MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions Decision: 20 2 3 ME 58 Docket: Cum

- 22

- 404 Argued : July	6,	2023 Decided: August	24,	2023 Panel: STANFILL ,	C.J.,	and MEAD, JABAR , HORTON , CONNORS , LAWRENCE, and DOUGLAS , JJ.

BOARD	OF	OVERSEERS	OF	THE	BAR

v. DONALD	F.	BROWN

PER	CURIAM [¶1] Donald	 F.	 Brown	 appeals	 from a judgment	 of a	 s ingle j ustice ( McKeon,	J. ) finding that he	violated the	Maine	Rules	of	Professional	Conduct and	 the	 Maine	 Bar	 Rules and	 imposing	 a	 public	 reprimand	 and	 a one - year suspended suspension

. 1 See M.	 Bar	 R.	 13(g)(4). Brown challenges	 the sufficiency	of	the	evidence	supporting	the	single	justice’s	findings,	argues	t hat
t he	single	justice	erred	and	abused	his	discretion	in	a pplying	the	Maine	Rules of	Professional	Conduct and the Maine	Bar	Rules ,	and	asserts that the single justice	imposed	inappropriate	 sanctions

. The	Board of	Overseers	 of	 the	Bar moves	to	dismiss	the	appeal,	arguing	that	its	motion	for	clarification and	further

1 We	 may	 review	 a	 single	 justice’s	 findings	 and	 conclusions	 order	 and	 subsequent	 sanctions orders	together	as	a	final	judgment. See Bd.	of	Overseers	of	the	Bar	v.	Carey , 2019	ME	136,	¶ 2 & n.1, 215	A.3d	229 ; M.	Bar	R.	13(g)(4).2 order did	not	extend	the	timeline	for	filing	an	appeal.		We	hold	that	the	appeal was	timely	filed	and affirm	the judgment.
I
. BACKGROUND
A. Factual	Findings [¶ 2 ] T he	 sin gle	justice made	 the	 following	 factual	 findings,	which are supported	 by	 competent	 record	 evidence. See Bd.	 of	 Overseers	 of	 the	 Bar	 v. Prolman ,	2018	ME	128,	¶ 2,	193	A.3d	808; Bd.	of	Overseers	of	the	Bar	v.	Brown , 623	A.2d	1268,	1270	(Me.	1993).
1
. Count 1 (CLE V iolation) [¶ 3 ] Brown	has	been	licensed	to	practice	in	Maine	since	1997.		He	is	a solo	practitioner	who	maintains	an	office	in	Brewer	and	currently	employs	two part
- time	support	staff. Around	February	24,	2020,	Brown	became	aware	that he	 did	 not	 have	 any	 continuing	 legal education	 (CLE)	 credits	 for	 the	 2019 calendar	 year.	 	 Maine	 Bar	 Rule	 5	 required	 Brown	 to	 earn	 twelve	 credits	 by February	 28,	 2020. 2 Brown	 reached	 out	 to	 the	 Board	 to	 determine	 how	 he could	 obtain	 the	 necessary	 credits	 by	 the	 deadline.	 	 The	 Board	 pointed him

2 Maine	 Bar	Rule	 5 (c)(1) provides	 that	 every	 attorney	licensed	 to	 practice	in	Maine	 “shall	 be required	to	earn	a	minimum	of	12	MCLE	credit	hours	per	calendar	year.		No	more	than	five	of	the credit	hours	may	be	earned	through	self

- study	programs	as	defined in	Rule	5(h)(1)(B).”		In	addition, “[e]ach	year,	attorneys	subject	to	[the	Maine	Bar	Rules]	shall	certify	the	accuracy	of	their	individual [Maine	Continuing	Legal	Education] Annual	Report	Statement	to	the	CLE	Committee	no	later	than	the close	of	business	o n	the	last	business	day	of	February.”		M.	Bar.	R.	5(e)(3).3 toward	 several	 third

- party	 CLE	 providers.	 	 Brown	 chose	 a	 service	 named Lorman	Education	Services	and	purchased	an	all

- access	pass	which	gave	him access	to	both	“live”	and	“self

- study”	courses ,	all	of	which	were	online .		Under Maine	Bar	Rule 5(c)(1),	seven	of	the	twelve	CLE	credits	must	be earned	through live,	as	opposed	to	self

