Filed 4/30/21 Marriage of Saltz man CA2/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re the Marriage of STEPHEN SALTZMAN and RANDY SCHIENBERG SALTZMAN

.

_ _________________________________ STEPHEN SALTZMAN,

Respondent

,

v.

RANDY SCHIENBER G SALTZMAN,

Appellant

. B302819

(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 17STFL08376 )

APPEAL from a status judgment and orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Anne K. Richardson , Judge.
Affirmed.
Law Offices of Vicki J. Greene and Vicki J. Greene for Appellant. Feinberg Mindel Brandt & Klein and Gregory A. Girvan for Respondent.

_______________________2 This appeal arises from the trial court’s status judgment dissolving the parties ’ marriage and bifurcating all remaining issues for late adjudication. Appellant wife contends that the

tr i al court erred because its orders issued in conjunction with the termination of marriage adversely impact her health insurance coverage and do not adequately protect her interest in community property retirement accounts. Finding no abuse of discretion , we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Ste phen Saltzman ( Husband ) and Randy S c hienber g Saltzman ( Wife ) married on August 17, 1991. They have a 17

-
year

- old daughter and an adult son. On December 14, 2017,
Husband filed a petition for dissolution of marriage based on
irreconcilable diff

erences, contending that the parties had separated in September 2016. Wife responded to the p etition on February 20, 2018 , also citing irreconcil able differences and requesting divorce , and they exchan ged preliminary declarations
of d isclosure. Wife ’s response stated “TBD” for the parties’ date of separation

. At the time he filed for divorce, Husband was a long

- term partner at the law firm Loeb & Loeb LLP (Loeb). While at Loeb,
he contributed to three L oeb

- affiliated retirement accounts and took part in Loeb’s group health insurance plan, which covered both parties and their children . He transitioned to the law firm
Paul Hastings in February 2018 and began taking part in the Paul Hastings insurance pl an, again covering both parties and
their children

. On August 23, 2018, Husband filed a r equest for o rder to
bifurcate and terminate marital status. On October 12, 2018,
Wife filed an opposition

, opposing Husband ’s request to bifurcate3

marital status, or in the alternative, asking for 17 c onditions to be imposed in connection with termination of marital status. On November 13, 2018, Husband joined his Loeb retirement plans to the action.
After a Ma rch 2019 consolidated hearing on the request to bifurcate and other requests for order s , t he trial court entered its operative Findings and Order After Hearing on September 17, 2019, granting bifurcation , among other things, and stating its intention to terminate marital status subjec t to express conditions protecting Wife’s health insurance and retirement plan survivor benefits and other express conditions. 1 Regarding health insurance, the trial court ordered : “Pursuant to Family Code section 2337(c)(2): Until judgment has been ente red on all remaining issues and has become final, [Husband] shall maintain all existin g health and medical insurance coverage for the [Wife] and any minor children as named dependents, so long as the [Husband] is eligible to do so. If at any time during t he period the [Husband] is not eligible

1 The trial court entered a previous Findings and Order After Hearing o n June 21, 2019, but amended and replaced it with the operative order on its own motion, over Wife’s objections on unrelated grounds. This was within the trial court’s inherent authority to modify, amend, or revoke its prior interim orders. (See Schachter v. Citigroup, Inc . (2005) 126 Cal .App.4th 726, 737

– 739 [court has “inherent power to correct its own rulings”] ; cf. In re Marriage of Barthold (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1301, 1313 & fn. 9 [trial court may reconsider its own interim or final orders; for final orders “ the issue whether a trial court can reconsider an appealable order on its own motion after the time to appea l from that order has expired” is undecided].)4

to maintain the existing coverage, the [Husband] shall, at the [Husband’s] sole expense, provide and maintain COBRA health and medical insurance coverage to the extent it is available. To the extent COBRA coverage i s not available, the [Husband] shall be responsible to pay for the health an d medical care for the [ Wife] to the extent that care would have been covered by the existing insurance coverage but for the dissolution of marital status, and shall otherwise indemnify and hold the other party harmless from any adverse consequences resulting from the loss
or reductio n of the existing coverage. For purposes of this subdivision, ‘health and medical insurance coverage’ is the

cover age for which the parties are e ligible under [Husband’s] Paul Hastings group medical plan.”
As for retirement accounts, the trial court order ed the parties to ensure Wife ’s survivor benefi ts in the retirement plans

were protected through an interim order , as discussed in greater
detail below

. On October 16, 2019, Husband filed a new request for order

to enter a status judgment consist ent with t he Findings and
Order After Hear ing issued September 17, 2019. Husband attached a proposed judgment, consisting of Judicial C ounc il
Fo rms FL

- 180 (Judg ment), FL

- 347 (Bifurcation of Status of Marriage or Domestic Partnership), and FL

- 348 (Pension
Benefits

—

A ttachment to Judgment).
Wife opposed the proposed judgment and request for order, and after briefing t he matter came on for h earing on December 6,
2019. The trial court concluded that the form of the proposed judgment was appropriate and accurately reflected the o rder
after h earing , rejected Wife ’s arguments that the orders on5

health insurance and retirement plan survivor benefits were improper, and entered the proposed judgment.
Th is appeal followed.

DISCUSSION
I. Standar d of Review At its core, Wife ’s argument is that the trial court’s bifurcation order and status judgment dissolving the parties’ marriage was in error because her health insurance coverage and entitlement to community retirement assets were not optimally

p rotected . These are a ll issues which the trial court has
discretion to determine. “[A] motion to bifurcate and separately adjudicate the issue of dissolution of the marriage is addressed to the j udicial discretion of the court” ( In re Marriage of Lusk (1 978) 86 Cal.App.3d 228, 235), as are a trial court’s o rders valuing and dividing community property ( In re Marriage of Oliverez (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 298, 309). A trial court “has not abused its discretion as long as its decision ‘is within the range of options available under governing legal criteria in light of the evidence before the tribunal.’ ” ( In re Marriage of Taschen (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 681, 691.) “ ‘ “The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court
exceeded the bound s of reason. When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court.” ’ ” ( Ibid. )
II. Relevant Legal Principles Family Code section 2337 provides that “[i]n a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, the court, upon noticed motion, may sever and grant an early and separate trial on the issue of the dissolution of the status of the marriage apart from other issues.”6

(Fam. Code, § 2337, subd. (a).) 2 The trial court may separately try the issue of termination of marriage if doing so “is likely to simplify the determination of the other issues.” (Cal. R ules of
C ourt
, r ule 5.390(b)(7).)
P ublic p olicy favors bifurcation of trial on pivotal issues in
a dissolution action

. ( In re Marriage of Macfarlane & Lang (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 247, 257 ; see In re Marriage of Wolfe (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 889, 893

– 894 [“To the extent bifurcation of issues such as custody, support or the d ivision of community property can assist the parties to achieve settlement of remaining issues, it should be encouraged”].) For the issue of marital status,

“ [c] onsistent with the legislative policy favoring no fault dissolution of marriage, only slight e vidence is necessary to
obtain bifurcation and resolution of marital status. On the other hand, a spouse opposing bifurcation must present compelling reasons for denial.” ( Gionis v. Superior Court (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 786, 790.) The minimum statutory re quirements for bifurcating and terminating marital status are that six months must have passed since the date of service of the summons and petition (§ 2339, subd. (a)), and that the party seeking termination of marital status must have served a preliminar y declaration of disclosure or obtained a written agreement to defer service to a later date (§ 2337, subd. (b)). Both requirements were met here. Additionally, “[t]he party not requesting termination of status may ask the court: [¶] (A) To order that the judgment granting a dissolution include conditions that preserve his or her claims in retirement benefit plans, health insurance, and other

2 Subsequent u ndesignated statutory references are to the Family Code.7

assets; and [¶] (B) For other orders made as conditions to terminating the parties ’ marital status or domestic partnership.” (Cal. R ules of Court

, r ule 5.390(d)(2).) S ection 2337 , subdivision (c) sets out various discretionary conditions a trial court “ may impose upon a party” until final judgment has been entered

, including maintenance of the same or compa rable health insurance coverage, protection of spousal interests in retirement

assets , and “ [a] ny other condition the court determines is just and equitable

. ” (§ 2337, subd. (c)(2)

, (5) , (9)(B) & (E) , (10) .) Specifically, w ith regard to healt h insurance, a trial court may require that “ the party shall maintain all existing health and medical insurance coverage for the other party and any minor children as named dependents, so long as the party is eligible to do so. If at any time during this period the party is not eligible to maintain that coverage, the party shall, at the party ’ s sole expense, provide and maintain health and medical insurance coverage that is comparable to the existing health and medical insurance coverag e to the extent it i s available, ” or pay for care to
the extent it would have been covered but for dissolution

, if comparable coverage is not available. (§ 2337, subd. (c)(2).) With regard to retirement assets, the trial court may require that the party requesting bifurcatio n “ shall indemnify and hold the other party harmless from any adverse consequences to the other party if the bifurcation results in the loss of the other party ’ s rights with respect to any retirement, survivor, or deferred compensation benefits under any p lan, fund, or arrangement, or to any elections or options associated therewith, to the extent that the other party would have been entitled to those benefits or elections as the spouse o r surviving spouse of the party

. ” ( § 2337 , subd. (c)(5) .) The trial court also8

“may order a specific security interest designed to reduce or eliminate the likelihood that a postmortem enforcement proceeding would be ineffective or unduly burdensome to the surviving party,” including “[a]n order to provide a security interest by Qualified Domestic Relations Order from that party ’ s share of a retirement plan or plans” or “an interim order requiring the party to pay or cause to be paid, and to post adequate security for the payment of, any survivor benefit that
would hav e been payable to the other party on the death of the party but for the judgment granting a dissolution of the status of the marriage, pending entry of judgment on all remaining issues.” ( Id. , subd. (c)(9)(B) & (E) .) Section 2337, subdivision (d), further requires that “[p]rior to, or simultaneously with, entry of judgment granting dissolution of the status of the marriage,” the trial court must join the party’s retirement or pension plan

. ( I d. , subd. (d)(1)

. )
A nd “[t]o preserve the claims of each spouse in all retirement plan benefits upon entry of judgment granting a dissolution of the status of the marriage,” the trial court must enter one of the following orders prior to or simultaneously with entry of judgment : ( A ) An order pursuant to s ection 2610 disposing of each party ’ s interest in retirement plan benefits, includ ing survivor and death benefits; or ( B ) An interim order preserving the nonemployee party ’ s right to retirement plan benefits, including survivor and death benefits, pending entry of ju dgment on all remaining issues ; or ( C ) An attachment to the judgment granting a dissolution of the status of the marriage which contains specific language required to be included by section 2337, subdivision (d)(1 ) (C). As9

indicated post in part IV at pag es 13

– 14 , the judgment attached
Form FL

- 348 , which includes this language

, which specifically tracked the language required.
III. The Trial Court’s Health Insurance Order Was Not
an Abuse of Discretion
Wife contends that the trial court’s termination of marital
status and health insurance order improperly “prematurely impose [s] COBRA benefits ” onto her, effectively shortening the total period of time during which she would be assured health
insurance benefit s as Husband ’s spouse or former spouse. 3 She
also contends that the trial court failed to check the correct box

on Form FL

- 347 regarding health insurance.
We find no abuse of discretion. T he trial court expressly
ordered that Husband would maintain for Wife (1) “ all existin g health and medical insurance coverage so long as the [Husband] is eligible to do so”; (2) “ COBRA health and medical insurance

coverag e to the extent it is available” if he becomes in eligible to maintain the existing coverage; and (3) “[t] o the extent COBRA coverage is not available, ” pay ment for her health an d medical

care “ to the extent that care would have been covered by the existing insurance coverage but for the dissolution of marital status, and shall otherwise indemnify and hol d the other party

3 COBRA is an acronym for the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985. (See 29 U.S.C. § 1161 et seq.) COBRA gives eligible individuals, who lose coverage under a group plan, the option of paying premiums to maintain coverage for a limited pe riod of time. The California Continuation Benefits Replacement Act or “Cal

– COBRA” (Health & Saf. Code, § 1366.20 et seq.) provides temporary continuation coverage for individuals who are ineligible for federal COBRA benefits.10

harmless from any adverse consequences resulting from the loss or reduction of the existing coverage. ”
Wife ’s health insurance coverage is thus effectively fully protected until entry of final j udgment on all remaining issues

. E ven if her COBRA benefits begin and expire during that period
of time , until entry of final judgment her medical care still must be paid for by Husband to the full extent of the existing coverage

. This is consistent with the full scope of the discretionar y protective health insurance order contemplated by section 2337, subdivision (c)(2).
It is true that COBRA benefits attach only for a limited period of time after an employee or covered party becomes ineligible for group plan coverage

, so the longer Wife stays legally married the longer she may have specific entitlement to
continued coverage under the existing plan , if COBRA commences on dissolution of marriage

. However, t hat the clock

on Wife ’s continuation coverage under COBRA may begin ticking

up on dis solution is not a legal barrier to termination of marital

status ; Wife provides no support for this proposition . The trial
court considered Wife ’s objections and request for an order for
Husband to maintain Wife as a beneficiary on his existing health pol icy without initiating COBRA (although no evidence was offered that this option was available postdissolution ), and
concluded that her concerns did not justify delaying bifurcation and termination of marital status any further

. The trial court explained

, “ [A] s I see it they have complied with the R ules of
C ourt and with the [Code of Civil Procedure] and it does appear that after a year and three months, bifurcation of status which is supposed to be freely given as long as all of the requirements are given are accomplished, is supposed to be freely granted.” We11

likewise conclude that, given the polic ies in favor of bifurcation
and no

- fault termination of marriage, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by deciding that Wife ’s COBRA

- related concerns were not a compelling reason to delay bifurcation and
termination of marital status. With regard t o Form FL

- 347, Wife ’s concerns are not
material. Form FL

- 347 contains preprinted selections that mirror the discretionary conditions listed in section 2337
, subdivision (c). Wife contends that the court was obligated to
check box 5.b. on Form FL

- 347 rela ted to health insurance, which provides that the party requesting bifurcation must “provide and maintain health and medical insurance coverage that is comparable to the existing health and medical insurance coverage to the extent it is available” for the o ther party and minor children; provide comparable coverage at his own expense if not eligible to maintain existing coverage; or pay for medical care to the extent it would have been covered by the existing policy.
Rather than using box 5.b. of the Form FL

- 347, the Form
FL

- 3 47 prepared by Husband and adopted by the trial court directs the reader to language inserted in section 5.j.

, “which reflects the precise terms of the September 17, 2019 Order After Hearing.” This language merely duplicates the language of the trial court’s order after hearing with regard to health insurance :

“ [Husband] shall maintain all existin g health and medical insurance coverage for the [Wife] and any minor children as named dependents, so long as the [Husband] is eligible to do so

. If at any time during the period the [Husband] is not eligible to maintain the existing coverage, the [Husband] shall, at the [Husband’s] sole expense, provide and maintain COBRA health12

and medical insurance coverage to the extent it is available. To

t he extent COBRA coverage is not available, the [Husband] shall be responsible to pay for the health an d medical care for the [Wife] to the extent that care would have been covered by the existing insurance coverage but for the dissolution of marital

status , and shall otherwise indemnify and hold the other party harmless from any adverse consequences resulting from the loss or reduction of the existing coverage. For purposes of this subdivision, ‘health and medical insurance coverage’ is the

cover age for wh ich the parties are e ligible under [Husband’s]
Pau l Hastings group medical plan.” These provisions effectuate the intent of the trial court and
do not deviate from those in box 5.b. of the Form FL

- 347 in any
substantive way. IV. The Trial Court’s Interim Order Regarding
Husband ’s Retirement Accounts Was Not an Abuse
of Discretion
Wife contends that the trial court erred by not entering an interim qualified domestic relations order (interim QDRO)
modeled after a sample she provided to Husband. Instead, after ordering that an interim order be prepared to protect her community retirement plan benefits, the trial court adopted Husband’s proposed use of Judicial Council Form FL

- 348 as its
interim order , in conjunction with Form FL

- 347

. The trial court expressly considered Wife ’s objections to the use of Form FL

- 348, and rejected them, conclud ing that there was no substantive
difference between what she was askin g for and the protections
the Judicial Council forms provided.
We find no e rror. In its order after hearing, the trial court specifically ordered: “Pursuant to Family Code section13

2337(c)(9)(E): [Husband] and [Wife] shall ensure that all community property plans are subject to an enforceable court order for the payment of spou sal survivor benefits to the [Wife] through an appropriate interim order requiring any survivor benefit that would have been payable to the [Wife] on the death
of the [Husband] but for the judgment granting a dissolution of the status of the marriage, pend ing entry of judgment on all remaining issues, to be paid to th e [Wife] .”
Form FL

- 348 accomplishes this purpose. It “serves as a temporary qualified domestic relations order” (Cal . R ules of
Court

, r ule 5.390 (d)(4)) and tracks the language of section 2337
, subdivision (d)(2) (C) , with preprinted language stating : “Each party identified above is provisionally awarded without prejudice, and subject to adjustments by a later domestic relations order, a separate interest equal to one

- half of all
ben efits accrued or to be accrued under any retirement plan in which one party has accrued a benefit, including but not limi ted to the plans listed below, as a result of employment of the o ther party during the marriage or domestic partnership and before the date of separation. In addition, pending further notice, the plan

must , as allowed by law , or as allowed by the terms of the plan in the case of a governmental plan, continue to treat the parties as
married persons or domestic partners for purposes of any survivor rights or benefits available under the plan to the extent necessary to provide for payment to the surviving spouse or domestic partner of an amount equal to that separate interest or
of all of the survivor benefit s if at the time of death of the participant there is no other eligible recipient of the survivor
benefit.”14 T his language in Form FL

- 348 substantively ensures Wife ’s
entitlement to one

- h alf of the community interest i n Husband ’s retirement plans , and requires that Wife be paid any survivo r rights or benefits that would have been payable to her on the
death of the Husband but for dissolution of the status of the marriage , as the trial court required in its order after hearing.
Wife provides no support for her contention that the language o f
F orm FL

- 348 might somehow permit a future spouse of
Husband ’s to assert eligibility to Wife ’s protected separate interest and survivor benefits. We therefore conclude it was an “appropriate interim order” pursuant to the trial court’s specifications.
A former spouse’s entitlement to retirement survivor benefits may be unprotected in a situation where the trial court made no order preserving the former spouse’s interest before the employee spouse subsequently remarried and died

. ( In re Marriage of Padgett (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 830 , 836 [“where the plan participant dies or retires before the former spouse secures an order awarding that spouse any interest in the pension plan, a domestic relations order entered before the plan participant ’ s death tha t does not award the former spouse an interest in the participant ’ s pension plan but simply ‘ reserves jurisdiction ’ over the plan provides an inadequate basis for entry nunc pro tunc of either a QDRO or of an order determining the former spouse ’ s interest in the pension plan that later may be qualified as a QDRO”].) However, that is not the case here, as F orm FL

- 348 expressly awards Wife a provisional separate interest in the plans and continued survivor benefits equal to the extent of that interest (or fo r all of the survivor benefits if there is no other eligible recipient).15 In addition, the F orm FL

- 3 47 prepared by Husband and adopted by the trial court contains added language which
“reflect s the precise terms of the S e ptember 17, 2019 Order After Hearing .” As with the health insurance issue, it essentially duplicates the language of the trial court’s order after hearing with regard to retirement benefits : “ Pursuant to Family Code
2337 (c)(9)(E): [Husband] and [Wife] shall ensure that all community prope rty retirement plans are subject to an enforceable court order for the payment of spousal survivor
benefits to the [Wife] through an appropriate interim order requiring any survivor benefit that would have been payable to
the [Wife] on the death of the [Hu sband] but for the judgment granting a dissolution of the status of the marriage, pending entry of judgment on all remaining issues, to be paid to the [Wife] .”
As Wife concedes, the trial court had a choice of alternatives to protect her retirement survivo r benefit rights pending entry of judgment on all remaining issues. (See Hogoboom and King, Cal. Practice Guide: Family Law (The Rutter Group 20 20 ) ¶ 5:126 [“In lieu of an interim QDRO, the optional Judicial Council form FL

- 348

. . . will serve as a provisional order on pension benefits

— in effect, a temporary QDRO

— and can be attached to a status only dissolution judgment ” ] ; see also id. at ¶ 11:484:8 [same]

. )
W e conclude that the trial court’s adoption of Form FL

- 348
, entered concurrently with entry of judgment and Form FL

- 347
, was within the range of available legal options for an interim
order , effectuated the intent of the trial court’s operative order
aft er hearing, and sufficiently ensured that Wife ’s interest in community property ret irement plans , including survivor16

benefits, was preserved upon termination of marital status. That
the trial court did not elect Wife ’s preferred interim QDRO
format is not an abuse of discretion.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’ s status judgment and orders are affirmed. Stephen Saltzman shall recover his costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

LUI, P. J.
We concur:

ASHMANN

- GERST, J.

CHAVEZ, J.