J-S06002-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: J.H., B.J.H. 

AND J.G., MINOR CHILDREN

APPEAL OF: E.H., FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1018 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Decrees Entered February 29, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000580-2013, 

CP-51-AP-0000581-2013, CP-51-AP-0000582-2013, 

CP-51-DP-0000159-2012, CP-51-DP-0000189-2012, 

CP-51-DP-0000448-2013, FID# 51-FN-000272-2012

BEFORE: MOULTON, RANSOM, and FITZGERALD*, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY MOULTON, J.: FILED MARCH 27, 2017

Appellant, E.H. (“Father”), appeals from the decrees entered February 

29, 2016, in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas involuntarily 

terminating his parental rights to his minor children, B.H., born in 

September 2001; J.H., born in June 2005; and J.G., born in February 2013 

(collectively, “the Children”) pursuant to the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. § 

2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b).1 We affirm. 

____________________________________________

*

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 The trial court also terminated the parental rights of S.G. (“Mother”) 

on the same date. Mother filed timely appeals in this Court, which are 

docketed at 907 EDA 2016, 909 EDA 2016 and 910 EDA 2016. This Court 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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The family first came to the attention of the Philadelphia County 

Department of Human Services (“DHS”) on January 8, 2012, when DHS 

received an emergency general protective services (“EGPS”) report, which 

was later substantiated. See Opinion (“1925(a) Op.”), 6/2/16, at 2 

(unpaginated). The EGPS report alleged that J.H., a wheelchair-bound 

special needs child diagnosed with cerebral palsy, deafness, and 

developmental delays, was losing weight and was not being taken to his 

medical appointments. Id. The EGPS report stated that there was 

insufficient food for the Children in the home, and that J.H. and B.H. were 

truant from school. Id. The EGPS report further alleged that Mother and 

Father had domestic violence issues. Id. The trial court adjudicated J.H. 

and B.H. dependent on February 7, 2012. Id. 

On February 9, 2013, DHS received a general protective services 

(“GPS”) report alleging that Mother had given birth to J.G., and that both 

Mother and J.G. tested positive for cocaine at the hospital. Id. J.G. was 

placed in his current pre-adoptive foster home upon release from the 

hospital. Id. J.G. was adjudicated dependent on March 12, 2013. Id. 

On October 11, 2013, DHS filed petitions to involuntarily terminate 

Father’s parental rights to the Children pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

affirmed the trial court’s determination in these consolidated appeals by 

memorandum decision on November 8, 2016.
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(2), (5), (8), and (b). The trial court conducted a four-day hearing on 

August 14, 2014, January 13, 2015, October 7, 2015, and February 29, 

2016. Id. at 3. The trial court heard testimony from James Cosby, a child 

advocate social worker, Erica Williams, a licensed psychologist, and Charles 

Younger, a DHS caseworker. 

On February 29, 2016, the trial court involuntarily terminated Father’s 

parental rights to the Children. On March 18, 2016, Father timely filed a 

notice of appeal, together with a concise statement of errors complained of 

on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. Rule 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).

Father raises three questions on appeal:

1. Did the Trial Court err in terminating [Father’s] parental 

rights under 23 Pa.C.S. Section 2511(a)(1), 2511(a)(2), 

2511(a)(5), and 2511(a)(8)?

2. Did the Trial Court err in finding that termination of 

Father’s parental rights best served the [C]hildren’s 

developmental, physical and emotional needs under 23 

Pa.C.S. Section 2511(b)?

3. Did the Trial Court err in changing the [C]hildren’s goal 

to adoption? 

Father’s Br. at vi.

We consider Father’s issues mindful of our well-settled standard of 

review. 

The standard of review in termination of parental rights 

cases requires appellate courts to accept the findings of 

fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if they 

are supported by the record. If the factual findings are 

supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial 

court made an error of law or abused its discretion. A 

decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only 
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upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, 

partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial court’s 

decision, however, should not be reversed merely because 

the record would support a different result. We have 

previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that 

often have first-hand observations of the parties spanning 

multiple hearings.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks 

omitted).

