### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs A pr il 5, 200 5
STATE OF TENNESS EE v . DAVE LONG

Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court for Sequ atchie County

No. 4313 Thomas W. G raham , Judge

No. M2004- 01721-CCA -R3-C D - F iled Jun e 6, 2005

A f t e r e n t e r i n g a p l e a o f g u i l t y, t h e D e f e n d a n t , D a v e L o n g , w a s c o n v i c t e d o f o n e c o u n to f

b u r g l ar y, a Class D fe lony

. Pursuant to a plea a g ree ment, the Def endant wa s to be sentenc ed to six y ear s as a R an ge II , m u l t i p l e o ff

en d er , wi t h t h e t ri al co u rt t o es t ab l i s h t h e m an n ero f s er v i ce

. Fo l l o w i n g a sentenc ing he aring , the trial court ordere d the Def endant se rve his entire sentenc e with the Te nnessee De pa rt me nt o f C orr ect io n (TD OC ). On app e a l, the De fe nd a nt a rg ue s th a t th e tr ia l c ou rt

e rr e d in de nying him

pr ob a tio n o r o the r a lte rn a tiv e se nte nc ing . We a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f the tr ia l c ou rt

. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Aff irm ed

D AVI D H. W EL L ES , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which J A M ES C UR WO OD W I TT , J R ., and J. C. M C L IN , J J ., joined.

B. J ef fe ryHa rm o n , J as p er , T en n es s ee , fo r t h e a p p el l an t , Da v e Lon g.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney Gene ral and Reporter ; Preston Shipp, Assi stant Attorney Gene ral; and J . Michae l Tay lor, District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

. OP IN ION

F AC TS

Ac c or din g to the State ’s fa c tua l ba sis pr e se nte d at th e ple a a c c e ptanc e he ari ng, th e fa c ts
su rr ou nd ing the of

fe ns e a t is su e in this c a se c a n b e su mma ri zeda s f oll ow s: [O]n Jul y the 7thof

20 03 , th e Cha

pe l H ill Un ite d M e tho dis t Ch ur c h inSe qu a tc hie Countywas burg larized. That one of the parishioners advised Investig ator [Keith] Her ron [of the Sequatchie CountySheriff' s Offic e] that he had see n a vehic le par ked at the chur ch that day

and that he later saw the sa me vehicle in Hamilton Count y and
was a ble to g et a tag number. Investig ation ensued and t h e i n vestig ation reve aledT h e S t a t e ’ s t h e or y was t hat t he Def e n da n t bu r g l a r i z e d t h e c h u r c h on t w o s e pa r a t e oc c a s i on s , s t e a l i n g s om e 1

a u d io -visu a l eq u ip m e n t an d m ic ro w a v e s the fi rs t t im e , an d re tur n in g s e v e ra l d a ys la te r to ste a l se v e ra l “w e e d e a te rs .” T h e D e fen d a n t, w h ile a d m itt ing to the the ft o f t h e p ro p e rty, c la im e d he e n te re d the c h u rc h p ro p e rty o n ly o n c e

. -2- that M r

. L o n g h a d p a w n e d inCh a tt a n o o g a it e ms s to le n f

r o m C h ap e l H il l U n it ed Methodist Church within a short period of time afte r t he burg lary occur red and that would be esse ntially

what the State’ s proof would be

. For sentenc ing pur

poses the State would be show ing that Mr. L ong has two,
a m i n i m u mo f

t w o p r i o r f

e l o n y c o n v i c t i o n s w h i c h w o u l d m ak e h i ma R a n g e II offe nder.

The De fendant confirmed the above f acts we re true

.
I n September of 2003, the Def endant was indicted by

a Sequatc hie County

g rand jury

on two
c ou nts of bu rg lary a nd tw o co un ts of the ft

. I n April of 20 04 , the De fe nd a nt e nte re d a ple a of g uil ty 1 to one count of bur g lary

and the State dismissed the re maining thr ee c harg es ag ainst him. Also, as part of this plea

ag ree ment, the Def

endant a g ree d to be sentenced a s a Rang e I I offe nder to six y ear s with the m anner of service to be determined by the t rial court. At the pl ea hearing, the court found that the Def

endant unde rstood the consti tutional rig hts he waive d by entering a

g uiltyplea, a nd had done so both knowing ly

and voluntarily . The c ourt ac cepte d th e De fe ndant’s g uiltyplea a nd
c o n v i c t e d t h e D e f

e n d a n to f o n e c o u n to f

C l a s s D f e l o n y b u r g l ar y.

I n May of 2004, a sentencing hearing was conducted t o determine the m anner in which the Def endant would se rve his six -y ear burg lary conviction sentenc e. At this he aring , Diane L ong , the De fe nd a nt’ s mo the r, te sti fi e d th at the De fe nd a nt b e c a me inv olv e d inc ri min a l a c tiv ity a t th e e arl y age o f sevente en bec ause he associate d with the “wr ong crow d.” Howe ver, she believed he was do ing muc h b e tte r in re c e nt y e ars , w a s try ing to turn h is l if e aro un d, a ndwa s tr

uly re mor se fu l f

or his burg lary of the c hurch. The pre sentenc e re port ref lects that at the time of sentenc ing the Def endant wa s thirty -two y e ars old , a

pp are ntl y div or c e d, a ndthe fathe r of tw o c hil dr e n. He dr op pe d ou t of sc ho ol in the te nth g rade and has an “instituti onal GED.” He ha s no history of stea d y em p l o y m en t. He does ha ve a l e n g t h y h i s t o r y o f

c r i m i n a l a c t i v i t y.
The Defendant testified at the s entenc ing hearing that many of hi s criminal problems re lated to dru g a nda lc oh ol a

bu se , w hic h b e g a n inhis y ou th. He a dmi tte d h e vio la te d p ro batio n a ndpa ro le in the past, both times for failing drug tests. The De fendant testified that he stopped smoking pot two y ear s prior to his sentencing hearing, and wa s a model prisoner, rea ching trusty status. The Def endant e x plained that just be fore he burg larized the churc h, he smoked metha mphetamine and “fr eake d out for a f

ew day s,” but was sorry for his actions, wished to apolog ize to the church, and
o ff er ed t o re p ay t h e ch u rc h fo r th ei r l o s s es “t en fo l d

. ” Att h e c o n cl u s i o n o f t h e s en t en ci n g h ea ri n g, the tr ia l c ou rt de nie d bothpr ob a tio n a nda lte rn a tiv e se nte nc ing a ndse nte nc e d th e De fe nd a nt t o s ix y ear s with the TDOC. The De fendant timelyfiled a notice of appe al.-3- AN AL YSI S On appe al, the Def

endant claims the trial court e rre d in deny ing him probation or alternative sentenc ing. Spec ifically , the Def endant a rg ues that he should have rec eived pr obation beca use he could be r ehabilitated, or should have be en g rante d alternative sentenc ing be cause t h e t ri al court failed to a rticulate how his confinement wa s nece ssary to avoid depre cating the seriousne ss of the
o f f e n s e o r w a s n e c e s s ar y

to p r o v id e a

d e te rr e n t e f

f e c t. Se e T e n n

. Co d e A n n

. § 4 0

- 3 5

- 1 0 3 ( 1 ) ( B )

. We disag ree

. A. Standard of

Review Be fore a trial c ourt imposes a sentenc e upon a convicted c riminal defe ndant, it must consider (a) the evidenc e adduc ed at the trial and the sentencing hearing; ( b) the pre -sentenc e re port; (c) the principles of se ntencing and ar g uments as to sentenc ing a lternatives; (d) the nature and char acte ristics of the criminal conduct involved; (e) evidenc e and inf ormation offe red by

the parties on the enha nceme nt and mitigating fac tors set forth in Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tions 40-35- 113 an d 4 0 -3 5 -114; and (f ) any statement the de fendant wishes to make in the def endant’ s own behalf about s entenc ing. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210(b); State v. I mfeld, 70 S.W.3d 698, 704 (T e nn . 2 00 2) . T o f

a c ili ta te app e llate re vie w, the tr ial cou rt is r e qu ir e d to pla c e on the re c or d it s rea sons for i m p o sing the specific sentenc e, including the identification of the mitigating and enhanc emen t f

a c to r s f o u n d , th e s p e c if

ic f a c ts s u p p o r ti n g e a c h e n h a n c e me n t f a c to r f o u n d , a n d the
me tho d b y

wh ic h th e mitig a ti ng and enh a nc e me nt f a c tor s h a ve be e n e va luate d a ndba la nc e d in determining the se ntence . See State v. Samuels, 44 S.W.3d 489, 492 (Tenn. 2001).

