PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-1442

RENEE PRYOR,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

UNITED AIR LINES, INC.,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Leonie M. Brinkema, 

District Judge. (1:13-cv-01125-LMB-TRJ)

Argued: April 8, 2015 Decided: July 1, 2015 

Before MOTZ and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Vacated and remanded by published opinion. Judge Gregory wrote 

the opinion, in which Judge Motz and Senior Judge Davis joined.

ARGUED: Spencer Freeman Smith, SMITH PATTEN, San Francisco, 

California, for Appellant. Jody A. Boquist, LITTLER MENDELSON, 

P.C., Chicago, Illinois, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Dow W. Patten, 

SMITH PATTEN, San Francisco, California, for Appellant. 

Paul E. Bateman, Angela I. Rochester, LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C., 

Chicago, Illinois, for Appellee.
2

GREGORY, Circuit Judge:

This case most centrally concerns the question of when an 

employer may be held liable for a hostile work environment 

created by an anonymous actor. Renee Pryor, an African-American 

flight attendant, alleges that her employer, United Airlines, 

failed to adequately respond to a racist death threat left in 

her company mailbox. The district court concluded that Pryor 

was subjected to a racially hostile work environment, but 

granted summary judgment to the airline after deciding that it 

was not liable for the offensive conduct. For the reasons that 

follow, we vacate the order granting summary judgment and remand 

for further proceedings.

I.

Pryor joined United Airlines in 1984 and began working out 

of Dulles International Airport in the early 1990s. In January

2011, she discovered in her company mailbox a paper note 

claiming to be a “Nigger Tag – Federal Nigger Hunting License,” 

declaring that the holder was “licensed to hunt & kill NIGGERS 

during the open search hereof in the U.S.” J.A. 209. The tag 

also purported to give “the holder permission to hunt day or 

night, with or without dogs.” Id. A hand-drawn image of a 

person hanging from a pole or a tree appeared on one corner of 

the document, along with the words “this is for you.” J.A. 
3

1947.1 The mailbox was in a secure space at the airport,

accessible to United employees and others with company 

authorization.

Pryor was shaken and afraid. She immediately sought out 

her supervisor, Richard Reyes, and showed him the racist death 

threat. Reyes told Pryor he was “sorry” but that there was “not 

much” United could do because there were no security cameras 

covering the area. J.A. 1948.2 Reyes gave Pryor a flight 

attendant report to fill out and told her that he would give the 

form – along with the offensive note – to security and the base 

manager. Pryor completed the form and gave it, along with the 

threat, to Reyes.

At the time, United maintained an official Harassment & 

Discrimination (“H&D”) Policy.3 The policy provided guidance for 

supervisors and managers when they received a complaint 

 1 Although Pryor maintains that the note included the image 

of a person hanging from a noose, the copy in the record only 

bears the ‘mock license’ without the drawing. It is unclear 

whether that copy is, in fact, the version that Pryor first 

received, or if United lost or altered the original (which Pryor 

alleges). Pryor continues to claim that the drawing was 

originally included on the document, and we must accept her 

version as true at the summary judgment stage, as the district 

court did.

2 Reyes, in fact, thought the racist death threat “was a 

joke.” J.A. 156.

3 In 2010, a new written policy also took effect, known as 

the Working Together Guidelines. But the H&D policy was still 

active in January 2011, when Pryor received the first note.
4

regarding harassment or discrimination. It instructed such 

employees to:

Listen to the allegation and regard it seriously.

Contact the Employee Service Center immediately to 

report the complaint. The ESC will be responsible for 

initial in-take of the complaint and then forward to 

an investigative team for investigation and follow-up.

The team will also direct you if your participation in 

the investigation is necessary. If the complaint is 

determined to be valid after a thorough and impartial 

investigation, the supervisor will administer 

appropriate discipline in consultation with the 

investigative team.

