No. 3--05-0722 Filed April 17, 2007. IN THE AP PE LLATE COU RT OF ILLIN OIS THIR D DI STRICT A.D., 2007

______________________________________________________________________________ In re MARRIAGE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of the 10t

h Judicial Cir

cuit, WADE S. THORNTON, ) Peoria Co unty , Illi nois, ) Petitioner-Appellee, ) ) and ) No. 99--D--375 ) ROSIEMARY THORNTON, ) ) Honorab le Stephe n Kouri, Responde nt-Appe llant. ) Judge , Pres idin g.

JUSTICE McDADE d

elivere d the opini on of the c ourt:

The respondent, Rosiemary Thornton, has appealed the order of the circ uit court of Peoria Co unty granti ng the o ral req

uest of he r former spouse, Wa

de S. Thor

nton, to te

rminate h is obligation to make maintenance pay ments to her. Respondent also asks this court to change our decision in In re Marriage of Snow , 322 Ill. App. 3d 953, 750 N.E.2d 1268 (2001), which she interprets as holding that the filing of a petition is not required prior to a he aring on the termination of maintenance pursuant to the conjugal coha bitation provision of section 510(c) of the Illinois Marriage a

nd Dissolution of Marriage Act (750 I LCS 5/510(c) (West 2004)). She prays that we

reverse Snow and find t

he filing of a peti tion nece ssary

to maintai

n an acti on to abate maintenance. Finally, respondent has requested that we remand this matter a nd order the2

trial court to enter judgment in her favor on the issues of ma intenance and of all other debts and obligations of the petitioner, including past-due mortga ge pay ments owed to her by pe

titioner as set forth in their marital settlement agreement. In the original opinion issued in this appeal, we a ffirmed the trial court on all three issues. In re Marriage of Thornton , No. 3--05--0722 (August 9, 2006). We now vacate that Opinion and, for the reasons that follow, we reaff irm our decision in Snow , reverse the trial court’s order finding the obligation to pay maintenance had abated, and remand the matter for consideration of respondent’s requests for extended, incre ased and permanent maintenance and petitione r’s resp onsibility

of complia

nce with t he other debts and

obligat ions he ha

d pursuan t to the judgment of dissolution and its included marital settlement agreement. BACKGROUND In June 1999, Wade Thornton petitioned for dissolution of his marriage to the r espondent Rosiemary Thornton. The pa rties reached a settlement agr eement, and a judgment for dissolut ion of thei r marriage incorp orating that agreement was ent ered on March 19 , 2001. By the terms of the settlement agreement, Wade ag reed, inter alia , to pay maintenanc e in the amount of $275 per month for 30 months and to pay "one-half (1/2) of the second mortg age on the marital house his portion of which totals $373.50, commencing with the November 2000 payment until su ch debt is p aid in full ." In September 2004, respondent filed a six-count petition for indirect civil contempt and a petition for maintenance, alleging that pe titioner had failed to make any of the required maintena nce pay ments and

had fail ed to make

pay ments or c omply

with oblig ations as

set forth in the sett lement ag reemen t. She soug

ht $8,250 in

unpaid ma

intenanc e, $15,31 3 in unpaid mortga ge pay ments, sta

tutory interest , relief

from her obligat ion to pay creditors for de

bts3

as si gn ed to he r h us ba nd in th e s et tl em en t a gr ee me nt bu t d is ch ar ge d b y hi m i n b an kr up tc y, execution of the de ed quit-c laiming t he house to her, a nd pay ment of a ttorney fees. She

also sought to increase the amount of maintenance a nd to make it permanent. In Dec ember 2004, the trial court entered a finding that Wade had not paid a ny maintenance

and that a past-due balance of $8,250 plus statutory interest rema ined due. However, the court later re served that decision and sche duled an e

videntia ry hearing on Wade’s

oral cla im that main

tenance had “au tomatica lly terminated due to a person of the opposite sex living congically [sic] with Mrs. Thornton.”. That evidentiary

hearing took place on June 7, 2005. No transcript was made of the proceedings, but we do have a " bystander’s r eport" agreed to by

the parties and certified by the court to be "a true and corre ct depiction of the evidence presented at trial." That report establishes that Wad

e Thornton admitted

that he ha

d made none of the a

greed -upon pa yme nts, but claimed he had no obligation to do so because his brother had moved in with Rosiemary shortly before

entry of the judg

ment of dissolution and was living with her in a conjugal relation ship. He c alled two witnesse s who both o ffere d some cir cumstanti al suppor

t for his contention that such a relationship existed. Petitioner’s friend, Gary

Irby, testified that he saw the brother’s car outside responde nt’s home on "various occasions." Although Mr. I rby did not live in respondent’s neig hborhood, he claimed to have seen the car outside the house on at lea st one occasion when he attended a moving sale in the vicinity in Fe bruary 2004. Wade’s aunt, Viola Thornton, was his second witness. Her only evidence was that she had gone to Rosiemary ’s home a couple of times and Wade’s brother was there and that occasionally the br

other would call her and she could tell from her ca ller ID that he was ca

lling from Rosiemary’s home. She te stified that this occurred in 2004.4

Respondent testified that she had allowed the petitioner’s brother to move in "out of the goodness of her heart" because "he di d not have a pl ace to stay [and] w as in essence, homeless. " She testified that the brother stayed and slept in the basement and that they led separate lives. She denied that there was at any time any romance

or conjugal relationship between them. No other evidence was presented to the c ourt, and respondent’s description of the "relationship" stands undisputed. On June 23, 2005, the trial court entered an order abating in full all maintenance pursuant to section 510(c) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act. 750 I LCS 5/510(c) (West 2002). The trial court made no findings of fact a nd offered no reasons for abating petitioner’s maintenance obligation. The trial court also made no mention in the order of the mortgage pay

ments or any of the othe

r issues raised in the petition for indirect civil contempt. Respondent filed a timely motion for re consideration asking the court to reverse its prior f inding regarding maintenanc e and to enter an order on petitioner’s other de bts and obligations. The court denied the motion citing, without explanation, In re Marriage of Snow , 322 Ill. App. 3d 953, 750 N.E.2d 1268 (2001). Respondent timely appe aled. ANA LYSIS I. Meaning a

nd Impact of In re Marriage of Snow Respondent has challenged the validity and effectiveness of the trial court’s orde r on the grounds that her former husband had not filed a petition seeking relief from his obligation to pay maintenance. She apparently believes that this court’s decision in In re Marriage of Snow, 322 Ill. A pp. 3d 953, 750 N.E.2 d 1268 (20 01), held that no pe

tition nee d be file d in order to terminat e mainten ance on the basis of "con jugal c ohabitat

ion," an d she has a sked us to r

everse that decision. We initially address that issue.5

In Snow , as in the instant case, we considered a claim that a c ontinuous conjugal relationship had abated the obligation of the former spouse to pay court-or

dered maintenance. The comp laining

husband f

iled a pe tition see king an order f inding the existenc e of the r equisite relationship and relieving him of his maintenance obligation. The trial court granted the husband’ s petition a

nd abate d maintenance ef fective on the dat

e the pet ition was f

iled. The case proceeded to this court on cross-appeals. The wif e was unsuccessful in her challeng e to the finding s (1) tha

t conjug al cohab itation ha d been pr oven and (2) that t he termination lan

guag e in the settle ment ag reemen t was not sufficien

t to overr ide the a utomatic t

erminati on presc

ribed in the statute. The husband’s challenge to the date of filing of the petition as the trigger f or abateme nt of the ma

intenanc e obliga

tion fare d better . We agr eed with t he rele vant rea soning in In re Marriage of Gray , 314 Ill. App. 3d 249, 731 N.E.2d 942 (2000), and adopted a portion of its h oldi ng stat ing:

"Further, we ag

ree with In re Marriage of Gray that the triggering period for termination of maintenance is the time the conjuga l cohabita tion beg an and no t when the petition to

terminat e maintenance is filed. Gray , 314 Ill. App. 3d at 253, 731 N.E.2d at 946

. Therefore, we hold that the trial court err ed in terminating William’s ma

intenanc e obliga

tions from

the time he

filed his petition. Accordin

gly , we rema

nd this ca use for t he trial c ourt to determine when Dawn began the cohabitation and to terminate her payments as of that d ate." Snow, 322 Ill. App. 3d at 957, 750 N.E.2d at 1271. We thus affirmed the issues raised by the wife and reversed that asserted by the husband,6

remandi ng for a determination of the proper trigg ering d

ate for terminat ion. Clear

ly nothing in our order found that maintenance pay ments could be discontinued without the filing of a petition and an or der of th e court. Similarly in Gray , the abatement action was initiated by the husband’s filing of a petition to terminate maintenance. Gray , 314 Ill. App. 3d at 250-51, 731 N.E.2d at 944. Gray differed factua lly f rom Snow in that the Grays’ se ttlement agreement had a clause pr oviding "in relevant part, that John’s obligation to pay maintenanc e ‘terminated on the earliest of the following events: (a) the remarriag e of Patricia; or (b) the death of either par ty; or (c) the c ohabitation of Patricia.’ " Gray, 314 Ill. App. 3d at 250, 731 N.E.2d at 944. The Gray court state d its hold ings as follow s: "We therefore hold that the trial court erre d in concluding that

John’s obligation to pay maintenance terminated on the date of filing the petition

rather than fro m the date

Patricia began to cohabit w ith Evans on a resid

ent, cont inuing, c onjuga

l basis. We also hold that the settlement agreement clearly intende d that John could terminate maintenance, without first petitioning the court, f rom the da

te Patric ia cohab ited with E vans. Simila

r to section 510(c), the settlement agreeme nt does not contain any provision requirin g that a petition mu st first be

filed to te

rminate maintenance or that the obligation to pay ceases from the date of the petiti on when Pa

tricia c ohabits wi

th anothe r." (Em phasis added.) Gray, 314 Ill. App. 3d at 253, 731 N.E.2d at 946. While the Snow court adopted the holding in Gray that the obligation to pay ma intenance7

terminates from the date cohabitation begins, the cour t did not deal with a failure to file a petition or

hold that s

uch a fil ing was

unnece ssary . The insta

nt case d oes, howe ver, dir ectly raise the issue of whether a spouse who has bee n ordered by

the court to pay maintena nce can cease such pay

ments unilaterally without benefit of a petition and a determination that there had, in fact, been "conjugal coha bitation." We believe, contrary to the decision in Gray , that such unilater al action is contra ry to the I llinois Mar

riage and Disso lution of Ma

rriag e Act and flies in the face of extensive and long-standing f amily case law

. The Gray court derived support for its conclusion that a petition was unnecessary by comparing the languag e of sections 510(a) and 510(c) of the I llinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (750 I

LCS 5/101 et seq. (West 2002)) and finding that 510(a) specifically requires filing a motion and giving notice while 510(c) doe s not expressly include such a re quirement. As did Gray, we beg in our ana lys is by compari ng those two secti ons. Section 51 0(a) pr

ovides in p ertinen

t part: "Exc ept a s othe

rwis e pro vide d in [two irr elev ant se ction s], the provisions of any judg ment respecting maintenance or support may be modifie d only

as to insta

llments ac cruing

subseque nt to due notice by the moving party of the f

iling of the motion for modification and, with respect to maintenance, only upon a showing of a subst

antial change in

circumst ances." 750 I LCS 5/510(a) (West 2002). Section 510(a) also included additional language relating to modifications of child-support orders that were not pertinent to the issue of maintenance . However, since Gray and Snow were decided, the legislature has added a subsection (a-5) that sets out a number of factors to be8

consider ed, in add ition to thos e set out in

section 5 04(a), w

hen addr essing e fforts to

modify or to terminat e mainten ance. T hey speak to modifica

tion or ter mination f

or reas ons of pra

cticalit y and of need; they

do not address the termination factors that are still set out in section 510(c). We do not, therefore, believe that the amendment chang es in any sig nificant way the

analyses undertaken in Gray and

Snow or in the instant case. Se ct io n 5 10 (c ) p ro vi de s – un ch an ge d a nd in it s e nt ir et y: "Unless otherwise agree d by the parties in a w ritten agreement set forth in the judgment or otherwise approved by the court, the obligat ion to pay future ma

intenanc e is termi

nated upon the dea

th of either party , or the remarriage of the pa rty rec eiving maintena nce, or i f the par

ty r eceivin g mainte nance c ohabits wi

th another person on a resident, continuing conjug al basis." 750 IL CS 5/510(c) (West 2002). We agree with Graythat the two sections distinguish between regular or r outine modifications and terminations of maintenance (section 510(a)) a nd the automatic termination of an obligation to continue previously ordered pay

ments set out in section 510(c). We believe, however, that the focus of that differenc e relates to the timing of the relief and not to the mechani cs or pro cedure

for sec uring it . That is, s ection 51 0(a) al lows modif ication only

as to installme nts accr uing af ter the d ue notice provided by t he filing of a motion . By

contras t, section 510(c) provides that the obligation to make future maintena

nce pay ments is automatic ally

terminat ed when one of the se three particu lar eve nts occurs. See 750

IL CS 5/510(c) (West 2002 ). Lo gic com pels us to c onclude t

hat sect ion 510(c ) crea

tes an exc eption to section 510(a)’s limitation of relief to installments after the filing of the motion or petition, but9

does not establish an exemption from the obligation to file a petition in order to conform the court’s order to present circumst ances. We draw support for this construction of the two statutory sections from section 511, which pr ovides in p ertinen

t part: "A judgment of dissolution or of legal separa tion or of a declaration of invalidity of marriage may

be enforced or modified by order of

court pursuant to petition. (a) Any judgment entered within this State may be enforced or modified in the judicial circuit wherein such judg ment was entered or last modified by the filing of a petition with notice mailed to the respondent at his last known address or by the issuance of summons

to the re spondent. " 750 I LCS 5/5 11 (West 2002). It can thus be seen that any modification or enforcement of the judgment of dissolution entered in the State of Illinois must be initiated by the filing of a petition and notice. I ndeed, review of the entirety of se ction 511 shows that a modification or enforcement of such a judg ment no

ma tt er wh er e i t w as en te re d r eq ui re s t he fi li ng of a p et it io n o r m ot io n. Cl ea rl y, t he n, an y change in the judgment must be made by the court and not as a result of independent action by the parties. Moreover, Gray is quite pla inly distingu ishable on its fact s from Snow and from the instant case. The essence of the decision in Graywas its determination that the clause in the settlement agreement requiring only cohabitation (without any re quirement that it be continuous and conjugal in nature) by the wife was self-actuating and did not, ther efore, constitute a change.10

This would parallel the situation where the judgment provided for ter mination of child support when the child reaches the ag e of 18. Such termination is not a change – it is actually directed by the judgme

nt. The differences, of course, w ith Snow are that (1) there was no such clause in the settlement agreement or otherwise in the judg ment of dissolution and no argument to be made that the judgment

or the settlement a

greement incor

porated therein can be r ead as a ctually requiring the termination without action by the court, and (2) the termination created by section 510(c ) requi res fac tual d eterm inati ons t hat an y cohabit ation is on a "resi dent, conti nuin g, conjugal basis" and when such re lationship commenced. Moreover, William Snow actually had filed a petition. Accordingly , when determining the limited issues presented in Snow , we adopted only the re levant portions of Gray dealing with the triggering period for termination and the substantive factors used to examine a claim of conjugal coha bitation. See Snow , 322 I ll. App. 3d at 957, 750 N.E.2d at 1271. Snow did not hold that a petition was unnecessary to bring the issue of termination of maintenance on the basis of conjugal cohabitation bef ore the court. We, therefore, find the Act requires that a petition must be filed and the requisite findings conce rning conjugal cohabitation must be made before a court-imposed obligation to pay maintenance as ordered can be terminated. Thornton filed no such petition. We, therefore, next consider whether the c ourt’s order is render ed void by

