COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Moon, Judges Willis and Fitzpatrick 

Argued at Alexandria, Virginia 

J. P. 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 1168-96-4 JUDGE JOHANNA L. FITZPATRICK 

 MAY 13, 1997 

CLARENCE CARTER, COMMISSIONER OF THE 

 VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ARLINGTON COUNTY 

Benjamin N. A. Kendrick, Judge 

 Kenneth H. Rosenau (Rosenau & Rosenau, on 

brief), for appellant. 

 Gaye Lynn Taxey, Assistant Attorney General 

(James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General; 

William H. Hurd, Deputy Attorney General; 

Siran S. Faulders, Senior Assistant Attorney 

General, on brief), for appellee. 

 J. P. (appellant) appeals the trial court's decision 

affirming the Department of Social Services' (DSS) determination 

of "founded sexual abuse." On appeal, she contends that the 

trial court erred in: (1) failing to find that her 

constitutional due process rights were violated by the procedures 

used by DSS in the submission of her name to the central registry 

as a "founded" sexual abuser; (2) failing to subpoena additional 

witnesses and documents to reconstruct and supplement the 

administrative record as she requested; (3) preventing appellant 

from raising additional errors not designated in her petition for 

appeal; and (4) finding that the "Juvenile and Domestic Relations 

Courts law" does not conflict with or supersede the Child Abuse 

and Neglect Act. For the following reasons, we affirm the 
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decision of the trial court. 

 BACKGROUND 

 On Saturday, May 8, 1993, the Arlington County Police 

Department received a report that two children had been sexually 

molested by appellant, their thirteen-year-old baby-sitter. 

Arlington Police Officer McLeran responded, interviewed the 

children and their parents, and filed a police report. The 

report included claims that appellant conducted satanic rituals, 

used a "magic" crystal and a "magic" ring, as well as allegations 

of statutory rape, sodomy, and aggravated sexual battery. 

 Detective Kyle, also of the Arlington County Police, 

received the report on May 10, 1993, and referred this 

information to DSS. David Romer (Romer), the DSS social worker 

assigned to the case, conducted the investigation on behalf of 

DSS.1

 On May 11, 1993, as part of the criminal investigation, 

 1There are three steps in the administrative process of 

investigating claims of child abuse: (1) the "initial 

determination," (2) the "local conference," and (3) the appeal 

before the Commissioner. 

 (1) The "initial determination"

 First, after a complaint is filed, a 

representative of the department investigates 

the complaint and makes an initial 

determination of whether there is clear and 

convincing proof of abuse. If a complaint is 

deemed "founded" or "reason to suspect," the 

alleged abuser may appeal the determination 

to the local director of the department. 

 (2) The "local conference"

 In this first appeal proceeding, called 

the "local conference," the local director 

must determine whether the record [shall] be 

amended. Finally, in the last stage of the 
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Detective Kyle contacted appellant's mother (Ms. P.) to arrange 

for an interview with her and appellant. Later that day, 

Detective Kyle left a message with Romer informing him that Ms. 

P. chose to consult with an attorney prior to allowing appellant 

to be interviewed. The record reflects that Romer did not 

contact appellant prior to making the initial disposition because 

he had been informed by Detective Kyle that "there [were] 

criminal proceedings of the charges made at that point and time. 

 The decision had already been made by [appellant's] mom to 

retain an attorney for [appellant], [and] not to meet with Det. 

Kyle."2

 Romer assumed that because appellant's attorney would 

not allow appellant to be interviewed by the police in the 

criminal investigation, neither would the attorney allow her to 

be interviewed by him in the parallel DSS investigation. It is 

appeal process, the alleged abuser may 

request a hearing before the Commissioner. 

 (3) Appeal before the Commissioner (or hearing officer)

 Here the alleged abuser must prove by a 

preponderance of the evidence that the record 

should be amended because it contains 

information which is irrelevant or 

inaccurate. 

See Turner v. Jackson, 14 Va. App. 423, 428 n.4, 417 S.E.2d 881, 

885 n.4 (1992) (citing Protective Services Manual, Vol. VII, Sec. 

III, Chap. A at 56-60). 

 2On May 17, 1993, appellant was criminally charged with two 

counts of aggravated sexual assault. On July 15, 1993, a hearing 

was held in the Arlington County Juvenile and Domestic Relations 

District Court on the criminal charges, and appellant entered an 

Alford plea to one charge of sexual battery. This conviction is 

not at issue in the instant case. 
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undisputed that Romer made no attempt to contact appellant 

directly during his initial investigation, and that the only 

contact he had with appellant was at the "local appeal hearing." 

