alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS COMPENSATION AND WORKING CONDITIONS

Page 1

IRRA Changes Its Name

by Lawrence H. Leith

Bureau of Labor Statistics

Originally Posted: November 30, 2005

More than 50 years after its inception, the Industrial Relations Research Association (IRRA) is changing its name. The

organization’s members voted last year to change the name to the Labor and Employment Relations Association (LERA).

IRRA was founded in 1947 as a research and education organization for professionals in the fields of labor relations and

human resources management. A news release about the name change, posted on the organization’s website (http://

www.lera.uiuc.edu/news/namechange.html), quotes the incoming president of LERA as saying that the organization’s

mission is to provide a forum for "practitioners and scholars of labor and workplace relations to meet, discuss, and debate

critical issues."

Due to the increasingly narrow meaning of the term "industrial relations," discussion about a possible name change had

taken place within the organization for nearly a decade. John Burton, chair of the Special Strategic Membership Committee,

charged with developing a new name for IRRA, said, "The vote of the members to change our name to the Labor and

Employment Relations Association (LERA) is an important confirmation of the organization's relevance and vitality in the 21st

century. The new name best conveys our long-standing commitment to all aspects of labor, employment, and the workplace."

Despite widespread agreement within the organization on the need for a new name, finding one that the members could

agree on proved difficult. Readers of CWC Online may recall a short piece published here in November 2003 that reported

the IRRA was "considering a name change to reflect its broader interest in research, practice, theory, and public policy in the

fields of labor, employment, and the workplace." IRRA’s Executive Board had agreed in June 2003 to change the name to

the Labor and Employment Relations Association. After soliciting comments from members, the board decided to submit the

proposed name change to the entire membership for a vote in 2004. The members voted to approve the new name by a

margin of more than 3 to 1. LERA’s mission remains the same as it had been under the former name. Although local

chapters of the organization are not required to change their names, they are encouraged to do so. Implementation of the

new name began earlier this year.

Lawrence H. Leith

Economist, Office of Publications and Special Studies, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

Telephone: (202) 691-7922; E-mail: Leith.Lawrence@bls.gov

U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics | Division of Information and Marketing Services, PSB Suite 2850, 2 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC

20212-0001 | www.bls.gov/OPUB | Telephone: 1-202-691-5200 | Contact Us
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.1

                CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

     In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Health Fitness
Corporation (the "Company") for the period ended June 30, 2006, as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 14, 2006 (the "Periodic
Report"), I, Jerry V. Noyce, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, hereby
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

     1.   The Periodic Report fully complies with the requirements of section
          13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     2.   The information contained in the Periodic Report fairly presents, in
          all material respects, the financial condition and results of
          operations of the Company.


/s/ Jerry V. Noyce
-------------------------------------
Jerry V. Noyce
Chief Executive Officer
August 14, 2006
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-30586 Conference Calendar

CHARLES CARTER, Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus TOWN OF NEW ROADS, Mayor; JOHN R. JARREAU; BUDDY JOE LEONARD; JAMES BEST, Defendants-Appellees.

- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana USDC No. 95-CV-461-B-M2

- - - - - - - - - - October 24, 1996 Before POLITZ, Chief Judge, and JOLLY and HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Charles Carter appeals from the district court’s dismissal of his civil rights complaint pursuant to Heck v. Humphrey , 114 S. Ct. 2364 (1994). Carter has not adequately briefed the district court’s determination that his § 1983 claims are not cognizable under Heck nor has he briefed the court’s determination that, insofar as Carter is seeking habeas relief, he has not exhausted his state remedies. These issues are therefore deemed abandoned on appeal. See Yohey v. Collins , 985F.2d 222, 225 (5th Cir. 1993). Accordingly, the judgment of the

district court is AFFIRMED.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-3575

___________

CBS CORPORATION;

CBS BROADCASTING INC.;

CBS TELEVISIONSTATIONS INC.;

CBS STATIONS GROUP OF TEXAS L.P.;

and KUTV HOLDINGS, INC.,

Petitioners

v.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION;

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondents

_______________________

Petition for Review of Orders of the

Federal Communications Commission

FCC Nos. 06-19 and 06-68

______________

Argued September 11, 2007

Decided July 21, 2008

Certiorari Granted, Judgment Vacated and Remanded

from the Supreme Court of the United States

May 4, 2009

Argued on Remand February 23, 2010

Before: SCIRICA, RENDELL and FUENTES, Circuit Judges

ORDER AMENDING OPINION

During the course of the litigation Mr. Jerome Shestack co-counsel for CBS joined the 

law firm of Schnader Harrison Segal & Lewis, LLP, but did not file a change of address 

with the Clerk. Mr. Shestack has since passed away. 
At the direction of the Court it is hereby O R D E R E D that the opinion shall be 

amended to reflect the change as follows:

Jerome J. Shestack, Esq.

