### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 6 -00 306 -CR

Do ugl as K e llyP ye , A ppe lla nt

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF WI LLIAM SO N COUNTY , 26TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. 05- 547- K2 6 , HO NORAB LE B ILLY RAY STUB B LEF IELD , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N Appellant Doug las Kelly

Py e appe als his state j ail felony conviction for f org ery . See Tex. P enal Code A nn. § 22.21 (West Supp. 2008). The jury found appellant g uilty and the tria l court

a sse sse d p un ish me nt at on e y e ar’ s im pr iso nme nt.
P OIN TS OF ER RO R Appellant adva

nces f ive poi nts of err or, four

of which a lleg e the tria l court er red in o ve rr uli nghis mot ion

fo r n e w tri a l. F ir st, a

pp e lla nt a sse rt s th e tr ial cou rt erre d in fa ili ngto g rant a new tria l on the basis of ineff ective a ssistance of c ounsel bec ause counsel did not “view” the pr e se nte nc e re po rt

fo rt y -e ig ht h ours be fo re the he ari ngc oncern ingthe pr e se nte nc e re po rt
. Alternatively , appellant claims counsel failed t o object to the presentence repor t, failed to pre pare
a pp e lla nt t o r e sp on d in

c ourt to t he pr e se nte nc e re po rt , a

nd int e rr up te d a pp e lla nt duri nghis re sp on se at t h e h ea ri n g.2 Se c on d, a pp e lla nt u rg e s error i n th e ov e rr

uli ngof the ne w tri a l mo tio n b e c a us e counsel wa s ineffe ctive wh en h e gav e erroneous le g al advice that appellant ha d a mer itorious “def ense” of a la ck of intent to def raud or harm the complainant. I t is claimed that this led appe llant to m a ke state me nts in t

he pr e se nte nc e int e rv ie w a nd la te r i n c ou rt th a t w e re c ha ra c te ri zed a s a

“ min imi zat ion

of g uil t,” re su lti ngin t

he re je c tio n o f a

ple a ba rg a in a g re e me nt. Third, er ror is ag ain urg ed in the over ruling of the ne w trial motion beca use appe llant was de prived of c ounsel at a c ritical stag e of the proce eding s resulting from the district attorne y ’s dis c los ur e to a

pp e lla nt’ s c ouns e l of

the dis pa ra g ingre marks mad e a

bo ut c ouns e l by

a pp e lla nt i n
re c or de d ja il t e le ph on e c on ve rs a tio ns .

Four th, appellant ar g ues that a ne w trial should have be en gr an ted bec ause the trial court a

bused its discretion at the new trial hear ing by admitting into evidenc e “e leventh hour” aff idavits offer ed by

the State on the last day befor e the motion for ne w trial wa s overr uled by operation of law.

Fifth a nd last, appellant c ontends that the trial cour t erre d in failing to follow a plea barg ain ag ree ment for defe rre d adjudication beca use (1) appellant did not minimiz e his g uilt in t he prese ntence repor

t, or (2) the trial court ha d acc epted the g uilt plea and plea barg ain ag ree ment prior to reque sting a

prese ntence repor

t. We will affirm the judg ment of convic tion.
F ACTUAL BACK GR OUND Ap p e l l a nt d oe s n ot c ha lle ng e the le g a l or fa c tua l su ff

ic ie nc y of the e vid e nc e to s us ta in the c on vic tio n. A r e c itatio n o f t he fa c ts a nd the pr oc e dure uti lize d will pla c e the po int s of e rr or in proper perspe ctive. In J anuar

y 2005, appellant Py e a n d Dustin Almazan were both employ ees at3

the Ma c Ha ik F or d a

uto mob ile de a le rs hip in Ge or g e tow n. Ap pe lla nt ha d a ssi ste d Al maz an, his “cousin-in- law,” in obtainingemploy ment there about a y ear

ear lie r. S ometime in J anuar y 2005, Al ma zan ’s e mpl oy

me nt w a s te rm inate d, app aren tl y fo r f a ili ngto m e e t hi s sa le s q

uo ta . T he Ha ik de a le rs hip “ c ut” Al ma zan ’s te rm ination check in the a mou nt o f $ 59 .8 0 a

nd pla c e d th e c he c k in

a draw er in the “sale s tower” of the deale rship for Almazan. The rec ord ref lects that ap p el lant ob ta ine d th e Al ma zan check , for ged Al ma zan ’s name , a

nd c a sh e d th e c he c k at a

fo od mart . T his was done with o u t the knowledg e, conse nt, or permission of Almazan. When Almazan inquired about the che ck, the de aler ship learne d that the che ck had been cashe d. Another chec k was issued to Almaz an by

the dea lership, and the a g ency ’s bank took the loss af ter Almazan filed a

forg ery aff idavit. When Almazan was at the Ge org etown police station, he rec eived a telephone call fr om
a p p e l l an t
. A l m a z anr e tu r

n e d t h e c a l l o na p o l i c e t e l e p h o n e an d t h e c o n v e r s a t i o nw a s r e c o r d e d

. In the conve rsation, appe llant admitted to ha v i n g ca s h ed the c heck w ithout permission by signing Almazan’s name.

J ohn Tirella, inventor

y manag er of t h e Haik dealership, investig ated the missing che ck. Tirella talked to appe llant, who, in an admission ag ainst interest, stated to Tire lla that he (appe llant) had take n the che ck and c ashed it. De tective Ronald Price testified as to the filing of char g es ag ainst appellant on F ebrua ry 16, 2005, and the r ecor ded telephone conver sation betwee n Al ma zan and a pp e lla nt. Throug hout the rec ord, there was testimony about a “ spin” che ck issued by the For d Motor Company

to a salesman w ho had sold a c erta in ty pe of ve hicle as a

n additional commission. The “ spin” che cks in these c as es were alwa y s issued only

in the name of

the first salesma

n on4

the list because the fe dera l income t ax form 1099 wa s sent to that individual. I f two or more
sa le sme n w e re inv olv e d in a sa le , the y c ou ld ag re e ho w t o s pli t th e “ sp in” c he c k ma de ou t to the fi rs t name on the list. I f a dispute arose, the H aik dea lership enc ourag ed a se ttlement but did not enforce

a g re e me nts . I t a

pp e ars that in

Janu ary 20 05 , A lma zan re c e ive d a n $ 82 .5 0 “ sp in” c he c k f

or the sa le of a L inc oln Na

vig a tor . De fe ns e e xhibi t N o. 2, a Ha ik d e a le rs hip do c ume nt, wa s in tr od uc e d at tr ia l. I t r efle cted that the sa lesmen listed on the sale of the L incoln Navig ator we re “ Almazan, Dustin” and “Py e, Doug las,” in that orde r.

J ohn Tirella testified tha

t when he questioned appellant a bout the matter, a

ppellant simply stated t hat he ha d made “ a mistake a nd messed up.” A

ppellant made no c laim to Tirella that Almazan intended to share the “spin” c heck of $82.50 with him (appe llant). Tirella f urther te stified that he did not know of a ny ag ree ment betwee n Almazan and appe llant ab o u t t he sale of the L incoln automobile.

Dustin Almazan testif

i ed t h at he repeatedly

called the Haik dea lership about h i s termination chec k of $59.80 and w as finally told that it had been ca shed. Almazan filed a forg ery aff idavit and went to the Ge org etown police de partment. I n two or three ear lier telephone
co n v er s at i o n s wi t h ap p el l an t , n o m en t i o nwa s m ad e to Al m az an t h at ap p el l an t h adan y kn o wl ed ge of the c ashed c heck. A ccor ding to Alm azan, it was not until the telephone c onversation recor ded by the po lic e that he le arn e d a pp e lla nt h a d ta ke n th e c he c k a

nd c a sh e d it

. Al ma z an reve a le d th a t a

pp e lla nt c a me to t

he sit e of Al ma zan ’s ne w j ob in T e mpl e and put $60.00 in cash on the desk. Almazan re fused to ac cept the money . Almazan place d the money in a desk dra

wer and left that employ

ment two day s later. As far as he kne w, the money was5

still in the draw er. Almazan testified that appellant was trying to g et him to drop the ca se. Almazan related that he ha d ear lier re ceive d the “spin” c heck f or the sale of a L incoln automobile, which wa s issued solely

to him, although appellant was also listed as a salesman on the dealer ship recor ds. He

a dmi tte d h a vin g an o ng oin g dis pu te wi th a pp e lla nt a bo ut s ha ri ngthe “ sp in” c he c k, bu t ha d f ina lly decide d not to share. He had not share d any other “ spin” che cks that he ha d rec eived. Appellant did not testify

at the guilt/innocence stag e of the trial befor e the jury , but did te sti fy a t th e pe na lty

sta g e of the tr ia l be fo re the tr ia l c ourt
.
P ROCEDURAL BACK GR OUND On May 31, 2005, appellant wa s indicted on two counts of for g ery . On Fe bruar y 6, 20 06 , a pp e lla nt, re pr e sent ed by

