Rule 23 order filed NO. 5-04-0731

September 12, 2006; Motion to publish gran

ted IN T HE October 30, 2006. AP PEL LA TE C OU RT OF ILLIN OIS FIF TH DIST RICT

________________________________________________________________________ THE CHRI STI AN COUNTY BOAR D OF ) Appeal from the REV I EW, ) Circui t Court of ) C hr ist ian C ou nt y. Plaintiff-A ppella nt, ) ) v. ) No. 01-MR-13 ) THE PROPERTY TAX APPEAL ) BOARD, CAROL P RESNELL, andJACK ) PRESNELL, ) Honorable J ames J. Eder and ) Hon orable M ichael R. W eber, Defendan ts-Appellees. ) Judges, presi ding.

-------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- ---------- THE CHRI STI AN COUNTY BOAR D OF ) Appeal from the REV I EW, ) Circui t Court of ) C hr ist ian C ou nt y. Plaintiff-A ppella nt, ) ) v. ) No. 01-MR-15 ) THE PR OPERT Y TAX APP EAL ) BOARD and ALLEN C. BRAUNE, ) Honorable J ames J. Eder and ) Hon orable M ichael R. W eber, Defendan ts-Appellees. ) Judges, presi ding.

-------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- ---------- THE CHRI STI AN COUNTY BOAR D OF ) Appeal from the REV I EW, ) Circui t Court of ) C hr ist ian C ou nt y. Plaintiff-A ppella nt, ) ) v. ) No. 01-MR-17 ) THE PROPERTY TAX APPEAL ) BOARD and ROBERT A. NOREUIL, ) Honorable J ames J. Eder and ) H ono rab le M icha el R . W ebe r, Defendan ts-Appellees. ) Judges, presi ding.

-------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- ----------2

THE CHRI STI AN COUNTY BOAR D OF ) Appeal from the REV I EW, ) Circui t Court of ) C hr ist ian C ou nt y. Plaintiff-A ppella nt, ) ) v. ) No. 01-MR-16 ) THE PROPERTY TAX APPEAL ) BOARD, ) ) De fend ant-A ppelle e and Cro ss-A ppella nt, ) ) and ) ) BELINDA SEXS ON, ) Honorable J ames J. Eder and ) H ono rab le M icha el R . W ebe r, Defendant-Appell ee. ) Judges, presi ding.

________________________________________________________________________ JUS TIC E W EL CH delive red the opin ion o f the c ourt: In 199 9, the C hristian C oun tyBoard of Review (County ) asses sed five manufact ured homes lo ca ted in C hr ist ian C ou nt y as re al p ro pe rty. Each owner of the manufact ured homes sepa rately appealed t

he assess ments to t

he Propert

y Tax Appeal Board (PTAB) and argued that th e m an ufac tu re d h om es sh ou ld be as se ss ed as pe rso na lty and not realpropert y. The PTAB agreed with each owner of the manufact ured homes and found that becaus e the manufactured

homes do not res t on a permanent foundati on and because t he County di d not have a lawful method of assess ing manufactur ed homes orlike- kind propert y pr ior t o 1979, they were improperly as sessed as real property pursuant to the P rope rtyTax C ode (3 5 I LCS 200/1-1 et se q. (W est 20 02)). T he P TA B fo und th at the manu factur ed homes should be treat ed, for taxation pur

poses, as mo bile home s s ubj ect to th e pr ovi si ons of t

he Mob il e Home Local Services Tax Act (35 ILCS 515/1 et seq. (West 2002)) . The County appealed ea ch PT AB dec ision to th e circ uit co urt o f C hrist ian C oun ty. On review , the circu itcour t uph eld the PTAB's findings that none of the manufact

ured homes rest ed on a permanent f oundation. The circuit court also hel d that

regarding four of the manufactured homes, the PTAB's findings that the County di d not have a lawful met hod3

of assess ing manufactur ed homes or like-kind pr operty prior to 1979 and that therefore the class ific ationof the prope rty did not fr eeze undersection 24-5 of the Prop erty Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/24-5 ( West 2002)) were n ot agai ns t the mani fest weight of the evi dence. How ever, regard ing the fif th manufactur ed home, the c ircui t court held that because the
e vidence was uncontradi cted that the fifth manufactured home had bee n assess ed as rea l prop erty priorto 19 79, the PT AB 's findin gs "w ith resp ect to th e asse ssme nt of [ this manufactured

