34 Monthly Labor Review March 2000

Aviation Employment Aviation Employment

Transportation by air: job growth

moderates from stellar rates

Aviation employment and business activities

increased massively for decades,

but growth slowed in the ’90s

William C. Goodman

William C. Goodman

is an economist in the

Office of Employment

and Unemployment

Statistics, Bureau of

Labor Statistics.

Commercial air transportation has grown

rapidly in the United States since 1938 or

earlier.1 The most significant reason for

such growth is probably that air travel has become almost continuously more affordable. Ticket

prices adjusted for inflation have been falling consistently since 1950 or earlier.2

Airfares have decreased over the years not

because of any one consistent reason, but because of two distinct sets of circumstances: regulation and deregulation. From 1938 to 1978, Federal control of fares, routes, and even the existence of each airline prevailed. After the lifting of

economic regulation, price competition was a

major force. Before 1978, development of the

commercial airplane itself contributed heavily to

decreases in the costs of operations and consequently to lower fares (after adjustment for inflation). After 1978, when changes in routes and

fares and the formation of new airlines became

unrestricted, price competition and a variety of

management responses to competition have reduced operators’ costs. The resulting lower

fares have multiplied demand and jobs in the industry.

According to estimates from the Bureau of

Labor Statistics, 3 employment in commercial

aviation increased by about 700,000 jobs, or

more than 400 percent, from 1958 to 1996 as

output, consisting mainly of passenger-miles

and cargo ton-miles, increased by more than

1,800 percent.4 Although the main purpose of

this article is to explain the trend in numbers of

jobs in the industry, the movement of aviation

output is cited often. Some industries have

been known to lack a close connection between production and employment; thoroughly automated processes in certain industries may explain the possibility of little connection between volume of production and

number of employees. The aviation industry,

despite its great technological advances, remains a service industry, and is labor-intensive. According to the Air Transport Association, “. . . there is no changing the fact that

they [airlines] are in a service business where

customers require, and often demand, a lot of

personal attention. More than one-third of the

revenue generated each day by the airlines

goes to pay its workforce.”5 This article shows

the extent to which employment and production are linked in the aviation industry.

Despite the massive cumulative increases of

output and employment, the growth of both decelerated; recent increases have been at reduced

rates. This article explains some of the many technological, legislative, and business changes that

have caused the growth and the deceleration of

the industry.

Economic performance

The amount of growth that has occurred in the

industry’s jobs and business, both in isolation and

in relation to other transportation industries, the

general economy, and U.S. international trade, is

extraordinary. To give one of many possible perspectives, from 1971 to 1997, the proportion of U.S.

adults who had ever traveled by an airliner increased

from less than half (49 percent) to 81 percent. According to surveys from the Air Transport Association of America, the proportion of adults who
Monthly Labor Review March 2000 35

Within the transportation division, establishments are assigned to a specific industry based on the main economic activity of the entire company. In 1996, a considerable number of

establishments engaged in express delivery of letters and packages were re-evaluated regarding the industry in which they

properly belonged. Most of the establishments in question

had been considered members of the trucking industry; a

smaller number had been assigned to the transportation services industry. In 1997, these establishments were reassigned

to the air transportation industry. Estimates of employment in

trucking were reduced, and estimates of employment in transportation by air were increased. Each of the two changes was

on the order of 250,000 jobs. Because of the significant break

in the aviation employment data, the old series, which is analyzed in this article, was terminated in 1997. On the basis of the

changes in industry classification, new estimates of employment in trucking and in transportation by air were calculated

from microdata back to the year 1988.

The revision in the estimated number of employees in

transportation by air is large enough so that estimates for

years prior to 1988, available only in the old series, are not

compatible with estimates from the new series for purposes

of analyzing the trends of the industry. To analyze the

growth of employment in airlines over several decades,

starting in 1958, analysis of employment in this article is

generally confined to the use of the old series of estimates.

Despite the difference in magnitude between the old series

and the new one, the 8-year trend of the old series in terms of

percent employment growth agrees with the new series’ trend

during the period of overlap, from 1988 to 1996. Although the

two time-series show differing percent changes in various individual years, the two estimated aggregate percent changes

from 1988 to 1996 are within 1 percentage point of each other.

(As shown below, the aggregate growth in employment is

estimated at 31.1 percent in the discontinued series and 30.2

percent in the new series.) Average annual percent growth

during the 8-year period is 3.4 percent in each of the two series.

An indication of growth in jobs in years after 1996 is provided only by the new series. From 1996 to 1999, growth

accelerated somewhat to 3.8 percent per year from 3.4 percent in the preceding 8-year period.

The recent growth, however, is clearly slower than that of

still earlier years as estimated by the old series. In the 31-

year period through 1989, employment grew by an average

of 4.7 percent per year, sharply differing from the more recent 3.8 percent rate.

Comparison of two sets of estimates of employment in transportation by air, 1988–99

Old series New series

Thousands Percent change Thousands Percent change

 Total 1988–96................... ... 31.1 ... 30.2

1988 ............................... 646 ... 850 ...

1989 ............................... 683 5.7 897 5.5

1990 ............................... 745 9.1 968 7.9

1991 ............................... 733 –1.6 962 –.6

1992 ............................... 730 –.4 964 .2

1993 ............................... 740 1.4 988 2.5

1994 ............................... 753 1.8 1,023 3.5

1995 ............................... 788 4.6 1,068 4.4

1996 ............................... 847 7.5 1,107 3.7

1997 .................................... ... ... 1,134 2.4

1998 .................................... ... ... 1,183 4.3

1999 .................................... ... ... 1,237 4.6

Trends in the former and current estimates of air transportation employment, 1988–96

Year
36 Monthly Labor Review March 2000

Aviation Employment

had traveled on an airliner in the latest 12 months increased from

21 percent to 39 percent during the period.6

Between 1960 and 1996, the output of the air transport industry increased sixteen-fold. By comparison, the output of

the entire business sector only increased by a factor of 3.6.

Total passenger-miles of all major forms of transportation

tripled, and domestic ton-miles of all major modes of freight

transportation increased 1-1/2 times. (See chart 1.)7

Substitution? Most modes of transportation have grown

during the last 40 years. But to a considerable extent, aviation

has taken over the roles of other forms of travel in the typical

American life; flight is now a more frequent experience, and

most other major modes of passenger transportation have not

kept up with the growth of the general economy. The only

large category of U.S. transportation to show an actual reduction of business in recent decades is rail passenger transport,

which lost 12 billion annual passenger miles from 1960 to 1996.

Even if all those who previously traveled by train now travel

by air, the loss in rail passenger transport would explain only 3

percent of the increase in domestic air passenger business. In

1960, air transport was 2 percent of all U.S. domestic passenger-miles (including the use of private automotive vehicles);

air transport rose to 10 percent of the total by 1996. The following tabulation compares changes in the volumes of the

major passenger modes from 1960 to 1996. (Over the same

period, by comparison, gross domestic product in chained

1996 dollars increased by 231 percent.):8

Change in passenger- miles

In billions In percent

 Total, all modes ................ 2,939 200

Air ....................................... 395 1,293

Highway, except bus ........... 2,400 170

Intercity bus (1960–95) ...... 9.7 50

Rail...................................... –12 –70

In contrast to air passenger service, air cargo has not taken

the role of any other mode of freight transportation to any

large extent. All three domestic surface modes of freight transportation (truck, rail, and water) operate on a much greater

scale than air transportation of freight and have shown much

more massive growth. The increase in domestic air freight tonmiles since 1960, though large as a percentage of its 1960 level,

is about 12 billion ton-miles, while intercity trucking, domestic

water, and rail freight have each increased by between 350

billion and 785 billion ton-miles. Similarly, the scale of international air cargo has been insufficient to affect the growth of

the much vaster operations of international water cargo by

much. Aviation has not seriously reduced the growth of any

major mode of freight transportation.

It is true, however, that the percent increases in international air cargo and domestic air cargo are not nearly approached by the other modes. The following tabulation shows

rates of growth in the major forms of freight transportation.9

Increase in ton-miles

In billions In percent

1960–96:

Domestic air cargo ...................... 12 2,226

Intercity trucking ........................ 701 146

Rail ............................................. 784 37

Domestic water .......................... 351 85

1970–94:

International air cargo ................. 7 502

International water tonnage

(ton-miles not available) ......... 455 million tons 78

Deceleration. The growth of output in air transport, however,

has decelerated over the decades. The output of the industry

increased by 648 percent, or 10.6 percent per year, from 1958 to

1978. A closer look shows that growth was concentrated in the

earlier part of the period and slowed to a 6.0-percent rate in the 10

years ending in 1978. From 1978 to 1996, output increased by 5.5

percent per year. From 1986 to 1996, output gained a further

decelerated 5.0 percent per year.10 Some, but not all, of the deceleration is attributable to reduced growth in the business sector

as a whole. The following tabulation shows the relationship between growth of output in air transport and increases in output

in the entire business sector.

Percent change per

year in output

 Air Business Ratio of

transport sector (a) to (b)

(a) (b)

1960–70 .................................. 14.3 4.3 3.3

1970–80 .................................. 6.0 3.5 1.7

1980–90 .................................. 6.1 3.4 1.8

1990–96 .................................. 4.4 3.0 1.5

Further explanations for the deceleration in air transport business, and in turn for the deceleration of employment in aviation, have to do with the history of aviation technology, regulation by the Federal Government, and the airlines’ operational

methods. Other explanations relate to general economic deceleration. The technology, regulation, and business strategies

of the industry have changed greatly; major changes will be

explained in later sections of this article.

Growth of subdivisions of air transport. The various categories of air transport (freight, passenger, domestic, and inMode

Mode
Monthly Labor Review March 2000 37

Chart 1. Aviation output and business-sector output, 1959 to 1996

1959 1964 1969 1974 1979 1984 1989 1994

0

5

10

15

20

0

5

10

15

20

Air transport

Business sector

Multiple of

1959 level

Multiple of

1959 level

1958 1963 1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

0

25

50

75

100

125

150

175

Employment

Output

Employment

in thousands

Index of

output

Chart 2. Output and employment in transportation by air, 1958 to 1996
38 Monthly Labor Review March 2000

Aviation Employment

ternational) have grown at far different rates. Air cargo has

increased much more rapidly, in percent terms, than passenger

flight. From 1970 to 1996, while passenger-miles almost quadrupled, air cargo ton-miles increased to about six times their

1970 level. One explanation for the rapid growth of air cargo

may be the growth of catalog and mail-order retailers, who

often offer express delivery by air. From 1982 to 1995, the output of such catalog and mail-order retailing increased by 222

percent, while the output of the entire business sector increased by 61 percent.11 In the domestic market for freight

transportation, relative costs are a factor; from 1960 to 1996,

the cost of domestic airfreight adjusted for inflation declined,

while the cost of class 1 intercity trucking increased.12 Greater

international trade is another explanation for the growth of air

cargo, as discussed later in this article.

 The transportation of passengers may be divided between

business travel and personal travel. Both business trips and

personal trips have increased substantially, but the growth of

personal travel has been greater. From 1977 to 1997, business

trips increased by 125 percent, but personal trips increased by

175 percent. As personal travel is more sensitive to fares, the

long-term decline in fares is a more important factor in personal flights than in business trips.

 Within the broad category of reasons for personal travel,

the specific reason that showed the most dramatic gain was

sightseeing and resort use. Travel to resorts and the sights

motivated trips for 20 percent of air travelers in 1977 and 31

percent in 1997. Flying to visit friends or relatives also increased as a proportion of air travelers’ purposes. In 1977, 53

percent of air travelers flew to visit people; in 1997, 71 percent

did. (Some individuals took more than one trip for more than

one personal reason.)13

Growth: domestic versus international. Within the category

of passenger transport, domestic flight contributed most of

the increase in business because domestic operations constitute the bulk of the passenger business. But international business grew proportionately more. From 1960 to 1996, domestic

passenger miles increased by 1,293 percent (395 billion passenger miles), and international passenger-miles increased by

1,741 percent (145 billion passenger-miles).14

 From 1983 to 1996, the number of overseas visitors to the

United States nearly tripled (a 189-percent increase), reaching

a level of 22.7 million arrivals in 1996. Trips to the United

States by overseas residents grew to outnumber overseas

trips from the United States by U.S. residents, during the period. While a single trip can have more than one purpose, a

nearly constant percentage of visitors from overseas (32 percent in 1983 and 31 percent in 1996) performed business or

professional activities in the United States. The proportion

that visited friends or relatives in the United States also was

stable at 30 percent to 31 percent. The percentage indulging

in leisure activities during at least part of their stay increased

substantially, from 47 percent in 1983 to 63 percent in 1996.

Growth in visits to the United States appears to be concentrated among those motivated by leisure and recreational activities.15

 Among U.S. residents flying overseas, growth in trips has

the opposite concentration in motive. All major categories of

activity contributed to an overall 103-percent increase in overseas flights by U.S. residents, but the proportionately greatest

increase was in work and work-related activities. Those performing business or professional activities overseas increased

from 27 percent of the total in 1983 to 36 percent in 1996.16

 In freight transport as well, domestic service is greater in

scale than international service and contributed a larger increase in ton-miles. From 1970 to 1996, domestic air cargo increased by 10.7 billion ton-miles, and international ton-miles

increased by 7.4 billion. But, as in passenger service, international freight increased at a greater percentage rate (567 percent) than domestic freight (488 percent).

 The enormously increased share of international, as opposed

to domestic, business in general requires more air travel, including both cargo transport and passenger flight for business purposes. International cargo traffic is also boosted by

manufacturers’ “just-in-time” approach to inventory, which

became widespread in the 1980s and 1990s, and by recent consumer demand for fresh foods of all kinds regardless of the

season.17 The following tabulation shows the increasing proportions of international business as a part of the U.S.

economy.18

U.S imports as a U.S exports as a

percentage percentage

of gross domestic of gross domestic

product product

1960 ................................ 4.6 3.7

1970 ................................ 6.3 4.5

1980 ................................ 6.7 6.8

1990 ................................ 9.5 8.6

1996 ................................ 12.3 11.2

Jobs. Employment of airline personnel is linked tightly to air

transport output. Ninety-nine percent of the variation in numbers of employees from 1958 to 1996 can be predicted on the

basis of industry output, according to a regression calculation. Chart 2 shows that the curves representing output and

employment over time have similar shapes.

 The number of jobs added and the amount of output added

each year, however, have not been in a constant proportion to

each other. Over time, fewer employees are hired for a given

amount of additional business because technological and operational progress allows for the more efficient use of both old

and new employees.
Monthly Labor Review March 2000 39

Like output, employment in the industry has grown almost

every year since 1958. From 1958 to 1996, despite various mass

layoffs, mergers, and failures, employment in the air transportation industry as a whole increased from 165,000 to 847,000, a

413-percent increase, or an average of 4.4 percent per year.

(See table 1.)

Not surprisingly, employment in air transportation has expanded at a far greater rate than employment in other modes of

travel. Aside from the much greater percent increases of business in air transportation, another major factor contributes to

the differences in hiring: employment in rail and water transportation declined even as ton-miles increased. Percent increases or decreases in jobs by mode are shown in the following tabulation:

Rail........................................... 1958–96 –76

Water ........................................ 1964–96 –24

Air ............................................ 1958–96 413

Trucking and

warehousing ......................... 1988–96 21

Air ............................................ 1988–96 31

A deceleration is evident in aviation employment. While

jobs increased by 4.6 percent per year from 1958 to 1978, from

1978 to 1996 they increased by 4.1 percent per year. From 1990

to 1996, the rate of increase slowed to 2.2 percent. The following tabulation shows the relationship between growth in aviation-industry jobs and all nonfarm payroll jobs:

Ratio of percent

growth in air

transportation

to percent growth

in total

nonagricultural

industry

1958–78 ................... 4.6 2.7 1.7

1978–96 ................... 4.1 1.8 2.3

1980–90 ................... 5.1 1.9 2.7

1990–96 ................... 2.2 1.5 1.5

In proportion to the general economy, then, jobs in transportation by air have not increased as strongly in the 1990s as

they had in earlier decades.

Estimates from the Bureau of Labor Statistics permit the

comparison of rates of job growth in the following subdivisions of the aviation industry since 1988: scheduled passenger service, air courier service (the carrying of letters and small

parcels), nonscheduled air transportation, and support services, including the operation of airports and the servicing of

aircraft. The following tabulation shows rates of growth in

employment by industry from 1988 to 1998. 19

Increase as a

percentage

of entire increase

in jobs in

transportation

by air

45 Transportation by air .. 39 100

4512 Scheduled air

transportation

(passenger and

cargo, over regular

routes on regular

schedules) .................. 15 20

4513 Air couriers (letters,

parcels, and generally

smaller packages) ....... 70 59

452 Nonscheduled transport

(nonscheduled cargo,

charter, and others) .... 137 8

458 Support services

(airports, flying fields,

services) ..................... 48 13

 The faster recent growth of cargo transportation, as opposed

to passenger traffic, is reflected in the more rapid growth of air

couriers (who carry only letters, parcels, and packages) and

nonscheduled transport (which is dominated by cargo).

Scheduled air transportation, on the other hand, is dominated

by the more slowly growing passenger traffic. The rapid

growth of support services such as airport operations is explained in part by the building up of airport facilities to handle

greater cargo traffic.20

Layoffs in recessions. During and soon after the last three

recessions (over the years 1980 to 1991), layoffs in the industry have been proportionately much more severe than those

of the entire nonfarm sector. (See table 2.) Because personal

air travel is generally not a necessity, individuals may be more

likely to sacrifice it as opposed to other goods or services.

The consistently thin financing of the airlines also makes layoffs and company failures more difficult to avoid.21

After the recession of 1969 to 1970 (and to a lesser extent,

after the recession of the mid-1970s), air transport employment continued to fall well after the official end of the recession and the upturn of total employment. In the case of the

1969 to 1970 period, the decline in airline employment also

started before the recession. In both periods, the declines were

not strictly recessionary, as various special problems then affected the industry. (See the section on deregulation later in

this article.)

In the latest recession, the loss of jobs in air transportation

was almost entirely in scheduled air transportation (SIC 4512,

losing 24,000 jobs). Air couriers (SIC 4513) expanded in employment at a reduced rate during the recession; they gained

19,000 jobs in the 12 months just before the recession and

Air Total

transport nonfarm

Annual percent

change in jobs

Percent

 increase

SIC Industry in employment

Year

Employment

change

Mode in percent
40 Monthly Labor Review March 2000

Aviation Employment

gained 5,000 during the recession. Airports, flying fields, and

services (SIC 458), previously gaining about 7,000 jobs per year,

stopped growing, but lost only 1,400 jobs during the recession. It appears that scheduled passenger service is the component most vulnerable to economic layoffs.

