alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
[Federal Register Volume 82, Number 162 (Wednesday, August 23, 2017)]
[Notices]
[Page 40065]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2017-17780]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS


Voluntary Service National Advisory Committee, Notice of Meeting

    The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) gives under the Federal 
Advisory Committee Act that the Executive Committee of the VA Voluntary 
Service (VAVS) National Advisory Committee (NAC) will meet October 18-
19, 2017, at the Fleet Reserve Association National Headquarters, First 
Floor Meeting Room, 125 North West Street, Alexandria, Virginia. On 
October 18, 2017, the meeting will begin at 8:30 a.m. and end at 4:30 
p.m. On October 19, 2017, the meeting will begin at 8:30 a.m. and 
adjourn at 12:00 p.m. The meeting is open to the public.
    The Committee, comprised of fifty-four major Veteran, civic, and 
service organizations, advises the Secretary, through the Under 
Secretary for Health, on the coordination and promotion of volunteer 
activities and strategic partnerships within VA health care facilities, 
in the community, and on matters related to volunteerism and charitable 
giving. The Executive Committee consists of 20 representatives from the 
NAC member organizations.
    On October 18, agenda topics will include: NAC goals and 
objectives; review of minutes from the April 19, 2017, Executive 
Committee meeting; VAVS update on the Voluntary Service program's 
activities; VHA update, update on strategic partnerships; Parke Board 
update; evaluations of the 2017 NAC annual meeting; review of 
membership criteria and process; and plans for 2018 NAC annual meeting 
(to include workshops and plenary sessions).
    On October 19, agenda topics will include: Subcommittee reports; 
review of standard operating procedures; review of Fiscal Year 2017 
organization data; 2019 NAC annual meeting plans; and any new business.
    No time will be allocated at this meeting for receiving oral 
presentations from the public. However, the public may submit written 
statements for the Committee's review to Mrs. Sabrina C. Clark, 
Designated Federal Officer, Voluntary Service Office (10B2A), 
Department of Veterans Affairs, 810 Vermont Avenue NW., Washington, DC 
20420, or email at <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#0d5e6c6f7f64636c234e616c7f664d5b4c236a627b"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="b2e1d3d0c0dbdcd39cf1ded3c0d9f2e4f39cd5ddc4">[email protected]</span></a>. Any member of the public 
wishing to attend the meeting or seeking additional information should 
contact Mrs. Clark at (202) 461-7300.

    Dated: August 17, 2017.
Jelessa M. Burney,
Federal Advisory Committee Management Officer.
[FR Doc. 2017-17780 Filed 8-22-17; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE P


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#### The Mangalore.

*(District Court, D. California.*

June 12, 1883.)

Shipping — Injury to Cargo — Measure of Damages—Berate at CustomHouse.

Where a cargo has been injured by Hie negligence of the vessel, the measure of the damages is the differ once between the market value of the damaged goods at the time and place of delivery and what their value would have been if uninjured, less any rebate allowed at the custom-house.

In Admiralty.

*William Barber,*for libelants.

*Milton Andros*and *Charles Page,*for claimants.

Hoffman, J.

The only question raised by the exceptions which, as it appears to me, admits of doubt, is whether the damage to the shipment was confined to 164 bales, or extended to the whole consignment. Mr. Gallego wishes it to be understood that the damage estimated by him at one and three-quarters to two cents per bag pervaded the entire lot of 300 bales, containing 1,000 bags each. But his testimony is quite obscure, and his memory by no means distinct. His examination of the shipment was made in conjunction with the customs officers, who took, as their duty required, notes of the results of their inspections in order to determine the rebate of duty to be al*464lowed, on the damaged appraisement. There does not appear to have been at the time any difference of opinion between them and Mr. Gallego as to the results of the survey.' There was allowed at the custom-b,ouse a rebate of $1,016 on the duties otherwise leviable on 164 bales. The remainder were charged the full duty as on sound, dutiable value. No objection or protest appears to have been made by the shippers, and the duties were adjusted and paid on this basis. The prices subsequently obtained (though not until the next season, and after certain expenditures made by the shipper for repacking, repairing, etc., were incurred) tend to strengthen the impression that the damage was subsequently confined to the 164 bales. Accepting, then, Mr. Gallego’s estimate of damage per bag to 164 bales, or 164,000 bags, as one and three-quarters, we have total damage of $2,870. The payment of this sum would have placed the owner in the same condition as if his goods had arrived sound; but by reason of their damaged condition he was able to obtain them by the payment of duties less by $1,016 than he would otherwise have paid. Deducting this sum from $2,870, we have $1,854, which, with interest, is the damage sustained. The commissioner has reached substantially the same conclusion by computing the difference between the sound market value of the goods (eight and seven-eighths cents per bag) and the market value of the 164 injured bales, (seven and four-tenths cents per bag.) This .amounts to $1,049, and to this he has very reasonably added $200 as an allowance for bales damaged to so small an extent as under custom-house rules is not considered. This allowance would amount to nearly 2 per cent, on the sound, duty-paid market value of the remaining 136 bales constituting the balance of the shipment.

