### In The C ou rt o f A p p ea ls Si x t h Appe l l at e Di st r i c t o f Te x as a t Te x ar ka na

______________________________ No . 0 6- 09 -0 00 56 -C V

______________________________ CHARL ES A. HARREL L , SR., Appellant

V. CI TI Z ENS BAN K & TRUST COMP ANY OF V I VI AN, L OUI SI ANA, Appe llee

On Appea l from the 276th J udicial District Court

Marion County , Texas Trial Court No. 0800147

B e f o r e M o r r i s s , C

. J. , C a

rt e r an d M o s e l e y , JJ. Opinion by

J ustice Carte r2 O P I N I O N Charles A. H arr ell, Sr. (Har rell) a ppeals a forc ible detainer

suit brought by

Citi zens Bank (B ank) alleg ing that his son and stepson own an inter est in the proper ty there by cre ating a title issue which divested the trial court ofjurisdiction to issue a writ of possession. Secondarily , Har rell urg es that the B ank only

owns an undivi ded int ere st in the property , that he occupies t he property with the consent of the other owner s and cannot be evicted. T he B ank denie s eac h of Ha rre ll's c ontentions and asse rts t h at Har

rell' s notice of a

ppeal wa s untimely

filed. We aff

irm the judg ment of the trial court. I. F ACTUAL AND P ROCEDURAL BACK GR OUND On No ve mbe r 1 , 1 99 6, Ha

rr e ll e xec ute d a de e d of tr us t in fa vo r o f t he B ank se c ur inga

no te iss ue d t o t h e B an k o n t h a t s a m e d ay an d g r an t i n g a f i r s t l i e n o n c e rt a i n r e a l p r o p e rt y loc a te d in Marion County , Texas. The dee d of trust provides, in per tinent part, that 5

. I f G ra n t o r d ef

au l t s o nt h e n o t e o r f

ai l s t o p er fo rm an y

o f G ra n t o r's o b l i g a t i o n s . . . , t h e nB e n e f i c i ar y m ay: A. De c lare the un

pa id pr inc ipa l ba lanc e and e arn e d int e re st on the no te immediately

due; B. Request trustee to f orec lose this lien, in which case Be nefic iar y or Be nefic iary ' s ag ent shall g ive notice of the fore clos u re sale a s provided by

the Texas Property

Code as then amended; and C. Pur c ha se the pr op e rt y a t any fo re c los ur e sa le by

of fe ri ngthe hig he st bid and then have the bid cre dited on the note.

. . . .J u r is d ic ti o n o f a f o r c ib le d e ta in e r s u it is in th e ju s ti c e c o urt in th e p r e c in c t wher e the 1 proper ty in question is located. T EX . G OV ' T C ODE ANN . § 27 .0 31 (a )( 2) (V e rn on Sup p. 20 08 ); T EX . P R OP . C ODE ANN . § 24 .0 04 (V e rn on 20 00 ). Ap pe a l f

ro m a forcib le det ain er sui t is to t he c ounty court of the county in which the judgme nt is rende red. T EX . R. C IV . P. 74 9. I n th is c a se , a pp e a l to the 276th J udicial Dis trict Court of Marion County was appropriate

. Section 24.453(c) of the Te x as Gover nment Code provides that "[t]he jurisdiction of the 276th D istrict Court is conc urre nt with the jurisdi ct i on of the 115th District Court in Marion County . . . ." Sec tion 24.217(b) of the Te x as Gover nment Code provides that " in addition to other jurisdiction provided by law, the 115th Dist rict Court ha s the c ivi l a

nd c ri min a l juri sd ic tio n o f a c ounty c ourt in M ari on

County ." We n ote the se provisions beca

use they bestow upo n t h e 2 76th J udicial District Court the civil jurisdiction of a county court. T EX . G OV ' T C ODE ANN . § 24.453(c) (Ve rnon 2004), § 24.217( b) (Ve rnon 2004). 3 1. I f any of the pr op e rt y is sol d und e r thi s De e d o f T ru st, Gr anto r s ha ll immediately

surre nder posse ssion to the purchase r. I f Grantor fails to do so, Grantor sh a ll b e c ome a

te na nt at su ff e ra nc e of the purc ha se r, su

bje c t to an a c tio n f

or fo rc ibl e detainer

. Har rell def aulted on t h e n o t e, an d the prope rty was sold to the B ank at a nonjudicial f o r e c l o s u r e s a l e A u g u s t7 , 2 0 0 7

. A s u b s t i tu t e t r u s t e e ' s d e e d

w a s i s s u e d

t o t h e B an k

t h a ts a m e d ay. Th e B ank de mand e d Harr e ll va c a te the pr e mis e s. Whe n H arr e ll r e fu se d, the B ank fi le d a fo rc ibl e detainer action in the justice c ourt; the justice cour t gr anted the B ank a w rit of possession. H ar r e l l a p p e a l e d t h e j u d g m e n to f

t h e j u s t i c e c o u rtt o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u rto f M ar i o nC o u n t y. 1 I n that proce eding and on appea l to this Court, Harr ell contends that Char les A. Ha rre ll, J r., owne d an undivided one- fourth intere st in the real pr operty descr ibed in plaintiff' s s wo rn complaint for forc ible detainer

and that Ha

rre ll remains on t he property with the consent of Harre ll, J r. I t is alleg ed that Har rell, Jr. inherited th i s i n t er es t from his mother, Diane Har rell, bef ore the execution of the deed of trust. We neither have the last will and testament of D iane ( assuming the re is one) befor eHar rell testi fi ed t h at h e sig ned the de ed of trust a s g uardia n for his son, Har

rell, Jr. 2 Howeve r, the gra

ntor in the deed of

trust is li sted as Charle s A. Har rell, Inc., a T exas Corporation, d/b/a Charlie' s Country

Corner, Inc. We have no documentar y evidenc e bef

ore us re gar d ing the g ua rd ians hip te sti fi e d to by

Ha rr e ll; the de e d o f t

ru st d oe s n ot e vid e nc e , o n it s f a c e , th a t H arr e ll signe d as g rantor in the c apac ity of g uardia

n on behalf

of Ha rre ll, J r. 4 u s , n o r i s t h er e a n y

o t h er d o cu m en t ary

ev i d en ce t o s u

p p o rt t h e b ar e a l l e g a t i o no f H arre l l , J r. 's

o w n e r s h i p i n t e r e s ti nt h e s u b j e c tp r o p e rt y. Ha rr e ll c on te nd s th a t a t the tim e he e xec ute d the de e d o f t ru st i n f a vo r o f t he B ank , H arr e ll, Jr. w a s a min or . Harr e ll tes tif

ie d tha t he wa s app oin te d g ua rd ian of Ha

rr e ll, Jr. an d tha t he fa ile d to g ain t he approval of the county court in which H arr ell, J r.' s g uardia nship was pendingbefor e sig ning the deed of t rust as guar dian for his son. As a result of t his omiss ion, Harr ell contends the tria l court 2 lacke d subject-matter

jurisdiction because these owne rship issues are bey ond the j urisdiction of the court sitting in a f

orcible de tainer he aring . No documentation of the g uardia nship was offe red. Har rell fur ther testified that he convey ed five acr es of the subje ct prope rty to J ohn Anthony J ones, his stepson, befor e the e x ecution of the deed of trust. There i s n o deed in the r ecor d evidenc ing this cla imed interest on the part of Jones by Har rell. This issue, taken tog ether with the issue of Ha

rre ll, J r.' s, alleg ed owne rship interest in the subject proper ty , Har rell conte nds, deprived the trial cour

t of subject-matter jurisdiction. II. ISSU ES P RE SEN TED ( 1 ) Whe th e r th e tr ia l c o u rt h a d s u b je c t- matt e r ju

