97-470

 No. 97-470

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

 

 1998 MT 124

 SAM DOBLE, d/b/a DOBLE LOGGING,

 Plaintiff and Appellant,

 v.

 CECIL BERNHARD, BERNHARD BUSINESS TRUST,

 Defendant and Respondent.

 APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Nineteenth Judicial District,

 In and for the County of Lincoln, The Honorable Michael C.

 Prezeau, Judge presiding.

 COUNSEL OF RECORD:

 For Appellant:

 S. Charles Sprinkle; Douglas Law Firm, P.C.;

 Libby, Montana

 For Respondent:

 Thomas R. Bostock; Warden, Christiansen, Johnson & 

 Berg, PLLP; Kalispell, Montana

 Submitted on Briefs: January 8, 1998

 Decided: May 20, 1998

 Filed:

 __________________________________________

 Clerk

Justice Jim Regnier delivered the opinion of the Court.

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¶1. In April 1992, plaintiff and appellant Sam Doble, d/b/a Doble Logging, filed 

an action

in the District Court for the Nineteenth Judicial District in Lincoln County against 

Cecil

Bernhard, Bernhard Business Trust. Doble, a logging contractor, brought suit against

Bernhard alleging breach of a logging contract, and breach of the implied covenant of

good faith and fair dealing. Bernhard subsequently filed a motion for summary 

judgment,

which the District Court granted in an April 14, 1997, order. Doble filed a motion 

to alter

or amend the court's judgment, which the court denied on June 25, 1997. It is from 

the

court's order granting Bernhard's motion for summary judgment, as well as from the

court's order denying Doble's motion to alter or amend, that Doble presently 

appeals. For

the reasons stated below, we reverse. 

¶2. Generally at issue on appeal is whether the District Court erred in granting

Bernhard's motion for summary judgment. More specifically, we find the following

issues dispositive: 

¶3. 1. Did the District Court err in concluding that the logging contract 

entered

into by Doble and Bernhard expired on July 1, 1989? 

¶4. 2. Did the District Court err in concluding the parties had not entered into

an enforceable oral agreement altering the terms of the logging contract? 

¶5. 3. Did the District Court err in concluding that, as a matter of law,

Bernhard had not breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing?

 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶6. On December 31, 1987, Sam Doble, an independent contract logger, entered

into a logging agreement with his uncle, Cecil Bernhard, who owned 480 acres of

timberland located in Lincoln County, Montana. The December 31, 1987, logging

contract set forth the terms pursuant to which Doble was to log portions of 

Bernhard's

property. The contract provided, in pertinent part, as follows:

 LOGGING AGREEMENT

 Agreement made on the 31 day of December, 1987 between Cecil Bernhard

 and Bernhard Business Trust, a Montana Business Trust, organized and

 existing under the laws of the State of Montana, herein referred to as

 "Company" and Sam Doble an individual doing business under the name of

 Doble Logging herein referred to as "contractor."

 

 In consideration of the mutual promises hereinafter stated, company and

 contractor agree as follows:

 

 LOCATION

 Contractor shall log designated timber from the following described real

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 property: said property being described on the attached Exhibit "A" and by

 this reference made a part hereof. Parcels or pieces of these areas are to be

 issued to the contractor for logging as agreed upon between contractor and

 company. Company reserves the right to limit area or volume to approval

 of logging job completed and to performance bond advanced and to time

 contractor will need to complete the job.

 

 TERM OF CONTRACT

 The contract shall extend for a period of eighteen (18) months but

 considerable progress must be made on the contract by 60 days after

 approval by FSLIC as time is of the essence. An extension of six (6)

 months can be obtained at the discretion of company.

 . . . .

 

 STARTING DATE

 Contractor shall begin logging within thirty (30) days from the date of

 approval of FSLIC unless otherwise agreed to by the parties.

 . . . .

 

 MISCELLANEOUS

 . . . .

 4. Time is of the essence of this contract.

 

¶7. According to Doble, the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Company

(FSLIC) approved the contract sometime in the late summer of 1988. Doble spent that

fall completing another logging project, and thus did not begin logging Bernhard's

property until approximately November 15, 1988. Between November 15, 1988 and July

14, 1989, Doble's logging efforts generated a total of roughly $264,800 in gross 

proceeds. 