this fact

. By the ter ms of the order of dissolution, which was entered on March 19, 2001, Wade Thornton was required to pay Rosiemary $275 per month 30 months. The per iod of maintenance would, therefore, have expired on September 19, 2003. On September 14, 2004, Rosiemary filed (1) her petition for maintenance alleging a complete failure of Wade to pay any maintenanc e,11

assertin g a cha nge of health a nd financ ial circ

umstance s and see

king pa yme nt of the previousl

y required past maintenance and extended, increa sed, and permanent maintenance; and (2) the petition f or indire ct civil c ontempt se eking p ast mainte nance a nd an ord er requ iring Wa de to comply with all other debts and oblig ations pursuant to the judgment of dissolution. At the Decemb er 30, 20 04, hear ing on he r petition , the cour

t entere d an orde

r finding an arre arage

in the amoun

t of $8,250

plus statut

ory interest for maint enance . No other

finding s were ma

de at that time. Apparently Wade inter posed an oral

contention that his former wife was cohabiting with his br

other an d the hea ring wa s continue d so the co urt could take evi dence on his claim

. Thus, at the time of the hearing on June 7, 2005, Rosiemary ’s petition for increased and permanent maintenance was before the court and there was no petition to invoke the court’s jurisdiction to consider termination of maintenance on the basis of conjugal c ohabitation pursuant to section

510(c). Becau se such te

rmination require s factua

l finding s that (1)residen t, continuing conjugal cohabitation had actually occurred and (2) when it commence d, the termination cannot be had absent action by the court and appropriate modification of the judgment of dissolution. If Rosiemary

had filed no petition, we believe the judgment terminating maintena nce would simply be void. However, since the court had initial jurisdiction to consider the issue of maintena nce, we find the order wa s merely voidable . Rosiemar

y ha s not spec ifically

sought to void the order; rather she has asked to have the judg ment abating the obligation to pay maintena nce rev ersed on

the merit s. We accede to that request because ( 1) she has been declared in public circuit cour t documents to have conjugally cohabited with a man, (2) that decision was affirmed by this court in a published opinion, (3) the finding of conjugal cohabitation had no pr oven basis in law or12

fact, and (4) we believe both fairne ss and principles of judicial economy require us to consider that judg ment of the

trial cou rt on its me

rits. II . Section 510(c) Cohabitation. As previously discussed, the substantive de cision at issue in this case is governed by section 5 10(c) of

the I llinois Mar

riage and Disso lution of Ma

rriag e Act (75 0 ILCS 5/10(a)(West 2004)). T o reiter

ate, tha t section p

rovides: “Unless otherwise agreed by the parties in a written agreement set forth in the judgment or othe rwise approved by

the court, the obligation to pay future maintenance is terminated upon the death of either party , or the remarriage of the pa rty rec eiving maintena nce, or i f the par

ty r eceivin g mainte nance c ohabits wi

th another person on a resident, continuing conjug al basis.” 750 IL CS 5/510(c) (West 2004). The paye e spouse seeking termination of maintenance ( in this case, Wade Thornton) has the burden of proof. He must prove by the manifest weight of the evidence the e xistence of a resident, continuing conjugal relationship. To satisfy that burden, he must make a substantial showing that the former spouse is involved in a de factohusband and wife relationship with a third party. In re Marriage of Sunday , 354 Ill. App. 3d 184, 820 N.E.2d 636 (2004). To demonstrate the existence of a de factohusband and wife relationship, while proof of sexual conduct is no longer necessary , something more than merely living under the same roof with a person of the opposite sex is required; lesser involvement by recipient spouse does not require termination of maintenance. In re Mar riage of Lam bdin , 245 Ill. App. 3d 797, 613 N.E.2d 1381 (1993).13

In Snow, which we have now confirmed as the law in this district, the following f actors for examining a claim of conjugal cohabitation have been identified: (1) the length of the relationship; (2) the amount of time the couple spends together; (3) the nature of activities engaged in; (4) the interr

elation of their personal affairs; (5) whethe r they vac ation together; and (6) whether they

spend holidays toge

ther. Snow , 322 Ill. App. 3d at 956, 750 N.E.2d at 1270. After a careful reading

of the amended by standers’ report agree d to by the parties and certified by

the trial judge to be “a true and corr ect depiction of the evidence presented a t trial,” we can find no evidence relating to any of the six factors and, c onsequently, no evidenc e that there ever was a de factohusband and wife relationship between Rosiemary and Wade’s brother. With regard to any

conjugal aspects of the brother’s re sidence in the house, the only evidence was her testimony . As rec ited in the amended bys tanders ’ repor

t: “She testified that Petitioner’s brother stay ed and slept in the basement and that she and the brother lead separ ate lives. She stated that at no time was there any romance or conjugal relationship between her and Petitioner’s brother. She testified that the only reason tha

t he moved in was because he did not have a place to stay , in essence was homeless, and she let him stay there out of the goodness of her heart.” That testimony is wholly

undisputed. Peti tion er admi tted t hat he had ne ver pai d any of th e main tenan ce or mo rtgage obligations set out in the settlement agreement, claiming r espondent’s conjugal cohabitation as justification. The only evidence presented by

petitioner to prove the six factors required to find a residen t, continu ing con jugal r elationsh ip was (1) his own ba

ld and limit

ed asser tion that hi s14

brother had moved in with his former wife shortly before the entry

of judgment providing for maintenance; (2) the testimony of petitioner’s friend, Gary Irby, who stated he had seen the brother ’s car p arked ou

tside Ms. T

hornton’ s home on “

various o ccasion s” but at le ast one time when he had attended a moving sale in the neig hborhood in February

2004; and (3) the testimony of petitioner’s a

unt, Viola Azetta Thornton, who stated that she ha d gone t o respondent’s home a couple of times and petitioner’s brother wa s there, and that petitioner’s brother had called her from respondent’ s home phone, something she knew because of he r caller ID. She could not give a month, but knew tha t this had occurred in 2004. None of the three witne sses p

rovid ed an y e vidence p erta

ining to an y o f the six Snow factor s. The sum total of this evidence shows that Rosiemary allowed her former husband’s homeless brother to stay in her basement and to occasionally use her phone between March 2001 and February

2004 and that they lived “se parate lives” without any

romance or conjugal relationship between them. There is no evidence of the amount of time, if any, Rosiemary spends with Wade’s brother; the nature of the activities, if any , they eng age in together; the interrelation, if any , of their personal or financial affairs; whe ther they vac ation together; or whether they spend holi day s together. I n short, th ere is no

evidenc e relati

ng to fiv e of the s ix factors that are to be used as the basis for de termination. Moreover, failing such substantive evidence of resident, continuing conjug al cohabitation, a mere showing that Wade’s brother lived in Rosiemary’s baseme nt for roughly

three ye ars does not prove “a relationship” of any duration – thus fai ling the

first fa ctor as w ell. We find tha

t there is no eviden

ce of a r esident, continuin

g conju gal re lationship

in this case and that there is no basis for termination of maintenance pursuant to section 510(c) of the Act. We, therefore, reverse the or der of the circuit court of Peoria County abating petitioner’s15

maintena nce oblig ation and

direct the court t

o compel p etitioner

to pay responde nt the amo

unt it previously found to be due a nd owing, together with statutory interest, in its order of December 30, 2004. III. Continuing Maintenance We next consider, to the extent the record permits, Rosiemary’ s two petitions seeking an increase in the amount of maintenance and that her entitlement to it be made permanent, and other relief required by

the judgment of dissolution. We make the following observations pertinent to this petition. The rec ord discl oses that

on Septemb er 14, 20 04, Rosiema ry filed the previous ly described petition for maintenance and six-count petition for indirect civil contempt. Only one count of the second petition related to maintenance, The re maining five counts alleged other specific violations by Wade of the judgment of dissolution and the incorporated settlement agreement. We find no indication that the circuit court has e ver substantively addr

essed or resolved any

of those other issues, although the court does appear to have denied both petitions in their entirety in its origina l order of June 23, 2005, the transcript of the September 6, 2005, hearing on the motion for reconsideration, and the order of September 19, 2005, deny ing the motion for reconsideration. As we have previously

