### I N THE UNI TED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FI F TH CI RCUI T

No. 12-20216

CHRISTOPHER J. EMERSON, Plaintiff - Appellant
v. RICK THALER, Defendant - Appellee

A ppeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. 4:11-CV-2367

Before KING, SOUTHWICK, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Appellant Christopher Emerson, a T e x a s p risoner, appeals the district court’s dismissal of his c omplaint seeking DNA t esting under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. F o r th e re a so n s sta t e d b e lo w , w e A F F I R M th e d ism issa l.

I. F a c ts a n d P r o c e d u r a l B a c k g r o u n d C h ristopher Emerson (“Emerson”), Texas pris o n e r # 4 5 1 8 6 3 , w a s c o n v i c t e d of an O ctober 1985 aggravated sexual a ssault in case number 439,551 in the 351st S t a te District Court of Harris County, Texas, and sentenced to 35 years U n i t e d S t a te s C o u r t o f A p p e al s

F i f t h C i rc u i t 

### F I L E D March 20, 2013 Ly l e W . Cay ce Clerk

* Purs uant to 5 T H C I R

. R. 47. 5, the court has determ ined that this op inion s hould not be p ublis hed and is not p reced ent excep t und er the lim ited circum s tances s et forth in 5 T H C I R

. R. 47. 5. 4. Case: 12-20216 Document: 00512181465 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/20/2013No. 12-20216

in prison. Emerson v
. State , 7 5 6 S

. W

. 2 d 3 64, 3 65 (Tex. App. 1988). The ju d g m ent was affirmed o n direct appeal. Id. a t 370. Emerson w as separately convicted of a second s exual a ssault in a November 1985 incident involving the

same victim in the 177th S tate Dist r i ct Court of Harris County, Texas. See Emers o n v
. State , 1990 W L 144054, at *3, *6, * 9 (Tex. App. 1 990) (affirming conviction). However, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals overturned the second conviction based o n Batson v. Kentucky , 476 U.S. 79 (1986), see Emerson

v. State , 820 S

. W.2d 802, 8 03

- 0 5 ( T e x
. Crim. App. 1991), a nd later held that Emerson was entitled to a new t rial d u e t o B atson v iolations, see Emerson v. State , 851 S.W.2d 269, 274-75 (Tex. Cri m
. App. 1 993). Nothing in the record indicates that Emerson was ever retried for this offense. I n J une 2 011, proceeding p ro se and in forma pauperis (IFP), Emerso n filed a civil rights complaint under § 198 3 , s e e k i n g an order to have federal marshals seize eviden c e from his state conviction and to h ave a federal laboratory perform DNA testing on three pubic hairs a n d t w o c heckbooks. Emerson asserted that Texas had withheld the pubic hairs during his trial, and that o ne c h e c k b o o k was introduced at his trial in case n umber 439,551 and a second checkbook was introduced at his trial in case number 439,552, w hich he argued prove s t h at the e v i dence was fabricated. H e stated that he had requested DNA testing of the pubic hairs from the 177th State District Court in June 2007 and January 2008 but did n ot receive a response from the state court. Emerson asserted th a t T exas’s refusal to subject t he evidence to DNA testing violated his constitutional rights. With regard to t he testing of the checkbooks, the d i strict co u rt determined that Emerson had failed to allege a v iolation of his rights because Emerson did not indicate that he sought testing of the checkbooks in state court. The court also found that Emerson failed to allege a violation w ith r egard to the requested DNA testing of the pubic hairs because h e h a d f i l e d h is motion in the 177th

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S t a t e District Court, the c ourt in which his conviction w as overturned, rather than in the 351st S t a t e District Court, the convicting court i n the offense for which he is imprisoned. The d istrict co u rt dismissed Emerson’s complaint with prejudice a s frivolous or for failure t o s tate a c laim p ursuant t o 28 U .S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Emerson filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment and for relief from the judgment pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e) and 60(b). He argued that the d istrict c o u rt failed to consider his two exhibits–pictures of the checkbooks

