alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**Exhibit 32.1**
**CERTIFICATION**
     The undersigned officer of DATATRAK International, Inc. (the “Company”),does hereby certify, to such officer’s knowledge, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,that:
1. the Company’s Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarterended March 31, 2004 (the “Form 10-Q”) fully complies with therequirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities ExchangeAct of 1934, as amended; and 2. the information contained in the Form 10-Q fairly presents,in all material respects, the financial condition and results ofoperations of the Company as of, and for, the periods presented inthe Form 10-Q.        Dated: May 13, 2004 /s/ Jeffrey A. Green     Jeffrey A. Green   Chief Executive Officer
#### Makisa Denise MARTIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Tonya HAIRSTON, Deputy; Captain Spence; Deputy McFarlin; Deputy Smith, a/k/a Skipper, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 07-7436.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: Jan. 11, 2008.

Decided: Jan. 24, 2008.

Makisa Denise Martin, Appellant Rro Se.

Before KING, GREGORY, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Makisa Denise Martin appeals the district court’s order dismissing her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) complaint without prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. *See Martin v. Hairston,*No. 7:07-cv-00413-JLK, 2007 WL 2781713 (W.D.Va. Sept. 21, 2007). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*
EXHIBIT
32.A







CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO
 18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
 AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906
 OF
THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
   In connection with
the Annual Report on Form 10-K for the period ending December 31, 2008, of
Colorado Interstate Gas Company (the “Company”) as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I,
James J. Cleary, President, certify (i) that the Report fully complies
with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, as amended, and (ii) that the information contained in the Report
fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results
of operations of the Company.
   /s/
      James J. ClearyJames J.
      ClearyPresident(Principal
      Executive Officer)Colorado
      Interstate Gas CompanyMarch 2,
      2009
         A signed original
of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to Colorado
Interstate Gas Company and will be retained by Colorado Interstate Gas Company
and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon
request.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
 
<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1997
<CASH>                                          98,202
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    1,243
<ALLOWANCES>                                        37
<INVENTORY>                                        194
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               105,666
<PP&E>                                          39,292
<DEPRECIATION>                                   3,634
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 167,125
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           15,901
<BONDS>                                          7,509
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                            1,377
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                      96,862
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   167,125
<SALES>                                         26,984
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                32,466
<CGS>                                           21,377
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   23,114
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                11,656
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 207
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  4,618
<INCOME-TAX>                                     1,312
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              4,618
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     3,306
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.26
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.26
        

</TABLE>
Court of Appeals

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA,____________________

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:

A14A2186. LINDA BULLOCK v. HOMEQ SERVICING CORPORATION

f/k/a TMS MORTGAGE, INC. d/b/a THE MONEY STORE, et al.

After HOMEQ Servicing Corporation sought to foreclose four properties

owned by Linda and James Bullock, the parties entered a Settlement Agreement in

2006, wherein the Bullocks agreed to make monthly payments of $2,462.77 into the

registry of the trial court until the loans were paid in full or reinstated. HOMEQ filed

a motion to draw down funds, after the Bullocks failed to continue to make monthly

payments. The trial court granted the motion, and Linda Bullock, appearing pro se,

filed this direct appeal. We lack jurisdiction.

The record before us contains no final order disposing of this case in superior

court. Because the case remains pending below, the trial court’s order granting the

motion to draw down funds is interlocutory. See Grange Mut. Cas. Co. v. Riverdale

Apartments, 218 Ga. App. 685, 686 (463 SE2d 46) (1995). Therefore, Linda Bullock

was required to follow the interlocutory application procedures set forth in OCGA §

5-6-34 (b), which include obtaining a certificate of immediate review from the trial

court. Her failure to do so deprives us of jurisdiction over this appeal, which is

hereby DISMISSED. See id.

Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk’s Office, Atlanta,____________________

I certify that the above is a true extract from

the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court

hereto affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

12/22/2014

December 22, 2014
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>     5
<LEGEND>      THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL
              INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE REGISTRANT'S
              FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR ITS THIRD QUARTER OF
              FISCAL YEAR 1996 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS
              ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL
              STATEMENTS
       
<CAPTION>
<S>                           <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                 9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                       Dec-31-1996
<PERIOD-END>                            Sep-30-1996
<CASH>                                       88,728
<SECURITIES>                                      0
<RECEIVABLES>                                71,967
<ALLOWANCES>                                      0
<INVENTORY>                                  16,382
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            181,398
<PP&E>                                       18,425
<DEPRECIATION>                                    0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              215,003
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        75,027
<BONDS>                                           0
<COMMON>                                        148
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                             0
<PREFERRED>                                       0
<OTHER-SE>                                   98,069
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                215,003
<SALES>                                      96,581
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            225,845
<CGS>                                        52,070
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               147,694
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             67,417
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                  0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              178
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              10,556
<INCOME-TAX>                                  1,100
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                               0
<DISCONTINUED>                                    0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                   0
<CHANGES>                                         0
<NET-INCOME>                                  9,456
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                  0.65
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  0.65
        


</TABLE>
1

The Honorable Catherine D. Perry, United States District Judge for the Eastern

District of Missouri.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 02-4065

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the Eastern

* District of Missouri.

Earl Smith, *

* [UNPUBLISHED]

Appellant. *

___________

 Submitted: June 25, 2003 

 Filed: July 9, 2003

___________

Before MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, BYE, and RILEY, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Earl Smith (Smith) pled guilty to possessing with intent to distribute over 50

grams of a mixture containing a detectable amount of cocaine base (crack), in

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The district court1

 applied a two-level

enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) for possession of a firearm, and sentenced

Smith to 120 months imprisonment and 5 years supervised release. On appeal, Smith

argues that the district court clearly erred in applying the enhancement because the

government did not show that he possessed the firearm or that it was connected with
-2-

the offense. Smith’s live-in girlfriend testified at the sentencing hearing she owned

the gun for protection, she had not seen Smith with the weapon, and she did not know

Smith was dealing drugs. We affirm.

The district court did not clearly err in applying the enhancement. Smith had

constructive possession over the loaded firearm, as it was found in the apartment

where he resided with his girlfriend. Further, the gun was found in the same room as

a large amount of cash, drug paraphernalia was found in the kitchen, and, at the time

of the search, Smith was attempting to flush drugs down the toilet. See United States

v. Braggs, 317 F.3d 901, 904 (8th Cir. 2003) (standard of review); United States v.

Betz, 82 F.3d 205, 210-11 (8th Cir. 1996) (upholding enhancement where loaded

firearms and drugs were found in different places on defendant’s property); United

States v. Payne, 81 F.3d 759, 762 (8th Cir. 1996) (“either actual or constructive

possession is sufficient, i.e., the individual must have exercised ownership, dominion,

or control either over the firearm or the premises on which it is found”) (internal

quotation and citation omitted). The district court discredited Smith’s girlfriend’s

testimony regarding the weapon, which is virtually unreviewable on appeal. See

United States v. Gutierrez-Manzanarez, 323 F.3d 613, 615 (8th Cir. 2003). 

Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed. 

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                                           7


<MULTIPLIER>                                    1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                         DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-END>                              SEP-30-2000
<DEBT-HELD-FOR-SALE>                           68,907
<DEBT-CARRYING-VALUE>                               0
<DEBT-MARKET-VALUE>                                 0
<EQUITIES>                                     24,784
<MORTGAGE>                                        156
<REAL-ESTATE>                                   3,551
<TOTAL-INVEST>                                102,211
<CASH>                                         17,954
<RECOVER-REINSURE>                                  0
<DEFERRED-ACQUISITION>                          5,680
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                140,370
<POLICY-LOSSES>                                83,823
<UNEARNED-PREMIUMS>                               175
<POLICY-OTHER>                                  1,480
<POLICY-HOLDER-FUNDS>                          16,581
<NOTES-PAYABLE>                                 8,125
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                               0
<PREFERRED>                                         0
<COMMON>                                        1,761
<OTHER-SE>                                     25,897
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                  140,370
<PREMIUMS>                                     17,420
<INVESTMENT-INCOME>                             4,561
<INVESTMENT-GAINS>                              4,661
<OTHER-INCOME>                                    181
<BENEFITS>                                     14,196
<UNDERWRITING-AMORTIZATION>                       405
<UNDERWRITING-OTHER>                            8,380
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 3,825
<INCOME-TAX>                                    1,272
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             2,553
<DISCONTINUED>                                      0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                     0
<CHANGES>                                           0
<NET-INCOME>                                    2,553
<EPS-BASIC>                                      1.45
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    1.45
<RESERVE-OPEN>                                      0
<PROVISION-CURRENT>                                 0
<PROVISION-PRIOR>                                   0
<PAYMENTS-CURRENT>                                  0
<PAYMENTS-PRIOR>                                    0
<RESERVE-CLOSE>                                     0
<CUMULATIVE-DEFICIENCY>                             0



</TABLE>
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA No. DA 22 - 0242 STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee, v. ZECHARIAH JUSTIN DANIEL SMITH,

Defendant and Appellant.

**ORDER** Pursuant to authority granted under Mont. R. App. P. 26(1), the Appellant is given an extension of time until May 6 , 202 4, to prepare, file, and serve the Appellant’s reply brief. No further extensions will be granted.

Electronically signed by: Mike McGrath Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

April 3 2024

04/03/2024
CIRCUIT COURT OF FAUQUIER COUNTY

#### Richard Thacher and Norma Thatcher v. Michael H. Greene et al.

June 22, 2001

Case No. (Chancery) CH00-298

By Judge Jeffrey W. Parker

The Court heard argument on four separate motions in regard to the above styled case on June 20,2001. The Court ruled from the bench that the Motion for an Injunction filed by the complainant was denied and that the Demurrer filed by the complainant against the defendant’s Cross-bill was sustained with prejudice. The Court took the Plea in Bar and the Demurrer and the Motion to Transfer to the Law Side of the Court and to strike *lis pendens*filed by the defendants under advisement. The Court wished to review in detail the prior rulings of the Court prior to ruling on these matters.

The Court is now in a position to rule. The defendant alleges that the cause of action is barred by the Statute of Fraud, § 11-2(6), (8).

Section 11-2(6) requires that any contract for the sale of real estate must be in writing. Clearly, there is a detailed written contract between Michael H. Greene and Richard and Norma Thatcher, which was attached to the original Bill of Complaint. Defendant alleges that Mrs. Greene’s name does not appear on the contract and that the Statute of Frauds prohibits an action to enforce the sale of this property which is owned as tenants by the entirety between husband and wife. The complainant alleges agency in its Bill of Complaint. There is apparently no written agency agreement, but the complainant indicates that agency can be established through evidence.

*16A contract between principal and agent for the sale or purchase of real property need not be in writing. See *Morris v. Mosby,*227 Va. 517, 522 (1984). Due to the fact that this is an evidentiary issue, using the Plea in Bar § 11-2(6) as a basis for barring the action of the plaintiff is denied.

Section 11-2(8) states that a written contract not to be performed within one year must be in writing. There is no indication in the plaintiff s pleading nor in the contract which was appended to the complaint that the contract was not to be performed within one year, and this Plea is also denied.

The defendant, in her Motion to Transfer to the Law Side of the Court and to strike *lis pendens,*asserts that specific performance is not available in a construction contract. The complainant alleges that the property is “90%” completed. During argument on June 20, 2001, Mr. MacMahon proffered in response to Mr. O’Connell’s question that the defendants had moved into the property. Apparently, the property, if not completely finished, is habitable.

Further, Judge Hoss dealt with this issue on Demurrer and previously stated that this matter could go forward despite the question of specific performance on partially completed property. Therefore, the Court denies the Demurrer and the Motion to Transfer to the Law Side of the Court and to strike the *lis pendens.*
Exhibit 35.1

SERVICING COMPLIANCE STATEMENT

In connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K of Santander Drive Auto Receivables Trust 2013-3 for the fiscal year ending
December 31, 2013 (the Report), the undersigned, a duly authorized officer of Santander Consumer USA Inc. (the Servicer), does hereby certify and represent that:



| | 1. | A review of the activities and performance of the Servicer under the Sale and Servicing Agreement, dated as of May 15, 2013, among Santander Drive Auto Receivables LLC, Santander Consumer USA Inc., Santander Drive
Auto Receivables Trust 2013-3 and Wells Fargo Bank, National Association (the Agreement) during the period that is the subject of the Report has been made under my supervision.
| | -- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2. | To the best of my knowledge, based on such review, the Servicer has fulfilled all of its obligations under the Agreement in all material respects throughout the period that is the subject of the Report.
| | -- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



SANTANDER CONSUMER USA INC.By:

/s/ Jason KulasName:

Jason KulasTitle:

President and Chief Financial OfficerDate:

March 28, 2014By:

/s/ Jennifer M. PoppName:

Jennifer M. PoppTitle:

Chief Accounting OfficerDate:

March 28, 2014
### Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan

Marilyn Kelly,
Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanag h

Elizabeth A. Weave r

Maura D. Corriga n Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markma n Diane M. Hathaway,

J ustices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

_______________________________________ __ Clerk September 11, 2009

p0831 

# Order

September 11, 2009

138655

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 138655 COA: 283610 Wayne CC: 07-014289-FC LEROY O’NEIL HOPKINS, a/k/a ERIC MOSLEY, Defendant-Appellant.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the application fo r leave to appeal th e February 26, 2009 judgment of the Court of Appeals is consid ered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.
<PAGE>

                                                  EXHIBIT 99(ii)

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECITON 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

     In connection with the Annual Report of Dialysis Corporation of America
(the "Company") on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2002 as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date therein specified
(the "Report"), I, Timothy Rumrill, Principal Financial Officer of the Company,
certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:

     (1)     The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)     The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.

                              /s/ Timothy Rumrill
                              ---------------------------------------------
                              TIMOTHY RUMRILL, Principal Financial Officer

Dated:  February  27,  2003






<PAGE>
#### Hayes *v.*Bickelhoupt, Sr.

*(Circuit Court, S. D. New York.*

August 25, 1884.)

Patents for Inventions—Novelty—Patent No. 170,852.

The first and fifth claims of patent No. 170,852, granted December 7, 1875, to George Hayes, for an improvement in ventilating louvers, *held*void for want of novelty.

In Equity.

*J. H. Whitelegge,*for orator.

*Arthur v. Briesen,*for defendant.

Wheeler, J.

This suit is brought upon letters patent No. 170,852, dated December 7, 1875, and issued to the orator for an improvement in ventilating louvers. There are five claims, the first and fifth of which are alleged to be infringed. A louver appears to be an opening in buildings crossed by a series of slanting slats to exclude rain and snow, and admit air, The patent describes a louver with *567an outer reticulated covering and curved slats, called gutters, within, having flanges at the upper edges extending upwards, and at the lower edges extending downwards, both serving to stiffen the gutters, and the lower one for an attachment for the reticulated covering. The first claim is for the combination of the covering with the gutters, and the fifth is for the gutters themselves. These gutters are shown as slanting, and operating to shed rain or snow in the same manner as the slanting slats. The reticulated covering operates as a screen, precisely as it would if there were Ho slats. Neither operates any differently, or accomplishes any result in connection with the other different from what it would if the other was not there. They appear to form a mere aggregation, and not a patentable combination. *Pickering*v. *McCullough,*104 U. S. 310; *Double-pointed Tack Co.*v. *Two Rivers Manuf’g Co.*109 U. S. 117; S. C. 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 105. Further, slanting slats performing the same office as these were a part of common knowledge,—their existence is assumed in the patent as a known part of a louver, on which the invention was set up as an improvement. A screen like the reticulated covering was also well known. There would not appear to be any patentable invention in putting the two to uses together for which each was before well known separately.

The flanges to the gutters for stiffening them were merely such additions as would be supplied by good workmanship when needed. They were not new for that purpose. And the use of the flange shape for attaching the reticulated covering would appear to be very obvious. These claims appear to be without sufficient invention to uphold them.

Let there be a decree dismissing the bill of complaint, with costs.