October 30 2009Justice James C. Nelson delivered the Opinion of the Court. ¶1 The Greater Missoula Area Federation of Early Childhood Educators and Related Personnel, MEA-MFT, AFT, NEA, AFL-CIO (the Federati on) commenced the instant action against Child Start, Inc. (Child Start) in September 2006 by filing a Complaint and Motion to Compel Arbitration. The District Court grante d the Federation’s motion.

Child Start then filed a motion under M. R. Civ. P. 60(b) for relief from the District Court’s order. The court denied this motion, and Child Start now appeals. We affirm. ISSUE ¶2 The sole issue on appeal is whether th e District Court erre d in denying Child Start’s Rule 60(b) motion. BACKGROUND The Grievance ¶3 This case involves an employer and the un ion representing its employees. Child Start operates a Head Start early-childhood-development program at Whittier School in Missoula, Montana. The Fe deration, a local union affilia ted with MEA-MFT and its national affiliates, is the certified collective- bargaining representative for nonsupervisory employees of Child Start. ¶4 Child Start and the Federation are parties to a collective-bargaini ng agreement (the Agreement). The stated term of the Agreemen t is January 1, 2003, through December 31, 2006, though Article One, Section 2 of the Agreement provides that the contract shall

remain in full force until a new agreement is negotiated. Of relevance to the present case, Article Two, Section 7 sets forth a “Grievance Procedure,” the stated intent of which is to

2resolve employee complaints “at the earliest possible step.” A “grievance” is defined as “a complaint by an employee th at there has been a violati on, misinterpretation, or misapplication of the provisions of this agreem ent.” An “employee” is defined as “(1) an individual employee or (2) a group of em ployees having the same grievance.” Furthermore, “[a]ny employee, or group of employees, has the right to Union representation at any stage of the grievance procedure.” Un til the grievance is resolved, the employee proceeds through the following six steps: Step 1: The employee discusses the grie vance with the immediate supervisor. Step 2: The employee submits the grievance to the immediate supervisor on a mutually approved form. Step 3: The employee submits the written grievance to Child Start’s director. Step 4: The employee may appeal to Child Start’s Policy Council. Step 5: The employee may proceed to mediation before three mediators. Step 6: The employee may proceed to binding arbitration. ¶5 In early 2006, Child Start faced rising co sts without a corresp onding increase in federal funding. Thus, Child Start decided that for budgetary reasons it would reduce by one week the number of weeks the program wo uld operate during the school year. As a result, all employees’ annual wages would be cut by 40 hours at their respective hourly rates, regardless of program priority , job position, or seniority rank. ¶6 On May 30, 2006, Karen Giuliani filed a grievance (using a Head Start Grievance Form) concerning Child Start’s decision. At the time, Giuliani was an employee of Child Start and a member of the bargaining unit re presented by the Federa tion. She also was president of the Federation. She named the Federation as the aggrieved party but indicated that the grievance was on behalf of “Several A ffected” employees. Giuliani

asserted that Child Start’s d ecision to reduce the work year of bargaining-unit employees

3“does not comply with the requirements of our Collective Bargaining Agreement regarding a reduction in force.” She stated that the provisions of the Agreement on which the grievance was based “include but are not necessarily limited to” Article Two, Section 2 (the Job Security provision), which st ates, in relevant part, that in the event of “provable financial exigency necessitating a reduction in force,” a management/union committee shall meet to examine personnel areas in which savings may be made. Furthermore, layoffs are to be made “on the basis of program priority,” and reductions in force are to be made “on the basis of seniority .” Giuliani requested that the reduction in the work year for bargaining -unit employees be rescinded and that Child Start conduct any necessary reduction in force in compliance with Article Two, Section 2. She also sought “any additional relief nece ssary to rectify this matter.” ¶7 Giuliani’s grievance proceed ed through the Grievance Pr ocedure outlined above. At each step, however, Child Star t repeatedly refused even to recognize the grievance, let alone attempt to resolve it “at the earliest possi ble step.” On June 6, 2006, Scot Anderson (Child Start’s director) sent a letter to Giulia ni asserting that the gr ievance was not a valid grievance because, in his view , it had not been filed by an individual employee, no group of employees had been identified, and the Federation as a whole did not qualify “because not all members have the same complaint.” Anderson opined that the Federation had a “conflict of interest” in representing all bargaining-unit employees because their “individual interests differ according to whethe r they would or would not be laid off.”

Anderson concluded that “[n]o further action will be take n regarding the grievance.” The Federation then gave notice of its intent to appeal to Child Start’s Policy Council;

4however, Anderson wrote a second letter re iterating his position that the grievance was not valid and asserting that “[ s]ince there is no grievance, there will be no appeal.” The Federation then gave notice of its intent to proceed to mediation; however, Sally Woodruff (president of Child Start’s Board of Directors) issued a letter giving the same responses Anderson had previo usly given: the grievance was not valid, the Federation could not represent all of its members in this matter due to a supposed “conflict of interest,” and Child Start would not take any further action regarding the grievance. ¶8 Having reached Step 6, the Federation gave notice of its intent to proceed to arbitration. To that end, the Federation se nt a letter to the Department of Labor and Industry’s Board of Personnel Appeals (BOPA) requesting a list of qualified arbitrators. Anderson, however, responded with a letter to BOPA stating that the grievance was

invalid and that Child Start intended “to take no further action regard ing this grievance.” Indeed, he asserted that Child Start did not agree to arbitration or to participate in requesting the list of arbitrators and that Child Start “will not participate in the arbitration process, since we are not obligat ed to do so by the Master Co ntract.” Shortly thereafter, Child Start implemented the one-week reduction. The 2006 -2007 school year, which had been scheduled to start on August 14, 2006, instead started on August 21.