– and that the three pubic h airs were relevant to c ase number 439,551, the case for w hich he is imprisoned. H e asserted that h e sought DNA testing o f t he three p ubic hairs and the checkbooks i n the 177th District Court, because j urisdiction in t he case was transferred to the 1 77th D istrict Court. The d istrict co u rt denied that motion, r e s t ating that Emerson was n ot entitled to DNA testing under state l aw because he did not file a m otion for such testing in the correct court. Emerson here appeals the dismissal of his complaint. II. Discussion Under § 1915(e)(2)(B), a district court shall dismiss a complaint f i l e d by

a plaintiff proceeding IFP if it is frivolous o r fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. Where, as here, a district court dismisses the c omplaint both

as frivolous and for failure to state a claim, t h is court reviews the de c i s ion d e

novo. Samford v. Dretke , 5 6 2 F.3d 674, 678 (5th Cir. 2009). To determine whether the complaint states a claim, this court applies t he same standard used in reviewing a dismissal under Federal R ule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and will uphold a dismissal if, “taking the plaintiff’s a llegations as true, it appears that

no relief c ould b e g ranted based on the plaintiff's all e g e d f a cts.” Id. To withstand dismiss a l , a p l a intiff must plead “enough f acts t o s tate a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U .S. 544, 570 (2007).

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On appeal, Emerson c ontends that the district court erred in dismissing his case, which he argues is i ndistinguishable from Skinner v. Switzer , 131 S. Ct. 1289 (2011). Liberally c onstruing his arg u m e n t s , h e asserts t hat because he futilely pursued DNA testing i n state court, he has stated a § 1983 claim that the
state court procedures violate his p rocedural d u e p r o cess rights and that he is entitled to DNA testing. 1 To s tate a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that t here was a violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and that the deprivation w as c ommitted by a person acting under the color of state law. See Sw. Bell Tel., L P v. City of Houston , 529 F.3d 2 57, 260 (5th C i r
. 2008). A l t h o u g h sta te s a re u n d e r n o o b lig a tio n to p ro v id e m e c h a n ism s fo r p o stc o n v i c t i o n re lie f, w h e n th e y ch o o s e t o d o so , th e p ro ce d u r e s th e y cre a te m u s t

co m p o rt w ith d u e p ro ce ss a n d p ro v id e litig a n ts w ith a fa ir o p p o rtu n ity to a sse rt th e ir sta te -cre a te d rig h ts. S e e E v itts v
. L u cey , 4 6 9 U .S

. 3 8 7 , 3 9 3 (1 9 8 5 ). T e x a s h a s cre a te d a rig h t to p o st-co n v ictio n D N A t e stin g in A rticle 6 4 o f th e T e x a s C o d e o f C rim in a l P ro ce d u re
. T h u s, “[w ] h ile th e r e is n o fre e sta n d in g r ig h t f o r

a c o n v icte d d e fe n d a n t to o b ta in e v id e n ce fo r p o s t-co n v ictio n D N A te s tin g , T e x a s h a s cre a t e d su ch a rig h t, a n d , a s a re su lt, th e sta te p r o v id e d p ro ce d u re s m u s t b e a d e q u a te to p r o te ct th e su b sta n tiv e rig h ts p ro v id e d

. ” E la m v
. L y k o s , 4 7 0 F

. A p p ’x 2 7 5 , 2 7 6 ( 5 th C ir. 2 0 1 2 ) (u n p u b lish e d ) (citin g S k in n er , 1 3 1 S .C t

. a t 1 2 9 3 ; Dist. Att’y’s Office for Third Jud. Dist. v. Osborne , 557 U.S. 52, 67-69 (2009)).

1 There is no s ubs tantive d ue proces s right to pos t- c o nviction D N A tes ting. Ski nner , 131 S. Ct. at 1293; D i st. Att’y’s O f f i ce f or Thi rd Jud. D i st. v
. O sborne , 557 U. S. 52, 74 ( 2009)

. To the extent that Em ers on rais es other claim s of violations of his rights , w hich are lis ted in h i s com p laint but not brief ed on ap p eal, Em ers on has aband oned thos e argum ent s
. I n a n y event, thos e claim s of Bra dy violations , p ros ecutorial m is cond uct and actual innocence, w hich
neces s arily im p ly the invalid ity of his conviction, are not cognizable und er § 1983 but m us t be brought in a habeas p etition. See S ki nner , 131 S. C t. at 1298- 1300; O sborne , 557 U

. S. at 66- 67; H eck v
. H um

p hrey , 512 U

. S. 477, 486- 87 ( 1994)

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A r ticle 64 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure permits a convi c t e d defendant to m ove in “ the c onvicting court” for DNA testing of evidence that was “secured in relation to t he offense that is the basis of t he challenged conviction and was in p o ssession of the state during the t rial of the offense.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 6 4.01(a-1), (b). Article 6 4 allows the state court to o rder testing if it finds that: (1) the unaltered evidence is available for testing; ( 2) identity was at issue in the case; (3) the convicted person establishes by a preponderance of the evidence tha t h e w o u l d not have b een convicted if DNA t esting p rovided exculpatory r esults; and (4) t h e m o t i o n is not made t o delay the execution of a sentence. Id. art. 64.03(a)

. Emerson alleges that he f iled m otions for DNA testing in state court, and received no response to his motions. In Skinner , th e S u p r e m e C o u rt h e ld th a t p o st-co n v ictio n cla i m s fo r a cce ss to e v id e n ce fo r D N A te stin g c a n b e b ro u g h t u n d e r § 1 9 8 3 , b u t d id n o t se t fo rth
sta n d a rd s fo r a n a ly z in g th e m e r i t s o f su ch cla im s. S ee 1 3 1 S

. C t. a t 1 2 9 8 -9 9 , 1 3 0 0

. T h o u g h th e re is g e n e ra lly n o e x h a u stio n re q u ire m e n t f o r § 1 9 8 3 cla im s, O sb o rn e , 5 5 7 U .S

. a t 7 1 , O s b o rn e sta te s t h a t “F e d e ra l co u r ts m a y u p se t a S ta te ’s
p o st-co n v ictio n re lie f p ro ce d u re s o n ly if th e y a re fu n d a m e n ta lly in a d e q u a te to

v in d i c a t e t h e su b sta n tiv e rig h ts p ro v id e d ,” i d

. a t 6 9

. In S k in n er a n d p o st

S k in n e r ca se s a n a ly z in g D N A te stin g cla im s u n d e r § 1 9 8 3 , th e p riso n e r se e k in g te stin g w a s ch a lle n g in g th e d e n ia l b y t h e sta te co u rts o f h is re q u e s ts fo r D N A
te stin g
. S ee S k in n e r , 1 3 1 S

. C t. a t 1 2 9 5 -9 6 (d e scrib in g th e T e x a s co u r ts’ d e n ia ls

o f S k in n e r’s m o tio n s fo r D N A te stin g ); E la m , 4 7 0 F

. A p p ’x a t 2 7 5 (sta tin g th a t th e T e x a s co u rt d e n ie d E la m ’s m o tio n f o r D N A te stin g ); G a rcia v
. C a stillo , 4 3 1 F

. A p p ’ x 3 5 0 , 3 5 3 (5 th C ir. 2 0 1 1 ) (u n p u b lish e d ) (sta tin g th a t th e T e x a s co u r t s d e n ie d L e a l’s m o tio n fo r D N A te stin g ). H e re , E m e r so n h a s re ce iv e d n o d e n ia l

. T h o u g h h e a rg u e s th a t t h e sta te p ro ce d u re s p ro v e d fu tile b e ca u se h e d i d n o t

re ce iv e a d isp o sitio n o f h is m o tio n s, h e d o e s n o t sta te in h is p le a d in g s o r b rie f

