Filed 5/23/24 P. v. Juarez CA2/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ROMEO JUAREZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B330153

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. SA107261)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Lana S. Kim, Judge. Affirmed.

Laini Millar Melnick, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior 

Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne and Sophia A. 

Lecky, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

__________________________________
2

In January 2023, appellant Romeo Juarez was convicted by 

a jury of first degree residential burglary with a person present, a 

specific intent crime. Three witnesses testified that, during and 

after the incident, Juarez seemed “off” and “out of it.” Based on 

this testimony, Juarez requested the trial court instruct the jury 

with CALCRIM No. 3426, which states that a jury may consider a 

defendant’s voluntary intoxication in deciding whether the 

defendant could have formed the requisite intent. The court 

refused, finding there was no evidence that Juarez was 

voluntarily intoxicated. Pursuant to Evidence Code section 352, 

the court also denied Juarez’s request to play footage from an 

officer’s body camera, which Juarez contended was further 

evidence of his intoxication.

On appeal, Juarez contends the trial court erred in both 

these decisions. He argues that the testimony that he seemed 

“off” and “out of it” sufficed to warrant an instruction on 

voluntary intoxication, and that the body camera footage was 

relevant and not unduly prejudicial. We disagree and therefore 

affirm.1

1 Juarez also urges us to “analyze the prejudicial effect of 

the two errors together,” contending that “if a single error alone 

is not sufficient to require reversal, reversal is required when the 

two errors are viewed cumulatively.” Because we find Juarez 

failed to demonstrate either error, his claim of cumulative 

prejudice also fails.
3

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2

In October 2022, Juarez was charged by information with 

one count of violating Penal Code section 459—first degree

residential burglary with a person present. He pleaded not 

guilty. A jury trial occurred over three days in January 2023. 

A. First Day of Trial

Leslie Adler testified that, in September 2022, after she 

returned to her Marina del Rey home, she opened the sliding 

glass door in her living room to let in some air, locked the sliding 

screen door, and went to the bathroom. While in the bathroom, 

she heard a noise that she assumed was her husband and dog 

returning home; she believed her dog was waiting outside the 

bathroom door for her to emerge, as was his custom. However, 

after she exited the bathroom, she did not see her dog, and went 

to the garage to look for him. After entering the garage, she saw 

that her husband’s car was not there, and then she heard a noise 

and saw Juarez rifling through the family’s tools. Leslie3 asked 

Juarez who he was; Juarez responded by holding up a pair of bolt 

cutters and asking, “Can I have th[is]?” Leslie said, “No,” and 

asked who Juarez was and how he got in. Juarez responded, 

“Well, I’m not the first one,” which caused Leslie to believe there 

might be someone upstairs in the house. Leslie left the garage, 

closing and locking the door to the garage behind her. She then 

exited the home and called 911. As she was on the phone with 

2 We limit our summary to the facts and procedural history 

relevant to the issues raised on appeal.

3 Because two of the witnesses share a surname, we refer to 

them by their first names.
4

911, she noticed the screen door in the living room had been 

damaged.

4

While Leslie was waiting for the police to arrive, she saw 

her husband Michael driving home and waved at him to come 

toward her, knowing that he would normally park in the garage. 

When Michael got to her, she informed him that someone had 

broken into their home and was still in the garage; Michael told 

her he had already opened the garage door. Michael parked and 

exited his car, ran to the street where the garage was, and saw 

Juarez walking out of the garage, carrying Michael’s toolbox and 

a backpack. Michael asked what Juarez was doing with his stuff. 

Juarez stated, “What’s the big deal? You’re rich. You can just . . . 

buy more.” 

B. Second Day of Trial

1. Body Camera Footage

At the start of the second day of trial, the People informed 

the court that Juarez’s counsel intended to play video footage 

from an officer’s body camera, and that the People objected to this 

both for lack of foundation and lack of relevance. Juarez’s 

counsel countered that the footage was relevant because it 

showed Juarez “was drunk at the time” and also showed his 

“demeanor.” Specifically, Juarez’s counsel claimed the video 

4 A picture of the damaged sliding screen door was 

admitted into evidence as Exhibit 2. The screen portion of the 

door appeared disconnected from the left and bottom sides, 

creating a gap wide enough for a person to enter. While the 

exhibit was not included in the appellate record, we obtained it 

from the superior court and, on our own motion, augment the 

record with it.
5

would show Juarez’s “slurred speech” and inability to stand up 

while “face planted into the dirt.” The court viewed the proffered 

footage and excluded it under Evidence Code section 352, stating:

“I can’t tell that he [Juarez] is intoxicated. . . . It just shows him 

being arrested. You can’t see his face at any point in time.” After 

the court stated it could not tell how Juarez’s “face got planted on 

to the ground” and “can’t tell that the voice or his words are 

slurred” and thus “d[id]n’t see the probative value,” Juarez’s 

counsel offered to “play more of the video where you can.” The 

court refused the request, stating it had already ruled.5

5 The video footage was marked for identification as Exhibit 

A-1, but not admitted into evidence. Although Juarez failed to 

include the footage in the appellate record, we obtained the 

exhibit from the superior court and, on our own motion, augment 

the record with it. It is 70 seconds long and begins with Juarez 

face down in a mostly barren garden-like area next to a rough 

wall, with officers placing handcuffs around his wrists. 

Throughout the video, officers repeatedly ask Juarez to stand up, 

and he refuses, saying (as best as we can discern) things such as: 

“No, I can’t unless you understand it’s safe.” “If they say it’s cool,

it’s cool.” “Go figure out what’s happening. If it’s cool, it’s cool. 

No, if it’s cool, it’s cool. If not, my mom is going to die. And then 

my parents are going to kill each other and then you’re going to 

have two [unintelligible] dead.” “If you let my [unintelligible] die, 

you guys are bitches, man.” “Nah, dude, leave me where I am, 

it’s cool.” At approximately 63 seconds in the video, officers begin 

hauling Juarez to his feet, and the footage ends with him 

standing upright and two officers holding him on either side. 

While Juarez was not always intelligible, he did not sound as if 

he were slurring his words. Nor did we perceive him being 

unable—as opposed to refusing—to stand up.
6

2. Leslie Adler

On cross-examination, Leslie testified that Juarez seemed 

“off” and “out of it” to her that day. While she did not know 

whether he was intoxicated, she had a conversation with a police 

officer about him being drunk, or on drugs or some other 

substance, but also stated that his behavior “might have been 

normal for him.” When a police officer tried to handcuff Juarez, 

it appeared that Juarez resisted by pulling away, and then fell 

over and “face planted” into the plants and dirt, where he stayed 

“for a while.” At this point, Juarez’s counsel informed the court 

that he would “like to play the video.” The court held a 

discussion at sidebar with both counsel, reiterating that it had 

already excluded the footage, and had not changed its mind. The 

prosecutor added that the evidence should be excluded under 

Evidence Code section 352 “for a wide variety of reasons,” 

arguing that the footage showed the officers using force without 

foundation for why Juarez was resisting arrest, and also showed 

Juarez “crying out in pain” and being “distraught” but only after 

the completion of the crime and thus did not demonstrate his 

state of mind at the time of the crime. The prosecutor concluded 

that whatever limited probative value the footage had was 

“clearly . . . outweighed by the prejudice of seeing [Juarez] in this 

state using the use of force [sic].” The court agreed. 

3. Michael Adler

Michael testified that, on the day in question, he was 

driving home and, as he neared his home, he opened the garage 

door with his remote. He then learned from Leslie that an 

individual had broken into the home and was still in the garage; 

Michael parked his car and saw Juarez exit the garage with 

Michael’s tool chest. Michael asked Juarez what he was doing 
7

with his tool chest; Juarez “mumbled something” in response. 

