascals, about half were members of Hellside. Some of the attendees angrily discussed recent incidents involving their rivals, Asian Family, Viet Together, and Power of Viet. Tran was angered by a recent fight, and ot hers were in turn riled up by the discussion. The party broke up around midnight, as various individual s went out to eat. In Tran’s car were a teenage girl related to Tran, Tran’s cousin, and two of Tran’s friends. When they were leaving the party, one of Tran’s friends put a gun into the car. Ultimately, this group went to the pool hall. Tran’s relatives st ayed in the car while the others got out.5 At approximately 2:00 a.m., outside the pool hall on March 20, 2011,

between four and seven vehicles were blocking the pa th out of the park ing lot. One of the cars at the pool hall was dr iven by defendant. The people in the cars were the same people who were at the T.R.G./Hellside party earlier in the night. One of the passengers in defendant’s car, Anthony Ng uyen, knew there was a plan to lure rival gang members outside to fight. Defendant and others would use their cars as a roadblock to prevent the victims from leaving the pool hall parking lot. Defendant never got out of his car at the pool hall. Two groups of males (one group with about six individuals, the other with about eight individuals) were standing outs ide yelling at each other. Someone shouted, “Fuck A.F.” People were yelli ng, “Fuck V.T.” and “Fuck As ian Family.” Scottie Bui yelled, “P.O.V.” Someone else said, “T.R.G.” The plan to prevent the rival gang members from leaving changed when Tiny Rascals and Hellside members determined someone in the other group had a gun. When Tran got back in his car, he said a gang was there. The eight males affiliated with Viet Together, Power of Viet, and Asian Family piled into a sports utility vehicle (SUV). When a SUV passed his automobile, Tran said , “That’s them.” Tran’s car followed the vehicle. A number of cars sped out of the park ing lot. There were probably five or more

cars. Defendant drove his car out of a differe nt exit than the other cars, but turned right and tried to catch up with his friends. The individual in the front passenger seat of Tran’s car, Benjamin Nguyen,

rolled down his window and to ld Tran to accelerate. Be njamin Nguyen yelled at the SUV, asking whether they were in a gang. Three to five gunshots were fired by Benjamin Nguyen. The shooti ng occurred approximately 150 to 400 yards from the pool hall parking lot. Scottie Bui was shot and killed. Roger James was shot and suffered great bodily injury. Defendant’s car was approximately 50 to 60 yards from where the shooting occurred.6 At least some of the Tiny Rascals and Hellside affilia ted individuals involved in the confrontation (including de fendant) met at the residence of a Hellside member, Tony Ngo. People talked about the fa ct that a shooting occurred. It was stated at this meeting that everyone should “l ay low” and not mention the incident.

Defendant’s Admissions and D eceitful Statements to Police When defendant was interviewed by a po lice officer later in the day of the shooting (March 20, 2011), defendant stated th at he was at a girlfriend’s house all night, starting at noon the previous da y. Defendant claimed his car was not running due to tire or axle problems. Defendant was able to identify a photograph of victim Bui by his nickname and his gang affiliation with Power of Viet. Defendant was also able to identify a photograph of victim James by hi s first name and his gang affiliation with either Asian Family or Power of Viet. After the officer investigated defenda nt’s alibi, the officer confronted

defendant with the results of his investigation. Defendant admitted he had lied about being at a girlfriend’s house. Defendant admitted he had asked the girlfriend and her mother to lie about his presence. Defenda nt then claimed he received a phone call directing him to the pool hall from Tran to provide “backup”; defendant heard arguing and individuals claiming gang membership in the background of the phone call. Defendant drove to the pool hall location, but arrived after “it had happened.” Defendant