The Federation’s Motion to Compel Arbitration ¶9 On September 6, 2006, the Federation f iled its Complaint and Motion to Compel Arbitration under § 27-5- 115, MCA, which states: (1) On the application of a party showing an agreement [to submit a controversy to arbitration] and the oppo sing party’s refusal to arbitrate, the district court shall order the parties to proceed with arbitr ation; but if the

5opposing party denies the existence of the agreement to arbitrate, the court shall proceed summarily to the determination of that issue raised and shall order arbitration if it finds for the appl ying party or deny the application if it finds for the opposing party.

. . . (5) An order for arbitration may not be refused on the ground that the claim in issue lacks merit or good faith or because no fault or grounds for the claim sought to be arbitrated have been shown.

The Federation contended that under this statut e, the only issue before the District Court was “whether there is an agreement to arbitrat e—not the merits of th e claim or the nature of the defense to a claim.” Here, the Federati on argued, there is an agreement to arbitrate unresolved grievances like the one filed by Giu liani, and Child Start’s objections as to the validity of the grievanc e are matters to be decided by the arbitrator. ¶10 Child Start responded with a motion to di smiss in which it raised a number of different points. As to the question of arbitrability, Child St art argued that the Agreement did not require the parties to arbitrate all disputes; rather, it required them to arbitrate only “properly filed” grievances. Child Start maintained that the gr ievance here was not properly filed for the reasons stated in Anderson’s and Wood ruff’s letters. In addition, Child Start argued that there was no “grievance” at all because the Federation had not identified a “specific” violation, misinterpret ation, or misapplication of the Agreement. Lastly, Child Start discussed the merits of the grievance. Acco rding to Child Start, “there is nothing in the [Agreement] which prohibits [Child Start] from shortening the length of the school year for budgetary pur poses.” To the contrary, Chil d Start asserted that Article One, Section 10 (the Management Rights provision) “legally authorized” it to decide, in

6its “sole and exclusive discreti on,” to cut the length of the school year by one week rather

than reduce the workforce. Moreover, Child Start argue d that there had been no violation, misinterpretation, or misapplication of Article Two, Section 2 (the Job Security provision) because there had been no layoffs and no reduc tions in force. ¶11 In November 2006, while their respective motions were pending in the District Court, the parties settled a se parate grievance concerning a pay increase. In conjunction with that settlement, the partie s agreed that while the Federa tion “will continue to pursue resolution of its Reduction-In-Force (RIF) grievance,” the Federation “will not seek a remedy requiring a back pay or other financial award for the one week reduction in the 2006-07 work schedule.” They also agreed that “neither party makes any admissions with respect to its posi tion on the validity and/or merits of the so-called RIF grievance by entering into this agreement” and that “this agreement sets no precedent.” ¶12 The District Court issued its Opinion an d Order on August 2, 2007, denying Child Start’s motion to dismiss and granting the Fede ration’s motion to compel arbitration. The court first observed that the parties did not di spute two points: the Agreement contains a

valid and enforceable arbitrati on clause, and the arbitration clause applies to unresolved “grievances.” The court also noted that the Federation had complied method ically with the procedural steps for pursuing a grievance, as set out in Ar ticle Two, Section 7. Thus, the court focused on the question of whether the complaint filed by Giuliani constituted a “grievance” under the Agreement. ¶13 In this regard, the court flatly rejected Child Start’s contention that the grievance had not been filed by a proper party, observing that Article Two, Section 7 “expressly

7gives the Federation clear contractual authority to bring the grievance on behalf of an identifiable ‘employee, or group of employees .’ ” The court reasoned that an identifiable group of employees had been implicated and affected by Child Start’s decision to cut the annual wages of all bargaining-unit employ ees by 40 hours at their respective hourly rates, regardless of program priority, job positi on, or seniority rank. Likewise, the court rejected Child Start’s claim that the Fede ration’s pursuit of the grievance compromised its duty to represent all of its members, noting that this wa s a contractual issue between the Federation and its members. Lastly, the court observed that Child Start’s argument regarding the merits of the grievance “clear ly reveals a contractual dispute under the terms of the Agreement”—namel y, whether Child Start has “s ole authority” under Article One, Section 10 to reduce the annual salaries of all employees, or whether Child Start has a duty under Article Two, Section 2 to meet with a union committee to examine personnel areas in which savings may be made when there is a provable financial need to make budgetary cuts affecting bargaining-un it employees. The court reasoned that an arbitrator, not the court, mu st resolve the parties’ conf licting interpretations of the Agreement’s provisions. For the foregoing reas ons, the District Court concluded that the Federation’s grievance is subject to the Ag reement’s arbitration clause, and the court accordingly ordered the parties to s ubmit the grievance to arbitration. Child Start’s Rule 60(b) Motion ¶14 Child Start did not appeal the District C ourt’s August 2, 2007 Opinion and Order. Rather, on August 31, Child Start filed a Rule 60(b) Moti on for Relief from Judgment or Order. Relying on subsections (4), (5), and (6) of M. R. Civ. P. 60(b), Child Start asked

8the court to vacate its Opinion and Order “due to events whic h transpired prior to this