- study ,	programs . [¶ 4 ] Brown	signed	up	 for	 four	live	courses	and	 five	self

- study	courses with	Lorman.		Brown	soon	realized,	however,	that	he	had	scheduling	conflic ts with	some	of	the	live	courses.		Brown	asked a	support staff	person,	T ammy	May, to	sign	on using Brown ’s	credentials to	the	live online	c ourses	that	Brown	could not	attend.		May	understood	that	her	role	was	to	complete	the	live	CLE courses for	Brown.		In accordance	with	Brown’s	request, May	completed	at	least	three of	Brown’s	live	 CLE	 courses on	 February	 25,	 26,	and	 28,	 2020.	 	Brown	 then

“ allowed	Lorman	to	report ” to	the	Board that he	had	attended	those live	CLE

c ourses. After May	filed a complaint again st	Brown	with	the	Board and after the	Board	extended	the	deadline	for	2020	CLE	completion	due	to	the	COVID

- 19 pandemic ,	 Brown attended	 sufficient	 programs	 to	 meet	 his	 live	 CLE requirement.4 2
. Count 2 (Representation	of	T .F. ) [¶ 5 ] Brown	first	began	a sexual	relationship	with	T .F. in	2014.		At	some point	after	Brown	and T. F

. met, T.F. married	M .P. T.F. and M.P. had	a	child	in
2017 , and during	 th e	 pregnancy there	 was	 a	 gap	 in	 Brown	 and T. F

. ’s relationship .		In	2018, T. F

. retained	Brown	to	file	a	motion to	enforce	a	marital property distribution she was	entitled	to	a s	part	of	her	previous	divorce	from another	man.		Brown	and T. F

. then resumed	having	a	sexual	relationship	while Brown	represented T. F

. on	the	motion to	enforce

. [¶ 6 ] T. F

. moved	out	of	her	home	with M. P

. in	the	late	summer	to	early	fall of	 2019.	 	At	 that	 time,	Brown	and T.F. were	 still	engaging	in	 periodic	 sexual relations. Also	in	the	fall	of	2019, Brown	began	representing T.F. in	her	divorce from M.P. ,	 a	 protection	 from abuse	 action	 against M.P. ,	 and	 an	 unrelated foreclosure	action. Around	this	time, T.F. also	began	working	for	Brown on	a part
- time	basis

. [¶ 7 ] B efore	Brown	began	representing T.F. in	her	divorce action	 f rom M.P. , T.F. and	Brown discussed t he	ethical	ru le regarding sexual	relations with a	client

. See M.R.	Prof.	Conduct	1.8(j). 3 After	doing	so,	Brown	did	not	believe	it

3 “A	lawyer	shall	not	have	sexual	relations	with	a	client	unless	a	consensual	sexual	relationship existed	between	them	when	the	client

- lawyer	relationship	commenced.”		M.R.	Prof.	Conduct	1.8(j). The	single	justice	did	not	find	that	Brown had violated	this	rule.5 would	be	a	conflict	of	interest	for	him	to	represent T.F. in	her	divorce ,	and T.F. was	 comfortable	 with	 Brown	 representing	 her in	 the	 matter .	 	 Brown	 never obtained T.F. ’s	consent	to	the	representation	in	writing

. [¶ 8 ] Starting	around	 the	 fall or winter	of	2019,	Brown	and T.F. began staying	at	each	other’s	homes	often.		As a	result ,	Br own	regularly	saw T.F. and
M.P. ’s	minor	child	and	regularly	discussed	the	circumstances	of T.F. and M.P. ’ s divorce	with T.F

. [¶ 9 ] During	the	pendency	of the divorce	action and	shortly	after	signing on	to	the	CLE	classes	for	Brown, May	stopped working	for	Brown.		On	March 11, 2020,	May	contacted M.P. ’s	divorce	attorney to	say	 that	she	had	information that	 could	 help M.P

. M.P.’s attorney agreed	 to	 speak	 with	 May,	 and	 May provided	 him	 with	 information	 about	 Brown’s	 relationship	 with T.F

