COURT OF APPEALS

DECISION

DATED AND FILED

November 7, 2019

Sheila T. Reiff

Clerk of Court of Appeals

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further editing. If 

published, the official version will appear in 

the bound volume of the Official Reports. 

A party may file with the Supreme Court a 

petition to review an adverse decision by the 

Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 

and RULE 809.62. 

Appeal No. 2019AP95 Cir. Ct. No. 2018CV47

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS

DISTRICT IV

RACHAEL WARRINGTON AND KURT 

WARRINGTON, JR., PARENTS OF K. W.,

INDIVIDUALLY AND AS THE PERSONAL 

REPRESENTATIVES FOR THE ESTATE OF K. W.,

 PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS,

THE NORTH CENTRAL REGIONAL COUNCIL 

OF CARPENTERS HEALTH FUND,

 INVOLUNTARY-PLAINTIFF,

 V.

CITY OF PRAIRIE DU CHIEN, PRAIRIE DU CHIEN 

AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT AND EMPLOYERS 

MUTUAL CASUALTY COMPANY,

 DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.
No. 2019AP95

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APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Crawford County: 

CRAIG R. DAY, Judge. Affirmed.

Before Fitzpatrick, P.J., Blanchard and Graham, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent 

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).

¶1 PER CURIAM. Rachel and Kurt Warrington, individually and as 

the personal representatives of their son K.W.’s estate, appeal the circuit court 

order that dismissed their negligence claims against the City of Prairie du Chien 

and the Prairie du Chien Area School District. The Warringtons contend that the 

circuit court erred by applying the recreational immunity statute to conclude that 

the Warringtons failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. We 

agree with the circuit court that the statute applies and, therefore, we affirm the 

circuit court’s dismissal order.

1

¶2 We review de novo whether the Warringtons’ complaint states a 

claim, accepting as true the facts alleged in the complaint. See Atkinson v. 

Everbrite, Inc., 224 Wis. 2d 724, 727, 592 N.W.2d 299 (Ct. App. 1999). Whether 

the recreational immunity statute applies to a given set of facts is likewise a 

question of law we review de novo. See Minnesota Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Paper 

Recycling of La Crosse, 2001 WI 64, ¶9, 244 Wis. 2d 290, 627 N.W.2d 527.

 

1

 As an alternative basis for dismissing the Warringtons’ claims against the School 

District, the circuit court concluded that the Warringtons failed to properly serve the School 

District with their summons and complaint. We do not address this alternative basis for 

dismissing those claims.
No. 2019AP95

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¶3 According to the Warringtons’ complaint, four-year-old K.W. was 

brought by his grandparents to the Prairie du Chien pool to attend a swimming 

lesson for “non-swimmers.” The lesson was supervised, instructed, and 

lifeguarded by City and School District staff. During the lesson, the staff lost 

track of K.W. and did not realize that he was missing until the lesson was nearly 

over. K.W. was found face down and unconscious in four feet of water. It was 

estimated that he had been submerged for five to ten minutes before he was found. 

K.W. later died.

¶4 The parties dispute whether, based on these alleged facts, the City 

and School District are immune from liability under paragraph (2)(b) of the 

recreational immunity statute. That provision states that “no owner ... is liable for 

the death of, any injury to, or any death or injury caused by, a person engaging in a 

recreational activity on the owner’s property.” See WIS. STAT. § 895.52(2)(b) 

(2017-18).2

¶5 The Warringtons’ sole argument against the application of this 

statutory provision is that K.W. was not engaging in a recreational activity. The 

Warringtons concede that swimming and receiving instruction in swimming both 

qualify as “recreational activity” under the statutory definition. See WIS. STAT.

§ 895.52(1)(g) (defining “[r]ecreational activity” as including “water sports” and 

 

2

 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2017-18 version unless otherwise 

noted. We cite the current version for ease of reference. The recreational immunity statute has 

not changed since the time of the events that led to K.W.’s death.
No. 2019AP95

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as including “instruction in” a recreational activity).3 The Warringtons argue, 

however, that K.W. was not engaging in either of these activities when he

sustained his fatal injuries. According to the Warringtons, K.W. could not have 

been swimming when he was injured because he was a “non-swimmer,” and K.W. 

was not receiving instruction in swimming when he was injured because the pool 

staff had lost track of him.

¶6 Putting aside whether K.W. was engaging in swimming, we 

conclude that the statute applies because K.W. was engaging in “instruction in” 

swimming. The Warringtons’ argument to the contrary views K.W.’s instruction 

in recreational activity moment by moment, isolating the time of injury and the 

moments leading up to the injury from the overarching activity in which K.W. was 

engaged. The Warringtons point to no statutory language or other authority that 

supports such a restrictive construction of the statute. Further, the Warringtons’ 

argument runs contrary to the legislature’s directive that the statute “‘should be 

liberally construed in favor of property owners to protect them from liability.’” 

 

3

 WISCONSIN STAT. § 895.52(1)(g) defines “[r]ecreational activity” as follows:

“Recreational activity” means any outdoor activity 

undertaken for the purpose of exercise, relaxation or pleasure, 

including practice or instruction in any such activity. 

“Recreational activity” includes hunting, fishing, trapping, 

camping, picnicking, exploring caves, nature study, bicycling, 

horseback riding, bird-watching, motorcycling, operating an allterrain vehicle or utility terrain vehicle, operating a vehicle, as 

defined in s. 340.01(74), on a road designated under s. 23.115, 

recreational aviation, ballooning, hang gliding, hiking, 

tobogganing, sledding, sleigh riding, snowmobiling, skiing, 

skating, water sports, sight-seeing, rock-climbing, cutting or 

removing wood, climbing observation towers, animal training, 

harvesting the products of nature, participating in an agricultural 

tourism activity, sport shooting and any other outdoor sport, 

game or educational activity.
No. 2019AP95

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See Wilmet v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 2017 WI App 16, ¶13, 374 Wis. 2d 413, 893 

N.W.2d 251 (quoting the act that created the current statute).

¶7 The circuit court, in its oral ruling, aptly explained why the 

Warringtons’ construction of the statute is at odds with this directive and 

unreasonably restrictive:

You look to the purpose of the use, recreational immunity 

is to be liberally construed in favor of immunity .... And 

just universally it is, from this Court’s reading of the law, 

painting with too fine of a brush to parse the words of the 

recreational immunity statute that finely.

....

If you ... start down that path of receiving 

instruction—when do you start receiving instruction and 

when do you stop receiving instruction, I don’t know where 

it logically would ever end. If we were to try to slice it that 

thinly, then if a supervisor was not directly engaged 

physically with you are you receiving instruction? If the 

supervisor were not directly verbally engaged, are you 

receiving instruction? If the supervisor is talking to the 

whole group but not looking at you, are you receiving 

instruction?

I can envision just all kinds of ways that this gets 

complicated in a fashion that does not advance the overall 

goal of recreational immunity. The fact that this fact 

situation ... speaks of a lack of due care makes no 

difference. That’s the whole point of immunity. It’s not 

that you’re not negligent; it’s that you are negligent but you 

are not liable based upon a grant of statutory immunity.

We agree with the circuit court’s analysis.

¶8 Our conclusion that the recreational immunity statute applies here is 

bolstered by Stann v. Waukesha County, 161 Wis. 2d 808, 468 N.W.2d 775 (Ct. 

App. 1991). For the reasons we now explain, Stann is, if not controlling, at least 

supportive of our conclusion.
No. 2019AP95

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¶9 In Stann, a three-year-old girl died as a result of a drowning incident 

at a county beach after the girl had apparently wandered away from her mother. 

See id. at 812. In suing the county, the girl’s parents alleged that lifeguards failed 

to take appropriate action upon being informed that the girl was missing. Id. at 

812-13. The girl’s parents in Stann contended that a child of such young age who 

wanders off cannot be said to be engaging in recreational activity within the 

meaning of the statute. See id. at 821. This court disagreed and concluded that 

what mattered instead was the undisputed fact that the girl’s mother “brought [her] 

to the ... beach in order to use and enjoy the recreational aspects of the site.” See

id. at 823. Therefore, the court concluded, the girl’s “presence at the ... beach was 

for purposes of her engaging in recreational activity as contemplated pursuant to 

sec. 895.52.” Id.

¶10 Here, it is undisputed that K.W. was brought to the pool for a 

recreational activity—his swim lesson. We would conclude that Stann is 

controlling except that the court in Stann was addressing paragraph (2)(a) of the 

recreational immunity statute, a different provision than the one the parties dispute 

here, and the City expressly disclaims any reliance on sub. (2)(a) as a basis for its 

motion to dismiss. See id. at 819. Under paragraph (2)(a), a property owner owes 

no duty to keep the property safe for recreational activities to a person who “enters

the owner’s property to engage in a recreational activity.” See WIS. STAT.

§ 895.52(2)(a) (emphasis added). Here, the parties dispute the applicability of 

paragraph (2)(b), which does not contain similar “enters ... to” language. Rather, 

as already noted, paragraph (2)(b) immunizes property owners from liability for 
No. 2019AP95

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harm caused by a person “engaging in a recreational activity on the owner’s 

property.” See § 895.52(2)(b).4

¶11 Based on the court’s discussion in Stann, we are uncertain to what 

extent the court’s focus on the reason for entering property was dependent on the

“enters ... to” language in paragraph (2)(a). See Stann, 161 Wis. 2d at 819-23. 

To the extent that the court in Stann was relying on that language, Stann may not 

be controlling here in the absence of similar language in paragraph (2)(b). 

However, a determination that the recreational immunity statute applies here is

consistent with Stann, whereas concluding that the statute does not apply here

may be inconsistent with Stann. Accordingly, Stann supports our conclusion that 

the recreational immunity statute applies in this case.

¶12 We turn finally to the Warringtons’ reliance on a different case, 

Engelhardt v. City of New Berlin, 2019 WI 2, 385 Wis. 2d 86, 921 N.W.2d 714. 

 

4

 WISCONSIN STAT. § 895.52(2) provides, in full:

(2) No duty; immunity from liability. (a) Except as 

provided in subs. (3) to (6), no owner and no officer, employee 

or agent of an owner owes to any person who enters the owner's 

property to engage in a recreational activity:

1. A duty to keep the property safe for recreational 

activities.

2. A duty to inspect the property, except as provided 

under s. 23.115(2).

3. A duty to give warning of an unsafe condition, use or 

activity on the property.

(b) Except as provided in subs. (3) to (6), no owner and 

no officer, employee or agent of an owner is liable for the death 

of, any injury to, or any death or injury caused by, a person 

engaging in a recreational activity on the owner’s property or for 

any death or injury resulting from an attack by a wild animal.
No. 2019AP95

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We need not discuss the factual details of Engelhardt. It is enough to point out 

that Engelhardt involves the known danger exception to governmental immunity 

under WIS. STAT. § 893.80(4), and that the Warringtons do not contend that there 

is a comparable exception under the recreational immunity statute. See

Engelhardt, 385 Wis. 2d 86, ¶¶3-7. Thus, the Warringtons’ reliance on 

Engelhardt is misplaced and not persuasive.

¶13 In sum, for the reasons stated, we affirm the circuit court order 

dismissing the Warringtons’ claims.

By the Court.—Order affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT. RULE

809.23(1)(b)5.