 On May 20, 1993, Romer mailed a letter to appellant that 

included the following information: 

 On 5-10-93, Child Protective Services 

received a report of alleged child abuse 

and/or neglect regarding the above-named 

child(ren). 

 As a result of that report the following 

allegations are being investigated: sexual 

abuse of children. 

 If you have any questions concerning 

this investigation, please call me at (703) 

358-5100. 

 Romer's initial investigation consisted of a review of the 

police reports of the incidents and the taped interviews with the 

children, their mother, and Detective Kyle. In a letter dated 

June 1, 1993, Romer issued the initial disposition of the 

allegations implicating appellant: 

 Following an investigation of the complaint, 

it has been determined that this case will be 

submitted to the State Central Registry as 

Founded, Level 1: Sexual Molestation, with a 

"high" risk assessment noted. 

 Your name will be registered as the 

abuser with the Commonwealth of Virginia, 

Department of Social Services, Child Abuse 

and Neglect Central Registry, where it will 

remain for eighteen (18) years past the date 

of the above-noted complaint. 

Romer concluded that "[i]ntervention [was] necessary to protect 

these children and other potential victims," and informed 
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appellant of her appeal rights. With this letter, Romer enclosed 

a child protective services pamphlet that explained the 

definitions of abuse and neglect and the appeal process. 

 Following Romer's initial disposition, a local conference 

was held pursuant to appellant's request. The conference took 

place on July 21, 1993 with Barbara Glaser (Glaser), the Chief of 

DSS, presiding. Appellant, her mother, and Romer were present at 

the conference. Appellant was given the opportunity to present 

evidence regarding the allegations and chose to do so. She 

denied committing the alleged sexual abuse, being involved in 

satanic rituals, making any statements referencing Satan, or 

playing any of the "games" with the exception of the "bat game." 

 Ms. P. expressed the concern that perhaps another baby-sitter 

had committed the abuse. 

 By letter dated July 21, 1993, Glaser informed Ms. P. that 

"[d]uring our conference, nothing was said that would lead me to 

alter Mr. Romer's finding of Sexual Molestation by your daughter, 

[appellant], of [the children]. The disposition, therefore, 

remains Founded, Level I: Sexual Molestation." Ms. P., on 

behalf of appellant, appealed Glaser's decision to the 

Commissioner pursuant to Code § 63.1-248.6:1(C). 

 Jody E. Holyst (Holyst), a State Hearing Officer, informed 

Ms. P. by letter of the purpose of the final administrative 

hearing: 

 [You may] appeal information in the record 

which is inaccurate or irrelevant. You may 

also appeal the disposition(s) of the 
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allegation of abuse or neglect. 

* * * * * * * 

 You have the right to present additional 

information and witnesses at the hearing in 

order to support your request for an 

amendment to your record. 

(Emphasis added.) 

 The final administrative appeal before the designated 

hearing officer was conducted on December 10, 1993, was recorded, 

and appellant was represented by counsel. Appellant and her 

mother testified regarding the abuse allegations. Appellant 

denied abusing or touching the children inappropriately or 

engaging in satanic rituals. Appellant argued that the initial 

agency finding dated June 1, 1993 deprived her of her right to 

due process of law, and that the "punishment" under the "Child 

Abuse and Neglect Act" was inconsistent with the "letter and 

intent of the 'Juvenile Justice Act.'" 

 Romer testified, in part, that the children: 

 [R]eported to their parents that [appellant] 

had undressed and fondled [one child] on 

these two different occasions, performed oral 

sodomy, had [him] touch her breast and sat on 

top of [him] and quote "hurt his penis." 

[Appellant] allegedly had [the other child] 

draw a pentagram and circle and told [him] 

this is where to love Satan while she fondled 

his penis. . . . [The children's mother] said 

the boys reported that [appellant] talked of 

Satan's power and that she would kill them 

and their parents if they told anyone what 

happened. 

Romer further testified that, in reaching the initial disposition 

of the allegations, he relied on two interviews, "the first 
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completed by Det. Kyle on the 10th of May and then another joint 

interview with Det. Kyle, myself with the [children] on the 20th 

of May." 

