UNITED STATES ARMY COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

Before 

BURTON, HAGLER, and FLEMING 

Appellate Military Judges 

UNITED STATES, Appellant 

v. 

Private First Class NATHANIEL E. ALLEN 

United States Army, Appellee

ARMY MISC 20180285 

Headquarters, 7th Infantry Division 

Timothy P. Hayes, Jr., Military Judge (arraignment) 

Lanny J. Acosta, Jr., Military Judge (motions hearing) 

Colonel Russell N. Parson, Staff Judge Advocate 

For Appellant: Captain Catharine M. Parnell, JA (argued); Colonel Tania M. 

Martin, JA; Lieutenant Colonel Eric K. Stafford, JA; Captain Allison L. Rowley, 

JA; Captain Catharine M. Parnell, JA (on brief); Colonel Steven P. Haight, JA; 

Lieutenant Colonel Eric K. Stafford, JA; Captain Catharine M. Parnell, JA (on 

reply brief). 

For Appellee: Captain Benjamin A. Accinelli, JA (argued); Lieutenant Colonel 

Christopher D. Carrier, JA; Captain Patrick G. Hoffman, JA; Captain Benjamin 

J. Wetherell, JA; Captain Benjamin A. Accinelli, JA (on brief). 

14 August 2018 

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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ACTION ON APPEAL 

BY THE UNITED STATES FILED PURSUANT TO 

ARTICLE 62, UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE 

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This opinion is issued as an unpublished opinion and, as such, does not serve as precedent.

BURTON, Senior Judge: 

Appellee stands accused of one specification of attempted indecent visual 

recording, two specifications of false official statement, and one specification of 

indecent visual recording, in violation of Articles 80, 107, and 120c, Uniform Code 

of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 880, 907, and 920c (2016) [UCMJ]. This case is 

before this court pursuant to a government appeal filed under Article 62, UCMJ. 
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In its appeal, the government challenges the military judge’s decision to 

suppress certain statements of the accused and the contents of his cell phone. We 

find the military judge’s ruling is ambiguous and incomplete on several predicate 

issues. Therefore, we must return the matter to the military judge for clarification 

and action in accordance with the decision below. 

BACKGROUND 

The charged offenses involve allegations the accused recorded or attempted to 

record soldiers in toilet stalls at the National Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, 

California. 

On 12 April 2018, trial defense counsel filed a motion to suppress certain 

statements of the accused to law enforcement and the contents of his cell phone. On 

20 April 2018, the government filed its response. The parties consented to the 

military judge considering the motions and attachments in making his ruling. The 

parties also stipulated to certain facts in the motions. 

At the motions hearing, three different witnesses testified and the parties 

entered into a stipulation of testimony for a fourth witness. Notably, the accused 

himself testified. His testimony spanned over forty pages and addressed his 

interactions with law enforcement on the night in question. Among other things, the 

accused testified about: (1) how he felt physically that night, (2) his state of mind 

when he waived his rights and provided a statement, (3) his state of mind when he 

provided consent to search his cell phone, and (4) the effect of his prior unwarned 

statements and other attending circumstances. 

On 9 May 2018, the military judge granted the defense motion to suppress. In 

his ruling, the military judge addressed the voluntariness of the accused’s statements 

to Criminal Investigation Command (CID) and the voluntariness of his consent to 

search his cell phone and provide his numeric passcode (PIN). For his annotated 

findings of fact, the military judge primarily adopted portions of the written 

motions. The military judge’s remaining findings of fact involve three sentences, 

none of which address the accused’s testimony at the motions hearing. 

 

In his ruling, the military judge first determined the accused’s statements to 

CID were not voluntary based on the “totality of the circumstances.” Within his 

analysis, the military judge did not list any circumstances besides the lack of a 

cleansing statement. The military judge next determined the accused’s consent to 

search his cell phone and provide his PIN was also not voluntary. For these issues, 

the military judge again discussed the lack of a cleansing statement, but then briefly 

cited to “further evidence,” to include the accused falling asleep in the interrogation 

room after waiting to be interviewed for several hours. Following the military 

judge’s ruling, the government filed a timely appeal under Article 62, UCMJ. 
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LAW AND DISCUSSION 

As our superior court has explained, the standard of review we apply in an 

appeal by the United States of a military judge’s suppression ruling is necessarily 

deferential: 

“We review a military judge’s ruling on a motion to 

suppress for abuse of discretion.” United States v. 

Rodriguez, 60 M.J. 239, 246 (C.A.A.F. 2004) (citing 

United States v. Monroe, 52 M.J. 326, 330 (C.A.A.F. 

2000)). “In reviewing a military judge’s ruling on a 

motion to suppress, we review factfinding under the 

clearly-erroneous standard and conclusions of law under 

the de novo standard.” United States v. Ayala, 43 M.J. 

296, 298 (C.A.A.F. 1995). “Thus on a mixed question of 

law and fact . . . a military judge abuses his discretion if 

his findings of fact are clearly erroneous or his 

conclusions of law are incorrect.” Id. The abuse of 

discretion standard calls “for more than a mere difference 

of opinion. The challenged action must be ‘arbitrary, 

fanciful, clearly unreasonable, or clearly erroneous.’” 

United States v. White, 69 M.J. 236, 239 (C.A.A.F. 2010) 

(quoting United States v. Lloyd, 69 M.J. 95, 99 (C.A.A.F. 

2010)). 

When reviewing matters under Article 62(b), UCMJ, [a 

service] court may act only with respect to matters of law. 

United States v. Gore, 60 M.J. 178, 185 (C.A.A.F. 2004). 

“When a court is limited to reviewing matters of law, the 

question is not whether a reviewing court might disagree 

with the trial court’s findings, but whether those findings 

are ‘fairly supported by the record.’” Id. (quoting United 

States v. Burris, 21 M.J. 140, 144 (C.M.A. 1985)). When 

reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, “we consider 

the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing 

party.” United States v. Cowgill, 68 M.J. 388, 390 

(C.A.A.F. 2010) (quoting United States v. Reister, 44 M.J. 

409, 413 (C.A.A.F. 1996)). 

United States v. Baker, 70 M.J. 283, 287-88 (C.A.A.F. 2011). See also United States 

v. Henning, 75 M.J. 187, 190-91 (C.A.A.F. 2016). 

However, in conducting such a review, “[t]he appropriate remedy for 

incomplete or ambiguous rulings is a remand for clarification.” United States v. 
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Kosek, 41 M.J. 60, 64 (C.M.A. 1994)). See also United States v. Lincoln, 42 M.J. 

315, 320 (C.A.A.F. 1995) (explaining the appropriate remedy for incomplete or 

ambiguous findings is to remand for clarification or for additional findings). 

For several reasons, we conclude such a remand is required in this case. 

First, the military judge’s annotated findings of fact are almost exclusively 

rooted in adopting the written motions of both parties. As such, the military judge’s 

ruling does not adequately address the additional testimony from the motions 

hearing. The absence of such findings is problematic for our review, as we “may not 

make findings of fact in this case.” Lincoln, 42 M.J. at 320. 

For example, in their briefs and at argument, the parties cite to the accused’s 

testimony as either undercutting or buttressing the military judge’s ruling. This 

testimony, however, is not explicitly addressed in the ruling itself. In essence, the 

parties are asking this court to fill in the gaps resulting from the military judge’s 

limited findings and analysis of the motions hearing. In line with our superior 

court’s guidance, we decline to overstep our boundaries in this context. 

Second, it is ambiguous whether the military judge meant to compartmentalize 

his “totality of the circumstances” analysis for the accused’s statements to CID. 

Unsurprisingly, the parties disagree on this point. The government asserts the 

military judge’s analysis of the accused’s statement stands alone and is not colored 

by the later analysis of the accused’s consent to search his cell phone and providing 

his PIN. By contrast, the accused asserts certain circumstances addressed in the 

subsequent analysis should be logically imputed back to the initial analysis. Both 

sides cite contextual language in the ruling to support these diametrically opposed 

positions. 

Despite the parties adopting black-and-white positions over the military 

judge’s apparent intent, we find this issue contains shades of gray. Simply put, it is 

unclear to us whether the military judge meant to separate or conjoin portions of his 

analyses. We are equally unsure over which, if any, of the adopted findings the 

military judge applied to each issue. Again, in such circumstances, “[t]he 

appropriate remedy . . . is a remand for clarification.” Kosek, 41 M.J. at 64. 

Third, our difficulty is magnified by the military judge’s statements that 

reveal he may have erroneously ascribed categorical weight to the lack of a 

cleansing statement. For example, in his analysis of the cell phone, the military 

judge stated, “[W]here the government fails to provide the accused his rights 

warning and the accused provides incriminating information, his subsequent consent 

to a search is unlawfully obtained when no cleansing statement is provided.” This 

reads like a categorical pronouncement of law, implying that the cleansing statement 

is the single criterion the military judge considered for this issue. However, 
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following this language, the military judge briefly discussed additional evidence 

before determining the government failed to meet its burden under the “totality of 

the circumstances.” 

Similarly, in his ruling regarding the accused’s statements to CID, the 

military judge referenced the “totality of the circumstances,” but then said the rights 

waivers were “tainted by the lack of a cleaning statement and thus not knowing and 

voluntary,” and called the lack of a cleaning statement a “fatal flaw” in this case. 

Taken together, these statements imply the military judge may not have actually 

considered the totality of the circumstances, but rather applied the “cat-out-of-thebag” test, in which an unwarned statement fatally taints an accused’s later statement. 

