No. 14749 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1980 

THE STATE OF MONTANA, 

Plaintiff and Respondent, 

VS . 

WILLIAM STUMPF, 

Defendant and Appellant. 

Appeal from: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Yellowstone, 

Honorable Charles Luedke, Judge presiding. 

Counsel of Record: 

For Appellant: 

Joseph P. Hennessey, Billings, Montana 

For Respondent : 

Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana 

Harold Hanser, County Attorney, Billings, Montana 

; . 

Filed: 

Submitted on briefs: October 25, 1979 

Decided : 
Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea delivered the Opinion of the 

Court. 

Defendant William Sturnpf appeals from a judgment of 

the Yellowstone County District Court whereby he was 

sentenced to three years imprisonment for the crime of 

tampering with witnesses (section 45-7-206, MCA). 

Defendant has two basic attacks on the statute itself. 

He claims that the substantive provisions of the statute 

are too broad, and furthermore, that the penalty provision 

does not contain proper guidelines for sentencing. Defendant 

cites no authority and virtually makes no argument to 

support his contention that the substantive provision of the 

statute is too broad, and we are not inclined to do that for 

him. Accordingly, we reject this portion of his argument. 

Section 45-7-206(2), provides that "[a] person convicted 

of tampering with witnesses or informants shall be imprisoned 

in the state prison for any term not to exceed 10 years." 

He claims that the statute itself contains inappropriate 

guidelines for sentencing, and furthermore, that the trial 

court abused its discretion by sentencing him to three years 

in prison. The statute itself does not have to contain the 

sentencing guidelines, and therefore we find no merit to 

this contention. We do find, however, that the failure of 

the trial court to specify the reasons why defendant was 

sentenced to three years in prison, is an abuse of discretion. 

We do not deny the discretion of a trial court to 

sentence a defendant within the limits set by the statute. 

Indeed, it has always been the position of this Court that 

the extent of punishment is vested in the sound discretion 

of the trial court. But here, although the sentence imposed 

was well within the statutory limit of ten years, we are 

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presented with no underlying reasons of why the trial court 

exercised its discretion in sentencing defendant to three 

years in prison. That a trial court has a right to exercise 

its discretion does not mean that a trial court should not 

disclose the reasons underlying a discretionary act. Absent 

these reasons, we as an appellate court, are left to guess 

as to why the trial court made a particular decision. 

In Ballantyne v. Anaconda Co. (1978), 175 Mont. 406, 

574 P.2d 582, set forth the underlying reasons why trial 

courts should set forth in the record the reasons for their 

decisions. Although that case involved the granting of a 

new trial without a specification of reasons, the same 

rationale applies to most of the decisions made by trial 

courts in both civil and criminal cases. 

Although admittedly in a different context, this Court 

recently in the Matter of McFadden (1980), - Mont . I 

605 P.2d 599, 37 St.Rep. 55, determined that a sentencing 

court must articulate its reasons underlying a determination 

that an offender was to be designated as a dangerous offender. 

Although McFadden turned on a statutory requirement, that 

reasoning also applies here. 

In the context of this case, several jurisdictions 

require sentencing courts to state on the record the reasons 

for selecting a particular sentence. Some of these are 

controlled by statutes requiring the sentencing courts to 

disclose its reasons for sentencing (e.g., ~ennsylvania, 

Louisiana, Illinois, Wisconsin, and Oregon). Others require 

it under the criminal procedure rules of the respective 

states (e.g., Pennsylvania, Iowa, and New Jersey). See, 

for example, State v. Ingenito (1979), 169 N.J. Super. 524, 

405 A.2d 418; Com. v. Wareham (Pa. Super. 1978), 393 ~.2d 

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951. We also note that the American Bar Association 

Standards Relating to Appellate Review of Sentences, 

require the sentencing judge to state his reasons for 

selecting the particular sentence imposed. Standard 2,3(c). 

Although a defendant is of course entitled to have a 

sentence reviewed by the Sentence Review Board, there can 

be no question that a statement in the record at the time 

sentence is imposed as to the reasons for the particular 

sentence, can give valuable aid to the Board when it is 

called upon to review the particular sentence involved. 

Otherwise it, too, is forced to guess as to why the particular 

sentence was involved. Undoubtedly, the Board could always 

contact the sentencing judge, but the chances that a faulty 

memory will become a factor in this process are avoided 

when the reasons for the sentence are stated for the record 

at the time of the sentencing. 

We note, furthermore, that this requirement that the 

sentencing court state the specific reasons for imposing 

the particular sentence involved, is consistent with the 

first paragraph of Canon 19, Montana Canons of Judicial 

Ethics, 144 Mont. at XXVI-XXVII: 

"In disposing of controverted cases, a judge 

should indicate the reasons for his action 

in an opinion showing that he has not disregarded or overlooked serious arguments of 

counsel. He thus shows his full understanding 

of the case, avoids the suspicion of arbitrary 

conclusion, promotes confidence in his intellectual 

integrity and may contribute useful precedent to 

the growth of the law." 

We see no reason why a defendant sentenced to prison 

is not also entitled to know precisely why the sentencing 

judge chose the particular sentence involved. It is not 

enough that the sentence be within the statutory maximum. 

If that were the case, the sentence would simply not be an 

abuse of discretion, it would be plainly illegal. While 
illegal action must inevitably be an abuse of discretion, 

an abuse of discretion can occur and still not be tainted 

by illegality. 

For the foregoing reasons the sentence imposed is 

vacated and this cause is remanded to the District Court 

for resentencing consistent with what we have said in this 

&-her than as it ap lies to the defendant 

opinion/ This decision sha !i 1 have prospective ap8lication 

only. -=-. 

. -*- ............................... Justice 

We Concur: . 

p.*.* Justices ------------- 
Mr. Chief Justice Frank I. Haswell dissenting: 

I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. 

The punishment for the crime of which the defendant was 

convicted is a prison term not to exceed 10 years. Section 45-7- 

206, MCA. A sentence of three years imprisonment in the State 

Prison was imposed in this case. The extent of punishment is 

vested in the sound discretion of the sentencing judge. Petition 

of Amor (1963), 143 Mont. 305, 389 P.2d 54. 

The majority hold that the district judge abused his 

discretion because he did not articulate his reasons for imposing 

a three year sentence in the record. This holding flies directly 

in the face of the presumption that the trial court is correct 

and it is the appellant's burden to overcome that presumption. 

State v. Lane (1977), 175 Mont. 225, 573 P.2d 198, 34 St.Rep. 

1588; Petition of Meidinger (1975), 168 Mont. 7, 539 P.2d 1185. 

Whatever the law in other states may be, I find no support 

in the laws of Montana for a requirement that the sentencing judge 

specify in the record his reasons for imposing a particular sentence within the limits provided by law. If the majority now seek 

to impose such additional requirement, they should at least give 

advance notice of the fact to the district judges of this state 

and not impose this additional requirement retroactively. See 

Kussler v. Burlington Northern, Inc. (1980), Mont. , 606 

P.2d 520, 37 St.Rep. 240, and authorities cited therein. 

The majority state that their decision shall have prospective application only. Yet they set aside a sentence imposed 

over a year ago because the district judge failed to follow a 

sentencing requirement imposed upon him for the first time today. 

Prospective application? 

The majority find solace in the case of In the Matter of 

McFadden (1980) , Mont. , 605 P.2d 599, 37 St.Rep. 55, decided after the sentencing in this case. Despite certain language 
in that decision that might support a contrary view, I believe 

that McFadden is based on a lack of substantial evidence to 

support a determination that petitioner was a dangerous offender. 

This is a far cry from requiring the sentencing judge to specify 

his reasons for imposing a particular sentence in a given case. 

Chief Justice )