Supreme Court

No. 2021-320-Appeal.

No. 2021-321-Appeal.

(NC 14-333)

(Dissent begins on Page 14) 

 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision 

before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers 

are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme 

Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence, 

Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone (401) 222-3258 or 

Email opinionanalyst@courts.ri.gov of any typographical 

or other formal errors in order that corrections may be 

made before the opinion is published.

Carol Allen :

v. :

Laura Sitrin, as Finance Director for 

the City of Newport, et al.

:
- 1 -

Supreme Court

No. 2021-320-Appeal.

No. 2021-321-Appeal.

(NC 14-333)

(Dissent begins on Page 14)

 

Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ.

O P I N I O N

Justice Lynch Prata, for the Court. In these consolidated appeals, the 

plaintiff, Carol Allen individually, and in her capacity as Administratrix for the 

Estate of Kenneth MacDuff (Allen or the plaintiff),1 and the defendants, Laura Sitrin, 

as the Finance Director for the City of Newport (the city), Donald Botelho, and Ben 

Bona (collectively, the city defendants), cross-appeal from two amended judgments 

of the Superior Court entered in favor of the plaintiff following a nonjury trial. The 

city defendants argue that the trial justice erred by: failing to apply the Connecticut 

1 Kenneth MacDuff’s name is spelled inconsistently in the record. We adopt the 

spelling that appears in the trial transcripts. No disrespect is intended. 

Carol Allen :

v. :

Laura Sitrin, as Finance Director for 

the City of Newport, et al.

:
- 2 -

Rule;2 finding that there were unusual circumstances that triggered their duty before 

the end of the storm; determining that Botelho and Bona owed duties in their 

individual capacities to the plaintiff; and finding that the plaintiff did not assume the 

risk of her injury. On her cross-appeal, the plaintiff argues that the trial justice erred 

by limiting the city’s liability under the public-duty doctrine. For the reasons stated 

herein, we vacate the judgments of the Superior Court. 

Facts and Travel

On February 3, 2014, Allen and MacDuff, Allen’s husband,3 went to Newport 

City Hall (city hall) to pay their quarterly property taxes. MacDuff dropped Allen 

off at the Bull Street entrance to city hall. Allen testified that when she arrived, she 

remembered feeling an icy rain or sleet on her face. On cross-examination, she 

explained that it could have been a light mix of sleet and snow. Allen made it up the 

steps to city hall without any difficulty, but she testified that there was a slushy 

mixture or “slight film” on the stairway. A bystander, Charles M. Holder Sr., 

testified that there was no snow accumulation on the stairway before Allen’s fall, 

but that the stairs were slippery and wet.4

 Holder further testified that it may have 

2 The Connecticut Rule will be explained infra. 3 The trial justice’s determination that the evidence “clearly establishes that Mr. 

MacDuff was Ms. Allen’s common-law husband” is not contested by the city 

defendants on appeal. 

4 Holder’s testimony was presented, by agreement of the parties, through deposition 

because he was unavailable to testify at trial due to a medical condition. 
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been lightly snowing prior to Allen’s fall. After paying her taxes, Allen began to 

exit the building the way she entered.

That morning, defendants Bona and Botelho were the employees responsible 

for treating the city hall steps with ice melt. Although Bona typically treated all the 

stairways and sidewalks before 8 a.m., he had not begun treating the Bull Street 

entrance at the time of Allen’s fall. Further, Bona had neither placed warning signs 

at the exits nor roped off the Bull Street stairway, as he had done on prior occasions. 

Allen made it down the first set of stairs, but as she approached the landing, she 

noticed that the second set of stairs was covered with a slushy film. Consequently, 

she held onto the center handrail with both hands and proceeded slowly down the 

stairway, one step at a time. 

While descending, Allen slipped and fell on the granite steps. Photographs of 

the scene taken approximately seven to twenty-three minutes after her fall depict 

“heavy, wet snow” falling and accumulating on nearby bushes, cars, railings, and 

people. As a result of her fall, Allen suffered a severe head injury, which induced

multiple seizures and the loss of her ability to taste and smell. When Allen returned 

home from the hospital, she needed around-the-clock care. She could not cook, 

clean, or do her laundry without help from MacDuff, friends, and family. MacDuff 

cared for her until his death in 2017. Allen alleges that the city and its employees 

were negligent in failing to properly treat the stairs for adverse weather conditions.
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Allen filed a complaint for negligence and, in her capacity as Administratrix 

of MacDuff’s estate, for loss of consortium against the city, Bona, Botelho, and 

William R. Riccio Jr., the Director of Public Services for the city.5

 Following a 

nonjury trial, the trial justice issued a written decision summarizing the facts 

established at trial and making findings relative to the credibility of the witnesses. 

He first addressed the city’s duty to plaintiff. He noted the general rule that the duty 

of a premises owner to clear snow and ice is not triggered until a reasonable time 

after a storm ends, known as the Connecticut Rule. However, the trial justice 

commented that precedent “clearly suggests that there are fact patterns in which the 

Connecticut Rule may not apply even if winter precipitation is occurring.” 

Looking to the facts of the instant case, the trial justice found: that “there was 

intermittent light to moderate snow on the morning of February 3, 2014”; that “the 

temperatures on February 3, 2014[,] were falling and reached freezing (32 degrees) 

at 8:22 a.m.”; that the photographs of the scene taken after Allen’s fall show no 

detectable accumulation of snow on the steps, but that Allen and Holder’s testimony 

that there was a “slight film” forming on the steps as she ascended them was credible; 

and that the application of ice melt “would have prevented the early accumulation 

of snow and the formation of ice” on the steps. The trial justice thus found that 

5 There was no evidence presented against Riccio at trial; therefore, the trial justice 

entered judgment in his favor. Neither plaintiff nor Riccio have appealed that 

judgment.
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“there was not a sufficient accumulation of snow or ice on the steps where [Allen] 

fell to [in]voke the Connecticut Rule.” 

Alternatively, the trial justice found that “[e]ven if the Connecticut Rule were 

to apply * * * the circumstances here present[ed] a scenario that would trigger the 

unusual circumstance[s] exception.” The trial justice reasoned that there were 

unusual circumstances present because the failure to “apply ice melt and to take other 

protective measures that had been used in the past exacerbated the risks inherent in 

the use of the stairs by [Allen].” The trial justice further reasoned that the policy 

behind the Connecticut Rule would not be fulfilled by its application in this case 

because the storm was not so severe that any efforts of the city defendants to clear 

the steps would have been useless. 

The trial justice then proceeded to address the remaining issues in the case, 

finding that: the public-duty doctrine did not apply; Botelho and Bona were 

individually liable to plaintiff; Allen was 35 percent comparatively negligent for her 

fall; Allen did not assume the risk of the fall; Allen’s injuries were causally related 

to her fall; plaintiff was entitled to damages; the statutory damages cap applied to 

the city’s liability for damages; and the statutory damages cap did not apply to the 

individual defendants. Thereafter, two amended judgments were entered in favor of 

plaintiff, against Bona, Botelho, and the city. The city defendants and plaintiff filed 
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timely notices of appeal, and this Court consolidated the appeals for briefing and 

argument. 

Standard of Review

“A judgment in a nonjury case will be reversed on appeal when it can be 

shown that the trial justice misapplied the law, misconceived or overlooked material 

evidence or made factual findings that were clearly wrong.” Quillen v. Cox, 306 

A.3d 1040, 1045 (R.I. 2024) (quoting Boisse v. Miller, 267 A.3d 634, 636 (R.I. 

2022)). “Upon review, we accord the factual findings of a trial justice sitting without 

a jury great deference and consider questions of law de novo.” Id. (quoting Boisse, 

267 A.3d at 636). The existence of a legal duty and the application of the 

Connecticut Rule are questions of law, properly decided by the Court. See Sullo v. 

