alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

MARSHALL MARTIN,

1

Petitioner Below,

Appellant,

v.

LONDON VALENTINE,

Respondent Below, 

Appellee.

§

§ No. 401, 2022

§

§

§ Court Below–Family Court

§ of the State of Delaware

§ 

§ 

§ File No. CK21-02925

§ Petition No. 22-20174

§

Submitted: October 31, 2022

Decided: November 18, 2022

Before VALIHURA, VAUGHN, and TRAYNOR, Justices.

ORDER

After consideration of the notice to show cause and the appellant’s response, 

it appears to the Court that:

(1) On October 25, 2022, the appellant, Marshall Martin, filed a notice of 

appeal from the Family Court’s September 23, 2022 order dismissing his petition for 

custody. Under Supreme Court Rule 6, a timely notice of appeal was due on or 

before October 24, 2022.

2

1 The Court previously assigned pseudonyms to the parties under Supreme Court Rule 7(d).

2 Del. Supr. Ct. R. 6(a)(i). Because the thirtieth day fell on a Sunday, the notice of appeal was due 

before the close of the next business day—Monday, October 24, 2022. Del. Supr. Ct. R. 11(a).
2

(2) The Senior Court Clerk issued a notice directing Martin to show cause 

why his appeal should not be dismissed as untimely filed. In his response to the 

notice to show cause, Martin asks for a rehearing of the Family Court’s order and 

argues the merits of his appeal but does not explain why he did not file a timely 

notice of appeal. 

(3) Time is a jurisdictional requirement.3 A notice of appeal must be 

received by the Court within the applicable time period to be effective.4 An 

appellant’s pro se status does not excuse his failure to comply strictly with the 

jurisdictional requirements of Supreme Court Rule 6.5 Unless an appellant can 

demonstrate that his failure to file a timely notice of appeal is attributable to courtrelated personnel, the appeal cannot be considered.6

 

(4) The record does not reflect that Martin’s failure to file a timely notice 

of appeal in this case is attributable to court-related personnel. Consequently, this 

case does not fall within the exception to the general rule that mandates the timely 

filing of a notice of appeal, and this appeal must therefore be dismissed. To the 

extent that Martin wishes to pursue relief under Family Court Civil Procedure Rule 

59, he must do so in the Family Court in the first instance.

3 Carr v. State, 554 A.2d 778, 779 (Del.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 829 (1989).

4 Del. Supr. Ct. R. 10(a).

5

See Smith v. State, 47 A.3d 481 (Del. 2012).

6 Bey v. State, 402 A.2d 362, 363 (Del. 1979).
3

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, under Supreme Court 

Rule 29(b), that the appeal is DISMISSED. 

BY THE COURT:

/s/ James T. Vaughn, Jr.

Justice
Cite as 2016 Ark. App. 128



## ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

EN BANC No. CV

- 15

- 653

MONROE CARLTON, JERRY RICE, KATHY RICE, AMANDA RICE, MEREDITH LEMONS, MIRANDA PASCOE, AND MARGARET PLEASANTS APPELLANT S

V.

GRACE ELLEN RICE APPELLEE Opinion Delivered: February 24, 2016

APPEAL FROM THE LONOKE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT [43PR

- 04

- 309]

HONORABLE JASON ASHLEY PARKER, JUDGE

APPEAL DISMISSED

PER CURIAM
Appellants appeal from an order denying “A Motion to Set Aside Order.” On

appeal they seek reversal of an “Order Removing the Trustee.” In a related case, Carlton

v. Rice , 2016 Ark. App. 48, this court reversed the order which removed the trustee. Thus

the relief so ught by the appellants has been granted, rendering this appeal moot.

Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.

Appeal dismissed.
EX-35.5


(logo) Prudential

Prudential Asset Resources

Prudential Mortgage Capital Company
2100 Ross Avenue, Suite 2500, Dallas TX 75201
Tel 214 777-4500

A business of Prudential Financial, Inc.


