UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

)

JUDICIAL WATCH, INC, )

)

 Plaintiff, )

)

 v. )

)

Civil Action No. 20-cv-1789 (TSC)

MURIEL BOWSER, in her official capacity 

as Mayor of the District of Columbia, et al., 

)

)

)

 Defendants. )

)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Judicial Watch, Inc., a not-for-profit organization, has sued Defendants—D.C.

Mayor Muriel Bowser, Interim Deputy Mayor John Falcicchio, and Director of Transportation 

Jeffrey Martoonian—alleging that they violated its First Amendment rights by denying its 

request to paint its organization’s motto on city streets. Defendants have moved to dismiss 

Plaintiff’s lawsuit, and, for the reasons explained below, the court will GRANT Defendants’ 

motion to dismiss. 

I. BACKGROUND

On June 5, 2020, in the wake of widespread protests surrounding the killing of George 

Floyd in Minneapolis, Minnesota, employees of MuralsDC and the D.C. Department of Public 

Works (“DPW”) teamed up with local artists to paint the words “Black Lives Matter” and the 

D.C. flag (“BLM mural”) on a two-block stretch of 16th Street, NW. ECF No. 1, Compl. ¶ 7, 

10. The two-block stretch was closed to traffic and remained so when Plaintiff filed this lawsuit. 

Id. ¶ 13. Mayor Bowser approved the work, and the day after it was painted stated, “[t]here are 

people who are craving to be heard and to be seen and to have their humanity recognized. We 
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had the opportunity to send that message loud and clear on a very important street in our city.” 

Id. ¶ 10. 

On June 6, 2020, activists acting without the Mayor’s permission painted the words 

“Defund the Police” on 16th Street directly next to the mural. Id. ¶ 8. They also altered the 

image of the D.C. flag by painting over the three stars in the D.C. flag crest. Id. ¶ 9. As a result,

the mural appeared to state, “Black Lives Matter = Defund the Police.” Id. The next day, DPW 

employees repainted the stars on the D.C. crest, but did not alter the “Defund the Police” text. 

Id. DPW employees announced that “the ‘Defund the Police’ message would not be removed.” 

Id.

On June 10, 2020, Plaintiff sent a letter to the Mayor’s office requesting permission to 

paint the words, “Because No One Is Above the Law!” on District streets, “preferably 

Independence Avenue SW, between 2nd and 4th Streets SW,” using lettering “identical in size 

and color to the lettering used to paint ‘Black Lives Matter’ on 16th Street NW.” Id. ¶ 11. On 

June 12, 2020, Deputy Mayor Falcicchio responded, referring Plaintiff to the D.C. Department of 

Transportation. Id. ¶ 13. He cautioned Plaintiff that it was unlikely that the Department of 

Transportation would grant the request because the paint would conflict with road markings. Id.

Falcicchio subsequently directed Plaintiff to a portion of the District’s webpage pertaining to 

public space permits. Id. ¶ 17. 

On June 23, 2020, Plaintiff sent another letter to Falcicchio, complaining that the District

was ignoring its request and that the District did not have a policy or procedure for it to request a 

permit to paint on city streets. Id. ¶ 19. Plaintiff alleges that the next day, it called the D.C.

Department of Transportation and spoke with a “customer service representative” who said she 

was “not sure we have a permit” for painting murals on city streets. Id. ¶ 21. 
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One week later, Plaintiff filed this action, alleging that Defendants violated its First 

Amendment rights, under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, by denying it permission to paint its 

organization’s motto on a public street. Id. ¶ 27. Plaintiff also argues that Defendants failed to 

“provide a reasonable basis for denying Plaintiff the timely opportunity to paint its expressive 

message on a district street.” Id. 

Defendants contend that Plaintiff fails to state a valid claim for relief because the BLM

mural is government speech and that the District is not required to convert city streets into 

private message boards. See ECF No. 12.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim “tests the legal 

sufficiency of a complaint.” Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2002). A 

complaint should state a “short plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 

relief.” Fed. R. of Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2). The complaint must contain enough facts to state a claim 

that is plausible on its face by alleging facts that, if assumed to be true, would allow the court to 

draw “reasonable inference[s] that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Bell Atl. 

Co. v. Twombly, 550 US 544, 555-56 (2007); Arpaio v. Obama, 797 F.3d 11, 19 (D.C. Cir. 

2015); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 US 662, 677-78 (2009). The court presumes the truth of a 

plaintiff’s factual allegations, see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, and construes the complaint “in favor of 

the plaintiff, who must be granted the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts 

alleged,” Hettinga v. United States, 677 F.3d 471 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Moreover, when deciding on a motion to dismiss, the court “may consider . . . the facts 

alleged in the complaint, any documents either attached to or incorporated in the complaint, and 

matters of which [the Court] may take judicial notice.” EEOC v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial 
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Sch., 117 F.3d 621, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Laughlin v. Holder, 923 F.Supp.2d 204, 209 (D.D.C. 

2013).

III. ANALYSIS

“It is axiomatic that the government may not regulate speech based on its substantive 

content or the message it conveys.” Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 

819, 828 (1995). If the government creates a space for public speech, it “must respect the open 

character of” that space, Oberwetter v. Hilliard, 639 F. 3d 545, 551 (D.C. Cir. 2011), and not 

engage in “viewpoint discrimination,” whereby the government favors or restricts certain speech 

based on the “motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of the speaker,” Penkoski v. 

Bowser, No. 20-CV-01519 (TNM), 2021 WL 2913132, at *5 (D.D.C. July 12, 2021) (citing 

Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829). 

While the First Amendment restricts government regulation of private speech, “it does 

not regulate government speech.” Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467 (2009). 

A government entity may “speak for itself,” and “select the views that it wants to express.” Id. at 

467-68. For instance, the government “need not promote ‘pro-littering’ campaigns aside its antilittering campaigns.” Penkoski, 2021 WL 2913132 at *5 (citing See Nat’l Endow. for Arts v. 

Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 598 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (“It is the very business of 

government to favor and disfavor points of view.”)). Indeed, “[e]ven political discrimination is 

allowed when the government chooses to sponsor speech.” Raven v. Sajet, 334 F. Supp. 3d 22, 

32 (D.D.C. 2018), aff’d sub nom. Raven v. United States, No. 18-5346, 2019 WL 2562945 (D.C. 

Cir. May 17, 2019). “Were the Free Speech Clause interpreted otherwise, government would not 

work.” Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 576 U.S. 200, 207 (2015). 
Page 5 of 15

A. Traditional Public Forum

Defendants argue that public streets are not a traditional public forum for street paintings, 

and therefore they were not required to “respect the open character” of city streets by allowing 

Plaintiff to paint its preferred message. Id. The court agrees. 

Plaintiff argues that public streets have long been recognized as a traditional public forum 

for “expressive activities” such as “street protests,” and that the forum should be interpreted to 

also allow street paintings. Pl. Opp’n at 25. To be sure, public streets “have immemorially been 

held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of 

assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.” 

Summum, 555 U.S. at 469. However, the Supreme Court’s characterization of a public street as a 

place of assembly for temporary communications does not convert public streets into a forum for 

painting permanent messages on the street. 

For example, in Summum, the Supreme Court rejected attempts to “analogize the 

installation of permanent monuments in a public park to the delivery of speeches and the holding 

of marches and demonstrations” and rejected the argument that public parks are a traditional 

public forum for the installation of monuments. Id. at 478. In so holding, the Court 

distinguished between expressions that are temporary—such as speakers who “eventually come 

to the end of their remarks” and people carrying signs who “at some point tire and go home”—

and monuments that “monopolize the use of the land on which they stand and interfere 

permanently with other uses of the public space.” Id. at 479. See also Mahoney v. Doe, 642 

F.3d 1112, 1117, 1119 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (finding that chalk art qualified as speech in a public 

forum—a closed road akin to a sidewalk—when “the defacement at issue is temporary and can 

be cured”). The Court concluded that, “as a general matter, forum analysis simply does not 
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apply to the installation of permanent monuments on public property.” Summum, 555 U.S. at 

480.

