United States Court of Appeals 

For the First Circuit 

No. 16-1351 

ROBERT CHASE, 

Plaintiff, Appellant, 

v. 

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE; MICHAEL KING; AND UNITED STATES, 

AS SOLE DEFENDANT ON COUNTS III, IV, AND V, 

Defendants, Appellees. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS 

[Hon. Douglas P. Woodlock, U.S. District Judge] 

Before 

Barron, Selya, and Stahl, 

Circuit Judges. 

Lori A. Jodoin, with whom Rodgers, Powers & Schwartz LLP, 

were on brief, for appellant. 

Christine J. Wichers, Assistant United States Attorney, with 

whom Carmen M. Ortiz, United States Attorney, was on brief, for 

appellees. 

David Conforto and Conforto Law Group, on brief for 

Massachusetts Employment Lawyers Association as amicus curiae. 

John Pagliaro and Martin J. Newhouse on brief for New England 

Legal Foundation and Associated Industries of Massachusetts as 

amicus curiae. 

December 14, 2016 

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STAHL, Circuit Judge. The Family Medical Leave Act 

(FMLA) allows an employee up to twelve weeks of leave, in a twelvemonth period, for a serious medical condition. 29 U.S.C. § 

2612(a)(1)(D). Under the FMLA, an employee's absence from work 

due to a personal health concern, or that of a spouse, child, or 

parent, is protected from interference and retaliation by his 

employer. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a). 

 Appellant Robert Chase alleged that his employer, the 

United States Postal Service (USPS), and supervisor Michael King, 

terminated him from the Brookline, Massachusetts Post Office in 

retaliation for taking FMLA leave. He brought interference and 

retaliation claims under 29 U.S.C. § 2615, arguing that King and 

USPS violated the FMLA by firing him while he was out of work on 

protected leave. 

 Following a bench trial, the district court held that 

King and the USPS did not violate the FMLA on the ground that King, 

as the USPS decisionmaker, did not have the requisite knowledge of 

the designation of Chase's medical leave necessary to hold 

defendants liable under the FMLA. This appeal followed, and we 

AFFIRM. 

I. Facts & Background 

Chase worked as a letter carrier at the USPS Brookline 

Post Office for nearly fourteen years. During this time, Chase 

never received a negative performance review nor was he subject to 
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any disciplinary action. King, manager of the Brookline Post 

Office, supervised Chase from 2005 until his termination on 

September 30, 2011. 

A. Accident and Leave of Absence 

The accident leading to Chase's leave and allegedly 

contributing to his termination occurred on July 21, 2010, when an 

elderly woman fell asleep at the wheel of her car and struck 

Chase's vehicle while he was parked during his lunch break. Chase 

was taken to the hospital and diagnosed with a serious shoulder 

injury including damage to his rotator cuff. King personally went 

to the scene of the accident to observe the severity of the 

accident and injury and to prepare a report of the incident. 

King's report noted Chase's shoulder injury. 

Following his injury, Chase applied for workers' 

compensation, despite being discouraged from doing so by King. 

This request was approved. Chase also applied for and was granted 

FMLA leave. USPS mailed a Designation/FMLA Approval Notice to 

Chase and to King which stated that "[Chase's] FMLA leave request 

is approved. All leave taken for this reason will be designated 

as FMLA leave."1 Pursuant to USPS policy, Chase opted for a 

 1 King claims that he never received the FMLA notice and that 

he thought perhaps an office worker had filed the notice without 

first showing it to him. He testified that he believed Chase's 

leave status was either "injured on duty" (IOD) or "out on workers' 

compensation" (OWCP), and that he assumed that Chase was not on 

FMLA leave because that leave is often unpaid and he believed that 
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continuation of pay and was fully compensated for the first 45 

days of his leave, after which he received workers’ compensation 

benefits amounting to two-thirds of his salary, tax-free, plus 

health insurance. Chase's concurrent FMLA leave lasted from July 

21, 2010 to October 12, 2010, but he remained on medical leave 

until September 30, 2011, when he was terminated. 

