### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT KNOXVI LLE Ma y 14, 200 4 S es sio n
ALVIN FREEMAN, ET AL 

### . v. J ANICE ST EWART , ET AL


### . Appeal f romthe Chancer y Court for Sull ivan Coun ty No. 31435(M ) John S . McLe llan, I II, Jud ge

No. E2003-02285-COA- R3-CV - F ILED JULY 27, 2004

Jani c e K. Ste wa

rt (“ Mr s. Ste wa

rt ” ) w a s th e re c or d o wn e r o f a pa rc e l of re a l pro pe rt y

loc a te d in Ta ll Oa ks Cou rt su bd ivi sio n w he n th is liti g a tio n be g a n. Se ve ra l of M rs . St e wa rt ’s ne ig hb or s f

ile d th is suit claiming Mrs. Stewa

rt was in violation of t he subdi vision restric tions byhaving a fr eesta nding metal g ara g e and a

separ ate larg e wooden structure on her property

. The Tr ial Court ag ree d and g ave Mrs. Stewart the option of ke eping one of the structure s as a g ara g e and or dering her to re move the other structure

. Mrs. Stewart subseque ntly transfe rre d the prope rty

to her husband, E d Stewart (“ Mr. Ste wa rt ” ), wh o th e n w a s a dd e d as a de fe nd a nt. Th e ne ig hb or s file d a p e tit ion fo r c on te mpt a g a ins t both M r. and Mrs S tewart when they continued to have both a fre estanding metal g ara g e and the wooden struc ture on their pr operty . A hearing was held on the petition for contempt and the Trial Court held Mrs. Stewart in conte mpt and found the wooden structure still to be in violation of the subdivision restrictions. W e af firm the Tria l Court’ s finding tha t the wooden struc ture is in violation of the subdivision restrictions. We vacate the finding of conte m p t and re mand for f urther proce eding s on the claim of c ontempt as to Mrs. Stewart.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Chancer y Court Affi rm ed in Par t and Vacated in P art; Case Re m anded

D. M I CH A EL S WI NEY , J
., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which C H A RLES D. S US ANO , J R ., J
., and W I L L I AM H. I NMAN , S R

. J
., joined.

Ti mothy R. Wi lke rs on , K ing sp ort, T e nn e sse e , f or the Ap pe lla nts Jani c e a nd EdSte wa

rt

.

K e rr y A

. M u s ic k
, B lo u n tv il le
, T e n n e s s e e , f o r th e A p p e ll e e s A lv in a n d D in a h F r e e ma n, Bill and Kathy Moore, Ray

and Shirley

Rose, Troy

and L ottie Wi lliams, and J ack a nd Mae Smith.-2- OP IN ION

Bac kgr ound

This lawsuit involv es a dispute betwe en neig hbors over alleg ed violations of subdivisions restric tions. The plaintiffs are Alvin and Dinah Fr eema n, Bill and Kathy Moore, Ray and Shirley

Rose, Troy

and L ottie Wi lliams, and Jack and Mae Smit h (“Plaintiffs”) . Plaintiffs sued Mrs. Stewart, who at t hat t ime was the rec ord owner of a parce l of property which borde red va

rious pa rc e ls o f p ro pe rt y

ow ne d b y

Pla int if fs . A ll o f the pa

rt ie s l iv e in Ta ll O a ks Cou rt su bd ivi sio n in Sul liv a n Co un ty . I n the c omp la int , Pl a int if fs c la ime d M rs . St e wa

rt wa s v iol a tin g nu me ro us ite ms contained w ithin the Declar ation of Restrictions applica ble to Tall Oaks Cou rt s u bdivision. The primary dispute involved two structure s on Mrs. Stewart’ s property , one being a fr eesta nding me tal g ara g e and the other being a separ ate wooden s tructure still under c onstruction when the c omplaint was filed.

After

a trial, the Trial Court entere d an Or der on Ma rch 2, 2002, w hich disposed of some of the issues such as whether the condition of Mrs. Stewart’s property constituted a nuisance

. A J udg ment was e ntere d on Ap ri l 1 5
, 2002, disposing of the rema ining issues a nd deter mining wh e the r the pr e se nc e of

the tw o s truc tur e s v iol a te d th e De c laratio n o f R e stric tio ns . Accord in g to the Tr ia l Co urt:

a . T he De c laratio n o f R e stric tio ns in p la c e a nde nf orce able ag ainst all properties in Tall Oaks Subdivision allow for eac h lot

own e r to h a v e o n e d e ta c h e d p r iv a te g ar a g e f o r n o t mo r e th a n three

c ars

.
b. Fr om the unref

uted testimony of the thre e expert witnesses called by the Plaintiffs, the standard in the community for a thre e ca r g ara g e is a struc ture that is no wider than 34 fee t and no dee per tha n 22 fee t.

* * * *

e. The Def

endant pr esently

has on her property a metal “f ree standing ” g ara g e and ha s almost completed the construction of a much larg er wooden st ructure on her property which is intended to be used as a g ara g e as w ell as storag e.

Ba sed on thes e factual finding s, the Trial Court orde red Mr s. Stewart to re move completely , at her

elec tion, either the fr eesta nding me t al gar age or the sepa rate wooden struc ture. The Tr ial Court further

held:M r. S te w a rt w a s a t t h e c o u rth o u se w h e n the fi rs t t ria l o c c u rr e d . B e c a u se he w a s a w itne ss a n d no t a p a rty, 1

h e a p p a re n tly w a s se q u e ste re d in the w itne ss r o o m

. -3-

[I ]f the Defe ndant elec ts to keep the wooden structure, it must be reconfig ured so that it complies with the community standard f

or a three car g ara g e. I n comply ing w ith the standard for a thre e ca r g ara g e, the Defe ndant s hall not be conf ined to having a structur e that is no wider than thirty

four ( 34) fe et and no de eper th an twenty

two (22) f eet, howe ver, the structure must be no larg er tha n seven hundr ed and forty eig ht (748) squar e fe et, that is, the structure may be dee per than twenty

two (22) fee t, or , wider then thirty four (34) f eet, but the total square f

ootag e ca nn ot exceed the squa re f ootag e of a

building with those dimensions.

The Tr ial Court also set fort h o t h er re q u irements that nee ded to be c omplied with if the wooden str uc tur e wa s r e ta ine d a ndMr s. Ste wa rt int e nd e d to c on str

uc t a c c e ss t o a

se c on d le ve l.

Mrs. Stewart or igina lly

elec ted t o keep the wooden struc ture, a nd she re moved the fre estanding metal gar ag e. I n September of 2002, Plaintiffs filed a motion seeking authority from the Trial Court to have the wooden struc ture inspec ted to deter mine if it was in compliance with the J udg ment. Plaintiffs claimed they soug ht permission from Mrs. Stewart to inspect t he woode n str uc tur e wh ic h may

ha ve o bvia te d th e ne e d f or jud ic ia l in te rv e nti on , b ut M rs . St e wa rt re fu se d to respond to their reque st. By this ti me, a diff

ere nt free standing metal g ara g e wa s on Mrs. Stewart’s property . Mrs. S tewart was no long er r epre sented by counsel a nd filed a pro s e re sp on se to Pla int if fs ’ mo ti on fo r a n in sp e c tio n. I n th is r e sp on se , M rs . St e wa rt a sse rt e d th a t sh e wa s in fu ll compl ia n c e w ith th e T r ia l Co u r t’ s Ju d g me n t. M r s

. St e w ar t s tate d th a t th e w o o d e n s tr u c tu r e “wa s made into a stora g e shed with no acc ess for vehicles.” Although not entirely clea r, Mrs. Stewart then claimed: (1) in the J udg ment the Trial Court a llowed her to r etain one of the structure s as a g ara g e; (2 ) s he de c ide d to ke e p th e fr e e sta nd ing me ta l g ara g e ; ( 3) the woode n st ruct ur e no lon g e r w a s a g ara g e; and (4) the prese nce of the wooden structure did not violate the J udg ment beca use it was not

a g ara g e a nd , th e re fo re , s he ha d o nly on e “ g ara g e ” a s r e qu ir e d b y the Judg me nt.

I n Dec ember

of 2002, P l ai n t i ff s filed a motion to join Mr. St ewa rt as a de fenda nt be c a us e “ the pr op e rt y

wh ic h is the su bje c t of thi s lit ig a tio n [ha s]

... be e n tr a ns fe rr e d to him fr om h is wife, the orig inal Def

endant, a fter the trial of this ca u s e.” Plaintiffs also filed a Petition for 1 Contempt, claiming that while Mr . and Mrs. Stewa rt (“the Stewarts”) initiallyremove d t he fre estanding metal g ara g e in ac corda nce with the Trial Court’s J udg ment, they there afte r obtained a permit to er ect a “picnic shelter” on the property and then put the fre estanding metal g ara g e bac k up. Plaintiffs further c laimed that the “stora g e shed” still violated the applica ble subd i v i sion restric tions as well as t he Trial Court’s previous orde r. I n Marc h of 2003, the Tr ial Court gr anted Plaintiffs’ mot io n to jo in M r

. St e w ar t a s a d e f e n d a n t. Si n c e M r

. St e w ar t w a s n o w a p ar ty to the lawsuit, Plainti ffs re filed their Petition for Contempt, once ag ain claiming bot h of the Stewa rts wer e in c on te mpt

fo r the re a so ns se t fo rth in the pr e vio us pe tit ion . T he Ste wa rt s th e n f ile d a Mo tio n to-4-

Dismiss claiming, among other thing s, that they wer e in full compliance wi t h t h e T ri al C ourt’s J udg ment.

A he ari ng on Pla int if fs ’ Pet iti on fo r C on te mpt

a ndthe Ste wa

rt s’ Mo tio n to Di smi ss
was conducte d on Aug ust 12, 2003. The Stewarts were pro s e at t he hearing

. The first witness was Dan Rosenbaum (“Rosenbaum”), the pr esident of As s o ci ated Builders, I nc. Rosenbaum testified that in the course of perf

orming construction work, he measure s buildings to a scertain their squar e footag e. Rosenbaum measur ed the woode n structure on the Stewarts’ property which mea sured 50' 2" by 14 ' 10 " , f or a tot a l squa

re fo ota g e on the g ro un d flo or of 70 7. 82 . Rose nb a um n ote d th a t th is

was a t wo story

structure and the se cond leve l would have the sa me square footag e as the lower le ve l. T he tot a l sq ua

re fo ota g e didno t ta

ke int o a c c ou nt the po rc he s o r o ve rh a ng s.

The ne x t witness was Tim Earle s (“Ea rles”) , the S u l l ivan County Building Com mis sio ne r. Ea

rl e s te sti fi e d to va

ri ou s bu ild ing pe rm its ob ta ine d by the Ste wa rt s. Th e Ste wa

rt s obtained thre e permits i n J uly of 2001. These permits wer e for a car port, a 30' by

58' detac hed g ara g e , a nda n 8 ' by

9' a wn ing to be c on str

uc te d ov e r a po rc h. I n Se pte mbe r of 20 02 , th e Ste wa rt s obtained permits for a

20' by 30' picnic shelter

and a 10' by

58' roof whic h was to be c onstructed ove r a dec k. I n J anuary

of 2003, the Stewa rt s o b t ai n ed a pe rmit to buil d a 20' by 30' addition to be

a tta c he d to the re ar of the ir ho us e

. Ac c or din g to Ea rl e s, the se pe rm its re qu ir e the pr op e rt y ow ne r t o
arr ang e for an initial setba ck inspection prior to beg inning c onstruction and then to ar rang e for a fina l inspection once the projec t is completed. Wit h reg ard to the pe rm i t fo r t h e d etac hed g ara g e, the initi a l i n s p e c ti o n w a s c o mp le te d
, b u t th e f in a l i n s p e c ti o n w a s n o t. E ar le s te s ti f ie d th a t th e r e is no time limi t on completing a projec t and the prope rty o wn er i s responsible for arr ang ing the final inspection upon completion. As a r esult, if a prope rty owner fails to notify the county

that a proje ct is complete and a

rra ng e for the final inspection, the county never would know if the spec ifics of the permit wer e complied with unless som ebody called a nd complained. Ea rles stated it would not violate the zoning ordinance for the Stewarts to obtain a pe rmit to buil d a g ara g e and the n use that structure purely

for stora g e. When a pr operty owner applies for a b u i lding pe rmit, the Building Commi ssio n d o es not asce rtain whe ther the pr oposed structure would violate any subdivision restric tions because the B uilding Commissi on’s only conce rn is wheth er the proposed struc ture vio la te s a pp lic able zon ing la ws

.
Plaintiffs’ counsel called Mr . Stewart a s a witness and a sked him to identify various pictures, a t which point Mr. Stewart refused to answe r any questions and invoked his “c onstitut ional Fifth Ame ndment rig hts.” Mr. S tewart also claimed he had not “ha d any due proc ess.” The Trial Cou rt tol d M r. Ste wa

rt the Fift h Am end me nt d id n ot a pp ly a ndMr . St e wa

rt the n p ro c e e de d to identify the pictures. Mr. Stewart acknow ledg ed that the lower floor of the wooden struc ture wa s “enc losed with a door so nothing can g et in except a per son.” Mr. Stewa rt furthe r testified that the wooden struc ture ha s a sec ond level “lof t” with a solid floor. Mr. Stewa rt identified a picture whic h showed a porch on the second f

loor of the wooden structure with an over hang from the r oof. Mr. Stewart went on to add that this previously had been an open deck a nd he obtained a permit to cover it with a r o o f

. M r

. St e w ar t a ls o id e n ti f ie d a me ta l g ar a g e w h ic h h e te s ti f ie d w a s “ a tt a c h e d to the-5-

house with nails.” This is not the same metal g ara g e that was at i ssue previously
, althoug h this new metal g ara g e is in the same location as the previous one

.

Mrs. Stewart also testified and she admitted the “orig inal plan” for th e w o o d en structure was for

it to be a g ara g e. Mrs. Stewa rt adde d, howeve r, that the woode n structure was not

c omp le te d a s a

g ara g e sin c e the re is n o a c c e ss f or ve hic le s.

The Tr ial Court en t er ed its J udg ment on Plaintiffs’ Petition for Contempt and the Stewarts’ Motion to Dismiss on S eptember 4, 2003, at wh i ch t i m e it noted that it previously had g iven Mrs. Stewart the option of maintaining e ither the meta l structure a s a g ara g e or r emoving the

m et al s t ru ct u re an d u s i n g t h e wo o d en s t ru ct u re as a gar age , “w i t h t h e on e no t t o b e us ed as a ga ra ge to be re moved from the pr operty .” The Trial Court then stated:

3. The Defenda nts, by their own admission, have attached the metal s tr u c tu r e to th e ir h o me a n d ar e u s in g it a s a g ar a g e a n d have

c on ve rt e d th e wo od e n s truc tur e to a sto ra g e bu ild ing thu s b e ing in violation of both Parag raph 4 of the applica b l e restrictions and the pr ior Or de r o f this Cou rt

.
4. Th at Mr. Ed S te wa

rt wa s n ot a

De fe nd a nt i n th is c a us e when it was or igina lly

filed, he ha ving been added a s a De fenda nt by subsequent Or der o f t h e Court, theref ore, he is not in contempt of Court for the violation of the J udg ment enter ed af ter the origina l trial on Marc h 6, 2002.

5. That Ja n i ce Stewart is in contempt of c ourt due to the rete ntion of both the metal g ara g e and the wooden struc ture a nd due to the us e of the wo od e n struc tur e a s a stor a g e bu ild ing a s o pp os e d to a thre e ca r g ara g e.

The Tr ial Court reser ved ruling on sanctions to be imposed on Mrs. Stewar t un til such time as the Stewarts chose not to appea l or until there wa s a final ruling by an appe llate court. The Trial Court denied the Stewarts’ Moti o n t o Di s miss and then desig nated this J udg ment as a f inal appea lable orde r.

The Stewa

rts appea l raising five issues, which w e quote:

1. Whe the r the e vid e nc e c on ta ine d in the re c or d is insufficient to support a finding by a rational trier of f act that Janice K. Stewart is g uilty bey ond a reasonable doubt of contempt of c ourt and the Judgment ther efor e contr ary to the weig ht of the evide nce?-6- 2. Whe the r the tr ia l c ou rt c omm itt e d r e vers ible e rr or in finding J anice K. Stewart to be i n co n t empt of court for the attachme nt of a metal structure to property she does not own a nd the use of a wooden structure a s a storag e building on pr operty she does not own and did not own at t h e t ime of the off enses f or which she sta nd s c on vic te d o f c on te mpt ?

3. Whe the r t he tr ia l c ou rt c omm itt e d r e ve rs ibl e e rr or in holding the attachment of a metal structure and its use as a g ara g e and the use of a

wooden structure to a storag e building on property owned by Ed Stewart wa s a violation of a pr evious Orde r of the trial court or

su bd ivi sio n r e stric tio ns ?

4. Whe the r the e vid e nc e c on ta ine d in the re c or d is insufficient to support a f i n d i n g b y a rational trier of f act that Ed Stewart is, b y a pre pondera nce of the evidenc e, in violation of subdivision restrictions applicable to pr operty owned by him and the J udg ment is theref

ore c ontrary

to the weig ht of the evide nce?

5. W h ether

the trial court committed rever sible err or by compelling parties c harg ed with co n tempt to testify in their trial d es p i t e t h ei r s t ro n g o b

j ec t i o n s t o t es t i fy i n g?

Pla int if fs do no t app e a l th e Tr ia l Co urt’ s d e c isi on tha t Mr . St e wa

rt wa s n ot i n c on te mpt

.
Discussion

The fa ctual finding s of the Tria l Court are acc orded a presumption of cor

rec tness, and we will not overturn those fac tual finding s unless the evidenc e pre ponderates ag ainst t h em. See Te nn . R. Ap p. P. 1 3( d) ; Bogan v. Bogan
, 60 S.W .3d 721, 727 (Tenn. 2001) . Wit h respe ct to leg al issues, our revie w is c onducted “ under a pure de novo standard of revie w, ac cording no defe renc e to the conclusions of l aw made by the l ower courts.” So uth e rn Con str uc tor s, In c . v . Lo ud

on Cou nty Bd. Of Educ. , 58 S.W .3d 706, 710 (Tenn. 2001)

.

We will beg in by discussing the orig inal J udg ment enter ed on April 15, 2002. I n that J u d gm en t , t h e T ri al C o u rt n o t ed t h at M rs

. S t ew ar t h ad o n h erp ro p er t y a f re es t an d i n g m et al gar age and a muc h larg er se parate wooden struc ture whic h she intended to use a s a g ara g e and f or storag e. The Trial Court a lso c oncluded the Dec lara tion of Restriction for Tall Oaks Court s ubdivision allowed eac h lot owne r to ha ve one detac hed priva te g ara g e for not more than thre e ca

rs. The Trial Court ordere d Mrs. Stewart to dec ide which of the two structure s she wante d to retain and to re move the oth e r s truc tur e . T he Ap ri l 15 , 2 00 2, Judg me nt w a s a fi na l ap peal abl e ju dg me nt w hic h M rs

. Stewart did not appea l. There fore
, in this appea l, we will not undertake to question the propr iety ofP l ai nt i f f s d i d not and do not arg ue t hat M r

. and M r s

. S t ewar t were i n pr i vi t y wi t h e ach ot her an d t he ori gi nal 2

Ju dg men t w as , t h er ef

or e, bi n di n g on M r

. St ew ar t , a n d t h e T r i al Cour t di d n ot ba s e i t s Se pt embe r 4, 2003, J u dg men t n ow on appeal on t hat gr ound. W e, t her efore, ex pres s no opi ni on on t hi s i s s ue.

-7- any of the Trial Court’s fac tual or leg al conclusions set forth in tha t Judgme nt and they are binding on Plaintiffs and Mrs. Stewart.

Mr . St e wa

rt arg ue s th a t th e Ap ri l 15 , 2 00 2, Judg me nt is not b ind ing on him be c a us e he w as not added a s a party until after e ntry

of that Judgment. Mr. Stewart then arg ues that the 2 p re p o n d er an ce o f t h e e v i d en ce we i gh s aga i n s t t h e T ri al C o u rt ’s co n cl u s i o n t h at t h e wo o d en s t o ra ge str uc tur e vio la te s th e De c laratio n o f R e stric tio ns . Co ve na nts su c h a s the on e inv olv e d in this c a se
are v al i d an d are binding on a ll purchase rs with notice. Se e , e .g ., Ri c ha rd s v . A bb ott

sfo rd H o m e o wn e r

s A s s 'n
, 809 S.W .2d 193, 195 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990). Howeve r, as pointed out by the Ste warts, the y

are stric tly

c on str ue d b e c a us e the y

are in d e ro g a tio n o f a

pr op e rt y ow ne rs ri g ht t o unrestric ted use of the ir property

. Id.

L ike other contra cts, covena nts should be enf orce d acc ording to the parties' clea

rly expre s s ed int entions. W aller v. Thomas , 545 S.W. 2d74 5, 74 7 ( Te nn . 1 97 6) ; Hamilton v. Broyle s , 57 Tenn. App. 116, 123-24, 415 S.W.2d 3 5 2
, 3 5 5 (1966). The y should be interpre ted in light of the ir fa i r and reasona ble meaning
, Mc

Do na ld v. C ha ffi n , 5 2 9 S. W. 2 d 5 4
, 5 7 ( T e n n

. 1 9 7 5 )
, b u t s h o u ld n o t be

e xten de d to c ov e r c ir c ums ta nc e s n ot p la inl y inc lud e d with in the ir terms. Turnley v. Garfinke l , 211 Tenn. 125, 130, 362 S .W.2d 921, 92 3 ( 19 62 ); Southern Adve rtising C o. v. Sherman , 43 Tenn. App. 3 2 3
, 3 2 6 -2 7
, 3 0 8 S

. W

. 2 d 4 9 1
, 4 9 3 (1 9 5 8 ). Al l d o u b t s co n ce rn i n g a
covena nt's a

pplicability

should be resolve d ag ainst the cove nant. See Lan d D e v e lop e rs, In c . v . M axwe ll , 537 S.W .2d at 918.

Richards , 809 S.W .2d at 195.

Acc ording to Mr. S tewart, the only “objec tive” evide nce introduc ed at tria l was that of Ear les who testified that the wooden structure did not violate a ny zoning ordinanc es. Taking that

on e g ia nt ste p furthe r, Mr . Stew art c la ims it is re a so na ble to co nc lud e that th e wo od e n s truc tur e is in c omp lia nc e wi th the De c laratio n o f R e stric tio ns be c a us e he or ig ina lly ob ta ine d a

pe rm it t o b uil d that structure as a g ara g e. I n our opinion, this arg ument completely overlooks Ea

rles’ te stimonythat when issuing a permit, the Building Commi ssion doe s not de termine whe ther the pr oposed structure vio la te s su bd ivi sio n r e stric tio ns . I n oth e r wo rd s, the mos t E arl e s’ te sti mon y on thi s p oin t c a n b e sa id to offer is tha t t h e wooden structure doe s not violate a zoning ordina nce, a fac t which Plaintiffs

rea dily conce de. This testimony cannot f airly or reasonably

be interpr eted a s having any impact whatsoeve r on whe ther the w ooden structur e is in violation of the Dec lara tion of Restrictions.

