alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
NO. 07-05-0337-CV

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AT AMARILLO

PANEL C

NOVEMBER 8, 2005

______________________________

IN THE MATTER OF D.L.C.

_________________________________

FROM THE COUNTY COURT OF SWISHER COUNTY;

NO. 387; HONORABLE HAROLD KEETER, JUDGE

_______________________________

Before QUINN, C.J., and REAVIS and HANCOCK, JJ.

ON ABATEMENT AND REMAND

Appellant D.L.C., a juvenile, appeals the trial court’s Order of Adjudication and

Disposition (TYC Committment) which found that D.L.C. had engaged in delinquent

conduct and placed him with the Texas Youth Commission for an indeterminate sentence

not to exceed his 21st birthday. D.L.C. timely filed a notice of appeal on September 23,

2005. By letter, dated September 26, this court notified D.L.C. that the $125 filing fee had

not been paid. In response, on October 10, D.L.C. filed with this court Appellant’s Motion

for Extension of Time to File Appeal Fee and an Affidavit of Inability to Pay Costs.
1Further reference to Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure will be by reference to

“Rule __.”

2

Section 56.01(b) of the Texas Family Code provides that the requirements

governing a juvenile appeal are as in civil cases generally. TEX.FAM.CODE ANN. § 56.01(b)

(Vernon 2002). Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 20.1(c)(1) and (3)1

 requires that an

affidavit of indigence be filed in the trial court with or before the notice of appeal, but allows

the appellate court to extend the deadline if, within 15 days of the filing of the notice of

appeal, the appellant files a motion to extend time that complies with Rule 10.5(b). Were

this a regular appeal, we would be compelled to find that, because appellant had failed to

comply with Rule 20.1(c)(1) and (3), he was not entitled to proceed on appeal without

advance payment of costs. See Holt v. F.F. Enters., 990 S.W.2d 756, 759

(Tex.App.–Amarillo 1998, pet. denied). However, the Texas Supreme Court has held that

Rule 20.1 does not apply to appeals under the Juvenile Justice Code. See In the Matter

of K.C.A., 36 S.W.3d 501, 502 (Tex. 2000). Rather, the provisions of the Texas Family

Code apply and a finding of indigence can be predicated on either a hearing or an affidavit

by the child’s parent. Id. at 503. The appropriate forum for such a determination is the trial

court. In the Matter of L.P., 51 S.W.3d 855, 855 (Tex.App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no

pet.) (citing In the Matter of K.C.A., 36 S.W.3d at 503).

Therefore, we abate the appeal and remand the matter to the trial court. Upon

remand, the judge of the court shall immediately cause notice to be given of and conduct

a hearing to determine whether the juvenile is indigent.
3

In support of its determination, the trial court shall prepare and file written findings

of fact and conclusions of law and cause them to be included in a supplemental clerk’s

record. The hearing proceedings shall be transcribed and included in a supplemental

reporter’s record. These supplemental records shall be submitted to the clerk of this court

no later than December 5, 2005.

Per Curiam
CHEFS INTERNATIONAL, INC. AND SUBSIDIARIES

EXHIBIT 21
----------


                                  SUBSIDIARIES

         The following table indicates the wholly owned subsidiaries of the
Company, their respective states of incorporation and the restaurants operated
by each:

                            State of
Name                        Incorporation          Restaurants
----                        -------------          -----------

Chefs International         Florida                Jack Baker's Lobster Shanty
     Palm Beach, Inc.                                   Vero Beach, Florida

Hightstown REB, Inc.        New Jersey             Jack Baker's Lobster Shantys
                                                        Pt. Pleasant Beach,
                                                        Toms River and
                                                        Hightstown, New Jersey
Exhibit 10.17


 


AMENDMENT


TO THE FIRST FARMERS AND MERCHANTS NATIONAL BANK

GROUP TERM CARVE-OUT PLAN DATED JULY 23, 2002


 


THIS
AMENDMENT, made and entered into this
           day of
                          ,
2008, by First Farmers and Merchants Bank, successor in interest to First
Farmers and Merchants National Bank, a bank organized and existing under the
laws of the State of Tennessee (hereinafter referred to as the “Bank”), shall
effectively amend the First Farmers and Merchants National Bank Group Term
Carve-Out Plan dated July 23, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as the “Agreement”)
as specifically set forth herein. 
Pursuant to Article 12 of the Agreement, the Bank and the
Participant hereby adopt the following amendment:


 


1.)                                   Section 4.2.1,
“Death Prior to Termination of Employment,” shall be deleted in its entirety
and replaced with the following Section 4.2.1:


 


4.2.1        Death Prior to Termination of Employment.  If the Participant dies while employed by the
Bank, the Participant’s beneficiary shall be entitled to a benefit equal to the
lesser of two and one-half (2 1⁄2) times (one times for Mr. Waymon L.
Hickman) the deceased Participant’s Base Annual Salary at the effective date of
the Plan (the amount of which is specified in Exhibit A) and the
net-at-risk insurance portion of the proceeds. 
The net-at-risk insurance portion is the total proceeds minus the cash
surrender value of the policy.


