2020 IL App (2d) 200335-U cons. 

No. 2-20-0335 

Order filed October 29, 2020 

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as 

precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

______________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

In re A.M. and A.M., Minors ) Appeal from the Circuit Court 

) of Kendall County. 

) 

) 

) 

) No. 18-JA-21 

) No. 18-JA-20 

) 

) 

(The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner- ) Honorable 

Appellee v. William M., Respondent- ) Melissa S. Barnhart,

Appellant). ) Judge, Presiding. 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

JUSTICE ZENOFF delivered the judgment of the court. 

Presiding Justice Birkett and Justice McLaren concurred in the judgment. 

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The Appellate Court held that (1) the trial court’s admission of Am.M.’s medical 

records into evidence was not error; (2) defense counsel was not ineffective for 

failing to object to the admission of the minor’s medical records; and (3) the trial 

court’s adjudication of the minors as wards of the court was affirmed where the 

court found the State’s expert more credible than the defense expert and that finding 

was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. 
2020 IL App (2d) 200335-U cons. 

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¶ 2 Respondent, William M., appeals an order of the circuit court of Kendall County 

adjudicating the minors, A.M. (Am.M.) and A.M. (Az.M.), wards of the court. This court ordered 

the cases consolidated for purposes of briefing, argument (if called), and decision. We affirm. 

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 William is both children’s biological father. Brittany P. is the biological mother.1 In 

September 2018, Am.M. was approximately three months old, and Az.M. was approximately a 

year old. On September 17, 2018, the State filed petitions for adjudication of wardship as to both 

minors. As to Am.M., the petition alleged in count I that she was an abused and neglected minor 

(705 ILCS 405/2-3(2)(i) (West 2018)) in that she sustained an injury other than by accidental 

means, that being an acute and subacute subdural hemorrhage of the brain. In count II, the petition 

alleged that Am.M. was a neglected minor (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1) (West 2018)) in that her

environment was injurious to her welfare. The petition further alleged that it was unknown how 

the injury to Am.M. was caused or by whom. As to Az.M., the State alleged that she was a 

neglected minor (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1) (West 2018)) under the theory of anticipatory neglect, in 

that Az.M. resided in the home where Am.M. received the brain injury. The trial court cases were 

not consolidated, although they were heard together. On September 17, 2018, the court granted 

guardianship of both minors to the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) 

with authority to place the minors. 

¶ 5 The adjudicatory hearing was held on December 13, 2019, January 28, 2020, January 31, 

2020, and February 21, 2020. The following testimony and evidence were adduced at the hearing.

¶ 6 A. The State’s Case-In-Chief 

1 We will refer to William and Brittany collectively as the “parents.”
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¶ 7 1. The DCFS and Police Investigations

¶ 8 On September 10, 2018, DCFS received a “hotline” report that Am.M. was in Rush 

University Hospital (Rush) in Chicago with a head injury. On that date, DCFS investigator Erica 

Anderson spoke with Brittany by telephone. Brittany told Anderson that Brittany and Am.M.’s 

father, William, were Am.M.’s only caretakers. Brittany denied any incident that could have 

caused Am.M.’s head injury. Brittany expressed concern about the use of forceps during Am.M.’s 

delivery. However, at Am.M.’s two-week checkup, everything was fine. Brittany said that Am.M. 

was a fussy baby who wanted to be held. 

¶ 9 On September 11, Anderson met with Brittany and her mother, Lorilyn Hernandez, at 

Hernandez’s home in Montgomery, Illinois. Brittany and the minors were living there with 

Hernandez and Hernandez’s boyfriend. Anderson observed the home to be “neat and clean” with 

no signs of abuse or neglect or hazardous conditions. Brittany occupied one bedroom with the two 

minors, who had their own beds. 

¶ 10 On September 11, Brittany related the following to Anderson. On September 7, 2018, 

Brittany took Am.M. to the Rush-Copley emergency room in Aurora. Am.M. was not eating, was 

“spitting up,” and she was not acting normally. Am.M. was sent home with a suppository. Brittany

was concerned, because the suppository was for a two-year-old child, but she administered it to 

Am.M. as directed. The next day, September 8, Brittany noted that Am.M. was blue and that she 

was “twitching.” Brittany again took Am.M. to the Rush-Copley emergency room. A CT scan 

revealed bleeding on Am.M.’s brain. Am.M. was transferred immediately to Rush. 

