FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

_____________________________

No. 1D18-2703

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LEON COUNTY, FLORIDA,

Petitioner,

v.

LAKESHORE GARDENS 

HOMEOWNERS’ ASSOCIATION,

INC., a Florida not for profit 

corporation; LAKESHORE 

GARDENS HOMEOWNERS’

ASSOCIATION, INC., a Florida not 

for profit corporation, as the 

representative for the class of all 

lot owners of Lakeshore 

Gardens, as per plat thereof 

recorded in Plat Book 12, Page 

2, of the Official Records of Leon 

County, Florida; LEON COUNTY 

TAX COLLECTOR; and LEON 

COUNTY PROPERTY APPRAISER,

Respondents.

_____________________________

Petition for Writ of Certiorari—Original Jurisdiction.

February 28, 2019
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PER CURIAM.

Leon County has filed a petition for writ of certiorari in this 

Court seeking review of the circuit court’s nonfinal order granting

the motion to dismiss its Petition in Eminent Domain filed by 

Lakeshore Gardens Homeowners’ Association, Inc. Through its 

petition filed below, Leon County sought to exercise its eminent 

domain authority over certain common area property in the 

Lakeshore Gardens neighborhood for use as an easement. The 

neighborhood reportedly has more than 100 property owners, all 

of which have an interest in the common area. 

The circuit court dismissed the petition on the basis it was

reliant only upon Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.221 in naming

the homeowners association rather than joining, as indispensable 

parties, each individual property owner as specified in section 

73.021, Florida Statutes. In granting the association’s motion to 

dismiss, the circuit court ruled that while the homeowners 

association contended “it does not have authority to act on behalf 

of the homeowners . . . at this stage of the proceedings, it is more 

significant that the [petition] contain[ed] no allegations that the 

Association has the needed legal authority.” Accordingly, the 

circuit court granted Leon County twenty days to submit an 

amended petition, presumably to list “[t]he names, places of 

residence, legal disabilities, if any, and interests in the property of 

all owners . . . ” in the affected area, as prescribed by section 

73.021(4), Florida Statutes.

We grant Leon County’s petition for writ of certiorari. Despite 

the general directions in section 73.021(4) for naming 

indispensable parties, section 720.303(1), Florida Statutes,

provides in relevant part that “the [homeowners] association may 

institute, maintain, settle, or appeal actions or hearings in its 

name on behalf of all members concerning matters of common 

interest to the members . . . [and] may defend actions in eminent 

domain or bring inverse condemnation actions.” (Emphasis added.)

In like manner, rule 1.221 expressly permits a homeowners

association to “institute, maintain, settle, or appeal actions or 

hearings in its name on behalf of all association members 

concerning matters of common interest to the members, including, 

but not limited to: . . . (6) defense of actions in eminent domain or 
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prosecution of inverse condemnation actions.” Because, to date,

Florida’s appellate courts have not addressed the propriety of 

naming the homeowners association as the sole party representing

the class of homeowners under the statute and rule just cited, we 

turn to the decisions of the Second District in Tedeschi v. Surf Side 

Tower Condominium Ass’n, 35 So. 3d 915 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010), and 

the Third District in Trintec Construction Inc. v. Countryside 

Village Condominium Ass’n, 992 So. 2d 277 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008).

Both Tedeschi and Trintec Construction addressed the issue as it 

relates to condominium associations in the context of petitions for 

writs of certiorari and both held that rule 1.221 authorizes a 

plaintiff to name only the condominium association, rather than

having to name all the condominium unit owners as indispensable 

parties. We apply the logic expressed in Tedeschi and Trintec 

Construction to reach the same conclusion in the instant case.

As a preliminary matter,

[b]efore a court may grant certiorari relief from the 

denial of a motion to dismiss, the petitioner must 

establish the following three elements: “‘(1) a departure 

from the essential requirements of the law, (2) resulting 

in material injury for the remainder of the case (3) that 

cannot be corrected on postjudgment appeal.’”

Williams v. Oken, 62 So. 3d 1129, 1132 (Fla. 2011) (quoting Reeves 

v. Fleetwood Homes of Fla., Inc., 889 So. 2d 812, 822 (Fla. 2004) 

(quoting Bd. of Regents v. Snyder, 826 So. 2d 382, 387 (Fla. 2d DCA 

2002))). “The last two elements are jurisdictional and must be 

analyzed before the court may even consider the first element.” Id.

In Tedeschi, the Second District held that by failing to 

acknowledge the provisions of rule 1.221, “[t]he circuit court 

departed from the essential requirements of the law by requiring 

the [petitioners/plaintiffs] to include the more than eighty other 

members of the condominium association in their lawsuit . . . .” 35 

So. 3d at 919. Significantly, it went on to find that the circuit 

court’s order improperly requiring the petitioners/plaintiffs “to file 

their complaint against over eighty additional defendants, [] would 

cause a material injury for the remainder of the proceedings for 

which there is no adequate remedy on appeal.” Id. at 920 (citing 

Trintec Constr., Inc., 992 So. 2d at 280). The Second District
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expressed its logic in the following discussion of case law, including 

Trintec Construction:

In Parkway Bank v. Fort Myers Armature Works, Inc., 

658 So. 2d 646, 649-50 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995), this court 

noted that where the issues to be resolved address 

procedures designed to avoid litigation, those issues can 

be reviewed by certiorari. For example, “an order 

dispensing with a statutorily mandated presuit 

procedure, which is a condition precedent to a legal 

proceeding,” is reviewable by certiorari “because the 

purpose of the presuit screening is to avoid the filing of 

the lawsuit in the first instance.” Id. at 649. In Parkway 

Bank, this court further noted that limited certiorari 

review was permitted to consider cases involving “the 

statutory procedures for amending a complaint to allege 

punitive damages because those safeguards cannot be 

remedied postjudgment.” Id.

In Trintec Construction, Inc., 992 So. 2d at 280, the 

court concluded that “the cost and delay inherent in 

identifying, pleading against, and serving a multitude of 

owners (and then substituting a new owner for a 

predecessor during the pendency of the case as units are 

sold or otherwise transferred) would be substantial.” See 

also Mantis v. Hinckley, 547 So. 2d 292, 293 (Fla. 4th 

DCA 1989) (concluding that circuit court erred in denying 

motion to dismiss where mortgagee failed to join a 

dissolution receiver as an indispensable party, and 

therefore, the petitioners established the circuit court 

departed from the essential requirements of law and 

there was a lack of an adequate remedy on appeal).

Id. at 919-20 (emphasis added).

We perceive no legal impediment to applying the rationales 

expressed in Tedeschi and Trintec Construction to cases involving 

homeowners associations. Accordingly, in the present case, we 

conclude that by dismissing Leon County’s petition for failure to 

join indispensable parties—namely, all one hundred or more of the 

property owners—the circuit court departed from the essential 

requirements of the law by failing to apply Section 720.303(1) and 
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rule 1.221, which would permit Lakeshore Homeowners’ 

Association, Inc., to be named as the proper party to defend against 

an eminent domain proceeding on behalf of the individual 

homeowners. Moreover, as in Tedeschi and Trintec Construction,

we hold the circuit court’s action in dismissing Leon County’s 

petition for failure to join indispensable parties caused a material 

injury to Leon County for which there would be no adequate 

remedy on appeal.

Consequently, for the reasons expressed, we grant Leon 

County’s petition for writ of certiorari and quash the order of the 

circuit court. 

RAY, KELSEY, and JAY, JJ., concur.

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Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

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Daniel J. Rigo and Katherine Vernet, Assistant County Attorneys, 

Tallahassee, for Petitioner.

John A. Grant of The Law Office of John A. Grant, P.A, 

Tallahassee; Edwin R. Hudson of Henry Buchanan, P.A., 

Tallahassee, for Respondent Lakeshore Gardens Homeowners’

Association, Inc.