_______________________________ 

Michigan Supreme Court 

Lansing, Michigan 

Chief Justice:	 Justices: 

Clifford W. Taylor Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver Opinion Marilyn Kelly 

Maura D. Corrigan 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman 

FILED MAY 11, 2005 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v No. 127115 

JOHN LAVELL WILLIAMS, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

PER CURIAM 

This case concerns the constitutionality of a traffic 

stop. After stopping defendant's vehicle for speeding, a 

state trooper asked defendant routine questions about his 

travel plans and obtained his consent to search the 

vehicle. Cocaine and marijuana were discovered during the 

search. Defendant argues, and the Court of Appeals 

determined, that his consent was invalid because his 

detention exceeded the proper scope of a traffic stop, in 

violation of the Fourth Amendment. The Court of Appeals 
 

 

held that the trial court should have suppressed the fruits 

of the search.1 

We conclude that the detention was reasonable and did 

not exceed the proper scope of a traffic stop. Because 

defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights were not violated as a 

result of the detention, his consent was valid. We reverse 

the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case 

to the trial court for reinstatement of defendant’s 

convictions and sentences. 

I. BACKGROUND 

On February 14, 2003, Michigan State Police Trooper 

Jason Varoni observed defendant’s vehicle traveling eightyeight miles an hour on I-75 in Cheboygan County, where the 

posted speed limit was seventy miles an hour. He stopped 

defendant’s vehicle. Upon request, defendant produced his 

driver's license. Trooper Varoni told defendant why he had 

been stopped and asked defendant where he was going. 

Defendant answered that he was going to Cheboygan to visit 

friends and that he was staying at the Holiday Inn. 

Because Cheboygan does not have a Holiday Inn, Trooper 

Varoni was suspicious of this response and asked defendant 

to step from the vehicle to answer additional questions. 

1

 Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued August 5, 2004

(Docket No. 249853). 

2
 
 

Defendant did so and, in response to further questioning, 

explained that he was coming from Detroit and that he 

intended to stay in Cheboygan for two days. No luggage was 

visible in the vehicle’s passenger compartment; when asked 

about this, defendant said that he brought no luggage on 

the trip. Trooper Varoni asked defendant if he had “been 

in trouble before,” and defendant disclosed that he had 

previously been arrested for a marijuana-related offense. 

Trooper Varoni then questioned the vehicle’s other two 

occupants about their own travel plans, but their 

inconsistent responses only increased his suspicions.2 This 

questioning was completed about five to eight minutes after 

the traffic stop occurred. Trooper Varoni then informed 

defendant that he had received conflicting stories from the 

occupants of the vehicle. He asked for defendant’s consent 

to search the vehicle, and defendant agreed. 

Trooper Varoni contacted the Tuscarora Township canine 

unit, and asked that a drug-detection dog be sent to the 

scene. The canine unit arrived within three minutes and 

the dog signaled the presence of narcotics in the backseat 

2

 The front-seat passenger claimed that he did not know

where they were going or how long they would be gone; he

confirmed that he had no luggage. The backseat passenger,

defendant’s wife, told Trooper Varoni that they were going

shopping in Cheboygan and then Detroit. She said that they

had made no arrangements for accommodations. 

3
 
 

of the vehicle. Trooper Varoni did not find any narcotics 

in that area, and he asked defendant for consent to search 

the vehicle’s trunk. Defendant initially agreed, but then 

withdrew his consent. A warrant was obtained, and the 

police discovered substances that appeared to be marijuana 

and cocaine.3 Trooper Varoni wrote defendant a citation for 

speeding and two drug-related felonies, and arrested him. 

Defendant was charged with possession with intent to 

deliver fifty grams or more but less than 225 grams of a 

substance containing cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iii), and 

possession with intent to deliver marijuana, MCL 

333.7401(2)(d)(iii). He moved to suppress evidence of the 

controlled substances seized from his vehicle, asserting 

that the search4

 and seizure were predicated on an illegal 

detention. The trial court denied the motion. It 

concluded that the statements made by the occupants of the 

vehicle raised reasonable suspicions in Trooper Varoni’s 

mind. It further concluded that the delay caused by the 

3

 This was confirmed through later testing. 