Greenberg, 68 A.3d 404, 408 (R.I. 2013). 

Discussion

The city defendants argue that the trial justice erred by failing to apply the 

Connecticut Rule. They assert that the application of the Connecticut Rule does not 

depend upon the extent of accumulation or whether a defendant could have taken 

protective measures, but rather whether there was an active snowfall at the time of 

the injury and whether the defendant had a reasonable time to clear the accumulation. 

Therefore, they argue, they owed no duty to plaintiff under the Connecticut Rule 
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because the evidence demonstrated that the storm was ongoing at the time of 

plaintiff’s fall. 

The plaintiff maintains that the trial justice’s decision to not apply the 

Connecticut Rule in this case was clearly supported by his findings of fact—i.e., that 

there was no ongoing storm and that there was no accumulation of snow or ice on 

the stairway. Therefore, she argues, according to these facts, it was not error for the 

trial justice to find that the Connecticut Rule did not apply. 

It is a fundamental principle of tort law that a “defendant cannot be liable 

under a negligence theory unless the defendant owes a duty to the plaintiff.” Benaski 

v. Weinberg, 899 A.2d 499, 502 (R.I. 2006) (quoting Lucier v. Impact Recreation, 

Ltd., 864 A.2d 635, 638 (R.I. 2005)). “Rhode Island follows the ‘Connecticut Rule’ 

when determining the duty of care to keep a premises safe from naturally occurring 

accumulations of ice and snow.” Berardis v. Louangxay, 969 A.2d 1288, 1291 (R.I. 

2009). Pursuant to this rule, we recognize that a landlord or a business invitor has a 

duty to “use reasonable care to see that the common areas are kept reasonably safe 

from the dangers created by an accumulation of snow and ice which is attributed to 

purely natural causes.” Fuller v. Housing Authority of City of Providence, 108 R.I. 

770, 772, 279 A.2d 438, 440 (1971); see also Terry v. Central Auto Radiators, Inc., 

732 A.2d 713, 716-17 (R.I. 1999) (extending application of Connecticut Rule to 

business invitor/business invitee situation). 
- 8 -

Therefore, “an accumulation of ice or snow upon those portions of the 

premises reserved for the common use * * * may make the [business invitor] liable 

for injuries sustained by his [invitee] which are due to such an accumulation * * *.” 

Fuller, 108 R.I. at 774, 279 A.2d at 441; see also Terry, 732 A.2d at 716 (applying 

Fuller to business invitors). However, “[t]o require a landlord or other invit[or] to 

keep walks and steps clear of dangerous accumulations of ice, sleet or snow or to 

spread sand or ashes while a storm continues is inexpedient and impractical.” 

Berardis, 969 A.2d at 1293 (quoting Kraus v. Newton, 558 A.2d 240, 243 (Conn. 

1989)). Therefore, a business invitor has “a reasonable time after the storm has 

ceased to remove the accumulation of snow or ice found on the common ways or to 

take such measures as will make the common areas reasonably safe from the hazards 

arising from such a condition.” See Fuller, 108 R.I. at 774, 279 A.2d at 441; Terry, 

732 A.2d at 716. 

The trial justice found that on the morning in question, there was “intermittent 

light to moderate snow” and that although the photographs taken after the fall show 

no detectable accumulation, Allen’s testimony that there was a “slight film” forming 

on the steps had more weight regarding the conditions when she fell.6

 The trial 

6 The plaintiff incorrectly argues that the trial justice found that there was no 

accumulation of snow on the stairway and that there was no ongoing snow prior to 

Allen’s fall. The plaintiff relies upon the testimony of Steve Cascione, an expert in 

weather conditions in the field of meteorology, for her assertion that there was no 

ongoing snow prior to the fall. However, the trial justice specifically rejected 
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justice therefore concluded that “there was not a sufficient accumulation of snow or 

ice on the steps where [Allen] fell to [in]voke the Connecticut Rule.” 

The application of the Connecticut Rule by this Court has never been based 

upon the extent of accumulation. See Fuller, 108 R.I. at 773-74, 279 A.2d at 440-41 

(holding landlord could be liable for tenant’s injuries caused by accumulation of 

snow and ice because landlords are equipped to “do battle with the fallen snow, the 

sun-melted snow now turned to ice, or the frozen rain”); Barenbaum v. Richardson, 

114 R.I. 87, 93, 328 A.2d 731, 734 (1974) (holding trial justice did not err in 

instructing jury on Connecticut Rule when there was a “slight dusting”); Sullo, 68 

A.3d at 408 (holding that dispute regarding whether there was any accumulation of 

snow at time of plaintiff’s fall precluded summary judgment). Instead, the 

application of the rule depends upon whether the plaintiff’s injuries were caused by 

the accumulation of snow or ice and whether the defendant was given “a reasonable 

time after the storm has ceased to remove the accumulation * * * or to take such 

measures as will make the common areas reasonably safe from the hazards arising 

from such a condition.” Fuller, 108 R.I. at 774, 279 A.2d at 441; see also Sullo, 68 

Cascione’s opinion on the form of precipitation in Newport on the day in question 

because “he testified that the weather station at Newport was unmanned * * * and 

he used the weather reports from T.F. Green Airport for reference.” Further, he 

determined that “the photographs depicting the scene do not necessarily depict the 

weather conditions at the time of the fall and f[ound] the testimony of [Allen] and 

* * * Holder to have more weight.” He specifically credited Allen’s testimony that 

there was a slight film on the stairway. 
- 10 -

A.3d at 407 (“Because the rationale is to allow a reasonable time to treat surfaces 

rather than ineffectually fight a continuing storm, the Connecticut Rule is intended 

to apply to ongoing winter storms resulting in an accumulation of snow, ice, or 

frozen rain.”); Aubin v. MAG Realty, LLC, 161 A.3d 1143, 1146 n.1 (R.I. 2017) 

(holding Connecticut Rule did not apply because plaintiff slipped on black ice that 

had formed the previous night instead of freshly accumulated snow).

The trial justice found that there was light to moderate snow on the morning 

of Allen’s fall. He found credible Allen’s testimony regarding the condition of the 

stairway at the time of her fall, and she testified that she felt either an “icy rain” or a 

light “mix of sleet and snow” on her face when she arrived at city hall, roughly ten 

minutes prior to her fall. Further, he found that Allen slipped and fell on the stairway 

which was slippery with a “slushy film.” According to the trial justice’s findings, to 

which we must give great deference, Allen fell due to the accumulation of snow or 

ice; therefore, the Connecticut Rule applies. See Fuller, 108 R.I. at 774, 279 A.2d at 

441; Aubin, 161 A.3d at 1146 n.1; see also Quillen, 306 A.3d at 1045 (noting that 

trial justice’s findings of fact are given great deference). Consequently, the city 

defendants’ duty to clear the natural accumulation of slush or ice did not arise until 

a reasonable time after the storm ended. Berardis, 969 A.2d at 1292. 

The trial justice made no explicit findings with regard to when the icy rain or 

“mix of sleet and snow” ended. Nevertheless, he found that the “unrefuted evidence 
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establishes that intermittent periods of light to moderate snow were falling the 

morning of February 3, 2014.” Moreover, he relied upon the testimony of Allen to 

determine the weather conditions at the time of the fall, and she testified that there 

was a light sleet, snow, or icy rain in the minutes leading up to her fall. Photographs 

of the scene, taken between seven and twenty-three minutes after Allen’s fall, 

demonstrate that the light sleet or snow had developed into a “[h]eavy, wet snow.” 

Therefore, based upon the factual findings of the trial justice, the storm was ongoing 

at the time of Allen’s fall, and the city defendants did not owe her a duty to clear the 

natural accumulation of snow and ice unless the unusual circumstances exception to 

the Connecticut Rule is applicable. Berardis, 969 A.2d at 1292. 

A business invitor has a reasonable amount of time after the end of a “storm 

to clear snow and ice ‘only in the absence of unusual circumstances.’” Terry, 732 

A.2d at 717 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Cooks v. O’Brien Properties, Inc., 710 

A.2d 788, 792 (Conn. App. Ct. 1998)). If unusual circumstances are present, then 

the business invitor’s duty of reasonable care arises before the end of the storm. 

Berardis, 969 A.2d at 1292. Unusual circumstances are those “that have been 

created by the business invitor and left to exist at the particular time and place and 

which results in injury to the business invitee.” Terry, 732 A.2d at 718 n.7. “The 

linchpin of our duty analysis in Terry was the presence of a heightened risk * * * 

created by the business invitor.” Benaski, 899 A.2d at 503-04. Accordingly, unusual 
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circumstances are present when the business invitor’s conduct exacerbates the 

inherent risk that a plaintiff voluntarily undertakes by going out during a winter 

storm. Id. at 504; Berardis, 969 A.2d at 1293. 

The city defendants argue that it was error for the trial justice to apply the 

unusual circumstances exception to the Connecticut Rule. They contend that the 

keystone of the unusual circumstances inquiry is whether there was a heightened risk 

to Allen that was created by the city defendants. Therefore, they contend, because 

the trial justice failed to point to any actions by the city defendants that exacerbated 

the risk to Allen, the decision was in error. 

The plaintiff disagrees, arguing that there were unusual circumstances in this 

case because the city could have taken measures to reduce the risk of harm. She 

contends that this Court has never held that the only unusual circumstances that can 

trigger a defendant’s duty are actions by the defendant that exacerbate and increase 

the risk to the plaintiff. Thus, plaintiff maintains that unusual circumstances exist 

when a defendant could have taken steps to mitigate the risk to the plaintiff. 

This Court has held that unusual circumstances were present when a business 

invitor created a dangerous situation that made the risk to the invitee greater than the 

risk that originally existed before the invitor’s actions. See Terry, 732 A.2d at 717-

18. By contrast, we have rejected the argument that unusual circumstances were 

present by virtue of a business invitor’s failure to take action that would have made 
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traveling during a storm safer. See Berardis, 969 A.2d at 1293 (finding no unusual 

circumstances where defendant business invitor undertook task of shoveling and 

applying ice melt earlier in day because his actions did not increase inherent risk of 

traveling during storm); Benaski, 899 A.2d at 503-04 (finding no unusual 

circumstances where defendant business invitor failed to follow usual practice of 

plowing roadway before start of business, failed to conduct daily inspections of 

premises, and failed to post signs warning of dangerous conditions because such

actions did not exacerbate risk of commuting during storm). 

The trial justice found there were unusual circumstances because there were 

reasonable precautionary measures that the city defendants could have taken to 

alleviate the danger to Allen, including putting down ice melt, posting warning signs, 

and roping off the stairway. However, the city defendants’ failure to alleviate the 

danger of the accumulated snow and ice did not exacerbate the risks already inherent 

in traveling during such a storm. See Benaski, 899 A.2d at 503-04; Berardis, 969 

A.2d at 1293. Allen voluntarily undertook the risks of traveling in slick conditions 

when she traveled to city hall during a snow event. The city defendants did not 

engage in any behavior that increased the risk to her. Therefore, there were no 

unusual circumstances that triggered the city defendants’ duty prior to the end of the 

storm. See Benaski, 899 A.2d at 503-04; Berardis, 969 A.2d at 1293. 
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Having determined that the city defendants’ duty to use reasonable care did 

not arise until a reasonable time after the storm ended, we need not address the 

public-duty doctrine, Botelho and Bona’s individual liability, Allen’s comparative 

negligence, or the statutory damages cap. 

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the judgments of the Superior Court and 

remand for entry of judgment in favor of the city defendants. 

Justice Goldberg, dissenting. The issue in this appeal does not rest on the 

city defendants’1 legal duty or actions during an ongoing winter storm, but rather 

turns on the city defendants’ legal duty and negligent failure to follow established 

protocols before the commencement of the storm. In these circumstances the 

Connecticut Rule does not absolve a property owner from complying with required 

preventative measures adopted to maintain its premises in a reasonably safe 

condition. The trial justice determined—and I will further detail below—that the 

city defendants violated established procedures instituted to protect city hall invitees 

from the hazards of inclement weather. These breaches occurred before the 

commencement of a winter storm and the result was predictable, foreseeable, and 

1 I continue the majority’s designation that the city defendants collectively comprise 

Laura Sitrin, as Finance Director for the City of Newport, Donald Botelho, and Ben 

Bona.
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catastrophic when an invitee slipped, fell down several stairs, and sustained grievous 

injuries. For the reasons discussed below, I would conclude that the Connecticut 

Rule does not apply to the facts of this case and does not absolve these defendants. 

I respectfully dissent from this unwarranted extension of the Connecticut Rule.

Factual Background

This incident occurred on Monday, February 3, 2014, a typical New England 

winter day consisting of cold temperatures with a mixture of rain and snow 

developing through the morning hours. Perhaps most importantly, this was a winter 

morning during which one or more of the city defendants expected snowfall. Despite 

these existing, anticipated, and predictable weather conditions, it is undisputed that 

defendants Ben Bona (Bona) and Donald Botelho (Botelho)—two city employees 

charged with maintaining the city hall premises—did not begin the inclement winter 

weather protocols until approximately 10 a.m. At approximately 10:25 a.m., 

plaintiff, Carol Allen (Allen), fell on the untreated Bull Street stairs as she exited 

city hall after paying her taxes. Allen described the stairs as consisting of a slushy 

mixture or a “slight film.” 

On February 3, 2014, temperatures were falling steadily throughout the 

morning. At 12:53 a.m., the temperature was 40 degrees, but at 8:22 a.m., the 

temperature had dropped to 32 degrees. The trial justice recounted that the evidence 
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reflected periods of light to moderate snow continued throughout the morning, 

including prior to Allen falling on the Bull Street stairs. 

Bona and Botelho were both working at city hall on this fateful morning and 

supplied critical testimony concerning the inclement weather protocols established 

by the city. Although they were less than candid, the testimony makes clear—and 

the trial justice found—that the city defendants failed to comply with two established 

procedures. 

Bona testified that he began his shifts at 5 a.m., including on the morning of 

Allen’s fall. Bona testified to at least three different scenarios in which procedures 

required him to apply ice melt to the common areas at or around city hall: (1) when 

freezing temperatures combined with precipitation; (2) when snow begins “sticking” 

to the sidewalks (snow “sticking” to the grass was insufficient); and (3) when the 

city hall stairs became “sticky.” After recessing for the day, Bona resumed his 

testimony the following day and supplemented his testimony to explain that he 

understood “freezing temperature” to mean “the pavements are freezing.” 

Bona’s testimony contained other head-scratching moments. For example, 

Bona indicated that if it were snowing but not “sticking,” he would not apply ice 

melt; and that if it was “snowing and frozen in temperatures,” the decision to apply 

ice melt would “depend[]” upon the temperature of the air, sidewalks, and stairs. 
- 17 -

Most importantly, the trial evidence revealed that Bona was confronted with the 

following testimony from his deposition:

Q: “How were you made aware that the conditions 

required that you put Ice Melt down? Do you 

understand my question?”

A: “Yes, sir. Because we were expecting snow, so I 

kept going out to check.” (Emphasis added.) 

Bona’s five-hour delay (from the start of his shift) in applying ice melt treatment is 

inexplicable and not in accordance with the protocol for pretreatment. This delay is 

even more perplexing considering Bona’s admission that he expected imminent 

snowfall that morning. Bona’s lying-in-wait prestorm posture, only to begin 

treatment procedures after the snowfall actually began, does not bring this case 

within the cloak of the Connecticut Rule. 

Bona’s supervisor was Botelho, the foreperson of the custodial staff, who 

described a “mainly automatic[]” protocol concerning the application of ice melt.2

 

On February 3, 2014, Botelho began his shift at or around 6 a.m. In contrast to 

Bona’s testimony and conduct that day, Botelho testified that “[t]he ice melt goes 

down before City Hall opens up.” 

Although snow had already fallen earlier in the morning, the trial justice noted 

Bona’s testimony that “he did not begin to put ice melt down until approximately 

2 By agreement of the parties, Botelho’s deposition testimony was introduced at trial 

because of his unavailability due to medical reasons.
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10:00 a.m.” It is undisputed that Bona applied ice melt to the Broadway stairs and 

then to the sidewalks and not the Bull Street stairs. After applying ice melt to the 

sidewalks, Bona then headed to the Bull Street stairs to apply ice melt to that 

stairway; and discovered that Allen had already fallen on the Bull Street stairs. This 

is another deviation from the protocol. 

Botelho also testified that when applying ice melt, the ice melt should be 

applied first to the Broadway and Bull Street stairs, then the ice melt should be 

applied to the sidewalks surrounding city hall on Broadway and Bull Street. Bona 

provided similar testimony concerning the protocol for applying ice melt, i.e., first, 

the Broadway stairs; and second, the Bull Street stairs before tackling the sidewalks. 

However, it is undisputed that Bona violated the city’s own procedure. Deviating 

from the city’s own established protocols, Bona first treated the Broadway stairs and 

sidewalk, and then proceeded to the Bull Street stairs, but it was too late. Allen had 

already fallen and was seriously injured.

Based upon the foregoing events, the trial justice determined that Bona’s

“failure to apply ice melt to the Bull Street stairway 

immediately after he applied it to the Broadway stairway 

was against protocol. [Bona] also failed to apply ice melt 

earlier in the day despite the fact that temperatures reached 

freezing at 8:22 a.m. and there was precipitation that 

morning, which was also against protocol.” (Emphases 

added.) 
- 19 -

The trial justice also concluded that Bona and Botelho both provided “inconsistent” 

testimony and were generally not credible witnesses. 

I reject the majority’s conclusion that the city can seek refuge in the judgemade Connecticut Rule in the face of these facts.

Analysis

This Court has recognized that “[u]nder the Connecticut Rule, a landlord or 

business invitor clearly has a duty to his tenants or invitees to clear snow 

accumulation and treat surfaces impacted by a storm.” Sullo v. Greenberg, 68 A.3d 

404, 407 (R.I. 2013). “However, this duty does not arise until a reasonable time 

after the storm has ended.” Id. We have also declared that the Connecticut Rule is 

not universal and applies, “only in the absence of unusual circumstances.” Benaski 

v. Weinberg, 899 A.2d 499, 503 (R.I. 2006) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Terry v. 

Central Auto Radiators, Inc., 732 A.2d 713, 717 (R.I. 1999)). 

This Court has consistently stressed that the Connecticut Rule “is intended to 

apply to ongoing winter storms resulting in an accumulation of snow, ice, or frozen 

rain.” Sullo, 68 A.3d at 407 (emphasis added). This Court has also explained the 

rationale supporting the adoption of the rule: “To require a landlord or other invit[or] 

to keep walks and steps clear of dangerous accumulations of ice, sleet or snow or to 

spread sand or ashes while a storm continues is inexpedient and impractical.” 

Berardis v. Louangxay, 969 A.2d 1288, 1293 (R.I. 2009) (emphasis added) (quoting 
- 20 -

Kraus v. Newton, 558 A.2d 240, 243 (Conn. 1989)); see also Barenbaum v. 

Richardson, 114 R.I. 87, 93, 328 A.2d 731, 734 (1974) (“A landlord is not required 

to be at his property, shovel in hand, catching the flakes before they hit the ground.”). 

