NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. 

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE 

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee, 

v.

ERIC LAWRENCE LOYD, Appellant. 

No. 1 CA-CR 15-0033 

 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County 

No. CR2014-115580-001 

The Honorable Jo Lynn Gentry, Judge 

AFFIRMED 

COUNSEL 

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix 

By Jana Zinman 

Counsel for Appellee 

Maricopa County Office of the Legal Advocate, Phoenix 

By Kerri L. Chamberlin 

Counsel for Appellant
STATE v. LOYD 

Decision of the Court 

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Presiding Judge Randall M. Howe delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Jon W. Thompson and Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop joined. 

H O W E, Judge: 

¶1 Eric Lawrence Loyd appeals his consecutive sentences for 

aggravated assault of a police officer and resisting arrest. Loyd argues that 

the trial court improperly imposed consecutive sentences because the two 

offenses constituted a single act. For the following reasons, we affirm. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

¶2 In April 2014, a Maricopa County Sheriff’s deputy observed 

Loyd driving a motorized scooter with one hand and swerving between 

lanes. The deputy followed Loyd, and after checking the license plate and 

discovering that its registration had expired, decided to stop him. Loyd was 

“cordial” toward the deputy at first, but when the deputy handed Loyd 

four civil traffic citations relating to lack of insurance and a suspended 

license plate, Loyd became irate and began yelling profanities. The deputy 

told Loyd that he would receive another citation if he rode the scooter 

again, so Loyd pushed the scooter away. About twenty-five minutes later, 

however, the deputy saw Loyd riding the scooter again, so he pulled Loyd 

over.

¶3 Loyd got off of his scooter and yelled to a nearby elderly 

couple to call 911 because the deputy was harassing him. Seeing that Loyd’s 

yelling caused the woman to become distressed, the deputy decided to 

arrest Loyd for disorderly conduct. The deputy asked Loyd to walk to the 

deputy’s vehicle and place his hands on the hood, and Loyd complied. The 

deputy told Loyd that he was under arrest and took Loyd’s hands behind 

his back one at a time. 

¶4 Holding Loyd’s thumbs together, the deputy then reached to 

place the handcuffs on Loyd’s left hand. As he did so, Loyd stated, “I’m not 

going back to prison,” and used his body to push off the deputy’s vehicle 

and back against the deputy. Loyd also “flung his arms up,” knocking the 

deputy’s sunglasses off. The deputy, surprised by Loyd’s strength in 

pushing against him, latched onto Loyd’s left arm. 
STATE v. LOYD 

Decision of the Court 

3

¶5 To gain control of Loyd and complete the arrest, the deputy 

decided to get Loyd on the ground. He knew that by doing so, he would 

better control Loyd and prevent him from fighting and kicking. But after 

the deputy took Loyd to the ground, Loyd began to flail his right arm, kick, 

and push, doing “anything possible to get from underneath” the deputy. 

Loyd’s movements caused him and the deputy to move in circles on the 

ground as the deputy continued to try to keep Loyd down. 

¶6 At one point during the struggle, the deputy felt Loyd try to 

pull the deputy’s gun out of its holster. Fearing that the elderly couple and 

other witnesses may be harmed if Loyd got the deputy’s gun, the deputy 

used his right shoulder to keep Loyd from doing so. The struggle to control 

Loyd on the ground continued for four minutes until other deputies arrived 

and arrested him. 

¶7 The State subsequently charged Loyd with aggravated 

assault by exercising control of a peace officer’s firearm, resisting arrest, and 

disorderly conduct. At the jury trial, the deputy testified that as a result of 

the struggle, he sustained a strained right shoulder and several scrapes and 

bruises on his arms and knees. The jurors acquitted Loyd of aggravated 

assault by exercising control of a peace officer’s firearm, but convicted him 

of the lesser included offense of aggravated assault of a police officer, 

resisting arrest, and disorderly conduct. 

¶8 The trial court sentenced Loyd to five years’ imprisonment for 

aggravated assault with 96 days’ presentence incarceration credit. For 

resisting arrest, the trial court suspended sentencing and imposed a 

consecutive term of three years’ supervised probation. For disorderly 

conduct, the trial court sentenced Loyd to three months’ incarceration, but 

granted an absolute disposition because Loyd’s presentence incarceration 

credit covered that time. Loyd timely appealed. 

DISCUSSION 

¶9 Loyd argues that the trial court incorrectly imposed 

consecutive sentences for his convictions of aggravated assault of a police 

officer and resisting arrest because they constituted a single act. Loyd did 

not object to the imposition of consecutive sentences at trial, so we review 

his claim only for fundamental error. State v. Carlson, 237 Ariz. 381, 

400 ¶ 78, 351 P.3d 1079, 1098 (2015). Imposition of an illegal sentence 

constitutes fundamental error. State v. Martinez, 226 Ariz. 221, 224 ¶ 17, 

245 P.3d 906, 909 (App. 2011). To prevail under fundamental error, Loyd 

must establish that fundamental error exists and that the error caused him 
STATE v. LOYD 

Decision of the Court 

4

prejudice. State v. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, 567 ¶ 20, 115 P.3d 601, 607 (2005). 