Supervisors and managers are additionally expected to 

monitor their workplaces to ensure compliance with 

this harassment and discrimination policy. Any 

supervisor or manager, who becomes aware of an 

incident or complaint of harassment or discrimination, 

whether by witnessing the incident or being told of 

it, must immediately report it to the ESC.

J.A. 2169 (emphases added).

Despite that policy, Reyes did not contact the Employee 

Service Center (“ESC”). Instead, he called Mary Kay Panos, the 

director of Inflight Services at Dulles, to inform her of the 

incident. Panos was out of the office (it was a Saturday) and 

told Reyes to put an envelope with the racist threat under her 

door so she could see it on Monday morning. When Panos found 

the envelope, she notified Denise Robinson-Palmer, an 

Operational Manager at Dulles, and instructed her to follow up. 

Panos, like Reyes, did not contact the ESC, even though she 

later acknowledged that it would have been proper protocol.
5

As both Panos and Robinson-Palmer were aware, the note left 

for Pryor was not the first incident of racism reported at 

United’s Dulles facility. In the 1990s, Pryor received a 

question from an unidentified colleague about rumors circulating 

among United employees that black flight attendants based out of 

Dulles were moonlighting as prostitutes during layovers in 

Kuwait. Both Panos and Robinson-Palmer became aware of these 

rumors when they resurfaced in 2009-2010. Panos informally 

looked into the claims, but failed to substantiate them.

Panos and Robinson-Palmer were also both aware that just a 

few months before Pryor discovered the threat, an apartment 

advertisement with a racist message on it had appeared in the 

flight attendants’ break room at Dulles. The message on the 

advertisement stated that “No niggers need apply.” J.A. 2182.

Pryor never viewed the flyer, but heard about it from co-workers 

and a supervisor. Although brought to the attention of Panos 

and Robinson-Palmer, neither documented the incident, conducted

any interviews, contacted human resources, or enlisted the help 

of corporate security. Instead, Robinson-Palmer called the 

number listed on the ad to try to determine who posted it. When 

the woman on the other line disclaimed any knowledge of the 

racist message on the advertisement, Robinson-Palmer “shredded 

[the flyer], because [she] was so offended by it.” J.A. 1340. 

The supervisor began to monitor the bulletin board and soon 
6

discovered a second identical posting. She again shredded it, 

without taking any additional action.

When Robinson-Palmer then became aware of the racist threat

in Pryor’s mailbox, she spoke to the flight attendant about it 

and contacted Michael Folan from Corporate Security. RobinsonPalmer did not contact the ESC. Security conducted no 

interviews of co-workers and did not preserve any physical 

evidence or “any hard copy documents concerning the 

investigation.” J.A. 2102. Security also claimed it was 

“unable to ‘brush’ for prints as there were no prints of other 

employees to match them with, and there was no telling how long 

the item was there, as anyone could have touched it.” J.A. 

1484-85. In the end, United “was unable to identify a suspect 

or even a time of placement of the document.” J.A. 1484-85.

Corporate security closed its investigation on February 4, 

2011. It appears, however, that nobody directly informed Pryor 

of that development. Increasingly frustrated, Pryor herself

called the ESC and another employee hotline on February 16, 

2011, to ask about the status of the investigation and express 

her unhappiness. The ESC referred the matter to Ally Zauner, a

human resources manager in Chicago. Zauner made telephone calls 

to Pryor, her supervisors, and Corporate Security to gather 

information.
7

Despite the occurrence of a possible hate crime, and a 

crime that involved a threat of violence at a major airport,

United never reported the incident to the police. Instead,

Pryor made a police complaint on February 27, 2011, at the 

Metropolitan Washington Airport Authority.4 In her police 

statement, Pryor recounted in part:

I showed [the note] to [Reyes]. He said we have no 

cameras so there is not much we can do. I was so 

stunned. I was hurt and even embarrassed . . . The 

“Base Manager” never came to me!! The assistan[t] 

