IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI NO. 2017-KA-01130-SCT TERRY L. HILL a/k/a MS FLY

a/k/a TERRY

HILL a/k/a TERRY

LAMONT HILL

v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 08/03/2017 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. LEE SORRELS COLEMAN TRIAL COURT ATTORNEYS: SCOTT W INSTON COLOM STEPHANIE L. MALLETTE COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: OKTIBBEHA COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: OFFICE OF THE STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER BY: MOLLIE MARIE McMILLIN GEORGE T. HOLMES ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: DISTRICT ATTORNEY: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: KATY TAYLOR GERBER SCOTT W INSTON COLOM NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 08/23/2018 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED: BEFORE RANDOLPH, P.J., KING AND ISHEE, JJ. KING, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT: ¶1. T e r r y L. Hill w as convicted in the Oktibbeha County Circuit Court of one count o f robbery , two counts of kidnapping, and one count of sexual battery . Aggrieved, Hill raises

o n e i s sue on appeal: w hether the trial court erred in d eny ing his attorney ’s m otion t o withdraw and Hill’s m otions f or new counsel. Because of the def endant’s actions prior to and at trial, and because o f t he substantial evidence against Hill, we af f irm the decision of thetrial court. FACTS

¶2. In the early m orning h ours of May 1, 2016, two m e n entered the house of Mississippi State University student Carly Stovall 1 in Starkville. The m en sexually assaulted Carly and robbed Stephen, 2 her boy f r iend at the tim e, of his iPhone. Law e nf orcem ent of

f icers arrived

on the scene while the two m en were present. Corporal Christopher Jackson, an of f icer with the Starkville Police Departm ent, testif ied tha t h e received a call that a s exual assault was occurring. He proceeded to the area with Sergeant G eorge Co lem an. Corporal Jackson observed s om eone p eeking through the windows o f the house. He walked to the f ront door, and a m an opened the door. Corporal Jackson identif ied the m an as Hill. H ill greeted the of f icer and stated that he was a nei g h b o r a n d that h e was the one who had c alled 911. Corporal Jackson ordered Hill to put his hands up. Sergeant Colem an then e ntered the house and identif

ied as Hill the m an to w hom he had observed Corporal Jackson speaking. 3 Shortly af terward, Stephen a p peared i n the doorway and said, “ get him .” Carly then appeared and started scream ing, “that’s the guy who raped m e.” ¶3. Hill ran out the door, and the of f icers chased him

. In the m eantim e , Stephen and Carly went to the hospital. There, Stephen inf orm ed the policem en that he did not h ave his iPhone. Stephen used a police of

f icer’s phone to log into the “Find my iPhone” application, a GPS

1 A p seu d o n y

m h as b een u sed th ro u g h o u t th is o p in io n . 2 A p seu d o n y

m h as b een u sed th ro u g h o u t th is o p in io n . 3 S erg ean t C o lem an w as w e arin g a b o d y cam era w h ich cap tu r ed th e u n f o ld in g ev en ts. 2tracking sy stem , which enabl e d t h e police of f icers to track the phone. Of f icer Andrew Jenkins, a patrol of

f icer with the Starkville Police Departm ent, stated that on Sunday , May 1, 2016, law enf

orcem ent of

f icers tracked Hill using Stephen’s iPhone an d inf orm ed him that Hill was on the MSU c am p us. Of f icer Jenkins went to the indicated area. W hile searching,

a sergeant with the MSU police departm e n t n oticed an open door that led to a crawl space under a house and wet f

o otprints just inside the door. The sergeant called f o r a K -9 unit. At approxim a tely

6:40 a.m ., Of

f i cer Jenkins f

ollowed the K-9 unit under the house and f ound Hill in the lef

t corner. 4 Stephen’s iPhone was f ound on Hill’s person. ¶4. The Oktibbeha County Hospital staf f perf orm ed a r ape kit o n Carly

