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Filed 10/5/20 P. v. Parsons CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(San Joaquin)

----

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

RONALD PARSONS,

Defendant and Appellant.

C090778

(Super. Ct. No. 

STKCRFER20170005938)

Defendant Ronald Parsons appeals after a jury found him guilty of evading a 

police officer, two counts of hit and run causing property damage, obstructing a police 

officer, and unlawful taking or driving of a vehicle. On appeal, defendant contends the 

court’s admission of hearsay statements given by a nontestifying witness violated both 

the state law restrictions on hearsay testimony and his right under both the United States 

and California Constitution to confront witnesses against him. (See U.S. Const., 6th 

Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 15; Evid. Code, §§ 1200, 1240.) We agree with defendant 

that the statements were admitted in violation of his right to confront witnesses and 

reverse. 
2

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

I

The Pertinent Facts

On March 7, 2017, Stockton Police Officers Apolonio Garcia-Rangel and 

Antoinette Laffranchini were on patrol as part of the “Neighborhood Blitz Team.” 

Officer Garcia-Rangel was driving through a parking lot, with Officer Laffranchini in the 

passenger seat, when he heard tires screeching and noticed a Dodge Charger. Officer 

Laffranchini ran the Charger’s license plate number through the stolen vehicle system, 

and the system indicated the car had been reported stolen. 

The positive hit notified other officers in the area, including Officer Joseph

Ciccarelli, who arrived on the scene soon after. As Officer Ciccarelli drove into the 

parking lot, the Charger passed his patrol car and began accelerating. Officer GarciaRangel turned on his car’s lights and sirens and followed the Charger. As the Charger 

quickly turned out of the parking lot, it struck a curb and lost a front tire. The damage 

caused the Charger to slow and the driver to lose control and collide with a mailbox. It 

then collided with a fence before striking the garage of a house. Immediately after the 

Charger hit the house, the driver got out, looked back at the officers, and began running 

away. Officer Garcia-Rangel chased the driver, repeatedly identifying himself as a 

Stockton Police Officer and commanding the driver stop. The driver continued running 

and eventually jumped a fence, escaping Officer Garcia-Rangel. 

Officer Garcia-Rangel returned to the patrol car, where he saw Officer 

Laffranchini detain the passenger of the Charger at gunpoint. Officer Garcia-Rangel 

placed the passenger in handcuffs and then put him in the backseat of the patrol car. 

Officer Garcia-Rangel then went to assist other reporting officers as they searched for the 

driver. Once the officers cleared the backyard of the house, without finding the driver, 

Officer Garcia-Rangel returned to the patrol car to establish a search perimeter. As he 

searched a computer in his patrol car for maps of the area, Officer Garcia-Rangel spoke 

with the passenger who was still handcuffed in the backseat of the patrol car. He asked 

the passenger “if he knew who the driver was,” and the passenger replied the driver was 
3

defendant, and identified defendant as his brother. Officer Garcia-Rangel had to ask the 

passenger three times for the driver’s name, as the commotion of other officers searching 

for the driver distracted Officer Garcia-Rangel from understanding the passenger. The 

passenger also told Officer Garcia-Rangel defendant’s date of birth. Officer GarciaRangel used this information to obtain a photograph of defendant and recognized the 

person in the photograph as the individual who ran away from him. In response to 

Officer Garcia-Rangel’s questions, the passenger gave other physical descriptors, 

including defendant’s build, hair color, and clothing. 

As the officers continued their search of the area, a woman driving by pulled over 

and asked Officers Garcia-Rangel and Laffranchini if her nephew was there. The woman 

asked the officers the identity of the person in their patrol car, and Officer Garcia-Rangel 

told her it was the passenger. She did not identify herself to the officers, but at some 

point yelled “Don’t shoot my baby.” The woman did not indicate who she was referring 

to as her “baby.” However, evidence admitted at trial revealed she and defendant live at 

the same apartment. 

