SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1487-15T1

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

JENNIFER R. WIGGINS,

Defendant-Appellant.

___________________________________

Submitted May 2, 2017 – Decided

Before Judges Ostrer and Vernoia.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New 

Jersey, Law Division, Cumberland County, 

Indictment No. 15-01-0010.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney 

for appellant (Jay L. Wilensky, Assistant 

Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the 

brief).

Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General, 

attorney for respondent (Arielle E. Katz, 

Deputy Attorney General, of counsel and on the 

brief).

PER CURIAM

The principal issue in this appeal pertains to the community 

caretaking exception to the warrant requirement. See, e.g., Cady 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." 

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.

May 31, 2017
2 A-1487-15T1

v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441, 93 S. Ct. 2523, 2528, 37 L. Ed.

2d 706, 714-15 (1973); State v. Scriven, 226 N.J. 20, 38 (2016);

State v. Bogan, 200 N.J. 61, 78-80 (2009); State v. Diloreto, 180 

N.J. 264, 275-76 (2004). Invoking that exception to justify a 

motor vehicle stop, the trial court denied defendant's motion to 

suppress drugs and weapons discovered after the stop. Defendant 

Jennifer Wiggins subsequently pleaded guilty to two counts of 

second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-

5(b), and fourth-degree possession of marijuana, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-

10(a)(3). Pursuant to the plea agreement, the court sentenced her 

to an aggregate term of five years imprisonment, with forty-two 

months of parole ineligibility. 

Defendant challenges the court's denial of her suppression 

motion. She also contends, for the first time on appeal, that her 

conviction was barred by L. 2013, c. 117. We affirm.

I.

The trial court credited the testimony of the sole witness 

at the suppression hearing, Vineland Police Officer Mustafa 

Ozdemir. He testified that shortly before midnight on September 

2, 2013, while working alone on drunk driving patrol, he observed 
3 A-1487-15T1

a Honda Accord with a non-working center brake light1 as it 

approached an intersection. Viewing the non-working light as a 

safety hazard, Ozdemir performed a traffic stop in order to inform 

the driver the light was not working. He admitted that he also 

believed the non-working light was a motor vehicle violation.2

Ozdemir parked behind the Honda and cautiously approached the 

vehicle on the passenger side. He observed a frontseat passenger 

hand a bag of green vegetation to a backseat passenger. At that 

point, the officer's concern about the brake light apparently 

receded. The officer then illuminated his flashlight, announced 

his presence, and asked the driver for credentials. During this 

initial exchange, he detected the odor of burnt marijuana and 

noticed that the three occupants appeared to have bloodshot eyes. 

Backup soon arrived. In the course of the police officers'

subsequent investigation, they seized marijuana; discovered and 

seized one handgun and crack cocaine in the possession of a 

 

1 Also called a "cyclops brake light," the light is defined under 

N.J.S.A. 39:3-66.3 as a "high-mounted rear stoplight on the 

vertical centerline." 

2 He stated, "As part of my community care taking, as I explained 

earlier, you — we have — a reasonable person would believe that a 

motor vehicle violation was, in fact, occurring. And, as part of 

the community care taking, one of our duties is to advise the 

community of possible hazards." 
4 A-1487-15T1

passenger who was patted down; and discovered another handgun 

partly under the front passenger seat, which was later seized.

3 

The trial judge credited the officer's stated reason for 

stopping the vehicle — to inform the driver of the non-working 

light. The court rejected the argument that reference to the 

light was a pretext for an investigatory stop. In the judge's 

view, the officer's cautious approach to the vehicle was not 

inconsistent with his purpose in conducting the stop. 

The court relied in part on three of our decisions sustaining 

traffic stops based on the community caretaking exception: State 

v. Cohen, 347 N.J. Super. 375 (App. Div. 2002), State v. Martinez, 

260 N.J. Super. 75 (App. Div. 1992), and State v. Goetaski, 209 

N.J. Super. 362 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 104 N.J. 458 (1986), 

which we discuss at greater length below. The judge concluded 

that although a non-functioning center brake light was not then a 

motor vehicle violation, the center light nonetheless enhanced 

vehicle safety. Its inoperability therefore posed a safety hazard, 

and the officer was justified in stopping the vehicle under the 

community caretaking exception. 

On appeal, defendant contends:

 

3 According to the trial judge, a vehicle search pursuant to a 

warrant also led to the seizure of bullets, as well as heroin and 

additional cocaine. Defendant does not challenge the legality of 

any of the post-stop searches and seizures. 
5 A-1487-15T1

POINT I

THE STOP OF THE DEFENDANT'S CAR, PURPORTEDLY 

JUSTIFIED UNDER THE "COMMUNITY CARETAKING" 

EXCEPTION TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT, 

CONSTITUTED AN UNLAWFUL SEIZURE, AND ITS 

RESULT MUST THEREFORE BE SUPPRESSED. U.S. 

CONST., AMEND. IV; N.J. CONST. (1947), ART. 

1, PAR. 7.

POINT II

THE SEIZURE OF GUNS OCCURRED DURING THE 

STATUTORY AMNESTY PERIOD. ACCORDINGLY, 

POSSESSION OF THOSE GUNS CANNOT CONSTITUTE A 

CRIME, AND DEFENDANT'S PLEA MUST BE VACATED. 

(NOT RAISED BELOW).

II.

On a motion to suppress, we are bound to defer to the trial 

court's findings supported by sufficient credible evidence in the 

record, particularly when they are grounded in the judge's feel 

of the case and ability to assess the witnesses' demeanor and 

credibility. State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 15 (2009); State v. 

Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 243-44 (2007). We review issues of law de 

novo. State v. Cryan, 320 N.J. Super. 325, 328 (App. Div. 1999).

"The community-caretaking doctrine recognizes that police 

officers provide a wide range of social services outside of their 

traditional law enforcement and criminal investigatory roles." 

Scriven, supra, 226 N.J. at 38 (internal quotation marks and 

citations omitted). The doctrine provides an independent 

justification for intrusions into citizens' liberty that would 
6 A-1487-15T1

otherwise require a showing of probable cause or reasonable and 

articulable suspicion of criminal behavior. Diloreto, supra, 180 

N.J. at 276. In applying the doctrine, the courts have long 

recognized the importance of law enforcement's concern for the 

proper and safe operation of automobiles. See Cady, supra, 413 

U.S. at 441, 93 S. Ct. at 2528, 37 L. Ed. 2d at 714-15 (establishing 

the doctrine within the context of state regulation of vehicles).

Our Supreme Court has found that the community caretaker role 

permits officers to "check on the welfare or safety of a citizen 

who appears in need of help on the roadway without securing a 

warrant or offending the Constitution." Scriven, supra, 226 N.J.

at 38. 

The doctrine entails a two-part inquiry. First, a court must 

ask whether the officer has reacted to an objectively reasonable

community concern. Id. at 39 (stating that officers must have an 

"objectively reasonable basis" to stop a vehicle to provide aid 

or check a motorist's welfare); Diloreto, supra, 180 N.J. at 278 

("[T]he caretaker doctrine permits the police to exceed a field 

inquiry's level of intrusiveness, provided that their action is 

. . . objectively reasonable under the totality of 

circumstances."); see also State v. Drummond, 305 N.J. Super. 84, 

88 (App. Div. 1997).
7 A-1487-15T1

That concern must serve as a distinct motivation for the 

officer's conduct, divorced from any desire to further a criminal 

investigation. In other words, community caretaking may not serve 

as a pretext for a warrantless intrusion into a citizen's liberty 

that does not satisfy another warrant exception. Bogan, supra, 

200 N.J. at 77; see Diloreto, supra, 180 N.J. at 280. However, 

the "divorce" between the two police functions "need only relate 

to a sound and independent basis for each role, and not to any 

requirement for exclusivity in terms of time or space." Bogan, 

supra, 200 N.J. at 77 (quoting State v. D'Amour, 834 A.2d 214, 217 

(N.H. 2003)). Notably, an officer may engage in community 

caretaking concurrently with a criminal investigation. Ibid.

Second, the court must discern whether the actions taken by 

an officer pursuant to his community caretaking remained within 

the limited scope justified by the caretaking function. As with 

all police stops, the officer's conduct must be "reasonably related 

in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in 

the first place." State v. Dickey, 152 N.J. 468, 476 (1998) 

(quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1879, 20 

L. Ed. 2d 889, 905 (1968)). Moreover, an officer's "community 

caretaking inquiry must not be 'overbearing or harassing in 

nature.'" Drummond, supra, 305 N.J. Super. at 89 (quoting State 

v. Davis, 104 N.J. 490, 503 (1986)). 
8 A-1487-15T1

As these legal standards imply, the two-part application of 

the community caretaking doctrine is a fact-sensitive inquiry. In 

several cases, we have found that police had an objectively

reasonable basis to engage in community caretaking. For example, 

in Cohen, supra, 347 N.J. Super. at 380-81, we stated that police 

were authorized to conduct a stop to inspect darkly-tinted windows 

that obstructed vision and posed an apparent "hazardous vehicular 

condition." In Martinez, supra, 260 N.J. Super. at 77-78, we 

authorized a stop of a vehicle travelling less than ten m.p.h. in 

a twenty-five m.p.h. residential zone without flashers at 2:00 

a.m. because there were reasonable concerns that the driver was 

in distress, the vehicle was disabled, or the slow driving posed

a hazard to other motorists. And in Goetaski, supra, 209 N.J. 

Super. at 364-65, we held the officer was justified in stopping a 

motorist driving slowly at 4:00 a.m., with a left blinker flashing, 

while on the shoulder of a rural state highway. 

In addition to circumstances presented in Cohen, Martinez, 

and Goetaski, which the trial court cited, we have relied upon the 

community caretaking doctrine in ruling that police were 

authorized to stop a vehicle at 12:20 a.m. after it was weaving 

within its lane at thirty-six m.p.h. in a forty-five m.p.h. zone.

State v. Washington, 296 N.J. Super. 569, 571-72 (App. Div. 1997). 

Police were also authorized by the doctrine to investigate a 
9 A-1487-15T1

parked, darkened car at a closed car wash at 11:44 p.m. Drummond, 

supra, 305 N.J. Super. at 86-88. In both cases, officers 

reasonably suspected that the occupants might be in distress, pose

a threat to others, or need assistance.

On the other hand, distinguishing Goetaski, Martinez, and 

Washington, the Court in Scriven held the trial court correctly 

determined that the community caretaking doctrine did not 

authorize an officer to stop a motorist who was operating his high 

beams under circumstances that did not affect oncoming vehicles 

or otherwise affect the safety of others. Scriven, supra, 226 

N.J. at 36, 38-40. The Court noted that the driver's use of his 

high beams "did not suggest that the driver of the car was impaired 

or that the vehicle had a problem." Id. at 39 (internal quotation 

marks omitted). The Court recognized that an officer may instruct 

a driver to dim high beams if their brightness impairs an officer's 

or road workers' ability to perform tasks; yet, the officer in 

Scriven stopped the vehicle for a different reason — he mistakenly 

and unreasonably believed the driver violated N.J.S.A. 39:3-60. 

Id. at 39-40. 

Similarly, in State v. Cryan, we found that the community 

caretaking doctrine did not justify a stop when the driver merely 

paused for about five seconds after a stoplight turned green at 
10 A-1487-15T1

approximately 4:24 a.m.

4 Cryan, supra, 320 N.J. Super. at 327, 

331. Simply put, that delay was not enough for an objectively 

reasonable officer to conclude that the driver was experiencing 

difficulty, thereby posing a hazard to himself or others. Id. at 

331.

Applying these principles, we discern no error in the trial 

court's decision. Given our standard of review, we are constrained 

to defer to the trial judge's determination that the officer 

stopped the Honda in order to advise the driver of the non-working 

brake light. The judge rejected the argument that the brake light 

condition was a pretext to conduct an investigatory stop. 

We also discern no error in the court's conclusion that the 

stop furthered the community caretaking purpose. Although the law 

had not yet required motorists to maintain operational center 

brake lights,5 it is evident nonetheless that the light serves the 

purpose of making vehicles safer. The center brake light's obvious 

design is to alert following drivers that a vehicle's brakes have 

been applied and it is about to slow or stop. As the center brake 

 

4 By contrast, a significant delay may justify an objectively 

reasonable concern about the driver's welfare, or raise a 

reasonable and articulable suspicion that his inattentiveness was 

due to intoxicants.

5 The Legislature required center brake lights in cars made after 

1985 when it adopted L. 2013, c. 230, § 2, which became effective 

on March 1, 2014.
11 A-1487-15T1

light may be more noticeable than the other lower-situated brake 

lights, it may prompt the following driver to slow sooner and help 

avoid rear end collisions. 

The officer observed that the brake light was not working. 

That equipment condition affected the safety of the passengers in 

the vehicle and those in any vehicle that might follow it. Unlike 

cases involving a slow travelling vehicle, where an officer may 

only suspect equipment trouble or other distress, the equipment 

trouble in this case was readily apparent to the officer. 

Consistent with the principles of the community caretaking 

doctrine, the officer was authorized to conduct a limited traffic 

stop to advise the driver of the Honda that the brake light was 

not working.

The scope of the officer's inquiry was also appropriate. It 

bears repeating that, consistent with the principles enumerated 

in Dickey, an officer may not expand a community caretaking stop 

into a free-ranging investigatory stop. Notably, however, our 

courts have consistently found that traffic stops are an 

appropriate means of responding to a reasonable community 

caretaking concern. See Cohen, supra, 347 N.J. Super. at 380-81;

Martinez, supra, 260 N.J. Super. at 77-78; Goetaski, supra, 209 

N.J. Super. at 364-65. We have acknowledged an officer need not 

simply permit a community hazard to pass by. The law does not 
12 A-1487-15T1

dictate the precise manner in which officials may perform their 

caretaking function. See Bogan, supra, 200 N.J. at 81 (noting 

that, when applying the community caretaking doctrine, "[t]he 

question is not whether the police could have done something 

different, but whether their actions, when viewed as a whole, were 

objectively reasonable"). 

We hasten to add, however, that if the purpose of a stop is 

to advise a motorist of non-operational equipment that does not 

constitute a motor vehicle violation, it is questionable whether 

the officer can go beyond that purpose and even request the 

driver's credentials. Cf. Scriven, supra, 226 N.J. at 40 (noting 

that the officer did not simply "signal to the driver to dim her 

high beams because they were interfering with his mission," but 

instead effectuated a motor vehicle stop because he unreasonably 

believed the driver violated the law). As the United States 

Supreme Court has held, absent applicability of a warrant 

exception, "stopping an automobile and detaining the driver in 

order to check his driver's license and the registration of the 

automobile are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment." Delaware 

v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 1401, 59 L. Ed. 2d 

660, 673 (1979). 

However, we need not define in detail the scope of activity 

authorized by the community caretaking doctrine in a case like 
13 A-1487-15T1

this. As the officer approached the vehicle, he observed the 

frontseat passenger hand off a bag of green vegetation. That 

plain view observation provided a new and separate crime-fightingrelated basis to continue the stop. See Bogan, supra, 200 N.J.

at 379-80 (noting the plain view doctrine permitted an officer to 

question and detain the defendant without "judicial permission" 

after the officer had lawfully entered the apartment where 

defendant was hiding pursuant to the community caretaking 

doctrine).

We acknowledge that the State now asserts an alternative 

basis for sustaining the stop. Citing Heien v. North Carolina, 

___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 530, 190 L. Ed. 2d 475 (2014), and State 

v. Sutherland, 445 N.J. Super. 358 (App. Div.), leave to appeal 

granted, ___ N.J. ___ (2016), the State contends that the officer 

had a reasonable and articulable suspicion of a violation of 

N.J.S.A. 39:3-66.3, even though the Legislature did not require 

center brake lights until several months after the stop. The 

State apparently did not press this argument before the trial 

court, nor did the trial court address it.6 Inasmuch as we affirm 

the trial court's decision grounded in the community caretaker 

 

6 We do not have the State's trial court brief. However, in oral 

argument, which occurred before Heien and Sutherland were decided, 

the assistant prosecutor relied upon the community caretaking 

function as a basis for the stop. 
14 A-1487-15T1

doctrine, we need not address whether a reasonable mistake of law 

might have justified the stop. 

In sum, the trial court did not err in denying defendant's 

motion to suppress.

III.

Defendant contends her conviction should be set aside 

because, under L. 2003, c. 117, her possession of guns in September 

2013 was not a crime. We disagree. 

The statute upon which defendant relies states:

Any person who has in his possession a handgun 

in violation of subsection b. of [N.J.S.A.

2C:39-5] . . . on the effective date of this 

act [August 8, 2013] may retain possession of 

that handgun . . . for a period of not more 

than 180 days after the effective date of this 

act. During that time period, the possessor 

of that handgun . . . shall:

(1) transfer that firearm to any person 

lawfully entitled to own or possess it; or

(2) voluntarily surrender that firearm 

pursuant to the provisions of [N.J.S.A. 2C:39-

12].

[L. 2013, c. 117, § 1.]

Under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-12, a person will not be held criminally 

liable for possessing a firearm "if after giving written notice 

of his intention to do so . . . he voluntarily surrendered the 

weapon[.]"
15 A-1487-15T1

Defendant had the burden to prove the amnesty law applied to

her, as it served her interest to do so, and the amnesty law did 

not create an element of the offenses charged. See N.J.S.A. 2C:1-

13(d) (stating that the burden of proof for a finding of fact that

is not an element of the offense rests on the party whose interests 

will be furthered if the finding were made). She has failed to 

do so. Instead, she admitted in her plea colloquy that she 

violated N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5 in September 2013.

According to the statute's plain language, see In re Kollman, 

210 N.J. 557, 568 (2012) (stating if the statute's plain language 

is clear, the court's interpretative task is complete), it applies 

only to persons in possession of a weapon on the effective date. 

See State ex rel. C.L.H.'s Weapons, 443 N.J. Super. 48, 56 (App. 

Div. 2015). Defendant presented no evidence that she possessed 

the firearms on August 8, 2013, that she provided written notice 

to authorities, or that she voluntarily surrendered the firearms. 

The statute was not intended to shield from prosecution a person 

who "voluntarily surrender[s]" a weapon only "after it has already 

been seized" by authorities. Id. at 56-57 (internal quotation 

marks omitted). In sum, the statute has no impact on her 

conviction. 

Affirmed.