[Cite as State v. Stahl-Francisco, 2020-Ohio-5456.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

 )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF MEDINA ) 

STATE OF OHIO 

 Appellee 

 v. 

JENNIFER M. STAHL-FRANCISCO 

 Appellant 

C.A. No. 19CA0093-M 

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT 

ENTERED IN THE 

MEDINA MUNICIPAL COURT 

COUNTY OF MEDINA, OHIO 

CASE No. 19TRC04877 

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY 

Dated: November 30, 2020 

 

HENSAL, Judge. 

{¶1} Jennifer Stahl-Francisco appeals her convictions in the Medina Municipal Court. 

For the following reasons, this Court affirms. 

I. 

{¶2} Ms. Stahl-Francisco was tried before a jury on one count of operating a vehicle 

under the influence of alcohol. About an hour after the jury began deliberations, the court received 

a question from it concerning whether a juror could be removed for being mentally unstable. While 

the court was consulting with counsel and crafting an appropriate response, it received a second 

question concerning what would happen if the jurors could not all agree on a verdict. After the 

court answered that question but was still reviewing the first question with counsel, it learned that 

the jury had reached a verdict. Upon calling the jury back into the courtroom, the court inquired 

with the juror who was the target of the first question. The juror indicated that she did not agree 

with the verdict but could not stay there forever and needed to go home. When the court inquired 
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further, the juror admitted that she was going along with the verdict not based on her own 

independent assessment of the case but because of her desire to get finished sooner. 

{¶3} Based on the juror’s statements, the court dismissed her and recalled the alternate 

juror to take her place. The court then instructed the jury to begin their deliberations anew. The 

recomposed jury found Ms. Stahl-Francisco guilty of the offense, and the trial court found her 

guilty of displaying improper taillights. The court sentenced Ms. Stahl-Francisco to 90 days in 

jail, but it suspended 80 of the days. Ms. Stahl-Francisco has appealed, assigning five errors. 

II. 

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE AND PLAIN ERROR 

WHEN IT, REMOVED A JUROR FOR REASONS STEMMING FROM THE 

JUROR’S VIEWS ON THE MERITS OF THE CASE IN VIOLATION OF SIXTH 

AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES 

CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, § 10 OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION. 

{¶4} Ms. Stahl-Francisco argues that the trial court denied her the right to an impartial 

jury when it removed the juror who expressed disagreement with the verdict. Criminal Rule 

24(G)(1) indicates that the purpose of alternate jurors is to replace jurors who “become or are 

found to be unable or disqualified to perform their duties.” The rule implicitly grants a trial court 

the authority to dismiss a juror who is not impartial or is otherwise not suitable for service. State 

v. Smith, 9th Dist. Summit No. 23288, 2007-Ohio-1680, ¶ 43. The Ohio Supreme Court has held, 

however, that “a juror cannot be removed if there is ‘any possibility’ that fellow jurors’ complaints 

about him or her are rooted in his or her view of the merits of the case.” State v. Robb, 88 Ohio 

St.3d 59, 81 (2000), quoting United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606, 621 (2d Cir.1997). “[T]o 

remove a juror because [s]he is unpersuaded by the Government’s case is to deny the defendant 

his right to a unanimous verdict.” Id. We review the trial court’s decision to discharge a juror for 

abuse of discretion. State v. Bryan, 101 Ohio St.3d 272, 2004-Ohio-971, ¶ 80. 
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{¶5} The jury’s initial question was “Can a jury member be removed from being what 

seems unstable, paren, very shaken, closed paren, mentally, question mark.” Before the parties 

and court determined how to respond to the question, the jury asked a second question of “What 

happens if we can’t agree?” Noting that it had only been about an hour since deliberations had 

begun, the court returned an answer on the second question that the jury should review the 

instructions and keep deliberating. The court then returned to discussing the first question with 

counsel. Before reaching an agreement on how to respond, the jury returned a verdict, so the court 

answered the jury that its first question was moot. 

