Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A03-1507-PL-790 | December 30, 2015 Page 1 of 12

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS

R. William Jonas, Jr.

Hammerschmidt, Amaral & Jonas

South Bend, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

SIMON WILSON

Andrew W. Hull

Jason L. Fulk

Hoover Hull Turner LLP

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

GARY MORGAN

Brian S. Jones

Joel T. Nagle

Bose McKinney & Evans LLP

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

CROWE HORWATH LLP

Eric A. Riegner

Maggie L. Smith

Frost Brown Todd LLC

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
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Magic Circle Corp. d/b/a Dixie 

Chopper, Arthur Evans, Wesley 

Evans, Jeffrey Haltom,

Appellants-Plaintiffs,

v.

Simon Wilson, Gary Morgan, 

and Crowe Horwath LLP,

Appellees-Defendants

December 30, 2015

Court of Appeals Case No.

71A03-1507-PL-790

Appeal from the St. Joseph Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Michael G. 

Gotsch, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

71C01-1404-PL-93

Baker, Judge.

[1] Appellants Magic Circle Corporation (Magic Circle), Arthur Evans, Wesley 

Evans, and Jeffrey Haltom appeal the judgment of the trial court dismissing 

their complaint for fraud against Simon Wilson and Gary Morgan. Finding 

that the trial court did not err in concluding that the complaint failed to allege 

fraud with the particularity required by Indiana Trial Rule 9(B), we affirm.

Facts

[2] For more than thirty years, Magic Circle designed and manufactured

lawnmowers under the name Dixie Chopper. In late 2008 and early 2009, 

Magic Circle hired Simon Wilson and Gary Morgan to help steer the company 

through difficult economic times. Magic Circle alleges that, during their time 

with the company, Wilson and Morgan knowingly misrepresented the 

company’s financial position. It was not until 2013 that members of the 

company’s board realized that the company had incurred massive losses 
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throughout this period. Morgan had left the company in 2011 and the board 

accepted Wilson’s resignation in 2013. 

[3] On December 15, 2014, after having been given an opportunity to amend its 

first complaint,1 Magic Circle filed its second amended complaint against 

Wilson and Morgan alleging fraud and breach of fiduciary duty. Three 

shareholders, Arthur Evans, Wesley Evans, and Jeffrey Haltom, also joined as 

plaintiffs, alleging that they had been personally injured when they were

induced to buy more of the company’s stock as a result of Wilson’s and 

Morgan’s misrepresentations. The complaint requested that the trial court 

award Magic Circle attorney fees as well as treble damages.

2

 

[4] On February 17, 2015, Wilson filed a motion to dismiss Magic Circle’s 

complaint, alleging that the complaint failed to plead fraud with the 

particularity required by Indiana Trial Rule 9(B) and that the plaintiffs had 

therefore failed to state a claim under Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(6). On May 15, 

2015, after hearing argument on the issue, the trial court granted the motion, 

and dismissed Magic Circle’s claims against Wilson and Morgan with 

prejudice. The trial court reasoned that the allegations were too general to meet 

Rule 9(B)’s particularity requirement. As to the individual plaintiffs’ claims of 

personal damage, the trial court reasoned that these claims could not be brought 

 

1 Appellants have not included the original complaint in the record. 

2 Magic Circle also alleged malpractice against Crowe Horwath, the company’s former accounting firm. 

These claims do not concern us here as the trial court has yet to rule on them. 
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directly, but instead must be brought as derivative claims under Indiana Trial 

Rule 23.1, with which the plaintiffs had failed to comply. All plaintiffs now 

appeal. 

Discussion and Decision

I. Direct v. Derivative Claims

[5] The complaint at issue in this case makes several claims that can be divided into 

two categories. First, there are claims brought by Magic Circle against Wilson 

and Morgan for alleged harm done to the corporation. Second, there is a claim 

brought directly by the above-mentioned individual plaintiffs for personal 

damages resulting from the same fraud. The trial court dismissed these latter 

claims, determining that they could not be brought directly, and we briefly 

comment on why the trial court was correct. 