Here, Plaintiff requested to paint the words “Because No One is Above the Law!” on a 

public road, “preferably Independence Avenue SW, between 2nd and 4th Streets SW,” using 

lettering “identical in size and color to the lettering used to paint ‘Black Lives Matter’ on 16th 

Street NW.” Compl. ¶ 11. Plaintiff’s envisioned painting would thus “span[] the entire width of 

the street and cover[] nearly two blocks.” Id. ¶ 7. It would be akin to erecting a permanent 

monument in a public park in that the painting would not “tire and go home” or fade or wash 

away like chalk. The Supreme Court’s characterization of a public street as a place of assembly 

where citizens can communicate is “undeniably distinct from an endorsement of the use of the

face of a street -- usually reserved for transportation-related guidance -- as a message board for 

private speech.” Women for Am. First v. de Blasio, 520 F. Supp. 3d 532, 543 (S.D.N.Y. 2021)

(internal citation omitted). This conclusion is further underscored by 18 DCMR § 2102.2, which 

prohibits the display of signs or markings that would hide or interfere with the effectiveness of 

traffic control devices.

Plaintiff’s own allegations show that the District’s streets have not historically been used 

to allow private street paintings. See Compl. ¶ 12 (alleging that Judicial Watch is “unable to 

identify or recall any similar use of District street surfaces for painting expressive messages”); 

id. ¶¶ 17-18 (alleging that the District’s webpage for public space permits contains no 

information regarding how to request a permit for street painting); id. ¶ 19 (“We also have not 

been able to identify a policy or procedure for requesting a permit to paint a message on a street 

or a policy or procedure for closing a street to accommodate a street painting.”); id. ¶ 21 
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(alleging that a “customer service representative” of the District Department of Transportation 

reported she had “never heard of” the Department issuing permits to paint city streets). 

The Supreme Court “has rejected the view that traditional public forum status extends 

beyond its historic confines.” Walker, 576 U.S. at 215 (citing Arkansas Ed. Television Comm’n 

v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 678 (1998)). Here, privately painted messages on public streets go

beyond historic confines. Accordingly, the court finds that Plaintiff has not alleged facts

sufficient to show that Defendants restricted access to a traditional public forum by denying

Plaintiff permission to paint on a public road. 

B. Designated or Limited Public Forum 

In the alternative, Plaintiff argues that the District converted city streets into a designated 

or limited public forum for street paintings when it approved the painting of the BLM mural. 

Plaintiff contends that having done so, Defendants are now required to permit similar expression 

of different viewpoints absent a compelling reason for denial. 

In Walker, the Supreme Court considered whether the state of Texas could permissibly 

restrict content that citizens displayed on specialty license plates. Walker, 576 U.S. at 203. The 

parties agreed that specialty license plates were not a traditional public forum, but they disputed 

whether Texas converted specialty license plates into a designated or limited public forum by 

approving some requests to display private messages. Id. at 215-16. The Court held that Texas’s 

specialty plates “are neither a designated public forum, which exists where government property 

that has not traditionally been regarded as a public forum is intentionally opened up for that 

purpose, nor a limited public forum, which exists where a government has reserved a forum for 

certain groups or for the discussion of certain topics.” Id. at 215 (cleaned up). The Court 

explained that the government does not create a public forum—of any variety— “by inaction or 
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by permitting limited disclosure.” Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). In 

addition, the government does not create a public forum when it engages in government speech

on government property. Id. (explaining that while courts engage in a “‘forum analysis’ to 

evaluate government restrictions on purely private speech that occurs on government property,” 

the analysis does not apply to government speech).

The Court in Walker provided three factors for courts to consider when determining if a 

message is private or government speech: (1) whether the medium at issue has historically been 

used to communicate messages from the government, (2) whether the public reasonably 

interprets the government to be the speaker, and (3) whether the government maintains editorial 

control over the speech. Id. at 216. One court in this jurisdiction has already considered the 

BLM mural through the lens of the three Walker factors, and it found the mural to be government 

speech. See Penkoski, 2021 WL 2913132, at *9. This court considers the three Walker factors in 

this case and reaches the same conclusion. 

