Filed 3/19/24 In re Andrew A. CA2/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on 

opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 

8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for 

purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re ANDREW A. et al., Persons

Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

_____________________________________

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND 

FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

MARIA A.,

Defendant and Appellant.

B326745

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. 19CCJP04588AB)

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles 

County, Pete Navarro, Commissioner. Affirmed.

Michelle E. Butler, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
2

Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, 

Assistant County Counsel, and Brian Mahler, Deputy County 

Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

 ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳

Maria A. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s 

February 1, 2023 order summarily denying her Welfare and 

Institutions Code1 section 388 petition, and its April 12, 2023 

order denying her request for conjoint counseling and additional 

visitation with her children. With regard to the February 1 

order, mother contends (1) she made a prima facie showing of 

changed circumstances and that the requested order was in the

children’s best interests, and thus the juvenile court erred by 

denying her request for an evidentiary hearing, and (2) the 

juvenile court violated her due process rights by considering her 

children’s statements to the court without permitting her to 

introduce additional evidence or to cross-examine the children. 

Mother makes no claim of error with regard to the April 12, 2023 

order.

2 As we discuss, we find no error, and thus we affirm the 

orders.

1 All subsequent statutory references are to the Welfare and 

Institutions Code.

2 Because mother makes no claim of error as to the April 12, 

2023 order, any such claim is forfeited. (Wright v. City of 

Los Angeles (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 683, 689 [“asserted grounds for 

appeal that . . . merely complain of error without presenting a 

coherent legal argument are deemed abandoned and unworthy of 

discussion”]; Singh v. Lipworth (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 813, 817 
3

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Mother has three children: Andrew A. (born in 2009), 

Gladys A. (born in 2011), and Allison A. (born in 2013). Raul A. 

(father) is the father of all three children. The present appeal 

concerns only Andrew and Gladys, and father is not a party to 

the appeal.

I. 2019 proceedings.

In June 2019, the Los Angeles County Department of 

Children and Family Services (DCFS) received a report that 

father had kicked mother and locked her out of the family’s home

in the children’s presence. The following month, DCFS filed a 

section 300 petition alleging the children were at substantial risk 

of physical harm due to domestic violence between the parents. 

The juvenile court ordered the children detained with the 

parents.

In September 2019, there were two additional incidents of 

serious domestic violence between the parents. In one incident, 

father pulled mother’s hair and choked her; in the other, mother 

lost control of her vehicle during an argument with father and 

crashed into a parked car. The children were in the car’s back 

seat, and Andrew and Gladys were injured. The children were 

detained from the parents and placed in foster care.

In October 2019, DCFS filed an amended petition alleging 

that mother abused marijuana and alcohol, and father abused 

methamphetamines. On November 7, 2019, the court sustained a 

single count of the petition pursuant to section 300, subdivision 

(b), and dismissed the remaining counts. Mother was ordered to 

[appellate contentions forfeited if “unsupported by ‘adequate 

factual or legal analysis’ ”].)
4

submit to 10 on-demand drug tests and to participate in a 

domestic violence program and individual counseling. She was 

granted weekly monitored visits with the children.

II. 2020 proceedings.

A. Children’s return to mother’s custody.

In January 2020, DCFS reported that mother and father 

were living separately. Mother had been consistently attending a 

domestic violence support group and individual counseling, was 

testing negative for all drug use, and was visiting the children 

regularly. She had been permitted unmonitored eight-hour visits 

with the children on weekends since December 2019.

On February 6, 2020, the court found mother had made 

substantial progress with her case plan, and it ordered the 

children returned to her care under DCFS supervision.

B. Subsequent petition and detention.

DCFS filed a subsequent petition in September 2020. It 

alleged that mother engaged in violent altercations with her 

boyfriend, Anthony M., in the children’s presence, and in 

August 2020, while heavily intoxicated, mother threw a brick 

through the window of Anthony’s home and punched Anthony’s

sister in the face (counts a-1, b-1). The petition further alleged 

that mother abused alcohol, rendering her unable to care for the 

children (count b-2). The children were detained from mother 

and placed in foster care. Mother was charged with vandalism 

and public intoxication.

