### FI LED U.S. COURT O F APP EALS ELEVENTH CIRCUIT Febru ary 16, 20 05 THO MAS K. KAH N CL ERK [PUBLIS H] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ N o. 03- 1147 1

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ D. C. Docket N o. 99-03372 -CV -T MP-S ALONZO HURTH,

Pet it io ne r-Ap pe ll an t, ve rs us BILLY MITCHEM, Warde n, ATTORNEY G ENERAL FOR THE STATE OF AL ABAMA, Res po nd en ts -Ap pe ll ees .

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ Appeal f rom the United State s District Court f o r th e N o rt h e rn D i s t r i c to f

A l ab a ma

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ (F eb ru ar y 16 , 200 5)Ho no ra ble Ric ha rd D. Cud ahy , Unit e d St ate s Ci rc uit Judg e fo r t

he Se ve nth

Cir c uit , * sitti ngby desig nation. 2 Be fo re D U BIN A , CA RN E S an d C U D A H Y , Ci rc uit Jud ge s. * CAR NE S, Circuit Judge: In order to serve a s the basis for a procedural bar in federa l habeas pr oc ee din gs, astate r

ule m ust be f irm ly e sta bli she d and r eg ularl y

f oll ow ed . H ill v. Jone s, 81 F . 3d 1 015, 102 3 ( 11th C ir . 199 6) ; C oc hr anv. H er ri ng, 43 F . 3d 1 404, 1408 , m odi fi ed

on r eh ’ g, 61 F . 3d 2 0 ( 11th C ir . 199 5) ; se e al so L ee v. K em na , 534 U . S. 362 , 376 , 122 S . Ct . 877 , 885 ( 2002 ). T his a ppe al pr es en ts u s w iththe que sti on o f w he the r the onl y state pr oc ed

ur al r ule s th at m ee t those r equir em en ts are ju ris di ct io na l o ne s. A r ule is j ur isd ic tio na l i f the pe tit ion er ’ s no n- co m pli an ce w ithit

a ct ua lly d i v e s t s th e s t a t e c o u rt s o f p o w e r an dau t h o r i t y t o d e c i d e th e u n d e r l yi n g c l a i m, instead of m erely

offer ing th e re spon dent an opp ortunityto assert a proce dural de fe nse w hic h m ay

be w ai ve d if

not r ai se d. S ee , e . g. , S ie be rt v. Cam pbe ll, 334 F. 3d 10 18, 1025 (11t h Cir. 2003 ) (“ Under [ Alabam a law ] , ‘ the failure to file a[n Alabam a] Rule 32 petition within the two-y ear lim itations period is a j urisdictio nal de fe ct that c anbe not ic ed

a t any ti m e an d is not

w ai ve d by

the f ai lur e of the state to a sse rt it . ’ ”) ( quot ing W ill iam s v. S ta te , 783 S o. 2d 1 35, 137 ( A la . Cr im . App.3

2000 ); see a lso id. at 1025– 26 n.8 (distin guish ing “ [a] court’ s discretionary au tho ri ty to dis m iss an un tim el y

pe tit ion ” fr om

“ a j ur isd ic tio na l r

ule r equir ing a court to dism iss un tim ely petition s whenever their untim eliness m ay be noticed”). W e ha ve c onf

lic tin g pr ior

pane l pr ec ed en t onthe que sti on o f w he the r state procedural rules m

ust be jurisdictional in natu re in order to be firm ly established and regularly

followed for federa l habeas procedural bar purposes. Before addressing th at intra-cir cuit conflict, w e w ill set out th e pertinent procedural histo ry of the present case . I. In199 4 A lon zo H urth w as tr ie d and c onvi ct ed in the A la

ba m a co urts o f robbery in the first degree. Bec ause he w as a habitual offender, Hurth w as se nte nc ed to lif e im pr iso nm en t w ith out

paro le . H urth v . S ta te , 688 S o. 2d 2 75, 276 (Ala. Crim . App. 1995), overruled by Morgan v. S tate, 733 So. 2d 940 (A la. Cr im . App. 199 9) . O n di re ct appe al the Co urt of

