SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2869-16T1

COMMITTEE OF PETITIONERS

TO PROTEST THE ADOPTION

OF ORDINANCE NO. 2016-01,

KENNETH E. PRINGLE, THOMAS

P. FAHY, LINDA SHARKUS,

LINDA CHELSEN, and KATRINA

CLAPSIS,

Plaintiffs-Respondents,

v.

BOROUGH OF BELMAR,

MAYOR & COUNCIL OF THE

BOROUGH OF BELMAR, APRIL

CLAUDIO, Municipal Clerk of

the Borough of Belmar, and COLLEEN

CONNOLLY, Business Administrator 

of the Borough of Belmar,

Defendants-Appellants.

_______________________________

Argued September 21, 2018 – Decided April 24, 2019

Before Judges Simonelli, O'Connor and DeAlmeida. 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2

A-2869-16T1

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Monmouth County, Docket No. L-1392-16.

Ramon E. Rivera argued the cause for appellants

(Scarinci & Hollenbeck LLC, attorneys; Ramon E. 

Rivera, of counsel and on the brief; Shana T. Don and 

Craig A. Long, on the brief).

Kenneth E. Pringle argued the cause for respondents

(Pringle Quinn Anzano, PC, attorneys; Kenneth E. 

Pringle, of counsel and on the brief; Denise M. O'Hara, 

on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Plaintiffs Committee of Petitioners to Protest the Adoption of Ordinance 

No. 2016-01 (Committee), Kenneth E. Pringle, Thomas P. Fahy, Linda Sharkus, 

Linda Chelsen and Katrina Clapsis were the prevailing parties in an action 

challenging an ordinance they believed weakened or eliminated the protections 

afforded by prior ordinances governing potential conflicts of interest arising 

from so-called "Pay-to-Play" campaign contributions. Defendants the Borough 

of Belmar (Borough), Mayor and Council of the Borough, April Claudio, and 

Colleen Connolly,

1

appeal from the November 10, 2016 and January 26, 2017 

Law Division orders, which awarded attorney's fees and costs to plaintiffs under

 

1 Claudio is the Borough's Municipal Clerk and Connolly is the Business 

Administrator. 
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A-2869-16T1

the New Jersey Civil Rights Act (NJCRA), N.J.S.A. 10:6-1 to -2. For the 

reasons that follow, we affirm.

I.

Pringle was an individual plaintiff and member of the Committee. He was 

also a partner in the law firm of Pringle Quinn Anzano, PC (PQA), which

represented plaintiffs in this matter. Pringle signed the certification verifying 

the complaint filed on behalf of all plaintiffs, and he and his associate, Edward 

R. Bonanno, Esq., were designated as trial counsel. Another PQA associate, 

Denise M. O'Hara, also worked on the case.

The parties engaged in extensive motion and appellate practice during the 

course of this litigation. Because this appeal only involves the award of 

attorney's fees, we focus on that part of the record relating to the fee award.

PQA filed a motion for a lodestar fee of $89,820, a forty percent 

contingency enhancement, and $734.22 for costs. In support thereof, PQA 

submitted certifications from Pringle, Bonanno, O'Hara, and an expert, Charles 

J. Uliano, Esq. PQA also submitted an invoice showing the hourly rates charged 

and services rendered by each PQA attorney.

According to Pringle, PQA represented plaintiffs in other public interest 

matters involving the Borough under the express understanding "that PQA's 
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A-2869-16T1

representation would be at no cost to them as clients, but that in the case of the 

affirmative litigation matters, [PQA] reserved the right to seek to recover [its]

fees and costs from the Borough . . . to the extent allowed by law." PQA never 

had a written retainer agreement with any of its public interest clients, including 

plaintiffs, because PQA represented them on the express understanding that 

PQA would not seek a fee from them and because the relief sought in these 

matters was equitable in nature. In addition, PQA 

made clear to [its] clients verbally that [PQA] would be 

relying upon the decision in Tumpson [v. Farina, 218 

N.J. 450 (2014)] to assert claims that the Borough's 

conduct violated the [NJCRA], and that if [PQA was] 

successful, [PQA] would be seeking an award of [its]

reasonable attorneys' fees and costs pursuant thereto.

Pringle also certified that PQA charged $300 per hour for his services, 

$250 per hour for Bonanno's services, and $225 for O'Hara's services, which 

reflected the hourly rates PQA charged to its non-insurance company clients for 

litigation matters. Pringle stated these hourly rates were comparable to the rates 

other litigation attorneys in Monmouth County customarily charged and were 

low in comparison to the rates charged by Monmouth County attorneys who 

have comparable levels of skill, background and litigation experience as the 

PQA attorneys. Pringle reviewed the time entries on the invoice and eliminated

charges he determined were duplicative, inefficient, or otherwise unnecessary 
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under the circumstances of this case, or were arguably unreasonable for the 

service described or not sufficiently detailed to enable him or the court to assess 

whether the charges were reasonable. 