To be clear, we are not suggesting that a military judge must discuss every 

fact each time he examines the totality of the circumstances. But if a military judge 

appears to rely almost exclusively on one circumstance—in this case, the lack of a 

cleansing statement—it is difficult to assess how much weight he gave to other 

relevant circumstances. Upon remand, the military judge can clarify the exact 

weight associated with the lack of a cleansing statement in his analyses of these 

issues. See, e.g., United States v. Olson, 74 M.J. 132, 134-35 (C.A.A.F. 2015) 

(analyzing the military judge’s application of the six nonexclusive factors used to 

assist in analyzing the voluntariness of a consent to search); United States v. 

Brisbane, 63 M.J. 106, 114-16 (C.A.A.F. 2006) (analyzing the voluntariness of a 

confession obtained subsequent to an earlier, unwarned statement). 

For the reasons above, we therefore hold that the military judge’s ruling is 

ambiguous, incomplete, and insufficient for us to perform a proper review under 

Article 62, UCMJ.*

CONCLUSION 

The appeal of the United States pursuant to Article 62, UCMJ, is GRANTED. 

The ruling of the military judge is vacated and the record of trial will be returned to 

the military judge for action not inconsistent with this opinion. We make no ruling 

as to the admissibility of the evidence in question. 

                                                            

*

 We expressly note that our sister court has countenanced the use of supplemental 

rulings by military judges in cases where the government files a timely notice of 

appeal. United States v. Catano, 75 M.J. 513 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2015). In 

approving this practice, our sister court pointed out, “[t]he Supreme Court has noted 

the wisdom of allowing trial courts ‘the opportunity to promptly correct their own 

alleged errors,’ as opposed to imposing added and unnecessary burdens on appellate 

courts.” Id. at 516-17 (quoting United States v. Dieter, 429 U.S. 6, 8 (1976)). 
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The military judge may, sua sponte or on request of a party, permit additional 

evidence and argument on any matter relevant to the suppression motion, to include 

the scope of consent issue that was not part of this appeal. The military judge shall 

make detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law to support his ruling. The trial 

may then proceed or the United States may again pursue appeal under Article 62, 

UCMJ, if appropriate. 

Judge FLEMING concurs. 

HAGLER, Judge, concurring: 

Because this court’s decision will allow the military judge to clarify his 

findings of fact and the basis for his decision, I concur with the majority opinion. 

But I write separately to explain why, in my view, the military judge’s ruling is at 

best ambiguous and what he might have done to help us resolve this appeal directly. 

This case puts us in an unusual situation, since we cannot find facts in an 

Article 62 appeal. If this was not such a case, I might be inclined to overturn the 

military judge’s ruling. I find scant support in the record for some of the military 

judge’s conclusions, which make no reference to the testimony given in the motions 

hearing. I might also find he erroneously applied the law. 

I recognize that we must give deference to the military judge’s ruling, but I 

find it hard to do so when he made no findings of fact reflecting the extensive, and 

often contradictory, motions hearing testimony in this case. The accused’s 

testimony alone accounts for 42 pages of the transcript, and his testimony is highly 

probative of the voluntariness of both his confession and his consent to search. 

For example, the accused testified on direct examination that he had already 

told law enforcement “everything,” yet it is plain from his two previous statements 

that his purpose was to deny all criminal misconduct. On cross-examination, the 

accused acknowledged he did not admit to any crime in these statements. Because 

the military judge did not address this testimony in his ruling, it is difficult to see 

how the accused’s prior statements tended to overbear his will and to coerce his 

confession to criminal conduct. 

Similarly, the accused testified on cross-examination that his previous 

statements did not impact his ultimate decision to confess. Yet the military judge 

ruled, “Because the accused believed his previous statements could be used against 

him, his subsequent waivers were tainted by the lack of a cleansing statement and 

thus not knowing and voluntary.” Again, the military judge’s findings of fact are 

silent on the motions hearing testimony, so it is difficult to see how the military 

judge weighed the accused’s testimony, or whether he even considered it, as part of 

his totality of the circumstances analysis. 
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Finally, I wholly support the use of supplemental rulings, as endorsed by our 

sister court in Catano and mentioned in a footnote of the lead opinion. Had the 

military judge issued a supplemental ruling with a more complete discussion, this 

court may have been able to rule on this appeal directly, rather than returning the 

case for clarification. Or the government may have elected not to appeal, as 

appellate counsel acknowledged during oral argument. To me, the use of 

supplemental rulings might affect a significant number of Article 62, UCMJ, 

appeals and thereby promote efficiency in the system. 

       

FOR THE COURT: 

 MALCOLM H. SQUIRES, JR. 

 Clerk of Court 

MALCOLM H. SQUIRES, JR. 

Clerk of Court 

FOR THE COURT: