### FI LED U.S. COURT O F APP EALS ELEVENTH CIRCUIT J uly 15, 20 04 THO MAS K. KAH N CL ERK [PUBLIS H] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

N o. 03- 1280 4 D. C. Docket N o. 97-00022 CR-B -S UNITED STAT ES OF AMERIC A, Plaintiff-Appellee, ve rs us CHA RL ES DA

NN Y H ARR IS, D ef en dant- Appe llant. Appeal f rom the United State s District Court f o r th e N o rt h e rn D i s t r i c to f

A l ab a ma (J ul y 15 , 200 4) Before DU BIN A and CARN ES , C ircuit Judg es, and MILL S*, D istrict Judg e. DU BIN A, Circuit Judge:

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ *Honora ble Richard Mills, United States District J udg e for the Central District of

I llinois , sitti ng by desig nation.2

Appe llant C harl es D an ny H ar ri s a ppe al s hi s c onvi ct ionand s en te nc e fo r fr au dul en t us e of

aS oc ia l S ec ur ity

num be r w ithint en t t o de ce ive , in vio la tio n of 4 2 U . S . C . § 4 0 8 ( a ) ( 7 ) ( B ) . H a rr i s c o n t e n d s th a th i s p r o s e c u t i o n v i o l a t e dth e t e rms of apr etri al div er sio n a gr ee m en t, a s w el l a s hi s r igh ts t o aspe edy tr ia l un de r the Sp ee dy T ri al A ct and the S ixth A m en dm en t, and, in an y e ve nt, that the gove rn m en t of

fe re d in suf

fi ci en t e vid en ce to sus ta in h is c onvi ct ion . F or the
r e a s o n s th a tf

o l l o w , w e a f

f i rm. I. BACKG ROUND On January

5, 1997, H om ew ood, Alabam a Police S ergeant Mar a Sirle s st op pe d a ve hi cl e d riv en by H arri s fo r em it ti ng ex ces si ve an d a nn oyin g s m ok e. When Sirles asked for H arris’ s driver’ s license, H arris instead produced three al te rn at e fo rm s of

ide nti fi catio n: an in te rn at ion al dr ivi ng p er m it, agov er

nm en t r at e card , and an id en tif

ic at ionc ar d, a ll of

w hic h w er e ty

pe w ri tte n and a

ppe ar ed to be fa lse . A ll of

the f orm s of ide nti fi catio n c ont ai ne d H ar ri s’ s ph oto gr ap h, and tw o of the m li ste d aS oc ia l S ec ur ity

num be r that w as not

a ssi gne d to H ar

ri s. T he governm ent rate c ard contained an obvio us ty pographi cal er

ror. W ad e G re en , anothe r H om ew ood pol ic e of fi ce r, arr ive d a t the sc en e to assist Sirles. Gr een asked H arris if the inform ation on the identification cards was co rr ec t, and H ar

ri s r es pond ed

a ff irm at ive ly . A ft er

H ar ri s w as arr es te d a t the3

sc en e, on unr el at ed

c harg es , G re eninquir ed

f urthe r as to w hom

the S oc ia l S ec ur ity num be r on the ide nti fi catio n c ar ds b el onge d. H ar ri s r es pond ed

that “ [h ] e w oul d rathe r not say . T he old

boy it be lon gs t o inA rk an sa s w oul dn’ t a ppr ec ia te it

or w oul dn’ t a

ppr ec ia te kno w ing that I w as usi ng i t. ” [ R. V ol. 3 a t 89 , 147 ; se e als o R. V ol. 1, T ab 15, E x. ] U lti m at el y , G re endis co ve re d th at the S oc ia l S ec ur ity num be r on the c ar ds b el onge d to the n- Pr es ide nt W ill iam Je ff er son Cl int on. H a rr i s l a t e r

a d mi t t e dth a th e h a do b t a i n e db l a n ki d e n t i f i c a t i o n c a r d s f

r o m a Louisiana m ail-order c om pany after his Tennessee driver’ s license had been re voke d f or f ai lur e to p ay

num er ous tr af

fi c ci ta tio ns. H ar

ri s lam inate d th e card s af te r ty pin g inhis pe rs ona l i nf

orm at iona s in dic at ed , a lon g w ithP re sid en t Clinton ’ s Social Sec urity num ber. O n January

15, 199 7, agr an d j ur

y r et ur ne d aone c ount

ind ic tm en t c harg ing Harris w ith kn owingly , w illfully , and falsely repre senting to law e nforcem ent that the Social Se curity

num ber printed on the identi fication cards w as the Social Se curi ty num be r as sig ne d to him

w hil e know ing that i t w as not , in vio la tio n of 42 U . S. C. § 40 8( a) (7 )( B) . A t hi s arr ai gnm en t onJanuary 23, 199 7, H ar

ri s pl ed not gu il ty.On Fe bruar y 3, 1997, a Mag istrate Judge or dere d the motions to be heard in c onj u nction 1 wi th t ri a l. 4 On J an ua ry

28 , 19 97 , Harri s fi le d t wo m ot io ns to supp res s ev id en ce. On 1 Fe br uary 27, 199 7, w hil e H ar

ri s’ s pr etri al m oti ons w er e sti ll pe ndi ng, the gove rn m en t and H ar

ri s e nte re d in to an “ A gr ee m en t f or P re tr ia l D ive rs ion ” (the

“ A gr ee m en t” ), w he re in the gov er nm en t a gr ee d to de fe r pr ose cu tio n f or 12 m onths, pr ovi de d th at

H ar ri s f ulf ill ed a ll of the “ Co ndi tio ns o f Pr etri al D ive rs ion ” enum er at ed

in the A gr ee m en t. [ R. V ol. 1, T ab 20, E x. ] T he f ir st o f the se co nd it io ns pro vi de d: “ You sh al l n ot vi ol at e an y law (f ed eral , st at e an d l oc al ). Y ou s ha ll im

m ed ia te ly c ont ac t y our

pr etri al div er sio n su

pe rv iso r if

arr es te d and/ or qu es ti on edby any

law en fo rcem en t o ffi cer.” T he A gr ee m en t f

urthe r state d, in tw o se parate pr ovi sio ns: Sh oul d y ou v iol at e the c ondi tio ns o f thi s su pe rv isi on, the U nit ed S ta te s A tto rn ey

m ay r ev oke or

m odi fy any c ondi tio ns o f thi s pretrial diversion program or change the period of supervision which shall in no case e xceed 12 m onth s. . . . The United States Attorney m ay a t any ti m e w ith in the pe ri od o f y our sup er vis ionini tiate pr ose cu tio n f

or the se of fe nse s sh oul d y ou v iol at e the c ondi tio ns o f thi s su pe rv isi on and w ill f

ur nis h y ou w ithnot ic e spe ci fy ing the co ndi tio ns o f y our

pr ogr am w hic h y ou h av e vio la te d. * * * If, upon com

pletion of y our period of supervisi on, a pre trial div er sio n r ep ort i s r ec ei ve d to the e ff ec t tha t y ou h av e co m

pli ed w ith al l the r ule s, r eg ulatio ns and c ondi tio ns a bove m en tio ne d, no5

pr ose cu tio n f

or the of fe nse s . . . w ill be ins tit

ute d inthi s D istri ct , and an y in di ct m en t o r in fo rm at io n wi ll be di sc ha rg ed . In the Agre em ent, H arris a lso sp ecifica lly agree d that an y de lay f ro m the da te of

thi s A gr ee m en t t o th e da te of the ini tiatio n of pr ose cu tio n, a s pr ovi de d f or in the te rm s a s e xpr es se d he re in, sha ll be de em ed

to be ane ce ssary

de lay a t m y r eque st and I w ai ve any de fe nse to suc h pr ose cu tio n onthe gr ound that su chde lay

ope rate d to deny m y rights un der 48(b) of the Fe deral Rules of C rim inal Procedure and the Sixth Am endm ent to the Const itutio n of the United St at es to a sp eed y

tri al . . . . Ina ddi tio n, the dis tr ic t c ourt gr an te d th e gove rn m en t’ s m oti on t o tr eat the di ve rs io n p eri od as e xc lu dabl e ti m e fo r pu rp os es of t he Sp eed y Trial Act. O n F eb ru ar

y 10, 199 8, the gov er

nm en t se nt H ar

ri s ale tte r inf

orm ing him that i t ha d le ar

ne d th at H ar ri s w as arr es te d inS ep te m be r 1997 and c harg ed

w ith mu l t i p l e dr

u g , a l c o h o l , an dtr a f

f i c o f f e n s e s . Th e g o v e rn men tg a v e Ha rr i s 1 4 d a ys to r es pond , and i nf

orm ed him that i f he f

ai le d to ti m el y

r es pond , the gov er

nm en t wou ldreq ue st th athi s ca se be pl aced ba ckon th e tr ia l ca le nd ar. H ar ri s f ai le d to ti m el y

r es pond to the le tte r, and the gov er nm en t m ove d to pr oc ee d to tr ia l onMarc h 20 , 199 8, appr oxi m at el y 23 d ay s a ft er

the 12- m onth pe ri od o f supe rv isi on e nde d. O n S ep te m be r 21, 199 8, the dis tr ic t c ourt gr an te d th e go ve rn m en t’s m ot io n a nd set Decem be r 7, 1 99 8, as th e tr ia l d at e.6

O n D ec em

be r 7, 199 8, H ar

ri s f ile d am oti on t o di sm iss the ind ic tm en t w hic h th e dis tr ic t c ourt or al ly de nie d th e fo llo w ing day a ft er ahe ar ing on the
m atter. T hen, following a hear ing on De cem ber 9, 1998 , the district court denied H ar ri s’ s st ill -p en din g su

ppr es sio n m oti ons, w hic h ha d be enf ile d onJanuary

28, 1997 , and deferre d unti l trial. On D ecem ber 14, 1998, the district court conducted voi r dir e an d c om

m en ce d tr ia l. Aj ur

y f ound H ar ri s gu ilty on D ec em

be r 15, 199 8. On Dec em

be r 22 , 19 98 , Harri s fi le d a m ot io n fo r jud gm en t o f acq ui tt al . T his m oti on r em ai ne d pe ndi ng f or m or e than th re e y ears . I n th e m eanti m e, the district court sentenced Har ris to seven m onth s im

prisonm ent, f

ollowed by

three y ears of sup er vis ed r el ea se . H ar

ri s f ile d ati m el y

not ic e of appe al , w hic h th e district court held pend ing entry of j udgm ent. D uring thi s period, H arris r em ained fr ee on b ond. O n Apr il 11, 200 2, the dis tr ic t c ourt de nie d H ar ri s’ s m oti on f

or j udgm en t of ac qui tta l. I n af

ootnot e in i ts o rd er , the dis tr ic t c ourt c om m en te d: “ T o say

that this ca se f el l thr oughthe c ra ck s is agr oss und er state m en t. T he c ourt ha s no e xc use an d m ak es non e fo r its f

