J-A12008-20 & J-A12009-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: M.-A.D., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: ALLEGHENY COUNTY 

OFFICE OF CHILDREN, YOUTH AND 

FAMILIES

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1861 WDA 2019

Appeal from the Order Entered November 21, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Orphans' Court at 

No(s): No. CP-02-AP-059-2014

IN THE INTEREST OF: A.D., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: ALLEGHENY COUNTY 

OFFICE OF CHILDREN, YOUTH AND 

FAMILIES

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1862 WDA 2019

Appeal from the Order Entered November 21, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Orphans' Court at 

No(s): No. CP-02-AP-060-2014

IN THE INTEREST OF: A.M.D., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: ALLEGHENY COUNTY 

OFFICE OF CHILDREN YOUTH AND 

FAMILIES

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1863 WDA 2019

Appeal from the Order Entered November 21, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Orphans' Court at 

No(s): CP-02-AP-061-2014
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IN THE INTEREST OF: A.M.D., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: ALLEGHENY COUNTY 

OFFICE OF CHILDREN, YOUTH AND 

FAMILIES

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 21 WDA 2020

Appeal from the Order Entered November 21, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Orphans’ Court at 

No(s): CP-02-AP-061-2014

IN THE INTEREST OF: A.D., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: ALLEGHENY COUNTY 

OFFICE OF CHILDREN, YOUTH AND 

FAMILIES

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 22 WDA 2020

Appeal from the Order Entered November 21, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Orphans’ Court at 

No(s): No. CP-02-AP-060-2014

BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., KING, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.: FILED JUNE 12, 2020

In these consolidated appeals, the Allegheny County Office of Children, 

Youth and Families (“CYF”) appeals from the trial court orders entered on 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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November 21, 2019, denying its petitions to involuntarily terminate the 

parental rights of M.W. (“Mother”) to her children, M.A.-D., a/k/a M.Y.D., a 

female born in February of 2006; A.Y.D., a female born in October of 2007;

and A.M.D., Jr., a male born in July of 2010, (collectively, “the Children”). CYF 

also appeals the same orders denying its petitions to involuntarily terminate 

the parental rights of A.D. (“Father”), to A.Y.D. and A.M.D., Jr.1, 2 The trial 

court denied the termination petitions based on the finding that granting 

Subsidized Permanent Legal Custodianship (“SPLC”), while maintaining the 

parental rights, would best serve the Children’s needs and welfare.

3

 After 

careful review, we affirm. 

The factual and procedural history of this matter is as follows. Mother, 

Father, and their respective children have been known to CYF since 2002. 

____________________________________________

1 The trial court granted CYF’s petition to terminate Father’s parental rights to 

M.-A.D., to whom he is the presumptive Father. The trial court also granted 

CYF’s petition to terminate the rights of C.W., a putative father to M.-A.D., 

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5) and (b), and the rights of the 

Unknown Father, pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5) and (8) and 

(b). The grant of the petition with regard to Father’s parental rights to M.-

A.D. is not at issue in this appeal, nor is the grant of the petition as to C.W. 

or any unknown father. 

2

In two separate orders, entered on January 7, 2020, and January 22, 2020, 

this Court, acting sua sponte, consolidated the three appeals regarding Mother 

and the two appeals regarding Father, respectively. On February 5, 2020, this 

Court listed consecutively for disposition the consolidated appeals regarding 

Mother and the consolidated appeals regarding Father. For ease of 

disposition, we have addressed all of CYF’s appeals in a single memorandum, 

as did the trial court. 

3 SPLC is defined infra.
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Mother and Father began a relationship in 2005. N.T., 2/6/19, at 199. 

Notably, the Children were removed from the care of Mother in January of 

2013 because Mother attended a family group decision-making conference in 

an intoxicated condition with A.M.D., Jr. Id. at 202. Subsequently, CYF went 

to Mother’s home, and found Mother unconscious and bleeding, with A.M.D., 

Jr., left unattended. Id. Father arrived but refused to allow CYF to perform 

a home assessment, so the Children were not placed in his care at that time.4 

Id. On June 10, 2014, A.M.D., Jr., and A.Y.D. were placed with Father, and 

CYF closed its case with regard to those two children. Id. M.-A.D. has not 

returned to the care of either parent since her removal in January 2013. Id. 

M.-A.D. was most recently adjudicated dependent on February 25, 2013. At 

some point before August of 2015, Father returned A.M.D., Jr., and A.Y.D. to 

Mother. Id. at 203. CYF received a report that Mother presented at a 

domestic violence shelter and was intoxicated while caring for A.M.D., Jr., and 

A.Y.D. Id. On September 14, 2015, A.M.D., Jr., and A.Y.D. were adjudicated 

dependent.

The Children have mental health and behavioral problems that have 

made their placements in foster care difficult. As a result, M.-A.D. has had 

twenty-two placements, and has been psychiatrically hospitalized five times. 

Id. at 204. A.Y.D. has had ten placements, and A.M.D., Jr., has had eight

placements. Id. CYF previously filed petitions for the involuntary termination 

of parental rights of Mother and Father to the Children in 2014, but withdrew 

those petitions due to Father’s progress. Id.