Uliano opined that the hourly rates PQA charged and the services rendered

in this matter were reasonable under RPC 1.5 and the guidelines established in 

Rendine v. Pantzer, 141 N.J. 292 (1995) and Walker v. Giuffre, 209 N.J. 124

(2012). Uliano stated the hourly rates PQA charged were lower than the 

prevailing market rate in Monmouth County for an adequately experienced 

attorney possessed of average skill and ordinary competence. He also stated the 

hourly rates PQA charged were significantly lower than what civil litigation 

attorneys of comparable backgrounds, skills and levels of experiences charged 

in Monmouth County, as reflected in the PQA attorneys' biographies and the 

quality of the submissions to the court. 

Uliano reviewed the invoice and noted the numerous time entries Pringle

eliminated because they were duplicative, unproductive, and otherwise not 

appropriately billed under RPC 1.5. Uliano concluded that for an average 

Monmouth County law firm to successfully litigate a case of this type against a 

municipality, the firm would have to expend at least the amount of time the PQA 

attorneys spent in this matter. 
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Defendants did not submit any certifications or documents countering 

Pringle's and Uliano's certifications. Rather, they argued that plaintiffs were not 

entitled to a fee award because there was no retainer agreement for this 

contingency matter, as required by RPC 1.5 and Rule 1:21-7, and PQA provided 

the services on a pro bono basis. Defendants noted that more than half of the 

fee sought related to the services Pringle performed, and without a retainer 

agreement specifying the scope of services, it was difficult to assess whether he 

or any other attorney was acting on his behalf or on behalf of the other plaintiffs. 

Defendants posited that if Pringle was acting on his own behalf, plaintiffs were 

not entitled to attorney's fees under the NJCRA, as Pringle was essentially 

appearing pro se. Defendants further argued there should be no fee award 

because plaintiffs did not actually incur legal fees. In the alternative, defendants 

argued the court should reduce the fee sought by one-fifth because a pro se 

attorney is not entitled to recoup fees. Defendants also stated the hourly rates 

charged and services rendered were not reasonable.

In a November 3, 2016 oral opinion, the motion judge disagreed with 

defendants' argument that PQA was not entitled to a fee award because there 

was no written retainer agreement. The judge found there was no evidence of 

any misunderstanding between plaintiffs and PQA as to PQA's agreement not to 
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A-2869-16T1

take payment from plaintiffs directly but reserving the right to pursue all legally 

allowed fees. The judge determined that to award no fees was contrary to the 

Legislature's intent to permit a fee award under the NJCRA, and would have the 

effect of discouraging attorneys from taking on matters of public importance, 

such as this one, where the only possibility for a fee award is by statute. The 

judge also found that the lack of a retainer agreement did not affect her ability 

to analyze the certifications and invoice to determine whether the fee sought was 

reasonable.

The judge also disagreed that Pringle's role in the case deprived plaintiffs 

of their statutory right to a fee award in whole or in part. The judge found that

Pringle was not acting pro se, but rather, PQA represented all plaintiffs, and 

Pringle's status as a member of the firm, a member of the Committee, and an

individual plaintiff did not strip plaintiffs of their statutory right to an award of

reasonable attorney's fees. 

The judge found that plaintiffs would have incurred the same fees and the 

same work would have been performed on their behalf regardless of whether 

Pringle was a plaintiff or a Committee member. The judge disagreed that it was 

impossible to determine what services Pringle rendered as an attorney or in a 

witness capacity, and found the distinction was readily discernible by a review 
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A-2869-16T1

of the invoice, which eliminated charges for services he rendered as a fact 

witness. The judge also noted defendants failed to cite any authority supporting 

their argument.

As for the reasonableness of the rates PQA charged, the judge found 

defendants submitted no certifications to refute Pringle's and Uliano's 

certifications and merely made bald assertions that the rates were unreasonable. 

The judge also noted that the Borough had once retained the Gibbons law firm 

at a blended rate of $450 per hour, which was significantly higher than the rates 

PQA charged in this matter. The judge further noted there was a distribution of 

the work among the PQA attorneys, with some work done at an associate's rate 

versus a partner's rate, and Uliano opined the rates PQA charged were 

reasonable and significantly lower than what Monmouth County civil litigation 

attorneys charged. The judge concluded the rates PQA charged were reasonable. 

As for the reasonableness of the services rendered, the judge found that 

given the nature of the case, it was reasonable for more than one attorney to 

work on it. However, the judge reviewed the invoice and reduced the charges

for duplicative or excessive work, work that PQA should have billed at a lower 

rate, and unnecessary work. The judge was able to determine the reasonableness 

of the time spent for a particular activity regardless of defendants' 
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characterization of the entry as block billing. The judge concluded the services 

rendered were reasonable and awarded plaintiffs a lodestar fee of $87,270.

The judge also awarded a forty percent contingency enhancement, finding 

PQA achieved a high degree of success, there was a high risk of non-payment 

to the firm, and the matter was of a high degree of public importance. The judge 

considered all of the factors in Rule 4:42-9, RPC 1.5(a), Rendine, Walker, and 

other applicable case law in reaching this conclusion. In a November 10, 2016 

order, the judge awarded a total fee of $122,178 plus $734.22 for costs. 