 By letter dated January 31, 1994, Holyst sustained the 

previous disposition and found "that the record contains clear 

and convincing evidence that the abuse occurred and that it was 

committed by the Appellant." (Emphasis added.) Moreover, Holyst 

found that appellant "failed to meet her burden of proving by a 

preponderance of the evidence that information contained in the 

agency record is either irrelevant or inaccurate," thus requiring 

a change in the disposition. Accordingly, Holyst affirmed 

Romer's conclusion of "founded Sexual Abuse Level One" of the two 

children. 

 Appellant filed a notice and petition for appeal in the 

Circuit Court of Arlington County on February 28, 1994 and March 

28, 1994, respectively. Appellant also filed two requests for 

subpoenas duces tecum in order to supplement the DSS 

administrative record.3

 In response, DSS filed a motion to quash 

the subpoenas and a motion to preclude the taking of additional 

evidence. The trial court granted DSS' motion to quash and made 

the following findings: 

 The Court, having reviewed Appellee's 

motion, Appellant's response and the 

 

 3The subpoenas required Romer and Holyst to attend the 

September 20, 1995 hearing, required Holyst to bring her original 

tape of the December 10, 1993 hearing, and required Romer to 

bring all records relating to appellant, including all 

correspondence to her. 
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authorities cited, concludes that Pursuant to 

Va. Code § 9-6.14:15 et seq. and Rule 2A of 

the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia, 

subpoenas may not be issued in an appeal 

under Va. Code § 9-6.14:15 et seq. Moreover, 

the Court's review is confined to the Record 

of Proceedings filed by the Appellee and the 

Court cannot hear new evidence. Therefore, 

Appellant may not call witnesses nor present 

additional evidence at the hearing on the 

merits scheduled for September 20, 1995. 

Further, the Court concludes that pursuant to 

Va. Code § 9-6.14:15 et seq. and Rule 2A of 

the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia, 

the Appellant must designate the errors 

assigned in the Petition for Appeal, and 

having done so, shall be precluded from 

raising additional errors not so designated. 

 The trial court heard the appeal on the merits on September 

20, 1995. By order dated April 18, 1996, the court found that 

appellant had not been denied due process and had failed to meet 

her burden of proof under Code § 9-6.14:17 to demonstrate an 

error of law as described in her petition for appeal. 

Additionally, the court affirmed the DSS' finding of "founded 

sexual abuse." Specifically, the court ruled as follows: 

 [A] remand is not necessary because the 

record is complete and contains a statement 

by David Romer that he did not interview 

[appellant] prior to making the initial 

determination because he was informed that 

[she] would not speak with the police about a 

companion criminal case and he assumed that 

she would not speak with him as well because 

of the risk of self incrimination. 

 . . . [Appellant] had two opportunities 

to appear at the local conference and the 

hearing conducted by the Virginia Department 

of Social Services ("DSS") and that she did 

in fact appear at the local conference and at 

the DSS hearing and was represented by 

counsel; that David Romer's failure to 

contact [appellant] before making the initial 
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determination of "founded sexual abuse" did 

not deny [appellant] due process, but rather 

was a failure to follow procedure which was 

harmless error under Va. Code 9-6.14:17, and 

 . . . appellant has failed to meet her 

burden under Va. Code 9-6.14:17, to 

demonstrate an error of law, as described in 

her petition for appeal, it is hereby 

 . . . ORDERED . . . that the finding of 

"founded sexual abuse" regarding [J. P.] 

. . . in the Virginia Department of Social 

Services is AFFIRMED. . . . 

I. DUE PROCESS 

 Appellant contends that by entering a "founded" disposition 

at the initial determination without first allowing her to 

confront her accusers and defend herself, DSS deprived her of her 

constitutional due process rights. She argues that Romer was 

required to speak with her prior to making his initial evaluation 

of the complaint. Additionally, appellant claims that the danger 

of future disclosure and the possible dissemination of her status 

as a "founded" abuser may have a negative impact on her 

reputation and adult livelihood. 

 "The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution 

provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 

property without due process of law." Jackson v. W., 14 Va. App. 

391, 405, 419 S.E.2d 385, 393 (1992). A due process analysis 

involves a two-part inquiry. First, a deprivation of a liberty 

or property interest must be shown. "Then, '"[o]nce it is 

determined that due process applies, the question remains what 

process is due."'" Id. at 406, 419 S.E.2d at 393-94 (quoting 
- 10 - 

Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)) (citing Klimko v. 

Virginia Employment Comm'n, 216 Va. 750, 754, 222 S.E.2d 559, 

563, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 849 (1976)); see also Turner v. 

Jackson, 14 Va. App. 423, 436, 417 S.E.2d 881, 890 (1992). 

