Filed 4/30/21 Marriage of Saltzman CA2/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re the Marriage of STEPHEN 

SALTZMAN and RANDY 

SCHIENBERG SALTZMAN.

__________________________________

STEPHEN SALTZMAN,

Respondent,

v.

RANDY SCHIENBERG SALTZMAN,

Appellant.

 B302819

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No.

 17STFL08376)

APPEAL from a status judgment and orders of the Superior 

Court of Los Angeles County. Anne K. Richardson, Judge. 

Affirmed.

Law Offices of Vicki J. Greene and Vicki J. Greene for 

Appellant.

Feinberg Mindel Brandt & Klein and Gregory A. Girvan for 

Respondent.

_______________________
2

This appeal arises from the trial court’s status judgment 

dissolving the parties’ marriage and bifurcating all remaining 

issues for late adjudication. Appellant wife contends that the 

trial court erred because its orders issued in conjunction with the 

termination of marriage adversely impact her health insurance 

coverage and do not adequately protect her interest in community 

property retirement accounts. Finding no abuse of discretion, we 

affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Stephen Saltzman (Husband) and Randy Schienberg

Saltzman (Wife) married on August 17, 1991. They have a 17-

year-old daughter and an adult son. On December 14, 2017, 

Husband filed a petition for dissolution of marriage based on 

irreconcilable differences, contending that the parties had 

separated in September 2016. Wife responded to the petition on 

February 20, 2018, also citing irreconcilable differences and 

requesting divorce, and they exchanged preliminary declarations 

of disclosure. Wife’s response stated “TBD” for the parties’ date 

of separation.

At the time he filed for divorce, Husband was a long-term 

partner at the law firm Loeb & Loeb LLP (Loeb). While at Loeb, 

he contributed to three Loeb-affiliated retirement accounts and 

took part in Loeb’s group health insurance plan, which covered 

both parties and their children. He transitioned to the law firm

Paul Hastings in February 2018 and began taking part in the 

Paul Hastings insurance plan, again covering both parties and 

their children.

On August 23, 2018, Husband filed a request for order to

bifurcate and terminate marital status. On October 12, 2018, 

Wife filed an opposition, opposing Husband’s request to bifurcate 
3

marital status, or in the alternative, asking for 17 conditions to 

be imposed in connection with termination of marital status. On 

November 13, 2018, Husband joined his Loeb retirement plans to 

the action.

After a March 2019 consolidated hearing on the request to 

bifurcate and other requests for orders, the trial court entered its 

operative Findings and Order After Hearing on September 17, 

2019, granting bifurcation, among other things, and stating its 

intention to terminate marital status subject to express 

conditions protecting Wife’s health insurance and retirement 

plan survivor benefits and other express conditions.1

Regarding health insurance, the trial court ordered:

“Pursuant to Family Code section 2337(c)(2): Until 

judgment has been entered on all remaining issues and has 

become final, [Husband] shall maintain all existing health and 

medical insurance coverage for the [Wife] and any minor children 

as named dependents, so long as the [Husband] is eligible to do 

so. If at any time during the period the [Husband] is not eligible 

1 The trial court entered a previous Findings and Order 

After Hearing on June 21, 2019, but amended and replaced it 

with the operative order on its own motion, over Wife’s objections 

on unrelated grounds. This was within the trial court’s inherent 

authority to modify, amend, or revoke its prior interim orders. 

(See Schachter v. Citigroup, Inc. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 726, 

737–739 [court has “inherent power to correct its own rulings”]; 

cf. In re Marriage of Barthold (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1301, 1313 

& fn. 9 [trial court may reconsider its own interim or final orders; 

for final orders “the issue whether a trial court can reconsider an 

appealable order on its own motion after the time to appeal from 

that order has expired” is undecided].)
4

to maintain the existing coverage, the [Husband] shall, at the 

[Husband’s] sole expense, provide and maintain COBRA health 

and medical insurance coverage to the extent it is available. To 

the extent COBRA coverage is not available, the [Husband] shall 

be responsible to pay for the health and medical care for the 

[Wife] to the extent that care would have been covered by the 

existing insurance coverage but for the dissolution of marital 

status, and shall otherwise indemnify and hold the other party 

harmless from any adverse consequences resulting from the loss 

or reduction of the existing coverage. For purposes of this 

subdivision, ‘health and medical insurance coverage’ is the 

coverage for which the parties are eligible under [Husband’s]

Paul Hastings group medical plan.”

As for retirement accounts, the trial court ordered the 

parties to ensure Wife’s survivor benefits in the retirement plans 

were protected through an interim order, as discussed in greater 

detail below.

On October 16, 2019, Husband filed a new request for order 

to enter a status judgment consistent with the Findings and 

Order After Hearing issued September 17, 2019. Husband

attached a proposed judgment, consisting of Judicial Council 

Forms FL-180 (Judgment), FL-347 (Bifurcation of Status of 

Marriage or Domestic Partnership), and FL-348 (Pension 

Benefits—Attachment to Judgment).

Wife opposed the proposed judgment and request for order, 

and after briefing the matter came on for hearing on December 6, 

2019. The trial court concluded that the form of the proposed 

judgment was appropriate and accurately reflected the order 

after hearing, rejected Wife’s arguments that the orders on 
5

health insurance and retirement plan survivor benefits were 

improper, and entered the proposed judgment.

This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

At its core, Wife’s argument is that the trial court’s 

bifurcation order and status judgment dissolving the parties’ 

marriage was in error because her health insurance coverage and 

entitlement to community retirement assets were not optimally 

protected. These are all issues which the trial court has 

discretion to determine. “[A] motion to bifurcate and separately 

adjudicate the issue of dissolution of the marriage is addressed to 

the judicial discretion of the court” (In re Marriage of Lusk (1978) 

86 Cal.App.3d 228, 235), as are a trial court’s orders valuing and 

dividing community property (In re Marriage of Oliverez (2019) 

33 Cal.App.5th 298, 309).

A trial court “has not abused its discretion as long as its 

decision ‘is within the range of options available under governing 

legal criteria in light of the evidence before the tribunal.’ ” (In re 

Marriage of Taschen (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 681, 691.) “ ‘ “The 

appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court 

exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more inferences can 

reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no 

authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court.” ’ ” 

(Ibid.)

II. Relevant Legal Principles

Family Code section 2337 provides that “[i]n a proceeding 

for dissolution of marriage, the court, upon noticed motion, may 

sever and grant an early and separate trial on the issue of the 

dissolution of the status of the marriage apart from other issues.” 
6

(Fam. Code, § 2337, subd. (a).)2 The trial court may separately 

try the issue of termination of marriage if doing so “is likely to 

simplify the determination of the other issues.” (Cal. Rules of

Court, rule 5.390(b)(7).)

Public policy favors bifurcation of trial on pivotal issues in 

a dissolution action. (In re Marriage of Macfarlane & Lang

(1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 247, 257; see In re Marriage of Wolfe (1985) 

173 Cal.App.3d 889, 893–894 [“To the extent bifurcation of issues 

such as custody, support or the division of community property 

can assist the parties to achieve settlement of remaining issues, 

it should be encouraged”].) For the issue of marital status, 

“[c]onsistent with the legislative policy favoring no fault 

dissolution of marriage, only slight evidence is necessary to 

obtain bifurcation and resolution of marital status. On the other 

hand, a spouse opposing bifurcation must present compelling 

reasons for denial.” (Gionis v. Superior Court (1988) 202 

Cal.App.3d 786, 790.)

The minimum statutory requirements for bifurcating and 

terminating marital status are that six months must have passed 

since the date of service of the summons and petition (§ 2339, 

subd. (a)), and that the party seeking termination of marital 

status must have served a preliminary declaration of disclosure 

or obtained a written agreement to defer service to a later date 

(§ 2337, subd. (b)). Both requirements were met here.

Additionally, “[t]he party not requesting termination of 

status may ask the court: [¶] (A) To order that the judgment 

granting a dissolution include conditions that preserve his or her 

claims in retirement benefit plans, health insurance, and other 

2 Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the 

Family Code.
7

assets; and [¶] (B) For other orders made as conditions to 

terminating the parties’ marital status or domestic partnership.” 

(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.390(d)(2).) Section 2337, subdivision 

(c) sets out various discretionary conditions a trial court “may 

impose upon a party” until final judgment has been entered, 

including maintenance of the same or comparable health 

insurance coverage, protection of spousal interests in retirement 

assets, and “[a]ny other condition the court determines is just and 

equitable.” (§ 2337, subd. (c)(2), (5), (9)(B) & (E), (10).)

Specifically, with regard to health insurance, a trial court 

may require that “the party shall maintain all existing health 

and medical insurance coverage for the other party and any 

minor children as named dependents, so long as the party is 

eligible to do so. If at any time during this period the party is not 

eligible to maintain that coverage, the party shall, at the party’s 

sole expense, provide and maintain health and medical insurance 

coverage that is comparable to the existing health and medical 

insurance coverage to the extent it is available,” or pay for care to 

the extent it would have been covered but for dissolution, if 

comparable coverage is not available. (§ 2337, subd. (c)(2).)

With regard to retirement assets, the trial court may 

require that the party requesting bifurcation “shall indemnify 

and hold the other party harmless from any adverse 

consequences to the other party if the bifurcation results in the 

loss of the other party’s rights with respect to any retirement, 

survivor, or deferred compensation benefits under any plan, fund, 

or arrangement, or to any elections or options associated 

therewith, to the extent that the other party would have been 

entitled to those benefits or elections as the spouse or surviving 

spouse of the party.” (§ 2337, subd. (c)(5).) The trial court also 
8

“may order a specific security interest designed to reduce or 

eliminate the likelihood that a postmortem enforcement 

proceeding would be ineffective or unduly burdensome to the 

surviving party,” including “[a]n order to provide a security 

interest by Qualified Domestic Relations Order from that party’s 

share of a retirement plan or plans” or “an interim order 

requiring the party to pay or cause to be paid, and to post 

adequate security for the payment of, any survivor benefit that 

would have been payable to the other party on the death of the 

party but for the judgment granting a dissolution of the status of 

the marriage, pending entry of judgment on all remaining 

issues.” (Id., subd. (c)(9)(B) & (E).)

Section 2337, subdivision (d), further requires that “[p]rior 

to, or simultaneously with, entry of judgment granting 

dissolution of the status of the marriage,” the trial court must

join the party’s retirement or pension plan. (Id., subd. (d)(1).) 

And “[t]o preserve the claims of each spouse in all retirement 

plan benefits upon entry of judgment granting a dissolution of 

the status of the marriage,” the trial court must enter one of the 

following orders prior to or simultaneously with entry of 

judgment:

(A) An order pursuant to section 2610 disposing of each 

party’s interest in retirement plan benefits, including survivor 

and death benefits; or

(B) An interim order preserving the nonemployee party’s 

right to retirement plan benefits, including survivor and death 

benefits, pending entry of judgment on all remaining issues; or

(C) An attachment to the judgment granting a dissolution 

of the status of the marriage which contains specific language 

required to be included by section 2337, subdivision (d)(1)(C). As 
9

indicated post in part IV at pages 13–14, the judgment attached 

Form FL-348, which includes this language, which specifically 

tracked the language required.

III. The Trial Court’s Health Insurance Order Was Not 

an Abuse of Discretion

Wife contends that the trial court’s termination of marital 

status and health insurance order improperly “prematurely 

impose[s] COBRA benefits” onto her, effectively shortening the 

total period of time during which she would be assured health 

insurance benefits as Husband’s spouse or former spouse.3 She 

also contends that the trial court failed to check the correct box 

on Form FL-347 regarding health insurance.

We find no abuse of discretion. The trial court expressly 

ordered that Husband would maintain for Wife (1) “all existing 

health and medical insurance coverage so long as the [Husband]

is eligible to do so”; (2) “COBRA health and medical insurance 

coverage to the extent it is available” if he becomes ineligible to

maintain the existing coverage; and (3) “[t]o the extent COBRA 

coverage is not available,” payment for her health and medical 

care “to the extent that care would have been covered by the 

existing insurance coverage but for the dissolution of marital 

status, and shall otherwise indemnify and hold the other party 

3 COBRA is an acronym for the Consolidated Omnibus 

Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985. (See 29 U.S.C. § 1161 et seq.) 

COBRA gives eligible individuals, who lose coverage under a 

group plan, the option of paying premiums to maintain coverage 

for a limited period of time. The California Continuation Benefits 

Replacement Act or “Cal–COBRA” (Health & Saf. Code, § 1366.20 

et seq.) provides temporary continuation coverage for individuals 

who are ineligible for federal COBRA benefits.
10

harmless from any adverse consequences resulting from the loss 

or reduction of the existing coverage.”

Wife’s health insurance coverage is thus effectively fully 

protected until entry of final judgment on all remaining issues. 

Even if her COBRA benefits begin and expire during that period 

of time, until entry of final judgment her medical care still must 

be paid for by Husband to the full extent of the existing coverage. 

This is consistent with the full scope of the discretionary 

protective health insurance order contemplated by section 2337, 

subdivision (c)(2).

It is true that COBRA benefits attach only for a limited

period of time after an employee or covered party becomes 

ineligible for group plan coverage, so the longer Wife stays legally 

married the longer she may have specific entitlement to 

continued coverage under the existing plan, if COBRA 

commences on dissolution of marriage. However, that the clock 

on Wife’s continuation coverage under COBRA may begin ticking 

upon dissolution is not a legal barrier to termination of marital 

status; Wife provides no support for this proposition. The trial 

court considered Wife’s objections and request for an order for

Husband to maintain Wife as a beneficiary on his existing health 

policy without initiating COBRA (although no evidence was 

offered that this option was available postdissolution), and 

concluded that her concerns did not justify delaying bifurcation 

and termination of marital status any further. The trial court 

explained, “[A]s I see it they have complied with the Rules of 

Court and with the [Code of Civil Procedure] and it does appear 

that after a year and three months, bifurcation of status which is 

supposed to be freely given as long as all of the requirements are 

given are accomplished, is supposed to be freely granted.” We 
11

likewise conclude that, given the policies in favor of bifurcation 

and no-fault termination of marriage, the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion by deciding that Wife’s COBRA-related 

concerns were not a compelling reason to delay bifurcation and 

termination of marital status.

With regard to Form FL-347, Wife’s concerns are not 

material. Form FL-347 contains preprinted selections that 

mirror the discretionary conditions listed in section 2337, 

subdivision (c). Wife contends that the court was obligated to 

check box 5.b. on Form FL-347 related to health insurance, which 

provides that the party requesting bifurcation must “provide and 

maintain health and medical insurance coverage that is 

comparable to the existing health and medical insurance 

coverage to the extent it is available” for the other party and 

minor children; provide comparable coverage at his own expense 

if not eligible to maintain existing coverage; or pay for medical 

care to the extent it would have been covered by the existing 

policy.

Rather than using box 5.b. of the Form FL-347, the Form 

FL-347 prepared by Husband and adopted by the trial court 

directs the reader to language inserted in section 5.j., “which 

reflects the precise terms of the September 17, 2019 Order After 

Hearing.” This language merely duplicates the language of the 

trial court’s order after hearing with regard to health insurance:

“[Husband] shall maintain all existing health and medical 

insurance coverage for the [Wife] and any minor children as 

named dependents, so long as the [Husband] is eligible to do so. 

If at any time during the period the [Husband] is not eligible to 

maintain the existing coverage, the [Husband] shall, at the 

[Husband’s] sole expense, provide and maintain COBRA health 
12

and medical insurance coverage to the extent it is available. To 

the extent COBRA coverage is not available, the [Husband] shall 

be responsible to pay for the health and medical care for the 

[Wife] to the extent that care would have been covered by the 

existing insurance coverage but for the dissolution of marital 

status, and shall otherwise indemnify and hold the other party 

harmless from any adverse consequences resulting from the loss 

or reduction of the existing coverage. For purposes of this 

subdivision, ‘health and medical insurance coverage’ is the 

coverage for which the parties are eligible under [Husband’s]

Paul Hastings group medical plan.”

These provisions effectuate the intent of the trial court and 

do not deviate from those in box 5.b. of the Form FL-347 in any 

substantive way.

IV. The Trial Court’s Interim Order Regarding 

Husband’s Retirement Accounts Was Not an Abuse 

of Discretion

Wife contends that the trial court erred by not entering an 

interim qualified domestic relations order (interim QDRO) 

modeled after a sample she provided to Husband. Instead, after 

ordering that an interim order be prepared to protect her 

community retirement plan benefits, the trial court adopted 

Husband’s proposed use of Judicial Council Form FL-348 as its 

interim order, in conjunction with Form FL-347. The trial court 

expressly considered Wife’s objections to the use of Form FL-348, 

and rejected them, concluding that there was no substantive 

difference between what she was asking for and the protections 

the Judicial Council forms provided.

We find no error. In its order after hearing, the trial court 

specifically ordered: “Pursuant to Family Code section 
13

2337(c)(9)(E): [Husband] and [Wife] shall ensure that all 

community property plans are subject to an enforceable court 

order for the payment of spousal survivor benefits to the [Wife]

through an appropriate interim order requiring any survivor 

benefit that would have been payable to the [Wife] on the death 

of the [Husband] but for the judgment granting a dissolution of 

the status of the marriage, pending entry of judgment on all 

remaining issues, to be paid to the [Wife].”

Form FL-348 accomplishes this purpose. It “serves as a 

temporary qualified domestic relations order” (Cal. Rules of 

Court, rule 5.390(d)(4)) and tracks the language of section 2337, 

subdivision (d)(2)(C), with preprinted language stating:

“Each party identified above is provisionally awarded 

without prejudice, and subject to adjustments by a later domestic 

relations order, a separate interest equal to one-half of all 

benefits accrued or to be accrued under any retirement plan in 

which one party has accrued a benefit, including but not limited 

to the plans listed below, as a result of employment of the other 

party during the marriage or domestic partnership and before the 

date of separation. In addition, pending further notice, the plan 

must, as allowed by law, or as allowed by the terms of the plan in 

the case of a governmental plan, continue to treat the parties as 

married persons or domestic partners for purposes of any

survivor rights or benefits available under the plan to the extent 

necessary to provide for payment to the surviving spouse or 

domestic partner of an amount equal to that separate interest or 

of all of the survivor benefits if at the time of death of the 

participant there is no other eligible recipient of the survivor 

benefit.”
14

This language in Form FL-348 substantively ensures Wife’s 

entitlement to one-half of the community interest in Husband’s 

retirement plans, and requires that Wife be paid any survivor 

rights or benefits that would have been payable to her on the 

death of the Husband but for dissolution of the status of the 

marriage, as the trial court required in its order after hearing. 

Wife provides no support for her contention that the language of 

Form FL-348 might somehow permit a future spouse of 

Husband’s to assert eligibility to Wife’s protected separate 

interest and survivor benefits. We therefore conclude it was an 

“appropriate interim order” pursuant to the trial court’s 

specifications.

A former spouse’s entitlement to retirement survivor 

benefits may be unprotected in a situation where the trial court 

made no order preserving the former spouse’s interest before the 

employee spouse subsequently remarried and died. (In re 

Marriage of Padgett (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 830, 836 [“where the 

plan participant dies or retires before the former spouse secures 

an order awarding that spouse any interest in the pension plan, a 

domestic relations order entered before the plan participant’s 

death that does not award the former spouse an interest in the 

participant’s pension plan but simply ‘reserves jurisdiction’ over 

the plan provides an inadequate basis for entry nunc pro tunc of 

either a QDRO or of an order determining the former spouse’s 

interest in the pension plan that later may be qualified as a 

QDRO”].) However, that is not the case here, as Form FL-348 

expressly awards Wife a provisional separate interest in the 

plans and continued survivor benefits equal to the extent of that 

interest (or for all of the survivor benefits if there is no other 

eligible recipient).
15

In addition, the Form FL-347 prepared by Husband and 

adopted by the trial court contains added language which

“reflects the precise terms of the September 17, 2019 Order After 

Hearing.” As with the health insurance issue, it essentially 

duplicates the language of the trial court’s order after hearing

with regard to retirement benefits: “Pursuant to Family Code 

2337(c)(9)(E): [Husband] and [Wife] shall ensure that all 

community property retirement plans are subject to an 

enforceable court order for the payment of spousal survivor 

benefits to the [Wife] through an appropriate interim order 

requiring any survivor benefit that would have been payable to 

the [Wife] on the death of the [Husband] but for the judgment 

granting a dissolution of the status of the marriage, pending 

entry of judgment on all remaining issues, to be paid to the 

[Wife].”

As Wife concedes, the trial court had a choice of 

alternatives to protect her retirement survivor benefit rights 

pending entry of judgment on all remaining issues. (See

Hogoboom and King, Cal. Practice Guide: Family Law (The 

Rutter Group 2020) ¶ 5:126 [“In lieu of an interim QDRO, the 

optional Judicial Council form FL-348 . . . will serve as a 

provisional order on pension benefits—in effect, a temporary 

QDRO—and can be attached to a status only dissolution 

judgment”]; see also id. at ¶ 11:484:8 [same].)

We conclude that the trial court’s adoption of Form FL-348, 

entered concurrently with entry of judgment and Form FL-347,

was within the range of available legal options for an interim 

order, effectuated the intent of the trial court’s operative order 

after hearing, and sufficiently ensured that Wife’s interest in 

community property retirement plans, including survivor 
16

benefits, was preserved upon termination of marital status. That 

the trial court did not elect Wife’s preferred interim QDRO 

format is not an abuse of discretion.

DISPOSITION

The trial court’s status judgment and orders are affirmed. 

Stephen Saltzman shall recover his costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

LUI, P. J.

We concur:

ASHMANN-GERST, J.

CHAVEZ, J.