¶8. In June 1989, Doble learned of yet another logging project available near Big

Sandy, in eastern Montana. In mid-June, Doble met in Kalispell with Bernhard and

Gregory Paskell, Bernhard's attorney. Doble asserts that, during this meeting, he 

told

both Bernhard and Paskell of his interest in pursuing the Big Sandy logging project, 

but

that Bernhard and Paskell urged him to complete Bernhard's project instead. Doble

continued logging on Bernhard's property until July 14, 1989, when Bernhard mailed

Doble a written notice terminating the contract. 

¶9. Doble filed an action in District Court, seeking a preliminary injunction in 

an

attempt to prevent Bernhard from removing him from the project. The District Court

denied Doble's motion for temporary injunctive relief on August 3, 1989, and Doble

subsequently vacated Bernhard's property.

¶10. Doble initiated the present action on April 28, 1992, asserting claims against

Bernhard for breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair 

dealing. 

Roughly two and one-half years later, on November 22, 1994, Bernhard filed a motion 

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to

dismiss for failure to prosecute. Little developed, and on October 30, 1996,

approximately four and one-half years after Doble filed his complaint, Bernhard 

filed a

second motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute. In light of the public policy 

favoring

resolution of disputes on their merits, and in light of Doble's renewed efforts in 

pursuing

his case, the court denied Bernhard's motion to dismiss in a January 29, 1997, 

order. 

¶11. Bernhard filed a motion for summary judgment on March 3, 1997. On April

14, 1997, the District Court entered an order granting Bernhard's motion for summary

judgment. On April 16, 1997, the court supplemented its earlier order, and entered a

document explaining the rationale in support of its decision to grant Bernhard's 

motion

for summary judgment. Doble subsequently filed a motion to alter or amend the 

court's

summary judgment ruling, which the court denied in a June 25, 1997, order. Doble 

filed

a timely notice of appeal on July 2, 1997. 

 DISCUSSION

¶12. This Court's standard of review in appeals from summary judgment rulings is

de novo. Treichel v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1997), 280 Mont. 443, 446, 930

P.2d 661, 663 (citing Motarie v. Northern Montana Joint Refuse Disposal Dist. (1995),

274 Mont. 239, 242, 907 P.2d 154, 156; Mead v. M.S.B., Inc. (1994), 264 Mont. 465,

470, 872 P.2d 782, 785). This Court reviews a summary judgment order entered pursuant

to Rule 56, M.R.Civ.P., based on the same criteria applied by the district court. 

Treichel,

280 Mont. at 446, 930 P.2d at 663 (citing Bruner v. Yellowstone County (1995), 272

Mont. 261, 264, 900 P.2d 901, 903).

¶13. In proving that summary judgment is appropriate:

 The movant must demonstrate that no genuine issues of material fact exist. 

 Once this has been accomplished, the burden then shifts to the non-moving

 party to prove by more than mere denial and speculation that a genuine

 issue does exist. Having determined that genuine issues of material fact do

 not exist, the court must then determine whether the moving party is

 entitled to judgment as a matter of law. [This Court] reviews the legal

 determinations made by the district court as to whether the court erred. 

 

Bruner, 272 Mont. at 264-65, 900 P.2d at 903. 

¶14. Moreover, the "moving party has the burden of showing a complete absence of

any genuine issue as to all facts considered material in light of the substantive 

principles

that entitle the moving party to judgment as a matter of law and all reasonable 

inferences

are to be drawn in favor of the party opposing summary judgment." Kolar v. Bergo

(1996), 280 Mont. 262, 266, 929 P.2d 867, 869.

 ISSUE 1

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¶15. Did the District Court err in concluding that the logging contract entered 

into

by Doble and Bernhard expired on July 1, 1989?

¶16. In granting Bernhard's motion for summary judgment, the District Court

concluded that the contract at issue took effect on December 31, 1987, and extended 

for a

period of eighteen months, terminating on July 1, 1989. The court determined that 

the

terms of the contract were clear and unambiguous on this point, and rejected Doble's

assertion that the contract did not take effect until its approval by the FSLIC.

¶17. On appeal, Doble argues the court erred in concluding the contract expired on

July 1, 1989, instead asserting that the question of when the contract commenced, and

when it expired, constitutes a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary

judgment in Bernhard's favor. Doble asserts that those portions of the logging 

agreement

which govern the contract's term and its starting date are in conflict and, 

therefore,

ambiguous. More specifically, Doble argues that portion of the contract which 

provides

the term of contract "shall extend for a period of eighteen (18) months," conflicts 

with

that portion mandating that the "[c]ontractor shall begin logging within thirty (30) 

days

from the date of approval of FSLIC." Doble argues it was the parties' intent that 

the

contract not take effect until approved by the FSLIC. Doble asserts the FSLIC did 

not

approve the contract until late summer of 1988, and correspondingly argues that the

eighteen-month contract term did not expire until well after the July 1, 1989, date 

relied

upon by the District Court. Doble thus maintains that whether the parties intended 

the

contract to take effect on the date it was signed, or upon approval by the FSLIC, is 

a

question of material fact precluding summary judgment in Bernhard's favor. 

¶18. In contrast, Bernhard argues the terms of the contract were clear, and asserts

the contract took effect when entered by the parties on December 31, 1987, and 

expired

eighteen months later on July 1, 1989. Because the terms of the contract are clear 

on this

point, Bernhard asserts, the parol evidence rule precludes the court from looking 

beyond

the terms of the contract itself for evidence of the parties' intent.

¶19. It is well-settled by this Court that, "[w]here the language of an agreement 

is

clear and unambiguous and, as a result, susceptible to only one interpretation, the 

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duty of

the court is to apply the language as written." Carelli v. Hall (1996), 279 Mont. 

202, 209,

926 P.2d 756, 761 (citing Audit Services, Inc. v. Systad (1992), 252 Mont. 62, 65, 

826

P.2d 549, 551). Whether or not an ambiguity exists is a question of law for the 

court to

decide. Carelli, 279 Mont. at 209, 926 P.2d at 761. Only where an ambiguity exists 

may

the court turn to extrinsic evidence of contemporaneous or prior oral agreements to

determine the intent of the parties. Carelli, 279 Mont. at 209, 926 P.2d at 761; 

Monte

Vista Co. v. Anaconda Co. (1988), 231 Mont. 522, 529, 755 P.2d 1358, 1362. We have

recognized that "[a]n ambiguity exists when the contract taken as a whole in its 

wording

or phraseology is reasonably subject to two different interpretations." Wray v. 

State

Comp. Ins. Fund (1994), 266 Mont. 219, 223, 879 P.2d 725, 727 (quoting Morning Star

Enterprises v. R.H. Grover (1991), 247 Mont. 105, 111, 805 P.2d 553, 557). If the 

terms

of the contract are clear, however, "there is nothing for the courts to interpret or 

construe"

and the court must determine the intent of the parties from the wording of the 

contract

alone. Wray, 266 Mont. at 223, 879 P.2d at 727; Marten v. Community Gas & Oil Co.

(1983), 205 Mont. 394, 398, 668 P.2d 243, 245. 

¶20. That portion of the logging agreement governing its effective term provides

that the contract would "extend for a period of eighteen (18) months." We conclude, 

as

did the District Court, that the foregoing language clearly and unambiguously 

establishes

that the contract took effect when signed by the parties on December 31, 1987, and 

was to

extend for a period of eighteen months. That the agreement required Doble to "begin

logging within thirty (30) days from the date of approval of FSLIC" did not alter the

explicit starting date of the contract term, but simply set forth the time by which 

Doble

was to begin his logging operations. In other words, as the District Court 

reasoned, the

FSLIC's approval of the contract was merely a "condition precedent to the

commencement of logging activity," and did not delay the effective date of the 

contract or

otherwise "extend the term of the contract." Similarly, we conclude that portion of 

the

contract requiring Doble to have made "considerable progress . . . on the contract 

by 60

days after approval by the FSLIC" does not alter the fact that the contract took 

effect

when signed by the parties on December 31, 1987. 

¶21. We thus conclude, as did the District Court, that the contract entered into 

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by the

parties on December 31, 1987, expired pursuant to its own terms on July 1, 1989. 

Based

on the foregoing, we conclude that Doble has failed to demonstrate the presence of a

genuine issue of material fact with respect to the question of when the eighteenmonth

contract term commenced and expired sufficient to withstand Bernhard's motion for

summary judgment. 

 ISSUE 2

¶22. Did the District Court err in concluding the parties had not entered into an

enforceable oral agreement altering the terms of the logging contract? 

¶23. With respect to the modification of written contracts, 28-2-1602, MCA,

specifically provides that "[a] contract in writing may be altered by a contract in 

writing

or by an executed oral agreement, and not otherwise." For an oral agreement, such 

as the

one alleged by Doble in the present case, to effectively alter the terms of a written

contract, that oral agreement must be fully executed "on both sides of the 

agreement." 

Westfork Const. Co. v. Nelcon, Inc. (1994), 265 Mont. 398, 402-03, 877 P.2d 481, 484

(citing Kraft v. Hodson (1992), 254 Mont. 262, 264, 836 P.2d 1234, 1236.) We have

recognized that "[a]n oral agreement modifying a written agreement is executed when 

its

terms have been fully performed." Eagle Watch Investments, Inc. v. Smith (1996), 278

Mont. 187, 194-95, 924 P.2d 257, 261 (quoting Lemley v. Allen (1983), 203 Mont. 37, 

41,

659 P.2d 262, 265). 

¶24. On appeal, Doble argues the District Court erred in concluding there existed

"no enforceable oral modification of the Logging Agreement which would extend the

term of the contract." Doble asserts that, even if the contract as drafted would 

have

expired on July 1, 1989, the parties entered into an oral agreement pursuant to 

which they

effectively altered the date by which the contract would expire. More specifically, 

Doble

asserts that during his meeting with Bernhard and Bernhard's attorney in June 1989, 

both

Bernhard and his attorney "orally agreed to modify the contract in such manner as to

require that [Doble] forsake the Big Sandy job to complete the Bernhard job." Thus, 

as

he did before the District Court, Doble argues he and Bernhard orally modified the 

terms

of the written contract, extending the term of the agreement to permit Doble to 

continue

working with Bernhard until all of Bernhard's timber had been harvested. Doble 

argues

Bernhard then "breached the contract by wrongfully terminating [Doble's] performance"

by way of the July 14, 1989, notice of termination. In light of the foregoing, Doble

asserts there exists a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the parties 

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executed an

oral agreement that altered the terms of the written contract, thereby extending the 

date by

which it would terminate. 

¶25. Bernhard, in contrast, argues there exists neither a written agreement nor an

executed oral agreement which would serve to effectively alter the terms of the 

agreement

as originally written. Bernhard argues "Doble simply alleges that Bernhard and his

attorney insisted that he perform the Logging Agreement as originally written," and 

has

therefore failed to even raise a question of fact as to whether the parties altered 

and

extended the original eighteen-month contract term. Bernhard concedes that "the only

oral agreements that would make any difference to the outcome of this case were if

Bernhard were to have orally agreed to extend the term of the contract," but argues 

Doble

has failed to even allege the existence of an agreement to that effect. Rather, 

Bernhard

argues Doble has himself conceded that the two never discussed extending the 

eighteen-month contract term, and asserts Doble has "not even allege[d] an express 

agreement by

Bernhard to modify the contract, but submits allegations that amount to no more than

vague and unsubstantiated inferences." 

¶26. As noted, Doble argues Bernhard orally agreed to effectively extend the

contract term to permit Doble to "complete the Bernhard job" by removing all 

remaining

harvestable timber. Thus, although Bernhard concludes otherwise, Doble has indeed

alleged the existence of an oral agreement with Bernhard effectively extending the 

term

of the contract. For the purposes of the pending appeal, we must determine whether

Doble has supported this allegation "with substantial and material evidence raising a

genuine issue of material fact." Herron v. Columbus Hospital (Mont. 1997), 943 P.2d

1272, 1274, 54 St. Rep. 840, 841 (citing Clark v. Eagle Systems, Inc. (1996), 279 

Mont.

279, 284, 927 P.2d 995, 998). In evaluating the offered evidence, we will draw all

reasonable inferences in Doble's favor. Herron, 943 P.2d at 1274, 54 St. Rep. at 841

(citing Clark, 279 Mont. at 284, 927 P.2d at 998).

¶27. As reflected by the following deposition testimony, Doble has conceded that he

and Bernhard never specifically discussed extending the eighteen-month contract 

term: 

 Q [Bernhard's attorney]: Did your uncle ever specifically agree to extend

 the term of the contract beyond what's set out in the contract?

 

 A [Doble]: What do you mean "extend the term"?

 Q: The contract provides that a term of 18 months, unless extended. Was

 there ever any discussion regarding an extension of a contract?

 

 A: No.

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¶28. Instead, Doble described the conversation during which he alleges he and

Bernhard agreed to modify the contract so that it would remain in effect until all 

timber

had been harvested from Bernhard's property as follows: 

 Q [Bernhard's attorney]: So the first time that you told them about the Big

 Sandy job would have been in Mr. Paskell's office in June of 1989. Who

 was present at the time that you had this discussion?