Base [Manager] did say (5 days later) she did hear of 

the incident. [Reyes] took the letter[,] put it in a 

large envelope[,] and told me it would be sent to 

Corporate Security. A lady from some [department]

that handles sexual harassment called me Feb. the 

18th, 2011. I returned her call Feb. 19th. She said 

United was busy merging with Continental Airlines and 

that she handles other types of situations. To say 

the least I have followed all the procedures United 

said to do but up until me calling HR in Chicago no 

one bothered to call me back. . . . I am stressed[,] 

hurt[,] and I do not feel safe at work. I dread going 

to my mailbox because I do not know if this person is 

in wait for me!! I do not feel safe!! . . . I 

noticed how [supervisors] look at me different now.

Mr. Barreta (supr.) has been good to me with his hugs.

It took me a long time to get to the [department] in 

HR!! Why is this! The stress of this matter has 

changed how I feel at work. I keep wondering why and 

who. I thought this behavior was not tolerated in any 

work environment today . . . It also bothers me that 

I was asked after my Moscow trip “what did I do” to 

get this in my mailbox. My response is what does a 

 4 Folan stated in a “case log” that he directed RobinsonPalmer to have Pryor prepare a police report in January. J.A. 

219. Robinson-Palmer, however, apparently failed to do so. 

Folan later told police that he informed Pryor in January that 

she should file a report. Pryor disputes that assertion.
8

person have to do to get a note or to be called a 

racial slur[].

J.A. 2192-93.

When the police first approached Pryor’s supervisors, they 

were greeted with less than enthusiastic cooperation. Panos 

told the officer “that they were in the middle of a situation 

and this was not the best time to meet.” J.A. 196. As the 

officer further noted on the relevant incident sheet:

Ms. Palmer and Ms. Panos stated the issue was being 

handled internally through Corporate Security and 

Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) and did not 

understand why the police [department] was involved.

I explained that in the Commonwealth of Virginia the 

racial note was considered a form of Hate Crime and a 

Threat. I also informed that MWAA PD should have been 

notified on the date of the incident. I also informed 

that Ms. Pryor did not feel that United Airlines was 

handling the situation and felt that her job was 

unsafe. At that time, all the supervisors filled out 

the Statement of Facts form.

J.A. 196.

Pryor spoke to Zauner again after filing the police report. 

During that conversation, Zauner received “very limited” details 

and believed that Pryor “did not want to really share a lot of 

information with me, unfortunately.” J.A. 1512. Pryor did 

suggest to Zauner that United should send out an email warning 

employees that “this type of behavior would not be tolerated,” 

and implement a program to encourage employees to “treat each 

other with respect.” J.A. 1960. In the end, Zauner could not 

identify suspects, and she concluded that the incident was 
9

isolated. Notably, Panos and Robinson-Palmer did not inform 

Zauner of the racist flyers which had been posted a few months 

earlier, or the prostitution rumors.

On March 25, 2011 – two and a half months after Pryor 

discovered the racist death threat – Panos sent a “must-read” 

email to Dulles-based employees. J.A. 1612. The email informed 

the employees that the company was investigating unspecified 

“inappropriate and offensive material,” and it instructed them 

to notify a manager if they had any knowledge regarding the 

unspecified activity. J.A. 1612. Panos also contacted Pryor to 

tell her that she believed the email would “discourage any 

future behavior.” J.A. 1194. Shortly thereafter, Zauner 

concluded that although the racist threat “did not align with 

. . . [the] Working Together Guidelines,” she could not 

“substantiate that somebody had violated the Harassment and 

Discrimination Policy.” J.A. 2083-84. Zauner wrote a letter to 

Pryor informing her of the findings and explaining that the 

investigation was being closed. The police department also 

suspended its investigation “pending the development of further 

leads.” J.A. 2189.

