The Honor able Da n Aar on Polst er, U nited States District J udg e for the Northe rn District of * Ohio, sitti ng by

desig nation NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION File Na me: 10a0185n.06 No. 08-5814 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT UNITED STAT ES O F AMERICA, P laintif f-App ellee,

v. JI M M Y SP RA G UE , Defendan t-Appellant. / ON AP P EA L F RO M THE U NI TED STA TES D ISTRIC T C OU RT F OR THE EA STER

N D ISTRIC T OF TEN NE SSEE

OP IN ION BEF OR E: CLAY and McK EAGU E, Circuit Judges; P OLS TER, District Judge

. * CL AY , Circuit Judge. D e f e n d an t Ji m m y S p r a g u e p l e a d e d g u i l t y t o r e c e ivi ng c hil d pornog raphy

transporte d in interstate commer ce in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a )(2) and (b) (1)

and wa s se nte nc e d to 36 0 mont hs in pr iso n. De fe nd ant ap pe a ls the de nia l of a moti on to s up pr e ss evidenc e take n following a sea rch of his apartment. In addition, he ch alleng es his sentenc e as substantively

unrea sonable. For the following rea sons, both the district court’s denia l of the motion to suppress and the se ntence are AF F IR M ED

. BACK GR OUND A. P roce dural Hi storyDe fe n d an th a d p r e v i o u s l y

c h a l l e n g e d

h i s c o mp e t e n c y

t o s t an d t r i a l

. F o l l o w i n g a

f u ll 1 evaluation, the district court found him competent, a nd Def endant doe s not challeng e that ruling

. Tenne ssee state police off icer s executed a se arc h war rant at Def

endant’ s home on Aug ust 19, 2005. I n the course of that sea rch, the y seized Defe ndant’s computer . A sepa rate war rant wa s issued

on De c e mbe r 15 , 20 05 to se arc h the c on te nts of the c omp ute r, and ov e r 80 0 images o f chi ld p o rn o graphy

wer e save d on the computer . A g rand jury indicted Def

endant on Ma

y 9, 2006 for

re ce i v i n g ch i l d

p o rn o grap h y , i n v i o l a t i o no f 1 8 U. S

. C

. § 2 2 5 2 A( a) (2 ) a n d (b )( 1 ) a n d

p o s s es s i n g a computer c ontaining imag es of c hild por nog raphy , in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a) (5)( B) and (b)( 2). Def

endant f iled a motion to suppress the evidenc e. A mag istrate judge held an e videntiary hear ing on October

4, 2006 and re commended de ny ing the motion to s uppress. The district court

overr uled Def endant’ s objections to the m ag istrate judge’ s Report and Recommendation and de nied the mot ion

to s up pr e ss. On September

21, 2007, Def

endant plea ded g uilty

to rec eiving child pornog raphy , and the second c harg e of posse ssing a computer containing imag es of child pornog raphy was droppe d. The

1 sent e n c in g g u id e li n e s c a lc u lati o nc a ll e d f o r a s e n te n c e o f

1 2 1 to 1 5 1 mo n th s , b u t t h e ma ndatory min imum ba se d o n D e fe nd ant’ s p re vio us c ri min a l hi sto ry wa s 1 80 mon ths . T he ma ximumja il sentenc e he c ould rec eive wa s 480 months. Pursuant to the plea ag ree ment, the g overnme nt ag ree d that no imag es portra

y ed sadistic or ma sochistic conduct a s defined by U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(4)

. Def enda n t’s Presentenc e Report ( “PSR”) found that at lea st four imag es portra y ed sadistic and

ma so c his tic c on du c t, a

nd if the e nh anc e me nt h a d b e e n a pp lie d, De fe nd ant’ s g uid e lin e s r ang e wo uld have be en 188 to 235 months. On J une 23, 2008, the district cour t sentence d Def

endant to 360months’ imprisonment. Defenda nt filed a ti mely

appea l challeng ing the sear ch of his apa rtment and the re asonable ness of his sentenc e. B. Se ar c h Wa r r ant A sear ch wa

rra nt was obtained by

the King sport, Tenne ssee police depar tment on Aug ust 19, 2005 to searc h the pre mises of an a partment lea sed by

De fe n d an t i n King ston, Tennessee (the “Prospec t Drive a

partment” ). The se arc h war ra n t wa s issued following the submission of an

a ff ida vit by Det ect ive Me lanie Ad

kin s. Th e se arc h w arr ant a sse rt e d th a t D e fe nd ant w a s n ot i n
com p l i an ce with the require ments of the state se x offe nder r eg istration statute and that he ha d perjure d himself in his sworn decla rations relating to those reg istration materia ls and various other court doc uments. Def

endant was barr ed fr om associating with minors, but Adkins had learne d that h e w a s r e p e a t e d l y h a v i n g c o n t a c tw i t h c h i l dr e nb y p l ayi n g t h e r o l e o f S a n t a C l a u s . A d d i t i o n a l l y, De fe nd ant’ s re g istratio n mate ri a ls a nd mul tip le sw or

n A ff ida vit s o f I nd ig e nc y state d th a t he on ly owned one car , a 1979 Pontiac, while two pickup tr ucks we re r eg istered in his name. De fenda nt had been se en driving both trucks. Fina lly , Def endant ha d claimed f

