IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 15–0024

Filed September 4, 2015

IOWA SUPREME COURT ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY BOARD,

Appellee,

vs.

FRANK SANTIAGO,

Appellant.

On appeal from the report of the Grievance Commission of the 

Supreme Court of Iowa.

The grievance commission reports that an attorney violated several 

rules of professional conduct and recommends a sixty-day suspension. 

LICENSE SUSPENDED. 

Frank Santiago, Iowa City, pro se.

Charles L. Harrington and Wendell J. Harms, Des Moines, for 

appellee.
2

WATERMAN, Justice. 

The Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board brought a 

complaint against Frank Santiago, charging him with violating Iowa 

disciplinary rules in connection with his representation of one client and

his failure to follow trust account procedures. A division of the 

Grievance Commission of the Supreme Court of Iowa found he violated 

several rules by failing to deposit an advance fee into his trust account, 

maintain proper trust account records, account for withdrawals, and

communicate his hourly rate. The commission recommended a sixty-day 

suspension, noting as an aggravating factor his failure to correct his 

bookkeeping practices after a 2011 audit. Santiago admits he violated 

the trust account rules but argues the sanction should be no more than 

a public reprimand. He argues the attorney who reported his 

misconduct did so out of spite, and his work for underserved, nonEnglish speaking clientele merits greater consideration to mitigate the 

sanction. On our de novo review, we find Santiago violated the rules and 

suspend his license to practice law for thirty days. 

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

Santiago has practiced law in Iowa since 1995. He is a solo 

practitioner with an office in Iowa City, concentrating in personal injury 

and criminal defense cases. He frequently represents non-English 

speaking Hispanic residents. He has no prior disciplinary record, but a 

2011 audit of his practice found numerous shortcomings in his 

bookkeeping and violations of the trust account rules. The 2011 auditor

assisted him in complying with record keeping requirements but he failed 

to take the lessons to heart. This case arose from his representation of 

one client and the resulting complaint, and the audit conducted in 2013–

2014. 
3

A. The 2011 Audit. The Client Security Commission audited 

Santiago’s trust account in 2011. The auditor, Thomas McGarvey, 

examined Santiago’s trust account statements from February to August 

of 2011. McGarvey testified at the 2014 grievance commission hearing 

that the rules require attorneys to perform a three-way reconciliation of 

the trust account on a monthly basis, and that Santiago had not 

performed the required reconciliation since 2007. Santiago admitted to 

McGarvey he had not been reconciling his account before the audit as 

required by the rules, but claimed he regularly performed his own review 

of the trust account. Santiago produced his bank statements for 

McGarvey, but had no check register or client ledger to cross-check the 

bank statements and lacked documentation for some transactions. The 

bank statements showed Santiago had made prohibited cash 

withdrawals from the trust account. McGarvey testified at the 

commission hearing that Santiago’s personal review procedure was 

inadequate because it would not show when he failed to make trust 

account deposits. McGarvey also reported that Santiago made no written 

accountings to criminal clients when he withdrew funds from the trust 

account. Instead, Santiago simply withdrew retainer funds from the 

trust account after performing the work without notifying the clients or 

identifying the clients for each withdrawal. 

McGarvey scheduled a follow-up appointment with Santiago in 

November of 2011. He found the records in better shape, which 

McGarvey attributed to the hiring of a new employee. However, Santiago 

still had not completed a check register, one of the elements necessary 

for a monthly reconciliation. McGarvey explained the need for individual 

client ledgers to use in reconciling the accounts each month. He showed 

Santiago how to complete the required reconciliations. McGarvey 
4

testified he saw no evidence in his review that Santiago misappropriated 

client funds or acted dishonestly in his bookkeeping. No disciplinary 

complaint was brought against Santiago as a result of the 2011 audit. 

B. Moreno Representation. In early January 2013, Santiago met 

with Joseph Moreno and agreed to represent him in criminal 

proceedings. Moreno faced charges for intimidation with a dangerous 

weapon, reckless use of a firearm, criminal mischief in the first degree, 

burglary in the first degree, carrying weapons, and operating a motor 

vehicle while intoxicated (OWI), first offense. According to court filings,

Moreno, while severely intoxicated, pointed a loaded Glock 9 mm, semiautomatic handgun at his roommate. Moreno fired shots in their 

apartment, drove to Coral Ridge Mall, and crashed his Ford Explorer

through the glass entrance doors at Scheels All Sports. He then ran to 

the upper level of the store, smashed the glass case containing 

ammunition, and passed out there before his arrest by a SWAT team.

Moreno paid Santiago $100 for the initial one-hour conference and 

agreed to pay Santiago $5000 to seek an acceptable plea agreement. On 

January 3, Moreno gave Santiago $2500 in cash as a retainer. Santiago 

admittedly never placed that cash retainer in his trust account and,

instead, put it in a drawer in his office. Santiago gave Moreno a 

handwritten receipt on the back of a business card but never discussed 

his hourly rate with Moreno or entered into a written fee agreement. 

Santiago filed his appearance for Moreno in the criminal cases on 

January 4. According to Santiago, he also advised Moreno on several 

matters ancillary to the criminal charges, including a restraining order 
5

preventing Moreno from entering his apartment,1 Moreno’s status with

the National Guard, and Moreno’s employment with Mercy Hospital. 

Santiago also discussed Moreno’s case with the assistant county 

attorney, interviewed witnesses, and performed legal research, all 

without memorializing his work. By interviewing Moreno’s roommate, 

Santiago learned that he claimed Moreno had forcibly marched him into 

the apartment at gunpoint and ordered him to lie down and count to a 

thousand, before firing shots into a wall. Santiago noted this information 

was not in the minutes of testimony and would support a charge of 

kidnapping, a forcible felony. Therefore, Santiago sought a quick plea 

agreement to forestall that additional felony charge. 

Meanwhile, in early February, Moreno contacted Cedar Rapids 

attorney Maria Victoria Cole and met with her on February 25. On 

March 7, Moreno decided to dismiss Santiago and retain Cole to 

represent him. The record is silent about Moreno’s reasons for

substituting counsel. Cole called Santiago that day and left him a 

voicemail. According to Cole, she informed Santiago that Moreno had 

retained her and requested that Santiago provide Moreno a final 

accounting of his work and return any unused retainer funds. According 

to Santiago, Cole demanded the entire $2500 retainer in a threatening 

manner and did not claim to act as Moreno’s attorney. Cole followed the 

voicemail with a letter to Santiago dated March 8 informing Santiago of 

her appearance as counsel for Moreno. 

1Santiago’s office was in the same building as Moreno’s apartment, which 

Moreno was prohibited from visiting under the terms of his pretrial release. 

Santiago prepared a motion to amend the pretrial release conditions to allow 

Moreno to meet with Santiago in his office. Santiago also arranged with the 

landlord to permit Moreno to retrieve his belongings. 

 
6

Santiago said he “knew the situation wasn’t going to be good” as 

soon as he heard Cole’s voice because he believed she carried a grudge

from a case they litigated ten years earlier. In 2003, Cole was the 

assistant county attorney prosecuting Santiago’s client, Raynaro Pirtle, 

on charges of possession of marijuana. See State v. Pirtle, No. 03–1655, 

2005 WL 67524 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 13, 2005). Santiago and Cole’s 

recollections differ. According to Santiago, at the conclusion of the trial,

he asked the judge to inform the jurors that Santiago may contact them. 

After the judge left the courtroom, Santiago remembers Cole pointing at 

him and saying, “[I]f you bother those jurors, I will prosecute you, too.” 

Santiago said he complained to Cole’s boss, Johnson County Attorney 

Patrick White, about a credible threat of prosecution, and as a result of 

his complaint, Cole received a written reprimand for the incident. By 

contrast, Cole remembered the trial and a conversation with Santiago 

about harassing jurors, but she denied threatening to prosecute Santiago 

and denied any knowledge of a subsequent complaint or reprimand from 

White. White, called by Santiago to testify at the 2014 grievance 

commission hearing, lacked any recollection of reprimanding Cole, and 

no written reprimand of Cole appears in the record. Cole denied she 

carried any grudge against Santiago from the Pirtle case and maintained

she had a cordial relationship with Santiago since that trial. 

Santiago, at Cole’s request, promptly provided her with CDs of 

police interviews, but he was much slower at providing the requested 

accounting. On March 20, Moreno called Santiago to get the accounting. 

Santiago told him he was tied up in a trial, and Moreno agreed the 

accounting could wait until after the trial. Santiago delivered his 

accounting to Moreno on April 10 with a letter stating he had reduced his 

usual hourly rate of $200 to $150 for Moreno and claimed 28.5 hours of 
7

work for a total fee of $4275. Santiago offered to waive the $1775 

balance he claimed Moreno owed him. 

In response, Cole drafted a letter on Moreno’s behalf disputing 

Santiago’s hourly rate and time charges. Cole’s letter, dated May 23, 

argued that Moreno reasonably thought Santiago’s hourly rate was $100

based on his charge in that amount for the initial one-hour consultation. 

Cole also claimed Santiago inflated his bill by including irrelevant 

matters and excessive time charges. Specifically, Cole’s letter alleged 

that Santiago should not have charged Moreno for discussions with the 

landlord that she viewed as unrelated to Moreno’s criminal defense and 

that Santiago overcharged Moreno for drafting his appearance and 

withdrawal and sending investigative materials to Cole. Cole told 

Santiago to hold $1250 in his trust account as disputed funds until the 

matter could be resolved. Cole simultaneously forwarded a copy of her

letter to the Board. Santiago responded to Cole’s letter on May 28 

disputing Cole’s complaints but offering $500 to settle the matter. 