Cr im ina l Appe al s r em an de d th e case to the trial c ourt for further proceedings relating to th e sentence. Id. at 27 6– 77 . O n r em an d th e tr ia l c ourt r e- im pose d th e sa m e se nte nc e, and o n r et ur n of the c as e fr om

r em an d th at

se nte nc e as w el l a s th e co nvi ct ionw er e af fi rm ed by the Co urt of Cr im ina l Appe al s. I d. a t 27 7 n. * ( subs eque nt h ist or y not e by Re porte r of4

Deci si on s) . Thatap pe ll at e co ur t al so de ni edHurt h’s re qu es t fo r a reh eari ng , id ., an d f oll ow ing the A la

ba m a Su pr em e Co urt’ s de nia l of

his pe tit ionf

or aw ri t of ce rt ior ar i, id. , it

iss ue d ac er

tif ic at e of j udgm en t i n th e ca se on D ec em be r 20, 199 6. O n F eb ru ar

y 5, 199 9, w hic h w as m or e that tw o y ears a ft er iss uanc e of

the certific ate of j udgm ent, H urth filed the Ala. R. Crim . P . 32 collatera l petition that w oul d le ad

to thi s c as e. I n th at

pe tit ionhe r ai se d th e ine ff ec tiv e as sis tanc e of co unse l c la im s th at

he w oul d late r as se rt

in thi s f ed er al ha be as pr oc ee din g. T he s t at e t ri al co u rt d i dn o tad d re s s th e mer i t s o f a n y o f t h e c l ai m s ra i s ed i n Hu rt h ’s Ru le 32 p et iti on. I nst ea d, the c ourt di sm iss ed the pe tit iona s un tim el y

und er the tw o- y ear statut e of

li m itatio ns i n R

ule 32. 2( c) . T ha t pr ovi sio n sp ec if ie s th at :

“ [T ] he c ourt sh al l no t e nte rt ai n any pe tit ionf or r el ie f fr om

ac onvi ct ion[ on spe ci fi ed gr ound s, inc lud ing f

ed er al c onst itu tio na l vi olatio ns] unl es s th e pe tit ionis fi le d . . . w ith in tw o ( 2) y ears a ft er the iss uanc e of

the c er tif ic at e of j udgm en t by the Co urt of

Cr im ina l Appe al s. ” A la . R. Cr im . P . 32. 2( c) ( 2002 ) (am en de d to low er the pe ri od i n w hic h ape tit ionm ay be f ile d f ro m tw o y ears to one y ear on Mar ch 22 , 20 02 , effec ti ve Aug us t 1 , 20 02 ). T he Co urt of

Cr im ina l Appe al s a ff

irm ed the tr ia l c ourt r

uli ng, and i n do ing so held th at: “ Beca

use Hurth’ s petition wa s barred f rom reviewby

the two-y ear lim itatio n pe ri od p ro vid ed in Ru le 32. 2( c) , the tr ia l c ourt w as auth or iz ed to5

dis m iss the pe tit ionw ith out an e vid en tiary

he ar ing , and w ith out

r equir ing a response from

the state.” H urth the n f

ile d th is 2 8 U . S. C. § 22 54 p et iti on r ai sin g th e sa m e ine ff ec tiv e as sis tanc e of

c ouns el c la im s he ha d a sse rt ed in his Ru le 32 p ro ce ed ing in state co urt. T he m ag istrate j udge iss ue d ar ep ort and r ec om m en da tio n th at

the pe tit ion be de nie d; i t w as ba se d onthe c la im be ing pr oc ed

ur al ly barr ed a s ar es ult

of H urth’ s f ai lur e to f ile his Ru le 32 p et iti on i n st at e co urt w ith in the tw o- y ear statut e of li m itatio ns c ont ai ne d inA la . R. Cr im . P . 32. 2( c) . O ve r H urth’ s ob j ec tio ns the dis tr ic t c ourt a dopt ed

