United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-1035

___________

Advantage Media, L.L.C., *

*

Plaintiff - Appellant, *

*

v. *

*

City of Eden Prairie, *

*

Defendant - Appellee. * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the District of

----------------------------- * Minnesota.

* 

American Planning Association; *

International Municipal Lawyers *

Association; Scenic America, *

Incorporated; Scenic Minnesota, *

Incorporated, *

*

Amici on behalf of *

Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: June 12, 2006

 Filed: August 1, 2006

___________

Before MURPHY, MELLOY, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

MURPHY, Circuit Judge.
1

The Honorable David S. Doty, United States District Judge for the District of

Minnesota.

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Advantage Media (Advantage) submitted permit applications to Eden Prairie,

Minnesota (the City) to construct fourteen large commercial billboards. All of

Advantage's applications were denied because each proposed billboard violated

multiple provisions of the Eden Prairie Sign Code. Advantage then brought this

action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that the sign code is unconstitutionally

overbroad under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and that its own constitutional

rights were violated by the denial of its applications. The district court1

 granted

summary judgment to the City, and Advantage appeals. Concluding that Advantage's

overbreadth challenge to the sign code fails for lack of standing and that its own rights

were not violated, we affirm.

I.

Advantage is an outdoor advertising company. It rents commercial advertising

space for profit on billboards which it owns, although in its pleadings it stated that it

would also be willing to make some space available for nonprofit advertising. On

February 13, 2004 Advantage submitted permit applications to the City for

construction of thirteen 672 square foot, double sided freestanding billboards, ranging

in height from 20 to 80 feet. Each billboard was to contain trivision technology,

which displays three different triangular images that rotate every ten seconds to allow

for multiple displays. Advantage also applied to construct one 160 square foot

billboard attached to an existing building.

Eden Prairie, like many other municipalities, regulates what signage may be

erected within its limits through its sign code. The sign code's stated purpose is to

"encourage creativity, freedom of choice, and effective communication" while

preserving the City's "visual amenities" and protecting residents from annoyance and
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danger. The sign code regulates sign dimensions, construction, height, location, and

setback (location from walkways, roadways, and property lines). It favors smaller

signs over larger ones, dispersion over clustering, signs in commercial or industrial

areas rather than residential, and signs located on the premises of a business

(accessory signs) over those advertising a business or service located elsewhere (non

accessory signs). It prohibits "motion signs" (signs with movable displays), signs of

more than 80 square feet in size or 8 feet in height, freestanding signs with bases of

more than 40 square feet, some types of multi faced signs, and all commercial non

accessory signs. Noncommercial signage is exempt from many parts of the code and

completely exempt from regulation for a specified period before and after elections.

The City reviews and approves sign applications through a permitting process.

Permit applications must include a complete description of the proposed sign, a

sketch, and "such other information as shall be necessary" to inform city officials of

the sign's "kind, size, material, construction, and location." Under Minnesota law the

City must grant or deny permit applications within 60 days, Minn. Stat. § 15.99, subd.

2(a), although it can extend the deadline to 120 days upon written notice to the

applicant. Id., subd. 3(f). Until December 2004 the City's practice was to evaluate

permit applications for compliance with the sign code and then subject them to

additional review and approval by "the City Manager or a designee." The normal

designee, a city planner named Steven Durham, stated in an affidavit that even when

this extra step was in place he did not feel he had the discretion to deny permit

applications which were otherwise in compliance with the sign code. The City

nevertheless amended the code to eliminate this final review step. In 2005 it also

added the 60 day limit for reviewing permit applications mandated by state law to the

sign code itself. Denial of a permit application is appealable to the City's Board of

Appeals and Adjustments (the Board).

After Advantage submitted its permit applications on February 13, 2004, it

received a reply letter from Durham dated February 27 informing it that the
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applications were incomplete and requesting additional information related to setback

and location. Advantage responded by providing scaled aerial photographs of all the

proposed sign locations. On March 26 Advantage received a second letter from

Durham, informing it that the review period would be extended to 120 days due to the

number of permit applications it had submitted and their uniqueness. Finally on May

28, Advantage received letters from Durham denying each application for numerous

reasons. Among the reasons listed for the denials were that all of the proposed signs

exceeded the size and height limits in the sign code and the thirteen proposed double

sided freestanding signs had excessively large bases, were too close to nearby

roadways, had too much space between each sign face, and violated the City's

prohibitions on motion signs and commercial non accessory signs. The record does

not indicate that Advantage appealed to the Board.

Approximately two months after its permit applications were denied, Advantage

brought this action in the district court. Advantage argued that the sign code's

substantive regulations are unconstitutionally overbroad under the First and

Fourteenth Amendments because they favor commercial over noncommercial speech

and some types of noncommercial speech over others, thereby chilling a wide array

of protected expression without being narrowly tailored to a compelling government

interest. Advantage also claimed that its own free speech rights had been violated by

the denial of its sign permit applications. Finally, Advantage argued that the sign

permit process, as it existed when Advantage's applications were denied, was both

facially invalid and invalid as applied because it lacked necessary procedural

safeguards and afforded city officials unbridled discretion. Advantage argued that the

sign code should be declared "invalid in its entirety" and requested injunctive relief,

damages, and attorney fees.

The City moved for summary judgment, arguing that Advantage lacked

standing under Article III of the Constitution to bring facial or applied challenges to

the sign code on its own behalf or on behalf of other potential speakers. In the
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alternative, the City argued that Advantage also lacked prudential standing to bring

an overbreadth challenge on behalf of noncommercial speakers and that the applied

challenges on its own behalf failed on the merits. The district court agreed with all

of the City's arguments and granted the motion. Advantage appeals, arguing that it did

have standing to bring a facial overbreadth challenge to the sign code and that the

applied challenges had merit.

II.

We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, using the same standard

as the district court. Bunch v. Canton Marine Towing Co., Inc., 419 F.3d 868, 870

(8th Cir. 2005). Summary judgment should not be granted unless there is no issue of

material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Lund

v. Hennepin County, 427 F.3d 1123, 1125 (8th Cir. 2005). An issue of fact cannot

result from mere denials or conclusory allegations in the pleadings but must be based

on specific factual allegations. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324

(1986).

A.

Advantage argues that it has met the constitutional standing requirements

necessary to bring a facial overbreadth challenge to the sign code in its entirety. The

City disagrees. The Supreme Court has held that the "irreducible minimum" of

constitutional standing consists of three elements: 1) an injury in fact which is

"actual, concrete, and particularized"; 2) a causal connection between that injury and

defendant's conduct; and 3) a likelihood that the injury can be redressed by a favorable

decision. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). 

Advantage first contends that it has constitutional standing regardless of

whether it has met the Lujan test. Citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601
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(1973), it claims that the Supreme Court has created an exception to normal standing

requirements for overbreadth challenges under the First Amendment. So long as it has

demonstrated an injury in fact and that it will "satisfactorily ... frame the issues in the

case," Secretary of State of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 958

(1984), Advantage claims that its facial overbreadth challenge to the sign code may

proceed. The City counters that facial overbreadth challenges are not exempt from

normal constitutional standing requirements and that Advantage must satisfy the

Lujan test.

Article III of the Constitution limits federal jurisdiction to cases and

controversies, and the "core component of standing is an essential and unchanging

part of the case-or-controversy requirement." Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. Whether a

party has established the traditional elements of Article III standing is thus an

inescapable threshold question. Id.; see also Mosby v. Ligon, 418 F.3d 927, 932-33

(8th Cir. 2005) (litigants must satisfy "normal requirements" of Article III standing

even when bringing facial challenges). Advantage's reliance on Broadrick and

Munson to support its assertion of an exception to this prerequisite for First

Amendment overbreadth challenges is misplaced. As the Eleventh Circuit recently

explained, those cases are better understood to create an exception to additional

prudential standing doctrines which normally prevent parties from litigating the rights

of others in federal court. See CAMP Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. City of Atlanta,

451 F.3d 1257, 1269-72 (11th Cir. 2006). Because the First Amendment's free speech

guarantees need "breathing space," the Court has allowed litigants whose own speech

could constitutionally be regulated to challenge overly broad regulations which affect

them. See Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 611-12. Under no circumstances, however, does the

overbreadth doctrine relieve a plaintiff of its burden to show constitutional standing.

Advantage's overbreadth challenge must therefore meet the requirements set forth in

Lujan.
2

Advantage no longer seeks injunctive relief, but requests that we find it has

standing to challenge the sign code in its entirety and then remand for further

proceedings on its claims for damages and attorney fees. It also contends that if the

entire code is invalid it may have a claim for equitable relief under Minnesota law

which would permit it to construct its signs. 

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Advantage argues in the alternative that it has met all three of the Lujan

requirements. The parties agree that Advantage was injured by the denial of its permit

applications. Advantage further maintains that since the provisions of the sign code

are "not amenable to severance," its injury should be understood to have been caused

by enforcement of the code in its entirety and to be redressable by invalidation of the

entire code.2

 The City responds that Advantage cannot challenge the sign code in its

entirety, but only the provisions which were applied to it. As a result Advantage

cannot show causation and redressability for any overbreadth challenge. Most of the

code provisions it alleges to be unconstitutional were not factors in the denial of its

permit applications which was based on other provisions whose constitutionality is

undisputed.

The interpretive approach that Advantage urges with respect to severability is

inconsistent with the clear intent of the drafters of the Eden Prairie City Code and with

the intent of the Minnesota legislature, from which the City derives its regulatory

authority. See Lilly v. City of Minneapolis, 527 N.W.2d 107, 110 (Minn. 1994) (a

city is a political subdivision of the state). The Supreme Court has described

legislative intent as the "touchstone for any decision about remedy." Ayotte v.

Planned Parenthood of Northern New England, 126 S.Ct. 961, 968 (2006). In this

case the city code contains a comprehensive severability provision, under which

"every chapter, section, subdivision, paragraph or provision of the City Code shall be,

and is hereby declared, severable," such that if any provision of the code is held

invalid that ruling has no effect on the other valid provisions. Eden Prairie, Minn.

Code § 1.05 (2005). The Minnesota legislature has stated a similar preference for

severance of an unconstitutional provision from an otherwise valid statutory
3

An Eleventh Circuit panel did adopt Advantage's approach in Tanner

Advertising Group, LLC v. Fayette County, Georgia, 411 F.3d 1272, 1276-77 (11th

Cir. 2005), but it was later rejected by the en banc court. See Tanner, 2006 WL

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framework, except where the remaining provisions are so dependent upon the invalid

provision that "[a] court cannot presume the legislature would have enacted" one

without the other, see Minn. Stat. Ann. § 645.20, a showing Advantage has not made

here. We should be sensitive to such expressions of legislative preference for

severance. See Ayotte, 126 S.Ct. at 968; United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 227-

29 (2005); cf. also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 932, 934 (1983) ("A provision is ...

presumed severable if what remains after severance is fully operative as law.").

Advantage's approach to severability has been rejected in analogous situations

by several other circuits. See Tanner Advertising Group, LLC v. Fayette County,

Georgia, 451 F.3d 777, 790-91 (11th Cir. June 9, 2006) (en banc); Brazos Valley

Coalition for Life, Inc. v. City of Bryan, Texas, 421 F.3d 314, 323 (5th Cir. 2005);

Granite State Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. City of Clearwater, Florida, 351 F.3d 1112,

1117 (11th Cir. 2003); Gospel Missions of America v. City of Los Angeles, 328 F.3d

548, 554 (9th Cir. 2003). The Eleventh Circuit decisions in Tanner and Granite State

are directly on point. In each of these cases an outdoor advertising company

(represented by Advantage's counsel in this action) sought to use denial of its sign

permit applications under one part of a municipal code to challenge other provisions

of the code which had not been applied to it, and in each case the challenges failed for

lack of standing. Tanner, 451 F.3d at 791; Granite State, 351 F.3d at 1117. Brazos

and Gospel Missions reached similar results, except that those cases dealt with

noncommercial speakers and/or different forms of speech. See Brazos, 421 F.3d at

323 (antiabortion protesters lacked standing to challenge sign code provisions never

applied to them and from which they appeared to be exempt); Gospel Missions, 328

F.3d at 554 (nonprofit religious corporation lacked standing to challenge restrictions

on professional fundraisers which were not applied to it). Advantage cites to no

persuasive case which has taken the approach it advocates.3
1567244

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Instead Advantage relies on the Supreme Court's holding in Metromedia, Inc.

v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981) (plurality opinion). Metromedia involved

a sign company's facial challenge to a newly enacted municipal prohibition on outdoor

advertising signs which exempted on premises signs and twelve largely content based

categories of off premises signs. Id. at 495-96. The Court held that the company had

standing to challenge the ordinance as a whole. Id. at 505 n.11. Severability was not

raised as an issue in Metromedia and severance would likely have been inappropriate

given the interrelated structure of the ordinance in question. In contrast, here we are

confronted with a more comprehensive regulatory framework enacted piecemeal over

a number of years, one in which universally applicable restrictions related to size and

location can easily be severed from those which may necessitate more scrutiny.

Metromedia is not applicable on the issue of severability.

Advantage also argues that even if severance might be appropriate, the

severability of a statutory provision goes to the merits and should not factor into a

standing determination. We disagree. The Supreme Court has incorporated

severability analysis into standing determinations when there was clear evidence of

legislative intent, see Chadha, 462 U.S. 931-36, as there is here. Moreover, severance

of particular statutory provisions to limit standing promotes important goals, notably

the avoidance of unnecessary constitutional adjudication and the sharpening of legal

issues facing the court. Contractors Ass'n of Eastern Pennsylvania, Inc. v. City of

Philadelphia, 6 F.3d 990, 996-98 (3rd Cir. 1993). The district court properly

considered the provisions of the sign code to be severable in making its overbreadth

standing determination.

Because the code's provisions are properly considered severable, Advantage

must show injury, causation, and redressability with respect to each provision it

challenges as overbroad. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. To establish causation a plaintiff
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must show that its injury is "fairly traceable" to a challenged statutory provision.

Republican Party of Minnesota v. Klobuchar, 381 F.3d 785, 792 (8th Cir. 2004).

Since most of the content based restrictions and procedural mechanisms which

Advantages claims violate the First Amendment rights of other parties were not

factors in the denial of its own permit applications, it cannot show causation with

respect to them. Gospel Missions, 328 F.3d at 554. These challenges fail for lack of

constitutional standing.

As for redressability, it is established by a more than "merely speculative"

showing that the court can grant relief to redress the plaintiff's injury. Planned

Parenthood of Mid-Missouri and Eastern Kansas, Inc. v. Ehlmann, 137 F.3d 573, 576-

77 (8th Cir. 1998). In this case a favorable decision for Advantage even with respect

to those sign code provisions which were factors in the denial of its permit

applications would not allow it to build its proposed signs, for these would still violate

other unchallenged provisions of the sign code like the restrictions on size, height,

location, and setback. See Harp Advertising Illinois, Inc. v. Village of Chicago Ridge,

Illinois, 9 F.3d 1290, 1292 (1993) (no standing to challenge sign code's ban on off

premises signs where proposed sign also violated unchallenged zoning restrictions).

On an overbreadth challenge Advantage would also be barred from collecting § 1983

damages which are available only for violations of a party's own constitutional rights.

Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 309 (1986); Tanner, 451 F.3d

at 786. Even attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 would be unavailable because they

can be awarded only to a "prevailing party" who receives "actual relief on the merits

of his claim," Granite State Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. City of St. Petersburg,

Florida, 348 F.3d 1278, 1283 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S.

103, 109 (1992)); Advantage could never be such a party, for even in victory it would

be "no closer" to erecting its billboards or obtaining damages than when litigation

began. Id. Because Advantage cannot show redressability with respect to even those
4

Because of this holding we need not decide whether Advantage would

otherwise have had prudential standing to challenge sign code provisions on behalf

of noncommercial speakers. 

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provisions which did factor into the denial of its sign permit applications, it cannot

challenge any part of the sign code as overbroad.4

B.

We turn next to Advantage's applied challenges. Although Advantage has made

many different claims during the course of this litigation, from its briefs we

understand it to have preserved on appeal only three applied challenges to the sign

code. See Jasperson v. Purolater Courier Corp., 765 F.2d 736, 740-41 (8th Cir. 1985)

(failure to raise issue on appeal constitutes abandonment of that issue). Advantage's

applied challenges are: 1) that the City's denial of its sign permit applications

discriminated against it on the basis of content in a manner unjustified by compelling

or substantial government interests; 2) that City officials were afforded excessive

discretion in reviewing its permit applications; and 3) that the sign permitting process

in place when Advantage's applications were denied lacked other required procedural

safeguards. The City responds that Advantage lacks standing to bring these

challenges and that they also fail on the merits.

We consider first Advantage's claim that application of the restrictions on non

accessory signs discriminated against it on the basis of content. As with our

consideration of Advantage's overbreadth challenges, the clearly expressed intent of

the Minnesota legislature and of the drafters of the Eden Prairie City Code requires

us to consider each sign code provision applied to Advantage to be severable from the

remainder of the code. Ayotte, 126 S.Ct. at 968; Booker, 543 U.S. at 227-29. The

content discrimination Advantage alleges here is based entirely on the sign code's

restriction of non accessory signs. If Advantage were seeking only injunctive or

equitable relief it might therefore lack standing. See Harp, 9 F.3d at 1291-92.
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However, Advantage also seeks nominal damages and attorney fees, relief to which

it could be entitled if it could show that the restrictions on non accessory signs

violated its own First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. See Stachura, 477 U.S. at

308 n.11. Advantage's claim is therefore redressable, and it has standing. See Tandy

v. City of Wichita, 380 F.3d 1277, 1290 (10th Cir. 2004) (possible right to nominal

damages sufficient to show redressability).

Since Advantage admits that it would engage primarily in commercial speech,

we first analyze the merits of its challenge under Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp.

v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557(1980). Under Central Hudson, nonmisleading

commercial speech related to lawful activity may be restricted if the restriction seeks

to implement a substantial government interest, directly advances that interest, and

reaches no further than necessary to accomplish its objective. Metromedia, 453 U.S.

at 507 (quoting Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564-66). The restriction need not always

be content neutral, for government "may distinguish between the relative value of

different categories of commercial speech." Id. at 514. The sign code's restrictions

on non accessory signs as applied to Advantage are permissible under Central Hudson.

Municipalities have a "weighty, essentially esthetic interest in proscribing intrusive

and unpleasant formats for expression," including some types of signage. City of Los

Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 806 (1984). Distracting roadside

billboards of the type Advantage sought to erect could also pose real danger to both

motorists and nearby pedestrians. Metromedia itself upheld restrictions on off

premises commercial signs similar to the restrictions on non accessory signs here. 453

U.S. at 507-512. Advantage's First Amendment right to engage in commercial speech

was not violated.

Advantage claims that its proposed signs will also be used for some protected

noncommercial expression. Limits on such expression must generally take the form

of content neutral time, place, and manner restrictions, Ward v. Rock Against Racism,

491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989); otherwise they are subject to strict scrutiny. United States
5

A potential right to attorney fees alone would be insufficient to keep this

controversy alive. See Lewis v. Cont'l Bank Corp. 494 U.S. 472, 480 (1990).

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v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000). Advantage argues that the

City's restrictions on non accessory signs are not content neutral even with respect to

noncommercial expression. Our own examination of the sign code, however,

indicates that all noncommercial expression is exempt from the general non accessory

sign prohibition. In none of the provisions which are applicable to noncommercial

speech is any distinction between accessory and non accessory signs even mentioned.

Advantage's noncommercial expression was not unconstitutionally burdened.

Even if the substantive provisions of the sign code are constitutional,

Advantage finally argues that the sign permitting process applied to its applications

lacked necessary procedural safeguards and afforded City officials excessive

discretion. Several of the deficiencies Advantage alleges were remedied after this

action commenced, which would moot any claim for injunctive relief. See Epp v.

Kerrey, 964 F.2d 754, 755-56 (8th Cir. 1992). As we previously noted, however,

Advantage has also maintained a claim for damages and attorney fees, so its

challenges are not moot. Granite State, 351 F.3d at 1119.5

 Since Advantage might

be entitled to nominal damages if it could show that it was subjected to

unconstitutional procedures, it has standing to assert these claims. Stachura, 477 U.S.

at 308 n.11; Tandy, 380 F.3d at 1290.

Licensing schemes which implement content based regulations of protected

speech must limit the time which the regulator has to decide on a particular license

application and must have mechanisms for prompt judicial review. FW/PBS, Inc. v.

City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 230 (1990); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58

(1965). In addition, they may not vest "unbridled discretion" in individual officials

to permit or deny expressive activity. City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co.,

486 U.S. 750, 755 (1988). Where a scheme implements purely content neutral time,
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place, and manner restrictions, the Supreme Court has said that it need only provide

limits on discretion and "effective judicial review." Thomas v. Chicago Park Dist.,

534 U.S. 316, 323 (2002). 

The primary procedural deficiency which Advantage alleges is the supposedly

unbridled discretion city officials had to require "additional, unspecified" information

after Advantage's sign permit applications had been filed, and arbitrarily to deny these

applications even if they complied with the sign code's requirements. To avoid

granting officials unbridled discretion, a permitting scheme like that created by the

sign code must employ "narrowly drawn, reasonable, and definite standards," although

such standards can be provided through "established practice" if absent from the text

of the code. Forsyth County, Georgia v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 133

(1992) (internal quotations omitted). The required standards were not lacking here.

Although city officials were empowered to request "other information" after

Advantage had submitted its applications, that information had to relate to the "kind,

size, material, construction, and location" of the proposed signs. The information they

did request concerned location. There is also no evidence of impermissible discretion

in the final review by the City Manager or a designee. That designee, Steven Durham,

stated that he did not have the power to deny applications which complied with the

sign code. Advantage's applications were rejected because they were not in

compliance. Other than making conclusory allegations, it has provided no evidence

of any "pattern of unlawful favoritism." Thomas, 534 U.S. at 325. Advantage's

permit applications were not subjected to the unbridled discretion of city officials.

The other procedural inadequacy alleged by Advantage is the absence of time

limits for processing permit applications in the text of the sign code at the time its

applications were submitted. Even assuming that the full range of procedural

safeguards mandated under FW/PBS and Freedman is necessary rather than the more

limited protections required under Thomas, we conclude that the omission of time

limits in the code itself was permissible. The states have discretion to decide how
6

Advantage also claims that the sign code appeals process did not provide it

with "prompt" judicial review because there is no time limit for a final decision. Since

Advantage failed to avail itself of the appeals process, it lacks standing to bring this

challenge. See Granite State, 351 F.3d at 1117-18. The claim also lacks merit, for

here "prompt" judicial review does not equate to time limits but to the avoidance of

"undue delay" as determined on a case by case basis. City of Littleton, Colorado v.

Z.J. Gifts D-4 LLC, 541 U.S. 774, 781 (2004) (internal quotations omitted).

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they will incorporate necessary procedural safeguards into their regulations. See

Freedman, 380 U.S. at 60. It was sufficient here for Minnesota to enact the needed

time limits; they did not have to be repeated in the sign code itself. Cf. Deja Vu of

Nashville, Inc. v. Metro Gov't of Nashville, 274 F.3d 377, 401 (6th Cir. 2001)

(procedural safeguards inadequate where neither municipal ordinance or state law

provided for prompt judicial review).6

 We conclude that the procedures used to

process Advantage's sign permit applications were constitutional.

III.

For these reasons, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.

_____________________________