alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Maria Del Rocio SALAZAR-GARCIA, Petitioner, v. Michael B. MUKASEY, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 07-70354.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Dec. 3, 2007.*

Filed Jan. 9, 2008.

Maria Del Rocio Salazar-Gareia, Océano, CA, pro se.

Ronald E. LeFevre, Chief Counsel, Office of the District Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, Joseph D. Hardy, U.S. Department of Justice Civil Division, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

Before: GOODWIN, WALLACE and FISHER, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Maria Salazar-Gareia, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions pro se for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ denial, as untimely and without merit, of her motion to reopen proceedings in order to apply for protection under the Convention Against Torture following the denial of her application for cancellation of removal. *855Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We deny the petition for review.

Salazar-Garcia contends that her motion to reopen was timely because there is no time limit for motions to reopen that seek relief under CAT and because she only recently became aware of “widespread torture” in Mexico. Salazar-Garcia filed her motion to reopen outside the ninety-day time limit set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). In addition, she failed to present material evidence of changed country conditions that, for the most part, was not available and could not have been presented at the previous proceeding. *See*8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(h); *He v. Gonzales,*501 F.3d 1128, 1131-32 (9th Cir.2007).

Salazar-Garcia also contends that the Board erred in concluding that she failed to establish a prima facie case of eligibility for relief under CAT. The generalized evidence attached to her motion did not meet this standard. *See Nuru v. Gonzales,*404 F.3d 1207, 1216 (9th Cir.2005) (holding that CAT applicant must establish that it is more likely than not that he would be tortured if removed to his native country); *Ordonez v. INS,*345 F.3d 777, 785 (9th Cir.2003) (holding that motion to reopen must establish prima facie case demonstrating reasonable likelihood that requirements for relief have been satisfied).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
#### Paul Gregory HOUSE, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Ricky BELL, Warden, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 00-6136.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Oct. 25, 2006.

Stephen M. Kissinger, Federal Defender Services, Knoxville, TN, for Petitioner-Appellant.

Alice B. Lustre, Asst. Atty. General, Jennifer L. Smith, Asst. Atty. General, Office of the Attorney General, Michael E. Moore, Solicitor General, Paul G. Summers, Attorney General, Tennessee Attor*550ney General’s, Nashville, TN, for Respondent-Appellee.

ORDER

This appeal is now before us on remand from the Supreme Court, *House v. Bell,*— U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 2064, 165 L.Ed.2d 1 (2006). In light of the Court’s opinion (and the Tennessee attorney general’s statement in respondent’s brief before the Supreme Court that unexhausted issues remain under Tenn.Code. Ann. § 40-30-117(a)(2)(4)), we ask that the parties submit letter briefs addressing whether remand to the courts *of Tennessee*is appropriate in order to allow petitioner to exhaust his state-court remedies on his actual innocence claim.

Letter briefs shall be due within sixty days of this order and shall not exceed fifteen pages.
EXHIBIT 31.1 CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER I, Donald J.
  Ciappenelli, certify that:1.
I have
  reviewed this annual report on Form 10-KSB of Le@P Technology, Inc.;2.
Based on my
  knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material
  fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made,
  in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not
  misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;3.
Based on my
  knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included
  in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial
  condition, results of operations and cash flows of the small business issuer
  as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;4.
The small
  business issuers other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for
  establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined
  in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the small business issuer
  and have;a)
Designed
  such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls
  and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material
  information relating to the small business issuer, including its consolidated
  subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities,
  particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;b)
Evaluated
  the effectiveness of the small business issuers disclosure controls and procedures
  and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the
  disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this
  report based on such evaluation; andc)
Disclosed in
  this report any change in the small business issuers internal control over
  financial reporting that occurred during the small business issuers most
  recent fiscal quarter (the small business issuers fourth fiscal quarter in
  the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably
  likely to materially affect, the small business issuers internal control
  over financial reporting; and5.
The small
  business issuers other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on
  our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to
  the small business issuers auditors and the audit committee of small
  business issuers board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent
  functions):a)
All
  significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation
  of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to
  adversely affect the small business issuers ability to record, process,
  summarize and report financial information; andb)
Any fraud,
  whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have
  a significant role in the small business issuers internal control over
  financial reporting. Date: March
28, 2007 /s/ Donald J. CiappenelliDonald J.
  CiappenelliChief
  Executive Officer
II 

114TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 365 

To improve rangeland conditions and restore grazing levels within the Grand 

Staircase-Escalante National Monument, Utah. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

FEBRUARY 4, 2015 

Mr. HATCH (for himself and Mr. LEE) introduced the following bill; which was 

read twice and referred to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources 

A BILL 

To improve rangeland conditions and restore grazing levels 

within the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument, Utah. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. IMPROVEMENT OF RANGELAND CONDITIONS 

4 AND RESTORATION OF GRAZING LEVELS, 

5 GRAND STAIRCASE-ESCALANTE NATIONAL 

6 MONUMENT. 

7 (a) IN GENERAL.—As soon as practicable after the 

8 date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Interior 

9 shall implement a management program within areas of 


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2 

•S 365 IS

1 the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument that 

2 are administered by the Bureau of Land Management— 

3 (1) to improve rangeland conditions for wildlife 

4 and livestock carrying capacity in those areas; and 

5 (2) to restore livestock grazing to the level of 

6 usage in those areas that existed as of September 

7 17, 1996. 

8 (b) PERMITS.—In issuing or renewing grazing per9 mits and in issuing or modifying allotment management 

10 plans for livestock grazing in the areas described in sub11 section (a), the Secretary of the Interior shall incorporate 

12 reasonable standards and guidelines that are consistent 

13 with— 

14 (1) the ‘‘Utah Standards for Rangeland Health 

15 and Guidelines for Grazing Management for BLM 

16 Lands in Utah’’, approved by the Secretary of the 

17 Interior on May 20, 1997; and 

18 (2) the applicable regulations of the Bureau of 

19 Land Management contained in subpart 4100 of 

20 title 43, Code of Federal Regulations (relating to 

21 livestock grazing on public land) (or successor regu22 lations). 

Æ 


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**EXHIBIT 32.2****CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,****AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO****SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**     In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Health Fitness Corporation (the“Company”) for the period ended September 30, 2007, as filed with the Securities and ExchangeCommission on November 19, 2007 (the “Periodic Report”), I, Wesley W. Winnekins, Chief FinancialOfficer of the Company, hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant toSection 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:     The Periodic Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934; and     The information contained in the Periodic Report fairly presents, in all material respects,the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.              /s/ Wesley W. Winnekins   Wesley W. Winnekins   Chief FinancialOfficer
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-7155

MICHAEL LEE ROY,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

LORRAINE SINGLETON,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond. James R. Spencer, District Judge.

(CA-96-369)

Submitted: November 19, 1996 Decided: December 2, 1996

Before MICHAEL and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Michael Lee Roy, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Appellant appeals the district court's order dismissing his

civil action for lack of jurisdiction. We have reviewed the record

and the district court's opinion and find no reversible error.

Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. Roy

v. Singleton, No. CA-96-369 (E.D. Va. July 17, 1996). We dispense

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument

would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA No. DA 23
- 0668 STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee, v. CLAYTON DOUGLAS KIRN,

Defendant and Appellant
.

**ORDER** Upon consideration of Appellant’s motion for extension of time, and good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant is granted an extension of time to and including May 17, 202 4 , within which to prepare, file, and serve Appellant’s opening brief on appeal.

Electronically signed by: Mike McGrath Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

April 9 2024

04/09/2024

Case Number: DA 23-0668
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Antoine NELSON, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 07-40545

Summary Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Jan. 23, 2008.

David Haskell Henderson, Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Eastern District of Texas, Beaumont, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Frank Warren Henderson, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Federal Defender’s Office, Eastern District of Texas, Tyler, TX, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before KING, DAVIS and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Antoine Nelson appeals his sentence following his guilty-plea for assaulting an employee of the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) & (b). Nelson’s sole argument on appeal is that the district court erred in applying U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2 based on its finding that the boiling water thrown by Nelson onto a corrections officer was a “dangerous weapon” under the Guidelines. Nelson argues that under § 2A2.2 a “dangerous weapon” refers only *590to “instruments” and not to substances, such as water. Nelson does not refute, however, the district court’s finding that the assault caused serious bodily injuries.

