### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-04-00707- CR

The St at e of Te xa s, App e lla nt

v. Ginger Dee Anna Fisher, Appellee

F ROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 1 OF HAY S COUNTY NO. 74364 , HO NORAB LE HO WARD WARNER, JUDGE PRESI DING

O P I N I O N
The State a

ppeals a n order by the county court at law purporting to acquit appellee G i n g e r D e e A n n a

F i s h e r o f d r i v i n g w h i l e i n t o x i c a t e d an d d i s m i s s i n g t h e c a

u s e w i t h p r e

j u d i c e . In its br ie f, the Sta te fr a me s th e iss ue a s f oll ow s:
Whether the trial court, when it had no authority to be the fa ct finder

since the State would not consent to waiving a jury trial, abused i t s d i s cr et i on and er red by insisti ng that it would be the fa ct finder in the ca se, for cing the State to a trial be fore the cour t, as well as, makinga finding of not guilty afte r the State re fused to put on evidenc e.
Fisher responds by

arguing that the State has no rig ht of appea l a nd that double jeopar dy

bars a retria l in any event. We conc lude that jeopar dy did not attach, t he purpor ted ac quittal was a nullity , and the tr ia l c ourt ’s jud g me nt is in e sse nc e a n or de r of dis mis sa l that is a pp e a la ble by the Sta te . We wi ll
re ve rs e that or de r a

nd re mand fo r f ur the r p ro c e e din g s.The clerk’s recor d contains a written waiver of jury trial dated N ovember

1, 2004, signe d by 1 Fisher and her attorney and by the trial cour

t, but not by

counsel for

the State. 2 A trial bef

ore the court on a

n information ac cusing Fi s h er o f first off ense dr iving while intox icated was set for November 1, 2004. On t hat day , the arresting office r fa iled to appea r even thoug h he had be en subpoena ed. The S tate filed a mot ion for c ontinuance w hich was de nied. The State then a

nnounced that it did not consent to a jury waiver and aske d that the ca

use be r eset for a jury trial. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 1.13(a) (West 2005) (State must consent to jury waiver ). Def

ense c ounsel objecte d that this was mere ly a subterf ug e to obtain a c ontinuance. T he 1

c ourt re fu se d th e Sta te ’s “ or a l mo tio n f or a jur y tr ia l se tting” and a sk e d if the Sta te wa s r e a dy

to proce ed. The State announce d that it was not ready . Def ense c ounsel announc ed re ady and aske d that the inf or ma tio n b e re a d. On

the c ourt ’s ins tr

uc tio n, the pr os e c uto r r e a d th e inf or ma tio n, to wh ic h Fi sh e r en te re d a ple a of no t g uil ty . F ish e r t

he n c a lle d O ff

ic e r E d St a

pp , th e c ourt ’s ba ili ff

, to t es t i fy
. De fe n s e c o u n s el as k edo n e qu es t i o n , “O ff i ce r S t ap p , d o y o uh av e a n y p er s o n al kn o wl ed ge of the fa cts or cir cumstance s of this case?” He answe red, “ No, sir.” Wit h that, both sides rested a nd the cour t announce d that it found Fisher not guilty . The c ourt subsequently signe d and ente red a written “judg ment and dismissal” rec iting that F isher w as found not g uilty by the cour t and dismiss ing the cause with prejudice
.

The State i s en t i tled to appea l an orde r dismissing an indictment, information, or complaint. Tex. Code Crim. P roc. A nn. art. 44.01(a )(1) (West Supp. 2005). Under this statute, the State has the a

uthority to appea l from any trial court order concer ning a n indictment or information (and the co u rt o f appeals has jurisdiction to address the me rits of the appe al) whe never the orde rI n fede ral prose cution s without a jury , jeopar dy attache s when the tria l court beg ins to hear 2 evidenc e. Serfass v. United States , 420 U.S. 377, 388 (1975). The Supreme Court has not he ld that this rule must be applied by the states under

the Fif th Amendment. Bu t c

f. C ris t v . B re tz , 4 37 U. S. 28, 38 (1978) (applying to the states fede ral rule that jeopar dy attache s when jury

is empanele d and sworn). 3 eff ectively terminates the pr osecution in favor of the defe ndant. State v. More no , 807 S.W .2d 327, 332 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). The right to appea l does not exis t, howeve r, where double je opardy prohibits further pr osecution. Id . at 332 n.6. Thus, to decide whether this appeal is prope rly

befor e
us , w e mus t de c ide wh e the r f ur the r p ro se c uti on

of F ish e r is ba

rr e d re g a rd le ss of a ny

ir re g ula ri ty in the proc eeding s below.

Both the United States and Texas c onstitut ions pr ovide that no person may be twice pu t in je op a rd

y fo r the sa

me of fe ns e . U .S. Con st. a me nd s. V, XIV; Te x. Con st. a rt . I , § 10 . O ur state constitution further provide s that no person may be put to trial for the same off ense a fter a

verdic t of not g uilty

in a cour t of compet en t j u ri s d i ction. Tex. Cons t. art. I , § 10. Finally , the code of
c ri min a l pro c e dure pr ov ide s tha t an ac qu itt a l of the de fe nd a nt pr oh ibi ts a se c on d tri a l for the same offe nse howe ver irr eg ular the pr ocee dings ma y h av e b ee n . Tex. Code Crim. P roc. A nn. art. 1.11 (West 2005). B e fo re a

de fe nd a nt c a n b e pl aced in d ou ble je op a rd

y , h e mus t ha

ve be e n p ut i n jeopar dy befor e, that is, jeopar dy

must have attac hed at an earlier proce eding
. I n Texas, “jeopar dy attache s [at a bench tria l] when both side s have announce d rea dy and the defe ndant has pled to the char g ing instrument.” State v. Torres , 805 S.W .2d 418, 421 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). I n Ex pa rte 2 George , afte r the State ref used to consent to a jur

y waiver , the trial cour

t pronounce d the State re ady f o r tr ia l o v e r

it s o b je c tion a n d

to o k th e d e f e n d a n t’ s n o t gu il ty

p le a . 8 7 4 S. W. 2 d

9 1 6 , 9 1 7 ( T e x.Calling the bailiff to te stify did not put Fisher to trial bef ore the trier of

the fa cts, se e Se rfa ss , 3 420 U.S. at 391, beca

use the trial c ourt was not leg ally authorized to act a s tri er o f fac ts. See E x parte George , 913 S.W .2d 523, 527 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). 4 App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994), rev’d , 913 S.W .2d 523, 527 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). After the State prese nted no evidenc e, the c ourt found the d ef endant not guilty

and re ndere d a judg ment of acquittal. George , 874 S.W .2d at 917. The S tate refiled the case under a new cause numbe r and the defe ndant soug ht pretrial ha beas c orpus re lief on double jeopa rdy and prior acquittal grounds. Id
. Disag ree ing w ith the court of a ppeals, the c ourt of cr iminal appeals he ld that jeopardy did not attach at the orig inal proce eding “since no jury was ever empane led or sworn, no e vidence was off ere d or
rec eived, a

nd no plea wa s entere d by

[t he def endant] after

the announc ement of rea dy by both sides.” George , 913 S.W .2d at 525. For the same r easons, jeopa rdy did not attach at the pr ocee ding be low in t he c a us e no w b e fo re us . 3 Thus, as in George , the question bec omes whethe r F isher was acquitted or found not g uilty within the meaning of ar

ticle 1.11 and the second clause of article I , section 10. An a cquittal
me a ns a fi nd ingof

fa c t th a t th e a c c us e d is no t g uil ty of the c ri min a l of

fe ns e wi th w hic h s he is
c ha rg e d “ ma de in the c on te xt o f a n a dv e rs a ry pr oc e e din g , by a n ind ivi du a l or g ro up of ind ivi du a ls with the leg al authority t o d ecide the question of g uilt or innocence .” Id . at 527. “[I ]t is not the decision of a

person without lawf

ul authority

to decide.” Id
. A trial cour

t “doe s not have the disc retion to serve as a f act- finder in the tr ial of a mis de me a no r c a se a

bs e nt the c on se nt a nd a

pp ro va l of the State a s pr e sc ri be d by Ar t. 1 .1 3( a ) .
. . to the ac cused’ s waiver

of jury trial.” Sta te e

xre l. C urry v . Ca rr , 8 47 S .W .2 d 5 61 , 5 62 (T e x. Cr im. App. 1993) (c onditionally g ranting writ of mandamus directing trial court to se t a side order denying5

Sta te ’s re qu e st f

or jur y tr ia l in mis de me a no r c a se ). B e c a us e the re c or d c le a rl y

sh ow s th a t th e State did not consent to the jury waiver , the court below “wa s not a uthorized to pass upo n ” F i sher’ s culpability

and its not guilty

finding “has no more leg al ef fec t than such a fi n d i n g b y any other unauthorized p e r s o n o r e n ti ty w o u ld h a v e . I n s h o rt, it d o e s n o t a mo u n t to a n a c qu itta l w it h in the meaning of our law .” George , 913 S.W .2d at 527.

Fisher argues t hat t he S tate shoul d be bound by the findi ng of not g uilty beca use she would be bound by

a finding of g uilty

under the se circ umstances. In Ex parte Collier , the opinion cited by Fisher , it was held that a de fenda nt could not collatera lly

attack his c onviction on the g round that th e Sta te ha d n ot s ig ne d th e jur y wa ive r. 61 4 S.W.2 d 429 , 4 34 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 81 ). B ut i n that case , the record showed that both the defe ndant and the State a g ree d to the jury waiver , and the only proce dural flaw was the l ack of the prose cutor’s sig nature on the waive r for m. Id . The re cord

n o w b ef o re u s , o n t h e o t h er

h an d , s h o ws t h at t h e S t at e di d n o tagr ee t o t h e j u ry wa i v er . Al t h o u gh
we need not de cide the question, the logic of the George opinion sugg ests that a finding of g uilty by the court under the circ umstances prese nted here would have no le g al ef fec t. See also Ge orge , 913 S.W .2d at 527 n.*.

I t is re a so na

bly c le a r f ro m th e re c or d th a t th e State did no t tr uly wa nt t o tr y thi s c a se be fo re a jur

y , a nd that it inv ok e d a rt ic le 1. 13 (a ) sim ply to o bta in t

he c on tin ua nc e that th e tr ia l c ourt , in its discretion, would not g rant. Thus, we are not unsy mpathetic to the trial court’ s consternation
a t th e Sta te ’s c on du c t. We a re a lso con cern e d th at a llo wi ngthe Sta te to u se art ic le 1. 13 (a ) i n th is
manner invites abuse. Neve rtheless, unde r George , the trial cour t was not leg ally

authorized to try F ish e r a nd fi nd he r n ot guil ty

un de r t he se c ir c ums tanc e s.6 Be cause F is h e r “ w a s n e it h e r p u t in je o p a r dy f

o r n o r e v e r a c tu a ll y a c qu itte d of the char g ed off

ense,” George , 91 3 S.W. 2d a t 52 7, the tr ia l c ourt ’s wr itt e n “ jud g me nt a nd

dis mis sa l” is
no mor e tha

n a n o rd e r t e rm inatin g the pr os e c uti on in F is her’ s favo r. As su c h, it i s an a pp e a la ble order under a rticle 44.01(a )(1)
. State v. Lewallen , 9 27 S.W. 2d 73 7, 73 9 ( Te x. Ap p. —Fort W or th 1996, no pet.). A trial cour t does not have g ener al authority to dismi ss a

c a s e w it h o ut the prosec utor’s consent. State v. Johnson , 8 21 S.W. 2d 60 9, 61 3 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 91 ); State v. Gray , 801 S.W .2d 10 , 1 1 ( Te x. Ap p. —A us tin 19 90 , n o p e t.) . T he tr ia l c ourt wa s no t aut ho ri zed

to d ism iss thi s prosec ut i o n wi t h o u t the State’s conse nt simpl y beca use the State re fused to conse nt to the jury waiver
. State v. Allen , 953 S.W .2d 769, 771 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1997, no pet.).

The trial c ourt’s “judg ment and dismissal” is reve rsed a nd the ca use is r emande d for fu rt he r p ro c e e din g s.

_________________ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___________________ David Pury ear , J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces Patter son and Pury ear Reverse d and Remande d Filed: May

26, 2006 Pub lis h