RECORD IMPOUNDED

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0586-15T4

NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD 

PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

V.E.,

Defendant-Appellant.

__________________________________

IN THE MATTER OF R.S., a minor.

__________________________________

Argued December 1, 2016 - Decided 

Before Judges Lihotz, Hoffman and Whipple.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Bergen 

County, Docket No. FN-02-179-15.

Deric Wu, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, 

argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. 

Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Mr. Wu, 

on the brief).

Christian A. Arnold, Assistant Attorney 

General, argued the cause for respondent 

(Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General, 

attorney; Andrea M. Silkowitz, Assistant 

Attorney General, of counsel; Jill N.

Stephens-Flores, Deputy Attorney General, on 

the brief).

February 1, 2017

APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION

February 1, 2017

APPELLATE DIVISION
2 A-0586-15T4

Noel C. Devlin, Assistant Deputy Public 

Defender, argued the cause for minor (Joseph 

E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian, 

attorney; Mr. Devlin, on the brief).

The opinion of the court was delivered by 

LIHOTZ, P.J.A.D.

Defendant V.E., the mother of R.S. now age nine, challenges 

an order dismissing a Title 9 action filed by plaintiff the New 

Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency (Division), 

prior to an evidentiary hearing. The Division issued an 

administrative "established" finding of abuse or neglect against 

V.E., who was not afforded an administrative hearing to 

challenge the determination.1 She sought to contest the 

Division's finding before the Superior Court in this matter. 

However, over V.E.'s objection, the Family Part judge granted 

the Division's motion to dismiss the Title 9 litigation. 

On appeal, V.E. argues due process and fundamental fairness 

mandate she be granted an evidentiary hearing to contest the 

Division's finding child neglect was "established." She 

maintains the court erred when it dismissed the Title 9 action 

without considering her challenge to the finding. 

 

1 The action also involved A.S., the child's father. 

However, he has not appealed and therefore we limit our 

discussion to V.E.'s challenges. 
3 A-0586-15T4

Following our review, we conclude the court did not abuse 

its discretion in dismissing the Title 9 action. However, 

because an established finding is a finding of child abuse or 

neglect under N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4), subject to disclosure as 

permitted by N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.11a(b) and other statutes, due 

process considerations require a party against whom abuse or 

neglect is established be afforded plenary administrative 

review. The agency's denial of an administrative hearing is 

reversed. 

I.

At the time of the Division's involvement, A.S., V.E. and 

R.S. resided on the first floor of a two-family home located in 

Hackensack. The residence was owned by A.S., who was V.E.'s 

partner and R.S.'s father. According to V.E., there were three 

families residing in the residence. In addition to her family, 

and a family living on the second floor, V.E. told police "[two] 

unknown Hispanic males in their 30s . . . live[d] in the 

basement." 

On December 22, 2014, a kitchen grease fire erupted on the 

second floor of the dwelling. At the time, V.E. was in her 

apartment, A.S. was out of state working, and R.S. was attending 

an after-school program. When concerns arose regarding a 

possible gas leak, the fire department forcibly entered the 
4 A-0586-15T4

basement through a back door. While searching for the gas line, 

firemen forced open an inside basement door and discovered two 

rooms containing "a very large quantity of [c]annabis [p]lants." 

A report authored by Officer Pedro Dominguez of the 

Hackensack Police Department stated when he reviewed the scene 

with the fire department, he "immediately smell[ed] the 

overwhelming odor of raw marijuana emanating in the back yard 

area of the home." Officer Dominguez described the basement's 

"sophisticated . . . growing operation," which included a 

makeshift irrigation system, fans, fluorescent lights, and heat 

lamps. The entire building was evacuated after the Hackensack 

Building Department condemned the structure because of the 

possible gas leak and an "unsafe overload of the electric 

panel."

Narcotics Detective Alexander Lopez-Arenas took over the 

criminal investigation. He noted the "entire home smelled like 

marijuana" and valued the growing operation at approximately 

$2,000,000. 

V.E. was charged with child endangerment and various drugrelated offenses. She was detained in the county jail. A.S. 

was not located; a warrant for his arrest was issued. The 
5 A-0586-15T4

Division exercised an emergency removal of R.S., who was placed 

with his Godmother.2

On December 26, 2014, the Division filed a verified 

complaint for custody to protect the best interests of R.S., 

pursuant to N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21 and N.J.S.A. 30:4C-12. The court 

upheld the emergency removal and R.S.'s placement outside his 

home. The resultant order granted the Division legal and 

physical custody of the minor and contained provisions for 

supervised visitation, substance abuse evaluations, and random 

urine screenings for both parents. 

On December 23, 2014, the Division's investigation 

commenced with V.E.'s interview. She denied knowledge of the 

growing operation and explained her basement access was limited 

to using the laundry room. Further, she asserted R.S. never 

entered the basement. V.E. insisted she knew nothing of drugs 

in her home and stated she was very confused by the police 

action. 

 

2 The Division's removal of a child without a court order, 

commonly called a "Dodd removal," is authorized by the Dodd Act, 

which, as amended, is found at N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21 to -8.82. "The 

Act was authored by former Senate President Frank J. 'Pat' Dodd 

in 1974[,]" for whom it was named. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family 

Servs. v. P.W.R., 205 N.J. 17, 26 n.11 (2011) (quoting N.J. Div. 

of Youth & Family Servs. v. N.S., 412 N.J. Super. 593, 609 n.2 

(App. Div. 2010)).
6 A-0586-15T4

The Division later communicated with A.S. by cell phone. 

He reported a man named "Jose" rented the basement apartment. 

A.S. maintained he had not been in the basement "for over a 

year" and denied knowledge of drugs in his home. He insisted 

neither V.E. nor R.S. knew of the marijuana growing operation. 

Although A.S. stated he was returning to New Jersey that evening 

and would report to police, he did not do so and his exact 

whereabouts remained unknown. 

The Division also spoke to R.S., who appeared "happy and 

talkative" during his interview. R.S. stated he lived with his 

parents, an adult sibling, and his grandparents. R.S. confirmed 

two of A.S.'s friends lived in the basement, and explained he 

only entered the laundry area with V.E. R.S.'s responses 

reflected he had no knowledge of drugs in the home and never saw 

plants in the basement. 

