[Cite as State v. Snider, 2011-Ohio-889.]

COURT OF APPEALS 

STARK COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

STATE OF OHIO 

 Plaintiff-Appellee 

-vsSTEVEN L. SNIDER 

 Defendant-Appellant 

JUDGES: 

: Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J. 

: Hon. Sheila G. Farmer, J. 

: Hon. Julie A. Edwards, J. 

: 

: 

: Case No. 2010-CA-00128 

: 

: 

: O P I N I O N

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Criminal appeal from the Stark County 

Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 2008-

CR-0583 

JUDGMENT: Affirmed 

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: February 22, 2011 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant 

JOHN FERRERO RICHARD DRAKE 

PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 303 Courtyard Centre 

BY: RONALD MARK CALDWELL 116 Cleveland Avenue N.W. 

110 Central Plaza South, Ste. 510 Canton, OH 44702 

Canton, OH 44702
[Cite as State v. Snider, 2011-Ohio-889.]

Gwin, P.J. 

{¶1} Appellant Steven Lee Snider appeals his conviction for felonious assault 

and domestic violence in the Stark County Court of Common Pleas. The relevant facts 

underlying appellant’s case are set forth in State v. Snider, Stark App. No. 2008 CA 

000147, 2009-Ohio-3427. 

STATEMENT OF THE CASE 

{¶2} Appellant was indicted on a charge of felonious assault and domestic 

violence. After hearing the evidence and receiving instructions from the trial court, the 

jury returned a verdict finding appellant guilty as charged in the indictment. The jury 

further found that appellant had two prior convictions for domestic violence, one in 2003 

and the other in 2005. As memorialized in a Journal Entry filed on June 27, 2008, 

appellant was sentenced to an aggregate prison sentence of thirteen (13) years. His 

conviction and sentence were affirmed by this Court. State v. Snider, Stark App. No. 

2008 CA 000147, 2009-Ohio-3427. However, the sentencing entry filed by the trial 

court did not properly inform the appellant of the length of post release control. 

{¶3} On April 12, 2010 appellant filed a “Motion to Impose Lawful Sentence on 

Defendant” citing the trial court’s failure to properly impose post-release control as part 

of appellant’s original sentence. By Judgment Entry filed May 5, 2010, the trial court 

denied appellant’s motion as moot as the Court held a Video Re-sentencing Hearing 

pursuant to R.C. 2929.191 on May 3, 2010. The court issued a journal entry on May 6, 

2010 reflecting the re-sentencing. 

{¶4} Appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, raising via appointed counsel, 

the following five assignment of error for our consideration: 
Stark County, Case No. 2010-CA-00128 3 

{¶5} “I. THE APPELLANT WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO TRIAL BY AN 

IMPARTIAL JURY. 

{¶6} “II. THE APPELLANT WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE 

ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.” 

{¶7} “III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY PERMITTING A NON-EXPERT 

WITNESS TO GIVE AN OPINION OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF EVID. R. 701. 

{¶8} “IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING CONSECUTIVE 

SENTENCES WITHOUT MAKING FINDINGS AS REQUIRED BY R.C. §2929.14(E)(4). 

{¶9} “V. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING OF GUILTY WAS AGAINST THE 

MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE AND WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY 

SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE.” 

{¶10} Additionally, appellant has filed a brief pro se in which he raises as an 

additional assignment of error: 

{¶11} “I. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE AND PREJUDICIAL 

ERROR IN FAILING TO ALLOW APPELLANT THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO 

PROCEED PRO-SE.” 

JURISDICTION TO CONSIDER APPELLANT'S FIRST THROUGH FIFTH 

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR RAISED BY APPOINTED COUNSEL AND 

APPELLANT’S SINGLE PRO SE ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR. 

{¶12} Appellant argues that a direct appeal from a void sentence is a legal nullity 

and a defendant's appeal following resentencing is actually a defendant's first appeal as 

of right. Therefore, appellant argues that, even though this Court reviewed the merits of 

the arguments that he had raised in his first direct appeal relating to his conviction he 
Stark County, Case No. 2010-CA-00128 4 

now has the right to assert additional arguments relating to his conviction following his 

resentencing. We disagree. 

{¶13} In State v. Fischer (Dec. 23. 2010), Ohio Sup. Ct. No. 2009-0897, __Ohio 

St.3d__, __N.E.2d__, 2010-Ohio-6238, the Ohio Supreme Court specifically precluded 

the raising of such legal claims in an appeal from a post-release control resentencing 

hearing. The Supreme Court held that "[a]lthough the doctrine of res judicata does not 

preclude review of a void sentence, res judicata applies to other aspects of the merits of 

a conviction, including the determination of guilt and the lawful elements of the ensuing 

sentence. Thus, "[t]he scope of an appeal from a resentencing hearing in which a 

mandatory term of post release control is imposed is limited to issues arising at the 

resentencing hearing."‘ Id. at ¶ 40. 

{¶14} Further, the Ohio Supreme Court has rejected the argument that a void 

sentence is a legal nullity and a defendant's appeal following resentencing for post 

release control errors was his first appeal as of right. In State v. Ketterer, Donald 

Ketterer had been convicted of capital and noncapital offenses. 126 Ohio St.3d 448, 

935 N.E.2d 9, 2010-Ohio-3831. The Ohio Supreme Court held that the trial court 

properly denied the motion to withdraw Ketterer's guilty pleas. Because mandatory post 

release control was not properly imposed, however, the Court remanded the case for 

the trial court to conduct a hearing under R.C. 2929.191. While the case was on 

remand for resentencing, Ketterer filed a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. (Id. at ¶ 

55). In response, the state argued that res judicata barred Ketterer's motion to withdraw 

his guilty pleas because on the first appeal, the Supreme Court rejected his attacks on 

his pleas. (Id. at ¶ 59). 
Stark County, Case No. 2010-CA-00128 5 

{¶15} The Court agreed noting, “In Ketterer's first appeal, this court considered 

most of the claims that Ketterer raised on remand as a basis to withdraw his guilty pleas 

... Thus, res judicata was a valid basis for rejecting these claims.” (Id. at ¶ 60). 

Furthermore, the Court found, “In addition, the state invokes State ex rel. Special 

Prosecutors v. Judges, Belmont Cty. Court of Common Pleas (1978), 55 Ohio St.2d 94, 

97-98, 9 O.O.3d 88, 378 N.E.2d 162, to argue that the court lacked jurisdiction to vacate 

Ketterer's guilty pleas. In Special Prosecutors, this court held that ‘Crim.R. 32.1 does 

not vest jurisdiction in the trial court to maintain and determine a motion to withdraw the 

guilty plea subsequent to an appeal and an affirmance by the appellate court. While 

Crim.R. 32.1 apparently enlarges the power of the trial court over its judgments without 

respect to the running of the court term, it does not confer upon the trial court the power 

to vacate a judgment which has been affirmed by the appellate court, for this action 

would affect the decision off the reviewing court, which is not within the power of the trial 

court to do.’ Id. at 97-98, 9 O.O.3d 88, 378 N.E.2d 162. 

{¶16} “On appeal, this court affirmed Ketterer's convictions and death sentence. 

State v. Ketterer, 111 Ohio St.3d 70, 2006-Ohio-5283, 855 N.E.2d 48, ¶ 12. Ketterer's 

appeal was later reopened and his case was remanded for the limited purpose of 

resentencing him on his noncapital offenses, 113 Ohio St.3d 1463, 2007-Ohio-1722, 

864 N.E.2d 650. Under the authority of Special Prosecutors, the panel had no authority 

to consider Ketterer's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, let alone grant him a new 

trial.” Ketterer 126 Ohio St.3d at 460, 935 N.E.2d at 22, 2010-Ohio-3831 at ¶ 61-62. 
Stark County, Case No. 2010-CA-00128 6 

{¶17} We note that in the case at bar, the trial court originally sentenced 

appellant on June 10, 2008 after the effective date of R.C. 2929.191. See, State v. 

Nichols, Richland App. No.2009CA0111, 2010-Ohio-3104 at ¶ 15. 

{¶18} In this appeal, however, appellant does not raise any challenge to the 

2010 sentencing hearing, but instead raises issues related to his original trial. 

{¶19} In the case at bar, we find as we did in Nichols, supra, “that an appeal 

from a re-sentencing entry for sentences imposed after July 11, 2006, is limited to 

issues concerning the re-sentencing procedure. Under these circumstances, we find 

that an appellant may not raise additional arguments relating to his conviction following 

his resentencing.” (Id. at ¶ 19). Res judicata is a valid basis for rejecting these claims. 

Ketterer, supra. Accordingly, appellant is not entitled to a second appeal as of right 

from the trial court original sentencing entry filed June 10, 2008. 

{¶20} Appellant's first, second, third, fourth, and fifth assignments of error raised 

by appointed counsel and appellant’s sole pro se assignment of error are dismissed. 
Stark County, Case No. 2010-CA-00128 7 

{¶21} Accordingly, the judgment of the Stark County Court of Common Pleas is 

affirmed. 

By Gwin, P.J., 

Farmer, J., and 

Edwards, J., concur 

 

 _________________________________ 

 HON. W. SCOTT GWIN 

 _________________________________ 

 HON. SHEILA G. FARMER 

 _________________________________ 

 HON. JULIE A. EDWARDS 

 

WSG:clw 0204 
[Cite as State v. Snider, 2011-Ohio-889.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR STARK COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

STATE OF OHIO : 

 : 

 Plaintiff-Appellee : 

 : 

 : 

-vs- : JUDGMENT ENTRY 

 : 

STEVEN L. SNIDER : 

 : 

 : 

 Defendant-Appellant : CASE NO. 2010-CA-00128 

 For the reasons stated in our accompanying Memorandum-Opinion, the 

judgment of the Stark County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. Costs to appellant. 

 _________________________________ 

 HON. W. SCOTT GWIN 

 _________________________________ 

 HON. SHEILA G. FARMER 

 _________________________________ 

 HON. JULIE A. EDWARDS