alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Third District Court of Appeal

State of Florida

Opinion filed September 16, 2015.

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D14-1726

Lower Tribunal No. 06-CF-1440-K

________________

Enrique Davalos,

Appellant,

vs.

The State of Florida,

Appellee.

An Appeal under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.141(b)(2) for

Monroe County, Tegan Slaton, Judge.

Enrique Davalos, in proper person.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Magaly Rodriguez, Assistant

Attorney General, for appellee.

Before WELLS, EMAS and FERNANDEZ, JJ.

FERNANDEZ, J.

Enrique Davalos appeals the summary denial of his motion to correct illegal
sentence, pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.801. We reverse the

denial of Davalos’ motion, and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.

On February 17, 2009, Davalos received a sentence of 33.75 months in

prison, followed by 26.25 months probation, with credit for 804 days for time

served. Davalos served his prison sentence after which he was released on August

14, 2009 to serve his probationary period and an INS Detainer. Davalos

subsequently violated his probation and entered a plea of partial admission to the

violations. The court revoked Davalos’ probation and, on April 16, 2014, Davalos

received a sentence of five years in prison, followed by eight years probation. 

Davalos alleges and the State concedes that there is a jail credit discrepancy

between the jail credit awarded in February 2009 and April 2014. Upon the

imposition of the new sentence in April 2014, Davalos received jail credit for 711

days. Specifically, he received jail credit for 668 days from April 22, 2007 to

February 17, 2009 and 43 days from March 5, 2014 to April 16, 2014. Thus, there

is a 93-day discrepancy for which remand is warranted. See Williams v. State, 768

So. 2d 1195, 1196 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000).

We therefore reverse the denial of Davalos’ 3.801 motion, and remand for

the trial court to either provide record attachments that explain the discrepancy in

the amount of jail credit awarded or correct Davalos’ jail credit.

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

2
#### MUZAK CORP. *v.*MUSE-ART CORP.

No. 14960.

United States District Court, E. D. Pennsylvania.

May 25,1954.

*173Schnader, Harrison, Segal & Lewis, Philadelphia, Pa., for plaintiff.

Harry A. Rutenberg, Philadelphia, Pa., for defendant.

WELSH, District Judge.

This is plaintiff’s motion to compel defendant, by its Vice-President, Max Ingber, to appear for depositions on oral examination.

1. It is the contention of the defendant that the Court should enter an order providing that the defendant is not required to appear because the sole purpose of the oral examination is to annoy, embarrass and oppress the defendant. See Federal Rule 30(b), 28 U. S.C.A.; In support of this contention the defendant urges that the only issue in this case is whether receipts from its sales of equipment are to be included in its gross receipts for the purpose of determining the royalty due the plaintiff and that said issue is solely one of law, depending upon the interpretation of the franchise agreement.

2. The contention is not persuasive for a reading of the complaint discloses that the issue is in reality the full extent of defendant’s underpayments, through whatever devices the defendant may have adopted to conceal its actual gross receipts. We feel that as to each such device, including the one mentioned in defendant’s brief, namely, the sales of equipment, the plaintiff is entitled to develop the facts by oral depositions.

 3. The right of the plaintiff to orally examine the defendant is not affected by the fact that the defendant has now agreed to permit plaintiff to inspect its books and records for the reason that a party itself, not its adversary, has the right to invoke any one of the pre-trial discovery procedures it chooses.

4. In the light of our holding herein it is unnecessary to pass on plaintiff’s contention to the effect that defendant’s request for relief under Federal Rule 30(b) was not seasonably made.

5. The motion is accordingly granted.

An order requiring the defendant, by its Vice-President, Max Ingber, to appear for depositions on oral examinations within thirty (30) days of the entry of the order will be prepared and submitted.
#### M. A. PORAZZI COMPANY, Libelant, v. THE MORMACLARK, her engines, boilers, etc., and Moore McCormack Lines, Inc., Respondent and Jarka Corp. of Baltimore, Respondent Impleaded.

United States District Court S. D. New York.

Aug. 29, 1951.

