alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### UNITED STATES of America ex rel. LEE KUM HOY, Lee Kum Cherk and Lee Moon Wah, Relators, v. Edward *J.*SHAUGHNESSY, District Director of Immigration and Naturalization Service, New York, Respondent.

United States District Court, S. D. New York.

Nov. 16,1955.

*559Hong & Gim, New York City, Benny Gim, New York City, of counsel, for relators.

J. Edward Lumbard, U. S. Atty. for Southern Dist. of New York, New York City, Harold R. Tyler, Jr., Asst. U. S. Atty., New York City, Lester Friedman, Attorney, Immigration and Naturalization Service, New York City, of counsel, for respondent.

DIMOCK, District Judge.

This is a motion by relators pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.—presumably Rule 34—for production of documents, records and files. While no final disposition has been made of the writ of habeas corpus herein, and while, therefore, that writ is still pending before this court, the hearings before the Special Inquiry Officer have been reopened for a limited purpose. See U. S. ex rel. Lee Kum Hoy v. Shaughnessy, 123 F.Supp. 674. It appears that these reopened proceedings are now pending before the administrative authorities. The material requested by relators is for use in the administrative proceedings. In the absence of proof that the Special Inquiry Officer has acted improperly with respect to any application by relators for discovery-this court is powerless. The motion is denied.
#### In the Matter of Government General Employees Insurance Company, Respondent, v Pearson Constantino, Appellant.

[854 NYS2d 459]

On June 29, 2006 the appellant, Pearson Constantino was struck by a hit-and-run driver as he was riding a bicycle, and allegedly sustained injuries. He subsequently sought benefits under the “supplementary uninsured/underinsured motorist” (hereinafter SUM) provisions of the “Family Automobile Insurance Policy” (hereinafter the policy) issued by the Government Employees Insurance Company, sued herein as Government General Employees Insurance Company (hereinafter GEICO), to his fiancée nonparty Julia K. Wrona. When GEICO denied payment, Constantino demanded arbitration of the claim. GEICO then commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 seeking a permanent stay of arbitration on the ground that Constantino was not a “resident relative” under the policy and, therefore, was not entitled to SUM benefits for his injuries. Constantino countered that he was entitled to SUM benefits because, when Wrona purchased the policy from GEICO, she specifically sought coverage for him that was equal to her own, and because a page on a website maintained by GEICO listed Constantino as a “driver[ ] covered” and an “individual covered” under the policy. The Supreme Court granted GEICO’s petition for a permanent stay of arbitration, concluding that Constantino was not entitled to benefits because he was neither Wrona’s spouse nor related to her. We affirm.

*737The policy unambiguously listed only Wrona as the named insured. Insofar as relevant here, the policy’s SUM coverage provided benefits only to Wrona, her spouse, and their relatives, provided that they were residents of Wrona’s household. Constantino is not mentioned in the policy, and it is undisputed that he was neither married to nor related to Wrona when he was injured. Thus, Constantino was not entitled to SUM benefits under the terms of the policy.

Constantino’s contention that he was nonetheless entitled to SUM benefits because a web page maintained by GEICO listed him as an “individual covered” or as a “driver[ ] covered” under the policy is without merit. The policy provides that its “terms and provisions . . . cannot be . . . changed, except by an endorsement issued to form a part of this policy.” The web page does not constitute such an endorsement. In any event, inasmuch as the language of the policy admits of no ambiguity, resort may not be had to the extrinsic web page which is not part of the policy (see *Matter of State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v Russell,*39 AD3d 759, 761 [2007]; *cf. Kennedy v Valley Forge Ins. Co.,*84 NY2d 963 [1994], *affg*203 AD2d 930 [1994]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly found that Constantino was not entitled to SUM benefits under the policy.

Constantino’s remaining contention is without merit. Fisher, J.P., Dillon, McCarthy and Belen, JJ., concur.
AMENDMENT

                                 to
     
                   ASSUMPTION REINSURANCE AGREEMENT

                               Between
     
              UNIVERSAL GUARANTY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY
               hereinafter referred to as "the Company"

                                 and
     
              FIRST INTERNATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY
              hereinafter referred to as "the Reinsurer"
     

       WHEREAS, the Company and the Reinsurer have made and
     entered into an Assumption Reinsurance Agreement dated as of
     September 30, 1996 (the "Assumption Agreement"); and

       WHEREAS, the Company and the Reinsurer wish to amend
     certain provisions of the Assumption Agreement;

       NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual
     agreements, promises and covenants provided herein, the
     Company and the Reinsurer hereby agree to amend the
     Assumption Agreement as follows:


     SECTION 1.-DEFINITIONS

            All terms used in this Amendment shall be subject to
     the definitions provided in the Assumption Agreement.

