2023 IL App (1st) 221782-U

FIFTH DIVISION

April 21, 2023

No. 1-22-1782 

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

______________________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

COLIN KISSOON, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

 v. 

BARBARA VLCEK and UKNOWN OCCUPANTS, 

 Defendant

(Cheryl Simpson, Appellant)

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Appeal from the Circuit Court

of Cook County.

No. 19 CH 9140

The Honorable Raymond

Mitchell and Anna 

Demacopoulos, Judges

Presiding. 

PRESIDING JUSTICE DELORT delivered the judgment of the court.

Justices Lyle and Navarro concurred in the judgment. 

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The law of the case doctrine prevents relitigation of an issue which this court 

decided in a prior appeal. The second appeal was frivolous within the scope of 

Illinois Supreme Court Rule 375 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994) and the appellant is sanctioned 

to pay the appellee’s attorney fees. 
No. 1-22-1782 

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¶ 2 The plaintiff, Colin Kissoon, filed a three-count amended complaint against the defendants, 

Barbara Vlcek and unknown owners, for ejectment, specific performance, and breach of contract, 

relating to residential property located in Chicago. The circuit court granted summary judgment to 

Kissoon and entered an order declaring that he was the lawful owner and possessor of the property 

as against Vlcek and unknown occupants. The court stated in the order that Vlcek “had litigated 

with great gusto but made assertions devoid of truth.”

¶ 3 Shortly after the circuit court granted summary judgment to Kissoon, he filed a motion for 

an eviction order against unknown occupants whom he discovered residing at the property. On 

March 8, 2021, the court granted that motion, specifically finding that the unknown occupants at 

the property were (1) not Kissoon’s tenants, (2) had no possessory right to the property, and (3) 

were a direct threat to the health and safety of Kissoon, his family, and neighbors. The court also 

directed the Cook County Sheriff to execute the eviction order instanter. 

¶ 4 Shortly thereafter, Cheryl Simpson, who identified herself as one of the unknown occupants, 

filed a motion to reconsider and stay the circuit court’s ejectment order, in which she essentially 

reiterated Vlcek’s arguments opposing summary judgment. Simpson was already familiar to the 

court because she had assisted Vlcek in defending against the summary judgment motion, though 

Simpson was not an attorney and never sought leave to intervene in the case. Kissoon responded 

to Simpson’s motion, arguing she lacked standing to attack the summary judgment order because 

she was not a party. On April 20, 2021, the court denied Simpson’s motion. She then appealed 

only the March 8 order granting summary judgment in favor of Kissoon. 

¶ 5 On April 29, the Cook County Sheriff executed an eviction order at the property against an 

unnamed female resident. 
No. 1-22-1782 

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¶ 6 Kissoon moved to dismiss Simpson’s appeal and requested that this court impose sanctions 

upon her pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 375 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994). This court took Kissoon’s 

motions with the case. After full briefing, this court issued a 21-page opinion reviewing the case 

in detail. This court reasoned that because Simpson was not a party, her motion to reconsider the 

summary judgment order did not toll the time to appeal that order, resulting in her appeal being 

untimely. Therefore, this court dismissed her appeal. Kissoon v. Vlcek, 2022 IL App (1st) 210488 

(Kissoon I).

¶ 7 This court next addressed Kissoon’s sanctions motion. Although the court lacked 

jurisdiction over Simpson’s appeal on the merits, it was required to address the merits of the appeal 

to determine whether it was frivolous. In so doing, this court found that Simpson lacked standing, 

and the circuit court’s summary judgment order was well grounded in the facts and law. Kissoon 

I, ¶¶ 65-68. Specifically, this court found that “Simpson’s appeal and her reconsideration motion 

in the trial court were frivolous, as they were not well-grounded in fact or warranted by law.” Id.

¶ 65. Notwithstanding that finding, this court declined to grant sanctions, noting that Simpson’s 

actions were grounded in “a wholly mistaken but understandable layperson’s belief.” Id. ¶ 69.

¶ 8 Simpson was undeterred. On August 11, 2022, only days after this court returned its 

mandate to the circuit court, Simpson filed a pleading in the circuit court captioned “petition to 

vacate summary judgment and eviction order.” The petition does not reference section 2-1401 of 

the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (Pub. Act 102-813, § 675 (eff. May 13, 2022) (amending 735 

ILCS 5/2-1401)) or any other procedural mechanism for vacating a circuit court order at such a 

late juncture. It also does not reference this court’s opinion which held that Simpson lacked

standing. On September 9, 2022, Simpson also filed a “petition to have a corrected order drafted.” 
No. 1-22-1782 

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¶ 9 On November 3, 2022, the circuit court1 entered an order stating: “Pursuant to the Appellate 

Court’s mandate denying Non-Party Cheryl Simpson’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction and standing 

to appeal, Non-Party Cheryl Simpson’s Emergency Petitions are DENIED.” On November 29, 

Simpson filed a notice of appeal not only appealing the November 3, 2022 order, but orders 

supposedly entered on March 8, 2019, March 31, 2019, and April 19, 2019. However, the 

complaint was not even filed until August 7, 2019. Clerical errors in a notice of appeal do not 

necessarily render the notice defective, so we will presume that the year “2019” is a scrivener’s 

error and that Simpson intended to refer to orders entered in 2021. Gillard v. Northwestern

Memorial Hospital, 2019 IL App (1st) 182348, ¶ 41.