Months later, on October 21, 2011, Pryor received a nearly 

identical racist death threat in her United mailbox at Dulles, 

also purporting to be a license to hunt and kill AfricanAmericans. Pryor went immediately to the nearest supervisor, 
10

Sandra Sales, who largely ignored her entreaties. Pryor then 

showed the note to Reyes. Reyes asked to keep it, but Pryor 

said that she wanted to take it to the police. Crying, Pryor 

went upstairs to call her aunt and tell her about the threat. 

Shortly thereafter, a pilot walked by and Pryor showed him the 

note and explained where she found it. The pilot went to “get 

someone downstairs” to help, and he brought Reyes up to speak 

with Pryor again. J.A. 1141. Reyes told Pryor that he had 

already called Panos and told her what happened. Pryor then 

took the note to the police station and filed a new report.

Two or three days later, Panos called Pryor at home to 

discuss the incident. Pryor asked why there were no cameras in 

the facility, and Panos mentioned the cost of installation. 

Panos also scheduled a meeting with Pryor and George Bellomusto, 

who at the time was United’s Human Resources Manager at Dulles. 

During that meeting, Bellomusto gave Pryor a letter to sign 

about the confidentiality of the investigation. Pryor refused 

to sign it. The HR manager nonetheless promised to do a 

thorough investigation.

Pryor also emailed corporate security and filed another

complaint with United’s ESC. She told the ESC that she was 

“hurt and afraid,” and asked “if something could be done about 

it.” J.A. 1159. Charles Miller from Corporate Security 

reviewed Pryor’s email to that department. Miller referred the 
11

matter to a colleague for “follow-up investigation.” J.A. 1468.

Miller also called Pryor to let her know that they were “taking 

it seriously” and to tell her that she should contact him or

Bellomusto with any questions. Id.

During this time period, the same racist threat was 

discovered by four other senior African-American flight 

attendants in their mailboxes. Subsequent daily audits of the 

mailboxes revealed copies left for five more employees. On 

October 31, Bellomusto sent an email to supervisors and HR

personnel, letting them know of the notes that had been found. 

One of the other flight attendants, the email stated, was very 

concerned because fingerprints were not kept on file. 

Bellomusto expressed his hope that the police would be able to 

help.

Ten days later, through collaboration with the police, 

United installed two temporary security cameras in the mailbox 

area. The cameras, however, did not capture any relevant 

information, and Bellomusto closed the investigation on or about 

November 15 after failing to identify suspects. A month later, 

Bellomusto informed Pryor of the measures the company had taken

to prevent future incidents. United also worked with the police 

to record the fingerprints of all United employees known to have 

touched the notes to narrow the field of potential suspects if 

subsequent dusting yielded any evidence.
12

Pryor relocated to George Bush Intercontinental Airport in 

Houston. She has not reported any further race-related 

incidents, nor does the record contain evidence of any

additional incidents.

On March 9, 2012, Pryor filed a complaint with the Equal 

Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), alleging that United 

failed to adequately investigate the prostitution rumors and 

racist notes left in her mailbox, and that the failure 

constituted unlawful discrimination. She received a right-tosue letter and timely filed the instant action. Pryor’s First 

Amended Complaint includes three counts, each premised on the 

set of facts described above.5 Count I alleges that United 

“engaged in a systemic pattern and practice of unlawful racial 

discrimination” through its failure to investigate Pryor’s 

complaints, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Counts II-III

allege that United created a hostile work environment based on 

the speculation regarding the prostitution ring and the two 

notes received, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.

 5 A quasi companion case was also filed by two of Pryor’s 

colleagues. See Johnson v. United Airlines, Inc., No. 1:13-CV00113, 2013 WL 3990789 (E.D. Va. Aug. 2, 2013), appeal 

dismissed, No. 13-2053 (4th Cir. Dec. 12, 2013). The district 

court in Johnson granted summary judgment for United after 

finding that neither of the plaintiffs had actually “received 

the Hunting License . . . or viewed it personally.” Id. at *4.
13

United moved for summary judgment on all three counts. On 

April 16, 2014, the district court granted the company’s motion.

