J-A14036-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JUSTIN JOSEPH RICHARDS

Appellant

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 1606 WDA 2019

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 13, 2019

in the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-63-CR-0002037-2017

BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 10, 2020

Justin Joseph Richards (“Richards”) appeals from the judgment of

sentence1imposed following his convictions of strangulation and simple

assault.2 We affirm.

On July 4, 2017, at approximately 3:00 a.m., Richards called E.C. and

asked her to come over to his house. E.C. arrived at Richards’s house at about

4:00 a.m. Richards and E.C. went to Richards’s bedroom, which was located

in the basement, watched Netflix and engaged in consensual sex.

After some time, E.C. began to feel pain during intercourse and asked

Richards to stop. Richards stopped, but after a few minutes, attempted to re-

____________________________________________

1 We note that Richards’s sentence was executed on May 9, 2019, but not

entered on the docket until May 13, 2019. The caption has been corrected to

reflect the date the order was docketed.

2 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2718(a)(1), 2701(a)(1).
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initiate intercourse, at which time E.C. rebuffed his attempts. Richards

became irate and pinned E.C. down, onto the bed. Richards attempted to

insert his penis into E.C.’s vagina; however, his attempts were unsuccessful

due to their respective positioning. E.C. again asked Richards to stop, but

instead, he inserted his penis into her anus.

E.C. began to scream, but Richards covered her mouth with his hand

and muffled her screams. E.C. responded by biting Richards’s finger, which

caused Richards to withdraw his hand from E.C.’s mouth. In response,

Richards punched E.C. in the back of the head several times. E.C. continued

screaming until Richards grabbed E.C.’s necklace in the back and pulled it,

muffling her screams again. At some point, Richards also had his hand around

her throat. E.C. testified that she was unable to breathe, or cry out, and may

have lost consciousness.

E.C. next remembered waking up and gathering her things to leave. At

approximately 5:30 a.m., E.C. drove home and showered. On the same day,

between the hours of 8:00 and 9:00 a.m., E.C. drove to the McDonald Police

Department where she detailed the events to Police Chief Dennis Ahlborn

(“Chief Ahlborn”). After her interview, E.C. went directly to Washington

Hospital, where hospital staff performed a rape kit.

Dr. Shawna Gelormino (“Dr. Gelormino”), an emergency room physician

at Washington Hospital, examined E.C.’s physical injuries. Dr. Gelormino

observed that E.C. had suffered bilateral subconjunctival hemorrhages, which
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are broken blood vessels in the white parts of the eye and show the

appearance of blood surrounding the iris and pupil. Dr. Gelormino noted that

this type of injury can occur from strangulation. Additionally, Dr. Gelormino

diagnosed E.C. as having a petechial hemorrhage, which was described as the

“next step” in the progression from a subconjunctival hemorrhage. The

petechial hemorrhage appeared as multiple little red dots that looked like

blood in the white parts of the eye. Dr. Gelormino explained that a petechial

hemorrhage can be caused by a more prolonged and severe strangulation. Further, Dr. Gelormino observed linear marks of erythema and signs of

ecchymosis around E.C.’s neck. Dr. Gelormino explained that these types of

bruises would require significant force, and are consistent with E.C.’s

description of the strangulation.

Linda Yelenik (“Yelenik”), a Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner, performed

physical and sexual assault examinations of E.C. These consisted of

transcribing E.C.’s version of events, taking photographs, and observing and

documenting any injuries. Yelenik observed the same injuries as Dr.

Gelormino. Additionally, Yelenik collected buccal, vaginal, and rectal swabs.

The swabs collected by Yelenik were sent to the Pennsylvania State

Police Regional Laboratory, where they were tested. Jillian Scola (“Scola”), a

forensic scientist from the Pennsylvania State Police, conducted DNA analyses

on the vaginal and rectal swabs. Scola compared the swabs to the DNA

samples provided by E.C. and Richards. On the vaginal swab, Scola identified
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a mixture of two different individuals, which indicated that E.C. and Richards

could not be excluded as contributors. On the rectal swab, Scola was again

able to identify DNA from two individuals, but the swab was insufficient to

determine if the DNA from the second individual matched Richards.