re ta ine d c ouns e l, w a ive d tr ia l by jur y and e nte re d a ple a of g uil ty be fo re the tr ia l c ourt to th e fi rst c ount o f t he ind ic tme nt c ha

rg ing a state ja il f

e lony . T he State offe r e d a “ o n e d ay o n ly” p le a b ar g a in o f f e r , to w h ic h a

p p e ll an t an d h is c o u n s e l a g r e ed. The plea barg ain ag ree ment called f or a punishment of f

our y ear s of def

err ed adju d i ca tion supervision (probation), a $2,500 fine, and t hirty day s in jail with j ail cre dit for time in confineme nt. Appellant was duly admonished of the conseque nces of his guilty plea and the trial court was made awa re of the plea ba

rg ain. Appellant made a judicial conf ession afte r which the trial court e x amined appe llant

a s to the ple a

ba rg a in. Th e re c or d th e n r e fl e c ts:
The Court: Mr. Py e. I acc ept y our plea. I fi n d t he evidenc e substantiates y our

g uilt, but I do not find y ou g uilty at this tim e.6 The c ause w as rec essed to a wait the prepa

ration of the prese ntence repor t a nd to then deter mine whether

the plea ba

rg ain ag ree ment was to be a cce pted. The c ase w as re cal l ed o n M ar ch 23, 2006. In a somewhat informal manner , the trial court e stablished appellant’ s identity and what had earlier transpired in the case; then, skipping
over a ppellant’s prior c riminal rec ord , the trial cour t directe d questions personally to appellant raising an issue as to w hether appellant was denying his guilt. Appellant acknowle dg ed the truth of the state me nts in t

he pr e se nte nc e re po rt

that he ha d a

“ stu pid , c ra zy ide a ” to c a shthe check s o it could be e asily

divided, with the intent to give A lmazan an op p o rt u n i t y to pay appellant the fo rt y do lla rs ow e d him fr om t

he sh ari ngof

the “ sp in” c he c k. Ap pe lla nt a g re e d th a t he ha d a lso tol d the probation interviewer that he had no intent to defra u d o r harm a ny one. Appe llant’s counsel tried to modify

appella n t ’s s tatements and his admission that he wa s only g uilty of a pa rt of the alleg ations in the indictment. The prosec utor then ra ised questions about proce eding with the plea ba rg a in. Th e tr ia l c ourt

re je c te d th e ple a

a g re e me nt o f d e fe rr e d a dju dic atio n a nd or de re d th e c a se
se t f or a jur y tr ia l. T he re we re no ob

je c tio ns to t

he tr ia l c ourt ’s a c tio ns . Th e jur y tr ial on appel lant’ s p le a of no t g uil ty

c omm e nc e d o n M ay

1, 20 06 , th is time on the second c ount of the indictment. The f irst count was wa ived and a bandoned by

the State. After the jury

found appe llant guilty , the trial cour t conducted a

penalty hear ing. A

ppellant testified that he wa s d isa

pp oin te d in

the jur y ’s ve rd ic t, b ut h is i nte nt w a s t o g ive Al ma zan the op po rt

un ity to repa y him the money owed. He ex plained that he did not intend to keep the money if there was a dispu t e. He ag ree d that his testimony was the same as re veale d to the probation off icer for7

the purp os e s o f t

he PSI . T he tr ia l c ourt

c ited a pp e lla nt’ s te sti mony

re g ard ing“ thi nk inge rr or s” in assessing a one y ear

state jail felony

punishment i n s t ea d of probation. Sentence wa s imposed on May 2, 2006.
MOTION F OR NEW TRIAL

I n points of err or one and two, appellant urg es that the trial court e rre d in overruling the motion for new tr ial, which included se parate claims of inef fec tive assistance of counse l. The claims are related to counsel’s c onduct prior to the jury trial which resulted in appellant’s c onviction

and in wh ic h a

pp e lla nt wa s re pr e se nte d by same c ouns e l (R ob e rt Phi lli ps ) or c ouns el o f t he s ame law firm ( Mark B runner). We shall beg in with the law applica ble to the hea

ring on the motion fo r n e w tri a l and

the c la ims fo r t

he ine ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l.
STA ND AR

D O F RE VI EW An appe llate cour

t review s a trial cour

t’s denial of a

motion for n ew trial under an abuse of discre tion standard. Cha rle s v . S tate , 146 S.W .3d 204, 208 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); Sa laz ar v . S tat e , 38 S.W .3d 141, 148 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). At a hea ri ng on a motion for
ne w tri a l, t

he tr ia l c ourt

is the tr ie r of fact and the so le jud g e of the c re dib ili ty

of the wi tne sse s. Le wis v . S

tat e , 9 11 S.W. 2d

1, 7 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 95 ); W oo da ll v . S

tat e , 7 7 S
. W .3d 38 8, 39 3 ( Te x. App.— Fort W orth20 02 , p e t. r e f’ d) ; Ge or ge v . S tat e , 20 S.W .3d 130, 135 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2000, pet. re f’d)

. I ts findings should not be disturbed unless a n abuse of discretion has be en demonstra ted. Tol le tt v. Sta te , 799 S.W .2d 256, 259 (Tex. Crim. App.8

1990). We view the evide nce in the lig ht most favorable to the trial court’ s ruling on the new tria l motion and presume that all rea sonable fac tual finding s that could have been ma de ag ainst the losing p arty wer e made ag ainst the losing pa rty
. Charles , 1 4 6 S. W. 3 d a t 2 0 8
. We d o n o t s u b s ti tute our judgme nt for that of the trial court, but rather decide whether the trial court’ s decision was a rbitrar y
o r u n r e a s o n a

b le. Ho lde n v . S

tat e , 201 S.W .3d 761, 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). The trial c ourt abuses its discre tion in deny ing a motion for new tria l only when no r easona

ble view of

the re cord would support the t rial court’s ruling

. W e bb v . S tat e , 232 S.W .3d 109, 113 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) ; Holden , 201 S.W .3d at 763.
A REVIEW OF THE LAW—COUNSEL’S I NEF F ECTIVE ASS ISTANCE Appellant conte nds that the trial cour t erre d in overruling

the motion for new trial by re j ec t i ng his alleg ations as to the ineff ective a ssistance of tr ial counsel. We first examine the a pp lic a ble law by qu ot in g fr om Lop e z v . S tat e , 96 S.W .3d 406 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, pet. re f’d) :
A def endant in a criminal case has a c onstitut ional rig ht to the rea sonably eff ective assistance of counse l. S

t a f f o rd v . Stat e , 813 S.W .2d 503, 506 (Tex. Crim. App. 19 91 ). Ho we ve r, a

de fe nd ant i s n ot e nti tle d to e rr or le ss c ouns e l or c ouns e l w ho se competenc y is judg ed by hindsight. Id

. InStrickland v. W ashington , 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct . 2052, 80 L . Ed. 2d 674 (1984), the United Sta t es S u preme Court pr omu lg a te d a

tw o-pro ng e d te st t o d e te rm ine wh e the r r e pr e se ntatio n w a s so inadequate that it violated a defe ndant’s Six th A mendment rig ht to counsel. The Strickland

analy sis has been a dopted in Tex as and applies to c laims arising under article one, section ten of the Te x as Constitut ion. He rn an de z v . S tat e , 726 S.W .2d 53, 57 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). Under the two-prong ed test, a c onvicted def endant must first show that his counsel’s perf ormanc e wa s deficie nt, and s ec o nd, show that the def

icient per formanc e pre

judiced the de fense

. Strickland , 466 U.S. at 687; J ac k so n v . S tat e , 877 S.W .2d 768, 771 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). The defe ndant has the burde n to prove a claim of ineffe ctive assistance of counse l by a pre pondera

nce9

of the e vidence

. Mc

Fa rla nd v . S tat e , 928 S.W .2d 482, 500 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). I f the de fenda

nt fails to make the r equire d showing of both defic ient perf ormanc e and prejudice , his claim must fall. Id

. Th e re vie w o f a

c la im o f i ne ff

e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l is hig hly

de fe re nti a l. Strickland , 466 U.S. at 689. A re viewing court must indulge a strongpresumption that trial counsel ’s conduct falls within a wide ra ng e of r easona

ble re prese ntation. McFarland , 928 S.W .2d at 500. T h e as s essment of whe ther a defe ndant re ceive d e f f e c ti v e a s s is ta

n c e o f c o u n s e l mu s t b e ma d e a c c o r d in g to th e f a c ts o f e a c h c a s e . We a sse ss t he tot a lity

of c ouns e l’ s r epre sen tat ion r a the r t ha n h is o r h e r i so la te d a c ts or omissions. Strickland , 466 U.S. at 689. Oe str ic k v . S tat e , 939 S.W .2d 232, 239 (Tex. App.—Austin 1997, pet. ref ’d). While a single eg reg ious error of commission or o m i s s i o n may

be suff icient, re viewing courts g ener ally are hesitant to decla

re co u n sel ineff

ective ba sed on a sing le alleg ed miscalc ulation. Tho mp so n v Sta te , 9 S.W .3d 808, 813, 814 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
Id . at 416-17.
P OINT OF ERROR TWO

