****************************************************** The ‘‘officially released’’ date that appears near the beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the ‘‘officially released’’ date appearing in the opinion. In no event will any such motions be accepted before the ‘‘officially released’’ date. All opinions are subjectto modification andtechnical correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the electronic version of an opinion and the print version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or ConnecticutAppellate Reports, the latest print version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service andinthe Connecticut LawJournal andboundvolumes of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced and distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.

******************************************************JAMES A. HARNAGE v. RACQUEL LIGHTNER ET AL. (AC 37539)
Gruendel, Prescott and Pellegrino, Js. Argued October 28, 2015—officially released March 1, 2016 (Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Peck, J. [motion to dismiss]; Hon. Constance L. Epstein, judge trial referee [motions to dismiss, for

judgment].)
James A. Harnage, self-represented, the appellant (plaintiff).
MichaelA. Martone, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were George Jepsen, attorney general, and TerrenceM. O’Neill, assistantattorneygeneral, for the appellees (defendants).Opinion PRESCOTT, J. The plaintiff, James A. Harnage, appeals fromthejudgment ofthe trial court, dismissing his civil action in favor of the defendants1 on the grounds that he failed to properly serve the defendants intheirindividualcapacitiesandfailedtopostarecognizance bond as required by General Statutes (Rev. to 2013) § 52-185.2 On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the courtimproperlygrantedthe defendants’ motionto dismiss because: (1) General Statutes §§ 52-64 (a) and 52- 57 (a)permitprocesstobeserveduponstateemployees in their individual capacities by serving the attorney general at the Office of the Attorney General in Hartford; and (2) the recognizance bond requirement, as set forth in General Statutes (Rev. to 2013) §§ 52-185 and 52-186,3 does not apply to him, or, if it does, such a requirement is unconstitutional because it violates his rights to due process and equal protection of the law under the United States constitution. We are not persuaded by either claim. Nevertheless, because we put
an interpretive gloss on §§ 52-185 and 52-186 in order to avoid placing these statutes in constitutional jeopardy, we are compelled to reverse thejudgment in part and to remand this case to the trial court to consider whetheritshouldwaivetheplaintiff’s obligationtopost
a recognizance bond.
The record reveals the following undisputed facts and procedural history. The plaintiff is incarcerated at the MacDougall-Walker Correctional Institution. On February 11, 2014, thetrial courtfoundthattheplaintiff
was indigent and granted him afee waiver forthe entry fee, the filing fee, and the cost of service of process. Theplaintifftheninitiatedthis action againstthe defendants, intheirofficialandindividualcapacities,4alleging that the defendants had violated his constitutional rights because they were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. The plaintiffclaimed, inter alia, that the defendants reused needles when administering insulin medication to inmates with diabetes, as well as refused to provide him with medical treatment for a serious hemorrhoid and an abdominal hernia. On March 5, 2014, the plaintiff attempted to serve the defendants by leaving a copy of the writ of summons, and complaint with the attorney general or his designee at the Office of the Attorney General. On or about April 15, 2014, the defendants mailed a letter to the plaintiff, requesting that he post a recognizance bond in the amount of$250 within ten days. That same day, the defendants also filed a motion to dismiss the complaint against the defendants in their individual capacities forlack ofpersonaljurisdiction due to insufficient service of process, and against the defendants in their official capacities because the plaintiff had failed to post a recognizance bond.The plaintiff subsequently filed an objection to the defendants’ motion to dismiss. In his objection, the plaintiff argued that he had properly served the defendants in their individual capacities by leaving a copy of the process with the attorney general at the Office of the Attorney General in Hartford. Furthermore, he claimed that the requirement ofposting arecognizance bond pursuant to § 52-185 and Practice Book § 8-3 did not apply to him and, even if it did, the amount of the recognizance bond was in the court’s discretion and should be limited to the nominal amount of one dollar, which, in essence, is a request for a waiver. On June 30, 2014, the court granted the defendants’ motionto dismissinpart. Specifically, the courtgranted the motionto dismiss the claims againstthe defendants intheirindividual capacitiesbecause the plaintifffailed to properly serve the defendants in their individual capacities pursuant to § 52-57 (a). The court also ordered the plaintiff to a post a recognizance bond in the amount of $250 within two weeks or it would dismiss the case in its entiretyupon reclaim ofthe motion. Because the plaintiff could not afford to post the $250 recognizance bond and desired to appeal from the court’s decision, on November 10, 2014, he filed a motion for judgment, which the court subsequently granted. This appeal followed.
I
The plaintiff first claims that the court improperly granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction the claims brought against them intheirindividualcapacitiesonthegroundthathefailed to properly serve the defendants pursuant to § 52-57 (a). The plaintiff argues that in a civil action against state employees in their individual capacities, § 52-64 (a) permits service of process to be made by a proper officer leaving a copy ofprocess with the attorney general at the Office of the Attorney General in Hartford. The plaintiff further argues that § 52-57 (a) does not require him to serve the defendants in hand or at their place of abode because the phrase, ‘‘[e]xcept as otherwise provided,’’ contained in § 52-57 (a), is a reference to § 52-64. The defendants respond that it is clearly established that § 52-64 (a) applies only if a state employee hasbeen suedinhis official capacityandthat § 52-57 (a) applies when a state employee is sued in his individual capacity. We agree with the defendants.
Webeginwiththestandardofreviewandtherelevant legal principles governing the plaintiff’s claim. ‘‘A motion to dismiss

. . . properly attacks the jurisdiction ofthe court

. . . . A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction.

. . . [O]ur review of the trial court’sultimatelegalconclusionandresulting [decision to grant]

. . . the motion to dismiss will be de novo.. . . To the extent that our resolution of an appeal requires us to construe a statute, our review is plenary,
as statutoryconstructionis aquestionoflaw.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Ribeiro v. Fasano, Ippolito & Lee, P.C., 157 Conn. App. 617, 623– 24, 117A.3d 965 (2015); seeStatev. Boyd, 272 Conn. 72, 76, 861 A.2d 1155 (2004) (stating that when interpreting language of statute, standard of review is plenary). ‘‘The principles that govern statutory construction
are well established. When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature.

. . . In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning ofthe statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply.

. . . In seeking to determine thatmeaning, General Statutes § 1-2z directs
us first to consider the text ofthe statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning ofthe statute shall not be considered.

. . . When a statute is not plain and unambiguous, we also look for interpretive guidance to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter

. . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Southern New England Telephone Co

. v. Cashman, 283 Conn. 644, 650–51, 931 A.2d 142 (2007).
We begin, as we must, with the language ofthe statutes at issue. Section 52-57 (a) provides: ‘‘Except as otherwise provided, process in any civil action shall be servedbyleavingatrueandattestedcopyofit, including the declaration or complaint, with the defendant, or at his usual place of abode, in this state.’’ Section 52-57 (b) through (f) then set forth a number of exceptions to subsection (a). Forexample, subsection (d) provides in relevant part: ‘‘In actions against a partnership, service ofprocess may be made bypersonally serving any process within the state upon any one of the partners or, if none of the partners are residents of the state, service may be made upon the Secretary of the State

. . . .’’ General Statutes § 52-57 (d). Additionally, § 52-64 (a) provides: ‘‘Service of civil process in any civil action or proceeding maintainable against or in any appeal authorized from the actions of, or service ofanyforeign attachment or garnishment authorized against, the state or against any institution, board, commission, departmentoradministrativetribunal thereof, or against any officer, servant, agent or employee ofthe state or ofany such institution, board, commission, department or administrative tribunal, asthe case may be, may be made by a proper officer (1) leaving a true and attested copy ofthe process, includingthe declarationorcomplaint, withtheAttorneyGeneral at the office of the Attorney General in Hartford,
or (2) sending a true and attested copy ofthe process, includingthesummonsandcomplaint,bycertifiedmail, return receipt requested, to the Attorney General atthe office of the Attorney General in Hartford.’’
In construing §§ 52-57 (a) and 52-64 (a), we do not write on a clean slate. Decisions of this court have repeatedlyheldthataplaintiff, whoservesastatedefendant pursuant to § 52-64 (a) by leaving a copy of the process with the attorney general at the Office of the Attorney General, has properly served the defendant only in his or her official capacity and has failed to properly serve the defendant in his or her individual capacity. See Traylor v. Gerratana, 148 Conn. App. 605, 612–13, 88 A.3d 552 (holding that plaintiff’s claims against defendants in their individual capacities were barred by lack of personal jurisdiction on basis of improper service of process because plaintiff only served process on attorney general and not at defendants’ places of abode as required by § 52-57 [a]), cert. denied, 312 Conn. 901, 91 A.3d 908, cert. denied, 312 Conn. 902, 112 A.3d 778, cert. denied, U.S. , 135 S. Ct. 444, 190 L. Ed. 2d 336 (2014); Edelman v. Page, 123 Conn. App. 233, 243–44, 1 A.3d 1188 (‘‘[T]he court properly dismissed the action against the state defendants due to insufficient service.

. . . [T]hey were beingsuedintheirindividualcapacities, whichrequired that they be served at their usual place of abode. The plaintiff acknowledged that service was made on the secretary at the office of the attorney general [only]

. . . .’’ [Citations omitted.]), cert. denied, 299 Conn. 908, 10 A.3d 525 (2010); Reitzer v. Board of Trustees ofState Colleges, 2 Conn. App. 196, 203–204, 477 A.2d 129 (1984) (holding that service on defendants through Office ofAttorney General was proper because defendants were sued in their official capacities but relief sought can onlybe grantedagainstthemintheirofficial capacity and not in their individual capacity).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has similarly declined to interpret § 52-64 (a) as authorizing service on a state employee in his or her individual capacity by leaving a copy of the process with the attorney general at the Office of the Attorney General. See Bogle-Assegai v. Connecticut, 470 F.3d 498, 507 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1165, 128 S. Ct. 1121, 169 L. Ed. 2d 949 (2008). In reaching that conclusion, the Second Circuit relied in particular on the following language of § 52-64 (a): ‘‘against