Court’s order.” 1 In particular, Child Start pointed out that the one-week reduction in the school year had occurred in August 2006 and that the Federation had agreed in November 2006 not to seek any financial award for the reduction in the work sc hedule. Child Start

contended that rescission and mo netary damages, therefore, were not available and that the Federation had not requested any other specific relief. Child Start thus reasoned that the matter is moot, as there is nothing to arbitrate and no relief to be granted; that mootness results in a loss of jurisdiction; and that the District Court’s decision, therefore, is “void for lack of jurisdiction,” entitling Ch ild Start to relief un der subsection (4). Alternatively, relying on the “equity” clause of subsection (5), Child Start argued that

arbitration here would be “needless and wast eful” and would “damage all parties through the depletion of scarce financial resources. ” Similarly, invoking subsection (6), Child Start suggested that relief was appropriate because “int ervening circumstances” had rendered arbitration on the Federation’s gr ievance “moot and pointless.” Child Start concluded that in the interests of “equity , common sense and judicial/administrative economy,” the court should vacate its August 2, 2007 Opinion and Order. ¶15 In response, the Federation contended that Child Start had misidentified the actual controversy underlying the District Court’s decision. That controversy, the Federation

1 M. R. Civ. P. 60(b) states, in relevant part: “On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a party’s legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: . . . (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been sa tisfied, released, or discharg ed, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reve rsed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have pros pective application; or (6) a ny other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.”

9argued, as defined by § 27-5 -115, MCA, was whether there is an agreement between the parties to arbitrate unresolved grievances and whether the Federation’s complaint constitutes a “grievance” under the Agreement. The Federation noted that the court had answered both questions in th e affirmative and, thus, had gr anted the “relief” requested by the Federation (i.e., it ordered arbitration); and for this reason, the Federation disputed

Child Start’s assertion that the District C ourt lacked the ability to grant relief. The Federation further argued that the question of whether its grievance has become moot is a separate matter for the arbitrator, not the cour t, to decide. Nevertheless, the Federation pointed out that even w ith the passage of time, disputes still remained as to whether Child Start misinterpreted or misapplied the Agreem ent when it reduced the work year in lieu of implementing the seniority and layoff pro cedures and whether Child Start has sole authority to reduce unilaterally the work year and the annual salary of all employees or whether it has a duty to work first with the Federation. ¶16 The District Court rendered its decision on October 29, 2007, denying Child Start’s Rule 60(b) motion. The court agreed with the Federation that the issues at hand are not moot. For one thing, the court ob served, the contractua l relationship between

Child Start and the Federation “continues and is dependent on disputed interpretations of critical and material contract language.” Fu rthermore, the court reasoned, Child Start “forced” these court proceedings to occur “ by thwarting the grieva nce and arbitration provisions” of the Agreement and is likely to do so again “giv en the arbitrary and capricious manner” in which it dealt with the present grieva nce. As for Child Start’s claim that it was entitled to equitable relief under Rule 60(b), the c ourt quite clearly was

10not persuaded in light of Child Start’s con duct throughout the grie vance process. For starters, the court found that Child Start’s stated reasons for repeatedly refusing to recognize the Federation’s grievance “bordered on the frivolous.” For example, the court noted that Child Start had no legal right to refuse the grievance on the ground that the Federation might have a “conflict of interest” in pursuing it, as this was an issue solely between the Federation and its membership. Mo reover, the court found that Child Start’s “arrogant decision” to summarily refuse to honor the grievance process was “arbitrary and capricious” and that Child Start’s “unreasonabl[e]” c onduct had forced the Federation to file the present court action af ter expending significant time and effort to follow the steps for resolving grievances. Lastly, as to Child Start’s claim that arbitration would be a financial burden, the cour t pointed out that had Child Start not arbitrarily and capriciously refu sed to perform its contractual duties under the bargaining agreement, the added expense of going to arbitration following this court proceed ing would not have tran spired, and therefore, [Child Start] is solely responsible for the added expense and cannot use it as an excuse for not arbitrating the pr ocedural and substantive issues which are within the sole juri sdiction of the arbitrat or under the bargaining agreement and statutory law.

The District Court concluded that Child Star t’s “continuing indefensible resistance” to arbitration must fail. Child Start now appeals. STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶17 Our standard of review of a district cour t’s ruling on a motion under M. R. Civ. P. 60(b) depends on the nature of the final judgment, order, or proceeding from which relief is sought and the specific basi s of the Rule 60(b) motion. Essex Ins. Co. v. Moose’s Saloon, Inc. , 2007 MT 202, ¶ 16, 338 Mont. 423, 166 P.3d 451. As a general rule, we

11review the district court’s ruling for abuse of discretion; howeve r, different standards apply where the movant sought relief from a default judgment or where the movant sought relief under subsections (2) or (4) of Rule 60(b). See Essex , ¶¶ 16-17. ¶18 Here, Child Start invoked subsections (4), (5), and (6) in the District Court, and

the Federation asserts that Child Start has “n ever clearly articulated ” which subsection it is attempting to invoke. In its reply brie f, Child Start acknowledges that it has cited subsections (4), (5), and (6) “in the alternativ e” but indicates that it is invoking only subsection (4). Accordingly, as Child Start contends, our standard of review is de novo.

See Essex , ¶ 16 (“[W]here the movant sought relief under subsection (4) of Rule 60(b) on the ground that the judg ment is void, the standard of review is de novo, since the determination that a judgment is or is not void is a conclusion of law.”). DISCUSSION ¶19 Under M. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4), a party is entitled to relief from a final judgment, order, or proceeding if the judgme nt is void. As it did in th e District Court, Child Start maintains that the court’s August 2, 2007 Opinion and Order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration is void. Child Start again points ou t that in August 2006 it implemented the one-week reduction in the work year with no attendant layoffs or

reductions in force. Child St art also points out that the Federation agreed in November 2006 not to seek a remedy requiring back pa y or other financial award for the one-week

reduction. Child Start conten ds that these events effec tively mooted the controversy between the parties and “thwarted” any relief th at could have been gr anted in response to the Federation’s grievance. Ch ild Start thus reasons that th e present action has been moot

12since November 2006, if not earlier; that th ere is no justiciable c ontroversy between the parties; and that the District Court conseque ntly lacked jurisdicti on when it issued its decision on August 2, 2007. 2 ¶20 The Federation responds that Child Start’ s mootness argument fails because it is incorrectly based on whether th e issue to be presented to the arbitrator is moot, rather

than on whether the issue before the District Court was moot. The Federation points out that the dispute underlying the District Cour t’s August 2, 2007 Opinion and Order had nothing to do with the merits of its grievanc e. Rather, as define d by § 27-5-115, MCA, the specific dispute was whether the parties had an agreement to arbitr ate the grievance. In this connection, the Federation suggests th at Child Start is impr operly attempting to narrow the range of grievances that are arbitrable under the Agreement. The Federation notes that a “grievance,” as defined by the Agreement, includes a complaint that there has been a “misinterpretation or misapplication” of the Agreement’s provisions, and the Federation observes that its grievance is just that: a compla int that Child Start misinterpreted or misapplied the Agreemen t by reducing the work year in lieu of implementing the seniority and layoff proced ures. The Federation points out that although the one-week reduction has already occurred, and although it is not pursuing a financial award, there is nothing in the Agre ement limiting arbitrati on of grievances to situations where the parties can be restored to their original positions or where monetary

2 Recognizing that th e factual basis for its mootness argument existed long before it filed its Rule 60(b) motion on August 31, 2007, Child Start o ffers the somewhat dubious explanation that “[c]ounsel for Child Start was not aware until after receipt of the District Court’s August 2, 2007 Opinion and Order of the facts which made moot that decision.”

13damages are available. To the contrary, th e Federation contends th at the grievance and arbitration process is “ ‘a vehicle by wh ich meaning and content are given to the collective-bargaining agreement’ ” (quoting United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co. , 363 U.S. 574, 581, 80 S. Ct. 1347, 1352 (1960)), and the Federation explains that an arbitrator’s decision on the Federa tion’s grievance will resolve the parties’ “festering disputes ” over the meaning of the Agreement—in particular, whether Child Start has sole author ity to unilaterally reduc e the work year or has a duty to work with the Federation underthe Agreement’s layoff and reduction-inforce procedures, and whether the presiden t of the Federation may sign a grievance on

behalf of the Federation’s members. ¶21 Before considering these arguments, we fi rst note the Federation’s suggestion that “mootness is [not] properly raised within th e context of a Rule 60(b)(4) motion.” A judgment or order may be challenged as “voi d” under Rule 60(b)(4) on the ground that the rendering court lacked jurisdiction. See e.g. Nikolaisen v. Advance Transformer Co. , 2007 MT 352, 340 Mont . 332, 174 P.3d 940; see also O’Rourke Bros. Inc. v. Nesbitt Burns, Inc. , 201 F.3d 948, 951 (7th Cir. 2000) (“ A judgment is void only if the court which rendered it lacked jurisdiction of the subj ect matter or of the par ties, or if it acted in a manner inconsistent with due process of law.”). It follows from this and from the justiciability and mootness principles discusse d below that a judgme nt or order may be challenged as void (as Child St art does here) on the ground th at the controversy between the parties was moot at the time the c ourt rendered the judgment or order. See e.g. Schreiber Foods, Inc. v. Beatrice Cheese, Inc. , 402 F.3d 1198, 1202-03 (Fed. Cir. 2005).

14Justiciability and Mootness ¶22 The judicial power of the courts of Montana is limited to justiciable controversies. See Dukes v. City of Missoula , 2005 MT 196, ¶ 15, 328 Mont. 155, 119 P.3d 61; Powder River County v. State , 2002 MT 259, ¶ 101, 312 Mont. 198, 60 P.3d 357; cf. Flast v.

Cohen , 392 U.S. 83, 94-95, 88 S. Ct. 1942, 1949-50 (1968) (noting the same limitation on the judicial power of the federal cour ts). This limitation derives in part from constitutional requirements and in part from policy or “prudential” considerations. See e.g. Montana Power Co. v. Mo ntana Public Service Commn. , 2001 MT 102, ¶ 32, 305 Mont. 260, 26 P.3d 91 (observing that th e ripeness doctrine is grounded in both the constitution and judicial prudence); Olson v. Dept. of Revenue , 223 Mont. 464, 469-70, 726 P.2d 1162, 1166 (1986) (same with re spect to the doctrine of standing); cf. Flast , 392 U.S. at 94-97, 88 S. Ct. at 1949-51. Artic le VII, Section 4 of th e Montana Constitution, in relevant part, confers origin al jurisdiction on district c ourts in “all civil matters and cases at law and in equity.” Mont. Const. art. VII, § 4(1). This language has been interpreted as embodying the same sorts of lim itations as those imposed on federal courts by the “case or controversy” provision of Article III, Se ction 2 of the United States

Constitution. See Seubert v. Seubert , 2000 MT 241, ¶ 17, 301 Mont. 382, 13 P.3d 365;

Olson , 223 Mont. at 469-70 , 726 P.2d at 1166. ¶23 The central concepts of jus ticiability have been elabor ated into more specific categories or doctrines—namely, advisory opinions, feigned and collusive cases, standing, ripeness, mootness, political quest ions, and administrative questions—each of which is governed by its own set of substantive rules. See e.g. Clark v. Roosevelt County ,

152007 MT 44, ¶ 11, 336 Mont. 118, 154 P.3d 48 (advisory opinions); Havre Daily News, LLC v. City of Havre , 2006 MT 215, ¶¶ 19, 31, 333 M ont. 331, 142 P.3d 864 (ripeness and mootness); Columbia Falls Elementary School Dist. No. 6 v. State , 2005 MT 69, ¶ 15, 326 Mont. 304, 109 P.3d 257 (po litical questions); Armstrong v. State , 1999 MT 261, ¶¶ 6-7, 296 Mont. 3 61, 989 P.2d 364 (standing); Hardy v. Krutzfeldt , 206 Mont. 521, 524-26, 672 P.2d 274, 275-76 (1983) (a dvisory opinions); Carlson v. City of Helena , 38 Mont. 581, 585, 101 P. 163, 164 (1909) (collusive cases); see also Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure vol. 13, § 3529, 612 (3d ed., West 2008). In the present case , we are concerned with the question of

mootness. As we have previously observed, mootness is “the doctrine of standing set in a time frame: The requisite personal interest that must exist at th e commencement of the litigation (standing) must continue th roughout its existence (mootness).” Havre Daily

News , ¶ 31 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, if the issue presented at the outset of the action has ceased to exist or is no longer “live,” or if the court is unable due to an intervening event or change in circumstances to grant effective relief or to restore the parties to their original position, then the issue before the court is moot. See Powder

River , ¶ 101; Shamrock Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co. , 1999 MT 21, ¶ 19, 293 Mont. 188, 974 P.2d 1150; Serena Vista, LLC v. Dept. of Natural Resources and Conservation , 2008 MT 65, ¶ 14 , 342 Mont. 73, 179 P.3d 510; Los Angeles County v. Davis , 440 U.S. 625, 631, 99 S. Ct. 1379, 1383 (1979). And because the constitutional requirement of a “case or controversy” c ontemplates real controversies and not abstract differences of opinion or moot questions, Seubert , ¶ 18; cf. Wright et al., Federal Practice and

16Procedure vol. 13B, § 3533.1, 725-27, courts lack jurisdiction to decide moot issues

insofar as an actual “case or co ntroversy” no longer exists, see Dennis v. Brown , 2005 MT 85, ¶ 8, 326 Mont. 422, 110 P.3d 17; Iron Arrow Honor Socy. v. Heckler , 464 U.S. 67, 70, 104 S. Ct. 373, 374- 75 (1983) (per curiam); Enrico’s, Inc. v. Rice , 730 F.2d 1250, 1253 (9th Cir. 1984); see also Ballas v. Missoula City Bd. of Adjustment , 2007 MT 299, ¶¶ 15-16, 340 Mont. 56, 172 P.3d 1232. Application of Mootness Principles ¶24 The issue as framed by Child Start is whethe r a district court lacks jurisdiction to render a decision on a motion to compel arbitration of a dispute that the opposing party

contends has become moot. Th is Court has not previously ad dressed this issue directly, but we note that some federal and state courts have. In fact, the parties rely on several cases from other jurisdictions in support of their respective positions. We will consider these authorities for their pers uasive value in resolving th e mootness issue presented. ¶25 At the outset, it is necessary to clarify the focus of our analys is in light of two related points raised by the parties. First, in both the District Court and this Court, Child Start has repeatedly confused the jus ticiability requirement’s applicability to courts , as opposed to arbitrators . For example, relying on ou r statements in ¶ 14 of Serena Vista that “[w]e do not render advisory opinions, and we limit our rulings to those matters in which we can grant effective reli ef,” Child Start contends that all an arbitrator could do regarding the Federation’s allegedly moot grievance is render an “advisory opinion” answering “abstract questions,” which Child Start contends is “not appropriate” under

Serena Vista . It is essential to keep in mind, however, that arbitration is a matter of

17contract, Solle v. Western States Ins. Agency , 2000 MT 96, ¶ 22, 299 Mont. 237, 999 P.2d 328, and the arbitrator’s author ity derives from and is limited by the parties’ agreement , not the case-or-controversy pr ovision of the Constitution, see Miller v. County of Glacier , 257 Mont. 422, 427-28, 85 1 P.2d 401, 404 (1993); Terra West Townhomes, LLC v. Stu Henkel Realty , 2000 MT 43, ¶ 27, 298 M ont. 344, 996 P.2d 866; Barrentine v. ArkansasBest Freight System, Inc. , 450 U.S. 728, 744, 101 S. Ct. 1437, 1446 (1981). As one court has pointed out, “[t]here would be nothi ng improper or illegal (and certainly not unconstitutional) about an arb itration panel resolving a disp ute that would have to be

dismissed from federal court because it did not constitute a case or controversy.” Klay v. United Healthgroup, Inc. , 376 F.3d 1092, 1106 (11th Cir. 2004); cf. Wright et al.,