Quality. An increasing volume of complaints in recent years

indicates that the flight experience is more often unpleasant.

Complaints have been about less spacious configurations, “. . .

unexplained delays, baggage hassles and crowded cabins.”22

Unlike other aspects of the industry, the quality of the flight

experience is difficult or impossible to quantify.23 Exactly how

to weight less comfortable flights against seriously lower

prices is unclear.

Technological progress

By 1958, economic regulation of the industry was well established and effectively prevented price competition. Airlines

therefore had incentive to compete and advance in aspects

other than fares. Between 1958 and 1978 (as well as earlier),

the large civil aircraft typically in use changed greatly. Its

improvements both appealed to the general public in and of

themselves and lowered operational costs. Although prices

did not vary between airlines at a given point in time, cost

savings achieved through more advanced aircraft were

passed on to passengers in the form of substantially declining ticket prices after adjustment for inflation. Two changes

to the aircraft were of particular economic importance. First,

Comparison of employment in air transportation and in all nonagricultural industry, 1958–96

1958 .......................... 165 ... 51,322 ... ...

1959 .......................... 179 8.5 53,270 3.8 2.2

1960 .......................... 191 6.7 54,189 1.7 3.9

1961 .......................... 196 2.6 53,999 –.4 –7.5

1962 .......................... 197 .5 55,549 2.9 .2

1963 .......................... 202 2.5 56,653 2.0 1.3

1964 .......................... 213 5.4 58,283 2.9 1.9

1965 .......................... 229 7.5 60,763 4.3 1.8

1966 .......................... 248 8.3 63,901 5.2 1.6

1967 .......................... 298 20.2 65,803 3.0 6.8

1968 .......................... 329 10.4 67,897 3.2 3.3

1969 .......................... 353 7.3 70,384 3.7 2.0

1970 .......................... 352 –.3 70,880 .7 –.4

1971 .......................... 345 –2.0 71,211 .5 –4.3

1972 .......................... 348 .9 73,675 3.5 .3

1973 .......................... 366 5.2 76,790 4.2 1.2

1974 .......................... 368 .5 78,265 1.9 .3

1975 .......................... 363 –1.4 76,945 –1.7 .8

1976 .......................... 374 3.0 79,382 3.2 1.0

1977 .......................... 386 3.2 82,471 3.9 .8

1978 .......................... 408 5.7 86,697 5.1 1.1

1979 .......................... 438 7.4 89,823 3.6 2.0

1980 .......................... 453 3.4 90,406 .6 5.3

1981 .......................... 455 .4 91,152 .8 .5

1982 .......................... 444 –2.4 89,544 –1.8 1.4

1983 .......................... 455 2.5 90,152 .7 3.6

1984 .......................... 488 7.3 94,408 4.7 1.5

1985 .......................... 522 7.0 97,387 3.2 2.2

1986 .......................... 566 8.4 99,344 2.0 4.2

1987 .......................... 603 6.5 101,958 2.6 2.5

1988 .......................... 646 7.1 105,209 3.2 2.2

1989 .......................... 683 5.7 107,884 2.5 2.3

1990 .......................... 745 9.1 109,403 1.4 6.4

1991 .......................... 733 –1.6 108,249 –1.1 1.5

1992 .......................... 730 –.4 108,601 .3 –1.3

1993 .......................... 740 1.4 110,713 1.9 .7

1994 .......................... 753 1.8 114,163 3.1 .6

1995 .......................... 788 4.6 117,191 2.7 1.8

1996 .......................... 847 7.5 119,608 2.1 3.6

Ratio of percent growth

in air transport

employment to percent

growth in total nonfarm

Percent employment

change

Percent

change

Number

(in thousands)

Number

(in thousands)

Year

Air transportation

employment

Total

nonagricultural

employment

Table 1.
Monthly Labor Review March 2000 41

aircraft consistently became larger, so that more travelers

could share the cost of a particular flight. From 1960 to 1978,

the average number of passenger seats per plane increased

from 66 to 146.24

Secondly, aircraft became faster because of the gradual

transition from propeller-generated thrust to jet power, starting in the late 1950s. 25 A much faster craft could make more

runs in a given amount of time, so that the crew and the plane

became more productive; consequently, the average cost of a

flight declined. Furthermore, at the time, jet fuel cost about

half as much as the gasoline used in piston aircraft engines.

Faster travel also was more attractive to passengers, and demand increased because of quicker trips and because of lower

prices.

Perhaps surprisingly, wide-bodied aircraft, introduced in

1969,26 represented the last major technological change in the

craft to have major economic consequences. After the late

1970s, technological advances in civil air transport have continued, especially in the areas of fuel efficiency and noise

reduction,27 but have been less economically important than

earlier developments. By the late 1970s, the transition to jet

power among the major airlines was already accomplished.

The size of the average airliner in passenger service (in terms

of the number of seats) peaked in 1983, when the average

craft had 165 passenger seats. The average number of seats

then declined to 152 in 1996.28

An initiative to build a domestic supersonic jet for passenger service ended in 1971 because of the issue of sonic booms

traveling over populated areas. No U.S. airline has ever operated a supersonic craft.29 Airlines have continued to improve

in fuel efficiency, emissions control, and noise abatement.30

If the further development of civil aircraft had less economic importance after 1978, a certain earthbound type of

technological system did have considerable economic impact.

Computer-based reservations systems made reservations

bookkeeping more efficient. Certain major airlines shared systems, generating still greater efficiency. Travel agents’ electronic access to the airlines’ reservations systems further facilitated the sales process. Most recently, customers can check

fares and make reservations via the Internet.

More importantly, computers are well suited to a much more

sophisticated use. Although ticket pricing had been simple

before the late 1970s (typically divided into only two classes:

first and coach), modern computer reservations systems enable airlines to provide a complicated and rapidly changing

set of prices for better economic advantage.

Computerized reservations systems facilitate benefiting

from the differing natures of two types of demand: business

travel and personal travel. Generally, the executive on a business trip has an inflexible schedule and relative indifference to

ticket prices. The pleasure traveler has more time to spend on

layover, more ability to adapt to unpreferred times and dates

of travel, and more sensitivity to prices. With computer reservations systems, the airlines can rapidly formulate and implement lower fares with certain restrictions in scheduling, typically required stayovers, to attract more pleasure travelers.

The computer systems also quickly calculate higher fares with

freer scheduling to attract executives on business.

In addition, tickets tend to become more valuable as the

flight becomes more filled and as the date of travel approaches.

Computer reservations systems enable the airlines to recalculate fares rapidly in accordance with the changing supply and

demand for seats on a particular flight.3 1 The industry has

succeeded in filling more seats by means of varying fares;

therefore more passengers share the cost of a flight, bringing

down average fares and consequently aiding growth as average ticket prices fall.

Deregulation: new ways of competing

After the 1970s, fares continued to fall, even though technological changes had much less economic impact. The reasons

for the continued reductions of fares are mainly related to the

end of most of the Federal Government’s economic control of

air transport.

Federal control of fares and allocation of routes can be

traced back to 1938, when Congress created the Civil Aeronautics Authority to foster satisfactory air service. The theory

Total nonagricultural industry Transportation by air

Apr. 1960—Feb. 1961 ..... Apr. 1960—Feb. 1961 10 2.3 Aug. 1960—Jan. 1961 5 2.1

Dec. 1969—Nov. 1970 .... Mar. 1970—Nov. 1970 8 1.5 Sept. 1969—Jan. 1972 28 6.6

Nov. 1973—Mar. 1975 ... Oct. 1974—Apr. 1975 6 2.9 Dec. 1974—Oct. 1975 10 6.0

Jan. 1980—Jul. 1980 ..... Mar. 1980—Jul. 1980 4 1.4 Jan. 1980—Nov. 1980 10 2.8

Jul. 1981—Nov. 1982 ..... Jul. 1981—Nov. 1982 16 3.0 Aug. 1981—Aug. 1982 12 4.2

Jul. 1990—Mar. 1991 ..... Jun. 1990—Feb. 1992 20 1.6 Dec. 1990—Dec. 1991 12 5.1

NOTE: Recessions are designated by the National Bureau of Economic Research.

Official dates

of recession

Dates

of decline

 in employment

Duration

of decline

(in months)

Percent

decline

in employment

Percent

decline

 in employment

Dates

of decline

in employment

Duration

of decline

(in months)

Table 2. Cyclical behavior of aviation employment, 1960–91
42 Monthly Labor Review March 2000

Aviation Employment

that excess, disorderly competition would be bad for the industry exerted a crucial influence on Congress. Unregulated

start-ups of an unlimited number of operators theoretically

would have resulted in so much competition that any particular airline would be unable to attract the capital required to

offer good, sustainable service. A certain degree of concentration of capital was believed to be necessary for the development of adequate airlines. “Chaotic competition” had been

a great problem in the 1920s in various industries. The Civil

Aeronautics Act of 1938 and the Federal Aviation Act of 1958

provided government control of fares, of the creation of any

new interstate airlines, and of allocation of routes among airlines.32 The airlines were to be protected from too many competitors and destructive price slashing.

 The Civil Aeronautics Board, the agency created by Congress to regulate the airlines economically, prevented cuts in

fares in several ways. First, considerable advance notice of a

change in fare had to be given to the board, alerting competitors and thereby reducing the financial incentive to cut fares.

The board also disallowed the formation of new airlines; from

1950 to 1974, 79 companies submitted applications to start

airline service, but none of the applications were approved.

Furthermore, starting in the late1960s, the Board’s rules effectively required an airline to change fares, if it did so, on all of its

routes rather than selected ones. The result was that fare cuts

seldom occurred after 1968.33 The government not only set

rates, but also held down the number of carriers servicing most

routes to three or fewer, greatly reducing the potential competition. (Despite these problems, airfares adjusted for inflation

did decline substantially and almost continuously during the

period of regulation, but perhaps not as much as they could

have.)

 With no competition on price, airlines competed on amenities and on convenience, meaning frequency of scheduled

flights. Routine flights, including coast-to-coast ones, by

about half-empty planes became a recognized example of vast

waste. At least theoretically, such wasteful practices at the

expense of travelers would be seriously reduced by unrestricted market entry and price competition.

Why Congress deregulated airlines. Various economic papers from as early as the late 1950s suggested that price competition in air transport would seriously lower fares.34 Deregulation did not occur, however, until the combination of three

economic events contributed to widespread public dissatisfaction with air travel and passage of the Airline Deregulation

Act of 1978. First, the Arab oil embargo of 1973 was followed

by huge increases in fuel costs. The price of jet fuel climbed

greatly through 1981. Secondly, the recession of the mid-1970s

reduced growth in airline business and contributed to a downturn in airline volume in 1975. And third, the carriers’ financial

vulnerability was worsened because carriers had recently incurred the expense of newly developed wide-bodied aircraft

and were unable to fill them. To protect the airlines, the Civil

Aeronautics Board allowed considerable increases in fares (the

price of a passenger-mile, not adjusted for inflation, rose by a

third from 1973 to 197835) and allowed carriers to reduce service. The public response to higher prices and scarcer seats

was unfavorable. Prominent Senate subcommittee hearings

spread the idea that ticket prices would be reduced significantly under free competition. Fares, including the cost of

moving freight as well as people, availability of seats, and the

financial soundness of the carriers, then, were the key issues

in a historic reversal of government policy.36

 Starting in late 1977, cargo carriers were allowed to set their

own prices and fly any domestic route. The Airline Deregulation Act passed in October 1978, and by late 1979, “carriers

were able to launch just about any domestic service they

wanted”and decide on their own ticket prices.37 New providers of domestic airline service also were permitted to start operations; the number of carriers using craft with over 60 passenger seats more than tripled from 1978 to 1984.3 8 International air service, however, was not deregulated, as the various governments did not agree to do so.

 In retrospect, two of the developments that caused deregulation were of relatively short duration or were misperceived.

The large increases in ticket prices were perhaps the most

important immediate motivation, yet they were arguably illusory. The nominal price increases near the end of regulation,

from 1973 to 1978, were indeed large, but adjustment of the

fares for general inflation (using the Consumer Price Index or

CPI) shows that real prices of airline tickets continued to fall

even in that time, despite the Arab oil embargo. Adjusted for

inflation, airfares fell by 2.3 percent per year from 1973 to 1978.

The downward trend in real prices in the 5-year period, then,

was at about the same rate as in the preceding years.39

 The mid-1970s recession, which in reducing airline business

led to fears about the airlines’ financial survival, ended in 1975.

Even during the recession, airline business (as measured by

output) declined in only one year, 1975, the final year of the

recession. In 1976, still under regulation even if regulation was

eased in policy, airline-industry output (consisting primarily

of passenger-miles and cargo ton-miles) rose by 10 percent

and reached an all-time high, as it had in every year since 1948

except for 1975. Two of the immediate motivations for deregulation (rising fares and declining business), then, were arguably illusory reasons for a permanent change in policy.

 Changes in economic trends of the industry clearly occurred

soon after deregulation. Greater competition, generating lower

prices and consequently greater demand, was a major development. The number of carriers was obviously affected. Soon

after passage of the Airline Deregulation Act, entrepreneurs

did indeed respond to the sudden possibility of flying routes

at will. The number of major, national, and regional airlines had

Table

1 .

Table

1 .
Monthly Labor Review March 2000 43

decreased from 52 in 1971 to 43 in 1978; but in 1979, 60 such

carriers (40 percent more) operated. Still more airlines opened

for business, until the number peaked at 87 in 1984.40

 The established major airlines successfully regained market

share by means of the following changes:

· Flying more routes

· Making cooperative arrangements with commuter airlines to

offer more continuous routes under the same brand

name so as to offer greater convenience and more visibility

· Using computer reservation systems tied in with travel agencies and offering a range of prices for the same trip

· Conducting frequent-flyer programs

· Increasing production quotas of personnel

The number of carriers decreased to 60 in 1989 as mainly the

newer ones failed. The number of carriers then climbed to 96

by 1996 41 as demand for travel continued to increase and the

successful strategies of the majors had already had their most

crucial effects. 42

Yet the level of competition has been greater ever since

deregulation because, since 1978, the major carriers have competed much more with each other on particular routes.4 3 Surprisingly enough, the number of carriers nationwide shows

little relationship to overall prices, the volume of business, or

employment. (See chart 3.) But the number of carriers serving

a particular route is highly relevant to ticket prices on that

route. Naturally, routes served by a larger number of competitors have lower prices per mile.44

During regulation, from 1969 to 1978, average per-mile ticket

costs, adjusted for inflation using the CPI, fell 2.2 percent per

year. After deregulation, real prices fell at only a slightly faster

rate, 2.3 percent. (See chart 4.) While the airliner was no longer

changing so substantially to produce more economical operations, price competition was occurring. According to one respected source, deregulation was responsible for 58 percent

of the price cuts from 1978 to 1993 and made fares 22 percent

lower than they would have been without deregulation.45 As

stated earlier, lower prices raise demand and contribute to

growth and, in turn, employment.

In recent years, however, ticket prices have fallen at a reduced

rate. From 1986 to 1998, they declined by 1.8 percent per year.

Changed rules and productivity

Labor productivity, highly relevant to the rate of growth in

jobs, had already been increasing impressively before deregulation; larger and faster craft made greater productivity on the

part of flight crews possible. After 1978, the causes of increasing productivity changed, as management developed responses to the newly competitive environment. In earlier years,

the increasing capacity of the average airliner allowed more

passengers to be transported by a flight crew, aided by a

dispatcher and other ground personnel whose efforts also

became more efficient as the airliner grew. But in the new

competitive market, the average capacity of a passenger aircraft (in seats) about leveled off, then dropped by 14 percent

from 1986 to 1996. When a price war strained airline budgets

soon after deregulation, massive layoffs by certain major airlines, reduced pay, and renegotiated work rules were used to

cut costs.4 6 Reservations systems were computerized and

shared among airlines, reducing the manual workload entailed

in reservations.

The development of the hub-and-spoke system of routes in

the early 1980s was especially advantageous. 47 Instead of the

simpler, more traditional arrangement of routes between paired

cities, passengers from various points of origin were flown to

a “hub” and then grouped together to fill a large craft more

fully during a common leg of their journeys. The hub-andspoke system was successful in increasing the number of

seats filled. “Load factor,” the percentage of passenger seats

filled, had increased by 0.2 percent per year from 1958 to 1978,

but increased more than three times as fast, by 0.7 percent per

year, from 1978 to 1996. The hub-and-spoke system, however,

was only one factor responsible for the gains; the deliberate

use of smaller aircraft on routes with less demand has been

another important cause of increasing load factors.48 Despite

more frequent use of smaller craft, the average number of passengers carried per aircraft mile increased from 90 in 1978 to

103 in 1996, making craft and crew more productive.49

Productivity on a per-employee basis50 has shown improvement almost continuously since 1947, increasing every year

except 1980, 1981, and 1988 to 1991 (mostly years of recession,

when reduced business activity in general worked against load

factors). Despite all the benefits of competition, output per

employee advanced much more slowly after 1978, when ongoing changes to the aircraft were not so economically meaningful. Gains of 6.4 percent per year from 1958 to 1978 slowed to

2.6 percent per year during the 18-year period ending in 1996.

Once the hub-and-spoke system and computer reservations

systems had already been implemented, the rate of increase in

productivity slowed to 1.7 percent per year from 1986 to 1996.

The following tabulation summarizes the percent change per

year in output per person in air transport.

Annual rate

of change

1958–78 ............................................................ 6.4

 1968–78 .......................................................... 4.8

1978–96 ............................................................ 2.6

 1978–86 .......................................................... 3.8

 1986–96 .......................................................... 1.7

Because productivity has been rising more slowly in recent

years, requirements for labor have been greater recently than

-
44 Monthly Labor Review March 2000

Aviation Employment

1971 1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995

0

1

2

3

4

5

0

1

2

3

4

5

No. of airlines

Employment

Output

Deflated fare per mile

Multiple of

1971 level

 SOURCES: Bureau of Transportation Statistics, U.S. Department of Transportation (number of carriers); Office of Productivity and 

Technology, BLS (output); Air Transport Association (real fares). 

Multiple of

1971 level

Chart 3. Number of carriers, fares, and industry output, 1971–96

1960 1964 1968 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996

0

5

10

15

20

25

0

5

10

15

20

25

Real 1982 84 cents 

NOTE: The Consumer Price Index for all Urban Consumers (CPI-U) is used to adjust raw fare per mile.

SOURCE: Unadjusted fares are from the Air Transport Association.

Real 1982 84 cents 

Chart 4. Fare per mile of U.S. scheduled airlines, adjusted for inflation, 1960–98
Monthly Labor Review March 2000 45

they would have been if productivity had continued to rise at

the faster rates of the past.

