Opinion issued October 15, 2015

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The 

First District of Texas 

————————————

NO. 01-14-00536-CR

———————————

DENNIS ROY REDDING, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 212th District Court

Galveston County, Texas

Trial Court Case No. 12-CR-2363

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Dennis Roy Redding was indicted for the first degree felony 

offense of murder and was convicted of the lesser included offense of 

manslaughter. Redding raises three issues on appeal. First, he contends that the 

trial court erred by submitting a voluntary intoxication instruction pursuant to 
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Penal Code section 8.04(a) because he did not rely on voluntary intoxication as a 

defense. Second, he contends that the trial court erred by failing to include 

Redding’s proposed application paragraph. Finally, Redding asserts that the trial 

court erred in overruling his objections to the State’s comments during closing 

argument in which the prosecutor allegedly told the jury that to be convicted of 

murder, Redding merely had to intend to engage in conduct rather than intend a 

result. Finding no error, we affirm. 

Background

Redding and Mark Holcomb, the complainant, were longtime friends who 

met when their daughters were in elementary school, then became closer when 

Redding’s wife, Joan, went to work for Holcomb. On June 22, 2012, Redding and 

his son-in-law, Darren Schieffer, joined Holcomb and his wife Francine at the 

Holcombs’ waterfront home for the weekend. The Holcombs’ daughter Ashley, 

Ashley’s husband Jonathan (John) Contois, and John’s brother Dan Contois were 

also there. 

Holcomb and Redding began drinking sometime before 5:00 p.m. They 

continued to drink outside while dinner was being prepared. The group, except 

Redding, ate dinner around 8:00 p.m. After dinner, everyone gathered outside and 

continued socializing and drinking. Holcomb and Redding remained as the rest of 

the group gradually dispersed to go to bed. 
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Around 9:30 p.m., neighbors Gert Rhodes, David Baggs, and Jeff Dolen 

joined Holcomb and Redding, and Francine came back downstairs. The group 

continued to drink and socialize until sometime after midnight. Then, with the 

help of Rhodes and Baggs, Holcomb assisted Redding upstairs to bed. 

Once upstairs, Holcomb stood in the doorway as Redding entered the 

bedroom where Darren was already sleeping. Redding stumbled, falling into the 

wall. He then pulled his bag out and began to rummage through it. Holcomb 

turned on the light and asked Redding what he was looking for. Darren awakened 

and sat up, and Redding yelled at Holcomb to “turn the fucking light off.” 

Redding then walked toward the doorway pointing his handgun at Holcomb while 

saying, “you mother fuckers are treating me like a baby.” As Redding approached 

Holcomb, Redding fired the gun. Holcomb grabbed his stomach and fell to the 

floor saying, “Dennis you shot me.” 

Darren ran to where John had been sleeping on the couch and told him that 

Redding shot Holcomb. John ran into the bedroom to subdue Redding while 

Darren called 911. Family members and guests then converged on the scene, and 

Holcomb was holding his side and saying, “Call 911, he shot me”; “it was an 

accident”; and “he didn’t mean to do it.” Darren and John restrained Redding and 

found the gun in Redding’s left pocket. They overheard Redding saying, “Let me 

up. It was an accident, let me up.” While awaiting EMS, Holcomb again told 
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Francine “it was an accident.” Both the EMS and police arrived and Holcomb was 

taken by life flight to the UTMB. Holcomb underwent surgery, but died from 

blood loss early that morning. 

At trial, Darren testified that Redding told him that he never meant to kill 

Holcomb, but that he was just trying to scare Holcomb by shining the gun’s laser 

on him. Redding believed the laser was trigger-activated, but, in fact, the gun had 

a button on the grip to activate the laser. Darren testified he is familiar with guns 

and does not know of any gun that has a trigger-activated laser. 

Trial testimony also revealed that Redding was familiar with firearms. 

Redding was a former Houston police officer and was previously the head of 

security at NASA. Redding also hunted regularly, was a concealed handgun 

license holder, practiced shooting at a gun range, and typically carried a gun with 

him.

The jury charge during the guilt-innocence phase of trial included 

instructions on murder and two lesser included offenses: manslaughter and deadly 

conduct. Over Redding’s objection, the trial court submitted the following 

instruction on voluntary intoxication, which tracked Texas Penal Code § 8.04(a) 

and (d): 

Voluntary intoxication does not constitute a defense to the 

commission of a crime.
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Intoxication means disturbance of mental or physical capacity 

resulting from the introduction of any substance into the body.

The trial court also refused Redding’s proposed application paragraph which he 

contended was needed to inform the jury that a finding of voluntary intoxication by 

the defendant does not negate the State’s burden to prove all elements of the 

offense.

The jury convicted Redding of the lesser included offense of manslaughter, 

found the deadly weapon special instruction true, and sentenced Redding to seven 

years’ confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of 

Criminal Justice. 

Jury Charge

Redding argues that the trial court’s charge contained two errors. In his first 

issue, he argues that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury on voluntary 

intoxication. In his second issue, he argues that the trial court erred in failing to 

include an application paragraph with the voluntary intoxication instruction. He 

asserts that he preserved these errors, and they caused some harm, warranting 

reversal. 

A. Standard of Review

In analyzing a jury-charge issue, our first duty is to decide if error exists. 

See Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 174 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (op. on reh’g); 

Tottenham v. State, 285 S.W.3d 19, 30 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. 
6

ref’d). Only if we find error do we then consider whether an objection to the 

charge was made and analyze for harm. Tottenham, 285 S.W.3d at 30; see also 

Warner v. State, 245 S.W.3d 458, 461 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (“The failure to 

preserve jury-charge error is not a bar to appellate review, but rather it establishes 

the degree of harm necessary for reversal.”).

“The degree of harm necessary for reversal depends upon whether the error 

was preserved.” Hutch v. State, 922 S.W.2d 166, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). 

Error properly preserved by a timely objection to the charge will require reversal 

“as long as the error is not harmless.” Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171. The Court of 

Criminal Appeals has interpreted this to mean that any harm, regardless of degree, 

is sufficient to require reversal. Arline v. State, 721 S.W.2d 348, 351 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 1986). However, when the charging error is not preserved “and the accused 

must claim that the error was ‘fundamental,’ he will obtain a reversal only if the 

error is so egregious and created such harm that he ‘has not had a fair and impartial 

trial’—in short ‘egregious harm.’” Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171. 

B. Applicable Law

An instruction on voluntary intoxication informs the jury that the elements 

of the offense—including the requisite mental state—are not affected or altered by 

evidence of intoxication. Sakil v. State, 287 S.W.3d 23, 28 (Tex. Crim. App.

2009). The Court of Criminal Appeals has held that a voluntary intoxication 
7

instruction is appropriate if evidence from any source might lead a jury to conclude 

that the defendant’s intoxication somehow excused his actions. Taylor v. State, 

885 S.W.2d 154, 158 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). The Court has expressly rejected 

the argument that such an instruction relieves the State of its burden of proving 

intent, Sakil, 287 S.W.3d at 28, noting that, if anything, the instruction acts to 

reaffirm the mental state requirements, not delete them. Id.

C. Analysis

1. Voluntary intoxication instruction

In his first point of error, Redding asserts that the trial court erred by 

instructing the jury on voluntary intoxication at the State’s request. Specifically, 

Redding maintains that the instruction was not warranted because there was neither 

evidence nor argument that his intoxication was not voluntary or that it caused or 

excused his conduct.

Under Almanza, our first duty is to determine whether there was error in the 

charge. We conclude that there was not. In Taylor, the Court stated that a section 

8.04(a) instruction is appropriate if evidence from any source might lead a jury to 

conclude that the defendant’s intoxication somehow excused his actions. Taylor, 

885 S.W.2d at 158; see also Fisher v. State, 397 S.W.3d 740, 746–47 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. ref’d) (voluntary intoxication instruction 

appropriate where equivocal testimony might have led jury to conclude that 
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voluntary intoxication excused appellant’s actions). The instruction may be 

appropriate even if the defense does not argue that intoxication somehow excused 

an accused’s conduct and even if evidence of intoxication is itself equivocal. Sakil, 

287 S.W.3d at 27–28. 

In Sakil, the defendant elicited testimony from his own witness regarding 

defendant’s history of drug abuse, and that history was suggested to have some 

link to the appellant’s symptoms on the date of the offense. Id. at 27. Despite the 

complainant telling emergency dispatchers the defendant was not intoxicated at the 

time of the offense, the trial court concluded that testimony on defendant’s history 

of drug use alone increased the possibility the jury would infer a cause-and-effect 

relationship between defendant’s history of drug use and the offense conduct. Id. 

The Court of Criminal Appeals explained that although the evidence did not 

establish that the appellant was intoxicated at the time of the offense, there was 

some evidence from which a juror could conclude that voluntary intoxication 

excused appellant’s actions. Id. Thus, a voluntary intoxication instruction was 

appropriate as it “properly utilized the charge’s function to actively prevent

confusion.” Id. at 28. 

This case is similar. Here, there was considerable evidence of Redding’s 

intoxication. Francine testified that Redding and Holcomb had a longstanding 

history of drinking heavily together while on vacation. John described Redding as 
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“pretty drunk” at dinnertime, around 8:00 p.m., and Francine testified that Redding 

continued to drink downstairs for a few hours and was very intoxicated. Darren 

recalled that appellant was “drunk ... stumbling everywhere” when appellant came 

upstairs right before the shooting. The uncontroverted testimony provided 

evidence from which a juror could conclude that intoxication excused Redding’s

actions. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in including a voluntary 

intoxication instruction. Taylor, 885 S.W.2d at 158 (voluntary intoxication 

instruction appropriate where evidence from any source might lead jury to 

conclude that defendant’s intoxication somehow excused his actions even if 

defendant has not explicitly argued intoxication as a defense); Sakil, 287 S.W.3d at 

26–28 (voluntary intoxication instruction appropriate even if evidence of 

intoxication is equivocal in order to actively prevent confusion).

We overrule appellant’s first issue.

2. Omission of application paragraph

In his second point of error, Redding contends that the trial court erred in 

refusing an application paragraph regarding voluntary intoxication. Specifically, 

Redding argues that the voluntary intoxication instruction could have misled the 

jury into thinking that Redding was strictly liable if the jury found voluntary 

intoxication. 

Redding asked the trial court to include the following application paragraph:
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Evidence of the defendant’s intoxication, if any, does not 

negate the elements of intent or knowledge or recklessly or the 

State’s burden to prove the defendant’s intent, knowledge or 

recklessness as those terms has [sic] been defined beyond a 

reasonable doubt.

We conclude that the trial court did not err in refusing to submit the 

proposed application paragraph. We read Sakil and other authorities to mean that a 

trial court does not err in failing to submit an application paragraph with a 

voluntary intoxication instruction. See, e.g., Taylor, 885 S.W.2d at 158 (abstract 

voluntary intoxication instruction without a related application instruction not 

noted as error where charge indicated burden of production remained with the 

State); Sakil, 287 S.W.3d at 28 (concluding that abstract voluntary intoxication

instruction “operates to inform the jury that the elements of the offense, including 

the requisite mental state, are not affected by any evidence of intoxication” (citing 

Hawkins v. State, 605 S.W.2d 586, 589 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980))); Hughes v. State, 

No. 01-11-00282-CR, 2012 WL 2923180, *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 

12, 2012, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (abstract voluntary 

intoxication instruction without a related application instruction operated to 

prevent juror confusion and was not noted as error). “If anything, a voluntaryintoxication instruction acts to reaffirm the mental-state requirements, not delete 

them. . . . [T]he instruction operates to inform the jury that the elements of the 

offense, including the requisite mental state, are not affected by any evidence of 
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intoxication.” Sakil, 287 S.W.3d at 28 (citing Hawkins, 605 S.W.2d at 589); see 

also Raby v. State, 970 S.W.2d 1, 5 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (concluding that a 

section 8.04(a) instruction suffers no constitutional infirmity and does not 

improperly benefit the State by shifting the burden on the requisite element of 

criminal intent). 

Here, the charge instructed the jury that the State maintained its burden of 

proving the required mental state beyond a reasonable doubt. The general 

instructions stated: “[a]ll persons are presumed to be innocent and no person may 

be convicted of an offense unless each element of the offense is proved beyond a 

reasonable doubt.” The next paragraph reinforced the idea that the State bore the 

burden of production on each and every element: “[t]he prosecution has the burden 

of proving the Defendant guilty and it must do so by proving each and every 

element of the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt and if it fails to do so, 

you must acquit the Defendant.” Thus, the charge included the substance of the 

proposed application paragraph that Redding argues should have been submitted, 

albeit not immediately after the voluntary intoxication instruction as Redding 

wished. See Comm. on Pattern Jury Charges, State Bar of Tex., Texas Criminal 

Pattern Jury Charges: Defenses § B6.3 (2013) (suggesting voluntary intoxication 

instruction tracking Penal Code section 8.04(a) be accompanied by an instruction 
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that “you are reminded that the state must prove all elements of the offense beyond 

a reasonable doubt.”). 

We conclude that the charge adequately informed the jury that the State 

retained the burden to prove all elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, 

the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing Redding’s proposed 

application paragraph. 

We overrule appellant’s second issue.

Closing Arguments

In his third issue, Redding argues that the trial court erred in overruling his 

objections to the State’s closing arguments, which he maintains incorrectly led the 

jury to believe that murder was a nature of conduct rather than result of conduct 

offense. 

A. Standard of Review

A trial court’s ruling on an objection to improper jury argument is reviewed 

for abuse of discretion. Rodriguez v. State, 446 S.W.3d 520, 536 (Tex. App.—San 

Antonio 2014, no pet.). Prosecutorial misstatements of law are improper, but they 

are not constitutional in nature, and are governed by the harm analysis set out in 

Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2(b). Mosley v. State, 983 S.W.2d 249, 259 

(Tex. Crim. App. 1998). Nonconstitutional errors are disregarded unless 

appellant’s substantial rights are affected. Herrera v. State, 11 S.W.3d 412, 415 
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(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. ref’d). A substantial right is affected 

when error has a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the jury’s verdict. 

King v. State, 953 S.W.2d 266, 271 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).

To determine whether the prosecutor’s misstatement of the law in closing 

argument to the jury had a substantial and injurious effect, a reviewing court must 

look at all the evidence and the court’s charge. Herrera, 11 S.W.3d at 415. The 

court does not consider only isolated statements when reviewing for error. 

Rodriguez v. State, 90 S.W.3d 340, 364 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2001, pet. ref’d).

B. Applicable Law

To be permissible, the State’s jury argument must fall within one of the 

following four general areas: (1) summation of the evidence; (2) reasonable 

deduction from the evidence; (3) answer to argument of opposing counsel; or 

(4) plea for law enforcement. Davis v. State, 329 S.W.3d 798, 821 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2010). When an argument exceeds the permissible bounds, it does not 

constitute reversible error unless, in light of the record as a whole, the argument is 

extreme or manifestly improper, violative of a mandatory statue, or injects new 

facts harmful to the accused into the trial proceeding. Todd v. State, 598 S.W.2d 

286, 296–97 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980) (first citing Kerns v. State, 550 

S.W.2d 91 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977); then citing Thompson v. State, 480 S.W.2d 624 

(Tex. Crim. App. 1972)).
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C. Analysis

Redding contends that portions of the State’s closing argument misstated the 

law by improperly directing the jury to focus on Redding’s “acts” on the night of 

the shooting. In particular, during closing argument, the prosecutor told the jury:

The issue for you, ladies and gentlemen, is has the State proven 

murder? Has the State proved intentionally or knowingly acts? 

What I want you to focus on are the acts. 

Redding objected, “That’s a misstatement of the law. It’s intentionally or 

knowingly cause the result, not that he engaged in conduct.” The trial court 

overruled Redding’s objection. 

The prosecutor continued, later arguing:

When you focus on the actions of the defendant in this case 

from walking up to that bedroom, rummaging around in the 

bag, taking the gun out of the holster, his gun, the gun he’s 

familiar with, the retired police officer with the CHL, his gun 

and he pulls the trigger after taking several steps forward, those 

are all, ladies and gentlemen, intentional, knowing, those are 

purposeful actions. 

Redding objected:

Your Honor, I object. The jury charge says the conduct that 

caused the result, not that he engaged in conduct. That’s not 

part of the intentional and knowing. It’s a misstatement of the 

law that applies to this case by saying if you find he engaged in 

conduct. That’s not the law. 

The trial court again overruled the objection. 

Even assuming the arguments complained of were improper and that the trial 

court erred in overruling the objections, we find no substantial or injurious effect 
15

or influence. TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b). Determining harm under the standard for 

nonconstitutional error in improper argument cases requires balancing the 

following three factors: (1) severity of the misconduct (prejudicial effect); 

(2) curative measures (the efficacy of any cautionary instruction by the judge); and 

(3) the certainty of the conviction absent the misconduct (the strength of the 

evidence supporting the conviction). Mosley, 983 S.W.2d at 259 (first citing 

United States v. Millar, 79 F.3d 338, 343 (2nd Cir. 1996); then citing United States 

v. Palmer, 37 F.3d 1080, 1085 (5th Cir. 1994)). 

First, considering the severity of the misconduct, we conclude that the 

State’s comments were not manifestly improper. Consideration of the State’s 

entire closing argument shows that the State was properly asking the jury to 

evaluate Redding’s intent by focusing on his actions that night. Notwithstanding 

the fact that murder is a result of conduct offense, a fact finder may infer that a 

particular result was intended based on a defendant’s acts. See Brown v. State, 122 

S.W.3d 794, 800 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (explaining that while intent to kill 

cannot be inferred as a matter of law, a jury may infer intent based on any facts in 

evidence which it determines prove the existence of an intent to kill); Ex parte 

Weinstein, 421 S.W.3d 656, 668 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (explaining that intent to 

commit murder may be inferred from circumstantial evidence, including the 

accused’s acts and words); Holiday v. State, 14 S.W.3d 784, 789–90 (Tex. App.—
16

Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. ref’d) (factfinder may infer intent to kill from the use 

of a deadly weapon). The arguments did not invite speculation, Thompson v. State, 

89 S.W.3d 843, 850–51 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. ref’d) 

(argument inviting speculation clearly improper and amounted to constitutional 

error), did not inject new facts into the record, Everett v. State, 707 S.W.2d 638, 

641 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (prosecutor may not use closing argument to place 

matters outside the record before the jury), and did not cast aspersion on defense 

counsel’s veracity, Cole v. State, 194 S.W.3d 538, 544 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st 

Dist.] 2006, pet. ref’d) (comments impugning defense counsel’s veracity in closing 

arguments may constitute reversible error). Instead, the arguments complained of 

permissibly encouraged reasonable deductions from the evidence. Additionally, 

the jury concluded that Redding did not intentionally or knowingly cause 

Holcomb’s death. Instead, the jury found Redding guilty of the lesser-included 

offense of manslaughter, requiring only recklessness. In light of the verdict, we 

conclude that any misstatement in closing arguments did not improperly cause the 

jury to infer an intent to kill. 

Second, the trial court gave no oral curative instruction, but the charge 

correctly stated the law regarding the mens rea applicable to each offense 

submitted. Third, absent jury nullification, conviction on the manslaughter charge 

was almost certain, because the uncontroverted evidence showed that Redding 
17

pointed a firearm at Holcomb and the charge instructed the jury to presume 

recklessness if Redding knowingly did so. Additionally, a seven year sentence is 

at the lower end of the range of punishment the jury considered. In short, although 

there was no curative instruction, the benign nature of the objected to statements, 

together with the strength of the State’s manslaughter case, lead us to conclude that 

any error in overruling Redding’s objections to the State’s closing argument does 

not warrant reversal. Mosley, 983 S.W.2d at 259–60; see also Schultze v. State, 

177 S.W.3d 26, 44–50 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. ref’d) (though 

prosecutor’s argument improperly invoked matters outside record and no curative 

measures were taken, there was no harm given relatively minimal degree of 

misconduct and certainty of conviction). 

We overrule appellant’s third issue.

Conclusion

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Rebeca Huddle

Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack, Justice Bland, and Justice Huddle.

Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).