I think the sum of $1,854, with interest from Aytgust 8, 1881, allowed by the commissioner, is as just and reasonable an estimate of the damages as can be arrived at.
**Exhibit
      23.1**





**CONSENT
      OF MOORE STEPHENS, P.C.**





**CONSENT
      OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM**




We
      consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statement of
      Dialysis Corporation of America on Form S-8, Registration No. 333-122455,
      pertaining to certain stock options under the 1999 Stock Incentive Plan of
      Dialysis Corporation of America, of our report dated February 23, 2007, relating
      to the consolidated financial statements and financial schedule of Dialysis
      Corporation of America included in the Annual Report on Form 10-K, for the
      year
      ended December 31, 2006.




/S/
              MOORE STEPHENS, P.C.MOORE
              STEPHENS, P.C.




March
      15,
      2007


Cranford,
      New Jersey
Appeal Dismissed and Memorandum Opinion filed August 30, 2018.

In The 

Fourteenth Court of Appeals 

NO. 14-18-00423-CV

JOSE R VAZQUEZ, Appellant 

V.

RENE FLORES, Appellee 

On Appeal from County Civil Court at Law No. 4 

Harris County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. 1108504 

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N 

This is an appeal from a judgment signed June 5, 2018. Appellant’s brief was 

due July 9, 2018. No brief or motion for extension of time to file the brief was filed. 

On July 19, 2018, the court ordered appellant to filed a brief by August 20, 

2018. We cautioned that if appellant failed to comply with our order, we would 

dismiss the appeal for want of prosecution. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(b). No brief or 

motion for extension of time to file the brief was filed.

Therefore, the appeal is DISMISSED. 

PER CURIAM 

Panel consists of Justices Donovan, Wise, and Jewell.
## SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 

## Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

**531 CA 12-02124**  PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., PERADOTTO, SCONIERS, VALENTINO, AND MARTOCHE, JJ.

NANCY BURKHART, SISTER AND LEGAL GUARDIAN FOR BRIAN BURKHART, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

PEOPLE, INC., ELISA SMITH, KATELYNNE COLEMAN, AMY MAZURKIEWICZ, DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS, LUCIAN VISONE AND LAKEFRONT CONSTRUCTION, INC., DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.

HAGELIN KENT LLC, BUFFALO (MICHAEL T. HAGELIN OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.

CLAUDE A. JOERG, COUNTY ATTORNEY, LOCKPORT, FOR PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT.