ai lur e to p ro m

ptl y de ci de thi s m atte r. ” [ R. V ol. 1, T ab 43 at 1 n. 1. ] T he dis tr ic t c ourt m odi fi ed H ar ri s’ s se nte nc e, in its ow n w or ds, “ to sligh tly am eliorate the harm

done to defendant bythe court’ s inexcusable delay .” [R. Vol. 1, T ab 43 at 9.] W ith the concurrence of the governm ent, the district7

co urt r ed uc ed H ar ri s’ s se nte nc e to f

ive m onths p ro ba tio n w ithaspe ci al c ondi tio n that H ar ri s se rv e fo ur

m onths h om e de te nti on. H ar ri s ha s c om

ple te d th e co ndi tio ns o f his r ev ise d se nte nc e, but non ethe le ss ch al le nge s hi s f

el ony c onvi ct ion . II. ISS UES 1. Whe the r the gov er

nm en t’ s pr ose cu tio n of

H ar ri s vi olate d th e te rm s of

the pr etri al div er sio n a gr ee m en t. 2. Whe the r the de lay

in H ar ri s’ s pr ose cu tio n vi olate d hi s S ixth A m en dm en t ri ght to a spe edy

tr ia l and h is r igh ts unde r the S pe edy T ri al A ct . 3. Whe the r the gov er nm en t’ s e vid en ce w as suf fi ci en t t o su sta in a

c onvi ct ion under 42 U.S .C. § 408(a)(7)(B ).

III. STA ND AR

DS OF RE VIEW Whe the r the gov er

nm en t ha s vi olate d th e te rm s of apr etri al div er sio n ag re em en t i s aque sti on o f lawthat this c ourt r ev ie w s de novo . See U nited Sta tes v. Ny hui s , 211 F . 3d 1 340, 134 3 ( 11th C ir . 200 0) ( hol din g th at the c ourt w oul d rev ie w de novo the iss ue of w he the r the gov er

nm en t’ s pr ose cu tio n of

the de fe ndant- ap pe llant c onst itu te d abr ea chof his ple a ag re em en t) ; United States v.In Bo nn e r v . Ci ty of Pric ha rd, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207- 09 (11th Cir. 1981) (e n banc) , this court 2 adopted a s binding pre cede nt all Fifth Circuit dec isions is sued prior to Oc tober 1, 1981. 8 W arren , 594 F . 2d 1 046, 104 9 ( 5thCi r. 197 9) (n oti ng tha t a pr etri al div er sio n 2 agreem ent is “ analogou s to a plea bargain agree m ent”). T his c ourt r ev ie w s de novo the district court’ s denial of a cr im inal de fe ndant’ s m oti on t o di sm iss ba se d up on h is S ixth A m en dm en t r igh t t o aspe edy tri al , United States v. Schlei , 122 F . 3d 9 44, 986 ( 11th C ir . 199 7) , or the S pe edy Tria l Act , Uni te d S ta te s v. Will ia ms , 31 4 F .3d55 2, 5 56 (11 th Cir . 20 02 ). How ever, this court reviews f or clear err or the district court’ s factual de te rm inatio ns a s to w ha t c onst itu te s e xc lud ab le ti m e unde r the S pe edy T ri al A ct . Id
. T his c ourt a lso r ev ie w s de novo the suf fi ci en cy of e vid en ce sup portin g a co nvi ct ion , but

m ust vie wa ll ev ide nc e in t

he li ght m ost f av or ab le to the gove rn m en t and m

ust m ak e al l r ea sona

ble inf er en ce s and c re dib ili ty

c hoi ce s in fav orof t he jury’ s v erd ic t. U nit ed Sta tes v . Ke nt , 175 F. 3d 87 0, 873 (11th Cir. 1999 ).9 IV . A N A LY SI S A . T he gov er

nm en t di d no t br ea chH ar ri s’ s pr etri al div er sio n a gr ee m en t. A pre tri al di ve rs io n a gr eem en t i s an al og ou s t o a pl ea b arg ai n a gr eem en t. see W arren , 594 F . 2d at 10 49; accord Aschan v. A uger , 861 F . 2d 5 20, 522 ( 8th Ci r. 198 8) ; United States v. H icks , 693 F . 2d 3 2, 33 ( 5thCi r. 198 2) ; United States
v. G arc ia , 519 F. 2d 13 43, 1345 n .2 (9th Cir. 1975 ). A ccordingly , this court int er pr et s apr etri al div er sio n a gr ee m en t a ppl y ing the sam e standard s w e w oul d us e to in te rp reta pl ea ag reem en t. This court interprets a plea agree m ent “ in a m anner that is som etim es likened to con tractual interpretation.” United States v. J efferies , 908 F . 2d 1 520, 1523 ( 11th C ir . 199 0) . T his c ourt w ill not a dopt a“ hy pe r- te ch nic al r ea din g of

the wr itten agreem ent” or “ a rigidly literal approach in the construction of langu age.” In re A rne tt , 80 4 F .2d12 00 , 12 03 (11 th Cir . 19 86 ), quot ed in Jefferies , 908 F. 2d at 1523 . I nst ea d, the wri tte n a gr ee m en t w ill be “ vie w ed a ga ins t the ba ck gr ound

of negotiatio ns and sh ouldnot be interpreted to directly contradict an oral understandi ng.” Jefferies , 908 F . 2d at 15 23 ( int er na l qu otatio ns and a lte ratio ns om itt ed ). I n a ddi tio n, a ll am big uit ie s inthe a gr ee m en t m ust be c onstru ed

a ga ins t th e g ov ern m en t. Id

.10

T o su ppor t hi s arg um en t tha t the A gr ee m en t barr ed the gov er

nm en t f ro m ini tiatin g th is p ro se cu tio n, H ar ri s r el ie s e xc lus ive ly

on t he langua ge in the f

ir st pr ovi sio n, w hic h auth or iz es the gov er nm en t t o pr ose cu te H ar

ri s duri ng the diversion period in the event that he “ violate[s] the conditio ns of this s upervisio n.” H ar ri s f ai ls e nti re ly , how ev er , to ad dr es s th e se co nd p ro vis ion , w hic h do es not co nta in any

ti m e lim itatio n, and whic h e xpl ic itl y e nvi sio ns tha t the gov er

nm en t retains its right to p rosecute H arris if it does no t rece ive a favorable “ pretrial div er sio n r ep ort” f

ro m his pr ogr am

sup er vis or “ uponc om

ple tio n of [ the ] pe ri od o f supe rv isi on. ” A cc ep tin g H ar ri s’ s arg um en t w oul d r en de r m eanin gle ss the langua ge of

the se co nd p ro vis ionbe ca use the gov er

nm en t c oul d no t po ssi bly re ce ive suc h af

av or ab le r ep ort of

c om pli an ce unt il aft er the 12-m onth period had co nc lu de d. Consid ering both p rovisio ns of the Agree m ent together, the district court the re fo re r ej ec te d H ar

ri s’ s arg um en t, sup portin g it s ana ly sis and c onc lus ionw ith U nit ed Sta tes v . G ogar ty , 533 F . 2d 9 3 ( 2d C ir . 197 6) . I n G ogar ty , the S ec ond Ci rc uit he ld tha t the gov er

nm en t di d no t br ea chasim ilar pr etri al div er sio n ag re em en t by

pr ose cu tin g ade fe ndant who f ai le d to c om

ply w ithit s c ondi tio ns, ev entho ugh the gov er

nm en t di d no t i nit ia te pr ose cu tio n un til a ft er the 12- m onth di ve rs io n p eri od ha d e xp ire d. Id
. a t 94 -9 5. S im ilar to the A gr ee m en t a t i ssu e inFur thermore , as the Sec ond Circuit noted in Goga rty : 3 Ap pe lla nt’ s r e a l com

pla int is that he ha s a

c ontr a c tua l r ig ht n ot t o b e pr os e c ute d, . . . b ut t his obviously implies that he has performed his part of the barg ain. The a ppellant fa iled to live up to his obli g ation and this ag ree ment . . . contained no time lim it on the gove rnment’s right 11 thi s c as e, the a gr ee m en t i n G ogar tycontained two separate provisi ons: o ne that au tho ri ze d th e gove rn m en t t o in iti at e pr ose cu tio n w ith in the div er sio n pe ri od i f the defendant failed to fulfill his obl igation s, and another that expressly conditio ned the governm ent’ s prom ise not to p rosecute on the governm ent’ s rece ipt of a fav or ab le rep or t fr om

a pr og ram

supe rv is or . Se e id
. at95 . Re ly ing on G ogar ty , the district court concluded that these provis ions were not a m big uous and d id n ot p re cl ude the gov er nm en t f ro m ini tiatin g pr ose cu tio n af te r the 12- m onth de fe rr al pe ri od h ad e xpi re d. T he dis tr ic t c ourt st at ed : T he f ir st [ pr ovi sio n] m er el y

put s th e de fe ndant o n no tic e that i f at any tim e dur ing the pe ri od o f supe rv isi on h e vio la te s th e co ndi tio ns o f the ag re em en t, the gov er

nm en t m ay

ini tiate pr ose cu tio n a ft er giv ing not ic e of the vio la tio n. T he ne xt [ pr ovi sio n] f urthe r expands the ab ili ty of the gov er

nm en t t o pr ose cu te if

it doe s no t r ec ei ve not ic e of co m pl ia nc e wit h t he ter m s o f th e ag reem en t. [R . Vo l . 1 , Tab 4 3 at 3 .] W e ag re e w iththe dis tr ic t c ourt and c onc lud e that the gov er nm en t c oul d ha ve pr ope rl y

pr ose cu te d H ar

ri s w ith in the 12- m onth pe ri od, and i t pr ope rl y

“ pr ose cu t[ ed ] him

a ft er the 12- m onth pe ri od whe n no f av or ab le r ep ort [ w as ] rece iv ed .” Se e G ogar ty , 533 F. 2d at 95 (hold ing th at, because “ no such

3to [ ]p ro se c ute the de fe nd ant i n th e e ve nt o f n on c omp lia nc e . O ne wh o f

a ils to c arr

y out hi s pa rt of the ba rg a in c ann ot i nv ok e the a g re e me nt a g a ins t th e g ov e rnme nt. 533 F.2d at 95 (internal c itations and footnote omitted). 12 [f av or ab le r ep ort] w as e ve r w ri tte n . . . , [ the gov er nm en t] w as . . . j ust if

ie d in pr ose cu tin g [ de fe ndant] a ft er the 12- m onth pe ri od” e xpi re d) ; cf
. G arc ia , 519 F . 2d at 134 4- 45 ( hol din g th at

the gov er

nm en t vi olate d th e te rm s of apr etri al div er sio n ag re em en t w he n th e ag re em en t c ont ai ne d no langua ge f ro m w hic h to inf

er that the gove rn m en t c oul d in iti at e pr ose cu tio n be y ond the pe ri od o f supe rv isi on, and the governm ent indicted th e defe ndant after the expiration of the express 150-day lim itation p eriod authorized by agree m ent). Ther efore, we hold th at the governm ent did no t breach H arris’ s pretrial div er sio n a gr ee m en t ba se d onthe gr ound s id en tif ie d inthe dis tr ic t c ourt’ s w el lre as one d op ini on, inc lud ing it s r el ianc e upon G ogar ty . A cc or din gly , the onl y lim itations on the gov ernm ent’ s ability to prosecute pursuant to the Agre em ent are the S pe edy

T ri al A ct and the S ixth A m en dm en t. B. H ar

ri s’ s r igh ts t o aspe edy

tr ia l un de r the S pe edy

T ri al A ct and the S ixth A m en dm en t w er e not

vio la te d. 1. Speedy Trial Act T he S pe edy

T ri al A ct pr ovi de s th at :B e c a us e the re qu ir e me nts of

the Spe e dy

Tr ia l A c t c e a se on c e tr ia l be g ins , th e de lay in 4 de c idi ng Ha

rr is’ s po st- c onvic tio n mot ion fo r a c qu itt a l is no t pa rt of the Spe e dy

Tr ia l A c t ana ly sis . Se e, e .g., Un ite d S

tates v . G arc ia , 778 F .2 d 155 8, 15 62 (1 1th Cir . 1 98 6) (“ F or

sp e e dy tr ia l pu rp os e s, the clock stops whe n the trial beg ins.”). T h e A c t a ls o e xc lu d e s f r o m th e c o mp u tati o n “ [a ]ny p e r io d o f d e la y d ur in gwhich 5 prosec ution is deferr ed by the attorne y

for the G overnme nt pursuant to written agr eeme nt with the de fe nd ant, wi th the a

pp ro va l of the c ourt , fo r the purp os e of a llo wi ng the de fe nd ant to d e mon str ate his good c onduct.” 18 U.S.C. § 3 1 6 1 (h)( 2). Ther efor e, Ha rris ar gues that the e x clusion pursuant to § 31 61 (h )( 2) , whic h is ba se d o n h is p re tr ia l di ve rs ion a g re e me nt, su pe rs e de d th e oth e rw ise applicable § 3161(h)( 1)(F ) exclusion, based on his pretria l motions , beca use multiple sections of the Spe e dy Tr ia l Ac t c ann ot a pp ly in c on

jun c tio n wi th and simult ane ou sly to ot her s e c tio ns . Acc ording ly , the ar gument go es , v i rt ually all of the pe riod betwe en F ebrua ry 26, 1998, when the diversion agree ment lapsed, a nd September 21, 1998, when the district cour t gr anted the g overnme nt’s motion to proce ed with t he prose cution, is not ex cludable f rom the Speedy

Trial Ac t calc ulation. In the alter

native, Ha

rris ar gu es , b ased on the same pre mise, that the five months betwee n the time the g overnme nt filed its moti on for tria l and the time the district cour t decided that motion also is not ex cludable time, pur suant to § 3161(h)(1) (J), which excludes from the c omp utatio n “ [a]ny

pe ri od of . . . d e lay re a so na bly attr ibuta ble to any peri od, n ot t o e xce e d th ir ty day s, duringwhich any

proce edingconce rningthe def endant i s ac tually

under a dvisement by

the court.” See United States v. P hillips , 936 F.2d 1252, 1254 ( 11th Cir. 1991) (“[30-day] l imitation ari se s whe n a mo tion whic h d oe s n ot r e qu ir e a he ari ngis b e fo re the c ourt .” ). No su pp or t e xists , howeve r, in the case law or the Speedy Trial Act for Har ris’s contention that multiple sections of the Speedy Trial Ac t cannot apply

simult aneously . See, e .g., United States v. Elkins , 79 5 F .2 d 9 19 (1 1th

13 [i] n any case in w hich a plea of not guilt y is entered, the trial of a de fe ndant . . . sha ll co m

m en ce w ith in s ev en ty

day s f ro m the f ili ng date . . . of the . . . indictm ent, or f rom the date the defendant has ap pe ar ed be fo re aj udi ci al of

fi ce r of the c ourt i n w hic h su chc harg e is pe nd in g, wh ic he ve r da te las t o ccu rs . 18 U . S. C. § 31 61( c) (1 ). H ow ev er , the A ct e xc lud es f

ro m the c om put at ionof

the 4 70 d ay s “ [a ] ny

pe ri od o f de lay

r es ult ing f

ro m oth er pr oc ee din gs c onc er

nin g th e defendant, including b ut not lim ited to . . . delay resulting from

any pretrial
m oti on, f ro m the f ili ng o f the m oti on thr oughthe c onc lus ionof the he ar ing on, or other prom

pt disp ositio n of, such m otion .” I d. § 3161 (h)(1)( F). 5Cir. 1986) (apply ing multiple sec tio n s of the Speedy Trial Ac t to various periods of time). Fur thermore , Har

ris’s pos ition is indirectly inconsistent with this court’s prece dent providingthat a mag istrate’s de fer

ral of a pre trial motion preserve s its chara cter as a pr etrial motion, pendingbefor e the district court and subject to § 3161(h)( 1)(F ), until re solved by the cour t. See, e .g. , Ga rc ia , 778 F.2d at 1562. There fore , we summarily reje ct these a

rguments beca

use Ha rris’s pre trial suppression motions were pe nding f

rom J anuar

y 28, 1997, until Decembe r 8, 1998.

14 H ar ri s w as arr ai gne d onJanuary 23, 199 7, and f

ile d pr etri al sup pr es sio n m otion s on Janu ary

28, 1997. T he district court correc tly found that th e five-day pe rio d fr om

Jan ua ry 24 , 19 97 , to Jan ua ry

28 , 19 97 , is no t ex cl ud ab le . See U nited Sta tes v . E lk

ins , 795 F . 2d 9 19, 922 ( 11th C ir . 198 6) ( not ing that the day of the arra ignm ent is excluded from the Speedy

Tr ial Ac t calculation). The district court also correctly

found that Harr is tolled th e running o f the Spee dy Tr ial Ac t lim itatio ns p er iod

on J anuary

28, 199 7, by

f ili ng p re tr ia l su

ppr es sio n m oti ons, whi ch req ui re a h eari ng . See U nit ed Sta tes v . Phil lip s , 936 F . 2d 1 252, 125 4 ( 11th Cir. 1991 ) (“ Motion s necessitating h earings, such as suppression hearings . . . are gove rn ed by se ct ion316 1( h) (1 )( F) . ”) ; see also Henderson v. U nited Sta tes , 476 U . S. 321 , 326 -3 0, 106 S . Ct . 187 1, 187 5- 76, 90 L . E d. 2d 2 99 ( 1986 ); United Sta tes v . B ea rd , 41 F . 3d 1 486, 148 8 ( 11th C ir . 199 5) ; U nit ed Sta tes v . G arc ia , 778 F. 2d 1 558, 156 2 ( 11th C ir . 198 6) . A cc or din g to the dis tr ic t c ourt, “ [s ] inc e the Magistrate Judge at the pretrial c onference deferr ed the m otion s to the dis trict c o u rtt o b e h e a r da tth e t i me o f tr i a l , f i l i n g th e mo t i o n s t o l l e dth e s p e e d y t r i a l t i me until the district court condu cted the hearing.” [R. Vol. 1, T ab 43 at 5.] T herefor e,15

the pe ri od f

ro m January 28, 199 7, w he n th e supp re ssi on m oti ons w er e fi le d, unt il D ec em be r 8, 199 8, w he n th e he ar ing on s uc h m oti ons w as he ld, is ex cl ude d f ro m the S pe edy

T ri al A ct c al cu la tio n. H ar ri s su gge sts that this c ourt sh oul d ho ld tha t e xc lud ing thi s e nti re pe ri od
w oul d be unr ea sona

ble be ca use the “ or

oth er pr om pt d isp osi tio n” langua ge in § 316 1(h)(1)(F ) evinces “ a legislative intent to exclude . . . no m ore tim e than necessary [for resolution of a m otion ] .” H owever , this court has held that

“ § 31 61( h) (1 )( F) e xc lud es all ti m e be tw ee n th e fi lin g of the m oti on and the conclusio n of the hearing at w hich it is addressed.” U nit ed Sta tes v . D unn , 345 F.3 d 1 28 5, 1 29 2 (1 1t h C ir. 2 00 3) (em ph as is ad de d) , cert. denied , ___ S . Ct . __ (June 14, 200 4) ; se e als o Phil lip s , 936 F . 2d at 12 54 ( “ [T ] he e nti re ti m e fr om the fi lin g of the m oti on t o th e co nc lus ionof the he ar ing is ex cl uda

ble , e ve n w he n th e he ar ing is de fe rr ed

unt il tr ia l. ”) . “ T his e nti re pe ri od i s e xc lud ed f ro m the spe edy trial clock and is not su bje ct to reviewregar ding its reasonableness.” D unn , 345 F. 3d at 129 2. T he Suprem e Court has sim ilarly held that “ Congress intend ed s ub s e c t i o n ( F ) t o e x c l u d e f r o m th e S p e e d y T r i a l A c t ’s 7 0
- d a y l i mi t a t i o n a l l t i me be tw ee n th e fi lin g of

am oti on and the c onc lus ionof the he ar ing on tha t m oti on, whether or not a delay

in hold ing th at hearing is ‘ reasonably necessary .’ ” H en de rso n , 47 6 U.S. at 33 0, 1 16 S. Ct. at 18 77 .Be cause Har ris’s motion for acquittal was made post c onviction (as it must be), it is not part 6 of Ha rris’s Six th Amendment claim. See, e .g., Dunn , 3 45 F .3 d at 12 96 (“ Spe c if ic a lly , th e de lay

wi th which we are conce rned is that be tween the date of the indictment and the tria l date.”) . Moreove r, even if this c ourt wer e to c onsider such delay , Har ris has shown no prejudice resultingfrom the de lay beca use, amongother thing s, he wa s fre e on bond duringthe re levant time per iod. 16 Thi s co ur t m

us t fo ll ow D unn an d H

en de rso n and h old

that the e nti re pe ri od betwee n Har

ris’ s filing of his pretrial m otion s on Janu ary 28, 1997, and the district court’ s hearing on Dece m ber 8, 1998 , w as excluded from the Speedy