 In a similar case, we determined that the DSS procedure and 

the nature of the agency's determination of "founded" require 

this due process analysis. See Jackson, 14 Va. App. 391, 419 

S.E.2d 385. In that case, we held that "[DSS'] primary purpose 

is to investigate complaints of child abuse and, when necessary, 

provide appropriate services for the child or family. However, 

to perform its function, the department issues a binding 

determination that a party did abuse a child." Id. at 408, 419 

S.E.2d at 395. Thus, we concluded that the purpose of DSS was 

not purely investigative; rather, the purpose may also be 

construed as adjudicative. Accordingly, we held that both parts 

of the due process test must be evaluated. 

A. The Nature of the Process 

 Appellant's first contention, that she was deprived of due 

process because Romer failed to contact her prior to entering the 

initial determination of "founded," is without merit. Nothing in 

Code §§ 63.1-248.6 or 63.1-248.6:1 requires notice or an 

opportunity to be heard prior to the initial determination. 

While it is clearly preferable for an investigating official to 

contact the accused and any interested party, it is not a 

prerequisite to a valid determination. As in the instant case, 
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there may be circumstances where contact is impractical or 

impossible. Rather, appellant is given the right to appeal this 

first determination. 

 A person who is suspected of or is found to 

have committed abuse or neglect may, within 

thirty days of being notified of that 

determination, request the local department 

rendering such determination to amend the 

determination and the local department's 

related records. . . . The local department 

shall hold an informal conference or 

consultation where such person, who may be 

represented by counsel, shall be entitled to 

informally present testimony of witnesses, 

documents, factual data, arguments or other 

submissions of proof to the local department. 

. . . If the local department refuses the 

request for amendment or fails to act within 

forty-five days after receiving such request, 

the person may, within thirty days 

thereafter, petition the Commissioner, who 

shall grant a hearing to determine whether it 

appears, by a preponderance of the evidence, 

that the determination or record contains 

information which is irrelevant or inaccurate 

regarding the commission of abuse or neglect 

by the person who is the subject of the 

determination or record and therefore shall 

be amended. Rather, the Code allows the 

appellant the right to appeal the initial 

determination. 

Code § 63.1-248.6:1(A). 

 In the instant case, Romer was advised by the detective who 

was investigating the related criminal charges that appellant's 

attorney would not allow her to be interviewed. Appellant 

received written notification of the investigation on May 20, 

1993. Although Romer did not contact her directly, neither did 

appellant attempt to contact him after notification. Romer 

advised appellant of the initial disposition by letter dated June 
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1, 1993. Appellant appealed that disposition to the local 

director and then to the Commissioner. Because appellant 

received a timely notice of the initial determination, exercised 

the two opportunities granted by Code § 63.1-248.6:1 to appeal, 

was represented by counsel, and presented evidence at the 

hearings, she was allowed an adequate opportunity to present 

evidence. See Jackson, 14 Va. App. at 412, 419 S.E.2d at 397. 

Accordingly, we hold that appellant was given adequate notice and 

opportunity to be heard. 

B. Future Harm 

 Next, appellant argues that the danger of future disclosure 

and dissemination of her status may impact negatively on her 

adult livelihood as well as on her good name, reputation, honor, 

and integrity. However, appellant points to no actual harm 

caused to her by the DSS procedure nor does she identify any 

specific deprivation of a right protected by the Due Process 

Clause. 

 In the case at bar, appellant contends that she has property 

interests in future employment, her reputation, the right to own 

and operate a nursing home, the right to own, operate, and/or 

work at a child care center, the right to be an adoptive and/or 

foster parent, and that these rights are entitled to protection 

under the Due Process Clause. Thus, appellant argues that 

"[g]iven the imminent, indeed inevitable, likelihood of 

disclosure and dissemination, [she] suffers a stigma and loss of 
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tangible interests of constitutional proportion." 

 In Jackson v. W., W.'s allegations of future deprivation 

closely resembled those of appellant's in the instant case. In 

Jackson, appellant argued that DSS' disposition would expose him 

to criminal prosecution, prevent him from being a foster or 

adoptive parent, prevent him from owning, operating or working in 

a nursing home or child care center, damage his reputation, and 

claimed that the danger of future disclosure would impact his 

career and livelihood negatively. See Jackson, 14 Va. App. at 

409, 419 S.E.2d at 395. However, we held that W. suffered no 

deprivation of any right protected by the Due Process Clause. 

Rather, we found W.'s contentions to be "speculative" at best: 

 "That any of these consequences will result 

is purely conjectural. There is nothing in 

the record to indicate that such will be the 

case . . . . However, even if such collateral 

consequences were to flow from the [agency's] 

investigations, they would not be the result 

of any affirmative determinations made by the 

[agency], and they would not affect the 

legitimacy of the [agency's] investigative 

function." 

Id. at 409, 419 S.E.2d at 395-96 (quoting Hannah v. Larche, 363 

U.S. 420, 443 (1960)). 

 This rationale applies equally to the instant case. 

"Because [appellant] has not identified any actual loss, and 

merely speculates that these adverse consequences could possibly 

result at some later date, [s]he has failed to claim a 

deprivation under the Fourteenth Amendment." Turner, 14 Va. App. 
- 14 - 

at 438, 417 S.E.2d at 891. 

II. THE RECORD ON APPEAL 

 Appellant next argues that the trial court erred in denying 

her the opportunity to reconstruct and to supplement the record 

to be considered at her appeal to the circuit court. She 

contends: (1) that the transcript of the December 10, 1994 

administrative appeal hearing was incomplete and that she should 

have been allowed to reconstruct the "missing portion," and (2) 

because she obtained relevant evidence after the agency 

proceedings were concluded, she should have been allowed to add 

this information to the record. 

 In response to DSS' motion to quash and to preclude the 

taking of evidence before the trial court, appellant argued that 

the transcript required reconstruction because it "[was] replete 

with omissions which were found by the Court Reporter to be 

inaudible," and that the missing evidence included testimony by 

Romer conceding that he did not feel the notice was adequate. 

Additionally, she attempted to supplement the record with new 

testimony of a psychologist indicating that appellant was 

incapable of committing the alleged abuse. Lastly, appellant 

desired to present evidence to challenge the legality of DSS' 

review, including the hearing officer's qualifications. 

 The trial court found, regarding appellant's request to 

supplement and reconstruct the record, that: 

 [P]ursuant to Va. Code § 9-6.14:15 et seq.

and Rule 2A of the Rules of the Supreme Court 

of Virginia, subpoenas may not be issued in 
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an appeal under Va. Code § 9-6.14:15 et seq. 

 Moreover, the Court's review is confined to 

the Record of Proceedings filed by the 

Appellee and the Court cannot hear new 

evidence. 

We agree. The agency decision is reviewable pursuant to Rule 

2A:4 and Code § 9-6.14:17. Rule 2A:4(b) of the Rules of the 

Supreme Court of Virginia provides that: 

 The petition for appeal shall designate the 

regulation or case decision appealed from, 

specify the errors assigned, state the 

reasons why the regulation or case decision 

is deemed to be unlawful and conclude with a 

specific statement of the relief requested. 

(Emphasis added.) Moreover, Code § 9-6.14:17 states, in 

pertinent part, as follows: 

 The burden shall be on the party complaining 

of agency action to designate and demonstrate 

an error of law subject to review by the 

court. . . . When the decision on review is 

[] to be made on [the] agency record, the 

duty of the court with respect to issues of 

fact is limited to ascertaining whether there 

was substantial evidence in the agency record 

upon which the agency as the trier of facts 

could reasonably find them to be as it did. 

 . . . Whether such fact issues are reviewed 

on the agency record or one made in the 

review action,4

 the court shall take due 

account of the presumption of official 

regularity, the experience and specialized 

competence of the agency, and the purposes of 

the basic law under which the agency has 

acted.5

 

 4Because an agency record exists in the instant case, the 

trial court was not required to construct a record in its review. 

 5The Revisers' Note to this section clarifies the court's 

scope of review: 

 The reference to the evidential record 

confines the court to the agency record as to 

the facts where constitutional or statutory 
- 16 - 

(Emphasis added.) See also State Bd. of Health v. Godfrey, 223 

Va. 423, 433, 290 S.E.2d 875, 880 (1982). 

 Further, 

 "[t]he sole determination as to factual 

issues is whether substantial evidence exists 

in the agency record to support the agency's 

decision. The reviewing court may reject the 

agency's findings of fact only if, 

considering the record as a whole, a 

reasonable mind would necessarily come to a 

different conclusion." When reviewing 

factual issues, the court must take into 

account "the presumption of official 

regularity, the experience and specialized 

competence of the agency, and the purposes of 

the basic law under which the agency has 

acted." "In this context, Code § 9-6.14:17 

provisions in effect make the agency the 

trier of fact . . . . In those cases, 

moreover, the court is further limited by the 

next sentence and the last sentence of this 

section. 