The Division also (1) interviewed R.S.'s Godmother, her 

household members, and V.E.'s adult son, who attended college in 

Maine; (2) reviewed R.S.'s medical and school records; (3) 

considered police reports; and (4) viewed photographs of the 

crime scene depicting "multiple rooms in the basement of the 

home with hundreds of marijuana plants growing at different 

stages of development," "many haphazardly placed wires, lighting 
7 A-0586-15T4

system and an irrigation system throughout the basement" along 

with a security system with a video monitor. 

Once completed, the Department of Children and Families 

(Department) "Investigation Summary" issued findings and 

concluded "substantial risk of injury and environmental neglect" 

was "established" against V.E. and A.S. Noting V.E. was 

incarcerated on charges of "possession of marijuana, 

maintaining/operating CDS production/facility, fortified 

structure for dispensing drugs, hindering apprehension [by 

uttering] false infor[mation], and endangering the welfare of a 

child," the Department stated R.S. 

was placed [at] a substantial risk of harm 

as the home [where] he was residing was 

condemned for illegal wiring which was used 

to conduct an elaborate, illegal marijuana 

growing operation complete with an 

irrigation system, security cameras and 

lighting. 

The Division released this report to V.E.'s attorney during 

a February 19, 2015 case management hearing and informed the 

judge its investigation "established" neglect against both 

parents. The Division then proposed to dismiss the Title 9 

complaint to proceed solely under Title 30. V.E. objected, 

arguing: 

[W]e are objecting to the Division's request 

for a dismissal of the Title 9, since we do 

want an opportunity for a fact finding, and 

we do want an opportunity to have the 
8 A-0586-15T4

Division put forth their proofs, and 

indicate a specific reason and prove by a 

preponderance of the evidence that this 

child is an abused [or] . . . neglected 

child.

The judge denied V.E.'s request for a hearing, reasoning a 

hearing was not warranted since the Division was "not asking the 

court to make that finding" of abuse or neglect under Title 9. 

The judge further stated the "established" finding would not 

require either parents' name to be added to the central 

registry. She ordered the Title 9 action dismissed without 

prejudice. The litigation continued pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4C12. 

Thereafter, V.E. stipulated there was a need for continued 

services extended by the Division and waived her right to a 

summary hearing.3 Physical custody of R.S. was returned to V.E., 

with the Division continuing care and supervision. On August 

18, 2015, the court terminated the litigation. The final order 

stated it was safe for R.S. to return to the joint legal and 

physical custody of V.E. and A.S. This appeal followed.

 

3 V.E. attended a psychological examination and all random 

urine screens were negative, obviating substance abuse 

treatment. 
9 A-0586-15T4

II.

A.

Our review of a Family Part order is limited. We give 

substantial deference to the Family Part's findings of fact, 

Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998), "when supported 

by adequate, substantial, credible evidence." Finamore v. 

Aronson, 382 N.J. Super. 514, 519 (App. Div. 2006) (quoting 

Cesare, supra, 154 N.J. at 412). Reversal is warranted if there 

is insufficient evidentiary support for the trial judge's 

findings, N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J.

261, 279 (2007), or if the stated findings are "so manifestly 

unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and 

reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of 

justice." Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Inv'rs Ins. Co. of Am., 65 

N.J. 474, 484, (1974). On the other hand, our review of a trial 

judge's legal conclusions remains de novo. Manalapan Realty, 

L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995).

B.

"The primary concern of all public agencies involved with 

abuse and neglect is to ensure the safety, well-being, and best 

interests of the child." N.J.A.C. 3A:10-1.4.4 "Other 

 

4 The Department of Children and Families has recodified 

certain regulations relevant to abuse and neglect 

(continued)
10 A-0586-15T4

considerations, such as the objective of maintaining family 

integrity, promoting family functioning or the concern for 

traditional 'parental rights,' are secondary." Ibid. 

Relevant to the instant appeal, the Legislature has defined 

an abused or neglected child as 

a child less than 18 years of age 

. . . whose physical, mental or emotional 

condition has been impaired or is in 

imminent danger of becoming impaired as the 

result of the failure of his parent or 

guardian . . . to exercise a minimum degree 

of care . . . in providing the child with 

proper supervision or guardianship, by 

unreasonably inflicting or allowing to be 

inflicted harm, or substantial risk thereof 

. . . .

[N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4)(b).]

Not every harm or risk of harm is of such a serious nature 

to cause a child to become an abused or neglected child. Only 

 

(continued)

investigations. See 49 N.J.R. 98(a) (January 3, 2017) ("The 

Department of Children and Families requested, and the Office of 

Administrative Law agreed to permit, the administrative 

recodification of the Department's rules from Title 10, Human 

Services, to the newly created Title 3A, Children and Families, 

of the New Jersey Administrative Code."). The Notice of 

Administrative Changes noted the recodified chapters and 

technical changes were effective January 3, 2017, but it was 

"anticipated that approximately two to four chapters will be 

recodified with each Code Update produced." Ibid. Where 

applicable we cite the recodified regulations. The Notice 

included a table, which set forth "the Title 10 chapters being 

recodified along with their chapter headings and new Title 3A 

codification." Ibid. For example, N.J.A.C. 3A:10-1.4 was 

formerly N.J.A.C. 10:129-7.7(a). 
11 A-0586-15T4

conduct that is "grossly or wantonly negligent" constitutes 

failure to "exercise a minimum degree of care" under N.J.S.A.

9:6-8.21(c)(4). L.A. v. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs., 217 

N.J. 311, 332 (2014). Thus, it is not inconsistent to find a 

child was placed at risk of harm and yet was not abused or 

neglected.

The Department oversees the Division and is charged with 

the prompt investigation of allegations of child abuse or 

neglect. N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.11.5 See also N.J.A.C. 3A:10-2.1. 

"[The Department] has broad authority to investigate allegations 

of child abuse." In re L.R., 321 N.J. Super. 444, 449 (App. 

Div. 1999). The "grant of authority to an administrative agency 

is to be liberally construed in order to enable the agency to 

accomplish its statutory responsibilities and . . . the courts 

should readily imply such incidental powers as are necessary to 

effectuate fully the legislative intent." N.J. Guild of Hearing 

Aid Dispensers v. Long, 75 N.J. 544, 562 (1978). 

After receiving a referral regarding possible child abuse 

or neglect, the Department follows the defined child protection 

investigation process, as authorized by N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.11 and 

promulgated regulations, N.J.A.C. 3A:10-7.3(b). The 

 

5 N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.11 designates the Division as the 

representative in the Department to investigate child abuse or 

neglect. 
12 A-0586-15T4

investigation is designed to assess and assure a child's health 

and safety, while the Division gathers evidence regarding the 

child's condition, obtains statements from the child, interviews 

alleged perpetrators or other witnesses, requests available 

police reports, and consults with medical and educational 

professionals. N.J.A.C. 3A:10-2.4; N.J.A.C. 3A:10-3.1 to -3.3. 

The evidence specific to each allegation must be evaluated to 

determine whether abuse or neglect has occurred, making "every 

reasonable effort to identify the perpetrator for each 

allegation of abuse or neglect." N.J.A.C. 3A:10-7.3(a). 

The investigation must be completed and a report issued 

within seventy-two hours. N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.11. Once completed, 

the Department must "notify the alleged perpetrator and others 

of the outcome of its investigation." Dep't of Children & 

Families v. D.B., 443 N.J. Super. 431, 441-42 (App. Div. 2015) 

(quoting In re Allegations of Sexual Abuse at E. Park High Sch., 

314 N.J. Super. 149, 155 (App. Div. 1998)). 

The statutory and regulatory framework also delineates the 

authorized actions with respect to any findings. The 

Department, through the Division, may take both administrative 

and judicial action. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. D.F., 377 

N.J. Super. 59, 64 (App. Div. 2005). Thus, concurrent review of 

the Division's findings of abuse or neglect may be undertaken. 
13 A-0586-15T4

When a child is removed from his or her home and when the 

Division concludes it must provide services to the abused or 

neglected child, which would also include services to aid the 

parents, its only recourse is to file a protective services 

complaint in the Family Part. N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.22. "The 

objective of such an action is 'the immediate protection of' the 

abused or neglected child." D.F., supra, 377 N.J. Super. at 67. 

In such a proceeding, the Division is obliged to prove the child 

was abused or neglected by "preponderance of the evidence, and 

only through the admission of 'competent, material and relevant 

evidence.'" P.W.R., supra, 205 N.J. at 32 (quoting N.J.S.A.

9:8.46(b)). If the Division satisfies its burden, the court may 

enter appropriate orders to protect the child. See, e.g., 

N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.31(b) (awarding temporary custody of the child to 

a "suitable person"); N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.55 (permitting court to 

enter appropriate orders of protection). When the Division opts 

to proceed in the Family Part, it often accompanies its 

complaint for custody, care and supervision of the child under 

N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21 to -8.82, with a claim the family is in need 

of services under N.J.S.A. 30:4C-12.

However, there are circumstances where the Division 

investigates an incident administratively and concludes a person 

committed child abuse or neglect, as defined by N.J.S.A. 9:6-
14 A-0586-15T4

8.21(c)(4), forwards the perpetrator's name to the child abuse 

registry, N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.11, but does not seek further relief. 

In other words, if the Division administratively concludes a 

child has been abused or neglected, it need not also file a 

complaint in the Superior Court. 

In the past, the administrative findings of child abuse or 

neglect were categorized as "substantiated," "not 

substantiated," or "unfounded." However, effective April 1, 

2013, the Department adopted a regulatory framework providing it 

could render one of four findings at the conclusion of an abuse 

or neglect investigation. N.J.A.C. 3A:10-7.3(c). Now, the 

Division may conclude an abuse or neglect allegation is: 

"substantiated," "established," "not established," or 

"unfounded." N.J.A.C. 3A:10-7.3(c). 

The regulations explain:

1. An allegation shall be "substantiated" 

if the preponderance of the evidence 

indicates that a child is an "abused or 

neglected child" as defined in N.J.S.A. 9:6-

8.21 and either the investigation indicates 

the existence of any of the circumstances in 

N.J.A.C. 3A:10-7.4 or substantiation is 

warranted based on consideration of the

aggravating and mitigating factors listed in 

N.J.A.C. 3A:10-7.5.

2. An allegation shall be "established" if 

the preponderance of the evidence indicates 

that a child is an "abused or neglected 

child" as defined in N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21, but 

the act or acts committed or omitted do not 
15 A-0586-15T4

warrant a finding of "substantiated" as 

defined in (c)1 above.

3. An allegation shall be "not 

established" if there is not a preponderance 

of the evidence that a child is an abused or 

neglected child as defined in N.J.S.A. 9:6-

8.21, but evidence indicates that the child 

was harmed or was placed at risk of harm.

4. An allegation shall be "unfounded" if 

there is not a preponderance of the evidence 

indicating that a child is an abused or 

neglected child as defined in N.J.S.A. 9:6-

8.21, and the evidence indicates that a 

child was not harmed or placed at risk of 

harm.

[N.J.A.C. 3A:10-7.3(c).]

In evaluating information gathered, the Department 

considers the following "aggravating factors" to determine 

whether abuse or neglect should be substantiated or established:

1. Institutional abuse or neglect;

2. The perpetrator's failure to comply 

with court orders or clearly established or 

agreed-upon conditions designed to ensure 

the child's safety, such as a child safety 

plan or case plan;

3. The tender age, delayed developmental 

status, or other vulnerability of the child;

4. Any significant or lasting physical, 

psychological, or emotional impact on the 

child;

5. An attempt to inflict any significant 

or lasting physical, psychological, or

emotional harm on the child;
16 A-0586-15T4

6. Evidence suggesting a repetition or 

pattern of abuse or neglect, including 

multiple instances in which abuse or neglect 

was substantiated or established; and

7. The child's safety requires separation 

of the child from the perpetrator.

[N.J.A.C. 3A:10-7.5(a).]

Additionally, the following mitigating factors are 

assessed:

1. Remedial actions taken by the alleged 

perpetrator before the investigation was 

concluded;

2. Extraordinary, situational, or 

temporary stressors that caused the parent 

or guardian to act in an uncharacteristic 

abusive or neglectful manner;

3. The isolated or aberrational nature of 

the abuse or neglect; and

4. The limited, minor, or negligible 

physical, psychological, or emotional impact 

of the abuse or neglect on the child.