Plaintiffs subsequently filed a motion for a lodestar fee of $9795 plus 

$179.90 for costs incurred on appeal, supported by an invoice and certifications 

from the PQA attorneys and Uliano. Defendants submitted a certification from 

their attorney stating the hourly rates his firm charged municipal entities in 

public interest matters, which were lower than the rates PQA charged in this 

matter. 

In a January 12, 2017 oral opinion, the judge found that PQA's hourly 

rates were reasonable and consistent with those of attorneys with reasonably 

comparable skill, experience and reputation in the community. The judge

recited the procedural history of this case to emphasize the rapid sequence of 

events and the extensive work that PQA performed in a relatively short time, as 
10 A-2869-16T1

well as the need for skilled, experienced attorneys working on this matter. The 

judge determined that the lower rates defendants' attorney charged to municipal 

entities were not dispositive of the reasonableness and appropriateness of the 

rates PQA charged. The judge concluded that the information plaintiffs 

provided regarding the experience and skill of the PQA attorneys, as supported 

by Uliano, confirmed the rates PQA charged on appeal were reasonable. 

The judge reviewed the invoice and reduced the amount sought to 

$9,656.15. The judge also found plaintiffs were entitled to $179.90 for costs 

because defendants did not dispute them. The judge entered an order on January 

26, 2017, memorializing the award. This appeal followed. 

II.

"We review fee determinations by trial courts with deference and will 

disturb them 'only on the rarest occasions, and then only because of a clear abuse 

of discretion.'" DeSanctis v. Borough of Belmar, 455 N.J. Super. 316, 335 (App. 

Div. 2018) (quoting Rendine, 141 N.J. at 317). "In our review of fees awarded 

pursuant to fee-shifting provisions, we do consider whether the trial court 

'sufficiently address[ed] the factors or the framework that [our Supreme Court] 

established in Rendine.'" Ibid. (alterations in original) (quoting Walker, 209 N.J. 

at 148). "The Court reposed discretion in trial courts to establish any 
11 A-2869-16T1

contingency enhancement in fee-shifting cases." Ibid. (quoting New Jerseyans 

for a Death Penalty Moratorium v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 185 N.J. 137, 158 (2005)). 

We discern no abuse of discretion here.

An award of attorney's fees is permitted "[i]n all cases where attorney's 

fees are permitted by statute." R. 4:42-9(a)(8). The NJCRA permits an award 

of reasonable attorney's fees and costs to the prevailing party. N.J.S.A. 10:6-

2(f); see also Tumpson, 218 N.J. at 479. Defendants argue that PQA, of which 

Pringle was a member, is not entitled to recoup its fees because a pro se attorney 

may not receive a fee award under the NJCRA, and an attorney acts pro se even 

when representing additional parties. 

To support these arguments, defendants cite to unpublished opinions 

from this court, a published trial court opinion, an unpublished out-of-state 

lower court opinion, and published opinions from federal courts. However, 

these opinions do not constitute precedent or bind us. See Lipkowitz v. 

Hamilton Surgery Ctr., LLC, 415 N.J. Super. 29, 36 (App. Div. 2010); Trinity 

Cemetery Ass'n v. Twp. of Wall, 170 N.J. 39, 48 (2001); Meadowlands 

Basketball Assoc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 340 N.J. Super. 76, 83 (App. Div. 

2001); R. 1:36-3. 
12 A-2869-16T1

The published opinions defendants cite, Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432 

(1991) and Alpert, Goldberg, Butler, Norton & Weiss, P.C. v. Quinn, 410 N.J. 

Super. 510 (App. Div. 2009), do not support their arguments.

In Kay, an attorney filed a successful action on his own behalf challenging

the constitutionality of a Kentucky statute and requested a fee award under 42 

U.S.C. § 1988. 499 U.S. at 434. The United States Supreme Court, in construing 

the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1988, concluded that an attorney representing 

himself or herself cannot claim the benefits of that statute's attorney's fees 

provision. Id. at 437-38. The Court's reasons for that conclusion reveal its

preference for encouraging all litigants to engage the services of independent 

counsel. As such, the Court commented on the need for even a pro se attorney 

to have counsel capable of "framing the theory of the case, evaluating alternative 

methods of presenting the evidence, cross-examining hostile witnesses, 

formulating legal arguments, and . . . making sure that reason, rather than 

emotion, dictates the proper tactical response to unforeseen developments in the 

courtroom." Id. at 437. Thus, the Court concluded that allowing pro se attorney 

litigants to secure an award of attorney's fees would create an unwanted 

disincentive for attorneys to hire counsel. Id. at 438.
13 A-2869-16T1

In Alpert, a law firm represented itself in litigation against former clients

for attorney's fees, expenses and collection fees under a retainer agreement and 

as a sanction under Rule 1:4-8(d)(2). 410 N.J. Super. at 526-28. We held that 

counsel proceeding pro se cannot recover attorney's fees for frivolous litigation 

