UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-4241

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

TRUMAN LEVI LEWIS,

Defendant - Appellant.

No. 14-4242

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

NORMAN DEVI LEWIS,

Defendant - Appellant.

No. 14-4648

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.
2

TRUMAN LEVI LEWIS,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the District 

of South Carolina, at Charleston. Richard M. Gergel, District 

Judge. (2:12-cr-00507-RMG-1; 2:12-cr-00507-RMG-3)

Submitted: April 30, 2015 Decided: May 12, 2015

Before WILKINSON, KING, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Jessica Salvini, SALVINI & BENNETT, LLC, Greenville, South 

Carolina; Louis H. Lang, CALLISON, TIGHE & ROBINSON, LLC, 

Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellants. William N. Nettles, 

United States Attorney, James Hunter May, Winston Holliday, 

Assistant United States Attorneys, Columbia, South Carolina, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
3

PER CURIAM:

Truman Levi Lewis (“Truman”) and Norman Devi Lewis 

(“Norman”) appeal their convictions for conspiracy to commit 

health-care fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1347, 1349 

(2012), four counts of wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§§ 1343, 1349, 2 (2012), and conspiracy to commit money 

laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(h), 1957(a), 2,

(2012), based on their company’s overbilling of Medicaid. 

Truman also appeals his 120-month sentence. Truman argues that

the district court erred by excluding a certain audio recording, 

by finding the evidence sufficient to support his convictions,

by denying his motions for a new trial based on these issues,

and by enhancing his sentence for obstruction of justice based 

on his trial testimony.*

 Norman argues that the district court 

 ∗ Counsel also purports to raise the following issues 

pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967): 

(1) whether the district court reversibly erred by denying 

Truman’s motion to sever; (2) whether the district court erred 

by denying Truman’s Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 motions because no 

witness made an in-court identification of him; (3) whether the 

district court erred by denying Truman’s motions for a new trial 

based on the denial of the motion to sever, the denial of a 

motion to suppress, a lack of adequate time to review the jury 

panel, and ineffective assistance of counsel; (4) whether the 

district court reversibly erred by overruling Truman’s 

objections to the facts presented at sentencing, the loss 

amount, and the leadership-role enhancement, and by ordering 

restitution in the amount it did; (5) whether trial counsel was 

ineffective; and (6) whether the district court reversibly erred 

by denying Truman’s motion to stay forfeiture pending appeal.

(Continued)
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erred by failing to order a second competency evaluation and by 

refusing to allow him to represent himself. We affirm.

I.

Truman first argues that the district court erred by 

refusing to admit an audio recording of a meeting at which he 

reached an administrative settlement with certain officials. 

“We review a trial court’s rulings on the admissibility of 

evidence for abuse of discretion, and we will only overturn an 

evidentiary ruling that is arbitrary and irrational.” United 

States v. Cole, 631 F.3d 146, 153 (4th Cir. 2011) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). To the extent Truman challenges the 

district court’s ruling that the recording would not be admitted 

in its entirety, we conclude that the district court did not 

abuse its discretion because the recording contained numerous 

 

Anders applies only when “counsel finds his case to be 

wholly frivolous, after a conscientious examination of it.” 386 

U.S. at 744 (emphasis added). Because Truman’s attorney is able 

to raise nonfrivolous issues on appeal, Anders does not permit 

her to brief frivolous issues simply because her client so 

requests. Cf. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 750-51 (1983) 

(holding that Anders does not mean that “appellate counsel must 

raise every nonfrivolous issue requested by the client”). While 

a defendant “has the ultimate authority to make certain 

fundamental decisions regarding the case, as to whether to plead 

guilty, waive a jury, testify in his or her own behalf, or take 

an appeal,” the decision regarding which issues to raise on 

appeal lies solely with the professional judgment of counsel. 

Id. at 751. Nevertheless, in an abundance of caution, we have 

reviewed each of the issues purportedly submitted pursuant to 

Anders and conclude that they are without merit.
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inadmissible hearsay statements by Truman. Moreover, the 

district court allowed Truman to request permission to present 

specific facts and statements from the recording. The only such 

fact that Truman cites on appeal as having been improperly 

excluded is the fact of the administrative settlement. We 

conclude that the district court did not act arbitrarily or 

irrationally in excluding evidence of this settlement, 

especially in light of the court’s decision to allow Truman to 

testify regarding the general nature of the meeting. 

Accordingly, Truman is entitled to no relief on his evidentiary 

claim.

Next, Truman argues that the district court erred by 

denying his Rule 29 motions because there was insufficient 

evidence that he possessed the requisite criminal intent for his 

offenses. We review de novo the district court’s denial of a 

Rule 29 motion. United States v. Reed, 780 F.3d 260, 269 (4th 

Cir. 2015). Where, as here, the motion was based on a claim of 

insufficient evidence, we will sustain the jury’s verdict “if 

there is substantial evidence, taking the view most favorable to 

the Government, to support it.” Glasser v. United States, 315 

U.S. 60, 80 (1942); see Reed, 780 F.3d at 269-70 (defining 

substantial evidence). 