Federal Practice and Procedure vol. 13B, § 3533.1, 728 (not ing that an administrative agency is not bound by constitutional limits and may be empowered to maintain proceedings that would be moot in a court). Likewise , there is no basis under Montana law for Child Start’s proposition that an arbitrator may not resolve a dispute which does

not constitute a “case or controve rsy” under Article VII, Sec tion 4(1). Along these same lines, we note that an arbitrator has broad po wer to fashion remedies on issues the parties have empowered the arbitrator to resolve, and in some instances the arbitrator may be authorized to grant relief th at could not be granted by a court of law or equity. See § 27-5-312(2), MCA; Nelson v. Livingston Rebuild Center, Inc. , 1999 MT 116, ¶¶ 18-19, 294 Mont. 408, 981 P.2d 1185; Courier-Citizen Co. v. Bo ston Electrotypers Union

No. 11 , 702 F.2d 273, 28 1 (1st Cir. 1983); Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co. , 254 F.3d 925, 937 (10th Cir. 2001); see also e.g. Wallace v. Hayes , 2005 MT 253, ¶ 40, 329 Mont. 23,

18124 P.3d 110; United Steelworkers of America v. USX Corp. , 966 F.2d 1394 , 1402 (11th Cir. 1992). For these reasons, Child Start’s app lication of justiciability doctrines as limits on the arbitrator’s authority is misplaced. In evaluating Child Start’s motion under Rule 60(b)(4), our focus is on whether there was a “live” case or controversy in the District

Court , not whether there would be one in front of the arbitrator. ¶26 This leads into the second point. The Federation has cons istently maintained that the question of whether its grievance is moot is for the arbitrator to decide. The Federation cites some cases, and we have foun d others, which suppor t this proposition. See e.g. W. Dow Hamm III Corp. v. Millennium Income Fund, LLC , 237 S.W.3d 745, 757 (Tex. App. 1st Dist. 2007) (“[W]hether matters s ought to be arbitrated are in fact moot is a question of proced ural arbitrability that is reserved fo r the arbitrator, ab sent the parties’ agreement to the contrary.”); Oil, Chemical and Atomic Wo rkers Intl. Union v. Conoco,

Inc. , 64 Fed. Appx. 178, 185 (10th Cir. 2003) (unpublished 3 ) (“Given the tightly

circumscribed role that the courts are assigned in determining arbitrability, and considering that arbitrators have broad equita ble powers to fashion remedies, it is not for us to decide that a remedy will not be available for a particular grievance.”); Galveston Maritime Assn. v. South Atlantic & Gulf Coast Dist. , 234 F. Supp. 250, 251-52 (S.D. Tex. 1964); Western Automatic Mach. Sc rew Co. v. Intl. Union , 335 F.2d 103, 105-06 (6th Cir. 1964). The Supreme Court has stated that a gateway dispute about whether the parties

3 Unpublished decisions of other courts may be cited as legal authority to the extent the rules of the rendering court allow. McDonald v. Dept. of Envtl. Quality , 2009 MT 209, ¶ 53, 351 Mont. 243, 214 P.3d 749. Under 10th Cir. R. 32.1, unpublished decisions issued prior to Januar y 1, 2007, “are not precedentia l, but may be cited for their persuasive value.”

19are bound by a given arbitrati on clause raises a “question of arbitrability” for a court to

decide. Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. , 537 U.S. 79, 84, 123 S. Ct. 588, 592 (2002). Likewise, a disagreement about whethe r an arbitration clau se in a concededly binding contract applies to a particular type of controversy is for the court. Howsam , 537 U.S. at 84, 123 S. Ct. at 59 2. But “procedural questions” which grow out of the dispute and bear on its final dispositio n—such as time limits, waiver, notice, laches, estoppel, and whether the steps of a grievance proce dure were completed—are presumptively not for the court, but for an arbitrator, to decide. Howsam , 537 U.S. at 84-85, 123 S. Ct. at 592; see also Klay , 376 F.3d at 1109 (“Generally speakin g, courts are empowered to resolve disputes that solely involve whether a particular claim shoul d be resolved in court or arbitration. Arbitrators, on the other hand, are empowered, absent an agreement to the contrary, to resolve disputes over whether a particular claim may be successfully litigated anywhere at all (due to concerns such as st atute of limitations, laches, justiciability, etc.), or has any substantive merit whatsoever.” (citation omitted)). Likewise, this Court has indicated that although the question of whethe r the parties agreed to arbitrate is, as a general rule, to be decided by the court, see Higgins Dev. Part ners, LLC v. Skanska U.S.A. Bldg., Inc. , 2009 MT 287, ¶ 20, 352 Mont. 243, 216 P.3d 199, procedural questions such as “the arbitrability of an indisputably arbitrable issue” are for the arbitrator to decide, see Intl. Bhd. of Elec. Wo rkers v. Montana Power Co. , 280 Mont. 55, 60-61, 929 P.2d 839, 842-43 (1996). Cf. § 27-5-115(5), MCA (“An order for arbitration may not be refused on the ground that the cl aim in issue lacks merit or good faith or because no fault or grounds fo r the claim sought to be arb itrated have been shown.”).