Although the court determined that the racist notes were 

sufficiently severe to create a hostile work environment, it 

concluded that the conduct could not be imputed to United.

Pryor timely appealed.

II.

We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de 

novo, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party (Pryor) and drawing all reasonable inferences in 

her favor. EEOC v. Cent. Wholesalers, Inc., 573 F.3d 167, 174 

(4th Cir. 2009). Summary judgment is appropriate if “there is 

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(a). Summary judgment is inappropriate, however, if “the 

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict 

for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 

U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

III.

Pryor alleges that she was subjected to a racially hostile 

work environment, contravening the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 

U.S.C. § 1981, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 
14

U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17.6 The elements an employee must 

prove are the same under either provision. Spriggs v. Diamond 

Auto Glass, 242 F.3d 179, 184 (4th Cir. 2001). To survive 

summary judgment, Pryor must show that a reasonable jury could 

find that the conduct she alleges was (1) unwelcome; (2) based

on her race; (3) sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the 

conditions of her employment and to create an abusive work 

environment; and (4) imputable to her employer. Okoli v. City 

of Baltimore, 648 F.3d 216, 220 (4th Cir. 2011); see also BoyerLiberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., --- F.3d ---, 2015 WL 2116849, 

at *9 (4th Cir. May 7, 2015) (en banc).

The first two elements – that the conduct at issue was 

unwelcome and based on race – are not in dispute here. The 

parties, however, disagree about whether the conduct was 

sufficiently severe to create a hostile environment, and whether 

 6 The Civil Rights Act of 1866 prohibits race discrimination 

in the “making, performance, modification, and termination of 

contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, 

and conditions of the contractual relationship.” 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1981(b). Title VII, meanwhile, prohibits employers from 

“discriminat[ing] against any individual with respect to his [or 

her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 

employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, 

sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Workplace 

harassment that sufficiently alters the terms and conditions of 

employment is actionable under a “hostile work environment” 

theory. See Ocheltree v. Scollon Prods., Inc., 335 F.3d 325, 

331 (4th Cir. 2003).
15

liability can be imputed to United. We consider each question 

in turn.

A.

A violation of Title VII occurs when an employee’s

“workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, 

ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to 

alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an 

abusive working environment.” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 

510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). To make that showing, a worker must demonstrate that

“the environment would reasonably be perceived, and is 

perceived, as hostile or abusive,” even if it is not actually 

“psychologically injurious.” Id. at 22. We determine the 

“objective severity of harassment . . . from the perspective of 

a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position, considering all 

the circumstances.” Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 

523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Our inquiry into the severity of unwelcome conduct “is not, 

and by its nature cannot be, a mathematically precise test.” 

Harris, 510 U.S. at 22. “[S]imple teasing, offhand comments, 

and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not 

amount to discriminatory changes in the terms and conditions of 

employment.” Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 

(1998) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). But as
16

we have recently confirmed, “an ‘isolated incident[]’ of 

harassment can ‘amount to discriminatory changes in the terms 

and conditions of employment,’ if that incident is ‘extremely 

serious.’” Boyer-Liberto, 2015 WL 2116849, at *10 (alterations 

in original) (quoting Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788).

Here, Pryor alleged in her complaint that both the 

prostitution rumors and mailbox threats engendered a hostile 

work environment. The district court concluded that although 

the prostitution rumors were not severe or pervasive enough to 

create a hostile environment, the racist death threats were 

sufficient by themselves. On appeal, Pryor does not contest the 

court’s findings regarding the prostitution rumors. United, 

meanwhile, argues that a hostile environment cannot arise from 

two notes that it characterizes as isolated, infrequent, and 

anonymous.

We agree with the district court’s determination that

although the notes may not have been pervasive, “a reasonable 

jury could find that [they] were sufficiently severe to alter 

the conditions of plaintiff’s employment” and create a hostile 

work environment. Pryor v. United Airlines, Inc., 14 F. Supp. 

