## I L L I N O I S 

## O F F I C I A L 

## RE P O R T S Appellate Court

U.S. Ban k National A ss’n v. IN Retail Fu nd Al gonquin Com m ons, LLC , 2013 IL App (2d) 130213

Appellate Court Caption U.S. BA NK NATI ONAL ASSOCI ATI ON, as Successor in Intere st to Ba nk of Americ a, N.A., Successor to Wells Fa rg o Ba nk, N.A., as Trustee for the Reg istered Holders of TIAA Seasoned Commercial M o rt g ag e Trust 2007 C-4, Commercial Pass-Throug h Certificates, Series 2007-C4, Plaintiff-Appellee
, v. I

N RETAI L FUN D AL GONQU I N COMMONS, L L C; I N RETAI L FUN D, L L C; and I NLAND COMMERCI AL PR O PE RT Y M A

N A G E M EN T
, I

NC., Def endants-A

ppellants (Jeffre y R. Ander son Real Estate; Xtreme Fire Protection, Inc.; Mike Kokosis, d/b/a All Circuits Electric Inc.; Unknown Owner s; and Nonre cord Claimants, Def endants).

District & N o. Second District Docke t No. 2-13-0213

Filed J une 21, 2013

Held (Note : This sy ll abus

co n st it ute s no par t of the opi nio n of the cour t but has bee n pre

par ed by the R e

por te r of D e c i s i o n s f

o r t h e

c o n v e n i e n c e o

f t h e

rea der

. ) In an act i o n for the fore closure of a commerc ial development, the appellate court dismiss ed defe ndants’ appea l from various orde rs , including an order g rantin g plaintiff’s motion for substitut ion of judge and declining to enfor ce a local rule ag ainst plaintiff as to its motions for admission pro h a c vi ce , a temporary restra ining order, the appointment of a rec eiver
, and leave to file an amende d complaint, since defe ndants failed to establish jurisdiction pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 307(a) (1).

Dec ision Under
Review Appea l from the Circuit Court of Kane County
, No. 13-CH-12; the Hon. J ohn G. Dalton, Judge, pr esiding

.J udg ment Appea l dismi ssed.

Counsel on Appea l Eug ene S. Kra us, Miles V. Cohen, and J ason R. Sleezer, all of Scott & Kra us, L L C, of Chicag o, for a ppellants.

J er ry L

. Switz er and J ean Soh, both of Polsi nelli Shugha rt, P.C., of Chicag o, and Br ett D. Ander s and Aar on J ackson, both of Polsi nelli Shugha rt, P.C., of Kansas City , Missouri, for appe llee.

Panel J USTI CE BI RKETT deliver ed the judg ment of the c ourt, with opinion.
J ustices Schostok and Hudson conc urre d in the judgme nt and opinion.

OP INION

¶ 1 Def

endants I N Retail Fund Alg onquin Commons, L L C, I N Retail Fund, L L C, and Inland Commercial Property Manag ement, Inc., appea l various order s enter ed by the trial court. For the re asons that follow, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

¶ 2 BA CKGROUND ¶ 3 In Dec ember 2012, plaintiff, US Ba n k Na t i o n al Association, broug ht a complaint for fore closure ag ainst defe ndants. The s u bject proper ty is a commerc ial development in Alg onquin, I llinois

. On J anuar y 11, 2013, plaintiff moved for appointment of a rec eiver for the proper

ty

. Also in J anuar

y 2 0 1 3
, p l ai n t iff filed (1) two motions for admission pro hac vice ; (2) a motion for a temporar y restra ining order ; and (3 ) a motion to file an amende d complaint

. T h e t empora ry restra ining order that plaintiff soug ht would “re strain[ ] [defendants] from in any manner removing
, destroy ing or diminis hing the [c] ollatera l,” except that defe ndants would be permitted “to make use of the [c] ollatera l in the ordinar y

course of their business and for pay ment of ordinary operating expenses curr ently incurre d in the ordinary

course of business.” ¶ 4 On Fe bruar

y 1, 2013, I

N Retail Fund filed a motion to qu as h s er v i ce of summons as noncompliant with Supreme Court Rule 101 (I ll. S. Ct. R. 101 (ef f. May 30, 2008)). Also on Fe bruar y 1, the Honora

ble Edwar d C. Schreibe r hear d all of plaintiff’s pending motions. At the hear ing, defe ndan t s objected that the cer tificates of service for the motions wer e defic ient. The tria l c o u

rt ag ree d and direc ted plaintiff to “re -notice” the motions. On Fe bruar y 8
, 2 0 1 3
, p l aintiff ref

iled the motions and also filed a motion to strike the jury demand o f Inland Commercial Property Manag ement. At a Fe bruar y 11 hear ing, J udg e Schreibe r ag ree d with defe ndants that the ref iled motions likewise had defic ient cer tificates of service

