Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-13-00310-CR

Antonio DOMINGUEZ,

Appellant

v.

The STATE of 

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the County Court at Law No. 9, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 391724

Honorable Walden Shelton, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Karen Angelini, Justice

Sitting: Karen Angelini, Justice

Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

Delivered and Filed: August 27, 2014

AFFIRMED

Antonio Dominguez was charged with and convicted of DWI. In this appeal, Dominguez 

argues the trial court erred in denying his pretrial motion to suppress. We affirm. 

BACKGROUND

The only witness to testify at the motion to suppress hearing was San Antonio Police 

Officer Richard Conrad. Officer Conrad testified that on the night in question at about 10:30 p.m., 

he started his shift at roll call. During roll call, he heard on his radio a “be-on-the-lookout” (BOLO) 

for a full-size Ford or Dodge white pickup truck in the Lincoln Court area that was causing a 
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disturbance. Officer Conrad testified, “I heard that there was a disturbance being created. The

individual was trying to pick up people in the area.” Officer Conrad explained a BOLO is 

something that dispatch broadcasts over the radio to advise officers that an incident is occurring. 

According to Officer Conrad, the Lincoln Court apartments are in a very dangerous area–one 

known for gang activity, drugs and prostitution. In his six weeks of patrol there, Officer Conrad 

had handled four to five shootings. According to Officer Conrad, the BOLO stated that the 

individual in the white pickup truck had been seen multiple times.

After roll call, Officer Conrad went to the Lincoln Court area where he saw a group of 

people running down the street. He saw a Hispanic male, later identified as Adam Castro, in front 

of the group running fast. Officer Conrad testified that the people who were on the street appeared 

to be angry, upset, and in distress. Officer Conrad then saw a white four-door pickup truck. It was 

the only vehicle on the road at the time. Castro was yelling something Officer Conrad could not 

hear. Castro then waved Officer Conrad down and pointed at the pickup truck. Castro said, “That’s 

the truck right there that was trying to pick up my nieces.” When Officer Conrad asked Castro 

what the man was doing, Castro replied, “[H]e was trying to take them to go party.” Castro said 

his nieces were ages twelve and sixteen. Officer Conrad then followed the pickup truck. 

Officer Conrad testified that at the time he was following the pickup truck, he was thinking 

that a disturbance was going on because the individual may have attempted to pick up Castro’s 

twelve and sixteen year-old nieces. Officer Conrad further testified that he was not sure what the 

man in the pickup truck was trying to do: “There’s multiple things that were going on–it could 

have been a kidnapping, was he trying to pick up these girls for any kind of sexual conduct, drug 

activity, I wasn’t sure.” Further, Officer Conrad stated, “So I wanted to stop him and talk to him 

and then, you know, figure out what was going on at the time. Because I knew the only thing I had 

for sure was that there was a disturbance going on.” 

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Officer Conrad also testified that when Castro waved him down, Castro gave him the 

license plate number and a description of the driver. And, Officer Conrad testified he made visual 

contact with the pickup truck. Officer Conrad followed the pickup truck into a parking lot and 

pulled in behind it. Officer Conrad testified that when the driver stepped out of the pickup truck, 

he appeared intoxicated. The driver was the defendant, Antonio Dominguez. Officer Conrad 

testified that he believed he had a duty to protect the driver of the pickup truck as well as the crowd 

in the street. According to Officer Conrad, he believed there was a potential for harm. He knew 

there was a disturbance happening, and his immediate involvement was necessary to stop it. 

After hearing Officer Conrad’s testimony and counsels’ arguments, the trial court denied 

the motion to suppress. The trial court signed findings of fact and conclusions of law, which 

included the conclusion that “Officer Conrad articulated facts and reasonable inferences [that] 

support an objective determination of reasonable suspicion.” On appeal, Dominguez contends that 

the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because (1) Castro was not a reliable 

informant, and (2) Officer Conrad did not have sufficient facts to establish reasonable suspicion 

for the detention. 

DISCUSSION

A warrantless detention that amounts to less than a full-blown custodial arrest must be 

justified by a reasonable suspicion. Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). 

An officer conducts a lawful temporary detention when he has reasonable suspicion to believe that 

an individual is violating the law. Id. Reasonable suspicion exists if the officer has specific, 

articulable facts that, when combined with rational inferences from those facts, would lead him to 

reasonably conclude that a particular person actually is, has been, or soon will be engaged in 

criminal activity. Id. This is an objective standard that disregards any subjective intent of the 

officer making the stop and looks solely to whether an objective basis for the stop exists. Id. A 

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reasonable-suspicion determination is made by considering the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 

492-93. The circumstances may seem innocent in isolation, but may combine to reasonably suggest 

the imminence of criminal conduct. Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441 (1980). “[T]he relevant 

inquiry is not whether particular conduct is innocent or criminal, but the degree of suspicion that 

attaches to particular types of non-criminal acts.” Woods v. State, 956 S.W.2d 33, 38 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 1997) (citing United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1989)). In evaluating the totality of 

the circumstances, we use a bifurcated standard of review. Ford, 158 S.W.3d at 493. We give 

almost total deference to the trial court’s determination of historical facts and review de novo the 

trial court’s application of law to facts not turning on credibility and demeanor. Id.

Dominguez argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because Castro 

was not a reliable citizen informant. “A tip by an unnamed informant of undisclosed reliability 

standing alone rarely will establish the requisite level of reasonable suspicion necessary to justify 

an investigative detention.” State v. Fudge, 42 S.W.3d 226, 231 (Tex. App.—Austin 2001, no pet.). 

“There must be some further indicia of reliability, some additional facts from which a police officer 

may reasonably conclude that the tip is reliable and a detention is justified.” Id. Courts have 

explained that “just as there is no per se rule establishing the reliability of a person’s information 

to justify a stop in every instance, likewise there is no per se rule requiring an officer to obtain the 

identity of a person giving information before acting on that information.” Id. at 231. In evaluating 

the reasonableness of the officer’s conduct, a court can consider “both the circumstances in which 

the information was given to the officer and the facts that would justify the officer in acting on the 

information without knowing the person’s identity or obtaining information for tracing him later.” 

Id. Thus, courts have given credence to a citizen informant, not connected with the police, who 

gives a police officer unsolicited information in a face-to-face manner, thereby holding himself to 

account for the accuracy and veracity of his report. See Derichsweiler v. State, 348 S.W.3d 906, 

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914-15 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has explained that such 

information “may be regarded as reliable,” and that “[i]n such a scenario, the only question is 

whether the information that the known citizen-informant provides, viewed through the prism of 

the detaining officer’s particular level of knowledge and experience, objectively supports a 

reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal activity is afoot.” Id. at 915. 

Although Dominguez acknowledges that Castro had a face-to-face encounter with Officer 

Conrad, he nevertheless argues Castro is not a reliable citizen informant because Castro did not 

“state that he witnessed the event.” The fact that Castro did have a face-to-face encounter with 

Officer Conrad and can be held accountable, however, is the reason the officer could regard him 

as reliable. See Arizpe v. State, 308 S.W.3d 89, 93 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2010, no pet.) 

(explaining that courts recognize the heightened reliability of a tip provided by an unidentified 

informant who places himself in a position to be easily identified and held responsible for the 

information he provides). Additionally, Officer Conrad received sufficient information from which 

he could conclude that Castro actually witnessed the reported event. At the time Officer Conrad 

arrived at the scene, he observed Castro chasing and pointing at the white pickup truck. He further 

observed Castro flag him down to report that the driver of the white pickup truck had driven by 

the area and had asked Castro’s nieces, ages twelve and sixteen, to “go party.” Castro was able to 

relate to Officer Conrad the license plate number on the white pickup truck. And, according to 

Officer Conrad, Castro and others who were chasing the white pickup truck were angry and 

agitated. Based on his observations, Officer Conrad could have reasonably believed Castro 

witnessed the events he reported. 

Dominguez further argues that Castro, as a citizen-informant, was required to report a 

specific crime to Officer Conrad in order to be considered reliable. According to Dominguez, the 

report that a man was trying to pick up two girls, ages twelve and sixteen, to “go party” did not 

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amount to an allegation of a specific crime and, therefore, no inference could be drawn about 

criminal activity. Dominguez further argues that no specific crime could be inferred because 

Officer Conrad testified he did not know what was happening. Dominguez emphasizes that Officer 

Conrad testified that it could have been “multiple things”: a kidnapping, a possible pick up for

sexual conduct, or drug activity. However, there is no requirement for a specific penal code offense 

to be identified. Derichsweiler, 348 S.W.3d at 916-17. “Particularly with respect to information 

suggesting that a crime is about to occur, the requirement that there be ‘some indication that the 

unusual activity is related to crime’ does not necessarily mean that the information must lead 

inexorably to the conclusion that a particular and identifiable penal code offense is imminent.” Id.

at 917 (quoting Meeks v. State, 653 S.W.2d 6, 12 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983)) (emphasis in original). 

When considering whether there is reasonable suspicion, it does not matter that the conduct could 

be construed as innocent; “it is enough that the totality of the circumstances, viewed objectively 

and in the aggregate, suggests the realistic possibility of a criminal motive, however amorphous, 

that was about to be acted upon.” Id. Thus, in this case, Castro did not need to identify a specific 

criminal offense to Officer Conrad. And, in considering the totality of the circumstances, the trial 

court could conclude the officer believed there was a realistic possibility of a criminal motive that

was about to be acted upon.

Finally, Dominguez argues that the detention was not justified because Castro’s report of 

events was not corroborated by Officer Conrad. This argument is based, in large part, on 

Dominguez’s contention that Castro could not be considered a reliable informant. We have, 

however, already found that the officer could consider Castro to be a reliable informant. And, 

because Castro was a face-to-face, unsolicited informant, a lesser amount of corroboration is 

required than if Castro had been an anonymous caller. See Martinez v. State, 348 S.W.3d 919, 923 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (explaining that “[a]n inverse relationship exists between the reliability of 

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the informant and the amount of corroborated information required to justify the police intrusion; 

the less reliable the tip, the more information is needed.”). 

“Corroboration by law enforcement of any information related by the informant may 

increase the reliability of the information.” Pipkin v. State, 114 S.W.3d 649, 654 (Tex. App.—Fort 

Worth 2003, no pet.). “Corroboration in this sense does not mean that the officer must personally 

observe the conduct that causes him to reasonably suspect that a crime is being, has been, or is 

about to be committed.” Id. “Rather, corroboration refers to whether the police officer, in light of 

the circumstances, confirms enough facts to reasonably conclude that the information given to him 

is reliable and a temporary detention is justified.” Id. As noted, in addition to hearing Castro’s 

report that a man in a white pickup truck had tried to pick up his underage nieces to “go party,” 

Officer Conrad knew someone driving a white pickup truck was causing a disturbance by trying 

to pick somebody up in a high-crime and dangerous area of town. He also observed a group of 

angry, agitated people, including Castro, chasing the white pickup truck down the street. Officer 

Conrad saw the pickup truck, the only other vehicle on the road, leaving the area. After Castro 

pointed out the pickup truck to Officer Conrad and provided him with the license plate number 

and a description of the driver, Officer Conrad made visual contact with the driver of the pickup 

truck. All of these facts were sufficient corroboration, and Officer Conrad had reasonable suspicion 

to justify the detention. See State v. Kerwick, 393 S.W.3d 270 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (holding 

investigative detention reasonable where officer responded to a report that people were fighting in 

front of a bar; officer saw several people standing outside the bar; a person who owned a damaged 

vehicle at the location pointed at a parked vehicle and stated, “There they are right there,” and as 

the officer approached the vehicle, it began to move). 

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Based on the totality of the circumstances, we conclude the trial court did not err in denying 

Dominguez’s motion to suppress. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Karen Angelini, Justice

Do not publish

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