IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Respondent,

ZACHARY SCOTT LARSON,

a.k.a. ZACH LARSON,

Appellant.

DIVISION ONE

No. 71238-1-1

PUBLISHED OPINION

FILED: February 17, 2015

r-l

Dwyer, J. — Zachary Larson attempted to steal a pair of shoes from a

retail store. The shoes were equipped with a security device that was attached

to the shoes by wire. Yet, Larson, using wire cutters that he had brought into the

store, severed the wire and removed the security device. When Larson tried to

leave the store, he was stopped by security employees and, subsequently, was

charged with one count of retail theft with extenuating circumstances, which

criminalizes the commission of retail theft while in possession of a "device

designed to overcome security systems." Former RCW 9A.56.360(1 )(b) (2013).1

After a bench trial resulted in his conviction, he appealed, arguing that because

wire cutters do not constitute a device designed to overcome security systems,

the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Given our contrary

1 RCW 9A.56.360 was amended, effective January 1, 2014, so as to replace every

instance of the phrase "extenuating circumstances"with "specialcircumstances." Lawsof 2013,

ch. 153, § 1. The statutory language at issue in this matter was not altered by the amendment

and remains in effect.
No. 71238-1-1/2

conclusion that wire cutters do, in fact, constitute a device designed to overcome

security systems, we deny Larson's request for appellate relief and, instead,

affirm his conviction.

I

On May 17, 2013, Larson and his girlfriend, Meichielle Smith-Bearden,

entered a Marshalls store in Bellingham. Larson used wire cutters to sever the

wire that attached the security device to a pair of Nike shoes. By doing so, he

was able to remove the security device from the shoes. When the couple

attempted to leave the store without paying for the shoes, theywere detained by

security and the police were called. Larson admitted to a responding officer that

he had intended to take the shoes without paying for them.

On May 23, Larson was charged by amended information with one count

of retail theft with extenuating circumstances.

(1) Aperson commits retail theft with extenuating circumstances if

he or she commits theft of property from a mercantile establishment

with one of the following extenuating circumstances:

(b) The person was, at the time ofthe theft, in possession of

an item, article, implement, or device designed to overcome

security systems including, but not limited to, lined bags or tag

removers.

Former RCW 9A.56.360.

On November 8, Larson filed a Knapstad2 motion, seeking dismissal of the

charge. Therein, he argued that, as a matteroflaw, wire cutters do not

constitute a "device designed to overcome security systems." Thus, he asserted,

2 State v. Knapstad. 107 Wn.2d 346, 729 P.2d 48 (1986).

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No. 71238-1-1/3

the facts alleged were legally insufficient to support a finding of guilt as to the

charged crime.

On November 18, after a hearing, the trial court denied Larson's motion.

Larson then stipulated to the admissibility and accuracy of the police reports,

waived his right to a jury trial, and agreed that the trial court could decide his

innocence or guilt based upon the police reports and argument of counsel.

On December 18, the trial court found Larson guilty as charged. He was

sentenced to 60 days of confinement.

Larson appeals.

II

Larson's lone contention is that the State failed to adduce sufficient

evidence to support his conviction. He maintains, as he did in his Knapstad

motion, that wire cutters do not constitute a "device designed to overcome

security systems," as required by former RCW 9A.56.360(1)(b). We disagree.

The plain meaning ofthe statute reveals the legislature's intent to punish thieves

who, anticipating that the possession ofa device which may be able to foil a

store's security system will be expedientto their cause, commit retail theftwhile

in possession of such a device. In recognition ofthe fact that wire cutters are

designed to cutwire, which is a common feature ofsecurity systems, we hold

that, within the meaning of former RCW 9A.56.360(1 )(b), wire cutters constitute a

"device designed to overcome security systems."

It is the State's burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every

essential element of a charged crime. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.

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No. 71238-1-1/4

Ct. 1068, 25 L Ed. 2d 368 (1970); State v. Vasquez. 178 Wn.2d 1, 6, 309 P.3d

318 (2013). "In a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, this court reviews

the evidence in the light most favorable to the State." State v. Serano Salinas.

169 Wn. App. 210, 226, 279 P.3d 917 (2012), review denied. 176 Wn.2d 1002

(2013). A conviction will be reversed only in the event that no rational fact finder

could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable

doubt. State v. Engel. 166 Wn.2d 572, 576, 210 P.3d 1007 (2009).