____________________________________________

4 Mother and Father had ended their relationship.
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On September 27, 2017, CYF again filed petitions to involuntarily 

terminate Mother and Father’s parental rights. The court appointed Anastasa 

Williams, Esquire, to serve as both a guardian ad litem and legal interests 

counsel for the Children.5 

The trial court held evidentiary hearings on the petitions on October 15, 

2018, February 6, 2019, and November 6, 2019. At the October 15, 2018 

hearing, CYF presented the testimony of Allison Kroll, the CYF casework 

supervisor. Mother and Father appeared with separate counsel, and each 

testified on their own behalf. At the February 6, 2019 hearing, CYF presented 

the testimony of Brittany Tomasic, A.Y.D.’s therapist from Auberle; Tarraca 

____________________________________________

5 M.-A.D. and A.Y.D., at ages thirteen and twelve respectively, have expressed

preferences against adoption. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 2711(a)(1) (providing that 

the consent of an adoptee, if over the age of 12, is required for adoption). 

The trial court perceived no conflict between the best interests of the Children 

and their legal interests, and appointed only one counsel to serve as both a 

legal interest counsel and GAL for the Children. See In re Adoption of 

L.B.M., 639 Pa. 428, 161 A.3d 172 (2017) (plurality). See also In re T.S., 

648 Pa. 236, 192 A.3d 1080 (2018) (filed August 22, 2018) (holding that the 

trial court did not err in allowing the children’s GAL to act as their sole 

representative during the termination proceeding because, at two and three 

years old, they were incapable of expressing their preferred outcome). See 

also In re: Adoption of K.M.G., 219 A.3d 662, 669 (Pa. Super. 2019) (en 

banc) (filed September 13, 2019) (holding that this Court has authority only 

to raise sua sponte the issue of whether the trial court appointed any counsel 

for the child, and not the authority to delve into the quality of the 

representation) (limited appeal granted, December 9, 2019). 

At the final termination hearing, the Children’s legal interests

counsel/GAL stated that the termination of Mother’s parental rights is not in 

the best interests of the Children. N.T., 11/6/19, at 205-208. The Children’s

legal interests counsel/GAL added that termination of Father’s parental rights 

is not in the best interests of A.Y.D. and A.M.D., Jr., but noted that termination 

of Father’s parental rights to M.-A.D. would not have a negative effect on M.-

A.D. Id. at 206.
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Jackson, a supervisor from the Allegheny County Health Department drug and 

alcohol screening laboratory; Bonnie Petrosky, a CYF caseworker in the 

permanency department for A.M.D., Jr.; Neil Rosenblum, Ph.D., the courtappointed psychologist; Leanne Redulic, a CYF matching specialist for M.-

A.D.; Gail Redman, a foster care caseworker for A.M.D., Jr.; and Amy Rendos, 

supervisor of visit coaching at Project Star. On November 6, 2019, CYF again

presented the testimony of Allison Kroll and Toni Baird, the clinical supervisor 

for a program at Holy Family Institute. Dr. Rosenblum testified a second time. 

Father and Mother appeared, and each testified again on their own behalf.

Based upon the testimony and documentary evidence provided at the 

hearings, the court set forth the factual and procedural background of these 

appeals, as follows.

The parents’ problems are reflected in the goals set for them. 

Mother’s goals were to improve her parenting skills, obtain stable 

housing, attend mental health treatment, maintain sobriety from 

her substance abuse problem primarily with alcohol but also with 

marijuana and to engage in visits. [Notes of Testimony, February 

6, 2019, (“Tr. I”)] at 205. Father’s goals were similar; he was to 

address his substance abuse problems — [sic] primarily involving 

alcohol but also marijuana — to engage in domestic violence 

counseling, to obtain stable housing and to attend parenting 

classes. Id. at 222. Originally, his goals also included marriage 

counseling, but he and Mother separated permanently. Id. [See 

also Notes of Testimony, November 6, 2019, (“Tr. II”)] at 140 

(wherein Mother testified that she has no contact with Father, 

although Mother is aware that the [C]hildren love him). Numerous 

services were offered to Mother and Father over the years with 

mixed results. See Tr. I at 207-19, 224-40. Overall, Father made 

more progress and participated more reliably in services than 

Mother[,] although it cannot be said he completed his goals, and 

he sometimes declined services outright when he believed they 

were not warranted. Id. at 224-40. The court-appointed 

psychologist[, Dr. Rosenblum,] was unable to testify to 

professional certainty that he could recommend termination of 
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parental rights in this case. See Tr. I at 99-104. See also Tr. II 

at 96. 

. . . .

M.Y.D.

M.Y.D. is the biological daughter of Mother only. M.Y.D. is 13. 

See Tr. I at 252. M.Y.D. has problems with verbal and physical 

aggression and difficulty with impulse control. See id. at 71. She 

has been diagnosed with Oppositional Defiant Disorder and 

Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder. Id. As of the [second]

hearing, she had been in the heavily structured setting of 

Passavant Memorial Care Home for about three years. See Tr. II 

at 102. Although Dr. Rosenblum found that she had improved in 

that placement somewhat, he noted that her progress by February 

of 2019 was moderate, that she continued to need intensive 

mental health treatment and that she would pose a major 

challenge in a foster-family setting. See Tr. I at 72. In fact, the 

psychologist[, Dr. Rosenblum,] went so far as to say that the child 

would be at great risk for a failed adoption, explaining that, 

despite CYF’s petition for it, “terminating parental rights is literally 

reckless.” Id. at 99. Given that her [m]other has been the only 

consistent figure in M.Y.D.’s life who has shown her love, with 

termination of parental rights, the psychologist[, Dr. Rosenblum,]

testified that “[all] you’re doing is making her a psychological 

orphan.” Id. at 100. Mother, though not always present, provides 

this fragile child with emotional support, and M.Y.D. enjoys 

Mother’s company. Id. at 95. Dr. Rosenblum characterized their 

relationship as necessary and beneficial to M.Y.D. Id.

