alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO


18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002






Pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as created by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002, the undersigned officer of Geron Corporation (the “Company”) hereby
certifies, to such officer’s knowledge, that:




(i)
            the
      accompanying quarterly report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the three
      and six months ended June 30, 2008 (the “Report”) fully complies with the
      requirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d), as applicable, of the
      Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended;
and





(ii)
            the
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
      Company.






Dated:
July 31, 2008




/s/
THOMAS B. OKARMA


Thomas B.
Okarma


President
and Chief Executive Officer






A signed
original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to
Geron Corporation and will be retained by Geron Corporation and furnished to the
Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon
request.
Description of Personal Loan from William
G. Styles to Organic Plant Health, LLC.


– not represented
by Promissory Note


 


 


	$68,384.00	
        As of September 30, 2011

         

	 	Charlotte, North Carolina
	 	 


 


 


Loan From:Mr. William G. Styles


Loan To:Organic Plant Health, LLC


Balance of 9/30/2011:$68,384.00


Interest Due:5.5% Annually


Interest Paid:Monthly


Maturity Date:January 1, 2016


 


Purpose of Loan:Mr.
Styles loaned the money to Organic Plant Health, LLC for the


purpose of helping
fund the operations of the company.


 


Conversion:At
such point as Mr. Styles and the company mutually agree, the outstanding loan amount, including all unpaid principle and interest,
may be converted to common stock of the parent company, Organic Plant Health, Inc., (OTC:OPHI) at the rate of $.05 per common share.
Exhibit 99.2



OLD DOMINION ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Quarterly Report of Old Dominion Electric Cooperative (the Company) on
Form 10-Q for the period ending March 31, 2003 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Daniel M. Walker, Senior Vice President Accounting and Finance of the Company, certify, pursuant to
18 U.S.C. section 1350, as adopted pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | (1) |  | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- |  | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) |  | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.
| | --- |  | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



Date:  May 15, 2003



|/s/  DANIEL M. WALKER                                                                                     
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|Daniel M. Walker Senior Vice President Accounting and Finance (principal financial and accounting officer)









21
Court of Appeals

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA,____________________

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:

A22A1070. WINBUSH v. DULUTH POLICE DEPT., et al.

This appeal was docketed on March 2, 2022. Due to an issue with the mail,

Appellant was given an extra day beyond the 20-day filing period to file his brief,

making his brief and enumeration of errors due to be filed no later than March 23,

2022. Court of Appeals Rules 22 (a) and 23 (a). As of the date of this order, Appellant

has not timely filed a brief, and he has not requested an extension of time for filing

it. Accordingly, this appeal is DISMISSED. Court of Appeals Rules 7 and 23 (a).

Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk’s Office, Atlanta,____________________

I certify that the above is a true extract from

the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court

hereto affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

April 11, 2022

04/11/2022
# United States Court **of Appeals**  **f or the Fifth Circuit** 

No. 21

- 50500 Summary Calendar

**United States of America,** Plaintiff

— Appellee **,**

versus
**Fernando Contreras**

**- Rojas,**  Defendant

— Appellant

**.**

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC No. 4:20

- CR

- 579

- 1

Before **Davis, Jones,** and **Elrod,** Circuit Judges

. **Per Curiam :**  Fernando Contreras

- Rojas appeals the sentence imposed following his guilty plea conviction of illegal reentry . The sole argument Contreras

- Rojas raises on appeal is that the enhancement of his sentence under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)( 1 ) is unconstitutional because the fact of a prior conviction was neither found by a jury nor alleged in the indictment

. He acknowledges that this argument is foreclosed by Almendarez

- Torres v. United States , 523 U.S. 224 (1998), but he wishes to preserve the issue for further United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED October 29, 2021

Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 21-50500 Document: 00516074331 Page: 1 Date Filed: 10/29/2021No. 21

- 50500

2 review. The Government has moved for summary affirmance or, in the alternative, for an extension of time to file a brief.
Almendarez

- Torres held that a prior conviction is not a fact that must be alleged in an indictment or found beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury for purposes of a statutory sentencing enhancement. 523 U.S. at 239

- 47. This court has held that subs equent Supreme Court decisions such as Alleyne v. United States , 570 U.S. 99 (2013), and Apprendi v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 466 (2000), did not overrule Almendarez

