NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO D.L. and A.L.

No. 1 CA-JV 23-0221

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JD15644

The Honorable Gregory Como, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

John L. Popilek, P.C., Scottsdale

By John L. Popilek

Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson

By Jennifer Blum

Counsel for Appellee

FILED 07-30-2024
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO D.L. AND A.L.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Paul J. McMurdie delivered the Court’s decision, in which 

Judge Maria Elena Cruz and Judge Cynthia J. Bailey joined.

M c M U R D I E, Judge:

¶1 Tatiana G. (“Mother”) appeals from an order terminating her 

parental rights to two of her children. She argues that a termination based 

on physical abuse must show a specific risk to the children involved. We

find no error and affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 This appeal concerns Mother’s parental rights about two of

her children: Delaney,1 born in 2007, and Austin, born in 2009. Mother’s 

daughter, Tara, born in 2006, is also relevant here.

¶3 Mother’s history with the Department of Child Safety 

(“Department”) began in 2007 when a concerned relative filed a 

dependency petition alleging nine-month-old Tara was dependent because 

of neglect. Following reunification services, the juvenile court dismissed the 

dependency in 2009 and returned Tara to Mother’s care. In 2016, Mother 

pushed Tara down, chipping her tooth, which the Department 

substantiated after its investigation. Around that time, Mother left Tara, 

Delaney, and Austin in their grandparents’ care “so she could work on 

herself.” Delaney and Austin have remained with their grandparents ever 

since.

¶4 In 2021, fifteen-year-old Tara moved back with Mother. Less 

than a year later, Mother and Tara got into an argument that turned 

physical. Mother assaulted Tara, inflicting bruising on her face, cut and 

swollen lips, bite marks and bruises on her arms, and road rash on her arm 

and lower body. Mother took Tara to her grandparents’ house, who 

contacted the police, and Tara went to the hospital. The Department then 

filed a dependency petition as to Tara, Delaney, and Austin, alleging that 

all three children were at risk of abuse.

1 We use pseudonyms to protect the children’s identities.
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO D.L. AND A.L.

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¶5 Mother was already receiving Department services, including 

psychological evaluation, for a dependency involving another child. In her

evaluation, Mother disclosed that she was diagnosed with bipolar disorder 

but did not take medication, nor was she engaged in mental health services.

The evaluation noted that Mother “ha[d] a significant history of untreated 

mental health” and that “there [was] cause for concern regarding 

[Mother’s] history of alcohol use[,] which appear[ed] to serve as a 

self-medicating function.” The evaluation concluded there was sufficient 

evidence to support a diagnosis of alcohol use disorder and offered a 

provisional diagnosis of bipolar disorder. Still, the evaluation 

recommended “ongoing inquiry and observational assessment.” As to 

whether Mother might discharge parental responsibilities in the near 

future, the evaluation concluded: 

My prognostic impression at this point is poor due to 

[Mother’s] current degree of psychological distress caused by 

her untreated mental health, her lack of insight related to her 

mental health, her substance use, unknown sobriety status, 

refusal to engage in services, her ability to consistently 

provide for and meet the needs of her children, and the 

relationship difficulties/lack of between she and her children.

¶6 The Department referred Mother for other services, including 

substance abuse testing and treatment, psychiatric evaluation, individual 

counseling, the Family Connections program, and supervised visitation.

From April 2022 through the end of the year, Mother engaged in her 

substance use testing and tested negative for drugs and alcohol. Mother 

also completed the recommended substance abuse treatment program and 

psychiatric evaluations by September 2022. Mother self-referred for 

individual counseling, and her therapist reported that she had engaged in 

sessions from July 2022 through the end of the year. Mother secured stable 

housing and employment.

¶7 Still, in February 2023, the Department moved to have 

grandparents appointed as Delaney and Austin’s permanent guardians. 

The same day, the children moved to terminate Mother’s parental rights on 

the physical abuse, mental illness, and nine-month time-in-care grounds. 

The Department requested to withdraw the guardianship motion, and the 

juvenile court granted the request, noting that the children “do not want 

guardianship and wish to be adopted.” The juvenile court substituted the 

Department as the petitioner in the termination motion.
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO D.L. AND A.L.

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¶8 The Department referred Mother for the Nurturing Parenting 

Skills Program in March 2023, but Mother disengaged from the service, and 

it closed for lack of contact. Between February and July 2023, Mother’s 

participation in substance-abuse testing was less consistent, and she tested 

positive for alcohol in April and June 2023. Still, the Department admitted

that Mother had significantly improved regarding substance abuse.

¶9 The juvenile court held a contested severance hearing in 

October 2023. Following the hearing, the court terminated Mother’s 

parental rights to Delaney and Austin on physical abuse, mental illness, and 

nine months’ time-in-care grounds. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(2), (3), (8)(a). The 

court considered that Mother had physically abused Tara in April 2022 and 

September 2016. It explained that although there were no reports of Mother 

abusing Delaney or Austin, they had not lived with her for many years, so 

it was “not surprising that they have not been physically abused by 

Mother.” It also noted that Mother had “not addressed her mental illness in 

a meaningful way,” which meant it was likely that “the underlying cause 

of her violent temper [would] remain present.” Finally, the court found that 

the termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best 

interests because Mother was unlikely to address the issues causing the 

out-of-home placement, and termination would allow the children to be 

adopted by their grandparents.

