1

STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

In re W.C. and P.C.

No. 19-0603 (Ohio County 18-CJA-51 and 18-CJA-52)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Petitioner Mother K.P., by counsel Richard W. Hollandsworth, appeals the Circuit Court 

of Ohio County’s May 30, 2019, order terminating her parental rights to W.C. and P.C.

1 The West 

Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources (“DHHR”), by counsel Lee Niezgoda, filed 

a response in support of the circuit court’s order. The guardian ad litem, Anne Marie Morelli, filed 

a response on behalf of the children in support of the circuit court’s order. Petitioner filed a reply. 

On appeal, petitioner argues that the circuit court erred in finding that she had not substantially 

corrected the conditions of abuse and neglect, terminating her parental rights without imposing a 

less-restrictive disposition, and failing to rule on the terms of petitioner’s improvement period.

2

This Court has considered the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal. The facts and legal 

arguments are adequately presented, and the decisional process would not be significantly aided 

by oral argument. Upon consideration of the standard of review, the briefs, and the record 

presented, the Court finds no substantial question of law and no prejudicial error. For these reasons, 

a memorandum decision affirming the circuit court’s order is appropriate under Rule 21 of the 

Rules of Appellate Procedure.

In May of 2018, the DHHR filed an abuse and neglect petition against petitioner alleging 

that her house was filthy, the children had lice, there was domestic violence in the home, and

petitioner had untreated mental health and substance abuse issues. Specifically, the DHHR alleged 

that petitioner left her daughter in the care of strangers while she overdosed on drugs in a car in a 

parking lot, and, as a result, was charged with various crimes. 

1

Consistent with our long-standing practice in cases with sensitive facts, we use initials 

where necessary to protect the identities of those involved in this case. See In re K.H., 235 W. Va. 

254, 773 S.E.2d 20 (2015); Melinda H. v. William R. II, 230 W. Va. 731, 742 S.E.2d 419 (2013); 

State v. Brandon B., 218 W. Va. 324, 624 S.E.2d 761 (2005); State v. Edward Charles L., 183 W. 

Va. 641, 398 S.E.2d 123 (1990). 

2

For brevity and clarification, the Court has combined and condensed several of petitioner’s 

assignments of error.

FILED

April 6, 2020

EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

OF WEST VIRGINIA
2

The circuit court held an adjudicatory hearing in July of 2018, and petitioner stipulated to 

abusing non-prescribed Xanax and Suboxone. She also stipulated to leaving her daughter in the 

care of strangers while she used drugs. Notably, petitioner stipulated that her substance abuse was 

ongoing and she was willing to “do whatever the [multidisciplinary team] (“MDT”) reasonably 

requires to obtain an agreed-to improvement period.” Petitioner stated she was “presently seeking 

a long term treatment program.” The circuit court accepted petitioner’s stipulation and adjudicated 

her as an abusing parent. Thereafter, petitioner attended a MDT meeting in which she disclosed 

her extensive history of mental health and drug abuse issues. The MDT reviewed petitioner’s drug 

screens from the past two months, which were positive for buprenorphine, marijuana, alcohol, and 

methamphetamine. Petitioner then filed a motion for a post-adjudicatory improvement period. In 

August of 2018, petitioner was admitted into a substance abuse stabilization unit for eleven days 

and was released after receiving a Vivitrol shot to curb her addiction. 

In September of 2018, the circuit court held a status hearing wherein the parties explained 

that they could not agree on the terms of petitioner’s requested improvement period. The DHHR 

and the guardian argued that petitioner needed to complete inpatient rehabilitation due to her 

extensive history of substance abuse and mental health issues and noted that she had not yet 

attended her scheduled psychological examination. Petitioner requested that she be allowed to 

complete short-term substance abuse treatment or outpatient services. As there was no agreement, 

the circuit court stated that it would set the matter for disposition and not award petitioner an 

improvement period. After a short recess in which petitioner discussed the matter with counsel, 

petitioner accepted the term of completing an inpatient treatment program as a condition of her 

improvement period, and the circuit court granted her a post-adjudicatory improvement period. 

Petitioner submitted to a psychological evaluation in October of 2018. The evaluation was

completed on November 2, 2018, the results of which showed that petitioner was diagnosed with 

Polysubstance Use Disorder and Unspecified Personality Disorder with impulsive and dependent 

personality traits. The psychologist opined that petitioner could attempt an intensive outpatient 

program if she did not relapse, but believed inpatient treatment may be necessary. The evaluation 

recommended, among other things, that petitioner “demonstrate six months clean time to ensure 

her commitment to sobriety.” In November of 2018, petitioner entered into an intensive outpatient 

program but was discharged for noncompliance on December 5, 2018. Thereafter, petitioner was 

referred to a twenty-eight day inpatient treatment program, but she failed to enroll. 

In January of 2019, the circuit court held a status hearing in which it addressed petitioner’s 

failure to complete an inpatient program and her recent relapse in recovery. Petitioner argued that 

because the psychologist recommended that she could attend intensive outpatient rehabilitation, 

she was “confused” about which treatment she should attend. Nonetheless, petitioner stated that

she understood that completing inpatient treatment was a condition of her improvement period and 

that she would report to an appropriate facility the same day. However, petitioner failed to report 

to the inpatient treatment program, and the guardian filed a motion to terminate her improvement 

period. The motion noted that the inpatient treatment program would no longer accept petitioner’s 

applications because she had failed three times to report for treatment. In March of 2019, the circuit 

court held a hearing on the guardian’s motion. Petitioner announced that she did not contest the 
3

termination of her improvement period and filed a written waiver with the circuit court. The circuit 

court then terminated petitioner’s improvement period.

The circuit court held the final dispositional hearing in May of 2019. The DHHR presented 

evidence that petitioner was removed from an intensive outpatient program for noncompliance and 

referred to an inpatient treatment program. However, petitioner failed to enroll in the inpatient 

program, despite the program workers’ efforts to secure a bed on three separate occasions. The 

DHHR also presented evidence that petitioner declined a program that provided sober living

housing that allowed children to stay, which would have helped to reunify her with the children. 

The DHHR further presented evidence that petitioner had been noncompliant with services since 

January of 2019, when she tested positive for alcohol and started missing drug screens. Due to her 

noncompliance, petitioner’s supervised visitations were suspended. The DHHR worker then 

testified that the MDT’s recommendation at its first meeting was for petitioner to attend a longterm inpatient rehabilitation program due to her lengthy history of drug abuse and untreated mental 

health issues. She further testified that petitioner’s failed attempt to complete an intensive 

outpatient program supported the MDT’s recommendation for inpatient treatment. Lastly, she 

testified that the DHHR recommended the termination of petitioner’s parental rights, as she failed 

to regain her supervised visitations with the children despite not seeing them for many months. 

Petitioner testified that she had been sober for more than 280 days, that her positive drug 

screen was not a relapse, and that she stopped submitting to drug screens after the DHHR services 

provider informed her that services had been terminated. She further testified that attending 

inpatient rehabilitation would have been detrimental to her recovery because she would have lost

her employment. Finally, petitioner requested that the circuit court terminate only her custodial 

rights, arguing that she could improve herself on her own terms. Based upon the evidence, the 

circuit court found that petitioner had over a year to address her substance abuse and mental health

issues, but failed to do so. The circuit court concluded that petitioner had not submitted to drug 

screens in two months; had not seen her children since the suspension of her supervised visitations 

in January of 2019; and had not completed any meaningful addiction treatment. The circuit court 

concluded that there was no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of abuse and neglect could 

be substantially corrected in the near future and that it was in the best interest of the children to 

terminate petitioner’s parental rights. Accordingly, the circuit court terminated petitioner’s 

parental rights by its May 30, 2019, order. It is from this dispositional order that petitioner appeals.3

The Court has previously established the following standard of review:

“Although conclusions of law reached by a circuit court are subject to de 

novo review, when an action, such as an abuse and neglect case, is tried upon the 

facts without a jury, the circuit court shall make a determination based upon the 

evidence and shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether such 

child is abused or neglected. These findings shall not be set aside by a reviewing 

court unless clearly erroneous. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there 

is evidence to support the finding, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left 

3

The fathers of W.C. and P.C. were nonabusing parents below, and the children will remain 

in their respective father’s custodies.
4

with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. However, 

a reviewing court may not overturn a finding simply because it would have decided 

the case differently, and it must affirm a finding if the circuit court’s account of the 

evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety.” Syl. Pt. 1, In 

Interest of Tiffany Marie S., 196 W.Va. 223, 470 S.E.2d 177 (1996). 

Syl. Pt. 1, In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011). 

On appeal, petitioner raises four assignments of error related to the termination of her 

parental rights and one assignment related to the circuit court’s findings regarding the terms of her 

improvement period.4 We first address the termination of petitioner’s parental rights. Petitioner 

argues that the circuit court erred in finding that she had not corrected the conditions of abuse and 

neglect when she was “sober” throughout the proceedings and when her substance abuse was the 

only condition of abuse and neglect that needed to be corrected. Petitioner also asserts that the 

circuit court erred in terminating her parental rights without imposing a less-restrictive disposition. 

Moreover, petitioner argues that the circuit court failed to analyze the best interests of the children 

in making its final ruling. We disagree and find that petitioner is entitled to no relief. 

Contrary to petitioner’s position that she was sober and her substance abuse was the only 

condition of abuse and neglect that needed to be corrected, the record shows that petitioner also 

4

Petitioner argues at length about the qualifications of presiding circuit court judges in child 

abuse and neglect proceedings, but fails to cite any authority demonstrating how this argument is 

relevant to the issue of the termination of her parental rights. Petitioner’s failure to provide any 

support for her argument is in violation of Rule 10(c)(7) of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate 

Procedure, as follows:

The brief must contain an argument exhibiting clearly the points of fact and law 

presented, the standard of review applicable, and citing the authorities relied on, 

under headings that correspond with the assignments of error. The argument must 

contain appropriate and specific citations to the record on appeal, including 

citations that pinpoint when and how the issues in the assignments of error were 

presented to the lower tribunal. The Court may disregard errors that are not 

adequately supported by specific references to the record on appeal.

Additionally, in an Administrative Order entered December 10, 2012, Re: Filings That Do Not 

Comply With the Rules of Appellate Procedure, this Court specifically noted that “[b]riefs that lack 

citation of authority [or] fail to structure an argument applying applicable law” are not in 

compliance with this Court’s rules. Further, “[b]riefs with arguments that do not contain a citation 

to legal authority to support the argument presented and do not ‘contain appropriate and specific 

citations to the record on appeal . . .’ as required by rule 10(c)(7)” are not in compliance with this 

Court’s rules. Id. “A skeletal ‘argument,’ really nothing more than an assertion, does not preserve 

a claim . . . . Judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs.” State v. Kaufman, 227 

W. Va. 537, 555 n.39, 711 S.E.2d 607, 625 n.39 (2011) (quoting U.S. v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 

956 (7th Cir. 1991)). Because petitioner’s brief with regard to this assignment of error is inadequate 

and fails to comply with Rule 10(c)(7), we decline to address her argument on appeal.
5

admitted to untreated mental health issues. At adjudication, petitioner stipulated that her substance 

abuse was an ongoing problem, that she was seeking long-term drug treatment, and that she had 

long-term mental health problems. However, petitioner recanted and unilaterally refused to attend 

inpatient treatment to address her substance abuse and mental health issues. Also, despite 

petitioner’s contention that she was “sober” throughout the proceedings, the record indicates that 

she tested positive for buprenorphine, marijuana, alcohol, and methamphetamine around June and 

July of 2018. She also tested positive for alcohol and missed several drug screens in January of 

2019, and failed to drug screen from February 19, 2019, until the dispositional hearing in May of 

2019. Because petitioner did not submit to drug screening for nearly four months prior to the final 

dispositional hearing, the record is devoid of any proof of petitioner’s alleged sobriety. Clearly, 

petitioner failed to correct the conditions of abuse and neglect. 

West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(b)(6) permits a circuit court to terminate parental rights 

upon findings that “there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of neglect or abuse can be 

substantially corrected in the near future” and that termination is necessary for the welfare of the 

children. Further, pursuant to West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(c)(3), a situation in which there is 

no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of abuse and neglect can be substantially corrected 

includes one in which “[t]he abusing parent . . . [has] not responded to or followed through with a 

reasonable family case plan or other rehabilitative efforts . . . designed to reduce or prevent the 

abuse or neglect of the child[ren].”

As shown above, the record supports the finding that there was no reasonable likelihood

petitioner could correct the conditions of abuse and neglect in the near future because she failed to

follow through with her case plan by meaningfully addressing her serious substance abuse and 

mental health issues. Most importantly, petitioner agreed to the term of inpatient treatment, and 

the circuit court awarded her a post-adjudicatory improvement period based upon that agreement. 

Although petitioner claims she was punished for not “blindly” agreeing to inpatient treatment, the 

other MDT members reasonably made their recommendation of inpatient treatment based upon

petitioner’s positive drug screens for various substances and her admission to an extensive history 

of substance abuse and mental health problems. While petitioner claimed she should have been 

permitted to complete outpatient treatment, she was removed from the intensive outpatient 

program for noncompliance and referred to an inpatient rehabilitation program in December of 

2018, which she did not attend. As petitioner accepted the reasonable term of inpatient treatment 

as a condition of her improvement period, but failed to complete said term, we find no error in the 

circuit court’s finding that there was no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of abuse and 

neglect could be substantially corrected in the near future. 

While petitioner claims that the circuit court failed to assess the best interests of the 

children, the circuit court clearly made the required findings in its May 30, 2019, order. The circuit 

court found that it was in the best interests of the children to remain in the custody of their 

respective fathers. It further found that termination of petitioner’s parental rights was in the 

children’s best interest as they needed permanency. Indeed, the record supports such a finding

because petitioner elected to stop drug screening and never regained supervised visitation with the 

children despite not seeing them for nearly five months. “We have previously pointed out that the 

level of interest demonstrated by a parent in visiting his or her children while they are out of the 

parent’s custody is a significant factor in determining the parent’s potential to improve sufficiently 
6

and achieve minimum standards to parent the child.” In re Katie S., 198 W. Va. 79, 90 n.14, 479 

S.E.2d 589, 600 n.14 (1996) (citations omitted). The circuit court further found that there were 

safety concerns with the children given petitioner’s “untreated issues” and that seeing petitioner 

again would be “detrimental to their emotional well-being.” As such, the record supports the 

finding that termination of petitioner’s parental rights was necessary for the children’s welfare.

To the extent petitioner claims that she should have been granted a less-restrictive 

disposition because the children were not seriously threatened, we have held that

“[t]ermination of parental rights, the most drastic remedy under the 

statutory provision covering the disposition of neglected children, [West Virginia 

Code § 49-4-604] may be employed without the use of intervening less restrictive 

alternatives when it is found that there is no reasonable likelihood under [West 

Virginia Code § 49-4-604(c)] that conditions of neglect or abuse can be 

substantially corrected.” Syllabus point 2, In re R.J.M., 164 W.Va. 496, 266 S.E.2d 

114 (1980).

Syl. Pt. 5, In re Kristin Y., 227 W. Va. 558, 712 S.E.2d 55 (2011). Because the circuit court properly 

found that there was no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of abuse and neglect could be 

corrected in the near future, a less-restrictive alternative disposition was not warranted. 

Lastly, petitioner argues that the circuit court erred in failing to make a ruling regarding 

whether she should be required to attend inpatient treatment as a term of her improvement period.

However, petitioner misrepresents the record. In September of 2018, the parties advised the circuit 

court that they were unable to reach an agreement regarding the issue of inpatient treatment. As a 

result, the circuit court stated that it would set the matter for disposition. After speaking with 

counsel, petitioner agreed to attend inpatient treatment and was granted a post-adjudicatory

improvement period based upon that agreement. As such, petitioner’s argument that the circuit 

court erred in failing to rule on this term is disingenuous as it is clear petitioner agreed to it as a 

condition of her post-adjudicatory improvement period. Therefore, we find no error. 

For the foregoing reasons, we find no error in the decision of the circuit court, and its May 

30, 2019, order is hereby affirmed.

 Affirmed.

ISSUED: April 6, 2020

CONCURRED IN BY:

Chief Justice Tim Armstead 

Justice Margaret L. Workman

Justice Elizabeth D. Walker

Justice Evan H. Jenkins

Justice John A. Hutchison