Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-MI-2259 | September 23, 2019 Page 1 of 15

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Jason M. Smith

Smith Law Services, P.C.

Seymour, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Debra A. Mastrian

Suzannah W. Overholt

Elizabeth S. Traylor

SmithAmundsen LLC

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Mathew R. DuSablon,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

Jackson County Bank,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

September 23, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-MI-2259

Appeal from the Jackson Superior 

Court

The Honorable Bruce A. 

MacTavish, Special Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

36D01-1802-MI-15

Najam, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-MI-2259 | September 23, 2019 Page 2 of 15

Statement of the Case

[1] In two notices of appeal filed with our Court,1 Mathew R. DuSablon stated that 

he was appealing the trial court’s entry of a preliminary injunction, the court’s 

subsequent conversion of that preliminary injunction into a permanent 

injunction, an order in which the trial court found DuSablon to be in contempt, 

a September 2018 sanctions order, and an October 2018 sanctions order.

DuSablon asserted that Indiana Appellate Rules 14(A)(1) and 14(A)(5) 

provided that he may appeal each of those various interlocutory orders as a 

matter of right. DuSablon’s counter-claims against plaintiff Jackson County 

Bank (the “Bank”) remain pending in the trial court.

[2] DuSablon purports to raise two issues for our review. However, we conclude 

that DuSablon has not secured appellate jurisdiction. There is no final 

judgment, as his counter-claims remain pending in the trial court. The 

preliminary injunction, which may have supported interlocutory review as of 

right under Appellate Rule 14(A)(5), no longer exists. And neither permanent 

injunctions nor contempt findings, without more, are bases for appellate review 

under Appellate Rule 14(A).

[3] This leaves the two sanctions orders. The October 2018 sanctions order 

superseded the September 2018 sanctions order, and we agree with DuSablon 

that the October order is appealable as of right under Appellate Rule 14(A)(1)

1

 We later consolidated the two appeals.
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as an order for the payment of money. However, DuSablon raises no actual

argument on appeal regarding the payment of money under that order, to say 

nothing of an argument supported by cogent reasoning and citations to the 

record. Accordingly, there is nothing for this Court to review. We therefore

dismiss this appeal.2

Facts and Procedural History3

[4] On February 28, 2018, the Bank filed its complaint against DuSablon on the 

ground that he was in violation of a noncompete agreement with the Bank. 

The Bank sought a preliminary and permanent injunction. DuSablon moved to 

dismiss the Bank’s complaint, which the trial court denied, and filed counterclaims against the Bank.

[5] In August, after a fact-finding hearing on the Bank’s request for a preliminary 

injunction, the trial court found as follows:

2

 After the Bank filed its complaint against DuSablon for his alleged violation of a noncompete agreement, 

DuSablon responded as follows: he refused to comply with the Bank’s discovery requests, for which the trial 

court sanctioned him; he refused to comply with the court’s entry of a preliminary injunction, for which the 

court found him to be in contempt; he attempted to delay the proceedings in the trial court by improperly 

removing the case to federal court, for which the federal district court sanctioned him; and he now attempts 

to appeal several interlocutory orders that are not appealable as a matter of right, dedicating his arguments on 

appeal to the merits of orders that are not properly before us. 

Moreover, while we respect vigorous advocacy, we must agree with the Bank that much of DuSablon’s lead

brief on appeal and reply brief are riddled with impertinent attacks on opposing counsel and the trial court. 

We have disregarded such language in our consideration of this appeal. See, e.g., WorldCom Network Servs., 

Inc. v. Thompson, 698 N.E.2d 1233, 1236-37 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998), trans. denied. We also direct the Clerk of 

this Court to send a copy of this opinion and the parties’ briefs to the Indiana Supreme Court Disciplinary 

Commission, which has exclusive jurisdiction to discipline an attorney, where appropriate, for violations of 

the Rules of Professional Conduct.

3

 We agree with the Bank that the Statement of Facts in DuSablon’s brief is not in accordance with the 

standard of review appropriate to any of the orders DuSablon purports to appeal, and we disregard his 

Statement of Facts accordingly. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(6)(b).
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1. [The Bank] is an Indiana state chartered bank that 

provides consumer banking services to customers as well as 

investment services . . . .

2. In September 2007, [the Bank] hired DuSablon as an 

Investment Representative to provide investment services to [the 

Bank’s] customers.

3. On September 12, 2007, DuSablon executed the 

Agreement, which includes provisions barring DuSablon from 

disclosing confidential [Bank] information, requiring the return 

of [Bank] property upon his termination, barring competition for 

a reasonable period of time within a reasonable geographic area 

after termination, and prohibiting him from soliciting and 

diverting employees, certain customers, and prospective 

customers of [the Bank].

4. Specifically, the Agreement provides that:

DuSablon covenants and agrees not to enter the 

employment of, or perform any advisory or consulting 

service for, or make a substantial investment in, any 

branch, office or satellite of a financial services business, 

investment services business, or a financial 

institution . . . which branch, office or satellite is located in 

any county in which [the Bank] has a branch or office for a 

period of twelve (12) months from the date of termination 

of employment with [the Bank], irrespective of who 

terminated the employment or why it was terminated.

(Agreement, Section 1.)

5. The Agreement further provides that:
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DuSablon agrees that he will not directly or indirectly at 

any time during the Business Protection Period solicit or 

induce or attempt to solicit or induce any employee of [the 

Bank] to terminate his or her employment, representation 

or other association with [the Bank].

(Agreement, Section 2(b).[)] The Agreement defines “Business 

Protection Period” as the time DuSablon was employed by [the 

Bank] and for a period of twelve (12) months after such 

employment ends. (Agreement, Section 2(a).)

6. [The Bank] has offices in the following counties (the 

“Restricted Area”): Jackson, Lawrence, Jennings, Monroe and 

Bartholomew.

7. DuSablon’s responsibilities as an employee of [the Bank] 

included pursuing new business on [the Bank’s] behalf, 

developing investment relationships with current and prospective 

customers of [the Bank], and selling insurance and financial 

products for [the Bank’s] benefit.

8. To accomplish these tasks, DuSablon relied upon direct 

marketing and referrals from [the Bank], [the Bank’s] employees, 

and [the Bank’s] branches.

9. DuSablon was also responsible for compliance 

requirements in accordance with [the Bank’s] procedures, as well 

as the requirements of [the Bank’s] broker-dealer, INVEST 

Financial Corporation (“INVEST”), for which he also served as 

[a] registered representative.

10. DuSablon executed the purchase and sales of securities 

through INVEST for [the Bank’s] customers.
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11. In late July 2017, DuSablon approached [the Bank’s] Chief 

Wealth Management Officer, George Spray, and told Spray that 

he heard a rumor that INVEST was being sold to LPL Financial 

(“LPL”). [The Bank] subsequently considered alternative brokerdealers, and [it] ultimately decided to contract with Raymond 

James. [The Bank’s] change from INVEST/LPL to Raymond 

James became effective on or about January 16, 2018.

12. On January 8, 2018, just days before the change to 

Raymond James was to occur, DuSablon resigned and 

voluntarily terminated his employment with [the Bank].

13. Almost immediately after resigning from [the Bank], 

DuSablon became a registered representative of LPL[] and 

created a new business entity, New Legacy Wealth Management, 

to offer the same investment and other financial services and 

advice that he performed while employed by [the Bank].

14. DuSablon also opened an office which is located just two 

blocks from [the Bank’s] main branch in Seymour and provides 

his services from that office.

15. As of July 9, 2018, the day DuSablon was deposed in this 

case, every single customer of his at New Legacy Wealth 

Management was a former [Bank] investment services customer 

that he served while employed by [the Bank].

16. DuSablon’s assistant at [the Bank], Erin Goodpaster, 

resigned the very day after DuSablon resigned.

17. Goodpaster admitted under oath . . . that while she and 

DuSablon were still employed by [the Bank] DuSablon discussed 

with her the possibility of her joining him in his new venture after 

he left [the Bank].
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Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 16-19. The court then concluded in part as follows:

13. . . . [D]espite DuSablon’s contention . . . that he was an 

employee of INVEST, not [the Bank], DuSablon received W-2 

statements from [the Bank], and the Agreement specifically states 

that DuSablon was hire[d] as an employee of [the Bank]. (E.g., 

Agreement, Recitals B-D.) Whether or not DuSablon might also 

have been an employee of INVEST or some other entity while he 

was employed by [the Bank] is not relevant . . . .

14. DuSablon has violated the Agreement by opening his new 

business just blocks away from [the Bank] and by soliciting 

Goodpaster to leave [the Bank] and join him. . . .

Id. at 21.

[6] In September, about two weeks after the court’s entry of the preliminary 

injunction, the court entered an “Order on Sanctions and Attorney Fees” (the 

“September Fees Order”). According to the September Fees Order:

[The Bank] served discovery to [DuSablon] and non-parties 

including . . . Goodpaster and [DuSablon’s] new employer. The 

Court granted [the Bank’s] Motion to Expedite this discovery. 

The Court reviewed [the Bank’s] discovery [requests, which 

were] limited in scope, focused[,] and relevant to the issues in this 

case.

[DuSablon’s] responses to [the Bank’s] discovery [requests] were 

to object to all of the [requests] and to not produce a single 

document. Discovery under the Indiana Trial Rules is supposed 

to be open[,] liberal[,] and self-executing. The Court granted [the 

Bank’s] Motion to Compel . . . on June 20, 2018.
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[DuSablon] has engaged in an ongoing pattern to evade 

responding to relevant discovery requests. [DuSablon] 

responded to no requests. He then removed this case to the 

Federal Court the day before the Motion to Compel hearing. 

Judge Sarah Evans Barker found the removal improper and 

untimely. This Court should not penalize Du[S]ablon for the 

removal as he was sanctioned with fees in Federal Court. This 

Court should consider the timing of the removal in examining 

Du[S]ablon’s conduct. Evidence at the Preliminary Injunction 

eviden[tiary] hearing showed Du[S]ablon also encouraged a nonparty[,] LPL Financial LLC[,] he currently has a relationship 

with to not respond to the legitimate non-party discovery 

[requests].

[DuSablon] has engaged in a pattern of obfuscation and delay 

that violates the spirit, letter[,] and requirements [of] the Indiana 

Trial Rules . . . relating to discovery.

The Court finds that [DuSablon’s] conduct does not justify[] 

striking any of his claims or defenses. [DuSablon’s] conduct 

clearly justifies the granting of . . . attorney fees. [The Bank’s] 

counsel is given seven (7) days to file an Affidavit setting forth

the [Bank’s] attorney’s fees relating to the Motion to Compel and 

Opposition to [DuSablon’s ensuing request for a] Protective 

Order. If [DuSablon] wishes to contest the amount of attorney 

fees he can file a Request for Hearing . . . . If [DuSablon] does 

not contest the attorney fees he should pay them within thirty 

(30) days of the filing of [the Bank’s] counsel’s affidavit.

Id. at 24-25 (citations omitted).

[7] On September 19, DuSablon filed his first notice of appeal in our Court. In that 

notice, DuSablon stated that he was appealing the trial court’s entry of the 

preliminary injunction as a matter of right pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 
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14(A)(5). He further stated that he was appealing the September Fees Order as 

an order for the payment of money under Appellate Rule 14(A)(1).

[8] However, DuSablon did not request the trial court to stay its proceedings

pending the appeal, and in October the trial court converted the preliminary 

injunction into a permanent injunction, which DuSablon did not contest. In 

doing so, the court adopted its findings and conclusions on the preliminary 

injunction.

4

 The court directed that the permanent injunction “shall run until 

one year from the date of the preliminary injunction on August 20, 2018.” Id.

at 26. In that same order, the court found DuSablon to be in contempt for 

having “violated the preliminary injunction” by continuing to “conduct[] a 

competing investment business in Seymour”; for “work[ing] for the investment 

clients he had while employed at [the Bank]”; and for “provid[ing] investment 

services to these clients.” Id. The court’s order (hereinafter the “Permanent 

Injunction and Contempt Order”) stated that “[s]anctions for violation of the 

preliminary injunction are deferred for further hearing.” Id. at 27.5

[9] Also in October, the court revisited the September Fees Order, stating as 

follows:

4

 After the trial court had converted the preliminary injunction into a permanent injunction, DuSablon filed 

an “Emergency Motion to Stay Enforcement and Effect of Preliminary and Permanent Injunction” in our 

Court, which we denied. Order at 1, DuSablon v. Jackson Cty. Bank, No. 18A-MI-2259 (Ind. Ct. App. Jan. 22, 

2019).

