United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 20-30231

Summary Calendar

Shantrice L. Jones,

Plaintiff—Appellant,

versus

Southern University; Sage Rehabilitation Outpatient; 

Leigh Ann Baker; Amelia Major; Donna FitzgeraldDejean; Terrilynn Gillis; Elaine Lewnau; Janet Rami; 

Carpenter Health Network, L.L.C., on behalf of Sage 

Rehabilitation Outpatient; Christy Wynn Moland, 

Defendants—Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Louisiana

USDC No. 3:18-CV-1034

Before King, Smith, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

* Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this 

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited 

circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

November 13, 2020

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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Proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, Shantrice Jones appeals the 

district court’s dismissal of her Title VI retaliation claims with prejudice. We 

AFFIRM.

I.

Jones is a former speech-language pathology graduate student at 

Southern University and A&M College (Southern). She enrolled in 2015 and 

graduated in 2018. Following graduation, Jones filed a pro se lawsuit against 

Southern, Sage Rehabilitation Hospital (Sage), and seven related 

individuals,1 alleging discrimination and retaliation claims under Title II, 

Title VI, Title VII, Title IX, and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, as well as a 

state law claim for defamation. 

Southern filed a Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss on 

behalf of itself and its current and former employees. In response, Jones 

amended her complaint. Her amended complaint largely recited her original 

allegations but added additional instances of alleged discrimination and 

retaliation, and attached fourteen exhibits. Jones alleged that her 

supervisors, Baker (Southern) and Major (Sage), gave preferential treatment 

to other students and acted in a discriminatory manner on the bases of her 

race and her child’s disability. She also asserted that Southern and Sage 

discriminated and retaliated against her by increasing her workload, failing to 

protect her from retaliatory events, and harassing her. Jones further alleged

that other former and current faculty members retaliated by trying to dismiss 

her from the graduate program.

1 The individuals Jones sued are current and former employees of Southern and 

Sage. Southern’s employees are Leigh Ann Baker, Donna Fitzgerald-Dejean, Terrilynn 

Gillis, Janet Rami, Elaine Lewnau, and Christy Moland. Sage’s named employee is Amelia

Major.

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After Jones filed the amended complaint, Southern moved to

withdraw its original motion to dismiss and filed a renewed motion to dismiss 

the amended complaint. A day later, Rami and Baker filed separate motions 

to dismiss. In response to defendants’ dispositive motions, Jones moved for 

leave to file a second amended complaint. On the heels of Jones’s motion to 

amend, Sage moved to dismiss Jones’s claims under Rule 12(b)(6), and Jones 

filed a response in opposition. 

The district court denied Jones’s motion for leave to file a second 

amended complaint and ordered Jones to respond to the motions to dismiss 

filed by Southern, Rami, and Baker. Shortly thereafter, Fitzgerald-Dejean, 

Lewnau, Gillis, and Moland also moved to dismiss Jones’s claims under Rule 

12(b)(6). In due course, Jones filed responsesto all these dispositive motions. 

The district court granted the motions filed by Southern, Rami, and 

Baker, dismissing Jones’s claims against those defendants with prejudice. 

Jones moved to reconsider, but the court denied her motion. On November 

1, 2019, Jones filed a notice of appeal. Because her claims against Sage, 

Major, Fitzgerald-Dejean, Lewnau, Gillis, and Moland remained pending in 

district court, this court dismissed Jones’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 

Jones v. Southern Univ., No. 19-30911, 2019 WL 8645963, at *1 (5th Cir. Dec. 

9, 2019) (unpublished).

On March 23, 2020, the district court granted the remaining 

defendants’ motions to dismiss. The district court dismissed Jones’s claims 

with prejudice, including those against Major, which the court dismissed sua 

sponte. This appeal followed. 

II.

A district court’s grant of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is 

reviewed de novo. Vizaline, L.L.C. v. Tracy, 949 F.3d 927, 931 (5th Cir. 

2020). “We accept all well-pleaded facts as true and construe the complaint 

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in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Heinze v. Tesco Corp., 971 F.3d 

475, 479 (5th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up). “But we do not accept as true 

conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual inferences, or legal 

conclusions.” Id. (cleaned up). We review the denial of leave to amend the 

complaint for abuse of discretion. Lewis v. Fresne, 252 F.3d 352, 356 (5th Cir. 

2001). 

III.

While Jones alleged numerous claims before the district court, Jones 

articulates only two challenges on appeal: (1) whether the district court erred 

by denying her second request to amend and (2) whether the district court 

erred by dismissing her Title VI retaliation claims.

2

 

A.

Jones argues the district court erred by denying her second request to 

amend her complaint. Under Rule 15, “[a] party may amend its pleading 

once as a matter of course . . . 21 days after service of a motion under Rule 

12(b)[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(B). “In all other cases, a party may 

amend its pleading only with the opposing party’s written consent or the 

2 Pro se litigants’ filings are “‘to be liberally construed,’ . . . and ‘a pro se complaint, 

however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings 

drafted by lawyers[.]’” Coleman v. United States, 912 F.3d 824, 828 (5th Cir. 2019)

(quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). Pro se litigants’ briefs must 

nonetheless adhere to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. Al-Ra’id v. Ingle, 69 F.3d 

28, 31 (5th Cir. 1995). Jones’s appellate brief fails to provide argument or authority 

regarding the district court’s dismissal of her claims under Title II, Title VII, Title IX, § 

504 of the Rehabilitation Act, or her state law defamation claim. As a result, Jones has

waived any arguments related to those claims. See Roy v. City of Monroe, 950 F.3d 245, 251 

(5th Cir. 2020) (“Failure adequately to brief an issue on appeal constitutes waiver of that 

argument.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Jones also asserts a new 

negligence argument, but we decline to address issues raised for the first time on appeal. 

See Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 225 (5th Cir. 1993).

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court’s leave. The court should freely give leave when justice so requires.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). “Although Rule 15(a) requires the district court 

to grant leave to amend freely, leave to amend is in no way automatic.” Body 

by Cook, Inc. v. State Farm Auto. Ins., 869 F.3d 381, 391 (5th Cir. 2017). “The 

district court is entrusted with the discretion to grant or deny a motion to 

amend and may consider a variety of factors including undue delay, bad faith, 

or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure 

deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the 

opposing party . . . , and futility of the amendment.” Marucci Sports, L.L.C. 

v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 751 F.3d 368, 378 (5th Cir. 2014). 

After Southern filed its Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss the claims Jones 

asserted against Southern in her original complaint, Jones responded by 

amending her complaint as a matter of course under Rule 15(a)(1)(B). In her 

amended complaint, she asserted substantively identical claims, against the 

same defendants, but added fourteen exhibits. Soon thereafter, Southern

filed a renewed motion to dismiss, and Rami and Baker filed separate Rule 

12(b)(6) motions to dismiss Jones’s amended complaint. Jones promptly 

followed with a motion for leave to file a second amended complaint. The 

district court denied Jones’s motion to amend.

Jones argues that the district court erred. She asserts that her 

proposed second amended complaint would have “clearly labeled” an 

already existing defendant and “cured” confusion regarding “the events and 

times and the actions.” But Jones has failed to explain, either in the district 

court or on appeal, how the additional facts and clarifications she would have 

added materially varied from the allegations she had already asserted in the 

first two versions of her complaint. She likewise fails to show how she could 

have overcome the fatal deficiencies found by the district court if she had 

been allowed to amend her complaint a second time. Brewster v. Dretke, 587 

F.3d 764, 768 (5th Cir. 2009). Jones has also provided no indication that she 

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did not plead her best case in her amended complaint. Id.; see Bazrowx v. 

Scott, 136 F.3d 1053, 1054 (5th Cir. 1998) (per curiam). Therefore, we discern 

no abuse of discretion in the district court’s denial of Jones’s motion to 

amend her complaint a second time.

B.

Next, Jones argues the district court erred by dismissing her Title VI 

retaliation claim. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits race 

discrimination in all programs receiving federal funds. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. 

Claims may be brought only against the institution receiving federal funds, 

not employees of those institutions. Sewell v. Monroe City Sch. Bd., 974 F.3d 

577, 582 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 

246, 257 (2009)). As a result, the district court properly dismissed Jones’s 

claims against the individuals named in the complaint. We thus focus on the 

alleged retaliatory conduct of Southern and Sage.

To sustain a claim for Title VI retaliation, Jones must show (1) that 

she engaged in a protected activity; (2) that the Defendants took a material 

action against her, and (3) that a causal connection existed between the 

protected activity and the adverse action.3 Peters v. Jenney, 327 F.3d 307, 320 

(5th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted); Bhombal v. Irving Indep. Sch. Dist., 809 F. 

App’x 233, 238 (5th Cir. 2020) (per curiam).

Jones actually alleges that Southern provided her accommodations to 

meet her scheduling needs. Jones also acknowledges that Vice Chancellor 

James Ammons supported her during the grievance appeal process, ensuring 

that Jones remained enrolled in her classes and received ADA 

accommodations. After Jones won her grievance appeal, Southern vacated 

3 We assume without deciding that Title VI encompasses a retaliation claim. See 

Sewell, 974 F.3d 577, 586 n.4 (5th Cir. 2020).

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the failing grade she received in her clinical practicum and approved the 

clinical hours she worked at Sage. Jones then graduated from Southern. The 

allegations in Jones’s amended complaint thus undermine her claim against 

Southern for retaliation.

Similarly, Jones affirmatively alleges that Sage accommodated and

excused numerous absences and instances of tardiness while she interned at 

Sage. To the extent that Jones’s amended complaint references any 

retaliatory conduct by Sage, those allegations are conclusory and do not give 

rise to a reasonable inference of retaliation cognizable under Title VI. See 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (stating that “naked assertion[s]” 

without “further factual enhancement” are insufficient) (citation omitted). 

Jones’s amended complaint cannot rest on a foundation of unsupported legal 

conclusions. Id. 

Because the district court correctly concluded that Jones’s amended 

complaint failed to state a prima facie case against any of the defendants, we 

AFFIRM the dismissal of Jones’s retaliation claims.

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