This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 PATRICIA GUNDERSEN and 2 JOHN MONAFO, 3 Petitioners-Appellants, 4

v. NO. 32,851 5 CITY OF ROSWELL MUNICIPAL COURT, 6 Respondent-Appellee, 7 and 8 LARRY LOY, Municipal Court Judge, 9 BELINDA FRANCO, Municipal Court Clerk, 10 LISA FRESQUEZ, Municipal Court Clerk, 11 JOHANNA CANTU, Municipal Court Clerk, 12 Parties In Interest-Appellees. 13 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF CHAVES COUNTY 14 Freddie J. Romero, District Judge 15 Patricia Gundersen 16 John Monafo 17 Roswell, NM 18 Pro Se Appellants 19 Hinkle, Hensley, Shanor & Martin, L.L.P. 202 Richard E. Olson 1 Roswell, NM 2 for Appellees 3 MEMORANDUM OPINION 4 VIGIL, Judge. 5
{1} Plaintiffs appeal the district court’s re fusal to issue a writ of mandamus to the 6 Roswell Municipal Court. We issued a noti ce proposing to affirm the district court. 7 Plaintiffs have responded with a memorandum in opposition, and we have carefully 8 considered the arguments raised in th at memorandum. However, we continue to 9 believe our proposed disposition is correct. Wetherefore affirm for the reasons stated 10 in this opinion and in the notice of proposed disposition. 11
{2} As the parties are aware, the legal issue in this case concerns the meaning of the 12 word “issue” in Rule 8-602(A)(3) NMRA, whic h states that the municipal court judge 13 or clerk “shall issue a subpoena, signed but otherwise in blank, to a party requesting 14 it, who shall fill it in before service.” Plai ntiffs argue that this language requires the 15 Municipal Court to provide the physical s ubpoena form itself to litigants who request 16 issuance of a subpoena. Defendants, on the other hand, contend that litigants such as 17 Plaintiffs must provide the blank form, wh ich will then be signed by the clerk or judge 18 and thereby “issued.” 193 {3} In the notice of proposed disposition we pointed out that th e language of the 1 rule does not clearly answer the question presented in this case, and we discussed 2 alternate sources of meaning for the word “issue,” including the Black’s Law 3 Dictionarydefinition: “[t]o be put forth officially.” Black’s Law Dictionary908 (9th 4 ed. 2009). We also pointed out that in most contexts, courts do not provide litigants 5 with the physical materials that are necessaryto prosecute their case, such as paper on 6 which to prepare pleadings, computers for filing pleadings electronically, or prepared 7 orders that a party wishes to have si gned by a judge. We concluded by proposing to 8 hold that the important aspect of the term “issue” in Rule 8-602(A )(3) is the fact that 9 a municipal court imbues the subpoena form w ith official authority, and that provision 10 of the physical piece of paper making up the subpoena is not contemplated by the rule. 11 We therefore proposed to affirm the district court’s decision. 12
{4} Plaintiffs have raised a number of arguments in response to the proposed 13 summary disposition. Initially, they inquire about the conversion of this case from an 14 application for interlocutory appeal to an appeal from a final order; they ask whether 15 this Court has considered the arguments and authorities presented in the application 16 for interlocutory appeal, as well as the att achments to that application. The answer is 17 that we have reviewed all of the legal discussion and material s contained in the 18 application and attached thereto. 194 {5} Plaintiffs next ask for an opportunity to file an amended docketing statement, 1 or alternatively to have this case placed on the general calendar, or that we review de 2 novo the meaning of the term “issue.” As to the first request, Plaintiffs have not 3 indicated why an amended docketing statement would be necessary or helpful in this 4 case. The application for interlocutory app eal sets out all the necessary facts and 5 clearly raises the quite narrow legal issue th at is at stake in this appeal—the proper 6 construction of Rule 8-602(A)(3). We therefore deny Plaintiffs’ request. As for the 7 request to place this case on th e general calendar, we do not believe this is the type of 8 case that would benefit from full briefing. The legal issue involved—whether litigants 9 in municipal courts can be required to s ubmit blank subpoena forms in order to have 10 a subpoena issued—is not significant to a great number of people. Furthermore, it is 11 not complicated, as it requires a simple j udgment call concerning the meaning of the 12 rule in question. We therefore deem it appropriate to decide this case on the summary 13 calendar. Finally, we agree with Plaintiffs’ request that we make a de novo 14 determination concerning the meaning of Rule 8-602(A)(3) and the term “issue.” 15 Construction of a rule or statute is a le gal question that is addressed de novo by an 16 appellate court, and wehave applied that principle in this case. See Grygorwicz v. 17 Trujillo , 2009-NMSC-009, ¶ 7, 145 N.M. 650, 203 P.3d 865 (stating that a lower 18 court’s interpretation of court rules is reviewed de novo). 195 {6} Plaintiffs next argue that the meaning of the rule should be determined by its 1 context, the rules of grammar, and the co mmon usage of the words used in the rule. 2 We completely agree w ith this statement. See NMSA 1978, § 12-2A-2 (1997). As we 3 pointed out in the notice of proposed di sposition, the word “issue” has a number of 4 common usages. In our notice we focused on a particular usage which has nothing to 5 do with physically transferring a piece of paper, but instead relates to clothing a 6 subpoena with the official authority that is necessary to compel an individual’s 7 attendance at a hearing or trial. We considerthat aspect of “issuance” to be by far the 8 most significant for carrying out the purpos es of a subpoena. Furthermore, we have 9 pointed out the context of the rule, which is part of a system of litigation in which 10 litigants, not the courts, provide their own litigation materials. We therefore believe 11 our construction of Rule 8-602(A)(3) is the correct one. 12
{7} Plaintiffs next engage in argument ba sed on a similar rule as well as the 13 language of Rule 8-602(A)(3), contending our proposed c onstruction of the rule is 14 erroneous. They point to Rule 1-045.1 NMRA, which according to Plaintiffs is the 15 only instance in New Mexico’s various ru les of civil procedure in which a rule 16 explicitly requires parties to submit a form to a court clerk prior to issuance of a 17 subpoena. Rule 1-045.1(B)(1) concerns issuan ce of a foreign subpoena, and states that 18 a party requesting issuance of such a subpoe na “must submit a foreign subpoena to the 196 clerk of the district court where the disc overy is sought to be conducted.” According 1 to Plaintiffs, the absence of a submissi on requirement in Rule 8-602(A)(3) means the 2 Municipal Court cannot require such submi ssion. We do not agree. We note first that 3 Rule 1-045.1’s separation of the party’s act of submission from the court’s act of 4 issuance of the subpoena supports our interp retation of the word “issue” as it is used 5 in the rules of civil procedure in general – that it refers to the clothing of the subpoena 6 with official authority, rather than to both the provision of the physical subpoena form 7 and the imbuement of that form with th e power of the court. We also note that 8 although Rule 8-602(A)(3) does not mandate the submission of a subpoena form to 9 the clerk, it also does not prohibit a court from requiring such submission. It is 10 possible that in certain circumstances, it will be easier and more cost-effective for a 11 municipal court to both provide the form and give it official effect by issuing it. We 12 see no reason that would not be allowed under the rule; however, we do disagree with 13 Plaintiffs’ argument that the rule requires a municipal court to follow that practice. 14
{8} Plaintiffs maintain that our proposed construction of Rule 8-602(A)(3) ignores 15 parts of that rule. We point out, however, that other parts of the rule support our 16 construction. Specifically, the second sentence of the rule, discussing subpoenas duces 17 tecum, states that a “judge or clerk may issue a subpoena duces tecum to a party only 18 if the subpoena duces tecum is completed by the party prior to issuance by the judge 197 or clerk.” Rule 8-602(A)(3). If “issuing” a subpoena duces tecum required the court 1 to both provide the form and sign it, it woul d not be possible for the party to complete 2 the subpoena prior to issuance. Instead, this sentence contemplates that a party will 3 obtain a form for a subpoena duces tecum, co mplete it, and then submit it to the court, 4 which will then issue it. We see no reason why the Supreme Court, in enacting Rule 5 8-602(A)(3), would have used the word “issue” in two different ways in the same rule. 6 We therefore will not construe the rule to require a municipal court to both provide 7 the physical subpoena form to a litigant and, in addition, to do what is necessary to 8 provide that form with official imprimatur. Again, we note that the rule does not 9 preclude a court from doing so; it simply does not require such action. 10
{9} Plaintiffs’ final argument is a global one, emphasizing the authorities they have 11 cited supporting their interpretation of the rule. We agree that persuasive arguments 12 can be made on both sides of this issue. However, given the context of Rule 8- 13 602(A)(3) as well as the textual analysis set out above, we continueto believe that our 14 interpretation of the rule is correct. 15
{10} For the reasons discussed in this Opinion and in our notice of proposed 16 disposition, we affirm the district court’s decision. 17
{11} IT IS SO ORDERED. 18

__________________________________ 198 MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge 1 WE CONCUR: 2

___________________________________ 3 RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Chief Judge 4

___________________________________ 5 J. MILES HANISEE, Judge 6