alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Restated Certificate of Trust



 Exhibit 4.4 
 RESTATED CERTIFICATE OF TRUST OF 
 LINCOLN NATIONAL CAPITAL VII 
 This Restated Certificate of Trust of Lincoln National Capital VII (the “Trust’) is being duly executed and filed by the undersigned, as
trustee, to amend and restate the original Certificate of Trust of the Trust which was filed on March 18, 2002 (the “Original Certificate of Trust”) with the Secretary of the State of Delaware under the Delaware Statutory Trust Act
(12 Delaware Code § 3801 et seq.) (the “Act”). 
 The Original Certificate of Trust is hereby amended and restated
in its entirety to read as follows: 
 1. Name. The name of the statutory trust formed hereby is Lincoln National Capital VII.

 2. Delaware Trustee. The name and business address of the trustee of the Trust with a principal place of business in the State of
Delaware are BNY Mellon Trust of Delaware, White Clay Center, Route 273, Newark, Delaware 19711. 
 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has
executed this Restated Certificate of Trust in accordance with Section 3811(a)(2) of the Act. 
  

			
	 BNY MELLON TRUST OF DELAWARE,
 not in its
individual capacity but solely as trustee

		
	By:	 	 /s/ Kristine K. Gullo

	Name:	 	Kristine K. Gullo
	Title:	 	Vice President
#### KEYBANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff, v. PERKINS ROWE ASSOCIATES, L.L.C., Defendant. Keybank National Association, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Thornco, L.L.C., Defendant-Appellant.

No. 12-30184.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Dec. 19, 2012.

Steven W. Copley, Esq., Phillip Jay Antis, Jr., Donna Phillips Currault, Gordon, Arata, McCollam, Duplantis & Eagan, L.L.P., New Orleans, LA, Frederick Scott Kaiser, Phelps Dunbar, L.L.P., Baton Rouge, LA, Janine Cone Metcalf, Esq., Jones Day, Atlanta, GA, for Plaintiff-Ap-pellee.

Fredrick R. Tulley, Edward J. Laper-ouse, II, Taylor, Porter, Brooks & Phillips, L.L.P., Baton Rouge, LA, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before BARKSDALE, DENNIS, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

After reviewing the record, studying the briefs, and listening to oral arguments, we *408AFFIRM the judgment of the district court for essentially the same reasons given by the district court in its well-reasoned Ruling on Motions for Summary Judgment. *KeyBank Nat’l Ass’n v. Perkins Rowe Assocs., LLC,*823 F.Supp.2d 399 (M.D.La. Oct.11, 2011). AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
Summary of 2009 Bonus Targets



 EXHIBIT 10.7 
 ICAGEN, INC. 
 Summary of 2009 Bonus Targets 
 Executive Officer 2009 Bonus Targets 
  

			
	 Executive Officer
	  	 Bonus Targets for 2009

	 P. Kay Wagoner, Ph.D., Chief Executive Officer and President
	  	Up to 50% of base salary
	 Richard D. Katz, M.D., Executive Vice President, Finance and Corporate Development, Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer
	  	Up to 40% of base salary
	 Seth V. Hetherington, Senior Vice President, Clinical and Regulatory Affairs
	  	Up to 40% of base salary

 Cash bonuses for Dr. Wagoner, Dr. Katz and Dr. Hetherington for 2009 will be based
on the achievement of specified corporate performance objectives. The corporate performance objectives for 2009 are progression of research, preclinical and clinical development programs; building shareholder confidence; achievement of corporate and
business development objectives; timely, effective and efficient completion of public company reporting obligations; and completing and maintaining policies and procedures for internal controls and compliance obligations. The actual amount of such
cash bonuses, if any, will be determined in the discretion of the Compensation Committee, subject to the maximum bonus targets shown above. The Compensation Committee will evaluate the Company’s and each executive’s performance against the
objectives listed above from time to time during 2009, and may, in its discretion, approve the payment of any bonuses in one or more installments during 2009 or in early 2010.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

HILLSIDE VILLAS CONDOMINIUM 

ASSOCIATION, INC.

v.

BOTTARO DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, 

MERVIN E.S. RESNICK AND JOYCE K. 

RESNICK IRREVOCABLE TRUST, JOHN 

L. BOTTARO, LAWRENCE J. BOTTARO, 

BOTTARO CONSTRUCTION COMPANY

PETITION OF: MERVIN E.S. RESNICK 

AND JOYCE K. RESNICK 

IRREVOCABLE TRUST

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No. 107 MAL 2018

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from 

the Order of the Commonwealth Court

HILLSIDE VILLAS CONDOMINIUM 

ASSOCIATION, INC.

v.