[6] The trial court determined that the individual plaintiffs, being Magic Circle 

shareholders, had suffered no injury distinct from the alleged injury to Magic 

Circle and, therefore, could not sue directly. This Court has recognized that 

“shareholders of a corporation may not bring actions in their own name to 

redress an injury to the corporation.” PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP v. Massey, 860 

N.E.2d 1252, 1257 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).

[7] The plaintiffs attempt to distinguish their injuries by pointing out that they 

“executed promissory notes to acquire funds to purchase more shares of Magic 

Circle.” Reply Br. p. 17. They argue that, because they are personally liable on 

these notes, they have been personally injured and should be allowed to seek 
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recovery directly. Id. However, this Court has heard this argument before and 

held that

The plaintiffs can show no such injury because they cannot claim 

any cognizable injury aside from the diminution in share value. . 

. . Their only injury is to repay the funds that they themselves 

borrowed to purchase stock. This injury makes them no different 

than any other shareholder. 

PricewaterhouseCoopers, 860 N.E.2d at 1262. In so holding, we agreed with the 

reasoning of the Seventh Circuit that

“To hold otherwise would lead to an absurd result. Under the 

plaintiffs’ theory, any shareholder who funded a stock purchase 

through any form of loan—whether a margin loan, an advance 

on a home equity line or even a loan from relatives—could claim 

a separate and distinct injury because they were now ‘personally 

liable’ on a loan instrument.” 

Id. (quoting Massey v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 464 F.3d 642, 649 (7th Cir. 

2006)). Here, as the diminution in the share value of Magic Circle’s stock is the 

sole reason for plaintiffs’ injury, their direct claims must likewise fail.3 With 

this issue out of the way, we now turn to the central question presented in this 

case: whether the complaint alleged fraud with sufficient particularity.

 

3 Magic Circle attempts to argue that we should apply the exception outlined in Barth v. Barth, where our 

Supreme Court held that “‘[i]n the case of a closely held corporation, the court in its discretion may treat an 

action raising derivative claims as a direct action’” under certain circumstances. 659 N.E.2d 559, 562 (Ind. 

1995) (quoting A.L.I., Principles of Corporate Governance § 7.01(d)). However, Magic Circle fails to argue that 

it is, in fact, a closely held corporation and has failed to give us any information, such as the number of 

shareholders it has, from which we could make this determination. This argument therefore fails. 
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II. Pleading Fraud

[8] A person commits fraud when he has, (1) with knowledge or reckless ignorance 

of falsity, (2) made a material misrepresentation of past or existing facts, (3) 

which caused the complainant to rely on the misrepresentation to the 

complainant’s detriment. Ohio Farmers Ins. Co. v. Ind. Drywall & Acoustics, Inc., 

970 N.E.2d 674, 684 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). While our rules of trial procedure 

generally require only notice pleading, Indiana Trial Rule 9(B) provides an 

exception for complaints alleging fraud. Dutton v. Int’l Harvester Co., 504 N.E.2d 

313, 318 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987). The rule, which is nearly identical to Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 9(B), requires that:

In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances 

constituting the fraud or mistake shall be specifically averred. 

Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of the mind may 

be averred generally. 

T.R. 9(B); McKinney v. State, 693 N.E.2d 65, 71 (Ind. 1998). 

[9] Like its federal counterpart, Rule 9(B) serves the objectives of deterring 

groundless suits or “fishing expeditions,” protecting the reputations of 

defendants, and providing defendants with sufficient information to enable 

them to prepare a defense. McKinney, 693 N.E.2d at 72; Vicom, Inc. v. Harbridge 

Merchant Servs., Inc., 20 F.3d 771, 777 (7th Cir. 1994). In light of these 

objectives, we have held that this rule requires plaintiffs to state the time, the 

place, the substance of the false representations, the facts misrepresented, and to

identify what was procured by fraud. Ohio Farmers, 970 N.E.2d at 683; see also 
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DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 N.E.2d 624, 627 (7th Cir. 1990) (observing that the

rule requires plaintiffs to state “the who, what, when, where, and how: the first 

paragraph of any newspaper story”). 

[10] Here, Magic Circle attempts to comply with Rule 9(B) by designating ten 

paragraphs in the middle of its complaint that purport to “detail the time, place, 

and specific content of false statements of fact by Morgan and Wilson that are 

formally recorded and documented in the Company’s corporate records.” 

Appellant’s App. p. 18. However, close inspection of these paragraphs shows 

that they fail, both individually and collectively, to state a claim of fraud with 

the specificity necessary to effectuate Rule 9(B)’s purpose. 

[11] We take the first of these paragraphs as an example. It reads:

As recorded in the minutes for the Annual Shareholders meeting 

held March 11, 2009, at the offices of Magic Circle in 

Coatesville, Indiana . . . :

Mr. Wilson indicated the company began the year in 

a serious cash shortfall and the requirement for a 

turn-around plan. A plan was created and is kept on 

file at the company’s headquarters. The company 

struggled throughout 2009 but the actions enacted in 

the year left the company solvent and in good 

position for the future. 

These statements were materially false and misleading. The 

actions of he and Morgan had not left the company “solvent and 

in a good position.” In fact, Morgan and Wilson were materially 

misstating the company’s financial results to the shareholders, all 

of which Crowe [Magic Circle’s accountant] failed to detect by 
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failing to conduct GAAS audits. The minutes document[] [that] 

Morgan and Wilson provided the shareholder[s] written reports 

about the company’s financial position and business operations. 

Those report[s] were materially inaccurate, mischaracterized 

Morgan and Wilson’s actions, and provided a materially 

inaccurate picture of the company[’s] overall position and its 

prospects. Each of the individual Plaintiffs attended the meeting,

among others. 

Id. at 18-19. 

[12] We first note our bewilderment at Magic Circle’s decision to quote directly 

from the minutes of the meeting, which by their very nature present a terse 

summary of events rather than a particularized account. As a result of this, the 

paragraph fails to provide us enough information to get a true picture of events. 

First, we cannot gather who made the statements at issue. While the first 

sentence of the minutes attributes a statement to Wilson, it is not clear whether 

the sentences that follow refer to his statements. Furthermore, although the 

minutes only refer to Wilson, the paragraph goes on to conclude that Wilson 

and Morgan “were materially misstating the company’s financial results to the 

shareholders.” Id. In short, we do not know who said what and, even were we 

to assume that both men spoke in unison, we would not know what was said. 

[13] The paragraph also alleges that Morgan and Wilson gave shareholders 

“materially inaccurate” reports that “mischaracterized” their actions. Id. at 19. 

It does not, however, specify what was inaccurate, how the inaccuracy was 

material, what actions Wilson and Morgan had taken, or how they had

mischaracterized these actions. Rule 9(B) requires that these questions be 
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answered with some specificity, and conclusory declarations, such as “[the 

reports] provided a materially inaccurate picture of the company[’s] overall 

position and its prospects,” come no closer to meeting this requirement. Id. 

The contention that “[Wilson] and Morgan’s actions had not left the company 

‘solvent and in a good position’” is similarly vague. Id. at 18 (emphasis added). 

Was the company not solvent? Was it not in a good position? Or was is not 

both of these things at once? Does Magic Circle mean to say that the company 

was unable to pay its debts, or does it mean only to say that Wilson and 

Morgan had done nothing to help the cause? Magic Circle may view such 

questions as nitpicking, but we honestly do not know the answers. 

