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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

SCOTT JAMES LAUDERBAUGH 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1000 WDA 2018

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 13, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County Criminal Division at No(s): 

CP-25-CR-0003193-2017

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., LAZARUS, J., and STRASSBURGER*, J.

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED MARCH 15, 2019

Scott James Lauderbaugh appeals from his judgment of sentence, 

entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County, after a jury convicted 

him of aggravated assault,1recklessly endangering another person (“REAP”),2

resisting arrest,3fleeing or attempting to elude police officer,4 and driving 

while operating privilege was suspended.5 Upon careful review, we affirm.

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1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(3).

2 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2705.

3 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5104.

4 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3733(a).

5 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1543(b)(1).

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court
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The trial court set forth the facts of this matter as follows:

In the early morning hours of September 3, 2017, [Lauderbaugh] 

and one passenger were driving on PA Route 20 in North East 

Township, Erie County, when they were observed driving 

erratically by on-duty Pennsylvania State Police Trooper Adam 

Gadsby, and his partner, Trooper James Webber, who were 

following behind the vehicle. The troopers pulled the vehicle over 

to investigate. Initially, [Lauderbaugh] was cooperative, 

however, as it became apparent Lauderbaugh had given Trooper 

Webber false identification and was driving with a suspended 

license, [Lauderbaugh] and his passenger fled the scene by 

vehicle and a high-speed chase ensued.

After a mile or two, [Lauderbaugh] pulled over and fled from the 

vehicle. Trooper Webber secured the passenger while Trooper 

Gadsby chased after [Lauderbaugh]. As they ran through a poorly 

lit yard, [Lauderbaugh] tripped over a low fence and fell to the 

ground. Trooper Gadsby observed the fall, but not the fence. As 

he closed in on [Lauderbaugh], he too tripped over the fence and 

landed near [Lauderbaugh]. The two struggled for three or four 

minutes before Trooper Webber arrived to help subdue 

[Lauderbaugh].

In the police recording of the incident, Trooper Gadsby can be 

heard shouting in desperate tones for Trooper Webber’s help. As 

Trooper Webber arrived at the scene of the struggle, he observed 

Trooper Gadsby and [Lauderbaugh] wrestling on the ground 

“pretty intensely.” Trooper Webber engaged in the struggle, and 

it took two or three more minutes to overpower [Lauderbaugh]. 

During this time, the troopers testified that [Lauderbaugh] was 

thrashing, flailing, kicking, and striking about with his hands. Both 

troopers’ Tasers and radios were knocked away. Ultimately, it 

took hand-to-hand combat and pepper spray to bring 

[Lauderbaugh] under control.

Trooper Gadsby testified that when he tripped over the fence, his 

neck struck a tree stump just above the collarbone. He said the 

wind was knocked out of him, and his vision blurred, but he 

continued to apprehend [Lauderbaugh]. At one point during the 

struggle, [Lauderbaugh] wrapped his legs around Trooper 

Gadsby’s neck as “with a wrestling move.” After the incident, the 

troopers were examined at a local hospital. They took an x-ray of 

Trooper Gadsby’s left wrist, and a CT scan of his neck.
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Trooper Gadsby testified that immediately after the incident he 

was short of breath, had pain in his neck, observed scratches and 

cuts to his arm, his uniform shirt was torn and bloody, and he had 

sharp pain and swelling in his left wrist and forearm. He was 

prescribed steroid medication for pain and numbness in his arm 

an[d] fingers for approximately three weeks after the incident and 

was unable to work.

Trial Court Opinion, 8/28/18, at 2-3 (internal citations omitted).

On April 12, 2018, a jury found Lauderbaugh guilty of the above 

offenses. On June 13, 2018, the trial court sentenced Lauderbaugh to an 

aggregate term of 58 to 116 months’ confinement, followed by eight and onehalf years’ probation. On July 10, 2018, Lauderbaugh filed a timely notice of 

appeal. On July 13, 2018, the trial court ordered Lauderbaugh to file a 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained on appeal and 

Lauderbaugh timely complied.

On appeal, Lauderbaugh raises the following issue on appeal: “Whether 

the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient evidence to find [] Lauderbaugh 

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravated assault?” Brief of Appellant, 

at 3.

 Lauderbaugh contends the evidence was insufficient to sustain his 

conviction for aggravated assault, arguing the Commonwealth failed to prove 

the necessary criminal intent beyond a reasonable doubt. 

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court applies the 

following standard:
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[W]e must view all evidence admitted at trial in the light most 

favorable to the Commonwealth, as verdict winner, to see whether 

there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every 

element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. This standard 

is equally applicable to cases where the evidence is circumstantial 

rather than direct so long as the combination of the evidence links 

the accused to a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Although a 

conviction must be based on more than mere suspicion or

conjecture, the Commonwealth need not establish guilt to a 

mathematical certainty.

Commonwealth v. Stokes, 78 A.3d 644, 649 (Pa. Super. 2013) (internal 

quotation marks and brackets omitted). Moreover, when “reviewing the 

sufficiency of the evidence, the Court may not substitute its judgment for that 

of the fact-finder; if the record contains support for the convictions, they may 

not be disturbed.” Id.

 The Crimes Code defines aggravated assault, in relevant part, as 

follows:

 § 2702. Aggravated Assault

(a) Offense defined.-- A person is guilty of aggravated assault 

if he:

. . .

(3) attempts to cause or intentionally or knowingly 

causes bodily injury to any of the officers, agents, 

employees, or other persons enumerated in

subsection (c), in the performance of duty.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(3). The term “officer” as referenced in section 

2702(a)(3) includes police officers. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(c)(1).