Wells Fargo Bank, National Association
Attn: Commercial Mtg Servicing
MAC D1086-120
550 South Tryon Street, 14th Floor
Charlotte, NC 28202


RE:  Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through, WFRBS 2013-C13
     Period: May 1, 2013 to December 31, 2013 (the "Reporting Period")

Annual Compliance Statement

I, Keith Kehlbeck, in my capacity as Vice President, Accounting and Operations
of Prudential Asset Resources, Inc. (the "Company") hereby certify with regard
to the Company's role as Primary Servicer under the Pooling and Servicing
Agreement, (the "Agreement") dated as of May 1, 2013 pertaining to the
above-referenced certificates, that:

(i)  a review of the activities of the Company under the Agreement during the
     Reporting Period, and of the performance of the Company under the Agreement
     has been made under my supervision, and

(ii) to the best of my knowledge, based on such review, the Company has
     fulfilled all its obligations under the Agreement in all material respects
     throughout the Reporting Period.


Effective as of March 25, 2014


/s/ Keith Kehlbeck
Keith Kehlbeck
Vice President, Accounting and Operations
Prudential Asset Resources, Inc.
**Exhibit 99.1**

 

**CERTIFICATIONPursuant to 18 United States Code Section 1350,As adopted pursuant to Section 906 of theSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**

 

The undersigned herebycertifies that the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March31, 2003 of Riverwood Holding, Inc. (the ‘‘Company’’) filed with the Securitiesand Exchange Commission on the date hereof fully complies with the requirementsof section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that theinformation contained in such report fairly presents, in all material respects,the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

 
|   | /s/ STEPHEN M. HUMPHREY                       |
|--------|-----------------------------------------------|
|   | Name: Stephen M. Humphrey                     |
|   | Title: President and Chief Executive  Officer |
|   | Date: May 15, 2003                            |

 

 

A signed original of thiswritten statement required by Section 906 has been provided to RiverwoodHolding, Inc. and will be retained by Riverwood Holding, Inc. and furnished tothe Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

 

----

**Exhibit 99.1 (Cont'd)**

 

**CERTIFICATIONPursuant to 18 United States Code Section 1350,As adopted pursuant to Section 906 of theSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**

 

The undersigned herebycertifies that the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March31, 2003 of Riverwood Holding, Inc. (the ‘‘Company’’) filed with the Securitiesand Exchange Commission on the date hereof fully complies with the requirementsof section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that theinformation contained in such report fairly presents, in all material respects,the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

 
|   | /s/ DANIEL J. BLOUNT                                      |
|--------|-----------------------------------------------------------|
|   | Name: Daniel J. Blount                                    |
|   | Title: Senior Vice President  and Chief Financial Officer |
|   | Date: May 15, 2003                                        |

 

 

A signed original of thiswritten statement required by Section 906 has been provided to RiverwoodHolding, Inc. and will be retained by Riverwood Holding, Inc. and furnished tothe Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

 

----
EXHIBIT 13.2




CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICER PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906


OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002




In connection with the Annual Report of Evogene Ltd. (the “Company”) on Form 20-F for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2013 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Sigal Fattal, do certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:




(1)           The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and




(2)           The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.




/s/ Sigal Fattal


Sigal Fattal


Chief Financial Officer





Date: April 8, 2014
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule

47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 96-30586

Conference Calendar

 

CHARLES CARTER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

TOWN OF NEW ROADS, Mayor; JOHN R.

JARREAU; BUDDY JOE LEONARD; JAMES BEST,

Defendants-Appellees.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Louisiana

USDC No. 95-CV-461-B-M2

- - - - - - - - - -

October 24, 1996

Before POLITZ, Chief Judge, and JOLLY and HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Charles Carter appeals from the district court’s dismissal

of his civil rights complaint pursuant to Heck v. Humphrey, 114

S. Ct. 2364 (1994). Carter has not adequately briefed the

district court’s determination that his § 1983 claims are not

cognizable under Heck nor has he briefed the court’s

determination that, insofar as Carter is seeking habeas relief,

he has not exhausted his state remedies. These issues are

therefore deemed abandoned on appeal. See Yohey v. Collins, 985
F.2d 222, 225 (5th Cir. 1993). Accordingly, the judgment of the

district court is AFFIRMED.
(logo) pwc

 

 

 

 

Report of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm

 

 

To the Board of Directors and shareholders of CoreLogic, Inc.:

 

We have examined management's assertion, included in the accompanying Report on Assessment of Compliance, that CoreLogic Commercial Real Estate Services, Inc. (the "Company"), an indirect subsidiary of CoreLogic, Inc. complied with the servicing criteria set forth in Item 1122(d) of the Securities and Exchange Commission's Regulation AB for all loans for commercial mortgage loan outsourcing customers for which the Company served as the commercial tax service provider (the "Platform"), as of December 31, 2014 and for the year then ended, only including 1122(d)(1)(iv), 1122(d)(2)(ii), 1122(d)(2)(v), 1122(d)(2)(vi), 1122(d)(2)(vii), 1122(d)(4)(xi), 1122(d)(4)(xii) and 1122(d)(4)(xiii), which the Company has determined are applicable to the servicing activities performed by it with respect to the Platform. Management is responsible for the Company's compliance with the servicing criteria. Our responsibility is to express an opinion on management's assertion based on our examination. 

 

Our examination was conducted in accordance with attestation standards of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (United States) and, accordingly, included examining, on a test basis, evidence about the Company's compliance with the applicable servicing criteria and performing such other procedures as we considered necessary in the circumstances. Our examination included testing of selected servicing activities related to the Platform, and determining whether the Company performed those selected activities in compliance with the applicable servicing criteria. Our procedures were limited to the selected servicing activities performed by the Company during the period covered by this report. Our procedures were not designed to detect noncompliance arising from errors that may have occurred prior to or subsequent to our tests that may have affected the balances or amounts calculated or reported by the Company during the period covered by this report. We believe that our examination provides a reasonable basis for our opinion. Our examination does not provide a legal determination on the Company's compliance with the servicing criteria. 

 

In our opinion, management's assertion that the Company complied with the aforementioned applicable servicing criteria as of and for the year ended December 31, 2014 for all loans for commercial mortgage loan outsourcing customers for which the Company served as the commercial tax service provider is fairly stated, in all material respects. 

 

 

/s/ PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP

February 11, 2015

 

 

 

 

 

PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 2001 Ross Avenue, Suite 1800, Dallas, TX 75201-2997

T: (214) 999 1400, F: (214)754 7991, www.pwc.com/us
## Court of Appeals Sixth Appellate District of Texas

J U D G M E N T

Fred Wright, Jr., Appellant

No. 06

- 15

- 00153

- CR v.
The State of Texas, Appellee Appeal from the 188th District Court of Gregg County, Texas (Tr. Ct. No. 43,014

- A ). Opinion delivered by Ch ief Justice Morriss, Justice Moseley and Justice Burgess participating.

As stated in the Court’s opinion of this date, we find no error in the judgment of the court

below

. We affirm the judgment of the trial court

. W e note that the appellant, Fred Wright, Jr., has adequately indicated his inability to pay
costs of appeal. Therefore, we waive payment of costs.

RENDERED JUNE 6, 2016 B Y ORDER OF THE COURT JOSH R. MORRISS, III CHIEF JUSTICE

ATTEST: Debra K. Autrey, Clerk
#### John DENOTO, Plaintiff, v. The PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD COMPANY, Defendant.

United States District Court, S. D. New York.

Oct. 14, 1954.

Jacobs, Leibowitz & Kahn, New York City, for plaintiff.

Conboy, Hewitt, O’Brien & Boardman, New York City, for defendant.

DAWSON, District Judge.

Defendant moves to set aside notice of taking a deposition which specifies the persons to be examined as “the defendant by its officers, and more particularly by its employee, James Basham” on the ground that plaintiff has not identified which officer from whom it seeks to take a deposition, and that the named employee is not an officer, director or managing agent within the purview of Rule 26(d)(2), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A., by whom the deposition of a corporation may be taken.

A notice of the taking of the deposition of a corporation should designate the officer or category of officer whom it is sought to examine; here the notice does not. See Spaeth v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., D.C.S.D.N.Y.1941, 1 F.R.D. 729.

A party cannot be compelled to produce its employees for examination upon notice to take a deposition.

It is not disputed that the employee whose deposition is sought here is not an officer, director or managing agent of the corporate defendant and, therefore, not one through whom the corporation’s testimony may be taken.

Plaintiff may proceed to take the deposition of defendant’s employee under *568Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and may compel attendance as provided by Rule 45. See 4 Moore’s Fed.Prac.2d Ed. 1051.

Motion granted, notice vacated without prejudice. So ordered.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from Swift Energy
Pension  Partners  1991-C,  Ltd.'s  balance  sheet and  statement of  operations
contained  in its Form 10-Q for the  quarter  ended  September  30,  1999 and is
qualified in its entirety by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                                   SEP-30-1999
<CASH>                                         1,717
<SECURITIES>                                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  30,562
<ALLOWANCES>                                   0
<INVENTORY>                                    0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               32,279
<PP&E>                                         4,141,411
<DEPRECIATION>                                 (3,550,149)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 623,541
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          4,084
<BONDS>                                        0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
<PREFERRED>                                    0
<COMMON>                                       0
<OTHER-SE>                                     619,457
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   623,541
<SALES>                                        134,532
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               135,272
<CGS>                                          0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  72,915<F1>
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                16,636
<INCOME-TAX>                                   0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            16,636
<DISCONTINUED>                                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                0
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                   16,636
<EPS-BASIC>                                    0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  0
<FN>
<F1>Includes  lease  operating  expenses,  production  taxes  and  depreciation,
depletion and  amortization  expense.  Excludes general and  administrative  and
interest expense.
</FN>



</TABLE>
#### D. Heywood HARDY, v. W. Lee O’DANIEL.

Civ. No. 3221-48.

United States District Court for the District of Columbia.

Nov. 4, 1954.

Roy St. Lewis, Washington, D. C., for plaintiff.

J. H. Connaughton, Washington, D. C., for defendant.

HOLTZOFF, District Judge.

This motion to quash service of summons and complaint involves a question of law, namely, the construction of Rule 4(d) (1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C., which governs the mode of service upon an individual. That rule provides in its pertinent clauses that a summons upon an individual other than an infant or an incompetent person may be made by delivering copies to him personally, or by leaving copies thereof at his dwelling house or usual place of abode, with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process.

In this case the plaintiff relies upon the last clause, because the service was made upon a person who is claimed to have been an agent of the defendant.

The affidavits submitted on this motion —and I am construing these affidavits *356from the standpoint most favorable to the plaintiff—establish that the person served was an agent for certain purposes, principally an agent of the defendant to collect certain payments claimed by him to be due him, and to transmit those payments to him.

The rule, however, does not permit service on any agent. In that respect it differs from paragraph (3) of the same rule, which governs service of process upon a corporation. The last mentioned rule permits service on a managing or general agent, or any other agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process. The rule relating to service upon a natural person is much more narrow and does not permit service on a managing or general agent, or any agent whatever except an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process.

It seems to the Court that this rule should be construed as relating to an agent expressly authorized by appointment of the defendant to receive process in his behalf, or an agency created by statute to receive service of process, such as an agency in respect to suits against nonresident defendants in connection with automobile accident cases, or other statutory agencies of that sort.

It seems to the Court that the agent in this instance, although clothed with a great deal of authority in behalf of the defendant, was not such an agent as is contemplated by the rule, because the agent was not authorized to receive process by any appointment, in the name of the defendant, or by any statutory appointment. Under the circumstances, the Court deems itself constrained to grant the motion to quash service.

The Court might say, in conclusion, that the construction that it has placed upon this rule is similar to that adopted in Fleming v. Malouf, D.C., 7 F.R.D. 56, and Morfessis v. Marvins Credit, Inc., D.C.Mun.App., 77 A.2d 178, 26 .A.L.R.2d 1082.

Motion granted.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>        5


<S>                                                            <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                                  3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                                              DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-END>                                                   Jun-30-2000
<CASH>                                                             847,633
<SECURITIES>                                                       265,586
<RECEIVABLES>                                                    3,118,992
<ALLOWANCES>                                                       266,328
<INVENTORY>                                                      1,730,600
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                                 6,790,112
<PP&E>                                                           8,947,125
<DEPRECIATION>                                                   1,392,587
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                                  14,907,826
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                            4,055,483
<BONDS>                                                              2,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                                    0
<PREFERRED>                                                        119,588
<COMMON>                                                            81,188
<OTHER-SE>                                                               0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                                    14,907,826
<SALES>                                                         11,374,960
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                                11,374,960
<CGS>                                                            4,588,209
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                                    4,588,209
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                                         0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                                         0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                                 402,063
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                                   (653,139)
<INCOME-TAX>                                                             0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                               (653,139)
<DISCONTINUED>                                                           0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                                    568,750
<CHANGES>                                                                0
<NET-INCOME>                                                       (84,389)
<EPS-BASIC>                                                         0.08
<EPS-DILUTED>                                                         0.08


</TABLE>