In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 20-2691 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v.

CORY SANFORD, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Central District of Illinois.

No. 16-cr-20082 — Colin S. Bruce, Judge. 

____________________ 

SUBMITTED SEPTEMBER 27, 2021* — DECIDED MAY 26, 2022 

____________________ 

Before ROVNER, HAMILTON, and KIRSCH, Circuit Judges. 

ROVNER, Circuit Judge. Cory Sanford was charged with 

possession of heroin with intent to distribute in violation of 

21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(C), possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

*On September 17, 2021, we granted the parties’ joint motion to waive 

oral argument. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and record. 

FED. R. APP. P. 34(f).
2 No. 20-2691 

§ 924(c)(1)(A)(i), and possession of a firearm as a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The government obtained evidence against Sanford pursuant to a search warrant, and Sanford sought to challenge that search. Toward that end, Sanford filed a motion for a hearing under Franks v. Delaware, 438 

U.S. 154 (1978) (a “Franks hearing”), as to the veracity of the 

information provided in support of the search warrant. The 

district court conducted a pre-Franks hearing, and then denied the request for a Franks hearing and upheld the search. 

Sanford subsequently pled guilty to possession of heroin with 

intent to distribute and possession of a firearm in pursuance 

of a drug-trafficking crime, reserving his right to challenge the 

denial of his Franks motion on appeal. The only issue in this 

appeal is whether the district court erred in denying the request for a Franks hearing. 

In seeking a no-knock search warrant in this case, Officer 

Benjamin Stringer and a confidential informant appeared before the state court judge on September 27, 2016. Stringer did 

not file an affidavit in support of the request for a search warrant. Instead, both Stringer and the confidential informant testified before the judge. Stringer testified that he observed a car 

driven by the informant exit the driveway of 608 N. Logan 

Avenue in Danville earlier that day, and that a subsequent 

search of that vehicle revealed several syringes and a small 

amount of crystal methamphetamine. The informant told him 

that she had acquired the drugs at the house at 608 N. Logan, 

and she described the home including the detail that a refrigerator was on the front porch of that home. They then drove 

by the house and Stringer confirmed that the house matched 

her description. 
No. 20-2691 3

The confidential informant testified as well, and related 

that she had been inside the home at 608 N. Logan Avenue on 

a daily basis for the past week, and that Cory Sanford lived at 

that house along with his girlfriend. She further testified that 

she was at the house twice the night prior to the warrant hearing, and that on both occasions she traded items such as alcohol, cigarettes, and even a doorbell and alarm kit, for heroin. 

She testified that she saw Sanford holding a gun when she 

was there that night, and he told her that someone had robbed 

him a couple of weeks earlier and, pointing the gun at the 

front door, he stated “Bam, that’s what’s gonna happen to 

someone next time they try to rob my house.” 

She also stated that the methamphetamine found in her 

vehicle had been purchased from a third party while at Sanford’s house, and that on another occasion she saw a baggie 

of heroin on the table at the house, and observed Sanford pick 

it up and place it into his pocket. Finally, she testified that she 

had injected heroin the night before the hearing. 

The judge had an opportunity to question both Stringer 

and the informant at that hearing, and based on that testimony issued a no-knock warrant to search Sanford’s house 

for controlled substances, drug paraphernalia, guns, evidence 

of ownership, and other related evidence. The officers executed the warrant the same day, and discovered 26.1 grams of 

heroin, a handgun, ammunition, digital scales, and $1,745 in 

cash. 