. . . the state or

. . . any officer, servant, agent or employee of the state

. . . as such

. . . .’’ (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. The court reasoned that ifa defendant is a state employee, but is not sued ‘‘as such,’’ in other words, if he is sued in hisindividual capacity, service of process must be made pursuant to § 52-57 (a), which requires that service be made by leaving the summons and complaint with the defendant or at his usual place of abode. Id. In light of the language of the statutes and these authorities, in orderfortheplaintifftohaveproperlyservedthe defendants in their individual capacities, he was required to
serve process in the manner required by § 52-57 (a).
Theplaintiffarguesthatif§ 52-57(a)isapplicable,the legislature’s use of the phrase, ‘‘[e]xcept as otherwise provided,’’ demonstrates an intent that § 52-64 (a) applies in the event that a state employee is sued in his
or her individual capacity. The language ofthe statute, however, does not allow for such an interpretation because § 52-64 (a) does not ‘‘otherwise provide’’ for service of process on a state employee in his or her individual capacity by serving process on the attorney general at the Office ofthe Attorney General. Furthermore, § 52-57 specifically enumerates exceptions to subsection (a), noneofwhichprovidethatitispermissible to serve process in cases against state employees in their individual capacities by leaving a copy of the process with the attorney general at the Office of the Attorney General. Thus, the legislature’s use of the phrase, ‘‘[e]xcept as otherwise provided,’’ does not advance the plaintiff’s claim because he has failed to identify any applicable statutory exception to § 52-57 (a).
In sum, in order for the plaintiff to properly serve process onthe defendants intheirindividual capacities, the plaintiffwas requiredto ‘‘[leave] atrue and attested copy of [process], including the declaration or complaint, withthe defendant, orathisusualplace ofabode

. . . .’’ General Statutes § 52-57 (a). Because the plaintifffailedto complywith § 52-57 (a) and onlyattempted to serve process upon the defendants by leaving a copy of process at the Office of the Attorney General, such service was insufficient to obtain personaljurisdiction
over the defendants in their individual capacities. Accordingly, we conclude that the court properly dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction the claims brought againstthe defendants in theirindividual capacities because the defendants were notproperly served pursuant to § 52-57 (a).
II
The plaintiff next claims that the court improperly granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the claims brought against them in their official capacities on the ground that the plaintiff failed to post a recognizance bond pursuant to § 52-185.5 Specifically, the plaintiff argues that the recognizance bond requirement does not apply to him, or if it does, it is unconstitutional because it deprives him of his rights to due process andequalprotectionofthelawunderthefederalconstitution. We concludethattherecognizancebondrequire-ment does applytotheplaintiff. We, however, conclude that it is necessary to place an interpretive gloss on §§ 52-185 and 52-186 in order to avoid placing them in constitutionaljeopardy. Accordingly, we construethese provisions as authorizing the court to waive the plaintiff’s obligation to post, or to reduce significantly the amount of, a recognizance bond in light of a party’s indigency and status as an inmate.
A
The plaintiff first argues that the recognizance bond requirement, as set forth in §§ 52-185 and 52-186, does not apply to him because a recognizance bond is required only if costs can be taxed against him if the state prevails. The plaintiff argues that costs cannot be taxed against him because a 1931 decision of our Supreme Court stated that if costs are not taxable against one party, then that party may not seek costs in its favor. See Bissing v. Turkington, 113 Conn. 737, 740, 157 A. 226 (1931) (‘‘[i]f [costs] are not taxable against the respondent they are not taxable in his favor againsttheapplicant’’). Thus, accordingtotheplaintiff’s argument, because the state’s sovereign immunity prevents the imposition of costs against it, costs may not be taxed against him.6 We are not persuaded.
Whether the recognizance bond requirement, as set forth in §§ 52-185 and 52-186, applies to the plaintiff in this case is a question of statutory interpretation, and, therefore, our review is plenary. See Atlantic Mortgage & Investment Corp

. v. Stephenson, 86 Conn. App. 126, 131–32, 860 A.2d 751 (2004) (‘‘The question of whether a particular statute

. . . applies to a given state of facts is a question of statutory interpretation

. . . . Statutory interpretation presents a question of law for the court.

. . . Our review is, therefore, plenary.’’ [Internal quotation marks omitted.]); Ribeiro v. Fasano, Ippolito & Lee, P.C., supra, 157 Conn. App. 623–24 (in reviewing trial court ruling on motion to dismiss, ifrequiredto construestatute, appellatereview is plenary because it is question of law); see also part I of this opinion (discussing standard of review for statutory construction issues and legal principles guiding our analysis).
Webeginwiththe language oftheprovisions atissue. General Statutes (Rev. to 2013) § 52-185 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) Ifthe plaintiffin any civil action

. . . does not appear to the authority signing the process that the plaintiff is able to pay the costs of the action shouldjudgment be rendered against him, the plaintiff shall enter into a recognizance to the adverse party with a financially responsible inhabitant of this state
as surety, or a financially responsible inhabitant ofthis state shall enter into a recognizance to the adverse party, that the plaintiff shall prosecute his action to effect and answer all costs for which judgment is rendered against him.

. . .’’General Statutes (Rev. to 2013) § 52-186 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘The court, upon motion ofthe defendant or on its own motion, may order a sufficient bond to be given by the plaintiff before trial

. . . . In determining the sufficiency ofthe bondto be given, the court shall consider only the taxable costs which the plaintiff may be responsible for under section 52-257

. . . .’’
It is well settledthat these statutes only apply in civil
cases in which costs are taxable against the plaintiff. See Bissing v. Turkington, supra, 113 Conn. 739 (‘‘[recognizance bond requirement] must be construed to apply only to process in actions in which costs are taxable, since there would be no reason for securing the payment of costs in an action in which costs could not in any event be recovered’’). ‘‘Costs are a matter ofstatutoryregulation, andare nottaxable unless given by statute.’’ Id. General Statutes § 52-257 (a) permits costs to be taxed in favor of the prevailing party in civil actions ‘‘in which the matter in demand is not less than fifteen thousand dollars

. . . .’’7 Section 52-257 clearly and unambiguouslyprovidesforcoststobe taxable infavor of the prevailing party in civil actions, making no explicitexceptionsforinmates orindigentparties: ‘‘The prevailing party in any such civil action shall receive

. . . .’’8 (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 52-257 (a).
The plaintiff’s assertion that these provisions do not apply to him is based on the following syllogism. In Bissing v. Turkington, supra, 113 Conn. 740, our Supreme Courtstated: ‘‘If[costs] arenottaxableagainst the respondent they are not taxable in [the respondent’s] favor against the applicant.’’ The plaintiff then argues that costs are not taxable against the state because the legislature did not waive the state’s sovereign immunity when it enacted § 52-257. See State v. Chapman, 176 Conn. 362, 364–66, 407 A.2d 987 (1978). Because the state’s sovereign immunity prevents the taxation of costs against the state in this action, the defendant assertsthatthe language inBissingprevents costs from being taxed against him. Accordingly, he argues that a recognizance bond is not required in this case.9
We disagree because the plaintifftakes the language used by our Supreme Court in Bissing out of context. Bissing was a habeas corpus proceeding. Although habeas corpusproceedingsaretechnicallycivilactions;
see Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 712, 81 S. Ct. 895, 6 L. Ed. 2d 39 (1961) (‘‘habeas corpus may, of course, be found to be a civil action forprocedural purposes’’); theydonotfallwithintheparameters of§ 52-257, which expressly limits its applicability to civil cases that seek monetary relief. See General Statutes § 52-257. Mone-tary relief is not available in habeas proceedings. See Sanchez v. Warden, 214 Conn. 23, 34, 570 A.2d 673 (1990) (stating that standard relief in habeas corpus action is discharge ofprisoner, while standard reliefin § 1983 action may include compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive relief, andattorney’sfees).Bissing heldthatbecause there was no statute permitting costs to be taxable infavor oftheprevailingpartyin ahabeas corpus action, ‘‘there would seem to be nojustification for the taxation ofcosts in such proceeding, and therefore no need for a recognizance for costs.’’ Bissing v. Turkington, supra, 113 Conn. 740.
The present case, unlike a habeas proceeding, falls into a category of cases in which the legislature has specifically authorized the taxation of costs because it is a civil action ‘‘in which the matter in demand is not less than fifteen thousand dollars

. . . .’’ General Statutes § 52-257 (a). Thus, § 52-257 applies to the plaintiff and, should the state prevail in this action, he would be liable to the state to pay the state’s taxable costs. Accordingly, we concludethatthe courtproperlydetermined that the recognizance bond requirement applied to the plaintiff.
B
The plaintiffargues, in the alternative, that the court improperly granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the official capacity claims on the ground that such a recognizance bond requirement is unconstitutional, as applied to him, an indigent inmate, because it denies himhisfundamentalrightofaccesstothecourts,particularly his right to challenge the conditions of his confinement. Thus, the plaintiff contends that, as applied to him, the statutes requiring arecognizance bond deny him due process and equal protection ofthe law under the United States constitution. Although recognizing that the plaintiff has raised a constitutionalchallenge,thedefendantssimplyrespond that all statutes are presumed to be constitutional. The defendants also argue that the plaintiff’s access to the courts is not unlawfully restricted because of his indigent status, in light of the fact that § 52-185 permits a plaintifftoavoidactuallypostingtherecognizancebond by having a ‘‘financially responsible inhabitant of this state

. . . enter into a recognizance to the adverse party

. . . .’’ General Statutes (Rev. to 2013) § 52-185 (a). The defendants, however, donototherwise address whether the statute infringes upon the plaintiff’s right of access to the courts in light of the fact that he is indigent and incarcerated. ‘‘[I]n evaluating the [plaintiff’s] challenge to the constitutionality of [a] statute

. . . [w]e will indulge in everypresumptioninfavorofthe statute’s constitutionality

. . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State

v. Indrisano, 228 Conn. 795, 805, 640 A.2d 986 (1994).‘‘It

. . . is well established that a validly enacted statute carries with it astrongpresumption ofconstitutionality, [andthat] thosewhochallengeitsconstitutionality mustsustaintheheavyburdenofprovingitsunconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt.

. . . Therefore, [w]hen a question of constitutionality is raised, courts must approach it with caution, examine it with care, and sustain the legislation unless its invalidity is clear.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Doe v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 317 Conn. 357, 405, 119 A.3d 462 (2015). ‘‘[W]e may also add interpretive glossto achallengedstatute in orderto renderit constitutional. In construing a statute, the court must search for an effective and constitutional construction that reasonably accords with the legislature’s underlying intent.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Indrisano, supra, 805–806.
Withtheseprinciplesinmind, weturntothe specifics of this case. The plaintiff raises valid constitutional
concerns regardingthe recognizance bondrequirement
as applied to him, an indigent inmate. Prisoners have
a fundamental right of access to the courts, including the right to challenge the conditions of their confinement. See Wolffv. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 579, 94 S. Ct. 2963, 41 L. Ed. 2d 935 (1974). It is well established that prisoners have a fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts, and that such access must be ‘‘adequate, effective and meaningful.

. . . Decisions of the United States Supreme Court have consistently required [s]tates to shoulder affirmative obligations to
assure all prisoners meaningful access to the courts. It is indisputable that indigent inmates must be provided at state expense withpaperandpento draft legal documents, with notarial services to authenticate them, and with stamps to mail them. States must forgo collection of docket fees otherwise payable to the treasury and expend funds for transcripts. State expenditures are necessary to pay lawyers for indigent [criminal] defendants at trial

. . . and in appeals as of right

. . . .’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Washington v. Meachum, 238 Conn. 692, 735, 680 A.2d 262 (1996). Prisoners possess aright ofaccess not only to pursue appeals from criminal convictions orto bring
a habeas action, but also to assert civil rights actions to vindicate their basic constitutional rights, including challenging the conditions of their confinement under the eighth amendmentto the federal constitution. Wolff

v. McDonnell, supra, 579 (‘‘[i]t is futile to contend that the Civil Rights Act of 1871 has less importance in our constitutional scheme than does the Great Writ’’).
In civil cases in which a fundamental right is implicatedandjudicialrecourseisthe sole mannerofresolving the dispute, there cannot be a total deprivation of
access to the courts, and a statute conditioning access tothe courts onpaying courtfees orcosts raises significant constitutional concerns. See Boddie v. Connecti-cut, 401 U.S. 371, 382–83, 91 S. Ct. 780, 28 L. Ed. 2d 113 (1971) (holding that statute requiring indigentplaintiffs to pay filing fee to obtain divorce violated due process because marriage is fundamental interest and plaintiff
can only obtain divorce through judicial system); see also M.L.B

. v. S.L.J

., 519 U.S. 102, 123–24, 117 S. Ct. 555, 136L. Ed. 2d473 (1996) (holdingthatstatute conditioning civil litigants’ right to appeal a termination of parental rights on prepayment ofcosts was unconstitutional as violation of due process and equal protection because it implicated fundamental interest and resort to court was sole path for relief); cf. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 410, 95 S. Ct. 553, 42 L. Ed. 2d 532 (1975) (limiting Boddie to circumstances where there is total deprivation of access to the courts to obtain divorce and holding that access to courts was not denied by delaying access to divorce); United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 445–46, 93 S. Ct. 631, 34 L. Ed. 2d 626 (1973) (upholding statute requiring payment of court fees as condition precedent to discharge in bankruptcy because no fundamental interest is at stake and resort to courts is not sole path to securing debt forgiveness).
In the present case, in considering the recognizance bond statutes and assessing their constitutionality, we are mindful ofthese constitutional principles. Sections 52-185 and 52-186 contain no express exception to the recognizance bond requirement for indigent inmates. Furthermore, the recognizancebondrequirementisnot
one ofthe enumerated fees or costs that can be waived pursuant to General Statutes § 52-259b if a plaintiff is found to be indigent and unable to pay.10 In light ofthe lack of express authority to waive the recognizance bond requirement, a handful of our Superior Courts have held that indigent inmates must comply with the recognizance bond requirement, regardless of their inability to pay. See Steinkamp v. Jacque, 36 Conn. Supp. 37, 38, 410 A.2d 489 (1979) (holding that waiver of bond for prosecution for indigent defendant is not permitted); Fellows v. Williams, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-00-0800686-S, 2000 WL 1655273 (September 27, 2000) ( Rittenband, J .) (no waiver of bond for prosecution for inmate).
These Superior Court decisions, upon which the defendantsrely, havenotanalyzedwhethertherecognizance bond requirement as applied to indigent inmates
runs afoul of an inmate’s fundamental right of access to the courts to challenge the conditions of his or her confinement. The defendants are correct that § 52-185 authorizes aplaintiffto find anotherfinanciallyresponsible person to enter into a recognizance on his behalf, thereby permitting an indigent plaintiffto avoid having to pay the recognizance bond out of his own pocket. This option does not alleviate our constitutional concerns altogetherwhen the indigent plaintiffis incarcerated. An indigent inmate, who has no financial ability to pay the recognizance bond and lacks access to thegreater world, may not be able to find a ‘‘financially responsible inhabitant of this state’’; General Statutes (Rev. to 2013) § 52-185 (a); to turn to for help, and, thus, would be cut off from accessing the courts to bring any civil actions that fall within the parameters of the recognizance bond requirement.11
In order to alleviate the constitutional concerns that the plaintiff has brought to our attention, we place an interpretive gloss on §§ 52-185 and 52-186. See State v. Indrisano, supra, 228 Conn. 805 (placing interpretive gloss on disorderly conduct statute to eliminate constitutional infirmity). In crafting an effective interpretive gloss that does not conflict withthe legislature’s underlying intent, it is instructive to consider decisions of the federal circuit courts assessingthe constitutionality ofthe fee provision ofthe Prison Litigation ReformAct (PLRA); 28 U.S.C. § 1915;12 which conditions prisoners’
access to the courts on the prepayment of filing fees.
Inupholdingtheconstitutionalityofthefeeprovision, the federal circuit courts have relied heavily on the fact that the PLRA contains a safety valve provision; 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (b) (4); which ensures that indigent inmates, who have no means bywhich to paythe initial filing fee, are not barred from bringing their civil actions. See, e.g., Murray v. Dosal, 150 F.3d 814, 818 (8th Cir. 1998) (‘‘[g]iven

