IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-41642

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

JUAN DUQUE-TINOCO, also known as Rogelio Lopez-Ruiz, 

 Defendant - Appellant

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

 consolidated with No. 15-41638

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff – Appellee

v.

JUAN DUQUE-TINOCO

 Defendant - Appellant

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 3:15-CR-17-1

Before JOLLY, HIGGINBOTHAM, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

January 23, 2017

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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PER CURIAM:*

Juan Duque-Tinoco pleaded guilty to illegal reentry and was sentenced

to 37 months of imprisonment and three years of supervised release. His

supervised release imposed for a prior conviction was revoked, and he was

sentenced to 24 months of imprisonment. The sentences were ordered to run

consecutively. He challenges both sentences in these consolidated appeals.

As to the sentence for the new offense, Duque-Tinoco argues that the

district court abused its discretion in departing upward pursuant to U.S.S.G.

§ 5K2.21 for uncharged conduct. The uncharged conduct the district court

relied on was the fact recounted in the Presentence Report that Duque-Tinoco

was found in the United States during a traffic stop of a vehicle in which

officers discovered 2.2 kilograms of methamphetamine. Duque-Tinoco argues

that the mere presence of the drugs in containers in a vehicle he was driving

does not establish he possessed the methamphetamine. He argues that the 

Presentence Report does not provide much detail about the drugs including 

their exact location in the vehicle or visibility.

The parties disagree about whether plain error applies to this argument,

but we need not resolve that dispute because the claim of error fails even under

the standard of review that applies when we review preserved challenges to

factual determinations. We conclude that the district court did not clearly err

in finding, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Duque-Tinoco committed

the uncharged conduct. See United States v. Koss, 812 F.3d 460, 466 (5th Cir.

2016).

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

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Rejection of this argument in the context of the new illegal reentry case

also warrants rejecting Duque-Tinoco’s argument that any error in the district

court’s assessment of the uncharged conduct at that sentencing improperly

influenced the sentence in the revocation case. 

Duque-Tinoco raises an additional argument challenging the revocation

sentence: that he was denied the opportunity to allocute. He concedes that he

did not raise this objection in the district court. We have discretion to correct

a forfeited error only if the error is obvious, affects the defendant’s substantial

rights, and undermines the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial

proceedings. Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009).

The district court held the hearings in both of Duque-Tinoco’s cases backto-back and only afforded a chance to allocute in the first hearing that dealt

with the new case. Not allowing allocution at the revocation hearing was a

clear error. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1(b)(2)(E); United States v. Avila-Cortez,

582 F.3d 602, 604-05 (5th Cir. 2009). Duque-Tinoco’s substantial rights were

arguably affected because he was sentenced above the Guidelines range. 

Avila-Cortez, 582 F.3d at 605. But given that the district court had just heard

Duque-Tinoco allocute a few minutes earlier in connection with his sentence

for the new reentry offense that raised similar issues to the revocation

sentence, we decline to exercise our discretion to correct this error. See id. at 

606 (explaining that “if the defendant had a prior opportunity to allocute . . .

then the case is one of those ‘limited class of cases’ in which we will decline to 

exercise our discretion to correct the error” (quoting United States v. Reyna, 

358 F.3d 344, 352 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc))); see also United States v. Legg, 

439 F. App’x 312, 313 (5th Cir. 2011) (declining to correct the error because the 

defendant’s proposed allocution had already been considered and deemed 

unpersuasive and did not undermine the district court’s reasons for imposing 

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sentence); United States v. Coleman, 280 F. App’x 388, 392 (5th Cir. 2008) 

(similar); United States v. Neal, 212 F. App’x 328, 332 (5th Cir. 2007) (similar).

The judgments of the district court are AFFIRMED.

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