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*********************************************** 
STUART C. CARLSON ET AL. v.

VERNON F. CARLSON ET AL.

(AC 43007)

Elgo, Cradle and Flynn, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiffs sought, inter alia, a partition of the assets and a dissolution

of a family partnership, of which the plaintiffs and the named defendant

were original members. The plaintiffs claimed that there was significant

discord among the members, including that the defendant occupied

certain real property in Manchester owned by the partnership without

paying rent and refused to remit rent received from nonpartner tenants.

In 2015, the court dissolved the partnership and appointed R as a receiver

to wind up the partnership and to sell certain real property owned by

the partnership. Later that year, during the trial, the plaintiffs and the

partnership reached a settlement agreement and submitted a partial

settlement notice, which stated that issues remained in dispute between

the plaintiffs and the defendant. Soon thereafter, the plaintiffs and the

defendant reached a settlement agreement. In accordance with the settlement agreement, the trial was adjourned and certain real property was

sold with partial distributions made to the parties, with the exception

of the defendant, who was to receive a certain parcel of real property,

the value of which was to be deducted from his share of funds generated

from the sale of real property. In 2017, the court approved the receiver’s

report, over the defendant’s objection, which authorized the receiver

to proceed with an application for a subdivision of real property. In

2018, the application for the subdivision of the property was approved

and the court thereafter granted the receiver’s motion for an order for

the authority to list the lots for sale. Later that year, the defendant

moved to inspect and copy financial records of the partnership, which

the court denied. The defendant did not then appeal from that judgment.

In 2019, the defendant filed a counterclaim, without a request for leave

to amend or motion to amend. The defendant appealed from the court’s

judgment granting the plaintiffs’ motion to strike the defendant’s counterclaim, but failed to brief that claim. In 2020, the court appointed P

as receiver. Thereafter, the defendant amended his appeal five times,

challenging other actions of the court. Held:

1. The portion of the defendant’s appeal challenging the trial court’s denial

of his motions to inspect and copy corporate and partnership tax returns

and his motion to compel further discovery was dismissed, the defendant

having failed to properly appeal those rulings of the court.

2. The portions of the defendant’s appeal challenging the trial court’s failure

to address the dispute in the presettlement notice among the parties

before the settlement was reached and its failure to order the plaintiffs

to release all claims during the 2015 settlement negotiations were dismissed: these events occurred nearly four years before the defendant

filed the present appeal; moreover, these portions of the defendant’s

appeal are not from judgments of the court and are not judgments

encompassed in his notice of appeal.

3. This court declined to review the defendant’s claim that the trial court

erred in authorizing an application for a subdivision of a property owned

by the partnership as the claim was inadequately briefed, the defendant

having failed to cite any statute, case law, rule of court, or other legal

authority that could render the court’s action improper.

4. The trial court did not err in appointing P as a receiver, as the appointment

of a receiver is within the sound discretion of the trial court.

Argued November 9, 2021—officially released February 8, 2022

Procedural History

Action seeking, inter alia, the dissolution of a partnership, and other relief, brought to the Superior Court

in the judicial district of Hartford, where the named
defendant filed a counterclaim; thereafter, the court,

Noble, J., granted the plaintiffs’ motion to strike the

counterclaim, and the named defendant appealed to

this court; subsequently, the court, Noble, J., granted a

receiver’s motion for discharge of lis pendens filed by

the named defendant on certain real property owned

by the partnership, and the named defendant amended

his appeal; thereafter, the court, Noble, J., appointed

Peter Carlson as receiver, and the named defendant

amended his appeal. Appeal dismissed in part;

affirmed.

Vernon F. Carlson, self-represented, the appellant

(named defendant).

William G. Reveley, with whom, on the brief, was

Malcolm F. Barlow, for the appellees (plaintiffs and

defendant Kristine Carlson).
Opinion

PER CURIAM. The self-represented defendant, Vernon F. Carlson,1 appeals from various judgments and

actions of the trial court stemming from a 2007 action

commenced by the plaintiffs, Stuart C. Carlson, Patricia

W. Carlson, and Alexis S. Carlson,2 and a subsequent

settlement agreement that was reached by the parties

in 2015. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court

erred (1) in denying his motions to inspect and copy

corporate and partnership tax returns, (2) by not

addressing the dispute in the presettlement notice

between the parties before a settlement was reached,

(3) in not ordering the plaintiffs to release all claims

during the 2015 settlement negotiations, (4) in authorizing an application for a subdivision of a property owned

by the partnership, and (5) in appointing Peter Carlson

as receiver. We conclude that the defendant’s first three

claims must be dismissed. As for the fourth and fifth

claims, for the reasons set forth herein, we affirm the

judgments of the court.

The court set forth the following facts and procedural

history of the case in its February 5, 2020 memorandum

of decision granting the plaintiffs’ motion to terminate

stay. ‘‘The long history of this case began with a complaint filed in 2007 by the plaintiffs . . . . The complaint alleged, and the parties do not dispute, that the

parties were members of a partnership referred to as

Carlson Associates. The parties possessed varying percentages of interest in the partnership. Stuart Carlson

was alleged to have been the managing partner. The

court file reveals that no written partnership agreement

governed the relations among the partners or between

the partners and the partnership. The plaintiffs alleged

in their original complaint that the assets of the partnership consisted of fourteen parcels of real estate located

in the towns of Manchester . . . and Glastonbury . . .

and loans by Carlson Associates to Karen [Carlson],

Kristine [Carlson] and the defendant. The two count

complaint asserted claims for partition of the assets of

the partnership and its dissolution. These claims were

grounded on the existence of significant discord among

the partners, which included the occupancy of Karen

[Carlson] and the defendant of partnership properties

without paying rent and the refusal to remit rent

received from nonpartner tenants. Karen [Carlson] and

the defendant were alleged to have refused to agree to

the sale of any of the partnership properties although

the expenses and liabilities of the partnership, including

past due real property taxes, exceeded its income. Stuart [Carlson] and Patricia [Carlson] claimed in the complaint that they loaned money to the partnership without repayments, and further that the partnership loaned

money to the defendant, Kristine Carlson and Karen

Carlson, which had not been repaid. The plaintiffs additionally sought settlement of accounts and contribu-
tions between the [parties].

‘‘After the filing of the complaint, four years lapsed

with little activity. Stuart Carlson died on January 23,

2011, and Patricia Carlson, the administratrix of his

estate, was substituted as a [plaintiff]. In 2012, the matter was dismissed for failure to prosecute and subsequently reopened. Three more years passed in the service of disagreement. During this time, the [plaintiffs]

moved for court orders to sell four partnership properties in 2012. . . . The defendant objected. In 2013, the

defendant moved for an order permitting him to inspect

partnership records. . . . Later that year, the [plaintiffs] moved successfully, over the objection of the

defendant, for a court order permitting the partnership

to enter into a listing agreement with a real estate agent

to market and sell the remaining properties. . . . The

movants asserted that the defendant had refused to

sign any listing agreement. In the meantime, foreclosure

proceedings were commenced by the town of Glastonbury for unpaid property taxes. . . . Despite the foreclosure proceedings, the defendant continued to resist

the sale of the properties including those under contract. . . . The sale of the properties under contract

was ultimately consummated, apparently in 2014. On

May 26, 2015, the court . . . dissolved the partnership

and appoint[ed] Richard Conti, Esq. as a receiver. . . .

Despite multiple offers to purchase certain other properties of the partnership, the partners were unable to

agree on their sale of the listing of other properties

causing the offers to be withdrawn. . . .

‘‘On November 17, 2015, the case came before the

court for trial. The operative pleadings at the time of

trial were the amended complaint dated November 9,

2015, and the answer with setoffs of the defendant, also

dated November 9, 2015. At no time during the prior

eight years during which the action was pending had

the defendant asserted a counterclaim or cross claim.

The [plaintiffs] reached a settlement agreement among

themselves and with the partnership. On the fourth day

of evidence, the defendant and the [plaintiffs] reached

a settlement. The settlement included an adjournment

of the trial and payment of $102,000 to Patricia Carlson.

The remaining property was to be appraised and, with

the exception of the property known as 637 South Main

Street in Manchester, sold with the proceeds of the

sales to be distributed among the partners according

to their varying partnership percentages. The defendant

was to receive the 637 South Main Street property, the

value of which was to be deducted from his share of

funds generated from the sale of the property. The bills

of any creditors of the partnership and the receiver

were to be paid before any distributions were made.

Distributions to the partners were subject to the

approval of the court, which was to retain jurisdiction

of the matter for the winding down of the partnership

assets and debts.
‘‘Pursuant to the settlement agreement, including the

adjournment of the trial, a number of properties owned

by the partnership were sold and partial distributions

made to the parties with the exception of the defendant.

The defendant made objections to both. . . . The

defendant also objected at various times to the payment

of fees to the receiver. . . . The attendant delay in

making a distribution to the defendant involved the

uncertainty relative to the value of the total assets of

the estate and the value of the 63[7] South Main Street

property. Disputes arose (1) between the defendant and

an easement holder over 637 South Main Street, (2)

whether the defendant and Karen Carlson remained

indebted to the partnership as had previously been

claimed by Stuart [Carlson] and Patricia Carlson and

(3) whether to subdivide one of the parcels of property.

Two attorneys’ liens for work done on behalf of the

defendant by two different attorneys were presented

to the receiver for payment. The court declined to treat

the attorneys’ fees as partnership debt because it was

work done primarily for the benefit of the defendant

as evidenced by court filings. Any claims against the

defendant and that might have remained after the settlement agreement were withdrawn, on the record and in

a filing with the court, by the [plaintiffs]. The disagreement over the easement remains. The court granted

approval, over the objection of the defendant, to subdivide the parcel at issue. [Karen] Carlson died in 201[7],

and her interests were represented by [Kristine] Carlson

as the executrix of the estate of [Karen] Carlson.

‘‘On March 21, 2019, a counterclaim was, for the first

time, asserted by [the defendant] against ‘Patricia Carlson, Alexis Carlson, Kristine Carlson and Attorney William G. Reveley [counsel for the partnership, Patricia

Carlson individually and as administratrix of Stuart

Carlson’s estate, and Alexis Carlson], Attorney Mary

Rossettie [prior counsel for the estate] and the estates of

Stuart C. Carlson and Karen Carlson.’ The counterclaim

was procedurally improper in that it was filed without

a request for leave to amend, or motion to amend, as

required by Practice Book § 61-10. The counterclaim

named two attorneys as defendants, who were not parties to the action without permission of the court as

required by Practice Book § 10-11 and General Statutes

§ 52-102a. Moreover, the court interpreted the settlement agreement, involving an adjournment of the trial,

as a general release of any and all claims the parties

had against each other. Finally, the court notes that the

conduct complained of by the defendant in his counterclaim, which asserts counts of breach of fiduciary duties

and abuse of process, assert claims for conduct that is

outside of the statute of limitations. On April 15, 2019,

all the other parties joined in an objection, expressed

through the vehicle of a motion to strike, to the counterclaim on the above grounds and together filed a motion

to enforce the settlement agreement. The court granted
the motions on May 28, 2019, ordered the counterclaim

stricken, and the defendant appealed.

‘‘On June 21, 2019, this court granted the joint motion

of all parties excluding the defendant to terminate the

automatic stay imposed by Practice Book § 61-11. The

motion was limited to lifting any stay imposed on the

filing of a Mylar,3 necessary to effect the subdivision

of 637 South Main Street, Manchester. The filing of the

Mylar was a condition subsequent to the permitting of

the property by the appropriate municipal boards. The

receiver supported the lifting of the stay to file the

Mylar because the liquid assets under his control were

diminishing and the available partnership funds would

become insufficient to pay its debts, a refrain commonly

voiced over the prior years. The court, pursuant to

Practice Book § 61-11 (d), granted the motion finding

that although the [defendant] had not filed the appeal

only for delay, the due administration of justice required

the termination of stay.

‘‘Thereafter, on July 19, 2019, the receiver filed a

motion for discharge of lis pendens. In his motion, the

receiver noted the active efforts underway to sell the

remaining parcels including those that are subject to

subdivision on Line Street in Manchester and two parcels to the rear of Line Street in Glastonbury. The

receiver alerted the court that notices of lis pendens

had been filed by the defendant on both parcels and

moved for their discharge. The motion was joined by

the [plaintiffs] and objected to by the defendant. The

receiver, and the [plaintiffs], asserted that the two lis

pendens were significantly impeding their ability to

market and ultimately sell the properties. The receiver

and the [plaintiffs] referred to the diminishing liquid

funds from which to pay taxes and ongoing fees related

to the winding down. On September 16, 2019, the court

granted the motion to discharge from which order the

defendant appealed by way of amendment to the original appeal. On January 2, 2020, the [plaintiffs] moved

to terminate the stay attendant to the amended appeal

of the order discharging the lis pendens. A hearing was

held on the motion to terminate the stay on January

28, 2020.’’4

(Footnote added.)

The following appellate procedural history is pertinent to our resolution of the defendant’s appeal. On

June 3, 2019, the defendant appealed from the court’s

May 28, 2019 judgment granting the plaintiffs’ motion

to strike his counterclaim. Thereafter, the defendant

filed five amended appeals challenging other actions of

the court. In his first amended appeal form, the defendant stated that he was appealing from the following:

‘‘motion for discharge of lis pendens, interim report of

receiver, request for order.’’ The defendant never

briefed his appeal of the striking of his counterclaim,

nor did he brief his appeal of the motion for discharge

of lis pendens. These two claims on appeal are thus
deemed abandoned.

The defendant’s subsequent four amended appeals

listed several other actions of the court. In his third

amended appeal, he listed, among other things, that he

was challenging the court’s decision to appoint Peter

Carlson as receiver. This claim is the only action from

those four amended appeals that the defendant has

briefed. The remaining claims listed in the amended

appeal forms are thus deemed abandoned.

Additionally, this court dismissed portions of the

defendant’s appeal prior to oral argument. On February

20, 2020, this court granted the plaintiffs’ motion to

dismiss the defendant’s second amended appeal, but

only as to the portion of the appeal challenging the

court’s November 18, 2019 order terminating the appellate stay. On June 9, 2021, this court granted the plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss the defendant’s fifth amended

appeal, which stated that he was appealing from his

‘‘objection to the filing of Carlson Associates’ 2019 partnership federal income tax returns.’’ Additional facts

and procedural history will be set forth as necessary.

I

The defendant briefs that the court erred in denying

his motions to inspect and copy corporate and partnership tax returns. The defendant’s brief appears to challenge the court’s rulings on two separate motions. First,

on November 6, 2018, the defendant filed a ‘‘motion to

inspect and copy financial records’’ of the partnership.

On November 19, 2018, the court denied that motion.

The defendant did not then appeal from that judgment,

nor has he done so now on any of his appeal forms.

Second, on August 7, 2020, the defendant filed a motion

to compel discovery of the 1986 income tax returns of

SHVC, Inc.5 On August 14, 2020, the court denied that

motion. In its order denying the motion, the court

stated: ‘‘The discovery is not calculated to lead to the

discovery of admissible evidence as this case settled

in 2015.’’

Practice Book § 61-9 provides in relevant part:

‘‘Should the trial court, subsequent to the filing of a

pending appeal, make a decision that the appellant

desires to have reviewed, the appellant shall file an

amended appeal within twenty days from the issuance

of notice of the decision as provided for in Section 63-

1. . . .’’ The defendant did not amend his appeal to

include a claim regarding the court’s August 14, 2020

order denying his motion to compel further discovery.

Because the defendant has not properly appealed either

ruling, we cannot address his claim challenging those

rulings. Accordingly, we must dismiss this portion of

the appeal.

II

The defendant next briefs that the court erred by

not addressing the dispute in the presettlement notice
among the parties before a settlement was reached. It

is unclear what judgment of the court from which the

defendant appeals. The record indicates that on November 16, 2015, the plaintiffs, Kristine Carlson, and Karen

Carlson filed a partial settlement notice indicating that

they had reached a settlement in the underlying action.

The notice stated: ‘‘Issues remain in dispute as between

the plaintiffs and [the defendant].’’ The defendant’s

claim presumably stems from that notice, as we are

unaware of any other presettlement notice filed by any

party. The settlement occurred on November 25, 2015,

nearly four years before the defendant filed the present

appeal. His brief does not reference any judgment from

which he is appealing and none of his appeal forms

reference any judgment concerning a presettlement

notice. Accordingly, we must dismiss this portion of

the appeal as it is not from a judgment of the court and

it is not a judgment encompassed in his notice of appeal.

III

The defendant next briefs that the court erred in not

ordering the plaintiffs to release all claims during the

2015 settlement negotiations. The claim he attempts to

raise, like the claim he attempted to raise in part II of

this opinion, concerns events that occurred nearly four

years before the defendant filed the present appeal and

is not from a judgment of the court. Furthermore, none

of his appeal forms references any judgment concerning

this matter. Accordingly, we must dismiss this portion

of the appeal as it is not from a judgment of the court

and it is not a judgment encompassed in his notice

of appeal.

IV

The defendant next briefs that the court erred in

authorizing an application for a subdivision of a property owned by the partnership. At the outset, we note

that this claim that he now attempts to raise is not

encompassed in his notice of appeal or amended

notices. His first amended appeal, however, challenges

the court’s order allowing a receiver to market the lots

created by the subdivision of that property. We reasonably can interpret the defendant’s brief as challenging

that order. Nevertheless, we decline to review this claim

because it is inadequately briefed.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to this claim. At all relevant times, the partnership

owned a property at 637 South Main Street in Manchester. On August 8, 2017, the receiver reported to the

court that this property ‘‘consists of approximately

eleven acres of land with an existing three family home

and two barns. All partners are in agreement that the

best way to sell the land left after subdividing off the

front corner (which is to be conveyed to [the defendant]

pursuant to the settlement reached by the partners) is

to subdivide the remaining acreage into building lots.’’
On September 11, 2017, the court issued an order

approving of the receiver’s report, which, in turn,

authorized the receiver to proceed with an application

for a subdivision of the property. The defendant did

not appeal from the issuance of that order at that time

or in his five later notices of appeal.

On September 5, 2018, the Planning and Zoning Commission of the Town of Manchester (commission)

approved the application for a subdivision of the property. On October 15, 2018, the receiver filed a motion

for an order in which he informed the court that the

subdivision application had been approved and

requested the authority to list the lots for sale at prices

suggested by a local Realtor. On October 29, 2018, the

court granted that motion. The defendant did not appeal

from the granting of that motion.

On May 28, 2019, the defendant filed an objection to

the ‘‘filing of resubdivision’’ of the property. The gist

of the defendant’s argument was that the subdivision

application that was approved by the commission did

not comply with the terms of the settlement agreement.

The court did not rule on the defendant’s objection.

The defendant’s first amended appeal purports to

appeal from the interim report of the receiver dated

August 12, 2019, and from the request for an order. In

that report, the receiver stated that ‘‘the resubdivision

[of 637 South Main Street] is now perfected following

approval, and the lots created thereby are available to

transfer/sell.’’ The receiver asked the court ‘‘whether

to direct the [R]ealtor to continue marketing the . . .

lots’’ created by the subdivision. The court approved

the report and order on September 16, 2019. In his brief

to this court, the defendant states in the heading for

this claim that ‘‘the trial court err[ed] in allowing a

comprehensive subdivision instead of just obtaining an

appraisal.’’

‘‘Claims are inadequately briefed when they are

merely mentioned and not briefed beyond a bare assertion. . . . Claims are also inadequately briefed when

they . . . consist of conclusory assertions . . . with

no mention of relevant authority and minimal or no

citations from the record . . . .’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Estate of Rock v. University of Connecticut, 323 Conn. 26, 33, 144 A.3d 420 (2016).

In the section of his brief regarding this claim, the

defendant discusses matters that are unrelated to the

subdivision of 637 South Main Street. He does not brief

any statute, case precedent, rule of court, or other legal

authority that could render the court’s action improper.

We, therefore, deem this claim inadequately briefed and

decline to review it. Accordingly, we decline to review

this portion of the defendant’s appeal.

V

Finally, in his third amended appeal, the defendant
claims that the court erred in appointing Peter Carlson

as receiver. ‘‘The application for a receiver is addressed

to the sound legal discretion of the court, to be exercised with due regard to the relevant statutes and rules,

and such exercise is not to be disturbed lightly nor

unless abuse of discretion or other material error

appears.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Antonino

v. Johnson, 113 Conn. App. 72, 77, 966 A.2d 261 (2009),

quoting Chatfield Co. v. Coffey Laundries, Inc., 111

Conn. 497, 501, 150 A. 511 (1930). After reviewing and

considering the record in this case, including the briefs

and arguments of the parties on appeal, we conclude

that the court did not abuse its discretion in appointing

Peter Carlson as receiver. There is no error.

The appeal is dismissed with respect to all claims

except the claims regarding the authorization of an

application for a subdivision and the appointment of a

receiver; those judgments are affirmed.

1 Kristine Carlson, Karen Carlson, and Carlson Associates were also named

as defendants when the plaintiffs commenced the underlying action. Kristine

Carlson and Karen Carlson were removed as defendants in 2015. Following

Karen Carlson’s death in 2017, the court, in 2018, granted the motion of

Kristine Carlson, administrator of the estate of Karen Carlson, to be made

a party defendant. Carlson Associates remains a defendant in the action

but did not participate in the present appeal. Our references in this opinion

to the defendant are to Vernon F. Carlson.

2 Stuart C. Carlson died on January 23, 2011, and, on July 21, 2011, the

plaintiffs moved to substitute Patricia W. Carlson, in her capacity as administratrix of the estate of Stuart C. Carlson, as a plaintiff in the action. On

August 1, 2011, the court granted this motion.

3

‘‘A Mylar map is a map prepared on a thin polyester film suitable for

recording on the land records.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) 500

North Avenue, LLC v. Planning Commission, 199 Conn. App. 115, 118 n.2,

235 A.3d 526, cert. denied, 335 Conn. 959, 239 A.3d 320 (2020).

4 On February 5, 2020, the court granted the plaintiffs’ motion to terminate

the stay.

5

In that motion, the defendant stated that SHVC, Inc., was a family owned

real estate investing company, and that Carlson Associates was formed in

1986 after SHVC, Inc., was dissolved.