ATTORNEYS FOR PETITIONER: ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENT:

RANDAL J. KALTENMARK GREGORY F. ZOELLER

ZIAADDIN MOLLABASHY INDIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL

BARNES & THORNBURG, LLP JOHN P. LOWREY

Indianapolis, IN ANDREW T. GREIN

DEPUTY ATTORNEYS GENERAL

MARK S. BERNSTEIN Indianapolis, IN

AKERMAN LLP

Chicago, IL

IN THE

INDIANA TAX COURT

BRANDENBURG INDUSTRIAL SERVICE )

COMPANY, an Illinois corporation, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) Cause No. 49T10-1206-TA-00037 

)

INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF STATE )

REVENUE, )

)

Respondent. )

ORDER ON RESPONDENT’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

FOR PUBLICATION

August 10, 2016

WENTWORTH, J.

Brandenburg Industrial Service Company has appealed the Indiana Department 

of State Revenue’s denials of its claims for a refund of the sales and use tax remitted in

2006 and 2007 as well as its assessments of sales and use tax for the same period (the 

period at issue). The matter is currently before the Court on the Department’s Motion 
2

for Partial Summary Judgment and presents one issue for the Court to decide.1 The 

Court restates the issue as whether Brandenburg was a producer of scrap steel eligible 

for exemption under Indiana Code § 6-2.5-5-3 (the Equipment Exemption) and Indiana 

Code § 6-2.5-5-5.1 (the Consumption Exemption) during the period at issue.2 Upon 

review, the Court finds in favor of Brandenburg.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Brandenburg is an Illinois corporation that primarily processes and sells ferrous 

and non-ferrous metal to steel manufacturers throughout the United States. (See Pet’r 

Des’g Evid., Aff. Jack Jasinowski (“Jasinowski Aff.”) ¶¶ 27-28, 48.) Brandenburg 

engages in related businesses that provide access to the metal it processes and sells

from its facilities in Illinois, Indiana, Pennsylvania, and Puerto Rico, such as the 

demolition of retired assets, environmental remediation (e.g., asbestos abatement, soil 

remediation, or hazardous material removal), and site preparation. (See Pet’r Des’g 

Evid., Jasinowski Aff. ¶¶ 27-28, 30-32; Resp’t Des’g Evid., About the Company, 

BRANDENBURG.COM, http://www.brandenburg.com/AboutTheCompany.aspx (last visited 

Apr. 29, 2016).) Brandenburg’s Indiana facility is located inside the United States Steel 

Corporation’s Gary Works steel mill and is comprised of a scrap metal yard, a 

fabrication shop, a data processing center, a technology department, and a receiving 

department. (See Pet’r Des’g Evid., Jasinowski Aff. ¶ 27.)

 

1

 The issues not before the Court in this matter concern Brandenburg’s eligibility for exemption 

under Indiana Code § 6-2.5-3-2 (the Temporary Storage Exemption) as well as the propriety, 

timeliness, and constitutionality of the Department’s actions under Indiana Code § 6-8.1-3-3, 

Indiana Code § 6-8.1-5-2, and the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. (See

Pet’r First Am. Pet. Refund Sales & Use Tax ¶¶ 40-62.)

2

 The parties have designated evidence that contains confidential information. Accordingly, the 

Court will only provide that information necessary for the reader to understand its disposition of 

the issue presented. See generally Ind. Administrative Rule 9.
3

Brandenburg acquires the metal that it processes either by directly purchasing 

retired assets (e.g., boats, machinery, or railroad scrap) or by performing services in its 

related businesses, such as building demolition or environmental remediation, in 

exchange for the metal. (See Pet’r Des’g Evid., Jasinowski Aff. ¶¶ 34-37; Resp’t Des’g 

Evid., Ex. 9 (“L. Jasinowski Depo.”) at 15-16.) (See also Resp’t Des’g Evid., Ex. 12 at 

3837-38, Ex. 13 at 3871-72, Ex. 15 at 3882-83 (sample contract excerpts).) Since 

1993, Brandenburg has processed the metal using the following seven-step process:

1. Identification: Identify the location, quantity, and alloy 

content/chemistry of the metal by reviewing pertinent 

documentation, visually inspecting the metal, and using a 

portable spectrometer;

2. Removal: Remove the metal from the retired asset/building by 

either surgically extracting it from the object or demolishing the 

object and removing the metal from the debris;

