## FIL ED SEPT 18, 2009 LEO NARD GREEN, Clerk NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 09a0647n.06 No. 08-3745 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
AARTI HOSPI TAL I TY, L L C, d/b/a Hilto n Gar den I n n ; ARI TI , L L C, d/b/a L aQuinta Inn; BL I SSFUL COR P OR AT I ON , d / b / a C omfort I nn South; CO L UM B US L OD GING ASS OC I AT ES, L P, d /b/ a Holiday I nn Ex press; NATRAJ C ORPORATI ON, d/b / a B e st We ste rn ; F EL I CI A C ORPOR AT I ON , d /b/ a M i c r o t e l ; K

A L I H O S P IT A L IT Y , L T D
. , d / b / a D ays I nn; SGB MANA GE M E NT , I NC
. , d / b / a Hampton Inn, Pla int if fs -A pp e lla nts , v. CI T Y O F G RO V E CI T Y , O H I O ; JO SE PH W. TE STA , F rankl in C ounty Au dit or ; D RU RY I

NN S, I NC.; BOB EVANS F ARMS, I NC., De fe nd ants -A

pp e lle e s. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON A PP E A L F RO M T HE UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STR I CT CO UR T F OR

TH E SO UT HE RN D IS T R IC T O F O H IO

B EF OR E: ME RRI TT , G RI F F I N, and KE TH L ED GE , Ci rc uit

Judg e s. GRI FF I N, Circuit J udg e. Plaintiffs, eig ht hotels in Grove City , Ohio, alleg ed that the city discriminated ag ainst them ba se d o n t h e e t h n i c b a c k g r o u n d o f t h e i r o w n e r s an d d e n i e d t h e m p r o c e d u r a l d u e p r o c e s s w he n it pa sse d a ta x ab a te me nt o rd ina

nc e and a pp ro ve d ce rt a in de sig n fe a tur e s f or the be ne fi t of

pla int if fs ’ business competitors, there by g iving those r ivals unfair business advanta g es. Plaintiffs arg ued that the ordinanc e should be de clar ed void as contra ry to Ohio law under

Ohio’s Dec laratory

J udg mentNo. 08-3745

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of G ro v e City

, O hio , e t al

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- 2 - Ac t , Ohio Revised Code § 2721.03, alleg ed violations of Ohio’s Public Records A ct, Statutory Re c or ds Re te nti on Sc he du le , an d Ope n Mee tin g s Ac t, an d ass e rt e d f e de ra l c la ims un de r 4 2 U .S. C. § 1983 based on the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. The district court enter ed judgme nt on the pleading s in defenda nts’ favor under Rule 12( c) of the F e de ra l Rule s o f C ivi l Pr oc e dure on pla int if fs ’ r e qu e st f

or de c lara tor y re lie f, ru lin g that th e ir alleg ed injury

of “inc rea sed compe tition” was insufficient to con f e r s ta n d in g u p o n th e m u n der O hio’s Dec laratory

J udg ment Act. The district court also g rante d summary judgme nt in Grove City ’s favor on plaintiffs’ fe dera l claims, holding that the city did not discriminate ag ainst them or deny them due pr oc e ss. F ina lly , th e d i s t

r i c t c o u r t de c lin e d to e xer c ise su

pp le me nta l juri sd ic tio n o ve r p la int if fs ’ s ta te law re cords a

nd open mee tings c laims and rema nded them to state c ourt. Be cause we hold that plaintiffs’ state la w alleg ations relatingto their reque st for dec laratory
re lie f f a il t o sat isf

y Oh io’ s stand ing re qu ir e me nts , we a ff ir m th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s dis mis sa l of tho se claims. I n addition, be cause the evidenc e does not de monstrate that Grove C i t y d i scriminated ag ainst plaintiffs or denie d them due proc ess, we a ffirm the district co u rt ’s grant of summary judgme nt in Grove City ’s favor on plaintiffs’ f eder al claims. I. I n 1986, Grove City

passed a n ordi n an ce which cr eate d a community reinve stment area (“CRA”) . Wit hin the CRA, Grove City soug ht to create “ince ntive measure s to a ssist i n encour ag ing

. . . ec o n o m i c and community development . . . by

remode ling or

new c onstruction[.] ” OneNo. 08-3745

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- 3 - “ince ntive” the or dinance cre ated wa s a fi ft ee n -y ear tax ex emption for the c onstruction of
commerc ial and industrial buildings within the CRA. I n 2003, the city expanded the CRA by adding additional acr eag e to the tax abatement a rea . Plaintiff hotels are loc ated within the expanded CRA. Alt h o u gh the hotels conc ede that they can take a d v an t age of

the tax abatements, they complain that in order

to do so, they

must remodel or construct ne w improvements on their alre ady exis ting proper ties. They

contend that this puts them
a t a “ g ro ssl y un fa ir ” c omp e tit ive dis a dv anta g e to ne w bus ine sse s, inc lud ingde fe nd ant D ru ry I nn s, I nc ., and de fe nd ant B ob Ev ans F arm s, I nc ., wh ic h to ok a dv anta g e of

the fi ft e e n- y e ar t a x ab a te me nts to construct a ne w hotel and r estaura nt within the ex panded CRA. Although plaintiffs’ primary complaint conce rns the leg ality of the tax abateme nt ordinance under O hio law, their unde rly ing theory is that the ordinance was pa rt of a pattern by

Grove City

of discriminating a g ainst the hotels beca use of the e thnic backg round of their owne rs, who ar e imm ig ra nts fr om I

nd ia . As p art

of thi s a lle g e d s c he me , p la int if fs a lso c on te nd

that th e c ity dis c ri min a te d a g a ins t th e m by de nying the ir re qu e sts fo r ta x ab a te me nts and e c on omi c inc e nti ve s; reje cting their re quests for va rianc es re lated to the desig ns and fe ature s of their hotels, while g ranting Dr ur y I nn s’ s r e qu e sts (a llo wi ngthat ho te l and its sig n to be bu ilt

hig he r a nd larg e r t ha n o the r h ote ls in t he are a ); c omm iss ion inga stu dy a sse ssi ng the fe a sib ili ty of ne w ho te l c on str uc tio n w ith in t

he c ity
and sh ari ngits re su lts wi th D ru ry I nns but n ot w ithpla int if fs ; and ho ldi ngse c re t me e tin g s w ith Drury I nns. Furthe r, they

alleg e that Gr ove C ity withheld information or misled them about the 2003 ordinanc e and the construction of D rury I nns.No. 08-3745

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The other defe ndants included Hawkstone Associates, Inc., L ucas State Stree t Stringtown 1 L td., I ng ram F amily

L imited Partnership, Roosters Real Estate, L L C, and J ohn Does. Oh io R e vis e d Co de § 2 72 1. 03 pr ov ide s, in p e rt ine nt p art : 2 Sub je c t to div isi on (B ) of se c tio n 27 21 .0 2 of the Re vis e d Cod e , . . . any pe rs on wh os e rig hts, status, or other leg al re lations are a ffe cted by a . . . municip al ordinance . . . may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the
. . . ordinanc e . . . and obta in a decla ration of rig hts, status, or othe r leg al re lations under it. O HI O R EV . C ODE ANN . § 149.43. 3 O HI O R EV . C ODE ANN . §§ 121.211 and 149.01 et seq . 4 O HI O R EV . C ODE ANN . § 121.22. 5 - 4 - On Se pte mbe r 2 7, 20 06 , p la int if fs fi le d s uit a g a ins t de fe nd ants , a s we ll a s o the r d e fe nd a nts , 1 in the Fr anklin County

