IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION THREE

STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Respondent,

v.

JERRY WAYNE CLARK,

Appellant.

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No. 37838-1-III

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

LAWRENCE-BERREY, J. — Jerry Wayne Clark appeals his conviction of second 

degree assault for strangling his stepfather. He argues the trial court abused its discretion 

by allowing a medical expert to testify in a manner that required the jury to speculate 

whether his stepfather’s injuries were caused by strangulation. Because Clark did not 

object on this basis at trial, we decline to review this purported error. 

Clark also argues, and the State concedes, that resentencing is required because his 

two convictions for possession of a controlled substance should not be included in his 

offender score. We remand for resentencing.

FILED

JANUARY 11, 2022

In the Office of the Clerk of Court

WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
No. 37838-1-III

State v. Clark

2

FACTS

On March 9, 2020, Larry Michael McFarland and his wife, Gloria Richardson, 

returned to their Spokane home after dinner. McFarland and Richardson’s adult son,

Jerry Wayne Clark, exchanged hostile words. Clark punched McFarland in the face two 

or three times. McFarland fell on the floor, and Clark got on top of him and put his hands 

around McFarland’s throat. Clark said, “I’m going to kill you, I’m going to kill you.” 

Report of Proceedings (RP) at 137; see also State’s Ex. 10 at 4 min., 5 sec.1 McFarland 

told Clark to get off him, and he became dizzy. Richardson yelled at her son until he got 

off McFarland, and Clark then left. During the altercation, Richardson’s hand was 

injured. 

Richardson called the police. The responding officers found McFarland in a state 

of shock with visible injuries on his face and marks on his neck. The officers 

photographed McFarland’s injuries. Medics assisted McFarland at his home. He went to 

the hospital at some point following the incident and had trouble communicating with the 

doctors. 

 

1 State’s Exhibit 10 is the bodycam footage from the police officer who 

interviewed Richardson on the night of the incident.
No. 37838-1-III

State v. Clark

3

Trial court proceedings

The State charged Clark with second degree assault by strangulation against 

McFarland (count 1) and fourth degree assault against Richardson (count 2). Both crimes 

carried the domestic violence family or household member enhancement as defined by 

RCW 26.50.010(6). 

Expert testimony on strangulation

The State sought to call registered nurse Cassandra Klakken Viramontes to testify 

on the effects of strangulation. Clark objected, arguing: (1) the expert testimony will not 

be helpful to the jury because most people are familiar with the concept of strangulation, 

(2) strangulation is an element of the charged crime so testimony on that topic would 

invade the province of the jury, and (3) in the alternative, the State provided no 

information on the established scientific methodology behind the proposed testimony, so 

a Frye2 hearing is necessary.

The court ruled that Nurse Klakken’s testimony was admissible under ER 702. 

Its written order read, in part:

[The] Court finds that the information provided by the state does not require 

a separate hearing to determine Ms. Klakken’s credentials as an expert. 

[ER] 702 is broad in its allowance of admitting expert witness[es] if the 

court believes that it will assist the trier of fact. A qualified expert may 

 

2 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
No. 37838-1-III

State v. Clark

4

testify in the form of an opinion. It is possible that this testimony will assist 

the trier of fact. Generally, the public will know some symptoms of 

strangulation such as raspy voice or sore throat, however there are technical 

aspects and/or symptoms to blocking the flow of breath and/or blood such 

as petechia [sic] that the trier of fact may not be aware of. Admittance of 

testimony is still subject to prior foundation being laid as an expert and 

defense counsel may question qualifications. . . .

Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 35.

Trial

The State called five witnesses. 

Larry Michael McFarland

McFarland testified that he did not remember what happened before the incident, 

but remembered Clark “came at” him when he and Richardson arrived home from dinner. 

RP at 135. He said, “[Clark] hit me in the face” with a closed fist. RP at 135. Clark is “a 

lot bigger” than McFarland, who is 72 years old. RP at 136. After Clark hit him, 

McFarland said: “I hit the floor, and he had got on top of me and strangled me.” 

