2020 UT App 24

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

LABOR COMMISSION,

Appellant and Cross-appellee,

v.

DEREK PRICE,

Appellee and Cross-appellant.

Amended Opinion1

No. 20170734-CA

Filed February 13, 2020

Third District Court, Salt Lake Department

The Honorable Su Chon

No. 126918635

Sean D. Reyes and Brent A. Burnett, Attorneys for

Appellant and Cross-appellee

Mark D. Tolman and Jessica P. Wilde, Attorneys for

Appellee and Cross-appellant

JUDGE DAVID N. MORTENSEN authored this Opinion, in which 

JUDGES MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER and JILL M. POHLMAN

concurred.

MORTENSEN, Judge:

¶1 As specifically provided for in Utah Code section 34-28-

9(4)(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2019), the Labor Commission 

(Commission) filed in the district court an abstract of judgment 

 

1. This Amended Opinion replaces the Opinion in Case No. 

20170734-CA that was issued on December 12, 2019. Footnote 9 

has been revised to address an issue Derek Price raised in a 

petition for rehearing, and we hereby grant the petition to that 

limited extent. See Utah R. App. P. 35(j). The petition for 

rehearing is denied in all other respects.
Labor Commission v. Price

20170734-CA 2 2020 UT App 24

obtained in an administrative proceeding against Derek Price 

and others.2 Some years later, when the Commission garnished 

his wages, Price filed a motion to vacate that judgment. Focusing 

on due process, specifically service by mail, Price claimed that 

the judgment was obtained without jurisdiction and was 

therefore void. He also argued that the judgment was 

unenforceable against him in light of Heaps v. Nuriche, LLC, 2015 

UT 26, 345 P.3d 655, a decision from our supreme court that 

delineated the extent of personal liability of corporate officers 

and agents for unpaid wages. The district court agreed on both 

counts. However, rather than vacating the Commission’s 

judgment, the district court quashed the garnishment and 

ordered Price to pursue a motion to set aside the judgment with 

the Commission. We reverse.

BACKGROUND

¶2 In May 2010, Marc Cummings filed a wage dispute claim 

with the Commission against Level 11 Mentoring (Level 11) and 

Mad Cow Productions (Mad Cow). In the articles of organization 

for the two companies, Price was listed as the sole membermanager and registered agent of Mad Cow and one of the four 

member-managers of Level 11. The Commission commenced a 

wage claim against these employers and several individuals 

associated with them, and it identified Price as a respondent in 

the wage claim action filed by Cummings. The other 

respondents also identified by the Commission included 

(1) Level 11, (2) Mad Cow, (3) Aaron Christner (a membermanager of Level 11), and (4) Ryan Jensen (the registered agent 

and a member-manager of Level 11).

 

2. Because there have been no significant changes to the relevant 

sections of the Utah Code, we cite the most current version 

unless otherwise noted.
Labor Commission v. Price

20170734-CA 3 2020 UT App 24

¶3 In September 2010, the Commission issued and mailed

notices of the wage claim. The notices advised the respondents

that they could either pay the wages or submit a form detailing 

their disagreement with the allegation. In November 2010, 

having received no response from any of the respondents, the 

Commission issued and mailed a preliminary finding stating

that respondents owed Cummings $4,721 in unpaid wages. The 

respondents were advised that if they disagreed with the 

preliminary finding, they could request a review or informal 

hearing. On January 27, 2011, the Commission issued and mailed 

a default order (Default Order) directing the respondents to pay 

(1) $4,721 in wages to Cummings, (2) a $4,721 fine, and (3) $3,148

in attorney fees, for a total award of $12,590. The Default Order 

concluded with the following notice:

Both parties are advised that this [Default Order] is 

the final agency action, when mailed, unless a 

written request for agency reconsideration is 

received within 20 days of the date of this [Default 

Order]. . . . Additionally, the parties are advised 

that pursuant to Utah Code § 63G-4-401, they may 

appeal a final agency decision to the District Court. 

That appeal must be made within 30 days of the 

date of the final agency action.

¶4 Copies of these three documents (viz., the wage claim, the 

preliminary finding, and the Default Order) were sent via firstclass mail to Price at the two addresses—one in Orem, Utah, and 

another in Salt Lake City, Utah—listed for him in the Utah 

Department of Commerce’s records. None of these mailings 

were returned to the Commission as undeliverable by the U.S. 

