**_______________________________** Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan
Chief Justice: Justices: Clifford W. Taylor Michael F. Cavanagh Elizabeth A. Weaver Marilyn Kelly 

# Opinion

Maura D. Corrigan Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman

**FILED MAY 11, 2005**

**PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellant,** 
**v No. 127115**  **JOHN LAVELL WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellee.** 

**PER CURIAM This case concerns the constitutionality of a traffic**  **stop. After stopping defendant's vehicle for speeding, a state trooper asked defendant routine questions about his**  **travel plans and obtained his consent to search the vehicle. Cocaine and marijuana were discovered during the**  **search. Defendant argues, and the Court of Appeals determined, that his consent was invalid because his**  **detention exceeded the proper scope of a traffic stop, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The Court of Appeals** **held that the trial court should have suppressed the fruits of the search.**  **1 We conclude that the detention was reasonable and did**  **not exceed the proper scope of a traffic stop. Because defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights were not violated as a**  **result of the detention, his consent was valid. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case**  **to the trial court for reinstatement of defendant’s convictions and sentences.** 
**I. BACKGROUND**  **On February 14, 2003, Michig an State Police Trooper**  **Jason Varoni observed defendant’s vehicle traveling eighty**   ** eight miles an hour on I-75 in Cheboygan County, where the** **posted speed limit was seventy miles an hour. He stopped defendant’s vehicle. Upon request, defendant produced his**  **driver's license. Trooper Varoni told defendant why he had been stopped and asked defendant where he was going.**  **Defendant answered that he was going to Cheboygan to visit friends and that he was staying at the Holiday Inn.**  **Because Cheboygan does not have a Holiday Inn, Trooper Varoni was suspicious of this response and asked defendant**  **to step from the vehicle to answer additional questions.**

**1 Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued August 5, 2004**  **(Docket No. 249853).**

2**Defendant did so and, in response to further questioning, explained that he was coming from Detroit and that he**  **intended to stay in Cheboygan for two days. No luggage was visible in the vehicle’s passenger compartment; when asked**  **about this, defendant said that he brought no luggage on the trip. Trooper Varoni asked defendant if he had “been**  **in trouble before,” and defendant disclosed that he had previously been arrested for a marijuana-related offense.**  **Trooper Varoni then questioned the vehicle’s other two occupants about their own trave**  **l plans, but their inconsistent responses only increased his suspicions.**  **2 This**  **questioning was completed about five to eight minutes after the traffic stop occurred. Trooper Varoni then informed**  **defendant that he had received conflicting stories from the occupants of the vehicle. He asked for defendant’s consent**  **to search the vehicle, and defendant agreed. Trooper Varoni contacted the Tuscarora Township canine**  **unit, and asked that a drug-detection dog be sent to the scene. The canine unit arrived within three minutes and**  **the dog signaled the presence of narcotics in the backseat**

**2 The front-seat passenger claimed that he did not know**  **where they were going or how long they would be gone; he confirmed that he had no luggage. The backseat passenger,**  **defendant’s wife, told Trooper Varoni that they were going shopping in Cheboygan and then Detroit. She said that they**  **had made no arrangements for accommodations.**

3**of the vehicle. Trooper Varoni did not find any narcotics in that area, and he asked defendant for consent to search**  **the vehicle’s trunk. Defendant initially agreed, but then withdrew his consent. A warrant was obtained, and the**  **police discovered substances that appeared to be marijuana and cocaine.**  **3 Trooper Varoni wrote defendant a citation for**  **speeding and two drug-related felonies, and arrested him. Defendant was charged with possession with intent to**  **deliver fifty grams or more but less than 225 grams of a substance containing cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iii), and**  **possession with intent to deliver marijuana, MCL 333.7401(2)(d)(iii). He moved to suppress evidence of the**  **controlled substances seized from his vehicle, asserting that the search**  **4 and seizure were predicated on an illegal**  **detention. The trial court denied the motion. It concluded that the statements made by the occupants of the**  **vehicle raised reasonable suspicions in Trooper Varoni’s mind. It further concluded that the delay caused by the** 

**3 This was confirmed through later testing.** 

**4 Defendant disputes the validity of the initial search**  **of the car; he does not separately challenge the validity of the later search of the trunk, which was conducted after**  **Trooper Varoni obtained a search warrant and which led to the discovery of the controlled substances.** 

4**additional questioning was not unreasonable under the circumstances presented.**  **Defendant was convicted as charged following a bench trial, and was sentenced to consecutive prison terms of**  **seven to twenty years (for the cocaine conviction) and two to four years (for the marijuana conviction).**  **Defendant appealed, challenging the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress, and the Court of Appeals**  **reversed. Concluding that the initial traffic stop had been lawful, the Court then determined that the trooper**  **“unlawfully exceeded the initial stop when he asked defendant to step out of the vehicle” to answer questions**  **about his travel plans while the officer possessed only a “generalized hunch” that criminal activity was afoot. The**  **trooper’s questions had no relevance to the traffic stop, the Court held, and he had no reasonable suspicion of**  **criminal activity to warrant asking the questions. The Court concluded that Trooper Varoni was acting on a**  **“hunch,” which is insufficient grounds for pursuing an investigatory stop. For these reasons, it reversed the**  **trial court’s ruling on the motion to suppress. The prosecutor applied to this Court for leave to**  **appeal.**

5**II. STANDARD OF REVIEW**  **This Court reviews a trial court’s findings at a suppression hearing for clear error.**  People v Jenkins **, 472 Mich 26, 31; 691 NW2d 759 (2005);**  People v Custer **, 465 Mich 319, 325-326; 630 NW2d 870 (2001). But the application of**  **constitutional standards regarding searches and seizures to essentially uncontested facts is entitled to less**  **deference; for this reason, we review de novo the trial court’s ultimate ruling on the motion to suppress.**  Jenkins **,** supra **;** People v Oliver **, 464 Mich 184, 191-192; 627 NW2d 297 (2001).** 
**III. ANALYSIS**  **We review here the Court of Appeals determination that the traffic stop escalated into an illegal detention in**  **violation of the Fourth Amendment, rendering defendant’s eventual consent to search a nullity.**  **The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides:**  **The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,**  **against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but**  **upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the**  **place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.**  **[5]**

**5 US Const, Am IV.** 

6**In assessing the protections created by this amendment, the United States Supreme Court has “long held that the**  **'touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.'”** Ohio v Robinette **, 519 US 33, 39; 117 S Ct 417; 136 L Ed 2d 347 (1996) (citation omitted). Reasonableness is measured**  **by examining the totality of the circumstances.** Id **. Because of “'endless variations in the facts and**  **circumstances'” implicating the Fourth Amendment, reasonableness is a fact-intensive inquiry**  **that does not lend itself to resolution through the application of**  **bright-line rules.** Id **., quoting** Florida v Royer **, 460 US 491, 506; 103 S Ct 1319; 75 L Ed 2d 229 (1983).**  **In analyzing the propriety of the detention here, we apply the standard set forth in**  Terry v Ohio **, 392 US 1; 88 S Ct 1868; 20 L Ed 2d 889 (1968).**  **6 Under**  Terry **, the reasonableness of a search or seizure depends on “whether**  **the officer’s action was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the** 

**6** Knowles v Iowa **, 525 US 113, 117; 119 S Ct 484; 142 L Ed 2d 492 (1998) (despite existence of probable cause, a**  **common traffic stop is more analogous to limited detention authorized by**  Terry **than to an arrest) (quoting** Berkemer v McCarty **, 468 US 420, 439-440; 104 S Ct 3138; 82 L Ed 2d 317 [1984]).** 

7**circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.”**  **7** Terry, supra **at 20. In this case, there is no dispute that the initial**  **traffic stop was occasioned by defendant’s speeding, and**  **was therefore based on probable cause and was reasonable.** Robinette **,** supra **at 38. Under** Terry **, the remaining question is whether the subsequent detention was**  **“reasonably related in scope to the circumstances" of this**

**case.** Terry, supra **at 20. We conclude that it was. As a threshold matter, the Court of Appeals erred when**  **it agreed with defendant that the purpose of this traffic stop was fully effectuated when defendant handed Trooper**  **Varoni his driver's license and other requested paperwork. This view of the essential nature of the traffic stop**  **imposes an unreasonable restriction on an officer’s ability to investigate a violation of the law.**  **A traffic stop is reasonable as long as the driver is detained only for the purpose of allowing an officer to ask**  **reasonable questions concerning the violation of law and**

**7 The reviewing court considers the objective facts**  **relating to the traffic stop; the officer’s subjective state of mind is not relevant to the determination whether**  **the detention was proper.** Oliver **,** supra **at 199.**

8**its context for a reasonable period. 8**  **The determination whether a traffic stop is reasonable must necessarily take**  **into account the evolving circumstances with which the officer is faced. As we observed in**  People v Burrell **, 417 Mich 439, 453; 339 NW2d 403 (1983), when a traffic stop**  **reveals a new set of circumstances, an officer is justified in extending the detention long enough to resolve the**  **suspicion raised. 9**  **It is no violation of the Fourth Amendment for an officer to ask reasonable questions in order to obtain**  **additional information about the underlying offense and the circumstances leading to its commission. For example, in**  **addition to asking for the necessary identification and paperwork, an officer may also ask questions relating to** 

**8 There is considerable discretion allowed an officer**  **charged with enforcing the traffic laws as a member of the executive branch of government. This discretion can be**  **exercised effectively only if an officer is allowed to ask reasonable questions concerning the c**  **ontext of a traffic offense. To deny an officer the ability to ask**  **reasonable questions, reasonably circumscribed in scope and duration, is to deny the officer the ability to reasonably**  **exercise the officer's discretion.**

**9 Put another way, when considering whether a detention**  **is reasonably related in scope to the circumstances of the case, a reviewing court must consider whether “the**  **officer’s subsequent actions were fairly responsive to the emerging tableau—the circumstances originally warranting**  **the stop, informed by what occurred, and what the officer learned, as the stop progressed.”**  United States v Chhien **, 266 F3d 1, 6 (CA 1, 2001).** 

9**the reason for the stop, including questions about the driver’s destination and travel plans.**  United States v Williams **, 271 F3d 1262, 1267 (CA 10, 2001). 10**  **Specifically, an officer may ask about the “purpose and itinerary of a**  **driver’s trip during the traffic stop” in order to determine whether a “violation has taken place, and if so,**  **whether a citation or warning should be issued or an arrest made.”**  United States v Brigham **, 382 F3d 500, 508 (CA 5, 2004). Such inquiries are “within the scope of**  **investigation attendant to the traffic stop.”** Id **. Implicit in the authority to ask these questions is**  **the authority to ask follow-up questions when the initial answers given are suspicious.**  **11 Likewise, there is no**  **constitutional prohibition against asking similar questions of any passengers in the vehicle.**  **12**

**10 See also**  United States v Givan **, 320 F3d 452, 459 (CA 3, 2003);**  United States v Linkous **, 285 F3d 716, 719 (CA 8, 2002);**  United States v Hill **, 195 F3d 258, 268 (CA 6, 1999);** United States v Johnson **, 58 F3d 356, 357 (CA 8, 1995).**

**11** United States v Johnson **, 58 F3d 356, 357-358 (CA 8, 1995).** 

**12** Linkous **,** supra **at 719 (an officer may question the occupants of a vehicle to verify information provided by**  **the driver).**

10**Simply put, the Fourth Amendment does not impose a “one size fits all” rule of police investigation,**  **13 much**  **less one that restricts the officer to informing the driver of the nature of the infraction, and subsequently obtaining**  **the information necessary to fill out a citation. The Fourth Amendment requires only that the detention be**  reasonable **—that is, that it be reasonably restricted in light of all the facts available to the officer. See**  Robinette **,** supra **at 39. That standard was satisfied here. Trooper Varoni**  **introduced himself to defendant, explained the purpose of the stop, and obtained the necessary identification and**  **paperwork in order to complete the citation for the civil infraction of speeding. In response to a routine question**  **about his travel plans, defendant provided Trooper Varoni with an explanation that was implausible.**  **14 Therefore, even**  **before Trooper Varoni could resolve the matter of** 

**13 See**  Robinette, supra **at 39 (“In applying this test we have consistently eschewed bright-line rules, instead**  **emphasizing the fact-specific nature of the reasonableness inquiry.”).** 

**14 The Court of Appeals stated that there were**  **“plausible” innocent explanations for the statements made by the vehicle occupants. But the fact that such**  **explanations can be imagined does not mean that Trooper Varoni acted unreasonably in seeking to resolve the**  **inconsistencies. See** Oliver **,** supra **at 204.**

11**defendant’s violation of the traffic laws, he was presented with additional suspicious circumstances that warranted**  **further investigation. Trooper Varoni acted on these new suspicions by asking**  **defendant additional questions about his travel plans and whether he had been in trouble before, and by briefly**  **speaking with the vehicle's occupants. None of the answers provided by defendant or his companions allayed Trooper**  **Varoni’s suspicions. Moreover, the entire encounter took only five to eight minutes, at which time Trooper Varoni**  **requested and obtained defendant’s c onsent to search the**  **vehicle. After reviewing the facts and evaluating the totality**  **of the circumstances, we conclude that the traffic stop here was reasonable in both scope and duration.**  **It follows that defendant was not being unlawfully detained when he was asked to consent to the search.**  **Consent must be freely and voluntarily given in order to be valid.**  People v Borchard-Ruhland **, 460 Mich 278, 294; 597 NW2d 1 (1999);**  Royer **,** supra **at 497. An investigatory stop, as occurred in this case, is not so inherently coercive**  **that it renders involuntary consent given during the stop.** Royer, supra **at 501, 502;** People v Acoff **, 220 Mich App 396,**

12**400; 559 NW2d 103 (1996). There is no suggestion that defendant was coerced into giving his consent.**  **15 It is unnecessary to consider whether Trooper Varoni**  **had an independent, reasonable, and articulable suspicion that defendant was involved with narcotics, or even whether**  **the Fourth Amendment might impose such a requirement under different circumstances.**  **16 The detention and search here**  **were reasonable because: (1) the initial traffic stop was lawful, (2) Trooper Varoni’s questions about defendant’s**  **travel plans, and his limited follow-up, were reasonable and did not exceed the proper scope and duration of the**  **initial traffic stop, and (3) after Trooper Varoni concluded his questioning, defendant voluntarily consented**  **to the search of the vehicle. All in all, rather than amounting to a constitutional violation, we find that** 

15 **Defendant’s own actions show that he understood that he could refuse the request. He later declined to consent**  **to a search of the trunk.**

16 **One aspect of an officer’s ability to conduct a drug search without independent, articulable, and reasonable**  **suspicion was addressed in** Illinois v Caballes **, 543 US ___; 125 S Ct 834; 160 L Ed 2d 842 (2005). Employing the**  **reasonableness standard of** Robinette **, the United States Supreme Court held that, as long as the traffic stop is not**  **prolonged, an officer may use a drug-detection dog to sniff a vehicle during the stop, even if the defendant does not**  **consent and the officer lacks reasonable, articulable suspicion that the occupants of the vehicle are involved**  **with narcotics.**

13**Trooper Varoni's work in this case amounted to excellent police work. The trial court properly denied defendant’s**  **motion to suppress evidence of the controlled substances**  **found during the search of his vehicle.**
**IV. CONCLUSION**  **Because the detention was reasonable and did not constitute a violation of defendant’s Fourth Amendment**  **rights, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the trial court for reinstatement of**  **defendant’s convictions and sentences. MCR 7.302(G)(1). Clifford W. Taylor**  **Michael F. Cavanagh Elizabeth A. Weaver**  **Maura D. Corrigan Robert P. Young, Jr.**  **Stephen J. Markman**

14**_______________________________ v**  **S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N**
**SUPREME COURT**

**PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellant,** 
**No. 127115**  **JOHN LAVELL WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellee.** 

**KELLY, J. (** dissenting **). I agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court**  **erred by denying defendant's motions to suppress and to strike the evidence provided by Trooper Jason Varoni. The**  **trooper's questions of defendant were not reasonably related to the purpose of the traffic stop. Furthermore,**  **defendant's statement to the trooper that he was staying at a Holiday Inn in Cheboygan could not evoke a reasonable**  **suspicion that he was engaged in criminal activity. Therefore, I would affirm the decision of the Court of**  **Appeals.** Terry v Ohio **Traffic stops are subject to the test established by the United States Supreme Court in**  Terry v Ohio **, 392 US 1, 20; 88 S Ct 1868; 20 L Ed 2d 889 (1968). According to**  Terry **, an officer's investigation of a traffic stop must be "reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which**  **justified the interference in the first place."** Id. **A defendant may not be detained even momentarily without**  **reasonable, objective grounds for doing so.** Florida v Royer, **460 US 491, 498; 103 S Ct 1319; 75 L Ed 2d 229**  **(1983). The scope of the detention must be carefully tailored to the justification for the stop.**  Id **. at 500. Considering the totality of the circumstances, I would**  **find that the officer's questioning in this case exceeded the permissible legal scope of inquiry regarding a speeding**  **offense. It was not reasonably related to defendant’s violation of the speed limit. Furthermore, I believe that**  **the answers to the officer’s questions did not give rise to an articulable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot.**  **Scope of the Stop Trooper Varoni detained defendant for driving in**  **excess of the speed limit. An additional reason for the stop was that his vehicle had a cracked windshield. There**  **was no reasonable articulable suspicion of any other offense.**  **Neither the United States Supreme Court nor the Michigan Supreme Court has ever ruled that questioning**  **beyond the scope of a traffic stop is allowed. The Court of Appeals decision in this case accurately reflects Michigan** 

**2 law. However, with this decision, the Court changes**  **Michigan law to enlarge the permissible scope of an inquiry by a police officer during a routine traffic stop.**  **Permissible Questioning The questions "Why the rush?" and "Where are you**  **headed in such a hurry?" from a police officer may be reasonably related to a traffic stop for speeding. They**  **seek an admission of speeding. But questions about a driver's destination, purpose,**  **length of stay, and with whom he will be staying are meant to inquire into issues beyond a speeding offense. Not only**  **have they nothing to do with a speeding offense, they are not helpful to a police officer's decision to release the**  **driver or to issue a citation or warning. 1**  Ante **at 10. On direct examination, Trooper Varoni testified that**  **he asked defendant where he was going and that defendant offered that "he was going into Cheboygan to visit friends**  **and that he was staying at the Holiday Inn." However, it is apparent from the cross-examination**  **of Trooper Varoni that defendant did not volunteer this information to the** 

**1 The majority cites several federal circuit court of**  **appeals cases for the proposition that questions about travel plans are reasonably related to the scope of a**  **traffic stop. We are not bound by these decisions, and, as noted above, I find their logic defective.** 

**3 trooper in response to a general question. Instead, as**  **Trooper Varoni admitted:**
A. **Uh, it's—it's my practice to ask more than just for those thre**  **e pieces of uh, documentation [referring to license,**  **registration, and insurance paperwork].** *** * *** Q. **All right. And then you proceeded to further this investigation by questioning Mr.**  **Williams as to um, issues of where he was going and what he was going to do when he was there, is**  **that correct?**
A. **Yes.** Q. **And these questions weren't relevant to how fast he was going, were they?** 
A. **I-I ask everybody I stop where they're going to and where they are coming from.**  *** * *** Q. **My question was; the question about where he's going and how long he is staying is not**  **relevant to how fast he's going and the purpose for your stop; is it?** 
A. **That's correct. Without question, the trooper asked defendant**  **questions that exceeded the scope of legal inquiry regarding a speeding offense. The trooper evoked an answer**  **regarding the location where defendant was planning to spend the night. He also asked defendant if defendant had**  **any prior narcotics convictions. Trooper Varoni testified: Um, I asked him if he had been in trouble**  **before and uh, he told me that he had. I asked if**

**4 it had any—you know, related narcotics [sic], if**  **he'd ever been arrested for anything to do with drugs and he told me that he had. I asked him for**  **what and he said marijuana. This question likewise was unrelated to the purpose of the**  **traffic stop. Once defendant stated that he was staying at a Holiday Inn in Cheboygan in response to a question about**  **where he would spend the night, the purpose of the investigation changed. Trooper Varoni's subsequent**  **questions, having nothing to do with the scope of the traffic stop, changed the fundamental nature of the stop.**  **What began as a routine traffic stop became an all**   ** encompassing criminal investigation. Trooper Varoni** **admitted it:** Q. **Your purpose of the initial stop had seized [sic]; you weren't investigating speeding**  **violation [sic] anymore were you?**
A. **No, no I wasn't. Reasonable Suspicion of Criminal Activity**  **Even if Trooper Varoni's questions had been appropriate for a traffic stop, a second pertinent concern**  **for the Court is whether defendant's answer provided a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was occurring.**  **Trooper Varoni essentially admitted that he continued questioning the occupants of the vehicle on the basis of a**  **hunch that something "wasn't quite right."**

**5**Q. **[** Mr. Kwiatkowsi **]: Is it possible that he was in error as to where the Holiday Inn was?** 
A. **[** Trooper Varoni **]: That's possible, yes.** Q. **And the fact that someone misstates where they're staying um, you're saying that made you**  **suspicious of him, is that right?**
A. **Uh, you—you can call it what you want, I don't know about suspicious but, yeah, it made me**  **think twice about the statements he made.** Q. **All right, so you weren't suspicious?**
A. **Yeah, I-I questioned his statements.** Q. **Well, now when you're talking about suspicion you understand suspicious of something,**  **right? Of some activity that's unlawful, right?**
A. **Yes, that could be.** Q. **Well, what was it about that response that you were suspicious of that was unlawful?** 
A. **I wasn't suspicious of any particular thing that was unlawful.**  Q. **So it was unparticularized suspicion is that what you're saying?** 
A. **Um, I guess that could be.** Q. **Okay. Because you couldn't put your finger on what it was you were suspicious of,**  **right?**
A. **I was suspicious that something wasn't quite right.**  Q. **But you didn't know what it was, right?**
A. **That's right. The trooper’s intuition that "something wasn't quite**  **right" and his observation that no luggage was visible in**

**6 the passenger compartment were the things that made him**  **suspicious. The trooper admitted that it is not uncommon for people to carry luggage out of sight in the trunk.**  **Therefore, the only valid reason for the trooper to be suspicious was defendant's statement that he was staying at**  **a Holiday Inn in Cheboygan. The fact that defendant answered with the name of a**  **hotel chain that did not have a facility in Cheboygan hardly created a reasonable suspicion that criminal**  **activity was afoot. 2**  **The next question of defendant, once he had stepped out of the vehicle, was whether he had any**  **prior conviction for drugs. It was likewise unrelated to the traffic stop. This question is a further indicator**  **that the trooper was acting on a mere hunch. Where there is no articulable basis to suspect that a**  **crime is being committed, the officer's questions amount to**

**2 It is noteworthy that the explanations Mr. Williams**  **and his two passengers gave are not as inconsistent as the prosecution would have the Court believe. Mr. Williams**  **indicated that they were going to Cheboygan to visit friends and would be there "about two days." They would be**  **staying at a Holiday Inn. His companion, Mr. King, indicated that he was not sure how long they were going to**  **be gone. This is not inconsistent with defendant's statement.**  **Mrs. Williams indicated that they were planning to do some shopping in Cheboygan. She was not sure where they**  **were staying; they did not have reservations. This is also not inconsistent with Mr. Williams's explanation.** 

**7 nothing more than a fishing expedition. The questioning**  **and the subsequent search in this case went beyond the scope of the traffic stop and were unsupported by any**  **reasonable articulable suspicion. I agree with the Court of Appeals that, given the**  **totality of the circumstances, the trooper had insufficient grounds for pursuing an inve**  **stigatory stop and conducted his investigation based merely on a hunch.**  People v Champion **, 452 Mich 92, 98; 549 NW2d 849 (1996). I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.**  **Marilyn Kelly**

**8**