J-S61033-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

DAVID PHILLIP PIERGROSSI 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 499 EDA 2018

Appeal from the PCRA Order January 9, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-46-CR-0005014-2012

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES, J., and PANELLA, J.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED APRIL 09, 2019

Appellant, David Phillip Piergrossi, appeals pro se from the order 

dismissing his first petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act 

(PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541–9546. Appellant failed to appeal within the 

mandatory time limitation. Accordingly, we quash. 

The PCRA court aptly summarized the relevant history of the case as 

follows.

Following a two day jury trial, [Appellant] was convicted of Count 

1 -Robbery, [] Count 3 - Terroristic[] Threats,[] Count 4 -Theft By 

Unlawful Taking,[] Count 5 -Receiving Stolen Property,[] Count 6 

-Possessing an Instrument of Crime[] and Count 9 -Simple 

Assault[]. On May 5, 2015, [Appellant] received an aggregate 

sentence of 11-25 years to be served in a State Correctional 

Facility. [Appellant] did not file any post sentence motions. 

[Appellant] filed a direct appeal. The Superior Court affirmed the 

judg[]ment of sentence by Opinion dated May 11, 2016. On 

November 8, 2016, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied 

Defendant’s Petition for Allowance of Appeal. On July 21, 2017,

the [Appellant] filed a pro se “Petition Under the Post Conviction 
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Collateral Relief Act (PCRA)” alleging a constitutional violation 

such that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have 

taken place and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. 

Robert Adshead, Esquire, was subsequently appointed to serve as 

PCRA counsel pursuant to an Order issued by [the PCRA] Court on 

July 26, 2017. In a “no merit” letter dated October 25, 2017, and 

prepared in accordance with Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 

213 (Pa. Super. 1988), PCRA counsel advised [Appellant] that, in 

his opinion, [Appellant]is not eligible for the PCRA 142 Pa.C.S.[A.]

§ 9541 et seq. relief alleged in his Petition. By Order of November

22, 2017, [the PCRA] Court notified the [Appellant] of its intention 

to dismiss the petition without a hearing. On December 17, 2018, 

the [Appellant]responded to the dismissal notice. On January 9,

2018, [the PCRA] Court issued an Order dismissing the petition 

without a hearing. The [Appellant] filed a Notice of Appeal, which 

was docketed February 13, 2018. The envelope accompanying 

the Notice indicates it was mailed on February 9, 2018. 

PCRA Court Opinion, 6/14/18, at 1-3 (footnotes omitted). 

Appellant raises four questions on appeal, which we reproduce 

verbatim: 

I. Was the Appellant ever properly arraigned on this matter in 

that:

a. The Bill of information was not signed or filed by 

the Commonwealth at the time of the Arraignment, 

and 

b. The Appellant was allowed to proceed pro se 

without the [c]ourt conducting a colloquy to 

determine if the Appellant could represent himself 

at the arraignment?

II. Was Counsel ineffective for allowing arraignment to proceed 

without objecting to proceedings in that he 

As Mr. Nestor, Esq. failed to object to proceedings 

[and] ask for arraignment to be rescheduled.

III. Was counsel ineffective in that she
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a. Carol Sweeney did not challenge formal 

[arraignment’s] validity at omnibus pre-trial motion[?]

[IV]. Was counsel ineffective in that he 

a. John McMahon, Esq. did not challenge validity of 

formal arraignment[ ] From Jan. 24, 2013 till Dec. 2014 

when he was fired.

Appellant’s Brief, at 1-2.1

Before we may address the merits of Appellant’s issues, we must 

address the timeliness of this appeal. Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 903(a) provides that “the notice of appeal . . . shall be filed within 

30 days after the entry of the order from which the appeal is taken.” Pa.R.A.P. 

903(a). 

It is well-settled that: 

Time limitations for taking appeals are strictly construed and 

cannot be extended as a matter of grace. This Court can raise the 

matter sua sponte, as the issue is one of jurisdiction to entertain 

the appeal. Absent extraordinary circumstances, this Court has 

no jurisdiction to entertain an untimely appeal.

Commonwealth v. Burks, 102 A.3d 497, 500 (Pa.Super.2014) (citations 

omitted). 

Here, the record confirms that Appellant’s notice of appeal was 

postmarked February 9, 2018, the 31st day after the entry of the order 

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1 We note that Appellant’s brief is inconsistently paginated. 
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dismissing his petition. See 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1908.

2

 However, it contains no 

evidence of extraordinary circumstances such as a court holiday or closing or 

a breakdown in the operations of the court, which might excuse Appellant’s 

untimely filing. Based on this record, because Appellant did not timely file his

notice of appeal, the PCRA court requests that we quash this appeal. See

PCRA Ct. Op., at unnumbered page 1, and 3. Appellant does not address the 

issue of quashal in his brief. This Court lacks jurisdiction to review the merits 

of his other issues. See Pa.R.A.P. 903(a); see also Burks, 102 A.3d at 500. 

Accordingly, we quash.

Appeal quashed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/9/19

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2 Therefore, even applying the prisoner mailbox rule, Appellant’s notice was 

filed beyond the jurisdictional time limit. See Commonwealth v. Jones, 700 

A.2d 423, 426 (Pa. 1997).