16-412 Xu v. Sessions BIA Christensen, IJ A205 436 888 

### UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS **FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT** 

## SUMMARY ORDER

**RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED**  **ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT**  = **S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED**  **WITH THIS**  **COURT, A**  **PARTY MUST**  **CITE EITHER**  **THE FEDERAL**  **APPENDIX OR**  **AN ELECTRONIC**  **DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY**  **OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for**  1 **the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States** 2 **Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the** 3 **3 rd**  **day of January, two thousand eighteen.** 4 5 **PRESENT: JOHN M. WALKER, JR.,** 6 **REENA RAGGI,** 7 **CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY,** 8 Circuit Judges. 9

**_____________________________________** 10 11 **JIAYANG XU,** 12 Petitioner **,** 13 14 **v. 16-412** 15 **NAC** 16 **JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III,** 17 **UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,** 18 Respondent **.** 19

**_____________________________________** 20 21 **FOR PETITIONER:** Zhidong Wang, Wang, Leonard & 22 Condon, Chicago, Illinois. 23 24 **FOR RESPONDENT:** Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy 25 Assistant Attorney General; Cindy 26 Ferrier, Assistant Director; Tracie 27 N. Jones, Trial Attorney, Office of 28 Immigration Litigation, United 29 States Department of Justice, 30 Washington, DC. 312 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 1 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 2 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is 3

DENIED. 4 Petitioner Jiayang Xu, a native and citizen of the People’s 5 Republic of China, seeks review of a January 19, 2016 decision 6 of the BIA affirming an August 1, 2014 decision of an Immigration 7 Judge (“IJ”) denying Xu’s application for asylum, withholding 8 of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture 9 (“CAT”). See In re Jiayang Xu, No. A205 436 888 (B.I.A. Jan. 10 19, 2016), aff’g No. A205 436 888 (Immig. Ct. N.Y.C. Aug. 1, 11 2014). Where, as here, the BIA does not expressly “adopt” the 12 IJ’s decision, but closely tracks its reasoning, we review both 13 the IJ’s and BIA’s opinions “for the sake of completeness.” 14 Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. , 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 15 2006), applying well-established standards of review, see 8 16 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Su Chun Hu v. Holder , 579 F.3d 155, 158 17 (2d Cir. 2009). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the 18 underlying facts and procedural history of this case. 19 Absent past persecution, an a lien may establish 20 eligibility for asylum by demonstrating a well-founded fear of 21 future persecution, which is a “subjective fear that is 22 objectively reasonable.” Dong Zhong Zheng v. Mukasey , 552 F.3d 233 277, 284 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); see 1 also 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2). “An 2 asylum applicant can show a well-founded fear of future 3 persecution in two ways: (1) by demonstrating that he or she 4 ‘would be singled out individually for persecution’ if 5 returned, or (2) by proving the existence of a ‘pattern or 6 practice in [the] . . . country of nationality . . . of 7 persecution of a group of persons similarly situated to the 8 applicant’ and establishing his or he r ‘own inclusion in, and 9 identification with, such group.’” Y.C. v. Holder , 741 F.3d 10 324, 332 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting 8 C.F.R. 11 § 1208.13(b)(2)(iii)). To do this, “an alien must make some 12 showing that authorities in [her] country of nationality are 13 either aware of [her] activities or likely to become aware of 14 [her] activities.” Hongsheng Leng v. Mukasey , 528 F.3d 135, 15 143 (2d Cir. 2008). 16 The agency here reasonably determined that Xu failed to 17 show a reasonable possibility that she would be singled out 18 individually for persecution. Although Xu pointed to three 19 instances in which she proselytized publicly and approximately 20 fifteen articles about religion that she published to a blog, 21 her claim that the Chinese government is aware of these 22 activities is purely speculative. See Jian Xing Huang v. U.S. 234 INS , 421 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that “[i]n the 1 absence of solid support in the record,” fear of persecution 2 is “speculative at best” and not objectively reasonable); Y.C. 3 v. Holder , 741 F.3d at 334 (rejecting premise that “Chinese 4 government is aware of every anti-Communist or pro-democracy 5 piece of commentary published online”). 6 Regarding her prospective practice, Xu testified that she 7 would worship at an unauthorized church in China and 8 proselytize. In essence, she alleged that the Chinese 9 authorities would become aware of her future activities in China 10 and persecute her for them because there is a pattern or practice 11 of such persecution. But the agency reasoned that she did not 12 establish any pattern or practice of persecution. The State 13 Department report, of which the agency took administrative 14 notice, reflects that tens of millions of unregistered 15 Christians worship in China, so it is unlikely that Chinese 16 officials would discover Xu’s pract ice and single her out for 17 harm. See Jian Xing Huang v. U.S. INS , 421 F.3d at 129. 18 Although Xu argues that the IJ failed to consider whether the 19 government was more likely to discover her practice because she 20 would proselytize, the IJ considered that fact, but found that 21 the country conditions evidence did not support Xu’s claim. 225 We identify no error in this finding. To establish a 1 pattern or practice of persecution against a particular group, 2 an applicant must demonstrate that the harm to that group is 3 “systemic or pervasive.” In re A-M- , 23 I. & N. Dec. 737, 741 4 (B.I.A. 2005); see Mufied v. Mukasey , 508 F.3d 88, 92-93 (2d 5 Cir. 2007). Here, Xu testified that she did not personally know 6 anyone who was persecuted in China, and the State Department’s 7 2012 International Religious Freedom Report stated that in some 8 parts of China “local authorities tacit ly approved of . . . the 9 activities of unregistered religious groups or did not 10 interfere with [them].” SPA 1. Given the nationwide 11 variation in and lack of evidence of persecution in Xu’s home 12 province of Liaoning, the agency reasonably concluded that Xu 13 failed to establish a pattern or practice of persecution of 14 Christians in her region of China. See Santoso v. Holder , 580 15 F.3d 110, 112 (2d Cir. 2009) (affirming agency determination 16 that petitioner unlikely to experience future persecution as 17 Catholic where evidence suggested that persecution was 18 “occurring on a very localized basis and was not countrywide”); 19 cf. Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey , 546 F.3d 138, 142, 149 (2d Cir. 20 2008) (identifying no error in BIA framework requiring evidence 21 of local enforcement of family-planning policy, given regional 22 variations in enforcement). 236 Accordingly, because the agency rea sonably found that Xu 1 failed to demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution, it 2 did not err in denying asylum or in concluding that she 3 necessarily failed to meet the higher burden required for 4 withholding of removal or CAT relief. See Lecaj v. Holder , 616 5 F.3d 111, 119-20 (2d Cir. 2010). 6 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 7

DENIED. 8

FOR THE COURT: 9 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court 10