. M.P.’s attorney was	concerned	that	Brown	and T.F. ’s	relationship	was	contributing	to the	contentiousness	of	the	divorce.		At	an	interim	divorce	hearing	the	following day,	 March	 12,	 2020, testimony about	 Brown’s	 relationship	 with T.F. was presented, and as	a	resul t the f amily l aw m agistrate	called	a	recess	 to	speak with	Brown	and M.P.’s	attorney .		The m agistrate	advised	both	Brown	and M.P.’s attorney to	contact B ar C ounsel to	inquire	whether	their	actions	conformed	to Maine’s	 ethical	 rules.	 	 Brown talked	 with an A s sistant B ar C ounsel who6 cautioned	 him	 that	 continuing	 to	 represent T.F. could constitute a	 personal conflict of	interest

. [¶1 0 ] After	 the interim hearing,	 Brown	 moved	 to	 disqualify M.P.’s attorney .		At	a	hearing	on	that	motion	in	July	2020,	Brown	confirmed	that	he

was now cohabitating	with T.F. and	her	child.		Brown	and T.F. later agreed	it would	be	best	if	Brown	withdrew from	representing	her .		Brown	withdrew	his motion	 to	 disqualify M.P.’s	 attorn ey and withdrew as T.F. ’s	 counsel	 in	 the divorce	matter

. B. Procedural	History [¶1 1 ] In	March	2020, May	filed	a	bar	complaint against	Brown, alleging multiple	 instances	 of	 misconduct

. Bar	 Counsel	 recommended	 that	 formal charges	be	filed	against	Brown. See M.	Bar	R.	13(b)(1)(F).		In November	2020, a	panel	of	 the G rievance C ommission	reviewed	 the	allegations	and approved Bar	Counsel’s	recommendation	 for	the	 filing	of	 formal	charges. On	August	25 and	26,	2021,	a	second	panel	of	the G rievance C ommission	held	a	hearing	on th e matter.	 	 On	 September	 30,	 2021,	 that	 second	 panel	 filed	 a	 finding	 of probable	cause	and	directed Bar	Counsel to	file	an i nformation with th e	c ourt pursuant	 to Maine Bar Rule	 13(g)(1). S ee M. Bar	 R.	 13(e)(10)(E). On January 10,	 2022,	 Bar	 Counsel filed	 a	 three

- count	 information with	 the7 Executive	 Clerk	 of	 the	 Supreme	 Judicial	 Court

. Count	 1	 alleged	 that	 Brown violated	the	Maine	Bar	Rules	and	the	Maine	Rules	of	Professional	Conduct	with regard	to	his	continuing	legal	education.		Count	2	alleged	that	Brown	violated the	Maine	Rules	of	Professional	Conduct	with	regard	to	his	representatio n	of
T.F

. Count 3 alleged that,	 in	 a	 matter	 unrelated	 to	 Counts	 1	 and	 2, Brown misrepresented	circumstances	in	a	motion	to	continue. [¶1 2 ] Following	 a	 hearing	 on	 July	 19	 and	 21,	 2022,	 the	 single	 justice issued an order	 finding	 that	 the	 Board	 proved Counts	 1	 and	 2 by	 a preponderance	 of	 the	 evidence. 4 Based	 on	 the	 evidence	 produced	 at	 the hearing,	the	single	justice concluded	that with	respect	to	Count 1 , regarding	his
CLE requirements , Brown	violated Maine	Bar	Rul e 5(e)(3) 5 and Maine	Rule s of Professional	 Conduct 8.4(a) 6 and 8.4 (c)

. 7 The	 single	 justice	 also	 concluded

4 The	single	justice	found	in	Brown’s	favor	on	Count 3

.
5 “Each	 year,	 attorneys	 subject	 to [the	 Maine	 Bar	 Rules] shall	 certify	 the	 accuracy	 of	 their individual	MCLE	Annual	Report	Statement	to	the	CLE	Committee	no	later	than	the	close	of	business on	the	last	business	day	of	February.”		M.	Bar.	R.	5(e)(3).

6 “It	is	professional	misconduct	for	a	lawyer	to:	(a)	violat e	or	attempt	to	violate	any	provision	of either	the	Maine	Rules	of	Professional	Conduct	or	the	Maine	Bar	Rules,	or	knowingly	assist	or	induce another	to	do	so,	or	do	so	through	the	acts	of	another

. ”		M.R.	Prof.	Conduct	8.4(a).

7 “It	is	professional	misco nduct	for	a	lawyer	to	.	.	.	engage	in	conduct	involving	dishonesty,	fraud, deceit	or	misrepresentation

. ”		M.R.	Prof.	Conduct	8.4(c).8 Brown violated Maine	Rule s of	Professional	Conduct 1.7(a)(2) 8 and	8.4(a) with respect	to Count 2 and	his representation	of T.F

. [¶1 3 ] The	single	justice	issued	a separate sanctions	order on	October 6, 2022.		Regarding	Count 1 ,	the	single	justice	suspended	Brown	from	the	practice of	law	for	one	year.		Brown’s	suspension	was	fully	suspended	subject	to	several conditions,	including	that	(1)	within	twenty

- one	days,	the	parties	would	agree
on	a	monitor who wo uld	confirm	Brown’s	com pliance	with	 the	court’s	order through	monthly	reports	to	the	Board	and	report	any	violation	by Brown of	the order,	the	Maine	Bar	Rules,	or	the	Maine Rules	of	Professional	Conduct ;	and	(2) Brown	would	fully	reimburse	the	Board	for	costs	recoverable	under M aine	Bar Rule 22.		Regarding	Count 2 ,	the	single	justice imposed a	public	reprimand. [¶1 4 ] On	October	20,	2022,	the	Board filed	a	“Motion	for	Clarification & Further	 Order,”	 without	 citation	 to	 authority,	 and requested	 that	 the	 single justice	 “impose	 a deadline	 for	 [Brown’s]	 reimbursement	 of	 costs, require [Brown]	 to	 bear	 any	 associated	 costs	 of	 monitoring and	 order	 that	 Bar Counsel [’s] office,	or	the	Court,	be	permitted	to	select	a	monitor	in	the event	the

8 “Except	as	provided	in	paragraph	(b),	a	lawyer	shall	not	represent	a	client	if	the	representation involves	a	 concurrent	 conflict

- of

- interest.	 	A	 concurrent	 conflict

- of

- interest	exists	if	 .	 .	 . there	is	a significant	 risk	 that	 the	 representation	 of	 one	 or more	 clients	would	 be	materially	limited	 by	 the lawyer’s	responsibilities	to	another	client,	a	former	client	or	a	third	person	or	by	a	personal	interest of	the	lawyer.”		M.R.	Prof.	Conduct	1.7(a)(2).9 parties [could	not] reach	agreement	[on	a	monit or]	after	twenty

- one	(21)	days.” On	 November	 23,	 2022,	 the	 single	 justice	 held	 a	 hearing	 on	 the	 motion	 for clarification	 and issued an	 order	 on	 that	 motion together with an	 order governing	 Brown’s probation	 and	 monitoring. T he	 single	 justice ordered Brown	 to	 fully	 reimburse	 the	 Board	 for	 costs	 recoverable	 under	 M aine	 Bar Rule 22	within	twenty

- one	days,	ordered	Brown	to	assume	all	costs	incurred	to effectuate	 the	 monitoring	 requirements	 in	 the	 sanctions	 order,	 and	 ordered that B ar C ounsel selec t	a	monitor	in	the	event	the	parties	could	not	agree	on	a monitor	within	 twenty

- one	days. The	orders	were	entered	on	 the	docket	on November	23,	2022,	and Brown	filed	his	notice	of	appeal twenty
- one	days	later, on	December 14,	2022. See M.	Bar	R.	13(g)(4)

. The	Board	moved	to	dismiss	the appeal as	untimely pursuant	to Maine	Rule	of	Appellate	Procedure 2B(c)(1) o n December 20,	2022.
II
. DISCUSSION
A. Motion	to	Dismiss [¶1 5 ] T he	Board	contends	that	Brown’s	appeal	is	untimely and	should be	dismissed

. Brown argues that his	appeal is	timely because	it	was	filed	within twenty
- one	 days	 of	 the	 entry	 of	 the	 order	 on	 the	 Board’s	 motion	 for clarification. According	to	Brown, the	time for filing	the	notice	of appeal in	this10

case was extended	pursuant	to Maine Rule of	Appellate	Procedure 2B(c)(2)(D) because the	 Board ’s motion	 for	 clarification	 is	 properly	 characterized	 as	 a motion	 to	 alter	 or	 amend a judgment under Maine Rule	 of	 Civil	 Procedure 59(e) .		The	Board	counters	that	Rule 2B(c)(2)	does	not	apply and its	motion	is

m ost accurately	characterized	as	a	motion	for	relief	from a judgment or	order under Maine	Rule	of	Civil	Procedure	60 ,	which	would	not	extend	the	time	for filing	an	appeal

. [¶1 6 ] We	 will	 not	 entertain	 an	 appeal	 if	 the	 appealing	 party	 fails	 to strictly	 comply	 with	 the	 time	 limits	 outlined	 in Rule 2B. Bourke	 v.	 City	 of
S. Portland ,	2002	ME	155,	¶	4,	806	A.2d	1255. Under	Rule	2B(c)(1),	“an	appeal may	 be	 taken	 in	 a	 civil	 case	 .	 .	 .	 2 1	 days	 after	 entry	 into	 the	 docket	 of	 the judgment	 or	 order	 appealed	 from.”	 	 Pursuant	 to	 Rule 2B(c)(2),	 the	 filing	 of certain	 post

- judgment	 motions,	 including a motion to	 alter	 or	 amend	 a judgment ,	can	extend	that	timeline.		If	one	of	those	motions	is	time ly	filed	after judgment, a	notice	of	appeal	need	not	be	 filed	within	21	days	after	entry	of judgment. Instead, a	notice	of	appeal	may	be	filed	at	any	time	after the	entry	of	judgment	but	not	later	than	21	days	after	the	entry	of the	order	on	the	motion. A	notice	of	appeal	so	filed	shall	be	treated as	 an	 appeal	 from	 both	 the	 judgment	 and	 the	 order	 on	 the motion

. . . . M.R.	App.	P.	2B(c)(2).11
[¶1 7 ] Where,	 as	 here,	 a	 party	 does	 not cite	 to	 a	 specific	 authority	 or procedural	rule	for its	motion , 9 we	look	to	the	relief	requested	and	the	intention of	 the	 motion	 to	 determine	 how	 to	 classify	 it. See Levesque	 v.	 Levesque , 1997 ME 166, ¶ 9, 697 A.2d 1309; State	 v.	 O’Neal ,	 432	 A.2d	 1278,	 1280 (Me. 1981); Palacci	v.	Palacci ,	613	A.2d 951,	953

- 54 (Me.	1992). [¶1 8 ] Rule	59(e)	is	quite	broad a nd allows	the	court	to alter	or	amend	a judgment	to	correct	an	error	or	“t o	reach	what	the	revising	court	deems	a	more just	 result.” Most	 v.	 Most ,	 477	 A.2d	 250,	 258	 (Me.	 1984); see Brown	 v. Manchester ,	 384	 A.2d	 449,	 454	 n.5	 (Me.	 1978)	 (“Anything	 which	 would persuade	the	judge	sitting	in	a	bench	hearing	to	modify	a	previo us	judgment	is open	 to	 his	 consideration	 on	 a	 timely	 filed	 Rule	 59(e)	 motion.”) ; see	 also Theberge	 v.	 Theberge , 2010	 ME	 132,	 ¶	 27,	 9	 A.3d	 809	 (affirming	 a	 court’s amendment	 of	 a	 spousal	 support	 obligation	 pursuant	 to	 Rule	 59(e)); MacDowall	v.	MMG	Ins.	Co. ,	2007	ME	56,	¶¶	6,	15,	920	A.2d	1044	(affirming	a court’s	amendment	of	a	judgme nt	to	include	interest	and	costs	pursuant	to	Rule 59(e)).