Schnader Harrison Segal & Lewis, LLP

1600 Market Street

Suite 3600

Philadelphia, PA 19103

For the Court,

Marcia M. Waldron, Clerk

Date: November 18, 2011
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,



AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO



SECTION 906 OF THE U.S. SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002







In connection with the Quarterly Report of Jewett-Cameron Trading Company Ltd. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ended February 28, 2011 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), each of the undersigned officers of the Company does hereby certify, to such officers knowledge, that, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



(1)

The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



(2)

The information contained in this Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



|Date:  April 13, 2011 | Signed:  /s/  "Murray G. Smith"         
|--------------------- | ----------------------------------------
|                      | Murray G. Smith,
Chief Financial Officer
The Honorable Bobby E. Shepherd, United States Magistrate Judge for th e 1 Western District of Arkansas, to whom the case was referred for final disposition by consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 97-3756

___________ Seebetha Richmond, * * Appellant, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * Western District of Arkansas. Kenneth S. Apfel, Commissioner * of Social Security, * [UNPUBLISHED] * Appellee. *

___________ Submitted: March 16, 1998 Filed: March 17, 1998

___________ Before BOWMAN, WOLLMAN, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circui t Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM. See betha Richmond appeals the District Court’s order granting summary 1 judg ment to the Commissioner and affirming the Commissioner’s decision to den y Richmond supplemental security income benefits. Having carefully reviewed the-2-

recordand the parties’ submissions, we affirm the judgment of the District Court for the reasons set forth in its memorandum. See 8th Cir. R. 47B. A true copy. Attest: CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
#### UNITED STATES v. LUSTIG.

United States District Court S. D. New York.

July 9, 1954.

See also D.C., 110 F.Supp. 806.

*139J. Edward Lumbard, U. S. Atty., New York City, George C. Mantzoras, Asst. U. S. Atty., New York City, for the United States.

Donner, Kinoy & Perlin, David Scribner, New York City, for defendant.

WEINFELD, District Judge.

The defendant in this action to revoke citizenship for concealment of material facts and wilful misrepresentation moves to vacate a notice to take his deposition served by the Government pursuant to Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. In support of his motion defendant submits an affidavit wherein he asserts his privilege against self-incrimination. I hold that its assertion at this time is premature and furnishes no ground to vacate the proposed examination of the defendant. The time to assert the plea is when specific questions are put to the defendant during the course of the examination.1

Undoubtedly the examination will center about the basic charge of concealment of material facts and wilful misrepresentation, but many questions may be put as to which the defendant may not desire or be entitled to assert the Constitutional privilege. The protection of the Fifth Amendment against self-incrimination extends only where one “has reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct answer.” 2 It is true the privilege embraces answers which may support a conviction under a federal statute, and also those which would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute a party asserting the privilege for a federal crime. But the mere assertion of the privilege as now set forth in the defendant’s affidavit and before a single question has been propounded does not gain for him automatic immunity. The Court, and not the defendant, determines whether the refusal to answer is justified and may “require him to answer if ‘it clearly appears * * * that he is mistaken’ ” in his refusal.3

To uphold the defendant’s plea in advance of the taking of his testimony upon the mere filing of his affidavit asserting the privilege would take from the Court the determination of the basic issue of whether or not an answer in response to specific questions would incriminate the defendant or subject him to real danger and leave its determina*140tion entirely to the defendant. This is .'not.the law.

The motion is denied. Settle order on nbtice.

1

. Cravatts v. Klozo Fastener Corp., D.C., 15 F.R.D. 12; see Brockway Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., D.C., 36 F.Supp. 470; Grauer v. Schenley Products Co., Inc., D.C., 26 F.Supp. 768; Nekrasoff v. U. S. Rubber Co., D.C., 27 F.Supp. 953; O’Keefe v. Shaughnessy, D.C., 95 F.Supp. 900, 901; 4 Moore’s Federal Practice, p. 1088.

2

. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486, 71 S.Ct. 814, 818, 95 L.Ed. 1118; Mason v. United States, 244 U.S. 362, 365, 37 S.Ct. 621, 61 L.Ed. 1198.

3

. Hoffman v. United States, supra; United States v. Doto, 2 Cir., 205 F.2d 416; Enrichi v. United States, 10 Cir., 212 F.2d 702; In re Friedman, D.C., 104 F.Supp. 419.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1998
<CASH>                                      14,540,196
<SECURITIES>                                25,944,393
<RECEIVABLES>                                  796,877
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            42,151,000
<PP&E>                                       8,716,623
<DEPRECIATION>                               5,267,023
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              45,660,191
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        2,611,940
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       168,735
<OTHER-SE>                                  42,879,516
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                45,660,191
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             1,202,149
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                4,624,693
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              3,422,544
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 3,422,544
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (0.10)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1996
<CASH>                                       4,579,273
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  461,269
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                    156,648
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             5,420,364
<PP&E>                                       2,799,636
<DEPRECIATION>                                 716,728
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               7,552,289
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          891,766
<BONDS>                                        215,466
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        35,888
<OTHER-SE>                                   5,964,150
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 7,552,289
<SALES>                                      3,830,809
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             4,136,515
<CGS>                                        2,508,323
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                2,508,323
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             1,577,487
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              86,694
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (35,989)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (22,961)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (22,961)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     (.01)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
<FN>ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE ARE NET OF ALLOWANCE OF
$154,000 AT DECEMBER 31, 1996.


