UN PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 22
- 4159

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff − Appell ee ,

v. KEVLIN JERROD JACKSON, a/k/a Kevlin Jackson , Defendant

– Appell ant

. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Virginia , at Huntington

. Robert C. Chambers , District Judge. ( 3:21−cr−00091−1 )
Argued : October 26 , 2023 Decided: March 1 8 , 2024

Before DIAZ, Chief Judge, and WILKINSON and HEYTENS , C ircuit Judg es.

Vacate d and remanded by unpublished opinion. Chief Judge Diaz wrote the opinion, in which Judge Wilkinson and Judge Heytens joined.

ARGUED: Jonathan D. Byrne, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. Joseph Franklin Adams, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Huntington, West Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Wesley P. Page, Federal Public Defender, Lex A. Coleman, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. William S. Thompson, United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee. USCA4 Appeal: 22-4159 Doc: 35 Filed: 03/18/2024 Pg: 1 of 92 Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 22-4159 Doc: 35 Filed: 03/18/2024 Pg: 2 of 93 DIAZ , Chief Judge:
Kevlin Jerrod Jackson pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of firearm s
. He challenges a special condition of his supervised release that permits warrantless searches
of his property, person, and papers

. Because we conclude that the district court’s imposition of th is condition was procedurally unreasonable, we vacate the search condition and remand for resentencing

.

I.
In November 20 20, l aw enforcement received information that Jackson was distributing drugs. After witnessing him engage in an apparent drug transaction six months
later , officers executed a search warrant at Jackson’s apartment. They seized two firearms
and about sixty grams of cocaine. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Jackson pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession
of firearms , in violation of 18 U.S.C. § § 922 (g)(1) and 924(a)(2)

. The presentenc e report ( the “PSR”) , comple ted by Jackson’s probation officer,
calculated Jackson’s guideline range as 37 to 46 months ’ imprisonment , followed by 1 to 3 years ’ supervised release

. As relevant here, the PSR recommended the following special condition of super vised release: The defendant shall submit his or her person, property, house, residence, vehicle, papers, or office to a search conducted by a United States probation officer when there is reasonable suspicion that the defendant has violated a condition of supervision. The search must be conducted at a reasonable time and in a reasonable manner. Failure to submit to a search may be grounds USCA4 Appeal: 22-4159 Doc: 35 Filed: 03/18/2024 Pg: 3 of 94 for revocation of release. The defendant shall inform other occupants that the premises may be subject to searches pursuant to this condition.
J.A. 152. The PSR justified this recommendation by cit ing to Jackson’s prior felony drug
conviction , his history of probation and supervised release violations, and the facts of the underlying offense . It submitted that the c ondition promote d public safety and deterrence by allowing “effective oversight” and quick intervention if the probation officer suspects that Jackson has violated a condition of supervision. J.A. 152. Jackson object ed to the search condition before sentencing. He argued that the
condition (1) wasn’t based on his individual characteristics; (2) wasn’t required by Congress for felon

- in

- possession offenses; (3) didn’t relate to the purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); (4) involve d a greater deprivation of liberty than necessary; and (5 ) conflict ed
with the Sentencing Commission’s policy statements

. The probation officer responded that the search condition was a “Mandatory Condition[] of supervised release as reflected in Administrative Office of the Un ited States
Courts Form 245B

. . . which this officer does not have the authority to amend.” J.A. 159. Jackson renewed his objections to the search condition at sentencing . He also added
that the condition was (1) unnecessary because a nother standard condition would permit his probation officer to visit unannounced and seize prohibited items in plain view; and ( 2 ) overly broad because it doesn’t require a nexus between the suspected violation and
area to be searched. Finally, he complained that there was no judicial remedy against improper searches since the exclusionary rule doesn’t apply in revocation proceedings. USCA4 Appeal: 22-4159 Doc: 35 Filed: 03/18/2024 Pg: 4 of 95 In response, the government adopted the PSR’s justification. It also argued that the
condition wasn’t a “blanket search condition” because “[i]t’s tied to that reasonable suspicion standard.” J.A. 114.
T he district court imposed a downward variant sentence of 15 months’ imprisonment followed by 3 years ’ supervised release. It then denied Jackson’s objection s to the search condition

. The court agreed with the government that the reasonable

- suspicion standard sufficiently limit ed the condition

. It also reasoned that if Jackson’s probation officer
witness ed an apparent drug deal

— as law enforcement had before searching Jackson’s
home

— she wouldn’t be able “to actually search for anything based upon just the [plain

view] provision.” J.A. 114. The cour t concluded , “I think this . . . will be construed and applied in a way that connects the suspicious circumstances to a particular violation and not just some theoretical all

- encompassing violation.” J.A. 114

– 15. Although the court purported to adopt the PSR and addendum before imposing Jackson’s sentence, it didn’t address the PSR’s original explanation for the condition nor its response to Jackson’s written objections

. This appeal followed.

II.

“ We review special conditions of supervised release for abuse of discretion , recognizing that district courts have broad latitude in this space.” United States v.
Castellano , 60 F.4th 217, 224 (4th Cir. 2023) (cleaned up). Still, the district court must USCA4 Appeal: 22-4159 Doc: 35 Filed: 03/18/2024 Pg: 5 of 96 adequately explain any special condition. See United States v. Van Donk , 961 F.3d 314,
322

– 23 (4th Cir. 2020). And special conditions must comply with the requirements of
18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). See United States v. Ellis , 984 F.3d 1092, 1098 (4th Cir. 2021). Jackson’s sole argument on appeal is that the search condition doesn’t comport with § 3583(d)

. But w e can’t assess the condition’s substantive reasonableness because the
district court ’s explanation for imposing it was inadequate. 1 See United States v. Boyd , 5 F.4th 550, 55 7 (4th Cir. 2021) (“Unless a court adequately explains its reasons for imposing certain conditions, we can’t judge whether the § 3583(d) factors have been met.” ( citing
United States v. McMiller , 954 F.3d 670, 67 6 (4th Cir. 2020) ) )

. The district court must provide an “individualized explanation” for why a special
condition is appropriate considering the § 3583(d) factors. Van Donk , 961 F.3d at 322 (citing McMiller , 954 F.3d at 676

– 77)

. Under § 3583(d) , a special condition must be

“ (1) reasonably related to the statutory goals of deterrence, protection of the public, and rehabilitation; (2) no greater a deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary to achieve those statutory goals; and (3) consistent with any relevant policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission. ” McMiller , 954 F.3d at 676.
The degree of explanation required “var[ies] with the nature of the condition imposed and the circumstances of each case .” Id. at 677 (citing United States v. Blue , 877

1 We’re required to ensure that the district court didn’t commit a procedural error

— such as failing t o adequately explain the special condition

— before turning to substantive reasonableness , even when the defendant doesn’t make the argument. United States v. Provance , 944 F.3d 213, 217

– 18 (4th Cir. 2019). USCA4 Appeal: 22-4159 Doc: 35 Filed: 03/18/2024 Pg: 6 of 97 F.3d 513, 518 (4th Cir. 2017)). “But where a defendant makes nonfrivolous objections that cast doubt on compliance with § 3583(d), the district court must address them head

- on.” Boyd , 5 F.4th at 559 (citing United States v. Arbaugh , 951 F.3d 167, 17 4 (4th Cir. 2020)).
The district court didn’t address Jackson ’s nonfrivolous objections

. T o take but one example, Jackson argued that the search condition wasn’t based on his individual
circumstances. Jackson ha d a limited, non

- violent criminal history, expressed remorse, and took rehabilitative steps before sentencing. Yet the district court said nothing in
response. Jackson also objected to the breadth of the search condition , which authorizes a
search for any suspected violation of the conditions of super vision

. One of Jackson’s conditions, for example, requires that he “answer truthfully” questions asked by his probation officer. J.A. 125. So if his probation officer suspect ed that Jackson lied to her , that would justify a search of his property, person, and papers

— no ma tter how untethered the search is to the substance of the alleged lie. To its credit, the district court announced its expectation that the condition would be applied in a way “ that connects the suspicious circumstances to a particular violation

. ”
J.A. 11 4

– 1 5. But the condition itself admits of no such limitation. In contrast, t he district court provide d a thorough explanation for Jackson’ s imprisonment sentence

. It carefully discussed the PSR and advisory guidelines, heard the parties’ arguments for sentencing, and addressed the § 35 5 3(a) factors

. But this explanation didn’t extend to the search condition. USCA4 Appeal: 22-4159 Doc: 35 Filed: 03/18/2024 Pg: 7 of 98 In prior cases, w e ’ve look ed at the structure and content of the district court’s sentencing explanation to determine whether it addresse d the special conditions. Compare
McMiller , 954 F.3d at 676 ( finding that the sentencing explanation didn’t apply to the special conditions whe n the district court referred only to the imprisonment term when conducting its § 3553(a) analysis and “made no attempt to link its explanation . . . with the term or conditions of supervised release”) , with United States v. Williams , 5 F.4th 500, 50 9 (4th Cir. 2021) ( finding that the sentencing explanation applied to the special conditions
whe n the district court announced the entire sentence

— imprisonment, supervised release, and sp ecial conditions

— and then conducted its § 3553(a) analysis).
H ere, the district court conducted its § 35 5 3(a) analysis and imposed Jackson’s prison sentence before addressing the special condition s
. Consistent with that approach, the court adopted the PSR and addendum after resolving Jackson’s factual and guidelines

based objections, but before addressing his objections to the conditions of supervision. I t’s thus unclear whether the district court ’s adopt ion of the PSR encompassed the R eport’s explanation for the search condition

. In any event, the PSR’s justification for the condition is itself insufficient. In response to Jackson’s initial objections , t he PSR stated that the condition was a mandatory
condition of release. But the district court couldn’t circumvent its duty to impose tailored conditions by relying on a standing order that imposes standard conditions. 2 See McMiller ,

2 The PSR ’s response was also factually wrong , as t he search condition isn’t mandated by Form 245B. See Admin

. Off. of the U.S. Cts., AO 254B (2019), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/ao245b.pdf [ https://perma.cc/8DSV

- WSRB ]

. USCA4 Appeal: 22-4159 Doc: 35 Filed: 03/18/2024 Pg: 8 of 99 954 F.3d at 676

– 77 ; see also Boyd , 5 F.4th at 560 (“[T] he question is whether the specifics
of a defendant ’ s case justify a condition ’ s inclusion , rather than its exclusion. To that end,
a court ’ s wholesale adoption of a menu of standard conditions adds little to the adequacy
of its explanation .”).
And the district court didn ’ t say whether it agreed with the PSR ’ s original justification for the condition nor explain whether that justification outweighed Jackson ’ s objections. Cf. United States v. Dacosta , 781 F. App’x 150, 153

– 54 (4th Cir. 2019) (per curiam). In sum, there may be sound reasons for imposing a broad search condition on a defendant in Jackson’s circumstances. But “[w]e cannot assume that a sentencing court truly considered the parties’ nonfrivolous arguments or the defendant’s individual
characteristics when the record fails to make it patently obvious.” Provance , 944 F.3d at 218 (cleaned up). The record fails to do so here.

III. Because the district court didn’t adequately expla in the search condition , we can’t assess whether it complies with § 3583(d). We therefore vacate the search condition and remand for resentencing.

VACATED AND REMANDED USCA4 Appeal: 22-4159 Doc: 35 Filed: 03/18/2024 Pg: 9 of 9