This opinion is subject to revision before publication

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ARMED FORCES

_______________

UNITED STATES

Appellee

v.

Matthew D. NORWOOD,

Machinist’s Mate Nuclear First Class Petty Officer

United States Navy, Appellant

No. 20-0006

Crim. App. No. 201800038

Argued October 27, 2020—Decided February 24, 2021

Military Judge: Shane E. Johnson

For Appellant: Lieutenant Commander Chris Riedel, JAGC, 

USN (argued); Captain Nicholas S. Mote, USMC.

For Appellee: Major Kerry E. Friedewald, USMC (argued); 

Lieutenant Commander Timothy C. Ceder, JAGC, USN, 

Lieutenant Colonel Nicholas L. Gannon, USMC, and Brian

K. Keller, Esq. (on brief).

Chief Judge STUCKY delivered the opinion of the Court, 

in which Judge MAGGS and Senior Judge EFFRON

joined. Judge OHLSON filed a separate opinion 

concurring in the result. Judge SPARKS filed a separate 

opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part and in 

the result.

_______________

Chief Judge STUCKY delivered the opinion of the Court.

Appellant claims that the military judge erred during his 

court-martial by admitting the majority of the videotaped forensic interview of the alleged victim as a prior consistent 

statement under Military Rule of Evidence (M.R.E.)

801(d)(1)(B)(ii) and mishandling supposed improper argument by the trial counsel. The United States Navy-Marine 

Corps Court of Criminal Appeals (CCA) found that some errors did occur, but that they nevertheless did not materially 

prejudice Appellant’s substantial rights. We hold that while 

the interview was properly admitted as a prior consistent 

statement, the improper argument prejudiced Appellant as to 

sentencing, and reverse. 
United States v. Norwood, No. 20-0006/NA

Opinion of the Court

2

I. Procedural History

Appellant was investigated and prosecuted for sexually 

abusing his niece, EN. The panel of officers that sat as a general court-martial convicted Appellant, contrary to his plea, 

of one specification of sexual abuse of a child, in violation of 

Article 120b, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 

U.S.C. § 920b (2012). The panel then sentenced Appellant to 

a dishonorable discharge, confinement for eighteen months, 

and reduction to the grade of E-1. The convening authority 

approved the adjudged sentence. On appeal, the CCA affirmed the findings with exceptions and affirmed the sentence. United States v. Norwood, 79 M.J. 644, 661–62, 666–67 

(N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2019).1

II. Prior Consistent Statement

A. Facts

The first issue is whether the military judge erred by admitting the substantive portions of EN’s videotaped forensic 

interview as a prior consistent statement under M.R.E. 

801(d)(1)(B)(ii) such that Appellant was prejudiced. 

As the primary source of the Government’s evidence 

during the court-martial, EN testified about the events as 

follows.

In late December 2015, EN and her brother, RJ, stayed 

with Appellant for a brief visit. At the time, EN was fifteen 

years old and RJ was twelve. One night, Appellant and EN 

watched a movie on the couch in the living room, while RJ 

played a video game on Appellant’s computer in the bedroom. 

During the movie, Appellant asked EN if she wanted a massage. When EN replied yes, Appellant said, “ ‘I don’t want you 

 

1 Although not relevant to the granted issues, we note that the 

lower court excepted certain words from the specification. 79 M.J. 

at 661. Appellant was charged and convicted of sexually abusing 

EN by touching her “breast, buttocks, groin, and inner thigh.” The 

CCA, however, found that Appellant’s conviction was legally and 

factually sufficient only as to Appellant’s “touching EN’s breast, 

buttocks, and thigh,” and therefore excepted the words “groin” and 

“inner” from the specification. Id. Nevertheless, the court decided 

that those exceptions did not “change . . . the penalty landscape” 

and therefore affirmed the sentence as adjudged. Id. at 662.
United States v. Norwood, No. 20-0006/NA

Opinion of the Court

3

to get mad at me, but I need you to take your bra off.’ ” EN did 

so and Appellant proceeded with the massage. Initially, he 

simply massaged her back, but then he began to touch her 

around her stomach, breast, and pubic areas. Even though 

EN became tense and pushed his hand away, he continued 

touching her and moved her so that she was sitting on him 

such that she could feel his erect penis. Then, he asked her 

“how far [she] had been with someone and if there was a boy 

back [home].” When she said that she had only kissed one boy 

in fourth grade, he responded that “ ‘that didn’t count’ ” and 

pushed her off of him. EN then left the room, eventually returning to watch another movie with Appellant and RJ. The 

next day, Appellant apologized to EN, saying “ ‘I’m sorry for 

being an asshole the other night.’ ”

EN believed that Appellant had “touched [her] inappropriately” and “for sexual purposes.” Consequently, she tried to 

avoid Appellant as much as possible for the rest of the trip 

and felt that the remainder of the visit was “really awkward.” 

When she returned home, she had trouble sleeping, spending 

time with her friends, and being physically close to anyone, 

especially boys in her class. Still, she did not tell anyone what 

had happened, because she thought that she was at fault and 

feared that Appellant would hurt her if she told. Additionally, 

she wanted her parents to know and help her, but did not tell 

them because she worried about disappointing them. However, a few weeks later, she talked about the incident with her 

best friend. The friend told her father, who informed EN’s 

stepfather. Appellant subsequently was charged with sexually abusing EN.

After EN’s direct testimony at the court-martial, the 

defense sought to undermine her credibility through 

cross-examination. In particular, the defense asked EN about 

how she had not spoken with the defense before the 

court-martial, her mother had not wanted her to talk to the 

defense, and she had met with the prosecution a number of 

times before the court-martial. Following up about the 

meetings with the prosecution, the defense asked if the 

prosecution had told her to “ ‘[j]ust tell the truth’ ” and 

whether she had “had to practice to tell the truth” before. On 

redirect, the Government sought to rehabilitate EN’s 

credibility by introducing her videotaped forensic interview 
United States v. Norwood, No. 20-0006/NA

Opinion of the Court

4

as a prior consistent statement. The defense objected, arguing 

that the interview was inadmissible hearsay. The military 

judge then called an Article 39(a), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 839(a)

session to develop the record regarding the issue. After 

hearing arguments by both the Government and defense, the 

military judge agreed with the Government’s assertion that 

the defense had attacked EN’s credibility by suggesting that 

the prosecution had coached her testimony and that EN’s 

statements from the interview were consistent with those 

that she made during her court-martial testimony. As a 

result, the military judge found that the interview, with the 

exception of the introductory rapport building discussion, was 

admissible as a prior consistent statement under M.R.E. 

801(d)(1)(B)(ii). The Government then played that interview 

for the members.

On appeal, the CCA analyzed whether the interview was 

admissible as a prior consistent statement. Norwood, 79 M.J. 

at 654–57. The lower court agreed with the military judge 

that the Government was permitted to introduce EN’s interview as a prior consistent statement because the defense had 

implied that the trial counsel had coached EN’s testimony 

and the statements from the interview were consistent with 

the statements from the testimony. Id. at 656. However, the 

court then found that the alleged coaching was a charge of 

recent fabrication or recent improper influence, rather than 

that of an attack on another ground, meaning the military 

judge should have admitted the interview under M.R.E. 

801(d)(1)(B)(i) instead of M.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B)(ii). Id. But because the interview was still admissible, just pursuant to a 

different provision, it found that the military judge’s error did 

not prejudice Appellant. Id.

B. Law

We review a military judge’s decision to admit evidence for 

an abuse of discretion. United States v. Finch, 79 M.J. 389, 

394 (C.A.A.F. 2020) (quoting United States v. Frost, 79 M.J. 

104, 109 (C.A.A.F. 2019)). The military judge’s decision constitutes an abuse of discretion if “his findings of fact are 

clearly erroneous, the court’s decision is influenced by an erroneous view of the law, or [his decision] is outside the range 

of choices reasonably arising from the applicable facts and the 
United States v. Norwood, No. 20-0006/NA

Opinion of the Court

5

law.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted). If the military judge did improperly admit evidence, we 

evaluate whether the error prejudiced the appellant, weighing “(1) the strength of the Government’s case, (2) the 

strength of the defense case, (3) the materiality of the evidence in question, and (4) the quality of the evidence in question.” United States v. Kohlbek, 78 M.J. 326, 334 (C.A.A.F. 

2019) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United 

States v. Norman, 74 M.J. 144, 150 (C.A.A.F. 2015)).

Hearsay statements—out of court statements offered into 

evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted—usually 

are inadmissible in courts-martial. M.R.E. 801(c); M.R.E. 802. 

However, a prior consistent statement made out of court may 

not constitute hearsay, and thus can be admitted as substantive evidence, if certain threshold requirements are first met: 

(1) the declarant of the statement testifies at the court-martial, (2) the declarant is subject to cross-examination, and (3) 

the statement is consistent with the declarant’s testimony. 

Finch, 79 M.J. at 394–95 (citing M.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B)). The 

first prong of M.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B) requires the prior consistent 

statement to be offered “ ‘to rebut an express or implied 

charge that the declarant recently fabricated it or acted from 

a recent improper influence or motive in so testifying.’ ” Id. at 

394 (quoting M.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B)(i)). Under the second prong 

of the rule, the statement must be offered “ ‘to rehabilitate the 

declarant’s credibility as a witness when attacked on another 

ground.’ ” Id. (quoting M.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B)(ii)). The party that 

attempts to admit the prior consistent statement into evidence bears the burden of proving that it is admissible. Id.