5

 In November, the trial court entered separate orders for the permanent injunction and the finding of 

contempt, but those two orders are substantively identical to their respective portions of the original 

Permanent Injunction and Contempt Order.
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On September 4, 2018, the Court issued an order on discovery 

sanctions. The order provided that counsel for [the Bank] was to 

submit an affidavit of attorney fees within ten days of the order. 

An affidavit of attorney fees was submitted . . . . The Court’s 

order gave [DuSablon] thirty days . . . to contest the fees. 

[DuSablon] has not filed an objection to contest the fees, and the 

Court hereby orders that judgment be entered in favor of [the 

Bank] and against [DuSablon] in the amount of $5,734.00.

Id. at 28 (the “October Fees Order”). The court’s award of $5,734 to the Bank 

was promptly recorded in the court’s record of judgments and orders. See

Appellee’s App. Vol. 2 at 13.

[10] DuSablon then filed a second notice of appeal. In that notice, he stated that he 

was appealing, as a matter of right, the court’s interlocutory Permanent 

Injunction and Contempt Order and October Fees Order. We consolidated 

DuSablon’s two interlocutory appeals, and the trial court stayed further 

proceedings pending this appeal.

Discussion and Decision

[11] On appeal, DuSablon raises two issues for our review. First, he challenges the 

trial court’s denial of his motion to dismiss and entry of injunctive relief for the 

Bank. Second, he asserts that the trial court violated his federal due process 

rights for various reasons, rendering “all orders entered against DuSablon” 

invalid. Appellant’s Br. at 23.

[12] “It is the duty of this Court to determine whether we have jurisdiction before 

proceeding to determine the rights of the parties on the merits.” Allstate Ins. Co. 
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v. Scroghan, 801 N.E.2d 191, 193 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. 

“Jurisdiction is a question of law we review de novo.” Ind. Newspapers, Inc. v. 

Miller, 980 N.E.2d 852, 857 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), aff’d on reh’g, 980 N.E.2d 863 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. This Court’s typical jurisdiction is over final 

judgments from our trial courts. Ind. Appellate Rule 5(A). There is no final 

judgment here, however, as DuSablon’s counter-claims remain pending in the 

trial court. See App. R. 2(H)(1).

[13] Nonetheless, this Court “shall have jurisdiction over appeals of interlocutory 

orders” pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 14. App. R. 5(B). As we have 

explained: 

An appeal from an interlocutory order is not allowed unless 

specifically authorized by the Indiana Constitution, statutes, or 

the rules of court. The authorization is to be strictly construed, and 

any attempt to perfect an appeal without such authorization warrants a 

dismissal.

* * *

. . . There are three ways that this Court has jurisdiction over 

interlocutory orders under Rule 14: (1) Rule 14(A) allows 

interlocutory appeals as of right; (2) Rule 14(B) permits 

discretionary appeals “if the trial court certifies its order and the 

Court of Appeals accepts jurisdiction over the appeal”; and (3) 

Rule 14(C) authorizes other interlocutory appeals only as 

provided by statute.

Allstate Ins. Co., 801 N.E.2d at 193 (emphasis added; citations omitted). There 

is no dispute that Appellate Rules 14(B) and 14(C) are not at issue here.
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[14] Instead, DuSablon asserts that Appellate Rules 14(A)(1) and 14(A)(5) secure 

our jurisdiction. Appellate Rule 14(A) states:

Appeals from the following interlocutory orders are taken as a 

matter of right by filing a Notice of Appeal with the Clerk within 

thirty (30) days after the notation of the interlocutory order in the 

Chronological Case Summary:

(1) For the payment of money;

* * *

(5) Granting or refusing to grant . . . a preliminary 

injunction . . . .

[15] We first consider DuSablon’s attempt to appeal the preliminary injunction. 

Appellate Rule 14(A)(5) expressly permits such appeals as a matter of right. 

However, a preliminary injunction no longer exists in this case. Rather, 

DuSablon did not seek to have the trial court stay its entry of the preliminary 

injunction after DuSablon filed his first notice of appeal, and the trial court 

subsequently converted the preliminary injunction into a permanent injunction. 

Appellate Rule 14(A)(5) does not speak to permanent injunctions. Cf. Witt v. 

Jay Petroleum, Inc., 964 N.E.2d 198, 203 (Ind. 2012) (stating that Appellate Rule 

14(A)(5) does not apply to temporary restraining orders). Thus, there is no 

preliminary injunction for DuSablon to appeal under Appellate Rule 14(A)(5).

[16] We next consider DuSablon’s attempt to appeal the Permanent Injunction and 

Contempt Order. Again, the permanent-injunction component of that order
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does not render the order appealable as a matter of right. App. R. 14(A)(5). 

And Appellate Rule 14(A) does not permit appeals as of right from contempt 

findings in and of themselves. See id. Further, the Permanent Injunction and 

Contempt Order, which deferred “[s]anctions for violation of the preliminary 

injunction . . . for further hearing,” is not an order for the payment of money. 

Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 27; see Rowe v. Ind. Dep’t of Corr., 940 N.E.2d 1218, 

1219-20 (Ind. Ct. App 2011), trans. denied. Thus, this interlocutory order is not 

properly before us.

[17] This leaves DuSablon’s attempt to appeal the October Fees Order, which 

superseded the September Fees Order. We agree with DuSablon that the 

October Fees Order, which ordered him to pay a specific sum of money by a 

date certain6 and was recorded in the trial court’s record of judgments and 

orders, is appealable as of right as an order for the payment of money under 

Appellate Rule 14(A)(1). However, DuSablon does not actually challenge the 

October Fees Order on appeal. Rather, he argues only that the entirety of the

proceedings before the trial court were so infused with the trial judge’s bias for 

the Bank that “all orders entered against DuSablon” are invalid as a matter of 

law. Appellant’s Br. at 23.

[18] Our scope of review in interlocutory appeals is limited to the interlocutory order 

on appeal. As our Supreme Court has said, “an interlocutory appeal raises 

6

 The September Fees Order directed DuSablon to pay the attorney’s fees within thirty days of the 

submission of the Bank’s attorney’s fees affidavit, and the October Fees Order did not alter that timeframe.
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every issue presented by the order that is the subject of the appeal.” Tom-Wat, 

Inc. v. Fink, 741 N.E.2d 343, 346 (Ind. 2001) (emphasis added). Such appeals 

are not vehicles through which one may attack the trial court proceedings as a 

whole and without regard to the order on appeal. See id. Indeed, the purpose of 

Appellate Rule 14(A)(1) in particular “is to provide a remedy to parties 

compelled to part with money which is tied up awaiting litigation.” Bessette v. 

Turflinger (In re Paternity of S.R.W.), 100 N.E.3d 285, 289 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). 

“It seems to us to defeat the purpose of allowing such interlocutory appeals if 

the party does not actually raise an issue regarding the payment of money” on 

appeal. Id.

[19] DuSablon does not actually raise any issues regarding the payment of money 

compelled by the October Fees Order. He instead asserts—with virtually no 

citations to the record in support of his assertions—that the trial judge acted 

with such bias and partiality in favor of the Bank that no order from the court, 

including the October Fees Order, can stand. But it is clear from the whole of 

DuSablon’s argument that, insofar as there is a discernable order he is 

challenging, it is not the October Fees Order but the trial court’s denial of his 

motion for change of venue and the court’s various discovery orders, which are 

not appealable as a matter of right. See App. R. 14(A). Only in a sentence on 

page 48 of his brief on appeal does DuSablon add that, “on the same grounds,”

the October Fees Order is invalid. Appellant’s Br. at 48. Such a passing 

reference is not an argument supported by cogent reasoning. See App. R. 

46(A)(8)(a); Morris v. BioSafe Eng’g, Inc., 9 N.E.3d 195, 199 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 
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2014), trans. denied. In other words, we conclude that, while the October Fees 

Order provided a basis for appellate jurisdiction under Appellate Rule 14(A)(1), 

DuSablon does not actually, specifically, or cogently challenge that order, and, 

thus, there is nothing “presented by the order” for us to review. Tom-Wat, Inc., 

741 N.E.2d at 346.

[20] In sum, DuSablon’s purported appeal of the preliminary injunction order, the 

Permanent Injunction and Contempt Order, or any other order except the 

October Fees Order is not properly before us. And while the October Fees 

Order is appealable as a matter of right, DuSablon raises no actual argument on 

appeal regarding the payment of money under that order. Accordingly, there is 

nothing for this Court to review, and we dismiss this appeal.

[21] Dismissed.

Bailey, J., and May, J., concur.