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NON - PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: M.

- A.D., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: ALLEGHENY COUNTY OFFICE OF CHILDREN, YOUTH AND FAMILIES : : : : : : : : : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 1861 WDA 2019 Appeal from the Order Entered November 21, 2019 In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Orphans' Court at

No(s): No. CP

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- AP

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- 2014 IN THE INTEREST OF: A.D., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: ALLEGHENY COUNTY OFFICE OF CHILDREN, YOUTH AND FAMILIES : : : : : : : : : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 1862 WDA 2019 Appeal from the Order Entered November 21, 2019 In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Orphans' Court at

No(s): No. CP

- 02

- AP

- 060

- 2014 IN THE INTEREST OF: A.M.D., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: ALLEGHENY COUNTY OFFICE OF CHILDREN YOUTH AND FAMILIES : : : : : : : : : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 1863 WDA 2019 Appeal from the Order Entered November 21, 2019 In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Orphans' Court at No(s): CP

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IN THE INTEREST OF: A.M.D., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: ALLEGHENY COUNTY OFFICE OF CHILDREN, YOUTH AND FAMILIES : : : : : : : : : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 21 WDA 2020 Appeal from the Order Entered November 21, 2019 In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Orphans’ Court at No(s): CP

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- AP

- 061

- 2014

IN THE INTEREST OF: A.D., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: ALLEGHENY COUNTY OFFICE OF CHILDREN, YOUTH AND FAMILIES : : : : : : : : : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 22 WDA 2020 Appeal from the Order Entered November 21, 2019 In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Orphans’ Court at

No(s): No. CP

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BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., KING, J., and COLINS, J. *

MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.: FILED JUNE 12, 2020 In these consolidated appeals, the Allegheny County Office of Children, Youth and Families (“CYF”) appeals from the trial court order s entered on

_________________ __________ ______ ____ _______

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.J

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November 21, 2019 , denying its petition s to involuntarily terminate the parental rights of M.W. (“Mother”) to her children, M.A.

- D., a/k/a M.Y.D., a female born in Febru ary of 2006 ; A.Y.D., a female born in October of 2007;
and A.M.D., Jr., a male born in July of 2010 , (collectively, “the Children”) . CYF also appeals the same order s denying its petition s to involuntarily terminate the parental rights of A.D. (“Father”), to A.Y.D. and A.M.D., Jr. 1 , 2 The trial court denied the termination petitions based on the finding that granting Subsidized Permanent Legal Custodianship (“SPLC”) , while maintaining the parental rights, would best serve the Children’s needs and welfare

. 3 After careful review, we affirm.
The factual and procedural history of this matter is as follows. Mother, Father, and their respective children have been known to CYF since 2002.

_________________ __________ ______ ____ _______
1 The trial court granted CYF’s petition to terminate Father’s parental rights to M.

- A.D., to whom he is the presumptive Father. The trial court also granted CYF’s petition to terminate the rights of C.W., a putative father to M.

- A.D., pursuant to 23 Pa.C. S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5) and (b), and the rights of the Unknown Father, pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5) and (8) and (b). The grant of the petition with regard to Father’s parental rights to M.

- A.D. is not at issue in this appeal, nor is the grant of the petition as to C.W. or any unknown father.

2 In two separate orders, entered on January 7, 2020, and January 22, 2020, this Court, acting sua sponte , consolidated the three appeals regarding Mother and the two appeals regarding Father, respectively. On February 5, 2020, this Court listed consecutively for disposition the consolidated appeals regarding Mother and the consolidated appeals regarding Father. For ease of disposition, we have addressed all of CYF’s appeals in a single memor andum, as did the trial court.

3 SPLC is defined infra

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Mot her and Father began a relationship in 2005. N.T., 2/6/19, at 199. Notably, the Children were removed from the care of Mother in January of
2013 because Mother attended a family group decision

- making conference in an intoxicated condition with A.M.D., Jr

. Id. at 202. Subsequently, CYF went to Mother’s home, and found Mother unconscious and bleeding, with A.M.D., Jr., left unattended. Id. Father arrived but refused to allow CYF to perform a home assessment, so the Children were not placed in his care a t that time. 4
Id. On June 10, 2014, A.M.D., Jr., and A.Y.D. were placed with Father , and CYF closed its case with regard to those two children. Id. M.

- A.D. has not returned to the care of either parent since her removal in January 2013. Id.
M.

- A.D. was most recently adjudicated dependent on February 25, 2013. At some point before August of 2015, Father returned A.M.D., Jr., and A.Y.D. to
Mother. Id. at 203. CYF received a report that Mother presented at a domestic violence shelter and was intoxicated while caring for A.M.D., Jr., and
A.Y.D. Id. On September 14, 2015, A.M.D., Jr., and A.Y.D. were adjudicated dependent. The Children have mental health and behavioral problems that have made their placement s in foster c are difficult. As a re sult, M.

- A .D. has had twenty

- two placements , and has been psychiatr ically hospitalized five times.
Id. at 204. A.Y.D. has had ten placements, and A.M.D., Jr., has had eight placements

. Id. CYF previously filed petitions for the involuntary termination of parental rights of Mother and Father to the Children in 2014, but withdrew those petitions due to Father’s progress. Id.

