(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2021 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is 

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. 

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been 

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

NANCE v. WARD, COMMISSIONER, GEORGIA 

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, ET AL. 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 

THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 

No. 21–439. Argued April 25, 2022—Decided June 23, 2022 

A prisoner who challenges a State’s proposed method of execution under

the Eighth Amendment must identify a readily available alternative 

method that would significantly reduce the risk of severe pain. If the 

prisoner proposes a method already authorized under state law, the

Court has held that his claim can go forward under 42 U. S. C. §1983,

rather than in habeas. See Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U. S. 637, 644– 

647. But the prisoner is not confined to proposing a method already

authorized under state law; he may ask for a method used in other 

States. See Bucklew v. Precythe, 587 U. S. ___, ___. The question presented is whether a prisoner who does so may still proceed under

§1983. 

Petitioner Michael Nance brought suit under §1983 to enjoin Georgia from using lethal injection to carry out his execution. Lethal injection is the only method of execution that Georgia law now authorizes. 

Nance alleges that applying that method to him would create a substantial risk of severe pain. As an alternative to lethal injection, 

Nance proposes death by firing squad—a method currently approved 

by four other States. The District Court dismissed Nance’s §1983 suit 

as untimely. The Eleventh Circuit rejected it for a different reason: 

that Nance should have advanced his method-of-execution claim by

way of a habeas petition rather than a §1983 suit. A habeas petition, 

that court stated, is appropriate when a prisoner seeks to invalidate

his death sentence. And the Eleventh Circuit thought that was what 

Nance was doing. It asserted that Georgia law—which again, only authorizes execution by lethal injection—had to be taken as “fixed.” 981 

F. 3d 1201, 1211. Under that “fixed” law, the court said, enjoining 

Georgia from executing Nance by lethal injection would mean that he 
 

 

 

2 NANCE v. WARD 

Syllabus 

could not be executed at all. The court therefore “reconstrued” Nance’s 

§1983 complaint as a habeas petition. Id., at 1203. Having done so, 

the court then dismissed Nance’s petition as “second or successive,” 

because he had previously sought federal habeas relief. 28 U. S. C. 

§2244(b). 

Held: Section 1983 remains an appropriate vehicle for a prisoner’s 

method-of-execution claim where, as here, the prisoner proposes an alternative method not authorized by the State’s death-penalty statute. 

Both §1983 and the federal habeas statute enable a prisoner to complain of “unconstitutional treatment at the hands of state officials.” 

Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U. S. 477, 480. A prisoner may generally sue 

under §1983, unless his claim falls into that statute’s “implicit exception” for actions that lie “within the core of habeas corpus.” Wilkinson 

v. Dotson, 544 U. S. 74, 79. When a prisoner seeks relief that would 

“necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence,” he 

comes within the core and must proceed in habeas. Heck, 512 U. S., at 

487. 

The Court has twice held that prisoners could bring method-ofexecution claims under §1983. See Nelson, 541 U. S., at 644–647; Hill 

v. McDonough, 547 U. S. 573, 580–583. Although these cases predated

the Court’s requirement that prisoners identify alternative methods of

execution, each prisoner had still said enough to leave the Court convinced that alternatives to the challenged procedures were available. 

See Nelson, 541 U. S., at 646; Hill, 547 U. S., at 580–581. Because 

alternatives were available, the prisoners’ challenges would not “necessarily prevent [the State] from carrying out [their] execution[s].” 

Nelson, 541 U. S., at 647 (emphasis in original); see Hill, 547 U. S., at 

583. That made §1983 a proper vehicle. 

In Nelson and Hill, the Court observed that using a different method 

required only a change in an agency’s uncodified protocol. Here, Georgia would have to change its statute to carry out Nance’s execution by

firing squad. Except for that fact, this case would even more clearly 

than Nelson and Hill be fit for §1983. Since those cases, the Court has 

required a prisoner bringing a method-of-execution claim to propose 

an alternative way of carrying out his death sentence. Thus, an order 

granting the prisoner relief does not, as required for habeas, “necessarily prevent” the State from implementing the execution. Nelson, 

541 U. S., at 647 (emphasis in original). Rather, the order gives the 

State a pathway forward. 

That remains true even where, as here, the proposed alternative is 

one unauthorized by present state law. Nance’s requested relief still 

places his execution in Georgia’s control. If Georgia wants to carry out 

the death sentence, it can enact legislation approving what a court has 

found to be a fairly easy-to-employ method of execution. Although that 
 

Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 3 

Syllabus 

may take more time and effort than changing an agency protocol, Hill 

explained that the “incidental delay” involved in changing a procedure

is irrelevant to the vehicle question—which focuses on whether the requested relief would “necessarily” invalidate the death sentence. 547 

U. S., at 583. And anyway, Georgia has given no reason to think that

passing new legislation would be a substantial impediment. 

The Court of Appeals could reach the contrary conclusion only by 

wrongly treating Georgia’s statute as immutable. In its view, granting

Nance relief would necessarily imply the invalidity of his death sentence because Georgia law must be taken as “fixed.” 981 F. 3d, at 1211. 

But one of the “main aims” of §1983 is to “override”—and thus compel

change of—state laws when necessary to vindicate federal constitutional rights. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167, 173. Indeed, courts not 

uncommonly entertain prisoner suits under §1983 that may, if successful, require changing state law. 

Under the contrary approach, the federal vehicle for bringing a federal method-of-execution claim would depend on the vagaries of state 

law. Consider how Nance’s claim would fare in different States. In 

Georgia (and any other State with lethal injection as the sole authorized method), he would have to bring his claim in a habeas petition. 

But in States authorizing other methods when a court holds injection

unlawful, he could file a §1983 suit. It would be strange to read stateby-state discrepancies into the Court’s understanding of how §1983

and the habeas statute apply to federal constitutional claims. That is 

especially so because the use of the vehicles can lead to different outcomes: An inmate in one State could end up getting his requested relief, while an inmate in another might have his case thrown out.

The approach of the Court of Appeals raises one last problem: It 

threatens to undo the commitment this Court made in Bucklew. The 

Court there told prisoners they could identify an alternative method

not “presently authorized” by the executing State’s law. 587 U. S., at 

___. But under the approach of the Court of Appeals, a prisoner who 

presents an out-of-state alternative is relegated to habeas—and once 

there, he will almost inevitably collide with the second-or-successive 

bar. That result, precluding claims like Nance’s, would turn Bucklew 

into a sham. 

Finally, recognizing that §1983 is a good vehicle for a claim like 

Nance’s does not countenance “last-minute” claims to forestall an execution. Id., at ___. Courts must consider delay in deciding whether to 

grant a stay of execution, and outside the stay context, courts have 

tools to streamline §1983 actions and protect a sentence’s timely enforcement. Pp. 5–13. 

981 F. 3d 1201, reversed and remanded. 

KAGAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., 

and BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAVANAUGH, JJ., joined. BARRETT, J., filed 

a dissenting opinion, in which THOMAS, ALITO, and GORSUCH, JJ., joined. 
 

 

 

 

 

_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 1 

Opinion of the Court 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the 

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to 

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that 

corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 21–439 

MICHAEL NANCE, PETITIONER v. TIMOTHY C. 

WARD, COMMISSIONER, GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 

[June 23, 2022] 

JUSTICE KAGAN delivered the opinion of the Court. 

In several recent decisions, this Court has set out rules 

for challenging a State’s proposed method of execution under the Eighth Amendment. To prevail on such a claim, a 

prisoner must identify a readily available alternative

method of execution that would significantly reduce the risk

of severe pain. In doing so, the prisoner is not confined to

proposing a method authorized by the executing State’s 

law; he may instead ask for a method used in other States.

See Bucklew v. Precythe, 587 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (slip op., 

at 19).

This case concerns the procedural vehicle appropriate for 

a prisoner’s method-of-execution claim. We have held that 

such a claim can go forward under 42 U. S. C. §1983, rather 

than in habeas, when the alternative method proposed is 

already authorized under state law. See Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U. S. 637, 644–647 (2004). Here, the prisoner has 

identified an alternative method that is not so authorized. 

The question presented is whether §1983 is still a proper

vehicle. We hold that it is. 
 

2 NANCE v. WARD 

Opinion of the Court 

I 

A 

States choosing to impose capital punishment have over 

time sought out “more humane way[s] to carry out death

sentences.” Glossip v. Gross, 576 U. S. 863, 868 (2015). In 

the 27 States with the death penalty, lethal injection is by

far the most common method of execution. See ibid. Fifteen States, including Georgia, authorize only the use of lethal injection.1 Nine States authorize lethal injection plus

one or more other specified methods; of those (to use an example relevant here), four approve the firing squad.2 And 

three States provide that if their authorized methods (including lethal injection) are found unconstitutional, then

they may carry out a death sentence by any constitutional 

means.3 

A death row inmate may attempt to show that a State’s 

planned method of execution, either on its face or as applied 

to him, violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on 

—————— 1Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §13–757(A) (2020); Ga. Code Ann. §17–10–38(a) 

(2020); Idaho Code Ann. §19–2716 (2017); Ind. Code §35–38–6–1(a) 

(2021); Kan. Stat. Ann. §22–4001(a) (2007); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 

§15:569(B) (West 2022); Mont. Code Ann. §46–19–103(3) (2021); Neb.

Rev. Stat. §83–964 (2020 Cum. Supp.); Nev. Rev. Stat. §176.355(1) 

(2017); N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. §15–188 (2021); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 

§2949.22(A) (Lexis 2021); Ore. Rev. Stat. §137.473(1) (2021); 61 Pa. Cons. 

Stat. §4304(a) (2015 Special Edition); S. D. Codified Laws §23A–27A–32

(2016); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. §43.14(a) (Vernon 2018). 2Mississippi, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Utah authorize the firing squad among other methods of execution. H. B. 1479, 2022 Leg., Reg. 

Sess. (Miss.); Okla. Stat., Tit. 22, §1014 (2020 Supp.); S. C. Code Ann.

§24–3–530 (2021 Cum. Supp.); Utah Code §77–18–113 (2021). The rest 

of the States in this bucket most commonly authorize electrocution or 

lethal gas. See Ark. Code Ann. §§5–4–617(a), (l) (Supp. 2021); Cal. Penal 

Code Ann. §3604(a) (West Supp. 2022); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. 

§§431.220(1)(a), 431.223 (Lexis 2021); Mo. Rev. Stat. §546.720(1) (2016); 

Wyo. Stat. Ann. §7–13–904 (2021). 3Ala. Code §15–18–82.1(c) (2018); Fla. Stat. §922.105(3) (2018); Tenn.

Code Ann. §40–23–114(d) (2018). 
Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 3 

Opinion of the Court 

“cruel and unusual” punishment. To succeed on that claim, 

the Court held in Glossip, he must satisfy two requirements. First, he must establish that the State’s method of 

execution presents a “substantial risk of serious harm”—

severe pain over and above death itself. Id., at 877. Second, 

and more relevant here, he “must identify an alternative 

[method] that is feasible, readily implemented, and in fact 

significantly reduce[s]” the risk of harm involved. Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). Only through a “comparative exercise,” we have explained, can a judge “decide

whether the State has cruelly ‘superadded’ pain to the punishment of death.” Bucklew, 587 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 

15).

In identifying an alternative method, the Court in Bucklew held, an inmate is “not limited to choosing among those

presently authorized by a particular State’s law.” Id., at ___ 

(slip op., at 19). The prisoner may, for example, “point to a 

well-established protocol in another State as a potentially 

viable option.” Ibid. The Eighth Amendment, Bucklew explained, “is the supreme law of the land, and the comparative assessment it requires can’t be controlled by the State’s 

choice of which methods to authorize.” Id., at ___ (slip op., 

at 20); see Arthur v. Dunn, 580 U. S. ___, ___ (2017) (slip 

op., at 10) (SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). In addition, Bucklew stated, allowing an inmate to 

propose a method not authorized by the State keeps his 

“burden” within reasonable bounds. 587 U. S., at ___ (slip 

op., at 19). Because the inmate can look beyond the State’s 

current law, we saw “little likelihood” that he would “be unable to identify an available alternative.” Id., at ___ (slip

op., at 20); see id., at ___ (slip op., at 2) (KAVANAUGH, J., 

concurring). 

B 

While trying to flee a bank robbery, petitioner Michael 
 

 

 

4 NANCE v. WARD 

Opinion of the Court 

Nance shot and killed a bystander. A Georgia jury convicted Nance of murder, and the trial court sentenced him 

to death. Nance challenged his conviction and sentence—

first on direct appeal, next in state collateral proceedings, 

and finally in federal habeas—but without success. 

Nance later brought suit under §1983 to enjoin Georgia

from using lethal injection to carry out his death sentence.

As stated above, lethal injection is the only method of execution Georgia law now authorizes. See supra, at 2.4 In his 

complaint, Nance alleges that applying that method to him

would create a substantial risk of severe pain. See App. to

Pet. for Cert. 86a. According to Nance, his veins are “severely compromised and unsuitable for sustained intravenous access.” Ibid. They are, Nance says, likely to “blow”

during the execution, “leading to the leakage of the lethal

injection drug into the surrounding tissue” and thereby

causing “intense pain and burning.” Ibid. On top of that,

Nance asserts, his longtime use of a prescription drug for 

back pain creates a risk that the sedative used in the State’s 

lethal injection protocol will fail to “render him unconscious 

and insensate.” Ibid. Nance proposes, as a “readily available alternative” method of execution, “death by firing

squad.” Ibid. As noted earlier, four other States have approved that method. See supra, at 2, and n. 2. Use of a 

firing squad, Nance says, will lead to “swift and virtually 

painless” death. App. to Pet. for Cert. 102a. And implementing that method, he says, would be simple: Georgia 

has enough qualified personnel and could borrow specific

protocols from another State. Ibid. 

After the District Court dismissed Nance’s suit as untimely, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit rejected it for a different reason—that Nance had used the 

—————— 4See Ga. Code Ann. §17–10–38(a) (“All persons who have been convicted of a capital offense and have had imposed upon them a sentence

of death shall suffer such punishment by lethal injection”). 
 

