Opinion filed August 3, 2017

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals 

__________

Nos. 11-16-00131-CR & 11-16-00132-CR

__________

STEPHANIE RENE VALADEZ STEVENS, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 35th District Court

Brown County, Texas

Trial Court Cause Nos. CR24040 & CR24041

O P I N I O N

The grand jury indicted Appellant for possession with intent to deliver a 

controlled substance, namely methamphetamine in the amount of four grams or more 

but less than 200 grams, in a drug-free zone. The grand jury also indicted her for 

the offense of tampering with or fabricating physical evidence. In each case, 

Appellant waived her right to a jury trial and entered open guilty pleas. The trial 

court found Appellant guilty of both offenses, assessed punishment at confinement

for ten years for the possession offense and at two years for the tampering offense,
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and ordered that the sentences were to run consecutively. In each appeal, Appellant 

challenges the voluntariness of her plea. We affirm.

I. Background Facts

Law enforcement officers executed a search warrant at Appellant’s home after 

receiving a confidential tip from an informant that narcotics were located in 

Appellant’s home and that children in the home might be at risk. As law 

enforcement officers entered the house, Appellant threw more than six grams of 

methamphetamine into a toilet. When law enforcement officers searched 

Appellant’s home, they found approximately forty grams of “methamphetamine

cut,” which is a substance “used to bulk up methamphetamine for distribution.”

During the entry of her guilty pleas, the trial court asked Appellant whether 

she understood the charges leveled against her and the possible punishment that she 

faced. Before the trial court accepted Appellant’s guilty plea in each cause, the trial 

court asked Appellant about her age and education level and her ability to read and 

write the English language. The trial court also asked whether she understood that 

she had waived her right to a jury trial, whether her mental health was impaired, and 

whether she understood that no plea bargain had been arranged in each cause. The 

trial court also explained that it would decide her punishment within the applicable 

range and asked if her plea was made freely and voluntarily. The trial court then

explained to Appellant how the drug-free zone statute would enhance the possession

charge and how her punishment in the possession case could be stacked upon 

punishment in the tampering-with-evidence case. Appellant told the trial court that 

she understood the consequences explained to her and that she wished to freely and 

voluntarily enter an open plea of guilty to each offense.

II. Analysis

Appellant claims in a single issue on appeal in both causes that her open pleas

of guilty were not voluntary. A guilty plea involves a waiver of several 
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constitutional rights. Ex parte Barnaby, 475 S.W.3d 316, 322 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2015) (citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242–43 (1969)) (a guilty plea 

involves, among other things, a waiver of a defendant’s federal constitutional rights 

to be tried by a jury, to confront his accusers, to have a speedy and public trial, and 

to invoke his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination); see Ex parte 

Palmberg, 491 S.W.3d 804, 807 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). Although a defendant has 

an absolute right to a jury trial, he also has a right to waive it. Adams v. United States

ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 275 (1942); see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.

art. 1.13(a) (West Supp. 2016). The defendant must make the waiver in person and 

in writing, in open court, and do so with the consent and approval of both the court 

and the State. CRIM. PROC. art. 1.13(a). In addition, “[f]ederal due process requires 

that ‘[w]aivers of constitutional rights not only must be voluntary but must be 

knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant 

circumstances and likely consequences.’” Davison v. State, 405 S.W.3d 682, 686 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (second alteration in original) (quoting Brady v. United 

States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970)); see Dansby v. State, 448 S.W.3d 441, 451 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2014).

When we consider the voluntariness of a plea, we examine the record as a 

whole. Martinez v. State, 981 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). “The 

crucial issue is whether, under all the facts and circumstances, the plea was truly 

voluntary.” Barnaby, 475 S.W.3d at 323 (quoting Gaither v. State, 479 S.W.2d 50, 

51 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972)); see Salvaggio v. State, No. 11-15-00027-CR, 2017 WL 

922509, at *1 (Tex. App.—Eastland Feb. 28, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op., not 

designated for publication). Pleas are only involuntary when induced by threats, 

misrepresentation, or improper promises. Khamissi v. State, No. 11-10-00020-CR, 

2010 WL 3796225, at *3 (Tex. App.—Eastland Sept. 30, 2010, pet. ref’d) (mem. 

op., not designated for publication) (citing Brady, 397 U.S. at 755). The fact that a 
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trial court duly admonished a defendant about her rights and the consequences of her

guilty plea creates a prima facie showing that the defendant knowingly and 

voluntarily entered the plea. Martinez, 981 S.W.2d at 197.

Appellant asserts that her plea was not voluntary because she was unaware 

that the Court of Criminal Appeals might revise the mens rea element of the drugfree zone enhancement. While her appeal was before this court, the Court of 

Criminal Appeals considered White v. State to decide whether the State must prove 

that the defendant knew that he was in a drug-free zone. 509 S.W.3d 307 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2017). In White, the court held that no such mens rea requirement was

necessary. Id. at 315. An accused need not be aware that, when he possessed an 

illegal drug, he was in a drug-free zone. Id.

In both causes, the trial court properly admonished Appellant as to her rights, 

her understanding of the charges against her, and the consequences of her guilty 

pleas. We note that Appellant does not claim that her guilty pleas were the product 

of any threat, misrepresentation, or any improper promise. The open plea to the 

possession offense is not related in any way to the separate tampering offense for 

which she also entered an open plea. Furthermore, a defendant’s failure to anticipate 

a potential change in the law at the time of her guilty plea does not impugn the truth 

or reliability of that plea. Brady, 397 U.S. at 757. We overrule Appellant’s single 

issue on appeal in each cause.

III. This Court’s Ruling

We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

August 3, 2017 MIKE WILLSON

Publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b). JUSTICE

Panel consists of: Wright, C.J.,

Willson, J., and Bailey, J.