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*********************************************** 
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v.

JAHMON HAKEEM NORRIS

(AC 44024)

Bright, C. J., and Clark and DiPentima, Js.

Syllabus

Convicted under two informations of the crimes of risk of injury to a child,

assault in the third degree, breach of the peace in the second degree

and interfering with an officer, the defendant appealed to this court. The

defendant’s convictions stemmed from his involvement in a domestic

violence incident with his girlfriend, which her minor child witnessed,

and from his aggressive behavior with a police officer and hospital staff

after he was brought to a hospital following the domestic violence

incident. He claimed that the trial court improperly failed to conduct

an adequate independent inquiry into his competency to stand trial and

to order a competency hearing at the start of trial following a prior

evaluation in which he had been found competent to stand trial. He

also claimed that the court improperly granted the state’s motion for

joinder of the cases for trial because the conduct alleged in the domestic

violence assault case was significantly more brutal and shocking than

the conduct at the hospital alleged in the interfering with an officer

case. Held:

1. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant’s

motion for a competency evaluation or in failing to conduct an independent inquiry into his competency, the defendant having failed to meet

his burden that, at the time he moved for the competency evaluation,

the court had before it specific factual allegations that, if true, would

have constituted substantial evidence of mental impairment: the court,

before ruling on the motion, engaged in extensive dialogue with the

defendant, observed his demeanor, took notice of his general pattern

of disruptive conduct, reviewed the competency report in the case file,

and determined that the defendant was competent to stand trial and

that his repeated disruptions and assertions that he did not understand

were a delay tactic and specifically referenced the defendant’s behavior

when denying the motion; moreover, the court concluded that, on the

basis of the defendant’s comments and ability to remain calm and cooperative during the initial stages of jury selection, the defendant clearly

understood what was happening; furthermore, the court did not err in

relying, in part, on the defendant’s previous competency evaluation, as

the defendant failed to produce any evidence that demonstrated that

his condition had changed since that evaluation, and the previous report

was not the only source of information on which the court relied in

making its determination.

2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in consolidating the two

informations for trial, as the defendant failed to demonstrate that joinder

resulted in substantial prejudice to him: although the trial court erred

by joining the defendant’s two cases for trial because the defendant’s

conduct with respect to the domestic violence assault charge was significantly more brutal and shocking than his conduct at the hospital relating

to the interfering with an officer charge, the court’s explicit instructions

to the jury to consider each charge separately in reaching its verdict

sufficiently cured the risk of substantial prejudice to the defendant and,

therefore, preserved the jury’s ability to fairly and impartially consider

the offenses charged in the jointly tried cases; moreover, it was highly

unlikely that the violent nature of the facts adduced in the domestic

violence case prejudiced the jury’s verdict as to the defendant’s state

of mind in the interfering with an officer case because the facts of what

happened at the hospital were undisputed; furthermore, the fact that

the jury acquitted the defendant of charges in both cases highlighted

the limited prejudicial impact that joinder had.

Argued January 3—officially released June 14, 2022

Procedural History
Substitute information, in the first case, charging the

defendant with the crimes of risk of injury to a child,

interfering with an officer, breach of the peace in the

second degree, interfering with an emergency call,

assault in the third degree, threatening in the second

degree and strangulation in the second degree, and substitute information, in the second case, charging the

defendant with the crimes of assault on a public safety

officer and interfering with an officer, brought to the

Superior Court in the judicial district of Waterbury,

geographical area number four, where the court, Doyle,

J., granted the defendant’s motion for a competency

evaluation; thereafter, following a competency hearing,

the court, Doyle, J., determined that the defendant was

competent to stand trial; subsequently, the court, Klatt,

J., granted the state’s motion for joinder and denied

the defendant’s motion for a competency evaluation;

thereafter, the matter was tried to the jury before Klatt,

J.; verdicts and judgments of guilty of risk of injury to

a child, assault in the third degree, breach of the peace

in the second degree and interfering with an officer,

from which the defendant appealed to this court.

Affirmed.

Naomi T. Fetterman, assigned counsel, for the appellant (defendant).

Melissa Patterson, senior assistant state’s attorney,

with whom were Anne Holley, senior assistant state’s

attorney, and, on the brief, Maureen Platt, state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion

BRIGHT, C. J. The defendant, Jahmon Hakeem Norris, appeals from the judgments of conviction, rendered

by the trial court following a jury trial, of risk of injury

to a child in violation of General Statutes § 53-21 (a)

(1), breach of the peace in the second degree in violation

of General Statutes § 53a-181 (a) (2), assault in the third

degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-61 (a) (1),

and interfering with an officer in violation of General

Statutes § 53a-167a. On appeal, the defendant claims

that the court abused its discretion by (1) failing to conduct an adequate independent inquiry into the defendant’s competency to stand trial and order a competency hearing pursuant to General Statutes § 54-56d1

and (2) improperly granting the state’s motion for joinder for trial of the charge of interfering with an officer

with the other charges the defendant faced. We affirm

the judgments of the trial court.

The following facts, which reasonably could have

been found by the jury, and procedural history inform

our review of the defendant’s claims. In February, 2018,

the defendant rekindled a friendship with T.2 At that

time, the defendant was having financial difficulties and

needed help, so T allowed him to live with her and her

children at her Waterbury apartment. By April, 2018, T

and the defendant were in a romantic relationship.

On the morning of April 14, 2018, the defendant, T,

and T’s six year old daughter, I, were all at the apartment. The defendant and T were arguing because the

defendant had asked her for money to visit his daughter

in New Haven, but T did not have any money to give

him. As the argument progressed, the defendant became

more aggressive with T and eventually pushed her into

the kitchen. At that point, T asked the defendant to

leave, but he refused and began walking toward her. T

told him, ‘‘Do not put your hands on me,’’ but the defendant kept coming. T grabbed a knife to defend herself,

but the defendant broke the blade off of the knife while

it was still in her hand.

The fight between the defendant and T then became

more physical. The defendant grabbed at T, struck her,

bit her, held her down on the couch, ripped her clothes

off, spat in her face, pressed his arm against her throat,

grabbed her by the hair, threw her onto the kitchen

floor, and then hit her again, this time in the mouth,

which caused her to bleed onto the floor. The defendant

later instructed I to clean up her mother’s blood.

During the fight, T told I to leave the apartment, but

the defendant prevented I from leaving. T also repeatedly tried to call 911, but the defendant took her phone.

The defendant eventually gave T her phone back so

that she could try to find someone to give the defendant

money. T used that opportunity to text several people

and tell them that she needed help because the defen-
dant would not let her go.

One of the people who received a text from T called

the police, and two officers from the Waterbury Police

Department, Brian Gutierrez and Justin DeVaull, were

dispatched to T’s apartment to conduct a welfare check.

After arriving at the apartment building, the officers

knocked on the exterior front door but no one answered.

They eventually located an open window and used that

to enter the building. The officers then found the door

to T’s apartment, knocked, and identified themselves.