Santiago never placed Moreno’s retainer or the disputed $1250 in his 

trust account.

C. The 2013 Audit. The Client Security Commission again 

audited Santiago in 2013. Auditor Gerald Murphy called Santiago on 

September 6, 2013. Murphy testified the audit was in response to 

Santiago’s answer in his 2013 client security report admitting that he 

had not been reconciling his trust account. According to Murphy’s notes 

of their initial phone call, Santiago made the following statements:

1. Records are not in order

2. Girl left him shortly after the last auditor was there

3. He doesn’t take client money

4. Just isn’t well organized
8

5. Small operator

6. Does everything himself

7. Takes in only small retainers

Murphy forwarded Santiago information on the trust account rules in 

chapter 45 and an article on compliance. 

Murphy visited Santiago’s office on October 14. Santiago admitted 

to Murphy that he had failed to place Moreno’s retainer in the trust 

account but denied failing to deposit any other client’s cash retainers in 

the account. Santiago also admitted he had not provided his criminal 

clients with notice or accounting when he withdrew funds from the trust 

account. Murphy noted Santiago had been making cash withdrawals2

from the trust account and still had no check register, client ledger 

records, or monthly reconciliations. Murphy started a check register for 

him beginning in October of 2011 and completed two months of 

reconciliations, instructing Santiago to update his records up through 

September of 2013 within thirty days. 

Murphy returned to Santiago’s office on November 18 to review 

Santiago’s reconstructed check register and reconciliation documents. 

Murphy reported that “[t]his review revealed that [Santiago] had 

numerous deposits and withdrawals that he could not associate with a 

specific client and that he did not create a separate sub-account ledger 

page for each client.” Murphy prepared a spreadsheet to assist Santiago

and discovered six clients with a negative balance and an overall account 

deficiency of $5257. As Murphy reported, “This is clear evidence that 

2Murphy’s final report documented cash withdrawals from Santiago’s trust 

account in 2012 on March 26, May 18, July 19, September 13, September 27, 

October 15, and October 19. Murphy also documented cash withdrawals on May 10 

and July 1 of 2013. Santiago admitted to another cash withdrawal on January 3 of 

2014. 

 
9

[Santiago] has not been keeping timely records and has not been 

providing the required notices and accountings to his clients.” Murphy 

continued to work with Santiago to address the discrepancy. Santiago 

initially agreed to update Murphy by January 2, 2014, then promised to 

send information by January 22. On January 21, Santiago called 

Murphy to say he had a new bookkeeper who would need more time to 

analyze his records and update his spreadsheets. Santiago sent Murphy 

an updated client ledger spreadsheet on February 11, but it still showed 

a $1000 deficiency. On March 20, Santiago told Murphy he had 

discovered the problem and reduced the deposit amounts for two clients 

so the deficiency no longer existed. On March 24, Santiago asked 

Murphy if he could now withdraw earned funds from the trust account. 

Murphy responded that he could if he provided notice and accounting to 

the client and provided Murphy with a copy of the notice. 

On March 31, Murphy emailed Santiago and asked to meet April 9 

to continue the audit. Murphy requested documentation for the bank 

statements, check registers, and client ledgers between September 2013 

and March 2014. Santiago responded a few minutes later, saying:

[H]ere’s my problem

I stopped adding anything new into my client trust 

acct. until you gave me a clearance from the current review. 

I’ve been keeping records of new clients but not entered into 

the computer. I’ve ask[ed] Elizabeth to wait until I can get 

this first phase (this is what I am calling it) resolved. Then I 

was going to pick up from Sept 2013 to the present; which I 

postponed until this instant matter is taken care of. 

I can’t even have you come over on the 9th, b/c I need 

to have Elizabeth and I now pick up from Sept. 2013 to the 

present . . . . 

Santiago provided most of the information Murphy requested on 

April 21. Murphy noted Santiago still showed recent cash withdrawals 
10

from the trust account and asked Santiago to provide him a copy of his 

fee agreement with his clients. Santiago responded:

Ninety-five percent of my work is a flat fee 

arrangement. As of this writing I do not have a Contract for 

me and my clients. This has not been a problem. But I will 

prepare a Flat Fee arrangement for my clients. Further, I am 

improving on my notices and accountings of the clients’

ledgers and letters which have more details. 

Murphy noted in his report that as of April of 2014 he believed Santiago 

had achieved good trust account records as far as reconciliation with no 

outstanding deficiencies. Murphy testified at the hearing that he spent 

at least forty hours auditing Santiago and assisting him in bringing

records up to date. He also testified Santiago was cooperative, honest, 

and forthright with him, and he saw no evidence of misappropriation. 

