COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Elder and Overton 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

TONY CURTIS INGRAM, SR. 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 2720-96-2 CHIEF JUDGE JOHANNA L. FITZPATRICK 

 MARCH 3, 1998 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CHESTERFIELD COUNTY 

John F. Daffron, Jr., Judge 

 David B. Hargett (Joseph D. Morrissey; 

Morrissey, Hershner & Jacobs, on brief), for 

appellant. 

 Jeffrey S. Shapiro, Assistant Attorney 

General (Richard Cullen, Attorney General; 

Ruth Ann Morken, Assistant Attorney General, 

on brief), for appellee. 

 Tony Curtis Ingram, Sr. (appellant) was convicted in a bench 

trial of three counts of taking indecent liberties with a minor 

while maintaining a custodial or supervisory relationship in 

violation of Code § 18.2-370.1. On appeal, he contends the 

evidence was insufficient to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable 

doubt. For the following reasons, we affirm the convictions. 

 I. 

 "On appeal, 'we review the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable 

inferences fairly deducible therefrom.'" Archer v. Commonwealth, 

26 Va. App. 1, 11, 492 S.E.2d 826, 831 (1997) (citation omitted). 

 "'The judgment of a trial court sitting without a jury is 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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entitled to the same weight as a jury verdict and will not be set 

aside unless it appears from the evidence that the judgment is 

plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.'" Id.

 Appellant and his wife, Tammy, were experienced foster 

parents who had cared for between seventeen and twenty foster 

children prior to August 1991. In August 1991, pursuant to an 

emergency removal procedure, a Richmond city social worker 

removed five siblings - three girls and two boys - from the home 

of their mother and placed them with Mr. and Mrs. Ingram. At 

that time the Ingram household included the Ingrams' son, Tony 

Jr., and another foster child. The three sisters were L.P., who 

was age twelve in 1991 and seventeen at trial, C.T., who was age 

eleven in 1991 and fifteen at trial, and S.D., who was age four 

in 1991 and ten at trial. 

 After some time in the Ingrams' home, the five siblings 

expressed a desire to be adopted by the Ingrams. The children 

had relatives in Philadelphia who opposed the adoption and wanted 

custody.1

 The relationship between these relatives and the 

Ingrams was poor. For approximately a year, the children's 

behavior followed a pattern: first they would appear happy and 

want the Ingrams to adopt them, then they would speak to their 

relatives, become upset and rebellious for a few days, and would 

no longer want the adoption. In conversation with their 

relatives, the children also accused the Ingrams of using social 

 

 1The children's natural mother died in May 1993. 
 3 

services money intended for the children to buy a new car for 

themselves. These accusations and the pattern of fluctuating 

behavior caused the Ingrams to cut off telephone communication 

between the children and their relatives in Philadelphia. When 

the problems did not subside, the Ingrams requested that the 

children be removed from their home, with the understanding that 

if the children wanted to return, they could. In July 1994, the 

children were removed from the Ingram home. 

 Approximately one year after the children left the Ingram 

home, S.D., the youngest girl, confided to her foster parents' 

daughter that appellant had touched her sexually. Her sisters 

also accused appellant of improper sexual conduct, and he was 

tried on three counts of knowingly taking indecent liberties with 

a child in his custody. 

 Testimony at trial established that the three girls shared a 

room throughout their stay with the Ingrams. They were close to 

Tammy Ingram and discussed intimate subjects with her on multiple 

occasions. They had contact with their case worker outside the 

presence of the Ingrams, and they went to school, socialized, and 

visited relatives. The girls testified that none of them told of 

the abuse until more than a year after they had left the Ingram 

home. 

 All three girls testified at trial. L.P., the oldest, 

testified that "everything just started going wrong" in the 

middle of the first year with the Ingrams; she "was being 
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molested and everything and just not being treated . . . fair 

between [her] brothers and sisters." She testified that 

appellant began touching her over and then under her clothes. 

She claimed he would "caress [her] breast or [her] vagina . . . 

for . . . punishment." She further testified that appellant "put 

his finger in [her] vagina," but she could not say whether this 

happened more than once or when it happened. She added "[w]ell 

his mouth was on my vagina that once," and claimed that he 

propositioned her. She stated that these incidents occurred when 

she was alone with appellant in the basement family room or in 

her bedroom and that "during the day [she] was punished one time, 

that's when he came up to [her] room." 

 L.P. testified that she allowed appellant to do and say 

these things because she wanted to protect her sisters from him, 

and she was afraid that the children would be split up if she 

reported the acts. Additionally, appellant told her that if she 

spoke of his behavior, he would go to jail and the children would 

be separated. 

 C.T. testified that appellant began touching her "after 

about a year" of residence with the Ingrams. She claimed he 

grabbed her breasts almost daily when she hugged him before 

bedtime, even when Tammy Ingram was in the same room with them. 

In addition, C.T. testified that appellant attempted to place her 

hand on his penis on four occasions. She did not tell Tammy 

Ingram, with whom she had a close relationship, because she "was 
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afraid that [Mrs. Ingram] would hate me," and she did not tell 

the case worker because she did not trust her. 

 S.D., the youngest, testified that the first time appellant 

attempted sexual contact with her was when she and appellant were 

lying under a blanket watching television with the rest of the 

family. She claimed he attempted to place her hand on his penis, 

but that she resisted and moved to sit on the floor. S.D. also 

testified that she was grounded "most of the time" and that 

appellant would "come up to [her] room and he'd ask [her] to suck 

his dick." Additionally, she stated that while she was supposed 

to be grounded and in her room, she was sitting on the stairs and 

overheard a conversation in the kitchen in which appellant asked 

L.P. to "suck his dick." S.D. admitted that she did not tell 

anyone because she sometimes lies, and she was afraid no one 

would believe her. 

 Tammy Ingram testified that if the sisters were being 

sexually mistreated by appellant, she was sure they would have 

told her. She further testified that, due to the Ingrams' 

extensive experience with foster children, they had a standing 

rule that "at no time would either one of us be left alone with 

one particular child, there would always be somebody else with 

us, and we were never left alone with one particular child at any 

time." Additionally, Tammy Ingram testified that, to her 

knowledge, her husband was never alone with any of the girls 

during the three years they lived together. 
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 Appellant denied each allegation of sexual misconduct. 

Several additional witnesses who knew appellant and the girls 

testified to appellant's character and denied knowledge or 

suspicion of sexual abuse. 

 The trial court acknowledged that the central issue was one 

of credibility: 

 I listened closely to the testimony. I took 

notes in the testimony. I am aware of some 

things that I feel are just simply 

inconsistencies in the girls' statements, but 

the bottom line, as I see, is the children, 

and I'm convinced after hearing the testimony 

and evaluating this that the Commonwealth has 

proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt. 

So accordingly, I . . . find Mr. Ingram 

guilty as charged in each of the three 

indictments. 

 On October 13, 1996, the trial court denied appellant's 

motion to set aside the verdict. 

 I've had the opportunity to go back and read 

the transcript of the proceedings and read it 

away from the tension or as lawyers say the 

heat of trial, and upon review of all the 

matters, I've concluded that the Commonwealth 

has proved its case. 

The trial court sentenced appellant to five years in prison, four 

years suspended, for each count, resulting in a sentence of three 

years of active time in prison. 

 II. 

 Appellant challenges the girls' uncorroborated testimony of 

abuse as vague and inconsistent, and he argues that the alleged 

events are contrary to human experience and usual behavior to 

such an extent that the testimony was inherently incredible. 
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 "'It is within the province of the fact finder to evaluate 

the credibility of the witnesses . . . .'" Dicker v. 

Commonwealth, 22 Va. App. 658, 662, 472 S.E.2d 655, 657 (1996) 

(citation omitted). 

 "In testing the credibility and weight to be 

ascribed [to] the evidence, we must give 

trial courts and juries the wide discretion 

to which a living record, as distinguished 

from a printed record, logically entitles 

them. The living record contains many 

guideposts to the truth which are not in the 

printed record; not having seen them 

ourselves, we should give great weight to the 

conclusions of those who have seen and heard 

them." 

Nicholas v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 188, 194, 422 S.E.2d 790, 

794 (1992) (citation omitted). The conclusion of the fact finder 

"may only be disturbed on appeal if this Court finds that [the 

supporting] testimony was 'inherently incredible, or so contrary 

to human experience as to render it unworthy of belief.'" 

Robertson v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 854, 858, 406 S.E.2d 417, 

419 (1991) (citing Fisher v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 296, 299-300, 

321 S.E.2d 202, 204 (1984)). "Under settled principles of law, 

[a] child's testimony alone, if believed by the [fact finder], 

[is] sufficient to support appellant's conviction, even in the 
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absence of corroborating physical or testimonial evidence." Love 

v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 84, 90, 441 S.E.2d 709, 713 (1994). 

See Swanson v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 376, 382 S.E.2d 258 

(1989) (a ten year old's uncorroborated, impeached testimony that 

her uncle molested her was sufficient to find guilt). 

 In the instant case, the victims testified they had suffered 

abuse from appellant, and appellant denied abusing them. The 

trial court acknowledged that "the issue here is . . . 

credibility," and stated that "credibility issues are the hardest 

issues." After due consideration, the trial court determined 

that "the Commonwealth . . . proved its case beyond a reasonable 

doubt." 

 Appellant also contends the girls' delay of more than a year 

in reporting the abuse casts doubt on the validity of the claims. 

 "[W]hile the lapse of time between the alleged event and the 

report is certainly an issue, it is a question of weight rather 

than of admissibility. '[T]he accompanying circumstances must 

determine how far the delay has been successfully explained 

away.'" Lindsey v. Commonwealth, 22 Va. App. 11, 16, 467 S.E.2d 

824, 827 (1996) (citation omitted). A delay of several months 

before reporting abuse may be reasonably "explained by and 

completely consistent with the all too common circumstances 

surrounding sexual assault on minors - fear of disbelief by 

others and threat of further harm from the assailant." Woodard 

v. Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 24, 28, 448 S.E.2d 328, 330 (1994). 
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 In the instant case, evidence was presented that appellant 

threatened one child and that all feared separation if his 

actions were reported. Credible evidence explained the sisters' 

delay in reporting the abuse, and we cannot say that the 

evidence, when viewed in its entirety, was inherently incredible 

or contrary to human experience. For the foregoing reasons, we 

affirm the convictions. 

 Affirmed.