</TABLE>
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-6635

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

ROBERT LIONEL SISK,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western 

District of North Carolina, at Asheville. Martin K. Reidinger, 

District Judge. (1:01-cr-00052-MR-14; 1:05-cv-00312-MR)

Submitted: June 30, 2011 Decided: July 5, 2011

Before WILKINSON, DUNCAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Robert Lionel Sisk, Appellant Pro Se. Amy Elizabeth Ray, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Robert Lionel Sisk seeks to appeal the district 

court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West 

Supp. 2010) motion. The order is not appealable unless a 

circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 

28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (2006). A certificate of 

appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of 

the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) 

(2006). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a 

prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that 

reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s 

assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. 

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see Miller-El v. 

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003). When the district court 

denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must 

demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is 

debatable, and that the motion states a debatable claim of the 

denial of a constitutional right. Slack, 529 U.S. at 484-85. 

In his informal brief, Sisk has failed to address the 

district court’s reasons for denying his motion. Therefore, 

Sisk has forfeited appellate review of the district court’s 

rulings. See 4th Cir. R. 34(b). Accordingly, we deny a 

certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
3

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
| (logo) WELLS FARGO | **Corporate Trust Services**

  MAC R1204-010  9062 Old Annapolis Road  Columbia, MD 21045  Tel: 410 884 2000  Fax: 410 715 2380 |
|--------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

 

J.P. Morgan Chase CommercialMortgage Securities Corp. 

383 Madison Avenue

31st Floor

New York, New York 10179

 

Re: Annual Statement ofCompliance for J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust2013-LC11, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2013-LC11

 

 

Per the Pooling and ServicingAgreement dated as of May 1, 2013 (the "Agreement"), the undersigned,a duly authorized officer of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., as CertificateAdministrator ("Wells Fargo"), hereby certifies as follows as of andfor the year ending December 31, 2016 (the "Reporting Period"):

 

(a) A review of Wells Fargo'sactivities during the Reporting Period and of its performance under theAgreement has been made under such officer's supervision; and

 

(b) To the best of suchofficer's knowledge, based on such review, Wells Fargo has fulfilled all of itsobligations under the Agreement in all material respects throughout theReporting Period.

 

 

February 27, 2017

 

/s/ Brian Smith

BRIAN SMITH

Vice President

 

 

| Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. | (logo) Together we’ll  go far |
|------------------------|-------------------------------------|
EXHIBIT 99.2

CERTIFICATIONS

In
connection with the annual report of Talisman Energy Inc. (the "Company") on Form 40-F for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2013, as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Harold N. Kvisle, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

By:

/s/ HAROLD N. KVISLEName:

Harold N. KvisleTitle:

President and Chief Executive Officer


DATEDat Calgary, Alberta, as of March 3, 2014.

---





CERTIFICATIONS

In
connection with the annual report of Talisman Energy Inc. (the "Company") on Form 40-F for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2013, as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Paul R. Smith, Executive Vice-President, Finance and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

By:

/s/ PAUL R. SMITHName:

Paul R. SmithTitle:

Executive Vice-President, Finance and
Chief Financial Officer


DATEDat Calgary, Alberta, as of March 3, 2014.

---



QuickLinks
Percent distribution of the civilian noninstitutional population 
by age, second- and third-and-higher-generation nativity, March 2005


			Second generation	Third and higher generation
			(Percent)		(Percent)

Age		
16 to 24 years		      23.1			   16.2
25 to 54 years		      39.9			   54.6
55 to 64 years		       9.6			   14.0
65 years and older	      27.5			   15.2

Percents may not sum to 100.0 due to rounding.
#### NELMS v. BALTIMORE & OHIO R. CO.

No. 25580.

United States District Court N. D. Ohio, E. D.

April 24, 1951.

Arthur L. Limbach, New Philadelphia, Parker Fulton, Cleveland, Hennan E. Rabe, Richard A. Chenoweth, Akron, for plaintiff.

Dwight B. Buss, Baker, Hostetler & Patterson, Cleveland, for defendant.

FREED, District Judge.

Plaintiff’s action for personal injuries was dismissed on stipulation of counsel, November 16, 1949. This motion seeks an order under Rule 60(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A., setting aside and vacating the dismissal.

By affidavit, the plaintiff asserts that the authorization for the dismissal entry was given counsel by her husband, now deceased. She states that at no time was the husband constituted her agent, in fact or by implication, and that consequently the dismissal, entered without her knowledge or consent, deprives her of her “day in court.” In addition, it is suggested by plaintiff that her husband, at the time of dismissal, was not mentally competent.

In answer to the charge that the dismissal was entered without authority of the plaintiff, defendant has made no demonstration which would point to a different factual situation. Though counsel who signed the stipulation for the plaintiff is of highest reputation and integrity, this Court can only conclude that the entry was made without authority and should be set aside and vacated.

The motion will be granted.