96-674

 No. 96-674

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

 

1997

STATE OF MONTANA,

 Plaintiff and Appellant,

 v.

BARBARA E. McELDERRY,

 Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Twentieth Judicial District,

 In and for the County of Lake,

 The Honorable C. B. McNeil., Judge presiding.

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

 For Appellant:

 Lawrence J. Nistler, Attorney at Law, Polson, Montana

 For Respondent:

 Hon. Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General;

 Patricia J. Jordan, Assistant Attorney General;

 Helena, Montana

 Kim Christopher, Lake County Attorney;

 Robert J. Long, Deputy County Attorney;

 Polson, Montana

 Submitted on Briefs: August 7, 1997

 Decided: September 8, 1997

Filed:

 __________________________________________

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 Clerk

Justice Terry N. Trieweiler delivered the Opinion of the Court.

 On October 16, 1996, the State of Montana charged Barbara McElderry, by

complaint filed in the Lake County Justice Court, with driving under the influence of

alcohol, fifth offense, a felony, in violation of 61-8-401(1)(a), MCA, and with 

reckless

driving and driving while her license was suspended or revoked, in violation of 

61-8-

301(1)(b) and 61-5-212, MCA, respectively. On October 25, 1996, the State filed a

motion and affidavit for leave to file an information in District Court. That 

motion was

granted on October 28, 1996, and the information was filed that same day. The

information, however, was later dismissed for the State's failure to file an 

information

within a reasonable time from the date of the defendant's imprisonment. The State

appeals from the District Court's order dismissing the information. We vacate the

District Court's judgment and remand this case for further consideration consistent 

with

this opinion.

 The issues on appeal are:

 1. Did the District Court err when it calculated the time period referred to 

in

 46-10-105, MCA, from the time of the defendant's arrest, rather than from her 

initial

appearance?

 2. Did the District Court err when it concluded that in State v. Higley 

(1980),

190 Mont. 412, 621 P.2d 1043, this Court adopted a ten-day time limitation for 

charging

a person in custody, consistent with Rule 5(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal

Procedure?

 3. Did the District Court err when it found the period of time which elapsed

prior to the filing of the information unreasonable in this case?

 FACTUAL BACKGROUND

 On October 14, 1996, Barbara McElderry was arrested in Lake County for

allegedly committing the offenses of driving under the influence of alcohol, reckless

driving, and driving while her license was suspended. In its complaint and 

affidavit, the

State alleged that the arresting officer noticed McElderry's vehicle weaving in her 

lane

and speeding along highway 93 near Pablo, Montana. Following her detention and

refusal to perform any of the standard field sobriety tests, McElderry was placed 

into

custody in the Lake County jail.

 Two days later, on October 16, 1996, McElderry made her initial appearance in

the Lake County Justice Court and the State charged her by filing its complaint. The

charges brought against McElderry were driving under the influence of alcohol, her 

fifth

offense, a felony pursuant to 61-8-401(1)(a), MCA, and the misdemeanors of reckless

driving in violation of 61-8-301(1)(b), MCA, and driving while her license was

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suspended or revoked in violation of 61-5-212, MCA. 

 On Friday, October 25, 1996, the State filed a motion for leave to file an

information in the District Court for the Twentieth Judicial District in Lake 

County. The

District Court granted leave to file the information on Monday, October 28, 1996. On

that same day, fourteen days after McElderry's arrest and imprisonment, and twelve 

days

after her initial appearance in the Justice Court, the State filed its information.

 On October 29, 1996, McElderry filed a motion to dismiss the charges based on

her contention that the reasonable time requirement in 46-10-105, MCA, as 

interpreted

by this Court in Higley, 190 Mont. 412, 621 P.2d 1043, requires a determination of

probable cause within ten days following a defendant's initial appearance. The State

responded that this Court, in Higley, found that a ten-day delay prior to a 

determination

of probable cause is not unreasonable, but that ten days is not considered an outer 

limit

for what is reasonable. The District Court granted McElderry's motion and dismissed

the State's information with prejudice. 

 In its order dismissing the State's information, the District Court adopted by

reference McElderry's arguments as set out in her briefs, and stated that, pursuant 

to

Higley, the State failed to hold a preliminary examination in Justice Court or 

obtain leave

from the District Court to file the information within a reasonable time. The 

arguments

presented by McElderry in support of her motion to dismiss, and which were later

adopted by the District Court in its order, focused on our interpretation of 46-10-

105,

MCA, in Higley. 

 Section 46-10-105, MCA, provides as follows:

 After the initial appearance, in all cases in which the charge is triable in

 district court, the justice's court shall, within a reasonable time, hold a

 preliminary examination unless:

 (1) the defendant waives a preliminary examination;

 (2) the district court has granted leave to file an information;

 (3) an indictment has been returned; or

 (4) the case is triable in justice's court.

 Because McElderry was charged with a felony which is triable in district court,

 46-10-105, MCA, requires that, unless an exception applies, a preliminary 

examination

must be held within a reasonable time after McElderry's initial appearance. Of the 

four

enumerated exceptions to the reasonable time requirement in the statute, only 

subsection

(2) "the district court has granted leave to file an information," applies to this 

case. 

McElderry, however, contends, and we agree, that the exception does not apply if a

"reasonable time" expired before leave was granted. 

 The Federal statute referred to by McElderry, as set out in Higley, states in

relevant part: 

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"Such examination shall be held within a reasonable time but in any event

no later than 10 days following the initial appearance if the defendant is in

custody . . . provided, however, that the preliminary examination shall not

be held if the defendant is indicted or if an information against the

defendant is filed in district court . . . ."

Higley, 190 Mont. at 419, 621 P.2d at 1048 (quoting 18 U.S.C. Fed. R. Crim. P. 5(c)).