In the district court, Sanford challenged that search, seeking a Franks hearing to determine the validity of the search 

warrant. As support for that challenge, Sanford presented a 

Declaration from Ashley Hinkle, identifying herself as the 

confidential informant who testified in the warrant hearing. 
4 No. 20-2691 

Specifically, Sanford relied upon the statements in Hinkle’s 

Declaration that: officers told her that if she did not cooperate 

they would take her one-year-old daughter away from her;

Stringer told her that she would not be charged with any new 

offenses and that an outstanding warrant for failure to appear 

in a misdemeanor case would be “taken care of;” she was told 

to inform the judge at the hearing that she had not been promised anything for testifying; and about three weeks after the 

hearing she was nevertheless arrested on the outstanding 

warrant. Sanford argued that Hinkle’s lengthy criminal record and the existence of the active warrant, and Stringer’s assurance that no criminal charges would be filed and the warrant would be taken care of, were not revealed to the issuing 

judge, and the omission of that information relevant to Hinkle’s credibility would have altered the probable cause determination. Sanford sought a Franks hearing to assess the truthfulness of the information provided to the court in support of 

the request for a search warrant and the impact of any omissions on the probable cause determination. 

“’A defendant is entitled to a Franks hearing—an evidentiary hearing regarding the veracity of information included 

in a search warrant application—if he can make a substantial 

preliminary showing that: (1) the warrant affidavit contained 

false statements, (2) these false statements were made intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth, and (3) the 

false statements were material to the finding of probable 

cause.’” United States v. Hancock, 844 F.3d 702, 708 (7th Cir. 

2016), quoting United States v. Mullins, 803 F.3d 858, 861–62 

(7th Cir. 2015); United States v. Williams, 718 F.3d 644, 647 (7th 

Cir. 2013). That showing is not limited to false statements, but 

applies to material omissions as well. Hancock, 844 F.3d at 708; 

Mullins, 803 F.3d at 862. A hearing is not mandated absent 
No. 20-2691 5

“allegations of deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for 

the truth, and those allegations must be accompanied by an 

offer of proof.” Franks, 438 U.S. at 171. 

Sanford argued that Stringer and Hinkle intentionally 

misrepresented key facts and omitted other material facts that 

would have affected the issuance of the search warrant. The 

government opposed a Franks hearing arguing that because 

Stringer and Hinkle testified in person at the warrant hearing, 

the issuing judge had the opportunity to explore any such issues. The government informed the court that FBI agents had 

discussed Hinkle’s Declaration with her and that she told 

them she did not prepare the Declaration and that much of it 

was false or twisted the actual circumstances to something essentially untrue. 

When a defendant seeks a Franks hearing it can be difficult 

to delineate between sufficient and insufficient showings. 

United States v. McMurtrey, 704 F.3d 502, 509 (7th Cir. 2013). 

In McMurtrey, we recognized that district courts sometimes 

resort to “pre-Franks“ hearings to enable defendants to supplement or elaborate on their original submissions. Id. The focus of such a pre-Franks hearing is to determine whether the 

preliminary showing could be met. Id. We held in McMurtrey

that “[s]uch hearings are well within a district court’s discretion to aid it in making a sound decision on whether to hold 

a full Franks hearing.” Id. In McMurtrey, we noted that preFranks hearings may be problematic if the government is allowed to present new evidence but the defense is not afforded 

a full opportunity for cross-examination. Id. Here, however, 

the district court explicitly recognized that concern, and noted 

that a full opportunity was given to cross-examine Stringer, 

and further stated that even if the hearing was considered a 
6 No. 20-2691 

full Franks hearing the result would be the same. Dist Ct. Order at 11–12 n.1. However characterized, Sanford does not 

challenge the hearing conducted in this case. 

Because the arguments for and against the Franks hearing 

were both premised on the statements from Hinkle in her 

Declaration and whether Hinkle disowned those statements, 

the court in the “pre-Franks” hearing assessed the credibility 

of Hinkle and of the statements made by her in the Declaration in order to determine whether Sanford presented the necessary substantial preliminary showing. See McMurtrey, 704 

F.3d at 509 (noting that “[it] is relatively difficult for a defendant to make the ‘substantial preliminary showing’ required 

under Franks. ... [T]he claim of falsity should be substantiated 

by the sworn statements of witnesses.”) At the hearing, Hinkle’s testimony veered from the statements in the Declaration 

in some significant ways. For instance, with respect to the 

claim that the officers threatened to take her daughter away, 

Hinkle now testified that her daughter was in foster care and 

she had a visit scheduled for the next day and was informed 

she would miss that visit if she did not cooperate, but she was 

never threatened that they would take her daughter away. 