When a convicte d defe ndant cha lleng es the manner of service of a sentenc e, thi s Court has a duty to conduct a de novo revie w of the se ntence with a presumption that the determinations made by the tr ia l c ou rt

are c or re c t. S e e Te nn . Co de An n. § 40- 35 -4 01 (d ). Ho we ve r, thi s p re su mpt ion“ is conditioned upon t he af

firmative showing in the rec ord that the trial c ourt consider ed the se ntencing principles and all rele vant fac ts and circ umstances.” State v. Ashby , 823 S.W .2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991). I f our revie w ref

lects that the trial court followed the statutory sentenc ing pr ocedur e, that the court imposed a la wful sentenc e af ter ha vi n g gi v en due c onsideration and pr oper w eig ht to the fac tors and princ iples set out under the se ntencing law, and that the trial court’ s findings of fac t are adequately

supported by the record, then the presumption is applicable, and we may not modify

the sentenc e eve n if we w ould have pr efe rre d a diffe rent re sult. S ee State v. F letcher , 805 S.W . 2d 785, 789 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991) . We will uphold t he sente nce imposed by the trial court if (1) the senten ce co m plies with the purposes and principles of the 1989 Sentenc ing A ct, and ( 2) the trial court’s f indings a re a dequate ly

supported by

the re cord. See State v

. Ar n et t , 4 9 S.W .3d 250, 257 (Tenn. 2001) . The burde n of showing that a sentenc e is imprope r is upon the appe aling party . See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-401 Sentenc ing Commission Com ments; Arnett, 49 S.W.3d at 257.

We note that the leng th of the Def endant’ s sentenc e, six y ear s, was pa rt of the plea

ag ree ment and is not challeng ed on appea l. There fore , we will examine only the trial court’s determination as to the manner

of ser vice.-4-

B. Denial of

P robation A d e fe nd a nt i s e lig ibl e fo r p ro batio n if the a c tua l se nte nc e imp os ed up on the de fe nd a nt i s eig ht y ear s or less and the of fense for whic h the defendant is sentenc ed is not specific ally excluded by statute. See Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 303(a) . T h e t rial court shall automatically consider probation as a

sentenc ing a lterna

ti v ef o r e li g ib le d e f endants; howe ver, the defe ndant bea rs the burde n of pro vi ng hi s or he r s uit abil ity fo r p ro batio n. Se e id. § 4 0- 35 -3 03 (b ). No c ri min a l de fe nd a nt i s au t o m at i callyentitled to probation as a matter of law . See id. § 40-35-303( b), Sentenc ing Commi ssion Com ments; St ate v. Da vis, 940 S.W .2d 558, 559 (Tenn. 1997) . Rather, the de fenda nt must demonstrate that probation would serve the e nds of justice and the best interests of both the public and the de fendant. See State v. Souder, 105 S.W.3d 602, 607 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2002).

I n determining whe ther to g rant probation, the court must consider the nature a nd circ umstances of

the offe nse; the def

endant’ s crimi n al rec ord; his or her ba ckg round and soc ial his tory ; hi s o r h e r p re se nt c on dit ion , b othph y sic a l a nd me nta l; the de te rr e nt e ff e c t onthe de fe nd a nt;
a ndthe de fe nd a nt’ s p ote nti a l f or re ha bil itatio n or tr e a tme nt. Se e id. I f the c ou rt de te rm ine s th a t a pe rio d o f p r o b a ti o n is ap p r o p r iate , it s h a ll s e n te n c e th e d e f e n d a n t to a s p e c if

ic s e n te n c e b u t the n suspend that sentenc e and pla ce the defe ndant on supervised or unsupervise d probation either immediately

or af ter the se rvice of a period of confine ment. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40- 35-303(c ), -306(a ). We beg in by

noting that the D efe ndant is elig ible for pr obation. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-303(a ). Howe ver, the Def endant ha s failed to demonstrate that probation would both serve the ends of justice and would be in the best interests of the publ ic and the Def endant. See Souder, 105 S.W .3d at 607. The tria l court noted that from 1989 to 2003, the y ear the Def endant c ommitt ed the crime at issue in this case, ther e wa s never a period longe r than two y ear s in which the De fenda nt was not involved in c riminal activity