BOTTARO DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, 

MERVIN E.S. RESNICK AND JOYCE K. 

RESNICK IRREVOCABLE TRUST, JOHN 

L. BOTTARO, LAWRENCE J. BOTTARO, 

BOTTARO CONSTRUCTION COMPANY

PETITION OF: MERVIN E.S. RESNICK 

AND JOYCE K. RESNICK 

IRREVOCABLE TRUST

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No. 108 MAL 2018

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from 

the Order of the Commonwealth Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM
[107 MAL 2018 and 108 MAL 2018] - 2

AND NOW, this 13th day of August, 2018, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is 

DENIED.
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 10**  **- 6693** 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee ,
v. HAROLD STEVEN JACKSON, a/k/a Ears , Defendant

- Appellant
.

Appeal from the United States District Court f or the District of Maryland , at Greenbelt
. Peter J. Messitte , Senior District Judge. ( 8:06

- cr - 00306

- PJM

- 1 )

Submitted : September 30 , 2010 Decided: October 8 , 2010

Before NIEMEYER, AGEE, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by un published per c uriam opinion
. Harold Steven Jackson, Appellant Pro Se. Deborah A. Johnston, Assistant United States Attorney, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Harold Steven Jackson seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. A. § 2255 ( West Supp. 2010 ) motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (200 6 ). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (200 6 ). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see Miller

- El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336

- 38 (2003). When the district court denies relief on proc edural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack , 529 U.S. at 484

- 85. We have independently reviewed the re cord and conclude that Jackson has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the material s3 before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process. DISMISSED
#### UNITED STATES v. LUCAS et al.

Grand Jury No. 1560.

United States District Court District of Columbia.

Oct. 13, 1952.

Charles M. Irelan, U. S. Atty., and John Conliff, Jr., Asst. U. S. Atty., Washington, D. C., for the United States.

George B. Parks, of Washington, D. C., for defendant.

HOLTZOFF, District Judge.

This is a motion to stay grand jury proceedings involving the moving party, until a preliminary hearing is held before a committing magistrate. It appears.that when the moving party was first brought before a committing magistrate, the preliminary hearing was continued and, in the meantime, the matter is to be presented to the grand jury.

The grand jury has a right to hear any matter whatsoever involving the possibility of commission of a crime. It is not limited to considering only those cases in which the defendant has been bound over for the action of the grand jury, by a committing magistrate.

The purpose of preliminary hearings provided for by Rule 5 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 18 U.S.C.A., is to protect the defendant against an improvident and unjust incarceration while he is awaiting the action of the grand jury. The only purpose of a preliminary hearing, as its history fully discloses, is to determine whether there is a basis for holding the defendant either in jail or on bail until the grand jury can look into the matter and dispose of it. A defendant obviously is not *178prejudiced by action taken by the grand jury prior to the time when the defendant would like to have action taken.

This view of the purpose of a preliminary hearing is fully supported by an opinion of Judge Parker, speaking for the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in the case of Barber v. United States, 142 F.2d 805, 807. There Judge Parker said:

> “The only purpose of a preliminary hearing is to determine whether there is sufficient evidence against an accused to warrant his being held for action by a grand jury; and, after a bill of indictment has been found, there is no occasion for such hearing.”

Obviously there is no reason why the grand jury should not act before a preliminary hearing is had, or before it is completed if one has been commenced.

I had occasion to review this matter in United States v. Gray, D.C., 87 F.Supp. 436, 437, where I stated that the grand jury is not limited to considering cases of only those persons who have been bound over to the grand jury by a committing magistrate.

I see no reason for interfering with the orderly procedure in this case and for staying presentation of the case before the grand jury. Even if power to do so exists, it should be used very sparingly, bearing in mind the plenary historical authority of the grand jury.

Motion for a stay is denied.
```

[Congressional Bills 114th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 398 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

114th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 S. 398

   To amend the Department of Veterans Affairs Health Care Programs 
 Enhancement Act of 2001 and title 38, United States Code, to require 
  the provision of chiropractic care and services to veterans at all 
Department of Veterans Affairs medical centers and to expand access to 
            such care and services, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                            February 5, 2015

  Mr. Moran (for himself, Mr. Blumenthal, Mr. Grassley, Mr. King, Mr. 
 Tester, Mr. Whitehouse, and Mr. Brown) introduced the following bill; 
    which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Veterans' 
   Affairs, and the Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
   To amend the Department of Veterans Affairs Health Care Programs 
 Enhancement Act of 2001 and title 38, United States Code, to require 
  the provision of chiropractic care and services to veterans at all 
Department of Veterans Affairs medical centers and to expand access to 
            such care and services, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Chiropractic Care Available to All 
Veterans Act of 2015''.

SEC. 2. PROGRAM FOR PROVISION OF CHIROPRACTIC CARE AND SERVICES TO 
              VETERANS.

    Section 204(c) of the Department of Veterans Affairs Health Care 
Programs Enhancement Act of 2001 (Public Law 107-135; 115 Stat. 2459; 
38 U.S.C. 1710 note) is amended--
            (1) by inserting ``(1)'' before ``The program''; and
            (2) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
    ``(2) The program shall be carried out at not fewer than 75 medical 
centers by not later than December 31, 2016, and at all medical centers 
by not later than December 31, 2018.''.

SEC. 3. EXPANDED CHIROPRACTOR SERVICES AVAILABLE TO VETERANS.

    (a) Medical Services.--Paragraph (6) of section 1701 of title 38, 
United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new 
subparagraph:
            ``(H) Chiropractic services.''.
    (b) Rehabilitative Services.--Paragraph (8) of such section is 
amended by inserting ``chiropractic,'' after ``counseling,''.
    (c) Preventive Health Services.--Paragraph (9) of such section is 
amended--
            (1) by redesignating subparagraphs (F) through (K) as 
        subparagraphs (G) through (L), respectively; and
            (2) by inserting after subparagraph (E) the following new 
        subparagraph (F):
            ``(F) periodic and preventive chiropractic examinations and 
        services;''.
                                 <all>
```
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

IN RE:

AMENDMENT OF RULE 1910 OF THE

RULES OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION :

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: No. 522

J UDICIAL ADMINISTRATION DOCKET

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 8 th day of October , 201 9

, it is Ordered pursuant to Article V,

Section 10 of the Constitution of Pennsylvania that Rule 1910 of the Rules of Judicial

Administration is amended in the attached form

.

To the extent that notice of proposed rulemaking would otherwise be required by

Pa.R.J.A. No. 103, the immediate promulgation of the amendment is found to be in the

interest of efficient administration.

This Order shall be processed in accordance with Pa.R.J.A. No. 103(b), and the

amendment s shall be effective on January 1, 2020

.

Additions are bolded and are underlined.

Deletions are bolded and are [bracketed].
8269

#### TAYLOR v. JACKSON.

Appeal — Esuity.—Findings of fact in an issue in equity .not shown by appellant to be against the preponderance of the evidence will not be disturbed.

Before Copes, J., Dillon, October term, 1911.

Affirmed.

Action by E. V. Taylor and Austin Hamilton against Thomas Jackson and Nedie Jackson. Plaintiffs appeal.

*Messrs. Gibson & Muller,*for appellants.

*Mr. James R. Coggeshall,*contra.

July 22, 1912.

The opinion of the Court was delivered by

Mr. Justice Fraser.

The plaintiffs-appellants brought action in this case against the defendants-respondents for a tract of forty acres of land, and alleged that the defendants are in the unlawful possession of said land and wrongfully withhold the possession of the same from the plaintiffs.

The defendants claim that the defendant, Nedie Jackson, is in the lawful possession and is the equitable owner and is entitled to specific performance of an agreement to convey made by one W. W. Hamilton, Sr., the immediate grantor of the plaintiffs, and that the plaintiffs took their title with full knowledge of the equity of the defendant, Nedie Jackson.

The case was withdrawn from the jury by consent of counsel and tried upon the equitable issues by Judge Robert Aldrich, the then presiding Judge.

After reading carefully all the evidence and arguments of counsel, we do not see that the evidence preponderates against the findings of fact by the Circuit Judge.

*114There are nine exceptions, but they all raise questions of fact.

In the case of *Boatright*v. *Crosby,*83 S. C. 191, the Court says: “The burden rested upon the appellant to show error, on the part of his Honor, the Circuit Judge, in his finding that the deed was intended as a mortgage. The testimony is conflicting upon every material fact; and the appellant has failed to satisfy this Court that the preponderance of the evidence is in his favor.

“It would subserve no useful purpose to narrate the details of testimony.”

The judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed

Mr. Justice Woods *absent.*
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Robert Baker, Appellant.

[852 NYS2d 867]

Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon a plea of guilty of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fifth degree (Penal Law § 220.06 [5]). The contention of defendant that County Court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment does not survive his valid waiver of the right to appeal *(see People v Castillo,*208 AD2d 944 [1994]), nor in any event does it survive his guilty plea *(see People v Porter,*300 AD2d 698, 699 [2002], *lv denied*100 NY2d 541 [2003]). The further contention of defendant that his plea was not knowing, voluntary and intelligent survives his waiver of the right to appeal, but defendant failed to preserve that contention for our review by failing to move to withdraw the plea or to vacate the judgment of conviction *(see People v Davis,*45 AD3d 1357 [2007], *lv denied*9 NY3d 1005 [2007]). Present— Scudder, P.J., Centra, Lunn, Fahey and Green, JJ.
#### The People of the State of New York ex rel. Emerson Thurman, Appellant, v Glenn S. Goord as Commissioner of New York State Department of Correctional Services, Respondent.

[852 NYS2d 857]

Present-Scudder, P.J., Martoche, Smith, Green and Gorski, JJ.
#### SERVICE v. MUTUAL LIFE INS. CO. OF NEW YORK.

No. C. A. 71.

District Court, W. D. Pennsylvania.

March 28, 1945.

Martin E. Cusick and Service, McNeal, Cusick & Isenberg, all of Sharon, Pa., for plaintiff.

Wm. F. Illig and Gunnison, Fish, Gifford & Chapin, all of Erie, Pa., for defendant.

SCHOONMAKER, District Judge.

This case was removed from the Court of Common Pleas of Mercer County, Pennsylvania, by defendant. Before answering, defendant has moved: (1) To dismiss for failure to state a cause of action on which relief can be granted; (2) For a more definite statement or bill of particulars of the matter alleged in paragraphs 7, 9, and 10 of the complaint.

As to the motion to dismiss, we are of the opinion that the complaint does state a cause of action on which relief can be granted.

As to the motion for a more definite statement, this is a suit to recover double indemnity under the provisions of an insurance policy issued by defendant to Fred A. Service. By the terms of this policy, defendant agreed to pay the beneficiary named therein, Anna V. Service, $20,000 on due proof of death, or $40,000 on due proof that such death resulted from bodily injury effected solely through external, violent, and accidental means.

Our conclusion is that the complaint is sufficiently definite in the allegations of paragraphs 7 and 9, which aver that the insured died June 13, 1944, as the result of bodily injuries caused by a fall from the second floor to the first floor of his residence; that his death within an hour after the accident, resulted from bodily injuries effected solely through external, violent, and accidental means, independently and exclusively of all other causes, of which there was evidence by a visible contusion or wound on the exterior of his body.

Paragraph 10 of the complaint, however, merely alleges that proof of death of said insured on blanks provided by the defendant company was furnished the said defendant on or about July 12, 1944. The policy provides that the forty-thousand-dollars double indemnity shall *be*payable “upon receipt of due proof that such death resulted from bodily injury effected solely through external and accidental means”.

We therefore conclude that the defendant is entitled to a more definite statement or bill of particulars of the matters alleged in paragraph 10 of the complaint to show that proofs were submitted to defendant that the insured’s death resulted from bodily injury effected solely through external and accidental means. Such bill of particulars shall be filed within twenty days from the date of the order of the court.

Counsel for defendant may submit an order accordingly on notice to opposing counsel.
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CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

I, Theodore Tomasovich, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of Beartooth Platinum
    Corporation (formerly Idaho Consolidated Metals Corp.); and
2. Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any untrue
    statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to
    make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements
    were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this quarterly
    report.

|Date: | October 22, 2003 |                                    
|----- | ---------------- | -----------------------------------
|      |                  |                                    
|      |                  | /s/ Theodore Tomasovich          
|      |                  | Theodore Tomasovich                
|      |                  | President & Chief Executive Officer

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Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-40580

Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

ALFREDO DE LA FUENTE-GARZA

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas 

USDC No. 5:03-CR-1275-ALL

Before JONES, Chief Judge, and JOLLY and ELROD, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:*

The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Alfredo De La FuenteGarza has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). De La Fuente-Garza has not filed a

response. Our independent review of the record and counsel’s brief discloses no

nonfrivolous issue for appeal. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to

withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein,

and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. See 5TH CIR. R. 42.2.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

April 30, 2009

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk