UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

KEITH FRAZIER, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v. 

P. FLORES, 2 Unit Manager, CCCF; 

INFANTE, Case Manager, CCCF; 

JANSSEN, Correctional Officer; 

CARDENIAS, Sergeant, CCCF; FRY, 

Case Manager, CCCF: M. MILLER, 

Warden, CCCF. 

 Defendants - Appellees. 

No. 15-1237 

(D.C. No. 1:14-CV-02600-CMA-MJW) 

(D. Colo.) 

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ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before KELLY, LUCERO, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges. 

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Keith Frazier appeals the district court’s dismissal of his civil rights complaint. 

Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm. 

 *

 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of 

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 

estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit 

January 4, 2016

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
2 

I 

 During the events relevant to this case, Frazier was an inmate at the Crowley 

Correctional Facility. In two separate searches, one in October 2013 and a second in 

May 2014, prison officials seized a number of items from Frazier’s cell. Frazier 

alleges that these seizures violated his due process and equal protection rights, and 

were undertaken in retaliation for his prior exercise of First Amendment rights. 

 Pursuant to its screening function under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the district court 

dismissed Frazier’s due process and equal protection claims as frivolous. A 

magistrate judge recommended that Frazier’s retaliation claim against Paul Flores, a 

unit manager at the correctional facility, be dismissed for failure to state a claim. 

The district court adopted that recommendation. Frazier timely appealed. 

II

 We review de novo the district court’s decision to dismiss a complaint as 

frivolous under § 1915A(b) if the dismissal is based on a legal issue. See Fogle v. 

Pierson, 435 F.3d 1252, 1259 (10th Cir. 2006). We apply the same standard in 

reviewing a dismissal for failure to state a claim. Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1217 

(10th Cir. 2007). A complaint must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that 

is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 

Because Frazier is proceeding pro se, we construe his filings liberally. See Hall v. 

Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). 

 Frazier alleges that his due process rights were violated when his property was 

seized. We agree with the district court that this due process clam fails because 
3 

Frazier did not allege the absence of an adequate state remedy. “[N]either negligent 

nor intentional deprivations of property under color of state law that are random and 

unauthorized give rise to a § 1983 claim where the plaintiff has an adequate state 

remedy . . . .” Gillihan v. Shillinger, 872 F.2d 935, 939 (10th Cir. 1989), overruled 

on other grounds by Clark v. Wilson, 625 F.3d 686, 691 (10th Cir. 2010). Frazier 

asserts that prison officials had a de facto policy of unlawfully seizing property and 

thus the existence of state remedies is immaterial. However, as we noted in a prior 

appeal filed by Frazier, “individual correctional officers’ alleged practice of 

arbitrarily seizing inmates’ property with scant justification is not the type of 

‘established state procedure’” that requires a pre-deprivation hearing. Frazier v. 

Flores, 571 F. App’x 673, 676 (10th Cir. 2014) (unpublished) (quoting Parratt v. 

Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 541 (1981)). 

 With respect to the equal protection claim, Frazier’s sole argument is that the 

district court erred in failing to provide him an opportunity to amend. However, 

Frazier does not direct us to any district court filing, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 or 

otherwise, in which he sought leave to amend. Having failed to request permission to 

amend, Frazier cannot now complain that the district court denied a non-existent 

request. See Brannon v. Boatmen’s First Nat’l Bank, 153 F.3d 1144, 1150 (10th Cir. 

1998) (failure to attempt an amendment at the trial level waives the issue on appeal). 

 Lastly, we affirm the district court’s ruling that Frazier failed to state a First 

Amendment retaliation claim. “An inmate claiming retaliation must allege specific 

facts showing retaliation because of the exercise of [his] constitutional rights.” 
4 

Peterson v. Shanks, 149 F.3d 1140, 1144 (10th Cir. 1998). And a plaintiff must show 

“that but for the retaliatory motive, the incidents to which he refers . . . would not 

have taken place.” Id. (quotation omitted). Frazier’s complaint contained very few 

allegations of personal participation by Flores in the alleged retaliation. See Foote v. 

Spiegel, 118 F.3d 1416, 1423 (10th Cir. 1997) (“Individual liability under § 1983 

must be based on personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation.”). 

And Frazier failed to allege particular facts suggesting these actions would not have 

occurred but for Frazier’s protected activity. 

III

 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

Frazier’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED, but we remind him of 

his obligation to continue making partial payments until the fee has been paid in full. 

 

Entered for the Court 

Carlos F. Lucero 

Circuit Judge