This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations fr om the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 2 Plaintiff-Appellee, 3

v. No. 35,291 4 MANUEL SANCHEZ, 5 Defendant-Appellant. 6 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF EDDY COUNTY 7 Jane Shuler Gray, District Judge 8 Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General 9 Laura E. Horton, Assistant Attorney General 10 Santa Fe, NM 11 for Appellee 12 Robert E. Tangora, LLC 13 Robert E. Tangora 14 Santa Fe, NM 15 for Appellant 16

MEMORANDUM OPINION 17 BOHNHOFF, Judge. 18
{1} Defendant Manuel Sanchez appeals his conviction of one count of felon in 192 possession of a firearm following a jury trial. See NMSA 1978, § 30-7-16(C)(2), (3) 1 (2001). Defendant raises three issues on app eal: (1) whether the district court erred in 2 allowing the prosecutor to comment on Defendant’s right to remain silent during voir 3 dire, (2) whether the district court erred inrestricting Defendant’s counsel from cross4 examining a witness, and (3) that th ere was insufficient evidence to support 5 Defendant’s conviction. We affirm the district court withrespect to the first issue, and 6 we do not address the remaining two issues because the arguments are unclear and 7 wholly undeveloped. 8 BACKGROUND 9
{2} During voir dire, the prosecutor asked the potential jurors about Defendant’s 10 Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. Sh e began by stating, “One of the rights that 11 you have in the United States is the Fifth Amendment. Everyone heard about taking 12 the Fifth? Okay. What that means when you ’re in the courtroom is—” At that point, 13 defense counsel asked to approach the be nch and a bench conference followed. During 14 the bench conference, the prosecutor statedthat she was going to ask whether the 15 potential jurors would hold it against Defendant if he did not testify and whether they 16 would give Defendant extra credit if he chose to testify. The defense attorney 17 responded that he could ask that question, but the prosecutor could not, because if the 18 prosecutor asked the question it would cons titute comment on Defendant’s right to 193 remain silent. The prosecutor insisted th at she could get into the subjects she 1 mentioned, and the district court agreed w ith her because the pros ecutor wanted to ask 2 whether the jury would hold it against Defendant if he did not testify. The district 3 court pointed out that if the potential juro rs say they will hold it against Defendant if 4 he does not testify, “they’reoff [the jury],” implying that any juror answering the 5 prosecutor’s question in the affirmative w ould be excused for cause, which defense 6 counsel then did not dispute. 7
{3} The district court overruled defense counsel’s objection, and the prosecutor 8 continued with voir dire. The prosecutor then asked the following questions: 9 So if you’re accused of anything, whether it’s a speeding ticket or 10 something else, you have the right in the United States to not testify. 11 Now I don’t know what the Defendant is gonna do but he has that right. 12 So I have two questions. The firs t question is—if he doesn’t—if he 13 decides to exercise his rights and not testify, is there anybody that’s 14 gonna hold that against him and make any kind of assumptions about 15 why he’s doing that? Okay, so thatmeans you all are gonna follow what 16 the law is in the United States, right? You take that? Okay, second 17 question: if he decides to waive hi s right, and despite the fact that he 18 doesn’t have to testify, get up on the stand and testify, is there anybody 19 who is going to say, “Well, you know, he didn’t have to testify but he 20 decided to testify so I’ll kind of give him a little extra credit.” Anybody 21 gonna give him extra credit? Any teachers here? You know what I’m 22 talking about, right? Okay, all right. 23 None of the potential jurors indicated thatthey would hold it against Defendant if he 24 chose not to testify. Similarl y, none of the potential jurors indicated that they would 25 give Defendant extra credit for choosing to testify. 264 DISCUSSION 1 I. The District Court Did Not Err in Overruling Defendant’s Objection to the 2 Prosecutor’s Comment on Defendant’s Fifth Amendment Right to Remain 3 Silent 4 A. Standard of Review 5
{4} Defendant argues that while the prosecu tor did not specifically and directly 6 comment on Defendant’s exercise of his right to remain silent, the prosecutor’s 7 general questions to the jury during voir dire constituted impermissible comment on 8 Defendant’s Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. When the facts are not in 9 dispute, questions of constituti onal law are reviewed de novo. State v. Gutierrez , 10 2007-NMSC-033, ¶ 10, 142 N.M. 1, 162 P.3d 156; State v. DeGraff, 2006-NMSC11 011, ¶ 6, 139 N.M. 211, 131 P.3d 61. “Where a defendant has made a proper objection 12 at trial, the appellate court determines whether the prosecution commented on the 13 defendant’s protected silence, and if so, reverses the conviction unless the State can 14 demonstrate that the error wa s harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” DeGraff , 2006- 15 NMSC-011, ¶ 22 (internal quotati on marks and citation omitted). 16 B. Basic Principles 17
{5} We recognize, as New Mexico courts have for decades, “the general rule 18 forbidding a prosecutor from commenting on a defendant’s silence or introducing 19 evidence of silence.” State v. Foster , 1998-NMCA-163, ¶ 9, 126 N.M. 177, 205 967 P.2d 852. Although there is no “rule of au tomatic reversal for every prosecutorial 1 comment on silence,” Gutierrez , 2007-NMSC-033, ¶ 19, “w e have long held that 2 prosecutorial comment on a defendant’s exercise of his or her right to remain silent 3 violates a defendant’s rights under the Fifth Amendment to the [F]ederal Constitution, 4 as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. ¶ 11 (emphasis 5 added). According to this Court in Foster , there are “three independent underpinnings 6 for the general rule: (1) the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, (2) 7 constitutional due process, and (3) the rule s of evidence barring irrelevant evidence, 8 and evidence whose probative value is s ubstantially outwei ghed by the danger of 9 unfair prejudice.” 1998-NMCA-163, ¶ 9 (citation omitted). The first of the 10 underpinnings for the general rule, the constitutional privilege against self11 incrimination, “prohibits the prosecutor from commenting on a defendant’s failure to 12 testify at trial.” Id . ¶ 10; s ee also DeGraff , 2006-NMSC-011, ¶ 11 (stating that one of 13 four time periods a defendant can either vol unteer a statement or remain silent is at 14 trial and the prosecution may not comment on a defendant’s silence during any of the 15 four time periods). That is, a defendant’s c hoice not to testify during trial is protected 16 by the Fifth Amendment. DeGraff , 2006-NMSC-011 , ¶ 12. 17
{6} InDeGraff , our Supreme Court de scribed the analysis for a claim that a 18 prosecutor has commented on a defendant’s ri ght to remain silent: “We first consider 196 whether the prosecutor commented on [the d] efendant’s silence, contrary to his 1 constitutional rights. We then address whether and how [the d]efe ndant’s silence was 2 protected. Finally, we determine whether the comment should be characterized as 3 fundamental error.” Id. ¶ 7. To determine whether the prosecutor’s comment on the 4 defendant’s silence violated the Fifth Ame ndment, “New Mexico courts . . . consider 5 whether the language used was manifestly intended to be or was of such a character 6 that the jury would naturallyand necessarily take it to be a comment on the accused’s 7 exerciseof his or her right to remain silent .” Id. ¶ 8 (emphases added) (internal 8 quotation marks and citation omitted). See also State v. Pacheco , 2007-NMCA-140, 9 ¶ 12, 142 N.M. 773, 170 P.3d 1011 (applying the same standard). However, 10 consideration of the manifest intent of the comment does not end the inquiry. New 11 Mexico courts must also consider th e comment in context by determining “the 12 manifest intention that prompted the remarks as well as the natural and necessary 13 impact upon the jury.” DeGraff , 2006-NMSC-011, ¶ 8 (empha sis added) (internal 14 quotation marks and citation omitted). 15 II. The Prosecutor’s First Question Was a Permissible Comment on 16 Defendant’s Right to Remain Silent; the Prosecutor’s Second Question 17 Was Not a Comment on Defendant’s Right to Remain Silent 18
{7} In this case the prosecutor made two comments during voir dire that are relevant 19 to our review: one comment con cerned whether Defendant might choose not to testify , 207 and the second comment concerned whether Defendant might choose to testify , 1 knowing that he had a choice not to testify. Our analysis is fact specific, and in this 2 case, the wording of the prosecutor’s questions is crucial to why we decide that the 3 comments did not violate Defendant’s Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. 4
{8} In the prosecutor’s first comment on Defendant’s protected right to remain 5 silent at trial, the prosecutor asked the potential jury members whether any of them 6 would hold it against Defendantif Defendant chose not to testify. Specifically, the 7 prosecutor said, “[I]f he decides to exercisehis rights and not testify, is there anybody 8 that’s gonna hold that against him and makeany kind of assump tions about why he’s 9 doing that? Okay, so that means you all are gonna follow what the law is in the United 10 States, right?” This is the type of question a defense attorney could be expected to ask 11 during voir dire, as the prosecutor pointed out during the bench conference. See, e.g. , 12 State v. Rackley , 2000-NMCA-027, ¶¶ 10-11, 128 N.M. 761, 998 P.2d 1212 13 (discussing defense counsel’s question during voir dire about juro r attitudes regarding 14 the constitutional right to remain silent inthe context of examining juror bias). See 15 also State v. Chaddock , 280 S.W.3d 164, 167-68 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009) (affirming trial 16 court’s denial of defense’s motion for mistrial on abuse of discretion standard when 17 prosecutor stated, “And so the burden of pr oof, and the fact that the [j]udge will 18 instruct you that the [d]efense does not have to testify, and that you cannot find 198 any—you should not consider that against him, that’s one of the [c]ourt’s instructions 1 that [it] will give you, is there anyone know ing that much now, is there anyone that 2 thinks that you could not follow this [c]ourt’ s instructions and weigh them in light of 3 the evidence? Understanding that you will be instructed in that regard.). 4
{9} It would appear, in the specific wordi ng of the question that the prosecutor 5 asked, that her manifest intent, if anything, was to protect Defendant. See DeGraff , 6 2006-NMSC-011, ¶ 8. It would be highly prejudicial to Defendant, rather than the 7 State, if a juror held Defendant’s choice not to testify against him. In that situation, 8 Defendant would feel pressure to tes tify, as opposed to exercising his Fifth 9 Amendment right to remain silent. Although the prosecutor’s question was a comment 10 on Defendant’s right to remain silent, it was a question that would assist Defendant 11 during voir dire and to ensurethe selection of a fair jury, as opposed to being a 12 question intended to select a jury that wa s already prejudiced against Defendant. The 13 natural and necessary impact of this comment upon the jury would be to not hold 14 Defendant’s silence against him, as oppos ed to encouraging the jurors to hold 15 Defendant’s silence against him. See id. ¶ 8 (“We evaluate the statement in context to 16 determine the manifest intention that prompted the remarks as well as the natural and 17 necessary impact upon the jury.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 18
{10} In the prosecutor’s second comment, th e prosecutor asked the potential jury 199 members during voir dire whether any of th em would give Defendant “extra credit” 1 if he chose to testify, despite also having the choice not to te stify. This arguably was 2 an indirect comment about Defendant’s priv ilege not to testify—in other words, his 3 silence—but is a direct comment about Defendant’s potential choice to testify. Again, 4 Defendant’s silence during trial is protected, and comment on his silence is generally 5 not allowed; the same is not true of comment on Defendant’s choice to testify. See 6 Gutierrez , 2007-NMSC-033, ¶ 19

. However, again, we engage in fact-specific 7 analysis to determine the manifest intent of the comment and th e natural and necessary 8 impact upon the jury of the comment. See DeGraff , 2006-NMSC-011, ¶ 8

. Here, the 9 prosecutor asked the question to determine whether anyone in the group would be 10 biased in favor of Defendant if Defe ndant testified, knowing that Defendant did not 11 have to testify. Again, we find that this question was intended to ensure that a fair, 12 impartial jury was impaneled. Simply as king whether potential members of the jury 13 would give Defendant additional credibility if he testified would not naturally and 14 necessarily cause the jury to think about whether they would not give Defendant 15 additional credibility if he did not testify. See State v. Searls , 106 So. 3d 1146, 1148 16 (La. Ct. App. 2012) (“During voir dire, the [s]tate may mention the defendant’s 17 constitutional privilege against self-incrimination to the jurors, and then inquire into 18 the weight jurors will give to the defendant ’s testimony if he decides to testify.”). 1910 {11} We therefore affirm the district court and conclude that the court did not err in 1 permitting the prosecutor to question the potential jurors about whether they would 2 hold it against Defendant if he did not te stify, and about whether they would give 3 Defendant more credibility if he chose to testify. 4 III. Remaining Issues 5
{12} The remaining issues that Defendant raises on appeal, whether the district court 6 erred in restricting defense counsel from cross examining a witness and that there was 7 insufficient evidence to support Defendant’s conviction, were in adequately briefed 8 and thus will not be considered by this Court. 9
{13} With respect to whether defense couns el was impermissibly restricted from 10 cross-examining a witness, Defendant’s brief in chief does not even specify which 11 witness the argument concerns. Nor does Defendant mention which questions were 12 asked of the witness, whether the State objected to defense counsel’s questions in 13 order to preserve any error, and what the district court’s ruling was upon such an 14 objection. 15
{14} With respect to Defendant’s sufficien cy argument, Defendant argues only that 16 this Court cannot affirm Defendant’s gu ilt “because the evidence of his intent to 17 commit the crime was insufficient.” Defendant does not review the State’s evidence 18 that was presented at trial regarding his intent, and Defendant does not explain why 1911 that evidence was insufficient. 1
{15} Appellate courts are under no obligation to review unclear or undeveloped 2 arguments. See State v. Guerra , 2012-NMSC-014, ¶ 21, 278 P.3d 1031; State v. 3 Clifford , 1994-NMSC-048, ¶ 19, 117 N.M. 508, 873 P.2d 254 (reminding counsel that 4 the appellate courts are not require d to do their research for them); see also Rule 12- 5 213(A)(3) NMRA (2015, current version atRule 12-318 NMRA) (“A contention that 6 a verdict, judgment or finding of fact is not supported by substantial evidence shall be 7 deemed waived unless the summary of proceedings includes the substance of the 8 evidence bearing upon the proposition[.]”). “[T]his Court’s policy is to refrain from 9 reviewing unclear or undeveloped arguments [that] require us to guess at what [a 10 party’s] arguments might be”; thus, we decline to review these undeveloped 11 arguments. State v. Urioste , 2011-NMCA-121, ¶ 29, 267 P. 3d 820 (internal quotation 12 marks and citation omitted). 13 CONCLUSION 14
{16} We affirm the district court’s ruling that the prosecutor’s comments during voir 15 dire did not violate Defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights. 1612 {17} IT IS SO ORDERED. 1

______________________________ 2 HENRY M. BOHNHOFF, Judge 3

WE CONCUR: 4

___________________________________ 5 LINDA M. VANZI, Chief Judge 6

___________________________________ 7 M. MONICA ZAMORA, Judge 8