UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 07-5036

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

 v. 

ALEJANDERO ARANGO-LOPEZ, a/k/a Alejandero Jesus Arango, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Baltimore. Benson Everett Legg, Chief District 

Judge. (1:07-cr-00002-BEL) 

Submitted: July 27, 2009 Decided: August 7, 2009 

Before WILKINSON, GREGORY, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

William J. Baker, MORENO & ASSOCIATES, Chula Vista, California, 

for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, 

Bryan M. Giblin, Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore, 

Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
PER CURIAM: 

 After a jury trial, Alejandero Arango-Lopez was 

convicted of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to 

distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine powder, in 

violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846 (2006), and was 

sentenced to 151 months in prison. On appeal, Arango-Lopez 

argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to 

suppress evidence obtained in a warrantless search of the 

commercial truck he was driving and his subsequent statements, 

that he was entitled to a two-level reduction in offense level 

pursuant to the statutory “safety valve,” and that his sentence 

was unreasonable. Finding no error, we affirm. 

 This court reviews the factual findings underlying the 

district court’s denial of a motion to suppress for clear error 

and its legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Branch, 537 

F.3d 328, 337 (4th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 943 

(2009). The evidence is construed in the light most favorable 

to the prevailing party below. United States v. Uzenski, 434 

F.3d 690, 704 (4th Cir. 2006). 

 We have recognized that “[o]bserving a traffic 

violation provides sufficient justification for a police officer 

to detain the offending vehicle for as long as it takes to 

perform the traditional incidents of a routine traffic stop.” 

Branch, 537 F.3d at 335. Thus, in the course of a routine 

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traffic stop, an officer can a obtain driver’s license and 

registration and perform a computer check on these documents 

before issuing a citation. United States v. Farrior, 535 F.3d 

210, 217 (4th Cir. 2008). However, “[a]ny further investigative 

detention . . . is beyond the scope of the Terry1 stop and 

therefore illegal unless the officer has a reasonable suspicion 

of a serious crime or the individual consents to the further 

detention.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations 

omitted). Reasonable suspicion requires more than a hunch but 

less than probable cause, and may be based on the collective 

knowledge of officers involved in an investigation. Illinois v. 

Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123-24 (2000); United States v. Hensley, 

469 U.S. 221, 232 (1985). Courts assess the legality of police 

conduct during a Terry stop under the totality of the 

circumstances. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8 (1989). 

 Arango-Lopez was traveling over the speed limit and 

Trooper Stines possessed sufficient cause to stop him, request 

his license, registration, and other documents pertaining to 

commercial trucking, and examine them. Arango-Lopez argues that 

Trooper Stines had neither a reasonable suspicion nor probable 

cause to detain him beyond the initial traffic stop. Trooper 

Stines testified that during the initial traffic stop and review 

 1 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 

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of Arango-Lopez’s documentation he became suspicious of the 

legitimacy of Arango-Lopez’s trucking business and itinerary, 

thus justifying continued detention. Trooper Stines testified 

that during the questioning Arango-Lopez appeared extremely 

nervous and the nervousness did not dissipate once Stines 

informed him that he was merely writing him a warning ticket. 

Arango-Lopez’s bills of lading and log book also contained 

inconsistencies, including a large load of expensive electronics 

in an unsealed trailer, an unexplained day-and-a-half stop in 

Arkansas, and a circuitous route that was hundreds of miles 

longer than the more heavily-patrolled direct route. Based on 

the totality of the circumstances, Trooper Stines had a 

reasonable suspicion that Arango-Lopez was involved in criminal 

activity to detain him beyond the initial stop. 

 We also conclude that the warrantless search of the 

truck trailer was lawful. First, probable cause existed to 

support the search after a trained drug dog alerted to drugs in 

the truck trailer. Moreover, independent of probable cause, 

Arango-Lopez provided voluntary oral and written consent to the 

search. We therefore conclude that the district court did not 

err in refusing to suppress the evidence obtained during the 

search of the truck trailer or Arango-Lopez’s subsequent 

statements. 

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 We also reject Arango-Lopez’s contention that the 

district court erred in failing to apply the safety valve 

provision. A defendant is eligible for an offense level 

reduction and a sentence below an otherwise applicable statutory 

mandatory minimum if he meets all five requirements set forth in 

the statute.2 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) (2006); USSG § 5C1.2. To 

satisfy the fifth requirement, the defendant must “truthfully 

provide[] to the Government all information and evidence the 

defendant has concerning the offense.” Id. § 3553(f)(5). We 

have previously stated that the “plain and unambiguous language 

of [18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(5)] obligates defendants to demonstrate, 

through affirmative conduct, that they have supplied truthful 

information to the Government.” United States v. Ivester, 75 

F.3d 182, 184-85 (4th Cir. 1996). Moreover, a defendant must 

acknowledge responsibility before qualifying for an application 

of the safety valve, and the decision to proceed to trial is 

inconsistent with accepting one’s criminal actions. See United 

 2

 The statute applies only if the defendant: (1) “does not 

have more than one criminal history point”; (2) has not used 

violence or possessed a dangerous weapon in connection with the 

offense; (3) has not caused death or serious bodily injury; (4) 

“was not an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of others 

in the offense”; and (5) “not later than the time of the 

sentencing hearing, . . . has truthfully provided to the 

Government all information and evidence” concerning offenses 

that are part of the same course of conduct or a common scheme 

or plan. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(f) (West 2006); USSG § 5C1.2(a) 

(2006). 

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States v. Withers, 100 F.3d 1142, 1147 (4th Cir. 1996). The 

district court’s determination that a defendant has not 

satisfied the safety valve criteria is a question of fact 

reviewed for clear error. United States v. Wilson, 114 F.3d 

429, 432 (4th Cir. 1997). 

 The district court found that Arango-Lopez was not 

eligible for the safety valve because he did not accept 

responsibility for his actions, citing his rejection of an 

offered plea agreement that forced the Government to proceed to 

trial. Further, even after his conviction, Arango-Lopez made no 

affirmative effort to disclose all he knew to the Government. 

We conclude the district court’s finding was not clearly 

erroneous. 

 Finally, Arango-Lopez argues that his sentence was 

unreasonable. When determining a sentence, the district court 

must calculate the appropriate advisory guidelines range and 

consider this in conjunction with the factors set forth in 18 

U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006). Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 

____, 128 S. Ct. 586, 596 (2007). Appellate review of a 

district court’s imposition of a sentence, “whether inside, just 

outside, or significantly outside the [g]uidelines range,” is 

for abuse of discretion. 128 S. Ct. at 591. Sentences within 

the applicable guidelines range may be presumed by the appellate 

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court to be reasonable. United States v. Pauley, 511 F.3d 468, 

473 (4th Cir. 2007). 

 The district court followed the necessary procedural 

steps in sentencing Arango-Lopez, appropriately treating the 

sentencing guidelines as advisory, properly calculating and 

considering the applicable guidelines range, performing an 

individualized assessment of the § 3553(a) factors to the facts 

of the case, and stating in open court the reasons for the 

sentence. United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 

2009). (J.A. 88-89). The court determined that a sentence 

within the guidelines was warranted, due to the serious nature 

of the offense, but in light of Arango-Lopez’s good character 

references and work history found a sentence at the bottom of 

the guidelines range appropriate. Arango-Lopez’s sentence, 

which is the bottom of the applicable guidelines range and below 

the statutory maximum of life, may be presumed on appeal to be 

reasonable. Thus, the district court did not abuse its 

discretion in imposing the 151-month sentence. 

 Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district 

court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process. 

AFFIRMED