home]" were against the manifest we ight of the ev idenc e. Th e Co unty app eals the circuit court 's a dverse deci sions onthe four manufact ured homes, and the PT AB appe als the circuit court 's a dverse deci sion on the fift h manufactured home. These cases have been consoli dated. For

th e r ea so ns th at

fo ll ow, we a ff

ir m t he de ci si ons of

th e PT AB, an d we affirm in part a nd re verse in part th e dec isions o f the c ircuit co urt. Befor e add ressing the is sues rai sed on appeal , we note t hat thi s appeal c omes to us from severaldecisi ons by t he cir cu it c ou rt o f C hr ist ian C ou nt y. Howe ve r, be caus e the PTAB is an a dmi ni stra ti ve a gen cy sub je ctto th e Administrati ve Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3-101 et seq. (We st

200 4) ), our

re vi ew f oc us es ex cl us iv el yon t

he de ci si ons of

th e PT AB and not the dec ision s of

the c ircu it cou rt. Senachwine Club v. Putnam County Board of Review , 362 Ill. App. 3d 566, 56 8 (2 005 ). W e a lso no te t ha t o ur re vi ew of an ad m in ist ra tiv e a ge nc y's findings of

fa ct is pe rf ormedund er

a mani fe st -we ig ht -o f- th e- ev id en ce st an da rdof re vi ew. Dowrick v. Village of Downers Grove , 362 Il l. App. 3d 512, 515 (2 005 ). Fur

th ermor e, we review de novo an adm inistr ative age ncy's c onc lusio n on a qu estio n of law

. Comprehensive Co mm unity Solutions, Inc. v. Rockford School District No. 205 , 216 Il l. 2d 455, 471 (2005). Fi na lly, where there is a mixed quest i on of law and fact, we review an adminis trative ag en cy's decisi on for cle arerro r. Elementary School Distri ct 159 v. Schill

er , 221 Il l. 2d 130, 143 (20 06). Es se nt ial ly, there are thr ee issues rais ed by t he parti es on appeal . These i ssues can be4

summarized as f

ollows: firs t, whether the PTAB's dec isi ons that t he County di d not have a lawful method for ass essing manufac tur ed homes or like-kind pr operty prior to 1979 and thereby improperly as sessed t

he manufacture d homes as realpropert y pur suantto section 24- 5 were against

the manifes t weight of the evi dence, se cond, whet her the PT AB erred in defini ng the term "perm anen t foun dation " as it is used in t he Propert

y Tax Code, and t

hird, whetherthe P TA B err ed in a ssessin g as re al prop erty air cond itioner u nits atta che d t o so me of th e m anu fac ture d ho me s. Th e ev iden ce p rese nted to th e PT AB wa s as follo ws . There are four owners of the fi ve manufacture d homes. Belinda Sexson i s the owner of two of the manufact

ured homes. Car ol and Jack P re sn el l, Al len C. B raune, and Rob ert A. Noreuil ea ch own one man ufactur ed hom e. Each owner of a m anufactured home also
owns the proper

ty where the manufact

ured home is l ocated. Four of the manufact

ured homes
were cons tructed after 1 980 . The fifth m anufactu red home, whi ch is one of th e two manufactured

hom es ow ned b y Sexso n, w as bu ilt prior to 1 979 and w as on the pro perty purchased by

Sexson in 1995. Each manufactured home r ests on c oncrete bloc ks. Wood s hi ms l ie bet weenth e fr ame of the manufact

ured homes and the concret e blocks, to leve l the manufactured homes. The
conc rete blocks are n ot mortared together. The concrete blocks rest on concrete pads, pier s,
or gra vel. None of the concret e pads or pi ers ext ends more than a few inches bel ow th e gro und

