Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before 

any court except for the purpose of 

establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

MATTHEW J. MCGOVERN GREGORY F. ZOELLER

Anderson, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana

J.T. WHITEHEAD

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

HUBERT COOK MAYHUGH III, )

)

Appellant-Defendant, )

)

vs. ) No. 82A01-1312-CR-531

)

STATE OF INDIANA, )

)

Appellee-Plaintiff. )

APPEAL FROM THE VANDERBURGH CIRCUIT COURT

The Honorable David D. Kiely, Judge

Cause No. 82C01-1203-MR-335

July 16, 2014

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

NAJAM, Judge
2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Hubert Cook Mayhugh III appeals his convictions for felony murder, a felony, and 

theft, as a Class D felony, following a jury trial. Mayhugh presents five issues for our 

review, which we consolidate and restate as:

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted certain 

evidence.

2. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support his theft

conviction.

3. Whether his sentence is inappropriate in light of his character.

We affirm in part and reverse in part.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In early 2012, Megan Mecum and Keith Vaughn were dating, but Mecum was not 

faithful to Vaughn. Mecum and Levi Mayhugh (“Levi”), Mayhugh’s cousin, were 

romantically involved. And Mecum and Levi plotted to steal “everything” Vaughn had. 

Tr. at 377. Mecum and Levi told Mayhugh about their plan to rob Vaughn.

In February 2012, Mecum and Vaughn were married. The marriage was volatile, 

and Mecum repeatedly threatened to kill Vaughn. Vaughn ultimately obtained a 

protective order against Mecum. Mecum frequently stayed overnight with Levi and 

Mayhugh, who lived with Levi’s parents in Evansville.

During the evening of March 10, Mayhugh, Mecum, and Levi were riding around 

Evansville in Mecum’s GMC truck when they ran into Tony Martin, an acquaintance of 

Mayhugh’s, at a gas station. Mayhugh explained to Martin that he was having financial 

problems. And Mayhugh told Martin that he, Mecum, and Levi “wanted to go rob”
3

Vaughn. Id. at 214. Mayhugh told Martin that, according to Mecum, Vaughn had

$30,000 or $40,000 at his house. Martin tried to talk Mayhugh out of committing the 

robbery. Martin then watched Mayhugh, Mecum, and Levi drive off in the direction of 

Vaughn’s neighborhood.

On March 11, Julie Moore and Kenneth Baker, whose backyard is catty-corner to 

Vaughn’s backyard, found a bag they did not recognize sitting next to their trash cans. 

Inside the bag they found a DVR box, surveillance cameras, two cordless phones, and “a 

couple of bloody knives.” Id. at 21. Moore called police, and Evansville Police 

Department Officers Anthony Hartweck and Tony Walker arrived to investigate. The 

officers determined that one of the phones found in the bag belonged to Vaughn, so they 

proceeded to Vaughn’s house. They got no answer at the front door, but a neighbor gave 

them a key to gain entry. Once inside, officers found Vaughn’s dead body in a bedroom. 

A cord was wrapped around Vaughn’s neck, his throat had been cut, and there was blood 

spatter on the wall next to his body.

Officers obtained a search warrant for Vaughn’s house. During their search, 

officers found: bloody shoe prints on the floor; two surveillance cameras that were 

similar to those found in the bag near Moore and Baker’s trash; cut wires at the soffit of 

the northeast corner of the house matching the wires attached to the cameras found in the 

bag; a hat in the backyard; and cigarette butts. While officers were searching Vaughn’s 

house, Mecum arrived in her GMC truck. Evansville Police Detective Stacy Spaulding 

spoke with Mecum, and Mecum “said some things that were kind of alarming[.]” Id. at 

165. Accordingly, Detective Spaulding told Mecum that a police officer was going to 
4

transport Mecum to the police station for further questioning. Mecum retrieved her purse 

from the back seat of the truck and became “visibly shaken” when she saw a wallet in the 

rear of the truck. Id. at 175. Mecum stated that the wallet had belonged to Vaughn, but 

officers discovered that the wallet belonged to Mayhugh. Officers found a receipt for Air 

Jordan tennis shoes in Mayhugh’s wallet. Officers also discovered blood on a floor mat 

in Mecum’s truck.

Officers contacted Mayhugh and, during an interview, he stated that Mecum and 

Levi had robbed and murdered Vaughn, but he denied any involvement. But Levi’s 

mother, Rachel Mayhugh, told police that Mayhugh had admitted to her that he had

stabbed Vaughn in the neck and killed him. And Mayhugh’s friend Starr Fauquher told 

police that, the day after the murder, she had observed Mayhugh crying, and, when she 

asked him what was wrong, he said only that he “didn’t mean to hurt him.” Id. at 262. 

Mayhugh did not elaborate on what he meant by that statement.

Forensic tests revealed that the hat found in Vaughn’s backyard contained 

Mayhugh’s DNA. And the bloody shoe prints in Vaughn’s house matched the tread 

pattern of an Air Jordan shoe found at Mayhugh’s former residence. In addition, again,

police had found a receipt for Air Jordan shoes in Mayhugh’s wallet.

The State charged Mayhugh with felony murder, a felony; armed robbery, as a 

Class B felony; burglary, as a Class B felony; and theft, as a Class D felony. A jury 

found him guilty as charged. The trial court entered judgment of conviction for felony 

murder and theft and sentenced him as follows: sixty years for murder and thirty months 

for theft, to run concurrently. This appeal ensued.
5

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

Issue One: Admission of Evidence

Our standard of review of a trial court’s admission of evidence is an abuse of 

discretion. Speybroeck v. State, 875 N.E.2d 813, 818 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). A trial court 

abuses its discretion if its decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and 

circumstances before the court or if the court misapplies the law. See id. Here, Mayhugh 

contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted certain forensic 

evidence. We address each contention in turn.

Fungible Evidence

Mayhugh maintains that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted the 

State’s exhibits numbered 26 through 34, 36 through 40, and 80. Those exhibits 

included: swabs from Mayhugh, Mecum, and Levi; Vaughn’s blood; a hat alleged to 

contain Mayhugh’s DNA; swabs from the bloody knives; a swab from the digital 

recorder; cigarette butts; and a report on the analysis of those items. Mayhugh objected 

to the admission of each of those exhibits on the grounds that the State had failed to 

establish an adequate chain of custody in handling the evidence. The trial court admitted 

each of the exhibits into evidence over Mayhugh’s objections.

In Culver v. State, 727 N.E.2d 1062, 1067 (Ind. 2000), our supreme court 

explained:

It is well established in Indiana that an exhibit is admissible if the evidence 

regarding its chain of custody strongly suggests the exact whereabouts of 

the evidence at all times. See Robinett v. State, 563 N.E.2d 97, 100 (Ind.

1990); Jones v. State, 425 N.E.2d 128, 132 (Ind. 1981). That is, in 

substantiating a chain of custody, the State must give reasonable assurances 

that the property passed through various hands in an undisturbed condition.
6

See Cliver v. State, 666 N.E.2d 59, 63 (Ind. 1996); Kennedy v. State, 578 

N.E.2d 633, 639 (Ind. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 921 (1992). We have 

also held that the State need not establish a perfect chain of custody 

whereby any gaps go to the weight of the evidence and not to admissibility.

See Wrinkles v. State, 690 N.E.2d 1156, 1160 (Ind. 1997) cert. denied, 525 

U.S. 861 (1998); Kennedy, 578 N.E.2d at 639.

Here, Mayhugh points out that “a serologist in [an] Evansville laboratory prepared 

swabs from physical evidence and submitted those swabs through four evidence clerks 

and an unknown courier to the forensic biologist in [an] Indianapolis laboratory.” 

Appellant’s Br. At 12. But, Mayhugh asserts, the State did not present testimony from 

any of the evidence clerks or the courier. And he contends that “this gaping hole in the 

chain of custody is fatal” to the State’s case. Id. We cannot agree.