Postal Service. The Commission also mailed the same documents 

to the other respondents at their recorded addresses.

¶5 Price claimed that he never received the mailings, 

explaining that he had not lived at the Orem address since the 
Labor Commission v. Price

20170734-CA 4 2020 UT App 24

early 1990s and that he had never lived at and did not recognize 

the Salt Lake address, which the Commission also identified as 

the address of Mad Cow. Price also asserted that Christner and 

Jensen had listed him as the registered agent and a membermanager of Mad Cow without his knowledge or consent. Price 

further claimed that he had quit working for Mad Cow around 

September 2010 after his paychecks bounced and he lost 

confidence in the company’s ability to pay him for his work. 

Price stated that he was living in Sandy, Utah, around the time 

he quit. He then moved to California for a few years, eventually 

returning to St. George, Utah, in 2015, and later moving to 

Midvale, Utah, in 2016.

¶6 In June 2012, the Commission sought to collect on the 

Default Order by filing an abstract of final award with the 

district court identifying the amount of unpaid wages, fines, and 

attorney fees detailed therein. In January 2017, an administrative 

writ of garnishment was issued and served on Price’s employer. 

After learning of the garnishment from a coworker, Price filed a 

request for a hearing on the matter in district court. In response, 

the court, on February 17, 2017, stayed the writ of garnishment 

for thirty days to allow Price to try to resolve his concerns with 

the Commission. Price claimed that he “sent certified mail 

containing several papers” to the Commission explaining that he 

was never an owner of Mad Cow.3 Having received no response, 

Price asserted that he attempted to make contact with the 

Commission through phone calls, personal visits, and email. On 

April 4, 2017, Price received an email from the Commission

stating,

 

3. Jensen also filed a request for hearing, claiming that Price and 

Christner were the owners of Mad Cow and that Price owed him 

money.
Labor Commission v. Price

20170734-CA 5 2020 UT App 24

Proper notice of this claim, and its progression, 

was sent to numerous addresses of all principals of 

the business, including yourself, Mr. Christner, and 

Mr. Jensen. This includes the initial notice of claim, 

subsequent Preliminary Finding, and subsequent 

Order on Default and Order to Pay.

Numerous opportunities were given to appeal or 

dispute the claim, and the involvement or lack 

thereof as to the named Respondents therein. This 

claim was originally filed in May 2010, with a 

subsequent order to pay issued on January 27, 

2011. The time to dispute this claim has long since 

passed.

¶7 Price, who up until this point had been acting pro se, 

retained counsel and filed in the district court a motion to vacate 

the Commission’s judgment. The Commission filed a 

memorandum in opposition.

¶8 In August 2017, the district court issued a memorandum 

decision in which it ruled that (1) the res judicata doctrine did 

not bar Price from pursuing judicial review of the Commission’s 

action; (2) service by first-class mail was insufficient to provide 

Price notice and afford him due process; and (3) Heaps v. Nuriche, 

LLC, 2015 UT 26, 345 P.3d 655, applied retroactively to shield 

Price from personal liability for the amounts owed pursuant 

to the Default Order because he was not an “employer” under 

the Utah Payment of Wages Act, see Utah Code Ann. § 34-28-

2(1)(c) (LexisNexis Supp. 2017). However, the district court did 

not vacate the Commission’s Default Order against Price. 

Instead, it quashed the writ of garnishment and ordered Price to 

“pursue a motion to set aside in the administrative proceeding 

with notice to all interested parties.” The Commission appeals, 

and Price cross-appeals the denial of his request for attorney 

fees.
Labor Commission v. Price

20170734-CA 6 2020 UT App 24

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶9 The threshold issue before this court is whether the 

district court had jurisdiction to consider Price’s challenge to the 

Commission’s enforcement of the Default Order against him. 

“Whether the district court has jurisdiction is a question of law 

that we review for correctness, giving no deference to the lower 

court.” Potts v. Potts, 2018 UT App 169, ¶ 7, 436 P.3d 263 (cleaned

up).