_________________ __________ ______ ____ _______
4 Mother and Father had ended their relationship.J

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On September 27, 2017, CYF again filed p etitions to involuntarily terminate Mother and Father ’s parental rights. The court appoin ted Anastasa Williams, Esquire, to serve as both a guardian ad litem and legal interests counsel for the Children. 5 The trial court held evidentiary hearings on the p etitions on October 15, 2018, February 6, 2019, and November 6, 2019. At the October 15, 2018 hearing, CYF presented the testimony of Allison Kroll, the CYF casework supervisor. Mother and Father appeared with separate counsel, and each testified on their own behalf. At the February 6, 2019 hearing, CYF presented
the testi mony of Brittany Tomasic, A.Y.D.’s therapist from Auberle; Tarraca

_________________ __________ ______ ____ _______
5 M.

- A.D. and A.Y.D., a t ages thirteen and twelve r espectively, have expressed preferences against adoption. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 2711(a)( 1) (providing that the consent of an adoptee, if over the age of 12, is required for adoption). The trial court perceived no conflict between the best interests of the Children and their legal interests, and appointed only one counsel to serve as both a l egal interest counsel and GAL for the Children. See In re Adoption of L.B.M. , 639 Pa. 428, 161 A.3d 172 (2017) (plurality). See also In re T.S. , 648 Pa. 236, 192 A.3d 1080 (2018) (filed August 22, 2018) (holding that the trial court did not err in allowi ng the children’s GAL to act as their sole representative during the termination proceeding because, at two and three years old, they were incapable of expressing their preferred outcome). See also In re: Adoption of K.M.G. , 219 A.3d 662, 669 (Pa. Super. 2019) ( en banc ) (filed September 13, 2019) (holding that this Court has authority only to raise sua sponte the issue of whether the trial court appointed any counsel for the child, and not the authority to delve into the quality of the representation) ( lim ited appeal granted , December 9, 2019). At the final termination hearing, t he Children’s legal interest s counsel/GAL stated that the termination of Mother ’s parental rights is not in the best interests of the Children. N.T., 11/6/19, at 205

- 208. The C hildren’s legal interest s counsel/GAL added that termination of Father’s parental rights is not in the best interests of A.Y.D. and A.M.D., Jr., but noted that termination of Father’s parental rights to M.

- A.D. would not have a negative effect on M.

- A.D. Id. at 206.J

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Jackson, a supervisor from the Allegheny County Health Department drug and alcohol screening laboratory ; Bonnie Petrosky, a CYF caseworker in the permanency department for A.M.D., Jr.; Neil Rosenblum, Ph.D., the court

appointed psychologist; Leanne Redulic, a CYF matching specialist for M.

- A.D.; Gail Redman, a foster care caseworker for A.M.D., Jr.; and Amy Rendos , supervisor of visit coaching at Project Star. On November 6, 2019, CYF again presented the testimony of Allison Kroll and Toni Baird , the clinical supervisor for a program at Holy Family Institute. Dr. Rosenblum testified a second time. Father and Mother appeared , and each testified again on their own behalf. Based upon the test imony and documentary evidence provided at the hearings, the court set forth the factual and procedural background of these appeals, as follows.
The parents’ problems are reflected in the goals set for them. Mother’ s goals were to improve her parenting sk ills, obtain stable housing, attend mental health treatment, maintain sobriety from her substance abuse problem primarily with alcohol but also with mar ijuana and to engage in visits. [Notes of Testimony, February 6, 2019, (“Tr. I”)] at 205. Father’ s goa ls were similar; he was to address his substance abuse problems

— [sic] primarily involving alcohol but also marijuana

— to engage in domestic violence counseling, to obtain stable housing a nd to attend parenting classes. Id. at 222. Originally, his goal s also included marriage counseling, but he an d Mother separated permanently. Id. [ See also Notes of Testimony, November 6, 2019, (“Tr. II”)] at 140 (wherein Mother testified that she has no cont act with Father, although Mother is aware that the [C] hildr en love him). Numerous services were offered to Mother and Father over the years with mixed results. See Tr. I at 207

- 19, 224

- 40. Overall , Father made more progress and participated more reliably in services than Mother [,] although it cannot be s aid he completed his goals, and he sometimes declined services outright when he believed they were not warranted

. Id. at 224

- 40. The court

- appointed psychologist [, Dr. Rosenblum,] was unable to testify to professional ce rtainty that he could recommend terminati on ofJ

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parental rights in this case. See Tr. I at 99

- 104. See also Tr. II at 96.

. . . . M.Y.D.
M.Y.D. is the biol ogical daughter of Mother only. M.Y.D. is 13. See Tr. I at 252. M.Y.D. has problems with verbal and physical aggression and difficulty with impulse control

. See id. at 71. She has been diagnosed with Oppositional Defiant Disorder and Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder. Id. As of the [second] hearing, she had been in the heavily structured setting of Passavant Memorial C are Home for about three years. See Tr. II at 102. Although Dr. Rosenblum found that she had improved in that placement somewhat, he noted that her progress by February of 2019 was moderate, that she continued to need intensive mental health treatment and that sh e would pose a major challe nge in a foster

- family setting. See Tr. I at 72. In fact, the psychologist [, Dr. Rosenblum,] went so far as to say that the child would be at great risk for a failed adoptio n, explaining that, despite CYF’ s petition for it, “ terminating parenta l rights is literally reckless.” Id. at 99. Given that her [m] other has been the o nly consistent figure in M.Y.D.’ s life who has shown her love, with termination of parental rights, the psychologist [, Dr. Rosenblum,] testified that “[a ll] you’ re doing is mak ing her a psychological orphan.” Id. at 100. Mother, though not always present, provides this fragile child with emotional support, and M.Y.D. enjoys Mother’s company. Id. at 95. Dr. Rosenblum characterized their relationship as necessary and beneficial to M.Y.D. Id. CYF presented the testimony of a matching specialist [, Ms. Rendulic,] whose job it was to find [a] placement for M.Y.D. She informed the [c] ourt about the failed efforts to find a relative to take in M.Y.D. and that she had finally given up on actively looking fo r family members for this girl. Id. at 138. The matching specialist did agree that M.Y.D. improved somewhat at Passavant. Id. at 137. The matching specialist had worked with M.Y.D. since January of 2016, and , although the specialist worked “continuously” to find a foster home for this child, she had not succeeded by February of 2019 [,] and was unable to agree with the CYF caseworker [, M s. Kroll,] that terminating parental righ ts would make placement easier. Id. at 136

- 38, 141

- 43, 251

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By the second part of the hearing in November of 2019, M.Y.D. had finally been placed in a foster home, but had only been there for two months. See Tr. II at 10

- 11. M.Y.D. was continuing to visit wit h Mother three times per month. Id. at 12

- 13. M.Y.D. had stated that she liked the foster home, but she had tried to run from it on one occasion in those first two months , although she did come back qu ickly a fter the police were contacted. Id. at 11

- 12, 27, 50. Dr. Rosenblum testified that he had not performed an updated evaluation since the first hearing date but reiterated his reservations about moving M.Y.D. to a goal of adoption without evidence t hat she could remain in that home successfully, characterizin g such action as “premature.” Id. at 88

- 89, 102. Although he indicated he would need an evaluation to give an opinion about the placement, he emphasized that M.Y.D. had a significant history of mental health and adjustment issues , and that she would certainly need more time for the situation to be assessed, even for permanent legal custodianship [“PLC”]

. Id. at 91, 94

- 95.

A.Y.D. A.Y.D. is the biological child of Mother and Father and is 12 ye ars of age. The psychologist [, Dr. Rosenblum,] saw this child four times and testified that A.Y.D. also has difficulty with impulse control, can be mouthy and irritable [,] and has tr ouble controlling her emotions. See Tr. I at 75. He opined that she req uired con tinued mental health treatment. Id. A.Y.D. resides with a foster mother now, but it took a long time to find one, with the child undergoing 10 d ifferent placements beforehand. Id. at 78, 204. A.Y.D.’s therapis t [, Ms. Tomasic] testified that A.Y.D. talks about Mother and Father and how much she misses and loves them. Id. at 9

- 10, 12, 17, 24

- 25. According to the therapist, A.Y.D. looks forward to parental visits, and describes Father as funny and fun [,] and tells the therapist about the place s he takes her. Id. at 12, 24

- 25. The therapist [, Ms. Tomasic,] noted that Father has been consistently involved in this child’s life. Id. at 25. The psychologist [, Dr. Rosenblum,] stated that he believed that, ultimately, [PLC] would serve A.Y.D. bet ter than adoption because of the meaningful relationships she has with her parents, especially with Father. Id. at 100

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- A.M.D., Jr. The third child in this case is A.M.D., Jr., age 9. A.M.D., Jr., according to the psychologist [, Dr. Rosenblum , ] has a high degree of impulsivity like his siblings. Id. at 73. He also suffers from ADHD [Attention Deficit Hyperactive Disorder, “ADHD”] and can be aggressive and oppositional. Id. at 74. After eight placements, he was seemingly settled in with his c urrent foster mother, who is patient with him, even though has done things like put a hole in her wall in a fit of anger. Id. This [c] ourt did hear testimony from the coordinator for foster care [, Ms. Redman] , who believes that A.M.D., Jr., has improved in the home [,] although the CYF case supervisor [, Ms. Kroll] , at the following hearing, agreed that he still exhib ited behavioral problems there. Id. at 150; Tr. II at 15.
Dr. Rosenblum’ s conclusions were the same as they were with A.Y.D.

