Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-903 | December 20, 2019 Page 1 of 13

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Kurt A. Young

Nashville, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Samuel J. Dayton

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Jordan Phillip Taber,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

December 20, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-CR-903

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court

The Honorable Sheila A. Carlisle, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

49G03-1708-MR-29848

Riley, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-903 | December 20, 2019 Page 2 of 13

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

[1] Appellant-Defendant, Jordan Taber (Taber), appeals his conviction for murder,

a felony, Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(1).

[2] We affirm. 

ISSUE

[3] Taber presents this court with two issues on appeal, which we consolidate and

restate as the following single issue: Whether the trial court abused its 

discretion in admitting into evidence his statement to the police. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

[4] In the late hours of June 3, 2017, Raeshawn Lawrence (Lawrence), Brandan 

Key (Key), Evenbay Settles (Settles), and Fairly Griffie (Griffie), were smoking 

marijuana and drinking alcohol. All four men were in a vehicle being driven by 

Key. First, the group went to a party in Avon, Indiana, and left after about 

thirty minutes. Then, at the suggestion of Griffie, Key drove them to a birthday 

party at Carriage House Apartments in Indianapolis, Indiana. They arrived 

between 11:00 p.m. and midnight. 

[5] After about twenty minutes, a group of three men arrived at the birthday party. 

One of the men, who had short hair, was Johnny Talley (Talley), and the other,

who had a long “fuzzy ponytail,” was Taber. (Transcript Vol. II, p. 102). 

According to Lawrence, Talley had a “gun on his waist,” and, moments after 
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arriving at the party, Talley “aggressively” approached Griffie for “a couple of 

seconds,” but they eventually “just shook hands.” (Tr. Vol. II, pp. 101, 104). 

At some point during the party, Lawrence heard Talley state, “Let’s squash 

this.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 108). 

[6] After spending about an hour at the birthday party, Lawrence, Key, Settles, and 

Griffie decided to leave. When they got to Key’s vehicle, Griffie did not get 

inside; instead, he turned around and walked away. After about thirty seconds,

multiple gunshots were fired. Key backed the car out of the parking space and 

drove toward Griffie. Settles and Lawrence exited the vehicle and found Griffie

lying on the ground with multiple gunshot injuries to his chest. Lawrence 

observed Griffie’s gun resting on the ground next to Griffie. As Settles and 

Lawrence tried to place Griffie inside the vehicle, Lawrence saw Taber come

around the corner of an apartment building, and Taber began shooting toward 

Key’s vehicle. Lawrence and Settles ducked and got inside Key’s vehicle, and 

Key drove to a different location in the apartment complex. In the meantime, 

Taber walked toward Griffie and took Griffie’s gun. Lawrence observed 

Taber’s actions. Moments later, Lawrence saw a “blue sports car” speed away 

“[v]ery fast.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 112). Lawrence, Settles, and Key returned to 

where Griffie was and called 9-1-1. 

[7] At around 1:30 a.m. on June 4, 2017, Officer Scott Highland (Officer Highland) 

of the Speedway Police Department was dispatched to the scene. Upon 

arriving, Officer Highland found Griffie lying on the ground, and Griffie had 
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several bullet holes through his shirt. Using scissors from his first aid kit, he cut 

Griffie’s shirt and applied gauze to Griffie’s chest wounds. Griffie struggled to 

breathe, was unable to talk, and he eventually died on the scene. 

[8] At around 1:57 a.m., Detective Erika Jones (Detective Jones) and other 

detectives of the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department arrived at the 

scene. Detective Jones encountered Lawrence and Key, and she transported 

them to the homicide office to obtain their taped statements. After conducting 

the interviews, Detective Jones received information from Griffie’s mother that 

Griffie had “been having a beef” with a man named “Johnny.” (Tr. Vol. III, p. 

59). Griffie’s mother also provided Detective Jones with a screen shot of 

Johnny’s Facebook profile. Johnny’s Facebook profile name was “James 

Slaughter,” and upon further research, Detective Jones discovered that 

Johnny/James Slaughter was Talley, an associate of Taber. (Tr. Vol. III, p. 

59). Also, while looking through Talley’s Facebook photos and list of friends, 

Detective Jones was looking for the shooter, who might have had “long stringy 

hair” pulled back in a ponytail. (Tr. Vol. III, p. 62). Detective Jones found a 

photo of a man that matched the description she was looking for and the profile 

name for the man displayed on Facebook was “Julio Hernandez.” (Tr. Vol. III, 

p. 62). Upon cross-referencing Julio Hernandez’s date of birth as listed on 

Facebook with BMV records, Detective Jones discovered that Julio Hernandez 

was Taber. Following her research, Detective Jones assembled separate photo 

arrays which included Taber and Talley. 
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[9] A few hours after the shooting, Detective Jones talked to Lawrence and showed 

him the photo arrays. Lawrence, who had seen Taber shooting at the scene, 

stated, “[t]hat’s the dude.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 12). Lawrence proceeded to circle 

and sign his name beside Taber’s photo. Detective Jones also showed the photo 

arrays to Key. Key was unable to recognize Taber from the lineup, but he 

recognized Talley. Settles recognized Taber in one of the photo arrays, but

since he was “going through a lot” at the time, he did not want his “name on 

any paperwork.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 198). 

[10] On June 6, 2017, Detective Jones telephoned Talley and asked if he would be 

willing to speak with her at the homicide office in Indianapolis. Talley 

accepted the invitation, and he informed Detective Jones that he would be 

accompanied by his attorney. Detective Jones called Talley’s attorney to 

confirm Talley’s story. Talley’s attorney indicated that it was true he was 

accompanying Talley and that they were on their way. Talley’s attorney added 

that Taber was accompanying them since Taber wanted to speak with Detective 

Jones. Talley’s attorney indicated that he was only representing Talley and not 

Taber. 

[11] When Talley, Talley’s attorney, and Taber arrived at the homicide office, 

Detective Jones and her partner, Detective Gray Smith (Detective Smith),

directed Talley and his attorney to the conference room. Since “there was not a 

section for anyone to just kind of sit and wait,” Taber was ushered into an

interview room. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 14). For about an hour, Detective Jones 
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questioned Talley. In the course of the interview, Talley asserted that during 

the shooting, he saw Griffie pull a “gun out on [] Taber” and fire “a shot.” (Tr. 

Vol. II, p. 15). 

[12] After completing Talley’s interview, Detectives Jones and Smith entered the 

interview room where Taber was waiting and introduced themselves. Detective

Jones then read Taber his Miranda warnings. Taber stated that he had a GED 

and understood English, and when he was asked to sign the waiver form, Taber 

stated that he “wanted to have a lawyer” present. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 16). 

Detectives Jones and Smith terminated the interview and began packing up. 

Taber, however, stated that he wanted to “give a statement, but he [did] not 

want all the trick questions.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 17). Detective Jones explained to 

Taber that since he had invoked the right to have an attorney present, she could 

not question him further. Taber then asked Detective Jones if he “had to stay [] 

there” or “he had to wait until he had an attorney.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 17). 

Detective Jones informed Taber that he “was not free to leave.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 

17). At that moment, Taber changed his mind and stated that “he wanted to 

give a statement [] without an attorney.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 18). Detectives Jones 

and Smith left the room, and Detective Jones intended to consult the prosecutor 

as to whether she would be permitted to question Taber since he had waived his 

right to counsel. 

[13] While Detectives Jones and Smith were out of the room, on two occasions

Taber stood up and knocked on the door to get the detectives’ attention. As 
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soon as Detectives Jones and Smith reentered the interview room, Taber 

pointed at the seat Detective Jones had recently vacated and stated

unequivocally that he wanted to give a statement. Detective Jones again read 

Taber his Miranda warnings. Taber stated that he understood his rights, and he 

signed a waiver. During a two-and-a-half-hour interview, Taber admitted that 

at some point during the shooting, he “pulled out a gun and then [] closed [his] 

eyes and then [] just got to shooting.” (State’s Exh. Vol. I, p. 40). Given that 

there was more than one gun fired, and pending the results of a forensic firearm 

examination, Taber was permitted to leave after the interview. The results of 

the forensic examination were released in July 2017, and Taber was arrested. 

[14] On August 15, 2017, the State filed an Information, charging Taber with Count 

I, murder, a felony, and Count II, unlawful possession of a firearm by an SVF, 

a Level 4 felony. On February 14, 2019, Taber filed a motion to suppress the 

statement he gave to Detectives Jones and Smith. The trial court conducted a 

hearing on March 6, 2019 but denied Taber’s motion. A bifurcated jury trial 

was held on March 18 through March 20, 2019. During the first phase, the jury 

found Taber guilty of murder, and there was no need for a second phase since 

the State moved to dismiss the Level 4 felony unlawful possession of a firearm 

by an SVF charge. On March 27, 2019, the trial court conducted a sentencing 

hearing and sentenced Taber to sixty years in the Department of Correction. 

[15] Taber now appeals. Additional information will be provided as necessary. 
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DISCUSSION AND DECISION

I. Admission of the Evidence

[16] When ruling on the admissibility of evidence, the trial court is afforded broad 

discretion, and we will only reverse the ruling upon a showing of abuse of 

discretion. Gibson v. State, 733 N.E.2d 945, 951 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). An abuse 

of discretion involves a decision that is clearly against the logic and effect of the 

facts and circumstances before the court. Id. We consider the evidence most 

favorable to the trial court’s ruling and any uncontradicted evidence to the 

contrary to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to support the ruling. 

Id.

[17] Taber first contends that he was unlawfully detained, which was a violation of 

his rights under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. As 

such, Taber contends that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting his 

statement to Detectives Jones and Smith. Further, Taber claims that his Fifth 

Amendment rights under the United States Constitution were violated when 

Detectives Jones and Smith continued questioning him even after he had 

demanded an attorney.

II. Fourth Amendment Violation

[18] Taber argues that shortly after he arrived at the homicide office, he was held in 

a locked interrogation room, and Detective Jones subsequently informed him 

he was not free to leave. Taber contends that the statement he offered thereafter 
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“was a direct result of that illegal detention,” and his Fourth Amendment rights

under the United States Constitution were violated. (Appellant’s Br. p. 21). In 

response, the State argues that because Detective Jones had probable cause to 

detain Taber, his Fourth Amendment rights were not violated. 

[19] The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution declares “[t]he right 

of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 

unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” Krise v. State, 746 

N.E.2d 957, 961 (Ind. 2001). The Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on 

unreasonable searches and seizures applies not only to searches and seizures of 

property, but also to physical apprehension of persons, such as arrests. Roberts 

v. State, 599 N.E.2d 595, 598 (Ind. 1992). In general, police must have a 

warrant to make an arrest. Thomas v. State, 81 N.E.3d 621, 625 (Ind. 2017). An 

officer may, however, arrest a suspect without a warrant if he observes the 

suspect committing a crime, or if the officer has probable cause to believe that 

the suspect has committed a felony. Sears, 668 N.E.2d at 666-67. 

[20] “Probable cause to arrest arises when, at the time of the arrest, the arresting 

officer has knowledge of facts and circumstances, which would warrant a 

person of reasonable caution to believe that the defendant committed the 

criminal act in question.” Id. at 626 (citing Sears, 668 N.E.2d at 667). The 

amount of evidence necessary to satisfy the probable cause requirement for a 

warrantless arrest is evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Id. Rather than 

requiring “a precise mathematical computation, probable cause is grounded in 
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notions of common sense.” Id. (citing Ogle v. State, 698 N.E.2d 1146, 1148 

(Ind. 1998)). “A police officer’s subjective belief as to whether he has probable 

cause to arrest a defendant has no legal effect. Instead, the police officer’s 

actual knowledge of objective facts and circumstances is determinative.” State 

v. Parrott, 69 N.E.3d 535, 543 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied. “The ultimate 

determination of probable cause is reviewed de novo.” Id.

[21] Contesting the existence of probable cause, Taber claims that at the time 

Detective Jones interviewed him, there was no “warrant for [his] arrest and no 

charges had been filed against him.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 21). Thus, Taber 

contends that his “statement was a direct result of [an] illegal detention.” 

(Appellant’s Br. p. 21). 

[22] As to whether Detective Jones and other officers had probable cause to lawfully 

detain Taber in the interview room, the record reveals that prior to Taber’s

voluntary visit to the homicide office, Detective Jones had questioned 

Lawrence regarding the shooting. Lawrence stated that Taber had fired several 

shots at Griffie and toward Key’s vehicle. Lawrence had also stated that he had 

seen Griffie with a gun at the birthday party, and after Griffie had been shot, he 

saw Taber take Griffie’s gun which was lying on the ground next to Griffie. 

Additionally, from the photo arrays prepared by Detective Jones, Lawrence 

identified Taber as one of the people who fired shots on the day Griffie was 

shot. Based on Lawrence’s statement, Detective Jones determined that Taber 

was not free to leave since he was the lead suspect in the homicide. Also, 
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Detective Jones believed that Taber could have been charged with “theft from 

stealing [Griffie’s] firearm, possibly robbery, possibly criminal recklessness for 

firing the gun at the back of [Key’s] vehicle.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 18). 

[23] Under the facts and circumstances of this case, a person of reasonable caution 

in Detective Jones’ position could have concluded that Taber had committed 

several felony offenses, thus, we cannot hold that Taber’s detainment at the 

homicide office violated Taber’s Fourth Amendment rights under the United 

States Constitution. Thus, we hold that his statement was admissible, and the 

trial court did not abuse its discretion. 

III. Fifth Amendment Violation 

[24] Taber further contends that his questioning was improper because it continued 

after he requested to have counsel present. Taber, therefore, asserts that his 

confession was not freely and voluntarily given and that his Fifth Amendment

rights under the United States Constitution were violated. 

[25] It is undisputed that Taber was in custody when Detective Jones informed 

Taber that he was not free to leave the interview room. When a person is 

questioned by law enforcement officers after being taken into custody, that 

person must first “be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any 

statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a 

right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.” Miranda v. 

Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Once 
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the accused requests counsel, “the interrogation must cease until an attorney is 

present.” Carr v. State, 934 N.E.2d 1096, 1102 (Ind. 2010) (citing Edwards v. 

Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1883, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981)).

Future interrogation is allowed only when it is shown by a preponderance of 

the evidence that the accused initiated further discussions and knowingly and 

intelligently waived the right to counsel he had earlier invoked. Smith v. Illinois, 

469 U.S. 91, 95, 105 S.Ct. 490, 83 L.Ed.2d 488 (1984). 

[26] In the present case, Taber was willingly present at the homicide office. 

Detective Jones testified that since “there was not a section for anyone to just 

kind of sit and wait,” Taber was taken to an interview room. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 

14). When Detectives Jones and Smith concluded their interview with Talley, 

they entered the room where Taber was waiting. Detective Jones immediately 

read Taber his Miranda warnings and asked Taber to sign the waiver of rights 

form. Taber invoked his right to an attorney. Detectives Jones and Smith 

terminated the interview and proceeded to exit the room. At that moment, 

Taber changed his mind and stated that “he wanted to give a statement [] 

without an attorney.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 18). Detective Jones ultimately left the 

room to consult the prosecutor as to whether she would be permitted to 

question Taber since he had waived his right to counsel. A short while later, 

Taber reinitiated communication with the detectives by knocking on the door. 

When Detective Jones reentered the interview room, she asked Taber what his 

knock meant, and Taber explicitly stated that he wanted to give a statement
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without an attorney. Detective Jones again read Taber his Miranda warnings

and asked whether he understood them. Taber answered affirmatively and 

signed the waiver. Detective Jones then proceeded with the interrogation, and 

Taber made an incriminating statement. 

[27] While Taber had unequivocally invoked his right to counsel at the initial 

encounter, he knowingly and intelligently waived that right by reinitiating 

conversation with Detective Jones. Because Taber initiated further 

communication, Taber voluntarily chose to forego his right to counsel. 

Detective Jones readvised Taber of his Miranda rights. Taber said he 

understood, and he then made an incriminating statement. These facts strongly 

suggest that Taber issued a voluntary statement, and we conclude that the trial 

court did not abuse its discretion by admitting Taber’s statement. 

CONCLUSION

[28] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Taber’s Fourth and Fifth Amendment 

rights under the United States Constitution were not violated, and the trial 

court did not abuse its discretion by admitting Taber’s statement. 

[29] Affirmed. 

[30] Baker, J. and Brown, J. concur