¶ 11 On September 13, 2018, Anderson met with William. William told Anderson the 

following. During the week before September 7, William was taking care of Am.M. alone at his 

home in Chicago. William denied any incidents that could have caused Am.M.’s injury. Next, 
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Anderson spoke with Am.M.’s physician. After that conversation, DCFS took Am.M. into 

protective custody. 

¶ 12 On September 14, 2018, DCFS advised the Montgomery Police Department that Am.M. 

was abused. Officer William Novak spoke with Brittany on September 17. Brittany told Novak 

that she initially took Am.M. to the emergency room because she was not eating and was tired. 

Brittany also told Novak that Am.M.’s left leg, arm, and eye were “twitching.” Brittany believed 

that the doctor’s use of forceps during delivery caused this condition. Brittany told Novak that the 

doctors at the emergency room diagnosed seizures. Then, at Rush, the doctors said that Am.M. 

had a hemorrhage on her brain. According to Novak, Brittany denied any history of violence in 

the home. Brittany told Novak that she lived with her mother, stepfather, and brother, and that no 

one except Brittany cared for Am.M. Brittany denied that she ever left home. Brittany told Novak 

that Am.M.’s father lived in the “city” and that he visited but was never alone with Am.M. Brittany

denied that she and Am.M. ever visited William in the city.

¶ 13 Detective Sergeant Jeff Ricedorf of the Montgomery Police Department interviewed 

William in September 2018. William told Ricedorf the following. On September 5, 2018, Brittany

told William that Am.M. was not eating, was “lethargic,” and very tired. William agreed that 

Brittany should take the baby to the emergency room. William believed that Am.M.’s head injury 

was caused from the use of forceps at her delivery. William stated that he stayed in Chicago and 

visited the house in Montgomery “occasionally.” William denied any incidents after Am.M.’s birth 

that could have caused her head injury. 

¶ 14 2. Testimony of Lorilyn Hernandez 

¶ 15 Hernandez testified that in September 2018 her household consisted of herself, her fiancé, 

her son, Brittany, Am.M., and Az.M.. William visited two or three times a month but did not stay 
2020 IL App (2d) 200335-U cons. 

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with them. On or about September 5, 2018, Hernandez noticed that Am.M. was spitting up and 

that her bowels had not moved in a couple days. On September 7, Hernandez accompanied Brittany

and Am.M. to the emergency room. Am.M. was discharged home, and the next day, Hernandez 

noticed Am.M. having quite a few “seizure-like episodes” in which Am.M.’s eyes rolled back and 

fluttered side-to-side. She also noticed that Am.M. was shaking on her left side. Hernandez and 

Brittany took Am.M. to the emergency room. From there, Am.M. was transported to Rush. 

¶ 16 Hernandez testified that within two weeks prior to this incident, Brittany and the children 

were visiting William in Chicago for a couple of days. No one at Hernandez’s home cared for 

Am.M. other than Brittany and herself. Hernandez denied that Am.M. suffered any falls or injuries 

prior to September 7. 

¶ 17 3. Admission of the Medical Records into Evidence

¶ 18 After Hernandez’s testimony concluded, the State moved pursuant to section 2-18(4)(a) of 

the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act) (705 ILCS 405/2-18(4)(a) (West 2018)) to admit into 

evidence as a business record its Exhibit 2. Exhibit 2 consisted of over 900 pages of Am.M.’s Rush 

medical records. When the State offered the records into evidence, William’s counsel stated: “No 

objection, Your Honor.” Brittany’s counsel also had no objection, and the court admitted the 

records into evidence. 

¶ 19 4. Testimony of Dr. Margaret Scotellaro 

¶ 20 Doctor Margaret Scotellaro was Am.M.’s treating physician at Rush. Scotellaro was 

employed as a pediatrician and assistant professor at Rush. She was also a consultant medical 

director to DCFS. She is board certified in general pediatrics and in child abuse pediatrics. She 

had been qualified as an expert witness between 15 and 20 times. 

¶ 21 Scotellaro met Am.M. when she was asked by a doctor on the pediatric intensive care unit 
2020 IL App (2d) 200335-U cons. 

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to consult on the case. Scotellaro testified that she looked at MRIs, CT scans, and X-rays daily. 

She also relied on the official readings of the neuroradiologists. Am.M.’s scans showed acute, 

subacute, and chronic subdural hematomas, bleeding within the brain itself, and multiple retinal 

hemorrhages in her left eye. Scotellaro worked with a team of physicians to determine the cause 

of Am.M.’s injuries. Specifically, a hematologist checked for blood disorders, such as bleeding 

and clotting, but Am.M.’s tests were normal. 

¶ 22 Scotellaro spoke with Brittany on September 10, 2018. Brittany described Am.M. as 

“colicky” and “fussy.” At the emergency room, Am.M. was diagnosed with constipation, and she 

was given a suppository. Later that day, according to Brittany, Am.M. began shaking on her left 

side. Brittany said that the next day, Am.M. had another shaking episode during which Brittany 

noticed a change in Am.M.’s facial features. Brittany took Am.M. back to the emergency room. 

Brittany denied that Am.M. had suffered any falls or injuries. Brittany told Scotellaro that she and 

William were living together and that there were no other caretakers for Am.M.. When Scotellaro 

spoke with William, he denied that Am.M. had suffered any injuries or that he or Brittany had hurt 

her.

¶ 23 Scotellaro testified that she physically examined Am.M. in the intensive care unit, where 

Am.M. was on a ventilator. Except for Am.M.’s brain injury, the exam was normal. Dr. Scotellaro 

testified that she and her team concluded that the cause of Am.M.’s condition was “traumatic brain 

injury,” after having ruled out everything else. Scotellaro testified that, within a reasonable degree 

of medical certainty, Am.M. had a “traumatic brain injury caused by child abuse,” which formerly 

was called “shaken baby syndrome.” Scotellaro testified that Am.M.’s injuries were “classic” for 

this. According to Scotellaro, half of the cases of traumatic brain injuries that she had seen involved 

no broken bones or other external injuries. Scotellaro opined, based on Am.M.’s MRI, that Am.M. 
2020 IL App (2d) 200335-U cons. 

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did not suffer a venous stroke. 

¶ 24 On cross-examination, Scotellaro agreed that Am.M. had no external bruising. However, 

Scotellaro qualified that Am.M.’s injuries showed “chronicity,” indicating that any bruising could 

have healed by the time that Scotellaro observed Am.M.. Scotellaro also agreed that a differential 

diagnosis is arrived at by excluding other conditions. Scotellaro testified that the blood clotting 

tests that were recommended by the radiologist were not performed because they were ruled out 

by the expert hematologist, who consulted on Am.M.’s care and determined, clinically, that those 

tests were not needed. Scotellaro testified that she and her team saw no indication that Am.M. had 

a stroke. Scotellaro could not tell whether Am.M. was shaken or received a blow to her head. 

¶ 25 On cross-examination, Scotellaro expanded on her connection to DCFS. One of her duties 

as medical director was to consult for medical services for children who are in DCFS’s custody. 

Scotellaro also had reviewed other hospitals’ determinations of child abuse for DCFS on two 

occasions. 

¶ 26 On redirect examination, Scotellaro testified that she relied on the entire team of medical 

professionals who saw or treated Am.M. in forming her opinions. Scotellaro also testified that 

Am.M.’s MRI exhibited no signs of a stroke. After Scotellaro’s testimony, the State rested. 