Officer Garcia-Rangel found a cell phone outside of the Charger at the scene of 

the crash, which the driver dropped as he ran from Officer Garcia-Rangel. Officer 

Garcia-Rangel also collected two other cell phones from inside the Charger. Defendant’s 

fingerprints were on one of the phones recovered from the Charger. Medics transported 

the passenger to a hospital for treatment, but the extent of his injuries, if any, were not 

testified to at trial. 

II

Relevant Proceedings

The passenger did not testify at defendant’s trial and was not included on the 

prosecution’s proposed witness list. Instead, the prosecution offered Officer GarciaRangel to testify to the passenger’s statements identifying defendant as the driver. 

Defendant objected on hearsay and confrontation grounds. The trial court ruled the 

statements admissible as excited utterances reasoning the passenger “was under the stress 

of the event and a car chase and crash into a fence and house, that specifically was in 
4

response to the police officer’s question ‘Who was the driver?’ There were other cases 

that discussed that and had indicated that that is a spontaneous declaration . . . . The 

Court does find in this situation it does meet those requirements. I’ll allow [the 

prosecution] to elicit that testimony, the hearsay statement of [defendant’s] brother.” The 

court also overruled defendant’s confrontation objection.1 

During testimony, Officer Garcia-Rangel relayed the passenger’s statements 

identifying and describing defendant as the driver of the Charger. He testified to the 

importance of this information for providing a description to the other officers responding 

to the scene to search for the driver. Officer Garcia-Rangel recalled the driver had “short 

curly hair, almost like an afro-type short hair.” The homeowner whose residence was 

damaged in the collision testified he had never seen defendant before and recalled the 

driver having dreadlocks. 

The parties stipulated to several of the passenger’s prior arrests. The court read 

the following stipulation to the jury: “The district attorney and counsel for [defendant]

have reached the following stipulation: [¶] That [the passenger] has the following 

criminal history: One, arrest for possession of burglary tools in violation of Penal Code 

Section 466 on May 11th, 2019; [¶] Two, arrest for vehicle burglary in violation of 

Penal Code Section 459 on April 28, 2018; [¶] Three, arrest for taking or driving a 

motor vehicle without the owner’s consent and receiving a stolen vehicle on October 1st, 

2017; [¶] Four, arrested for carrying a concealed firearm upon the person and carrying a 

loaded firearm on January 16th, 2017. [¶] It is further acknowledged during the April 

28, 2018 arrest and the October 1, 2017 arrest, [the passenger] attempted to deflect blame 

1 The timing of the passenger’s statements relative to the crash and his detention is 

unclear. When arguing for the admissibility of the passenger’s statements, the 

prosecution described these statements as being “made within . . . five to ten minutes of 

the actual accident.” At trial, Officer Garcia-Rangel testified that after reviewing his 

body camera he believed two to three minutes elapsed from noticing the Charger in the 

parking lot to speaking with the passenger, although looking back he felt as if it was more 

like five to six minutes. 
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to other people. The other coparticipants admitted their actions and partial 

responsibility.” 

During closing argument, the prosecution argued that, because the passenger had 

previously cooperated with police by revealing his criminal associates, the jury should 

find his statements as relayed by Officer Garcia-Rangel credible. The prosecution also 

argued the woman who yelled “Don’t shoot my baby” was likely looking for defendant 

so she could help him evade police. Finally, the prosecution pointed to the fingerprints 

recovered from a cell phone in the Charger as evidence linking defendant to the crime. 

The prosecution argued the sum total of all of this evidence pointed toward defendant’s 

guilt. Defendant emphasized the passenger’s absence from trial, along with his history of 

deflecting blame onto other parties, as reasons to doubt defendant’s guilt. 

The jury returned guilty verdicts on all counts. Defendant was sentenced to five 

years of probation. This appeal followed. 

DISCUSSION

Defendant argues the court’s admission of the passenger’s statements to Officer 

Garcia-Rangel violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront and cross-examine 

witnesses against him. The People argue the court’s admission of these statements did 

not violate defendant’s confrontation rights because the statements were not testimonial. 

We agree with defendant and conclude the error prejudicial.

