UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. No. 96-4607

TONY O'NEAL HARRIS,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of South Carolina, at Greenville.

Henry M. Herlong, Jr., District Judge.

(CR-95-912)

Submitted: February 27, 1997

Decided: March 13, 1997

Before MURNAGHAN, NIEMEYER, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

Adrian E. Cooper, Rock Hill, South Carolina, for Appellant. J. Rene

Josey, United States Attorney, E. Jean Howard, Assistant United

States Attorney, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________
OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Tony O'Neal Harris pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute crack

cocaine, 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1994). He appeals his 250-month sentence,

contending that the district court considered unreliable evidence to

find that he was responsible for at least 1.5 kilograms of crack, and

that the court clearly erred in finding that he was a leader in the

offense. United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual,

§§ 2D1.1, 3B1.1(c) (Nov. 1995). We affirm.

Harris was arrested on November 20, 1995, after he and Eulee

Scott sold two ounces of crack to Tyrone Moore and Howard Davis

in Chester, South Carolina. Moore and Davis had previously been

arrested and were cooperating with authorities. Another six ounces of

crack were recovered from a hidden compartment in Harris' Dodge

van. At Harris' sentencing hearing, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Agent Michael Doaerty testified that he learned in interviews with

Davis and Moore that Harris and Scott brought crack from Florida on

a weekly basis beginning in late September 1995. Both Harris and

Scott lived in Florida. Harris sometimes used his Ford Crown Victoria

which also had a hidden compartment. He had purchased the Dodge

van in the name of a girlfriend, who lived in Charlotte, North Carolina. He also had a cellular phone in her name and the telephone

records showed numerous calls to Charlotte and Gastonia in North

Carolina and to Miami and Fort Lauderdale in Florida. The agent also

interviewed Scott, who said that most of the drugs he and Harris

transported from Florida were sold in Gastonia.

Davis also testified at the sentencing hearing. He said Harris was

in charge, but did not always come with Scott to Chester to deliver

drugs. Davis said he personally saw six or seven ounces of crack each

time a delivery was made. He said he remembered five or six deliveries during the time he and Moore were buying crack from Harris.

Taking the lowest amounts, this evidence showed deliveries of

slightly less than a kilogram of crack to Davis and Moore. The district

court estimated that Harris was involved with at least a kilogram and

a half in the course of the conspiracy.

 2
We find that the district court based its determination of the

amount of crack attributable to Harris on reliable evidence. Both witnesses were subject to cross-examination and were questioned by the

court. See USSG § 2D1.1, comment. (n.12); United States v. Hicks,

948 F.2d 877, 883 (4th Cir. 1991) (due process is satisfied if factual

evidence relied on has minimal indicia of reliability beyond mere allegation). The court did not rely on protected information provided by

Harris pursuant to his plea agreement, but on information from his codefendants. Moreover, the court's finding that Harris exercised a leadership position was not clearly erroneous because it was supported by

Davis' testimony as well as the fact that Harris owned the speciallyequipped cars which were used to transport the drugs.

The sentence is therefore affirmed. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented

in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

 3