### IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE February 3, 1 999 Session KAREN ELAINE (BROCK) ROTH v. R ICHARD DANIEL ROTH
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Sumner County No. 16684-C Thomas Goodall, Judge

No. M1998-00911-COA-R3-CV - Filed March 20, 2001

This appeal involves the dissolution of a sixteen-year marriage. The wife f i led suit in the Circu

it Courtfor Sumner County seeking a divorce and custody of the parties’ three children. The husband didnot contest the divo

rce but requeste

d custody of

the parties’ two o

lder chil dren. Fo llowing a benchtrial, the trial court awarded t he wife a divorce on the ground of adultery and g ranted her custody of the children. On this appeal, the husband takes issue with the trial court’s valuation of marital pro pert y, the allocation of marital debt, and the award of long-term spousal support. We have concluded that the trial court’s decisions regarding the valuation of the marital property should be modified but that the remainder of the judgment should be affirmed.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court

Modified and Affirmed

W ILLI AM C. K OCH , J R ., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which B EN H. C ANTRELL , P.J., M.S., and W ILLI

AM B. C AIN , J., joined. F. Dulin Kelly, Hendersonville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Richard Da niel Roth. Michael W. Edwards, Hendersonville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Karen Elaine (Br ock) Roth.
OPINION

RichardDaniel Roth and Karen Elaine Roth met in 1980 when they were both stationed at Fort Jackson, South Carolina. Dr. Roth is a dentist, and

Ms. Roth a nurse. Dr. Roth did not inform Ms. Roth that he was married when the y first beg an dating. Sometim

e later, Dr. Roth

told Ms. Roth that he an d his wife were estranged. Dr. Roth and his then-wife were later divorced, a nd i n Jun e 1981, the parties married in Rome, Georgia.-2-

The parties moved to En

terprise, Alaba

ma where Dr. Roth co

mpleted his

service obligation. Whileliving there, Ms. Roth obtained a masters degree in nursing from the University of Alabama. The parties’ first child was born there in November 1982. Following the completion of Dr. Roth’s military service, the parties moved to Tulsa, Oklahoma where Dr. Roth bought an existing dental practicewith the assistance of a $30,000, no-interest loan from his father. Ms. Roth was employed full-time, except for a brief period in July 1985 when the parties’ second child was born.

In December 1985, Dr. Roth sold his dental practic

e, and the partie

s moved to Tennesse

e in 1986 where Dr. Roth took a job at the Veterans Administration Hospital in Na shville . Ms. Roth obtainedemployment teaching nursing at Volunteer State Community College. Dr. Roth’s father continuedto assist the parties financially by extending the term of his loan to Dr. Roth and by giving them$40,000 which the parties used, at least in part, to pay

down the mortgag

e on their home. Ms. Roth gave birth to

the parties’ thir

d child in April 1988 butcontinued to teach nursing full-time at Volunteer State Community College.

Ms. Roth was injured in

1989 when a dump

truck collided with her automobile. Her injuries required surgery and

have cause

d her to continue to experience pain in her leg and back. She eventually

settled her p ersona l injury claim for $123,000 and deposited the proceeds of the settlement

into the parties’ joint account at First American National Bank. Ms. Roth has notworked f ull-t ime since the accide

nt. While her phy

sician has not plac

ed any res

trictions on her a

ctivities, she wo rks only two d

ays per we

ek at Cumberland U

niversity. Sh

e continues to take

antiinflammatory

drugs and anti-

depressants to co

ntrol her pain. She

has not sought f

ul l-time employment

as a nurse because she believes that practicing or t

eaching nursin

g would require her to lift patients or sta

nd for extended pe

riods of time and tha

t both of these activitie

s would be painful to her.

The parties’ relationship began to deteriorate in 1996. They began to have heated a

rguments that sometimes esc al ated into violent outbursts by Dr. Roth. Ms. Roth eventually discovered that Dr. Roth had been having an extramarital affair sin ce 1993 with a co- worker named He

nrietta Johnson and that

he had also been

involved in a sexual relationship with their next-door neighbor for approximately

eight yea rs. The parties se

parated in Marc

h 1997, and Dr. Roth

mo ved i n with Ms. Johnson three months later.

