Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before publication in the PACIFIC REPORTER. 

Readers are requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate Courts, 

303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878, email 

corrections@akcourts.us. 

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA 

ANDREA C., ) 

) Supreme Court No. S-14996 

Appellant, ) 

) Superior Court No. 3AN-04-08093 CI 

v. ) 

) O P I N I O N 

MARCUS K., ) 

) No. 7027 – August 7, 2015 

Appellee. ) 

_______________________________ ) 

Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third 

Judicial District, Anchorage, Patrick J. McKay, Judge. 

Appearances: Andrea C., pro se, Wolfeboro, New 

Hampshire, Appellant. Marcus K., pro se, Anchorage, 

Appellee. 

Before: Fabe, Chief Justice, Winfree, Stowers, Maassen, and 

Bolger, Justices. 

STOWERS, Justice. 

I. INTRODUCTION 

Andrea C.1 appeals the superior court’s decision to award Marcus K. 

primary physical and sole legal custody of their two children. Andrea argues the 

superior court made inadequate findings regarding Marcus’s history of domestic 

1 We have abbreviated the parties’ names and use pseudonyms for their 

children to protect the children’s privacy. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

violence, and she also challenges the superior court’s application of the best interest 

factors. We affirm the superior court’s custody decision for the reasons discussed below. 

II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 

A. Earlier Custody Proceedings2 

Andrea C. and Marcus K. are the divorced parents of two children, Daniel 

and Bryson.3 Since their divorce, Andrea and Marcus have engaged in a contentious 

custody battle. Although Marcus originally received only supervised visitation with the 

children because he had a history of domestic violence,4 Marcus enjoyed primary 

physical custody and shared legal custody immediately prior to the custody modification 

at issue in this appeal. 

This significant shift in custody appears to have been the result of two 

factors. First, Marcus rebutted the domestic violence presumption, making it possible 

for the superior court to award him physical and legal custody. Second, the superior 

court had increasing concerns regarding Andrea’s parenting. For example, in 2006 the 

court noted that both parents had “emotionally abused” the children, but that Marcus had 

made “great strides in his ability to deal with [the] confrontation and stress associated 

with divided parenting.” The court described Andrea as “the primary person that 

continually subjects the children to emotional abuse” and believed she was unable to 

2 We discuss the history of this custody dispute in some detail to provide 

relevant context. 

3 At the time of the 2012 custody modification from which Andrea appeals, 

Daniel was eleven years old and Bryson was eight years old. 

4 AS 25.24.150(g). A parent who has a history of perpetrating domestic 

violence is subject to a rebuttable presumption against an award of physical or legal 

custody. Id. A parent has a history of perpetrating domestic violence when “during one 

incident of domestic violence, the parent caused serious physical injury or . . . the parent 

has engaged in more than one incident of domestic violence.” AS 25.24.150(h). 

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recognize her shortcomings as a parent. The court later characterized Andrea as 

“controlling” and “manipulative.” 

In a related 2007 proceeding, the superior court took evidence regarding 

an interaction between Andrea and Daniel, which the court described as “disturbing.” 

A custody investigation ordered in a 2010 modification proceeding also raised concerns 

regarding Andrea’s relationship with Daniel, noting, “[I]t is clear there is a serious 

problem between Mother and [Daniel]. [Daniel’s] escalating behavior and verbal abuse 

towards Mother is a concern as well as Mother’s sometimes inappropriate responses.” 

The superior court attempted to address these issues by ordering Andrea to 

complete a parenting class in 2006. And in 2007, in response to the “disturbing” 

interaction between Andrea and Daniel, the court ordered her to take an anger 

management class. Andrea failed to complete either requirement for several years and 

was eventually held in contempt. It appears Andrea may have completed the anger 

management course and started the parenting class in 2010. 

B. The Current Custody Dispute 

The proceedings leading up to this appeal began when Andrea filed a 

custody modification request because of her new husband’s impending move to New 

Jersey. Andrea briefly mentioned domestic violence in her motion to modify, stating 

“[domestic violence] is being addressed in another motion. I would, however, like the 

court[] to consider these issues when making its decision.” 

The same day she moved to modify custody Andrea also filed a motion for 

an order to show cause. Among other allegations, Andrea noted that Marcus had a 

history of domestic violence and that Marcus’s second ex-wife, Angelec, had recently 

obtained a domestic violence protective order against him, which Andrea attached to her 

motion. Superior Court Judge Patrick J. McKay denied the motion for an order to show 

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cause but informed Andrea that she could raise these allegations at the custody 

modification trial. 

