No. 13849 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1978 

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF 

ROLLAND C. HEBEL, 

Petitioner and Appellant, 

-vsMARGARET C. HEBEL, 

Respondent and Respondent. 

Appeal from: District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, 

Honorable Frank E. Blair, Judge presiding. 

Counsel of Record: 

For Appellant: 

A. Michael Salvagni arqued, Bozeman, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Berg, Angel, Andriolo and Ilorgan, Bozeman, Montana 

Ben E. Berg argued, Bozeman, Montana 

Submitted: January 31, 1978 

Decided TI r & - 1 $78 
Mr. ~ustice Daniel J. Shea delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

Rolland C. Hebel appeals from an order of the District 

Court, Madison County, awarding his former wife $20,000 as the 

disposition of marital property in a dissolution of marriage action. 

Rolland and Margaret Hebel were married in 1975. The 

marriage lasted approximately 18 months. There was a wide disparity in assets between the parties prior to their marriage. 

The husband's assets then included 97 acres of land in Madison 

County worth between $125,000 and $150,000, 160 head of cattle, 

4 draft horses, 2 vehicles and various pieces of farm machinery. 

The husband was employed at a talc mine in Cameron, Montana, taking 

home approximately $750 per month. 

Before the marriage the wife's assets included a trailer 

house being purchased in monthly installments, one vehicle, a onethird interest in a lot in Pony, Montana, worth approximately $300, 

three lots in New Mexico worth $3,000, a one-third interest in a 

nonproducing mining claim, and approximately $2,300 in a savings 

account. The wife managed the Norris Bar in Norris, Montana, for 

which she received between $400 and $700 per month in wages plus a 

"working interest" in the bar amounting to approximately $4,000 

per year. 

The husband sold all the cattle, one horse, and 20 acres 

of land during the marriage. The wife sold her house trailer, 

spent $1,900 of her savings and gave up her job at the Norris Bar, 

forfeiting her working interest therein, while she was married. 

At the time of the property disposition hearing, the husband had assets of between $100,000 and $125,000 and liabilities 

of approximately $15,000. He was taking home $750 per month in 

wages and reported monthly expenses of $640. The wife's assets 

amounted to approximately $4,000 and she was taking home monthly 

wages of approximately $340. She reported expenses averaging $385 

per month. 
The husband is in good health. The wife suffers from 

a heart condition which interferes with her ability to work and 

will ultimately require surgery. Prior to the marriage the wife 

had group health insurance coverage and during the marriage she 

was covered under her husband's plan. She is currently unable to 

procure health insurance and has medical expenses averaging $50 

per month. The wife's heart condition existed and was known by 

the husband prior to the marriage. 

Following the hearing the District Court entered findings 

of fact, conclusions of law, and a decree awarding the wife a lump 

sum settlement of $20,000, payable within five years of entry of 

the decree with annual interest of 6 percent payable in semi-annual 

installments. To secure the wife's settlement award the District 

Court imposed a lien in her name upon the husband's real property. 

In an opinion accompanying its decree, the District Court 

allocated specific portions of the $20,000 award: (1) $1,900 for 

the wife's investment of that amount of her savings in the marriage; 

(2) $12,000 for the wife's working interest in the Norris Bar which 

she forfeited during the marriage; (3) $4,500 for the wife's contribution as a spouse and a homemaker; and (4) $1,600 for the disparity in age, health, strength and earning capacity. 

The issue on appeal is whether the District Court abused 

its discretion in awarding the $20,000 lump sum settlement payable 

within five years at 6 percent annual interest. 

The husband first contends the settlement award is, in 

effect, a taking of property he acquired prior to the marriage 

and argues the ~istrict Court failed to follow guidelines for the 

disposition of such property set forth in section 48-321, R.C.M. 

1947. 

The District Court did not award any real property to the 

wife and specifically rejected ordering the sale of any such 
property in satisfaction of the settlement. In any event, section 

43-321, R.C.M. 1947, provides that a District Court may equitably 

divide property "however and whenever acquired", and therefore 

the question of title is not controlling. Morse v. Morse, (1977), 

Mont . , 571 P.2d 1147, 34 St.Rep. 1334, 1337. 

As to the apportionment of property "belonging to either 

or both", section 48-321 provides the District Court shall consider: 

" * * * the duration of the marriage, and prior 

marriage of either party * * * the age, health, 

station, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate, 

liabilities, and needs of each of the parties * * * whether the apportionment is in lieu of 

or in addition to maintenance, and the opportunity of each for future acquisition of capital 

assets and income. The court shall also consider 

the contribution or dissipation of value of the 

respective estates, and the contribution of a 

spouse as a homemaker or to the family unit. * * *I1 

As to the disposition of property acquired by one spouse prior to 

the marriage, section 48-321 provides the court shall consider: 

" * * * those contributionsofthe other spouse 

to the marriage, including the nonmonetary contribution of a homemaker; the extent to which 

such contributions have facilitated the maintenance of this property and whether or not the 

property disposition serves as an alternative 

to maintenance arrangements." 

The husband has not shown that the District Court ignored 

the above guidelines in awarding the $20,000 lump sum settlement. 

Although the marriage was not long-lived, the wife did suffer a 

depletion of resources in spending most of her savings and giving 

up her working interest in the Norris Bar during the course of the 

marriage. While she was not a full-time homemaker, the wife did 

abandon full-time employment in an effort to save the marriage. 

Other undisputed testimony established that the wife's physical 

condition precludes strenuous activity, limiting her employability 

and earning capacity. 

As this Court has often stated, a District Court has farreaching discretion in resolving property divisions and its judg- 
ment will not be altered unless a clear abuse of that discretion 

is shown. Cromwell v. Cromwell, (1977), Mont . , 570 P.2d 

1129, 34 St.Rep. 1193, 1194; Zell v. Zell, (1977), Mon t . I 

570 P.2d 33, 34 St.Rep. 1070, 1074. Since the District Court did 

not arbitrarily dispose of the marital property under the circumstances of the present case, its disposition was not an abuse of 

discretion. 

The husband next contends the interest provision of the 

settlement award is in effect a maintenance award, and argues the 

District Court did not follow guidelines set forth in section 48-322, 

R.C.M. 1947, in determining that the wife was entitled to such 

maintenance. 

The wife requested maintenance. The decree, however, does 

not grant it. The decree does give the husband the option of paying 

the settlement upon entry of the decree or at any time up to five 

years thereafter. The interest provision is brought into play only 

in the event the husband chooses to defer payment and only so long 

as such payment is deferred. 

While the District Court determined the wife had met the 

threshold requirements for an award of maintenance found in section 

48-322, R.C.M. 1947, in finding she "lacks sufficient property to 

provide for her reasonable needs and she is unable to support 

herself by appropriate employment", the interest provision here 

cannot be properly characterized as maintenance. There is, therefore, no basis for the husband's claim that the District Court 

abused its discretion in granting the wife interest on any deferred 

payment of the lump sum settlement. The factors supporting the 

settlement award also support the provisional interest award. 

The judgment of the District Court is affirmed. 

---\ 
We Concur: 

- 1 

Chief Justice 

Justice John C. Sheehy did not participate in this case.