FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CHRISTOPHER GRIMES, 

Petitioner - Appellant, 

 v. 

BRYAN D. PHILLIPS, Warden High 

Desert State Prison, 

Respondent - Appellee.

No. 21-56353 

D.C. No.

2:21-cv-05735-

MWF-PD

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Michael W. Fitzgerald, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted April 4, 2024

Pasadena, California

Filed June 26, 2024

Before: Ryan D. Nelson, Lawrence VanDyke, and Gabriel 

P. Sanchez, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Sanchez
2 GRIMES V. PHILLIPS

SUMMARY*

Habeas Corpus

The panel affirmed the district court’s denial of 

Christopher Grimes’ 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus 

petition challenging his California conviction for seconddegree murder in a case in which the trial court denied 

Grimes’ motion to suppress statements from his 

conversation with an undercover jailhouse informant, which 

took place after Grimes invoked his Fifth Amendment right 

to counsel under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 346 (1966). 

The California Court of Appeal determined that the 

statements were admissible because law enforcement is not 

required to give Miranda warnings to a suspect before 

placing them in a jail cell with an undercover informant 

under Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (1990). In his federal 

habeas petition, Grimes contended that the California Court 

of Appeal misapplied Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 

(1981), which held that law enforcement must cease 

custodial interrogation when a suspect invokes their right to 

counsel unless they subsequently waive that right. 

Because the Supreme Court has never squarely 

addressed whether the Fifth Amendment precludes an 

undercover jailhouse informant posing as an inmate to 

question an incarcerated suspect who has previously invoked 

his right to counsel, the panel held that the California Court 

of Appeal’s decision is not contrary to, or an unreasonable 

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has 

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
GRIMES V. PHILLIPS 3

application of, clearly established federal law as defined by 

the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.

COUNSEL

Patrick M. Ford (argued), La Jolla Legal Publications Inc., 

San Diego, California, for Petitioner-Appellant.

Herbert S. Tetef (argued), Deputy Attorney General; Jason 

Tran, Supervising Deputy Attorney General; Susan S. 

Pithey, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Lance E. 

Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General; Rob Bonta, 

California Attorney General; Office of the California 

Attorney General, Los Angeles, California; for RespondentAppellee.

OPINION

SANCHEZ, Circuit Judge:

Christopher Grimes, a California state inmate, appeals 

the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas 

corpus petition challenging his conviction for second-degree 

murder. The trial court denied Grimes’ motion to suppress 

statements from his conversation with an undercover 

jailhouse informant, which took place after he invoked his 

Fifth Amendment right to counsel under Miranda v. Arizona, 

384 U.S. 436 (1966). The California Court of Appeal 

affirmed Grimes’ conviction on direct appeal, determining 

that his statements were admissible because law 

enforcement is not required to give Miranda warnings to a 

suspect before placing them in a jail cell with an undercover 
4 GRIMES V. PHILLIPS

informant under Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (1990). In 

his federal habeas petition, Grimes contends that the 

California Court of Appeal misapplied Edwards v. Arizona, 

451 U.S. 477 (1981), which held that law enforcement must 

cease custodial interrogation when a suspect invokes their

right to counsel unless they subsequently waive that right. 

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253, 

and we affirm. Because the Supreme Court has never 

squarely addressed whether the Fifth Amendment precludes 

an undercover jailhouse informant posing as an inmate to

question an incarcerated suspect who has previously invoked 

his right to counsel, the California Court of Appeal’s 

decision is not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of,

clearly established federal law as defined by the 

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(AEDPA). See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

I.

A.

On February 12, 2014, Adrian Dawson and his fiancée 

Marrisha Robinson parked their Mitsubishi at a Los Angeles 

strip mall. Dawson went into a store while Robinson waited 

in the car with their infant daughter. Grimes drove into the 

same parking lot in his gold four-door Mercedes and double 

parked behind Dawson and Robinson’s Mitsubishi. Grimes 

exited his Mercedes without putting it in gear or setting the 

brake, causing it to roll forward and hit the rear bumper of 

the Mitsubishi. Robinson immediately checked on her 

daughter in the back seat and then exited her car. Grimes 

told Robinson not to worry and said he would “take care of 

it.” Dawson ran out of the store and “sucker punched” 

Grimes in the face two or three times yelling, “My baby’s in 

the car.” Grimes told Dawson that he did not want to fight,
GRIMES V. PHILLIPS 5

quickly got back in his Mercedes, and drove away from the 

parking lot. Dawson and Robinson returned to their car, and 

Robinson drove the Mitsubishi out of the parking lot. 

Less than two minutes later, Dawson told Robinson that 

the Mercedes involved in the accident was behind them. 

Robinson slowed down, thinking she and Grimes might 

exchange insurance information. The Mercedes suddenly 

sped up and fired four gunshots from the driver’s side 

window toward the front passenger seat of the Mitsubishi. 

Dawson, who was seated in the front passenger seat, was 

struck. He told first responders that the shooter was driving 

a gold four-door Mercedes. Dawson died later that day from 

a gunshot wound to his abdomen.

Grimes was arrested two days after his altercation with 

Dawson. Robinson identified Grimes in a photographic 

lineup. Ammunition and bullet casings capable of being 

fired by a nine-millimeter firearm, the type of weapon used 

to kill Dawson, were also found in a search of Grimes’ home 

and car. Cell-phone records revealed that Grimes made 11 

phone calls to friends immediately after the shooting and 

sent and received several text messages. A friend texted 

Grimes to tell him he was “doing his homework now,” to 

which Grimes responded by describing Dawson’s 

appearance. Grimes told the same friend, “I left the area and 

did my shit. It’s kill or be killed. Not fight for no reason.” 

The next day, Grimes texted an unknown number stating, 

“Don’t play games with me I stay with heat.”

After his arrest, Grimes was subjected to custodial 

interrogation. Grimes asked to have his lawyer present 

before the interrogation began. After detectives read Grimes 

his Miranda rights, he once again requested his lawyer. 

Rather than end the interview, detectives told Grimes that he 
6 GRIMES V. PHILLIPS

did not have to say anything because he had invoked his right 

to counsel, but wanted to let him know that they were 

conducting a “very serious investigation” in which he had 

been implicated. Detectives told Grimes that the 

investigation was about a murder and that he was going to 

be arrested for the crime. Grimes asked, “Why would I be 

arrested for murder?” One detective then asked if Grimes 

wanted to wait for an attorney or talk. Grimes eventually 

agreed to speak without the presence of an attorney. Grimes 

admitted to having an altercation with Dawson in the parking 

lot of the strip mall but denied involvement in the shooting 

that killed Dawson.

A few hours after the custodial interrogation, detectives 

placed Grimes in a jail cell with an undercover informant 

posing as a fellow inmate. The undercover informant had 

been given information by detectives about Dawson’s death, 

including that a firearm was used in the crime and Dawson’s 

girlfriend was present during the shooting. Throughout his 

conversation with the informant, Grimes maintained that he 

was not the shooter, but he made several incriminating 

statements. When told by the informant that gunshot residue 

remains when a gun is fired inside a car, especially out of the 

right window, Grimes corrected him and said, “Out the left.” 

Grimes expressed concern that gunshot residue or shell 

casings might be found in his vehicle and commented about

getting a witness who identified him in the shooting out of 

the way. He also stated that he knew the shooting took place 

“two minutes” after his strip mall incident with Dawson, 

despite not being told that fact by detectives.

Prior to trial, Grimes moved to suppress all statements

he made to law enforcement after invoking his Miranda right 

to counsel during his custodial interview. The trial court 

denied Grimes’ motions to suppress, finding that although 
GRIMES V. PHILLIPS 7

Grimes had unequivocally invoked his right to counsel at the 

start of his custodial interview, he waived it by voluntarily 

reinitiating further conversation with detectives. The trial 

court also ruled that the recorded statements to the 

undercover jailhouse informant were admissible because 

Grimes was not aware that the informant was working for 

the police and spoke freely.

Grimes was tried for Dawson’s murder before a Los 

Angeles jury. Grimes testified in his own defense, 

acknowledging his involvement in the strip mall collision 

but insisting he had not shot Dawson. He claimed that he 

drove home after leaving the strip mall because he could not 

find his insurance information and believed Dawson was a 

violent gang member. The state relied on Grimes’ 

statements to the informant during trial to establish Grimes’

involvement in Dawson’s shooting. Although the jury in 

Grimes’ first trial could not reach a verdict, on retrial a 

second jury convicted him of second-degree murder and 

found that he personally used and discharged a firearm 

causing great bodily injury or death. Grimes was sentenced 

to 40 years to life in state prison. 

B.

On direct appeal, Grimes asserted that the trial court 

erred by admitting statements from his custodial interview

and from the recorded conversation with the undercover 

jailhouse informant. The California Court of Appeal agreed 

that detectives violated Grimes’ Miranda rights by 

continuing to interrogate him after he invoked his right to 

counsel during the custodial interview. The court concluded 

that Grimes did not reinitiate questioning by responding to 

statements from detectives designed to elicit an 

incriminating response because there was no break in the 
8 GRIMES V. PHILLIPS

interrogation. However, the admission of Grimes’ custodial 

interview statements was found harmless beyond a 

reasonable doubt under Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 

(1967).

With respect to Grimes’ recorded conversation with the 

undercover jailhouse informant, the California Court of 

Appeal determined that the statements were properly 

admitted. The state court concluded that the United States 

Supreme Court’s holding in Perkins makes clear that the 

policy underlying Miranda—“protecting a suspect from 

coercion inherent in the ‘police-dominated atmosphere’ of a 

custodial interview”—is not implicated when a suspect 

makes statements to an individual they believe is a fellow 

inmate. In the absence of a coercive custodial environment, 

the state court found that the recorded statements were 

properly admitted and affirmed Grimes’ conviction. 

Grimes’ petition for review before the California Supreme 

Court was denied without comment.

Grimes filed the instant federal habeas petition under 28 

U.S.C. § 2254 seeking relief on the basis that the trial court 

erred by admitting his recorded conversation with the 

undercover informant.1 A magistrate judge recommended

that the district court deny Grimes’ petition because the 

Supreme Court has never held that Miranda requires 

suppression of a defendant’s custodial statements made to an 

undercover informant and the state court reasonably applied 

existing Supreme Court precedent to determine Grimes’ 

statements to the jailhouse informant were admissible. The 

district court adopted the magistrate judge’s report and 

1 Grimes also unsuccessfully challenged the trial court’s refusal to 

instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter, but we did not certify that 

issue for appeal. 
GRIMES V. PHILLIPS 9

recommendation as its own findings and conclusions. We 

granted a certificate of appealability on the following issue:

whether the admission of Grimes’ recorded statements to a 

jailhouse informant violated Grimes’ Fifth Amendment 

rights because he had previously invoked his right to counsel 

under Miranda. 

II.

We review a district court’s denial of habeas relief de 

novo. Jurado v. Davis, 12 F.4th 1084, 1090 (9th Cir. 2021). 

AEDPA governs our review because Grimes filed his habeas 

corpus petition after April 24, 1996, when the statute became 

effective. See Murray v. Schriro, 745 F.3d 984, 996 (9th Cir. 

2014). Under AEDPA, Grimes can prevail on his habeas 

petition only if he demonstrates that the state court’s 

decision (1) “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” or 

(2) “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts 

in light of the evidence presented in the State court 

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2). AEDPA’s 

“highly deferential standard” applies to the state court’s last 

reasoned decision on the merits, in this case the California 

Court of Appeal decision. See Reis-Campos v. Biter, 832 

F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted).

Grimes’ habeas petition relies on the “contrary to” and 

“unreasonable application” clauses of Section 2254(d)(1). A 

decision is “contrary to clearly established federal law ‘if the 

state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by 

[the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court 

decides a case differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a 

set of materially indistinguishable facts.’” Ochoa v. Davis, 

50 F.4th 865, 876 (9th Cir. 2022) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 
10 GRIMES V. PHILLIPS

529 U.S. 362, 413 (2000)) (alterations in original). A state 

court decision involves “an unreasonable application of” 

clearly established federal law if it “correctly identifies the 

governing legal rule but applies it unreasonably to the facts 

of a particular prisoner’s case.” Taylor, 529 U.S. at 407–08. 

The relevant inquiry under AEDPA is not whether the state 

court’s determination was erroneous or incorrect, but rather 

whether it was “objectively unreasonable,” a “substantially 

higher threshold.” Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010). 

“Clearly established Federal law” refers to “the holdings, 

as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme] Court’s decisions 

at the time of the relevant state-court decision.” Taylor, 529 

U.S. at 412. Federal law is “clearly established” if the 

Supreme Court has “squarely addresse[d]” a claim and 

provided a “clear answer.” Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 

120, 125–26 (2008). “[I]f a habeas court must extend a 

rationale before it can apply to the facts at hand, then by 

definition the rationale was not clearly established at the 

time of the state-court decision.” White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. 

415, 426 (2014) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 

A.

Grimes’ habeas petition is based on the constitutional 

safeguards mandated by Miranda and its progeny. Miranda

holds that the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition against selfincrimination requires police to inform a suspect that he has 

the right to the presence of an attorney before subjecting him 

to custodial interrogation. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444–45. If 

the accused requests counsel, the interrogation must cease 

until an attorney is present. Id. at 474. The warning 

mandated by Miranda is meant to preserve the privilege 

against self-incrimination during “incommunicado 

interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated 
GRIMES V. PHILLIPS 11

atmosphere.” Id. at 445. Without proper safeguards, “the 

process of in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or 

accused of a crime contains inherently compelling pressures 

which work to undermine the individual’s will to resist and 

to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so 

freely.” Id. at 467.

The protections outlined by Miranda were reinforced by 

the Supreme Court in Edwards, which concerned the 

reinterrogation of a suspect after he invoked his right to 

counsel. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 485. In Edwards, the 

defendant willingly submitted to police questioning during 

an interview after being informed of his Miranda rights. Id.

at 478. When he learned that another suspect in custody had 

implicated him in the crime, the defendant sought to make a 

deal with officers but expressed his desire to have an 

attorney present before doing so. Id. at 479. Officers ceased 

questioning and the defendant was taken to jail. Id. The next 

morning, officers asked to see the defendant in jail. Id. The 

defendant did not wish to speak to the officers but was told 

he had to. Id. Officers once again read the defendant his 

Miranda rights and he subsequently made incriminating 

statements. Id. The Supreme Court held that officers 

violated the defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights because the 

invocation of his right to counsel during the initial interview 

precluded “further interrogation” until the defendant’s 

counsel was present or he initiated communication with 

police. Id. at 484–85. Edwards made clear that “a valid 

waiver of [the right to counsel] cannot be established by 

showing only that [the defendant] responded to further 

police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he [was] 

advised of his rights.” Id. at 484.

In Perkins, the Supreme Court clarified that “fidelity to 

the doctrine announced in Miranda requires that it be 
12 GRIMES V. PHILLIPS

enforced strictly, but only in those types of situations in 

which the concerns that powered the decision are 

implicated.” Perkins, 496 U.S. at 296. There, an undercover 

agent was placed in a cell with the defendant, who was 

already incarcerated on charges unrelated to the subject of 

the agent’s investigation. Id. at 294. The defendant made 

statements implicating himself in the crime the agent was 

investigating. Id. The defendant argued that his statements 

should be inadmissible at trial because he had not been given 

Miranda warnings by the agent. Id. The Supreme Court 

disagreed, holding that an undercover law enforcement 

officer posing as a fellow inmate need not give Miranda

warnings to an incarcerated suspect before asking questions 

that may elicit an incriminating response. Id. at 300. 

“Miranda forbids coercion, not mere strategic deception by 

taking advantage of a suspect’s misplaced trust in one he 

supposes to be a fellow prisoner.” Id. at 297. When a 

suspect “boast[s] about their criminal activities in front of 

persons whom they believe to be their cellmates,” those 

statements are considered voluntary. Id. at 298. Thus, there 

“is no federal obstacle to their admissibility at trial.” Id. at 

300.

Relying on Perkins, the California Court of Appeal held 

that the trial court did not err by denying Grimes’ motion to 

suppress his recorded conversation with the undercover 

jailhouse informant. The state court observed that “neither 

the United States Supreme Court nor the California Supreme 

Court has addressed the application of Miranda in a case 

where the defendant has invoked his or her Miranda rights 

prior to the Perkins interview.” The court reasoned that 

under Perkins, the underlying policy of Miranda and 

Edwards was not implicated when Grimes voluntarily spoke 
GRIMES V. PHILLIPS 13

to a person he did not know was an agent of the police after 

invoking his Miranda right to counsel.

The California Court of Appeal’s decision that Grimes’ 

statements to the undercover informant were admissible at 

trial is not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of,

“clearly established Federal law” as defined by AEDPA. 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Neither Edwards nor Perkins provides 

a “clear answer” to the issue presented by Grimes—whether 

the Fifth Amendment requires the suppression of a 

defendant’s statements made to an undercover informant 

after the defendant invoked his Miranda right to counsel 

during a custodial interrogation. See Wright, 552 U.S. at 

126. As Grimes acknowledges, the Supreme Court has 

never “squarely addressed” if the Fifth Amendment 

privilege against self-incrimination precludes law 

enforcement from using an informant to obtain incriminating 

statements from a suspect who has invoked his Miranda 

right to counsel. Id. Under AEDPA, the California Court of 

Appeal’s “adjudication of [an] issue not addressed by the 

Supreme Court cannot be contrary to, or an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established federal law.” Stenson v. 

Lambert, 504 F.3d 873, 881 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Kane v. 

Garcia Espitia, 546 U.S. 9, 11 (2005)); see also White, 572 

U.S. at 426 (Section 2254(d)(1) “does not require state 

courts to extend [Supreme Court] precedent or license 

federal courts to treat the failure to do so as error.”). 

Accordingly, Grimes is not entitled to habeas relief. 

B.

Grimes nevertheless contends that the California Court 

of Appeal’s decision is contrary to, and an unreasonable 

application of, the bright line rule established in Edwards. 

He asserts that detectives failed to cease all “police-initiated 
14 GRIMES V. PHILLIPS

custodial interrogation” when he invoked his Miranda right 

to counsel. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484. After his Miranda

right to counsel was violated by detectives during the 

custodial interview, Grimes alleges he was “delivered [] to 

an undercover agent to finish the interrogation.” Because he 

never waived his Miranda right to counsel after invoking it, 

Grimes claims that continued “interrogation” by the 

undercover informant violated Edwards.

2

 

The California Court of Appeal’s reliance on Perkins

rather than Edwards to resolve this claim was not 

“objectively unreasonable” under AEDPA. See Renico, 559 

U.S. at 773. Edwards “does not apply to all interactions with 

the police—it applies only to custodial interrogation.” 

Martinez v. Cate, 903 F.3d 982, 993 (9th Cir. 2018). See 

also Perkins, 496 U.S. at 296 (“Miranda forbids coercion, 

not mere strategic deception. . .”). “Interrogation” is express 

questioning by police or its “functional equivalent,” 

meaning “any words or actions on the part of the police . . .

that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an 

incriminating response from the suspect.” Rhode Island v. 

Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300–01 (1980). Whether police are 

“reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response” 

2 Grimes cites Justice Brennan’s concurrence in Perkins, which 

emphasizes that the majority’s holding is limited to “the question of 

whether Miranda applies to the questioning of an incarcerated suspect 

by an undercover agent.” Perkins, 496 U.S. at 300–01. In Justice 

Brennan’s view, “[n]othing in the Court’s [Perkins] opinion suggests 

that, had [the defendant] previously invoked his Fifth Amendment right 

to counsel [], his statements would be admissible.” Id. But Justice 

Brennan’s concurrence in Perkins does not constitute clearly established 

Supreme Court precedent for AEDPA purposes. See Woods v. Donald, 

575 U.S. 312, 316 (2015) (“clearly established Federal law” under 

Section 2254(d)(1) includes only the holdings of Supreme Court 

decisions).
GRIMES V. PHILLIPS 15

depends “primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect, 

rather than the intent of the police.” Id. at 301; see also 

Perkins, 496 U.S. at 296 (“Coercion is determined from the 

perspective of the suspect.”). 

As the California Court of Appeal found, Grimes was 

unaware that the jailhouse informant was working for law 

enforcement. The record supports the state court’s 

determination that Grimes spoke freely, believing the 

informant was a fellow inmate. Therefore, the state court’s

conclusion that Grimes’ conversation with the informant 

lacked the coercive or police-dominated atmosphere of 

custodial interrogation underlying the Supreme Court’s 

holding in Miranda and Edwards was reasonable. “[S]o 

long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness 

of the state court’s decision,” it is not unreasonable. 

Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011) (quoting 

Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). 

In sum, the California Court of Appeal’s determination

that the trial court did not err by denying Grimes’ motion to 

suppress his recorded conversation with an undercover 

jailhouse informant was not contrary to, or an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established federal law as determined 

by the United States Supreme Court. We affirm the 

judgment of the district court denying Grimes federal habeas 

relief. 

AFFIRMED.