This opinion

## was flied

### forrecord

# -~ 

# :R. carpeni9i Supreme Court Clark 

### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

GREGGBECKER, ) ) Respondent, ) ) v. ) ) COlVlMUNITY HEALTH SYSTEMS, INC. ) d/b/a COMMUNITYHEALTH SYSTEMS ) PROFESSIONAL SERVICES ) CORPORATION d/b/a COMMUNITY ) HEALTH SYSTEMS PSC, INC. d/b/a/ ) ROCKWOOD CLINIC P.S.; and ) ROCKWOOD CLINIC, P.S., ) ) Petitioners. ) 

# ___________________________) No. 90946-6
EnBanc

Filed 

### SEP 1

## 7 2015 JOHNSON, J.-This case involves the "jeopardy" element ofthe tort for wrongful discharge against public policy and whether the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), 18 U.S.C. § 1514A, orthe Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6, bar GreggBecker from recovery under the tort claim. This is one ofthree concomitant cases before
us concerning the "adequacy ofalternative remedies" component ofthejeopardy element. 

### SeeRose v. Anderson.Hay & Grain Co., No. 90975-0 (Wash. Sept. 17, 2015), and

### Rickman v. Premera Blue Cross, No. 91040-5 (Wash. Sept. 17, 2015).Becker v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., No. 

### 90946-6 Ourrecent holding in

### Rose instructs that alternative statutory remedies are to be analyzed for exclusivity, ratherthan adequacy. Underthat formulation, neither SOX nor Dodd-Frankpreclude Becker from recovery. We affirm the trial court's denial ofCommunityHealth Systems Inc.'s (CHS) CR 12(b)(6) motion, and affirm the Court ofAppeals in upholding that decision upon certified interlocutory review. FACTS 

### Beckerbegan working for Rockwood Clinic PS, an acquired subsidiary of CHS, 1

### as its chieffinancial officer (CFO) in February 2011. As a publiclytraded company, CJ-IS is required to file reports withthe United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). These reports are available publicly for the purpose ofaccurately advising the SEC, and CHS' creditors and investors, ofCHS' profitability and business strategies. As Rockwood's CFO, Becker was required by state and federal law to ensure that Rockwood's reports did not mislead the public, which also required his personal verification that the reports did not contain any inaccurate material facts or material omissions. As the CFO, Beckerhimselfwas

1Rockwood is an acquired entity ofCHS and does business as Community Health Systems Professional Services Corporation (CHSPS). CHS is apublically traded company incorporated in Delaware and licensed to do business in Washington. Becker's allegations are against CHS as the employer; however, the superior court dismissed CHS as a defendant, since CHS is a holding company with no contacts in Washington. CHSPS remains a party to the lawsuit. 2Becker v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., No. 90946-6 

### potentially criminally liable for misleading reporting. In October 2011, Becker submitted to CHS' financial department an "EBIDTA," a calculation ofearnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization-it serves as an important
measure offinancial healthfor publically traded companies. Becker's EBIDTA reportprojected a $12 million operating loss for Rockwood the upcoming year. Unbeknownst to Becker, when CHS acquired Rockwood it represented to creditors that the Rockwood acquisition would incur only a $4 million operating loss. To cover the discrepancy, CHS' financial supervisors allegedly directed Becker to correcthis EBIDTA to reflectthe targeted $4 million loss. CHS did not provide a basis for its low calculation. Beckerrefused, fearing thatthe projection would mislead creditors and investors inviolation ofSOX. Soon after, Rockwood's chiefexecutive officer (CEO) initiated an unscheduled evaluation ofBecker's performance in which the CEO marked him with an unacceptable performance rating and placed him on a performance improvement plan: As part ofhis improvement plan, Becker was directed to edit the EBIDTA projected loss to reflect the $4 million valuation. The CEO made clear that Becker's refusal to do so put his position injeopardy. Becker sought legal counsel and decided to report his concerns upward: he wrote to CHS' and Rockwood's CEOs, explaining his concern that CHS was attempting to misrepresentits projected budget in violation offinancial reporting
3Becker v. Onty. Health Sys., Inc., No. 

### 90946-6 laws. He wrote that he feltcompelledto resign unless CHS responded to his
concerns. The next day, CHS and Rockwood accepted Becker's resignation. Becker filed two claims in Spokane County Superior Court: one for wrongful discharge in violation ofpublic policy and the other for a violation of SOX.2 

### CHS successfullyremoved the case to federal court, prompting Beckerto amend his complaint and omithis federal SOX claim. The federal court remanded**~·** 

### the case back to the state superior court. Becker's amended complaint alleged wrongful discharge for Becker's refusal to violate financial reporting laws, which resulted in economic and emotional distress damages. CHS filed a CR 12(b)(6) motionto dismiss the complaint for failure to state

. . . 

### . a claim, contending that thejeopardy element ofthe torthad not been metbecause there were adequate alternative means to protectthe public policy ofhonesty in corporate financial reporting. The trial court denied the motion, and CHS successfully movedto have the question certified for interlocutory review under RAP 2.3(b)(4). The Court ofAppeals accepted review and determined thatthe jeopardy element had been satisfied because the alternative administrative enforcement mechanisms ofSOX and Dodd-Frank were inadequate and therefore

2 Becker also filed a whistle blower complaint with the United States Occupational Safety and Health Administration, but i.t was dismissed. His appeal onthat matter will be heard in January 2016. 4Becker v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., No. 

### 90946-6 did not**for~close th~**  

### common law tort remedies for employees. Becker v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., 

### 182 Vvn. App. 935, 332 P.3d 1085 (2014), review granted, 

### 182 Wn.2d 1009, 343 P.3d 759 (2015). ANALYSIS We 

### review the trial court's ruling on a motion to dismiss de novo. Factual allegations are accepted as true, and unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiffcan prove no set offacts consistent with the complaint that would entitle him or herto relief, the motion to dismiss must be denied. Corrigal v. Ball &Dodd FuneralHorne, Inc., 

### 89 Wn.2d 959, 961, 577 P.2d 580 (1978). We accepted re':':iew ofthese three cases-Becker,Rose, 

### andRickman-to 

### determine whether o.ther nonexclusive administrative remedies nevertheless

. preempt the tort for wrongful discharge when those statutes are "adequate" to

promote**th~** 

### public policy. In our decision inRose, 

### we determined that the "adequacy ofalternative remedies" analysis misapprehends the role ofthe common law and the underlying purpose ofthe tort. When other statutory remedies provide**alternativ~** 

### remedies to protectthe public policy, we concludedthat exclusivity, not adequacy, is the key inquiry. Applied to thesefacts, we agree with the Court of Appeals that Becker's**~laim** 

### properly survives CHS' CR 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.

5Becker v. C!·nty. Health Sys., Inc., No. 

### 90946-6 The tort for wrongful discharge in violation ofpublic policy is a narrow exception tothe at-will doctrine. It

### is recognized as a means ofencouraging employees to follow the law andpreventing employers from using the at-will doctrine to subvert those efforts to promote public policy. To state a cause of action, the plaintiffmust plead andprove that his or her termination was motivated by reasons that contravene an important mandate ofpublic policy. We maintain a

1 

### ··,strict clarity requirement in which the plaintiffmust establish that the public policy is clearly legislatively orjudiciallyrecognized. Once established, the burden shifts to the employer to plead andprove that the employee's termination was motivated by other, legitimate, reasons. Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wn.2d 219, 232;_33, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984). Because we construe this tort exception narrowly, wrongful discharge claims ··have generally been limited to four scenarios: (1) where employees are fired for refusing to commit an illegal act; (2) where employees are fired for performing a public duty or obligation, such as servingjury duty; (3) where employees are fired for exercising a legal right orprivilege, such as filing workers' compensation claims; and (4) where employees are fired in retaliation for reporting employer misconduct, i.e., whistle blowing. Gardner

## v. LoomisArmored, Inc., 128 Wn.2d 931,936, 913 P.2d 377 (1996) (citingDicomes v. State, 113 Wn.2d 612, 618, 782 P.2d 1002 (1989)). When the plaintiffs**c~1se** 

### does not fit neatly within one ofthese scenarios, a more refined

6Beckerv
.. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., No. 90946-6 analysis may be necessary, and the four-factor Perritt analysis mayprovide helpful guidance. 

### Gardner, 128 Wn.2d at 941 (citing HENRY H. PERRITT, JR., WORKPLACE TORTS: RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES§ 

### 3.7 (1991)). 3 J3ut such detailed analysis is unnecessary here. Becker's complaint alleges that he was terminated for refusing to criminally misrepresentthe EBIDT A report ofRockwood's operating losses. His case falls squarely within the first scenario-**;c-:~termination** for refusal to commit an illegal act. Taking his allegations as true, as
we must when reviewing

## a motionto dismiss, Beckerhas pleaded sufficient facts to establish a claim that his discharge was in violation ofclear, importantpublic policy. As to the potential exclusionary effects ofalternative statutes, we review these statutes for exclusivity, not adequacy. Forthe same reasons discussed in 

### Rose, we reject the argument thatthe adequacy ofalternative remedies approach plays any legitimate role in our analysis. IfSOX and Dodd-Frank already protect ' ' whistle-blowers from termination, then the availability ofthis alternative method ofrecovery does not impactthe employer's discretion to terminate employees '

3Under

## our adoption ofthe Perritt analysis, courts examine (1) the existence ofa "clear pul:?lk policy" (claritYelement), (2) whether "discouraging the conduct in which [the employee] engaged wouldjeopardizethe public policy" Qeopardy element), (3) whether the**"public~policy** linked conduct caused the dismissal" (causation element), and (4) whether the employer is "able to offer an overridingjustification for the dismissal" (absence of justification element). Gardner, 128 Wn.2d at 941. Gardner, 128 Wn.2d at 941. This framework was specifically helpful in Gardner, a very factually unique case that demanded a more refined analysis.
7Becker v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., No. 90946-6 without cause. The elimination ofthis adequacy requirement has no effect on the breadth ofthe

# at-will doctrine; rather, its removalfrom our analysis merely eliminates a loophc)le for employers who intentionally contravene public policy to escape liability. Once.. a plaintiffcan establish thatthe employer's actions violate an important mandate ofpublicpolicy, no legitimate reason exists for excusing those actions. In support ofthe "strict adequacy" requirement, CHS also argues that the cottcurrent availability ofthis tort with the SOX and Dodd-Frank would undermine the statutes' g;oal in encouraging whistle-blowers. SOXprovides reliefonly for those employees who actually report, notthose who merely refuse to violate the ' .. . . . ' law. 

### CHS argues that the tort would encourage employees to "sitontheirhands" rather thanreport violations because the concurrent availability ofthe tort would

, reward those employees for their indifference byproviding reliefwhenthey

deserve none. Without addressing the numerous flaws to this argument, we maintajnthat it is with the proper authority ofCongress and the legislature to address that concern by expressly limitingremedies only to those provided by the statute. Congress andthe legislature possess greaterrelative competencyto determine how and when employees shouldbe afforded remedies for their termination, and retain the authority to determine when its administrative remedies should be exclusive. Here, Congress expressly declared that the remedies available
8Becker v. Cmty. Health S);s., Inc., No. 90946-6
under

### .SOX. and Dodd-Frank supplementrather than preclude state or federal re,medies. 

### See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(d); 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(3). We respect Congress' choi9e to avail these administrative remedies in addition to our existing
commonlaw, and we declineto contravene that intent by barring Becker from full adjudication ofhis claim
.. ·.CONCLUSION We agree with the Court ofAppeals that Becker's allegations constitute a compelling case for protectionunder a public policytort. Takingthese allegations as true, as we must at this stage ofreview, Rockwood and CHS directed Beckerto commit a crime for which he wouldbe personallyresponsible. By doing so, "Rockwood and CHS forced himto choose betweenthe consequences ofdisobeying his employer and the consequences ofdisobeying criminal law." 

### Becker, 182 Wn. App, at 952 (citing DANIEL P. WESTMAN & NANCY M. MODESITT, WHISTLEBLOWING: THELAWOFRETALIATORYDISCHARGEch. 5.II.A.1, at 101 (2d ed. 2004)). When an employer intentionally uses the at-will doctrine to subvert public poli_cy inthis manner, it exposes itselfto potential liability for

9Becker v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., No. 90946-6 wrongful termination. We affirm the Court ofAppeals.

WE CONCUR:

# .~4-

10Beckerv. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., No. 90946-6 Fairhurst, J. (dissenting)

No. 90946-6 FAIRHURST, J. (dissenting)-! dissent because section 806(a) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), 18 U.S.C. § 1514A, 1 provides an adequate alternative remedy that should prevent Gregg Becker from bringing a claim for wrongful discharge in violation ofpublic policy. This is one ofthree cases before us that involves thejeopardy element ofthe tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy and that element's corresponding adequacy ofalternative remedies analysis. 

### SeeRosev. AndersonHay & Grain Co., No. 90975-0 (Wash. Sept. 17, 2015);

### Rickman v. PremeraBlue Cross, No. 91040-5 (Wash. Sept. 17, 2015). In

### Rose, I wrote a detailed dissent explaining

1The majority also asserts that section 922 ofthe Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer ProtectionAct (Dodd-Frank), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6, could provide an alternative statutory remedy. The majority is correct that Dodd-Frank could provide an adequate alternative remedy. However, since SOXprovides an adequateremedyto preclude GreggBecker's claimfor wrongful discharge, it is not necessary for this dissent to include an in depth discussion ofthe remedies available through Dodd-Frank. 1Becker v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., No. 90946-6 Fairhurst, J. (dissenting) 

### why I believe it is incorrect for the court to overrule precedent and adopt a new analytical frameworkthateliminatesthe adequate alternativeremedies analysis from
a claim for wrongful discharge in violation ofpublic policy. Pursuant to the framework established in Rose, 

### the majority finds that Becker's claim for wrongful discharge in violation ofpublic policy should not be dismissed. Majority at 2. Because I disagree with the analytical framework established in Rose, 

### I would analyze Becker's claim for wrongful discharge in violation ofpublic policy under this court's precedentpre-Rose 

### and would hold that Becker's claim should be dismissed because he cannot establish the jeopardy element. Prior to Rose, 

### to bring a claim for wrongful discharge in violation ofpublic policytheplaintiffwas requiredto prove (1) the existence ofclearpublicpolicy (the clarity element), (2) that discouragingthe conductinwhichhe or she engagedwould jeopardizethepublic policy (thejeopardyelement), and (3) the public-policy-linked conduct caused the dismissal (the causation element). Gardner v. LoomisArmored, Inc., 

### 128 Wn.2d 931, 941, 913 P.2d 377 (1996). Additionally, the employer must not be able to offer an overriding justification for the dismissal (the absence of justification element).Jd. The only element at issue here is thejeopardy element.

2Beckerv. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., No. 90946-6 Fairhurst, J. (dissenting)
Thejeopardy element ensures that an employer's managementdecisions will not be challenged unless a public policy is genuinely threatened. 

### Id. at 941-42. To establish jeopardy, the plaintiff must show that he or she "engaged in particular conduct, and the conduct directly relates to the public policy, or was necessary for the effective enforcement ofthe public policy." 

### Id. at 945 (emphasis omitted). The plaintiff also must show that other means of promoting the public policy are inadequate. I

### d. In addition, the plaintiffmust showhowthe threat ofdischarge from his orhercurrentpositionwill discourageothers from engagingindesirable conduct. I

### d. Before 

### Rose, proving thejeopardy element was the most difficult when the statute that declared the alleged public policy also provided a remedy. HENRY H. PERRITT, JR., WORKPLACETORTS: RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES§ 3.15, at78 (1991). This courtfound thatifan available statutoryremedywas adequate, thentheplaintiffwas precluded from bringing a tort claim for wrongful discharge. 

### See Korslund v. DynCorp Tri-Cities Servs., Inc., 156 Wn.2d 168, 182-83, 125 P.3d 119 (2005); 

### Cudney v. ALSCO, Inc., 172 Wn.2d 524, 531-33, 259 P.3d 244 (2011); 

### Hubbardv. Spokane County, 146 Wn.2d 699, 717, 50 P.3d 602 (2002). Thismade sensebecause thejeopardy elementwas intendedto ensure thatthe tort claim was available only if
a public policy was genuinelythreatened. Ifthe publicpolicywas already protected
3Becker v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., No. 90946-6 Fairhurst, J. (dissenting)


### under a statutory scheme, then there was no reason to recognize a tort remedy for the employee. It 

### is important to emphasize that the issue in deciding whether an employee has a claim for wrongful discharge is not whether the employee will be adequately
or fully compensated. "Instead, the inquiry is solely to decide whether the tort must be recognized to ensure thatthe public policy at issue is adequately protected." 

### Piel
v. City of Federal Way, 177 Wn.2d 604, 623, 306 P.3d 879 (2013) (Madsen, C.J., concurring in dissent). The majority asserts thatrejecting the adequacy analysis "merely eliminates a loophole for employers who intentionally contravene public policy to escape liability."Majority at 8. The adequacy ofalternativeremedies analysis didnotcreate
a loophole for an employer to escape liability. Where an adequate statutory remedy exists, the employer can be held liable to the same or nearly same extent under the statute. A statutoryremedy was adequate ifitprovided comprehensiveremedies. This court also examined the statutory language to determine ifthe legislature indicated that the statutory remedy, on its own, was not sufficient to vindicate the public policy. 

### See Piel, 177 Wn.2d at 617. This court found that a remedy was comprehensive ifit provided damages equivalent to those available in a tort action
4Becker v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., No. 90946-6 Fairhurst, J. (dissenting)


### and provided a process through which the employee could holdthe employer liable. 

### See Korslund, 156 Wn.2d at 182-83. In 

### Korslund, we found that an administrative remedy in the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 (ERA), 42 U.S.C. § 5851, adequately protected the public policy, such that the plaintiffs were precluded from asserting a claim for wrongful discharge. 

### Korslund, 156 Wn.2d at 181-83. The ERA provided an administrative process for adjudicating whistle-blower complaints and required a violator to reinstate the employee to his or her former position with the same compensation, terms and conditions ofemployment, back pay, and compensatory damages. 

### ld. Here, the statutory remedy in SOX is an adequate alternative remedy to protect the alleged public policy. SOX provides comprehensive whistle-blower protections that apply even where an employee believes that misconduct is aboutto
occur. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1514A(a)(1), 1341. SOX protects persons who disclose information that they reasonably believe constitutes a violation of Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rules orregulations whenthe information is provided to "a person with supervisory authority over the employee (or such other person working for the employerwho has the authorityto investigate, discover, orterminate misconduct)." 18 U.S.C. § 

### 1514A(a)(1)(C)). By enacting SOX, Congress intended


### 5Becker v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., No. 90946-6 Fairhurst, J. (dissenting)

to dismantle a corporate culture that discouraged employees from reporting fraudulentbehaviorinternally orto outside authorities. 

### Dayv. Staples, Inc., 555 F.3d 42, 52 (1st Cir. 2009). SOX provides that no company or agent ofthat company may discharge an employee because ofany lawful act done by that employee to provide information
or assist in an investigation regarding any conduct that "the employee reasonably believes constitutes a violation of section 1341, 1343, 1344, or 1348, any rule or regulation ofthe [SEC], or any provision ofFederal law relating to fraud against shareholders." 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1). SOX applies evenifthe company attempts to commit fraud. 

### Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 1341. A person who alleges discharge in violation ofSOX may seek reliefby filing a complaint with the secretary oflabor. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(1)(A). This action should be brought within 180 days after the date onwhichtheviolation occurs. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(D).2 Ifan employee prevails, he or she shall be entitled to all relief necessary to make the employee whole. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(c)(1). SOX specificallyprovides thatreliefshall include .reinstatement with the same seniority status that the employee had, back pay with

218 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(1)(B) provides that an action at law or equity can be brought in federal district court, ifthe secretary has not issued a final decision within 180 days and there is no showing the delay is due to bad faith ofcomplainant. 6Becker v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., No. 90946-6 Fairhurst, J. (dissenting) 

### interest, and compensation for any special damages that were the result of the discrimination. 18 U.S.C. § 

### 1514A(c)(2). The remedies available through SOX are very similar to the remedies available in the ERA examined in Korslund. 

### Under SOX, compensation for employees includes back pay with interest and compensation for any special damages. SOXprovides that aprevailing employee is entitledto "allreliefnecessary to make the employee whole." 18 U.S.C. 

### § 1514A(c)(l). This may include relieffor noneconomic damages, such as emotional distress. Halliburton, Inc. 

### v. Admin. Review Bd., 

### 771 F.3d 254, 267 (5th Cir. 2014); see also LockheedMartin Corp. 

### v. Admin. ReviewBd., 

### 717 F.3d 1121, 1138-39 (lOth Cir. 2013). Other courts that have examined the remedy available m SOX, have determined that SOX provides an adequate remedy such that the tort claim for wrongful discharge should be precluded. See Nunnally 

### v. XO Commc 'ns, 

### No. C07- 1323JLR, 2009 WL 112849, at* 12 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 15, 2009) (courtorder) (noting that SOX provided an adequate means for promoting the public policy); see also Lawson 

