(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2016 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

MIDLAND FUNDING, LLC v. JOHNSON 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 

THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 

No. 16–348. Argued January 17, 2017—Decided May 15, 2017 

Petitioner Midland Funding filed a proof of claim in respondent Johnson’s Chapter 13 bankruptcy case, asserting that Johnson owed Midland credit-card debt and noting that the last time any charge appeared on Johnson’s account was more than 10 years ago. The 

relevant statute of limitations under Alabama law is six years. Johnson objected to the claim, and the Bankruptcy Court disallowed it.

Johnson then sued Midland, claiming that its filing a proof of claim

on an obviously time-barred debt was “false,” “deceptive,” “misleading,” “unconscionable,” and “unfair” within the meaning of the Fair 

Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U. S. C. §§1692e, 1692f. The District Court held that the Act did not apply and dismissed the suit.

The Eleventh Circuit reversed. 

Held: The filing of a proof of claim that is obviously time barred is not a

false, deceptive, misleading, unfair, or unconscionable debt collection

practice within the meaning of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. 

Pp. 2–10.

(a) Midland’s proof of claim was not “false, deceptive, or misleading.” The Bankruptcy Code defines the term “claim” as a “right to

payment,” 11 U. S. C. §101(5)(A), and state law usually determines

whether a person has such a right, see Travelers Casualty & Surety 

Co. of America v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 549 U. S. 443, 450–451. 

The relevant Alabama law provides that a creditor has the right to 

payment of a debt even after the limitations period has expired. 

Johnson argues that the word “claim” means “enforceable claim.”

But the word “enforceable” does not appear in the Code’s definition, 

and Johnson’s interpretation is difficult to square with Congress’s intent “to adopt the broadest available definition of ‘claim,’ ” Johnson v. 

Home State Bank, 501 U. S. 78, 83. Other Code provisions are still 
 

2 MIDLAND FUNDING, LLC v. JOHNSON 

Syllabus 

more difficult to square with Johnson’s interpretation. For example, 

§502(b)(1) says that if a “claim” is “unenforceable” it will be disallowed, not that it is not a “claim.” Other provisions make clear that

the running of a limitations period constitutes an affirmative defense

that a debtor is to assert after the creditor makes a “claim.” §§502, 

558. The law has long treated unenforceability of a claim (due to the

expiration of the limitations period) as an affirmative defense, and 

there is nothing misleading or deceptive in the filing of a proof of 

claim that follows the Code’s similar system. 

Indeed, to determine whether a statement is misleading normally 

“requires consideration of the legal sophistication of its audience,” 

Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U. S. 350, 383, n. 37, which in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy includes a trustee who is likely to understand that

a proof of claim is a statement by the creditor that he or she has a

right to payment that is subject to disallowance, including disallowance based on untimeliness. Pp. 2–5.

(b) Several circumstances, taken together, lead to the conclusion 

that Midland’s proof of claim was not “unfair” or “unconscionable” 

within the terms of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. 

Johnson points out that several lower courts have found or indicated that, in the context of an ordinary civil action to collect a debt, a 

debt collector’s assertion of a claim known to be time barred is “unfair.” But those courts rested their conclusions upon their concern 

that a consumer might unwittingly repay a time-barred debt. Such 

considerations have significantly diminished force in a Chapter 13

bankruptcy, where the consumer initiates the proceeding, see §§301,

303(a); where a knowledgeable trustee is available, see §1302(a);

where procedural rules more directly guide the evaluation of claims,

see Fed. Rule Bkrtcy. Proc. 3001(c)(3)(A); and where the claims resolution process is “generally a more streamlined and less unnerving

prospect for a debtor than facing a collection lawsuit,” In re Gatewood, 533 B. R. 905, 909. 

Also unpersuasive is Johnson’s argument that there is no legitimate reason for allowing a practice like this one that risks harm to 

the debtor. The bankruptcy system treats untimeliness as an affirmative defense and normally gives the trustee the burden of investigating claims to see if one is stale. And, at least on occasion, the assertion of even a stale claim can benefit the debtor. 

More importantly, a change in the simple affirmative-defense approach, carving out an exception, would require defining the exception’s boundaries. Does it apply only where a claim’s staleness appears on the face of the proof of claim? Does it apply to other 

affirmative defenses or only to the running of the limitations period? 

Neither the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act nor the Bankruptcy 
 

 

 

Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 3 

Syllabus 

Code indicates that Congress intended an ordinary civil court applying the Act to determine answers to such bankruptcy-related questions. The Act and the Code have different purposes and structural

features. The Act seeks to help consumers by preventing consumer 

bankruptcies in the first place, while the Code creates and maintains

the “delicate balance of a debtor’s protections and obligations,” Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U. S. 642, 651. Applying the Act in this context would upset that “delicate balance.” 

Contrary to the argument of the United States, the promulgation of

Bankruptcy Rule 9011 did not resolve this issue. Pp. 5–10. 

823 F. 3d 1334, reversed. 

BREYER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, 

C. J., and KENNEDY, THOMAS, and ALITO, JJ., joined. SOTOMAYOR, J., 

filed a dissenting opinion, in which GINSBURG and KAGAN, JJ., joined. 

GORSUCH, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. 
 

 

_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 1 

Opinion of the Court 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 16–348 

MIDLAND FUNDING, LLC, PETITIONER v.
 

ALEIDA JOHNSON
 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
 

[May 15, 2017] 

JUSTICE BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court. 

