Filed 12/27/23

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

ARTURO CASTAÑARES,

Petitioner,

v.

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN 

DIEGO COUNTY,

Respondent;

 D082048

 (San Diego County

 Super. Ct. No. 37-2021-00017713-

 CU-MC-CTL)

CITY OF CHULA VISTA,

Real Party in Interest.

Original proceeding on a petition for extraordinary relief. Relief 

granted in part; denied in part.

Briggs Law Corporation, Cory J. Briggs, and Janna M. Ferraro, for 

Petitioner.

Aaron Mackey for Electronic Frontier Foundation; David Loy for First 

Amendment Coalition; and Katie Townsend for Reporters Committee for 

Freedom of the Press, as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.
2

Karen Rogan, Assistant City Attorney; Colantuono, Highsmith & 

Whatley, Michael G. Colantuono, Carmen A. Brock, and Andrew C. Rawcliffe, 

for Real Party in Interest.

Jones & Mayer, Scott Wm. Davenport for California Sheriffs’ 

Association, California Police Chiefs Association and California Police 

Officers’ Association as Amici Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest.

Bobbitt Pinckard & Fields, Richard L. Pinckard for Peace Officers 

Research Association of California and Peace Officer Research Association of 

California Legal Defense Fund as Amici Curiae on behalf of Real Party in 

Interest.

Gutierrez, Preciado & House for the League of California Cities and the 

International Municipal Lawyers Association, as Amici Curiae on behalf of 

Real Party in Interest.

No appearance for Respondent. 

In this matter of first impression, we consider a request made by a 

private citizen under the California Public Records Act (Gov. Code,1

§ 7923.500; CPRA) to obtain video footage recorded by drones operated by the 

City of Chula Vista’s (City) police department. The City operates a pilot 

program to use drones as first responders for certain 911 calls. Per this 

program, a police officer determines when sending a drone to examine a 

situation is an appropriate response to a public call for assistance. If the 

officer decides that the use of a drone is suitable, a remote pilot flies the 

drone to the area in question, streaming video to the officers to better inform 

them how to respond to the situation.

1 Statutory references are to the Government Code unless otherwise 

specified.
3

Arturo Castañares, a journalist and private pilot, made a CPRA

request for information related to the City’s use of drones, including the video 

footage for all drone flights from March 1 to March 31, 2021. Ultimately, the 

City provided Castañares with all the information he requested except for the 

video footage but not before Castañares filed suit against the City.

The matter proceeded to trial, and, as detailed in its minute order, the 

superior court determined that the video footage was exempt under 

section 7923.600, subdivision (a) as records of investigations. Further, the 

court found that any benefit of turning over the videos was outweighed by the 

“unreasonable burden” placed on the City in redacting the videos before they 

could be provided to Castañares.

Castañares then filed this petition for an extraordinary writ asking us

to direct the superior court to vacate its minute order and order the City to 

disclose the requested video footage that is not related to any law 

enforcement investigation with appropriate redactions if necessary. In an 

informal response, the City requested that this court consider the petition to 

clarify the scope of its obligation to provide the drone video footage.

We agree with Castañares that the superior court erred in determining, 

as a matter of law, all video footage from the drone program is exempt under 

section 7923.600, subdivision (a) as records of investigations. However, it 

might be the case, after further inquiry, consistent with this opinion, that the 

majority of the video footage is exempt. That said, we cannot make that 

determination on the record before us. Similarly, we acknowledge that the 

catchall provision of the CPRA, codified at section 7922.000, may also support 

the City’s position that the drone video footage does not have to be provided 

to Castañares, but the record does not allow us to engage in the necessary 

balancing to determine if that provision applies. As such, we shall grant the 
4

requested relief in part and remand this matter back to the superior court

with directions to vacate the subject minute order and conduct further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion. We decline to order any of the other 

requested relief in the instant petition.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) selected the City’s police 

department as the first in the country to test the use of drones as first 

responders. Previously, police agencies relied on responding officers to 

launch drones when on scene. The City’s innovation was to dispatch drones 

before officers arrived and, similar to the use of helicopters, provide incident 

commanders and responding officers livestreamed video of the scene before 

arrival, so they could respond more effectively and safely.

Before launching its program, the City engaged in extensive outreach 

to civil rights groups, media, and in other public fora, soliciting input on 

policies for police use of drones. The City’s policy, which prohibits use of 

drones for general surveillance or patrol, reflects that outreach and the City’s 

extensive planning and research.

Moreover, the City’s drone policy adopted many of the American Civil 

Liberties Union’s 2013 recommendations to Congress including:

(1) restricting use of drones to calls for service; (2) privacy controls limiting 

access to and retention of videos; (3) community engagement and online 

access to flight path data through a website and links to City’s policies and 

media coverage, as well as offering program tours to civic groups, police 

agencies, and others; (4) City Council and citizen advisory committee 

oversight of policy decisions; (5) internal auditing and tracking; and

(6) banning weaponization.
5

Additionally, the City provides a substantial amount of information 

about the drone program on its website. To this end, the public may access 

anonymized flight data (including date, time, location, flight paths, and call 

summaries). The City also offers after-action-reports (AARs) wherein the 

City can respond to questions about drone flights (for example, “Why did a

drone fly over my house?”).

