* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### OCT 7 1998 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

MARGIE J. PHELPS,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v. MICHAEL BARBARA, in his official capacity as Judge of the Third Judicial District, Retired, Assigned; CARLA J. STOVALL, in her official capacity as Attorney General; JOHN BORK, in his official capacity as Assistant Attorney General and Assigned Special Prosecutor, Respondents-Appellees. No. 97-3385 (D.C. No. 97-CV-3110) (D. Kan.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before ANDERSON, BARRETT, and EBEL , Circuit Judges.-2-

After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materiallyassist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The c ase is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. Appellant Margie J. Phelps appeals from the distric t court’s order dismissing her petition for writ of habeas corpus p ursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In her petition, Ms. Phelps sought dismissal or rev ersal of a state court finding of criminal contempt. In the alternative, she sought the same relief under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988. The district court dismissed herclaim for habeas relief on the basis that she had failed to satisfy the “in custody” requirement of § 2254. It further dismissed her §§ 1983 and 1988 claims findi ng that they constituted an impermissible collateral attack on her state court conviction. The contempt finding against Ms. Phelps arose out o f her conduct in St. David’s Episcopal Church v. Westboro Baptist Church , No. 94-CV-967, a civil action filed on June 13, 1994 in the Third Ju dicial District Court, Shawnee County, Kansas. St. David’s Episcopal Church (St. David’s) filed the action seeking to prevent members of Westboro Baptist Chur ch (Westboro) from harassing or assaulting members of St. David’s as they entered the church. Ms. Phelps served as attorney for Westboro. Judge Michael Barbara, a retired district court judge and a law professor, was assig ned to hear the case.-3-

On July 21, 1994, Judge Barbara entered a temporaryrestraining order imposing limitations on picketing by Westboro membe rs at St. David’s. On August 14, 1994, Fred W. Phelps, Sr., Ms. Phelps’ f ather, stated on a Topeka radio program known as the “Old School Baptist Hour ” that Judge Barbara had acted immorally and unlawfully in his private life and in a manner which reflected on his fitness to be a law professor. On September 14, 1994, Ms. Phelps filed a motion fo r change of judge in the St. David’s case. During a hearing on this motion on Septembe r 20, 1994, Ms. Phelps presented Judge Barbara with a transcrip t of Mr. Phelps’ statement and had it marked as an exhibit for identification purposes. Judge Barbara reviewed the exhibit, stated that it contained cont emptuous language, and told Ms. Phelps that if she persisted in offering it, sh e might face contempt proceedings. She withdrew the exhibit. Judge Barbara thereafter issued an order directing Ms. Phelps to show cause why she should not be held in contempt. Foll owing a hearing in the contempt proceedings, Judge Barbara found her in di rect criminal contempt. He ordered her to be removed as counsel in the St. David’s case, fined her $500 plus one-half of the cost of proceedings, and prohi bited her from practicing law in the Third Judicial District until the fine was p aid. The Kansas Court of-4-

Appeals upheld the contempt conviction. The Kansas Supreme Court denied Ms. Phelps’ motion for review. Federal courts are empowered to grant habeas corpus relief to persons “in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State cou rt,” where that custody violates the Constitution or laws or treaties of th e United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Although the statute refers to persons “incustody,” a petitioner need not show that she is in actual, physical custody to obtain relief. See Maleng v. Cook , 490 U.S. 488, 491 (1989). It is sufficient to showthat her conviction has made her subject to “severe restraints on [her] individual liberty.” Hensley v. Municipal Court , 411 U.S. 345, 351 (1973). Restraints are severe when they exceed those which the state imposes upon the public generally, see Jones v. Cunningham , 371 U.S. 236, 242-43 (1963), and when they “signi ficantly restrain [the] petitioner’s liberty to do those things whichin this country free men are entitled to do,” id. at 243. Courts have generally held that a person sentenced only to a fine or restitution is not “in custody” within the meaning of the habeas statute. See Barry v. Bergen County Probation Dep’t , 128 F.3d 152, 160 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. denied , 118 S. Ct. 1097 (1998); Edmunds v. Won Bae Chang , 509 F.2d 39, 41-42 (9th Cir. 1975). Ms. Phelps acknowledges these pre cedents, but argues that she faces consequences which exceed those present in th e typical “fine only” case.-5-

