[Cite as Salibra v. Mayfield Hts. Mun. Bd. of Appeal, 2016-Ohio-276.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

Lawrence A. Salibra, II, : 

 

 Appellant-Appellant, : No. 14AP-890 

 (B.T.A. No. 2012-933) 

v. : 

 (ACCELERATED CALENDAR) 

Mayfield Heights Municipal Board : 

of Appeal et al., 

 : 

 Appellees-Appellees. 

 : 

 

D E C I S I O N 

Rendered on January 26, 2016 

 

Lawrence A. Salibra, II, pro se. 

Amy L. Arrighi, for appellee City of Mayfield Heights, c/o 

Regional Income Tax Agency, Tax Administrator; Paul T. 

Murphy for appellee City of Mayfield Heights Municipal 

Board of Appeal. 

 

APPEAL from the Ohio Board of Tax Appeals 

BROWN, J. 

{¶ 1} This is an appeal by appellant, Lawrence A. Salibra, II, from a decision and 

order of the Ohio Board of Tax Appeals ("BTA"), affirming a decision of appellee, the City 

of Mayfield Heights Board of Review ("BOR"), denying appellant's appeal of a decision by 

the Regional Income Tax Authority ("RITA") which granted in part and denied in part 

appellant's request for a refund of tax withheld by his employer and paid to appellee, the 

City of Mayfield Heights ("Mayfield Heights" or "the city") in 2007. 

{¶ 2} The following background facts, taken primarily from the decision and 

order of the BTA, dated September 26, 2014 are generally undisputed. At issue in this 
No. 14AP-890 2 

case is a tax arising out of the cancellation of stock options which appellant's former 

employer, Novelis, Inc. ("Novelis"), granted to appellant. In 1995, appellant began 

working for Alcan Aluminum Corporation ("Alcancorp"), the predecessor to Novelis, at 

Alcancorp's office in Mayfield Heights. During the course of his employment with 

Alcancorp, appellant was granted company stock options. In 2005, Novelis was formed as 

a spinoff from a portion of the Alcancorp operation; as a result of the spinoff, appellant's 

unexercised stock options were converted to Novelis stock options. 

{¶ 3} During the time appellant worked in Mayfield Heights for Alcancorp and 

Novelis, he requested and received from the city refunds of a portion of the tax his 

employer withheld and remitted to the city each year; these refunds represented days that 

appellant, a non-resident of Mayfield Heights, demonstrated he performed work outside 

of the city. Appellant received these refunds by filing a request with RITA, documenting 

the days he worked outside the city and including a certification by his employer that it 

had withheld the city tax from appellant in excess of his liability to the city. 

{¶ 4} Appellant retired from Novelis, effective January 1, 2006. In 2007, an 

India-based company acquired Novelis; as a result of the acquisition, all existing Novelis 

stock options were cancelled and the resulting income paid to the holders, including stock 

options still held by appellant. Appellant received a form W-2 from Novelis for tax year 

2007 which reported the income he received as a result of the cancellation of the stock 

options. Novelis withheld and remitted tax to the city at the rate of 1 percent of the 

income reported to appellant. 

{¶ 5} Appellant sought a refund from RITA of all income tax withheld and paid to 

the city by his former employer on the basis that he neither worked nor lived in the city 

during 2007 when he received the stock option income. RITA granted in part and denied 

in part appellant's refund request. The partial refund was calculated by apportioning the 

dollars received by appellant in 2007 by the average percentage of time he worked outside 

the city over the course of his employment with Alcancorp and Novelis, as demonstrated 

by prior refund requests certified by the employer. Upon notification of the partial denial, 

appellant appealed to the BOR, which affirmed RITA's denial of the remainder of the 

refund. Appellant appealed that determination to the BTA, which issued its decision and 

order September 26, 2014 affirming the decision of the BOR. 
No. 14AP-890 3 

{¶ 6} On appeal, appellant sets forth the following four assignments of error for 

this court's review: 

1. The Ohio Board of Tax Appeals (hereinafter "BTA") erred in 

characterizing the legal issue in this case as a challenge to the 

Appellees authority to tax stock options granted while the 

Appellant was employed in the municipality but were 

exercised after he retired and no longer worked or resided in 

the municipality. 

2. The BTA erred by not detailing in its opinion the 

undisputed facts concerning the manner in which stock 

options are granted and exercised in the context of s [sic] 

globally mobile workforce of a foreign multinational 

corporation. 

3. The BTA erred by not addressing the issue of whether the 

Appellees refusal to apply its standard rule to determine 

taxable income by creating a fraction whose numerator are 

the days worked in the municipality and whose denominator 

is total work days to allocate taxable income and instead 

creating a new rule unique to Appellant was legally 

appropriate[.] 

4. The BTA erred by not complying with the Ohio Rules of 

Civil Procedure by failing to grant the appropriate sanctions 

against the Appellee for failure to answer interrogatories. 

{¶ 7} At the outset, we note that appellant has failed to separately argue each 

assignment of error as required by App.R. 16(A)(7). Accordingly, we will address the 

assignments of error jointly. 

{¶ 8} The standard of review for an appellate court on an appeal from the BTA is 

set forth in R.C. 5717.04, which states in part: 

If upon hearing and consideration of such record and 

evidence the court decides that the decision of the board 

appealed from is reasonable and lawful it shall affirm the 

same, but if the court decides that such decision of the board 

is unreasonable or unlawful, the court shall reverse and vacate 

the decision or modify it and enter final judgment in 

accordance with such modification. 
No. 14AP-890 4 

{¶ 9} Pursuant to the above cited provision, a decision of the BTA "is to be 

affirmed unless the decision is unreasonable or unlawful." Ohio Natl. Bank v. Franklin 

Cty. Bd. of Revision, 10th Dist. No. 00AP-1161 (Mar. 30, 2001). 

{¶ 10} Although not styled as an assignment of error, appellant argues in his 

"issues presented for review" that "Appellees' taxation of a small segment of the class of 

persons which it has defined as subject to the tax simply because they can be conveniently 

taxed when the Appellee has neither the administrative capability, infrastructure or * * * 

capability of taxing the vast majority of the taxable class violates the 'as applied' 

provisions of the Due Process Clauses of the Constitution of The United States and the 

State of Ohio." We note that, in the body of his appellate brief, appellant refers to his "asapplied" challenge as an equal protection argument. 

{¶ 11} As noted under the facts, appellant was granted company stock options as 

part of his employment with Alcancorp and Novelis. Over the course of his employment, 

appellant, a non-resident of Mayfield Heights, requested and received from the city 

refunds of a portion of the tax his employer withheld and remitted to the city each year 

based upon days appellant demonstrated that he performed work outside the city. In 

2007, following appellant's retirement (effective January 1, 2006), Novelis was sold, and 

existing Novelis employee stock options were cancelled; the resulting income was paid to 

the holders, including stock options held by appellant. Novelis withheld and remitted to 

the city tax at the rate of 1 percent of the income reported to appellant. Appellant applied 

for a refund from RITA, which RITA granted in part and denied in part based on 

appellant's past allowed refunds for income he received with respect to days he worked for 

his employer outside the city. 

{¶ 12} Appellant challenged RITA's determination, and a hearing was conducted 

before the BOR on December 1, 2008. The BOR affirmed RITA's denial of the remainder 

of the refund on the basis that the stock options granted to appellant were compensation 

taxable when granted (i.e., while appellant was working in the city), and therefore subject 

to taxation pursuant to Section 739.03 of the Codified Ordinances of Mayfield Heights 

(hereafter "the city ordinance"). The BTA affirmed that decision, finding no error with the 

BOR's determination that the tax was properly imposed "per the City's ordinances and 

related RITA rules and regulations." In its decision, the BTA agreed with the position of 
No. 14AP-890 5 

Mayfield Heights that, under Ohio law, "stock options have been repeatedly found to be 

earned for municipal income tax purposes when they are granted, but taxable when 

exercised." 

{¶ 13} While appellant's primary argument on appeal focuses on an "as-applied" 

constitutional challenge, we begin with a consideration of the BTA's finding that the BOR 

did not err in its determination that the tax was properly imposed with respect to stock 

options granted to appellant pursuant to the city's taxing ordinances and related RITA 

rules and regulations. On this point, appellant contends that the city, if it was "seriously 

concerned about the most revenue at the lowest cost, * * * would argue its right to tax 

arises when the income is received regardless of when the options are granted." 

{¶ 14} Several Ohio courts have addressed the issue of municipal tax liability 

associated with income from employee stock options. In Hartman v. Cleveland Heights, 

8th Dist. No. 66074 (Aug. 11, 1994), the court held that an employee's receipt of stock 

options was a form of compensation that was taxable under the city's Income Tax Rules 

and Regulations. In so holding, the court relied in part on C.I.R. v. Lo Bue, 351 U.S. 243 

(1956), in which the United States Supreme Court recognized that stock options are 

treated as compensation, includible as taxable income. 

{¶ 15} In Rice v. Montgomery, 104 Ohio App.3d 776 (1st Dist.1995), the plaintiffstaxpayers appealed from a trial court's decision affirming a determination by the 

Montgomery Board of Tax Appeals that the plaintiffs' exercise of an employee stock 

option was subject to municipal income taxation. The court in Rice affirmed the 

judgment of the trial court, finding that the grant of a stock option constituted 

compensation subject to municipal income taxation. In its decision, the court addressed 

and rejected the plaintiffs' contention that an owner exercising stock options would first 

have to realize money from the sale of the stock in order for the municipality to tax the 

stock option. Rather, the court determined, the city "is using the exercise event to assign a 

fair market value to the compensation earned in the form of stock options." Id. at 781. 

Thus, the court held, "[e]arned compensation only need be recognized, not realized, 

income for tax purposes," and the Ohio Revised Code "does not prevent recognized 

income from being taxed by municipalities." (Emphasis sic.) Id. 
No. 14AP-890 6 

{¶ 16} In Wardrop v. Middletown Income Tax Review Bd., 12th Dist. No. 

CA2007-09-235, 2008-Ohio-5298, the appellants, two retirees of AK Steel, challenged 

whether the city of Middletown could tax them on income received from stock options 

where the appellants neither worked nor lived in the city in the year of receipt. Under the 

facts of that case, the appellants, who both retired in 2003, exercised stock options in 

2004 which their employer had granted them during the course of their employment. For 

the 2004 tax year, the employer withheld and remitted to the city of Middletown 1.5 

percent of the compensation as city personal income tax. The appellants filed income tax 

returns with the city of Middletown for the tax year 2004, seeking a refund of a 

percentage of the income tax they paid based on the average number of days each was 

physically present in the city over the past five years. The city of Middletown denied the 

refund requests. The city of Middletown Income Tax Review Board also rejected 

appellants' claims for refunds, and the trial court affirmed that decision. 

{¶ 17} On appeal, the appellants raised several challenges, including a claim that 

the options should not be subject to the Middletown tax because they did not realize the 

income at issue until after their retirement. The court rejected this argument, agreeing 

with the trial court's determination that the critical issue "was when appellants earned the 

income, not when they received it." Id. at ¶ 16. 

{¶ 18} The appellants in Wardrop also asserted that the income they earned while 

working on behalf of AK Steel outside the territorial jurisdiction of Middletown was not 

subject to municipal income tax. More specifically, the appellants argued that the city was 

required to apportion their income based on the number of days they worked within the 

city. The city ordinance at issue in that case imposed "a municipal tax '[o]n all qualifying 

wages, commissions, and other compensation and other taxable income earned or 

received during the effective period * * * by nonresidents for work done or services 

performed or rendered in the City.' " Id. at ¶ 19. 

{¶ 19} The reviewing court in Wardrop construed the ordinance as 

"unambiguously" restricting the city to "taxing nonresidents for work activities occurring 

within its territorial boundaries." Id. at ¶ 20. The court found that, to the extent the 

appellants performed work within the city, such work was subject to taxation under the 

ordinance; conversely, to the extent they performed work outside of the city, it was not 
No. 14AP-890 7 

subject to taxation. The court therefore concluded that the appellants "were entitled to 

apportion the income, for municipal tax purposes, based on the number of days they 

worked within the city." Id. at ¶ 29. The court further found that "absent any guidance 

from Middletown prescribing an alternative method of allocation, appellants adopted a 

reasonable allocation based on the average number of days worked within the city over 

the preceding five years." Id. 

{¶ 20} Finally, the court in Wardrop addressed the appellants' argument that the 

trial court erred in finding that the appreciated value of their stock options was subject to 

the city's income tax. The appellants asserted that the profit was not subject to taxation 

under the city ordinance because they did not work or reside in Middletown when the 

appreciation occurred or when they exercised the options. The court, relying in part on 

the decision in Rice, rejected this argument, holding in part: 

[Appellants] earned compensation in the form of stock 

options while working for AK Steel. Middletown could tax 

this compensation to the extent it constituted "income earned 

* * * by nonresidents for work done or services performed or 

rendered in the City." * * * Middletown necessarily had to wait 

until the option-exercise date to assign a value to the 

compensation, however, because the value of the options 

could not be determined until then. Although [appellants] did 

not reside or work in Middletown when they exercised the 

options, the fact remains that they earned the stock-option 

compensation while working for AK Steel. Therefore, [the city 

ordinance] authorized Middletown to tax the resulting gain, 

which could be calculated only when appellants exercised the 

options. 

 

(Emphasis sic.) Wardrop at ¶ 47. 

{¶ 21} In the present case, Section 793.03 of the city ordinance states in part: "An 

annual tax * * * shall be imposed * * * at the rate of one percent per year upon * * * all 

salaries, wages, commissions and other compensation earned after December 31, 1971, by 

nonresidents of the City for work done or services performed or rendered in the City." 

{¶ 22} The BTA, in addressing appellant's claim that the city ordinance was 

improperly applied to the facts, found no error with the BOR's determination that the tax 

was properly imposed in accordance with the city's tax laws and related RITA rules and 

regulations. As previously noted, the BTA agreed with the city's argument that, in 
No. 14AP-890 8 

accordance with Ohio law, "stock options have been repeatedly found to be earned for 

municipal income tax purposes when they are granted, but taxable when exercised." In so 

holding, the BTA relied in part on Hartman and Rice. 

{¶ 23} Upon review, we find that the BTA's determination on this issue was neither 

unreasonable nor unlawful. Under Ohio law, the employer's grant of stock options to 

appellant while he worked in Mayfield Heights was a form of compensation for work done 

or services performed, but the value of those options could not be determined until the 

exercise of those options. The fact that appellant was retired, and did not reside or work 

in Mayfield Heights at the time the options were exercised (or cancelled), did not preclude 

the city from imposing the tax at issue (subject to the income tax rate in effect at the time 

the income was earned). Wardrop at ¶ 47 (although retirees did not reside or work in 

taxing city when they exercised the options, "the fact remains that they earned the stockoption compensation while working for" their employer and, therefore, the city ordinance 

authorized the city to tax the resulting gain "which could be calculated only when [the 

retirees] exercised the options"). (Emphasis sic.) 

{¶ 24} Further, we agree with appellees that the manner in which the city, through 

RITA, provided a partial refund to appellant was appropriate. As noted by appellees, the 

city apportioned the stock option income to account for time appellant worked outside the 

city, resulting in a partial refund of the tax paid to the city on the stock options. On this 

issue, we find persuasive the reasoning of the court in Wardrop, which deemed such a 

method of allocation as reasonable. See id. at ¶ 29. 

{¶ 25} We next address appellant's "as-applied" constitutional argument. In his 

appellate brief, appellant contends that neither the city nor the BTA "appear to 

acknowledge (or perhaps understand) the nature of [an] as-applied challenge," suggesting 

that they treated his constitutional claim as a facial challenge to the city's ordinance. 

{¶ 26} In general, statutes, ordinances and administrative rules "may be 

constitutionally challenged on their face or as applied." Wymsylo v. Bartec, Inc., 132 

Ohio St.3d 167, 2012-Ohio-2187, ¶ 20. Thus, "[a] statute which is constitutional on its 

face may be found unconstitutional if it is applied in a discriminatory manner." Cleveland 

v. Pfledger, 8th Dist. No. 58314 (Mar. 21, 1991). Further, " '[i]f a statute is 

unconstitutional as applied, the State may continue to enforce the statute in different 
No. 14AP-890 9 

circumstances where it is not unconstitutional, but if a statute is unconstitutional on its 

face, the State may not enforce the statute under any circumstances.' " Fagan v. Boggs, 

4th Dist. No. 10CA17, 2011-Ohio-5884, ¶ 22, quoting Ruble v. Ream, 4th Dist. No. 

03CA14, 2003-Ohio-5969, ¶ 17. 

{¶ 27} A facial challenge involves an allegation that "a statute, ordinance, or 

administrative rule, on its face and under all circumstances, has no rational relationship 

to a legitimate government purpose." Wymsylo at ¶ 21. By contrast, a party raising an asapplied constitutional challenge "alleges that 'the "application of the statute in the 

particular context in which he has acted, or in which he proposes to act, would be 

unconstitutional. The practical effect of holding a statute unconstitutional 'as applied' is 

to prevent its future application in a similar context, but not to render it utterly 

inoperative." ' " Id. at ¶ 22, quoting Yajnik v. Akron Dept. of Health, Housing Div., 101 

Ohio St.3d 106, 2004-Ohio-357, ¶ 14, quoting Ada v. Guam Soc. of Obstetricians & 

Gynecologists, 506 U.S. 1011 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Further, "[a] statute may be 

unconstitutional as applied if the government selectively enforces it in violation of equal 

protection rights." Fagan at ¶ 23. Thus, " '[t]hough the law itself be fair on its face, and 

impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority with an 

evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations 

between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal 

justice is still within the prohibition of the constitution.' " Id., quoting Yick Wo v. 

Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886). 

{¶ 28} Under Ohio law, "[b]ecause an as-applied challenge depends upon a 

particular set of facts, this type of constitutional challenge to a rule must be raised before 

the administrative agency to develop the necessary factual record." Wymsylo at ¶ 22. See

also Temponeras v. Ohio State Med. Bd., 10th Dist. No. 14AP-970, 2015-Ohio-3043, ¶ 15 

(noting that "a facial constitutional challenge may be raised for the first time in an appeal 

from an administrative agency, but an as-applied constitutional challenge must be raised 

first in the agency to allow the parties to develop an evidentiary record"). 

{¶ 29} In order to prevail on a constitutional challenge to a statute "as applied, the 

challenger has the burden of presenting clear and convincing evidence of a presently 

existing set of facts that make the statute unconstitutional when applied to those facts." 
No. 14AP-890 10 

Simpkins v. Grace Brethren Church of Delaware, 5th Dist. No. 13 CAE 10 0073, 2014-

Ohio-3465, ¶ 66. 

{¶ 30} Appellant argues on appeal that "in the context of a globally mobile 

workforce," the taxing statute at issue, "which defines the tax class as one whose liability 

arises when the options are granted * * * was not and practically could not be 

administered in [a] manner that was not discriminatory." Appellant contends that such 

"discrimination arises not from commission but from omission." According to appellant, 

while "the statute is facially constitutional," appellee "is not enforcing the statute" in 

instances in which "the costs of collecting it would be prohibitive." Appellant also raises 

what appears to be a selective enforcement equal protection argument, asserting that this 

case involves one "of affirmative discrimination in the statute's administration" based on 

the formula it used to calculate his tax liability, i.e., that the taxing authority utilized a 

standard that applied solely to him. 

{¶ 31} In order to prevail on a claimed denial of equal protection by selective 

enforcement of a law, a taxpayer is required to show: "(1) [the taxpayer], compared with 

others similarly situated, was selectively targeted; and (2) that such selective treatment 

was based on impermissible considerations such as race, religion, intent to inhibit or 

punish the exercise of constitutional rights, or malicious or bad faith intent to injure a 

person." Rubinovitz v. Rogato, 60 F.3d 906, 909-10 (1st Cir.1995). 

{¶ 32} Based upon this court's review of the record of proceedings before both the 

BOR and BTA, appellant's equal protection challenge, whether viewed as a standard "asapplied" claim or as a selective enforcement claim, fails. We note that, during the hearing 

before the BOR, appellant offered his own views regarding the application and 

enforcement of the city ordinance with respect to a hypothetical set of circumstances 

involving stock option holders residing outside the state or country. There is, however, no 

factual evidence in the record reflecting that the city administered or applied the 

ordinance in an unequal or unreasonable manner, or that the city treated similarly 

situated individuals differently. See, e.g., Hegwood v. Eau Claire, 676 F.3d 600, 603 (7th 

Cir.2012) ("When we are confronted with an as-applied challenge, we examine the facts of 

the case before us exclusively, and not any set of hypothetical facts under which the 

statute might be unconstitutional."). Nor did appellant submit evidence that the city 
No. 14AP-890 11 

administered the tax in a manner that singled him out in contrast to others similarly 

situated, or that it enforced the ordinance against him based upon discriminatory or 

impermissible considerations. Accordingly, appellant has failed to show by clear and 

convincing evidence that the income tax ordinance, as applied by the city under the facts 

of this case, violated his equal protection rights. 

{¶ 33} Appellant also contends that the BTA erred in ruling on his motion to 

compel answers to interrogatories. In his "issues presented for review," appellant 

contends he was deprived of his "right to sanctions for failure to obtain a timely response 

to interrogatories." 

{¶ 34} By way of background, the record indicates that appellant submitted 

interrogatories to the BOR during the administrative proceedings before the BTA. On 

September 19, 2012, the BOR submitted answers to the interrogatories. On October 19, 

2012, appellant filed a motion to compel answers to interrogatories propounded to the 

BOR. In the motion, appellant argued in part that the decision of the BOR had failed to 

address the constitutional issues he raised, and that the BOR's answers to his 

interrogatories "reflect an unwillingness * * * to effectively address this constitutional 

challenge." By order filed October 30, 2012, the BTA denied the motion to compel on the 

basis that appellant had not acted in a timely manner. 

{¶ 35} On November 8, 2012, appellant filed a motion for reconsideration of the 

BTA's order denying his motion to compel answers to interrogatories. On November 9, 

2012, the BTA rendered a decision granting appellant's motion for reconsideration based 

on the BTA's acknowledgment that "some confusion could have resulted from the board's 

failure to respond to the parties' multiple joint motions for extension of time 

response/object to interrogatories." In considering the merits of appellant's motion to 

compel, the BTA denied the motion on the basis that the BOR "provided adequate 

responses/appropriate objections to the subject discovery requests." 

{¶ 36} In general, the determination of discovery disputes and decisions with 

respect to discovery rules "are confided to the sound discretion of the BTA, and absent a 

showing that the BTA abused its discretion, such decisions by the BTA will not be 

disturbed on appeal." HK New Plan Exchange Property Owner II, LLC v. Hamilton Cty. 

Bd. of Revision, 122 Ohio St.3d 438, 2009-Ohio-3546, ¶ 16. 
No. 14AP-890 12 

{¶ 37} We note that, pursuant to Section 793.29(b) of the city ordinance, "[t]he 

Administrator shall enforce payment of all taxes owing to the City," while Section 793.32 

of the city ordinance authorizes the board of trustees of RITA, pursuant to an agreement 

entered into by the city, "to administer and enforce" Chapter 793 as the agent of the city. 

Section 793.36 of the city ordinance authorizes the BOR to hear appeals from "any ruling 

or decision of the Administrator" and, in its adjudicative capacity, the BOR has 

"jurisdiction to affirm, reverse or modify any such ruling or decision or any part thereof." 

{¶ 38} In the instant case, many of the interrogatories propounded to the BOR 

called for legal conclusions or sought explanations as to the administration and/or 

enforcement of the income tax, including inquiries as to the "legal basis" upon which the 

BOR "relies to assess the income tax," whether it was the position of the BOR "that the 

United States may tax * * * income of a US citizen that is subject to treaty exclusion," and 

whether it was the position of the BOR that "the United States may tax the income of a 

non US citizen." In response to these latter inquiries, the BOR stated that it "cannot 

speculate or opine on the taxability of the income by the United States." Appellant also 

inquired whether the BOR had "ever collected income tax on stock options exercised by 

US nationals who were former employees" of Alcancorp or Novelis. The BOR responded 

that it "is a reviewing board and does not collect tax." Upon review of the interrogatories 

and responses at issue, we find that the BTA did not abuse its discretion in its 

determination that the BOR provided adequate responses and objections to the discovery 

requests. Thus, the BTA did not err in denying the motion to compel. 

{¶ 39} Based upon this court's review of the record, we find the BTA's decision and 

order was reasonable and lawful. Accordingly, appellant's first, second, third, and fourth 

assignments of error are not well-taken and are overruled, and the order of the Ohio 

Board of Tax Appeal, affirming the decision of the City of Mayfield Heights Board of 

Review, is hereby affirmed. 

Order affirmed. 

KLATT and HORTON, JJ., concur. 

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