Court of Common Pleas. The rea fter, the majority of def endants re moved the
case to the United States District Court for the Southern D istrict of Ohio. Th e a me nd e d c omp la int

a sse rt ed fou

rt e e n c ounts : Co un ts O ne thr ou g h F ive so ug ht a de c larator y jud g me nt v oid ingthe 20 03 or din anc e fo r fa ili ng to co mpl y wi th Oh io law und e r O hio Re vis e d Co de § 2 72 1. 03 , and Counts Th ir

te e n a nd F ourt e e n a sse rt e d v iol a tio ns of Oh io’ s Pu

bli c 2 Records A ct, Ohio’s Statutory Records Rete ntion Sche dule, and Ohio’s Open Me eting s Act. The 3 4 5
rema ining c ounts were the foll owing fede ral claims asser ted onl y ag ainst Grove City : violation of the Equal Protec tion Cl ause ( Count S ix ), violation of the F ourtee nth Amendment (Count Seven), violation of Due Proce ss (Count E i gh t ), v i o l ati on of public policy (Count Nine), violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based upon the Equa l Protection Clause (Count Ten), a § 1983 claim base d upon theNo. 08-3745

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- 5 - Due Proc ess Clause (Count Eleve n), and a § 1983 claim based upon an allege d violation of Title VI of the Civil Ri g hts Act of 1964 (Count Twe lve). On M ay 1 6 , 2 007, the distr i ct co u rt gra n t edd ef en d an t s ’ m o t i o nfo r j u d gm en to nt h e p l ea d i n gs under Rule 12( c) of

the Fe dera l Rules of Civil Procedur e on Counts One through F ive, ruling that plaintiffs lacke d standing to obtain a dec laratory judgme nt voiding the 2003 or dinance beca use “a
me re a lle g a tio n o f i nc re a se d c omp e tit ion do e s n ot c on sti tut e the a dv e rs e e ff ect on pe rs on a l, pecunia ry , or property rig hts neede d to confe r sufficient standing .” The court also held t hat plaintiffs did not have standing in their ca pacities a s tax pay ers beca use they made no contention that they wer e being forc ed to oper ate unde r, or that their tax dollars wer e supporting , an illeg al ordinanc e or reg ime, and they

failed to identif

y an y p ro p er ty

rig hts or interests that we re je opardized by an ordinanc e that could e qually benef it them. On May 9, 2008, the district court g rante d summary judgme nt i n Gr o v e C ity ’s favor on plaintiffs’ fe dera l claims (Counts Six throug h Twelve ). Reg ardingthe Equal Protec tion claim, the court held that there was no evidenc e that Grove City discriminated ag ainst plaintiffs beca use they did not attempt to obtain a tax abate ment under the 2003 ordinanc e, and G rove City did not treat them differ ently

than similarly -situated entities which w ere not I ndian-owne d. As to th e ir p r o c e d ural Due Proc ess claim, the c ourt ruled that Grove City did not deny

plaintiffs due proc ess bec ause the re
wa s no e vid e nc e that it fa ile d to g ive the m a de qu a te no tic e a bo ut the or din anc e and

an o pp or tun ity to be hea rd. The c ourt also held t hat pl aintiffs’ claims based on Title VI of t he Civil Ri g hts Act of 1964 and public policy

failed be cause plaintiffs did not demonstrate that Gr ove City discriminatedNo. 08-3745

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y , LLC , e t al . v . Ci ty

of G ro v e City

, O hio , e t al

.

Th e re le va

nt c ounts (C ou nt s O ne thr ou g h F ive ) a lle g e d th a t th e 20 03 or din anc e wa s v oid 6 beca use “a community reinve stment a rea cannot contain two sepa rate and noncontig uous are as and, there fore , the purporte d expansion to t he ar ea east of I -71 wa s null and void” (Count One); the ordinanc e fa iled to comply with the post-1994 CRA statutes and re quirements, “inc luding but not limit ed to, the re quirement to ente r into a community reinve stment area

ag ree ment prior to the com m encement of c onstruction under R.C. §[] 3735.671” (Count Two); it was r evoked ( Count Three ); it violated Ohio Revised Code § 3735.671 and other post-1994 law (Count F our); and Gr ove City fa ile d to make the re qu ir e d fi lin g s and dis c los ur e s to the Oh io De pa rtme nt of De ve lop me nt, in violation of Ohio law (Count Five ). - 6 - ag ainst them or violated public policy . Finally , the cour t declined to exerc ise ju ri s d i cti on over pla int if fs ’ r e ma ini ngstate law c la ims (O hio Re c or ds and Op e n M e e tin g s A c t cla ims in C ounts Th ir te e n a nd F ourt e e n) and re mand e d thos e c la ims to the F ra nk lin County Court of Com mon Ple a s. Plaintiffs tim ely

appea l. II. F ir st, pla int iffs con ten d tha t th e dis tr ic t c ourt e rr e d in ru lin g tha

t th e y la c ke d s tand ingto reque st a dec laratory

judgme nt voidin g t h e ordina nce unde r Ohio Revised Code § 2721.03. To 6 support their standing under § 2721.03, pl ai n t i ff s asser t that they

are taxpay ers within the tax abate ment are a, ar e directly aff ecte d by and suffere d an economic i mpact fr om the 2003 ordinanc e, and a r e e n ti tl e d

to a r u li n g r e g ar d in g th e v a li d it y o f th e o r d in an c e b e f

o r e th e y ma k e s u b stantial expenditures to remodel or c onstruct new improve ments on their prope rt i es i n relianc e upon the city ’s promise of ta x abate ments. We reviewthe district c ourt’s dismiss al of plaintiffs’ claims under Rule 12( c) of the Fe dera l Rules of Civil P roce dure usingthe same de novo standard of re view applica ble to our re view of a

n order of dism i s s al under Rule 12( b)(6) of the F eder al Rules of Civil P roce dure. Tucker v

.No. 08-3745

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of G ro v e City

, O hio , e t al

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- 7 - Middleburg-Legac

y Place , 539 F.3d 545, 5 4 9 (6 t h Cir. 2008). “F or purpose s of a motion for judgme nt on the pleading s, all well-plea ded ma t er i al al leg ations of the plea dings of the opposing pa rt y mus t be take n a s tr

ue , a nd the mot ion

may be g ra nte d o nly if the mov ingpa

rt y is n e ve rt he le ss clea rly entitled to judgment.” Id
. (q u o t i n g JPMorgan Chase Bank , N.A. v. W

inget , 5 1 0 F. 3d 577, 581 (6th Cir. 2007)). I n addition, we g ive defe renc e to a district court’s de nial of dec laratory relief , revie wing that decision for

abuse of discretion. Se e Sc ott

sd aleIn s. Co. v . F

low e rs , 513 F.3d 546, 554 ( 6th Cir. 2 0 0 8 ) ( ci t i n g W

ilton v. Seve n Falls Co. , 515 U.S. 277, 289-90 (1995)) . Under the abuse of discre tion standard, pla intiffs bear

a hea vy burden – w e mus t h av e “a d ef inite and firm convic tion that [ the district court’s] conclusion was a clea r er ror of judgme nt.” Days Inn W

orldwide, Inc. v. Pate l , 445 F.3d 899, 906 ( 6th Cir. 2006). A. The district cour

t based its denial of dec laratory relief upon its determination that plaintiffs failed to satisfy

Ohio’s standing require ments. Be fore addre ssing the parties’ competing positions
a bo ut wh e the r an a lle g a tio n o f i nc re a se d c omp e tit ion is s uf fi c ie nt t o c on fe r u

po n p la int if

fs state law standing to obtain a dec laratory judgme nt under Ohio Revised Code § 2721.03, w e first a ssess if the district court er

red in not consider ing w hether plain t i ff s s at isfied the constitutional standing require ments of Article I I Iof the United States Constitution. Th re e pr inc ipl e s ap ply . F ir st, wh ile it i s tr ue tha t A rt ic le I I Ista

nd ing“ is the thr e sh old question in every

fede ral c ase,” see W

ar th v . S e ldi n , 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975), it is well-establishedNo. 08-3745

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- 8 - t h a tt h e l aw “ d o e s n o t d i c t a t e a s e qu e n c i n g o f j u r i s d i c t i o n a l i s s u e s ” an d t h a t“ a f e d e r a l c o u rt[ m a y] choose a mong thr eshold g rounds for de ny ing a udience to a ca se on the mer its.” Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co. , 5 26 U. S. 5 74 , 5 84 -8 5 ( 19 99 ); see also Mom s Against Mercury v . FDA , 483 F.3d 824, 826 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“ Where both standing and subjec t matter jurisdiction are at issue, . . . a court may inquire into either a

nd, finding it lac king, dismiss the matter without r eac hing the other.” ). Se c on d, be c a

us e pla int if

fs ’ r ig ht to re lie f on

the se state law c la ims ari se s so le ly fr om a n O hio statute, the cr

ucial inqui ry is whether Ohio law, not fede ral law, authorizes the re medy soug ht. The law is well-se ttled that a fe dera l court e xe r c is in g s u p p lemental or dive rsity

subject matter jur isdiction
ov e r state law c la ims mus t a pp ly state su bs tanti ve law t o th os e c la ims . 2 8 U .S. C. § 16 52 ; Gasperini v. C tr. for Humanities, Inc. , 5 18 U. S. 4 15 , 4 27 n. 7 ( 19 96 ); Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins , 304 U.S. 64, 78-79 (1938) . Whether plaintiffs have standing to se ek a decla ratory judgme nt under Ohio Revised Code § 2721.03 is a questi o n o f Oh io substantive, not feder al proc edura l, law. See Ziche rman v. Korean Air Lines Co. , 5 16 U. S. 2 17 , 2 25 (1 99 6) (h old ing that the iss ue of “ wh o may br ingsu it” is
a “substantive question[] ” that must “ be answe red by the domestic law selec ted by the cour ts of the
c on tr a c tin g state s. ” ); Int’l Primate Protec tion League and its Members v . Adm’rs of Tulane Educ. Fund , 500 U.S. 72 (1991) (a pproving the principle that “standing ‘should be seen as a que stion of
su bs tanti ve law, ans we ra

ble by re fe re nce to th e statut or y . . . p ro vis ion

wh os e pr ote c tio n is invoked.’” ) (quoting Fletc her, The Structure of Standing , 98 Y AL E L .J. 2 21 , 2 29 (1 98 8) ); Ragan v. Merc hants Trans

fer & W arehouse Co. , 337 U.S. 530, 532 (1949) (“[T]he rig hts enjoy ed under local law should not vary

beca use enf orce ment of those rig hts w as soug ht in the fede ral c ourt rathe r thanNo. 08-3745

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- 9 - in the state cour

t. I f rec overy could not be had in the state cour t, it shoul d be denie d in the fede ral court.” ). Th e Se c on d Ci rc uit

ha s e xpla ine d th a t: [i ]t is the source of the right, not the basis of f eder al jurisdiction, which deter mines the co n t ro l ling law . This includes any restric tions set by

the state on whe ther a p la in ti f f ma y b r in g a c o u rt a c ti o nr e g ar d in g th e c la im
. I f a s tate w o u ld

n o t r e c o g n iz e a plaintiff’ s rig ht to bring a state cla im in st ate co u rt , a fe dera l court exercising pendent jurisdiction, standing in the shoes of the state court, must follow the state’s jurisdictional determination and not a llow that c laim to be appende d to a fe dera l law claim in fede ral c ourt. Promisel v. First Am. Artificial Flow ers, Inc

. , 9 43 F .2 d 2 51 , 2 57 (2 d Cir
. 19 91 ) (q uo ta tio n ma

rk s, pa re nth e se s, and

c itatio ns omi tte d) ; see also In re Asbe stos Li tigation , 90 F .3 d 96 3, 10 22 n. 92 (5 th Cir . 1 99 6) (v a c a te d a

nd re mand e d o n o the r g ro un ds ) ( “ Th e qu e sti on of wh o ma y br inga su it i s a qu e sti on ans we re d b y su

bs tanti ve law i n a

div e rs ity c a se , s ta te su

bs tanti ve law. . . . [T ]he ro le of state law is to identify , withi n fede ral c onstitut ional limit s, the persons who ha ve leg ally

protec ted int e re sts and

wh a t th os e int e re sts are .” ) ( Smit h, J., d iss e nti ng ); Certain I nterested Unde rwrit ers at Lloyd’s v. Layne , 26 F.3d 39, 43 ( 6th Cir. 1994) (holding that, in diversity case s, state substantive law dete rmines whethe r a pa rty is a “re al par

ty in interest” with standing to sue under Rule 17( a) of the F e de ra l Rul e s of Civ il P roce du re ); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. W albrook Ins. Co. , 41 F.3d 764, 772-74 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding that state substantive law must be ap p l i ed in state-ba sed decla ratory judgme nt actions broug ht in feder al cour t). Thus, on fac ts similar to those in this case, the Eig hth Circuit in W estborough Mall, Inc. v

. City of Cape Girardeau , 693 F.2d 733 ( 8th Cir. 1982) appli ed st ate substantive law to determineNo. 08-3745

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- 10 - whether the plaintiffs had standingto challeng e the va lidity of a city ’s zoning ordinanc es. Aff irming the district c ourt’s g rant of summary judgme nt in favor of

the city , the Eig hth Circuit held (without addre ssing Ar

ticle I I Istanding ) that the pl ai ntiffs’ alleg ation of “me re c ompetitive disadvantag e” resulting from the or dinance s “does not g ive rise to standing ” under Missouri law. Id . at 747-48. T h i rd , Ar t i cl e II Is t an d i n g j u ri s p ru d en ce m ay n o t b e co mp l et el y i rr el ev an t wh en as s es s i n g a plaintiff’s standing to bring state law c laims in feder al cour t. Where a state supreme c ourt has not addre ssed the re levant state la w issue, we must “disce rn, fr om all available sour ces” (such as fede ral
case s interpre ting Ar

ticle I I I ’s standing require ments) how the state supreme co u rt would rule. M c Cla in v . No r th we

s t Cm ty
. Co r r . Ct

r . J u dic ia l Corr. Bd. , 4 4 0 F.3d 320, 328 ( 6th Cir. 2006). Moreove r, althoug h we ha ve not add ressed the issue, the Ninth Circuit has held that “a plaintiff whose c ause of

action is perf

ectly viable in state c ourt under state law may nonetheless be fore closed fr om l iti g a tin g the same c a us e of a c tio n in fe de ra l c ourt , if

he c ann ot d e monstrate the re qu isi te injury .” Lee v. A m. Nat’l Ins. Co. , 2 60 F .3 d 9 97 , 1 00 1- 02 (9 th C ir . 2 00 1) (h old ingin a div e rs ity c a se that, a lth ou g h Califor

nia law a uth or ize d th e pla int if

f t o c ha lle ng e the de fe nd ant’ s a lle g e dly un fa ir business prac tices wit hout having suffe red a n individualiz ed injury , the plaintiff neve rtheless lac ked standing to pursue his state law c laims in fe d er al co urt bec ause he failed to satisfy Article I I I ’s standing require ments). Under Lee , there fore , an int ere sting question might arise where a plaintiff wh o h a s in c ur

re d n o in jur y su e s in fe de ra l c ourt

to e nf or c e a pu bli c ri g ht u

nd e r O hio law. I n th e se “public intere st” ca ses, the S upreme Court of Ohio has held that Ohio law, unlike Ar ticle I I I , does not r equire the complaining party to have be en injured in orde r to have standing to sue. Se e Sta teNo. 08-3745

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- 11 - e x re l. Oh io Ac ad

. of Tri al L awy e rs v . S

he war d , 715 N.E.2d 1062, 1081 (Ohio 1999) (“[T]he fede ral [st anding ] decisions . . . are not binding upon this court, and we ar e fr ee t o dispense with the require ment fo r i n

j u ry wher e the public inter est so demands.” ) (c itation and quotation marks omi tte d)
. I n su c h a c a se , we mig ht be c a lle d u po n to de te rm ine wh e the r A rt ic le I I Ifo re c los e s su it in fede ral c ourt despite the plaintiff’ s ability to satisfy

Ohio’s standin g re q u i rements, thereby
co n fr o n t i n g Lee head-on and de ciding whether it is t he law of

this circuit. Howeve r, we need not
rea ch that important question today beca use we conclude that, under Ohio substantive law, plaintiffs do not have standingto seek a n Ohio decla

ratory judgme nt. B. “When dec iding a

n issue of state law , we a pply the law of the state’s hig hest court.” El lis

v . Cl e v e lan d M

un . S c h. Di st. , 4 5 5 F. 3 d

6 9 0 , 6 9 7 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 6 ) ( ci t i n g Er ie , 304 U.S. a t 78). Where the state’s hig hest court ha s not decided the applicable law, we “must make the best pre diction . . . of what the [court] would do if it wer e conf ronted with [the] question[,] ” Combs v. Int’l Ins. Co. , 354 F.3d 568, 577 ( 6th Cir. 2004) (citations and interna l quotation marks omitted), “asc erta in[ ing] the state law f rom all rele vant data, inc luding the state’s interme diate cour t decisions.” Ellis, 455 F.3d at 698 (c itations and quotation marks omitted). “[ W ] h er e a state appe llate cour t has resolve d an issue to which t h e high c ourt has not spoken, we will normally treat [ those] decisions . . . as authoritative a

bsent a strong s h o wi ng that the state’s hig hest court would de cide the issue differ ently .” Hisrich v. Volvo Cars of N. Am ., Inc. , 226 F.3d 445, 449 n.3 ( 6th Cir. 2000) (citation
and qu otatio n ma

rk s o mit te d) . A n a

pp lic a ble state a

pp e llate co ur

t de c isi on g uid e s o ur

ana ly sisNo. 08-3745

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- 12 - “re g ardle ss of whether the appellate court decision i s published or unpublished.” Ziegler v. IBP H og Mkt., Inc

. , 249 F.3d 509, 517 ( 6th Cir. 2001). Fu rt h er , “when g iven a c hoice be tween a n interpre tation of [st ate] law which rea sonably restric ts liability , and one which g reat l y ex p ands l i ab i l i t y , we should choose the na rrowe r and more rea sonable path.” Combs , 354 F.3d at 577 (citations and quotation mar ks omitt ed). Ohio’s co u rt s have he ld that Ohio Revised Code § 2721.03 “re prese nt[ s] [ a] leg islative g rant[] of jurisdiction to Ohio courts under c erta in circumsta n ces to he ar a nd decide decla

ratory judgme nt actions. That dec laratory relief is an ava ilable re medy

is a separ ate que stion from one’s standing to file such an ac tion.” Holcomb v . Schlichter , 517 N.E.2d 1001, 1004-05 ( Ohio Ct. App. 1986). Se e als o W

alg as h v . Bd

. of Trs

. ofMo nc lov a Twp. , Lu c as Cou nty , N o . L
- 8 0

- 1 0 5 , 1 9 8 1 WL 5518, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 20, 1981) (“While [Ohio R evised Code §] 2721.03 cr eate s the rig ht to b ri nga de c larator

y jud g me nt a c tio n to de te rm ine the va lid ity of an o rd ina

nc e , th e re qu ir e me nts of justici[ a]bili ty , including sta nding a nd ripene ss, must still be met bef ore a court c an ente rtain the action.”)
.

“ Th e qu e sti on

of sta nd ingis w he the r a

lit ig ant i s e nti tle d to have a c ourt de te rm ine the me ri ts of the issues pre sented.” Cuy ah og a Co un ty Bd . o f Co mm ’r

s v . S tat e , 8 58 N. E. 2d

330, 33 3 ( Oh io 2006) (c itation and quotation marks om i t t ed). “ I n order to establish standing [under O hio law], a pe rs on mus t dem on str a te that the c ha lle ng e d ac tio n ha s ca us e d or wil l ca

us e him or he r i nju

ry in f a c t,
e c on omi c or

oth e rw ise , a

nd tha t the int e re st sou g ht to be pr ote c te d is with in t he sp he re of

int e re sts p r o te c te d o r r e g u la ted by the statute in question.” St ark-T us car aw as -W

ayn e Joi nt

So li d W as te Mgm t.No. 08-3745

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B y c omp ari so n, Ar

tic le I I Ista

nd ingre qu ir e s th a t a

pa rt y de mon str a te that it : 7 (1) . . . ha s suffer ed an “injury in f act” that is (a) c oncre te and pa rticularized and ( b) a c tua l or immin e nt, no t con je c tur a l or hy

po the tic a l; (2 ) the inj ur

y is f a ir ly tr a c e a ble to t he c ha lle ng e d a c tio n o f t

he de fe nd ant; and

(3 ) i t is lik e ly , a s op po sed to m e re ly speculative, that the injury will be redr essed by

a fa vorable decision. Fi e ge r v . M ic h. Su pr e meCou rt , 5 5 3 F. 3 d

9 5 5 , 9 6 2 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 9 ) ( qu o t i n g Fi e ge r v . F e rry , 471 F.3d 637, 643 ( 6th Cir. 2006)). - 13 - Di st. v . R e pu bli c W as te Se rv s. of O hio II

, LLC , No. 07AP-599, 2009 Ohio App. L EXI S 1799, at *19 (Ohio Ct. App. M ay 7, 2009) (c itations and internal quotation marks omitted). “ The a lleg ed injury must be conc rete , rathe r than a bstract or suspected[.]” Id . (citations and inter nal quotation marks omitted). Moreove r, althoug h “thre atene d injury ” is enoug h to establish the require d “injury in fac t,”
an in jur y that is me re ly

“ thr e a te ne d, ” rathe r t

ha n “ a c tua l and

imm e diate ,” mus t po se “ a re a lis tic dang er a rising f rom the cha lleng ed ac tion.” Id . at 20 (c itations and internal quotation marks omitted). 7 I n Ohio, “[a]s a ge nera l rule compe titors lack standing to challeng e compe tition create d or enhanc ed by

g overnme nt action unless t h ey ca n claim the bene fit of an implied or e x presse d statutory aid to standing .” Blanchester Care Center, Inc. v. Ack erman , N o. 81 AP- 11 3, 19 81 Oh io Ap p. L EX I S 12 84 5, a t *1 8 ( Oh io C t. A pp . Nov . 5, 198 1) . “[A ]n im pli e d o r e xpre sse d s ta tut or y a id to s tand ing ” ha s b e e n f

ound wh e re the c ha lle ng e d sta tut e or or din anc e wa s e na c te d, a t le a st i n p a rt , to protect c ompetitive interests. Se e At woo d Re s. , In c . v . Pu bli c Ut ils

. Com m’n of O hio , 538 N.E.2d 1049, 1051-52 (Ohio 1989) (holding that public utilit y company had standing to challeng e anothe r public utilit y ’s competitive ac tiviti es bec ause a n Ohio statute expressly

authorized such suits and theNo. 08-3745

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- 14 - c omp la ine d- of

c on du c t w a s r e g ulate d b y law) ; Ack

erman , 198 1 Oh i o App. L EXI S 12845, at *20 (holding that the plaintiff had standing to bring a mandamus action cha lleng ing the construction of
a c omp e tit or

nurs ing ho me be c a

us e “ the [Oh io] leg isl a tur e ha s app are ntl y c on c lud e d th a t th e pu bli c int e re st i n a de qu a te he a lthse rv ic e s is fu rt he re d b y so me re str ic tio n o n c omp e tit ion .” ). I n c on tr a st, wher e the c ontroverte d law does not e vince a leg islative intent to protect a pla intiff from incr ease d competition, Ohio’s courts have found standingto be lacking
. See A merican Aggre gates Corp. v. City of Col umbus , 584 N.E.2d 26, 28-29 ( Ohio Ct. App. 1990) (holding that a cor porate plaintiff lacke d standing to appea l a zoning var iance g rante d by the City of C olumbus to pl aintiff’s c ompetitor beca use Ohio Revised Code § 25 0 6
. 0 1 , which “pr ovides that an a ppeal may