The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 91 Stat. 874, 15 

U. S. C. §1692 et seq., prohibits a debt collector from asserting any “false, deceptive, or misleading representation,” or using any “unfair or unconscionable means” to

collect, or attempt to collect, a debt, §§1692e, 1692f. In 

this case, a debt collector filed a written statement in a 

Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding claiming that the

debtor owed the debt collector money. The statement 

made clear, however, that the 6-year statute of limitations

governing collection of the claimed debt had long since 

run. The question before us is whether the debt collector’s 

filing of that statement falls within the scope of the aforementioned provisions of the Fair Debt Collection Practices

Act. We conclude that it does not. 

I 

In March 2014, Aleida Johnson, the respondent, filed for 

personal bankruptcy under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy 

Code (or Code), 11 U. S. C. §1301 et seq, in the Federal 

District Court for the Southern District of Alabama. Two 

months later, Midland Funding, LLC, the petitioner, filed 
 

 

2 MIDLAND FUNDING, LLC v. JOHNSON 

Opinion of the Court 

a “proof of claim,” a written statement asserting that

Johnson owed Midland a credit-card debt of $1,879.71. 

The statement added that the last time any charge appeared on Johnson’s account was in May 2003, more than 

10 years before Johnson filed for bankruptcy. The relevant statute of limitations is six years. See Ala. Code §6–

2–34 (2014). Johnson, represented by counsel, objected to 

the claim; Midland did not respond to the objection; and

the Bankruptcy Court disallowed the claim. 

Subsequently, Johnson brought this lawsuit against

Midland seeking actual damages, statutory damages,

attorney’s fees, and costs for a violation of the Fair Debt 

Collection Practices Act. See 15 U. S. C. §1692k. The 

District Court decided that the Act did not apply and

therefore dismissed the action. The Court of Appeals for 

the Eleventh Circuit disagreed and reversed the District

Court. 823 F. 3d 1334 (2016). Midland filed a petition for 

certiorari, noting a division of opinion among the Courts of 

Appeals on the question whether the conduct at issue here

is “false,” “deceptive,” “misleading,” “unconscionable,” or

“unfair” within the meaning of the Act. Compare ibid. 

(finding the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act applicable) 

with In re Dubois, 834 F. 3d 522 (CA4 2016) (finding the 

Act inapplicable); Owens v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 832 

F. 3d 726 (CA7 2016) (same); and Nelson v. Midland 

Credit Management, Inc., 828 F. 3d 749 (CA8 2016) 

(same). We granted the petition. We now reverse the 

Court of Appeals. 

II 

Like the majority of Courts of Appeals that have considered the matter, we conclude that Midland’s filing of a 

proof of claim that on its face indicates that the limitations

period has run does not fall within the scope of any of the 

five relevant words of the Fair Debt Collection Practices 

Act. We believe it reasonably clear that Midland’s proof of 
Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 3 

Opinion of the Court 

claim was not “false, deceptive, or misleading.” Midland’s 

proof of claim falls within the Bankruptcy Code’s definition of the term “claim.” A “claim” is a “right to payment.” 

11 U. S. C. §101(5)(A). State law usually determines

whether a person has such a right. See Travelers Casualty 

& Surety Co. of America v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 549 

U. S. 443, 450–451 (2007). The relevant state law is the 

law of Alabama. And Alabama’s law, like the law of many 

States, provides that a creditor has the right to payment of

a debt even after the limitations period has expired. See 

Ex parte HealthSouth Corp., 974 S. 2d 288, 296 (Ala. 2007) 

(passage of time extinguishes remedy but the right remains); see also, e.g., Sallaz v. Rice, 161 Idaho 223, ___, 

384 P. 3d 987, 992–993 (2016) (similar); Notte v. Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 185 N. J. 490, 499–500, 888 A. 2d 

464, 469 (2006) (similar); Potterton v. Ryland Group, Inc., 

289 Md. 371, 375–376, 424 A. 2d 761, 764 (1981) (similar); 

Summers v. Connolly, 159 Ohio St. 396, 400–402, 112 

N. E. 2d 391, 394 (1953) (similar); DeVries v. Secretary of 

State, 329 Mich. 68, 75, 44 N. W. 2d 872, 876 (1950) (similar); Fleming v. Yeazel, 379 Ill. 343, 344–346, 40 N. E. 2d 

507, 508 (1942) (similar); Fidelity & Cas. Co. of N. Y. v. 

Lackland, 175 Va. 178, 185–187, 8 S. E. 2d 306, 309 (1940) 

(similar); Insurance Co. v. Dunscomb, 108 Tenn. 724, 728– 

731, 69 S. W. 345, 346 (1902) (similar); but see, e.g., Miss. 

Code Ann. §15–1–3(1) (2012) (expiration of the limitations

period extinguishes the remedy and the right); Wis. Stat.

§893.05 (2011–2012) (same). 

Johnson argues that the Code’s word “claim” means

“enforceable claim.” She notes that this Court once referred to a bankruptcy “claim” as “an enforceable obligation.” Pennsylvania Dept. of Public Welfare v. Davenport, 

495 U. S. 552, 559 (1990). And, she concludes, Midland’s 

“proof of claim” was false (or deceptive or misleading) 

because its “claim” was not enforceable. Brief for Respondent 22; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 18– 
 

 

4 MIDLAND FUNDING, LLC v. JOHNSON 

Opinion of the Court 

20 (making a similar argument). 