Our supreme court addressed a similar argument in Cliver, where the defendant

claimed that the State’s failure to present testimony from a technician who had 

transported fungible evidence from Indianapolis to Evansville rendered the chain of 

custody inadequate. But our supreme court held that the totality of the evidence rendered 

the technician’s testimony unnecessary. In particular, the court stated as follows:

Two State Police crime scene technicians testified that they had gathered 

and sealed the contested evidence into bags, which they then marked with 

their initials. They arranged for the various samples to be transported to the 

Indianapolis State Police crime laboratory, and upon arrival the evidence 

was checked in by technician Connie Faust. Each technician also identified 

the evidence at trial, stating that it appeared to be in the same condition as 

when the samples were originally collected, except for the changes caused 

by testing. Because of a backlog at the Indianapolis laboratory, Faust 

eventually transported the evidence to the Evansville laboratory for 

analysis. The serologist from the Evansville office testified to the time of 

receipt of the samples and to the facts that the bags were still sealed and 

were delivered by Faust. The defendant urges that because Faust did not 

testify, there was a fatal gap in the foundation of the evidence. Over the 

defendant’s objection, the trial court admitted the testimony related to the 

exhibits.
7

* * *

We find that the State sufficiently accounted for the whereabouts of 

the evidence. This Court presumes that public officials who handle 

evidence use due care and that the evidence is handled properly. Bell[ v 

State, 610 N.E.2d 229, 233 (Ind. 1993)]. Although Faust gave no testimony 

herself, the individuals who gave Faust the evidence and the serologist who 

received the evidence did testify. This testimony, along with that of the 

technicians who collected the samples, provides adequate assurance that the 

evidence passed through the various hands in an undisturbed condition.

Therefore, absent a showing by the defendant that more than a mere 

possibility of tampering existed, the State’s chain of custody must be 

deemed sufficient. The defendant has made no such showing and has 

therefore failed to rebut the presumption of proper handling.

Cliver, 666 N.E.2d at 63.

Here, likewise, the State presented sufficient evidence to substantiate the chain of 

custody with respect to the challenged exhibits. Evansville Police Department Officer 

Tony Walker testified that he personally collected each of the challenged exhibits and 

sealed them, after which the exhibits were “secured in the crime scene unit in a storage 

area until [they were] submitted to the Lab or placed in the property room of the 

Evansville Police Department.” Tr. at 105-06. Nicole Hoffman, a forensic DNA analyst 

and serologist with the Indiana State Police Department Laboratory in Evansville (“the 

Evansville lab”), testified that when she received the exhibits, she marked each sealed 

packet with the case number, the name of the item, and her initials. Hoffman then 

performed serology tests on the items. Hoffman testified that items “that were going to 

be tested for DNA” were placed “in another envelope with our own markings, my initials, 

[and] case number” and sent by courier to the Indiana State Police Laboratory in 

Indianapolis (“the Indianapolis lab”). Id. at 250. The other items were repackaged,

resealed, and placed in an evidence vault in Evansville.
8

Kimberly Masden, a forensic biologist at the Indianapolis lab, testified that, when 

evidence arrives at the lab, an evidence clerk stores the evidence in a secure vault until 

the case is assigned to an analyst, who then 

retrieves the evidence from the evidence clerk who retrieves it from the 

vaults and the analyst performs their [sic] analysis, they [sic] then return the 

evidence once their [sic] analysis is complete to the evidence clerk who 

stores it in the vault until the contributing agency comes to pick it up, the 

only difference from that is as far as DNA, sometimes sub items are created 

where samples are taken from a larger item, and we retain those at the 

laboratory[. T]hose aren’t returned.

Id. at 400. Masden also testified that, “on all the items I examine, I place my mark for 

identification which includes the case number, my initials and employee number, along 

with the item number.” Id. Finally, Masden identified, by name, four evidence clerks in 

the Evansville and Indianapolis labs who had handled the evidence in the context of 

checking it in and/or storing it. There was no evidence that any of the challenged 

exhibits had been tampered with during the process of collecting, analyzing, or storing 

the items.

Still, Mayhugh contends that the lack of evidence “regarding the transfer of 

fungible evidence across the State of Indiana to another facility—a transfer that involved 

at least five persons”—shows that “an entire link in the chain of possession is missing in 

this case[.]” Appellant’s Br. at 16. Mayhugh avers that this court “should find that the 

potential for mistake, tampering, cross contamination and/or substitution is too great in 

this case.” Id. at 13. In support of that contention, Mayhugh cites to Graham v. State, 

253 Ind. 525, 255 N.E.2d 652 (1970), and Willis v. State, 528 N.E.2d 486 (Ind. Ct. App. 

1988). But those cases are inapposite here. In Graham, the State had lost track of 
9

fungible evidence for six days before conducting a “chemical examination” on it, and our 

supreme court held that that evidence should have been excluded at trial because of the 

“complete break in the chain of evidence.” 255 N.E.2d at 655. And in Willis, the 

undisputed evidence showed that an unknown person tampered with the fungible 

evidence at issue. 528 N.E.2d at 489.

