KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting 

Cite as: 586 U. S. ____ (2019) 1 

Statement of KAVANAUGH, J. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

MORRIS COUNTY BOARD OF CHOSEN 

FREEHOLDERS, ET AL. 

18–364 v. 

FREEDOM FROM RELIGION 

FOUNDATION, ET AL. 

THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN 

MORRISTOWN, ET AL. 

18–365 v. 

FREEDOM FROM RELIGION 

FOUNDATION, ET AL. 

ON PETITIONS FOR WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME 

COURT OF NEW JERSEY 

Nos. 18–364 and 18–365. Decided March 4, 2019 

The petitions for writs of certiorari are denied. 

Statement of JUSTICE KAVANAUGH, with whom JUSTICE 

ALITO and JUSTICE GORSUCH join, respecting the denial of 

certiorari. 

Morris County, New Jersey, distributes historic preservation funds to help preserve local buildings such as libraries, schoolhouses, performing arts centers, and museums. As part of that program, Morris County also 

distributes funds to help preserve religious buildings such

as synagogues, temples, churches, and mosques. But it 

turns out that New Jersey law, as recently interpreted by

the New Jersey Supreme Court, prohibits Morris County

from awarding grants to preserve religious buildings. 

The petitioners here argue that the State’s exclusion of 

religious buildings—because they are religious—from

Morris County’s historic preservation program constitutes 

unconstitutional discrimination against religion in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
2 MORRIS COUNTY BD. OF CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS v. 

FREEDOM FROM RELIGION FOUNDATION 

Statement of KAVANAUGH, J. 

States Constitution. The New Jersey Supreme Court

concluded that the State’s discrimination did not violate 

the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 

In my view, the decision of the New Jersey Supreme

Court is in serious tension with this Court’s religious

equality precedents.

As this Court has repeatedly held, governmental discrimination against religion—in particular, discrimination 

against religious persons, religious organizations, and 

religious speech—violates the Free Exercise Clause and 

the Equal Protection Clause. In the words of Justice 

Brennan, the “government may not use religion as a basis 

of classification for the imposition of duties, penalties, 

privileges or benefits.” McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U. S. 618, 

639 (1978) (opinion concurring in judgment). Under the 

Constitution, the government may not discriminate 

against religion generally or against particular religious

denominations. See Larson v. Valente, 456 U. S. 228, 244 

(1982).

The principle of religious equality eloquently articulated 

by Justice Brennan in McDaniel is now firmly rooted in

this Court’s jurisprudence. As Justice Kennedy later

wrote for the Court, a law may not discriminate against

“some or all religious beliefs,” and “a law targeting religious beliefs as such is never permissible.” Church of 

Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U. S. 520, 532, 

533 (1993). Put another way, the government may not

“impose special disabilities on the basis of . . . religious 

status.” Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of 

Ore. v. Smith, 494 U. S. 872, 877 (1990). 

We have applied that bedrock principle of religious

equality in numerous cases. See, e.g, Trinity Lutheran 

Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 582 U. S. ___ (2017); 

Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 533 U. S. 

98 (2001); Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of 

Va., 515 U. S. 819 (1995); Lamb’s Chapel v. Center 
 

Cite as: 586 U. S. ____ (2019) 3 

Statement of KAVANAUGH, J. 

Moriches Union Free School Dist., 508 U. S. 384 (1993); 

McDaniel, 435 U. S. 618. 

For example, in McDaniel, a Tennessee statute disqualified ministers from serving as delegates to Tennessee’s 

constitutional convention. The Court ruled the statute 

unconstitutional, explaining that the Constitution does 

not allow the government to discriminate against religious

persons by prohibiting their service in a public office. See 

435 U. S., at 629. 

In Good News, a school district in New York allowed 

residents to use the local public high school for social,

civic, and recreational events. But the school district 

prohibited a religious organization from using the school, 

simply because the organization was religious. This Court 

held that the school district’s exclusion of the religious

organization was unconstitutional discrimination against 

religion. See 533 U. S., at 109. 

That same principle of religious equality applies to

governmental benefits or grants programs in which religious organizations or people seek benefits or grants on

the same terms as secular organizations or people—at 

least, our precedents say, so long as the government does

not fund the training of clergy, for example. See Trinity 

Lutheran, 582 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 13); Locke v. Davey, 

540 U. S. 712, 721, 725 (2004). 

In Trinity Lutheran, Missouri barred a religious school

from obtaining a state funding grant for the school’s playground. By contrast, Missouri allowed secular private

schools to obtain state funding grants for their schools’ 

playgrounds. This Court held that Missouri’s law was 

unconstitutional. The Court stated that the Constitution 

“protects religious observers against unequal treatment.”

582 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 6) (alterations omitted). In 

the Court’s description, Missouri’s law reflected an unconstitutional policy of “No churches need apply.” Id., at ___– 

___ (slip op., at 13–14). The Court minced no words: Dis-
 

 

4 MORRIS COUNTY BD. OF CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS v. 

FREEDOM FROM RELIGION FOUNDATION 

Statement of KAVANAUGH, J. 

criminating against religious schools because the schools

are religious “is odious to our Constitution.” Id., at ___ 

(slip op., at 15). 

In this case, New Jersey’s “No religious organizations 

need apply” for historic preservation grants appears similar to, for example, Missouri’s “No religious schools need

apply” for school playground grants and New York’s “No

religious clubs need apply” for use of school facilities and 

Tennessee’s “No ministers need apply” for state office.

To be clear, this is not a case like Lee v. Weisman, 505 

U. S. 577 (1992); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783 (1983); 

or County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 

Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U. S. 573 (1989), where 

the government itself is engaging in religious speech, such 

as a government-sponsored prayer or a governmentsponsored religious display. Nor is this a case like Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U. S. 682 (2014), or 

Smith, 494 U. S. 872, where a religious group or person is

asking for an accommodation or exemption from a generally applicable law. Under the Court’s precedents, both of 

those categories of cases can pose difficult questions. This 

kind of case, by contrast, should not be as difficult: Barring religious organizations because they are religious 

from a general historic preservation grants program is 

pure discrimination against religion. 

* * * 

At some point, this Court will need to decide whether

governments that distribute historic preservation funds

may deny funds to religious organizations simply because 

the organizations are religious. But at this point and in 

this case, it is appropriate to deny certiorari, for two main 

reasons. First, the factual details of the Morris County 

program are not entirely clear. In particular, it is not

evident precisely what kinds of buildings can be funded 

under the Morris County program. That factual uncer-
 

Cite as: 586 U. S. ____ (2019) 5 

Statement of KAVANAUGH, J. 

tainty about the scope of the program could hamper our 

analysis of petitioners’ religious discrimination claim. 

Second, this Court decided Trinity Lutheran only recently, 

and there is not yet a robust post-Trinity Lutheran body of

case law in the lower courts on the question whether

governments may exclude religious organizations from

general historic preservation grants programs.

For those reasons, denial of certiorari is appropriate. As 

always, a denial of certiorari does not imply agreement or 

disagreement with the decision of the relevant federal 

court of appeals or state supreme court. In my view,

prohibiting historic preservation grants to religious organizations simply because the organizations are religious

would raise serious questions under this Court’s precedents and the Constitution’s fundamental guarantee of

equality.