Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1531| November 20, 2019 Page 1 of 11

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT B.M.

John R. Worman

Evansville, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Benjamin M. L. Jones

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Matter of the Termination 

of the Parent–Child Relationship 

of J.M. (Minor Child)

and 

B.M. (Mother),

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

The Indiana Department of 

Child Services,

Appellee-Petitioner.

November 20, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-JT-1531

Appeal from the Vanderburgh 

Superior Court

The Honorable Brett J. Niemeier, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

82D04-1812-JT-2236
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1531| November 20, 2019 Page 2 of 11

Bradford, Judge.

Case Summary

[1] B.M. (“Mother”) is the biological parent of J.M. (“Child”), (born December 16, 

2012). In February of 2018, Child was adjudicated to be a child in need of 

services (“CHINS”) due to Mother’s homelessness and substance abuse. In 

December of 2018, the Department of Child Services (“DCS”) petitioned for 

the termination of Mother’s parental rights. On June 26, 2019, the juvenile 

court ordered that Mother’s parental rights to Child be terminated. Mother 

contends that the juvenile court’s termination of her parental rights was clearly 

erroneous. We affirm. 

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On February 12, 2018, DCS removed Child from Mother’s care due to 

concerns over homelessness and substance abuse and petitioned for Child to be 

adjudicated a CHINS. On February 21, 2018, Child was adjudicated to be a 

CHINS. On March 21, 2018, the juvenile court held a dispositional hearing on 

the CHINS petition and ordered Mother to, inter alia, maintain contact with 
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DCS, obey the law, remain drug- and alcohol-free, submit to random drug 

screens, obtain mental-health and substance-abuse evaluations and follow all 

recommendations, cooperate with parent aid services, attended visitation, 

maintain suitable and stable housing, and secure a legal and stable source of 

income. 

[3] In May of 2018, Mother disclosed to family case manager (“FCM”) Jodi Straus

that she had used THC. From May of 2018 to October of 2018, Mother 

attended visitation with Child; however, visitation was thereafter stopped due 

to Mother’s noncompliance. On July 9, 2018, Mother was charged with driving 

without a valid driver’s license and possession of a synthetic drug, to which she 

pled guilty. On October 19, 2018, Mother was charged with Class A 

misdemeanor theft, to which she pled guilty. On December 11, 2018, DCS 

petitioned for the termination of Mother’s parental rights. The juvenile court 

held evidentiary hearings on January 23, and April 11, 2019. On January 26, 

2019, Mother was charged with possession of a synthetic drug, criminal 

trespass, and possession of paraphernalia, which were still pending at the time 

of the second evidentiary hearing.

[4] At the evidentiary hearing, FCM Straus testified that she believed it was in 

Child’s best interests that Mother’s rights be terminated and Child be adopted.

FCM Straus noted Mother’s continued substance abuse, including her 

admission to using THC in May of 2018, and that Mother had only submitted 

to ten to fifteen drug screens even though they were required twice weekly.

FCM Straus also testified that she referred Mother four different times for a 
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dual assessment for mental health and substance abuse, but Mother only went 

as of March of 2019. FCM Straus testified that Mother had lived at 

approximately five different locations throughout this matter. 

[5] Court-appointed special advocate (“CASA”) Debroah Gamache testified that 

she believed it was in Child’s best interests that Mother’s parental rights be 

terminated. CASA Gamache noted that “Mother hasn’t done the services that 

were offered to her until just recently. So even though she requested in court 

and was Court ordered [...] to do a mental health [evaluation], it took her just 

about a year to actually go[.]” Tr. p. 76. 

[6] At a hearing, Mother admitted to using synthetic drugs during this matter. She 

also admitted that the reason she had avoided a drug evaluation was because 

she had smoked marijuana in August of 2018 and did not want to screen 

positive. Moreover, Mother admitted that she had dealt with a “little bout of 

homelessness this past year,” tr. p. 54, but was currently living with her 

boyfriend in a recreational vehicle (“RV”) but showering and eating at his 

parents’ home. Mother also admitted that she did not have a steady job or

source of income, and since January of 2019, she had only earned a “couple 

hundred bucks,” tr. p. 61, mowing lawns, a job which she classified as not “a 

tax paying job.” Tr. p. 56. On June 26, 2019, the juvenile court terminated 

Mother’s parental rights. 

Discussion and Decision
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[7] The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the 

traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children. Bester v. 

Lake Cty. Office of Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). The 

parent–child relationship is “one of the most valued relationships in our 

culture.” Neal v. DeKalb Cty. Div. of Family & Children, 796 N.E.2d 280, 286 (Ind. 

2003) (internal citations omitted). Parental rights, however, are not absolute 

and must be subordinated to the child’s interests when determining the proper 

disposition of a petition to terminate the parent–child relationship. Bester, 839 

N.E.2d at 147. Therefore, when parents are unwilling or unable to fulfill their 

parental responsibilities their rights may be terminated. Id.

[8] In reviewing the termination of parental rights on appeal, we neither reweigh 

the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. Doe v. Daviess Cty. Div. of 

Children & Family Servs., 669 N.E.2d 192, 194 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied. 

We consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom which are 

most favorable to the juvenile court’s judgment. Id. Where, as here, a juvenile 

court has entered findings of facts and conclusions of law, our standard of 

review is two-tiered. Id. First, we determine whether the evidence supports the 

factual findings and second, whether the factual findings support the judgment. 

Id. The juvenile court’s findings and judgment will only be set aside if found to 

be clearly erroneous. Id. A finding is clearly erroneous if no facts or inferences 

drawn therefrom support it. In re R.J., 829 N.E.2d 1032, 1035 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2005). “A judgment is clearly erroneous if the findings do not support the 
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juvenile court’s conclusions or the conclusions do not support the judgment.” 

Id.

[9] Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b) dictates what DCS is required to establish to 

support a termination of parental rights. Of relevance to this case, DCS was 

required to establish by clear and convincing evidence

(B) that one (1) of the following is true: 

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions 

that resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for 

placement outside the home of the parents will not be 

remedied. 

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation 

of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the wellbeing of the child. 

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been 

adjudicated a child in need of services[.]

[and]

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child[.]

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2).

1

In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to 

sustain the termination of her parental rights, Mother contends that the trial 

court erred by concluding that (1) the conditions that resulted in the removal of 

Child from Mother’s care would not be remedied, (2) the continuation of the 

1

It is not disputed that the Child had been removed from Mother for at least six months under a dispositional 

decree and that there was a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the Child, both required findings 

pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2).
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parent–child relationship between Child and Mother posed a threat to Child’s 

well-being, or (3) termination of Mother’s parental rights was in Child’s best 

interests.

I. Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B)

[10] Mother contends that there is insufficient evidence to establish a reasonable 

probability that the conditions that resulted in Child’s removal would not be 

remedied or that the continued parent–child relationship posed a threat to 

Child. Because Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) is written in the 

disjunctive, DCS was only required to establish one of the circumstances. We 

choose to first address Mother’s contention that the trial court erred by 

concluding that the conditions which resulted in Child’s removal would not be 

remedied. 

In determining whether the conditions that resulted in the 

child[ren]’s removal...will not be remedied, we engage in a twostep analysis[.] First, we identify the conditions that led to 

removal; and second, we determine whether there is a reasonable 

probability that those conditions will not be remedied. In the 

second step, the trial court must judge a parent’s fitness as of the 

time of the termination proceeding, taking into consideration 

evidence of changed conditions—balancing a parent’s recent 

improvements against habitual pattern[s] of conduct to determine 

whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or 

deprivation. We entrust that delicate balance to the trial court, 

which has discretion to weigh a parent’s prior history more 

heavily than efforts made only shortly before termination. 

Requiring trial courts to give due regard to changed conditions 
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does not preclude them from finding that parents’ past behavior 

is the best predictor of their future behavior. 

In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642–43 (Ind. 2014) (internal citations, quotations, and 

footnote omitted, first and third set of brackets in original, second set added).

[11] The conditions that led to Child’s removal were homelessness and substance 

abuse. We conclude that DCS has produced ample evidence to establish a 

reasonable probability that these conditions will not be remedied. Regarding 

homelessness, Mother admitted to periods of homelessness while this matter 

was ongoing. Mother has lived in approximately five different locations in less 

than one-and-one-half years. Further, at the time of the termination hearing, 

Mother was living in a RV with her boyfriend, who has a criminal history 

associated with drugs, but showers and eats at her boyfriend’s parents’ 

residence. Regarding substance abuse, Mother has admitted to using synthetic 

drugs. In May of 2018, she admitted to FCM Straus that she had used THC, 

and in August of 2018, she admitted to smoking marijuana, causing her to 

choose to forgo a substance-abuse evaluation. While the ten to fifteen drug 

screens Mother submitted to had negative results, she was ordered to submit to 

drug screens twice a week. Mother’s noncompliance paired with FCM Straus’s 

testimony that “[d]ue to the different compound and chemicals they use in K22

2

“In 2011, the General Assembly outlawed the possession and dealing of synthetic cannabinoids, substances 

which are generally referred to as K2 or Spice.” L.J.K. v. State, 987 N.E.2d 164, 166–67 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013)

(citations omitted). 
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it’s very hard to screen for it. It’s very hard to catch. Not to mention, it doesn’t 

stay in the system very long,” tr. p. 23, diminishes Mother’s few negative 

screens. Moreover, Mother has been arrested three times, twice on charges 

relating to substance abuse. The juvenile court did not clearly err in concluding 

that the conditions that led to Child’s removal would not be remedied. 

II. Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(C)

[12] Mother contends that there is insufficient evidence to support the juvenile 

court’s conclusion that termination of her parental rights was in the Child’s best 

interests. We are mindful that, in determining what is in the best interests of a 

child, the juvenile court must look beyond factors identified by DCS and 

consider the totality of the evidence. In re J.S., 906 N.E.2d 226, 236 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2009). The juvenile court need not wait until a child is irreversibly harmed 

before terminating the parent–child relationship because it must subordinate the 

interests of the parents to those of the children. McBride v. Monroe Cty. Office of 

Family & Children, 798 N.E.2d 185, 203 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). We have 

previously held that recommendations from the FCM and CASA to terminate 

parental rights, in addition to evidence that conditions resulting in removal will 

not be remedied, is sufficient evidence to show that termination is in the child’s 

best interests. In re J.S., 906 N.E.2d at 236. 

[13] FCM Straus testified that she believed it was in Child’s best interests that 

Mother’s rights be terminated and that Child be adopted. CASA Gamache also 

testified that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in Child’s best 

interests. While coupling that testimony with our previous conclusion that there 
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was sufficient evidence to show that the conditions of removal would not be 

remedied is sufficient to support the juvenile court’s termination of Mother’s 

parental rights, it is not as though this testimony is unsupported by other 

evidence in the record. 

[14] In addition to Mother’s inability to maintain stable housing or sobriety, Mother 

does not have the ability to provide the necessary care for Child. When DCS 

became involved in this case Child was developmentally delayed and diagnosed 

with PTSD. FCM Straus testified that due to Child’s PTSD, “It is very 

important that [he has] a routine, that [he] is able to rely on people, and he’s 

able to feel safe and secure.” Tr. p. 35. Since DCS involvement, Child is 

attending kindergarten and testing at age-appropriate levels. Child works with 

multiple therapists, including a skills-development coach, outpatient therapist, 

and may need to start working with an occupational therapist to improve motor 

skills. In the words of FCM Straus, “He is thriving.” Id. Mother, however, does 

not have a valid driver’s license or a legal source of income. Mother has failed 

to demonstrate that Child could rely on her for safety and security. In fact, in 

the prior CHINS case, DCS had enrolled Child in Head Start, but once Child 

was placed back with Mother, DCS found that Child was no longer enrolled. 

Considering the totality of the evidence, Mother has failed to establish that the 

juvenile court’s determination that termination was in the Child’s best interest 

was clearly erroneous. 

[15] The judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed. 
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Vaidik, C.J., and Riley, J., concur.