1 Filed 1/29/15 In re J.H. CA1/3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re J.H., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
SOLANO COUNTY HEALTH & SOCIAL SERVICES DEPARTMENT, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. C.H., Defendant and Appellant. A141018
(Solano County Super. Ct. No. J41522)

In re C.H., on Habeas Corpus. A142616

Following a hearing held pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26, 1 the juvenile court entered an order on February 14, 2014, terminating the parental rights of C.H. (father) with respec t to his son J.H. and directing the Solano County Health & Social Se rvices Department (the ag ency) to commence adoption proceedings for the child. On appeal and in his consolidated petition for writ of habeas

1 All further unspecified statutory refere nces are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.2 corpus, 2 father does not present any substan tive arguments challenging the juvenile court’s findings or order entered after the sect ion 366.26 hearing. He argues only that the February 14, 2014, order “was the inevitable pr oduct” of earlier antecedent orders entered after the jurisdictional and dispositional hear ing, and the six-mont h and 12-month review hearings, which preceded the February 14, 2014 order. ( In re Meranda P. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1143, 1146 ( Meranda P .).) According to father, e ach antecedent order was wrongly decided by the juvenile court or was the consequence of his counsel’s ineffective
assistance. We conclude father’s failure to either appeal or seek writ relief regarding the propriety of the orders antedating the Febr uary 14, 2014, order precludes him from now challenging those orders either by this appeal or by petition for writ of habeas corpus. ( Ibid .) Accordingly, we affirm the February 14, 2014, order and summarily deny father’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
FACTUAL AND PROCED URAL BACKGROUND 3 A. Jurisdiction and Disposition Orders Mother gave birth to the child in May 2006. Father was present at the child’s birth
and is listed as the father on the child’s bi rth certificate. Father and mother were not living together at the time of the child’s birt h. The parents have never been married and father reported he is married to another woman. In June 2012, the agency filed a petition seeking to detain th e child, who had just turned six, in an out-of-home placement pend ing further investigation and a jurisdictional hearing. The agency’s intervention had been sought by a Fairfield police officer who had taken the child into protective custody when his temporary caretaker (mother’s friend)
was arrested and mother could not be found. In a detention report , the agency social
worker stated that th e child reported he had been livin g with his mother’s friend for the

2 In support of his petition for writ of habe as corpus, appellant asks us to take judicial notice of the record, briefs and pleadi ngs filed in the appeal in this case, which request is granted.
3 Because mother has not filed an appeal ch allenging the termina tion of her parental rights, our recitation of the facts focuses primarily, if not exclusively, on father’s circumstances.3 last 30 days and before that he had been livi ng with his mother at a hotel. The child also reported that either his parents or his moth er’s friend took him to and from school each day. A.T., the child’s adult-half sibling, re ported that for the last three years, she and mother had been residing togeth er on and off. In mother’s absence, A.T. cared for the
child. About one month before the child’s detention, mother had arranged for the child to
live with mother’s friend. M. J., the child’s maternal grandm other, reported that in about February 2012, mother began staying at a mo tel. At the end of April or beginning of May 2012, father had been arre sted and was currently in the Yolo County jail. According to M.J., after father’s arrest, “things we nt downhill even more because [father] had helped stabilize [mother] and that he was ta king care of [his son] primarily. [M.J.] reported that [father] had kept [mother] away from drugs, steered her . . . on the right track, and ensured [his son] went to scho ol.” M.J. also explained her current circumstances and willingness to care for the child. In its first amended petiti on, filed on July 2, 2012, the agency sought court intervention, alleging mother had failed to pr otect the child (§ 3 00, subd. (b)) based on her history of substance abus e, unstable housing, untreated mental health needs, and leaving the child with variou s caretakers without additional provisions for support, placing him at substantial risk of physical harm or illness, a nd father had failed to provide support for the child (§ 300, subd. (g)) based on the fact that father was “currently incarcerated” and “[d]ue to . . . father’s abse nce, he cannot make appropriate provisions for [the child’s] ongoing care and supervision which places the minor at substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness.” After a hearing on July 3, 2 012, the court continued