On April 1, 1997, Ms. Roth f iled s uit in the Circuit C ourt for Su mner Count y seeking a divorce on the grounds of adultery and inappropriate marital conduct. She also sought custody of the parties’ childre

n. Two weeks late

r, she obtained a

n order restrai

ning Dr. Roth

from having any contact with her. Following a violent confrontation in the parties’ home, Ms. Roth sought to have Dr. Roth held in criminal contempt for violating the restraining order. When Dr. Roth filed hi s answer, he concede d that he h ad committed adulte ry, reque sted custody

of the parties’ tw

o oldest children, and de nied t hat he had vi olate d the r estra inin g order . In May 1997, the trial court determinedthat Dr. Roth had violated the restraining order and gave Ms. Roth temporary custody of the children and exclusive possession of the marital home.1 Following the argument of this case, Dr. Roth withdrew the portion of his appeal regarding the custody of the

parties’ c

hildren based upon t

he parties’ resolution of this di spute.

-3- Following a trial in September 1997, the trial court filed a final divorce decree on October 30, 1997, awarding Ms. Roth a divorce on the ground of adultery and granting Ms. Roth custody of the parties’ three c

hildren. The tria

l court divided the

parties’ marita

l estate, set D

r. Roth’s child support obligation, and directed Dr. Roth to pay Ms. Roth $5,000 in alimony in solido and $1,000 per month in long-term spousal support. The trial court also directed Dr. Roth to pay for Ms. Roth’s health insurance

for thirty- six months and to pay her attorney ’s fees.

On November 26, 1997, Dr. Roth filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 59.04 motion, requesting the trial court to allocate several mari tal debt s that it had overlooked and to correct the amounts of the balances in various bank ac counts. Two months later, Ms. Roth requested the trial court to amend the final decree to award her the marital home instead of having it sold and dividing the proceeds. The trial court entered an or der on February 18, 1998, deny ing the parties’ motions, except for allocating several marital debts not mentioned in the original decree. Dr. Roth perfected this appeal in which he takes issue with the decision rega rdi ng cu sto dy, 1 the allocation of the parties’ debts, the valuation and distribution of the parties’ maritalproperty, and the decision t o award Ms. R oth longterm spousal suppor

t.
I. T HE D IVISION OF THE M ARITAL E STATE
Dr. Roth asserts

that the trial court

erred in its valuation of the parties’ marital property and its division of the martial debts and that these errors resulted i n an inequitable net division of the parties’ marital estate. We concur that the trial court erred by failing to value certain bank ac

counts basedon their balances at the time of the divorce hearing. However, afte r correcting t

hese errors,
we have de te rmined that the net effect of the trial court’s division of the marital estate was not inequitable.

A.

Trial courts should divide the parties’ property and debts after they have determined how the parties will be divorced and, if required, the custody and visitation arrangements for the minor children. Anderton v. Anderton , 988 S.W.2d 675, 679 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). Dividing a marital estate necessarily begins

with the classification of the property as either sep arat e or m ari tal pro pert y. Herrera v. Herrera , 944 S.W.2d 379, 389 (Tenn. Ct. App. 19 96); McClella n v. McClellan, 873 S.W.2d 350, 351 (Tenn. Ct. A pp. 1993). The definitions of “separate property” and “mar ital pro pert y” in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b) (Sup

p. 2000) provide th

e ground rules for the task. O nce the property

has been classif

ied, the trial cou

rt’s goal is to divi

de the marital p

roperty in a

n essentially

equitabl e manner. Kinard v. Kinard , 986 S.W.2d 220, 230 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). A division is not rendered inequitable simply because it is not precisely equal, Cohen v. Cohen , 937 S.W.2d 823, 832 (Tenn. 1996); Bookout v. Bookout , 954 S.W.2d 730, 732 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997),-4-

or because each

party did not receive a share of every piece of marital property

. King v. King , 986 S.W.2d 216, 219 (Tenn. Ct. A pp. 1998); Brown v. Brown, 913 S.W