The defendant partially opened the door but with the

chain lock still in place. The officers identified themselves again and told the defendant that they were there

for a welfare check, but the defendant slammed the

door shut. The officers then kicked the door down so

that they could check on T. Upon entering the apartment, they found T in the kitchen, crying and shaking,

and with bruises to her neck, back, and lip, and bite

marks on both sides of her body. I was also in the kitchen

with T and appeared scared. The officers then arrested

the defendant.

After the defendant was arrested, he was taken to St.

Mary’s Hospital in Waterbury. Officer Joseph Civitella

accompanied the defendant to the hospital and was

assigned to guard him while he was being treated. The

defendant was seen by a physician, who determined

that he needed X-rays. While the defendant and Civitella

waited for him to be x-rayed, the defendant became

agitated and impatient. Civitella unsuccessfully tried to

calm him down, but the defendant, who was partially

handcuffed to a stretcher, became physically aggressive

and launched himself off of the stretcher and onto the

floor. Civitella requested assistance to get the defendant

back on the stretcher. A fellow officer, as well as hospital security staff and a patient care assistant, Raphael

Pages, came to help. While the group was struggling to

return the defendant to the stretcher, he began banging

his head against the wall. Pages, in an attempt to restrain

the defendant, placed his hand over the defendant’s

face. The defendant then bit Pages’ finger through his

medical glove, causing Pages to bleed.

The state charged the defendant in two separate informations—one relating to the domestic violence incident

in T’s apartment and one relating to the defendant’s

actions at the hospital. With respect to the domestic

violence incident, the defendant was charged with risk

of injury to a child, interfering with an officer, breach

of the peace in the second degree, interfering with an

emergency call, assault in the third degree, threatening

in the second degree, and strangulation in the second

degree. With respect to the hospital incident, the defendant was charged with assault on a public safety officer

and interfering with an officer.

Prior to the defendant’s trial, the state filed a motion

to join the two informations for trial, which the court,
Klatt, J., granted.3 A jury trial followed. With respect

to the domestic violence incident, the defendant testified that T was the aggressor and that he had acted in

self-defense. He also testified that he never prevented

I from leaving the apartment. As to the hospital incident,

the defendant admitted to throwing himself off of the

stretcher and biting Pages but claimed that he only

bit Pages because Pages was restricting his ability to

breathe.

After the conclusion of the trial, the jury found the

defendant guilty of risk of injury to a child, assault in

the third degree, and breach of the peace in the second

degree in the domestic violence case, and guilty of

interfering with an officer in the hospital case. The jury

acquitted the defendant of the remaining charges in

both cases. The court accepted the jury’s verdict and

sentenced the defendant to a total effective term of

twelve years of incarceration, execution suspended

after six years, with five years of probation. This appeal

followed. Additional facts and procedural history will

be set forth below as needed.

I

The defendant first claims that the court abused its

discretion by failing to conduct an independent inquiry

into his competency to stand trial and, consequently,

failing to order a competency hearing pursuant to § 54-

56d. We are not persuaded.

The following additional facts and procedural history

are necessary to our resolution of these claims. Defense

counsel was appointed for the defendant on May 15,

2018, and, thereafter, moved for a competency evaluation pursuant to § 54-56d, which the court, Doyle, J.,

granted. Suzanne Ducate, a psychiatrist, performed the

defendant’s competency evaluation and issued a report

in which she concluded that the defendant was able to

understand the proceedings against him and assist in

his own defense. On December 10, 2018, the court held

a competency hearing at which the defendant was found

competent to stand trial.

On July 26, 2019, the defendant filed a motion for a

speedy trial, which was granted on September 11, 2019.

Two days later, defense counsel made an oral motion

to withdraw as counsel, which the court granted. Thereafter, Attorney Jared Millbrandt was appointed to represent the defendant. Then, on November 6, 2019, the

parties appeared before the court for a hearing on the

state’s motion for joinder and the start of jury selection.

At the start of the hearing, the defendant indicated that

he wanted to address the court. The court warned the

defendant against doing so, but the defendant iterated

his wish to speak. The defendant then remarked as

follows:

‘‘In all due respect, Your Honor, I don’t believe that

I’m ready to go to trial. I wasn’t briefed or prepared to
go to trial; I just met this attorney . . . maybe less than

a month [ago]. We had two sessions in Cheshire, and

since then it’s—I’m not prepared. I don’t know nothing

about the jury. I don’t know about the selection. I don’t

know what to ask him. I wasn’t told anything. Today

was supposed to have been a day where we schedule,

and . . . I was supposed to have another chance of

seeing my lawyer to talk to him about jury duty, or how

to pick [a] jury, or what to say to the jury, or what the

jury is.’’

The parties then had a short conversation with the

court about the defendant’s previously granted motion

for a speedy trial. The parties also agreed that jury

selection had been scheduled to start that day. The

court then explained to the defendant that his speedy

trial motion had ‘‘[set] into motion a series of steps,

which lead to jury selection.’’ The court further noted

that there was no indication that defense counsel was

unprepared to select a jury. In response, the defendant

reiterated his belief that he and Millbrandt were not

prepared for jury selection and that it was in the defendant’s best interest to reschedule the proceedings.

Defense counsel denied being unprepared, and the

court denied the defendant’s motion for a continuance.

The court next attempted to hear the state’s motion

for joinder, but the defendant interrupted the proceedings again, this time stating: ‘‘I don’t want to work with

[Millbrandt] no more. It’s over. I don’t want to work with

you, so I don’t know how that’s going to work. I’d rather

represent myself. I’m fine.’’ The court advised the defendant against representing himself and also warned him

that continued disruptions would not be tolerated. The

court took no action on the defendant’s request to have

defense counsel removed.

After hearing arguments from the parties on the state’s

motion for joinder, the court granted that motion. Because

the state had filed two substitute informations in order

to correct some typographical errors, the court ordered

that the defendant be put to plea on the substitute

informations. At that point, the defendant remarked:

‘‘Your Honor, I don’t know what’s going on.’’ The court

explained that, as a matter of procedure, the defendant

needed to enter his not guilty pleas again. The following

colloquy then took place:

‘‘The Defendant: So what about the splitting the two

cases and not joining? That’s what we—

‘‘The Court: I granted the state’s motion to join them,

so it’s one trial that you’re facing. Two separate information[s], but one trial that you’re facing.

‘‘The Defendant: So, you’re saying that the jury’s going

to hear both cases at the same time?

‘‘The Court: Correct.

‘‘The Defendant: But that’s—I thought that’s what we
were arguing about. Your Honor, see, this is what I’m—

‘‘The Court: And I get that, sir. Your counsel made—

again, your—

‘‘The Defendant: He made an argument just now for

that?

‘‘The Court: He argued it, he filed a brief.

‘‘The Defendant: Wait a minute. When did he argue

on—that’s what I’m just trying to understand. I don’t

understand.

‘‘The Court: Sir, I am not getting into a conversation

with you about what just happened. You heard your

attorney argue. I have already indicated that he has

filed a motion. I’ve listened to both arguments—

‘‘The Defendant: Can I see that motion? Oh, this is

the motion?

‘‘The Court: I have done—I have listened to both

arguments—

‘‘The Defendant: Yes.

‘‘The Court: I’ve researched the case law, and I’ve

made a ruling. Just because . . . the court doesn’t rule

in your favor, does not mean that a lawyer is not doing

his job. Now, put the defendant to plea. . . .

‘‘The Defendant: No, I don’t understand what’s

going on.’’

The court again attempted to put the defendant to

plea, first on the information in the domestic violence

case, to which the defendant pleaded not guilty. The

court next asked the defendant if he was electing a trial

by the court or a trial by jury, to which the defendant

again professed, ‘‘I don’t know what’s going on.’’ The

court explained the difference between a jury trial and

a bench trial, but the defendant continued to state that

he did not understand what was happening. This led

to another exchange between the court, the defendant,

and defense counsel:

‘‘The Defendant: Okay. And what are we doing right

now?

‘‘[Defense Counsel]: We’re picking a jury, as I’ve

explained to you a number of times.

‘‘The Defendant: I don’t understand you. I don’t understand it.

‘‘[Defense Counsel]: Your Honor, at this point I don’t

know what more I can say to the court.

‘‘The Court: Sir, are you electing to a court or a jury?

‘‘The Defendant: If I’m asking Your Honor, if I’m being

forced, I don’t want to be forced to say anything that

I [don’t] understand. That’s why I’m asking. I don’t—

and I see that you’re getting frustrated because you’re

feeling like I—
‘‘The Court: What don’t you understand about what’s

happening?

‘‘The Defendant: I just don’t understand what’s going

on. I don’t know why I’m pleading guilty, okay—

‘‘The Court: You’re not pleading guilty, you’re pleading not guilty.

‘‘The Defendant: Okay. I don’t understand why I’m

not—

‘‘The Court: What don’t you understand about being

told that you’re being asked whether or not you want

a jury trial? You filed the motion for [a] speedy trial.

You’re telling me you don’t understand. What don’t you

understand about this process?

‘‘The Defendant: I filed for a motion because that’s

what I discussed with my lawyer, that that was for my

best interest.

‘‘The Court: Okay.

‘‘The Defendant: To push the case forward. But, since

then I don’t understand where—like, what’s today and

how like, you’re telling me to plead—not plead guilty,

and to pick for a jury. And that you said something

about you and the court and the state, or whatever.

‘‘The Court: All right.

‘‘The Defendant: I’m not playing to—you know, I

don’t—

‘‘The Court: Sir, I don’t—quite frankly I’m going to

have it noted for the record that it appears to me that

the defendant fully understands what’s happening, and

is attempting to be obstructionist. So, again—

‘‘The Defendant: Okay.

‘‘The Court: [A]re you electing to a jury trial?

‘‘The Defendant: Your Honor—

‘‘The Court: Do you want a jury to make a decision

as to whether or not you’re guilty or not guilty, or do

you want a judge to make a decision as to whether or

not you’re guilty or not guilty? It’s that simple. It’s not

difficult to understand. You’re an intelligent young man,

make that choice now.

‘‘The Defendant: I don’t—I don’t—what do you want

me to do, man?’’

Defense counsel then asked for a five minute recess,

which the court granted. After the parties returned to

the courtroom, defense counsel moved for a competency evaluation, stating: ‘‘Your Honor, at this time I

just would like to make a record. I met with [the defendant] in an effort to discuss what is happening here

today again. I emphasize[d] that we are here to begin

jury selection in his case, for which he had prior counsel

file a speedy trial motion. He repeatedly indicated to
me he doesn’t understand what’s happening. At this

point I’m making a motion pursuant to [§] 54-56d, as

he does not apparently have the ability to assist in his

own defense, nor understand the charges against him.’’

The defendant then interrupted, again stating that

he did not understand what was happening. Defense

counsel explained that he was moving for a competency

evaluation to determine whether the defendant understood the nature of the charges against him, as had

previously occurred in the case. The defendant proclaimed to have no memory of a prior competency

evaluation, at which point the prosecutor interrupted

and noted that the defendant had previously undergone

a competency evaluation and been found competent to

stand trial. The court then reviewed the competency

report in the case file. Thereafter, the court remarked:

‘‘All right. I’ve reviewed the file. I’ll indicate for the

record that apparently the defendant’s indication that

he doesn’t know, he doesn’t understand, has been a

repeated theme throughout this particular prosecution.

‘‘The psychiatrist who examined him indicated that

he was uncooperative throughout the process. He

repeatedly responded to her, I don’t know, I don’t remember, it’s none of your business. That he claimed [that]

he developed some type of amnesia when he was incarcerated. I lost my memory at [the Department of Correction]. I can’t remember things. But it’s simply—the bottom line determination is overall, and I’m quoting from

the [competency] report. ‘Overall it is the evaluator’s

opinion that [the defendant’s] uncooperativeness during the evaluation and his lack of psychiatric symptoms

or signs indicate that his performance during much

of the evaluation is not considered to be an accurate

representation of his abilities [or knowledge] base,

especially with his past history of involvement with the

legal system.’ I think he is attempting to simply prolong

or postpone things, rather than to get to—ultimately

get to the trial. I do not see where his behavior or

anything that [the defendant] has said is indicative of

the fact that he’s not capable of understanding or not

capable of assisting his counsel. He may be unwilling

to do so, but that is not the same as being incapable.

So, in light of that, and in light of the fact that there

has been a recent evaluation, and I’ve seen nothing

different other than he repeats the same thing again and

again and again, I’ll deny any motion for evaluation.’’

In response, the defendant remarked: ‘‘Your Honor,

like I said, I’m not playing any games with you. I’m not

trying to manipulate the system.’’ The court responded

that such a comment told the court that the defendant

was ‘‘fully capable and understanding of the system and

[had] the ability to proceed.’’ The substitute informations were again read to the defendant, who continued

to claim that he did not understand. The court then

entered pleas of not guilty on all of the charges in both
informations and elected a jury trial on the defendant’s

behalf. Thereafter, the court ordered the defendant to

cooperate with defense counsel and warned him that,

if he disrupted the proceedings again, he would be held

in contempt. At that point, one final conversation

between the court and the defendant occurred:

‘‘The Defendant: I’m not going to cause any problems.

But, Your Honor—

‘‘The Court: Very good.

‘‘The Defendant: [Y]ou just met me, Your Honor, and

you already have an idea of who I am, and I continue

to say the same thing—

‘‘The Court: I have no idea who you are sir.

‘‘The Defendant: I continue to say the same thing.

This whole . . . almost eighteen months I haven’t

known anything that’s going on with my case, Your

Honor. I don’t know anything.

‘‘The Court: And simply saying I don’t know, doesn’t

quite frankly help you at this point in time.

‘‘The Defendant: How is that not helping me? I’m not

trying to ask for help, but how do I suppose to talk to

a jury, get up on the stand when I wasn’t—I don’t know

anything about my defense. It’s in my—like, I don’t have

a defense, Your Honor.

‘‘The Court: Sir, again—

‘‘The Defendant: You just—all right. You just—it’s all

about this man and he’s fighting—he might as well

take—he might as well take the sentence that I have.

‘‘The Court: Okay.

‘‘The Defendant: You giving my life to this man

right here.

‘‘The Court: Well, what everyone is trying to tell you

is you are accused of a crime. You have a right to a

trial. You are being given the opportunity for that trial.

What I am trying to warn you about is, based on your

past behavior this morning, we should have already

been jury selecting. Instead, we have continually—you

have continually stopped the events by claiming that

you don’t know what’s happening, when it’s abundantly

clear that you do know what’s happening.

‘‘The Defendant: How is that?

‘‘The Court: That is because I’m listening to what

you’ve said.’’

Despite the court’s repeated warnings, the defendant

continued to disrupt the remaining jury selection proceedings by making loud comments to Millbrandt and

asking the court questions about jury selection. This

led the court ultimately to remark: ‘‘All right. Counsel,

for the last time, and I am not repeating it. If your client

interrupts one more time with the loud questioning
of you, which is clearly heard throughout the whole

courtroom, and possibly infecting the jury, and I would

note that he certainly managed to keep quiet and not

interrupt during the time when he needed to. So, in my

opinion, this is all a show by him.’’

We begin by setting forth the standard of review and

legal principles that guide our analysis. ‘‘We review the

court’s ruling on a motion for a competency evaluation

under the abuse of discretion standard. . . . In

determining whether the trial court [has] abused its

discretion, this court must make every reasonable presumption in favor of [the correctness of] its action. . . .

Our review of a trial court’s exercise of the legal discretion vested in it is limited to the questions of whether

the trial court correctly applied the law and could reasonably have reached the conclusion that it did.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State

v. Kendall, 123 Conn. App. 625, 651, 2 A.3d 990, cert.

denied, 299 Conn. 902, 10 A.3d 521 (2010).

‘‘[T]he conviction of an accused person who is not

legally competent to stand trial violates the due process

of law guaranteed by the state and federal constitutions.

. . . This rule imposes a constitutional obligation, [on

the trial court], to undertake an independent judicial

inquiry, in appropriate circumstances, into a defendant’s competency to stand trial . . . . [Section] 54-

56d (a) codified this constitutional mandate, providing

in relevant part: A defendant shall not be tried, convicted or sentenced while the defendant is not competent. [A] defendant is not competent if the defendant

is unable to understand the proceedings against him or

her or to assist in his or her own defense.

‘‘This statutory definition mirrors the federal competency standard enunciated in Dusky v. United States,

362 U.S. 402, 80 S. Ct. 788, 4 L. Ed. 2d 824 (1960) (per

curiam). According to Dusky, the test for competency

must be whether [the defendant] has sufficient present

ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable

degree of rational understanding—and whether he has

a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him. . . .

‘‘Although § 54-56d (b) presumes the competency of

defendants, when a reasonable doubt concerning the

defendant’s competency is raised, the trial court must

order a competency examination. . . . Thus, [a]s a

matter of due process, the trial court is required to

conduct an independent inquiry into the defendant’s

competence whenever he makes specific factual allegations that, if true, would constitute substantial evidence

of mental impairment. . . . Substantial evidence is a

term of art. Evidence encompasses all information

properly before the court, whether it is in the form of

testimony or exhibits formally admitted or it is in the

form of medical reports or other kinds of reports that

have been filed with the court. Evidence is substantial
if it raises a reasonable doubt about the defendant’s

competency . . . . The trial court should carefully

weigh the need for a hearing in each case, but this is not

to say that a hearing should be available on demand.’’

(Citation omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) State v. Jordan, 151 Conn. App. 1,

30–32, 92 A.3d 1032, cert. denied, 314 Conn. 909, 100

A.3d 402 (2014).

The defendant claims that his convictions should be

reversed, and a new hearing ordered to determine

whether a competency evaluation is required, because

the court in the present case failed to conduct an adequate, independent inquiry into his competency and,

thus, violated his due process rights. In support of his

claim, the defendant principally relies on State v. Dort,

315 Conn. 151, 106 A.3d 277 (2014). Specifically, he

claims that ‘‘the extent of the ‘inquiry’ conducted by

the court was to review a stale competency evaluation

and unilaterally interpret [the defendant’s] behavior as

obstinate and dilatory. As in Dort . . . this is insufficient to satisfy the court’s constitutional mandate.’’

Because the facts of this case are markedly different

than those in Dort, we are not persuaded.

In Dort, our Supreme Court affirmed this court’s

reversal of the defendant’s judgment of conviction following the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s request

for a competency hearing. State v. Dort, supra, 315

Conn. 153–55. As in the present case, the defendant in

Dort was found competent to stand trial after an earlier

competency evaluation was done. Id., 156. Before the

start of jury selection, however, defense counsel

requested a second competency evaluation. Id., 156–57.

In requesting that evaluation, defense counsel provided

several detailed representations to the court regarding

why further inquiry into the defendant’s competency

was required. Id., 156–59. Specifically, defense counsel

told the court that his client had a fundamental misunderstanding as to ‘‘what can be put forward as a defense

in this case’’ and ‘‘the seriousness of the charges in light

of the defense.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Id., 158. Defense counsel also informed the court that

‘‘attempting to extrapolate the relevant information

from [the defendant] in order for [counsel] to go forward with his defense is virtually impossible’’ and that

the current circumstances were not merely a tactical

disagreement between him and the defendant. (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Id. When pressed by the

court for more details, defense counsel asserted that the

defendant lacked a sufficient understanding of certain

facts that were highly relevant to the case.4

Id., 159.

The court then reviewed the earlier competency

report and, based largely on that report, denied the

defendant’s motion for a competency evaluation after

finding that the statements made by defense counsel

in support of the motion did not constitute substantial
evidence that would give rise to a concern regarding

the defendant’s competency. Id., 175. In denying the

defendant’s motion, the court did not canvass the defendant regarding his competency or consider the defendant’s behavior in court. Id., 176. The court also denied

the defendant’s request to address the court regarding

his competency to stand trial. Id., 159–60. The defendant

then appealed to this court.

On appeal, we reversed the trial court’s judgment

of conviction, holding that the court had abused its

discretion by disregarding defense counsel’s assertions

that the defendant was not competent without conducting any further inquiry into the defendant’s competence.

State v. Dort, 138 Conn. App. 401, 412, 51 A.3d 1186

(2012), aff’d, 315 Conn. 151, 106 A.3d 277 (2014). We

specifically concluded that the court’s inquiry into the

defendant’s competence was insufficient because the

court never made ‘‘any reference to the defendant’s

behavior or any relevant communications with the

defendant’’ and ‘‘also refused the defendant the opportunity to address the court on [the issue of competency].’’ Id.

The state then appealed to our Supreme Court. On

appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed this court’s reversal

of the judgment of the trial court, albeit on different

grounds. State v. Dort, supra, 315 Conn. 178. The court

focused on whether the allegations made by the defendant in support of his motion for a competency evaluation constituted substantial evidence of mental impairment such that further inquiry into the impairment was

required by the trial court and, if so, whether the court

sufficiently conducted such an inquiry. Id., 169–70. The

court then concluded that ‘‘[t]he statements made by

defense counsel in support of the defendant’s motion

for a competency hearing represent the sort of specific,

fact laden allegations that, if true, would constitute

substantial evidence of mental impairment on the part

of the defendant.’’ Id., 178. Accordingly, the court concluded that the trial court abused its discretion when

it rejected defense counsel’s statements and instead

relied solely on the ‘‘seven month old competency report.’’

Id.

The court also rejected the state’s argument that the

trial court properly relied on its own observations of

the defendant instead of relying on counsel’s representations. Id., 182. The court held: ‘‘Although we agree

with the state that a trial court need not automatically

defer to the opinion of defense counsel on the matter

of the defendant’s competence when the trial court sees

evidence contradicting those representations before his

or her own eyes; see, e.g., State v. DesLaurier, [230

Conn. 572, 589–90, 646 A.2d 108 (1994)]; we disagree

that the defendant was canvassed here, and we note

that the trial court did not deny the defendant’s motion

on the basis of its own in-court observations regarding
the defendant’s behavior.’’ Id.

The facts of this case are distinguishable from those

in Dort in two important respects. First, in the present

case, unlike in Dort, defense counsel failed to make any

specific or detailed factual representations in support of

his motion for a competency evaluation. Instead, defense

counsel stated only that the defendant had ‘‘repeatedly

indicated to me he doesn’t understand what’s happening’’ and that defense counsel therefore believed that

the defendant ‘‘does not apparently have the ability to

assist in his own defense, nor understand the charges

against him.’’ These representations were vague in

nature and unsupported by any particular allegations

that might have constituted substantial evidence of the

defendant’s lack of competency. Trial courts are only

required to conduct an independent inquiry into a defendant’s competency when the defendant ‘‘makes specific

factual allegations that, if true, would constitute substantial evidence of mental impairment.’’ (Emphasis

added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Jordan, supra, 151 Conn. App. 31. Such specific factual

allegations simply do not exist in the present case.

Accordingly, the court did not abuse its discretion when

it declined to conduct a more thorough independent

inquiry than it did into the defendant’s competency.

Second, unlike in Dort, the court in the present case

conducted a thorough inquiry into the defendant’s competency by engaging in extensive dialogues with the

defendant both before and after Millbrandt moved for

a competency evaluation, and it made reference to its

observation of the defendant’s behavior when discussing the defendant’s competency. As we set forth

previously in detail, the court and the defendant had

several in-depth conversations over the course of the

proceedings on November 6, 2019. During these lengthy

exchanges, the court was able to speak directly with

the defendant and observe his demeanor, as well as

take notice of a general pattern of disruptive conduct

by the defendant. In addition, the court also reviewed

the competency report in the case file and determined

that the report confirmed the court’s own observations

that the defendant was competent to stand trial and

that his repeated disruptions and assertions that he did

not understand were simply a delay tactic.

Furthermore, even after the court denied the defendant’s motion for a competency evaluation, the court

continued to take into account the defendant’s behavior, including his comments that he was not ‘‘playing

games’’ or trying to manipulate the system, as well as

the defendant’s ability to remain calm and cooperative

during the initial stages of jury selection. On the basis

of these additional observations, the court again concluded that, the defendant’s repeated assertions notwithstanding, it was abundantly clear that the defendant

did, in fact, understand what was happening.
Thus, the bases for the court’s denial of a competency

evaluation in this case were much different than that

in Dort. In State v. Dort, supra, 315 Conn. 182, ‘‘the trial

court did not deny the defendant’s motion on the basis

of its own in-court observations regarding the defendant’s behavior.’’ In the present case, by contrast, the

court specifically referenced the defendant’s behavior,

which it had observed at length, when denying the

motion for a competency evaluation. This court has

held that relying on such information is sufficient. See

State v. Jordan, supra, 151 Conn. App. 35–37 (court’s

denial of defendant’s motion for competency evaluation

was not abuse of its discretion when denial was based

on court’s review of previous competency report and

court’s own observations of defendant). This court also

previously has held that behavior of a defendant similar

to that observed by the court in this case does not

require a competency evaluation. See State v. Johnson,

22 Conn. App. 477, 489, 578 A.2d 1085 (defendant’s

‘‘obstreperous, uncooperative or belligerent behavior

did not obligate the court to order a competency examination,’’ particularly when defendant’s behavior

showed he had ability to be cooperative but did not

want to), cert. denied, 216 Conn. 817, 580 A.2d 63 (1990);

see also State v. Paulino, 127 Conn. App. 51, 66, 12

A.3d 628 (2011) (‘‘although the defendant did admit that

he often was confused by court procedures, a lack of

legal expertise is not indicative of incompetence’’).

Consequently, contrary to the defendant’s claim, the

court was not required to accept defense counsel’s bald

assertion that the defendant lacked the capacity to

understand the proceedings and assist in his own

defense. First, it is clear from the transcript of the

November 6, 2019 hearing that the court did consider

defense counsel’s allegations regarding the defendant’s

competency. It simply was unpersuaded by those allegations, in large part because the court had been able to

observe and talk with the defendant during the hearing.

On the basis of the court’s own observations of and

interactions with the defendant, it was reasonable for

the court to give less weight to defense counsel’s representations regarding the defendant’s competency. Second, we are unpersuaded by the defendant’s argument

that his counsel’s opinion regarding his competency

was entitled to greater weight because the motion for

a competency evaluation was made after a brief recess

during which counsel had an opportunity to talk privately with the defendant. Following the recess, defense

counsel provided the court with no specific factual allegations concerning the defendant’s lack of competency.

Furthermore, the court engaged in an extensive dialogue with the defendant after the recess and specifically referred to its observations of and interactions

with the defendant when it denied the defendant’s

motion.
We also reject the defendant’s argument that the court

should not have considered the defendant’s prior competency evaluation because it was one year old. In State

v. Jordan, supra, 151 Conn. App. 36–37, the defendant

made the same argument. In response, this court noted:

‘‘The defendant . . . has not cited, and we have not

found, any case law that establishes a bright line rule

as to when a competency report becomes stale. State v.

Mordasky, 84 Conn. App. 436, 447, 853 A.2d 626 (2004).

Rather, the court’s inquiry when deciding whether to

order another competency evaluation is whether the

defendant’s condition has materially changed since a

previous finding of competence.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) State v. Jordan, supra, 37. As was true

of the defendant in Jordan, in the present case, the

defendant failed to produce any evidence that demonstrated that his condition had changed since the 2018

evaluation. Moreover, as previously noted in this opinion, the 2018 competency report was not the only source

of information on which the court relied when making

its decision. Accordingly, the court’s reliance, in part,

on the 2018 competency report does not undermine our

conclusion that the court did not abuse its discretion

in denying the defendant’s motion for a competency

evaluation.

The defendant also argues that, by relying on the previous competency report to deny his motion, the court

ignored and discounted the defendant’s prior history of

mental impairment. We disagree. The report specifically

discussed the defendant’s mental health history, and

there is nothing in the record to indicate that the court

did not consider that portion of the report in denying

the defendant’s motion.

Finally, the defendant argues that the court erred when

it failed to canvass the defendant before denying his

motion. There are two problems with this argument.

First, it assumes that there was no canvass of the defendant in the present case. As set forth previously in this

opinion, the court had extensive discussions with the

defendant from which it could form an opinion as to

the defendant’s competency. During these discussions,

the defendant initially stated that he was not ready to

go to trial, had not had sufficient time to meet with his

counsel, who he did not believe was prepared for trial,

and had questions about the jury selection process. He

also asked whether the cases were going to be tried

separately. Thus, he demonstrated that he understood

what was happening but just did not want to go forward

with jury selection on a consolidated trial that day. It

was only after the court told the defendant that jury

selection was going forward that he began stating that

he did not understand what was happening. The court

then engaged in further discussions with the defendant

before defense counsel made his motion for a competency evaluation, which the court denied. Although the
court did not specifically ask the defendant if he understood the nature of the charges against him and whether

could assist in his own defense, it simply is inaccurate

to say that the court did not canvass the defendant.

Second, in Dort, the Supreme Court made clear that

some form of a canvass of the defendant was required

because defense counsel had made ‘‘specific, fact laden

allegations that, if true, would constitute substantial

evidence of mental impairment on the part of the defendant.’’ State v. Dort, supra, 315 Conn. 178. In the present

case, no such allegations were made.

In sum, for the foregoing reasons, we conclude that

the court did not abuse its discretion by denying the

defendant’s motion for a competency evaluation or conducting a further inquiry of its own before denying the

motion.

II

The defendant next claims that the court erred when

it granted the state’s motion to join for trial the charges

in the two separate informations. Specifically, the

defendant argues that joinder was improper under the

second State v. Boscarino, 204 Conn. 714, 723, 529 A.2d

1260 (1987) factor because the conduct alleged in the

domestic violence case was ‘‘of a brutal or shocking

nature, far in excess of the allegations underlying the

interfering with an officer charge [in the hospital case].’’

The defendant further argues that insufficient jury

instructions were given to cure the prejudicial effect

of the joinder. We agree that the court erred in joining

the charges in the two separate informations, but we

also conclude that, under the circumstances of this

case, the court’s instructions to the jury were sufficient

to cure any prejudice caused by the joinder.

The following additional facts and procedural history

are necessary to our resolution of this claim. On September 23, 2018, the state filed a motion for joinder of

the charges in the two informations, claiming that the

‘‘charges involve discrete, easily distinguishable factual

scenarios . . . the crimes are not violent in nature and

do not concern brutal or shocking conduct on the defendant’s part . . . the incidents are consecutive events

. . . and . . . the trial will not be complex.’’ On

November 6, 2019, the defendant filed an objection to

the motion, asserting that joinder was ‘‘inappropriate

as it would result in significant and substantial prejudice

to the defendant [and] allow the jury to hear repetitious

allegations concerning violent conduct and might allow

the jury to conclude guilt based on what amounts to

propensity evidence.’’

Also on November 6, 2019, the court, Klatt, J., held

a hearing on the state’s motion. At the hearing, the

prosecutor conceded that the evidence in the two cases

was not cross admissible but argued that joinder was

nonetheless proper. Defense counsel disagreed and
argued that joinder of the two cases would ‘‘amount to

propensity evidence, thus allowing the jury to conclude

that, because [the defendant] is charged in two informations occurring on the same date, or two separate incidents occurring on the same date, that he is essentially

a bad person.’’ The court then conducted an analysis

under State v. Boscarino, supra, 204 Conn. 722–24, and

concluded that joinder would not substantially prejudice the defendant because (1) the charges were discreet and based on easily distinguishable facts, (2) the

crimes, although violent in nature, were not shocking

to the conscience, and (3) joinder would not result in

a lengthy or complicated trial. The charges in the two

informations were then joined for presentation at a

single trial. On appeal, the defendant challenges only the

court’s conclusion as to the second Boscarino factor.

We first set forth the standard of review and legal

principles that guide our analysis. ‘‘The principles that

govern our review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion

for joinder . . . are well established. Practice Book

§ 41-19 provides that [t]he judicial authority may, upon

its own motion or the motion of any party, order that

two or more informations, whether against the same

defendant or different defendants, be tried together.

. . . In deciding whether to [join informations] for trial,

the trial court enjoys broad discretion, which, in the

absence of manifest abuse, an appellate court may not

disturb. . . . The defendant bears a heavy burden of

showing that [joinder] resulted in substantial injustice,

and that any resulting prejudice was beyond the curative power of the court’s instructions. . . .

‘‘A long line of cases establishes that the paramount

concern [when joining informations] is whether the

defendant’s right to a fair trial will be impaired. Therefore, in considering whether joinder is proper, this court

has recognized that, where evidence of one incident

would be admissible at the trial of the other incident,

separate trials would provide the defendant no significant benefit. . . . Under such circumstances, the

defendant would not ordinarily be substantially prejudiced by joinder of the offenses for a single trial. . . .

Accordingly, we have found joinder to be proper where

the evidence of other crimes or uncharged misconduct

[was] cross admissible at separate trials. . . . Where

evidence is cross admissible, therefore, our inquiry ends.

‘‘Substantial prejudice does not necessarily result from

[joinder] even [if the] evidence of one offense would

not have been admissible at a separate trial involving

the second offense. . . . Consolidation under such circumstances, however, may expose the defendant to

potential prejudice for three reasons: First, when several charges have been made against the defendant, the

jury may consider that a person charged with doing so

many things is a bad [person] who must have done

something, and may cumulate evidence against him
. . . . Second, the jury may have used the evidence of

one case to convict the defendant in another case even

though that evidence would have been inadmissible at

a separate trial. . . . [Third] joinder of cases that are

factually similar but legally unconnected . . . present[s] the . . . danger that a defendant will be subjected to the omnipresent risk . . . that although so

much [of the evidence] as would be admissible upon

any one of the charges might not [persuade the jury]

of the accused’s guilt, the sum of it will convince them

as to all. . . .

‘‘[Accordingly, the] court’s discretion regarding joinder . . . is not unlimited; rather, that discretion must

be exercised in a manner consistent with the defendant’s right to a fair trial. Consequently, [in State v.

Boscarino, supra, 204 Conn. 722–24, our Supreme

Court] identified several factors that a trial court should

consider in deciding whether a severance or [denial of

joinder] may be necessary to avoid undue prejudice

resulting from consolidation of multiple charges for

trial. These factors include: (1) whether the charges

involve discrete, easily distinguishable factual scenarios; (2) whether the crimes were of a violent nature or

concerned brutal or shocking conduct on the defendant’s part; and (3) the duration and complexity of the

trial. . . . If any or all of these factors are present, a

reviewing court must decide whether the trial court’s

jury instructions cured any prejudice that might have

occurred.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) State v. McKethan, 184 Conn. App. 187, 194–

96, 194 A.3d 293, cert. denied, 330 Conn. 931, 194 A.3d

779 (2018).

Before turning to the merits of the defendant’s joinder

claim we address the state’s argument that the claim

was not properly preserved for appellate review. The

state argues that the claim is unpreserved because (1)

‘‘the defendant never contested the state’s representation of the facts as they relate to the second Boscarino

factor’’ and (2) ‘‘when [T] testified at trial, the defendant

never moved to sever based on the supposed change

in factual circumstances, namely, the more shocking

or brutal nature of the ‘domestic violence’ case allegations.’’ We disagree and conclude that this claim was

preserved.

The state is correct that, as summarized above, the

defendant never specifically addressed the second

Boscarino factor in either his written objection or at

the hearing. The court, however, in its ruling on the

state’s motion for joinder, did address that factor, stating in relevant part: ‘‘The crimes, while they are violent

in nature, are certainly not so shocking to the conscience that the second factor would be triggered.’’

Because the court addressed the issue now raised on

appeal, the claim was properly preserved for appellate

review. See State v. McKethan, supra, 184 Conn. App.
194 n.2 (defendant’s challenge to second Boscarino factor was preserved even though defendant did not specifically challenge factor before trial court because court

addressed second factor in its ruling). Furthermore, the

fact that the defendant did not move to sever the two

cases after T testified does not undermine our conclusion that the defendant’s claim is preserved. Again,

because the trial court specifically addressed the violent

nature of the defendant’s charges in its ruling on the

state’s motion for joinder, the claim is preserved. See

id. (‘‘Unlike the trial court in [State v.] Snowden, [171

Conn. App. 608, 157 A.3d 1209, cert. denied, 326 Conn.

903, 163 A.3d 1204 (2017)], the trial court in this case

specifically addressed the violent nature of the defendant’s murder charge in its ruling, which the defendant

presently challenges on appeal. We therefore conclude

that the defendant’s claim is preserved for appellate

review.’’).

We now move to the merits of the defendant’s claim.

We agree with the defendant that the second Boscarino

factor weighs against joinder and that the court consequently abused its discretion when it joined for trial

the charges in the two informations.

‘‘Whether one or more offenses involved brutal or

shocking conduct likely to arouse the passions of the

jurors must be ascertained by comparing the relative

levels of violence used to perpetrate the offenses

charged in each information.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) State v. Payne, 303 Conn. 538, 551, 34 A.3d

370 (2012). The domestic violence case was based on

allegations and evidence that the defendant struck, bit,

strangled, spit at, and grabbed T, and, at one point,

threw her onto the kitchen floor and hit her in the

mouth so hard that she began to bleed. In the hospital

case, however, far less violence was involved. Although

the defendant did bite a hospital employee during that

incident, that was the only violence committed and

the incident was described by the hospital’s security

supervisor as ‘‘[j]ust another day at work. Unruly patient

and just honestly another day at work.’’ Because the

defendant’s conduct in the domestic violence case was

significantly more brutal and shocking than his conduct

in the hospital case, we conclude that the second Boscarino factor weighs against joinder. See State v. Ellis,

270 Conn. 337, 378, 852 A.2d 676 (2004) (defendant’s

abuse of one victim was substantially more egregious

than his abuse of other victims and, therefore, joinder

was improper under second Boscarino factor). Accordingly, the court erred when it found that the second

Boscarino factor was not triggered and, thus, abused

its discretion when it joined for trial the charges in the

two informations.

Our analysis of this claim, however, does not end

here. Having concluded that joinder of the defendant’s

two cases was improper, we must decide whether the
court’s jury instructions cured any potential prejudice.

In assessing any prejudice to the defendant it is

important to note that any prejudice to the defendant

could have occurred only with respect to the charges

in the hospital case, which was the case that involved

substantially less egregious allegations. By contrast, the

fact that the jury heard evidence regarding the hospital

case was not prejudicial to the defendant, under the

second Boscarino factor, in the domestic violence case

because the allegations in the domestic violence case

were more shocking and brutal. See State v. Payne,

supra, 303 Conn. 554 n.19. Consequently, we must determine whether the joinder of the charges in the two

informations prejudiced the defendant in the hospital

case.

‘‘On appeal, the burden rests with the defendant to

show that joinder was improper by proving substantial

prejudice that could not be cured by the trial court’s

instructions to the jury. . . . [A]lthough a curative

instruction is not inevitably sufficient to overcome the

prejudicial impact of [inadmissible other crimes] evidence . . . where the likelihood of prejudice is not

overwhelming, such curative instructions may tip the

balance in favor of a finding that the defendant’s right

to a fair trial has been preserved.’’ (Citation omitted;

internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. McKethan,

supra, 184 Conn. App. 198.

In the present case, the court instructed the jury as

follows with regard to the charges against the defendant:

‘‘The defendant here is charged with ten counts in

two separate informations. The defendant is entitled to

and must be given by you, a separate and independent

determination of whether he is guilty or not guilty as

to each count. Each of the counts charged is a separate

crime. The state is required to prove each element in

each count beyond a reasonable doubt.

‘‘Each count must be deliberated upon separately.

The total number of counts charge[d] does not add to

the strength of the state’s case. You may find that some

evidence applies . . . to more than one count, in more

than one information. The evidence, however, must be

considered separately as to each element in each count.

Each count is a separate entity.

‘‘You must consider each count separately and return

a separate verdict for each count. This means you may

reach opposite verdicts on different counts. A decision

on one count does not bind your decision on another

account. Now, again, as I have indicated, the defendant

is charged in two separate informations.’’

The court further instructed the jury on the two separate counts of interfering with an officer as follows:

‘‘Now, interfering with an officer. The defendant is

charged in two separate counts with interfering with
an officer. . . . Now, I will remind you of my previous

instructions on multiple charges during your deliberations.

‘‘The defendant is charged with two counts of interfering with an officer. While the elements are the same,

each of the counts charged is a separate crime. The state

charges that separate incidents occurred at different

times, in different locations, and with three distinct

complainants. Each count must be considered separately, and must be given by you a separate and independent determination of whether [the defendant] is guilty

or not guilty as to each count.’’