¶10 The second issue is whether the district court erred in 

ruling that first-class mail was insufficient to provide Price 

notice of the wage claim, the preliminary finding, and the 

Default Order. “Constitutional issues, including questions 

regarding due process, are questions of law that we review for 

correctness.” Salt Lake City Corp. v. Jordan River Restoration 

Network, 2012 UT 84, ¶ 47, 299 P.3d 990 (cleaned up).4

 

4. The parties raise two additional issues. First, the Commission 

argues that res judicata precluded the district court from 

reviewing the Commission’s decision to reach a determination 

whether Heaps v. Nuriche, LLC, 2015 UT 26, 345 P.3d 655, applied

retroactively. We agree that the district court should not have

addressed the applicability of Heaps, not because of res judicata 

principles, but instead because we conclude that the district 

court acted without jurisdiction in resolving this question.

Price argued below that the Commission acted without 

authority in rendering the Default Order against him because 

Heaps, decided years after the claim was determined here, 

should be retroactively applied to limit the extent of personal 

liability of corporate officers and agents for unpaid wages. 

Specifically, he asserts that Heaps clarified that the Default Order 

should not apply to him, relying on Utah Code section 63G-4-

501(3)(b) (LexisNexis 2016) which provides, “In a proceeding for 

(continued...)
Labor Commission v. Price

20170734-CA 7 2020 UT App 24

ANALYSIS

I. Jurisdiction of the District Court

¶11 Under the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA), 

Utah Code Ann. §§ 63G-4-101 to -601 (LexisNexis 2016), parties 

typically have thirty days to file a petition for judicial review of a 

final agency action. Id. § 63G-4-401(3)(a). “The timeliness” of 

Price’s petition to review the Commission’s Default Order “is a 

question of jurisdictional significance. To preserve the right to 

 

(...continued)

civil enforcement of an agency’s order, in addition to any other 

defenses allowed by law, a defendant may defend on the ground 

that . . . the order does not apply to the defendant . . . .” But Price 

mischaracterizes the statute. Section 63G-4-501(3)(b) confers 

jurisdiction for the court to hear the defense that a defendant has 

been misjoined (e.g., someone who was not named in the order 

or someone who was mistakenly joined because he shared the 

same name with the responsible party), not for a defendant to

claim that he was improperly held responsible for the unpaid 

wages. Price is not contending that he was mistakenly joined. 

Rather, he is arguing that even though he is the Derek Price

named in the Default Order, he should not have been held 

responsible either because the Commission lacked personal 

jurisdiction over him or because he should not be held liable for 

the unpaid wages under Heaps. Thus, because Price was not 

misjoined in this proceeding, we conclude that the district court 

acted without jurisdiction in addressing the applicability of 

Heaps to Price’s case.

Second, Price asserts that the district court erred in not 

awarding him attorney fees. Because we reverse on the issue of 

the sufficiency of service by first-class mail, we need not address 

awarding attorney fees incurred in the district court or on 

appeal.
Labor Commission v. Price

20170734-CA 8 2020 UT App 24

challenge an agency decision, an interested party must file a 

request for review within thirty days. If no such request is filed, 

the agency action is final and conclusive and may not be subject 

to collateral attack.” Living Rivers v. U.S. Oil Sands, Inc., 2014 UT 

25, ¶ 18, 344 P.3d 568; see also Perez v. South Jordan City, 2013 UT 

1, ¶ 10, 296 P.3d 715 (“[T]he requirement of a timely appeal is 

jurisdictional.”); Blauer v. Department of Workforce Services, 2007 

UT App 280, ¶ 7, 167 P.3d 1102 (“The timely filing of petitions 

for review, like that of notices of appeal from judicial orders, is 

jurisdictional, and failure to timely file results in dismissal.” 

(cleaned up)). Thus, the Commission argues that the district 

court lacked jurisdiction to hear Price’s challenge to the Default 

Order because he failed to timely file a petition for judicial 

review.

¶12 The Commission’s argument fails because jurisdiction in 

this case obtains by statutory grant. Price did not seek review of 

the Default Order; rather, he sought to defend against the 

garnishment. Thus, the jurisdiction question must be resolved 

within the framework of the garnishment proceeding, not in the 

context of judicial review of an agency action. And Price 

correctly argues that the district court in fact had jurisdiction to 

hear at least one of his defenses to the Commission’s 

enforcement of the Default Order under a relevant exception 

provided by the UAPA:

In a proceeding for civil enforcement of an 

agency’s order, in addition to any other defenses 

allowed by law, a defendant may defend on the 

ground that: (a) the order sought to be enforced 

was issued by an agency without jurisdiction to 

issue the order [or] (b) the order does not apply to 

the defendant . . . .

Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-501(3)(a)–(b) (LexisNexis 2016).
Labor Commission v. Price

20170734-CA 9 2020 UT App 24

¶13 Price asserts that the writ of garnishment was a 

“proceeding for civil enforcement” of the Default Order against 

which he is mounting a defense recognized by section 63G-4-

501(3). Therefore, he argues that the district court had

jurisdiction to hear his case under the narrow statutory grant of 

this authority. See id. The Commission counters by citing our 

decision in Utah State Tax Commission v. Echols, 2006 UT App 19U 

(per curiam), in which we stated that a district court lacks 

“subject matter jurisdiction to consider a collateral attack on an 

underlying judgment in the context of the garnishment 

proceedings.” Id. para. 4. But our decision in Echols addressed 

the lack of jurisdiction to attack an underlying judgment during 

a garnishment proceeding in broad terms. It did not address the 

statutory grant of jurisdiction.5 So, while the general rule (viz., 

that a garnishment proceeding cannot be used to mount a 

collateral attack of an underlying judgment) expressed in Echols

remains valid,6 the district court in Price’s case possessed

 

5. In addition to the defense that an agency acted without 

jurisdiction and that an order does not apply to a defendant, the 

statute also allows a defendant to assert the following defenses

in a proceeding for civil enforcement of an agency order: (1) “the 

defendant has not violated the order” or (2) “the defendant 

violated the order but has subsequently complied.” Utah Code 

Ann. § 63G-4-501(3)(c)–(d) (LexisNexis 2016).

6. Caselaw from other jurisdictions supports this general rule. 

See Koors v. Great Sw. Fire Ins. Co., 538 N.E.2d 259, 260 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 1989) (“[I]t is well established that [an order of 

garnishment in] proceedings supplemental cannot be used to 

collaterally attack the underlying judgment.”); Estate of Droomers 

ex rel. Droomers v. Parnell, Nos. 333691, 333692, 334822, 2017 WL 

4654416, at *8 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 17, 2017) (per curiam) (“[I]n a 

(continued...)
Labor Commission v. Price

20170734-CA 10 2020 UT App 24

jurisdiction to consider a narrow category of challenges under a 

specific statutory grant of authority.

¶14 Thus, we conclude that the defense Price raised in the 

context of the garnishment proceeding conferred jurisdiction on 

the district court to determine whether the Commission acted 

without jurisdiction in rendering the Default Order.

II. Sufficiency of Notice by First-class Mail

¶15 Price asserts that serving the notice of the wage claim by 

first-class mail deprived him of due process, resulting in the 

Commission acting without jurisdiction to render the Default 

Order against Price. While it is true that proper service is 

required to exercise jurisdiction over a party, see Cooper v. 

Dressel, 2016 UT App 246, ¶ 3, 391 P.3d 338 (stating that “a 

judgment entered against party that was never properly served 

is void” for lack of personal jurisdiction), the question here is 

whether service via first-class mail in an administrative wage 

claim proceeding satisfies due process under the particular facts 

of this case.

¶16 The UAPA requires an agency to “mail the notice of 

agency action to each party” when “adjudicative proceedings are 

commenced by the agency.” Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-201(2)(b)(i) 

(LexisNexis 2016). The statute is silent regarding what type of 

mail must be used, but the Commission has defined mail to 

mean “first class mailing sent to the parties of a wage claim or 

claim of retaliation, to the last known address on the 

Commission’s record.” Utah Admin. Code R610-3-2(I). Here, the 

Commission used first-class mail to notify Price of the wage 

 

(...continued)

garnishment proceeding, a party may not attack the underlying 

judgment . . . .”).
Labor Commission v. Price

20170734-CA 11 2020 UT App 24

claim, the preliminary finding, and the Default Order. See id.

R610-3-4(F). In response to Price’s motion to vacate the judgment 

against him, the district court made the following determination

regarding service:

Service by first class mail may be adequate most of 

the time, but this situation is a reminder that the 

Department of Commerce’s business directory is 

open to fraud when people can register a business 

in the name of another without their knowledge or 

consent. . . . The burden on the Commission to alter 

its service requirement to certified mail would be

minimal for its outgoing mail.

While the effect of this analysis is not altogether clear, Price and 

the Commission seem to agree that the district court decided 

that the Commission was required to use certified mail to serve 

notice and so satisfy the requirements of due process. Thus, it 

appears that the district court determined certified mail should

be required to prevent fraud, even though the court 

acknowledged that there was no evidence fraud had ever 

actually occurred in a wage claim proceeding. The court also 

concluded that certified mail was more likely to apprise 

someone in Price’s position of a wage claim. Ultimately, we 

disagree with the district court and determine that service by 

first-class mail satisfied the requirements of due process.

¶17 Price asserts that two Utah cases support his position that 

the Commission was required to notify him using certified mail. 

In Anderson v. Public Service Commission, 839 P.2d 822 (Utah 

1992), the Motor Carrier Act required that service of process be 

made by certified mail. Id. at 825. The Public Service 

Commission (PSC) complied and sent notice of a proposed order 

to Anderson via certified mail. Id. When the proposed order was 

returned, Anderson argued that the PSC had a duty to take 

additional steps to ensure that he received notice. Id. Our 
Labor Commission v. Price

20170734-CA 12 2020 UT App 24

supreme court disagreed and held that the Motor Carrier Act 

“makes no reference to any sort of personal service or actual 

notice requirement. The most burdensome form of service 

articulated is certified mail. Thus, we can infer that, at most, the 

legislature intended that the [PSC] be obligated to serve its 

orders by certified mail, not by personal service.” Id. In John 

Kuhni & Sons Inc. v. Labor Commission, 2018 UT App 6, 414 P.3d 

952, the labor commission successfully sent notice to Kuhni via 

FedEx. Id. ¶ 3. But the governing statute required that notice be 

made by “certified mail.” Id. ¶ 10. We determined that “the term 

‘certified mail,’ as used in the relevant statute, encompasses only 

items sent via certified mail through the United States Postal 

Service,” and we held “that the State did not properly serve 

Kuhni when it sent the Citation to Kuhni via FedEx.” Id. ¶ 21.

¶18 Price argues that Anderson and Kuhni support his 

“position that service by certified mail would have been a more 

reliable way to notify him than first class mail.” But neither case 

stands for the proposition Price asserts, namely that the 

Commission must use certified mail to satisfy the demands of 

due process. Anderson and Kuhni dealt with the issue of whether 

an agency must follow statutory directives with regard to 

providing service, not whether the statutory requirements 

themselves met the demands of due process. In both of those 

cases, service by certified mail was required—nothing more, 

nothing less—and no substitute would suffice. Thus, Price’s 

argument misses the mark. These cases are not about the 

superiority of certified mail; rather, they merely stand for the 

proposition that agencies are required to use the statutorily 

authorized method of providing service.7 In no way do they 

 

7. In Anderson v. Public Service Commission, 839 P.2d 822 (Utah 

1992), our supreme court determined that certified mail met the 

demands of due process, but the court did not opine on whether 

(continued...)
Labor Commission v. Price

20170734-CA 13 2020 UT App 24

categorically mandate that state agencies must use certified mail 

to provide notice of proceedings. The most that can be inferred 

from these cases is that certified mail meets the demands of due 

process in certain circumstances, not that first-class mail fails to 

do so.

¶19 Price also argues that due process required the 

Commission to have been more diligent in its efforts to find him, 

implying that the Commission had a responsibility to ensure 

that Price “received the mail.” “An elementary and fundamental 

requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be 

accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the 

circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of 

the action and afford them an opportunity to present their 

objections.” Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 

306, 314 (1950). And as our supreme court has noted, 

“sufficiency of ‘notice’ for due process purposes is more limited 

in administrative matters than in other areas of the law.” 

Anderson, 839 P.2d at 825 (quoting Worrall v. Ogden City Fire

Dep’t, 616 P.2d 598, 602 (Utah 1980) (Hall, J., dissenting)). Thus, 

“notice must be reasonably calculated under all the 

circumstances to give interested parties an opportunity to 

protect their interests. Under this standard, the proper inquiry

 

(...continued)

first-class mail fell below that standard: “To comport with due 

process, notice must be reasonably calculated under all the 

circumstances to give interested parties an opportunity to 

protect their interests. . . . Although certified mail will not ensure 

actual notice in all cases, it is a method reasonably calculated to 

inform certificate holders of Commission orders.” Id. at 825–26

(cleaned up). The Anderson court did not opine about whether 

first-class mail would meet the same standard but examined 

only the standard of certified mail that the legislature had 

expressly designated.
Labor Commission v. Price

20170734-CA 14 2020 UT App 24

focuses on whether the agency acted reasonably in selecting 

means likely to inform persons affected, not whether each 

affected person actually received notice.” Id. (cleaned up); see also

State v. King, 111 P.3d 1146, 1147 (Or. Ct. App. 2005) (“In general, 

due process under the Fourteenth Amendment is a flexible 

concept that calls for such procedural protections as the 

particular situation demands.” (cleaned up)); Withrow v. Schou, 

13 S.W.3d 37, 40 (Tex. App. 1999) (“As to Constitutional 

concerns, actual notice is not and has never been the standard for 

determining whether due process has been afforded a litigant. 

