SUMMARY

April 16, 2020

2020COA68

No. 17CA1399, People v. Gillis — Crimes — First Degree 

Burglary — First Degree Criminal Trespass — Assault in the 

Third Degree; Criminal Law — Prosecution of Multiple Counts 

for Same Act — Lesser Included Offenses

A division of the court of appeals considers whether first 

degree criminal trespass and third degree assault are lesser 

included offenses of first degree burglary under the statutory 

elements test articulated in Reyna-Abarca v. People, 2017 CO 15,

390 P.3d 816. Given that the elements of first degree criminal 

trespass are a subset of the elements of first degree burglary, the 

division holds that first degree criminal trespass is a lesser included 

offense of first degree burglary. The division vacates the 

defendant’s conviction for first degree criminal trespass because it 

merges into his conviction for first degree burglary.

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions 

constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by 

the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be 

cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division. 

Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion 

should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.
Although third degree assault is a lesser included offense of 

first degree burglary when the assault is charged as the predicate 

offense for first degree burglary, the division affirms each of the 

defendant’s convictions because he assaulted the victim twice. 

The division also holds that the defendant was not denied his 

right to counsel and that his appeal of the trial court’s denial of his 

right to a preliminary hearing is moot because a jury found him 

guilty as charged. 
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2020COA68

Court of Appeals No. 17CA1399

Adams County District Court No. 15CR2485

Honorable Michael A. Cox, Judge

Honorable Patrick T. Murphy, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Ian Joseph Gillis,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART

AND VACATED IN PART

Division VII

Opinion by JUDGE LIPINSKY

Fox and Berger, JJ., concur

Announced April 16, 2020

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Jennifer L. Carty, Assistant Attorney 

General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Taylor J. Hoy, Deputy State 

Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
1

¶ 1 Defendant, Ian Joseph Gillis, appeals the judgment of 

conviction entered on jury verdicts finding him guilty of first degree

burglary, first degree criminal trespass, and third degree assault. 

We affirm Gillis’s convictions for first degree burglary and third 

degree assault, but vacate his conviction for first degree criminal 

trespass. We do not remand for resentencing because the court 

sentenced Gillis to identical concurrent sentences for each offense.

I. Background Facts and Procedural History

A. The Underlying Incident

¶ 2 According to E.G., her boyfriend Gillis demanded that she 

return to her apartment so he could collect belongings he had left 

there. Later that day, E.G. placed Gillis’s belongings outside her 

apartment and locked the door because she was “freaked out” from 

their earlier conversation.

¶ 3 Shortly thereafter, Gillis attempted to enter E.G.’s apartment, 

but was unable to do so because the door was locked. He kicked in 

the door while E.G. screamed at him to stop from inside her 

apartment.

¶ 4 Once inside her apartment, Gillis threw E.G. to the floor and 

smothered her face to stop her from screaming. E.G. ran to her 
2

bedroom when Gillis finally got off her. He followed her, threw her 

on her bed, climbed on top of her, and smothered her face with a 

pillow. Eventually, Gillis got off E.G. and told her they would leave 

her apartment together. After E.G. said she would not leave with 

him, Gillis dragged her down the hallway toward the front door, 

causing rug burns on her knees.

¶ 5 At that point, E.G. convinced Gillis to let her use the 

bathroom. While inside the bathroom, E.G. texted a friend for help. 

Gillis waited outside the bathroom door and began hitting or 

kicking it to force E.G. to leave the bathroom. Fearing he would 

kick down the door, she stepped out of the bathroom. Gillis then 

began to pull E.G. down the hallway to force her to leave with him. 

When she struggled, he slammed her against a wall, causing her to 

hit her head. Gillis next wrapped a towel around E.G.’s neck, used 

it to pull her into the kitchen, and began to choke her with it.

¶ 6 Shortly thereafter, E.G.’s friend and her friend’s boyfriend 

arrived and yelled at Gillis to leave. Gillis dropped the towel and left 

the apartment. E.G. then left the apartment and called the police.
3

¶ 7 Based on the information E.G. gave to the police, the 

prosecution charged Gillis with (1) first degree burglary; (2) first 

degree criminal trespass; and (3) second degree assault.

B. Gillis’s Preliminary Hearings

¶ 8 During Gillis’s advisement on January 21, 2016, he informed 

the court that he planned to hire private counsel. The court set his 

preliminary hearing for March 3, 2016 (the March Preliminary 

Hearing).