### v. FMR LLC, 

### 724 F. Supp. 2d 141, 165-66 (D. Mass. 2010), rev'don other grounds, 

### 670 F.3d 61 (1st Cir. 2012), rev'd and remanded, 

### _U.S._, 134 S. Ct. 1158, 188 L. Ed. 2d 158 (2014). 3

3However, in Willis v. Comcast ofOregon II, Inc., No. 06-1536-AA, 2007 WL 3170987, at *2 (D. Or. Oct. 25, 2007) (court order), the court found that the SOX remedy did not preclude 

### 7Becker v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., No. 90946-6 Fairhurst, J. (dissenting) 

### Since SOX'sremedies are comprehensive, I wouldnextexamine the statutory language to determine ifCongress indicatedthatthe statutory remedy is insufficient to vindicate the public policy. SOX contains a nonpreemption clause that reads, "Nothing in this section shall be deemed to diminish the rights, privileges, or remedies ofany employee under any Federal or State law, or under any collective bargaining agreement." 18 U.S.C. § 

### 1514A(d). Because the statute declares that its remedies do not preclude others, the Court of Appeals found that there was the '"strongestpossible evidence'" thatthe statutory remedies were inadequate on their
own to promote the public policy at issue. Becker v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., 

### 182 Wn. App. 935, 948, 332 P.3d 1085 (2014) (quoting Pie!, 

### 177 Wn.2d at 617). The majority also finds that the nonpreemption clause indicated that the remedy in SOX is not exclusive and does not preclude the tort action. Majority at 9. The nonpreemption clause in SOX is different from the statutory language at issue in Pie!. 

### Chapter 41.56 RCW, the statute at issue in Pie!, 

### established the statutory remedies available through the Public Employee Relations Commission,
the tort ofwrongful discharge because the legislature indicated that this statute was not intended to preempt available state law claims. In Oregon, to defend against a claim ofwrongful discharge in violation ofpublic policy, the defendant must demonstrate that the remedy for violation ofthe statute is adequate incomparisonto the remedy available under a common law tort action and that the legislature intended the statute to abrogate the common law. Olsen v. Deschutes County, 204 Or. App. 7, 14, 127 P.3d 655 (2006). In Washington, prior to Rose, an employer did not need to show that the legislature intended the statute to abrogate the common law. Instead, the employee needed to show there was not an adequate alternative remedy such that the tort claim is not necessary to protect the public policy. See Korslund, 156 Wn.2d at 183. 8Becker v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., No. 90946-6 Fairhurst, J. (dissenting)
and contained a provision that stated, "'The provisions ofthis chapter are intended tobe additionalto otherremedies and shallbe liberallyconstruedto accomplishtheir purpose.'" 

### Pie!, 177 Wn.2d at 617 (quoting RCW 41.56.905). Unlike the statute in 

### Pie!, nothing in SOX states thatthe remedy inthe statute is intendedto be additional to otherremedies. Instead, thenonpreemption clause in SOX states that it shouldnot preclude otherremedies. 4 While SOXdoes not expresslyprecludethe tort claim, its language does not indicate that its remedy is inadequate. The question this court shouldaskwhenevaluating an alternative statute is notwhetherthetortis precluded, but whetherthe statute adequately protects the public policy suchthatthe tort claim is not necessary. 

### See Korslund, 156 Wn.2d at 183. Since the remedies provided by the statute are comprehensive, the public policy is adequately protected and the public policy will notbe genuinely threatened by dismissing Becker'stort claim. BecauseI disagree withthe analytical framework establishedin

### Rose and find that the adequacy ofalternative remedies analysis is necessary to establish a claim for wrongful discharge in violation ofpublic policy, I dissent. Becker cannot satisfy thejeopardy element ofthe tort because he cannot show that SOX is an inadequate

4The ERA-the statute examined inKorslund-contained a similar nonpreemptionclause as in SOX. See 42 U.S.C. § 5851(h) ("This section may not be construed to expand, diminish, or otherwise affect any right otherwise available to an employee under Federal or State law."); Korslund, 156 Wn.2d at 182-83. This court found that nonpreemption clauses, like in the ERA, did not indicate that the statutory remedy was inadequate. Korslund, 156 Wn.2d at 183; see Pie!, 177 Wn.2d at 617. 9Becker v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., No. 90946-6 Fairhurst, J. (dissenting) remedy to promotethe allegedpublicpolicy. Congress established a comprehensive statutory remedial scheme in SOX. The remedial scheme is adequate to protect the publicpolicy. I would dismiss Becker's claim andreverse the Court ofAppeals.

10Becker v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., No. 90946-6 Fair hurst, J. (dissenting)

11

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