On April 5, 2021, Castañares emailed a Chula Vista Police lieutenant a 

CPRA request for “access to and copies of video footage from all CVPD [Chula 

Vista Police Department] drone flights conducted between March 1 and 

March 31, 2021, as well as documents related to the retention and custody of 

such videos, who maintains the physical storage of those videos, who has 

access to those videos, and documents related to all costs associated with the 

storage and retention of those videos.” However, Castañares qualified his 

request by asking the City to “redact any such videos that may be part of any 

ongoing or pending investigations, but provide a log of any videos or 

documents withheld, who made the determination to withhold them, and 

when they may be released.” In addition, Castañares asked for documents 

“related to any preplanning, flight plans, mapping, or other information used 

to organize, operate, and monitor [the drone] flights.”

On April 14, a day before the statutory deadline to respond,2 the City 

provided “a timely partial response” informing Castañares that responsive 

information could be found on the City’s website3 and the requested video 

2 An agency must respond within 10 days of receiving a request for a 

copy of records under the CPRA. (§ 7922.535, subd. (a).) 

3 Under section 7922.545, subdivision (a), in response to a request for a 

public record, a public agency may direct a member of the public to its 

website. 
6

footage was exempt under the investigatory records exemption per 

section 7923.600, subdivision (a). The City also extended the deadline for its 

response to Castañares’s request until April 26.4

Before the April 26 deadline for the City to respond, Castañares filed a 

lawsuit against the City for declaratory and injunctive relief, requesting a 

judicial declaration that the City did not comply with the CPRA, a writ of 

mandate directing the City to comply with the CPRA, and an injunction to 

require the City to allow Castañares to inspect and obtain copies of all 

responsive records to his CPRA request. Castañares also sought “[a]ll 

attorney fees and other legal expenses incurred . . . in connection with th[e] 

lawsuit.”

However, before Castañares filed suit, the chief of police offered to give 

him a tour of the City’s drone program operations. As part of the tour, 

Castañares would be permitted to “ask direct questions of those responsible 

for administering the program regarding program data gathering use and 

storage.” Additionally, the City proposed to further discuss with Castañares 

“a more limited form of disclosure” as well as “other possible program checks 

and balances that could be developed beyond what is already in place to 

address Mr. Castañares’ concerns.” Through his attorney, Castañares stated 

“the tour and any information that would have been elicited during the tour 

should be handled through formal discovery.”

The City filed an answer to the complaint, and the parties engaged in 

limited discovery, including the taking of depositions of two of the City’s 

designees as well as written discovery. Also, the City produced additional 

4 Section 7922.535, subdivision (b) allows an agency to extend the usual 

10-day time limit to respond to a CPRA request under certain circumstances.
7

documents in response to Castañares’s CPRA request and requests for 

production.

In March 2023, the parties submitted their briefs on the merits as well 

as other supporting documentation and evidence. After reviewing the 

submitted material, the trial court issued a tentative ruling as well as orders 

on Castañares’s objections to certain evidence proffered by the City.

At trial call on March 30, 2023, the parties confirmed that they wished 

to present oral argument, and the court calendared a hearing for April 10, 

2023.

At the April 10 hearing, Castañares admitted that the only open issue 

was whether the City had to provide the drone video footage. After the court 

entertained oral argument, it issued a minute order finding in favor of the 

City. In doing so, the court acknowledged that there was no California 

authority addressing the issues before it: “It is undisputed that the CVPD 

drone program is the first of its kind in California, and consequently it is 

undisputed that no California court has previously taken up the legal 

questions raised in this case.” Nevertheless, the court concluded, “as a 

matter of law, that the material requested in petitioner’s CPRA request and 

which has not already been turned over by the City (consisting of footage 

from all CVPD drone flights conducted between March 1, and March 31, 

2021) is categorically exempt under Government Code section 7923.600.” 

In addition, the court determined that the City established that the CPRA 

request “seeks to impose an unreasonable burden on the City’s resources with 
8

no substantial countervailing benefit given the wealth of information already 

turned over by the City to petitioner.”5

Castañares then filed this petition. Although the City opposes the 

relief Castañares seeks, it agreed that this Court should address the issues 

raised in the petition to provide guidance for future CPRA requests related to

drone video footage, especially to address its redaction obligations.

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

“An order of the court, either directing disclosure by a public official or 

supporting the decision of the public official refusing disclosure, . . . shall be 

immediately reviewable by petition to the appellate court for the issuance of 

an extraordinary writ.” (§ 7923.500, subd. (a).) We “conduct an independent 

review of the trial court’s ruling; factual findings made by the trial court will 

be upheld if based on substantial evidence.” (Times Mirror Co. v. Superior 

Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1325, 1336.)

B. The CPRA

Enacted in 1968, the CPRA grants public access to public records held 

by state and local agencies. (§ 7920.000 et seq.) “Modeled after the federal 

Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. § 552 et seq.), the [CPRA] was enacted 

for the purpose of increasing freedom of information by giving members of the 

public access to records in the possession of state and local agencies. 

[Citation.] Such ‘access to information concerning the conduct of the people’s 

business,’ the Legislature declared, ‘is a fundamental and necessary right of 

5 Despite not being specifically referenced by the trial court, the parties 

agree that this additional reason articulated by the court was based on the 

catchall provision of the CPRA (§ 7922.000).
9

every person in this state.’ ” (Los Angeles County Bd. of Supervisors v. 

Superior Court (2016) 2 Cal.5th 282, 290.)

Under the California Constitution, the CPRA must be “broadly 

construed” because its statutory scheme “furthers the people’s right of 

access.” (Cal. Const., art. I, § 3, subd. (b)(2).) Nevertheless, the act does not 

confer an absolute right of access. As part of the CPRA, the Legislature 

included a provision declaring it was “mindful of the right of individuals to 

privacy.” (§ 7921.000.) This express policy declaration “ ‘bespeaks legislative 

concern for individual privacy as well as disclosure.’ [Citation.] ‘In the spirit 

of this declaration, judicial decisions interpreting the [CPRA] seek to balance 

the public right to access to information, the government’s need, or lack of 

need, to preserve confidentiality, and the individual’s right to privacy. 

[Citations.]’ ” (Copley Press, Inc. v. Superior Court (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1272, 

1282 (Copley Press).)

The CPRA balances the dual concerns for privacy and disclosure by 

providing for various exemptions that permit public agencies to refuse 

disclosure of certain public records. (See, e.g., §§ 7927.200–7927.500.) For 

example, the CPRA does not require agencies to permit public inspection of 

records that are exempted or prohibited from public disclosure pursuant to 

federal or state law, including Evidence Code provisions relating to privilege. 

(§ 7927.705.) Also, as discussed post, law enforcement investigatory files 

typically are categorically exempt from the CPRA’s general requirement of 

disclosure. (§ 7923.600.) “ ‘In large part, these exemptions are designed to 

protect the privacy of persons whose data or documents come into 

governmental possession.’ ” (Copley Press, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 1282.) 

CPRA exemptions are narrowly construed (American Civil Liberties Union 

Foundation v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1032, 1042 (ACLU 
10

Foundation)), and the agency opposing disclosure bears the burden of proving 

an exemption applies. (Long Beach Police Officers Assn. v. City of Long 

Beach (2014) 59 Cal.4th 59, 70; County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court

(2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 57, 63.)

C. Castañares’s Contentions

Although Castañares raises multiple issues with the trial court’s 

ruling,6 his claims fall into two primary categories: (1) the trial court erred 

in finding all drone footage was categorically exempt as investigatory records 

under section 7923.600, subdivision (a), and (2) the City did not satisfy its 

burden under the catchall provision of the CPRA (§ 7922.000) to support 

6 Castañares challenges the trial court’s order finding the City was 

justified in not producing the drone video footage on several grounds. First, 

he contends the court improperly construed the statutory exemptions broadly 

under the CPRA while narrowly construing his right to access the footage. 

Second, he asserts the drone video footage cannot be exempt as a matter of 

law without some showing that the footage was related to a law enforcement 

investigation and not a mere inquiry. Third, he claims the trial court’s ruling 

is contrary to “the obvious intent of the Legislature to make police records as 

accessible to the public as possible (while still respecting the right to 

privacy).” Fourth, Castañares insists the ruling was improper because 

neither the City nor the trial court reviewed any of the drone video footage to 

determine whether any privacy rights would be implicated or threatened by 

the release of the footage to Castañares. As such, the court could not 

properly engage in the balancing required to determine whether the 

“catchall” provision of the CPRA (see § 7922.000) supported the City’s 

decision not to disclose the drone video footage. Finally, Castañares 

maintains the trial court erred by faulting him for not being more specific in 

his CPRA request or pursing a less burdensome means of obtaining the 

desired information while not criticizing the City for failing to do more to help 

Castañares with respect to his request and for not providing facts to justify 

withholding of the drone footage in its initial response to Castañares’s CPRA 

request. We need not resolve each of these challenges to decide the issues 

before us.
11

nondisclosure of the drone video footage. We shall address each of these 

issues in turn.

D. The Investigatory Records Exemption

The CPRA “does not require the disclosure of records of . . .

investigations conducted by . . . any state or local police agency, or any 

investigatory . . . files compiled by any other state or local police agency, or 

any investigatory . . . files compiled by any other state or local agency 

for . . . law enforcement . . . purposes.” (§ 7923.600, subd. (a).) The parties do 

not disagree that the investigatory records exemption applies to at least some 

of the drone video footage. To this end, the parties stipulated below: “Drone 

footage from calls for service that result in a law enforcement investigation 

(i.e., a case number was assigned) are exempt from public disclosure 

under . . . section 7923.600, subdivision (a) . . . unless the drone footage is 

otherwise discoverable.” Here, Castañares has not offered any argument that 

drone video footage that is linked to an actual investigation (at least to the 

extent that drone video footage is part of an investigatory file) should 

otherwise be disclosed in response to a CPRA request. Accordingly, we are 

not concerned with the drone video footage that is part of an investigatory
12

file. Such files are exempt from disclosure. (See § 7923.600, subd. (a); Black 

Panther Party v. Kehoe (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 645, 654.)7

Thus, we turn our attention to the drone video footage that is not part 

of an investigatory file. As a threshold matter, we note that drone video 

footage that falls under this category is not apparent on the record before us. 

Nor has such footage been identified or otherwise described in the record. 

Nevertheless, we shall endeavor to provide guidelines in considering such 

footage, cognizant of our high court’s decree that investigatory records “are 

exempt on their face, whether or not they are ever included in an 

investigatory file.” (Haynie, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1069.)

