FI L ED U.S. COURT OF A P P E A LS E LE V EN T H C IR C U IT SEPTEMBER 26, 2005 THOMAS K. KAH

N CL ERK [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ N o. 04- 1502 4 Non-A rgum ent Calendar

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ D. C. Docket N o. 97-00079 -CR- OD E- 1-1 UNITED STAT ES OF AMERIC A, Pla in ti ff-Ap pe ll ee, ve rs us DAVID O. SPENCE, SR., Defen da nt -Ap pe ll an t.

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ Appeal f rom the United State s District Court fo r the N orthe rnD istri ct

of G eo rg ia

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ (S ep te m be r 26, 200 5) Be fo re A N D E RS O N , CA RN E S, and M A RC U S, Ci rc uit Jud ge s. PE R CU RIA M:2 I. BACKG ROUND InJun e 1999 , D av id O . S pe nc e, S r. , w as c onvi ct ed of be ing af el on i n poss ession o f fir earm s, in violation of 18 U. S. C. §§ 92 2(g) and 924(a), and was sentenced to 92 m onth s’ im prisonm ent, to be followe d by 3 y ears’ supervised re le as e. A cc or din g to the P re -S en te nc e Inve sti ga tio n R ep ort i ssu ed in re latio n to this conv iction, Spence f ired five shots into the bedroom of his form er w ife, Marcia Buford. Af

ter fir ing th e shots, Spence pulled Buford onto th e bed by her hair and held a gun to h er tem ple, a sking Buford whether “ that got [her] attention.” Sp en ce the n be at

Bu fo rd in the f ac e, c au sin g B uf

or d’ s f ro nt t ooth to c om e out

of he r m outh and b re ak ing tw o othe r te eth. A ft er Bu fo rd w en t i nto the bathr oom

“ to ge t so m e of

the blo od and t ee th o ut o f he r m outh, ” Sp en ce f ir ed ar ound int o th e ba th ro om . T he c ondi tio ns o f Sp en ce ’ s su pe rv ise d r el ea se inc lud ed , int er a lia , that he co uld not c om m it an oth er

f ed er al , state , or

loc al c ri m e, and tha t c oul d no t l eave the N orthe rnD istri ct

of G eo rg iaw ith out

the pe rm iss ionof

the c ourt or

his pr obatio n officer . The district court r evoked Spence’ s supervised release on ground s that Sp en ce ha d c om

m itt ed the f el ony of a ggr av at ed

sta lki ng ( pe rp etrate d a ga ins t hi s ex-w ife, Buford) and had left the j urisdictio n without perm issio n. T he district co urt i m pose d 24 m onths’ im

pr iso nm en t. S pe nc e ap pe al s.Un de r F e d. R.C ri m.P . 3 2. 1( b) (2 )( C) , a jud g e mus t g ive a

de fe nd ant at a

pa ro le 1 re vo c atio n h e ari ng“ an o pp or tun ity to a pp e ar, pr e se nt e vid e nc e , a nd qu e sti on any a dv e rs e wi tne ss unless the cour

t determines that the inter est of justice doe s not require the witness to appea r . . . 3 II. D ISCU SSION A. Spence’ s Evidentiary Challenges O n a ppe al , S pe nc e ar gue s th at the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed

by a dm itt ing the fo llo w ing he ar say

te sti m ony

a t hi s su pe rv ise d r el ea se r ev oc at ionhe ar ing : ( 1) the allegations of Marcia B uford, S pence’ s form er w ife, relating to the aggravated s t a l k i n g c h ar g e ; ( 2 ) d o c u men t s r e l a t i n g t o h i s tr an s f e r f r o m Pau l d i n g C o u n ty, Ge orgia, to a nursing hom e in Macon, Ge orgia; and (3) an ar rest w arrant issu ed ag ai nst him f or e sc ap e. S pe nc e m ai nta ins that the dis tr ic t c our t vi olate d hi s S ixth Am endm ent right of confrontation by adm itting this hearsay

testim ony . Spence not es that i n C raw fo rd

v. W as hin gto n, 541 U . S. 36, 124 S . Ct . 135 4, 158 L . E d. 2d 177 (200 4), the S uprem e Court held that, under the Confrontation Clause, out-ofco urt t es tim oni al state m en ts b y aw itn es s m ay