¶ 27 B. The Defense Case-In-Chief 

¶ 28 1. The Testimony of Dr. Joseph Scheller 

¶ 29 Scheller is a board-certified physician, who is licensed in Maryland and New Jersey, with 

a specialty in child neurology and a subspecialty in neuroimaging. Scheller is in private practice 

in Baltimore. Scheller reviewed all of Am.M.’s medical records, including her CT scans, MRIs, 

and other radiographic images. With respect to a CT scan of September 8, 2018, Scheller noted 

several very small blood clots “adjacent” to Am.M.’s brain surface on either side. These blood 
2020 IL App (2d) 200335-U cons. 

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clots were “acute,” meaning that they occurred within a “few” days of the imaging. Scheller also 

noted the presence of a subdural hygroma, which is a collection of fluid that was a complication 

of Am.M.’s birth. There were drops of blood in the fluid. Scheller opined that this collection of 

fluid was not a chronic subdural hematoma, because (1) a surgeon drained it and found fluid rather 

than old blood, and (2) Am.M. had no history of a head or brain injury. 

¶ 30 Scheller next testified regarding an MRI of Am.M.’s brain taken on September 10, 2018. 

He noted a blood clot caused by a stretched blood vessel. According to Scheller, the clot could 

have been caused by abuse, but “you would want to look for other evidence of that, like scalp or 

skull injury, neck injury, [or] bodily injury.” In the absence of injury, Scheller testified, one would 

be skeptical that abuse occurred. Scheller opined that the radiographic images showed no evidence 

that Am.M. was struck or shaken. Scheller testified that the very small blood clots were called 

venous thrombosis, or blood clots within veins. Scheller testified that blood clots within veins are 

strokes. He opined that Am.M. had several “very, very small” strokes caused by excessive blood 

clotting. Scheller testified that the radiologist at Rush who noticed the blood clots recommended a 

series of tests designed to show whether Am.M. had a clotting disorder, but the hematologist 

ordered tests for the opposite problem, excessive bleeding. Therefore, according to Scheller, 

excessive clotting was never ruled out. Scheller testified that there was a duty to clinically rule out 

a clotting disorder. According to Scheller, because the Rush doctors did not rule out a clotting 

disorder, their differential diagnosis was incomplete. 

¶ 31 Scheller described petechial hemorrhages in Am.M.’s eye as drops of blood that leaked 

from her clotted veins. Scheller testified that those hemorrhages were indicative of bleeding in the 

brain rather than abuse from shaking. Scheller testified, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, 

that all of Am.M.’s findings could be attributed to something other than abuse. 
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¶ 32 On cross-examination, Scheller testified that he was not currently affiliated with any 

hospitals. He obtained his board certifications in pediatrics and neurology before continuing 

examinations were required, and he had not availed himself of continuing education to update his 

certifications. Scheller estimated that he testified 200 times in abuse or shaken baby cases, always 

for the defense. 

¶ 33 Scheller testified that he saw an acute subdural hematoma on Am.M.’s films. He did not 

see a subacute or chronic subdural hematoma. Because he did not see evidence that Am.M. was 

born with a blood vessel abnormality, nor did he find infection, bleeding disorder, or trauma, 

Scheller diagnosed the cause of Am.M.’s seizures as venous stroke.

¶ 34 Scheller testified that he disagreed with the term “abusive head trauma,” as being too 

vague. Scheller believed that acceleration-deceleration injuries could be caused by a caregiver only 

to very young infants—one or two months old. Scheller admitted that this view was shared by only 

five percent of his peers. In rejecting the term “abusive head trauma,” Scheller acknowledged that 

he was “at odds” with the American Academy of Pediatrics and the American Board of Pediatrics. 

Scheller testified that he disagreed with every doctors’ organization that accepted the use of the 

term “abusive head trauma.” Scheller testified that he also rejected the notion that a diagnosis of 

abuse could conclusively be established absent physical findings such as broken bones. Scheller 

testified that it is a “commonly held belief” among ophthalmologists that retinal hemorrhaging is 

an indicator of abuse, but he disagrees that such hemorrhages are “useful in any way” in 

determining whether a baby was subject to abuse. 

¶ 35 On redirect examination, Scheller testified that his continuing medical education consists 

of reading journals and occasionally attending seminars. According to Scheller, Am.M.’s seizures 

were caused by “a little bit of blood that was irritating the surface of the brain.” 
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¶ 36 2. The Testimony of Brittany P. 

¶ 37 On September 7, 2018, Brittany took Am.M. to the emergency room because Am.M. was

lethargic, not eating properly, and vomiting. Am.M. was diagnosed with constipation and given a 

suppository. Upon discharge, Brittany was instructed to give Am.M. Enfalyte. The next day, 

Am.M. still was not eating well. After Brittany administered the Enfalyte, Am.M.’s left arm and 

leg began twitching, and Am.M. began “blinking.” That episode lasted about 10 seconds. Then, 

Am.M. had more episodes, and Brittany asked Lorilyn to witness what was happening. Brittany 

immediately took Am.M. to the emergency room. From there, Am.M. was transported to Rush. 

¶ 38 Brittany testified that Am.M.’s head at birth was bruised and her left eye was “bulging” 

and bloodshot. Brittany identified two photographs of Am.M. at two weeks of age, which Brittany 

said depicted the bruising and bulging of the eye. 

¶ 39 At Rush on September 8, Brittany spoke with hospital staff. Brittany did not mention that 

her father and grandfather had a history of strokes because the hospital personnel never asked her 

about that. 

¶ 40 Brittany testified that about five-to-ten days before September 7, she, Az.M., and Am.M. 

visited William in Chicago, where he was living with his grandmother. They stayed with William 

about four hours. During that time, there were periods when Brittany was not watching Am.M.. 

According to Brittany, she had advised William on September 6 that Am.M. was not feeling well.

¶ 41 Brittany testified that she did not live with William in September 2018. She lived in 

Montgomery with her mother, her stepfather, her oldest brother, Az.M., and Am.M.. Brittany was 

Am.M’s primary caregiver. Brittany never saw any family members abuse Am.M.. Brittany 

testified that neither she nor William ever abused Am.M.. 

¶ 42 On cross-examination, Brittany testified that she had no safety concerns about William 
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being with the children. She also testified that, when she noticed Am.M’s bruising and protruding 

eye at two weeks of age, she did not take Am.M. to the doctor because she did not have a car or a 

babysitter. Brittany acknowledged telling her social worker and Scotellaro that Am.M. was a fussy, 

colicky baby. Brittany testified that she believed that Am.M.’s injuries were caused by forceps at 

birth. According to Brittany, she was asked at the hospital about a family history of strokes but not 

about blood disorders. Brittany clarified that her father had a stroke after Am.M.’s hospitalization 

in September 2018, and she did not know about her grandfather’s stroke when she was interviewed 

at the hospital on September 8. Brittany testified that she told hospital personnel that Am.M. first 

suffered seizures on September 8. At the conclusion of Brittany’s testimony, the defense rested.

The State presented no rebuttal. The parties submitted written closing arguments.

¶ 43 C. The Court’s Findings and Order 

¶ 44 On April 24, 2020, the court entered a 16-page typewritten order. After reciting the trial 

testimony in minute detail, the court noted that the Rush medical records indicated the following. 

Brittany told three different doctors and a social worker, in separate interviews, that she, Am.M., 

and Az.M. were living with William and that no one other than the parents cared for Am.M.. 

Brittany stated that Lorilyn watched Az.M.. Brittany told the social worker that the cause of 

Am.M.’s injuries was lack of adequate oxygen at birth. Brittany also stated that Am.M. pulled her 

hair quite hard. Brittany stated to Scotellaro and another physician that Am.M. had two seizures 

on the night of September 7. 

¶ 45 The court noted that the State’s petition for adjudication of wardship did not allege who 

was responsible for inflicting Am.M.’s injuries. The court further noted that the State was not 

required to prove that a specific person participated in the abuse that gave rise to the petition. 

¶ 46 The court found that Scotellaro based her opinion that Am.M. suffered abusive head trauma 
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on her education, training, and expertise as a child abuse pediatric physician and after consultation 

with numerous other experts, notably a neuroradiologist and a hematologist. The court noted that 

it had the opportunity to assess Scotellaro’s “candor and credibility.” The court found that 

Scotellaro had been declared an expert approximately 15-to-20 times. 

¶ 47 The court rejected the parents’ argument that Scotellaro’s position as medical director for 

DCFS tainted her independence. The court found no conflict in Scotellaro’s positions as a treating 

physician and DCFS medical director. The court noted that Scotellaro’s job was not to “generate 

business for DCFS * * *.” The court also noted that Scotellaro did not charge a fee for her 

testimony. 

¶ 48 The court found the parents’ argument that abuse did not occur because Am.M. had no

other internal or external injuries to be without merit. The court relied on Scotellaro’s testimony 

that half of the abuse cases the doctor had seen involved no other internal or external injuries. The 

court also relied on Scotellaro’s testimony that it was possible that any bruises had healed by the 

time Am.M. presented at Rush. 

¶ 49 The court also rejected the parents’ argument that Rush did not test for a clotting disorder, 

and, thus, failed to rule it out as a cause of Am.M.’s injuries. The court again relied on Scotellaro’s 

testimony that, although a radiologist had recommended such tests, the hematologist disagreed 

based upon her clinical evaluations of Am.M.. The court rejected Brittany’s explanations of 

forceps and lack of oxygen as the causes of Am.M.’s injuries, as neither of those theories was 

supported by any medical evidence. 

¶ 50 Next, the court found the Rush medical records “compelling,” while the court found 

Scheller’s testimony to be not credible. The court noted that Scheller had not participated in the 

maintenance of his certifications and did not attend seminars to keep current. The court further 
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noted that Scheller “shunned” “what 95% of medical professionals have accepted as abusive head 

trauma.” The court also found that Scheller “dismissed” the diagnoses of Scotellaro and the “entire 

Rush team of specialists,” including the hematologist. The court found, considering the children’s 

best interests and the evidence, that Am.M. was an abused and neglected minor. Based on that 

finding, the court found that Az.M. was also a neglected minor. The court entered both an 

adjudicatory order and a dispositional order. 

¶ 51 William filed a motion to reconsider, which was denied. William then filed a timely notice 

of appeal. 

¶ 52 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 53 William first contends that the court erred in admitting the medical records into evidence.

The court admitted the medical records into evidence, without objection, pursuant to section 2-

18(4)(a) of the Act, which makes such records admissible as business records when accompanied 

by a certificate from the head of the hospital or responsible employee stating that the records are 

the full and complete record of the reported condition, act, transaction, occurrence, or event. 705 

ILCS 405/2-18(4)(a) (West 2018). That section further provides that a certification by someone 

other than the head of the hospital shall be accompanied by a photocopy of a delegation of authority 

signed by both the head of the hospital and by such other employee. 705 ILCS 405/2-18(4)(a) 

(West 2018). 

¶ 54 Because William did not object to the admission into evidence of the medical records, he 

argues that their admission can be reviewed under the plain-error doctrine. The admission of 

evidence is within the trial court’s sound discretion, and we will reverse that decision only if it is

arbitrary, fanciful, and unreasonable, such that no reasonable person would agree with it. People 

v. Randolph, 2014 IL App (1st) 113624, ¶ 16. The plain-error doctrine permits the appellate court 
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to review unpreserved error where (1) a clear or obvious error occurred and the evidence is so 

closely balanced that the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against the defendant, 

regardless of the seriousness of the error, or (2) a clear or obvious error occurred, which was so 

serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant’s trial and challenged the integrity of the 

judicial process, regardless of whether the evidence was closely balanced. People v. Holliday, 

2020 IL App (5th) 160547, ¶ 61. The plain-error doctrine can be applied in abuse and neglect 

cases. In re Andrea D., 342 Ill. App. 3d 233, 242 (2003). William asks us to review this issue under 

both prongs of the plain-error doctrine. We first, however, must decide whether error occurred. 

Holliday, 2020 IL App (5th) 160547, ¶ 62. 