. Kathry n Rogers,

a f orensic deoxy

ribonucleic acid (DNA) analy st with Scales Biological Laboratory , testif ied that the vulvar swabs contained a m ixed DNA prof i le consisting of at least two individuals and included sperm cells. Hill c ould not b e excluded as a contributor; however, 99.99 percent of the general w orld population would be excluded f rom the m ixture. The vaginal swabs contained a DNA prof

ile f rom o ne m ajor co n t r ibutor which m atched Hill’s buccal swabs. Rogers testif

ied that particular f

requency i s less t h a n o n e in 999 trillion. In summ ary , Hill could not be excluded as a c ontributor to the sperm cells on the vulva r swab and he was a

m atch t o the m a

jor contributor o f t h e m i x t ure f ound in the sperm f

raction of the vaginal swabs. PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶5. The trial court appointed public d e f e nder Stephanie M allette to represent Hill. Hill

4 O f f icer Jen k in s’s b o d y

cam era also cap t

u red th e ev e n ts lead in g to H ill’s arrest. 3was i ndicted on six counts: Count I, Robbery ; Count I I, Kidnapping; Count III, Kidnapping;

Count IV, Aggravated Assault; Count V, Sexual Battery ; and Count VI, Rape. Hill pleaded not guilty to all counts. ¶6. On July 2 7, 2016, Mallette f iled a Motion t o W ithdraw, stating that Hill had advised her that he was not indigent and that h e n o l o n g e r d esired Mallette t o represent him

. On January 5, 2017, at a hearing on the m atter, H ill requested that the c ourt appoint a dif f erent attorney to represent him , stating: Because m e and my counselor are not com prom ised in our – my

– i n this case. W e can’t agree on any

thing. I have f

iled m any letters. I never get a response, and I just f

eel as though she’s not qualif i ed f or this case. The trial court responded that it would n o t g rant the a p pointm ent of a new attorney but instructe d M a l l e t te to respond to any letters that she r eceived in the f uture. Mallette stated that she had responded to e very letter that Hill h ad written to her with the e xception of the

m ost recent one, because she had received the letter during the Christm as break. ¶7. On January 17, 2017, H ill f iled a “Motion f

or App o i n t me n t o f N ew Counsel.” Hill stated that Mallette had f ailed t o investigate properly “num e r ous” avenues of exculpatory evidence and m itigating f acts, including street v ideo surveillance, p o l i c e body -cam era f ootage, cellphone data f

rom the victim ’s phone, illegal drug and a l c o h ol usage by the victim s, an d evidence that the police knew of high drug usage around the Bin 612 in Starkville. Hill alleged that Mallette’s representation f ell well below the standa r d o f

com petent counsel. ¶8. Hill’s trial was scheduled f or July 24, 2 017; however, the S t a t e d i d not elect to call

4Hill’s case f or trial on that date. Hill’s codef endant Jerry

Talley ’s trial had been scheduled f or July 31, 2017. Subsequent t o that t im e, counsel f or Talley had been allowed to withdraw f rom the case, rendering Talley ’s trial i m possible on July 31. The district attorney then called Mallette and inf

orm ed her that the State was ready to proceed a gainst H ill on July 31. Mallette indicated that she was prepared f or trial. ¶9. On July 27, 2017, at a hearing bef ore the trial court, Mallette s tated that Hill again had dem anded that the c ourt appoint him a dif f erent a t torney

. The trial court requested that Hill address the court f

rom the podium

. Hill d eclined and then s tated, “It ’ s n o t a problem

. W e [ are] just h aving issues and I f eel a s though she’s g oing to r epresent m e. I want her to be my attorney .” The trial court then d irectly asked H ill if he wanted Mallette to be his attorney , and Hill responded that he did. The trial court asked Mallette i f she was prepared to begin trial, and Mallette again represented that she was prepared f or trial at that point. ¶10. On July 3 1 , 2 0 1 7 , t h e S t a t e c a l l e d H i l l ’ s c a se f or trial. Mallette requested a continuance, arguing that Hill had identif ied Talley i n exchange f

or the S tate’s consideration of Hill’s cooperation. M allette contended that the State did not give Hill’s cooperation any consideration and that the State had changed its agreem ent to try Talley bef ore Hill. It was undisputed that the Sta t e a n d t h e def ense never h ad an y written agreem ent. The State responded that n o prom ises had been m ade to Hill and that the State had c onsidered the f act that Hill had identif

ie d Talley but balanced that consideration with the allegations against Hill. The State then decid e d t h a t Hill did not deserve m uch consideration. T he State also argued that H ill had destroy ed his own chances of cooperating with the State when Hill stated

