Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 29A04-1510-MF-1779 | June 16, 2016 Page 1 of 8

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as 

precedent or cited before any court except for the 

purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

APPELLANT PRO SE

Segun Rasaki

Putnamville Correctional Facility

Greencastle, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE

Miranda D. Bray

Manley Deas Kochalski LLC

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Segun M. Rasaki,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

Union Savings Bank,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

June 16, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No.

29A04-1510-MF-1779

Appeal from the Hamilton Superior 

Court

The Hon. William J. Hughes, Judge

The Hon. William P. Greenaway, 

Magistrate

Trial Court Cause No. 29D03-1410-

MF-10300

Bradford, Judge.

Case Summary

[1] Appellant-Defendant Segun Rasaki purchased a home in Hamilton County 

(“the Property”) with a loan from Appellee-Plaintiff Union Savings Bank 

(“USB”) secured by a mortgage. When Rasaki failed to make timely payments 
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on the loan, USB filed a foreclosure action. The trial court entered summary 

judgment in favor of USB. 

[2] During the pendency of Rasaki’s appeal of the foreclosure judgment, Rasaki 

secured a temporary stay to prevent the sale of the Property (“the Stay”), which 

the trial court granted subject to monthly payments of $5000.00 to the Hamilton 

County Clerk in lieu of a bond. Rasaki filed several pleadings with the trial 

court and this court in an attempt to reduce the payments, all of which attempts 

were rejected, and none of which rejections was appealed. When Rasaki failed 

to make the second payment, USB moved to have the Stay lifted and return the 

case to the active docket, which motion the trial court granted. The Property 

was sold in a sheriff’s sale on February 25, 2015. Rasaki contends that the trial 

court abused its discretion in granting USB’s motion to lift the Stay. Because 

we disagree, we affirm. 

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Some of the background for this case may be found in this court’s disposition of 

a previous appeal by Rasaki:

[2] On August 26, 2009, to purchase a home on 10574 Iron 

Horse Lane in Carmel, Rasaki executed a promissory note and 

mortgage, granting USB a secured interest in the property. 

Rasaki lived on Iron Horse Lane with his wife Priscilla Rasaki 

(“Priscilla”) and their children. On or about April 1, 2014, 

Rasaki defaulted upon the note and mortgage by failing to make 

timely payments.
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[3] In October 2014, USB filed a complaint on promissory note 

and to foreclose mortgage against Rasaki and Priscilla. Rasaki 

filed an appearance providing his address in Putnamville 

Correctional Facility. In November 2014, Rasaki, pro se, filed a 

motion for a settlement conference and enlargement of time. The 

trial court ordered the parties to participate in a settlement 

conference and ordered USB to supply the Rasakis with a 

complete payment history, a loan payoff, and reinstatement 

figures. The trial court also granted Rasaki’s motion for 

enlargement of time and gave Rasaki up to and including 

January 20, 2015, to file an answer.

[4] At some point, Rasaki provided a power of attorney to 

Priscilla. In December 2014, USB sent the payment history and 

other documents required by the trial court’s order setting the 

settlement conference to Priscilla at Iron Horse Lane. In 

February 2015, the settlement conference was held, but no 

settlement was reached.

[5] In March 2015, USB filed a motion for summary judgment 

pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 56 with designated materials 

including the promissory note and mortgage and the affidavit of 

USB’s authorized representative, attesting to the breach of 

contract and that the balance due on the note was $795,539.32. 

Rasaki timely filed a motion for alteration of time limits of Trial 

Rule 56, but rather than asking for more time to respond to 

USB’s summary judgment motion, he asked for more time to 

respond to USB’s “complaint.” Appellant’s App. at 182. The 

trial court granted the motion and ordered him to respond to 

USB’s complaint by May 20, 2015. On May 22, 2015, Rasaki 

filed his “Reply to Complaint on Promissory Note and To 

Foreclose Mortgage,” which also included his counterclaims. Id.

at 192. His reply to complaint was unverified and did not have 

attached sworn affidavits in support of his assertions. USB 

treated his reply to complaint as a pleading, and in June 2015, 

pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 12(F), USB filed a motion to 

strike it, alleging that it was both untimely and failed to state a 

claim under Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(6).
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[6] On June 5, 2015, the trial court held a hearing on all matters. 

On June 8, 2015, Rasaki filed a judicial notice informing the trial 

court that he was revoking the power of attorney that he had 

granted to Priscilla. On June 9, 2015, the trial court issued an 

order granting USB’s summary judgment motion. In it, the trial 

court found that USB had shown that no issue of material fact 

exists and that it was entitled to judgment on all claims asserted 

against Rasaki in its complaint. The trial court ordered that the 

mortgage be foreclosed and that the property be sold and 

awarded USB a personal judgment against Rasaki for 

$795,539.32, to which the net proceeds of the sale of the property 

would be applied. Also on June 9, 2015, the trial court issued an 

order granting USB’s motion to strike Rasaki’s reply to 

complaint, but the trial court did not provide the basis for its 

ruling. Rasaki filed a notice of appeal of the trial court’s June 9, 

2015 orders.

Rasaki v. Union Sav. Bank, Cause No. 29A02-1506-MF-663 at *1-2 (Ind. Ct. 

App. Mar. 22, 2016) (footnote omitted). 

[4] On July 24, 2015, the Hamilton County Sheriff issued a Sheriff’s sale notice for 

the Property, which sale was set for September 3, 2015. On July 27, 2015, 

Rasaki moved in the trial court for a stay of all interlocutory and dispositive 

orders, including a stay on the sheriff’s sale of the Property. On August 10, 

2015, the trial court issued the Stay pending Rasaki’s appeal of the entry of 

summary judgment in favor of USB and ordered that a condition of the Stay be 

that Rasaki make monthly payments of $5000.00 to the Hamilton County 

Clerk. Rasaki made several unsuccessful attempts to have the amount of the 

payment reduced, both in this court and the trial court. Rasaki, however, 

appealed neither the order establishing the Stay nor any of the denials of his

challenges. On September 1, 2015, Rasaki made his first payment. 
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[5] On October 5, 2015, after Rasaki failed to make the October payment, USB 

moved to lift the Stay and return the case to the active docket, which motion 

the trial court granted on October 14, 2015. On October 29, 2015, Rasaki filed 

a reply/objection to USB’s motion to remove the Stay. Meanwhile, on or 

about October 23, 2015, Rasaki had filed a notice of appeal from the trial 

court’s order lifting the Stay.1 On February 25, 2016, the Property was sold at 

sheriff’s sale. On March 22, 2016, this court affirmed the trial court’s grant of 

summary judgment in favor of USB. Rasaki, Cause No. 29A02-1506-MF-663 at 

4-5. In this appeal, Rasaki challenges the trial court’s lift of the Stay. 

Discussion and Decision

Whether the Trial Court Abused its 

Discretion in Lifting the Stay

[6] When an appeal is taken from an interlocutory or final judgment 

granting, dissolving or denying an injunction, the appointment of 

a receiver or, to the extent that a stay is not otherwise permitted 

by law upon appeal, from any judgment or order for specific 

relief other than the payment of money, the court to which the 

application is made in its sound discretion may suspend, modify, 

restore, or grant the injunction, the appointment of the receiver 

or the specific relief during the pendency of the appeal upon such 

terms as to bond or otherwise as it considers proper for the 

security of the rights of the adverse party. Nothing in this rule is 

 

1

 Rasaki initially made several filings related to the appeal of the lifting of the Stay to Cause Number 29A02-

1506-MF-663, the appeal of the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to USB. Eventually, Rasaki’s appeal 

of the Stay removal was assigned this cause number. 
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intended to affect the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court 

or the Indiana Court of Appeals.

Trial R. 62(C). 

Relief under T.R. 62(C) is expressly committed to the sound 

discretion of the trial court. Dandy Co., Inc. v. Civil City, Etc., 401 

N.E.2d 1380, 1385 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980); Angleton v. Estate of 

Angleton, 671 N.E.2d 921, 929 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied.

A trial court’s decision will not be disturbed absent an abuse of 

that discretion. See Dandy, 401 N.E.2d at 1385.

Kennedy v. Jester, 700 N.E.2d 1170, 1172 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998). 

[7] Rasaki devotes most of his Brief of Appellant to arguing that, from the outset,

the terms of the Stay did not comply with relevant statutory authority. This 

particular ship has sailed, however. Although Rasaki did file challenges to the 

Stay order in this court and the trial court,2 he appealed from neither the order 

itself nor the denials of those challenges. Rasaki may not now challenge the 

provisions of the Stay on appeal, having failed to do so in a timely manner 

previously. 

[8] Rasaki also contends that he suffered from a lack of service of process in that he 

failed to receive a copy of USB’s motion to lift the Stay before it was granted by 

the trial court. Even assuming, arguendo, that Rasaki initially failed to receive a 

copy of USB’s motion to lift the Stay, it does not follow that a lack of service of 

 

2

 Rasaki may well have believed that he was “appealing” the Stay by filing challenges to it in this court, but 

the fact remains that he did not properly appeal until after the Stay was lifted. Pro se litigants such as Rasaki 

are “held to the same standards as a trained attorney and [are] afforded no inherent leniency simply by virtue 

of being self-represented.” Zavodnik v. Harper, 17 N.E.3d 259, 266 (Ind. 2014). 
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process occurred. USB’s motion to lift the Stay indicates that it was served on 

Rasaki on October 8, 2015, by United States mail, prepaid, to: “Segun Rasaki, 

AKA Segun M. Rasaki, #245770, c/o Superintendent Stan Knight, 1946 West 

U.S. Highway 40, Greencastle, IN 46135.” Rasaki does not claim that this 

address was incorrect (the service address on the motion is, in fact, the address 

that was provided by Rasaki) or that USB’s service of its motion to lift the Stay 

was otherwise deficient in any way. Trial Rule 5(B)(2) provides that service by 

mail “shall be deemed complete upon mailing.” Even if he never actually 

received a copy of USB’s motion, Rasaki has failed to establish a failure of 

service of process. 

[9] Rasaki also contends that the trial court abused its discretion in ruling on USB’s 

motion to lift the Stay before receiving a response from him. Rasaki cites to no 

authority to support this contention, and we are aware of none. The trial 

court’s order contains no provisions for a response in the event of a request by 

USB to lift the Stay and is clear that “failure to make timely and adequate 

payments as required by this order” will result in the trial court dissolving the 

Stay. Appellant’s App. p. 592. Rasaki has also failed to show that he was 

prejudiced by the trial court not waiting for his response. Because Rasaki does 

not dispute that he failed to make the ordered payments, it is unclear just what 

argument he could have made that would have made a difference if he had 

responded. Rasaki has failed to establish an abuse of discretion in this regard. 

[10] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 
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Bailey, J., and Altice, J., concur.