            The definition of Reinsured Policies in Article I shall
     be replaced with the following:

            ""REINSURED POLICIES" means all paid-up life
     insurance and, if attached thereto, annuity policies,
     contracts, binders or certificates of insurance, and
     all riders, endorsements and amendments thereto,
     whether written or oral, issued or assumed by the
     Company, that are in force on the Effective Date,
     except those offered in settlement to so called "HIV"
     policyholders and paid-up business associated with the
     Company's Jr./Sr. Plan Single Premium Interest
     Sensitive Whole Life policies, including, without
     limitation, Policy Loans, all such Reinsured Policies
     being set forth in Schedule G of the Coinsurance
     Agreement." 

<PAGE>

     SECTION 2.-COUNTERPARTS

            This Amendment to the Assumption Agreement may be
     executed in several counterparts and each shall have the
     same force and effect as an original. 


     SECTION 3.-EFFECT

            Except as amended herein, the Assumption
     Agreement, together with all Exhibits, remains in full force
     and effect.

     
            IN WITNESS WHEREOF, UNIVERSAL GUARANTY LIFE INSURANCE
     COMPANY and FIRST INTERNATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY have
     by their respective officers made and entered into this
     Amendment as of the 30th day of September, 1996.
     
     UNIVERSAL GUARANTY LIFE             FIRST INTERNATIONAL LIFE
     INSURANCE COMPANY                   INSURANCE COMPANY
     
     
     James E. Melville                   Jeremy Starr
     By                                  By
      
     President                           Vice President, Reinsurance     
     Title                               Title
     
     
<PAGE>
<table class="regular" id="BLStable_2022_2_3_17_4" style="width: 95%;"><caption><span class="tableTitle">Chart 1. Percentage of employed mothers and women who are without children, working part time, by age</span></caption>
<thead>
<tr>
<th style="vertical-align: middle; min-width: 80px;" rowspan="1" scope="col">Age and total</th>
<th scope="col">Mothers</th>
<th scope="col">Women without children</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<th scope="row">
<p>Total employed part time</p>
</th>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>27.6</td>
</tr>
<tr class="greenbar">
<th scope="row">
<p>18 to 24</p>
</th>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>47.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<th scope="row">
<p>25 to 34</p>
</th>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr class="greenbar">
<th scope="row">
<p>35 to 44</p>
</th>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>16.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<th scope="row">
<p>45 to 54</p>
</th>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr class="greenbar">
<th scope="row">
<p>55 and over</p>
</th>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>35.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
<tfoot id="BLStable_2022_2_3_17_4_footnotes" style="display: table-footer-group;">
<tr class="footnotes">
<td class="footnotes" colspan="3">
<p>Note: Data include all working women.</p>
<p>Source: 2017–18 American Time Use Survey.</p>
</td>
</tr>
</tfoot>
</table>
<p></p>
Exhibit 99.1



OLD DOMINION ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Quarterly Report of Old Dominion Electric Cooperative (the Company) on
Form 10-Q for the period ending March 31, 2003 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Jackson E. Reasor, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18
U.S.C section 1350, as adopted pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | (1) |  | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- |  | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) |  | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.
| | --- |  | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



Date:  May 21, 2003

|/s/  JACKSON E. REASOR                                
|------------------------------------------------------
|Jackson E. Reasor President andChief Executive Officer





20
**Exhibit 31**

**Certifications**

I, RichardSimpson, certify that: 

1.        I have reviewed this report on Form 10-K and all reports on Form 10-D required to be filed in respect of the period covered by this report on Form 10-K of CitigroupCommercial Mortgage Trust 2013-GCJ11 (the “Exchange Act periodic reports”); 

2.        Based on my knowledge, the Exchange Act periodic reports, taken as a whole, do not containany untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3.        Based on my knowledge, all of the distribution, servicing and other informationrequired to be provided under Form 10-D for the period covered by this report is included in the Exchange Act periodic reports; 

4.        Based on my knowledge and the servicer compliance statement(s) required in this report underItem 1123 of Regulation AB, and except as disclosed in the Exchange Act periodic reports, the servicers have fulfilled their obligations under the servicing agreements in all material respects; and 

5.        All of the reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backedsecurities and their related attestation reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed securities required to be included in this report in accordance with Item 1122 of Regulation AB and Exchange Act Rules 13a-18 and 15d-18 have been included as an exhibit to this report, except as otherwise disclosed in this report. Any material instances of noncompliance described in suchreports have been disclosed in this report on Form 10-K.

In giving the certifications above, Ihave reasonably relied on information provided to me by the following unaffiliated parties: Wells Fargo Bank, National Association; LNR Partners, LLC; Pentalpha Surveillance LLC; U.S. Bank National Association; CoreLogic Commercial Real EstateServices, Inc.; National Tax Search, LLC; and Trimont Real Estate Advisors, Inc. 

Date:    March 29, 2019 

/s/ RichardSimpson                                

Richard Simpson 

President, Citigroup Commercial MortgageSecurities Inc. 

(senior officer in charge of securitization of the depositor) 

 

CGCMT 2013-GCJ11 Certifications (2018)
Percent of employed wage and salary workers 25 years and over
 who had 10 years or more of tenure with 
 their current employer, by age, 2008

  Age		      Percent
65 years and older	56.3
60 to 64		53.6
55 to 59		52.4
50 to 54		47.7
45 to 49		40.2
40 to 44		32.9
35 to 39		23.0
30 to 34		10.1
25 to 29		 2.3
[928 NYS2d 415]

#### Bell Atlantic Corporation, Doing Business as Verizon Communications, Respondent, v Friendly Realty and Management Corp., Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Term, Second Department,

May 26, 2011

*40APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

*Sajid H. Jaffrey,*Floral Park, for appellant. *Solomon & Solomon, P.C.,*Albany *(Douglas M. Fisher*of counsel), for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

Memorandum.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs.

In this action to recover for telephone services provided by plaintiff to defendant, the summons and complaint were served upon the Secretary of State, pursuant to Business Corporation Law § 306, in 2003. Upon defendant’s failure to appear and answer the complaint, plaintiff obtained a default judgment. Thereafter, defendant moved to vacate the default judgment. In an order entered March 15, 2010, the Civil Court denied defendant’s motion. On appeal, defendant claims that it did not receive notice of the summons and complaint because, in 1996, it had moved from the address to which process was mailed.

While there is no per se rule under CPLR 5015 which precludes a corporation from establishing, as its reasonable excuse for defaulting in an action, its failure to keep its current address on file with the Secretary of State *(Eugene Di Lorenzo, Inc. v A.C. Dutton Lbr. Co.,*67 NY2d 138, 143 [1986]), courts should consider, as one factor in determining whether such an excuse is reasonable, the length of time for which the address had not been kept current *(see id.).*Since defendant, by failing to update its address for seven years, breached its obligation to keep a current address on file with the Secretary of State (Business Corporation Law § 306), we find that defendant has not demonstrated a reasonable excuse for defaulting in this action *(Eugene Di Lorenzo, Inc.*at 143; *Widgren v 313 E. 9th Assoc.,*295 AD2d 146 [2002]; *Crespo v A.D.A. Mgt.,*292 AD2d 5 [2002]; *Cedeno v Wimbledon Bldg. Corp.,*207 AD2d 297 [1994]; *Long Is. Indus. Group Two LLC v Prime Communications Inc.,*13 Misc 3d 127[A], 2006 NY Slip Op 51668[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2006]).

While relief from a default judgment may be obtained pursuant to CPLR 317 where service was made in a manner other than by personal delivery and the defaulting party did not *41receive actual notice of the summons in time to defend *(Persaud v Gallante Props., Inc.,*11 AD3d 442 [2004]; *Udell v Alcamo Supply & Contr. Corp.,*275 AD2d 453 [2000]), here not only was the address that defendant had on file with the Secretary of State stale, but defendant also failed to rebut proof offered by plaintiff that an additional copy of the summons and complaint had been mailed to defendant’s current address. The affidavit of service raised a presumption that a proper mailing had occurred and that defendant had received the summons and complaint. Defendant’s mere denial of receipt, without more, was insufficient to rebut this presumption *(see Udell,*275 AD2d at 454; *Facey v Heyward,*244 AD2d 452 [1997]). Accordingly, defendant’s motion to vacate the default judgment was properly denied.

Pesce, RJ., Golia and Steinhardt, JJ., concur.
#### Sowles *v.*United States.

*Circuit Court, D. Vermont.*

August 6, 1884

Imperfect Record.

Case will not be heard upon an incomplete transcript of record

At Law.

*H. S. Royce,*for plaintiff in error.

*Kittredge Haskins,*U. S. Atty., and *W. D. Wilson,*for defendant.

Wallace, J.

The transcript of the record brought up on this writ of error consists of a declaration filed by the plaintiff, a consent by the respective attorneys for the p] aintiff and defendant to waive a trial by jury, and that the action be tried by the court, and the opinion of the judge of the district court who tried the cause, which concludes with a direction for a judgment for the plaintiff. There seems to have been no plea or answer on the part of the defendant, there is no bill of exceptions, and no formal judgment seems to have been entered.