 

Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 5 

Opinion of the Court 

wrong procedural vehicle. In the panel majority’s view, 

Nance should have brought his method-of-execution claim

by way of a habeas petition rather than a §1983 suit. A 

habeas petition, the court stated, is appropriate when a

prisoner seeks to “invalidate” a death sentence. 981 F. 3d 

1201, 1209 (2020). And the court thought that was what

Nance was doing: The injunction he requested, preventing 

the use of lethal injection, “necessarily impl[ies] the invalidity of his death sentence.” Id., at 1203. That was so, the 

court reasoned, because Georgia law “must [be taken] as

fixed”—and under that “fixed” law, if Nance could not be 

executed by lethal injection, then he could not be executed 

at all. Id., at 1211. The court therefore “reconstrued” 

Nance’s complaint as a habeas petition. Id., at 1203. And 

having done so, the court dismissed the petition as “second

or successive” because Nance had already sought federal

habeas relief. 28 U. S. C. §2244(b); see supra, at 4. Judge

Martin dissented, arguing that Nance could proceed under 

§1983. In her view, Nance was not challenging his death 

sentence; all he wanted was an order telling “the State to 

execute him by a different method.” 981 F. 3d, at 1215. The 

Eleventh Circuit denied Nance’s petition for rehearing en 

banc over the dissent of three judges. See 994 F. 3d 1335 

(2021).

We granted certiorari, 595 U. S. ___ (2022), and now reverse. 

II 

This Court has often considered, when evaluating state 

prisoners’ constitutional claims, the dividing line between

§1983 and the federal habeas statute. Each law enables a 

prisoner to complain of “unconstitutional treatment at the

hands of state officials.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U. S. 477, 

480 (1994). But there the resemblance stops. The habeas 

statute contains procedural requirements (like the second-
 

 

 

6 NANCE v. WARD 

Opinion of the Court 

or-successive rule) nowhere found in §1983; the former statute may therefore require dismissal of a claim when the latter statute would not. See id., at 480–481. Still more pertinent here, the scope of the two laws also differs. Section 

1983 broadly authorizes suit against state officials for the

“deprivation of any rights” secured by the Constitution. 

Read literally, that language would apply to all of a prisoner’s constitutional claims, thus swamping the habeas

statute’s coverage of claims that the prisoner is “in custody 

in violation of the Constitution.” 28 U. S. C. §2254(a); see 

Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U. S. 74, 78–79 (2005). So we have 

not read §1983 literally in the prisoner context. To the contrary, we have insisted that §1983 contains an “implicit exception” for actions that lie “within the core of habeas corpus.” Id., at 79. 

In defining that core, this Court has focused on whether

a claim challenges the validity of a conviction or sentence. 

See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 475, 489 (1973). The 

simplest cases arise when an inmate, alleging a flaw in his 

conviction or sentence, seeks “immediate or speedier release” from prison. Heck, 512 U. S., at 481. The analogue

in the capital punishment context, also clear-cut, is when

an inmate seeks to overturn his death sentence, thus preventing the State from executing him. Slightly less obvious,

this Court has held that an inmate must proceed in habeas 

when the relief he seeks would “necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.” Id., at 487 (barring 

§1983 suits for money damages when prevailing would imply a conviction was wrongful). In doing so, though, we 

have underscored that the implication must be “necessar[y].” Wilkinson, 544 U. S., at 81 (emphasis in original); 

see Nelson, 541 U. S., at 647. On the opposite end of the 

spectrum, the Court has held that a prison-conditions claim

may be brought as a §1983 suit. See Preiser, 411 U. S., at 

498–499. Such a suit—for example, challenging the adequacy of a prison’s medical care—does not go to the validity 
 

Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 7 

Opinion of the Court 

of a conviction or sentence, and thus falls outside habeas’s 

core. 

In Nelson v. Campbell and Hill v. McDonough, this Court 

held two method-of-execution claims to fall on the §1983

side of the divide. See Nelson, 541 U. S., at 644–647; Hill, 

547 U. S. 573, 580–583 (2006). Both cases involved challenges to a State’s lethal injection protocol—the first to the 

use of a “cut-down” procedure to access the prisoner’s veins,

the second to a particular three-drug sequence. The cases 

predated our requirement that prisoners identify alternative methods, but each prisoner had said enough to leave

the Court convinced that alternatives to the challenged procedures were available. See Nelson, 541 U. S., at 646; Hill, 

547 U. S., at 580–581. And that made the difference in both 

cases. A claim should go to habeas, the Court held, only if 

granting the prisoner relief “would necessarily prevent [the 

State] from carrying out its execution.” Nelson, 541 U. S., 

at 647 (emphasis in original); see Hill, 547 U. S., at 583.5 

In neither case would it have done so. Each prisoner had

asked only for a change in implementing the death penalty,

and an order granting that relief would not prevent the

State from executing him. So the claims could proceed under §1983.

