In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 99-2608

United States of America,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Tracee L. Taylor, 

Defendant-Appellant,

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Indiana, Hammond Division.

No. 97 CR 167--Rudy Lozano, Judge.

Argued May 9, 2000--Decided August 21, 2000

 Before Manion, Kanne and Rovner, Circuit Judges.

 Kanne, Circuit Judge. Tracee Taylor joined two

confederates in a vicious carjacking during which

the trio trapped a pregnant woman in her car,

shot her in the chest and stole the automobile.

Taylor was convicted of committing a carjacking

in violation of 18 U.S.C. sec. 2119, and aiding

and abetting the use of a weapon in connection

with a violent felony in violation of 18 U.S.C.

sec. 924(c). He appeals on three grounds, all of

which we reject. 

I. History

 During the morning of December 8, 1997, Lakesha

Wade was driving to pick her son up from school

in Gary, Indiana. Wade, who was four months

pregnant, noticed a blue 1995 Mitsubishi Mirage

tailing closely behind her 1986 Pontiac

Parisienne. At first, Wade thought nothing of it,

but she became alarmed when the Mitsubishi

continued to pursue her through a number of

turns. Wade accelerated to escape her pursuer,

but the Mitsubishi raced faster in pace. Wade

panicked, running a red light, almost hitting

another car and driving indecisively all over

Gary while trying to decide where to go. She

eventually raced to her sister’s residence and

skidded to a halt in the front yard. Wade jammed

her car horn, hoping that someone would come to

the door and let her in the house, but no one
answered. Her sister Lasonia Williams was home

but asleep upstairs. Moments later, the

Mitsubishi sped into the driveway and blocked

Wade’s exit. 

 Kevin Wilson leapt out of the Mitsubishi

menacingly wielding a .38-caliber handgun. He

screamed, "Bitch, bitch, get out of the car. Get

out of the car, bitch. I ain’t playing with you,

bitch. Get out of the car or I’ll kill you,

bitch." Wilson ran at Wade, who was still sitting

in her car, and shot her through the car door

window. The bullet tore through Wade’s upper left

arm and struck her left breast. Wilson then

opened the driver-side door, pulled Wade from the

car and sat down in the driver’s seat. Wade ran

to her sister’s door, but Williams, now awake

from the mayhem outside, feared for herself and

refused to open the door. Wilson soon noticed

Williams watching him from inside the house and

fired three or four shots at her as she escaped

upstairs. Wade ran and hid inside a postal truck

parked nearby. 

 Defendant Tracee Taylor remained inside the

Mitsubishi this entire time. The Mitsubishi had

been stolen from Taylor’s neighbor the day

before, and Taylor, Wilson and Patrick Lucas used

it to chase down Wade. At this point, Wilson

could not get Wade’s Pontiac started so he and

Lucas pushed it into the street. Taylor slipped

into the driver’s seat of the Mitsubishi and

drove it down the street pushing the Pontiac

along. After the threesome departed and the

police arrived, Wade was receiving emergency

medical treatment from paramedics when she

noticed the Mitsubishi returning to the scene of

the crime. Aided by Wade’s tip, Gary police

officer Luis Donald soon spotted the Mitsubishi

and chased it until it spun out of a sharp turn

and crashed into a car parked along the curb. The

three men inside the Mitsubishi sprinted off in

different directions, but Donald tackled Wilson

and other police captured Taylor in the vicinity.

A key ring, which Taylor’s sister identified as

belonging to Taylor, was found in the Mitsubishi

and held keys matching the locks to Taylor’s

home. The Federal Bureau of Investigation later

discovered that Wade’s Pontiac, stolen by Taylor,

Wilson and Lucas during the carjacking, was

originally manufactured in Fairfax, Kansas. 

 A federal grand jury promptly issued a twocount indictment charging Taylor with violating

the federal carjacking statute and aiding and

abetting Wilson’s use of a firearm during a crime

of violence. On August 14, 1998, after a four-day

trial, the jury convicted Taylor on both counts

of the indictment. 
II. Analysis

 Taylor raises three claims on appeal: (1)

Taylor challenges the sufficiency of the evidence

to establish that he intended to aid and abet

Wilson’s use of a firearm in violation of 18

U.S.C. sec. 924(c); (2) Taylor argues that the

federal carjacking statute, 18 U.S.C. sec. 2119,

exceeds Congress’s constitutional authority under

the Commerce Clause; (3) Taylor argues the

district court’s omission of a jury instruction

on "serious bodily injury" for his carjacking

conviction was plain error. 

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence for 18 U.S.C.

sec. 924(c)

 The jury found Taylor guilty of violating 18

U.S.C. sec. 924(c) by virtue of his assistance to

Wilson’s use of a firearm during the carjacking,

but Taylor challenges the sufficiency of the

evidence to establish that he knew beforehand of

Wilson’s intent to use a firearm. Typically, we

review the sufficiency of the evidence in the

light most favorable to the government and

reverse only if the record is devoid of evidence

from which the jury could reach a finding of

guilt. See United States v. Johnson-Nix, 54 F.3d

1295, 1302 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v.

Rosalez-Cortez, 19 F.3d 1210, 1215 (7th Cir.

1994). However, our review here requires an even

higher showing from Taylor because he failed to

renew his motion for acquittal at the close of

all evidence or within seven days of the verdict

under Fed. R. Crim. P. 29. See United States v.

Hickok, 77 F.3d 992, 1002 (7th Cir. 1996)

(citations omitted). As a result, "under wellestablished precedent in this circuit, [the

defendant] has waived an appellate challenge to

the sufficiency of the evidence and may obtain a

reversal only if he demonstrates ’a manifest

miscarriage of justice.’" Id. 

 To convict for aiding and abetting under 18

U.S.C. sec. 924(c), the jury must find that the

defendant knowingly and intentionally assisted

the principal’s use of a dangerous weapon in a

violent felony. See United States v. Woods, 148

F.3d 843, 848 (7th Cir. 1998). This requires

finding that (1) the defendant knew, either

before or during the crime, of the principal’s

weapon possession or use; and (2) the defendant

intentionally facilitated that weapon possession

or use once so informed. See id. However,

"[m]erely aiding the underlying crime and knowing

that a gun would be used or carried cannot

support a conviction under 18 U.S.C. sec.

924(c)." Id.; see also United States v.

Bancalari, 110 F.3d 1425, 1430 (9th Cir. 1997);

United States v. Medina, 32 F.3d 40, 45 (2d Cir.

1994). Instead, "the defendant must aid and abet
the use or carrying of the firearm." Woods, 148

F.3d at 848. 

 In this case, the government introduced no

direct evidence showing that Taylor knew in

advance that Wilson would use a firearm to commit

the carjacking. In contrast to the evidence

presented in United States v. Woods, 148 F.3d

843, there was no testimony that Taylor asked

Wilson before the crime whether Wilson had his

gun, then watched Wilson load the gun and bring

it with him. However, a reasonable jury could

infer from the inherently violent character of

carjackings that Taylor either anticipated or

knew that Wilson was going to use a weapon.

Moreover, during the extended pursuit of Wade,

Taylor rode along in the Mitsubishi with Wilson,

who was carrying his handgun this entire time,

and the jury could reasonably infer that Taylor

noticed or learned during the ride that Wilson

possessed a weapon. 

 Even if Taylor did not discover Wilson’s

planned use of the weapon by this point, Taylor

must have so understood once Taylor and his

cohorts had trapped their victim at her sister’s

residence. There, Wilson charged out of Taylor’s

car wildly brandishing his weapon, shot Wade in

the arm and fired three or four shots into the

house. Taylor remained just yards away from

Wilson this entire time and cannot credibly claim

to have missed Wilson’s use of a firearm during

the carjacking. See, e.g., Haugh v. Booker, 210

F.3d 1147, 1151 (10th Cir. 2000) (inferring

knowledge based on the defendant’s presence

during his confederate’s use of a firearm). If

Wilson was physically distant or otherwise

removed from Taylor’s vantage at the time Wilson

brandished and used the firearm, we could not

automatically presume Taylor’s observation and

actual knowledge of weapon use. See United States

v. Spinney, 65 F.3d 231, 239 (1st Cir. 1995);

United States v. Dinkane, 17 F.3d 1192, 1197 (9th

Cir. 1994). Such was not the case here; Taylor

was present on the scene within yards of Wilson

when Wilson shot Wade from close range and

discharged several shots into the residence. 

 At this point, after learning of Wilson’s

firearm use and while the commission of the

carjacking was still ongoing, Taylor continued to

participate in the carjacking and facilitated

Wilson’s escape. Taylor backed the Mitsubishi out

of the front yard and used it to push Wade’s

Pontiac down the road, thus knowingly aiding

Wilson’s escape from a violent felony in which

Wilson used a firearm. Taylor’s acts of

assistance are more than sufficient to meet the

facilitation element, which "once knowledge on

the part of the aider and abettor is established,
. . . does not take much to satisfy." Woods, 148

F.3d at 848 (quoting United States v. Bennett, 75

F.3d 40, 45 (1st Cir. 1996)). Less has met the

requirement of facilitation in the past. For

example, in United States v. Price, 76 F.3d 526,

530 (3d Cir. 1996), the Third Circuit found that

the defendant had knowingly facilitated the use

of a firearm when he continued to collect money

from cash drawers during a bank robbery after the

principal had threatened bank employees with a

gun. See also Bazemore v. United States, 138 F.3d

947, 949-50 (11th Cir. 1998) (finding

facilitation when the defendant drove the

principal to the scene of the crime); United

States v. Morrow, 977 F.2d 222, 231 (6th Cir.

1992) (finding no miscarriage of justice when the

defendant received the protection of his

confederate’s weapon). Taylor likewise continued

to assist Wilson by facilitating Wilson’s escape

after it was clear that Wilson had used a firearm

in the commission of the carjacking. 

 Manifest miscarriage of justice is perhaps the

most demanding standard of appellate review. We

will reverse "’only if the record is devoid of

evidence pointing to guilt, or if the evidence on

a key element of the offense was so tenuous that

a conviction would be shocking.’" United States

v. McKinney, 143 F.3d 325, 330 (7th Cir. 1998)

(quoting United States v. Wright, 63 F.3d 1067,

1072 (11th Cir. 1995)). We cannot say that the

record is devoid of evidence pointing to guilt or

that the evidence is so tenuous that it shocks

the conscience. No manifest miscarriage of

justice resulted from Taylor’s conviction. 

B. 18 U.S.C. sec. 2119 and the Commerce Clause

 Taylor argues that 18 U.S.C. sec. 2119, the

federal carjacking statute under which he was

convicted, exceeds congressional authority under

the Commerce Clause. The Commerce Clause confers

upon Congress the power "[t]o regulate Commerce

with foreign Nations, and among the several

States." U.S. Const. Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 3. From

1937 to 1995, the Supreme Court consistently

upheld federal legislation against claims that

Congress had overstepped its authority under the

Commerce Clause. See Perez v. United States, 402

U.S. 146, 150 (1971); Heart of Atlanta Motel,

Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 256 (1964);

Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128-29 (1942);

United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118 (1941);

National Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin

Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937). However, the

Court ended this fifty-eight-year quiescence with

United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 

 Overturning the Gun-Free School Zones Act of

1990, 18 U.S.C. sec. 922(q)(1)(A), the Lopez
Court identified "three broad categories of

activity that Congress may regulate under its

commerce power": (1) "Congress may regulate the

use of the channels of interstate commerce"; (2)

"Congress is empowered to regulate and protect

the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or

persons or things in interstate commerce, even

though the threat may come only from intrastate

activities"; (3) "Congress’ commerce authority

includes the power to regulate those activities

having substantial relation to interstate

commerce." Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59 (citation

omitted). The statute in Lopez criminalized the

knowing possession of a firearm in a school zone,

but did not contain a jurisdictional element that

linked the criminalized conduct to interstate

commerce or established any substantial

relationship to interstate commerce. 18 U.S.C.

sec. 922(q)(1)(A) (1988 & Supp. V). The Court

struck the statute as unconstitutional because it

"is a criminal statute that by its terms has

nothing to do with ’commerce’ or any sort of

economic enterprise." Id. at 561. 

 More recently, in United States v. Morrison,

___ U.S. ___, 120 S.Ct. 1740, 1759 (2000), the

Supreme Court invalidated sec. 40302 of the

Violence Against Women Act ("VAWA") (codified at

42 U.S.C. sec. 13981). The VAWA created civil

liability for the commission of a gender-based

violent crime, but without any jurisdictional

requirement of a connection to interstate

commerce or commercial activity. 42 U.S.C. sec.