CYF presented the testimony of a matching specialist[, Ms. 

Rendulic,] whose job it was to find [a] placement for M.Y.D. She 

informed the [c]ourt about the failed efforts to find a relative to 

take in M.Y.D. and that she had finally given up on actively looking 

for family members for this girl. Id. at 138. The matching 

specialist did agree that M.Y.D. improved somewhat at Passavant. 

Id. at 137. The matching specialist had worked with M.Y.D. since 

January of 2016, and, although the specialist worked 

“continuously” to find a foster home for this child, she had not 

succeeded by February of 2019[,] and was unable to agree with 

the CYF caseworker[, Ms. Kroll,] that terminating parental rights 

would make placement easier. Id. at 136-38, 141-43, 251-52.
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By the second part of the hearing in November of 2019, M.Y.D. 

had finally been placed in a foster home, but had only been there 

for two months. See Tr. II at 10-11. M.Y.D. was continuing to 

visit with Mother three times per month. Id. at 12-13. M.Y.D. 

had stated that she liked the foster home, but she had tried to run 

from it on one occasion in those first two months, although she 

did come back quickly after the police were contacted. Id. at 11-

12, 27, 50. Dr. Rosenblum testified that he had not performed an 

updated evaluation since the first hearing date but reiterated his 

reservations about moving M.Y.D. to a goal of adoption without 

evidence that she could remain in that home successfully, 

characterizing such action as “premature.” Id. at 88-89, 102. 

Although he indicated he would need an evaluation to give an 

opinion about the placement, he emphasized that M.Y.D. had a 

significant history of mental health and adjustment issues, and 

that she would certainly need more time for the situation to be 

assessed, even for permanent legal custodianship [“PLC”]. Id. at 

91, 94-95.

A.Y.D.

A.Y.D. is the biological child of Mother and Father and is 12 years 

of age. The psychologist[, Dr. Rosenblum,] saw this child four 

times and testified that A.Y.D. also has difficulty with impulse 

control, can be mouthy and irritable[,] and has trouble controlling 

her emotions. See Tr. I at 75. He opined that she required 

continued mental health treatment. Id. A.Y.D. resides with a 

foster mother now, but it took a long time to find one, with the 

child undergoing 10 different placements beforehand. Id. at 78, 

204. 

A.Y.D.’s therapist[, Ms. Tomasic] testified that A.Y.D. talks about 

Mother and Father and how much she misses and loves them. Id.

at 9-10, 12, 17, 24-25. According to the therapist, A.Y.D. looks 

forward to parental visits, and describes Father as funny and 

fun[,] and tells the therapist about the places he takes her. Id. at 

12, 24-25. The therapist [, Ms. Tomasic,] noted that Father has 

been consistently involved in this child’s life. Id. at 25. The 

psychologist[, Dr. Rosenblum,] stated that he believed that, 

ultimately, [PLC] would serve A.Y.D. better than adoption because 

of the meaningful relationships she has with her parents, 

especially with Father. Id. at 100-02, 123.
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A.M.D., Jr.

The third child in this case is A.M.D., Jr., age 9. A.M.D., Jr., 

according to the psychologist[, Dr. Rosenblum,] has a high degree 

of impulsivity like his siblings. Id. at 73. He also suffers from 

ADHD [Attention Deficit Hyperactive Disorder, “ADHD”] and can 

be aggressive and oppositional. Id. at 74. After eight placements, 

he was seemingly settled in with his current foster mother, who is 

patient with him, even though has done things like put a hole in 

her wall in a fit of anger. Id. This [c]ourt did hear testimony from 

the coordinator for foster care[, Ms. Redman], who believes that 

A.M.D., Jr., has improved in the home[,] although the CYF case 

supervisor[, Ms. Kroll], at the following hearing, agreed that he 

still exhibited behavioral problems there. Id. at 150; Tr. II at 15. 

Dr. Rosenblum’s conclusions were the same as they were with 

A.Y.D. — that [PLC] was preferable to adoption. See Tr. I at 100-

01, 103-04, 123. Dr. Rosenblum gave a detailed description of 

the boy’s interactional visit with Mother[,] where the boy went to 

her and hugged her for almost 10 minutes straight, demonstrating 

that the relationship is very meaningful to him. Id. at 113. Dr. 

Rosenblum said that sometimes A.M.D., Jr., is reluctant about 

visits, but[,] when he knows that Mother is coming, he is willing 

to go[,] and that, at the interactional, the boy was “overwhelmed 

with emotion” upon seeing Mother. Id. at 114. The psychologist[, 

Dr. Rosenblum,] believed termination would hurt the boy, and 

that his foster mother had even been afraid to raise the issue for 

fear of destabilizing him. Id. at 114-15. A.M.D., Jr., also remains 

very attached to[,] and expresses great love and affection for[,] 

Father. Id. at 115, 123-124, 129.

Finally, as to the three [C]hildren, it is clear to the [c]ourt that 

they are very bonded to each other despite their separate 

residences. See Tr. I at 77.

Mother

Mother has struggled throughout this case, and it cannot fairly be 

said that she has met her goals[,] because she has progressed 

and relapsed in cycles. See, e.g., id. at 87, 89. However, she has 

always made her way back to the [C]hildren and maintained a 

positive and loving relationship with them[,] when available. 

Mother’s substance abuse problem bedevils her, and she has failed 
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to show up for numerous drug screens when requested, as 

attested to by a witness from the Allegheny County’s [sic] Health 

Department. Id. at 32-33. It should be noted that Mother did 

state at the second hearing that she was tested at the threequarter home[,] where she resided prior to finding her recent 

housing[,] although she also admitted to one recent positive test 

for THC [tetrahydrocannabinol], indicating marijuana usage. See

Tr. II at 110-11, 137, 141. The psychologist[, Dr. Rosenblum,]

testified that Mother does acknowledge her substance abuse 

problems, and that she has a history of domestic violence with a 

boyfriend other than Father. See Tr. I at 87. Mother also 

acknowledged her mental health history to CYF. Id. at 206. 

Mother has had treatment for ADHD, and Bipolar disorder and, in 

the psychologist’s[, Dr. Rosenblum’s] view, has trouble 

understanding the [C]hildren’s emotional needs because Mother’s 

own issues interfere in her parenting. Id. at 88-89. She suffers 

from depression and guilt about the [C]hildren, but loves them,

even if she does not always keep them in the forefront of her 

mind. Id. at 89. The psychologist[, Dr. Rosenblum,] credibly 

opined that Mother needs continued mental health care[,] and is 

not now able to meet the [C]hildren’s essential needs. Id. at 89-

90.

Dr. Rosenblum saw A.M.D., Jr., during interactional sessions with 

Mother[,] and observed that Mother had difficulty providing the 

structure the boy needs[,] although she showed improvement 

over time. Id. at 92-93. Mother also improved slowly in her 

responsiveness to the [C]hildren and in engaging them in 

constructive activities. Id. at 88. Mother’s relationship with 

M.Y.D. is the best of the three [Children], and Mother clearly 

makes M.Y.D. feel loved, as described above. Id. at 95. At the 

time of the first hearing, Mother was following through with more 

visits [with] M.Y.D. Id. at 108. At the second hearing toward the 

end of the year, Mother was participating in mental health 

treatment[,] and was visiting with the [C]hildren three times per 

month with supervision. See Tr. II [at] 18-19, 34-35. At that 

time, Mother herself testified that she had moved out of 

supportive housing and into a one-bedroom apartment, although 

she did not want CYF to evaluate it before she got more furniture. 

Id. at 17-18, 112, 116-17. In summary, Mother was participating 

more in services and working on her goals at the time of both 

hearings, but the [c]ourt recognizes her history of upswings and 
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downswings[,] and agrees that Mother cannot independently care 

for the [C]hildren. Id. at 219, 221. 

Father

Father overall has done a better job of making progress as a

parent, but without sufficient stability to become their caretaker. 

Nonetheless, this [c]ourt finds that A.M.D., Jr., and A.Y.D. are 

beneficially bonded to him in a mutually loving relationship, and 

the two children need him. Id. Father was holding down two jobs 

in the year prior to the second hearing. Id. at 154-55. He can be 

willful and sometimes fails to participate in programming or drug 

and alcohol screens because of his frustration with the system and 

its scrutiny of him[,] although he also did experience relapses. 

See, e.g., Tr. I at 32-33, 82-83, 184. See also Tr. II at 23-25, 

59, 79, 167-68, 185-86. Father was facing criminal charges at 

the time of the first hearing, and his preoccupation with the 

possible outcomes affected his visitation for a time, but[,] by the 

second hearing, he was on probation with no further concern for 

incarceration, having pleaded guilty to possession of firearms and 

making terroristic threats. See Tr. II at 21, 170. 

Dr. Rosenblum testified that Father has shown increased

parenting skills and increased engagement with the [C]hildren 

during visits. See Tr. I at 85. Father’s primary problems in the 

past in interacting with the [C]hildren involved a lack of animation 

and some detachment, for example spending time texting rather 

than talking to the [C]hildren. Id. at 90, 183-184. Dr. Rosenblum 

concluded that Father does want to do better with them[,] and 

lets the [C]hildren know he is proud of them and loves them. Id.

at 91-92. Significantly, the psychologist [, Dr. Rosenblum,]

testified as follows: His kids really love him and I think that he’s 

done a good job of making them feel welcome, making them feel 

that he cares about them, maintaining a sense of family and 

connectedness to one another. ... [H]e has a way of infusing his 

children with a sense that “I love you, we’re connected, and we’re 

a family.” They have not let go of that. Id. at 123-24. 

Trial Court Opinion, 1/24/20, at 2-8. 

On November 21, 2019, the trial court entered orders as to each of the 

Children granting in part and denying in part CYF’s petitions, as explained 
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supra. The trial court denied CYF’s petitions and concluded that CYF did not 

meet its burden of proof pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a) or (b) for the 

involuntary termination of parental rights of Mother to all three Children and 

of Father to A.M.D., Jr., and A.Y.D.6 

Thereafter, CYF timely filed notices of appeal and concise statements of 

errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).

On appeal, CYF raises two issues for our review:

1. Did the Orphans’ Court err as a matter of law and/or abuse its 

discretion in denying CYF’s petition to involuntarily terminate

[Mother’s/Father’s parental rights] pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 

2511(a)(2), and (8) after CYF proved by clear and convincing 

evidence the statutory grounds for termination?

2. Did the Orphans’ Court err as a matter of law and/or abuse its 

discretion in denying CYF’s petition to involuntarily terminate 

[Mother’s/Father’s parental rights] pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 

2511(b) after CYF proved by clear and convincing evidence that 

termination of Mother’s[/Father’s] parental rights would best 

serve the developmental, physical and emotional needs and 

welfare of the [C]hildren?

CYF’s Briefs at 5. 

CYF contends that the court abused its discretion when it denied CYF’s 

petitions. CYF argues that it proved by clear and convincing evidence that 

Mother and Father failed to remedy their incapacity to parent related to the 

issues which caused the Children to be removed from the parents’ care. 

In reviewing an appeal from the denial of a petition to terminate parental 

rights, we adhere to the following standard:

____________________________________________

6 As noted supra in n. 1, the court granted CYF’s petition as to the termination 

of Father’s parental rights to M.-A.D.
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[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion standard 

when considering a trial court’s determination of a petition for 

termination of parental rights. As in dependency cases, our 

standard of review requires an appellate court to accept the 

findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if 

they are supported by the record. In re: R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179, 

1190 (Pa. 2010). If the factual findings are supported, appellate 

courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law 

or abused its discretion. Id.; In re R.I.S., 36 A.3d 567, 572 (Pa. 

2011) (plurality). As has been often stated, an abuse of discretion 

does not result merely because the reviewing court might have 

reached a different conclusion. Id.; see also Samuel–Bassett 

v. Kia Motors America, Inc., 34 A.3d 1, 51 (Pa. 2011); 

Christianson v. Ely, 838 A.2d 630, 634 (Pa. 2003). Instead, a 

decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon 

demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, 

prejudice, bias, or ill-will. Id.

As we discussed in R.J.T., there are clear reasons for applying an 

abuse of discretion standard of review in these cases. We 

observed that, unlike trial courts, appellate courts are not 

equipped to make the fact-specific determinations on a cold 

record, where the trial judges are observing the parties during the 

relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous other 

hearings regarding the child and parents. R.J.T., 9 A.3d at 1190. 

Therefore, even where the facts could support an opposite result, 

as is often the case in dependency and termination cases, an 

appellate court must resist the urge to second guess the trial court 

and impose its own credibility determinations and judgment; 

instead we must defer to the trial judges so long as the factual 

findings are supported by the record and the court’s legal 

conclusions are not the result of an error of law or an abuse of 

discretion. In re Adoption of Atencio, 650 A.2d 1064, 1066 

(Pa. 1994).

In re I.E.P., 87 A.3d 340, 343–44 (Pa. Super. 2014) (quoting In re Adoption 

of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826–27 (Pa. 2012)).

The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental 
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rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009). 

Moreover, we have explained, “[t]he standard of clear and convincing 

evidence is defined as testimony that is so ‘clear, direct, weighty and 

convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without 

hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.’” Id. (quoting In re J.L.C., 

837 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2003)). “Satisfaction of the requirements 

in only one subsection of Section 2511(a), along with consideration of the 

provisions in Section 2511(b), is sufficient for termination.” In re Z.S.W., 

946 A.2d 726, 729 (Pa. Super. 2008) (brackets omitted, emphasis in original).

Section 2511 of the Adoption Act provides, in relevant part, as follows:

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may 

be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

* * *

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without essential 

parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or 

mental well-being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, 

abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the 

parent.

* * *

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2).

With respect to section 2511(a)(2), the moving party must produce 

clear and convincing evidence regarding the following elements: (1) repeated 

and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) such incapacity, 

abuse, neglect or refusal caused the child to be without essential parental 
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care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being; 

and (3) the causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will 

not be remedied. See In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa. 

Super. 2003). The grounds for termination of parental rights under section 

2511(a)(2), due to parental incapacity that cannot be remedied, are not 

limited to affirmative misconduct; to the contrary those grounds may include 

acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental duties. In re A.L.D.

797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 2002).

In the present case, the trial court conceded that it could find grounds 

to terminate the parental rights of Mother and Father:

Given the parents’ inconsistency in making progress toward their 

goals and the amount of time each has had to make significant 

changes, this [c]ourt could find grounds to terminate the parents’ 

rights, particularly under Subsection (a)(2). The [c]ourt notes, 

however, that at different points in the case during a parental 

upswing, this would not have been the correct result in striking a 

balance between the parents’ progress and the [C]hildren’s needs. 

It is a frustration to all involved that neither parent has managed 

to do better over a consistent period of time, knowing the bond 

that the [C]hildren have with them. In this difficult case, it is 

noteworthy that even the expert psychologist [, Dr. Rosenblum,] 

could not offer a view on the preferred outcome with reasonable 

professional certainty.

Trial Court Opinion, 1/24/20, at 10.

While the trial court noted that it could find that CYF met its burden 

under section 2511(a)(2),7the court concluded that neither reunification nor 

____________________________________________

7 As the trial court focused on section 2511(a)(2), and conceded that CYF met 

its burden thereunder, we need not discuss a second subsection of section (a), 

i.e., (a)(8). In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 729 (Pa. Super. 2008).
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adoption is best suited for the Children’s needs and welfare, and concluded 

that SPLC8is appropriate in this case. The court explained:

Although both parents have relapsed in their sobriety and have 

gone through times in which their participation waned, both have 

consistently tried again and again, and both have demonstrated 

love and commitment to the [C]hildren. None of the [C]hildren 

want to sever their ties, and all express deep affection for their 

parents[,] and have beneficial and bonded relationships with 

them. Witnesses testified that, after the passage of so much time, 

achieving permanence with another family becomes more difficult. 

While adoption is often a preferred result, as the court-appointed 

psychologist Dr. Neil Rosenblum explained in straightforward 

terms, “in this particular case we’re not dealing with young 

children who are going to say, you know, they have a new mommy 

and a new daddy.” Id. at 101. See also id. at 115; Tr. II at 219-

23. 

____________________________________________

8

In In re Adoption of J.N.M., 177 A.3d 937, 946 n.9 (Pa. Super. 2018), this 

Court stated that SPLC is one of the permanency goals the juvenile court may 

consider at each permanency review hearing. 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(f.1)(3). 

SPLC is a program that was created in 2001, in which financial support is 

provided to families willing to become permanent legal custodians under 42 

Pa.C.S. § 6351(f.1)(3), whereby permanent legal custody is transferred to the 

dependent child’s legal custodian without requiring the termination of the 

parents’ parental rights, and, where deemed appropriate, the trial court may 

permit the continued visitation by the dependent child’s parents. J.N.M., 177 

A.3d at 946 n.9 (quoting In re B.S., 861 A.2d 974, 977 (Pa. Super. 2004)). 

The legal custodian must meet all of the requirements for foster parenthood, 

submit to an annual eligibility evaluation, and have the ability to provide for 

the child without court supervision. 

The panel in J.N.M. stated that alternative permanency arrangements 

such as an SPLC offer less stability than adoption because parents may 

petition the court to attempt to re-gain custody at any time, but an SPLC may 

be appropriate in cases where reunification or adoption is not in the best 

interest of the child. J.N.M., 177 A.3d at 946 n.9 (citing In re S.H., 71 A.3d 

973, 978 (Pa. Super. 2013)).
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Primarily for these reasons, the [c]ourt could not in good 

conscience grant CYF’s petitions to terminate parental rights. On 

the other hand, the evidence showed that neither parent is in a 

position to care for these [C]hildren, and years of services and 

reunification efforts have not changed this. Further, the 

[C]hildren’s foster placements, imperfect or not, are reasonable 

for them at this time, given their individual needs and difficulties 

in foster care. 

Trial Court Opinion, 1/24/20, at 11. 

The trial court concluded that SPLC is most suited for cases precisely 

like this one, and credited the testimony of Dr. Rosenblum, who proffered that 

“SPLC could satisfy a permanency outcome for these children in a satisfactory 

manner”. N.T., 2/6/19, at 101. The legal interests counsel/GAL suggested 

that SPLC may be in the Children’s best interests given that they have 

expressed a “strong desire” for continued parental contact no matter what the 

outcome. N.T., 11/6/19, at 208. The legal interests counsel/GAL added that 

the Children “are fine as of now remaining with the foster parents” but that 

“they do not want to be adopted.” Id.

Upon review, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion 

when it determined that SPLC was in the Children’s best interests. As the trial 

court based its SPLC orders on the testimony presented and the record 

supports its factual findings, we conclude no abuse of discretion occurred.

As to Section 2511(b), our Supreme Court has stated as follows:

[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are met, a 

court “shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S. 

§ 2511(b). The emotional needs and welfare of the child have 

been properly interpreted to include “[i]ntangibles such as love, 

comfort, security, and stability.” In re K.M., 53 A.3d 781, 791 

(Pa. Super. 2012). In In re E.M., [620 A.2d 481, 485 (Pa. 1993)],

this Court held that the determination of the child’s “needs and 

welfare” requires consideration of the emotional bonds between 
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the parent and child. The “utmost attention” should be paid to 

discerning the effect on the child of permanently severing the 

parental bond. In re K.M., 53 A.3d at 791. However, as 

discussed below, evaluation of a child’s bonds is not always an 

easy task.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013).

Generally, this Court has stated that a parent’s own feelings of love and 

affection for a child, alone, will not preclude termination of parental rights. In 

re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 512 (Pa. Super. 2007). We have stated that a “child’s 

life ‘simply cannot be put on hold in the hope that [a parent] will summon the 

ability to handle the responsibilities of parenting.’” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 

1108, 1125 (Pa. Super. 2010). 

Our Supreme Court has instructed, however, that this Court should 

defer to the trial court where a “close call” was made. See In re R.J.T., 9 

A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010).

Therefore, even where the facts could support an opposite result, 

as is often the case in dependency and termination cases, an 

appellate court must resist the urge to second guess the trial court 

and impose its own credibility determinations and judgment; 

instead we must defer to the trial judges so long as the factual 

findings are supported by the record and the court’s legal 

conclusions are not the result of an error of law or an abuse of 

discretion. In re Adoption of Atencio, 650 A.2d 1064, 1066 

(Pa. 1994).

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 826-27. 

In the present case, the trial court denied CYF’s petitions to involuntarily 

terminate the parental rights of Mother and Father pursuant to Section 

2511(b), and explained, in part:
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Ultimately, to this [c]ourt, the case centered on CYF’s failure to

prove that termination of parental rights would serve these 

[C]hildren’s needs and welfare by any evidentiary standard. This 

[c]ourt concluded that termination would in fact be contrary to the

[C]hildren’s interests. In cases such as these, the court must 

engage in a “determination of the needs and welfare of the child 

under the standard of best interests of the child. One major

aspect of the needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and

status of the emotional bond between parent and child, with close 

attention paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing 

any such bond.” In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 100 (Pa. Super.2011)

(quoting In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007)). 

Trial Court Opinion, 1/24/20, at 10-11. 

As set forth infra, the trial court concluded that Mother and Father have 

demonstrated, however inconsistently, their love and commitment to 

Children, none of whom want to sever their ties to their parents, and all of 

whom have beneficial and bonded relationships with them.

Our review of the record supports the trial court’s conclusion. Dr. 

Rosenblum testified that he had considerable reservations about 

recommending termination. Rather, Dr. Rosenblum opined that “SPLC is 

probably the choice that presents with the greatest degree of -- the best fit 

for the [C]hildren right now.” N.T., 2/6/19, at 128. With respect to M.-A.D. 

and Mother, Dr. Rosenblum emphasized that it would be “literally reckless” to 

terminate Mother’s parental rights. Id. at 99. Dr. Rosenblum believed “the 

relationship of [A.Y.D. and A.M.D., Jr.] with both parents, but particularly with 

[F]ather, is meaningful and, therefore, overall thought a goal of SPLC was 

perhaps a better selection . . . it would still allow a connection to birth parents, 

even if it was on a more limited basis.” Id. at 100-101. Dr. Rosenblum stated 

that “[e]veryone knows that these children don’t want to be adopted and have 

close connections to their parents.” 
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After a careful review of the record, we conclude that the trial court’s 

findings have sufficient support in the certified record and that the court did 

not commit an error of law or abuse of discretion in its determination that 

SPLC is in the Children’s best interests pursuant to Section 2511(b). 

As discussed supra, our Supreme Court has stated, appellate courts –

unlike trial courts – are not in a position to make the close calls based on factspecific determinations. In re R.J.T., 9 A.3d at 1190. Not only do trial judges 

observe the parties during the termination hearing, but they usually preside 

over the dependency hearings with the same parties and have a longitudinal 

understanding of the case and the best interests of the children involved. Id. 

Therefore, even where the facts could support an opposite result, as is often 

the case in dependency and termination cases, an appellate court must resist 

the urge to second guess the trial court and impose its own credibility 

determinations and judgment so long as the factual findings are supported by 

the record and the trial court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an error 

of law or an abuse of discretion. In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 826-

827.

In the present case, the trial court explained that “what it came down 

to is that Dr. Rosenblum believes that neither of [the parents] have 

demonstrated the capacity to meet [the Children’s] essential needs,” however, 

the trial court also determined that “it’s not clear and convincing that it’s in 

the [C]hildren’s best interests to terminate.” N.T., 11/6/19, at 219. The trial 

court concluded that a goal of SPLC is in the Children’s best interests. Id. at 

223. 
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After a careful review of the record in this matter, we find the record 

supports the trial court’s factual findings, and the court’s conclusions 

regarding SPLC are supported by competent evidence in the record, and are 

not the result of an error of law or an abuse of discretion. In re Adoption of 

S.P., 47 A.3d at 826-27; In re: T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267.

CYF argues that this case is akin to T.S.M, supra. See CYF’s Brief at 

41-42. In T.S.M., the trial court had denied petitions for the termination of 

the parental rights of a mother to the five youngest of her seven children. In 

re T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 253. Each child had been in six to thirteen foster 

placements, and each was experiencing significant psychological and 

behavioral problems. Id. The trial court found that the evidence supported 

the termination of parental rights under section 2511(a)(2); however, the trial 

court also found that termination did not best serve the needs and welfare of 

the children required under section 2511(b), as well as subsection 2511(a)(5) 

and (a)(8). Id. at 259–60. The trial court pointed to the evidence of a strong 

bond between the children and mother. Id. at 260. 

Ultimately, upon review, our Supreme Court noted that, while the 

parent-child bond was strong, the trial court minimized the children's 

unhealthy and pathological bond with their mother. Id. at 271. The Supreme 

Court noted that the trial court failed to recognize the substantial, possibly 

permanent, damage done to the children by the prolonged, unhealthy, 

pathological bond with their mother that was preventing the children’s ability 

to form attachments to their foster families. Id. at 271. 

Here, unlike the situation in In re T.S.M., the testimony provided by 

Dr. Rosenblum supported the trial court’s finding that there is a clear bond 
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between the Children and their parents, and there was no evidence that the 

bond was harmful. Thus, this Court finds the factual situation in T.S.M. 

distinguishable from the instant appeal, and CYF’s argument misplaced.

CYF contends that it was error for the trial court to consider that M.-A.D. 

was not in a pre-adoptive home when making its decision. See CYF’s Brief at 

54-55. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 2512(b) (“If the petitioner is an agency it shall not 

be required to aver that an adoption is presently contemplated nor that a 

person with a present intention to adopt exists.”). However, as our Supreme 

Court has stated, “[c]ommon sense dictates that courts considering 

termination must also consider whether the children are in a pre-adoptive 

home and whether they have a bond with their foster parents.” T.S.M., 71 

A.3d at 268. In addition, the Pennsylvania Dependency Benchbook provides 

that “[w]hile having an identified adoptive resource is not a prerequisite for 

[termination of parental rights], ideally there should be a strong likelihood of 

eventual adoption.” Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts Office of 

Children and Families in the Courts, Pennsylvania Dependency Benchbook § 

12.1 at 126 (2010).

At the time of the final termination hearing in November of 2019, M.-

A.D. was thirteen years of age, and had consistently and unequivocally 

maintained a preference not to have Mother’s rights terminated. Although 

CYF avers that M.-A.D. was residing in a suitable foster home identified as a 

long-term placement, M.-A.D. had only been in that placement for the two 

months preceding the November 2019 termination hearing. Moreover, in that 

two-month period, an incident occurred where M.-A.D. was missing for several 
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hours and the police were contacted. N.T., 11/6/19, at 52. Dr. Rosenblum 

cautioned:

[W]e are dealing with a youngster who has significant history of 

significant mental health and adjustment concerns. And so, it 

would be important, in my opinion, to assess it over a reasonable 

period of time so that one would have certainty. Two months 

would certainly seem a bit premature to be making a final 

conclusion as to whether this is going to be a placement that has 

a reasonable chance of long-term success. And even at [M.-

A.D.’s] age, you know, it certainly is, in my experience, a much 

higher risk of an adoptive disruption or a disruption to an adoptive 

placement, you know, with a youngster who is [eleven] now 

[thirteen] years of age. She’ll be [fourteen] in three months.

Id. at 92-93.

The trial court credited Dr. Rosenblum’s testimony that he would be 

concerned about prematurely moving forward with termination “without more 

confirmation or evidence over a longer period of time.” Id. at 102.

Based on the foregoing, we conclude the trial court’s findings are 

supported by the competent evidence in the record, and the trial court did not 

err or abuse its discretion in denying CYF’s petition to terminate Mother’s 

parental rights as to M.-A.D. M.-A.D. may never return to the care of Mother, 

but the trial court found no benefit in making M.-A.D. “a psychological

orphan.” N.T., 2/6/19 at 100. Dr. Rosenblum testified that M.-A.D. derived 

benefit from her bond with Mother. Id. at 95 and 113. Simply stated, it is 

M.-A.D.’s age and the fact that she does not wish to be adopted that make 

termination of Mother’s parental rights not in her best interests. See In re 

Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 826-27 (“[E]ven where the facts could support 

an opposite result, as is often the case in dependency and termination cases, 

an appellate court must resist the urge to second guess the trial court and 
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impose its own credibility determinations and judgment; instead we must

defer to the trial judges so long as the factual findings are supported by the 

record and the court's legal conclusions are not the result of an error of law 

or an abuse of discretion.”).

Finally, CYF avers that the trial court committed an error of law when it 

determined that SPLC is the most appropriate permanency option for the 

Children. Further, CYF argues that it was error for the trial Court to rely on 

In re B.S., 861 A.2d 974 (Pa. Super. 2004), as that was a goal change case 

which interpreted the Juvenile Act not the Adoption Act.

As our Supreme Court has previously stated, appellate courts – unlike 

trial courts – are not in a position to make the close calls based on fact-specific 

determinations. In re R.J.T., 9 A.3d at 1190. Not only do trial judges observe 

the parties during the termination hearing, but they usually preside over the 

dependency hearings with the same parties and have a longitudinal 

understanding of the case and the best interests of the children involved. Id. 

Therefore, even where the facts could support an opposite result, as is often 

the case in dependency and termination cases, an appellate court must resist 

the urge to second guess the trial court and impose its own credibility 

determinations and judgment so long as the factual findings are supported by 

the record and the orphans’ court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an 

error of law or an abuse of discretion. In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at

827.

Here, the trial court conceded that “in this difficult case, it is noteworthy 

that even the expert psychologist [, Dr. Rosenblum,] could not offer a view on 

the preferred outcome with a reasonable [degree of] of professional 
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certainty.” Trial Court Opinion, 1/24/20, at 10. The trial court concluded that, 

despite the parents’ inconsistency in making progress towards their goals, 

“both have demonstrated love and commitment to the [C]hildren. None of 

the [C]hildren want to sever their ties, and all express deep affection for their 

parents and have beneficial and bonded relationships with them” Id. at 10. 

As our Supreme Court has instructed, this Court should defer to the trial court 

where a “close call” was made. See R.J.T., 9 A.3d at 1190.

After review of the certified record, we find that there was competent, 

clear and convincing evidence in the record to support the trial court's denial 

of the petitions to terminate Mother’s parental rights to the Children and 

Father’s parental rights to A.Y.D. and A.M.D., Jr. Accordingly, we affirm the 

trial court’s orders.

Orders affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/12/2020
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