. J udg e Schreibe r ag ain direc ted plaintiff to “re -notice” th e mo ti ons. On Fe bruar y 14, plaintiff moved

-2-for substitut ion of judge as a matter of rig ht under section 2-1001(a )(2) of the Code of Civil

Procedur e (735 I L CS 5/2-1001(a) (2) (West 2010)). On Fe bruar y 22, plaintiff filed a “notice of motion” f

or eac h of the following motions: (1) two motions for admission pro hac vic e ; (2) a motion for appointment of a rec eiver ; (3) a motion for a temporar y restra ining order; (4) a motion for leave to file an amende d complaint; and (5) a motion to strike Inland Commercial Property Management’s jury demand. Plaintiff did not file the motions themselves along wi th the notices, but stated that copies of the motions wer e previously

serve d upon defe ndants. Meanwhile, the motion for substitut ion was g rante d and the case

rea ssigne d to the Honora

ble J ohn G. Dalton. ¶ 5 On Fe bruar

y 28, plaintiff’s third round of motions (or, more prec isely
, notices) came up for hearin g b e f

o r e J udg e Dalton. Def

endants now objected that plaintiff failed to comply with local rule 6.05(d) (16th J udicial Cir. Ct. R. 6.05(d) (June 20, 2001)), which provides that “[a]
copy of t he mot ion, any paper s to be presented with the m otion, and proof of service shall be serve d with the notice.” J udg e Dalton denied the objection. After argument on the merits of t he mot ions, t h e trial court gra nted t he mot ion for appointment of a rec eiver

. In light of the appointment, plaintiff withdrew its motion for a temporar y restra ining order

. The court t h en order ed that, pending the receive r t aking possession of t he property
, defe ndants we re enjoined “fr om making or cashing pay ments related to the proper ty *** ef

fe ct i v e [i mmediately ].” The cour t also g rante d plaintiff’s re maining motions. ¶ 6 On M arc h 1, J udg e Dalton hear d and denied I N R etail Fund’s motion to quash service of summons. That same day
, defe ndants filed a notice of appea l under I llinois Supreme Court Rule 307(a) (1) (ef

f. Fe b. 2 6
, 2 0 10), which provides that “[a]n appea l may be taken to the Appellate Court from an interlocutory order of court *** g ranti n g, modifying, ref using, dissolving, or ref

using to dissolve or modify an injunction.” On Marc h 4
, d ef endants amende d the notice to identify 11 separ ate orders e ntere d by the trial cour

t on Febr uary 28 and Marc h 1 in disposing of plaint i ff’s various motions and I N Retail Fund’ s motion to quash ser vice of summons.

¶ 7 ANALYSI S ¶ 8 Def

endants argue that the t rial court err ed by (1) re j ec t ing their objection t hat plaintiff violated l ocal rule 6.05(d) by serving notices wit hout acc om p an y i n g m otions; (2) denying I N Retail Fund’ s motion to quash service of summons; and (3) g ranting plaintiff’s mot ion for substitut ion of judge as a matter of rig ht. Notably
, though defe ndants claim jurisdiction under a supreme court rule that permits appea ls from interlocutory order s perta ining to injunctions, they

do not challeng e the substanc e of the injunctive order enter ed by the t rial
court. They believe nonetheless that we have jurisdiction over the various other order s. They

rea son that “[t] he Trial Court’s Orde rs on these point s–including the improper gr anting of the Motion for Substi tution of J udg e–taint all further order s enter ed by the Trial Court,” and, there fore
, “[i] t is appropr iate for this Court to undertake revie w, in order to avoid such dire
conseque nces, and befor e the trial court proce eding further advanc es.” As authority
, they cite
two case s, Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Center v. Berlin
, 268 I ll. App. 3d 184 (1994), decide d by the Four

th District Appellate Court
, an d P a r t i p ilo v. Partipilo
, 331 I ll. App. 3d 394

