J-S16022-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

DONALD LEE WAY 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1449 EDA 2019

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 16, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-23-CR-0003558-2018

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: Filed: July 30, 2020

Donald Lee Way appeals from the judgment of sentence entered 

following his convictions for possession with intent to deliver a controlled 

substance (“PWID”), possession of drug paraphernalia, and institutional 

vandalism.1 He challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress. 

We affirm.

Way’s convictions stem from what began as a traffic stop. During this 

traffic stop, officers searched Way’s vehicle and they arrested and charged 

him with the above referenced offences. Way filed a motion to suppress

arguing that the search of the vehicle was illegal because the officers did not 

have probable cause. See N.T., Motion to Suppress, 10/19/18, at 3.

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1 35 Pa.C.S. §§ 780-113(a)(30), (32) and 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3307(a)(3), 

respectively. 
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The trial court summarized its findings of facts from the motion to 

suppress hearing as follows:

On April 9, 2018, at approximately 8:30 PM, in the area of 

Bailey Road and Orchard Avenue in Yeadon, Delaware 

County, Officer Leah Cesanek initiated a stop on a Honda 

Coupe with expired registration. (N.T. 10/19/18, p. 6). The 

vehicle turned onto Orchard Road and pulled over to the side 

of the road. (N.T. 10/19/18, p. 7). When the vehicle 

stopped, [Way] stepped out and despite being ordered back 

into the car, refused to do so. (N.T. 10/19/18, p. 9) [Way]

did not park the car legally. (N.T. 10/19/18, p. 12). [Way] 

was the sole occupant in the car. (N.T. 10/19/18, p. 9). 

Once again, after the Officer told [Way] to get back into the 

car, he refused and proceeded to run up Orchard Avenue. 

(N.T. 10/19/18, p. 9). [Way] did not close the driver's side 

door. (N.T. 10/19/18, p. 19). Officer Cesanek pursued 

[Way], who was caught by another officer. (N.T. 10/19/18, 

p. 9). Sergeant Reynolds stayed with the vehicle during the 

pursuit. (N.T. 10/19/18, p. 9). [Way] was searched and then 

placed in the back of Officer McGrenera's patrol car. (N.T. 

10/19/18, p. 9). Upon inspection of [Way’s] car, Officer 

Cesanek observed through the open driver's side door a 

clear plastic baggie with "green vegetable -like matter" that 

the officer believed to be marijuana. (N.T. 10/19/18, p. 13). 

Officer Cesanek also smelled a strong odor of fresh 

marijuana coming from the vehicle. (N.T. 10/19/18, p. 13).

A search of [Way’s] vehicle led to the discovery of two

additional green plastic vials containing suspected 

marijuana and one plastic baggie containing a second 

baggie within that bag containing suspected marijuana. 

(N.T. 10/19/18, p. 14). In the rear of the car was a Mason 

jar containing 16 clear plastic baggies containing marijuana, 

and an unopened box of plastic baggies that were identical 

to the other plastic baggies in the car. (N.T. 10/19/18, p. 

15). [Way’s] vehicle was subsequently towed. (N.T. 

10/19/18, p. 16).
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Trial Ct. Op., filed 10/24/19, at 2. The court did not rule on the motion at the 

hearing but eventually entered an order denying the motion. See Order, filed 

10/22/18. 

Way proceeded with a stipulated bench trial. See N.T., Trial 4/15/19 at 

11. The next day, the court found Way guilty of the above-referenced offenses

and imposed concurrent sentences on each conviction: 11-1/2 to 23 months’ 

incarceration for PWID; 12 months’ probation for possession of drug 

paraphernalia; and nine months’ probation for institutionalized vandalism. 

See N.T., 4/16/19, at 3, 6. This timely appeal followed. 

Way presents one issue before this Court: 

Whether the suppression court erred when it failed to find 

that the police conducted an unconstitutional, warrantless

search of Appellant's parked vehicle in light of the physical 

evidence presented at the suppression hearing that the 

vehicle door could not have remained open following 

Appellant's exit, thus not subject to a permissible 

warrantless search?

Way’s Br. at 4. 

Our standard of review of the denial of a motion to suppress is well 

settled:

[An appellate court's] standard of review in addressing a 

challenge to the denial of a suppression motion is limited to 

determining whether the suppression court's factual 

findings are supported by the record and whether the legal 

conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. Because the 

Commonwealth prevailed before the suppression court, we 

may consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth and 

so much of the evidence for the defense as remains 

uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a 

whole. Where the suppression court's factual findings are 
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supported by the record, [the appellate court is] bound by 

[those] findings and may reverse only if the court's legal 

conclusions are erroneous. Where ... the appeal of the 

determination of the suppression court turns on allegations 

of legal error, the suppression court's legal conclusions are 

not binding on an appellate court, whose duty it is to 

determine if the suppression court properly applied the law 

to the facts. Thus, the conclusions of law of the courts below 

are subject to [ ] plenary review.

Commonwealth v. Jones, 121 A.3d 524, 526–27 (Pa.Super. 2015) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Jones, 988 A.2d 649, 654 (Pa. 2010)).

Way claims that “the police were precluded from searching [Way’s] 

parked vehicle without a warrant under [Arizona v.] Gant, [556 U.S. 332 

(2009),] since he was secured by police away from the vehicle[.]” Way’s Br. 

at 11. He also alleges that the warrantless search is not valid because the 

officer’s would not have observed anything “if the driver’s side vehicle door 

was actually closed.” Id. at 12. 

“Generally, a warrant stating probable cause is required before a police 

officer may search for or seize evidence.” Commonwealth v. Bumbarger, -

-- A.3d ---, 2020 WL 1242438 at *7 (Pa.Super. 2020). However, the plain 

view doctrine provides that “when an officer is lawfully in a position to view 

an item, the incriminating nature of which is immediately apparent, he may 

legitimately seize that item.” Commonwealth v. Zhahir, 751 A.2d 1153, 

1160 (Pa. 2000). This doctrine applies if: 

1) police did not violate the Fourth Amendment during the 

course of their arrival at the location where they viewed the 

item in question; 2) the item was not obscured and could be 

seen plainly from that location; 3) the incriminating nature 
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of the item was readily apparent; and 4) police had the 

lawful right to access the item.

Commonwealth v. Anderson, 40 A.3d 1245, 1248 (Pa. Super. 2012)

(citation omitted).

Here, Officer Cesanek testified that he initially conducted a traffic stop 

of Way’s vehicle because his vehicle’s registration was expired. An officer has 

authority to stop a vehicle when the officer observes the driver commit a traffic 

violation, and Way does not dispute that Officer Cesanek had the authority to 

conduct a traffic stop of Way’s vehicle for his expired registration. See

Commonwealth v. Calabrese, 184 A.3d 164, 167 (Pa.Super. 2018)

(“Pennsylvania law makes clear that a police officer has probable cause to stop 

a motor vehicle if the officer observes a traffic code violation, even if it is a 

minor offense.”) (citation omitted).

Way’s argument is that Officer Cesanek could not have seen the drugs 

in the vehicle because his driver side door was closed. However, the trial court 

made a finding of fact that Way’s door was open, based on Officer Cesanek’s 

testimony. Additionally, the trial court credited Officer Cesanek’s testimony 

that he smelled a strong odor of marijuana as he approached the vehicle, 

which invoked the plain smell doctrine, also giving him probable cause to 

search the vehicle. See Commonwealth v. Stoner, 344 A.2d 633, 636

(Pa.Super. 1975) (plain smell of marijuana gives officer probable cause to 

search vehicle); see also Commonwealth v. Batista, 219 A.3d 1199, 1206 

(Pa.Super. 2019) (stating deference given to suppression court’s factual 
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findings). As such, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Way’s 

motion to suppress. 

His citation to Gant is inapposite. The Court in Gant held that “[p]olice 

may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest only if the arrestee 

is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the 

search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the 

offense of arrest.” Gant, 533 U.S. at 351. The search here was not a search 

incident to arrest. We therefore affirm the judgment of sentence. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/30/20