But we do not find this argument convincing. The word 

“enforceable” does not appear in the Code’s definition of 

“claim.” See 11 U. S. C. §101(5). The Court in Davenport

likely used the word “enforceable” descriptively, for that

case involved an enforceable debt. 495 U. S., at 559. And 

it is difficult to square Johnson’s interpretation with our 

later statement that “Congress intended . . . to adopt the 

broadest available definition of ‘claim.’” Johnson v. Home 

State Bank, 501 U. S. 78, 83 (1991).

It is still more difficult to square Johnson’s interpretation with other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. Section 502(b)(1) of the Code, for example, says that, if a

“claim” is “unenforceable,” it will be disallowed. It does 

not say that an “unenforceable” claim is not a “claim.” 

Similarly, §101(5)(A) says that a “claim” is a “right to 

payment,” “whether or not such right is . . . fixed, contingent, . . . [or] disputed.” If a contingency does not arise, or 

if a claimant loses a dispute, then the claim is unenforceable. Yet this section makes clear that the unenforceable 

claim is nonetheless a “right to payment,” hence a “claim,”

as the Code uses those terms. 

Johnson looks for support to other provisions that govern bankruptcy proceedings, including §502(a) of the 

Bankruptcy Code, which states that a claim will be allowed in the absence of an objection, and Rule 3001(f ) of 

the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, which states 

that a properly filed “proof of claim . . . shall constitute 

prima facie evidence of the validity and amount of the

claim.” But these provisions do not discuss the scope of 

the term “claim.” Rather, they restate the Bankruptcy

Code’s system for determining whether a claim will be 

allowed. Other provisions make clear that the running of 

a limitations period constitutes an affirmative defense, a

defense that the debtor is to assert after a creditor makes 

a “claim.” §§502, 558. The law has long treated unen­
Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 5 

Opinion of the Court 

forceability of a claim (due to the expiration of the limitations period) as an affirmative defense. See, e.g., Fed. 

Rule Civ. Proc. 8(c)(1); 13 Encyclopaedia of Pleading and 

Practice 200 (W. McKinney ed. 1898). And we see nothing

misleading or deceptive in the filing of a proof of claim

that, in effect, follows the Code’s similar system. 

Indeed, to determine whether a statement is misleading 

normally “requires consideration of the legal sophistication of its audience.” Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U. S. 

350, 383, n. 37 (1977). The audience in Chapter 13 bankruptcy cases includes a trustee, 11 U. S. C. §1302(a), who 

must examine proofs of claim and, where appropriate,

pose an objection, §§704(a)(5), 1302(b)(1) (including any 

timeliness objection, §§502(b)(1), 558). And that trustee is 

likely to understand that, as the Code says, a proof of 

claim is a statement by the creditor that he or she has a 

right to payment subject to disallowance (including

disallowance based upon, and following, the trustee’s

objection for untimeliness). §§101(5)(A), 502(b), 704(a)(5), 

1302(b)(1). (We do not address the appropriate standard

in ordinary civil litigation.) 

III 

Whether Midland’s assertion of an obviously timebarred claim is “unfair” or “unconscionable” (within the 

terms of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act) presents a 

closer question. First, Johnson points out that several 

lower courts have found or indicated that, in the context of 

an ordinary civil action to collect a debt, a debt collector’s 

assertion of a claim known to be time barred is “unfair.” 

See, e.g., Phillips v. Asset Acceptance, LLC, 736 F. 3d 1076, 

1079 (CA7 2013) (holding as much); Kimber v. Federal 

Financial Corp., 668 F. Supp. 1480, 1487 (MD Ala. 1987) 

(same); Huertas v. Galaxy Asset Management, 641 F. 3d 

28, 32–33 (CA3 2011) (indicating as much); Castro v. 

Collecto, Inc., 634 F. 3d 779, 783 (CA5 2011) (same); Frey-
 

 

6 MIDLAND FUNDING, LLC v. JOHNSON 

Opinion of the Court 

ermuth v. Credit Bureau Servs., Inc., 248 F. 3d 767, 771 

(CA8 2001) (same). 

We are not convinced, however, by this precedent. It 

considers a debt collector’s assertion in a civil suit of a 

claim known to be stale. We assume, for argument’s sake, 

that the precedent is correct in that context (a matter this 

Court itself has not decided and does not now decide). But 

the context of a civil suit differs significantly from the 

present context, that of a Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding. The lower courts rested their conclusions upon their

concern that a consumer might unwittingly repay a timebarred debt. Thus the Seventh Circuit pointed out that

“‘few unsophisticated consumers would be aware that a 

statute of limitations could be used to defend against 

lawsuits based on stale debts.’” Phillips, supra, at 1079 

(quoting Kimber, supra, at 1487). The “‘passage of time,’” 

the Circuit wrote, “‘dulls the consumer’s memory of the 

circumstances and validity of the debt’” and the consumer 

may no longer have “‘personal records.’” 736 F. 3d, at 

1079 (quoting Kimber, supra, at 1487). Moreover, a consumer might pay a stale debt simply to avoid the cost and 

embarrassment of suit. 736 F. 3d, at 1079. 

These considerations have significantly diminished force

in the context of a Chapter 13 bankruptcy. The consumer 

initiates such a proceeding, see 11 U. S. C. §§301, 303(a), 

and consequently the consumer is not likely to pay a stale 

claim just to avoid going to court. A knowledgeable trustee 

is available. See §1302(a). Procedural bankruptcy 

rules more directly guide the evaluation of claims. See 

Fed. Rule Bkrtcy. Proc. 3001(c)(3)(A); Advisory Committee’s Notes on Rule 3001–2011 Amdt., 11 U. S. C. App., p. 