Tr ial Ac t c a l c u l a t i o n , wi t h o u tr e g a r dt o i t s r e a s o n ab l e n e s s . Ac c o r d i n g l y, l e s s th a n 7 0 d a ys el ap se d u nd er t he Act fr om Harri s’s i nd ic tm en t u nt il hi s t ria l. The refo re, we co nc lu de th atth e d is tri ctco ur t p ro pe rly rejecte d Harris ’s Spe ed y Trial Act cl ai m . 2. Six th A m en dm en t T he S ixth A m en dm en t gu ar an te es that, “ [i ] n a ll cr im ina l pr ose cu tio ns, the accused shall enj oy

the right to a speedy

and publ ic trial. ” U .S . C onst. am end. V I. 6 Inor de r to d et er

m ine w he the r a de fe ndant h as be ende pr ive d of his r igh t t o a speedy trial, this court m

ust cons ider (1) whether the delay before tr ial wa s u n c o mmo n l y l o n g ; ( 2 ) w h e t h e r th e g o v e rn me n to r

th e d e f e n d a n ti s mo r e t o b l a me fo r that de lay ; ( 3) w he the r, in due c our se , the de fe ndant a sse rt ed his r igh t t o a spe edy tr ia l; an d ( 4) w he the r the de fe ndant s uf fe re d pr ej udi ce a s ar es ult of the delay (the “ Barker fact or s” ). Doggett v. United States , 505 U. S. 647, 651, 112 S. Ct . 268 6, 269 0, 120 L . E d. 2d 5 20 ( 1992 ) (c iti ng B ark er v . W ingo , 407 U . S. 514 ,17

92 S . Ct . 218 2, 33 L . E d. 2d 1 01 ( 1972 )) . “ T he f ir st f ac tor se rv es atr igg er ing fu nc ti on ; u nl es s s om e ‘pres um pt iv el y pre jud ic ia l’ per io d o f de la y

oc cu rred , we need not cond uct the rem ainder of the analy sis.” United States v. R egister , 182 F. 3d 8 20, 827 ( 11th C ir . 199 9) ( ci tin g Barker , 40 7 U.S. at 53 0, 9 2 S . Ct. at 21 92 ). A de lay of m or e than 18 m onths –

a s is the c as e he re – i s “pr es um pti ve ly pr ejud ic ia l” to th e d efen da nt un de r th e fi rs t fa ct or . D unn , 34 5 F .3dat 1 29 6. N one the le ss, the S upr em e Co urt ha s r ec ogni ze d th at ade fe ndant g en er al ly cannot e sta bli sh a S ixth A m en dm en t sp ee dy tr ia l c la im , how ev er

lon g th e de lay , if the gov er nm en t purs ue d th e pr ose cu tio n w ith“ re as ona ble dil ige nc e, ” an d th e de fe ndant f

ai ls t o sh owthat the de lay r es ult ed in “ spe ci fi c pr ej udi ce to his defense. ” D ogge tt , 505 U . S. a t 65 6, 112 S . Ct . a t 26 93. W e co nc lud e that H ar ri s m ust dem onstrate actual prej udice to his d efense bec ause the rec ord dem onstrates that the gov er

nm en t purs ue d hi s pr ose cu tio n w ithr ea sona ble dil ige nc e. A s th e dis tr ic t c ourt c om

m en te d init s or de r, the de lay in H ar ri s’ s pr ose cu tio n, a sid e fr om t h e d i v er s i o n p er i o d , “ wa s b as ed o n th e s ch ed u l i n g d eman d s o f t h e c o u rt ’s calendar . . . and had no thing to do with either the governm ent or the defendant.” [R. Vo l. 1 , Tab 4 3 a t 8 -9 .] Furtherm ore, in this circuit, the defendant m ust dem onstrate actual prej udice unless each of the first three factors “ we igh heavilyagainst the gov ernm ent.”A defendant who must prove a ctual pre judice to establish a spe edy trial claim ca

n do so by 7 showing(1) oppr essive pre trial incar cer ation; (2) anxiety and conc ern r esulting f

rom the delay ; or (3) the possibility

that hi s d ef

en s e wi l l be impaire d. Un ite d S tates v . Clar

k, 83 F.3d 1350, 1354 (1 1th Cir . 1 99 6) . H arr is w a s n ot i nc arc e ra te d whil e awa iti ng tr ia l and ha s o ff e re d n oth ingto s ug g e st e ith e r t hat his de fe ns e wa s imp a ir e d duri ng the de lay or that he su ff e re d so me e sp e c ia l anxie ty a s a result of the de lay . 18 D unn , 345 F. 3d at 129 6. I n this case, the f irst three Barker

f ac tor s do not

w ei gh heavily against the gov ernm ent. E ven if the length of the delay wa s

“ pr es um pti ve ly pr ej udi ci al , ” the va st m aj or ity of the de lay w as not a ttr ibu ta ble to the governm ent, and Harr is did n ot assert his right to a speedy trial until Dece m

ber 7, 199 8, the da te that hi s tr ia l w as sc he dul ed to be gin . Though required to sho w a ctual prej udice, H arris did not even argue actual pr ejud ic e in th e d is tri ctco ur t, n ordo es he rai se th e is su e o n app eal . Se e, e . g. , W ilkes v. United States , 289 F. 3d 68 4, 689 n.9 (11th Cir. 2002) (deem ing as
w ai ve d an arg um en t no t r ai se d onappe al ); U nit ed Sta tes v . A nde rto n , 136 F . 3d 747, 751 n. 3 ( 11th C ir . 199 8) ( not ing that de fe ndant’ s S ixth A m en dm en t arg um en t not r ai se d be fo re the tr ia l c ourt w as w ai ve d onappe al ). Mo re ove r, e ve n if H ar ri s had not waived the issue, the rec ord does no t indicate that Har ris suffere d actual p re ju d i ce du e t o th e d el ay. Ac co rd i n g l y, be ca u s e n o s up p o rt ex i s t s fo r H arri s ’s 7 posit ion th at his Sixth Am endm ent right to a speedy trial has been violated, there is no Six th Am en dm en t v io la ti on .A fe w cour ts have c oncluded that the third e lement of a § 408(a) (7)( B) offe nse re quires the 8 g overnme nt to prove t hat t he defenda nt committed the charg ed conduct for the pur pose of obtaining something of