the child’s detention and scheduled a combin ed jurisdictional and dispositional hearing for July 24, 2012. In its findi ngs and orders after detention hearing filed on July 3, 2012,
the court found reasonable efforts were made to prevent or elimin ate the need for the child’s removal from the home and “[a] rela tive who is able, a pproved, and willing to
care for the child is not available. This is a temporary finding and does not preclude later placement with a relative under Welf. & Inst. Code, § 361.3 .” (Italics in original.)4 In advance of the jurisdictional and dispos itional hearing, the agency social worker filed a jurisdictional report on July 19, 2012. By that time the child had been placed with maternal relatives, provisionally approved by the agency. Based on an interview with father, the agency soci al worker reported the following info rmation. Father asserted that since the child’s birth he had provided financ ial support for the child and the day-to-day care for the child including ta king the child to school every day. However, he admitted he had no knowledge of the arrangements mo ther had made for the child to stay with mother’s friend. He was opposed to any plan to re turn the child to mo ther as she was not able to provide appropriate car e. When father received the section 300 petition he was
relieved to know the child had been removed from mother’s care and was safe. Father explained the circumstances leading to his Ma rch 29, 2012 arrest on charges of evading a police officer and driving with a suspended license. Since father had been in police custody he had not seen the ch ild. The agency social worker concluded her assessment of
the father’s situation as follows: Father “has expressed his deep love and concern for [the child]. [Father] has stated that were he not incarcerated , he would be able to make appropriate arrangements for the care of [the ch ild], and has further stated that prior to his incarceration he ensured that [the child] wa s cared for, fed, and attended school. The outcome of his sentencing for his current inca rceration is still unknown. As a result, there is, again, little altern ative to the continued dete ntion of the [child].” At the originally scheduled jurisdicti onal and dispositional hearing on July 24, 2012, father was not present but was repr esented by a deputy public defender. The
matter was continued for a month to allow counsel to speak with father in jail. At the continued hearing on August 24 , 2012, father was again not present in court. The court
was informed that there wa s an agreement “to resolve jurisdiction and potential disposition” at that time. Mother submitted to allegations, as amended, that she had failed to protect the child (§ 300, subd. (b)) based on a histor y of unstable housing, a past history of substance abuse, and untreated mental health needs, which periodically affected her ability to protect the child from physical harm and/or illness. Father’s counsel told the court: “I did visit with [fa ther] in custody in Yolo County. I advised5 him of his right to be present today, but he had a court appearance scheduled at the same time up there, so he opted to stay up there. [¶] And as to the [section 300, subdivision (g), failure to provide support] allegation . . . , we did review that, and he was prepared to submit on that.” Based on the agency’s dete ntion report and jurisdictional report, as well
as the certified documents re garding the criminal proceedi ngs against father, the court found by a preponderance of th e evidence, that the allegations, as amended, against both parents were true, and accordingly, the child came within the jurisdiction of the court under subdivisions (b) and (g) of section 300. The court then discussed the terms and conditions of a disposition orde r. The court granted the agen cy’s request that the child remain in an out-of-home pl acement with maternal relative s and both parents be granted reunification services. On Augu st 29, 2012, the court issued its findings and order after jurisdictional hearing, and later, on September 7, 2012, issued its findings and order after dispositional hearing. The court declared th e child a dependent after finding that, based on the facts stated on the record, (1) continua nce of the child in the mother’s home was contrary to his welfare and physical cu stody should be removed from mother, and (2) although father did not reside with th e child at the time the petition was filed and desired custody of the child, “[b]y clear a nd convincing evidence, placement with the [father] . . . would be detrimental to the safe ty, protection, or physical or emotional wellbeing of the child.” The juvenile court found fath er to be the presumed father of the child. The court granted both parents reunification serv ices after finding, in pertinent part, that
services to father would benef it the child. As to father’s c ontact with the child, the court directed that father’s “[i]n-person” visits “shall commence upon the father’s release from jail. The father shall contac t the Department upon his rel ease to initiate visits,” and “[t]elephone and written contact are permitted, as allowed by the relative caregiver. Letters containing inappropriate content may be returned to the write r.” On January 15, 2013, the child was removed from the home of his maternal relatives at their request and
moved to a foster fam ily agency home.6 B. Six-Month Review Hearing
In advance of the six-mont h review hearing, the agency social worker submitted a report indicating father had remained incarcerat ed in Yolo Co unty for the duration of the current reporting period. As to visits, the agency social worker report ed: “As [father] is currently incarcerated, he does not have in person contact with [the child]. He is allowed and encouraged to mail letters or cards to [t he child] through the De partment. [Father] has mailed one letter to [the child] during th e current reporting period. The [agency social worker] is not recommending changes to [father’s] visitation schedule.” The agency social worker fu rther reported: “[Father] states that he needs to have contact with [the child]. He states that he wants in person visitation with [the child]. He would also
like to have better access to se rvices while he is incarcer ated in Yolo County.” At the six-month review hearing held on February 26, 20 13, father was not present. Father’s counsel stated he wo uld “submit” on the matter, but was granted ten days to recalendar the matter because counsel had not heard from father and was not able to confirm if father had received the agency’s report. In its February 28, 2013, written findings and order entered after the six-mont h review hearing, the court continued its previous orders granting reunification services and directing that father’s in-person visits
with the child would commence on his rele ase from incarceration and father was to contact the agency on his rele ase to initiate visits. On Ma y 1, 2013, the child was moved from his foster care home pl acement to the home of his maternal grandmother. C. Twelve-Month Review Hearing
In advance of the 12-month review hearin g, the agency social worker filed its August 5, 2013, report, recommending termin ation of family reunification services for both parents. As to the child’s circumstance s, the agency social worker reported that between January 15, 2013 and April 2013, th e child had spent ever y weekend with his maternal grandmother in anticipation of pla cement in her home that occurred on May 1, 2013. The child was adjusting well to his placement and enj oyed living with the maternal grandmother. The maternal grandmother was committed to pr oviding the child permanency in the form of ad option or guardianship, should re unification efforts with the7 parents fail. Since March 2013, the child ha d weekly individual counseling sessions with a mental health therapist. The therap ist reported the child was “ ‘bright and precocious,’ ” and “ ‘very, very smart and de lightful.’ ” The child loved his maternal grandmother and “ ‘is ready to attach.’ ” The child was in need of healthy adult relationships and would easily at tach to anyone with a strong presence in his life. The child expressed anxiety over not knowing wh at would happen to hi m, and this anxiety was manifesting as stomach aches and chest pa ins. The child want ed to live with his father, but if he could not do so he wanted to live with his maternal grandmother.
As to father’s circumstan ces, the agency soci al worker reported that on June 26, 2013, father had been sentenced to more than seven years in prison, and therefore there was no substantial probability of return of the child to him w ithin the next six months. The agency social worker reported father di d not have in person visits with the child
because of father’s incarceration. Father se nt letters and comic strips to the child who reportedly enjoyed the corresponde nce. The child asked the ag ency social worker to send father a school picture of child and on the back, the child had written that he loved his dad, and he and the maternal grandmother misse d father a lot. The agency social worker opined that once father was assigned to pe rmanent prison housing, the child would benefit from visits with father, provided the prison could arrange fo r contact visits and the decision was made in conjunction with the child’s therapist. The agency social worker concluded her report by commenting: Father “has attempted to engage in the few services he has access to while incarcerated in Yolo County. He sends letters to [t he child] which [he] enjoys. [The child] misses [father] and painted a broken heart for him. However, [father] will be incarcerated for a significant portion of [the child’s] childhood. There is no probability that [the child] can be returned
to father within the next seve ral years.” The agency social worker included in her report certified documents relating to the criminal proceedings against father. The certified documents indicated that on June 26, 2013, pursuant to a plea agreement, father was sentenced to an aggregate term of seven year s and four months for the felony offenses of “evading a peace officer with reckless driving” and “evad ing a peace officer while8 driving in the opposite direction,” that he waived presenten ce custody credit up to May 29, 2013, and he was granted cred it for time served of 56 days.
