alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
cmfo_ex1019.htm


Exhibit 10.19








 


EMPLOYMENT SUPPLEMENTARY AGREEMENT


 







 


This SUPPLEMENTARY AGREEMENT (the “Agreement”), is entered into as of July 26, 2009 (the “Effective Date”) by and between Nice Enterprise Trading H.K. Co., Ltd, a company incorporated and existing under the laws of Hong Kong (“Nice Enterprise”) and Mr. Marco Hon Wai KU, an individual (the “Executive”), as an amendment to the EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT (the “Original Agreement”) entered into as of July 26, 2008 by and between the abovementioned parties.


 


RECITALS


 


Nice Enterprise desires to employ the Executive as the Chief Financial Officer for China Marine Food Group Limited (the “Company”) and to assure itself of the services of the Executive upon the terms and conditions of this Agreement.


 


AGREEMENT


 


The parties hereto agree to replace Section 5 of the Original Agreement as follows:


 



	
5.

	
COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS







 



	  	
(a)

	
Cash Compensation. The Executive’s cash compensation shall be US$11,700 (i.e. Rmb80,000) per month, of which US$8,800 (i.e. Rmb60,000) per month will be regarded as housing and traveling allowances.







 



	  	
(b)

	
Equity Incentives. The Executive is entitled to the Company’s common stock award of 30,000 shares at the anniversary of this Agreement (i.e. July 25, 2010). The Company should bear any related registration or administration fees in full.







 



	  	
(c)

	
Annual Leave and Other Benefits. The Executive is entitled to 20 days of annual leave per annum. If the Executive cannot enjoy the annual leave due to business commitments, such remaining balances of annual leave can be carried forward to the following year. The Executive is eligible for participation in any standard employee benefit plan of the Company that currently exists or may be adopted by the Company in the future, including, but not limited to, any retirement plan, life insurance plan, health insurance plan and travel/holiday plan.







 



	  	
(d)

	
Annual Review. Compensation and benefits will be reviewed by the Board or the Compensation Committee of the Company on an annual basis.
























  





  











  
















IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this Agreement has been executed as of the date first written above.


 


 




	 	
Nice Enterprise Trading H.K. Co., Ltd.

	 
	 	 	 	 
	
 

	
By: 

	/s/ Pengfei Liu	 
	 	Name:	
Pengfei LIU

	 
	 	Title:	
CEO and Executive Director

	 
	 	 	 	 







 




	 	
Executive

	 
	 	 	 	 
	
 

	
By: 

	/s/ Marco Hon Wai Ku	 
	 	Name:	Marco Hon Wai KU	 
	 	Title:	
CFO
#### GAINES v. RACENET. GAINES et al. v. RACENET. RACENET et al. v. GAINES. LA BONNE et al. v. GAINES.

United States District Court S. D. New York.

Oct. 2, 1950.

*110See also, D.C., 11 F.R.D. 111.

Appell & Appell, New York City, for plaintiffs Gaines. Morris A. Wainger, Frederick W. Appell, New York City, of counsel. ,

Warren W. Wells, White Plains, N. Y., for plaintiffs Racenet and LaBonne.

CONGER, District Judge.

Motion to consolidate the four above entitled actions.

These actions arose out of an automobile collision which occurred on the Hutchinson River Parkway, Westchester County, New York on June 26, 1949. John S. Gaines was the driver and owner of one car; his wife, Edith L. Gaines, was riding with him. Jules L. Racenet was the owner and driver of the other car; his wife, Kathleen Racenet, was riding with him, as was Alphonse J. LaBonne and his wife, Annette M. LaBonne.

The Racenet and LaBonne actions were commenced on September 16, 1949. The action in which John S. Gaines is plaintiff was commenced on October 20, 1949. The action in which Edith L. Gaines and John S. Gaines áre plaintiffs was commenced on May 12, 1950.

This application to consolidate the four actions is made by the plaintiffs Gaines, pursuant to Rule 42 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A.

I think this is a proper case for consolidation. There are common questions of law and fact involved in these cases. The basic issue, of course, is who was to blame for this accident. Was it Gaines, was it Racenet, or was it the fault of both? This question of negligence is common to all the cases, and this issue of whose negligence caused the accident will depend on the same evidence. True, a different rule of law as to guests riding in a car will have to be considered, but that is common to three of the cases.

The only questions to be determined are who was at fault and the amount of the damage. True, there are six persons here claiming. personal injuries, but I see no reason why a jury under the guidance of the Court on the law could not intelligently decide 'the issues and reach a just and proper verdict as to each. I cannot see how the Racenets and the LaBonnes can in any way be prejudiced by this con-' solidation. As, far as the -trial procedure *111is concerned they should hav.e the same standing as though they were plaintiffs in that their counsel shall have the right to open first and sum up last.

There is one problem which presents itself. Mr. and Mrs. Gaines, in the action in which they are plaintiffs, are represented by ■ one firm of attorneys, while as defendant in two actions John S. Gaines is represented by another firm. By this consolidation I would not want to give the moving parties a technical advantage. In other words, there may not be two1 openings and two summations for the Gaines’ side of this controversy.

Motion granted as indicated above.

Settle order.
II 

114TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 801 

To amend the National Labor Relations Act to provide for appropriate 

designation of collective bargaining units. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

MARCH 19, 2015 

Mr. ISAKSON (for himself, Mr. ALEXANDER, Mr. SCOTT, Mr. COATS, Mr. 

PERDUE, Mr. THUNE, Mr. SESSIONS, Mr. CORNYN, Mr. CORKER, Mr. 

HATCH, Ms. AYOTTE, Mr. BOOZMAN, Mr. MCCONNELL, and Mr. ROBERTS) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to 

the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions 

A BILL 

To amend the National Labor Relations Act to provide for 

appropriate designation of collective bargaining units. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Representation Fair5 ness Restoration Act’’. 

6 SEC. 2. AMENDMENT TO THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS 

7 ACT. 

8 Section 9(b) of the National Labor Relations Act (29 

9 U.S.C. 159(b)) is amended to read as follows: 


emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 801 IS

1 ‘‘(b) In each case, prior to an election, the Board 

2 shall determine, in order to ensure to employees the fullest 

3 freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by this Act, 

4 the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bar5 gaining. Unless otherwise stated in this Act, excluding 

6 acute health care facilities, the unit appropriate for pur7 poses of collective bargaining shall consist of employees 

8 that share a sufficient community of interest. In deter9 mining whether employees share a sufficient community 

10 of interest, the Board shall consider (1) similarity of 

11 wages, benefits, and working conditions; (2) similarity of 

12 skills and training; (3) centrality of management and com13 mon supervision; (4) extent of interchange and frequency 

14 of contact between employees; (5) integration of the work 

15 flow and interrelationship of the production process; (6) 

16 the consistency of the unit with the employer’s organiza17 tional structure; (7) similarity of job functions and work; 

18 and (8) the bargaining history in the particular unit and 

19 the industry. To avoid the proliferation or fragmentation 

20 of bargaining units, employees shall not be excluded from 

21 the unit unless the interests of the group sought are suffi22 ciently distinct from those of other employees to warrant 

23 the establishment of a separate unit. Whether additional 

24 employees should be included in a proposed unit shall be 

25 based on whether such additional employees and proposed 


emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with BILLS
3 

•S 801 IS

1 unit members share a sufficient community of interest, 

2 with the exception of proposed accretions to an existing 

3 unit, in which the inclusion of additional employees shall 

4 be based on whether such additional employees and exist5 ing unit members share an overwhelming community of 

6 interest and the additional employees have little or no sep7 arate identity.’’. 

Æ 


emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with BILLS
#### Ellen R. DUNCAN, as Adm’x of the goods, chattels and credits of Lawrence H. Duncan, deceased, Libelant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent.

United States District Court, S. D. New York.

Oct. 20, 1954.

Grabow & Katz, New York City, David M. Fink, Jacquin Frank, New York City, of counsel, for libelant.

J. Edward Lumbard, U. S. Atty., New York City, Tompkins, Boal & Tompkins, New York City, of counsel, for respondent.

DAWSON, District Judge.

This is a motion, under Rule 30(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A., to vacate a notice for the taking of the-deposition of' the respondent as an adverse party by its Captain, Chief Officer, and Junior Third Officer.

This is an action in Admiralty for the death of the decedent, who was employed as a cook on the S.S. Walt Whitman.

Libelant is, of course, at liberty to examine any of the individuals named in its notice as witnesses and to compel their attendance by subpoena. However, a Chief Officer or a Junior Third Officer is not a managing agent. Aston v. American Export Lines, Inc., D.C.S.D.N.Y.1951, 11 F.R.D. 442. So much of the *569notice as seeks to examine the respondent by the Chief -Officer and Junior Third Officer is vacated.

 The respondent states that the Captain, as well as the other two officers, is no longer in the employ of respondent. Libelant presents no proof that the Captain is in the employ of the respondent. If the Captain is not in the employ of the respondent as a managing agent at the time of taking the deposition of the respondent, the respondent is not required to produce him. Wilkerson v. East Harbor Trading Corp., D.C.S.D.N.Y.1954, 16 F.R.D. 280. In the absence of definitive proof that the Captain is or is not in the employ of the respondent, so much of the notice as provides for the taking of the deposition of respondent through the Captain will not be vacated. However, if the Captain is not produced, the burden will be on the libelant, in any motion under Rule 37, to show that at the time set for the taking of the deposition, the Captain was in the employ of the respondent as a managing agent.
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<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM RIVERWOOD
HOLDING, INC.'S CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS AND STATEMENTS OF
OPERATIONS FOR THE PERIOD ENDED MARCH 29, 1997 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY
BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
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<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-29-1997
<CASH>                                           9,354
<SECURITIES>                                       838
<RECEIVABLES>                                  151,262
<ALLOWANCES>                                       923
<INVENTORY>                                    202,890
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<PP&E>                                       1,781,439
<DEPRECIATION>                                 107,599
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               2,661,047
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          342,197
<BONDS>                                      1,600,721
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<CGS>                                          235,209
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<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                   197
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              38,901
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (40,498)
<INCOME-TAX>                                       901
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (41,399)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (37,844)
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#### Ralph Franklin FREDRICK, Petitioner—Appellant, v. Theodis BECK, Department of Corrections, Respondent—Appellee.

No. 07-7558.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: Jan. 17, 2008.

Decided: Jan. 28, 2008.

Ralph Franklin Fredrick, Appellant Pro Se.

Before TRAXLER, SHEDD, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

*541PER CURIAM:

Ralph Franklin Fredrick seeks to appeal the district court’s order dismissing his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000) petition as successive. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. *See*28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that any assessment of the constitutional claims by the district court is debatable or wrong and that any dispositive procedural ruling by the district court is likewise debatable. *See Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003); *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *Rose v. Lee,*252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th Cir.2001). We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Fredrick has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny Fredrick’s motion for a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED.*
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM UNAUDITED 
INTERIM STATEMENTS FOR THE SIX MONTHS ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 1998 AND IS QUALIFIED 
IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH QUARTERLY REPORT ON FORM 10-QSB FOR THE
QUARTERLY PERIOD ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 1998.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          MAR-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             APR-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1998
<CASH>                                         195,702
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  234,757
<ALLOWANCES>                                       953
<INVENTORY>                                    121,008
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               560,173
<PP&E>                                         283,216
<DEPRECIATION>                                 194,330
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 662,076
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        2,191,087
<BONDS>                                        516,519
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          962,341
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        63,694
<OTHER-SE>                                 (3,074,565)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   662,076
<SALES>                                         73,895
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               255,441
<CGS>                                           70,313
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  337,405
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               657,021
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             147,876
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (921,737)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (921,737)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
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<CHANGES>                                            0
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<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.02)
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CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ALEXANDRIA

#### Stephen Adu Gyamfi v. Tinisha Monique Powell

March 2, 2001

Case No. (Chancery) CH001485

By judge Alfred D. Swersky

The Court cannot grant the relief sought, namely, the setting aside of a divorce decree entered by the Court on November 8,1999. The present action seeks to set aside that judgment based on claim of fraud in procuring the divorce decree. The fraud is alleged to be the perjury of Complainant in that cause (Defendant here) concerning the length of the separation of the parties. Defendant here has failed to respond and [the plaintiff) sought judgment based on a Bill *pro confesso.*

Since the Court has an interest separate and apart from the parties, tire matter was taken under advisement. This interest is, of course, the finality of judgments.

Rule 1:1 of the Rules of Court makes all decrees of the circuit court final after twenty-one days. The decree may only be set aside for certain statutory reasons including “fraud on the Court.” *See*Code of Va., § 8.01-428(A).

The type of fraud contemplated by the statute is referred to in the cases as “extrinsic,” meaning conduct outside of the judicial process which prevents a fair submission of the controversy to the Court. *Peet*v. *Peet,*16 Va. App. 323, 429 S.E.2d 487 (1993). This type of fraud is distinguished from “intrinsic” fraud which includes peijury as alleged here. Intrinsic fraud renders a judgment voidable not void and subject to attack only on direct appeal and not by collateral attack. *Campbell v. Campbell,*1999 Va. App. LEXIS 52, 99 Vap. UNP 0172-97-2 (1999); *see also, Taylor v. Taylor,*159 Va. 338, 165 S.E. 414 (1932). Rule 1:1, then, deprives this Court of jurisdiction to set aside, modify, or alter the November 8, 1999, decree.