. Each manufactured home has an exter ior skirti ng surrounding its perimet er. The skirting do es not support the homes in any way . Some of the manufact ured homes have a centra l-air-condi tioning unit attached. Th e Cou nty assessed these attache d air conditione rs
as re al p ro pe rty. Ro nald Fi nley, the chi ef county assess ment office r of Chris tian County, has been employe d with the Chri sti an County a ssessment office as the super

visor of assess ments from5

October16, 1978, to May 16, 1994, and since December 1, 1996. Evi dence was present ed byFinley in regard t o Christ ian County 's met hods for ass essing mobi le home proper ty prior to 1979. According to an affi davit s ubmitt ed by Fi nley , he "made an exhaus tive review of the recor ds and doc uments" fr om 1975 through 1978, and based upon thi s revi ew he concluded that the County had a general policy of assessing mobile homes as follows: "[A ]ll facto ry[-]assem bled s tructure s desig ned for pe rman ent ha bit ation which are not locat ed in a mobil e home park or ar e notsit uated on l eased ground[and] which have wheels, tongues[, ] and hit ches removed were and ar e treated as real estate and
assess ed as realestat e for the purposes of ad valorem taxation. Those with wheels, ton gue s[,] and hitc hes intact, or those located in a mobile home park or, for the most part, on leased ground, were and ar e treated for t axati on purposes under the M obile Ho me Lo cal S erv ices Ta x A ct ** *." The affidavi t, however, noted some ins tances where the County assess ed mobile homes locat ed on leased property as realpropert

y. In addition, the affidav itpointed out that during 1980 or 1981, Fi nley

had conducted a r eview of all"fac tor y[-]assem bled d we llings" to determi ne if si milar properti es were being a ssesse d by t he same method and he l earned that
som e mo bile hom es that had the t ongues, hi tches, and wheels intact were i mproperly assess ed
as real pro perty and that som e mo bile homes with tongues , hitches, and whe els remov ed w ere imp ro perly assess ed as pers onalty . These i mproper asse ssments were c orrect ed upon di sc ov er y. Finley test ifie d that t

he crit erion us ed by Ch ris tian Cou nty to determine w hether a
mo bile home should be taxed as realpropert y or persona l ty

is whether

the owner of the
mo bile home owns the underlying proper ty where the m obile home is located. Finley test ifie d that it w as nev er the pol icy of the County

to tax mobi le homes based on whether they rest ed on a permanent f oundation.6

Upon reviewing t

he evidence, the PTAB found thatthe County fail ed to est ablis h that ithad a unifo rm co nsisten t practic e of c la ssifying and ass essing mobi le homes as r eal prop erty prior

to 1979. As a r esult , the PTAB found that be cause the County di d not have
a lawful method for

assess ing mo bile ho mes or like-k ind p rope rty prior to 1979, sec tion 24-5 did not "fr eeze" the class ific ation of manufactured homes. In addition, t he PTAB found that the manufactured homes di d not res t in whole on a perman ent foun dation and were therefore improperly as sessed as real property pursuant to the Pr operty

Tax Code. The first issue raised on ap peal p ertains to secti on 24-5 and the PTAB's findings that the County did not lawfully assess mo bile ho me p rope rty or like-kin d pro perty prior to 1979. Section24-5 was enacte d in 1979 to prevent the recla ssifi cati on of personalpropert y t o real prop erty after

the GeneralAssembly a bolis hed the ad

valorem personalpro per ty tax. Oregon Co mm unity Unit School District No. 220 v. Property Tax Appeal Boa rd , 285 Il l. App. 3d 170, 176 (1996). The current version of section 24-5 provides as follows: "No prop erty lawf

ully assesse d and taxed as pe rsona l prop erty prior to Jan uary 1, 1979, or propertyof l ike kin d acq uired o r place d in u se afte r Janu ary 1, 197 9, sha ll be classifie d as re al prop erty subjec t to asse ssme nt and taxatio n. N o pro perty law fully
assess ed and ta xed a s real p rope rty prior to Janu ary 1, 197 9, or p rope rtyof like kind acquire d or place d in use aft er Januar y 1, 1979, shal l b e class ifie d as persona l property." 35 ILC S 200 /24-5 (W est 2002). Under secti on 24-5, i f a propert y was l awfully

assess ed as real pro perty or p erson al prop erty prior to January

1, 1979, t

hat proper

ty and propert

y of l ike kind must

be class ifie d th e s ame way afte r Januar

y 1, 1979. In the inst ant case , the PTAB found that the County

did not have a lawful method of
assess ing mo bile ho me p rope rty prior to 1979 and that , the refore, the st atus o f mob il e ho me prop erty or property

of like kind did not

freeze. The County disputes the PTAB's findings,7

arguing that t

he evidence de monstrat ed that the C ountyhad a lawful consi stent method of
assess ing mobile homes as real pro perty prior to 197 9 and that, there fore, th e mo bile homes in the instant

case were properly

assess ed as realpropert y pur suant t o secti on 24-5. Under sec tion 24- 5, class ification s are o nly "froz en" if the pro perty w as "law fully
assess ed" prio r to 1 979
. Oregon Comm unity Unit School Dist

rict No. 220 , 285 Il l. App. 3d at183 . "It is we ll establish ed tha t it i s unlawful for an assess or to exempt one kind of prop erty wh ile cla ssifyin g th e sa me kin d of pro per ty in the sam e dis trict a s no nex em pt." Oregon Comm unity Unit School District No. 220 , 285 I ll. Ap p. 3d a t 178 . "The unifo rmity clause of the cons titution [ (Ill. Con st. 1970, art. IX, §4 (a))] prohibi ts a t axing offi cialto [ sic ] value one propert

y i n one manner and then v a lu e the s ame k in d of pr ope rt y , in the s ame district, in another manner." Oregon Comm unity Unit School Dist

rict No. 220 , 285 Ill . App. 3d at 183. In the ins tant c ase, Fi nley 's a ffidavi t and te sti mony support the PT A B 's findings that the C ou nt y di d n ot ha ve a la w fu l m eth od of as se ss in g m ob ile ho m e p ro pe rty. T he C ou nt y's po lic y, as set forth b y Finley, prov ided th at mo bile homes are ass essed base d on whether the
mo bile homes are loc ated on l and own ed by the ow ners of the mobil e homes or whether t he
mo bile hom es are located o n land that w as leased. H owe ver, the evi dence revea ls that this generalpolicy

was not consi stent ly

applie d. Finl ey t esti fied that in 1980 or 19 81 , he reviewedthe assessm ents of similar prop erties an d fo und that som e w ere no t assess ed in accordance with the Count y' s poli cy. According to Finley 's a ffidavi t, s ome mobile homes that were locat ed on lease d grounds were ass essed as r eal prope rty . Other evidence also reveal ed a dispar ate treatment of simil ar proper

ties in vari ous townships . For exampl e, evidence revealed that 11 of 27 factory- assembled homes i n B ear Creek Tow nship w ere t reate d as pe rsona lty, while the rema ining 1 6 w ere trea ted as r eal pro perty. Th e Co unty offe re d n o e xp lan ati on fo r th e d isp ar ity.8

Upon review ing th e record, we cannot conclude that t he PTAB's findings that t he Co unty did not hav e a cons istent m ethod , and h ence a law ful m ethod , of ass essing mo bile hom e pro perty or propert y of l ike kind prior t o 1979 are against t he manifest

weight of the evidence. As a result , the PTAB 's de cisi on that s ecti on 24-5 does not permit t he Co unty to
assess the manufactured homes at is sue as real property was also not

in err or. Because the Co unty fail ed to demonstrate that mobil e home property or propert y of l ike kind ha d been lawf ully assess ed as realpropert y pr ior t o 1979, section 24-5 does not p rovid e the C oun ty wit h a m ean s to a sses s the ma nufactu red hom es in the in stan t cas e as real p rop erty. Our decisi on extends t o the manufact ured home that

was construc tedprior

to 1979, which th e c irc ui t co ur t h eld w as pr op er ly a ssessed as r eal property unde r section 24-5 because the County

had alway s asses sed thi s spec ific prop erty as realpropert

y. Again, because th e Countyfai le d t o sh ow that it hada l awfu l me th od o f as se ss in g mob il e ho me pr op er ty, und er the p lain terms of t he stat ute section 24-5 cannot

be employed. Se ction 24-5 only applie s to pro perty that w as law fully assess ed. The Co unty has failed to sho w th at said prop erty wa s law fully assess ed as re al p ro pe rty. A cc or di ng ly, w e r ev er se th e c irc ui t co ur t's decisi on as it

pertains to the pre-1979 manufactured hom e owned b y Sexson. Because the PT AB 's findin gs tha t the C oun ty did not law fully asses s mo bile hom e pro perty or p rope rty of like kind prior to 19 79 w ere not against the m anifest w eight of the ev idence, w e affirm the PT A B 's findings that

the County

improperly as sessed t

he five manufact

ured homes as real propert y i n accordance wit

h secti on 24-5. The s econd iss ue rais ed on appeal per tains to the PTAB's def inition of the te r m "permanentfoundati on." In t he inst ant case , the County al so asses sed the manuf acture d homes as real p rope rtybased on the claim that because the m anufacture d ho mes rest in w hole
on a permanent foundation, they were real propert

y i n acc or dance with t

he Propert

y Tax Code a nd the Mobile Home Local Servi ces Tax Act (35 I LCS 515/1 et seq. (West 2002 ))

.9

T he PTAB co rrectly

observed t

hat the Property Tax Code and the Mobile Home Local Services Tax Act do not defi ne the t erm "permanent foundati on," andso th e PT AB turned to other stat utes t hat do defi ne the t erm, and t he PTAB adopted a definition of a permanent foundati on for the pur

poses of the Propert

y Tax Code and th e M obile Home Local Services Tax Act. Underthe de finition adop ted, the P TA B fo und that the man ufac tured h om es did not rest on a perm anent fou ndation an d therefore w ere impro perly as se ss ed as re al p ro pe rty. The County now chall enges the PTAB's definiti on of a permanent foundation. Befo re sett ing fort

h the defi niti on of the t erm "permanent foundati on" that

th e PT AB adoptedand th e spe cific o bjectio ns raise d by the C oun ty to this defini tion, we note that the PTAB has the aut

horit y t o constr

ue stat utory provisi ons in making decis ions and determi nations but that its interpretation of a statute pre sents aq uestion of law and is therefore subject

to de novo rev iew

. Geneva Comm unity Unit School Dist

rict No. 304 v. Pro perty Tax Appea l Board , 296 Il l. App. 3d 630, 633 (1998). However, alt hough the reviewing cour t is not b oun d by an a genc y's interpretatio n of a statute , courts w ill give substantial we ight to the interpre tation o f an a mb iguo us statu te by the a genc y charge d w ith its adm inistr ation and enforc em ent. Geneva Comm unity Unit School Dist

rict No. 304 , 296 Ill . App. 3d at633. Agencies are able to make infor med judgments upon t

he issue s, bas ed
on their exp erien ce a nd e xpe rtise. Geneva Comm unity Unit School District No. 304 , 296 I ll. App. 3d at 633. Section1-130 of the Pr operty Tax Code st ates in re levan t part tha t real pro perty include s "any vehicle or sim ilar portable structure used or so constructed as to permit i ts use
as a dw elling place, if the structure is resti ng in whole on a permanent foundation ." (Em phas is added.) 35 I LCS 200/1-130 (West 2002). The Mobile Home Local Services Tax Act prov ides tha t if a hom e fit s withi n the defi niti on of a mobile home, it i s subjec t to t he privi lege ta x andsha llnotbe as ses sedand t axed as r ealpro perty . 35 ILC S 515 /1 et seq.10

(West 2002). Sect ion 1 o f the Mobile Home Loc al Se rvices Tax Act de fines the term "mobile home" as follows:

" '[M]obil e home' means a fa ctory [-]as sembled st ructur e designed f

or p ermanenthabitation and s o constr ucted as to permit its transport on whe els , temp orarily or permanentl y at tached t o its frame, from the pla ce of its cons truction to the locat ion, or

subsequent

locat ions , and p lacement on a temporary

foundati on, at which it i s int ended to be a per manent habit ation, and situated so as to permit the occupancythereof as a d welling plac e for one or more persons, provided t hat any such structure resting in whole on a perm anent foundation , with wheel s, t ongue[,] and hitchremoved at t

he time of r egist

rati on provided for

in Secti on 4 of this Ac t, shall not be constr

ued as a ' mobile home' [] but shal l be ass essed and t axed as real pro perty
as defined by Se ction 1-1 30 o f the Pro per ty Tax Co de." (Em pha sis ad ded .) 35 I LCS 515/1 (W est 2002). Like the Proper

ty Tax Code, the Mobile Home Local Services Tax Act does not define the term "pe rma nen t fou nda tion ." Recognizing that

