19-4123

Chen v. Garland

BIA

Nelson, IJ

A208 192 420

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION 

TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED 

AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS 

COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT 

FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX 

OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A 

PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY 

NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 

2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United 

3 States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, 

on the 11th 4 day of January, two thousand twenty-two.

5

6 PRESENT:

7 GUIDO CALABRESI,

8 JOSÉ A. CABRANES,

9 RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,

10 Circuit Judges.

11 _____________________________________

12

13 QI LIANG CHEN,

14 Petitioner,

15

16 v. 19-4123

17 NAC

18 MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED 

19 STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,

20 Respondent.

21 _____________________________________

22

23 FOR PETITIONER: Dehai Zhang, Esq., Flushing, NY.

24

25 FOR RESPONDENT: Ethan P. Davis, Acting Assistant

26 Attorney General; John S. Hogan, 

27 Assistant Director; Todd J. 

28 Cochran, Trial Attorney, Office of 
2

1 Immigration Litigation, United 

2 States Department of Justice, 

3 Washington, DC.

4 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 

5 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 

6 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review 

7 is DENIED.

8 Petitioner Qi Liang Chen, a native and citizen of the 

9 People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a November 14, 

10 2019, decision of the BIA affirming a March 5, 2018, decision 

11 of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying asylum, withholding of 

12 removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture 

13 (“CAT”). In re Qi Liang Chen, No. A 208 192 420 (B.I.A. Nov. 

14 14, 2019), aff’g No. A 208 192 420 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Mar. 

15 5, 2018). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the 

16 underlying facts and procedural history.

17 We have reviewed both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions 

18 “for the sake of completeness.” Wangchuck v. Dep’t of 

19 Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). The 

20 applicable standards of review are well established. See

21 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 

22 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018) (reviewing adverse credibility 

23 determinations for substantial evidence); Paloka v. Holder, 

24 762 F.3d 191, 195 (2d Cir. 2014) (reviewing factual findings 
3

1 for substantial evidence and questions of law de novo). In 

2 determining whether an asylum applicant has met his burden, 

3 the agency “weigh[s] the credible testimony along with other 

4 evidence of record.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii). The 

5 agency did not err in concluding that Chen failed to meet his 

6 burden of proof. 

7 The agency reasonably concluded that Chen was not 

8 credible. “Considering the totality of the circumstances, 

9 and all relevant factors, a trier of fact may base a 

10 credibility determination on . . . the consistency between 

11 the applicant’s . . . written and oral statements . . . and 

12 any inaccuracies or falsehoods in such statements[.]” 

13 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). “We defer . . . to an IJ’s 

14 credibility determination unless, from the totality of the 

15 circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder 

16 could make such an adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin 

17 v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2008); accord Hong Fei 

18 Gao, 891 F.3d at 76. An IJ may, “either expressly or 

19 impliedly,” discredit an applicant’s testimony and evidence 

20 under the “maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus [false in 

21 one thing, false in everything].” Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 

22 F.3d 160, 170–71 (2d Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks 
4

1 omitted, brackets in original). The IJ appropriately did so 

2 here because Chen admitted that the detailed testimony of 

3 past persecution that he gave under oath at his credible fear 

4 interview was not true. The IJ was not required to credit 

5 Chen’s recantation of these statements or his explanation 

6 that a snakehead told him to lie and he later recanted because 

7 he was no longer allowed to lie after being baptized. See 

8 Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A 

9 petitioner must do more than offer a plausible explanation 

10 for his inconsistent statements to secure relief; he must 

11 demonstrate that a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled

12 to credit his testimony.” (internal quotations omitted)).

13 Chen did not otherwise meet his burden of proof. He did 

14 not allege past persecution before the IJ, so he had the 

15 burden to establish a well-founded fear of future persecution

16 by showing he would be “singled out individually for 

17 persecution” based on his practice of Christianity or that 

18 there was a “pattern or practice” of persecution of Christians 

19 in China. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2); Jian Liang v. Garland, 

20 10 F.4th 106, 117 (2d Cir. 2021). The agency did not err in 

21 concluding that Chen did not establish a well-founded fear of 

22 persecution under either theory.
5

1 Chen did not establish that he would be singled out for 

2 persecution because he did not document the alleged events in 

3 China or show that Chinese authorities were aware of his 

4 practice of Christianity in the United States. See Hongsheng 

5 Leng v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 135, 137 (2d Cir. 2008) (“in order 

6 to establish eligibility for relief based exclusively on 

7 activities undertaken after . . . arrival in the United 

8 States, an alien must make some showing that authorities in 

9 his country of nationality are (1) aware of his activities or 

10 (2) likely to become aware of his activities”); see also Jian

11 Liang, 10 F.4th at 117.

12 Even assuming Chen would continue to practice 

13 Christianity at an unregistered church in China, the agency 

14 reasonably concluded that he did not establish a well-founded 

15 fear of persecution based on a pattern or practice of 

16 persecution of Christians because the record reflected varied

17 treatment of Christians throughout China and because his 

18 grandmother continued to practice Christianity unharmed. See 

19 Jian Liang, 10 F.4th at 117 (holding that petitioner failed 

20 to meet burden where State Department reports established

21 that “treatment of Christians in China varies by locality” 

22 and petitioner’s evidence did not show persecution occurring 
6

1 in his home province); Melgar de Torres v. Reno, 191 F.3d 

2 307, 313 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding asylum applicant’s fear of 

3 persecution not well-founded in part because her mother and 

4 daughters continued to live unharmed in applicant’s native 

5 country).

6 Given Chen’s admission that he lied under oath to 

7 fabricate a past persecution claim and the lack of evidence 

8 to support a pattern-or-practice claim, the agency did not 

9 err in concluding that he failed to meet his burden of proof. 

10 See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii). That determination is 

11 dispositive of Chen’s asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT 

12 protection claims because all three forms of relief were based 

13 on the same factual predicate. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 

14 F.3d 148, 156–57 (2d Cir. 2006).

15 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 

16 DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and 

17 stays VACATED.

18 FOR THE COURT: 

19 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,

20 Clerk of Court