not be a dm itt ed

unl es s th e de cl ar an t is unava ila

ble , and the de fe ndant p re vio usl y ha d an op portun ity

to cr oss -e xam ine him . Spence ar gues that we should h old th at Crawf ord applies to a sup ervised re le as e re voc at ionhe ar ing . A lte rn at ive ly , S pe nc e ar gue s th at w e shou ld d et er

m ine whether the district court erred by apply ing th e balancing test outl ined in United States v. Fraz ier, 26 F.3d 110 (11th Cir. 1994 ) and Fed. R.C rim .P . 32. 1(b)(2)(C ). 1.” 4

T he appl ic ab ili ty

of e vid en tiary

r ule s insup er

vis ed r el ea se r ev oc at ion pr oc ee din gs i s aque sti on o f lawsub j ec t t o de nov o r ev ie w . U nit ed S tate s v. Fr az ie r, 26 F . 3d 1 10, 112 ( 11th C ir . 199 4) . I n C raw fo rd , the S upr em e Co urt he ld that pr ior te sti m oni al state m en ts m ay be a dm itt ed

onl y if the de cl ar an t i s unava ila ble , and the de fe ndant h ad an e ar lie r oppo rt

uni ty to cr oss -e xam ine the declarant. Cr aw ford, 541 U.S . at 68, 124 S.Ct. at 1374. W e have not addressed the iss ue of

w he the r the S upr em e Co urt’ s ho ldi ng i n C raw fo rd a ppl ie s to a supervised release re vocation h earing. How ever, [a] lthou gh the Federal Rules of E vidence do no t apply in supervised re le as e re voc at ionhe ar ing s, the a dm iss ibi lity of he ar say is not autom atic. De fendants invo lved in revocation p roceedings are e ntitled to certain m inim al due process requirem ents. A m ong th ese m inim al re qui re m en ts i s th e ri ght

to co nf ro nt and c ro ss- ex am ine a dve rs e w itn es se s. F ed . R. Cr im . P. 32. 1, w hic h a ppl ie s to sup er

vis ed r el ea se re voc at ion , inc or

por at es the se sam e m ini m al due pr oc es s re qui re m en ts. I nde ed , “ [t ] he sam e pr ote ct ion s gr an te d th ose f ac ing re voc at ionof

paro le are r equir ed

f or tho se f ac ing the r ev oc at ionof supe rv ise d r el ea se . ” T hus, in de ci din g whe the r or not to adm it he ar say te sti m ony , the c ourt m

ust ba lanc e the de fe ndant' s r igh t t o co nf ro nt a dve rs e w itn es se s a ga ins t the gr ound s a sse rt ed by the governm ent for deny ing confrontatio n. I n additio n, the hear say statem ent m

ust be reliable. Fr az ie r, 26 F . 3d at 11 4. InF ra zi er , w e fo und that a lth oughthe dis tr ic t c ourt ha d e rr ed by f ai lin g toWe note that elsewhe re in his brief , Spence’ s counsel conc edes that “Mr. Spence 2 violated a pr otective or der r epea tedly .” B lue B rief at 25.

5 determ ine the reliability

of the hearsay

testim ony

or conduct the required balancing test, the err or wa s harm less because other properly considered evidence de m onstrate d th at

F ra zi er ha d br ea ch ed

the te rm s of

his sup er vis ed r el ea se . I d. W e ne ed not de te rm ine w he the r Cr aw fo rd appl ie s to r ev oc at ionhe ar ing s, nor whether a dm issio n of the challenged evidence violated th e balancing test set fo rth in F ra zi er . A s inF ra zi er , any e rr or w as harm le ss. E ve n a ssum ing that the evidence challenged by

Spence should no t have been adm itted, the er ror w as harm less because other, uncont ested evidence satisfied the elem ents of aggravated sta lki ng and e sta

bli she d th at

S pe nc e le ft

the j ur isd ic tio n w ith out

pe rm iss ion . 2 Under O .C. G. A. 16-5-91(a): A per son comm its the offense of aggravated stalking when such pe rs on, in vio latio n of

abon d to ke ep the pe ac e post ed pur suant t o Code Section 17-6-110, tem porary restra ining order, tem

porary pr ote ct ive or de r, pe rm an en t r es tr ai nin g or de r, pe rm an en t pr ote ct ive or de r, pr el im inary

inj unc tio n, goo d be havio r bond , or pe rm an en t inj unc tio n or

c ondi tio n of

pr etri al r el ea se , c ondi tio n of pr obatio n, or co ndi tio n of

paro le in ef

fe ct pr ohi bit ing the be havio r de sc ri be d inthi s subs ection, follows, places under surveillance, or contacts another person at or about a place or place s without the cons ent of the other pe rs on f or the pur pose of hara ssi ng and i nti m idatin g th e oth er pe rs on. The uncontested evidence relate d to stalki ng inclu ded the following: (1) De tective L afay

Stree tm an, who was w orking with Spence’ s parole office r,Streetman testified that she is the lead domestic violenc e investig ator at the 3 Pa uld ingCounty

She ri ff ’s De pa rtme nt. De te c tiv e Str e e tma

n a lso te sti fi e d th at B uf

or d to ld h e r t

hat B uf or d w a s so a fr a id 4 that sh e ha d mi sse d w or

k, sta y e d w ithhe r p are nts , a

nd ha d b e gun

se e inga do c tor wh o c ou ld presc ribe medic ation for he r anxiety . 6 testified that Buford delivered various docum ents to Streetm an that Buford had re ce ive d th ro ugh the m ai l, inc lud ing le ga l do cum en ts tha t S pe nc e ha d f ile d w ith the Superior Court of Pa

uldin g Countyand personal letters that either contained Sp en ce ’ s si gnatur e or

w er e sig ne d “ y our

hus band. ” S ev er al of

tho se doc um en ts 3 inv olv ed S pe nc e’ s atte m

pt t o di vor ce his e x- w if

e, notw ith standi ng the f

ac t tha t the two w ere alrea dy

divorced. ( 2) Buford’ s perm anent protective order w as adm itted w ith out obj ec tio n. T ha t pr ote ct ive or de r state d th at S pe nc e w as “ en

j oin ed and re str ai ne d f

ro m doi ng o r atte m

pti ng t o do or

thr eate nin g to do any

a ct of inj ur ing , m olesting , m altreating, har assing, harm ing or abusi ng the petiti oner in any m anner an d f ro m appr oa ch ing w ith in 2 00 y ar ds o f the pe tit ion er and f ro m appr oa ch ing w ith in 2 00 y ar ds o f pe tit ion er ’ s r es ide nc e or pla ce of e m plo ym en t. ” Re voc at ion He aring at 47. ( 3) Spence adm itted that he had served Buford with legal doc um en ts. ( 4) T he de te ct ive te sti fi ed that S pe nc e ha d to ld h er he w as tr y ing to

“ resolve” his m arria ge with Buford. (5) The dete ctive testified that she believed that Buford viewed the m ailings as a form of harassm ent , and that Buford was

“ taking all th is in” and appeared to be “ excessively afr aid.” E ven assum ing th at

4Rather, without pointing to any corr oboratingevidenc e, Spence claims that he lef t 5 in order to avoid beingsubject to medica l proce dures to which he did not consent. Spence does not dispute the fac t that he was f ound and ar

rested in Camde n County , Geor g ia, which is outside the jur isd ic tio n. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt jud g e fo un d Sp e nc e ’s a c c ount o f why he le ft the nurs ingho me not to be cre dible. Revocation Hear ing at 97. 7 al l the e vid en ce w hose a dm iss ibi lity S pe nc e ch al le nge s is ina dm iss ab le in a paro le revocation hearing, the unchallenged evidence is sufficient to justify the district co ur t’s fi nd in g t ha t Sp en ce h adco m m it te d t he fel on y

of a gg rav at edst al ki ng . T he c ourt w as a lso j ust if

ie d inf ind ing that S pe nc e ha d vi olate d th e te rm s of his r el ea se by

le av ing the N orthe rnD istri ct of G eo rg iaw ith out

auth or iz at ionf

ro m the court or his probatio n officer . Although Spence c hallenges the adm issib ility of ce rt ai n do cum en ts r el at ing to Sp en ce ’ s tr an sf er f ro m P au ldi ng C ounty

c ust ody to a nur sin g ho m e in G eo rg ia , and t o th e ar re st w ar rant i ssu ed

a ft er S pe nc e le ft

the nur sin g ho m e, S pe nc e doe s no t di sput e that he le ft the nur sin g ho m e w ith out authorization. T he probation officer ’ s petition for r evocation of sup ervised

5 relea se alleged that Spence w as guiltyof the crim e of esca pe. As the district court poi nte d ou t, r eg ar dle ss o f w he the r Sp en ce is gui lty of the c ri m e of

e sc ap e, the ev ide nc e ab ove is suf

fi ci en t t o j ust if

y the f ind ing that S pe nc e le ft

the j ur isd ic tio n without perm issio n of the court or his parole officer . B. Spence’ s PRO TE CT Ac t Challenges Spence also ar gues that his sentence upon revocation o f his supervisedTo establish plain err or, Spence must persuade us that (1) ther e wa s an er ror, ( 2) 6 that w a s p la in, (3 ) t

hat a ff e c te d h is s ub sta

nti a l r ights , a

nd (4 ) t hat, i f l e ft un c or re c te d, wo uld s er i o u s l y af fe ctth e f ai rn es s , i n t egr i ty

o r p u b l i c r ep ut at i o no f aj u d i ci al p ro ce ed i n g. S ee , e. g. United States v. Humphrey , 164 F.3d 585, 588 n.3 ( 11th Cir. 1999). 8 re le as e did

not c om ply w iththe r equir em en ts o f the P ro se cutor ia l R em ed ie s and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children T oday Ac t, ( the “ PRO TE CT A ct ”) P ub. L . N o. 108 -2 1, 117 S ta . 650 ( 2003 ). S pe ci fi ca lly , S pe nc e m ai nta ins that the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed by ( 1) im posi ng a se nte nc e ab ove the se nte nc ing r an ge se t f orth i n U . S. S. G . § 7B 1. 4, w hic h S pe nc e ar gue s w as m ad e m an da tor y by the PR O T E CT A ct , and ( 2) f ai lin g to inc lud e a wri tte n e xpl an at ionf or it s de ci sio n to im pose the sentence. Sp en ce pr es er

ve d hi s c ha lle nge to the se nte nc e out sid e of the se nte nc ing ra n g e d es cr i b edi nU.S .S .G. § 7 B1 .4 , b u td i dn o to b je ctt o th e d i s tri ctco u rt ’s fai lu re t o p ro vi de a writ te n s ta te m en t o f it s re as on s fo r do in g s o. Th eref or e, we re vie wthi s is sue f

or pla in e rr or . S ee U nit ed

S tate s v. A gui llard , 217 F . 3d 1 319, 1320 ( 11th C ir . 200 0) . W e have “ he ld that whe re ne ith er the S upr em e Co urt no r 6 thi s C ourt ha s e ve r re sol ve d an is sue , and o the r ci rc uit s are spl it on i t [ or have unanim ousl y

he ld a ga ins t the appe llant] , the re c anbe no p la in e rr or in re gard to that i ssu e. ” A gui llard , 217 F . 3d at 13 21, c iti ng Unit ed S tate s v. H um

phr ey , 164 F.3 d 5 85 , 58 8 (1 1t h C ir. 1 99 9) .9

Sp en ce’s arg um en t t ha t t he sen te nc in g ra ng e d es cri be d i n t he U.S.S.G. §7B 1. 4 po lic y

state m en t i s no wm an da tor y is ba se d up on the f

oll ow ing pr ovi sio ns of the statut e. S ec tio n 35 53( b) (1 ) of T itl e 18 p ro vid es in re le vant p ar t: T he c ourt sh al l i m

pose ase nte nc e of

the kin d, and w ith in the r an ge re fe rr ed to in s ubse ct ion( a) (4 ) unl es s th e co urt f ind s th at the re e xis ts an aggravating or m itigatin g circum stance of a kind, or to a degree, not a de quate ly

take n in to c onsi de ratio n by the S en te nc ing Co m m iss ionin fo rm

ulatin g th e gui de lin es . 18 U . S. C. §35 53( b) (1 ). T he r ef er en ce d su

bse ct ion( a) (4 ) inc lud es the f oll ow ing pr ovi sio n r eg ar din g paro le r ev oc at ion s: T he c ourt, in de te rm ini ng the part ic ular se nte nc e to b e im pose d, sha ll co nsi de r –