The superior court also ordered that an earlier custody investigation be 

updated. The updated report stressed that the children continued to be placed in the 

middle of their parents’ custody dispute and that the children needed consistency and 

stability above all to meet their needs. The report found Marcus was more capable and 

willing to meet the children’s educational needs based on interviews with their teachers 

that indicated that Marcus was the more involved parent. The report also noted that both 

children preferred to stay in Anchorage so that they could “be near their friends and 

complete school with them.” 

5 The custody investigator concluded that the stability factor favored Marcus

because of his “support for the education of the children and for their team sports.” And 

on domestic violence, the investigator noted, “[the Office of Children’s Services] has 

been involved with this family on a historical basis but . . . nothing has been 

substantiated.”6 The investigator believed that “[t]he boys need to remain together” and 

underscored that they “need consistency” and “need to remain with their familiar 

teachers and friends.” The report ultimately recommended that Marcus receive sole legal 

and primary physical custody, with Andrea having physical custody during seven 

consecutive weeks in the summer and over certain holidays. 

5 Alaska Statute 25.24.150(c) lists nine best interest factors a court should 

consider in making a custody determination, one of which is “the length of time the child 

has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment and the desirability of maintaining 

continuity.” AS 25.24.150(c)(5). 

6 The report did not discuss the new domestic violence order that Angelec 

had obtained against Marcus. 

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The superior court held a custody trial in November 2012. Andrea called 

as a witness Dr. Laura Jones, a child psychologist who had worked with both children. 

While Dr. Jones noted that Andrea had “played an important role” in the children’s 

therapy, Marcus “ha[d] been more actively involved.” And Dr. Jones testified that 

Andrea and Daniel “ha[d] had a more emotionally reactive relationship over the years.” 

Dr. Jones noted that “[Daniel] struggles when he does not have consistency and stability 

in his life, and certainly a big family move . . . creates a lack of consistency, a lack of 

stability . . . that has been difficult for [Daniel].” Dr. Jones explained that “for young 

kids, having physical . . . stability in terms of a very regulated, continual . . . experience 

of their life, their surroundings, the people they’re with leads . . . to psychological 

stability.” 

Andrea never introduced any evidence supporting her allegations of 

Marcus’s history of domestic violence, notwithstanding her brief reference to domestic 

violence in her motion for an order to show cause and the superior court’s statement to 

her that she could address her allegation in the custody trial. 

The superior court found that Andrea’s move out of Alaska constituted a 

substantial change in circumstances and then reviewed the statutory best interest factors 

to make its custody decision. The court found that “[Daniel] has some special 

educational and emotional needs which are currently being met here in Alaska.” The 

court noted that “both parties have the capability and desire to meet most of the 

children’s needs, [but] . . . the parties seem to be unable to control themselves or [are] 

oblivious as to how their continual bickering affects their children’s development.” The 

court did not give significant weight to the children’s preference because of their age and 

because “any preference . . . [was] in all probability not free of suggestion from their 

parents.” 

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The court found that “there is clearly love and affection . . . between both 

children and each parent.” And on the stability factor, the court found that “even prior 

to [Andrea’s] move . . . , [Marcus’s] home, with the paternal grandparents, ha[s] been a 

stable and satisfactory environment, probably the most stable environment in their lives; 

Dr. Jones has testified both previously and at this hearing, that stability is extremely 

important for [Daniel].” The court found that “both parties express a desire to allow an 

open and loving, frequent relationship between their children and the other parent, [but] 

neither parent [does] particularly well at this.” 

Regarding the domestic violence presumption, the superior court 

determined that “there [was] no current evidence of any domestic violence . . . in either 

household which would affect this court’s decision at this time.” (Emphasis added.) And 

the court found no evidence of substance abuse by either parent. 

The superior court awarded Marcus sole legal and primary physical 

custody; it awarded Andrea physical custody for seven consecutive weeks in the summer 

and over certain holidays. The court noted that “the overwhelming recommendation 

from the experts . . . is the need for continuity and stability in [Daniel’s] and [Bryson’s] 

li[ves].” 

Andrea filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that her earlier motion 

to show cause regarding Marcus’s alleged domestic violence was “not taken into 

consideration.” The superior court denied her motion, and Andrea appealed.7 We 

remanded for clarification on the domestic violence issue and gave the court the option 

to take additional evidence, but did not require it to do so.8 

7 Andrea C. v. Marcus K., No. S-14996 (Alaska Supreme Court Order, 

July 28, 2014). 

8 Id. at 4. 

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C. The Superior Court’s Supplemental Findings 

Judge McKay made additional findings without holding another hearing.9 

He noted that Andrea was not a credible witness and that “[n]o other witnesses testified 

as to Marcus’[s] propensity for domestic violence.”10 Judge McKay also indicated that 

he had listened to the hearing on Angelec’s long-term domestic violence petition, which 

had been conducted by another judge, and “[did] not find that the entry of that order 

should in any way be considered as a ‘qualifying’ long[-]term protective [order] under 

AS 25.24.150(g).”11 

Judge McKay specifically took issue with (1) the procedure used in the 

domestic violence proceedings; (2) Marcus being informed by the judge that the order 

would not affect him unless he violated it; and (3) Marcus being told by the judge to 

focus on staying away from Angelec as opposed to filing an appeal or Civil Rule 60(b) 

motion.12 Judge McKay determined that Andrea’s evidence did not support a finding 

that Marcus had a renewed history of domestic violence, and he affirmed his decision to 

give no weight to the domestic violence factor.13 We permitted the parties to file 

supplemental briefs addressing his findings on remand. 

9 Marcus K. v. Andrea C., No. 3AN-04-08093 CI (Alaska Super., 

Aug. 4, 2014). 

10 Id. at 1. 

11 Id. at 2. 

12 Id. at 2 n.1. 

13 Id. at 2. 

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III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

The superior court has “broad discretion in determining whether a proposed 

child-custody modification is in [a] child’s best interests.” 14 We will reverse a superior 

court’s custody modification only where the record demonstrates an abuse of discretion, 

or when the court’s controlling findings of fact were clearly erroneous.15 

An abuse of discretion in the custody modification context occurs when 

in reaching its decision the trial court “consider[ed] improper factors, fail[ed] to consider 

statutorily mandated factors, or g[ave] too much weight to some factors while ignoring 

others.”16 “In the context of a custody modification decree, this analysis must be applied 

to assess whether the superior court was justified in changing the previous custody 

determination.”17 

Factual findings are clearly erroneous if we are left with a definite and firm 

conviction that the superior court was mistaken.18 

“The applicability of collateral estoppel to a particular set of facts is a 

question of law subject to independent review.” 19 But we review the decision to apply 

14 Heather W. v. Rudy R., 274 P.3d 478, 481 (Alaska 2012) (quoting Rego v. 

Rego, 259 P.3d 447, 452 (Alaska 2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

15 Id. (citing McLane v. Paul, 189 P.3d 1039, 1042 (Alaska 2008)). 

16 Kessler v. Kessler, 827 P.2d 1119, 1119 (Alaska 1992) (citing S.N.E. v. 

R.L.B., 699 P.2d 875, 878 (Alaska 1985)) (per curiam). 

17 Gratrix v. Gratrix, 652 P.2d 76, 80 (Alaska 1982). 

18 Heather W., 274 P.3d at 481(citing Barrett v. Alguire, 35 P.3d 1, 5 (Alaska 

2001)). 

19 State v. United Cook Inlet Drift Ass’n, 895 P.2d 947, 950 (Alaska 1995) 

(citing Rapoport v. Tesoro Alaska Petrol. Co., 794 P.2d 949, 951 (Alaska 1990)). 

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collateral estoppel when its technical requirements20 are otherwise satisfied for abuse of 

discretion. 21 We will find an abuse of discretion when the superior court has acted in a 

manifestly unreasonable manner.22 

IV.	 DISCUSSION 

We interpret Andrea’s appeal as presenting two sets of issues. First, we 

consider the superior court’s treatment of Andrea’s domestic violence allegations. 

Second, we consider the court’s balancing of the remaining best interest factors. 

A.	 The Superior Court Did Not Err When It Gave No Weight To The 

Domestic Violence Allegations Against Marcus. 

Andrea argues that there is sufficient evidence in the record to establish that 

Marcus has a history of domestic violence. And she contends that the superior court 

20	 These elements are: 

1. The plea of collateral estoppel must be asserted against a 

party or one in privity with a party to the first action; 

2. The issue to be precluded from relitigation by operation of 

the doctrine must be identical to that decided in the first 

action; [and] 

3. The issue in the first action must have been resolved by a 

final judgment on the merits. 