the r ep ort and r ec om

m en da tio n, and d en ie d th e pe tit ionf or fed eral habe as rel ie f. A ft er H urth a ppe al ed , thi s C ourt i ssu ed ac er tif ic at e of appe al ab ili ty

on the f o l l o w i n g i s s u e : “Wh e t h e r th e d i s t r i c tc o u rte rr e di n d i s mi s s i n g th e c l a i ms in ap pe llant’ s f

ed er al ha be as c or pus pe tit ion , 28 U . S. C. § 22 54, a s pr oc ed ur al ly de fa ult ed w he n it is ar gua ble a m ong j ur ist s of

r ea son that the state ’ s r at ion al e fo r failing to reach the m erits of appellant’ s claim s was not consistentl y applied.” II. Hurth stakes his posi tion th at the statute of lim itations provisio n contained in A la ba m a’ s R ule 32. 2( c) is not

f irm ly e sta bli she d and r eg ularl y

f oll ow ed —or co nsi ste ntl y

appl ie d, a s th e que sti on i s ph ra se d inthe c er tif ic at e of appe al ab ili ty6

that he w as gr an te d—s ole ly upo n th is C ourt’ s pr ior

de ci sio n inMo or e v. Cam pbe ll, 344 F . 3d 1 313 (1 1thCi r. 200 3) ( pe r curi am). I n th at c as e, the S ta te of A la ba m a ha d f

ai le d to ple ad

the Ru le 32. 2( c) statut e of li m itatio ns i n th e state co llate ra l pr oc ee din g, id. a t 13 20, and the tr ia l c ourt ha d de nie d th e cl ai m s onthe m er its , id. a t 13 17. T he Co urt of Cr im ina l A

ppe al s ha d a ff

irm ed , but

on the gr ound that M oor e’ s st at e co llate ra l pe tit ionw as ti m e- barr ed be ca use it ha d no t be en bro ug ht wit hi n R

ul e 3 2.2 (c)’s t wo- y ear l im it at io ns pe rio d. Id . at 1 31 7– 18 . T he f ed er al dis tr ic t c ourt i n th e Moo re c as e de nie d ha be as r el ie f, r ea soni ng that M oor e’ s c la im s w er e w ith out m er it. A t the sam e tim e, it r ej ec te d th e St at e of Alabam a’ s alternative ar gum ent that the claim s wer e also procedurally barre d be ca use of Mo or e’ s f

ai lur e to c om

ply w iththe tw o- y ear statut e of li m itatio ns i n Al ab ama’s Ru l e 3 2 .2 (c ). Id . a t1 3 1 8

– 1 9 . M o o re ap p ea l ed th e d i s t ri ct co u rt ’s de nia l of his pe tit ion , and the S ta te c ro ss- ap pe al ed the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s r

uli ng reject in g t he pro cedur al ba r de fen se . Id. at 13 19 . This Court aff

irm ed the district court’ s denial of Moore’ s federa l habeas pe tit ion , a gr ee ing w iththe dis tr ic t c ourt bo th tha t the c la im s w er e not pr oc ed ur al ly barr ed and tha t the y

la ck ed m er it. I n th e co ur se of

r ej ec tin g th e St at e of A la ba m a’ s pr oc ed

ur al bar ar gum en t ba se d onthe Ru le 32. 2( c) statut e of lim itations , this Court rec ogni zed that failure to com ply with a state court7

procedural rule does bar f ederal habea s reviewof claim s “ if the state procedural ru li ng res ts up on an ‘ in de pe nd en t an d a de qu at e’ sta te gro un d.” Id. at 13 20 . As we ad de d, how ev er , “ [o ] nly

r ule s th at are ‘ fi rm ly

e sta bli she d and r eg ularl y

f oll ow ed ’ qualify as adequate state grounds for precluding su bstantiv e re view of f ederal cl ai m s.” Id . So fa r, so go od . Th e p ro b l em is th at th i s Co u rt th en erro n eo u s l y co n cl u d ed th at Al ab ama’s Rule 32.2(c) wa s not firm ly established and regularly followed w hen Moore filed his state c oll at er al pe tit ionm or e than tw o y ears a ft er the 198 9 is suanc e of