— that [PLC] was prefera ble to adoption. See Tr. I at 100

- 01, 103

- 04, 123. Dr. Rosenblum gave a detailed description of the boy’ s interactional visit with Mother [,] where the boy went to her and hugged her for almost 10 minutes straight, demonstrating that the relati onship is very meaningful to him. Id. at 113. Dr. Rosenblum said that sometimes A.M.D., Jr., is reluctant about visits, but [,] when he knows that Mother is coming, he is willing to go [,] and that, at the interactional, the boy was “overwhelmed with emoti on” upon seeing Mother. Id. at 114. The psychologist [, Dr. Rosenblum,] believed termination would hurt the boy, and that his foster mother had even been afraid to raise the issue for fear of destabilizing him. Id. at 114

- 15. A.M.D., Jr., also remains v ery attached to [,] and expresses great love and affection for[,] Father. Id. at 115, 123

- 124, 129. Finally, as to the thre e [C]hildren, it is clear to the [c] ourt that they are very bonded to each other des pite their separate residences. See Tr. I at 77

. Mother
Mother has struggled throughout this case, and it cannot fairly be said that she has met her goals [,] because she has prog ressed and relapsed in cycles. See, e.g., id. at 87, 89. However, she has a lways made her way back to the [C] hildren and maintained a positive and loving relationship with them [,] when available. Mother’ s substance abuse problem bedevils her, and she has failedJ

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to show up for numerous drug screens when requested, as attested to by a wi tness from the Allegheny County’s [ sic] Health Department. Id. at 32

- 33. It should be noted that Mother did state at the second hearing that she was tested at the three

quarter home [,] where she resided prior to finding her recent housing [,] although she also admitted to one recent positi ve test for T HC [tetrahydrocannabinol], indicating marijuana usage. See Tr. II at 110

- 11, 137, 141. The psychologist [, Dr. Rosenblum,] testified that Mother does acknowledge her substance abuse problems , and that she has a history of domestic violence wi th a boyfriend other than Father. See Tr. I at 87. Mother also acknowledged her mental health history to CYF. Id. at 206. Mother has had treatment for ADHD, and Bipolar di sorder and, in the psychologist’ s [, Dr. Rosenblum’s] view, has tro uble understand ing the [C]hildren’ s emotional needs because Mother’ s own issues interfere in her parenting. Id. at 88

- 89. She suffers from depression and guilt about the [C] hildren , but loves them , even if she does not always keep them in the forefront of her mind. Id

. at 89. The psychologist [, Dr. Rosenblum,] credibly opined that Mother nee ds continued mental health care[,] a nd is not now able to meet the [C]hildren’s essential needs. Id. at 89

- 90. Dr. Rosenblum saw A.M.D., Jr., during interactional sessions with M other [,] and observed that Mother had difficulty providing the structure the boy needs [,] although sh e showed improvement over time. Id. at 92

- 93. Mother also improved slowl y in her responsiveness to the [C] hildren and in engaging them in constructive ac tivities. Id. at 88. Mother’ s relationship with M.Y.D. is the best of the three [Children] , and Mother clearly makes M.Y.D. feel loved, as described above. Id. at 95. At the time of the first hearing, Mother was follo wing through with more visits [with] M.Y.D. Id. at 108. At the second hea ring toward the end of the year, Mother was participating in mental health treatment [,] and was visiting with the [C] hildren three ti mes per month with supervision. See Tr. II [at] 18

- 19, 34

- 35. At that time, Mother herself testified that she had moved out of supportive housing and into a one

- bedroom a partment , although she did not want CYF to evaluate it before she got more furniture. Id. at 17

- 18, 112, 116

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downswings [,] and agrees that Mother can not independently care for the [C] hildren. Id. at 219, 221.
Father
Father overall has done a better job of making progress as a parent, but without sufficient stability to become thei r caretaker. Nonetheless, this [c] ourt finds t hat A.M.D., Jr., and A.Y.D. are beneficially bonded to him in a mutually loving relationship, and the tw o children need him. Id. Father was holding down two jobs in the ye ar prior to the second hearing. Id. at 154

- 55. He can be willful and sometimes fails to participate in programming or drug and alcohol screens beca use of his frustration with the system and its scrutiny of him [,] although he also did experience r elapses. See , e.g., Tr. I at 32

- 33, 82

- 83, 184. See also Tr. II at 23

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- 86. Father was facing criminal charges at the time of the first hearing, and his pr eoccupation with the possible outco mes affected his visitation for a time, but [,] by the second hearing, he was on probation with no further concern for incarceration, having pleaded guilty to possession of firearms and making terroristic threats. See Tr. II at 21, 170.
Dr. Rosenblum testified that Father has shown increased parenting skills and increased engagement w ith the [C]hildren during visits. See Tr. I at 85. Father’ s primary problems in the past in interacting with the [C] hildren involved a l ack of animation and some detachment, for example spending time text ing rather than talking to the [C] hildren. Id. at 90, 183

- 184. Dr. Rosenblum concluded that Father does want to do better with them[,] and lets the [C] hildren know he is proud of them an d loves them. Id. at 91

- 92. Significantly, the psychologist [, Dr. Rosenblum,] testified as follow s: His kids real ly love him and I think that he’ s done a good j ob of making them feel welcome, making them feel that he cares about them, maintaining a sens e of family and connectedness to one another. ... [H]e has a way of infusing his children with a sen se that “I love you, we’re connected, and we’ re a family. ” They have not let go of that. Id. at 123

- 24. Trial Court Opinion, 1/24/20, at 2

- 8.
On November 21 , 2019, the trial court entered orders as to each of the Children granting in part and denying in part CYF’s petitions , as explainedJ

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supra
. The trial court denied CYF’s petitions and concluded that CYF did not meet its burden of proof pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a) or (b) for the involuntary termination of parental rights of Mother to all three Children and of Father to A.M.D., Jr., and A.Y.D. 6 Thereafter, CYF timely filed notices of appeal and concise statements of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). On appeal, CYF raises two issues for our review:

1. Did the Orphans’ Court err as a matter of law and/or abuse its discretion in denying CYF’s petition to involuntarily terminate [Mother’s/Father’s paren tal rights] pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), and (8) after CYF proved by clear and convincing evidence the statutory grounds for termination?

2. Did the Orphans’ Court err as a matter of law and/or abuse its discretion in denying CYF’s petition to invo luntarily terminate [Mother’s/Father’s parental rights] pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b) after CYF proved by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s [/Father’s] parental rights would best serve the developmental, physical and emot ional needs and welfare of the [C] hildren?
CYF’s Brief s at 5. CYF contends that the court abused its discretion when it denied CYF’s petitions. CYF argues that it proved by clear and convincing evidence that Mother and Father failed to remedy t he i r incapacity to parent related to the
issues which caused the Children to be removed from the parents’ care

. In reviewing an appeal from the denial of a petition to terminate parental rights , we adhere to the following standard :

_________________ __________ ______ ____ _______
6 As noted supra in n. 1, the court granted CYF’s petition as to the termination of Father’s parental rights to M.

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[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion standard when considering a trial court’s determination of a petition for termination of parental rights. As in dependency cases, our standard of review requires an appellate court to accept the findings of fact and credibili ty determinations of the trial court if th ey are supported by the record. In re: R.J.T. , 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010)

. If the factual findings are supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial court made an error o f law or abused its discretion. Id. ; In re R.I.S. , 36 A.3d 567, 572 (Pa. 2011) (plurality). As has been often stated, an abuse of discretion does not result merely because the reviewing court might h ave reached a different conclusion. Id. ; see also Samuel – Bassett v. Kia Motors America, Inc. , 34 A.3d 1, 51 (Pa. 2011) ; Christianson v. Ely , 838 A.2d 630, 634 (Pa. 2003)

. Instead, a decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill

- will. Id.
As we discussed in R.J.T. , there are clear reasons for applying an abuse of discretion sta n dard of review in these cases. We observed that, unlike trial courts, appellate courts are not equipped to make the fact

- specific determinations on a cold record, where the trial judges are observing the parties during the relevant hearing and often presi ding over numerous other hearings r egarding the child and parents. R.J.T. , 9 A.3d at 1190

. Therefore, even where the facts could support an opposite result, as is often the case in dependency and termination cases , an appellate court must resist the urge to second guess the trial court and impose its own credibility determinations and judgment; instead we must defer to the trial judges so long as the factual findings are supported by the record and the court’s lega l conclusions are not the result of an error of law or an abuse of discretion. In re Adoption of Atencio , 650 A.2d 1064, 1066 (Pa. 1994)

. In re I.E.P. , 87 A.3d 340, 343

– 44 (Pa . Super. 2014) (quoting In re Adoption of S.P. , 47 A.3d 817, 826

– 27 (Pa. 2012) ). The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of par entalJ

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rights are valid. In re R.N.J. , 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009)

. Moreover, we have explained, “[t]he standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined as testimony that is so ‘clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.’” Id
. ( quoting In re J.L.C. , 837 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2003) ). “Satisfaction of the requirements
in o nly one subsection of Section 2511(a) , along with consideration of the provisions in Section 2511(b) , is sufficient for termination.” In re Z.S.W. , 946 A.2d 726, 729 (Pa. Super. 2008) (brackets omitted, emphasis in original). Section 2511 of the Adoption Act provides, in relevant part, as follows:
§ 2511 . Grounds for involuntary termination (a) General rule. -- The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following grounds:

* * * (2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well

- being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.
* * * 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a) (2 )

. With respect to section 2511(a)(2), the moving party must produce
clear and convincin g evidence regarding the following elements: (1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal caused the child to be without essential parentalJ

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care, control or subsistence necessary for his p hysical or mental well

- being; and (3) the causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will
not be remedied. See In re Adoption of M.E.P. , 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2003). The grounds for termination of parental rights under sectio n 2511(a)(2), due to parental incapacity that cannot be remedied, are not limited to affirmative misconduct; to the contrary those grounds may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental duties. In re A.L.D. 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Su per. 2002). In the present case, the trial court conceded that it could find grounds to terminate the parental rights of Mother and Father:
Given the parents’ inconsistency in making progress toward their goals and the amount of time each has had to make significant changes, this [c] ourt could find grounds to terminate the parents’ rights, partic ularly under Subsection (a)(2). The [c] ourt notes, however, that at different points in the case during a parental upswing, this would not have been the correct r esult in striking a balance between the parents’ progress and the [C]hildren’ s needs. It is a frustration to all i nvolved that neither parent has managed to do better over a consistent period of time, knowing the b ond that the [C]hildren have with them. I n this difficult case, it is noteworthy that even the expert psychol ogist [, Dr. Rosenblum,] could not offer a view on the preferred outcome with reasonable professional certainty. Trial Court Opinion, 1/24/20, at 10. While the trial court noted that it co uld find that CYF met its burden under section 2511(a)(2), 7 the court concluded that neither reunification nor

_________________ __________ ______ ____ _______
7 As the trial court focused o n section 2511(a)(2), and conceded that CYF met its burden thereunder, we need not discuss a second subsection of section (a), i.e., (a)(8). In re Z.S.W. , 946 A.2d 726, 729 (Pa. Super. 2008).J

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adoption is best suited for the Children’s needs and welfare, and concluded
that SPLC 8 is appropriate in this case. The court explained:
Although both parents have relapsed in their sobriety and have gone through times in which their participation waned, both have consistently tried again and again, and both have demonstrated love and commitment to the [C]hildren. None of the [C] hildren wa nt to sever their ties, and all express deep affection for their parents [,] and have beneficial and bonded relationships with them. Witnesses testified that, after the passage of so much time, achieving permanence with another family becomes more difficul t. While adoption is often a preferred result, as the court

- appointed psychologist Dr. Neil Rosenblum expla ined in straightforward terms, “in this particular case we’ re not dealing with young children who are going to say, you know, they have a new mommy and a new daddy.” Id. at 101. See also id. at 115; Tr. II at 219

- 23.

_________________ __________ ______ ____ _______
8 In In re Adoption of J.N.M. , 177 A.3d 937, 946 n.9 (Pa. S uper. 2018) , this Court stated that SPLC is one of the permanency goals the juvenile court may consider at each permanency review hearing. 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(f.1)(3)

. SPLC is a program that was created in 2001, in which financial support i s provided to families willing to become permanent legal custodians under 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(f.1)(3) , whereby permanent legal custody is transferred to the dependent child’s legal custodian without requiring the termination of the parents’ p arental rights, and, where deemed appropriate, the trial court may permit the continued visitation by the dependent child’s parents. J.N.M. , 177 A.3d at 946 n.9 (quoting In re B.S. , 861 A.2d 974, 977 (Pa. Super. 2004) ). The legal custodian must meet all of the requirements for foster parenthood, submit to an annual eligibility evaluation, and have the ability to provide for the child without court supervision. The panel in J.N.M. s tated that alternative permanency arrangements such as an SPLC offer less stability than adoption because parents may petition the court to attempt to re

- gain custody at any time, but an SPLC may be appropriate in cases where reunification or adoption is not in the best interest of the child. J.N.M. , 177 A.3d at 946 n.9 (citing In re S.H. , 71 A.3d 973, 978 (Pa. Super. 2013) ).J

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Pr imarily for these reasons, the [c] ourt could n ot in good conscience grant CYF’ s petitions to terminate parental rights. On the other hand, the evidence showed that neither parent i s i n a position to care for these [C] hildren, and years of services and reunification efforts have not chang ed this. Further, the [C]hildren’ s foster placements, imperfect or not, are reasonable for them at this time, given their individual needs and diff iculties in foster care. Trial Court Opinion, 1/24/20, at 11

. The trial court concluded that SPLC is most suited for cases precisely like this one, and credited the testimony of Dr. Rosenblum, who proffered that “SPLC could satisfy a permanency outcome for these children in a satisfactory manner”. N.T., 2/6/19, at 101. The legal interests counsel/GAL suggested that SPLC may be in the Children’s best interests given that they have expressed a “strong desire” for continued parental contact no matter wha t the outcome. N.T., 11/6/19, at 208. The legal interests counsel/GAL added that the Children “are fine as of now remaining with the foster parents” but that “they do not want to be adopted.” Id. Upon review, we conclude that the trial court did not ab use its discretion when it determined that SPLC was in the Children’s best interests. As the trial court based its SPLC orders on the testimony presented and the record supports its factual findings, we conclude no abuse of discretion occurred.
As to Sec tion 2511(b), our Supreme Court has stated as follows:
[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are met, a court “shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 251 1(b). The emotional needs and welfare of the child have been properly interpreted to include “[i]ntangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability.” In re K.M. , 53 A.3d 781, 791 ( Pa. Super. 2012). In In re E.M. , [620 A.2d 481, 485 (Pa. 1993)], t his Court held that the determination of the child’s “needs and welfare” requires consideration of the emotional bonds betweenJ

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the parent and child. The “utmost attention” should be paid to discerning the effect on the child of permanently severing the pa rental bond. In re K.M. , 53 A.3d at 791. However, as discussed below, evaluation of a child’s bonds is not always an easy task.
In re T.S.M. , 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). Generally, this Court has stated that a parent’s own feelings of love and
affectio n for a child, alone, will not preclude termination of parental rights. In
re L.M. , 923 A.2d 505, 512 (Pa. Super. 2007). We have stated that a “child’s life ‘simply cannot be put on hold in the hope that [a parent] will summon the ability to handle the r esponsibilities of parenting.’” In re Z.P. , 994 A.2d 1108, 1125 (Pa. Super. 2010). Our Supreme Court has instructed, however, that this Court should
defer to the trial court where a “close call” was made. See In re R.J.T
. , 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010 )

. Therefore, even where the facts could support an opposite result, as is often the case in dependency and termination cases, an appellate court must resist the urge to second guess the trial court and impose its own credibility determinations and judgme nt; instead we must defer to the trial judges so long as the factual findings are supported by the record and the court ’ s legal conclusions are not the result of an error of law or an abuse of discretion. In re Adoption of Atencio , 650 A.2d 1064, 1066 (Pa . 1994). In re Adoption of S.P. , 47 A.3d at 826

- 27

. In the present case, t he trial court denied CYF’s petition s to involuntarily
termin ate the parental rights of Mother and Father pursuant to Section 2511(b), and explained , in part:J

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Ultimatel y, to this [c]ourt, the case centered on CYF’ s failure to prove that termination of parental ri ghts would serve these [C] hildren ’ s needs and welfare by any evidentiary standard. This [c] ourt concluded that termination would in fact be contrary to the [C]hildren’ s i nterests. In cases such as these, the court must engage in a “ determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child of perma nently severing any such bond.” In re N.A.M. , 33 A.3d 95, 100 (Pa. Super.2011) (quoting In re L.M. , 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007)).

Trial Court O pinion, 1/24/20, at 10

- 11

. As set forth infra , the trial court concluded that Mother and Father have demonstrated, however inconsistently, their love and commitment to Children, none of whom want to sever their ties to their parents, and all of
whom hav e beneficial and bonded relationships with them. Our review of the record supports the trial court’s conclusion. Dr. Rosenblum testified that he had considerable reservations about recommending termination. Rather, Dr. Rosenblum opined that “SPLC is prob ably the choice that presents with the greatest deg ree of

-- the best fit for the [C] hildren right now.” N.T., 2/6/19, at 128. With respect to M.

- A.D. and Mother, Dr. Rosenblum emphasized that it would be “literally reckless” to terminate Mother’s parental rights. Id. at 99. Dr. Rosenblum believed “the relationship of [A.Y.D. and A.M.D., Jr.] with both parents, but particularl y with [F]ather, is meaningful and, therefore, overall thought a goal of SPLC was perhaps a better selection . . . it would still allow a connection to birth parents, even if it was on a more limited basis.” Id. at 100

- 101. Dr. Rosenblum stated that “[e] veryone knows that these children don’t want to be adopted and have close connections to their parents.”J

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A fter a careful review of the record, we conclude that the trial court’s findings have sufficient support in the certified record and that the court did not commit an error of law or abuse of discretion in its determination that SPLC is in the Children’s best interests pursuant to Section 2511(b).
As discussed supra , our Supreme Court has stated, appellate courts

– unlike trial courts

– are not in a position to make the close calls based on fact

specific determinations. In re R.J.T. , 9 A.3d at 1190

. Not only do trial judges observe the parties during the termination hearing, but they usually preside
over the d ependency hearings with the same parties and have a longitudinal understanding of the case and the best inte rests of the children involved. Id. Therefore, even where the facts could support an opposite result, as is often the case in dependency and term ination cases, an appellate court must resist the urge to second guess the trial court and impose its own credibility determinations and judgment so long as the factual findings are supported by
the record and the trial court’ s legal conclusions are not the result of an error of law or an abuse of discretion. In re Adoption of S.P. , 47 A.3d at 826

- 827

. In the present case, the trial court explained that “what it came down
to is that Dr. Rosenblum believes that neith er of [the parents] have demonstrated the capacity to meet [the Children’s] essential needs,” however, the trial court also determined that “it’s not clear and convincing that it’s in the [C]hildren’s best interests to terminate.” N.T., 11/6/19, at 219. The trial court concluded that a goal of SPLC is in the Children’s best interests. Id. at
223.J

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After a careful review of the record in this matter, we find the record supports the trial court’s factual findings, and the court’s conclusions regarding SPL C are supported by competent evidence in the record, and are not the result of an error of law or an abuse of discretion. In re Adoption of
S.P. , 47 A.3d at 826

- 27; In re: T.S.M. , 71 A.3d at 267. CYF argues that this case is akin to T.S.M , supra
. See CYF ’s Brief at
41

- 42. In T.S.M. , the trial court had denied petitions for the termination of the parental rights of a mother to the five youngest of her seven children. In
re T.S.M. , 71 A.3d at 253. Each child had been in six to thirteen foster placements, and each was experiencing significant psychological and behavioral problems. Id

. The trial court found that the evidence support ed the termination of parental rights under section 2511(a)(2) ; however, the trial court also found that termination did not best serve the needs and welfare of the children required under section 2511(b) , as well as subse ction 2511(a)(5) and (a)(8)

. Id. at 259

– 60

. The trial court pointed to the evidence of a strong
bond b etween the children and mother. Id. at 260

. Ultimately, upon review, o ur Supreme Court noted that , while the parent

- child bond was strong, the trial court minimized the children's unhealthy and pathological bond with their mother. Id. at 271

. The Supreme Court noted that the trial cou rt failed to recognize the substantial, possibly permanent, damage done to the children by the prolonged, unhealthy, pathological bond with their mother t hat was preventing the children’ s ability to form attach ments to their foster families. Id. at 271

. Here, unlike the situation in In re T.S.M. , the testimony provided by Dr. Rosenblum supported the trial court’s finding that there is a clear bondJ

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between the Children and their parents, and there was no evidence tha t the bond was harmful. Thus, this Court finds the factual situation in T.S.M. distinguishable from the instant appeal, and CYF’s argument misplaced. CYF contends that it was error for the trial court to consider that M.

