IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. 124PA22

Filed 22 March 2024

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v.

RICHARD HENRY JORDAN, JR.

On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of a unanimous decision 

of the Court of Appeals, 282 N.C. App. 651 (2022), reversing an order entered on 22

January 2020 by Judge Daniel Kuehnert in Superior Court, Mecklenburg County, 

and remanding the case. Heard in the Supreme Court on 7 November 2023.

Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, by Michael T. Henry, Special Deputy 

Attorney General, for the State-appellant.

Christopher A. Brook for defendant-appellee.

DIETZ, Justice.

While investigating reports of a stolen car, law enforcement officers observed 

a suspect retreat to a nearby home. The officers followed the suspect into the home 

and saw evidence of an illegal drug operation.

The issue presented in this case is whether defendant—one of the participants 

in that drug operation—has standing to challenge the officers’ warrantless entry into 

the home. Defendant told the police he did not live there. Defendant’s uncle, who was 

also present, told the officers that he lived there and consented to a search. The uncle 

also told the officers that one of the other men present—the original suspect that led 
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officers to the home—was temporarily staying there and had some personal 

belongings in the home. The uncle did not indicate that defendant lived in the home 

or frequently visited.

After a suppression hearing, the trial court orally denied defendant’s motion 

to suppress, referencing defendant’s lack of any reasonable expectation of privacy in 

the home. The court’s oral ruling did not include clearly identified findings of fact, 

with much of the court’s discussion being mere recitation of the evidence. The court 

instructed the State to prepare a draft order, which the court would then enter to

memorialize its ruling.

That never happened, and the case went to trial without the trial court 

memorializing its oral ruling in a written order with express fact findings. After the 

jury convicted defendant of a number of drug-related offenses, defendant appealed. 

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress, 

reasoning that the trial record would not support any finding that defendant lacked 

a reasonable expectation of privacy in the home.

As explained below, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals. The 

evidence presented at the suppression hearing could support findings that defendant 

lacked standing to challenge the search. But the trial court never made those 

findings, despite being compelled to do so because the trial record contains materially 

conflicting evidence. See State v. Bartlett, 368 N.C. 309, 312 (2015).

We therefore reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand with 
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instructions to further remand this matter to the trial court to make findings of fact 

based on the trial record. The trial court, based on those new findings, may again 

deny the motion to suppress, leaving defendant’s convictions intact, or it may grant 

the motion to suppress in whole or in part and order a new trial. See State v. 

Hammonds, 370 N.C. 158, 160–62 (2017).

Facts and Procedural History

In 2017, law enforcement officers arrived in a residential neighborhood to 

investigate reports of a stolen car. The officers located the stolen car in a parking lot. 

While observing the car, officers saw Marcel Thompson leave a nearby house and 

approach the car as if he planned to enter it. After Thompson saw the officers, he 

turned and hurried back towards the house.

Thompson knocked on the door of the house and said “it’s the police” loudly 

enough for the officers to hear as they followed him. Defendant opened the door to let

Thompson into the home. Thompson left the door open as he entered. One officer put 

his foot through the threshold of the door and told the occupants that he wanted to 

speak with them. After Thompson declined to step outside, the officer fully entered 

the home, while another officer moved into the doorway. 

The second officer observed defendant close a safe that was sitting on a table 

in the center of the room. The officer saw defendant lock the safe and put a key in his 

pocket. That officer also saw baggies, razor blades, and white powder on the same 

table.
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There were two other individuals in the house with Thompson and defendant. 

Officers asked the occupants who lived in the home. One of the occupants, James 

Deitz,1 told the officers that he resided in the home. Officers later learned that Deitz 

is defendant’s uncle.

The officers asked Deitz for permission to search the home, and Deitz 

consented. When the officers asked to search the safe, defendant claimed the safe was 

not his. Defendant then objected to the officers searching the safe and refused to 

provide them with the key. When the officers asked defendant if he lived in the home, 

he stated, “I don’t have anything to do with anything that’s in here. I don’t live here. 

This has nothing to do with me.”