19381(c). The Court explained that in both Lopez

and Morrison "the noneconomic, criminal nature of

the conduct at issue was central to our

decision." Id. at 1750. Furthermore, the Court

pointed out that in neither case was there an

"’express jurisdictional element which might

limit its reach [to those instances that] have an

explicit connection with or effect on interstate

commerce.’" Id. at 1751 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S.

at 562). In both cases, Congress criminalized

activity that was not commercial in nature

without including a jurisdictional element

establishing the necessary connection between the

criminalized activity and interstate commerce. 

 Nine circuits since Lopez have achieved

remarkable unanimity in upholding 18 U.S.C. sec.

2119 under the Commerce Clause. See United States

v. Rivera-Figueroa, 149 F.3d 1, 3-4 (1st Cir.

1998); United States v. Cobb, 144 F.3d 319, 321-

22 (4th Cir. 1998); United States v. Romero, 122

F.3d 1334, 1339 (10th Cir. 1997); United States

v. Hicks, 103 F.3d 837, 848 (9th Cir. 1996);

United States v. McHenry, 97 F.3d 125, 126-29

(6th Cir. 1996); United States v. Coleman, 78

F.3d 154, 157-60 (5th Cir. 1996); United States

v. Hutchinson, 75 F.3d 626, 627 (11th Cir. 1996);
United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569, 576-83 (3d

Cir. 1995); United States v. Robinson, 62 F.3d

234, 236-37 (8th Cir. 1995). These courts have

found the carjacking statute constitutional both

as a regulation justified by the substantial

effect of carjackings on interstate commerce,

see, e.g., Rivera-Figueroa, 149 F.3d at 3;

McHenry, 97 F.3d at 126-27; Bishop, 66 F.3d at

580, and as a regulation of instrumentalities of

interstate commerce. See, e.g., Cobb, 144 F.3d at

322; Bishop, 66 F.3d at 588-90. Without

discussing the latter conclusion, we find the

former argument particularly persuasive. 

 Carjacking bears a substantial relationship to

interstate commerce and poses a threat that

Congress was authorized to address under the

Commerce Clause. Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. sec.

2119 in response to the estimated $8 billion to

$9 billion annual loss to car theft, which

Congress deemed "a very large and lucrative

business" and "the nation’s number one property

crime problem." H. Rep. No. 102-851(I), at 14

(1992) (reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2829,

2830). Congress had a rational basis for

believing that sec. 2119 would help protect the

interstate businesses of automobile manufacturing

and sales by addressing the rising property and

insurance costs resulting directly from car theft

and carjackings. See id.; see also Bishop, 66

F.3d at 578-80. In addition, Congress struck at

the burgeoning interstate trade in stolen

vehicles and parts expropriated through car

thefts and carjackings--activity that is economic

and commercial in nature, albeit criminal as

well. See H.Rep. 102-85(I), at 14-15; see also

United States v. Thomas, 159 F.3d 296, 297-98

(7th Cir. 1998) (treating illegal drug sales as

interstate commerce under the jurisdictional

element of the Hobbs Act). 

 The carjacking statute was "an essential part

of a larger regulation of economic activity . .

. that arise[s] out of or [is] connected with a

commercial transaction which viewed in the

aggregate, substantially affects interstate

commerce." Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561. It was the

lead provision of the Anti Car Theft Act of 1992,

Pub. L. No. 102-519, comprehensive federal

legislation addressing the economic problem of

interstate automobile theft. See Bishop, 66 F.3d

at 580. In addition to attaching federal

sanctions for carjacking, the Anti Car Theft Act

accomplished the following: increased penalties

for importation and exportation of stolen

vehicles and for interstate transportation or

possession of such vehicles; criminalized the

operation of "chop shops" for dismantling stolen

vehicles; provided federal funds for the local

anti-car theft committees, ordered the creation
of a national task force on auto theft and fraud;

developed a national checking system for

detecting automobile title fraud; required

marking of automobile parts to combat the use of

stolen parts; required strict Custom Service

inspections to prevent exportation of stolen

vehicles. Unlike the statutes in Morrison and

Lopez, which targeted noneconomic violence, sec.

2119 is an integral part of a large-scale federal

regulatory effort to protect interstate commerce

and attack illegal commercial activity by

criminalizing the theft of goods involved in

interstate commerce. 

 Reinforcing this conclusion, sec. 2119 contains

a jurisdictional element, applying its reach only

to vehicles that have been "transported, shipped,

or received in interstate or foreign commerce."

As a result of the jurisdictional limitation,

sec. 2119 attaches federal penalties only to

thefts of vehicles that have traveled in the

stream of interstate commerce. Lopez recognized

that congressional inclusion of just such a

jurisdictional element (absent in Lopez itself)

"would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that

the [regulated conduct] in question affects

interstate commerce." Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.

Explaining by contrast, the Court cited former 18

U.S.C. sec. 1202(a) as containing a

jurisdictional component that would protect that

statute from a Commerce Clause challenge. See

Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562. Similarly, in Morrison,

the Court noted that sec. 13981 of the VAWA

"contains no jurisdictional element establishing

that the federal cause of action in pursuance of

Congress’ power to regulate interstate commerce,"

but explained approvingly that the Courts of

Appeals have uniformly upheld a separate section

of the VAWA that contains a limiting

jurisdictional element. Morrison, 120 S.Ct. at

1751-52. 

 To convict under sec. 2119, the jurisdictional

element requires the government to prove that the

stolen vehicle had traveled in interstate

commerce at some time. The government showed that

the stolen Pontiac in this case was manufactured

in Kansas, sold across state lines and eventually

stolen in Indiana. As we explained in United

States v. Bell, 70 F.3d 495, 498 (7th Cir. 1995),

"the mere movement of [the object of regulation],

at some time, across state lines satisfied the

commerce element." Accordingly, we have held that

the inclusion of a jurisdictional element in 18

U.S.C. sec. 922(g)(1), which required that a

weapon must have traveled in interstate commerce

to be subject to the statute, was sufficient

under Lopez to satisfy the Commerce Clause, at

least when coupled with express congressional

findings showing that the regulated activity
substantially affected interstate commerce. See

Bell, 70 F.3d at 498; see also United States v.

Kenney, 91 F.3d 884, 886 (7th Cir. 1996).

Repeatedly since Lopez we have held that a

jurisdictional element ensures sufficient nexus

with interstate commerce to withstand Commerce

Clause challenges. See Gillespie v. City of

Indianapolis, 185 F.3d 693, 704-05 (7th Cir.

1999) (18 U.S.C. sec. 922(g)(9)); United States

v. Wilson, 159 F.3d 280, 285-87 (7th Cir. 1998)

(18 U.S.C. sec. 922(g)(8)); United States v.

Hardy, 120 F.3d 76, 77 (7th Cir. 1997) (18 U.S.C.

sec. 922(u)). The government’s showing that the

stolen Pontiac had traveled in interstate

commerce established the necessary nexus to

interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause. 

C. Jury Instruction Omission for Serious

Bodily Injury

 Count One of Taylor’s indictment alleges that

he violated subsection two of 18 U.S.C. sec.

2119, which reads in full:

Whoever, possessing a firearm as defined in

section 921 of this title, takes a motor vehicle

that has been transported, shipped, or received

in interstate or foreign commerce from the person

or presence of another by force and violence or

by intimidation, or attempts to do so, shall

(1) be fined under this title or imprisoned not

more than 15 years, or both,

(2) if serious bodily injury (as defined in

section 1365 of this title) results, be fined

under this title or imprisoned not more than 25

years, or both, and 

(3) if death results, be fined under this title,

or imprisoned for any numbers of years up to

life, or both.

 In Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 251

(1999), the Supreme Court held that 18 U.S.C.

sec. 2119(1)-(3) comprises "three separate

offenses by the specification of distinct

elements, each of which must be charged by

indictment, proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and

submitted to a jury for its verdict." Jones, 526

U.S. at 252. The Court explained further that

"serious bodily injury," as it appears in sec.

2119(2), represents an essential element, rather

than a sentencing enhancement, of the independent

offense defined by sec. 2119(2). See id. Taylor’s

indictment charged him under sec. 2119(2) as

required, but Taylor’s trial preceded Jones.

