### TEXA S COU RT O F AP PEAL S, THIRD DISTRICT , AT AUST IN

NO. 03-00-00125-CR

Apparajan Gane san, Appellant

v. The State of Texas, Appellee

FROM THE

DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAV IS COUNTY, 390 TH J

UDICIAL DISTRICT NO. 0995324, HONORAB LE J ULIE H. KOCUREK, JUDGE PRESIDING

A jury convicted appellant Apparajan Ganesan on two counts of solicitation t o
co mm it mu rde r. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 15. 03, 19. 02 (West 1994). The jury found t hat appellant solicite d Reda S

ue Prier to kill Sud

ha Valla bhaneni, appella

nt’s wife, and Amy W

right, the la wy er re pre se ntin g V al la

bh an en i in h er di vorce action. The jury assessed punishment for each count at imprisonmen t for ten years, to be served concurr ently. We will affirm the
co nv ic ti on

on on e c ou nt , bu t revers e a

nd render an

ac quit tal o n t he ot her.
SUFFICIE NCY OF EVIDE NCE Proof of Soli citation

Inhis f irst issue , appella

nt conten ds the S tate did not prove that he engage d in criminal solicitation as defined in the penal code and alleged in the indictment. The penal code provides that a person commits an offense if, with intent that a capital or fir st degree felony be2

committed, he “ requests, commands, or attempts to induce another to engage in spec ific conduct that, un de r t he circumsta nces s urrounding his condu

ct as th e actor belie

ves the m to be, would constit ute the felony or make the oth er a par ty to its commission. ” Id
. § 15. 03(a). The two counts of the indictment alle ged that appella nt, w ith the requis ite intent , requested Prier “ to engage in specific conduct, to wit: to kill [the complainant]” under circumstances that “ would have made Reda Sue Prier a party to the c ommiss ion of murder. ” It is undisputed that appellant did not ask Prier to kill either Valla bhaneni o

r Wright. Instead , Prier testifie d th at appellan t repeatedly

asked her to find someone to kill them. Appellant contends that Prier ’s testimony does not reflect a cr iminal solicitation, but merely a noncr iminal “ solicitation of solicitation. ”

In Johnso n v. State , 650 S. W. 2d 784, 787 (Tex. Cri m. App. 1983), the indictment alleged that t he defend

ant “ attempte d to induce Roger B ryant to employ a nother” to commit a
mu rde r. Th e def

enda nt arg ue d t ha t a sk in g B rya nt to em pl oy anot her to co mm it

mu rde r w a s a solicitation

of a solicitation, and therefor e not an offense under the terms of penal code section 15. 05. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 15. 05 (West 1994) (solicitation of a cha pt er 1 5 p rep ara

to ry offense is not an offense). The court r ejected this argument. Citing the la st phrase in section 15. 03(a), the court noted that the a ct solic ited mus t either cons titute the intended felony or make the person solicited aparty to its commission. Johnson , 650 S. W. 2d at 787. The act solicited by the defendant, B ryant’s employment of another to commit mur der, would make B ryant a party to th e m urder. Thus, the defendant’s solicitation of B ryant constituted an offense under section 15. 03. Id
.1 Although appellant does not brief this issue, we also conclude that there is no fatal vari ance betwee n the indic tment and the evide

nce. The indictme

nt allege d that app ellant as ked Prier “ to engage in spec ific condu ct, to wit: to kill” Vallabha neni and W

right, under circumstanc es th a t “ would have made Reda S ue Pr ier a party to the commission of mur der. ” Appellant did not object to the form or substa

nce of the

indictmen

t. See Tex. Code Cr im. Pr oc. Ann. art. 1. 14(b) ( West Supp. 2001). An indictment need not allege the facts

which mak

e a party criminally respons ible for th e c on du ct

of an ot her. Pitts v

. State , 569 S. W. 2d 898, 900 ( Tex. Crim
. App. 1978)
. Although there is no evidence that appellant solicited Prier to kill Va

ll ab ha neni and W rig ht , th ere is evidence that he solicited Prier to arr ange for th e m urders , whic h w ould

ha ve made Prie r a party as alleged. 3

If, in the cause bef

ore u s, Pri er had a

rranged for so meon e els e to k ill ap pella nt’s wifeand her attorney as she testified that appellant requested and attempted to induce her to do, Pr ier would have b een a par ty to the m urd ers. See Tex. Penal C ode Ann. § 7. 02(a)( 2) (West 1994)
. Appe llant ’s co nten tion t hat Prier’s testimonydoes not show that he committed a criminal solicitation under section 15. 03 is without merit. Issue one is overruled. 1 Corroboration of Solicitee