because Rule 1:4-8 "specifically permits only the reimbursement of attorneys' 

fees and expenses incurred by a party. It does not permit the reimbursement of 

a party's loss of income in dealing with frivolous litigation." Id. at 545. We 

explained this reasoning also applied to attorneys appearing pro se, because "[t]o 

compensate an attorney for his lost hours would confer on the attorney a special 

status over that of other litigants who may also be subject to frivolous claims 

and are appearing pro se." Id. at 546. Thus, we concluded that "an attorney 

appearing pro se is not entitled to fees unless they are actually incurred as 

opposed to imputed." Id. at 547. We noted, however, that our holding was 

"directed solely to the language of Rule 1:4-8(d)(2)" and did not deal with "the 

award of fees otherwise authorized by contract, rule, or statute." Id. at 546 n.8.

The distinction between Kay and Alpert and the case here is that Pringle 

was not acting pro se, representing only himself and his own interests. Rather, 

a law firm represented him as well as the other plaintiffs, and the law firm was 

not a party to the litigation. Thus, Kay and Alpert do not control here. 
14 A-2869-16T1

We are satisfied the judge properly determined that Pringle's status as a 

member of PQA, a member of the Committee, and an individual plaintiff did not 

strip plaintiffs of their statutory right to reasonable attorney's fees. Pringle was 

not acting pro se with respect to the work he performed as an attorney because 

he was not representing only himself, but four other members and the Committee

of which all plaintiffs were members. As such, regardless of whether or not 

Pringle was a plaintiff, he would have generated the same amount in fees and

work in this matter. Pringle's membership on the Committee did not confer upon 

him any responsibilities or benefits that were different from any of the other 

plaintiffs. Rather, the claims plaintiffs were collectively pursuing were entirely 

equitable in nature and served to benefit the Borough of Belmar electorate as a 

whole. 

Second, none of the policy considerations in support of denying attorney's

fees to pro se attorneys apply here and they should not be extended to situations 

where the plaintiff-attorney also represents other co-plaintiffs. There is no

evidence that Pringle prolonged the litigation to generate more fees or filed

frivolous claims or motions. Instead, the record confirms that Pringle obtained 

the relief plaintiffs sought in the verified complaint, filed a successful summary 
15 A-2869-16T1

judgment motion and motions to enforce compliance with court orders, and 

obtained a swift resolution of this matter. 

By representing plaintiffs and himself, Pringle did not take advantage of 

a remedy meant to help ordinary citizens obtain competent representation. Feeshifting statutes are enacted so "that plaintiffs with bona fide claims are able to 

find lawyers to represent them[,] . . . to attract competent counsel in cases 

involving statutory rights, . . . and to ensure justice for all citizens." New 

Jerseyans for a Death Penalty Moratorium, 185 N.J. at 153 (alteration in 

original) (quoting Coleman v. Fiore Bros., Inc., 113 N.J. 594, 598 (1989)). As

a result of this fee-shifting provision, Pringle was able to provide competent 

representation to the other plaintiffs who were not attorneys because his firm 

could not have afforded to undertake representing plaintiffs in this case were it 

not for the holding in Tumpson, which afforded them the right to recover their

reasonable fees and costs if they prevailed.

The fact that Pringle did not expect to be paid at all, and the amount of the 

award, do not affect the nature of the fee award because "the reasonable counsel 

fee . . . under fee-shifting statutes is determined independently of the provisions 

of the fee agreement between [the] party and his or her counsel. The statutory 

fee award may be comparable to or substantially different from the amount 
16 A-2869-16T1

payable under a negotiated fee agreement." Id. at 156 (alteration in original)

(quoting Szczepanski v. Newcomb Med. Ctr., Inc., 141 N.J. 346, 358 (1995)). 

Thus, given that the statutory fee award is not dependent on the provisions of a 

fee agreement, we find no merit in defendants' argument that the attorney's fees 

would not have been the same had Pringle not been a plaintiff because PQA was 

charging the pro bono matter at private client rates. 

Furthermore, the fee award did not create a windfall for PQA because the 

relief sought was entirely equitable in nature and plaintiffs were entitled to 

reasonable attorney's fees and costs under the fee-shifting provision of the 

NJCRA. The award also did not create two distinct classes of pro se litigants 

who are each afforded different remedies because PQA incurred fees in 

connection with its representation of both the plaintiff-attorney and the nonattorney plaintiffs in the same matter. Thus, unlike in Alpert, 410 N.J. Super. at 

546-47, Pringle was not being compensated for lost hours or fees that were 

imputed, but for fees actually incurred, as he represented parties other than 

himself. 

Unlike in Kay, 499 U.S. at 437-38, an attorney-client relationship existed

between Pringle and other plaintiffs, and thus, Pringle was not acting solely pro 

se with a personal interest in the outcome of the case. The interest in this case 
17 A-2869-16T1

was equitable in nature and benefited the whole Borough of Belmar electorate, 

making Pringle a disinterested and independent party similar to any of the other 

plaintiffs. Thus, PQA is entitled to fees generated in pursuing the claims 

asserted in this matter on behalf the other plaintiffs, which were the same claims 

Pringle made against defendants generating essentially the same fees. 