Thus, we must first determine whether the trial court committed some 

error. State v. Lavers, 168 Ariz. 376, 385, 814 P.2d 333, 342 (1991). Moreover, 

we review de novo whether the trial court complied with A.R.S. § 13–116 in 

imposing consecutive sentences. State v. Cotten, 228 Ariz. 105, 108 ¶ 8, 

263 P.3d 654, 657 (App. 2011). Because Loyd’s convictions arose from 

multiple acts, the trial court did not err in imposing consecutive sentences. 

¶10 In Arizona, “an act . . . which is made punishable in different 

ways by different sections of the laws may be punished under both, but in 

no event may sentences be other than concurrent.” A.R.S. § 13–116. In 

determining whether a defendant has committed a single act pursuant to 

this statute, the court considers three factors. Carlson, 237 Ariz. at 400 ¶ 80, 

351 P.3d at 1098. First, the court must decide which of the two crimes is the 

“ultimate charge—the one that is at the essence of the factual nexus and that 

will often be the most serious of the charges.” State v. Gordon, 161 Ariz. 308, 

315, 778 P.2d 1204, 1211 (1989). The court then considers the facts of each 

crime separately and “subtract[s] from the factual transaction the evidence 

necessary to convict on the ultimate charge.” Id. If the remaining evidence 

satisfies the secondary crime’s elements, the offenses may constitute 

multiple acts and consecutive sentences may be permissible. Id. 

¶11 Second, the court considers whether “it was factually 

impossible to commit the ultimate crime without also committing the 

secondary crime” given the entire transaction. Id. If not, the offenses may 

constitute multiple acts. But if so, the court thirdly considers whether the 

defendant’s conduct in committing the secondary crime “caused the victim 

to suffer an additional risk of harm beyond that inherent ultimate crime.”

Id. If the conduct caused an additional harm, then the court should find that 

the defendant committed multiple acts. 

¶12 Although only two factors are necessary to properly impose 

consecutive sentences, all three factors show that Loyd committed multiple 

acts. Here, the ultimate charge is aggravated assault, and after subtracting 

the necessary evidence for that conviction, sufficient evidence remains to 

convict Loyd of resisting arrest. To commit aggravated assault of a police 

officer, one must commit assault and know or have reason to know that the 

person assaulted was a peace officer engaged in the execution of official 

duties. A.R.S. § 13–1204(A)(8)(a). The facts necessary to support the 

aggravated assault conviction are that Loyd kicked, pushed, and flailed his 

arm and legs after the deputy brought him to the ground, causing the 

deputy to sustain a sprained shoulder, bruises on his arms, and scrapes on 

his knees. Additionally, Loyd had reason to know that the deputy was a 
STATE v. LOYD 

Decision of the Court 

5

peace officer executing official duties because the deputy had just pulled 

him over twice, issued him four civil traffic citations, and told Loyd that he 

was under arrest for disorderly conduct. Subtracting this evidence from the 

factual transaction, sufficient evidence remains to convict Loyd of resisting 

arrest. To commit resisting arrest, one must intentionally prevent a person 

known as a police officer from effecting an arrest by use of physical force. 

A.R.S. § 13–2508. Here, Loyd pushed back against the deputy with his body, 

stated that he was “not going back to prison,” and flung his arms up, 

knocking the deputy’s sunglasses off. Thus, because this remaining 

evidence satisfies the elements of resisting arrest, the first factor suggests 

that Loyd committed multiple acts. 

¶13 Second, given the entire transaction, it was not factually 

impossible for Loyd to commit aggravated assault without also resisting 

arrest. Loyd did not have to push back on the officer or fling his arms up to 

commit the assault on the deputy. Indeed, Loyd could have assaulted and 

injured the deputy by kicking and flailing his legs after the deputy had 

effected the arrest. Cf. State v. Urquidez, 213 Ariz. 50, 52 ¶ 9, 138 P.3d 1177, 

1179 (App. 2006) (concluding that it would have been factually impossible 

for the defendant, a prohibited possessor, to commit aggravated assault 

with a deadly weapon without also committing prohibited possession of a 

deadly weapon). Thus, because committing one act did not require him to 

commit the other, the second factor also suggests that Loyd committed 

multiple acts. 

¶14 Although we can conclude that the trial court properly 

imposed consecutive sentences because the first two factors sufficiently 

suggest that Loyd committed multiple acts, the third factor also supports 

this conclusion. Specifically, Loyd’s conduct in resisting arrest caused a risk 

of harm to the deputy in addition to the harm caused by committing 

aggravated assault. Loyd created a risk of physical injury to the deputy by 

using his body to push off of the deputy’s vehicle and against the deputy. 

Loyd also flung his arms up, knocking the deputy’s sunglasses off. This risk 

of physical harm was separate from and in addition to the risk and harm 

caused by Loyd’s kicking and pushing the deputy while on the ground. 

Accordingly, because all three factors weigh in favor of viewing the two 

offenses as discrete and separate acts, the trial court did not err in imposing 

consecutive sentences under A.R.S. § 13–116. 
STATE v. LOYD 

Decision of the Court 

6

CONCLUSION 

¶15 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.