 On November 18, 1996, the District Court granted McElderry's motion to dismiss

and adopted by reference the arguments presented by McElderry as a basis for finding

the time lapse unreasonable. However, contrary to the assertions of both McElderry 

and

the State, the District Court calculated the delay from October 14, 1996, the day

McElderry was arrested and placed into custody, rather than October 16, 1996, the day

she made her first appearance. The total delay assumed by the court was, therefore,

fourteen days, rather than twelve.

 ISSUE 1

 Did the District Court err when it calculated the time period referred to in

 46-10-105, MCA, from the time of the defendant's arrest, rather than from her 

initial

appearance?

 The standard of review of a district court's conclusions of law is whether the

court's interpretation of the law is correct. See Kreger v. Francis (1995), 271 

Mont.

444, 447, 898 P.2d 672, 674. In Kreger, we held that "'where the language of the

statute is plain, unambiguous, direct, and certain, the statute speaks for 

itself.'" Kreger,

271 Mont. at 447, 898 P.2d at 674 (quoting State ex rel. Palmer v. Hart (1982), 201

Mont. 526, 530, 655 P.2d 965, 967).

 The District Court dismissed the State's information based in part on its 

conclusion

that the time period at issue began at the moment McElderry was arrested and placed 

into

custody. The plain language of the governing statute, however, clearly requires a

preliminary examination to be held, or other determination of probable cause to be 

made,

within a reasonable time after the initial appearance. Section 46-10-105, MCA, 

provides

in relevant part that: 

After the initial appearance, in all cases in which the charge is triable in

district court, the justice's court shall, within a reasonable time, hold a

preliminary examination unless: 

 . . . .

(Emphasis added.) Therefore, we conclude that the District Court erred in its 

calculation

of the delay.

 ISSUE 2 

 Did the District Court err when it concluded that in State v. Higley (1980), 190

Mont. 412, 621 P.2d 1043, this Court adopted a ten-day time limitation for charging a

person in custody, consistent with Rule 5(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal 

Procedure?

 In its order dismissing the State's information, the District Court concluded 

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that,

pursuant to our decision in Higley, the reasonable time requirement set forth in 

46-10-

105, MCA, for holding a preliminary examination or otherwise making a determination

of probable cause, has an outer limit of ten days. Based on this conclusion, the 

District

Court found the fourteen day delay between McElderry's incarceration and the filing 

of

the State's information unreasonable.

 Section 46-10-105, MCA, itself, does not set a ten-day time limit, but merely

states the preliminary hearing must be held within a reasonable time unless, inter 

alia,

the court grants leave to file an information or unless another statutory exception 

applies. 

Contrary to the arguments set forth by McElderry, we did not adopt the ten-day time

period established in Rule 5(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in our 

decision

in Higley. We merely held that a ten-day delay in determining probable cause was not

unreasonable. Our discussion in Higley of the current federal ten-day rule serves 

only

as an example of jurisdictions using precise time limits, and to distinguish it from

Montana's "reasonable time" rule which is similar to the previous federal rule. 

 Our intent in Higley was to demonstrate that even a ten-day delay, as proscribed

by the federal statute, may not be unreasonable in Montana. This is evident in our

discussion of James v. Lawrence (D.C. Cir. 1949), 176 F.2d 18, a case decided 

pursuant

to the previous federal rule which merely required a hearing in a reasonable time. 

There,

we noted that eighteen days was not an unreasonable delay. See James, 176 F.2d at 

20.

In another example of a standard similar to that used in Montana, we also noted in 

Higley

the Alaska case of Martinez v. State (Alaska 1967), 423 P.2d 700, 710-11, in which 

the

Alaska Supreme Court concluded that what constitutes a reasonable time must be

determined by the facts of the case. In Martinez, a sixteen-day delay was found

reasonable. See Martinez, 423 P.2d at 710. We therefore concluded in Higley that "a

10-day delay in determining probable cause was not unreasonable." Higley, 190 Mont

at 420, 621 P.2d at 1048. 

 Therefore, we conclude that the District Court erred by holding that in Higley 

this

Court adopted the ten-day time limitation for charging a person in custody as 

established

by Rule 5(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.

 ISSUE 3

 Did the District Court err when it found the period of time which elapsed prior 

to

the filing of the information unreasonable in this case?

 We have held that a determination of a "reasonable time" pursuant to 46-10-

105,

MCA, is within the discretion of the district court. Higley, 190 Mont. 412, 621 P.2d

1043. The standard of review of discretionary trial court rulings in criminal cases 

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is

whether the trial court abused its discretion. See State v. Sullivan (1994), 266 

Mont.

313, 324, 880 P.2d 829, 836. See also State v. Mergenthaler (1993), 263 Mont. 198,

204, 868 P.2d 560, 563; State v. Later (1993), 260 Mont. 363, 364, 860 P.2d 135, 136.

 However, because the District Court erred in its calculation of the period of 

delay,

we are not able to determine how the court would, in fact, exercise its discretion 

based

on the actual delay which was twelve days.

 Therefore, we conclude that the District Court erred in its calculation of the 

actual

delay, and when it concluded that Higley established a ten-day time limit for 

granting

leave to file an information. Since the reasonableness of the delay is a 

discretionary

decision which is factually driven, we do not know how the District Court would 

exercise

its discretion, absent these erroneous assumptions and, therefore, vacate the prior

judgment of the District Court and remand this case for further consideration 

consistent

with this opinion.

 /S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER

We Concur:

/S/ J. A. TURNAGE

/S/ KARLA M. GRAY

/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART

/S/ WILLIAM E. HUNT, SR.

___________________________________

 Chief Justice

___________________________________

___________________________________

___________________________________

 Justices

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