COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-11-00495-CV

TEDRICKE GARDNER APPELLANT

V.

TARRANT COUNTY CIVIL

SERVICE COMMISSION AND 

TARRANT COUNTY, TEXAS

APPELLEES

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FROM THE 141ST DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY

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MEMORANDUM OPINION1

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I. Introduction

In one issue, Appellant Tedricke Gardner appeals pro se the trial court’s 

summary judgment for Appellees Tarrant County Civil Service Commission and 

Tarrant County, Texas (collectively Tarrant) and the trial court’s decision to deny 

his motion for new trial. We affirm.

 

1See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
2

II. Factual and Procedural Background

This is the parties’ third appearance before this court. See Gardner v. 

Tarrant Cnty. Civil Serv. Comm’n (Gardner I), No. 02-04-00130-CV, 2005 WL 

32415, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 6, 2005, no pet.) (mem. op.); see also 

Gardner v. Tarrant Cnty. Civil Serv. Comm’n (Gardner II), No. 02-06-00164-CV, 

2007 WL 1018657, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 5, 2007, no pet.) (mem. 

op.).

In October 2000, Gardner, employed as a probation officer with Tarrant 

County Juvenile Services (TCJS), took a three-week leave of absence.2 See

Gardner I, 2005 WL 32415, at *1. During his leave, TCJS sent Gardner two 

letters. Id. The first time that the parties appeared here, we held that because 

the letters’ language was clear and unambiguous in outlining TCJS’s position that 

it considered Gardner to have abandoned his job, it was Gardner’s responsibility 

to file a grievance contesting TCJS’s position within seven days of receiving the 

second letter. See id. at *3. We affirmed the trial court’s judgment that 

substantial evidence existed to show that the grievance was not timely filed.

3

Id.

In Gardner II, we dismissed Gardner’s appeal for want of jurisdiction 

because the summary judgment granted on most of Gardner’s claims was 

 

2Gardner claimed that the leave was authorized; TCJS claimed that it was 

not. See Gardner I, 2005 WL 32415, at *1 n.2.

3Gardner I presents a complete factual background of the case. See 2005 

WL 32415, at *1–2.
3

interlocutory rather than final.

4

 2007 WL 1018657, at *1, 3. Tarrant subsequently

filed a combined motion for summary judgment and plea to the jurisdiction on 

Gardner’s remaining claims. The trial court signed an order granting the motion 

and an order granting the plea. Gardner then filed a motion for new trial or for 

rehearing, which was overruled by operation of law. This third appeal followed.

III. Inadequate Briefing

In Gardner’s appellate brief and reply brief in this court, he states his single 

issue as, “The district court erred in granting appellees’ motion for summary 

judgment, and denying appellant’s motion for new trial or to modify order.” At the 

eleventh hour, after this case was submitted, Gardner filed a supplemental brief 

in which he added a complaint about the trial court’s decision to grant the plea to 

the jurisdiction.

A brief is required to “contain a clear and concise argument for the 

contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record,” but 

Gardner’s briefs do not present a cogent discussion or citations to authority 

regarding how the trial court’s rulings on Tarrant’s assertion of immunity or the 

absence of waiver of immunity or on Tarrant’s summary judgment grounds are 

incorrect or how the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion for 

 

4

In its first motion for summary judgment, Tarrant sought summary 

judgment on Gardner’s federal and state constitutional claims. Gardner added a 

claim for breach of contract before the trial court granted summary judgment for 

Tarrant on Gardner’s federal and state constitutional claims, making that 

summary judgment interlocutory. See Gardner II, 2007 WL 1018657, at *1.
4

new trial. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i); Tello v. Bank One, N.A., 218 S.W.3d 109, 

116 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (“[W]e know of no authority 

obligating us to become advocates for a particular litigant through performing 

their research and developing their argument for them.”) (internal quotation 

omitted); see also Fredonia State Bank v. Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co., 881 S.W.2d 

279, 284–85 (Tex. 1994) (discussing the “long-standing rule” that point may be 

waived due to inadequate briefing). Therefore, we overrule Gardner’s sole issue 

as inadequately briefed.5

IV. Conclusion

Having overruled Gardner’s sole issue, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

PER CURIAM

PANEL: MCCOY, J.; LIVINGSTON, C.J.; and MEIER, J.

DELIVERED: July 19, 2012

 

5We would further note that an issue raised for the first time in a motion for 

rehearing or in a post-submission brief is not preserved for appellate review. 

Coastal Liquids Transp., L.P. v. Harris Cnty. Appraisal Dist., 46 S.W.3d 880, 885 

(Tex. 2001); Romero v. State, 927 S.W.2d 632, 634 n.2 (Tex. 1996).