C. Analysis

The Government argues that it met the requirements laid 

out in M.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B) and Finch such that the substantive part of the interview was admissible as a prior consistent 

statement. See also Finch, 79 M.J. at 394–95 (citing M.R.E. 

801(d)(1)(B)). Appellant concedes that EN testified and was 

subject to cross-examination at the court-martial, the interview was offered to rehabilitate EN’s credibility because the 

defense attacked it, and the interview was consistent with 

EN’s statement at least in part. Nevertheless, Appellant continues to object to the admission of the interview on two pri-
United States v. Norwood, No. 20-0006/NA

Opinion of the Court

6

mary bases. We agree with the Government and find Appellant’s arguments opposing the admission of the interview unpersuasive. 

First, Appellant contends that both the military judge and 

the CCA erred regarding the defense’s attack of EN’s credibility: according to Appellant, the accusation was not that the 

prosecution had coached her to provide incriminating testimony against Appellant, but instead that she had made up 

the allegations from the beginning. However, the military 

judge found as a fact that the ground on which the defense 

attacked EN’s credibility was that her testimony as a witness 

was coached by the Government. The military judge’s finding 

of fact is not clearly erroneous. Defense counsel asked EN 

“[h]ow many times” she spoke with the prosecutors and 

whether they told her to “ ‘[j]ust tell the truth.’ ” They also 

questioned EN about whether she “ever before had to practice 

to tell the truth or is this like the first time?” Finally, they 

inquired as to whether EN only remembered an event when 

she was “practicing [her] testimony.” Based on these statements, the military judge could infer that defense counsel was 

relying on the “suggestive force of questions . . . to carry the 

message” that EN’s testimony was coached by the Government. 4 Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence § 8:39, at 341 (4th ed. 2013). Consequently, even 

if Appellant is correct that the defense also tried to undermine 

EN’s credibility by contending that she had fabricated the allegations herself, the military judge’s decision—to admit the

interview as a response to the argument that she was 

coached—was within the range of choices reasonably arising 

from the facts and law. See United States v. Campo Flores, 

945 F.3d 687, 705–06 (2d Cir. 2019). 

The framing of the attack also leads to the issue of the 

prong of M.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B) under which the interview could 

be admitted. The CCA determined that the military judge 

erred when he concluded the interview was admissible under 

M.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B)(ii) because the impeachment constituted 

an attack on another ground, when he should have determined that the interview was admissible under M.R.E. 

801(d)(1)(B)(i) because the attack amounted to a charge of a 

recent fabrication or recent improper influence. Norwood, 79 

M.J. at 656. Even if it were true that the military judge erred, 
United States v. Norwood, No. 20-0006/NA

Opinion of the Court

7

there could not be prejudice when the interview still was admissible. See United States v. Bess, 80 M.J. 1, 12 (C.A.A.F. 

2020) (explaining that we affirm a military judge’s ruling 

when “ ‘the military judge reached the correct result, albeit 

for the wrong reason’ ” (quoting United States v. Robinson, 58 

M.J. 429, 433 (C.A.A.F. 2003))). 

Second, Appellant complains that the majority of the interview was irrelevant to the Government’s goal of rehabilitating EN as a witness and inconsistent with EN’s testimony,

rendering the interview inadmissible. Neither of these arguments is persuasive. As explained above, the Government offered the interview into evidence as a prior consistent statement in order to rebut the defense’s attack that the 

Government had coached EN’s testimony. The coaching claim 

was an attack on EN’s entire testimony at trial regarding the 

alleged sexual assault, not to specific portions of her testimony. As a result, the entire substantive portion of EN’s forensic interview, containing her full version of the events and 

given before she met with the Government (and thus prior to 

the point that any coaching would be possible), was admissible as a prior consistent account of the sexual assault. Additionally, the only inconsistencies that Appellant points to are 

two details from EN’s testimony she did not mention during 

the interview: that Appellant apologized to her for the incident and the rest of the trip was awkward. The prior statement “ ‘need not be identical in every detail to the declarant’s 

. . . testimony at trial’ ” for it to be “ ‘consistent’ ” under M.R.E. 

801(d)(1)(B). Finch, 79 M.J. at 395 (alteration in original) 

(quoting United States v. Vest, 842 F.2d 1319, 1329 (1st Cir. 

1988)). Accordingly, these two small additions do not change 

the fact that the interview was “ ‘for the most part consistent’ 

and in particular, . . . ‘consistent with respect to . . . fact[s] of 

central importance to the trial.’ ” Id. (alterations in original) 

(quoting Vest, 842 F.2d at 1329). Therefore, the interview was 

admissible as a prior consistent statement. 

III. Improper Argument

A. Facts

The second issue is whether the trial counsel committed 

prosecutorial misconduct during the court-martial by making 

improper arguments that prejudiced Appellant. 
United States v. Norwood, No. 20-0006/NA

Opinion of the Court

8

The trial counsel and assistant trial counsel, Lieutenant 

C.B. and Lieutenant Commander B.K., made numerous arguments that were, at best, impassioned. 

During the court-martial, Lieutenant C.B. and Lieutenant 

Commander B.K. seemed to personally vouch for EN’s credibility in both the opening and closing arguments by referring 

to her as an “innocent” child who had no reason to lie, claiming that she was telling the truth, and asserting that her family believed her. The defense objected to the comments about 

EN’s family, and while the military judge overruled the objection, he did issue a curative instruction explaining that it was 

up to the members to evaluate the witnesses’ credibility and 

testimony. Later, in the rebuttal closing argument, Lieutenant Commander B.K. repeatedly called Appellant a “child molester,” going so far as to assert that “by saying that there are 

reasonable doubts in this case, defense is asking you to give 

child molesters a license to commit these crimes, because if 

you can’t find [Appellant] guilty . . . the only way . . . a child 

molester could ever be convicted [is] if he is literally caught in 

the act.” The defense did not object to those remarks and the 

military judge took no action. 

Finally, Lieutenant C.B. continued this style of argument 

in the sentencing proceedings. During the Government’s sentencing argument, she asserted that the defense would request a lenient sentence and, clearly opposing that notion, 

asked the members to consider what would happen “when you 

all return to your normal duties . . . . [A]nd someone asks you 

. . . . ‘Wow, what did [Appellant] get for that?’ Do you really 

want your answer to be ‘nothing at all’?” Again, the defense 

did not object to this language and the military judge did not 

act upon it sua sponte.

Appellant raised numerous improper argument claims on 

appeal, but the CCA rejected most of them. Norwood, 79 M.J. 

at 662–67. However, the lower court did agree with Appellant

that Lieutenant Commander B.K. made improper sentencing 

arguments by accusing the defense of requesting that the 

members give child molesters a “license” to commit this kind 

of crime and claiming that EN’s family only declined to cooperate with the defense because they believed EN was telling 

the truth. Id. at 663–64. While the court said these arguments 

were improper and the military judge should have sustained 
United States v. Norwood, No. 20-0006/NA

Opinion of the Court

9

Appellant’s objection to the latter and given a stronger curative instruction, it nonetheless concluded that the misconduct 

was “isolated and brief,” the military judge’s instruction that 

the members were to determine the witnesses’ credibility 

themselves was at least somewhat curative, and the errors 

did not prejudice Appellant. Id. at 663–65. 

B. Law

A prosecutor proffers an improper argument amounting to 

prosecutorial misconduct when the argument “ ‘overstep[s]

the bounds of that propriety and fairness which should characterize the conduct of such an officer in the prosecution of a 

criminal offense.’ ” United States v. Fletcher, 62 M.J. 175, 178 

(C.A.A.F. 2005) (alteration in original) (quoting Berger v. 

United States, 295 U.S. 78, 84 (1935)). 

When the accused objects to an improper argument during 

his court-martial, we review the issue de novo. United States 

v. Voorhees, 79 M.J. 5, 9 (C.A.A.F. 2019). In that de novo review, we determine whether any error materially prejudiced 

the appellant’s substantial rights under Article 59, UCMJ, 10 

U.S.C. § 859; Fletcher, 62 M.J. at 179. “We weigh three factors 

to determine whether trial counsel’s improper arguments 

were prejudicial: (1) the severity of the misconduct, (2) the 

measures adopted to cure the misconduct, and (3) the weight 

of the evidence supporting the conviction.” Voorhees, 79 M.J.

at 12 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted). 

When a trial counsel makes an improper argument during 

findings, “reversal is warranted only when the trial counsel’s 

comments taken as a whole were so damaging that we cannot 

be confident that the members convicted the appellant on the 

basis of the evidence alone.” United States v. Andrews, 77 

M.J. 393, 401–02 (C.A.A.F. 2018) (internal quotation marks 

omitted) (citation omitted).

On the other hand, if the accused failed to object on this 

basis during the court-martial, we review the matter for plain 

error. Id. at 398. To prove plain error resulted from the trial 

counsel’s improper argument during the sentencing proceeding, Appellant has the burden of establishing “(1) there was 

error; (2) it was plain or obvious; and (3) the error materially

prejudiced a substantial right.” United States v. Marsh, 70
United States v. Norwood, No. 20-0006/NA

Opinion of the Court

10

M.J. 101, 104 (C.A.A.F. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted).

In this context, material prejudice to the substantial rights of the accused occurs when an error 

creates “an unfair prejudicial impact on the [court 

members’] deliberations.” [United States v.] Knapp, 

73 M.J. [33,] 37 [C.A.A.F. 2014] ([first] alteration in 

original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted). In other words, the appellant “must 

show a reasonable probability that, but for the error, 

the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.” Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 

1338, 1343, 194 L. Ed. 2d 444 (2016) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted).

United States v. Lopez, 76 M.J. 151, 154 (C.A.A.F. 2017).

C. Analysis

As an initial matter, two of the alleged improper arguments clearly do not merit relief. First, we reject Appellant’s 

claim that trial counsel personally attacked him by referring 

to him as a “child molester.” A child molester is “[s]omeone 

who interferes with, pesters, or persecutes a child in a sexual 

way, esp. when touching is involved.” Black’s Law Dictionary

302 (11th ed. 2019) (entry for “child molester”). Given that 

Appellant was prosecuted for and convicted of a sexual offense 

against a child, we agree with the Government that this language actually was a permissible characterization supported 

by the charge and the evidence. See, e.g., Voorhees, 79 M.J. at 

11 (noting that a trial counsel’s “word choice” can be improper 

argument when it is a “personal attack on the defendant” but 

not when it is a “commentary on the evidence” (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted)); see also United 

States v. Bentley, 561 F.3d 803, 811 (8th Cir. 2009) (deciding 

that when there was “strong” evidence that the appellant had 

“committed sexual offenses against young girls,” then “[t]he 

government’s description of [the appellant] as a sexual predator was not plain error”). Second, it is true that the military 

judge erred in overruling defense counsel’s objection to the 

one supposedly improper argument to which Appellant objected during the court-martial: that EN’s family believed 

that she was telling the truth about this matter. But while 

this claim was irrelevant and inappropriate, it did not 
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Opinion of the Court

11

amount to severe misconduct, particularly because no one 

would expect her family not to believe her and it only made 

up a few lines of rebuttal argument. Cf. Voorhees, 79 M.J. at 

12 (noting that “trial counsel’s improper argument was severe” when “[t]he misconduct was sustained throughout argument and rebuttal, occurring with alarming frequency”). 

Also, the defense immediately objected to the argument and, 

although the military judge overruled the objection, he issued 

a curative instruction explaining that the members alone are 

to judge witnesses’ credibility. “ ‘We presume, absent contrary 

indications, that the panel followed the military judge’s instructions . . . .’ ” United States v. Short, 77 M.J. 148, 151 

(C.A.A.F. 2018) (quoting United States v. Sewell, 76 M.J. 14, 

19 (C.A.A.F. 2017)). Accordingly, Appellant was not prejudiced by these arguments.

Although Appellant did not object to the other improper 

arguments when the trial counsel made them, those arguments were more problematic. 

Lieutenant C.B. and Lieutenant B.K. clearly committed 

misconduct during findings by repeatedly vouching for EN, a 

method of argument that we have explicitly prohibited. Voorhees, 79 M.J. at 11–12; Fletcher, 62 M.J. at 180. Trial counsel 

“are military officers and should conduct themselves accordingly,” a standard that these trial counsel failed to meet under our precedent regarding improper argument. Voorhees, 79 

M.J. at 14. However, while those improper arguments constituted obvious error, there was no material prejudice to Appellant during findings. EN testified credibly that Appellant sexually abused her and, despite strenuous efforts to undermine 

her credibility, the defense failed to offer a plausible reason 

as to why EN would have fabricated these allegations. Therefore, Appellant cannot show a reasonable probability that he 

would not have been convicted in the absence of these improper arguments. See Molina-Martinez, 136 S. Ct. at 143.

Instead, the prejudice arises from the sentencing proceeding. In the sentencing argument, Lieutenant C.B. pressured 

the members to consider how their fellow servicemembers 

would judge them and the sentence they adjudged instead of 

the evidence at hand. This Court has repeatedly held that “a 

court-martial must reach a decision based only on the facts in 

evidence.” Fletcher, 62 M.J. at 183 (citing United States v. 
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Opinion of the Court

12

Bouie, 9 C.M.A. 228, 233, 26 C.M.R. 8, 13 (1958)). Arguing an 

inflammatory hypothetical scenario with no basis in evidence 

amounts to improper argument that we have repeatedly, and 

quite recently, condemned. See Voorhees, 79 M.J. at 14–15. 

Furthermore, neither the defense counsel nor the military 

judge took action to address the issue themselves. The defense counsel could have done more to meet their “duty to 

the[ir] client[s] to object to improper arguments early and often,” as could have the military judge to fulfill his “sua sponte

duty to [e]nsure that an accused receives a fair trial” but because they did not, there was a total lack of curative measures 

to redress this misconduct. Id. at 14–15 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted).

2

In addition to meeting the first two prongs of the plain error test by showing that the improper argument amounted to 

error that was plain or obvious, Appellant also has met his 

burden to show a reasonable probability that there would 

have been a different outcome to the sentencing proceeding 

had this improper argument not occurred. See Marsh, 70 M.J.

at 107. As our predecessor court said, “[t]rial counsel may 

properly ask for a severe sentence, but [they] cannot threaten 

the court members with the specter of contempt or ostracism 

if they reject [their] request.” United States v. Wood, 40 

C.M.R. 3, 9 (C.M.A. 1969). Lieutenant C.B. demanded the 

members impose a sentence of a dishonorable discharge, confinement for four years, and reduction to E-1, while Appellant’s counsel implored the members to limit the sentence to 

confinement for one year. Under the circumstances, we conclude that Appellant established that the trial counsel’s egregious attempt to pressure the members resulted in a reasonable probability that the sentence adjudged was greater than 

it would have been otherwise. Because “we cannot be confident that [Appellant] was sentenced on the basis of the evidence alone,” Lieutenant C.B.’s improper sentencing argument caused material prejudice to Appellant such that he is 

 

2 We do note, however, that Appellant raised an ineffective assistance of counsel claim before the CCA based on the defense counsel’s failure to object to the improper argument, but the court decided that relief was not warrented because it had determined that 

the “arguments were either not improper, or if they were, they were 

not prejudicial to [Appellant].” Norwood, 79 M.J. at 666.
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Opinion of the Court

13

entitled to relief. Marsh, 70 M.J. at 107 (internal quotation 

marks omitted) (citation omitted).

Judgment

The decision of the United States Navy-Marine Corps 

Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed as to findings, but is 

reversed as to the sentence. The sentence is set aside and the 

record is returned to the Judge Advocate General of the Navy. 

A sentencing rehearing is authorized. 
United States v. Norwood, No. 20-0006

Judge OHLSON, concurring in the result.

I write separately in order to discuss certain important aspects of this case as they relate to the provisions of Military 

Rule of Evidence (M.R.E.) 801(d)(1)(B), and to sound a note of 

caution to the field about the applicability of this decision to 

future cases.

To begin with, I believe the majority is remiss in not 

squarely acknowledging that the military judge was wrong in 

applying the provisions of M.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B)(ii) to a key 

facet of this case. Specifically, the military judge ruled that 

because defense counsel had implied that the victim’s in-court 

testimony was the product of improper prosecutorial coaching, M.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B)(ii) applied to the question of whether 

a videotape of the victim’s prior statement to forensic investigators was admissible at trial. As demonstrated below, the 

military judge was clearly mistaken about the applicability of 

this particular provision, and the majority should affirmatively concede this point.

M.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B)(i) provides, in pertinent part, that a 

prior statement is not hearsay if it is consistent with the witness’s in-court testimony and is offered “to rebut an express 

or implied charge that the declarant recently fabricated it or 

acted from a recent improper influence.” (Emphasis added).

On the other hand, M.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B)(ii), which was the subpart cited by the military judge, provides that a prior statement is not hearsay if it is consistent with the witness’s incourt testimony and is offered to rehabilitate the declarant’s 

credibility as a witness “when attacked on another ground.”

(Emphasis added).

Here, the military judge concluded that the defense counsel had implied that the victim’s in-court testimony was the 

product of improper prosecutorial coaching but then stated 

that prosecutorial coaching is an attack on another “ground.”

However, as we emphasized in United States v. Finch, the reference in M.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B)(ii) to “another ground” means a 

ground other than a ground listed in M.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B)(i). 

79 M.J. 389, 395–96 (C.A.A.F. 2020). A charge of prosecutorial 

coaching falls under the grounds listed in M.R.E. 
United States v. Norwood, No. 20-0006/NA

Judge OHLSON, concurring in the result

2

801(d)(1)(B)(i). Thus, the proper basis for analyzing the admissibility of the victim’s videotaped statement was M.R.E. 

801(d)(1)(B)(i) rather than M.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B)(ii). 

This is not an inconsequential point. As the United States 

Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals (CCA) astutely observed in this case:

 This distinction is important because rebutting a 

challenge of recent fabrication [under M.R.E. 

801(d)(1)(B)(i)] logically permits a more expansive 

use of prior statements to show that nothing substantial has changed in the declarant’s testimony. 

On the other hand, rehabilitating the credibility of 

the declarant [under M.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B)(ii)] may require something more precisely related to explaining 

or rebutting the specific manner of the attack on the 

witness’[s] credibility. 

United States v. Norwood, 79 M.J. 644, 655 (N-M. Ct. Crim. 

App. 2019) (citations omitted).

Next, I diverge from the majority’s apparent viewpoint 

that the military judge’s admission of the entire substantive 

portion of the interview—rather than discrete sections of that 

interview—was an appropriate default position. Specifically, 

I believe it is a close question whether the military judge 

abused his discretion in deciding that, in the course of questioning the victim, the defense counsel had flung open the 

door so wide that the Government could walk through it with 

the entire substantive portion of the victim’s videotaped 

statement. My concerns are as follows.

Consistent with our recent unanimous decision in Finch, 

when ruling on an M.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B) issue such as this one,

a military judge may admit at trial only those portions of a 

prior statement that are consistent with a witness’s in-court 

testimony and that are relevant to the express purpose of rebutting the allegation of a recent improper influence. Finch, 

79 M.J. at 396. Thus, if just a segment of a prior statement 

can adequately rebut an allegation that a witness was affected by a recent improper influence, then only that segment 

may be admitted at trial. 
United States v. Norwood, No. 20-0006/NA

Judge OHLSON, concurring in the result

3

In those instances where a defense counsel alludes to a 

purported inconsistency between a witness’s in-court testimony and a prior statement, the task of identifying the admissible portion or portions of that prior statement is relatively easy. If a witness said “x” at trial, the military judge 

should admit only those portions of the prior statement where 

the witness similarly said “x” in the prior statement.1 However, where, as here, a defense counsel alludes to a purported 

omission (i.e., the witness said “x” during in-court testimony 

but did not mention “x” in the prior statement), the situation 

is far more tricky. Simply stated, there is no specific “x” to be 

found in the proverbial haystack that would directly rebut the 

defense allegation that this omission was reflective of a recent 

improper influence. Therefore, in such a scenario it is incumbent upon this Court to grant a military judge considerable 

leeway in deciding just how much of the witness’s prior consistent statement needs to be admitted to demonstrate to the 

panel members that the omission was the product of, say, a 

simple oversight on the part of the witness or the failure of an 

interviewer to ask the witness a question that was reasonably 

likely to elicit a relevant response. For these reasons, the military judge did not abuse his discretion in deciding to admit 

the entire substantive portion of the victim’s prior statement—although it is near the tipping point. However, I am 

not as confident as the majority appears to be that the military judge handled this issue in an exemplary manner for the 

following four reasons.

First, the record suggests that the military judge did not

adequately consider whether the videotaped segment played 

for the panel members could have been significantly pared 

back while still achieving the Government’s legitimate goal of 

rebutting the defense counsel’s contention that there had 

been improper prosecutorial coaching. Specifically, in addressing the victim’s omission from her videotaped statement 

 

1 For this reason, to the extent the Government argues that the 

prior videotaped statement was also admissible under the provisions of M.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B)(ii), because defense counsel additionally sought to impeach the victim based on a few alleged inconsistencies in her in-court testimony, this approach does not justify the 

military judge’s decision to admit the entire substantive portion of 

the video.
United States v. Norwood, No. 20-0006/NA

Judge OHLSON, concurring in the result

4

that after the sexual abuse incident the rest of her vacation 

stay with Appellant was “awkward,” I believe the military 

judge erred by failing to admit at trial only those portions of 

the victim’s prior statement that dealt with the victim and 

Appellant’s interactions after the sexual abuse—and not the 

sexual abuse itself. However, I hesitantly conclude that this 

misstep did not rise to the level of an abuse of discretion.

Second, military judges must place the burden on the moving party—here, the Government—both to identify the consistent portions of the prior statement and to demonstrate the 

relevancy of those portions to the stated aim of rebutting the 

aspersions cast on a witness’s credibility. Finch, 79 M.J. at

396. Here, by admitting the entire substantive portion of the 

videotape without adequately putting the prosecution 

through these required steps the military judge allowed into 

evidence some inconsistent statements made by the victim 

and some other statements that were not directly relevant to 

rebutting the specific omissions raised by the defense counsel.

Third, the majority minimizes the harmful effect of admitting the entire substantive portion of the victim’s videotaped 

statement by noting that the inconsistent portions represented merely “two small additions” to the victim’s testimony.

Respectfully, this misses an important point. As the Drafters’ 

Analysis of M.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B) makes clear, beyond preventing the introduction of evidence that was not adduced at trial,

a fundamental evil to be avoided in situations such as this one 

is the “impermissible bolstering” of the witness. Manual for 

Courts-Martial, United States, Analysis of the Military Rules 

of Evidence app. 22 at A22-61 (2016 ed.); Finch, 79 M.J. at 

396. In the minds of triers of fact, repetition can be confused 

with reliability. Therefore, the very act of admitting the entire 

substantive portion of the videotape carried the risk of prejudicing Appellant, and that is precisely why the strictures on 

hearsay, and the hurdles imposed by M.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B),

must be strictly observed. 

Fourth and finally, on redirect examination the trial counsel in this case had the following exchange with the victim:

Q: . . . I just want to follow up on some of defense 

counsel’s questions. Defense counsel asked you a lot 

of questions about meeting with us. What is the one 
United States v. Norwood, No. 20-0006/NA

Judge OHLSON, concurring in the result

5

thing, the only thing, that we told you you [sic] absolutely had to say in this courtroom?

A: To tell the truth.

Q: Defense counsel also said that you didn’t— he implied that you hadn’t told the forensic interviewer 

about the rest of the trip in Hawaii and how it was 

awkward. That’s correct isn’t it?

A: Yes.

Q: Isn’t it also true that the forensic interviewer 

didn’t ask you what the rest of the trip was like?

A: Yes.

In my view, the military judge should have more fully considered whether this exchange between the trial counsel and 

the victim—standing alone—was sufficient to rebut the defense counsel’s allegation that the witness’s in-court testimony was the product of improper prosecutorial coaching. Indeed, I believe this point should have been factored into the 

military judge’s M.R.E. 403 balancing test in deciding

whether the probative value of introducing the entire prior 

consistent statement was substantially outweighed by the 

risk of creating unfair prejudice (through repetition of the allegations), causing undue delay, wasting time, and presenting 

cumulative evidence.

For these reasons, unlike the majority I believe that the 

issue presented in this case is a very close question. Even 

though we now hold that the military judge’s decision to admit the entire substantive portion of the videotaped statement did not rise to the level of an abuse of discretion, I do 

not believe this case should be seen as an exemplar of how 

military judges should approach these types of issues in the 

future. Generally speaking, a military judge’s decision to admit a prior consistent statement in its entirety is fraught with 

peril. See Finch, 79 M.J. at 398. Indeed, such a step may result in prejudice to an accused of such a magnitude that it 

merits reversal of a conviction. Therefore, in regard to Issue 

I, although I ultimately agree with the majority that the military judge did not abuse his discretion in admitting the entire 

substantive portion of the videotape, I believe it is prudent to 

sound a note of caution to the field about the applicability of 

this decision to future cases with different facts. 
United States v. Norwood, No. 20-0006/NA

Judge OHLSON, concurring in the result

6

In regard to Issue II, I agree with the majority that Appellant’s sentence should be set aside with a sentence rehearing 

authorized. 
United States v. Norwood, No. 20-0006/NA

Judge SPARKS, concurring in part and dissenting in 

part and in the result.

I concur with the majority’s conclusion that the recorded 

interview was properly admissible as a prior consistent 

statement under Military Rule of Evidence (M.R.E.) 

801(d)(1)(B)(i). However, I cannot join the majority’s 

resolution of the improper argument on sentencing. In my 

view, Appellant has not carried his burden under the plain 

error standard to show that, based on trial counsel’s 

argument regarding what the members’ coworkers might 

think, a reasonable probability exists that the sentence 

adjudged was greater than it would have been otherwise. 

The majority relies solely upon the sentences requested by 

the parties as evidence of prejudice. The Government argued 

for a sentence of four years of confinement, reduction to the 

grade of E-1, and a dishonorable discharge while the defense 

argued for no more than one year of confinement and no 

punitive discharge. However, this rationale ignores the 

sentence that the members actually adjudged. Appellant was 

sentenced to eighteen months of confinement, a reduction to 

the grade of E-1, and a dishonorable discharge. The term of 

adjudged confinement is closer to what the defense requested 

than what the Government requested of the members. 

Further, it is unrealistic, under the facts and 

circumstances of this case, to conclude that Appellant would 

not have been adjudged a dishonorable discharge. The fifteenyear-old victim testified on the merits and gave an in-person 

unsworn statement at sentencing. During the Government’s 

case on the merits, the members heard, and apparently found 

credible, the victim’s detailed description of Appellant’s 

conduct against her. On sentencing, the victim described how 

Appellant’s offense against her had left her severely 

emotionally and mentally affected.

Finally, we should take into account that defense counsel 

did not object to the trial counsel’s sentencing argument. 

Defense counsel in this case was best situated to determine 

which parts of trial counsel’s argument were worth objecting 

to and which were not. The majority has already pointed out 

that earlier in the court-martial defense counsel seemed 

skilled enough to recognize when and on what basis an 
United States v. Norwood, No. 20-0006/NA

Judge SPARKS, dissenting

2

objection should be lodged. In the absence of an 

ineffectiveness claim before this Court, defense counsel’s 

failure to object here raises the possibility that, from defense 

counsel’s perspective, trial counsel’s inappropriate comments 

may have had less of an effect on the members than the 

majority believes. 

 My concern is that concluding under plain error that there 

was prejudice in a case such as this one suggests this Court’s 

lack of confidence in the skills and abilities of military defense 

lawyers to try their own cases. I certainly agree with the 

majority that trial counsel’s statements were otherwise plain 

and obvious error. I also agree with the majority’s admonition 

to defense counsel and military judges generally. However, I 

am simply not convinced that Appellant met his burden to 

show material prejudice to his substantial rights. It might 

have been a different matter had counsel objected and been 

overruled without a curative instruction to the members. 

Since that is not the case here, I must respectfully dissent.