2

I

Relevant Law

Both the United States and California Constitution provide “[i]n all criminal 

prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses 

2 Because we conclude admission of the passenger’s statements violated 

defendant’s right to confront witnesses, we need not decide whether the statements 

constituted excited utterances under state law. (See People v. Liggins (2020) 53

Cal.App.5th 55, 64 [that the admission of the evidence may comply with state evidentiary 

law does not end the inquiry, there is a second step to the analysis, one posed by the 

underlying constitutional objection].)
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against him.” (U.S. Const., 6th Amend.; see Cal. Const., art. I, § 15.) “[A] primary 

interest secured by [the confrontation clause] is the right of cross-examination.” 

(Douglas v. Alabama (1965) 380 U.S. 415, 418 [13 L.Ed.2d 934, 937].) The opportunity 

to cross-examine is “the principal means by which the believability of a witness and the 

truth of his testimony are tested.” (Davis v. Alaska (1974) 415 U.S. 308, 316 [39 L.Ed.2d 

347, 353].) The United States Supreme Court addressed the admissibility of hearsay 

statements from nontestifying witnesses in Crawford. (Crawford v. Washington (2004) 

541 U.S. 36 [158 L.Ed.2d 177].) There, the court held “the Framers would not have 

allowed admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial 

unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for 

cross-examination.” (Id. at pp. 53-54 [158 L.Ed.2d at p. 194].) Under the facts of that 

case, the court determined a declarant’s statements were testimonial because they were 

made and recorded while she was in police custody, after having been given Miranda3

warnings as a possible suspect herself. (Crawford v. Washington, supra, 541 U.S. at 

pp. 51, 65 [158 L.Ed.2d at pp. 193, 201]; see Davis v. Washington (2006) 547 U.S. 813,

822 [165 L.Ed.2d 224, 237].) 

While the Crawford court declined to offer a comprehensive definition of 

“testimonial,” it reasoned “[s]tatements taken by police officers in the course of 

interrogations are . . . testimonial under even a narrow standard.” (Crawford v. 

Washington, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 52 [158 L.Ed.2d at p. 193].) The court clarified the 

definition in Davis, concluding “[s]tatements are nontestimonial when made in the course 

of police interrogation[4] under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary 

purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. 

They are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such 

3 Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [16 L.Ed.2d 694].

4 As used in Davis ̧ “police interrogations” includes all police interactions. (Davis

v. Washington, supra, 547 U.S. at p. 822 [165 L.Ed.2d at p. 237.)
7

ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or 

prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.” (Davis v. 

Washington, supra, 547 U.S. at p. 822 [165 L.Ed.2d at p. 237].) “[T]he confrontation 

clause is concerned solely with hearsay statements that are testimonial, in that they are 

out-of-court analogs, in purpose and form, of the testimony given by witnesses at trial.” 

(People v. Cage (2007) 40 Cal.4th 965, 984.) 

In Davis, the Supreme Court examined two cases to determine whether statements 

given to law enforcement personnel were testimonial: State v. Davis (2005) 154 Wn.2d 

291 [111 P.3d 844] and Hammon v. State (Ind. 2005) 829 N.E.2d 444. (Davis v. 

Washington, supra, 547 U.S. at p. 813 [165 L.Ed.2d at p. 224].) In the first of these 

cases, Davis, the victim gave the relevant statements during a 911 call. (Id. at pp. 817-

818 [165 L.Ed.2d at p. 234].) The court acknowledged the 911 call was a police 

interrogation, but distinguished it from Crawford, stating the holding in Crawford was 

concerned with “interrogations solely directed at establishing the facts of a past crime, in 

order to identify (or provide evidence to convict) the perpetrator. The product of such 

interrogation, whether reduced to a writing signed by the declarant or embedded in the 

memory (and perhaps notes) of the interrogating officer, is testimonial.” (Davis, at p. 826 

[165 L.Ed.2d at pp. 239-240].) In Davis, however, the victim “was speaking about events 

as they were actually happening, rather than ‘describ[ing] past events.” ’ (Id. at p. 827 

[165 L.Ed.2d at p. 240]; quoting Lilly v. Virginia (1999) 527 U.S. 116, 137 [144 L.Ed.2d 

117, 135].) The court reasoned the victim in Davis was facing an ongoing emergency, as 

her 911 call was “plainly a call for help against a bona fide physical threat.” (Davis, at p. 