678. And, as the Eighth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate

Panel put it, the claims resolution process is “generally a

more streamlined and less unnerving prospect for a debtor 

than facing a collection lawsuit.” In re Gatewood, 533 

B. R. 905, 909 (2015); see also, e.g., 11 U. S. C. §502 (out­
 

Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 7 

Opinion of the Court 

lining generally the claims resolution process). These 

features of a Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding make it 

considerably more likely that an effort to collect upon a 

stale claim in bankruptcy will be met with resistance,

objection, and disallowance. 

Second, Johnson argues that the practice at least risks 

harm to the debtor and that there is not “a single legitimate reason” for allowing this kind of behavior. Brief for 

Respondent 32. Would it not be obviously “unfair,” she

asks, for a debt collector to adopt a practice of buying up

stale claims cheaply and asserting them in bankruptcy

knowing they are stale and hoping for careless trustees? 

The United States, supporting Johnson, adds its view that

the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure make the 

practice open to sanction, and argues that sanctionable 

conduct is unfair conduct. Brief for United States as 

Amicus Curiae 20. See Fed. Rule Bkrtcy. Proc. 9011(b)(2) 

(sanction possible if party violates the Rule that by “presenting to the [bankruptcy] court” any “paper,” a “party is

certifying that to the best of ” his or her “knowledge, . . .

the claims . . . therein are warranted by existing law”).

We are ultimately not persuaded by these arguments.

The bankruptcy system, as we have already noted, treats

untimeliness as an affirmative defense. The trustee normally bears the burden of investigating claims and pointing out that a claim is stale. See supra, at 4–5. Moreover, 

protections available in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding minimize the risk to the debtor. See supra, at 6. And, 

at least on occasion, the assertion of even a stale claim can 

benefit a debtor. Its filing and disallowance “discharge[s]” 

the debt. 11 U. S. C. §1328(a). And that discharge means

that the debt (even if unenforceable) will not remain on a 

credit report potentially affecting an individual’s ability to 

borrow money, buy a home, and perhaps secure employment. See 15 U. S. C. §1681c(a)(4) (debt may remain on a 

credit report for seven years); cf. Ala. Code §6–2–34 (6­
 

8 MIDLAND FUNDING, LLC v. JOHNSON 

Opinion of the Court 

year statute of limitations); Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code 

Ann. §5–101 (2013) (3-year statute of limitations); cf. 16

CFR pt. 600, App. §607, ¶6 (1991) (a credit report may 

include discharged debt only if “the debt [is reported] as

having a zero balance due to reflect the fact that the consumer is no longer liable for the discharged debt”); FTC, 

40 Years of Experience with the Fair Credit Reporting Act:

An FTC Staff Report with Summary of Interpretations 66 

(2011) (similar).

More importantly, a change in the simple affirmativedefense approach, carving out an exception, itself would 

require defining the boundaries of the exception. Does it 

apply only where (as Johnson alleged in the complaint) a 

claim’s staleness appears “on [the] face” of the proof of

claim? Does it apply to other affirmative defenses or only 

to the running of a limitations period?

At the same time, we do not find in either the Fair Debt 

Collection Practices Act or the Bankruptcy Code good

reason to believe that Congress intended an ordinary civil 

court applying the Act to determine answers to these 

bankruptcy-related questions. The Act and the Code have 

different purposes and structural features. The Act seeks 

to help consumers, not necessarily by closing what Johnson and the United States characterize as a loophole in 

the Bankruptcy Code, but by preventing consumer bankruptcies in the first place. See, e.g., 15 U. S. C. §1692(a) 

(recognizing the “abundant evidence of the use of abusive,

deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices [which]

contribute to the number of personal bankruptcies”); see 

also §1692(b) (“Existing laws and procedures . . . are inadequate to protect consumers”); §1692(e) (statute seeks to 

“eliminate abusive debt collection practices”). The Bankruptcy Code, by way of contrast, creates and maintains 

what we have called the “delicate balance of a debtor’s 

protections and obligations.” Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 

U. S. 642, 651 (1974). 
 

Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 9 

Opinion of the Court 

To find the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act applicable 

here would upset that “delicate balance.” From a substantive perspective it would authorize a new significant 

bankruptcy-related remedy in the absence of language in

the Code providing for it. Administratively, it would 

permit postbankruptcy litigation in an ordinary civil court 

concerning a creditor’s state of mind—a matter often hard 

to determine. See 15 U. S. C. §1692k(c) (safe harbor for 

any debt collector who “shows by a preponderance of evidence that the violation was not intentional and resulted 

from a bona fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of 

procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such error”).

Procedurally, it would require creditors (who assert a

claim) to investigate the merits of an affirmative defense 

(typically the debtor’s job to assert and prove) lest the 

creditor later be found to have known the claim was untimely. The upshot could well be added complexity,

changes in settlement incentives, and a shift from the

debtor to the creditor the obligation to investigate the 

staleness of a claim. 

Unlike the United States, we do not believe that the 

Advisory Committee on Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 

settled the issue when it promulgated Bankruptcy Rule 

9011. The Committee, in considering amendments to the 

Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure in 2009, specifically

rejected a proposal that would have required a creditor to

certify that there is no valid statute of limitations defense. 

See Agenda Book for Meeting 86–87 (Mar. 26–27, 2009). 

It did so in part because the working group did not want to 

impose an affirmative obligation on a creditor to make a

prefiling investigation of a potential time-bar defense. 

Ibid. In rejecting that proposal, the Committee did note

that Rule 9011 imposes a general “obligation on a claimant to undertake an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances to determine . . . that a claim is warranted by

existing law and that factual contentions have evidentiary 
 

10 MIDLAND FUNDING, LLC v. JOHNSON 

Opinion of the Court 

support,” and to certify as much on the proof of claim. Id., 

at 87. The Committee also acknowledged, however, that

this requirement would “not addres[s] the statute of limitation issue,” but would only ensure “the accuracy of the 

information provided.” Ibid. 

We recognize that one Bankruptcy Court has held that 

filing a time-barred claim without a prefiling investigation 

of a potential time-bar defense merits sanctions under

Rule 9011. In re Sekema, 523 B. R. 651, 654 (Bkrtcy. Ct. 

ND Ind. 2015). But others have held to the contrary. See, 

e.g., In re Freeman, 540 B. R. 129, 143–144 (Bkrtcy. Ct. 

ED Pa. 2015); In re Jenkins, 538 B. R. 129, 134–136 

(Bkrcty. Ct. ND Ala. 2015); In re Keeler, 440 B. R. 354, 

366–369 (Bkrtcy. Ct. ED Pa. 2009); see also In re Andrews, 

394 B. R. 384, 387–388 (Bkrtcy. Ct. EDNC 2008) (recognizing that “[m]any courts have . . . found that sanctions

[under Rule 9011] were not warranted for filing stale 

claims”).

These circumstances, taken together, convince us that

we cannot find the practice at issue here “unfair” or “unconscionable” within the terms of the Fair Debt Collection 

Practices Act. 

IV 

For these reasons, we conclude that filing (in a Chapter 

13 bankruptcy proceeding) a proof of claim that is obviously 

time barred is not a false, deceptive, misleading, unfair,

or unconscionable debt collection practice within the 

meaning of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. The 

judgment of the Eleventh Circuit is reversed. 

It is so ordered. 

JUSTICE GORSUCH took no part in the consideration 

or decision of this case. 
_________________ 

_________________ 

 

Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 1 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 16–348 

MIDLAND FUNDING, LLC, PETITIONER v.
 

ALEIDA JOHNSON
 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
 

[May 15, 2017] 

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, with whom JUSTICE GINSBURG 

and JUSTICE KAGAN join, dissenting. 

The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA or Act)

prohibits professional debt collectors from using “false, 

deceptive, or misleading representation[s] or means in

connection with the collection of any debt” and from

“us[ing] unfair or unconscionable means to collect” a debt.

15 U. S. C. §§1692e, 1692f. The Court today wrongfully

holds that a debt collector that knowingly attempts to

collect a time-barred debt in bankruptcy proceedings has

violated neither of these prohibitions. 

Professional debt collectors have built a business out of 

buying stale debt, filing claims in bankruptcy proceedings

to collect it, and hoping that no one notices that the debt is 

too old to be enforced by the courts. This practice is both 

“unfair” and “unconscionable.” I respectfully dissent from

the Court’s conclusion to the contrary.1 

I 

Americans owe trillions of dollars in consumer debt to 

creditors—credit card companies, schools, and car dealers, 

—————— 

1Because I believe the practice at issue here is “unfair” and “unconscionable,” and thus violates 15 U. S. C. §1692f, I do not address the 

Court’s conclusion that the practice is not “false, deceptive, or misleading” in violation of §1692e. 
 

2 MIDLAND FUNDING, LLC v. JOHNSON 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

among others. See Fed. Reserve Bank of N. Y., Quarterly 

Report on Household Debt and Credit 3 (2017). Most 

people will repay their debts, but some cannot do so. The 

debts they do not pay are increasingly likely to end up in 

the hands of professional debt collectors—companies

whose business it is to collect debts that are owed to other 

companies. See Consumer Financial Protection Bur., Fair 

Debt Collection Practices Act: Annual Report 2016, p. 8

(CFPB Report). Debt collection is a lucrative and growing 

industry. Last year, the Nation’s 6,000 debt collection 

agencies earned over $13 billion in revenue. Ibid. 

Although many debt collectors are hired by creditors to

work on a third-party basis, more and more collectors also 

operate as “debt buyers”—purchasing debts from creditors

outright and attempting to collect what they can, with the 

profits going to their own accounts.2 See FTC, The Structure and Practices of the Debt Buying Industry 11–12 

(2013) (FTC Report); CFPB Report 10. Debt buyers now 

hold hundreds of billions of dollars in consumer debt; 

indeed, a study conducted by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in 2009 found that nine of the leading debt 

buyers had purchased over $140 billion in debt just in the 

previous three years. FTC Report, at i–ii, T–3 (Table 3).

Because creditors themselves have given up trying to

collect the debts they sell to debt buyers, they sell those 

debts for pennies on the dollar. Id., at 23. The older the 

debt, the greater the discount: While debt buyers pay close

to eight cents per dollar for debts under three years old, 

they pay as little as two cents per dollar for debts greater

than six years old, and “effectively nothing” for debts

greater than 15 years old. Id., at 23–24. These prices 

—————— 

2A case pending before this Court, Henson v. Santander Consumer 

USA Inc., No. 16–349, asks whether a certain kind of debt buyer is a

“debt collector” under the FDCPA. Midland does not dispute that it is a 

debt collector under the Act. 
 

 

Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 3 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

reflect the basic fact that older debts are harder to collect. 

As time passes, consumers move or forget that they owe

the debts; creditors have more trouble documenting the 

debts and proving their validity; and debts begin to fall 

within state statutes of limitations—time limits that 

“operate to bar a plaintiff ’s suit” once passed. CTS Corp. 

v. Waldburger, 573 U. S. ___, ___ (2014) (slip op., at 5). 

Because a creditor (or a debt collector) cannot enforce a

time-barred debt in court, the debt is inherently worth

very little indeed.

But statutes of limitations have not deterred debt buyers. For years, they have filed suit in state courts—often 

in small-claims courts, where formal rules of evidence do 

not apply—to collect even debts too old to be enforced by

those courts.3 See Holland, The One Hundred Billion 

Dollar Problem in Small-Claims Court, 6 J. Bus. & Tech. 

L. 259, 261 (2011). Importantly, the debt buyers’ only

hope in these cases is that consumers will fail either to 

invoke the statute of limitations or to respond at all: In

most States the statute of limitations is an affirmative 

defense, meaning that a consumer must appear in court 

and raise it in order to dismiss the suit. See ante, at 4–5 

(majority opinion). But consumers do fail to defend themselves in court—in fact, according to the FTC, over 90% 

fail to appear at all. FTC Report 45. The result is that 

debt buyers have won “billions of dollars in default judgments” simply by filing suit and betting that consumers

will lack the resources to respond. Holland, supra, at 263. 

The FDCPA’s prohibitions on “misleading” and “unfair” 

conduct have largely beaten back this particular practice.

Every court to have considered the question has held that 

—————— 

3Petitioner’s parent alone filed 245,000 lawsuits in 2009. See SilverGreenberg, Boom in Debt Buying Fuels Another Boom—in Lawsuits,

Wall Street Journal, Nov. 29, 2010, pp. A1, A16. Petitioner itself filed 

110 lawsuits on just one date in a single state court. Id., at A1. 
 

 

4 MIDLAND FUNDING, LLC v. JOHNSON 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

a debt collector that knowingly files suit in court to collect

a time-barred debt violates the FDCPA. See Phillips v. 

Asset Acceptance, LLC, 736 F. 3d 1076, 1079 (CA7 2013); 

Kimber v. Federal Financial Corp., 668 F. Supp. 1480,

1487 (MD Ala. 1987); see also ante, at 5–6 (majority opinion) (citing other cases). In 2015, petitioner and its parent

company entered into a consent decree with the Government prohibiting them from filing suit to collect timebarred debts and ordering them to pay $34 million in

restitution. See Consent Order in In re Encore Capital 

Group, Inc., No. 2015–CFPB–0022 (Sept. 9, 2015), pp. 38, 

46. And the leading trade association has now adopted a 

resolution barring the practice. See Brief for DBA International, Inc., as Amicus Curiae 2–3. 

Stymied in state courts, the debt buyers have now 

turned to a new forum: bankruptcy courts. The same debt 

buyers that for years filed thousands of lawsuits in state

courts across the country have begun to do the same thing 

in bankruptcy courts—specifically, in cases governed by 

Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, which allows consumers earning regular incomes to restructure their debts and 

repay as many as they can over a period of several years. 

See 8 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶1300.01 (A. Resnick & H. 

Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2016). As in ordinary civil cases, a

debtor in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding is entitled 

to have dismissed any claim filed against his estate that is 

barred by a statute of limitations. See 11 U. S. C. §558.

As in ordinary civil cases, the statute of limitations is an

affirmative defense, one that must be raised by either the 

debtor or the trustee of his estate before it is honored. 

§§502, 558. And so—just as in ordinary civil cases—debt

collectors may file claims in bankruptcy proceedings for 

stale debts and hope that no one notices that they are too

old to be enforced. 

And that is exactly what the debt buyers have done. As 

a wide variety of courts and commentators have observed, 
 

Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 5 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

debt buyers have “deluge[d]” the bankruptcy courts with

claims “on debts deemed unenforceable under state statutes of limitations.” Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 

758 F. 3d 1254, 1256 (CA11 2014); see also In re Jenkins, 

456 B. R. 236, 239, n. 2 (Bkrtcy. Ct. EDNC 2011) (noting a 

“plague of stale claims”); Brief for National Association of 

Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys et al. as Amici Curiae 9 

(noting study describing “hundreds of thousands of proofs 

of claim asserting hundreds of millions of dollars of consumer indebtedness, all in a single year”). This practice 

has become so widespread that the Government sued one 

debt buyer last year “to address [its] systemic abuse of the 

bankruptcy process”—including a “business model” of 

“knowingly and strategically” filing thousands of claims

for time-barred debt. Complaint in In re Freeman-Clay v. 

Resurgent Capital Servs., L.P., No. 14–41871 (Bkrtcy. Ct. 

WD Mo.), ¶¶1, 35 (Resurgent Complaint). This practice,

the Government explained, “manipulates the bankruptcy

process by systematically shifting the burden” to trustees 

and debtors to object even to “frivolous claims”—especially 

given that filing an objection is costly, time consuming, 

and easy to overlook. Id., at ¶¶35, 43–44. 

II 

The FDCPA prohibits professional debt collectors from 

engaging in “unfair” and “unconscionable” practices. 15 

U. S. C. §1692f.4 Filing a claim in bankruptcy court for 

—————— 

4This Court has not had occasion to construe the terms “unfair” and 

“unconscionable” in §1692f. The FDCPA’s legislative history suggests

that Congress intended these terms as a backstop that would enable 

“courts, where appropriate, to proscribe other improper conduct . . . not 

specifically addressed” by the statute. S. Rep. No. 95–382, p. 4 (1977). 

Courts have construed these terms, consistent with other federal and 

state statutes that employ them, to borrow from equitable and commonlaw traditions. See, e.g., LeBlanc v. Unifund CCR Partners, 601 F. 3d 

1185, 1200–1201 (CA11 2010) (per curiam); Beler v. Blatt, Hasenmiller, 

Leibsker & Moore, LLC, 480 F. 3d 470, 473–474 (CA7 2007). 
 

 

6 MIDLAND FUNDING, LLC v. JOHNSON 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

debt that a collector knows to be time barred—like filing a 

lawsuit in a court to collect such a debt—is just such a

practice. 

A 

Begin where the debt collectors themselves began: with 

their practice of filing suit in ordinary civil courts to collect 

debts that they know are time barred. Every court to have 

considered this practice holds that it violates the FDCPA.

There is no sound reason to depart from this conclusion. 

Statutes of limitations “are not simply technicalities.” 

Board of Regents of Univ. of State of N. Y. v. Tomanio, 446 

U. S. 478, 487 (1980). They reflect strong public-policy 

determinations that “it is unjust to fail to put [an] adversary on notice to defend within a specified period of time.” 

United States v. Kubrick, 444 U. S. 111, 117 (1979). And 

they “promote justice by preventing surprises through the 

revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until 

evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses 

have disappeared.” Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway 

Express Agency, Inc., 321 U. S. 342, 348–349 (1944). Such 

concerns carry particular weight in the context of smalldollar consumer debt collection. As one thoughtful opinion 

explains: 

“Because few unsophisticated consumers would be

aware that a statute of limitations could be used to 

defend against lawsuits based on stale debts, such

consumers would unwittingly acquiesce to such lawsuits. And, even if the consumer realizes that she can 

use time as a defense, she will more than likely still

give in rather than fight the lawsuit because she must

still expend energy and resources and subject herself

to the embarrassment of going into court to present

the defense . . . .” Kimber, 668 F. Supp., at 1487. 

Debt buyers’ efforts to pursue stale debt in ordinary civil 
Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 7 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

litigation may also entrap debtors into forfeiting their time

defenses altogether. When a debt collector sues or threatens to sue to collect a debt, many consumers respond by

offering a small partial payment to forestall suit. In many

States, a consumer who makes an offer like this has— 

unbeknownst to him—forever given up his ability to claim

the debt is unenforceable. That is because in most States 

a consumer’s partial payment on a time-barred debt—or

his promise to resume payments on such a debt—will 

restart the statute of limitations. FTC Report 47; see, e.g., 

Young v. Sorenson, 47 Cal. App. 3d 911, 914, 121 Cal. 

Rptr. 236, 237 (1975) (“‘The theory on which this is based

is that the payment is an acknowledgement on the existence of the indebtedness which raises an implied promise 

to continue the obligation and to pay the balance’”). Debt 

collectors’ efforts to entrap consumers in this way have no

place in honest business practice. 

B 

The same dynamics are present in bankruptcy proceedings. A proof of claim filed in bankruptcy court represents

the debt collector’s belief that it is entitled to payment,

even though the debt should not be enforced as a matter of

public policy. The debtor’s claim will be allowed, and will 

be incorporated in a debtor’s payment plan, unless the 

debtor or his trustee objects. But such objections require

ordinary and unsophisticated people (and their overworked trustees) to be on guard not only against mistaken

claims but also against claims that debt collectors know

will fail under law if an objection is raised. Debt collectors 

do not file these claims in good faith; they file them hoping 

and expecting that the bankruptcy system will fail. Such 

a practice is “unfair” and “unconscionable” in violation of 

the FDCPA. 

The Court disagrees. But it does so on narrow grounds. 

To begin with, the Court does not hold that the Bankruptcy 
 

 

 

 

8 MIDLAND FUNDING, LLC v. JOHNSON 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

Code altogether displaces the FDCPA, leaving it with

no role to play in bankruptcy proceedings. Such a conclusion would be wrong. Although the Code and the FDCPA 

“have different purposes and structural features,” ante, at 

8, the Court has held that Congress, in passing the 

FDCPA’s predecessor, did so on the understanding that 

“the provisions and the purposes” of the two statutes were 

intended to “coexist.” Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U. S. 642, 

650 (1974). Although petitioner suggests that the FDCPA 

is best read “to have no application to [a] debt collector’s

conduct” in a bankruptcy proceeding, Brief for Petitioner 

41, the majority declines its invitation to adopt such a 

sweeping rule.5 

Nor does the majority take a position on whether a debt

collector violates the FDCPA by filing suit in an ordinary 

court to collect a debt it knows is time barred. Ante, at 6. 

Instead, the majority concludes, even assuming that such 

a practice would violate the FDCPA, a debt collector does 

—————— 

5The majority does lean heavily on its fear that, were we to conclude 

that the FDCPA bars the practice at issue, we would be licensing

“postbankruptcy litigation in an ordinary civil court” concerning matters best left to bankruptcy courts. Ante, at 9. But to do so would not, 

as the majority suggests, “upset [the] ‘delicate balance’ ” struck by the 

Code. Ibid. (quoting Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U. S., at 651). For one, 

nothing requires a debtor to engage in satellite litigation in order to sue 

a debt collector under the FDCPA; a debtor can easily file an adversary

proceeding asserting an FDCPA claim with the bankruptcy court itself, 

and in many cases will be better served by doing so. See, e.g., Simon v. 