Th e app lic able po rt ion of the De c laratio n o f R e stric tio ns pr ov ide s a s f oll ow s:-8- 4. L and use and Buildings. All lots restric ted hereby shall be known and de signated as re sid en t i al lots. No structure sha ll be

ere cted, a ltered or

permitted to rema in on any lot o t h er t h an one detac hed sing le fa milydwelling
, not to exceed two stories in heig ht and a private g ara g e for

not more than thre e ca

rs.

Mr. Stewart arg ues that beca use the wooden structure is not a g ara g e, the f oreg oing does not eve n apply . The Tr ial Court disag ree d, and s o do we. The obvious purpose of the fore g oing r estriction is to pr ohibit the property owner s from building va rious and sundry

structure s on the prope rty . We ag ree with the Trial Court’s conclusion that the clea r intent of the De clar ation

o f R es t ri ctions is to li mit the structures permanently built on the property

to two types, i.e., a detac hed sing le fa milydwelling or a thre e ca r g ara g e with the total num ber of structure s allowed be ing on e de ta c he d s ing le fa mil y dw e lli ng a ndon e g ara g e fo r n ot m or e tha n th re e c ars

.
Th e Ste wa

rt s a lso arg ue that othe r p ro pe rt y ow ne rs ha ve sto rag e sh e ds on the ir property and it is not right to make the m take theirs down an d n o t do the same thing to the other property owner s. We reje ct t his arg ument for two rea sons. First, as noted bythe Trial Court, wha t may or may not be on other pr operty

owner s’ land is not at issue in t h e p re s en t case . Second, the Ste wa rt s’ sto ra g e fa c ili ty is ove r 1,4 00 sq ua re fe e t whe n co un tin g the sq ua refo ota g e of

bo th l e ve ls,

even without taking into ac count the two dec ks. I t is int ere sting that in Para g raph 8 of the Dec lara tion of Restrictions, the minim um living ar ea of the houses built on lot s one throug h nine must be at least 1,100 squar e fe et, and the living are a of the houses built on lots ten throug h eig hteen must be a t le a s t 1
, 4 0 0 s q u ar e f e e t. Q u it e s imp ly
, th e St e w ar ts ’ “ s to r a g e ” f a c il it y is th e siz e of a house. Even if

the Dec lara tion of Restrictions could be re ad to allow storag e sheds, we do not believe the y

could fa irly

be re ad to allow storag e sheds the size of a house. W e affirm the September 4, 2003, Judgment of the Trial Court insofar

as it conclude d the wooden storag e structur e is in viol ation of both the De clar ation of Restrictions and its prior orde r.

Wit h reg ard to the issues pe rtaining to the Trial Court’s findin g of conte mpt, there

are two types of c ontempt, civil and criminal. The dif fer ence betwee n civil and cr iminal contempt

wa s re centlydiscussed by our Supreme Court in Do e v . B d. of P ro fe ssi on al R e sp on sib ili ty , 1 04 S.W. 3d46 5 ( Te nn . 2 00 3) a s f oll ow s:

We have on numer ous occa sions stated t hat a contempt may either be civil or cri m i n al in nature. See W ilson v. W

ilson , 984 S.W .2d 898, 90 6 ( Te nn . 1 998) (B ir c h, J., d iss e nti ng ); Black , 938 S.W .2d at 39 8- 40 1; Turner
, 914 S.W .2d at 954. Civil contempt occurs whe n a person doe s not comply

with a court order and an a ction is broug ht by a priva te party to enfor ce rig hts under the order that has bee n violated. See B lack , 938 S.W. 2d a t 39 8; Robinson v. Air Draulics Eng'g Co.
, 214 T e nn . 3 0, 37 7 S. W.2 d 9 08 , 9 12 (1 96 4) ; Turner , 914 S.W .2d at 995. Punishm ent for civil contempt is designe d to coer ce c ompliance with the court' s order

and is imposed at the insistence a nd for the-9- benef it of the private pa

rty who has suff

ere d a viol ation of rig hts. See Black
, 93 8 S. W.2 d a t 39 8; Turner 91 4 S.W.2 d at 9 55 ; Sh e rro d v . W ix
, 84 9 S. W.2 d 7 80 , 7 86 n. 4 (Ten n. Ct . A pp . 1 99 2) . A lso , in c ivi l

c on te mpt c a se s, th e qua ntu m of

pr oo f n e c e ssa

ry to c on vic t is a preponde ra n ce of the e vidence . On the other hand, criminal contempts are "intende d to p re s er ve the powe r and vindicate the dignity and author ity of the law, and the court as an org an of soc iety ." Black , 9 38 S.W. 2d a t 39 8. Pun ish me nt f or c ri min a l c on te mpt

is b oth punitive and unconditional in nature and serv es t o adjudicate "a n is su e bet ween th e pu bl ic and th e accu sed ." Id . I n criminal conte mpt proce eding s, the defen d ant i s presumed to be innocent and must be proven g uiltybey ond a re asonable doubt. Se e Sh ifl e t v . S tat e , 217 Tenn. 690, 400 S.W.2d 542, 543 (1966).

Doe , 104 S.W .3d at 473-74.

Un fo rtun a te ly , th e Tr ia l Co urt’ s Judg me nt d oe s n ot i nd ic a te wh e the r i t f ou ndMr s. Stewart in c ivil or c riminal contempt. Additionally , the Trial Court’s de cision to withhold i ts ruling on what sanc tions to apply to Mr s. Stewart for her contempt of court leave s us further in the dark. Wit hout the sanctions having been deter mined by the Trial Court, w e cannot tell whe ther they are desig ned to coer ce Mr s. Stewart’s c ompliance with the Trial Court’s order , i.e., civil contempt, or whether they are intended to prese rve the power and vindi cate the authority of both the Tria l Court and the law, i .e., criminal contempt. L ikewise, the Petition for Contempt does not state whe ther Plaintiffs were seeking to have the Stewa rts held in civil or criminal con t em p t. On appea l, the Stewarts ar g u e Pl a in ti f

f s w e r e s e e k in g to h a v e th e m h e ldin c r im in a l c o n te mp t a n d th a t th e T r ia l Court actually

found Mrs. Stewart in criminal contempt. On the other ha nd, Plaintiffs claim they at all times wer e s e e k in g to h a v e th e St e w ar ts h e ldin c iv il c o n te mp t, a n d th e Ju d g me n t o f th e T r ial Cou rt inv olv e d a

fi nd ing of

c ivi l c on te mpt

on the pa rt of Mr s. Ste wa

rt

. Th is ca se is a

g oo d e xamp le of wh y i ti s i m p o r t a n tw h e n t h e r e i s a f i n d i n g o f c o n t e m p tf

o r a t r i a l c o u r tt o s t a t e s p e c if ic a lly whether the contem p t i s civil or criminal. The dif fer ence betwee n civil and cr iminal contempt involves not onlythe ava ilabilityof constitutional safeg uards, but also a ffe cts this Court’s standard of re view. See, e .g., Barber v. Chapman
, N o

. M 2 0 0 3

- 0 0 3 7 8

- C O A

- R 3

- C V
, 2 0 0 4 T e n n

. A p p

. LE X IS 111, at *8 (Te nn. Ct. App. Feb. 23, 2004)
, no appl. perm appeal filed (“ [O]n app eal , i nd iv idua ls convicted o f c r im in a l c o n te mp t lo s e th e ir p r e s u mp ti o n o f in n o c e n c e a n d mu s t o v e r c o me the presumption of g uilt.”).

An o t h eri m p o rt an tas p ec to f c i v i l co n t em p ti s t h e a b i l i t y o f t h e c o n t em n o r t o p u rge herse lf of conte mpt. Our Supreme Court in Ah e rn v . A he rn , 15 S.W .3d 73 (Tenn. 2000) noted the fo llo wi ng abo ut c ivi l c on te mpt pr oc e e din g s:

After a finding of conte mpt, courts have se vera l remedie s available depending upon the fac ts of the case

. A court can imprison

a n in div idu a l to c omp e l pe rf or man ce of a

c ou rt or de r. Th is i sT h a t i s n o t t o sa y tha t t h e tra n sfe r n e c e ssa rily w o u ld no t b e va lid fo r o the r p u rp o se s. 3

-10- ty pic a lly re fe rr e d to a s " c ivi l c on te mpt ." Th is re me dy is availab le only when the individual has the ability t o comply with the order

at the tim e of

the c on te mpt he ari ng . Te nn . Co de An n. § 2 9- 9- 10 4; see also Garrett v. Forest Lawn Memorial Gardens , 588 S.W

. 2 d 309, 31 5 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 1 97 9)

. Th us , w ith c ivi l c on te mpt , th e on e in contempt has the "ke y s to the jail" a nd can pur g e the c ontempt by comply ing w ith th e c o u r t' s o r d e r

. T e n n

. Co d e A n n

. § 2 9

- 9

- 1 0 4; Ga rre tt , 5 88 S.W. 2da t 315. I n c ivi l c on te mpt , th e imp ri so nme nt i s meted out f

or the benef

it of a party litigant. Se e Sh ifl e t v . S tat e , 217 Tenn. 690, 693, 400 S.W.2d 542, 543 (1966).

Ah e rn 15 S.W .3d at 79 (footnote omitted).

Whil e we are inc lin e d to a g re e wi th P la intif fs that Mr s. Ste wa

rt wa s h e ld i n c ivi l

c on te mpt , b a se d o n th e re c or d b e fo re us we c a nn ot be c e rt a in thi s is c or re c t. A c c or din g ly , w e mus t

rema nd this case to the Trial Court to state specific ally whether Mrs. Stewart wa s found in civil or

c ri min a l c on te mpt . Re g ard le ss o f w he the r Mr s. Ste wa rt is fo un d to be in civ il or c ri min a l c on te mpt , she will be entitled to appellate revie w of the s anctions i mposed by the Trial Court, if any . I n order to avoid multipl e appea ls in the future, the Trial Court is direc ted to impose the sanctions it believes

are appropriate, if any , so the finding of conte mpt and the sanc tions im posed ca n be re viewed at the same time should Mrs. Stewart c hoose to pursue a n appea l at that time.

A s n o t e d p r e v i o u s l y, o n e a s p e c to f c i v i l c o n t e m p ti s t h a tt h e c o n t e m n o r h a s t h e “ k e ys to the ja il” a ndha s th e po we r t o ta ke a c tio n to pu rg e he rs e lf of the c on te mpt

. Mr s. Ste wa rt c la ims she does not have that power beca us e s h e no long er ow ns the property . The re cord c ontains no evidenc e re g arding why

the prope rty at issue was tra nsfer red f rom Mrs. Stewart to Mr. Stewart. The T r i a l C o u r t ’ s S e p t e m b e r 4
, 2 0 0 3
, J u d g m e n t m a k e s n o m e n t i o n o f t h i s t r a n s f e r a n d i t s i m p a c t , i f

a n y, on the contempt c l ai m aga i n s t Mrs. Stewart. Certainly , if the transf er w as a sha m made for

the purpose of

avoiding the clea

r re quirements of the April 15, 2002, J udg ment, then i t is of no ef fec t for pur poses of this litigation as such shenaniga ns simply to avoid a court orde r ca nnot be per mitted to s t a n d

. I f
, h o w e v e r , t h e r e w a s a l e g i t i m a t e b a s i s f o r t h e t r a n s f

e r o t h e r t h a n t o a tte mptto 3 circ umvent the Trial Court’s clea r orde r, and the l eg itimate basis was the re ason for the transf er, the n such a f inding may

neg ate a finding of civil contempt by Mrs. Stewart.

Be cause we c onclude this matter must be re manded to the Trial Court for the r easons set forth a bove, Mrs. Stewa

rt’s oth er i s sues surrounding the finding of conte mpt are pr eter mitted. As previously discussed, the Trial Court held that Mr. Stewart was “not in conte mpt of Court for the violation of the J udg ment enter ed af ter the origina l trial on Marc h 6, 2002.” There fore
, to the extent Mr. Stewart raises a ny

issues conce rning the contempt fil i n g s applicable to him, thos e issues ar e
moo t a s Mr . St e wa

rt wa s n ot f ou ndto b e in c on te mpt

.-11- The Septembe r 4, 2003, Judgment of the Trial Court holding the wooden struc ture to be a violation of both the De clar ation of Restrictions and its previous Judgment is aff irmed, and

on rema nd the Trial Court is instructed to ente r an appropriate orde r addr essing this viol ation. The Trial Court’s finding that Mrs. Stewart wa s in “contempt” is vac ated. On r emand, the T rial Court is instructed to clarif

y whether it found Mrs. Stewart in criminal or civil contempt and set forth what it d ee ms to be appropr iate sanc tions. I f Mrs. Stewart was soug ht to be held in civil contempt, the Tria l C o u rt i s further instructed to conduc t a hea ring reg arding the re asons for the transfe r of the pr op e rt y fro m Mr s. Ste wa rt to M r. Ste wa

rt in o rd e r t o d e te rm ine if

tho se re a so ns are su c h th a t a finding of civil contempt ag ainst Mrs. Stewart still would be appropriate.

Conclusion

Th e Judg me nt o f the Tr ia l Co urt is a ff ir me d in p art

a ndva c a te d in pa

rt , a ndthi s c a us e is remande d to the Trial C ourt for further procee dings c onsistent with thi s Opinion and for c ollection of the c os ts be low

. Exe rc isi ng ou r d isc re tio n, c os ts o n a pp e a l are a sse sse d a g a ins t th e Ap pe lla nts , J anice K. Stewart and Ed Stewart, and their sure ty

.

___________________________________ D. MI CHAEL

SW I NEY, JUDGE