Hill, Rivkins & Middleton, New York City, for libelant.

Kirlin, Campbell & Keating, New York City, for respondent.

SUGARMAN, District Judge.

The notice of examination herein sought to examine the respondent by its Vice President, General Claims Agent and the Master and Chief Mate of the vessel. Respondent objects to its examination by anyone other than General Claims Agent upon the grounds that a) the Vice President has no personal knowledge of the shipment involved and his production for examination would be an annoyance, embarrassment and oppression in view of the fact that the records and data from which he would testify would also serve as the basis for the examination of the Claims Agent; b) the Master of the vessel is no longer in the employ of the respondent; and c) the Chief Mate is not a proper person through whom the respondent may be examined. Respondent has no objection to the examination of the Master and Chief Mate as witnesses.

The foregoing issues are disposed of as follows: 1) The examination of the General Claims Agent, to which respondent consents, will proceed at a time and place to be agreed upon by counsel foi the parties in the order to be settled herein. 2) It appearing that the Vice President could contribute nothing beyond that which would be gleaned *from*an examination of the General Claims Agent, I hold this to be a showing of good cause that the deposition of the Vice President should not be taken at the present time, *384Fed.RuIes Civ.Proc. rule 30(b), 28 U.S. C.A., and the notice thereof is vacated without prejudice to his being examined upon application should the libelant, after the conclusion of the examination of the General Claims Agent, establish the need for further examination of the respondent by its Vice President. 3) The respondent may be examined by its Master, whose examination will proceed at a time and place to be agreed upon by counsel, in the order to be submitted herein. 4) The application to vacate so much of the notice, as seeks to examine respondent by the First Mate of its vessel is granted without prejudice to his being examined by libelant as a witness.

Settle order in accordance herewith.
_________________________________________ 

 

Order Michigan Supreme Court 

Lansing, Michigan 

December 27, 2005 Clifford W. Taylor,

 Chief Justice 

129639 Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 129640 

Marilyn Kelly 

Maura D. Corrigan 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman, TIMOTHY KING, Personal Justices 

Representative of the Estate of

ANDREW BAKER,

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v SC: 129639, 129640 

 COA: 259136, 259229 

Livingston CC: 04-020535-NH

MICHAEL BRIGGS, D.O., MERLE

HUNTER, M.D., EMERGENCY 

PHYSICIANS MEDICAL GROUP, 

P.C., and McPHERSON HOSPITAL, 

a/k/a TRINITY HEALTH-MICHIGAN,

Defendants-Appellees. 

_________________________________________/ 

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the July 12, 2005 

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not 

persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. 

CAVANAGH, J., would grant leave to appeal. 

KELLY, J., would grant leave to appeal to reconsider Waltz v Wyse, 469 Mich 642 

(2004). 

l1219 

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

December 27, 2005 

Clerk
Exhibit 13.1

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, each of the undersigned officers of KUBOTA
CORPORATION (the Company), hereby certifies, to such officers knowledge, that the Companys annual report on Form 20-F for the year ended March 31, 2006 (the Report) fully complies with the requirements
of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

Dated: September 21, 2006



/s/ Daisuke HatakakeDaisuke HatakakePresident and Representative Director (Chief Executive Officer)/s/ Hirokazu NaraHirokazu NaraDirector (Chief Financial Officer)
#### BERGEN TOY & NOVELTY CO., Inc. v. SHALAND et al.

United States District Court S. D. New York.

Dec. 15, 1950.

Pennie, Edmonds, Morton & Barrows, New York City, for plaintiff.

Kenyon & Kenyon, New York City, for defendants.

NOONAN, District Judge.

The defendants have made two motions, the first one of which is to vacate plaintiff’s notice of taking defendants’ deposition, and the second motion is to stay the plaintiff from serving any further notice of taking depositions upon defendants, and to stay the plaintiff from taking any of the defendants’ depositions, until after defendants have completed the taking of plaintiff’s depositions.

This action was commenced on November 2, 1950. On November 22, 1950, the-plaintiff without leave of Court, served' upon the attorneys for the defendants notice of the taking of defendants’ de-. positions.

