United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 00-3120

___________

Carol Knight Jackson, on behalf of *

herself and all others similarly situated, *

*

Plaintiff-Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of Minnesota.

Fortis Benefits Insurance Company, *

*

Defendant-Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: March 14, 2001

Filed: April 6, 2001

___________

Before BYE, LAY, and JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judges.

___________

LAY, Circuit Judge.

Carol Knight Jackson worked for the Minnesota State Employees Union

AFSCME Council No. 6 from 1986 until mid-1995. As an AFSCME employee, she

participated in a qualified ERISA long-term disability plan, which was underwritten by

Fortis Benefits Insurance Company (“Fortis”). 

The plan requires Fortis to pay disability benefits upon receipt of “proof that [the

claimant] is totally disabled due to sickness or injury and requires the regular care of
1The elimination period is the “period of consecutive days of total disability for

which no benefit is payable.” Jackson, No. 99-CV-689, slip op. at 2 n.2.

2

Jackson’s claim was supported by a physician’s statement that listed Jackson’s

disabling diseases as arthralgia/fibromyalgia, allergy, fatigue, joint pain, irritable bowel,

and magnesium deficiency.

-2-

a physician.” Jackson v. Fortis Benefits Ins. Co., No. 99-CV-689, slip op. at 2 (D.

Minn. Aug. 1, 2000) (citation omitted). Total disability is defined in the plan as “an

injury or sickness which . . . prevents the insured from doing each of the main duties

of his or her regular job.” Id. Claimants under the plan are required to submit to Fortis

written proof of disability within ninety days of the elimination period,1 if practicable.

Id. 

In January 1996, Jackson submitted to Fortis a claim for long-term disability

benefits, claiming a disability related to a number of physical ailments.2 Fortis denied

Jackson’s claim and Jackson appealed through the Group Claim Denial Review

Procedure. In the process of her appeal, Jackson amended her claim to identify posttraumatic stress disorder as the disabling condition. Fortis denied Jackson’s amended

claim, based on lack of documentation of the disability. During her appeal, Jackson’s

condition was evaluated by various doctors, which eventually produced the necessary

diagnosis and documentation to support her claim. Jackson submitted these documents

to Fortis in December 1998 and Fortis granted Jackson full benefits approximately

three weeks later. Fortis established a disability onset date of April 6, 1995, a benefits

commencement date of July 5, 1995 (accounting for the ninety-day elimination period),

and a benefits expiration date of July 4, 1997. Fortis disbursed those benefits to

Jackson in a lump sum payment on January 12, 1999. 

Jackson requested that Fortis pay interest on the sum for the time between the

April 6, 1995 disability onset date and the January 12, 1999 date of payment. Fortis

denied her request, stating that it did not “pay interest in connection with claim
3The Honorable James M. Rosenbaum, United States District Judge for the

District of Minnesota, presiding.

-3-

decisions which are overturned in the course of [the] Group Claim Denial Review

Procedure.” Id. at 7. 

Jackson filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of

Minnesota, seeking relief in the form of interest for herself and all others similarly

situated on the grounds of Fortis’ unjust enrichment and breach of fiduciary duty. The

district court3 granted summary judgment in favor of Fortis, finding that prejudgment

interest is not available under ERISA § 502(a)(3)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)(B),

absent a showing that a plan administrator has either breached ERISA’s statutory

obligations or the terms of the plan document. We affirm.

ERISA permits participants “to recover benefits due to [them] under the terms

of [their] plan.” Id. The statute further provides that participants may bring a civil

action “(A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this subchapter

or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress

such violations or (ii) to enforce any provision of this subchapter or the terms of the

plan.” ERISA § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3). In this case we are presented with

the issue of whether, in these sections, ERISA provides for an award of interest on

back benefits when payment is delayed. The question is one of first impression in this

court. 

The district court read the statute as limiting equitable relief to two situations:

(1) when a plaintiff seeks to remedy a plan breach, or (2) when a plaintiff seeks to

enforce rights granted under a plan or the statute. The court concluded that there was

no need for it to create a remedy because Congress had precluded Jackson’s claim for

interest by the terms of the statute. 
-4-

On appeal, Jackson argues that an award of accrued interest is “appropriate

equitable relief” under ERISA § 502(a)(3)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)(B), which is

necessary to make an ERISA plan beneficiary whole and necessary to prevent the

unjust enrichment of the plan. Contrary to the district court’s finding, Jackson points

out that in ERISA, Congress did not address the issue of whether interest on back

benefits is due when payment has been delayed. Jackson further asserts that even in

the absence of a congressional directive, the Eighth Circuit recognizes the equitable

propriety of awarding prejudgment interest in ERISA cases. 

Fortis responds that Jackson’s argument that an award of interest is necessary

to enforce the terms of the plan is not supported by any authority in the absence of

breach or repudiation. Fortis explains that every court to consider ERISA claims for

interest in other circumstances supports the rule articulated by the district court in the

instant case. See, e.g., Clair v. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 190 F.3d 495, 497-99 (7th

Cir. 1999) (holding that ERISA “authorizes suit to redress plan violations,” but

concluding there was no breach of ERISA or terms of the plan); Holmes v. Pension

Plan of Bethlehem Steel Corp., 213 F.3d 124, 128 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting that “ERISA

permits actions to recover interest on wrongly withheld benefits”) (citing Fotta v.

Trustees of the United Mine Workers of Am. Health & Retirement Fund, 165 F.3d 209

(3d Cir. 1998)); Dependahl v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 653 F.2d 1208, 1218-19 (8th

Cir. 1981) (allowing prejudgement interest under ERISA where there has been a

violation of the plan).

We hold that the district court correctly applied the rule adopted by this and

other circuits, which requires a showing that the plan was breached before interest on

back payments may be awarded under ERISA. We affirm and adopt the well-reasoned

opinion of the district court. 

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
-5-

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.