1. Historical Medium

While “not a prerequisite,” courts “have recognized that a medium that has long 

communicated government messages is more likely to be government speech.” Pulphus v. 

Ayers, 249 F. Supp. 3d 238, 247-48 (D.D.C. 2017) (cleaned up). As an initial matter, though, the 

court must define the “medium.” Penkoski, 2021 WL 2913132 at *9. 

Defendants consider the relevant “medium” to be markings on public streets generally, 

and they argue that the government has historically used that medium—through traffic and safety 

markings—to communicate with the public. Def. Mot. at 15. Plaintiff argues that the court 

should define the medium more narrowly, as art murals on public streets, and that in this regard,

the BLM mural was “unique” and the first of its kind. Pl. Opp’n at 24. 
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The Penkoski court was faced with a similar question and ultimately defined the medium 

as “paintings on public streets.” Penkoski, 2021 WL 2913132 at *7. See also Pulphus, 249 F. 

Supp. 3d at 248 (applying a “higher level of generality” to the historical analysis prong). This 

court agrees and adopts that same definition.

It is undisputed that the District has historically painted roads to communicate with the 

public. Double yellow lines convey the boundary between traffic moving in a different 

direction; arrows urge drivers to merge before their lane ends; and crosswalk markings 

communicate with both drivers and pedestrians to proceed with caution. Likewise, District street 

surfaces are not traditionally places where members of the public can display permanent or longterm messages. See, e.g., 18 DCMR § 2102.2 (prohibiting anyone from displaying signs or 

markings that would hide or interfere with the effectiveness of traffic control devices). 

On the other hand, Defendants offer no historical examples of the District painting 

similar murals on city streets, and traffic and safety instructions differ from the BLM mural in 

both purpose and design. See Penkoski, 2021 WL 2913132 at *7 (distinguishing traffic 

instructions directed at drivers and pedestrians from the BLM mural which is “perpendicular to 

traffic on the road or sidewalk”). Although these differences support Plaintiff’s position, they 

are not necessarily determinative. See Pulphus, 249 F. Supp. 3d at 248-49 (“[T]he Supreme

Court has not required that a medium convey a consistent or unified government message in 

order to constitute a ‘traditional’ medium for government speech.”); cf Cornelius v. NAACP 

Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 803 (1985) (explaining that courts must not “infer 

that the government intended to create a public forum” simply because “the nature of the 

property is inconsistent with expressive activity”). 
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Ultimately, this court, like the court in Penkoski, finds that the first Walker factor is 

inconclusive. 

2. Reasonable Interpretation 

The second Walker factor asks whether the public would reasonably interpret the 

government to be the speaker. This factor weighs heavily in favor of finding that the BLM mural 

is government speech. 

City streets—like the public parks at issue in Summum, and the license plates in 

Walker—are often closely identified in the public mind with the government. See Summum, 555 

U.S. at 472. The District government pays for street construction and repairs, see D.C. Code § 

9–401, regulates First Amendment assemblies on public streets, see generally D.C. Code §§ 5–

331.01–17, and enacts laws to enforce its legitimate interest in “ensuring public safety and order, 

promoting the free flow of traffic on streets and sidewalks, [and] protecting property rights,” 

Schenck v. Pro–Choice Network of Western N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 376 (1997). A reasonable 

person would understand that it “is not common for property owners,” including the government, 

“to open up their property [to messages] with which they do not wish to be 

associated.” Summum, 555 U.S. at 471. Accordingly, “[e]ven if the government has not 

historically conveyed messages on the streets of the District in this way, the public would 

reasonably assume the government endorses messages that appear permanently painted on its 

streets.” Penkoski, 2021 WL 2913132 at *8. See also Pulphus, 249 F. Supp. 3d at 

249 (collecting cases) (explaining that art selected for display on public property is “often treated 

as being endorsed by the government or representative of the government’s views, and is 

therefore considered government speech”).
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Plaintiff’s own allegations further illustrate that a reasonable person would interpret the 

BLM mural to be government speech. On June 5, 2020, the day the BLM mural was painted, 

Mayor Bowser held a press conference and stated, “[t]here are people who are craving to be 

heard and to be seen and to have their humanity recognized. We had the opportunity to send that 

message loud and clear on a very important street in our city.” Compl. ¶ 10. And it is not 

disputed that the District renamed the site of the mural “Black Lives Matter Plaza” and closed 

the painted section of 16th Street to traffic. Id. ¶¶ 13-15. Indeed, Plaintiff’s own interpretation 

seems to be that the BLM mural was government speech. See id. ¶ 10 (“Mayor Bowser plainly 

approved and supports the painting of ‘Black Lives Matter’ on 16th Street and either approved or 

acquiesced in the painting of ‘Defund the Police.’”); id. ¶ 11 (observing the same); id. ¶ 19 (“We 

have been unable to identify any particular reason why 16th Street remains closed other than to 

accommodate the two street paintings.”). These alleged facts underscore that a reasonable 

person would interpret the BLM mural as government as government speech.

3. Editorial Control 

While the second Walker factor deals with the degree to which the public perceives that 

the government exercises control over the BLM mural, the third factor deals with the degree to 

which the government actually exercises control over the mural. 

Plaintiff alleges that the District has not maintained editorial control over the BLM mural

because non-District employees contributed to painting the original mural, id. ¶ 7; Pls. Response 

to Mot. to Dismiss at 27, and because activists added the words “Defund the Police” to the mural 

and painted over the stars on the D.C. flag. Even assuming these facts to be true, they do not 

give rise to a valid First Amendment claim for three reasons. 
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First, the fact non-District employees assisted with the physical effort of painting the 

BLM mural is immaterial for First Amendment purposes. Walker, 576 U.S. at 217 (“The fact 

that private parties take part in the design and propagation of a message does not extinguish the 

governmental nature of the message or transform the government’s role into that of a mere 

forum-provider.”); see also People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Gittens (PETA), 

414 F.3d 23, 28 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“compilation of the speech of third parties is a communicative 

act”) (cleaned up). 

Second, after activists painted over the stars in the D.C. flag and added the words 

“Defund the Police,” District employees repainted part of the mural the next day, adding back 

the stars to the D.C. emblem. Compl. ¶ 9. “That temporary loss of control does not detract from 

the [BLM mural] as government speech; in fact, the District’s quick movement to repaint the 

D.C. flag exhibits editorial control.” Penkoski, 2021 WL 2913132, at *8. Cf. Walker, 576 U.S. at 

213 (noting that “the State has rejected at least a dozen proposed designs” for the license plate 

when judging degree of editorial control). 

Third, Plaintiff recognizes Defendants’ affirmative decision to keep the “Defund the 

Police” addition as part of the mural. See Compl. ¶ 9 (“[T]he District Department of Public 

Works also announced that the ‘Defund the Police’ message would not be removed”). Plaintiff’s 

allegation that Defendants decided to accept some changes to the mural, while rejecting others,

demonstrates their editorial control. Consider the following examples. At public libraries, “the 

government speaks through its selection of which books to put on the shelves and which books to 

exclude.” PETA, 414 F.3d at 28. When planning a parade, a government commission was free 

to make “arbitrary or viewpoint-based decisions about which donkeys and elephants it wanted in 

its parade.” Id. And the Smithsonian Board of Regents has “expansive authority to accept a 
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portrait ‘on the basis of its general historical interest, its artistic merit, or the historical 

significance of the individual to which it relates, or any combination of any such factors.’” 

Raven, 334 F. Supp. 3d at 32, aff’d sub nom. 2019 WL 2562945. Plaintiff appears to allege that 

the BLM mural “appears as the Mayor wants it to appear, communicating a political message 

from the District.” Penkoski, 2021 WL 2913132, at *9. See also Summum, 555 U.S. at 467 (the 

government may “select the views it wants to express”). Thus, this factor, like the previous one, 

supports a finding that the BLM mural is government speech. 

Because the weight of the Walker factors compels a finding that the BLM mural is

government speech, Plaintiff fails to state a valid claim that Defendants created a public forum or 

impermissibly denied them access to that forum. 

C. Forum Analysis Is Inapposite

Having found that the BLM mural is government speech, the court concludes that a

public forum analysis, and the accompanying judicial scrutiny, does not apply. See Walker, 576 

U.S. at 215 (forum analysis is “misplaced” where the government is speaking on its own behalf); 

Summum, 555 U.S. at 480 (“[F]orum analysis simply does not apply to the installation of 

permanent monuments on public property.”); PETA, 414 F.3d at 29. “The curator of a 

stateowned museum, for example, may decide to display only busts of Union Army generals of 

the Civil War, or the curator may decide to exhibit only busts of Confederate generals. The First 

Amendment has nothing to do with such choices.” Id. at 28. 

Therefore, even were the court to credit Plaintiff’s vague and conclusory allegation that 

Defendants denied its application without a “reasonable basis” and did so relying on “reasonable, 

non-arbitrary processes and procedures,” Compl. ¶ 27, that would not establish a valid claim for 

relief. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 799-800 (“Nothing in the Constitution requires the 
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Government freely to grant access to all who wish to exercise their right to free speech on every 

type of Government property without regard to the nature of the property or to the disruption that 

might be caused by the speaker’s activities.”); PETA, 414 F.3d at 30 (“[W]e can see no First 

Amendment problem with the Commission making arbitrary or viewpoint-based decisions about 

which donkeys and elephants it wanted in its parade. No one could plausibly argue that an 

Inauguration Parade has to have balance, or that the losing Presidential candidate must—if he 

requests—be allowed to have a float of his own.”). Plaintiff may consider Defendants’ actions 

arbitrary and inappropriate, but Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to show that in this case 

the First Amendment requires the government to permit private parties to paint on public streets.

D. Motion to Dismiss 

Plaintiff finally argues that the court lacks sufficient factual evidence to conclude that the 

BLM mural is government speech. It relies on Stewart v. D.C. Armory Bd., 863 F.2d 1013 (D.C. 

Cir. 1988), which held that the question of whether a sports stadium on government property 

served as a public forum was “inherently a factual” question that should not have been decided 

by the court as a matter of law. Plaintiff’s reliance on Stewart is misplaced.

The inquiry in Stewart—whether the government was hosting a public or nonpublic 

forum—is not the question here. Because the court has found that the BLM mural was 

government speech, “forum analysis does not apply.” Pulphus, 249 F. Supp. 3d at 247. 

In any event, contrary to Plaintiff’s suggestion, Stewart did not announce a bright-line 

rule that public forum questions cannot be addressed at the motion to dismiss stage; rather, the 

court’s decision was limited to the specifics of the case. See Stewart, 863 F.2d at 1014 (“We 

conclude that the question of whether RFK Stadium is a public forum is inherently a factual 

one.”) (emphasis added); id. at 1018 (“We conclude that identifying the government’s intent in 
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this case raises inherently factual issues) (same). Courts have since granted motions to dismiss 

involving similar questions where the specific facts of those cases permitted. See Raven, 334 F. 

Supp. 3d at 22, aff’d sub nom. 2019 WL 2562945 (granting motion to dismiss plaintiff’s 

complaint for failure to state a First Amendment violation because the government’s selection of 

artwork constituted government speech).

Finally, in Stewart, the D.C. Circuit held that the district court erred in relying on 

“inferences drawn by the court” that, “even if true, [were] not sufficient to defeat” the plaintiff’s 

factual allegations. Id. at 1018. Unlike the district court in Stewart, this court has not drawn its 

own inferences to counter or rebut Plaintiff’s allegations. As previously explained, at each turn 

in this case, the court has credited Plaintiff’s allegations. Ultimately, however, those allegations 

must establish a viable claim for relief. Twombly, 550 US 544, 555-56. Here, they do not. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For reasons explained above, the court will GRANT Defendants’ motion to dismiss. 

Date: February 7, 2022

Tanya S. Chutkan 

TANYA S. CHUTKAN

United States District Judge