COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Chafin, Russ ell and Senior Judge Clements Argued at Richmond, Virginia

TERENCE LAMONT COLLINS, JR. MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY v. Record No . 0765-17-2 JUDGE TERESA M. CHAFIN OCTOBER 23, 2018 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND W. Reilly Marchant, Judge Daniel W. Hall (Law Office of D aniel W. Hall, on brief), for appellant. Elizabeth Kiernan Fitzgerald, Assi stant Attorney General (Mark R. Herring, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

The Circuit Court of the City of Richmond convicted Terence Lam ont Collins, Jr., of aggravated malicious woundi ng, attempted robbery, and two count s of using a firearm in the commission of a felony. On appeal, Collins maintains that the circuit court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence obtai ned from the search of his cel l phone. Collins also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions. Fo r the following reasons, we affirm Collins’s convictions.
I. BACKGROUND “In accordance with establishe d principles of appellate review , we state the facts in the light most favorable to the Commo nwealth, the prevailing party in the trial court[, and] accord the Commonwealth the benefit of all inferences fairly deducible from the evidence.” Riner v.

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this op inion is not designated fo r publication.UNPUBLISHED- 2 - Commonwealth, 268 Va. 296, 303, 601 S.E.2d 555, 558 (2004). So viewed, the evidence is as follows.
A. THE SHOOTING AND INITIAL IDENTIFICATION OF COLLINS Around 11:00 a.m. on February 5, 2016, David Johnson saw Collin s at a convenience store in downtown Richmond. Johnson knew Collins from “the str eet.” Collins offered to give Johnson a ride to a nearby barbershop, and Johnson accepted the offer. Johnson bought heroin from Collins in a parking lot near the barbershop. During the transaction, Collins saw that Johnson possessed a substantial amount of money. Collins followed Johnson through the parking lot after the her oin transaction. At some point, Collins pointed a pistol at Johnson and told him to “kic k the money.” Collins then shot Johnson in both of his legs. Johnsonrefused to give his moneyto Collins. Collins shot Johnson in the buttocks as he was running toward an alley. Collins als o fired a shot at Johnson’s torso, but the bullet got caught in J ohnson’s jacket and did not actua lly hit him. As he was running, Johnson’s leg buckled and he fe ll to the ground. After Johnsonfell, Collins shot him again in the right leg. He then demanded Johnson’s money and hit him in the face with the pistol. When Johnson cried for help, Collins ran to his car and drove away f rom the area. Police officers and emergency medical personnel promptly arriv ed at the scene of the shooting in response to a 9-1-1 ca ll. Johnson initially told the police officers that he did not know who shot him. After he was t ransported to the hospital, h owever, Johnson told the police that someone named “Tee” shot him with a “pink and black .380” caliber pistol. Johnson also provided a detailed physical desc ription of his assailant, and told the police that the shooter was wearing an “Army fatigue jacket .” Based on Johnson’s descripti on, the police identified Collins as a suspect. Johnson subsequently identified Collins as the s hooter from a photo lineup.- 3 - The police obtained warrants fo r Collins’s arrest, and he was t aken into custody five days after the shooting. Collins deni ed any involvement in the shoo ting. He told the police that he did not know Johnson or own any firearms. Collins had two cell phones with him when he was taken into custody. He was als o wearing a camouflage jacket.
B. THE SEARCH OF THE CELL PHON E AND THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS Detective Mark Godwin, the lead i nvestigator in the present cas e, applied for two search warrants pertaining to Collins’ s cell phones. Godwin initially requested a warrant allowing him to search the personal property he ld by the jail in which Colli ns was an inmate and seize the cell phones that he possessed when he came into police custody. Godwin submitted this request to a magistrate in Prince George County, the jurisdiction where the jail was located. In the affidavit supporting the w arrant, Godwin described the shooting and explained how Collins was identified as a suspect. The affidavit also no ted that Collins had cell phones in his possession when he was take n into custody. The affidavit then stated: Based on your affiant’s training and experience investigating weapons offenses, as well as vio lent crimes, your affiant knows that offenders communicate with cellular devices by means of phone conversations, text messages, email, and social media applications. Your affiant has investigated numerous violent criminal cases in which cell reco rds, to include call detail li sts, contact lists, text message c ontent were instrumental in understanding how a violent cr ime occurred and who was involved. Therefore, . . . your affiant requests a search warr ant be issued to further thi s investigation. Additionally, the affidavit discus sed Godwin’s law enforcement training and experience. The affidavit stated that Godw in had been a police officer for nine years and that he was currently an aggravated assault detective. The affidavit also explained that Godwin had investigated numerous crimes involving violence. The magistrate issued the reque sted warrant. Pursuant to the warrant, Godwin searched Collins’s personal property and s eized two cell phones. Godwin then applied for an additional- 4 - warrant allowing him to search the contents of one of the cell phones. As the search of the cell phone was to be conducted within t he City of Richmond, Godwin s ubmitted his request for the second warrant to a circuit court judge sitting in that jurisdi ction. Godwin submitted an almost identical affidavit to support the second warrant. Notably, th e affidavit contained the statement regarding the role of cell phones in violent crimes previously quoted in this opinion. After reviewing the affidavit, a cir cuit court judge issued the reque sted warrant. The police found several images on the cell phone when they ex ecuted the search warrant. One of the images showed a hand holding a pink and bl ack Ruger .380 caliber pistol. Another image showed Collins. Both images were created within eleven minutes of each other on December 8, 2015, approximately two months before the shooti ng. Collins filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the cell phone. Collins argued that the warrant authoriz ing the search of the cell phon e was not supported by probable cause. Specifically, Collins maint ained that the affidavit sup porting the warrant failed to establish any factual connection b etween the charged offenses a nd the cell phone or any reason to believe that evidence pert aining to the s hooting would be fo und on the cell phone. In addition, Collins contended that the warrant was overbroad because it all owed the police to search all of the data on the cell phone. Following a hearing on Collins’s motion to suppress, the circu it court determined that “the affidavit for the search w arrant, and the search warrant i tself[,] lacked sufficient particularity and were facially overbroad.” 1 Nevertheless, the circuit court concluded that the evidence obtained from the sear ch of the cell phone was admissi ble under the good faith

1 As the Commonwealth did not chall enge this ruling, the only is sue before us is whether the circuit court erre d in determining that the evidence was ad missible under the good faith exception. Therefore, we decline to address whether the circui t court correctly concluded that the underlying affidavit failed t o establish probable cause to support the search w arrant at issue. See Adams v. Commonwealth, 48 Va. App. 737, 745 n.5, 635 S.E.2d 20, 24 n.5 (2006).- 5 - exception set forth in Unite d States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (198 4). The circuit court acknowledged that the law regard ing cell phone searches was in a “state of uncertainty and flux.” The circuit court also noted tha t a circuit court judge issued the warrant authorizing the search. Under these circumstances, the c ircuit court conc luded that the police reasonably relied on the search warrant in good faith and de nied Collins’s motion to sup press. C. COLLINS’S JURY TRIAL Johnson testified about the event s of the shooting at Collins’s trial. He unequivocally identified Collins as his assailant, and testified that Collins shot him with a “pink and black .380” caliber pistol. He also testified that Collins drove a small b lue four-door car w ith “donut tires” on the day of the shooting and that Collins was wearing an “Arm y fatigue jacket” on that day. Johnson explained that he did not identify Collins as his assai lant at the scene of the shooting because a crowd of people had gathered around him and he feared further bodily harm if he identified Collins as the shooter in public. Raymond Fleming, a Dominion Power employee working nearby on t he day of the shooting, also testified at Collin s’s trial. Fleming testified that he heard five gunshots coming from the area where the shoo ting occurred. Fleming testified that he saw a man matching Collins’s general description “wa lking away really fast” from the area where the gunshots were fired. Fleming explained that th e man “kept looking back to hi s left over his shoulder.” Fleming testified that the man was wear ing an “old school . . . Army ca mo” jacket and that he drove away from the area in a small blue four-door car with a “donut” tire

. Eugene Provost, a crime scene de tective, testified that three . 380 caliber cartridge cases and two bullets were found at the crime scene. An additional b ullet was recovered following Johnson’s medical treatment. Jami Dizon, a firearm and tool ma rk forensic scientist, analyzed the cartridge cases and bullets. D izon testified that the thre e cartridge cases were fired from the- 6 - same firearm and that the three bullets were fired from the sam e firearm. While Dizon could not verify that the cartridge cases and the bullets w ere fired from one firearm, she concluded that both the cartridge cases and the bullets could have been fired from a Ruger .380 caliber pistol. The images obtained from Collins’s cell phone were admitted into evidence, including the image of the pink and blac k Ruger .380 caliber pistol. Add itionally, the camouflage jacket that Collins was wearing when he came into police custody was a dmitted into evidence. Collins presented defense evidence following the Commonwealth’ s case-in-chief. Collins testified on his own behalf. Collins acknowledged that he knew Johnson and that he gave him a ride on the day of the shooting. Collins explained that he initially lied to the police about the shooting because he ha d sold heroin to Johnson. Coll ins denied that he owned a pink and black pistol, and explained that the image on his cell phon e was the cover of his rap mix tape. Collins admitted that he had previously been convicted o f five felonies and three misdemeanors involving moral turpitude. Collins testified that a man wearing a black jacket and a black “du-rag” approached Johnson in the alley near the ba rbershop on the day of the shoo ting. When the man said “something like I got you, got your ass, got you,” Collins turn ed and ran back to his car. He then heard a gunshot. Collins suggested that the shooting was relat ed to Johnson’s gang affiliation. Collins also presented testimony from Joshua Brown, an individ ual who called 9-1-1 after the shooting. Brown testi fied that he was sitting in his car near the scene of the shooting when he heard one gunshot. He then s aw an individual wearing a“black cap and a black hoodie” “bolt” from the alley w here the shooting occurred. The jury ultimately convicted Col lins of aggravated malicious w ounding, attempted robbery, and two counts of using afirearm in the commission of a felony. This appeal followed.- 7 - II. ANALYSIS On appeal, Collins contends that the circuit court erred by de nying his motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the search of his cell phone. Colli ns argues thatthe warrant authorizing the search only stated generalized suspicions and f ailed to establish the required nexus between the cell phone and the shooting. Collins maintai ns that the affidavit supporting the warrant was so lacking in i ndicia of probable cause that anobjective police officer could not have reasonably relied on it in good faith. Therefore, Collins contends that the circuit court erred by determining that the evidence obtained from his cell phone w as admissible under the good faith exception established by Leon and subsequent cases. Collins also argues that the evidence presented at trial was i nsufficient to support his convictions. Collins contends that the evidence failed to esta blish that he was the perpetrator of the charged offenses. While C ollins acknowledg es that Johnson unequivocally identified him as the shooter, Collins maintains that Johnson’s testimony was con tradicted by additional evidence presented in this case. He als o argues that Johnson was inhere ntly incredible. Upon review, we conclude that the circuit court did not err by admitting the evidence obtained from Collins’s cell phone pursuant to the Leon good fa ith exception. We also conclude that the evidence presented in this case was sufficient to supp ort Collins’s convictions.