B. Workplace Tensions Between King and Chase 

On several occasions, both before and during the course 

of these events, King publicly mocked Chase and accused him of 

faking injuries. In September of 2006, Chase had injured his knee 

while on the job and subsequently missed a week of work. At that 

time, in apparent response, King made an announcement over the 

Brookline Post Office loudspeaker, "[w]ill Bob Chase, the injury 

fraud specialist, please report to the office." In August of 2010, 

a month after Chase's motor vehicle accident at issue in this case, 

King posted a job opening on the office bulletin board advertising 

a position for an "injury compensation specialist." King then 

made an announcement mocking Chase: "[T]here’s a job posted on 

the bulletin board for an[] injury compensation specialist since 

you’re the biggest fraud when it comes to injuries." Brookline 

Post Office employee Maria Constantino testified that she heard 

King say that Chase was faking the 2010 shoulder injury he had 

 

employees only used FMLA leave once they had exhausted all forms 

of paid leave, which to his knowledge Chase had not. 
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sustained in the car accident and heard King announce on multiple 

occasions, "Can I have the carrier on Route 92 [Chase] who is 

faking an injury come to the office, please?" 

C. USPS Disciplinary Action 

On September 18, 2010, while on FMLA leave, Chase was 

arrested with his brother and charged with possession of cocaine 

with intent to distribute and conspiracy to violate drug laws, in 

violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 94C, §§ 32A(a) and 40. The 

arrests were publicized in a local newspaper, the Brookline Tab. 

After seeing the article and arrest reports, King notified his 

then-manager, Lori Bullen, about the arrests, saying, "[i]t would 

be nice if we can proceed with something." Bullen forwarded King's 

email to Labor Relations indicating that Chase was "out OWCP [on 

workers' compensation] to boot." 

Following the arrest Chase and King remained in fairly 

regular communication. During one of these conversations, Chase 

notified King that the criminal charges would soon be dismissed. 

King then turned the conversation to Chase's medical leave and 

began to threaten Chase with a workers' compensation fraud 

investigation if he did not return to work. Several Brookline 

Postal workers including Joseph DeMambro, the Chief Union Steward, 

and another employee, Wanda Jackson, testified that King believed 

that Chase was faking his current shoulder injury and that King 

was often suspicious of employees who took medical leave. 
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On January 18, 2011, King and Chase spoke over the 

telephone for a pre-disciplinary interview, during which they 

discussed how Chase's arrest and charges might affect his job. 

Chase and King ceased communicating after Chase phoned King asking 

for help to resolve an issue related to his medical leave and King 

responded, "go [expletive] yourself." 

On January 27, 2011, King's manager approved the request 

that Chase be issued a Notice of Removal. On the following day, 

Labor Relations prepared for King a Notice for "Failure to Perform 

Duties in a Satisfactory Manner." King signed that Notice on 

February 1, 2011, and issued it to Chase. Chase was still on 

medical leave when he received the Notice of Removal. The 

dismissal notice cited Chase's arrest and refusal to answer 

questions during his pre-disciplinary interview. In response to 

the notice, Chase filed a grievance through his union, but USPS 

denied the grievance and his case proceeded to arbitration pursuant 

to the union contract. Before the final arbitration hearing, 

Chase's criminal case reached a favorable resolution when, on 

August 31, 2011, the conspiracy charge was dismissed outright and 

the charge of possession with intent to distribute was reduced to 

a charge of simple possession, to be dismissed upon completion of 

one year of pre-trial probation and random drug testing. The 

grievance process ultimately reached its conclusion on September 

30, 2011, when the arbitrator ruled against Chase. The arbitrator 
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issued a final written decision, affirming Chase's removal on the 

grounds that USPS had shown through clear and convincing evidence 

that Chase had possessed a Class B illegal drug, which violated 

USPS policy. He was officially terminated that same day. 

D. The FMLA 

The FMLA provides an employee suffering from a serious 

injury or medical condition with up to twelve weeks of protected 

leave, in a twelve-month period. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D). An 

employee is eligible for FMLA leave for each of the following 

reasons: 

(A) Because of the birth of a son or daughter of 

 the employee and in order to care for such son or 

 daughter. 

(B) Because of the placement of a son or daughter with 

 the employee for adoption or foster care. 

(C) In order to care for the spouse, or a son, daughter, 

 or parent, of the employee, if such spouse, son, 

 daughter, or parent has a serious health condition. 

(D) Because of a serious health condition that makes the 

 employee unable to perform the functions of the 

 position of such employee. 

(E) Because of any qualifying exigency . . . arising out 

 of the fact that the spouse, or a son, daughter, or 

 parent of the employee is on covered active duty . 

 . . has been notified of an impending call or order 

 to covered active duty) in the Armed Forces. 

