COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Humphreys, Powell and Senior Judge Clements

VELMA SHANTE CHAMBERS AYERS MEMORANDUM OPINION * v. Record No. 1469-09-2 PER CURIAM DECEMBER 1, 2009 BUCKINGHAM COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES

FROM THE CIRCUIT COUR T OF BUCKINGHAM COUNTY Richard S. Blanton, Judge (Daniel L. Ru therford, on brief), for appellant. (E. M. Wright, Jr.; Jo dy H. Fariss, Guardian ad litem for the minor child, on brief), for appellee.
Velma Shante Chambers Ayers, appellant, appeals a decision of the trial court approving a permanency planning order with a goal of adoption and terminating he r residual parental rights. On appeal, she contends the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court’s decision. Upon reviewing the record and briefs of the parties, we conclude that this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm th e decision of the trial court. See Rule 5A:27. We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prev ailing party below and grant to it all reasonable inferences fa irly deducible therefrom. See Logan v. Fairfax County Dep’t of
Human Dev. , 13 Va. App. 123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 462 (1991). Code § 16.1-283(C)(2) requires cl ear and convincing evidence that termination is in the best interests of the child and that the parent . . . without good cause, ha[s] been unwilling or unable within a reasonable period of tim e not to exceed twelve months

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opin ion is not designated for publication.- 2 - from the date the child was placed in foster care to remedy substantially the conditio ns which led to or required continuation of the child’s foster care placement, notwithstanding the reasonable and appropriate efforts of social, medical, mental health or other rehabilitative agencies to such end. The child was born on June 30, 2007 with a respiratory illness. On July 9, 200 7, the child’s doctor contacted the Department of Social Serv ices (DSS) when the ch ild missed a follow-up medical appointment relate d to his condition. In September 2007, DSS in vestigated a complaint related to the child, and, in December 2007, th e complaint was founded for medical neglect and inadequate physical care. In June 2008, DSS received information that appellant ha d stabbed her boyfriend while the child was presen t in the same residence. DSS assumed custody of the child and placed him in foster care. A co mplaint was founded for physical abuse, physical neglect, and medical neglect. During the invest igation of the incident, appellant tested positive for illegal drug

use. Prior to the involvement of DSS, the child was re siding in a trailer that had no running water, no heat, several broken wi ndows, and no indoor plumbing. The child was found abused and neglected on July 22, 2008, and DS S developed a foster care service pl an with the goal of return to home. As part of the plan, ap pellant was to: (1) demonstrate appropriate and emotional bonding with the child, including visitation; (2) participate in an attachment evaluation; (3) participate in rehabilitative services; (4) pa rticipate in substance abuse and psychological evaluations; (5) participate in a home study; (6) establish healthy liv ing conditions, including maintaining a job, having adequate housing, and having adequa te finances; and (6) cooperate with DSS. At a hearing held on April 23 , 2009, a foster care worker test ified that appellant failed to complete most of the foster care plan requirements. Although appe llant attended the majority of the scheduled visitations with the chil d, she did not attempt to bond with him duri ng the visits. In addition, appellant attended some counseling sessions with a licensed clinical social worker and she- 3 - achieved some financial stab ility. At one point, water and elec trical services were connected to her residence. However, the licensed clinical social worker testified that the household had not become stable. Appellant refused to provide DSS with her contact information, and sh e sought no assistance from DSS in order to use services offered to her by DSS. Appellant wa s not employed, but she received disability payments. The trial court found th at appellant failed to : (1) complete the at tachment assessment; (2) avail herself of any rehabilita tive services; (3) eliminate risks to the ch ild that were present; (4) seek substance abuse and psychological evaluatio ns; (5) complete the hom e study; (6) establish healthy living conditions; an d (7) cooperate with DSS. The trial court also noted that appellant had made only two telephone calls to DSS within a four-to-five-month time period and that when she finally met with DSS personnel to discuss the serv ice plan, she became agit ated and walked out of the meeting. The trial court approved the change in goal of the permanency planning order to adoption, and it terminated appellant’s re sidual parental rights pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(B) and 16.1-283(C)(2). Appellant appealed the trial court’s decision to this Court. “On review, ‘[a] trial court is presumed to have thoroughly weighed all the evidence, considered the statutory require ments, and made its determinat ion based on the child’s best interests.’” Fields v. Dinwiddie Coun ty Dep’t of Soc. Servs. , 46 Va. App. 1, 7, 614 S.E.2d 656, 659 (2005) (quoting Farley v. Farley , 9 Va. App. 326, 329, 387 S.E.2d 794, 796 (1990)). The trial court’s findings, “‘when based on evidence heard ore tenus , will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong or without ev idence to support it.’” Logan v. Fairfax County Dep’t of Human Dev. , 13 Va. App. 123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 463 (1991) (quoting Peple v. Peple , 5 Va. App. 414, 422, 364 S.E.2d 232, 237 (1988)). “In matters of a child’s welfare, trial courts are vested with broad- 4 - discretion in making the decisions necessary to gu ard and to foster a child ’s best interests.” Farley , 9 Va. App. at 328, 387 S.E.2d at 795. While appellant participated in some of th e foster care plan requirements and services, the evidence clearly proved that she has been unwilling or unable to re medy substantially the conditions which led to or requi red the continuation of the child ’s foster care placement during the period in which she has been offered rehabilita tion services. “It is cl early not in the best interests of a child to spend a le ngthy period of time waiting to find out when, or even if, a parent will be capable of resuming [her] responsibilities.” Kaywood v. Halifax County Dep’t of Soc.
Servs. , 10 Va. App. 535, 540, 394 S.E.2d 492, 495 (1990). The record supports the trial court’s deci sion to approve the goa l of adoption in the permanency planning order. In addition, the record supports the trial court’s finding that the evidence proved by clear and convincing evidence that appellant’s parental rights to the child should be terminated and that the termination of ap pellant’s parental rights is in the child’s best interests. Code § 16.1-283(C)(2). Accordingly, we summarily a ffirm the decision of the trial

court. 1
Affirmed.

1 The trial court also terminated appellant’s parental rights purs uant to Code § 16.1-283(B). When a trial court’s judgment is ma de on alternative grou nds, we need only consider whether any one of the alternatives is sufficient to sustain the ju dgment of the trial court a nd, if we so find, need not address the ot her grounds. See Fields , 46 Va. App. at 8, 614 S.E.2d at 659 (termination of parental rights upheld under on e subsection of Code § 16.1-283 forecloses need to consider termination under alte rnative subsections).