We t ur n f ir st t o p oin t of

e rr or tw o w hic h s ta te s:
A new tr ial sho u l d h ave be en g rante d beca use Mr. Py e wa s denied e ffe ctive a s s i s t an c e o f

c o u n s e l w h e n h e w a s g i v e ne r r o n e o u s l e g a l a d v i c e b y h i s t r i a l a t t o r n e ys that he had a

meritorious defe nse of lac k of in t en t t o harm or de fra ud the complainan t , wh i ch resulted in the statements made in the PSIwhich we re err oneously

char acte rized as a mi nimiz ation of g uilt, as well as a much stiff er se nte nc e tha

n th a t c on te mpl a te d b y

the ple a a g re e me nt.
B o th c o u n ts o f th e in d ic tm e n t w e r e dr a f te d u n d e r th e p r o v is io n s o f s e c ti o n 32.21. Tex. P enal Code A nn. § 32.21 (W est Supp. 2008). Subsection (b) of se ction 32.21 provides: “a person c ommits an off

ense if he forg es a w riting w ith intent to defr aud or harm another .” “A nother” is define d as “a person other than the ac tor.” Id. § 1 .0 7( a )( 5) (We st Su pp . 2 00 8) . In b oth

c ountsThe pertinent parts of the counts of the indictment alleg e that on or a bout J anuar

y 31, 2005, 1 a pp e lla nt: Parag raph O ne altere d, made, c ompleted, executed, or authenticated a w

r iting , namely

chec k 020903 from the a ccount of M ac Hai k F or d a t Bank One , so that it purported to be the a ct of Dustin Almaz an , who di d not authorize that act, with int ent to defr aud or ha rm Dustin Almaz an , Parag raph Tw o i s s u ed , t ra n s fe rr ed , re gi s t er edt h e t ra n s fe r o f, p as s ed , p u b l i s h ed , o r u t t er eda w ri t i n g, namely , chec k 020903 from the acc ount of M ac Hai k F or d a t Bank One , knowing such writing had been a ltered, ma de, complete d, executed, or a uthenticated so that it purported to be the a ct of D us t in Alm azan , who did no t a uth or ize that a c t, w ith int e nt t o d e fr a

ud or ha rm Dustin Almaz an , Th e te rm

“ de fe ns e ” is o ft e n lo os e ly us e d in bo th c ivi l and

c ri min a l la

w p ra c tic e . I n f

a c t, 2 a “de fense ” is a de fenda

nt’s “stated rea son why

the plaintiff or pr osecutor ha s no valid case .” See Blac k ’s Law D ic tio na ry

3 4 3 ( 7 t h e d

. 1 9 9 9 )

. T h e r e ar e m an y t yp e s o f d e f e n s e s i n c l u d i n g c a

p a c i t y, collater al, di latory , frivolous leg al, m eritorious and sham. Id

. I n leg al circ les, the word “ defe nse” may be commonly used to r efe r to the State’s inability to pr ove eac h element of an off ense be y ond a re asonable doubt in a criminal prose cution.
10 of the indictment, th e n am e o f t he complaina nt, Dustin Almaz an, wa s alleg ed as the person
a pp e lla nt h a d th e int e nt to de fr a

ud or ha rm . The State c hose to specif ically alleg e the name of the 1 complainant rather than “ another .”

Appellant’s a ffidavit, admitted at the hear ing on the motion for new tr ial, ref lects that af t er d i s cu s s i n g a n “ o p e n p l ea ” o f gu i l t y s t ra t egy , h e a n d

at t o rn ey P h i l l i p s tu rn edt o d i s cu s s i n g a
c on te ste d jur

y tr ia l. Phi lli ps the n tol d a pp e lla nt t hat a pp e lla nt “ c ou ld w in t

he c a se ” wi th a

n e mph a sis on “could” if the State failed to pr ove appellant ha d an intent to defr aud or ha rm his “cousin-in-la

w” Almazan. Phill ips felt that while much of the evidenc e wa s damag ing, a ppellant had a

“def ense” 2Tec hnically , a “de fense ” or a n “af firmative de fense ” ar e only those so labeled in the pe nal code. T ex. P enal Code A nn. §§ 2.03, 2.04 (West 2003). Th e re c or d at th e g uil ty

ple a pr oc e e din g s r e fl e c ts, in p art : 3 Q. Now, we ’ve ta lked about y our def enses in the case if we w ent to trial; notably , the fa ct t hat they would have to show that y ou ha d a c e rt a in int e nt to d e fr a ud the c omp la ini ngwi tne ss i n th e case who is y our cousin. I ’ve g one over that with y ou, h a v e n ’ tI? A. Rig ht. Q. And y ou understand t h at if a jury had a r easona

ble doubt about that, they

woul d h av e to find y ou not guilty . I ’ve explained that to y ou. A. Th a t’ s c or

re c t. Q
. Al l r i g h t
. K

n o w i n g a l l t h e s e t h i n g s , kn o w i n g w h a tthe ri sk and a dv anta g e s are of g oin g to tr ia l, it’ s b e e n y our d e c isi on to a c c e pt t his ple a a g re e me nt t od ay . I s th a t c or re c t? A. Ye s. Q. Have y ou been satisfied with my repr esentation in thi s case ? A. Ye s.
11 on the “ in te n t” is s u e . Su b s e qu e n tl y , th e r e c o r d s h o w s th a t a p p e ll an t a c c e p te d a p le a barg ain and enter ed a g uilty plea to the f irst count of the indictment. Duringthe proc eeding s, upon interrog ation by attorney Phill ips, appellant testified that he was plea ding guilty of hi s own fre e will; that he was knowing ly

fore g oing a

ny potential “def

ense” on the intent issue; and that he had willingly acc epted the ple a ba rg a in a g re e me nt. 312 I t appea rs that appe ll a

nt i s contendingthat his trial counsel’s a dvice a bout a “de fense ” le d h im t o ma

ke state me nts a

bo ut h is l a c k o f i nte nt t o th e pr ob a tio n o ff ic e r a nd to the tr ia l c ourt , which we re later c hara cter ized as a “minimiz ation of g u i l t ” stateme nts, resulting in the r ejec tion of the ple a ba rg a in a nd a “ sti ff e r” se nte nc e fo llo wi ngthe su bs e qu e nt j ur

y tr ia l. Th e State ha s th e burd e n to pr ov e e a c h e le me nt of the of fe ns e be y on d a

re a so na ble doubt. Va nti l v . S

tat e , 8 8 4 S. W. 2 d 2 1 2 , 2 1 4 ( T e x. A p p . — F o rt Wo rth 1 9 9 4 , n o p e t. )

. T h e State, being bound by its alleg ations in the i ndictment, must prove them beyond a re asonable doubt. Butler

v . S tat e , 429 S.W .2d 497, 502 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968). Trial counse l’s evaluation of appellant’s
case that appellant ha d a potential “def ense” if the State failed to prove bey ond a re asonable doubt the e sse nti a l e le me nt o f “ int e nt” a pp e ars to b e c or

re c t, n ot e rr on e ou s a s c la ime d b y a pp e lla nt. Appellant, howeve r, takes a differ ent tact a nd relies upon Pi e rc e v . S

tat e , 113 S.W .3d 431 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, pet. re f’d) , which wa s ext ant at the time of his proc eeding s and of wh ic h he c la ims his c ouns e l wa s unawa re . Ap pe lla

nt as se rt s th a t Pierce ho lds that if the State fa ils to p rov e in a for gery

c a se a n in te nt t o d e fr a

ud or ha rm a pa rt ic ula r p e rs on , th e e vid e nc e is s til l sufficie nt if it sim ply

shows an intent to defr aud or ha rm “a nother.” There fore , appellant ur g es that his trial counsel’s a dvice a bout a “de fense ” wa s err oneous in this case. Th e de fe nd ant Pie rc e wa s on pr ob a tio n a ft e r b e ingc on vic te d o f “ the ft by wo rt hle ss chec k.” The State soug ht to r evoke pr obation based on a violation of a probationary condition not to commit an offense ag ainst the law. The revoc ation motion alleg ed, in pertinent part, that Pierce “did then and the re w ith the intent to defra ud or har m another, make a w riting that purported to be the ac t of A. K. B obbitt, who did not authoriz e the a ct.”13 The fa cts wer e not set out in any g rea t detail in the Pierceopinion. I t ap p ea rs t hat Bobbitt g ave a