{¶6} When the jury was called into the courtroom, the court asked whether the juror who 

was alleged to be unstable was feeling well. She responded that she “actually disagree[d] with the 

overall verdict, but I can’t stay here forever, and I need to go home. And I think it’s not right, 

actually, that you make people stay until they decide, because then people are going to choose to 

go with the group.” The court replied that the point of deliberations “is that the parties work 

through disagreements, examine evidence together, reason with each other, and come to certain 

conclusions.” It also informed the juror that deliberations “are giv[en] a sufficient amount of time 

so people can work through those issues. But it sounds to me as though you have decided to 

acquiesce your verdict reached by your co-jurors for reasons not having to do with your own 

independent assessment in this case, but your desire to get out of here soon.” The juror verified 

that the court’s assessment was correct. The court, therefore, concluded that the verdict was not 

unanimous, finding that the jury had only reached a conclusion because one juror “for reasons 

ha[ving] nothing to do with actually delivering a verdict in this case, desire[d] to leave the court, 

[and] abandon her jury duty * * *.” It determined, however, that Ms. Stahl-Francisco could still 

receive a fair trial by dismissing the juror and replacing her with the alternate juror. The court 
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called the jury back into the courtroom and dismissed the juror finding that “she has abdicated her 

responsibilities as a juror, she has decided not to participate in accordance with the Court’s 

instructions, and that she is reaching her conclusions by reasons, I think, creates an obvious 

injustice to [Ms. Stahl-Francisco] * * *.” 

{¶7} The jury’s first question did not contain any indication that its concern about one 

of its members had anything to do with that juror’s views on the merits of the case. The jury’s 

second question did not indicate that it was the juror who was the subject of the first question who 

was creating disagreement among the jurors. When the jury returned to the courtroom, the court 

did not ask the jurors to describe anything that had occurred during deliberations. It simply asked 

the juror who was referenced in the first question whether she was feeling well. It was at that point 

that the juror volunteered that she was only going along with the verdict because she wanted to 

leave. The court did not actually know whether the verdict was to convict or acquit Ms. StahlFrancisco. It decided, however, that the juror was declining to participate in further conversations 

about the merits of the case and was only going along with the verdict to facilitate the end of her 

service. 

{¶8} Upon review of the record, we conclude that there is no indication that the jury’s 

concern about one of its members was rooted in the juror’s view of the merits of the case. There 

is also no indication that the court removed the juror because she was unpersuaded by the State’s 

case. Although the jury convicted Ms. Stahl-Francisco after the alternate juror was substituted for 

the removed juror, at the time the court removed the juror, it had no idea whether the jury’s original 

verdict was for conviction or acquittal. We cannot say that the trial court exercised improper 

discretion when it decided to remove the juror based on her admission that she was refusing to 

perform her responsibilities as a juror. We also conclude that the removal of the juror did not 
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deprive Ms. Stahl-Francisco of the right to a fair trial. Ms. Stahl-Francisco’s first assignment of 

error is overruled. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II 

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE AND PLAIN ERROR 

WHEN IT INSTRUCTED THE JURY TO RESUME DELIBERATIONS AFTER 

IT REMOVED A JUROR AND REPLACED THE JUROR WITH AN 

ALTERNATE IN VIOLATION OF SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH 

AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND SECTION 

10, ARTICLE I OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION. 

{¶9} Ms. Stahl-Francisco next argues that the trial court committed error when it 

replaced the removed juror because it failed to instruct the reconstituted jury that it should begin 

its deliberations anew. Rule 24(G)(1) provides that, “[i]f an alternate replaces a juror after 

deliberations have begun, the court must instruct the jury to begin its deliberations anew.” Ms. 

Stahl-Francisco acknowledges that she did not object to the court’s instructions to the new jury but 

contends that the alleged error was plain. 

{¶10} The record does not support Ms. Stahl-Francisco’s argument. After replacing the 

dismissed juror, the court explained to the jury: 

[N]ow that you are recomposed with this new juror, you need to start anew when 

you begin your deliberations. In other words, you don’t just pick up and work with 

[the replacement juror] with regard to the conclusions you’ve already made. You 

owe it to [Ms. Stahl-Francisco] and to the State that the evidence and the law be reexamined fresh with the new composition, with this new Jury, so that everyone gets 

a fair and impartial trial in this case. 

Immediately thereafter, it directed the jury to “please reconvene to restart your deliberations * * 

*.” We, therefore, conclude that the trial court did not fail to comply with the requirement in Rule 

24(G)(1) that it instruct the jury to begin its deliberations anew. Ms. Stahl-Francisco’s second 

assignment of error is overruled. 

 
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ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III 

MS. STAHL-FRANCISCO WAS DENIED HER CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 

TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AT TRIAL WHEN HER TRIAL 

COUNSEL FAILED TO OBJECT TO THE TRIAL COURT’S INSTRUCTING 

THE JURY TO RESUME DELIBERATIONS. 

{¶11} Ms. Stahl-Francisco next argues that she received ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, she must establish (1) that her 

counsel’s performance was deficient to the extent that “counsel was not functioning as the 

‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment” and (2) that “the deficient 

performance prejudiced the defense.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). A 

deficient performance is one that falls below an objective standard of reasonable representation. 

State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136 (1989), paragraph two of the syllabus. A court, however, 

“must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of 

reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, 

under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’” 

Strickland at 689, quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955). To establish prejudice, 

Ms. Stahl-Francisco must show that there existed a reasonable probability that, but for her 

counsel’s errors, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. State v. Sowell, 148 

Ohio St.3d 554, 2016-Ohio-8025, ¶ 138. 

{¶12} Ms. Stahl-Francisco argues that her counsel should have objected when the trial 

court violated Rule 24(G) after replacing one of the jurors. She also alleges that the error directly 

affected the outcome of the proceedings. As noted above, however, the trial court did not fail to 

instruct the jury to begin its deliberations anew after it replaced one of the jurors with the alternate. 

We, therefore, conclude that Ms. Stahl-Francisco’s counsel did not render deficient performance 

when she dd not object to the court’s instructions. Consequently, Ms. Stahl-Francisco has not 
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established that she received ineffective assistance of counsel. Ms. Stahl-Francisco’s third 

assignment of error is overruled. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR IV 

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED DEFENDANT’S MOTION 

FOR A TRANSCRIPT OF THE SUPPRESSION HEARING IN VIOLATION OF 

MS. STAHL-FRANCISCO’S RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND TO 

EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER THE LAW. 

{¶13} Ms. Stahl-Francisco’s fourth assignment of error is that the trial court incorrectly 

refused to provide her with a copy of the transcript of the suppression hearing. According to Ms. 

Stahl-Francisco, because she did not have a copy of that transcript, it hindered her crossexamination of the trooper who conducted the traffic stop of her vehicle. 

{¶14} The transcript of the suppression hearing has been prepared for appeal. Ms. StahlFrancisco, however, has not identified anything in her argument that she would have used to crossexamine the trooper. In her statement of facts, Ms. Stahl-Francisco notes that, at the suppression 

hearing, the trooper was able to identify the shoes she was wearing at the time of the stop. She 

alleges that at trial, however, he could not identify the shoes. 

{¶15} On cross-examination, Ms. Stahl-Francisco asked the trooper whether they had 

talked about “these shoes” during a previous hearing. The trooper agreed. She then asked whether 

he agreed that “these are the ones she was wearing.” He replied that they “could be, yes.” 

Accordingly, we do not agree that the trooper was unable to identify Ms. Stahl-Francisco’s shoes 

at trial. In addition, Ms. Stahl-Francisco does not argue how a transcription of the trooper’s 

answers regarding her shoes during the suppression hearing would have aided her crossexamination of him. Upon review of the record, we conclude that, even if Ms. Stahl-Francisco 

was entitled to a copy of the suppression hearing transcript, she was not prejudiced by the trial 

court’s denial of her motion. Crim R. 52(A) (“Any error, defect, irregularity, or variance which 
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does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.”). Ms. Stahl-Francisco’s fourth assignment 

of error is overruled. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR V 

THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THE TRIAL COURT’S ERRORS DENIED 

DEFENDANT A FAIR TRIAL. 

{¶16} Ms. Stahl-Francisco’s final argument is that the cumulative effect of all of the trial 

court’s errors deprived her of a fair trial. “Under the doctrine of cumulative error, ‘a conviction 

will be reversed when the cumulative effect of errors in a trial deprives a defendant of a fair trial 

even though each of the numerous instances of trial-court error does not individually constitute 

cause for reversal.’” State v. Froman, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2020-Ohio-4523, ¶ 156, quoting State v. 

Powell, 132 Ohio St.3d 233, 2012-Ohio-2577, ¶ 223. 

{¶17} Ms. Stahl-Francisco has not established that the trial court committed multiple 

errors in this case. The doctrine of cumulative error, therefore, is not applicable. State v. Hunter, 

131 Ohio St.3d 67, 2011-Ohio-6524, ¶ 132. Ms. Stahl-Francisco’s fifth assignment of error is 

overruled. 

III. 

{¶18} Ms. Stahl-Francisco’s assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the 

Medina Municipal Court is affirmed. 

Judgment affirmed. 

 

 There were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 
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 We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Medina Municipal 

Court, County of Medina, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy 

of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27. 

 Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of 

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period 

for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to 

mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the 

docket, pursuant to App.R. 30. 

 Costs taxed to Appellant. 

 

 JENNIFER HENSAL 

 FOR THE COURT 

CARR, P. J. 

SCHAFER, J. 

CONCUR. 

APPEARANCES: 

OLIVIA A. MYERS, Attorney at Law, for Appellant. 

ROBERT B. CAMPBELL, Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.