NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.ROBERTO JAIME RAMIREZRAMIREZ, Defendant - Appellant. No. 12-50162 D.C. No. 2:08-cr-00701-RT-1
MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Robert J. Timlin, Senior District Judge, Presiding Submitted August 27, 2013 ** Pasadena, California Before: O’SCANNLAIN and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges, and COGAN, District Judge. *** 

# FILED
SEP 23 2013 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Brian M. Cogan, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.Roberto Ramirez-Ramirez appeals his convictions and sentence for conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute and conspiracy to distribute at least five kilograms of cocaine (21 U.S.C. §§ 846 & 841(b)(1)(A)(ii)), conspiracy to interfere with commerce by robbery (18 U.S.C. § 1951), possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)), and being an illegal alien in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)). 1. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedur e 11(c)(1), on its face, applies to plea negotiations, not a defendant’s jury trial waiver. Whereas “judicial involvement in plea negotiations inevitably carries with it the high and unacceptable risk of coercing a defendant to accept the pr oposed agreement and plead guilty,” United States v. Bruce , 976 F.2d 552, 556 (9th Cir. 1992), Ramirez-Ramirez contested his guilt in a bench trial. Moreover, a colloquy is required in other situations when a defendant waives a jury trial, see, e.g. , United States v. Duarte-Higareda , 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir. 1997), and this creates inherent tension between Rule 11(c)(1)’s proscription of judicial participation and a jury trial waiver. 2. The district court’s colloquy adequately addressed the criteria described in United States v. Cochran , 770 F.2d 850, 852 (9th Cir. 1985). With respect to precautions that would have been taken in a jury trial to avoid prejudice from the alien in possession of a firearm charge, the district court did not need to “explain to 2the defendant the strategic ramifications of the decision” to waive a jury trial. United States v. Reyes , 603 F.2d 69, 72 (9th Cir. 1979) (waiver of 12-person jury). 3. Ramirez-Ramirez did not present any evidence tending to show “a lack of intent or lack of capability to deal in the quantity of drugs charged.” United States v. Yuman-Hernandez , 712 F.3d 471, 475 (9th Cir. 2013). Ramirez-Ramirez’s argument that there was no evidence that he was predisposed mis-perceives the burden of proof. Id. 4. Although generally a “district court is obligated to make express factual findings as to whether the defendant met” his or her burden to show sentencing entrapment by a preponderance of the evidence, United States v. Riewe , 165 F.3d 727, 729 (9th Cir. 1999), here, Ramirez-Ram irez presented no credible evidence to satisfy his burden. Consequently, the di strict court’s findings were adequate. AFFIRMED.

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