 


2.)                                   Section 4.2.2,
“Death After Termination of Employment,” shall be deleted in its entirety and
replaced with the following Section 4.2.2:


 


4.2.2        Death After Termination of Employment.       If, pursuant to Article 5, a
terminated Participant has a Vested Insurance Benefit at the date of death, the
Participant’s beneficiary shall be entitled to a benefit equal to the lesser of
two and one-half (2 1⁄2) times (one times for Mr. Waymon L. Hickman) the
Participant’s Base Annual Salary (as specified in Exhibit A) and the
net-at-risk insurance portion of the proceeds. 
The net-at-risk insurance portion is the total proceeds minus the cash
surrender value of the policy.


 


This Amendment shall be
effective the 1st day of December, 2007.  To the extent that any term, provision, or
paragraph of the Agreement is not specifically amended herein, or in any other
amendment thereto, said term, provision, or paragraph shall remain in full
force and effect as set forth in said Agreement.


 


[signatures
on following page]


 

















 


IN
WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto acknowledge that each has
carefully read this Amendment and executed the original thereof on the first
day set forth hereinabove, and that, upon execution, each has received a
conforming copy.


 


	
   

  	
  FIRST FARMERS AND MERCHANTS
  BANK

  
	
   

  	
  Columbia,
  Tennessee

  
	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
  By:

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  (Bank Officer other
  than Insured)

  
	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
  Title:

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
  PARTICIPANT
**Exhibit
        23.2**
 
 **CONSENT
        OF MOORE STEPHENS, P.C.**
 
 **CONSENT
        OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM**
 
 
  We
        consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statement of
        Dialysis Corporation of America on Form S-8, Registration No. 333-122455,
        pertaining to certain stock options under the 1999 Stock Option Plan of Dialysis
        Corporation of America, of our report dated February 18, 2005 (except for
        Note
        16 as to which the date is March 15, 2005), relating to the consolidated
        financial statements and financial schedule of Dialysis Corporation of America
        included in the Annual Report on Form 10-K/A, Amendment No. 1, for the year
        ended December 31, 2004.
  
  /S/
        MOORE STEPHENS, P.C.
 MOORE
        STEPHENS, P.C.
 
  August
        9, 2005
  Cranford,
        New Jersey
_________________________________________ 

 

 

Order Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan 

January 22, 2008 Clifford W. Taylor,

 Chief Justice 

135209 Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Marilyn Kelly 

Maura D. Corrigan 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman,

 Justices 

v SC: 135209 

 COA: 271293 

Wayne CC: 06-001040-01

JERRY GLOVER,

 Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the September 25, 2007 

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not 

persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. 

l0114 

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

January 22, 2008 

 Clerk
#### BOWLES, Price Administrator, v. SEBAS-TOPOL BERRY GROWERS ASS’N.

Civil Action No. 4945.

District Court, N. D. California, N. D.

Oct. 12, 1945.

*503W. H. Brunner, of San Francisco, Cal., for plaintiff.

Albert Picard, of San Francisco, Cal., and Libby & Finn, of Sebastopol, Cal., for defendant.

WELSH, District Judge.

Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that defendant is liable for treble damages in the sum of $55,734.96 for violations of Section 4(a) of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix § 904(a).

Defendant moved to dismiss on the ground that said complaint fails to state a claim against it upon which relief can be granted. It also made a motion for a more definite statement of the nature of the allegations, and for a bill of particulars.

While the allegations are quite general, they are adequate to comply with the requirements of Rules 8(a) and 8(e) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c.

This Court had occasion recently to analyze a similar complaint in Bowles v. Flotill Products, 4 F.R.D. 499. Reference is hereby made to the opinion filed therein on September 21, 1945.

The Court believes that, in this case, as in that one, the motion for a bill of particulars should be granted. Paragraph IV of the complaint reads: “That within one year last past defendant sold and delivered frozen berries, including blackberries, boysenberries and youngberries, packed in containers other than barrels, the maximum prices for which said sales and deliveries were fixed until August 6, 1943, under said Maximum Price Regulation No. 207 and after August 6, 1943 under said Maximum Price Regulation No. 409, at prices in excess of those established under said Maximum Price Regulations.”