She notes that as the result of her contempt convic tion she faces the necessity of paying court costs, that she has been “disbarred” f rom the Third Judicial District of Kansas until the fine has been paid, that she ha s been “disbarred” from serving as attorney for Westboro in the St. David’s case, that she has been required to post a bond, that she has had professional discipli nary proceedings instituted against her, and that she faces disciplinary actionagainst her by her employer, the Kansas Department of Corrections Human Resource s Division. We agree with the district court that even in view of these additional consequences, Ms. Phelps is not “in custody” withinthe meaning of the habeas statute. First, she fails to show that court costs should be treated any differently than a fine. See Sandoval v. Municipal Court , No. 97-2098, 1998 WL 30240, at **1 (10th Cir. Jan. 9, 1998) (holding combination o f fine and court costs did not constitute custody); Wright v. Bailey , 381 F. Supp. 924, 925 (W.D. Va. 1974), aff’d , 544 F.2d 737 (4th Cir. 1976). The restrictions o n her ability to practice law and the risk of disciplinary action against her as an attorney do not constitute custody. See Ginsberg v. Abrams , 702 F.2d 48, 49 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that petitioner’s removal from the bench, loss of licens e to practice law, and disqualification from being licensed as a real estate broker or insurance agent was1 Ms. Phelps cites a number of cases in which courts have held that a habeas

petition was not moot because the petitioner remain ed subject to professional discipline. See, e.g. , Watson v. Block , 102 F.3d 433, 437 n.3 (9th Cir. 1996), rev’d on other grounds , Pounders v. Watson , 117 S. Ct. 2359 (1997); Zal v. Steppe , 968 F.2d 924, 926 (9th Cir. 1992). We do not fin d these cases persuasive here. They concern the question of whether suffici ent collateral consequences remained to present a live controversy after a sent ence of incarceration had been served. Custody and collateral consequences are two separate issues. See Maleng , 490 U.S. at 491-92; see also United States v. Keane , 852 F.2d 199, 202 (7th Cir. 1988) (“Civil disabilities (collateral co nsequences) may prevent a challenge begun during imprisonment from becoming m oot on release, but civil disabilities alone are not ‘custody’ authorizing co llateral litigation.” (citation omitted)). -6- not custody). 1 Potential disciplinary action by her employer, si milarly, does not constitute custody, even though it may “greatly [li mit her] economic mobility.” Id. Finally, Ms. Phelps does not contest the appellee s’ contention that the bond which she posted was a supersedeas bond for purpose s of taking appeal, rather than a bond to secure her release from incarceratio n. The cases she cites in which prisoners released on bond have been considered “incustody” for habeas purposes are therefore inapplicable. Considering all of the alleged restrictions in combination, we conclude that the restraint on Ms. Phelps’ liberty is insufficient to constitute custody for purposes of the habeas st atute. The district court acted properly in dismissing her habeas claims. We turn, therefore, to her alternative argument, th at she is entitled to relief on her civil rights claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988. The district court also acted properly in dismissing these claim s.-7-

A federal district court does not have the authority to review final judgments of a state court in judicial proceedings; such review may be had only in the United States Supreme Court. Fe deral district courts do not have jurisdiction over challenges to state-court decisions in particular cases arising out of judici al proceedings even if those challenges allege that the state court’s a ction was unconstitutional. Van Sickle v. Holloway , 791 F.2d 1431, 1436 (10th Cir. 1986) (citations and quotations omitted). Ms. Phelps’ constitutional challenge is “inextricab ly intertwined” with the state court decision. See id. She acknowledges the force of this rule, but argu es that her circumstances place her within one or more purported exceptions to it. We have reviewed her arguments concerning the alleg ed exceptions, and do not find them persuasive. The judgment of the United States District Court fo r the District of Kansas is therefore AFFIRMED.

ENTERED FOR THE COURT PER CURIAM