9 A	movant	is required	to	“state	with	particularity	. .	.	the	rule	or	statute	invoked	if	the	motion	is brought	pursuant	to	a	rule	or	statute.”		M.R.	Civ.	P.	7(b)(1).12 [¶1 9 ] By	 contrast, Rule	 60(a)	 allows	 the	 court	 to	 correct inadvertent clerical	errors , see,	e.g., Beedle	v.	Beedle ,	2022	ME	45,	¶¶ 8

- 9,	279	A.3d	399 ,	and
R ule	60(b)	“permits	the	court	.	.	. to relieve	a	party	from	final	judgment	for	any of	the	six	reasons	articulated	in	the	rule , ” Merrill	v.	Merrill ,	449	A.2d	1120,	1125 (Me.	1982). [¶ 20 ] The	Board’s	motion	for	clarification did	not	ask	the	single	justice

to correct	 a	 clerical	 error and did not seek	 to	 relieve	 the	 Board	 from	 the judgment.		Instead,	the	Board asked	the	single	justice	to add	to	the	sanctions order	by impos ing a	deadline	 for	Brown’s	reimbursement	of	costs,	requir ing Brown	to	pay	costs	associated	with	monitoring,	and permitting B ar C ounsel	or the	single	justice	to	select	a	monitor	in	the	event	a	monitor	was	not agreed	upon within	twenty

- one	days of	the	sanctions order

. B ecause the	motion requested that the	 single	 justice	 make	 changes to the	 sanctions order rather	 than requesting	 that the	 Board be	 relieved	 from	 it,	 the motion	 is	 mo re properly characterized	as	a timely

- filed motion	to	alter	or	amend	a judgment

. See M.R. Civ.	 P.	 59 (e)

. Accordingly ,	 the	 timeline	 for Brown’s appeal	 was	 extended pursuant	to Rule 2B(c)(2) (D) of	the	Maine	Rules	of	Appellate	Procedure , and Brown	timely	appealed the	single	justice’s	judgment when	he	filed	his	appeal13 within	twenty

- one	days	of	the	single	justice’s	order	on	the	Board’s	motion	for clarification

. B. Count 1 (CLE Vi olation) [¶ 2 1] Brown asserts the	 single	justice	 erred in	 his	 findings	 regarding Brown’s	CLE	violation .		Brown insis ts that	he inadvertently	misrepresented	his CLE	 credits	 to	 the	 Board	 because he misunderstood the	 Maine	 Bar	 Rules regarding CLE	courses. He	further	argues	that because he	later	viewed	the	live courses	and	attended	other	live	programs, he complet ed his	CLE	requirements before	the	extended	deadline	expired	and	“cur ed ”	any	violation	of Maine	Bar Rule	5. [¶ 22 ] The	 single	 justice	 found	 that	 a	 “pattern	 of	 electronic

commun ication	 is	 strong	 evidence	 that	 May	 was	 assigned,	 by	 Brown,	 to complete	his	CLE[]	for	him.		The	text	messages	contained	no	suggestion	she	was simply	‘downloading’ [the	live	CLE	courses] so	he	could	review	them	later.” The single	justice found	 that	Brown	m isrepresented	his	CLE	credits	 to	 the	Board when “ he	allowed	Lorman	to	report ” to	the	Board	that	he	had	completed	the live	CLE	programs	attended	by	May.		The single	justice also	specifically	found that “[a]sking	 that	 May	 complete	 the	 courses	 for	 him	 is	 cond uct	 involving dishonesty,	fraud,	deceit	or	misrepresentation

. ” (Quotation	marks	omitted.) It14 is	 Brown’s	 dishonest	 conduct	 that	 led	 to	 the	 imposition	 of	 the	 significant sanction,	 not	 a	 mere	 misunderstanding of	 the	 difference	 between	 live	 and self

- study	pr ograms . [¶ 23 ] We	will	 uphold	 the	 findings	and	inferences	 of	 the	 single	justice “unless	 they	 are	 clearly	 erroneous.” Bd.	 of	 Overseers	 of	 the	 Bar	 v.	 Dineen , 500 A.2d	 262,	 264	 (Me.	 1985).	 	 A	 finding	 is	 clearly	 erroneous	 when	 no competent	record	evidence	supports	it. See Brown , 623	A.2d	at	1270. We	find no	error	in	any	of	the	single	justice’s	factual	findings regarding	Count 1 ,	which

are amply supported	by compete nt	record	evidence

. C. Count 2 (Representation	of T.F. ) [¶ 24 ] Brown	argues	the	single	justice	erred	and	abused	his	discretion	in determining	 that	 Brown’s	 representation	 of T.F. violated Maine	 Rule	 of Professional	 Conduct 1.7(a)(2). Contrary	 to	 Brown’s	 contentions,	 the	 single justice’s	 factual	 findings	 regarding	 Brow n’s	 representation	 of T.F. are supported	by	competent	 record	evidence , and	we	 find	no	error

