2004 D e c i sion s O p inion s of the U nit e d S t at e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit
8-12-2004 

# Gr ee n v . J o y C one C o P r e c e de n t i al or N on-P r e c e de n t i al : N on-P r e c e de n t i al D ocke t N o . 03-3859

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w . v i l l a no va . e du/thir dc ir c uit_2004/3981 NOT PRE CEDENT IAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE TH IRD CIR CU IT No: 03-3859 BRENDA GRE EN, Appellant

v. JOY CO NE COMPANY App eal from th e Un ited States District Co urt for the We stern D istrict of P enns ylvania (CivilAction No. 03-cv- 02471) Distric t Judg e: Ho n. Joy F. C onti Argued: May 12, 2004 Be for e: N ygaa rd, M cK ee, C her toff , Circuit Judges
. (Fil ed: August 12, 2004) Co lleen R. J ohn ston , Esq
. (Argued) Ogg, Cordes, Murphy & Ignelzi 245 F ort Pitt Bouleva rd Pitt sburgh, PA 15222 Gary F. Lynch, Esq. 36 North Jeffer son Stree t P.O. Box 7635 New C astl e, PA 16107 Attorney s for Appel lant Pat rick W . Ritc hey, E sq. (Argued) Ree d Sm ith2

435 Sixth Avenue Pitt sburgh, PA 15219 Attorney for Appellee OPI NION M cK ee, Circuit

Judge
. Brenda Green contends that J oy Cone Company ( “Joy Cone” or “the Company ”) made an impe rmissible pre-em ployment inqu iry under the Ameri cans with Dis abili ties Act (“A DA ”), 42 U.S .C. § 121 12(d), w hen it required h er to sign a m edical release fo rm as part of her employ ment appli cati on. The district co urt gra nted s um mary jud gm ent in favo r of Jo y Con e. For the rea sons discu ssed b elow , we c onclu de tha t this app eal is pate ntly friv olo us a nd w ill aff irm t he d istrict cou rt. I Green is a non- disabl ed indivi dual. On February 12, 2001, s he appli ed for employment

with JoyCone. Appx. 17, 19. As part of the employ ment appli cati on, she
wa s requ ired to s ign a b lank m edica l release form , wh ich state d:

I underst and that , aft er an offer of employ ment is made byJoy Co ne C om pany, or a t any time d uring my em ployme nt w ith the Compan y, Imay be required to submit to and pass a physi cal e xam inati on i n ac cor dan ce w ith o ur p olicy . . . . I further underst and and agree t hat, when requested to do so by the Company, I willexecute document s authorizing t he Company to obt ain, for it s int ernal us e, medica l records and information pert aining to any phy sicalexaminati on. App x. at 19. In addition, the relea se requires the ap plicant to list his/her health care1 During oral argument, when asked about her haste in rushing to the EEOC only three weeks after apply

ing for a job her client had not y et been rejected from, plaintiff’s counsel sugge sted that t

he statute of limitati ons had been a con siderati on. However, the ADA allow s a victim of discrimination 300 days from the act of termination to file a charge with the EEOC. See Watson v. Eastman Kodak Co., 235 F.3d 851 (3d Cir. 2000). We therefore can not help but conclude that counsel’s reliance upon the ADA’ s limitations period was disingenuous at best. 3 provider and physician( s). If t he applicant does not have a regular physi cian, he/she must lis t the na mes of any doc tors, clini cs, and/or medicalfacil iti es at which he/she r eceived treat me nt w ithin the p rev iou s 10 years. Id. As a matter of policy , JoyCone does not request an appli cant’s medical r ecords until t he appli cant has received an off er of employment . Appx. 17. Green did not received a response t o her appli cati on, and Joy Co ne n eve r acc esse d he r me dica l reco rds. Id. On M arch 6, 2001, after waiting a ll of t

hree weeks, and without eve r having bee n informed that her j ob applic ation ha d been rej ected, Green fil ed a charge wit h the Equal Employment Opport

unity Commission (“EEOC”), ass erti ng that t he incl usion of the medical r elease form was a per se vi ol atio n of th e ADA. 1 App. 21. Not sur prisi ngly , the EEOC d is mi ss ed th e c ha rg e b as ed on i ts in ab il it y to fi nd a

st atut or y vi ol atio n. On December 26, 2001, Gree n file d a class acti on complaint in the United State s District Court for t

he Western Dist

rict of Pennsy lvania . Appx. 2. On August 21, 2003, t he district co urt gra nted J oy Co ne’s m otion f or sum mary jud gm ent. G reen f iled a tim ely appe al. II Before address ing the “ merits ” of Green’s cl aim, we must determine whether she4

has constitutional s tanding to sue. I n order t o have consti tuti onal st anding, the pla inti ff must est ablis h that: (1) he/ she suffer ed an inj ury -in- fact; (2) there is a causal nexus between the i njuryand the conduct complained of; and (3) the injur y wil l li kelybe red ress ed b y a fav ora ble ju dicia l dec ision
. Joint St ock Societ

y v. UDV North America, Inc. , 266 F.3d 164, 175 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Luja n v. D efend ers of W ildlife , 504 U. S. 555, 560-61 ( 1992)). We review questi ons of sta nding de novo
. Hutchins v. I.R. S. , 67 F.3 d 40 , 42 ( 3d C ir. 19 95)
. The exist ence of an inj ury -in- fact may be demonstrated “through a ctual damage (emotiona l, pe cuniary , or ot herwise) , or t

hrough the pr esence of a continuing i llega l practi ce to which pl ainti ff is l ikely to be subj ect abse nt court intervention. ” Tice v. Centre Transp. Auth. , 247 F.3d 506, 519 (3d Cir. 2001). In other words, the injury must be “concrete and particularized” and “actualor imminent , not c onjectural or hypothetic al. ” Lujan , 504 U.S . at 56 0 (c itatio ns a nd i nter nal q uot ation ma rks o mitte d). “[A] violation of § 12112( d), wit hout such a s howing, pres ents no ‘ injury’ capable of remedy, and thus affords no basis for sui t.” Tice , 247 F.3 d at 5 19- 20 ( citatio ns o mitte d). Section 12112( d) does provi de that , pri or to making an offer of employ ment, an employe r cannot “ conduct a medic al examinat ion or make i nquiri es of a job applicant as to w hethe r such applic ant is an individ ual w ith a disa bility or as to th e natu re or se verity2 However, an employ er “may requir e a medicalexaminati on after an offer of employment

has been made to a j ob applic ant and pri or to t he commencement of the employment

duties of such appli cant, and may condi tion an of fer of employ ment on the results of such exam ination . . . .” § 12112(d ).
5 of s uch disa bility.” 2 Thus, a vi olati on of § 12112(d) occur s at t he moment an employ er conducts an i mproper medicalexaminati on or asks an i mproper dis abili ty -rel ated que stion , reg ard less o f the resu lts or resp ons e. See, e. g., Gri ffi n v. Steeltek, Inc
. , 160 F.3d 591 (10th Cir. 19 98); Armstrong v. Turner Industries, Inc. , 141 F.3 d 55 4 (5 th C ir. 19 98)
. It i s uncontes ted that JoyCone never attempted to acc ess Green’s medical r ecords and there is no evi dence that the Company di scri minated agai nst her based on any actual or percei ved disabi lit

y. Appx. 17. Even assumi ng arguendo that J oy Cone’s policy requiring appli cants t o sign a medic al rel ease form as part of i ts employment appli cati on is a per se vio latio n of § 12 112 (d), th ere is abs olu tely no cog niza ble in jury to G reen . Rather, any vi olati on was merelytechni cal. “[T]here i s no indi cati on in eit her the text of the A DA or in its h istory that a tec hnica l violation § 12 112 (d) w as inten ded to give ris e to damages li abili ty .” Tice , 247 F.3 d at 5 20. Green argues that she is entitled to injunctive relief based on Joy Co ne’s contin uing illegal pr actice. A lthoug h the C om pany ad mitted durin g arg um ent tha t it continue s to i nclude the medical release form as part of its job appli cati on, Green is not entitled to s eek inj unctive reli ef on behalf of he rsel f or other s on thi s recor d. It is, of
cou rse, tr ue th at an inju nctio n is in tend ed to pre ven t futu re v iolat ion s of plain tiff’ s righ ts.6

Ho we ver, “[ t]he pla intiff m ust show that [he/ she] . . . i s immediat elyin danger of sustai ning some direct i njuryas the r esult of the chal lenged . . . c onduct .
. . . ” City of Los Angeles v. Lyons , 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983) (c itat ions and i nternalquotati on marks omitt ed). Green’ s standi ng to seek i njuncti ve reli ef ther efore depends on whether Joy Cone is li kelyto acces s her medica l records in the future and discriminat e against her base d on som e actu al or pe rceive d disa bility. She h as of fered no p roof that this in jury is about to be fall her. I n fact, in her has te to f ile a class acti on without awai ting a de cisi on on her appli cati on for employ ment, she put hers elf i n a rathe r bizar re si tuati on where she is ar guing about a

job rej ecti on that ne ver occurred. There is no reason to t

hink that Green will apply for anothe r posit ion with J oy Cone in the i mmediate future, and s he does not ar gue that she will . Nor has she of fered anything t o show that the Com pany will change its policy and begin accessi ng applicants’
me dica l reco rds p rior to ma kin g of fers of e mp loym ent in vio latio n of § 12 112 (d). Moreover, Green’s medical r ecords would r eveal that she i s not act ually disabl ed, and there is nothi ng to suggest the Company’s conduct wou ld give rise t o a “regarded as” disa bility cla im. Simply put, de spit e counsel’ s apparent drive t o litigate , the clie nt has not suffered the injury necessary for the stand ing that is a cond ition preceden t to this court’s3 Green also fai ls t o sati sfy the causation and redressabili ty requir ements, which

are in exo rab le lin ked to injury-in -fac t.

4 Because we find that

Green does not have standi ng, we need not address anyof the oth er qu estions prese nted in this app eal. 7 jurisdiction under A rticle III. 3 Therefore, the dis tri ct court clear ly did not er

r in di smissi ng her su it. 4 III Bas ed on the fo rgoin g ana lysis, we w ill affirm the distric t court.