RP at 136. Clark used enough pressure to “put bruises on the side of [his] neck.” 

RP at 137. McFarland was able to breathe and see while Clark’s hands were around his 

neck. Although McFarland could not see Richardson, he said Clark got off him due to his 

wife’s intervention.
No. 37838-1-III

State v. Clark

5

After Clark left, McFarland could not stand up to call the police. He does not 

remember how long he laid on the floor. When he got to the hospital, he “couldn’t talk at 

all.” RP at 145. He “probably” could not remember everything that happened that night, 

although he had memory problems before that evening. RP at 139. His doctors said he 

“had a couple strokes” after the incident. RP at 141. His balance is off, and he falls 

down a lot. These problems were all diagnosed after the incident. 

On cross-examination, the defense inquired further about the effects of the 

incident. The following exchange took place:

[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] . . . Would you be surprised if the medical 

records said you did not have a stroke? 

[MR. McFARLAND:] Yeah, very surprised since I had—according 

to the doctor at Deaconess, I had some bleeds where I had my strokes. I 

took medicine for that to stop the bleeding.

. . . .

[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] There’s no mention of this incident in 

those records. I believe your prior testimony was that you had some 

problems documented from this incident, . . . would you be surprised that 

there is no reference to this incident—

[MR. McFARLAND:] Yeah—

RP at 143-44. McFarland again stated that he could breathe and see during the incident 

and did not have bloodshot eyes afterward, only some bruises. 
No. 37838-1-III

State v. Clark

6

Responding police officers

Officer Adam Anderson responded to the scene that evening. He testified: “When 

I saw Mr. McFarland, the first thing I noticed was that he had dried blood around his lips, 

he had a cut or dried blood on—above his right eye, and it looked like an abrasion on his 

right cheek.” RP at 46. When there was more light, Officer Anderson “saw some scratch 

marks around his neck, some red abrasions around his neck similar to if somebody was in 

a physical altercation of some sort.” RP at 47. There were two or three scratch marks on 

both sides of McFarland’s neck. McFarland seemed “a little dazed” and “just kind of 

shocked.” RP at 46. It was difficult to have a conversation with him, and Officer 

Anderson had to continuously redirect him to get the story. Officer Anderson 

acknowledged that McFarland’s age could have affected his ability to have a 

conversation. 

Officer Anderson had training on injuries related to strangulation and noted that if 

someone is strangled long enough, they could have abrasions, early signs of bruising on 

the neck, and bloodshot eyes. McFarland did not appear to have bloodshot eyes. 

Officer Vanessa Johnson also responded to the scene. She testified that “the 

residents inside were visibly shaken or pretty upset.” RP at 148. McFarland had “[f]acial 

trauma” and was obviously bleeding from injuries on his face. RP at 153. Officer 
No. 37838-1-III

State v. Clark

7

Johnson interviewed Richardson inside the home and found her to be very animated like 

“[s]omething just occurred.” RP at 149. Richardson got emotional and cried. She also 

had an abrasion that was bleeding on the back of her right hand. Richardson was treated 

by medics that night but did not go to the hospital. 

Gloria Richardson3

Richardson testified that, at the time of the incident, Clark had been living with her 

and McFarland. She recalled that Clark and McFarland got into a scuffle. She otherwise 

did not remember much, did not know why certain things happened, and revealed that she 

had multiple split personality disorder. After her testimony, the State successfully moved 

to admit bodycam footage of Officer Johnson’s interview with her. 

The bodycam footage shows Officer Anderson’s six-minute interview with 

Richardson. Richardson said that McFarland went to the kitchen to fix some ice cream. 

She heard McFarland tell Clark he may need to find another place to go because they 

were scared of him. Richardson said, “[Clark] got up and spit in my face” and “hit me” 

on the shoulder. When Clark was fighting with Richardson, McFarland tried to call 911. 

Clark then took McFarland down on the bathroom floor and was “choking him.” Clark 

 

3 As the trial date neared, Richardson said she would not testify. This prompted 

the State to request and be granted a material witness warrant. Richardson’s reluctance to 

testify against her son explains her sparse testimony at trial. 
No. 37838-1-III

State v. Clark

8

was saying, “I’m going to kill you, I’m going to kill you.” McFarland kept saying, “It’s 

okay, I hear you.” Richardson jumped on Clark’s back to get him off McFarland, and 

Clark knocked her down. She did not know how long Clark was choking McFarland. 

See State’s Ex.10.

Cassandra Klakken

 Nurse Klakken is a registered nurse in the emergency department of Holy Family 

Hospital, a position she has held for 13 years. She has attended numerous trainings, 

including an advanced training for strangulation and asphyxiation. She holds a 

certification in emergency nursing. She presents on strangulation to forensic nursing 

students and teaches a five-hour class on strangulation. The State asked that Nurse 

Klakken be recognized as an expert, and Clark did not object. 

Nurse Klakken follows methodology that is accepted practice in her medical 

community when she examines someone for strangulation. Other physicians and doctors 

use the same methods and ask the same questions to determine whether a patient has been 

strangled. 

Nurse Klakken testified that all strangulations are serious because they carry the 

possibility of lifelong consequences. She explained: 

Depending on the type of injuries that a strangulation victim receives, . . . 

[t]hey could have memory loss, they could have difficulty with higher 
No. 37838-1-III

State v. Clark

9

functioning, so personality changes, time management, injury to the frontal 

lobe.

There’s long-term consequences that could show up years later where 

there’s microclots. So if you think about a person who’s had strokes, you 

would see those same type of physical events later. . . .

RP at 164-65. It can be difficult to determine where a patient’s stroke-like symptoms 

came from. 

Nurse Klakken explained that people confuse strangulation with choking. It is 

difficult to diagnose strangulation because: “More than 50 percent of people who have 

been strangled don’t have any . . . visible injuries.” RP at 166. If there are visible signs, 

they may be marks on the neck. There also may be petechiae, “where the capillaries 

break open and blood will seep into the tissue.” RP at 167-68. This looks like “tiny red 

spots” on the face, ears, in the mouth, or on the scalp. RP at 168. Some people’s 

capillaries in their eyes rupture. Other symptoms include hoarseness of the voice, 

intonation change, and swelling.

Nurse Klakken described two types of strangulation: one where force is exerted 

against the trachea blocking air flow and another where pressure is applied to the lateral 

sides around the neck blocking blood flow to the brain. The latter type “can cause tearing 

in the vessels, so it can pool in the neck and create swelling” or “additional bruising.” 

RP at 172. She described the physiology of blood entering and leaving the brain and what 
No. 37838-1-III

State v. Clark

10

happens when there is a blockage. A person can still speak when their blood flow is 

blocked as long as their trachea is intact. 

On cross-examination, Nurse Klakken explained that with strangulation victims, 

“[t]here’s a list of symptoms, and any of those symptoms could be reported.” RP at 184. 

Vision problems may happen or may not, “It’s a crapshoot.” RP at 184. Nurse Klakken 

stated that the prosecution asked her to testify but she knew very little about the case 

other than it involved an alleged strangulation. She never met Mr. McFarland or any 

other witness and she had not looked at the medical records, photographs, or police 

reports. The following exchange took place:

[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] Okay. So you don’t know anything at all 

about this case, correct?

[NURSE KLAKKEN:] Correct.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] So you’re not in a position to say if there’s 

been strangulation—

[NURSE KLAKKEN:] No.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] —or what happened or anything like that?

[NURSE KLAKKEN:] I’m not here to make that determination. 

These fine folks over here are the ones that’s [sic] doing that.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] Okay. But I’m just asking you if you 

were given any information.

[NURSE KLAKKEN:] Oh, yeah. No, none at all.

