IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Brien L. Readinger, :

:

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 282 C.D. 2017

: Submitted: October 13, 2017

Pennsylvania Housing Finance :

Agency, :

:

Respondent :

BEFORE: HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge

HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

HONORABLE J. WESLEY OLER, Jr., Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

BY JUDGE WOJCIK FILED: January 29, 2018

Brien L. Readinger (Petitioner) petitions pro se for review of the 

January 14, 2017 adjudication of a Hearing Examiner of the Pennsylvania Housing 

Finance Agency (PHFA) denying his application for emergency mortgage assistance 

under the statute known as the Homeowner’s Emergency Mortgage Assistance Loan 

Program (HEMAP) Act (Act 91).1 We affirm.

 

1 Act of December 3, 1959, P.L. 1688, added by the Act of December 23, 1983, P.L. 385, 

as amended, 35 P.S. §§1680.401c–1680.410c. The purpose of Act 91 is “to establish a program

which will through emergency mortgage payments prevent widespread mortgage foreclosures . . . 

which result from default caused by circumstances beyond a homeowner's control.” Crawl v. 

Pennsylvania Housing Finance Agency, 511 A.2d 924, 927 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1986) (emphasis in 

original).
2

In May 2009, Petitioner secured a primary mortgage from Santander 

Bank, N.A. (Santander) in the amount of $119,200 to purchase the property located 

at 1054 Shoemakersville Road, Shoemakersville, Pennsylvania (Property). The 

monthly mortgage payments are $896. Thereafter, Petitioner secured a second 

position mortgage from Santander as a secured line of credit in the amount of 

$10,000. The monthly mortgage payments are $44. Petitioner contacted Santander 

in 2010 or 2011 seeking to refinance his primary mortgage, but his application was 

denied. Supplemental Reproduced Record (S.R.R.) at 2b.

Petitioner received an Act 91 Notice dated August 2, 2016, indicating 

that Santander intended to foreclose on the Property based on a default in the 

mortgage payments beginning June 1, 2016. S.R.R. at 6b-8b. The PHFA received 

Petitioner’s HEMAP application on September 27, 2016. S.R.R. at 2b. At the time 

of his application, Petitioner’s monthly expenses totaled $2,399. S.R.R. at 3b.

Prior to the foreclosure notice, Petitioner was employed at Carpenter, a 

company for which he began work in July 2006. In December 2013, Petitioner was 

terminated though the record does not indicate a reason for the termination. 

Petitioner obtained a new position with C.R. England, a tractor trailer company, in 

September 2014, where he worked for approximately seven months before 

resigning. Beginning in March 2015, Petitioner worked for the Reading Area Water 

Authority (Water Authority) for approximately one year until he was terminated in 

March 2016. When the PHFA reviewed Petitioner’s HEMAP application, Petitioner 

was unemployed. S.R.R. at 2b.

The PHFA initially denied Petitioner’s HEMAP application because it 

determined that: (1) Petitioner had no reasonable prospect of resuming full mortgage 

payments within 24 months from the date of mortgage delinquency and paying the 
3

mortgage by maturity because his income was insufficient,2 and (2) Petitioner’s 

financial hardship was due to overextension, not circumstances beyond his control.3 

Petitioner requested and was granted a hearing to contest the PHFA’s initial denial 

of his HEMAP application.

A Hearing Examiner conducted a telephonic hearing on December 8, 

2016. Petitioner testified that he attempted to refinance his mortgages in 2010 or 

2011 in order to pay off his installment debt and lower his interest rate. S.R.R. at 

44b. He averred that Santander denied his application without explanation. Id. 

Petitioner testified that he terminated his employment at C.R. England 

because he was not earning sufficient income and that he had not received proper 

training to adequately perform his job duties. S.R.R. at 33b. Petitioner further 

testified regarding his termination from the Water Authority, that he informed his 

 

2 Section 404-C(a)(5) of Act 91 provides that no assistance may be made with respect to a 

mortgage or mortgagor unless

there is a reasonable prospect that the mortgagor will be able to 

resume full mortgage payments within twenty-four (24) months 

after the beginning of the period for which payments are provided

under this article and pay the mortgage or mortgages in full by its 

maturity date or by a later date agreed to by the mortgagee or 

mortgagees for completing mortgage payments.

35 P.S. §1680.404c(a)(5) (emphasis added). The initial decision appears to conflate this 

requirement with that of Section 404-(a)(8), which provides that no assistance may be provided 

unless the PHFA determines “that the mortgagor has insufficient household income or net worth 

to correct the delinquency or delinquencies within a reasonable period of time and make full 

mortgage payments,” and that of Section 404-C(a)(12), which requires that no assistance may be 

provided if the mortgagor is more than 24 consecutive or non-consecutive months in arrears, no 

matter the reason therefore. 35 P.S. §§1680.404c(a)(8),(12).

3 Section 404-C(a)(4) of Act 91 provides that no assistance may be provided unless the 

mortgagor is suffering financial hardship as the result of circumstances beyond his control. 35 

P.S. §1680.404c(a)(4).
4

supervisor that he was leaving early due to illness but was suspended pending an 

investigation. S.R.R. at 36b. According to his Letter of Circumstance submitted 

with his HEMAP application, the Water Authority asserted that Petitioner quit his 

position and violated a work rule, which resulted in his termination. S.R.R. at 56b. 

Petitioner testified that he did not violate a work rule and that he was contesting his 

termination from the Water Authority as unlawful. S.R.R. at 35b-36b. Petitioner

stated that he applied for unemployment compensation benefits following his 

termination, but the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (Board)

determined that Petitioner was ineligible because his discharge was the result of 

willful misconduct.4 S.R.R. at 37b. He testified that he appealed his denial to this 

Court and expected that he would receive approximately $14,000 to $15,000, should 

he prevail. 5 S.R.R. at 37b, 46b.

Since his separation from employment at the Water Authority, 

Petitioner has been searching for a new position, but at the time of the hearing had

been unable to obtain new employment. S.R.R. at 37b. Petitioner also testified that 

his monthly expenses had decreased since the date of his HEMAP application. 

S.R.R. at 39b-43b.

By decision entered January 14, 2017, the Hearing Examiner affirmed 

the initial decision of the PHFA and denied the mortgage assistance loan. She 

determined that Petitioner’s employment had not been steady since December 2013. 

She also determined that the outcome of Petitioner’s then-pending appeal of his 

 

4 Section 402(e) of the Unemployment Compensation Law provides that an employee shall 

be ineligible for compensation for any week in which his unemployment is due to his discharge 

from work for willful misconduct connected with his work. Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex. 

Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended, 43 P.S. §802(e).

5 On June 5, 2017, we affirmed the order of the Board. Readinger v. Unemployment 

Compensation Board of Review, (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1289 C.D. 2016, filed June 5, 2017).
5

unemployment compensation benefits or Petitioner’s ability to secure any future 

employment within the statutory period to resume full mortgage payments was 

speculative.

On appeal,6 Petitioner argues that the Hearing Examiner erred in 

determining that he did not have a reasonable prospect of resuming full mortgage 

payments within the statutory period and paying the mortgage by maturity. An 

applicant for a HEMAP loan has the burden of establishing the facts necessary to 

qualify under Act 91. Koch v. Pennsylvania Housing Finance Agency, 505 A.2d 

649, 650 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1986). As a matter of policy, the PHFA will generally 

consider a number of factors, including an applicant’s prior work history and 

financial prospects, in determining whether an applicant has a reasonable prospect 

of resuming full mortgage payments within the statutory period and paying the 

mortgage by maturity.7 The PHFA will generally determine that an applicant 

 

6 This Court’s scope of review is limited to determining whether constitutional rights were 

violated, an error of law was committed, or necessary findings of fact are not supported by 

substantial evidence. Section 704 of the Administrative Agency Law, 2 Pa. C.S. §704; Johnson v.