[N.J.A.C. 3A:10-7.5(b).]

A "substantiated" finding applies to the most severe cases, 

and specifically results in matters involving death or near 

death, inappropriate sexual conduct, serious injuries requiring 

significant medical intervention, or repeated acts of physical 

abuse. N.J.A.C. 3A:10-7.4. Although an "established" finding 

of abuse or neglect appears to apply to less egregious conduct, 

regulations make clear "[a] finding of either established or 
17 A-0586-15T4

substantiated shall constitute a determination by the Department 

that a child is an abused or neglected child pursuant to 

N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21." N.J.A.C. 3A:10-7.3(d) (emphasis added). 

See D.B., supra, 443 N.J. Super. at 442. Conversely, "[a] 

finding of either not established or unfounded shall constitute 

a determination by the Department that a child is not an abused 

or neglected child pursuant to N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21." N.J.A.C.

3A:10-7.3(d). 

The Division asserts an established finding is used to 

denote less severe conduct, and maintains the gradation of 

findings permits the "records to better reflect the 

circumstances of an investigation" and "allow the Division to 

distinguish between incidents of abuse and neglect," identifying 

the most severe as "substantiated and subject to a Child Abuse 

Record Information (CARI) check." 44 N.J.R. 357(a) (Feb. 21, 

2012). Thus, the regulatory differentiation between the 

"substantiated" and "established" findings appears to be a 

question of the degree of harm and, possibly, the strength of 

the gathered proofs. 

III.

On appeal, raising issues of procedural due process and 

fundamental fairness, V.E. urges us to determine an established 

finding essentially places her in the same legal position as a 
18 A-0586-15T4

substantiated finding. She insists the report and record makes 

her subject to the adverse consequences of disclosure of the 

Division's abuse finding, yet she was denied the right to 

contest the determination in an adjudicatory forum. 

The Division admits defendant's name and its report of 

established child abuse are in its database, but maintains V.E. 

is not included in the "central abuse registry," which is a 

reporting the Division reserves solely for substantiated 

findings. Further, the Division admits disclosure of an 

established finding is authorized in more limited circumstances 

than a substantiated finding. Relying on that distinction, the 

Division asserts its established finding amounts to nothing more 

than an investigatory determination, for which no adjudicatory 

review is required.

The Law Guardian for R.S. asserts the child's safety and 

security were properly protected in the continued Title 30 

action. Thus, the Law Guardian supports the dismissal of the 

Title 9 action, and suggests administrative review is more 

appropriate to challenge an established finding. Alternatively, 

the Law Guardian suggests this court could order a remand to 

develop the record.
19 A-0586-15T4

A.

"An administrative agency's interpretation of statutes and 

regulations within its implementing and enforcing responsibility 

is ordinarily entitled to our deference." Wnuck v. N.J. Div. of 

Motor Vehicles, 337 N.J. Super. 52, 56 (App. Div. 2001) (quoting 

In re Appeal by Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 307 N.J. Super. 93, 

102 (App. Div. 1997)). We recognize "[a]n agency's exercise of 

its statutorily delegated responsibilities is entitled to a 

strong presumption of reasonableness and our court will 

generally defer to that agency's expertise and superior 

knowledge in the field." D.B., supra, 443 N.J. Super. at 443. 

"Although we recognize that deference is generally given to an 

administrative agency charged with interpretation of the law, we 

are not bound by the agency's legal opinions." Levine v. State, 

Dep't of Transp., 338 N.J. Super. 28, 32 (App. Div. 2001) 

(citing G.S. v. Dep't of Human Servs., 157 N.J. 161, 170 

(1999)). 

B.

We start our review by examining the relevant statutes. 

The Legislature has directed the Department maintain a child 

abuse registry, which "shall be the repository of all 

information regarding child abuse or neglect that is accessible 

to the public pursuant to State and federal law." N.J.S.A. 9:6-
20 A-0586-15T4

8.11 (emphasis added). The statute does not differentiate 

between the type of abuse or neglect findings; rather, such 

designations are regulatory. 

We understand all records for which abuse and neglect has 

been "substantiated," "established," or "not established" are 

retained by the Department. N.J.A.C. 3A:10-8.1(b). See D.B., 

supra, 443 N.J. Super. at 442. Further, the Department does not 

isolate those matters where abuse or neglect was substantiated. 

Rather, one database contains all information regarding 

investigations of child abuse or neglect. N.J.A.C. 3A:10-

7.3(d). Although a regulation limits disclosure of 

"substantiated" findings when a CARI check is required, we 

locate no specific insulation from the child abuse registry for 

individuals against whom abuse and neglect is established, other 

than the Division's assurances. N.J.A.C. 3A:10-7.7(a) ("A 

Department employee shall disclose only substantiated findings 

for a . . . (CARI) check.") But see 45 N.J.R. 738(a) (April 1, 

2013) (stating the Division will not disclose "established" 

findings). We reject the contention that the regulations' 

purported limitations can restrict the clear scope of disclosure 

authorized by N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10a(b).

The information in the child abuse registry is not public 

information, as it is considered confidential. N.J.S.A. 9:6-
21 A-0586-15T4

8.10a(a); N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.11.6 However, N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10a(b) 

expressly authorizes release of abuse or neglect records upon 

written request to designated persons and entities. A lengthy 

list of institutions, governmental entities, and persons to whom 

the Division may release information contained in the registry 

regarding any finding of abuse or neglect is set forth in 

N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10a(b)(1) to (23), -8.10a(c) to (g). Under the 

statute, disclosure is not limited solely to perpetrators of 

substantiated findings of abuse or neglect, subject to a CARI 

check. Even though N.J.A.C. 3A:10-7.7(a) restricts Department 

employees' disclosure of only substantiated findings when a CARI 

check is requested,7 that regulation does not encompass all 

authorized disclosures of abuse and neglect findings. 

In a prior matter, this court observed, subject to the 

statute's confidentiality requirements, the Division is 

empowered to disclose "all information" from its investigations 

of abuse or neglect "regardless of whether the allegations are 

substantiated and whether . . . the information has been entered 

 

6 Violation of the confidentiality restrictions as defined, 

may result in prosecution. N.J.S.A. 9:8-10b. 

7 We also note a CARI check is required in connection with

employment-related background screenings, D.B., supra, 443 N.J. 

Super. 442; N.J.A.C. 3A:10-7.7(a), and for applications seeking 

to serve as a foster or adoptive parent. N.J.A.C. 10:122C5.5(a)(1). An established finding would not be revealed for 

these purposes. 
22 A-0586-15T4

in the Central Registry." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. 

M.R., 314 N.J. Super. 390, 402 (App. Div. 1998). Cf. N.J. Div. 

of Youth & Family Servs. v. S.S., 372 N.J. Super. 13, 27 (App. 

Div. 2004) (The scope of "[p]ermissible disclosure of names 

contained in the Central Registry . . . is . . . extensive."), 

certif. denied, 182 N.J. 426 (2005).

In many instances, the authorized disclosure relates to an 

investigation of abuse or neglect conducted by police, doctors, 

hospitals, the Office of Administrative Law, grand juries, and 

the courts. N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10a(b)(2), (3), (4), (6), (7). See 

also N.J. Dep't of Children & Families, Div. of Child Prot. and

Permanency v. E.D.-O., 223 N.J. 166, 170 n.2 (2015) ("The 

records may be disclosed to physicians, courts, child welfare 

agencies, and certain employers."). 

However, disclosure as authorized by the Legislature is not 

as circumscribed as the Division suggests. Information may be 

released: to "[a] family day care sponsoring organization for 

the purpose of providing information on child abuse or neglect 

allegations involving prospective or current providers or 

household members," N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10a(b)(10), N.J.S.A. 30:5B25.2; to any person or entity which must conduct a background 

check or employment providing services to children that screens 

for child abuse or neglect, N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10a(b)(13), (14); or 
23 A-0586-15T4

regarding a person being evaluated as a possible caregiver for a 

child in the Division's care, N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10a(b)(16). The 

records may be released when a person seeks registration as a 

professional guardian, N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10e, licensure for a 

daycare facility, N.J.S.A. 30:5B-25.3; qualification to provide 

kinship care, N.J.A.C. 10:122C-2.1(e);8 and persons seeking to 

adopt, N.J.S.A. 9:3-54.2(b). 

A prior finding of abuse or neglect may be used by the 

Division to determine an individual's suitability as a 

prospective child care placement of children in other public and 

private agencies, N.J.S.A. 30:5B-25.3, and "facts of those prior 

acts of abuse apparently are considered by [Division] 

representatives when determining whether future allegations are 

'substantiated' based on a pattern of abuse," Fall & Romanowski, 

N.J. Family Law, Relationships Involving Children § 30:7-1 

(2015). "Finally, and perhaps most significantly, an abuse or 

neglect finding may provide a basis for an action to terminate a 

parent's custodial rights to a child. N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15(a) 

(allowing petition to terminate parental rights based on 

 

8 According to the January 3, 2017, Notice of Administrative 

Changes, N.J.A.C. 10:122C was recodified to N.J.A.C. 3A:51. 

However, as of the publication of this opinion, the 

recodification is not yet manifested in the Code itself. 
24 A-0586-15T4

adjudication of abuse or neglect)." N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & 

Permanency v. Y.N., 220 N.J. 165, 179 (2014). 

In D.B., this court noted the Division's stated distinction 

between substantiated and established findings, but we were not 

requested to squarely decide the impact of such an established 

finding because our examination in D.B. involved the right of 

the defendants-teachers to challenge the communication to their 

employer of the Department's findings "child abuse charges have 

not been substantiated." D.B., supra, 443 N.J. Super. at 431 

(emphasis added). The defendants argued "N.J.A.C. 10:129-8.1 

[now at N.J.A.C. 3A:10-8.1], which allows the Department to 

retain unproven accusations forever is a violation of N.J.S.A.

9:6-8.40a."9 Id. at 444. We rejected this argument and 

concluded 

the interest of retaining information about 

alleged claims of abuse, where some cause 

for concern is demonstrated, is within the

mandate given to the Department to protect 

children from abuse. The records retained 

for "substantiated" allegations are the only 

ones made public, thus [the defendants] have 

a lesser due process right in regard to 

information kept for the use of the agency 

and entities involved in the protection of 

children. 

 

9 "The Division . . . shall expunge from its records all 

information relating to a report, complaint, or allegation of an 

incident of child abuse or neglect . . . which the division 

. . . has determined . . . unfounded." N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.40a(a).
25 A-0586-15T4

[Ibid.] 

Our reasoning in D.B. was grounded on the specific 

investigatory nature of the agency's conclusion. Understanding 

the Division is granted broad authority to investigate child 

abuse allegations, we determined its release of reported 

unsubstantiated findings to the defendants' employer did not 

require the same procedural protections mandated by an 

adjudicatory proceeding. D.B., supra, 443 N.J. Super. at 446-

47. See also Dep't of Children & Families' Institutional Abuse 

Investigation Unit v. S.P., 402 N.J. Super. 255, 270 (App. Div. 

2008) ("[A] teacher is not entitled to an adjudicatory hearing 

to challenge a finding . . . child abuse allegations are not 

substantiated, even when DYFS has expressed 'concerns' about a 

teacher's conduct because such a finding is 'intrinsically less 

damaging to reputation than a finding that child abuse charges 

have been substantiated.'") (quoting In re L.R., supra, 321 N.J. 

Super. at 460; In re L.R., supra, 321 N.J. Super. at 449) ("We 

also conclude that when DYFS submits a report to a school 

district that it has found a charge of child abuse against a 

teacher to be 'not substantiated with concerns,' the teacher has 

no right to a hearing to contest DYFS' investigatory 

findings.").
26 A-0586-15T4

Here, the Division similarly suggests its established 

finding is a mere "investigatory finding made solely by the 

Division and not for disclosure to third parties." We disagree. 

Although the regulations provide some differentiation in 

the level of disclosure between individuals against whom abuse 

or neglect is "established" and those against whom abuse and 

neglect is "substantiated,"10 we conclude there is broad impact 

accompanying an established finding, which significantly affects 

an individual against whom it is issued. The effect of a 

finding that abuse and neglect is established is much closer to 

the effect of a substantiated finding than a not substantiated 

finding. 

As we have observed, despite the Division's interpretation 

of promulgated regulations, N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10a(b) and other 

statutes allowing release of records, findings, and reports of a 

person found to commit child abuse or neglect or who put a child 

at risk of serious injury or harm do not exclude from the 

disclosure the "less severe" established finding of child abuse 

 

10 We are aware N.J.A.C. 3A:10-7.6, which mandates the 

Department's obligation to issue notification of its findings of 

abuse or neglect to a perpetrator, an abused or neglected child, 

the child's parents or guardians, and others, restricts 

notification to include persons regarding substantiated abuse or 

neglect findings. The regulation, which pre-dates the 2013 

amendments, does not mention an obligation to notify those 

involved in matters resulting in established findings. 
27 A-0586-15T4

or neglect. In short, an established finding is a conclusion 

abuse or neglect occurred, as defined by N.J.S.A. 9:6-

8.21(c)(4). N.J.A.C. 3A:10-7.3(d). Disclosure of an 

established finding is authorized by N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10a(b) and 

other statutes, imposing upon the rights of a perpetrator. 

Thus, the result of an established finding is "significant" and 

is accompanied by "longstanding adverse consequences," which, in 

part, match the effects attached to a substantiated finding. 

Y.N., supra, 220 N.J. at 179. 

IV.

We turn to the heart of V.E.'s appeal, which regards the 

fact she was denied independent review of the Division's 

determination establishing R.S. was an abused or neglected child 

and that it was she who subjected the child to "substantial risk 

of injury and environmental neglect." She seeks the opportunity 

to challenge this conclusion before an independent factfinder.

A.

Administrative hearings are permitted to attack a 

substantiated finding of abuse and neglect. N.J.A.C. 3A:5-

4.3(a)(2)11 (providing that by request a person can seek 

administrative review of substantiated findings); D.F., supra, 

377 N.J. Super. at 64-66. But, "N.J.A.C. 10:120A-4.3(a)(2) [now 

 

11 Formerly N.J.A.C. 10:120A-4.3(a)(2).
28 A-0586-15T4

at N.J.A.C. 3A:5-4.3(a)(2)] does not provide a right to an 

administrative hearing to one challenging a finding that abuse 

or neglect has been 'established,' 'not established,' or 

'unfounded.'" D.B., supra, 443 N.J. Super. at 442. 

Few cases examine the nature of review of the Division's 

findings and none examine the right to challenge an established 

finding. Prior opinions have addressed possible due process 

concerns arising from the Division's findings. For example, the 

defendants in D.B. attacked the Division's disclosure of "not 

substantiated" findings because they were denied an 

administrative hearing. We concluded no hearing was required 

because the defendants were afforded due process protections 

such as, defendants retained the right to challenge the wording 

used in the notice sent to the defendants' employer, D.B., 

supra, 443 N.J. Super. at 443-44, and a hearing was required, 

prior to any action by the school district impacting the 

defendants' employment. Id. at 443.

A teacher against whom a finding has 

been made by [the Division] expressing 

concern about the teacher's conduct "has a 

due process right to challenge the wording 

of such a finding on the ground that it is 

misleading and unfairly damaging to his 

reputation." "The impact upon a teacher's 

reputation of a finding by [the Division] 

expressing concern about the teacher's 

conduct may be significant, especially if it 

is accompanied by what appears to be an 

affirmative finding by [the Division] that a 
29 A-0586-15T4

teacher has had improper physical contact 

with a student." "The investigatory findings 

and 'concerns about the teacher's conduct,' 

warrant 'some due process protection' by 

'judicial review and correction [of the 

findings] to curb administrative abuses.'"

[S.P., supra, 402 N.J. Super. at 270 

(citations omitted).]

We reject any suggestion the present matter is governed by 

our holding in D.B. First, as we have discussed, significant 

ramifications of disclosure are attached to an established 

finding. Second, no availing due process protections are 

offered to V.E. if aggrieved by the disclosure of what she 

believes is an unsupported conclusion.12 We also reject the 

notion that only the broader implications of a substantiated 

finding trigger adjudicatory review. 

Federal and state courts alike recognize due process as a 

"flexible" concept, such that the scope of its procedural 

protections depend upon the circumstances at issue. In re R.P., 

333 N.J. Super. 105, 112-13 (App. Div. 2000) (citing Doe v. 

Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 106 (1995)). When determining what process 

is due, the primary inquiry is "whether there is a protectable 

liberty interest at stake." In re E. Park High Sch., supra, 314 

N.J. Super. at 160. A liberty interest is not implicated 

 

12 The parties agree regulations limit the remedy to challenge 

an established finding to an appeal to this court.
30 A-0586-15T4

anytime a governmental agency transmits information that may 

impugn a person's reputation. L.R., supra, 321 N.J. Super. at 

460.

Whether the requirements of procedural 

due process apply to the interest asserted 

hinges upon whether it is encompassed in the 

Fourteenth Amendment's protections of life, 

liberty and property. Ingraham v. Wright, 

430 U.S. 651, 672, 97 S. Ct. 1401, 1413, 51 

L. Ed. 2d 711 (1977). If one of these 

interests is implicated, the second step of 

the analysis is to determine what procedure 

would afford the proper level of procedural 

due process to an individual being deprived 

of that right. Ibid.

The interest in reputation and the 

interest in nondisclosure have both been 

recognized as protectable liberty interests. 

Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-600, 97 S. 

Ct. 869, 876-877, 51 L. Ed. 2d 64, 73-74 

(1977); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S.

433, 437, 91 S. Ct. 507, 510, 27 L. Ed. 2d 

515, 517 (1971); Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 

100 (1995). However, reputation "apart from 

some more tangible interests such as 

employment, is not either 'liberty' or 

'property' by itself sufficient to invoke 

the procedural protection of the Due Process 

Clause." Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701-

702, 96 S. Ct. 1155, 1160-1161, 47 L. Ed. 2d 

405, 413-414 (1976). Thus, it has been said 

there must be "stigma plus" some other 

tangible element in order to be considered a 

"protectable liberty interest." Valmonte v. 