A. THE CIRCUIT COURT DID NOT ERR BY DENYING COLLINS’S MOTION T O SUPPRESS THE EVIDENCE OBTAI NED FROM HIS CELL PHONE “A defendant’s claim that eviden ce was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment presents a mixed question of l aw and fact that we review de novo on appeal.” McCain v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 546, 551, 659 S.E.2d 512, 515 (2008). “I n considering such questions, [we are] required to give defere nce to the factual findings of the trial court and to determine independently whether, under the law, the manner in which the e vidence was obtained satisfies constitutional requirements. ” McCain v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 483, 490, 545 S.E.2d 541,- 8 - 545 (2001). “The defendant has th e burden to show that, consid ering the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonw ealth, the trial court’s denial of his suppression motion was reversible error.” McCain, 275 Va. at 552, 659 S.E.2d at 515. “The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution require s that a search warrant be based upon probable cause.” S owers v. Commonwealth, 49 Va. App. 588, 595, 643 S.E.2d 506, 510 (2007). Generally, “[w]here law enforcement officers illegally search private premises or seize property wit hout probable cause in violation of the Fo urth Amendment, the illegally seized evidence will be excluded from evidence [in a criminal p rosecution].” Colaw v. Commonwealth, 32 Va. App. 806, 810, 531 S.E.2d 31, 33 (2000); s ee also Anzualda v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. App. 764, 779, 607 S.E.2d 749, 756 (2005) ( en banc ). In Leon, “the United States Supr eme Court established a good-fa ith exception to the exclusionary rule, applicable when a search is conducted pursua nt to a warrant subsequently determined to be defective for F ourth Amendment purposes.” War d v. Commonwealth, 273 Va. 211, 222, 639 S.E.2d 269, 274 (2008). “Under the good faith ex ception, ‘[w]here a police officer has an objectively reasonable belie f that the issuing magistrat e had probable cause to issue the search warrant, the officer may rely upon the magistrate’s prob able cause determination and the evidence [obtained pursuant to the defective warrant] will not be excluded.’” Sowers, 49 Va. App. at 602, 643 S.E.2d at 513 (quoting Colaw, 32 Va. App. at 810-11, 531 S.E.2d at 33). “[T]he exclusionary rule is de signed to deter police misconduct rather than to punish the errors of judges and magistrat es.” Id. (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 916). “An officer ordinarily cannot be expected to question the magistrate’s determination o f probable cause.” Adams, 48 Va. App. at 747, 635 S.E.2d at 24. “Evidence seized pursuant t o a warrant should be suppressed ‘only in those unusual cases in which exclusion will further th e purposes of the exclusionary rule.’” Id. at 746, 635 S.E.2d a t 24 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. a t 918). “[P]enalizing the officer for- 9 - the magistrate’s error, rathe r than his own, cannot logically c ontribute to the de terrence of Fourth Amendment violations.” Leon, 468 U.S. at 921. “The good-faith exception is not without limitations. In Leon , the Supreme Court outlined four circumstances in which the good-faith exception t o the exclusionary rule would not apply.” Ward, 273 Va. at 222, 639 S.E.2d at 274. A police off icer cannot have an objectively reasonable belief that probable cause exists for a search and s uppression is an appropriate remedy: “(1) [W]hen the [magistrate] ‘was misled by information in an affidavit that the affiant kne w was false or would have known w as false except for his reckless di sregard of the truth’; (2) when‘the issuing magistrate wholly aba ndoned his judicial role . . .’; (3) when ‘an affidavit [is] so l acking in indicia of probable c ause as to render official belief i n its existence entirely unreason able’; or (4) when ‘a warrant [is] s o facially deficient . . . that th e executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid.’” Id. at 222-23, 639 S.E.2d at 274 (quo ting United States v. Pere z, 393 F.3d 457, 461 (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 923)); see also Sowers, 49 Va. App. at 602, 643 S.E.2d at 513. Collins bases his appellate ar gument on the third limitation t o the Leon good faith exception. Collins argues that the affidavit supporting the wa rrant authorizing the search of his cell phone was so lacking in indici a of probable cause that a r easonable police officer could not have relied on it in good faith. C ollins emphasizes that the o nly statements contained in the affidavit suggesting that evi dence pertaining to the shooting w ould be found on his cell phone were Godwin’s generalized stateme nts about the behavior of viol ent criminals. Therefore, Collins contends that the affidavit failed to establish any fac tual nexus between the shooting and the data contained on the cell phone. Assuming without deciding that the circuit court correctly det ermined that the warrant at issue was not supported by probabl e cause, we find that the cir cuit court correctly concluded that the evidence obtained from the search of Collins’s cell phone w as admissible pursuant to the- 10 - Leon good faith exception. Although the affidavit supporting the warrant may have failed to establish the requis ite nexus between the c ell phone and the sh ooting, it was not “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to r ender official belief in its e xistence entirely unreasonable .” Leon, 468 U.S. at 923 (emphasis adde d); see also Ward, 273 Va. at 222, 639 S.E.2d at 274. “[A]s long as there is some indicia of probable cause in t he underlying affidavit, we will apply the good faith exception as long as a reasonable police o fficer, after assessing the facts set forth in the affidavit, could have believed that the warrant wa s valid.” Anzualda, 44 Va. App. at 781, 607 S.E.2d at 757. In the present case, the affidavit sup porting the warrant at issue contained some indicia of probabl e cause. The affidavit contai ned a description of the shooting, and stated that the victim ident ified Collins as his assailant. The affidavit also indicated that Collins had a cell phone in his possession when he was taken in to police custody following the shooting. The affidavit then expl ained that the data contained in a suspect’s cell phone was often “instrumental in understanding how a violent crime occurred and who was involved.” While conclusions based on a po lice officer’s training and exp erience are not sufficient in themselves to provide a basis for probable cause, a magistrate may consider such conclusions when determining whether to issu e a search warrant. See Soward s, 49 Va. App. at 597, 643 S.E.2d at 510. Based on Godwin’s tra ining and experience, he c oncluded that Collins’s cell phone likely contained evidence pertaining to the shooting. Inthe affidavit supporting the warrant, Godwin explained that vi olent offenders often communic ated with their cell phones and that their cell phones frequentl y contained evidence of their c rimes. The affidavit also described Godwin’s prior law enforcement experience, and indicated that h e had investig ated numerous violent crimes. These statement s established a nexus, “however slight,” between the shooting and Collins’s cell phone. See Anzualda, 44 Va. App. at 784, 60 7 S.E.2d at 759.- 11 - Moreover, additional circumstances supported police reliance o n the warrant at issue. “In determining whether police o fficers relied in good faith on a j udicially issued warrant, we may ‘take into account informati on known to police officers that wa s not included in the search warrant affidavit.’” Midki ff v. Commonwealth, 54 Va. App. 323, 332, 678 S.E.2d 287, 292 (2009) (quoting Adams, 275 V a. at 273, 657 S.E.2d at 94). In t his case, Godwin obtained two warrants regarding the cell phones . A magistrate in Prince Geo rge County issued a warrant authorizing Godwin to search Col lins’s property and seize any c ell phones that he found, and a circuit court judge sitting in the City of Richmond issued a warrant authorizing the search of the contents of the cell phone. Thus , two different officials had previously determined that Godwin’s affidavit established a sufficient nexus between the s hooting and Collins’s cell phone. We conclude that a reasonable pol ice officer could have relied in good faith on the warrant authorizing the search of Collins’s cell phone. The wa rrant contained some indicia of probable cause establishing tha t evidence of the shooting would be found on the cell phone, and both a magistrate and a circuit court judge concluded that prob able cause supported the search. Under these circumstances, the circuit court did not err by det ermining that the evidence obtained from Collins’s cell phone was admissible under the Leo n good faith exception.
B. THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT COLLINS’S CONVICTION S When considering the sufficien cy of the evidence on appeal, we “presume the judgment of the trial court to be correct ” and reverse only if the trial court’s decision is “plainly wrong or without evidence to support it .” Davis v. Commonwealth, 39 Va. App. 96, 99, 570 S.E.2d 875, 876-77 (2002); see also Code § 8.01-680. Under this standard, “a reviewing court does not ‘ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at t he trial established guilt beyo nd a reasonable doubt.’” Crowder v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 658, 663, 588 S. E.2d 384, 387 (2003) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979)). Itasks instead whether “ any- 12 - rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Kelly v. Commonwea lth, 41 Va. App. 250, 257, 584 S.E.2 d 444, 447 (2003) ( en banc ) (emphasis added) (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319). “This fam iliar standard gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve confl icts in the testi mony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Jackson, 443
U.S. at 319. On appeal, Collins contends that the evidence presented at tria l failed to establish that he was the perpetrator of the cha rged offenses. Collins maintains that Johnson’s testimony was incredible. Collins emphasizes that Johnson’s testimony regard ing the shooting was inconsistent with the evidence found at the cr ime scene. Collins also notes that Johnson’s testimony was contradicted by his own version of the shooting and the testimony of Brown, the individual who called 9-1-1 after the shooting. “The credibility of the witnesse s and the weight accorded the evidence are matters solely for the fact finder who has t he opportunity to see and hear tha t evidence as it is presented.” Smith v. Commonwealth, 56 Va. App. 711, 718, 697 S.E.2d 14, 17 (2010) (quoting Sandoval v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 133, 138, 455 S.E.2d 730, 732 (1995)) . “[T]he conclusions of the fact finder on issues of witness credibility may be disturbed o n appeal only when we find that the witness’ testimony was ‘inheren tly incredible, or so contrary t o human experience as to render it unworthy of belief.’” Ragsdale v. Commonwealth, 38 Va. App. 42 1, 429, 565 S.E.2d 331, 335 (2002) (quoting Ashby v. Co mmonwealth, 33 Va. App. 540, 548, 53 5 S.E.2d 182, 187 (2000)). “At trial, the Commonwealth b ears the burden of proving the ide ntity of the accused as the perpetrator beyond a reasonabl e doubt.” Cuffee v. Commonwe alth, 61 Va. App. 353, 364, 735 S.E.2d 693, 698 (2013) (quoting Blevins v. Commonwealth, 40 Va. App. 412, 423, 579 S.E.2d 658, 663 (2003)). In the pres ent case, Johnson unequivo cally identified Collins as his- 13 - assailant. Johnson testified that he knew Collins before the s hooting. Johnson also provided a detailed physical description of Collins to the police after th e shooting, and later selected him as the perpetrator from a photo lineup. Johnson’s testimony ident ifying Collins as his assailant was not inherently incredible. Moreover, Johnson’s testimony reg arding the shooting was corro borated by substantial evidence. Johnson testified that Collins shot at him five time s. Fleming, the Dominion Power employee working nearby, testifi ed that he heard five gunshots on the day of the shooting. Johnson also testified that Collin s was wearing an “Army fatigu e jacket” and driving a small blue four-door car with “donut t ires” on the day of the shootin g. Fleming testified that he saw an individual wearing a camouflage jacket quickly walk away from the scene of the shooting and drive away in a similar car w ith a “donut tire” on one of its w heels. Johnson also testified that Co llins shot him with a pink and b lack .380 caliber pistol. Cartridge cases and bullets were found at the crime scene that could have been fired by a .380 caliber firearm. Furthermore, an image found on Collins’s cell phone showed a hand holding a pink and black Ruger .380 caliber pist ol, and a forensic scient ist testified that the cartridge cases and bullets found at the crime s cene could have been fired by asimilar weapon. Collins notes that Johnson testified that he was initially sho t in the parking l ot rather than the alley. As no cartridge cases or bullets were found in the parking lot, Collins maintains that Johnson’s description of the shoot ing was incredible. This arg ument is without merit. Provost, the detective who collected evide nce from the crime scene, test ified that first responders often inadvertently moved evidence when responding to an emergency me dical situation. Although Johnson testified that Collins shot at him five times, the poli ce only found three cartridge cases and three bullets following the shooting. Based on this eviden ce, the jury coul d have reasonably- 14 - inferred that the police simpl y failed to discover all of the c artridge cases and bu llets located at the crime scene. While Johnson’s testimony regardi ng the shooting was inconsist ent with Collins’s testimony about the incident, the jury reasonably rejected Coll ins’s testimony. “In its role of judging witness credibility, the f act finder is entitled to dis believe the self-serving testimony of the accused and to conclude that the accused is lying to concea l his guilt.” Flanagan v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 681, 702, 714 S.E.2d 212, 222 (2011) (quoting Marable v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 505, 509-10, 500 S.E.2d 233, 235 (199 8)). In the pres ent case, the jury was entitled to reject Co llins’s self-serving testimony th at an unknown man shot Johnson. Notably, the evidence in this case established that Collins immediately fled from the scene of the shooting. The Supreme Court of Virginia has expla ined that “[f]light following the commission of a crime is evidence of guilt.” Clagett v. Common wealth, 252 Va. 79, 93, 472 S.E.2d 263, 271 (1996). Additionally, Collins lied to the poli ce about the shooting. Collins initially told the police that he did not know Johnson, and he denied any involvement in the shooting. “A false or evasive a ccount is a circumstance, simil ar to flight from a crime scene, that a fact finder may properly consider as evidence of guilty knowl edge.” Covil v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 692, 696, 604 S.E.2d 79, 82 (2004). Further, Collins’s credibility was impeached by his prior criminal convictions . See Code § 19.2-269; Va. R. Evid. 2:609. Collins contends that Brown’ s testimony supported his descript ion of the shooting. Brown testified that he saw a ma n wearing black c lothing run aw ay from the alley immediately after the shooting. Although Collins suggested that this man m ay have been the shooter, the jury could have inferred that this ind ividual was merely a bystander running away from the shooting or a concerned individual runni ng to get help. The shooting oc curred in downtown Richmond in the middle of the day, and many people were nearby.- 15 - We conclude that the evidence presented by the Commonwealth wa s sufficient to support Collins’s convictions. Ample evidence established that Collins was the perpetrator of the offenses at issue. Johnson unequivocally identified Collins as his assailant, and his testimony regarding the shooting was corr oborated by substantial evidence . Accordingly, the circuit court did not err by convicting Collins of the present offenses.
III. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated, we affirm Collins’s convictions. Affirmed.