¶ 9 Gillis appeared pro se at the March Preliminary Hearing. He 

told the court that he still intended to hire private counsel, but that 

he needed more time to find the money for a retainer to pay an 

attorney. He requested another continuance. The court said that 

“[w]e’ll set it over one time,” granted his request, and rescheduled 

the preliminary hearing for April 14, 2016 (the April Preliminary 

Hearing).

¶ 10 One day before the April Preliminary Hearing, the prosecution 

requested a continuance because two of its witnesses were 

unavailable. The court did not rule on the prosecution’s request

that day, however. At the April Preliminary Hearing, the prosecutor 

informed the court that Gillis had recently hired counsel. Gillis did 
4

not object to the prosecutor’s representation. The prosecutor then 

renewed his request for a continuance. The court granted the 

request, rescheduling the hearing for May 5, 2016 (the May 

Preliminary Hearing).

¶ 11 Gillis appeared pro se at the May Preliminary Hearing. He 

requested another continuance so he could apply for representation 

from the public defender’s office. The prosecutor objected to Gillis’s 

request and the court denied the requested continuance. The court 

found that Gillis had waived his right to a preliminary hearing by 

appearing at multiple hearings without counsel. Gillis objected to 

the court’s ruling.

¶ 12 The court instructed Gillis to take his application to the public 

defender’s office. Gillis complied, and a public defender entered her 

appearance as his counsel of record later that day. Gillis’s public 

defender moved for a preliminary hearing, but the record is unclear 

whether the court ever addressed the motion. Gillis did not move 

for a preliminary hearing during any subsequent hearings.

C. Gillis’s Trial

¶ 13 Because Gillis’s assault on E.G. occurred over time and 

because he inflicted distinct injuries on her during the different 
5

stages of the assault, the prosecutor argued that Gillis had 

assaulted E.G. twice. For this reason, the prosecutor charged him 

separately with first degree burglary, based on the predicate offense 

of assault, and second degree assault. Gillis did not object at trial 

to the prosecutor’s decision to treat his actions as constituting two 

assaults.

¶ 14 A jury convicted Gillis of (1) first degree burglary, based on the 

predicate offense of third degree assault; (2) first degree criminal 

trespass; and (3) third degree assault. The court sentenced him to 

four years’ probation on each conviction, to be served concurrently, 

with the condition that he participate in, and abide by the rules and 

regulations of, a veteran’s court program.

II. Discussion

¶ 15 Gillis raises two contentions of error. First, he contends that 

the court erred by finding that he impliedly waived his right to 

counsel and subsequently waived his right to a preliminary hearing. 

Second, he asserts that the court erred by failing to merge his 

convictions for first degree criminal trespass and third degree

assault into his conviction for first degree burglary. We agree that 

Gillis’s conviction for first degree criminal trespass merges into his 
6

conviction for first degree burglary but disagree with his remaining 

arguments.

A. The Trial Court Found Only that Gillis Waived His Right to a 

Preliminary Hearing

¶ 16 The parties disagree how we should analyze Gillis’s first 

contention of error. Contending that the court violated his right to 

counsel, Gillis asserts that the court erred in finding that he 

impliedly waived his right to counsel by requesting multiple 

continuances of his preliminary hearing and appearing without

counsel at any of the rescheduled hearings. Gillis argues that this 

finding impaired his ability to construct, prepare, and present a 

defense at trial.

¶ 17 According to the People, however, the court found that Gillis’s 

actions resulted in a waiver of his right to a preliminary hearing, 

rather than a waiver of his right to counsel. The People assert that 

the trial court did not hold that Gillis waived his right to counsel, 

particularly as it instructed him to apply to the public defender’s 

office to obtain counsel.

¶ 18 Based on the record, we agree with the People that the court 

did not deprive Gillis of his right to counsel. Gillis appeared pro se 
7

at the March Preliminary Hearing, the April Preliminary Hearing, 

and the May Preliminary Hearing only because he failed to retain 

private counsel after informing the court of his intention to do so. 

At the May Preliminary Hearing, he first disclosed that he planned 

to ask the public defender’s office to represent him. After stating 

that Gillis was “playing games,” the court found that he had waived 

his right to a preliminary hearing. It did not find that he waived his 

right to counsel. Instead, the court asked Gillis why he had not 

retained private counsel, rejected his argument that he lacked 

sufficient funds to hire a lawyer because he qualified for a public 

defender, and instructed him to take his application “over to the 

Public Defender’s Office right now” because “[t]hat way you’ll have 

an attorney.” Gillis then submitted his application to the public 

defender’s office. A public defender entered her appearance as his 

counsel of record and represented him throughout the case.

¶ 19 Thus, Gillis was not deprived of his right to counsel. We next 

consider his contention that the court erred in denying him the 

right to a preliminary hearing.
8

B. Gillis’s Contention that the Court Denied him a Preliminary 

Hearing Is Moot

1. Legal Authority

¶ 20 Section 16-5-301(1)(a), C.R.S. 2019, provides that “[e]very 

person accused of a class 1, 2, or 3 felony . . . has the right to 

demand and receive a preliminary hearing . . . .” See Crim. P. 

5(a)(4). First degree burglary is a class 3 felony. § 18-4-202(2), 

C.R.S. 2019. Second degree assault is a class 3 felony if the victim 

“suffered serious bodily injury during the commission” of a 

burglary. § 18-3-203(2)(b.5), C.R.S. 2019.

¶ 21 “The purpose of a preliminary hearing is to ‘screen out cases 

in which prosecution is unwarranted by allowing an impartial judge 

to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that the 

crime charged may have been committed by the defendant.’” People 

v. Nichelson, 219 P.3d 1064, 1066-67 (Colo. 2009) (quoting Rex v. 

Sullivan, 194 Colo. 568, 571, 575 P.2d 408, 410 (1978)).

¶ 22 But the right to a preliminary hearing is not absolute. People 

v. Moody, 630 P.2d 74, 76 (Colo. 1981); see Crim. P. 5(a)(4)(I) 

(providing that the defendant or prosecution must request a 
9

preliminary hearing within seven days of the defendant being 

brought before the county court).

¶ 23 A defendant who seeks appellate review of a court’s denial of 

his or her request for a preliminary hearing must do so before trial 

because, if the defendant is convicted at trial, the alleged error in 

denying the preliminary hearing becomes moot. Nichelson, 219 

P.3d at 1067; see Kuypers v. Dist. Court, 188 Colo. 332, 335, 534 

P.2d 1204, 1206 (1975) (“Resolution of [probable cause] questions 

must be made prior to trial in order to avoid the anomalous 

situation where a defendant may be found guilty at trial, and then

attempt to have the conviction reversed for a preliminary hearing on 

probable cause.”). The proper procedure for seeking such review is 

a C.A.R. 21 petition to the supreme court. Nichelson, 219 P.3d at 

1066-67; Kuypers, 188 Colo. at 335, 534 P.2d at 1206.

2. Analysis

¶ 24 We do not reach the merits of Gillis’s contention that the court 

denied his right to a preliminary hearing because we conclude the 

issue is moot. Although Gillis repeatedly requested a preliminary 

hearing and objected to the court’s finding that he had waived his 

right to one, he did not seek relief under Rule 21 before his case 
10

proceeded to trial. Thus, he failed to pursue the only remedy 

available to him. See Nichelson, 219 P.3d at 1066-67. It is too late 

for him to challenge whether there was probable cause to support 

the first degree burglary charge after a jury found beyond a 

reasonable doubt that he committed the offense. Nor can he 

challenge whether there was probable cause to support the second 

degree assault charge because a jury found beyond a reasonable 

doubt that he also committed the lesser included charge of third 

degree assault. See id.; Kuypers, 188 Colo. at 335, 534 P.2d at 

1206; see also Blue v. United States, 342 F.2d 894, 901 (D.C. Cir. 

1964) (“Where, as here, the accused has been found guilty of those 

charges in a full-scale trial that we have otherwise found to be free 

of error, the chances that he could persuade a magistrate that no 

probable cause exists . . . are perhaps not ungenerously to be 

characterized as speculative.”).

C. The Court Erred When It Did Not Merge Gillis’s Conviction for 

First Degree Criminal Trespass, but Not His Conviction for 

Third Degree Assault, Into His Conviction for First Degree 

Burglary

¶ 25 Gillis argues that the elements of first degree burglary 

encompass the elements of first degree criminal trespass and third 
11

degree assault. For this reason, he contends that the court erred 

by sua sponte failing to merge his convictions for first degree 

criminal trespass and third degree assault into his conviction for 

first degree burglary. The People concede, and we agree, that his 

conviction for first degree criminal trespass merges with his 

conviction for first degree burglary. Thus, we vacate his conviction 

for first degree criminal trespass. We disagree, however, that 

Gillis’s conviction for third degree assault merges because his 

multiple assaults against E.G support his convictions of the two 

separate offenses.

1. Standard of Review

¶ 26 “Whether convictions for different offenses merge is a question 

of law that we review de novo.” Page v. People, 2017 CO 88, ¶ 6, 

402 P.3d 468, 469. If a defendant fails to preserve a double 

jeopardy claim based on merger, we review for plain error. 

Reyna-Abarca v. People, 2017 CO 15, ¶ 46, 390 P.3d 816, 823. 

“Errors that so undermine the fundamental fairness of the trial as 

to cast serious doubt on the reliability of the judgment of conviction 

constitute plain error.” People v. Vigil, 127 P.3d 916, 929-30 (Colo. 

2006). “In the double jeopardy context, the answer [to whether 
12

plain error occurred] would invariably be ‘yes’” if the defendant was 

convicted multiple times for the same conduct. People v. Tillery, 

231 P.3d 36, 48 (Colo. App. 2009), aff’d sub nom. People v. Simon, 

266 P.3d 1099 (Colo. 2011).

2. Legal Authority

¶ 27 The Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States and 

Colorado Constitutions and the doctrine of merger protect an 

accused “against multiple punishments for the same offense,” 

unless the General Assembly “specif[ied] multiple punishments 

based upon the same criminal conduct.” Woellhaf v. People, 105 

P.3d 209, 214 (Colo. 2005) (quoting Whalen v. United States, 445 

U.S. 684, 688 (1980)); see U.S. Const. amends V, XIV; Colo. Const. 

art. II, § 18; People v. Delci, 109 P.3d 1035, 1036 (Colo. App. 2004) 

(discussing the merger doctrine).

¶ 28 The General Assembly has determined that “a defendant may 

not be convicted of two offenses for the same conduct if the lesser 

offense is included in the greater.” Page, ¶ 9, 402 P.3d at 470; see 

§ 18-1-408(1)(a), C.R.S. 2019. We apply the statutory elements test 

articulated in Reyna-Abarca to determine whether an offense is a 

lesser included offense of another. Page, ¶ 9, 402 P.3d at 470. The 
13

statutory elements test provides that “an offense is a lesser included 

offense of another offense if the elements of the lesser offense are a 

subset of the elements of the greater offense, such that the lesser 

offense contains only elements that are also included in the 

elements of the greater offense.” Reyna-Abarca, ¶ 64, 390 P.3d at 

826. If the statutory elements test is satisfied, the lesser offense

merges into the greater offense. Id. at ¶ 79, 390 P.3d at 827-28.

¶ 29 However, “[m]ultiple convictions for two separate offenses the 

elements of one of which constitute a subset of the elements of the 

other can clearly stand if the offenses were committed by distinctly 

different conduct.” People v. Rock, 2017 CO 84, ¶ 17, 402 P.3d 472, 

478. And a defendant may be convicted separately for the same 

offense if he or she committed the offense more than once. Id. 

Under either circumstance, a defendant may be convicted of both 

offenses only if (1) “the unit of prosecution prescribed by the 

legislature permits the charging of multiple offenses” and (2) “the 

evidence in support of each offense justifies the charging of distinct 

offenses.” Quintano v. People, 105 P.3d 585, 590 (Colo. 2005) 

(citing Woellhaf, 105 P.3d at 214).
14

¶ 30 The unit of prosecution is “the manner in which a criminal 

statute permits a defendant’s conduct to be divided into discrete 

acts for purposes of prosecuting multiple offenses. Once the 

General Assembly prescribes the unit of prosecution, the 

prescription determines the scope of protection offered by the 

Double Jeopardy Clause.” Woellhaf, 105 P.3d at 215 (citations 

omitted). “To determine the unit of prosecution, we look exclusively 

to the statute and, where possible, seek to discern the legislative 

intent from the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory 

language.” People v. McMinn, 2013 COA 94, ¶ 21, 412 P.3d 551, 

558.

