NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 

23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, 

as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties 

and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's 

decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire 

court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. 

A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 

2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted 

above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 

n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

23-P-419

PAULA TAYLOR & another1

vs.

BOSTON TEACHERS UNION, LOCAL 66, AFT MASSACHUSETTS, AFL-CIO.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The plaintiffs, Paula Taylor and John Daley, both members 

of the Boston Teachers Union (BTU or defendant), appeal from a 

judgment of the Superior Court dismissing their complaint

seeking declaratory relief pursuant to G. L. c. 231A, § 1. We 

affirm.

Background. Taking the plaintiffs' well-pleaded 

allegations as true, at a February 9, 2022 monthly union 

membership meeting a draft memorandum of agreement (MOA) between 

the Boston Public Schools and the BTU was presented to the 

attending membership for a vote. "The [February 2022] MOA, 

among other things, divided the workforce into 'verified' and 

'non-verified' employees depending upon which medical treatments 

1 John Daley.
2

they preferred," and further provided for the imposition of 

unpaid leave for "'non-verified' employees based upon [certain]

contingencies." The February 2022 MOA also purported to reduce 

compensation for employees "who used sick days as compensation 

during unpaid leave." The union membership voted in favor of 

the February 2022 MOA.

On February 14, 2022, the plaintiffs filed a complaint 

against the defendant alleging that the defendant conducted a 

vote on the February 2022 MOA in violation of notice and voting 

requirements of the union bylaws. Article X of the BTU's bylaws 

provides that "[a]ny motion which alters or amends our 

collective bargaining agreement shall require the same notice to 

the membership as a constitutional amendment." Article X 

further provides that proposed amendments to the bylaws "[s]hall 

be announced to the membership in writing at least fifteen (15) 

days in advance of the next meeting of the membership," and that 

proposed amendments "shall become part of the Bylaws of the 

[union] by two-thirds (2/3) vote of those present and voting in 

favor."

The plaintiffs argue that the above-referenced provisions 

of the February 2022 MOA "substantially altered the rights and 

obligations of the members under the union's Collective 

Bargaining Agreement [CBA]," thus triggering the Article X bylaw 

provisions requiring fifteen days advance written notice and a 
3

two-thirds supermajority vote. The plaintiffs claim that by 

failing to give that required notice and failing to require a 

supermajority vote, the defendant breached the bylaws and 

proceeded on an unlawful basis without the authority of union 

membership. Accordingly, the plaintiffs seek a declaration that 

the defendant's actions violated the bylaws and are unlawful.

The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the basis 

that, inter alia, paragraph 19 of the February 2022 MOA requires 

the "approval of the Boston School Committee" (BSC) to become 

effective, and the BSC has never voted on or approved the 

February 2022 MOA. Consequently, the defendant argued, the 

request for declaratory relief was not ripe for adjudication as 

there was no actual controversy within the meaning of G. L. 

c. 231A. The plaintiffs filed an opposition to the motion to 

dismiss and subsequently filed a motion to supplement the 

pleadings pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 15 (d), 365 Mass. 761 

(1974). The motion to supplement sought, in essence, to amend 

the complaint to include allegations regarding a subsequent 

September 6, 2022 MOA that contained a requirement for union 

members to "verify their vaccination status" and in some 

circumstances submit to an unspecified "COVID-19 screening 

test." The plaintiffs maintained that certain provisions of the

September 2022 MOA likewise altered or amended rights and 

obligations in the CBA and were thus subject to the notice and 
4

supermajority provisions of Article X of the bylaws and likewise

were unlawful. The defendant filed an opposition to the motion 

to supplement arguing that the September 2022 MOA did not alter 

the terms and conditions of employment for union members. On 

January 31, 2023, a Superior Court judge allowed the defendant's 

motion to dismiss and denied the plaintiffs' motion to 

supplement. This appeal ensued.

Discussion. We review the allowance of a motion to dismiss 

de novo, accepting the allegations in the complaint as true and 

drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. See 

Curtis v. Herb Chambers I-95, Inc., 458 Mass. 674, 676 (2011). 

"[W]e look beyond the conclusory allegations in the complaint 

and focus on whether the factual allegations plausibly suggest 

an entitlement to relief." Id., citing Iannacchino v. Ford 

Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 635-636 (2008).

With respect to declaratory judgment actions, G. L. c. 231A 

"expressly requires that the pleadings set forth specifically 

some actual controversy." Penal Insts. Comm'r for Suffolk Co. 

v. Commissioner of Correction, 382 Mass. 527, 530-531 (1981), 

citing G. L. c. 231A, §§ 1, 9. "Such proceedings are concerned 

with the resolution of real, not hypothetical, controversies; 

the declaration issued is intended to have an immediate impact 

on the rights of the parties." Id. at 531, quoting 

Massachusetts Ass'n of Independent Ins. Agents & Brokers, Inc. 
5

v. Commissioner of Ins., 373 Mass. 290, 292 (1977). "Conclusory 

allegations as to official duties or potential future conflicts 

will not do." Penal Insts. Comm'r for Suffolk Co., supra. With 

these principles in mind, we address the plaintiffs' claims on 

appeal.

As to the February 2022 MOA, there is no dispute that it 

was never approved by the BSC and never went into effect. As a 

result, these circumstances present a hypothetical controversy

where the declaration sought by the plaintiffs -- i.e., that the 

MOA not in effect is nonetheless unlawful -- would not have an

"immediate impact" on the rights of the parties. Massachusetts 

Ass'n of Independent Ins. Agents & Brokers, 373 Mass. at 292. 

Plaintiffs' argument would also fail because "[a] party has 

standing pursuant to G. L. c. 231A where the defendant has 

violated some duty owed to the plaintiff[s] . . . and where the 

plaintiffs can allege an injury within the area of concern of 

the statute or regulatory scheme" (quotations omitted). Service 

Employees Int'l Union, Local 509 v. Department of Mental Health, 

469 Mass. 323, 328 (2014). Here, for the reasons stated above, 

the plaintiffs do not allege a cognizable injury within the 

meaning of c. 231A. "[U]ntil the defendant[] decide[s] upon 

definite action with some finality, declaratory relief is 

premature." McCaffrey v. School Comm. of Haverhill, 352 Mass. 

516, 518-519 (1967). In addition, "[i]t is settled that G. L. 
6

c. 231A does not provide an independent statutory basis for 

standing." Enos v. Secretary of Envtl. Affairs, 432 Mass. 132, 

135 (2000). A plaintiff seeking declaratory relief must 

"demonstrate not only the existence of an actual controversy but 

also the requisite legal standing to secure its resolution"

(quotation omitted). Entergy Nuclear Generation Co. v. 

Department of Envtl. Protection, 459 Mass. 319, 326 (2011). "To 

have standing in any capacity, a [plaintiff] must show that the 

challenged action has caused the [plaintiff] injury." Sudbury

v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 485 Mass. 774, 779 (2020). 

Here, the plaintiffs have not been injured by the defendant's 

alleged failure to abide by the notice and supermajority 

provisions of the bylaws, because, again, the February 2022 MOA 

never took effect. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss was 

properly allowed.

As to the September 2022 MOA, it appears that there is 

nothing in the record before us that indicates that it went into 

effect. Thus, for the reasons delineated above, the plaintiffs 

fail to satisfy the actual controversy requirement of c. 231A.2 

Even assuming, arguendo, that the September 2022 MOA did go into 

2 There were representations by the parties at oral argument 

that the September 2022 MOA went into effect, but, of course, we 

are bound by the record before us. In any event, for the 

reasons discussed infra, the claim is also unavailing on the 

merits.
7

effect, the judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the 

motion to supplement the complaint to include allegations 

regarding the September 2022 MOA. See Chang v. Winklevoss, 95 

Mass. App. Ct. 202, 212 (2019) (denial of motion to amend

complaint reviewed for abuse of discretion). As the judge 

found, the plaintiffs did not show how the September 2022 MOA 

alters or changes any preexisting term or condition of 

employment contained in the CBA, and thus "amending the 

complaint would be futile" and would "not survive a motion to 

dismiss for failure to state a claim." Id. On the record 

before us, we cannot say that the judge made "a clear error of 

judgment in weighing the factors relevant to the decision . . . 

such that the decision falls outside the range of reasonable
8

alternatives" (quotation omitted). L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 

Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014).3

Judgment affirmed.

By the Court (Neyman, 

Hershfang & Hodgens, JJ.4),

Clerk

Entered: July 30, 2024.

3 We also note that the present litigation appears to be 

moot. See generally Lynn v. Murrell, 489 Mass. 579, 582-583 

(2022). The plaintiffs respond that the mootness doctrine 

should not apply because the present case is not about the 

coronavirus, but about essential issues of organizational

governance. Although there is some force to the plaintiffs' 

claim, we are not persuaded to alter the result we reach for the 

reasons already discussed herein.

4 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.