Pennsylvania Housing Finance Agency, 512 A.2d 1319, 1321 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1986).

7

 The PHFA’s regulations provide, in pertinent part:

(a) In general, the Agency will consider all relevant factors when 

evaluating whether the homeowner has a reasonable prospect of 

being able to resume full mortgage payments within 24 months 

after the beginning of the period for which assistance payments 

are provided the Agency and of being able to pay the mortgage 

in full by maturity or by a later date agreed to by the mortgagee, 

including the following:

(1) The homeowner’s prior work history, 

experience, training, opportunities for 

retraining and similar factors which may affect 
6

demonstrates a reasonable prospect of resuming payments, despite unemployment, 

if he is suffering financial hardship through no fault of his own and is able to 

demonstrate a favorable work history. 12 Pa. Code §31.206(b)(1).8

However, neither the Act nor the PHFA’s regulations allow for the 

consideration of speculative income and the PHFA is bound to evaluate an 

applicant’s eligibility based on his actual income history. Cullins v. Pennsylvania 

Housing Finance Agency, 623 A.2d 951, 954 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993). Consequently, a 

hearing examiner does not abuse her discretion or commit an error of law in denying 

an application for mortgage assistance when the applicant’s evidence of future 

income is speculative or legally insufficient to demonstrate a reasonable prospect of 

resuming mortgage payments and paying the mortgage by maturity. See R.M. v. 

Pennsylvania Housing Finance Agency, 740 A.2d 302, 308 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999)

(holding that despite applicant’s evidence of significant earning potential, he failed 

 

the homeowner’s future employment 

opportunities.

(2) Potential for future changes in the 

homeowner’s financial prospects through reemployment, schooling, training or debt 

reduction, or other income changes sufficient 

to enable the homeowner to resume full 

mortgage payments.

12 Pa. Code §31.206(a)(1),(2). Our Court has held that this provision is a non-binding statement 

of policy rather than a regulation with the force and effect of law. R.M. v. Pennsylvania Housing 

Finance Agency, 740 A.2d 302, 308 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999).

8 PHFA will generally determine that an applicant has demonstrated a reasonable prospect 

of resuming payments and paying the mortgage by maturity despite unemployment by presenting 

evidence of: (1) a favorable work and credit history; (2) the ability and history of paying the 

mortgage when employed; (3) the lack of an impediment or disability that prevents reemployment; 

and (4) that he is actively seeking work as evidenced by a written statement to that effect. 12 Pa. 

Code §31.206(b).
7

to present evidence as to when he could expect to earn this income; therefore, “[i]t 

was reasonable for the hearing examiner to conclude that [the applicant’s] future 

income was speculative” and “the hearing examiner did not err as a matter of law in 

denying [the] application for mortgage assistance.”); Mull v. Pennsylvania Housing 

Finance Agency, 529 A.2d 1185, 1188 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987) (holding that the hearing 

examiner did not err in determining that there was no reasonable prospect of 

applicant resuming mortgage payments within the required time frame where the 

applicant’s income was insufficient to meet her monthly expenses).

Petitioner did not introduce any evidence beyond his own bare 

assertions that there was a reasonable prospect that he could resume payments. 

Instead, the record demonstrates that Petitioner has remained unemployed since 

March 2016 despite his efforts to regain his former employment or secure new 

employment. The record also indicates an unfavorable work history where 

Petitioner was terminated from two of the three positions he held in the previous 

four years and that he voluntarily quit the third position. Therefore, the Hearing 

Examiner did not err in her determination that Petitioner had no reasonable prospect 

of resuming full mortgage payments within 24 months and payment of the mortgage 

in full by maturity.

Accordingly, the PHFA’s order is affirmed.

MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Brien L. Readinger, :

:

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 282 C.D. 2017

: 

Pennsylvania Housing Finance :

Agency, :

:

Respondent :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 29th day of January, 2018, the order of the 

Pennsylvania Housing Finance Agency, dated January 14, 2017, is AFFIRMED.

__________________________________

MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge