alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision **

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

REGINALD B. DEJOHNETTE,

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

 v.

CHARLES LEE; et al.,

 Defendants - Appellees.

No. 10-17576

D.C. No. 3:08-cv-04844-MMC

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Maxine M. Chesney, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted September 10, 2012** 

Before: WARDLAW, CLIFTON, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges. 

Reginald B. DeJohnette, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the 

district court’s September 30, 2010 order dismissing DeJohnette’s 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 complaint alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. We 

FILED

SEP 25 2012

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 10-17576

dismiss the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. 

The district court dismissed DeJohnette’s complaint with leave to amend. 

Rather than filing an amended complaint or obtaining a final order of dismissal

from the district court, DeJohnette filed a notice of appeal. We therefore lack

jurisdiction. See WMX Tech., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1135-37 (9th Cir.

1997) (en banc) (a district court’s dismissal that expressly grants leave to amend is

not final, and a final judgment must be obtained before such a case becomes

appealable). The exception allowing a premature notice of appeal to be treated as

timely filed under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(2) does not apply. See Serine v. Peterson,

989 F.2d 371, 372 (9th Cir. 1993) (order) (“Rule 4(a)(2) permits a notice of appeal

from a nonfinal decision to operate as a notice of appeal from the final judgment

only when a district court announces a decision that would be appealable if

immediately followed by the entry of judgment.”). 

Because we dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, we do not consider DeJohnette’s

outstanding motions.

DISMISSED.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Hugh BRYSON, Defendant.

No. 33559.

United States District Court, N. D. California, S. D.

June 3, 1953.

See, also, D.C., 16 F.R.D. 431.

*478Lloyd H. Burke, U. S. Atty., San Francisco, Cal., for plaintiff.

Gladstein, Andersen & Leonard, San Francisco, Cal., for defendant.

MURPHY, District Judge.

Defendant herein has filed a motion to dismiss, a motion to compel election* and a motion for a bill of particulars in relation to an indictment which charges that the defendant “in a matter within the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board, an agency of the United States, did unlawfully and wilfully make, use, and cause to be made, and used a false writing and document, namely an ‘Affidavit of Non-Communist Union Officer’—Form (NLRB 1081) knowing the same to contain a false, fictitious and fraudulent statement and representation, to wit: that he was not a member of the Communist Party, whereas the said Hugh Bryson then and there well knew that he was a member of the Communist Party”.

The second count is in the same language with the exception of the substitution of the words “affiliated with the Communist Party” in lieu of “was a member of the Communist Party”.

The test to be applied to the sufficiency of an indictment is not to look for mere formal defects and academic distinctions. The test is whether it contains the necessary elements of the offense intended to be charged. Hagner v. U. S., 285 U.S. 427, 431, 52 S.Ct. 417, 76 L.Ed. 861. This indictment clearly apprises the defendant of what he must be prepared to meet.

Upon the authority of the well considered opinion in U. S. v. Lohman and U. S. v. Hupman, D.C., 127 F.Supp. 432, it is ordered that the motion to dismiss be and it is hereby denied.

Finding no merit whatsoever in the motion to compel election, it is denied without further comment.

 As to the motion for a Bill of Particulars, Rule 7(f) of the Federal *479Rules of Criminal Procedure, 18 U.S.C. A., provides that “The court for cause may direct the filing of a bill of particulars”. It is urged that the particulars requested would simply require the government to state the overt acts upon which the indictment is based. If this were done, it would in my opinion, force the government to spread before the accused its entire case. Such is not the function of a Bill of Particulars. Accordingly, that motion is also denied. American Tobacco Co. v. U. S., 6 Cir., 147 F.2d 93; Hughes v. U. S., 6 Cir., 114 F.2d 285.
<PAGE>
                                                                   EXHIBIT 23(c)








                       CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS



We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration
Statements on Forms S-8 (Nos.333-32229, 333-58686 and No. 333-76347), S-3 (Nos.
333-51932, 333-52560, 333-27849, 333-37241, 333-74958, 333-45556) and S-4 (No.
33-60007) of CMS Energy Corporation of our report dated February 10, 2004
relating to the financial statements of Jorf Lasfar Energy Company S.C.A. which
appears in the CMS Energy Corporation Form 10-K for the year ended December 31,
2003.




Price Waterhouse

Casablanca, Morocco
March 8, 2004
#### The Colorado.

*(District Court, N. D. New York.*

1884.)

Admiralty Practice—Marshal’s Pees—Commissions.

Where a marshal has been paid his fees and commissions on the sale of a vessel under decree of the district court, and a claimant flies a petition, on which njonition is issued, asking- that the balance of the proceeds of the sale in the registry of the court be paid to him, and it so ordered, the marshal is not entitled, in addition to his fees for serving the process, to a commission on the amount paid to the claimant.

Appeal from Taxation of Marshal’s Costs.

*James A. Murray,*for marshal.

*William B. Hoyt,*for respondent.

Coxe, J.

In May, 1884, the propeller Colorado was sold by the marshal, under a decree, and the proceeds were paid into court. His fees and commissions for this service, estimated on the entire amount realized, were paid him in full. After discharging the debt of the libelants there still remained a large sum in the registry of the court.

On the seventh of June, 1884, the present proceeding was instituted by Frederick L. Danforth, as receiver, to reach the amount so remaining. A petition was filed and a monition issued which was placed in the hands of the marshal for service.

. In addition to his fees for serving mesne process, mileage, etc., he charged $49.58 “per cent, on amount recovered.” This item was disallowed by the clerk. The marshal now appeals. The clerk was clearly correct. The marshal had already received his commissions. The money was in the registry of the court and under its control. No action on the part of the marshal was necessary to restore it to its rightful owner. When its owner was found the clerk was directed to pay it over. That was all. No process was required and none was issued, there was no sale and no settlement. There is no section of the fee-bill which directly or indirectly makes such a charge permissible, and it is not a case where the discretionary power of the court on the subject of costs can be invoked.

Taxation affirmed.
Exhibit 99.1

Certification of CEO and CFO Pursuant to  18 U.S.C. Section 1350,  as Adopted Pursuant to  Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

In connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K of Zenith National Insurance Corp. (the "Company") for the year ended December 31,
2002 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), Stanley R. Zax, as Chief Executive Officer of the Company, and William J. Owen, as Chief Financial Officer
of the Company, each hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of his knowledge:

(1)  The
Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)  The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

|/s/ Stanley R. Zax  |  |                                    
|------------------- |  | -----------------------------------
|Name:               |  | Stanley R. Zax                     
|Title:              |  | Chairman of the Board and President
|Date:               |  | March 14, 2003                     
|                    |  |                                    
|/s/ William J. Owen |  |                                    
|Name:               |  | William J. Owen                    
|Title:              |  | Chief Financial Officer            
|Date:               |  | March 14, 2003                     

This
certification accompanies the Report pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not, except to the extent required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
be deemed filed by the Company for purposes of §18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.

---

QuickLinks
| (logo) ncb  National Cooperative Bank    | 2011 Crystal Drive  Suite 8oo  Arlington, Virginia 22202 |
|-----------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|

 

 

February 6, 2017

 

RBS Commercial Funding, Inc.as Depositor

600 Washington Blvd.

Stamford, CT 06901

 

RE:         Annual Statement as to Compliance

WFRBS 2013 C13

 

Dear Sir/Madam:

 

In accordance with the Poolingand Servicing Agreement entered into in connection with the issuance of theCommercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2013-C13, as an authorizedofficer of National Cooperative Bank, N.A., formerly NCB, FSB (the “Co-opSpecial Servicer”), I hereby certify that:

 

a. A review of the activitiesof the Co-op Special Servicer during the preceding calendar year (the“Reporting Period”) and of its performance under the Pooling andServicing Agreement has been made under my supervision.

 

b. To the best of myknowledge, based on these reviews, the Co-op Special Servicer has fulfilled allobligations under this agreement in all material respects throughout theReporting Period.

 

Please note that the annualfinancial statement will be sent under separate cover on or before March 31,2017.

 

 

Best regards,

 

/s/ Karyn Mann

Karyn Mann

Senior Vice President,Investor Compliance

National Cooperative Bank,N.A.
Order entered April 16, 2014

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-13-01041-CR

No. 05-13-01042-CR

No. 05-13-01043-CR

ANTHONY HILL, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 292nd Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause Nos. F12-53911-V, F12-53671-V, F12-54044-V

ORDER

The Court GRANTS the State’s April 14, 2014 second motion for extension of time to 

file the State’s brief.

We ORDER the State to file the brief within THIRTY (30) DAYS from the date of this 

order.

/s/ DAVID EVANS 

JUSTICE
**Exhibit 32.1**

 

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

 

Inconnection with the Quarterly Report of Universal Hospital Services, Inc.(the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the period ended March 31, 2009, asfiled with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Report”), I, Gary D.Blackford, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify,pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of theSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 

                (1)           The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

                (2)           The information contained in the Report fairly presents,in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations ofthe Company.

 

Date:May 13, 2009

 
| /s/  Gary D. Blackford |                       |
|------------------------|----------------------------|
|                   | Gary  D. Blackford         |
|                   | Chairman  of the Board and |
|                   | Chief  Executive Officer   |
|                        |                            |  |

 

----
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-6045

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. KEVIN V. BURTON, Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond. Henry E. Hudson, District Judge. (3:03-cr-00006-HEH-1; 3:08-cv-00717-HEH)

Submitted: July 23, 2009 Decided: July 29, 2009

Before WILKINSON and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Linda S. Sheffield, LINDA S. SHEFFIELD ATTORNEY AT LAW, Atlanta, Georgia, for Appellant. Richard Daniel Cooke, Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Kevin V. Burton seeks to appeal the district court’s order construing his motion for writ of error audita querela, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2006), as a successive motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp. 2009) and denying relief. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2006). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2006). A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that any assessment of the constitutional claims by the district court is debatable or wrong and that any dispositive procedural ruling by the district court is likewise debatable. MillerEl v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); Rose v. Lee , 252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th Cir. 2001). We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Burton has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional

process.

DISMISSED
<PAGE>

                                                  EXHIBIT 99(i)


                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECITON 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

     In connection with the Annual Report of Dialysis Corporation of America
(the "Company") on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2002 as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date therein specified
(the "Report"), I, Thomas K. Langbein, Chief Executive Officer of the Company,
certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:

     (1)     The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)     The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.

                              /s/ Thomas K. Langbein
                              --------------------------------------------
                              THOMAS K. LANGBEIN, Chief Executive Officer

Dated:  February  27,  2003



<PAGE>
# Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas

March 22, 2019

No. 04

- 18

- 00601

- CV

One Thousand Four Hundred Thirty

- Seven Dollars ($1,437.00) in United States Currency and a

2016 Toyota Corolla VIN 2T1BURHE0GC627119

,

Appellant

v.

The State of Texas, Appellee

From the 451st Judicial District Court, Kendall County, Texas

Trial Court No. 18

- 223 Honorable Bill R. Palmer, Judge Presiding



### O R D E R

The State’s brief was originally due on March 4, 2019

. After this court advised the State
that its brief was overdue , the State moved fo r a n extension of time to file its brief until April 2 2

, 2019

. The State’s motion is GRANTED. The State’s brief is due on April 2 2 , 2019

.

_________________________________ Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said court on this 22nd day of March, 2019

.

___________________________________ K eith E. H ottle Clerk of Court
<PAGE>
                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.A

                           CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                       AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906
                        OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


         In connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K for the period ending
December 31, 2003, of Colorado Interstate Gas Company (the "Company") as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"),
I, John W. Somerhalder II, Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer,
certify (i) that the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and (ii) that
the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



                                               /s/ John W. Somerhalder II
                                             --------------------------------
                                             John W. Somerhalder II
                                             Chairman of the Board and
                                             Chief Executive Officer
                                             (Principal Executive Officer)

                                             March 15, 2004



A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
provided to Colorado Interstate Gas Company and will be retained by Colorado
Interstate Gas Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission
or its staff upon request.
*

The Honorable James B. Loken became Chief Judge of the United States

Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit on April 1, 2003.

**The Honorable Ronald E. Longstaff, United States District Judge for the

Southern District of Iowa.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 02-2610

___________

Valentino Maghee, *

*

Appellant, * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the Southern

v. * District of Iowa.

*

John Ault, Warden, * [UNPUBLISHED]

*

Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: March 10, 2003

Filed: April 30, 2003

___________

Before McMILLIAN, FAGG, and LOKEN,*

 Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Valentino Maghee, an inmate on work release at the Marshalltown Residential

Facility in Marshalltown, Iowa, appeals the district court’s** denial of his 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254 habeas petition. Maghee contends the district court should have excused his
-2-

failure to exhaust state remedies because initiating state postconviction proceedings

in the absence of appointed counsel would have been futile. Having reviewed the

district court’s findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo, we

affirm the district court. Hall v. Luebbers, 296 F.3d 685, 692 (8th Cir. 2002) (standard

of review).

First, although Maghee asserts that he failed to pursue his habeas claims in

state postconviction proceedings, this is not the case. Even though Maghee could not

pay the filing fee, the county clerk’s office opened a case file for Maghee’s

postconviction relief claims, and the state responded to Maghee’s claims. On July 12,

2002, the state trial court denied Maghee’s application for postconviction relief.

Because Maghee did not appeal the July 12 judgment within the thirty-day limit

established by state law, the district court properly concluded Maghee failed to

exhaust state postconviction remedies. Maghee’s habeas petition is barred for this

reason. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) (2000).

Second, even if Maghee had not pursued his claim through state postconviction

proceedings, Maghee would not be entitled to an exception to the exhaustion

requirement based on his assertion that initiating postconviction proceedings without

the assistance of appointed counsel is “a waste of time.” See 28 U.S.C. §

2254(b)(1)(B)(ii) (state prisoner need not exhaust state remedies if “circumstances

exist that render [state] process ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant”).

Maghee has not shown the absence of counsel made the state process ineffective in

his case. Although Maghee’s habeas claims might have been better presented in the

state court if he had the benefit of counsel, the absence of appointed counsel at that

stage of the proceedings does not violate Maghee’s federal constitutional rights,

Miller v. Kemna, 207 F.3d 1096, 1097 (8th Cir. 2000) (per curiam), or even his state

constitutional rights, Maghee v. State, 639 N.W. 2d 28, 30 (Iowa 2002). 
-3-

We thus affirm the district court’s denial of habeas relief. We also grant Ault’s

motion to supplement the record. 

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.