Both Nelson and Hill, though, reserved the question at 

issue here: whether the result should be different when a 

State’s death-penalty statute does not authorize the alternative method of execution. See Nelson, 541 U. S., at 645; 

Hill, 547 U. S., at 580. In each case, the Court observed 

that using a different method required no change in the

State’s statute, but only a change in an agency’s uncodified 

—————— 5 In both cases, the Court made clear that its formulation (again, would 

granting relief necessarily prevent the execution) merely adapted to the

capital punishment context the question the Court had formerly asked

in choosing between §1983 and habeas: Would granting relief necessarily

imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence? See Nelson, 541 U. S., 

at 646; Hill, 547 U. S., at 583; supra, at 6. 
 

8 NANCE v. WARD 

Opinion of the Court 

protocols. Here, all parties agree that Georgia would have 

to change its statute to carry out Nance’s execution by 

means of a firing squad. They dispute whether that fact 

switches Nance’s claim to the habeas track. 

Except for the Georgia statute, this case would even more

clearly than Nelson and Hill be fit for §1983. Since those 

two cases, we have compelled a prisoner bringing a methodof-execution claim to propose an alternative way for the 

State to carry out his death sentence. He must, we have 

said, present a “proposal” that is “sufficiently detailed” to

show that an alternative method is both “feasible” and 

“readily implemented.” Bucklew, 587 U. S., at ___ (slip op., 

at 21); see supra, at 3. In other words, he must make the 

case that the State really can put him to death, though in a

different way than it plans. The substance of the claim, now 

more than ever, thus points toward §1983. The prisoner is

not challenging the death sentence itself; he is taking the 

validity of that sentence as a given. And he is providing the

State with a veritable blueprint for carrying the death sentence out. If the inmate obtains his requested relief, it is

because he has persuaded a court that the State could readily use his proposal to execute him. The court’s order therefore does not, as required for habeas, “necessarily prevent”

the State from carrying out its execution. Nelson, 541 U. S., 

at 647 (emphasis in original). Rather, the order gives the 

State a pathway forward.

That remains true, we hold today, even if the alternative

route necessitates a change in state law. Nance’s requested

relief still places his execution in Georgia’s control. Assuming it wants to carry out the death sentence, the State can

enact legislation approving what a court has found to be a 

fairly easy-to-employ method of execution. To be sure, 

amending a statute may require some more time and effort 

than changing an agency protocol, of the sort involved in 

Nelson and Hill. But in Hill, we explained that the “incidental delay” involved in changing a procedure—which 
 

 

Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 9 

Opinion of the Court 

even when uncodified may take some real work6—is not relevant to the vehicle question. 547 U. S., at 583. Instead, 

that inquiry (as described earlier) focuses on whether the

requested relief would “necessarily” invalidate, or foreclose 

the State from implementing, the death sentence. Ibid.; see 

supra, at 6. And anyway, Georgia has given us no reason 

to think that the amendment process would be a substantial impediment. The State has legislated changes to its 

execution method several times before. See Dept. of Corrections, Office of Planning and Analysis, A History of the 

Death Penalty in Georgia: Executions by Year 1924–2014 

(Jan. 2015) (describing how Georgia moved from hanging to 

electrocution to lethal injection). Other States have regularly done the same, often in an effort to make executions 

more humane. See S. Banner, The Death Penalty: An

American History 296–297 (2002); see supra, at 2. That 

Nance’s claim would require such action does not turn it 

from one contesting a method of execution into one disputing the underlying death sentence.

The Court of Appeals could reach the contrary conclusion 

only by wrongly treating Georgia’s statute as immutable. 

Recall the court’s reasoning: Granting Nance relief would 

“necessarily imply[] the invalidity” of his death sentence because Georgia law (presumably both statutes and regulations) “must [be taken] as fixed.” 981 F. 3d, at 1210–1211; 

see supra, at 5; post, at 3–4 (BARRETT, J., dissenting) (agreeing that we must “take state law as we find it”). But why

must it be so taken—when as a matter of fact Georgia could

change its law and execute Nance? And when Nance accepts the validity of the State’s taking that course? The 

Court of Appeals posited that “it is not [a federal court’s]

place to entertain complaints under section 1983” that 

—————— 6 In a recent case, Texas described to this Court the complexity of 

changing uncodified execution protocols, given the number of state actors

who need to reach agreement. See Respondents’ Rule 32.3 Material in 

Ramirez v. Collier, O. T. 2021, No. 21–5592, p. 14a. 
 

 

10 NANCE v. WARD 

Opinion of the Court 

would compel a State to change its capital punishment law.

981 F. 3d, at 1211; see post, at 3. Except that sometimes it 

is. One of the “main aims” of §1983 is to “override”—and

thus compel change of—state laws when necessary to vindicate federal constitutional rights. Monroe v. Pape, 365 

U. S. 167, 173 (1961); see Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U. S. 113, 

124 (1990). Or said otherwise, the ordinary and expected 

outcome of many a meritorious §1983 suit is to declare unenforceable (whether on its face or as applied) a state statute as currently written. See, e.g., Cedar Point Nursery v. 

Hassid, 594 U. S. ___ (2021). And in turn, the unsurprising 

effect of such a judgment may be to send state legislators 

back to the drawing board. See, e.g., Kolender v. Lawson, 

461 U. S. 352, 358 (1983). A prisoner, no less than any 

other §1983 litigant, can bring a suit of that ilk—can seek 

relief that would preclude a State from achieving some result unless and until it amends a statute. 

And indeed, courts not uncommonly entertain prisoner

suits under §1983 that may, if successful, require changing 

state law. As noted earlier, the classic prisoner §1983 suit 

is one challenging prison conditions—say, overcrowding or

inadequate medical care. See supra, at 6–7. Those suits 

can be brought under §1983 because—just like this one— 

they attack not the validity of a conviction or sentence, but

only a way of implementing the sentence. (They concern, in

other words, how the prescribed incarceration is being carried out.) And the suits do not get diverted into habeas if, 

as sometimes is true, a judgment for the inmate would require a new statutory appropriation for the prison—to hire 

more doctors, for example. See, e.g., Stafford v. Carter, No. 

1:17–cv–00289 (SD Ind.), ECF Docs. 268, 282. Similarly, no

one would think an action of that kind should go to habeas

if the prison policy challenged (say, each facility’s maximum 

population) were specified in a statute or regulation. Or 

consider another kind of prisoner §1983 suit this Court has 

recently considered—one by a death row inmate seeking to 
 

Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 11 

Opinion of the Court 

compel the State to open the execution chamber to his spiritual advisor. See Dunn v. Ray, 586 U. S. ___ (2019); Murphy v. Collier, 587 U. S. ___ (2019); Gutierrez v. Saenz, 592 

U. S. ___ (2021); Ramirez v. Collier, 595 U. S. ___ (2022). 

Here too, the claim belongs in §1983 because—just like this 

one—it challenges not the validity of a death sentence, but

only the State’s mode of carrying it out. And again, we cannot think it would matter if a State codified its no-spiritualadvisor protocol in a regulation. The State, assuming it lost

the suit, would then have to modify its law to go forward 

with the execution. But the nature of the suit would still be 

the same. The complaint would still ask to adjust only a 

matter of implementation, so it still could be filed under 

§1983.

Under the contrary approach, the federal vehicle for 

bringing a federal claim—and with that, the viability of the 

claim—would depend on the vagaries of state law. Consider 

how Nance’s own method-of-execution claim would fare in 

different States. In Georgia (and any other State with lethal injection as the sole authorized method), he would have

to bring his claim in a habeas petition. But in some other 

States primarily using lethal injection, he could file a §1983

suit—because their statutes include back-up plans for when 

a court holds injection unconstitutional. See supra, at 2. 

Oklahoma’s statute, for example, provides in that event for 

several alternative methods, including a firing squad. See 

Okla. Stat., Tit. 22, §§1014(B)–(D). And Alabama’s statute, 

in addition to listing alternatives, provides for execution “by 

any constitutional method.” Ala. Code §15–18–82.1(c).

Similar issues of non-uniformity could arise when inmates

challenge, as in Nelson and Hill, specific ways of carrying

out a lethal injection. See supra, at 7. That is because some 

States have codified injection protocols in their statutes or

regulations, while others (like Georgia) have not. Compare, 

e.g., Ark. Code Ann. §§5–4–617(c)–(f ) with, e.g., Ga. Code 

Ann. §17–10–38(a). It would be strange to read such state-
 

 

12 NANCE v. WARD 

Opinion of the Court 

by-state discrepancies into our understanding of how §1983 

and the habeas statute apply to federal constitutional 

claims. And that is especially so because the use of those

vehicles can lead to different outcomes: An inmate in one 

State could end up getting his requested relief, while a similarly situated inmate in another would have his suit

thrown out. We cannot agree with the dissent that such a 

disparity would be “unremarkable.” Post, at 3. Its acceptance would mean that the Eighth Amendment is enforceable in federal court in one State, but not in another. 

Again, this case tells the tale: Having reconstrued Nance’s

complaint as a habeas petition, the court below dismissed it

as second or successive—a bar existing in habeas alone. See 

supra, at 5–6. 