RP at 185. Following Nurse Klakken’s testimony, the parties rested their cases. 
No. 37838-1-III

State v. Clark

11

Jury instructions and closing arguments

The court instructed the jury that “strangulation” means “to compress a person’s 

neck, thereby obstructing the person’s blood flow or ability to breathe, or doing so with 

the intent to obstruct the person’s blood flow or ability to breathe.” CP at 58.4

In closing, the prosecutor argued that McFarland’s symptoms were similar to some 

of those described by Nurse Klakken:

[McFarland] said he couldn’t get up off the floor. He also testified 

that he has had certain amount of injuries or cognitive defects since this 

occurred. Memory, he’s had memory problems. He testified to that. He 

said he didn’t have them near as bad until after this occurred. He talked 

about having stroke-like symptoms. . . . Ms. Klakken testified that, when 

blood is restricted or breath is restricted, an individual later on may have 

those kind of symptoms.

[Nurse Klakken] testified there’s no clear way of knowing if those 

are associated with something else or whether it was strangulation, but she 

said those symptoms do occur later down the line from strangulation. This 

happened in March. It is now September. These symptoms, he said, have 

been occurring since then.

RP at 226-27. The prosecutor then argued that McFarland exhibited petechiae in his eyes 

and face and told the jury to “look closely” at the photographs of him following the 

incident. RP at 228. 

 

4 We note that “obstructing” and “obstruct” can imply either full or partial 

blockage. This issue is not before us.
No. 37838-1-III

State v. Clark

12

In closing, defense counsel argued there was no medical evidence of strangulation 

and that Nurse Klakken’s testimony did not apply to this situation because she did not 

“tie anything to this case.” RP at 235.

Verdict and sentencing

The jury found Clark guilty of second degree assault by strangulation against 

McFarland and returned a special verdict finding they were members of the same family 

or household. The jury found Clark not guilty of fourth degree assault against his mother. 

Clark agreed to the State’s understanding of his criminal history, which included 

two possession of a controlled substance (PCS) convictions: a February 3, 2014 

conviction from Kootenai County, Idaho, and an August 24, 2007 conviction from 

Spokane County, Washington. Clark’s offender score was calculated as 8, resulting in a 

sentencing range of 53-70 months. 

At sentencing, the defense renewed its objection to Nurse Klakken’s testimony. 

The court overruled the objection, stating: 

As it relates to the strangulation expert, I actually learned a lot. I 

think it did go beyond the scope of the average jury, how can somebody talk 

like Mr. McFarland when, you know, when they’ve been choked and the 

distinction between the trachea not being crushed and the cartilage rings in 

the throat. So I don’t think . . . it was unnecessary window dressing that 

was very prejudicial. It was very informational. . . .

RP at 269.
No. 37838-1-III

State v. Clark

13

The trial court sentenced Clark to a midrange sentence of 61.5 months’ 

incarceration. He timely appealed to this court.

5

ANALYSIS

EXPERT TESTIMONY

Clark contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to exclude the expert 

testimony on strangulation. He argues the testimony, which was general in nature, invited 

the jury to speculate that McFarland’s mini-strokes were caused by strangulation, thus 

resulting in his conviction. We decline to review this purported error. 

“A party may assign evidentiary error on appeal only on a specific ground made at 

trial. This objection gives a trial court the opportunity to prevent or cure error.” State v. 

Kirkman, 159 Wn.2d 918, 926, 155 P.3d 125 (2007) (citation omitted); see also

RAP 2.5(a).

Before trial, Clark objected to the expert witness testimony on three grounds: 

(1) the expert witness would not be helpful to the jury because most people are familiar 

with the concept of strangulation, (2) strangulation is an element of the charged crime so 

 

5 On appeal, Clark moved to supplement the record with the bodycam footage of 

Richardson’s interview with Officer Johnson. The jury had seen the video but it was not 

transcribed. A commissioner of this court granted the motion to supplement the record. 
No. 37838-1-III

State v. Clark

14

testimony on that topic would invade the province of the jury, and (3) a Frye hearing is 

necessary. 

Nurse Klakken’s testimony provided information about strangulation that even the 

trial court did not know. For this reason, Clark does not reiterate his first argument on 

appeal. He raises a new argument: that Nurse Klakken’s testimony, which was general in 

nature, required the jury to speculate that strangulation caused McFarland’s mini-strokes.

Trial counsel for Clark could have raised this precise objection at the end of Nurse 

Klakken’s testimony, thereby giving the trial court an opportunity to cure any error. 

Instead, during closing argument, trial counsel adeptly argued that the jury must find 

Clark not guilty because the State had failed to tie Nurse Klakken’s testimony to the case. 

Rather than objecting to the potential flaw in the expert’s testimony, trial counsel used it 

to her advantage.

Because Clark did not object at trial on the basis he now raises on appeal, we 

decline to review the purported evidentiary error.6

 

6 Shortly before oral argument, the State raised RAP 2.5(a) for the first time on 

appeal in a statement of additional authorities. This was improper. A new appeal 

argument cannot be raised in this fashion. The State subsequently acknowledged this, 

albeit tacitly, in a supplemental statement of additional authorities, informing this court 

that it has the discretion to raise RAP 2.5(a) sua sponte. Be assured, this panel saw this 

issue well before oral argument. 
No. 37838-1-III

State v. Clark

15

RESENTENCING UNDER BLAKE

Clark contends he is entitled to resentencing pursuant to State v. Blake, 197 Wn.2d 

170, 481 P.3d 521 (2021). The State concedes this issue.7

Washington PCS conviction

In Blake, our Supreme Court held that Washington’s possession of a controlled 

substance statute is constitutionally invalid. 197 Wn.2d at 186. A prior conviction that is 

constitutionally invalid on its face may not be considered in a defendant’s offender score. 

State v. Ammons, 105 Wn.2d 175, 187-88, 718 P.2d 796 (1986). Under Blake, Clark’s 

2007 PCS conviction from Spokane County, Washington, is invalid and may not be 

considered in his offender score. The conviction must be struck at resentencing. 

Idaho PCS conviction

Prior out-of-state convictions may be counted in an offender score if they are 

comparable to a Washington crime. RCW 9.94A.525(3). This ensures defendants with 

equivalent convictions are treated equally regardless of whether the prior convictions 

were incurred in Washington or elsewhere. State v. Markovich, 19 Wn. App. 2d 157, 

 

7 The State concedes that Clark’s two Washington PCS convictions must be struck

and therefore does not discuss comparability. Clark has one Washington and one Idaho 

PCS conviction. Because the breadth of the State’s concession is unclear, we fully 

address this assignment of error.
No. 37838-1-III

State v. Clark

16

172-73, 492 P.3d 206 (2021). We review comparability of convictions de novo. State v. 

Olsen, 180 Wn.2d 468, 472, 325 P.3d 187 (2014).

“If a statute is unconstitutional, it is and has always been a legal nullity.” State ex. 

rel Evans v. Bhd. of Friends, 41 Wn.2d 133, 143, 247 P.2d 787 (1952). Because 

Washington’s PCS statute “has always been a legal nullity,” there is no Washington 

offense with which to compare Clark’s 2014 PCS conviction from Idaho. See Markovich, 

19 Wn. App. 2d at 173-74 (although Blake does not invalidate out-of-state PCS 

convictions, offender scores including those convictions are inaccurate because they are 

no longer comparable to a valid Washington offense). Thus, we remand for the trial court 

to recalculate Clark’s offender score without the Washington or Idaho PCS convictions 

and to resentence Clark.8

 

8 On remand, the State may be able to prove factual comparability to a different 

Washington statute. However, the State may only rely on “facts that were admitted, 

stipulated to, or proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Olsen, 180 Wn.2d at 478. At 

resentencing, “both parties have the opportunity to present any evidence relevant to 

ensure the accuracy of the criminal history.” State v. Jones, 182 Wn.2d 1, 10-11, 338 

P.3d 278 (2014).
No. 37838-1-III 

State v. Clark 

Affirm conviction, but remand for resentencing. 

A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the 

Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to 

RCW 2.06.040. 

Lawrence-Berrey, J. 

WE CONCUR: 

Q. ' c.. :t:' ~~ ,.:r. Pennell, C.J. Fearing, J. 

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