2015 IL App (1st) 133433 

 SIXTH DIVISION

 March 20, 2015 

 No. 1-13-3433 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the 

 ) Circuit Court of 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County. 

 ) 

v. ) No. 05 CR 3179 

 ) 

FRANK GOLEN, ) Honorable 

 ) Colleen Ann Hyland, 

Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge Presiding. 

 JUSTICE LAMPKIN delivered the judgment of the court with opinion. 

 Presiding Justice Hoffman and Justice Hall concurred in the judgment and opinion. 

OPINION 

&1 Defendant, Frank Golen, appeals from the trial court's resentencing order following this 

court's mandate remanding the cause for resentencing because we found defendant's initial 

concurrent sentence entered on a negotiated guilty plea was void. People v. Golen, 2012 IL App 

(1st) 102862-U. Defendant contends the trial court had authority to impose a sentence less than 

the aggregate initially imposed; therefore, the trial court erred by failing to order a presentence 

investigation report and his counsel was ineffective for failing to advocate for a lower sentence. 

In addition, defendant contends the trial court erred by failing to provide admonishments 

pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 605(c) (eff. Oct. 1, 2001). Based on the following, we 

affirm. 
1-13-3433 

2 

&2 FACTS

&3 Defendant was charged by indictment with multiple counts of first degree murder, armed 

robbery, and possession of a stolen motor vehicle in connection with the December 27, 2004, 

murder of the 70-year-old victim, wherein the victim was bludgeoned to death and had his 

wallet, keys, and car stolen. On December 20, 2005, defendant entered a negotiated plea of 

guilty to first degree murder and armed robbery. Prior to sentencing, defendant waived his right 

to a presentence investigation report both verbally and in writing. He was sentenced to 

concurrent terms of 45 years' imprisonment on the murder charge and 25 years' imprisonment on 

the armed robbery charge. The trial court admonished defendant of his appeal rights, including 

the need to first file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea and the right to assistance of counsel in 

the preparation of that motion. Defendant did not file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 

&4 On September 29, 2008, defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition alleging that he 

was denied effective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to seek a fitness hearing 

despite knowing defendant was taking psychotropic medication. The petition was docketed and 

defendant was appointed counsel. Postconviction counsel filed a supplemental petition alleging 

trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and adequately consult with defendant, for 

misinforming and misleading defendant concerning the agreed sentence, and for coercing him 

into pleading. Postconviction counsel additionally alleged defendant's plea was not voluntary 

and knowing. Postconviction counsel maintained defendant's plea should be vacated and the 

charges reset for a new trial. The State filed a motion to dismiss defendant's postconviction 

petition. Following a hearing, the trial court granted the State's motion to dismiss. Defendant 

appealed.
1-13-3433 

3 

&5 On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court erred in dismissing his postconviction 

petition where he made a substantial showing that his trial counsel was ineffective and that his 

guilty plea was not voluntary and knowing. In addition, defendant argued, for the first time, that 

his concurrent sentences were void because the relevant sentencing statute (730 ILCS 5/5-8-

4(a)(i) (West 2004)) required the imposition of consecutive sentences. On August 7, 2012, in an 

unpublished order, this court affirmed the trial court's finding that defendant failed to 

substantially show his trial counsel was ineffective and his guilty plea was not knowing and 

voluntary. People v. Golen, 2012 IL App (1st) 102862-U, ¶ 33. With regard to the argument 

that defendant's sentence was void, this court agreed, relying on People v. Donelson, 2011 IL 

App (1st) 092594, aff'd, 2013 IL 113603. This court explicitly found that defendant's plea 

agreement was enforceable because he pleaded guilty in exchange for a total of 45 years' 

imprisonment and, given the sentencing ranges for murder and armed robbery, namely, 20 to 60 

years and 6 to 30 years, respectively, he could be sentenced properly to consecutive terms 

totaling 45 years' imprisonment consistent with section 5-8-4(a)(i) of the Unified Code of 

Corrections (Code) (730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(a)(i) (West 2004)). Golen, 2012 IL App (1st) 102862-U, 

¶ 25. This court provided that "we find that the appropriate remedy is to enforce the overall plea 

agreement consistent with the relevant statute by vacating the void sentence and remanding for 

resentencing to a total prison term, with mandatory consecutive sentencing, of not more than 45 

years." Id. 

&6 On remand, the trial court stated that this court issued a mandate wherein defendant's 

sentence was vacated and the trial court was to resentence defendant "in order to impose 

consecutive sentences with an aggregate cap of 45 years' imprisonment." Defendant's attorney 

and the State were provided time to confer off the record. When the proceeding resumed on the 
1-13-3433 

4 

record, the trial court asked whether the State and defense had "a disposition that pursuant to 

[the] mandate that you are agreeing to." The State responded, "the armed robbery with a Class X 

would carry a minimum of 6 years. To reach the aggregate sentence, the sentence on the murder 

would have to be 39 years to reach the 45." Defense counsel responded, "That's correct, Your 

Honor." The trial court then stated the following:

 "Mr. Golen, pursuant to the mandate of the Appellate Court you are resentenced to 39 years in the Illinois Department of Corrections on the First 

Degree Murder Charge which is Count [II]. You'll receive a credit of 3,198 days 

towards that sentence. The sentence you receive on Count [II] must be served at a 

calculable rate of a hundred percent. And this sentence will run consecutive to 

the sentence that you received on Count [VII], the Armed Robbery Charge, in 

which you will be re-sentenced to six years in the Illinois Department of 

Corrections. And that sentence is served at an 85 percent calculable rate.

 *** 

 And, obviously, you have the right to appeal this re-sentencing. If you 

choose to do so, you must do so within 30 days of today's date. You must file a 

written motion setting forth all grounds why you wish to have your sentence 

reconsidered, and anything you fail or forget to put in that motion would be 

waived or given up for all times. 

 If that motion were denied, you would have 30 days from the date of 

denial to file any notice of appeal. And if you choose not to file a motion to 

reconsider the sentence, you have 30 days from today's date to file your notice of 

appeal."
1-13-3433 

5 

&7 Defendant did not file any postsentencing motions in the trial court. This appeal 

followed. 

&8 ANALYSIS

&9 The issues presented in this case involve questions of law, which we review de novo. 

People v. Breedlove, 213 Ill. 2d 509, 512 (2004). 

&10 I. Scope of Remand for Resentencing

&11 Defendant contends this court's August 7, 2012, mandate ordering his resentencing on 

remand gave the trial court the authority to resentence him to a term of less than 45 years' 

imprisonment. As a result, defendant contends the trial court was required to order a presentence 

investigation report pursuant to section 5-3-1of the Code (730 ILCS 5/5-3-1 (West 2004)). 

Defendant maintains the trial court's failure to do so was error. Defendant additionally contends 

that his resentencing counsel was ineffective where counsel agreed with the State that a total 

term of 45 years' imprisonment was necessary instead of advocating for a sentence of less than 

45 years. 

&12 In order to address defendant's contentions, we first turn to the express language of this 

court's mandate, which established the purpose and scope of the proceedings on remand. This 

court's August 7, 2012, order provided, "we find that the appropriate remedy is to enforce the 

overall plea agreement consistent with the relevant statute by vacating the void sentence and 

remanding for resentencing to a total prison term, with mandatory consecutive sentencing, of not 

more than 45 years. Donelson, [2011 IL App (1st) 092594, ¶¶] 15, 18-19." Golen, 2012 IL App 

(1st) 102862-U, ¶ 25. Later in the order, this court concluded, "[b]ased on the foregoing, we 

vacate defendant's sentences and remand to the trial court for resentencing to impose consecutive 
1-13-3433 

6 

sentences with an aggregate cap of 45 years' imprisonment and affirm the judgment in all other 

respects." Id. ¶ 34. 

&13 Defendant's contentions rely on the faulty premise that the trial court was authorized to 

impose a sentence of less than 45 years. We recognize that the State agreed with this premise in 

its appellate brief; however, we find the language of the mandate does not support the parties' 

belief. This court's mandate instructed the trial court to sentence defendant to "not more than" 

and "an aggregate cap of" 45 years; the mandate did not state that defendant's sentence can be 

less than 45 years. "The trial court has no authority to act beyond the dictates of the mandate." 

PSL Realty Co. v. Granite Investment Co., 86 Ill. 2d 291, 309 (1981); People ex rel. Daley v. 

Schreier, 92 Ill. 2d 271, 276 (1982) ("a trial court must obey the clear and unambiguous 

directions in a mandate issued by a reviewing court"). In fact, a sentence of less than 45 years 

would violate an essential term of the parties' negotiated plea agreement and would prevent the 

State from receiving the benefit of its bargain. 

&14 The supreme court has stated that a plea agreement is commensurate to an enforceable 

contract and contract law principles may be applied in appropriate circumstances. Donelson, 

2013 IL 113603, ¶ 18. The supreme court advised: 

"Where a plea rests in any significant degree upon a promise or agreement 

of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or 

consideration for the plea, that feature of the agreement must be fulfilled. 

[Citation.] The principal inquiry, in that respect, is whether the defendant has 

received the benefit of his bargain. [Citation.] Though rarely emphasized in this 

court's jurisprudence, the other half of the contractual equation is the benefit of 

the bargain accruing to the State, a consideration that looms larger as the temporal 
1-13-3433 

7 

gap between the commission of the offenses and attempts to withdraw the guilty 

plea widens." Id. ¶ 19. 

&15 Here, similar to the circumstances in Donelson, defendant and the State mistakenly 

agreed to a plea that included concurrent prison terms. However, where the parties were in 

agreement and their true intent is discernible, contract principles provide that the "parties' mutual 

mistake may be rectified by recourse to contract reformation." Id. ¶ 20. There is no dispute that 

the parties were in agreement that defendant would plead guilty to first degree murder and armed 

robbery in exchange for concurrent terms of 45 years' imprisonment on the murder charge and 25 

years' imprisonment on the armed robbery charge. Therefore, the parties' intent was that 

defendant would serve no more than 45 years. In line with Donelson, this court remanded for 

resentencing in accordance with the plea agreement and applicable statutes. The supreme court 

has since applied Donelson to a similar procedural situation in People v. Taylor, 2015 IL 117267, 

¶¶ 26-27. In so doing, the supreme court concluded that the defendant's sentence could be 

"reconfigured" to comply with the applicable statutes while also providing both the defendant 

and the State with the benefits of their bargains. Id. ¶ 27; see also Donelson, 2013 IL 113603, 

¶ 27 ("defendant's sentence can be reconfigured, consistently with statutory mandates, in such a 

way as to give him the benefit of his bargain"). Based on the supreme court's direction to 

"reconfigure" a sentence under circumstances such as those presented in the case before us, we 

conclude that the trial court had no discretion to depart from the terms of the parties' contract and 

could not impose an aggregate sentence of less than 45 years' imprisonment. 

&16 We recognize that this court's August 7, 2012, mandate differed from Donelson in the 

exact language provided, namely, here, this court instructed the trial court to resentence 

defendant to "not more than" or "an aggregate cap of" 45 years' imprisonment, while the 
1-13-3433 

8 

Donelson mandate instructed the trial court to resentence the defendant "to a total prison term, 

with mandatory consecutive sentencing, of 50 years" (Donelson, 2011 IL App (1st) 092594, 

¶ 19). However, contrary to the parties' interpretation of the mandate in this case, this court's 

language likely was intended to insist that the trial court not impose any additional "punishment" 

upon defendant as a result of the remand. Nevertheless, as discussed, contract principles dictate 

that the trial court was required to honor and enforce the terms of the parties' agreement and 

"reconfigure" defendant's sentence in compliance with the applicable statutes to reach a total of 

45 years' imprisonment. 

&17 A. Failure to Order a Presentence Investigation Report 

&18 Because the trial court lacked the authority to impose a sentence other than that agreed 

upon by the parties in compliance with the applicable statutes, we conclude that a presentence 

investigation report was not required. 

&19 Section 5-3-1 of the Code provides: 

 "A defendant shall not be sentenced for a felony before a written 

 presentence report of investigation is presented to and considered 

by the court. 

 However, other than for felony sex offenders being 

 considered for probation, the court need not order a presentence 

 report of investigation where both parties agree to the imposition 

 of a specific sentence, provided there is a finding made for the 

 record as to the defendant’s history of delinquency or criminality, 

 including any previous sentence to a term of probation, periodic 
1-13-3433 

9 

 imprisonment, conditional discharge, or imprisonment." 730 ILCS 

 5/5-3-1 (West 2004). 

"[T]he purpose of the requirement of a presentence investigation report is to insure that the trial 

judge will have all necessary information concerning the defendant before sentence is imposed

***." People v. Youngbey, 82 Ill. 2d 556, 564 (1980). 

&20 While the written presentence investigation report requirement also applies during 

resentencing (People v. Harris, 105 Ill. 2d 290, 299 (1985)), the unique set of circumstances 

presented here did not require a presentence investigation report. Unlike the defendant in Harris, 

who was subject to resentencing as a result of a probation revocation proceeding and was, 

therefore, subject to the trial court's discretion in conjunction with the applicable statutes, here 

defendant was not subject to the trial court's discretion. In fact, pursuant to the dictates of this 

court's mandate, the trial court had no authority to impose a sentence other than a total of 45 

years' imprisonment, as had been agreed to by the parties. PSL Realty Co., 86 Ill. 2d at 309 

("[t]he trial court has no authority to act beyond the dictates of the mandate"). As a result, the 

purpose for a presentence investigation report did not have application where it was unnecessary 

for the trial court to have knowledge of defendant’s background. 

&21 B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

&22 Defendant next contends his resentencing counsel was ineffective for agreeing with the 

State that a total term of 45 years' imprisonment was necessary instead of advocating for a 

sentence of less than 45 years. Defendant argues that his counsel "failed to deliver even 

minimally effective representation." The State responds that defendant received effective 

assistance of counsel where he was prohibited from seeking a reduction in his negotiated 

sentence while holding the State to its part of the negotiated plea agreement.
1-13-3433 

10

&23 To present a successful claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must allege 

facts demonstrating that (1) his counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness, and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the results 

would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). A 

reasonable probability is defined as a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 

outcome, i.e., that the defense counsel's deficient performance rendered the result unreliable or 

the proceeding fundamentally unfair. Id. at 694. A defendant must satisfy both prongs of the 

Strickland test to establish ineffective assistance. People v. Albanese, 104 Ill. 2d 504, 525 

(1984). 

&24 Again, this court's mandate expressly provided that defendant's negotiated guilty plea was 

enforceable. The terms of the plea, as negotiated by both parties, were that defendant was to 

receive a total of 45 years' imprisonment. We, therefore, conclude that defense counsel had no 

authority to suggest a sentence that varied from the terms of the parties' negotiated guilty plea. 

As result, defendant cannot sustain a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel where counsel's 

performance at the resentencing hearing did not fall below an objective standard of 

reasonableness. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88; Albanese, 104 Ill. 2d at 527. 

&25 II. Admonishments 

&26 Defendant additionally contends the trial court erred in failing to provide Rule 605(c) 

admonishments, instead providing partial admonishments applicable to non-negotiated guilty 

pleas pursuant to Rule 605(b). 

&27 In response, the State contends Rule 605(c) had no application in this situation "where the 

trial court is merely tasked with recalculating the defendant's sentence and lacks the authority to 

alter the guilty plea." According to the State, the trial court was prohibited from granting 
1-13-3433 

11

defendant the means to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea as provided by Rule 605(c) 

because of this court's mandate and the law of the case doctrine. The State further argues 

defendant waived this contention by failing to file a motion to reconsider his sentence. 

Notwithstanding, the State maintains defendant's contention is moot where the trial court issued 

Rule 605(b) admonishments and defendant filed the instant appeal. 

&28 We first turn to the parties' dispute over the appropriate set of admonishments, namely, 

whether Rule 605(b) or Rule 605(c) applied. There is no question that the State bound itself to a 

specific sentence of 45 years' imprisonment; therefore, defendant’s guilty plea was negotiated. 

See People v. Diaz, 192 Ill. 2d 211, 225 (2000) (if a plea agreement "limits or forecloses the 

State from arguing for a sentence from the full range of penalties available under law" it is a 

negotiated plea). Rule 605(c) provides: 

"In all cases in which a judgment is entered upon a negotiated plea of 

guilty, at the time of imposing sentence, the trial court shall advise the 

 defendant substantially as follows: 

(1) that the defendant has a right to appeal;

 (2) that prior to taking an appeal the defendant must file in 

 the trial court, within 30 days of the date on which sentence is 

 imposed, a written motion asking to have the judgment vacated 

 and for leave to withdraw the plea of guilty, setting forth the 

 grounds for the motion; 

 (3) that if the motion is allowed, the plea of guilty, sentence 

and judgment will be vacated and a trial date will be set on the 

charges to which the plea of guilty was made;
1-13-3433 

12

 (4) that upon the request of the State any charges that may 

 have been dismissed as a part of a plea agreement will be 

reinstated and will also be set for trial;

 (5) that if the defendant is indigent, a copy of the transcript 

 of the proceedings at the time of the defendant's plea of guilty and 

 sentence will be provided without cost to the defendant and 

 counsel will be appointed to assist the defendant with the 

 preparation of the motions; and 

 (6) that in any appeal taken from the judgment on the plea 

 of guilty any issue or claim of error not raised in the motion to 

 vacate the judgment and to withdraw the plea of guilty shall be 

deemed waived.

 For purposes of this rule, a negotiated plea is one in which the 

 prosecution has bound itself to recommend a specific sentence, or a 

specific range of sentence, or where the prosecution has made concessions 

 relating to the sentence to be imposed and not merely to the charge or 

charges then pending." Ill. S. Ct. R. 605(c) (eff. Oct. 1, 2001). 

In comparison, Rule 605(b) provides: 

"In all cases in which a judgment is entered upon a plea of guilty, other 

 than a negotiated plea of guilty, at the time of imposing sentence, the 

trial court shall advise the defendant substantially as follows: 

(1) that the defendant has a right to appeal;
1-13-3433 

13

 (2) that prior to taking an appeal the defendant must file in 

 the trial court, within 30 days of the date on which sentence is 

 imposed, a written motion asking to have the trial court reconsider 

the sentence or to have the judgment vacated and for leave to 

 withdraw the plea of guilty, setting forth the grounds for the 

 motion; 

 (3) that if the motion is allowed, the sentence will be 

 modified or the plea of guilty, sentence and judgment will be 

vacated and a trial date will be set on the charges to which the plea 

of guilty was made;

 (4) that upon the request of the State any charges that may 

have been dismissed as a part of a plea agreement will be 

reinstated and will also be set for trial;

 (5) that if the defendant is indigent, a copy of the transcript 

 of the proceedings at the time of the defendant's plea of guilty and 

 sentence will be provided without cost to the defendant and 

 counsel will be appointed to assist the defendant with the 

 preparation of the motions; and 

 (6) that in any appeal taken from the judgment on the plea 

 of guilty any issue or claim of error not raised in the motion to 

reconsider the sentence or to vacate the judgment and to withdraw 

the plea of guilty shall be deemed waived.
1-13-3433 

14

For the purposes of this rule, a negotiated plea is one in which the 

 prosecution has bound itself to recommend a specific sentence, or a 

specific range of sentence, or where the prosecution has made concessions 

 relating to the sentence to be imposed and not merely to the charge or 

charges then pending." Ill. S. Ct. R. 605(b) (eff. Oct. 1, 2001). 

&29 Based on the unique facts of this case, we conclude that, upon resentencing, defendant 

was not entitled to Rule 605(c) admonishments. There is no dispute that defendant received Rule 

605(c) admonishments when he was sentenced initially. Moreover, there is no dispute that the 

purpose of remand was to resentence defendant in compliance with the applicable statutes. As 

we previously determined, the matter was remanded to "reconfigure" defendant's sentence from a 

concurrent term of 45 years' imprisonment to a consecutive term of 45 years' imprisonment. Our 

mandate expressly maintained the integrity of the parties' plea agreement. Golen, 2012 IL App 

(1st) 102862-U, ¶ 25 ("we find that the appropriate remedy is to enforce the overall plea 

agreement consistent with the relevant statute by vacating the void sentence and remanding for 

resentencing to a total prison term, with mandatory consecutive sentencing, of not more than 45 

years"). It was the trial court's duty to comply with our mandate; therefore, defendant had no 

right to withdraw his guilty plea. See PSL Realty Co. v. Granite Investment Co., 86 Ill. 2d 291, 

309 (1981) ("[t]he trial court has no authority to act beyond the dictates of the mandate"). As a 

result, Rule 605(c) admonishments were not applicable.

&30 We note that defendant never filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, as was his right, 

within 30 days of first having entered the plea. However, in his postconviction petition, 

defendant alleged that his counsel was ineffective for failing to seek a fitness hearing and that his 

plea was not voluntary and knowing. Defendant, therefore, essentially sought the withdrawal of
1-13-3433 

15

his guilty plea on postconviction review. Following second-stage review, the trial court granted 

the State's motion to dismiss defendant's postconviction petition and, on appeal, we found, inter 

alia, defendant failed to make a substantial showing that his guilty plea was not voluntary and 

knowing. Golen, 2012 IL App (1st) 102862-U, ¶ 33. Accordingly, defendant's guilty plea was 

considered valid and enforceable. This court’s finding is the law of the case. Krautsack v. 

Anderson, 223 Ill. 2d 541, 552 (2006) ("Generally, the law of the case doctrine bars relitigation 

of an issue previously decided in the same case. [Citation.] Thus, 'the determination of a 

question of law by the Appellate Court on the first appeal may, as a general rule, be binding upon 

it on the second appeal.' [Citations.]"). Simply stated, defendant had no right to withdraw his 

guilty plea and, therefore, was not entitled to Rule 605(c) admonishments at resentencing. 

&31 Although we conclude defendant was not entitled to Rule 605(c) admonishments, we find 

defendant was entitled to some form of admonishments related to his resentence. Here, after 

resentencing defendant, the trial court provided the following admonishments: 

"And, obviously, you have the right to appeal this re-sentencing. If you 

choose to do so, you must do so within 30 days of today's date. You must file a 

written motion setting forth all grounds why you wish to have your sentence 

reconsidered, and anything you fail or forget to put in that motion would be 

waived or given up for all times [sic].

 If that motion were denied, you would have 30 days from the date of 

denial to file any notice of appeal. And if you choose not to file a motion to 

reconsider the sentence, you have 30 days from today's date to file your notice of 

appeal."
1-13-3433 

16

The trial court's admonishments following the imposition of defendant's resentence did not 

expressly comply with any subsection of Rule 605; however, none of the subsections of Rule 605 

squarely fit the facts of this case. The rules, as written, do not apply to the circumstances of 

defendant's resentence and the supreme court has not considered a similar set of facts since its 

finding in Donelson. That said, the facts of this case lead us to conclude that defendant was 

admonished with his rights relative to the procedural posture of his case: defendant was advised 

that he had the right to challenge his new sentence; that any motion must include all of the 

grounds for the challenge to avoid waiver; that he had 30 days to do so; and that, if he chose not 

to file a motion challenging the new sentence, he could appeal within 30 days. 