The 12-month review heari ng was ultimately held on Se ptember 16, 2013. Father was not present but was represented by a deputy public defender. The court stated it had read and considered the agency ’s report filed on August 5, 2013, and took judicial notice of the certified documents relating to fathe r’s criminal proceedi ngs in Yolo County. When asked for father’s position on the matte r, his counsel replied that based on the information regarding defendant’ s seven-year sentence, counsel was prepared to submit. Based on the agency’s recomme ndations, the court terminated reunification services for both parents and scheduled a s ection 366.26 hearing for January 7, 2014, to determine the child’s permanent placement. In so ruling, the court explaine d: “The Court having read and considered the status review report does find at this point in time that [the child’s] needs have become paramount . . . . [¶] . . . I am going to terminate reunification services for both [mother] and [father] at this point in time given their absence of compliance with the existing case plan, and in [fath er’s] case, the fact that notw ithstanding his effort to try to complete his case plan, his present prison sentence does not authorize the Department to extend services beyond th e time in which he would otherwise be incarcerated, and the provisions of additional services would not be of be nefit to the minor.” With respect to visitation, the court ruled that “[w]hen [father ] is settled in an appr opriate facility, I’ll direct the Department to inquire whether or not it’s possible for them to arrange a special visit for [father] consistent with the rules and regulations of the facility in which he is incarcerated.” In its written findings and or der filed on September 19, 2013, the court directed that “in-person visitation shall be al lowed at the discretion of the social worker in conjunction with the ch ild’s therapist while the fa ther remains incarcerated, consideration being given to the rules and regulations of the penal institution. Should the father be released from custody, supervised visitation will occur at least once monthly,” and “[w]ritten contact is permitted.” Father, in propria persona, filed a notice of intent to file a writ petition and request for record to review the September 19, 2013 order. However, this court struck the filing9 of the record after father failed to timely file a writ petition. In our order, we stated that “[t]he failure to file a timely petition shall preclude any subs equent appellate review of the order setting a hearing unde r Welfare and Institutions Co de section 366.26 (Welf. and Inst. Code, section 366.26, subd. (l)).” D. Section 366.26 Hearing
In advance of the secti on 366.26 hearing, the agency social worker filed a December 20, 2013, report, recommending termin ation of parental ri ghts and adoption as the child’s permanent placement pl an. By that time, the child had been detained for 18 months and had been living with his mate rnal grandmother for seven months. The maternal grandmother had moved to a two- bedroom apartment and had retired from her employment. She was committed to adopting th e child, providing him with a safe, stable home into adulthood, and supporting the child’s contact with both parents as the child had stated that was important to him. If th e maternal grandmother was not able to adopt the child, there were other fam ily members who had expressed an interest in adopting the
child. Father remained incar cerated. He maintained some contact with the child and was supportive of the child remaining in the car e of the maternal grandmother. The agency social worker also reported on the child’s circ umstances. The child appeared comfortable and well-adjusted in the ma ternal grandmother’s home, enjoyed living with her and wanted to stay there if he could not reunify with the parents. The child and father exchanged letters and had infre quent telephone calls. The ch ild enjoyed his contact with father. The child had received counseling from March 2013 to Au gust 28, 2013, when his case was closed after he showed signifi cant progress. However, in December 2013, the agency social worker again referred the child for counseling after he began to show some serious anger and aggression when upset , expressing that he was angry because his
mother had not visited him. At the section 366.26 hearing held on February 10, 2014, the court heard testimony from father, the child’s maternal grandmother, and the agency’s reunification and adoption social worker assigned to the case. Both the agency’s counsel and the child counsel’s urged the court to follow the ag ency’s recommendations and terminate the10 parental rights of both parents after finding th at the child was adoptable in general and by the maternal grandmother. Father’s counsel argued that the court should select legal guardianship, rather than adoption, as the child’s permanent plan on the ground father had met his burden of showing there was a co mpelling reason for finding that termination of parental rights would be de trimental to the child because father had maintained visits
and contacts with the child to the best of his ability and the ch ild would benefit from continuing the relationship. Counsel noted th at legal guardianship would give the child stability because the child woul d not be moving and the mate rnal grandmot her would be
able to raise the child while fa ther’s parental rights would be maintained and kept intact. The juvenile court found the agency had met its burden of demonstrating that the child’s permanent placement plan should be adoption. In so ru ling, the court explained: “[F]irst of all, it’s uncontradicted here toda y that [the child] is adoptable, both generally and specifically. His grandmother very much wa nts to adopt him. And even if that were not to occur, the only evid ence I have is that he’d be a very adoptable ch ild, even without his grandmother there specifically indicating th at she wanted to adopt him. [¶] Second, the only evidence I have, and I’ll take judicial notice of the file I have, is that family
reunification services were terminated for bo th . . . mother and . . . father back on September 16th, 2013. [¶] . . . [H]aving made those findings, that brings me to the exceptions to the adoption perman ency plan that [father’s c ounsel] has referred to . . . known as the [parental] beneficial relati onship exception.” The court found, however, that the parental beneficial relationship ex ception did not apply in this case for the following reasons: “[E]ach party in this case has focused in on the portions of the statute that, well, benefits their appr oach to this case. [¶] . . . I’m extremely pleased that everybody in this room has [the child’s] best interests at heart. . . . [¶] . . . I want to do what’s best for [the child.] [¶] These types of decisions are frequently not easy, and this is one of those times. . . . [¶] . . . What I have to decide is the application of the exception. And I note that the burden of proof is on [fa ther] in that regard, the department having already met its burden [o]n th e question of adoptability. [¶] . . . [A]s I understand the statute, there are two prongs. [¶] Prong one is that [father] has the burden of showing that11 he had regular visitation and contact. I don’t think that the ev idence shows anything
other than he hasn’t. But as I understand hi s position, his position is that he hasn’t had regular contact, but, well, it’s not his fault. A nd I have some difficulty with that, [father]. I recognize that the department did not facilita te visitation and contact by you with [the child] while you were incarcerated in Yolo County , but . . . that’s not their fault. . . . The fault is yours [because] you were incarcerat ed for mistakes that you made. And I recognize that this is a very heavy price to pay, maybe more than other people have to pay for their mistakes. [¶] The second prong is benefit to th e child. And without a doubt, in my mind, I am perfectly sure that you love [the child] very much, and that he loves you. And . . . that’s very important to me. [But] . . . . it has to be weighed against the benefit to [the child] of adoption. And in this particular case, it appears to me that [the child] does need that stability. [¶] And I recognize that duri ng a portion of his life, you did have a parental role and an important parental role. But that hasn’t been possible since you were incarcerated almost two years ago. And that’s been lacking from [the child’s] life. And he needs this. And you’re going to be incarcerated fo r some time in the future, for a period of time in which none of us are clear exactly what that is. And as a result of that, you don’t curren tly occupy a parental role. And, admittedly, that role has been given to [the maternal grandmother]. [¶ ] And I have to say, after seeing her testify and hearing her testimony, I can understand why you’re comf ortable with that and why [the child’s] mother is comfortable with that, because, . . . she apparently is doing a very good job. [¶] I have to find that the benefi cial relationship exception does not apply in this particular case, for the reasons that I’ve stated.” The court furt her commented that its ruling concerned only the termination of fathe r’s “legal rights to make parental decisions for [the] child. Now I recogniz e that if that happens, it leav es [father] with no legal rights
to force contact to occur that . . . [a] legal parent would have. But somehow, with this family, . . . at least right now, I don’t hear an ything like that . . . in this courtroom. [¶] I have to do what’s right for [the child]. And in this particular case, I think what’s right for
him is that he needs that st ability that his grandma is givi ng him. And as a result, I’m going to terminate the parental rights of both [parents], therefor e leaving [the child]12 available to be adopted by his grandmother.” The court filed an order on February 14, 2014, embodying its section 366.26 findings. Fa ther filed a notice of appeal challenging the February 14, 2014 order, an d later filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, which we consolidated with this appeal.