*12In the underlying divorce action, Complainant here waived service of process and further notice of further proceedings and claims he was “coerced” into signing it. He further alleges that he did not remember reading the Complaint for divorce which he now alleges is perjured. He, therefore, had ample time prior to the divorce hearing to discover the alleged fraud but failed to do so.

Moreover, one year after the entry of the decree passed prior to his filing this action. This passage of time is particularly significant in divorce cases. *See Taylor,*159 Va. at 351-52.

For these reasons, Complainant’s motion for relief will be denied and this cause dismissed.
_______________________________________ __ _____________ _______________ _____________

___________________ _________________ Michigan Supreme Court 

# Order

Lansing, Michigan

Clifford W. Taylor, Chief Justice October 25, 2006
Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver 129733(89) Marilyn Kelly 130064 Maura D. Corrigan Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman, HARTMAN & EICHHORN BUILDING Justices COMPANY, INC., Plaintiff/Counter Defendant, SC: 129733 v COA: 249847 Oakland CC: 2001-032203-CK STEVEN DAILEY and JANINE DAILEY, Defendants/Counter Plaintiffs/ Third-Party Plaintiffs/Appellees, and

GEORGE H. PRESLEY, and ABN-AMRO, d/b/a STANDARD FEDERAL BANK, Defendants, and

JEFFRY R. HARTMAN, Third-Party Defendant-Appellant.

ARTHUR Y. LISS and BEVERLY LISS, Plaintiffs/Counter Defendants/ Appellees, SC: 130064 v COA: 266326 Oakland CC: 03-046587-CK LEWISTON-RICHARDS, INC., and JASON P. LEWISTON, Defendants/Counter Plaintiffs/ Appellants.

On order of the Chief Justice, th e motion by the Consumer Law Section
Council of the State Bar of Mich igan for leave to file a brief amicus curiae is considered
and it is GRANTED.

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

October 25, 2006

Clerk
Document headings vary by document type but may contain
                    the following: the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document
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                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly
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the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in
                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory
                      Actions See the
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                    for more details.
 Small Business Administration [Disaster Declaration #15253 and #15254; Louisiana Disaster Number LA-00078]
 AGENCY: U.S. Small Business Administration.
 ACTION: Notice.
 SUMMARY: This is a notice of an Administrative declaration of a disaster for the State of Louisiana dated August 22, 2017.
 DATES: Issued on 08/22/2017. *Physical Loan Application Deadline Date:*
                         10/23/2017. *Economic Injury (EIDL) Loan Application Deadline Date:*
                         05/22/2018.
 ADDRESSES: Submit completed loan applications to: U.S. Small Business Administration, Processing and Disbursement Center, 14925 Kingsport Road, Fort Worth, TX 76155.
 FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: A. Escobar, Office of Disaster Assistance, U.S. Small Business Administration, 409 3rd Street SW., Suite 6050, Washington, DC 20416, (202) 205-6734.


SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Notice is hereby given that as a result of the Administrator's disaster declaration, applications for disaster loans may be filed at the address listed above or other locally announced locations. *Incident:*
                     Torrential Rainfall and Flooding. *Incident Period:*
                     08/04/2017 through 08/06/2017.
                    ( print page 41302) The following areas have been determined to be adversely affected by the disaster: *Primary Counties:*
                     Orleans *Contiguous Counties:* Louisiana: Jefferson, Plaquemines, Saint Bernard, Saint Tammany. The Interest Rates are: Percent*For Physical Damage:*Homeowners With Credit Available Elsewhere
3.500Homeowners Without Credit Available Elsewhere
1.750Businesses With Credit Available Elsewhere
6.610Businesses Without Credit Available Elsewhere
3.305Non-Profit Organizations With Credit Available Elsewhere
2.500Non-Profit Organizations Without Credit Available Elsewhere
2.500*For Economic Injury:*Businesses & Small Agricultural Cooperatives Without Credit Available Elsewhere
3.305Non-Profit Organizations Without Credit Available Elsewhere
2.500
 The number assigned to this disaster for physical damage is 15253 B and for economic injury is 15254 0. The States which received an EIDL Declaration # are Louisiana. (Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance Number 59008) Dated: August 22, 2017. Linda E. McMahon, Administrator.


[FR Doc. 2017-18374 Filed 8-29-17; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 8025-01-P