 The reference to the agency record, where the 

agency is the trier of the facts, merely puts 

in statutory form the "substantial evidence" 

rule long adhered to by courts in reviewing 

agency action. 

(Emphasis added.) 

 In an earlier case, we explained the rationale underlying 

this code section: 

 The trial court reviews the facts of the case 

as determined by the [agency] because it is 

required to determine as a matter of law 

whether there is substantial evidence to 

support the Commissioner's decision. The 

substantial evidence rule gives stability and 

finality to the fact-finding of the 

administrative agency. 

Roanoke Memorial Hospitals v. Kenley, 3 Va. App. 599, 610, 352 

S.E.2d 525, 531 (1987) (emphasis added). 
- 17 - 

clearly mandates that agency findings of fact 

are to be accorded great deference under the 

substantial evidence standard of review." 

 A case subject to the standard of review 

outlined in Code § 9-6.14:17 [and] . . . the 

factual issues on appeal [therein] are 

controlled solely by the agency record. The 

reviewing court is not free to take 

additional evidence, even at the request of 

one of the parties. Therefore, under the 

VAPA, the circuit court's role in an appeal 

from an agency decision is equivalent to an 

appellate court's role in an appeal from a 

trial court. In this sense, the General 

Assembly has provided that a circuit court 

acts as an appellate tribunal. 

School Board v. Nicely, 12 Va. App. 1051, 1061-62, 408 S.E.2d 

545, 551 (1991) (citations and footnote omitted) (emphasis 

added). Thus, in an agency appeal, the circuit court is not free 

to take additional evidence at the request of one of the parties, 

but is obliged to defer to the trier of fact. See Jackson, 14 

Va. App. at 400-01, 419 S.E.2d at 390; Turner, 14 Va. App. at 

430-31, 417 S.E.2d at 886. 

 In the instant case, substantial evidence supports the 

factual findings of DSS. The record contains the written 

decision of the hearing officer, the transcript of the hearing, 

all documents relied upon by Romer in making the initial 

determination, the notices from DSS to appellant regarding 

appellant's agency appeals, and the certification of authenticity 

of the record. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court 

properly disallowed appellant's addition of evidence not 

presented at the agency level pursuant to Code § 9-6.14:17. 
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III. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION 

 Next, appellant contends that the trial court erred in 

failing to rule that Holyst, the designated hearing officer, was 

unqualified to act and therefore her decision was void. Although 

appellant failed to raise this issue in her petition for appeal 

to the circuit court, she argues that the issue is one of subject 

matter jurisdiction and thus can be raised at any time. We 

disagree. 

 "[O]bjections to subject matter jurisdiction may be raised 

at any time and are not waivable." Owusu v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. 

App. 671, 672, 401 S.E.2d 431, 431 (1991). Additionally, "a 

judgment is void ab initio [] if it 'has been . . . entered by a 

court that did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter or 

the parties.'" Parrish v. Jessee, 250 Va. 514, 521, 464 S.E.2d 

141, 145 (1995) (quoting Rook v. Rook, 233 Va. 92, 95, 353 S.E.2d 

756, 758 (1987)). 

 DSS was required to make a determination of "founded" or 

"unfounded" pursuant to Code § 63.1-248.6, which provides in 

pertinent part as follows: 

 The local department shall be the public 

agency responsible for receiving and 

investigating complaints and reports . . . . 

* * * * * * * 

 (E) The local department shall upon 

receipt of a report or complaint: 

 1. Make immediate investigation; 

 2. When investigation of a complaint 

reveals cause to suspect abuse or neglect, 
- 19 - 

complete a report and transmit it forthwith 

to the central registry; 

* * * * * * * 

 6. Send a follow-up report based on the 

investigation to the central registry within 

fourteen days and at subsequent intervals to 

be determined by Board regulations; 

 7. Determine within forty-five days if 

a report of abuse or neglect is founded or 

unfounded and transmit a report to such 

effect to the central registry and to the 

person who is the subject of the 

investigation. . . . 

Thus, DSS had original jurisdiction to make the determination of 

"founded" in the instant case. Once appellant exhausted her 

administrative appeals under Code § 63.1-248.6:1, she appealed 

the agency's determination to the circuit court. 

 The circuit court unquestionably had appellate jurisdiction 

over this appeal of the agency's determination of "founded" 

pursuant to Code § 63.1-248.6:1(B) ("If aggrieved by the decision 

of the hearing officer, such person may obtain further review of 

the decision in accordance with Article 4 (§ 9-6.14:15 et seq.) 

of the Administrative Process Act.") and Code § 9-6.14:16(A) 

("Any person affected by and claiming the unlawfulness of a case 

decision, . . . shall have a right to the direct review thereof 

by an appropriate and timely court action . . . ."). Both DSS 

and the circuit court properly exercised subject matter 

jurisdiction, and appellant's argument is without merit. 

 Moreover, any possible defect in Holyst's qualifications as 

a DSS hearing officer is procedural in nature. The Virginia 
- 20 - 

Supreme Court has distinguished subject matter jurisdiction from 

other procedural defects as follows: 

 The term jurisdiction embraces several 

concepts including subject matter 

jurisdiction, which is the authority granted 

through constitution or statute to adjudicate 

a class of cases or controversies; . . . and 

"the other conditions of fact must exist 

which are demanded by the unwritten or 

statute law as the prerequisites of the 

authority of the court to proceed to judgment 

or decree." 

 While these elements are necessary to 

enable a court to proceed to a valid 

judgment, there is a significant difference 

between subject matter jurisdiction and the 

other "jurisdictional" elements. Subject 

matter jurisdiction alone cannot be waived or 

conferred on the court by agreement of the 

parties. A defect in subject matter 

jurisdiction cannot be cured by reissuance of 

process, passage of time, or pleading 

amendment. . . . 

 Even more significant, the lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at 

any time in the proceedings, even for the 

first time on appeal by the court sua sponte. 

 In contrast, defects in the other 

["]jurisdictional["] elements will be 

considered waived unless raised in the 

pleadings filed with the trial court and 

properly preserved on appeal. 

 One consequence of the non-waivable 

nature of the requirement of subject matter 

jurisdiction is that attempts are sometimes 

made to mischaracterize other serious 

procedural errors as defects in subject 

matter jurisdiction to gain an opportunity 

for review of matters not otherwise 

preserved. 

Morrison v. Bestler, 239 Va. 166, 169-70, 387 S.E.2d 753, 755-56 

(1990) (citations omitted). "'While the procedural requirements 
- 21 - 

of the statute and the charters in this regard [may be] mandatory 

and compliance with them is necessary, they should not be 

regarded as jurisdictional.'" Id. at 173, 387 S.E.2d at 755-56 

(quoting City of South Norfolk v. Dail, 187 Va. 495, 503, 47 

S.E.2d 405, 408-09 (1948) (discussing notice requirements for 

medical malpractice claims). Failure to comply with the 

procedure at issue in the instant case did not divest either the 

agency or the circuit court of subject matter jurisdiction. 

Accordingly, appellant's failure to raise at the agency level the 

procedural issue of Holyst's competence and her failure to 

designate this argument in her petition for appeal preclude her 

from raising the issue on appeal. 
- 22 - 

 IV. THE JUVENILE AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS COURTS LAW and 

THE CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT ACT 

 Lastly, appellant contends that the "additional punishment" 

of the "possibility that a child will be listed in the registry 

and thus endure a stigma that will outlast their criminal record 

. . . is excessive and conflicts with the Juvenile Justice Act." 

 Thus, she argues, the purpose of Code § 16.1-226 et seq. (the 

juvenile law) conflicts with and supersedes those contained in 

Code § 63.1-248.1 et seq. (the Child Abuse and Neglect Act, or 

the Act). However, we find no such conflict. 

 The General Assembly clearly stated the purpose of the 

juvenile and domestic relations court law as follows: 

 This law shall be construed liberally 

and as remedial in character, and the powers 

hereby conferred are intended to be general 

to effect the beneficial purposes herein set 

forth. It is the intention of this law that 

in all proceedings the welfare of the child 

and the family, the safety of the community 

and the protection of the rights of victims 

are the paramount concerns of the 

Commonwealth . . . . 

* * * * * * * 

 2. To provide judicial procedures 

through which the provisions of this law are 

executed and enforced and in which the 

parties are assured a fair hearing and their 

constitutional and other rights are 

recognized and enforced; 

* * * * * * * 

 4. To protect the community against 

those acts of its citizens, both juveniles 

and adults, which are harmful to others and 

to reduce the incidence of delinquent 

behavior and to hold offenders accountable 

for their behavior. 
- 23 - 

Code § 16.1-227. This language manifests the legislature's 

intent to balance the interests of the juvenile offender with 

those of the community. Thus, the statute provides for a 

juvenile charged with a criminal offense to be, inter alia, tried 

for such offense and to be punished accordingly, as well as 

providing services to the child and family. 

 The statutory mandate of the Child Abuse and Neglect Act is 

markedly different. Code § 63.1-248.1 sets forth the policy of 

the Act as follows: 

 The General Assembly declares that it is the 

policy of this Commonwealth to require 

reports of suspected child abuse and neglect 

for the purpose of identifying children who 

are being abused or neglected, of assuring 

that protective services will be made 

available to an abused or neglected child in 

order to protect such a child and his 

siblings and to prevent further abuse or 

neglect, and of preserving the family life of 

the parents and children, where possible, by 

enhancing parental capacity for adequate 

child care. 

See Jackson v. Marshall, 19 Va. App. 628, 631, 454 S.E.2d 23, 25 

(1995) (quoting Jackson v. W., 14 Va. App. 391, 400, 419 S.E.2d 

385, 390 (1992)). 

 DSS' primary purpose is "to investigate complaints of child 

abuse and, when necessary, provide appropriate services for the 

child or family." Jackson, 14 Va. App. at 408, 419 S.E.2d at 

395. Notably, the purpose of the Act is not one of punishment 

and correction of the alleged abuser. Rather, under this 

statute, the policy of protecting abused children and preventing 
- 24 - 

further abuse of those children is key. Id. at 402, 419 S.E.2d 

at 391. Although appellant interprets her inclusion in the 

registry as punitive, we disagree. Any possible aspect of 

punishment is merely ancillary to the primary purpose the 

registry serves, which is to protect the abused child and the 

community from offenders. 

 Appellant expresses particular concern about the 

confidentiality aspect of the central registry. She correctly 

states that, regarding the confidentiality of the records of 

juvenile offenders, the policy in Virginia is to restrict the use 

of juvenile court records and to "preserv[e] a juvenile 

offender's anonymity as expressed in Virginia's juvenile law." 

Lavinder v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 1003, 1007, 407 S.E.2d 910, 

912 (1991). However, we do not find this policy to be at odds 

with the policy of maintaining the central registry under the 

Child Abuse and Neglect Act. 

 Included in the duty of "maintain[ing] a central registry of 

all cases of child abuse and neglect within the Commonwealth" is 

the requirement "[t]o provide for methods to preserve the 

confidentiality of all records in order to protect the rights of 

the child, his parents or guardians." Code § 63.1-248.7(K) and 

(L) (emphasis added). To further the ends of protecting 

confidentiality, the General Assembly provided that "[t]he 

information contained in the central registry shall not be open 

to inspection by the public." Code § 63.1-248.8. Thus, "no 
- 25 - 

reasonable likelihood exists that this information would become 

available to [the public]." Jackson, 14 Va. App. at 409, 419 

S.E.2d at 396. Because "the statute expressly provides for the 

confidentiality of all records or files compiled during the 

investigation, and the data stored in the Computerized Central 

Registry, . . . information concerning [a defendant's] abusive 

conduct is not generally available to the public." Id. at 

409-10 n.14, 419 S.E.2d at 396 n.14. Accordingly, we do not find 

confidentiality to be an irreconcilable issue between the 

juvenile law and the Act. 

 The administrative proceedings under the Act are not 

criminal in nature and are not intended to punish or rehabilitate 

the abuser. The inclusion of appellant's name in the central 

registry is an administrative remedy to combat the danger 

identified by the General Assembly in the Act. The department 

has no authority to bring additional criminal charges, and "[t]he 

Commissioner cannot find [appellant] guilty of criminal child 

abuse. If [she] is to be found guilty of criminal child abuse, a 

court must make that finding beyond a reasonable doubt." Turner, 

14 Va. App. at 438, 417 S.E.2d at 891. 

 The two statutory enactments are not mutually exclusive. 

Clearly, both statutes may apply to the same juvenile. Although 

the purposes and policies of the statutory enactments may be 

different, they are not disharmonious. The listing of a juvenile 

in the central registry once he or she is found to be an abuser 
- 26 - 

serves the mandated statutory purpose of protecting all children. 

 Accordingly, these two legislative enactments appropriately 

balance the interests of the accused juvenile, the abused 

children, and the community. Confidentiality is reasonably 

maintained under both enactments. We can find no legitimate 

rationale for appellant's contention that the mandates of the 

Child Abuse and Neglect Act are superseded by those outlined in 

the juvenile law. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the 

judgment of the trial court. 

 Affirmed.