 

 A [Doble]: Like Mr. Bernhard said, there was Mr. Paskell, Mr. Bernhard

 and myself in his office. My wife was waiting out in the waiting room. But

 she remembers when we came out and we was finishing up conversation,

 like everybody does, she remembers Paskell said to me that my main

 priority was with Cecil and staying there and getting that debt paid off. 

 You know, if I wanted to sign off the contract completely, I could, but

 otherwise just stick to it and don't look right nor left. Just finish it.

 

 Q: You knew that there was time limit to the contract that you had with

 Cecil, didn't you?

 

 A: Oh, yes. And I knew that I was way ahead of schedule. 

 

 Q: The contract was due to expire 18 months after December --

 

 A: After it had been accepted by FSLIC.

 

¶29. Although Doble conceded that he and Bernhard never specifically discussed

extending the eighteen-month contract term, Doble asserted Bernhard and his attorney

nevertheless led him to believe they would effectively extend the contract until all 

the

trees had been harvested from Bernhard's property: 

 Q: [Bernhard's attorney]: So as I understand what you're saying, it was a

 statement made by Cecil or a statement made by Greg Paskell during the

 course of conversation that you had in Paskell's office in June of 1989 to the

 effect that you were to stay on that -- stay focused on Cecil's project?

 A [Doble]: Right.

 

 Q: And because of that statement, you felt that they were promising -- that

 Cecil was promising you the rest of the job until completion?

 

 A: Cecil and Paskell.

 

 Q: Okay. Anything other than that statement? 

 

 A: They led me to believe that they [were] perfectly happy the way things

 were going, the amount of volume of timber, everything, except they

 wanted more money. You know, up until then everything was rosy, and

 then there was -- then it became a few minor things with the clipper and you

 have got to take more and more of this small timber and stay focused on

 your job right here. 

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¶30. Thus, although Doble concedes that neither he nor Bernhard specifically

discussed extending the eighteen-month contract term, he nevertheless asserts 

Bernhard

and his attorney led him to believe they wished him to work beyond the contract's

pending July 1, 1989, termination date. For example, Doble alleges they asked him to

forego the Big Sandy job and instead complete the Bernhard project, which Doble 

asserts

he interpreted as an invitation to continue logging until all of the harvestable 

timber had

been removed. Moreover, although Doble agrees they never specifically discussed

extending the contract's precise expiration date, he asserts Bernhard and his 

attorney led

him to believe they were happy with the way things were going, and urged him to stay

focused on the Bernhard project. Whether Bernhard and his attorney agreed to permit

Doble to continue logging his property until all harvestable timber had been removed,

thereby agreeing to effectively extend the contract term, is a question of material 

fact

precluding summary judgment in Bernhard's favor.

¶31. Doble additionally argues that the fact that Bernhard sent him a written 

notice,

dated July 14, 1989, terminating the contract means Bernhard himself believed the

contract was still in effect at the time and, therefore, supports his assertion that 

he and

Bernhard had in fact entered an enforceable oral agreement amending the logging

contract. Doble also argues the termination notice's reference to "other oral 

agreements"

amounts to a concession by Bernhard that the written contract was in fact orally 

modified.

¶32. In response, Bernhard maintains he sent the written notice of contract

termination simply to get Doble off of his property, and asserts the reference to 

"other

oral agreements" was to conversations during which he and Doble had specifically

identified the parcels of land Doble was to log. 

¶33. Whether Bernhard sent Doble written notice terminating the contract because

he believed the contract was still in effect pursuant to their alleged oral 

agreement, or

whether he did so merely because he could think of no other way to get Doble off his

land, is a question of fact. Moreover, whether the notice's reference to "other oral

agreements" was intended to refer to their alleged oral agreement to extend the term 

of

the contract, or to conversations during which he and Doble had specifically 

identified the

parcels of land Doble was to log, is an additional question of fact precluding 

summary

judgment in Bernhard's favor. 

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¶34. Based on the foregoing, we conclude there exists a question of fact as to

whether Doble and Bernhard entered into an enforceable oral agreement altering the

terms of the logging contract, and accordingly hold the District Court erred in 

granting

Bernhard's motion for summary judgment on this issue. 

 ISSUE 3

¶35. Did the District Court err in concluding that, as a matter of law, Bernhard 

had

not breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing?

¶36. In granting Bernhard's motion for summary judgment, the District Court

concluded that, "[o]nce the contract between the parties expired on July 1, 1989, 

there

was no contractual relationship between the parties and therefore no breach by 

Bernhard

of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing." As the court noted, Doble alleged 

in his

pretrial order that "[t]he termination by Defendants of [Doble's] logging of the 

timber was

a breach by the Defendants of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 

which,

in turn, constituted a breach by Defendants of the altered contract." The court 

recognized

that, although "a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing does not

necessarily require that there first be a breach of the contract, the covenant does 

require

that there be a contract in existence in the first instance." 

¶37. Because the court concluded the logging contract had expired on July 1, 1989,

it accordingly concluded there was no contract between the parties at the time 

Bernhard

terminated Doble's logging efforts on July 14, 1989. The court thus held that 

"Doble's

cause of action for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing must 

necessarily

fail with the Court's ruling that the term of the contract expired, and there was no 

oral

contract to extend the written contract." 

¶38. In light of our conclusion that the District Court erred in determining Doble

failed to establish a question of fact regarding the presence of an executed oral 

agreement

extending the eighteen-month contract term, we conclude the court erred in granting

summary judgment in Bernhard's favor with respect to Doble's claim for breach of the

implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 

¶39. Based on the foregoing, we reverse the District Court's order granting summary

judgment in Bernhard's favor and remand to the District Court for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

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 /S/ JIM REGNIER 

We Concur:

/S/ J. A. TURNAGE

/S/ WILLIAM E. HUNT, SR.

/S/ KARLA M. GRAY

Justice W. William Leaphart, specially concurring.

¶40. I concur in the Court's reversing the summary judgment under issues number

two and three since there exists a question of fact as to whether the parties 

entered into an

enforceable oral agreement altering the terms of the logging contract. I disagree,

however, with the Court's holding on issue number one; that is, whether there was an

ambiguity as to when the logging contract commenced. 

¶41. Bernhard contended, and the Court agrees, that the contract provided that:

"[t]he contract shall extend for a period of eighteen months . . . " and that this 

language

clearly meant that the term commenced upon signing. Doble, on the other hand, 

focused

on the contract language that "considerable progress must be made on the contract by 

60

days after approval by FSLIC as time is of the essence." As Doble points out, the

contract further provides "Contractor shall begin logging within thirty (30) days 

from the

date of approval of FSLIC unless otherwise agreed to by the parties." Based upon 

these

two provisions which reference FSLIC approval, Doble asserts that there was an

ambiguity as to whether the term commenced upon signing (December 1987) or upon

FSLIC approval (summer of 1988). 

¶42. Whether an ambiguity exists is a question of law for the court to decide. 

Carelli v. Hall (1996), 279 Mont. 202, 209, 926 P.2d 756, 761. The Court holds 

that the

specified term of 18 months "clearly and unambiguously establishes that the contract 

took

effect when signed by the parties on December 31, 1987, and was to extend for a 

period

of eighteen months." I disagree. I find it incongruous to hold, as does the 

Court, that the

contract term commenced some 6 months before Doble received FSLIC approval to begin

logging. When the contract required Doble to begin logging within 30 days of FSLIC

approval, FSLIC approval was the event which would trigger commencement of the 18-

month term. 

¶43. In any event, despite my view that commencement of the term was clearly 

tied to FSLIC approval, the most that can be said of the contract is that it is 

reasonably

subject to two different interpretations. That being the case, an ambiguity exists, 

see

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Wray v. State Comp. Ins. Fund (1994), 266 Mont. 219, 223, 879 P.2d 725, 727, and the

court erred in entering summary judgment. Accordingly, I would reverse on the first 

as

well and the second and third issues. 

 /S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART

Justice Terry N. Trieweiler concurring in part and dissenting in part.

¶44. I concur with the majority's decision to reverse the judgment of the District

Court; however, I disagree with majority's reasons for doing so. Specifically, I 

concur

with the opinion of Justice Leaphart that the contract is at least ambiguous with 

regard to

the date on which the contract commenced. However, I disagree with the majority's

disposition of Issue 2. Doble concedes there was no agreement to extend the term of 

the

contract, and nothing allegedly said by the defendant or his attorney effectively 

modified

the contract so as to extend its date of expiration.

 /S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER

Justice James C. Nelson joins in the foregoing dissenting opinion.

 /S/ JAMES C. NELSON

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