inancial r esponsibility

for two minor daug hters who a lleg edly

lived with him, but Def

endant had restric tions ag ainst living with minors and wa s require d to notify authorities within 48 hours of a minor c oming to live in his residenc e. The sea rch w arr ant was sig ned by the s tate court judge on Aug ust 19, 2005 and executed that

same da y . St a te po lic e of

fi c e rs c on fi sc a te d D e fe nd ant’ s c omp ute r a nd st orage me dia , p a

pe r f ile s, disposable camera s, videotapes, a Santa Claus c ostume, and $39,280 ca sh. I ncluded we re nume rous discs and videos that wer e either children’ s videos or var ious pornog raphic movies, including discs la be le d “ te e n p or

n. ” Up on dr ivi ngawa

y fr om the se arc h, Ad

kin s saw De fe nd ant an d stop pe d h im based on a

n active w arr ant for failure to a ppear . Adkins informed him of the se arc h of the Prospec t Dr ive a pa rtme nt, a nd

De fe ndant conse nte d to the se arc h o f h is s tor a g e fa c ili ty . D e fe nd ant a lsoinformed Adkins that he was c urre ntly living with a S andra Conley

. Conley confirme d this, and a

sear ch war

rant was subsequently obtained for her residenc e. As stated above, a sear ch war rant wa s also later obta ined to sear ch De fenda nt’s computer. At the suppression hear ing befor e the mag istrate judge , Def endant c alled five witnesses. The first witness, Diane Bur

khart, wa s the manag er of

the apa rtment complex where the sear ch occ urre d. She testified that she had been in Def endant’ s apar

tment befor e the searc h beca use maintena

nce w as fo rc e d to ins ta ll n e w l oc ks a ft e r D e fe nd ant ha d ch ang e d the loc ks wi tho ut p e rm iss ion . B ur kh a rt did not know whether

Def endant ha d been g iven ne w k ey s t o t he apa rtment. She also testified confusing ly

about when she beca

me awa re of Def endant’ s status as a sex offende r, sug g esting that sh e fi rs t le arn e d in

ta lki ng wi th De te c tiv e Ad kin s in Aug us t but l a te r c lari fi e d h e r t e sti mony to s ta te that another

office r informe d her in May , 2005. Mary Jone s, a n e mpl oy e e wi th t he a g e nc y

that pr ov ide d Se c tio n 8 ho us ingvo uch e rs to Def endant, testified that she had been contac ted by Bur khart while the sear ch of the apa rtment was ong oing. Jones further

testified that B urkh ar t informed her that Def endant ha d not lived in the apar tment in three y ear s. Bur khart de nied ever making this re mark beca use she ha d not even be en at the complex that long a nd there fore “wouldn’t know that.” (Suppression Hr . Tr. 21). B urkhar t testified that the messy

state of the a

partment as viewed during the s ear ch led he r to tell J ones that there was “ no way

that y ou could be living there .” Id

. Adkins testified that she bec ame a war e of D efe ndant in J une 2005 base d on her involveme nt with alleg ations by

a minor who ha d filed a hara ssment complaint ag ainst Defe ndant. Adkins lear ned that De fenda

nt was a r eg istered se x offe nder, a nd she st ar t ed investigating his appa rent violations o f t h e sex offende r re g istration require ments. Adkins subsequently char g ed De fenda

nt in state court with violating the reg istration require ments. Be fore the sea rch w arr ant was issued, butafte r Adkins completed the aff idavit, an indictment was re turned by a g rand jury

on the char g es that Def endant violated his re g istration require ments and commit ted per jury . Adkins also testified that B ur kh art ha d inf or me d he r that the a

pa rtme nt wa s De fe nd ant’ s re sid e nc e Th e tw o d id n ot d isc us s whether it was Def

endant’ s primary

or sec ondary

residenc e. The fo u rth

w it n e s s w a s D e te c ti v e Pe n n y M a k o w s k i w h o , li k e A d k in s , w o r k e d f o r the King sport Police Depa

rtment. The f

inal witness was Amy

Ennis, a neighbor of Defenda nt’s at the apar tment comp l ex . Ennis testified that she saw a blonde, heavy set woman g oing in a nd out of Def endant’ s apar

tment in the day s prec eding the sea rch, a nd testifi ed t h at i t was Makow ski. She testified that: “I

can hone stly

say y es. I do believe I

did see [Makowski] there .” (Suppre ssion Hr. Tr. 180). She a l s o n oted B urkhar t enteringDef

endant’ s apar

tment with a man who she did not

rec og nize and who was “ too well dresse d” to be a maintenanc e man. ( Suppression Hr. Tr. 182)

. C. Se nt e nc ing The sente ncing g uidelines for D efe ndant ca lled for a sentenc e of 180 months because it was the m andator

y minimum sentenc e and highe r t han the g uideline ra ng e. The probation off

icer noted that at the time of the PSR, Defe ndant had s ev er al s t ate charg es pending , including te lephone hara ssment, stalking, fa ilure to co m ply with the sex offender

reg istry , ag g ravated per

jury , sexual battery , and solicitation of a minor. (PSR 11-13). Def endant objec ted to the PSR , alleg ing that alleg ations i n p ar agr aphs five thr oug h seven

wer e fa lse. Those parag raphs involved an allege d complaint by a fe llow inmate that Def

endant ha d tried to have sex wit h him, alleg ations of pre scription medicine be ing disc overe d under D efe ndant’s mat in jail, and finding a series of newspaper article s in his cell having to do with s tories of a sexual nature . I n his sentencingmemorandum, De fenda nt also noted that he would be in his late seve nties at the end of

fiftee n y ear s, the minimum sentenc e he c ould rec eive.The g overnme nt also put on a witness from the Washing ton County Sheriff’ s Detention 2 Ce nte r, B re nd a

Do wn e s, to t e sti fy

a bo ut t he a lle g a tio ns a g a ins t De fe nd ant ma de by his fo rm e r c e ll mate, Just in Keff

er. D efe ndant ca lled Keffe r hi mself, and Ke ffe r re cante d the alleg ations he previously

made to Downe s. The district cour t expl icitly

did not rely

on any of this testimony

. At the s entenc ing hear ing, Adkins testified t hat Defenda nt’s apar tment complex adjoined a day car e ce nter a

nd was one block from a n ele m en t ar y s chool. Adkins testified that she took a statement fr om a ten-y ear -old g irl who had see n Def endant ha ng ing a round th e p l ay g round at the school on wee kends. Def

endant asked the g irl to come to his car , g rabbe d her to pull her into his ca r, and only rele ased he r whe n a police car passed. The g irl also stated that one time De fenda nt asked he r t o lo ok

un de r t he c ar t o g et a cat, a

nd wh e n s he be nt d ow n, he be g an f on dli nghe r b re a sts
. Adkins further

testified t h at Def

endant ha d play ed Santa Claus at va rious churc hes, schools, and

c omm un ity c e nte rs , a

nd tha t he had, wi tho ut a

uth or iza tio n, e nte re d o ne sc ho ol d re sse d a s Sa

nta Claus. Defe ndant also fr equente d a skating rink wher e many children a

nd teena g ers were found. Following the execution of the sea rch w arr ant, Def

endant invited A dkins to g o to the skating rink with him so t hat she “ could see how well they l i k ed h i m . ” (Sentencing Tr. 20). Ag irl filed a restra ining or der, a

nd stalking charg es were filed ag ainst Def endant in part based on activity arising

a t th e sk a ti ng ri nk . A dk ins fu rt he r t e sti fi e d th a t w he n D e fe nd ant’ s st or a g e un it w a s se arc he d, it contained “ numerous childre n’s toy s, children’ s clothes, shoes, books.” ( SentencingTr. 24). Shana Ly nn testified that she met De fenda nt w hile visiti ng her mother , Sandra Conley . At the tim e , Ly

nn wa s 1 6 y e ars old

. L y

nn ind ic a te d that De fe nd ant re pe a te dly a sk e d he r to e ng a g e in oral sex with him. Eventually she allowe d him to perform ora l sex on her, even though she did not

wa n t h i m t o d o i t
. F o l l o w i n g t h i s e v e n t , D e f e n d an t a s k e d L y

n n ’ s 1 4 y e ar o l d s i s t e r i f h e c ou ld perf orm oral sex on her. D efe ndant subsequently tried to contac t L y

nn repe atedly , claiming to be he r r e a l f a the r. L y nn te sti fi e d th a t whi le sh e us e d to be a fr a id o f D e fe nd ant, sh e no lon g e r w a s. 2The district court eng ag ed in a leng thy discussion of the § 3553(a ) fa ctors, noting some of the imag es De fenda

nt possessed showed r apes of “ver y y oung children” by

adults that the dis t ri ct court c alled “tor

ture.” I n considering the “hist ory and chara cter istics of t he Defenda nt,” t he cour

t found th at De fendant “is a pre viously convicted se x offe nder . . . w ho has pre viously committed sexual crimes ag ainst children.” (Sentenc ing Tr. 71). The dist rict court rec ounted Def endant’ s prior convictions and noted that one did not count towards his c riminal history points. The court noted that Def endant’ s continued illeg al conduc t “i n d i ca te quite clea rly that Mr. Sprague’s se x ual devianc e, if y ou will, was not cure d by his former te rm of i mprisonment.” (Sentenc ing T r. 72). The district court noted that De fenda nt lived near

place s fre quente d by

children, that he possessed a rticles that could be use d to entice c hildren, that he dr essed a s Santa Claus to be near children, and that he fre quently

went to a skating r ink. After rec iting these fac ts, the court held that: “T he proof in this case esta

b l ishes that Mr. Sprag ue is a c hild sex ual pre dator who ha s been a ctively seeking additional victims.” Furthe rmore, he “pr esents a continued risk of re offe nding a nd . . . is a hig h risk for r ecidivism.” (Sentenc ing T r. 73). T h e d is tr ic t c o u rt f

o u n d b y a p r e p o n d e r an c e o f

th e e v id e n c e th a t D e f

e n d an t h a d

c ommitt ed

numerous sexual off

enses over the past two or three y ear s. The court specific ally cre d i t ed t he testimony of Ly nn and believe d those ac ts occurr ed. I n response to Defe ndant’s ar g uments about his medical condition and his adva nced a g e, the district court found that the a cts that occ urre d betwee n 2004 and 2006 happe ned while De fenda nt was suff eringfrom his me dical condition. The court conclude d: “ I t appea rs to this court that neither ag e nor phy sical infirmity will in any way deter Mr. S prague from committing further offenses, a nd the fa cts in t h i s ca se establish that the only way to protect the public is in fa ct to imprison Mr. Sprag ue for

the re st of his n at u ral life.” (Sentenc ing T r. 76-77) . Def endant wa s subject to amaxi mum of 480 months’ imprisonm ent. The district c ourt sentenc ed him to 360 months, meaning

D e f e n d an tw o u l d

b e i n c ar c e r a t e d

p a s th i s 9 0 t h b i rt h d ay. DI SCU SSIO N I. M ot ion to Suppr e ss .

