alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Jorge OLAYO-AGUILAR, Petitioner, v. Michael B. MUKASEY,* Attorney General; et al., Respondents.

No. 06-75222.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Dec. 20, 2007 **.

Filed Dec. 28, 2007.

*73Bethania Maria, Esq., Law Offices of Bethania Maria, Sacramento, CA, for Petitioner.

Ronald E. LeFevre, Chief Counsel, Office of the District Counsel, San Francisco, CA, Ari Nazarov, Esq., Washington, DC, for Respondent.

Before: GOODWIN, WALLACE, and HAWKINS, Circuit Judges.

*

 Michael B. Mukasey is substituted for his predecessor, Alberto R. Gonzales, as Attorney General of the United States, pursuant to Fed. R.App. P. 43(c)(2).

**

**The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM ***

Jorge Olayo-Aguilar seeks review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals summarily affirming an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) order denying his application for cancellation of removal. We dismiss the petition for review.

We lack jurisdiction to review the IJ’s discretionary determination that Olayo-Aguilar failed to show exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to a qualifying relative. *See Romero-Torres v. Ashcroft,*327 F.3d 887, 892 (9th Cir.2003).

Olayo-Aguilar’s contention that the agency deprived him of due process by misapplying the law to the facts of his case does not state a colorable due process claim. *See Martinez-Rosas v. Gonzales,*424 F.3d 926, 930 (9th Cir.2005) (“[Tjraditional abuse of discretion challenges recast as alleged due process violations do not constitute colorable constitutional claims that would invoke our jurisdiction.”); *see also Sanchez-Cruz v. INS,*255 F.3d 775, 779 (9th Cir.2001) (holding that the “misapplication of case law” may not be reviewed).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DISMISSED.

***

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
EXHIBIT 99.3

CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM

We consent to the use of our reports dated February 28, 2013 with respect to the consolidated financial statements of Talisman
Energy Inc., which comprise the consolidated balance sheets as at December 31, 2012 and 2011, and the consolidated statements of income, comprehensive income, changes in shareholders'
equity and cash flows for the years ended December 31, 2012, 2011 and 2010, and a summary of significant accounting policies and other explanatory information, and the effectiveness of internal
control over financial reporting of Talisman Energy Inc. as at December 31, 2012, included in an exhibit to the Annual Report (Form 40-F) for the year ended
December 31, 2012.

We
also consent to the incorporation by reference in (i) the Registration Statement (Form S-8 No. 333-178449) pertaining to the Employee
Stock Option Plan and Director Stock Option Plan of Talisman Energy Inc., (ii) the Registration Statement (Form S-8 No. 333-154924) pertaining to
the Corporate Strategy Implementation Recognition Program of Talisman Energy Inc., (iii) the Registration Statement (Form S-8 No. 333- 178450)
pertaining to Performance Share Unit Plan for Eligible Employees of Talisman Energy Inc. and its Affiliates, and (iv) the shelf Registration Statement (Form F-10
No. 333-180401), of our reports dated February 28, 2013, with respect to the consolidated financial statements of Talisman Energy Inc., which comprise the consolidated
balance sheets as at December 31, 2012 and 2011, and the consolidated statements of income, comprehensive income, changes in shareholders' equity and cash flows for the years ended
December 31, 2012, 2011 and 2010, and a summary of significant accounting policies and other explanatory information, and the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting of
Talisman
Energy Inc. as at December 31, 2012, included in an exhibit to the Annual Report (Form 40-F) for the year ended December 31, 2012.

Signed
"Ernst & Young LLP"

Calgary,
Canada
February 28, 2013

---



QuickLinks
**Exhibit 35.1**

 

**Servicer Compliance Statement of John Deere Capital Corporation**

 

I, Andrew C. Traeger, Senior Vice President and Controller of John Deere Capital Corporation, certify:

 

A review of John Deere Capital Corporation’s activities for the period from November 1, 2014 through October 31, 2015 (the “Reporting Period”) and of John Deere Capital Corporation’s performance under the Sale and Servicing Agreement dated as of April 10, 2013 among John Deere Capital Corporation, John Deere Receivables, Inc. and John Deere Owner Trust 2013 has been made under my supervision, and to the best of my knowledge based on such review, John Deere Capital Corporation has fulfilled all its obligations under all relevant agreements in all material respects throughout the Reporting Period.

 
| Date: January 8,   2016 | John Deere Capital   Corporation |
|------------------------------|----------------------------------|
|                         |                             |
|                         |                             |
|                         |                             |
|                         | By                               | /s/*Andrew C.   Traeger* |
|                         |                             |  

        Andrew   C. Traeger |
|                         |                             |  

        Senior   Vice President and Controller |

 

----
```

[Congressional Bills 114th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 924 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

114th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 S. 924

  To require the National Credit Union Administration to hold public 
 hearings and receive comments from the public on its budget, and for 
                            other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             April 14, 2015

Mr. Heller (for himself and Mr. Warner) introduced the following bill; 
which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing, 
                           and Urban Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To require the National Credit Union Administration to hold public 
 hearings and receive comments from the public on its budget, and for 
                            other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``National Credit Union Administration 
Budget Transparency Act''.

SEC. 2. BUDGET TRANSPARENCY FOR THE NCUA.

    Section 209(b) of the Federal Credit Union Act (12 U.S.C. 1789) is 
amended--
            (1) by redesignating paragraphs (1) and (2) as paragraphs 
        (2) and (3), respectively;
            (2) by inserting before paragraph (2), as so redesignated, 
        the following:
            ``(1) on an annual basis and prior to the submission of the 
        detailed business-type budget required under paragraph (2)--
                    ``(A) make publicly available and cause to be 
                printed in the Federal Register a draft of such 
                detailed business-type budget; and
                    ``(B) hold a public hearing, with public notice 
                provided of such hearing, wherein the public can submit 
                comments on the draft of such detailed business-type 
                budget;''; and
            (3) in paragraph (2), as so redesignated--
                    (A) by inserting ``detailed'' after ``submit a''; 
                and
                    (B) by inserting ``, and where such budget shall 
                address any comments submitted by the public pursuant 
                to paragraph (1)(B)'' after ``Control Act''.
                                 <all>
```
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<CIK> 0000887021
<NAME> LIGGETT GROUP INC.
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
<CURRENCY> U.S. DOLLARS
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1997
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                      1
<CASH>                                             477
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   10,047
<ALLOWANCES>                                       930
<INVENTORY>                                     49,261
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                60,329
<PP&E>                                          48,643
<DEPRECIATION>                                  29,981
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  85,507
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          141,499
<BONDS>                                        107,245
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                    (179,782)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    85,507
<SALES>                                         66,301
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                66,301
<CGS>                                           30,259
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   30,259
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 1,808
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               6,040
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 (1,104)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             (1,104)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    (1,104)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
#### Luyties and others *v.*Hollender and others.

*(Circuit Court, S. D. New York.*

August 9, 1884.)

Trade-Marks—State Laws.

The rights and remedies concerning trade-marks generally depend upon tho laws of the states, common or statutory, and not upon the laws of the United Slates.

In Equity.

*Samuel T. Smith,*for orators.

*Louis C. Raegener,*for defendants.

Wheeler, J.

Eights and remedies pertaining to trade-marks generally depend upon the laws of the state, common and statutory, and not upon the laws of the United States. *Trade-mark Cases,*100 U. S. 82. The laws of the United States now in force, under which this trade-mark was registered, relate only to trade-marks specially used in commerce with foreign nations, or with the Indian tribes. Act of March 3, 1881, (21 St. at Large, *c.*137, § 1.) They are particularly restricted so as not to give cognizance to any court of the United States in an action or suit between citizens of the same state, unless the trade-mark in controversy is used on goods intended to be transported to a foreign country, or in lawful commercial intercourse with an Indian tribe. Id. § 11. Tho goods on which the trademark in question is used are not intended to be transported to any foreign country, nor for any Indian tribe, but are mineral waters sold for consumption in the city of New York; and the parties are all citizens of the state of New York.

As this case is now presented, the orators are not entitled to maintain it in this court, and this motion for a preliminary injunction must he denied.
#### Jason Mark SMITH *v.*STATE of Arkansas

CR 98-329

962 S.W.2d 813

Supreme Court of Arkansas

Opinion delivered April 9, 1998

*Joel O.Huggins,*for appellant.

No response.

Per Curiam.

Appellant Jason Mark Smith, by and through his attorney, has filed a motion for a rule on the clerk. His attorney, Joel O. Huggins, states in the motion that the record was tendered late due to a mistake on his part.