Appellant further con

tend s tha t Prier’s testimony was not adequately corrobor ated. A person may no t be convi cted of criminal sol icitation on the uncorr oborated testimony of the perso n alleged

ly solic ited and “unless the s olicitation is made under circumstanc es str ongl y
corr oborative of both the s olicitation itself and the actor’s intent that the other person act on the solicitation. ” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 15. 03(b) (West 1994). Section 15. 03(b) is anal ogous to the accomplice witness statute, and the same test for evaluating the sufficiency of the cor robor ation is used. Richar

dson v. State , 700 S. W. 2d 591, 594 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) ; see also Tex. Code Crim. Pr oc. Ann. art. 38. 14 (West 1979). Therefor e, we must eliminate Prier ’s testimony from consideration and determine whether ther e is other evidence tending to connect appellant to the4

crime. Richardson , 700 S. W. 2d at 594. The corr oboration must go to both the solicitation and the alleged intent, but need n ot be suffic ient in its elf to est ablish g uilt. Id
. We view th e
corr oborating evidence in the light most favorable to the ve rdict. Gill v. State , 873 S. W. 2d 45, 48 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) ; Utsey v. State , 921 S. W. 2d 451, 453 (Tex. App.
S Texarkana 1996, pet. ref’d). Appellant

is an engineer who had designed a computer chip t

hat he hop ed to market in partnership with a Swiss corporation. In November 1996, one month after Vallabhaneni filed for divorce, appellant liquidated his broke r age account and ordered that the pr oceeds, over one million dollars, be wired to a Swiss bank a ccount. B efore the money could be mo ve d, how ev er, his wife obtained a

restr aining order and the money was deposited in the regist ry of the c ourt. In late 1997 or early1998, appellant f iled for bankr uptcy. Vallabhaneni , as a claimant to the funds,
was scheduled to be deposed in the ba nkrup tcy proce eding in November 1998. The alleged solicitations for the murders of Vallabha neni a nd Wright took place in September and October 1998. The record reflects that a ppellant believe d that his

wife’s actions were damagin g his ability to market the computer chip. During a telephone conversation with

Va ll ab ha neni in Ja nu ary 1997, which she tape recorded on Wright’s advi ce, appella nt said t h at he r di vo rc e action was

“ making sure that this product will die. ” Appellant went on, “ Let me tel l you this. I do n’ t c are what you do. If this product dies, one of us will be dead, yeah, I promise you that. ” Vallabhaneni replied, “ What do you mean, you’ll kill me?” Appellant answered, “ I will kill myself or I’ll kill you or I’ll

kill b oth of u s or you

will k ill yourself. That mu

ch I ca n tell you. If .
. .5

this product dies, one of us will die. I know that. B ecause I won’t be able to live with the shame. Maybe you w

ill be able

to live with

it. ” In Richardson , the defen dant wasconv icte d of s olici

ting t he mu rder of a man who
was sched

uled to te stify aga

inst him i n a prosecut io n for theft. The court of criminal app eals stated that t he “ theft charge and [the victim’s] actions with respect to it suggest[] the existence of
anagreement [between the defendant and the alleg ed solicitee] .” Id
. at 595. Applying the reasoning of Richardson , appellant’s belief that his wife’ s litigat

ion threatene d to derail a potentia llylucrative business opportunity was evidenc e of mo tive t hat te nds t o sup port Prier’s testimonyth at

ap pe ll an t s ol ic it ed th e m urders of hi s w if e a nd her a ttorney. While evidence of motive is in suffi cient in i tself to corr oborate an accomplice, it may be considered with other evidence to connect

the accused with the crime. Reed v

. State , 744 S. W. 2d 112, 127 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988)
. Appe llant ’s statement that “ one of us will b e dead” if the chip design did not succeed adds so me

ad di ti on al su pp ort to th e exi st

ence of th e s ol ic it at

io n o f V al la

bh an en i’ s m urder. In his brief, appellant dismisses his remar ks during the telephone conversation as nothing more than hyperbole, and notes that the con versation took place twenty months before the alleged solicitation. B ut viewing the evidence in the light most favo rable to the jury’s ve rdict, as we m

ust,
we cann ot disregard the threat im plicit in a ppellant ’s state

ment. Ap pellant was arrested in

May 1997 for violatin

g a protective

order obta ined b y Vallabha neni. While in

the Travis County J

ail, he met J ames Hammo nds, who was awaiting his release on bail following an arr est for theft. Hammonds testified that appellant told him “ about6

how his wife and the system and the judge had des troyed his life and his business and how hewas losing everything. ” According to Hammonds, appellant asked, “ Do you know of anyone, or can youtake care of

my wife for me?” When Hammonds replied, “ Excuse me?” appellant said, “ You know what I mean. ” Hammonds said that this “ really scared me” and that he thought he was

“ being set up by

the cops. ” Hammonds refused to give appellant his address but gave appellant a telephone numbe

r where he could be reac hed, not expec

ting appe llant to ca

ll. A few weeks later, however, appellant called Hammonds and asked if he

“ remember [ed] the conve rsation in the

cell that we had. ” Appellan

t added, “ I need to ta

lk to you about this again. We need to talk about thi s. ” Still fearing that he was being tricked, Hammonds told appellant his upcoming trial date and suggested that they meet at the courthouse. After giving the matter fur ther consideration, Hammonds contacted the police and reported what appellant had said. Subs equently , u n der the supervision of a T exas Ranger, Hammonds (who had obtained appe llant ’s telephone number by me an s o f ca lle r ID) called appellant while being recorded. When Hammonds attempte d to talk about their pr evious conversations, appellant “ started back-peddling. He st arte d try ing

to g et out of t he co nve rsa tio n. He didn’t want

to talk ab out that. ” The call ended and the police did not pursue the matter to H ammonds’s knowledge.

That appellant solicited Hammonds to kill his wife, albeit sixteen months before the alleged solicita tion of Prier, tends to

corr oborate P rier ’s testimony both as to the solicitation itself and appellant’s intent that Pr ier act on the solicitation. See Va rvar o v. State , 772 S. W. 2d 140, 143-44 (Tex. App.
S Tyler 1988, pet. ref’d). B ut Hammonds’s testimon y corroborates Prier only7

with respect to the solicitation of Vallabhaneni’s murder. It does not tend to connec t appella

nt to th e a ll eg ed so li cita ti on of Wri gh t’ s m urder. Pr ier testified that during the months appellant was asking her to arra nge the murder s, he instructed her to go to a post off ice near the Arbor etum shopping center and watch who came an

d went. She a

lso testified that a

ppellant told her to watch an office on Lake Austin B oulevard, which he identified as Wright’s husband’s law office. The State c ontends thi s testimonywas corr oborated by Va lla bhanen i’s testimony that she received her mail at the Arbor etum post office and by Wright’s testimony that her husband’s law office was in a building
on Lake Austin B oulevard. St anding alone, however, this alleged corrobor ative evidence does notconnect appel lant to the criminal solic itations
. Vallabha neni’s a nd Wright’s tes

timony is meaningless except by refer ence to Pri er’s testimony. Such “ bo o tstrapping” cannot be used to corroborate an accomplice, and by extension cannot be used to c orr oborate a solicitee. See Sonens chein v. State , 722 S
. W. 2d 450 , 452 (Tex. App.

— Aust in 198 7, pet. ref’d). The State also contends that Pr ier’s testimony was corr ob or ated by ap pella nt’s bankruptcy att

orney. This witne ss testi fied t hat in Novemb er 1998, follow ing a ppel lant’ s arr est for the inst ant off

ense and at appellant’s direction, he retr ieved over $100, 000 in cash from appellant’s house. The State argues that this shows appe llant had the financial means to pay for the solicited murder s and to flee if necessary. B ut once again, this evidence haslittle significance standing alone. Appellant’s possess ion of a large sum of cash is inculpatory, if at all, only when it is cons idered in

light of Pr ier’ s testimony r egard ing the all eged solicit ations. We must di sr eg ard8

Prie r’ s testimony in our search for corr oborating evidence. Richardson , 700 S. W. 2d at 594 ; Sonens chein , 722 S. W. 2d at 452.

F inally, the Sta

te asks this Court to consider evidence tendered by the State but excluded by the district court. The Sta te cites no pertinent au

thority th at

woul d p erm

it th is Co urt to consider excluded testimony in determining the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a criminal conviction, and we decline to do so. The State did not file

a cross-appeal and the propr iety of the district cour t’s r uling is no t befor e us. See T ex. C ode Cr im. Pr oc. Ann. art. 44. 01(c) ( West Sup p. 2001)
. We conclude that the evidence of motive, the veiled threa t durin g the telephone conversation, and the earlier solicita tion of Hammonds

adequa tely corr oborates Pr ier’s testimony both as to appellant’s solicitation of Vallabhaneni’s murder and appellant’s intent that P rier act on the solicitation. We find, however, insufficien t c orr oboration for Pr ier’s testimony r egarding appe llant ’s solicitation of Wright’s mur der. Therefor e, we will overr ule issue two in part and
sus tain it in p art , rev ers e a pp el la nt ’sco nv ic ti on

on coun t o ne of th e i nd ic tm en t, and render a judgment o f acquitta

l on that c ount.
OTHER ISSUES Extraneous Of

fen se Appellant contends Hammonds’s testimony was erroneously admitted over his rule 403 ob je ct io n b ec au se

th e c ou rt faile d to perfor m the necessary balancing test to determine whether the probative value of the testimony was outweighed by the danger of unfair pr ejudice, confusionof the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or needless presentation of cumulative9

evid ence. See Tex. R. Evid. 403. Appellant does not argue that the court r eac hed the wron g conclusion

after applying the test. Instead, appellant argues thatthe cour t failed to apply the proper balancing te st at all
.

The State first tendered H ammonds’s testimony outsidethe jury’s pr esence. As pa rt of its prese ntation, the State submitted a memorandum, in the recor d as court’s exhibit one, summarizing the holdings of several opinions, including the lea ding ca se on the subject of extraneous misconduct evidence, Montgomery v. State , 810 S. W. 2d 372, 386 (Tex. Cri m. App. 1991) (op. on reh’g)
. In its disc uss ion of Montgomery , this memorandum se t o ut th e f ac to rs the trial court is to consider when balancing pr obative value ag ainst the danger of unfair prejudice pursuant to rule 403: (1) the probative value of the ex tra ne ou s m is co nd uc t e vi denc e wit

h re ga rd to a fact of consequence in the case; ( 2) the potential for the challenged evidence to impr ess the ju ryin some i

rr ati onal but i ndelible way; (3) the time needed to develop the extraneous misconduct

evidence; and (4) the proponent’s ne ed for the evid ence. See id
. at 389-90. The prosecutor discussed eac

h of these factors with the court and counsel for appellant responded. The
court then heard Ham

monds ’s testimony without the jury. Then, after fur ther ar gument by the part ies, the court over ruled appellant’s rule 404(b) and 403 obj ections. See Tex. R. Evid. 404(b ).

At this point, defense counsel asked t he court to “ perfor m a [rule 403] balancing test. ” The court r eplied, “ I did, but I’ll go ahe ad and do it again for you. The Cour t does find that the probative value out

weighs the prejudicia

l effect in view of all

the factors that are —

have been prese

nted in this

case. ” Counsel pur sued the matt er, asking the cou rt t o expr essly addr ess2 It appears that ap pe ll an t’ s r eq ue st fo r an ex pre ss fi nd in g w as mi su nd ers to od by th e c ou rt to be a request for the cour t to determine the pr obative value of the proffer ed evidence.
3 Were the issue raised, we would rule that the district cour t did not abuse its discretion by overr uling appe llant ’s objectionto Hammonds’s testimony. Pr ier’s cr edibility was the principal issue at trial, both factually and legally. Hammonds’s testimony was crucial to the State; without it, it is unlik

ely that Pr ier’s testimony r egarding the soli citation o f Vallabha neni’s mu rder would have been adequately corrobor ated. Hammonds’s testimony did not have the potential for influ encing the jur y in some ir rati onal way, since it was dir ectly r elated to th e st atutor y corr oboration issue. 10 the four factor s discusse d in Montgomery
. Wh en

aske d b y c ou

ns el to ma ke a f in ding “ wi th reg ard to impressing the jury in a potentially ir rational manner , ” the court r esponded, “ Okay. As far as the potential of this evidence to impress the jury in an ir rational manner, the Court is not going to make a finding in that regar d because I think it’s presumptuous to assess — my job is not to be the fact finder in this case. That’s the jury’s job. So I’ll not make that finding. ”

Appe llant ’s contention is that the court failed to co nsi der the potential for Hammon ds’s

testimonyto impr ess the jury in some irrational but indelib le way. The record is to the contrar y. This issue was expressly addressed in the S tate’s trial memor andumand discussed by the prosecutor dur ing hi s a rgu ment in fa vo r of ad mi ss io n. Thecourt

expressly

stated that it had perfor med the rule 403 balancing test and found that “ the probative va lue outw eighs the prejudicial effect in view of all the factors that .
. . have bee n p res en te d.” Alth ough

th e c ou rt refused to m ake an express finding on the issue, Montgomery do es no t re quire

a t ria l c ou rt t o conduct the rule 403 balancing test on the recor d o r to expr essly articulate the

reasons for its ruling. 2 Caballe

ro v. State , 919 S. W. 2d 919, 922 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dis t. ] 1996, pet. ref’d); Houstonv. State , 832 S. W. 2d 180, 184 (Tex. Ap p.
— Waco 1992) , pet. dism’d, improvidently granted

, 846 S. W. 2d 848 (Tex. Cri m. App. 1993). Issue three is overr uled. 311

Jury Instruction

Appel lant conten ds the court err ed by refusing to instr uct the jury on the renunciation defen se. It

is an affirmative defense to pr osecution for cr iminal solicitation that the defendant countermanded his solicitation under cir cumstances manifesting a voluntary and complete renunciation of his cr iminal objective. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 15. 04(b) (West 1 994). Appellan t urges that Hammon

ds’s te stimony that appel lant “ started back-peddling ” during their last telephone conversation raised the renunciation defense.

Appe llant ’s trial request was that the c ourt give the renunci ation instruction “ with reg ard to the extraneous offense, ” t ha t is, with regar d to the solicitation of Hammonds. B ut appellant was on t rial for solic iting Prier. Hammonds’s testimon y did not raise

an iss ue as to whether appellant countermanded his solicitation of P rier
. Issue five is overruled. Jury Ar gument Pr osecutor Amy Casner concluded her opening ar gument at the guilt stage by saying that the police and prosecutors had done all they could, that the jury was the “ last link in the chain, ” and that “ the evidence tells you he’s guilty. ” She then added, “ And if you acquit that man, youare signing those two women’s death warrants. ” Appellant objected that this was an

“ improper and inflammatory argument that h as nothi ng to do with

the rendition of the evidence. ” The objection was overruled and the prosecutor r epeated, “ Ladies and gentlemen, you will be signing the death warrants of those two young women if y ou acquit t his man because the evidence12

tel l s you he’s guilty. ” Appellant requested a “ running objection, ” which was granted, and Casner’s ar gument ended.

Pr osecutor Bill Mangeretur ned to this theme is his closing argument at the guilt stage: “ Well, in this case they have tried to put Amy Wright on trial. They have tried to put Reda Sue Prier on trial.
. . . This trial is about .
. . Apparajan Ganesan, who is trying to kill these two women, and if he walks away with a not guilty, they are dead. Count on it. ” Appellant objected that this was an

“ in fl am ma to ry sta tement . . . th at ’sme an

t ent ire ly to in fl am e t

he ju ry. . . .” Th e
cour tdid no t rule on

the objec tion, but admoni she d the prosec utor to “r efrain from —

you’v e already ha

ve th at sa id on ce — fro m t he in fl am ma to ry sta te me nt s.” Af

ter fu rth er a rgu ment, ho wever, Mange concluded by saying, “ I have said all I have to say. Lives are depending on you. All I ask is

that you lo ok at the e

vidence and do the

right t hing. The eviden ce is all ther e is. ” Appellant objecte d, “ That is tota

lly improper argument. Lives are dep endi

ng on t his, there’s

no evidence that that’s the truth
. ” This objec tion was susta ined and t

he jury was in structed to disregard. Appellant’s motion for mistr ial was overruled.

Inorder to preserve err or regarding the State ’s jury argument, a defendant must object to th e argument and pur sue the objection to an adverse ruling. Cockr ell v. State , 933 S. W. 2d 73, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 199 6)
. Un der Cockr ell , appellant failed to preserve any er ror with regard to Mange’s

“ they are dead

” argument. As has often been said, proper jury ar gument is limited to: (1) summation of the evidence; (2) reasonable deductions from t he evidence; (3) an answer to the argument of opposing
counse l; and (4) a ple a for law enforcement
. Wilso n v. State , 938 S. W. 2d 57, 59 (Tex. Crim.13

App. 1996) ; Alejandro v. State , 493 S. W. 2d 230, 231 (Tex. Cri m. App. 1973). Appellant argues that the compl ained-of argumen ts “ invited the jury to speculate on matters outside the record” and
we re “ calculated to hav e a

pre judicial effect” on him. The State responds that the challenged argu ments w ere r easonable deductions from the evidence and legitimate pleas for law enforcement. The Sta

te reminds us that “ a prosecutor may str ike hard blows but not foul ones. ” Harri s v. State , 996 S
. W. 2d 232 , 237 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th

Dist. ] 1999 , no pe t. ). Evidence that appell ant had twic e solicited h is w ife ’s murder , and had on the second occasion als o solicited the murder of her attor ney, reasonably supports an argument that appellant would aga

in solic it the murders if given the c hance. The prosecutors could legit imately urge th e j ury

to convict appellant b oth to pun ish his past cr iminal con duct and to p reven t su c h misconduct

in the future. The pro se cu to rs ex ce eded

th e s co pe of proper ju ry a rgu ment , ho wever, by telling the juror s that they would be co ndemning two women to death if they were to find appellant not guilty. Such an inflammatory assertion ca nn ot be ch ara ct eri ze d a s a

mere deduction from the evidenc e or plea for law enforceme nt. The court susta

ined appe llant ’s objection to Mange’s statement that lives depended on the jury r eturning a guilty v erdi ct and instr ucted the ju ry t o disr egard it. In most cases, such
anin st ruc ti on wi ll cu re ju ry a rgu ment error. Shannon v

. State , 942 S. W. 2d 591, 597 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). While the efficacy of the court’s instr uction may hav e been red uc ed by th e c ou rt having permitted Casner’s earl ier, more inflammator y remar ks to go uncorr ected, we conclude that the c ourt’s instruction w as sufficient to c ure the error in Mange’s argument.14 Casne r’s a rgument presents

a more difficult que stion. Not only was her “ death warrant” remar k more extr eme than Mange’s, the court er roneously over ruled appe llant ’s objection and permitted the r emark to be r epeated. Not every im proper jury ar gument requir es reversal, howev er. McKa y v. State , 707 S. W. 2d 23, 38 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). Reversible
err or i s p re sented when jury argument: (1) violates a mandatory statute; (2) injects new and harmful facts into the case; or (3) is manife stly improper, harmful, and prejudicia l to the rights of the accused. Wilson , 938 S. W. 2d at 59; McKay , 707 S. W. 2d at 38. Casner’s remark did not violate a mandatory statute or inject ne w facts i nto the ca se. While the

question is a close one,
we conclude that Casner’s argument was not so manifestly improp er or pr ejudicial under the circumstances as to warrant r eversal. Issue four is overr uled.

The distric t cour t prepared separate ju dgments on each count of the

indictmen

t. We rever se the judgment of conviction on count one and render a judgment of acquittal. The judgment of conviction on count two is affirmed.

Mack Kidd, Justice B ef ore Ju st ic es K idd, Yea ke l a nd Pow ers * Af fi rme d in Pa

rt; Re vers ed and R endered in Par t F iled: F ebruar y 28, 2001 Publ ish15 * B ef ore John E. Power s, Senior Justice (retired), Third Court of Appeals, sitting by assig nment. See Tex. Gov’t

Code A nn. § 74. 003(b ) (West 1998 ).