“ Th is c ourt

re vie ws a dis tr ic t c ourt ' s de c isi on on a mot ion to s up pr e ss u

nd e r t wo sta nd a rd s. ‘F indings o f fa ct are upheld unless c lear ly err oneous, while c onclusions of law a re r eviewe d

de

novo .’” United States v. Je nkins , 3 9 6 F. 3 d 7 5 1 , 7 5 7 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 5 ) ( qu o t i n g United States v. Leak e , 95 F.3d 409, 416 ( 6th Cir. 1996) ). “This court views the evidenc e in the lig ht most l ikely to support the district court' s decision.” U n it e d S ta te s v . M cPhe arson , 469 F.3d 518, 523 ( 6th Cir. 2006) (interna l quotation omit ted). “ A fa ctual finding is clear ly err oneous whe n, althoug h there may be evidenc e to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidenc e is left wit h the definite and firm conviction t hat a mistake ha s been c ommitt ed.” Un ite d S tat es v . B lai r , 524 F.3d 740, 747 ( 6th Cir. 2008) (inter

nal quotation omitted). De fe nd ant p re mis e s h is a

pp e a l of the de nia l of his mot ion to sup pr e ss on two the or ie s. F ir st, he ar g ues th a t th e a f

f id a v it f o r th e f ir s t s e ar c h w ar

r an t c o n ta in e d a ma

te r ia l f a ls e h o o d , th a t the

a pa rtme nt c on sti tut e d D e fe nd ant’ s p ri mary re sid e nc e . Se c on d, De fe nd ant argue s that th e purp os e of the sea

rch was to uncover

child pornog raphy , not to investigate the alleg ed violations of Def endant’ s obligations to reg ister as a sex offender . “In Fran k

s v . D e law ar e , [438 U.S. 154, 171 (1 9 7 8 ), ] t he Supreme Court cre ated pr ocedur al protec tions for a de fenda nt who claimed that the

a ff ida vit su pp or ti ng th e prob a

ble c a us e of a se arc h w arr ant c on ta ine d in te nti on a l or re c kle ss falsehoods. The Court stated t hat i t presumed the validity of the a ffidavit in support of the se arc h

warrant.” Un i ted States v. Abboud , 4 3 8 F

. 3 d 5 5 4 , 5 7 4 ( 6 th

Ci r . 2 0 0 6 )

. T h e b u r d e nis o nthe defe n d an t to s h o w s u c h f a ls e h o o d s in th e a f

f id a v it

. I f th e d e f

e n d an t me e ts th is b u r d e n , then thequestion become s whether the af fidav i t i s s u fficient to support probable c ause w ithout the falsehoods. Id

. Def

endant f ails to provide suffic ient evidenc e to over come the pr esumption of the

va lid ity of the se arc h w arr ant. The que stion of whether

the apa rtment was De fenda

nt’s primary addre ss is easily resolved. As a pre liminary

matter, De tective Adkins ne ver swor e in the af fidavit that i t was his primary residenc e. The aff

idavit stated that the Prospect Drive apar tment w as “re sided in or occupie d and po sse sse d b y ” De fe nd ant, no t tha t it wa s his pr ima ry re sid e nc e . The a

pa rtme nt w a s und ou

bte dly sti ll p o s s es s edb y

De fe n d an t , an d

ev en i f he we re u s u al l y

s t ay i n g at C o n l ey ’s p l ac e, h e s t i l l h ada l ar ge

n u mb e r o f p o s s e s s i o n s a tt h e P r o s p e c tD r i v e a p ar t m e n t , i n c l u d i n g ano u t d o o r c a t
. A d d i t i o n a l l y, Def endant r ece ived a Sec tion 8 voucher, w hich is only available for a

primary residenc e, for

the apar tment. He st ated that the apartment was his addre ss on all of hi s reg istration forms t o reg ister

a s a se x off e nd e r a s w e ll a s o the r s wo rn le g a l do c ume nts
. Def endant doe s not offer

any conclusive e vidence t h at Ad kins did not believe that the Prospect Dr ive apa

rtment was “ resided in o r o cc u p ied and possesse d by ” De fenda nt. Defe ndant acknow ledg es that Bur

khart told Adkins that the apar tment w as his “ residenc e,” highlig h t i n g that she did not tell Adkins it was his “primar y residenc e.” Bur

khart did te stify that nobody could live in that apar

tment beca

use it was so messy , but no evidenc e sug g ests that she told that information to Adkins. The fac t that Burkha rt told that information to J ones is cer tainly evidenc e that she mig ht have told it to A dkins as well, but Adkins specific ally testified that she wa s not told t hat Def endant did not live ther e. Reviewing the district c ourt’s fac tual deter minations for clea

r er ror, we easily

find that the sworn testimony

of a w itness can outweigh the speculation that Bur khart would have r elay ed the same infor

mation to two differe nt people. This Court cannot overturn a district court’s fa ctual finding s unless it is left wit h the “de finite and fir m conviction that a mistake ha s been c ommitt ed.”Def endant also cites an affidavit for a wa rra nt on Conley ’s apa

rtment that Adkins submitt ed 3 on Au g us t 23 , 2 00 5 s ta tin g that D e fe nd ant d id n ot s tay in t he Pr os pe c t D ri ve apar tm ent . T his langua g e is n ot a sig n that Ad kin s wo uld us e “ wh a te ve r langua g e in t he a ff ida vit that sh e ne e de d in or de r t o le a

p f ro g fr om t

he se arc h of

on e se t of

pr e mis e s to a

no the r. ” (D e f. B r. 33 ). Th a t a ff ida vit was submitt ed afte r Adkins enter ed the Prospec t Drive a partment pursua

nt to the searc h war

rant on Aug ust 19, 2005. Adkins assuredly could assume that the a ddress that De fenda nt list ed on all lega l do c ume nts wa s h is r e sid e nc e bu t su bs e qu e ntly realize , a ft e r s e e ingthe pla c e wa s uninha bit a ble during the execution of a se arc h war rant, that Defenda

nt may not have be en g ener ally staying at that addre ss. Blair , 5 24 F .3 d at 74 7 ( int e rn a l quo tation o mit te d) . T he dis tr ic t c ourt a ssu re dly did no t e rr in declining to find that Adkins committed a Franks vio la tio n in he r a ff ida vit

. 3 Def endant ne x t contends that while the a ffidavit for the s ear ch wa

rra nt stated that it was inv e sti g a tin g vio la tio ns of the se x off

e nd e r r e g ist

ratio n r e qu ir eme nts and

pe rj ur y , it wa s r e a lly intended to f

ind c hild por

nog raphy

. Def

endant’ s argument is ba sed on the fac t that the g rand jury issued an indictment for D efe ndant on the re g istration violations and perjur y char g es bef

ore the

sear ch wa rra nt was executed. The a rg ument that the evidenc e should be suppressed based on the alleg ed true motives of Adkins must fail for a numbe r of r easons. F irst, while the re g istration violations had been broug ht befor e the g rand jury , Adkins testified that she did not kn o w t h e indi ctment was issued w hen she pre s e n te d h e r w ar r an t a f f id a v it

. ( Su

p p r e s s io nH r . T r . 8 7

- 8 9 )

. Se c o n d , th e f a c t t h a t a nindic tment was issued doe s not a

utomatically mean that all investigation should st op. For instance, one of the alleg ations that Defe ndant was in violation of the se x offe nder r eg istration r equire ments was that he ha d c on ta c t w i t h c h i l dr e n b y p l ay i n g S an t a C l a u s . I t c e rt a i n l y b o l s t e r s t h e g o v e r n m e n t ’ s c a s e to procur e the Santa Claus suit and numerous pictures with D efe ndant dresse d as Santa Clau s found

a t th e Pr os pe c t D ri ve a

pa rtme nt. I t is possible that the office rs wer e hoping to f ind c hild por

nog raphy on the computer s, but

we a re una war e of any

principle of la

w that a se arc h war

rant issued ba sed on cr edible alleg ations ofObviously , t h e p o l i ce can only conduct a

sear ch consistent with the sea rch w arr ant, but 4 Def endant doe s argue that the se arc h exceede d the scope of the warra nt and does not argue that any of the mate rial seized from his apa rtment was unlaw ful. Se e Un ite d Stat es v. G ar c ia , 496 F.3d 495, 50 7 ( 6th Cir . 2 00 7) (n oti ngtha

t a se arc h “ purs ua

nt t o a va lid wa

rr ant m ay de vo lve int o a

n inva lid g ener al searc h i f t he off

icer s flag rantly

disreg ard the limit ations of the sea rch w arr ant”) (interna l qu otatio ns omi tte d) . F ur

the rm or e , o ff

ic e rs we re le g a lly e nti tle d to be in De fe nd ant’ s a pa rtme nt t o inv e sti g a te the re g istratio n and pe rj ur y a lle g a tio ns , so the fa c t that the y c a me a c ro ss e vid e nc e of

c hil d pornog raphy

is simpl y not problematic. See, e .g., United States v. Ree d , 141 F.3d 644, 649 ( 6th Cir. 1998) (holding that as l ong as person is “leg ally prese nt at t heir vantag e whe n their re spective se nses are aro us e d b y

ob vio us ly

inc ri min a tin g e vid e nc e , a se arc h w ith in t

he meanin g of

the F ourt

h Amendment has not oc curr ed”)

. I f the g overnme nt could demonstrate t h at i t would have se arc hed the a partment a

ny way 5 pursuant to A dkins’ investigation, then any prior illeg al sea

rche s would not lead to the suppre ssion of evide nce. See U

nited States v. Keszthelyi , 308 F.3d 557, 574 (6th Cir. 2002) (a cknowledg ing that “the inevitable discovery

exception to the exclusionary rule applies when .