Defendant further explained, “I came to visit my uncle. I don’t live in here 

period, there is nothing here in my name.” When the officers again asked if defendant 

lived at the home, he responded, “No, I don’t live here.” The officers then pointed out 

that because defendant had the key to the safe, he must at least own what is in the 

safe, but defendant again responded, “No.”

The officers discussed with Deitz who resided in the house. Deitz told the 

officers that Thompson had been staying in the house for a few days. Thompson 

confirmed that he had various belongings in the home. Neither Deitz nor Thompson 

indicated that defendant also stayed at the home, which was relatively small and had 

1 The State uses the name “James Deitz.” Defendant uses the name “James Deese.” 

As explained below, because the trial court did not enter a written order, the record does not 

definitively resolve the correct spelling of this witness’s surname.
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only one bedroom, and no one identified any of defendant’s belongings inside the 

home.

The officers later obtained a warrant to search the safe and the home. Inside 

the safe, the officers found a firearm, cocaine in different baggies, and money. 

Throughout the home, the officers found baggies, syringes, razor blades, and scales. 

The State charged defendant with trafficking cocaine, possession of a firearm 

by a felon, possession of drug paraphernalia, and attaining habitual felon status.

Before trial, defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence, claiming that

the officers unlawfully entered Deitz’s home. At the hearing, both parties briefly 

addressed the issue of defendant’s expectation of privacy in the home, but it was not 

a focus of either side’s arguments.

At the end of the hearing, the trial court orally denied defendant’s motion to 

suppress. As is common in these scenarios, the trial court’s oral ruling did not include 

clearly defined findings of fact and conclusions of law. Instead, the trial court 

indicated that it would enter a written order memorializing the oral ruling. The court 

instructed the State to prepare a draft order. The parties acknowledge on appeal that 

the trial court never entered a written order as anticipated at the hearing. 

A jury later found defendant guilty of trafficking cocaine, possession of a 

firearm by a felon, and possession of drug paraphernalia. Defendant then pleaded 

guilty to attaining habitual felon status. After entry of judgment, defendant appealed 

from the judgments, arguing that the trial court erred by denying his motion to 
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suppress.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s order and remanded 

the case. See State v. Jordan, 282 N.C. App. 651 (2022). We allowed the State’s 

petition for discretionary review. 

Analysis

By statute, when a trial court rules on a motion to suppress, the court must 

“make findings of fact and conclusions of law which shall be included in the record.” 

N.C.G.S. § 15A-974(b) (2023); see also id. § 15A-977. The need to make findings of fact 

is crucial for appellate review because appellate courts “cannot find facts.” Pharr v. 

Atlanta & Charlotte Air Line Ry. Co., 132 N.C. 418, 423 (1903). Instead, appellate 

courts examine only “whether competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings 

of fact and whether the findings of fact support the conclusions of law.” State v. Biber, 

365 N.C. 162, 167–68 (2011). When the trial court does not make findings of fact, this 

can frustrate our ability to engage in appellate review because we have no underlying 

facts to which we can apply the law. Bartlett, 368 N.C. at 312.

Although trial courts can make the necessary findings of fact in an oral ruling, 

we have long held that entering a written order with findings of fact “is the better 

practice.” Id. One reason for doing so is that it can be difficult in an oral ruling to 

distinguish between “a mere recitation of the evidence” and “true findings.” Harrison 

v. Gemma Power Sys., LLC, 369 N.C. 572, 583 (2017). 

For example, when announcing an oral ruling, trial courts often will describe 
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the testimony and evidence received at the hearing. The court might say, “The officer 

testified that the door was open.” Is this a finding that the officer’s testimony is 

credible and, thus, a finding that the door was indeed open? On a cold appellate 

record, it can be hard to tell. 

As a result, when the trial court fails to make express findings of fact, either 

orally or in a written order, we typically remand the matter for the trial court to do 

so as required by the applicable statutes. See State v. Salinas, 366 N.C. 119, 122–26

(2012). But we have also recognized an exception to this general rule: “Although the 

statute’s directive is in the imperative form, only a material conflict in the evidence—

one that potentially affects the outcome of the suppression motion—must be resolved 

by explicit factual findings that show the basis for the trial court’s ruling.” Bartlett, 

368 N.C. at 312. When there is no material conflict in the evidence, “the trial court’s 

findings can be inferred from its decision.” Id.

Here, we cannot infer the necessary findings under Bartlett because there is a 

material conflict in the evidence that the trial court must resolve. The central issue 

in this motion to suppress is whether defendant has standing to challenge the officers’ 

search of the home. A defendant may move to suppress evidence only when the 

defendant’s own rights, “not those of some third party,” have been violated. State v. 

Taylor, 298 N.C. 405, 415 (1979). Thus, before a defendant may challenge the legality 

of a search, he must demonstrate that the room in the home “where the search 

occurred was an area in which he had a reasonable expectation of privacy.” Id. at 416.
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The burden is on the defendant to prove that he had the requisite expectation of 

privacy. State v. Jones, 299 N.C. 298, 306 (1980).

There is no fixed test for assessing a defendant’s expectation of privacy, but 

the expectation must be “one that society deems to be reasonable.” State v. Wiley, 355 

N.C. 592, 602 (2002). Every case is fact specific. For example, overnight guests 

typically have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area where they are staying, 

even if they are merely a temporary visitor. Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 98–99 

(1990). Similarly, a family member who is a “frequent visitor” to the home of a relative 

may develop a reasonable expectation of privacy in the relative’s home. E.g., Bonner 

v. Anderson, 81 F.3d 472, 475 (4th Cir. 1996). By contrast, one who visits another’s 

home “for a business transaction” and remains there only to conduct that transaction

likely does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the home. Minnesota v. 

Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 90 (1998).

Here, there are fact questions that must be resolved to apply these legal 

principles to this case. For example, defendant told the officers that he did not live in 

the home and that “there is nothing here in my name.” Deitz, who identified himself 

as the resident of the home, consented to the search. Deitz also explained to the 

officers that Thompson—the man police had followed from the stolen car to the 

home—was staying in the house for a few days. Thompson confirmed that he had 

various belongings in the home.

Importantly, Deitz did not tell the officers that defendant also was staying at 
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the home or that defendant had any belongings there. Nor is there any direct evidence 

of whether defendant was a frequent visitor to Deitz’s home or had the sort of 

relationship with Deitz that could give defendant a reasonable expectation of privacy 

in the home. 

The trial court reasonably could infer from the statements of Deitz and 

Thompson that only those two individuals had a reasonable expectation of privacy in 

the home and that the others present were there solely to participate in the illegal 

drug operation. See Carter, 525 U.S. at 90. This finding would support the trial court’s 

conclusion that defendant, unlike Deitz and Thompson, did not have a reasonable 

expectation of privacy in the home. But, as noted above, the trial court did not make 

that fact finding because it did not make any fact findings.

The dissent insists that there is no need for further fact-finding because there 

are “uncontroverted” facts that show an expectation of privacy. In doing so, the 

dissent merely highlights why further fact-finding is needed. 

For example, the dissent asserts that defendant had “authority to let persons 

into the home regardless of whether Mr. Deitz was present.” There is no direct 

evidence of this. Deitz did not say this was so. Nor did defendant. This is an inference

that defendant draws in his appellate briefing from the fact that he opened the door 

and let Thompson in. 

But a fact-finder would not be compelled to draw this inference. Indeed, a factfinder might reasonably infer the opposite—that defendant ordinarily would not have 
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permission to let others into the home, but did so here because Thompson was 

pounding on the door shouting, “it’s the police,” and Deitz was not in the room at the 

time.

The same is true of the other purported facts identified by the dissent; they are 

not facts, they are inferences. And for each of them, a fact-finder also could draw a 

competing inference in the opposite direction. This Court cannot choose between 

these competing inferences. When “different inferences may be drawn from the 

evidence,” only the trial court, as fact-finder, can determine “which inferences shall 

be drawn and which shall be rejected.” Knutton v. Cofield, 273 N.C. 355, 359 (1968).

Accordingly, we reject the Court of Appeals’ determination that the trial record 

“does not support a finding that Defendant lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy 

in the residence searched.” Jordan, 282 N.C. App. at 660. We hold that the record 

could support the necessary findings, but there are material fact questions that must 

be resolved by the fact-finder before any legal conclusion can be reached.

In sum, because the trial court did not enter a written order as intended at the 

conclusion of the suppression hearing, the trial court did not make adequate findings

of fact “that resolved the material conflict in the evidence.” See Bartlett, 368 N.C. at 

312. “Without such a finding, there can be no meaningful appellate review of the trial 

judge’s decision.” Id.

When the trial court fails to resolve fact issues necessary to review the trial 

court’s legal conclusions, “an appellate court may remand the cause for appropriate 
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proceedings without ordering a new trial.” State v. Lang, 309 N.C. 512, 523–24 (1983).

We therefore reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand with 

instructions to further remand this matter to the trial court to make the necessary 

findings of fact based on the trial record. The trial court, based on those new findings, 

may again deny the motion to suppress, leaving defendant’s convictions intact, or it 

may grant the motion to suppress in whole or in part and order a new trial. See 

Hammonds, 370 N.C. at 160–62.

Conclusion

We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand for further 

proceedings.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.
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Justice RIGGS dissenting.

The majority remands this matter to the trial court for further findings of fact 

that it believes are necessary to conclude that Mr. Jordan possessed a reasonable 

expectation of privacy in the premises illegally searched by law enforcement. Because 

I believe there is already adequate uncontradicted evidence in the record to establish 

such a conclusion, I respectfully dissent.

I begin with the uncontroverted facts established from the evidence introduced 

at the suppression hearing. Mr. Jordan’s uncle, Mr. Deitz, resided in the premises 

searched.1 Mr. Jordan himself had permission to be in the residence late at night, 

even when Mr. Deitz was not at home. Mr. Jordan also had authority to let persons 

into the home, regardless of whether Mr. Deitz was present.2 Mr. Jordan was 

likewise familiar with the home and the fact that the house had been divided to allow 

businesses, like a salon, to operate out of the space.3 And Mr. Jordan, at a minimum, 

had access to and control over a safe in the home—and a safe’s very purposes are to 

sharply limit indiscriminate access, deter discovery, and ensure the privacy of its 

1 There is no question from the evidence that the premises searched belonged to Mr. 

Deitz, or that Mr. Deitz was Mr. Jordan’s uncle. 

2 The majority asserts this is exclusively based on an inference from the fact that Mr. 

Jordan opened the door for Mr. Thompson. It is not; instead, it is supported by a witness’s 

statement—captured on an officers’ body camera video and introduced into evidence at the 

suppression hearing—that Mr. Jordan and Mr. Thompson were the only persons present at 

the home when she arrived.

3 Mr. Jordan evinced such knowledge in direct statements on the body camera footage 

introduced into evidence.
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Riggs, J., dissenting

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contents.4 

The above undisputed facts establish Mr. Jordan’s reasonable expectation of 

privacy in the premises searched. Familial relations certainly weigh in favor of that 

conclusion. See, e.g., United States v. Washington, 573 F.3d 279, 289 (6th Cir. 2009) 

(holding a nephew had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his uncle’s apartment); 

United States v. Heath, 259 F.3d 522, 533 (6th Cir. 2001) (cousins); Figueroa v. Mazza, 

825 F.3d 89, 110 (2d Cir. 2016) (mother and son); cf. United States v. Gray, 491 F.3d 

138, 153 (4th Cir. 2007) (recognizing Fourth Amendment standing of “social visitors 

with near-familial relationships”). That Mr. Jordan was entrusted to be at the home 

without Mr. Deitz likewise discloses a substantial measure of control over and 

acceptance into the household. Cf. Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 99 (1990) (noting 

that overnight guests are likely to have a reasonable expectation of privacy in 

another’s residence because “[i]t is unlikely that the guest will be confined to a 

restricted area of the house; and when the host is away or asleep, the guest will have 

a measure of control over the premises”). So, too, does the fact that Mr. Jordan had 

the ability to control admission into the home. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 

149 (1978) (holding a visitor had a reasonable expectation of privacy in a friend’s 

apartment because he “had complete dominion and control over the apartment and 

could exclude others from it”). Further, his ownership and/or control over a safe in 

4 That Mr. Jordan had access to and control over the safe is not disputed by the 

evidence and is accepted by the majority. 
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Riggs, J., dissenting

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the home—together with repeated assertions that police lacked permission to access 

it—necessarily bestowed him with authority to “preserve as private” materials in the 

home. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). All of these facts establish 

that Mr. Jordan, as a trusted family member of Mr. Deitz with substantial 

unsupervised control over access to the home and the locked safe within, had “a 

legitimate expectation of privacy there.” See Olson, 495 U.S. at 96.

I do not believe the conflicts in the evidence identified by the majority undercut 

that conclusion. Whether Mr. Deitz and Mr. Thompson were the only overnight 

residents of the home with common law property interests in the possessions therein 

is not dispositive. See Gray, 491 F.3d at 153 (“[W]e have recognized that persons 

other than overnight guests can have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the home 

of another . . . in the context of social visitors with near-familial relationships.”); 

Rakas, 439 U.S. at 144 n.12 (“Expectations of privacy protected by the Fourth 

Amendment, of course, need not be based on a common-law interest in real or 

personal property, or on the invasion of such an interest.”). Nor does that question 

diminish the fact that Mr. Jordan is a family member with the right to control and 

access both the home—including outside Mr. Deitz’s presence—and a safe found 

inside it. The fact that illegal activity was underway at the time police arrived does 

not change the calculus; a college student with free and unsupervised access to a 

relative’s home and locked liquor cabinet is still a familial relation with substantial 

acceptance into the relative’s household—even if the student uses the space for a 
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Riggs, J., dissenting

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homeowner-approved and invite-only illegal poker game involving underage 

drinking.5 Privacy interests of close friends and family with acceptance into and 

control over the home are not erased because the location is being used for illegal 

activity at the time of the search. See, e.g., United States v. Pollard, 215 F.3d 643, 

647 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding a defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in a 

friend’s home despite his use of the house “to complete an illegal sale of cocaine”); 

United States v. Poe, 556 F.3d 1113, 1122 (10th Cir. 2009) (holding a social guest who 

was permitted to remain in the home to conduct a drug sale after the resident left 

had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the home).

In sum, I do not agree with the majority that the identified conflicts in the 

evidence require resolution to conclude that Mr. Jordan had Fourth Amendment 

standing to challenge the search of his uncle’s residence. His familial relationship, 

familiarity with the home, unsupervised control of admittance into the house during 

late-night hours, and his authority over access to the safe inside combine to establish 

that has was so accepted into the residence as to have a reasonable expectation of 

5 The majority relies on Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 90 (1998), for the proposition 

that Mr. Jordan lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy if he was present “solely to 

participate in the illegal drug operation.” This is an overreading of Carter, which held that 

non-overnight guests lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the searched premises 

because they “were essentially present for a business transaction[,] . . . [t]here [was] no 

suggestion that they had a previous relationship with [the resident,] . . . [n]or was there 

anything similar to the overnight guest relationship . . . to suggest a degree of acceptance into 

the household.” Id. (emphases added); see also United States v. Gamez-Orduño, 235 F.3d 453, 

458 (9th Cir. 2000) (“An individual whose presence on another’s premises is purely 

commercial in nature . . . has no legitimate expectation of privacy in that location.” (emphasis 

added) (citing Carter, 525 U.S. at 90)).
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Riggs, J., dissenting

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privacy independent of his purposes for being there, his status as a non-overnight 

guest, or his lack of legal ownership. I would therefore affirm the Court of Appeals' 

decision and respectfully dissent.

Justice EARLS joins in this dissenting opinion.