The only element of the charged offenses that Truman 

contests on appeal is the intent requirement. See United States 
6

v. Simpson, 741 F.3d 539, 547, 550 (5th Cir.) (discussing 

elements of conspiracy to commit health-care fraud), cert. 

denied, 134 S. Ct. 2318 (2014); United States v. McLean, 715 

F.3d 129, 137-38 (4th Cir. 2013) (stating elements of 

substantive offense of health-care fraud); United States v. 

Wynn, 684 F.3d 473, 477-78 (4th Cir. 2012) (setting forth 

elements of wire fraud); United States v. Green, 599 F.3d 360, 

371 (4th Cir. 2010) (providing elements of conspiracy to commit 

money laundering). Having reviewed the record, we conclude that 

the ample testimony that Truman instructed his employees to 

provide Medicaid with information he knew was false was 

sufficient for the jury to infer that he intended to deceive 

Medicaid and knew that these actions were criminal. See United 

States v. Wilson, 115 F.3d 1185, 1189-90 (4th Cir. 1997)

(discussing resolution of conflicting evidence). Accordingly, 

the district court did not err in denying Truman’s Rule 29 

motions.

Truman also argues that the district court erred by denying 

his motions for a new trial based on the exclusion of the 

aforementioned audio recording and the sufficiency of the 

evidence. Because the district court did not abuse its 

discretion in excluding the recording and the evidence was 

sufficient to convict Truman of the charged offenses, the 

district court did not err in denying Truman’s motions for a new 
7

trial on these bases. See United States v. Bartko, 728 F.3d 

327, 334 (4th Cir. 2013) (stating that appellate court reviews

denial of motion for new trial for abuse of discretion), cert. 

denied, 134 S. Ct. 1043 (2014). 

Finally, Truman argues that the district court erred by 

applying an obstruction-of-justice enhancement under U.S. 

Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3C1.1 (2012), based on his 

testimony at trial. We review the imposition of this 

enhancement for clear error. United States v. Hughes, 401 F.3d 

540, 560 (4th Cir. 2005). This enhancement is appropriate if 

the defendant gave “false testimony concerning a material matter 

with the willful intent to provide false testimony.” United 

States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 94 (1993); United States v. 

Perez, 661 F.3d 189, 192-93 (4th Cir. 2011) (discussing “degree 

of specificity Dunnigan requires”).

The district court found that Truman testified falsely that 

he was unaware that his employees signed notes falsely stating

that they worked on weekends. On appeal, Truman argues that his 

testimony was not false because he admitted on cross-examination 

that he was in charge of the company’s billing. However, this

general admission does not remedy his prior testimony that he 

was unaware of the deceptive notes. Truman does not challenge 

on appeal the district court’s findings that this testimony was 

false, material, and made with the intent to provide false 
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testimony. Accordingly, we discern no clear error in the 

application of the obstruction-of-justice enhancement.

II.

Norman first challenges the district court’s refusal to

order a second competency evaluation based on his behavior 

during jury selection. In determining whether there is 

reasonable cause to order a competency hearing, a trial court 

must consider “evidence of irrational behavior, the defendant’s 

demeanor at trial, and medical opinions concerning the 

defendant’s competence.” United States v. Bernard, 708 F.3d 

583, 592-93 (4th Cir.) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. 

denied, 134 S. Ct. 617 (2013). The fact that an individual 

possesses questionable beliefs about the law or makes frivolous 

or nonsensical legal arguments does not mean that he lacks 

competence to stand trial. United States v. Banks, 482 F.3d 

733, 743 (4th Cir. 2007).

Norman’s psychological report indicated that, although he 

had personality disorders and below-average intelligence, he was 

competent to stand trial. See United States v. Mason, 52 F.3d 

1286, 1290 (4th Cir. 1995) (“Medical opinions are usually 

persuasive evidence on the question of whether a sufficient 

doubt exists as to the defendant’s competence.” (internal 

quotation marks omitted)). After observing Norman’s behavior, 

the district court concluded that he was not delusional but was 
9

deliberately behaving obstructively. Because this finding was 

consistent with Norman Lewis’s behavior and psychological 

report, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its 

discretion in declining to conduct a second competency 

evaluation. See Bernard, 708 F.3d at 589-90 (stating standard 

of review).

Norman also argues that the district court erred by finding 

him incompetent to represent himself. The Sixth Amendment 

guarantees not only the right to be represented by counsel but 

also the right to self-representation. Faretta v. California, 

422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975). Where, as here, the district court 

finds the defendant competent to stand trial, the court may 

nevertheless find him incompetent to represent himself at trial 

if a mental illness renders him “unable to carry out the basic 

tasks needed to present his own defense without the help of 

counsel.” Bernard, 708 F.3d at 589-90; accord Indiana v. 

Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 175-76 (2008). 

The district court found that, although Norman was 

competent to stand trial, his disordered thinking prevented him 

from personally managing the large amount of documentary 

evidence in this case. This finding was adequately supported by 

Norman’s refusal to review the documents presented by the 

Government or even acknowledge that they formed the evidence in 

this case, by the psychological report indicating that he had a 
10

low intelligence, and by his demeanor as observed by the

district court. Thus, the district court did not abuse its 

discretion in terminating Norman’s self-representation under 

Edwards. United States v. Barefoot, 754 F.3d 226, 233 (4th 

Cir.) (stating standard of review), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 502 

(2014).

III.

Because the claims raised on appeal do not warrant relief, 

we affirm the judgments of the district court. We dispense with 

oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before this court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED