#### UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Jorge SALAZAR-GOMEZ, also known as Manuel Salazar-Gomez, Appellant.

No. 07-1478.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: Jan. 29, 2008.

Filed: Jan. 31, 2008.

Before WOLLMAN, RILEY, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Jorge Salazar-Gomez (Salazar-Gomez) appeals the 120-month prison sentence the district court1 imposed after Salazar-Gomez pled guilty to conspiring to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and distributing and possessing with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1). Salazar-Gomez’s counsel moved to withdraw and filed a brief under *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), arguing (1) the district court erred in sentencing Salazar-Gomez to the statutory mandatory minimum sentence because a co-defendant received a less severe sentence; (2) the requirement of a government motion for substantial *934assistance to depart below the mandatory minimum violates the separation of powers by giving too much power to the prosecution; and (3) the government’s delay in indicting Salazar-Gomez prejudiced his ability to provide substantial assistance.

These arguments are without merit. First, the district court had no discretion, without a government departure motion or Salazar-Gomez’s qualification for safety-valve relief, to sentence him below the mandatory minimum sentence. *See United States v. Gregg,*451 F.3d 930, 937 (8th Cir.2006) (rejecting an argument that the district court had discretion to determine whether the ultimate sentence is reasonable and to impose a non-Guidelines sentence when a portion of the sentence is the result of a mandatory minimum sentence; *“Booker*
      *2*
      **does not relate to statutorily-imposed sentences”); *United States v. Chacon,*330 F.3d 1065, 1066 (8th Cir.2003) (stating “the only authority for the district court to depart below the statutorily mandated minimum sentence is found in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) and (f), which apply only when the government makes a motion for substantial assistance or when the defendant qualifies under the safety valve relief’) (citing *United States v. Auginash,*266 F.3d 781, 785 (8th Cir.2001)).

Second, requiring a government motion to depart below the mandatory minimum does not violate the separation of powers doctrine. *See United States v. Holbdy,*489 F.3d 910, 914 (8th Cir.2007) (requiring a government motion before the court can deviate from a statutory mandatory minimum sentence for defendant’s substantial assistance does not violate the separation of powers doctrine, and *Booker*does not provide an avenue to reconsider such holding).

Third, Salazar-Gomez’s guilty plea forecloses his challenge to the alleged preindictment delay, *see United States v. Staples,*435 F.3d 860, 864 (8th Cir.) (holding a valid guilty plea waives nonjurisdictional defects or errors), *cert. denied,*— U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 148, 166 L.Ed.2d 108 (2006), and in any event, there has been no showing the delay caused Salazar-Gomez to lose access to any specific testimony or documents that would have aided his defense, *see United States v. Hance,*501 F.3d 900, 905-06 (8th Cir.2007) (discussing pre-indictment delay).

After reviewing the record independently under *Penson v. Ohio,*488 U.S. 75, 80, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), we find no nonfrivolous issues. We grant counsel leave to withdraw, and we affirm.

. The Honorable Laurie Smith Camp, United States District Judge for the District of Nebraska.

. *United States v. Booker,*543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005).