- Torres

. See , e.g. , United States v. Wallace , 759 F.3d 486, 497 (5th Cir. 2014); United States v. Pineda

- Arrellano , 492 F.3d 624, 625

- 26 (5th Cir. 2007). Accordingly, Contreras

- Rojas’s concession of foreclosure is correct, and summary judgment is appropriate. See Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis , 406 F. 2d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir. 1969).
Over f ourteen years ago, this court opined that appeals based on Almendarez

- Torres are virtually all frivolous. See United States v. Pineda

Arrellano , 492 F.3d 624 , 625 (5th Cir. 2007). After hundreds, if not thousand s , mor e cases challenging Almendarez

- Torres , we reiterat e and reaffirm our statement that “[i]n the future, barring new developments in Supreme Court jurisprudence, arguments seeking reconsideration of Almendarez

- Torres will be viewed with skepticis m.” Id. at 6 2 6. We urge “appellants and their counsel not to damage their credibility with this court by asserting non

- debatable arguments.” Id. at 626. We meant it then and mean it now. The Government’s motion for summary affirmance is **GRANTED** , the Government’s al ternative motion for an extension of time to file a brief is **DENIED** , and the district court’s judgment is **AFFIRMED**

. Case: 21-50500 Document: 00516074331 Page: 2 Date Filed: 10/29/2021
Exhibit 32.2


        CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO RULE 13a-14(b) OF THE EXCHANGE ACT AND
         18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ENACTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF
                         THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

         In  connection  with the filing of Zunicom,  Inc. and  Subsidiary  (the
"Company") Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the period ending March 31, 2007 as
filed with the  Securities  and  Exchange  Commission  on the date  hereof  (the
"Report"),I,  John C. Rudy,  Chief  Financial  Officer of the Company,  certify,
pursuant to Rule  13a-14(b)  of the  Exchange  Act and 18 U.S.C.  (SS) 1350,  as
enacted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

                 (1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of
                      section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Act of 1934;
                      and

                 (2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents,
                      in all material respects, the financial condition and
                      results of operations of the Company,


/s/ John C. Rudy
----------------------
John C. Rudy
Chief Financial Officer
(principal financial officer

May 20, 2007



























                                Exhibit 32.2 - 1
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 99.1


                CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



     In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Aspect Medical
Systems, Inc. (the "Company") for the period ended September 28, 2002 as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"),
the undersigned, Nassib G. Chamoun, Chief Executive Officer of the Company,
hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that:

     (1) the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.


                                           /s/ Nassib G. Chamoun
                                           -------------------------------------
Dated: November 12, 2002                   Nassib G. Chamoun
                                           Chief Executive Officer
**Exhibit 3.1**

** **

**CERTIFICATE OF FORMATION**

** **

**OF**

** **

**AMERICAN HONDA RECEIVABLES LLC**

 

This Certificate ofFormation of American Honda Receivables LLC(the “**Company**”),dated as of March 16, 2011, is duly executed and filed to form a limited liability company in accordance with the Delaware LimitedLiability Company Act (6 Del. C. §18-201, et seq.).

 

1.          Name.The name of the limited liability company is American Honda Receivables LLC.

 

2.          RegisteredOffice. The address of its registered office in the State of Delaware is c/o The Corporation Trust Company, 1209 Orange Street,in the City of Wilmington, County of New Castle, 19801.

 

3.          RegisteredAgent. The name and address of its registered agent for service of process in the State of Delaware is The Corporation TrustCompany, 1209 Orange Street, in the City of Wilmington, County of New Castle, 19801.

** **

**IN WITNESS WHEREOF**,the undersigned has executed this Certificate of Formation of American Honda Receivables LLC as of the 16th day of March, 2011.
**EXHIBIT 31.1**

 

**CERTIFICATION**

 

I, Richard J. Stockton, certify that:

 

1.                                      I have reviewed this Amendment No. 1 to the Annual Report on Form 10-K/A of Braemar Hotels & Resorts Inc.; and

 

2.                                      Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report.

 
| Date: April 30, 2018 |                    |
|---------------------------|-------------------------|
|                      |                    |
|                      | /s/ RICHARD J. STOCKTON |
|                      | Richard J. Stockton     |
|                      | Chief Executive Officer |

 

----
September 20, 2012

JUDGMENT

The Fourteenth Court of Appeals

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellant

NO. 14-12-00408-CR V.