If it were proper to assume that a judgment had been entered, it would be competent for the plaintiff in error to insist upon any error apparent upon the record, if any exists, and it would then be the duty of the court to inspect the declaration, to ascertain whether the court below had jurisdiction, and whether the declaration sets forth a cause of action, and upon this record only those questions could be considered. *Garland*v. *Davis,*4 How. 131; *Bennett*v. *Butterworth,*11 How. 669; *Suydam*v. *Williamson,*20 How. 427. As the record now is, no such inquiry can be made, and it is ordered that unless within 30 days the plaintiff in error applies for a *certiorari*to bring up a perfect record, or for leave to dismiss the writ of error and proceed anew, *(Elmore*v. *Grymes,*1 Pet. 469,) the writ of error shall stand dismissed.
```

[Federal Register Volume 82, Number 164 (Friday, August 25, 2017)]
[Notices]
[Page 40580]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2017-18055]

=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM

Formations of, Acquisitions by, and Mergers of Bank Holding 
Companies

    The companies listed in this notice have applied to the Board for 
approval, pursuant to the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 (12 U.S.C. 
1841 et seq.) (BHC Act), Regulation Y (12 CFR part 225), and all other 
applicable statutes and regulations to become a bank holding company 
and/or to acquire the assets or the ownership of, control of, or the 
power to vote shares of a bank or bank holding company and all of the 
banks and nonbanking companies owned by the bank holding company, 
including the companies listed below.
    The applications listed below, as well as other related filings 
required by the Board, are available for immediate inspection at the 
Federal Reserve Bank indicated. The applications will also be available 
for inspection at the offices of the Board of Governors. Interested 
persons may express their views in writing on the standards enumerated 
in the BHC Act (12 U.S.C. 1842(c)). If the proposal also involves the 
acquisition of a nonbanking company, the review also includes whether 
the acquisition of the nonbanking company complies with the standards 
in section 4 of the BHC Act (12 U.S.C. 1843). Unless otherwise noted, 
nonbanking activities will be conducted throughout the United States.
    Unless otherwise noted, comments regarding each of these 
applications must be received at the Reserve Bank indicated or the 
offices of the Board of Governors not later than September 20, 2017.
    A. Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas (Robert L. Triplett III, Senior 
Vice President) 2200 North Pearl Street, Dallas, Texas 75201-2272:
    1. Noble Bancorporation, Inc., Spring, Texas; to become a bank 
holding company by acquiring Falcon Bancorporation, Inc., and thereby 
indirectly acquiring First Bank and Trust of Memphis, both in Memphis, 
Texas.

    Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, August 22, 
2017.
Yao-Chin Chao,
Assistant Secretary of the Board.
[FR Doc. 2017-18055 Filed 8-24-17; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 6210-01-P
```
United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 10-1441

___________

Pamela Rhodes, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Eastern District of Arkansas.

Arkansas State University, *

* [UNPUBLISHED]

Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: August 4, 2010

Filed: August 11, 2010

___________

Before WOLLMAN, MELLOY, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Pamela Rhodes appeals the district court’s1

 adverse grant of summary judgment

in her employment-discrimination action against Arkansas State University. After

careful de novo review, see Hannoon v. Fawn Eng’g Corp., 324 F.3d 1041, 1045 (8th

Cir. 2003), we find no error in the district court’s order, see id. at 1048 (elements of

harassment claim); Box v. Principi, 442 F.3d 692, 696 (8th Cir. 2006) (elements of

race-discrimination and retaliation claims). Accordingly, we affirm. See 8th Cir. R.

47B. We deny appellee’s pending motion as moot.

______________________________

1

The Honorable Brian S. Miller, United States District Judge for the Eastern

District of Arkansas.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE> 5
<RESTATED>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1996
<CASH>                                       4,579,273
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  461,269
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                    156,648
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             5,420,364
<PP&E>                                       2,799,636
<DEPRECIATION>                                 716,728
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               7,552,289
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          891,766
<BONDS>                                        215,466
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        35,888
<OTHER-SE>                                   5,964,150
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 7,552,289
<SALES>                                      3,830,809
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             4,136,515
<CGS>                                        2,508,323
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                2,508,323
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             1,577,487
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              86,694
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (35,989)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (22,961)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (22,961)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.01)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.01)
<FN>
Accounts receivable are net of allowance of $154,000 at December 31, 1996.



</TABLE>
<PAGE>


                                                                    EXHIBIT 99.2


                    CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER

   PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 (18 U.S.C. 1350)

         The undersigned executive officer of Anchor BanCorp Wisconsin, Inc.
(the "Registrant") hereby certifies that the Registrant's Form 10-Q for the
three months ended September 30, 2002 fully complies with the requirements of
Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the information
contained therein fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
condition and results of operations of the Registrant.




                                          /s/ Michael W. Helser
                                          --------------------------------
                                          Michael W. Helser, Treasurer and
                                          Chief Financial Officer

November 11, 2002




                                       31