admitted he was aware that Hellside and Tiny Rascals gang memb ers were together earlier that night and that He llside members had guns. Defe ndant denied that any Tiny Rascals had firearms on the night in question. About a month after the incident, defe ndant was interviewed a third time, having been arrested and read his rights. Defendant adm itted he was at the party at Tran’s house with many individuals from Tiny Rascals and Hellside. Defendant agreed there was sentiment expressed at the party ab out the commission of violence against their7 gang rivals: “I mean, people were drinking , I mean, they did sa y like, oh yeah, fuck POV, fuck VT, but it wasn’t like oh, yeah, let’s go out and look for them. It was just like, man, fuck those fools, this and that. Or lik e, oh, if I catch those guys doing, I’ll shoot ‘em or I’ll beat ‘em up, you know, like people were talking ‘cause they were drinking.” According to defendant, it was “[m]ainly the Hellside guys.” Defendant left the party to go to an establishment known as a hangout fo r rival gangs, Volcano Tea. The officer asked defendant, “What’s gonna happen if you see them there, Tien?” Defendant responded, “Yeah. The guys in my car are go nna try — probably try to bang on them.” Right after defendant received a phone call about the pool hall, there were people that wanted to go. Defendant drove his car to the pool hall. Defendant agreed (“Yeah”) with the officer’s premise that by goi ng to the pool hall defendant “knew that at least a fucking brawl was going to happen.” Defendant agreed it was true he went to the pool hall to backup the Tiny Rascals. Defe ndant stated, “I mean two groups and both sides have weapons, yeah, someone’s gonn a get hurt hard.” Defendant knew it was going to be bad when Hellside members star ted opening their vehicle trunks; defendant assumed they were retrieving weapons. Hells ide members had talked at the party about having guns. Benjamin Nguyen and someon e named Dung had guns. When the cars started pulling out onto the stre et, defendant chased the gr oup in his car. Defendant “knew . . . after everything’s done like we just happen to stop chasing them, we’re going

to meet somewhere down th ere anyways.” “I knew it wasn’t over because nothing happened and then, when I turn out to this co rner, yeah, I could of went straight, I could have made a left but, I mean, everyone’s going this way. All my ho mies going this way.” After the shooting happened, Dung told defendant to get out of the area. The group later met up at someone’s house, where two in dividuals criticized Benjamin Nguyen for missing. At the conclusion of the interview, de fendant asked, “Is there a way I could get out of this?” and “so, there’ s no way you could help me out?”8 DISCUSSION

The prosecutor argued three theories of liability to the jury with regard to the murder of Bui, the atte mpted murder of James, and discharging a firearm at an occupied vehicle: (1) defendant aided and abetted these crimes; (2 ) defendant aided and abetted a different crime (i.e., “disturbing the peace by challenging someone to fight and/or assault with a deadly weapon”), the natural and pr obable consequence of which was the commission of the charged offenses; a nd (3) defendant entered into a conspiracy to commit a crime, the natu ral and probable consequence of which was the commission of the charged offenses. Defendant claims the jury instructi ons provided with regard to these

theories were erroneous. Defendant did not ch allenge the relevant instructions below. (See People v. Samaniego (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1148, 1163 [party forfeits challenge to instructions that correctly state the law in ge neral, even if the instructions are misleading in the particular case].) We address the meri ts of his contentions of instructional error, both because defendant contends the alleged erro rs affected his substa ntial rights (§ 1259)

and because defendant ar gues in the alternative that he re ceived ineffective assistance of counsel with regard to the jury instructions.

Defendant also asserts there was insuffi cient evidence to support any of his convictions and that the court erred by imposing (then staying) section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(C), enhan cements. We address e ach contention in turn.

Instructions on Aiding and Abetting Liability The first question presented is wh ether the pertinent CALCRIM form instructions on direct aiding and abetting liability (CALCRIM Nos. 401, 402) adequately state the law with regard to estab lishing defendant’s mens rea.9 We begin with an exposition of releva nt legal principles. “‘All persons concerned in the commission of a crime, . . . whether they dir ectly commit the act constituting the offense, or aid and abet in its commission, . . . . are principals in any crime so committed.’ [Citations.] Thus, a pers on who aids and abets a crime is guilty of

that crime even if someone else committed some or all of the criminal acts. [Citation.] Because aiders and abettors may be criminally liable for acts not their own, cases have described their liability as ‘vicarious.’ [Citation. ] This description is accurate as far as it goes. But . . . the aider and abettor’s guilt for the intended crime is not entirely vicarious. Rather, that guilt is based on a combination of the direct perpetrator’s acts and the aider

and abettor’s own acts and own mental state.” ( People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1116-1117.) Thus, assuming the natural and pr obable consequences doctrine is inapplicable, an aider and abettor can be guilty of the same crime as the perpetrator, or a greater or lesser crime than the perpetrator, de pending on the respective mental states of the various principals. (See People v. McCoy , supra , 25 Cal.4th at pp. 1117, 1122; People v. Loza (2012) 207 Cal.App.4t h 332, 351-355.) Examples illustrate this phenomenon better than generalities. The more unlikely scenario is one in which the perpetrator has a lower level of liability than the aider and ab ettor. Two indi viduals shoot at a victim, but the one who actually hits th e victim has an unreasonable self-defense theory, potentially reducing his criminal liabi lity below that of the aider and abettor. ( People v. McCoy , supra , 25 Cal.4th at p. 1122.) Iago maliciously induces and encourages Othello (who it might be posited is acting in the heat of passion) into killing Desdemona, rendering the aider and abettor guilty of first degree murder but the perpetrator guilty of manslaughter. ( Id . at pp. 1121-1122.) More commonly, perhaps,

aiders and abettors can be he ld liable for lesser crimes than the actual perpetrator. A spouse provides assistance to her husband during a violent c onfrontation, which ends in her husband committing first degr ee murder; the jury must dete rmine the wife’s intent in10 assisting her husband during the incident. ( People v. Loza , supra , 207 Cal.App.4th at pp. 336, 356.) A street fight ends in the stabbing death of one of the combatants; the victor’s sister, present at the scene and accused of assisting her brother, might bear less responsibility than her brother. ( People v. Nero (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 504, 507-508, 519.) Defendant suggests the following sta ndard CALCRIM instructions do not make clear the jury’s obligatio n to focus on the aider and ab ettor’s mens rea for purposes of direct aider and abettor liability. “A pe rson may be guilty of a crime in two ways. One, he or she may have directly committe d the crime. I will call that person the perpetrator. Two, he or she may have ai ded and abetted a perpetrator, who directly committed the crime. A person is guilty of a crime whet her he or she committed it personally or aided and abetted the perpetra tor. . . .” (CALCRIM No. 400.) “To prove that the defendant is guilty of a crime based on aiding and abetting th at crime, the People must prove that: [¶] 1. Th e perpetrator committed the crime; [¶] 2. The defendant knew that the perpetrator intended to commit the crime; [¶] 3. Before or during the commission of the crime, the defendant inte nded to aid and abet the perpetrator in committing the crime; [¶] AND [¶] 4. The de fendant’s words or conduct did in fact aid and abet the perpetrator’s commissi on of the crime. [¶] Someone aids and abets a crime if he or she knows of the perpetrator’s unlawful purpose and he or she specifically intends to, and does in fact, aid, facilitate, promote, encourage, or instigate the perpetrator’s commission of that crime. . . .” (CALCRIM No. 401.) Relying primarily on a case that has si nce been depublished as a result of a grant of review on a different issue, 2 defendant claims the form instructions (CALCRIM Nos. 400, 401) allow the jury to utilize the mens rea of the perpetrators (the shooter, Benjamin Nguyen, in particular) to convict defendant. We see no plausible theory

2 People v. Ramirez , review granted Dec. 18, 2013, S214133.11 pursuant to which these instructions are probl ematic as to defendant’s convictions for attempted murder 3 and willfully discharging a fi rearm at an occupied vehicle. 4 CALCRIM No. 401 clearly require s the jury to find that de fendant knew th e perpetrator (Benjamin Nguyen) intended to commit these crimes and that defendant intended to aid and abet Benjamin Nguyen in the commissi on of these crimes. Defendant does not explain, and we cannot divine, how the instructi ons could be read as an invitation to hold defendant vicariously liable for Benjamin Nguyen’s mental state on these counts. As the previously listed examples of divergent liability suggest, however, murder is particularly prob lematic in the aiding and abetting context because the same conduct constitutes different crimes (e.g., fi rst degree murder, second degree murder, voluntary manslaughter) depending on the mental state of the prin cipals. The jury in this case was tasked with deciding whether defend ant was guilty of first degree or second degree murder pursuant to CALCRIM Nos. 520, 521, and 640. In murder cases, particularly those in which both the perpetrato r and aider and abettor are being tried at the same time, there is a danger that a careless rendering of the CALCRIM instructions could

3 The court instructed the jury w ith CALCRIM No. 600, which states in relevant part: “The defendant is charged in Count 2 with attempte d murder. [¶] To prove that the defendant is guilty of attempted murde r, the People must pr ove that: [¶] 1. The defendant took at least one direct but in effective step toward killing another person; [¶] AND [¶] 2. The defendant intended to kill that person. . . .” We note that the attempted murder count did no t include an allegation that the attempted murder was “willful, deliberate, and premeditated.” (§ 664, subd. (a).) Even if it had, section 664, subdivision (a), “properly interpreted, does not require personal willfulness, deliberation, and premeditation on the part of an attempted murderer.” ( People v. Lee (2003) 31 Cal.4th 613, 616-617.)

4 The court instructed the jury w ith CALCRIM No. 965, which states in relevant part: “The defendant is charged in Count 3 with shooting at an occupied motor vehicle. [¶] To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that: [¶] 1. The defendant willfully and maliciously shot a firearm; [¶] AND [¶] 2. The defendant shot the firearm at an occupied motor vehicle.”12 confuse the jury as between the aider and abe ttor’s mens rea and that of the perpetrator. The instructions pertaining to murder require d the jury to find “t he defendant” committed the crimes at issue. Of particular importa nce is CALCRIM No. 521, which provides in relevant part: “The defendant is guilty of first degree murder if the People have proved that he acted willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation. The defendant acted willfully if he intended to k ill. The defendant acted deliberately if he carefully weighted the considerations for and against his choice and, knowing the cons equences, decided to

kill. The defendant acted with premeditation if he decided to kill before completing the act that caused death.” Obviously, defendant did not “complet[e] the act that caused

death.” This instruction co uld have confused the jury had defendant and Benjamin Nguyen been on trial at the same time. The unexplained use of the general term “the

defendant” in these in structions may be inappropriate in a multiple defendant aiding and abetting case. Here, however, defendant was the only in dividual on trial. When reviewing the direct aiding and abetting instructions in conjunction with th e substantive murder instructions, the jury could only conclude th at it needed to focus on defendant’s mens rea for purposes of direct aiding and abetti ng liability. CALCRIM No . 640 also helpfully sets forth the process for the jury to follow in determining whether “the defendant” (not Benjamin Nguyen) was guilty of first degree murder, second degree murder, or not at all with regard to count 1. “W e determine the correctness of th e jury instructions from the entire charge of the court, not from consider ing only parts of an instruction or one particular instruction.” ( People v. Smith (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 7, 13.) There is no reasonable likelihood the jury was confused by the instructions or applied them incorrectly in the manner cont ended by defendant. (See People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1202-1203.) 5

5 During deliberations, the jury sent a note to the trial court asking for “exact language describing definitions of 1st degree and 2nd degree murder.” After consulting13 Instructions on Aiding and Abetting With Na tural and Probable Cons equences Doctrine Defendant also claims the jury in structions (those cited above in conjunction with CALCRIM No. 40 3) were prejudicially err oneous with regard to the prosecutor’s theory that the charged crimes were the na tural and probable consequences of uncharged crimes that defe ndant aided and abetted. “[A] defendant may be held crimina lly responsible as an accomplice not only for the crime he or she intended to aid an d abet (the target crime), but also for any other crime that is the ‘natural and probab le consequence’ of the target crime.” ( People v. Prettyman (1996) 14 Cal.4th 248, 261.) A jury “must find that the defendant, acting with (1) knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator; and (2) the intent or

with counsel, the court responded, “The ex act language describing definitions of 1st degree and 2nd degree murder is contained in CALCRIM Inst ruction No. 520 and 521.” The jury later sent a second note, indicating that it was unable to “find an explicit definition to determine the difference betwee n 1st and 2nd degree mu rder as per 520 and 521.” After again consulting with couns el, the trial court provided the following explanation: “For purposes of this case, fi rst degree murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought. Fo r first degree murder, express malice is required, i.e ., an intent to kill, and, such intent to kill must be accompanied by a killing done with premeditation and deliberation. Pr emeditation and deliberation is explained in CALCRIM 521. [¶] Second degree murder, again for purposes of this case, is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought. Second degree murder can result when: [¶] 1. There is an unlawful intent to kill, i.e ., express malice, but the act of killing is done without prem editation and deliberation or insufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation. [¶] 2. Seco nd degree murder can also be the unlawful killing of a human being ba sed on ‘implied’ malice, i.e ., (1) If the unlawful act of killing is intentionally done; and (2) The natural a nd probable consequences of the act were dangerous to human life; and (3) At the time the person committed the act, he knew his act was dangerous to human life; and (4) He deliberately acted with conscious disregard for human life.” These questions and response s do not suggest any confusion on the part of the jury with regard to th eir obligation to examine defendant ’s mental state as part of an inquiry into direct aidi ng and abetting liability. (Cf. People v. Nero , supra , 181 Cal.App.4th at p. 519 [jury expressly asked about possib ility of aider and abettor being held liable for lesser crime, which questio ns were erroneously addressed by court’s statement that “‘[e]ach principal . . . is equally guilty ’”]; People v. Loza , supra , 207 Cal.App.4th at pp. 353-355 [follows Nero in similar circumstances].)14 purpose of committing, encour aging, or facilitating the commission of a predicate or target offense; (3) by act or advice aided, promoted, encouraged or instigated the commission of the target crim e[;] (4) the defendant’s conf ederate committed an offense