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has explained the reason for 

applying an abuse of discretion to termination decisions:

[U]nlike trial courts, appellate courts are not equipped to 

make the fact-specific determinations on a cold record, 

where the trial judges are observing the parties during the 

relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous other 

hearings regarding the child and parents. Therefore, even 

where the facts could support an opposite result, as is 

often the case in dependency and termination cases, an 

appellate court must resist the urge to second guess the 

trial court and impose its own credibility determinations 

and judgment; instead we must defer to the trial judges so 

long as the factual findings are supported by the record 

and the court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an 

error of law or an abuse of discretion.

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-27 (Pa. 2012) (citations 

omitted).

This Court need only agree with the trial court’s determination as to 

any one subsection of section 2511(a), along with section 2511(b), in order 

to affirm the termination of parental rights. In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 

384 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en banc). We conclude that the trial court in this 

case properly terminated Father’s parental rights pursuant to sections 

2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide as follows:
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(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a 

child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the 

following grounds:

. . .

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child 

to be without essential parental care, control or 

subsistence necessary for his physical or mental 

well-being and the conditions and causes of the 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will 

not be remedied by the parent.

. . .

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the 

rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare 

of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated 

solely on the basis of environmental factors such as 

inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and 

medical care if found to be beyond the control of the 

parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to 

subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider 

any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions 

described therein which are first initiated subsequent to 

the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (b).

To terminate parental rights pursuant to section 2511(a)(2), the 

moving party must produce clear and convincing evidence of the following: 

“(1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) such 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the child to be without 

essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or 

mental well-being; and (3) the causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal cannot or will not be remedied.” See In re Adoption of M.E.P., 

825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa.Super. 2003). 
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Father argues DHS failed to present clear and convincing evidence 

supporting termination, and the trial court erred in terminating his parental 

rights. Father’s Br. at 3. Father maintains that he met all of his Family 

Service Plan (“FSP”) objectives except mental health treatment. Id. Father 

maintains that he completed the mental health evaluation, but felt he did 

not need to engage in mental health treatment. Id. Father states he has 

resolved all issues that gave rise to the dependency action, and termination 

was improper. Id. We disagree.

The trial court found Father failed to complete his FSP goals, finding:

The DHS social worker identified the father’s FSP 

objectives as: 1) obtain appropriate housing, 2) engage in 

mental health treatment, 3) attend anger management 

classes, 4) maintain visits with the children and 5) 

complete a [Parenting Capacity Evaluation (“PCE”)]. The 

father did not obtain appropriate housing. Furthermore, 

the father did not complete mental health treatment. 

Moreover, the father did not visit[] with the [C]hildren 

consistently. The father attended fifty-four percent of the 

visits and has been consistently thirty to sixty minutes 

late. The length of the visit is two hours. 

1925(a) Op. at 4 (internal citations omitted).

The trial court further found that:

In the instant case, Dr. Erica Williams, an expert in the 

field of forensic and clinical psychology, completed a PCE 

for the father. Dr. Williams concluded that the father did 

not have the capacity to provide a safe environment or 

permanency for the children. Dr. Williams recommended 

mental health treatment for the father. The father refused 

to attend mental health treatment. The father testified “I 

feel no need for mental health treatment.” . . . 

Furthermore, the visits with . . . the father have never 

progressed from supervised to unsupervised. 
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Id. at 5 (internal citations omitted). 

Dr. Williams testified that at the time of the evaluation, Father did not 

have the capacity to provide safety and permanency for the Children. N.T., 

1/13/15, at 14, 20. Dr. Williams noted that Father provided shifting 

explanations for B.H.’s truancy, first denying that B.H. was truant, and then 

blaming Mother and the school. Id. Dr. Williams explained that, although 

Father stated that he wanted to do anything he needed to have the Children 

returned and was taking responsibility, he was unable to explain what he 

would do differently if the Children were returned. Id. at 15. Dr. Williams 

further testified that there were concerns for Father’s “insight, judgment, 

[and] decision making as well as reported symptoms of anxiety and 

depression,” but that Father denied any long-term issues with anxiety or 

depression. Id. at 19. 

Charles Younger testified that Father had been ordered by the trial 

court many times throughout this case to engage in mental health 

treatment. Id. at 50-51. Mr. Younger stated that Father did not attend 

mental health services. Id. at 51-52. Mr. Younger further stated that 

Father’s visits had not progressed beyond supervised visits. Id. at 54. 

We find that the trial court’s credibility and weight determinations are 

supported by evidence in the record. See In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 

(Pa.Super. 2004). Accordingly, we find that the trial court’s determinations 

regarding section 2511(a)(2) are supported by sufficient, competent 

evidence in the record. 
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The trial court must also consider how terminating Father’s parental 

rights would affect the needs and welfare of the Children pursuant to 23 

Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). The focus in terminating parental rights under section 

2511(b) is not on the parent, but on the child. In re Adoption of C.L.G., 

956 A.2d 999, 1008 (Pa.Super. 2008) (en banc). Pursuant to section 

2511(b), the trial court must determine “whether termination of parental 

rights would best serve the developmental, physical and emotional needs 

and welfare of the child.” See In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284, 1286 

(Pa.Super. 2005). “A parent’s own feelings of love and affection for a child, 

alone,” will not preclude termination of parental rights. In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 

1108, 1121 (Pa.Super. 2010). As this Court stated, “a child’s life ‘simply 

cannot be put on hold in the hope that [a parent] will summon the ability to 

handle the responsibilities of parenting.’” In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 732 

(Pa.Super. 2008) (quoting In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1276 

(Pa.Super. 2003)). Rather, “a parent’s basic constitutional right to the 

custody and rearing of his or her child is converted, upon the failure to fulfill 

his or her parental duties, to the child’s right to have proper parenting and 

fulfillment of his or her potential in a permanent, healthy, safe 

environment.” In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 856 (Pa.Super. 2004).

This Court has explained that “[i]ntangibles such as love, comfort, 

security, and stability are involved in the inquiry into [the] needs and 

welfare of the child.” In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d at 1287. Further, the trial 
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court “must also discern the nature and status of the parent-child bond, with 

utmost attention to the effect on the child of permanently severing that 

bond.” Id. However, “[i]n cases where there is no evidence of any bond 

between the parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists. 

The extent of any bond analysis, therefore, necessarily depends on the 

circumstances of the particular case.” In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-763 

(Pa.Super. 2008).

Father argues that termination is improper because Father had been 

visiting with the Children. Father’s Br. at 10. Father contends that 

termination of his parental rights would not be in the best interest of the 

Children because to do so would terminate the love, comfort, security, and 

stability that the Children have with Father. Id. We disagree. 

The trial court found:

In the instant matter, J.G. and B.H. reside in the same 

pre-adoptive home. They share a primary parental bond 

with the kinship parent. They both look to the kinship 

parent to meet their day to day needs. B.H. stated that 

she no longer wants to visit with her biological parents. 

J.G. never lived with his biological parents. J.H. resides in 

a pre-adoptive foster home. The foster mother has the 

appropriate medical training to care for the child. She is a 

registered nurse. J.H. is bonded to the foster mother. 

Furthermore, the [C]hildren would not suffer 

permanent/irreparable harm if the parental rights of 

[Father] were terminated. Lastly, it would be in the best 

interest of the [C]hildren if their goal was changed to 

adoption. 

Rule 1925(a) Op. at 6 (internal citations omitted).
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With respect to B.H., James Cosby testified that B.H. has not wanted 

to see Father for approximately one-and-a-half years. N.T., 2/29/16, at 22. 

Mr. Cosby testified that B.H. is doing well in her foster home, and has 

expressed her desire to be adopted by her kinship parent. Id. at 22-24. Mr. 

Cosby concluded that adoption is in B.H.’s best interest. Id. at 24. 

With respect to J.H., Mr. Younger testified that Father failed to do 

things beyond supervised visitation to follow J.H.’s progress or to provide for 

J.H. N.T., 1/13/15, at 54. Mr. Younger further testified that the foster 

mother has been J.H.’s primary caregiver throughout this case, the foster 

mother is very attentive to J.H.’s needs, and there is a bond between J.H. 

and the foster mother. Id. at 55. Mr. Younger concluded that it would not 

be harmful to J.H.’s developmental, physical, or emotional needs if Father’s 

parental rights were terminated. Id. at 54-55.

With respect to J.G., Mr. Younger testified that Father had supervised 

visits with J.G. Id. at 56. Mr. Younger described Father’s visits with J.G., 

stating “he’s growing of course and attentive, but nothing that stands out, 

reaching and grabbing.” Id. at 57. Mr. Younger further testified that J.G. 

identifies the kinship parent as his primary caregiver, and when interacting 

with the kinship parent, J.G. craves more attention, responds to cues, and 

there is a level of bonding with hugging, kissing, and other behavior that 

social workers look for between parents and children. Id. 

We find that the competent evidence in the record supports the trial 

court’s determination that there was no bond between Father and the 
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Children which, if severed, would be detrimental to the Children, and that 

the termination of Father’s parental rights would best serve the needs and 

welfare of the Children. Thus, we will not disturb the trial court’s 

determinations. See In re M.G., 855 A.2d at 73-74. 

Lastly, Father argues that the trial court erred in changing the 

Children’s goal to adoption. Father’s Br. at 11. Father did not present this 

claim for review in his Rule 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b) concise statement of errors 

complained of on appeal. Therefore, we find Father’s claim is waived. See 

Krebs v. United Refining Company of Pennsylvania, 893 A.2d 776, 797 

(Pa.Super. 2006) (holding that an appellant waives issues that are not raised 

in both his or her concise statement of errors complained of on appeal and 

the statement of questions involved in his or her brief on appeal). 

Further, even if Father had not waived the issue, we would find it lacks 

merit. This Court has stated: “When reviewing an order regarding the 

change of a placement goal of a dependent child pursuant to the Juvenile 

Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6301, et seq., our standard of review is abuse of 

discretion.” In re B.S., 861 A.2d 974, 976 (Pa.Super. 2004). We stated:

[T]o conclude that the trial court abused its discretion, we 

must determine that the court’s judgment was manifestly 

unreasonable, that the court did not apply the law, or that 

the court’s action was a result of partiality, prejudice, bias 

or ill will, as shown by the record. We are bound by the 

trial court’s findings of fact that have support in the record. 

The trial court, not the appellate court, is charged with the 

responsibilities of evaluating credibility of the witnesses 

and resolving any conflicts in the testimony. In carrying 

out these responsibilities, the trial court is free to believe 
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all, part, or none of the evidence. When the trial court’s 

findings are supported by competent evidence of record, 

we will affirm even if the record could also support an 

opposite result.

In re A.K., 936 A.2d 528, 533 (Pa.Super. 2007). 

Additionally,

[t]he trial court must focus on the child and determine the 

goal with reference to the child’s best interests, not those 

of the parents. Safety, permanency, and well-being of the 

child must take precedence over all other considerations. 

Further, at the review hearing for a dependent child who 

has been removed from the parental home, the court must 

consider the statutorily mandated factors.[2] These 

statutory mandates clearly place the trial court’s focus on 

the best interests of the child.

In re S.B., 943 A.2d 973, 978 (Pa.Super. 2008) (emphasis in original) 

(citations and quotation marks omitted).

Here, the trial court considered the Children’s best interest in deciding 

whether to change the permanency goal to adoption. The evidence in the 

record supports the trial court’s determinations that at the time the decrees 

were entered, B.H. and J.H. had been in foster care for over four years, and 

____________________________________________

2 See 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(f)(1)-(6), (9) (setting forth matters to be 

determined at a permanency hearing, including, “continuing necessity for 

and appropriateness of the placement,” “appropriateness, feasibility and 

extent of compliance with the permanency plan developed for the child,” 

“extent of progress made toward alleviating the circumstances which 

necessitated the original placement,” “appropriateness and feasibility of the 

current placement goal for the child,” “likely date by which the placement 

goal for the child might be achieved,” and whether “child is safe” and setting 

forth additional considerations where child has been in placement for at least 

15 of the last 22 months).
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that J.G. had never been in his biological parents’ care. Rule 1925(a) Op. at 

2. Moreover, the evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that it would 

be in the best interest of the Children if their goals were changed to 

adoption. Id. at 6. We will not disturb these determinations. See In re 

M.G., 855 A.2d at 73-74.

We affirm the decrees terminating Father’s parental rights on the basis 

of sections 2511(a)(2) and (b). 

Decrees affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/27/2017