29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1). In keeping with its comprehensive remedial 

purpose "to help working men and women balance the conflicting 

demands of work and personal life," the FMLA should be broadly 

construed. See Hodgens v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 144 F.3d 151, 164 

(1st Cir. 1998) (quoting Price v. City of Ft. Wayne, 117 F.3d 1022, 
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1024 (7th Cir. 1997)); see also Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 

332, 336 (1967) (noting that "remedial legislation should be 

construed broadly to effectuate its purposes.") 

FMLA leave may take many forms, including an unpaid leave 

of absence, a paid vacation, personal leave, family leave, medical 

leave, or sick leave. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(c)-(d). FMLA leave 

may also run concurrently with other types of paid leave such as 

workers' compensation. 29 C.F.R. § 825.207(d)-(e). When making 

a request for leave, "the employee need not expressly assert rights 

under the FMLA or even mention the FMLA" for FMLA protection to 

attach. 29 C.F.R. § 825.302(c). 

An employer may not interfere with, restrain, or deny 

the exercise of or the attempt to exercise any right provided under 

the FMLA, nor may an employer discharge or discriminate against an 

individual who takes FMLA leave. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a); see also 29 

C.F.R. § 825.220(c); Hodgens, 144 F.3d at 160 n.4. Additionally, 

an employer may not include FMLA leave "as a negative factor in 

employment actions ... ." 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c). While the FMLA 

itself does not explicitly contain a prohibition on retaliation 

for taking leave, courts have interpreted the Act to have such an 

implied prohibition. See Pagán-Colón v. Walgreens of San Patricio, 

Inc., 697 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2012). 
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E. Procedural History 

On June 29, 2012, Chase filed his Complaint in the United 

States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. He 

alleged FMLA interference (Count I) and FMLA retaliation (Count 

II) in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 2615. In addition, Chase sued 

King for intentional interference with advantageous business 

relations (Count III), intentional infliction of emotional 

distress (Count IV), and defamation (Count V). The United States 

substituted itself for King for Counts III-V under the Westfall 

Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2679, which allows the United States to step in 

as defendant for one of its employees where the employee is sued 

for damages as a result of an alleged tort committed within the 

scope of his or her employment. 

On August 30, 2012, USPS and King moved to dismiss all 

claims. Chase opposed these motions and the court took them under 

advisement. At the close of discovery the defendants moved for 

summary judgment in their favor on all claims. Chase again opposed 

defendants' motions. The district court heard oral arguments on 

October 16, 2013. On November 4, 2013, the court granted summary 

judgement on all claims with the exception of the FMLA retaliation 

claim (Count II). 

Count II proceeded to a bench trial on April 7-10, 2014. 

On March 1, 2016, the district court entered judgement for USPS 

and King, reasoning that the defendants could not have acted with 
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retaliatory animus because King lacked the requisite knowledge 

that Chase's leave was protected under the FMLA. Chase filed this 

appeal on March 31, 2016. 

II. Discussion 

We review a district court's factual findings for clear 

error and its legal holdings de novo. Industria y Distribuction 

de Alimentos v. Trailer Bridge, 797 F.3d 141, 144 (1st Cir. 2015). 

We find no clear error in the district court's finding that King 

reasonably believed Chase was not out on FMLA leave, and we agree 

with the district court that King's knowledge was insufficient to 

support an FMLA retaliation claim. 

To make out a claim for retaliation under the FMLA, a 

plaintiff must show that the employer "took the adverse action 

because of a prohibited reason [and not for] a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason." Hodgens, 144 F.3d at 160. In order to 

make out a prima facie case of retaliation, the employee "must 

show that (1) he availed himself of a protected right under the 

FMLA; (2) he was adversely affected by an employment decision; (3) 

there is a causal connection between the employee's protected 

activity and the employer's adverse employment action." Id. at 

161 (citing Randlett v. Shalala, 118 F.3d 857, 862 (1st Cir. 

1997)). Because the employer's intent in FMLA retaliation claims 

is highly relevant, an employer cannot be found to have retaliated 

against an employee for invoking his rights under the FMLA or 
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taking FMLA leave unless the decisionmaker knew or should have 

known that the employee had invoked those rights. See Ameen v. 

Amphenol Printed Circuits, Inc., 777 F.3d 63, 70 (1st Cir. 2015). 

This case turns on whether there was a causal connection 

between the employee's protected activity (taking FMLA leave) and 

the employer's adverse employment action (termination). On 

appeal, Chase argues that the district court erred in determining 

that King did not believe that Chase was out on FMLA leave, and, 

therefore, cannot be held liable for retaliation under the FMLA. 

Chase argues King knew he was injured and knew the FMLA covered 

the first twelve weeks of his medical leave. Further, Chase 

asserts that even if King did not have direct knowledge of his 

FMLA leave, USPS's institutional knowledge binds the organization. 

We address these arguments in turn. 

A. Retaliatory Animus 

Chase contends that King knew he was on FMLA leave as a 

result of his on-the-job motor vehicle accident and argues the 

district court committed clear error in holding otherwise. It is 

undisputed that King was aware of Chase's injury, that he visited 

the scene of the accident and made a report, and that he was aware 

that Chase was out of work on medical leave; however, there is no 

evidence that King knew or should have known that Chase was out on 

protected FMLA-designated leave. Consequently, we find that Chase 

does not have a valid claim for FMLA retaliation because he failed 
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to prove that King acted with retaliatory animus towards his FMLA 

leave. See Ameen, 777 F.3d at 70 (holding that to succeed on an 

FMLA retaliation claim, a plaintiff "must show that the retaliator 

knew about [his] protected activity——after all, one cannot have 

been motivated to retaliate by something he was unaware of." 

(quoting Medina–Rivera v. MVM, Inc., 713 F.3d 132, 139 (1st Cir. 

2013) (alteration in original))). 

It is true beyond a doubt that King knew that Chase had 

suffered a serious injury, one that was both covered by workers' 

compensation and FMLA-eligible. Indeed, the injury ultimately 

resulted in FMLA leave being granted. However, the case presents 

an unusual situation in which King also reasonably believed that 

Chase was out on paid workers' compensation medical leave, rather 

than FMLA-designated leave. For this belief, King relied on a 

computer program that listed Chase as either "injured on duty" or 

"out on workers' compensation." In addition to the USPS internal 

computer system, which made no mention of Chase having been granted 

FMLA leave, King also testified that he neither received nor saw 

the FMLA notice that was allegedly mailed to both Chase and King. 

King also reasonably concluded, as the district court 

found, that "even though seriously injured, it would not make sense 

[for] Chase to take FMLA leave until——at the earliest——his paid 

leave expired," Chase v. U.S. Postal Serv., 149 F. Supp. 3d 195, 

212 (D. Mass. 2016), because using FMLA leave concurrently with 
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the more advantageous coverage available under workers' 

compensation would be redundant. In other words, given that King 

"reasonably believed that the FMLA's protections had been 

declined," id., he cannot be held liable in this case for a failure 

to inquire further into Chase's leave status, see, e.g., Dotson 

v. Pfizer, Inc., 558 F.3d 284, 295 (4th Cir. 2009) (FMLA 

retaliation can be found where the employer "was on notice that 

[the employee] was inquiring about his FMLA options" and "did not 

fulfill its duty to inquire about whether his leave should be 

classified as FMLA-protected"); 29 C.F.R. § 825.302(c) ("In all 

cases, the employer should inquire further of the employee if it 

is necessary to have more information about whether FMLA leave is 

being sought by the employee.") (emphasis added). 

Moreover, even King's workplace comments over the 

loudspeaker and to various employees, inappropriate as they may 

have been in polite company, or for that matter in employee 

relations, support the district court's conclusion that King 

actually believed that Chase was receiving workers' compensation 

and had not taken FMLA leave. As the district court sustainably 

found, "it was the workers' compensation leave——not the concurrent 

FMLA leave——which angered King and contributed to Chase's 

termination." Chase, 149 F. Supp. 3d at 213. Liability for 

retaliation under the FMLA is restricted to actions taken out of 

animus towards FMLA-protected leave. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c) 
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(an employer may not consider an employee's use of FMLA leave "as 

a negative factor in employment actions").2 Chase's arguments, to 

the extent that they establish King's animus towards Chase for 

taking workers' compensation leave, are insufficient to show that 

King acted with any retaliatory animus in violation of the FMLA 

given that King had no actual or constructive knowledge that the 

FMLA had been invoked. 

To be clear, actual knowledge on the part of an employer 

that a particular employee has specifically invoked the FMLA's 

statutory protections, as opposed to having taken leave for an 

injury or other condition which happens to be FMLA-protected, is 

 2 We note that there is some tension in the case law as to 

the appropriate causation standard to apply in FMLA retaliation 

cases. The currently operative Department of Labor Regulations 

(DOL), as indicated above, prohibit an employer from using an 

employee's decision to take FMLA leave as a "negative factor" in 

employment actions. 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c). We have previously 

held that DOL regulations interpreting the FMLA are entitled to 

deference under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 

Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). See, e.g., Hodgens, 144 F.3d at 160 

n.4; Colburn v. Parker Hannifin/Nichols Portland Div., 429 F.3d 

325, 331 (1st Cir. 2005). However, the Supreme Court has held 

that Title VII retaliation claims "must be proved according to 

traditional principles of but-for causation . . . [which] requires 

proof that the unlawful retaliation would not have occurred in the 

absence of the alleged wrongful action or actions of the employer." 

Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2533 

(2013). The district court concluded that Nassar had not changed 

the landscape for FMLA claims, and that the "negative factor" test 

promulgated by DOL continued to apply. Given that Chase is unable 

to prevail under even the more lenient "negative factor" test, we 

save for another day the question of Nassar's impact on FMLA 

jurisprudence with respect to the required causation standard, and 

take no position on the district court's decision to grant the DOL 

regulations continued Chevron deference. 
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not the sine qua non of FMLA retaliation liability. After all, as 

the Department of Labor Regulations instruct, "the employee need 

not expressly assert rights under the FMLA or even mention the 

FMLA" to provide his employer with notice, 29 C.F.R. § 825.302(c), 

and as we noted in our first encounter with FMLA retaliation, the 

relevant inquiry in such cases is "whether there [was] sufficient 

evidence . . . for a jury to conclude that [the plaintiff's] 

discharge was motivated by retaliation for his having availed 

himself of a right protected by the FMLA, namely, the right to 

take medically necessary leave time." Hodgens, 144 F.3d at 169. 

However, in the case before us, not only was King 

oblivious to the statutory character of the leave in question, but 

he had a reasonable and well-founded belief that Chase had not 

availed himself of FMLA protection, because it would not have made 

sense for him to do so while he was already receiving a more 

beneficial package under the workers' compensation regime. The 

information and records to which King was privy appeared to 

indicate only that Chase was receiving "paid leave [in the form of 

workers' compensation], under terms more favorable than the FMLA 

provides," Chase, 149 F. Supp. 3d at 212. Although this case is 

unusual in that the injury in question qualified Chase for FMLA 

leave, we do not believe that the district court clearly erred in 

concluding that the particular chronology and facts of this case 
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rendered King's belief that Chase had declined to invoke FMLA 

protection a reasonable one. 

B. General Corporate Knowledge 

 Finally, Chase argues that even if King reasonably 

believed that Chase was not out on FMLA leave, USPS had "general 

corporate knowledge" of the FMLA designation, which binds its 

conduct as a matter of law. Alston v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 14 F. 

Supp. 2d 308, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). Chase's argument is inherently 

flawed because precedent does not support his basic proposition 

that corporate or managerial knowledge can override a 

decisionmaker's lack of knowledge in FMLA retaliation cases, for 

reasons we explain below. 

In Ameen, this court declined to find retaliatory 

conduct because the plaintiff could not show that the decisionmaker 

knew that the plaintiff was engaging in protected activity, even 

though others in the company hierarchy did. 777 F.3d at 70 (citing 

Medina–Rivera, 713 F.3d at 139); see also Pomales v. Celulares 

Telefónica, Inc., 447 F.3d 79, 85 (1st Cir. 2006) ("[T]here must 

be proof that the decisionmaker knew of the plaintiff's protected 

conduct when he or she decided to take the adverse employment 

action."). Other circuits echo this decisionmaker knowledge 

requirement. See Henderson v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 610 F. App'x 

488, 496 (6th Cir. 2015); Brungart v. Bellsouth Telecomms., Inc., 

231 F.3d 791, 800 (11th Cir. 2000); Cohen v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 686 
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F.2d 793, 797 n.5 (9th Cir. 1982).3 Based on these cases, there 

is no precedent to support Chase's proposition that USPS's general 

knowledge can substitute for King's lack of knowledge for purposes 

of this FMLA retaliation analysis. 

III. Conclusion 

 While King clearly demonstrated animus towards Chase for 

his absence, that animus was directed exclusively towards Chase's 

workers' compensation leave, not his FMLA leave. Because King 

reasonably believed that Chase was not out on FMLA leave, we AFFIRM 

the district court's finding that King lacked the requisite 

knowledge necessary to hold him liable for retaliation in violation 

of the FMLA. Affirmed.

 3 To the extent that these cases involve retaliatory actions 

based on statutes other than the FMLA, they are still informative 

because the discrimination analysis under each is highly 

analogous, if not identical, to that under the FMLA.