United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Argued February 22, 2017

Decided June 2, 2017

Before

No. 16-2874

ARMANI BELL,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

CITY OF CHICAGO, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Northern District of Illinois, 

Eastern Division.

No. 1:14-cv-06627

Joan Humphrey Lefkow, Judge.

O R D E R

Armani Bell was charged with the murder of John Lemon in January 2011 after 

participating in the drug deal that resulted in Mr. Lemon’s death. He was acquitted of 

the murder in February 2014, and six months later, he filed this civil lawsuit against the 

City of Chicago, Chicago Police Officers Reiff and Stanek, and Chicago Police 

 

* Of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, sitting by 

designation. 

WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge

JON E. DEGUILIO, District Judge*

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. APP. P. 32.1
No. 16-2874 Page 2

Department Superintendent Jody Peter Weis (collectively the “City Defendants”) and 

claimed that they violated his civil rights, conspired against him, and maliciously 

prosecuted him. 

Following the dismissal of his second amended complaint, Armani Bell filed this 

appeal challenging the court’s dismissal order, the sanction order of Bell’s attorney for 

filing a frivolous claim, and denial of Bell’s motion for leave to amend and “emergency” 

discovery motion. We find his arguments incomplete and unpersuasive, and affirm the 

district court.

Bell filed three complaints in this lawsuit: his original complaint, the first 

amended complaint, and the second amended complaint (“SAC”) which is the subject 

of the final judgment from which he appeals. In both his original and first amended 

complaints, Bell alleged that he was investigated for Lemon’s death because he had 

been accused of an earlier shooting that involved a gun with the same firing pin 

characteristics. He also alleged that Officers Stanek and Reiff knew that Bell did not kill 

Lemon, but they demanded that he identify his friend, Berney Lockhart, as the 

murderer. When Bell refused to do so, the officers put Bell in a suggestive lineup, which 

led to him being identified and wrongfully charged with murder. Bell claimed that, by 

these actions, Officers Stanek and Reiff violated the equal protection and due process 

clauses of the U.S. Constitution, violated 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2), committed civil 

conspiracy, and maliciously prosecuted him. He also claimed that the City of Chicago 

could be held liable under Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 

436 U.S. 658 (1978) and under an Illinois tort statute. 

The City Defendants moved to dismiss Bell’s original complaint, but Bell sought 

leave to amend and was granted an opportunity to file a first amended complaint, 

which he did. The City Defendants again moved to dismiss, and the district court 

dismissed Bell’s first amended complaint for failure to state a claim. The district court 

permitted Bell to file a second amended complaint within twenty-one days.

Bell then filed his SAC with essentially the same claims (civil rights claims 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, civil conspiracy, and malicious prosecution), but this time

he alleged that Officers Stanek and Reiff tortured and beat him to get him to identify 

Lockhart and omitted allegations about a suggestive lineup. The SAC also added the 

Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 7 (“FOP”) as a defendant, and brought a new claim

that that the FOP conspired with the City to violate Bell’s equal protection rights. This 
No. 16-2874 Page 3

new “equal protection” claim sought relief because a collective bargaining agreement 

(“CBA”) between the City and the FOP granted FOP members “rights over and above 

the rights enjoyed by other citizens in Chicago....” The City Defendants again moved 

under Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss Bell’s complaint, this time challenging all of Bell’s federal 

claims as time barred. The FOP also moved to dismiss the new claim against it and 

sought sanctions against Bell’s attorney for filing a frivolous and untimely claim.

After a full briefing of the motions to dismiss, Bell again moved for leave to file 

yet another amended complaint. He also filed an unusual “emergency” discovery 

motion which asked the district court to set aside an order issued by the Voluntary 

Labor Arbitration Tribunal. Bell argued that the arbitration order would result in the 

destruction of police disciplinary records, and preservation of all police disciplinary 

records was necessary to prove his current and future claims.

The district court first heard Bell’s motion seeking leave to amend. The court 

informed Bell that it had read the motions to dismiss and his case was likely to be 

dismissed “for failure to file on a timely basis.” The court noted that Bell’s “issues about 

accrual of claims are just simply not correct.” The court denied the motion to amend 

without prejudice noting that it may permit further amendment if any part of the 

complaint survived dismissal, but “at this point, it doesn’t look real promising.”

The district court next heard Bell’s “emergency” discovery motion. The court 

denied the motion because the disciplinary records of the officers involved in Bell’s case 

were already preserved, so the issue was moot. The court informed Bell that it did not 

have the power or reason to preserve records of non-party officers for future claims,

and the records of Officers Stanek and Reiff were not at risk of being destroyed. 

Finally, the district court dismissed the SAC, with prejudice, because it

established “an ironclad defense” of untimeliness. The district court found that because 

Bell’s federal claims were based on his arrest and murder charge in January 2011, the 

two-year statute of limitations expired well before Bell filed suit in August 2014. The 

dismissal order also granted FOP’s motion for sanctions, and admonished Bell’s counsel 

for filing a legally frivolous claim that was “so far from the mainstream of equal 

protection analysis that it cannot be fairly described as a nonfrivolous argument.” 

