No. 13338 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1976 

LITTLE HORN STATE BANK, 

Plaintiff and 9 

ROBERT STOPS AND NORMA STOPS, 

Defendants and Respondents. 

Appeal from: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, 

Honorable Charles Luedke, Judge presiding. 

Counsel of Record: 

For Appellants : 

Clarence T. Belue argued, Hardin, Montana 

For Respondent : 

Cate, Lynaugh, Fitzgerald and Huss, Billings, Montana 

Thomas J. Lynaugh argued, Billings, Montana 

Submitted: September 9, 1976 

Decided: ~ICT -7 291'6 

Filed: '. ' 7 

' icj/\; 
Mr. Chief Justice James T. Harrison delivered the Opinion of 

the Court. 

This is an appeal from an order entering a permanent 

injunction against levying or executing upon the property of 

respondents within the Crow Indian Reservation. The injunction 

was ordered in the district court of Big Horn County. 

This appeal adds another chapter to the never ending 

story of Indian jurisdiction. The relevant facts are as follows: 

Respondents, members of the Crow Indian Tribe residing 

on the Crow Indian Reservation, obtained a loan from appellant 

bank located in Hardin, Montana, and failed to repay the loan. 

This commercial transaction took place at the bank which is 

located outside the exterior boundaries of the Crow Indian Reservation. Process was served upon respondents on the reservation. 

Thereafter appellant obtained a judgment in the district court 

of the thirteenth judicial district in the amount of $3,541.24. 

Following this judgment on February 18, 1976, execution was issued 

by the district court on February 23, 1976. The writ of execution 

was directed to the sheriff of Big Horn County, who proceeded to 

garnish the wages of respondents earned on the reservation but 

within Big Horn County. Respondents sought and obtained injunctive relief against the writ of execution. Appellant seeks to 

dissolve the permanent injunction and be allowed to levy upon 

the respondents' property and wages within the reservation. 

Respondents did not attack the district court's subject 

matter jurisdiction or personal jurisdiction at the district 

court level or before this Court. Both of these issues have been 

laid to rest by Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 93 

S.Ct. 1267, 36 L Ed 2d 114, 119, and Bad Horse v. Bad Horse, 163 

Mont. 445, 517 P.2d 893, cert. den. 419 U.S. 847, 95 S.Ct. 83, 

A review of the district court's jurisdiction had no 
Indian jurisdictional dispute been involved, is useful to this 

decision. It has been a long standing doctrine that any court 

having jurisdiction to render a judgment also has the power to 

enforce that judgment through any order or writ necessary to 

carry its judgment into effect. U.S. ex rel. Riggs v. Johnson 

County, 6 Wall. 166, 18 L.Ed 768 (1868); Pam-to-Pee v. United 

States, 187 U.S. 371, 23 S.Ct. 142, 47 L.E~ 221 (1902); Hamilton 

v. Nakai, 453 F.2d 152, cert. den. 406 U.S. 945, 92 S.Ct. 2044, 

The United States Supreme Court defined "jurisdiction" 

at p. 773 in Riggs: 

" * * * Jurisdiction is defined to be the power 

to hear and determine the subject matter in 

controversy in the suit before the court, and 

the rule is universal, that if the power is 

conferred to render the judqment or enter the 

decree, it also includes the power to issue 

proper process to enforce such judqment or 

decree. * * * 

"Express determination of this court is that the 

jurisdiction of a court is not exhausted by the 

rendition of the judgment, but continues until 

that judgment shall be sati:ified. * * *" (~mphasis added.) 

The Montana legislature enacted section 93-1106, R.C.M. 

1947, which contains language analagous to this principle. We 

have interpreted section 93-1106 to confer upon a court, having 

proper jurisdiction, all the means necessary to carry the same 

into effect, and if the court has the power to make an order, it 

has jurisdiction to enforce that order. State ex rel. Eisenhauer 

v. District Court, 54 Mont. 172, 168 P. 522. 

The district court initially sought to enforce its judgment by a writ of execution pursuant to section 93-5801 et seq., 

R.C.M. 1947. A writ of execution against property of a judgment 

debtor may be issued by the district court to the sheriff of any 

county in the state. Section 93-5809, R.C.M. 1947. Thus, a 

district court has statewide enforcement power under that section. 
However, the writ must issue to the proper sheriff, since a 

sheriff has no authority to serve the writ outside of his 

county. Merchants Credit Service v. ChJteau Co. Bank, 112 

Mont. 229, 114 P.2d 1074. 

Absent the existence of the Crow Indian Reservation, 

there is no question that this writ of execution would be a 

valid means of enforcing the judgment of the district court. 

The property subject to the writ was located within Big Horn 

County, the writ was directed to the sheriff of Big Horn County, 

and all other essential elements of a valid writ of execution 

existed. 

Respondents urge us to hold that a court having jurisdiction to render a judgment does not have the power to enforce 

that judgment because the property subject to such writ is located 

on the Crow Indian ~eservation. In effect, they ask that the 

reservation be treated on an even par with our sister states. 

Such a situation would not be feasible, since the Crow Tribe does 

not provide for the honoring of state court judgments, nor is the 

full-faith and credit clause applicable to the tribe. Had the 

judgment debtor's property been located in a sister state, appellant bank could have obtained a judgment in that state by pleading the Montana judgment and showing the jurisdictional requirements. Such a conclusion is not available in our situation. 

The task to be performed by this Court is to determine 

whether or not the State action taken in this case is acceptable 

under the doctrines concerning state jurisdiction over Indian 

reservations. 

The United States Supreme Court has applied different 

rationale from time to time, and the recent court decisions must 

be read as a whole to arrive at the proper test to be applied in 

this case. The initial test was propounded in Williams v. Lee, 
358 U.S. 217, 79 S.Ct. 269, 3 L Ed 2d 251, 254, which stated: 

" * * *Essentially, absent governing Acts of 

Congress, the question has always been whether 

the state action infringed on the right of 

reservation Indians to make their own laws and 

be ruled by them." 

This test was apparently overruled by Kennerly v. District Court 

of Montana, '&@U.S. 423, 91 S.Ct. 480, 27 L Ed 2d 507. However, 

in McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Commission, 411 U.S. 164, 93 S.Ct. 

1257, 36 L Ed 2d 129, 140, 141, the Court revived the Williams 

test stating: 

" * * * It must be remembered that cases applying 

the Williams test have dealt principally with 

situations involving non-Indians. [Citations 

omitted.] In these situations, both the tribe and 

the State could fairly claim an interest in 

asserting their respective jurisdictions. The 

Williams test was designed to resolve this conflict 

by providing that the State could protect its 

interest up to the point where tribal self-government would be affected. 

" * * * This Court has therefore held that 'the 

question has always been whether the state action 

infringed on the right of reservation Indians to 

make their own laws and be ruled by them.'" 

The Court still adheres to the Williams test as evidenced by the 

recent decision of Fisher v. District Court of Montana, 44 U.S.L.W. 

3940 (U.S. March 1, 1976), when the court applied the Williams 

test, even though all parties were members of the Northern Cheyenne 

Tribe, and the litigation arose on the reservation. 

The Williams test is appropriate to review this appeal. 

The litigation involves a member of the Crow Tribe residing on 

the Crow Indian reservation and a nonmember, located off the 

reservation. It is important to note that the transaction in 

dispute arose off the reservation. Therefore, we must determine 

whether state action, in the form of a writ of execution to enforce a judgment rendered on a transaction arising outside the 

reservation, interferes with the tribe's right to make its own 
rules and be governed by them. 

We hold that it does not. 

that 

The cases holding/such interference has occurred present 

a combination of the transaction occurring on the reservation 

and the tribal court providing jurisdiction over such matters. 

In Williams the tribal court exercised jurisdiction over disputes 

over commercial transactions arising on the reservation between 

members and nonmembers. In Security State Bank v. Pierre, 162 

Mont. 298, 511 P.2d 325, the tribal court provided for civil 

litigation between members and nonmembers. In Fisher, the most 

recent United States Supreme Court case so holding, the facts 

relating to the child custody dispute all arose on the reservation, 

and the Crow Tribe provided for custody litigation among members 

(all parties were members of the Crow Tribe). We note that in the 

situation at hand the Crow Tribal Court only exercises jurisdiction over civil litigation between members and nonmembers if both 

parties so stipulate. 

However, what is in issue in this case is the enforcement 

of a valid judgment, not the proper court to initiate the litigation. 

The transaction did not occur on the reservation as in the above 

cases but outside the reservation boundaries. The subject matter 

jurisdiction was within the state court, not the tribal court. The 

Crow Tribe provides no means of enforcing state court judgments, 

no method of attaching property of a state judgment debtor, and 

is not subject to the full faith and credit clause as sister states 

are. Until the Crow Tribe has provided a means of such enforcement or acted in some manner within this area, we fail to see how 

tribal self-government is interfered with by assuring that reservation Indians pay for their debts incurred off the reservation. 

The crucial fact of this appeal is that the subject matter 

jurisdiction lies with the state court, not the tribal court. In 
this case the tribal members elected to leave the reservation 

and conduct their affairs within the jurisdiction of the state 

courts. When they do so they are submitting themselves to the 

laws of this state. They cannot violate those laws and then 

retreat to the sanctuary of the reservation for protection. 

The cases analagous to the situation presented here are: State 

Securities, Inc. v. Anderson, 84 N.M. 629, 506 P.2d 786, 789; 

Natewa v. Natewa, 84 N.M. 69, 499 P.2d 691, 693; and State ex rel. 

Old Elk v. District Court, Mont . , 552 P.2d 1394, 33 St.Rep. 

637 (1976). In all of these cases the state court properly had 

jurisdiction over the dispute at hand and process was allowed on 

the reservation to bring the Indian defendant before the state 

court. 

In Natewa, the wife, a Zuni Indian living in Wisconsin, 

brought a URESA action against her ex-husband, a Zuni Indian residing on the Zuni Indian Reservation in New Mexico. The New 

Mexico Supreme Court upheld the New Mexico District Court's order 

directing the ex-husband to pay child support, saying: 

" * * * Appellant cannot interpose his 

special status as an Indian as a shield to protect him from obligations that result from his 

marriage to appellee which had been entered into 

off the reservation. * * *" 

In State Securities, a corporation brought suit to recover 

on notes contracted off the reservation by Navajo Indians. The 

New Mexico Supreme Court allowed service upon the Indians while 

they were on the reservation, stating at p. 789: 

"State jurisdiction does not eliminate Indian 

jurisdiction, it exists concurrently with it. 

There is no interference with Indian selfgovernment. * * * . 

" * * * Exclusive jurisdiction in Indian courts, 

which do not necessarily apply state law, may 

result in shielding Indians from obligations 

incurred off the reservation." 

We have taken a similar position in Old Elk, holding that 
a sheriff of this state may serve a warrant for the arrest 

of an Indian on the reservation, when the crime has occurred 

off the reservation. 

The respondents elected to be governed by the laws of 

this state when they left the boundaries of the reservation to 

obtain the loan from the appellant. This was not a case of a 

nonmember choosing to transact his business within the boundaries 

of the Indian reservation as in Williams, Kennerly, and Pierre. 

The United States Supreme Court stated in Mescalero Apache 

Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 93 S.Ct. 1267, 36 L Ed 2d 114, 119: 

" * * * Absent express federal law to the contrary, Indians going beyond reservation boundaries 

have generally been held subject to nondiscriminatory state law otherwise applicable to all citizens of the state." [Citations omitted.] 

Here the respondents did go beyond the boundaries of the Crow 

Indian reservation and the execution statutes are nondiscriminatory and are otherwise applicable to all citizens of Montana. 

This appeal essentially boils down to whether the jurisdiction granted in Mescalero is the same as that defined by the 

United States Supreme Court in Riggs and Pam-to-Pee, or is it 

merely the opportunity to render a judgment incapable of enforcement. The latter would be absurd. As the Court said in Pam-to- 

- Pee, at p. 226: 

"The award of execution is a part, and an 

essential part, of every judgment passed by 

a court exercising judicial power. It is no 

judgment, in the legal sense of the term, 

without it. Without such an award the judgment 

would be inoperative and nugatory, leaving the 

aggrieved party without a remedy. It would be 

merely an opinion, which would remain a dead 

letter, and without any operation upon the rights 

of the parties * * *.I" 

To avoid such an illogical situation we hold that a writ 

of execution from a state court is valid within the Indian reservation when such is a means of enforcing a valid judgment of that 

court. 

AS we stated in Old Elk at 643: 
"Individual rights, due process, impartial and 

effective maintenance of justice and the public 

confidence in and respect for the courts are 

paramount in the resolution of these kinds of 

matters. However, these rights and duties are 

owed to all citizens not only those residing 

within the exterior boundaries of an Indian 

reservation. The citizens of Montana generally 

and Big Horn County particularly would be 

grossly deprived if under the guise of individual 

due process they not only had no speedy, adequate 

remedy, but - no remedy at all." 

As stated earlier, the state court was the only forum 

available to the appellant. The tribal court lacked subject 

matter jurisdiction. No federal jurisdiction could be invoked, 

since there was no federal question, no diversity of citizenship, 

and the amount in controversy was less than $10,000. The state 

court had the jurisdiction to render its judgment, not even the 

respondents contest this. Such would not be a judgment without 

the power to enforce the same. The only available and peaceful 

means of enforcement to the appellant was the writ of execution 

from the state court. Without such, the result would be a "catchus-off-the-reservation" situation, which could possibly lead to 

breaches of the peace. 

In Old Elk we held that an Indian may not violate the 

criminal laws of this state while off the reservation, and then 

return to the sanctuary of the reservation and throw up his Indian 

status as a shield against enforcement of those criminal laws. 

We now hold the same is true for the civil laws of this state. 

We are not unmindful of Annis v. Dewey County Bank, 335 

F.Supp. 133 (1971) cited by respondents. The federal court cited 

authority from South Dakota and Minnesota in holding that state 

officials had no jurisdiction on Indian reservations either to 

serve process on an enrolled member or to enforce a state judgment. The law of this state is directly contrary and in accord 

with New Mexico, as evidenced by Old Elk. We do not agree with 

the law cited by the federal court in Annis, nor do we agree with 
their rationale. 

The decision of the district court is reversed and the 

injunction dissolved and vac 

Chief Justice 

We concur: 

Hon. Robert , District 

Judge, sitting n place of Mr. 

Justice Gene B. Daly.