We find that such an error, admittedly made by an attorney for a criminal defendant, is good cause to grant the motion. *See In Re Belated Appeals in Criminal Cases,*265 Ark. 964 (1979) (per curiam).

The motion is, therefore, granted. A copy of this opinion will be forwarded to the Committee on Professional conduct.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT STACY LEE WATTS, ) ) Appellant, ) ) v. ) Case No. 2D18-1079 ) STATE OF FLORIDA, ) ) Appellee. ) ___________________________________) Opinion filed September 26, 2018. Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(b)(2) from the Circuit Court for Collier County; Christine Greider, Judge.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

SILBERMAN, BADALAMENTI, and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, JJ., Concur.
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 15**  **- 7508** 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee ,
v. JOHN C. CURTISS , Defendant

- Appellant
.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia , at Richmond
. Robert E. Payne , Senior District Judge. ( 3:88

- cr - 00053

- REP

- RCY; 3:12

- cv - 00752

- REP

- RCY )

Submitted : March 29 , 2016 Decided: March 31, 2016

Before GREGORY and DUNCAN , Circuit Judges , and DAVIS, Senior Circuit Judge
.
Dismissed by un published per curiam opinion
. John C. Curtiss, Appellant Pro Se. Stephen Wiley Miller, Assistant United States Attorney, Jessica D. Aber, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: John C. Curtiss seeks to appeal the district court’s order dismissing as untimely his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certific ate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (B) (2012) . A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012)
. When the district court denies relief on the me rits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see Miller

- El v. Cockrell , 5 37 U.S. 322, 336

- 38 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack , 529 U.S. at 484

- 85. We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Curtiss has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal3 contentions are adequately presented in the materials before th is court and arg ument would not aid the decisional process.
DISMISSED
#### Normenia B. SOWERS, Administratrix of the Estate of Clair R. Sowers, Deceased, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION and Fleet Carrier Corporation; Normenia B. SOWERS, Administratrix of the Estate of Anita Louise Sowers, a minor, deceased, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION and Fleet Carrier Corporation; John SOWERS, Rosie Sowers and Barbara Jean Sowers, minors by their parent and natural guardian, Normenia B. Sowers and Normenia B. Sowers, in her own right, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION and Fleet Carrier Corporation; Normenia B. SOWERS, Administratrix of the Estate of Clair B. Sowers, Deceased, v. Kenneth WYMER.

Civ. A. Nos. 16265, 16280, 16308, 16957.

United States District Court, E. D. Pennsylvania.

Nov. 17, 1954.

Richter, Lord & Farage, Philadelphia, Pa., for plaintiffs.

John F. Donohue, Philadelphia, Pa., for defendants.

WELSH, District Judge.

In these actions, plaintiffs are seeking the depositions of the defendant, Ken*563neth Wymer, driver of a vehicle owned by the corporate defendants. The defendants are unwilling to have the driver, a resident of Pontiac, Michigan, appear for depositions here, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, unless all of the travel expenses and wages lost by the driver while attending the depositions are paid by the plaintiff. The matter is before the Court on plaintiffs’ motion under Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. rule 26, 28 U.S.C., to compel the driver to appear for depositions.

 A determination of the question of whether or not a party is obliged to pay the transportation costs and lost wages of an individual whose depositions are sought rests in the sound discretion of the Court, and how the Court exercises the discretion lodged in it depends on the facts and circumstances of a particular case. The plaintiffs in urging that the Court exercise its discretion in their favor advance the following facts:

1. The depositions of the driver are being sought at the place where plaintiffs commenced their action;

2. All of the plaintiffs reside in this District;

3. This is the District where the accident happened and where other witnesses are to be found, and

4. Plaintiffs are a destitute widow and her three minor children, the oldest of which is ten years of age.

The defendants, on the other hand, urge the following facts in their favor:

1. The transportation costs and wages lost will be borne by the driver and not the corporate defendants;

2. The information sought from the driver can be obtained equally as well by interrogatories, and

3. Plaintiffs can refer the matter to counsel at the residence of the operator, namely, Pontiac, Michigan.

In our judgment the facts favor the plaintiffs and we accordingly grant plaintiffs’ motion under Rule 26.

An appropriate order will be prepared and submitted.
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-20613

Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

TIMOTEO JUAN FLORES, also known as Timoteo Juan-Flores,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:15-CR-251-1

Before REAVLEY, ELROD, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Appealing the judgment in a criminal case, Timoteo Juan Flores raises

an argument that is foreclosed by United States v. Rodriguez, 711 F.3d 541, 

562-63 & n.28 (5th Cir. 2013) (en banc), in which we held that the generic, 

contemporary definition of sexual abuse of a minor does not require the age of 

consent to be below 17 years old and does not include an age-differential 

requirement. He also raises an argument that is foreclosed by United States 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

August 16, 2016

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 15-20613 Document: 00513638999 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/16/2016
No. 15-20613

2

v. Elizondo-Hernandez, 755 F.3d 779, 781-82 (5th Cir. 2014), which held that 

the Texas offense of indecency with a child by contact satisfied the generic 

definition of sexual abuse of a minor. Accordingly, the motion for summary 

affirmance is GRANTED, the alternative motion for an extension of time to file 

a brief is DENIED, and the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

 Case: 15-20613 Document: 00513638999 Page: 2 Date Filed: 08/16/2016
114TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. 817 

AN ACT 

To provide for the addition of certain real property to the 

reservation of the Siletz Tribe in the State of Oregon. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
2 

†S 817 ES

1 SECTION 1. PURPOSE; CLARIFICATION. 

2 (a) PURPOSE.—The purpose of this Act is to facili3 tate fee-to-trust applications for the Siletz Tribe within 

4 the geographic area specified in the amendment made by 

5 this Act. 

6 (b) CLARIFICATION.—Except as specifically provided 

7 otherwise by this Act or the amendment made by this Act, 

8 nothing in this Act or the amendment made by this Act, 

9 shall prioritize for any purpose the claims of any federally 

10 recognized Indian tribe over the claims of any other feder11 ally recognized Indian tribe. 

12 SEC. 2. TREATMENT OF CERTAIN PROPERTY OF THE 

13 SILETZ TRIBE OF THE STATE OF OREGON. 

14 Section 7 of the Siletz Tribe Indian Restoration Act 

15 (25 U.S.C. 711e) is amended by adding at the end the 

16 following: 

17 ‘‘(f) TREATMENT OF CERTAIN PROPERTY.— 

18 ‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.— 

19 ‘‘(A) TITLE.—The Secretary may accept 

20 title to any additional number of acres of real 

21 property located within the boundaries of the 

22 original 1855 Siletz Coast Reservation estab23 lished by Executive order dated November 9, 

24 1855, comprised of land within the political 

25 boundaries of Benton, Douglas, Lane, Lincoln, 

26 Tillamook, and Yamhill Counties in the State of 
3 

†S 817 ES

1 Oregon, if that real property is conveyed or oth2 erwise transferred to the United States by or on 

3 behalf of the tribe. 

4 ‘‘(B) TRUST.—Land to which title is ac5 cepted by the Secretary under this paragraph 

6 shall be held in trust by the United States for 

7 the benefit of the tribe. 

8 ‘‘(2) TREATMENT AS PART OF RESERVATION.— 

9 All real property that is taken into trust under para10 graph (1) shall— 

11 ‘‘(A) be considered and evaluated as an on12 reservation acquisition under part 151.10 of 

13 title 25, Code of Federal Regulations (or suc14 cessor regulations); and 

15 ‘‘(B) become part of the reservation of the 

16 tribe. 

17 ‘‘(3) PROHIBITION ON GAMING.—Any real prop18 erty taken into trust under paragraph (1) shall not 

19 be eligible, or used, for any gaming activity carried 
4 

†S 817 ES

1 out under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (25 

2 U.S.C. 2701 et seq.).’’. 

Passed the Senate July 14, 2016. 

Attest: 

Secretary. 

114TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. 817 

AN ACT 

To provide for the addition of certain real property 

of Oregon. to the reservation of the Siletz Tribe in the State
Exhibit 99.2





CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. §1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF
2002



In connection with the Quarterly Report of Universal
Hospital Services, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ended March 31, 2003 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, John A. Gappa, Chief Financial Officer of the
Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents,
in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





/s/    JOHN A. GAPPAJohn A. Gappa Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer May 13, 2003






A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to
the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.



22