1 Filed 4/28/15 P. v. Wagner CA4/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELL ATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. EARL WILLIAM WAGNER, Defendant and Appellant. E061166 (Super.Ct.No. RIF1303259) OPINION

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Irma Poole Ashberry, Judge. Affirmed with directions. Steven J. Carroll, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A. Swenson and Heather M. Clark, De puty Attorneys Genera l, for Plaintiff and Respondent.2 A jury convicted defendant, Earl Wagner, of two counts of first degree residential burglary (Pen. Code, § 459), 1 during which a non-accomplice was present (§ 667.5, subd. (c)(21)), and two counts of recei ving stolen property (§ 496, subd. (a)). In bifurcated proceedings, he admitted suffe ring five prior convictions, for which he served prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)), one serious prior conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)) and one strike prior (§ 667, subds. (c) & (e)(1)). He was se ntenced to prison for 15 years, eight months, and appeals, claiming error occurred in: (1 ) defense counsel conceding defendant’s guilt of the charged receiving stolen property offenses, (2) denial of defe ndant’s motion to acquit as to one of the charged burglaries, (3 ) denial of defendant’s motion to disclose juror identifying information and, (4) imposition of a restitu tion fine. We reject his contentions and affirm, while directing the tr ial court to correct errors in the court minutes and abstract of judgment.
F ACTS The male renter of a Riverside apartmen t testified that at 9:45 p.m. on May 24, 2013, he left his apartment to walk his dog, leaving the front door open, but the security screen door closed. He returned 15-20 minut es later and noticed th e screen door was ajar and his wallet, containing iden tification and an ATM card, and his live-in girlfriend’s cell phone were missing. His live-in girlfriend testified that while her boyfriend was out walking the dog, she was inside the one-b edroom apartment’s bathroom, with the bathroom door open, putting on makeup. Thre e to five minutes after her boyfriend had

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.3 left with the dog, she heard a noise, looked outside the bathroom bu t saw no one, noticed that the screen door was ajar and closed the front door. He r cell phone had last been on the coffee table in the living room, near the front door. At 9:40 or 9:50 the same night, defenda nt entered a sober living house across the street and one door down from the afore-me ntioned apartment. He went into the bathroom and closed the door. When two occ upants of the house tried to confront him, he escaped through another door in the bathroom and went out the back door of the house and over the backyard fence, as will be descri bed in greater detail la ter in this opinion. A police officer testified that around 10 :05 that night, he saw defendant, who matched the description of th e person who had entered the sober living house, in the driveway of a house that backed up to th e back yard of the sober living house. Defendant’s knees were bent, as though he had just jumped the fence that surrounded the sober living house’s back yard. Defendant disappeared, so the officer knocked on the door to the house where he had seen defendan t in the driveway and after several knocks, defendant came to the door. Defendant said he was there visiting his friend, “Eric,” but he could not supply “Eric’ s” last name nor the address where he was. Defendant was convicted of the charged receiving stolen property counts, which were the wallet and the cell phone taken fro m the apartment. The jury acquitted defendant of burglarizing the house when defendant was seen by the officer in the driveway.4 I SSUES AND D ISCUSSION 1. Defendant’s Concession On December 2, 2013, the People requested that the standard instruction on a defendant’s right not to testify be given at the end of trial. On December 3, during opening statement, defense counsel said, “[M]istakes were made and crimes were committed in this case and . . . you shouldn’t let anybody slid e by on that. The evidence will show that [defendant] did possess stolen property, the wallet and the cell phone, and you should hold him accountable for those crimes. [¶] . . . [T]he evidence will show you that [defendant] did not enter anyone’s home that night with the in tent to steal. [¶] . . . Hold [defendant] accoun table for what he did, no more and no less.” During discussion of jury instructi ons on December 4, the trial c ourt noted that the People had requested the instruction on a defendant’s right not to testify, as well as defense counsel’s lack of objection to it. The court adde d, however, that during a discussion of the instructions the day before, o ff the record, it and counsel “indicate[d], based on . . . what counsel felt might come out with some of the evidence, that we would need to revisit . . . [the jury instruc tion on a defendant’s right