. 2d 163, 168 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994). Dividing a marital estate is not a mechanical process but rather is guided by considering the factors in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c). Kinard v. Kinard , 986 S.W.2d at 230. Trial courts have wide latitude in fashion

ing an equitable

division of marital property, Fisher v. Fisher, 648 S.W.2d 244, 246 (Tenn. 1983); Brow n v. Brown, 913 S.W.2d at 168, and appellate courts accord great weight to a trial court’s division of marital property. Wilson v. Moore, 929 S.W.2d 367, 372 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996); Edwards v. Edwards, 501 S.W.2d 283, 288 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1973). Thus, we will ordinarily defer to the trial court’s decision unless it is inconsistent with the factors in Tenn. Code Ann . § 3 6-4 -12 1(c) or i s no t su ppo rte d by a preponderance of the evidence. Brown v. Brown, 913 S.W.2d at 168; Mahaffey v. Mahaffey, 775 S.W.2d 618, 622 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989); Hardin v. Hardin, 689 S.W.2d 152, 154 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983).

B. T HE V ALUATION E RRORS
Dr. Roth asserts that th

e trial court err

ed with regard

to its valuation of th

ree marital asse

ts. He insis ts that the tr

ial court should have valued two bank accounts based on their balance at the time of the divorce he

aring rather t

han when Ms. Roth fi

led her divorce c

omplaint and that the valuation of the 1997 Dodge Caravan award

ed to Ms. Roth is

not supported by the evidence. We agree.
The parties’ marital estate included the joint account at First American Nat ional B ank, in which Ms. Rothdeposited the proceeds from her personal injury settlement, and Dr. Roth’s persona l account. The trial court valued the joint account at $14,993.20, its balance when Ms. Roth filed her divorce complaint, even though the entire balance of the account had been depleted by the time of the divorce trial in September 1997. Similarly, the trial court valued Dr. Roth’s account at $7,635.54, even th

ough there was

only $2,000 in

the account at the

time of the divorce

trial.

The valuation of

a marital asset is a question of fact. Kinard v. Kinard , 986 S.W.2d at 231. Valuation decisions should be made by considering all relevant evidence, and e ach party bears the burden of bringing forth competent evidence. Koch v. Koch , 874 S.W.2d 571, 577 (Tenn. Ct. App. 19 93). If the evidence of value is conflicting, the trial court may assign a value that is within the range of values supported by the evidence. Ray v. Ray , 916 S.W.2d 469, 470 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995); Wallacev. Wallace , 733 S.W.2d 102, 107 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987). On appeal, we presume the trial court’s factual determinations are correct unless the evidence preponderates against them. Watters
v. Watters , 959 S.W.2d 585, 589 (T enn. Ct. App. 1997) ; Jahn v. Jahn , 932 S.W.2d 939, 941 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996).2 Because of its errors with regard to the valuati on of the two bank accounts, the trial court overvalued the marital property by $20,628.74. It undervalued the 1997 Dodge Caravan by $4,425. Accordingly, the net overvaluati on of the marital p roperty is $2 0,628.7 4 - $4,42 5.00 = $ 16,203 .74.
-5- We agree with Dr.

Roththat the trial court erroneously valued the parties’ joint account and Dr. Roth’s checking account. When trial courts value marital property, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4

- 121(b)(1)(A) requires them to v alue the propert

y “as of a d

ate as near as r

easonably possible to the final divorce hearing date.” Brock v. Brock , 941 S.W.2d 896, 902 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996). When the trial court heard the evidence in September 1997, there was a zero balance in the joint

account and $2,0 00 in Dr. Roth’s checking account. Accor

dingly, the

trial court should h

ave adopted thes

e values, rather t

han the balance

s in the accounts w

hen Ms. Roth filed he

r divorce compla

int.

The trial cou rt, a pparently adopting Ms. Roth’s valuation estimate, placed a value on the 1997 Dodge Caravan of $400. However, the evidence shows that

the retail value of this vehicle had been$24,425 and that the outstanding car loan was $19,600. Accor dingly, t he evidence preponderates against

the trial court’s finding that the value of the vehicle was only $400. For the purposes of dividing the marital estate, the value of the Dodge Caravan should have been $4,825.

The effect of these

three valuation e

rrors was to infla

te the value of the

parties’ marita

l estate at the time of the divorcehearing. In order to correct these errors, the value of the parties’ marital property must be reduced by $16,203.74.2

C. T HE A LLOCATION OF M ARITAL D EBT
With the exception of the automobile loan for the 1997 Dodge Ca

ravan that was a

warded to Ms. Roth, the trial court overlooked three marital debts in its O

ctober 30, 1997 de

cree. As a resu

lt, Dr. Ro th filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 59.04 motion bringing to the trial court’s attention t hat it ha d overlookedthe $36,500 in loans from Dr. Roth’s father, a $2,600 debt to Otolary ncology A

ssociates, and a $800 debt to V

anderbilt Univer

sity Medica

l Center. In its

February 18,1998 order, the trial court allocated these debts to Dr. Roth.

Trial courts should alloc

ate the parties’ mari tal debt as part of the division of the marital estate. Anderton v. Anderton , 98 8 S. W.2 d at 679 . Th e par tie s’ d ebt , li ke t hei r ma rit al p rop ert y, should be divided equitably

in accordance with the factors in Tenn. Code. Ann. § 36-4-121(c) and in light of (1) which party

incurred the deb

t, (2) the purpose of the debt, (3) which party benefitted from incurring the debt, and (4) which party is better able to re pay the debt. Goodman v. Goodman , 8 S.W.3d 289, 298 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999); Cutsinger v. Cutsinger , 917 S.W.2d 238, 243 (T enn. Ct. App. 1995). Marital debts need not be divide

d in precisely

the same manner a

s the marital asse

ts, although, where possible, t hey frequ ently follow their

related assets. Kinard v. Kinard , 986 S.W.2d at 233; King v. King , 986 S.W.2d at 219; Mondelli v. Howard , 780 S.W.2d 769, 773 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989).3 $317,482 [the trial court’ s valuation] - $16,203.74 [net valuation errors] + $19,600 [adjustment for retail value of the 1997 Dodge Ca

ravan] = $320, 878.26.

4 These debts included: $36,500 to Dr. Roth’s father, $3,400 in medical bills, and $19,600 for the car loan.
-6- Dr. Roth obtained th

e $ 36,500 in loans from his father to help finance his dental practice. Ms. Roth played no r

ole in obtaining these loans. When Dr. Roth sold his private dental practice, he used the proceeds for marital purposes rather than for repay ing his father. Thus, these loans can properly be considered ma

rital because bo

th parties eventu

ally benef itted from them. However, Dr. Rothclearly is

in a better position to be able to earn income to repay these loans, at least to the extent that his father required repayment. Accordingly , the trial court did not err in allocating the

se debts to Dr. Roth.

We reach the same conclusi on with regard t

o the debts to the two

healthcare pro

viders. Whilethese debts were

incurred in orde

r to provide medical s

ervices to Ms. Roth,

Dr. Roth isin a better financial position to repay them. In addition, these debts could h a ve been paid fro

m Ms. Roth’s $123,000 settlement of her personal injury action. However, these funds ran short when Dr. Roth used part of them to pay his car loan and to purchase an a

utomobile for his son

from his first marriage. In light of this evidence, we have no basis for second-guessing the trial court’s decision to allocate these debts to Dr. Roth.

D. T HE N ET D IVISION OF THE M ARITAL E STATE
After co rrecting the trial court’s valuation errors and taking into consideration the retail value of the 1997 Dodge Caravan, we have determined that the aggre gate value of the part

ies’ marita

l property is $320,878.26. 3 Dr. Roth received $134,573.26 (or 42%) of this pr operty; whil

e Ms. Roth received $ 186,305 ( or 58%) of this pro perty. The

parties also had $

59,500 in marital de

bts. 4 Of these debts, the trial court allocated $39,900 (or 67%) to Dr. Roth and $19,600 (or 33%) to Ms. Roth. Taking both the marital property and marital debts into consideration, the parties’ net estate is valued at $261,378.26 . Dr. Rot h’s share is $94,673.26 (or 36%), and Ms. Roth’s share is $166,705 (or 64%).