That part of the circuit court’s opinion raises one last

problem, because it threatens to undo the commitment this

Court made in Bucklew. See post, at 4 (acknowledging the 

point, though finding it irrelevant). Recall that the Court 

there told inmates they could identify an alternative

method of execution not “presently authorized” by the executing State’s law. 587 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 19); see 

supra, at 3. That option would ensure state law does not

“control[]” the Eighth Amendment inquiry; and it would 

keep manageable the inmate’s “burden” to identify an alternative. 587 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 19–20). Under the 

circuit court’s approach, however, that option is no option

at all. Once an inmate presents an out-of-state alternative,

he is relegated to habeas. And once he is in habeas, he will 

(according to the circuit court) almost inevitably collide 

with the second-or-successive bar (because a method-of-execution claim typically postdates a first habeas petition by

many years). We do not here decide whether that view of 

the second-or-successive bar is correct. But the two aspects

of the circuit court’s ruling, when taken together, turn 

Bucklew into a sham. On the Eleventh Circuit’s view, Geor-
 

Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 13 

Opinion of the Court 

gia law effectively prevents an inmate like Nance from putting forward an out-of-state alternative. And Georgia law 

thereby precludes the kind of method-of-execution claim 

this Court told prisoners they could bring. 

One last point from Bucklew—this one about “dilatory” 

tactics—bears repeating here. Id., at ___ (slip op., at 30). 

In recognizing that §1983 is a good vehicle for a claim like

Nance’s, we do not for a moment countenance “last-minute” 

claims relied on to forestall an execution. Ibid. “Courts 

should police carefully against attempts to use [method-ofexecution] challenges as tools to interpose unjustified delay.” Ibid. In deciding whether to grant a stay of execution,

courts must consider whether such a challenge “could have

been brought earlier” or otherwise reflects a prisoner’s “attempt at manipulation.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks 

omitted). And outside the stay context, courts have a variety of tools—including the “substantive [and] procedural

limitations” that the Prison Litigation Reform Act imposes—to streamline §1983 actions and protect “the timely 

enforcement of a sentence.” Nelson, 541 U. S., at 650 (listing PLRA limitations); Bucklew, 587 U. S., at ___ (slip op., 

at 29). Finally, all §1983 suits must be brought within a 

State’s statute of limitations for personal-injury actions. 

See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U. S. 384, 387 (2007). Here, the 

District Court held Nance’s suit untimely under that limitations period. See No. 20–cv–00107 (ND Ga., Mar. 13,

2020), ECF Doc. 26, p. 12; supra, at 4. The Eleventh Circuit 

did not review that holding because it instead reconstrued 

the action as a habeas petition. Now that we have held that 

reconstruction unjustified, the court on remand can address

the timeliness question, as well as any others that remain. 

* * * 

For the reasons stated, we reverse the judgment of the 

Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit and remand the

case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 

14 NANCE v. WARD 

Opinion of the Court 

It is so ordered. 
_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 1 

BARRETT, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 21–439 

MICHAEL NANCE, PETITIONER v. TIMOTHY C. 

WARD, COMMISSIONER, GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 

[June 23, 2022] 

JUSTICE BARRETT, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS, JUSTICE 

ALITO, and JUSTICE GORSUCH join, dissenting. 

An inmate must bring a method-of-execution challenge in 

a federal habeas application, rather than under 42 U. S. C. 

§1983, if “a grant of relief to the inmate would necessarily 

bar the execution.” Hill v. McDonough, 547 U. S. 573, 583 

(2006). Under this criterion, Michael Nance must proceed 

in habeas because a judgment in his favor would “necessarily bar” the State from executing him. Ibid. Nance 

asked the District Court to “enjoin the Defendants from proceeding with [his] execution . . . by a lethal injection,” claiming that the use of such method would violate the Eighth 

Amendment as applied to him. App. to Pet. for Cert. 103a– 

104a. But lethal injection is the only method of execution

authorized under Georgia law. See Ga. Code Ann. §17–10–

38(a) (2020). Thus, if Nance is successful, the defendants 

in this case—the commissioner of the Georgia Department 

of Corrections and the warden—will be powerless to carry

out his sentence. That makes habeas the right vehicle for 

Nance’s Eighth Amendment challenge. 

The Court sees things differently. True, Nance is arguing 

that the Eighth Amendment renders his sentence invalid

under current Georgia law. But the Court points out that 
 

 

 

2 NANCE v. WARD 

BARRETT, J., dissenting 

the law could change: The legislature could authorize execution by firing squad, the alternative method that Nance 

has proposed. In fact, the Court says that Nance’s proposal

offers Georgia a “veritable blueprint for carrying the death

sentence out.” Ante, at 8. So an order in Nance’s favor 

would not “necessarily bar” the State from ever executing 

Nance, in the Court’s view. Instead, the order would “giv[e] 

the State a pathway forward” if the legislature chooses to 

pursue the amendment process. Ibid. 

The Court is looking too far down the road. In my view, 

the consequence of the relief that a prisoner seeks depends 

on state law as it currently exists. And under existing state

law, there is no question that Nance’s challenge necessarily 

implies the invalidity of his lethal injection sentence: He 

seeks to prevent the State from executing him in the only 

way it lawfully can.

In this respect, Nance’s method-of-execution challenge 

differs from those brought in Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U. S. 