On October 10, 2017, the Commonwealth charged Richards with the

above-mentioned offenses, as well as with rape, involuntary deviant sexual

intercourse, and sexual assault.3 After several continuances, Richards

proceeded to a jury trial on February 14, 2019.

Following the jury trial, Richards was found guilty of strangulation and

simple assault, and not guilty of the remaining offenses. The trial court

deferred sentencing in order for a pre-sentence investigation report (“PSI”) to

be prepared.

On May 9, 2019,4 Richards was sentenced to 20 to 48 months in prison

for the strangulation conviction. For the simple assault conviction, Richards

was sentenced to 4 to 24 months in prison. The trial court directed Richards’s

sentences to run consecutively, resulting in an aggregate term of 24 to 72

months in prison, plus fines and costs. Additionally, Richards was ordered to

pay $1,448.00 into the Victim Compensation Assistance Program.

____________________________________________

3 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3121(a)(1), 3123(a)(1), 3124.1.

4 The sentencing Order was not docketed until May 13, 2019.
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On May 16, 2019,5 Richards filed a Post-Sentence Motion. On June 27,

2019, Richards filed an Amended Post-Sentence Motion challenging the

sufficiency and the weight of the evidence supporting his convictions. Further, Richards asserted that his sentence was unduly harsh and requested a

hearing. The hearing was held on August 12, 2019.6 On October 22, 2019,

the trial court denied Richards’s post-sentence Motions. The trial court issued

an Amended Sentencing Order on October 24, 2019, which corrected a clerical

error in the original document.

Richards filed a timely Notice of Appeal and a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P.

1925(b) Concise Statement of errors complained of on appeal.7 The trial court

____________________________________________

5

In its Opinion, the trial court indicates that Richards timely filed an initial

Post-Sentence Motion on May 16, 2019. See Trial Court Opinion, 12/11/19,

at 5. We note that this Motion does not appear in the record, nor on the

docket. However, the trial court’s Order scheduling a hearing based upon the

Motion is both in the record and on the docket. Indeed, as noted infra, it

appears that despite this defect, the trial court was able to aptly address

Richards’s Post-Sentence Motion claims, despite the absence of these filings.

Therefore, we decline to find Richards’s claims waived.

6 The transcript of this proceeding is not included in the record.

7

In its Opinion, the trial court indicates that Richards timely filed his Concise

Statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).

See Trial Court Opinion, 12/11/19, at 17. The docket also reflects its timely

filing. However, the Concise Statement was not made part of the record on

appeal, and Richards has not attached a copy of it to his appellate brief. See

Pa.R.A.P. 2111(d) (requiring the appellant to attach a copy of his Pa.R.A.P.

1925(b) concise statement as an appendix to the appellate brief). Despite

this defect, we decline to find Richards’s issues waived on this ground because

the trial court was able to review the Concise Statement and ably address

each claim.
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filed a responsive Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion.

Richards now presents the following issues for our review:

1. Was there sufficient evidence to convict [Richards] of

[s]trangulation and [s]imple [a]ssault, where the Commonwealth

presented no credible evidence corroborating [E.C.]’s version of

events?

2. Was the verdict of guilty against the weight of the evidence as

to the charge [sic] of [s]trangulation and [s]imple [a]ssault,

where the jury found that [E.C.] was a family/household member

but also found that the strangulation was not a result of sexual

violence?

3. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt abuse its discretion when it sentenced

[Richards] in the aggravated range for both the charge [sic] of

[s]trangulation and [s]imple [a]ssault and ran the sentences at

both counts consecutively?

Brief for Appellant at 10.

In his first claim, Richards argues that the Commonwealth failed to

present sufficient evidence to sustain the convictions of strangulation and

simple assault. Id. at 25. Initially, Richards asserts that the Commonwealth

failed to present evidence corroborating E.C.’s claims that she was strangled

by Richards and that Richards punched E.C. in the head. Id. Regarding the

strangulation conviction, Richards acknowledges E.C.’s testimony that she was

strangled by Richards. Id. at 26. However, Richards contends that the

injuries on E.C.’s neck “could have” been caused by “anything [that] affect[s]

blood flow[,] ... which can include severe coughing.” Id. Further, Richards

asserts that the Commonwealth failed to prove that E.C.’s injuries were caused

by strangulation. Id.
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Regarding the simple assault conviction, Richards acknowledges E.C.’s

testimony that she was punched in the head several times by Richards. Id.