She further clarified that only Stringer, not the prosecutor, 

told her to say that she had not been promised anything, and 

she had been guaranteed only that she would not be arrested 

that night; she further acknowledged that Stringer had told 

her only that he would see what he could do about the warrant but could not make any promises. Finally, Hinkle testified to prior convictions for: possession of a controlled substance, residential entry and resisting; possession of a syringe 

and false informing; and two convictions for theft. The district 

court also heard testimony from Stringer that was largely consistent with that testimony from Hinkle. 
No. 20-2691 7

Following that testimony, the district court made some 

factual findings. The court found that Hinkle’s statement in 

the Declaration that she was told her daughter would be 

taken away if she failed to cooperate was “patently untrue.” 

The court also found that it was clear that Hinkle hoped that 

she would not be arrested for the drug purchases or on the 

outstanding warrant if she cooperated, but that no promises 

were actually made to her. We afford special deference to a 

district court’s credibility determination, and review findings 

of fact only for clear error, and there is no basis for finding 

error here. United States v. Clark, 668 F.3d 934, 940 (7th Cir. 

2012); United States v. Glover, 755 F.3d 811, 815 (7th Cir. 2014). 

The district court then concluded that a full Franks hearing 

was not warranted because Sanford had not made a substantial showing that the testimony in support of the warrant contained false statements or omissions, made intentionally, that 

were material to the finding of probable cause.

On appeal, Sanford argues that a Franks hearing was necessary because Stringer failed to inform the state court judge 

about Hinkle’s criminal history or her pending charges. Sanford contends that Hinkle claimed that Stringer told her that 

if she cooperated then she would not be arrested for the drugs 

recovered in the stop or for the outstanding warrant. According to Sanford, that information and Hinkle’s criminal history 

would have altered the probable cause determination for the 

search warrant. 

The district court’s findings following the pre-Franks hearing torpedo any argument based on the failure to reveal 

promises made to Hinkle that she would not be arrested for 

the drugs or for the outstanding warrant. The district court 

found that no such promises were made to Hinkle, and 
8 No. 20-2691 

therefore any claim based on that allegation is meritless. The 

only argument in favor of a Franks hearing that survives is the 

claim that Stringer failed to inform the state court judge of 

Hinkle’s criminal history, including the outstanding warrant 

for the failure to appear in a misdemeanor case. 

In order to obtain a Franks hearing on that basis, Sanford 

had to make a substantial preliminary showing that the omission was material to the probable cause determination and 

that the information was omitted deliberately or with reckless 

disregard for the truth. Glover, 755 F.3d at 820. We addressed 

an analogous situation in United States v. Woodfork, 999 F.3d 

511 (7th Cir. 2021). In that case, the defendant similarly sought 

a Franks hearing based on the omission of the confidential 

sources’ criminal histories and other details about their credibility. We held that the omission of the confidential sources’ 

criminal history in that case was not material to the finding of 

probable cause. Id. at 516–17. First, we noted that the probable 

cause determination in that case did not rest solely on the unverified tip from the confidential informant, but included controlled-buy transactions of which the testifying officer had direct knowledge, which made the informant’s reliability and 

credibility less relevant to the probable cause determination. 

Id. at 517. Secondly, we emphasized that the officer testified 

in person before the judge, and therefore, unlike the consideration of a written affidavit, the judge had the opportunity 

to ask the officer questions regarding the confidential sources’ 

backgrounds and criminal histories. Id. We expressed confidence that “warrant-issuing judges are aware that the individuals upon whom law enforcement relies to make drug 

purchases through controlled buys are likely to have criminal 

histories,” and that “it is not a stretch to assume that the judge 

here knew that a confidential source buying methamphet-
No. 20-2691 9

amine likely had some criminal history.” Id. We concluded 

that if the issuing judge believed that the confidential sources’ 

criminal history or motivations were relevant to the probable 

cause determination, the judge could have asked the officer 

questions as to those matters. Id. Accordingly, Woodfork

makes clear that the confidential informant’s criminal history 

is not always material to the probable cause determination. 

That does not mean that the failure to reveal an informant’s criminal history is never material to the probable cause 

determination. Indeed, we have recognized that the failure to 

reveal an informant’s criminal history can be a factor necessitating a Franks hearing. See Glover, 755 F.3d 811. In Glover, the 

issuing judge based the probable cause determination on a 

written affidavit from an officer, which omitted highly relevant and damaging information about the informant’s credibility including his criminal record while serving as an informant, his prior use of aliases to deceive the police, and his 

expectation of payment for his information. Id. at 817. The informant’s tip had only minimal corroboration, there was no 

evidence of any testimony by the informant, and the affidavit 

“did not provide the magistrate with even a minimum of information on credibility that might have triggered further inquiry.” Id. at 818. 

The materiality of the omission of criminal history, then, 

depends on the significance of the history in light of the totality of the circumstances, including considerations of other factors relevant to the credibility determination including “the 

level of detail, the extent of firsthand observation, the degree 

of corroboration, the time between the events reported and 

the warrant application, and whether the informant appeared 

or testified before the magistrate.” Id. at 816. In Glover, we held 
10 No. 20-2691 

that because vital credibility information was omitted from 

the affidavit, “[t]he probable cause affidavit here left the magistrate unable to fulfill his role as a neutral arbiter and therefore provided an insufficient basis for finding probable cause 

to support the warrant.” Id. at 818. 

In the circumstances presented here, the failure to affirmatively reveal Hinkle’s criminal history did not impact the 

ability of the magistrate to fulfill that role and is insufficient 

to require a Franks hearing. Although the probable cause determination depended largely on the information from the 

confidential informant, Hinkle, with only some verification of 

details by the officer, and in that way lacks the corroboration 

presented by the controlled buys in Woodfork, here the issuing 

judge was presented with testimony from the confidential informant, Hinkle, herself. Therefore the issuing judge did not 

have to depend upon a written affidavit or even testimony 

from an officer. The judge had the opportunity to question 

Hinkle as to any issues of importance to the judge in making 

the credibility determination and in deciding whether probable cause was established. Accordingly, the failure of Stringer 

to discuss Hinkle’s criminal history did not prevent the state 

court judge from accessing that information if it proved significant to the judge. 

Moreover, Hinkle’s own testimony apprised the state 

court judge that Hinkle had engaged in past criminal conduct. 

Hinkle acknowledged repeatedly purchasing illegal drugs including methamphetamine and heroin, and unlawfully consuming such drugs. There is no doubt, therefore, that the state 

court judge was aware that Hinkle was a person who had 

committed criminal conduct in the past. And given that Hinkle provided that information only after she was found in 
No. 20-2691 11

possession of methamphetamine, the issuing judge was also 

aware that Hinkle had an incentive to testify for the government because she had a potential pending criminal charge. 

The state court certainly could have inquired further of Hinkle to determine whether she had prior convictions for that or 

other criminal conduct if those facts were important to the 

judge in the probable cause determination. As the district 

court found, Hinkle had an extensive criminal history due to 

her drug addiction and theft crimes, but her history did not 

compare to the history of the informant in Glover, which included crimes while working as an informant. In contrast to 

Glover, any omitted criminal history information here was not 

different in kind from the information already in front of the 

judge making the probable cause determination. The issuing 

judge had an opportunity to hear the information directly 

from the confidential informant and to assess the demeanor 

and ask any questions in determining credibility. Woodfork, 

999 F.3d at 518–19; United States v. Sutton, 742 F.3d 770, 775 

(7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Sims, 551 F.3d 640, 645 (7th Cir. 

2008). As we recognized in Woodfork, warrant-issuing judges 

are aware that confidential informants in drug purchases are 

likely to have criminal histories, and Hinkle in fact admitted 

to criminal conduct. The district court did not err in determining that a Franks hearing was not necessary based solely on 

the failure to discuss the criminal history, which was unremarkable in nature for a person involved in ongoing drug use, 

in the testimony to the issuing judge in this case. 

Accordingly, the decision of the district court is 

AFFIRMED.