Here, we hold that the State presented ample evidence strongly suggesting the 

exact whereabouts of the evidence at all times and giving reasonable assurances that the 

property passed through various hands in an undisturbed condition. See Culver, 727 

N.E.2d at 1067. Officer Martin testified regarding his procedures for collecting and 

packaging the evidence, and Hoffman and Masden testified regarding their procedures for 

conducting their analyses on the evidence, including resealing and labeling the evidence 

for storage and/or transport. This testimony provides adequate assurance that the 

evidence passed through the various hands in an undisturbed condition. Absent a 

showing by Mayhugh that more than a mere possibility of tampering existed, the State’s 

chain of custody must be deemed sufficient. Mayhugh has made no such showing and 

has therefore failed to rebut the presumption of proper handling. See Cliver, 666 N.E.2d 

at 63.

Shoe Print Comparison Testimony

Mayhugh next contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it permitted 

testimony “regarding the similarity of a shoe print on a fence rail, photographed in State’s 

Exhibit 53, to the shoe tread in another, comparable photograph.” Appellant’s Br. at 19. 
10

In particular, Officer Walker testified regarding a photograph of a portion of a shoe print 

found on a fence rail in Vaughn’s backyard and stated in relevant part as follows:

Q: Okay, and that appears to be a footprint, a tread?

A: It appears to be a pattern print of a shoe, yes.

Q: Okay, do you know if it’s similar to the one that was on the other 

picture?

A: It has similar characteristics, yes.

* * *

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Preliminary question, Officer did you take that 

photograph?

A: No I did not.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Did you observe that rail when the photograph 

was taken?

A: Yes I did.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Did you . . . test it for prints that day?

A: It was tested for prints that day.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: But you did not do it?

A: I did not do it.

Tr. at 139-40. Mayhugh objected to the testimony as follows: “I would object, Your 

Honor, he didn’t take, he didn’t examine this, only to take a photograph of it, I don’t 

think he can testify as to what may or may not have been on that fence.” Id. at 140. And 

Mayhugh moved that the trial court strike the “testimony about the comparison” of the 

shoe prints, but the trial court denied that motion. Id.
11

But, for the first time on appeal, Mayhugh contends that Officer Walker’s 

testimony was inadmissible because it “failed to meet the standard set out by our supreme 

court in McNary[ v. State, 460 N.E.2d 145 (Ind. 1984)].” Appellant’s Br. at 22. In 

McNary, our supreme court, quoting this court’s opinion in Johnson v. State, 177 Ind.

App. 501, 380 N.E.2d 566, 569 (1978), stated as follows:

“Evidence of the character of footprints found where the crime is 

discovered and of the similarity of those footprints to the shoes worn by the 

defendant is admissible to identify him as the guilty person. . . . For the 

reason that footprints are large and the points of similarity are obvious 

(contrasted with fingerprints or palm prints), expert testimony is not 

required and the comparison may properly be made a subject of non-expert 

testimony. A witness is generally allowed to give his opinion as to their 

similarity, provided he bases his conclusion on measurements or 

peculiarities of the footprints.”

(Emphasis in original.)

In support of his objection to Officer Walker’s testimony at trial, Mayhugh argued 

that Officer Walker had only observed the shoe print on the fence rail, but had not 

“examine[d]” it himself. Tr. at 140. Mayhugh did not argue to the trial court that Officer 

Walker’s testimony was inadmissible because he had not based his conclusion that the 

prints were similar on measurements or peculiarities of the prints. Nothing in McNary

prohibits comparison testimony based on evidence prepared or processed by someone 

else. It is well settled that a defendant may not object on one ground at trial and raise 

another on appeal; any such claim is waived. See Houser v. State, 823 N.E.2d 693, 698 

(Ind. 2005). Mayhugh has not preserved this issue for our review.
12

Issue Two: Sufficiency of the Evidence

Mayhugh next contends that the State did not present sufficient evidence to 

support his convictions for armed robbery, burglary, or theft. Because the trial court did 

not enter judgment of conviction on either the armed robbery or burglary guilty verdicts, 

we address only Mayhugh’s contentions with respect to his theft conviction. When 

considering whether the evidence is sufficient to support an appellant’s conviction, we 

neither reassess witness credibility nor reweigh the evidence, as those tasks are reserved 

to the fact-finder. Delagrange v. State, 5 N.E.3d 354, 356 (Ind. 2014). Rather, we 

consider only the evidence most favorable to the conviction, and we will affirm unless no 

reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable 

doubt. Id.