The meaning of a statute is a question of law subject to de novo review.

State v. Ervin, 169 Wn.2d 815, 820, 239 P.3d 354 (2010). "The purpose of

statutory interpretation is 'to determine and give effect to the intent ofthe

legislature.'" State v. Evans, 177 Wn.2d 186, 192, 298 P.3d 724 (2013) (quoting

State v. Sweanv. 174 Wn.2d 909, 914, 281 P.3d 305 (2012)). Where a statute's

meaning is plain on its face, we mustgive effect to that plain meaning as an

expression oflegislative intent. Ervin, 169 Wn.2d at 820. "The plain meaning of

a statute may be discerned 'from all that the Legislature has said in the statute

and related statutes which disclose legislative intent about the provision in

question.'" State v. J.P., 149 Wn.2d 444, 450, 69 P.3d 318 (2003) (quoting Dep't

of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn. LLC. 146 Wn.2d 1,11, 43 P.3d 4 (2002)).

While we may, in seeking to perceive the plain meaning of a statute, examine

"'the ordinary meaning of the language at issue, the context ofthe statute in

which that provision isfound, related provisions, and the statutoryscheme as a

whole,'" we "'must not add words where the legislature has chosen not to include

them,'" and "must 'construe statutes such that all ofthe language is given effect.'"

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No. 71238-1-1/5

Lake v. Woodcreek Homeowners Ass'n. 169 Wn.2d 516, 526, 243 P.3d 1283

(2010) (quoting Engel. 166 Wn.2d at 578; Rest. Dev.. Inc. v. Cananwill, Inc.. 150

Wn.2d 674, 682, 80 P.3d 598 (2003)). "If, after this inquiry, the statute is

susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, it is ambiguous and we

'may resort to statutory construction, legislative history, and relevant case law for

assistance in discerning legislative intent.'" Ervin, 169 Wn.2d at 820 (quoting

Christensen v. Ellsworth, 162 Wn.2d 365, 373, 173 P.3d 228 (2007)).

A person commits retail theftwith extenuating circumstances if, at the time

of the theft, that person was in possession of a device designed to overcome

security systems.

(1) Aperson commits retail theft with extenuating circumstances if

he or she commits theft of property from a mercantile establishment

with one of the following extenuating circumstances:

(b) The person was, at the time of the theft, in possession of

an item, article, implement, or device designed to overcome

security systems including, but not limited to, lined bags or tag

removers.

Former RCW 9A.56.360(1)(b).

On appeal, Larson contends that the legislature, by using the phrase

"device designed to overcome security systems," signaled an intent to criminalize

the commission of retail theft while in possession of devices "conceived and

manufactured for the purpose ofoverriding security systems." Opening Br. of

Appellant at 5. Larson maintains thatwire cutters are not conceived and

manufactured for the purpose of overriding securitysystems and, thus, are not

designed to overcome security systems. According to Larson, wire cutters are
No. 71238-1-1/6

designed to cut wire: an act that is not confined to the overcoming of security

systems.

We agree that wire cutters are designed to cut wire, just as we perceive

that tag removers (one of the two illustrative example set forth in the statute) are

designed to remove tags—both are designed to perform the physical act

suggested by their descriptors. However, in considering this issue, we are

careful to distinguish between an act and its outcome. While the question of

whether a device is designed to perform a physical act is relevant to our inquiry,

it is not itself the decisive issue. The decisive issue is whether the act which the

device was designed to perform is meant to effect an outcome—namely, a

security system being overcome.

In order to determine whether a device is designed as such, it is

necessary to consider not only the device itself, but also the object upon which

the device, often in the hands of an individual, acts.3 More to the point, it must

be determined whether the object meant to be neutralized, disabled, or otherwise

thwarted by the device is actually used in security systems. For instance, in

order to determine whether the use of a tag remover is designed to overcome a

security system, it is necessary to consider whether tags are used in security

systems.

3Our analysis does not depend upon the actual use ofa device (or lack thereof) in each

case. Rather, ourconsideration of usage on an abstractlevel is premised on the notion thatthe

relationship between the device and the object upon which it actswill often suggest a design ofor

purpose for that device. Thus, while it is true that, in this case, Larson used wire cutters to cut the

wire and thereby overcome the store's security system, our conclusion would bethe same if it

had beenfound only that he wasin possession ofwire cutters while committing retail theft.

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No. 71238-1-1/7

The facts of this case, as well as experience, confirms that wire is used in

security systems. Thus, the unremarkable observation that wire cutters are

designed to cut wire, when considered together with the fact that wire is used in

security systems, indicates that wire cutters are indeed designed to overcome

security systems. While, in addition to overcoming security systems, wire cutters

may be designed to achieve other results, the statutory provision at issue here

does not restrict the devices within its ambit to those whose sole purpose is to

overcome security systems.

We are aware that the foregoing analysis is at odds with a recent Division

Two decision. See State v. Reeves, Wn. App. _, 336 P.3d 105 (2014)

(holding that "ordinary pliers" do not constitute a device designed to overcome

security systems). We are not persuaded bythat decision's reasoning.

The Reeves court distinguished between "ordinary tools" and "tools

specifically made to facilitate theft." In the former category, the court placed

"ordinary pliers" and other tools "which have many purposes independent ofretail

theft." Reeves, 336 P.3d at 108-09. In the latter category, the court placed "lined

bags and tag removers" and other "devices that have a primary purpose of

facilitating retail theft." Reeves, 336 P.3d at 108.

We do not agree that the devices with which the legislature was

concerned were those whose primary purpose is to facilitate retail theft. While

we do not have reason to doubt that the legislature acted in response to the evils

presented by retail theft, the language that was used in the statute targeted

possession ofdevices "designed to overcome security systems"—not "devices

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No. 71238-1-1/8

that have a primary purpose of facilitating retail theft." By straying from the

statutory text, the Reeves court formulated a test that actually excludes one of

the examples—tag removers—set forth in the statute by the legislature to

illustrate the types of devices it intended to cover. Indeed, as Larson's counsel

acknowledged at oral argument, the primary purpose of tag removers is not to be

used by thieves to facilitate retail theft but, rather, to be used by retailers to

disable security systems following an exchange of currency for goods.

Furthermore, as observed, the legislature did not limit the statute's reach

to those devices designed "only" or even "primarily" for the purpose of

overcoming security systems. In the absence of restrictive language to that

effect, we do not presume that the legislature intended to exclude certain devices

that are designed not only to overcome security systems, but to accomplish other

objectives as well. Therefore, even assuming that wire cutters are designed to

achieve more than one result, we decline to hold that they are, by virtue of their

diverse utility, removed from the statute's coverage.

The provision at issue suggests that the legislature intended to target

thieves who foresee the need for a device which may be able to overcome

security systems. By providing illustrative rather than enumerative examples, the

legislature signaled its intent to reach devices beyond those set forth in the

statute. To exclude wire cutters from the statute's reach on the basis that wire

cutters may be used in other settings to achieve different ends would frustrate

the legislature's intent, while providing those inclined to commit retail theft with an

unmistakable incentive to employ "ordinary devices," as characterized by the

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No. 71238-1-1/9

Reeves court, to pursue their nefarious ends. Surely, the legislature did not

intend such a result. We hold, therefore, that the legislature intended to include

wire cutters within those devices "designed to overcome security systems."

Accordingly, sufficient evidence was presented at trial to support the trial court's

judgment of guilt.

Affirmed. a

vj* i> ^--c*—"T^i y -

We concur: J

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No. 71238-1-1, State v. Zacharv Scott Larson

Trickey, J. (dissenting) — I respectfully dissent. The phrase "device

designed to overcome security systems including, but not limited to, lined bags or

tag removers" is ambiguous. Former RCW 9A.56.360(1 )(b) (2013). The phrase

is susceptible of differing reasonable interpretations, one of which isthat the device

must be "specifically constructed to overcome a security system." State v. Reeves,

Wn. App. , 336 P.3d 105, 108 (2014). Since the statute here creates a

criminal offense, we must apply the rule of lenity and "strictly construe" the statute

in favor of the accused. Reeves, 336 P.3d at 109. Wire cutters are built to perform

many tasks other than retail theft. The trial court should have granted the motion

to dismiss.

IrVcKe^ , 3~^

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