ne it he r s tatute de fi ne s t

he te rm " pe rmane ntfo und at io n, " t he PTAB lookedto severalother s tatutes and codes t hat do defi ne the term. The stat utes i ncluded the Illinois Man ufactur ed Housing and M obile Home Safety Act (430 ILCS 115/2(a) (West 2002)), the Manufactured Home Qualit y Assur ance Act (430 ILCS 117/10 (West 2002)) , and the Mobile Home Park Act (210 ILCS 115/ 2.10 (West 2002)) . The codes i ncluded the Illinois Manufactured Home Insta llation Code (77 Il l. Adm. Code §870.20 ( Conway-Green CD- ROM 20 00 )) a nd th e M an ufac tu re d H om e C om m un ity Cod e (7 7 Ill . Adm. Code §860.150(a) (Conway-Green CD-ROM 2000)). Mobile homes are t he subject

matter in each
o f these state st atutes or codes. Each statut e and code exam ined by the PTAB con tains a defini tionof the t erm "permanent foundat ion." The simil arities among the se definitions11

include a description of a closed or conti nuous p erimet er foundat ion of material s uch as mortared conc rete blo ck tha t exten ds into the ground bel ow the establ ished fr ost dept h or is intende d to support

and anchor the unit to withst and the spe cif ied desi gn loads. After considering the defi niti ons in these st atut es and c odes, the PT AB defined th e term "permanentfoundati on" as "a continuous per imeter formati on composed of concret e, mortared concret e block, mortared brick[, ] and the l ike that exte nds below the frost line t hat actua llysupports and anchors t he mobile home. " Based on the ev idence pr esented in the underlying cases, the PTAB found that non e o f the manufact ured homes res ts i n whole on a permanent foundation. On appeal, the County

does not chal lenge the PTAB's findings that t he manufactured homes do n ot rest o n a pe rman ent fo und ati on as that term is defined by t he PTAB. The Co unty instead challe nges the P TA B's de finiti on of th e te rm an d a rg ue s th at t he PT A B 's defini tionis erron eous and th at it shou ld have defined a pe rmanent foundation as "anything that tra nsfe rs we ight of

a struc ture to th e earth intend ed to la st [fo r] the u sefu lness o f said struc ture ," wh ic h i s t

he de fi ni ti on e mpl oy edby th e Co unt

y . T he Cou ntymak es two arguments to support its position that the defini tion adopted by the PTAB is erroneous. First, the County

contends t

hat the PTAB erred in forming a def init ion of the term "permanentfoundati on" from the st atute s and codes i t examined. The County cont ends that the stat utes and codes from which t he PTAB garnered a defini tion di d not int end to defi ne the te rm "permanent f

oundation" for "purpos es of taxation" and that theref ore they are not applic able to th e ins tant c ase . Howe ver, the appe llate cou rt has a lready reje cted th is argumentin Lee C oun ty Bo ard o f Rev ie w v. Prope rty Tax Appeal Board , 278 Il l. App. 3d 711, 720 -21 (19 96)

. In Lee County Board of Revi ew , th e a pp ell ate co ur t affir m ed th e P TA B 's defini tionof the t erm "permanent foundati on " as t aken from the I llinois Manufactur ed Housing and M obile H om e Safety Act. Lee County Board of Revi ew , 278 Il l. App. 3d at 722.12

In Lee County Board of Revi ew , the PTAB acknowledged that neithe r the Revenue Act (now kno wn as the P rope rtyTax Code) nor the Mobile Home Local Services TaxAct defined t he term "permanent foundation." Lee County Board of Revi ew , 278 Il l. App. 3d at 722. A cc or di ng ly, the P TA B tur ned to the de finition set for th in th e Ill inois Manufactured Housing and Mobile Home SafetyAct. On revie w, the appel late court not ed that be cause the stat utes invo lve the sam e sub ject m atte r–mobile h omes–the PTAB's use of t he defini tion from the Il linoi s Manufactured Hous ing and M obi le H om e Sa fety A ct w as p rop er. Lee Co unty Board of Review , 278 Ill. App . 3d at 721. The court

stat ed, "[I ]t i s appropri ate for the co urt to co m pa re ot he r st atu tes on th e s am e s ub jec t m att er , ev en th ou gh no t st ric tly in pari ma teria ." Lee County Board of Revi ew , 278 Ill . App . 3d at 721. As in Lee C oun ty Board of Review , we do not bel ieve the PTAB erred in defini ng the te rm "permanent foundati on" base d on defin itions in other s imil ar st atute s that a lso i nvolve the same subject matter–mobile homes. Ne xt, the County

contends t

hat the PTAB 's de finition of the term "per manent foundati on" is er

roneous becaus e under the defini tion, no mobile home can re st wholl y on
a perimet erfoundation because it would collapse from the lac k of supp ort. To supp ort this cl ai m, the County

cite s the t esti mony of Alle n Braune, an owner of one of the manufact

ured homes at is sue in t

he inst ant case , who testifie d during one of t he heari ngs that

he beli eved that if his manufactured

home rested only on a perimeter foundati on, it

would colla

pse. The Co unty also cites Sweitzer v. Cit y of O'Fall

on , 135 I ll. Ap p. 3d 1, 4 (1985), w herein this cou rt stat ed: "[T]he mobil e home of today remains uns uitabl e fo r a ttac hment to a per manent foundati on. It is general ly supporte d by a s teelfram e and tied do wn by cable s to pre vent it from being blown awayor displ aced in se vere winds. " No additi onal evi dence was present ed to support t

he County' s position. The County did notoffe r any exp ert testim ony to support its claim . In any ev ent, i n reviewing an agency 's c onstruc tion of a stat ute, we defer to an13

ag en cy's experie nce in const ruing and applyi ng the st atute s that it administers. Based on the record in this case, we d o not agre e that th e PTAB's defini tion of t he term "per

manent foundati on" i s erro neo us b ecause it re nde rs th e Pr ope rt

yTax C ode andth e Mobi le Home Local Services Tax Act meaningles s be ca us e n o m ob ile ho m e c an be su pp or ted by a permanent foundation. In sum, we reject the County's argument that the PTAB 's defini tion is in err or. Because the County does not chal lenge the PTAB's applic ation of the fact s to t

his definiti on,
we affirm t

he PTAB's findings that t he manufacture d homes are mobil e homes within t he meaning of the Mobile Home Local Servi ces Tax Act andnot su bject to real esta te taxat ion in acco rdan ce w ith the P rope rtyTax Code. Accordingly, we affirm the PTAB's findings that th e C ou nt y im pr op er ly as se ss ed th e m an ufac tu re d h om es as re al p ro pe rty. We now turn to the t

hird i ssue rai sed on appeal , whether t he PTAB erred in findi ng t hat the County i mproperly assess ed the ai r-condi tioning units that were atta ched to the mobile homes as real property . In Boone C ounty Board of Review v. Propert y Tax Appeal Board , 276 Ill. App . 3d 989, 99 7 (1995 ), the appellate court held that it ems merely atta ched to perso nalty can not b e taxe d as re al prop erty. The C oun ty does n ot cha llenge this prin ciple but argues t

hat becaus e the manufact ured homes were properly as sessedas realpropert y, the air conditi oners al so were proper ly assess ed as re al pr ope rt y . Be cau se our

dec is io n af

fi rms the PTAB 's f

indings that t

he manufacture d homes were improperly as sessedas re al p ro pe rty,
we agree with the PTAB that the air conditioners also w ere imprope rly assess ed as real pr op er ty. A cc or di ng ly, we affirm the PT AB 's decision that the air cond itioners attach ed to th e m an ufac tu re d h om es w er e im pr op er ly as se ss ed as re al p ro pe rty. For the fore going reas ons, we affi rm the ci rcuit court' s decis ions pe rtai ni ng to the manufactured

homes owned by Car ol an d J ac k Pr es ne ll , A ll en C. Bra une , and R obe rt

A. No reuil. In ad di tio n, w e a ff irm th e c irc ui t co ur t's decisi on as it pertains to the manufacture d14

home owned by Beli nda Sexson that was manufacturedafter 1979. Final ly , we revers e the circuit court' s decis ion pert aining to the manufact ured home owned by Belinda Sexson t hat was manufactured prior t o 1979.

Affirme d in p art and revers ed in p art.

GO LD EN HE RSH and H OP KIN S, JJ., concur.