However, Richards contends that the Commonwealth failed to provide

evidence that E.C. received treatment for the punches to the back of her head.

Id. Further, Richards contends that a conviction of summary harassment,

rather than simple assault, would have been more appropriate. Id.

When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we

determine

whether[,] viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light

most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence

to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond

a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh

the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In

addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by

the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of

innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be

resolved by the fact-finder[,] unless the evidence is so weak and

inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be

drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth

may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime

beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial

evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record

must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be

considered. Finally, the finder of fact[,] while passing upon the

credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced,

is free to believe all, or part or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Melvin, 103 A.3d 1, 39-40 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation

omitted).

The Crimes Code provides that “[a] person commits the offense of

strangulation if the person knowingly or intentionally impedes the breathing

or circulation of the blood of another by: (1) applying pressure to the throat
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or neck; or (2) blocking the nose and mouth of the person.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. §

2718(a). Additionally, “[i]nfliction of a physical injury to a victim shall not be

an element of the offense.” Id. § 2718(b).

The Crimes Code provides that “[a] person is guilty of assault if he: (1)

attempts to cause or intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury

to another.” Id. 2701(a)(1); see also Commonwealth v. Martuscelli, 54

A.3d 940, 948-49 (Pa. Super. 2012) (stating that “it is sufficient to support a

conviction [of simple assault] if the Commonwealth establishes an attempt to

inflict bodily injury[,]” and that such attempt may be shown by circumstances

reasonably suggesting that a defendant intended to cause injury). “Bodily

injury” is defined as “[i]mpairment of physical condition or substantial pain.”

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2301.

In its Opinion, the trial court addressed Richards’s sufficiency claims as

follows:

Upon review of the testimony and evidence presented at

trial, th[e trial court] finds that the Commonwealth has provided

sufficient evidence to sustain [Richards]’s conviction[s] and has

established each material element of the offenses beyond a

reasonable doubt. In regard to the charge of [s]trangulation,

[E.C.], testified that [Richards] positioned his body behind her,

grabbed the chain of her necklace, and then “twisted [the

necklace] in the back and started pulling on it and also had his left

hand around [her] throat in the front.” [E.C.] explicitly testified

that she could not breathe at that time. Indeed, [E.C.] [testified

that she] “was scratching at the wall, the basement wall, just

crying and was banging on it to try and let [Richards] know that

[she] could not breathe.” Accordingly, [E.C.]’s testimony alone

establishes that [Richards] is guilty of [s]trangulation, for

[Richards] knowingly or intentionally impeded [E.C.]’s breathing

by applying pressure to her throat and neck.
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Moreover, although the victim need not lose consciousness

or sustain physical injuries to prove [s]trangulation, [E.C.]

experienced both. [E.C.] testified that after [Richards] strangled

her with her necklace, she “passed out.” ... Second, the

Commonwealth provided a plethora of evidence regarding [E.C.]’s

physical injuries she suffered due to [Richards] strangling her.

[The] Commonwealth’s Exhibits 1-4 illustrated the bruising on

[E.C.]’s neck that resulted from [Richards] strangling her with the

necklace[].

Furthermore, the Commonwealth presented testimony from

Dr. Gelormino, who went into great detail regarding the severity

of [E.C.]’s physical injuries; namely that [E.C.] suffered bilateral

subconjunctival hemorrhages, a petechial hemorrhage, and

“linear marks of erythema from reported choking” around her

neck. Not only did Dr. Gelormino opine that all of [E.C.]’s injuries

could occur from strangulation, but [also] that “petechial

hemorrhages [would result] from a more prolonged or more

severe strangulation-type injury” and that linear marks of

erythema, commonly known as developing bruising, “would

require significant force, and it [was] consistent with [E.C.’s]

description[.]” Ultimately, Dr. Gelormino’s expert opinion was

that [E.C.]’s aforementioned injuries were [] caused by

strangulation.

The Commonwealth also introduced a number of

photographs that were taken while [E.C.] was at [Washington

Hospital]. These photographs included troublesome illustrations

of [E.C.]’s injuries, such as her blood[-]filled eyes, the blood[-

]filled dots surrounding her eyes, and the developing bruising

around her neck. Later, [] Yelenik corroborated both [E.C.’s] and

Dr. Gelormino’s testimony, [when she] indicat[ed] that she also

observed [E.C.]’s physical injuries. Accordingly, th[e trial c]ourt

finds that the Commonwealth has sustained its burden and that

all of the material elements of [s]trangulation have been proven

beyond a reasonable doubt.

Regarding the charge of [s]imple [a]ssault, the testimony

and evidence presented at trial clearly and unequivocally indicates

that [Richards] is guilty. In addition to [Richards] strangling

[E.C.], and [E.C.] suffering significant injuries therefrom, [E.C.]

also stated that [Richards] punched her in the back of the head

“about three or four times.” ... Furthermore, as was previously
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stated, [E.C.] suffered numerous bodily injuries from [Richards],

after [Richards] grabbed her neck and twisted the chain of her

necklace[,] she lost consciousness. Accordingly, th[e trial c]ourt

finds that the Commonwealth has presented sufficient evidence to

sustain [Richards]’s conviction for [s]imple [a]ssault.

See Trial Court Opinion, 12/11/19, at 19-21 (citations omitted).

We agree with and adopt the trial court’s well-reasoned and thorough

Opinion. See id. Moreover, to the extent that Richards contends that the

Commonwealth failed to prove that E.C. suffered actual injury, his argument

is without merit for the reasons stated by the trial court. See id. Additionally,

even if the Commonwealth’s evidence did not establish actual injury, it

certainly established an attempt to cause injury, where Richards punched E.C.

several times in the back of the head. See Martuscelli, supra; see also

Commonwealth v. Richardson, 636 A.2d 1195, 1196 (Pa. Super 1994)

(stating that the Commonwealth had demonstrated an attempt to cause bodily

injury where the defendant had punched a police officer in the face, even

though the officer received no medical treatment). Thus, to the extent that

Richards contends that the Commonwealth failed to prove that E.C. suffered

an actual injury, his argument is without merit.

In his second claim, Richards argues that his convictions of simple

assault and strangulation were against the weight of the evidence, “where the

jury found that [E.C.] was a family/household member but also found that the
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strangulation was not a result of sexual violence.”8 Brief for Appellant at 26- 27. Richards asserts that if the jury believed E.C.’s testimony, the jury would

also have believed that the strangulation was a result of sexual violence. Id.

at 27. Additionally, Richards argues, the convictions of simple assault and

strangulation are intertwined because the Criminal Information states that

“[Richards] did strangle [E.C.], causing [E.C.] to suffer extensive bruising

and/or petechial hemorrhages....” Id. Richards contends that E.C.’s

testimony cannot be believed because the bruising on her neck was not

consistent with her testimony. Id. at 28.

Here, Richards fails to develop his claim with citations to the record or

relevant legal authority. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a); see also Commonwealth

v. Johnson, 985 A.2d 915, 924 (Pa. 2009) (stating that “where an appellate

brief fails to provide any discussion of a claim with citation to relevant

authority[,] or fails to develop the issue in any other meaningful fashion

capable of review, that claim is waived.”). It is not the role of this Court to

“formulate [an a]ppellant’s arguments for him.” Id. at 925. Richards makes

bald claims that his convictions of simple assault and strangulation are

intertwined and are, thus, against the weight of the evidence, without citing

____________________________________________

8 Richards bases this claim on his interpretation of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2718(d)(2), which provides that a violation of the statute constitutes a second-degree

felony if committed “against a family or household member as defined in 23

Pa.C.S.A. § 6102 (relating to definitions)[.]” As we will discuss infra, [E.C.]

met the statutory definition of “family or household member.”
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to any statutes or case law supporting his argument. Additionally, Richards

baldly asserts that the jury could not have found E.C. to be a family or

household member, but includes no development or discussion in relation to

his claim. To the extent that Richards includes photographs in his brief and

places phrases in quotation marks, he does not direct this Court to the place

in the record where these photographs or phrases may be found. Indeed,

none of the photographs in Richards’s brief were included in the record before

this Court. Because Richards fails to adequately develop his second issue for

review, Richards’s challenges to the weight of the evidence are waived. See

Johnson, supra. Moreover, to the extent that Richards challenges the jury’s finding that

E.C. was a family/household member, such a claim lacks merit. The

strangulation statute provides, in relevant part, as follows:

§ 2718. Strangulation

* * *

(d) Grading.

* * *

(2) A violation of this section shall constitute a felony of the

second degree if committed:

(i) against a family or household member as defined in 23

Pa.C.S.[A.] § 6102 (relating to definitions)[.]

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2718(d)(2)(i). According to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6102(a), “[f]amily

or household members” are defined as “[s]pouses or persons who have been
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spouses, persons living as spouses or who lived as spouses, parents and

children, other persons related by consanguinity or affinity, current or

former sexual or intimate partners or persons who share biological

parenthood.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6102(a) (emphasis added); see also Evans v.

Braun, 12 A.3d 395, 399 (Pa. Super. 2010) (stating that parties who were

involved in a “dating relationship” fall within Section 6102’s definition of a

family or household member).

At trial, both E.C. and Richards testified that they were, at many times

previous, intimate partners and were “on and off sexually.” See N.T. (Jury

Trial), 2/14/19, at 25, 211; see also D.H. v. B.O., 734 A.2d 409, 410 (Pa.

Super. 1999) (stating that parties who were in month-long sexual relationship

fell within 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6102(a) definition of a family or household member).

Accordingly, even if Richards’s challenges to the weight of the evidence were

not waived, we would afford him no relief.

In his final claim, Richards contends that the trial court abused its

discretion when it sentenced him in the aggravated range for each offense and

directed his sentences to run consecutively. Brief for Appellant at 33-34. Richards challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence, from

which there is no absolute right to appeal. See Commonwealth v.

Sunealitis, 153 A.3d 414, 420 (Pa. Super. 2016). Rather, when an appellant

challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence, we must consider his

brief on this issue as a petition for permission to appeal. Commonwealth v.
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Yanoff, 690 A.2d 260, 267 (Pa. Super. 1997); see also Commonwealth v.

Tuladziecki, 522 A.2d 17, 18 (Pa. 1987). Prior to reaching the merits of a

discretionary sentencing issue,

[this Court conducts] a four-part analysis to determine: (1)

whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see

Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly

preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify

sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. [720]; (3) whether appellant’s brief

has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a

substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not

appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b). * * *

The determination of what constitutes a substantial question

must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. A substantial

question exists only when the appellant advance[s] a colorable

argument that the sentencing judge’s actions were either: (1)

inconsistent with the specific provisions of the Sentencing Code;

or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the

sentencing process

Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa. Super. 2010) (quotation

marks and some citations omitted).

Here, Richards timely filed a Notice of Appeal, raised his discretionary

aspects of sentencing claim in his Post-Sentence Motion, and properly included

a 2119(f) Statement in his brief. Therefore, we will determine whether there

is a substantial question requiring us to review the discretionary aspects of his

sentence.

In his Rule 2119(f) Statement, Richards argues that the trial court

abused its discretion imposing consecutive, aggravated-range sentences. See

Brief for Appellant at 33-34. Richards claims that the trial court impermissibly
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considered the gravity of the offense, where it was “already considered in the

Pennsylvania Sentencing Guidelines ... and cannot be considered twice.” Id.

at 30. Additionally, Richards asserts that the trial court ran his sentences

consecutively for the sole purpose of incarcerating him for a longer period of

time. Id. at 31. Richards further takes issue with the trial court’s

characterization of the incident as a “brutal assault,” and claims that this

characterization is incorrect because there was “no corroborating evidence,” and “the Commonwealth did not charge [Richards] with aggravated assault.”

Id. at 31-32. Finally, Richards contends that the trial court improperly

admonished him for failing to take responsibility for the crimes.9 Id. at 32. In support of this final point, Richards asserts that people are wrongfully

convicted every day, and that it is impermissible for a trial court to admonish

a defendant’s failure to take responsibility where the defendant never

admitted to committing the crimes. Id.

A court’s exercise of discretion in imposing a sentence concurrently or

consecutively does not ordinarily raise a substantial question.

Commonwealth v. Mastromarino, 2 A.3d 581, 587 (Pa. Super. 2010).

Rather, the imposition of consecutive rather than concurrent sentences will

____________________________________________

9 With regard to his contention that the sentencing court relied on an

impermissible factor at sentencing, Richards cites Commonwealth v.

Bowen, 975 A.2d 1120 (Pa. Super. 2009), for the proposition that a “trial

court’s admonishment emphasizing defendant’s failure to acknowledge

responsibility for crimes he never admitted to committing at sentencing was

improper.” Brief for Appellant at 38.
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present a substantial question in only “the most extreme circumstances, such

as where the aggregate sentence is unduly harsh, considering the nature of

the crimes and the length of imprisonment.” Commonwealth v. Lamonda, 52 A.3d 365, 372 (Pa. Super. 2012).

To make it clear, a defendant may raise a substantial question

where he receives consecutive sentences within the guideline

ranges if the case involves circumstances where the application of

the guidelines would be clearly unreasonable resulting in an

excessive sentence; however, a bald claim of excessiveness due

to the consecutive nature of a sentence will not raise a substantial

question.

Commonwealth v. Dodge, 77 A.3d 1263, 1270 (Pa. Super. 2013) (emphasis

omitted).

With respect to Richards’s contentions that the trial court relied upon an

impermissible factor, i.e., his purported failure to take responsibility, in

imposing an unreasonable sentence, we conclude that he has raised a

substantial question for our review. See Commonwealth v. Downing, 990

A.2d 788, 792-93 (Pa. Super. 2010) (claims that the sentencing court relied

on an improper factor in imposing sentence can raise a substantial question).

Additionally, Richards’s claim that the trial court impermissibly “double- counted” the gravity of the offense when it sentenced him also raises a

substantial question. See Commonwealth v. Goggins, 748 A.2d 721, 727

(Pa. Super. 2000) (stating that a claim that the sentencing judge double- counted factors included in the sentencing guidelines raises a substantial

question). Thus, we will review the merits of Richards’s claim.
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We adhere to the following standard of review:

Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the

sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal

absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse

of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather,

the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the

sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its

judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or

arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.

Commonwealth v. Robinson, 931 A.2d 15, 26 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation

omitted).

“In every case in which the court imposes a sentence for a felony ... the

court shall make as part of the record, and disclose in open court at the time

of sentencing, a statement of the reasons or reasons for the sentence

imposed.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b); see also Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 812 A.2d 617, 620-21 (Pa. 2002) (plurality). The Sentencing Code also

provides that “the [trial] court shall follow the general principle that the

sentence imposed should call for confinement that is consistent with the

protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact

on the life of the victim and on the community, and the rehabilitative needs

of the defendant.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b); see also Commonwealth v.

McClendon, 589 A.2d 706, 713 (Pa. Super. 1991) (stating that “the court

should refer to the defendant’s prior criminal record, age, personal

characteristics and potential for rehabilitation.”). “A sentencing court may

consider any legal factor in determining that a sentence in the aggravated

range should be imposed. ... [T]he sentencing judge’s statement of reasons
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on the record must reflect this consideration....” Commonwealth v.

Stewart, 867 A.2d 589, 592-93 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citation omitted).

Further, the trial court must consider the Sentencing Guidelines.

Commonwealth v. Sheller, 961 A.2d 167, 190 (Pa. Super. 2008).

Here, importantly, the trial court did not justify its sentencing scheme

based solely, or even primarily, on Richards’s lack of remorse or failure to take

responsibility for his crimes. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court placed

the following reasons on the record:

There are several factors the [c]ourt must consider before

imposing [a] sentence. Among those factors are the need to

protect society; the need for deterrence; the particular

circumstances of the offense; the [d]efendant’s character; and

whether the defendant is remorseful.

The [c]ourt is aware of the individualized sentencing

schemes in Pennsylvania, and the [S]entencing [G]uidelines,

which take into account [Richards]’s prior record score and the

offense gravity score assigned to each crime.

* * *

In imposing [this] sentence, the [c]ourt is taking into

consideration the Pennsylvania [S]entencing [G]uidelines; the

thorough [PSI]; the victim impact statement given by [E.C.]; the

character references given by Eric Miller, Martha Loutes, Debbie

Fronaro, Melissa Brandt, Dianna Conn, Renee Bird, Nancy

Veltham, Charles Robinson[,] and Carol Nation; the rehabilitative

needs of [Richards]; and the particular circumstances and gravity

of the offense.

After carefully weighing all [of] these factors, the [c]ourt

concludes that a sentence of total confinement is appropriate, and

any lesser sentence would depreciate the seriousness of these

offenses.

* * *
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The [c]ourt notes for the record that this sentence is in the

aggravated range of the [S]entencing [G]uidelines, and there are

several reasons the [c]ourt has sentenced [Richards] in the

aggravated range.

At trial, this [c]ourt had the opportunity to hear from both

the emergency room physician and the emergency room nurse,

who examined [E.C.] hours after this assault occurred, and they

detailed her injuries. Also at trial, the [c]ourt viewed numerous

photos vividly depicting the extent of [E.C.]’s injuries, and her

injuries were quite extensive. This was clearly a brutal assault

perpetrated upon [E.C.], and [she] is lucky to have survived.

As expressed in her victim impact statement, [E.C.] has

suffered greatly as a result of this assault. She’s suffered both

physically and mentally. And while the physical scars heal over

time, the emotional scars may last a lifetime.

Finally, [Richards] does not appear to be remorseful for his

conduct and has not taken any responsibility for his actions.

N.T. (Sentencing Hearing), 5/9/19, at 22-24, 25-26.

Our review confirms that the trial court considered all the relevant

sentencing factors and set forth its reasons for imposing aggravated- sentences. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b). Therefore, we cannot conclude that

the trial court’s sentence was based solely upon the trial court’s statement

that Richards did not appear to take responsibility for his crimes or

demonstrate remorse. Indeed, in his brief, Richards acknowledges that the

trial court considered several other factors in fashioning his sentence,

including, but not limited to, the victim impact statement, and the offense

gravity scores of the respective offenses. Brief for Appellant at 33-34, 36-39.
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To the extent that Richards relies on Bowen, we note that in Bowen, this Court declined to vacate the sentence based on the trial court’s actions.

Bowen, 975 A.2d at 1127. Rather, this Court opined that significant other

facts were present and articulated by the trial court in justifying its sentence.

Id.; see also Commonwealth v. P.L.S., 894 A.2d 120, 133 (Pa. Super.

2006) (stating that even if the trial court considered an inappropriate factor

at sentencing, “the court offered significant other support for sentencing in

excess of the guidelines[.]”). Further, regarding Richards’s contention that the trial court improperly

considered the gravity of the offense, the transcript from the sentencing

hearing does not support Richards’s contentions. See N.T. (Sentencing

Hearing), 5/9/19, at 22-24, 25-26. Our review of the record indicates that

the trial court complied with the requirements of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b) when

it imposed Richards’s sentence. See id.; see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b);

Commonwealth v. Griffin, 804 A.2d 1, 10 (Pa. Super. 2002) (stating that

“a court is required to consider the particular circumstances of the offense and

the character of the defendant.”).

Moreover, the trial court had the benefit of a PSI, which the trial court

expressly stated it had considered. N.T. (Sentencing Hearing), 5/9/19, at 23;

Trial Court Opinion, 12/11/19, at 29; Commonwealth v. Devers, 546 A.2d

12, 18 (Pa. 1988) (explaining that where a sentencing judge considered the

PSI, it is presumed that they are “aware of relevant information regarding the
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defendant’s character and weighed those considerations along with mitigating

statutory factors.”). Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse

its discretion in imposing Richards’s sentence and that Richards’s challenge to

the discretionary aspects of his sentence is without merit. Based upon the

foregoing, we discern no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in imposing

Richards’s judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/10/2020