Sopcak v. Northern Mountain Helicopter Servs., 924 P.2d 1006, 1009 (Alaska 1996) 

(quoting Campion v. State, Dep’t of Cmty. & Reg’l Affairs, 876 P.2d 1096, 1098-99 

(Alaska 1994)). 

21 Misyura v. Misyura, 242 P.3d 1037, 1040 (Alaska 2010). But the superior 

court’s discretion “must be tempered by principles of fairness in light of the 

circumstances in each particular case.” Id. (quoting Borg-Warner Corp. v. Avco Corp. 

(Lycoming Div.), 850 P.2d 628, 635 (Alaska 1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

22 See Collins v. Arctic Builders, 957 P.2d 980, 981 (Alaska 1998) (quoting 

Sheehan v. Univ. of Alaska, 700 P.2d 1295, 1297 (Alaska 1985)). 

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must make new findings regarding whether Marcus has rebutted the domestic violence 

presumption at each custody modification, even when there have been no new 

allegations since the last modification order. She asserts that the superior court’s 

findings in this most recent modification proceeding were insufficient. 

We see no error with respect to the superior court’s treatment of the prior 

allegations of domestic violence against Marcus. Marcus successfully rebutted the 

domestic violence presumption in 2006, and he has been awarded increasing custody of 

the children since then. We read the court’s findings in the present custody modification 

as recognizing that Marcus had a past history of domestic violence, but that there were 

no current concerns and that the children would be best served by remaining in Marcus’s 

custody, particularly in light of its concerns regarding Andrea. 

We agree that the superior court’s initial findings were problematic with 

respect to the new domestic violence order Angelec obtained, but the court’s 

supplemental findings have resolved our concerns. Andrea’s inclusion of the protective 

order granted to Angelec appears to have been an attempt to establish, through nonmutual, offensive collateral estoppel,23 that Marcus had committed domestic violence 

against Angelec. A new instance of domestic violence might have been sufficient to 

trump Marcus’s earlier rebuttal of the presumption against custody. But we need not — 

and do not — decide what effect a new incident of domestic violence would have had 

23 “Offensive use of collateral estoppel occurs where a plaintiff seeks to 

preclude a defendant from relitigating an issue that the defendant previously litigated 

unsuccessfully against the same or a different party.” United Cook Inlet Drift Ass’n, 

895 P.2d at 950 n.7. We have previously held that “the decision to apply collateral 

estoppel is within the discretion of the trial court, although this discretion must be 

tempered by principles of fairness in light of the circumstances in each particular case.” 

Misyura, 242 P.3d at 1040 (quoting Borg-Warner Corp., 850 P.2d at 635) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

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because the superior court did not abuse its discretion in choosing not to apply collateral 

estoppel against Marcus. 

“[C]ollateral estoppel bars relitigation, even in an action on a different 

claim, of all issues of fact or law that were actually litigated and necessarily decided in 

[a] prior proceeding.” 24 The doctrine’s application here could arguably prevent Marcus 

from contesting that he had recently committed a new crime of domestic violence. But 

the superior court retains discretion regarding when it will apply the doctrine.25 The 

court permissibly exercised that discretion here. 

First, the judge hearing Angelec’s domestic violence petition found she had 

not proven the underlying domestic violence allegation in her petition. Thus, there was 

no apparent reason for that judge to have granted a protective order because Marcus had 

not been found to have done anything that would require changing the status quo. 

Second, the judge hearing Angelec’s domestic violence petition based his 

entry of the protective order on two earlier violations of a civil no-contact order by 

Marcus. It is not clear from the judge’s comments at the domestic violence hearing 

which earlier instances he was referencing. And while Marcus had been fined previously 

for violating the no-contact order, the judge hearing Angelec’s petition had not 

previously issued a protective order in response to the violations. Judge McKay was 

understandably reluctant to apply collateral estoppel where the judge presiding over the 

domestic violence proceedings had not previously issued a protective order even though 

Marcus twice violated a civil no-contact order, had found as a matter of fact that Marcus 

did not commit domestic violence against Angelec, but had issued a protective order 

24 Wall v. Stinson, 983 P.2d 736, 740 (Alaska 1999) (quoting Campion, 

876 P.2d at 1098) (first alteration added, second alteration in original) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). 

25 Misyura, 242 P.3d at 1040. 

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anyway based on Marcus’s previous violations of the civil no-contact order (for which 

he had already been fined). 

Third, the judge presiding over the domestic violence proceeding twice told 

Marcus that the new protective order would have no impact on his life so long as he did 

not violate it. Notably, the judge failed to explain that the protective order could have 

a significant negative impact in future child custody proceedings. To someone 

unfamiliar with the law, the judge’s “no impact” statement might have dissuaded Marcus 

from appealing the protective order. Taking Marcus’s entire situation into account, the 

judge’s explanation was clearly incorrect. Marcus is a parent engaged in a contentious, 

on-going custody dispute with a prior finding that he has a history of domestic violence; 

an order finding that he had committed additional domestic violence has serious potential 

to affect his custody of the children. 

Judge McKay carefully evaluated the record and evidence from Angelec’s 

domestic violence protective order proceedings and permissibly concluded that the way 

in which that proceeding was conducted justified not giving that order credence. We 

conclude that Judge McKay did not abuse his discretion when he chose not to permit 

Andrea to establish that Marcus committed domestic violence against Angelec through 

non-mutual, offensive collateral estoppel. 

This holding raises the question whether Andrea should have been given 

another opportunity to prove Marcus had committed domestic violence because she was 

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representing herself. 26 Indeed, we have imposed additional obligations on the superior 

court when self-represented litigants allege domestic violence.27 

But the facts of this case are materially different from our earlier cases, and 

we conclude that the superior court’s decision not to hold another hearing was an 

appropriate exercise of the court’s discretion. The court earlier had explicitly informed 

Andrea that she could present evidence of domestic violence at the custody hearing. 

Andrea failed to do so. And nothing in the record indicates that Andrea had personal 

knowledge regarding Marcus’s alleged acts of domestic violence against Angelec, 

making any requirement that the court question Andrea about those allegations an 

exercise in futility.28 On the facts of this case, the court was not required to provide 

Andrea with a new opportunity to prove her domestic violence allegations against 

Marcus. 

26 To the extent Andrea argues that our remand order required the superior 

court to hold another hearing, she is incorrect. Our order gave the superior court the 

option of holding another hearing, but did not require it to do so. Andrea C. v. Marcus 

K., No. S-14996 (Alaska Supreme Court Order, July 28, 2014). 

27 See, e.g., Williams v. Barbee, 243 P.3d 995, 1005 (Alaska 2010) (holding 

that the superior court should have inquired into pro se party’s allegations of domestic 

violence in her pleadings and should have allowed party to present evidence in support 

of those allegations); Parks v. Parks, 214 P.3d 295, 300 (Alaska 2009) (holding that the 

superior court should have inquired further into pro se party’s domestic violence 

allegations). 

28 See Alaska R. Evid. 602 (requiring fact witnesses to testify based on 

personal knowledge); Williams, 234 P.3d at 1005; Parks, 214 P.3d at 300. 

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B.	 The Superior Court Correctly Analyzed The Best Interest Factors. 

The superior court’s custody modification decision must be guided by the 

best interest factors listed in AS 25.24.150(c).29 While the “court cannot assign 

disproportionate weight to particular factors while ignoring others, it has considerable 

discretion in determining the importance of each statutory factor in the context of a 

specific case and is not required to weigh the factors equally.”30 

1.	 The superior court did not err when it found the children’s 

needs were being met in Alaska. 

The superior court generally found that Daniel had some special needs that 

were being met in Alaska and that both parents wanted to and could meet their children’s 

needs. Overall, the superior court weighed these factors in favor of Marcus because both 

children, especially Daniel, needed continuity and consistency — and their Alaska home 

provided that. 

Andrea argues that the superior court “neglected . . . to make any findings 

as to whether the needs of the children could be adequately met by Andrea in any other 

state or, more importantly, whether Andrea was more willing and able to meet the needs 

of the children than Marcus.” But a “court’s ultimate decision to give determinative 

weight to one of [the best interest] factors and the consequent emphasis it placed on this 

factor do not, standing alone, establish that it ignored the remaining factors or gave them 

inadequate weight.”31 Here, the court sought to ensure that Daniel and Bryson had 

29 AS 25.24.150(a), (c). 

30 Williams, 243 P.3d at 1005 (quoting Barlow v. Thompson, 221 P.3d 998, 

1005 (Alaska 2009)) (alteration omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

31 Ebertz v. Ebertz, 113 P.3d 643, 649 (Alaska 2005). 

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stability in their lives, especially because both parents destabilized matters due to their 

inability to cooperate over the course of this custody dispute. 

The testimony amply supports the superior court’s finding that the children, 

especially Daniel, needed emotional stability — a need that was best met in Alaska in 

Marcus’s continued custody. Andrea was the parent with whom Daniel had the more 

difficult relationship. And the children’s psychologist was concerned about how a crosscountry move would impact Daniel, noting that physical stability leads to psychological 

stability for young children. Thus, while the court recognized Andrea might personally 

have the capability and desire to meet Daniel and Bryson’s needs, the court did not err 

in finding it was not in the children’s best interest to relocate with her. 

2.	 The superior court did not assign disproportionate weight to the 

stability factor. 

Relying on Moeller-Prokosch v. Prokosch,

32 Andrea argues that the 

superior court weighed the stability factor too heavily and “gave too little consideration 

to the community, (and more importantly, the extended family), of the minor child[ren] 

in the New Jersey area.” Andrea also argues that the superior court’s decision 

“shatter[ed] the bonds” between Daniel and Bryson and their half-brother, Charles. 

“The continuity factor has two components: maintaining geographic 

continuity and maximizing relational stability.”33 Andrea is correct that “[a] continuity 

test centered entirely on the child’s geographical stability would always favor placing the 

child with the non-moving parent.”34 Indeed, the superior court “may properly award 

primary custody to the relocating parent when that parent offers superior emotional 

32 99 P.3d 531, 535 (Alaska 2004). 

33 Blanton v. Yourkowski, 180 P.3d 948, 953 (Alaska 2008). 

34 Meier v. Cloud, 34 P.3d 1274, 1279 (Alaska 2001). 

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stability.” 35 The real question on appeal is whether the court engaged in a 

“comprehensive inquiry into each parent’s respective ability to maintain stable and 

satisfactory relations between themselves and the child.”36 

The record supports the superior court’s finding in favor of Marcus. The 

custody investigator’s report stressed that Bryson and Daniel continued to be placed “in 

the middle” of their parents’ custody dispute and needed consistency and stability.37 The 

investigator noted that Marcus provided a more stable environment and stated that “[t]he 

boys need to remain together” and “need to remain with their familiar teachers and 

friends.” Andrea, on the other hand, had a tumultuous relationship with Daniel, was 

repeatedly ordered by the court to undertake parenting and anger management classes, 

failed over a protracted period to take these classes, and failed to acknowledge her 

shortcomings as a parent. 

The facts support the superior court’s conclusion that Andrea’s home would 

not provide as emotionally stable an environment for the children as Marcus’s home. 

Dr. Jones’s comments regarding the importance of stability for young children further 

emphasizes the necessity of stability for Daniel and Bryson. 

Regarding Andrea’s assertion that the superior court’s decision “shatter[ed] 

the bonds” between the boys and their half-brother, we have said that where “[a] review 

of the record reveals little evidence that sibling bonds were of overwhelming importance 

to [a sibling] or to his well-being . . . weighing sibling bonds less than other factors [is] 

35 Id. 

36 Id. (quoting McQuade v. McQuade, 901 P.2d 421, 426 (Alaska 1995)) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). 

37 While the court gave it no weight, we note that the children also indicated 

that they wanted to be in Anchorage to “be near their friends and complete school with 

them.” 

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not an abuse of discretion.”38 Here, Daniel and Bryson shared a custodial household with 

their half-brother for only the first 10 months of their half-brother’s life. The court’s 

decision not to give particular weight to the half-sibling relationship in its determination 

of the best interest factors was not an abuse of discretion.39 

Thus, we conclude that the superior court did not err in its consideration of 

the stability factor. 

V. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM the decision of the superior 

court. 

38 Stephanie W. v. Maxwell V., 274 P.3d 1185, 1192 (Alaska 2012). 

39 See, e.g., Craig v. McBride, 639 P.2d 303, 306 (Alaska 1982). In Craig, 

the half-siblings were separated for substantial lengths of time, and the superior court 

determined that the sibling relationship was not critical for the child’s social 

development. Id. at 306 n.11. There, this court stated: “Though maintaining sibling 

relationships will typically be in the best interests of the child, cases will undoubtedly 

arise where the best interests of the child dictate otherwise.” Id. at 306. This is such a 

case. 

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