DAMON MOREY LLP, BUFFALO (AMY ARCHER FLAHERTY OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Niagara County (Catherine Nugent Panepinto, J.), entered February 2, 2012. The order denied the motion of defendants Lucian Visone and Lakefront Construction, Inc., for summary judgment on the issue of negligence.
It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: Plaintiff commenced this action on behalf of her brother seeking damages for injuries he sustained when he was struck by a vehicle operated by defendant Lucian Visone and owned by defendant Lakefront Construction, Inc. (Lakefront). Visone and Lakefront appeal from an order denying their motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of Visone’s negligence. We affirm. Visone and Lakefront failed to submit evidence sufficient to establish, prima facie, that the alleged negligence of the other defendants or of plaintiff’s brother “was the sole proximate cause of the accident, that [Visone] kept a proper lookout, and that [Visone’s] alleged negligence, if any, did not contribute to the happening of the accident” ( Topalis v Zwolski , 76 AD3d 524, 525; see Sauter v Calabretta , 90 AD3d 1702, 1704). Visone and Lakefront failed to establish in support of their motion that plaintiff’s brother “suddenly ‘darted out . . . directly into the path of the . . . vehicle’ ” ( St. Andrew v O’Brien , 45 AD3d 1024, 1027-1028, lv denied and dismissed 10 NY3d 929) or that Visone complied with his “duty to see that which through the proper use of his senses he should have seen” ( Lupowitz v Fogarty , 295 AD2d 576, 576; see Rost v Stolzman , 81 AD3d 1401, 1402;**-2- 531 CA 12-02124** 

Hyatt v Messana , 67 AD3d 1400, 1402). Visone and Lakefront thus failed to meet their initial burden on their motion ( see generally Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr. , 64 NY2d 851, 853).

Entered: May 3, 2013 Frances E. Cafarell Clerk of the Court
[No. 23213-1-III.

Division Three.

October 25, 2005.]

#### The State of Washington, *Respondent,*v. Michael Coronado, *Appellant.*

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Walla Walla County, No. 04-1-00120-7, Donald W. Schacht, J., entered July 16, 2004. *Affirmed*by unpublished opinion per Brown, J., concurred in by Kato, C.J.; Thompson, J. Pro Tern, dissenting.
<PAGE>
                                                                   EXHIBIT 24(a)


January 27, 2005



Mr. S. Kinnie Smith, Jr.
Mr. Thomas J. Webb
Mr. Michael D. VanHemert
CMS Energy Corporation
One Energy Plaza
Jackson, MI 49201-2276

CMS Energy Corporation is required to file an Annual Report on Form 10-K for the
year ended December 31, 2004 with the Securities and Exchange Commission within
90 days after the end of the year.

We hereby make, constitute and appoint each of you our true and lawful attorney
for each of us and in each of our names, places and steads to sign and cause to
be filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission said Annual Report with any
necessary exhibits, and any amendments thereto that may be required.

Very truly yours,


/s/ K. Whipple                                    /s/ W. U. Parfet
-------------------------------                   ------------------------------
Kenneth Whipple                                   William U. Parfet



/s/ Merribel S. Ayres                             /s/ Percy A. Pierre
-------------------------------                   ------------------------------
Merribel S. Ayres                                 Percy A. Pierre



/s/ Earl D. Holton                                /s/ S. Kinnie Smith Jr.
-------------------------------                   ------------------------------
Earl D. Holton                                    S. Kinnie Smith, Jr.



/s/ D. W. Joos                                    /s/ Kenneth L. Way
-------------------------------                   ------------------------------
David W. Joos                                     Kenneth L. Way



/s/ M. T. Monahan                                 /s/ John B. Yasinsky
-------------------------------                   ------------------------------
Michael T. Monahan                                John B. Yasinsky



/s/ Joseph F. Paquette, Jr.
-------------------------------
Joseph F. Paquette, Jr.
## In **T he**  **Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo**  No. 07 - 21 - 00268 - CV JASON PAUL WHITE, DDS , A PPELLANT V. JANE DOE, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS NEXT FRIEND OF JOHN DOE, A MINOR CHILD, AND JOHN DOE II, AS NEXT FRIEND OF MINOR CHILDREN, JOHN DOE III AND JOHN DOE IV , APPELLEE S On Appeal from the 99th District Court Lubbock County, Texas Trial Court No . 2021 - 542,885 , Honorable J. Phillip Hays , Presiding 