To prove theft, as a Class D felony, as charged, the State was required to show that

Mayhugh

did knowingly exert unauthorized control over the property of Keith 

Vaughn, to wit: lawful United States currency, with the intent to deprive

the said Keith Vaughn of the value and use thereof, by taking and 

possessing said item(s) without the knowledge or consent of the said Keith 

Vaughn, contrary to the form of the statutes in such cases made and 

provided by I.C. [§] 35-43-4-2(a) and against the peace and dignity of the 

State of Indiana.

Appellant’s App. at 19 (emphasis added). As Mayhugh points out, the State presented no 

evidence that he stole any money from Vaughn. Thus, Mayhugh contends, the evidence 

is insufficient to support his theft conviction. We must agree.

The trial court instructed the jury that it could convict Mayhugh for theft if it 

determined that he had stolen money from Vaughn. But, as the State acknowledged in its 
13

closing argument, “you don’t have much [evidence], if any to be honest, about cash being 

taken” from Vaughn. Tr. at 498-99. Nevertheless, on appeal, the State argues that the 

jury could have concluded that Mayhugh stole money from Vaughn because Mecum had 

planned to steal the $40,000 that Vaughn allegedly kept at his house and there was 

evidence that the trio had gone through drawers and looked under the mattress at 

Vaughn’s house the night of the murder. But the mere suspicion or possibility of guilt is 

not sufficient to sustain a conviction. Bunting v. State, 731 N.E.2d 31, 35 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2000), trans. denied. There is no factual basis in the record that would support a 

reasonable inference either that money was missing from Vaughn’s house or that

Mayhugh stole any money from Vaughn. We hold that the State did not present 

sufficient evidence to support Mayhugh’s conviction for theft as charged. We vacate 

Mayhugh’s theft conviction.1

Issue Three: Sentence

Finally, Mayhugh contends that his sentence is inappropriate in light of his 

character. Although a trial court may have acted within its lawful discretion in 

determining a sentence, Article VII, Sections 4 and 6 of the Indiana Constitution 

“authorize[ ] independent appellate review and revision of a sentence imposed by the trial 

court.” Roush v. State, 875 N.E.2d 801, 812 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (alteration original). 

This appellate authority is implemented through Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B). Id. 

Revision of a sentence under Appellate Rule 7(B) requires the appellant to demonstrate 

 

1

 Because we vacate Mayhugh’s theft conviction, we need not address his allegation that his 

convictions for felony murder and theft violate double jeopardy principles. Neither do we address 

Mayhugh’s contention that his conviction should be reversed because of a fatal variance between the 

information and proof at trial.
14

that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of his offenses and his character. 

See App. R. 7(B); Rutherford v. State, 866 N.E.2d 867, 873 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). We 

assess the trial court’s recognition or non-recognition of aggravators and mitigators as an 

initial guide to determining whether the sentence imposed was inappropriate. Gibson v. 

State, 856 N.E.2d 142, 147 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). However, “a defendant must persuade 

the appellate court that his or her sentence has met th[e] inappropriateness standard of 

review.” Roush, 875 N.E.2d at 812 (alteration original).

The Indiana Supreme Court has also stated that “sentencing is principally a 

discretionary function in which the trial court’s judgment should receive considerable 

deference.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222 (Ind. 2008). Indiana’s flexible 

sentencing scheme allows trial courts to tailor an appropriate sentence to the 

circumstances presented. See id. at 1224. The principal role of appellate review is to 

attempt to “leaven the outliers.” Id. at 1225. Whether we regard a sentence as 

inappropriate at the end of the day turns on “our sense of the culpability of the defendant, 

the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other facts that come to 

light in a given case.” Id. at 1224.

The trial court sentenced Mayhugh to sixty years. The sentencing range for 

murder is forty-five years to sixty-five years, with an advisory sentence of fifty-five 

years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-3. Mayhugh asks that we revise his sentence to fifty years.

Mayhugh makes no argument that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the 

nature of the offense. Mayhugh acknowledges that Vaughn, who was disabled, was 

“brutally murdered.” Appellant’s Br. at 32. But, he maintains, “this Court should still 
15

find that [Mayhugh]’s enhanced sentence is inappropriate in light of his character.” Id. 

In support of that contention, Mayhugh points out that this is his first felony conviction; 

he is a “loving” father of four children who “has always worked hard to support his 

family”; and he “completed the Celebrate Recovery program while incarcerated in the 

Vanderburgh County Jail, a Biblically-based 12-step recovery program.” Id. at 31.

But the State correctly points out that this court must consider both the nature of 

the offense and Mayhugh’s character in conducting an analysis under Appellate Rule 

7(b). And the State describes the circumstances of Vaughn’s murder as follows:

The pathologist who assisted the Vanderburgh County Coroner’s office, 

Elmo Griggs, testified that in addition to the fatal wound to the right side of 

Vaughn’s neck and head, which cut the jugular vein and carotid artery, 

Vaughn also suffered multiple additional cuts and stabs to his face and 

body, mostly in the upper chest, head and neck area. Vaughn also suffered 

hemorrhaging and bruising. Vaughn also suffered defensive wounds in the 

form of multiple cuts to his hands and fingers. Vaughn also suffered a 

dozen or more superficial cuts and stab wounds in and around his chin. A 

slash wound to the right side entered in through the orbit of his right eye. 

This one was consistent with a serrated knife. Vaughn bled to death, 

primarily from the fatal wound that penetrated the jugular and carotid, but 

before bleeding to death, and either before, or during, the time in which he 

suffered the additional dozen or more stabs and cuts, Vaughn was also 

strangled: a ligature mark on his neck, and a cord to the base of a cordless 

telephone wrapped around his neck, caused changes in his lungs that are 

consistent with suffocation and/or asphyxia, namely, petechial, or small 

hemorrhages to the lungs from broken capillaries, proving constriction of 

his airway. In other words, before bleeding to death, or while bleeding to 

death, Defendant and/or his accomplices inflicted upon Vaughn dozens of 

additional stabbing wounds including at least one to the eye, and strangled 

him on top of all of that. According to the pathologist, the one cut would 

have done the job, but Defendant and his accomplices went farther than 

what either death or the statute prohibiting murder would have required of 

them.

Appellee’s Br. at 27-28 (citations omitted). The State also points out that Mayhugh knew 

about Vaughn’s disability before the night of the murder. And the State also contends 
16

that Mayhugh’s allegations that he acted in self-defense or in defense of Levi are 

especially galling in light of Vaughn’s disability. We cannot say that Mayhugh’s 

sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense.

With respect to Mayhugh’s character, the State points out that he has admitted to 

an almost ten-year crack cocaine addiction and methamphetamine abuse. At the time of 

his arrest for Vaughn’s murder, Mayhugh was using methamphetamine once or twice per 

week. And, when asked about the quantity of methamphetamine he took “per sitting,” he 

stated, “Enough to get ****ed up.” Appellant’s App. at 113. Mayhugh’s criminal 

history consists of five misdemeanor convictions, including a conviction in 2001 for 

“Assault Caus[ing] Bodily Injury.” Id. at 115. And the presentence investigation report 

states that Mayhugh is “a high risk to re-offend.” Id. at 112. While Mayhugh’s criminal 

history is relatively minor, we cannot ignore his long history of untreated substance 

abuse, which reflects a very poor character. And Mayhugh’s sentence is not an outlier. 

We cannot say that Mayhugh’s sixty year sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature 

of the offense and his character.

Conclusion

The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted the challenged 

evidence at trial. But we hold that the State presented insufficient evidence to prove theft 

as charged, and we reverse Mayhugh’s theft conviction. Finally, Mayhugh’s sentence is 

not inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his character.

Affirmed in part and reversed in part.

VAIDIK, C.J., and BROWN, J., concur.