4

 Defendant disputes the validity of the initial search

of the car; he does not separately challenge the validity

of the later search of the trunk, which was conducted after

Trooper Varoni obtained a search warrant and which led to

the discovery of the controlled substances. 

4
 
additional questioning was not unreasonable under the 

circumstances presented. 

Defendant was convicted as charged following a bench 

trial, and was sentenced to consecutive prison terms of 

seven to twenty years (for the cocaine conviction) and two 

to four years (for the marijuana conviction). 

Defendant appealed, challenging the trial court’s 

denial of his motion to suppress, and the Court of Appeals 

reversed. Concluding that the initial traffic stop had 

been lawful, the Court then determined that the trooper 

“unlawfully exceeded the initial stop when he asked 

defendant to step out of the vehicle” to answer questions 

about his travel plans while the officer possessed only a 

“generalized hunch” that criminal activity was afoot. The 

trooper’s questions had no relevance to the traffic stop, 

the Court held, and he had no reasonable suspicion of 

criminal activity to warrant asking the questions. The 

Court concluded that Trooper Varoni was acting on a 

“hunch,” which is insufficient grounds for pursuing an 

investigatory stop. For these reasons, it reversed the 

trial court’s ruling on the motion to suppress. 

The prosecutor applied to this Court for leave to 

appeal. 

5
 
 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

This Court reviews a trial court’s findings at a 

suppression hearing for clear error. People v Jenkins, 472 

Mich 26, 31; 691 NW2d 759 (2005); People v Custer, 465 Mich 

319, 325-326; 630 NW2d 870 (2001). But the application of 

constitutional standards regarding searches and seizures to 

essentially uncontested facts is entitled to less 

deference; for this reason, we review de novo the trial 

court’s ultimate ruling on the motion to suppress. 

Jenkins, supra; People v Oliver, 464 Mich 184, 191-192; 627 

NW2d 297 (2001). 

III. ANALYSIS 

We review here the Court of Appeals determination that 

the traffic stop escalated into an illegal detention in 

violation of the Fourth Amendment, rendering defendant’s 

eventual consent to search a nullity. 

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution 

provides: 

The right of the people to be secure in

their persons, houses, papers and effects,

against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall

not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 

upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 

affirmation, and particularly describing the 

place to be searched, and the persons or things

to be seized.[5] 

5

 US Const, Am IV. 

6
 
 

In assessing the protections created by this amendment, the 

United States Supreme Court has “long held that the 

'touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.'” 

Ohio v Robinette, 519 US 33, 39; 117 S Ct 417; 136 L Ed 2d 

347 (1996) (citation omitted). Reasonableness is measured 

by examining the totality of the circumstances. Id. 

Because of “'endless variations in the facts and 

circumstances'” implicating the Fourth Amendment, 

reasonableness is a fact-intensive inquiry that does not 

lend itself to resolution through the application of 

bright-line rules. Id., quoting Florida v Royer, 460 US 

491, 506; 103 S Ct 1319; 75 L Ed 2d 229 (1983). 

In analyzing the propriety of the detention here, we 

apply the standard set forth in Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1; 88 

S Ct 1868; 20 L Ed 2d 889 (1968).6 Under Terry, the 

reasonableness of a search or seizure depends on “whether 

the officer’s action was justified at its inception, and 

whether it was reasonably related in scope to the 

6 Knowles v Iowa, 525 US 113, 117; 119 S Ct 484; 142 L

Ed 2d 492 (1998) (despite existence of probable cause, a

common traffic stop is more analogous to limited detention

authorized by Terry than to an arrest) (quoting Berkemer v 

McCarty, 468 US 420, 439-440; 104 S Ct 3138; 82 L Ed 2d 317

[1984]). 

7
 
 

 

circumstances which justified the interference in the first 

place.”7 Terry, supra at 20. 

In this case, there is no dispute that the initial 

traffic stop was occasioned by defendant’s speeding, and 

was therefore based on probable cause and was reasonable. 

Robinette, supra at 38. Under Terry, the remaining 

question is whether the subsequent detention was 

“reasonably related in scope to the circumstances" of this 

case. Terry, supra at 20. We conclude that it was. 

As a threshold matter, the Court of Appeals erred when 

it agreed with defendant that the purpose of this traffic 

stop was fully effectuated when defendant handed Trooper 

Varoni his driver's license and other requested paperwork. 

This view of the essential nature of the traffic stop 

imposes an unreasonable restriction on an officer’s ability 

to investigate a violation of the law. 

A traffic stop is reasonable as long as the driver is 

detained only for the purpose of allowing an officer to ask 

reasonable questions concerning the violation of law and 

7

 The reviewing court considers the objective facts

relating to the traffic stop; the officer’s subjective

state of mind is not relevant to the determination whether 

the detention was proper. Oliver, supra at 199. 

8
 
 

 

 

its context for a reasonable period.8 The determination 

whether a traffic stop is reasonable must necessarily take 

into account the evolving circumstances with which the 

officer is faced. As we observed in People v Burrell, 417 

Mich 439, 453; 339 NW2d 403 (1983), when a traffic stop 

reveals a new set of circumstances, an officer is justified 

in extending the detention long enough to resolve the 

suspicion raised.9 

It is no violation of the Fourth Amendment for an 

officer to ask reasonable questions in order to obtain 

additional information about the underlying offense and the 

circumstances leading to its commission. For example, in 

addition to asking for the necessary identification and 

paperwork, an officer may also ask questions relating to 

8

 There is considerable discretion allowed an officer 

charged with enforcing the traffic laws as a member of the

executive branch of government. This discretion can be 

exercised effectively only if an officer is allowed to ask

reasonable questions concerning the context of a traffic 

offense. To deny an officer the ability to ask 

reasonable questions, reasonably circumscribed in scope and

duration, is to deny the officer the ability to reasonably

exercise the officer's discretion. 

9

 Put another way, when considering whether a detention

is reasonably related in scope to the circumstances of the

case, a reviewing court must consider whether “the 

officer’s subsequent actions were fairly responsive to the

emerging tableau—the circumstances originally warranting 

the stop, informed by what occurred, and what the officer

learned, as the stop progressed.” United States v Chhien,

266 F3d 1, 6 (CA 1, 2001). 

9
 
 

 

the reason for the stop, including questions about the 

driver’s destination and travel plans. United States v 

Williams, 271 F3d 1262, 1267 (CA 10, 2001).10 Specifically, 

an officer may ask about the “purpose and itinerary of a 

driver’s trip during the traffic stop” in order to 

determine whether a “violation has taken place, and if so, 

whether a citation or warning should be issued or an arrest 

made.” United States v Brigham, 382 F3d 500, 508 (CA 5, 

2004). Such inquiries are “within the scope of 

investigation attendant to the traffic stop.” Id. 

Implicit in the authority to ask these questions is 

the authority to ask follow-up questions when the initial 

answers given are suspicious.11 Likewise, there is no 

constitutional prohibition against asking similar questions 

of any passengers in the vehicle.12 

10 See also United States v Givan, 320 F3d 452, 459 (CA

3, 2003); United States v Linkous, 285 F3d 716, 719 (CA 8,

2002); United States v Hill, 195 F3d 258, 268 (CA 6, 1999);

United States v Johnson, 58 F3d 356, 357 (CA 8, 1995). 

11 United States v Johnson, 58 F3d 356, 357-358 (CA 8,

1995). 

12 Linkous, supra at 719 (an officer may question the

occupants of a vehicle to verify information provided by

the driver). 

10
 
 

Simply put, the Fourth Amendment does not impose a 

“one size fits all” rule of police investigation,13 much 

less one that restricts the officer to informing the driver 

of the nature of the infraction, and subsequently obtaining 

the information necessary to fill out a citation. The 

Fourth Amendment requires only that the detention be 

reasonable—that is, that it be reasonably restricted in 

light of all the facts available to the officer. See 

Robinette, supra at 39. 

That standard was satisfied here. Trooper Varoni 

introduced himself to defendant, explained the purpose of 

the stop, and obtained the necessary identification and 

paperwork in order to complete the citation for the civil 

infraction of speeding. In response to a routine question 

about his travel plans, defendant provided Trooper Varoni 

with an explanation that was implausible.14 Therefore, even 

before Trooper Varoni could resolve the matter of 

13 See Robinette, supra at 39 (“In applying this test

we have consistently eschewed bright-line rules, instead

emphasizing the fact-specific nature of the reasonableness

inquiry.”). 

14 The Court of Appeals stated that there were 

“plausible” innocent explanations for the statements made

by the vehicle occupants. But the fact that such 

explanations can be imagined does not mean that Trooper

Varoni acted unreasonably in seeking to resolve the 

inconsistencies. See Oliver, supra at 204. 

11
 
defendant’s violation of the traffic laws, he was presented 

with additional suspicious circumstances that warranted 

further investigation. 

Trooper Varoni acted on these new suspicions by asking 

defendant additional questions about his travel plans and 

whether he had been in trouble before, and by briefly 

speaking with the vehicle's occupants. None of the answers 

provided by defendant or his companions allayed Trooper 

Varoni’s suspicions. Moreover, the entire encounter took 

only five to eight minutes, at which time Trooper Varoni 

requested and obtained defendant’s consent to search the 

vehicle. 

After reviewing the facts and evaluating the totality 

of the circumstances, we conclude that the traffic stop 

here was reasonable in both scope and duration. 

It follows that defendant was not being unlawfully 

detained when he was asked to consent to the search. 

Consent must be freely and voluntarily given in order to be 

valid. People v Borchard-Ruhland, 460 Mich 278, 294; 597 

NW2d 1 (1999); Royer, supra at 497. An investigatory stop, 

as occurred in this case, is not so inherently coercive 

that it renders involuntary consent given during the stop. 

Royer, supra at 501, 502; People v Acoff, 220 Mich App 396, 

12
 
 

 

400; 559 NW2d 103 (1996). There is no suggestion that 

defendant was coerced into giving his consent.15 

It is unnecessary to consider whether Trooper Varoni 

had an independent, reasonable, and articulable suspicion 

that defendant was involved with narcotics, or even whether 

the Fourth Amendment might impose such a requirement under 

different circumstances.16 The detention and search here 

were reasonable because: (1) the initial traffic stop was 

lawful, (2) Trooper Varoni’s questions about defendant’s 

travel plans, and his limited follow-up, were reasonable 

and did not exceed the proper scope and duration of the 

initial traffic stop, and (3) after Trooper Varoni 

concluded his questioning, defendant voluntarily consented 

to the search of the vehicle. All in all, rather than 

amounting to a constitutional violation, we find that 

15 Defendant’s own actions show that he understood that 

he could refuse the request. He later declined to consent 

to a search of the trunk. 

16 One aspect of an officer’s ability to conduct a drug

search without independent, articulable, and reasonable 

suspicion was addressed in Illinois v Caballes, 543 US ___;

125 S Ct 834; 160 L Ed 2d 842 (2005). Employing the

reasonableness standard of Robinette, the United States

Supreme Court held that, as long as the traffic stop is not

prolonged, an officer may use a drug-detection dog to sniff

a vehicle during the stop, even if the defendant does not

consent and the officer lacks reasonable, articulable 

suspicion that the occupants of the vehicle are involved

with narcotics. 

13
 
Trooper Varoni's work in this case amounted to excellent 

police work. The trial court properly denied defendant’s 

motion to suppress evidence of the controlled substances 

found during the search of his vehicle. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

Because the detention was reasonable and did not 

constitute a violation of defendant’s Fourth Amendment 

rights, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and 

remand this case to the trial court for reinstatement of 

defendant’s convictions and sentences. MCR 7.302(G)(1). 

Clifford W. Taylor

Michael F. Cavanagh

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Maura D. Corrigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.

Stephen J. Markman 

14
 
_______________________________ 

v 

S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N 

SUPREME COURT 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

No. 127115 

JOHN LAVELL WILLIAMS, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

KELLY, J. (dissenting). 

I agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court 

erred by denying defendant's motions to suppress and to 

strike the evidence provided by Trooper Jason Varoni. The 

trooper's questions of defendant were not reasonably 

related to the purpose of the traffic stop. Furthermore, 

defendant's statement to the trooper that he was staying at 

a Holiday Inn in Cheboygan could not evoke a reasonable 

suspicion that he was engaged in criminal activity. 

Therefore, I would affirm the decision of the Court of 

Appeals. 

Terry v Ohio 

Traffic stops are subject to the test established by 

the United States Supreme Court in Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1, 

20; 88 S Ct 1868; 20 L Ed 2d 889 (1968). According to 

Terry, an officer's investigation of a traffic stop must be 
"reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which 

justified the interference in the first place." Id. A 

defendant may not be detained even momentarily without 

reasonable, objective grounds for doing so. Florida v 

Royer, 460 US 491, 498; 103 S Ct 1319; 75 L Ed 2d 229 

(1983). The scope of the detention must be carefully 

tailored to the justification for the stop. Id. at 500. 

Considering the totality of the circumstances, I would 

find that the officer's questioning in this case exceeded 

the permissible legal scope of inquiry regarding a speeding 

offense. It was not reasonably related to defendant’s 

violation of the speed limit. Furthermore, I believe that 

the answers to the officer’s questions did not give rise to 

an articulable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. 

Scope of the Stop 

Trooper Varoni detained defendant for driving in 

excess of the speed limit. An additional reason for the 

stop was that his vehicle had a cracked windshield. There 

was no reasonable articulable suspicion of any other 

offense. 

Neither the United States Supreme Court nor the 

Michigan Supreme Court has ever ruled that questioning 

beyond the scope of a traffic stop is allowed. The Court of 

Appeals decision in this case accurately reflects Michigan 

2
 
 

law. However, with this decision, the Court changes 

Michigan law to enlarge the permissible scope of an inquiry 

by a police officer during a routine traffic stop. 

Permissible Questioning 

The questions "Why the rush?" and "Where are you 

headed in such a hurry?" from a police officer may be 

reasonably related to a traffic stop for speeding. They 

seek an admission of speeding. 

But questions about a driver's destination, purpose, 

length of stay, and with whom he will be staying are meant 

to inquire into issues beyond a speeding offense. Not only 

have they nothing to do with a speeding offense, they are 

not helpful to a police officer's decision to release the 

driver or to issue a citation or warning.1 Ante at 10. 

On direct examination, Trooper Varoni testified that 

he asked defendant where he was going and that defendant 

offered that "he was going into Cheboygan to visit friends 

and that he was staying at the Holiday Inn." However, it 

is apparent from the cross-examination of Trooper Varoni 

that defendant did not volunteer this information to the 

1

 The majority cites several federal circuit court of

appeals cases for the proposition that questions about

travel plans are reasonably related to the scope of a

traffic stop. We are not bound by these decisions, and, as

noted above, I find their logic defective. 

3
 
trooper in response to a general question. Instead, as 

Trooper Varoni admitted: 

A. Uh, it's—it's my practice to ask more

than just for those three pieces of uh,

documentation [referring to license,

registration, and insurance paperwork]. 

* * * 

Q. All right. And then you proceeded to

further this investigation by questioning Mr. 

Williams as to um, issues of where he was going

and what he was going to do when he was there, is

that correct? 

A. Yes. 

Q. And these questions weren't relevant to

how fast he was going, were they? 

A. I-I ask everybody I stop where they're

going to and where they are coming from. 

* * * 

Q. My question was; the question about where

he's going and how long he is staying is not

relevant to how fast he's going and the purpose

for your stop; is it? 

A. That's correct. 

Without question, the trooper asked defendant 

questions that exceeded the scope of legal inquiry 

regarding a speeding offense. The trooper evoked an answer 

regarding the location where defendant was planning to 

spend the night. He also asked defendant if defendant had 

any prior narcotics convictions. Trooper Varoni testified: 

Um, I asked him if he had been in trouble

before and uh, he told me that he had. I asked if 

4
 
it had any—you know, related narcotics [sic], if

he'd ever been arrested for anything to do with

drugs and he told me that he had. I asked him for

what and he said marijuana. 

This question likewise was unrelated to the purpose of the 

traffic stop. Once defendant stated that he was staying at 

a Holiday Inn in Cheboygan in response to a question about 

where he would spend the night, the purpose of the 

investigation changed. Trooper Varoni's subsequent 

questions, having nothing to do with the scope of the 

traffic stop, changed the fundamental nature of the stop. 

What began as a routine traffic stop became an allencompassing criminal investigation. Trooper Varoni 

admitted it: 

Q. Your purpose of the initial stop had

seized [sic]; you weren't investigating speeding

violation [sic] anymore were you? 

A. No, no I wasn't. 

Reasonable Suspicion of Criminal Activity 

Even if Trooper Varoni's questions had been 

appropriate for a traffic stop, a second pertinent concern 

for the Court is whether defendant's answer provided a 

reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was occurring. 

Trooper Varoni essentially admitted that he continued 

questioning the occupants of the vehicle on the basis of a 

hunch that something "wasn't quite right." 

5
 
Q. [Mr. Kwiatkowsi]: Is it possible that he

was in error as to where the Holiday Inn was? 

A. [Trooper Varoni]: That's possible, yes. 

Q. And the fact that someone misstates where 

they're staying um, you're saying that made you

suspicious of him, is that right? 

A. Uh, you—you can call it what you want, I

don't know about suspicious but, yeah, it made me

think twice about the statements he made. 

Q. All right, so you weren't suspicious? 

A. Yeah, I-I questioned his statements. 

Q. Well, now when you're talking about 

suspicion you understand suspicious of something,

right? Of some activity that's unlawful, right? 

A. Yes, that could be. 

Q. Well, what was it about that response

that you were suspicious of that was unlawful? 

A. I wasn't suspicious of any particular

thing that was unlawful. 

Q. So it was unparticularized suspicion is

that what you're saying? 

A. Um, I guess that could be. 

Q. Okay. Because you couldn't put your

finger on what it was you were suspicious of,

right? 

A. I was suspicious that something wasn't

quite right. 

Q. But you didn't know what it was, right? 

A. That's right. 

The trooper’s intuition that "something wasn't quite 

right" and his observation that no luggage was visible in 

6
 
 

the passenger compartment were the things that made him 

suspicious. The trooper admitted that it is not uncommon 

for people to carry luggage out of sight in the trunk. 

Therefore, the only valid reason for the trooper to be 

suspicious was defendant's statement that he was staying at 

a Holiday Inn in Cheboygan. 

The fact that defendant answered with the name of a 

hotel chain that did not have a facility in Cheboygan 

hardly created a reasonable suspicion that criminal 

activity was afoot.2 The next question of defendant, once 

he had stepped out of the vehicle, was whether he had any 

prior conviction for drugs. It was likewise unrelated to 

the traffic stop. This question is a further indicator 

that the trooper was acting on a mere hunch. 

Where there is no articulable basis to suspect that a 

crime is being committed, the officer's questions amount to 

2

 It is noteworthy that the explanations Mr. Williams

and his two passengers gave are not as inconsistent as the

prosecution would have the Court believe. Mr. Williams

indicated that they were going to Cheboygan to visit 

friends and would be there "about two days." They would be

staying at a Holiday Inn. His companion, Mr. King,

indicated that he was not sure how long they were going to

be gone. This is not inconsistent with defendant's 

statement. 

Mrs. Williams indicated that they were planning to do

some shopping in Cheboygan. She was not sure where they

were staying; they did not have reservations. This is also

not inconsistent with Mr. Williams's explanation. 

7
 
nothing more than a fishing expedition. The questioning 

and the subsequent search in this case went beyond the 

scope of the traffic stop and were unsupported by any 

reasonable articulable suspicion. 

I agree with the Court of Appeals that, given the 

totality of the circumstances, the trooper had insufficient 

grounds for pursuing an investigatory stop and conducted 

his investigation based merely on a hunch. People v 

Champion, 452 Mich 92, 98; 549 NW2d 849 (1996). I would 

affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals. 

Marilyn Kelly 

8