Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A

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### MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

A TTORNEY FOR A PPELLANT Kurt A. Young Nashville, Indiana A TTORNEY S FOR A PPELLEE Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Attorney General of Indiana Samuel J. Dayton Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana



### IN THE 

# COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Jordan Phillip Taber , Appellant

- Defendant,

v.


### State of Indiana , Appellee

- Plaintiff

. December 20, 2019 Court of Appeals Ca se No. 19A

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- 903 Appeal from the Marion Superior Court The Honorable Sheila A. Carlisle, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 49G03

- 1708

- MR

- 29848

Riley , Judge
.Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A

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### STATEMENT OF THE CASE

[1] Appellant

- Defendant , Jordan Taber ( Taber ), appeals his conviction for murder , a felony , Ind. Code § 35

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- 1

- 1( 1 )

.

[2] We affirm.


### ISSUE

[3] Taber presents this court with two issue s on appeal, which we consolidate and

restate as the following si ng le issue : Whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting into evidence his statement to the police.


### FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

[4] In the late hours of June 3, 2017, Raeshawn L awrence (Lawrence), Brandan Key (Key), Evenbay Settles (Settles) , and Fairly Griffie (Griffie), were smoking marijuana and drinking alcohol. All four men were in a vehicle being driven by Key. First , the group went to a party in Avon, Indiana, and left after about thirty minutes. Then , a t the suggestion of Griffie, Key drove them to a birthday party at Carriage House Apartment s in Indianapolis, Indiana. The y arrived between 11:00 p.m. and midnight.

[5] After about twenty minutes, a group of three men arrived at the birthday party. One of the men , who had short hair , was Johnny Talley (Talley) , and the other , who had a long “fuzzy ponytail , ” was Taber. (Tr anscript Vol. II, p. 102). According to Lawre nce, Talley had a “gun on his waist , ” and , moments afterCourt of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A

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- 903 | December 20, 2019 Page 3 of 13 arriving at the party, Talley “aggressively” approached Griffie for “a couple of seconds , ” but they eventually “just shook hands.” (Tr

. Vol. II, p p . 101 , 104 )

. At some point during the party, Lawre nce heard Talley state, “Let ’ s squash this.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 108).

[6] After spending about an hour at the birthday party, Lawrence, Key, Settles, and Griffie decided to leave . When they got to Key’s vehicle, Griffie did not get inside ; instead, he turned around and walked away. After about thirty seconds , multiple gunshots were fired . Key backed the car out of the parking space and drove toward Griffie. Settles and Lawrence exit ed the vehicle and found Griffie lying on the ground wit h multiple gunshot injuries to his chest

. Lawrence observed Griffie’s gun resting on the ground next to Griffie . As Settles and
Lawrence tried to place Griffie inside the vehicle, Lawrence saw Taber com e around the corner of an apartment building , and Ta ber began shooting toward Key’s vehicle. Lawrence and Settles ducked and got inside Key’s vehicle , and Key drove to a different location in the apartment complex. In the meantime, Taber walked toward Griffie and took Griffie’s gun

. Lawrence observed Tab er’s actions. Moments later, Lawrence saw a “blue sports car” speed away “[v]ery fast.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 112). Lawrence, Settles, and Key returned to where Griffie was and called 9

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[7] At around 1:30 a.m. on June 4, 2017, Officer Scott Highland (Offic er Highland) of the Speedway Police Department was dispatched to the scene. Upon arriving, Officer Highland found Griffie lying on the ground , and Griffie hadCourt of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A

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- 903 | December 20, 2019 Page 4 of 13 several bullet holes through his shirt. Using scissors from his first aid kit, he cut Griffie’s shirt and applied gauze to Griffie’s chest wounds. Griffie struggl ed to breath e , was unable to talk , and he eventually died on the scene.