The defendant argues that these instructions were

insufficient because, despite the court’s repeated instruction that each count was to be considered separately,

the court never instructed the jury that the evidence in

both cases was not cross admissible, and, thus, that

the jury could not consider the evidence in the domestic

violence case in determining the defendant’s guilt in the

hospital case.

Although we agree that it is better practice for a trial

court to give a specific instruction that the evidence is

not cross admissible, we conclude that the jury instructions given in this case were adequate because the risk

of prejudice was very low. See State v. McKethan, supra,

184 Conn. App. 199 (court’s repeated instructions to

jury that each count must be considered separately

cured prejudice caused by joinder because risk of prejudice was not overwhelming). We reach this conclusion

for two reasons. First, the instructions given by the

court in the present case, with one exception, were

very similar to those given by the trial court in McKethan, which this court determined were sufficient to

cure any possible prejudice resulting from the erroneous joinder. Id. The one difference between the instructions in this case and those in McKethan is that, in this

case, the court instructed the jury that it may find that

some evidence applies ‘‘in more than one information.’’

That single statement should not have been made by

the court because the state conceded that the evidence

supporting each information was not cross admissible.

Nevertheless, we cannot conclude that the defendant

was prejudiced by this error. The error was an isolated

occurrence outweighed by the court’s repeated instructions to the jury that it must consider each count against

the defendant separately. Moreover, the defendant did

not object to the statement after the court made it. In

fact, on appeal the defendant has not claimed any error

as a result of this statement.

Second, although the defendant’s state of mind was

at issue regarding the hospital incident, there was no

dispute as to the events that occurred during that incident. The defendant himself testified at trial that he

threw himself off of the stretcher and bit a hospital

employee while receiving treatment at St. Mary’s and,
at oral argument before this court, the defendant again

conceded that the events of the hospital incident were

not in dispute. Given that what happened at the hospital

is undisputed, we conclude that it is highly unlikely that

the violent nature of the facts adduced in the domestic

violence case could have prejudiced the jury’s verdict

as to his state of mind during the hospital incident. This

conclusion is strengthened by the fact that the jury

acquitted the defendant of charges in both cases, including of the more serious charge of assault of a police

officer in the hospital case, which highlights the limited

prejudicial impact that joinder had. See State v. Davis,

286 Conn. 17, 37, 942 A.2d 373 (2008) (‘‘by acquitting

the defendant of all of the offenses charged in [case

A], the jury evidently was able to keep the three cases

separate and did not blindly condemn the defendant on

the basis of the evidence adduced in [case B]’’), overruled on other grounds by State v. Payne, 303 Conn.

528, 549, 34 A.3d 370 (2012); see also State v. Atkinson,

235 Conn. 748, 766, 670 A.2d 276 (1996) (‘‘by returning

a verdict of not guilty on the charge of possession of

a weapon in a correctional institution . . . the jury evidently was able to separate the two cases and did not

blindly condemn the defendant on his participation in

the murder’’); State v. Gerald A., 183 Conn. App. 82,

123 n.21, 191 A.3d 1003 (‘‘[w]e conclude that acquittal

of the charges related to [one victim’s] allegations demonstrates that the jury properly considered each information separately’’), cert. denied, 330 Conn. 914, 193

A.3d 1210 (2018); State v. Rodriguez, 91 Conn. App.

112, 120–21, 881 A.2d 371 (‘‘Although the jury found the

defendant guilty of all the counts of burglary, attempt

to commit burglary, larceny and criminal trespass that

it considered, it found the defendant not guilty of one

count of breach of the peace in the second degree.

That acquittal demonstrated that the jury was able to

consider each count separately and, therefore, was not

confused or prejudiced against the defendant.’’), cert.

denied, 276 Conn. 909, 886 A.2d 423 (2005). But see

State v. Boscarino, supra, 204 Conn. 724 (acquittals in

joined cases did not ‘‘establish that the results in the

four cases, had they been separately tried, would have

been the same’’).

Although we conclude that the court’s instructions,

on the specific facts of the present case, were sufficient,

as noted previously in this opinion, it would have been

preferable for the court expressly to have informed the

jury that the evidence adduced by the state with regard

to the domestic violence case was not admissible as

proof in the hospital case, and to have informed the

jury that the cases had been consolidated solely for the

purpose of judicial economy. See State v. Delgado, 243

Conn. 523, 536 n.13, 707 A.2d 1 (1998) (advising that

better practice when cases have been joined is to explicitly instruct that evidence in one case is not admissible

as proof in separate case). Giving such an instruction
further minimizes any potential prejudice that might

come with joining charges in separate informations and

serves to underscore for the jury that it must consider

the evidence in each case separately.5

In sum, for the reasons we have explained, we conclude that, even though the court erred by joining the

defendant’s two cases, the jury instructions that the

court gave sufficiently cured the risk of prejudice to

the defendant and, therefore, preserved the jury’s ability

to fairly and impartially consider the offenses charged

in the jointly tried cases. We therefore conclude that

the court did not abuse its discretion in consolidating

the two informations for trial.

The judgments are affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 General Statutes § 54-56d (c) provides: ‘‘If, at any time during a criminal

proceeding, it appears that the defendant is not competent, counsel for the

defendant or for the state, or the court, on its own motion, may request an

examination to determine the defendant’s competency.’’

2

In accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3) (2018), as

amended by the Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization Act of 2022,

Pub. L. No. 117-103, § 106, 136 Stat. 49; we decline to identify any person

protected or sought to be protected under a protection order, protective

order, or a restraining order that was issued or applied for, or others through

whom that person’s identity may be ascertained.

3 Additional facts about the joinder of the two informations will be provided in part II of this opinion.

4 Defense counsel specifically stated: ‘‘And there’s been things he’s seized

upon, including the fact that there’s . . . an alleged gun. And he’s been

informed that that’s not whether the gun is operable or whether it’s a rubber

gun or it’s made of wood—that does not constitute a defense. I cannot for

the life of me extrapolate much more in the way of facts from him at this

juncture. I don’t know whether it’s because he’s seizing up today or what

. . . but I need the information that he’s talking about because the charges

have just changed and now that’s not an issue.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) State v. Dort, supra, 315 Conn. 174–75.

5 Our review of the Connecticut Judicial Branch’s model criminal jury

instructions reveals that the model instructions on multiple informations

do not contain the language that we have suggested here. See Connecticut

Criminal Jury Instructions 2.6-11, available at https://www.jud.ct.gov/JI/

Criminal/Criminal.pdf (last visited June 3, 2022). Accordingly, we encourage

the Criminal Jury Instruction Committee to consider adding language to the

model instructions directing that, where cases have been joined but the

evidence is not cross admissible, the jury cannot use evidence from one case

to reach its result in another. The committee may find the jury instructions

discussed in State v. Boscarino, supra, 204 Conn. 719 n.6, and State v.

Iovieno, 14 Conn. App. 710, 722 n.7, 543 A.2d 766, cert. denied, 209 Conn.

805, 548 A.2d 440 (1988), to be helpful examples of such instructions.