Lauderbaugh avers the evidence introduced by the Commonwealth 

failed to establish that he acted “intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly in 

causing the injuries to Trooper Gadsby.”6 Brief of Appellant, at 7.
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Specifically, our Crimes Code states that a person acts intentionally with 

respect to a material element of an offense when:

(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or a result 

thereof, it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that 

nature or to cause such a result; and

(ii) if the element involves the attendant circumstance, he is 

aware of the existence of such circumstances or he believes or 

hopes that they exist.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 302(b)(1). To prove aggravated assault against a police officer 

“[t]he Commonwealth need not establish that the [officer] actually suffered 

bodily injury; rather, it is sufficient to support a conviction if the 

Commonwealth established an attempt to inflict serious bodily 

injury.” Commonwealth v. Richardson, 636 A.2d 1195, 1196 (Pa. Super. 

1994). This intent “may be shown by circumstances which reasonably suggest 

that a defendant intended to cause injury.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 23 

A.3d 544, 560 (Pa. Super. 2011). For an aggravated assault, an attempt is 

properly found when an “accused, with the required specific intent, acts in a 

manner which constitutes a substantial step toward perpetrating a serious 

bodily injury upon another.” Commonwealth v. Gray, 867 A.2d 560, 567 

(Pa. Super. 2005). 

Additionally, we have previously held that:

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6 The subsection under which Lauderbaugh was convicted does not criminalize 

reckless conduct and, instead, only proscribes acts under section 2702(a)(3) 

that are “knowing” or “intentional.”
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[T]he fact-finder is free to conclude the accused intended the 

natural and probable consequences of his actions to result 

therefrom. A determination of whether an appellant acted with 

an intent to cause seriously bodily injury must be determined on 

a case-by-case basis.

An intent is a subjective frame of mind, it is of necessity difficult 

of direct proof[.] We must look to all the evidence to establish 

intent, including, but not limited to, appellant’s conduct as it 

appeared in his eyes[.] Intent can be proven by direct or 

circumstantial evidence; it may be inferred from acts or conduct 

or from the attendant circumstances.

Commonwealth v. Lewis, 911 A.2d 558, 564 (Pa. Super. 2006) (internal 

citations and quotations omitted).

 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, 

as the verdict winner, we conclude the evidence supports Lauderbaugh’s

conviction for aggravated assault. Lauderbaugh fled in his vehicle after a highspeed pursuit by police officers, and, after one unsuccessful attempt to subdue 

Lauderbaugh with a Taser, the pursuing Trooper Gadsby fired a second Taser 

cartridge at the still-fleeing Lauderbaugh in a dimly-lit backyard. N.T. Jury 

Trial, 4/12/18, at 72-73. Trooper Gadsby observed Lauderbaugh “flinch” as 

though the Taser struck Lauderbaugh and immediately drop to the ground. 

Id. As Trooper Gadsby approached Lauderbaugh, he tripped over a fence - -

approximately one or two feet high - - and struck his neck on a tree stump as 

he landed. Id. at 77. Despite blurred vision and difficulty breathing, Trooper 

Gadsby issued verbal commands to Lauderbaugh, who remained on the 

ground next to the trooper. Lauderbaugh failed to comply with the trooper’s 
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commands and, instead, Lauderbaugh closed his legs around Trooper 

Gadsby’s neck “as if in a wrestling move.” Id. at 78.

The trooper extricated himself from Lauderbaugh’s grip, at which time 

Lauderbaugh “kick[ed] with his feet trying to push away” and grabbed at 

Trooper Gadsby’s uniform. Id. at 79. Trooper Gadsby struggled alone with 

the still “kicking and flailing” Lauderbaugh for several minutes, since 

Lauderbaugh knocked loose Trooper Gadsby’s microphone, making him 

unable to call for assistance. Id. at 78. Trooper Webber was able to hear 

Trooper Gadsby’s screams for assistance and entered the backyard to assist 

him. Trooper Webber observed Lauderbaugh “wrestling” or “in a fight” with 

Appellant “pretty intensely.” Id. at 37, 40. Trooper Webber attempted to 

Tase Lauderbaugh four times before Lauderbaugh’s “kicking and swinging” 

knocked the Taser from his control. Id. at 38-39. It took Troopers Webber 

and Gadsby several minutes of struggling with Lauderbaugh before the two 

could place him under arrest and take him into custody.

In Lauderbaugh’s struggle with Trooper Gadsby, he knocked away the 

trooper’s Taser, tore open the trooper’s uniform shirt and, while grabbing at 

the trooper’s duty belt, dislodged magazines for his service weapon. Id. at 

78, 81, 82. Trooper Gadsby broke several vertebrae from falling while 

pursuing Lauderbaugh. Id. at 87. Further, Trooper Gadsby had to take 

steroid medication for numbing in his arms and tingling in his fingers. Id. at 

92. The injuries Trooper Gadsby suffered from his violent struggle with 

Appellant forced him to miss two months of work. Id.
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In light of the evidence before the trial court, a jury could have 

reasonably found Lauderbaugh guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Lauderbaugh mischaracterizes the intent requirements to be convicted under

section 2702(a)(3). The Commonwealth was not required to demonstrate 

actual serious bodily injury (or whether the injuries were foreseeable), and 

instead only had to prove Lauderbaugh acted with intent to cause serious 

bodily injury to Trooper Gadsby. The minutes-long, violent struggle between 

Lauderbaugh and the two troopers demonstrate his intent to inflict serious 

bodily injury. Further, the circumstances of this offense reasonably suggest 

Lauderbaugh intended to cause serious bodily injury to a law enforcement 

officer. Therefore, Lauderbaugh is entitled to no relief.

 Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/15/2019