The use of smaller planes to reduce costs, while not directly

relevant to labor productivity, is also an important means of

economizing. Smaller aircraft are used more often to cut costs

of equipment and fuel, even if labor productivity is reduced

somewhat as a result. Smaller craft often are appropriate for

more minor spoke routes.51 Most aircraft also are configured

with less room per seat to increase the number of seats and the

potential revenues of each flight, reducing comfort but contributing to lower prices.52

The various means of increasing labor productivity and of

increasing the productivity of capital contribute to lower costs

that enable the airlines to reduce fares. Lower fares attract

more passengers and contribute to growth and employment.

Safety

Another important long-term trend in the industry, seldom recognized as a contributor to industry growth in recent decades,

is airline safety. The increasingly safe nature of commercial

flight may be a factor in the public’s increased flying. Rates of

accidents and fatalities have declined greatly in the long

term.53

As the possibility of deregulation was debated in the 1970s,

critics predicted that the loss of regulation would result in a

major decline in safety as smaller, less reliable airlines gained

larger shares of traffic and as established carriers were pressured

to reduce costs, including aircraft maintenance.54 (Only economic regulation was being debated. Regulation for purposes of

safety, including required maintenance of craft, specified training

of pilots, and right-of-way rules in the sky, was never ended or

even seriously considered for termination by any important

party.) Trends in two measures of airline safety have remained

favorable, although improvements have decelerated.

Passenger fatalities per million aircraft-miles is one established measure of air safety. Accidents per thousand departures may be a better one, though, for measuring the fitness of

pilots, controllers, and equipment, considering that the crash

of just one large aircraft can skew the fatality statistic. Departures and arrivals are the most hazardous normal operations

because they involve the greatest proximity to the ground as

well as the heavier traffic of the airport environment. Furthermore, the fatalities-per-miles measure is subject to distortion

when the average length of a flight changes, but the rate of

accidents per thousand departures is free of influence by the

length of flights.

According to both statistical measures of safety, the air

transportation system improved both before and after deregulation. Far greater improvement occurred in times closer to the

beginning of substantial commercial aviation, because the relatively young industry had more problems to solve. (See chart 5.)

The following tabulation will give an idea of the progress that

has been made since 1958, although the year-to-year variability

of figures makes precise analysis of progress in safety difficult.

Average annual percent change

 Fatalities Accidents per

per million 1,000

aircraft miles departures

1958–96 ................................. –2.1 –3.5

1958–78 ................................. –3.7 –6.1

1978–96 ................................. –.3 –.4

In 1996, 8.2 million scheduled departures entailed 32 accidents, including three fatal ones. The same year, 319 passengers out of 581 million carried were killed, implying a fatality

rate of one death for every 1.8 million people boarded.55

Because the most dramatic decreases in accidents occurred

in the earlier decades of the period under study, it seems likely

that most of the increase in the public’s confidence in aviation

also occurred during the earlier decades. If greater confidence

in the safety of aviation contributes to the growth of business, the bulk of such economic effects were probably also in

the earlier decades.

Analysis

In the last 40 years, in commercial aviation, fares after adjusting for inflation have declined, labor productivity has increased, and output and employment have increased vastly.

Such trends appear to suggest continuous driving forces.

Certain factors, such as at least some improvement in safety,

general economic growth, and increased international trade

have endured from the regulatory period to the free-market

period and have continued to contribute to the growth of the

industry. But by all accounts, great changes in the economics

of aviation occurred. The pre-regulatory, regulatory, and postregulatory periods each allowed for certain types of progress

in the industry. The development of the airplane itself into a

safe, fast, and efficient vehicle, primarily during the pre-regulatory and regulatory periods, allowed vast commercial

progress. The development of radio navigation systems and

air traffic control, also primarily before deregulation, reduced

accidents, probably reducing the public’s fear of aviation.

Navigation systems and air traffic control also made air service more reliable because flight became sensible in a greater

range of weather conditions. After deregulation, competition

drove airlines to find ways to economize in operations to

lower fares. Recent fares, after adjustment for inflation, are

cheaper than ever.

General economic deceleration accounts for only part of

the deceleration in the growth of air transport. Other explana-
46 Monthly Labor Review March 2000

Aviation Employment

monthly periodical, Employment and Earnings. See the box on page 3

for the special attributes of the estimates of employment used in this

article.

4

 Output and productivity statistics used in this article are from the

Office of Productivity and Technology, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

5

 Air Transport Association, The Airline Handbook, ch. 4, p. 2, on

the Internet at www.air-transport.org/handbk/chaptr04.htm.

6

 Air Transport Association of America, Air Travel Survey 1998

(Washington, 1998), p. V-1.

7

 Passenger-mile and ton-mile figures are from National Transportations have to do with innovations that contributed to acceleration in growth as they were introduced and as they spread

but now have been largely completed. Aircraft ceased to become larger or so radically improved in engine design as when

the jet engine first came into commercial use. The time-saving

and cost-cutting accomplished by the two major changes to

the craft have long ceased to be new advantages over the

operations of the recent past. Hub-and-spoke routing and

computer reservations systems have become standard in the

industry. They can no longer serve to accelerate growth, as they

did when they were introduced and as they spread. The one-time

technological and operational innovations of both the regulatory period and the post-regulatory period have been standard

for years, and cannot now increase the rate of growth; ticket

sales via the Internet are one possible exception. After 1986,

increases in productivity, reductions in fares, and the growth of

output and employment decelerated. Further innovation may be

required if growth is to be as rapid as in the past.

Notes

1

 Annual numbers of passengers carried starting in 1938 can be found

in the “Safety Record of U.S. Airlines,” Air Transport Association, on

the Internet at http://www.air-transport.org.

2

 Real fares also are from the Air Transport Association, on the

Internet at http://www.air-transport.org.

3

 Estimates of employment in this article are from the BLS Current

Employment Statistics (CES) survey of establishments, unless otherwise

noted. The CES program produces estimates of employees on all nonfarm payrolls, except in private households, based on a monthly survey

of about 390,000 work sites. Data from the survey appear in the Bureau’s

1958 1963 1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993

0

0.005

0.01

0.015

0.02

0

0.005

0.01

0.015

0.02

Accidents per

 thousand departures

 NOTE: Data are for Part 121 airlines, which are those subject to Part 121 of the Federal Aviation Regulations and include all airlines 

operating craft with over 30 seats.