noted , the 30 months during which respondent was to have been paid maintenance expired on September 19, 2003. Her new petition for maintena nce was not filed unti l Septembe

r 14, 2004 . We, ther

efore, address

as a pre liminary

matter w hether t his petition w as timely

filed to in

voke the t rial cou rt’s juri sdiction. We believ e that it w as. The rele vant lang uage in the settle ment ag reemen t provide s: “The Husband shall pay

to the Wife as and for maintenance the16 sum of Two Hundred and Seventy -five Dollars ($275.00) per month for a total of 30 months, the first payment be ing due on the first day of the we ek follow

ing the e ffectiv e date of

this Agreement and subsequent pay ments being due on the first day of each month thereafter. The maintenance shall be reviewed at the end of thi s period, to deter mine whet

her it sho uld contin

ue and, if so, to wha

t extent. ” (Emphasis added.) We look to three cases to assess the jurisdiction of the trial court to address Rosiemary ’s petition. In In re Marriage of Tucker , 223 I ll. App. 3d 671, 672, 5 85 N.E. 2d

1105 (199 2), this court assessed maintenance langua ge that provided: “[T]he Plaintiff shall pay to the Defenda nt, as and for maintenance, the sum of Twelve Hundred Dollars ($1,200.00) per month, com

mencing the first day of the mon

th succe eding the date of this Judgment and continuing at said amount for Seventy -seven (77) consecutive months thereafter for a total of Seventy-eig

ht (78) months or until the Defendant shall die, remarry , or until further Order of this Court, whichever shall first occur.” None of the other languag e could be construed as providing for re view of that maintenance award. The Tucker

court held that the parties had clearly and unambiguously limited the dura tion of maintenance ( Tucker, 223 I ll. App. 3d at 675, 58 5 N.E.2d a

t 1108) but

that it did “

not clea rly preclude modification of the amounts of maintenance and other benefits within the prescribed periods” ( Tucker , 223 Ill. App. 3d at 677, 585 N.E.2d at 1110). The dec ision in Tucker is17

clearly disting

uishable from the instant case because here the parties have expressly provided for review o f maintenance to d etermine if it should

continue and, if so , to what extent. We next turn to Rice v. Rice , 173 Ill. App. 3d 1098, 528 N.E.2d 14 (1988). I n that case, involving a provision for rehabilitative maintenance, the judg ment granted maintenance for a period of 42 months and did not reserve jurisdiction to review the award a t the end of that time. Rice , 173 I ll. App. 3d

at 1101-0 2, 528 N.E

2d at 16. T

he court framed the issue as: “What happens when a petition to modify a n award of maintenance, limited in its duration, is filed to extend the duration of the award when the court has not expressly reserved jurisdiction to extend th e term? I

n answer ing this q uestion, w e find it is important to deter mine whet

her the p etition for modific ation is filed during the period set for rehabilitative maintenanc e or after the term of rehabilitative maintenance has expired and bee n completed.” Rice , 173 Ill. App. 3d at 1102, 528 N.E.2d at 16-17. The court held that where there has bee n no express provision for review of the award, the trial court ha s jurisdiction to exten d the awa rd only if the petition req

uesting the extens ion is filed within the identified maintenance period. When it is filed after the term has expired, the court lacks jurisdiction. The Rice court also noted that the petition had been filed after pay ment in full of the maintenance award and afte r the trial court’s jurisdiction to modify the maintena nce award had terminated. Rice, 173 Ill. App. 3d at 1103, 528 N.E.2d at 17. Although Rosiemary’ s petition was filed after the period of maintenance ha d expired, there wa s an expre ss provision for re view. Mor

eover, Wa

de had ne ver made a single maintenance pay

ment to Rosiemary. For the se reasons, the forfeiture of the rig ht to seek an18

extension of the duration of maintenance found in Rice has not occurred in the instant case. Rather, this situation is more closely analog ous to that found in this court’s decision in In re Marriage of Rodriguez , 359 Ill. App. 3d 307, 834 N.E.2d 71 (2005). I n that case, the husband did not dispute that the trial court had ordered “reviewa ble” maintenance. He did, however , claim tha

t his forme

r wife w as barr

ed from s eeking

maintena nce by her fai lure to petition for review within the maintenance period.. This court distinguished Rice because there had bee n no provis ion for r

eview in t hat case , and then

held: “Nevertheless, it is our view that any time the court provides for maintenance reviewable after a time specified, the court retains jurisdiction to review the maintenance until one or both of the parties petitions for review. Upon review the trial court c an consider whether maintenance should continue and if so, whe ther the amoun

t should be

increa sed or de crease d. Until a p arty petitions for review, the maintenance award sha ll continue as ordered.” Rodriguez , 359 Ill. App. 3d at 313, 834 N.E. 2d at 76. Thus, in the

instant ca se, the tr

ial cour t retaine d jurisdiction to rev iew maint enance until Rosiemary filed her

petition in September 2004. The trial court has determined by its order of December 30, 2004, that $8,250, plus statutory interest, was due and owing from Wade at the end of the 30 months. Unlike the situation in Rodriguez , Rosiemary’s awa rd of maintenance was for a period certain (30 months). Consequently, Wade’s obligation, as imposed by the judgment of dissolution, ended in September 2003 but is reviewable. Pursuant to section 510(a), discussed previously, the ea rliest any additional maintenanc e installments can accrue would be September 2004 when the petition was filed and notice was g iven.19

Turning to the issues presented in Rosiemary ’s petition for maintenance and unreviewed by the trial court, the r

ecord discloses that in September 2001, six months after entry of the dissolution judgment in which certain marital obligations and debts were assig ned to Wade, he secured a discharge of

some of those debts and obligations through bankruptcy . Rosiemary has averred that, as a result of his action, she bec ame obligated for not only the debts assigned to her in the judgment, but also for some or all of those assigned to her f ormer spouse. There is also a sugge stion that b ecause

of his fa ilure to ma

ke requi site pay

ments to he

r and his c

reditors she fell behind in her own f

inancia l obliga tions and was requi

red to fil e for ba

nkruptcy . Her all egations, if proven, could support a finding of a substantial chang e in circumstances. See In re Marriage of Letsinger , 321 Ill. App. 3d 961, 748 N.E.2d 812 (2001). Rosiemary , who is 60 years old, has also alleged that her health has deter iorated and that she can no longer continue the foster parenti ng which has pre

viously been a su bstantial element o f her sup

port. The

record also disclose s that she

and Wade a

dopted tw o of the se

veral f oster ch ildren the y to ok in and that his child support obligation ended for both upon majority . Rosiemary subsequently adopted a third foster child for whom apparently Wade has no responsibility. The order totally a

bating maintenance and those deny ing the two petitions filed by Rosiemary prec luded development of an evidentiary basis for ruling on her request for extended, increased, and permanent maintenance . We note that there has also been no evidence pre sented (save Wade’s admission that he had made no pay ments of the mortgage), no fac tual findings and no legal determination of Wade’s obligations with reg ard to other issues raised in the petition for indirec t civil con

tempt and various motions for

attorne y f ees. Ac cordingly, we rema nd this matter to the circuit court of Peoria County for the purpose of addressing all of the r emaining issues.20 CONCLUSIO

N We find that the case of In re Mar riage of Sn ow did not hold that a petition was unnecessary

to invoke the jurisdiction of the court to terminate maintenance on the basis of conjugal cohabitation pursuant to section 510(c) of the I llinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act. With

that clar ification, we confirm that Snow remains the law in this district. Further, for the reasons set forth in this pinion, the order of the circuit court abating the maintenance obligation of petitioner, Wade Thornton, on the basis of conjug al cohabitation of his fo rmer s pouse is rev ersed o n the m erits . The o rder of Decemb er 30, 2004, findi ng a maintenance arrearag e is reinstated and that obligation shall be enforced. The remaining issues raised by Rosiemary ’s petition for Maintenance, petition for indirect civil contempt, and petit ions for fee s, and not re solv ed by the t rial c ourt, are rem anded for fur ther p roceed ings consistent with this opinion and the legal obligations of the parties. Reversed and remanded with direction. CARTER and SCHMIDT, JJ., concur.