be take n from an administr at i v e decision which de termines the ‘ rig hts, duties, privilege s, benef its, or leg al relationships of a person,’ . . . is not intended to e ncompass the benefit of reduc ed compe tition.”); Ohio State Pharmace utical Ass’n v. W ickham , 573 N.E.2d 148, 154 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989) ( holding that plaintiff phar

macists had no standing to seek a decla ratory judgm en t voiding a c ompetitor’s mail-order

pharma ceutica l service s to various state r etireme nt sy stems beca use “the statutes at issue do not indicate any leg islative purpose to protect Ohio pha rmac ists from increa sed compe tition.”). The Atwood

and W ickham co u rt s were persua ded by the United States Supreme Court’ s decision in Hardin v. Kentuck y Util. Co. , 390 U.S. 1 (1968). Ha rd in held that a utilit y

company had standing to reque st an inju n ct i o n ag ainst the Tenne ssee Va lley Authority ’s (“ TVA” ) compe titive
a c tiv iti e s in

a lle g e d v iol a tio n o f a

fe de ra l st a tut e be c a

us e the uti lity

c omp any wa s w ith in t

he c la ss of private utilit ies which the statute pr otected f rom TVA c ompetition. Id
. at 7. The Court explained:No. 08-3745

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- 15 - This Court has, it is t rue, r epea tedly held that the ec onomic injury which re sults from lawf ul c omp e tit ion

c ann ot, in a

nd of its e lf

, c on fe r s tand ingon

the inj ur e d b us ine ss to question the leg ality of any aspec t of its c ompetitor’s operations. Railroad Co. v. Ellerman , 1 05 U. S. 1 66 (1 88 2) ; Alabama Power Co. v. Ic kes , 302 U.S. 464 ( 1938); TennesseePower Co. v. TVA , 30 6 U .S. 11 8 ( 19 39 ); Perkins v . Lukens Stee l Co. , 310 U.S. 113 (1940). B ut competitive i njury provided no ba sis for standing in the above case s simply

beca use the statutory and constit utional require ments that the plaintiff soug ht to enfor ce wer e in no way conce rned with pr otecting ag ainst co m p etitive injury
. I n contra st, it has been the rule, at least since the Chi c ago J un c tio n Ca se , 264 U. S. 2 58 (1 92 4) , that wh e n the pa rt ic ula r statut or y pr ov isi on

inv ok e d d oe s r e fl e c t a leg islative purpose to protec t a competitive intere st, the injured comp eti tor has standing to require compliance with that provision. See A lton R. Co. v. United States , 31 5 U .S. 15 , 1 9 ( 19 42 ); Chicago v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. , 357 U. S . 77, 83 (1958). Id . at 5-6. See also W

arren Bank v . Camp , 396 F.2d 52, 54 ( 6th Cir. 1968) (“We re cog nize that the United States Supreme Court ha s rec ently rea ffirme d its view that economic injury resulting from lawful c ompetition is not alone suff icient to convey

standing to sue.”). Her e, as in Am e ric an Ag

gr e ga te s and W ickham , Gr ov e City ’s ta x ab a te me nt o rd ina nc e did not protect a g ainst competitive injury
. To the contra ry , the ordinanc e cr eate d “ince ntive measure s to assi s t i n encour ag ing . . . e conomic and c ommunity development . . . by

remode ling or

new construction.” T hus, the ordinanc e wa s enac ted for the leg itimate purpose of stimulating G rove C i ty’ s e c o n o m y b y encouraging (not reduc ing) competition. We also note that the har

m that plaintiffs alleg e is purely speculative. Plaintiffs do not assert that they have suf fer ed or w ill incur economic injury simply beca use one hotel – Drury I nns – has enter ed the hotel mar

ket i n Gr o ve City

wher e the e ight plaintiff hote ls have done business for a number of y ear s. Se e Mi

x on v . O hio , 193 F.3d 389, 400 ( 6th Cir. 1999) (stating that, when r eviewing a district cour

t’s g rant of a

motion for judgme nt on the pl eading s, “we need not acce pt as true leg alNo. 08-3745

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- 16 - c on c lus ion s o r u

nw arr ante d f

a c tua l in fe re nc e s” ). Suc h an a ssumpt ion is part ic ula rl y ina pp ro pr ia te wher e, as here , plaintiffs conce de that the tax abatements are equally available to them and that they have ne ither applied f

or, nor be en denie d, any tax abatements under the 2003 ordinanc e. See W alg as h , 1 98 1 WL

55 18 , at *4 (r e v e r s i n g

t h e t r i a l c ourt ’s de c lara

tor y jud g me nt v oid inga me ndme nts to a zoning ordina

nce unde r § 2721.03 bec ause “ [t ]here is no claim .
. . that any of the plaintiffs have applied for

a zoning pe rmit, transfer red the ir lan d o r att empted to have a propose d plat draw ing
a pp ro ve d. Th e re fo re , a

ny po ssi ble e ff

e c t of the se zon ing or din anc e s on the se pa rt ic ula r p la int if fs

appellee s is larg ely

speculative.”). F urther, although plaintiffs argue in their appeal t hat they desire
a jud ic ia l de te rm inatio n r egardi ng th e va lid ity of the 20 03 or din anc e be fo re e xpe nd ingfu nd s to improve their pr operties in relianc e upon the c ity ’s promise of ta x abate ments, it is s olely plaintiffs themselves who se ek to invalidate the or dinance . I ndeed, the first fi v e co u n t s of the ame nded complaint are unambig uously labeled “ The 2003 Or dinance I s Void.” Finally , the district court ruled corr ectly that plaintiffs lacke d standing in their ca pacities a s taxpay ers. Plaintiffs c oncede that they “ar e not c halleng ing the expenditure of public funds[,] ” and they identify no p u b l ic “r ight,” apar

t from their pure ly

persona l gr ievanc e re g ardingtheir own speculative economic injury from incr ease d competition, that they are seeking to enforc e. See Sta te
ex rel. Levin v. S

ch r emp , 654 N.E.2d 1258, 1261 (Ohio 1995) (holding that to assert a statutory taxpay er suit, “the t ax p ay er’ s aim must be to enforc e a public r ight, r eg ardle ss of any persona l or private motive or a dvantag e.”)
. Moreove r, plaintiffs do not alleg e that they complied with Ohio’s statutory require ments for initiating a suit which seeks to enjoin a m unicipal cor poration’sNo. 08-3745

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- 17 - misapplication of taxpay er’ s funds. See O HI O R EV . C ODE §§ 73 3. 56 & 73 3. 59 ; Ha ig v . O hio Sta te Bd. of Educ. , 5 84 N. E. 2d 70 4, 70 7 (O hio 19 92 ) ( ho ldi ngtha t “ pr oc e e din g s f

or de c larator

y re lie f w ill not be enter

t ai n ed where a

nother ‘e qually

service able’ reme dy

is provided.”) (citation omitted); W estbrook v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. , 5 24 N. E. 2d 48 5, 48 8- 89 (Oh io 19 88 ) ( ho ldi ngthat a common-law ta x pay er suit “may be ente rtained only

in the absenc e of a statutory reme dy ” and that “whe re statutory

relief is a ffor ded and clea

rly applies to the circ umstances g iving r ise to the ac tion, the statute constitutes the exclusive avenue for se eking redr ess.”)
. For these re asons, we a ffirm the district c ourt’s g rant of judg ment on the pleading s in Grove City ’s fa vor on Counts One throug h Five. III
. Next, plaintiffs contend that the district c ourt err ed in g ranting summary judgme nt in Grove City ’s fa vor on their f

eder al Equal Protection, proce dural Due Process, Title VI , and Public Policy
c la ims (C ounts Six thr ou g h T we lve ). Th e y a sse rt that “ [g ]en

uin e iss ue s o f m a te ri a l f

a c t e xist a s to whether Grove City discriminated aga inst [ them], denied them due proc ess and other wise violated their rig hts.” We reviewa district cour t’s g rant of summar

y judgme nt de novo. Johnson v. U niv. of Cin c inn ati , 215 F.3d 561, 572 ( 6th Cir. 2000). A.No. 08-3745

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The dire ct constitutional claims ass er t ed i n Counts S ix , Seven, and E ight a re duplicative 8 of, and a re the ref ore subsumed by , those broug ht pursuant to § 1983 in Counts Ten, Eleven, a nd Twelve
. Thomas v. Shipka , 818 F.2d 496, 499 ( 6th C i r. 1 987) (holding that “in ca ses wher e a plaintiff states a c onstitut ional claim un d er 4 2 U.S.C. § 1983, that statute is t he exclusive reme dy for the a lleg ed constitutional violations”), vacate d on other grounds , 488 U.S. 1036 (1989). - 18 - Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims are br oug ht under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a c laim under 8 § 1983, plaintiffs must e stablish: “(a ) deprivation of a rig ht se cure d under the Constitut ion or fede ral law; and (b) that deprivation wa s cause d by a person acting under color of state law.” A lkir e v. Irving , 330 F.3d 802, 813 ( 6th Cir. 2003). 1. To e sta bli sha vio la tio n of the Eq ua l Pr ote c tio n Cla

us e , pla int if

fs mus t sh owthat G ro ve City discriminated aga inst them beca use t hey are I ndian-owne d. See He nr yv . M e tro . S e we r D ist
. , 922 F.2d 332, 341 ( 6th Cir. 1990) (stating that a § 1983 plaintiff a lleg ing a n Equal Protection violation

“ mus t a lle g e that a

sta te a c tor i nt e nt i o n a l l y

dis c ri min a te d a g a ins t th e pla int if f b e c a us e of me mbe rs hip in a pr ote c te d c la ss. ” ) (c itatio n omit te d)
. To su pp or t su c h a n in fe re nc e , p la int if

fs “ mus t de mon str a te that the gover

nment treated [ them] disparate ly as compared to simil arly situated persons . . . .” Club Italia Socce r & Sports Org., Inc. v. Charter Twp. of Shelby , 470 F.3d 286, 298 ( 6th Cir. 2006). Pla int if fs c on te nd

that th e y “ c ann ot t a ke adv ant age of the ta x ab a te me nt b e c a

us e it w ou ld
re qu ir e the m to de mol ish the ir e xistin g ho te ls a

nd sp e nd mil lio ns of do lla

rs bu ild ingne w h ote ls, wh ic h w ou ld o ff

se t by fa r a ny g a ine d tax adva

nta g e ” and

that “ [t]his is n ot e c on omi c a lly fe a sib le g ive n th e decre a sin g re ve nu e s and oc c up anc y

ra te s in Gr ov e City ’s so ft

ho te l ma rk e t.” Th e y

a lso
e mph a size that:No. 08-3745

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- 19 - the dis tr ic t c ourt

ov e rl oo ke d th e ma ss o f e vid e nc e de mon str a tin g dis pa ra te tr e a tme nt: [pl aintiffs] were ref

used an a batement a

nd varia nces, w ere no t i n fo rm ed about the Dr ur y I nn de ve lop me nt, we re no t inf or me d a bo ut the pe nd inge xpans ion of the CRA to include [plainti ffs’] proper ties and Drury I nn’s proper ty , never g ot the benef

it of an Impa c t S tu dy

be fo re de ve lop ingthe ir

ho te ls, we re no t in fo rm e d th a t th e y c ou ld obtain a tax abatement if the y constructe d meeti n g ro oms, have ne ver r ece ived the attention and assistanc e fr om Grove City and its Council that was given to Drury I nn, and have develope d in a

PUD [pl anned unit deve lopment] [si c] and not rec eived the signa g e and he ight c oncessions g iven to Drury I nn. The e vidence supporting pla intiffs’ claims of discr imination is lacking . The dist rict cour t fo un d c or re c tly that the e xpand e d CRA inc lud e d pla int if fs , th us makin g the m “ e lig ibl e fo r t he same [t ax advantag es] as Drury I nn and B ob Evans, if they , like Drury I nn and B ob E v an s , s at i s fy the qu a li f y in g r e mo d e li n g o r im

p r o v e me n t a c ti v it ie s th a t ar e p r e r e qu is it e s to a tax a b a te ment.” The court opined that t h er e m ay even be a “misunder standing ” betwe en the pa rties bec ause B allubhai Pa te l, p la int if

fs ’ r e pr e se ntativ e , a

nd Na nu bh a i Pate l, o wn e r o f p la int if f C omf or t Inn , te sti fi e d in

the ir de po sit ion s th a t th e y

we re un awa

re that th e ir

ho te ls w e re wi thi n th e CRA and that th e y c ou ld a lso potentially qualify for the tax abatement. The c ourt noted ac curately that plaintiffs did not take the ste ps ne c e ssa

ry to r e c e ive the ta x a

bate me nts , did no t a

pp ly fo r t he m, a nd Gr ov e City

did no t r e fu se them. The district cour

t also relied r easona

bly upon Zajicek v. A aby , N o . 94 C 50 0 6 6 , 1 9 9 5 WL 150031 (N.D. I ll. Apr. 3, 1995) as pe rsuasive a uthority . There the pl aintiff asserted a § 1983 Equal Pr ote c tio n c la im a lle g ingthat a c ity dis c ri min a te d a g a ins t him by no t awa rd ing him ta x ab a te me nts for his re sidential mobile home park under an ordinanc e creating an “ente rprise z one.” Id . at *1-*2. L ike Grove City ’s ordinanc e, the or dinance in Aabyawa rded ta x abate m en t s o n l y t o businessesNo. 08-3745

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- 20 - within the zone that engag ed in re modeling, r ehabilitation, or newconstruction. Id . Plaintiff
c omp la ine d th a t hi s mo bil e ho me pa rk wa s “ sim ila

rl y sit uate d” to “ oth e r r e sid e nti a l de ve lop me nts such as subdivisions, condominiums and apartments [sic] buildings, and the ordinanc e esta blishing the enter prise zone depr ive[d] [hi m] of the be nefits g rant ed t o o ther similarly situated reside ntial developments without a rational rea son.” Id . at *2 (interna l quotation ma rk s omitted). The cour t g rante d the def

endant’ s motion to di smiss pl aintiff’s Equa l Protection claim under Rule 12( b)(6) of the F e de ra l Ru le s o f C ivi l Pr oc e dure , s ta tin g : [T]he e sse nc e of

pla int if f’ s e qu a l pr ote c tio n c la im i s tha t he did no t r e c e ive c e rt a in ta x be ne fi ts und e r the or din anc e s. Th e ta x be ne fi ts at iss ue are on ly ma de a va ila

ble to those o wner s of prope rty upon which new

improvements have been c onstructed or upon which ex isting ones have been renovate d or rehabilitated, or those who have purcha sed bui l d i n g materia ls for re modeling, r ehabilitation or newconstruction. Thus, plaintiff m ust, to alleg e that he is similarly situated to those who have rec eived the tax benefits, alleg e that he ha s undertake n improvements or purc hased building ma te ri a ls e ith e r o f w hic h a re sim ila r t o th os e imp ro ve me nts mad e or ma te ri a ls purcha sed by

persons re ceivingthe bene fits. This he has not done. * * * I t is we ll w ith in t

he bo un ds of

e qu a l pr ote c tio n la

w t o p ro vid e ta x be ne fi ts t o c e rt a in proper ty owner s in an effort to improve t he conditions of t he property i.e., those who either e ng ag e in construc tion, rehabilitation or re novation o r who use building materia ls in doing so, while not allowing t he same benef its to other similarly

situated proper ty or prope rty

owner s who do not undertake such construc tion, rehabilitation or re novation. Id . at *4, n.2. The district cour

t also corr ec tly

reje cted plaintiffs’ alleg ations of past discrimination. P l ai n t i ff s b as e t h ei r c o n t en t i o nt h at Gr o v e C i t y d i s cr i m i n at edaga i n s tt h em b y re fu s i n g t h ei r p re-2003 reque sts for tax ab atements on a short interac tion with former Gr ove City administrator, Charle sNo. 08-3745

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- 21 - Boso, Jr., in 1996 or

1997. Howeve r, plaintiffs do not alleg e that any other business wa s g rante d a tax abatement at that time and conce de that they did not request or a pply for a ny other tax abateme nt afte r that sing le inquiry

some six or seve n y ear s prior to the ef fec tive date of

the 2003 ordinanc e. Plaintiffs’ complaint that Grove City discriminated ag ainst them by denying the m varianc es for “ signa g e and heig ht” i s equally without merit. Ballubhai Patel a cknowledg ed in his deposition that D ru ry I nn s h a s a

hig he r s ig n th an h is h ote ls o nly be c a us e it i s a hig he r b uil din g , s ix oth e r m ote ls in Grove City – all of t hem C hinese- and I ndian-owne d – have “hig h-rise signs,” all six of the Asianowned motels re quested, a nd wer e g rante d, varia

nces for t heir sig ns by

Grove City , he knew

of no other motels owned by

plaintiffs that applied for and wer e denied va rianc es for

high- rise sig ns, he
never applied for

a var iance to construct a hig h-rise building , he wa s unawa re of any other plaintiff who applied to build a hi gh -r i s e b u i lding, he had no knowledg e of a ny desig n features that we re denied to plaintiffs but g rante d to Drury I nns, he knewof no deve lopment rest ri ctions that Grove City enfor ced a g ainst h i m o r t h e o t h er pla intiffs that it did not apply to Drury I nns, and he w as
unawa re of any zoning code s that Grove City applied to him or th e o t h er p l ai n t i ffs that it did not enfor ce ag ainst Drury I nns. When asked whether “Grove City ever [t ook] any action ag ainst any

of the hotels that are plaintiffs in this case beca use those hotels we re ow ned by Asian-Ame rica

ns” and wh e the r “ Gr ov e City

e ve r r e fu se [d] to do any

thi ng fo r any of the ho te ls that ar e pla int if fs in t his c a se be c a us e the y are ow ne d b y

As ian-A me ri c ans [,]” his re sp on se to b oth qu e sti on s w a s: “ No t th a t I know.” Ec ho ingB a llu

bh a i Pate l’ s tes tim on y , Nanu bh a i Pate l st a te d in

his de po sit ion

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- 22 - the Comfort I nn, has a hig h-rise sig n and that the Ha mpton I nn and Red Roof Inn, both of which a re owned by individuals of I ndian desce nt, ha ve high- rise signs. Nanubha i Pate l a lso a g ree d that he had
no inf or m a t i o nt h a tG r o v e C i t y

t r e a t e d h i m d i f f e r e n t l y t h ant h e o w n e r s o f

t h e D r u r y I nn s, dis c ri min a te d a g a ins t hi m be c a us e he is o f I

nd ian d e sc e nt, or

de nie d h im the op po rt

un ity to f ile applications, re quests for va rianc es, or “ any

thing with the c ity .” I n essenc e, plaintiffs have wholly failed to suppor t the ir claim of unlawful di scrimination. B a se d o n th e ir

c on c e ssi on s and

the overwh elmin g e vid e nc e fr om w hic h n o r e a so na ble jur y c ou ld conclude that Grove City

illega lly discriminated ag ainst them, we a ffirm the district court’s g rant of summary judgme nt in Grove City ’s favor on plaintiffs’ Equa l Protection claim. 2. Unde r th e D u e Pr o c e s s Cl a u s e o f th e F o u rte e n th A me n d me n t, s tate s ar e p r o h ib ite d from

“ de pr iv[i ng ] . . . an y pe rs on of lif e , li be rt y , o r p ro pe rt

y , w ith ou t du e pr oc e ss o f l aw. ” U. S. C O N ST . amend. XIV. I n Clu b I

tal ia , w e e xpla ine d: T h e r ig h t to p r o c e d

u r a l d u e p r o c e s s “ r e qu ir e s th a t w h e na St a te s e e k s to te r

mi n a te [a pr ote c te d] in te re st .
. . it must a ff or d ‘no tic e and

op po rt un ity fo r h e ari nga

pp ro pr ia te to the nature of t he ca se’ be fore the termination bec omes eff ective.” Bd

. o f R e ge nts v. Roth , 4 0 8 U. S
. 5 6 4 , 5 7 0 (1 9 7 1 ) ( qu o t i n g Bell v. Burson , 4 0 2 U
. S. 5 3 5 , 5 42 (1971)) . I mportantly , proce dural due proce ss ri g hts are only violated when a pr ote c te d lib e rt

y or pr op e rt

y int e re st is de nie d wi tho ut a de qu a te he ari ng . Thus , in or d e r to s u c c e e d o n th is c la im , Pl a in ti f f mu s t s h o w ( 1 ) th a t it w a s d e p r ive d of a protec ted liberty or prope rty interest, and ( 2) that such de privation occ urre d without the re quisite due proce ss of law. 470 F.3d at 296. Pla int if fs ’ a pp e a l of the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s g ra

nt o f s umm ar

y j u d g m e nt o n th e ir du e pr oc e ss c la imNo. 08-3745

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- 23 - is b oth fo rf e ite d a nd me ri tle ss. Af

te r s e tti ngfor th th e app li c a ble law o n th e ir

du e pr oc e ss c la im, plaintiffs devote one sentenc e in their appellate brief t o “ar g uing” why the district court’s judg ment should be reve rsed: “A s discussed above , Grove City did no t comply

with its own ordinance a nd failed to notify

[pl aintiffs] th at Dr u ry I n n ’s pl ans we re modified f rom 150 to 180 rooms, thereby de pr iv in g [ plai nti ff

s] of the ir ri g ht t o c on te st s a me a t th e Counc il m e e tin g .” Con tr ary to t his
a sse rt ion , h ow e ve r, pla int if fs did no t “ dis c us s[]” in t

he ir br ie f a ny ma tte r r e la tin g to t

he ir du e pr oc e ss appea l. Our law is w ell-settled that “[i] ssues adver ted to in a perf

unctory manner , unacc ompanied by some eff ort at deve loped ar g umentation, are deeme d waived.” United St ates v. Sandridge , 385 F .3 d 1 03 2, 10 35 -3 6 ( 6th

Cir . 2 00 4) . A c c or din g ly , w e de e m pl a int if fs ’ a pp e a l of the ir du e pr oc e ss claim forf eited. We a lternatively hold that pla intiffs’ due proce ss claim is meritless. Ba llubhai Patel testified in h is d e po sit ion that he wa s no t awa re of any law, statut e , or

or din anc e e ith e r i n G ro ve City or in Ohio that require d Grove City to notify him of varianc es, building a n d d es ign f

eatur es, zoning modifications, or tax benefits reque sted by Drury I nns. I n fac t, he conce ded that Gr ove City was not require d to provide him special notice of var iance s, building and de s i gn features, zoning modifications, or tax benefits bec ause he and the other owner s o f t h e p laintiff hotels wer e not neig hboring proper

ties of Drur

y I nn. Plaintiffs’ contentions that Grove City did not inform them “about the pe nding e x pansion of the CRA to incl ude [the ir ] pr op e rt ie s and Dr ur y I nn ’s pr op e rt

y ” or no tif y the m “ that th e y

c ou ld obtain a tax abatement if the y constructe d mee t i n g ro o m s” ar e puzzl ing. T he 2003 ordina nceNo. 08-3745

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- 24 - expanding the CRA is a c ity ordinanc e. Acc ording ly , plaintiffs at lea st were place d on constructive notice of it. Tami Kelly , Grove City ’s Clerk of Council, stated in he r af fidavit that the ordinanc e wa s bo th i ntr od

uc e d a nd the n ap pr ov e d at a pub lic c ity c ounc il mee tin g , af te r she g a ve the re qu ir e d p ub lic notice that the or dinance would be considered at the meeting . She further stated that the public wa s notified that the ordinance h ad passe d. Reg ardingtheir ar g ument that Grove City would have g rante d them a specia l ta x abate ment if they “construc ted meeting rooms,” plaintiffs fa il to develop that argument or substantiate it. Significa ntly , Ba llubhai Patel stated i n his deposition that, to his knowledg e, neither he nor any of the other owne rs of the pla intiff motels had eve r bee n denied the oppor tunity to be hea rd at a hea ring , to be hea

rd at a proceed ing, or

rec eive infor

mation about Drury

Inns beca

use they are Asian-Ame rica

ns . He fu rt her a dmitted that he did not attend any city council or pla

nning
c omm iss ion pu

bli c me e tin g s con c e rn ing Dr ur y I nn s and that he wa s n ot e ve n a wa re that G ro ve City provided public notice s of i ts meeting s. Sim ilarly , Nanubha i Patel testified in his deposition t hat he
was ne ver de nied the opportunity to attend any

hear ings or

meeting s with the city
. B a s e d o nth is te s ti mo n y , th e d is tr ic t c o u rt c o r r e c tl y r u le d th a t “ e v e nu n d e r

Pl a in ti ffs’ own understanding

of Grove Ci t y ’s l eg al obliga tions, the city

was not re quired to provide the m the specific notices P laintiffs complain about not rec eiving .” (Emphasis adde d.) We ag ree and af firm the district court’s g rant of summar y judgme nt on plaintiffs’ due pr ocess c laim.

3. Ti tle VI of the Civ il Ri g hts Ac t of

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- 25 - No per son in the United States shall, on the g round of rac e, color , or national orig in, be e xclud ed fro m pa

rt ic ipatio n in , b e de nie d th e be ne fi ts o f, or be su bje c te d to discrimination under any prog ram or activity rec eiving Fe dera l financia l assistance. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. Pla int if fs ’ s ole c on te nti on is that bec a us e Gr ov e City vio la te d its Equ a l Prot e c tio n rig hts , it de ri vativ e ly

vio la te d Titl e VI
. Al tho ug h Gr ov e City argue d b e low

and re a sse rt s o n a

pp e a l th a t T itl e VI is ina pplicable beca

use it did not r ece ive any fede ral financ ial assistance , the district court did not addre ss that contention beca us e i t held that its gr ant of summary judgme nt on plaintiffs’ Equal Protection claim also entitled Gr ove City to summary

judgme nt on plaintiffs’ Title VI claim. We ag ree , and for the s ame reasons articulated in our analy sis affirming the district court’s g rant of summar

y judgme nt on the m erits of plaintiffs’ Equal Protection cla im, we also af firm the district court’s g rant of summar y judgme nt on plaintiffs’ Title VI claim. B. F ina lly , p la int if

fs c on te nd

that th e dis tr ic t c ourt e rr e d in g ra nti ngsu mma

ry jud g me nt o n it s “public policy ” cla im in C ount Eight. Plaintiffs devote one sentenc e to their a ppeal of this iss ue: “[T] he district cour

t should not have gr anted summ ary judgme nt ag ainst [pl aintiffs] on their fede ral
c la ims , a nd the re fo re , th e dis tr ic t c ourt sh ou ld not have g ra nte d summ a

ry jud g me nt a g a ins t [th e m] on their public policy

claim.” The issue is forf

eited. Sandridge , 385 F.3d at 1035-36 (“I ssues adve rted to in a pe rfunc tory
manner , unacc ompanied by some eff

ort at deve lop ed ar gumentation, are deeme d waived” ). As su min g a rgue nd o th a t the pu bli c po lic y c la im is su

bs ume d by pla int if

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- 26 - also fails on its merits beca use plaintiffs’ othe r cla ims are mer itless.

I V. For these re asons, we a ffirm the judg ment of the district cour t.No. 08-3745

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- 27 - KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judge, c oncurring in part and concurring in the jud gm ent. I be lie ve we mus t de te rm ine wh e the r w e have Ar tic le I I I jur isd ic tio n wi th re sp e c t to t he Ho te ls’ c la ims under the Ohio Dec laratory J udg ment Act bef ore pr ocee ding to de cide any qu e sti on of state law w ith respe ct to the m. “‘Without jurisdiction the court cannot pr ocee d at a ll in a ny c a us e . Jur isd ic tio n is power to declar e the law, and when it cea ses t o exis t, the onl y function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fac t and dismissi ng the ca use.’” Steel v. Citizens for a Better Env’ t , 523 U.S. 83, 9 4 (1 9 9 8 ) ( em p h as i s ad d ed ) ( qu o t i n g Ex pa rteMc Car dle , 74 U.S. (7 Wil l.) 506, 514 (1868)) . Ithink the Ho te ls p la inl y

la c k A rt ic le I I Ista

nd ingwi th re sp e c t to the ir Oh io d e c larator y -j ud g me nt c la ims ; and that, in my

view, should be the e nd of the matter
. Th e ma jor ity pr oc e e ds ins te a d w itha

rathe r e xten de d a

na ly sis of the qu e sti on

wh e the r O hio law per mits t he Hotels to asse rt their dec laratory -judg ment claims. Wit h due re spect, I think that
ana ly sis lie s b e y on d o ur po wers un der Arti c le I I I . T he re is n o Su pr e me Court

pr e c e de nt, to my knowledg e, that per

mits us t o addre ss questions of purely state law a s to claims over whic h we lac k Article I I Ijurisdiction. Ste e l say s as much directly , and nothing in Ru hr ga s A G v . M

arath on Oi l Co ., 526 U.S. 574 (1999), is to the contra ry . Th e ma jor ity c ite s Ru hr

ga s for the pr oposition t hat there is no mandatory “seque ncing of jurisdictional issues.” Id. at 584. That wa s true enoug h in the unusual circ umstances pr esente d there , but those circ umstances are ve ry differ ent from the one s here . First, and most important, the Court sp e c if ic a lly no te d th a t there was no defec t in Article III jurisdiction in Ruhrgas ; the question
a s to subj e c t
- m a t t e r

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- 28 - diversity require d by

28 U.S.C. § 1332, but not by Article III , is absent.” Id. at 584 (e mphasis added; citations omitt ed). Ruhrgas there fore aff ords fe dera l courts no license to decide issues to whic h the “[t] he judicial powe r of the U nited States” does not extend. U.S. Const. art. I I I , § 1. Second, both of the jurisdictional g rounds at issue in Ruhrgas (name ly , subject-matter jurisdiction and persona l jurisdiction) depende d on federal rathe r than sta t e l aw . Moreove r, the persona l-jurisdiction gr ound that the Court said could be r eac hed first wa s, unlike the subject-matter one, constitutional in nature. See 526 U.S. at 584 (“Ruhrg as relies on the consti tutional safeguard of du e pro cess to st op the c ourt fr om p ro c e e din g to t

he me ri ts o f t

he c a se ” ); see also id. (“‘ The require ment that a cour

t have pe rsonal jurisdiction flows . . . from the Due Proce ss Clause’”) (q u o t i n g In s . C o r

p . o f Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites deGuinee , 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982) (alter ation in orig inal)). Ruhrgas , th e re fo re , wa s a ca se in wh ic h the re wa s n o d e fe c t in the c ourt s’ Article I I I power , and in which the Supreme Court held that, as be tween two f eder al jurisdictional issues, the district court did not abuse its discr et i o n i n rea ching the constitutional one first. That holding doe s not permit u s t o d ec i de issues of Ohio law in the absenc e of judicia l power unde r A rt i c l e III
. To say that a fe dera l court lac ks power under Article I I I is to say that it lacks a ny power at all. Ibelieve w e lac k power under A rticle I I Iwith re s p ec t to the Hotels’ state- law cla ims for de c larator y re lie f, a nd

thu s I re sp e c tf ull y c on c ur on ly in t he judg me nt a s to tho se c la ims . I fu lly
c on c ur , h ow e ve r, in t

he ma jor ity ’s ana ly sis of

the Ho te ls’ fe de ra l- law c la ims
.