3. Decontamination: Remove contaminants, such as concrete, 

brick, wood, or insulation, from the metal retrieved in Step 2; 

4. Cutting: Reduce the oversized pieces of decontaminated metal 

for further transporting and processing by cutting the metal to 

more manageable sizes;

5. Sorting: Separate the cut metal into various categories of 

ferrous (e.g., No. 1 heavy melt or plate and structural steel) and 

non-ferrous (e.g., copper, brass, nickel, aluminum, or stainless 

steel) metal;

6. Preparation: Ensure the metals sorted in Step 5 meet 

customer specifications, which may require additional size, 

shape, or thickness alterations as well as additional sorting; and

7. Staging: Stockpile the prepared metals in specific locations for 

future loading and transport to customers.

(See Pet’r Des’g Evid., Jasinowski Aff. ¶¶ 38-47, 51, 59-65, Exs. S-T.) (See also Resp’t 

Des’g Evid., Ex. 8 (“J. Jasinowski Depo.”) at 84-85, 93-100.)
4

In December of 2009 and 2010, Brandenburg filed four refund claims with the 

Department in which it asserted that several items it used in processing metal were 

exempt from sales and use tax under the Equipment and Consumption Exemptions. 

(See Pet’r Des’g Evid., Jasinowski Aff. ¶¶ 8-9, 19-20, Exs. A-B, K-L.) The Department 

ultimately denied all four of Brandenburg’s refund claims by, among other things, 

issuing Proposed Assessments that in effect rescinded its prior approval of two of the 

four claims. (See Pet’r Des’g Evid., Jasinowski Aff. ¶¶ 10-15, 21-22, Exs. C-H, M-N.) 

Brandenburg protested the Department’s denials of its refund claims and the Proposed 

Assessments, which the Department subsequently denied. (See Pet’r Des’g Evid., 

Jasinowski Aff. ¶¶ 16-17, 23-26, Exs. I-J, O-Q.) 

On June 22, 2012, Brandenburg initiated this original tax appeal. On November 

16, 2015, after the Court resolved a procedural matter,3the Department moved for 

partial summary judgment and designated, among other things, its Proposed 

Assessments as evidence. (See Resp’t Des’g Evid., Exs. 1G-1H.) On April 21, 2016, 

the Court held a hearing on the Department’s Motion. Additional facts will be supplied 

when necessary.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is proper only when the designated evidence demonstrates 

that no genuine issues of material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment 

as a matter of law. Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). A genuine issue of material fact exists when a 

fact concerning an issue that would dispose of the case is in dispute or when the 

undisputed material facts support conflicting inferences regarding the resolution of an 

 

3

 See Brandenburg Indus. Serv. Co. v. Indiana Dep’t State Revenue, 26 N.E.3d 147 (Ind. Tax 

Ct. 2015) (denying in part and granting in part Brandenburg’s motion to compel). 
5

issue. Miller Pipeline Corp. v. Indiana Dep’t of State Revenue, 995 N.E.2d 733, 734 n.1 

(Ind. Tax Ct. 2013). “When any party has moved for summary judgment, the court may 

grant summary judgment for any other party upon the issues raised by the motion 

although no motion for summary judgment is filed by such party.” T.R. 56(B). 

LAW

During the period at issue, Indiana imposed a sales tax on retail transactions 

made in Indiana. IND. CODE § 6-2.5-2-1(a) (2006). Indiana also imposed a use tax 

when sales tax was not remitted on tangible personal property that was acquired in a 

retail transaction and was subsequently stored, used, or consumed in Indiana, 

regardless of where the retail transaction occurred or where the retail merchant was 

located. See IND. CODE § 6-2.5-3-2(a) (2006). See also Horseshoe Hammond, LLC v. 

Indiana Dep’t of State Revenue, 865 N.E.2d 725, 727 n.4 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2007) (providing 

that the use tax is complementary to the sales tax because it is designed to reach outof-state purchases of tangible personal property that are subsequently used in Indiana), 

review denied.

Indiana also exempted certain retail transactions by the producers of goods from 

the imposition of sales and use tax (the Manufacturing Exemptions). See, e.g., Harlan 

Sprague Dawley, Inc. v. Indiana Dep’t of State Revenue, 605 N.E.2d 1222, 1228 (Ind. 

Tax Ct. 1992); IND. CODE § 6-2.5-3-4(a) (2006). For example, the Equipment Exemption

exempted transactions involving manufacturing machinery, tools, and equipment from 

sales and use tax “if the person acquiring that property acquire[d] it for direct use in the 

direct production, manufacture, fabrication, assembly, extraction, mining, processing, 

refining, or finishing of other tangible personal property.” IND. CODE § 6-2.5-5-3(b) 
6

(2006) (amended 2007). Likewise, the Consumption Exemption exempted transactions 

from sales and use tax “if the person acquiring the property acquire[d] it for direct 

consumption as a material to be consumed in the direct production of other tangible 

personal property in the person’s business of manufacturing, processing, refining, 

repairing, mining, agriculture, horticulture, floriculture, or arboriculture.” IND. CODE § 6-

2.5-5-5.1(b) (2006).

ANALYSIS

The question before the Court is whether Brandenburg was a producer of scrap 

steel during the period at issue. The parties do not dispute where Brandenburg’s 

process begins and ends, the absence of a chemically induced change in its raw 

material metals, or the marketability of its scrap metal end product. (See, e.g., Resp’t 

Reply Supp. Resp’t Mot. Summ. J. (“Resp’t Reply Br.”) at 3-5; Hr’g Tr. at 36-37, 48-51.) 

The Department’s claim for partial summary judgment focuses on whether 

Brandenburg’s process 1) falls within the scope of the Equipment and Consumption 

Exemptions and 2) substantially transforms its raw materials into new, marketable 

goods, i.e., produces “other tangible personal property.” (Compare, e.g., Resp’t Mem. 

Supp. Partial Summ. J. (“Resp’t Mem.”) at 5-7, 9-16 and Hr’g Tr. at 7-15 with Pet’r 

Resp. Resp’t Mot. Partial Summ. J. (“Pet’r Resp. Br.”) at 19-20, 26-30 and Hr’g Tr. at 

55-60.)

(1)

The Department claims that it is entitled to partial summary judgment because 

Brandenburg’s demolition process is not an activity that is expressly stated in either the 

Equipment or the Consumption Exemption statutes. (See Resp’t Mem. at 5-9.) The 
7

Department explains that each exemption statute contains a specific list of activities that 

is “a ‘comprehensive description of [the] various means of production[,]’” and the 

absence of an activity from either list “indicates that the activity probably is not 

production.” (Resp’t Mem. at 6-7 (citation omitted).) As a result, the Department 

asserts that because Brandenburg’s demolition activities are not specifically listed 

exempt activities and are “inextricable” from its seven metal processing steps, 

Brandenburg is simply not engaged in production within the meaning or scope of either 

exemption as a matter of law.4 (See Resp’t Mem. at 6-7.) 

Previously, this Court has explained that the lists of activities set forth in the 

Equipment and Consumption Exemption statutes are an illustrative rather than an 

exhaustive list of activities capable of transforming tangible personal property into a 

new, marketable product. See, e.g., Rotation Prods. Corp. v. Dep’t of State Revenue, 

690 N.E.2d 795, 799 (Ind. Tax Ct. 1998) (explaining that a taxpayer’s eligibility for 

manufacturing exemptions, like those at issue here, is not based on whether its 

operations or activities fit within one of the listed terms). Indeed, when the Indiana 

Supreme Court first examined the predecessor to the Equipment and Consumption 

Exemptions over thirty years ago, it interpreted the juxtaposition of the various activities

expansively because a broad interpretation was the only way to give effect to the 

 

4

 The Department has also claimed that Indiana Code § 6-2.5-5-45.8 (the Recycling 

Exemption), which exempts comparable transactions from sales and use tax, supports its 

position because it expressly excludes demolition activities from the scope of that exemption. 

(See Resp’t Mem. Supp. Partial Summ. J. (“Resp’t Mem.”) at 7-9.) Moreover, the Department 

claims that the 2015 amendment to the Equipment Exemption demonstrates that merely cutting 

metal is outside the scope of the exemptions as a matter of law. (See Resp’t Mem. at 12-13; 

Resp’t Reply Supp. Resp’t Mot. Summ. J. (“Resp’t Reply Br.”) at 5-8.) The Court finds the 

Department’s reliance on these two statutory provisions tenuous at best, considering that 

neither was in effect during the period at issue. See P.L. 137-2012, § 50; P.L. 250-2015, § 10. 

Accordingly, the Court will not address either claim in resolving this issue. 
8

Legislature’s intent of removing the burden of intermediate tax incidents from a taxpayer 

that increases the number of scarce economic goods. See Indiana Dep’t of State 

Revenue v. Cave Stone, Inc., 457 N.E.2d 520, 523-24 (Ind. 1983).

Keeping this scope in mind, this Court has issued a plethora of decisions that 

focus on whether the facts in each case demonstrate that the taxpayer’s integrated 

process transforms raw materials into new, marketable products. Indeed, the Court has 

consistently examined whether a taxpayer’s integrated series of operations caused a 

substantial change or transformation in tangible personal property by placing it in a 

“form, composition, or character different from that in which it was acquired,” i.e., a new 

product.5 See, e.g., Indianapolis Fruit Co. v. Indiana Dep’t of State Revenue, 691 

N.E.2d 1379, 1383-86 (Ind. Tax Ct. 1998); Rotation Prods., 690 N.E.2d at 800-02; 

Mechanics Laundry & Supply, Inc. v. Indiana Dep’t of State Revenue, 650 N.E.2d 1223, 

1229-31 (Ind. Tax Ct. 1995); Harlan Sprague Dawley, 605 N.E.2d at 1226-29. See also

45 IND. ADMIN. CODE 2.2-5-8(k) (2006) (see http://www.in.gov/legislative/iac). The Court 

finds no reason to depart from this well-established method of analysis in favor of simply 

matching a taxpayer’s activity to one of the examples identified in the Equipment or 

Consumption Exemption statutes. Accordingly, the Department is not entitled to partial 

summary judgment on this basis.

(2)

The Department also claims that it is entitled to partial summary judgment 

because there is no genuine issue of material fact that Brandenburg’s seven-step 

 

5

 The Department has urged the Court to apply the four-part test set forth in Rotation Products 

Corporation v. Department of State Revenue, 690 N.E.2d 795, 802-03 (Ind. Tax Ct. 1998). (See

Resp’t Mem. at 14-16; Hr’g Tr. at 23-25.) The Court, however, need not apply that test to 

resolve this matter. 
9

process fails to create “other tangible personal property,” i.e., distinct, marketable

products. (See Resp’t Mem. at 9-16.) Specifically, the Department maintains that no

substantial transformation occurs at all because: a) Brandenburg’s process is 

“fundamentally destructive;” and b) the metal has the same intrinsic value and specific 

alloy content when it is part of a structure as it has after Brandenburg processes it. 

(See, e.g., Resp’t Mem. at 15; Resp’t Reply Br. at 4-5.) Brandenburg responds, 

however, that its multi-step process involves far more than demolition and substantially 

transforms the metal debris it extracts from buildings and retired assets because the 

metal is not useful or valuable until its seven-step process is completed. (See, e.g., 

Pet’r Resp. Br. at 11-13, 19-22; Hr’g Tr. at 57-64.) 

(a) Brandenburg’s process

Throughout these proceedings, the Department has characterized Brandenburg’s 

process as a single-step demolition process. (See, e.g., Resp’t Mem. at 7 

(“Brandenburg’s process is inextricable from the demolition of a building”); Hr’g Tr. at 4 

(“Today this Court confronts the issue of whether a demolition company is engaged in 

exempt production when it destroys a building and sells a portion of the resultant 

debris”).) Nonetheless, the undisputed material facts demonstrate that Brandenburg’s 

multi-step process involves more activities than merely demolition. (See Pet’r Des’g 

Evid., Jasinowski Aff. ¶¶ 38-46 (stating that demolition occurs only during the second 

step of the process).) Additionally, Brandenburg’s Equipment Utilization Report, based 

on time-lapsed photographs of Michigan, New York, and Tennessee jobsites and 

corroborated by a statistician, indicates that Brandenburg’s metal processing and 
10

demolition activities are distinct.6 (See Pet’r Des’g Evid., Aff. Joseph E. Manzi, P.E. ¶¶ 

6-11, Ex. A; Aff. Stanley L. Sclove, Ph.D. ¶¶ 6-8, Ex. B.) Consequently, despite

Brandenburg’s admission that its metal processing and demolition activities are related 

and “feed off of each other[,]” their interrelationship does not lead the Court to conclude

that Brandenburg’s seven-step process was subsumed by its demolition activities, as 

the Department has urged. (See Resp’t Reply Br. at 3 (referring to Pet’r Des’g Evid., 

Jasinowski Aff. ¶ 34).) 