. See	Dineen , 500 A.2d	at	264. [¶ 25 ] W e	 interpret	 the	 meaning	 of	 the	 Maine	 Rules	 of	 Professional Conduct	de	novo, cf.	In	re	Prolman ,	2022	ME	25,	¶ 8,	273	A.3d	35 2	(providing that	we	interpret	the	Maine	Bar	Rules	de	novo),	and	review	the	single	justice’s15 overall	 determination	 for	 an	 abuse	 of	 discretion, id. ¶	 9. Pursuant	 to Rule 1. 7(a)(2), a	lawyer	shall	not	represent	a	client	if	the	representation	involves a	concurrent	conflict

- of

- interest.		A	concurrent	conflict

- of

- interest exists	if	.	.	.	there	is	a significant	risk that	the	representation	of	one or	 more	 clients	 would	 be	 materially	 limite d by the	 lawyer’s responsibilities	to	another	client,	a	former	client	or	a	third	person or by a personal	interest	of	the	lawyer

. (Emphasis	 added

. ) Paragraph b	 of	 the R ule	 provides	 that	 a	 lawyer	 may represent	a	client	despite	a	concurrent conflict

- of

- interest	if	two	conditions	are met:	 “(1)	 the	 lawyer	 reasonably	 believes	 that	 the	 lawyer	 would	 be	 able	 to provide	competent	and	diligent	representation	to	each	affected	client;	and	(2) each	affected	client	gives	informed	consent,	confirmed	in	wr iting.”		M.R.	Prof. Conduct	1.7(b). The	plain	language	of	 the R ule makes	clear that	if	 there	is	a significant	risk	that	the	representation	of	a	client	would	be	materially	limited by	 the	 attorney’s	 personal	 interest,	 the	 attorney	 should	 not	 represent	 that client,	unless	the	attorney	complies	with paragraph b. See Prolman ,	2018	ME 128,	¶ 37,	193	A.3d	808 (Jabar,	 J.	concurring) (“If	 the	language	of	 the	 rule	is unambiguous,	we	apply	its	plain	meaning.”). Comment	12	of	the R ule	further states	that	a	sexual	relationship	between	an	attorney	and	client in	fact presents such	a	risk	because	there	is “a	significant	danger	that , because	of	the	lawyer’s emotional	 involvement,	 the	 lawyer	 will	 be	 unable	 to	 represent	 the	 client16 without impairment	 of	 the	 exercise	 of	 independent	 professional	 judgment.” M.R.	Prof.	Conduct	1.7	cmt.	(12). [¶ 26 ] Neither party contends that	 there	is	 a	 per se	 rule	 that	 a	 sexual relationship	 between	 an	 attorney	 and	 client	 creates	 a	 conflict	 of	 interest. 10
In stead, Rule	1.7 and	comment 12 demonstrate that	there are situations	where

an attorney’s	 personal	 interest	 may	 limit	 that	 attorney’s	 ability	 to	 provide sound,	independent legal	counsel to a	client	with	wh om the	attorney	is	having a	 sexual	 relationship. Of course,	 whether	 such	 a conflict	 of	 interest	 exists depends	upon on	the	circumstances	and	context	of	the	representation

. [¶ 27 ] For	example, if	Brown	 repre se nted T.F. in a	 small	claims	action against	 an	 auto	 shop	 for	 its	 failure to fix	 her	 car ,	 the	 risk that Brown’s independent	judgment would	 be	materially	limited may be	 smaller	 than	 the risk	associated	with	representing	her	in	the	divorce	action. Brown	would	not

necessar ily be	emotionally	involved	in the	outcome of	the	small	claims	action , and	there	would	be less risk	that	his	emotional	involvement	would	hinder	his ability	 to	 provide T.F. with	 sound,	 independent	 legal representation .	 	 Here, however,	 the evidence	 and	 factu al	 findings support	 the	 single	 justice’s