¶ 10 Simpson has filed a brief in this court which does not even mention this court’s prior 

opinion. Kissoon has moved to dismiss the appeal, and he again seeks sanctions under Illinois 

Supreme Court Rule 375 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994). Simpson responded to those motions, and then moved 

to file an additional response. This court stayed further briefing on its own motion.

¶ 11 We first address jurisdiction. Simpson already appealed the March 8, 2021 order granting 

summary judgment and, presumably, earlier orders in the procedural progression leading to it. This 

court found that her appeal was untimely. Kissoon I, ¶ 59. It is obvious that her second and later 

appeal of those same orders is also untimely. However, Simpson’s appeal of the circuit court’s 

November 3, 2022, order is timely, and we will proceed to review that portion of the appeal. 

¶ 12 In her brief, Simpson does not explain how the circuit court could have had jurisdiction to 

entertain her post-appeal petition to vacate summary judgment and eviction order, and her petition 

1 Up to this point, the relevant orders had been entered by Judge Raymond Mitchell. 

However, he was then appointed to this court, and the final order was entered by Judge Anna 

Demacopoulos. 
No. 1-22-1782 

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to issue a corrected order. Instead, she rehashes arguments she made in the prior appeal against the 

circuit court’s original summary judgment order. These arguments are now barred by the law of 

the case doctrine. Under that doctrine, rulings on points of law made by a reviewing court are 

binding in that case both on the trial court and on subsequent appeals to that same reviewing court, 

unless a higher court has changed the law. Therefore, the determination of a question of law by an 

appellate court on the first appeal is generally binding upon it on the second appeal. See Barnai v. 

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2021 IL App (1st) 191306, ¶ 48 (citing Emerson Electric Co. v. Aetna 

Casualty & Surety Co., 352 Ill. App. 3d 399, 417 (2004) and Krautsack v. Anderson, 223 Ill. 2d 

541, 552 (2006)). We see no reason to depart from that doctrine here, and therefore affirm the 

circuit court’s November 3, 2022, order.

¶ 13 Kissoon has moved for sanctions against Simpson in this appeal, and we agree that sanctions 

are appropriate. In Kissoon I, although this court specifically found that Simpson’s appeal was 

frivolous within the meaning of Rule 375, it stayed its hand, noting Simpson’s “mistaken 

layperson’s belief.” All litigation must eventually come to an end, however, and this litigation 

came to an end when this court issued Kissoon I. Simpson’s conduct in returning to the circuit 

court, and this court, to relitigate decided issues is even more frivolous than her conduct in the first 

appeal, and the facts which moved this court to deny sanctions in Kissoon I are no longer present. 

Instead, the record shows that Simpson has ignored multiple warnings regarding her potentially 

sanctionable conduct. These warnings include this court’s opinion explaining to Simpson why her 

position was incorrect, as well as a letter Kissoon’s counsel sent to Simpson, informing her that 

she could face sanctions if she did not withdraw this appeal. Rather than heeding these warnings, 

Simpson pursued the same arguments she already lost in the circuit court and this court. 
No. 1-22-1782 

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¶ 14 Upon consideration of the sanctions motion, we find that this appeal was frivolous within 

the scope of Rule 375, and we impose a sanction of paying Kissoon “the reasonable costs of the 

appeal *** including reasonable attorney fees.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 375(b) (eff. Feb. 1, 1994); see also

Parkway Bank and Trust Company v. Korzen, 2013 IL App (1st) 130380, ¶¶ 101-102. Kissoon 

may file a petition for attorney fees and costs within 14 days of this court’s order, restricted to fees 

relating to this appeal. Simpson shall then have 14 days to file a response. The response shall be 

strictly limited to the attorney fee petition, and shall not address the case on the merits. This court 

shall retain jurisdiction to consider the fee petition. 

¶ 15 In summary, we dismiss the appeal as to the circuit court orders entered in 2021, and affirm 

the circuit court’s November 3, 2022 order. We thus grant the pending motion to dismiss in part 

and deny it in part, and we grant the motion for sanctions. We also grant Simpson’s motion to file 

an additional response to the motion to dismiss, and set a briefing schedule on Kissoon’s fee 

petition.

¶ 16 Affirmed in part and dismissed in part.