Michael shoved Juarez, who fell to the pavement, losing his grip 

on the tool chest; Michael retrieved it. Michael stood over Juarez 

and told him not to move. After Juarez got up and began walking 

toward an adjacent property, Michael noticed Juarez was 

carrying a backpack. Michael followed him and asked to see 

what was in the backpack. When Juarez stated his “stuff” was in 

the backpack, Michael threatened to push him down again and 

Juarez handed the backpack over; inside the backpack were 

Michael’s bolt cutters. 

On cross-examination, Michael agreed that Juarez seemed 

“off,” “out of it,” and not “quite right.” However, Michael testified 

he did not know whether Juarez was drunk and could not say his 

speech was slurred. 

4. Ian Clark

Clark testified that he had been a police officer for 17 years 

and was one of the officers who responded to the incident in 

question and who detained Juarez. Clark opined that Juarez “did 

not seem normal” that day, stating that he was “talking to 

himself,” was “aggressive” and “not fully compliant when 

confronted by our armed officers,” and was “difficult to 

communicate with.” Clark elaborated that Juarez “might answer 

a question with an odd homey kind of impression [sic] or not at 

all” or “talk in circles.” However, Clark did not smell alcohol on 

Juarez’s breath and his behavior was not what Clark would 

associate with drunkenness. Clark stated he could not state 

whether Juarez was “high,” because he “lack[ed] the expertise to 

tell the difference between someone who has[,] say[,] long term 

narcotics damage and someone who is currently high.” Clark 
8

explained that long-term narcotics users would “exhibit some 

behaviors and patterns of speech that the defendant did.” 

C. Third Day of Trial

1. Jury Instructions

During a discussion about jury instructions, the court 

refused to include CALCRIM No. 3426 (Voluntary Intoxication), 

finding there was no evidence that Juarez voluntarily ingested 

any alcohol. Defense counsel countered that the testimony that 

Juarez “appeared to have been high” was enough evidence for a 

jury to infer Juarez was intoxicated. The court disagreed, 

reiterating “there was absolutely no evidence that the defendant 

was intoxicated or that he voluntarily consumed alcohol” and 

refused to include the requested instruction. 

2. Closing Arguments

During closing arguments, Juarez’s attorney argued that 

Juarez did not necessarily intend to commit theft when he broke 

into the Adlers’ home because “he was certainly out of his mind 

at the time.” Counsel stated that he did not know if Juarez “was 

drunk or high or going through some kind of episode” or if he had 

“long term damage . . . from long-term drug use,” but all 

witnesses testified that Juarez was “extremely off,” talking to 

himself and responding to unasked questions.

3. Verdict and Sentence

After less than an hour of deliberation, the jury found 

Juarez guilty. The court sentenced him to the upper term of six 

years but suspended the sentence and placed him on three years 
9

of probation on the condition that he attend a residential 

treatment program. Juarez timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

A. The Court Did Not Err in Refusing to Instruct 

on Voluntary Intoxication

“A defendant is entitled to . . . an instruction [regarding 

voluntary intoxication] only when there is substantial evidence of 

the defendant’s voluntary intoxication and the intoxication 

affected the defendant’s ‘actual formation of specific intent.’ ” 

(People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 677 (Williams).) 

Juarez argues the court erred in refusing to instruct the jury 

using CALCRIM No. 3426 because “the uncontradicted evidence 

of three witnesses was that Mr[.] Juarez’s conduct was that of 

someone who was under the influence of some intoxicating 

substance.” “[A]ssertions of instructional error are reviewed de 

novo.” (People v. Shaw (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 833, 838.) We 

discern no error.

CALCRIM No. 3426 is entitled “Voluntary Intoxication” 

and instructs the jury that it is permitted to “consider evidence, if 

any, of the defendant’s voluntary intoxication only . . . in deciding 

whether the defendant acted . . . with” the specific intent 

required for the crime. The instruction goes on to explain that 

“[a] person is voluntarily intoxicated if he or she becomes 

intoxicated by willingly using any intoxicating drug, drink, or 

other substance knowing that it could produce an intoxicating 

effect, or willingly assuming the risk of that effect.”

Juarez cites to the witnesses’ testimony that Juarez was 

“off” and “out of it” and “didn’t seem quite right.” At most, such 

evidence may have supported an inference that some condition 
10

was affecting Juarez’s behavior or cognition. But to support the 

giving of CALCRIM No. 3426, the jury would have needed to 

infer that Juarez’s not-quite-right behavior stemmed from 

intoxication instead of mental illness, long-term drug use, or 

some other cause; that Juarez voluntarily became intoxicated;

and that Juarez knew or willingly assumed the risk that the 

substance he allegedly ingested would have an intoxicating effect. 

There was no evidence to permit the jury to make these 

inferences. (See Williams, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 677 [witness 

testimony that defendant was “probably spaced out” on morning 

of crime insufficient to warrant instructing the jury on voluntary 

intoxication].)

Moreover, even if the witnesses’ testimony sufficed for a 

jury to conclude Juarez was intoxicated, there was no evidence to 

permit the jury to conclude that the alleged intoxication affected 

Juarez’s formation of the requisite specific intent. (See People v. 

Marshall (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 847–848 [although there was 

evidence defendant was intoxicated, was feeling the effects of 

intoxication, “ ‘did not appear to be in a normal behavior [sic],’ ” 

and appeared “dazed” when arrested, voluntary intoxication 

instruction unnecessary because “evidence of the effect of 

defendant’s alcohol consumption on his state of mind is 

lacking”].)

Juarez fails to demonstrate the court erred in refusing to 

instruct the jury with CALCRIM No. 3426.

B. The Court Did Not Err in Refusing to Admit the 

Body Camera Footage

“No evidence is admissible except relevant evidence.” 

(Evid. Code, § 350.) Additionally, “[t]he court in its discretion 

may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially 
11

outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) 

necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial 

danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of 

misleading the jury.” (Evid. Code, § 352.)

Juarez contends the court erred in refusing to admit the 

body camera footage because it was both relevant and more 

probative than prejudicial. “A trial court’s determination 

regarding relevance is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” (People 

v. Oneal (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 581, 591.) Similarly, the

determination as to whether the probative value of evidence is 

substantially outweighed by the possibility of unfair prejudice or 

misleading the jury is “ ‘entrusted to the sound discretion of the 

trial judge who is the best position to evaluate the evidence.’ ”

(People v. Miramontes (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1085, 1097.) “A 

trial court’s exercise of its discretion under section 352 ‘ “must 

not be disturbed on appeal except on a showing that the court 

exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious or patently 

absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of 

justice.” ’ ” (People v. Brown (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1324, 1337, 

italics omitted.)

Having reviewed the video footage, we cannot find that the 

court acted in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd 

manner in refusing to permit the footage to be played to the jury. 

The video began with Juarez already on the ground, without 

showing how he got there. While some of Juarez’s statements on 

the video seemed nonsensical, he was not slurring his words—

any unintelligible portions are reasonably attributed to the 

position of his face (which was in the dirt) relative to the camera. 

And the footage ends with the officers hauling Juarez to his 
12

feet—there is no evidence that Juarez was unable to stand.

6

Thus, we hold the trial court acted well within its discretion in 

finding both that the video footage was not relevant and that, in 

any case, any potential relevance was substantially outweighed 

by the probability that its admission would create substantial 

danger of undue prejudice from seeing Juarez in this state 

(handcuffed and face down on the ground) without context of how 

he got there.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

CHANEY, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

BENDIX, J.

6 Moreover, given that he was standing in the Adlers’ 

garage when Leslie first encountered him, and was able to exit 

the garage under his own power, it would be reasonable to 

conclude that any difficulty in standing that Juarez later 

encountered was due to being shoved to the ground by Michael, 

as well as “face-planting” into the ground while resisting arrest, 

and then having his hands cuffed behind his back.