### November 15, 2021 ORDER Before QUINN, C.J., and PIRTLE and PARKER, JJ. On November 5, 2021, this Court denied appellant’s emergency motion to suspend receivership pending appeal. On November 9, appellant filed a second emergency motion for relief, again requesting that we stay the trial court’s order appointing a receiver an d further requesting that we issue a temporary injunction blocking the receiver from selling real property or transferring funds.2 A ppellant maintains that he is entitled to supersede the trial court’s order pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 24 .1(a)
. While a judgment debtor is generally entitled to supersede a judgment and thus defer its enforcement while pursuing an appeal , see T EX . R. A PP . P. 24.1; Miga v. Jensen , 299 S.W.3d 98, 100 (Tex. 2009) , appellant has not indicated that he has sought relief from the trial court via any of the four methods listed in Rule 24.1(a)
. As such, there is no supersedeas ruling presented for our review. Further, w hen seeking temporary orders in an appeal of an interlocutory order, it is the movant’s bur den to make a clear showing that he is entitled to relief. Lamar Builders, Inc. v. Guardian Sav. & Loan Ass’n , 786 S.W.2d 789, 791 (Tex. App.
— Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, no writ ) (order). To be entitled to injunctive relief, appellant must plead and prove (1) the existence of a wrongful act, (2) a probable right to the relief sought, and (3) the likelihood of imminent and irreparable injury. Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co. , 84 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Tex. 2002). A ppellant has not presented sufficient evidence to demon strate that the receivership presents a danger justifying emergency or injunctive relief. Appellant’s assertions about potential harm resulting from “pending transactions” do not inform the Court as to the property involved, its value, the projected sales date , or any imminent and irreparable injury that might result. Thus, we conclude that the motion is insufficient to support granting appellant’s request for a stay or issuing an injunction. Appellant’s motion is therefore denied.

Per Curiam
[Federal Register Volume 82, Number 162 (Wednesday, August 23, 2017)]
[Notices]
[Page 40057]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2017-17833]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[Public Notice 10097]


E.O. 13224 Designation of Abu Yahya al-Iraqi, aka Ayad Hamed 
Mohal al-Jumail, aka Ayad Hammed Muhal Shuab, aka Abu-Yahya, aka Iyad 
Hamed Mahl al-Jumaily, aka Iyad al-Jumayli, aka Ayad Hamid al-Jumaili, 
aka Ayad al-Jumaili, aka Ayad Miuhammed Mahar, aka Ayad Muhammad Mahar, 
aka Ayad Hamed Mohl Aljamali, aka Ayad Hamed Mahal Joumily as a 
Specially Designated Global Terrorist

    Acting under the authority of and in accordance with section 1(b) 
of Executive Order 13224 of September 23, 2001, as amended by Executive 
Order 13268 of July 2, 2002, and Executive Order 13284 of January 23, 
2003, I hereby determine that the person known as Abu Yahya al-Iraqi, 
also known as Ayad Hamed Mohal al-Jumail, also known as Ayad Hammed 
Muhal Shuab, also known as Abu-Yahya, also known as Iyad Hamed Mahl al-
Jumaily, also known as Iyad al-Jumayli, also known as Ayad Hamid al-
Jumaili, also known as Ayad al-Jumaili, also known as Ayad Miuhammed 
Mahar, also known as Ayad Muhammad Mahar, also known as Ayad Hamed Mohl 
Aljamali, also known as Ayad Hamed Mahal Joumily, committed, or poses a 
significant risk of committing, acts of terrorism that threaten the 
security of U.S. nationals or the national security, foreign policy, or 
economy of the United States.
    Consistent with the determination in section 10 of Executive Order 
13224 that prior notice to persons determined to be subject to the 
Order who might have a constitutional presence in the United States 
would render ineffectual the blocking and other measures authorized in 
the Order because of the ability to transfer funds instantaneously, I 
determine that no prior notice needs to be provided to any person 
subject to this determination who might have a constitutional presence 
in the United States, because to do so would render ineffectual the 
measures authorized in the Order.
    This notice shall be published in the Federal Register.

Rex W. Tillerson,
Secretary of State.
[FR Doc. 2017-17833 Filed 8-22-17; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4710-AD-P
<partyblock><br><br><div align="center"><b><font size="+1">John Perotti, Respondent, <br><br>against<br><br>Luis Sollecito and SOUTH SHORE HONDA, Appellants.</font></b></div><br><br><p>Appeal from a judgment of the District Court of Nassau County, First District (Colin F. O'Donnell, J.), entered February 8, 2013. The judgment, after a nonjury trial, awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $4,871.25.</p><p>ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.</p><p>Plaintiff commended this small claims action to recover the sum of $4,500, alleging that he had been hired by defendants and was never paid for his services. After a nonjury trial, the District Court awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $4,871.25. </p><p>In a small claims action our review is limited to a determination of whether "substantial justice has . . . been done between the parties according to the rules and principles of substantive law" (UDCA 1807; <i>see</i> UDCA 1804; <i>Ross v Friedman</i>, 269 AD2d 584 [2000]; <i>Williams v Roper</i>, 269 AD2d 125 [2000]). The determination of a trier of fact as to issues of credibility is given substantial deference, as a trial court's opportunity to observe and evaluate the testimony and demeanor of the witnesses affords it a better perspective from which to assess their credibility (<i>see Vizzari v State of New York</i>, 184 AD2d 564 [1992]; <i>Kincade v Kincade</i>, 178 AD2d 510, 511 [1991]). This deference applies with greater force to judgments rendered in the Small Claims Part of the court (<i>see Williams v Roper</i>, 269 AD2d at 126). </p><p>The District Court found that plaintiff and defendants had entered into an oral contract and that plaintiff had performed his obligations thereunder (<i>see Strategic Domain, Inc. v Medsite, Inc.</i>, 304 AD2d 368 [2003]; <i>Four Seasons Hotels v Vinnik</i>, 127 AD2d 310 [1987]). As the court's determination is supported by the record, we find that the judgment provided the parties with substantial justice (<i>see</i> UDCA 1804, 1807).</p><p>Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.</p><p>Marano, P.J., Tolbert and Brands, JJ., concur.</p><br>Decision Date: June 15, 2016<br><br><div align="center"><form method="LINK" action="../../slipidx/at_2_idxtable.shtml"><input type="submit" value="Return to Decision List"></form></div></partyblock>
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA No. DA 22
- 0 305 JAMES JOSEPH MAIN, JR.,

Petitioner and Appellant, v. STATE OF MONTANA,

Respondent and Appellant.

**ORDER** Upon consideration of Appellant’s motion for extension of time, and good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant is granted an extension of time to and including April 19, 2023 , within which to prepare, file, and serve Appellant’s opening brief on appeal.

Electronically signed by: Mike McGrath Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

March 13 2023

03/13/2023

Case Number: DA 22-0305
Filed 11/25/20 In re A.M. CA2/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115(a).

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

In re A.M., a Person Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court 

Law.

 B304707

 (Los Angeles County

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF 

CHILDREN AND FAMILY 

SERVICES,

Plaintiff,

v.

A.M.,

Objector and Appellant,

CESAR M.,

Defendant and 

Respondent.

 Super. Ct. No. 19CCJP05963)
2

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Steff Padilla, Judge Pro Tempore. 

Dismissed.

Marissa Coffey, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Objector and Appellant.

Pamela Deavours, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Respondent.

________________________________

A.M. (minor) appeals a January 6, 2020 order granting 

father Cesar M. reunification services. Minor argued on 

appeal that the juvenile court erred when it failed to bypass 

father’s reunification services under Welfare and 

Institutions Code section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10). On 

November 5, 2020, while minor’s appeal was pending, the 

juvenile court terminated reunification services for both 

parents, finding that the Department of Children and 

Family Services had offered reasonable reunification 

services, and that parents’ participation was not substantial.

On November 9, 2020, we provided the parties an 

opportunity to address whether we should take judicial 

notice of the court’s November 5, 2020 order terminating 

reunification services and declare minor’s current appeal 

moot. Minor filed a letter brief agreeing that the appeal was 

moot. No additional letter briefs were filed.

“‘An appeal becomes moot when, through no fault of 

the respondent, the occurrence of an event renders it 

impossible for the appellate court to grant the appellant 
3

effective relief. [Citations.]’ (In re Esperanza C. (2008) 165 

Cal.App.4th 1042, 1054.)” (In re Anna S. (2010) 180 

Cal.App.4th 1489, 1498.) Taking judicial notice of the 

minute order entered on November 5, 2020, (Evid. Code, 

§ 452, subd. (d)), we dismiss minor’s appeal as moot.

 RUBIN, P. J. BAKER, J. MOOR, J.