III.

Defendants contend the judge erred by disregarding the prevailing hourly 

rate in the entire State of New Jersey, arguing the judge should have taken 

judicial notice of the prevailing rates in public sector legal market charged 

statewide, as reflected in municipal resolutions appointing attorneys. 

Defendants also argue the judge should have compared the rates PQA charged 

with a comparable firm, and that attorneys practicing municipal law charge 

between $150 and $220 per hour.2 This argument lacks merit. 

In Rendine, 141 N.J. at 292, and Szczepanski, 141 N.J. at 346, the Court 

addressed the issue of calculation of a reasonable attorney's fee payable under 

fee-shifting statutes to the prevailing party. Although occasioned by cases 

involving fee-shifting legislation, such as the New Jersey Law Against 

 

2

 Again, defendants cite to a federal court opinion to support this argument, 

which does not constitute precedent or bind us. 
18 A-2869-16T1

Discrimination in Rendine and Szczepanski, these standards have been applied 

in situations where the prevailing party is entitled to a fee award. See Incollingo 

v. Canuso, 297 N.J. Super. 57, 63-64 (App. Div. 1997). The Court declared that 

conformance with the standards announced in Rendine and Szczepanski would 

permit "future fee determinations . . . [to] be disturbed only on the rarest 

occasions, and then only because of a clear abuse of discretion." Rendine, 141

N.J. at 317. 

In Rendine, the Court explained that the trial judge must first "determine 

the lodestar, 'the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation 

multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.'" Id. at 333-34 (quoting Singer v. State, 

95 N.J. 487, 499 (1984)). This requires the "court to evaluate carefully and 

critically the aggregate hours and specific hourly rates advanced by counsel for 

the prevailing party . . . ." Id. at 335. Time not reasonably expended should be 

excluded. Ibid. "A reasonable hourly rate it to be calculated according to the 

prevailing market rates in the relevant community." Id. at 337 (quoting Rode v. 

Dellaciprete, 892 F. 2d 1177, 1183 (3d Cir. 1990)). In general, a reasonable 

hourly rate is one "that would be charged by an adequately experienced attorney 

possessed of average skill and ordinary competence ̶̶ not those that would be 
19 A-2869-16T1

set by the most successful or highly specialized attorney in the context of private 

practice." Walker, 209 N.J. at 132-33 (quoting Singer, 95 N.J.at 500-01). 

The same standard applies when attorneys undertake representation 

without expectation of payment. See New Jerseyans for a Death Penalty 

Moratorium, 185 N.J. at 156 (holding that a reasonable counsel fee is determined 

independent of the fee arrangement between a party and counsel and stating that 

an attorney's expectation of payment has no bearing on the fee award); see also 

BJM Insulation & Constr., Inc. v. Evans, 287 N.J. Super. 513, 517 (App. Div. 

1996) (stating that the terms under which an attorney has agreed to provide 

representation to a client "is none of [the obligor party's] business").

Here, the judge acted within her discretion in finding PQA's rates were 

reasonable based on Uliano's and Pringle's uncontroverted certifications. The 

judge correctly determined that PQA's rates were not only reasonable, they were

significantly lower than what civil litigation attorneys in Monmouth County 

charge. 

The judge found that PQA's rates on appeal were reasonable and 

consistent with those of attorneys with reasonably comparable skill, experience 

and reputation in the community. The judge also found the rates were 

reasonable and consistent given the information provided by the PQA attorneys
20 A-2869-16T1

regarding their experience and skill, as supported by their expert's review and 

as demonstrated by the quality of the work they performed. 

The judge's findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the 

record, ̶̶and ̶̶thus ̶̶are ̶̶owed ̶̶deference. ̶̶ ̶̶Contrary ̶̶to ̶̶defendants’ ̶̶assertion ̶̶that ̶̶the ̶̶

relevant market constitutes the entire State of New Jersey, in the lodestar 

method, "the number of hours reasonably expended by counsel is multiplied by 

an hourly rate appropriate for the region and the lawyer's experience." Sutter v. 

Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield of N.J., 406 N.J. Super. 86, 104 (App. Div. 

2009) (emphasis added). The court should evaluate counsel's rates "in 

comparison to rates 'for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable 

skill, experience, and reputation' in the community." Furst v. Einstein Moomjy, 

Inc., 182 N.J. 1, 22 (2004) (quoting Rendine, 141 N.J. at 337).

Uliano certified that each PQA attorney's rate was lower than the 

prevailing market rate charged by Monmouth County civil litigation attorneys 

of comparable backgrounds, skills and levels of experience. Because Uliano's

opinion considered the prevailing rate in Monmouth County, where PQA is 

located and the litigation ensued, the quality or nature of the legal services the 

attorneys rendered and their experience, as reflected in their biographies, the 
21 A-2869-16T1

judge did not err in relying upon Uliano's opinion to find PQA's rates were 

reasonable. 