We have never held that this rationale applies before the storm commences or serves 

as a shield against a failure to comply with established practices. In contrast to the 

purpose of the Connecticut Rule, ample evidence exists in this case for a factfinder 

to conclude that the city defendants failed to take reasonable measures that were in 

place and designed to maintain the city hall’s premise in a reasonably safe condition 

prior to the commencement of the winter storm.

Bearing in mind that Botelho declared “[t]he ice melt goes down before City 

Hall opens up,” Bona was confronted with dropping temperatures and precipitation 

at 6:48 a.m.—over an hour before city hall opened, nearly two hours after he began 

his shift, and almost one hour after Botelho started his shift. Yet Bona and/or 

Botelho failed to take any action until approximately 10 a.m., by which time weather 

conditions had already deteriorated to intermittent periods of light to moderate snow. 

The trial evidence demonstrates that not only did one or more of the city defendants 

expect snowfall on this date, but Bona repeatedly “kept going out[side] to check.” 

Despite already being outside with the expectation of an approaching snowfall, Bona 

inexplicably failed to apply any ice melt until approximately 10 a.m. Because the 

city defendants’ omissions occurred prior to the commencement of the winter storm, 
- 21 -

and in deviation of established protocols, I am of the opinion that the Connecticut 

Rule does not relieve or insulate the city defendants from liability in this case. I 

reject the “Oh well, we didn’t have to do it anyways” defense in this case.

While a factfinder may very well find—and in this case did find—that the city 

defendants’ omissions breached the duty “to exercise reasonable care for the safety 

of persons reasonably expected to be on the premises,” Kemp v. PJC of Rhode Island, 

Inc., 184 A.3d 712, 717 (R.I. 2018), there is no dispute that the city defendants’ 

omissions violated the protocols established by the city to make its property safe 

from winter weather hazards. The failure to comply with established procedures or 

protocols may be considered by a factfinder in determining whether a defendant has 

breached the duty of care. See Flynn v. Nickerson Community Center, 177 A.3d 468, 

480 (R.I. 2018) (“[W]e look next to the closeness of the connection between [the 

defendant’s] purported negligence in violating its security protocols and plaintiffs’ 

injuries.”); Seide v. State, 875 A.2d 1259, 1272 (R.I. 2005) (“We are satisfied that a 

police department[’]s pursuit policy, adopted as official policy governing high-speed 

police pursuits, may serve as a standard that the jury could compare with the 

defendants’ conduct to determine whether there was a breach of the standard of 

care.”). 

Here, the trial justice concluded that the city defendants violated the 

established inclement weather protocols by: (1) failing to apply ice melt earlier in 
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the morning before snow began to fall and (2) failing to apply ice melt to the Bull 

Street stairway (where Allen fell) prior to treating the sidewalks. While the 

Connecticut Rule may have allowed the city defendants to delay responding to an 

ongoing winter storm, I am aware of no authority that protects landowners from 

taking reasonable actions to maintain a premise in a reasonably safe condition prior

to the arrival of an expected winter storm. 

Conclusion

For the reasons discussed, I would conclude that the Connecticut Rule does 

not apply in these circumstances because the city defendants’ omission occurred 

before the commencement of a winter storm. I express no opinion on any other 

issues presented for this Court’s consideration. Consequently, I respectfully dissent.
SU-CMS-02A (revised November 2022)

STATE OF RHODE ISLAND

SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE

Licht Judicial Complex

250 Benefit Street

Providence, RI 02903

OPINION COVER SHEET

Title of Case Carol Allen v. Laura Sitrin, as Finance Director for 

the City of Newport, et al. 

Case Number No. 2021-320-Appeal.

(NC-14-333)

Date Opinion Filed May 23, 2024

Justices Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and 

Long, JJ.

Written By Associate Justice Erin Lynch Prata 

Source of Appeal Newport County Superior Court 

Judicial Officer from Lower Court Associate Justice Brian Van Couyghen

Attorney(s) on Appeal

For Plaintiff:

Mark B. Morse, Esq.

For Defendants:

Mark T. Reynolds, Esq.