-3-(2002), de cided by the Fir st District Appellate Court. ¶ 9 The de fenda

nt in Berlin moved for substitution of judge as a matter of right. The cour t denied the motion and later g rante d the plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction. The defe ndant appe aled unde r Rule 307(a) (1). The defe ndant’s sole challeng e to the injunction

was that it was enter ed by a judge for whom another judge should have been substitut ed. The appellate court held that jurisdiction under Rule 307(a) (1) lay nonetheless. In so ruling
, the
court acknow ledg ed two authorities that appea red to instruct otherwise: Murges v. Bowman
, 254 I ll. App. 3d 1071 (1993), and City of Chicago v. Airline Canteen Servic e, In c. , 64 I ll. App. 3d 417 (1978), both decide d by the First District Appellate Court. Both Airline Canteen and Murges we re Rule 307(a) (1) appeals from injunctive order s, and in eac h case the t rial court, prior to enter ing the injunction, denied a motion to chang e venue. See Murges
, 254 I ll. App. 3d at 1076; Airline Canteen
, 64 I ll. App. 3d at 423. The appellate court in eac h case held that i t s Rule 307(a) (1) jurisdiction did not extend to the order denying a chang e of venue. See Murges
, 254 I ll. App. 3d at 1 0 8 4 ; A i r l i n e C anteen , 64 I ll. App. 3d at 428. The court in Airline Canteen rea soned: “Only final judg ments or orders are appea lable unless the particular judgment or orde r

comes within one of the specifie d exceptions set forth [i n the Supreme Court rules]. The denial of a motion for chang e of venue is not a final order
, nor does any Supreme Court rule authorize an appea l from an interlocutory order of such nature

. [C itations.] *** An
appea l under Rule 307 does not open up the door to a g ener al revie w of all order s enter ed by the trial court up to that date. Interlocutory appea ls are piece meal in nature and Rule 307 provides for some very specific exceptions to the rules ag ainst piece meal appea ls.” Airline Canteen , 64 I ll. App. 3d at 428. ¶ 10 Be sides declining to revie w the venue challeng e, the court in Murges held that it had no jurisdict i o n t o consi der the denial of the defe ndants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint on the g round that the plaintiff lacke d leg al capa city to sue. Murges
, 254 I ll. App. 3d at 1084. The court said: “This order is not final an d ap p ealable, and the appea l from a later order under Rule 307 does not g ive this court jurisdiction to revie w the pri o r order denying the motion to di smiss.” Id. ¶ 11 T h e co u rt i n B er l i n d ec lined to follow Murges and Airline Canteen
, becau s e t h e “diffic ulty with the[ir] holdings *** is t h at they permit a judge who should not be hearing

a motion for interlocutory injunctive relief to hear that matter without the objecting party having any rec ourse.” Berlin
, 268 I ll. App. 3d at 186-87. As the Berlin court understood it, Rule 307 permits the revie wing court “to revie w any prior err or that bear s direc tly upon the question of whethe r the orde r on appe al was pr oper.” Id. at 187. ¶ 12 Berlin cited one c ase to support its rea ding of Rule 307: Kurle v. Ev angelical Hospital Ass’n
, 89 I ll. App. 3d 45 (1980), decid ed b y this court. In Kurle
, the plaintiff filed a fourcount complaint for wrong ful termination and petitioned for injunctive relief

. The defe ndant moved to dismiss count I of the c omplaint. At the hear ing on the petition for an injunction and the motion to dismi ss, the following occur red:
“The motion to dismiss count I of t h e compl aint and the petition for a preliminary injunction we re hear d and in eff ect denied by the trial court. The court then asce rtained

-4-that [t he] defe ndant desired to stand on its motion to d i s miss and did not intend to file

an answe r to the alleg ations of count I or to the petition. The judge then stated t h at h e

was order ing [t he defe ndant] to reinstate the plaintiff with back pay , but then proce eded to hold an evidentiar

y hear ing.” Id. at 48.
At the conclusion of the hear ing, the court enter ed an injunction. Id. The defe ndant appea led the injunction, and this court held that the trial court err ed in conducting an evidentiar y hearing on the petition, beca use “on a motion for a temporar y injunction, wher e the defe ndant has not answe red the complaint and wher e issues have not been joined, the court should not rec eive or consider evidenc e or aff idavits.” Id. This court went on to hold that the defe ndant had f

orfe ited his objection to the evidentiary hear ing by

participating in it. Id. ¶ 13 The Berlin court rea soned that the issue of whether a substitut ion of judge should have been g rante d prior to a ruling on a petition f or an injunction is “of equal signific ance ” with the issue of whether the trial court should have held an evidentiar y hear ing on such a petition. Berlin
, 268 I ll. App. 3d at 187. Berlin conclude d that, if a reviewing court has jurisdiction to consider the latter, it has jurisdiction to consider the f ormer. ¶ 14 As furthe r support for reac hing the substitut ion issue, the Berlin court noted that some I llinois decisions have held that the err oneous denial of a motion for substitut ion of judge has a taintingeff

ect on subseque nt orders in the tria l court: “While the judge from whom substitut ion was soug ht here is an able and respe cted jurist, the rationale of the proce dure for substitut ion of judge is that t h e party seeking substitut ion perc eives that the deter mination of the judge who hear s the matter is likely
to ‘af fec t’ the outcome of the matter befor e the judge

. The importance of a proper ruling

on a motion for s u b s t i t u t i o n of judge is so g reat that some courts have held that the
wrong ful ref

usal of a proper reque st for substit u t i o n of judge rende rs all subsequent order s by that judge enter ed in the ca se void. [C itations.] ” Id. ¶ 15 In Partipilo
, the second case on which defe ndants rely here
, the plaintiff appea led under Rule 307, challeng ing both the denial of her petition for injunctive relief and the trial court’s prior denial of her motion for substit u t i o n o f j u dg e. The First District, following Berlin without question or comment, held t hat it had jurisdiction to review the substitut ion issue. Partipilo , 331 I ll. App. 3d at 398. ¶ 16 Neither Berlin
, Partipilo
, nor Kurle convinces u s t h at we h av e j u risdiction over the order s that defe ndants challeng e. As decisions from sister appellate districts, Berli n and Partipilo are not binding on this court. See American E conomy InsuranceCo. v. Holabird & Root
, 382 I ll. App. 3d 1017, 1034 (2008). Moreove r, since Kurle did not discuss the issue of jurisdiction, we cannot deem it prec edential on t h e q u est ion involved here

. There are , howeve r, decisions from this dis trict that expressly addre ss the scope of jurisdiction under Ru l e 307. Ba sed on their direc tion, which is consistent with that of Airline Canteen and Murges
, we m u s t conclude that we lack jurisdiction to revie w the order s that defe ndants challeng e. ¶ 17 In Olympic F

eder al v. W

itney Developme nt Co.
, 113 I ll. App. 3d 981 (1983), we cited Airline Canteen in saying: “Only final judg ments or orde rs ar e appe alable unless the particular judg ment falls

-5-within one of the specifie d exceptions. Interlocutory appea ls are piece meal in nature , and Supreme Court Rule 307 provides for some very specific exceptions to piece meal
appea ls.” Id. at 983-84 (c iting Airline Canteen , 64 I ll. App. 3d at 428).
We went on:
“An appea l u nder Rule 307 does not open the door to a g ener al revie w of all order s enter ed by the t rial court up to that date. [Ci tation.] Howeve r, ce rtain other or ders may be revie wable. For

example, in the case of an interlocutory appea l f rom the g ranting of temporar y injunctive relief

, an appellant may ask the appellate court not only to deter mine whether the t rial court proper ly exercised its discretion but also whe ther the complaint upon which the temporar y injunction was based was proper to sustain an injunction. [ Citation.] The rig ht to injunctive relief nece ssarily bring s into que stion the sufficie ncy of the complaint, and the defe ndant who does not stand on his motion to dismiss the complaint may never theless contend on appea l from an interlocutory order that the complaint does not set forth g rounds for any relief

. [C itation.] Thus, whether an order prec eding an interlocutory order from which an appea l is taken may be considere d during the interlocutory appea l depends on its relationship to the order appea led from.” Id. at 984. ¶ 18 In Olympic Fede ral
, the plaintiff filed a fore closure acti o n a n d later moved for possession of the subject pro p erty

. Wit hout first responding to the alleg ations in the complaint or the motion, the defe ndants filed a motion to strike the motion for possession on the g round that the plaintiff failed to establish that it was entitled to sue on the mortg ag e. After the trial court declined to strike t he mot ion for possession, the defendants moved for leave to respond to the alleg ations of the motion for possession. The court denied this as well, and subsequently
enter ed an order placing the plaintiff in possession. Id. at 985. The defe ndants appea led the order under Rule 307(a) (4) (I ll. S. Ct