637 (2004), and Hill, 547 U. S. 573. In Nelson, the inmate 

challenged the use of a “cut-down” procedure to access his 

veins. 541 U. S., at 640–642. We held that the suit sounded 

in §1983 because it would not “necessarily prevent Alabama

from carrying out its execution.” Id., at 647. We reasoned 

that, though venous access was an indispensable prerequisite to lethal injection, “a particular means of gaining such

access” was not. Id., at 645. Notably, “[n]o Alabama statute 

require[d] use of the cut-down,” and the State did not put

forward any “duly-promulgated regulations to the contrary.” Id., at 646. So even a successful challenge on these 

grounds “would have allowed the State to proceed with the

execution as scheduled.” Ibid. 

The same was true in Hill, which involved an inmate’s 

challenge to Florida’s three-drug protocol. 547 U. S., at 578. 

We held that the inmate could proceed under §1983 because

his “action if successful would not necessarily prevent the

State from executing him by lethal injection.” Id., at 580. 
Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 3 

BARRETT, J., dissenting 

We emphasized that the complaint did “not challenge the 

lethal injection sentence as a general matter” but instead 

only “the anticipated protocol.” Ibid. As in Nelson, we 

stressed that Florida law did “not require the department

of corrections to use the challenged procedure.” 547 U. S., 

at 580. The State was “free to use an alternative lethal injection procedure,” and so we explained that “[u]nder these 

circumstances a grant of injunctive relief could not be seen

as barring the execution of Hill’s sentence.” Id., at 580–581. 

Here, by contrast, the warden and the commissioner are 

not free to use an alternative to lethal injection—so if Nance

succeeds, they cannot carry out his sentence. And though

the Court contends otherwise, that consequence “switches

Nance’s claim to the habeas track.” Ante, at 8. An inmate 

can use §1983 actions to challenge many, if not most, aspects of prison administration. But when a challenge would 

prevent a State from enforcing a conviction or sentence, the 

more rigorous, federalism-protective requirements of habeas apply. The Court finds a way around those requirements with a theory at odds with the very federalism interests they are designed to protect: that an injunction barring

the State from enforcing a sentence according to state law 

does not really bar the State from enforcing the sentence 

because the State can pass a new law.

Unlike the Court, I would take state law as we find it in 

determining whether a suit sounds in habeas or §1983. The 

Court worries that this approach would make the appropriate federal vehicle “depend on the vagaries of state law.” 

Ante, at 11. Some States, like Georgia, provide for a single 

method of execution by statute; other States, like Alabama, 

allow for more flexibility. See ibid. So if state law determined the vehicle, an inmate in Georgia would have to challenge the lethal injection method in habeas, while an inmate in Alabama could use §1983. But that does not 

illustrate “the vagaries of state law”; it is an unremarkable 

consequence of federalism. States make different choices in 
 

4 NANCE v. WARD 

BARRETT, J., dissenting 

exercising their power to define punishment, and the law 

has long recognized a sovereign’s interest in mandating a 

particular form of capital punishment. Cf. 4 W. Blackstone, 

Commentaries on the Laws of England 397 (1769) (a sheriff 

would be “guilty of felony” if he “alter[ed] the manner of the

execution”). Habeas is appropriate in Georgia because under Georgia law, to enjoin execution by lethal injection is to

enjoin enforcement of the sentence itself. See Ga. Code 

Ann. §17–10–38(a) (“All persons who have been convicted

of a capital offense and have had imposed upon them a sentence of death shall suffer such punishment by lethal injection”). In Alabama, enjoining execution by lethal injection

does not have the same effect. See Ala. Code §15–18–82.1(c) 

(2018) (permitting execution “by any constitutional method 

of execution” if the other methods provided for by statute 

are held unconstitutional). The two sovereigns have made

different choices about how to define punishment, and federal law is designed to respect the choice of each. 

I understand the impulse to find a way out of habeas and 

into §1983. In States like Georgia, a claim under Bucklew 

v. Precythe, 587 U. S. ___ (2019), alleging an alternative

method of execution not presently authorized by state law 

would be difficult to assert in a federal habeas application 

because it would “almost inevitably collide with the secondor-successive bar.” Ante, at 12. But we acknowledged that 

very possibility in Bucklew. 587 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 

19). And more importantly, the unavailability of federal habeas relief does not justify recourse to §1983. Cf. Wilkinson 

v. Dotson, 544 U. S. 74, 87–88 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring) 

(“[A] prisoner who wishes to challenge the length of his confinement, but who cannot obtain federal habeas relief because of the statute of limitations or the restrictions on successive petitions, cannot use the unavailability of federal 

habeas relief in his individual case as grounds for proceeding under §1983” (citations omitted)). The habeas statutes 

funnel such challenges to the state courts—which are, after 
Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 5 

BARRETT, J., dissenting 

all, “the principal forum” for them. Harrington v. Richter, 

562 U. S. 86, 103 (2011).

For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.