¶ 55 Here, the certificate is not on letterhead identifying the institution that generated the 

records. The document references Am.M.’s name, date of birth, trial court case number, and the 

number of pages “enclosed.” The body is typewritten and states: “I, Amanda Ritzler, certify that 

all records have been provided all providers from all DOS, as requested.” Amanda Ritzler’s 

signature follows the typewritten material. A telephone number and the date of the document are 

also provided. The certificate does not identify Amanda Ritzler’s position. The body does not 

identify what the records are to which it refers. The content, really, is meaningless. Nevertheless, 

the State argues that the certificate, when read in conjunction with the medical records themselves,

demonstrates compliance with the Act. The State relies on this court’s decision in In re Z.J., 2020 

IL App (2d) 190824, for the proposition that compliance with the statute can be determined from 

examining the records themselves. 

¶ 56 In Z.J., DCFS service plans were admitted into evidence without the certificate required by 

section 2-18(4)(a). Z.J., 2020 IL App (2d) 190824, ¶ 55. This court held that, absent certification, 

the State can satisfy the statute’s foundational requirements by establishing that the writings were 
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made (1) as a memorandum or record of the event, (2) in the regular course of business, and (3) at 

the time of the event or within a reasonable time thereafter. Z.J., 2020 IL App (2d) 190824, ¶ 55. 

To determine whether a sufficient foundation was established, this court then examined the service 

plans. Z.J., 2020 IL App (2d) 190824, ¶¶ 57-61. 

¶ 57 Upon examination of the medical records in the instant case, we determine that section 2-

18(4)(a)’s foundational requirements were met. Each record contains the Rush logo, and the 

records clearly pertain to Am.M.. Each record details the medical service rendered, the date and 

time of the service, by whom the service was rendered, and the date and time that the record was 

filed. The records demonstrate that they were generated close to, or within hours, of the events 

recorded. Accordingly, we determine that the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the 

Rush medical records. Because we find no error, there is no plain error. 

¶ 58 William next argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the admission 

of the medical records where the certificate did not comply with the statute. To demonstrate 

ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that (1) his attorney’s conduct fell below 

an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) the attorney’s performance prejudiced the 

defendant. People v. Jackson, 2020 IL 124112, ¶ 90. The defendant’s failure to satisfy either prong 

of the test defeats his or her claim. Jackson, 2020 IL 124112, ¶ 90. “Matters of trial strategy are 

generally immune from claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.” People v. Manning, 241 Ill. 

2d 319, 327 (2011). Ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims are cognizable in juvenile 

proceedings. In re K.O., 336 Ill. App. 3d 98, 110 (2002). Whether to object to the foundation for 

the admission of evidence is generally a matter of trial strategy. People v. Probst, 344 Ill. App. 3d 

378, 387 (2003). As a matter of trial strategy, failure to object does not necessarily establish 

deficient performance. Probst, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 387. Here, counsel’s performance did not fall 
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below an objectively reasonable standard, because, as we determined, a sufficient foundation for 

the admission of the medical records into evidence existed despite the inadequate certificate. As a 

matter of trial strategy, defense counsel did not object to the records but presented his own expert 

who explained why, in his opinion, Rush’s records demonstrated that the State’s expert came to 

her opinions without sufficient underlying data. Therefore, the admission of the Rush records was 

essential to an understanding of the defense expert’s testimony. Accordingly, we hold that 

defendant’s counsel was not ineffective. 

¶ 59 William next argues that the court’s finding that Am.M. was neglected and abused is 

against the manifest weight of the evidence. The State must prove allegations of abuse and neglect 

by a preponderance of the evidence. In re Davon H., 2015 IL App (1st) 150926, ¶ 47. The trial 

court is in the best position to observe the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses and is, therefore, 

in the best position to determine their credibility and the weight to be given to their testimony. 

Davon H., 2015 IL App (1st) 150926, ¶ 47. We will not reverse a trial court’s finding of abuse and 

neglect unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Davon H., 2015 IL App (1st) 

150926, ¶ 47. A decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence when the opposite 

conclusion is clearly evident. Davon H., 2015 IL App (1st) 150926, ¶ 47. 

¶ 60 William contends that the court abused its discretion in relying on the medical records, 

which he argues were inadmissible. Therefore, William argues, the court’s findings were against 

the manifest weight of the evidence. As we have determined that the medical records were properly 

admitted into evidence, this argument has no merit. 