[8] At around 1:57 a.m., Detective Erika Jones (Detective Jones) and other detectives of the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department arrived at the scene. Detective Jones encountered Lawrence and Key , and she transported them to the homicide office to obtain their taped statements. After conducting the interviews, Detective Jones rec eived information from Griffie’s mother that Griffie had “been having a beef” with a man named “Johnny.” (Tr. Vol. III, p. 59). Griffie’s mother also provided Detective Jones with a screen shot of Johnny’s Facebook profile . Johnny’s Facebook profile nam e was “James Slaughter , ” and upon further research, Detective Jones discovered that Johnny/James Slaughter was Talley, an associate of Taber. (Tr. Vol. III, p. 59). Also, while looking through Talley’s Facebook photos and list of friends, Detective Jones was looking for the shooter , who might have had “long stringy hair” pulled back in a ponytail. (Tr. Vol. I II, p. 62). Detective Jones found a photo of a man that matched the description she was looking for and the profile

name for the man displayed on F acebook was “Julio Hernandez.” (Tr. Vol. III, p. 62). Upon cross

- referencing Julio Hernandez’s date of birth as listed on Facebook with BMV records, Detective Jones discovered that Julio Hernandez was Taber. Following her research, Detective Jones assem ble d separate photo
array s which included Taber and Talley

.Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A

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- 903 | December 20, 2019 Page 5 of 13 [9] A few hours after the shooting, Detective Jones talked to Lawrence and showed him the photo arrays . L awrence , who had seen Taber shooting at the scene, stated , “ [t] hat’s the dude. ” (Tr. Vol. I I, p. 12). Lawrence proceeded to circle and s ign his name beside Taber’s photo. Detective Jones also showed the photo
array s to Key

. Key was un able to recognize Taber from the lineup , but he recognized Talley

. Settles recognized Taber in one of the photo array s , but since he was “going through a lot ” at the time, he did not want his “name on any paperwork.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 198).

[10] On June 6, 2017, Detective Jones telephoned Talley and asked if he would be wil ling to speak with her at the homicide office in Indianapolis . Talley accepted the invitation, and he informed Detective Jones that he would be accompanied by his attorney. Detective Jones called Talley’s attorney to confirm Talley’s story. Talley’s att orney indicated that it was true he was accompanying Talley and that they were on their way . Talley’s attorney added that Taber was accompanying them since Taber wanted to speak with Detective Jones. Talley’s attorney indicated that he was only represent ing Talley and not Taber.

[11] When Talley, Talley’s attorney, and Taber arrived at the homicide office, Detective Jones and her partner , Detective Gray Smith (Detective Smith) , directed Talley and his attorney to the conference room . S ince “there was not a section for anyone to just kind of sit and wait,” Taber was ushered into an interview room. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 14). For about an hour, Detective JonesCourt of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A

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- 903 | December 20, 2019 Page 6 of 13 questioned Talley

. In the cours e of the interview, Talley asserted that during the shooting , he saw Griffie pull a “ gun out on [] Taber” and fire “a shot.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 15).

[12] After completing Talley’s interview, Detective s Jones and Smith entered the interview room where Taber was waiting and introduced themselves

. Detective Jones then read Taber his Miranda warning s

. Taber stated that he had a GED
and understood English, and when he was asked to sign the waiver form, Taber stated that he “ wanted to have a lawyer ” present

. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 16). Detective s Jones and Smith terminated the interview and began packing up

. Taber , however, stated that he wanted to “give a statement, but he [did] not want all the trick questions.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 17). Detective Jones explaine d to Taber that since he had invoked the right to have an attorney present, she could not question him further . Taber then asked Detective Jones if he “had to stay [] there ” or “he had to wait until he had an attorney.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 17). Detective J ones informed Taber that he “was not free to leave

. ” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 17). At that moment, Taber changed his mind and stated that “he wanted to give a statement [] without an attorney.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 18). Detective s Jones and Smith left the room , an d Detective Jones intended to consult the prosecutor
as to whether she would be permitted to question Taber since he had waived his right to counsel

.

[13] While Detective s Jones and Smith were out of the room, on two occasions Taber stood up and knocked on the door to get the detectives ’ attention

. AsCourt of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A

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- 903 | December 20, 2019 Page 7 of 13 soon as Detective s Jones and Smith reentered the interview room, Taber pointed at the seat Detective Jones had recently vacated and stated unequivocally that he wanted to give a statement. Detective Jones again read Taber his Miranda war nings. Taber stated that he understood his rights , and he signed a waiver

. During a two

- and

- a - half

- hour interview, Taber admitted that at some point during the shooting, he “pulled out a gun and then [] closed [his]
eyes and then [] just got to shooting.” (State’s Exh. Vol. I, p. 40). Given that there was more than one gun fired , and pending the results of a forensic firearm examination, Taber was permitted to leave after the interview. The results of the forensic exami nation were released in July 2017, and Taber was arrested.

[14] On August 15, 2017, the State filed an Information, charging Taber with Count I, murder, a felony, and Count II, unlawful possession of a firearm by an SVF, a Level 4 felony. On February 14, 2019 , Taber filed a motion to suppress the statement he gave to Detective s Jones and Smith. The trial court conducted a hearing on March 6, 2019 but denied Taber’s motion. A bifurcated jury trial was held on March 18 through March 20, 2019

. During the first phase, the jury found Taber guilty of murder , and there was no need for a second phase since the State moved to dismiss the Level 4 felony unlawful possession of a firearm by an SVF charge

. On March 27, 2019, the trial court conducted a sentencing hearing and sentenced Taber to sixty years in the Department of Correction.

[15] Taber now appeals. Additional information will be provided as necessary.Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A

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### DISCUSSION AND DECISION
I

. Admission of the Evidence

[16] When ruling on the admissibility of evi dence, the trial court is afforded broad discretion, and we will only reverse the ruling upon a showing of abuse of discretion. Gibson v. State , 733 N.E.2d 945, 951 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). An abuse of discretion involves a decision that is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court. Id

. We consider the evidence most favorable to the trial court ’ s ruling and any uncontradicted evidence to the contrary to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to support the ruling. Id

.

[17] Taber first contends that he was unlawfully detained , which was a violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution . As such, Taber contends that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting his

state ment to Detective s Jones and Smith. Further, Taber claims that his Fifth Amendment r ight s under the United States Constitution were violated when Detective s Jones and Smith continued questioning him even after he had demanded an attorney

.


### II

. Fourth Amendment Violation

[18] Taber argues that shortly after he arrived at the homicide office, he was held in a locked interrogation room , and Detective Jones subsequently informed him he was not free to leave . Taber contends that the statement he offered thereafterCourt of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A

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- 903 | December 20, 2019 Page 9 of 13 “ was a direct result of that illegal detention , ” and his Fourth Amendment right s under the United States Constitution were violated. (Appellant’s Br. p. 21). In response, the State argues that because Detective Jones had probable cause to deta in Taber, his Fourth Amendment rights w ere not violated

.

[19] The Fourth Am endment of the United States Constitution declares “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” Krise v. State , 746 N.E.2d 957, 961 (Ind. 2001). The Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures applies not only to searches and seizures of property, but also to physical apprehension of persons, such as arrests. Roberts
v. State , 599 N.E.2d 595, 598 (Ind. 1992). In general, poli ce must have a warrant to make an arrest. Thomas v. State , 81 N.E.3d 621, 625 (Ind. 2017)

. An officer may, however, arrest a suspect without a warrant if he observes the suspect committing a crime, or if the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect has committed a felony. Sears , 668 N.E.2d at 666

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[20] “Probable cause to arrest arises when, at the time of the arrest, the arresting officer has knowledge of facts and circumstances, which would warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that the defendant committed the criminal act in question.” Id . at 626 (citing Sears , 668 N.E.2d at 667). The amount of evidence necessary to satisfy the probable cause requirement for a warrantless arrest is evaluated on a case

- by

- case basis. Id

. Rat her than requiring “ a precise mathematical computation, probable cause is grounded inCourt of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A

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- 903 | December 20, 2019 Page 10 of 13 notions of common sense. ” Id

. (citing Ogle v. State , 698 N.E.2d 1146, 1148 (Ind. 1998)). “A police officer ’ s subjective belief as to whether he has probable

cause to a rrest a defendant has no legal effect. Instead, the police officer ’ s actual knowledge of objective facts and circumstances is determinative.” State
v. Parrott , 69 N.E.3d 535, 543 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied

. “The ultimate determination of probab le cause is reviewed de novo .” Id

.

[21] Contesting the existence of probable cause, Taber claims that at the time Detective Jones interviewed him, there was no “warrant for [his] arrest and no charges had been filed against him. ” (Appellant’s Br. p. 21). Thus, Taber

conten ds that his “statement was a direct result of [an] illegal detention.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 21).

[22] As to whether Detective Jones and other officers had probable cause to lawfully detain Taber in the interview room, the record reveals that prior to Taber ’s voluntary visit to the homicide office, Detective Jones had questioned
Lawrence regarding the shooting

. Lawrence stated that Taber had fired several shots at Griffie and toward Key’s vehicle. Lawrence had al so stated that he had

s een Griffie with a gun at the birthday party, and after Griffie had been shot, he

s aw Taber take Griffie ’s gun which was lying on the ground next to Griffie. Additionally, from the photo arrays prepared by Detective Jones, Lawrence identified Taber as one of the people who fired shots on the day Griffie was shot. B ased on Lawrence’s statement , Detective Jones determined that T aber was not free to leave since he was the lead suspect in the homicide. Also,Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A

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- 903 | December 20, 2019 Page 11 of 13 Detective Jones believed that Taber could have been charged with “theft from stealing [Griffie’s] firearm, possibly robbery, possibly criminal recklessness for firing the gun at the back of [Key’s] vehicle.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 18).

[23] Under the facts and circumstances of this case, a person of reasonable caution
in Detective Jones ’ position could have concluded that Taber had committed several felony offenses , thus, we cannot hold that Taber’s detainment at the homicide office violated Taber’s Fourth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution

. Thus, we hold that his statement was admissible , and the trial court did not abuse its discretion.



### III. Fifth Amendment Violation

[24] Taber further contends that his q uestioning was improper because it continued after he requested to have counsel present

. T aber , therefore, asserts that his confession was not freely and voluntarily given and that his Fifth Amendment right s under the United States Constitution were viola ted.

[25] It is undisput ed that T aber was in custody when Detective Jones informed Taber that he was not free to leave the interview room. When a person is questioned by law enforcement officers after being taken into custody, that person must first “be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.” Miranda v.
Arizona , 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). OnceCourt of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A

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- 903 | December 20, 2019 Page 12 of 13 the accused requests counsel, “the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present.” Carr v. State , 934 N.E.2d 1096, 1102 (Ind. 2010) (citing Edwards v.
Arizona , 451 U.S. 477, 482, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1883, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981)). Future interrogation is allowed only when it is shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the accused initiated further dis cussions and knowingly and intelligently waived the right to counsel he had earlier invoked. Smith v. Illinois , 469 U.S. 91, 95, 105 S.Ct. 490, 83 L.Ed.2d 488 (1984).

[26] In the present case, Taber was willingly present at the homicide office. Detective Jo nes testified that since “there was not a section for anyone to just kind of sit and wait,” Taber was taken to an interview room. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 14). When Detective s Jones and Smith concluded their interview with Talley, they entere d the room where Tab er was waiting. Detective Jones immediately read Taber his Miranda warnings and asked Taber to sign the waiver of rights form

. Taber invoked his right to an attorney. Detective s Jones and Smith terminated the interview and proceeded to exit the room. At that moment, Taber changed his mind and stated that “he wanted to give a statement [] without an attorney.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 18). Detective Jones ultimately left the room to consult the prosecutor as to whether she would be permitted to question Taber since he had waived his right to counsel. A short while later, Taber reinitiated communication with the detectives by knocking on the door. When Detective Jones reentered the interview room, she asked Taber what his knock m eant, and Taber explicitly stated that he wanted to give a statementCourt of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A

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. Detective Jones again read Taber his Miranda warnings and asked whether he understood them . Taber answered affirmatively and signed the waiver. Detective Jones the n proceeded with the interrogation , and Taber made an incriminati ng statement.

[27] While Taber had unequivocally invoked his right to counsel at the initial
encounter, he knowingly and intelligently waived that right by reinitiating conversation with Detecti ve Jones. Because Taber initiated further communication , Taber voluntar il y chose to forego his right to counsel

. Detective Jones readvised Taber of his Miranda rights

. Taber said he understood , and he then made an incriminating statement. These facts strongly suggest that Taber issued a voluntary statement , and we conclude that t he trial

court did not abuse it s discretion by admitting Taber’s statement.


### CONCLUSION

[28] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Taber’s Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution were not violated, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting Taber’s statement

.

[29] Affirm ed

.

[30] Baker, J. and Brown, J. concur