not to testify] after evidence was completed . . . . Obviously, if [defe ndant] testifies, that will be pulled.” Later that day, defendant to ok the stand. He admitted that he had been convicted in the past of numerous felonies, including burglary and stealing cars on three different occasions. He said that on May 24, 2013, he had just picked up so me methamphetamine, which he planned to inject, and was riding his bike back to his campsite, when he noticed things that were being thrown away in a dumpster near an ap artment on the same street as5 the apartment that was burglarized. He looked through the items and found a box containing the male apartment renter’s wallet and the female apartment renter’s pink cell phone. He looked inside the wallet and saw that there was no money in it, but there were identification and credit cards. He wanted to see if the cell phone was working, so he pushed the power button and it turned on. Wh en asked if he took the wallet and cell phone with him, he said, “I figured that I could sell it . . . .” He acknowledged that neither was his. When asked about the arre sting officer’s testimony that defendant told him that the cell phone belonged to the mother of his child, defendant said that he had two cell phones in his possession when detained by the officer, one of which was a black touch screen he had borrowed fr om his girlfriend. When asked if he was testifying that when the officer asked him abou t the pink cell phone, and defe ndant told the officer that it belonged to his child’s mo ther, he was actually referri ng to the black touch-screen, defendant said he did not know because he was so under the influence that he did not remember. Upon further questi oning, he admitted lying to th e officer about the pink cell phone. He said he went behind the tras h can that contained th e discarded items and injected the methamphetamine, at which time, thi ngs became fuzzy and he was unable to recall what became of his bicycle. He reme mbered banging on a d oor, opening the door, then awaking in an unfamiliar bed, in the house where he was acco sted by the arresting officer. He remembered walk ing into the house through an unlocked door, telling the officer he was there to visit an “Eric,” but no Eric lived there. He also remembered being at the side of a house, a female who wa s lying down reading a book yelling out the window at him to get out of there and him getting scared and running, then hiding behind6 a bush, but he did not recall be ing inside a house, other th an the one in which he had fallen asleep. He denied being in a back yard or remembering a swimming pool or a chain link fence, both of which were features at the sober living house. He denied going into anyone’s house intending to steal things. On rebuttal, the arresting officer testified that defendant exhibited no signs of into xication and defendant had only one cell phone on his person and it was the pink one. During argument to the jury, defense co unsel said, “[Defendant] did possess th[e] stolen property [as charged], and he to ld you . . . how he knew it didn’t belong, obviously, to him. He knew that it belonged to someone. The ce ll phone worked. The wallet had somebody’s name and address in it. He intended to keep it. He intended to sell it. You should find him gu ilty of those [crimes]. [¶] . . . [¶] I don’t know how much clearer I can be when I say he did that and you should convict hi m. . . . I’m asking you to return guilty verdicts there.” However, counsel went on to argue that there was reasonable doubt that defendan t was guilty of the three charged burglaries. As to the burglary of the apartment, she argued that if as the male apartment re nter told the police, he had $10 in his wallet, and if as the arre sting officer testified, when defendant was apprehended he had no money on him, then defendant’s cl aim that he found the wallet in the box in the dumpster and the inference th at someone else took it from the apartment, took the money out of it and left it in the b ox were both true. As to the burglary of the sober living house, counsel conceded that de fendant ran through the house, as its two occupants had testified. Ho wever, counsel argued that defe ndant was merely trying to7 flee the scene 2 and had no intent to take anything when he ran into the bathroom, then out the back door and over the fe nce. Counsel also conceded that defendant had gone into the house where he was apprehended by the arresting officer. However, counsel argued that defendant went into this house after seeing the officer because defendant knew he had stolen property in his possession and was attempting to hide from the officer, not to steal anything in the house. Alternatively, counsel argued that because defendant was under the influence, he did not form the specif ic intent to commit theft while at the sober living house and at the house where he was a pprehended by the arresting officer. In so arguing, counsel conceded that there was no such specific intent necessary for the charged offenses of possessing stolen property, so defendant’s claim of intoxication could not be used to escape liability for them, even as ide from defendant’s concession of guilt as to them. The jury was instructed as to the possession of stolen property charges and they returned verdicts of guilty. Defendant here contends that the trial court should not have allowed counsel below to concede that he wa s guilty of the possession counts without first assuring itself