[14] The complaint’s next paragraph displays similar shortcomings. Magic Circle 

alleges:

As recorded in the minutes for the Annual Shareholders meeting 

for fiscal year 2009, held November 11, 2010, at the offices of 

Magic Circle in Coatesville, Indiana, Wilson:

[C]ompleted a review of the 2009 financial 

performance of the company. Mr. Wilson discussed 

in detail the issue[s] the company faced in early 2009 

and the resulting actions that were required to be 

taken. He discussed the action plan developed in 

concert with the Keystone consulting group that was 

adopted by the board in early April 2009. The plan 

was required to be presented to PNC bank due to 

financial defaults experienced at the end of quarter 

two. PNC accepted the plan and the loan was 

modified in early June (copy of the plan and First 

Amendment Agreement attached). Mr. Wilson 
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reviewed the 1st half of 2010 performance as these 

were available on the meeting date. There were 

several questions from Mr. Stan Morton in regards to 

measure of margins that were answered by Mr. 

Wilson and Mr. Morgan.

Each of these statements was materially false. The financial 

performances Wilson stated for 2009 was materially inflated. 

The actions he claimed had been taken were not in fact taken, the 

performance for the first half of 2010 provided was materially 

inflated, and the information Wilson provided PNC was 

materially inaccurate, as the “plan” he provided was never 

intended to be achieve[d] except through materially inflating the 

company’s actual financial results. Morgan attended the meeting 

and, as noted, specifically answered questions that confirmed Mr. 

Wilson’s false statements. Attending this meeting were each of 

the individual Plaintiffs in this lawsuit, among others.

Id. at 19. 

[15] The minutes cited here do a slightly more thorough job of indicating who was 

speaking at this meeting, but we still have no true sense of what was actually

going on. We are simply assured that everything Wilson said was false, again 

without being told what he said. We are also asked to imagine a plan that 

Wilson presented to a bank and assume, once again, that its contents were 

materially inaccurate. There is no mention of the substance of any of the

alleged misrepresentations other than the perfunctory assertion that they 

generally dealt with finance. Then, in perhaps the complaint’s most dubious 

moment, we are given the following word puzzle: “Morgan . . . specifically 

answered questions that confirmed Mr. Wilson’s false statements.” Id. We will 
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leave it to the interested reader to determine how many possible meanings can 

be derived from this phrase. 

[16] The complaint continues on in a similar fashion, perhaps in the hope that it will 

eventually land on something specific enough to satisfy Rule 9(B). However, 

even if the complaint had managed to include a paragraph which offered a 

sufficiently detailed description of events, it would not be enough at this point. 

It is clear from the complaint that Magic Circle believes all of the alleged 

misrepresentations it purports to detail are important and that the fraud came 

about through Magic Circle’s reliance on the whole of these representations. Id.

at 30. Thus, even had the complaint clearly alleged one instance of Wilson or 

Morgan knowingly misrepresenting information, it would still fail to plead 

fraud, as Magic Circle does not claim to have detrimentally relied on any one 

instance alone.

[17] The complaint also contains a claim by Magic Circle that Wilson and Morgan

breached their fiduciary duty. The trial court dismissed this claim for vagueness 

as well because, although it is styled differently, it relies on the alleged fraud 

and therefore sounds in fraud. This decision was correct. Rule 9(B) has been 

held to apply to claims “grounded in fraud,” and such is the case here, as Magic 

Circle’s breach of fiduciary duty claim is based on the same allegations of 

fraudulent conduct against Wilson and Morgan as its fraud claim. McKinney, 

693 N.E.2d at 72. 
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[18] We find that the appellants’ complaint is insufficiently specific when judged in 

light of the purposes Rule 9(B) is intended to serve. While the appellants ask 

for another opportunity to plead this matter, they do not argue that more time 

will allow them to discover any relevant information that was not already in 

their possession at the time of this complaint’s filing. About eighteen months 

passed between the filing of the original complaint and the dismissal of the 

second amended complaint, during which the appellants were given more than 

one opportunity to plead this matter with sufficient specificity. As one of the 

purposes behind Rule 9(B) is to put an end to meritless litigation brought in the 

hope of a settlement, we see no reason to drag this out further, and we believe 

that the trial court was correct to dismiss this case with prejudice.

[19] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Bradford, J., and Pyle, J., concur.