alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> UT
<CIK> 0000107833
<NAME> WISCONSIN PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATION
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1998
<BOOK-VALUE>                                  PER-BOOK
<TOTAL-NET-UTILITY-PLANT>                      908,624
<OTHER-PROPERTY-AND-INVEST>                      2,888
<TOTAL-CURRENT-ASSETS>                         162,785
<TOTAL-DEFERRED-CHARGES>                        68,335
<OTHER-ASSETS>                                 124,950
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               1,267,582
<COMMON>                                        95,588
<CAPITAL-SURPLUS-PAID-IN>                      107,842
<RETAINED-EARNINGS>                            278,278
<TOTAL-COMMON-STOCKHOLDERS-EQ>                 481,708
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                     51,200
<LONG-TERM-DEBT-NET>                           304,033
<SHORT-TERM-NOTES>                              10,000
<LONG-TERM-NOTES-PAYABLE>                            0
<COMMERCIAL-PAPER-OBLIGATIONS>                  25,000
<LONG-TERM-DEBT-CURRENT-PORT>                        0
<PREFERRED-STOCK-CURRENT>                            0
<CAPITAL-LEASE-OBLIGATIONS>                          0
<LEASES-CURRENT>                                     0
<OTHER-ITEMS-CAPITAL-AND-LIAB>                 395,641
<TOT-CAPITALIZATION-AND-LIAB>                1,267,582
<GROSS-OPERATING-REVENUE>                      652,451
<INCOME-TAX-EXPENSE>                            29,191
<OTHER-OPERATING-EXPENSES>                     549,657
<TOTAL-OPERATING-EXPENSES>                     578,848
<OPERATING-INCOME-LOSS>                         73,603
<OTHER-INCOME-NET>                               6,607
<INCOME-BEFORE-INTEREST-EXPEN>                  80,210
<TOTAL-INTEREST-EXPENSE>                        23,024
<NET-INCOME>                                    57,186
<PREFERRED-STOCK-DIVIDENDS>                      3,111
<EARNINGS-AVAILABLE-FOR-COMM>                   54,075
<COMMON-STOCK-DIVIDENDS>                        66,838
<TOTAL-INTEREST-ON-BONDS>                       20,905
<CASH-FLOW-OPERATIONS>                         130,557
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0<F1>
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0<F1>
<FN>
<F1>All of Wisconsin Public Service Corporation ("WPSC") common stock is
controlled by WPS Resources Corporation which operates as a holding company.  
WPSC, as a subsidiary, does not calculate earnings per share.  The earnings
per share of WPS Resources Corporation for 1998 were $1.76 for both basic
and diluted earnings per share calculations.
</FN>
        
<PAGE>

</TABLE>
Order filed November 5, 2015

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals 

____________

No. 11-15-00228-CR

__________

FRANKIE RAY MCKINNEY, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 385th District Court

Midland County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. CR44036

O R D E R

Court-appointed counsel for Frankie Ray McKinney has filed in this court a 

timely motion to abate this appeal to give the trial court an opportunity to conduct 

a hearing on McKinney’s motion to proceed pro se in this appeal. We grant 

counsel’s motion and abate this appeal.

We abate the appeal and remand the cause to the trial court so that the trial 

court may determine the following: 

1. Whether McKinney desires to prosecute this appeal;

2. Whether McKinney is indigent;
2

3. If not indigent, whether McKinney has retained counsel for this appeal;

and

4. If indigent, whether McKinney desires to have counsel appointed to 

represent him in this appeal or whether, after being warned of the dangers 

and disadvantages of self-representation, McKinney competently and 

intelligently chooses to exercise the right to represent himself. 

If it is determined that McKinney is indigent and is exercising his right to represent 

himself, the trial court must develop evidence as to whether McKinney’s decision 

to proceed without counsel is knowingly and intelligently made. See Faretta v. 

California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975); Ex parte Davis, 818 S.W.2d 64 (Tex. Crim. App.

1991); Hubbard v. State, 739 S.W.2d 341, 345 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987); Webb v. 

State, 533 S.W.2d 780, 783–86 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976). The trial court is directed 

to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law and to make any appropriate 

recommendations to this court. 

The clerk of the trial court is directed to prepare and forward to this court a 

supplemental clerk’s record containing the findings, recommendations, and any 

orders of the trial court. The court reporter is directed to prepare and forward to 

this court the reporter’s record from the hearing. These records are due to be filed 

in this court on or before December 21, 2015.

The motion to abate is granted, and the appeal is abated. 

PER CURIAM

November 5, 2015

Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Panel consists of: Wright, C.J.,

Willson, J., and Bailey, J.
Exhibit
10.2

    
 

    WAIVER

    


    In
consideration for the benefits I will receive as a result of my employer’s
participation in the United States Department of the Treasury’s TARP Capital
Purchase Program, I hereby voluntarily waive any claim against the United States
or any state or territory thereof or my employer or any of its directors,
officers, employees and agents for any changes to my compensation or benefits
that are required in order to comply with Section 111 of the Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act of 2008, as amended (“EESA”), and rules,
regulations, guidance or other requirements issued thereunder (collectively, the
“EESA
Restrictions”).

    


    I
acknowledge that the EESA Restrictions may require modification of the
employment, compensation, bonus, incentive, severance, retention and other
benefit plans, arrangements, policies and agreements (including so-called
“golden parachute” agreements), whether or not in writing, that I have with my
employer or in which I participate as they relate to the period the United
States holds any equity or debt securities of my employer acquired through the
TARP Capital Purchase Program and I hereby consent to all such
modifications.  I further acknowledge and agree that if my employer
notifies me in writing that I have received payments in violation of the EESA
Restrictions, I shall repay the aggregate amount of such payments to my employer
no later than fifteen business days following my receipt of such
notice.

    


    This
waiver includes all claims I may have under the laws of the United States or any
other jurisdiction related to the requirements imposed by the EESA Restrictions
(including without limitation, any claim for any compensation or other payments
or benefits I would otherwise receive absent the EESA Restrictions, any
challenge to the process by which the EESA Restrictions were adopted and any
tort or constitutional claim about the effect of the foregoing on my employment
relationship) and I hereby agree that I will not at any time initiate, or cause
or permit to be initiated on my behalf, any such claim against the United
States, my employer or its directors, officers, employees or agents in or before
any local, state, federal or other agency, court or body.

    


    In
witness whereof, I execute this waiver on my own behalf, thereby communicating
my acceptance and acknowledgement to the provisions herein.

     

    
      
        	 
      	
                Respectfully,

              
	 
      	 
      	 
      
	 
      	 
      	
                   

              	 
      
	 
      	 
      	
                Name:

              
	 
      	 
      	
                Title:

              
	 
      	 
      	
                Date:
# Fourth Court of Appeals

**San Antonio, Texas**

December 4, 2019

No. 04

- 19

- 00514

- CR

George LUCIO

, Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,

A ppellee

From the 25th Judicial District Court, Guadalupe County, Texas

Trial Court No. 17

- 2556

- CR

- A Honorable Gary L. Steel, Judge Presiding



### O RDER

Appellant George Lucio ’s court

- appointed attorney has filed a brief and motion to withdraw pursuant to Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967), in which counsel asserts there are no meritorious issues to raise on appeal. Counsel sent copies of the brie f and motion to withdraw to appellant and explained appellant’s rights to review the record, file a pro se brief,

and file a pro se petition for discretionary review if this court determines the appeal is frivolous. See Kelly v. State , 436 S.W.3d 313 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). In addition, counsel’s letter explained how to obtain the record and enclosed a motion for this purpose. See id.

Appellant has filed a motion to obtain a copy of the record. The mot ion is granted . We

order the clerk of this court to send appellant, pro se, a copy of the record.

If Lucio desires to file a pro se brief, we order that he do so by January 21, 2020. If appellant files a timely pro se brief, the State may file a responsi ve brief no later than thirty days after appellant’s pro se brief is filed in this court. Alternatively, if appellant does not file a timely pro se brief, the State may file a brief in response to counsel’s brief no later than January 3,

20 20

.

We further order the motion to withdraw filed by appellant’s counsel is held in abeyance pend ing further order of the court. See Penson v. Ohio , 488 U.S. 75, 80

- 82 (1988) (holding that a motion to withdraw should not be ruled on before appellate court independently reviews the record to determine whether counsel’s evaluation that the appeal is frivolous is sound); Schulman

v. State , 252 S.W.3d 40 3, 410

- 11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (same); see also Kelly , 436 S.W.3d at 319 (appointed counsel’s duties of representation d o not cease when he files a motion towithdraw; counsel must continue to “act with competence, commitment and dedication to the

intere st of the client” until the court of appeals grants the motion). Accordingly, no new attorney will be appointed for appel lant at this time.

We order the clerk of this court to serve a copy of this order on appellant, his counsel, the attorney for the Sta te, and the clerk of the trial court.

_________________________________ Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

IN WITNESS WHE REOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said

court on this 4th day of December, 2019

.

___________________________________ MICHAEL A. CRUZ

, Clerk of Court
```

[Congressional Bills 114th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 549 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

114th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 S. 549

    To clarify that funding for the Securities Investor Protection 
              Corporation is not subject to the sequester.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                           February 24, 2015

 Mr. Enzi (for himself and Mr. Murphy) introduced the following bill; 
    which was read twice and referred to the Committee on the Budget

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
    To clarify that funding for the Securities Investor Protection 
              Corporation is not subject to the sequester.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. CLARIFICATION.

    Section 251A of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control 
Act of 1985 (2 U.S.C. 901a) does not apply with respect to the funding 
of the Securities Investor Protection Corporation.
                                 <all>
```
exv10w1







	 	 	 	 	 



Exhibit 10.1



     The following summarizes the current compensation information regarding certain of the
issuer’s executive officers. It is intended only to be a summary of existing arrangements and is
not intended to provide any additional rights to any officer.




     (e) On March 2, 2009, the Compensation Committee (the “Compensation Committee”) of the Board
of Directors of Big 5 Sporting Goods Corporation (the “Company”) approved no changes to the annual
base salaries for the Company’s executive officers for fiscal 2009. The following table sets forth
the annual base salaries for fiscal 2009 for the Company’s Chief Executive Officer, Chief Financial
Officer, and each of the Company’s three other most highly compensated executive officers during
the fiscal year ended December 28, 2008 (salary information for the prior year is also included for
comparison purposes):



	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	NAME AND POSITION	 	FISCAL YEAR	 	ANNUAL SALARY
	Steven G. Miller
	 	 	2009	 	 	$	473,000	 
	Chairman of the Board, President and

	 	 	2008	 	 	$	473,000	 
	Chief Executive Officer
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	Barry D. Emerson
	 	 	2009	 	 	$	325,000	 
	Senior Vice President and Chief Financial
	 	 	2008	 	 	$	325,000	 
	Officer
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	Thomas J. Schlauch
	 	 	2009	 	 	$	270,000	 
	Senior Vice President, Buying
	 	 	2008	 	 	$	270,000	 
	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	Richard A. Johnson
	 	 	2009	 	 	$	244,000	 
	Executive Vice President
	 	 	2008	 	 	$	244,000	 
	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	Gary S. Meade
	 	 	2009	 	 	$	209,000	 
	Senior Vice President, General Counsel

	 	 	2008	 	 	$	209,000	 
	and Secretary
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	 
	     Also, on March 2, 2009, the Compensation Committee authorized the payment of an annual cash
bonus to each of the foregoing executive officers in respect of the year ended December 28, 2008
(fiscal 2008), which amounts were as follows (bonuses previously paid for the prior year are also
shown for comparison purposes):
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	NAME	 	FISCAL YEAR	 	BONUS
	Steven G. Miller
	 	 	2008	 	 	$	250,000	 
	 
	 	 	2007	 	 	$	500,000	 
	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	Barry D. Emerson
	 	 	2008	 	 	$	110,000	 
	 
	 	 	2007	 	 	$	175,000	 
	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	Thomas J. Schlauch
	 	 	2008	 	 	$	134,000	 
	 
	 	 	2007	 	 	$	214,000	 
	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	Richard A. Johnson
	 	 	2008	 	 	$	122,000	 
	 
	 	 	2007	 	 	$	194,000	 
	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	Gary S. Meade
	 	 	2008	 	 	$	69,000	 
	 
	 	 	2007	 	 	$	110,000
**Exhibit 32.2****CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER****Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. 1350****)**The undersigned executive officer of Anchor BanCorp Wisconsin Inc. (the “Registrant”) herebycertifies that the Registrant’s Form 10-Q for the three months ended September 30, 2007 fullycomplies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that theinformation contained therein fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial conditionand results of operations of the Registrant.              /s/ Dale C. Ringgenberg   Dale C. Ringgenberg, Treasurer and   Chief Financial Officer   November 6, 2007**Note:**A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-OxleyAct of 2002 has been provided to Anchor BanCorp Wisconsin Inc. and will be retained by AnchorBanCorp Wisconsin Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff uponrequest.
44
Appeal Dismissed and Memorandum Opinion filed August 30, 2018
.

In The 

## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14- 18 -00423- CV
JOSE R VAZQUEZ, Appellant

V. RENE FLORES, Appellee

On Appeal from County Civil Court at Law No. 4

Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 1108504

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N This is an appeal from a judgment signed June 5, 2018. Appellant’s brief was due July 9, 2018. No brief or motion for extension of time to file the brief was filed. On July 19, 2018 , the court ordered appellant to filed a brief by August 20, 2018

. We caut ioned that if appellant failed to comply with our order, we would dismiss the appeal for want of prosecution. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(b). No brief or motion for extension of time to file the brief was filed. Therefore, the appeal is DISMISSED

. PER CURIAM Panel consists of Justices Donovan, Wise, and Jewell.
Exhibit 99.2





OLD DOMINION ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE





CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the Quarterly Report of Old Dominion Electric Cooperative (the Company) on Form 10-Q/A for the period ending June 30, 2002 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
Report), I, Daniel M. Walker, Senior Vice President of Accounting and Finance of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





(1)    The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)    The information contained in the Report
fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.





Date:    October 16, 2002



/s/    DANIEL M.
WALKERDaniel M. Walker Senior Vice President of Accounting and Finance (principal financial and accounting
officer)
# U nit edStates C ou rt o f App eal s For th e Firs t C ircu it

No. 09-2270 BRIAN K. MILWARD AND LINDA J. MILWARD, Plaintiffs, Appellants,

v . ACUITY SPECIALTY PRODUCTS GROUP, INC., ET AL.,

Defendants, Appellees.

ERRATA SHEET The opinion of this Court issued on March 22, 2011 is amended as follows:
On page 18, lines 9-10, "consistent with causality" is changed to "which although not statistically significant was consistent with causality". On page 19, lines 1-2, "cause the type of chromosomal damage characteristic of APL" is changed to "cause the general types of cellular damage that are known to cause APL". On page 29, lines 5-9, "in which the few studies that differentiate between AML and APL do not offer conclusive statistically significant evidence either way, in part because the rarity of APL makes it nearly impossible to perform a large enough study" is changed to "in which there is a lack of st a t i s t i c a l ly significant e p idemiological evidence, and in which the rarity of APL and difficulties of data collection in the United States make it very difficult to perform an epidemiological study of the causes of APL that would yield statistically significant results". On page 29, footnote 18, lines 1-2, "is not contested by defendants, and it" is deleted.
II 

114TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 539 

To amend title XVIII of the Social Security Act to repeal the Medicare 

outpatient rehabilitation therapy caps. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

FEBRUARY 24, 2015 

Mr. CARDIN (for himself and Ms. COLLINS) introduced the following bill; 

which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Finance 

A BILL 

To amend title XVIII of the Social Security Act to repeal 

the Medicare outpatient rehabilitation therapy caps. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Medicare Access to 

5 Rehabilitation Services Act of 2015’’. 

6 SEC. 2. OUTPATIENT THERAPY CAP REPEAL. 

7 Section 1833 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 

8 1395(l)) is amended by striking subsection (g). 

Æ 


SSpencer on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 97-7011
JOHN GRIMES WELLS, Plaintiff - Appellant, versusTOMMY A. COLEMAN, Officer; JIMMY BROWN, Captain; JOHN BAKER, Sheriff, Defendants - Appellees.Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. W. Earl Britt, District Judge. CA-97-416-5-BR) Submitted: September 25, 1997 Decided: October 21, 1997 Before LUTTIG, MICHAEL, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. John Grimes Wells, Appellant Pro Se. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Appellant, a North Carolina inmate, appeals the districtcourt's order denying relief on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) complaint under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915(e)(2) (West 1994 & Supp. 1997). We have reviewed the record and the district court's opinion and find that this appeal is frivolous. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the district court. Wells v. Coleman , No. CA97-416-5-BR (E.D.N.C. July 1, 1997). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented inthe materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
Opinion issued August 29, 2019

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The 

First District of Texas 

————————————

NO. 01-19-00621-CV

———————————

IN RE CATHERINE MURRAH MOLLOY, Relator

Original Proceeding on Petition for Writ of Mandamus

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Catherine Murrah Molloy challenges the trial court’s denial of her plea to the 

jurisdiction concerning the standing of paternal grandparents, Stephen A. and Juliana 

Fletcher.1 We deny the petition.

 

1 The underlying case is In the Matter of the Marriage of Kevin Alan Fletcher and 

Catherine Murrah Molloy and in the Interest of H.A.F. and C.P.F., Children, cause 

number 2018-67151, pending in the 257th District Court of Harris County, Texas, 

the Honorable Sandra Peak presiding.
2

Mulloy has not established that the trial court abused its discretion. See In re 

Prudential Ins. Co., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135 (Tex. 2004) (holding that relator is entitled 

to mandamus relief if relator demonstrates that trial court abused its discretion and 

there is no adequate remedy by appeal); Whitworth v. Whitworth, 222 S.W.3d 616, 

621–22 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (holding that grandparent 

had standing to intervene because she had standing to file original suit); TEX. FAM.

CODE § 102.004(a)(2) (grandparent has standing if both parents consent); In the 

Interest of A.M.S., 277 S.W.3d 92, 98 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2009, no pet.) 

(holding that trial court did not err in concluding grandmother had standing because 

record contained sufficient evidence that parents expressly agreed to order 

appointing her as joint managing conservator, which necessarily included consent to 

grandmother’s filing of suit).

Accordingly, the petition is denied. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(a). Any pending 

motions are dismissed as moot. 

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Justices Kelly, Hightower, and Countiss.
No. 1240.

#### Marley *v.*California.

June 3, 1946.

*Hiram T. Kellogg*and *Ralph C. Curren*for appellant.

*Ray L. Chesebro*and *John L. Bland*for appellee.

*Per Curiam:*

The appeal is dismissed for want of a substantial federal question.

Mr. Justice Rutledge dissents.