UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ CHAD WILLIAM REED, Petitioner - Appellant,

v. JASON BRYANT, Warden, Respondent - Appellee. No. 17-7021 (D.C. No. 6:13-CV -00542-RAW-KEW) (E.D. Okla.)

________________ _________________ ORDER DENYING CERTIFIC ATE OF APPEALABILITY *

________________ _________________ Before BRISCOE , O’BRIEN , and BACHARACH , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ Proceeding pro se, Oklahoma state pr isoner Chad William Reed requests a certificate of appealability (COA) to challenge the district court’s order denying his application for a writ of habeas corpus un der 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Because Mr. Reed has failed to satisfy the st andard for issuance of a CO A, we deny his request and dismiss this matter. Mr. Reed lived with his 71-year-old gr andmother, Dorothy Hendrix, in her home. Ms. Hendrix’s daughter, Judy Rutherfo rd, also lived there, as did Mr. Reed’s girlfriend, Patricia Hollingswo rth, and her son. On N ovember 21, 2006, Mr. Reed brought a loaded gun into th e house when he came inside to gather belongings to

* This order is not binding precedent excep t under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

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Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 spend the night at a motel with Ms. Hollings worth. He got into a heated argument with Ms. Hendrix, who was irritated with him for repe atedly allowing Ms. Hollingsworth’s large bulldog on the be d. Mr. Reed admits that he shot Ms. Hendrix in the head during the argument, but he claims he did so in self-defense after she threatened to shoot him and point ed her own gun at him. He then told Ms. Hollingsworth, “Call 911, I shot my Grandma.” Aplt. Combined Opening Br. and Appl. for COA at 2B. Ms. Hendrix died the next day. At trial, the government presented ev idence that contradicted Mr. Reed’s assertion that he acted in self-defense. For instance, Wyva Clou se (a friend of Mr. Reed’s) testified that a few days befo re the shooting Mr. Reed told her he was angry with his grandmother fo r taking his father’s social security death benefits and “wanted to shoot her in the head.” R. at 363. And Ms. Hollingsworth testified that she heard the gunshot immediately afte r Ms. Hendrix issued her threat— with “[n]o gap” in between, R. at 402—su ch that Ms. Hendrix could not have had time to get her gun and point it at Mr. Reed . Furthermore, Ms. Hendrix was lying on the bed with her gun under he r body, behind her lower back, when police arrived at the scene. A jury convicted Mr. Reed of first degr ee murder, and he was sentenced to life in prison with the possibility of parole. He appealed his conviction and sentence to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal App eals (OCCA), but the OCCA summarily affirmed. He then sought pos t-conviction relief in state dist rict court. Again, he was unsuccessful, and the OCCA affi rmed the denial of relief.3 Mr. Reed next filed the underlying § 2254 habeas petition in federal district court, asserting thirteen claims for relief: (1) the evidence was insufficient to prove malice aforethought, i.e., that he acted with the deliber ate intent to kill; (2) the evidence was insufficient to prove th at he did not act in self-defense; (3) the jury instructions on self-defense were erroneous, and the prosecutor made an improper argument based on the disputed instructions; (4) he was deprived of his Sixth Ame ndment right to confront Ms. Clouse and Ms. Rutherford and to impeach them based on their criminal backgrounds, biases, and favorab le treatment fo r testifying; (5) the trial court’s admission of prej udicial photographs of Ms. Hendrix violated his due process rights; (6) the trial court erred in denying hi s motion for a new trial, in which Ms. Clouse would not be allowed to testify; (7) the cumulative effect of all errors deprived him of a fair trial; (8) prosecutorial misconduct (namely, using the perjur ed testimony of Ms. Rutherford and Ms. Hollingsworth) violated his due process rights; (9) Brady violations by the State violat ed his due process rights; (10) he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial in violation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments; (11) he received ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal in violation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments; (12) he was denied due process because of improper jury instructions; and (13) he was denied due process because of an incomplete trial record. Mr. Reed had raised the first seven claims in his direct appeal, but the remaining claims first surfaced in his application for post-conviction relief. In a 52-page order, the district court held that Mr. Reed procedurally defa ulted on five of the claims4 (8, 9, 10, 12, and 13) and de nied habeas relief on the remaining claims (1-7, 11). It also declined to issue a COA. Mr. Reed now seeks to appeal the distri ct court’s order, but he must first receive a COA from this court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). To obtain a COA, he must make “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” Id. § 2253(c)(2). A substantial showing mean s that “reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter , agree that) the petition shoul d have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to pr oceed further.” Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). The st andard varies, depending on whether the district court rejected the constitutional claims in the habeas petition on procedural grounds or on the merits. For the former, the petitioner must demonstrate “that jurists of reason would fi nd it debatable whether th e petition states a vali d claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Id. For the latter, the petitioner must demonstrate “that reasonable jurists w ould find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Id. In his application to this court, Mr. R eed asserts the same thirteen claims he presented to the district court. We liber ally construe Mr. Reed’s pro se filings. See Hall v. Bellmon , 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10t h Cir. 1991). Even so, we find nothing to justify the issuance of a C OA. Mr. Reed has not shown that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s asse ssment and denial of claims 1-7 and 11 to be wrong or5 even debatable. Nor has he shown the dist rict court was incorrect in its procedural default ruling, through whic h it denied the remaining cl aims. Therefore, we deny Mr. Reed’s request for a COA and dismiss this matter.

Entered for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe Circuit Judge