KRISTEN SUSSANNE RUBLE, Appellee

________________________________

This cause was heard on the transcript of the record of the court below. The record 

reveals error in the judgment. The Court orders the judgment REVERSED and the cause 

REMANDED for further proceeding in accordance with its opinion.

We further order this decision certified below for observance.
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 10**  **- 6635** 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee ,
v. ROBERT LIONEL SISK , Defendant

- Appellant
.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina , at Asheville
. Martin K. Reidinger , District Judge. ( 1:01

- cr - 00052

- MR

- 14; 1:05

- cv - 00312

- MR )

Submitted : June 30, 2011 Decided: July 5, 2011

Before WILKINSON, DUNCAN, and WYNN , Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by un published per curiam opinion
. Robert Lionel Sisk, Appellant Pro Se. Amy Elizabeth Ray, Assistant United States Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Robert Lionel Sisk se eks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. A. § 2255 ( West Supp. 2010 ) motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (B) (200 6 ). A certific ate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (200 6 ). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that

reaso nable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see Miller

- El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336

- 38 (2003). When the district court denies relief o n procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack , 529 U.S. at 484

- 85. In his informal brief, Sisk ha s faile d to address the district court’ s reasons for denying his motion
. Therefore, Sisk has forfeited appellate review of the district court ’ s ruling s . See 4th Cir. R. 34(b). Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal3 contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-4192

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus JOHN CLIFFORD SIMMS, Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at Danville. Jackson L. Kiser, Senior District Judge. (CR-05-00001) Submitted: February 24, 2005 Decided: April 22, 2005 Before WILKINS, Chief Judge, and LUTTIG and MOTZ, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Paul Graham Beers, GLENN, FELDMANN, DARBY & GOODLATTE, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellant. John L. Brownlee, United States Attorney, Thomas Jack Bondurant, Jr., Assis tant United States Attorney, Morgan Eugene Scott, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: John Clifford Simms appeals a decision of the district court ordering him detained pending trial. We have jurisdiction to review the district court order pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 1291 (West 1993). See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3145(c) (West 2000). Finding that the record supports detention pending trial, we affirm. Under normal circumstances, we review a district court detention order for clear error. SeeUnited States v. Clark , 865 F.2d 1433, 1437 (4th Cir. 1989) (en banc); United States v. Williams , 753 F.2d 329, 333 (4th Cir. 1985). Here, however, the form used by the district court in reporting its reasons for ordering detention recited an incorrect legal standard. The Bail Reform Act requires that “clear and convincing evidence” support the district court conclusion that no conditions other than detention will reasonably assure the safety of any other person and the community. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3142(f)(2) (West 2000). But the form used by the district court here indicated that its findings were based only on the preponderance of the evidence. Accordingly, we do not afford the usual deference to the district court conclusion that releasing Simms would pose a threat to the communi ty. See Consolidation Coal Co. v. Local 1643 , 48 F.3d 125, 128 (4th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he clearly erroneous rule does not protect findings made on the basis of the application of incorrect legal standards.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).3 Nevertheless, based on the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C.A. § 3142(g) (West 2000) and our own review of the facts as found by the district court, we conclude that the detention order should be affirmed. The district court found that Simms has a substantial criminal history that includes convictions for violent crimes and a track record of retaliating against those who have reported him to authorities. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3142(g)(3)(A). Simms also conceded that the weight of the Government’s evidence against him in the instant case is considerable. Seeid. § 3142(g)(2). However, we instruct the district court to correct the error in the form it uses to report its findings in future cases.
AFFIRMED
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

R.C., a child,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

Nos. 4D13-341, 4D13-508, 4D13-509 and 4D13-1466

[February 11, 2015]

Consolidated appeals from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth 

Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Elijah H. Williams, Judge; L.T. Case 

Nos. 12004936DL00A, 12004023DL00D, 12002835DLC, 11009402DLD, 

11009638DL00A and 12000152DL00B.