On October 15, 2020, the juvenile court sustained the 

allegations of the petition and ordered the children removed from 

mother. Mother was ordered to complete a full drug/alcohol 

program with aftercare, submit to random drug testing, engage 
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in individual and conjoint counseling, and complete an anger 

management program. Mother was granted monitored visits

with the children.

III. 2021 proceedings.

In April 2021, DCFS reported that the children were 

thriving in foster care and wished to be adopted by their foster 

parents. Mother had not had any face-to-face visits with the 

children and phoned them inconsistently. She refused to drug 

test and had not complied with her case plan. The foster mother 

had to terminate some video calls between mother and the 

children because mother appeared to be under the influence of a 

substance.

On May 4, 2021, the juvenile court terminated the parents’ 

reunification services and set a section 366.26 hearing.

In July 2021, DCFS reported that the foster parents were 

not interested in adoption, and potential adoptive parents had 

not been identified. In August 2021, father filed a section 388 

petition requesting that his reunification services be reinstated

and the children returned to his care. The juvenile court 

reinstated father’s reunification services in October 2021.

IV. 2022 proceedings.

In March 2022, DCFS reported that the children continued 

to thrive in their foster care placement. Mother was jailed from 

October 2021 through March 2022 and had no visits or phone 

calls with the children during that period. Upon mother’s 

release, the children refused to see or speak to her. The children 

visited regularly with father, as well as with the maternal 

grandmother and the paternal great-aunt and great-uncle. 

Allison wished to live with father if she could not be adopted by 
6

the foster parents, but Andrew and Gladys refused to live with 

father.

In April 2022, the juvenile court terminated father’s 

reunification services, but ordered Allison to have overnight and 

weekend visits with father. In August, Allison was placed with 

father.

During an August 2022 hearing, children’s counsel reported

that Andrew and Gladys had been declining visits with both 

parents for several months and wished to have visits suspended. 

The caregiver told the court that the parents called weekly but

the children had refused to speak with them for months, and 

Andrew hid in the bathroom or the laundry room to avoid phone 

calls. The caregiver put calls on speaker phone so the children 

could hear the parents’ voices, but the children would walk away. 

In the past, mother sometimes had been inappropriate during 

phone calls, telling the children she was incarcerated or making 

false promises, including that the children would live with her 

again. Both Andrew and Gladys seemed very nervous when the 

parents called. The court found that contact with mother was 

detrimental to the children, and it ordered that mother’s contact 

be suspended.

Andrew and Gladys were matched with a potential 

adoptive family and had an overnight visit with them in 

November 2022. The children were placed with the prospective 

adoptive parents on December 22, 2022.

V. 2023 proceedings.

Mother filed a section 388 petition on January 26, 2023, 

seeking reinstatement of her reunification services or, 

alternatively, visits with Andrew and Gladys. In support, mother 

stated that she had been in an intensive recovery program since 
7

March 2022, had completed domestic violence counseling and 

drug/alcohol counseling, and was actively involved in parenting 

and anger management classes. She believed that the requested 

court order would be in the children’s best interests because she 

was “determined to parent all her children again. [Mother] has 

maintained consistent contact with . . . Allison and has kept up 

with her health and education and their relationship is described 

as positive and patient. Mother has attempted to call her 

children once a week for nearly an entire year. Such request 

would help strengthen the bond between the children and 

parents and allow [mother] to reunify with her children.”

At a February 1, 2023 hearing, mother’s counsel asked the 

juvenile court to set the section 388 petition for an evidentiary

hearing. The children’s counsel opposed the request, urging that 

mother had not made a prima facie showing of changed 

circumstances or that the requested order was in the children’s 

best interests. DCFS joined in the children’s opposition to 

mother’s request for an evidentiary hearing.

The court stated that it wanted to hear from Andrew and 

Gladys directly before ruling on mother’s request for an 

evidentiary hearing. The court then questioned the children

briefly outside of mother’s presence without placing them under 

oath. Andrew told the court he did not want to visit mother or 

father because he did not feel safe or comfortable around them. 

When the court asked why, Andrew said he felt anxious about 

being alone with his parents because he did not know “if . . . they 

are going to scream at me or scream at . . . my sisters or they are 

going to, like, fall asleep or do something.” His fear was based on 

his past experiences with his parents, “on them hitting each other 
8

[and] screaming.” Gladys gave a similar answer, saying she was 

“not comfortable seeing [mother and father] because of the past.”

After hearing from the children, the court noted that both 

seemed highly intelligent and expressed “in no uncertain terms 

their positions on . . . reunifying.” It thereafter denied mother’s 

request to set her section 388 petition for a hearing.

Mother timely appealed from the order denying her section 

388 petition.

On April 12, 2023, the juvenile court held a review hearing 

at which it denied the mother’s request for conjoint counseling 

and visitation. The court continued the section 366.26 hearing to 

August 2023. Mother appealed from the April 12, 2023 order.

DISCUSSION

Mother contends the juvenile court (1) abused its discretion 

by denying her section 388 petition without an evidentiary 

hearing, and (2) violated her due process rights by accepting 

evidence from the children without a full hearing. As we discuss, 

mother’s contentions lack merit.

I. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by 

denying mother’s section 388 petition without an 

evidentiary hearing.

A juvenile court order may be changed, modified or set 

aside under section 388 “if the petitioner establishes by a 

preponderance of the evidence that (1) new evidence or changed 

circumstances exist and (2) the proposed change would promote 

the best interests of the child. [Citation.] A parent need only 

make a prima facie showing of these elements to trigger the right 

to a hearing on a section 388 petition and the petition should be 

liberally construed in favor of granting a hearing to consider the 
9

parent's request.’ (In re Zachary G. (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 799, 

806.)

“ ‘However, if the liberally construed allegations of the 

petition do not make a prima facie showing of changed 

circumstances and that the proposed change would promote the 

best interests of the child, the court need not order a hearing on 

the petition. [Citations.] The prima facie requirement is not met 

unless the facts alleged, if supported by evidence given credit at 

the hearing, would sustain a favorable decision on the petition.’

(In re Zachary G., supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 806.)” (In re Mary 

G. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 184, 205; see also In re Jeremy W. 

(1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1407, 1413–1414 [§ 388 petition may be 

denied without a hearing “if the [petition] fails to reveal any 

change of circumstance or new evidence which might require a 

change of order”].) (§ 388, subd. (d) [“If it appears that the best 

interests of the child . . . may be promoted by the proposed 

change of order . . . , the court shall order that a hearing be 

held”].) We review the summary denial of a section 388 petition 

for an abuse of discretion. (In re Mary G., at p. 205; In re 

Anthony W. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 246, 250.)

In support of her section 388 petition, mother made a prima 

facie showing of changed circumstances—namely, that she had 

completed approximately 10 months of a one-year intensive 

recovery program, had begun mentoring others in her program, 

and had completed domestic violence and drug/alcohol 

counseling. However, the juvenile court correctly concluded that 

mother did not make a prima facie showing that reinstating her

reunification services and permitting her to visit the children was 

in their best interests. In support of her petition, mother 

asserted that a change of order would benefit the children 
10

because it “would help strengthen the bond between the children 

and parents and allow [mother] to reunify with her children.” 

But neither child expressed a desire for visits with mother—to 

the contrary, both children had been refusing visits and phone 

calls with mother for more than a year, and both told the social 

worker they did not wish to have any further contact with either 

parent. It therefore is highly unlikely that the children would 

have participated in visits with mother even had the court 

ordered them. In any event, even were mother correct that 

further visits would have fostered a bond between her and the 

children, it is unclear how such a bond would have served the 

children’s interests given mother’s failure to reunify with the 

children and their impending adoption.