Without contemporaneous objection from Taylor,

the district court did not instruct the jury that

"serious bodily injury" is an element of the

carjacking offense. In light of Jones, however,
Taylor and the government now agree that the

district court erred by omitting a jury

instruction on serious bodily injury. 

 Taylor argues that the absence of an

instruction on serious bodily injury requires

reversal on appeal. Seeking to avoid the burden

of showing prejudice, Taylor claims that the

omission of a jury instruction on an essential

element of the charged offense is reversible per

se, regardless of prejudice. Yet we are

instructed otherwise by Neder v. United States,

527 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1999), and Johnson v. United

States, 520 U.S. 461, 466 (1997), both of which

hold that omission of an offense element is not

structural error that fundamentally infects the

trial process and necessitates automatic

reversal. See also California v. Roy, 519 U.S. 2,

5 (1996). Taylor’s failure to object at trial to

the incomplete jury instruction resulted in

forfeiture of his claim on appeal, and we again

review only for plain error. See United States v.

Benitez, 92 F.3d 528, 533 (7th Cir. 1996). Under

this standard, we affirm unless the error was not

only clear in retrospect but also caused a

miscarriage of justice, seriously affecting the

fairness, integrity or public reputation of the

proceeding. See United States v. Hughes, 213 F.3d

323, 328-29 (7th Cir. 2000).

 "Serious bodily injury" is defined by the four

categories described in 18 U.S.C. sec.

1365(g)(3): "[a] bodily injury which involves (A)

a substantial risk of death; (B) extreme physical

pain; (C) protracted and obvious disfigurement;

or (D) protracted loss and impairment of a bodily

member, organ, or mental faculty." No prejudice,

and thus no plain error, occurred if the jury

would have found beyond a reasonable doubt that

Taylor’s victim suffered a bodily injury which

fits within any of these four categories. See

Neder, 527 U.S. at 8-9. In United States v.

Johnson-Dix, we interpreted the same terms at

issue here--"serious bodily injury" and "extreme

physical pain"--although in the sentencing

context under a different standard of review.

Johnson-Dix, 54 F.3d at 1312. Despite the absence

of trial testimony that the victim’s pain was

"extreme," we found the victim’s gunshot

injuries, which featured a fractured leg and

entry and exit wounds, constituted "serious

bodily injury" under U.S.S.G. sec. 2B3.2(b)(4)(B)

because the injuries inflicted "extreme physical

pain." Johnson-Dix, 54 F.3d at 1312. Although the

government presented little direct evidence on

the pain suffered by Taylor’s victim, Lakesha

Wade, it is clear here from the circumstances

that the jury would have found that she suffered

a bodily injury that involved "extreme physical

pain" under 18 U.S.C. sec. 1365(g)(3)(B). 
 Gunshot wounds, produced by a .38-caliber

bullet, fired at close range, that rips through

the victim’s arm and penetrates her breast,

constitute a serious bodily injury that produces

extreme physical pain. Here, the jury knew in

detail the tight proximity of Wilson to Wade when

he shot her, understood that the .38-caliber

bullet shattered Wade’s driver-side window and

tore through her arm into her chest and heard

that Wade was treated by paramedics and taken to

the hospital for treatment. In addition, the

government introduced into evidence color

photographs displaying Wade’s gunshot wounds just

hours after the carjacking. After asking Wade

about these pictures, the government asked

apologetically, "I know it sounds like a silly

question, but did you experience pain from this?"

She answered succinctly in the affirmative and

explained that her arm and breast were swollen

and "bruised up real bad." Wade did not testify

directly that she was in "extreme" pain in those

words (nor was she asked), but "[j]uries may use

common sense to evaluate the evidence and make

reasonable inferences from it." United States v.

Cunningham, 54 F.3d 295, 299 (7th Cir. 1995). A

rational jury would have found beyond a

reasonable doubt that the gunshot wounds of

Taylor’s victim constituted a serious bodily

injury that inflicted extreme physical pain. We

find that the omission of a jury instruction on

the issue was harmless under the circumstances.

III. Conclusion

 For the foregoing reasons, we Affirm Taylor’s

convictions.