the ce rt if ic at e of j udgm en t i n hi s di re ct

appe al . I d. H owthi s C ourt w en t a str ay in its re as oni ng i s a

ppare nt f ro m the e xpl an at ionit

gave . T ha t e xpl an at ionin its e nti re ty co nsi sts of

the f oll ow ing tw o se nte nc es : T his Court in Siebert v. Cam pbell, 334 F.3d 1018 (11th Cir. 2003), c o n c l u d e dth a t , b e f

o r e th e A l ab a maS up r e me C o u rt ’s d e c i s i o n i n Wi l l i a ms v. State, 783 So. 2d 135 , 137 (A la. Crim . App. 2000), the j urisdictio nal ch ar ac te r of

A la ba m a Ru le of

Cr im ina l P ro ce dur e 32. 2( c) w as not f irm ly es ta bli she d and n ot r eg ularl y f oll ow ed . B ec au se the j ur isd ic tio na l r ule in W ill iam s w as r en de re d w el l a ft er the A la ba m a co urts r

ule d onMo or e’ s R

ule 32 petiti on in 1 998 and1999 , the district court properly concluded that Moo re ’ s c la im s w er e not pr oc ed ur al ly barr ed . Id . I f Moo re ’ s e rr or

is not appare nt f

ro m that pa ssa ge a lon e, it

be co m es appare nt after close exam ination of the Siebert decision, which is the only authority Moore8

ci te d f or the pr opos iti on tha t a

state r ule is fi rm ly

e sta bli she d and r eg ularl y fo ll owe d o nl y

if i t i s ju ris di ct io na l i n n atur e. T ha t pr opos iti on i s no t su ppor te d by S ie be rt . T his Co urt di d no t de ci de in Si eb er t tha t A la ba m a’ s R ule 32. 2( c) statut e of

li m itatio ns p ro vis ionw as not f irm ly established andregularly followed for purpos es of determ ining whether a petition er’ s failure to abide by it would supp ort a procedural bar to federa l habeas re lie f. T he S ie be rt

c as e did not pr es en t tha t i ssu e; it

did not e ve n in vol ve the procedural bar doctrine. Instead, it invo lved the quest ion of whether that petition er had com

plied with the one-y ear statute of lim itations on filing federal habeas petition s that is contain ed in 28 U.S .C. § 2244 (d)(1). Siebert, 334 F. 3d at 1021 –22. More specific ally , the issue in the Siebert c ase w as whetherthe oney ear period for filing in federal c ourt had been toll ed while the state c ollateral petition wa s pendin g in the Alabam a courts. Id. It w as all a m atter of f ederal statut or y int er pr et at ion . T h e f e d e r a l s t a tu t e b e i n g i n t e r

p r e t e di n S i e b e rtp r o v i d e dth a t“[ t ]h e t i me during which a properly

filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral r eview” is pendin g would not count toward the running o f the fe deral period of lim itations . 28 U. S. C. § 224 4(d)(2). Bec ause the petition er had not filed his state c oll at er al pe tit ionw ith in the ti m e re qui re d by A la ba m a’ s R ule 32. 2( c) , the9

re spon de nt arg ue d th at

the state pe tit ionha d no t be en“pr ope rl y f ile d” w ith in the m eanin g of

§ 22 44( d) (2 ). A s ar es ult , the arg um en t w en t, the re c oul d be no t oll ing of the f ed er al statut e of

li m itatio ns f

or f ili ng f ed er al ha be as pe tit ion s. S ie be rt , 334 F. 3d at 10 20, 102 2. O nly in that c ont ex t di d A la

ba m a’ s R ule 32. 2( c) c om e up i n the Siebert c ase. T his Court held in Siebert that in order for a state collateral pe tit ionin A la

ba m a to h av e be en“pr ope rl y f ile d” f or §22 44( d) (1 ) tol lin g pur pose s, it is not ne ce ssary

f or that pe tit ionto ha ve m et the state ’ s own st at

ute of lim itations , unless that statute of lim itations is j urisdictio nal in nature. S ee id. at 1032 . T he S ie be rt

Co urt the n c onc lud ed

that R ule 32. 2( c) w as j ur isd ic tio na l, but onlyfr om

the date of the decision in W illiam s v. State , 783 So. 2d 13 5, 137 (Ala . Cr im . App. 200 0) , f

or w ar d. I n W ill iam s th e A la ba m a ap pe llate c ourt ha d he ld

“ that the Rule 32 statut e of lim itations is a j urisdictio nal bar that m ay be noticed at any stage of proceedings and alway s requires dism issal.” S iebert, 334 F.3d at 1025 . The Siebert c ourt decided, however , that Rule 32. 2(c) had not been j urisdictio nal in nature before the W illiam s decision was announ ced. Id. at 1026 –27. Beca

use the W illiam s decision cam e out too late to appl y to petitio ner Siebert’ s own case, the Court held that he had “ properly filed” his state collatera l pe tit ionf or § 22 44( d) (2 ) pur

pose s e ve n th oughit

w as unt im el y

und er Ru le10

32 .2(c ). Id. at 10 32 . It i s cr it ic al ly im po rta nt to no te , ho wev er, t ha t i n S ie be rt we held not hing and said noth ing abou t whether Alabam a’ s Rule 32.2(c) had been firm ly established and regularly followed for federa l habeas procedural bar purpos es. That w as sim

ply not the iss ue. T he m ist ak e thi s C ourt m ad e in the Mo or e ca se w as to take the j ur isd ic tio na l c ri te ri on f

ro m S ie be rt ’ s ho ldi ng a

bout w he n astate pr oc ed

ur al r ule is co gni za ble f or § 22 44( d) (2 ) “ pr ope rl y

f ile d” pur pose s, and i nse rt

it int o th e dif fe re nt c ont ex t of

w he the r the vio la tio n of

astate pr oc ed

ur al r ule is co gni za

ble in f ed er al ha be as pr oc ee din gs. S ee Mo or e, 344 F . 3d at 13 20–2 1. T he pur pose and func tio nin g of

the “pr ope rl y

f ile d” r equir em en t of

§ 22 44( d) (2 ) is d if

fe re nt f ro m that of the pr oc ed

ur al bar doc tr ine . A rt

uz v. Be nne tt, 531 U . S. 4, 9, 121 S . Ct . 361, 364 ( 2000 ) (“ [T ] he que sti on whe the r anappl ic at ionha s be en‘ pr ope rl y f ile d’ is quit e se parate f

ro m the que sti on whe the r the c la im s c ont ai ne d inthe appl ic at ion ar e m er ito ri ous an d f

re e of pr oc ed ur al bar. ”) ; se e al so E ste s v. Ch ap m an , 382 F . 3d 1237 , 123 9 ( 11th C ir . 200 4) ( dis cu ssi ng A rt uz ); W ad e v. Battl e, 379 F . 3d 1 254, 12 59 –6 0 (1 1t h C ir. 2 00 4) (qu ot in g Art uz ). Following the Artuz distinction betwee n “ proper filing” and “ procedural bar, ” w e sa id i n S ie be rt

of A la ba m a’ s R ule 32. 2( c) be fo re W ill iam s m ad e it j urisdictio nal, that although th e “ enforcem ent of the lim itations period was11

co m m itt ed to the c ir cu it co urt’ s di sc re tio n . . . S ie be rt . . . c oul d no t de m an d th at he be e xe m pte d f ro m the ti m e bar’ s a

ppl ic at ion . ” S ie be rt , 334 F . 3d at 10 29. W e al so said that “ com

pliance with Rule 32.2(c )’ s two-y ear deadline sho uld be regarded as a co ndi tio n to obt ai nin g r el ie f rathe r than ac ondi tio n to f ili ng. ” I d. a t 10 30. T his m eans tha t the j ur isd ic tio na l natur e cr ite ri on a ppl ie s inthe “pr ope rl y