Although there is no reported case dealing with a CPRA request 

seeking drone video footage, the City suggests that Haynie, supra, 26 

Cal.4th 1061 is helpful to our analysis here. In that case, the petitioner

claimed that he was injured by a Los Angeles County deputy sheriff during a 

traffic stop and sought certain public records regarding the incident. (Id. at 

p. 1065.) The sheriff’s department refused to provide those records, instead 

disclosing a “ ‘summary of the event,’ ” which asserted that the deputy 

“ ‘received a call from a neighbor who saw several males carrying guns enter 

7 This is not to say that a public agency can avoid disclosure under the 

CPRA simply by labeling certain information “investigatory.” (See 

Williams v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 337, 356 [“[I]t now appears well 

established that ‘information in public files [becomes] exempt as 

“investigatory” material only when the prospect of enforcement proceedings 

[becomes] concrete and definite’ ”].) “Such a qualification is necessary to 

prevent an agency from attempting to ‘shield a record from public disclosure, 

regardless of its nature, simply by placing it in a file labelled 

“investigatory.” ’ ” (Haynie v. Superior Court (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1061, 1069 

(Haynie), citing Williams, at p. 355.) Here, Castanares does not argue that 

the drone video footage that is part of any investigatory file has been labeled 

as such merely to avoid disclosure.
13

an older model dark blue Ford van and travel down the road. The deputy 

spotted a vehicle matching that description five minutes later and he decided 

to conduct an investigation of the van.’ ” (Id. at pp. 1065–1066.) The 

department asserted that the “[r]ecords of . . . investigations” exemption 

mooted CPRA disclosure. (§ 7923.600, subd. (a).) Among other arguments 

raised, the petitioner responded that “ ‘records of investigations’ should be 

defined so as to exclude investigations that are merely ‘routine’ or ‘everyday 

police activity,’ such as his traffic stop.” (Haynie, at p. 1070.)

The California Supreme Court disagreed with the petitioner. (See 

Haynie, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 1070–1071.) To that end, the court

discussed the risk that the petitioner’s proposed interpretation might pose to 

law enforcement operations. “Complainants and other witnesses whose 

identities were disclosed might disappear or refuse to cooperate. Suspects, 

who would be alerted to the investigation, might flee or threaten witnesses. 

Citizens would be reluctant to report suspicious activity. Evidence might be 

destroyed.” (Id. at pp. 1070–1071.) Our high court also emphasized, 

however, that “by including ‘routine’ and ‘everyday’ within the ambit of 

‘investigations’ in section [7923.600, subd. (a)], [it did] not mean to shield 

everything law enforcement officers do from disclosure. [Citation.] Often, 

officers make inquiries of citizens for purposes related to crime prevention 

and public safety that are unrelated to either civil or criminal investigations. 

The records of investigation exempted under section [7923.600, subd. (a)]

encompass only those investigations undertaken for the purpose of 

determining whether a violation of law may occur or has occurred. If a 

violation or potential violation is detected, the exemption also extends to 

records of investigations conducted for the purpose of uncovering information 

surrounding the commission of the violation and its agency. Here, the 
14

investigation that included the decision to stop [the petitioner] and the stop 

itself was for the purpose of discovering whether a violation of law had 

occurred and, if so, the circumstances of its commission. Records relating to 

that investigation are exempt from disclosure by section [7923.600, 

subd. (a)].” (Haynie, at p. 1071.)

Although Haynie provides some general principles to consider when 

assessing whether a CPRA request seeks records of investigations, we 

observe that the instant matter presents much different facts than Haynie. 

There, the court addressed a situation where an individual deputy stopped an 

individual driver, allegedly based on a single, close-in-time tip from a 

neighbor. In contrast, the instant matter does not concern an individual 

requesting information related to his encounter with law enforcement. 

Rather, the subject CPRA request here concerns over 91 hours of video 

footage related to a program utilized by the City’s police department.8 

Further, unlike the request in Haynie, it is not related to a single event, 

involving the petitioner. Therefore, we conclude that Haynie gives us some 

guidance, but it does not, by itself, provide the necessary framework to 

answer the questions before us.

Not surprisingly, Castañares urges us to follow a different case, ACLU 

Foundation, supra, 3 Cal.5th 1032, which he claims is analogous to the 

instant action. There, the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) and the 

Los Angeles Sherriff’s Department (LASD) employed automated license plate 

reader (ALPR) technology to locate vehicles linked to crimes under 

investigation. (Id. at p. 1036.) The ALPR data collection system used highspeed computer-controlled cameras mounted on fixed structures or on patrol 

8 Castañares disputes whether the requested drone video footage 

actually runs over 91 hours.
15

cars. The cameras automatically captured an image of each vehicles’ 

respective license plate that passed through their optical range. Using 

character recognition software, the ALPR system checked each license plate 

number against a list of license plate numbers associated with crimes, child 

abduction alerts, or outstanding warrants. If the ALPR system matched an 

image to a license plate on this list, the system would then alert officers in a 

patrol car or a central dispatch unit. However, most license plate numbers 

the ALPR units captured did not match the list and had no connection with 

any crimes, child abduction alerts, or outstanding warrants. (Id. at p. 1037.) 

As part of the ALPR program, each scanned license plate number, together 

with the date, time, and location of the scan, was stored on a confidential 

computer network. LAPD estimated that it recorded data from 1.2 million 

cars per week; LASD estimated that it recorded data from between l.7 and 

1.8 million license plates per week. The data was retained for two years. 

(Ibid.)

The petitioners sent substantially identical requests to the LAPD and 

the LASD, seeking “ ‘records related to those agencies’ use of ALPR 

technology, including “all ALPR data collected or generated” during a oneweek period in August 2012, consisting of, “at minimum, the license plate 

number, date, time, and location information of each license plate 

recorded.” ’ ” (ACLU Foundation, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 1037–1038.) The 

LAPD and the LASD withheld the requested license plate scan data, claiming 

the information was exempt as law enforcement records of investigations 

under section 7923.600, subdivision (a). (ACLU Foundation, at p.1038.)

The petitioners filed a petition for a writ of mandate to compel 

disclosure of the requested ALPR data. The superior court ruled in favor of 

the agencies, finding that the requested data was exempt from disclosure as 
16

records of investigations and was covered by the catchall provision under 

section 7922.000. (ACLU Foundation, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 1038.) The 

petitioners then sought issuance of an extraordinary writ in the Court of 

Appeal. However, the appellate court concluded the data was exempt from 

disclosure under section 7923.600, subdivision (a). (ACLU Foundation, at 

p. 1038.) 

After granting review, our high court determined that the “process of

ALPR scanning does not produce records of investigations, because the scans 

are not conducted as part of a targeted inquiring into any particular crime or 

crimes.” (ACLU Foundation, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 1042.) The court further 

observed that “[t]he scans are conducted with an expectation that the vast 

majority of the data collected will prove irrelevant for law enforcement 

purposes.” (Ibid.) The court acknowledged that it “may not always be an 

easy task to identify the line between traditional ‘investigation’ and the sort 

of ‘bulk’ collection at issue here[,]” but it was “clear that [the] . . . ALPR 

process falls on the bulk collection side of it.” (Ibid.)

In determining that the investigatory records exception did not apply to 

the ALPR scans, the California Supreme Court considered the impact of 

querying the ALPR database for information on particular vehicles. The 

court concluded that such a query did not transform the ALPR records into 

exempt records of investigations. (ACLU Foundation, supra, 3 Cal.5th at 

p. 1042.) As such, the court made clear that “[a] plate scan in itself always 

remains a result of bulk data collection, rather than a record of investigation, 

even if it has the potential to match a future search query.” The court noted 

a contrary rule would allow an agency to exempt data, “purportedly to 
17

advance some more traditional ‘investigation,’ simply by searching the entire 

database.” (Ibid.)9

Although Castañares claims the instant matter is analogous to ACLU 

Foundation, we observe a key difference between the two cases in considering 

whether the requested drone video footage falls under the records of 

investigations exemption of the CPRA. In ACLU Foundation, the ALPR 

scans were random and not aimed at any particular person or in response to 

any call to service from the public. In contrast, here, the drone video footage 

is recorded only after an officer determines a drone should be dispatched in 

response to a 911 call.10 Thus, unlike the ALPR scans in ACLU Foundation, 

the drone video footage in the instant matter required an act of discretion by 

the City’s police. This is a critical difference between the two programs and 

underscores why we are not persuaded that ACLU Foundation is instructive 

regarding the application of the records of investigations exemption here.

Therefore, the instant matter falls somewhere between Haynie (a 

targeted CPRA request based on a petitioner’s interaction with a specific 

officer) and ACLU Foundation (the random collection of bulk data). 

9 Our high court also addressed the applicability of the catchall provision 

of the CPRA to the ALPR data. (See ACLU Foundation, supra, 3 Cal.5th at 

pp. 1043–1047.) We will address this issue post and eschew a discussion of 

that portion of ACLU Foundation at this time.

10 Castanares contends the City’s police department would dispatch 

drones “in response to calls passively heard via Live911.” However, he does 

not explain the significance of this response or how it should impact our 

analysis. Thus, we deem any argument related to dispatching a drone in 

response to calls heard via Live911 to be forfeited. That said, we see no 

significant difference between the decision to dispatch a drone in response to 

a 911 call and the decision to dispatch a drone after hearing about a situation 

via Live911. The key issue under the CPRA remains the same: Was the 

drone dispatched to conduct an investigation? 
18

Additionally, we are further guided by our high court’s observation that 

“Haynie at least implies that an inquiry must be somewhat targeted at 

suspected violations of law (see Haynie, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1071) to 

qualify as an ‘investigation[ ]’ under section [7923.600, subd. (a)]. The mere 

fact of an inquiry is not enough.” (ACLU Foundation, supra, 3 Cal.5th at 

p. 1041.) As such, we envision three possible categories that the drone video 

footage can fall under in the instant action. The first category consists of 

drone video footage that is part of an investigatory file. As the parties agree, 

this footage would be exempt from disclosure under the CPRA per 

section 7923.600, subdivision (a). 

The second category consists of instances where officers used a drone to 

investigate whether a violation of law was occurring or had occurred but did 

not create a corresponding investigatory file. (See Haynie, supra, 26 Cal.4th 

at p. 1071; ACLU Foundation, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 1041.) Examples of such 

use of drones include dispatching a drone to investigate a possible assault, 

a claim of someone causing a disturbance, or a suspected break in; yet, the 

resultant video footage did not become part of an investigatory file. Under

Haynie and ACLU Foundation, drone video footage investigating these and 

other claims of crimes being committed would fall under the records of 

investigations exception. (See § 7923.600, subd. (a).) 

The final category is any drone video footage that does not fall under 

categories one or two. Such footage would consist of using a drone to make a 

factual inquiry to determine what kind of assistance is required, not to 

investigate a suspected violation of law. For example, a 911 call about a 

mountain lion roaming a neighborhood, a water leak, or a stranded motorist 

on the freeway could warrant the use of a drone but do not suggest a crime 

might have been committed or is in the process of being committed. 
19

Here, Castañares claims “much of the drone footage collected for the 

relevant time period did not relate in any way to an investigation.” In other 

words, he argues much of the subject footage would fall under the third 

category we articulated ante. In support of his position, he notes the City 

dispatched drones to investigate brush fires (at least twice), a subject down 

on the ground, and a possible mental subject. Castañares further argues 

drones responding to these incidents did not appear to involve investigations 

into potential violations of the law.11 

The City counters that the examples Castañares provides are, in fact, 

investigatory. Thus, the City notes that a brush fire could be the result of 

arson, a subject down might be a gunshot victim, and mental health checks 

often involve illicit drugs and reported violence.12 Therefore, according to 

the City, all the instances that Castañares asserts are not investigatory 

11 We observe that Castañares has not supported his suggestion that 

“much of the drone footage collected . . . did not relate in any way to an 

investigation.” Although not a precise word in terms of establishing an exact

number, the word “much” means a great amount or quantity of. Here, 

Castañares has provided us with four examples of incidents that he believes 

would not qualify as investigations. There is evidence before us that the 

requested drone video footage for March 2021 consists of videos from about 

370 responses to calls, and Castañares received call logs and AARs related to 

each of those flights. While we do not expect Castañares to create an 

exhaustive list of non-investigatory uses of a drone during March 2021, he 

should be mindful how he represents the record to this court. Even if we 

were to agree with Castañares that the examples he provided could not 

constitute investigations, four out of 370 calls responded to does not begin to 

suggest that a great quantity of the requested videos “did not relate in any 

way to an investigation.” We appreciate zealous advocacy. However, 

hyperbole is not helpful to Castañares’s position. 

12 The City’s argument is well taken. That said, we note that some of the 

AARs use “arson” in the summary column while others use “fire.” No 

explanation is provided for this difference.
20

require, at the outset, a police investigation to evaluate whether a crime was 

committed. 

The City buttresses its argument by emphasizing its “police 

department dispatches drones only to investigate 911 calls, not patrol or 

surveil the City.” Therefore, the City insists that its police force’s response to 

911 calls cannot be considered mere inquiries because “[p]olice respond to 911 

calls to investigate potential crimes, and ‘must take them seriously and 

respond with dispatch.’ ” And the City points us to the declarations of 

Miriam Foxx and Don Redmond in support of its position. 

Foxx, a captain and member of the police department’s command staff, 

declared: 

“Officers treat every call for service, at least initially, as a 

response to investigate . . . whether a potential crime 

occurred or may occur. Of course, that does not mean that 

every call for service results in an officer detecting a crime 

or an arrest, but every call has that potential, and an 

officer cannot rule out a crime or violation of the law 

without first conducting a preliminary investigation.”

Redmond, a retired captain in the City’s police department, stated:

“Simply put, the Department uses drones to investigate 

calls for service, and no more. Moreover, any reasonable 

office[r] treats a call for service as involving a potential 

crime, and investigate[s] them as such until more facts 

become known and prove otherwise.”

Consequently, relying on Foxx’s and Redmond’s declarations, the City argues 

that every response to a 911 call is investigatory.13 

13 We observe that Foxx’s and Redmond’s declarations refer to how a 

reasonable officer would respond to a generic 911 call. Here, such 

generalities are unnecessary and not particularly helpful. There are AARs 

for every drone flight at issue. Thus, each instance can be evaluated to 

determine whether it was investigatory or a factual inquiry.
21

Furthermore, the City argues that Haynie, supra, 26 Cal.4th at 

page 1070 forecloses Castañares’s argument in which he attempts to 

distinguish between the responses to different 911 calls. We disagree with 

the City on this point. In the portion of Haynie the City quotes, our high 

court was explaining the problems with the petitioner’s request for a bright 

line rule that the records of investigations exemption should be defined as to 

exclude investigations that are merely “ ‘routine’ ” or “ ‘everyday police 

activity,’ ” like a traffic stop. (Ibid.) Thus, the court pointed out that “[l]aw 

enforcement officers may not know whether a crime has been committed until 

an investigation of a complaint is undertaken.” (Ibid.) And the court relied 

on examples of a cause of death determination or a suspicious fire in support 

of its explanation. In both instances, the situations considered assumed the 

possibility of a crime committed (e.g., homicide or arson). The court, 

however, was not considering the drone program at issue here or possible 

responses to hundreds of 911 calls.

Moreover, unlike our high court, we are not faced with a situation 

where a petitioner is asking us to craft a bright line rule excluding routine or 

everyday police activities from the records of investigations exemption. 

Instead, we are engaged in a much more modest pursuit. We are simply 

considering the possibility that a drone could be dispatched in response to a 

call to service from the public wherein the use of the drone could not be 

considered investigatory in nature. As discussed ante, we can imagine such 

situations (e.g., potentially dangerous wildlife roaming the neighborhood, a 

stranded motorist, a water leak). Based on these reasonable scenarios and 

the dictate that we broadly construe disclosure under the CPRA (Cal. Const., 

art. I, § 3, subd. (b)(2)) and narrowly construe exemptions (ACLU 

Foundation, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 1042), we conclude, based on the record 
22

before us, the trial court’s broad ruling that all drone video footage, as a 

matter of law, is categorically exempt because the drones are only dispatched 

in response to 911 calls was error.

Instead of adopting such an all-encompassing rule, we conclude a more 

nuanced approach to the drone video footage is apt. The drone video footage 

should not be treated as a monolith, but rather, it can be divided into 

separate parts corresponding to each specific call. Then each distinct video 

can be evaluated under the CPRA in relation to the call triggering the drone 

dispatch. Further, as an initial determination, the City is well equipped to 

categorize the drone video footage in this manner. However, we do not 

propose to instruct the City regarding what process it must use to evaluate 

the drone video footage or suggest that a City designee must watch the 

footage to make the necessary determinations. Indeed, it could be more 

efficient for the City to simply review call logs, AARs, and other related 

information to ascertain what drone video footage falls into the three 

categories. After the City categorizes the drone video footage, Castañares

then should be permitted the opportunity to challenge or otherwise question

any of the determinations the City made. To the extent the parties disagree 

on the categorization of the drone video footage, we trust the trial court to 

resolve those issues of disputed fact consistent with Haynie, supra, 26 Cal.4th 

1061; ACLU Foundation, supra, 3 Cal.5th 1032; and this opinion. We offer 

no opinion regarding which subject videos fall into any of the three categories 

discussed ante.

E. The Catchall Provision

The second issue before us is whether drone video footage that is not 

exempt under section 7923.600, subdivision (a) may nonetheless be withheld 

pursuant to the catchall exemption set forth in the CPRA. This exemption, 
23

codified in section 7922.000, permits a public agency to withhold a public 

record under the CPRA if the agency demonstrates “that on the facts of the 

particular case the public interest served by not disclosing the record clearly 

outweighs the public interest served by disclosure of the record.” 

(§ 7922.000.) The catchall exemption “ ‘contemplates a case-by-case 

balancing process, with the burden of proof on the proponent of nondisclosure 

to demonstrate a clear overbalance on the side of confidentiality.’ ” (ACLU

Foundation, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 1043.) “Whether such an overbalance 

exists may depend on a wide variety of considerations, including privacy . . . ; 

public safety . . . ; and the ‘expense and inconvenience involved in segregating 

nonexempt from exempt information.’ . . . In balancing the interests for and 

against disclosure, we review the public interest factors de novo but accept 

the trial court’s factual findings as long as substantial evidence supports 

them.” (Ibid.) “As the party seeking to withhold the record, the [City] bears 

the burden of justifying nondisclosure.” (County of Santa Clara v. Superior 

Court (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1301, 1329.)

Below, the trial court concluded, as a separate reason for ruling in favor 

of the City, that Castañares’s CPRA request, “as framed by petitioner and as 

‘tempered’ by petitioner’s redaction suggestion, seeks to impose an 

unreasonable burden on the City’s resources with no substantial 

countervailing benefit given the wealth of information already turned over by 

the City to petitioner.” To make this finding, the trial court compared the 

burden associated with the redactions of the drone video footage coupled with 

the privacy concerns of turning over the videos to a third party, as well as the 

abundance of information the City supplied in response to Castañares’s 

CPRA request, to determine the catchall provision of the CPRA supported the 

City’s decision not to turn over the drone video footage. The City argues the 
24

trial court’s findings are supported by substantial evidence; thus, we must 

accept those findings. (See ACLU Foundation, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 1043 

[“In balancing the interests for and against disclosure, we review the public 

interest factors de novo but accept the trial court’s factual findings as long as 

substantial evidence supports them”].)

Below, the City offered the declaration of Shannel Honoré, the police 

support services manager for the City’s police department. Honoré explained

that it takes a digital technician on average about an hour to redact three 

minutes of video footage, resulting in a ratio of 20 hours of redaction time to 

one hour of video. However, Honoré opined that the 20:1 ratio 

underestimates the actual time, and a 30:1 ratio would be more appropriate. 

She then pointed out that Castañares’s CPRA request for all drone video 

footage from March 2021 encompasses 537 pieces of “digital evidence (videos), 

or 91 hours, 39 minutes, and 52 seconds of total drone footage.” 

Consequently, applying the 20:1 ratio to the amount of video footage, Honoré 

declared that it would take 1833.3 hours or 229.2 workdays to simply review 

and redact the footage without the additional legal review, research, and 

quality control that would be necessary to evaluate privacy, safety, and legal 

concerns. 

This need to redact the drone video footage is compelled by privacy 

concerns. As the trial court correctly noted, our state constitution expressly 

grants all Californians the right of privacy. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 1.) And

here, we agree that the drone video footage implicates serious privacy 

concerns. It is undisputed that when a drone is dispatched, its video camera 

is turned on and is recording. As the drones travel en route to the various 

scenes, it logically follows that they would, from time to time, travel over and 

film private backyards, perhaps capturing pool parties, barbeques, 
25

sunbathing, or other activities that are intended to be private. (Cf. Dean v. 

Superior Court (1973) 35 Cal.App.3d 112, 117 [“One who builds a swimming 

pool and sunbathing area in his backyard expects privacy . . . from aerial 

inspection”].) Additionally, a drone may record the face of a bystander or 

otherwise film some event where its participants had an expectation of 

privacy or would not want a third party, like Castañares, to see and possess a 

video of them. Thus, the need to carefully review and redact the drone video 

footage is well supported. (Cf. Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn.

(1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 24 [“The privacy tort seeks to vindicate multiple and 

different interests that range from freedom to act without observation in a 

home, hospital room, or other private place to the ability to control the 

commercial exploitation of a name or picture”].)