On appeal, Bell challenges each of the district courts’ orders mentioned above. 

We discuss each in turn. Bell first challenges the sanctions order, arguing that this court 
No. 16-2874 Page 4

has no jurisdiction over the appeal of sanctions “because there was no sanction since 

Plaintiff-Appellant’s attorney was not specifically identified” by the district court’s 

order. He contests that “the appeal of that issue should be dismissed.” Peculiarly, Bell 

seems to ask for dismissal of an issue he raised on appeal. Nevertheless, we find no 

jurisdictional issue because the district court’s order is unambiguous. It sanctioned

Bell’s attorney, sole practitioner Lawrence (Larry) Redmond, and it stated that attorney 

Redmond, despite failing to name himself on the notice of appeal as required by Federal 

Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c)(1)(A), intended to appeal the sanctions order against 

him. See Foreman v. Wadsworth, 844 F.3d 620, 626 (7th Cir. 2016) (finding jurisdiction 

where the attorney was not named on the notice of appeal, but was the only party with 

an interest in appealing the order of censure).

Upon review of the district court’s sanctions order, we find no abuse of 

discretion. Redmond was specifically reminded by the district court upon dismissal of 

the first amended complaint that any subsequent complaint must be consistent with 

Rule 11. Still, Redmond filed a claim against FOP that was void of legal merit. In fact, 

Redmond proclaimed at oral argument that there was no support for his “augmentation 

of rights” claim against the FOP in any of the fifty states or in any circuit court. He 

admitted that he knew his claim did not fit within any equal protection jurisprudence, 

yet he brought his claim as an equal protection claim. While Rule 11 “does not 

jeopardize aggressive advocacy or legal evolution,” Mars Steel Corp. v. Cont'l Bank N.A., 

880 F.2d 928, 932 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc), it does not permit claims that find no support 

in the law. The district court acted well within its discretion in admonishing Redmond

for filing this legally frivolous claim.

Bell next challenges the district court’s dismissal of the SAC. We review motions 

to dismiss de novo. Vesely v. Armslist LLC, 762 F.3d 661 (7th Cir. 2014). Bell’s federal 

claims all stemmed from his allegation that Officers Reiff and Stanek violated his

constitutional rights in January 2011 when they arrested, beat, and then charged him for 

murder. Bell filed his initial complaint on August 27, 2014. Therefore, because Bell’s 

federal causes of action began accruing at the time of his murder charge, they are timebarred under the two year statute of limitations. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 

(2007); see also Rosado v. Gonzalez, 832 F.3d 714 (7th Cir. 2016). As the federal claims were 

properly dismissed, Bell’s state law claims (civil conspiracy and malicious prosecution)

were properly dismissed without prejudice. See Groce v. Eli Lilly & Co., 193 F.3d 496, 501 

(7th Cir. 1999)(“[I]t is the well-established law of this circuit that the usual practice is to 

dismiss without prejudice state supplemental claims whenever all federal claims have 
No. 16-2874 Page 5

been dismissed prior to trial.”). We note that while Bell’s notice of appeal indicates that 

he sought to appeal the district court’s order dismissing the SAC, he did not raise a 

single argument challenging the untimeliness of his federal claims, nor did he address 

the time-barred nature of his claims at oral argument.

Instead of acknowledging the merits of the district court’s dismissal order, Bell 

argues that the district court erred by dismissing the SAC without first reviewing his

third amended complaint. We consider this a challenge to the district court’s denial of 

Bell’s motion to amend, and therefore review for an abuse of discretion. Mulvania v. 

Sheriff of Rock Island Cty., 850 F.3d 849, 854 (7th Cir. 2017). The district court considered

Bell’s requested amendment. In fact, the court denied his motion to amend six months 

before its dismissal order, finding that Bell’s “issues about accrual of claims are just 

simply not correct,” and the lawsuit “is going to be dismissed for failure to file on a 

timely basis.” The third amended complaint could not cure the fatal time bar. There is 

no abuse of discretion where the district court denies a motion for leave to amend when 

the proposed amendment would not cure the deficiencies identified in the earlier 

complaint. Gonzalez-Koeneke v. West, 791 F.3d 801 (7th Cir. 2002). Such was the case here.

Finally, Bell argues that the district court erred by denying his “emergency” 

discovery motion. We review such a discovery motion for abuse of discretion. See 

Packman v. Chicago Tribune Co., 267 F.3d 628, 646 (7th Cir. 2001). Bell argues that 

“evidence clearly shows” that he is likely to be profiled by the Chicago Police 

Department, and police disciplinary records may be needed “in the future to file a cause 

of action.” Although there are several problems with Bell’s argument, we need not 

address them. Bell’s lawsuit was properly dismissed with prejudice and all outstanding 

discovery or preservation requests are therefore moot.

We AFFIRM.