J-A11004-18

2018 PA Super 269

IN THE INTEREST OF: J.N.W. , A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT

OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: COMMONWEALTH OF 

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 1759 MDA 2017

Appeal from the Order Entered October 10, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County

Juvenile Division at No: CP-06-JV-0000457-2016

BEFORE: STABILE, J., NICHOLS, J., and PLATT, J.*

OPINION BY STABILE, J.: FILED OCTOBER 03, 2018

The Commonwealth appeals from the October 10, 2017 order entered 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County, Juvenile Division, granting the 

motion to suppress filed by Appellee, J.N.W., in relation to charges of 

endangering welfare of children (“EWOC”) and drug delivery resulting in death 

(“DDRD”).1 The Commonwealth argues that J.N.W. was not subjected to 

custodial interrogations at the time she provided statements to police and a 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 4304(a)(1) and 2506(a), respectively.
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deputy coroner, obviating the need for Miranda2 warnings. After careful 

review, we affirm.

At issue in this case are four statements given by J.N.W. in the days 

following events that occurred on May 18 and 19, 2016. In its December 22, 

2017 opinion, the suppression court issued its findings of fact, several of which 

reflected stipulations of the parties. Opinion, 12/22/17, at 1-6, ¶¶ 1-48. Our 

review confirms that the court’s factual findings are supported by the record 

with one clarification, as will be explained below. Although the underlying 

facts will be explored in more detail herein, we initially provide the following 

factual background based on our review of the suppression hearing transcripts 

and the DVD interview of J.N.W. conducted on May 23, 2016.

J.N.W. was nine days short of her eighteenth birthday on May 19, 2016, 

when her best friend, eighteen-year-old Nicholas Lintz (“Lintz”), died of a 

heroin overdose. In the hours before his death, Lintz and J.N.W. had snorted 

the heroin in the apartment where J.N.W. lived with her mother (“Janis”) and 

with J.N.W.’s three-year-old son (“E.W.”). Janis was in North Carolina at the 

time. E.W. was in the apartment with J.N.W. and Lintz.3 

At 4:41 a.m. on May 19, J.N.W. called 911 because Lintz was not 

breathing. Three officers from the Exeter Police Department responded to the 

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2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

3 E.W.’s father dropped the child off at J.N.W.’s apartment after J.N.W. 

purchased the heroin but before she and Lintz snorted it. 
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call. One of the officers, Officer Karen Grycon, comforted J.N.W. at a distance 

of approximately ten to fifteen feet from where the other officers and 

paramedics worked on Lintz, who was on the floor in the apartment’s 

bathroom when they arrived. J.N.W. initially denied drug use but then 

admitted that she and Lintz had snorted heroin she obtained through a friend 

and that Lintz had also consumed alcohol. She stated she flushed the 

packaging and what was left of the heroin down the toilet. She did not disclose 

the identity of the friend who supplied the heroin. Officer Grycon explained 

to J.N.W. that she would have to go to the hospital to be evaluated because 

she was a juvenile who had ingested heroin. Officer Grycon told J.N.W. to call 

E.W.’s father to come stay with the child while J.N.W. went to the hospital. 

J.N.W. was taken to Reading Hospital by EMS. See Notes of Testimony 

(“N.T.”), 7/22/17, at 6-14, 40. 

Lintz was transported to Reading Hospital where he was pronounced 

dead at 5:47 a.m. A deputy coroner received a call from the hospital about a 

possible overdose death. He conducted an examination, took photographs 

and drew materials for toxicology testing. He called the Exeter Police 

Department and was told no one from the department would be going to the 

hospital. At approximately 8:00 a.m., a nurse asked the coroner if he wished 

to speak with Lintz’s “girlfriend.” He went to J.N.W.’s room, identified himself, 

and told her wanted to find out what had happened before Lintz was taken to 

the hospital. She admitted to heroin use but declined to identify the source. 
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The coroner reported on his conversation to the police and indicated he would 

write up a report that included J.N.W.’s statements. 

J.N.W.’s grandfather picked her up from the hospital. J.N.W. then went 

to school. When three officers arrived at the school, J.N.W. was meeting with 

a counselor. The principal allowed the officers to interview J.N.W. in the 

principal’s office where they met for 15 to 20 minutes behind closed doors. 

The officers obtained information about how she and Lintz obtained the heroin, 

although J.N.W. did not disclose the name of the source. The officers also 

retrieved her cell phone, as authorized by Janis in a telephone conversation. 

The police subsequently obtained a search warrant for J.N.W.’s 

apartment and seized cell phones, iPads, laptops, and drug paraphernalia. In 

one of several telephone conversations between Janis and Exeter Police 

Detective Godshall, Janis agreed she would bring J.N.W. to the police station 

upon her return to Pennsylvania. 

On May 23, Janis and J.N.W. went to the Exeter Police Department 

where they met with Detectives Godshall and Gresh for a taped interview that 

last approximately one hour and twenty minutes. During that interview, 

J.N.W. recounted in detail the events of the evening of May 18 and early 

morning hours of May 19. She discussed calling her “connect” and meeting 

with her to purchase four bags of heroin for $45, but did not identify the 

“connect” because she did not want to “rat” on her. She related the warning 
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from the “connect” that the heroin was strong and that someone had 

overdosed on half a bag. 

On June 14, 2017, J.N.W. filed a motion to suppress statements. The 

suppression court held hearings on June 22 and July 18, 2017. At the 

conclusion of proceedings on July 18, the suppression court set a schedule for 

the filing of memoranda. On October 10, 2017, the suppression court issued 

its order granting the motion to suppress. The Commonwealth filed a timely 

appeal. Both the Commonwealth and the suppression court complied with 

Pa.R.A.P 1925.

In this appeal, the Commonwealth presents one issue for our 

consideration:

A. Did the suppression court err by concluding that J.N.W. was 

subjected to custodial interrogations where she was neither in 

custody nor asked questions likely to elicit incriminating 

responses?

Commonwealth Brief at 4.

In Commonwealth v. Korn, 139 A.3d 249 (Pa. Super. 2016), this 

Court explained:

Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to the 

suppression court’s granting of a suppression motion is well 

settled.

When the Commonwealth appeals from a suppression order, 

we follow a clearly defined standard of review and consider 

only the evidence from the defendant’s witnesses together 

with the evidence of the prosecution that, when read in the 

context of the entire record, remains uncontradicted. The 

suppression court’s findings of fact bind an appellate court 

if the record supports those findings. The suppression
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court’s conclusions of law, however, are not binding on an 

appellate court, whose duty is to determine if the 

suppression court properly applied the law to the facts. 

Commonwealth v. Miller, 56 A.3d 1276, 1278–1279 (Pa. Super. 

2012) (citations omitted). “Our standard of review is restricted to 

establishing whether the record supports the suppression court’s 

factual findings; however, we maintain de novo review over the 

suppression court's legal conclusions.” Commonwealth v. 

Brown, 606 Pa. 198, 996 A.2d 473, 476 (2010) (citation 

omitted).

Id. at 252-53.

In the instant case, the evidence presented by the defense included the 

stipulations of the parties4 and the testimony of J.N.W.’s mother, Janis. In 

her testimony, Janis explained that she had several conversations with 

Detective Godshall as she was making her way back to Pennsylvania from 

North Carolina. One conversation related to J.N.W.’s phone, which she 

authorized Detective Godshall to retrieve. “[H]e mentioned he was going to 

send someone over to the school to get the phone.” N.T., 7/18/17, at 46. 

She understood one officer would go and she did not give her consent for 

police to take J.N.W.’s statement at school. “All the conversations I had with 

Detective Godshall, we were waiting until I got back and I’d come to the police 

station.” Id. at 47. While it was her recollection that she took J.N.W. to the 

police station as soon as she arrived back in Pennsylvania, the record confirms 

____________________________________________

4 The stipulations of the parties were admitted as Defense Exhibit 1 on the 

first day of the suppression hearing. 
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the interview at the police station took place four days later, on May 23, 2016. 

Id. at 50-51.

The Commonwealth presented testimony of two police officers, two 

detectives, and the deputy coroner. In addition, the DVD of J.N.W.’s May 23 

interview was admitted at the hearing as Commonwealth Exhibit 1. For 

purposes of our review, we consider only the stipulations of the parties and 

Janis’ testimony, together with the evidence of the prosecution that, when 

read in the context of the entire record, remains uncontradicted. Korn, 139 

A.3d at 252. Again, this Court is bound by the suppression court’s findings of 

fact, to the extent they are supported in the record. Id. 

The suppression court’s opinion includes 48 specific findings of fact. Of 

those, 26 are based upon stipulations between the parties. We do not 

question any of those 26. The remaining 22 include citations to the record 

from the two days of hearings and from the DVD interview conducted at the 

Exeter Police Department on May 23, 2016. While we do not find that any of 

the 22 include misstatements of fact, we do believe that Finding of Fact 44 

requires clarification.

FINDING OF FACT 44
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According to Finding of Fact 44, “When [J.N.W.] asked if she could get 

in trouble for what she said, the police replied no. DVD.”5 This finding of fact 

warrants amplification. 

Detective Godshall informed J.N.W. that the “Good Samaritan law”6

would preclude any charges against her for using drugs because she called 

911 to report Lintz’s overdose and stayed with him until EMS personnel 

arrived. However, the detective also informed her she would not be immune 

from other forms of prosecution. On several occasions, both detectives 

mentioned that they would not do anything that would get her “in trouble” 

(using the suppression court’s word), but they could not speak for the District 

Attorney who might not be thrilled if she did not cooperate in identifying her 

“connect.” The detectives also noted she might be putting her baby at risk of 

going to foster care if she did not cooperate. Therefore, while the detectives 

told J.N.W. that she would not get “in trouble” with them, they did not tell her 

she would not be in trouble with the District Attorney. Finding of Fact 44 is 

accepted with that clarification. 

In sum, we are bound by the suppression court’s findings of fact to the 

extent they are supported by the record. We conclude the findings are 

____________________________________________

5 The suppression court referred to the DVD as the source of the exchange 

between J.N.W. and the police.

6 References to the “Good Samaritan law” refer to the Drug Overdose 

Response Immunity statute, 35 P.S. § 780-113.7, which provides immunity 

from prosecution for possessory offenses under certain circumstances. 
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supported by the record, as clarified above. We now turn to our de novo

review of the suppression court's legal conclusions.

In Commonwealth v. Freeman, 128 A.3d 1231 (Pa. Super. 2015), 

this Court explained:

It is a fundamental precept of constitutional law that a suspect 

subject to a custodial interrogation by police must be warned that 

he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says may be 

used against him in court, and that he is entitled to the presence 

of an attorney. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469, 86 S.Ct. 1602. If an 

individual is not advised of those rights prior to a custodial 

interrogation, any evidence obtained through the interrogation is 

inadmissible at trial. In re K.Q.M., 873 A.2d 752, 755 (Pa. Super. 

2005). The Miranda safeguards are triggered “whenever a 

person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its 

functional equivalent.” Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 

292, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980). Instantly, we focus 

our discussion upon whether Freeman was “in custody” for 

Miranda purposes at the time of his statement, because there is 

no doubt that [the detective’s] questioning constituted an 

interrogation. Innis, 446 U.S. at 292, 100 S.Ct. 1682 (defining 

interrogation to include express questioning and its functional 

equivalent).

We have explained that an individual is in custody for Miranda

purposes when he “is physically denied ... his freedom of action in 

any significant way or is placed in a situation in which he 

reasonably believes that his freedom of action or movement is 

restricted by the interrogation.” K.Q.M., 873 A.2d. at 755 (citing 

Commonwealth v. Williams, 539 Pa. 61, 650 A.2d 420, 427 

(1994)). “[T]he police officer’s subjective intent does not govern 

the [custody] determination,” instead we look to “the reasonable 

belief of the individual being interrogated.” Commonwealth v. 

Zogby, 455 Pa. Super. 621, 689 A.2d 280, 282 (1997). In order 

to ascertain the defendant’s reasonable belief, the reviewing court 

must consider the totality of circumstances, including factors such 

as “the basis for the detention; the duration; the location; whether 

the suspect was transferred against his will, how far, and why; 

whether restraints were used; the show, threat, or use of force; 

and the methods of investigation used to confirm or dispel 
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suspicions.” Commonwealth v. Busch, 713 A.2d 97, 101 (Pa. 

Super. 1998).

Id. at 1240-41. Further:

“[I]f a suspect makes a statement during custodial interrogation, 

the burden is on the Government to show, as a prerequisite to the 

statement’s admissibility in the Government’s case in chief, that 

the defendant voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently waived his 

rights.” J.D.B. v. North Carolina, [564 U.S. 261, 269-70] 

(2011) (internal quotations omitted).

The inquiry has two distinct dimensions. First the 

relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the 

sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice 

rather than intimidation, coercion or deception. Second, the 

waiver must have been made with a full awareness both of 

the nature of the right being abandoned and the 

consequences of the decision to abandon it. Only if the 

totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation 

reveal both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of 

comprehension may a court properly conclude that Miranda

rights have been waived. 

A determination of whether a juvenile knowingly waived his 

Miranda rights and made a voluntary confession is to be 

based on a consideration of the totality of the 

circumstances, including a consideration of the juvenile’s 

age, experience, comprehension and the presence or 

absence of an interested adult.

In re T.B., 11 A.3d 500, 505–506 (Pa. Super. 2010) (quotations, 

citations, and emphasis omitted).

In re B.T., 82 A.3d 431, 436 (Pa. Super. 2013).7 However, 

“[W]e acknowledge that the per se requirement of the presence 

of an interested adult during a police interview of a juvenile is no 

____________________________________________

7 The parties stipulated that J.N.W. had no prior experience with law 

enforcement. Stipulation #46. They also stipulated that J.N.W. was in the 

high school as of May 2016 “but has since graduated and at the time had a 

full academic scholarship to Albright College.” Stipulation #47. 
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longer required. Nevertheless, it remains one factor in 

determining the voluntariness of a juvenile’s waiver of his 

Miranda rights.” In the Interest of T.B., 11 A.3d [500, 507 

(Pa. Super. 2010)] (citing Commonwealth v. Williams, 504 Pa. 

511, 475 A.2d 1283 (1984)).

Commonwealth v. Knox, 50 A.3d 732, 746-47 (Pa. Super. 2012).

The suppression court examined each of the four encounters between 

J.N.W. and authorities and concluded J.N.W. was subjected to custodial 

interrogations and did not knowingly waive her Miranda rights. We consider 

each of the encounters separately as well.

QUESTIONING OF J.N.W. IN HER HOME

The suppression court determined J.N.W. was subjected to a custodial 

interrogation on the night of the incident and that her statements cannot 

represent a voluntary waiver of her Miranda rights. The court determined 

Officer Grycon “actively restricted” J.N.W.’s movements and refused to allow 

J.N.W. to leave her home “even when [she] expressed her desire to do so.” 

Opinion, 12/22/17, at 7. Further, the court noted her psychological state, 

which it concluded would have inhibited her ability to make a rational waiver 

of her rights, and also commented that no adult was present in the home. Id. 

Therefore, the court determined the statements made that night were to be 

suppressed. 

Officers Grycon and Loder testified about their interaction with J.N.W. 

on the night in question. Officer Grycon explained J.N.W. was “crying and 

upset and very agitated and upset.” N.T., 6/22/17, at 6. Officer Grycon 
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testified she tried to comfort J.N.W. and keep her away from Lintz so the other 

officers and paramedics could work on him. Id. at 6-7. Officer Grycon 

testified that J.N.W. admitted heroin and alcohol consumption, after first 

denying that Lintz had consumed anything. However, once she admitted to 

heroin use, she would not disclose the source of the heroin. Id. at 7-8. 

Counsel for J.N.W. stipulated that neither Officer Grycon nor any other officer 

on the scene handcuffed or otherwise restrained J.N.W. While neither officer 

informed J.N.W. that she was not free to leave, she was advised she would 

have to be checked out at the hospital because she was a juvenile and had 

possibly consumed bad drugs. Id. at 9-10. Officer Grycon advised J.N.W. to 

contact E.W.’s father to come to the apartment and stay with the child while 

J.N.W. was at the hospital. Id. at 10. Officer Grycon acknowledged her 

“concern was this 3-year-old little boy in bed and . . . [t]hey are doing drugs 

when he’s there. I wanted to make sure he was okay. . . . And I said, so you 

are here doing drugs and with this 3-year-old? That was my concern with the 

3-year-old.” Id. at 16. 

While the presence of an interested adult is no longer a per se 

requirement during a police interview of a juvenile, it remains a factor in 

determining whether the juvenile voluntarily waived Miranda rights. Knox, 

50 A.3d at 746-47. Considering the totality of the circumstances surrounding 

the interview of a visibly upset J.N.W. on the night of Lintz’s death, including 

questioning about the source of the drugs and snorting drugs while a three-
J-A11004-18

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year old child was in the apartment, and the directive to call the child’s father 

to come to the apartment because, as a juvenile, she had to go to the hospital 

to be checked out, we find no error of law in the suppression court’s conclusion 

that J.N.W. was subjected to a custodial interrogation and that she did not 

knowingly waive her Miranda rights. 

QUESTIONING OF J.N.W. AT THE HOSPITAL

J.N.W. was taken by EMS to Reading Hospital to be evaluated. While 

there, the deputy coroner—a former police officer with approximately 26 

years’ experience on the force—was present at the hospital in response to a 

report of Lintz’s overdose death. After conducting tests, the coroner was 

asked if he would like to speak with Lintz’s “girlfriend” before she went home. 

After contacting the Exeter Police Department and being advised no one from 

the department would be going to the hospital, the coroner went to her room, 

identified himself as being from the coroner’s office, and told her he “was just 

trying to find out what events occurred that led to the death.” N.T., 6/22/17, 

at 32. 

J.N.W. told the coroner that she and Lintz each got two bags of heroin 

and they did the heroin before having sex. The coroner “wanted to ask a little 

more detail on that. I asked who she got the heroin from and how they came 

to get it.” Id. at 35. She told him that she used her cell phone to call the 

person to get heroin but did not reveal the identity of the person she called. 

Id. at 35-36. J.N.W. told the coroner she was 17. Id. at 37. She also told 
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him that E.M.S. personnel took her to the hospital but she did not want to go. 

Id. at 40. 

Of note is a stipulation between the parties that “[w]hile at the hospital 

[J.N.W.] expressed that she wanted to leave but a nurse and then a doctor 

told her that she couldn’t leave.” Stipulation #11. Further, although the 

deputy coroner testified that he identified himself as such, J.N.W. was under 

the misimpression that he was a police detective, as reflected on the DVD 

memorializing her fourth interview. 

We agree with J.N.W. that this case is similar to In re C.O., 84 A.3d 

726 (Pa. Super. 2014), where this Court determined that a caseworker was 

required to provide Miranda warnings to a resident she was investigating in 

a juvenile detention center. Although the caseworker was not a police officer, 

she was investigating the juvenile and her questions elicited incriminating 

responses forming the basis of prosecution. Id. at 736. As this Court 

recognized in Commonwealth v. Heggins, 809 A.2d 908 (Pa. Super. 2002), 

“Under certain circumstances, individuals who are not law enforcement 

personnel nevertheless possess the status of law enforcement for purposes of 

custodial interrogation.” Id. at 914 (citing Commonwealth v. Chacko, 459 

A.2d 311, 313-14 (Pa. 1983) (director at a state correctional institution 

assumed investigatory duties when questioning defendant about his 

involvement in a crime)). Similarly, a custodial interrogation occurred when 

a Children and Youth Services’ (“CYS”) caseworker secured a confession from 
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a defendant in a child molestation case because “CYS is not only a treatment 

agency, but is the investigating arm of the statewide system of Child 

Protective Services.” Commonwealth v. Ramos, 532 A.2d 465, 468 (Pa. 

Super. 1987)). Cf. Heggins, 809 A.2d at 916 (counselors at treatment were 

not equivalent of law enforcement for Miranda purposes because they were 

providing treatment, not conducting an investigation, and defendant was 

aware his statement would be reported to law enforcement)

This Court has recognized that a coroner in Pennsylvania has powers 

that make the coroner part of the Commonwealth’s criminal investigation 

team. Commonwealth v. Anderson, 385 A.2d 365, 371-72 (Pa. Super. 

1978) (en banc). For instance, a coroner is charged with investigating facts 

and circumstances of deaths occurring under suspicious circumstances, 

including those in which drugs may have had a direct bearing on the outcome. 

16 P.S. § 1237(a)(2). “The purpose of the investigation shall be to determine 

the cause of any such death and to determine whether or not there is sufficient 

reason for the coroner to believe that any such death may have resulted from 

criminal acts or criminal neglect of persons other than the deceased.” 16 P.S. 

§ 1237(b). Further, “[i]n the exercise of [the coroner’s duties], the coroner 

shall, so far as may be practicable, consult and advise with the district 

attorney.” 16 P.S. § 1242. 

As J.N.W. notes, rather than inform J.N.W. about Lintz’s death and 

question her about the cause of death, he instead asked questions about the 
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person who provided the heroin, a line of questioning not designed to lead to

a determination of death. Appellee’s Brief at 20. The nature of his questions, 

coupled with the fact J.N.W. did not want to remain at the hospital and was 

reluctant to answer questions, and the fact the coroner reported on his 

interview of J.N.W. to law enforcement, supports the conclusion J.N.W. was 

subjected to a custodial interrogation while at the hospital. 

Considering the totality of the circumstances, we agree with the 

suppression court that J.N.W. was in custody for Miranda purposes at the 

hospital. Therefore, we find no error in the court’s determination that 

statements J.N.W. made in the hospital must be suppressed. 

QUESTIONING OF J.N.W. AT SCHOOL

Three officers, including Detective Gresh, arrived at J.N.W.’s school to 

retrieve her cellphone. Prior to that encounter, Janis authorized sending an 

officer to retrieve J.N.W.’s phone. As Janis testified at the suppression 

hearing, she did not authorize an interview of her daughter at the time, 

understanding that an interview would be conducted when Janis returned to 

Pennsylvania. 

When the officers arrived at the school, J.N.W. was meeting with a 

counselor. She was taken to the principal’s office where the officers 

interviewed her behind a closed door for approximately 15 to 20 minutes. 

During the interview, the officers attempted to obtain information regarding 

the source of the heroin and explained they were trying to prevent additional 
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deaths. N.T., 7/18/17, at 5-6, 11, 13. Detective Gresh acknowledged that 

J.N.W. was “very apprehensive” in her responses to their requests for 

information regarding the source of the heroin. Id. at 11. She eventually 

identified the person as a female who was known to her but would not identify 

the female because she did not want to be a “rat.” Id. at 11-13. During the 

course of the interview, J.N.W. was stoic and made little eye contact. Id. at 

14-15. 

Considering the totality of the circumstances, we find that J.N.W. did 

not waive her Miranda rights when she was interviewed behind closed doors 

by three officers mere hours after Lintz’s death. Again, her mother, who was 

on the road on the way back from North Carolina, authorized police only to 

retrieve J.N.W.’s cell phone. She did not authorize officers to interview her 

daughter. We agree with the suppression court the interview at school 

constituted a custodial interrogation and that J.N.W. did not waive her 

Miranda rights. We find no error of law in the suppression court’s 

conclusions. 

QUESTIONING OF J.N.W. AT EXETER POLICE DEPARTMENT

J.N.W. and her mother Janis met with Detectives Godshall and Gresh 

for an interview at the police station four days after Lintz’s death. J.N.W. did 

not want to go to the interview but Janis told her she “had to go.” Id. at 48. 

Janis was present for the duration of the interview and did tell J.N.W., prior to 
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the officers entering the room, that she did not need a lawyer because she 

was being interviewed only as a witness.8 

At the outset of the interview, the officers allowed J.N.W. to detail, 

without interruption, the events of May 18 and 19, and she did not appear 

reluctant to do so, although she clearly was not interested in disclosing the 

identity of her “connect.” Nevertheless, the officers continued to question

J.N.W. about the source of the heroin despite J.N.W.’s insistence that she did 

not want to be a “rat” or a “snitch.” While the officers tried to assure her that 

the “connect” would not know who identified her, J.N.W. stated, “I would 

know.” D.V.D., 5/23/17, at time stamp 18:42 (approximate). 

While the interview likely did not rise to the level of a custodial 

interrogation initially, the officers made references to CYS and continued to 

press J.N.W. on the identity of her “connect” while mentioning that the District 

Attorney would be looking at EWOC charges.9 On a number of occasions, 

Detective Godshall made remarks to the effect that the District Attorney would 

not be thrilled with her refusal to identify the source of the heroin. He also 

mentioned that the Good Samaritan Law would provide her immunity relating 

____________________________________________

8 The basis for Janis’ belief that J.N.W. was being interviewed “only as a 

witness” is not evident from the record. 

9 Stipulation #41 provides “The police told J.N.W. that delivery of drugs is 

illegal and this conversation will go to the District Attorney and to CYS, and 

that J.N.W. cold be charged with [EWOC] and that if J.N.W. did not reveal the 

name of the person who had brought the heroin that the District Attorney 

would see that as not cooperating.”
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to the use of drugs but would not make her immune from other forms of 

prosecution. He suggested they were not “making” J.N.W. help them. Id. at 

time stamp 18:50 (approximate). He later commented that if she identified 

the source, nothing would happen but if she did not, “bad stuff will happen.” 

Id. at time stamp 19:13 (approximate). Toward the end of the interview, he 

told her that the goal was her welfare and the welfare of her child and that 

her future and the future of her child hinged on the choices she made when 

she walked out the door. Id. at time stamp 19:18-19:20 (approximate). He 

reminded her that kids of addicts are removed from their parents and placed 

in foster care. Id. at time stamp 19:23 (approximate). She commented that 

she felt she was being blackmailed. Stipulation #44. 

The suppression court concluded that “[t]he officers’ demeanor, her 

mother’s own urging for her to answer the questions posed, her demonstrated 

reluctance to do so, and the very lengthy interview time all weigh toward 

[J.N.W.’s] statements not constituting a voluntary waiver.” Opinion, 

12/22/17, at 10. We agree. Considering the totality of the circumstances, 

including the several threatening references to possible charges against her 

and possible removal of her son from her care, we find no error in the 

suppression court’s conclusion. 

Based on our review, we conclude the suppression court properly 

applied the law to the facts of this case. Finding no error of the law in the 
J-A11004-18

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court’s grant of J.N.W.’s suppression motion, we shall affirm the suppression 

court’s order.

Order affirmed. 

Judge Platt joins this opinion.

Judge Nichols concurs in the result.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/03/2018