- A.D. was not in a pre

- adoptive home when making its decision. See CYF’s Brief at
54

- 55. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 2512(b) (“If the petitioner is an agency it shall not be required to aver that an adoption is presently c ontemplated nor that a person with a present intention to adopt exists.”). However, as our Supreme Court has stated, “[c]ommon sense dictates that courts considering termination must also consider whether the children are in a pre

- adoptive home and whethe r they have a bond with their foster parents.” T.S.M. , 71 A.3d at 268 . In addition, the Pennsylvania Dependency Benchbook provides that “[w]hile having an identified adoptive resource is not a prerequisite for [term ination of parental rights], ideally there should be a strong likelihood of eventual adoption.” Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts Office of Children and Families in the Courts, Pennsylvania Dependency Benchbook § 12.1 at 126 (2010).
At the tim e of the final termination hearing in November of 2019, M.

- A.D. was thirteen years of age, and had consistently and unequivocally maintained a preference not to have Mother’s rights terminated. Although
CYF avers that M.

- A.D. was residing in a suitable fo ster home identified as a long

- term placement, M.

- A.D. had only been in that placement for the two months preceding the November 2019 termination hearing. Moreover, in that
two

- month period, an incident occurred where M.

- A.D. was missing for severalJ

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hours and the police were contacted. N.T., 11/6/19, at 52. Dr. Rosenblum cautioned:
[W]e are dealing with a youngster who has significant history of significant mental health and adjustment concerns. And so, it would be important, in my opinion, to assess i t over a reasonable period of time so that one would have certainty. Two months would certainly seem a bit premature to be making a final conclusion as to whether this is going to be a placement that has a reasonable chance of long

- term success. And even at [M.

- A.D.’s] age, you know, it certainly is, in my experience, a much higher risk of an adoptive disruption or a disruption to an adoptive placement, you know, with a youngster who is [eleven] now [thirteen] years of age. She’ll be [fourteen] in three months. Id. at 92

- 93. The trial court credited Dr. Rosenblum’s testimony that he would be concerned about prematurely moving forward with termination “without more confirmation or evidence over a longer period of time.” Id. at 102. Based on the foregoing , we conclude the trial c ourt ’ s findings are supported by the competent evidence in the record, and the trial court did not
err or abus e its discretion in denying CYF’ s petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights as to M.

- A.D. M.

- A.D. may never return to the care of Mother,
but the trial court found no benefit in making M.

- A.D. “a psychological orphan. ” N.T., 2/6/19 at 100. Dr. Rosenblum testified that M.

- A.D. derived ben efit from her bond with Mother. Id. at 95 and 113. Simply stated, it is
M.

- A.D. ’s age and the fact that she does not wish to be adopted that make termination of Mother’s parental rights not in her best interests. See In re Adoption of S.P. , 47 A.3d at 826

- 27 (“[E]ven where the facts could support an opposite result, as is often the case in dependency and termination cases, an appellate court must resist the urge to second guess the trial court andJ

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impose its own credibility determinations and judgment; instead we must defer to the trial judges so long as the factual findings are supported by the record and the court's legal conclusions are not the result of an error of law or an abuse of discretion.”). Finally, CYF avers that the trial c ourt committed an error of law when it
determined that S PLC is the most appropriate permanency option for the Children. Further, CYF argues that it was error for the trial Court to rely on
In re B.S. , 861 A.2d 974 (Pa. Super. 2004), as that was a goal change case which interpreted the Juvenile Act not the Adoption Act. As our Supreme Court has previously stated, appellate courts

– unlike trial courts

– are not in a position to make the close calls based on fact

- specific
determinations. In re R.J.T. , 9 A.3d at 1190. Not only do trial judges observe the parties during the termination hearing, but they usually preside over the dependency hearings with the same parties and have a longitudinal understanding of the case and the best interests of the children involved. Id. Therefore, even where the facts could support an opposite result, as is often the case in dependency and termination cases, an appellate court must resist the urge to second guess the trial court and impose its own credibility determinations and judgment so long as the factual findings are supported by
the record and the orphans’ court’ s legal conclusions are not the result of an error of law or an abuse of discretion. In re Adoption of S.P. , 47 A.3d at 827

. Here, th e trial court conceded that “in this difficult case, it is noteworthy that even the expert psychologist [, Dr. Rosenblum,] could not offer a view on the preferred outcome with a reasonable [degree of] of professionalJ

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certainty.” Trial Court Opinion, 1/24/ 20, at 10. The trial court concluded that, despite the parents’ inconsistency in making progress towards their goals, “both have demonstrated love and commitment to the [C]hildren. None of the [C]hildren want to sever their ties, and all express deep aff ection for their parents and have beneficial and bonded relationships with them” Id. at 10.
As o ur Supreme Cour t has instructed, this Court should defer to the trial court
where a “ close call ” was made. See R.J.T. , 9 A.3d at 1190

. After review of the certified record, we find that there was competent, clear and convincing evidence in the record to support the trial court's denial of the petitions to terminate Mother ’ s parental rights to the Children and Father’ s pa rental rights to A.Y.D. and A.M.D., Jr . Accordi ngly, we affirm the trial court’ s order s
. Orders affirmed. Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 6/12/2020J

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