J-S26030-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

WILLIAM TYREE LINCOLN 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 402 MDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 21, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-41-CR-0001236-2019

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

WILLIAM TYREE LINCOLN 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 403 MDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 21, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-41-CR-0001786-2019

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

WILLIAM TYREE LINCOLN 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 404 MDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 21, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-41-CR-0001792-2019
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BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., McCAFFERY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY McCAFFERY, J.: FILED: SEPTEMBER 21, 2022

In these consolidated appeals1, William Tyree Lincoln (Appellant) 

appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed in the Lycoming County Court 

of Common Pleas following his jury conviction of multiple counts of delivery of 

controlled substances, possession with intent to deliver controlled substances 

(PWID), criminal use of a communication facility,2 and related offenses at 

three separate dockets. On appeal, Appellant contends the trial court abused 

its discretion when it (1) permitted the Commonwealth to admit into evidence 

a surveillance video that was not disclosed to Appellant until midway through 

the first day of trial, and (2) imposed a manifestly excessive sentence. For 

the reasons below, we affirm.

The trial court provided a detailed recitation of the facts underlying 

Appellant’s convictions in its opinion disposing of Appellant’s post-sentence 

motion, which we need not reiterate herein. See Trial Ct. Op. & Order, 

1/26/22, at 3-9. In summary, on March 29, 2019, Detective Curt 

Loudenslager of the Lycoming County District Attorney’s Office conducted a 

controlled buy of cocaine from Appellant using a confidential informant (CI 

#1). Id. at 3. Thereafter, Pennsylvania State Police Trooper Andrew Corl 

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 This Court consolidated the appeals sua sponte. See Order, 3/30/22.

2 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30); 18 Pa.C.S. § 7512(a).
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conducted four additional controlled buys of heroin from Appellant — on July 

16, 17, 23, and 24, 2019 — using another CI (CI #2). See id. at 4-6. 

Laboratory testing of all the narcotics sold by Appellant revealed the presence 

of cocaine, heroin, and 3-methylfentanyl.3 Id. at 6. Officers executed a 

search warrant at Appellant’s residence on July 25th and recovered “significant 

amounts of heroin, crack cocaine, methamphetamine, and cocaine[;]” some 

of the packages were stamped with the same notation as those sold to the 

CI’s. Id. at 7-8. The officers also recovered syringes, facemasks and digital 

scales, as well as more than $5,000 in cash, including $440.00 of the 

prerecorded buy money. Id.

Appellant was subsequently charged at three separate dockets: (1) at 

Docket No. CP-41-CR-0001786-2019 (1786-2019), relating to the March 29, 

2019, controlled buy, he was charged with one count each of delivery of 

controlled substances, PWID, possession of controlled substances,4 and 

criminal use of a communication facility; (2) at Docket No. CP-41-CR00001792, relating to the July 2019 controlled buys, he was charged with four 

counts each of delivery of controlled substances, PWID, possession of 

controlled substances, criminal use of a communication facility, and 

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3 “3-Methylfentanyl is . . . an analog of the potent opioid, fentanyl[,] one of 

the most powerful opioid drugs sold illegally[,] and is estimated to be between 

400-6000 times more potent than morphine in certain cases.” 

https://pubchem.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/compound/Mefentanyl.

4 35 P.S. §§ 780-113(a)(30).
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possession of drug paraphernalia;

5 and (3) at Docket No. CP-41-CR00001236, relating to the evidence recovered during the execution of the 

search warrant, he was charged with four counts of PWID, five counts of 

possession of controlled substances, and one count of possession of drug 

paraphernalia.6 On July 28, 2020, the trial court granted the Commonwealth’s 

motion to consolidate the three dockets for trial. See Order, 7/28/20.

Appellant’s jury trial began on April 29, 2021. Detective Loudenslager 

and another officer identified Appellant as the person who sold CI #1 the drugs 

during the March 29th transaction. See N.T., 4/29/21, at 35-36, 51-53. 

Additionally, the Commonwealth presented surveillance video footage of the 

March 29th controlled buy. Id. at 51-52. The Commonwealth then began its 

direct examination of Trooper Corl regarding the controlled buys he conducted 

in July of 2019. Trooper Corl described the July 16th and 17th transactions, 

and identified Appellant as the target of the investigation, before the trial court 

broke for lunch. See id. at 69-93.

After the lunch break, the Commonwealth’s attorney informed the court 

that earlier that morning, “in preparation for trial a detective found a video 

that was not known to either the Commonwealth or” Appellant. N.T., 4/29/21, 

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5 35 P.S. §§ 780-113(a)(32).

6 At Docket 1236-2019, Appellant was also charged with two violations of the 

Uniform Firearms Code, persons not to possess firearms and possession of a 

firearm with altered manufacturer’s number. See 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 6105(a), 

6110.2. On July 8, 2020, the trial court granted Appellant’s oral motion to 

sever those charges for trial. See Order, 7/8/20. 
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at 99-100. The Commonwealth’s attorney stated they “learned of” the video 

“at about 11 a.m.” and had their first opportunity to view it during the lunch 

break, at which time they also turned over the video to Appellant’s counsel. 

Id. at 100. Counsel described the video as “depict[ing the] hand-to-hand 

transaction” of the controlled buy conducted on July 17, 2019. Id. The 

Commonwealth’s attorney explained:

I’m not seeking to play this today. . . . I certainly want to give 

[Appellant’s counsel] a chance to review it and go over it with their 

client, but I would be seeking to play it tomorrow morning.

Id. Counsel assured the court that they were “personally unaware” of the 

existence of the video until that morning, when one of the detectives 

discovered it “unmarked today when going through” pretrial preparation. Id.

at 101.

Appellant’s counsel “strongly object[ed]” to the introduction of the 

video, noting “it does affect trial strategy and . . . disposition[,]” and implied

that had the video been turned over in a timely manner, Appellant may have 

accepted a guilty plea. N.T., 4/29/21, at 101-02. The trial court then briefly 

excused the jury to provide Appellant the opportunity to review the video 

footage with counsel. See id. at 104-05. After a 15 minute break, the trial 

resumed, and the Commonwealth continued its direct examination of Trooper 

Corl. Id. at 105. The Commonwealth presented four additional witnesses, 

including both CI’s, before the trial was recessed for the day. See id. at 139-

201. During CI #2’s testimony, the Commonwealth played for the jury 

surveillance video footage of the July 24th transaction. See id. at 165-67.
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The next morning, the Commonwealth resumed its case-in-chief. See

N.T., 4/30/21 (a.m.),

7 at 6-7. Before resting, the Commonwealth introduced, 

and played for the jury, the video footage of the July 17th controlled buy. See

id. at 78-81. Appellant did not testify or present any witnesses in his defense. 

That same day, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on all charges. 

On September 21, 2021, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an 

aggregate term of 17 years’, three months’ to 341⁄2 years’ imprisonment, 

consecutive to any sentence he was then serving. Specifically, the court 

imposed consecutive, standard range, sentences for each of the five counts of 

delivery of controlled substances at Dockets 1786-2019 and 1792-2019, and 

three of the four counts of PWID at Docket 1236-2019. The court also 

imposed sentences of 12 to 24 months’ imprisonment for each of the five 

counts of criminal use of a communication facility at Dockets 1786-2019 and 

1792-2019, but directed that those sentences run concurrent to each other, 

and concurrent to other sentences imposed. The court determined the 

remaining convictions merged for sentencing purposes. 

Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion challenging the sufficiency 

of the evidence, the court’s denial of his request to drug test the CI’s, the 

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7 The certified record contains three transcripts dated April 30, 2019. One 

notes that the proceedings commenced at 9:00 a.m. and concluded at 11:46 

a.m. We will refer to that transcript as “N.T., 4/30/19 (a.m.).” The second 

transcript is labeled “Closing Arguments,” and includes the proceedings 

following the lunch break until the jury was excused to deliberate. The last 

transcript is labeled “Jury Trial-Verdict,” and includes only the jury’s verdict.
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court’s admission of the surveillance video disclosed mid-trial, and the 

discretionary aspects of his sentence. Following a hearing,8the trial court 

denied Appellant’s motion on January 26, 2022. These timely appeals 

followed.9 

Appellant raises two claims for our review:10

I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the 

Commonwealth to admit previously undiscovered video halfway 

through the first day of trial?

II. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when imposing 

an aggregate sentence of 207 to 414 months in a state 

correctional institution?

Appellant’s Brief at 6.

Appellant’s first issue challenges the trial court’s decision to permit the 

Commonwealth to introduce into evidence a surveillance video of the July 17, 

2019, controlled buy, when the video was not provided to Appellant until 

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8 Although the trial court indicates a hearing was conducted on November 4, 

2021, the certified record does not include a transcript from that hearing. 

Nevertheless, we conclude the absence of that transcript does not hamper our 

review.

9 Appellant filed separate notices of appeal at each docket. He also timely 

complied with the trial court’s directive to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise 

statement of errors complied of on appeal at each docket. The court 

subsequently filed a joint opinion on March 22, 2022, in which it relied upon 

its prior opinion and order disposing of Appellant’s post-sentence motions. 

10 In his Rule 1925(b) statements, Appellant also challenged the sufficiency of 

the evidence supporting his convictions — a claim he does not assert in his 

brief. See Appellant’s Concise Statement of Matters Complained of on 

Appellant Pursuant to Rule 1925(b) Order, 3/21/22, at 1 (unpaginated). Thus, 

any sufficiency challenge is waived.
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midway through the first day of trial. See Appellant’s Brief at 10. Appellant 

maintains “the late disclosure severely hampered [his] ability to evaluate the 

testimony of Trooper . . . Corl regarding the alleged controlled buy on July 17 

and attempt to impeach on cross[-]examination.” Id. Because the trooper 

testified about the July 17th transaction before the video was provided, 

Appellant insists the “delay severely hampered any chance [he] had to use 

the video to impeach” the trooper by comparing “the details of the testimony 

with . . . what the video showed.” Id. at 11. He notes that there were no 

other photographs or videos of the July 17th incident. Id. Furthermore, 

because the impeachment of Trooper Corl on this transaction could “affect 

[his] credibility . . . overall,” Appellant requests a new trial on all three 

dockets. Id.

Preliminarily, we note there is no dispute that the video surveillance 

recording at issue was subject to mandatory disclosure pursuant to 

Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 573(B)(1)(g) (when requested by the 

defense, the Commonwealth is required to provide, inter alia, “recordings of 

any electronic surveillance”). Moreover, the Commonwealth’s duty to disclose 

such evidence is ongoing. Pa.R.Crim.P. 573(D). Nevertheless, Rule 573

provides that the remedy for a violation of the mandatory disclosure rules is 

a matter within the discretion of the trial court: 

(E) Remedy. If at any time during the course of the proceedings 

it is brought to the attention of the court that a party has failed to 

comply with this rule, the court may order such party to permit 

discovery or inspection, may grant a continuance, or may prohibit 

such party from introducing evidence not disclosed, other than 
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testimony of the defendant, or it may enter such other order as it 

deems just under the circumstances.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 573(E).

Our review of a trial court’s ruling concerning a discovery violation is 

guided by the following:

The trial court has broad discretion in choosing the appropriate 

remedy for a discovery violation. Our scope of review is whether 

the court abused its discretion in not excluding evidence pursuant 

to Rule 573(E). A defendant seeking relief from a discovery 

violation must demonstrate prejudice. A violation of discovery 

does not automatically entitle appellant to a new trial. Rather, an 

appellant must demonstrate how a more timely disclosure would 

have affected his trial strategy or how he was otherwise 

prejudiced by the alleged late disclosure. 

Commonwealth v. Causey, 833 A.2d 165, 171 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citations 

and quotations marks omitted).

Here, the trial court provided the following reasons for denying 

Appellant’s request to exclude the July 17th surveillance video:

The video of the second controlled purchase was incredibly similar

to other various video surveillance conducted and admitted into 

evidence at [Appellant’s] trial. [Appellant] and his counsel would 

have known and been able to anticipate the issues to their trial 

strategy upon their first viewing of the other videos of the 

controlled buys [Appellant] was charged with. Furthermore, the 

video was delivered to [Appellant’s] counsel over the lengthy 

lunch break, the [trial c]ourt dismissed the jury to provide an 

opportunity for [Appellant] and his counsel to view the video 

together, and the video was not admitted into evidence or played 

for the jury until the following day. Therefore, [Appellant] had 

ample time to prepare a defense to a comparable video 

demonstrating similar conduct as the other videos admitted into 

evidence and this did not overly prejudice him. . . .

Trial Ct. Op. & Order at 11.
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Upon our review, we conclude Appellant has failed to demonstrate the 

trial court’s ruling constituted an abuse of discretion. The Commonwealth 

turned over the video footage at issue shortly after it was discovered. The 

trial court then provided Appellant the opportunity to view the footage with 

defense counsel before the testimony proceeded. Further, the Commonwealth 

did not introduce the video, or display it to the jury, until the next day —

providing Appellant’s counsel with even more time to analyze, and prepare a 

rebuttal for, the footage. 

We also reject Appellant’s claim that the Commonwealth’s delay in 

disclosing the video “severely hampered” his ability to impeach Trooper Corl. 

See Appellant’s Brief at 11. The Commonwealth began its direct examination 

of Trooper Corl on the morning of July 29, 2021. After detailing the July 16th

transaction, Trooper Corl described the July 17th controlled buy immediately 

before the lunch break. See N.T., 4/29/21, at 81-93. During that lunch break 

the Commonwealth provided the video to Appellant. See id. at 100. Before

the Commonwealth resumed Trooper Corl’s direct examination, the trial court 

provided Appellant the opportunity to review the surveillance footage with his 

counsel. Id. at 103-05. The Commonwealth then continued its direct 

examination of Trooper Corl, after which Appellant cross-examined the 

trooper. Thus, Appellant’s bald allegation that his delayed receipt of the video 

hindered his ability to impeach Trooper Corl is specious, since he was able to 

view the video shortly after the trooper’s testimony regarding that specific

transaction. Moreover, even now Appellant fails to identify any grounds for 
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impeachment of Trooper Corl’s testimony that he became aware of only after

viewing the surveillance video. Because Appellant has not demonstrated he 

was prejudiced by the late disclosure of the video, we conclude no relief is 

warranted on this claim. See Causey, 833 A.2d at 171.

Next, Appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence. It 

is well established that such a challenge does not entitle an appellant to 

“review as of right.” Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 117 A.3d 763, 768 (Pa. 

Super. 2015) (en banc) (citation omitted). Rather, 

[b]efore this Court can address such a discretionary challenge, an 

appellant must comply with the following requirements: 

An appellant challenging the discretionary aspects of his 

sentence must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction by satisfying 

a four-part test: (1) whether appellant has filed a timely 

notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether 

the issue was properly preserved at sentencing or in a 

motion to reconsider and modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 

[720]; (3) whether appellant’s brief has a fatal defect, 

Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a substantial 

question that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate 

under the Sentencing Code.

Id. (citation omitted). 

Here, Appellant properly preserved his claim in a timely filed postsentence motion before the trial court, and a timely appeal before this Court. 

Moreover, he included the requisite Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement of reasons 

for allowance of appeal in his brief. See Appellant’s Brief at 12-13. 

Accordingly, we must now consider whether Appellant’s claim presents a 

substantial question justifying our review.
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An appellant “presents a substantial question when he sets forth a 

plausible argument that the sentence violates a provision of the sentencing 

code or is contrary to the fundamental norms of the sentencing process.” 