. R

. 3 0 7 (a )(4) (ef f. J uly 1, 1982)), which permits an appea l f rom an order “plac ing or ref using to pla ce a mortg ag ee in possession of mortg ag ed premises.” We noted t hat, given the restric ted s cope of an interloc utory appea l under Rule 307, we co u l d re v iew “only order s attendant to the motion to be place d in possession” ( Olympic Fede ral
, 113 I ll. App. 3d at 984), i.e.
, orders that “g o to the sufficie ncy of the motion” ( id. at 990). The defe ndants challeng ed both the denial of their motion to strike and the denial of their re quest for leave to r espond to the motion for possession. We found that we ha d jurisdiction to revie w bot h order s. We rec og nized that “[g]ener ally
, the denial of a motion to strike or dismiss of itself is not an appea lable order .” Id. at 985. Since, howeve r, the propriety of the order g ranting possession depende d on the merits of the motion to strike,

we c ould reviewthe latter. Id. ¶ 19 In their motion to strike, the defe ndants raised the issue of wh et h er t h e p l ai n t iff wa s

en t i t l ed to sue on the m ortg ag e, given that it denominated its elf as Oly mpic Fe dera l whi l e the listed mortg ag ee was Oly mpic Savings and L oan As s o ci at i o n. Acc ording to the defe ndants, the plaintiff had to prove that it was the assig nee of the mortg ag e. Id. at 990. The trial court found that the plaintiff established that it was former ly Oly mpic Savings and L oan Association, which had been conver ted into Oly

mpic Fe dera l, a fede rally char tere d saving s and loan. This court noted that, under I llinois statutes, “[a] merg ed saving s an d loan association or one conver ted from State to Fe dera l is an ong oing entity that reta ins all of its

-6-liabiliti es, rig hts, and interes t s i n p roperty without the need for a transfe r.” Id. at 991.

Acc ording ly , the plaintiff did not need to pr ove an a ssignment of the mortg ag e. Id. ¶ 20 This court then addre ssed whether
, the motion to strike having been proper ly denied, the defe ndants should h av e b een permitted to respond to the alleg ations in the motion for possession. Id. at 986. This court held that the defe ndants wer e en t i t l ed under the rules of
proce dure to re spond to the motion’s alleg ations. Id. at 987. ¶ 21 Another ill ustrative decision from this court is Exe cutive Commercial Services, L td. v. Daskalakis
, 74 I ll. App. 3d 760 (1 9 7 9 ), wher e the defe ndant appea led, under I llinois Supreme Court Rule 304 (ef f. J an. 1, 1970), the dismiss al of her counter claim and third-par ty complaint. The defe ndant asked us to addre ss as well the trial cou rt ’s denial, prior to the dismiss al order s, of her motion to chan ge venue. We held that we lacke d jurisdiction to revie w that order

. Exe cutive Commercial Servic es, Ltd.
, 74 I ll. App. 3d at 768. Noting that Airline Canteen had “re sisted an att empt to bootstrap an appea l of a venue ruling onto an interlocutory appea l under Supr eme Court Rule 307,” we found “no rea son why a simil ar conclusion is not warr anted he re f or an a ppeal unde r Supreme Court Rule 304.” Id. ¶ 22 W e we re corr ect to conclude that the jurisdictional questions in Airline Ca n t ee n an d Daskalakis raised the same issue though under differ ent supreme court rules. The jurisdictional ho l d ings in those case s, as in Olympic Fede ral
, wer e applications of the principle that, “[ i ] n an i n t erloc utory appea l, the scope of revie w is normally limit ed to an examination of whether the trial cour t abused its discretion in g rantingor re fusingto gr ant the interlocutory relief

” ( Estate of Bass v. Katten
, 375 I ll. App. 3d 62, 72 (2007))

. In Olympic Fede ral
, we rec og nized that revie w of an interlocutory o rd er may well require revie w of “attenda nt” prior or ders, i.e. , those intertwined with the merits of the interlocutory order

. ¶ 23 Fi n all y , we note In re Marriage of Nettleton
, 348 I ll. App. 3d 961 (200 4 ), ci t ed b y p laintiff as a counter

point to Berlin

. The responde nt in Nettleton appea led, under Ru l e 304(b)( 5) (I ll. S. Ct. R. 304(b) (5 ) (e ff

. Feb. 1, 1994)), a stipulated finding of i ndirec t civil contempt that he procur ed in the trial court for the avowe d purpose of challeng ing the court’s prior denial of his motion for substitut ion of judge as a matter of rig ht. Nettle t o n , 3 4 8 I ll. App. 3d at 963-64. The stipulation provided that the responde nt ref used to comply with the court’s maintenanc e order

. Id. We declined to fol low Berlin
, holding that we lacke d jurisdiction to review the or der de nying substitution. W e noted that to re ach tha t order “would re nder meaning less all other rules requiring a final order by allowing a party to circ umvent a trial court’s ref usal to include Ru l e 304(a) languag e in its order or its

re fu s al to cer

tify the issue pursuant to Rule 308 mere ly by ref using to comply wi t h an order by which the party ’s ref usal to compl y woul d result in a contempt order and challeng e all other order s with which the party is dissati sfied. See, e.g. , Bearden v. Hamby , 240 I ll. App. 3d 779, 784 (1992) ( permitting r eview of a conte mpt finding but ref using to consider the trial court’s ruling on the party ’s motion in limine beca use it was not a final an d appea lable order and it did not fall under any exceptions to the g ener al rule that preliminary order s are not appea lable). We there fore decline to subvert our supreme court’s rules and prec edent by considering responde nt’s reque sts for revie w of issues not properly

befor e us at this juncture.” Id. at 971.

-7-I mplicit in these rema rks was our deter

mination t h at t h e substitut ion and contempt issues

wer e not substantively l i nked and, there fore
, that the order denying substitut ion was not proper ly befor e us. ¶ 24 Ba sed on the approa ch of Olympic Fede ral and the other authorities from this court, we conclude that we lack jurisdiction to review any of the order s that defe ndants challeng e. Def endants’ first contention on appea l is that the trial court err ed in declining to enfor ce local rule 6.05(d) ag ainst plaintiff as to its motions (1) for admission pro hac vi ce ; (2 ) for a temporar y restra ining order ; (3) for appointment of a rec eiver ; (4) for leave to file an amende d complaint; and (5) to strike Inland Commerci al Property Manag ement’s jury demand. Their second contention is that the trial court err ed in denying I N Retail Fund’ s motion to quash service of summons for noncomplianc e with I llinois Supreme Court Rule 101. Acc ording to Olympic Fede ral
, 113 I ll. App. 3d at 984, our revie w under Rule 307(a) (1) extends to any order s “attenda nt” to the injunctive order that forms the basis for jurisdiction. Def endants make no attempt to establish a link betwee n any of the challeng ed order s and the injunctive order
, other than to claim broadly that the challeng ed order s “taint[ed]” all further order s below. As the appellants, defe ndants have the burden to establish our jurisdiction (see I ll. S. Ct. R. 341(h)( 4) (ef

f. J uly 1, 2008)), and here that require s them to prove an exception
to the g ener al rule in I llinois that the denial of a motion to dismiss (to which the challeng ed order s may be likened) is not a final and appea lable order (see Olympic Fede ral
, 113 I ll. App. 3d at 985). See State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co.
, 226 I ll. 2d 395, 415 (2007) (“It is *** well settled in this state that a trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order that is not final and appea lable.”)

. Def endants have not c arr ied that burde n. ¶ 25 Def

endants ha

v e a ls o f a il ed to establish our jurisdiction over the order g rantingplaintiff’s motion for substitut ion of judge

. We rec og nize, as did the court in Berlin
, that the err oneous denial of a motion for substitut ion of judge as a matter of rig ht r ender s void a ll subsequent

o rd ers in the case. S ee Illinois Licensed Beverage Ass’n v. Advanta L easing Services
, 3 3 3 I ll. App. 3d 927, 932 (2002) (re versingboth errone ous denial of substitution as a matter of rig ht a nd all subsequent order s in the case ). We know of no authority
, howeve r, sug g esting that the err oneous grant of a motion for substitut ion–as is alleg ed here–has a like eff ect. In any case , our supreme court has seen fit not to provide specific ally for interlocutory appea ls of any order disposing of a motion for substitut ion. Evaluate d under the criter ia of Olympic Fede ral
, the trial court’s g rant of plaintiff’s substitut ion motion was no more “attenda nt” to its later injunctive order than the order denying a chang e of venue in Daskalakis was to the later injunctive or der in that c ase. Nettleton is further suppor t for this conclusion.

¶ 26 CONCLUSI ON ¶ 27 Fo r t h e fo re go i n g rea sons, we hold that Rule 307(a) (1) aff ords us no jurisdiction t o revie w the various order s defe ndants challeng e. Acc ording ly
, we dismiss this appea l for lack of jurisdiction.

¶ 28 Appea l dismi ssed.

-8-