Nelson has failed to demonstrate any error in the district court’s finding that the hot water, in the manner used and in light of the injuries sustained, was a “dangerous weapon” under § 2A2.2. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
#### Harrison and others *v.*Merritt.

*(Circuit Court, S. D. New*York.

May 8, 1885.)

Customs Buttes—Bone-Buack—Rev. St. § 2504.

Bone-black is not included in tiio clause, “ bones crude, and not manufactured, burned, calcined, ground, or steamed,” in the free-list of section 2504 oí the Revised Statutes.

At Law.

*Henry E.*Davies, for plaintiffs.

*Elihu Root,*U. S. Atty., and *Sam’l B. Clark,*Asst. U. S. Atty., for defendant.

*654Wheeleb, J.

The question in this ease is whether bone-black is included in the clause, “bones crude, and not manufactured, burned, calcined, ground, or steamed,” in the free-list of section 2504 of the Revised Statutes. The evidence showed that it is made by subjecting bones, after being steamed and cleaned, to destructive distillation by heat in close vessels, until all is expelled but the carbon, and then crushing that, and assorting the pieces into proper sizes for clarifying sugar. The jury has found thereupon that bones so treated, are not manufactured more than by being burned, calcined, ground, or steamed. The defendant has moved for a new trial, principally upon the ground that this finding is not supported by, and is contrary to, the evidence. Bones are understood to be calcined when they are subjected to heat in open vessels so as to produce bone-ash, by being made friable; and to be burned when subjected to the direct action of fire. This distillation appears to be different from either. And the crushing and assorting is an important part of the process. By the whole a new article is made from bones. They, are not treated thus for the purpose of securing them, or making them portable, as grass is made into hay, without becoming manufactured, as was held in *Frazee*v. *Moffitt,*20 Blatchf. 267; S. C. 18 Fed. Rep. 584; or as apples are cut and dried, as in that case mentioned. The bones are manufactured into bone-black by processes of several steps. *Schriefer*v. *Wood,*5 Blatchf. 215; *Peters*v. *Robertson,*20 Fed. Rep. 818. These steps amount to more than either of those allowed by the statute without making the result dutiable. The verdict for these reasons appears to be contrary to the weight of the evidence, and ought, therefore, to be set aside.

Yerdict set aside, and new trial granted.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-7323

RAYED FAWZI ABED,

Petitioner – Appellant,

v.

ERIC D. WILSON, Warden,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Anthony J. Trenga, 

District Judge. (1:14-cv-00800-AJT-TCB)

Submitted: January 20, 2015 Decided: February 10, 2015

Before WILKINSON and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Rayed Fawzi Abed, Appellant Pro Se. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Rayed Fawzi Abed, a federal prisoner, appeals the 

district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 

(2012) petition. We have reviewed the record and find no 

reversible error. Accordingly, we grant leave to proceed in 

forma pauperis and affirm for the reasons stated by the district 

court. Abed v. Wilson, No. 1:14-cv-00800-AJT-TCB (E.D. Va. 

July 7, 2014). We deny the motion to remand or to place the 

case in abeyance and dispense with oral argument because the 

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 

materials before this court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

AFFIRMED
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NON - PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

BAIHEEM GRESHAN

Appellant : : : : : : : : : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 328 EDA 2019 Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered January 14, 2019 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP

- 51

- CR

- 0002458

- 2012 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

BAIHEEM GRESHAN

Appellant : : : : : : : : : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 331 EDA 2019 Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered January 14, 2019 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP

- 51

- CR

- 0008824

- 2014

BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS, J. * DISSENTING MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED JULY 31, 2020 I respectfully dissent. After careful review of the record, I agree with the Commonwealth’s conclusion that Appellant failed to present a challenge to the discretionary aspects of his sentence in his PCRA petition. Commonwealth’s Brief at 7. Accordingly, App ellant waived this issue , and he