Commonwealth v. Conte, 198 A.3d 1169, 1174 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation 

omitted). In the present case, Appellant contends that the aggregate 

sentence imposed by the trial court is “manifestly excessive in relation to his 

criminal conduct.” Appellant’s Brief at 12. Although his sentences all fell

within the standard range of the guidelines, Appellant maintains the court’s 

decision to impose “consecutive sentences for each of the Delivery and [PWID] 

charges,” led to an unduly harsh sentence “in light of the particular conduct 

alleged, the circumstances of the offenses, and the total length of 

imprisonment.” Id. We conclude these allegations raise a substantial 

question for our review. See Commonwealth v. Dodge, 77 A.3d 1263, 1270 

(Pa. Super. 2013) (“[A] defendant may raise a substantial question where he 

receives consecutive sentences within the guideline ranges if the case involves 

circumstances where the application of the guidelines would be clearly 

unreasonable, resulting in an excessive sentence[.]”) (emphasis omitted); 

Commonwealth v. Mastromarino, 2 A.3d 581, 587 (Pa. Super. 2010) (a 

substantial question is raised when “the decision to sentence consecutively 

raises the aggregate sentence to, what appears upon its face to be, an 

excessive level in light of the criminal conduct at issue”). Thus, we proceed 

to address Appellant’s sentencing challenge on appeal.
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Preliminarily we note: “Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound 

discretion of the sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on 

appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion.” Caldwell, 117 A.3d at 770 

(citation omitted). Thus, we review the sentence imposed by the trial court 

for an abuse of discretion. Id. 

In this context, an abuse of discretion is not shown merely by an 

error in judgment. Rather, the appellant must establish, by 

reference to the record, that the sentencing court ignored or 

misapplied the law, exercised its judgment for reasons of 

partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or arrived at a manifestly 

unreasonable decision.

Id. (citation omitted).

Appellant argues the court’s imposition of consecutive sentences for 

offenses which did not “involve violence or the threat of violence[,]” was 

excessive under the circumstances. Appellant’s Brief at 15. He emphasizes 

he was “convicted of five deliveries to two individuals[.]” Id. Moreover, 

although the trial court referred to Appellant’s crimes as an “operation” and 

mentioned the racketeering law, he insists “there was nothing presented — or 

alleged — to indicate [his] participation in some larger scheme.” Id. 

Appellant also maintains that the danger to the community as a result of his 

crimes is “already taken into consideration by the increased offense gravity 

score” applicable for the delivery of any controlled substances containing 

fentanyl. Id. Lastly, Appellant contends the trial court did not consider the 

fact that he faces additional time because he was on state parole when he 

committed the present offenses. See id. at 14. Appellant states that while 
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“a defendant should not be entitled to a reduced sentence merely because he 

is on parole and is facing a violation[,]” a sentencing court should consider 

the ”likely effect” of the violation “when weighing whether a sentence within 

the standard guideline ranges is excessive under the circumstances of a 

particular case.” Id.

Our review of the trial court’s explanation for the sentence imposed at 

the sentencing hearing reveals no abuse of discretion. Preliminarily, we note 

the trial court acknowledged that it reviewed Appellant’s pre-sentence 

investigation report before the hearing, and restated, on the record, much of 

the information contained in the report. See N.T., 9/21/21, at 3-6. Thus, we 

presume the trial court “properly considered and weighed all relevant factors 

in fashioning [Appellant’s] sentence.” See Commonwealth v. Baker, 72 

A.3d 652, 663 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted). 

Further, we conclude the court provided ample reasons for imposing 

consecutive sentences for each delivery charge involving the controlled buys, 

and three of the four PWID charges relating to the search warrant. We first 

emphasize the court sentenced Appellant only on the delivery convictions of 

the five controlled buys, finding the charges of PWID, possession of controlled 

substances, and possession of drug paraphernalia merged. See N.T., 

9/21/21, at 14. With regard to the convictions at Docket 1792-2016 — the 

four controlled buys in July of 2019 — the trial court explained that it 

“struggled with [treating] multiple transactions . . . like one big group because 

they are four separate transactions and . . . if [it] had four people come in 
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with each one of those transactions, they would be getting four sentences.” 

Id. at 13. The court further commented:

[V]olume dealers are not entitled to volume discounts. Because 

what deterrent . . . would that be for people to stop selling drugs 

generally, let alone stop selling drugs as a continuing operation. . 

. .

Id. 

Moreover, with regard to PWID charges at Docket 1236-2019, relating 

to evidence recovered during the search warrant, the court imposed

consecutive sentences for each charge involving a different drug: cocaine and 

fentanyl, cocaine, and methamphetamine. See N.T., 9/21/21, at 16. The 

court explained:

I accept the fact that there was . . . a search warrant that was 

utilized in this case; but once again, if a client is dealing in multiple 

drugs they shouldn’t be able to get the benefit of they’re a onestop shop. . . . I mean the guidelines are different for different 

drugs for a reason so for me to not factor that in would be to 

disregard what the legislature has identified when a person is in 

possession of these particular charges for the purpose of 

delivering them, they should be punished for that and then that 

begs the question if I do all of that what type of life sentence am

I essentially imposing because of the number of charges and the 

number of months is so large. . . . And this is a tough one for me 

because of the fact you have so many . . . what I would consider 

to be systematic aggravating factors, the fact that you were on 

parole, the fact that you have a high prior record score, the fact 

that you weren’t just selling marijuana, you were selling fentanyl, 

you were selling methamphetamine, offenses that have . . . a high 

offense gravity score. . . . [I]t just adds up to a very long 

sentence. But . . . if I don’t go along with that then the thought 

is maybe selling drugs in this type of quantity over this period of 

time isn’t such a big deal and that’s absolutely not what I want to 

say.
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Id. at 14-15. Thus, our review reveals ample support for the court’s decision 

to impose consecutive, as opposed to concurrent, sentences. It is well-settled 

that a defendant “is not entitled to a volume discount for his crimes.” 

Commonwealth v. Swope, 123 A.3d 333, 341 (Pa. Super. 2015). 

With regard to Appellant’s claim that the court did not consider his 

impending parole violation, the court explicitly stated that it intended to run 

the present sentence consecutive to any parole violation sentence Appellant 

may receive: “[F]or me there are two separate interests. You’re on 

supervision and then you commit a new offense you should have separate and 

independent punishments for those.” N.T., 9/21/21, at 12. Again, the court’s 

reasoning reveals no abuse of discretion.

Furthermore, contrary to Appellant’s characterization, the court did not 

imply that Appellant’s business was part of a larger operation, or that he 

should have been charged with racketeering. Rather, the court commented: 

. . . I struggle with a sentence of any less than this would 

depreciate the seriousness of what you did and how serious a 

problem controlled substances are in Lycoming County and how 

many, many cases that I deal with are one transaction and this 

isn’t just one, this is two cases; but with a series of five 

transactions and pretty significant quantities and then fentanyl on 

top of that and then a search warrant, which says that this wasn’t 

a one time or a two time or a very small time, that this was a 

significant operation that you were engaging in, at least that’s 

the evidence that the jury found and that a sentence of any less 

than this would send the wrong message . . . about not just what 

I as a Judge thinks about drug delivery in this county; but what I 

think . . . the legislature thinks about this as well . . .
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N.T., 9/21/21, at 17 (emphasis supplied). Although the trial court mentioned 

the racketeering law, it did so only to note that racketeering is a “separate 

and distinct charge[.]” Id. at 13. The court did not imply that it believed 

Appellant should have been charged with that offense.

Therefore, upon our review, we conclude the trial court provided ample 

reasons for the imposition of Appellant’s sentence. Although the sentence is 

lengthy, that is primarily due to the number of convictions and separate 

transactions, Appellant’s significant prior record, and the type and amount of 

narcotics recovered, rather than any abuse of discretion on the part of the 

trial court. Thus, no relief is warranted.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/21/2022