PUBLISH UNITED STATES CO URT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

__________________ _______________ STEVEN D. BONNEY, Petitioner-Appellant,

v. EDDIE WILSON, Warden, Wyoming State Penitentiary; ROBERT LAMPERT, Director, Wyoming Department of Corrections; PETER K. MICHAEL, Wyoming Attorney General,
Re spondents-Appellees. No. 15-8010

__________________ _______________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming (D.C. No. 2: 11-CV-00345-NDF)

__________________ _______________ Diane E. Courselle, Laramie, Wyoming, University of Wyoming College of Law, for Petitioner-Appellant. David L. Delicath, Deputy Attorney Ge neral, (Peter K. Michael, Attorney General, with him on the brief) Office of the Attorney Genera l for the State of Wyoming, Cheyenne, Wyoming, for Respondents-Appellees.

__________________ _______________ Before GORSUCH , BACHARACH , and McHUGH , Circuit Judges.

__________________ _______________ BACHARACH , Circuit Judge.

_______________ __________________ FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit March 29, 2016 Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 This appeal involves a habeas action brought by Mr. Steven Bonney. When Mr. Bonney wa s 17, five of his child rela tives accused him of sexual abuse. Mr. Bonney entered into a plea agreement with the State of Wyoming and pleaded guilty to charge s involving two of the children. The state district court accepted the plea, entering a judgment of conviction and sentencing Mr. Bonney to two consecutive terms of 15-20 years’ imprisonment (with the sec ond term suspended in favor of probation for 15 years). Mr. Bonney soon regretted his plea and sought post-conviction relief, arguing that his trial counsel ha d been ineffective. The state district court denied relief on some claims and granted summary judgment to the State on other claims. Mr . Bonney then br ought this federal habeas action. The federal district court granted habeas relief, bu t we reversed. 1 On remand the district court granted su mmary judgment to the respondents, and Mr. Bonney appeals. We revers e in part and a ffirm in part.

1 In granting habeas re lief, the district court held that Mr. Bonney’s attorney had provided in effective assistance by failing to inform Mr. Bonney of a letter from one of the alleged victims (K.S.). We reversed, holding that the state co urt “reasonably could have concluded that defense counsel’s failure to disclose K.S.’s letter in a timel y fashion was not sufficient to undermine c onfidence in the outcome of the prosecution and that a rational defendant would not have sought to wit hdraw his guilty plea despite K.S.’s partial recantation.” Bonney v. Wilson , 754 F.3d 872, 886 (10th Cir. 2014) (empha sis in original).3 I. Mr. Bonney did not commit a procedural default on his habeas claim involving trial counsel’s fa ilure to adequately investigate the children’s accounts. In the habeas petition, Mr. Bonney claimed in part that his trial counsel had failed to ad equately investigate the children’s accounts. The state district court declined to consider the merits of this claim, reasoning that Mr. Bonney had not raised the claim through a direct appeal. As a result, the federal district court cons idered the habeas claim procedurally defaulted. But a direct appeal would have re quired Mr. Bonney ’s trial counsel to allege his own ineffectiveness, and the Wyoming courts have not evenhandedly require d attorneys to raise thei r own ineffectiveness on direct appeal. For this r eason, the procedural requ irement, as applied by the state district court, did not consti tute an adequate basis for procedural default. In these circumstances, the federal district court should have considered the merits of the habeas claim. A. We do not address issues defaul ted in state court based on a state procedural ground that is independent and adequate. On habeas review, we do not address issues that were decided in state court on an independ ent and adequate state procedural ground. English v. Cody , 146 F.3d 1257, 1259 (10th Cir. 1998). The issue here is whether the4 state procedural gr ound is “adequate.” 2 A state procedural ground is adequate only if it has been applied “evenhandedly to all similar claims.” Hathorn v. Lovorn , 457 U.S. 255, 263 (1982). B. The state district court conc luded that Mr. Bonney should have filed a direct appeal to assert this claim. The state procedural gr ound at issue here is based on Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-14-103(a)(i), which stat es that post-conviction relief is ordinarily unavailable if the cl aim could have been raised on direct appeal but wasn’t. This statute is implicated because Mr. Bonney did not file a direct appeal; he instead asserted this claim for the first time in a post-conviction application. The state district court di sapproved of this tactic, concluding that Mr. Bonney could have raised the claim on direct ap peal but had failed to do so. Thus, relying on Wyo. Stat . Ann. § 7-14-103( a)(i), the state district court granted summary judgment to the State on Mr. Bonney’s claim. C. We apply de novo review of the federal district court’s ruling. On habeas review, the federal dist rict court concluded that the state procedural ground was adequa te for purposes of pr ocedural default. We review this conc lusion de novo. See Anderson v. Att’y Gen. , 342 F.3d 1140,

2 In his reply brief, Mr. Bonney also argues that the state procedural ground is not independ ent. We need not address this argument.5 1143 (10th Cir. 2003) (“ This court reviews de novo whether claims are procedurally barred.”). D. The respondents bo re the burden of provi ng that the state procedural ground was adequa te even though Mr. Bonney lacked separate appellate counsel. In conducting this review, we no te that the res pondents bear the burden of proof because procedural default is an affirmative defense. Hooks v. Ward , 184 F.3d 1206, 1216- 17 (10th Cir. 1999). Thus, the respondents had to prove in federal district court that the State of Wyoming had evenhandedly applied § 7-14-103(a)(i) to all similar claims.
See Part I(A), above. E. The state procedur al ground is inadequate here because Wyoming courts have not evenhandedly required trial attorneys to allege their own ineffectiveness in a direct appeal. Mr. Bonney argues that the state procedural ground is not adequate because his only attorney during the period for an appeal wa s the attorney who had handled the trial. In Mr. Bonney’s view, Wyoming courts have not evenhandedly requi red trial attorneys to assert their own ineffectiveness in a direct appeal. We agree. The Wyoming Supreme Court has c onsidered it “questionable” for attorneys to allege thei r own ineffectiveness. Keats v. State , 115 P.3d 1110, 1117 (Wyo. 2005). The court has also expressed skepticism about such an allegation when the defendan t’s trial and appellate attorneys are6 not independent fr om one another. Id. For example, in Keats v. State , the defendant’s appellate counsel consid ered herself a s ubordinate of the defendant’s trial counsel. Id. In light of this re lationship between the attorneys, the Wyoming Supreme Court applied cases stating “that it is not appropriate or expected for one to raise one’s own ineffectiveness.” Id. 3 Against this backdrop , the respondents have not identified a single case in which Wyoming courts applied § 7-14-103(a)(i) when

 the defendant’s appellat e counsel also served as trial counsel or

 the defendant’s only at torney during the ap peal period also handled the trial.
See Oral Arg. 31:41-32:03 (concession by the respondents that the Wyoming Supreme Court has never app lied § 7-14-103(a)(i ) when the same attorney represented the defendant at tr ial and in the direct appeal). Thus, § 7-14-103(a)(i) cannot serve as an adequate basis for a procedural default. See Neill v. Gibson , 263 F.3d 1184, 1193 (10th Ci r. 2001) (stating that Oklahoma’s “procedural bar . . . is not adequate to preclude habeas review of [the habeas petitioner’s] ineffect ive-assistance claim because the same attorney represented [the petitioner] both at trial and on direct appeal”);

3 Our circumstances differ because Mr. Bonney never filed a direct appeal. But the Wyoming Supreme Court applies § 7-14-103(a)(i) when the defendant bypasses a direct appeal to assert a claim for the first time in a post-conviction application. Hauck v. State , 162 P.3d 512, 515 (Wyo. 2007). Thus, the federal district cour t applied § 7-14-103( a)(i), reasoning that Mr. Bonney’s attorney could have appealed based on ineffectiveness of trial counsel.7 Walker v. Gibson , 228 F.3d 1217, 1231-32 (10t h Cir. 2000) (“[T]he claim is not procedurally barre d because [the habeas petitioner] had the same counsel at trial and on appeal.”). The respondents ar gue that in our unpub lished opinion in Teniente v. Wyoming Attorney General , we held that the procedural requirements in § 7-14-103(a)(i) are considered adequate for procedural default. 412 F. App’x 96 (10th Cir. 2011) (unpublished). Indeed, they ordinarily are. But
Teniente involved claims of prosecutorial miscondu ct and evidentiary error, not ineffect ive assistance. 412 F. App’x at 101. As a result, we did not address the adequacy of the pr ocedural requirem ents in § 7-14- 103(a)(i) when the habeas claim would involve an at torney’s allegation of his own ineffectiveness. See id. Thus, Teniente did not invo lve our issue. 4 F. The alleged procedural default cannot be based on Mr. Bonney’s appeal waiver. In concluding that the habeas claim was procedurally defaulted, the federal district court point ed to Mr. Bonney’s waiver of his right to appeal. But for two reasons, the appeal waiver cannot se rve as the basis for a procedural default: (1) th e waiver was not invoked in state court, and (2) Wyoming courts have not evenhandedl y enforced appeal waivers when defendants attribute their guilty pleas to ineffective lega l representation.

4 Because Teniente was unpublished, it would not constitute precedent even if the opinion had addressed our issue. 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A).8 First, the state district court did not mention the appeal waiver. Even here, the respondents do not argue that the appeal waiver would support a procedural default. See, e.g. , Appellees’ Resp. Br. at 13-15; Oral Arg. at 24:47-24:54. That is understandabl e because § 7-14-103(a)(i) would not apply to an appeal waiver . This section expressly c overs the failure to raise an argument in a direct appeal, but says nothing about the waiver of a right to appeal. Thus, in rely ing on § 7-14-103(a)(i), the state district court relied on the failure to assert the claim in a direct appeal, not Mr. Bonney’s waiver of his right to appeal. Second, Wyoming courts have no t evenhandedly enforced appeal waivers to preclude consideration of ineffective assistance claims. Wyoming courts apply a three-part test to determine the enforceability of an appeal waiver:
1. Does the appeal fall within th e scope of the appeal waiver?
2. Did the defendant know ingly and voluntaril y waive appellate rights?
3. Would enforcement result in a miscarriage of justice? Henry v. State , 362 P.3d 785, 789 (Wyo. 2015). In dete rmining whether enforcement would result in a miscar riage of justice, Wyoming courts consider whether the defe ndant lacked effective a ssistance of counsel in negotiating the waiver. Id. at 790.9 Mr. Bonney’s appeal waiver was c ontained in his pl ea agreement. Mr. Bonney attributes that plea agreement to ineffec tive assistance, claiming that his attorney exaggerated th e benefits of the agreement and underestimated the poten tial for an acquittal. Th e Wyoming Supreme Court has never addressed the validity of an appeal waiver that was allegedly the product of ineffective assistance. As a result, the res pondents have not shown evenhanded enforcement of appeal waivers in similar circumstances. For both reasons, the procedural default cannot be based on Mr. Bonney’s appeal waiver. G. We must remand rather than consider the possibility of affirming on alternative grounds involving the merits. Because the federal di strict court erred in applying procedural default, we must decide whether to consider the po ssibility of affirming on alternative grounds i nvolving the merits. We have declined to affirm a grant of summary judgment on alternative grounds wh en doing so would be unfair to the nonmovant. See Tavery v. United States , 32 F.3d 1423, 1427 n.5 (10th Cir. 1994). Affi rmance on alte rnative grounds wo uld be unfair here. Mr. Bonney, as the nonmovant opposing summary judgment, was obligated only to present evid ence opposing the argu ments made in the10 respondents’ summary judgment motion. See id. 5 In federal district court, the respondents s ought summary judgme nt on this clai m based solely on procedural default; they did not argue in the alternative th at the habeas claim would fail on the merits. As a result, Mr. Bonney had no reason to respond to the summary judgment motion with evidence suppo rting the merits of his habeas claim. Even now , the respondents do not defend the summary judgment ruli ng on the merits of the claim. In these circumstances, it would be unfair to affirm based on the merits. See id. (“We feel it would be unf air to affirm the summa ry judgment against Ms. Tavery [on the basis of an] argument . . . not made below.”); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f), (f)(2) (permitting entry of summ ary judgment on “grounds not raised by a party” on ly after the adverse party has obtained “notice and a reasonable time to respond” ). Thus, we decline to consider the possibility of affirming based on alterna tive grounds involving the merits. See Evers v. Regents of the Univ. of Colo. , 509 F.3d 1304, 1309- 10 (10th Cir. 2007) (stating that the Court of Appeals could not affirm a summary judgment

5 The federal district court has disc retion whether to apply the Federal Rules of Civil Procedur e in habeas cases. See Rule 12, Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 81(a)(4) (stating that in habeas cases, the applicability of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is governed by the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases). In the summary judgment pr oceedings, the federal district court and the parties relied on Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. As a result, we apply our case law involvin g a party’s duty under Rule 56 to respond to the grounds raised in the summary judgment motion.11 award on alternative ground s because the nonmoving party had no notice of the need to present ar gument and all his ev idence on the issue). II. The federal district court pr operly rejected Mr. Bonney’s other habeas claims on substantive grounds. In claiming ineffective assistance, Mr. Bonney also complained about his attorney’s portrayal of the benefits from the plea agre ement. On appeal, Mr. Bonney claims that hi s attorney exaggerated