. . . that the PLRA provides
no prisoner shall be prohibited from bringing an action ‘for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee,’ we agree that the provisions pass constitutional muster’’), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1070, 119 S. Ct. 1467, 143 L. Ed. 2d551 (1999); Tuckerv.Branker, 142 F.3d 1294, 1297–99 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (discussing that PLRA has safety valve to ensure access to courts for fully indigent prisoners); Hampton v. Hobbs, 106 F.3d 1281, 1284 (6th Cir. 1997) (upholding § 1915 because it does not deprive inmates their right of access to courts because of safety valve provision); see also Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 848–49 (9th Cir. 2002) (same).
In placing an interpretive gloss on §§ 52-185 and 52- 186, wenotetheneedforasafetyvalvethatwouldallow
anindigentinmate, who cannotaffordtherecognizance bond and who has no ability to procure a ‘‘financially responsible inhabitant of this state’’; General Statutes (Rev. to 2013) § 52-185 (a); willing to enter into one on his orherbehalf, to accessthe courts. In orderto create such a safety valve, we place a gloss on §§ 52-185 and 52-186 authorizing atrial courtto exercise its discretion to waive the recognizance bond requirement outright
or to significantly reduce the amount ofthe bond upon a proper showing of the inmate’s indigency and an inability to find another financially responsible person willing to enter into a recognizance bond on his or her behalf. Truly indigent inmates, at the hearing on the motion to dismiss for lack ofa recognizance bond, canrequest a waiver of the bond requirement or request that a nominal amount be imposed.13 Thus, an indigent inmate’s path to the courts is not blocked, and his or her fundamental right of access to the courts is not implicated, alleviating our constitutional concerns. Additionally, such a gloss ameliorates any potential constitutional infirmities because our judicially fashioned safety valve prevents there from being a total deprivation of access to the courts. In Sosna v. Iowa, supra, 419 U.S. 410, the United States Supreme Court upheldaoneyearresidencyrequirementbeforepermitting state residents to obtain a divorce, reasoning that although litigants have a right of meaningful access to the courts to obtain a divorce, this right may be burdened as long as there is not a ‘‘total deprivation’’ of
access. Usingsimilarreasoning, theUnitedStates Court ofAppealsfortheTenthCircuitupheldthe constitutionality of a statute, as applied to an inmate, sanctioning litigants for frivolous or malicious lawsuits because a prisoner’s constitutional right of access to the courts
can be limited as long as there is not a ‘‘total deprivation’’ of access to the courts. Green v. Price, Docket Nos. 95-1079, 95-1080, 1996 WL 56075 (10th Cir. February 9, 1996) (decision without published opinion, 76 F.3d 392 [10th Cir. 1996]). Similarly, with the interpretive gloss that we place on §§ 52-185 and 52-186, the recognizancebondrequirementdoesnottotallydeprive indigent inmates of access to the courts to challenge the conditions of their confinement; rather, they can still bring their lawsuits upon aproper showing ofindigency at the hearing on the motion to dismiss or at a requested hearing on the appropriate amount ofbond. Furthermore, such an interpretive gloss does no violence to §§ 52-185 and 52-186. These statutes are silent
as to whether they authorize a trial court to waive the recognizance bond requirement, and certainly they include no express language that prevents a trial court from doing so. Although they do provide that a trial court may order a ‘‘sufficient’’ bond amount after considering the potential taxable costs pursuant to § 52- 257; General Statutes (Rev. to 2013) § 52-186; arguably implying that an outright waiver of the recognizance bond is not permitted, our interpretive gloss is necessary to avoid constitutional jeopardy.14
Not only does our interpretive gloss do no violence to §§ 52-185 and 52-186, it is also in accord with the currentrevisionof§ 52-185.15SeeGeneralStatutes (Rev. to 2015) § 52-185, as amended by Public Acts 2015, No. 15-85, § 14. According to the Office of Legislative Research, the amendments to § 52-185 ‘‘[replace] certain provisions requiring a [recognizance] bond

. . . with new provisions prohibiting them, unless a court finds good cause

. . . .’’16 Office of Legislative Research, ConnecticutGeneralAssembly, BillAnalysis, SenateBillNo. 1033. Inamending § 52-185andinrepeal-ing § 52-186, the legislature has significantly narrowed the number ofcivil cases in which arecognizance bond is required and hasprovidedthe trial courtwith greater discretion in determining whetherarecognizance bond is necessary. Thus, as amended, § 52-185 lends support to the interpretive gloss that we place on General Statutes (Rev. to 2013) §§ 52-185 and 52-186. Further, althoughtheplaintiffdoeshave afundamental right of access to the courts to challenge the conditions of his confinement and to vindicate deprivations ofhis civil rights, with the gloss that we place on §§ 52- 185 and 52-186 permitting waiver of the recognizance bond, we determine that the possibility for deprivation ofthatrighthasbeenameliorated. Becausetherecognizance bond requirement with our interpretive gloss does not impinge on a fundamental right, we conclude that these statutes pass constitutional muster under due process and equal protection review.17 Having added this interpretive gloss to §§ 52-185 and 52-186, which the trial court did not consider, we find it necessary to remand the case to the trial court for a hearing to consider the plaintiff’s request, made before the trial court, for a waiver.
The judgment is reversed only as to the dismissal of the plaintiff’s causes of action against the defendants in their in official capacities and the case is remanded for a hearing consistent with this opinion to consider the plaintiff’s request for a waiver of his obligation to post a recognizance bond. Thejudgment is affirmed in all other respects.
In this opinion the otherjudges concurred.

1 According to the plaintiff’s complaint, the defendants are nine state employees. Eight of the nine defendants were employed by the University of Connecticut Correctional Managed Healthcare Program and provided medical services to inmates at the MacDougall-Walker Correctional Institution: Racquel Lightner, Dr. Pillai, Dr. O’Hallaran, CN Vecchairelli, Dr. Naqui, PARob, LPNFrancis, andLisaCaldonero. Theremainingdefendant, Lieutenant Williams, was employed by the Department of Correction and was a lieutenant at the MacDougall-Walker Correctional Institution.

