In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 15‐1604

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

CHARLES W. ARMOUR,

Defendant‐Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Central District of Illinois.

No. 3:07‐CR‐30103 — Sue E. Myerscough, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 22, 2015 — DECIDED OCTOBER 26, 2015

____________________

Before FLAUM, WILLIAMS, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

FLAUM, Circuit Judge. In 2008, Charles Armour was sen‐

tenced to fifty‐one months in prison and a three‐year term of

supervised release after he pled guilty to possession of a

firearm by a felon. After he was released from prison in 2012,

Armour violated the conditions of his supervised release in

several incidents, including a conviction of aggravated bat‐

tery for beating his eight‐year‐old son. Accordingly, his pro‐

bation officer submitted to the district court a petition to re‐
2 No. 15‐1604

voke Armour’s supervised release and a violation memo‐

randum detailing Armour’s most recent infractions. The dis‐

trict court then sentenced Armour to twenty‐four months in

prison followed by a one‐year term of supervised release.

Armour now appeals, challenging his new sentence and the

conditions of his supervised release. We affirm.  

I. Background

When Armour pled guilty to possession of a firearm by a

felon in 2008, he had a criminal history category VI, six felo‐

ny convictions, a total adjusted offense level of seventeen,

and an advisory guidelines range of fifty‐one to sixty‐three

months in prison. The district court sentenced Armour to fif‐

ty‐one months of imprisonment followed by three years of

supervised release. The conditions of Armour’s supervised

release prohibited him from, among other things, commit‐

ting another crime, leaving the district court’s jurisdiction

without permission from his probation officer, and unlaw‐

fully using a controlled substance.

Armour began his term of supervised release on October

23, 2012, and he began violating the conditions of his release

shortly thereafter. On January 31, 2013, Armour was arrested

for failure to comply with a lawful request in Missouri after

he ran from police officers who caught him trespassing in a

resident’s yard at 3:27 AM, and he pled guilty to this offense

on April 4, 2013. Armour did not obtain authorization before

traveling to Missouri, and therefore, had left the jurisdiction

without authorization. Between June and September 2013,

Armour submitted four urine samples that tested positive

for marijuana. In April 2014, Armour beat his eight‐year‐old

son with a belt and belt buckle, resulting in a conviction of
No. 15‐1604 3

two counts of aggravated battery and a sentence of seven

years in prison.

In May 2014, U.S. Probation Officer Thomas Brown sub‐

mitted to the district court a petition to revoke Armour’s su‐

pervised release, pointing to Armour’s beating of his son as

the basis for revocation. The district court granted the peti‐

tion and issued an arrest warrant for Armour. On August 20,

2014, Armour made an initial appearance before a magis‐

trate judge, who released Armour on bond pending a revo‐

cation hearing. As a condition of his release on bond, Ar‐

mour was ordered to reside with a third‐party custodian and

prohibited from having contact with any minor children. On

October 29, 2014, Armour’s probation officer petitioned to

have Armour’s bond revoked, alleging that he violated the

conditions of his bond by having contact with his minor

children. On November 3, 2014, the magistrate judge held a

hearing and allowed Armour to modify the conditions of his

release to permit him to stay with his sister‐in‐law, instead

of with his previous third‐party custodian. However, when

U.S. Probation Officer Sarah Dykstra visited Armour at his

sister‐in‐law’s home on February 11, 2015, Armour said that

his sister‐in‐law had moved to Iowa and was no longer liv‐

ing with Armour.

On February 23, 2015, Officer Brown filed a violation

memorandum with the district court. In addition to the

“Violation Conduct” section, which detailed the aggravated

battery conviction that was the basis of the revocation peti‐

tion, the violation memorandum contained a “Supervision

History” section, which stated that Armour had been arrest‐

ed in Missouri, had left the district court’s jurisdiction with‐

out permission, and had submitted four urine specimens
4 No. 15‐1604

that tested positive for marijuana. The violation memoran‐

dum also stated that Armour had failed to reside with a

third‐party custodian, thus violating a condition of his re‐

lease on bond, and it recommended several supervised re‐

lease conditions. Officer Brown attached to the violation

memorandum the original presentence investigation report

(“PSR”), which was prepared by U.S. Probation Officer

Michelle Cyrus prior to Armour’s 2008 sentencing for pos‐

session of a firearm by a felon.

On February 26, 2015, Armour filed a Commentary on

Revocation conceding that he had violated a condition of

supervised release and waiving his right to contest the alle‐

gations in the revocation petition. In this filing, Armour re‐

fers to the violation memorandum twice but does not object

to the filing of or the facts contained in the violation memo‐

randum. The Commentary on Revocation objects to the im‐

position of any further term of supervised release and “to

any and all discretionary conditions,” and it makes specific

objections to several of the proposed conditions of super‐

vised release.

At his revocation hearing on March 9, 2015, Armour reaf‐

firmed his decision to waive a hearing on the revocation pe‐

tition. The district court asked Armour if he “reviewed [the

violation memorandum] and had a chance to talk to [his] at‐

torney about it,” and Armour responded, “[y]es, Your Hon‐

or.” The district court asked about Armour’s objections to the

violation memorandum, and Armour’s counsel responded

that all of his objections “go to the conditions of supervised

release.” The government said it had no objection to the vio‐

lation memorandum, and the district court adopted the fac‐

tual findings of the violation memorandum as its own.  
No. 15‐1604 5

At this hearing, Armour requested a twelve‐month sen‐

tence with no supervised release, but the district court

agreed with the government’s recommendation and sen‐

tenced Armour to twenty‐four months in prison and a one‐

year term of supervised release. After the district court orally

pronounced the conditions of Armour’s supervised release,

Armour objected to all of them. Armour now appeals, chal‐

lenging his sentence and the following conditions of his su‐

pervised release:

 You shall not knowingly be present at places

where controlled substances are illegally sold,

used, distributed, or administered.  

 You shall report to the probation officer in a man‐

ner and frequency as directed by the Court or

Probation.

 You shall not possess a firearm, ammunition, de‐

structive device or any other dangerous weapon.

 You shall notify Probation at least ten days prior to

or as soon as you know about any changes in resi‐

dence and any time you leave a job or accept a job.  

 You shall not meet, communicate, or otherwise in‐

teract with any person whom you know to be a

convicted felon, or to be engaged in or planning to

engage in criminal activity unless you’re granted

permission to do so by the probation officer.  

 You shall permit a probation officer to visit you at

home or any other reasonable location between

the hours of 6:00 AM and 11:00 PM, unless investi‐

gating a violation or in case of emergency.

 You shall notify Probation within 72 hours of be‐

ing arrested or questioned by law enforcement.
6 No. 15‐1604

 You shall not purchase, possess, use, distribute, or

administer any controlled substance or psychoac‐

tive substance. You shall, at the direction of Proba‐

tion, participate in a program for substance abuse

treatment and abide by the rules of the treatment

provider. You shall be subject to this condition un‐

til such time as Probation determines that drug

abuse treatment and testing will no longer assist

you to avoid committing further crimes.  

II. Discussion

A. The Violation Memorandum

On appeal, Armour challenges the filing of the violation

memorandum by Officer Brown and the district court’s

adoption of the facts contained within it. Armour focuses his

argument on certain facts in the violation memorandum, in‐

cluding that he was arrested in Missouri, left the jurisdiction

without authorization, tested positive for marijuana, and did

not reside with a third‐party custodian when he was re‐

leased on bond. Armour argues that because these facts were

not asserted in the revocation petition as bases to revoke su‐

pervised release and because the district court did not de‐

termine the reliability of the information in the violation

memorandum, the district court erred in relying on these

facts at sentencing.  

However, Armour never raised these arguments before

the district court even though he had the opportunity to do

so, and thus they are waived. “Waiver occurs when a crimi‐

nal defendant intentionally relinquishes a known right.”

United States v. Brodie, 507 F.3d 527, 530 (7th Cir. 2007) (cita‐

tions and internal quotation marks omitted). “Waiver of a
No. 15‐1604 7

right extinguishes any error and precludes appellate review

....” Id.  

We recognize that “a lawyer’s statement at sentencing

that the defendant does not object to anything in the presen‐

tence report does not inevitably constitute a waiver ....”

United States v. Jaimes‐Jaimes, 406 F.3d 845, 848 (7th Cir. 2005).

However, “[t]he touchstone of waiver is a knowing and in‐

tentional decision.” Id. Therefore, when a criminal defendant

selects among arguments as a matter of strategy, he waives

the arguments he decides not to present. Id.

The facts of this case resemble those in Brodie, which held

that the defendant, Brodie, waived his right to object to his

sentence because Brodie had access to the presentence report

and knew of his right to object. 507 F.3d at 531. After his

conviction, Brodie objected to certain parts of the PSR, but

then stated at his sentencing hearing that he had no further

objections. Id. This Court found that this was “the paragon of

intentional relinquishment,” especially since Brodie had stra‐

tegic reasons not to raise his near‐frivolous arguments to the

sentencing judge, as they could have distracted the court

from the stronger arguments he did raise. Id. at 531–32.  

Here, Armour stated at the revocation hearing that he re‐

viewed the violation memorandum and had a chance to talk

to his attorney about it. His counsel stated that all of Ar‐

mour’s objections to the violation memorandum were about

the conditions of supervised release. The only other objec‐

tion Armour made to the violation memorandum was to the

cover page stating that he was arrested on August 19, 2014,

when he was actually arrested on June 22, 2014. Thus, we are

persuaded that Armour’s decision not to challenge the readi‐

ly‐proven facts in the violation memorandum was intention‐
8 No. 15‐1604

al and supported by a tactical rationale, as these weak argu‐

ments could have distracted the court from Armour’s

stronger arguments objecting to the conditions of his super‐

vised release. Therefore, Armour waived this challenge.1  

                                                  1 Even assuming, arguendo, that Armour merely forfeited this chal‐

lenge, his argument fails under plain error review. First, Armour argues

that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32 allows presentence reports

but that no legal authority permits violation memoranda. We disagree.

PSRs are created by probation officers to inform the court about a de‐

fendant’s criminal history and factors relevant to sentencing. See Fed. R.

Crim. P. 32(d). The violation memorandum here serves the same pur‐

pose. It includes the original PSR from Armour’s 2008 conviction and

provides updated information about his recent violations of his release

conditions. Additionally, 18 U.S.C. § 3603(2) requires a probation officer

to keep a sentencing court informed as to the conduct of a person on su‐

pervised release, thus providing a legal basis for the filing of a violation

memorandum. Finally, our case law acknowledges the use of violation

memoranda. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 770 F.3d 653, 657–58 (7th Cir.

2014) (relying on facts alleged in a violation memorandum when ruling

on defendant’s alleged violation of supervised release); United States v.

Tovar‐Pina, 713 F.3d 1143, 1146 (7th Cir. 2013) (noting that the probation

office prepared a violation memorandum, which neither party objected

to, in addition to PSRs).

Next, Armour challenges the reliability of the violation memoran‐

dum, arguing that Officer Brown, the author of the document, had no

first‐hand knowledge of the conduct alleged in the memorandum. How‐

ever, the facts alleged in the violation memorandum are reliable for other

reasons: Armour’s offense in Missouri was supported by his guilty plea;

the fact that he left the jurisdiction without permission was proven by his

arrest in Missouri; Armour’s marijuana use was established by lab tests;

and the fact that he did not reside with a third‐party custodian was sup‐

ported by Armour’s statement to Officer Dykstra that his third‐party

custodian had relocated to Iowa. Further, Armour bears the burden of

proving that the violation memorandum is inaccurate or unreliable. See

United States v. Rollins, 544 F.3d 820, 838 (7th Cir. 2008). Armour does not

offer any evidence calling into question the accuracy or reliability of the
No. 15‐1604 9

B. Sentencing Factors

We next turn to Armour’s challenge to the factors the dis‐

trict court considered at his revocation hearing. The Seventh

Circuit has not conclusively determined a specific standard

for appellate review of the factors the district court consid‐

ered when resentencing a defendant at a revocation hearing.

See United States v. Raney, 797 F.3d 454, 465 (7th Cir. 2015)

(noting that our review of a sentence imposed in a revoca‐

tion proceeding is “highly deferential”); United States v. Pitre,

504 F.3d 657, 663–64 (7th Cir. 2007) (applying the plain error

standard of review when defendant did not raise arguments

before the district court challenging the court’s lack of expla‐

nation for a sentence imposed at a revocation hearing); see

also United States v. Clay, 752 F.3d 1106, 1108 (7th Cir. 2014)

(leaving open whether the standard of review for the factors

considered at a revocation hearing should be abuse of discre‐

tion or plain error). As in Clay, we do not need to resolve the

disagreement over the standard of review because Armour’s

argument fails under both abuse of discretion and the more

deferential plain error standard. See 752 F.3d at 1108.  

Armour argues that the district court abused its discre‐

tion by relying primarily on a factor from the sentencing

statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)—“the need for the sentence

imposed ... to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to pro‐

mote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for

the offense”—that is not listed in the statute governing post‐

revocation sentencing, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). In Clay, we con‐

cluded that considering § 3553(a)(2)(A) in revoking super‐

                                                                                                             

violation memorandum. Thus, the district court did not plainly err in

adopting the facts in the violation memorandum.
10 No. 15‐1604

vised release is not procedural error, thereby joining the ma‐

jority of circuits that have addressed the question. 752 F.3d at

1107. As long as “the district court relies primarily on the fac‐

tors listed in § 3583(e), including the nature and circum‐

stances of the violations, the history and characteristics of

the defendant, the need to protect the public, and the need

for adequate deterrence,” then § 3553(a)(2)(A) may also be

considered. Id. at 1108 (emphasis added).

Although the district court referred to § 3553(a)(2)(A), the

court relied primarily on factors listed in § 3553(a)(1), name‐

ly, “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the his‐

tory and characteristics” of Armour. First, the court dis‐

cussed how Armour has “had a lot of trouble obeying the

law over the years” and noted that his latest violation—the

beating of his eight‐year‐old son—was “exceptionally trou‐

bling.” The court also discussed Armour’s other violations of

supervised release. Second, the court considered

§ 3553(a)(2)(C)—“the need for the sentence imposed ... to

protect the public from further crimes of the defendant”—

when it stated:  

So you have numerous prior incarcerations

and crimes. You show little improvement in

your way of life. I only hope that this addition‐

al term of imprisonment will provide you with

time to rethink your ways, help you with your

drug addiction, and keep you from coming out

and getting in further trouble with the law.

Although the district court also considered

§ 3553(a)(2)(A), stating, “I believe this sentence adequately

reflects the seriousness of the offense, promotes respect for

the law, provides just punishment, and hopefully affords ad‐
No. 15‐1604 11

equate deterrence,” a review of this comment within the

context of the full revocation transcript shows that this was a

concluding remark and not the court’s primary considera‐

tion. Additionally, as we noted in Clay, “there is significant

overlap between [the factors listed in § 3583(e)] and

§ 3553(a)(2)(A): the nature of a violation includes its serious‐

ness, and promoting respect for the law is a means of deter‐

ring future violations.” 752 F.3d at 1108–09 (internal citations

and quotation marks omitted). Thus, it was neither plain er‐

ror nor an abuse of discretion for the district court to impose

a sentence of twenty‐four months in prison and a one‐year

term of supervised release based on its consideration of the

above factors and Armour’s repeated violations.  

C. Length and Conditions of Supervised Release

Finally, we turn to Armour’s challenges to his one‐year

term of supervised release and to various conditions associ‐

ated with it. We review the imposition of a condition of su‐

pervised release for an abuse of discretion if it is a contested

condition (i.e., defendant objected below), while we review

uncontested conditions for plain error. United States v.

Kappes, 782 F.3d 828, 844 (7th Cir. 2015). Armour clearly ob‐

jected to all of the conditions of supervised release after they

were imposed by the sentencing judge, so we review for an

abuse of discretion.2

                                                  2 We note that there is “some tension in our cases as to the proper

standard of review when a defendant fails to object (or, more accurately,

take exception) after the sentencing judge imposes a condition to which

the defendant had no notice.” Id. at 843–44 (internal quotation marks

omitted). However, since Armour objected after the conditions were im‐

posed, we do not need to resolve this issue at this time.
12 No. 15‐1604

In United States v. Ross, this Court stated:

Under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), a sentencing court

has discretion to impose appropriate condi‐

tions of supervised release, to the extent that

such conditions (1) are reasonably related to

factors identified in § 3553(a), including the na‐

ture and circumstances of the offense and the

history and characteristics of the defendant; (2)

involve no greater deprivation of liberty than is

reasonably necessary for the purposes set forth

in § 3553(a); and (3) are consistent with the pol‐

icy statements issued by the Sentencing Com‐

mission. Policies emphasized by the Sentencing

Commission include deterrence, rehabilitation,

and protecting the public.

475 F.3d 871, 873 (7th Cir. 2007) (internal citation omitted).

1. One‐Year Term of Supervised Release

Armour argues that his term of supervised release is im‐

proper because the district court gave no justification for the

length of the supervised release. This Court reviews de novo

whether a judge adequately explained a chosen sentence.

United States v. Baker, 755 F.3d 515, 522 (7th Cir. 2014). Super‐

vised release is part of the sentence imposed, so the district

court’s justifications for imposing the twenty‐four months in

prison also apply to the one‐year term of supervised release.

See United States v. Thompson, 777 F.3d 368, 373 (7th Cir. 2015)

(noting that § 3583(c) confirms that conditions of supervised

release are part of the overall sentence). The factors set out in

§ 3583(c), which governs supervised release, are the same

§ 3553(a) factors that are set out in § 3583(e), which governs
No. 15‐1604 13

revocations. We have already determined that the district

court properly justified Armour’s sentence after considering

these factors, with particular emphasis on § 3553(a)(1)—“the

nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and

characteristics of the defendant”—and § 3553(a)(2)(C)—“the

need for the sentence imposed ... to protect the public from

further crimes of the defendant.” Thus, the district court

provided an adequate justification for Armour’s sentence,

which included his term of supervised release.  

2. Prohibition on Knowingly Being Present at a Place

Where Drugs are Illegally Sold

Next, Armour argues that the condition that he “shall not

knowingly be present at places where controlled substances

are illegally sold, used, distributed, or administered” is

vague and overbroad. He contends that the word “places” is

expansive and problematic because marijuana use is legal in

Illinois but illegal under federal law, creating “a conun‐

drum.” We find this unpersuasive. “A condition of super‐

vised release is unconstitutionally vague if it would not af‐

ford a person of reasonable intelligence with sufficient notice

as to the conduct prohibited.” United States v. Schave, 186

F.3d 839, 843 (7th Cir. 1999). The word “place” has a general‐

ly understood meaning—a building or area—such that a

person of reasonable intelligence would understand what is

prohibited by this condition. See, e.g., Merriam‐Webster (Oct.

13, 2015), http://www.merriam‐webster.com/dictionary/place

(providing that one definition of “place” is “a building or

area that is used for a particular purpose”). Thus, the district

court did not abuse its discretion in ordering this condition.
14 No. 15‐1604

3. Reporting to the Probation Officer as Directed

During his supervised release, Armour is also required to

“report to the probation officer in a manner and frequency

as directed by the Court or Probation.” Armour argues that

this poses a risk of inconsistent law enforcement since Ar‐

mour could be required to do as little as call the probation

officer semi‐annually, or he could be subject to more rigor‐

ous requirements, such as appearing in person twice a day.

We agree with the government’s argument that Armour’s

speculative concern is not supported by any evidence. Addi‐

tionally, this condition is justified by 18 U.S.C. § 3603(2)’s re‐

quirement that a probation officer remain informed of the

conduct and condition of a person under supervision. This

reporting condition will facilitate the probation officer’s

compliance with this statutory requirement. Further, the

condition is consistent with the policy goal of rehabilitation,

as it should allow the probation officer to help Armour

“bring about improvements in his conduct and condition.”

§ 3603(3). Therefore, the imposition of this condition was not

an abuse of discretion.  

4. The “Dangerous Weapon” Prohibition

The district court prohibited Armour from possessing a

“firearm, ammunition, destructive device or any other dan‐

gerous weapon.” Armour challenges this ban as unconstitu‐

tionally vague and overbroad. Since a person of reasonable

intelligence would have sufficient notice as to the conduct

prohibited—not possessing dangerous weapons—this condi‐

tion is not unconstitutionally vague. See Schave, 186 F.3d at

843. United States v. Watts supports this conclusion. In Watts,

we affirmed a conviction for assault with a dangerous

weapon with intent to do bodily harm after the defendant
No. 15‐1604 15

threw a forty‐four pound chair at a corrections officer. 798

F.3d 650, 651, 655 (7th Cir. 2015). We noted that although “[i]t

would be better if the statute stated that ‘dangerous weapon’

includes objects used, though not designed to be used, as

weapons ... it is not a fatal infirmity.” Id. at 653. The same

logic applies here. Thus, the district court did not abuse its

discretion in ordering this condition.

5. Reporting Changes in Residence or Employment

The district court required Armour to “notify Probation

at least ten days prior to or as soon as you know about any

changes in residence and any time you leave a job or accept a

job.” Armour argues that the reporting requirement for any

change in residence is vague and unnecessary, citing Kappes.

However, Armour takes the Kappes holding out of context. In

Kappes, this Court found that the condition that defendant

notify his probation officer of any “change in ... employ‐

ment” was overly vague because it failed to indicate

“whether change in employment just means changing em‐

ployers or also includes changing from one position to an‐

other for the same employer at the same workplace.” 782

F.3d at 849. This can be distinguished from the reporting

condition here, which makes clear that it applies when Ar‐

mour relocates to a new residence or leaves or accepts a job.  

Armour also argues that given that he is unemployed,

there should be no condition pertaining to his employment,

relying on our decision in United States v. Thompson. In

Thompson, we held that it was inappropriate to impose a

condition that the childless, single “defendant shall support

his or her dependents” because the condition “assumes arbi‐

trarily and maybe inaccurately that should [defendant] ever

acquire dependents he will have ... the resources necessary
16 No. 15‐1604

to support [them].” 777 F.3d at 376. However, Armour’s case

is distinguishable. While it is unwarranted to assume that a

defendant will have the resources to support hypothetical

future dependents, it is reasonable to think that if Armour

accepts a job, he will be able to comply with this simple re‐

porting requirement. Unlike the defendant in Thompson,

Armour is not required to take on responsibilities that he

may not be able to fulfill; rather, he need only notify his pro‐

bation officer if he accepts a job. Thus, the district court did

not abuse its discretion by imposing this condition.

6. Prohibition Against Knowingly Interacting with Felons

The district court prohibited Armour from “meet[ing],

communicat[ing], or otherwise interact[ing] with any person

whom [he] know[s] to be a convicted felon ... or to be en‐

gaged in or planning to engage in criminal activity unless

[he is] granted permission to do so by the probation officer.”

Armour argues that banning interactions with a convicted

felon serves no valid purpose, but we disagree. The district

court stated that the purpose of this condition is to limit Ar‐

mour’s exposure to triggers of negative behavior. Further,

this condition includes a knowledge requirement, which dis‐

tinguishes it from the conditions found to be fatally vague in

Kappes, 782 F.3d at 848–49 (defendant forbidden from “asso‐

ciat[ing] with any person convicted of a felony, unless grant‐

ed permission to do so by the probation officer”), and

Thompson, 777 F.3d at 377 (same). Thus, this was not an

abuse of discretion, especially given the district court’s dis‐

cussion of Armour’s “long history of abusing drugs and
No. 15‐1604 17

breaking the law, and despite numerous incarcerations, con‐

tinued negative behavior.”3

7. Home Visits Between 6:00 AM and 11:00 PM

Next, we turn to the condition that Armour “permit a

probation officer to visit [him] at home or any other reason‐

able location between the hours of 6:00 AM and 11:00 PM, un‐

less investigating a violation or in case of emergency.” Ar‐

mour argues that unlike probationers and parolees, his

Fourth Amendment rights are fully in place during super‐

vised release. He claims that allowing a probation officer to

search his property without a valid warrant is an infringe‐

                                                  3 Armour also argues that giving the probation officer the power to

determine whether Armour has permission to associate with convicted

felons violates the non‐delegation principle, citing United States v. Voelker,

489 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 2007). Armour takes issue with the probation of‐

ficer’s authority to decide whether Armour can “work at a job where an‐

other felon is employed, attend a church where another felon worships,

or shop at a store where a felon shops.” However, Voelker is distinguisha‐

ble from this case. In Voelker, the district court prohibited the defendant,

who pled guilty to possessing child pornography, from associating with

minors without the prior approval of the probation officer. Id. at 153. The

Third Circuit found improper the “unbridled delegation of authority”

that made the probation officer “the sole authority for deciding if [de‐

fendant] will ever have unsupervised contact with any minor, including

his own children, for the rest of his life,” with “no guidance whatsoever

for the exercise of that discretion.” Id. at 154. Delegating to a probation

officer the authority to decide whether an offender will ever have unsu‐

pervised contact with his children again is more serious than delegating

to a probation officer the authority to decide if Armour can interact with

a convicted felon during his term of supervised release. Therefore, Ar‐

mour has not shown that the district court’s decision to impose this con‐

dition was an abuse of discretion.
18 No. 15‐1604

ment on his Fourth Amendment rights. Armour is incorrect.

This Court has stated:  

Although it is true that persons on supervised

release, like prisoners, do not relinquish all

constitutional rights, those rights are not unfet‐

tered. A court may impose conditions of su‐

pervised release which implicate fundamental

rights so long as those conditions are reasona‐

bly related to the ends of rehabilitation and

protection of the public from recidivism.

United States v. Sines, 303 F.3d 793, 801 (7th Cir. 2002) (cita‐

tions omitted). This condition is reasonably related to reha‐

bilitation and protecting the public from recidivism since it

should allow probation officers to help Armour reintegrate

into society after his time in prison and to ensure that he is

abiding by the conditions of his supervised release. See John‐

son v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 709 (describing supervised

release as “the decompression stage” between prison and

full release and noting that defendants may need help

achieving “successful reintegration”).

Armour further argues that that the term “other reasona‐

ble location” is vague and may subject Armour to searches at

a church, hospital, or funeral home. However, under most

circumstances, those visits would be unreasonable and thus

barred by the condition itself. Therefore, imposing this con‐

dition was not an abuse of discretion.  

8. Notifications of Arrests or Law Enforcement Question‐

ing  

The district court also required Armour to “notify Proba‐

tion within 72 hours of being arrested or questioned by law
No. 15‐1604 19

enforcement.” Armour argues that this condition violates his

Fifth Amendment rights. We disagree. In Kappes, the defend‐

ant made this same argument in contesting an identical con‐

dition of supervised release. 782 F.3d at 850. This Court said

it did not see “how the mere fact of an arrest or law en‐

forcement contact is itself incriminating” and that “this con‐

dition assists the probation officer in monitoring the defend‐

ant’s conduct and compliance with the other conditions of

release, most notably, the mandatory condition that the de‐

fendant commit no other criminal offenses.” Id. Accordingly,

the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing this

condition.

9. Prohibition on Controlled or Psychoactive Substances  

Finally, Armour’s supervised release includes the condi‐

tion that he “shall not purchase, possess, use, distribute, or

administer any controlled substance or psychoactive sub‐

stance.” Armour is also required to, “at the direction of Pro‐

bation, participate in a program for substance abuse treat‐

ment [and] abide by the rules of the treatment provider.”

Armour points out that the district court gave a lengthy oral

explanation of the term “psychoactive” at the revocation

hearing but that the explanation was not included in the

written judgment. According to Armour, this is problematic

because if a dispute were to arise about the condition, the

parties are more likely to have access to the judgment than

the sentencing transcript. However, sentencing judges are

simply required to “orally pronounce all conditions, with the

written judgment only clarifying the oral pronouncement in

a manner that is not inconsistent with an unambiguous oral

provision.” Kappes, 782 F.3d at 839; see also Fed. R. Crim. P.

35(c) (“As used in this rule, ‘sentencing’ means the oral an‐
20 No. 15‐1604

nouncement of the sentence.”); United States v. Bryant, 754

F.3d 443, 447 (7th Cir. 2014) (“[W]hen the written sentence

differs from the oral, the oral [sentence] takes precedence.”).

Thus, if a dispute were to arise, there is no question that the

oral explanation would control, and the district court did not

abuse its discretion.

Armour also argues that he should have been given a

copy of the treatment provider’s rules prior to his resentenc‐

ing so that he would have had adequate notice and an op‐

portunity to object to them. We disagree. It would be more

problematic to require a judge to provide these rules prior to

sentencing, as it would be impractical to attempt to antici‐

pate developments in how substance abuse is treated and to

predict the type and success of the treatment the defendant

receives while in prison. See Thompson, 777 F.3d at 374 (not‐

ing that “because conditions of supervised release, though

imposed at sentencing, do not become operational until the

defendant is released, the judge has to guess at the time of

sentencing what conditions are likely to make sense in what

may be the distant future”).

Armour also finds it problematic that the probation office

can determine how long he will be subject to drug treatment

and testing, arguing that this violates the non‐delegation

principle. Armour cites United States v. Voelker, which is dis‐

tinguishable. In Voelker, the court provided “no guidance

whatsoever” for the probation office’s exercise of discretion.

489 F.3d 139, 154 (3d Cir. 2007). By contrast, the district court

in this case noted at the revocation hearing that Armour

would only be subject to drug treatment and testing until it

would “no longer assist [him] to avoid committing further
No. 15‐1604 21

crimes.” Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its dis‐

cretion in ordering this condition.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM.