* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4.

### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-60629

CARLOS R DAVIS Plaintiff - Appellant v. ALTACARE CORPORATION; HEALTHPRIME INC; ADVENTIST HEALTH CENTER Defendants - Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, Hattiesburg

No. 2:05-CV-2027
Before KING, DeMOSS, and PRADO, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Plaintiff-appellant Carlos R. Davis, a/k/a Shaun Davis, appeals the district court’s summary judgment for defendants-appel l ees AltaCare Corp., HealthPrime, Inc., and Adventist Health Center, dismissi ng his claims for discrimination and retaliation in violation ofTitleVII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e etseq., and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, as well as his state law claims for defamation and intentional inflection of emotional distress. Davis also appeals the district court’sjudgment insofar as it dismissed as moot his motions to strike portions United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit 

### F I L E D September 8, 2008 Charles R. Fulbruge III ClerkNo. 07-60629

1 In Trevino v. Celanese Corp., we explained that:

The term “employer” as used in Title VI I of the Civil Rights Act was meant to be liberally construed. . . . Thus the rule has emerged that superficially distinct entities may beexposed to liability upon a finding that they represent a single, integrated enterprise: a single employer. Factors considered in determining whether distinct entities constitute an integrated enterpriseare (1) interrelation ofoperations, (2) centralized control of labor relations, (3) common management, and (4) common ownership or financial control. Courts applying this four-part standard in Title VII and related cases havefocused on the second factor: centralized control oflabor relations. This criterion has been further refined to the poi nt that “[t]he critical question to be answered then is: What entity made the final decisions regarding employment matters related to the person claiming discrimination?”
701 F.2d 397, 403–04 (5th Cir. 1983) (internal citations omitted); s ee also Johnson v. Crown Enters., Inc., 398 F.3d 339, 343 (5th Cir. 2005).

2 ofthe defendants’ summaryjudgment evidence. We affirm the judgment of the district court essentially for the reasons stated in its Memorandum Opinion and Order. We have one modest qualification, which does not affect ourjudgment. We note that there is some evidence that AltaCare Corp. (“AltaCare”) and HealthPrime, Inc. (“HealthPrime”)—in addition to Adventist Health Center (“Adventist”)—were Davis’s employers for the purpose of his federal claims. 1 Specifically, there is evidence in the record that Annice Horton, AltaCare’s Executive Director of Operations, signed Davis’s “Separation of Employment” form, formally terminating him. There is also evidence in the record that Horton verbally terminated Davis in an exit interview on November 5, 2004. ByNo. 07-60629

3 contrast, the only evidence that Davis’s direct supervisor at Adventist, Sandra King, terminated him is a sworn statement to that effect in the affidavit of A ltaCare’s Director of Human Resources, Brenda Brawner. With respect to HealthPrime, there is evidence that: (1) HealthPrime was owned by AltaCare; (2) Adventist used HealthPrime’s letterhead; and (3) HealthPrime issued Adventist’s employee code of conduct. Nevertheless, we need not resolve this issue. Because we conclude that the district court’s resolution of the merits of all of Davis’s claims was correct, any potential liability ofAltaCare and HealthPrime is extinguished along with that of Adventist. With respect to Davis’s late-filed motions (denied by the district court as
moot) to strike portions of defendants’ summary judgment evidence, only the statements attached to Horton’s affidavit concerning Davis’s actions and inactions on the night ofJuly 14, 2004, could possibly affect Davis’s substantial rights. See Rock v. Huffco Gas & Oil Co., 922 F.2d 272, 277 (5th Cir. 1991). We first note that these statements were used for the non-hearsay purpose of showi ng the defendants’ state of mind in terminating Davis. But even if the district court had considered the statements for the truth ofthe matter asserted in them, it would not have abused its discretion because the business records exception in Rule 803(6) would apply. F E D
. R. E VI D
. 803(6); see Positive Black Talk, Inc. v. Cash Money Records, Inc., 394 F.3d 357, 376 (5th Cir. 2004); United States v. Duncan, 919 F.2d 981, 986–87 (5th Cir. 1990); Missouri Pac. R.R. Co.
v. Austin, 292 F.2d 415, 422–23 (5th Cir. 1961); see also Sana v. Hawaiian Cruises, Ltd., 181 F.3d 1041, 1047 (9th Cir. 1999). With respect to the affidavit of defense expert Polly Darnall, there is no indication in the district court’s Memorandum Opinion and Order that the court relied on it. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.