NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT WILLIAM PHILIPS, individually and on behalf of all others sim ilarly situated; et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY,

Defendant-Appellee. No. 17-15323 D.C. No. 5:14-cv-02989-LHK
MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Lucy H. Koh, District Judge, Presiding Subm itted May 18, 2018 * * San Francisco, California Before: N.R. SMITH and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges, and LYNN, * * * Chief District Judge. 

# FILED
JUN 08 2018 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

* * The panel unanim ously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argum e nt. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

* * * The Honorable Barbara M. G. Lynn, Chief United States District Judge for the Northern District of Texas, sitting by designation.WilliamPhilips, Jaim e Goodm an, and Alison Colburn (collectively

“Appellants”) appeal the dism issal of their California state law claim s, the exclusion of their expert witness econom ist, and the denial of class certification. We affirm
. 1. Appellants abandoned their individual claim s on appeal. Appellants’ opening brief never asserts error in the district court’s adverse sum m ary judgm ent ruling on Appellants’ individual claim s. Indeed, Appellants failed even to ask for reversal of the sum m ary judgm ent ruling, waiving any claim of error and m ooting the rem aining claim s. See United States v. Kama , 394 F.3d 1236, 1238 (9th Cir. 2005). 2. Perm issible exclusion of Appellants’ econom ic expert. Even assum ing Appellants’ briefing on the exclusion of their econom ic expert, Dr. Arnold, could be understood as im plicitly challenging the sum m ary judgm ent ruling on their individual claim s, the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Dr. Arnold’s testim ony and report. To be adm issible, an expert’s testim ony m ust be “based on sufficient facts or data,” be “the product of reliable principles and
m ethods,” and “reliably appl[y] the relevant principles and m ethods to the facts of the case.” City of Pomona v. SQM N. Am. Corp. , 750 F.3d 1036, 1043 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Fed. R. Evid. 702). Dr. Arnold’s analysis did not apply the expected
2utility theory outlined in his report. Accordingly, the district court perm issibly

excluded Dr. Arnold’s testim ony, because the m ethodology he did apply (in reaching his conclusion) was not dem onstrably reliable under any of the relevant criteria: “testability, publication in peer-reviewed literature, known or potential error rate, and general acceptance.” City of Pomona , 750 F.3d at 1044. Accordingly, Appellants’ argum ents with respect to class certification are m oot, because the proper dism issal of their individual claim s leaves them without a stake in the outcom e of the proceedings. See, e.g. , Campion v. Old Republic Prot. Co. , 775 F.3d 1144, 1146 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that putative class representatives lack of “financial interest in class certification” m oots an appeal of the certification issue). 3. Denial of m otion to file supplem e ntal dam ages report. Even assum ing the district court abused its discretion in denying leave to file a renewed class certification m otion with a new dam ages analysis, Appellants waived any basis to challenge this decision when they declined the opportunity to subm it a new dam ages analysis on the individual claim s. Instead, Appellants rested on Dr. Arnold’s original report, accepted an adverse judgm ent on their individual claim s, and appealed. Because Dr. Arnold’s report was properly excluded, Appellants

3cannot succeed in overturning sum m ary judgm ent on their individual claim s, thus

m ooting any issues relating to class certification. Campion , 775 F.3d at 1146. 4. Dism issal of the injunctive relief claim s was proper. The equitable
rem edies available under the Unfair Com petition Law (UCL) and the Consum er Legal Rem edies Act are “subject to fundam ental equitable principles, including inadequacy of the legal rem edy.” Prudential Home Mortg. Co. v. Superior Court , 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 566, 573 (Ct. App.), as modified on denial of reh’g (Oct. 29, 1998) (deem ing alternative “statutory rem edies . . . adequate” and “precluding equitable relief under the Business and Professions Code”); cf. Cortez v. Purolator Air Filtration Prods. Co. , 999 P.2d 706, 717 (Cal. 2000) (“[E] quitable defenses
m ay be considered by the court when the court exercises its discretion over which, if any , rem edies authorized by [the UCL] should be awarded.” (em phasis added)). Accordingly, the district court correctly determ ined that Appellants were required to plead the inadequacy of their legal rem edies to state a claim for injunctive relief. Appellants do not challenge the district court’s holding that their com plaint failed to plausibly state the inadequacy of their legal rem edies, so they have waived any argum ent that they alleged sufficient facts to plausibly establish the inadequacy of their legal rem edies. See Kama , 394 F.3d at 1238. AFFIRMED.
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