FIA Card Servs., N. A., 732 F. 3d 259, 263 (CA3 2013). Nor is there any

risk that finding the FDCPA applicable here will authorize bankruptcy 

courts (or, for that matter, civil courts) to engage in novel and unfettered inquiries into “a creditor’s state of mind.” Ante, at 9. Both Fed. 

Rule Civ. Proc. 11 and its bankruptcy counterpart, Fed. Rule Bkrtcy. 

Proc. 9011, authorize a court to impose sanctions on parties who 

willfully file meritless claims (a category that includes the debt buyers

here, see In re Sekema, 523 B. R. 651, 654–655 (Bkrtcy. Ct. ND Ind. 

2015)). So there is nothing new about the inquiry that courts would be

required to undertake; it is no different than analyses they conduct

every day. 
 

Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 9 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

not violate the Act by doing the same thing in bankruptcy 

proceedings. Bankruptcy, the majority argues, is different. True enough. But none of the distinctions that the 

majority identifies bears the weight placed on it. 

First, the majority contends, structural features of the 

bankruptcy process reduce the risk that a stale debt will 

go unnoticed and thus be allowed. Ante, at 6–7. But there 

is virtually no evidence that the majority’s theory holds 

true in practice. The majority relies heavily on the presence of a bankruptcy trustee, appointed to act on the

debtor’s behalf and empowered to (among other things) 

object to claims that he believes lack merit. See 11 

U. S. C. §§704(a)(5), 1302(b). In the majority’s view, the

trustee’s gatekeeping role makes it “considerably more 

likely that an effort to collect upon a stale claim in bankruptcy will be met with resistance, objection, and disallowance.” Ante, at 7. The problem with the majority’s ipse 

dixit is that everyone with actual experience in the matter

insists that it is false. The Government, which oversees 

bankruptcy trustees, tells us that trustees “cannot realistically be expected to identify every time-barred . . . claim

filed in every bankruptcy.” Brief for United States as 

Amicus Curiae 25–26; see also Resurgent Complaint ¶43 

(“Filing objections to all of [one collector]’s unenforceable

claims would clog the docket of this Court and other courts

with objections to frivolous claims”). The trustees themselves (appearing here as amici curiae) agree, describing

the practice as “wasteful” and “exploit[ative].” Brief for 

National Association of Chapter Thirteen Trustees as 

Amicus Curiae 12. And courts across the country recognize that Chapter 13 trustees are struggling under a 

“deluge” of stale debt. Crawford, 758 F. 3d, at 1256. 

Second, the other features of the bankruptcy process

that the majority believes will serve as a backstop against 

frivolous claims are even less likely to do so in practice. 

The majority implies that a person who files for bankruptcy 
 

 

 

 

10 MIDLAND FUNDING, LLC v. JOHNSON 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

is more sophisticated than the average consumer debtor 

because the initiation of bankruptcy is a choice made by a 

debtor. Ante, at 6. But a person who has filed for bankruptcy will rarely be in such a superior position; he has, 

after all, just declared that he is unable to meet his financial obligations and in need of the assistance of the courts.

It is odd to speculate that such a person is better situated 

to monitor court filings and lodge objections than an ordinary consumer. The majority also suggests that the rules 

of bankruptcy help “guide the evaluation of claims.” Ibid. 

But the rules of bankruptcy in fact facilitate the allowance 

of claims: Claims are automatically allowed and made part 

of a plan unless an objection is made. See 11 U. S. C. 

§502(a). A debtor is arguably more vulnerable in bankruptcy—not less—to the oversights that the debt buyers 

know will occur. 

Finally, the majority suggests, in some cases a consumer 

will actually benefit if a claim for an untimely debt is filed. 

Ante, at 7–8. If such a claim is filed but disallowed, the 

majority explains, the debt will eventually be discharged, 

and the creditor will be barred from collecting it. See 

§1328(a). Here, too, practice refutes the majority’s rosy 

portrait of these proceedings. A debtor whose trustee does 

not spot and object to a stale debt will find no comfort in 

the knowledge that other consumers with more attentive 

trustees may have their debts disallowed and discharged.

Moreover, given the high rate at which debtors are unable 

to fully pay off their debts in Chapter 13 proceedings, see

Porter, The Pretend Solution: An Empirical Study of 

Bankruptcy Outcomes, 90 Texas L. Rev. 103, 111–112 

(2011), most debtors who fail to object to a stale claim will 

end up worse off than had they never entered bankruptcy 

at all: They will make payments on the stale debts, thereby

resuscitating them, see supra, at 6–7, and may thus 

walk out of bankruptcy court owing more to their creditors

than they did when they entered it. There is no benefit to 
 

 

Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 11 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

anyone in such a proceeding—except the debt collectors. 

* * * 

It does not take a sophisticated attorney to understand 

why the practice I have described in this opinion is unfair.

It takes only the common sense to conclude that one 

should not be able to profit on the inadvertent inattention 

of others. It is said that the law should not be a trap for 

the unwary. Today’s decision sets just such a trap.

I take comfort only in the knowledge that the Court’s

decision today need not be the last word on the matter. If 

Congress wants to amend the FDCPA to make explicit

what in my view is already implicit in the law, it need only 

say so.

I respectfully dissent.