DISCUSSION In his appellate briefs and his petition, fa ther essentially argues that all the findings and orders issued in this dependency proc eeding starting with the jurisdictional finding against him should be reversed because of various errors made by the trial court and
ineffective assistance of father’s trial counsel. He argues that but for counsel’s failure to object to the jurisdictional allegation against father, father’s parental rights would not have been put into jeopardy because he could have dem onstrated he was entitled to custody of the child and coul d have made alternative livi ng arrangements for the child with the child’s maternal grandmother. He al so argues that but for trial counsel’s failure to object to the lack of vis its, it is reasonably likely that vi sits would have occurred, had
such visits occurred his bond w ith the child could have been preserved and he might have been able to maintain and/or strengthen his relationship with the child and establish the parental beneficial relationshi p exception to the termination of his parental rights. He asks us to reverse the February 14, 2014 order, and remand the matter to the juvenile
court with directions to reverse the findi ngs and order made after the section 366.26 hearing, vacate all prior finding s and orders affecting him, and hold a hearing, or if appropriate, a series of heari ngs, to which father would be entitled to notice and the right to appear and participate with assistance of counsel, at whic h time the court shall determine what findings and or ders affecting father are a ppropriate and to grant such
other and further relief as the tr ial court deems appropriate.
We conclude that father has forfeited fo r review his challenges to the findings and orders regarding jurisdiction an d disposition, and the findings and orders made after the
six-month review and the 12-month review hear ings, for which he did not file either a notice of appeal or a writ petition. (See In re Jesse W. (2001) 93 Cal.Ap p.4th 349, 355 [“ ‘[a] challenge to the most recent orde r entered in a depe ndency matter may not13 challenge prior orders for which the statutor y time for filing an appeal has passed’ ”].) “Given the state’s strong interest in th e expeditiousness and finality of juvenile dependency proceedings (citation), the statutory sc heme generally does not permit the critical findings and orders made prior to th e final setting of the 366.26 hearing to be reopened and relitigated in an appeal from the order terminating parental rights. Nor can the order setting the hearing itself, or any find ings subsumed therein, be appealed unless earlier writ review of any subs tantive claim was first sought and denied. (§ 366.26, subd. ( l ).)” ( In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 412-413, fn. omitted.) Contrary to father’s contention, we se e no reason to apply “an exception” to the
forfeiture rule in this cas e “even though the issues ra ised involve the important constitutional and statutory rights to . . . effective assistance of counsel.” ( Meranda P.,

supra , 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 1151.) “Enforcing the [forfeiture] rule against [father’s] representational claims does not infringe [his or his child’s] due process rights. Three
elements must be assessed in order to determine ‘ “wha t due process requires” for fundamental fairness, specifically, “the priv ate interests at stak e, the government’s interest, and the risk that the procedures used will lead to erroneous decisions.” ’ [Citations.] The interplay of these three fact ors favors application of the [forfeiture] rule because, whatever benefits might accrue to the parent in the abse nce of the rule, the resulting costs to the child an d the state are ‘greater.’ [C itation.] Of the many private and public concerns which collide in a depe ndency proceeding, time is among the most important. [Citation.] The actio n ‘ “must be concluded as rapi dly as is consistent with fairness . . . .” ’ [Citations.] The state’s in terest in expedition and finality is “strong.” [Citation.] The child’s interest in securing a stable, ‘normal ,’ home ‘support[s] the state’s particular interest in finality.’ [Citation.] To permit a parent to raise issues which go to the validity of a final earlier appealable or der would directly undermine these dominant concerns of finality and reasonable expedition.” ( Id . at pp. 1151-1152, fn. omitted.) “[A]t some point the in terests of a parent, and therefor e the correction of purported error which operates to the detriment of the parent, must give way to the interest of the child in a stable, secure, long-term, continuous home environment. Under California’s14 dependency statutes, this moment arrives when the juvenile court te rminates reunification and sets a permanency hearing. [Citations.] At this juncture, the balance of the competing interests is tipped well towards the child; it is pr esumed the interests of the child and the natural parents have diverged and are inconsistent . [Citations.] Therefore, if a parent, for whatever reason, has failed to timely and appropriately raise a claim about the existence of quality of counsel receiv ed at a proceeding antedating the [section 366].26 hearing, we will apply the [forfeiture] rule to foreclose the parent from raising such an objection on appeal fro m the termination order.” ( Id . at p. 1160.) For similar reasons, we reject father’s atte mpt to raise representational i ssues with respect to earlier final appealable orders in his petition for writ of habeas corpus. “[T]he rationale which supports our holding that the [fo rfeiture] rule should be enforced on the [parent’s] appeal from the termination order applies equally to the [parent’s] habeas corpus petition. The now paramount interests of the child in a stable, secure, long-t erm, continuous home
environment and the associated interest of the state in reasonable expedition and finality, which have overcome the parent’s interests in maintaining the family relationship, would be no less subject to subversion by a habeas petition than they would be by a direct appeal.” ( Id. at p. 1163; see In re Carrie M. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 530, 534 [“a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with jurisdiction and di sposition orders . . . may not be raised by a habeas corpus petition filed in connec tion with an appeal from an order terminating pa rental rights”].)
Father’s reliance on In re Janee J . (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 198 ( Janee J .) is misplaced. In that case, the court held the forfeiture rule “will be enforced unless due process forbids it.” ( Id. at p. 208.) But, in allowing for an exception to the forfeiture rule, the Janee J. court set forth the following guidelin es: “First, there must be some defect that fundamentally unde rmined the statutory scheme so that the parent would have been kept from availing himself or herself of the protections afforded by the scheme as a whole. Lack of notice of . . . [writ] rights [is] one such example. . . . Second, to fall outside the [forfeiture] rule, de fects must go beyond mere e rrors that might have been held reversible had they been properly and timely reviewed. To allow an exception for15 mere ‘reversible error’ of that sort would abrogate the revi ew scheme [citation] and turn the question of [forfeiture] into a review on the merits.” ( Id . at pp. 208-209.) Father has presented no defect that fundamentally underm ined the statutory scheme so that he was prevented from availing himself of the protections afforded by the scheme as a whole. At most, father has alleged deficiencies that mi ght have led to a finding of reversible error, which is not excepted from the forfeiture rule. ( Ibid. ) If father was concerned that his assigned trial counsel were not pursuing his interests, he could have asked for new counsel. (See In re V.V. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 392, 398 [juvenile courts allow “parents, who have a statutory and a due proc ess right to competent counsel, to air their complaints about appointed c ounsel and request new counsel be appointed”].) Instead, father made not the slightest effort to inform the agency social wo rker or the juvenile court that he was unhappy with his assigned co unsel at any time. Although father filed a notice of intent to file a writ petition challe nging the order schedul ing the sect ion 366.26 hearing, he complains his coun sel refused to file a writ petition. Had father brought the matter to the juvenile court’s attention, how ever, the court could have rescheduled the section 366.26 hearing and exte nded father’s time to file a writ petition if his concerns were found to be valid. “Instead, [father] ch ose to remain silent throughout the juvenile court proceedings.” ( Meranda P., supra , 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 1158.) Accordingly, we conclude father ha s forfeited his arguments challenging any findings or orders filed antecedent to the February 14, 2014, or der. Because father presents no substantive challenge to the February 14, 2014, or der, terminating his parental rights and selecting adoption as the ch ild’s permanent plan, we shall affirm that
order.
DISPOSITION The order filed on February 14, 2014, is affirmed. Th e petition for writ of habeas corpus is summarily denied.

_ ____________ ____________ Jenkins, J.16 We concur:

_____________ ____________ McGuiness, P. J.

_____________ ____________ Siggins, J.