*The HONORABLE ANDREW W. BOGUE, United States District Judge for

the District of South Dakota, sitting by designation. 

1The HONORABLE MICHAEL J. MELLOY, Chief Judge of the United States

District Court for the Northern District of Iowa. 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 98-2446

___________

United States of America, *

*

Plaintiff - Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Northern District of Iowa.

Debra Kay Tournier, now known as *

Debra Kay Laucamp, *

*

Defendant - Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: December 15, 1998

Filed: April 8, 1999

___________

Before BEAM and LOKEN, Circuit Judges, and BOGUE,* District Judge.

___________

LOKEN, Circuit Judge.

Debra Kay Tournier pleaded guilty to participating in a drug conspiracy in

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. The government appeals her ninety-month prison

sentence. The issue is whether the district court1 erred in finding her eligible for
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“safety valve” relief under18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) and U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2 after Tournier

repeatedly lied to government interviewers about aspects of the offense and did not

truthfully cooperate until just before her sentencing hearing. We affirm.

Tournier and three co-defendants were indicted for conspiring to possess and

distribute methamphetamine in Waterloo and Cedar Rapids, Iowa. Some months

later, Tournier agreed to plead guilty to one conspiracy count, an offense warranting

a mandatory minimum ten-year prison sentence. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A).

Congress provided relief for less culpable drug offenders from its harsh mandatory

minimum sentences in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f), enacted as part of the Mandatory

Minimum Sentencing Reform Act of 1994. See H.R. Rep. No. 103-460, 1994 WL

107571. This “safety valve” provision mandates that Tournier be sentenced under the

Guidelines, without regard to the statutory minimum sentence, “if the court finds at

sentencing” that she satisfies five criteria. It is undisputed Tournier meets the first

four criteria; the issue on appeal is whether she satisfies § 3553(f)(5) and U.S.S.G.

§ 5C1.2(5): 

not later than the time of the sentencing hearing, the defendant has

truthfully provided to the Government all information and evidence the

defendant has concerning the offense or offenses that were part of the

same course of conduct or of a common scheme or plan, but the fact that

the defendant has no relevant or useful other information to provide or

that the Government is already aware of the information shall not

preclude a determination by the court that the defendant has complied

with this requirement. 

Seeking to qualify for safety valve relief, Tournier submitted to three

government interviews in the months prior to her sentencing. The government also

interviewed her three co-defendants. As the government learned more about the

offense from Tournier’s conspirators, it became convinced she had provided false

denials or withheld information on relevant subjects such as: 
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-- whether she had provided drugs to her minor daughters; 

-- whether her daughter’s minor boyfriend sold drugs for her;

-- whether she knew of drug trafficking by her sisters and a niece; 

-- whether she personally profited from the drug trafficking;

-- whether she had seen a co-defendant in possession of a handgun;

-- whether an incident involving Gary or Deborah Alloway was drug-related;

-- the identities of additional drug suppliers and customers.

The government advised Tournier it would oppose safety valve relief. She then

agreed to a fourth interview in which she made additional admissions. Convinced she

was still lying, the government filed a sentencing memorandum urging no safety

valve relief. Just before the sentencing hearing, Tournier filed an affidavit containing

still more admissions. At sentencing, the government conceded she had provided

complete and truthful information prior to the hearing. The government nonetheless

argued that her previous lies and omissions made her ineligible for safety valve relief.

Considering it a close question, the district court found that Tournier is eligible

for safety valve relief under § 3553(f) and U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2. However, the court

sentenced her to ninety months in prison, near the top of her Guidelines range of 78-

97 months, because she had barely qualified for the safety valve. The court

explained:

I’m going to overrule the government’s objection. I think Ms. Tournier

has finally come forward and been forthright, although it’s been a little

bit of pulling teeth to get the information . . . . I guess I can see without

condoning why she was reluctant to admit that she provided controlled

substances to her children, and I think under the circumstances since she

has prior to the hearing finally come forward with what now appears to

be a complete and truthful rendition of the evidence, I will overrule the

objection and grant her the “safety valve” that’s been requested. 

* * * * *
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I do not think that this is a bottom-of-the-guideline range case. . . . The

principal reason is the issue of “safety valve” was a very close call in

this case, and I think I very well could have been justified in sustaining

the government’s objection which would have meant Ms. Tournier was

at the ten-year mandatory minimum . . . . [B]ecause of the fact that Ms.

Tournier’s cooperation has been so begrudging in this case, although it

finally did turn out to be sufficient -- although I emphasize barely

sufficient -- to get the “safety valve,” I believe something in at least the

upper, above-the-middle point of sentencing guidelines range is

appropriate in this case.

On appeal, the government argues we must review the district court’s decision

de novo because Tournier is not entitled to the safety valve as a matter of law. This

contention is without merit. The court’s decision is consistent with the plain

language of § 3553(f)(5) -- “not later than the time of the sentencing hearing, the

defendant has truthfully provided to the Government all information and evidence the

defendant has concerning the offense.” The government argues we should construe

§ 3553(f)(5) to prohibit sentencing courts from applying the safety valve to

defendants who wait until the last minute to cooperate fully. The government also

suggests that § 3553(f)(5) must be denied to those whose tardy or grudging

cooperation burdens the government with a need for additional investigation. These

factors are expressly relevant to other sentencing determinations, such as the third

level of reduction for acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b), and

substantial assistance motions under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1. But they are not a

precondition to safety valve relief, which is even available to defendants who put the

government to the expense and burden of a trial. See United States v. Shrestha, 86

F.3d 935, 940 (9th Cir. 1996). Of course, these factors may be considered by the

sentencing court in finding whether a defendant “truthfully provided to the

Government all information.” But the government’s contention that these factors

should be written into the statute must be addressed to Congress or the Sentencing

Commission, not this court. 
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Section 3553(f) specifically refers to the five safety valve criteria as findings.

Thus, it is well settled we review the district court’s application of § 3553(f) for clear

error. See United States v. Romo, 81 F.3d 84, 86 (8th Cir. 1996). Limiting our

review to the question of clear error, it is apparent we must affirm. The district court

found that Tournier (1) truthfully provided, (2) to the government, (3) all information

she had about the offense, (4) not later than the time of the sentencing hearing. The

record supports these findings; indeed, the government does not contest them. The

government instead argues the district court’s application of § 3553(f)(5) conflicts

with our decision in United States v. Long, 77 F.3d 1060 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 519

U.S. 859 (1996). We disagree. 

In Long we reviewed for clear error the denial of safety valve relief to a

defendant who deliberately misled the government until her cross-examination at the

sentencing hearing. Bearing in mind our deferential standard of review, we have no

difficulty concluding that Long is factually distinguishable. For example, in Long the

defendant did not “come clean” until she saw what the government was able to prove

at the sentencing hearing, and even then she withheld information until confronted

on cross-examination. In contrast, Tournier’s full and truthful cooperation, though

grudging and fitful, was completed before the sentencing hearing. The two cases may

present only a difference in degree, not in kind, but subtle distinctions are important

in fact finding, and they are for the sentencing court, not this court, to draw. Under

the clear error standard, we need not agree with the district court’s findings of

disputed fact to affirm. See Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573-75

(1985); United States v. Wells, 127 F.3d 739, 744-45 (8th Cir. 1997). Thus, even if

Long and this case are largely indistinguishable, in the absence of an error of law it

is appropriate to affirm in both cases.

The judgment of the district court is affirmed. 
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A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.