10 In	contrast, Maine	Rule	of	Professional Conduct	1.8(j) creates	a	per	se	rule,	not	applicable	here, that	prohibits	an	attorney	from	having	sex ual	relations	with	a	client	with	whom	the	attorney	did	not have a	consensual sexual	relations hip before	commencement	of	the	attorney

- client	relationship. See supra n.3.17 conclusion	 that	 there	 was	 a	 significant	 risk	 that	 Brown’s	 emotion al involvement	would	limit	his	ability	to fully	and	independently advise T.F. in	her divorce case .	 	 Brown ’s and T.F. ’s	 lives	 were	 intertwined while	 Br own represented	her	in	 the divorce	action : at	 the	beginning,	 t he t wo	were	having sexual	relations;	as	the	representation	went	on,	they	started regularly	staying at	each	other’s	homes ; and , ultimately, they began cohabitating with T.F. and
M.P. ’ s child .		 In	addition, Brown’s	position	as T.F. ’s	lawyer fueled	 the overall contentiousness	of	the divorce	proceedings. Indeed,	there	was	a lso	a potential that he	could	be	a	witness. [¶ 28 ] As	 the	 single	 justice	 noted,	 the	 facts show that there	 was	 a signi ficant	 risk	 that Brown	 could	 not	 give	 independent	 legal	 counsel	 to T.F. because	t he	outcome	of	the	divorce	case	would	have	a	direct	impact	on	Brow n’s

own home and	personal life

. Despite	this	reality,	B rown	continued	to	represent
T.F. and waited	until	July 2020	to	withdraw.		Brown	also	failed	to	remedy	the conflict	pursuant	to Rule 1.7(b)	because ,	even if he	reasonably	believed that he could	provide	competent	and	diligent	representation	to T.F. ,	h e failed	to	obtain her consent	in	writing as	the	rule	requires

. In	sum,	we	discern	no	error	or	abuse of	 discretion	 in the	 single	 justice’s determin ation	 that Brown	 violated	 the commands	of Rule 1.7(a)(2).18 D. Sanctions Order and Probation	and	Monitoring	Order [¶ 29 ] In	imposing	sanctions	 for	Coun ts 1 and 2 in	 this	case,	 the	single justice	 appropriately	 applied	 the	 four	 prongs	 of	 Maine	 Bar	 Rule	 21(c)	 and looked	 to	 the American	 Bar	 Association ’ s	 Standards	 for	 Imposing	 Lawyer
Sanctions for	 additional	 guidance. See	 Prolman ,	 2018	 ME	 128,	 ¶ ¶	 24

- 25,
193 A.3d	808 ; Bd.	of	Overseers	of	the	Bar	v.	White ,	2019	ME	91,	¶ 4,	210	A.3d 168; Bd.	of	Overseers	of	the	Bar	v.	Carey , 2019	ME	136,	¶ 36,	215	A.3d	229

. A

one - year	 suspended	 suspension	 of	 Brown’s	 license ,	 with	 its accompanying probation	and	monitoring	or der , wa s not an inappropriate	sanction	for Count 1

. Likewise, a	public	reprimand was	not an	inappropriate	sanction for	Count 2

. Put	simply,	t he	sanctions	applied	here	were	“neither	overly	harsh	nor	outside of	the	[single	justice’s]	broad discretion.” White , 2019	ME	91,	¶ 4,	210	A.3d	16 8

. The	entry	is: Motion	to	dismiss	appeal	denied. Judgment affirmed.

James	 M.	 Bowie,	 Esq. (orally) ,	 Thompson	 Bowie	 &	 Hatch	 LLC,	 Portland,	 for appellant	Donald	F.	Brown
Suzanne	E. Thompson, Asst.	Bar	Counsel (orally) ,	Board	of	Overseers	of	the	Bar, Augusta, for	appellee	Board	of	Overseers	of	the	Bar Maine	Supreme	Judicial	Court	docket	number	Bar

- 22

- 2 F OR C LERK R EFERENCE O NLY