2 We note that since the commencement ofthis action, § 52-185 has been amended, effective October 1, 2015. See Public Acts 2015, No. 15-85, § 14. Because the current revision of the statute is substantively different from its previous revision and was not in effect at the time that the trial court decided the motion to dismiss, our analysis pertains to the revision of the statute in effect at that time. Thus, all references to § 52-185 are to the revision that was in effect at that time, unless otherwise indicated.
3 We note that § 52-186, although in effect at the time of the motion to dismiss, has since been repealed, effective October 1, 2015. See Public Acts 2015, No. 15-85, § 27. Because the statute was in effect at the time that the motion to dismiss was decided, it is part of our analysis. There are a number ofprovisions of our rules ofpractice that implement §§ 52-185 and 52-186. See Practice Book §§ 8-3 through 8-12. Although the plaintiff mentions Practice Book § 8-4, he does not separately analyze any of the relevant provisions of the rules of practice. Because the recovery of costs and the need for a recognizance bond to secure those costs are primarily legislative matters; seeBissing v. Turkington, 113 Conn. 737, 739, 157 A. 226 (1931) (taxation of costs is matter of statutory regulation and recognizance bond required only if costs are taxable); our analysis focuses

on the meaning and import of the statutes.
4 The plaintiff’s complaint specifically indicates that the plaintiff is suing the defendants in their individual capacities but is silent as to whether heis also suing them in their official capacities. The defendants and the trial court treated the complaint as if the defendants were being sued in both their official capacities and individual capacities.

5 Inhisbrief, theplaintiffdiscusses only § 52-185. Section 52-186, however, also is part of the statutory scheme governing recognizance bonds and, thus, a discussion of this statute is necessary to a complete analysis ofthe plaintiff’s argument.
6 Theplaintiffalsomakesthefollowingpublicpolicyargument, contending that the recognizance bond requirement should not apply to him because he is an indigent inmate challenging the conditions of his confinement: ‘‘A challenge to an [inmate’s] conditions of confinement is not ofthe category of cases wherein costs may be taxed against the plaintiff. The underlying philosophy being that to do so would be to paralyze, and erect a barrier to

aninmate’s abilityto challengetheveryforcethatrestrainsthem, anddenies them an ability to insist on the most civilized treatment

. . . .’’ We construe this contention as an argument in support of the plaintiff’s constitutional claim, ratherthan as part ofhis statutory construction claim. Moreover, the plaintiff’s public policy concerns are mitigated by our construction of §§ 52- 185 and 52-186, and, thus, we are not persuaded by them. See part II B of this opinion.

7 General Statutes § 52-257 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) The fees of parties in civil actions in which the matterin demand is not less than fifteen thousand dollars

. . . . The prevailing party in any such civil action shall receive, by way of indemnity, the following sums: (1) For all proceedings before trial, fifty dollars; (2) for the trial ofan issue oflaw or fact, seventyfive dollars, but ifmore than one issue offact is tried at one time, only one trial fee shall be allowed; and (3) in difficult or extraordinary cases in the Superior Court, where a defense has been interposed, a further allowance, in the discretion of the court, not to exceed two hundred dollars. ‘‘(b) Parties shall also receive: (1) For each witness attending court, the witness’ legal fee and mileage; (2) for each deposition taken out ofthe state, forty dollars, and for each deposition within the state, thirty dollars

. . . (5) for maps, plans, mechanical drawings and photographs, necessary or convenient in the trial of any action, a reasonable sum; (6) for copies of records used in evidence, bonds, recognizances and subpoenas, court and clerk’s fees; (7) forthe signing and service ofprocess, the legal fees payable therefor, except that a fee shall not be allowed for the return ofa subpoena to court; (8) the actual expense incurred in publishing orders of notice under direction of the court; (9) for each interpreter necessarily employed in the trial of any civil action, twenty dollars per diem; (10) for premiums upon all bonds or undertakings provided pursuant to statute, rule of court, order of court or stipulation of parties, including bonds in lieu of or in release or dissolution ofattachment, the actual amount paid, not exceeding

a reasonable amount; (11) documented investigative costs and expenses, not exceeding the sum of two hundred dollars; and (12) for the recording, videotaping, transcribingandpresentationofthe depositionofapractitioner of the healing arts, as defined in section 20-1, dentist, registered nurse, advanced practice registered nurse or licensed practical nurse, as defined in section20-87a, orreal estate appraiserthatis usedinlieu oflivetestimony in the civil action, the reasonable expenses incurred.

. . .’’

8 Although General Statutes § 52-259b (a) provides for waiver of ‘‘fees payable to the court’’ and/or the cost ofservice ofprocess ifthe court finds

apartyto be indigent and unable to pay, § 52-259b does not waive any other litigation related costs.
9 Carried to its logical conclusion, the plaintiff’s argument would mean that the state is never entitled to the taxation of costs when it prevails in

a case because sovereign immunity prevents costs from ever being taxed againstit. We discernno language in anyofthese statutesthatwouldsuggest that the legislature intended to deprive the state ofits right to receive costs in civil actions in which it prevails. Moreover, the plaintiff has not cited a single case that would support such a remarkable proposition.
10 General Statutes § 52-259b provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) In any civil

or criminal matter, if the court finds that a party is indigent and unable to pay afee orfeespayable tothe court orto paythe cost ofservice ofprocess, the court shall waive such fee or fees and the cost of service of process shall be paid by the state.