In addition, the City maintains that it produced a myriad of 

information in response to Castañares’s CPRA request. The record 

substantiates this assertion. Among other documents, Castañares received 

anonymized flight telemetry for every drone flight in March 2021, which 

included the date and time of the flight, a case/incident number, location, and 

summary of the reason for dispatching the drone. He also received AARs, 

which corresponded to case/incident numbers and provided more detail about 

the reason a particular drone was dispatched.14 Additionally, the City 

produced documents about operating the drones, the drone program in 

general, and City meeting minutes.

14 For example, a drone was dispatched on March 27, 2021 at 2:30 p.m. in 

response to a call about a person down. The corresponding AAR states: “Call 

heard via Live911 regarding an elderly male who fell down and appeared to 

need help. [The drone] was on scene prior to units and CVFD [Chula Vista 

Fire Department] was already on scene tending to the subject. Units were 

advised.” 
26

In mounting his substantial evidence challenge, Castañares’s primary 

argument is that no one (neither the City nor the trial court) actually 

reviewed any of the subject drone video footage. Thus, he characterizes the 

City’s claim regarding the length of the video footage as an estimate15 and 

the time needed to review and redact as an assumption. He then asserts,

“[t]here is nothing in the record to support that review of the drone footage is 

one-to-one and could not occur more quickly.” To this end, without citation to 

any evidence in the record, he claims the video footage might be able to be 

reviewed at two or three times normal speed and concludes, “[r]eviewing 

digital material at a fast clip is commonplace and analogous to reviewing a 

paper document by quickly scanning its contents for exempt material, verses 

reading each and every word on each page.” 

Despite the lack of any evidence to support Castañares’s bald 

assertions, the fact that the City’s primary argument concerns its burden of 

reviewing and redacting drone video footage it has not seen gives us pause. 

Nonetheless, we conclude that the parties’ respective arguments here are off 

the mark. Both sides assume that the catchall provision of the CPRA needs 

to be applied to the entire drone video footage at issue. That assumption is 

incorrect. Because of the application of the records of investigations 

exemption to the drone video footage, the catchall provision does not and 

should not be applied to all 91 hours, 39 minutes, and 52 seconds of footage.

As we discussed ante, the investigation of records exemption 

(§ 7923.600, subd. (a)) applies to at least two of the three categories of drone 

video footage— footage that is part of an investigatory file and investigations. 

15 Although the City does not refute Castañares’s accusation that it did 

not watch any of the subject drone videos, the City invites us to “verify [its] 

calculation” of the length of video footage by reviewing the videos it lodged 

with the trial court under seal. We decline the City’s invitation.
27

Video footage falling under either of those two categories is exempt from 

disclosure. Therefore, the catchall provision of the CPRA need only be 

applied to the videos that fall into the third category—factual inquiries. 

However, on the record before us, we do not know what portion of the total 

drone video footage corresponds to the non-exempt inquiries. Accordingly, 

even if we were to accept the City’s evidence regarding the amount of time it 

would take to review and redact the video footage, we cannot evaluate the 

related burden without knowing the amount of footage in need of redaction.

Although the City’s burden of disclosure (here, primarily review and 

redaction time) is not the only factor we consider in analyzing the 

applicability of the catchall provision, it is central to the City’s argument. 

And because of the importance the City places on that factor and the lack of 

the development of the record allowing us to evaluate it, we must conclude 

that the City did not carry its burden in showing the catchall provision 

applies here.

F. Conclusion

In summary, we conclude the trial court erred in determining, on the 

record before it, that all drone video footage was exempt from disclosure 

under the CPRA. In addition, we find that the City did not carry its burden 

to show that the CPRA’s catchall provision supports its decision not to 

disclose the requested drone video footage. Therefore, we remand this matter 

back to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

Specifically, we suggest that the trial court ask the City to separate the 

requested drone video footage into three categories: (1) part of an 

investigatory file, (2) an investigation into whether a law has been broken

absent any investigatory file; and (3) a factual inquiry. The first two 

categories are exempt from disclosure under section 7923.600, 
28

subdivision (a).16 The third category is not. For the footage that falls under 

the third category, the City may then offer arguments as to why the catchall 

provision applies.17 Regarding the catchall provision analysis, we note that 

it might be sensible for the City to at least review a sampling of the 

remaining videos so it can more accurately represent the burden of redacting 

such videos and the privacy rights implicated in disclosing them to 

Castañares. We offer no opinion regarding what portion of the subject drone 

video footage is covered by the records of investigations exemption 

(§ 7923.600, subd. (a)) or whether the catchall provision (§ 7922.000) applies 

to any non-exempt footage. 

16 As we discussed ante, the trial court may resolve any disputes 

regarding the characterization of the drone video footage. 

17 Although not articulated in the petition here, we are aware that, at 

some point below, Castañares claimed that he might be entitled to portions of 

drone video footage that would be considered investigatory as long as that 

video footage does not actually depict the alleged crime being investigated 

(i.e., the video footage of the drone traveling to and from the investigation 

scene). We offer no opinion regarding whether such portions of the drone 

video footage should be disclosed under the CPRA. Nonetheless, on remand, 

if Castañares makes such an argument and persuades the trial court he is 

correct, then the City should be permitted to argue that the catchall provision 

applies to those videos as well.
29

DISPOSITION

We grant, in part, the relief requested in the petition for extraordinary 

relief. We thus remand this matter to the superior court with instructions to 

vacate the April 10, 2023 minute order and to conduct further proceedings 

consistent with this opinion. We grant none of the other requested relief.

Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.493(a)(1)(B), the parties shall 

bear their own costs in this proceeding.

HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

DATO, J.

DO, J.