IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 

CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

MANUEL BRACAMONTES,

Defendant and Appellant.

S139702

San Diego County Superior Court

SCD178329

April 11, 2022

Justice Corrigan authored the opinion of the Court, in which 

Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Liu, Kruger, 

Groban, Jenkins, and Menetrez* concurred.

__________________________

* Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate 

District, Division Two, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant 

to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
1

PEOPLE v. BRACAMONTES

S139702

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

A jury convicted Manuel Bracamontes of the first degree 

murder of nine-year-old Laura Arroyo, with special 

circumstances for committing the murder while engaged in 

kidnapping, lewd act on a child under 14, and oral copulation.

1

A death sentence was returned and imposed. We affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND

A. Guilt Phase

1. Prosecution Evidence

Luis and Laura Arroyo lived in a San Diego apartment 

complex with their children: Augustine, aged 11; Jose, aged 10; 

and Laura, aged 9.2 Maggie Porter lived in the same complex 

with her three children, including four-year-old Jessica and an 

infant son, Manuel Jr. Laura and Jessica were “best friends” 

and played together almost daily. Defendant, Manuel Jr.’s 

1 Penal Code sections 187, subdivision (a), 190.2, 

subdivision (a)(17)(B), (17)(E), (17)(F). The jury also found true 

an enhancement for personal deadly weapon use (Pen. Code, 

§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)) and convicted defendant of assault with a 

deadly weapon on a peace officer (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (c)) in 

connection with an attempt to evade arrest. The trial court 

struck the enhancement and imposed a concurrent midterm on 

the assault count. 

2 To avoid confusion, we will refer to the younger Laura 

Arroyo as “Laura” and her mother as “Mrs. Arroyo.” 
PEOPLE v. BRACAMONTES

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

2

father, had lived in the Porter apartment, but moved. After his 

departure, he was often seen at the complex. 

On June 19, 1991, Laura came home from school and 

played outside with her friends, including preteens Elizabeth 

Alcarez and Leonor Gomez. Defendant greeted the girls as he 

walked past them toward Porter’s apartment. Defendant came 

back a second time and told Elizabeth her mother was looking 

for her. Laura went home with Elizabeth, but her mother said 

she had not been looking for her. The children played outside 

until just before 9:00 p.m., then Elizabeth walked Laura home 

and saw her go inside. Luis had come home from work about 

8:30 p.m. Laura asked if she could play a bit longer and he 

agreed. At about the same time, a neighbor and his friend saw 

defendant walking toward the complex from his car. They 

invited him to join them but he declined. Defendant’s black 

Volkswagen Jetta was seen leaving the complex about 20 

minutes later. 

Once home, Laura went upstairs and watched television 

with her mother. Five minutes later, the doorbell rang and 

Laura went downstairs to answer it. Mrs. Arroyo heard Laura 

asking, “Who is it?” but heard nothing else. A few minutes after 

that, Mrs. Arroyo went downstairs and noticed the front door 

and metal security door were ajar. Thinking nothing was amiss, 

she began cooking. When Luis and his sons came downstairs, 

Mrs. Arroyo sent one of the boys to look for Laura. He could not 

find her, and they noticed Laura’s shoes were inside. The entire 

family went searching for Laura. Unsuccessful, they called 

police at 9:31 p.m. Officers and neighbors searched for Laura 

throughout the night. 
PEOPLE v. BRACAMONTES

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

3

About 6:30 the next morning, Laura’s body was found in 

the parking lot of an industrial complex in Chula Vista, threeand-a-half miles from her home. She lay on her back, wearing 

pink pajamas and underwear. She had been stabbed at least 10 

times in the upper body and torso. The concrete beneath her 

had been chipped away at various spots, and her wounds were 

consistent with having been stabbed with a pickaxe. Petechial 

hemorrhaging indicated strangulation. Other injuries included 

a broken nose and chipped teeth, along with bruising and 

lacerations. Although her genitalia bore no signs of sexual 

assault, swabs were collected from her mouth, vagina, anus, and 

neck. An initial examination did not reveal the presence of 

sperm. 

Between July 14 and August 1, 1991, Chula Vista Police 

interviewed defendant four times. Initially, he claimed he first 

went to the apartment complex at about 9:45 in the evening, 

only after Porter called and told him about Laura’s 

disappearance. He said he had not been to the complex in a 

week. He subsequently asserted he went to the complex earlier 

that day to pick up Manuel Jr. and returned that afternoon to 

drop off the baby. He denied any involvement with Laura’s 

disappearance and insisted he never spoke to Laura or any of 

the neighborhood girls. Defendant ultimately refused to answer 

more questions but did provide hair, blood, and saliva samples. 

On August 1, 1991, pursuant to warrant, officers searched 

defendant’s residence and car, seizing clothing and tools. These 

items, along with evidence recovered during the autopsy, were 

sent to an FBI lab. A blue-green fiber found on Laura’s pants 

was deemed potentially consistent with a fiber from a sweater

found at defendant’s home and with other fibers recovered from 
PEOPLE v. BRACAMONTES

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

4

his car. At the time, no other physical evidence tied him to 

Laura’s murder. 

Police investigated other leads. Mrs. Arroyo and three 

others reported seeing a suspicious brown car parked in a culde-sac near the complex. Neither the car nor any occupants 

were ever identified. Officers also investigated a dispute over 

the Arroyos’ sale of their taco shop but found no link to the

abduction. In June 1992, approximately a year after the killing, 

police spoke again with defendant, who continued to deny any 

involvement. No new evidence was uncovered. 

Eleven years later, the San Diego County District 

Attorney’s Office established a “cold case” unit, and the evidence 

in Laura’s case was reexamined in 2003. Chula Vista Police also 

sought assistance from the San Diego Police crime lab. New 

slides were prepared from the autopsy swabs using a method 

that had not been employed in 1991. The new slides revealed 

the presence of sperm in swabs from Laura’s mouth, neck, and 

fingernails. A DNA profile was developed and found to match

DNA taken from defendant’s hair sample. The probability of a 

random match was one in 2.7 trillion in the Latino population, 

one in 3.2 trillion among Caucasians, and one in nine trillion 

among African-Americans. Laura’s pajamas were placed under 

an alternate light source which revealed biological matter. 

Tested samples from the garment confirmed the presence of 

sperm. The resulting DNA profile matched defendant’s 

reference sample. The likelihood of a random match was one in 

30 quadrillion. 

On October 24, 2003, more than 12 years after Laura’s 

murder, district attorney investigators Robert Marquez and 

Michael Howard went to Porter’s apartment looking for 
PEOPLE v. BRACAMONTES

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

5

defendant. Manuel Jr. said his mother was not home, but 

defendant was expected to pick him up shortly. While the 

investigators waited in their car, defendant arrived and parked 

his Ford Explorer in front of the apartment. As Manuel Jr. 

approached the car, the investigators drove up and stopped in 

front of the Explorer. Marquez approached defendant and 

identified himself. Howard drew his gun, opened the passenger 

door, and told defendant he was under arrest for murder. 

Defendant initially raised his hands but then sped off. Howard 

fired twice toward the fleeing car. 

Early the next morning, officers saw defendant’s Explorer 

parked at a Chula Vista motel and placed a tracking device on 

it. About 10:30 a.m., the device indicated defendant had left the 

motel. Two officers in separate marked patrol cars found the 

Explorer parked in an alley. After blocking either end of the 

alley, officers approached on foot. Defendant started the engine 

and made a U-turn as officers drew their guns and ordered him 

to stop. He sped past them and drove over a curb to escape. 

After a high-speed freeway chase, defendant lost control of his 

car, crashed, and was arrested. 

2. Defense Evidence

Five years after the murder and eight years before the cold 

case review, Chula Vista Police Detective Susan Rodriguez

looked into the case. Defendant’s Jetta, which had been sold, 

was reexamined in vain. Latent fingerprints from the Arroyos’

front door did not match his. Rodriguez also recontacted a 

psychic who had been consulted during the initial investigation. 

No new leads were developed. Evidence from Laura’s body was 

not reexamined because Rodriguez had no reason to doubt the 

medical examiner’s conclusion ruling out sexual assault. 
PEOPLE v. BRACAMONTES

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

6

Manuel Jr. testified that when Marquez and Howard first 

approached him at the apartment they only identified 

themselves by name.3 They refused to tell defendant why he 

was being arrested and both men shot at defendant’s fleeing car. 

Several other witnesses testified about the attempted arrest. 

Defendant checked into a motel later that night using his real 

name. 

B. Penalty Phase

1. Prosecution Evidence

Laura’s parents and two brothers described the impact of 

her life and murder. Laura wanted to be a high school 

cheerleader and then a teacher, a role she often assumed while 

playing with friends. She was friendly with everyone and her 

mother’s constant companion. The family trip to Disneyland 

was replaced by Laura’s funeral. Laura was buried in the dress 

she was to wear for her first communion. Laura’s brothers were 

afraid to go anywhere after the murder. The family kept Laura’s 

room unchanged for six years after her death and still visited 

her grave every Sunday and on her birthday. Mari Peterson, 

Laura’s third grade teacher, testified about the impact of 

Laura’s death on her and her class. The jury was also shown a 

two-and-a-half minute video of an interview between Peterson 

and Laura filmed a few weeks before the crimes. 

In June 1996, Porter told defendant she wanted to end 

their relationship and he became violent. He refused to leave, 

pushed her, and held her down by the arm and neck. Photos 

3

In rebuttal, the prosecution presented evidence of an 

audiotape of the investigators’ interaction with Manuel Jr. in 

which Marquez identified himself as being a district attorney 

investigator. 
PEOPLE v. BRACAMONTES

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

7

showed abrasions to Porter’s upper body. Defendant pled guilty

to inflicting corporal injury on the mother of his child.4

2. Defense Evidence

Twenty-one defense witnesses testified that defendant 

was incapable of committing the murder. Porter related she 

married defendant shortly before trial and believed he was not 

capable of killing Laura. Porter’s ex-husband gave similar 

testimony. Porter’s two adult children described defendant as a 

good father who never said or did anything inappropriate with 

them. Family members described defendant’s childhood as 

normal and not marked by abuse. He played with his siblings, 

participated in Little League, and cared for his pets. As an 

adult, defendant was supportive of his family and a good father 

to Manuel Jr. After his father was injured in a car accident and 

confined to bed for two years, defendant helped care for him and 

the family. He also comforted his sister when her husband was 

fatally shot. He never acted inappropriately with his sisters or 

nieces. A work supervisor testified he was a hard worker who 

got along with others. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Pretrial Issues

1. Prefiling Delay

While the murder occurred in June 1991, defendant was 

not charged until October 2003. He argues the delay was 

unjustified and denied him due process because some evidence 

he could have presented, particularly schooling and employment 

4 Penal Code section 273.5, subdivision (a). 
PEOPLE v. BRACAMONTES

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

8

evidence for the penalty phase, became unavailable during that 

time. We reject the claim. 

a. Background

The defense argued that all charges should be dismissed 

because the prefiling delay violated due process. The trial court 

heard from numerous witnesses, primarily related to potential 

prejudice from lost evidence. Elementary and high school

employees testified that, although records of enrollment are 

kept permanently, other student files are usually destroyed 

after five years. Defendant graduated from high school in 1981, 

10 years before Laura’s murder. Several of defendant’s 

elementary school teachers had died by the time of the 2005

hearing; two others did not remember him. Representatives 

from seven companies where defendant worked between 1979 

and 1993 testified as to defendant’s employment records and pay 

stubs, with most indicating that detailed records were either 

never kept or were no longer available. The defense also 

presented evidence that three people who had a positive 

impression of defendant had passed away. Defendant also 

suggested that evidence regarding an alarm system at his 

parents’ house and record of a U-Haul truck his sister rented for 

her move supported his alibi but had been lost. Guadalupe 

Echeverria, whom the defense claimed was unhappy following 

her purchase of the Arroyos’ taco shop (see discussion post), had 

died in December 1991. 

In its opposition, the prosecution asserted the delay was 

justified. It observed that the initial medical examination of the 

victim’s body in 1991 did not reveal the presence of sperm or 

injuries consistent with sexual assault, and the victim’s clothing 

was intact, leading the medical examiner to conclude no such 
PEOPLE v. BRACAMONTES

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

9

assault had occurred. Police searched defendant’s car and home 

and repeatedly interviewed him. The blue-green fiber from the 

victim’s pajamas may have matched fibers from defendant’s car 

and clothing, but the result was inconclusive. It was not until 

2003 that a reexamination of evidence revealed sperm on swabs 

from the victim and a subsequent DNA test linked the sperm to 

defendant. Expert testimony explained that, in 1991, a waterbased extraction method was used to transfer evidence from a 

swab to a slide for examination. It was later discovered that this 

method, in contrast to a detergent-based method used in 2003,

was often ineffective and may have led to false negative results. 

Further, the restriction fragment length polymorphism DNA 

tests prevalent in 1991 required more material for testing than 

was present on the oral swabs. Defendant’s sister Teresa also 

testified that friends and family remained available to testify 

about defendant’s life, which she described as normal and 

unaffected by childhood abuse or involvement with gangs, 

alcohol, or drugs. A prosecution investigator testified 

defendant’s employers at the time of the murder remembered 

him and that he had been disciplined for failing to perform 

assigned duties and threatening a supervisor. 

The trial court denied defendant’s motion. It concluded 

that the prosecution could not reasonably bring charges in 1991 

based on the uncertain state of the evidence. The court balanced 

the justification for the delay with any potential prejudice. It 

held the strong public interest in prosecution outweighed any 

potential prejudice. The defense unsuccessfully renewed its 

motion to dismiss at the penalty phase, arguing the charging 

delay resulted in an “incomplete picture” of defendant being 

presented to the jury. 
PEOPLE v. BRACAMONTES

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

10

b. There Was No Prejudicial Prefiling Delay

“Although precharging delay does not implicate speedy 

trial rights, a defendant is not without recourse if the delay is 

unjustified and prejudicial. ‘[T]he right of due process protects 

a criminal defendant’s interest in fair adjudication by 

preventing unjustified delays that weaken the defense through 

the dimming of memories, the death or disappearance of 

witnesses, and the loss or destruction of material physical 

evidence.’ [Citation.] Accordingly, ‘[d]elay in prosecution that 

occurs before the accused is arrested or the complaint is filed 

may constitute a denial of the right to a fair trial and to due 

process of law under the state and federal Constitutions. A 

defendant seeking to dismiss a charge on this ground must 

demonstrate prejudice arising from the delay. The prosecution 

may offer justification for the delay, and the court considering a 

motion to dismiss balances the harm to the defendant against 

the justification for the delay.’ ” (People v. Nelson (2008) 43 

Cal.4th 1242, 1250 (Nelson).) 

Nelson observed that both negligent and purposeful 

charging delay, if accompanied by a showing of prejudice, can 

violate due process. “This does not mean, however, that whether 

the delay was purposeful or negligent is irrelevant . . . . 

[W]hether the delay was negligent or purposeful is relevant to 

the balancing process. Purposeful delay to gain an advantage is 

totally unjustified, and a relatively weak showing of prejudice 

would suffice to tip the scales towards finding a due process 

violation. If the delay was merely negligent, a greater showing 
PEOPLE v. BRACAMONTES

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

11

of prejudice would be required to establish a due process 

violation.”5 (Nelson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at pp. 1255–1256.) 

No prejudicial delay appears here. Defendant argues the 

charging delay was unjustified because evidence of sperm on the 

victim’s clothing and, thus, defendant’s DNA, could have been 

detected sooner using technology available at the time. We 

rejected a similar argument in Nelson, where the defendant 

argued “the DNA technology used here existed years before law 

enforcement agencies made the comparison in this case and 

that, therefore, the comparison could have, and should have, 

been made sooner than it actually was.” (Nelson, supra, 43 

Cal.4th at p. 1256.) We cautioned there that “[a] court may not 

find negligence by second-guessing how the state allocates its 

resources or how law enforcement agencies could have 

investigated a given case.” (Ibid.) Similarly here, the initial 

investigation into Laura’s killing suggested a sexual assault was 

not involved. The medical examination of the victim’s body did 

not reveal a sexual assault. The victim’s clothing was intact and 

her genitalia uninjured. Swabs collected from her body did not 

reveal the presence of sperm. The medical examiner’s 

conclusion that there had been no sexual assault, while 

reasonable, may have set back the investigation. Not until 

sperm was discovered later during a “cold case” review and a 

5 Nelson noted that state and federal constitutional 

standards regarding justification for delay differ. (Nelson, 

supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1251; see United States v. Lovasco (1977) 

431 U.S. 783, 795–796; United States v. Marion (1971) 404 U.S. 

307, 325–326.) Nelson, however, rested its holding on 

California’s constitution because “the law under the California 

Constitution is at least as favorable for defendant in this regard

as the law under the United States Constitution.” (Nelson, at p. 

1251.) We do so here as well. 
PEOPLE v. BRACAMONTES

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

12

DNA profile was produced did physical evidence connect 

defendant to the crimes. Indeed, defendant’s initial connection 

to the murder was inconclusive. The only physical evidence 

linking him to the crimes was a single blue-green fiber that may 

have matched fibers found in his car and residence. He had been 

seen at the apartment complex just before Laura’s 

disappearance, and he initially lied to police about being there. 

However, defendant denied involvement and no direct evidence 

linked him to the crimes. Further, the inability to detect sperm 

on the victim’s body not only deprived investigators of DNA 

evidence but also a motive for Laura’s murder. That his 

girlfriend’s daughter and Laura were friends did little to explain 

why defendant would have killed the child. 

Ultimately, “[t]he delay was investigative delay, nothing 

else.” (Nelson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1256.) As we observed in 

People v. Cordova (2015) 62 Cal.4th 104 (Cordova): “Sometimes 

a crime simply is not solved immediately but must await some 

break in the case, a break that occurred here . . . when a cold hit 

revealed a match between defendant and the evidence samples.” 

(Id. at p. 120.) As in Nelson: “ ‘The delay was the result of 

insufficient evidence to identify defendant as a suspect and the 

limits of forensic technology. [Citations.] When the forensic 

technology became available to identify defendant as a suspect 

and to establish his guilt, the prosecution proceeded with 

promptness.’ ” (Nelson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1257.) There is 

no indication that prosecution here was delayed to secure any 

improper advantage. 

In any event, “if the defendant fails to meet his or her 

burden of showing prejudice, there is no need to determine 

whether the delay was justified.” (People v. Jones (2013) 57 

Cal.4th 899, 921.) The potential prejudice identified by 
PEOPLE v. BRACAMONTES

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

13

defendant appears minimal. As to the guilt phase, defendant 

asserts that the delay prevented adequate defense investigation 

into potential third-party culpability evidence, including the 

occupants of a brown car near the victim’s apartment complex 

and the Arroyos’ sale of a taco shop. (See discussion post.) Near 

the time of the crimes, several witnesses reported seeing a 

brown car, but no one could identify the car or its occupants. 

Defendant speculates that an earlier investigation would have 

identified these persons but does not suggest how the defense 

investigation was hindered. With respect to the taco shop sale, 

Echeverria died only five months after the murder. Defendant 

also does not suggest what evidence Echeverria would have 

provided that was not otherwise available.

As for the penalty phase, defendant broadly contends that 

“whole categories of evidence essential to presenting the jury 

with a full picture of appellant were lost,” including school, 

employment, and medical records, as well as mitigation 

witnesses who passed away. The record belies this claim. 

Defendant presented 21 witnesses at the penalty phase who 

testified about his childhood and adult life; positive family 

interactions, favorable experiences and opinions; and testimony 

from a work supervisor. In light of this extensive presentation,

any prejudice from the absence of additional similar evidence 

would appear minimal. Defendant does not explain how 

documentary evidence regarding his education, employment, or 

medical care would have bolstered the evidence presented. On 

this record, “the claimed prejudice is speculative” and 

“[d]efendant was able to, and did, present evidence in his 

defense . . . .” (Cordova, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 120.) 
PEOPLE v. BRACAMONTES

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

14

2. Shackling

Defendant contends the trial court improperly ordered 

him to wear leg chains during trial, which prejudiced him at 

both the guilt and penalty phases. Prejudice does not appear on 

this record. 

a. Background

Defendant moved to appear without physical restraints, 

pointing out that he had previously made court appearances 

without disruption. The court tentatively indicated it would 

deny the motion but explained that “Mr. Bracamontes will 

have . . . ankle cuffs on, that they be tethered to a bolt in the 

floor. His hands will not be shackled. He will not be waist 

chained. He will be free to stand, turn to talk to both counsel, 

certainly assist in his defense. [¶] What he will be prevented 

from doing is leaving counsel table, which he isn’t allowed to do 

anyway. [¶] We’ll make every effort to ensure that the panel is 

not aware that he is chained to the floor.” When defense counsel 

argued defendant had been cooperative and had not been 

disruptive in the courtroom, the court noted that defendant had 

twice fled from police before being apprehended. The court also 

inquired whether it could consider the “mere fact of the charges 

and the potential penalty in the case . . . .” Both defense counsel 

responded that was not part of the inquiry whether there was a 

manifest need for restraints. Although agreeing with defense 

counsel that “Mr. Bracamontes has always been very respectful 

in court” and no instances of jail disruption had been reported, 

the court denied defendant’s motion. If defendant chose to 

testify, the court indicated he would be allowed to walk to the 

stand “unimpeded” and “when he’s excused, he’s free to walk 

back and sit down. We’ll make those arrangements.” Defendant 

elected not to testify so this eventuality did not arise. 
PEOPLE v. BRACAMONTES

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

15

Later, outside the presence of prospective jurors, defense 

counsel commented that, the day before, “with the table turned 

facing the audience, that the jurors that were seated in the jury 

box, at least some of them could see that Mr. Bracamontes was 

shackled to the floor . . . . The wire was visible underneath the 

chairs at least to probably the six people that are closest to the 

bench.” The “wire” was an apparent reference to the tether 

mentioned by the court. The court stated it was “not going to 

get rid of the panel” but asked the bailiff if counsel table could 

be turned. The bailiff responded, “I don’t know how I can. 

There’s more people at counsel table than expected, and there’s 

more people in the way when he stands.” The court replied, 

“We’ll leave it the way it is,” and defense counsel addressed 

another matter. 

b. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion

“ ‘In general, the “court has broad power to maintain 

courtroom security and orderly proceedings” [citation], and its 

decisions on these matters are reviewed for abuse of discretion. 

[Citation.] However, the court’s discretion to impose physical 

restraints is constrained by constitutional principles. Under 

California law, “a defendant cannot be subjected to physical 

restraints of any kind in the courtroom while in the jury’s 

presence, unless there is a showing of a manifest need for such 

restraints.” [Citation.] Similarly, the federal “Constitution 

forbids the use of visible shackles . . . unless that use is ‘justified 

by an essential state interest’ — such as the interest in 

courtroom security — specific to the defendant on trial.” . . . ’ ” 

(People v. Bell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 70, 123 (Bell).) “The imposition 

of physical restraints in the absence of a record showing of 

violence or a threat of violence or other nonconforming conduct 

will be deemed to constitute an abuse of discretion.” (People v. 
PEOPLE v. BRACAMONTES

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

16

Duran (1976) 16 Cal.3d 282, 291 (Duran).) “ ‘In deciding 

whether restraints are justified, the trial court may “take into 

account the factors that courts have traditionally relied on in 

gauging potential security problems and the risk of escape at 

trial.” [Citation.] These factors include evidence establishing 

that a defendant poses a safety risk, a flight risk, or is likely to 

disrupt the proceedings or otherwise engage in nonconforming 

behavior.’ ” (People v. Virgil (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1210, 1270 

(Virgil).)

As these authorities make clear, physical restraints are 

considered extraordinary measures. Courts entertaining such 

action must seriously consider the question on an individualized 

basis and ensure there is an adequate record for their ruling. 

Constitutional principles “prohibit the use of physical restraints 

visible to the jury absent a trial court determination, in the 

exercise of its discretion, that they are justified by a state 

interest specific to a particular trial.” (Deck v. Missouri (2005) 

544 U.S. 622, 629 (Deck).) The individualized consideration 

necessary before imposing restraints would be inconsistent with 

a blanket policy of shackling defendants charged with certain 

offenses, such as capital murder. (People v. Hawkins (1995) 10 

Cal.4th 920, 944; Duran, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 293.) “The mere 

facts that the defendant is an unsavory character and charged 

with a violent crime are not sufficient to support a finding of 

manifest need.” (People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 

Cal.4th 335, 389–390 (Bryant).)

Defendant contends there was no manifest need to shackle 

him, noting the lack of any courtroom or jail incidents involving 

nonconforming behavior. However, the record here does not 

support defendant’s assertion that the court relied primarily on 

a blanket policy to shackle capital murder defendants and failed 
PEOPLE v. BRACAMONTES

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

17

to consider his particular circumstances. The court did inquire 

at one point whether it could consider the present charges and 

commented that its prior handling of similar murder cases had 

“proved very successful in the past.” Nonetheless, the court 

specifically cited as a relevant factor defendant’s two attempts 

to evade arrest under dangerous circumstances. 

A court’s determination that a defendant constitutes a 

flight risk may justify a finding of manifest need for restraints. 

For example, in Vigil, we concluded there was no abuse of 

discretion in shackling the defendant because he “was a genuine 

escape risk” where he used “a makeshift key to unlock another 

inmate’s handcuffs” and lied about it. (Virgil, supra, 51 Cal.4th

at p. 1271; see People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 988

(Cunningham).) Further, a defendant’s recent attempt to 

escape custody, or evidence of an intent to escape, could support 

a finding of a manifest need for restraints. (See People v. Smith

(2015) 61 Cal.4th 18, 44; People v. Livaditis (1992) 2 Cal.4th 759, 

774; People v. Condley (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 999, 1006.) 

However, our cases teach that a mere disposition to 

violence or escape standing alone cannot justify the use of 

restraints. “A court’s decision about the use of restraints 

involves a prediction of the likelihood of violence, escape, or 

disruption weighed against the potential burden on the 

defendant’s right to a fair trial. Given the serious potential 

consequences on both sides of the scale, the range of factors the 

court may consider in assessing and weighing the risks should 

be broad.” (Bryant, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 390.) The necessary 

individualized assessment requires a determination, based on 

the totality of the circumstances, that a defendant presently 

intends to engage in nonconforming courtroom behavior, i.e., 

conduct that “ ‘would disrupt the judicial process if 
PEOPLE v. BRACAMONTES

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

18

unrestrained.’ ” (People v. Cox (1991) 53 Cal.3d 618, 651 (Cox), 

disapproved on another ground in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 

Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22.) “The imposition of physical restraints 

in the absence of a record showing of violence or a threat of 

violence or other nonconforming conduct will be deemed to 

constitute an abuse of discretion.” (Duran, supra, 16 Cal.3d at 

p. 291; see People v. Montes (2014) 58 Cal.4th 809, 841.) 

A defendant’s prearrest attempt to evade capture, 

standing alone, would not justify the use of physical restraints. 

People v. Jacla (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 878 concluded no manifest 

need for shackling was shown where the defendant, while on 

bail, was involved in a shooting and an ensuing high-speed

chase. The court explained: “We conceive Duran to hold that it 

is the defendant’s conduct in custody, now or at other times 

[citations], or his expressed intention to escape or engage in 

nonconforming conduct during the trial that should be 

considered in determining whether there is a ‘manifest need’ for 

shackles.” (Jacla, at p. 884; see also People v. Burnett (1980) 111 

Cal.App.3d 661, 667.) This court quoted Jacla positively in 

People v. Allen (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1222. With respect to the 

shackling of a witness, Allen observed that “none of the evidence 

presented by the prosecution relates to [the witness’s] present 

or past conduct in custody or in the courtroom, and most of the 

evidence seems of limited value in predicting [his] future 

conduct in the courtroom.” (Id. at p. 1263.) 

Similarly here, although defendant attempted to evade 

capture before his eventual arrest, there was no evidence that

defendant harbored a present intent to escape from custody or 

otherwise disrupt court proceedings. The trial court agreed that 

defendant had “always been very respectful in court” and there 

had been no reports of misbehavior in custody. The ultimate 
PEOPLE v. BRACAMONTES

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

19

question remains whether there exists a manifest need for 

shackling or other restraint. The need must arise from a current

risk of flight, violence, or other disruptive behavior. Although

the court’s consideration is not limited solely to custodial 

conduct, it must make a determination, based on the totality of 

the circumstances, that a manifest need for restraints currently 

exists. (See Cox, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 651.) The evidence was 

insufficient to justify such a determination here. Under these 

circumstances, the court abused its discretion by ordering the 

use of restraints. 

Finally, we emphasize that the justification “in support of 

the court’s determination to impose physical restraints must 

appear as a matter of record” (Duran, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 291). 

When restraints are requested by the prosecution, the People 

should place facts justifying their use on the record “so that the 

court may make its own determination of the nature and 

seriousness of the conduct and whether there is a manifest need 

for such restraints.” (People v. Simon (2016) 1 Cal.5th 98, 115; 

cf. People v. Miller (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1109, 1114; People v. 

Prado (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 267, 275–276.) We note the court 

may consider imposing restraints in the absence of a 

prosecutorial request. Further, and importantly, the court must 

ensure the record reflects both the reasons justifying the 

restraints, along with a description of “the type of restraints 

used [and] whether they were visible to the jury” (People v. 

Jackson (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1818, 1826). Of course, “[i]t is 

settled that the use of physical restraints in the trial court 

cannot be challenged for the first time on appeal. Defendant’s 

failure to object and make a record below waives the claim . . . .” 

(People v. Tuilaepa (1992) 4 Cal.4th 569, 583 (Tuilaepa); see 

People v. Majors (1998) 18 Cal.4th 385, 406.) As such, if the 
PEOPLE v. BRACAMONTES

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

20

defense disagrees with the trial court’s initial assessment of the 

visibility of the restraints at any point during trial, the defense 

should object so the trial court can make an appropriate record. 

c. The Trial Record Does Not Establish Prejudice

As the high court has stated, where a court improperly 

orders the use of visible physical restraints, “[t]he State must 

prove ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the [shackling] error 

complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’ ” 

(Deck, supra, 544 U.S. at p. 635; see People v. Miracle (2018) 6 

Cal.5th 318, 350, fn. 6.) Defendant contends that “the shackles 

apparently remained in the jury’s view for the duration of the 

trial.” The record on direct appeal does not support this 

contention. Defense counsel commented during jury selection 

that, “with the table turned facing the audience,” “at least some 

of” the prospective jurors could see the “wire,” suggesting that it 

was visible “to probably the six people that are closest to the 

bench.” The record does not indicate whether counsel table 

remained in the same location during trial, or any of the seated 

jurors ever saw the restraints. All that can be established is 

that, for an unspecified period of time during voir dire, some 

prospective jurors may have seen a portion of the “wire” used in 

the system. “Brief glimpses of a defendant in restraints have 

not been deemed prejudicial.” (Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th 

at p. 988; see Duran, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 287, fn. 2.) 

“Even if the restraint had been glimpsed during that 

portion of voir dire by one or more of the prospective jurors who 

actually sat on the jury, the unjustified shackling was harmless 

beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Ervine (2009) 47 Cal.4th 

745, 774.) As we reasoned in Tuilaepa, supra, 4 Cal.4th 569: 

“Strong guilt evidence in the form of eight positive eyewitness 
PEOPLE v. BRACAMONTES

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

21

identifications established that defendant shot four individuals 

and killed one of them in the course of robbing people in a 

neighborhood bar. No other guilt errors are raised on appeal or 

are evident from the record, and no prejudicial error occurred at 

the penalty phase for reasons we will explain. Defendant 

elected not to testify in his own behalf. Any glimpse jurors 

might have received of the restraints as defendant entered the 

courtroom could not possibly have shocked them or affected 

their assessment of the evidence.” (Id. at pp. 584–585.) 

Similarly here, with respect to the guilt phase, strong DNA 

evidence tied defendant to the murder. The lowest probability 

for a random match among the samples was one in 2.7 trillion 

among the Latino population. Further, as discussed below, no 

other error appears on this record. The court, in deciding to 

order shackling, reassured the defense that if defendant decided 

to testify, he would be allowed to walk to and from the stand 

unrestrained, and there is no assertion that the restraints 

otherwise inhibited defendant’s ability to assist in his defense. 

Even assuming some jurors may have briefly glimpsed the 

restraints, the shackling error was also harmless beyond a 

reasonable doubt at the penalty phase. During jury argument, 

the prosecutor identified only three aggravating factors: the 

circumstances of the crime; defendant’s age at the time of the 

offenses; and defendant’s commission of a prior domestic 

violence incident. (See Pen. Code, § 190.3, factors (a), (b), (i).) 

Of these, the prosecutor focused primarily on the circumstances 

of the offense, calling it “one of the most important factors in this 

case.” After acknowledging that defendant’s lack of felony 

convictions constituted a mitigating factor, along with defense 

evidence regarding “any good things about [defendant’s] life” 

(see Pen. Code, § 190.3, factors (c), (k)), the prosecutor argued 
PEOPLE v. BRACAMONTES

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

22

these factors were “extremely weak” compared to “the facts, 

circumstances of this case, like this one right here where her 

final resting place on that sidewalk is, it’s like comparing tons 

to ounces.” He graphically described the scene where the victim 

was found: “How about comparing all of those stab wounds to 

that little girl on that sidewalk, where she was impaled on that 

sidewalk, compare that to all the mitigation. I submit it makes 

the scale on this side go all the way to the ground. [¶] The chop 

wounds to the face and the other injuries to the face, shoulders, 

neck, each and every one of those facts, ladies and gentlemen, 

wipes out any weight, any slight weight that any of those items 

have on that mitigating side.” The prosecutor described the 

impact of the murder on Laura’s parents, brothers, her teacher, 

and classmates, then discussed Laura’s potential future and 

how she might have experienced the crimes as they were 

happening. Thereafter, the prosecutor argued: “You have to put 

this now on that scale, ladies and gentlemen. When you 

compare all of these things on this side of the scale, everything 

we just talked about, including the assault on the cop, the 

pickaxe that he used, the lewd act on the child, these are the 

special circumstances, the forced oral [copulation]. And the 

kidnapping, ladies and gentlemen, the aggravating side of this 

scale outweighs the mitigating side of the scale like the Queen 

Mary outweighs a rowboat. Like a 6’, 220-pound male outweighs 

a 61-pound third grade girl.” The single reference to an “assault 

on the cop” was not explained, and the prosecutor did not 

otherwise mention defendant’s flight from police during jury 

argument that spanned almost 30 pages of the reporter’s 

transcript. Further, aside from the specific commission of a 

domestic violence incident, the prosecutor did not suggest that 

defendant had a violent background warranting the death 
PEOPLE v. BRACAMONTES

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

23

penalty. As noted, he acknowledged defendant’s lack of felony 

convictions constituted a mitigating factor. 

The defense acknowledged the prosecution’s emphasis on 

the circumstances of the offense, with counsel commenting that, 

“as expected, the prosecutor has focused on the facts of the 

crime, because in this case that’s really all that he has to talk 

about.” Both defense counsel mentioned that defendant had no 

background of violence. This argument dovetailed into the two 

primary defense themes: that jurors should have a lingering 

doubt as to defendant’s guilt based on the multiple defense 

witnesses who testified that defendant was incapable of 

committing the murder; and that life imprisonment was a 

sufficient punishment for the present crimes. Counsel discussed 

lingering doubt at length, arguing that the DNA evidence only 

linked defendant to the sexual assault and not the killing. They 

argued evidence suggested others must be involved and that no 

physical evidence tied Laura to defendant’s car. They urged 

defendant had no history of child molestation, no history of 

having been abused himself, and no history of mental illness or 

drug addiction. All these facts were asserted to be inconsistent 

with defendant’s guilt. Defense counsel suggested that DNA 

evidence may someday exonerate defendant. They also 

emphasized that defendant would not be eligible for parole and 

there was no evidence that defendant had posed a danger to 

anyone during the two years that he spent in custody awaiting 

trial because “[t]here were no assaults on any guards or other 

inmates.” 

“[V]isible physical restraints like handcuffs or leg irons 

may erode the presumption of innocence because they suggest 

to the jury that the defendant is a dangerous person who must 

be separated from the rest of the community.” (People v. 
PEOPLE v. BRACAMONTES

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

24

Hernandez (2011) 51 Cal.4th 733, 742; cf. Deck, supra, 544 U.S. 

at pp. 632–633.) The record on direct appeal here reveals that 

the jury convicted defendant of the gruesome murder and sexual 

assault of a nine-year-old girl who had been kidnapped from her 

home. The prosecution’s subsequent penalty phase argument 

focused primarily on the circumstances of this horrific crime,

which the jury had previously assessed, rather than on 

defendant’s dangerousness. The bulk of the defense case, both 

with respect to jury argument and the evidence presented, 

emphasized a theory of lingering doubt, a factor in mitigation as 

to the circumstances of the crime. (See Pen. Code, § 190.3, factor 

(a); People v. Holmes (2022) 12 Cal.5th 719, 753.) The record 

before us only establishes that some prospective jurors may 

have seen a portion of a “wire” during voir dire over a month 

before the penalty phase began. In light of this record, the 

unjustified shackling was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt 

notwithstanding the possibility that some panel members may 

have seen some form of restraint during jury selection.

6

 

B. Guilt Phase Issues

1. Flight Instructions

Based on defendant’s flight from arresting officers, the 

court gave a consciousness of guilt instruction using a modified 

6

If there is evidence outside of the appellate record that the 

jury’s view of defendant’s restraints was more extensive, a 

habeas corpus proceeding would allow evaluation of such 

evidence. (Cf. People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 

266–268.) 
PEOPLE v. BRACAMONTES

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

25

version of CALJIC No. 2.52.

7

 (See Pen. Code, § 1127c.) The 

defense asked for an instruction on the absence of flight to show 

he had no consciousness of guilt. It noted that defendant had 

agreed to police interviews in 1991 and 1992 even after he had 

become the focus of the investigation.8 The trial court observed

the defense could argue the point to the jury, but it would not 

give “a pinpoint instruction on a negative.” 

Defendant contends the court’s refusal to instruct on the 

absence of flight deprived him of a fair trial. He argues the 

court’s refusal, coupled with its instruction on flight, led to 

“disparate treatment of the parallel inferences to be drawn from 

a defendant’s response to an accusation,” which improperly 

favored the prosecution. 

7 The instruction stated here: “The flight of a person 

immediately after the commission of a crime, or after he is 

accused of a crime and has knowledge of the accusation, is not 

sufficient in itself to establish his guilt, but is a fact which, if 

proved, may be considered by you in light of all other proved 

facts in deciding whether a defendant is guilty or not guilty. The 

weight to which this circumstance is entitled is a matter for you 

to decide.” (Italics added.) The italicized language was added 

after discussion with counsel. 

8 The proposed instruction stated: “The absence of flight of 

a person immediately after the commission of a crime, or after

he is accused of a crime, although the person had the 

opportunity to take flight, is a fact which may be considered by 

you in light of all other proven facts, in deciding whether or not 

the defendant’s guilt has been proven beyond a reasonable 

doubt. The absence of flight may tend to show that the 

defendant did not have a consciousness of guilt and this fact 

alone may be sufficient to create a reasonable doubt as to 

defendant’s guilt. The weight and significance of such 

circumstances are matters of [sic] the jury to determine.” 
PEOPLE v. BRACAMONTES

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

26

We have previously rejected this argument in the context

of admissibility. As People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1 observed,

evidence regarding absence of flight is generally not admissible. 

People v. Montgomery (1879) 53 Cal. 576 concluded the trial 

court did not err by excluding evidence that an in-custody 

defendant “had an opportunity to escape from the jail, but 

declined to avail himself of it.” (Id. at p. 577.) Montgomery

questioned whether an innocent inference could be made from 

the lack of escape, noting the defendant “may very naturally 

have been deterred from making an effort to escape from a fear 

that he would be recaptured, and that his fruitless attempt to 

escape would be evidence of guilt; or he may have felt so strong 

a confidence of his acquittal, for want of the requisite proof of 

his guilt, that he deemed it unnecessary to flee.” (Id. at pp. 577–

578.) Green clarified that “[t]he real issue here, however, is not 

whether this evidence is relevant but whether it should be 

excluded despite its relevance.” (Green, at p. 38.) Green

reasoned that such evidence presented “manifest risk of 

confusion and delay” and “the absence of flight is so ambiguous, 

so laden with conflicting interpretations, that its probative 

value on the issue of innocence is slight.” (Id. at pp. 38–39; cf.

People v. Cowan (2010) 50 Cal.4th 401, 473 [exclusion of 

evidence regarding the defendant’s offer to speak to police 

proper].) Green concluded an instruction on the absence of flight 

was properly denied because “the instruction would have 

injected a new issue into the jury’s deliberations and invited the 

kind of speculation that the Montgomery rule seeks to avoid.” 

(Green, at p. 39.) 

We affirmed Green’s reasoning in considering the question 

of instructions. People v. Staten (2000) 24 Cal.4th 434, rejected 

the argument that the defense had “a ‘reciprocal’ right to an 
PEOPLE v. BRACAMONTES

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

27

instruction on absence of flight, as showing lack of guilt.” (Id. at 

p. 459.) Staten noted Green “observed that such an instruction 

would invite speculation; there are plausible reasons why a 

guilty person might refrain from flight. [Citation.] Our 

conclusion therein also forecloses any federal or state 

constitutional challenge based on due process.” (Ibid.) 

Defendant relies on Cool v. United States (1972) 409 U.S. 

100, but that case only bolsters our conclusion. Cool was 

arrested along with her husband and one Robert Voyles. Voyles 

had tried to pass counterfeit bills at a local store while Cool and 

her husband waited outside. Cool testified in her own defense 

and also called Voyles as a witness. The latter admitted his guilt 

but insisted Cool and her husband were blameless. Over 

defense objection the court instructed in a way that clearly 

implied the jury “should disregard Voyles’ testimony unless it 

was ‘convinced it [was] true beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (Id.

at p. 102.) The high court concluded such an instruction placed 

an improper burden on the defense when an accomplice gave 

exculpatory testimony because “the effect of the judge’s 

instructions is to require the defendant to establish his 

innocence beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Id. at p. 104.) Cool

underscored that accomplice testimony used to exonerate a 

defendant should not be treated in the same way as testimony 

used to implicate her. Similarly, there are valid reasons to treat 

evidence of flight differently from the absence of flight. “[T]here 

is no fundamental unfairness in not requiring an instruction on 

the absence of flight . . . . [U]nlike the flight of an accused from 

the scene of a crime or after accusation of a crime, the absence 

of flight presents such marginal relevance it is usually not even 

admissible. (See People v. Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 37.) 

Since flight and the absence of flight are not on similar logical 
PEOPLE v. BRACAMONTES

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

28

or legal footings, the due process notions of fairness and 

parity . . . are inapplicable.”

9

 (People v. Williams (1997) 55 

Cal.App.4th 648, 653; see People v. McGowan (2008) 160 

Cal.App.4th 1099, 1105.) 

2. Third Party Culpability

Defendant contends the trial court improperly excluded 

third party culpability evidence and precluded him from arguing 

that someone else committed the crimes here. There was no 

error. 

a. Background

The defense sought pretrial discovery of files from a 

federal drug trafficking investigation tangentially involving the 

victim’s father, Luis Arroyo. Defense counsel explained the 

information was relevant to Luis’s possible involvement in 

Laura’s disappearance. The court warned that if the defense 

was pursuing a third party culpability theory, and “if you are 

seeking reports that are going to suggest that some other 

specific party is involved in the murder, I thought that had to be 

the basis of a noticed motion.” After reviewing the Drug 

Enforcement Administration records in camera, the court 

9 Defendant’s reliance on Wardius v. Oregon (1973) 412 U.S. 

470 fails for similar reasons. Wardius held that due process 

principles precluded enforcement of a rule requiring defendants 

give notice of an alibi defense “unless reciprocal discovery rights 

are given to criminal defendants” (id. at p. 472), reasoning “[i]t 

is fundamentally unfair to require a defendant to divulge the 

details of his own case while at the same time subjecting him to 

the hazard of surprise concerning refutation of the very pieces 

of evidence which he disclosed to the State” (id. at p. 476). As 

discussed, however, evidence of flight does not stand on equal 

footing with evidence regarding absence of flight. 
PEOPLE v. BRACAMONTES

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

29

determined there was no relevant information pertaining to Mr. 

Arroyo and denied the request. 

The court thereafter took evidence on the question of 

pretrial delay. (See discussion ante.) During that hearing, there 

was evidence that Luis Arroyo had completed a police

investigative questionnaire. He listed as one of the “five most 

important causes that would have created this situation 

[involving Laura’s case]” the sale of a family-owned taco shop to 

Guadalupe Echeverria. The defense also presented evidence of 

a letter sent by Echeverria’s lawyer alleging the Arroyos had 

made misrepresentations about the sale. Echeverria died in 

December 1991. Detective Maxey testified he looked into the 

taco shop transaction but did not interview Echeverria. 

At trial, Enrique Loa testified that he had seen a small 

brown car with several occupants parked in the cul-de-sac 

around 8:45 to 9:00 p.m. on the night of Laura’s disappearance. 

Loa’s sister, Teresa Thomas, testified Loa told her that night he 

had seen a brown Datsun with three men and a woman inside 

and that the occupants “squatted down to hide.” Thomas then 

saw the car and occupants from her balcony. Robert Vazquez,

who was with Loa that night, told police that he had seen a 

reddish-brown car parked in the cul-de-sac, describing the 

occupants as a Filipino man, two Filipino women in their 

thirties, and a Filipino woman “about 50 to 60.” The victim’s 

mother informed police that some friends told her that they had 

seen a small brown car with three men and a woman parked in 

the cul-de-sac between 8:50 and 9:00 p.m. On crossexamination, Mrs. Arroyo testified she did not remember 

hearing about a Datsun with four occupants or telling the police 

she suspected “a female from the taco shop” might have been 

involved in Laura’s disappearance. 
PEOPLE v. BRACAMONTES

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

30

During cross-examination of Detective Maxey, defense 

counsel asked whether police investigated the Arroyos’ possible 

involvement in drug activity. The court sustained three 

prosecution objections on relevance grounds. The questioning 

then turned to the taco shop sale. Maxey testified that both the 

person who sold the shop to the Arroyos and a subsequent 

purchaser were “unhappy with Mr. Arroyo.” The court excluded, 

as calling for hearsay, questions about Luis’s questionnaire 

responses, the attorney letter to the Arroyos, and the name of 

another person involved in the sale. When defense counsel 

began to ask whether Luis had received threats at his 

workplace, the prosecutor asked for a sidebar. The prosecutor 

objected “to apparently all these lines of questioning having to 

do with third-party culpability and trying to get it in through 

hearsay.” The court suggested the admissibility of such 

evidence should have been raised in a noticed, pretrial motion. 

When defense counsel insisted she was not eliciting the evidence 

for its truth but only to raise doubts regarding the thoroughness 

of the police investigation, the court questioned the relevance of 

the evidence and concluded “when I see something like this, I’ll 

go ahead and make sure that it doesn’t get to the panel.” When 

cross-examination resumed, defense counsel pursued a different 

line of questioning. 

b. There Was No Error

Defendant cannot demonstrate error on this record. 

Initially, although defendant suggests the court “cut off the 

defense from fully developing” his eschewed third party 

culpability theory, he makes no effort to identify what specific 

evidence the court precluded. Through cross-examination of 

prosecution witnesses, the defense elicited that a car with up to 

four occupants had been seen parked in the cul-de-sac at the 
PEOPLE v. BRACAMONTES

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

31

time of Laura’s disappearance. Defense counsel asked Detective 

Maxey whether he investigated the taco shop sale as a possible 

motive for the crimes here. Although the court sustained

hearsay objections to the contents of an attorney letter about the 

sale, defendant makes no argument here that a hearsay 

exception applied or that the letter itself was otherwise 

admissible.

Further, there was no basis for admitting the taco shop 

evidence. The defense theory appears to have been that 

Echeverria was a disgruntled purchaser and that an older 

passenger in a “suspicious” car parked in the vicinity was a 

woman. Whatever evidence supported this theory would have 

shown “mere motive or opportunity to commit the crime in 

another person” without providing any “direct or circumstantial 

evidence linking the third person to the actual perpetration of 

the crime.” (People v. Hall (1986) 41 Cal.3d 826, 833.) “We have 

repeatedly upheld the exclusion of third party culpability 

evidence when the third party’s link to a crime is tenuous or 

speculative.” (People v. Turner (2020) 10 Cal.5th 786, 817

(Turner).) As we explained in Turner, “admissible evidence of 

this nature points to the culpability of a specific third party, not 

the possibility that some unidentified third party could have 

committed the crime. [Citations.] For the evidence to be 

relevant and admissible, ‘there must be direct or circumstantial 

evidence linking the third person to the actual perpetration of the 

crime.’ ” (Id. at pp. 816–817.) Defendant’s argument here fails 

because there is no evidence linking the brown car’s occupants, 

whoever they were, to the abduction of Laura, or with 

Echeverria for that matter. (See People v. Kaurish (1990) 52 

Cal.3d 648, 685.) Defendant’s third party evidence argument 

rests on two layers of speculation: 1. That Echeverria was one 
PEOPLE v. BRACAMONTES

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

32

of the occupants of a car seen parked near the kidnapping scene,

and 2. that those occupants had something to do with Laura’s 

disappearance. (See Turner, at pp. 817–818; People v. Ghobrial

(2018) 5 Cal.5th 250, 283–284; People v. Alcala (1992) 4 Cal.4th 

742, 792–793.) The state of the record defeats his claim. 

C. Penalty Phase Issues

1. Victim Impact Evidence

Defendant contends the trial court improperly allowed 

victim impact testimony from Laura’s third grade teacher, Mari 

Peterson. There was no error. 

a. Background

Before the penalty phase, the parties discussed the 

prosecutor’s intent to offer the video of a conversation between 

Laura and her teacher. Defense counsel noted that the teacher 

was on the prosecution’s witness list and inquired whether she 

would merely authenticate the video or give victim impact 

testimony. The prosecutor clarified that the teacher would 

testify about the “impact of Laura’s death on her, friends, and 

community. Her little friends and community.” The defense 

objected to the presentation of victim impact testimony from 

someone outside the victim’s family, and the parties discussed 

relevant case authority. The trial court overruled the objection 

but clarified that the teacher would only be allowed to discuss 

the impact of Laura’s death in the days immediately following 

the murder, excluding evidence that Laura’s classmates 

purchased a plaque in her honor two or three years later. 

Mari Peterson testified she was Laura’s third grade 

teacher in 1991 and knew Laura “very well.” Laura was 

Peterson’s “favorite student that year” and “was the type of 

student that from the time you met her, you just wanted to love
PEOPLE v. BRACAMONTES

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

33

her.” Laura “loved school,” was “best friends with everybody,” 

and would welcome new students. Peterson described the 

atmosphere at school the morning after Laura disappeared. Her 

father was passing out flyers and concerned parents were asking 

questions. Half the students “were crying already” and “wanted 

to know where their friend was.” When Laura’s body was 

discovered later that morning, Peterson and a psychologist 

broke the news to the students. Peterson described the impact 

on Laura’s classmates: “Of course, they are not going to work. 

All they want to do is they want to know things. They want to 

know where she is. They want her back. Everybody wanted to 

sit at her desk. It was terrible.” After Laura’s death, parents 

began walking their children to and from school. Many children 

attended Laura’s funeral, which “was packed,” and Peterson 

described how Laura’s body was in a “tiny little casket” with a 

teddy bear. At the burial there were “just so many kids crying.” 

After Laura’s death, Peterson was unable to teach third grade 

again. She felt guilty for missing the last day Laura attended 

class. Peterson identified Laura’s class photo and a clip of the 

video conversation with Laura. 

b. There Was No Error

Defendant contends Peterson’s testimony constituted “an 

inflammatory appeal to the raw sentiments of the jurors that 

went well beyond” permissible victim impact evidence, and the 

probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by 

the probability of undue prejudice. We reject these claims. “The 

Eighth Amendment does not categorically bar victim impact 

evidence. [Citation.] To the contrary, witnesses are permitted 

to share with jurors the harm that a capital crime caused in 

their lives.” (People v. Perez (2018) 4 Cal.5th 421, 461–462.) 

“That is because ‘the effects of a capital crime are relevant . . .
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Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

34

as a circumstance of the crime.’ [Citations.] And so long as 

victim impact evidence does not invite the jury to respond in a 

purely irrational way, it is admissible.” (People v. Mendez (2019) 

7 Cal.5th 680, 712.) “Victim impact evidence is simply another 

form or method of informing the sentencing authority about the 

specific harm caused by the crime in question, evidence of a 

general type long considered by sentencing authorities.” (Payne

v. Tennessee (1991) 501 U.S. 808, 825.) “ ‘ “Unless it invites a 

purely irrational response from the jury, the devastating effect 

of a capital crime on loved ones and the community is relevant 

and admissible as a circumstance of the crime under section 

190.3, factor (a).” [Citation.] “The federal Constitution bars 

victim impact evidence only if it is ‘so unduly prejudicial’ as to 

render the trial ‘fundamentally unfair.’ ” [Citation.]’ ” (People 

v. Westerfield (2019) 6 Cal.5th 632, 729, italics added

(Westerfield).) 

Westerfield recently endorsed similar victim impact 

testimony from teachers “regarding [the victim’s] character and 

contributions, and to the effect of her murder on themselves and 

[her] classmates.” (Westerfield, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 728.) 

Westerfield reasoned: “ ‘The purpose of victim impact evidence

is to demonstrate the immediate harm caused by the 

defendant’s criminal conduct.’ [Citation.] That harm is not 

limited to immediate family members. [Citation.] Friends, 

coworkers, classmates, and teachers, may all be affected by the 

death of the victim under the specific circumstances of a case. 

[Citations.] Here, defendant’s shocking abduction and murder 

of seven-year-old Danielle caused emotional harm to her 

teachers and classmates. Our review of the record does not 

persuade us that her teachers’ testimony regarding Danielle and 

those effects would invite a purely irrational response from the 
PEOPLE v. BRACAMONTES

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

35

jury or that it rendered defendant’s trial fundamentally unfair 

under the circumstances.” (Id. at p. 729.) 

Westerfield’s reasoning applies equally here. Laura was 

very close to her teacher and classmates. The impact of her 

death on this community was relevant to assessing the harm 

defendant caused. “Moreover, we have repeatedly held that 

evidence related to a murder victim’s funeral is relevant and 

admissible.” (People v. Winbush (2017) 2 Cal.5th 402, 465.) 

Peterson’s descriptions of the funeral and burial were not so 

emotional as to elicit a purely irrational response from the jury. 

(See ibid. [testimony regarding victim’s funeral and family’s 

grave visits proper]; People v. Brady (2010) 50 Cal.4th 547, 579–

581 [videotape of victim’s funeral properly admitted]; see also 

People v. Dykes (2009) 46 Cal.4th 731, 780, 782; People v. 

Verdugo (2010) 50 Cal.4th 263, 296–298.) 

2. Constitutionality of the Death Penalty Statute

Defendant raises numerous familiar challenges to the 

constitutionality of California’s death penalty scheme. His 

primary contention is that, when the jury returns a death 

verdict, it must conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the 

aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating ones, because such 

a finding increases punishment. Proof of that nature is not 

required. As we have previously stated, “the only burden of 

proof applicable at the penalty phase” involves proof of the 

commission or conviction of other crimes under Penal Code 

section 190.3 factors (b) and (c). (People v. Capers (2019) 7 

Cal.5th 989, 1015 (Capers).) “Otherwise, our cases do not 

require that a burden of proof be applied to aggravating 

evidence.” (Ibid.) “We have previously held that the death 

penalty is not unconstitutional ‘ “ ‘for failing to require proof 
PEOPLE v. BRACAMONTES

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

36

beyond a reasonable doubt that aggravating factors exist, 

outweigh the mitigating factors, and render death the 

appropriate punishment.’ [Citation.]” ’ [Citation.] We also have 

consistently held the death penalty does not constitute an 

increased sentence. [Citation.] And we have determined that 

these conclusions are unaltered by Apprendi v. New Jersey

(2000) 530 U.S. 466, Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584, 

Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296, or Cunningham v. 

California (2007) 549 U.S. 270. [Citation.]” (People v. Wilson

(2021) 11 Cal.5th 259, 317 (Wilson).) The jury’s determination 

of the appropriate sentence within the statutorily specified 

options “is ‘an inherently moral and normative function, and not 

a factual one amenable to burden of proof calculations’ [citation], 

[and] the prosecution has no obligation to bear a burden of proof 

or persuasion [citation]. Nor does the federal Constitution 

require an instruction that life is the presumptive penalty.” 

(Turner, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 828.) 

Defendant relies upon Hurst v. Florida (2016) 577 U.S. 92, 

but we have explained that case “does not alter our conclusion 

under the federal Constitution or under the Sixth Amendment 

about the burden of proof or unanimity regarding aggravating 

circumstances, the weighing of aggravating and mitigating 

circumstances, or the ultimate penalty determination. 

[Citations.] And we have concluded that Hurst does not cause 

us to reconsider our holdings that imposition of the death 

penalty does not constitute an increased sentence within the 

meaning of Apprendi[ v. Arizona], supra, 530 U.S. 466, or that 

the imposition of the death penalty does not require factual 

findings within the meaning of Ring v. Arizona[, supra,] 536 

U.S. 584. [Citation.] As [defendant] acknowledges, neither Ring

nor Hurst decided the standard of proof that applies to the 
PEOPLE v. BRACAMONTES

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

37

ultimate weighing consideration.” (People v. McDaniel (2021) 12 

Cal.5th 97, 155−156.) 

Likewise, Rauf v. State (Del. 2016) 145 A.3d 430, cited by 

defendant, does not call our prior decisions into doubt. The 

Delaware statute at issue there, like the Florida statute in 

Hurst, required the trial court, rather than the jury, to engage 

in additional factfinding before it determined whether death 

was the appropriate sentence. Under that statutory approach,

the jury’s findings were merely recommendations. (See Del. 

Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4209(d).)10 As we have noted with respect 

to Hurst, “[t]he California sentencing scheme is materially 

different from that in Florida, which, in contrast to our death 

penalty statutes, mandates that the trial court alone must find 

that sufficient aggravating circumstances outweigh the 

mitigating circumstances.” (Capers, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1014.) 

10 The Delaware statute states in part that “the Court, after 

considering the findings and recommendation of the jury and 

without hearing or reviewing any additional evidence, shall 

impose a sentence of death if the Court finds by a preponderance 

of the evidence, after weighing all relevant evidence in 

aggravation or mitigation which bears upon the particular 

circumstances or details of the commission of the offense and the 

character and propensities of the offender, that the aggravating 

circumstances found by the Court to exist outweigh the 

mitigating circumstances found by the Court to exist. The jury’s 

recommendation concerning whether the aggravating 

circumstances found to exist outweigh the mitigating 

circumstances found to exist shall be given such consideration 

as deemed appropriate by the Court in light of the particular 

circumstances or details of the commission of the offense and the 

character and propensities of the offender as found to exist by 

the Court. The jury’s recommendation shall not be binding upon 

the Court.” (Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4209(d)(1).) 
PEOPLE v. BRACAMONTES

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

38

The same is true with respect to the Delaware statute at issue 

in Rauf. 

In addition to his primary claim, defendant summarily 

asserts other challenges to the death penalty statute and related 

instructions that we have previously rejected. He does so “in 

order to urge reconsideration and to preserve these claims for 

federal review,” but he presents no compelling argument to 

reconsider our precedents. We reject these claims as follows:

1. The death penalty statute is not impermissibly 

overbroad. It adequately narrows the class of defendants 

eligible for a death sentence. (Wilson, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 

317; People v. Chhoun (2021) 11 Cal.5th 1, 53 (Chhoun); Bell, 

supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 130; Westerfield, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 

733.) 

2. Penal Code section 190.3, factor (a), which directs the 

jury to consider the “circumstances of the crime,” is not 

overbroad. (See People v. Scully (2021) 11 Cal.5th 542, 610

(Scully); Wilson, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 317; Chhoun, supra, 11 

Cal.5th at p. 54; Bell, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 130.) 

3. The prosecution did not bear the burden of persuasion 

regarding proof of any aggravating factor, the weighing of 

aggravating and mitigating factors, or imposition of the death 

penalty. There was also no requirement to instruct the jury 

regarding the lack of a burden of proof. (Wilson, supra, 11 

Cal.5th at p. 317; Chhoun, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 54; Bell, supra,

7 Cal.5th at p. 131.) 

4. The jury need not find individual aggravating factors 

unanimously. (Wilson, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 317; Chhoun, 

supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 54; Westerfield, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 

733.) 
PEOPLE v. BRACAMONTES

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

39

5. An instruction that the jury should determine whether 

“the aggravating circumstances are so substantial in 

comparison with the mitigating circumstances that it warrants 

death instead of life without parole” was not impermissibly 

vague. (See Scully, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 609; Wilson, supra,

11 Cal.5th at p. 318.) 

6. CALJIC No. 8.88 is not unconstitutional for directing 

the jury to determine whether the aggravating circumstances 

“warrant” death rather than that the death penalty is 

“appropriate,” or for failing to expressly state that the jury 

should return a life sentence if it finds mitigating circumstances 

outweigh aggravating ones. (Wilson, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 318; 

Chhoun, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 54; People v. Morales (2020) 10 

Cal.5th 76, 112.) 

7. There is no presumption in favor of a life term. (Wilson, 

supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 317–318; Chhoun, supra, 11 Cal.5th at 

p. 54; People v. Ramirez (2021) 10 Cal.5th 983, 1039 (Ramirez).) 

8. The jury need not make written findings. (Wilson, 

supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 317; Chhoun, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 54; 

Bell, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 131.) 

9. The use of adjectives “extreme” and “substantial” do not 

improperly limit the jury’s consideration of certain mitigating 

factors. (Wilson, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 318; Chhoun, supra, 11 

Cal.5th at p. 55; Bell, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 130.) 

10. There was no requirement that inapplicable 

sentencing factors be deleted. (People v. Dworak (2021) 11 

Cal.5th 881, 917; Wilson, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 318; Chhoun, 

supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 55.) 
PEOPLE v. BRACAMONTES

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

40

11. There was no requirement to identify factors that were 

only mitigating. (Chhoun, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 55; Ramirez, 

supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 1040; Bell, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 130.) 

12. Intercase proportionality review is not 

constitutionally required. (Wilson, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 318; 

Chhoun, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 55; Bell, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 

131; Westerfield, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 734.) 

13. The death penalty scheme does not violate equal 

protection principles “by providing significantly fewer 

procedural protections for persons facing a death sentence than 

are afforded persons charged with noncapital crimes.” (Wilson, 

supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 318; Chhoun, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 55; 

Bell, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 131.) 

14. The death penalty is not a “regular” punishment that 

violates international norms. (Wilson, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 

318; Chhoun, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 55; Bell, supra, 7 Cal.5th 

at pp. 131–132.) 

D. Cumulative Error Claim

Defendant contends cumulative error deprived him of a 

fair trial. The only potential error identified was defendant’s 

shackling, for which he failed to establish prejudice. Therefore,

there is no reversable error to accumulate. (Bell, supra, 7 

Cal.5th at p. 132; Westerfield, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 728.) 
PEOPLE v. BRACAMONTES

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

41

III. DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. 

CORRIGAN, J.

We Concur:

CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J.

LIU, J.

KRUGER, J.

GROBAN, J.

JENKINS, J.

MENETREZ, J.*

__________________________

* Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate 

District, Division Two, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant 

to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 

argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion People v. Bracamontes

__________________________________________________________ 

Procedural Posture (see XX below)

Original Appeal XX

Original Proceeding

Review Granted (published) 

Review Granted (unpublished) 

Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________ 

Opinion No. S139702

Date Filed: April 11, 2022

__________________________________________________________ 

Court: Superior

County: San Diego

Judge: John M. Thompson

__________________________________________________________ 

Counsel:

Mary K. McComb, State Public Defender, under appointment by 

the Supreme Court, and AJ Kutchins, Deputy State Public 

Defender, for Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra and Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, Gerald A. Engler, 

Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney 

General, Holly D. Wilkens, Theodore M. Cropley and Michael T. 

Murphy, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 

publication with opinion):

AJ Kutchins

Deputy State Public Defender

1111 Broadway, Suite 1000

Oakland, CA 94607

(510) 267-3300

Michael T. Murphy

Deputy Attorney General

600 West Broadway, Suite 1800

San Diego, CA 92101

(619) 738-9211