20¶27 In light of these authorities, and since th e Agreement does not provide otherwise, we agree with the Federation th at the question of wh ether its grievance is moot is for the arbitrator, not the District C ourt, to decide. Necessarily, then, we also agree with the Federation that the District Court’s jurisd iction over the present case does not turn on whether the Federation’s grievance is moot. This does not mean, however, that mootness doctrine does not apply to motions to compel ar bitration of labor disputes. It only means, as previously indicated, that the focus of the mootness question is not on whether the issues raised in the grievance are themselves “live.” The “ case or controversy” presented

to the District Court in this case was th e narrow question of whether the Agreement’s arbitration clause applied to the Federation’s grievance. See § 27-5-115(1), MCA. It follows, therefore, that the specific question we must answer in resolving Child Start’s Rule 60(b)(4) motion is whethe r this “case or controversy” was “live” at the time the

District Court rendered its August 2, 2007 decision. Cf. Klay , 376 F.3d at 1110 n. 19 (“Of course, if a party makes a motion to compel arbitration under 9 U.S.C. § 4, a district

court must determine if there exists a case or controversy in order for it to exercise its jurisdiction over that motion to compel. . . . [T]he absence of a case or controversy requires a court to abstain from mandating arbitr ation . . . .”). We conclude that it was. ¶28 It would be one thing if the Federation had decided to withdraw its grievance during the pendency of the District Court proc eedings. At that poin t, the issue presented at the outset of this action—whether the Agreement’s arbitration clause applied to the Federation’s grievance—would ha ve become a purely academic point. The parties would have lost their legally cognizab le interest in the outcome, and the court would have been

21unable to grant effective relief. Indeed, the court would have been left in the position of issuing an advisory opinion on whether the arbitration clau se applied to a nonexistent grievance. In short, the case would have become moot, and the District Court would

have been bound to dismiss it for lack of jurisdiction. See Indep. Union of Flight Attendants v. Pan American World Airways, Inc. , 966 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir. 1992) (a party’s decision to withdraw a claim renders it moot); Dennis v. Brown , 2005 MT 85, ¶ 8, 326 Mont. 422, 110 P.3d 17 (courts have no jurisdiction to answer moot questions); Shamrock Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co. , 1999 MT 21, 293 Mont . 188, 974 P.2d 1150 (a case that has become moot must be dismissed); accord Great Western Sugar Co. v.

Nelson , 442 U.S. 92, 99 S. Ct. 21 49 (1979) (per curiam). The same result would have obtained had Child Start withdrawn its objections to arbitration and pr oceeded to arbitrate the Federation’s grievance. At that point, th ere would have been no case or controversy before the District Court. 4 ¶29 But no such events transpir ed here. The Federation ha s continually pursued its complaint related to Child Start’s decision to reduce the work ye ar by one week. The

Federation reached the last st ep of the Grievance Procedur e—arbitration—but Child Start refused to participate in arbitration. So , the Federation commenced the present action solely to compel Child Start to submit to the arbitration. Child Start responded that the

4 That was essentially the situation in Great Western Sugar , on which Child Start relies heavily. Nelson sued to compel arbitration, the district court granted the motion, and Great Western Sugar appealed . But before the appeal coul d be decided on the merits, the arbitration proceedings were completed. Thus, the Supreme Court concluded that the court case had become entirely moot and that dismissal was required. See Great Western Sugar , 442 U.S. at 93-94, 99 S. Ct. at 2150. In contrast, the arbitration sought by the Federation here has not even been started, let alone completed.

22Agreement’s arbitration clause does not apply to the Federation’s complaint. Child Start maintained this position throughou t this litigation. The Distri ct Court was in a position to grant effective relief by either granting the Fe deration’s motion to compel arbitration or granting Child Start’s motion to dismiss. Th is constitutes a “live” case or controversy, which still existed on August 2, 2007, when the District Court issued its decision. ¶30 Most of Child Start’s arguments to the c ontrary are directed to the question of

whether the issues raised in the Federation’ s grievance are moot—a question, as noted,

for the arbitrator to deci de. But Child Start does raise two points requiring some discussion. First, Child Start contends th at the Federation’s grievance does not qualify

for arbitration because the Federation is not s eeking any specific relief. Child Start points out that the Federation originally sought resc ission of the one-week reduction in the work year, which is no longer possible since Child Start implemented the reduction in August 2006, and that the Federation ag reed in November 2 006 not to seek a financial award. We note, however, that Child Start expressl y conceded in the No vember 2006 settlement

that the Federation “will contin ue to pursue resolution of” its grievance—an implicit acknowledgement that the Federation was seeki ng some other form of relief. In this regard, the Federation points out that under Article Two, Sec tion 7, a complaint regarding an interpretation or application of a provi sion of the Agreement may be pursued to arbitration; and here, the basis of the Fe deration’s grievance is that Child Start misinterpreted or misapplied provisions of the Agreement, including Article Two, Section 2 (the Job Security pr ovision). In its grievance, the Federation requested Child Start’s compliance with Article Two, Sectio n 2 plus “any additiona l relief necessary to

23rectify this matter.” The Fede ration explains that in light of its ongoing contractual relationship with Child Start, it seeks resolution of the partie s’ conflicting interpretations of the Agreement; and citing Stead Motors of Walnut Cree k v. Automotiv e Machinists Lodge No. 1173 , 886 F.2d 1200, 1205 (9 th Cir. 1989) (en banc), the Federation contends that the arbitrator is “the parties’ officially designated ‘reader’ of the contract . . . their joint alter ego for the purpose of striking whatever supplementary bargain is necessary” (ellipsis in original, some intern al quotation marks omitted). We agree that an arbitrator may serve to resolve disputes over the inte rpretation or application of a collectivebargaining agreement, see Intl. Bhd. of Elec. Workers , 280 Mont. at 58, 929 P.2d at 841; see also United Steelworkers of Americ a v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co. , 363 U.S. 574, 578, 80 S. Ct. 1347, 13 51 (1960) (noting that “arbitration of la bor disputes under collective bargaining agreements is part a nd parcel of the collective bargaining process itself”), and here, Article Two, Section 7, clearl y authorizes the arbitr ator to resolve such disputes arising out of the Agr eement. We also agree that an arbitrator is not constrained by Article VII, Section 4(1)’s case-or-controversy requirement and may grant relief that might not be available in a court of law or equity. See ¶ 25, supra . Thus, it follows from all this that a simple interp retation of the Agreement (which Child Start characterizes as an “advisory opinion” by the arbitrator) is in fact a form of “relief” available under the Agreement and requested by the Federation here. 5

5 Child Start cites District 2, Marine Engineers Beneficial Assn. v. Isbrandtsen Co. , 226 N.Y.S.2d 883 (Sup. Ct . 1962), for the proposition that “an actual case or controversy [is] a prerequisite for any adjudication whether in the courts or by arbitration.” However, to the extent District 2 stands for this rule, subsequent decisions

24¶31 Second, Child Start contends that the Fe deration cannot pursue arbitration of a grievance that is based on an expired contract . Yet, while the Agreement’s stated term is January 1, 2003, through Decem ber 31, 2006, Article One, Section 2 provides that the Agreement shall remain in fu ll force until a new agreement is negotiated, and there is no

evidence in the record that a new agreement has been negotiated. 6 Furthermore, it should be noted that the expiration of a collectiv e-bargaining agreement does not necessarily extinguish a grievance or a party’ s obligation to arbitrate it. See Providence Journal Co. v. Providence Newspaper Guild , 308 F.3d 129, 132 (1st Cir. 2002) (citing Litton Fin. Printing Div. v. NLRB , 501 U.S. 190, 204, 111 S. Ct. 2215, 2224 (1991), and Nolde Bros., Inc. v. Bakery and Confectionery Workers Union , 430 U.S. 243, 255, 97 S. Ct. 1067, 1074 (1977)); see also e.g. Solle v. We stern States Ins. Agency , 2000 MT 96, ¶¶ 26-29, 299 Mont. 237, 999 P.2d 328. For example, the oblig ation to arbitrate survives expiration where (as here) the dispute arose durin g the life of the contract but arbitration proceedings had not begu n before expiration. See Intl. Union v. Telex Computer Prods.,

Inc. , 816 F.2d 519, 522 ( 10th Cir. 1987) (citing Nolde Bros. , 430 U.S. at 251, 97 S. Ct. at 1071-72). And although the Federation is seeking an interpretation of a purportedly expired contract, the fact is that Child Start and the Federation still have a suggest that it is no longer a correct statement of the law in New York. See e.g. Bd. of Educ. v. Merrick Faculty Assn. , 410 N.Y.S.2d 876, 879 (A pp. Div. 2d Dept. 1978); Long Island Lighting Co. v. Trig en-Nassau Energy Corp. , 628 N.Y.S.2d 222, 224 (Sup. Ct. 1995). Likewise, Child Start’s reliance on Portland Web Pressmen’s Union v. Oregonian Publg. Co. , 286 F.2d 4 (9th Cir. 1960), is unpersuasi ve, as the parties’ controversy in that case was specifically covere d by the Labor Management Relations Act, not the collective-bargaining agreement. 6 Indeed, Child Start indicates, without explanation, that it do es not know “if any new contract even exists” as of the date of its reply brief in this appeal (April 24, 2008).

25collective-bargaining relationship which, as the District Court note d, “is dependent on disputed interpretations of critical and material contract language.” Cf. Intl. Assn. of Machinists and Aerospace Wo rkers v. BF Goodrich Aerosp ace Aerostructures Group , 387 F.3d 1046, 1049 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that courts l ong have been aggressive in determining that a collective-bargaining di spute remains live where the disputed issue continues to shape the parties’ periodic bargaining or day-to-day interaction). CONCLUSION ¶32 We conclude that a “live” case or contro versy existed throughout the proceedings

in the District Court. This case was not moot when the co urt issued its August 2, 2007 Opinion and Order, and that order is not voi d under Rule 60(b)(4). Accordingly, the District Court did not err in deny ing Child Start’s Rule 60(b) motion. 7 ¶33 Affirmed.

/S/ JAMES C. NELSON We Concur:

/S/ PATRICIA O. COTTER /S/ BRIAN MORRIS /S/ JIM RICE

Justice W. William Leaphart, concurring. ¶34 I agree with the Court’s analysis and fra ming of the issue as whether there was a “live” case or controversy in the District Co urt. The Court concludes that since the

7 The Federation has requested that we awar d sanctions against Child Start for this appeal pursuant to M. R. App. P. 19(5). However, we do not agre e that Child Start’s appeal meets the requirements of this rule. The Federation’s request is, therefore, denied.

26grievance sought “any additional relief necessary, ” it was appropriate for the arbitrator to resolve the parties’ conflicting interpretations of the Agreemen t, even though the specific concerns giving rise to this dispute were fait accompli. Given that the grievance sought any “additional relief necessary to rectify this matter ,” (i.e., the particular layoff at issue), allowing the matter to proceed to arbitration as an abstract interpretation of contract hangs on a very thin thread. However, in the interest of lib erally interpreting pleadings, I give the grievance the bene fit of the doubt. ¶35 Obviously, if the grievance had specifica lly sought declaratory relief rather than being so focused on the one-we ek reduction, the Court would not have to divine the pleader’s true intent under the catch-all prayer for “any additional relief necessary.”

/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART

27