Bane, 18 F.3d at 992, 999 (2d Cir.1994).

[M.R., supra, 314 N.J. Super. at 402-03.]

In the context of due process claims concerning privacy and 

reputational interests, the New Jersey Constitution extends due 
31 A-0586-15T4

process protection to personal reputation, "without requiring 

any other tangible loss." Doe, supra, 142 N.J. at 104. But 

"even if a person has a constitutionally protected interest, it 

does not automatically follow that the person must be afforded 

an opportunity for an adjudicatory hearing." R.P., supra, 333 

N.J. Super. at 113.13 Therefore, "if a government agency 

publicly disseminates findings which adversely affect the 

subject of an investigation, the agency may be required as a 

matter of due process to establish procedures by which the 

investigatory findings may be challenged." In re Allegations of 

Physical Abuse at Blackacre Academy on 2/10/93, 304 N.J. Super.

168, 182 (App. Div. 1997). See also Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S.

420, 442, 80 S. Ct. 1502, 1514-15, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1307, 1321 (1960) 

("[W]hen governmental agencies adjudicate or make binding 

determinations which directly affect the legal rights of 

individuals, it is imperative that those agencies use the 

procedures which have traditionally been associated with the 

judicial process."). 

 

13 Federal law differs as a party must demonstrate "damage to 

his or her reputation and impairment of some other interest" to 

establish a protectable liberty interest under federal law. In 

re E. Park High Sch., supra, 314 N.J. Super. at 160. State law 

"gives a plaintiff a protectable interest in reputation 

warranting due process protections 'without requiring any other 

tangible loss.'" Id. at 161. 
32 A-0586-15T4

In M.R., we concluded disclosure of a substantiated finding 

of abuse or neglect standing alone "would not rise to the level 

of deprivation of [a defendant's] liberty interest." M.R., 

supra, 314 N.J. Super. at 403-04. Nevertheless, the court 

determined the procedure employed violated "administrative due 

process requirements," id. at 409, and concluded the defendant 

was entitled to "an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing" to 

challenge a substantiated finding.14 Ibid.

 

14 The opinion of the court relied on a violation of 

fundamental fairness: 

[T]he doctrine of fundamental fairness 

is an integral part of due process, and is 

often extrapolated from or implied in other 

constitutional guarantees. The doctrine 

effectuates imperatives that government 

minimize arbitrary action, and is often 

employed when narrowed constitutional 

standards fall short of protecting 

individual[s] against unjustified 

harassment, anxiety, or expense.

[State v. Miller, 216 N.J. 40, 71-72 (2013), 

cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 1329, 

188 L. Ed. 2d 339 (2014) (citations 

omitted).]

Courts have applied the fundamental fairness doctrine when 

"someone was being subjected to potentially unfair treatment and 

there was no explicit statutory or constitutional protection to 

be invoked." Doe, supra, 142 N.J. at 109. However, two 

concurring judges, Judge Skillman, see M.R., supra, 314 N.J. 

Super. at 417-25, and Judge Eichen, id. at 426, rejected 

application of the use of fundamental fairness doctrine, and 

separately concluded the defendant was entitled to a trial type 

administrative hearing. 
33 A-0586-15T4

The Division refutes V.E.'s assertions maintaining an 

established finding has no direct or indirect impact on a 

perpetrator's "employment or liberty interests" because the 

Division does not consider the perpetrator as someone included 

in the child abuse registry. It reasons no adjudicatory hearing 

rights arise because the information is generally kept for 

agency use. See D.B., supra, 443 N.J. Super. at 444 (stating 

individuals "have a lesser due process right in regard to 

information kept for the use of the agency and entities involved 

in the protection of children"). 

For the reasons outlined in our opinion, we reject as 

unsupported the premise of the Division's position. What due 

process requires depends in part on "the private interest at 

stake" and on "the fiscal and administrative burdens . . . 

additional procedural safeguards would entail." J.E. on behalf 

of G.E. v. State, 131 N.J. 552, 566-67 (1993). Applying this 

test, we conclude an administrative hearing is required to 

contest the Division's conclusion abuse or neglect is 

established.

As we have detailed, an established finding is a conclusion 

of child abuse or neglect, which is subject to the concomitant 

disclosure to persons, agencies, and entities we have 

identified. Although disclosure is not as extensive as a 
34 A-0586-15T4

substantiated finding, it nonetheless may affect certain 

employment opportunities related to children, the right to adopt 

or serve as a resource parent, and impact possible future 

Division proceedings. Certainly V.E.'s private interests are at 

stake.

It is also undisputed defendant was denied an opportunity 

to challenge the Division's findings. The Division's conclusion 

was reflected only in the Department's "Investigative Summary," 

finalized on February 12, 2015, and disseminated to defendant's 

counsel during the February 19, 2015 case management conference. 

Importantly, V.E. was not informed this report represented a 

final agency decision. 

Examining the content of the report, we note it includes 

circumstantial evidence supporting V.E.'s possible knowledge of 

the cannabis growing operation, such as the pervasive odor of 

marijuana and V.E.'s initial evasiveness when asked about her 

relationship with A.S. Yet, V.E. and others offered evidence 

disputing V.E.'s knowledge of drugs in her home, the marijuana 

growing in the basement, or the illegal electrical overload 

caused by the illicit operation. Also, the growing operation 

occurred behind locked doors to which V.E. was not shown to have 

keys; V.E. entered the basement only to wash laundry and never 

viewed the space she asserted was rented by A.S. to third-
35 A-0586-15T4

parties; R.S.'s statements to the Division confirmed these 

assertions; the child's Godparents maintained neither A.S. nor 

V.E. used or sold drugs, which was borne out by their respective 

substance abuse evaluations; R.S. regularly attended and 

performed well in school; and defendant was an involved parent 

who provided for the health and physical well-being of R.S., as 

well as her older college-age child. 

On this record, necessary procedural safeguards must be 

employed to allow V.E. the right to challenge disputed 

adjudicative facts. This point is highlighted further when the 

credibility of witnesses impacts the factual foundation 

underpinning the agency's conclusion. Under such circumstances, 

procedural fairness entitles V.E. to an opportunity to be heard. 