The parties were married for almost sixteen years. During the marriage, Ms. Roth contributedto the marriage, not only as a wife and mother, but also as a full-time wage earner. Her current financial circu

mstances are le

ss favorable than t

hey were b

efore her injur

y in the autom

obile accident. The effects of her injuries have made it difficult to work full-time, and her inability to work has impaired her abi

lity to acquire capital assets and to earn income. While the $123,000 from the settlement

of her personal injury claim could have been a capital asset on which she could have relied in the future, those proceeds were deposited into a joint bank account and were spent by the timeof the divorce tr

ial. In fact,

Dr. Roth used part o

f these funds to pay off his car lo an and to purcha se a car for his son f rom his first marri

age. Considerin

g these facts in

light of Tenn. Co

d e Ann. § 36-4-121(c)(1), (2), (4), (5), (8), we have determined that it is equitable to award Dr. Roth5 Dr. Roth has not qu estioned the trial court’s decision to award M s. Roth $5,000 in alimony in soli do and to require him to pay $5,000 of her legal expenses. Therefore, we express no opini

on regarding the se awards or thei r effect on Dr. Roth’s overall spousal support obligation.
-7- 42% of t he m ari tal pro pert y and requ ire him to p ay 67 % ofthe mar ita l de bt. Acco rdi ngly, we affirm the trial court’s division of the parties’ marital estate as corrected herein.

II. T HE A WARD FOR L ONG -T ERM S POUSAL S UPPORT
Dr. Roth also

takes issue with the trial court’s decision to award Ms. Roth $1,000 per mo

nth in long-term spousal support. He asserts that Ms. Roth did not prove that she was incapable of rehabilitation and that the proof indicates that the

physical imp

airment caused b

y the automob

ile accident is not as serious as

Ms. Roth makes it out to be. We have determined that the evidence supportsthe trial court’s

decision to requir

e Dr. Roth to

pay Ms. Roth $1,000 per month in long-term spousal support. 5

A.

There are no hard and

fast rules for spousal support decisions. Anderton v. Anderton , 988 S.W.2d at 682; Crain v. Crain , 925 S.W.2d 232, 233 (T enn. Ct. App. 1996) ; Stone v. Stone , 56 Tenn. App. 607, 615-16, 409 S.W.2d 388, 392-93 (1966). Trial courts have broad discretion to determine whether sp ousal support is needed and, if so, its nature, amount, and duration. Goodman v
. Goodman , 8 S.W.3d at 293; Garfinkel v. G a rfinkel , 945 S.W.2d 744, 748 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996). Appellate courts are generally disinclined to second-gue ss a trial court’s spousal support deci sion unles s it is not supported by the evidence or

is contrary

to the public policie

s refle cted in th e applicable

statutes. Brown v. Brown , 913 S.W.2d at169; Ingram v. Ingram , 721 S.W.2d 262, 264 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986).

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d)(1) (S upp .20 00) refl ect s a p refe renc e for tem por ary, rehabilitative sp

ousal support, as o

pposed to long-te

rm support. Crabtree v. Crabtree , 16 S.W.3d 356, 358 (Tenn. 2000); Goodman v. Goodman , 8 S.W.3d at 293; Herrera v. Herre ra , 944 S.W.2d at 387. The purpose of rehabilitative suppor t is to enable the disadvantaged spouse to acquire additional job skills, education, or training that will enable him or her to be more self-suf ficient. Smithv. Smith , 912 S.W.2d 155, 160 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995); Cranford v. Cranford , 772 S.W.2d 48, 51 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989). On the other hand, the purpose of long-term spousal support is to provide support to a disadvantag

ed spouse who is unable to achieve some degree of self-sufficiency

. Loria
v. Loria , 952 S.W.2d 836, 838 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997). The statutory preference for rehabilitative support does not entirely displace other forms of spousal support when the facts warrant long term
or more open-ended support. Aaron v. Aaron , 909 S.W.2d 408, 410 (Tenn. 1995); Isbell v. Isbell , 816 S.W.2d 735, 739 (Tenn. 1991).-8-

Even tho ugh Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d)(1)(K) provides that fault is a releva n t considerationwhen setting spou sal support,decisions regarding spousal support are not intended t

o be punitive. Anderton v. Anderton , 988 S.W.2d at 682; Kinard v. Kinard , 986 S.W.2d at234. The purpose of spousal support, whether it is called “rehabilitative ” or “long- t erm,” is to enable the disadvantaged

spouse to become and rema

in self-sufficie

nt and, when possib

le, mitigate

the harsh
econ omi c realities of divorce. In most circumstances, the courts cannot fashion a remedy that enables both spouses to maintain their pre-divorce standard of living because the parties do not have sufficient resources to ac

complish this. Thus, the courts wi

ll decline to impove

rish an obligor sp

ouse in order to enable the disadvantaged spouse to continue to enjoy his or her pr e-divorce standard of living. Goodman v. Goodman , 8 S.W.3d at 295-96; Brown v. Brown , 913 S.W.2d at 169-70.

Decisions regarding the entitlement to spousal support, as well as the amount and duration of spousal support,

hinge on the uniqu

e factsof each case and require a careful balancing of many factors, including the factors identified in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d)(1). Watters v. W atters , 22 S.W.3d 817, 821 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999); Hawkins v. Hawkins , 883 S.W.2d 622, 625 (T enn. Ct. App. 1994). Among these f actors, the two considered most important are the disadvantaged spouse’s needand the obligor

spouse’s ability to pay. Anderton v. Anderton , 988 S.W.2d at 683; Lindsey v. Lindsey , 97 6 S.W.2d 175, 179 (Ten n. Ct. App. 1997); Umstot v. Umstot , 968 S.W.2d 819, 823 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997). Of these two factors, the disadvantaged spouse’ s n eed is the thresho ld consideration. Aaron v. Aaron , 909 S.W.2d at 410; Watters v. W atters , 22 S.W.3d at 821.

B.

Ms. Roth is currently forty-seve n years old. She

holds a masters degree in nursing, and she workedfull-time throughout most of the marriage pri o r to the auto accident. Were it not for her injuries, she would be able to earn $30,000 per year. However , she asserts that the injuries sustained in the 1989 collision have rendered he r una ble to work full-time because working in a clinical environment

or teaching nursing would require her to be able to lift and transfer patients and to be
on her feet all day. Thus, in 1996, she was able to earn only $13,259 working two days a we ek at Cum berl and Uni vers ity.

Dr. Roth asserts that Ms . Roth is overstating th

e effect of her

injuries on her ab

ility to work full-time because she has been

able to snow ski and

play tennis f

ollowing the colli

sion. While

Ms. Roth concedes that she has attempted to engage in the

se activities, she

states that her pa

in inhibits her ability to ski and has forced her to quit playing tennis. She also stated that her condition is not expected to improve. The trial court observed Ms. Roth’s testimony regarding the eff ect of her injuries on her ability to work full-time. Even in the absence of corroborating medical evidence, the trial court chose to accredit Ms. Roth’s testimony, and we have no basis to seco nd-gu ess this decision. Accordingly, for the purpose of this appeal, we accredit the trial court’s determination that Ms. Roth’s physical condition impairs her from working full-time.6 Aaron v. Aaron , 909 S.W.2d at 411.
-9- In her current circumstances, Ms. Roth is clearly economically disadvantaged when compared to Dr. Roth. Her

part-time income cannot match Dr. Roth’s income, and thus sh e will consistently lag behind his ability

to support himself

and accumulate capital assets for the future. In addition, her ability to work outside the home is somewhat circu mscr ibed because she received custody of the parties’ children. Thus, it is eviden t th at Ms. Roth will be unable to approach her pre-divorce standard of living i f she is forced to rely upon he

r part-time sala

ry as her so

le means of suppor

t. Based on the length of the marriage, the manner in which the trial court divided the marital estate, Ms. Roth’s physical condition, the fact that she received custody of the parties’ children, he r monetary and non-monetary contributions to the marriag e, the standard of living the parties establ ished durin g the marriage, Dr. Roth’s responsibility for precipitating the demise of the marriage, and Dr. Roth’s ability to pay spousal support, we haveconcluded that the trialcourt did not err b y deci din g to a ward Ms. Rot h “cl osi ng in mon ey” 6 in the amount of $1,000 per month.

III.

We affirm the final

divorce decre

e as modif

ied by this opinion and remand the case to the trial court for whate

ver further pro

ceedings may

be required. We ta

x the cost s of

this appeal to Richard Daniel Roth and his surety for which execution, if necessary , may issue.

____________________________ WILLIA M C. KOCH, JR., JUDGE