f ile d” c ont ex t of § 22 44( d) (2 ) but

not in the pr oc ed

ur al bar co nte xt. T he c ri te ri on i n th e pr oc ed ur al bar co nte xt i s w he the r the r ule is fi rm ly

e sta bli she d and r eg ularl y ap pl ie d, n ot whet he r it is juri sd ic ti on al in na tu re. See , e.g., Hil l, 8 1 F .3dat 1 02 3. N ow he re in Si eb er

t di d w e hol d, state , or

im ply that R ule 32. 2( c) w as not

f irm ly e s t ab l i s h e dan dr e g u l a r l y f o l l o w e d( a s an o n -

j u r i s d i c t i o n a l r

u l e ) b y t h e A l ab a ma co ur ts be fo re Will ia m s. Si eb er t’ s ho ldi ng i s c onsi ste nt w iththe S upr em e Co urt’ s de ci sio n and o p i n i o n i n Artu z ab o u twh at “p ro p er l y fi l ed ” i n § 2 2 4 4 (d )( 2 ) mea n s , b u tMo o re ’s hol din g is not

c onsi ste nt w ithour

pr ev iou s de ci sio ns a

bout w ha t “ fi rm ly established andregularly followed” m eans for proce dural bar purposes. T hat lack of consistency

is im portant because, under our prior panel prec edent rule, co nsi ste nc y

w ithe ar lie r de ci sio ns i s e ve ry thi ng. Whil e w e ar e not

pe rm itt ed

to reac h a result contrary

to a prior panel’ s decision m erely because w e ar e convinced it is wro ng, Sm ith v. GT E C orp., 236 F.3d 1292 , 1301–03 (11th Cir. 2001), United12

St at es v. S te el e, 147 F . 3d 1 316, 131 7–18 ( 11th C ir . 199 8) , w e m ust r ea cha contrary result wher e the prior panel decision is itself incon sistent with earlier one s. T his is but

anothe r w ay

of say ing that w he re tw o or m or e de ci sio ns o f thi s Co urt are inc onsi ste nt, w e fo llo wthe e ar lie st o ne . U nit ed S ta te s v. H or

na day , 392 F. 3d 1 306, 131 6 ( 11th C ir . 200 4) ; C ohe n v. O ff ic e D ep ot, I nc . , 204 F . 3d 1 069, 1072 (11th Cir. 2000). Inc om pari ng the pr ior

pr ec ed en t t o th e Moo re de ci sio n, w e ke ep in m ind Moo re ’ s e xa ct

hol din g: the f

ai lur e of ape tit ion er

to co m ply w ithA la ba m a’ s R ule 32. 2( c) is not

to be appl ie d a s apr oc ed ur al bar in f

ed er al ha be as pr oc ee din gs w h e r e th a tf

a i l u r e o c c u rr e db e f

o r e th e r u l e w a s ma d e j u r i s d i c t i o n a l b y t h e A l ab a ma courts in W illiam s, which was issued on October 27, 2000. Moore, 344 F.3d at 13 20 . The Mo or e o pi ni on was i ts el f is su edon Sep te m be r 15 , 20 03 . Id. at 13 13 . Wha t i s r el ev an t, the n, is an y de ci sio n of

thi s C ourt i ssu ed

be fo re S ep te m

be r 15, 2003 that decides whether a claim is procedurally

barre d from

feder al habeas reviewwher e the petitioner failed to com ply with A labam a’ s Rule 32.2(c) and that fa ilure to co m

ply oc curr ed be fo re O ct obe r 27, 200 0. T he re are se ve ra l de ci sio ns m eeting that description . They establish th at Moore fa iled to follow established ci rcu it law.13