The administrative action must be accompanied by the ability to 

seek an administrative remedy. See M.R., supra, 314 N.J. Super.

at 411 ("The right to a hearing before a government agency, 

whose proposed action will affect the rights, duties, powers or 

privileges of, and is directed at, a specific person, has long 

been embedded in our jurisprudence." (quoting Cunningham v. N.J. 

Dep't of Civil Serv., 69 N.J. 13, 19 (1975))). See also N.J. 

Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. T.B., 207 N.J. 294, 298-99 

(2011); D.F., supra, 377 N.J. Super. at 64.
36 A-0586-15T4

We recognize a party against whom abuse or neglect is 

established may seek recourse through a direct appeal from what 

amounts to the agency's final decision.15 N.J.A.C. 3A:5-2.8. 

See Fall & Romanowski, supra, § 30:6-2(b) (2015) ("To the extent 

that administrative review is precluded, such findings are a 

final decision appealable as of right to the Appellate Division 

pursuant to R. 2:2-3(a)(2)."). However, as we recognized in 

M.R., the determination of disputed facts, including credibility 

determinations, is not the function of this court. M.R., supra, 

314 N.J. Super. at 411-12. Accordingly, we reject the 

suggestion appellate review should be undertaken, and, as 

necessary, a remand ordered. The inherent delay of such a 

process is untenable, particularly in light of the fact the 

administrative review process is well-established and easily 

engaged.

Finally, we do not view the additional need for an 

administrative hearing as a burden, which significantly 

outweighs the need to adjudicate the disputed facts impacting 

the private interest of the party affected by the agency's 

finding. During argument it was estimated by the Deputy 

 

15 The Division admits no document informed defendant the 

report served as the final agency determination, subject to 

appeal as of right. At oral argument the Division agreed the 

issue is raised in this appeal. 
37 A-0586-15T4

Attorney General that approximately five percent of the 

approximately 2000 abuse and neglect determinations issued 

annually were "established" findings. Not all of these 

approximately 100 matters will be challenged, suggesting the 

burden is manageable. Overall, "we cannot ignore the overriding 

concern for the appearance of procedural fairness in agency 

adjudications." Id. at 412 (quoting J.E. on behalf of G.E., 

supra, 131 N.J. at 568). 

We hold when the Division finds parental conduct 

establishes abuse or neglect of a child, subjecting the 

individual to the ramifications of disclosure set forth in 

various identified statutes, a party who seeks to challenge that 

finding shall be entitled to an administrative hearing. 

B.

V.E. alternatively sought to challenge the Division's 

finding before the Family Part.16 She argues the dismissal over 

 

16 Regulations recognize the potential for concurrent 

investigations and review by the Division and the Family Part, 

resulting in both administrative and judicial findings regarding 

any abuse or neglect allegations. See e.g., N.J.A.C. 3A:10-

7.3(h)(1) (providing the Division to retain administrative 

authority to decide "whether an allegation of conduct determined 

to be abuse or neglect by the . . . Chancery Division, is 

established or substantiated"); N.J.A.C. 3A:10-7.3(h)(3) 

(authorizing the Division the administrative authority to 

"[d]etermine the finding for each allegation of abuse or 

neglect" even if the court declines to adjudicate the issue). 
38 A-0586-15T4

her objection violated Rule 4:37-1(b). We are not persuaded. 

We briefly address this challenge. 

When a judge has given the Division 

authority and responsibility for the care 

and supervision of a child removed from his 

home pursuant to Title 9 and Title 30, 

N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.30 and N.J.S.A. 30:4C-12, the 

Division may proceed under Title 30, 

irrespective of a finding of abuse or 

neglect. M.M., supra, 189 N.J. at 292-93 

(2007). However, when the abuse or neglect 

proceeding is terminated without a finding 

that the allegations in the complaint are 

substantiated, the Title 9 action should be 

dismissed after exercise of jurisdiction 

under Title 30 and orders should be entered 

in accordance with the standards and 

procedures pertaining to Title 30 

litigation. 

[Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. N.D., 417 

N.J. Super. 96, 109 (App. Div. 2010).]

Rule 4:37-1(b) governs the voluntary dismissal of actions

by order of the court. In relevant part, Rule 4:37-1(b) 

provides that "an action shall be dismissed at the plaintiff's 

instance only by leave of court and upon such terms and 

conditions as the court deems appropriate" and, unless otherwise 

stated, such dismissals are made without prejudice. Our courts 

have consistently held that Rule 4:37-1(b) is intended to 

protect litigants from having to defend a subsequent action 

premised upon similar charges in the future. Burns v. Hoboken 

Rent Leveling & Stabilization Bd., 429 N.J. Super. 435, 445 

(App. Div. 2013). This decision lies within the judge's 
39 A-0586-15T4

reasoned discretion. A.T. v. Cohen, 445 N.J. Super. 300, 307 

(App. Div. 2016). 

The Division's request resulted from its conclusion abuse 

or neglect was not substantiated and, with limited services, the 

child could safely be returned home. Although we disagree with 

the suggestion V.E. was not subject to significant adverse 

ramifications of disclosure, (a determination noted by the 

reviewing judge), we recognized the Division's objective to 

effectuate reunification was achieved. The "primary concern" 

under Title 9 "is the protection of children, not the 

culpability of parental conduct." G.S. v. Dep't of Human 

Servs., 157 N.J. 161, 177 (1999). See also N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.50(c) 

("[I]f the court concludes that its assistance is not required 

on the record before it, the court shall dismiss the [Title 9] 

complaint and shall state the grounds for the dismissal."). 

The ordered administrative hearing on the issues 

surrounding the Division's findings satisfies adequate review. 

Under these facts, we cannot agree the Title 9 litigation should 

have remained open to provide such an adjudication, when the 

child's safety was no longer in dispute. We conclude the judge 

did not abuse her discretion in granting the Division's motion 

to dismiss.
40 A-0586-15T4

V.

In summary, we affirm the order dismissing the Title 9 

litigation. We reverse the agency's denial of an adjudication 

hearing and remand the matter to the Office of Administrative 

Law for proceedings consistent with our opinion.

Affirmed in part. Reversed and remanded in part.