¶ 61 William next argues that the court erred in giving any weight to the Rush medical records

because (1) they were inadmissible, (2) the Rush radiologist did not testify and was not certified 

by the court as an expert, and (3) the medical records were hearsay and not substantive evidence, 
2020 IL App (2d) 200335-U cons. 

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so that the court’s reliance on the them as substantive evidence was error. We have determined 

that the records were admissible as a business record pursuant to section 2-18(4)(a) of the Act.

Business records are an exception to the hearsay rule. Troyan v. Reyes, 367 Ill. App. 3d 729, 733 

(2006). Like other business records, medical records are inherently reliable because they are 

generated by individuals who have no motive to lie and who must rely on their accuracy. Troyan, 

367 Ill. App. 3d at 734. Consequently, diagnoses and opinions contained in medical records are 

admissible to the same extent as objective facts, because a diagnosis is the “major premise” from 

which a physician draws his or her conclusion as to the proper treatment to be given. Troyan, 367 

Ill. App. 3d at 734 (quoting Falcone v. New Jersey Bell Telephone Co., 236 A.2d 394, 400 (N.J. 

1967)). The same indicia of reliability apply to opinions contained in medical records because the 

“opinions are worthless unless accurate.” Troyan, 367 Ill. App. 3d at 734. Accordingly, we hold 

that the court did not err in considering the Rush medical records as substantive evidence, and, 

more particularly, in relying on the Rush radiologist’s findings and conclusions. 

¶ 62 William asserts at length in a well-presented argument that the court erred in giving 

Scotellaro’s testimony more weight than Scheller’s. However, when confronted with a battle of 

the experts, i.e., different experts examining roughly the same information and arriving at opposite 

conclusions (see People v. Smith, 253 Ill. App. 3d 443, 446-47 (1993) (describing a battle of arson 

experts), it is “for the trier of fact to evaluate the expert testimonies and weigh their relative worth 

in context.” People v. Sims, 374 Ill. App. 3d 231, 251 (2007). Thus, the court was not required to 

accept Scheller’s testimony over Scotellaro’s. On appeal, we will not reweigh the experts’ 

testimonies based on their qualifications. See Sims, 374 Ill. App. 3d at 251 (the appellate court will 

not reweigh expert evidence based on the experts’ qualifications). Here, the court gave no weight 

to Scheller’s opinions, finding that (1) Scheller did not maintain his professional certifications or 
2020 IL App (2d) 200335-U cons. 

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keep current through attending seminars, and (2) Scheller “shunned” “what 95% of medical 

professionals have accepted as abusive head trauma.” Indeed, Scheller admitted that he was out of 

the mainstream of medical and academic thought on the subject. On this record, we cannot say that

the court’s rejection of Scheller’s testimony was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 63 Next, William contends that the court’s finding that Az.M. was a neglected minor is against 

the manifest weight of the evidence. The court’s finding was based on the theory of anticipatory 

neglect. Pursuant to the anticipatory-neglect theory, the State seeks to protect, not only those 

children who are direct victims of abuse or neglect, but also those children who have a probability 

of being abused or neglected because they reside with an individual who has neglected or abused 

another child. In re Arthur H., 212 Ill. 2d 441, 468 (2004). The theory of anticipatory neglect is 

premised on the concept of “injurious environment.” Arthur H., 212 Ill. 2d at 468. The Act 

provides that a juvenile court should not be prohibited from acting until each particular child 

suffers injury. In Interest of L.W., 291 Ill. App. 3d 619, 623 (1997). Thus, a finding of abuse of 

one sibling establishes a prima facie case of neglect based on injurious environment to another 

sibling. K.O., 336 Ill. App. 3d at 108-09. William’s sole argument with respect to Az.M. is that the 

State failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Am.M. was abused. As we have 

rejected that argument, the instant contention also is without merit. Accordingly, we hold that the 

trial court properly adjudicated both minors wards of the court. 

¶ 64 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 65 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Kendall County. 

¶ 66 Affirmed.