### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON O ct obe r 25, 200 6 S es sio n MARC ESKI N, ET AL 

### . v. ALI CE B. BARTEE , ET AL 

### . A Dire ct A ppeal f

romthe Circ uit Court for Sh elby County No. CT-006445-03 The Honorable Kar en R. Williams, Judge

No. W2006-01336-C OA-R3-C V - F iled Dece m ber 27, 2006

HOLL Y KI RBY, JUDGE, CONCURRI NG:
I agr ee wi t h t h e re s u l t re ac h ed b y t h e m aj o ri t y an d t h e s u b s t an ce o f t h e m aj o ri t y ’s re as o n i n g. I write sepa

rate ly only to note that I

disag ree with a portion of the majority ’s re ading of Ram sey v . Be av e rs , 931 S.W .2d 527 (Tenn. 1996) , and in particular its relianc e on Thing v. L a Chusa , 771 P.2d 814 (Cal. 1989).
Thin g v . L

a Chu sa i n v o l v e d f

a c t s s o m e w h a ts i m i l ar

t o t h e f a c t s i n t h e i n s t a n tc a s e
. In Thing , a child wa s struck by an automob i l e an d s er i o u s ly injured. Thing , 771 P.2d at 815. The mother wa s near

by but was not prese nt at the ac cident. Id. When she was told that her child was injured, the mother r

ushed to the sce ne and sa w her “bloody and unconsc ious” child l y ing on the roadw ay
. Id. The mother sue d the driver of the automobile for neg lige nt infliction of emotional distress. Id.
The Thing court discussed at leng th the appropriate limits for the tort of neg lige nce inf liction of emotional distress. Id. at 816-30. I t ultimately decide d to adopt a “brig ht-line” rule that a plaintiff could not rec over f

or neg lige nt infliction of emotional distress unless the plaintiff was pr esent at the injury -produc ing e vent at the time it occur red a nd was a war e at that time that it was causing injury to the victim. Id. at 829-30. I n explaining its reasoning , the Thing c ou rt no te d th a t w hil e a ny

lim its on the tort of neg lige nt infliction of emotio n al d i s t re s s would be ar bitrary and mig ht leave out deser ving plaintiffs, the rule that it adopted would establish rea sonable pa rame ters to allow re covery by the plainti ff s m o st likelyto suffer g enuine traumatic emotional injury

. See id. a t8 2 7

- 2 8

. It stated:

T h e i m p a c t o f p er s o n al l y o b s er v i n g t h e i n

j u ry -p ro d u ci n g ev en ti n m o s t , al t h o u gh
c on c e de dly

no t a ll, c a se s d ist ing uis he s th e pl ain ti ff ’s re su lta nt e mot ion a l di str e ss from the e motion felt when one le arns of the injury

or death of a lo ved one f rom a n o t h e r , o r

o b s e r v e s p a i n a n d s u f

f e r i n g b u tn o tt h e tr a u m a t i c c au s e o f t h e i n j u r y.-2-

Id. at 828. Thus, the Thing court felt that, while t he st andar d it was a dopting wa s not perfe ct, it was
nevertheless a reasona

ble standar d. See id. I t the n denied rec overy to the plaintiff beca use she wa s n o t p re sent at the a ccide nt. Id. at 830. Since then, the Thing d e c is io n h a s b e e n r e c o g n ized a s re pr e se nti ng the lin e of

c a se s f a vo ri ng a “ brig ht- lin e ” ru l ei nn e g l i g e nt i nf lic tio n o f e mot ion a l di str e ss case s. See, e.g. , Clo he ssy v. Bachelor , 675 A.2d 852, 858-59 (Conn. 1996); Cont reras v. Carbon Coun ty Sch. Dist. No. 1 , 843 P.2d 589, 593 (Wy o. 1992). As noted by

the majority , the Tenne ssee Supre me Court in Ramse y v . Be av e rs , 931 S.W .2d 52 7, 53 1 ( Te nn . 1 99 6) , c ite s Thing and quotes the above lang uag e. The majority , afte r stating that there is lit tle differ ence in the emotional injury suffe red by

a fa milymember w ho witnesses the inj ury a ndon e wh o a

rrive s o n th e sc e ne imm e diate ly the re a ft e r, state s: [T] he Ram sey Cou rt ’s qu otatio n f ro m Thing v . L

a Chu sa . . . indicates that the Court was not establishing a brig ht line rule that there must be ac t u al observance of the injury producing a ccide nt. I t appea rs the Court re cog nized that there may be circ umstances wh er e s ensory observa nce of

the injury -produc ing e vent is not an
abs olu te e sse nti a l e le me nt.
I must disagr ee w ith the maj o ri ty ’s cha rac terization of what is indicated by the Ram sey Court’s relianc e on T

h i ng
. P ri or to i ns e rt ing the abo ve qu otatio n f ro m Thing , the Ram sey Court notes that the “plaintiff’ s phy sical location at the time of the event or acc ident and aw are ness of the
acc ident are essential factors” and that it is “more fore seea ble that one witnessing or having sensory observation of the e vent will suffer eff ects fr om it.” Ram sey , 931 S.W .2d at 531 (footnote omitted). I m m e d i a t e l y

t h e r e a f t e r , t h e C o u r ti n s e r t s t h e q u o t a t i o n fr om Thi ng a ndthe n c on c lud e s th a t a “plaintiff must establish sufficie nt prox imityto the injury -produc ing e vent to allow sensory observation by

plaintiff.” Id. Certainly the Ram sey Court was aw are of the holding in Thing and that the ca se wa s perc eived a s standing for the adoption of a bright- line rule. I simplyrea d Ram sey as not g oing bey ond the issue prese nted in that case , that is, whether to a llow rec overy for a plaintiff who was pr esent at the scene but not in the z one of dang er, and not indicating one wa y or anothe r whether rec overy might, under

some circ umstances, be allowed for one not present at the scene of the i njury -produc ing event. But see McCracken v. City of Milli ngton , No. 02A01-9707- CV-00165, 1999 WL 142391, at *11 (Te nn. Ct. App. Mar.17, 1999).
I ag ree , there fore , with the majority ’s holding, and in particula r i ts relianc e on the reasoning in Hegel v. McMahon , 960 P.2d 424 (Wash. 1998). I write sepa

rate ly only to emphasize my

belief that our holding today

is a rea sonable e x tension of the Ram sey h o l d i n g.

____________________________________ HOLL Y M. KI RBY, JUDGE