. . . (B ) Inthe c as e of

avio latio n of

pr obatio n or

sup er vis ed r el ea se , the ap pli ca ble gui de lin es or

pol ic y state m en ts i ssu ed

by the S en te nc ing Co m m iss ion . 18 U. S. C. §355 3(a)( 4). In addition , S pence relies upon 18 U.S .C. §374 2(e), which re qui re s th at

an a ppe llate c ourt r ev ie wde part ur es f ro m the G uid el ine r an ge de novo . Finally , S pence relies upon 18 U.S .C. §374 2(f)( 2) which provides that an ap pe llate c ourt sh oul d se t a sid e an d r em an d ase nte nc e if it is out sid e the

“ applicable guid eline range and the district court failed to provide the required statem ent of rea sons in the order of j udgm ent and com m itm ent.” The “ required state m en t of

r ea sons in the or de r of

j udgm en t and c om

m itm en t” r ef

er s to 1810

U . S. C. §35 53( c) (2 ) w hic h pr ovi de s inr el ev an t part a s f oll ow s: St at em en t of

Re as ons fo r Im

posi ng a S en te nc e – T he c ourt, a t the tim e of se nte nc ing , sha ll state in ope n c ourt the r ea sons f or it s im posi tio n of

the part ic ular se nte nc e, and, if the se nte nc e –

. . . (2 ) is n ot o f the kin d, or

is out sid e the r an ge , de sc ri be d insub se ct ion (a )( 4) , the spe ci fi c re as on f or the im posi tio n of

ase nte nc e dif

fe re nt fr om that de sc ri be d, w hic h r ea sons m ust a lso be state d w ith sp eci fic it y

in th e wri tt en ord er o f jud gm en t an d c omm it m en t ... 18 U.S.C. §3 55 3( c)(2 ). As is re adily

apparent fr om

a close re view of the f

oregoing statutory pr ovi sio ns, the c ru ci al pr ovi sio n up on whic h S pe nc e re lie s to sup port hi s arg um en t that the pol ic y

r an ge s are m an da tor

y is §355 3( b) (1 ). I n othe r w or ds, onl y in §3 55 3( b) (1 ) is th ere a ny ind ic at io n a t al l o f a m an da to ry ob li ga ti on . Fo r t wo re as o n s , we re ad i l y co n cl u d e t h atth er e i s n o m er i ti nSp en ce ’s argum ent that the sentencing ranges re com m ended in the Chapter 7 policy state m en ts are m an da tor

y . F ir st, the c ru ci al langua ge of §35 53( b) (1 ) w as not ch an ge d by

the P RO T E CT A ct , and o ur pr e- PR O T E CT A ct

c as e laww as w el l es ta bli she d th at

suc h po lic y

r an ge s w er e m er el y

a dvi sor y . I n U nit ed

S tate s v. Hofier ka, 83 F. 3d 35 7 (11 Cir. 1996 ), we rej ected an ar gum ent that the then th ap pli ca ble §35 53( b) im

pose d am an da tor

y obl igatio n up on the se nte nc ing j udge to im pose ase nte nc e w ith in the r an ge spe ci fi ed in Ch ap te r 7 f

or avio latio n of11

pr obatio n or

sup er vis ed r el ea se . T he H of

ie rk a opi nio n in cl ude d aquo tatio n of the the n a ppl ic ab le §35 53( a) (4 ) an d of the the n a

ppl ic ab le §35 53( b) . S o f ar a s is re le vant t o th e que sti on o f w he the r or not the re is a m an da tor

y obl igatio n up on a se nte nc ing j udge to im

pose ase nte nc e w ith in the r an ge s sp ec if ie d inCh ap te r 7 f

or vio latio n of

pr obatio n or

sup er vis ed r el ea se , the re is ab sol ute ly no d if fe re nc e in the langua ge of

the statut e ap pli ed

in H of ie rk a as c om

pare d to the c ur

re ntl y ap pli ca ble pr ovi sio ns o f the statut e. T hus, S pe nc e’ s arg um en t i s whol ly w ith out m eri t. A sec ond reason for rej ecting Spence’ s argum ent that the sentencing ranges re co m m en de d inthe Ch ap te r 7 po lic y state m en ts are m an da tor y is ba se d up on United States v. Booker, ___ U.S . ___, 125 S. Ct. 738, 756-57 (2005). I n that case, the Court “ severed and excised” §3553(b)(1), thus elim inating the statutory language upo n which Spence r elies to supp ort his argum ent. P ursuant to Boo ker, ev enthe G uid el ine s pr om ulg at ed by the S en te nc ing Co m

m iss ionare m er el y advisory , and, of course, the sentencing ranges recom m ended in the Chapter 7 po li cy st at em en ts rem ai n m erel y ad vi so ry as we ll . Having dispo sed of Spence’ s argum ent that the sentencing rangesSpence’ s other ar guments challeng ing the sentenc e ar e re jected w ithout need for 7 discussion. For e x ample, his double countingargument is rejec ted bec ause w e conc lude there was no double c ounting. His a rgument for de novo revie w is based upon § 3742( e), which was also “seve red a

nd excised” by

Booke r; his challeng e to the sente nce is due to be af firmed unde r any conce ivable standa

rd. 12 re co m m en de d by

the Ch ap te r 7 po lic y

state m en ts are m an da tor y , w e tur n ne xt t o 7 his argum ent that the sentencing j udge failed to state with specificity in the written or de r of j udgm en t and c om

m itm en t the r ea sons f

or de part ing f

ro m the re co m m en de d se nte nc ing r an ge . I n th is r eg ar d, S pe nc e re lie s up on § 3553 (b )( 1) and §35 53(c)(2). A s no te d, the f

orm er se ct ionha s no wbe en“ se ve re d and e xc ise d, ” an d the re fo re c annot

sup port S pe nc e’ s arg um en t. H ow ev er , §35 53( c) (2 ) re m ai ns, and w e m ust a ddr es s S pe nc e’ s arg um en t. A s no te d a bove , S pe nc e did

not obj ec t i n th e di st ric t co ur t t o t he fai lu re t o p ro vi de su ch a writ te n s ta te m en t, an d t he refo re we re vie wonl y

f or pla in e rr or . W e re ad ily

c onc lud e that S pe nc e cannot satis fy the pla in e rr or

standard . I n ana ly zi ng the c ur re ntl y appl ic ab le statut or

y langua ge , the E igh th C ir cu it ha s square ly he ld tha t the Ch ap te r 7 se nte nc ing r an ge s f or vio latio n of supervised release r em ain m erely advisory , that a

sentence above that advisory range is not an upward departure contem plated by the statutory

language, and that the r equir em en t of

spe ci fi c fi ndi ngs j ust if

y ing de part

ur es doe s no t a

ppl y to a se nte nc e ab ove suc h an a dvi sor y r an ge . U nit ed

S tate s v. Whit e Fa ce , 383 F . 3dWe note that the sentenc ing judg e amply explained the rea sons for the se ntence 8 and me re ly fa ile d to inc lud e same in t he wr itt e n o rd e r o f j ud g me nt a nd c omm itm e nt. 13 733, 737-39 (8 Cir. 2004 ); U nited States v. Martin, 371 F. 3d 44 6, 449 (8 Cir. th th 2004 ). N ei the r thi s C ourt no r the S upr em e Co urt ha s sq uare ly a ddr es se d th e iss ue , a lth oughw e not e that the r at ion al e of our H of ie rk a de ci sio n w oul d po int tow ar d ar

uli ng s im ilar to tha t of

the E igh th C ir cu it. H ow ev er , w e ne ed not re sol ve the iss ue in thi s c as e be ca use S pe nc e cannot

e sta bli sh p la in e rr or . E ve n if the re w er e er

ro r, w hic h w e doub t, it

is not pla in o r obvi ous. W e al so r ea dil y co nc lud e that S pe nc e co uld not satis fy e ith er the thi rd or f ourth p ro ngs of

the pla in er ro r an al y sis . 8 III. C ONC LUS ION Upon re vie wof

the r ec or d onappe al and u pon co nsi de ratio n of

the part ie s’ b ri ef s , we d i s ce rn n o re v er s i b l e e rr o r. Ac co rd i n g l y, we a ff i rm th e d i s tri ctco u rt ’s revocation of Spence’ s supervised release and the sentence. AFFIRMED.