D. The Disciplinary Proceedings. The Board received Cole’s 

complaint on May 24, 2013, and wrote Santiago on June 13 with several 

inquiries. Santiago responded by letter dated July 9. He admitted his 

failure to deposit the Moreno retainer in his trust account, asserted he 

had earned more than the retainer, and denied he charged an 

unreasonable fee. The Board filed its complaint on May 29, 2014, 

alleging that Santiago violated Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct 

32:1.5(a), 32:1.15, and 32:8.4(c), as well as Iowa Court Rules 45.1, 

45.2(2), 45.2(3), and 45.7. On July 14, Santiago filed his answer, 

admitting that he failed to give notice and accounting to his criminal 

defense clients when making withdrawals and failed to deposit the 

Moreno retainer in his trust account. In the same answer, Santiago 

asserted he kept adequate trust records “proportional to his office,” while 

admitting he kept no check register or client ledgers. On September 3, 

Santiago admitted in his answers to the Board’s request for admissions 

that his reconciliation had not complied with the rules and that he 
11

withdrew earned retainers from the trust account without the required 

notice and accounting. Santiago continued to deny that he overbilled 

Moreno or falsified his time representing Moreno.

The commission held an evidentiary hearing on October 27. On 

December 30, the commission released its “Findings of Fact, Conclusions 

of Law, and Recommendations.” The commission found Santiago had 

violated rules 32:1.5 and 32:1.15 by representing his clients with no 

clear fee agreement and failing to put client funds in a trust account. 

The commission also found Santiago’s failure to deposit funds in his 

trust account, provide contemporaneous accountings upon withdrawal, 

and keep adequate records violated client trust account rules 45.1, 

45.2(3), 45.7(3), and 45.7(4). However, the commission found that the 

Board had not met its burden to prove Santiago had acted dishonestly in 

violation of rule 32:8.4(c) or charged Moreno an unreasonable fee. 

Santiago appealed the commission’s findings and conclusions. 

II. Scope of Review. 

Our review of attorney disciplinary proceedings is de novo. Iowa 

Ct. R. 35.11(1). We give the commission’s findings and recommendations 

“respectful consideration, but we are not bound by them.” Iowa Supreme 

Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Ricklefs, 844 N.W.2d 689, 696 (Iowa 2014). 

The Board must prove an attorney’s misconduct by a convincing 

preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 697. “This burden requires a 

greater showing than the preponderance of the evidence standard, but is 

less demanding than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Iowa Supreme 

Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Kersenbrock, 821 N.W.2d 415, 418–19 (Iowa 

2012). If we determine a violation has occurred, we may impose a 

sanction that is greater or lesser than the sanction recommended by the 

commission. Ricklefs, 844 N.W.2d at 697. 
12

III. Ethical Violations. 

Santiago’s answer to the Board’s complaint admitted he failed to 

deposit the Moreno retainer in his trust account, admitted his cash 

withdrawals from his trust account, admitted his failure to provide notice 

and accounting when withdrawing funds from the trust account, and 

admitted his lack of a written fee agreement. “Factual matters admitted 

by an attorney in an answer are deemed established . . . .” Iowa 

Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Nelson, 838 N.W.2d 528, 532 (Iowa 

2013); see also Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Alexander, 727 

N.W.2d 120, 122 (Iowa 2007) (“Admissions may be relied upon to meet 

the evidentiary burden of the Board.”). Nonetheless, we review de novo 

all of the allegations brought by the Board. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y 

Disciplinary Bd. v. Kelsen, 855 N.W.2d 175, 181 (Iowa 2014) (“An 

attorney’s stipulation as to a violation is not binding on us.”). Upon our 

review, we find Santiago violated our trust account rules and failed to 

communicate his hourly rate, but the Board failed to prove he charged 

Moreno an unreasonable fee. 

A. Trust Account Violations.

1. Rule 32:1.15 (Safekeeping Property). Iowa Rule of Professional 

Conduct 32:1.15 states in relevant part:

(a) A lawyer shall hold property of clients . . . separate 

from the lawyer’s own property. Funds shall be kept in a 

separate account. . . . Complete records of such account 

funds and other property shall be kept by the lawyer . . . . 

. . . . 

(c) A lawyer shall deposit into a client trust account 

legal fees and expenses that have been paid in advance, to 

be withdrawn by the lawyer only as fees are earned or 

expenses incurred. 

Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:1.15. The commission determined that 

Santiago violated this rule. Santiago admittedly failed to place the 
13

Moreno retainer in his trust account upon receipt and instead placed the 

cash in a drawer in his office. The failure to deposit cash retainers

potentially facilitates income tax avoidance. It also results in the loss of 

interest income for IOLTA that funds legal aid and other programs that 

assist the indigent. See Iowa Ct. R. 44.1(1) (governing the interest on 

lawyers’ trust account (IOLTA) program); Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & 

Conduct v. Humphrey, 377 N.W.2d 643, 651 & n.20 (Iowa 1985) 

(Reynoldson, C.J., concurring specially) (discussing the creation of the 

IOLTA program). 

Santiago admitted he later deposited part of the retainer directly in 

his personal account and perhaps the rest in his business account. 

Auditor Murphy also testified that Santiago admitted to failing to deposit 

other cash retainers in the trust account. We find Santiago violated rule 

32:1.15(c). We also find Santiago’s record keeping deficient regarding his 

client ledgers and reconciliations. Both McGarvey and Murphy 

discovered Santiago failed to provide notice and accounting and failed to 

reconcile his trust account regularly. Santiago admitted his records were 

incomplete and out of date and acknowledged in his annual client 

security report that his accounts were not reconciled. We find Santiago’s 

failure to keep proper records violated rule 32:1.15(a).3 

2. Rule 45.1 (Requirement for client trust account). Rule 45.1 

requires that “[f]unds a lawyer receives from clients or third persons for 

matters arising out of the practice of law in Iowa shall be deposited in 

one or more identifiable interest-bearing trust accounts located in Iowa.” 

3Santiago attempts to excuse his misconduct by contending he appropriately 

focused on representing Moreno in a fast-moving case and, as a sole practitioner, 

lacked time to deposit Moreno’s retainer. Those arguments are unavailing. All lawyers 

must make the time to comply with trust account requirements. 

 
14

Iowa Ct. R. 45.1. The commission determined that Santiago violated rule

45.1 by failing to deposit Moreno’s retainer in his trust account. We 

agree. 

3. Rule 45.2(3) (Action required upon receiving funds, accounting, 

and records). Rule 45.2(3) sets forth in detail the types of financial 

records lawyers must maintain for client trust accounts and billing. See

Iowa Ct. R. 45.2(3). The commission determined that Santiago violated 

this rule by failing to keep adequate trust account records. The 2011 

and 2013 audits conducted by McGarvey and Murphy demonstrate that 

Santiago failed to keep adequate check registers, client ledgers, and 

reconciliations. While Santiago claimed he personally reviewed his 

records regularly, he admitted his “reconciling is simple, granted not as 

required under the Rules.” We find Santiago violated rule 45.2(3). 

4. Rule 45.7 (Advance fee and expense payments). Rule 45.7(3)

requires a lawyer to “deposit advance fee and expense payments from a 

client into the trust account and . . . withdraw such payments only as 

the fee is earned or the expense is incurred.” Id. r. 45.7(3). For the 

reasons discussed above, we find Santiago’s failure to deposit Moreno’s 

retainer into his trust fund violated rule 45.7. Further, the rule states:

Notification upon withdrawal of fee or expense. A lawyer 

accepting advance fee or expense payments must notify the 

client in writing of the time, amount, and purpose of any 

withdrawal of the fee or expense, together with a complete 

accounting. The attorney must transmit such notice no later 

than the date of the withdrawal. 

Id. r. 45.7(4). “Contemporaneous billing requirements provide 

transparency to help ensure lawyers treat clients honestly and deal fairly 

with clients purchasing legal services. These record-keeping rules are 

essential to upholding public confidence in the justice system.” Iowa 

Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Boles, 808 N.W.2d 431, 441 (Iowa 
15

2012). The commission found Santiago violated this rule. Santiago 

admitted to both auditors and to the Board that he made withdrawals 

from his trust account without notifying clients or providing a timely 

accounting. We likewise find Santiago violated rule 45.7(4). 

B. Other Violations. 

1. Rule 32:1.5 (Fees). The Board alleged Santiago charged Moreno 

an unreasonable fee for the work he performed. “A lawyer shall not 

make an agreement for, charge, or collect an unreasonable fee or an 

unreasonable amount for expenses . . . .” Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 

32:1.5(a). Cole’s letter to the Board disputed both the amount of time 

Santiago spent performing specific tasks on Moreno’s behalf and the 

scope of Santiago’s representation. However, Santiago testified he had 

performed substantial work in preparing Moreno’s case and performed 

the work he did with Moreno’s landlord, employer, and military contacts 

at Moreno’s request.

The commission found the Board failed to meet its burden to show 

Santiago charged an unreasonable fee. The commission necessarily 

found Santiago’s testimony credible as to his time charges. We give 

deference to the commission’s credibility determinations because the 

commissioners hear live testimony and personally observe the demeanor 

of the respondent and the witnesses. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary 

Bd. v. Clarity, 838 N.W.2d 648, 659 (Iowa 2013). Further, the hourly 

rate Santiago charged Moreno is reasonable given Santiago’s experience 

in handling criminal matters. On our de novo review, we decline to find 

Santiago charged Moreno an unreasonable fee. 

However, Moreno’s confusion about Santiago’s hourly rate helps 

establish that Santiago violated rule 32:1.5(b), which provides:
16

(b) The scope of the representation and the basis or 

rate of the fee and expenses for which the client will be 

responsible shall be communicated to the client, preferably 

in writing, before or within a reasonable time after 

commencing the representation, except when the lawyer will 

charge a regularly represented client on the same basis or 

rate. Any changes in the basis or rate of the fee or expenses 

shall also be communicated to the client. 

Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:1.5(b). Santiago admitted he had no written 

fee agreement with Moreno and that he does not use written fee 

agreements for the majority of his criminal defense work, saying, “This 

has not been a problem.” Although rule 32:1.5(b) stops short of requiring

a written fee agreement, the rule plainly requires that an attorney 

communicate to a client the scope of the representation and basis or rate 

of the fee. Cole testified she understood Santiago never discussed his 

hourly rate with Moreno. Santiago, present for Cole’s testimony, offered 

no rebuttal on that point. If he had in fact orally informed Moreno of his 

hourly rate, we would expect him to so testify. He did not. A written fee 

agreement would have avoided the dispute that arose over Santiago’s 

hourly rate. The commission found Santiago violated rule 32:1.5. We 

agree that Santiago failed to communicate in a timely fashion his hourly 

rate to Moreno and therefore violated rule 32:1.5(b). 

2. Rule 32:8.4 (Dishonesty). Finally, the Board charged Santiago 

with violating rule 32:8.4(c), which prohibits a lawyer from “engag[ing] in 

conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.” Id.

r. 32:8.4(c). The Board argued that Santiago was motivated to 

exaggerate his time spent on Moreno’s representation because he had 

never deposited the funds and needed the money. Santiago, while

generally admitting his trust account violations, consistently denied he 

overcharged Moreno and insisted that he fully earned the retainer 

Moreno paid him. Both auditors testified Santiago was forthright and 
17

honest in his communications with them. The commission found that 

Santiago did not engage in dishonesty in his billing practices. Again, we 

defer to the commission’s assessment of Santiago’s credibility. Clarity, 

838 N.W.2d at 659. We find the Board failed to prove by a convincing 

preponderance of the evidence that Santiago violated rule 32:8.4(c). 

IV. Sanction. 

Having determined that Santiago violated rules 32:1.5(b), 

32:1.15(a) and (c), 45.1, 45.2(3), and 45.7(3) and (4), we must decide the

appropriate sanction. 

“ ‘Attorney disciplinary proceedings are not designed to 

punish, but rather to determine the fitness of an officer of 

[the] court to continue in that capacity, to insulate the 

courts and the public from those persons unfit to practice 

law, to protect the integrity of and the public confidence in 

our system of justice, and to deter other lawyers from 

engaging in similar acts or practices.’ ” 

Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Howe, 706 N.W.2d 360, 378 

(Iowa 2005) (alteration in original) (quoting Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & 

Conduct v. Vesole, 400 N.W.2d 591, 593 (Iowa 1987)). In determining the 

appropriate sanction, 

“we consider the nature and extent of the respondent’s

ethical infractions, his fitness to continue practicing law, our 

obligation to protect the public from further harm by the 

respondent, the need to deter other attorneys from engaging 

in similar misconduct, our desire to maintain the reputation 

of the bar as a whole, and any aggravating or mitigating 

circumstances.” 

Id. (quoting Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Kallsen,

670 N.W.2d 161, 164 (Iowa 2003)). “There is no standard sanction for 

particular types of misconduct.” Clarity, 838 N.W.2d at 660. While prior

cases may be instructive, “ ‘we determine the appropriate sanctions in 

light of the unique circumstances of the case before us.’ ” Id. (quoting 
18

Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Rhinehart, 827 N.W.2d 169, 

182 (Iowa 2013)). 

The commission recommends that we suspend Santiago’s law 

license for at least sixty days. We give the commission’s recommendation 

respectful consideration. See Ricklefs, 844 N.W.2d at 696. The Board 

recommends a suspension of ninety days to avoid automatic 

reinstatement, but acknowledges our applicable cases support a 

suspension of thirty to sixty days as well. Santiago asks for a private or 

public reprimand, arguing that his faulty bookkeeping caused no harm 

to clients and that the Board failed to prove misappropriation or more 

serious wrongdoing. We agree that no client harm was proven, which is 

a mitigating factor, but the poor state of his record keeping made it 

difficult for the auditors to trace funds to confirm lack of harm to clients. 

In Kersenbrock, we noted “the persistent failure to keep appropriate 

records has the effect of preventing effective review of Kersenbrock’s 

accounting practices.” 821 N.W.2d at 422. That observation applies to 

Santiago’s practice.

The commission correctly identified as a mitigating factor that 

Santiago primarily represents clients in a non-English speaking, 

underserved Hispanic community. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y 

Disciplinary Bd. v. Mendez, 855 N.W.2d 156, 173 (Iowa 2014) (noting in 

mitigation that Mendez “serves a vulnerable population, many of whom 

do not speak English and are unfamiliar with the American legal 

system”). Santiago cooperated with the auditors, the commission, and 

the Board and admitted his trust account violations. This too is a 

mitigating factor. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Eslick, 

859 N.W.2d 198, 202 (Iowa 2015) (stating “remorse and cooperation 

generally mitigate our sanction”); Mendez, 855 N.W.2d at 173 (stating 
19

cooperation is generally considered a mitigating factor). Finally, Santiago 

has no prior disciplinary history, another mitigating factor. See 

Kersenbrock, 821 N.W.2d at 422. 

Santiago argues Cole was motivated by petty revenge to file her 

complaint with the Board and that we should consider her motivation as 

a mitigating factor. His argument fails factually and legally. Factually, 

we do not find Cole bears a grudge from the events of the Pirtle trial ten 

years prior or that she filed the ethics complaint to settle a score with 

Santiago.

Legally, Cole’s motivation for filing the ethics complaint is 

irrelevant to the sanction we impose. Santiago relies on a recent decision 

for the proposition that “personal issues” can be a mitigating factor. See 

Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Dolezal, 841 N.W.2d 114, 129 

(Iowa 2013) (“Personal issues, such as depression, can be a mitigating 

factor, but they ‘do not excuse a lawyer’s misconduct.’ ” (quoting Iowa 

Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Curtis, 749 N.W.2d 694, 703 (Iowa 

2008))). In context, it is clear that Dolezal was referring to the 

respondent lawyer’s own personal problems such as depression—not the 

alleged animus of the complainant. We have consistently held that the 

motivation of the accuser does not excuse the respondent attorney’s

misconduct or mitigate the sanction. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l 

Ethics & Conduct v. Gallner, 621 N.W.2d 183, 188 (Iowa 2001) (“It is also 

unimportant that [the attorney]’s accusers may have been motivated to 

report his conduct by animosity or ill feelings.”); Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of 

Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Sunleaf, 588 N.W.2d 126, 127 (Iowa 1999) 

(“The commission was also correct in refusing to give consideration to the 

motive of [the attorney]’s former secretary in alerting the board to [the 

attorney]’s misconduct.”); Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Hall, 463 
20

N.W.2d 30, 36 (Iowa 1990) (“The commission also viewed the fact that 

the injured parties were not the complainants as a mitigating factor. We 

do not believe this situation mitigates the severity of respondent’s 

conduct.”).4 We reiterate the principle we stated more than seventy years 

ago: 

That one making an accusation against an attorney may be 

actuated by improper motives is not a bar to the prosecution 

of the charges. Nor is it necessary that charges be preferred

[sic] or prosecuted by a person who claims injury from the 

alleged wrongdoings. Such proceedings are matters of public 

interest. The basis for judgment of the court is the proof or 

failure of proof of the charges and not the identity or motives 

of the accuser. 

In re Boyer, 231 Iowa 597, 600, 1 N.W.2d 707, 709 (1942).5 Accordingly, 

the commission correctly determined that Cole’s motivation was not a 

mitigating factor. 

We turn next to the aggravating factors. The commission aptly 

observed: 

Santiago’s failure to learn from his [2011] audit is an 

aggravating factor even though he did not receive any 

4The complainant’s motivation or animus may be relevant to the credibility of his 

or her testimony in determining whether misconduct occurred. See, e.g., In re Krull, 

860 N.W.2d 38, 44 n.2 (Iowa 2015) (“We skeptically view motions to disqualify counsel 

filed by a litigation adversary.”); Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Ouderkirk, 

845 N.W.2d 31, 40 (Iowa 2014) (“[W]e approach with caution ethics complaints initiated 

by a litigation adversary.”). In this case, Santiago himself admitted violating the trust 

account rules, and our findings as to those rule violations do not rest on Cole’s 

credibility. 

5Indeed, a duty to report violations of our disciplinary rules may exist regardless 

of the reporting attorney’s motivations. See Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:8.3(a) (“A lawyer 

who knows that another lawyer has committed a violation of the Iowa Rules of 

Professional Conduct shall inform the appropriate professional authority.”); see also 16 

Gregory C. Sisk & Mark S. Cady, Iowa Practice Series: Lawyer and Judicial Ethics

§ 12:3(c), at 1047 (2015 ed.) (discussing confidentiality as an exception to the duty to 

report). Cole testified that Moreno waived privilege for purposes of reporting Santiago. 

We express no opinion whether Cole had sufficient knowledge of Santiago’s conduct to 

trigger a mandatory reporting obligation. 

 
21

suspension and had corrected those issues. In addition, the 

Division finds that the respondent was admitted to [the] 

practice of law in 1995 and has substantial experience which 

is an aggravating factor and that based upon the amount of 

time that he had be[en] serving as an attorney he should 

understand the rules regarding the Trust Accounts and the 

necessity of keeping good records in order to adequately 

protect the interest of his clients. 

We agree that Santiago’s experience and his failure to comply with trust 

account requirements despite the lessons he should have learned from 

his 2011 audit are aggravating factors. 

We have imposed a range of sanctions for trust account violations:

When dealing with client trust account violations, our 

sanctions have ranged from a public reprimand when the 

violation was relatively minor and isolated, to license 

suspension when the violation involved poor office 

management and neglect, to license revocation when the 

violation amounted to a misappropriation of client funds. 

Based upon the record in this case, we are not faced with a 

single incident, nor are we dealing with a case of 

misappropriation. Therefore, the suspension cases are most 

helpful in determining the ultimate sanction to impose in 

this case. Cases involving suspension for client trust 

account violations range from two months in less serious 

cases, to eighteen months in very severe cases when the 

violations combine with multiple instances of neglect and 

other ethical violations. 

Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Parrish, 801 N.W.2d 580, 588–

90 (Iowa 2011) (citations omitted) (imposing a sixty-day suspension).

This case does not involve misappropriation or harm to a client. 

Nevertheless, suspension is warranted given Santiago’s postaudit 

continuing disregard for the trust account rules scrupulously followed by 

other Iowa practitioners. A mere reprimand on this record would weaken 

the deterrence so important to motivating compliance with our rules that 

protect the public and maintain confidence in our legal system. 

In Ricklefs, an attorney committed a series of additional trust 

account violations after a prior audit revealed the problems and he was 
22

given the opportunity to resolve them. Ricklefs, 844 N.W.2d at 692–93. 

Like Santiago, Ricklefs failed to keep a ledger or check register and did 

not reconcile his trust account monthly. Id. Unlike Santiago, Ricklefs 

commingled client funds with his own and was dishonest on his client 

security commission form. Id. at 695. We found that Ricklefs warranted 

a stiffer sanction because he “was given a second chance after the [first] 

audit but did not mend his ways.” Id. at 702. We imposed a threemonth suspension. Id. In another recent disciplinary case, we imposed 

a six-month suspension for trust account violations based in part on the 

fact the attorney had been audited previously:

The record overwhelmingly documents Morris’s failure to 

comply with these clearly prescribed record-keeping and 

account-management requirements. His noncompliance 

persisted even after the auditors supplied him with an 

informational roadmap in May 2010. 

Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Morris, 847 N.W.2d 428, 435, 

437 (Iowa 2014). Santiago likewise received an “informational roadmap” 

from his 2011 audit, yet continued to flout our record keeping rules.

Similarly, in Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Powell,

we imposed a three-month disciplinary suspension for the wholesale 

mismanagement of a trust account resulting in a significant shortage

that continued after an audit and required appointment of a trustee. 

830 N.W.2d 355, 356, 360 (Iowa 2013). We expect lawyers to learn from 

their mistakes, and their failure to take to heart lessons learned through 

audits is an aggravating factor. See id. at 356, 359–60.

We have imposed suspensions in other cases involving a pattern of 

trust account violations. See Eslick, 859 N.W.2d at 203–04 (imposing a 

thirty-day suspension for “wholesale neglect of the obligation to maintain 

records” creating a “pattern of rule violations”); Mendez, 855 N.W.2d at 
23

160, 175 (ordering California attorney to cease and desist practicing 

immigration law in Iowa for sixty days, based on trust account and other 

rule violations); Kersenbrock, 821 N.W.2d at 422 (imposing a thirty-day 

suspension for “systemic failure to maintain adequate accounting 

records”); Boles, 808 N.W.2d at 442–43 (imposing a thirty-day 

suspension for trust account and other rule violations, noting in 

mitigation cooperation, corrective measures, and exemplary record of 

volunteer pro bono and community service). 

Considering all of the aggravating and mitigating factors, we 

conclude that Santiago’s misconduct requires more than a reprimand. 

We determine that Santiago’s license should be suspended indefinitely 

with no possibility of reinstatement for thirty days. 

V. Disposition. 

We suspend Santiago’s license to practice law with no possibility of 

reinstatement for thirty days from the filing of this opinion. This 

suspension shall apply to all facets of the practice of law. See Iowa Ct. R. 

35.13(3). Santiago must comply with the notification requirements of 

Iowa Court Rule 35.23. Costs are assessed against Santiago pursuant to 

Iowa Court Rule 35.27(1). Unless the Board objects, Santiago shall be 

automatically reinstated after the thirty-day suspension period on the 

condition that all costs have been paid. Iowa Ct. R. 35.13(2). 

LICENSE SUSPENDED.