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Ellen Griffin, Assistant Public 

Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Monique Rolla, 

Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

A juvenile appeals an order adjudicating him delinquent after his plea 

of no contest to multiple charges. Although not requested at the plea or 

disposition hearing, a subsequent order recites that appellant had 

preserved the right to appeal the prior order finding him competent to 

proceed in all of his cases. It does not state that the order was dispositive. 

Indeed, an order finding a defendant competent to proceed is not a 

dispositive order. See Fuller v. State, 748 So. 2d 292, 294 (Fla. 4th DCA 

1999) (an issue is dispositive only when, regardless of the outcome of the 

appeal, there will be no trial; an order determining defendant competent 

has no such effect, as trial proceeds). In Burns v. State, 884 So. 2d 1010, 

1012-13 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004), we explained that a competency issue 

relates to the voluntary and intelligent nature of a plea, which is among 

the limited issues which may be appealed from a plea, but not without 

moving to withdraw the plea first. We have applied this preservation rule 

to juvenile proceedings in P.R.T. v. State, 920 So. 2d 708, 709 (Fla. 4th

DCA 2006) citing State v. T.G., 800 So. 2d 204, 210 (Fla. 2001) (“[J]uveniles 
2

pleading guilty . . . may directly appeal an involuntary plea only if it is 

preserved by a motion to withdraw plea in the trial court.”). As appellant 

failed to file a motion to withdraw his plea, he has not preserved the issue 

for review.

Affirmed.

WARNER, GROSS and CIKLIN, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
#### KEIL LOCK CO., Inc., a corporation, Plaintiff, v. EARLE HARDWARE MANUFACTURING CO., a corporation, and Benjamin Kupetz and Sidney Kupetz, a partnership, doing business as Arden Hardware Co., Defendants.

United States District Court S. D. New York.

Aug. 27, 1954.

Harry Price, New York City, for plaintiff.

William J. Ruano, Pittsburgh, Pa., for defendants.

WALSH, District Judge.

In this action for damages for patent infringement, one of the defendants, Earle Hardware Manufacturing Company, moves to quash service of process and to dismiss the complaint as to it for lack of jurisdiction. The answer to the complaint contained defenses on the merits, a counterclaim, and, for Earle Hardware only, the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person.

Earle Hardware is a Pennsylvania corporation. Upon oral argument plaintiff’s attorney conceded that Earle Hardware was not properly served and could not be served in this district because it does not “reside” nor does it have a “regular and established place of business” within the district. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1400(b).

Plaintiff’s main contention is that defendant has waived this objection to the jurisdiction and has voluntarily appeared by setting forth a counterclaim in the answer. The objection is without merit. Rule 12(b), Fed.Rules Civ. Proc., 28 U.S.C.A. expressly provides that every defense available to a party, including a counterclaim, shall be asserted in a responsive pleading and that no defense or objection is waived by being joined with another. Thus the distinction between special and general appearances is abolished. Schlaefer v. Schlaefer, 71 App.D.C. 350, 112 F.2d 177, 130 A.L.R. 1014; Gerber v. Fruchter, 2 Cir., 147 F.2d 120. The defense of want of jurisdiction of the person is not waived by being joined in the answer with a defense to the merits or with a counterclaim. Moore’s Federal Practice, 2d Ed., Vol. 2, p. 2260; Blank v. Bitker, 7 Cir., 135 F.2d 962; Sadler v. Pennsylvania Refining Co., D.C.W.D.S.C., 33 F.Supp. 414.

Although it has been held that a party submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court by asserting a counterclaim in his answer (Hook & Ackerman, Inc., v. Hirsh, D.C.D.C., 98 F.Supp. 477) I am of the opinion that the better view is that such a joinder does not bar the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person. Sadler v. Pennsylvania Refining Co., supra.

*389Plaintiff argues further that a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over the person cannot be made after answer. While Rule 12(b) requires such a motion to be made before answer, the defense of want of jurisdiction of the person raised by answer may be determined before trial on application of a party. Rule 12(d); Moore’s Federal Practice, 2d Ed., Vol. 2, pp. 2274-2275; Sadler v. Pennsylvania Refining Co., supra.

Motion to quash service and to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the person granted.
#### The BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON, et al., petitioners, v. Frederick J. GREDE, as Trustee of the Sentinel Liquidation Trust.

No. 10-232.

Oct. 18, 2010.

Case below, 598 F.3d 899.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit denied.