IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

Assigned on Briefs February 17, 2016

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. BOBBY LYNCH

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Knox County

No. 102427 Steven W. Sword, Judge

No. E2015-01512-CCA-R3-CD – Filed March 9, 2016

The Defendant, Bobby Lynch, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of third 

offense simple possession or casual exchange of a controlled substance, a Class E felony. 

See T.C.A. § 39-17-418 (2010) (amended 2014). The trial court sentenced the Defendant as 

a career offender to six years‟ confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial 

court erred by denying him alternative sentencing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed

ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which THOMAS T.

WOODALL, P.J., and ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, J., joined.

Keith Lowe, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Bobby Lynch. 

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Jeffrey D. Zentner, Assistant Attorney 

General; Charme P. Allen, District Attorney General; and TaKisha Fitzgerald, Assistant 

District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

At the trial, Knoxville Police Officer Joe Shackleford testified that he had worked for 

the police department for nineteen years, that he had received training in the identification

and the smell of marijuana, and that he was able to identify marijuana upon sight. On June 

25, 2013, the police department received numerous complaints relative to general criminal 

activity, including prostitution and drug use, occurring at a particular intersection. Officer 

Shackleford responded to the intersection around 10:00 a.m. and saw the Defendant and 

codefendant Collins sitting on the ground of an open parking lot. The officer drove to their 

location and got out of his police cruiser. Officer Shackleford initially thought the Defendant 

and codefendant Collins were intoxicated but saw they were each rolling marijuana 
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cigarettes. He said that the Defendant and codefendant Collins each had a bag containing 

rolling papers and loose marijuana. Officer Shackleford confiscated the marijuana and 

issued the Defendant and codefendant Collins citations for the possession of the marijuana. 

The bag confiscated from the Defendant was received as an exhibit and contained two 

marijuana cigarettes, loose marijuana, and rolling papers. A video recording from the 

officer‟s police cruiser was played for the jury and was consistent with the officer‟s 

testimony. 

Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (TBI) Special Agent Ashley Cummings, an expert 

in forensic chemistry, testified that she performed three analyses on the substances contained 

in the bag confiscated from the Defendant. She concluded that the substances found inside 

the rolled papers and loose within the bag were marijuana, a controlled substance. 

Upon this evidence the jury found the Defendant guilty of simple possession of a 

controlled substance. After the jury rendered its verdict, additional proof was presented in 

order to allow the jury to make additional findings of fact relevant to the State‟s request for 

enhanced punishment. 

Stephanie Ogle, records keeper for the Knox County Criminal Court, presented one

previous citation and one previous warrant for simple possession of a controlled substance. 

Citation number A369081# reflects that on November 29, 2010, the Defendant was convicted 

of simple possession of marijuana. Warrant number @687065 reflects that on November 23, 

2004, the Defendant was convicted of simple possession of marijuana.

Upon this evidence the jury found the Defendant guilty of his third or subsequent 

offense of simple possession of a controlled substance. 

At the sentencing hearing, no witnesses were presented, but the presentence report 

was received as an exhibit. The report reflects that the Defendant was age forty-seven at the 

time of the presentence investigation. The Defendant had previous convictions for eight 

counts of public intoxication, three counts of aggravated burglary, two counts of simple 

possession, two counts of driving under the influence, attempted especially aggravated 

robbery, robbery, assault, domestic assault, theft of property valued at $500 or less, criminal 

impersonation, violation of the habitual traffic offender statute, “unlawful paraphernalia uses 

and activities,” a minor drug-related offense, driving on a suspended license, failure to carry 

driver‟s license and to it present upon demand, and two additional traffic-related offenses.

The presentence report reflects that the Defendant received probation previously and 

that his probation was revoked on five occasions. Likewise, the report reflects that the 

Defendant received parole and that it was revoked. The report reflects that while the 
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Defendant was in confinement for his previous convictions, multiple disciplinary reports 

were filed as a result of his conduct. The report reflects that between May 17, 1993, and 

June 28, 2007, the Defendant was involved in thirty-four disciplinary matters, which included 

creating disturbances, refusing cell assignments, disrespect, fighting, violating Tennessee 

Department of Correction policy, mutilation, drug possession, refusing a drug screen, having 

positive drug screens, destroying State property, tampering with security equipment, 

possessing contraband, and threatening a correction officer. 

The Defendant dropped out of school during the ninth grade. The Defendant reported 

he was in the process of obtaining his GED, and he submitted letters from teachers and 

grades as verification. The Defendant reported excellent mental and physical health. The 

Defendant said that he began drinking alcohol at age fourteen, that he typically drank “a 

twelve pack” two or three times weekly, and that he last drank alcohol in 2014. The 

Defendant said he began smoking marijuana at age thirteen and that he last smoked it in 

2014. The Defendant reported he began using cocaine at age eighteen and last used it in 

2014. The Defendant began using roxycodone daily at age forty-three and last used it in 

2014. While confined in the jail, the Defendant completed a peer support group program in 

October 2014. 

The Defendant reported previous employment at Labor Finders for more than five 

years and working periodically at Johnson‟s Siding, Windows, and Doors from 2004 to the 

time of the presentence evaluation. The Defendant provided a statement during the 

presentence investigation in which he requested a chance because he finally saw that his life 

was “not about yourself” and that life was “up to God‟s will.”

A report from probation officer Suzanne Green was received as an exhibit and states 

that the Defendant was not appropriate for enhanced probation. The report notes the 

Defendant‟s previous probation revocations and thirty-five disciplinary matters while in 

confinement for previous offenses. 

The prosecutor argued that the Defendant was a career offender and requested the 

Defendant serve his sentence in confinement. The prosecutor noted the Defendant‟s lengthy 

criminal history and argued he was not a good candidate for alternative sentencing. The 

prosecutor noted the Defendant‟s disciplinary matters during his previous periods of 

confinement. 

Trial counsel conceded that the Defendant was a career offender and that the 

Defendant had many legal troubles during the 1980s and 1990s, which included many of the 

disciplinary matters while the Defendant was in confinement. Counsel noted, though, that 

since 2004, the Defendant‟s legal troubles were associated with his homelessness. Counsel 
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argued that although the Defendant had not been a perfect citizen, the Defendant was not a 

menace. Counsel argued that the Defendant‟s potential six-year sentence at 60% service for 

rolling a marijuana cigarette was too severe when probation was a viable option. Counsel 

informed the court that the Defendant had secured a place to live and employment upon his 

release from confinement. Counsel requested probation and an opportunity for rehabilitation. 

The Defendant addressed the trial court. The Defendant conceded he had a lengthy 

criminal history and said he was not proud of it. The Defendant said he hated himself 

because he had hurt his family. He said, “We can all change.” Relative to his previous 

disciplinary matters, he said that for the previous seven months he had “walked a chalk line”

because “life ain‟t about me no more, sir.” 

The trial court found based upon six previous felony convictions that the Defendant 

was a career offender and imposed a six-year sentence. Relative to whether confinement was 

necessary to protect society by restraining a defendant with a long criminal history, the court 

found that the Defendant had a lengthy criminal history. The court noted that many of the 

violent offenses occurred in the 1980s but determined that the Defendant‟s recent convictions 

were generally associated with offenses committed by someone who was homeless, such as 

public intoxication. The court found that the Defendant‟s lengthy criminal history warranted 

a period of confinement. Relative to whether confinement was necessary to avoid 

depreciating the seriousness of the offense, the court found that the facts of the present case 

alone did not warrant confinement. Relative to whether confinement would serve as an 

effective deterrent, the court stated that although the legislature had made repeated drug 

possession a felony offense, the legislature did not mandate confinement. The court found 

that the facts of the case did not warrant confinement as a means of deterrence. 

The trial court determined that although the Defendant had not received probation 

recently, his criminal history showed frequent occurrences when alternative sentencing had 

been unsuccessful. The court found that the Defendant had five previous probation 

revocations and stated that the revocations did not “bode well for probation now” in light of 

the thirty-five disciplinary matters when the Defendant was previously incarcerated. Relative 

to the potential for rehabilitation, the court found that although the Defendant claimed he had 

been “walking the chalk line” the previous seven months, the Defendant‟s history indicated 

he was not amenable to rehabilitation. The court determined that split confinement was 

insufficient because of the Defendant‟s lengthy criminal history. As a result, the court 

ordered the Defendant to serve six years in confinement. This appeal followed. 

The Defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying him alternative 

sentencing. He argues that the trial court‟s reliance upon the Defendant‟s previous criminal 

history to deny alternative sentencing was an abuse of discretion and that the six-year 
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sentence in confinement is unjust for a simple possession of marijuana conviction. The State 

responds that the court properly sentenced the Defendant. We agree with the State. 

This court reviews challenges to the manner of service of a sentence within the 

appropriate sentence range “under an abuse of discretion standard with a „presumption of 

reasonableness.‟” State v. Bise, 380 S.W.3d 682, 708 (Tenn. 2012). A trial court must 

consider any evidence received at the trial and sentencing hearing, the presentence report, the 

principles of sentencing, counsel‟s arguments as to sentencing alternatives, the nature and 

characteristics of the criminal conduct, any mitigating or statutory enhancement factors, 

statistical information provided by the AOC as to sentencing practices for similar offenses in 

Tennessee, any statement that the defendant made on his own behalf, and the potential for 

rehabilitation or treatment. State v. Ashby, 823 S.W.2d 166, 168 (Tenn. 1991) (citing T.C.A. 

§§ 40-35-103 (2014), -210 (2014); State v. Moss, 727 S.W.2d 229, 236 (Tenn. 1986); State v. 

Taylor, 744 S.W.2d 919 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987)); see T.C.A. § 40-35-102 (2014). 

The standard of review for questions related to probation or any other alternative 

sentence is an abuse of discretion with a presumption of reasonableness. State v. Caudle, 388 

S.W.3d 273, 278-79 (Tenn. 2012). Generally, probation is available to a defendant sentenced 

to ten years or less. T.C.A. § 40-35-303(a) (2014). The burden of establishing suitability for 

probation rests with a defendant, who must demonstrate that probation will “„subserve the 

ends of justice and the best interest of both the public and the defendant.‟” State v. Souder, 

105 S.W.3d 602, 607 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2002) (quoting State v. Dykes, 803 S.W.2d 250, 259 

(Tenn. Crim. App. 1990)); see T.C.A. § 40-35-303(b); State v. Carter, 254 S.W.3d 335, 347 

(Tenn. 2008).

A sentence is based upon “the nature of the offense and the totality of the 

circumstances,” including a defendant‟s background. State v. Ashby, 823 S.W.2d 166, 168 

(Tenn. 1991); see State v. Trotter, 201 S.W.3d 651, 653 (Tenn. 2006). A trial court is 

permitted to sentence a defendant to incarceration when:

(A) [c]onfinement is necessary to protect society by restraining a defendant 

who has a long history of criminal conduct;

(B) [c]onfinement is necessary to avoid depreciating the seriousness of the 

offense or confinement is particularly suited to provide an effective deterrence 

to others likely to commit similar offenses; or

(C) [m]easures less restrictive than confinement have frequently or recently 

been applied unsuccessfully to the defendant[.]

T.C.A. § 40-35-103(1)(A)-(C); see Trotter, 201 S.W.3d at 654. 
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The record reflects that the trial court considered all the appropriate principles and 

purposes of sentencing. In denying the Defendant‟s request for alternative sentencing, the 

court relied heavily upon the Defendant‟s previous criminal convictions. The record supports 

the court‟s finding that the Defendant had a lengthy history of criminal conduct, and we note

the Defendant conceded at the sentencing hearing that he had numerous criminal convictions. 

The record also supports the court‟s determining that confinement was necessary to protect 

society from the Defendant‟s criminal conduct because the Defendant had continued 

engaging in criminal conduct for the majority of his life. See id. § 40-35-103(1)(C). 

Likewise, the record reflects that the Defendant had received the benefit of probation and 

parole previously but that the Defendant‟s probation was revoked on five previous occasions 

and that his parole was revoked, as well. See id. § 40-35-103(1)(B). Furthermore, the 

Defendant‟s poor conduct while previously incarcerated supported the court‟s finding that the

Defendant was not amenable to rehabilitation. Although the Defendant was eligible for 

alternative sentencing, his previous convictions resulted in his unfavorable candidacy for 

alternative sentencing. See id § 40-35-102(6)(A) (stating that “a defendant who is being 

sentenced for a third or subsequent felony conviction involving separate periods of 

incarceration or supervision shall not be considered a favorable candidate for alternative 

sentencing”). The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying his request for 

alternative sentencing, and the Defendant is not entitled to relief. 

In consideration of the foregoing and the record as a whole, we affirm the judgment of 

the trial court. 

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ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY, JR., JUDGE