The action having been started on November 2, 1950, the service on November 22, 1950 of plaintiff’s notice of taking defendants’' depositions, without first obtaining leave of the Court, was improper. Cf. Rule 3, 6(a) and 26(a), Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. 28 U.S.C.A.

On November 24, 1950, the defendants served upon the plaintiff a notice of taking-depositions of the plaintiff corporation by certain of its officers and employees. It would, therefore, appear that.the defend*209ants’ notice is the first one properly served, and the defendants should be permitted to take plaintiffs depositions before the plaintiff proceeds with the taking of defendants’ depositions.

Accordingly, both of these motions by the defendants are granted.

Settle order on two days’ notice.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE>                   5
<MULTIPLIER>                1000
       
<S>                         <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>            OCT-31-1996
<PERIOD-END>                 OCT-31-1996
<CASH>                       408
<SECURITIES>                 0
<RECEIVABLES>                810
<ALLOWANCES>                 35
<INVENTORY>                  0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>             1294
<PP&E>                       1319
<DEPRECIATION>               780
<TOTAL-ASSETS>               1833
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>        788
<BONDS>                      0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>        1609
<PREFERRED>                  0
<COMMON>                     0
<OTHER-SE>                   (652)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY> 1833
<SALES>                      5004
<TOTAL-REVENUES>             5004
<CGS>                        4914
<TOTAL-COSTS>                4914
<OTHER-EXPENSES>             0
<LOSS-PROVISION>             0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>           0
<INCOME-PRETAX>              90
<INCOME-TAX>                 0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>          90
<DISCONTINUED>               0
<EXTRAORDINARY>              0
<CHANGES>                    0
<NET-INCOME>                 90
<EPS-PRIMARY>                .02
<EPS-DILUTED>                .02
        

</TABLE>
**Exhibit 21****ARBITRON INC.****SUBSIDIARIES**     **State or**  **Other Jurisdiction****Subsidiaries and Their Affiliates:** **of Incorporation**Arbitron Holdings Inc. DelawareArbitron International, LLC (1) DelawareCSW Research Limited (2) United KingdomEuro Fieldwork Limited (3) United KingdomCeridian Infotech (India) Private Limited IndiaAudience Research Bureau S.A. de C.V. Mexico (1) Arbitron International, LLC is a subsidiary of Arbitron Inc. and Arbitron Holdings, Inc. (2) CSW Research Limited is a subsidiary of Arbitron Holdings, Inc. (3) Euro Fieldwork Limited is a subsidiary of CSW Research Limited.
**Exhibit32.2**

 

**CERTIFICATIONPursuant to 18 United States Code Section 1350,As adopted pursuant to Section 906 of theSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**

 

The undersigned hereby certifies that, to my knowledge, the QuarterlyReport on Form 10-Q for the period ended March 31, 2005 of Graphic PackagingCorporation (the “Company”) filed with the Securities and Exchange Commissionon the date hereof fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the information containedin such report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financialcondition and results of operations of the Company.

 

 
|   |   | /s/ JOHN T. BALDWIN                                        |
|--------|--------|------------------------------------------------------------|
|   |   | Name: John.  T. Baldwin                                    |
|   |   | Title:  Senior Vice President and Chief Financial  Officer |
|   |   | May 9, 2005                                                |

 

----
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 19-50568

Summary Calendar

DAVID GOAD, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

JUDGE GARY L. STEEL; JUDGE DIBRELL W. WALDRIP; HEATHER 

KELLER, Clerk; MEAGAN DOW, Coordinator; SAVANNAH MAURER, 

Coordinator; DOES 1-10, Inclusive; DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST 

COMPANY, as Trustee for Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 

2007-BR4, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-BR4; TARA 

DANIEL; LORI LIANE LONG; BRANDON B. WOLF; NOVIA SALAS, 

 Defendants - Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 5:19-CV-329

Before CLEMENT, ELROD, and OLDHAM, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

The plaintiff, David Goad, is appealing the dismissal of his case for 

failure to pay the requisite filing fee in an earlier action. The district court 

reviewed the filings in both the instant case and the earlier case and found no 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

March 4, 2020

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 19-50568 Document: 00515331638 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/04/2020
No. 19-50568

2

record that Goad ever paid the filing fee. The district court therefore did not 

abuse its discretion in dismissing the case. 

AFFIRM.

 Case: 19-50568 Document: 00515331638 Page: 2 Date Filed: 03/04/2020
aafinancial8kex105_3122009.htm


    


    


    Exhibit
10.5

    


    


    


    SECOND AGREEMENT TO AMEND
AND EXTEND AGREEMENT OF MERGER AND PLAN OF REORGANIZATION

     

    THIS
AGREEMENT TO AMEND AND EXTEND AGREEMENT OF MERGER AND PLAN OF REORGANIZATION is
made and entered into on March 11, 2009, by and among ACROSS AMERICA FINANCIAL
SERVICES, INC., a Colorado corporation (“Parent”), ACROSS
AMERICA ACQUISITION CORP., a Colorado corporation (“Acquisition Corp.”),
which is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Parent, and APRO BIO PHARMACEUTICAL
CORPORATION, a Colorado corporation (the “Company”).

     

    WHEREAS,
the Parties have entered into an Agreement of Merger and Plan of Reorganization
dated November 17, 2008 (“Agreement”) and an Agreement to Amend and Extend
Agreement of Merger and Plan of Reorganization dated February 11, 2009 (“First
Amendment”); and

     

    WHEREAS,
the First Amendment provides that it will terminate on March 11, 2009 if a
Closing has not occurred; and

     

    WHEREAS,
the Parties wish to amend to Agreement to extend the termination
deadline.

     

    NOW,
THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual agreements and covenants hereinafter
set forth, the parties hereto agree as follows:

     

    1.           Section
12.1 of the Agreement shall be amended to insert the date of March 31, 2009 in
place of the date of March 11, 2009.

     

    2.           In
all other respects, the Agreement shall remain in full force and
effect.

     

    IN
WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this Agreement to be binding
and effective as of the day and year first above written.

     

    
      	 
      	
              PARENT:

               

              ACROSS
      AMERICA FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC.

               

              By:  
      /s/ Brian L. Klemsz

              Brian
      L. Klemsz

              President
      and Chief Executive Officer

               

            


    

     

     

    
      
         

      

      
         

        
          

        

      

      
         

      

    

     

    
 

    
      	 
      	
              ACQUISITION
      CORP.:

               

              ACROSS
      AMERICA ACQUISITION CORP.

               

              By:   /s/Brian
      L. Klemsz

              Brian
      L. Klemsz

              President
      and Chief Executive Officer

               

               

            
	 
      	
              THE
      COMPANY:

               

              APRO
      BIO PHARMACEUTICAL CORPORATION

               

              By:   /s/
      Vicki D.E. Barone

              Vicki
      D.E. Barone

              Chairman
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

__________________ No. 95-50419 Summary Calendar

__________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus JESUS CASTANEDA CANCINO, Defendant-Appellant.

- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC No. EP-93-CR-424-8
- - - - - - - - - - January 13, 1996 Before KING, GARWOOD and DENNIS, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * This is a direct appeal of a guilty plea conviction for conspiracy to possess marijuana with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846. The appellant argues that his guilty plea was not knowing or voluntary; that the district court erred in failing to make specific fact findings concerning the quantity of marijuana that was reasonably foreseeable to him under Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure; and that the district court erred in not ordering the Government to produce his coconspirators' debriefing statements for inspection.No. 95-50419 -2-
We find that appellant waived the right to appeal his sentence and do not consider the sentencing issue raised by appellant. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm appellant's conviction. AFFIRMED.
Exhibit
10.6.2

    


    

     

     

    
      March 6,
2009

      


      Via
Facsimile and Federal Express Overnight Delivery

      


      Mr. Jeff
Moery

      Vice
President

      Aventine
Renewable Energy – Mt. Vernon, LLC

      1300
South 2nd
Street

      Pekin, IL
61554

      Facsimile:
(309) 478-1526

      
         

        
          	 	
                  Re:

                	
                  EPC
      Contract – Mt. Vernon West Ethanol Project

                
	 	 	
                  Change
      Order dated December 31, 2008

                


        

         

      

       

      Dear
Jeff:

      


      On March
3, 2009, Kiewit notified you of Aventine’s default of its payment obligations
under the EPC Contract, as modified by the referenced Change
Order.  As of today’s date, Aventine has failed to cure this
default.

      


      By this
letter, Kiewit notifies you of its termination of the Engineering, Procurement
and Construction Services Fixed Price Contract between Kiewit Energy Company and
Aventine Renewable Energy – Mt. Vernon, LLC dated May 31, 2007.  The
termination is effective March 6, 2009.

      


      Nothing
in this letter is intended to waive any right or remedy Kiewit Energy Company
may have.

      


      Please
contact me if you would like to discuss the matter further.

      


      Sincerely,

      


      /s/ Mike
Casey

      


      Mike
Casey

      Vice
President

      


      
        	
                cc: 

              	
                Brad
      Kaufman

              
	 	Elizabeth
      Gage


      

       

    

    
 

    KIEWIT
ENERGY GROUP

    7906 North
Sam Houston Parkway West, Suite 300, Houston, TX 77064

    (281)
517-8900           (281)
517-8906 fax
Exhibit 10.21


 


AMENDMENT TO THE


 


FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF CHESTER COUNTY


 


SUPPLEMENTAL BENEFIT RETIREMENT PLAN


 


The First National Bank of Chester County Supplemental Retirement
Benefit Plan is hereby amended in the following respects, effective January 1,
2005:


 


1. Section 3.3B is amended by adding the following to the end of
the last sentence thereof:  “, subject
to any election under Section 3.4 by the Member as to when payments are to
commence.”


 


2. Section 3.4 is amended by adding the following at the end of
the first sentence thereof:  “, beginning
at any time after the Member becomes eligible to receive such benefit.”


 


	
  Dated:

  	
       June 19, 2008

  	
   

  	
  FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF CHESTER COUNTY

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   By:

  	
     /s/ Kevin C. Quinn

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
     Kevin C. Quinn
###                                                          THRIVENT MUTUAL FUNDS

####                                              Supplement to Prospectus Dated June 30, 2005
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Felipe MORENO-CALZADA, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 07-10526.

Summary Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Jan. 24, 2008.

Denise B. Williams, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Northern District of Texas, Lubbock, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

David E. Sloan, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Northern District of Texas, Lubbock, TX, for Defendanf-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, USDC No. 5-.06-CR-47-ALL.

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, STEWART, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Felipe Moreno-Calzada pleaded guilty to a one-count indictment charging him with illegal reentry. *See*8 U.S.C. § 1326. The district court sentenced Moreno-Calzada to 71 months of imprisonment, to be served consecutively to any as-yet-undetermined state sentence that results from the revocation of state probation. Moreno-Calzada challenges the 16-level enhancement to his offense level and the consecutive nature of his sentence. However, he objected to neither, limiting our review to plain error. *See United States v. Lewis,*412 F.3d 614, 615-16 (5th Cir.2005).

The Government concedes that in light of *United States v. Ortegar-Gonzaga,*490 F.3d 393 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied,*— U.S. -, 128 S.Ct. 410, 169 L.Ed.2d 287 (2007), the district court plainly erred in applying a 16-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(l)(A) based on Moreno-Calzada’s California conviction for residential burglary. Accordingly, we vacate Moreno-Calzada’s sentence and remand for resentencing.

Moreno-Calzada also argues that the district court lacked the authority to order that his sentence run consecutively to an as-yet-unimposed state sentence. This argument is foreclosed by *United States v. Brown,*920 F.2d 1212, 1216-17 (5th Cir. 1991) (per curiam), *abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Candia,*454 F.3d 468, 472-73 (5th Cir.2006).

AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED IN PART AND REMANDED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.