 SOURCE: Calculated from series from the Air Transport Association.

 Accidents per

 thousand departures

Chart 5. Airline accidents per thousand departures, 1958–96
Monthly Labor Review March 2000 47

tion Statistics 1998 (U.S. Department of Transportation, Bureau of

Transportation Statistics, 1998), tables 1–10 and 1–11.

8

 Passenger-mile and ton-mile figures of the various modes are from

National Transportation Statistics 1998, tables 1–10, 1–11 and National Transportation Statistics 1997, table 1–7, p. 15.

9

 International water tonnage is from National Transportation Statistics 1996 (U.S. Department of Transportation, 1997), pp. 49, 50.

10 Output figures are from the Office of Productivity and Technology, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

11 Traffic figures are from the Air Transport Association, on the

Internet at http://www.air-transport.org.

12 National Transportation Statistics 1998 (U.S. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Transportation Statistics, 1998), table 2–21.

13 Figures for reasons for air travel are from the Air Travel Survey 1998

(Washington, Air Transport Association of America, 1998), p. V-5.

14 Domestic statistics are from National Transportation Statistics

1998, table 1–11. International statistics are for U.S. scheduled airlines

and are from the Air Transport Association, on the Internet at http://

www.air-transport.org.

15 Figures are from the U.S. Department of Commerce, International

Trade Administration, Tourism Industries. Flights between the U.S. and

Canada or Mexico are excluded.

16 International Trade Administration, Tourism Industries. Flights

between the U.S. and Canada or Mexico are excluded.

17 See “TIACA trustee projects industry growth, impact through 2015,”

Presswire (The International Air Cargo Association, July 7, 1997).

Also see Gary Hendricks, “Hartsfield City Limits: Air cargo taking off

at airport,” The Atlanta Journal, Oct. 20, 1997, pp. E5 ff.

18 Figures are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce, on the Internet at http://www.stat-usa.gov/

online.nsf/NIPAnav?openNavigator.

19 SIC is the acronym for Standard Industrial Classification. See Standard Industrial Classification Manual 1987 (Washington, Office of

Management and Budget).

20 Gary Hendricks, “Hartsfield City Limits,” The Atlanta Journal.

21 See Steven A. Morrison and Clifford Winston, The Evolution of the

Airline Industry (Washington, The Brookings Institution, 1995), pp.

28–31, on the subject of the relatively low profitability of airlines.

22 Christopher Reynolds, “TRAVEL: Lawmakers and waning profits

push airlines into voluntary reforms . . .,” Los Angeles Times, June 27,

1999. See also Cynthia Corzo, “Airlines’ Promises to Improve Customer Service Mean Little, Skeptics Say,” Knight Ridder Tribune Business News, June 19, 1999.

23 See Morrison and Winston, pp. 19–20.

24 Calculated from available seat-mile and aircraft-mile statistics provided by the Air Transport Association. Also, the point that seating

capacity is an important factor in costs is explained by the Bureau of

Transportation Statistics, U.S. Department of Transportation in Transportation Statistics Annual Report 1995, p. 122.

25 Transportation Statistics Annual Report 1996 (U.S. Department

of Transportation, Bureau of Transportation Statistics, 1996), p. 234.

26 The Airline Handbook, ch. 1, p. 10.

27 Ibid., ch. 4, p. 7.

28 The average seats per craft were calculated by dividing total seatmiles by total aircraft miles. Therefore the average is a weighted average, with the weights being the amount of use (in aircraft miles) of each

plane. The raw seat-miles and aircraft miles were obtained from the Air

Transport Association.

29 The Airline Handbook, ch. 1, p. 10.

30 Ibid., ch. 4, p. 7.

31 Ibid., p. 5.

32 Richard H.K. Vietor, “Contrived competition: economic regulation and deregulation, 1920s–1980s,” Business History, October 1994,

pp. 1 ff.

33 Stephen Breyer, Regulation and its Reform (Harvard University

Press, 1982), p. 210.

34 Transportation Statistics Annual Report 1996, p. 235.

35 Figures provided by Air Transport Association, on the Internet at

http://www.air-transport.org.

36 The Airline Handbook, ch. 2, pp. 1, 2, and Vietor, “Contrived

Competition.”

37 The Airline Handbook, p. 2.

38 Ibid., p. 4.

39 Real yield (fare per passenger-mile) is from the Air Transport

Association.

40 Transportation Statistics Annual Report 1996, p. 236.

41 National Transportation Statistics 1998 (U.S. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Transportation Statistics, 1999), Appendix A.

42 Winds of Change: Domestic Air Transport Since Deregulation

(Washington, Transportation Research Board, National Research Council, 1991), pp. 103–7.

43 Winds of Change, p. 107. 44 Airline Regulation: Changes in Airfares, Service, and Safety at

Small, Medium-Sized, and Large Communities, RCED 96–79 (Washington, General Accounting Office, 1996).

45 Morrison and Winston, pp. 12–15.

46 Vietor, “Contrived competition.”

47 Transportation Statistics Annual Report 1996, p. 242.

48 Don Phillips, “Climbing out of the Red: Struggling Airlines Are

Cramming Passengers into Planes in Bid to Survive,” The Washington

Post, June 18, 1995, pp. H1 ff.

49 Calculated from aircraft-miles and passenger-miles, both from the

Air Transport Association.

50 The hours spent during layovers and how such hours are counted

by employers for purposes of compensation make the hours worked

by airline employees difficult to sample and estimate. Therefore labor

productivity in air transport is calculated in terms of output per employee, rather than output per hour of work. Considerable changes in

the average workweek, if they occur, may cause increases or decreases

in output per employee. Such changes may distort the apparent efficiency of personnel. Nevertheless, this section will describe the trends

of productivity in terms of the available unit, output per employee.

51 Phillips, “Climbing out of the Red,” and The Airline Handbook, ch.

4, p. 7.

52 Phillips, “Climbing out of the Red.”

53 For information on occupational fatalities in aeronautics, see Peggy

Suarez, “Flying Too High: Worker Fatalities in the Aeronautics Field,”

Compensation and Working Conditions (Bureau of Labor Statistics,

Spring 2000), pp. 39–42. The article confirms a decreasing trend in

fatalities.

54 The Evolution of the Airline Industry, pp. 31, 32.

55 Safety figures are derived from statistics provided by the Air Transport Association, on the Internet at http://www.air-transport.org.