5u n d e r o a t h that he had no involvem ent in the case. T he S tate alleged that Hill had m a d e

him self an u n r e l i a b l e and u seless witness by under oath deny ing any involvem ent in the incident. Theref

ore, the State decided that, because of Hill’s habitual-of f ender status, any plea of f e r t h e S t a t e would be prepared to m ake would involve m ore tim e served than his counsel reasonably

could recom m end that Hill accept. ¶11. Mallette responded that the State now h ad m ade her a witness in the case b ecause the State had alleged that no prom ise had been m ade t o Hill that he w ould receive consideration by the Starkville Police Departm ent. Mallette alleged that the State’s c ontention was not true and that she had been a party to the conversation in which Hill was prom ised consideration if he c o o p e rated. The trial court denied Mallette’s m otion f or continuance, reasoning that Mallette had announced on two separate occasions that she was prepared f o r trial; the trial court f ound, theref

ore, trial at that point to have resulted in no prejudice t o Hill. In addition, the trial court stated that it had no authority to f o r c e the State to try Talley ’s case f irst. Mallette then requested that the trial court allow her to w ithdraw because she w as a possible witness in the case. Mallette argued that, if the State was going to deny that a prom ise had been m ade to M allette, then Hill w ould receive consideration f o r his c ooperation in Talley ’s case, and she would be a def inite and necessary witness. The State responded that it would not bring into evidence the f a ct that H ill h a d i d entif

ied Talley

. The trial court denied the

m otion to withdraw. ¶12. The State chose not to p roceed on the rape and aggravated assault counts and m oved to am end the indictm e nt t o p roceed on one count of robbery , two counts of kidnapping, and

6one count of sexual battery . The trial court granted the m otion. ¶13. The case proceeded to voir dire

. Af ter the conclusion of voir dir e , b u t bef ore jury selection, Hill advised h is attorney that he would pref er to represent him s elf

. Mallett e a d

v i s e d Hill that she should do jury selection and that he could r epresent him self af ter that process. Hill represented that a conf lict o f interest existed between h im and M allette. H e stated that he did n ot wish to p roceed any f urther with Mallette on the cas e . T he trial court inquired about the conf

lict of interest, to which Hill responded: W e ll, m y attorney , she has – we – we c an’t agree on any thing and a ll we do is f uss – I m ean, f

uss back and f

orth. Been doing this since the beginning, since she’s been on my case. I have f iled a m otion back in January

. I don’t know if y ou’re aware of

this about --. The trial court then asked Hill i f , just the p revious w e e k , h e h a d stated that h e w ould like Mallette to represent him

. H ill responded that he had answered in the af f irma t ive under pressure, and that he had been threatened. ¶14. H i l l a s k e d t h e trial court f or a continuance until he could f ind com petent c o u n s e l willing to represent him

. Hill represented that his f a m ily had “a resource that they can get in touch with.” Hill then stated: W e ll, y our Honor, w hat I wanted to say was, it’s a lot o f t h i n g s that hasn’t taken place in this case and I don’t – I don’t know the reason why

. You know, I have wrote Stephanie Mallette personally

. I have asked f or certain witnesses in this case that are not

– a s p o tential witness in this case that have som e involvem ent i n this case and they are not listed and I don’t understand why

– why – why

is that so. I f

eel like this is – my lif

e is on the line and I have just as m uch right as the victim

to def e nd that. The trial court read Unif

orm Rule of Circuit and County C ourt Practice 8.05, regarding pro

7se def

endants, to Hill. 5 Hill stated: But, y o u r Honor, m ay I say I understand that – I f eel like my attorney h as m isled this whole process because she w r o t e m e in writing say ing that she

– she was going to withdraw f rom my case and I com e way

up here and talked with her. I did not c om e in f ro n t o f t h e j udge at a hearing to c l arif y that s he was going to continue to be my attorney

. I’ve been having problem s with this counsel since the beginning and I want – I’m asking, can y ou please appoint m e som eone else? The State responded, stating that while Mallette vigorously had represented Hill thus f ar, the State could not stop Hi l l f r o m representing him self

. Hill stated that he did not want to represent him self

and that he would like the court to give him tim e to hire an attorney

. ¶15. The trial c ourt asked Mallette to respond. Bef ore Mallette responded, H ill said, “W ell, I’ll j ust c ontinue with Stephanie and I don’t have a f a ir trial, I m e an, it’s cool. I’ll continue.” The trial court stated that it would requ i r e Mallette to continue as shadow counsel if Hill insisted on r epresenting him self and asked Hill if h e wished t o continue by him self or with Mallette as his attorney

. Hill responded that Mallette could continue to be h is a ttorney

. The jury was selected, and the trial proceeded. ¶16. Stephen was the f

irst witness to testif

y . Af ter Stephen was excused, the court took a f if teen-m inute recess. At the conclusion o f the r ecess, but bef ore the jury w as brought back in, Hill again asserted his desire to rep r e s e n t h i ms elf

. The trial court i nf

orm ed Hill that he had the absolute r ight to represent him self an d a g ain told Hill the likely c o n s e q u e n ces of doing so. The trial court stated that, should Hill like to represent him self , it wo u l d appoint

5 Mallette pointed out that R ule 8.05 no longer existed. The trial court s tated that the corresponding Mississippi Rule of Crim i nal P rocedure was substantially sim ilar and that it believed that H ill had been a dvised properly of the probable ef f ect of representing him self

. 8Mallette as his standby counsel. Hill responded:

Sir, no, sir, I do not want her as my s h a d o w o r any thing because s he’s not

– she just told m e, f

uck m e. Excuse m

y language. She just said, f uck m e, and I’ve been dealing with this since this lady been on my case, sir, and I – that’s the reason why I d o not want . . . Stephanie Mallette as my attorney because all she d o i s threaten my lif e. S h e t e l l me I’m g onna die in prison. She don’t have no c onf

idence in this case. She’s not asking the right questions. She’s not try ing to f

ight under no circum stances. The trial court again stated that it would allow Hill to represent him se l f , but, whether Hill objected o r not, the tr i a l c o u r t was going to a ppoint M allette as advisory counsel. Hill responded that h e was under em otional distress and asked f or a continuance. T he trial court denied the continuance and stated that Hill could use M all e t te as m uch or as l ittle as he needed to. ¶17. H i l l r esponded that he was not having a f a i r trial and asked why the trial court ha d

rem oved Talley ’s counsel b ut still required Hill to b e at court. The trial court q uestioned the relevance of Hill’s q

uestion. Hill continued talking, m a king an incrim inating statem ent in the process: “Your Honor, he’s a witness in this case just as well as I am . He was th e r e a t the

sam e tim e I was there.” The trial court suggested that Hill not m ake any f urther statem ents and stated that i t was an excellent exam ple of why H ill needed counse l

. H i l l t h e n m ade another incrim inating statem ent, s ay i ng “I m ean, I never denied not being there no way , y our Honor.” The trial c ourt stated that it would not change its ruling and that Hill could represent him self or continue with Mallette as counsel. Hill then r epeatedly asked the trial court f o r a continuance t o appoint a n e w attorney

. The trial court again d enied Hill’s requests. Hill becam e recalcitrant and r ef used to answer the trial court’s questions about whether or not he

9would like to represent him self , s o the trial court stated that it w ould proceeded w ith Mallette as his representative. ¶18. Shortly af

terward, Mallette requested a hearing in cham bers. Mallette stated, “I’m not sitting by him . They ’re f

i ghting with him

down the hall. I am

scared to death he’s going to jum p o n m e.” The trial court stated that it had never encountered such a situation and asked if Mallette could sit f

ar enough away

f rom him . The hearing proceeded as f ollows: MALLETTE: And he j ust screame d , I did not rape any body , I’m innocent, down the hall and I know the jury h eard him

. T here’s no d oubt the jury heard him

. COLOM: Yeah. He’s acting a f ool. GARLAND: Yeah. Bailif f s just kind of all tackled him , so – COLOM: W e need to r esearch that because I think there – y ou can prosecute som ebody

in their absence. MALLETTE: No. O nly

– no. You have to – Judge Howard – y ou m ight want to ask Judge Howard about this b ecause he dealt w ith this with a crazy one and y ou have to do the m inim a l am ount of restraint that’s saf

e.

. . . THE COURT: That i s, y ou’re going to research the law and t e l l m e what I need to do. I’ve never had a – I’ve had a f e w jum p up and y ell s tuf

f e very once in awhile, but I ’ ve never had som ebody that’s acting this belligerent bef ore and, of course, there’s no way I c a n c o n t r ol him because holding him in contem pt is absolutely

–

. . . MALLETTE: Your Honor, my concern is, one, he’s going to escalate until he gets w hat he wants. T hat is my legitim ate concern that until he gets his way , he’s going to r esort – and I’m the one th at’s got to sit over there beside him , so –

. . . THE COURT: All r ight. The Court is f aced with an unusual situation and that is, outs i d e t h e presence of the jury , the Def endant, Mr. Terry Hill, becam e extreme l y belligerent and noisy and disruptive and I am inf o rm e d that the bailif f s have had to subdue him as he was going down the hallway

. The Court isn’t sure what restraints will be necessary on him to continue the trial and by a g reem ent of Counsel, State and Def ense, the Court i s now g oing to cal l t h e jury back in and recess until one o’clock this af t ernoon. . . .

1 0Af

ter recess, the trial court stated that Hill had calm ed down af ter a “ num

b er of deputies” had put him i n a jail cell during recess. The trial court decided to place bailif f s next to Hill during the c ourse of the trial. It stated that, although Hill had e xpressed dissatisf action w ith Mallette, the court had not seen any thing other than good representation by her. ¶19. Mallette m oved f

or a m istrial at this point, arguing that Hill had b een scream ing that he was innocent and that he had not raped any body while h e was being taken to the cell and that his voice likely c ould be heard i nside the j ury room . The trial court instead held that a lim iting instruction would b e given. Mallette then m ade ano t h e r m o t i on to withdraw, alleging that the p revious week Hill h ad threatened to hum i liate her and hurt her and, given his conduct at trial, s h e h a d n o r eason to b elieve that he did not intend t o act on his threats. Mallette stated that s h e was a f raid of him , that she was scared of him , and that she no longer had any desire to represent him

. She stated that, if the court ordered her t o c o n t inue representing Hill, she would represent him to the best o f h e r a b i l i t y , but that her representation would not be one-hundred percent because she was af raid he would hurt her. In an attem

pt not to alert the jury that extra security m easures had been t aken, the trial court decided a plain-clothes policem an would sit between Mallette and H i ll an d that two bailif f s

w o u l d s t a nd close by

. If Mallette needed to conf er with Hill, she w as instructed to m ake a

m otion to the court; the c ourt then would order a recess, enabling Mallette and Hill to go the visitor room

at the jail and to conf

er through the telephones. ¶20. Mallette objected to having any l aw enf orcem ent of

f icers around Hill, arguing that it created an unnecessary im pression that he was dangerous and stating that Hill had assured

1 1the court that he would not act up any m ore. T he trial court noted her objection but s tated that t h e of f icer was i n plain clothes and that he did not occupy a position like a deputy sh e r i f f where he would be widely known in the comm unity

. In addition, one bailif f w a s f o u r f eet behind Hill and the other b ailif f was approxim ately ten f eet f rom Hill. The trial court stated that bailif f s n o rm a lly were seen in the courtroom and, theref ore, should not be extrem ely noticeable. ¶21. The trial court gave a lim i ting instruction t o the j ury w h en it r eturned, and the trial again p roceeded. M allette’s m ain def ense during trial was to attack the c h ain of custody f or the DNA sam

p l es f rom the r ape k it and buccal swab and to challenge the integrity of the DNA sam ples because the sam

ples had not been ref

rigerated at all tim es or stored correctly

. Hill opted not to testif

y , and the def

ense rested without calling any witnesses. ¶22. The jury f

ound Hill guilty of Count I, R o b b e r y ; Count I I, Kidnapping o f Stephen; Count III, Kidnapping of

Carly ; and Count IV, Sexual Battery

. Because the def endant was indicted a s a habitual of

f ender pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 99-19-81, the trial court sentenced Hill to serve a term of f if teen y ears f

or r obbery , thi r t y y ears f o r each count of kidnapping, and thirty

y e ars f or sexual battery . The sentences were to run consecutively

. ¶23. Hill f

iled a Motion f

or a New Trial or in the Alternative a Judgm ent Notwithstanding the Verdict, alleging num erous errors by the trial court. The trial court d enied the def endant’s

m otion. ¶24. On ap p e a l , H i l l r a i s e s o n e issue: whether the trial c ourt erred in deny ing both Mallette’s m o tion t o withdraw and Hill’s m otions f o r n ew counsel, the denial of which

1 2f

orced Hill to proceed to trial without adequate representation. DISCUSSION ¶25. Hill argues that, in ref u sing to allow Mallette t o w i t h d raw f rom representation, the trial court denied Hill his right to counsel under the Sixth Am e ndm e nt. The Sixth Am endm ent to the United S tates Consti t u t ion states, “[ i]n all crim inal prosecutions, the

accus e d s h all enjoy the right

. . . to have the A ssistance of Counsel f or his def e nce.” U.S. Const. am end. VI. The Mississippi Constitution provides a sim ilar right: “In a l l c r im inal prosecutions th e accused shall have a right to be heard by him s elf o r c o unsel, or b oth

. . . .” Miss. Const. art. 3, § 26. “This a dept repr e s e ntation encom passes two broad principles:

m inim um com petence and loy al assistance.” Rinehart v. State , 883 So. 2d 573, 577 (Miss. 2004). In addition, due process of l a w r e q uires the undivided loy alty of d ef ense counsel. Kiker v. State , 55 So. 3d 1060, 1065 (Miss. 2011). ¶26. W hen considering a m otion to withdraw a s counsel, the trial court enjoy s com plete discretion. Hill v. State , 134 S o. 3d 7 2 1 , 7 25 (Miss. 2014). Hill’s c ontention that he was denied his right to counsel is based on two argum e nts: 1) that deny ing Mallette’s f inal m otion to w ithdraw essentially f

o rced Hill to proceed to the end of trial with counsel who could not represent him without conf lict, and 2) that Mallette’s f ear o f Hill lef t him with an attorney who could not give him

“undivided loy alty

. ” ¶27. Previously , this Court has held that, i n order to grant a substitution of counsel during trial, “ the def

e ndant m ust show good cause, such as a c o nf l i c t o f i n terest, a com

plete breakdown of comm

unication, or an irreconcilable conf lict w h i ch leads to an apparently

1 3unjust verdict.” Taylor v . State , 435 So. 2 d 701, 703 (Miss. 1983) (quoting M cKee v. Harris , 649 F.2d 9 27 (2d C ir. 1 981)) (internal citation om itted). “[ C]ertain restraints m ust be put on the reassignm ent of counsel lest the right be ‘ m anipula t ed s o a s to obstruct the orderly procedure in the courts or to interf ere with the f

air adm inistration of

justice.’” Id. (internal citation om itted). In Taylor , prior to trial, the def e ndant’s attorney f

iled a m otion to withdraw f rom representation, arguing that the def endant h ad threatened t o kill him and had ref used to cooperate with h im in any way . Id. at 7 02. At trial, the d ef endant ref used to speak with his attorney and argued that his attorney had not subpoenaed certain witnesses. Id. a t 704. This Court af f i rm ed the trial court’s decision to deny a continuance and discussed the absurdity that would occur if an accused w as allowed to “f all out” with his attorney imm e d iately prior to trial and then insist on a continuance. Id. ¶28. H e r e , t h e t r i a l court a cted within its discretion i n deny ing Hill’s mo t i o n s f o r a continuance and a new attorney and Mallette’s m o tion to withdra w . F o u r d a y s bef ore trial began, Hill twice stated to the trial court that he wanted Mallette t o represent him

