Filed 8/15/23 In re Nathen R. CA2/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re NATHEN R. et al., Persons

Coming Under the Juvenile Court 

Law.

 B325066

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No.

 20CCJP04635A-C)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

M.R. et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles 

County. Lisa A. Brackelmanns, Judge Pro Tempore. Affirmed.

Lori Siegel, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Defendant and Appellant M.R.
2

Donna Balderston Kaiser, under appointment by the Court 

of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant A.B.

David Michael Miller, Deputy County Counsel; Tarkian & 

Associates and Arezoo Pichvai for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_________________________

M.R. (mother) and A.B. (father) appeal from the juvenile 

court’s orders terminating their parental rights over Nathen R. 

(Nathen, born June 2012), Darlene B. (Darlene, born Dec. 2017) 

and Leilanee B. (Leilanee, born Oct. 2019).

1 (Welf. & Inst. Code, 

§ 366.26.)

2 Both parents argue that the juvenile court erred 

when it found that the beneficial parental exception to the 

termination of parental rights (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)) did not 

apply. In addition, father contends that the trial court erred in 

denying his request for a bonding study.

We affirm.

1 Father is Darlene and Leilanee’s father; Nathen’s father, 

K.R., is deceased. Thus, while mother is challenging the 

termination of her parental rights as to all three children, 

father’s appeal only concerns Darlene and Leilanee.

2 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and

Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
3

FACTUAL3 AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Referral and investigation

On July 19, 2020, the Los Angeles County Department of

Children and Family Services (DCFS) received a referral alleging 

general neglect of the three children by mother and father. 

According to the referral, on July 18, 2020, mother, father, and 

the children attended a family gathering at the maternal 

grandparents’ home. Father became intoxicated and attempted 

to drive the car. Mother pulled father out of the driver’s seat, and 

he punched mother’s face twice. The children were present 

during the incident. Mother’s family called the police, and father 

was arrested for domestic battery. Mother refused to file for a 

restraining order.

Initial interview with mother

On July 28, 2020, the investigating social worker visited

the family home. Mother stated that the children were not 

present during the incident and did not see what occurred. She 

reported that father had been intoxicated to the point where he 

did not recognize her. When father hit her, she screamed, and 

her family came out of the house and called the police. Mother 

denied that the children were exposed to any form of domestic 

violence. She admitted to using marijuana.

Interview with Nathen and paternal relatives

On July 30, 2020, the social worker interviewed Nathen,

his paternal grandmother, and his paternal uncle, Byron R.

(Byron). Byron reported that from the time Nathen’s father 

passed away, Nathen stayed with him and the paternal 

3 Because mother and father’s appeals focus on the parentalbenefit exception to the termination of parental rights, we largely 

limit our summary of the facts to those that pertain to that issue.
4

grandmother, who lived at the same residence, every weekend, 

and since the inception of the COVID-19 pandemic, Nathen lived 

with them.

Section 300 petition and detention (Sept. 3 & 8, 2020)

On September 3, 2020, DCFS filed a petition pursuant to 

section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b), on behalf of the three 

children. The petition alleged that mother and father had a 

history of domestic violence and substance abuse, and that both 

parents were current users of drugs or alcohol.

The juvenile court detained the children4 and granted the 

parents monitored visits.

Jurisdiction/disposition report (Jan. 11, 2021)

On December 28, 2020, Nathen reported that he liked 

living with his paternal relatives and had called Byron “‘daddy’” 

since he was a baby. Nathen missed mother, but “‘when it was 

just her and my sisters. With nobody else. Just me and her and 

my sisters. I really miss them.’”

Nathen was scheduled to have visits with mother three 

days a week. Byron reported that mother was inconsistent in 

visiting the child and only participated in the visits “‘less than 

50% of the time.’” The previous week, mother did not attend any 

of the visits, and the week before that, she only attended one 

visit.

Guadalupe reported that mother and father each had three 

visits a week and did not visit the girls together. She did not 

have any concerns regarding their interactions with the children 

and stated, “‘The little girls really do like them.’” Mother and 

4 Nathen was placed with Byron. Darlene and Leilanee were 

placed with Guadalupe R. (Guadalupe), mother’s cousin.
5

father’s visits were not consistent. They did not visit the children 

during that week and had visited only one time the week before.

Adjudication hearing (Jan. 11, 2021)

On January 11, 2021, the juvenile court sustained the 

section 300 petition and declared the children dependents of the 

court. It granted mother and father family reunification services 

and monitored visits six hours a week.

Status review report (July 12, 2021)

DCFS reported that the children had adjusted well to the 

homes of their caregivers.

Byron and Guadalupe reported that mother and father 

were inconsistent in visiting the children. Sometimes the parents 

did not call or visit; other times, the visits were short and the 

parents were not engaged (although father was more engaged 

with the children than mother).

Six-month review hearing (Aug. 10, 2021)

The juvenile court found that the parents had partially 

complied with the case plan, and ordered family reunification 

services to continue.

Status review report (Nov. 8, 2021)

Byron reported that mother continued to cancel one or two 

visits a week. When she did visit Nathen, she attended the visit 

for a little over an hour. Nathen became emotionally affected 

when mother failed to show up for the scheduled visits. Byron

reported that two weeks prior, mother canceled a visit with 

Nathen because her sister bought her a ticket to go to an 

amusement park. Byron opined that mother did not make the 

visits with Nathen a priority.

Guadalupe reported that mother was visiting Darlene and 

Leilanee more often, although her visits continued to be short in 
6

duration. Father also had been more consistent with his visits 

and continued to engage well with the girls. In October 2021, 

mother and father paid for Leilanee’s birthday celebration at 

Chuck E. Cheese restaurant.

Guadalupe stated she was afraid to report things to the

social worker because she received backlash from her family.

The maternal grandmother told Guadalupe that her reports to 

the social worker were the reason mother was not getting the

children back. Father was also upset with Guadalupe and told 

her that she “‘shouldn’t be reporting things to [the social worker] 

of what mother does or doesn’t do during visits with the girls 

because she is family and you don’t go against family.’”

Last minute information for the court (Jan. 19, 2022)

Guadalupe reported that mother again was inconsistent

with her visits with Darlene and Leilanee. She would have 

virtual visits with the girls sporadically for five minutes or less. 

Father had visited Darlene and Leilanee eight times a month.

12-month review hearing (§ 366.21, subd. (f); Feb. 1, 2022)

The juvenile court found that mother’s and father’s 

participation with the case plan had not been substantial, and 

terminated family reunification services.

Section 366.26 report and addendum report (May 31, 2022)

On March 17, 2022, the social worker learned that father

had been under the influence of a substance and got into a car 

accident. Mother reported that she was without a car and thus 

had to cancel visits with the children. Father participated in 

virtual visits during that time.

DCFS reported that Byron and paternal grandmother 

wished to provide a permanent home for Nathen through

adoption. The social worker observed Nathen to be comfortable 
7

and happy in his caregivers’ home. Nathen reported, “‘Daddy 

takes good care of me, and feeds me.’” He added, “‘Mamita does a 

very good job taking care of me.’”

Guadalupe was interested in adopting Darlene and 

Leilanee because she and her family loved them. The social 

worker observed the children to be comfortable in Guadalupe’s 

home.

On May 16, 2022, Guadalupe reported that during the last 

week, mother only visited Darlene and Leilanee one time, on 

May 12, 2022. Father had visited the children twice a week.

Byron reported that during mother’s in-person and 

telephone visits, Nathen suffered because mother asked closedended questions and did not keep the conversation going. Byron

stated, “Nathen sometimes becomes upset when mother tells him 

[she] has visited his sisters because it is a reminder to him 

(Nathen) that she is able to make time and visit them but not 

him.”

Status review report (Aug. 8, 2022)

On June 23, 2022, Guadalupe reported that mother had 

visited Darlene and Leilanee only once that week. When 

Guadalupe told mother that she should visit the girls more often, 

mother responded that Guadalupe should stop telling the social 

worker that she (mother) was not visiting the children, and 

instead, to tell the social worker mother did visit them.

Father visited the children twice that week.

On July 7, 2022, Nathen reported that during a visit with 

mother on July 5, 2022, she stated that she had not visited 

Darlene and Leilanee for three weeks. Byron reported that 

mother continued to ask Nathen a few questions and then began 
8

to talk about herself. Mother also did not take initiative during 

the visits.

Permanency planning hearing (Aug. 8, 2022)

The juvenile court continued the section 366.26 hearing 

and ordered DCFS to file a report addressing the quality and

frequency of mother’s and father’s visits with the children.

Last minute information for the court (Aug. 25, 2022)

As of August 8, 2022, mother had had virtual and telephone 

visits with Nathen. She was to resume in-person visits on 

August 25, 2022. She expected to visit Nathen three days a week 

for three hours each visit. Mother visited Darlene and Leilanee

on August 18 and August 19, 2022, for approximately one hour. 

Mother sat with the children during the visit but did not really 

engage with them.

Guadalupe reported that father visited Darlene and

Leilanee two times a week for approximately one hour. He

brought the children food and engaged in play with them.

Permanency planning hearing (Aug. 31, 2022)

On August 31, 2022, the juvenile court continued the 

section 366.26 hearing and ordered DCFS to prepare a report 

addressing mother’s and father’s visits with the children.

Last minute information for the court (Sept. 23, 2022)

On September 15, 2022, Byron reported that mother 

missed visits with Nathen on September 13 and September 14,

2022, because she had a toothache. On September 16, 2022, 

mother visited Nathen, and the visit went well. During the week 

of September 19, 2022, mother visited Nathen three times for 

one-and-a-half hours. Mother brought board games to visits and 

watched movies with the child.
9

On September 22, 2022, Guadalupe reported that mother

and father were visiting Darlene and Leilanee more often. 

Father had visited the children three times a week for one-and-ahalf hours. During the visits, he would engage in play and take 

the girls and Guadalupe to a liquor store to purchase snacks for 

them. Mother missed visits with the children on September 16 

and September 21, 2022, because she was having pain from 

kidney stones. Mother did not attend all three visits a week. She 

visited Darlene and Leilanee two days a week. During one visit 

with the children, mother brought Darlene a bicycle, but did not 

bring anything for Leilanee. Mother engaged more with the 

children during the recent visits, but still did not assist with 

bathing or cooking.

Permanency planning hearing (Oct. 4, 2022)

Byron’s testimony

Nathen had lived with Byron for two years and he wished 

to adopt the child. He wanted Nathen to have a relationship with 

Darlene and Leilanee.

Mother visited Nathen in his home. Nathen enjoyed the 

visits, had a bond with mother, and called her “mommy.” When 

asked how often mother visited Nathen in September 2022, 

Byron stated, “[T]he visits last about an hour, maybe two hours. 

And the month specifically of September, she has been on top of 

her visits. So she’s gone all three days. But there is a lot of 

inconsistency from visits.” During the visits, mother and Nathen 

played board games, watched television, or played outside. She

did not help Nathen with homework and rarely brought him food. 

Nathen was disappointed when mother missed visits. When 

mother missed visits with Nathen, they spoke telephonically, but 

the communication was very short.
10

Guadalupe’s testimony

Guadalupe testified the siblings had regular visits, and if 

they could not have a visit, Guadalupe and Byron would schedule 

a makeup visit.

Father requests a bonding study

Father’s counsel requested that the juvenile court order a 

bonding study for father and the girls, arguing the information as 

to the quality of father’s visits in the last minute information for 

the court reports had been from Guadalupe and not from the 

social worker’s own observations. The juvenile court denied 

father’s request, stating: “I’m not going to order a bonding study 

at this time, but you certainly can make whatever argument 

you’re going to make at the [section 366.26] hearing.”

Continuance of the section 366.26 hearing

The juvenile court ordered DCFS to “[p]rovide a detailed 

update as to the status of sibling visits, Mother’s visits, the 

quality of Father’s visits and consortium issues.” The hearing 

was continued.

Last minute information for the court (Oct. 25, 2022)

On October 14, 2022, Guadalupe and Byron signed a sibling 

contact agreement. Guadalupe also signed a contact agreement 

for visits between the girls and mother.

On October 18, 2022, Guadalupe informed the social

worker that mother told their family that she was going to lose 

her children because of everything Guadalupe reported to DCFS. 

Furthermore, during the last visit, father threatened to sue 

Guadalupe and DCFS if his parental rights were terminated. 

Father told Guadalupe that she should not have said anything 

against her family. Guadalupe did not want to give up on the 
11

girls because she loved them, but mother and father were being 

very difficult with her.

On October 25, 2022, Guadalupe reported that she was

“exhausted from the treatment she continue[d] to receive from

the parents, including extended family members . . . . However, 

she remain[ed] committed in moving forward with the plan of 

adoption, as she [was] invested in the girls having a stable and 

loving home.”

Last minute information report (Oct. 25, 2022)

DCFS detailed mother’s and father’s visits with the 

children during October 2022.

Father’s visits with Darlene and Leilanee

On October 5, 2022, father visited Darlene and Leilanee, 

and they played outside with their toys. On October 6, 2022, 

father visited the girls, brought them cheese pizza, played with 

them, and took them to the store for snacks. On October 7, 2022, 

father brought the girls food. On October 12, 2022, father visited

Darlene and Leilanee and again brought food for the girls. On 

October 13, 2022, father did not show up for the visit or call to 

cancel. On October 14, 2022, father did not show up for the visit 

with the girls. On October 19, 2022, father participated in a visit 

with the children.

Mother’s visits with Nathen

Mother failed to show up for the visit on October 4, 2022, 

despite texting Byron to see if the visit was going to take place. 

On October 5, 2022, mother contacted Byron and reported that 

she had a cough and was congested; she did not attend the visit 

that day. On October 6, 2022, mother did not attend the visit 

because she continued to be sick. On October 11 and 12, 2022, 

mother resumed in-person visits with Nathen, and the visits 
12

went well. On October 13, 2022, mother cancelled the visit with 

Nathen stating she had to work. On October 18, 2022, mother 

attended a visit with Nathen. Mother and Nathen played and 

watched television. While they were watching television, mother 

asked Nathen to sit closer to her, and when Nathen said, “‘No,’” 

mother responded, “‘You’re still my kid! You need to sit next to 

me!’” Byron said that mother made Nathen uncomfortable and 

did not respect his space. On October 19, 2022, mother cancelled 

the visit. On October 20, 2022, mother attended the visit and 

played with the child.

Mother’s visits with Darlene and Leilanee

Mother failed to attend the visits on October 5, 6, and 7, 

2022, because she was sick. On October 12, 2022, mother did not 

attend the visit or call to cancel. On October 13, 2022, mother

attended the visit and played with the children. During a visit on 

October 14, 2022, mother brought food for them to eat On 

October 19, 2022, mother did not show up to the visit or call to 

cancel. On October 20, 2022, mother visited the children, and the 

visit went well.

Continued section 366.26 hearing (Oct. 26, 2022)

Guadalupe’s testimony

Guadalupe testified that mother visited Darlene and 

Leilanee at her home one or two times a week. Mother was

bonded with the children “80 percent of the time,” and spent the 

other 20 percent talking to the family members that were at the 

visit. The children called mother, “Mommy,” and they enjoyed 

visits with her. Mother played with the children, and in the two 

years the children lived with Guadalupe, mother had fed them

three or four times. Mother sometimes changed their diapers or 

underwear.
13

She did not know that if she adopted Darlene and Leilanee, 

parental rights would be terminated. She stated, “Well, they 

kind of explained it to me at the beginning when they barely 

started for the adoption, but other than that, that’s been it.” 

When asked if she was considering legal guardianship or 

adoption, Guadalupe responded, “Whatever is best for the girls.”

When asked what she thought was best for Darlene and Leilanee,

Guadalupe stated, “I would want my cousin to get her kids back, 

and I been talking to her about that. So if it—if the court’s gonna

give them back to her or thinking about it, I would be the legal 

guardianship.”

Father visited the girls two days a week. Darlene and 

Leilanee were excited to see him, they loved him, and they called 

him, “Daddy.” Guadalupe testified: “Dad is a little bit more 

engaged with the girls. He does play with them more, takes them 

food sometimes.” Darlene and Leilanee stated that they missed 

their parents, but they did not request to go home with father. 

Guadalupe opined that father should have the opportunity to be 

reunited with the children. Once Guadalupe adopted Darlene 

and Leilanee, she would allow father to continue visiting them.

When asked if she felt pressure from mother to pursue 

legal guardianship over adoption, Guadalupe stated: “[A] little 

bit. But I understand her as a mother that she wants her kids 

back, and I—that’s the first thing I did, get her daughters to help 

her out. So I’m still here trying to help her.” Guadalupe testified 

the children lived with her for two years and did well in her care. 

Further, if she did adopt Darlene and Leilanee, Guadalupe would 

ensure that mother and father continued to have visits with 

them.
14

Father’s testimony

Father testified that he visited Darlene and Leilanee two

times a week for two hours, but he did his best to visit them three 

times a week. The girls called him “dad” and were always excited 

to see him. They would jump around and say, “Daddy’s home” or 

“Daddy’s here.” Father had a bond with Darlene and Leilanee. 

During visits, he brought them food, asked them about their 

days, and played with them. The girls said they wanted to go 

home with him on multiple occasions. Father testified that the 

social worker had never observed his visits with the children 

because he would visit after hours.

Court order

At the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court noted 

that it was unclear whether Guadalupe wished to care for the 

children under a plan of adoption or legal guardianship. Thus, it 

ordered DCFS to reinterview Guadalupe.

The hearing was continued.

Addendum report (Nov. 15, 2022)

On November 3, 2022, Guadalupe reported she was still

being harassed by mother and father to change the permanent 

plan from adoption to legal guardianship. Despite pressure from 

mother and father, Guadalupe indicated that her preference was 

to adopt Darlene and Leilanee, but if she could not adopt them, 

she was willing to proceed with legal guardianship.

Continued section 366.26 hearing (Nov. 15, 2022)

DCFS’s and the children’s counsel requested that the 

juvenile court terminate parental rights. The children’s attorney

argued that mother’s visits with Nathen were inconsistent. 

Further, while Nathen was bonded with mother, “the stability 

that Nathen has found with the person that he calls ‘daddy’ is 
15

one that warrants the legal recognition of that, and that that 

permanency does outweigh the relationship that he does have 

with his mother.”

Mother’s visits with Darlene and Leilanee were equally 

inconsistent. Counsel stated that the girls had “just become 

bonded with [Guadalupe] in a parental sort of way at the 

beginning of the case. But they have been there for a great deal 

of time.”

Mother’s and father’s attorneys requested that the juvenile

court find the exception to termination of parental rights under 

section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i), applied.

Thereafter, the juvenile court issued its ruling. It first 

noted, “These cases are extremely difficult, and I do want to 

acknowledge that the parents of these children—the mother 

. . . and, the father . . . —clearly love these children. However, 

the court has to follow the law and . . . go through the various 

prongs of [In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614 (Caden C.).]”

The juvenile court continued, acknowledging that the 

children’s relatives had “stepped up to the plate [and] have been 

caring for these children for over two years.” Regarding the 

parents’ visitation, the juvenile court found that mother’s and 

father’s visits with the children continued to be monitored and 

while at times, they were consistent, “overall, during the 

pendency of this case, they have not.”

The juvenile court then stated that there was a “substantial 

positive bond between the children and their parents, but, as 

noted—and I’m fully adopting the arguments of [the children’s 

trial counsel]—the benefit accruing to the children from their 

relationship with the parents is outweighed by the physical and 

emotional benefit the children will receive through the 
16

permanency and stability of adoption with Nathen with his 

caregiver, the paternal uncle, who has stepped in as a fatherfigure for him since the passing of his biological father; and, for 

the girls, [with] their caregivers is outweighed by the physical 

and emotional benefit the children will receive through the 

permanency and stability of adoption, and that adoption is in the 

best interest of these children.”

The juvenile court found that it was detrimental to the 

children to be returned to the parents and no exception to 

adoption applied. It then terminated mother’s and father’s 

parental rights.

Appeals

Mother and father’s timely appeals ensued.

DISCUSSION

Both mother and father argue that the juvenile court erred 

in finding that the parental-benefit exception to adoption did not 

apply. As part of his argument, father asserts that the juvenile

court erred in denying his request for a bonding study.

I. Termination of parental rights

A. Relevant law and standards of review

Once the juvenile court terminates family reunification 

services, “the focus [of the proceedings] shifts to the needs of the 

child[ren] for permanency and stability.” (In re Celine R. (2003) 

31 Cal.4th 45, 52.) Under subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) of section 

366.26, if the juvenile court finds the children adoptable, it shall 

order a plan of adoption unless there is a compelling reason such 

as when the parents show that they “have maintained regular 

visitation and contact with the child[ren] and the child[ren] 

would benefit from continuing the relationship.” (§ 366.26, subd. 

(c)(1)(B)(i).)
17

To establish this exception, the parent must prove the 

following three elements: “(1) regular visitation and contact, and 

(2) a relationship, the continuation of which would benefit the 

child such that (3) the termination of parental rights would be

detrimental to the child.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 631.) 

The burden is on the parents to prove that termination of 

parental rights would be detrimental to the children. (In re 

Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1351, overruled in part 

on other grounds in Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 636, fn. 5; 

In re Derek W. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 823, 826–827; In re 

Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1343–1345.)

“[I]n assessing whether termination would be detrimental, 

the trial court must decide whether the harm from severing the 

child’s relationship with the parent outweighs the benefit to the 

child of placement in a new adoptive home. [Citation.] By

making this decision, the trial court determines whether 

terminating parental rights serves the child’s best interests.”

(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) “‘If severing the natural 

parent/child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, 

positive emotional attachment such that,’ even considering the 

benefits of a new adoptive home, termination would ‘harm[]’ the 

child, the court should not terminate parental rights.” (Id. at 

p. 633.) The “‘statutory exceptions merely permit the court, in 

exceptional circumstances [citation], to choose an option other 

than the norm, which remains adoption.’” (Caden C., at p. 631.)

When reviewing an order terminating parental rights and 

rejecting application of the beneficial parental relationship 

exception, we apply a hybrid standard of review. On the one 

hand, “[a] substantial evidence standard of review applies to the 

first two elements [of the exception]. The determination that the 
18

parent has visited and maintained contact with the child 

‘consistently,’ taking into account ‘the extent permitted by the 

court’s orders’ [citation] is essentially a factual determination.

It’s likewise essentially a factual determination whether the 

relationship is such that the child would benefit from continuing 

it.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 639–640.)

On the other hand, the juvenile court’s determination on 

the third element is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. As to the 

third element, the juvenile court “makes the assessment by 

weighing the harm of losing the [parent-child] relationship 

against the benefits of placement in a new, adoptive home. And 

so, the ultimate decision—whether termination of parental rights 

would be detrimental to the child due to the child’s relationship 

with his parent—is discretionary and properly reviewed for abuse 

of discretion.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 640.)

“In reviewing factual determinations for substantial 

evidence, a reviewing court should ‘not reweigh the evidence, 

evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or resolve evidentiary 

conflicts.’ [Citation.] The determinations should ‘be upheld if 

. . . supported by substantial evidence, even though substantial 

evidence to the contrary also exists and the trial court might have 

reached a different result had it believed other evidence.’”

(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 640.) “Review for abuse of 

discretion is subtly different, focused not primarily on the 

evidence but the application of a legal standard. A court abuses 

its discretion only when ‘“‘the trial court has exceeded the limits 

of legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently 

absurd determination.’”’ [Citation.] But ‘“‘[w]hen two or more 

inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the 
19

reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for 

that of the trial court.’”’” (Caden C., at p. 641.)

“At its core,” this hybrid standard of review “embodies the 

principle that ‘[t]he statutory scheme does not authorize a 

reviewing court to substitute its own judgment as to what is in

the child’s best interests for the trial court’s determination in 

that regard, reached pursuant to the statutory scheme’s 

comprehensive and controlling provisions.’” (Caden C., supra, 

11 Cal.5th at p. 641.

B. Analysis

Applying these legal principles, we conclude that the 

juvenile court did not err when it found that the parental-benefit 

exception did not apply.

1. Inconsistent visits

With respect to the first prong of the section 366.26,

subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i), test, ample evidence supports the juvenile

court’s finding that mother’s and father’s visits were not 

consistent. At the detention hearing on September 8, 2020, the 

juvenile court granted mother and father monitored visits nine 

hours a week. At the inception of the case, Byron reported that

mother was inconsistent in visiting Nathen and only participated 

in half of the visits. Guadalupe also reported that mother and

father were not consistent in visiting the children.

Months later, in June and July 2021, mother and father

continued to visit the children inconsistently. Byron reported 

mother would either cancel her visits or attend them

“sporadic[ally].” She sent text messages to him stating she was 

not going to attend the visits because she did not feel well, or she 

had to attend her classes. Byron opined that mother did not treat 
20

her visits with Nathen as a priority because she cancelled a visit 

with the child to go to an amusement park with her sister.

Guadalupe also reported that mother and father were

inconsistent in their visits with Darlene and Leilanee. Father

did not visit the girls in May or June 2021. He attended visits on 

July 28 and July 30, 2021, but he only stayed for approximately 

one hour and 10 minutes.

By October 2021, mother and father were attending visits 

with Darlene and Leilanee more frequently. However, by 

January 2022, mother’s visits again were inconsistent.

The parents’ inconsistency with visits continued into 2022. 

Mother either cancelled or missed visits with all three children in 

September and October 2022.

In October 2022, father also missed visits with his 

daughters.

At the section 366.26 hearing, Guadalupe testified that 

mother visited Darlene and Leilanee one or two times a week, 

and father visited the children two days a week. Father testified 

he visited Darlene and Leilanee two times a week for two hours 

but did his best to visit them three times a week.

Taken together, this evidence shows, as the juvenile court

found, that the parents’ visits were inconsistent. While father’s 

visits with Darlene and Leilanee were more consistent than 

mother’s, he also missed visits, and when he did attend the visits 

with the children, he did not stay for the entire allowed time. 

Periods of consistency simply are not enough. (See In re C.F.

(2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 549, 554 [“Sporadic visitation is

insufficient to satisfy the first prong of the parent-child 

relationship exception to adoption”]; see also In re J.C. (2014) 

226 Cal.App.4th 503, 531 [regular visitation prong not present 
21

when there were significant lapses in visitation]; In re I.R. (2014) 

226 Cal.App.4th 201, 212 [significant lapses in visitation fatally

undermines any attempt to finding beneficial relationship 

exception].)

Urging us to reverse, the parents argue that because the 

juvenile court found that there was a bond between the children 

and their parents, it could not find the parents’ visits 

inconsistent. There are at least two problems with this 

argument. First, the parents offer no legal authority in support 

of this proposition.5 (Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 

149 Cal.App.4th 836, 852.) Second, based upon the evidence 

presented, the juvenile court properly determined that these two 

factors were not mutually exclusive.

2. Benefit from continuing the relationship

As to the second requirement of whether the parents and

children had such a relationship that the children would benefit 

from continuing it,6 we must focus on the children. (Caden C., 

supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) “And the relationship may be 

5 Father’s reliance upon In re Aurora P. (2015) 

241 Cal.App.4th 1142, 1163, is misplaced. In that case, the Court 

of Appeal considered “a novel question regarding which party 

bore the burden of proof at the section 364 review hearing.” (In 

re Aurora P., supra, at p. 1153.) Likewise, mother’s argument 

notwithstanding, nothing in Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at page 

632 supports the parents’ proposition.

6 In discussing this second prong, our Supreme Court noted

that expert observations, such as through a bonding report, can 

be “an important source of information about the psychological 

importance of the relationship for the child[ren].” (Caden C., 

supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 633.)
22

shaped by a slew of factors, such as ‘[t]he age of the child[ren], 

the portion of the child[ren’s] life spent in the parent’s custody, 

the “positive” or “negative” effect of interaction between parent 

and child[ren], and the child[ren’s] particular needs.’ [Citation.]” 

(Caden C., supra, at p. 632.)

Mother argues that the juvenile court did not engage in a 

proper analysis of the second requirement. We disagree.

At the conclusion of the section 366.26 hearing, the juvenile 

court acknowledged a “substantial positive bond between the 

children and their parents.” However, “the second element [of 

the beneficial parental relationship exception] is not, ‘Is there a 

bond?’ The question is whether [the children] had a ‘substantial, 

positive, emotional attachment to the parent[s]—the kind of 

attachment implying that the child[ren] would benefit from 

continuing the relationship.’ [Citation.]” (In re M.V. (2023) 

87 Cal.App.5th 1155, 1185.) The parents did not make that 

showing here.

Nathen was already living out of mother’s home prior to

juvenile court intervention. Furthermore, Darlene was two years 

old and Leilanee was 10 months old at the time of their 

detention. They lived in Guadalupe’s home for over two years 

during which time the parents maintained inconsistent visits. 

Therefore, even though the juvenile court found that there was a 

bond, the children’s relationship with their parents was not the 

substantial, positive, emotional attachment to the parents that 

would imply the children would benefit from continuing the 

relationship. (In re M.V., supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 1185.)
23

3. Whether termination would be detrimental to the

children

The third requirement of the beneficial parental 

relationship exception addresses whether the relationship

between the parents and the children was such that termination 

of parental rights would be detrimental to Nathen, Darlene, and 

Leilanee. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 633, 640.) Here, 

the evidence supports the juvenile court’s determination that 

termination of parental rights would not be detrimental to the 

children.

In assigning error, mother contends that “the court did not 

address whether [Nathen], Darlene, or Leilanee would suffer 

detriment by the termination of parental rights.” Father 

similarly argues that the juvenile court found the benefits of 

adoption outweighed the bond the children had with father 

“without analysis . . . of the bond.” These arguments fail. “[W]e 

are aware of no requirement . . . that the juvenile court, in 

finding the parental-benefit exception inapplicable, must recite 

specific findings relative to its conclusions regarding any or all of 

the three elements of the exception.” (In re A.L. (2022) 

73 Cal.App.5th 1131, 1156.) “To the contrary, we infer from 

section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(D)—under which the juvenile 

court is required to ‘state its reasons in writing or on the record’ 

when it makes a finding that termination of parental rights 

would be detrimental to the child—that the court is not required 

to make findings when it concludes that parental rights would 

not be detrimental.” (Ibid.)

Mother next argues that Guadalupe “did not even know the 

full extent of what adoption meant,” and thus the juvenile court 

should have considered legal guardianship. Contrary to mother’s 
24

argument, Guadalupe understood the difference between 

adoption and legal guardianship, and she consistently 

maintained she wished to adopt Darlene and Leilanee. The 

adoptions social worker spoke with Guadalupe about concurrent 

planning, legal guardianship, and adoption, and Guadalupe 

stated that she wished to adopt Darlene and Leilanee because 

she and her family loved them. Even though she was harassed 

by both parents, Guadalupe did not want to give up on the girls 

because she loved them. In fact, “she remain[ed] committed in 

moving forward with the plan of adoption, as she [was] invested 

in the girls having a stable and loving home.”

Finally, father argues that the juvenile court considered 

improper factors when it determined that the benefits of adoption 

outweighed the detriment the children would suffer if parental 

rights were terminated. Specifically, father states that the 

juvenile court erred when it “criticized the parents for being 

unfit, for failing to reunify, and for not being in the parental 

role.”

The juvenile court did not criticize the parents or state they 

did not stand in parental roles. Rather, it was the children’s 

counsel who argued that Darlene and Leilanee had become 

“bonded with [Guadalupe] in a parental sort of way.” While the 

juvenile court adopted the children’s counsel’s argument when it 

made its findings, it did not find that the parents did not stand in 

a parental role, and their failure to reunify did not influence the 

juvenile court’s decision.

7 Instead, in accordance with Caden C., 

7 To the extent the juvenile court may have based its 

findings on the parents’ failure to reunify with their children 

and/or not standing in parental roles, the parents did not suffer 

any prejudice. (See In re J.R. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 526, 531 [the 
25

supra, 11 Cal.5th at page 633, the juvenile court addressed 

mother’s and father’s visits; it found that the children’s relatives

had “stepped up to the plate” and cared for the children for over 

two years; it acknowledged that the parents shared a “substantial 

positive bond” with the children, but found that the benefit of 

maintaining their relationship to the parents was outweighed by 

the benefit they would receive through adoption; and the juvenile 

court found that it was detrimental for the children to be

returned to the parents.

The cases cited by father—In re L.A.-O. (2021) 

73 Cal.App.5th 197, 208–212; In re D.M. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 

261, 270; In re J.D. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 833, 865; and In re 

B.D. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 1218, 1230—do not compel a different 

result.

In In re D.M. and In re J.D., unlike in this case, the social 

workers’ reports gave the juvenile court little information about 

the quality of the children’s visits with the parent and how they 

felt about them. (In re D.M., supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at pp. 270–

271; In re J.D., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at pp. 855, 860.) Also, in In 

re D.M., the lower court expressly considered inappropriate 

factors when determining whether the exception to termination 

of parental rights existed. (In re D.M., supra, at p. 270.)

In In re J.D., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at page 864 and In re 

B.D., the appellate court could not determine whether the 

juvenile court relied upon improper factors when “balancing the 

harm of severing the natural parent-child relationship to the 

benefits of a new adoptive home in the crucial third step of the

mother was not prejudiced when the record would not support a 

finding in the mother’s favor “even if her evidence were 

credited”].)
26

analysis.” (In re B.D., supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at p. 1230; see also 

In re L.A.-O., supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at pp. 211–212 [because the 

trial court’s ruling was “terse,” the appellate court could not 

determine whether it relied upon inappropriate factors in 

terminating parental rights].) Here, as set forth above, we are 

able to determine that the juvenile court did not rely upon 

improper factors when it rejected the parents’ contention that 

this exception to termination of parental rights applied.

In sum, there is no indication in the record that the

juvenile court improperly relied on the parents’ unfitness or 

whether they occupied parental roles. Rather, based upon all of 

the evidence, including father’s testimony and the DCFS reports, 

which contained sufficient information about the quality of the 

children’s visits with their parents, the juvenile court assessed 

the parents’ visitation with the children, Nathen’s relationship

with mother, Darlene and Leilanee’s relationship with mother 

and father, whether continuing the relationship would benefit the 

children, and lastly whether the children would be harmed by the 

termination of parental rights. There was no error.

II. Father’s request for a bonding study

In support of his contention that the juvenile court erred in 

terminating his parental rights, father challenges the juvenile

court’s order denying his request for a bonding study.

A. The DCFS reports properly assessed father’s visits and

relationship with Darlene and Leilanee

Father first argues that DCFS did not file a proper 

assessment of his relationship with Darlene and Leilanee and 

thus failed to comply with section 366.21, subdivision (i)(1)(B).
27

1. Relevant law

“Once a court sets a hearing pursuant to section 366.26 to 

select and implement a permanent plan for a dependent child, 

[DCFS] must prepare an assessment . . . , frequently referred to 

as an adoption assessment. Such an adoption assessment 

provides the information necessary for the juvenile court to 

determine whether it is likely the child will be adopted [citation] 

and to consequently order termination of parental rights.” (In re 

G.M. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 552, 559.) As is relevant to this 

appeal, the assessment must include “[a] review of the amount of 

and nature of any contact between the child and [his or her]

parents . . . since the time of placement.” (§ 361.5, subd. (g)(1)(B); 

§ 366.21, subd. (i)(1)(B); § 366.22, subd. (c)(1)(B); § 366.25, subd. 

(b)(1)(B).)

“[I]f the assessment is incomplete in some respects, the

court will look to the totality of the evidence; deficiencies will go

to the weight of the evidence and may ultimately prove

insignificant. [Citation.] Substantial compliance with the 

assessment provisions has been deemed enough. [Citation.]” (In 

re John F. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1365, 1378.)

2. Analysis

DCFS’s reports in this case substantially complied with the 

statutory requirements, and any deficiencies in the assessments 

does not constitute prejudicial error. On February 1, 2022, the 

juvenile court terminated family reunification services and set 

the matter for a section 366.26 hearing. Thereafter, on May 16 

and June 23, 2022, Guadalupe reported to the social worker that 

father visited the children two times a week.

On August 8, 2022, the juvenile court continued the section 

366.26 hearing and ordered DCFS to file a report addressing the 
28

quality and frequency of the parents’ visits with the children. On 

August 25, 2022, the social worker prepared a report advising the 

juvenile court that father had visited Darlene and Leilanee two 

times a week for approximately one hour. During the visits, 

father brought food for the children and engaged in play with 

them.

On August 31, 2022, the juvenile court again continued the 

section 366.26 hearing and ordered DCFS to prepare another

report addressing the parents’ visits with the children.

In its September 23, 2022, report, DCFS advised the 

juvenile court regarding the parents’ visits. Regarding father, 

the report indicated that he visited the children three days a 

week for one-and-a-half hours. During the visits, he would 

engage in play and take the girls and Guadalupe to a liquor store 

to purchase snacks.

In an October 25, 2022, report, DCFS listed father’s visits 

with the girls for October. On October 5, 2022, father visited 

Darlene and Leilanee, and they played outside with their toys. 

On October 6, 2022, he visited the girls, brought them cheese 

pizza, played with them, and took them for snacks. On 

October 7, 2022, father brought food for the girls. On October 12, 

2022, he visited Darlene and Leilanee and again brought them 

food. On October 13 and 14, 2022, father did not show up for the 

visit or call to cancel. On October 19, 2022, father participated in 

a visit with the children.

At the hearing on October 26, 2022, Guadalupe and father 

testified as to father’s visits and relationship with Darlene and 

Leilanee.

Given the totality of the evidence, DCFS’s reports were 

adequate and provided the juvenile court with sufficient 
29

information regarding the amount and nature of contact between 

father and the girls.

B. The juvenile court properly denied father’s request for a 

bonding study

Father next argues that a bonding study was essential for 

him to prove the parental-benefit exception to termination of

parental rights.

1. Relevant law

At a section 366.26 hearing to select and implement a 

permanent plan for a child, “the primary issue often is whether 

the parents can establish that the child would benefit from a 

continuing relationship with them and that termination of 

parental rights would therefore be detrimental to the child. 

(§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).” (In re S.R. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 

864, 869.) “In attempting to establish or eliminate this exception 

to the preference for adoption, the parties or the court may 

require a bonding study to illuminate the intricacies of the 

parent-child bond so that the question of detriment to the child 

may be fully explored.” (Ibid.)

“There is no requirement in statutory or case law that a

court must secure a bonding study as a condition precedent to a 

termination order.” (In re Lorenzo C., supra, 54 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 1339.)

The timing of the request is crucial. “Bonding studies after 

the termination of reunification services would frequently require

delays in permanency planning. Similar requests to acquire 

additional evidence in support of a parent’s claim under section 

366.26, subdivision [(c)(1)(B)(i)] could be asserted in nearly every 

dependency proceeding where the parent has maintained some

contact with the child. The Legislature did not contemplate such 
30

last-minute efforts to put off permanent placement. [Citation.] 

While it is not beyond the juvenile court’s discretion to order a 

bonding study late in the process under compelling

circumstances, the denial of a belated request for such a study is 

fully consistent with the scheme of the dependency statutes, and 

with due process.” (In re Richard C. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1191, 

1197, fn. omitted.) “[A]t such a late stage in the proceedings [the

father’s] right to develop further evidence regarding [his] bond 

with the child was approaching the vanishing point.” (Id. at 

p. 1195.)8

We review a juvenile court’s denial of a request for a 

bonding study for abuse of discretion. (In re Lorenzo C., supra, 

54 Cal.App.4th at p. 1341.)

2. Analysis

Applying these legal principles, we conclude that the

juvenile court did not abuse its discretion when it denied father’s 

request for a bonding study. Aside from the fact that father’s 

request was made belatedly,9 a bonding study was not required 

because the DCFS reports contained sufficient information 

8 In his reply brief, father asserts that In re Richard C. was 

both wrongly decided and inconsistent with Caden C. We 

disagree. As recently noted in In re M.V., supra, 87 Cal.App.5th 

at p. 1182, it is “not an abuse of discretion to deny a belated 

request for a bonding study that would delay a child’s permanent 

placement.” (See also In re M.M. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 61, 68–

69, review granted on another issue, Oct. 12, 2022, S276099.)

9 As set forth above, father did not request the bonding study 

until October 4, 2022, eight months after the juvenile court 

terminated family reunification services and set the matter for a 

section 366.26 hearing.
31

regarding father’s visits and relationship with Darlene and 

Leilanee. While father argues that “[t]he quality of the visits 

between the girls and their father is wholly absent from any 

report”, the DCFS reports sufficiently described the interactions

between father, Darlene, and Leilanee and evaluated them

positively. In addition, the juvenile court heard testimony from 

Guadalupe and father regarding his visits and relationship with 

the children.

Urging us to reverse, father cites Caden C., supra, 

11 Cal.5th at pages 632 through 633 for the proposition that 

courts should allow “expert testimony in termination of rights 

cases based on observation.” However, nothing in Caden C.

purported to restrict the broad discretion a juvenile court 

exercises over whether to order a bonding study. Even after 

Caden C., a court that believes a bonding study is unnecessary 

because the record adequately reflects the nature of the 

relationship between a minor and his or her parent may still 

properly deny a request for a study. (In re B.D., supra, 

66 Cal.App.5th at p. 1228, fn. 3.)

Moreover, as set forth above, because father failed to 

demonstrate regular visitation and contact under the first prong 

of Caden C.’s test, any error in failing to order a bonding study to 

evaluate the second element (whether the child would benefit) 

does not require reversal of the finding that the exception did not 

apply. (See Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 632–633.)

Furthermore, also as set forth above, the juvenile court 

acknowledged a “substantial positive bond between the children 

and their parents.” Because the juvenile court found a bond 

between father and the girls, there was clearly sufficient evidence 

in the DCFS reports about father’s visits and relationship with 
32

Darlene and Leilanee, and a bonding study would not have been 

useful to the court. And, because the case had been pending for 

over two years, the juvenile court was well-aware of the nature 

and extent of father’s relationship with the girls, and thus

properly denied his request for a bonding study.

In re Amber M. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 681 does not compel 

a different result. In that case, the evidence showed a “common 

theme running through the evidence from the bonding study 

psychologist, the therapists, and the [court appointed special 

advocate]” that there was a “beneficial parental relationship that 

clearly outweigh[ed] the benefit of adoption.” (Id. at pp. 689–

690.) The bonding study was important because the social 

worker “provided no more than a perfunctory evaluation” of the

mother’s relationship to the children. (Id. at p. 690.) In contrast, 

here, the DCFS reports provided detailed information on the 

parents’ relationship with their children. In fact, those reports 

highlighted the positive aspects of father’s relationship with his 

daughters—evidence echoed by father and Guadalupe’s 

testimony.

Finally, father’s reliance upon In re Matthew P. (1999) 

71 Cal.App.4th 841 is misplaced. In that case, the Court of

Appeal found that de facto and former foster parents (appellants) 

were denied due process when the juvenile court admitted social 

worker reports without allowing the appellants to cross-examine 

the social worker. (Id. at pp. 845, 849.) Here, father was not 

denied due process because the juvenile court held a full 

evidentiary hearing before terminating parental rights.
33

DISPOSITION

The orders terminating parental rights are affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

_____________________, J.

ASHMANN-GERST

We concur:

_________________________, P. J.

LUI

_________________________, J.

HOFFSTADT