. . .’’

11 Though not discussed by the defendants, we also note that there is an alternative means by which the plaintiffmay access the courts to challenge the conditions ofhis confinement: he may file a habeas petition challenging the conditions of his confinement, which does not require the posting of arecognizance bond because costs are not taxable in a habeas proceeding. See Bissing v. Turkington, supra, 113 Conn. 740. This alternative avenue by which the plaintiff may challenge the conditions of his confinement, however, is not sufficient in and of itself to alleviate our constitutional

concerns because the recognizance bond requirement applies to all civil actions in which costs are taxable in favor ofthe prevailing party pursuant to § 52-257. As stated previously, inmates have a right to bring civil rights actions to vindicate their constitutional rights, which includes, but is not limited to, the right to challenge the conditions of their confinement. See Wolff v. McDonnell, supra, 418 U.S. 579. Therefore, although there is an alternative path forinmates to access the courts to challenge the conditions oftheir confinement, that option does not altogether alleviate our constitutional concerns regarding the preconditioning of indigent inmates’ access to the courts on the payment of a recognizance bond. Additionally, a civil action challenging an inmate’s conditions of confinement pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is distinct from a habeas proceeding that isbroughtto challengetheconditionsofconfinementbecausecompensatory and punitive damages are available in a § 1983 civil action, but are not available in a habeas proceeding. See id., 554 (‘‘habeas corpus is not an appropriate or available remedy for damages claims, which

. . . could be pressed under § 1983 along with suits challenging the conditions ofconfinement rather than the fact or length of custody’’).

12 Title 28 of the United States Code, § 1915, provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a)

. . . . (2) Aprisoner seeking to bring a civil action or appeal ajudgment in a civil action orproceeding without prepayment offees or security therefor, in addition to filing the affidavit filed under paragraph (1), shall submit

a certified copy ofthe trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for the prisoner for the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint or notice of appeal, obtained from the appropriate official of each prison at which the prisoner is or was confined.

. . . ‘‘(b) (1) Notwithstanding subsection (a), ifaprisoner brings a civil action

or files an appeal in forma pauperis, the prisoner shall be required to pay the full amount ofa filing fee. The court shall assess and, when funds exist, collect, as a partial payment of any court fees required by law, an initial partial filing fee of 20 percent of the greater of— ‘‘(A) the average monthly deposits to the prisoner’s account; or ‘‘(B) the average monthly balance in the prisoner’s account for the 6- month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint or notice of appeal. ‘‘(2) After payment of the initial partial filing fee, the prisoner shall be required to make monthly payments of20 percent ofthe preceding month’s income credited to the prisoner’s account. The agency having custody of theprisonershallforwardpayments fromtheprisoner’s accounttothe clerk of the court each time the amount in the account exceeds $10 until the filing fees are paid.

. . . ‘‘(4) In no event shall aprisonerbe prohibited from bringing a civil action

or appealing a civil or criminal judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no assets andno means bywhichto paythe initialpartial filing fee.

. . .’’

13 It is, ofcourse, the indigent inmate’s burden to prove that he is indigent and that he cannot afford the amount ofbond requested by the defendants. It is also the inmate’s burden to request a hearing as to the amount ofbond if such a hearing is desired.

14 Although the allowance in § 52-185 for aplaintiffnot to paythe recognizance bondfromhis ownfunds andinsteadto finda ‘‘financiallyresponsible inhabitant of this state’’ to enter into a recognizance on his behalf does not alleviate our constitutional concerns regarding the recognizance bond requirement as applied to indigentinmates, it is arelevantfactorto be taken into consideration by a trial court when deciding whether it should waive the recognizance bond or substantially reduce the bond amount.
15 The current revision of General Statutes (Rev. to 2015) § 52-185, as amended by Public Acts 2015, No. 15-85, § 14, provides in relevant part: ‘‘ No bond or recognizanceforprosecution is required from a party in any civil actionunless thejudicial authority, uponmotion andforgood causeshown, finds that a party is not able to pay the costs of the action and orders that the party give a sufficient bond or enter into a recognizance to an adverse partywith afinanciallyresponsiblepersontopaytaxable costs. In determining the sufficiency ofthe bond or recognizance, the judicial authority shall consider only the taxable costs which the party may be responsible for under section 52-257

. . . .’’ (Emphasis added.)

16 In testifying on behalf ofthe Judicial Branch in favor ofamending § 52-185,theHonorablePatrickL. CarrollIII,thedeputychiefcourtadministrator, stated that a recognizance bond ‘‘unnecessarily increases the burden on self-represented [plaintiffs]

. . . and does not provide any realistic security for costs of an action.’’ Judiciary Committee public hearing, concerning Senate Bill No. 1033 (April 1, 2015), testimony of Judge Carroll.

17 Ifnofundamentalrightisimplicated,thechallengedlegislationissubject to evaluation for substantive due process and equal protection purposes under the rational basis test. Federal Communications Commission v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313, 113 S. Ct. 2096, 124 L. Ed. 2d 211 (1993); Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 305, 113 S. Ct. 1439, 123 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1993). The plaintiffhas only briefed his due process and equal protection claims on the basis of a fundamental right being violated. The plaintiff has failed to brief whether the recognizance bond requirement passes the rational basis test, should we find that no fundamental right is at stake. In lightofthisinadequatebriefing, we declinetoaddressthisissue. See Clelford

v. Bristol, 150 Conn. App. 229, 233, 90 A.3d 998 (2014).