$160 chec k to the defe ndant’s employ er f or ser vices re n d ere d. The pa

y ee line on the che ck wa s left blank. Pierc e ente red he r name as pay ee, e ndorsed the ch eck, a nd cashe d it at

a lo c a l c o n v e n ie n c e store. Pierce , 113 S.W .3d at 435. At the re vocation hea ring , Pierce claimed her e mploy er ha d instructed her to make the c heck pa

y able to her self and use the money to buy office supplies. I n disposing of the sufficie ncy of evide nce que stion, the Texarkana Court noted:
F or the sake of c omp le te ne ss, we a lso no te Pie rc e ’s c on te nti on , e mbe dd e d w ith in t his point of e r r o r , th a t t h e e v id e n c e f

a il e d to s h o w s h e a c te d

w it h th e in te n t t o d e f

raud Mr . a nd Mr s. B ob bitt. S uc h a

show in g wa s no t nec e ssa ry . T he re qu isi te int e nt t o defr aud is direc ted at “a

nother.” T ex . Code Crim. Proc. Ann. ar t. 38.19 (Ver

non 1979). The T exas Penal Code define s “anothe r” a s “a pe rson other tha n the ac tor.” Tex. P enal Code A nn. § 1.07(a) (5) ( Ver non 2003). He re, Mr s. Bobbitt testified the chec k was g iven as pa

y ment for se rvice s by

Pierce ’s employ er, a

nd the employ er testified to the same. H aving rende red se rvice s and not having re ceive d pay ment for those servic es, the e mploy ee suf fer ed har m sufficient to satisfy

the forg ery

statute.
Id. at 436 n.2. Piercei s d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e f r o m t h e i n s t an tc a s e b o t h o nt h e f a c t s an d t h e l aw . In Pierce , the al le g a ti o nin

th e r e v o c a ti o nmo ti o nw a s “ a nin te n t t o d e f

r a u d o r h ar m a n o th e r , ” n ot a par ticular pe rson as in the instant i n d i ct m ent. A mot ion to revoke pr obation need not mee t the
s p ec ificity

require ment of an indictment or inf ormation. Cha rc on v . S

tat e , 5 5 8 S. W. 2 d 8 7 4 , 876 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 77 ); Tam e z v . S tat e , 5 34 S.W. 2d

68 6, 68 9 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 76 ). Th e State need not, in a motion to revoke probation, use the s ame precise terms as necessar y in an indictment alleg ation. Brad

le yv . S tat e , 608 S.W .2d 652, 655 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980). Moreove r, the burde n of proof in a re vocation of p ro b at i on proce eding is by a pre pondera

nce of evidenc e. Scamardo14

v . S tat e , 517 S.W .2d 2 9 3, 298 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974). I n a cr iminal trial, no person may be convic ted of a

n offe nse unless ea ch ele m en t o f t h e o ffe nse as a lleg ed is proved be y ond a
rea sonable doubt. See Tex. P enal Code A nn. § 2.01 (West 2003)

. The instant indictment alleg ed “Dustin Almazan” a s the person a ppellant h ad the intent to defraud or harm, while the revoc ation motion in Piercesimply

alleg ed the statutory

“anothe r.” Other tha n holding the e vidence was suff icient to revoke probation, the re al meaning of the Pierce court in its footnote is not altog ether clea r. The c ourt noted that it was the de fenda nt’s
c o n t e n t i o nt h a tt h e e v i d e n c e w a s i n s u f f i c i e n tt o s h o w h e r

i n t e n tt o d e f

r a u d o r h ar m t h e B ob bit ts. Ra the r t ha n disc us s th a t c on te nti on , th e c ourt , in e ff e c t, o bs e rv e d th a t “ a

no the r” ha d b e e n a lle g e d in the re vo c a tio n moti on , an d tha t the de fe nd ant’ s emp loy e r ha d be e n s ho wn to b e ha rm e d. We w ill not pause to examine all potential meaning s or possible options under the Pierce footnote. We do not ascribe , howeve r, to the mea ning of Pierceas urg ed by appellant. Her e, a specific person wa s named in the indictment as the complaina nt. Furthe rmore, Pierceis n ot b ind ingon thi s Co ur t. See De lam ora v . S

tat e , 1 28 S.W. 3d

34 4, 35 9 ( Te x. Ap p. —A us tin 20 04 , p e t. re f’ d) (c ourt

of a pp e a ls i s not bound by

decision of a

nother c ourt of appe als). At the g uilty

plea pr ocee dings, a

ppellant ac knowledg ed und er o at h that he wa s pleadingg uilty

fre ely and voluntarily

and that he w as for eg oing a ny potential defe nses. Appellant is in no posit ion to fault his counsel’s ea rlier a dvice f

or his o wn b u n gl ed stateme nts in the pr e se nte nc e int e rv ie w a

nd to t he tr ia l c ourt
. A d efen dan t is no t e nti tle d to e rr or le ss c ouns e l or c ouns e l w ho se c omp e te nc y is judge d by hindsight. Sta

ffo rd , 813 S.W .2d at 506. We a ssay the totality of counsel’s r epre sentation15

rathe r than isolated a cts or omissions. S tr ickland , 46 6 U.S. a t 68 9. He re , a pp e lla nt h a s f a ile d to establish either pr ong of the Strickland standard. McFarland , 928 S.W .2d at 500. The trial c ourt did not abuse its d i s cr et i o n i n overr uling the motion for ne w trial on the ba sis of ineffe ctive assistance of counse l as adva nced in the se cond point of er ror.
P OINT OF ERROR ONE As wi th t he se c on d p oin t of

e rr or , a pp e lla nt c omp la ins that

the tr ia l c ourt

e rr e d in
ov e rr uli ngthe mot ion

fo r ne w tr ia l ba se d on the c la im of ine ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l. Th e fi rs t po int , in a mul tif ari ou s v e in, state s:
A n e w tri a l shou ld have be e n g ra nte d b e c a us e a pp e lla nt’ s tr ia l c ouns e l f

a ile d to a sk to view the PSI at least 48 hours be fore the M arc h 2006 sentenc ing he aringpursuant t o s t a tu t e , an d a

p p e l l an t d i d n o t a f

f i r m a t i v e l y w a i v e t h i s r e qu i r e m e n t
. A l t e r n a t i v e l y, trial counsel wa s ineffe ctive, with the resulting harm being that objections wer e not ma de to p or

tio ns of the PSI , a

pp e lla nt w a s in a de qu ate ly

pr e pa re d to re sp on d to portions of the PSI , and appe llant was interr upted by his trial counsel whe n re sp on din g , a ll of wh ic h le d to the c a se no t be ing re so lve d a t the ple a he ari ng , w ith the re sult being a

one y ear state jail sentenc e, instead of the plea r ecommendation of four y ear s defe rre d adjudication probation. Appellant re lies in his brief upon ar ticle 42.12, sec tion 9(d) of the c ode of c riminal pr oc e dure , wh ic h pr ov ide s: “ Un le ss wa ive d by the de fe nd ant a t le a st 48 ho urs before sente ncing a def en d an t , t h e judg e shall per mit the defenda

nt or his counsel to rea d the pre sentenc e re port.” Tex. Code Crim. P roc. A nn. art. 42.12, § 9(d) (West Supp. 2008) (emphasis adde d).

Ap pe lla nt’ s c onten ti on of

a la c k o f s ta tut or

y c omp lia nc e wa s n ot r a ise d at tr ia l, i n the motion for new tr ial, or at the he aringon said motion. A co m p l ai n t o n ap peal must comportThe use of t he term “sente ncing hear ing” in ref ere nce to the Ma

rch 23, 2006 pr ocee ding 4 is not corre ct. Thi s was not a bifurcated proce eding

. Prior to the 1965 Code of Criminal Procedur e, all criminal t rials were unitary

. Du ha rt v . S tat e , 668 S.W .2d 384, 386 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). Af te r t he e ff e c tiv e date of

the cod e (Janu ary

1, 19 66 ) a ll tri a ls r e ma ine d unit ary e xce pt t ho se expressly authorized to be bifurcated—ple as of not g uilty befor e a jury

. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art . 37. 07 § 2(a ) ( Wes t Su pp . 2 00 8) . T he bif

ur c a tio n a uth or ize d b y

statut e do e s n ot a

pp ly to misdemeanor c ases within the jurisdiction of the justice a nd municipal courts. Id

. Bifur cation does not oc cur w here a def endant wa ives trial by j ury and ente rs a plea of g uilty or nolo conten d er e befor e the tria l court to the indictment or other pleading

. Ba rfi e ld v . S tat e , 6 3 S. W.3 d 4 46 , 4 50 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 01 ); Sa lda na v . S tat e , 150 S.W .3d 4 8 6 , 489 (T e x. Ap p. —A us tin

20 04 , n o p e t.) ; Lop e

z v. S tat e , 96 S.W .3d 406, 412 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, pe t. r e f’ d) ; Sta te v . Ke rsh , 2 S
. W
. 3 d 636, 638 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 1999), aff’d , 127 S.W .3d 775 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). A common pra ctice that has developed i s best explained by Professors Dix and Dawson: Whil e it is common for a judge t o bifurcate a be nch trial into g uilt/i nnocenc e and penalty phases, that is neither require d nor authoriz ed by Article 37.07. By its own terms, b if u r c a ti o n is to o c c u r in c a s e s “ w h ic h ar e tr ie d b e f o r e a ju r y o n a p le a of not guilty .” The Court o f C ri minal Appeals re cog nized in Ba rfi e ld v . S tat e that b i f u r c a t i o nd o e s n o to c c u r

i nj u r y- w a i v e d t r i a l s e v e nw h e nt h e j u d g e e mp l o ys proce dures c hara ct eristic of bifur cation. Writing for the majority , J udg e Womack 16 with the trial objection. Re za c v . S tat e , 782 S.W .2d 869, 870 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). A trial cour t
c an h ard ly

be fa ult e d f or no t r uli ngon a ma tte r r a ise d f

or the fi rs t ti me on

a pp e a l. I n his moti on for ne w trial, appellant did advanc e a related contention. He urg ed that his tr ia l c ouns e l f

a ile d to pe rm it h im t o r e a d th e pr e se nte nc e re po rt or adv is e him of

the c on te nts “prior to the da

y of sentenc ing.” All of this was rebutted by appellant’ s own aff

idavit t h at he had
re a d th e re po rt

in c ourt pr ior to t he he ari ngon Mar ch 23 , 20 06 , a nd ha d th e n c on ve rs e d w ith his a t t o rn ey ab out the repor t. I t is further c ontradicte d by the re cord r efle cting his remar ks to the trial court that his statements in the prese ntence repor t were acc urate . More importantly , there was no sentenc ing on Ma

rch 23, 2006. Se nte nc e wa s p ro no un c e d o n M ay 2, 20 06 , a ft e r a

jur y tr ia l. 4noted that the pra ctice of unauthorized bifurc ation is common in cases in which the d efe ndant is c onvicted (often on a plea of g uilty or nolo c ontender e) and t h e j u d ge re c e sse s th e pr oc e e din g s to e nab le a commun ity su pe rv isi on of fi c e r t o c on du c t a prese ntence investigat i o n. The pa rties later assemble f

or the sente ncing hear ing to consider the pr esente nce r eport a nd deter m i n e s entence. While that proce dure ma y b e th o u g h t o f b y th e p arti c ip an ts a s a b if u r c a te d tr ia l, it is n o t, b u t is r ather an extended unitary

trial punctuate d by

a re cess in its middle. 43 Geor g e E. Dix & Robert O. Daw son, Texas Practice : Criminal Practice and Proce dure § 38.14 (2d ed. Supp. 2008-09) (footnotes omitted). Her e, ther e wa s a unitary trial rec essed f

or pre paration of a p re s en t en ce report. I f the trial court ha d ap p roved the defe rre d adjudication plea barg ain, there would have be en no adjudication of guilty

and n o j u d gm en t and sente nce a s such. I f the trial c ourt reje cted the ple a barg ain, as it did, appellant ha d the rig ht to withdraw hi s g uilty plea a nd move to a jury

trial on a plea of not g uilty , as appe llant did. Only if appe llant had persisted in pleading g uilty on an “ope n plea” would sentenc e have been c onsidered. 17

Continui ng to argue his first point of err o r, ap p el lant claims his counsel wa s ineffe ctive beca

use counsel did not object to por tions of the prese ntence repor t. Appellant does not te ll u s w hat po rt ion s o f t

he re po rt that he ha s in

min d o r the ba sis of any

pr op e r o bje c tio n th a t c ou ld have be en made . The mer e assertion of error and the fa ilure to brief the question prese nts nothing for r eview. T he same is true of a ppellant’s simple asser

tion t h at h e was not adequately prepa red by c ouns e l to re sp on d to un de sig nate d p or tio ns of the re po rt
. Appellant further complains that counsel interrupted his re sponse to the pre sentenc e repor t before the trial cour

t. Appellant does not direc t our attention to the rec ord indicating wher e and how c ounsel interrupte d him. Our exami n ation reve als no interruption. Counsel did hand a copy of the indictment to the trial cour t an d t ri ed to clarify

appellant’ s remar

ks while ac ting on appellant’ s behalf. T he re cord doe s not support appellant’s c ontention.18 Appellant did not sustain his burden of proof to meet the tw o -p ro n g ed test of Strickland . Thus, the trial cour t did not abuse its discr etion in ove rruling the motion for new tria l as cla imed in the first point of err or, which is over ruled.
A C RI TIC AL STA G E WI THOU T C OU NSE L? I n point of err or three , appellant a sserts t h at a “n ew tria l should have bee n g rante d beca use appe llant ’s ri gh t to the eff ective a ssistance of c ounsel in prepa ring a motion for new tr ia l w a s in te rf

e re d w ithby

the Di str ic t A tto rn e y ’s of fi c e ’s dis c los ur e to t

ri a l c ouns e l of

a lle g e dly dis pa ra g ing ph on e c a lls wh ic h c a us e d c ouns e l to a

ba nd on a pp e lla nt d ur ingthe bu lk o f t

his critica l period.”

The thrust of a

ppellant’s ar g ument is that he was de nied counse l for twenty -one of the thirty day s permitted by

law in which to file a

motion for new tria l after the i m p o s i t i o n of the sentenc e in open c ourt. See Tex. R. App. P. 21.4( a). Appellant seeks an entirely new tria l for a post-trial oc curr ence . He r ecognizes that his t rial counse l formal ly withdrew a

nd substitut e counse l enter ed the c ase be fore the expiration of the thirty -day period.Un de r t he te rm s o f t

he c on tr a c t by

whi ch app ell ant r e ta ine d Ro be rt Phi lli ps and

his 5 law firm, the r ep re s en t at ion was to terminate on the date of the sentenc e. This is immaterial her e beca use of the la

w and the c ircumstance s that unfolded. Trial counsel’s leg al responsibilities do not a utomatically terminate at the con cl u s i o n of the trial. W

ar d v . S tat e , 740 S.W .2d 794, 796 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987). Trial counse l remains the defe ndant’s counse l until ex pressly permitted to withdraw. Id . at 797. Tr ia l c ouns e l, w he the r r e ta ine d o r a pp oin te d, ha s the du ty

to c on su lt w ithand

fu lly advise his client conc erningthe meaning and effec t of the trial cour t’s judgme nt, the rig ht to appeal f

rom that judg ment, and the ne cessity of g iving notice of appea l and taking other steps to pursue an appeal, as well as the duty to express his professional judgme nt as to possible gr ounds for a ppeal a nd their merit, and d el i n eate the a dv anta g e s and

dis a dv anta g e s o f a

pp e a l. Mc Br idev . S

tat e , 249 S.W .3d 673, 674 (Tex. A pp.—For t Worth 2008, no pet
. ) ( ci t i n g Oldham v . S tat e , 97 7 S.W. 2d 35 4, 36 0- 61 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 98 ) ( op on re h’ g ); Fu nk

v . S tat e , 188 S.W .3d 229, 231 (Tex. App.—For t Worth 2006, no pet.)).

19 Ap pe lla nt w a s se nte nc e d on Ma

y 2, 20 06 , wi th his re ta ine d tr ia l c ouns e l pr e se nt. On 5 May 17, 2006, appellant’ s retaine d trial attorney sent appe llant a letter te rminating his repre sentation of appe llant, not on the basis of any contra ct term, but bec ause of information Philli ps had “le arne d from the District Attorne y ’s offic e.” Phillips informed appe ll ant t hat re corde d jail telephone
conver sations refle cted that a ppellant had state d, in telephone c onversations with his family , that the Phill ips law firm “took a dive” and purposely lost appellant’ s case . Phill ips also informed a ppellant that Phill ips had lear

ned that appe llant’s mother wa s tape-r ecor ding te lephone c alls with his law fi rm . A c op y

of Phi lli ps ’s mot ion

to w ith dr aw a s c ouns e l w a s e nc los e d. Ap pe lla nt w a s a dv ise d to
re ta in o the r c ouns e l and

inf or me d th a t June 1, 20 06 , w a s th e la st d ay to g ive no tic e of

a pp e a l. The motion to withdraw

as counse l was filed on Ma y 18, 2006. On May

23, 2006, at a he aringin open co urt, the Philli ps law firm wa s permitted by the trial cour

t to withdraw as20

counsel with the e x press a pproval of ap p ell ant. New ly reta ined counse l, Greg ory Sherwood, wa s substitut ed as appellant’s new appe llate counse l. On that date, a ppellant, re prese nted by

Sherwood, g ave notice of appe al. The tria l court set a $25,000 appea l bond for a ppellant, which wa s executed the n e xt d ay . O n M ay 3 1 , 2 0 0 6 , a ti me ly mo ti o n f o r n e w tr ia l w a s f

il e d b y Sh e r

w o o d , attaching aff idavits and Phill ips’s letter.

We t ur n n owto w he the r t

he pe ri od of tim e in wh ic h to file a mot ion fo r n e w tri a l is

a c ri tic a l st a g e of

the pr oc e e din g s r e qu ir ingthe a ssi sta nc e of c ouns e l. An ac cused is enti t l ed t o the assistance of counse l under the Six th Amendment
o f t h e Un i t ed S tates Constitut ion at “eve ry critica l stag e of the proce eding s” whe re the adver sial proce eding s have be gu n , absent a valid waiver of the rig ht to counsel . S e e Up ton v . S

tat e , 85 3 S. W.2 d 5 48 , 55 3 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 93 ); Ga rc ia v . S tat e , 97 S.W .3d 343, 347 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003, no pet.). Whether a particula r stag e is critica l turns on the assessment of the useful n es s of counse l to the acc used at the time. Upton , 8 5 3 S
. W
. 2 d at 5 5 3 (c i t i n g Patterson

v . I lli no is , 487 U.S. 285, 290-91 (1998))

.

Wit hout question, the hear ing itself on the motion for ne w trial is a cr itical stag e of the proc eeding s. Con no r v . S tat e , 877 S.W. 2d 32 5, 32 6 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 94 ); Tre v ino v . S tat e , 565 S.W .2d 938, 940 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978). Trevino makes c lear that a cr i minal prosecution within the me aning of the Six th Amendment and a rticle I , section 10 of the T exas Const itution, does not e nd with the defe ndant’s convic tion. Ma ssi ng ill v . S tat e , 8 S.W. 3d

73 3, 73 6 ( Te x. Ap p. —A us tin 1999, no pet.).Se e Sm ith v . S tat e , 1 7 S. W.3 d 6 60 , 6 63 n. 3 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 00 ); Oldham , 977 S.W .2d 6 a t 36 0; Con no r v . S

tat e , 87 7 S.W. 2d 32 5, 32 6- 27 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 94 ); Ga rc ia v . S tat e , 97 S.W .3d 343, 347 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003, no pet.). As a matter

of fe dera l constituti on l aw , m o s t co urts of appe als have conclude d 7 the time period in which to fi l e a m o t i o n for new trial is a cr itical stag e of the proce eding s. See, e.g. , Funk , 1 88 S.W. 3d

a t 23 1; Ga rc ia , 9 7 S
. W
. 3 d a t3 4 8; Ch amp ion v . S tat e , 82 S.W .3d 79 , 8 3 ( Te x. Ap p. —A mari llo 20 02 , p e t. r e f’ d) ; Pr ud ho mm e v . S

tat e , 28 S.W .3d 1 1 4 , 119 (T e x. Ap p. —T e xarkan a 20 00 , p e t. r e f’ d) ; Ha ns on v . S tat e , 11 S.W .3d 285, 288 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 1999, pet. re f’d)

. 21 Does the thirty -day period afte r sentenc e in w hich to f ile a motion f

o r n ew t ri al
c o n s t i tu t e a c r i t i c a l s t a g e o f t h e c r i m i n a l p r o c e e d i n g s ? See Tex. R. App. P. 21.4( a). F or some time, th e T e xa s Co u rt o f

Cr im in a l A

p p e a ls d id

n o t a d dr e s s th e issue, while most courts of appe al 6 conclude d that it was a c ritical stag e. I n Coo k s v. S tat e , 240 S.W .3d 906 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007), 7 th e T e xa s Co u rt o f

Cr im in a l A

p p e a ls d e c id e d , a s a

ma tt e r o f f e d e r a l c o n s ti tuti o n a l l aw , that the thirty -day

period in w hich to f

ile a motion for new tria l is a critical stag e of the proce eding and a defenda nt has the rig ht to counsel during that period. Id . at 911-12. Cooks h e ld th a t while the defe ndant there was de prived of c ounsel during a cr itical stag e, the de privation was subjec t to a harmless e rror

analy sis and was ha

rmless in that case

. Id. I n r e so lvi ngc a se s li ke thi s on e , we fi nd we mus t c on sid e r r e bu tta ble pr e su mpt ion s. There ex i s t s a r eb u t t ab l e p re s u mp t i o nt h at t ri al co u n s el co n t i n u edt o ef fe ct i v el y re p re s en ta d efendant during the time for f

iling a motion f

o r n ew t ri al. Mc

Br idev . S

tat e , 249 S.W .3d 673, 674 (Tex. App.—For

t Worth 2008, no pet.) (c i t i n g Ol dh am v . S tat e , 97 7 S.W. 2d

35 4, 36 3 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 98 ) ( op on

re h’ g )) ; Fu nk

v . S tat e , 188 S.W .3d 229, 231-32 (Tex . App.—For t Worth 2006,
no pe t.)

. T h i s p r e s u mp t i o nar i s e s , i np art , b e c a u s e c o u n s e l r e m a i n s a s d e f e n s e c o u n s e l f

o r a ll purposes until expressly

permitted to withdraw. Se e W ar d v . S tat e , 74 0 S.W. 2d 79 4, 79 6 ( Te x. Cr im.I n this c ase, we a re de aling with retaine d counsel be fore and af ter the substitution. W here 8 an in dig e nt d e fe nd ant i s in vo lve d, the a pp oin tme nt o f n e w c ouns e l is the su bs tit uti on of c ouns e l. 22 Ap p. 19 87 ). And thi s p re su mpt ion is n ot r e bu tte d w he n th e re is n oth ingin t he re c or d to su g g e st
o th e r w ise. Smith v . S

tat e , 17 S.W .3d 660, 662-63 (Te x . Crim. App. 2000). When no motion for new tria l is file d i n a ca s e, the rebuttable pre sumption i s that it (the motion) was consider ed and re jected by a def endant a nd his counsel. Id. Th is g e ne ra l pr e su mpt ion do e s n ot a

pp ly wh e re c ouns e l ha s b e e n perm it ted to withdraw or

when c ounsel is repla ced by substitut e counse l during the time in which to file a motion for ne w trial. Ga rc ia , 9 7 S. W.3 d at 34 8; Ma ssi ng ill , 8 S.W .3d at 735. I n urg ing that he has r ebutted the g ener al pre sumption her e, appellant points to his tria l c ounsel’s withdrawa l a nd the substituti on of oth e r r e ta ine d c ouns e l.

We ag ree that the g ener al pre sumption has been re butted. Ap p el l an t , under the circ umstances, still must confront another presumption not es t ab l i s h ed by the time his brief wa s filed. In Cooks , the Texas Court of Criminal Appe als rec og nized a rebuttable presumption that an

a pp e lla nt i s ade qu a te ly re pr e se nte d by su bs tit ute a pp e llate c ouns e l dur ing the tim e re ma ini ng to f ile

a mot ion fo r n e w tri a l a ft e r t

he su bs tit uti on and the wi thd

ra wa l of e arl ie r c ouns e l. 240 S.W .2d at 8 91 1. He re , th e re we re nin e da y s r e ma ini nga ft e r M ay

23 , 2 00 6, wh e n th e su

bs tit uti on oc c ur re d in open cour t. Appellant’s re tained substitut e counsel filed a motion for new trial, g ave timely notice of a pp e a l, a nd se c ur e d a pp e lla nt’ s re le a se on bo nd

. Th e re is no c omp la int that su bs tit ute c ouns e l di d
no t ha ve su ff ic ie nt t ime to a dv ise a

pp e lla nt, to p re pa

re and fi le the ne c e ssa

ry do c ume nts , o r t o23

adequately

repr esent a

ppellant in the time r emaining . Nothing in substitute counsel’s r epre sentation rebuts the ne wly

established pre sumption i n Cooks , 240 S.W .3d at 911. Neve rtheless, a

ppellant re lies upon his claim that he w as deprived of c ounsel for twenty -one da

y s during the thirty -day

period in which to file a moti on for ne w trial. Appe llant urg es the depr ivation of counsel f or twenty -o n e day s resulted fr om interfer ence with the attorney -client relationship by

the district attorney ’s offic e, who r evea led t o counsel recor ded jail telephone
conver sations. The re cord is not well deve loped in this reg ard. When wa s th e re v el ati on of the telephone calls made? Who in t he district attorne y ’s offic e re veale d this information to appellant’s tr ia l c ouns e l? Ap pe lla

nt d oe s n ot d e ny

the te le ph on e c on ve rs a tio ns or the ir natur e , w hic h in dic a te that t h e s tate me n ts w e r e ma d e a f te r th e ju r y tr ia l. F u rth e r , a

p p e ll an t h a s n o t d is p u te d th e f a c t t h at his mother was a lleg edly

tape- rec ording her telephone calls to trial counsel’ s law off ice. F rom the

a ff ida vit s in tr od

uc e d at th e he ari ngon

the ne w tri a l motio n, we g le an tha t app e lla nt’ s r e la tio ns hip wi th h is tr ia l c ouns e l w a s n ot a lto g e the r c omp a tib le fr om t he be g inn ing . App e lla

nt w ou ld h a ve thi s Court take the State ro un dly

to t a sk fo r d isc los ingthe te le ph on e c on ve rs a tio ns . H e ins ist s th a t so me form of punishment for

the State is in order

. Appellant rec og nizes that whe re a defe ndant has be en de pr ive d o f c ouns e l du

ri ngthe tim e in w hic h to fi le a mot ion fo r ne w tri a l, the no rm a l pr oc e dure is to a bate the a pp e a l and re mand the c a se to t

he tr ia l c ourt

fo r a ne w p e ri od

in w hic h c ouns e l ma

y fi le a motion for new

trial. See Ga rc ia , 9 7 S. W.3 d at 34 9; P r u d h o m me v . S

tat e , 28 S.W .3d 114, 121 (T e x. Ap p. —T e xar

ka na 2 00 0, no pe t.) ; Ma ssi ng ill , 8 S.W. 3d a t 73 8. Ap pe lla

nt a rgue s th a t a s a result of the district attorney ’s behavior , a differ ent reme dy should be imposed. He urge s t h at an entirely new tria l should be g rante d, or better still , that the prosec ution should be dismi ssed. EitherI t is noted that article 40.05 of the 1965 Texas Code of Criminal Procedur e (nowrepe aled) 9 provided for

only ten day s after co n v i ct i o n t o file a motion for ne w trial. Ac t of May 27, 1965, 59th L eg ., R.S., ch. 722 (art. 40.05), 1965 T ex. Gen. L aws 317, 477. 24 action, appe llant cl ai m s , wo uld discourag e all prose cutors fr om eng ag ing in c onduct such a s the dis tr ic t a tto rn e y ’s c on du c t he re . We re je c t a pp e lla nt’ s su g g e sti on s. Th e qu e sti on

is n ot who c a

us e d a pp e lla nt’ s tr ia l c ouns e l to wi thd ra w. Th e re is enoug h blame to sprea d around. The issue i s whether , g iven all the cir cumstance s, including the withdrawa l afte r t wenty -one day s and the substi tution of retained c ounsel, appe llant was depr ived of counse l during the cr itical stag e involved. We conc lude that appe llant was not depri v ed of counsel duringthe per iod in which to file a motion for ne w trial. Appellant lost twenty -one da y s of the thi rt y -d a y pe ri od , b ut los t noth ing bu t ti me . A ft e r h is s ub sti tut ion , n e wl y re ta ine d c ouns e l w ith in nin e da y s to ok a ll the a c tio n n e c e ssa

ry to e ff e c tiv e ly re pr e se nt a

pp e lla nt. There are no claims that 9 substitut e counse l was hampe red by time restra ints or was ineff ective, or t h at appellant wa s p r e j u d i c e d b y ana c t i o nn o tt a k e nw i t h i nt h e t w e n t y - o n e d ay s b e f o r e t r i a l c o u n s e l ’ s w i t h dr aw a l

. It be inga pp e lla nt’ s b ur de n, he ha s not re bu tte d the ne wl y e sta bli sh e d p re su mpt ion

re g ard ingsu

bs tit ute counsel set f

orth in Cooks

. See 240 S.W .3d at 911. The trial court did not a buse its discretion on this basis. The third point of error is overrule d.
CO NSI DE RA TIO N O F AF F ID AV ITS I n his fourth point of err or, appe llant c laims that the trial court a bused its discretion by admitting into evidenc e and c onsidering the af fidavits of his two trial attorney s at the hea ring on the mot ion

fo r n e w tri a l.Te x. R. A pp . P. 4. 1( a ) p ro vid e s: 10

25 An abu s e of discre tion is t he standa rd of r eview w hen an a

ppellate c ourt revie ws
a trial court’s ruling on the admission of evidenc e eve n in a hea

ring on a motion for new

trial. See Mo ntgom e ry

v . S tat e , 810 S.W .2d 372, 3 9 1 (Tex . Crim. App. 1991) (op. on re h’g ). A trial c ourt abuses its discretion only when the decision l ies outside the zone of re asonable disag ree ment. Gree n
v . S tat e , 934 S.W .2d 92, 101-02 (Te x . Crim. App. 1996).

With re g ard to the ty

pe s of e vid e nc e a llo we d a t a he ari ngon

a mot ion fo r n e w tri a l, Rul e 21 .7 pr ov ide s: “ Th e c ourt may re c e ive e vid e nc e by

a ff ida vit or oth e rw ise .” Te x. R. A

pp . P. 21 .7 ; se e als o H

old e n v . S tate , 201 S.W .3d 761, 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). On May 31, 2006,
a pp e lla nt f ile d a mot ion fo r n e w tri a l. A tta c he d th e re to w e re three af fi dav its fr om a

pp e lla nt, his mother, Elisha Monty , and a c o-worke r, Duane Harris. The S tate filed a response on J uly 5, 2006, reque sting that the hearing be held on the basis of affidavits from the witnesses. No a ffidavits we re attache d to this response.

Ap p e ll an t, in h is mo ti o n , r e qu e s te d th a t th e h e ar in g b e h e ld p r io r to Ju ly 1 6, 2006, the s ev en t y -fifth da

y afte r the imposition of sentence on May 2, 2006, to preve nt an over ruling of the m otion by operation of law. See Tex. R. App. P . 21.8 (a) . I n its response, the State r equeste d that the hearing be held no later than J uly 17, 2006. This reque st was obviousl y influence d by the f a c tt h atJ u l y 1 6 , 2 0 0 6 , t h e l a s td ay t o c o n d u c ta h e ar i n g o n t h e m o t i o n f

o r n e w t r i a l , f

e l l o na S u n d a y. There fore , it was permissible to hold the hearing on Monday , J uly 17, 2006, the seve nty -six th day afte r sentenc e. See Tex. R. App. P . 4.1(a)

. 10(a) In Ge neral . The da y of an a ct, eve nt, or defa

ult after w hich a d es i gn at ed per iod be g ins to run is not in c lud e d w he n c omp uti nga pe ri od pr e sc ri be d o r a llo we d b y

the se rules, by court order, or by statute. The last day of t he period is included, but if that d ay is a Satu r d ay , Sun d ay , o r

le g a l h o li d ay , th e p e r io d

e xte n d s to th e e n d

o f th e n e xt d ay t h a ti s n o ta

S a tu r d ay, S u n d ay, o r

l e g a l h o l i d ay. 26 At the hea ring on J uly

17, counsel a cknowledg ed that he unde rstood the hea ring was to b e c on du c te d o n a ff

ida vit s, but ob

je c te d to the State ’s tw o a ffi davit s b e ingint ro du c e d in to
ev i d en ce as b ei n g u n t i m el y . He o b j ec t ed t o t h e “e l ev en t h h o u r” d i s cl o s u re o f a t we n t y -t h re e- p age aff idavit and a nine-pa g e affidavit from Mark Brunne r and Robert P hillips , respe ctively . Both ha d
se rv e d a s a

pp e lla nt’ s tr ia l c ouns e l, and mos t of a pp e lla nt’ s g ro un ds fo r n e w tri a l de a lt w ithc la ims of ineff ective a ssistance of c ounsel. Appellant’s c ounsel had copies of these aff idavits a n hour or so befor e they

wer e off ere d by the S tate. Counsel urg ed that he ha d not had suffic ient time to study the af fidavits. The trial c ourt overr uled the objec tion, noting that it would lose jurisdiction at the
en d o f t h e d ay . Appellant then introduc ed his aff idavits. L ater

during the hea

ring , the trial cour

t sustained appe llant’s objections t o s p ec ific par ts of the State’s af

fidavits. After

the hea ring , the trial court e ntere d a wr itten or der denying the motion for new trial befor e the end of the day and the loss of jurisdiction.