Defendants provided no evidence of the prevailing rates in New Jersey for 

civil litigation attorneys, nor did they refute Uliano ̶̶or ̶̶Pringle’s ̶̶certifications, 

instead arguing that their attorney's rates were much lower. However, the rates 

charged by defendants' attorney are not dispositive because defendants do not 

indicate what the prevailing rate is for legal services similar to the services PQA 

provided. The rates of defendants' attorney are only indicative of the prevailing 

rates of attorneys representing the Borough. Thus, the judge properly found that 

comparing PQA's rates to defendants' attorney's rates was insufficient. One law 

firm's decision to charge lower rates for certain types of clients or in particular 

cases is not dispositive of the prevailing rate of attorneys of comparable skill, 

experience, and reputation in the relevant community. Accordingly, the judge

acted within her discretion in finding Monmouth County represented the 

relevant community and the rates PQA charged were reasonable. 

We reject defendants' request to take judicial notice of municipal 

resolutions appointing counsel to determine the reasonable hourly rate 

prevailing in the relevant community. "The purpose of judicial notice is to save 

time and promote judicial economy by precluding the necessity of proving facts 
22 A-2869-16T1

that cannot seriously be disputed and are either generally or universally known." 

State v. Silva, 394 N.J. Super. 270, 275 (App. Div. 2007). On appeal, we have

the discretion to "take judicial notice of any matter specified in Rule 201, 

whether or not judicially noticed by the [trial] judge." N.J.R.E. 202(b); see

Marchak v. Claridge Commons, Inc., 261 N.J. Super. 126, 131-32 (App. Div. 

1992). The subject matter that may be judicially noticed is set forth in Rule

201(b):

(b) Notice of facts. Facts which may be judicially 

noticed include (1) such specific facts and propositions 

of generalized knowledge as are so universally known 

that they cannot reasonably be the subject of dispute, 

(2) such facts as are so generally known or are of such 

common notoriety within the area pertinent to the event 

that they cannot reasonably be the subject of dispute, 

(3) specific facts and propositions of generalized 

knowledge which are capable of immediate 

determination by resort to sources whose accuracy 

cannot reasonably be questioned, and (4) records of the 

court in which the action is pending and of any other 

court of this state or federal court sitting for this state.

[N.J.R.E. 201(b).]

Essentially, facts that can be reasonably questioned or disputed may not be 

judicially noticed. Ibid. 

In this case, taking judicial notice of the rates attorneys charge 

municipalities does not support the proposition that their rates are indicative of 
23 A-2869-16T1

the prevailing rates for attorneys who provide similar services and are of 

reasonably ̶̶comparable ̶̶skill, ̶̶experience, ̶̶and ̶̶reputation ̶̶as ̶̶plaintiffs’ ̶̶attorneys. ̶̶ ̶̶

The municipal resolutions may indicate what municipalities are willing to pay 

attorneys, but they do not indicate what attorneys charge private citizens in 

lawsuits against municipalities or that the rates listed in the resolutions are the 

prevailing rates for legal services similar to that which PQA provided to 

plaintiffs. 

IV.

Defendants contend the judge erred in finding that the absence of a 

retainer agreement did not preclude a fee award because under Rule 1:21-7(c),

contingency agreements in tort matters must be memorialized in writing and 

there is no case law addressing the waiver of the retainer agreement requirement 

because of a fee-shifting statute. We rejected this argument in DeSanctis, 455 

N.J. Super. at 335, and reject it again here.

The judge did not err by awarding fees in the absence of a written retainer 

agreement. In New Jerseyans for a Death Penalty Moratorium, 185 N.J. at 156, 

the Court held that a reasonable counsel fee is determined independent of the 

fee arrangement between a party and counsel and stated that an attorney's 

expectation of payment has no bearing on the fee award. See also BJM 
24 A-2869-16T1

Insulation & Constr., Inc., 287 N.J. Super. at 517 (stating that the terms under 

which an attorney has agreed to provide representation to a client "is none of 

[the obligor party's] business"). In New Jerseyans for a Death Penalty 

Moratorium v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 370 N.J. Super. 11, 15 (App. Div. 2004), we

affirmed the enhancement the trial court awarded where the plaintiff's firm 

provided legal services pro bono without the benefit of any written retainer 

agreement. We reasoned that "the possibility of compensation, i.e. contingent 

compensation, inheres in the existence of the fee-shifting provision." Ibid.

In construing the federal civil rights act on which the NJCRA is patterned,

the Supreme Court in Venegas v. Mitchell, 495 U.S. 82, 90 (1990), noted that 

the fee-shifting provision "controls what the losing defendant must pay, not what 

the prevailing plaintiff must pay his lawyer[,]" distinguishing retainer 

agreements from what prevailing parties are entitled to under fee-shifting 

statutes and noting that they do not affect one another. As our Supreme Court 

noted in Szczepanski, 141 N.J. at 358-59:

[T]he reasonable counsel fee payable to the prevailing 

party under fee-shifting statutes is determined 

independently of the provisions of the fee agreement 

between that party and his or her counsel. The 

statutory-fee award may be comparable to or 

substantially different from the amount payable under 

a negotiated fee agreement. The agreement determines 

the fee payable by the prevailing party to counsel, and 
25 A-2869-16T1

might reflect the risks inherent in the litigation, the 

plaintiff's financial resources, and the prospect that 

counsel will receive a significant fee in the event of a 

large verdict but no fee at all if the suit is unsuccessful. 

The statutory-fee award determines the fee payable by 

the unsuccessful party to the prevailing party. As our 

opinion in Rendine emphasizes, the focus of that 

determination is to ascertain what fee is reasonable, 

taking into account the hours expended, the lawyer's 

customary hourly rate, the success achieved, the risk of 

nonpayment, and other material factors. 141 N.J. at 

334-345. Although relevant, the fee payable under a 

contingent-fee agreement may bear little relation to the 

reasonable fee award authorized by statute, and in no 

event should the amount payable under the contingentfee agreement serve as a ceiling on the amount payable 

by statute.

As such, the judge properly found that the absence of a retainer agreement 

itself did not preclude plaintiffs' right to an award of reasonable attorney's fees

under the fee-shifting provision. 

There was no dispute in this case as to the payment arrangement between 

plaintiffs and PQA, and as such, the lack of a written retainer agreement has no 

bearing on plaintiffs' entitlement to an award of reasonable attorney's fees and 

costs. The absence of a retainer agreement between plaintiffs and PQA did not 

affect what defendants, as the losing party, are obligated to pay under a feeshifting provision because the arrangement between the parties expressly 

provided that fees were going to be sought pursuant to a fee-shifting provision. 
26 A-2869-16T1

Notwithstanding the absence of a retainer agreement, the judge analyzed

the invoice and certifications submitted to determine whether the fees sought 

were reasonable. From reviewing the invoice, the judge was able to determine 

what work Pringle did as an attorney and struck those charges attributable to his 

work as a fact witness. Thus, in accordance with the applicable case law and 

Pringle's certification, the judge properly awarded attorney's fees in the absence 

of a retainer agreement or contingency agreement pursuant to a fee-shifting 

provision, which the plaintiffs agreed would be their sole avenue of recovering 

fees and costs. 

V.

Defendants contend that while fee enhancements serve to attract 

competent counsel, Pringle needed no incentive to represent the Committee. 

Defendants argue that PQA incurred little to no risk representing the Committee 

because of the lack of novel and complex issues in this case, and PQA was not 

precluded from taking on other employment because the time and number of 

attorneys allocated to this matter was insignificant in light of the firm's size. 

Defendants further argue that the judge erred in awarding a forty percent

contingency enhancement without considering that the fees will be paid from 

public funds and did not support her finding that the issues presented in this case 
27 A-2869-16T1

were novel and complex. Defendants argue that given the lack of novel or 

complex issues, the low risk of nonpayment by pro bono clients, mitigation of 

economic risks, and Pringle's experience with the Faulkner Act, this case is 

"typical" and does not warrant a forty percent enhancement. 

Once the lodestar has been determined, the judge must consider whether 

the fee should be enhanced "to reflect the risk of nonpayment in all cases in 

which the attorney's compensation entirely or substantially is contingent on a 

successful outcome." Rendine, 141 N.J. at 337. The Rendine Court adopted 

Justice Blackmun's dissent in Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' 

Council for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711, 747 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting), 

"that 'a court's job simply will be to determine whether a case was taken on a 

contingent basis, whether the attorney was able to mitigate the risk of 

nonpayment in any way, and whether other economic risks were aggravated by 

the contingency of payment[.]'" Id. at 339. This is so because "it is the actual 

risks or burdens that are borne by the lawyer or lawyers that determine whether 

an upward adjustment is called for." Id. at 339-40 (quoting Delaware Valley, 

483 U.S. at 747 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)). 

Judges may also consider the legal risks inherent in the claim and order 

an additional enhancement where the result achieved "is significant and of broad 
28 A-2869-16T1

public interest." Id. at 328-29 (quoting Delaware Valley, 483 U.S. at 751 

(Blackmun, J., dissenting)). Where "the likelihood of success is unusually 

strong, a court may properly consider the inherent strength of the prevailing 

party's claim in determining the amount of contingency enhancement[,]" thereby 

reducing or denying an enhancement. Id. at 341.

Judges should also consider "the public importance of the matter, the 

degree of success achieved, the high risk . . . of non-payment, and any other 

factors that support the attorney's request for an enhancement." New Jerseyans 

for a Death Penalty Moratorium, 185 N.J. at 158. "The enhancement 'ordinarily 

should range between five and fifty-percent of the lodestar fee, with the 

enhancement in typical contingency cases ranging between twenty and thirtyfive percent of the lodestar.'" Ibid. (quoting Rendine, 141 N.J. at 343).

The Rendine Court recognized that "[d]etermination of the amount by 

which a lodestar fee should be enhanced to reflect the risk of nonpayment is 

conceptually difficult because there is 'no such thing as a market hourly rate in 

contingent litigation.'" 141 N.J. at 342. Finding that "fee awards of double the 

lodestar represent the high end of attorney fee awards under fee-shifting 

statutes," ibid., the Court "conclude[d] that contingency enhancements in feeshifting cases ordinarily should range between five and fifty-percent of the 
29 A-2869-16T1

lodestar fee, with the enhancement in typical contingency cases ranging between 

twenty and thirty-five percent of the lodestar," id. at 343. Further, the Court 

held that "[s]uch enhancements should never exceed one-hundred percent of the 

lodestar, and an enhancement of that size will be appropriate only in the rare and 

exceptional case in which the risk of nonpayment has not been mitigated at all 

. . . ." Ibid.

Moreover, "[p]laintiff's status as a public entity is not a special 

circumstance warranting denial of an award." Dunn ̶̶v. ̶̶State, ̶̶Dep’t ̶̶of ̶̶Human ̶̶

Servs., 312 N.J. Super. 321, 335 (App. Div. 1998). In Hunter v. Trenton Hous. 

Auth., 304 N.J. Super. 70, 75 n.5 (App. Div. 1997), we emphasized that "the fact 

that the party to be charged is a taxpayer-supported state agency" did not bar the 

prevailing party's claim for counsel fees. Accordingly, the judge committed no 

error in declining to consider defendants' public entity status in awarding fees. 

The judge also did not err by awarding a forty percent enhancement. 

Under the facts of this case, the enhancement was reasonable and not excessive. 

The judge correctly recognized the high risk of nonpayment to PQA given 

plaintiffs' agreement with the firm that the litigation would not cost them

anything and PQA would rely entirely on the NJCRA's fee-shifting provision to

seek an award of reasonable fees and costs if plaintiffs prevailed. 
30 A-2869-16T1

The judge also recognized the public importance of the matter, which 

protected plaintiffs' rights under the provisions of the Faulkner Act governing 

referendum petitions resulting in a special election benefiting the whole 

electorate. "[T]he right of referendum is about enfranchisement, about selfgovernment, and about giving citizens the right to vote on matters of importance 

to their community." Tumpson, 218 N.J. at 480. "The referendum is direct 

democracy in its purest sense, allowing citizens to take an appeal above the 

heads of their elected officials and directly to the voters who can then approve 

or reject an ordinance at the polls." Ibid.

The judge also weighed all the factors in RPC 1.5(a), which provides that 

in assessing the reasonableness of an award, courts must consider: 

(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and 

difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill 

requisite to perform the legal service properly;

(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the 

acceptance of the particular employment will preclude 

other employment by the lawyer;

(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for 

similar legal services;

(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;

(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the 

circumstances;
31 A-2869-16T1

(6) the nature and length of the professional 

relationship with the client;

(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer 

or lawyers performing the services;

(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.

[Litton Indus., Inc. v. IMO Indus., Inc., 200 N.J. 372, 

387 (2009)(quoting RPC 1.5(a)).] 

The judge acknowledged the "immediate emergency time consuming effort" on 

appeal; the novel issues presented by the defenses; the high degree of skill 

required to perform the legal services properly; the high likelihood that 

representation in this matter would preclude other employment due to its 

emergent nature; the pace of the litigation; the prevailing rate of similar legal 

services in the relevant locality; the public importance and equitable nature of 

the relief sought; PQA's fee arrangement with plaintiffs centered on the feeshifting provision of the NJCRA; and PQA's relationship with the clients and 

the experience, reputation and skill of the PQA attorneys. 

Pringle outlined in his certification the express verbal fee arrangement

PQA had with plaintiffs, which was contingent on prevailing and obtaining an 

award of fees under NJCRA. He submitted a copy of his biography detailing 

his education and thirty-two years of legal experience, and noted his relationship 

with plaintiffs included providing legal services in connection with other public 
32 A-2869-16T1

interest matters related to the Borough. He also noted that defendants' delay in 

complying with certain court orders resulted in additional litigation and 

attorney's fees. 

Given that contingency awards at the high end of the range are appropriate 

in cases where there is no mechanism to mitigate the risk of non-payment, PQA

was not able to mitigate the risk of nonpayment because its fees were dependent 

upon obtaining an award of fees under NJCRA, and the relief sought is primarily 

equitable in nature, a forty percent contingency enhancement was reasonable 

and appropriate in this case. The relief sought was equitable in nature and of 

broad public importance. PQA was not afforded the opportunity to mitigate the 

risk of non-payment because, in light of the relief sought, it could not expect to 

be compensated through a large contingent fee award nor could it expect that 

plaintiffs would be able to pay its fees when they prevailed.

For all of the foregoing reasons, we conclude the two awards of attorney's 

fees and costs were proper and not an abuse of discretion.

Affirmed.