* District Judge of the Western District of Louisiana, sitting by designation.

* * Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be

published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule

47.5.4. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-11144

CONNECTICUT GENERAL LIFE

INSURANCE COMPANY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

ANTON WERMELINGER, Individually,

on Behalf of the Estate of Raul Quevedo,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

For the Northern District of Texas

(3:95-CV-1910-D)

April 7, 1997

Before POLITZ, Chief Judge, DeMOSS, Circuit Judge, and DOHERTY, * District Judge.

PER CURIAM: **

Connecticut

General Life Insurance Company appeals the district court’s

dismissal of its interpleader or declaratory judgment action for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction. For the reasons assigned we reverse and render.2 BACKGROUND

Raul Quevedo purchased a group life insurance policy through his employer. He

originally designated “Anton Wermelinger” as the beneficiary. The designation was

later changed to “Anton Wermelinger-Trustee.” Quevedo died in 1995. Wermelinger

was the executor of Quevedo’s estate and sole beneficiary of his will. Quevedo was

unmarried and had no children. His parents survive him, and they assigned any claims

they have to Wermelinger.

When Quevedo died, Connecticut General became obligated to pay $110,000

in life insurance benefits and $740 in a cash value account to Wermelinger. In response

to a question on the claim form asking in what capacity he was making the claim,

Wermelinger wrote, “Beneficiary--No Trust Agreement Exists.”

Connecticut General invoked Fed.R.Civ.P. 22 and filed an inte rpleader action

as well as a claim for declaratory relief with respect to the $110,740, alleging that

Quevedo’s b eneficiary designation was susceptible to two interpretations: (1) that

Quevedo used the word “trustee” descriptively and wa s naming Wermelinger as

beneficiary in his individual capacity; or alternatively, (2) that Quevedo created a trust

for the life insurance proceeds and named Wermelinger trustee. Connecticut General

contends that it would be exposed to double or multiple liability by paying

Wermelin ger individually if in fact Quevedo created a trust, and the beneficiaries,

deprived of the benefits of the proceeds, might bring an action against it.3

The district court gave Connecticut General 60 days to conduct discovery to

determine whether a trust existed. Extensive discovery produced no evidence

whatsoever that Quevedo created a trust other than the bald designation of “trustee”

next to Wermelinger’s name. Quevedo’s parents, Wermelinger, Quevedo’s bank, the

attorney who drafted Quevedo’s will, and the accountant who prepared Quevedo’s

taxes all denied any knowledge of a trust. This was reported to the district court which

entered judgment dismissing the interpleader a ction without prejudice for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction, finding that complete diversity was lacking because

although Connecticut General is a citizen of Connecticut and Wermelinger is a citizen

of Texas, there were potential trust beneficiaries whose citizenship was unknown. The

district court also declined to rule on Connecticut General’s claim for a declaratory

judgment. Connecticut General timely appealed.

ANALYSIS

We conclude that the district court erred in finding diversity jurisdiction lacking.

The complaint names only Wermelinger and not the unknown beneficiaries, should any

exist. There is the requisite diversity of citizenship between Connecticut General and

Wermelinger.

On close examination we must conclude that the Rule 22 interpleader procedure

is not available herein. That procedure is appropriate where the plaintiff is or may be

exposed to double or multiple liability. We are mindful that claims1 Corrigan Dispatch Co. v. Casa Guzman, S.A. , 696 F.2d 359 (5th Cir. 1983).

4 for interpleader are to be construed liberally and at the initial stage the threat of

multiple and vexatious litigation is sufficient to ground the claim. 1 In the case at bar,

however, the likelihood of future litigation and multiple liability is so remote and

speculative that we must conclude that interpleader is not appropriate.

That decision does not terminate our consideration of this matter for, motivated

by a keen concern for the concept of judicial economies , we perforce conclude that

dismissing the action is inappropriate. Connecticut General has requested declaratory

relief. We deem same appropriate and prudent, given our noted concern for judicial

economies, and concl ude and hold that under the very specific and limited

circumstanc es of this case, Connecticut General is obligated to pay the proceeds to

Wermelinger and should do so forthwith.

F or the foregoing reasons we REVERSE and RENDER judgment directing

Connecticut General Life Insurance Company to pay the policy proceeds forthwith to

Anton Wermelinger. We direct the clerk of court of the Northern District of Texas to

promptly return the funds deposited by Connecticut General Life Insurance Company

in the aforementioned interpleader action. This opinion is to issue as mandate.