O ur pr e- Moo re de ci sio ns, w hic h are a lso pr e- Si eb er t, hol d th at

A la ba m a’ s Ru le 32. 2( c) statut e of

li m itatio ns i s f

irm ly e sta bli she d and r eg ularl y

f oll ow ed in the c ourts o f that st at e. T he m ost r ec en t de ci sio n onpoi nt b ef or e Moo re is Fr an kli n v. H igh tow er , 215 F . 3d 1 196 (1 1thCi r. 200 0) ( pe r curi am). T he A la ba m a Co urt of

Cr im ina l Appe al s ha d a ff irm ed the de nia l of

F rankl in’ s R

ule 32 pe ti ti on be cau se he ha d n ot fil editwit hi n t he two -y ear s ta tu te of l im it at io ns . Whe n F rankl in l at er

sou ght f ed er al ha be as r el ie f, the dis tr ic t c ourt de nie d r el ie f on the gr ound

that F rankl in’ s c la im s w er e pr oc ed ur al ly de fa ult ed be ca use his a tte m

pt to rai se th em

in st at e co ur t h adrun afo ul of Al ab am a’s Ru le 32 .2(c ). Id. at 11 98 . Ina ff irm ing the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s de nia l of r el ie f in F rankl in, w e re

j ec te d th e pe tit ion er ’ s arg um en t “ that the ti m e- bar re lie d onby the A la ba m a co urts i s no t consist ently

applied—and th us not a procedural bar under federa l law. ” Id. at 1199 . O ur

hol din g inF rankl in tha t R ule 32. 2( c) w as c onsi ste ntl y appl ie d and w oul d su ppor t a pr oc ed ur al bar, id. a t 11 99–1 201, c am e tw o y ears be fo re the Moo re de ci sio n. I t a lso c am e be fo re the A la ba m a de ci sio n inW ill iam s m ad e Ru le 32. 2( c) j ur isd ic tio na l i n natur e. T he re fo re , the r ule of F rankl in i s th at

af ai lur e to com ply with A labam a’ s statute of lim itations on the filing o f collatera l proceedings su pports a procedural bar in feder al habeas even though Rule 32.2(c) w as not c onsi de re d j ur isd ic tio na l a t the ti m e of the de fa ult . O the rw ise , w e w oul d14

not have a ff irm ed the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s a

ppl ic at ionof

the pr oc ed

ur al bar to Fran kl in ’s cla im s. In Bailey v. N agle, 172 F.3d 129 9, 1305–0 6 (11th Cir. 1999) (per c uriam ), decided four-and-a- half y ears bef ore Moore, we held that various claim s in a § 2254 pe tit ionw er e pr oc ed ur al ly de fa ult ed in part be ca use the c la im s w oul d have be enbarr ed

in the state c ourts o f A la ba m a be ca

use of the Ru le 32. 2( c) statut e of lim itations . In Ke nnedy

v. H erring, 54 F.3d 678, 684 & n.3 (11th Cir. 1995), d ec i d ed ei g h ty ea rs b ef

o re Mo o re , we h el dth at a f ed er al h ab ea s p et i t i o n er ’s ine ff ec tiv e as sis tanc e cl ai m

w as pr oc ed

ur al ly barr ed f or tw o r ea sons . O ne of

tho se re as ons w as that the c la im ha d no t be enti m el y

br ough t i n st at e co urt gi ve n th e tw o- y ear statut e of

li m itatio ns the n c ont ai ne d inA la ba m a’ s T em

por ar y Ru le of Cr im ina l P ro ce dur e 20. 2( c) , id. a t 68 4 n. 3, w hic h w as the pr ed ec es sor to Ru le 32. 2( c) . B oththe Ba ile y

and the K en ne dy

de ci sio ns p re ce de d th e Moo re de ci sio n by y ears . T he y

a lso pr ec ed ed

W ill iam s, w hic h m eans the y c am e be fo re Ru le 32. 2( c) w as r eg ar de d a s havin g any j ur isd ic tio na l si gni fi canc e. B othBa ile y and K en ne dy w oul d have c om e out

dif fe re ntl y on the Ru le 32. 2( c) pr oc ed ur al bar iss ue had the Moore rule been applied in them . Moore is in co ns is te nt wit h t ho se two earl ie r de ci sio ns.15

Moo re is al so i nc onsi ste nt w ithG or don v. N ag le , 19 F . 3d 6 40, 641 ( 11th Ci r. 19 94 ), a d eci si on th atpre ced editby nearl y a de cad e. In th e Gor do n c as e we he ld tha t a

f ed er al ha be as c la im

w as pr oc ed

ur al ly barr ed be ca use of the petition er’ s pre-W illiam s failure to com ply with A labam a’ s Rule 32.2(c). Id. at 641. I t i s im

poss ibl e to r ec onc ile our

G or don de ci sio n w ithMo or e’ s late r hol din g that onlyprocedural bars that divest state courts of j urisdictio n to decide defaulted cl ai m s ca n b e en fo rced in fed eral habe as pro ceed in gs . W e re cognize that Esslinger v. D avis, 44 F. 3d 15 15, 1525– 26 (11th Cir. 1995 ), c onc lud ed

that A la ba m a T em

por ar y Ru le 20( c) , the e ar lie r ve rs ionof Ru le 32.2(c), would not su pport a procedural bar in a f ederal habea s proceeding where the state had expressly

wa ived in state court the defense that the petition er had failed to file his petition within the two-y ear lim itations period. W e explained that w he re the state ha d w ai ve d th e state c ourt r ule “ inv oki ng the bar w oul d se rv e no im po rta nt fed eral in te res t.” Id . The E sslin ger decision has no b earing here be ca use the state ha s ne ve r w ai ve d it s R ule 32. 2( c) de fe nse in thi s c as e. A ny atte m pt t o e xte nd E ssl ing er

be y ond the w ai ve r fa ct s of that c as e w oul d r

un a fo ul o f our earlier

decisions which are binding prece dent and which enforce Rule 32.2(c) whe re t he st at e h as no t wai ve d i t.16

O ur hol din gs e nf

or ci ng A la

ba m a’ s R ule 32. 2( c) statut e of

li m itatio ns a s a procedural bar in fe deral habeas proce edings, even when the defa ult occurred be fo re that r

ule w as tr an sf

orm ed int o aj ur isd ic tio na l on e by the W ill iam s de ci sio n in 2 000, c ove r a pe ri od o f a ha lf doz eny ears . T he y

be ginw iththe G or don de ci sio n in199 4 and r

un thr oughthe F rankl in d ec isi on i n 20 00, w iththe K en ne dy (1 995) and B ai le y

( 1999 ) de ci sio ns i n be tw ee n. E ac h of tho se f our de ci sio ns, wh en re ad ag ai n s tth e p ri o r p re ce d en tru l e, p re v en t s u s fr o m fo l l o wi n g Mo o re ’s la te r hol din g th at

the e nf or ce ab ili ty

of Ru le 32. 2( c) in fe de ra l ha be as pr oc ee din gs depends o n that rule being jurisdictional in n ature at the tim e of the defa ult. It doe s no t. III . The sole basis that Hurth has put forw ard to suppo rt his contentio n that A la ba m a’ s R ule 32. 2( c) w as not

f irm ly e sta bli she d and r eg ularl y

f oll ow ed is that, atth e ti m e h e fai le d t o c om pl y wit h i t, t ha t ru le was n ot juri sd ic ti on al in na tu re. H av ing r ej ec te d H urth’ s pr opos iti on tha t the vio la tio n of ar ule m ust a ct ua lly div es t the state c ourts o f j ur isd ic tio n to de ci de ac la im be fo re the r

ule w ill be re spe ct ed in fe de ra l ha

be as pr oc ee din gs, w e re

j ec t hi s c ont en tio n th at

his f ai lur e to c o mp l y w i t h R

u l e 3 2 . 2 ( c ) d i dn o tp r o c e du r a l l y b a r h i s i n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e c l a i m.17

It did . T he dis tr ic t c ourt’ s j udgm en t de ny ing and dism issin g Hurth’ s federa l habe as pe ti ti on is AFFIRM ED.