827 [165 L.Ed.2d at p. 240].) Further, the court concluded the 911 operator’s questions 

were of such a nature as to elicit statements “necessary to be able to resolve the present 

emergency, rather than simply to learn (as in Crawford) what had happened in the past.” 

(Davis, at p. 827 [165 L.Ed.2d at p. 240].) For these reasons, the court concluded the 

victim’s statements were not testimonial. (Id. at p. 829 [165 L.Ed.2d at p. 241].)

In Hammon, the companion case to Davis, the court determined a victim’s 

statements to officers who reported to her home for a domestic disturbance were 
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testimonial and thus should have been excluded. (Davis v. Washington, supra, 547 U.S. 

at pp. 819, 834 [165 L.Ed.2d at pp. 235, 244].) The court concluded the officer’s 

interrogation of the victim was sufficiently formal, as it was “conducted in a separate 

room, away from her husband (who tried to intervene), with the officer receiving her 

replies for use in his ‘investigat[ion].’ ” (Davis, at p. 830 [165 L.Ed.2d at p. 242].) 

Further, “[i]t [wa]s entirely clear from the circumstances that the interrogation was part of 

an investigation into possible criminal past conduct . . . . There was no emergency in 

progress.” (Id. at p. 829 [165 L.Ed.2d at p. 242].) The court further distinguished 

Hammon from Davis, reasoning the victim in Davis was “seeking aid, not telling a story 

about the past. [Her] present-tense statements showed immediacy.” (Davis, at p. 831 

[165 L.Ed.2d at p. 243].) Meanwhile, the victim’s statements in Hammon narrated past 

events and were “delivered at some remove in time from the danger she described,” as 

evidenced by her signing an affidavit. (Davis, at p. 832 [165 L.Ed.2d at p. 243].) The 

court therefore reversed the petitioner’s conviction in Hammon, concluding “the Sixth 

Amendment operates to exclude [the victim’s] affidavit.” (Davis, at p. 834 [165 L.Ed.2d 

at p. 244].)

II

The Passenger’s Statements Were Testimonial

The passenger gave his statements to Officer Garcia-Rangel after he had been 

detained at gunpoint, handcuffed, and placed in the back of a patrol car. This constituted 

a custodial interrogation despite the People’s argument to the contrary. (See Miranda v. 

Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 444 [16 L.Ed.2d at p. 706] [a custodial interrogation is 

“questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into 

custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way”].) More 

importantly, however, the passenger’s statements were the product of an interrogation 

“solely directed at establishing the facts of a past crime, in order to identify (or provide 

evidence to convict) the perpetrator.” (Davis v. Washington, supra, 547 U.S. at p. 826 

[165 L.Ed.2d at p. 240].) 
9

Like the officer in Hammon, Officer Garcia-Rangel “was not seeking to determine 

. . . ‘what is happening,’ but rather ‘what happened.’ ” (See Davis v. Washington, supra,

547 U.S. at pp. 829-830 [165 L.Ed.2d at pp. 241-242].) Indeed, Officer Garcia-Rangel 

witnessed the crime occur, including who the driver of the Charger was, and knew what 

was happening -- the driver of the car was fleeing through the neighborhood. Once 

Officer Garcia-Rangel’s pursuit of the driver ended and he began questioning the 

passenger about who the driver was, Officer Garcia-Rangel’s focus was directed at 

establishing facts to “identify (or provide evidence to convict) the perpetrator.” (See id at 

p. 826 [165 L.Ed.2d at p. 240].) 

The People disagree relying on Romero, Pedroza, and Brenn. (People v. Romero

(2008) 44 Cal.4th 386; People v. Pedroza (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 784; People v. Brenn

(2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 166.) The People argue Officer Garcia-Rangel’s primary 

purpose in questioning the passenger was to respond to the ongoing emergency of an 

escaped suspect whose “dangerousness was unknown.” In each of the cases cited by the 

People, however, the officer did not question a suspected coparticipant during a custodial 

interrogation or witness the criminal event -- two meaningful distinctions. 

First, the questioning of a coparticipant during a custodial interrogation carries 

with it signs of a formal interrogation designed to gather evidence. (See Crawford v. 

Washington, supra, 541 U.S. at pp. 51-52 [158 L.Ed.2d at p. 193].) 

Further, unlike the officers in Pedroza and Brenn, Officer Garcia-Rangel was not 

reliant on the passenger’s statements to fill gaps of what happened prior to his arrival, 

including whether a crime occurred or who the perpetrator was. (See People v. Pedroza, 

supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at p. 793 [statements were nontestimonial when officers 

responded to an ongoing emergency of a house actively burning and they needed to 

ascertain whether the fire was the result of an accident or a crime and whether there was a 

potentially dangerous suspect]; see also People v. Brenn, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at 

pp. 170, 172, 177-178 [answers to officer’s preliminary questions determining whether a 

crime was committed, whether the victim was in need of medical attention, and whether 

the person detained was the person who committed the crime were nontestimonial].) 
10

Officer Garcia-Rangel further did not have to rely on the passenger’s identification 

of the driver because, if apprehended, Officer Garcia-Rangel could identify the driver 

himself. This serves in stark contrast to Romero where “[t]he primary purpose of the 

police in asking [the victim] to identify whether the detained individuals were the 

perpetrators, an identification made within five minutes of the arrival of the police, was to 

determine whether the perpetrators had been apprehended and the emergency situation 

had ended or whether the perpetrators were still at large so as to pose an immediate 

threat.” (People v. Romero, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 422.) 

We also disagree with the People that Officer Garcia-Rangel’s questioning was for 

the primary purpose of assessing the driver’s dangerousness. Officer Garcia-Rangel 

asked the passenger for the driver’s name and other identifying characteristics. These 

questions were not designed to determine whether the driver posed a danger to the 

officers looking for him or whether the driver was armed. Officer Garcia-Rangel’s 

questions were for the purpose of putting a name to the face he saw flee the stolen car. 

This is supported by Officer Garcia-Rangel’s conduct of checking the name given by the 

passenger in a database containing photographs that confirmed Officer Garcia-Rangel’s

identification. There is no indication Officer Garcia-Rangel questioned the passenger for 

any reason other than to identify the person Officer Garcia-Rangel saw drive the Charger 

and flee from the scene of a crash. Because this line of questioning seeks to determine 

what happened and to identify a perpetrator for purposes of prosecution, the passenger’s 

answers to Officer Garcia-Rangel’s questions were testimonial and should have been 

excluded. 

III

The Error Was Not Harmless

Defendant contends the admission of the passenger’s statements was prejudicial 

because the People cannot prove the evidence was unimportant to the jury’s verdicts. He 

argues the prosecution’s heavy reliance on the passenger’s identification of defendant as 

the driver is proof the evidence was prejudicial. The People make no argument on this 

point. We agree with defendant. 
11

If the reviewing court finds a defendant’s confrontation rights were violated, it 

must determine whether the violation prejudiced defendant under Chapman. (People v. 

Livingston (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1145, 1159, citing Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 

18, 24 [17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710-711].) The Chapman court stated “before a federal 

constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it 

was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Chapman, at p. 24 [17 L.Ed.2d at pp. 710-

711].) Under this standard, “[t]o say that an error did not contribute to the verdict is, 

rather, to find that error unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered on 

the issue in question, as revealed in the record.” (Yates v. Evatt (1991) 500 U.S. 391, 403 

[114 L.Ed.2d 432, 449].) “[T]he question [Chapman] instructs the reviewing court to 

consider is not what effect the constitutional error might generally be expected to have 

upon a reasonable jury, but rather what effect it had upon the guilty verdict in the case at 

hand. . . . The inquiry, in other words, is not whether, in a trial that occurred without the 

error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict 

actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error. That must be so, 

because to hypothesize a guilty verdict that was never in fact rendered -- no matter how 

inescapable the findings to support that verdict might be -- would violate the jury-trial 

guarantee.” (Sullivan v. Louisiana (1993) 508 U.S. 275, 279 [124 L.Ed.2d 182, 189].)

The identity of the driver was the key issue presented to the jury. Moreover, 

identity was highly contested. Officer Garcia-Rangel described the driver as having 

“short curly hair, almost like an afro-type short hair.” He stated he saw the driver’s face 

once or twice as he ran away. Officer Garcia-Rangel further stated he recognized the 

driver as the man in the search result of defendant’s name. The homeowner whose 

residence was damaged in the crash also testified for the prosecution. When asked by the 

prosecution, the homeowner denied ever seeing defendant in his neighborhood. He 

further stated that although the defendant was “about the height” of the driver he briefly 

saw running away, the driver “had longer hair,” such as dreadlocks, and repeated he had 

never seen defendant before. 
12

To resolve this conflicting testimony, the prosecution substantially relied on the 

passenger’s statement identifying defendant. In the prosecution’s closing argument, it 

repeatedly emphasized reasons the jury should find the passenger’s statement credible, 

arguing the passenger’s history of telling police about other individuals involved in 

criminal activity and the fact defendant was his brother contributed to his overall 

credibility. The prosecution’s heavy reliance on the passenger’s statement in its 

argument demonstrated the importance of this evidence to its case. (See People v. Earle

(2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 372, 409 [“nothing could more vividly demonstrate the crucial 

role played by the [evidence] in securing the . . . conviction than the prosecutor’s own 

heavy and pervasive reliance on it in jury argument”].) 

Without the passenger’s statements, the only evidence tending to resolve the 

conflicting testimony regarding defendant’s identity were statements made by a woman 

driving past the accident and defendant’s fingerprints on a cell phone recovered from the 

stolen car. As for the woman, she drove by the scene several times and at some point 

yelled “Don’t shoot my baby!” The prosecution used this statement, along with the 

evidence she and defendant lived at the same address, to suggest the woman may have 

been looking for defendant. There was, however, no evidence proving this woman was 

looking for defendant rather than the passenger, who is defendant’s brother. Therefore, 

this circumstantial evidence provides little corroborating weight to Officer GarciaRangel’s identification. 

The prosecution also relied on forensic evidence showing defendant’s fingerprints 

were on one of two cell phones collected from the Charger. We can infer from 

defendant’s fingerprints only that he at some point touched a cell phone recovered from 

the car, not that he touched the cell phone while driving the car. (See People v. Jenkins

(1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 579, 584 [“The only fact directly inferable from the presence of the 

fingerprints is that sometime, somewhere defendant touched the [cell phone]”]; People v. 

Flores (1943) 58 Cal.App.2d 764, 769 [concluding fingerprint evidence matching 

defendant obtained from a stolen vehicle did not establish beyond a reasonable doubt 

defendant was the thief].) Considering the cell phone was recovered in defendant’s 
13

brother’s presence, the circumstantial evidence of defendant’s fingerprints is susceptible 

to other interpretations not necessarily pointing to guilt. For example, defendant could 

have handed his brother a cell phone before his brother left the house and became the 

passenger in this stolen Charger. Because the fingerprint evidence provided weak 

support of Officer Garcia-Rangel’s identification, we cannot point to it as sufficient 

support of the verdicts absent consideration of the passenger’s statements.

The passenger’s statements were the prosecution’s best and clearest evidence 

corroborating Officer Garcia-Rangel’s contested identification of defendant as the driver 

of the Charger. Without the passenger’s improperly admitted hearsay statements, the jury 

would have been left only with circumstantial evidence susceptible to various 

interpretations. Accordingly, we cannot say the statements erroneously admitted in 

violation of defendant’s confrontation rights were unimportant to the jury’s ultimate 

conclusion. (See Yates v. Evatt, supra, 500 U.S. at p. 403 [114 L.Ed.2d at p. 449].) 

Thus, we must reverse. 

DISPOSITION

The judgment is reversed.

/s/ 

Robie, Acting P. J.

We concur:

/s/ 

Mauro, J.

/s/ 

Hoch, J.