¶10 Mother appealed. This court has jurisdiction under A.R.S. 

§§ 8-235(A), 12-120.21(A)(1), and 12-2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶11 Mother challenges the order terminating her parental rights.

We will affirm a termination order unless the juvenile court abused its 

discretion or its factual findings were clearly erroneous. Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. 

Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 207 Ariz. 43, 47, ¶ 8 (App. 2004). “The juvenile court, as 

the trier of fact in a termination proceeding, is in the best position to weigh 

the evidence, observe the parties, judge the credibility of witnesses, and 

make appropriate findings.” Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 

278, 280, ¶ 4 (App. 2002). We accept the juvenile court’s factual findings 

unless no reasonable evidence supports them. Id. We do not reweigh the 

evidence. Mary Lou C., 207 Ariz. at 47, ¶ 8.

A. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Terminating 

Mother’s Parental Rights.

¶12 The juvenile court may terminate parental rights if there is 

evidence “[t]hat the parent has neglected or wilfully abused a child,”
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO D.L. AND A.L.

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causing “serious physical or emotional injury.” A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(2). “[I]f a 

parent neglects or abuses a child, the court may terminate that parent’s 

rights to their other children on this basis, even if there is no evidence that 

the other children were harmed.” See Sandra R. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 248 

Ariz. 224, 227, ¶ 13 (2020) (citing Linda V. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ Sec., 211 Ariz. 

76, 79, ¶ 14 (App. 2005)). But finding parental unfitness requires “a 

demonstrable connection between the ground for termination and the harm 

or risk of harm to a child.” Id. at 229, ¶ 24. So, the “court may terminate a 

parent’s rights to non-abused children under [A.R.S.] § 8-533(B)(2) only if 

the extrapolation of unfitness—the risk of harm to such children—is proven 

by clear and convincing evidence.” Id.

¶13 Mother argues that it was inappropriate to sever her rights as 

to Delaney and Austin on physical abuse grounds when the Department 

only presented evidence of physical confrontation between her and Tara.

She contends that the Department had to prove Delaney and Austin “were 

specifically at risk from Mother” before terminating her parental rights. See 

Sandra R., 248 Ariz. at 229, ¶ 24.

¶14 But Mother overstates Sandra R. Although “a juvenile court is 

encouraged to make express findings concerning the risk of harm to 

non-abused children,” all Sandra R. requires is that “the risk of harm to 

non-abused children is proven by clear and convincing evidence.” See 

Sandra R., 248 Ariz. at 230, ¶ 27. And “the record may implicitly support a 

juvenile court’s termination order” on the physical abuse ground when 

abuse “readily demonstrates a comparable risk” to a parent’s other, 

similarly aged children. See id. Another factor courts may consider when 

assessing the abuse risk is whether the parent accepts or denies 

responsibility for past instances of abuse. See Shella H. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 

239 Ariz. 47, 51, ¶ 16 (App. 2016).

¶15 Tara is just one year older than Delaney and less than three 

years older than Austin. Mother has been involved in at least two episodes 

of physical violence with Tara for over six years. And the court found that

Mother deflected responsibility for her actions, “minimiz[ing] the [2022] 

altercation by describing it as a ‘scuffle.’” On these facts, the juvenile court 

did not abuse its discretion by finding severance was appropriate under 

A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(2).

¶16 The juvenile court also terminated Mother’s parental rights on 

the mental illness and nine months’ time-in-care grounds. See A.R.S. 

§ 8-533(B)(3), (8)(a). Mother purports to challenge these grounds by her

citation to Sandra R. See 248 Ariz. 224. We need not address her arguments 
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO D.L. AND A.L.

Decision of the Court

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because the juvenile court did not err by terminating on the physical abuse 

ground.

B. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Not 

Establishing a Guardianship.

¶17 Mother argues that the juvenile court “abused its discretion 

in failing to establish a guardianship for [Delaney] and [Austin]” rather 

than terminating her parental rights, claiming that each of the guardianship 

elements had been satisfied. See A.R.S. § 8-871(A). She asserts that the 

Department’s withdrawn motion to establish the grandparents as 

permanent guardians “establishes each of these factors.” And Mother 

claims she “requested a guardianship in lieu of severance” at the 

termination hearing.

¶18 Although Mother testified that she thought guardianship 

might be an “appropriate case plan” and that the children’s needs “can be 

met through a guardianship,” she did not petition for guardianship. See 

A.R.S. § 8-872 (procedure to move for permanent guardianship); see also 

Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 344 (procedure for permanent guardianship 

proceedings). Nor did she appeal the order affirming the dependency and 

setting the case plan to severance and adoption. See Lindsey M. v. Ariz. Dep’t 

of Econ. Sec., 212 Ariz. 43, 45, ¶ 7 (App. 2006) (citation omitted) (“[O]rders 

reaffirming findings that children are dependent” are appealable.). The 

only motion about guardianship had been withdrawn months before the 

severance trial and was no longer at issue. Thus, the court did not err by 

failing to establish a permanent guardianship when no such petition 

existed. See Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. v. Stanford, 234 Ariz. 477, 479-80, ¶¶ 9-13

(App. 2014) (The juvenile court may not sua sponte move for permanent 

guardianship.).

CONCLUSION

¶19 We affirm.