¶ 31 After identifying the unit of prosecution, “we then examine the 

evidence to determine whether the defendant’s conduct constituted 

factually distinct offenses.” Id. at ¶ 22, 412 P.3d at 558. When 

determining whether a course of conduct constituted a single 

offense or multiple offenses, we consider the following 

nonexhaustive list of factors:

(1) whether the acts occurred at different times 

and were separated by intervening events; (2) 

whether there were separate volitional acts or 

new volitional departures in the defendant’s 

course of conduct; and (3) factors such as 
15

temporal proximity, the location of the victim 

(e.g., if the victim was moved), the defendant’s 

intent as indicated by his or her conduct and 

utterances, and the number of victims.

Id.; see also Quintano, 105 P.3d at 591-92; Woellhaf, 105 P.3d at 

219. We also consider whether the prosecution treated the 

defendant’s acts as legally separable. Quintano, 105 P.3d at 592. 

Ultimately, the critical inquiry is “whether the evidence on which 

the jury relied for conviction was sufficient to support distinct and 

separate offenses.” Id.

3. The Court Erred in Failing to Merge Gillis’s Conviction for First 

Degree Criminal Trespass into His Conviction for First Degree 

Burglary

¶ 32 Gillis contends, the People concede, and we agree that, 

pursuant to the statutory elements test, first degree criminal 

trespass is a lesser included offense of first degree burglary. Thus, 

the court’s failure to merge his conviction for first degree criminal 

trespass into his conviction for first degree burglary amounted to 

plain error.

¶ 33 In holding that first degree criminal trespass is a lesser 

included offense of first degree burglary, we recognize that we 

depart from decisions of other divisions that took a different 
16

position. See, e.g., People v. Lucas, 232 P.3d 155, 168 (Colo. App. 

2009) (“First degree criminal trespass is not a lesser included 

offense of first degree burglary, because it requires entry into a 

dwelling, which is not an element of burglary by statute or as 

charged and instructed here.”); see also People v. Garcia, 940 P.2d 

357, 362 (Colo. 1997) (holding that “first degree criminal trespass is 

not a lesser included offense of second degree burglary”). However, 

we conclude that the Colorado Supreme Court’s analysis in Rock, 

which post-dates these cases, compels the conclusion that first 

degree criminal trespass is a lesser included offense of first degree 

burglary.

¶ 34 The Colorado Supreme Court specified the test for determining 

whether an offense is a lesser included offense in Reyna-Abarca and 

clarified the relationship between criminal trespass and burglary in 

Rock. See Rock, ¶ 20, 402 P.3d at 479 (holding that second degree 

criminal trespass is a lesser included offense of second degree 

burglary); Reyna-Abarca, ¶ 59, 390 P.3d at 825-26 (explaining that 

the “prior articulations of the strict elements test have not provided 

. . . clear and consistent guidance,” thereby requiring the supreme 

court to adopt a standard that can be uniformly applied); see also
17

People v. Smoots, 2013 COA 152, ¶ 20, 396 P.3d 53, 57 (“We are not 

obligated to follow the precedent established by another division [of 

the court of appeals], even though we give such decisions 

considerable deference.”), aff’d sub nom. Reyna-Abarca, 2017 CO 

15, 390 P.3d 816.

¶ 35 In Rock, the court noted that “[s]econd degree burglary is 

committed by . . . knowingly entering or remaining unlawfully in a 

‘building or occupied structure,’” which includes a “dwelling.” ¶ 20, 

402 P.3d at 479 (quoting § 18-4-203(1), C.R.S. 2019); see

§ 18-4-101(1), C.R.S. 2019. It also explained that “second degree 

criminal trespass is committed by, among various other means of 

commission, knowingly entering or remaining unlawfully in or upon 

‘the premises of another,’” which includes “buildings.” Rock, ¶ 20, 

402 P.3d at 479 (quoting § 18-4-503(1)(a), C.R.S. 2019); see

§ 18-4-504.5, C.R.S. 2019. The court then held that

[w]hile second degree criminal trespass may be 

committed in ways other than unlawfully 

entering or remaining in or upon the premises 

of another and, in fact, the premises at issue 

in criminal trespass need not even be a 

building, much less a dwelling, with reference 

to the element at issue here the commission of 

second degree criminal trespass requires no 

more than knowingly and unlawfully entering 
18

or remaining in the dwelling of another, a 

subset of the statutory elements of second 

degree burglary.

Rock, ¶ 20, 402 P.3d at 479.

¶ 36 As pertinent here, section 18-4-202(1) provides that a 

conviction for first degree burglary requires proof, among other 

things, that the defendant (1) knowingly (2) entered unlawfully, or 

remained unlawfully after a lawful or unlawful entry, (3) in a 

building or occupied structure. See also Lucas, 232 P.3d at 166-67. 

Section 18-4-502, C.R.S. 2019, similarly provides that a conviction 

for first degree criminal trespass requires proof that the defendant 

(1) knowingly and (2) unlawfully (3) entered or remained in a 

dwelling of another. See also People v. Hanna, 981 P.2d 627, 629 

(Colo. App. 1998) (discussing the elements of first degree criminal 

trespass and the meaning of “dwelling”).

¶ 37 Like the second degree criminal trespass offense discussed in 

Rock, the elements of first degree criminal trespass are knowingly 

and unlawfully entering or remaining in the dwelling of another. 

These elements are a subset of the elements of first degree burglary. 

Thus, first degree criminal trespass is a lesser included offense of 

first degree burglary. See Reyna-Abarca, ¶ 64, 390 P.3d at 826.
19

¶ 38 Because the record contains no evidence that Gillis’s conduct 

could be sufficiently differentiated to support a conviction for each 

offense, the court plainly erred in failing to merge his conviction for 

first degree criminal trespass into his conviction for first degree 

burglary. See id. at ¶¶ 80-82, 390 P.3d at 828; Tillery, 231 P.3d at 

48. Accordingly, we vacate Gillis’s conviction and sentence for first 

degree criminal trespass. However, we do not remand for 

resentencing because the court imposed identical and concurrent 

sentences for each of Gillis’s convictions. See People v. Berner, 42 

Colo. App. 520, 522, 600 P.2d 112, 114 (1979); see also People v. 

Fuentes, 258 P.3d 320, 326 (Colo. App. 2011) (“[A] court should 

enter as many convictions and impose as many sentences as are 

legally possible so as to fully effectuate the jury’s verdict.”).

4. The Court Did Not Err in Holding that Gillis’s Convictions for 

Third Degree Assault and First Degree Burglary Did Not Merge

¶ 39 Given that the prosecution charged him with third degree 

assault as the predicate offense for his first degree burglary charge, 

Gillis contends that the court erred in failing sua sponte to merge 

his conviction for third degree assault into his conviction for first 

degree burglary. We disagree.
20

¶ 40 Gillis is correct in asserting that section 18-4-202(1), which 

establishes the unit of prosecution, does not authorize separate 

punishments for first degree burglary and its predicate offense. See

§ 18-4-202(1) (assault is one of the predicate offenses for first 

degree burglary); Delci, 109 P.3d at 1037-38. However, “[s]eparate 

convictions for even the same offense are permissible if it was 

committed more than once.” Rock, ¶ 17, 402 P.3d at 478; see 

Quintano, 105 P.3d at 592 (upholding the defendant’s five 

convictions because sufficiently distinct evidence supported each 

conviction). Thus, we consider whether Gillis assaulted E.G. more 

than once. If so, one assault would be the predicate offense for his 

burglary conviction and the other assault would support a separate 

conviction for assault.

¶ 41 Although we cannot determine from the record the court’s 

reasoning in not merging Gillis’s convictions for first degree 

burglary and third degree assault, we conclude that this decision 

was correct because Gillis assaulted E.G. twice. See Rush Creek 

Sols., Inc. v. Ute Mountain Ute Tribe, 107 P.3d 402, 406 (Colo. App. 

2004) (holding that an appellate court may affirm the trial court’s 

ruling on any grounds supported by the record).
21

¶ 42 We primarily base our reasoning on two cases: Quintano and 

Qureshi v. District Court, 727 P.2d 45 (Colo. 1986). In Quintano, the 

supreme court affirmed the defendant’s five convictions for sexual 

assault on a child based on evidence that he followed the victim 

around her aunt’s home and (1) touched her breast in the living 

room; (2) touched her vaginal area at the home’s pool; (3) touched 

her buttocks in the bathroom; (4) touched her breast in the 

bathroom; and (5) bit her breast in the living room. 105 P.3d at 

588-89, 592. It reasoned that

[t]he record evidences that the defendant had 

sufficient time to reflect after each encounter. 

He persisted after the victim admonished him 

to stop several times. Each incident occurred 

in a different location [of the home], or after 

the victim had left a location and returned 

there. As well, the record reflects sufficient 

breaks between each incident to allow the 

defendant time to reflect. Moreover, the 

defendant’s statements supported the forming 

of renewed intentions. Though the record does 

not disclose specifically how long each incident 

lasted, the facts prove that the defendant’s 

conduct was separate in temporal proximity 

and constituted a new volitional departure in 

his course of conduct.

Id. at 592. The court also noted that the prosecution treated the 

defendant’s acts as legally separable by charging him with five 
22

counts and arguing in support of all the counts during the 

preliminary hearing. Id.

¶ 43 In Qureshi, the supreme court upheld the defendant’s 

convictions for attempted manslaughter and first degree assault 

because “there were two separate and different sets of acts which 

occasioned two crimes.” 727 P.2d at 47. It held that the evidence 

at trial supported the defendant’s conviction for first degree assault

because he stabbed the victim in the abdomen and his conviction 

for attempted manslaughter because, after the victim escaped the 

initial assault, he pursued her to a separate room and stabbed her 

again. Id.

¶ 44 For four reasons, we discern no meaningful difference between 

the facts supporting Gillis’s convictions for first degree burglary and 

third degree assault and the facts supporting the defendants’ 

multiple convictions in Quintano and Qureshi.

¶ 45 First, Gillis’s conduct occurred at different times and was 

separated by intervening events. Gillis initially assaulted E.G. by 

smothering her after throwing her on the floor and on her bed. 

Then, after E.G. managed to escape to the bathroom, text her friend 

for help, and emerge from the bathroom, Gillis slammed her head 
23

into a wall, dragged her down the hallway, and choked her with a 

towel. Thus, like the defendants in Quintano and Qureshi, Gillis 

engaged in an initial criminal act, allowed the victim to leave the 

immediate area, and then committed another criminal act against 

the same victim after a short period of time.

¶ 46 Second, Gillis engaged in separate volitional acts during his 

assaults on E.G. E.G. yelled at Gillis to stop throughout the entire 

episode — before he kicked down her door and while in her 

apartment. Therefore, like the defendant in Quintano, Gillis knew 

that the victim opposed his actions, but proceeded anyway. 105 

P.3d at 592. Moreover, while E.G. was in the bathroom, Gillis had 

sufficient opportunity to reflect on his course of conduct. See id.;

Qureshi, 727 P.2d at 47.

¶ 47 Third, Gillis’s conduct supported the formation of renewed 

intentions to assault E.G. He assaulted her at different locations 

within her apartment. As noted above, after E.G. temporarily 

escaped to the bathroom, Gillis had time to reflect on his actions. 

Instead of leaving the apartment or de-escalating the situation, he 

hit or kicked the bathroom door until E.G. emerged, slammed her 

head into a wall, dragged her across the floor, and choked her with 
24

a towel. And, this time, the assault occurred in the hallway and in 

the kitchen of E.G.’s apartment, instead of near the front door and 

in the bedroom. See Quintano, 105 P.3d at 592; Qureshi, 727 P.2d 

at 47.

¶ 48 Lastly, although the prosecutor did not clearly argue that each 

of Gillis’s acts (and E.G.’s corresponding injuries) fit into one of two 

distinct assaults, Gillis was charged with first degree burglary and 

second degree assault. The prosecutor consistently asserted that 

Gillis committed all the charged offenses. Thus, the prosecution 

treated Gillis’s assaults as legally separable. See Quintano, 105 

P.3d at 592.

¶ 49 Because each of the four factors supports our conclusion that 

Gillis assaulted E.G. twice and because “the evidence on which the 

jury relied for conviction was sufficient to support distinct and 

separate offenses,” id., we hold that the court did not err in entering 

the convictions for first degree burglary and third degree assault.

III. Conclusion

¶ 50 Gillis’s conviction for first degree criminal trespass is vacated. 

We affirm his convictions for first degree burglary and third degree

assault.
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JUDGE FOX and JUDGE BERGER concur.