_________________ __________ ______ ____ _______

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.J

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may not raise it for the first time on appeal. Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) ; see also Commonwealth v. Jones , 912 A.2d 268, 278 (Pa. 2019) (issue s not raised
in the PCRA petition are waived; a claim for post

- conviction relief cannot be raised for the first time on appeal).
T he Majority relies on Commonwealth v. Reaves , 923 A.2d 1119 (Pa. 2007), and Commonwe alth v. Presley , 193 A.3d 436 (Pa. Super. 2018), in support of its decision to reverse the order of the PCRA court. However, in both Reaves and Presley , the petitioners raised issue s concerning the discretionary aspects of their sentence s in the PCRA co urt and preserved them for appeal

. See Reaves , 923 A.2d at 1122 (petitioner alleged that the violation of probation court abused its discretion in imposing a sentence in excess of the Sentencing Guidelines with out stating the reasons for doing so on the r ecord ); see also Presley , 193 A.3d at 440 (petitioner challenged the discretionary aspects of his sentence and alleged the sentence was harsh and
excessive ). In the case at bar, Appellant alleged in his PCRA petition only that prior counsel was ineffective for “fail[ing] to attach an[] order VACATING the sentence ... Counsel also failed to contact the Honorable Rayford A. Means and either request a date for the Reconsideration Hearing or ask His Honor to Deny the Motion Without a Hearing.” PCRA Petition, 4/2 /18, at ¶10. Appellant does
not mention the discretionary aspects of his sentence or aver that the revocation court failed to provide reasons for the sentence imposed.J

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Therefore, I conclude that any issue Appellant has relative to the discretionary
aspec ts of sentence was waived. Jones , 912 A.2d at 278 . A ccordingly, I respectfully dissent.
IC 

114TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. 719 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MARCH 17, 2016 

Referred to the Committee on Armed Services 

AN ACT 

To rename the Armed Forces Reserve Center in Great Falls, 

Montana, the Captain John E. Moran and Captain William Wylie Galt Armed Forces Reserve Center. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 


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2 

S 719 RFH 

1 SECTION 1. RENAMING OF THE ARMED FORCES RESERVE 

2 CENTER IN GREAT FALLS, MONTANA, AS THE 

3 CAPTAIN JOHN E. MORAN AND CAPTAIN WIL4 LIAM WYLIE GALT ARMED FORCES RESERVE 

5 CENTER. 

6 (a) RENAMING.—The Armed Forces Reserve Center 

7 in Great Falls, Montana, shall hereafter be known and 

8 designated as the ‘‘Captain John E. Moran and Captain 

9 William Wylie Galt Armed Forces Reserve Center’’. 

10 (b) REFERENCES.—Any reference in any law, map, 

11 regulation, map, document, paper, other record of the 

12 United States to the facility referred to in subsection (a) 

13 shall be considered to be a reference to the Captain John 

14 E. Moran and Captain William Wylie Galt Armed Forces 

15 Reserve Center. 

Passed the Senate March 16, 2016. 

Attest: JULIE E. ADAMS, 

Secretary. 


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#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff—Appellee, v. Drew Elliott MCGILL, Defendant—Appellant.

No. 07-4597.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: Jan. 9, 2008.

Decided: Jan. 28, 2008.

Thomas N. Cochran, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Anna Mills Wagoner, United States Attorney, Michael A. DeFranco, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before NIEMEYER, GREGORY, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Drew Elliott McGill pled guilty to one count of possession of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2252A(a)(5)(B), (b)(2) (West 2000 & Supp.2007). On appeal, he challenges the district court’s imposition of the statutory maximum sentence of 120 months’ imprisonment. We affirm.

We find that the district court properly applied the Sentencing Guidelines and considered the relevant sentencing factors before imposing the 120-month sentence. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2007). Additionally, we find that the sentence imposed was reasonable. *See United States v. Johnson,*445 F.3d 339, 341 (4th Cir.2006); *Rita v. United States,*- U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2462-69, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007) (upholding presumption of reasonableness accorded within-guidelines sentence). Accordingly, we affirm McGill’s sentence.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*