Filed 1/12/15 In re Salinas CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re LUIS ANGEL SALINAS

on

Habeas Corpus.

 D065052

 (Imperial County

 Super. Ct. No. EHC01780)

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. Relief granted.

Janice R. Mazur, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Petitioner.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Jennifer A. Neill, Assistant Attorney 

General, Phillip J. Lindsay and Gregory J. Marcot, Deputy Attorneys General, for 

Plaintiff and Respondent.

Petitioner Luis Salinas is serving a prison sentence of 25 years to life. In 2012, 

Salinas was notified he was being investigated as a prison gang associate and was placed 

in the institution's security housing unit (SHU) pending completion of the investigation. 

The investigation ultimately validated Salinas as an associate of the Mexican Mafia 

(EME) prison gang. Salinas remained in the SHU for approximately 10 months, during 
2

which time he was statutorily precluded from earning postconviction custody credits 

because of his placement in the SHU. (Pen. Code, § 2933.6, subd. (a).) 

Salinas petitioned this court for a writ of habeas corpus alleging the gangvalidation procedures employed by California's prison system violated his due process 

rights under Wolff v. McDonnell (1974) 418 U.S. 539 (Wolff) insofar as the regulatory 

scheme imposed a blanket ban on his right to call and confront witnesses. He 

alternatively argues that, even if the decision validating him as a gang member is not 

reversible per se based on denial of his due process rights under Wolff, the decision 

validating him as a gang member should be reversed because the evidence did not satisfy 

the required showing for validating him as a gang member. We conclude the gang 

validation process, as applied to Salinas here, resulting in the loss of custody credits, 

denied Salinas the due process right to seek to call witnesses as mandated by Wolff.1

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The pertinent facts are largely undisputed. In October 2012 Salinas was notified 

that an investigation had been completed into his alleged status as an "associate" with a 

 

1 Our conclusions here are limited to the scheme for gang validation in effect and 

applied to Salinas. We note, however, that it appears California has drastically 

overhauled the validation process by the adoption of extensive amendments that became 

effective October 17, 2014. (See http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Regulations/Adult_Operations/

docs/NCDR/2014NCR/14-02/Final_Text_of_Adopted_Regulations_STG.pdf.) 

Accordingly, our opinion will refer to the applicable provision of title 15 of the California 

Code of Regulations, as was operative and applicable to Salinas's validation, as the 

"former section" when the new regulatory scheme appears to have replaced the former 

regulatory section in effect at the time of Salinas's validation. All further statutory 

references are to title 15 of the California Code of Regulations unless otherwise noted.
3

prison gang,2 the EME, and stated there was sufficient evidence to validate that 

determination. The October 2012 notice identified and disclosed four "source" items 

upon which the validation relied, including (1) a piece of paper found in Salinas's cell 

containing a Matlactomei symbol, which is a symbol "used by Mexican Mafia 

associates"; (2) a confidential memo reporting staff found a note (also known as a "kite") 

recovered in the administrative segregation unit identifying Salinas as "having the ability 

to refer other inmates in their effort to communicate with associates or members"; (3) a 

confidential memo stating staff found a note allegedly authored by Salinas under his gang 

moniker (Red) referring to another validated gang member (Goofy) and concerning the 

rules of conduct for gang members; and (4) a piece of paper found in Salinas's cell 

containing the name, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR)

number, and address of a validated EME associate, Raymond Tarin (also known by the 

moniker "Goofy"), which gave Salinas "the ability to communicate and conduct illegal 

gang activities on behalf of EME."

At the same time Salinas received the October 2012 notice, he was relocated into 

the SHU pending completion of the investigation of his gang status. Salinas met with 

investigators and provided oral and written responses to each of the four validation 

sources, stated there was more than one prisoner with the moniker "Red," and denied 

being involved with gangs. The investigators concluded Salinas's claims had no merit 

 

2 A gang "associate" was described in the former administrative regulations as "an 

inmate/parolee or any person who is involved periodically or regularly with members or 

associates of a gang." (Former § 3378, subd. (c)(4).)
4

and forwarded the validation packet to the office of correctional safety (OCS) for review. 

Officials reviewed the validation and in March 2013 found, pursuant to the validation 

requirements of former section 3378, that all of the four source items met the validation 

requirements, and therefore validated Salinas as an associate of the EME prison gang.

Salinas pursued and exhausted his administrative remedies, and his petition for 

writ of habeas corpus in the superior court was denied. Shortly before his petition for 

writ of habeas corpus in the superior court was denied, he was removed from the SHU 

and placed in the general population under a two-year pilot project.

Salinas petitioned this court for a writ of habeas corpus and, after considering the 

Attorney General's informal response, we issued an order to show cause why the relief 

requested should not be granted, and appointed counsel for the petitioner. The Attorney 

General filed a return, and Salinas filed a traverse to the return.

THE COMPETING CLAIMS

Salinas contends the procedures for gang validation must comply with the due 

process protections required by Wolff because the consequences attending validation 

include the loss of the inmate's ability to earn "custody credits," and he contends the 

procedures applied to him did not comply with Wolff because an inmate was prohibited 

from calling witnesses when contesting the prison authority's determination.3 The 

 

3 Salinas also contends that, even assuming he was not denied his due process rights 

under Wolff, the four source items on which the validation relied in this case were 

insufficient under the guidelines for gang validation. The People counter that we should 

decline to provide for judicial review of the evidentiary basis for gang validation 

decisions but, if such review is warranted, we should apply the extremely deferential 
5

People contend the due process protections required by Wolff concerning witnesses do 

not apply to gang validation proceedings but, even if Wolff's protections might apply, 

Salinas lacks standing to raise the instant due process challenge because he ceased losing 

custody credits when he was removed from the SHU and placed in the general 

population.

RELEVANT LAW

A. The Gang Validation Process

"Prison regulations promulgated by [CDCR] set forth the procedures and 

substantive requirements for validating an inmate as a member or associate of a prison 

gang. Because gangs 'present a serious threat to the safety and security of California 

prisons' [citation], validation of an inmate as a gang member or associate can result in the 

inmate's placement in a [SHU]." (In re Cabrera (2012) 55 Cal.4th 683, 685.)

Procedural Protections

The regulatory scheme applicable at the time Salinas was validated provided that 

an Institutional Gang Investigator (IGI) would investigate a suspected gang associate to 

determine if there is sufficient evidence (the "source items") to validate the inmate as an 

associate. (Former § 3378, subd. (c).) The IGI would then submit his or her findings 

verifying an inmate's gang identification to the OCS for validation. (Id. at subd. (c)(6).) 

Before submitting the validation package to the OCS, the IGI must interview the subject 

 

"some evidence" test and conclude there was some evidence to support the validation 

decision in this case. Because of our conclusion that Salinas's validation decision was 

reached without affording him the due process rights required by Wolff and therefore 

must be vacated, it is unnecessary to reach this secondary set of arguments.
6

of the investigation, who must also be given an opportunity to be heard in regard to the 

source items used in the validation review, and must receive written notice at least 24 

hours in advance of the interview. (Id. at subd. (c)(6)(A) & (B).) All source items 

referenced in the validation must be disclosed to the inmate at the time of notification, 

and he must be given copies of all nonconfidential documents and a CDC Form 1030

(Confidential Information Disclosure Form) for any confidential information used in the 

validation review. (Id. at subd. (c)(6)(C).) The IGI must document the interview and 

include a record of the inmate's opinion on each of the source items used in the 

validation, and the documented interview must be submitted with the validation package 

to the OCS to consider in connection with its approval or rejection of the validation. (Id. 

at subd. (c)(6)(D) & (E).)

The Evidentiary Basis: Source Items

"The validation of either a gang member or associate requires the recognition of 

three reliable source items indicative of active association with the gang, and at least one 

of those sources must constitute a direct link to a current or former validated gang 

member or associate." (In re Fernandez (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1199, 1205, fn. 

omitted.) The regulatory scheme applicable at the time Salinas was validated listed

numerous categories of source items indicative of association with validated gang 

affiliates, including tattoos and symbols distinctive to the gang, written material or 

communications evidencing gang activity, and the inmate's association with validated 

gang affiliates. (Former § 3378, subd. (c)(8).) At least one of those sources must be a 
7

direct link to a current or former validated gang member or associate. (Id. at subd. 

(c)(3).)

Some source items may be deemed confidential. These include information that, 

if known to the inmate, would endanger the safety of any person, and information that 

would jeopardize the security of the institution. (§ 3321, subds. (a)(1) & (2).) When 

confidential information was relied on to validate an associate, the inmate was given the

CDC Form 1030 (Confidential Information Disclosure Form) (former § 3378, subd. 

(c)(6)(C)), which disclosed as much information as possible without identifying the 

source of that information. (§ 3321, subd. (b)(3)(B).)

The Consequences of Gang Validation

"[T]he validation of an inmate as a gang member or associate, like a prison 

disciplinary decision, can implicate the inmate's credits, thereby affecting the inmate's 

sentence, as well as significantly affecting his housing assignment and other conditions of 

confinement." (In re Fernandez, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at 1215.) For example, 

"[e]xcept as provided at section 3335(a), section 3378(d) and subsection (c)(5), a 

validated prison gang member or associate is deemed to be a severe threat to the safety of 

others or the security of the institution and will be placed in a SHU for an indeterminate 

term" (former § 3341.5, subd. (c)(2)(A)(2)), which precludes the inmate from earning 

custody credits. (Pen. Code, § 2933.6, subd. (a).) Additionally, validation of an inmate 

as a gang member or associate and concomitant loss of custody credits can adversely 

impact the inmate's ultimate length of confinement both by delaying his initial eligibility 
8

for a parole suitability hearing4 (Pen. Code, § 3046) and by providing the parole 

authority with an evidentiary basis for concluding his behavior while incarcerated renders 

him unsuitable for parole. (§ 2402, subd. (c)(6) [circumstances tending to establish 

unsuitability for parole include that prisoner engaged in serious misconduct while in 

prison].)

Wolff and Other Decisional Law

"In [Wolff], the Court held that due process requires procedural protections before 

a prison inmate can be deprived of a protected liberty interest in good time credits." 

(Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institution v. Hill (1985) 472 U.S. 445, 453

(Hill).) Wolff held that, before a state may revoke or withhold good time credits, inmates 

must receive three procedural protections: (1) advance written notice of the allegations 

against them, (2) an opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in 

 

4 In this proceeding, the People argue in part that due process protections in the 

gang validation process are inappropriate precisely because loss of custody credits 

"merely affects the timing of his initial parole consideration hearing." In Wolff, which 

established the due process protections Salinas now claims to be applicable, the court 

observed that, although loss of custody credits does not visit "the same immediate 

disaster that the revocation of parole is for the parolee," the loss of such credits "can 

postpone the date of eligibility for parole and extend the maximum term to be served, but 

it is not certain to do so, for good time may be restored. Even if not restored, it cannot be 

said with certainty that the actual date of parole will be affected; and if parole occurs, the 

extension of the maximum term resulting from loss of good time may affect only the 

termination of parole, and it may not even do that. The deprivation of good time is 

unquestionably a matter of considerable importance. The State reserves it as a sanction 

for serious misconduct, and we should not unrealistically discount its significance." 

(Wolff, supra, 418 U.S. at p. 561, italics added.) Thus, although Wolff acknowledged loss 

of credits may merely serve to delay parole, it nevertheless concluded some level of due 

process was required if the state moved to require the inmate to forfeit those credits and 

thereby delay his parole.
9

their defense, and (3) a written statement by the factfinder of the evidence relied on and 

the reasons for the decision. (Wolff, supra, 418 U.S. at pp. 563-567.)

Wolff acknowledged the opportunity to call witnesses was not absolute, but could 

be limited to those instances "when permitting him to do so will not be unduly hazardous 

to institutional safety or correctional goals." (Wolff, supra, 418 U.S. at p. 566.) One 

court, discussing the ambit of Wolff's qualified right to call witnesses, explained that 

"[j]ail officials need not provide inmates an unfettered right to call witnesses, but they 

must make the decision whether to allow witnesses on a case-by-case basis, examining 

the potential hazards that may result from calling a particular person. [Citation.] '[A] 

blanket denial of permission for an inmate to have witnesses physically present during 

disciplinary hearings is impermissible, even where jail authorities provide for 

interviewing of witnesses outside the disciplinary procedure.' [Quoting Mitchell v. 

Dupnik (9th Cir. 1996) 75 F.3d 517, 525.]" (Serrano v. Francis (9th Cir 2003) 345 F.3d 

1071, 1079.)

ANALYSIS

Our review of California's gang validation process applicable at the time Salinas 

was validated convinces us the significant adverse consequences ordinarily attending 

such determination, which in fact were visited on Salinas,5 mandate that the state comply 

 

5 The People argue that because Salinas was reintegrated into the general population 

under a pilot program after only an approximately 10-month stay in the SHU, he is not 

continuing to suffer a loss of custody credits and therefore does not have any injury. 

However, Salinas lost some custody credits during this period and therefore has suffered 

an injury giving him standing to seek the present relief. Moreover, the gang validation 
10

with the minimum procedural due process protections outlined on Wolff before it may 

deny an inmate custody credits based on a gang validation determination. Certainly, 

"[t]he due process clause does not, standing alone, confer a protected interest in 

preventing adverse state action during incarceration, nor does it protect against every 

change in the conditions of confinement having an adverse impact on the prisoner." (In 

re Johnson (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 290, 297.) However, where disciplinary decisions do

result in a denial of custody credits, there is a "line of cases . . . hold[ing] that, because 

California and other states have legislatively granted inmates the right to conduct credits 

and created specific statutory and administrative procedural safeguard mechanisms that 

must be invoked before an inmate can be deprived of conduct credits, a vested liberty 

interest protected by the due process clause is created." (Ibid.)

As this court previously recognized, "where as here, 'the State ha[s] created the 

right to good time [credits] and itself recogniz[es] that its deprivation is a sanction 

authorized for major misconduct,' a prisoner's interest in retaining good conduct credits 

'has real substance and is sufficiently embraced within Fourteenth Amendment "liberty"

to entitle him to those minimum procedures appropriate under the circumstances and 

required by the Due Process Clause to insure that the state-created right is not arbitrarily 

abrogated.' [Citation.] Consequently, before a prisoner can be deprived of good conduct 

 

continues to hang as a Sword of Damocles over Salinas, both because it could subject 

him to being placed in the SHU (with the accompanying loss of custody credits) and also 

could provide a basis for denial of parole at his delayed parole hearing dates. (See

§ 2402, subd. (c)(6) [unsuitability may be premised on prisoner having engaged in 

serious misconduct in prison]; cf. In re Sanchez (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 962 [Board of 

Parole Hearings citing continued involvement with prison gangs as militating against 

grant of parole].)
11

credits, the state must provide: '(1) advance written notice of the disciplinary charges; (2) 

an opportunity, when consistent with institutional safety and correctional goals, to call 

witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense; and (3) a written statement 

by the factfinder of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action.' 

[Quoting Hill, supra, 472 U.S. at p. 454.]" (In re Rothwell (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 160, 

165 [concluding in dicta that Wolff's procedural protections apply in administrative 

proceeding that found prisoner committed rules violation resulting in forfeiture of 151 

days of good conduct credits].)

The scheme in effect at the time Salinas was validated did not provide the inmate 

with the ability to call witnesses.6 Although Wolff recognized an "inmate facing 

disciplinary proceedings . . . would normally be entitled to present witnesses," it did so 

with the recognition that "[p]rison officials must have the necessary discretion to keep the 

hearing within reasonable limits and to refuse to call witnesses that may create a risk of 

reprisal or undermine authority," and therefore concluded the officials "must have the 

necessary discretion" to deny an inmate the right to call witnesses when considerations of 

institutional safety or correctional goals would be impinged. (Wolff, supra, 418 U.S. at 

p. 566.) We agree with the court in Serrano v. Francis, supra, 345 F.3d 1071 that, 

although "[j]ail officials need not provide inmates an unfettered right to call witnesses, 

. . . they must make the decision whether to allow witnesses on a case-by-case basis, 

 

6 Although the validity of the newly enacted scheme is not before us in this 

proceeding, it appears the new scheme provides at least the potential for an inmate to 

seek to obtain evidence from witnesses. (See § 3378.2, subd. (d).)
12

examining the potential hazards that may result from calling a particular person. 

[Citation.] '[A] blanket denial of permission for an inmate to have witnesses physically 

present during disciplinary hearings is impermissible . . . .' " (Serrano, at p. 1079.) Other 

courts have reached similar conclusions and, interpreting Wolff, have disapproved blanket 

policies categorically excluding witnesses from the hearing. (See Ramer v. Kerby (10th 

Cir. 1991) 936 F.2d 1102, 1105 ["The decision whether to grant a request to call or 

confront a particular witness, however, must be made on an individualized basis. A 

refusal to permit a staff member to testify based solely on a blanket policy excluding the 

testimony of a certain class of individuals does not satisfy the requirement of the 

individualized determination established by the Supreme Court in Wolff."]; accord, 

Grandison v. Cuyler (3d Cir. 1985) 774 F.2d 598, 604; King v. Wells (6th Cir. 1985) 760 

F.2d 89, 93; Dalton v. Hutto (4th Cir. 1983) 713 F.2d 75, 78.)

We recognize that the court in In re Fernandez, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th 1199 

upheld the validation process even though the scheme did not permit an inmate to call 

witnesses. However, Fernandez's entire analysis of this issue was limited to the 

following statement:

"It is true that the validation process does not encompass calling 

witnesses. But, as noted, the United States Supreme Court has

indicated this is not required if institutional safety and correctional 

goals would be unduly jeopardized. Here, the context is prison 

gangs and institutional safety where the calling of witnesses, at a 

minimum, is problematic, given both the security concerns and 

confidential nature of the material used in the validation process.

[Citing Wolff, at p. 566.] As also noted by the Supreme Court: 

'Prison security, imperiled by the brutal reality of prison gangs, 

provides the backdrop of the State's interest [in the level of due 

process to afford]. Clandestine, organized, fueled by race-based 
13

hostility, and committed to fear and violence as a means of 

disciplining their own members and their rivals, gangs seek nothing 

less than to control prison life and to extend their power outside 

prison walls.' [Quoting Wilkinson v. Austin (2005) 545 U.S. 209, 

227.] [¶] Thus, we conclude that the failure to provide for witnesses 

is consistent with the United States Supreme Court's determination 

that procedural protections less demanding than those required by 

Wolff may be employed '[w]here the [proceeding at issue] draws 

more on the experience of prison administrators, and where the 

State's [due process] interest implicates the safety of other inmates 

and prison personnel . . . .' [Quoting Wilkinson, at pp. 228-229.]" 

(In re Fernandez, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1216-1217.)

We believe this analysis was erroneous and should not be followed. First, 

although briefly citing Wolff, the Fernandez court does not reconcile its approval of a 

blanket policy of prohibiting witnesses with Wolff's observation that an "inmate facing 

disciplinary proceedings . . . would normally be entitled to present witnesses" (Wolff, 

supra, 418 U.S. at p. 566, italics added) subject to the "necessary discretion [of prison 

officials] . . . to refuse to call witnesses that may create a risk of reprisal or undermine 

authority." (Ibid.) The plain language of Wolff, as construed by numerous subsequent 

federal court opinions, does not support a blanket prohibition on witnesses in gang 

validation proceedings. Additionally, although the Fernandez court, as well as the 

People on appeal, relied on Wilkinson v. Austin, supra, 545 U.S. 209 as supporting a 

policy of a blanket ban on witnesses, Wilkinson only approved Ohio's blanket limitation 

on witnesses when classifying prisoners for placement in a "Supermax" facility. The 

People on appeal argue Wilkinson controls here because validating a gang member and 

placing him into a SHU is analogous to classifying prisoners for placement into a 

Supermax facility. However, the Wilkinson court qualified the reach of its decision by 
14

specifically stating that, "Ohio is not, for example, attempting to . . . revoke good time 

credits for specific, serious misbehavior [citing Wolff] where more formal, adversary-type 

procedures might be useful" (id. at p. 228), which convinces us Wilkinson was careful to 

preserve Wolff's due process protections when the administrative decision, as here, does

result in "the forfeiture or withholding of good-time credits, which affects the term of 

confinement. . . ." (Wolff, supra, 418 U.S. at p. 547.) Because Wilkinson expressly 

cautioned it was not examining the type of administrative proceeding that could affect the 

term of confinement, we are unconvinced that Wilkinson eroded the protections required 

under Wolff, and Fernandez mistakenly imported Wilkinson's rationale when assessing 

the adequacy of the due process protections provided under California's decisionmaking 

process for gang validation.7

 

7 At least one court has observed, although in a different context, that whether Wolff

rather than Wilkinson should control for gang validation procedures resulting in a transfer 

to a SHU "depends, in significant part, on whether the prisoner's transfer to the SHU is 

characterized as disciplinary or administrative" and that "[a] review of Supreme Court 

decisions regarding procedural process in prisons does indicate that the loss of good time 

credits is a punitive measure (related to disciplinary reasons) that changes the due 

process analysis." (Cook v. Cate (N.D.Cal., Aug. 14, 2014, No. 11–cv–06581–YGR 

(PR)) ___F.Supp.2d ___ [2014 WL 4185718], *12, italics added.) The court then noted 

that, "in the instant case, California is revoking good-time credits for inmates who are 

housed in the SHU, which the Supreme Court implies requires more adversarial 

procedures. Wolff itself is also instructive, there the Supreme Court explained: '[t]he 

deprivation of good time is unquestionably a matter of considerable importance. The 

State reserves it as a sanction for serious misconduct, and we should not unrealistically 

discount its significance.' [Quoting Wolff, supra, 418 U.S. at p. 561.] Therefore, it is 

possible that California's decision to revoke good time credits has converted SHU 

assignment into a punitive measure (i.e., for disciplinary reasons) requiring more due 

process protections." (Id. at p. *13, italics added.)
15

The People's remaining arguments do not undermine our conclusion that the gang 

validation process applied to Salinas here, which brought with it the loss of custody 

credits, denied Salinas the due process right to seek to call witnesses as mandated by 

Wolff. For example, the People cite In re Jenkins (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1167 and In re 

Cabrera, supra, 55 Cal.4th 683 for the proposition that classification decisions are vested 

in the prison authorities and courts should defer to their construction and application of 

the classification scheme. Neither case addressed whether, when an inmate is subjected 

to the gang validation process and loses custody credits as a result of that determination, 

the inmate may categorically be denied the right to call witnesses as mandated by Wolff. 

The People also cite In re Johnson, supra, 176 Cal.App.4th 290 to argue the due process 

clause does not confer a protected interest in preventing adverse state action during 

incarceration or protect against every change in the conditions of confinement having an 

adverse impact on the prisoner. Although Johnson held there was no right to habeas 

review in inmate disciplinary actions not resulting in the loss of custody credits (id. at pp. 

296-297), Johnson explicitly cautioned it was not evaluating disciplinary decisions that 

do result in a denial of custody credits. (Ibid. [noting a "line of cases . . . hold[ing] that, 

because California and other states have legislatively granted inmates the right to conduct 

credits and created specific statutory and administrative procedural safeguard 

mechanisms that must be invoked before an inmate can be deprived of conduct credits, a 

vested liberty interest protected by the due process clause is created"].)

We are left the question of the appropriate remedy. As did the court in In re 

Fernandez, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at pages 1214 to 1215, we believe "the appropriate 
16

remedy is to attempt, as closely as possible, to return [Salinas] to the position he would 

enjoy if the gang validation had been unsuccessful. We shall vacate the gang validation 

decision and direct prison officials to expunge it from [Salinas's] prison file . . . . At the 

same time, our decision does not preclude prison officials from prospectively initiating a 

new validation procedure" that provides Salinas with the opportunity to call witnesses as 

mandated by Wolff. Additionally, the custody credits Salinas would have accrued during 

the time he was improperly placed in SHU shall be reinstated.

DISPOSITION

The relief sought in the petition for writ of habeas corpus is granted and the CDCR 

is directed to vacate Salinas's gang validation decision and expunge the validation 

decision from his prison central file. CDCR is further directed to (1) report the 

expungement of Salinas's validation to all gang-related law enforcement databases and 

clearinghouses to which the original validation was reported previously, (2) cease 

housing Salinas based on the vacated gang validation decision, and (3) reinstate any 

custody credits forfeited by Salinas as a result of the validation decision.

McDONALD, J.

WE CONCUR:

HALLER, Acting P. J.

AARON, J.