r is d ic ti o n o v e r th e c a

u s e o f action for forc ible detainer ;5

(2 ) Whe the r t

he B ank pr ov e d a su pe ri or ri g ht t o im me diate po ss ess ion of the pr op e rt

y in question sufficient to sustain its forcible de tainer c laim; and (3) Whether Ha

rre ll's notice of appe al was timely filed. III . STA ND AR

D O F RE VI EW A. Subj e c t- M at te r Jur isdi c ti on The que stion of whether

the trial cour

t had subjec t-matter jurisdiction is a question of law that we r eview de novo. Gibson v. D yn egy Midstream Servs., L.P. , 1 3 8 S. W. 3 d 5 1 8 , 5 2 2 ( T e x. A p p . — Fo rt W o rt h 2 0 0 4 , n o p et

. ) ( ci t i n g Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm'n v. IT-Davy , 74 S.W .3d 849, 855 (Tex. 2002)). When conduc ting a de novo re view, the r eviewingtribunal exercises i t s o w n j ud gment and"accord s t he o ri ginal tr ib un al's deci si on abs ol ut ely no defe renc e." Quick v

. City of A us tin , 7 S.W. 3d

10 9, 11 6 (T e x. 19 98 ). I n thi s c a se , th e de fe ns ive ple a din g and pr oo f r a ise the issue of subjec t-matter jurisdiction base d on the asser tion that the question of possession of the subject prope rty

cannot be deter

mined apar

t from deter

mining title. We theref

ore must deter

mine whether Har rell is corr ect in asse rting that questions of title and possession are so integ rally linked that the trial court lacke d subject-matter jurisdiction ove r t h e case. See Mitchell v. Arm strong Cap ita l Co rp ., 911 S.W .2d 169, 171 (Tex. A pp.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied) (holding g enuine issue r eg ardingtitle ex isted and trial cour t lacked subject -m atter jurisdiction, whe re defe ndant to forc ible detainer action pled that de ed under which plaintiff c laimed title was void).6

B. Legal Su ff

iciency The test for leg al sufficie ncy is " whether the evidenc e at trial would enable rea sonable a nd fai r-m in dedpeo pl e to reach th e ver di ct un der r evi ew. " City of Keller v. W ilson , 168 S.W .3d 802, 82 7 ( Te x. 20 05 ). I n ma kin g t hi s deter

min a tio n, we c re dit

fa vo ra ble e vid e nc e if

a re a so na ble fac t-finder

could, and disre g ard c ontrary evidenc e unless a reasonable fac t-finder could not. Id. at 82 3. So l on g a s the e vid e nc e fa lls wi thi n the zon e of re a so na ble dis a g re e me nt, we may no t su bs tit ute our judg ment for that of the fa ct-finde r. Id. at 822. The trie r of f act is t h e s o l e j u d g e of the

cre dibilit y of the witnesses and the weig ht to g ive their testimony

. Id. at 819. Althoug h we c onsider the e vid e nc e in a

lig ht m os t f

a vo ra ble to t he c ha lle ng e d f

ind ings, indul g inge ve ry re a so na ble infere nce that supports the m, w e may not disre g ard evidenc e that allows only one infe renc e. Id. at 822. C. F actual Suf fi ciency The trial c ourt found the B ank had me t its burden to p rove it had a superior r ight of po sse ssi on

to t he pr op e rt y . I n re vie wi ng a

fa c tua l su ff

ic ie nc y c ha lle ng e in t

his po sture , w e mus t f

ir st consider, w eig h, and examine all of the e vidence contra ry t o t h e j u ry

deter mination. The finding should be set aside only if the evidenc e supporting the jury finding is so weak a s to be clea rly wrong

an d m an ifestly

unjust. In re Estate of Stee d , 1 5 2 S. W. 3 d 7 9 7 , 8 0 6 ( T e x. A p p . — T e xar k an a 2 0 04, p et

. d en i ed ) ( ci t i n g Cai n v . B ain , 70 9 S.W. 2d 17 5, 17 6 ( Te x. 19 86 ) ( pe r c ur iam) ; W ilson v

. Goodye ar Tire & Rubber Co. , 753 S.W .2d 442, 448 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1988, writ denied) ).See T EX . P R OP . C ODE ANN . §§ 24.002, 24.0061 (Ve rnon 2000), § 24.0051 ( Ver non Supp. 3 2008). 7 IV . AN AL YSI S A. Sub jec t-M atte r Jurisdiction of the Trial Court The fa cts on which Ha

rre ll bases his claim that the trial cour t lacked su b

j ec t -m atter jur isd ic tio n a

re se t fo rt h a t le ng th a

bo ve . Ha rr e ll c on te nd s th a t th e se fa c ts c a us e the qu e sti on

of tit le to the proper

ty to be " so integ rally

linked to the issue of possessi o n t h at t h e rig ht to possession

cann ot be d ete rm in ed w it ho ut fi rst det erm in in g ti tl e." Gibson , 138 S.W .3d at 522. The proc edure to determine the rig ht to immediate possession of rea l property , if there was

n o u n l aw ful entry , is the action of f orcible de tainer. Rice v . Pinney , 5 1 S

. W

. 3 d 7 0 5 , 7 0 9 ( T e x. App.—Dallas 2001, no pe t.). A for cible deta iner a ction is a specia l proce eding g overne d by particula r statutes and r

ules. Id . The cause of

action for

forc ible detainer

is set out in the Tex as Property Code, which pe rm its forcible de tainer a ctions ag ainst persons who r efuse to surrende r possession of rea l pr operty when de manded to do so by one entitled to possession. Such an ac tion 3 is i nte nd e d to be a

sp e e dy and ine xpe ns ive me ans fo r r e so lvi ngthe qu e st io n of who is e nti tle d to immediate possession of proper ty without r esorting to an ac tion upon tit le. Fa lc on v . E ns ign ia , 976 S

. W

. 2 d 3 3 6 , 3 3 8 (T ex . Ap p . — C o rp u s C h ri s t i 1 9 9 8 , n o p et

. ) ( ci t i n g Cuellar v. Martinez , 625 S.W .2d 3, 5 (Tex. Civ. App.—San Antoni o 1981, no writ)). Rule 746 of t he Tex as Rules of Civil P roce dure highlig hts the limi ted purpos e o f a fo rc i b le detaine r ac tion, in st ating that the " only issue" in a forc ible detainer

action is " the rig ht to actual p o s session; and the merits of the title shall not beT EX . R. C IV . P. 746. 4 Counsel for Ha

rre ll concede d that "Mr . Har rell' s interest in the title is not an issue." 5 8 a dju dic a te d. " Th e sol e iss ue to b e a dd re sse d b y the tr ia l c ourt

is w ho ha s th e ri g ht o f i mme diate 4 possession. Villalon v. Bank One , 176 S.W. 3d 66 , 70 ( Te x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [1s t D ist .] 20 04 , p e t. denied)

. Whil e Ha rre ll claims title and possession are nece ssarily intertwined, the f acts he re a

re f ar d i ff ere nt than those in case s he cites in support of this ar gument. See, e .g. , Gu y e r v . R os e , 601 S.W. 2d 20 5, 20 5– 06 (T e x. Civ

. Ap p. —D a lla s 19 80 , wr it re f' d n. r. e .)