. Af ter trial proceedings began, Hill requested a new attorne y , alleging that he had asked f o r certain witnesses in the case and that Mallette had not listed those witnesses. Hill, however, f ailed to pr o v i d e , b oth at trial and on appeal, the nam es of those witnesses or any detail as to the p o t e n tial testim ony of those witnesses. Thus, Hill has not dem onstrated how the witness testim o ny would have resulted in a dif f erent o utcom e . See Puckett v. State , 879 S o. 2d 920, 941 (Miss. 2004). ¶29. Additionally , the record does not indic a t e t h a t M a l lette was d erelict in her duty to

1 4represent H ill. “The test i s whether the accused h as been protected, so f ar as c ounsel can do
so, in all of his legal rights.” Augustine v. State , 201 Miss. 277, 293, 28 So. 2d 243, 247–48 (1946). Mallette raised appropriate objections and cros s - e x a m i ned the State’s witnesses. Further, M allette repeatedly attacked the validity o f the DNA evidenc e i n t r o d u c ed at trial, questioning witnesses about the l a c k o f r ef rigeration and i m

proper storage of the DNA

sam ples a s well the chain o f custody f or the evidence. W hen an a t torney provides adequate representation, a personality conf lict between an a t t o rney and a client is insuf f icient to establish an actual conf

lict. Rowsey v. State , 188 S o. 3d 486, 498-99 (Miss. 2015). “Counsel is presum e d to be com

petent.

. . . An indigent c r im inal def endant is not en t i t l e d t o expert counsel , o r to counsel of his own choosing, but only to r easonably ef f ective assistance of counsel.” Id. at 499 (citations om itted). ¶30. Although H ill argues that the trial court essentially f orced h im to proceed to the end of trial with counsel who could not represent him without conf lict, any conf

lict that existed at trial was the result of Hill’s own actions. Hill becam e “belligerent” a n d h a d to be restrained by the bailif

f s. Mallette then becam e c oncerned f or her own saf

ety and m oved to withdraw f

rom representation. Af

ter considering i ts options during a r ecess, the tr i a l court decided that the best option to continue at that point w as to place a plain-clothes policem an between Mallette and Hill and t o be sure two deputies were in the courtroom

. It s pecif ically

s t a t e d that, should M allette and Hill n eed to c onf er, the two could do s o by p assing no t e s . Mallette also could, on m otion, be granted a recess so that she could talk to Hill through the telephone at the jail.

1 5¶31. The trial court o pted f or th e l e a s t r e s t r ictive saf ety m easures available to Hill. As stated in Taylor , absurd r esu l t s would occur if a d ef endant w as g ranted a m istrial or continuanc e a ft er acting “belligerent” during trial proceedings. T aylor , 4 35 So. 2d at 704. See

a l s o F a i r ley v. S

tate , 4 67 So. 2d 894, 899 (Miss. 1985) (stating that absurd results would

occur if a def

endant was granted a claim o f inadequate representa t i o n a f t e r ref using to cooperate at trial with appointed counsel). In addition, we cannot state w ith any certainty that the c onf lict b etween Mallette and Hill led to an apparently unjust verdict. The S tate presented substantial evidence against Hill, including ey ewitness tes t i m o ny , v i d e o - cam era f ootage, and DNA evidence. CONCLUSION ¶32. Accordingly , because Hill af f irm a tively stated f

our day s bef

ore trial that he w o uld like Mallette to represent h i m , because any conf lict that existed was the r esult o f Hill’s own actions, because Mallette adequately represented Hill, and because of the o verwhelm ing evidence introduced against Hill, we f ind that the trial c ourt’s denial of Mallette’s m otion to withdraw did not deprive Hill of due process or a f air trial. The trial court acted within its discretion in deny ing Hill’s requests f or new counsel and i n deny ing M a l l e tte’s m otion to withdraw. Theref

o re, we af f irm the judgm ent of the trial court. ¶33. AFFIRMED. WALLER, C.J., RANDOLPH AN D KITCHENS, P.JJ., COLEMAN, MAX W ELL, BEAM, CHAMBERLIN AND ISHEE, JJ., CONCUR.

1 6