Third District Court of Appeal

State of Florida 

Opinion filed September 20, 2023.

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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No. 3D22-1870

Lower Tribunal No. 21-10 AP

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Cristina Hernandez,

Petitioner,

vs.

City of Miami Code Enforcement Board,

Respondent.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade 

County, Appellate Division, Lisa S. Walsh, Daryl E. Trawick and Maria de 

Jesus Santovenia, Judges.

David J. Winker, P.A., and David J. Winker, for petitioner.

Victoria Méndez, City Attorney, and Kerri L. McNulty, Litigation & 

Appeals Division Chief, and Marguerite C. Snyder, Assistant City Attorney, 

for respondent.

Before LOGUE, C.J., and EMAS and BOKOR, JJ. 

PER CURIAM.
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Upon consideration, the petition for second-tier certiorari is denied. 

See Custer Med. Ctr. v. United Auto. Ins. Co., 62 So. 3d 1086, 1092 (Fla. 

2010) (providing:

This Court has continually applied certain 

fundamental principles for the use of certiorari to 

review decisions rendered by the circuit court acting 

in its appellate capacity from the time common-law 

certiorari jurisdiction was first recognized in 1855. 

See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Kaklamanos, 843 So.

2d 885 (Fla. 2003); Ivey v. Allstate Ins. Co., 774 So.

2d 679 (Fla.2000); Haines City Cmty. Dev. v. Heggs, 

658 So. 2d 523 (Fla. 1995); Combs v. State, 436 So.

2d 93 (Fla. 1983); Halliday v. Jacksonville & Alligator 

Plank Rd. Co., 6 Fla. 304 (1855). We have 

consistently observed that “as a case travels up the 

judicial ladder, review should consistently become 

narrower, not broader.” Haines, 658 So. 2d at 530. 

Therefore, when a district court considers a petition 

for second-tier certiorari review, the “inquiry is limited 

to whether the circuit court afforded procedural due 

process an whether the circuit court applied the 

correct law,” or, as otherwise stated, departed from 

the essential requirements of law. Id.; see also

Kaklamanos, 843 So. 2d at 889–90. The departure 

from the essential requirements of the law necessary 

for granting a writ of certiorari is something more than 

a simple legal error. See Kaklamanos, 843 So. 2d at 

889 (citing Ivey, 774 So. 2d at 682). Rather, a district 

court should exercise its discretion to grant review 

only when the lower tribunal has violated a clearly 

established principle of law resulting in a miscarriage 

of justice.) (footnote omitted). 

See also Advanced Chiropractic & Rehab. Ctr. Corp. v. United Auto. Ins. Co., 

103 So. 3d 866, 869 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (holding that petitioner waived its 
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claim of error in second-tier certiorari review where it failed to raise the error 

as a basis for reversal in its appellate brief to the circuit court acting in an

appellate capacity); Detournay v. City of Coral Gables, 127 So. 3d 869, 873 

(Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (reaffirming that “the City's discretion to file, prosecute, 

abate, settle, or voluntarily dismiss a building and zoning enforcement action 

is analogous to a prosecutor's discretion to file, prosecute, abate, settle, or 

dismiss a criminal or civil lawsuit. The prosecutor's discretion in this regard 

is a pure executive function that cannot be supervised by the courts, absent 

the violation of a specific constitutional provision or law”) (citing Trianon Park 

Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 468 So. 2d 912, 922 (Fla.1985)).