Defendant is entitled to more specific and detailed information concerning these alleged overcharges. It is entitled to be informed with reference to when, where and to whom it is alleged to have sold blackberries, boysenberries and youngberries, and each of said types of berries, at prices in excess of those established under Maximum Price Regulations No. 207 and No. 409.

As was said in Bowles v. Jacobson, D.C., 4 F.R.D. 447, 448: “It could be, or should be, easy for the plaintiff to set forth the specific date or dates, as i,t will be required to do upon trial.”

It is hereby further ordered that demotions to dismiss and to make more certain are denied, and that defendant’s motion for a bill of particulars is granted, and plaintiff is directed to furnish defendant, within 20 days after notice hereof, with an itemized statement of the alleged violations of said Maximum Price Regulations No. 207 and No. 409, including the dates on which and the persons to whom said defendant is alleged to have made each of the sales, the prices at which defendant .so sold, and the amounts by which the prices at which the same are alleged to have been sold exceeded said maximum prices.

It is hereby further ordered that defendant be required to answer within 20 days after service of such bill of particulars.
```

[Congressional Bills 114th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 485 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

114th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 S. 485

To prohibit the use of eminent domain in carrying out certain projects.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                           February 12, 2015

Mr. Boozman (for himself and Mr. Cotton) introduced the following bill; 
   which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Energy and 
                           Natural Resources

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To prohibit the use of eminent domain in carrying out certain projects.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Assuring Private Property Rights 
Over Vast Access to Land Act'' or the ``APPROVAL Act''.

SEC. 2. PROHIBITION ON EMINENT DOMAIN FOR CERTAIN PROJECTS.

    Section 1222 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (42 U.S.C. 16421) is 
amended--
            (1) by redesignating subsections (d) through (g) as 
        subsections (f) through (i), respectively; and
            (2) by inserting after subsection (c) the following:
    ``(d) Prohibition on Eminent Domain.--Notwithstanding any other 
provision of law (including regulations), the Secretary, SWPA, and WAPA 
may not carry out any Project under this section through the use of 
eminent domain, unless the use of eminent domain is explicitly 
authorized by--
            ``(1) the Governor and the head of each applicable public 
        utility commission or public service commission of the affected 
        State; and
            ``(2) the head of the governing body of each Indian tribe 
        the land of which would be affected.
    ``(e) Siting Requirement.--To the maximum extent practicable, a 
Project carried out under this section shall be sited on--
            ``(1) an existing Federal right-of-way; or
            ``(2) Federal land managed by--
                    ``(A) the Bureau of Land Management;
                    ``(B) the Forest Service;
                    ``(C) the Bureau of Reclamation; or
                    ``(D) the Corps of Engineers.''.
                                 <all>
```
EXHIBIT 11

         COMMERCE GROUP CORP. AND CONSOLIDATED SUBSIDIARIES
         --------------------------------------------------
          SCHEDULE OF COMPUTATION OF NET INCOME PER SHARE


                                          Years Ended March 31
                                     2002          2001          2000
                              -----------   -----------   -----------
BASIC
-----

Net income (loss) for
 primary income per
 common share                 $  (43,171)   $   129,790   $ (396,232)
                              ===========   ===========   ===========
Weighted average
 number of common
 shares outstanding
 during the year - basic       16,349,170    14,174,662    12,172,867
                              ===========   ===========   ===========
Income (loss) per
 common share - basic         $   (.0026)   $     .0092   $   (.0326)
                              ===========   ===========   ===========
DILUTED
-------

Net income (loss) for
 basic and diluted
 income per common share      $  (43,171)   $   129,790   $ (396,232)
                              ===========   ===========   ===========
Weighted average number
 of common shares used
 in calculating income per
 common share                  16,349,170    14,174,662    12,172,867

Add incremental shares representing:
  Shares issuable upon
   exercise of stock
   options                        670,000       920,000     1,254,900

Shares issuable upon
 payment of stock loans
 and interest                           0             0             0


Stock rights                            0             0       625,235
                              -----------   -----------   -----------
Weighted average number
 of shares used in
 calculation of fully
 diluted income per share      17,109,170    15,094,662    14,053,002
                              ===========   ===========   ===========
Fully diluted income
 (loss) per common
 share                        $   (.0025)   $     .0086   $   (.0282)
                              ===========   ===========   ===========
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
 
<ARTICLE> 9
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1998
<CASH>                                          84,578
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                           5,100
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                                45,000
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                     0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                    503,699
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                               0
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                                 0
<LOANS>                                      1,400,103
<ALLOWANCE>                                   (24,510)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               2,122,019
<DEPOSITS>                                   1,890,755
<SHORT-TERM>                                    23,369
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                             32,748
<LONG-TERM>                                          0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        15,930
<OTHER-SE>                                     159,217
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>               2,122,019
<INTEREST-LOAN>                                122,626
<INTEREST-INVEST>                               26,897
<INTEREST-OTHER>                                 1,988
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                               151,511
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                              58,276
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              60,508
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                           91,003
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                    5,100
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                                (81)
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                                 71,767
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 46,538
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                      46,538
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    30,665
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     2.14
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     2.09
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                    4.83
<LOANS-NON>                                     10,011
<LOANS-PAST>                                     2,267
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                     0
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                      0
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                                26,721
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                    9,459
<RECOVERIES>                                     2,148
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                               24,510
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                            24,510
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                              0
        

</TABLE>
**Exhibit
32.1**
 
 CERTIFICATION
OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
 AND CHIEF
FINANCIAL OFFICER
 PURSUANT
TO SECTION 13a-14(b) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 AND
 18 U.S.C.
SECTION 1350
 
 In
connection with the Annual Report of Dialysis Corporation of America (the
“Company”) on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2004 as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date therein specified (the
“Report”), the undersigned, Stephen W. Everett, President and Chief Executive
Officer of the Company, and Don Waite, Vice President of Finance and Chief
Financial Officer of the Company, each certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section
1350, that to the best of our knowledge:
 
 (1)  The
Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934; and
 
 (2)  The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
 
 /s/
      Stephen W. EverettSTEPHEN W. EVERETT, President and ChiefExecutive Officer/s/
      Don WaiteDON WAITE, Vice President of Finance
      andChief
      Financial OfficerDated: March 29, 2005
#### In the Matter of Charles Ross, Petitioner, v Donald Selsky, as Director of Special Housing and Inmate Disciplinary Programs, Respondent.

[854 NYS2d 565]

Petitioner was charged in a misbehavior report with conspiring to introduce drugs and soliciting others to smuggle drugs into the facility at which he was incarcerated. At the conclusion of the tier III disciplinary hearing that followed, petitioner was found guilty and a penalty of 36 months in the special housing unit, a corresponding loss of privileges and a recommended 24 months of loss of good time was imposed. Upon administrative review, the period of confinement to the special housing unit was reduced to 12 months. Petitioner thereafter commenced this proceeding, subsequently transferred to this Court, seeking to annul the underlying determination.

We confirm. Contrary to petitioner’s assertion, the confidential information received into evidence at the hearing was sufficiently detailed to permit the Hearing Officer to independently assess its credibility and reliability *(see Matter of Watkins v*Goord, 307 AD2d 503, 504 [2003], *appeal dismissed and lv denied*1 NY3d 532 [2003]). Such information, in turn, coupled with the misbehavior report, the testimony of the senior investigating officer and the taped telephone conversation between petitioner and another, provides substantial evidence to support the findings of guilt *(see id.).*

As to petitioner’s procedural objections, his claim that he was denied the right to call witnesses and present documentary evidence, as well as his assertion that there was an insufficient foundation laid for the introduction of certain drug test results, were not raised at the disciplinary hearing and, hence, are not preserved for our review *(see Matter of Frazier v Artus,*40 AD3d 1288 [2007]). In any event, the record reveals such claims to be meritless. Finally, with regard to the adequacy of the misbehavior report, we find that it was sufficient to apprise petitioner of the charges against him and enable him to prepare a defense. In view of the concerns for institutional safety and the nature of the ongoing investigation, the investigator’s failure to identify *1066all of the alleged coconspirators and each date upon which they allegedly conspired did not render it defective *(see Matter of Jackson v Smith,*13 AD3d 685 [2004], *lv denied*4 NY3d 707 [2005]; *Matter of Watkins v Goord,*307 AD2d at 504; *Matter of Mays v Goord,*285 AD2d 847, 848 [2001], *lv denied*97 NY2d 603 [2001]). Accordingly, the underlying determination is confirmed.

Peters, J.P., Rose, Lahtinen, Kane and Malone Jr., JJ., concur. Adjudged that the determination is confirmed, without costs, and petition dismissed.
COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-14-00287-CR

Donte Wordlaw

v.

The State of Texas

§

§

§

§

§

From the 396th District Court

of Tarrant County (1282730W)

February 5, 2015

Opinion by Justice Gabriel

(nfp)

JUDGMENT

This court has considered the record on appeal in this case and holds that 

there was error in the trial court’s judgment. The judgment and the attached 

order to withdraw funds in the burglary are modified to delete $4,490 in 

restitution. It is ordered that the judgment of the trial court is affirmed as 

modified.

SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

By /s/ Lee Gabriel

 Justice Lee Gabriel