other than the target crime; and (5) the offens e committed by the confederate was a natural and probable consequence of the ta rget crime that the defendant aided and abetted.” ( Id . at p. 262, fn. omitted.) A charged crime is a natural and probabl e consequence of a target crime if it was reasonably foreseeable that the charged crime would be committed. “The . . . question is not whether the aider and abettor actually foresaw the additional crime, but whether, judged objectively, it was reasonably foreseeable.” ( People v. Mendoza (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1114, 1133.) Thus, under this theory of the case, the prosecutor did not need to prove defendant had any subjective knowledge or inte nt that a murder (first degree or second degree), attempted murder, or discharge of a firearm would occur. It was enough to prove that defendant intended to (and actually did) aid and abet one of the target offenses, and that the crimes actually committed by Be njamin Nguyen were na tural and probable consequences of the target offense. Hence, the relevant mens rea for purposes of first degree murder (or second degree murder), atte mpted murder, and disc harge of a firearm at an occupied vehicle was that of Benjamin Nguyen, not that of defendant. Defendant’s mental state was only relevant to proving his intent to aid and abet the target offenses. The jury was instructed with CALCRIM No. 403, modified to include pertinent crimes as follows: “ Before you may decide whether a defendant is guilty of first degree murder, second degree murder , attempted murder, or shooting at an occupied motor vehicle on the natural and probable co nsequences doctrine of aiding and abetting law, you must decide whether he is gu ilty of disturbing the peace by challenging someone to fight and/or assault with a deadly weapon. [¶] To prove that the defendant is guilty of first degree murd er, second degree murder , attempted murder, or shooting at an15 occupied motor vehicle, the People must prove that: [¶] 1. The defendant is guilty of disturbing the peace by challenging someone to fight and/or assault with a deadly weapon; [¶] 2. During the commission of disturbing the peace by challenging someone to fight and/or assault with a deadly weapon a coparticipant in that disturbing the peace by challenging someone to fight and/or assault with a deadly weapon committed the crime of first degree murd er, second degree murder, attempted murder, or shooting at an occupied motor vehicle; [¶] AND [¶] 3. Under the circumstances, a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would have known that the commission of first degree murder, second degree murder, attempted murder, or shooting at an occupied motor vehicle was a natural and probable conseque nce of the disturbing the pe ace by challenging someone to fight and/or assault with a deadly weapon. A coparticipant in a crime is the perpetrator or anyone who aided and abetted the perpetrator. It does not include a victim or innocent bystander.

“A natural and probable consequence is one that a reasonable person would know is likely to happen if nothing unusual intervenes. In deciding whether a consequence is natural and prob able, consider all of the circumstances established by the

evidence. If the first degree murder, second degree murder , attempted murder, or shooting at an occupied motor vehicle, wa s committed for a reason independent of the common plan to commit the disturbing the pe ace by challenging someone to fight and/or assault with a deadly weapon, then the commission of the first degree murder, second degree murder , attempted murder, or shooting at an occupied motor vehicle was not a natural and probable conseque nce of disturbing the peace by challenging someone to fight and/or assault with a deadly weapon. [¶] To decide whether the crime of first degree murder, second degree murder , attempted murder, or shooting at an occupied motor vehicle was committed, please refer to the separate instructions that I will give you on those crimes. [¶] The People are alleging that the defendant originally intended to aid and abet disturbing the peace by challenging someone to fight and/or assault with a16 deadly weapon. [¶] If you decide that th e defendant aided and abetted one of these

crimes and that first degree murder, second degree murder , attempted murder, or shooting at an occupied moto r vehicle was a natural and pr obable consequence of that crime, the defendant is guilty of first degree murder, second degree murder , attempted murder, or shooting at an occupied motor vehi cle. [¶] You do not need to agree about

which of these crim es the defendant aided and ab etted.” (Italics added.) According to defendant (again rely ing on a subsequently depublished opinion as referenced in fn. 2), this instructi on “did not tell the jury the shooter’s premeditation of the murder wa s a necessary element of the offense and [defendant’s] liability for first degree murder required a dete rmination of the shoot er’s premeditation as part of the natural and probable conseq uence of whatever le sser crime the jury determined that [defendant] himself had intend ed to commit. [Citati on.] To the contrary, CALCRIM No. 403 permitted the jury to find [defendant] gu ilty of first degree murder based solely on the shooter’s premeditation.” But defendant simply ignore s the repeated references (italicized above) to both first degree murder and se cond degree murder in CALCRI M No. 403 as provided to the jury in this case. The jury was not provided with an undifferentiated reference to “murder” being a natural and probable cons equence of the target offenses. (Cf. People v.

Favor (2012) 54 Cal.4th 868, 882 (dis. opn. of Liu, J.) [jury “asked to determine only whether ‘the commission of attempted murder was a natural and probable consequence of

the commission of the ro bbery’” rather than premeditated attempted murder].) Instead, the logical path blazed for the jury by the version of CALC RIM No. 403 in this case was to determine which, if any, of the charged crimes was a natural a nd probable consequence of the uncharged target offens es. In following this path, the jury would then naturally proceed to examine the separate instructions for the ch arged offenses. Th ese instructions (including CALCRIM No. 521) accurately disti nguish between the mental states required for first degree and second degree murder.17 Uncharged Conspiracy Instruction “Pursuant to section 182, subdivision (a )(1), a conspiracy consists of two or more persons conspiring to commit any crime. A conviction of cons piracy requires proof

that the defendant and anothe r person had the specific intent to agree or conspire to commit an offense, as well as the specific intent to commit th e elements of that offense, together with proof of the commission of an overt act ‘by one or more of the parties to such agreement’ in furthera nce of the conspiracy.” ( People v. Morante (1999) 20 Cal.4th 403, 416, fn. omitted.) Defendant wa s not charged with th e separate crime of conspiracy in this case. Defendant takes issue with the jury being charged with instructions (CALCRIM Nos. 416-420) pertaining to the pros ecutor’s third theory of liability, to wit,

defendant entered into an uncharged conspiracy with Ti ny Rascals and/or Hellside gang

members to commit certain crim inal acts (disturbing the p eace by willfully fighting or challenging someone to fight), the natural and probable consequence of which was the charged offenses (murder, attempted murder, and discharging a firearm at an occupied vehicle). Defendant does not identify a particular problem with these instructions or with the uncharged conspiracy th eory being applied to the facts of this case. Instead, in a sprawling examination of hoary case law, defe ndant espouses the position that this theory of liability is unlawful generally as not auth orized by the Penal C ode or section 31 in particular. 6

6 “All persons concerned in the commission of a crime . . . whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense, or aid and abet in its commission, or, not being present, have advised and encouraged its commission . . . are principals in any crime so committ ed.” (§ 31.)18 We are unwilling to engage with th e merits of defendant’s lengthy treatment of this issue. “It is long and fi rmly established that an uncharged conspiracy may properly be used to prove criminal liability for acts of a coconspirator.” ( People v.

Belmontes (1988) 45 Cal.3d 744, 788, di sapproved on another point in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn . 22.) “One who conspires with others to commit a felony is guilty as a principal.” ( In re Hardy (2007) 41 Cal.4th 977, 10 25 [citing § 31].) We are required to follow the decisions of our Suprem e Court. Defendant makes no effort in his opening brief to argue that th e facts of this case fall outside of established Supreme Court authority; instead, defendant argues that courts (including our Supreme Court) have been

mistaken about this issue.

Sufficiency of the Evidence — All Counts Next, defendant asserts the evidence was insufficient to support each of his convictions. “In reviewing a challenge to th e sufficiency of the evidence, ‘we “examine the whole record in the light most favorable to the judg ment to determine whether it

discloses substantial evidence — evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid value

— such that a reasonable trier of fact coul d find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” [Citations.] We presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably de duce from the evidence.’” ( People v. Alexander (2010) 49 Cal.4th 846, 917.)

The direct and circumstantial evidence in this case can be summarized as follows: (1) defendant was a member of Tiny Rascals Gang; (2) Tiny Rascals and Hellside were allied against three rival gangs , Asian Family, Viet To gether, and Power of Viet; (3) the two sides engaged in reciprocal vandalism and physi cal violence during the time period leading up to the night in questi on; (4) numerous Tiny Rascals and Hellside gang members, including defendant, were pres ent at a party hours before the shooting; (5) defendant was aware that individuals at the party were in posse ssion of guns; (6) the19 gang rivalry was discussed, including angry statements suggesting the rivals would be attacked; (7) Tiny Rascals and Hellside memb ers spread out into the community; (8) eventually, defendant was cont acted by Tran to come to the pool hall to provide “backup”; (9) defendant responde d to the call, joining in w ith approximately five other cars partially blocking the parking lot exit; (10) some in dividuals from defendant’s group (but not defendant or anyone in his car) got out of their cars and co nfronted a group of approximately eight in dividuals affiliated wi th Asian Family, Viet Together, and Power of Viet; (11) numerous gang names were s houted, amounting to challenges to a violent confrontation; (12) a fight did not actua lly occur, perhaps because defendant’s group feared that their rivals had a gun; (13) the tw o groups got into their respective cars; (14) the rivals’ car was allowed to leave the park ing lot; (15) numerous cars from defendant’s group followed, including defend ant, who used an alternate ex it from the lot that left him behind the action; (16) with Tran driving, Be njamin Nguyen shot at the rivals’ car a few hundred yards down the street, killing Bui and injuring James; and (17) Tiny Rascals and Hellside members, including defendant, met at a residence afterward and discussed the

event. It is certainly a fair inference from the record that defendan t intended to aid and abet the uncharged target offenses of di sturbing the peace by challenging someone to fight (§ 415, subd. (1); CALCRIM No. 26 88) and/or assault with a deadly weapon (§§ 240, 245(a)(1); CALCRIM No. 875). By his own admission, defendant drove to the pool hall to provide “backup” to individuals he knew were armed. Anthony Nguyen, a passenger in defendant’s car, knew there was a plan to engage in a fight. Regardless of whether defendant specifically agre ed at the party to fight his gang’s rivals that night, it

cannot be denied that he answer ed the call from Tran to meet at the pool hall to assist in that purpose. Furthermore, defendant a rrived early enough to observe what was20 happening (e.g., Hellside members opening thei r trunks) and to see the cars leaving the parking lot. 7

There is also substantial evidence su pporting a finding that defendant, “by act or advice,” aided, promoted, and/or encouraged the target offenses. ( People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1158, 1164.) “[I]n general[,] neither pr esence at the scene of a crime nor knowledge of, but failure to preven t it, is sufficient to establish aiding and abetting its commission. [Citations.] However, ‘[a]mong the factors which may be considered in making the determination of aidi ng and abetting are: presence at the scene of the crime, companionship, and conduc t before and after the offense.’” ( People v. Campbell (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 402, 409.) As shown in the summary of the evidence above and the gang expert testimony, everythi ng that happened before and after the actual shooting supports the conclusion that defend ant aided, promoted, and encouraged the target offenses by providing backup to his allies. It is typically a question for the jury as to whether murder is a reasonably foreseeable consequence of an assault or battery involving gang members. (See People v.

Medina (2009) 46 Cal.4th 919, 922 -924 [killing of fleeing vic tim by one gang member’s gunshot was reasonably foreseeab le consequence of all thre e gang members repeatedly challenging victim with gang inquiri es and engaging in a fistfight]; People v. Ayala (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1440, 1448-1453 [does not matte r that assault did not go according to plan]; People v. Gonzales (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1, 10-11 [fatal shooting during gang-related fistfight was natural a nd probable consequence of fistfight]; People v. Olguin (1994) 31 Cal.App.4t h 1355, 1375-1376 [defendant’s punching of victim during gang confrontation foreseeably led to fatal shooting of victim by fe llow gang member]; People v. Godinez (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 492, 499–500 [fatal stabbing of rival gang

7 We also note that these same facts support the prosecution’s uncharged conspiracy theory, in that de fendant agreed to backup Tran and multiple overt acts were taken by Tiny Rascals a nd Hellside members to confront their rivals.21 member either during or after fistfight was natural and probable consequence of fistfight].) It is also for the jury to determine whether attempted murder is a reasonably foreseeable consequence of a figh t involving gang members. ( People v. Caesar (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1050, 1056-1058 [attempte d murder conviction based on assault and battery as target offenses], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Superior Court (Sparks) (2010) 48 Cal.4th 1, 18; People v. Hoang (2006) 145 Cal.A pp.4th 264, 275-276 [attempted murder was natura l and probable consequence of assault with a deadly weapon aided and abetted by gang member defendant]; People v. Montes (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1050, 1054-1056 [attempted murder by shooting of rival gang member during retreat from fight was natural and prob able consequence of gang fight in which defendant wielded a chain]; People v. Montano (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 221, 225-227 [defendant’s aiding and encouragement of batte ry on rival gang victim foreseeably led to attempted murder of victim by fellow gang members], superseded by statute on other grounds as explained in People v. Singleton (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d 418, 424.) These murder and attempted murder cases logically apply in equal measure to count 3, discharging a firearm at an occupied motor vehicle.

The evidence in this record supports a conclusi on that the charged offenses were natural and probable consequences of the target offenses. Defendant’s fellow gang members and allies actively sough t out their rivals. Hellside gang members were armed with firearms. As testified by the expert w itness, gang “hit-ups” are invitations to violent

confrontations. Defendant hims elf admitted that he knew things were going to get bad when he saw Hellside opening their trunks. Ther e is evidence that the stakes were raised

further when someone in defend ant’s group perceived that their rivals had firearms. The short car chase did not separate the fight from the shooting. Our Supreme Court has rejected the notion that a jury is required to draw fine distinctions between the fight itself and a flight from the fight that ends in murd er: “although Vallejo argues that the fistfight22 and shooting were not one unint errupted event, but rather two separate incidents, the evidence showed that [defendant s] did not consider the fight to be over and that the shooting resulted directly from that fight.” ( People v. Medina , supra , 46 Cal.4th at pp. 919, 923-924 [affirming conviction].) Similarl y, here the evidence suggests that the shooting occurred shortly after the parties entere d their vehicles and drove out of the pool hall parking lot. In sum, even if the jury concluded de fendant himself did not have the intent to kill, it could have reasonabl y concluded he was vicariously liable based on the natural and probable consequences doctr ine. This is not a case in which defendant was convicted of murder based merely on his gang membersh ip and his presence at the scene of the crime. Rather, this is a case in which de fendant requests us “to reweigh the evidence after a jury verdict, which is not our job wh en reviewing a verdict for sufficiency of the evidence.” ( People v. Mejia (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 586, 608 [affirming convictions of multiple gang members for first degree murde r, including some who aided and abetted by providing “‘backup’”].) As for count 4, street terrorism, “[a] ny person who actively participates in any criminal street gang with knowledge that its members enga ge in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity, and who will fully promotes, furthers, or assists in any felonious criminal conduct by members of that gang, shall be punished by imprisonment . . . .” (§ 186.22, subd. (a ).) Defendant’s argument here is largely

derivative of his claim that there is insuffici ent evidence to support his other convictions, which provided the basis for c oncluding that defendant willfu lly promoted, furthered, or assisted in any felonious crim inal conduct by members of that gang. Defendant does not contest that he actively participated in Tiny Rascals or that he had knowledge of its pattern of criminal gang activity. The subs tantial evidence detailed above supporting defendant’s convictions for first degree mu rder, attempted murder, and discharging a firearm at an occupied vehicle supports the street terrorism conviction. (See People v.23 Castenada (2000) 23 Cal.4th 743, 74 9-750 [violation of § 186.22, subd. (a), consists of aiding and abetting “separ ate felony offense committe d by gang members”].)

Street Gang Enhancements Defendant’s 50 years to life sentence c onsists of 25 years to life for first degree murder (§ 190, subd. (a )) and a consecutive 25 year s to life for the use of a handgun during the murder (§ 12022.53, subd. (d), (e)(1)). The court imposed additional punishments on the other counts and enhanc ements, but either ran the sentences concurrently or stayed them pursuant to section 654. As to the section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(C) allegations, which were found true by the jury, the court imposed a 10-year enhancement as to counts 1, 2, and 3. But the court stayed the execution of

sentence on these enhancements pursuant to section 654. Section 12022.53, subdivision (e )(2) states, “An enhancement for participation in a criminal street gang [pursu ant to section 186.22] shall not be imposed on a person in addition to an enhancement im posed pursuant to this subdivision, unless the person personally used or personally discharged a fire arm in the commission of the offense.” Obviously, defendant did not pers onally use or discha rge a firearm in the commission of his offenses. The Attorney General concedes that the court erred by imposing, then staying, a 10-year prison term for each of the section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(C), enhancements to counts 1 through 3. We agree that defendant is entitled to the relief he seeks, namely, the striking of th e 10-year enhancements imposed pursuant to section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(C). (See People v. Brookfield (2009) 47 Cal.4th 583, 596 [“what the trial court cannot do is to impose punishment under both section 186.22 and section 12022.53”].)24 DISPOSITION

The judgment is modified by striking the section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(C), enhancements imposed (t hen stayed) by the court as to counts 1, 2, and 3. The trial court is directed to prepare an amended abstract of judgment and forward a certified copy to the Department of Corrections and Re habilitation. The judgment is affirmed as

modified.

IKOLA, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’LEARY, P. J.

MOORE, J.