value. See, e .g. , United States v. Sparks , 6 7 F .3 d 1 14 5, 11 52 (4 th C ir . 1 99 5) ; se e als o Un ite d S tates v . Youla , No. 99-5151, 2002 WL29704, at *3 (3d Cir. Jan. 11, 2002) (conc luding that char g ed conduc t must be committ ed “f or the purpose of obtainingsome benefi t to which the defe ndant is not entitled”). This r equire ment has no basis in the text of the statute, howeve r, which descr ibes the mens rea element a s merely “with the intent to dece ive.” 42 U.S.C. § 408(a )( 7)(B ). There fore , this court conclude s, as the First, Six th, E ighth, and Tenth Circuits ha ve, that the cha

rg ed conduct may

be committed “f

or any purpose.” Means , 13 3 F .3 d at 44 7; McKnight , 17 F.3d at 1143; Doe , 8 78 F .2 d at 15 53 ; Da rre ll , 828 F.2d at 647. 19 C. T he gov er

nm en t of fe re d su ff ic ie nt e vid en ce to sus ta in H ar ri s’ s c onvi ct ion . Inor de r to e sta

bli sh a vio la tio n of

42 U . S. C. § 40 8( a) (7 )( B) , the gov er nm en t m u s tp ro v e t h at th e d ef

en d an t , “ wi t h i n t en tt o d ec ei v e, fa l s el y re p re s en t [e d ] a num be r to b e [h is S oc ia l S ec ur ity num be r] , w he n inf

ac t su chnum

be r [w as ] not [h is S oc ia l S ec ur ity

num be r] . ” 42 U . S. C. § 40 8( a) (7 )( B) . T hus, the e le m en ts o f the of fe nse are ( 1) f

al se r ep re se ntatio n of

aS oc ia l S ec ur ity

num be r, ( 2) w ithint en t to de cei ve , (3) foran y

pu rp os e. Se e U

nit ed Sta tes v . M

ea ns , 133 F . 3d 4 44, 447 (6 th C ir . 199 8) ; U

nit ed Sta tes v . M

cK nig ht , 17 F. 3d 11 39, 1143 (8th Cir. 1994 ); U nit ed Sta tes v . D oe , 878 F . 2d 1 546, 155 3 ( 1st Ci r. 198 9) ; United States v. D arr el l , 828 F. 2d 64 4, 647 (10th Cir. 1987). 8 At tria l, H arris a dm itted that, w hen asked for identification bythe law en fo rc em en t of

fi ce rs , he pr ovi de d th e of fi ce rs w iththr ee f

al se ide nti fi catio n doc um en ts, tw o of

w hic h bo re his nam e, pho tog ra ph, and a S oc ia l S ec ur ity num ber that did not b elong to him . Harris and O ffice r G reen both testified that20

Harris re spon ded affir

m atively when asked if the inform ation on the car ds was ac curate . T his e vid en ce a lon e w as suf fi ci en t t o e sta

bli sh tha t H ar

ri s f ra udul en tly use d so m eo ne e lse ’ s S oc ia l S ec ur ity num be r w iththe pur

pose and i nte nt t o de ce ive lawe nf

or ce m en t. A cc or din gly , w e co nc lud e fr om the r ec or d th at

the ev ide nc e pr es en te d a t tri al w as m or e than su ff ic ie nt t o su

ppor t H ar ri s’ s c onvi ct ion . V. C ONC LUS ION U nde r se ttl ed

pr ec ed en t, w e af

fi rm H ar ri s’ s S pe edy

T ri al A ct , S ixth A m en dm en t, and s uf

fi ci en cy of the e vid en ce c ha lle nge s to his c onvi ct ion . F ir st, Harris’ s Speedy

Tr ial Ac t claim

fails because the e ntire period betwee n January 28, 199 7, w he n he f

ile d hi s pr e- tr ia l m oti ons, and D ec em be r 8, 199 8, w he n th e he ar ing on s uc h m oti ons w as he ld, is ex cl ude d f ro m the spe edy

tr ia l c al cu la tio n under 18 U.S .C. § 3161 (h)(1)( F). Sec ond, Harris’ s Sixth Am endm ent speedy trial claim fails because he has not established a necessary fac tor: that he suffere d ac tu al p re ju d i ce as a r es u l to f t h e d el ay i n h i s p ro s ec u t i o n . Th i rd , Ha rr i s ’s sufficiency

of the evidence claim

fails because the j ury

heard evidence es ta bli shi ng tha t H ar

ri s r ep re se nte d to lawe nf or ce m en t of

fi ce rs that do cum en ts be ari ng hi s n am e an d s om eo ne els e’s So ci al Secu rit y nu m be r were a ccu rat e.21

Ina ddi tio n, r el y ing on G ogar ty , w e conclude, a s did th e district court, that t h e g o v e rn men td i dn o tb r e a c h Ha rr i s ’s p r e t r i a l d i v e r s i o n a g r e e men t . Ac c o r d i n g l y, we aff irm Harris’ s convictio n and sentence. AFFIR MED.