 the benefits from dismissa l of one count (Count V),

 the value of the prosecutor’s promise to make a favorable recommendation to a prosecutor in another county (Pueblo County) about the po ssible filing of add itional charges, and

 the significance of one chil d’s (P.M.’s) statement to prosecutors. On these claims, the state distri ct court granted an evidentiary hearing and

 granted summary judgment to th e State on the claim involving failure to seek dismissal of Count V,

 granted summary judgment to th e State on the claim involving exaggeration of the value of a recommendation not to pursue charges in Pueblo County, and

 denied habeas relief on the claim involving exaggeration about P.M.’s interview w ith prosecutors. Mr. Bonney renewed these claims in th e habeas petition , and the federal district court granted su mmary judgment to the respondents on each claim. We agree with these rulings.12 A. Our review is limi ted under federal law. The threshold issue is our standard of review. Because the federal district court granted summary judgment, we apply de novo review. Timmons v. White , 314 F.3d 1229, 1232 (10th Ci r. 2003). Thus, we must apply the standard that applie d in federal district court. See Sperry v.
McKune , 445 F.3d 1268, 1271 (10t h Cir. 2006) (stating that in considering a summary judgment moti on on a habeas claim, we “apply[] the same standards used by th e district court”). That standard had two components:

 Federal Rule of Civil Procedur e 56, which gover ns the award of summary judgment, and

 28 U.S.C. § 2254( d), which governs the aw ard of habeas relief. The federal district court applie d both component s when awarding summary judgment to the respondents. Thus, we must consider the interplay between

 the standard for summa ry judgment in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and

 the restrictions in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) fo r a grant of federal habeas relief. See Cummings v. Polk , 475 F.3d 230, 237 (4th Cir. 2007) (“We review de novo a district court’s award of summary judg ment, applying [the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s] de ferential standard of13 review to the state cour t’s adjudication of a pe titioner’s claims on the merits.”). The standard in federal district court was established in a federal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d ). Under that statute, th e federal district court cannot engage in de novo re view of legal conclusi ons adjudicated on the merits in state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). In stead, the scope of the federal district court’s review turns on whether the stat e court adjudicated the merits. See id. 6 The state district court rejected two of the constitutional claims by awarding summary j udgment to the State, and these rulings constituted adjudications on the merits. See Goichman v. City of Aspen , 859 F.2d 1466, 1471 n.13 (10th Cir. 1988) (“We recognize that summary judgment operates as an adjudica tion on the merits.”). As a result, the federal district court had to ap ply 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) on each of the three claims. This section allows consider ation of the underlying habeas claim only if the state district court

 acted contrary to a Supr eme Court decision or

 unreasonably applied a S upreme Court decision.

6 In post-conviction pro ceedings, the Wyoming Supreme Court denied certiorari. But there the court did not provide anal ysis. As a result, we review only the last r easoned court decision. Ylst v. Nunnemaker , 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991); see Brecheen v. Reynolds , 41 F.3d 1343, 1358 (10th Cir. 1994) (“In practice, the l ook-through rule tells a fe deral habeas court to ignore the unexplain ed order and focus upon the last reasoned state court decision.”).14 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 7 B. We apply a two-part test in addressing Mr. Bonney’s claim of ineffective assistance. In applying the stan dard under § 2254(d)(1), 8 we consider Mr. Bonney’s ineffectiven ess claims under the two-part test in Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Under Strickland , Mr. Bonney had to show that

 counsel’s performance was ob jectively unreasonable and

 there was a reasonable probabili ty that but for counsel’s deficient performance, the result of the proceeding would have been different. 466 U.S. at 687-88, 694. To show prejudice (the second pr ong) in the context of a plea agreement, Mr. Bonn ey had to “convince the court that a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the circumstances.” Padilla v. Kentucky , 559 U.S. 356, 372 (2010); accord Bonney v. Wilson , 754 F.3d 872, 884 (10th Cir. 2014). In applying this

7 Rule 56 and 28 U.S. C. § 2254(d) differ in how the federal district court is to view the evidence. Under Rule 56, the federa l district court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant (Mr. Bonney). Bertsch v. Overstock.com , 684 F.3d 1023, 1027 (10th Cir. 2012). Under § 2254(d)(2), however, the federal distri ct court must view the evidence in a light reasonably support ive of the state district court’s findings. See Part II(D), below. The difference between Rule 56 and § 2254(d)(2) does not affect our consideration of this issue becaus e Mr. Bonney has d eclined to invoke § 2254(d)(2) on this habeas claim.

8 See Part II(A), above.15 test, the federal district court conclude d that the alleged deficiencies in the representation would not ha ve been prejudicial. C. The federal distri ct court did not err in granting summary judgment to the respondents on the habeas claim involving failure of Mr. Bonney’s attorney to seek dismissal of Count V. In the habeas petition, Mr. Bonney alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to seek dismissal of Count V, which charged thirddegree sexual assault of V.B. Unde r state law, a th ird-degree sexual assault took place only if the perpetrator was an adult and the victim was 13 or younger. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-304(a)(ii) (repealed 2007). 9 Mr. Bonney was only 17 at th e time, not yet an adult, and V.B. was 14. The state district court granted summary j udgment to the State, reasoning that counsel’s alleged failure to seek dism issal was not prejudicial. The federal district court concluded that this ruling does not entitle Mr. Bonney to federal habeas relief. We agree.

9 Under Wyoming law, the prosecuti on is governed by the law in effect when the alleged crime took place. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-101(b). (stating that “[p]rosecutions for a crime shall be govern ed by the law in effect on the date when the crime occurred”). Thus , the 2007 repeal of the statute does not affect this appeal. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 8-1-107 (“[N]or shall any repeal or amendment affect . . . prosecutions or proceedings existing at the time of the . . . repeal , unless otherwise expressly provided in the amending or repealing act.”) . The conduct that was previously outlawed by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2- 304(a)(ii) is now outlawed by §§ 6-2- 315(a)(ii) and 6-2-316(a)(i).16 The plea agreement requ ired the State to dism iss Count V. Thus, Mr. Bonney obtained the benefit of dism issal even though it came as part of a plea agreement rather than an order on a motion to dismiss. Mr. Bonney argues that he signed the plea ag reement partly because his attorney had exaggerated the valu e of the State’s pr omise to dismiss Count V. According to Mr. Bonney, the State’s promise was meaningless because he was too young and the alleged victim (V.B.) was too old for a third-degree sexual assau lt. Even if Mr. Bonney is correct, the prosecutors could have amended the charges. For example, prosecutors could have invoked Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-105(a) (repealed 2007), 10 which prohibited Mr. Bonney from “knowin gly taking immodest, immoral or indecent liberties with any child or knowingly cau sing or encourag ing any child to cause or encourage anot her child to commit with him any immoral or indecent act.” The opportunity to amend the charge is fatal to this habeas claim because even if Count V were facial ly invalid, the attorney’s alleged failure to file a motion to dismiss did not affect the likelihood that a rational defendant wo uld accept the plea ag reement. In these circumstances, Mr. Bonney suffered no prejudi ce. As a result, the respondents were entitled to summary judg ment on this habeas claim.

10 This statute was repealed in 2007. See note 8, above.17 D. We affirm the grant of summary judgment to the respondents on the ineffectiv e assistance claim involving counsel’s exaggeration of the value of a recommendation that Pueblo County drop its charges. Mr. Bonney faced potential ch arges in two jurisdictions:
1. Pueblo County, Colorado and
2. Laramie County, Wyoming. These potential charges were base d on reports that Mr. Bonney had engaged in sexual misconduc t with five child rela tives of Mr. Bonney: P.M., K.S., K.B., T.N., an d V.B. By the time Mr . Bonney pleaded guilty, the prosecutors had narrowed the charges to be filed. In Laramie County, the charges involved sexual misconduct against only T.N. and V.B. In Pueblo County, Mr. Bonney faced the possibility of charges involving another child: K.B. Mr. Bonney pleaded guilty to the Larami e County charge s. In return, the Laramie County prosec utors agreed to recomme nd to prosecutors in Pueblo County that they not pursue any charges involving K.B. According to Mr. Bonney, his attorney overstat ed the risk of additional charges involving K.B. Mr. Bonn ey downplays the risk, insisting th at Pueblo County prosecutors had already decide d not to pursue the charges by the time he signed an amended plea agreement. On this claim, the state district court granted summary judgment to the State based on a lack of prejudice. Based on this ruling, the federal18 district court awarded summary judgme nt to the responden ts. In reviewing this grant of summary judgment, we apply th e dual standards under

 Federal Rule of Civ il Procedure 56 and

 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
See Part II(A), above. Appl ying these standards, we agree that this habeas claim fails for lack of prejudice. To prevail on this ha beas claim, Mr. Bonney must show that an objectively reasonable defendant would not have accepted the amended plea agreement if trial counsel had taken further steps to learn the status of the case in Pu eblo County. See Part II(A), above. Mr. Bonney cannot prevail under this standa rd. When he si gned the initial plea agreement, promising to plead gu ilty, Pueblo C ounty prosecutors were still considering whether to pursue the char ges involving K.B. Mr. Bonney later signed an amended plea agreement; by that time, Pueblo County prosecutors had decided not to pursue the additional charges. According to Mr. Bonney, he woul d not have signed the amended plea agreement if he had known of the decision by Pueblo County prosecutors. But if Mr. Bonney had refused to sign the amended plea agreement, the original plea agreement would have applied. The original agreement was virtually id entical to the amended pl ea agreement, for both versions19  required Mr. Bonney to plead gui lty to two coun ts of seconddegree sexual assault and

 required the prosecutors to recommend consecutive sentences of 15-20 years on the two counts. Mr. Bonney acknowledges on e difference, but this difference benefited him: Without the amendment, prosec utors could have brought new charges involving sexual misconduct against K.S. This possibility was eliminated in the amended plea agreement. 11 Having already committed to pl ead guilty under th e initial plea agreement, no rational de fendant would have refused to enter the amended plea agreement even if he or she had greater info rmation about the status of the Pueblo Coun ty charges. In these circ umstances, Mr. Bonney was not prejudiced by his attorney ’s alleged failure to learn the current status of the Pueblo Coun ty investigation. As a result, the respondents were entitled to summary judgment on this claim.

11 The amended plea agreem ent also expressly allowed K.S. and P.M. to testify at the sentencing . But the original plea ag reement did not prohibit that testimony. In th e absence of such a prohibiti on, the state district court could have allowed testim ony by K.S. and P.M. See Town v. State , 351 P.3d 257, 262-64 (Wyo. 2015) (allowing tes timony at sentencing); Magnus v. State , 293 P.3d 459, 468-69 (Wyo. 2013) (allowin g consideration of other offenses at sentencing).20 E. The federal distri ct court did not err in rejecting Mr. Bonney’s habeas claim involving his attorney’s misrepresentation about P.M.’s statements to prosecutors. P.M. told prosecutors that he had been sexually abused by Mr. Bonney. Under the amende d plea agreement, prosecutors agreed not to charge Mr. Bonney with abuse of P. M. According to Mr. Bonney, his attorney exaggerated the value of this promise, stating falsely that P.M. had given a video recording lasting 31⁄2 hours, had appeared to be a compelling witness, and had told pros ecutors about 8 separate acts that could result in 8 additiona l charges. The state dist rict court conducted an evidentiary hearing and re jected the habeas claim on the merits. In doing so, the court found that

 Mr. Bonney’s version of events wa s that his atto rney had told Mr. Bonney’s family about the P.M. video before the video could have been made,

 there was some doubt re garding the veracity of Mr. Bonney’s version,

 P.M.’s testimony could have cr eated problems for Mr. Bonney at trial, and

 P.M.’s testimony could have re sulted in additional charges. Mr. Bonney argues that his counsel

 failed to independently evaluate the prosecutor’s representations about P.M.’s testimony and

 exaggerated the importance of P.M.’s expected testimony.21 But in light of the state district court’s factua l findings, we conclude that Mr. Bonney was not prejudiced by hi s counsel’s alleged deficiencies. The state district court found th at it was “true” that “P.M.’s testimony could cause problems if al lowed to be presented as 404(b) evidence [‘proof of moti ve, opportunity, intent , preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or acci dent’] in this case” and that “additional charges could be filed.” Appellant’s App’x at 682. Mr. Bonney does not challenge the re asonableness of this finding, and that omission is fatal. Even if Mr. Bonney’s counse l had investigated further, he would have found that “P.M.’s testimony could cause problems” with respect to the existing charges and that the State could have filed additional charges. Id. The agreement allowed Mr. Bonney to

 avoid additional charges related to P.M. and

 reduce the risk that P.M. would be allowed to testify. Thus, Mr. Bonney has not shown that further investigation would have led a reasonable person to reject the plea agreement. See Part II(A), above. Because the state district court reasonably applie d Supreme Court precedent, we uphold the denial of ha beas relief on the claim involving
P.M.’s statement to prosecutors. III. Disposition We reverse the award of summary judgment to the respondents on the habeas claim i nvolving a failure to adequately investigate22 discrepancies in the children’s accoun ts. We affirm th e rulings on the other habeas claims.