NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SUKHWINDER SINGH,

Petitioner,

v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General, Respondent. No. 20

- 70522 Agency No. A208

- 194

- 142

MEMORANDUM *

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted November 9, 2021 * * Pasadena, California Before: COLLINS and LEE, Circuit Judges, and BAKER, ** * Judge.
Sukhwinder Singh, a native and citizen of India, seeks review of a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming an immigration judge’s (IJ)

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable M. Miller Baker, Judge for the United States Court of International Trade, sitting by designation. 

# FILED

JAN 6 2022 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2

denial of his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Tor ture (CAT). Singh claims that he was targeted by
members of the majority political party in India , the Bharatiya Jana t a Party ( “BJP” ), which is Hindu, because he is a member of the minority Mann Party, which is Sikh

. The IJ found Singh not credible based o n inconsistencies in the record and Singh’s
demeanor and the BIA affirmed that adverse credibility finding. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition.
We r eview adverse credibility determinations for substantial evidence , Shresth a v. Holder , 590 F.3d 1034, 1039 (9th Cir. 2010) , and must “uphold the agency’s determination unless compelled to conclude to the contrary , ” Singh v.
Whitaker , 914 F.3d 654, 658 (9th Cir. 2019) ( citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Where the BIA issues its own decision but draws on the IJ ’ s reasoning, we
review both decisions. Flores

- Lopez v. Holder , 685 F.3d 857, 861 (9th Cir. 2012)

. 1. We hold that substantial evidence in the record supports the three bas e s for the adverse credibility determination relied on by the IJ and the BIA.
A. S ubstantial evidence supports the adverse credibility determination
based on the inconsistency between Singh’s testimony and his medical
documentation about the treatment he received after the attacks by members of the
BJP

. While Singh testified he only received bandages, oral medication, and
oint ment, the letters from the hospital he submitted in support of his claim stated that3

he also receive d a teta nus injection after one attack and an intravenous treatment of
fluids after another attack

. Inconsistencies , even minor ones, can provide a basis for an adverse credibility determination. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) ; Shrestha , 590 F.3d at 1044. To support an adverse credibility determination, an inconsistency “should not be a mere trivial error such as a misspelling, and the petitioner’s explanation for the inconsistency, if any, should be considered in weighing credibility

. ” Shrestha , 590 F.3d at 1044 ( internal citation s omitted). This analysis “must take into account the totality of circumstances, and should recognize that the normal limits of human understanding and memory may make some inconsistencies or lack of recall pres ent in any witness ’ s case.” Id. at 1044

- 45. The inconsistency in the evidence regarding Singh’s medical treatment is not
trivial , like a typo graphical error or a mistaken date. See id. at 10 4 4; Bandari v. INS , 227 F.3d 1160, 1166 (9th Cir. 2000)

. O n the c ontrary, the extent of medical treatment
go es to the heart of Singh’s claim of persecution. Desta v. Ashcroft , 365 F.3d 741, 745 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[M] aterial inconsistencies in petitioner ’ s testimony concerning the extent of his injuries

. . . go to the heart of petitioner ’ s claim .”). And “[ a ] lthough inconsistencies no longer need to go to the heart of the petitioner ’ s claim, when an inconsistency is at the heart of the claim it doubtless is of great weight. ” Shrestha , 590 F.3d at 1046

- 47

. Th e IJ and the BIA w ere thus entitled to rely on th e4

inconsistency regarding Singh’s treatment to make an adverse credibility
determination. S

ee Manes v. Sessions , 875 F.3d 1261, 1264 (9th Cir. 2017)

. Singh argues that this discrepancy was an omission rather than an inconsistency and seek s to benefit from the more demanding standard for omission s
. See Bandari , 227 F.3d at 1167 (“[T] he mere omission of details is insufficient to uphold an adverse credibility finding .”). But t he record does not support th is interpretation. The IJ first asked Singh multiple times what treatments he received
and then asked him to confirm that he received no treatment other than the ones he listed. As a result, the IJ reasonably treated the discrepancy as an inconsistency.
Si ngh also argues that the inconsistency has no bearing on his credibility because it did not bolster his claim of persecution and cites Shah v. INS for the proposition that discrepancies that “cannot be viewed as attempts by the applicant to
enhance his cla ims of persecution [] have no bearing on credibility.” 220 F.3d 1062, 1068 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted)

. But this court has since clarified that “ when inconsistencies that weaken a claim for asylum are accompanied by other indications of dishonesty

. . . an adverse credibility determination may be supported by
substantial evidence. ” Don v. Gonzales , 476 F.3d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted) . In this case, the IJ and the BIA found other indications of dishonesty, such
as other inconsistenci es and Singh’s demeanor.5

B. S ubstantial evidence in the record supports an adverse credibility
determination based on the inconsistency in Singh’s evidence about the nature and the timing of the threats he received

. C. Finally, s ubstantial evidence in the record support s an adverse credibility determination based on Singh’s demeanor at the hearing

. This c ourt gives

“‘ special deference ’ to a credibility determination that is based on demeanor. ” Singh

Kaur v. INS , 183 F.3d 1147, 1151 (9th Cir. 1999) ( quoting Paredes

- Urrestarazu v.
INS , 36 F.3d 801, 818

- 19 (9th Cir. 1994)). T he IJ observed on the record that Singh’s

un responsiveness was not attributable to a lack of understand ing of the questions. Furthermore, the IJ considered and rejected alternative explanations for Singh’s
demeanor , such as personality or cultural differences and nervousness

. T he IJ reasonably concluded that Singh’s “ obvious disinclination to answer the question
was apparen t , ” and that Singh’s demeanor “was refle ct ive of a person who simply was not telling the truth.” Singh argues that the BIA did not rely on the IJ’s demeanor findings and th ose findings are therefore beyond th e scope of this c ourt’s review. Tekle v. Mukasey , 533 F.3d 1044, 1051 (9th Cir. 2008) . But t he BI A did rel y on th e demeanor finding s when it affirmed the IJ’s determination, in part, based on Singh’s “ evasiveness and equivocations when further questioned about the treatment he received ” and, in support, also cited the portion of the IJ’s analysis that discussed demeanor.6

In sum, given the three well

- supported , significant adverse

- credibility findings , made in the context of a holistic consideration of the whole record, we are persuaded that the “totality of t he circumstances and all relevant factors” support the adverse credibility determination. Alam v. Garland , 11 F.4th 1133, 1135 (9th Cir. 2021) (en banc) ( quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) ).
2. Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s conclusion that Singh’s documentary evidence neither rehabilitated his credibility nor independently established his claims for asylum

. Singh’s inconsistent testimony about his medical

treatment also shed doubt on the veracity of his medical records

. Because S ingh is not eligible for asylum, he cannot meet the higher standard for withholding of
removal. See Singh

-

Kaur , 183 F.3d at 1149

. Singh does not assert any challenge to the denial of CAT protection and therefore has forfeited any challenge to the denial
of CAT relief. See Rizk v. Holder , 629 F.3d 1083, 1091 n.3 (9th Cir. 2011)

. PETITION DENIED.