(b) The metal’s intrinsic value and alloy content

The Department further supports its claim that Brandenburg does not make 

“other tangible personal property” by asserting that the designated evidence shows that 

the metal has the same value and alloy content both before and after Brandenburg’s 

process. (See, e.g., Hr’g Tr. at 7-9, 14-19.) The Department first relies on the 

testimony of Brandenburg’s secretary-treasurer, Lynn Jasinowski, stating that she 

established that the processing of metal does not change its value. (See Resp’t Mem. 

at 3, 15 (citing Resp’t Des’g Evid., L. Jasinowski Depo. at 57-58).) (See also Resp’t 

Des’g Evid., L. Jasinowski Depo. at 8-9.) The designated portion of Ms. Jasinowski’s 

deposition, however, contains information regarding only the extent of her knowledge on 

the types of scrap steel Brandenburg sold, how customers used the scrap steel, the 

general businesses of Brandenburg’s customers, and its contract negotiation/bidding 

process. (See Resp’t Des’g Evid., L. Jasinowski Depo. at 57-58.) Consequently, Ms. 

 

6

 The Department has claimed the Equipment Utilization Report is not relevant because it was 

derived from three non-Indiana jobsites and concerns dates beyond the period at issue. (See

Hr’g Tr. at 38-39.) The Report is relevant, however, to whether Brandenburg’s metal processing 

and demolition activities are distinct regardless of their location because the parties do not 

dispute that Brandenburg has used the same seven-step process at all of its jobsites since 

1993. (See Pet’r Des’g Evid., Aff. Jack Jasinowski (“Jasinowski Aff.”) ¶ 38.)
11

Jasinowski’s deposition does not provide any information about the metal’s value or 

support for the Department’s position.

In addition, both parties rely on the testimony of a steel manufacturing industry 

expert, George William Knack. (See, e.g., Hr’g Tr. at 53-54, 83-84.) (See also Pet’r 

Des’g Evid., Aff. George William Knack (“Knack Aff.”) ¶¶ 7-12.) The specifically 

designated portions of Mr. Knack’s affidavit provide as follows:

37. Brandenburg’s role in the first stage is essential because 

unprepared scrap with unidentified chemistry has no value to steel 

manufacturers. As detailed above in paragraphs 26 to 33, a steel 

manufacturer can only use clean steel scrap that meets certain 

specifications. The length, width, thickness, cleanness, and alloy 

content of steel scrap directly affect the usability of that steel scrap 

as a raw material. Nonconformance with any of these 

characteristics can render steel scrap unusable for the manufacture 

of the intended steel products.

* * * * *

39. The published value governing the rate per ton paid for 

delivered scrap assumes a level of purity in its content. Scrap is a 

purchased commodity, similar to other raw materials used in the 

manufacture of raw steel. Prices per gross ton paid for various 

sizes and metallic contents of scrap purchased are dictated by how 

the scrap being purchased meets the parameters established in the

applicable Scrap Specifications Circular.7 Market prices paid for 

various types of purchased scrap that comply with the applicable 

Scrap Specifications Circular are issued monthly in two 

publications. These two publications are “Iron Age” and “American 

Metal Market”. To the best of my knowledge, during [the period at 

issue] no steel manufacturer intentionally purchased scrap that was 

unprepared or had an unknown chemistry. Scrap is a commodity, 

similar to other purchased raw material, which is paid for by weight 

when delivered to the steel maker.

40. A significant quantity of purchased scrap is “obsolete,” 

 

7

 The Institute of Scrap Recycling Industries, Inc.’s (“ISRI”) annual published guidelines, the 

Scrap Specifications Circular, provide buyers and sellers of various commodities with 

internationally accepted, standardized specifications for the quality and composition of various 

scrap metals. (See Pet’r Des’g Evid., Jasinowski Aff. ¶ 56; Aff. George William Knack ¶¶ 21-25, 

Ex. B at 4354, Ex. C at 4407, Ex. D at 4464.)
12

meaning that it had a previous life as part of a building, bridge, 

road, or other structure. Contaminants such as brick, cement, 

wood, and drywall, if delivered with the scrap, would add excess 

weight to a scrap shipment and make it impossible to establish a 

fair weight on which to base payment for the scrap.

41. Further, during [the period at issue], new steel manufacturers 

did not have the capacity or the economic desire to perform the 

work necessary to generate an acceptable scrap product. Instead, 

steel manufacturers relied upon third party companies such as 

Brandenburg, which is ISO 9001 certified,8to perform these tasks 

and ultimately supply processed scrap steel in accordance with [the 

Institute of Scrap Recycling Industries, Inc.’s (“ISRI”)] guidelines. In 

fact, it was a requirement for companies such as US Steel that any 

scrap purchased conform to ISRI guidelines and be from an ISO 

9001 certified or equivalent company.

(See Hr’g Tr. at 53-54, 83-84 and Pet’r Resp. Br. at 11 (citing Pet’r Des’g Evid., Knack 

Aff. ¶¶ 37, 39-41) (footnotes added).) Collectively, this testimony does not support the 

Department’s position that Brandenburg does not produce a new product, but merely 

releases the intrinsic value of the extracted metal. Instead, as Brandenburg claims, this 

expert testimony explains that the extracted metal is obsolete, valueless, and 

unmarketable until Brandenburg transforms it into the end product Brandenburg 

markets -- scrap steel. Accordingly, the Court not only finds that the designated 

evidence fails to support the Department’s claim that Brandenburg’s process does not 

transform the metal’s value, but also finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact 

that Brandenburg’s process substantially transforms the metal from obsolete, valueless, 

and unmarketable debris into newly marketable scrap steel.

Finally, the Department has asserted that Brandenburg has not met its burden to 

 

8

 While the International Organization for Standardization (“ISO”) publishes guidelines to 

standardize certain practices within the steel manufacturing industry, it does not determine 

whether a company is ISO compliant (i.e., ISO-certified). (See Pet’r Des’g Evid., Jasinowski Aff. 

¶¶ 48-50.) Instead, a third party company issues the certification after auditing and reviewing an

applicant company’s practices and procedures. (See Pet’r Des’g Evid., Jasinowski Aff. ¶ 50.)
13

show that it produces a new or distinct product because the price of the scrap steel, 

whether encased in cement or not, is solely dictated by its weight and alloy content. 

(See, e.g., Hr’g Tr. at 23-25, 32-36, 82-86.) The fact that the price of scrap metal is 

based on certain immutable characteristics such as its weight or alloy content does not 

mean, however, that encumbered metal and unencumbered metal are identical. To 

focus just on weight and alloy content as the sole measure of whether raw materials are 

substantially transformed would ignore other evidence of transformation. Logic dictates 

that a copper wire encased within a cement block is different from a copper wire without 

the encumbrance of debris, that sorted metal is different from unsorted metal, and that 

long lengths of metal are different from shorter, cut lengths of metal. 

Court precedent has recognized these logical conclusions finding that the measure of 

whether a process transforms property inputs into other tangible personal property is 

whether a taxpayer’s integrated production process yields a product that enters the 

marketplace. See, e.g., Harlan Sprague Dawley, 605 N.E.2d 1227-29 (distinguishing 

between rats based on their marketability); White River Envtl. P’ship v. Dep’t of State 

Revenue, 694 N.E.2d 1248, 1251-52 (Ind. Tax Ct. 1998) (denying an exemption not 

because water inputs resulted in water outputs, but because the water outputs were not 

sold); Rotation Prods., 690 N.E.2d at 802-03 (exempting items used to remanufacture

roller bearings because the repaired roller bearings were marketable). Brandenburg’s

designated evidence demonstrates that its seven-step process transformed nonmarketable metal into marketable scrap steel that it sold. See supra pp. 3, 9-12. 

Therefore, the Court finds that Brandenburg produced scrap steel and is thereby

entitled to the Equipment and Consumption Exemptions during the period at issue.
14

CONCLUSION

When, as here, all of the reasonable inferences arising from the undisputed 

material facts lead to but one conclusion, the Court may grant summary judgment to 

either party on the issues raised in the motion. See, e.g., Popovich v. Indiana Dep’t of 

State Revenue, 52 N.E.3d 73, 77-78 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2016). Accordingly, the Court 

GRANTS partial summary judgment to Brandenburg. The Court will direct the parties 

regarding all other remaining matters by separate cover.

SO ORDERED this 10th day of August 2016.

Martha Blood Wentworth, Judge

Indiana Tax Court

Distribution: Randal J. Kaltenmark, Ziaaddin Mollabashy, Mark S. Bernstein, John P. 

Lowrey, Andrew T. Grein.