Moreover, the statutory time to reunify had long since 

passed. Our Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed that “to 

promote the prompt resolution of the child’s custody status and 

her permanent and stable placement, the law sets a presumptive 

18-month limit on reunification services.” (Michael G. v. Superior 

Court (2023) 14 Cal.5th 609, 627.)3 This time limit “reflects a 

considered legislative choice: ‘[I]n order to prevent children from 

spending their lives in the uncertainty of foster care, there must 

be a limitation on the length of time a child has to wait for a 

parent to become adequate.’ (In re Marilyn H. [(1993)] 5 Cal.4th

[295,] 308.) If the child has already been out of the parent’s 

custody for 18 months and still cannot be safely returned, the 

statute instructs that the court ordinarily must proceed to 

schedule a permanency planning hearing under section 366.26, at 

3 Under some limited circumstances, services may be 

extended for an additional six months. (Michael G., supra, 

14 Cal.5th at pp. 628–629.)
11

which the court decides whether to terminate parental rights and 

place the child for adoption or else select another permanent 

plan. (§ 366.22, subd. (a)(3); see Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15 

[‘ “Shall” ’ is mandatory and “may” is permissive’].)” (Michael G., 

at p. 627.) In the present case, the children had been under court 

supervision for more than three-and-a-half years, and mother 

had already received nearly two years of family preservation 

and/or reunification services. The children had thrived in foster 

care and recently had been placed with a family who wished to 

adopt them. Under these circumstances, permitting mother 

additional reunification services would only have delayed 

permanency for her children, which was not in their best 

interests. (See In re Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 309 [once 

parent has been given reasonable period of time to reunify with 

children and has been unsuccessful, “the child’s interest in 

permanency and stability takes priority”]; In re J.C. (2014) 

226 Cal.App.4th 503, 527 [child’s best interests “are not to 

further delay permanency and stability in favor of rewarding 

Mother for her hard work and efforts to reunify”].)

After reunification services have been terminated, “the 

parents’ interest in the care, custody and companionship of the 

child are no longer paramount.” (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 

7 Cal.4th 295, 317.) Instead, “ ‘the focus shifts to the needs of the 

child for permanency and stability’ [citation], and in fact, there is 

a rebuttable presumption that continued foster care is in the best 

interest of the child.” (Ibid.) Because mother failed to make a 

prima facie showing sufficient to rebut the statutory presumption

and to demonstrate that the proposed change of order was in the 

children’s best interests, the juvenile court did not abuse its 

discretion by summarily denying mother’s section 388 petition.
12

II. The juvenile court did not violate mother’s due 

process rights.

Alternatively, mother contends that the juvenile court 

violated her due process rights by considering the children’s 

statements at the January 26, 2023 hearing without allowing her 

to cross-examine the children or to produce additional evidence. 

We need not decide whether the court erred by considering the 

children’s statements because any such error necessarily was 

harmless. Assuming for the sake of argument that considering 

the children’s statements was constitutional error, reversal still 

would not be required if we could conclude “beyond a reasonable 

doubt that the [result] would have been the same absent [the]

error.” (People v. Harrison (2005) 35 Cal.4th 208, 239.) We so 

conclude here. As discussed above, had the court not considered 

the children’s statements, it nonetheless would have been 

required to deny her an evidentiary hearing because she failed to 

make a prima facie showing that granting her additional 

visitation or reunification services was in the children’s best 

interests. (§ 388, subd. (d); In re R.F. (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 718, 

728.) Because mother was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing, 

the juvenile court’s consideration of the children’s statements 

could not have prejudiced her. 
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DISPOSITION

The February 1 and April 12, 2023 orders are affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL 

REPORTS

EDMON, P. J.

We concur:

EGERTON, J.

ADAMS, J.