. Additionally , the rec ord reve als that the Def endant violated both probation and pa

role in the pa st; his probation was revoke d for failing a drug test, and seve ral y e ars la te r his pa

ro le wa s re vo ke d fo r faili ng to ke e p ste a dy e mpl oyme nt, le a vin g the state , a nda g a in failing a drug test. I n short, the evidenc e conta ined in the re cord i s more than suf ficient to justify denial of pr obation. Acc ording ly , we f ind the trial court did n o t err in deny ing the Def

endant probation. This issue has no merit.

C. De nia l of A lt e r nat iveSe nt e nc ing A def endant who does not possess a criminal history showing a cle ar disre g ard f or society ’s laws and mora ls, who has not failed pa st rehabilitation eff orts, and who “is an espe cially mitigated
or stand ardof

fe nd e r c on vic te d o f a

Cla ss C , D , o r Efe lon y

is p re su me d to be a

fa vo ra ble c a nd idate for a lternative se ntencing options in t he abse nce of evidenc e to the contra ry .” Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35-102( 6). See a lso St ate v
. Fi el d s , 4 0 S.W .3d 435, 440 (Tenn. 2001) . The following
c on sid e ratio ns pr ov ide g uid a nc e re g ard ing wh a t c on sti tut e s “ e vid e nc e to the c on tr ary ” wh ic h w ou ld
re b u tt h e p re s u m p t i o n o f a l t er n at i v e s en t en ci n g: (A) Confinement is ne cessa ry to pr otect society by restraining a defe ndant who has
a lon g his tory

of c ri min a l c on du c t;T he D ef endan t al s o ar gu es t hat t he t r i al cour t er r ed becau s e t he r ecor d i s devoi d of an y ev i dence t hat a s ent enc e 2

o f co nf i nem ent wo ul d have a d et errent ef fect wi t hi n t he jur i sdi ct i o n, ci t i ng Stat e v. H o o p er, 29 S.W

. 3 d 1 (T enn. 20 0 0 ). H o w e v e r, w h ile d e te rr e n c e is a fa c to r fo r j u d g e s to c o n sid e r in d e lib e ra ting w h e the r t o issu e a se n te n c e o f co n fine m e n t, t he cour t i n t he cas e at hand p l ace d no rel i anc e o n det er r enc e as a r eas on f or i mp osi ng a s ent enc e of conf i nemen t

. See T e n n . C o d e A n n . § 4 0 -3 5 -1 0 3 (1 )( B ). A c c o rd ing ly, the D e fen d a n t’s ar g u m e n t o n this p o int is irre le v a n t.
-5- (B ) Confinement is nec essary to avoid depre ciating the s eriousness of the offe nse or c on fi ne me nt i s p art ic ula

rl y su ite d to pr ov ide a n e ff

e c tiv e de te rr e nc e to o the rs lik e ly to commit si milar offe nses; or (C) Mea sures less re strictive than conf inement have fre quently

or re centlybeen applied unsucc essfully

to the defe ndant[.]
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-103(1) ; see a lso St ate v. Hoope r, 29 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tenn. 2000). Additionally , the principles of sentenc ing ref lect that the se ntence should be no g reater than that deserved for the offe nse committed and should be the least sever e mea sure ne cessa ry to achieve the purposes f

or which the sent en ce is imposed. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-103(2) , (4). The court should also co n s i d er t h e def endant’ s potential for re habilitation or treatment in dete rmining the appr opriate se ntence . See id. § 40-35-103( 5).

I n the ca se at ha nd, th e De fe ndant was c onvicted as a Rang e I I , multipl e off

ender , and there fore is not presumed to be a favor able c andidate f

or a l t er native sente ncing . See Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35-102 (6 ). Additionally , the trial court found that denial of a lternative se ntencing was appropriate upon consideration of the three sentenc ing g uidelines perta ining direc tly to sentence s of confine ment

. F ir s t, th e c o u r t f o u n d th a t c o n f

in e me n t o f

th e D e f e n d a n t w a s n e c e s s ar y

to p r o te ct society from an individual with a long history of criminal conduct. See Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 10 3( 1) (A ). Th e e vid e nc e c on ta ine d inthe re c or d s up po rt s th is c on c lus ion

. Th e De fe nd a nt, no w o nly in his early

thirties, has well over

twenty criminal convictions for crimes such as for g ery , traff icking of marijuana, co ercion of a witness, thef t and burg lary , among others. The Def endant’ s criminal history demonstrates that he has be en eng ag ed in criminal activity all of his adult life.
Second, the tria l court also found the Def endant should be c onfined to avoid de prec iating the serio u s n e s s o f th e o f

f e n s e

. Se e T e n n

. Co d e A n n

. § 4 0

- 3 5

- 1 0 3 ( 1 ) ( B )

. T h e c o u r t r e a s oned that 2 beca use the De fendant had pre viouslybeen c onvicted of similar off en s es o f t h eft, as well as “an exactly simil ar of

fense , a burg lary ,” and y et co n t inued to commit these same ty pes of c rimes, the Def endant ha d not rec eived the me ssag e as to the se rious nature of these of fense s.
Howeve r, the De fendant arg ues on appea l that there was insufficient proof that his crime of burg lary rose to the l evel of

“espe cially

violent, horrifying, shoc king, r epre hensible, off ensive or oth e rwis e of

a n e xce ssi ve or

e xag g e rate d d e g re e , a ndthe natur e of the of fe ns e mus t ou tw e ig h a ll fac tors favoring pr obation,” as r equire d by State v. Cleavor, 691 S.W.2d 541, 543 ( Tenn. 1985). See
a lso State v. F ie lds , 4 0 S. W.3 d 4 35 , 4 41 (T e nn . 200 1) . We a g re e wi th the De fe nd a nt that th e fa c ts and cir cumstanc es of his burg lary fail to meet the string ent re quirements for denying a lternative sentenc ing to a void depre cating the seriousne ss of the offe nse. Howe ver, w e note that the statutory-6-

c ri te ri a su pp ortin g c on fi ne me nt l ist e d inTe nn e sse e Cod e An no ta te d s e c tio n 4 0- 35 -1 03 (1 ) i s a disjunctive list, and any one of the three criteria may support a sente nce of

confine ment. Thus, the trial court’ s misapplication of this one criterion doe s not w arr ant a modification of the De fenda nt’s sentenc e. Finally , the trial court found that measur es less re strict i v e t h an confine ment had bee n fre quently

or re cently

applied unsucc essfully

to t h e De fe n d an t . See Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 103(1)( C). The re cord c ontains evidenc e of a probation violation a nd a par ole violation, both in the prese ntence report and in the Def endant’ s own admissions at the sentenc ing he aring . Thus, we f ind the evidence is sufficient to support the trial c ourt’s conc lusion that measures less r estrictive than confine ment have pr oved unsuccessful for the Defenda nt in the past, and a se ntence of conf inement is theref ore a ppropriate

. Ad dit ion a lly , a ft e r c on sid e ri ng the De fe nd a nt’s e xten siv e c ri min a l hi sto ry , w e fi ndhis sentenc e of c onfinement in this case was not g reater than that dese rved f or the off ense, and was the least seve re measure nece ssary to achieve the purpose of his sentence . See Te nn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-103(2) , (4). The Def

endant’ s history

of re peate dly

committing thefts and bur g laries, a s well as prior probation and parole violations, both indicate a lac k of potential for reha bilitation. S ee T enn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 103(5).

We f ind th e Defenda nt’ s e xten siv e c ri min a l hi sto ry a s w e ll a s h is f

a ilu re to s uc c e ssf

ull y complete pr evious forms of a l t er native sente ncing both support the trial court’ s imposit ion of a sentenc e of c onfinement. Ac cording ly , the trial court did not err in d en y i n g t h e Defendant alternative sentenc ing. T his issue is without merit.

CO NC LU SION For the fore g oing r easons, we find the trial co u rt did not err in its determination of the
ma nn e r i n w hic h the De fe nd a nt’ s se nte nc e is t o b e se rv e d. Th e jud g me nt o f the tr ia l c ou rt is aff irmed.

___________________________________ DAVID H. WELLES, J UDGE