2 Counsel said, “[Defendant] was fleeing the scene of the first house through the house”, which, of course, makes no sense. Later, counsel said that defendant ran through the sober living house because “he was trying to get away.” Becau se defendant argued that he did not burglarize the apartment— that someone else did—counsel could not possibly have been implying that defendant wa s trying to get away from the scene of the apartment burglary. The only logical implicati on left is that defendant knew he possessed stolen property and was trying to get away from the police if they happened upon him.8 that defendant wanted to c oncede his guilt and without goin g through the same litany of advisements and waivers required for defend ants who plead guilty. We disagree. Counsel first conceded defendant’s guilt of the possession charges during opening statement, at a time when the record established that she was not aware whether defendant would testify. Therefore, contrary to defendant’s implication, the record does not support that counsel knew, when she first made this concession, that it would conflict with the opinion expressed by defendant duri ng his later testimony that the cell phone and wallet had been abandoned. Second, defendan t ignores the context of his own testimony. As the prosecutor pointed out twice to defe ndant during her cross-examination of him, defendant’s credibility was crucial. It is obvious defendant was doing his best on the stand to paint the rosiest picture of his acti ons. This included his claim that he believed that the wallet and cell phone had been abandoned. Howeve r, defense counsel ultimately recognized the reality of th e situation, which is that no owner willingly abandons a working cell phone or a wallet full of credit cards. This means that when defendant found the items, despite his clai m of opining that they had been abandoned, he knew that they belonged to other people (a matter he conceded on the stand) 3 and his obligation was either to walk away from them or to call th e police and report that he had found them so they could be returned to thei r rightful owners. It was not, as defendant conceded he had done, to take them upon forming the intent to sell them, thus depriving their rightful owners of them. In this regard, we do not view defendant’s testimony as conflicting with

3 Therefore, the fact that no one asked hi m, and he did not vol unteer, that he knew they were stolen is inconsequential.9 his attorney’s concession. Fi nally, as is clear from reading all of counsel’s argument to the jury, admitting that defenda nt possessed stolen property was crucial to defendant’s claim that he had entered the sober living h ouse as a means of fleeing the scene and the house in which he was apprehended by the arre sting officer as a means of hiding from the police because he knew he was in possession of stolen property. W ithout conceding that he was in possession of stolen property, de fendant had no reason for going into either house, other than to commit theft therein. Comparing the punishment and further consequences of convictions for first degree residential burglary with the sentence and further consequences of convi ctions for possessing stolen property, defense counsel’s tactical decision makes perfect sense. Theref ore, we cannot agree w ith defendant that his attorney acted inco mpetently in making this concession. As to defendant’s contention that his counsel’s concession was tantamount to a guilty plea, requiring both express agreement by the defe ndant and the guilty plea litany of advisements and waivers, the People corre ctly point out that the California Supreme Court has held otherwise. ( People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal 4th 1, 30 .) As to the former, defendant was present when his counsel made her conc essions during her opening statement and closing ar gument. He said nothing on eith er occasion, and did not, after trial, make a motion for a new trial or a Marsden 4 motion. Thus, we agree with the People that the trial court had no duty to inqu ire of defendant whether he agreed with her concession. We do not agree with defendan t that what he deems to be the conflict

4 People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118.10 between his trial testimony and the concession was an indication that he disagreed with his counsel’s tactical decision. As we have already concluded, there was no such conflict and the concession supported counsel’s tac tical decision to fight the more harshly punishable charges.
2. Defendant’s Motion for Acquittal At the end of the People’s case-in-chief, defendant moved for acq uittal as to all the charges. The trial court denied it, finding there was “substantia l evidence that would allow a reasonable finder of fact to find ever y element of the charged offense[s] had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Defendant here contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion as to the burglary of the sober living house. We disagree. One of the occupants of the sober liv ing house testified that she was on the computer in the living room of the house at 9:50 p.m. on May 24, 2013 when, alerted by a bell that rings when someone enters through the front door, she look ed to see defendant entering the home through the closed but unloc ked door. Defendant walked past her and into the bathroom, where he locked himself in, despite her walking behind him and saying, “Excuse me, hello.” Once he was in the bathroom, she spoke to him through the locked door, but he did not re spond to her. She checked the rear door to the bathroom, which let out through the pantry, to see if defendant had exited through it, and she knocked on it, but there was no answer. There were items that had been piled up against the pantry side of that door. She went an d got her housemate and when she returned to the rear bathroom door, the items that had been piled up against it had been moved and it appeared as though defendant had come out th rough that door, then left the house through11 the back door. The ba ck door leads to the pool area in the back yard. Defendant had been in the bathroom for 5-10 minutes. The occupant’s housemate testified that she was on the bed in her bedroom, which is next to the front door, watching televi sion when defendant ran through the house at 9:40 or 9:50 p.m. and locked himself in the bathroom for le ss than one minute. When she got to the rear door of the bathroom with the occupant, it was open and she assumed that defendant had run out through it and out the back door. She heard the chain link fence that separated her back yard from the ne ighbor’s shaking, as though someone was climbing it to jump into the ne ighbor’s yard. When defenda nt entered the house, all the lights were off—the only light came from the occupant’s computer screen and her television. A detective testified that in April 1999 , on the same street that the house where defendant was apprehended by the arresti ng officer occurred, a house was entered through an open rear door and a forced open window on an interior door. Two phones, a VCR, money and firearms were stolen. Anothe r detective testified that eight days later, defendant was stopped while driving a car in Ri verside that belonged to the daughter of the victim of the above-described burglary. Defendant claimed that the car belonged to his girlfriend, who had a differe nt last name than that of the car’s owner. Upon further questioning, defendant said that he had met a man named Jose on the street at 10:00 p.m. and Jose had asked defendant if defendant wanted the keys to a car, which Jose had taken from a garage down the street. Defendant took the keys from Jose, walked down the street and took the car. Defendant reached th e conclusion that the car had been stolen.12 The jury was instructed that it could consider this evidence in deciding whether defendant entered the apartment, the s ober living home and the home wh ere he was apprehended by the arresting officer with the specific intent to commit theft and that he did not enter any of those due to a mistake or by accident. Based on the evidence of defendant’s 1999 burglary and his burglary of the apartment, during both of which defendant stole items, the jury could reasonably infer that defendant entered the sober living house , which he did moments after burglarizing the apartment, with the intent to steal items, which plan was th warted by the fact that the house was dark and defendant could not see thin gs to take them, or that he entered the darkened house assuming there was no one inside and was surprised to find the occupant and her housemate there. S till, a third possibility was that defendant was “thrown off” his plan to take items inside the house by the bell that sounded when he walked through the front door. While defendant postulates a scenario based on the testimony of the occupant of the house in wh ich he was apprehended by th e arresting officer that she “th[ought] she saw [defendant] on [a] street [different from the street on which the sober house was located, but nearby] once before th at maybe[,]”and he entered the sober house to use the bathroom, this scenar io is a great deal less likely than the three this court has set forth above. After all, if you are just using someone’s bathroom, why would you fail to respond to them when they are trying to find out why you are in their house? And why would you then climb over a chai n link fence and hide in yet a nother house in order to get away? Both of these things suggest that defendant was up to no good, not that he somehow thought he was entitled to use the bathroom at th e sober living house because13 he somehow knew it was a sober living house a nd believed that gave him carte blanche in the bathroom. Equally unlikely is another of what defendant asserts is a reasonable inference that he entered the house to go into the bathroom to inject methamphetamine. What rational person would assume that they could use a stranger’s house as a place to engage in illegal behavior unfettered? More over, it directly contra dicts defendant’s own testimony that he injected methamphetamine behind the dumpster where he found the wallet and cell phone. While we recognize that the trial court did not have the advantage of this testimony when it denied the motion to acquit, granting it on this basis would have put defendant in a difficult position in terms of his testimony.
3. Disclosure of Juror Information Although we have already mentioned this in connection with th e first issue raised by defendant, we repeat what we had previously stated, thusly, “As to the burglary of the sober living house, [defense] counsel conced ed [during argument to the jury] that defendant ran through the house, as its two occupants had testified. However, counsel argued that defendant was merely trying to fl ee the scene and had no intent to take anything when he ran into the bathroom, then out the back door and over the fence.” In footnote number two, we continued, “[Defe nse c]ounsel said, ‘[Defendant] was fleeing the scene of the first house th rough the house,’ which, of course, makes no sense. Later, counsel said that defendant ra n through the sober living house because ‘he was trying to get away.’ Because defendant argued that he did not burgl arize the apartment—that the person who discarded the wallet and cell phone where defendant found them did— counsel could not possibly have been implying that defendant was trying to get away14 from the scene of the ap artment burglary. The only logi cal implication left is that defendant knew he possessed stolen propert y [(i.e., the wallet and the cell phone)] and was trying to get away from the police if they happen ed upon him.” We continued in the opinion, “[Defense c]ounsel also conceded th at defendant had gone into the house where he was apprehended by the a rresting officer. However, coun sel argued that defendant went into this house after seeing the offi cer because defendant knew he had stolen property in his possession and was attempti ng to hide from the officer, not to steal anything in the house.” Based on defense counsel’s argument that defendant was “fleeing the scene” when he entered the sober living ho use, post trial, defendant m oved for disclosure of juror information based on a declaration by trial co unsel for defendant in which she said the following, “[T]he foreman . . . told me that he and other ju rors had ‘caught my mistake.’ . . . [H]e explained that because I had said in closing that, even if the jury felt [that defendant] was guilty of the . . . residential burglary [of the apartment], it was clear that he was simply fleeing the sc ene at the [sober living hous e] and was hiding inside the . . . house [where he was later apprehen ded by the arresting officer], I had admitted his guilt and that is why they convicted him of burglary at the s[ober living] house. I asked if he remembered the Judge saying th at the arguments were not evidence. He replied[,] ‘[Y]es, but we caught you.’” Of course, these statemen ts make no sense. Although as we point out, defense counsel wa s not clear below about to what she was referring when she said that defendant was “f leeing the scene” when he entered the sober living house, she was very clear that when defendant entered the house where he was15 later apprehended by the arresting officer, he was trying to avoid the police because he knew he had stolen property on him. The only truly logical implication, as we have already said, to counsel’s clear argument that defendant was not guilty of burglarizing the sober living house was that defendant entered it to escape detection for having in his possession the wallet and cell phon e taken in the burglary of the apartment, but counsel was equally clear that defendant was not guilty of committing that burglary, either. Appellate counsel for defendant interpre ts the foreperson’s remarks as follows, “[Defense] counsel stated in her argument that even if the jury believed that [defendant] was guilty of [the burglary of the apartment], it was clear that as to [the burglary of the sober living house, defendant] was simply fl eeing the scene at the [sober living house] and was hiding inside the . . . house [where he was later apprehended by the arresting officer].” Of course, accepting this inte rpretation renders defendant’s request unmeritorious. If, as defendant asserts, defe nse counsel conceded de fendant’s guilt of the burglary of the apartment (which we have pointed out defense counsel clearly did not do) then, defendant’s guilt of the burglary of the sober living house was not “admitted” or “conceded” by counsel’s remarks, as she was merely saying that he entered the sober house to flee the scene of the apartment burglar y, not to steal anything in the sober living house. In their opposition to defendant’s motion, the prosecutor recalled the foreperson’s remarks differently. She said, “[The foreman] pointed out to [defense counsel] that in her closing argument she said the defendant was gu ilty. [Defense counsel] pointed out to the juror that anything the attorn eys say is not evidence. The [foreman] agreed and indicated16 he understood this jury instruction, but just wanted to let [defense counsel] know what she said during her closing argument. [The prosecutor] does not recall the [foreman] making any statement that the reason the jury convicted defendant of [the burglary of the sober living house] was because of [defense co unsel’s] statement rega rding [the burglary of the apartment] thereby in ferring guilt as to [the form er], but rather that it was something the juror noticed and wanted to point out to [defense coun sel] in his discussion about his vote as to [the burglary of the sobe r living house] . . . .” The People asserted that defendant’s motion was based on speculati on, in that the foreperson did not say that he took what defense counsel ha d said as evidence or that wh at she said had affected his deliberations or verdict. In any event, th e People continued, evid ence of juror’s thought processes were inadmissible under Eviden ce Code section 1 150, subdivision (a), 5 therefore, there was no point to disclosing juror informati on in the hopes of uncovering evidence that jurors r eached their verdict on the basis of what defense counsel had said. The People also asserted th at there was no evidence any of the jurors had committed misconduct. The trial court denied the request to disclose juror information, finding that a prima facie showing of good cause “to suppor t a reasonable belief that jury misconduct

5 That subdivision provides , “Upon an inquiry as to th e validity of a verdict, any otherwise admissible evidence may be receiv ed as to statements made, or conduct, conditions, or events occurring, either with or without the ju ry room, of such a character as is likely to have influenced the verdict improperly. No ev idence is admiss ible to show the effect of such statement, conduct, condition, or event up on a juror either in influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict or concerning the mental processes by which it was determined.”17 occurred and that further investigation is nece ssary to provide the [c ]ourt with adequate information to rule on a motion for new trial” had not been made. The trial court also concluded that any investigati on would be into information th at would be inadmissible. The court cited People v. Sanchez (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 460, 475, 476 ( Sanchez ), which cited the following from People v. Hedgecock (1990) 51 Cal.3d 3 95, 418-419, “Evidence Code section 1150 ‘may be violated not only by the admission of jurors’ testimony describing their own mental processes, but also by permitting testimony concerning statements made by jurors in the course of their deliberations. In rare circumstances a statement by a juror during delib erations may itself be an act of misconduct, in which case evidence of that statement is admissible. [Citation.] Bu t when a juror in the course of deliberations gives the reasons for his or her vote, the words are simply a verbal reflection of the juror’s mental processes. Consideration of such a statement as evidence of those processes is barred by Evid ence Code section 1150.’” The Sanchez court went on to hold, “[W]here, as here, the affidavit or declaration suggests ‘“‘deliberative error’ in the jury’s collective mental proc ess—confusion, misunderstanding, and misinterpretion of the law,”’ particularly rega rding ‘the way in whic h the jury interpreted and applied the instructions,’ the affidavit or declaration is inadmissible. [Citation.] The mere fact that such mental process was mani fested in conversation between jurors during deliberations does not alter this rule. [Citation.]” ( Sanchez , supra , 62 Cal.App.4th at p. 476.) The trial court concluded that the fo reman’s statement about so-called misconduct “had to do with the internal misunderstanding of the ju ry, not any overt act that occurred during the deliberation process.” The court pointed out that even defendant conceded18 that the foreperson had agreed with defense counsel that the statements of the attorneys were not evidence. Defendant here claims that the trial court abused its discretion ( People v. Carrasco (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 978, 991) a nd violated his rights to due process of law, a fair trial and effective assistance of counsel in deny ing his request for disclosure of juror information. We cannot agr ee with defendant because, as we point out, the request simply made no sense. Moreover, defendant do es not even assert how the information he hoped to uncover could have be en admitted in light of Ev idence Code section 1150.
4. Restitution Fine The probation report recommended the sent encing court impose a restitution fine of $1,120, pursuant to secti on 1202.4, subdivision (b)(1), which provides for a fine between $280 and $10,000, to be set at the discretion of the sentencing court. At the same time, the report recomme nded that the terms for the receiving stolen property convictions be stayed pursuant to section 6 54. The sentencing court imposed the fine recommended by the probation report. Defendant did not object to this fine below, however, he objects to it now, claiming it represents the minimum fine of $280 times the
number of convictions he suffere d in violation of section 654. 6 Because the trial court stayed punishment for two of those convicti ons, defendant here argues, the court should not have imposed fines as to them. However, as the People point out, the record does not

6 Section 1202.4, subdivision (b)(2) provi des, “In setting a felony restitution fine, the court may determine the amount of th e fine as the product of the minimum fine . . . multiplied by the numb er of years of imprisonment the defendant is ordered to serve, multiplied by the number of felony counts of which the defendant is convicted.”19 support defendant’s premise that the sentencing court imposed fines for all four convictions. Therefore, there is no basis fo r us to order that half of defendant’s restitution fine be stricken. Moreover, by fa iling to object to the fi ne below, defendant waived his current claim. ( People v. Trujillo (2015) 60 Cal.4th 850; People v. Aguilar (2015) 60 Cal.4th 862 ; People v. McCullough (2013) 56 Cal.4th 589.)
D ISPOSITION The trial court is directed to amend the minutes for December 2, 2013 to show that defendant admitted a serious prior conviction pursuant to section 667, subdivision (a). The trial court is further directed to stri ke the designation of the possession of stolen property conviction (count 4) as a violent fe lony on the Abstract of Judgment and, at number 4, to check the box for “current or prio r serious or violent felony[.]” In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
RAMIREZ P. J.

We concur: McKINSTER J. KING J.