. I n that c a se , the c ourt up he ld enjoinder of

a for cible deta iner suit wher e possession de pended on c ompliance with a c ontrac t for sale be tween the same two pa rties. Har rell also re lies on Gibson , 138 S.W .3d 518, in suppor t of his position that the trial cour t l ac k ed s u bject-matter jurisdiction. Gibson can be distinguished bec ause in that c ase, the alleg ed

un lawf ul o c c up ant o f t

he pr op e rt

y c la ime d to have a c qu ir e d ti tle to the pro pert y by a dv e rs e possession. Id . at 52 3. Th e is su e of po sse ssi on c ou ld t he re fo re no t be de te rm ine d w ith ou t f ir st deter mining the issue of

title. Further , and unlike this case, Gibson involved the same two pa rties claiming possession a

nd title. I n this c ase, Har rell does not c laim title to the proper ty in question. Her e, the issue of

possession involves Har

rell and the Ba

nk; H arr ell' s only

alleg ation is that the title issue involves Har rell, Jr., J ones, and the Ba nk. Har rell is not claiming a

ny title in his own rig ht. I n fac t, his attorney conce ded as much at the hea ring

. Har

rell' s claimed rig ht of possession 59

is merely made throug h one he c laims to have title t o the prope rty —Har rell, Jr. Harre ll does not claim that his ow ne rs hip int e re st i n th e pr op e rt y did no t va lid ly

pa ss t o th e B ank

via the de e d o f t

ru st and s u b s ti tute tr u s te e ' s d e e d

. A s b e tw e e n H ar r e ll an d th e B an k , th e r e is n o ti tl e d is pute; the alleg ation i n v o l v es a dispute in title betwee n nonparties ( Har rell, Jr. and J ones) a

nd the B ank. Har rell' s claim of a title dispute base d on the alleg ed proper ty interests of nonpa

rties with no supporting doc umentation is far too tenuous to per mit us t o conclude t h at t h e issue of posse ssion cannot be deter

mined. Specific e vidence of a title dispute is require d to raise a n issue of jurisdiction. Falcon , 976 S.W .2d at 338. Additionally , the rig ht to immediate possession c an be de termined sepa rate ly from the r ight to titl e in most cases. See Rice , 51 S.W .3d at 710. This is true , in part, bec ause a forc ible detainer action is not exclusive, but cumulative, of any other remedy that a party may have in the c ourts of this S tate. S

c o t t v . H e w itt , 12 7 Tex

. 31 , 9 0 S. W.2 d 8 16 , 8 18 –1 9 ( 19 36 ); Rice , 51 S.W .3d at 710 (L e g isl a tur e c on te mpl a te d c on c ur re nt a c tio ns in d ist

ri c t and jus tic e c ourt s to re so lve iss ue s o f t itl e and immediate possession, re spectively ). F o r e xa mp le , the case of Dormady v . Dinero Land & Cattl e Co. , 6 1 S. W. 3 d 5 5 5 ( T e x. App.—San Antonio 2001, pet. dism'd w .o.j.), involved alleg ed irre g ularities in a for eclosure sale. I t was alleg ed that the c ounty court lacke d jurisdiction be cause the issue of possession could not be deter mined independe nt of the title issue. Id . at 557. Even thoug h Dormady inv olv e d a

n a lle g e d ti tle dispute betwee n the s ame parties, t he court deter mined that the title action could proc eed in districtThis alleg ation is not clea r based on the re cord be fore the Court. As previously discussed, 6 the re is no do c ume nta

ry e vid e nc e of

a g ua rd ians hip , a

nd the de e d o f t

ru st d oe s n ot i nd ic a te that it w a s e x e c u t e d

b y H ar r e l l i na r e p r e s e n t a t i v e c a

p a c i t y. 10 c ourt . T he ri g ht t o im me diate po sse ssi on c ou ld b e dete rm ine d und e r t he fo rc ibl e de ta ine r s ta tut e without deciding what irre g ularities might have occ urre d in the fore closure a ction. Id . at 558. Her e, any issues involving title to the proper ty can be resolved in a

quiet title action betwee n those parties c laiming a title inter est—Har rell, J r., J ones, and the Ba nk. The de termination of the ri g ht o f i mme diate po ss ess io n as b e tw e e n H arr e ll a nd the B ank c an b e ma de ind e pe nd e nt o f t itl e issues involving the B ank and nonpa rties. Har rell fur ther c ontends that the dee d of trust e x ecute d by a g uardia n (Ha rre ll) without order of the probate court should be void, par ticularly wher e it results in the sale of the war d' s interest at a contr actua l forec losure sale . Even a ssuming the deed of trust c onvey ed Har rell, Jr.'s intere st in the proper ty , the issue of whe ther the sale was void as to Har rell, Jr.'s intere st can be resolved in a quiet 6 title action betwee n Har

rell, Jr. and the Ba

nk. Se e id

. Finally , Har

rell re lies on the ca se of Mi tc he ll v. Ar ms tro ng Cap ita l Co rp ., 911 S.W .2d 169 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t Dist. ] 1995, writ denied) . I n Mi tc he ll, the homeowne r sig ned a promissory

note for home improvements sec ured by a buil der' s and mechanic' s lien contrac t. The lien contra ct was f

orec losed, and a

forc ible detainer

action wa s filed. The justice c ourt awa rded possession to the note holder, a nd the county

court a ffirme d. Id. at 171. On appe al, it wasT EX . P R OP . C ODE ANN . § 24.002. 7 11 de te rm ine d th a t th e tr ia l c ourt la c ke d s ub

je c t- ma tte r j ur isd ic tio n b e c a us e the iss ue of

imm e diate possession depende d solely on title to the house under the te rms of the c ontrac t. Id. I n this case, a s in Dormady , the landlo r d

- te n a nt relationship is established in the orig inal deed of tr us t. T hat r e la tio ns hip pr ov ide s a ba sis un de r the statut e fo r d e te rm ini ngthe ri g ht t o im me diate 7 po sse ssi on

wi tho ut r e so lvi ngthe a lle g a tio ns by Ha rr e ll that nonp art ie s hav e an o wn e rs hip int e re st in the proper

ty

. B e c a us e w e d o n o t f

i n d t h a t t h e i s s u e s i n v o l v i n g t i t l e t o t h e s u b j e c t p r o p e rt y are so intertwined with the issue of w ho is entitled to immediate pos session, we find that the tr ial court ha d subject-matter

jurisdiction to hear the f

orcible de tainer a ction and to issue the wr it of possession. B. Suffic ie nc y o f the Evi de nc e to Sust ain th e F or c ible De ta ine r Cl aim I n his second point of er

ror, H arr ell contends that the B ank did not prese nt sufficient e vidence that it had a super ior rig ht of possession ag ainst him, due to H arr ell' s alleg ation that he wa s on the pr op e rt y wi th t he c on se nt of an und ivi de d in te re st o wn e r. He c on te nd s th a t be c a us e the B ank

on ly acquir ed an undivided interest in the land, one undivided interest owner has no rig ht to evict another undivided interest owne r. Stephens v . Taylor , 36 S.W

. 1083 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896). Har rell alleg es the other undivided inter est owner is Harr ell, J r. There was no eff ort on the par

t of the B ank to evict Har rell, Jr., and whateve r intere st Harr ell had in the prope rty was tra nsfer red to the B ank.T EX . P R OP . C ODE ANN . §§ 24.002(a) (2), ( b), 24.005 (Ve rnon 2000). 8 12 To pr e va il i n a

fo rc ibl e de ta ine r a c tio n, a pla int if f i s n ot r e qu ir e d to pr ov e tit le , b ut i s o nly

re qu ir e d to sh owsu ff

ic ie nt e vid e nc e of

ow ne rs hip to d e mon str a te a su per ior ri g ht t o im me diate possession. Goggins v. Leo , 849 S.W .2d 373, 377 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 1993, no writ). Her e, the B ank wa s requ i re d to show: (1) the substitute trustee c onvey ed the pr operty by deed to th e B an k a f

te r th e f o r e c lo s u r e s a le ; ( 2 ) th e d e e d o f tr u s t s ig n e d b y H ar

r e ll e s ta b li s h ed a land lor d- te na

nt r e la tio ns hip be tw e e n H arr e ll a n d t h e B a nk; ( 3) the B a

nk g a ve pr op e r n oti c e to H arr e ll that it required him to vacate t he premises; and (4) Har rell refused to vacate t he premises. To satisfy 8 those require ments, the Ba nk relied on its de ed of trust, a ppointment of substitut e trustee, the substitut e trustee ' s deed, a nd the written de mand to vaca te pre mises, all enter ed i n to evidence without objection. Th e tr us te e ' s dee d est a

bli sh e s th a t th e su

bs tit ute tr us te e c on ve y e d th e pr op e rt y in q ue sti on to the Ba nk and that the Ba

nk was entitled to posse ssion of the proper ty

. The deed of

t ru s t re quired Har rell t o surre nder possession of t he prope rty to the Ba nk as the purc haser

at the sale and fur

ther provided that fa ilure to do so would cause Har rell t o become a " tenant at suff era nce." The fo re c los ur e purs ua

nt t o the de e d o f t

ru st e sta bli sh e d a land lor d a

nd te na nt- a t- su ff e ra nc e re la tio ns hip betwee n the B ank and Har rell, which provided a basis for determining the rig ht of possession. See Villalon , 176 S.W .3d at 71.13

W e f i n d th e e v i d en ce s u

p p o rt s t h e j u d gm en to f t h e t ri al co u rt o nt h i s i s s u e. Ha rr el l 's challeng e to the suff

iciency of the e viden ce fails. Se e Fo rm os a P las tics Co rp . U SA v . P re sid io Eng'rs & Contractors, Inc. , 960 S.W .2d 41, 48 (Tex. 1998). C. The Time liness of Harre ll's Notice of App eal The B ank conte nds Harr ell' s notice of a ppeal was not proper ly perf ecte d beca

use it did not

c or re c tly ide nti fy the sty le of the c a se a s r e qu ir e d b y

Rul e 25 .1 (d )( 1) of

the Te xas R

ule s o f A pp e llate Procedur e. See T EX . R. A PP . P. 2 5. 1( d) (1 ). We d o n ot f ind thi s a rgume nt t o b e pe rs ua siv e . Ru le 25 .1 (f ) o f t he Te xas R

ule s o f A pp e llate Pr oc e dure pr ov ide s: An amende d notice of appea l c orre cting a defe ct or omission in an ea rlier f iled notice may be filed in the a

ppellate c ourt at any time befor e appellant' s brief is filed. T he a me nd e d n oti c e is s ub

je c t to bein g str

uc k f or c a us e on the mot ion

of any pa rt y aff ecte d by the amende d notice. Af

ter the a ppellant' s brief is filed, the notice may be amende d only

on leave of the a

ppellate c ourt and on s u ch t erms as the court may presc ribe. T EX . R. A PP . P. 25.1(f). Har rell filed a

n amende d notice of a

ppeal Ma y 5 , 2009. The judg ment was e ntere d Fe brua ry 1 7 , 2 0 09, and Ha rre ll filed a motion for newtrial Marc h 5, 2009, in a timely manner . Be cause the amende d notice of a ppeal wa s filed within ninety day s after

the judg ment was sig ned, it was timely

filed. T EX . R. A PP . P. 26 .1 (a ). F ur the r, the a me nd e d n oti c e wa s f ile d b e fo re Ha

rr e ll filed his brief, a

nd no objection was ma de.14

V. CO NC LU SION Be cause we hold that the trial court ha d subject-matter jurisdiction and that the B ank prove d a super ior rig ht to imm ediate posse ssion sufficient to sustain its claim for f orcible de tainer, w e af

firm the judg ment of the trial c ourt.

J ack Ca rter J ustice Date Submitted: September 8, 2009 Date D ecide d: September 16, 2009