Constraints Imposed by 18 U.S.C. § 1913 on

Lobbying Efforts

The Anti-Lobbying Act prohibits substantial “grass roots” lobbying campaigns of telegrams, 

letters, and other private forms o f communication designed to encourage members of 

the public to pressure Members o f Congress to support Administration or Department 

legislative or appropriations proposals.

The Anti-Lobbying Act does not prohibit (1) direct communications between Department of 

Justice officials and Members o f Congress and their staffs; (2) public speeches, appearances, and writings; (3) private com munications designed to inform the public about 

Administration positions or to prom ote those positions, as long as there is no significant 

expenditure o f appropriated funds; (4) the traditional activities o f Department com ponents w hose duties historically have included communicating the Department’s views 

to Congress, the media, or the public; or (5) communications or activities unrelated to 

legislation or appropriations, such as lobbying Congress or the public to support 

Administration nominees.

September 28, 1989 

M e m o r a n d u m O p i n i o n f o r t h e A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l

I. Introduction

You have requested our guidance concerning the extent to which the 

Anti-Lobbying Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1913 (the “Act”), imposes constraints on 

activities by executive branch employees that relate to legislative matters. Section 1913, which has not been the basis of a single prosecution 

since its enactment in 1919, prohibits the use of appropriated funds for 

activities designed to influence Members of Congress concerning any 

legislation or appropriation.

To summarize our analysis o f this statute, we offer the following guidelines for you and the Department as to what lobbying activities are 

permitted and prohibited.

Permitted activities:

1. The Act does not apply to direct communications between Department 

of Justice officials and Members of Congress and their staffs. Consequently, 

there is no restriction on Department officials directly lobbying Members of 

Congress and their staffs in support of Administration or Department 

positions.

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2. The Act does not apply to public speeches, appearances and writings. Consequently, Department officials are free to publicly advance 

Administration and Department positions, even to the extent of calling on 

the public to encourage Members of Congress to support Administration 

positions.

3. The Act does not apply to private communications designed to 

inform the public of Administration positions or to promote those positions. Thus, there is no restriction on private communications with members of the public as long as there is not a significant expenditure of 

appropriated funds to solicit pressure on Congress.

4. The Act does not circumscribe the traditional activities of Department components whose duties historically have included responsibility 

for communicating the Department’s views to Members of Congress, the 

media, or the public.

5. By its terms, the Act is inapplicable to communications or activities 

unrelated to legislation or appropriations. Consequently, there is no 

restriction on Department officials lobbying Congress or the public to 

support Administration nominees.

Prohibited activities:

The Act may prohibit substantial “grass roots” lobbying campaigns of 

telegrams, letters and other private forms of communication designed 

to encourage members of the public to pressure Members of Congress 

to support Administration or Department legislative or appropriations 

proposals.

If a question should arise with respect to any activity not listed here, 

we would be happy to analyze whether the statute applies to it.

II. Discussion

Section 1913 of title 18 provides:

No part of the money appropriated by any enactment of 

Congress shall, in the absence of express authorization by 

Congress, be used directly or indirectly to pay for any personal service, advertisement, telegram, telephone, letter, 

printed or written matter, or other device, intended or 

designed to influence in any manner a Member of Congress, 

to favor or oppose, by vote or otherwise, any legislation or 

appropriation by Congress, whether before or after the 

introduction of any bill or resolution proposing such legislation or appropriation; but this shall not prevent officers or 

employees of the United States or of its departments or 

agencies from communicating to Members of Congress on

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the request of any Member or to Congress, through the 

proper official channels, requests for legislation or appropriations which they deem necessary for the efficient conduct of the public business.

Whoever, being an officer or employee of the United 

States or of any department or agency thereof, violates or 

attempts to violate this section, shall be fined not more 

than $500 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; 

and after notice and hearing by the superior officer vested 

with the power of removing him, shall be removed from 

office or employment.

Several limitations on the otherwise expansive scope of this provision 

appear from the statute’s face.

First, the statute applies only to activities “intended or designed to 

influence ... legislation or appropriations.” Thus, lobbying activities related 

to other matters, such as nominations and treaties, are not subject to the 

statute.

Second, the statute prohibits only lobbying that is conducted in the 

form of the provision of a personal service or advertisement, that is presented in written form, or that is communicated by telephone or “other 

device.” Read in context, the prohibition on other “device[s]” does not 

appear to prohibit speeches or other verbal communications that are not 

relayed by telephone. Thus, we do not believe that the statute prohibits 

public speeches by executive branch employees aimed at generating 

public support for Administration policies and legislative proposals.

Third, the statute makes clear that it does not prohibit government 

officials from communicating “to Members of Congress on the request of 

any Member or to Congress, through the proper official channels” on 

matters those officials “deem necessary for the efficient conduct of the 

public business.”1 Thus, the statute does not bar contacts between 

Administration officials and Congress that are initiated by Members of 

Congress or that relate to requests for legislation or appropriations that 

the executive branch employee in the fulfillment of his official duties 

deems necessary to conduct the public business. Consistent with this 

provision, this Office and the Criminal Division previously have concluded that section 1913 does not apply to the lobbying activities of 

executive branch officials whose positions typically and historically 

entail an active effort to secure public support for the Administration’s

1 Congressman Good, who introduced the bill, was asked whether the bill was “intended .. to prevent 

the employees or officers o f the Government from communicating directly with their Representatives in 

Congress.” He replied, “No, that is expressly reserved.... They have, o f course, the nght to communicate, 

just as before, with their Members of Congress" 58 Cong. Rec. 404 (1919)

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legislative program.2 Such officials include presidential aides, appointees, 

and their delegees in areas within their official responsibility.3

This construction of section 1913 is strongly supported by the statute’s 

exemption of lobbying activities that are conducted pursuant to an 

“express authorization by Congress.” We believe that Congress’ continued appropriation of funds for positions held by executive branch officials whose duties historically have included seeking support for the 

Administration’s legislative program constitutes “express authorization 

by Congress” for the lobbying activities of these officials, and thus, that 

their activities are exempt from section 1913.4 Officials whose activities 

are covered by this “express authorization” exception to section 1913 

include the President, his aides and assistants within the Executive 

Office of the President, Cabinet members within their areas of responsibility, and persons to whom the Cabinet official traditionally has assigned 

such responsibilities.5

The legislative history to section 1913 sheds additional light on the type 

of activities that Congress intended to bar. Representative Good, who 

introduced the bill, described the statute’s purpose as follows:

[I]t will prohibit a practice that has been indulged in so 

often, without regard to what administration is in power — 

the practice of a bureau chief or the head of a department 

writing letters throughout the country, sending telegrams 

throughout the country, for this organization, for this man, 

for that company to write his Congressman, to wire his 

Congressman, in behalf of this or that legislation. The gentleman from Kentucky, Mr. Sherley, former chairman of this 

committee, during the closing days of the last Congress was 

greatly worried because he had on his desk thousands upon 

thousands of telegrams that had been started right here in 

Washington by some official wiring out for people to write 

Congressman Sherley for this appropriation and for that.

2 Sec Memorandum for Arthur B Culvahouse, Jr, Counsel to the President, from Charles J Cooper, 

Assistant Attorney General, Office o f Legal Counsel, Re Applicability of 18 U.S.C 1913 to Lobbying

Efforts in Support of Ratification of INF Treaty at, 6 n 7 (Dec. 31, 1987) (“Culvahouse Memo”); 

Memorandum for John R Bolton, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legislative Affairs, from Charles 

J Cooper, Assistant Attorney General, Office o f Legal Counsel, Re. Applicability of 18 U S.C. 1913 to

Contracts Between United States Attorneys and Members of Congress m Support of Pending

Legislation at 5-6 (Oct. 27, 1987) (“Bolton Memo”), Memorandum for Paul Michel, Acting Deputy 

Attorney General, from John M Harmon, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Alleged

Violations of 18 U S C 1913 at 2, 3-4 (Feb 20, 1980) (“Michel Memo"), Memorandum for Philip B 

Ileymann, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, from Thomas H Henderson, Jr, Chief, Public 

Integnty Section, Criminal Division at 8-10 (Oct. 15, 1979) ( “Henderson Memo”)

3 See Michel Memo at 3.

4 Culvahouse Memo at 6 n.7; Bolton Memo at 5-6, Henderson Memo at 8-10; Michel Memo at 2, 3-4

5 We caution, however, against these officials engaging in “grass-roots” campaigns o f the type mentioned in the legislative history to section 1913 See infra pp 303-04.

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Now, they use the contingent fund for that purpose, and I 

have no doubt that the telegrams sent for that purpose cost 

the Government more than $7,500. Now, it was never the 

intention of Congress to appropriate money for this purpose, and section 5 of the bill will absolutely put a stop to 

that sort of thing.

58 Cong. Rec. 403 (1919). These remarks demonstrate that Congress 

was concerned about the use of appropriated funds to implement 

“grass roots”6 mass mailing campaigns at great expense.7 Based on this 

legislative history, this Office consistently has concluded that the 

statute was enacted to restrict the use of appropriated funds for largescale, high-expenditure campaigns specifically urging private recipients to contact Members of Congress about pending legislative matters 

on behalf of an Administration position. See, e.g., Michael Memo at 5 

(section 1913 was intended to “prohibit the Executive from using 

appropriated funds to create artificially the impression that there is a 

ground swell of public support for the Executive’s position on a given 

piece of legislation”).8 Accordingly, we do not believe the statute 

should be construed to prohibit the President or executive branch 

agencies from engaging in a general open dialogue with the public on 

the Administration’s programs and policies. Nor do we believe the 

statute should be construed to prohibit public speeches and writings 

designed to generate support for the Administration’s policies and legislative proposals.

Because section 1913 imposes criminal penalties, it is appropriate that 

it be construed narrowly. Under the widely recognized “rule of lenity,” 

criminal provisions subject to more than one reasonable construction 

should be interpreted narrowly, and ambiguity should be resolved in 

favor of lenience. See, e.g., Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381 (1980); 

3 Sutherland, Statutory Construction §§ 59.03-59.06 (4th ed. 1973). In 

addition, a narrow construction of section 1913 is necessary to avoid the 

constitutional issues that would arise if the section were interpreted as

0 By “grass roots” lobbying we mean communications by executive officials directed to members of the 

public at large, or particular segments o f the general public, intended to persuade them in turn to 

communicate with their elected representatives on some issue of concern to the executive. This type of 

activity is to be distinguished from communications by executive officials aimed directly at the elected 

representatives themselves, no matter how much incidental publicity those communications may receive 

in the normal course o f press coverage See Memorandum for Robert J Lipshutz, Counsel to the 

President, from John M. Harmon, Assistant Attorney General, Office o f Legal Counsel, Re- Anti-Lobbying

Laws at 10 (Nov 29, 1977) (“1977 Harmon Memo") (“As long as a federal official limits himself to public forums and relies upon normal workings of the press, he may say anything he wishes without fear of 

violating section 1913.").

7 Our calculations indicate that an expenditure of $7500 in 1919 would be roughly equivalent to one of 

$50,000 today.

8 Culvahouse Memo at 6 n.7; Bolton Memo at 5; 1977 Harmon Memo at 10-14.

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imposing a broader ban.9 In previous analyses of this statute, we have 

identified at least three serious constitutional problems that would arise 

if section 1913 were construed as a blanket prohibition on executive 

branch activities relating to legislation or appropriations.

First, construing section 1913 broadly to restrict executive branch contacts with Members of Congress would interfere with the President’s constitutionally mandated role in the legislative process. Article II, Section 3, 

Clause 1 of the Constitution provides that the President “shall from time 

to time give to the Congress Information of the State of the Union, and 

recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient.” This Clause imposes on the President a responsibility to recommend measures to Congress and constitutes a formcil basis 

for the President’s role in influencing the legislative process.10 The 

President cannot be deprived of this capacity to explain why he believes 

particular measures are “necessary and expedient.”

Second, legislation curtailing the President’s ability to implement his 

legislative program through communications with Congress and the 

American people would infringe upon his constitutional obligation to 

“take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” U.S. Const, art. II, § 3.11 

It would be impossible for the President to fulfill this constitutional 

responsibility if he could not communicate freely with those who make 

the laws, as well as with those whose actions are governed by them.

Third, section 1913, if construed broadly, would weaken the constitutional framework established in Article II, which in general imposes on 

the President the duty to communicate with the American people. The 

President, of course, “is a representative of the people, just as the members of the Senate and of the House are.” Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 

52, 123 (1926). Indeed, “on some subjects ... the President, elected by all 

the people, is rather more representative of them all than are the members of either body of the Legislature, whose constituencies are local and 

not country wide.” Id. Because of his unique position as the only elected

9 See 1977 Harmon Memo, supra note 6 See also Letter for Leo Krulitz, Solicitor, Department o f the 

Intenor, from John M. Harmon, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel (July 18, 1978); 

Memorandum for Assistant Attorney General McConnell, from Deputy Assistant Attorney General 

Simms (Oct. 5, 1982) (forwarding a proposed draft report on S 1969, a bill to “prohibit the use o f appropriations for the payment of certain lobbying costs").

10 See Edward S Corwin, The Constitution of the United States 536 (2d ed. 1973) The early Presidents, 

Washington, Jefferson and Jackson among them, took an active role in their relations with Congress. 

“Today there is no subject on which the President may not appropriately communicate with Congress, in 

as precise terms as he chooses, his conception o f its duty ” Id at 537.

11 Supreme Court precedent establishes that Congress may not interfere with the President’s ability to 

carry out his constitutional prerogatives. See, for example, Hart v. United States, 118 U.S. 62 (1886), and 

United States v. Klein, 80 U S (13 Wall.) 128 (1872), invalidating congressional attempts to interfere with 

the President’s pardon power. Even where, as here, Congress acts pursuant to its appropriations power, 

its authonty is not absolute Congress may not, for example, use its appropnations power to establish a 

religion, Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 104-05 (1968), or to diminish the compensation of federal judges. 

United States v. Will, 449 U.S 200(1980).

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official with a truly “‘national’ perspective,” INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 

948 (1983), it is necessary to the independent power of the executive 

branch that the President be able to communicate freely with the citizens 

of the United States, including on matters that relate to legislative affairs. 

Thus, reading section 1913 broadly to restrict all communications with 

the public with respect to legislation or appropriations would interfere 

with the executive’s ability to perform his constitutionally imposed 

responsibilities.12

III. Conclusion

We conclude that section 1913 prohibits large-scale publicity campaigns to generate citizen contacts with Congress on behalf of an 

Administration position with respect to legislation or appropriations. It 

does not proscribe lobbying activities with respect to other matters, such 

as nominations or treaties. It does not prohibit speeches or other communications designed to inform the public generally about Administration policies and proposals or to encourage general public support for 

Administration positions. In addition, the statute does not prohibit contacts between executive branch officials and Members of Congress that 

either were initiated by the Member of Congress, or that relate to a 

request for legislation or appropriations that the employee deems “necessary for the efficient conduct of the public business.” Finally, the 

statute does not prohibit lobbying activities expressly authorized by 

Congress, such as activities by executive branch employees whose official duties historically have included lobbying functions, for whose positions Congress has continued to appropriate funds.

WILLIAM P. BARR

Assistant Attorney General

Office of Legal Counsel

12 To discharge these responsibilities effectively, the President must be permitted to employ the services o f his political aides, appointees and other officials Any restrictions on the ability of such officials 

to assist the President necessarily undermines the President’s ability to fulfill his constitutional responsibilities and amount to restrictions on the President himself. See Memorandum for Steve Markman, 

Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Policy, from John 0 McGinnis, Acting Deputy Assistant 

Attorney General, Office o f Legal Counsel, Re. H R. 3400 - Application of Hatch Act to Senior Political

Appointees and Presidential Aides (Oct. 19, 1987) (Congress may not restrict the President’s ability to 

communicate with the public by restricting those the President has chosen to assist him in this regard). 

In particular, the President must be permitted to employ the services o f his political appointees and aides 

necessary to effectuate his constitutionally protected ability to communicate with his constituency concerning the decisions for which the President, as the politically accountable head of the executive 

branch, is alone responsible For these reasons, section 1913 must be construed narrowly as it relates to 

the ability o f executive branch employees to communicate with the public on legislative matters

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