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th a t a fte r th e sta te co u rt fa ile d to re sp o n d to h is m o tio n s fo r D N A t e stin g , h e to o k a n y a ctio n t o o b ta i n a d isp o sitio n fro m th e sta te c o u rt b y , fo r e x a m p le , r e
u r g in g h is m o tio n o r filin g fo r a w rit o f m a n d a m u s w ith a h i g h e r sta t e co u rt. T h e r e c o u l d p e r h a p s b e a ca se w h e r e a sta t e ’s n o n -a ctio n d e sp i t e th e l i tig a n t’s

e ffo r ts co u ld b e ta k e n a s a n e ffe ctiv e d e n ia l o f th e re lie f s o u g h t , b u t E m e rso n h a s n o t a lle g e d th a t h e to o k a n y a ctio n in th e sta te co u rt b e y o n d in itia lly filin g th e m o tio n s. S t a tin g a lle g a tio n s th a t h e file d m o tio n s fo r D N A te stin g in sta te

co u r t a n d h a s re c e iv e d n o re sp o n se is n o t su fficie n t t o s t a te a cla im th a t t h e T e x a s s ta te p ro ce d u re s g o v e rn in g D N A te stin g a re fu n d a m e n ta l l y in a d e q u a te

a n d re q u ire f

e d e ra l co u r t i n te rv e n tio n in th e sta te p o s t -co n v ictio n fra m e w o rk

. S e e O sb o rn e , 5 5 7 U .S

. a t 6 9 , 7 0 -7 1

. Because the state has not actually denied his motions for DNA testing, Emer s o n ’ s c laim that Texas violated his due
process rights by denying him DNA testing was correctly dismissed for failure to state a claim. 2 Emerson’s additional assertion t hat the d istrict c o u rt violated his right to proceed before a magistrate judge is meritless. The d istrict co u rt “may” designate a magistrate judge to hold a hearing and h andle certain m atters. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A)-(B). The court is not required t o d o s o
. Additionally, because the record does not reveal any attempt by Emerson to amend his

2 Ad d itionally, w e note that Em ers on has nam ed Rick Thaler, the w ard en of the p ris on, as the d ef

end ant, w ho he ad m its d id not d eny him the D N A tes ting h e s e e k s a n d has no authority over nor cus tod y of the evid ence he s eek s to have tes ted

. Previous cas es analyzing D NA tes ting claim s und er § 1983 involve actions agains t the cus tod ians of the evid ence. See Ski nner , 131 S. Ct. at 1295- 96 (s tating that Sk inner nam ed as the d ef end ant “the D is trict Attorney w hos e of

f ice p ros ecuted Sk inner and has cus tod y of the evid ence Sk inner w ould lik e to have D N A tes ted ”) ; i d. at 1293 ( collecting f ed eral circuit cas es analyzing D N A tes ting claim s und er § 1983) ; El a m , 470 F. Ap p ’x at 275 ( nam ing t h e d is trict attorney as the d ef end ant) ; G arci a , 431 F. Ap p ’x at 350 ( nam ing a sta t e c r im e lab and its em p loyees as d ef end ants )

. Becaus e T haler d oes not have cus tod y of the evid ence and had no role in granting or d enying Em ers on the D N A tes ting he s ought, Thaler is not the p rop er d ef end ant.
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complaint, his assertion that the d istrict co u r t p revented him from amending his complaint is meritless. III. C o n c lu s i o n F o r th e fo re g o i n g r e a so n s, th e d istrict co u rt’s d i s m issa l o f E m e rso n ’s

co m p l a in t p u rsu a n t to § 1 9 1 5 (e )(2 )(B ) is A F F IR M E D

. The district court’s dismissal of Emerson’s 1 983 compl a i n t a s f rivolous and for f a i l u r e to state a claim c ounts as a strike for purposes of § 1915(g). S ee A d ep eg b a v
. H

a m m o n s , 1 0 3 F .3 d 3 8 3 , 3 8 7 -8 8 (5 th C ir. 1 9 9 6 ). Emerson is CAUTIONED that if he a ccumulates three strikes, he will not be able to proceed IFP in any civil action or appeal filed while he is incarcerated or detained in any faci l i t y u n l e ss h e is under i mminent danger of serious physical injury. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). AFFIRMED; SANCTION WARNING ISSUED.

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