3d 711, 721 (E.D. Va. 2014). Four considerations support that 

conclusion. First, the use of “the word ‘nigger’ is pure 

anathema to African-Americans,” Spriggs, 242 F.3d at 185, as it 

is to all of us. As the district court elaborated, the “[u]se 
17

of that word is the kind of insult that can create an abusive

working environment in an instant, see Rodgers v. WesternSouthern Life Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 668, 675 (7th Cir. 1993), and is 

degrading and humiliating in the extreme, see Walker v. 

Thompson, 214 F.3d 615, 626 (5th Cir. 2000).” Pryor, 14 F.

Supp. 3d at 720.

Second, as the district court also persuasively reasoned, 

the offensive language was made still more severe “by virtue of 

the presence of a clear element of violence” manifested by the 

threats inherent in a “hunting license” and the image of a 

lynching. Id. at 721. Indeed, the content of the notes is 

simply chilling, purporting to give permission for the hunting 

of a race of human beings “with or without dogs.” The “license”

thus “clearly implicates the express purpose of killing, the 

additional implication that the recipient is a sub-human object 

to be hunted, and the allusion to lynching.” Id.

Third, the location where Pryor discovered the threats 

added to their gravity. They were left in a secure mailroom at 

a major airport – a space with access ostensibly limited to coworkers and others with company authorization. In an age of 

unparalleled attention paid to the security of air travel, a 

death threat left for an airline employee in a secure, 

restricted space should have been viewed with heightened 

concern. Further, Pryor’s work as a flight attendant left her 
18

in a particularly vulnerable position, flying internationally 

and coming into contact with hundreds of strangers daily. And 

if there was any doubt, the record includes ample evidence that 

Pryor was subjectively terrified after receiving the threats.

Fourth and finally, the context of the notes matters. In 

addition to the two threats that Pryor directly received, the 

record includes evidence of (1) the same threats left for

several other flight attendants, (2) the racist message written

on the two apartment advertisements, of which Pryor was aware; 

and (3) the racially-tinged prostitution rumors. While not 

severe enough on their own to subject Pryor to a racially 

hostile work environment, such facts contribute to our 

evaluation of the severity of the two threats Pryor received.

See Spriggs, 242 F.3d at 184 (observing that a hostile work 

environment analysis looks not only to conduct directed 

specifically at an individual but also to “the ‘environment’ of 

workplace hostility”).

In sum, the conduct at issue in this case is far removed 

from the mere off-hand comments or teasing that courts have 

found of insufficient severity to engender a hostile 

environment. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788. As the district 

court properly concluded, “a reasonable jury could properly 

construe the notes as racially-tinged death threats so severe 
19

that it does not matter that they were not pervasive.” Pryor,

14 F. Supp. 3d at 721.

B.

The question of United’s liability for the anonymous 

harassing conduct is a closer one. On one hand, employers are 

not strictly liable for acts of harassment that occur in the 

workplace. See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,

72 (1986); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 

(1998). Indeed, instances of anonymous harassment pose unique

challenges to companies that must work both to identify the 

perpetrator and to protect victims from a faceless, though 

ominous, threat. But on the other hand, an employer maintains a

responsibility to reasonably carry out those dual duties of 

investigation and protection. The anonymous nature of severe 

threats or acts of harassment may, in fact, heighten what is 

required of an employer, particularly in circumstances where the 

harassment occurs inside a secure space accessible to only 

company-authorized individuals.

As we have held, an employer may be liable for hostile work 

environments created by co-workers and third parties “if it knew 

or should have known about the harassment and failed to take 

effective action to stop it . . . [by] respond[ing] with 

remedial action reasonably calculated to end the harassment.” 

EEOC v. Sunbelt Rentals, Inc., 521 F.3d 306, 319 (4th Cir. 2008) 
20

(internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added); see also

Freeman v. Dal-Tile Corp., 750 F.3d 413, 423 (4th Cir. 2014); 

EEOC v. Xerxes Corp., 639 F.3d 658, 669 (4th Cir. 2011). An

employer is not subject to a lesser standard simply because an 

anonymous actor is responsible for the offensive conduct. See

Xerxes, 639 F.3d at 672-73 (holding an employer to the same 

standard for responding to harassment carried out by known and 

unknown individuals); Cerros v. Steel Techs., Inc., 398 F.3d 

944, 951 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting that a plaintiff’s “inability 

to verify the authorship of . . . racist graffiti poses no 

obstacle to his establishing that this graffiti produced or 

contributed to a hostile work environment”). Instead, the fact 

of anonymity is a circumstance that helps inform our

determination of whether a company’s response was reasonably 

calculated to end the harassment at issue. See Tademy v. Union 

Pac. Corp., 614 F.3d 1132, 1149 (10th Cir. 2008) (“Although 

there may be difficulties with investigating anonymous acts of 

harassment, those difficulties at most present factual questions 

about the reasonableness of [the employer’s] response . . . .”).

The parties here do not dispute that United knew about the 

two racist death threats Pryor received (in addition to the 

prostitution rumors and the bulletin board apartment 

advertisements). Further, Pryor agrees that United’s response 

to the second threatening note she received was adequate. The 
21

only question is thus whether the airline’s actions in response 

to the first threat were prompt and reasonably calculated to end 

the harassment. See Freeman, 750 F.3d at 423.

Of course, the reasonableness of a company’s actions 

depends, in part, on the seriousness of the underlying conduct. 

See Xerxes, 639 F.3d at 675-76 (examining whether a company’s 

response was proportional to the seriousness of the incidents of 

harassment); Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 882 (9th Cir. 1991)

(observing that “remedies should be assessed proportionately to 

the seriousness of the offense” (internal quotation marks 

omitted)); Dornhecker v. Malibu Grand Prix Corp., 828 F.2d 307, 

309 (5th Cir. 1987) (looking to the severity of alleged sexual 

harassment to determine the adequacy of a company’s response). 

It is only in light of the nature of the harassment that we can 

see whether a company’s response was proportional by examining 

the promptness of any investigation, the specific remedial 

measures taken, and the effectiveness of those measures. See

Xerxes Corp., 639 F.3d at 669-70.

As previously described, the conduct at issue in this case

is some of the most serious imaginable in the workplace – an 

unmistakable threat of deadly violence against an individual 

based on her race, occurring in the particularly sensitive space 

of an airport. By its own terms, the note Pryor received was 

not only a threat to her but to all African-American employees 
22

who shared the same space. It is also reasonable to infer on 

this record that the perpetrator was someone United had 

entrusted with access to the mailroom.

Given the severity of the threat, a reasonable jury could 

find that United’s response was neither prompt nor reasonably 

calculated to end the harassment. United supervisors did not 

call police, even though police later suggested that they should 

have. They did not escalate the matter to the ESC, in apparent 

violation of the company’s H&D policy.7 They did not inform 

corporate security of the racist message on the fliers

previously discovered in the break room. They did not promptly

install cameras or other monitoring devices. They did not 

provide Pryor with additional security or protective measures. 

They did not obtain fingerprints, do other forensics analysis, 

or interview co-workers. And they remarkably did not inform 

Pryor when their investigation closed, an event that occurred 

without management having sent any correspondence to employees

to solicit information and/or put them on notice that the 

company was being vigilant in monitoring the workplace. In 

short, a reasonable jury could find that United had done very 

 7 Clearly, a company’s failure to follow an internal policy 

does not make its response unreasonable as a matter of law. But 

insofar as a company’s policies reflect its reasoned belief as 

to the best way to address and end harassing conduct, compliance 

with those policies is a factor we may consider.
23

little to deter future acts of harassment up until the time that 

the airline initially closed its investigation.

Tellingly, Pryor herself had to both call the ESC to 

resurrect the investigation and report the incident to police.

Were it not for Pryor’s actions, it is reasonable to infer that 

no email would have ever gone out to United employees – an email 

that Panos sent more than a month after Pryor contacted the ESC.

And after the ESC became involved, Panos and Robinson-Palmer 

failed to inform the investigating HR manager of prior instances 

and allegations of racism at United’s Dulles facility. A 

reasonable jury could find that such an omission contributed to 

the manager’s conclusion that the first note Pryor received 

represented an isolated occurrence.

As for United’s interaction with the police, when an 

officer first interviewed Panos and Robinson-Palmer, she was met 

with less than generous cooperation. In fact, before the 

officer could even explain her presence, the managers told her 

that it was “not the best time to meet” and questioned whether

she should have made an appointment. Curiously, Panos and 

Robinson-Palmer further indicated that they “did not understand 

why the police [department] was involved.” J.A. 196. Such 

initial antipathy to police involvement stands in informative 

contrast with the active cooperation advocated by Human 
24

Resources Manager George Bellomusto in the aftermath of the 

discovery of the second note.

It is also significant, albeit not dispositive, that 

United’s response to the first threat was ineffectual in 

stopping the harassing conduct, as the notes reappeared months 

later in greater number. The mere fact that a company’s

strategy was not successful does not necessarily mean the 

strategy was not a reasonably calculated one. Xerxes, 639 F.3d 

at 669-70. Yet the effectiveness of an employer’s actions 

remains a factor in evaluating the reasonableness of the 

response. See Cerros, 398 F.3d at 954 (observing that “the 

efficacy of an employer’s remedial action is material to our 

determination whether the action was reasonably likely to 

prevent the harassment from recurring” (internal quotation marks 

omitted)). On this record, a reasonable jury could find a 

causal relationship between United’s lukewarm initial response 

to the threat Pryor received and the later reappearance of the 

notes.

In granting summary judgment for United, the district court 

reasoned that there were no grounds to think that the 

perpetrator would have been found even if the airline had taken 

additional steps. Pryor, 14 F. Supp. 3d at 723 (“[T]here is 

absolutely no basis in the record to conclude that plaintiff’s 

preferred route would have led defendant to the culprit.”). But 
25

that logic miscalibrates the test for employer liability and 

fails to view the evidence in the light most favorable to Pryor.

A plaintiff in a hostile work environment case does not bear the 

burden of making the speculative showing that taking different 

measures would have necessarily stopped the harassing conduct at 

issue. Instead, the focus of our inquiry rests on whether the 

means that a company chose were “reasonably calculated” to end 

the harassment. That is, even if a diligent response may not 

have been successful, a company is not thereby excused for its 

lack of diligence.

Even using the district court’s logic, a reasonable jury 

could find that a more immediate and robust response to the 

first threatening note would have increased the chances of 

identifying suspect(s) while deterring the later proliferation 

of notes. Any number of actions could have been effective, 

including reporting the incident immediately to the police, 

conducting interviews with co-workers and others with access to 

the mailroom, and promptly sending correspondence about the 

incident to Dulles-based employees.

We need not, and indeed could not, prescribe exactly what 

United’s response to the first note should have been. There 

were, no doubt, multiple ways for the company to reasonably

respond. It also bears emphasizing that an employer’s response 

need not be perfect, or even embody best practices, to be 
26

considered reasonably calculated to end harassing conduct. 

Mikels v. City of Durham, N.C., 183 F.3d 323, 330 (4th Cir.

1999) (holding that an employer’s “particular remedial 

responses” need not be the “most certainly effective that could 

be devised”). We can, however, confidently say on this record

that a reasonable jury could conclude that the response United 

actually chose was neither prompt nor reasonably calculated.

Indeed, a reasonable jury could find that United’s response was 

instead reluctant and reactive, intended to minimize any 

disruption to day-to-day operations instead of identifying a

perpetrator and deterring future harassment.

We therefore vacate the district court’s award of summary 

judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this 

opinion.

VACATED AND REMANDED