&32 We are bothered that the trial court failed to advise defendant that he had the right to the 

assistance of counsel to prepare a challenge to his new sentence. However, we find that 

defendant was not prejudiced by the incomplete admonishments. Defendant has never expressly 

challenged his new sentence nor suggested any additional issues he would have raised had he 

been admonished of his right to assistance of counsel. See People v. Lambert, 364 Ill. App. 3d 

488, 494 (2006) (finding the defendant was not prejudiced by incomplete Rule 605(a) 

admonishments). To the extent he avoided forfeiture as a result of his failure to file a motion to 

reconsider his new sentence by raising the previously discussed ineffective assistance of counsel 

claim, we have concluded that the trial court was required to comply with this court's mandate 

and "reconfigure" defendant's prior sentence to represent a total of 45 years' imprisonment in 

compliance with the relevant statutes. Accordingly, defendant had no basis upon which to 

present a challenge to the actual terms of imprisonment. The mandate dictated that the terms of 

the parties' negotiated plea remain in force to the extent allowable by statute.
1-13-3433 

17

&33 Moreover, defendant does not challenge the manner in which his sentence was 

"reconfigured," i.e., that either his murder or armed robbery sentences failed to comply with the 

applicable sentencing ranges, the accuracy of his mittimus, his detention credit, nor any other 

ministerial matter. These types of ministerial issues were the only matters that defendant had the 

ability to challenge when, as we stated, the actual sentence was agreed upon and could not be 

altered by the trial court pursuant to the terms of the parties' negotiated agreement. Accordingly, 

defendant has not raised any viable challenges to his new sentence. Since defendant did file an 

appeal but did not raise any viable challenges to his sentence on appeal, his ability to raise a 

sentencing issue was not compromised by the actions of the trial court on resentencing. See 

People v. Garner, 347 Ill. App. 3d 578, 586 (2004) (citing People v. Williams, 344 Ill. App. 3d 

334, 339 (2003)). We recognize that this court has remanded causes for substantial compliance 

with Rule 605(b) and (c); however, the issue in those cases was whether the defendant's failure to 

file a postplea motion could be excused where the trial court failed to provide sufficient 

admonishments. People v. Foster, 171 Ill. 2d 469, 473-74 (1996); People v. Lloyd, 338 Ill. App. 

3d 379, 384-86 (2003); People v. Gougisha, 347 Ill. App. 3d 158, 162-63 (2004). We, however, 

find the facts of the case before us to be more similar to Garner and Williams where defendant 

did not raise any issues that he was precluded from raising as a result of the trial court's 

incomplete admonishments. We, therefore, conclude that, in light of the unique circumstances of 

defendant's resentence, defendant was not denied real justice or prejudiced as a result of the trial 

court's incomplete admonishments.

&34 CONCLUSION

&35 In sum, due to the limited mandate provided by this court in which the trial court was 

directed to enforce defendant's negotiated guilty plea and resentence him to a prison term in 
1-13-3433 

18

compliance with that plea, the applicable statutes, and Donelson, we conclude that: (1) the trial 

court was not required to obtain a presentence investigation report prior to imposing its 

resentence; (2) defendant failed to demonstrate counsel was ineffective by agreeing to the new 

sentence; and (3) defendant was not entitled to Rule 605(c) admonishments. 

&36 Affirmed.
REPORTER OF DECISIONS - ILLINOIS APPELLATE COURT

 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. 

FRANK GOLEN, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

No. 1-13-3433 

Appellate Court of Illinois

First District, SIXTH DIVISION

March 20, 2015 

JUSTICE LAMPKIN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 

 

Presiding Justice Hoffman and Justice Hall concurred in the judgment and opinion. 

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County. 

The Hon. Colleen Ann Hyland, Judge Presiding. 

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT 

Michael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Chicago, IL 60601

Alan D. Goldberg, Deputy Defender 

OF COUNSEL: Kieran M. Wiberg 

 

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE

Anita Alvarez, Cook County State’s Attorney, Chicago, IL 60602 

OF COUNSEL: Alan J. Spellberg, Tasha-Marie Kelly and Douglas P. Harvath