# Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed November 4, 2020

. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________ No. 3D20

- 0 260 Lower Tribunal No. 17

- 27434

________________ 

### ESJ JI Operations, LLC, et al., Appellant s ,

vs. 

### Todd Domeck, Appellee.

An a ppeal from the Circuit Court for Miami

- Dade County, William Thomas , Judge. Law Offices of Scott Alan Orth, P.A. , and Scott Alan Orth (Hollywood), for a ppellant s
. Dorta Law, and Matias R. Dorta , for appellee.

Befor e SCALES, HENDON, and MILLER, JJ.
MILLER , J

.2 Appellant s, ESJ JI Operations, LLC and ESJ JI Leasehold, LLC , challenge a final judgment granting attorney’s fees and costs in favor of appellee, Todd Domeck

. The dec ision below was predicated upon two timely served and procedurally compliant proposal s for settlement , which were rejected by the respective appellant
entities. See § 7 68.79, Fla. Stat. On appeal, appellants assign error in a purported deprivation of procedural due process

. 1 See Amend. XIV, U.S. Const.; A rt. I, § 9 , Fla. Const

. As “[t] he extent of procedural due process protections varies with the
character of the interest and nature of the proceeding involved ,” and, here, the trial
court afforded both notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard, we affirm. Hadley v. Dep’t of Admin. , 411 So. 2d 184, 187 (Fla. 1982) (citation omitted)

. “The fundamental requis [ i ] te of due process of law is the opportunity to be
heard.” Grannis v. Ordean , 234 U.S. 385, 394, 34 S. Ct. 779, 783, 58 L. Ed. 1363 (1914) (citations omitted). “ To hold one bound by the judgment who has not had such opportunity is contrary to the first p rinciples of justice.” Baker v. Baker, Eccles
& Co. , 242 U.S. 394, 403, 37 S. Ct. 152, 155, 61 L. Ed. 386 (1917). However , “ [d] ue
process, ‘ unlike some legal rules, is not a technical concept ion with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumsta nces. ’ ” Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union v. McElroy , 367 U.S. 886, 895, 81 S. Ct. 1743, 1748, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1230 (1961) (citation

1 The parties stipulated to the reasonableness of hourly rates and the hours expended in furtherance of litigation

.3 omitted)

. Instead, “due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” Morrissey v. Brewer , 408 U.S. 471, 481, 92 S. Ct. 2593, 2600, 33 L. Ed. 2d 484 (1972).
Here , after the appellant entities suffered an adverse final judgment , the trial
court, entirely familiar with the contested issues by virtue of having presided over the underlying suit from its inception, convened a hearing on entitlement to fees.
Both entities were furnished with reasonable notice in advance of the same
. The
record is devoid of any evidence to show the parties’ oral presentation s were unduly hampered, restricted, or curtailed in any manner

. Indeed , the trial judge allowed
additional written submissions and conducted yet another, albeit non
- evidentiary , hearing

. Given these circumstances , appellants were afforded the requisite opportunity
to be heard “at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner ,” and due process was
satisfied. 2 Mathews v. Eldridge , 424 U.S. 319, 333, 96 S. Ct. 893, 902, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1976) (citation omitted)

. Accordingly, and because the record lacks any demonstration that the lower tribunal abused its discretion in adjudicating the issue of good faith , we affirm the judgment under review

. 3 See Ruiz v. Policli nica

2 We summarily reject the contention that our decision in Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fl orida v. Lewis Tein P.L. , 277 So. 3d 299 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019) , required the trial court to conduct multiple evidentiary hearings in resolving fee entitlement. 3 “Discretion .

. . is abused when the judicial action is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, which is another way of saying that discreti on is abused only where4 Metropolitana, C.A. , 260 So. 3d 1081, 1089 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018) ( “ T he offeree bears the burden of proving the offeror’s proposal was not made in good fait h. ” ) (citation omitted) ; see a lso Matrisciani v. Garrison Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. , 298 So. 3d 53, 61 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020) ( The “ standard of review for whether a proposal for settlement was made in good faith is abuse of discretion.” ) (citation omitted) ; § 768.79(7)(a), Fla. Stat. (“If a party is entitled to costs and fees pursuant to the provisions of this section, the court may, in its discretion , determine that an offer was not made in good faith.”)

. Affirmed

.

no reasonable man [or woman] would take the view adopted by the trial court.” Canakaris v. Canakaris , 382 So. 2d 1197, 1203 (Fla. 1980) (citation omitted).