Rather, due process only requires notice, reasonably calculated 

under the circumstances, to be given.”).

¶20 Here, in the context of a garnishment proceeding flowing 

from an administrative proceeding, we must examine these 

circumstances under the factual underpinnings of the 

administrative adjudication. In this case, the Commission was 

working under the premise that Price was a manager of Mad 

Cow, which registered Price’s address as a manager, placing 

upon Price a concomitant duty to keep the Department of 

Commerce apprised of his address, see Utah Code Ann. § 16-17-

206 (LexisNexis 2013); id. § 48-3a-111(2) (2015). If these facts are 

actually based upon fraud, then that is a claim that should be 

brought before the Commission. However, assuming that Price 

was a registered manager of Mad Cow with an ongoing duty to 

keep his address current with the Department of Commerce, we 

conclude that the Commission’s use of service by first-class mail 

was reasonably calculated to provide notice to Price of the wage 

claim proceedings and thus comported with the demands of due 

process under the limited requirements of administrative 

proceedings.

¶21 First, it was reasonable for the Commission to follow the 

statutory requirements for providing notice of the 

commencement of adjudicative proceedings. The relevant statute 

required only that upon the commencement of agency 
Labor Commission v. Price

20170734-CA 15 2020 UT App 24

proceedings, the agency “mail the notice of agency action to each 

party,” id. § 63G-4-201(2)(b)(i) (2016), and rule R610-3-2(I) of the 

Utah Administrative Code required that notice of a wage claim 

be sent by “first class mailing . . . to the last known address on 

the Commission’s record.” Consistent with these requirements, 

the Commission sent notice of the wage claim by first-class mail

to Price at the addresses it had on file for him. See Anderson, 839 

P.2d at 825 (stating that the most burdensome form of service 

required is that articulated by the legislature); Kuhni, 2018 UT 

App 6, ¶ 20 (stating that agencies are required to comply with 

statutorily mandated methods of service); Saysavanh v. 

Saysavanh, 2006 UT App 385, ¶ 25, 145 P.3d 1166 (requiring 

service to be “in conformance with the mode prescribed by 

statute” for a court to have jurisdiction (cleaned up)); see also

State v. Lewis, 953 P.2d 1016, 1019, 1027 (Kan. 1998) (stating that 

statutory notice provisions requiring notice be sent by first-class 

mail “comport with notice requirements of the Due Process 

Clause of the United States Constitution”); Banks v. 

Unemployment Comp. Board of Review, 370 A.2d 1234, 1237 (Pa. 

Commw. Ct. 1977) (“Taking into consideration the type of 

hearing and rights adjudicated, [notification by means of regular 

mail] is a reasonable means of providing for service of notice. 

When the State Legislature prescribes a reasonable method of 

service, it is due process as to persons resident herein and as to 

parties to lawsuits in our State courts.”).

¶22 Second, the Commission acted reasonably in sending 

notices to the addresses it had on file for Price because 

attempting to contact him at these addresses provided the most 

likely means to inform Price of the matter under the 

circumstances of this case. See Salt Lake City Corp. v. Jordan River 

Restoration Network, 2012 UT 84, ¶ 162, 299 P.3d 990 (Lee, J., 

dissenting) (“[F]irst-class mail notice (or its equivalent) [is 

required] before a judgment can extinguish a claim belonging to 

known claimants. Mere publication is categorically insufficient 
Labor Commission v. Price

20170734-CA 16 2020 UT App 24

as a primary form of notice for known claimants under the Due 

Process Clause. It withstands constitutional scrutiny only as a 

supplement to individual notice or for claimants whose identity 

or location is unknown.”); see also Prince v. Marion County 

Auditor, 992 N.E.2d 214, 221 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (concluding that 

notice sent by first-class mail of a tax sale process “met the 

requirements of due process”); In re License of West Side Pawn, 

587 N.W.2d 521, 523 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998) (concluding that 

notice sent by first-class mail revoking a business license 

“satisfied due process”); Wells Fargo Bank, NA v. Ferreri, 199 A.3d 

892, 897 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2018) (concluding that service by firstclass mail was “reasonably calculated to inform [an] appellant of 

the pending [sheriff’s] sale and contained the information 

necessary to provide an opportunity to present objections” 

(cleaned up)).8

¶23 Third, while certified mail may have made actual notice 

more likely, it may have also had the opposite effect. As the 

Supreme Court noted, certified mail provides superior service 

only

 

8. Price asserts that he was listed as the registered agent and the

member-manager of Mad Cow without his knowledge or 

consent, thus implying that his name was fraudulently added to 

the Department of Commerce’s record. Apart from his assertion 

that his name was fraudulently listed, Price has provided no 

evidence of such fraud, and the district court also noted that 

“[n]either party has presented evidence of whether this sort of 

[fraudulent] situation has occurred in the past and how often.” 

As we note, supra note 3, another respondent claimed that it was 

Price who was the wrongdoer. This is the kind of factually open 

question that should be addressed to the Commission in the first 

place. See A-Fab Eng'g v. Tax Comm'n, 2019 UT App 87, ¶ 20, 444 

P.3d 547.
Labor Commission v. Price

20170734-CA 17 2020 UT App 24

when someone is home to sign for the letter, or to 

inform the mail carrier that he has arrived at the 

wrong address. Otherwise, certified mail is 

dispatched and handled in transit as ordinary mail, 

and the use of certified mail might make actual notice 

less likely in some cases—the letter cannot be left like 

regular mail to be examined at the end of the day, 

and it can only be retrieved from the post office for 

a specified period of time.

Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 234–35 (2006) (emphasis added)

(cleaned up). Following this reasoning, first-class mail may have 

provided a more certain means of giving notice to Price because 

the letters that the Commission sent remained at Price’s last 

known addresses for a longer period of time, thus increasing the 

probability that he would receive them. Certified mail would not 

have provided this prolonged opportunity for discovery.

¶24 Fourth, the fact that the notices were never returned to the 

Commission as undeliverable indicates that they were received 

and remained at the addresses available to the Commission and 

associated with Price. In other words, the Commission acted on 

a reasonable assumption that Price had received the notices 

because they were not returned as undeliverable. See Griffin v. 

Bierman, 941 A.2d 475, 487 n.14 (Md. 2008) (“If first-class mail is 

undeliverable, it is returned to the sender. At which point, the 

sender knows that notice was not received.”); id. at 484 n.11 

(noting that if first-class-mail notices are returned undelivered or 

certified mail is returned as unclaimed, then “reasonable followup measures . . . might be required” to give notice to the 

interested party); see also In re Foreclosures of Liens for Delinquent 

Land Taxes by Action in rem Collector of Revenue, 334 S.W.3d 444, 

457 (Mo. 2011) (en banc) (stating that to meet the due process 

standard articulated in Flowers, “in the absence of a postal 

service record, the city should maintain records detailing when 

notices are ‘returned to sender’”).
Labor Commission v. Price

20170734-CA 18 2020 UT App 24

¶25 Thus, providing notice by first-class mail did not deprive

Price of due process; accordingly, the Commission had 

jurisdiction to render the Default Order.

CONCLUSION

¶26 The district court had jurisdiction—in the context of a 

garnishment proceeding under section 63G-4-501(3)(a) of the 

Utah Code—to consider Price’s defense that the Commission 

acted without jurisdiction. However, the district court erred in 

determining that service by first-class mail violated Price’s right 

to due process.9

¶27 Reversed.

 

9. Price may not be without remedy. As a defaulted party, he can 

“seek to have the agency set aside the default order . . . by 

following the procedures outlined in the Utah Rules of Civil 

Procedure.” Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-209(3)(a) (LexisNexis 

2016). He would do so by filing a motion “to set aside [the] 

default and any subsequent order” with the presiding officer at 

the Commission. Id. § 63G-4-209(3)(b). The presiding officer’s 

decision on the motion to set aside the default would be subject 

to agency review and, if necessary, district court and appellate 

court review. Id. § 63G-4-209(3)(c). At oral argument, Price 

indicated that just such a proceeding is pending at the 

Commission, but he represented it had been stayed awaiting the 

disposition of this appeal.