. . evidenc e discove red during an illeg al sea

rch w ould have be en dis cover ed during a later le g al sea rch a nd the sec ond sear ch inevitably would have oc curr ed in the abse nce of the first”)

. i l l e g a l a c t i v i t y i s i n v a l i d w h e r e t h e o f f i c e r s h o p e t o f

i n d i n f o r m a t i o no f a d d i t i o n a l c r i m i n a l a c t i v i t y. Sup re me Court

jur isp ru de nc e wo uld

su g g e st the op po sit e . “ Sub je c tiv e int e nti on s p lay

no ro le in ordinary , probable -ca

use Four th A mendment analy sis.” W hren v. U nited States , 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). The fruits of this sea rch further ed the g oals of an on- g oing c riminal investigation, and we

are not conce rned w ith aspersions ca st on the motives of the offic ers in such a situation. 4 De fe nd ant f

ina lly argue s th a t th e se arc h w a s p reci pi ta te d b y pr e vio us ill e g a l e ntr ie s in to Def endant’ s apar

tment that tipped the au t horities off to the f act that c hild pornog raphy was in the residenc e. I f true, the subsequent wa rra nt c ould be problematic. Def endant relies on the testimony 5 of his ne ig hb or , E nn is, that so me on e ma tc hin g De te c tiv e Mak ows ki’s a pp e ara nc e ha d p re vio us ly enter ed the a

partment. De fenda

nt argues that this testimony , toge ther with the fact that Adkins and B ur kh art we re in c on ta c t be fo re the se arc h, ind ic a te s th a t th e of ficers kn ew a

bo ut t he c hil d po rn og ra ph y thr ou g h p ri or

wa rr antl e ss e ntr ie s. Th e pr ob le m f or De fe nd ant i s th a t th e ma g istrate judge considere d Ennis’ testimony “less than unequivoca l” and considere d a con t es t b et wee nAdkins’ cr edibility and Ennis’ c redibility

“not even close.” The mag istrate judg e’s f actua l finding that no ill e g a l e ntr

y ha d p re vio us ly

oc c ur re d w a s n ot c le arl y

e rr on e ou s. II. Reasonableness of Sentence A. Stand ard of Review We “re view a district c ourt' s sentencingdeter mination, ‘under a

defe rential a

buse-of

discretion standa

rd,’ f or re asonable ness[.] ” Unit ed S t a t es v. Bolds , 511 F.3d 568, 578 ( 6th Cir. 2 0 0 7 ) ( qu o t i n g Gall v. United States , 5 52 U. S. 3 8, 41 (2 00 7) ); see a l s o Rita v. United States , 551 U.S. 33 8, 34 7- 51 (2 00 7) . T his sta nd ard a pp lie s “ ‘[r ]eg ard le ss o f w he the r t he se nte nc e imp os e d is inside or out side the Guidelines r ang e . . . .’” United States v. Higgins , 557 F.3d 381, 397 ( 6th Cir. 2 0 0 9 ) ( qu o t i n g Ga ll , 552 U.S. at 51). United St ates v. Book er deter mined that sentenc ing judg es ar e permitted “to tailor the se nt en ce i n l i ght of other statutory conce rns as we ll.” 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2 00 5) (c iti ng 18 U.S .C

. § 35 53 (a )) . “ Thus , a dis tr ic t c ourt ' s d e c isi on

to e xer c ise its dis c re tio n to depar t from the advisory

Guidelines, either

upwar d or downwa

rd, i s revie wed f

or re asonable ness.” United States v. He rrera-Zuniga , 571 F.3d 568, 581 (6th Cir. 2009). Se e Un ite d S tat es v . S mi th , 474 F

. 3 d 8 8 8 , 8 9 4 ( 6 t h C i r . 2 0 0 7 ) ( “ T h e r e f o r e , i ti s h e r e t h a tw e w i l l i n c o r p o r a t e o u r

p o s t- Booke r jurisprudenc e to our re view of upw ard de parture s under § 4A1.3.” ). B. Ana lys is Def endant c halleng es only

the substantive rea sonablene ss of his 360 month sentence. “ [T] he dis tr ic t c ourt ’s ta sk

is t o im po se a se nte nc e su ff

ic ie nt, bu t no t g re a te r tha

n ne c e ssa ry , to c omp ly

wi th the purposes of the statutory sentenc ing sc heme.” United States v. Pre sley , 547 F.3d 625, 630- 31 (6 th Cir

. 20 08 ) (i nte rn a l qu otatio n omi tte d)

. “ A se nte nc e may be c on sid e red su bstanti ve ly

unrea sonable whe n the district court selects a sente nce a rbitrar ily , bases the se ntence onDe fe nd ant a lso hig hli g hts inc on sis te nc ie s in te sti mony re g ard ingan a lle g e d s e xua l a ssa ult 6 while in prison o f Ke ffe r. Ke ffe r wa s called at the sentenc ing he aringand re cante d his previous state me nts to t

he ja il s up e rv iso r wh o te sti fi e d on be ha lf of the g ov e rnme nt. Th is i ssu e is i rr e le va nt. The district cour

t specifica lly

stated that the a lleg atio n s re g ardingDef endant’ s conduct towa

rds Kef fer “will play

no part in the c ourt’s dec ision in t his case.” (Sentenc ing T r. at 68). impermissible factor s, fails to consider r eleva nt sentencingfac tors, or g ives an unre asonable amount of we ight to any

pertinent fa ctor.” United States v. Conatser , 514 F.3d 508, 520 ( 6th Cir. 2008). The guidelines calc ulations f or Def endant’ s sentenc e in the prese ntence repor t called f or a g uidelines rang e of 121 to 151 months. Def endant, howeve r, was subject to a mandatory minimum sentenc e of 180 months pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(1) . The guidelines are expli cit that wher e

a mand a tor y min imum se nte nc e is g re a te r t ha n the ma ximum of

the g uid e lin e s r ang e , “ the statut or ily require d minimum sentenc e s h all be the guideline sentenc e.” U .S.S.G. § 5G1.1(b). A g uideline sentenc e for

Def endant, ther efor e, would have been 180 months. The g overnme nt initi ally reque sted a 180 m o n t h s en t ence in its sentencing memorandum. At the a ctual sente ncing , the g overnme nt

r e v i s e d i t s p o s i t i o n an d

s t a t e d t h a t“ t h e f

a c tu a l b a s i s i s i nt h e r e c o r d f o r t h e c o u rtt o u

p w ar d l y v a r

y,
and to d o s o to pr ote c t the c hil dr e n in any c omm un ity wh e re Mr . Sp ra g ue may

be re le a se d u

po n h is term of imprisonment.” ( SentencingTr. at 65)

. The district cour

t imposed a sentenc e of 360 months, a se ntence twice a s long a s the g uideline sentenc e. De fenda nt challeng es the substantive rea sonablene ss of this sentence on sever al g rounds. Fir st, Defe ndant ar g ues that all of the r eleva nt fac tors listed by

the di s t ri ct co u rt “ar e ref lected in the se ntencingg uidelines and the statutory mandatory

minimum .” (A

ppellant’s B r. at 27 ). De fe nd ant al so no te s his de c lin ingme dic a l c on dit ion , c omp are s h is s e nte nc e to t hat of a Jim I rwin who re ceive d 21 0 m o n t h s fo r a c hild pornog raphy conviction, and que stions whether the conduct r elied on by

the district court wa s ever proven in a

court of la

w. 6The district c ourt did r efe r to a number of fac tors that are contemplated i n t h e s entenc ing 7 g uid e lin e s, inc lud ingc on c e rn wi th t he po we rl e ss v ic tim s that are the c hil dr e n a nd the he ino us ne ss of the abuse the children g o throug h in the production of these imag es that De fenda nt obtained. The dis tr ic t c ourt

e mph a size d th a t so me of

the se ima g e s w e re pa

rt ic ula rl y a pp a lli ng– in c lud ingmul tip le ima g e s o f a du lts e ng a g ingin s e xua l a c ts w iththe c hil dr e n – ind ic a tin g that with in the re a lm of c hil d po rn og ra ph y of fe nd e rs , th e qu anti ty

and ty pe of ima g e s p os se sse d b y

De fe nd ant w e re pa

rt ic ula rl y appalling

. De fe nd ant’ s argume nt t

hat a ll the re le va

nt c on du c t no te d by the dis tr ic t c ourt is inc lud e d in the sentenc ing guidelines i s s i m p l y n o t corr ect. The district court dec ided to g ive an aboveg uidelines sentenc e base d primarily on the spec ific likelihood of Def endant r e-of

fending

. The

7 dis tr ic t c ourt no te d that e ve n a ft e r De fe nd ant wa s im pr iso ne d o n h is p re vio us c on vic tio ns , h e c ho se to live n ea r a da

y car e ce nter a

nd an ele mentary

school with a playg round. His re sidence and the sto ra g e un it w e re bo th f

ill e d w ithc hil dr e n’ s it e ms, su c h a s c lot he s, toy s, and

c and y . H e pla y e d Sa nta Cla us a t sc ho ols , c hurc he s, and c omm un ity c e nte rs . Th e dis tr ic t c ourt state d: “ Th e pr oo f i n th is c a se establishes that Mr. Sprague is a c hild sex ual pre dator who ha s been actively seekingadditional victims. The proof in this case also establishes t h at Mr. Sprague pre sents a continued r isk of reof fendingand that he is a

high r isk of rec idivism .” (Sen t en ci n g T r. at 73). To bolster that conclusion, the district cour t found by

a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e that “Mr . Sprag ue has

c omm itt e d n

ume ro us se xua l of

fe ns e s o ve r t

he la st t wo or thre e y e ars pr ior

to h im f ind inghim se lf here today .” Id . The district cour t specifica lly

cre dited the t estimony of L y nn, who testified about De fe n d an t ’ s s e xu a l a s s a

u l t o n h e r , an d n o t e d t h at t h e B u r e a u o f P r i s o n s c l a s s i f

i e d D e f e n d an t a s a pe do ph ile and

a ma lin g e re r. Th e se fa c ts a re no t ac c ounte d for in t

he g uid e lin e s f

or a ty pic a l c hil d pornog raphy

conviction. Def endant’ s argument about his medical c ondition mus t also fail. The district c ourt specific ally

considere d it, and while the district court believe d that Def endant wa s exagg erating, a ndI n fac t, the district court’s spec ific intention was to g ive an ef fec tive life sentenc e. The 8 dis tr ic t c ourt

sa id: “ Mr . Spr a g ue , so tha t the re c or d will be c le ar, my purp os e he re tod ay is t o im po se a sente nce in this ca se that amounts to a life term of imprisonment. You should neve r be r elea sed fr om f e de ra l pr iso n; a

nd it g ive s me a

bs olute ly no ple a sure to s ay

that , bu t th e re c or d in

thi s c a se c le arl y e sta bli sh e s th e ri sk

of re of fe nd ing .” (S e nte nc ing Tr . 7 7- 78 ). De fe nd ant d oe s n ot s pe c if ic a lly c ha lle ng e thi s st a te me nt as an in app ro pr ia te c on sid e ratio n. We n ote that a se nte nc ingjud g e is su pp os e d to g ive a

se nte nc e “ no t g re a te r tha

n ne c e ssa ry” to c omp ly

wi th t he statut or

y c on sid e ratio ns . 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). To g ive an e ffe ctive life se ntence , a judge needs to do a thoroug h revie w of a ll of the § 355 3( a ) fa c tor s to det e rm ine that a def e nd ant sho uld ne ve r have an opp or tun ity to r e joi n society . We fee l comfortable that such an inquiry was unde rtake n in this case. the B ure au o f Prisons accuse d Def endant of malinge ring , the district court a cknowledg ed that Def endant’ s medical c ondition was serious. The c ourt, howeve r , n o te d th a t D e f e ndant would re ceive g oo d me dic a l tr e a tme nt w hil e in p ri so n, and mor e imp or

tantl y , note d tha t De fe nd ant c omm itt e d h is offe nse and targ eted children “whe n he was alre ady suffe ring from those disabiliti es.” (Sentenc ing Tr. at 75) . The fa ct that Def endant submitted a life ex p ec t an cy t ab le indicating that his life

e xpe c tanc y

wa s 1 4. 8 y e ars a t th e tim e of se nte nc ingdo e s n ot m a ke the se nte nc e su bstanti ve ly

un re a so na

ble . T he dis tr ic t c ourt

is a llo we d to se nte nc e so me on e to s pe nd the re st o f h is l if

e in j a il. 8 This Court has previously aff irmed a 360- month se ntence for a seventy y ear old man for possession of child pornog raphy

. United States v. Quinn , 257 F. App’x 864 (6th Cir. 2007). I n this case, whe re the cour t found that Def

endant posed a m ajor threat of re offe nding a nd was c ommitt ing of

fense s even in poor

medical c ondition, the dist rict court’s decision to sentence Def endant to a te rm in prison longe r than his life e x pecta ncy was not substantively

unrea sonable. Def endant a lso submit ted evidenc e of the sentenc ing of J im I rwin, who re ceive d 210 months fo r a c ri me that in c lud e d ch ild po rn og ra ph y of his 8- y e ar- old

g ra nd da ug hte r. De fe nd ant a

rgue s th is is a n unw arr ante d d isp ari ty

un der 1 8 U.S .C

. § 35 53 (a )( 6) . T his on e oth e r c a se is n ot h e lpf ul t o Def endant. I rwin had no previous criminal history and had a st atutory maxi mum sentenc e of 240 months. The district court in this case thoug ht it highly rele vant t hat not only did Def endant haveDef endant a lso arg ues that the conduc t relied on by the district court wa s never deter mined 9 in a cour t of l aw. This argument appea rs t o relate prim arily to the t estimony reg arding Kef fer , on which the dist rict cour

t expl icitly

did not rely . To the extent Defe ndant is conce rned a bout the other fac ts found by

the district court, c ircuit prec ede n t i s cl ea r that “district judg es in deter mining defe ndants’ senten ces may consider f

acts that they

find under a

preponde ranc e-of

-the-e vidence standard.” United States v. Klups , 514 F.3d 532, 537 ( 6th Cir. 2008). I n this case, the district c ourt thoroug hly

prese nted the fa cts that it found and the ba sis for finding those fac ts. a re peate d history of sexual abuse of minors, he did not chang e his way s after being convicted a

nd imprisoned on those cha

rg es. S e c ti o n

3 5 5 3 ( a ) ( 6 ) s p ecif

ically provides the ne ed to avoid unwa rra nted disparities betwe en def

endants “ with simi lar re cords.” This cruc ial differ ence betwee n Def endant and Irwin m ea n s t h e disparity betwee n the two sentenc es is not “unwar rante d.” United States v. Phinazee , 5 15 F .3 d 5 11 , 5 20 (6 th Ci r. 20 08 ) ( ho ldi ngthat “ unwarranted disparities in sentencing is what should be avoided, no t those that are war rante d). 9 We a c kn o w le d g e th a t D e f e n d an t’ s s e n te n c e is tw ic e h is g u id e li n e s e n te n c e an d e mp h a s iz e that such a sentenc e require s a strong justification f rom a district c ourt. I n this case, howe ver, the district court consider ed the a ppropriate fac tors and thoroug hly justified the sentenc e. The ref ore, the sentenc e is substantively rea sonable. CO NC LU SION F or the fo re g oin g re a so ns , th is j ud g me nt o f t he dis tr ic t c ourt

is AF F IR M ED

.