J-S43005-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 

Appellant

v.

WILLIE SUMPTER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 519 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Order Entered February 14, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-23-CR-001990-2021

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and NICHOLS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED JANUARY 11, 2023

The Commonwealth appeals from the February 14, 2022 Order1 entered 

in the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas granting Appellee Willie 

Sumpter’s motion to suppress evidence obtained from a warrantless search of 

the vehicle that he was driving. After careful review, we affirm. 

The relevant procedural and factual history is as follows. On December 

5, 2020, the Commonwealth charged Appellee with Firearms not to be Carried 

Without a License, Aggravated Assault, Resisting Arrest, Possession of 

Marijuana, Driving an Unregistered Vehicle, Driving Without a License, and 

related charges.

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1 The Order is dated January 14, 2022, but the trial court did not docket the 

Order under February 14, 2022. We have changed the caption accordingly. 

See Pa.R.A.P. 108(a). 
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On July 8, 2021, Appellee filed an Omnibus Pre-Trial Motion seeking, 

inter alia, to suppress physical evidence that the Darby Borough Police 

Department recovered from a warrantless search of the vehicle that he was 

driving at the time of his arrest. Appellee argued that the police search of his 

vehicle violated his constitutional rights pursuant to the 4th Amendment of the 

United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania 

Constitution and should be suppressed. Motion to Suppress, 7/8/21, at ¶ 7. 

On October 22, 2021, the trial court held a hearing on Appellee’s 

suppression motion. The court heard testimony from Police Officer Michael 

Ficchi and Sauia Macey, Appellee’s former paramour. 

Officer Ficchi testified that on December 5, 2020, he was employed by 

the Darby Borough Police Department and observed Appellee driving a white 

2004 Pontiac Vibe (“SUV”) with a partially obstructed, improperly displayed, 

and fraudulent temporary registration. Officer Ficchi stopped the vehicle, 

approached, and requested identification or documents relating to the vehicle. 

Appellee refused to provide identification. Officer Ficchi noticed that Appellee 

was nervous and concluded “there might be a further crime afoot other than 

the tag itself,” and requested that Appellee exit the vehicle. N.T. Hearing, 

10/22/21, at 10. Appellee complied. Officer Ficchi explained that, to this point,

he had not observed any criminal activity, and this was simply a stop for a 

motor vehicle violation. Id. at 24. Officer Ficchi performed a pat-down on 

Appellee, noticed that Appellee had a wallet in his back pocket, concluded that 

Appellee probably had identification in his wallet, and attempted to place 
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Appellee in hand restraints. At the same time, Officer Ficchi asked Appellee if 

there were any guns in the SUV and Appellee responded, “there’s nothing that 

I know of.” Id. at 27. Officer Ficchi then asked Appellee for consent to search 

the SUV and Appellee declined. 

Before Officer Ficchi could secure the hand restraints, Appellee pushed 

him away and ran off. Officer Ficchi ran after Appellee, eventually caught up 

to him, and held him at gunpoint until assisting units arrived. Appellee refused 

to obey verbal commands and resisted handcuffs, but eventually police were 

able to handcuff Appellee. When Appellee spat at and attempted to head-butt 

assisting Police Officer Kennedy, Officer Kennedy tasered Appellee. Police 

placed Appellee under arrest.

When Officer Ficchi returned to the SUV and began searching it, he saw 

an open bag of marijuana in the center console, a second bag of marijuana in 

the rear seat inside a sweatshirt, and a Smith and Wesson 380 Special firearm 

loaded with three live bullets underneath the driver seat. Eventually the SUV 

was towed. Officer Ficchi completed a tow slip and ran the car registration. 

Officer Ficchi testified that he conducted an inventory search because the 

SUV was stopped in the travel lane, “slightly obstructing the trolley lines.” Id.

at 16. He explained that he completed the search of the vehicle to recover 

“valuable items or any contraband[.]” Id. at 17. Officer Ficchi further 

explained that at that time there was a verbal police departmental policy 

regarding inventory searches, and he believes that a written policy now exists. 

Officer Fichhi did not complete an inventory search report. Officer Ficchi 
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testified that he could have secured the SUV to get a search warrant, but he 

did not. Id. at 32-36.

Ms. Macey testified that on December 5, 2020, she was romantically 

involved with Appellee and living with him. She stated that on that date, she

had owned the SUV for a few months and gave Appellee permission to drive it. 

Ms. Macey further explained that, at the time she lent Appellee the SUV, she

did not have the title and registration because she bought the SUV from an 

individual who became incarcerated for unrelated reasons during the 

transaction. N.T. Hearing, 11/3/21, at 4. 

On February 14, 2022, after considering evidence and memoranda of 

law, the trial court granted Appellee’s motion to suppress evidence.

The Commonwealth filed a timely appeal2 pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 311(d).3 

Both the Commonwealth and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

The Commonwealth raises the following issues for our review:

1. Did the trial court err in suppressing the gun and drugs where 

[Appellee] failed to prove that he had a legitimate expectation 

of privacy in the SUV where the owner did not give him 

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2 As stated above, the Order is dated January 14, 2022, but the trial court did 

not docket the Order under February 14, 2022. In the interim, the 

Commonwealth filed a Notice of Appeal on February 11, 2022. Pa.R.A.P. 

905(a)(5) allows for “a notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a 

determination but before the entry of an appealable order shall be treated as 

filed after such entry and on the day thereof.” Pa.R.A.P. 905(a)(5). 

Accordingly, the Commonwealth’s notice of appeal is timely. 

3 Rule 311(d) provides that “the Commonwealth may take an appeal as of right 

from an order that does not end the entire case where the Commonwealth 

certifies in the notice of appeal that the order will terminate or substantially 

handicap the prosecution.” Pa.R.A.P. 311(d).
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permission to use it and where he fled from the SUV, thereby 

abandoning any expectation of privacy in it?

2. Did the trial court err in suppressing the gun and drugs where 

the items were properly recovered during a legal inventory 

search?

Commonwealth’s Br. at 3. 

Our review of a grant of a suppression motion is limited to determining 

“whether the record supports the trial court’s factual findings and whether the 

legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct.” Commonweath v. 

Carmenates, 266 A.3d 1117, at 1123-24 (Pa. Super. 2021) (en banc) (citation 

omitted). “We may only consider evidence presented at the suppression 

hearing.” Id. at 1123 (citation omitted). Additionally, “[b]ecause the 

defendant prevailed on this issue before the suppression court, we consider 

only the defendant’s evidence and so much of the Commonwealth’s evidence 

as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the suppression record 

as a whole.” Id. (citation omitted). 

This Court is highly deferential to the suppression court’s factual findings 

and credibility determinations. Commonwealth v. Batista, 219 A.3d 1199, 

1206 (Pa. Super. 2019). “It is within the suppression court’s sole province as 

factfinder to pass on the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to 

their testimony. The trial court is free to believe all, some or none of the 

evidence presented at the suppression hearing.” Commonwealth v. 

Elmobdy, 823 A.2d 180, 183 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citations omitted). If the 

record supports the suppression court’s findings, we may not substitute our 

own findings. Bastista, 219 A.3d at 1206. However, we give no such
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deference to the suppression court’s legal conclusions and, instead, review 

them de novo. Id. Once a defendant files a motion to suppress, “it is the 

Commonwealth's burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that 

the challenged evidence was not obtained in violation of the defendant's 

rights.” Commonwealth v. Wallace, 42 A.3d 1040, 1047–48 (Pa. 2012)

(citation omitted); see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(H).

In the Commonwealth’s first issue, it avers that Appellee did not have a 

reasonable expectation of privacy in the SUV where the actual owner did not 

give him permission to use it. Commonwealth’s Br. at 12. The Commonwealth 

argues that Ms. Macey did not legally own the SUV and was not authorized to 

loan it to Appellee. Therefore, the Commonwealth asserts, Appellee did not 

have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the SUV. Id.4

Both the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 

1, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution “guarantee individuals freedom 

from unreasonable searches and seizures.” Commonwealth v. Bostick, 958 

A.2d 543, 550 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation omitted). In Pennsylvania, a 

defendant charged with a possessory offense has “automatic standing” to 

pursue a suppression motion under Rule 581. Commonwealth v. Enimpah, 

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4 The Commonwealth also argues, for the first time on appeal, that when 

Appellee fled from the SUV, he abandoned any expectation of privacy in it. 

See Commonwealth Br. at 15. We find this argument to be waived. See

Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised in the trial court are waived and cannot 

be raised for the first time on appeal.”); Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii) (“Issues not 

included in the Statement and/or not raised in accordance with the provisions 

of this paragraph (b)(4) are waived.”).
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106 A.3d 695, 698 (Pa. 2014). However, in addition to standing, “a defendant 

must show that he had a privacy interest in the place invaded or thing seized 

that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.” Id. (citation omitted). 

“The expectation of privacy is an inquiry into the validity of the search or 

seizure itself; if the defendant has no protected privacy interest, neither the 

Fourth Amendment nor Article I, § 8 is implicated.” Id. at 699.

This Court has found that an expectation of privacy will exist when the 

individual exhibits an actual or subjective expectation of privacy and that 

expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.

Commonwealth v. Jones, 874 A.2d 108, 118 (Pa. Super. 2005). In 

determining whether a person’s expectation of privacy is legitimate or 

reasonable, we must consider the totality of the circumstances and the 

determination “ultimately rests upon a balancing of the societal interests 

involved.” Commonwealth v. Peterson, 636 A.2d 615, 619 (Pa. 1993) 

(citations omitted). “The constitutional legitimacy of an expectation of privacy 

is not dependent on the subjective intent of the individual asserting the right 

but on whether the expectation is reasonable in light of all the surrounding 

circumstances.” Commonwealth v. Viall, 890 A.2d 419, 422 (Pa. Super. 

2005) (citation omitted).

In Byrd v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 1518 (2018), the United States 

Supreme Court held that a driver in otherwise legal possession and control of 

a rental car had a reasonable expectation of privacy in that car even when the

rental agreement did not list him or her as an authorized driver. Id. at 1531. 
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The Court explained, “[o]ne who owns and possesses a car, like one who owns 

and possesses a house, almost always has a reasonable expectation of privacy 

in it. More difficult to define and delineate are the legitimate expectations of 

privacy of others.” Id. at 1527. “[I]t is by now well established that a person 

need not always have a recognized common-law property interest in the place 

searched to be able to claim a reasonable expectation of privacy in it.” Id. 

Indeed, “[o]ne of the main rights attaching to property is the right to exclude 

others [and] one who owns or lawfully possesses or controls property will in all 

likelihood have a legitimate expectation of privacy by virtue of the right to 

exclude.” Id. (citations omitted). 

Instantly, the trial court found Ms. Macey’s testimony credible that she 

owned the SUV and allowed Appellee to drive the SUV. Order, 2/14/22, at 3. 

When the trial court concluded that Appellee had a reasonable expectation of 

privacy in the SUV, the court considered the totality of the circumstances and 

placed great weight on Ms. Macey’s testimony as well as the fact that Officer

Ficchi asked Appellee for permission to search the SUV. The trial court opined:

Appellee’s witness Sauia Macey testified at the suppression hearing 

she authorized Appellee to drive her car. Additionally, [Officer]

Ficchi recognized Appellee’s expectation of privacy in the vehicle 

when he specifically asked Appellee if he would provide consent to 

a search of his vehicle. Appellee in this case exhibited an 

expectation of privacy when he declined to provide consent to a 

search of the vehicle. This court concluded the Commonwealth 

conceded Appellee’s expectation of privacy in the vehicle when

[Officer] Ficchi at the suppression hearing asked Appellee to 

consent to a search, and based on Ms. Macey’s testimony and the 

testimony concerning Appellee’s refusal to consent to a search, 

Appellee exhibited an expectation of privacy in the vehicle. 
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Contrary to [the Commonwealth]’s assertion, this court 

determined, based on the evidence provided by the witnesses at 

the suppression hearing [and the] totality of circumstances set 

forth in the record, Appellee established he exhibited an 

expectation of privacy in the vehicle. 

Trial Ct. Op., filed 4/18/22, at 6 (party titles amended). 

In light of the trial court’s findings of fact, which the record supports, we 

discern no error of law in the trial court’s conclusion that Appellee had a 

reasonable expectation of privacy in the SUV. Appellee had permission from 

the putative owner of the SUV to drive it and attempted to exclude Office Ficchi 

from searching it, facts which support the trial court’s conclusion that Appellee 

had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the SUV. 

The Commonwealth cites Commonwealth v. Burton, 973 A.2d 428 

(Pa. Super. 2009), Commonwealth v. Cruz, 21 A.3d 1247 (Pa. Super. 2011), 

and Commonwealth v. Brown, 64 A.3d 1101 (Pa. Super. 2011), to support 

its argument that Appellee did not establish a reasonable expectation of privacy 

in the borrowed SUV. All of these cases are easily distinguished because, 

unlike in the instant case, none of the cases contained testimony that the 

defendant had permission to drive the vehicle.5 Accordingly, we remain 

unpersuaded by the Commonwealth’s argument.

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5

In Burton, this Court held that the defendant, the driver and lone occupant 

of the vehicle, failed to demonstrate that he had a reasonable expectation of 

privacy in a vehicle that he did not own, that was not registered to him, and 

for which he did not show authority to operate. 973 A.2d 436. In Brown, this 

Court held that the defendant failed to establish a reasonable expectation of 

privacy in a vehicle where defendant failed to present a connection to the 

owner or permission to operate the vehicle. 64 A.3d 1107. In Cruz, this Court 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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In its second issue, the Commonwealth asserts that even if Appellee had 

a reasonable expectation of privacy in the SUV, the trial court erred when it 

granted Appellee’s suppression motion because the police found the evidence 

pursuant to a valid inventory search. Commonwealth Br. at 19. 

Inventory searches are a well-defined exception to the warrant 

requirement of the Fourth Amendment. Commonwealth v. Nace, 571 A.2d 

1389, 1391 (Pa. 1990). Upon lawfully impounding a vehicle, the police may 

conduct an inventory search of the vehicle pursuant to reasonable, standard 

protocols. Commonwealth v. Hennigan, 753 A.2d 245, 255 (Pa. Super. 

2000). Because the search is intended to safeguard seized items, and not for 

investigatory purposes, the search does not need to be authorized by a warrant 

or supported by probable cause. Id.

“In determining whether a proper inventory search has occurred, the first 

inquiry is whether the police have lawfully impounded the automobile, i.e.,

have lawful custody of the automobile.” Commonwealth v. Henley, 909 A.2d 

352, 359 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation omitted). “The second inquiry is whether 

the police have conducted a reasonable inventory search.” Id. (citation 

omitted).

“An inventory search is reasonable if it is conducted pursuant to 

reasonable standard police procedures and in good faith and not for the sole 

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held that the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in a 

vehicle where he presented no evidence that he owned the vehicle, that it was 

registered in his name, or that he was using it with permission of the owner. 

21 A.3d 1251. 
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purpose of investigation.” Id. The inventory search is not a substitute for a 

warrantless investigatory search. Id.

Here, the trial court found that the police failed to conduct a good faith 

search that was reasonable pursuant to standard police procedures. The trial 

court emphasized Officer Ficchi’s testimony that he searched the SUV for 

“valuable items or any contraband” prior to towing the vehicle, revealing that 

the search was—at least in part—for investigatory purposes. Order, 2/14/22, 

at 2 (citing N.T. Hearing, 10/22/21, at 17). The trial court also found that the 

Commonwealth failed to establish that the police were acting according to an 

established police protocol, opining: 

[Officer] Ficchi testified law enforcement could have secured 

the vehicle and obtained a warrant, but they did not. 

[Officer] Ficchi also testified: the police department had an 

unwritten policy for the conduct of inventory searches; he 

did not complete an inventory search report; he did not 

mention the search he conducted was an inventory search in 

any of the reports he prepared, including the affidavit of 

probable cause[.] In view of the record established at the 

suppression hearing, this court concluded the 

Commonwealth failed to show the search was within the 

police department’s standard policy of routinely censuring 

and inventorying contents of impounded vehicles, the 

Commonwealth did not establish the inventory search of the 

vehicle was proper.

Trial Ct. Op. at 7-8. 

Upon review, the record supports the trial court’s factual findings and we 

discern no error in the trial court’s legal conclusions. In light of Officer Ficchi’s 

testimony that he was searching for contraband, it was reasonable for the trial 

court to conclude that the search was for investigative purposes and, therefore, 
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improper. See Commonwealth v. Casanova, 748 A.2d 207, 212 (Pa. Super. 

2000) (“Once the police suspected that there was contraband in the vehicle, 

they could no longer classify their search as one done for inventory 

purposes.”). Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err when it 

granted Appellee’s suppression motion. 

In conclusion, we affirm the trial court’s order granting Appellee’s motion 

to suppress evidence derived from Officer Ficchi’s search of the SUV.

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 1/11/2023