-1- 

STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

UNPUBLISHED 

March 31, 2016 

v No. 324479 

Genesee Circuit Court 

CLARENCE JOVAN DAVISON, LC No. 13-034125-FC 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

Before: RONAYNE KRAUSE, P.J., and JANSEN and STEPHENS, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 A jury convicted defendant of assault with intent to commit murder, MCL 750.83, and 

assault by strangulation, MCL 750.84(1)(b).1 The trial court sentenced defendant as a thirdoffense habitual offender, MCL 769.11, to concurrent prison terms of 40 to 60 years for the 

assault with intent to murder conviction and 114 months to 20 years for the assault by 

strangulation conviction. Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm defendant’s convictions; 

however, we remand for further proceedings in accordance with People v Lockridge, 498 Mich 

358, 397-399; 870 NW2d 502 (2015). 

 Defendant’s convictions arise from an October 15, 2013 assault of his former girlfriend. 

The victim had been involved in a dating relationship with defendant on and off for several 

years, but was actively trying to end the relationship in the weeks leading up to the assault. The 

victim was driving home from a store shortly before 1:30 AM on the date of the assault when 

defendant called her mobile phone 8 times within a ten minute span. She ignored the calls. The 

victim testified that, when she pulled into the driveway of her home, defendant approached her 

and held an item against her stomach while repeatedly stating, “I’m sick of this.” The victim 

believed the item to be a gun but could not describe the item as it was being concealed in 

defendant’s coat pocket. 

 

1

 The jury acquitted defendant of additional charges of armed robbery, MCL 750.529, felon in 

possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a 

felony, 750.227b. 
-2- 

 Defendant put his hand around the victim’s mouth and dragged her to the far side of an 

abandoned house next to her home. He threw the victim to the ground and choked her until she 

lost consciousness. When the victim regained consciousness, a shoestring was wrapped tightly 

around her neck. The victim testified that defendant then grabbed her by her ponytail and stated, 

“Well if I can’t have you, can’t nobody have you.” The victim then felt something sharp go 

across her neck and could hear blood gushing from the wound. At this point, defendant fled. 

The victim remained on the ground for several minutes before struggling to her home where her 

roommates called 911. Responding officers and paramedics testified that a shoelace was 

embedded in a wound around victim’s neck cutting off her air supply. Though the victim lost 

consciousness several times in the hours that followed, emergency personnel testified that the 

victim positively identified defendant as her assailant. 

I. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE 

 Defendant first argues that the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence to 

establish his identity as the person who assaulted the victim. When evaluating a sufficiency of 

the evidence claim, this Court must determine whether a rational trier of fact could find that the 

essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt based on the evidence 

presented at trial and viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution. People v Wolfe, 440 

Mich 508, 515; 489 NW2d 748 (1992), amended 441 Mich 1201 (1992). “[A] reviewing court is 

required to draw all reasonable inferences and make credibility choices in support of the jury 

verdict.” People v Nowack, 462 Mich 392, 400; 614 NW2d 78 (2000). “The credibility of 

witnesses and the weight accorded to evidence are questions for the jury, and any conflict in the 

evidence must be resolved in the prosecutor’s favor.” People v Harrison, 283 Mich App 374, 

378; 768 NW2d 98 (2009). 

 As identity is an essential element in every criminal prosecution, People v Yost, 278 Mich 

App 341, 356; 749 NW2d 753 (2008), defendant’s identity as the perpetrator of the charged 

crime must be established beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Kern, 6 Mich App 406, 409; 149 

NW2d 216 (1967). However, the prosecution need not prove identity with direct evidence; 

identity may be established by circumstantial evidence and any associated reasonable inferences. 

People v Nelson, 234 Mich App 454, 459; 594 NW2d 114 (1999); Kern, 6 Mich App at 409-410. 

 In the instant case, the victim positively identified defendant as her assailant. Defendant 

attacks this identification, claiming that, because the attack occurred in a dark area, the victim 

lost consciousness during and immediately after the attack, and a toxicology screen returned 

evidence that the victim had consumed illegal drugs, a rational jury could not find that 

defendant’s identity as the assailant was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. We disagree. 

 The victim testified that, although the attack occurred at about 1:30 AM, the street lights 

were working and she recognized defendant by both his appearance and voice. Though she lost 

consciousness during and after the event, the victim informed responding emergency personnel 

that defendant was her assailant. Furthermore, the victim testified that she had been trying to 

break off her dating relationship with defendant and that her assailant stated, “Well if I can’t 

have you, can’t nobody have you.” That the victim may have been under the influence of illegal 

drugs at the time of the assault may affect her credibility. However, any credibility questions 

were for the jury to resolve, and this Court will not resolve them anew. Harrison, 283 Mich App 
-3- 

at 378. “It is the jury’s task to weigh the evidence and decide which testimony to believe.” 

People v Jones, 115 Mich App 543, 553; 321 N.W.2d 723 (1982). That the jury believed the 

victim’s testimony over defendant’s contentions is within their province. Viewed in a light most 

favorable to the prosecution, the evidence was sufficient to establish defendant’s identity as the 

assailant beyond a reasonable doubt. 

II. JUDICIAL FACT-FINDING 

 Defendant next argues that he is entitled to resentencing because the trial court engaged 

in impermissible judicial fact-finding to score the sentencing guidelines, thereby violating his 

Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. Defendant preserved this issue by raising it in a motion to 

remand in this Court. People v McChester, 310 Mich App 354, 357; ___ NW2d ___ (2015). 

 Defendant’s fact-finding claims present a Sixth Amendment challenge reviewed de novo 

by this Court as a question of constitutional law. People v Stokes, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ 

NW2d ___ (2015) (Docket No. 321303); slip op at 6. In Lockridge, our Supreme Court held that 

Michigan’s mandatory sentencing guidelines violate a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a 

jury trial to the extent that they require judicial fact-finding beyond facts admitted by defendant 

or found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt and this judicial fact-finding increases the floor 

of defendant’s minimum sentence range. Lockridge, 498 Mich at 364-65. The remedy for this 

constitutional violation is severance of MCL 769.34(2) to the extent that it makes the guidelines 

mandatory. Id. “Thus, under Lockridge, while the sentencing guidelines must still be scored by the 

trial court, the resulting range is merely an advisory range that must be taken into account by the trial 

court when imposing a sentence.” Stokes, ___ Mich App at ___, slip op. at 8. Moving forward, the 

trial court must only use facts determined by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt when calculating 

defendant’s OV score under the guidelines. Once this score is calculated, the judge may utilize 

judicial fact-finding to depart from the sentence imposed by the guidelines. 2 The Supreme Court 

stated that “in cases in which a defendant’s minimum sentence was established by application of 

the sentencing guidelines in a manner that violated the Sixth Amendment, the case should be 

remanded to the trial court to determine whether that court would have imposed a materially 

different sentence but for the constitutional error.” Lockridge, 498 Mich at 397. This remedy 

was modeled on the procedure adopted in United States v Crosby, 397 F3d 103, 117-118 (CA 2, 

2005). See Lockridge, 498 Mich at 395-396. Although Lockridge prescribed this remedy in the 

context of an unpreserved claim that is subject to review for plain error, the Crosby remand 

 

2

 We are aware that, in the Lockridge opinion, our Supreme Court stated that “trial courts must 

assess the ‘highest number of points possible’ to each variable, ‘whether using judge-found facts 

or not.’” Stokes, __ Mich App at ___; slip op at 8, quoting Lockridge, 498 Mich at 392 and n 28. 

We find it difficult to reconcile that statement with the holding that sentencing guidelines are to 

be scored only on the basis of facts necessarily found by the jury or admitted by defendant. 

However, in Stokes, we understand that our Court concluded that it could reconcile the disparate 

statements in Lockridge by determining that judges may score guidelines on the basis of facts 

they found independent of the jury or defendant’s admissions on the theory that doing so 

constitutes a departure, which now need only be justified as reasonable. Id. 
-4- 

procedure also applies to a preserved Lockridge sentencing error. Stokes, ___ Mich App at___; 

slip op at p 11. Accordingly, since defendant here preserved the instant claim by raising it in a 

motion to remand, if we are to find that defendant’s sentence was established in a manner that 

violates defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, this court may remand under the 

Crosby remand procedure. 

 “The essential Sixth Amendment inquiry is whether a fact is an element of the crime.” 

Alleyne v United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2153 (2013). Defendant claims that his scores for OVs 

1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 10, and 19 violate his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial because these OVs 

were not scored on the basis of facts that have been admitted by defendant or found by a jury 

beyond a reasonable doubt, i.e., facts that are an element of an offense defendant had committed. 

We agree. 

 Defendant was assessed 15 points under OV 1, MCL 777.31(1)(c), 5 points under OV 2, 

MCL 777.32(1)(d), 25 points under OV 3, MCL 777.33(1)(c), 10 points under OV 4, MCL 

777.34(1)(a), 50 points under OV 6, MCL 777.36(1)(a), 15 points under OV 8, MCL 

777.38(1)(a), 5 points under OV 10, MCL 777.40(1)(c), and 10 points under OV 19, MCL 

777.49(c) for a total OV score of 185 points. The jury convicted defendant of assault with intent 

to commit murder, MCL 750.83, and assault by strangulation, MCL 750.84(1)(b). “The 

elements of assault with intent to commit murder are (1) an assault, (2) with the specific intent to 

commit murder, (3) which, if successful, would make the killing murder.” People v Beard, 171 

Mich App 538, 541; 431 NW 2d 232, 233 (1988). An assault is “an attempt or threat with force 

or violence to do corporal harm to another.” People v Brown, 267 Mich App 141, 147; 703 NW 

2d 230, 236 (2005). The elements of assault by strangulation are: (1) an assault, and (2) the 

intentional “impeding [of] normal breathing or circulation of the blood by applying pressure on 

the throat or neck or by blocking the nose or mouth of another person.” MCL 750.84(1)(b), (2). 

 Defendant’s use or possession of a weapon, MCL 777.31(1)(c) (OV 1) and MCL 

777.32(1)(d) (OV 2), were not elements of the charged offenses. The correct score for both OV 

1 and OV 2 is zero points. MCL 777.31(1)(f); MCL 777.32(1)(f). In addition, the jury was not 

required to find that the victim sustained a life-threatening injury, MCL 777.33(1)(c) (OV 3), or 

a psychological injury. MCL 777.34(1)(a) (OV4). The correct score for both OV 3 and OV 4 is 

zero points. MCL 777.33(1)(f), MCL 777.34(1)(b). Although intent to kill is an essential 

element of assault with intent to commit murder, the jury was not required to find that defendant 

acted with a premeditated intent to kill, as is necessary to score 50 points for OV 6. MCL 

777.36(1)(a). The correct score for OV 6 is 25 points. MCL 777.36(1)(b). The jury’s verdict 

also did not contain a finding that any of the aggravating factors necessary to score 50 points for 

OV 7 were present. MCL 777.37(1)(a). The correct score for OV 7 is zero points. MCL 

777.37(1)(b). In addition, the jury made no finding that the victim was asported, MCL 

777.38(1)(a) (OV 8), that defendant took advantage of the victim’s vulnerability, MCL 

777.40(1)(c) (OV 10), or that defendant interfered with the administration of justice, MCL 

777.49(c) (OV 19). The correct score for each of those offense variables is zero points. MCL 

777.38(1)(b); MCL 777.40(1)(d); MCL 777.49(d). 

 Because the trial court’s scoring of the offense variables was based on judicially-found 

facts that increased the floor of the guidelines minimum sentence range, the guidelines range was 

unconstitutionally constrained by a violation of the Sixth Amendment. Lockridge, 498 Mich at 
-5- 

399. Therefore, defendant is entitled to the Crosby remand procedure outlined in Lockridge. 

Stokes, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 12; see Lockridge, 498 Mich at 395-99. On remand, the 

trial court should allow defendant an opportunity “ ‘to avoid resentencing by promptly notifying 

the [trial] judge that resentencing will not be sought.’ ” Lockridge, 498 Mich at 398, quoting 

Crosby, 397 F3d at 118. If defendant does not wish to avoid resentencing, the court must 

determine if it “would have imposed a materially different sentence but for the unconstitutional 

constraint [considering] only the ‘circumstances existing at the time of the original sentence.’ ” 

Id., quoting Crosby, 397 F3d at 117. In making this determination, the trial court may properly 

consider the judicially-found facts underlying its original scoring when determining if departure 

from the properly scored guidelines range is appropriate. See id. at 391-92 (“[T]he sentencing 

court may exercise its discretion to depart from that guidelines range without articulating 

substantial and compelling reasons for doing so. A sentence that departs from the applicable 

guidelines range will be reviewed by an appellate court for reasonableness.”). If the sentencing 

court decides to depart from the properly scored guidelines range, it must state on the record its 

reasons for departure. MCL 769.34(b)(3).3

 

III. DEFENDANT’S STANDARD 4 BRIEF 

 Defendant raises additional issues in a pro se supplemental brief filed pursuant to 

Supreme Court Administrative Order 2004-6, Standard 4, none of which have merit. 

A. JURISDICTION 

 Defendant argues that various procedural defects divested the trial court of jurisdiction 

over his criminal proceeding. We disagree. Because defendant did not raise these procedural 

claims in the trial court, this issue is unpreserved. People v Pipes, 475 Mich 267, 277; 715 

NW2d 290 (2006). Therefore, review is limited to plain error affecting defendant’s substantial 

rights. People v Vandenberg, 307 Mich App 57, 61; 859 NW2d 229 (2014). 

 From what we can discern from defendant’s first argument about a defect involving an 

“Affidavit of Probable Cause,” it appears that defendant is challenging the lack of a probable 

cause hearing before trial. After defendant’s arrest, however, a preliminary examination was 

held, following which the district court found that the prosecutor had established probable cause 

to believe that defendant committed the charged offenses. Defendant’s argument that he was not 

presented with a probable cause hearing and that the magistrate’s actions, presumably in 

authorizing the complaint, amounted to a “rubber stamp” for the police is without merit. 

 

3 Lockridge, though changing the standard governing departure from the guidelines range, did 

not abrogate the requirement that a trial court departing from the guidelines range articulate its 

reasons for departure. See Lockridge, 498 Mich at 392 (changing the standard for review of 

departures from “substantial and compelling” to “reasonable”); MCL 769.34(3) (“A court may 

depart from the appropriate sentence range . . . if the court has a substantial and compelling 

reason for that departure and states on the record the reasons for departure”)(emphasis added). 
-6- 

 Defendant next appears to complain that the warrant was not supported by sufficient facts 

“to support an independent judgment that probable cause existed for the [warrant] to be issued.” 

We disagree. 

 A criminal complaint serves to “initiate[] the judicial phase of the prosecution and 

provide[] a basis for the issuance of an arrest warrant.” People v Burrill, 391 Mich 124, 128, 214 

NW2d 823 (1974). Concerning the substance of a criminal complaint, MCR 6.101 provides: 

“[A] A complaint is a written accusation that a named or described person has 

committed a specified criminal offense. The complaint must include the 

substance of the accusation against the accused and the name and statutory 

citation of the offense. 

[B] The complaint must be signed and sworn to before a judicial officer or court 

clerk” 

 The record discloses that the complaint contained: (1) the date of the offenses, October 

15, 2013; (2) the location where the offenses occurred, Genesee County; (3) the details of the 

charges against defendant, and (4) an assistant prosecutor’s signature based on “info[rmation] 

and belief.” The complaint satisfied the requirements in MCR 6.101(A) and (B), and served to 

properly commence the judicial proceedings against defendant. Burrill, 391 Mich at 128; People 

v Cain, 299 Mich App 27, 52, 829 NW2d 37 (2012), rev’d in part on other grounds 495 Mich 

874 (2013). 

 With respect to the warrant, the complaint can serve as the basis for the arrest warrant. 

MCL 764.1(1). A magistrate “ shall issue a warrant upon presentation of a proper complaint 

alleging the commission of an offense and a finding of reasonable cause to believe that the 

individual accused in the complaint committed that offense.” MCL 764.1a(1). According to 

MCL 764.1a(2), a reasonable cause finding may rest on “1 or more of the following: . . . (a) 

[f]actual allegations . . . contained in the complaint[,]” “(b) [t]he complainant’s sworn 

testimony[,]” “(c) [t]he complainant’s affidavit[,]” or “(d) [a]ny supplemental sworn testimony 

or affidavits of other individuals presented by the complainant or required by the magistrate.” 

MCR 6.102(A) similarly authorizes the issuance of an arrest warrant “if presented with a proper 

complaint and . . . the court finds probable cause to believe that the accused committed the 

alleged offense.” The court rules also specify that a probable cause finding can “be based on 

hearsay evidence . . . ” MCR 6.102(B). The felony warrant contained information identical to 

the allegations in the complaint and included, immediately above the magistrate’s signature, the 

statement that “[u]pon examination of the complaining witness, there is probable cause to believe 

that the offense charged was committed and the Defendant committed the offense.” The 

allegations in the complaint and warrant were sufficient to demonstrate compliance with MCL 

764.1a. Cain, 299 Mich App at 52. Regardless, even assuming that inadequate detail was 

presented to justify the issuance of the arrest warrant, the error would not divest the court of 

jurisdiction over defendant. Burrill, 391 Mich at 132-134. 

 Contrary to defendant’s assertion, the complaint and warrant were not improper because 

they were authorized by an assistant prosecutor instead of the elected prosecuting attorney. 

MCL 761.1(l) defines “[p]rosecuting attorney” to include, among others, “an assistant 
-7- 

prosecuting attorney for a county.” And again, any defect in this regard would not affect the trial 

court’s jurisdiction over defendant. Burrill, 391 Mich at 132-134. Thus, defendant is not 

entitled to relief based on any defect in the warrant or complaint. 

 We also find no merit to defendant’s argument that there was no official bindover to 

circuit court. The transcript of the preliminary examination contains a statement by the district 

court that it was binding over defendant to the circuit court. The register of actions also indicates 

that a bindover was issued on November 7, 2013, and received by the circuit court on November 

13, 2013. This argument is without merit. 

B. JUDICIAL BIAS 

 Defendant next makes the insulting and unreasonable argument that his due process 

rights were violated because the presiding judge and the trial prosecutor were both female. 

Although defendant argues that he was prejudiced by having a female judge preside over his 

trial, which involved charges relating to a domestic assault against a female, defendant did not 

preserve this claim by raising it in a motion for disqualification in the trial court. MCR 

2.003(D); People v Jackson, 292 Mich App 583, 597; 808 NW2d 541 (2011). Therefore, our 

review is limited to plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights. Vandenberg, 307 Mich 

App at 61-62. 

 Preliminarily, defendant has not offered any factual support for his suggestion that the 

trial judge was chosen through some method other than by lot or some other approved system. 

See MCR 8.111(B). Defendant’s reliance on a statistical analysis to argue that it is statistically 

improbable that his case would be assigned to both a female district judge and a female circuit 

judge, standing alone, does not demonstrate that the case was improperly assigned. 

 Further, nothing in the record suggests that the trial judge was biased against defendant. 

A defendant is entitled to a neutral and detached magistrate. Jackson, 292 Mich App at 597-598. 

A defendant claiming judicial bias must overcome a heavy presumption of judicial impartiality. 

Id. at 598. Defendant argues that the trial court’s interruption of his allocution at sentencing 

demonstrates that the court was biased against him. The record discloses that the trial court 

responded to defendant’s remarks during allocution by accurately stating that defendant’s 

protestation of innocence was at odds with the victim’s testimony. In addition, contrary to what 

defendant argues, the court made its remarks after defendant had finished his allocution. 

Defendant also asserts that the victim had been a witness in a prior case assigned to the same 

judge, but fails to explain how this fact supports any claim of judicial bias. Defendant has failed 

to overcome the heavy presumption of judicial impartiality. 

C. JURY VERDICT FORM 

 Defendant next argues that the jury verdict form was improper because it allowed the jury 

to consider the charged offense of assault with intent to commit murder or the lesser offense of 

assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder, but did not give the jury the option 

of finding him not guilty of the lesser offense. There was no objection to the verdict form in the 

trial court, thereby limiting review to plain error affecting substantial rights. Vandenberg, 307 

Mich App at 61. Defendant correctly observes that “a criminal defendant is deprived of his 
-8- 

constitutional right to a jury trial when the jury is not given the opportunity to return a general 

verdict of not guilty.” People v Wade, 283 Mich App 462, 467; 771 NW2d 447, 450 (2009). 

The jury verdict form presented the jury with the following options for count 1, assault with 

intent to commit murder4

: 

 ___ Not Guilty 

 or 

 ___ Guilty of Assault with Intent to Murder 

 or 

 ___ Guilty of the less serious offense of Assault with Intent to do Great 

 Bodily Harm less than Murder 

The verdict form clearly provided the jury with three options: (1) not guilty; of either offense (2) 

guilty of the charged offense of assault with intent to commit murder; or (3) guilty of the lesser 

offense of assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder. There was no error, plain 

or otherwise. 

D. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 

 Defendant’s claims of prosecutorial misconduct are also unpreserved, thereby limiting 

review to plain error affecting substantial rights. Vandenberg, 307 Mich App at 61. “[T]he test 

for prosecutorial misconduct is whether a defendant was denied a fair and impartial trial.” 

People v Dobek, 274 Mich App 58, 63; 732 NW2d 546 (2007). 

 Defendant faults the prosecutor for not raising the claims of error addressed in section III, 

parts A, B, and C. The prosecutor was not defendant’s legal representative. Regardless, having 

rejected each of those claims of error, we likewise reject this instant claim of misconduct. 

 Defendant also argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct by failing to perform 

due diligence in discovering evidence related to this case. Defendant correctly states that a 

criminal defendant has a due process right to obtain exculpatory evidence possessed by the 

prosecution if it would raise a reasonable doubt about defendant’s guilt. People v Stanaway, 446 

Mich 643, 666; 521 NW2d 557 (1994), citing Brady v Maryland, 373 US 83, 87; 83 S Ct 1194; 

10 L Ed 2d 215 (1963). However, defendant does not argue that the prosecution suppressed 

material evidence in its possession, but rather argues that it failed to search for and discover 

potentially useful evidence in the first place. It is well-established that neither the police nor the 

prosecutor have a duty to search for and discover evidence beneficial to the defense. People v 

 

4

 The jury was not instructed on a lesser offense for count 3, assault by strangulation, and the 

jury acquitted defendant of the remaining counts. 
-9- 

Burwick, 450 Mich 281, 289 n 10; 537 NW2d 813 (1995); People v Sawyer, 222 Mich App 1, 6; 

564 NW2d 62 (1997). Accordingly, there is no merit to this issue. 

E. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 

 Defendant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the previously 

discussed substantive issues. We have concluded, however, that defendant has not demonstrated 

any error with respect to those issues. Therefore, defense counsel was not ineffective for failing 

to raise those matters in the trial court. The failure to raise meritless issues does not constitute 

ineffective assistance of counsel. People v Wilson, 252 Mich App 390, 393–394; 652 NW2d 488 

(2002). 

F. CUMULATIVE ERROR 

 Defendant argues that the cumulative effect of the many errors identified in his brief 

entitles him to a new trial. However, having found no individual errors, there can be no 

improper cumulative effect. See People v Knapp, 244 Mich App 361, 388; 624 NW2d 227 

(2001). 

G. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF APPELLATE COUNSEL 

 Defendant argues that appellate counsel was ineffective to the extent that he “opened a 

door to jurisdiction” that would not otherwise exist but for appellate counsel’s choice of issues 

on appeal. Because we have previously rejected defendant’s jurisdictional arguments, we 

likewise reject this claim of error. 

 Defendant’s convictions are affirmed, however the case is remanded for further 

sentencing proceedings in accordance with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction. 

/s/ Amy Ronayne Krause 

/s/ Kathleen Jansen 

/s/ Cynthia Diane Stephens