COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Bray, Annunziata and Overton 

SHERRY MARIE SPANGLER 

v. Record No. 2545-96-3 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

 PER CURIAM 

HOLIDAY INN/SKYLINE SWANNANOA, INC. MARCH 4, 1997 

AND 

TRIGON ADMINISTRATORS, INC. 

 FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION 

 (Roger A. Ritchie; Roger Ritchie & Partners, 

P.L.C., on brief), for appellant. 

 (Patricia C. Karppi; McGuire, Woods, Battle & 

Boothe, L.L.P., on brief), for appellees. 

 Sherry Marie Spangler (claimant) contends that the Workers' 

Compensation Commission (commission) erred in finding that she 

failed to prove that her psychiatric condition was causally 

related to her compensable June 10, 1995 injury by accident. 

Upon reviewing the record and the briefs of the parties, we 

conclude that this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we 

summarily affirm the commission's decision. Rule 5A:27. 

 "General principles of workman's compensation law provide 

that '[i]n an application for review of any award on the ground 

of change in condition, the burden is on the party alleging such 

change to prove his allegations by a preponderance of the 

evidence.'" Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Bateman, 4 Va. App. 

459, 464, 359 S.E.2d 98, 101 (1987) (quoting Pilot Freight 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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Carriers, Inc. v. Reeves, 1 Va. App. 435, 438-39, 339 S.E.2d 570, 

572 (1986)). Unless we can say as a matter of law that 

claimant's evidence sustained her burden of proof, the 

commission's findings are binding and conclusive upon us. Tomko 

v. Michael's Plastering Co., 210 Va. 697, 699, 173 S.E.2d 833, 

835 (1970). 

 On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the party prevailing below. R.G. Moore Bldg. Corp. v. 

Mullins, 10 Va. App. 211, 212, 390 S.E.2d 788, 788 (1990). So 

viewed, we note that the commission made the following findings: 

 We . . . note that there is some evidence of 

emotional distress following the industrial 

injury which apparently was triggered by pain 

from that injury, as well as the resulting 

disability and perhaps the financial 

hardship. However, the claimant's emotional 

condition did not require treatment until her 

injuries were exacerbated by the assault at 

the hands of her boyfriend. Upon receiving 

medical treatment for those injuries, she 

told her treating physician, Dr. Trescot, 

that she was "losing it," indicating that her 

emotional condition had deteriorated. The 

contested treatment then followed. 

 We recognize that both Drs. Hoffman and 

Cianciolo, have reported and testified that 

the industrial injury was the primary cause 

of their treatment. However, their opinions 

were initially expressed without either 

having been informed of the altercation with 

the boyfriend. Then upon being fully 

informed of that event, both concluded that, 

while those injuries contributed to the 

claimant's psychiatric condition, the primary 

cause was the industrial injury. However, we 

do not find these conclusions persuasive, 

given the record in this case, as summarized 

above. In the final analysis, the claimant 

did not require psychiatric treatment until 

she was assaulted and injured by her 

boyfriend. 
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 The record fully supports these findings. Based upon Dr. 

Hoffman's and Dr. Cianciolo's lack of an accurate and complete 

history from claimant and upon the abundant evidence of 

claimant's non-work-related psychological stressors, the 

commission was entitled to reject the opinions of Drs. Hoffman 

and Cianciolo. "Medical evidence is not necessarily conclusive, 

but is subject to the commission's consideration and weighing." 

Hungerford Mechanical Corp. v. Hobson, 11 Va. App. 675, 677, 401 

S.E.2d 213, 214 (1991). 

 Based upon this record, we cannot say as a matter of law 

that the commission erred in finding the opinions of Drs. Hoffman 

and Cianciolo unpersuasive. Thus, claimant failed to meet her 

burden of proving a causal connection between her psychiatric 

condition and her compensable June 10, 1995 injury by accident. 

 For the reasons stated, we affirm the commission's decision. 

 Affirmed.