Ap pe lla nt n ow a c kn ow le dg e s th a t Ru le 21 .5 of th e Te xas R ule s o f A

pp e llate Procedur e does not plac e any time limi tation on t h e S t at e t o file controve rting aff idavits to a
ne w tri a l mo tio n. He c on te nd s th a t it is unr e a so na

ble fo r a tr ia l court to p e rm it the int ro du c tio n in to
e vid e nc e of

pr e vio us ly

un dis c los e d a ff

ida vit s at a hear ing on

the la st d ay

be fo re the mot ion

is
overr uled by operation of law. See Tex. R. App. P
. 21.8 (c)

. Appellant urg es that the “ motion for
ne w tri a l r ule ” sh ou ld b e int e rp re te d to re qu ir e the State to fi le its a ff ida vit s with in a re a so na

ble tim eF or a dis c us sio n of the us e of

a ff ida vit s in he ari ng s o n mo tio ns fo r n e w tri a l, see Charles 11 v . S tat e , 1 4 6 S
. W
. 3 d

2 0 4 , 2 1 0 ( T e x. C r i m . A p p . 2 0 0 4 ) ; Man zi v. S tat e , 88 S.W .3d 240, 250-55 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (Cochra n, J ., concur

ring ). 27 prior to the trial c ourt’s loss of jurisdicti o n . Ap p ell ant’s conc erns a re unde rstandable . Howeve r, we f ind no basis in the prese nt rules for the cour ts to make such an inter

pretation. Moreover , a g ood rule wor ks both w ay s. The proble m arises more fre quently when a ffidavits alone are used as the ba sis fo r t he he ari ngon

the mot ion

fo r n e w tri a l. 11 App el l an t does not point out how he was ha rmed or pr ejudiced by

the admission and consideration of the State’s aff idavits. The trial court did not abuse its discr etion in admitting and conside ring such evide nce. T he four th point of error

is overrule d.
F AILURE TO FOLLOW PLEA AG REEMENT I n p oin t of

e rr or fi ve , a pp e lla nt a sse rt s:
Th e tr ia l c ourt

e rr on e ou sly

fa ile d to fo llo w t

he ple a a g re e me nt e nte re d in th is c a se beca use the a ppellant did not minim ize his guilt in the PS Iat th e M arch 2006 sentenc ing he aringor bec ause the trial court a cce pted t he plea ag ree ment for de fer

red adjudication whe n saying a t the plea he aring , “Mr. Py e, I acc ept y our plea. Ifind the ev i d en ce s u

b s t an t i at es y o u r gu i l t , b u tId o n o t fi n d y o u gu i l t y at t h i s t i m e, ” l an gu age indicating a def

err al of a djudication of g uilt and acc eptanc e of the plea.
Th e po int of e rr or is m ult if ari ou s and

ri sk s r e je c tio n on that ba sis , bu t w e wi ll a dd re ss it. Ste rli ng

v . S tat e , 800 S.W .2d 513, 521 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). We shall, howeve r, consider the two contentions in reve rse or der.Ar tic le 42 .1 2, se c tio n 5 (a ) p ro vid e s: 12 (a) Ex cept a s provided by subsection (d) of t his section, when in the judge ’s o p i n i o nt h e b e s ti n t e r e s t o f s o c i e t y an d

th e d e f e n d an tw i l l b e s e r

v e d , t h e j u d g e m ay, afte r re ceivinga plea

of g uilty or plea of nol o contende re, he aringthe evidenc e, and finding that it substantiates the defe ndant’s g uilt, defer f urther pr ocee dings w ithout enter ing a n adjudication of guilt, and place the defe ndant on community supervision. 28 Def err ed adjudication c o mmunity supervision (nee 3 probation) is provided f or by statute. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12, § 5(a) (West Supp. 2008). The e ssence of def err ed 12 adjudi cation community

supervision is that the defe ndant is place d on community supervision without a finding of g uilt and without being c onvicted of a n y offe nse. Se e Mc

Ne w v . S tat e , 60 8 S. W.2 d 1 66 , 1 72 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 78 ); see als o Ex parte Sc hillings , 641 S.W .2d 538, 540 ( T e x. C r i m . A p p . 1 9 8 2) ; T ri ple tt v . S tat e , 686 S.W .2d 342, 345 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t Dist.] 1985, pet. re f’d)

.

Professors Dix and Dawson ha ve desc ribed the pr ocedur e norma lly followed:
The statue r equire s that i f t h e t rial cour t wishes to gr ant def

err ed adjudication community

supervision, it must do s o “without enter ing a n adjud i cation of guilt.” * * * This r efe rs to the entry of a finding of g uilt in the judgme nt f il ed i n t h e c ase. The trial c ourt is empower ed to re ceive a plea of g uilty with substantiating evide nce, or a lly fi nd the de fe nd ant to be g uil ty of the of fe ns e to w hic h h e ple a d guil ty , r e c e ss the proc eeding s for a

pres en t ence investig ation repor t, and at the r ece ssed setting g ra nt d e fe rr e d a dju dic a tio n c omm un ity su pe rv isi on . So l on g a s th e fi nd ingof g uil t is not enter ed in the judgme nt be fore the court attempts to g ran t d eferre d a dju dic a tio n, it i s n ot p re c lud e d f ro m do ingso by

an o ra l f ind ingof g uil t.
43A Geor g e E. Dix & Robert O. D awson, Te x as Prac tic e : Cri mi na l Prac tic e an d P ro c e du re § 39.52 (2d ed. 2002) (citations omitted). The proc edure descr ibed has re fer ence to the statutory provision for pr esente nce r eports. Te x . Code Crim. Proc. Ann. ar t. 42.12, § 9(a) ( West S upp. 2008).29 Trial cour

ts have wide discretion in deter mining whe ther o r n o t to acc ept a plea b ar g a in a g r e ement. Sta te e xre l B ry an v . M

c Do na ld , 662 S.W .2d 5, 9 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983); W rig ht v . S tat e , 1 58 S.W. 3d

59 0, 59 3 ( Te x. Ap p. —Sa n A nto nio 20 05 , p e t. re f’ d)

. A tr ia l c ourt is fr e e to a c c e pt o r r e

je c t a ple a ba rg a in ag re e me nt. Un til the c ou rt a c c e pts it, a ne g oti a te d p le a ba rg a in ag ree ment i s n o t b i nding on the parties. Or tiz v . S tat e , 933 S.W .2d 102, 104 (Tex. Crim. App. 19 96 ); Ho lla nd

v . S tat e , 112 S.W .3d 251, 254-55 (Te x . App.—Austin 2003, n o pet.). Onc e
e xpre ssl y a pp ro ve d b y

the tr ia l c ourt in op e n c ourt , ho we ve r, a ple a ba rg a in a g re e me nt b e c ome s a binding c ontrac tual arr ang em en t b etwee n the State and the de fenda nt. Or tiz , 933 S.W .2d at 104; W right , 158 S
. W
. 3 d at 593-94. Unde r such c ircumstance s, the trial cour t is bound to carry

out the t erms of the agr eeme nt. Holland , 11 2 S.W. 3d a t 25 5. I f the tr ia l c ourt re je c ts t he ple a ba rg a in ag ree ment, the defe ndant’s plea is r ender ed involuntary and the defe ndant is e ntitled to wi thdraw the g uilty plea. Id

. ( c i t i n g Zin n v . S tat e , 35 S.W .3d 283, 285 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2000, pet. re f’d) ). Her e, the tria l court wa s not bound by the plea ba

rg ain ag re em ent as c ontended. During the g uilty

plea procee dings on Fe bruar y 6, 2006, the trial cour

t stated to appellant: “I

cannot tell what conditions of probation would be imposed if I go along wi th this agreement beca use a Presentenc e investig ation must be completed a nd a re port filed with the Court.” (Emphasis adde d.) L ater , the trial cour

t stated: “I

acc ept y our plea . I

find the evide n ce substantiate s y our g uilt, but I do not find you guilty at this t ime .” (Empha sis added.) Atrial court’ s statement that, “I acc ept th e p le a , ” d o e s n o t m e anth e tr ia l c o u rt h a s a c c e p te d th e te r ms o f th e plea ag ree ment. Or tiz ,W rig ht v . S tat e , 1 58 S.W. 3d

59 0 ( Te x. Ap p. —Sa

n A nto nio 20 05 , p e t. r e f’ d) is 13 dis tin g uis ha

ble fr om the ins tant c a se on the law a nd the fa c ts. I t in vo lve d thre e jud g e s. Th e fi rs t, a visiting judg e, af

firmatively

approve d in open cour

t the plea ba

rg ain ag ree ment befor e proc eeding to acc ept the def

endant’ s nolo contender e plea

. Id. at 594. Once expressly approve d by

a trial c ourt in o pe n c ourt , th e ple a

ba rg a in a g re e me nt i s a

bin din g c on tr a c t bet

we e n the State and

the de fe nd a nt. Se e Or tiz v . S tat e , 933 S.W .2d 102, 104 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). 30 933 S.W .2d at 104. The tria l court ca ref ully followed proc edure to avoid being bound b y a plea barg ain ag ree ment. Appellant’s r eliance upon the W right opinion is m isplaced. 13 Next, we also reje ct the cla im that the trial court er red in f ai l i n g t o approve the plea ba rg ain agr ee m en t o n the basis that appe llant did not mi nimiz e his g uilt in t he pre sentenc e repor t a nd at the rec essed hear ing on Ma rch 23, 2006. The prese ntence repor t and the re cord of

the hear ing a re c ontrary to a

ppellant’s claim, which he does not support by argument or re fer ence to the
rec ord. The f

ifth point of error

is overrule d. The judg ment of convic tion is affirmed.

J ohn F. Onion, Jr., J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice Jones, J ustices Henson a nd Onion* Affir med Filed: F ebrua

ry 27, 2009 Do No t Pu

bli sh

* Be fore J ohn F. Onion, Jr., Pre siding J udg e (re tired), Texas Court of Criminal Appea ls, sitt ing by assig nment. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 74.003(b) ( West 2005).