1

Filed 1/29/15 In re J.H. CA1/3 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION THREE 

In re J.H., a Person Coming Under the 

Juvenile Court Law. 

SOLANO COUNTY HEALTH & 

SOCIAL SERVICES DEPARTMENT, 

 Plaintiff and Respondent, 

v. 

C.H., 

 Defendant and Appellant. 

 A141018 

 (Solano County 

 Super. Ct. No. J41522) 

In re C.H., 

 on Habeas Corpus. A142616 

 Following a hearing held pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 

366.26, 1

 the juvenile court entered an order on February 14, 2014, terminating the 

parental rights of C.H. (father) with respect to his son J.H. and directing the Solano 

County Health & Social Services Department (the agency) to commence adoption 

proceedings for the child. On appeal and in his consolidated petition for writ of habeas 

 

1

 All further unspecified statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions 

Code. 
2

corpus, 

2

 father does not present any substantive arguments challenging the juvenile 

court’s findings or order entered after the section 366.26 hearing. He argues only that the 

February 14, 2014, order “was the inevitable product” of earlier antecedent orders entered 

after the jurisdictional and dispositional hearing, and the six-month and 12-month review 

hearings, which preceded the February 14, 2014 order. (In re Meranda P. (1997) 56 

Cal.App.4th 1143, 1146 (Meranda P.).) According to father, each antecedent order was 

wrongly decided by the juvenile court or was the consequence of his counsel’s ineffective 

assistance. We conclude father’s failure to either appeal or seek writ relief regarding the 

propriety of the orders antedating the February 14, 2014, order precludes him from now 

challenging those orders either by this appeal or by petition for writ of habeas corpus. 

(Ibid.) Accordingly, we affirm the February 14, 2014, order and summarily deny father’s 

petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND3

 A. Jurisdiction and Disposition Orders 

Mother gave birth to the child in May 2006. Father was present at the child’s birth 

and is listed as the father on the child’s birth certificate. Father and mother were not 

living together at the time of the child’s birth. The parents have never been married and 

father reported he is married to another woman. 

 In June 2012, the agency filed a petition seeking to detain the child, who had just 

turned six, in an out-of-home placement pending further investigation and a jurisdictional 

hearing. The agency’s intervention had been sought by a Fairfield police officer who had 

taken the child into protective custody when his temporary caretaker (mother’s friend) 

was arrested and mother could not be found. In a detention report, the agency social 

worker stated that the child reported he had been living with his mother’s friend for the 

 

2

 In support of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, appellant asks us to take 

judicial notice of the record, briefs and pleadings filed in the appeal in this case, which 

request is granted. 

3

 Because mother has not filed an appeal challenging the termination of her parental 

rights, our recitation of the facts focuses primarily, if not exclusively, on father’s 

circumstances. 
3

last 30 days and before that he had been living with his mother at a hotel. The child also 

reported that either his parents or his mother’s friend took him to and from school each 

day. A.T., the child’s adult-half sibling, reported that for the last three years, she and 

mother had been residing together on and off. In mother’s absence, A.T. cared for the 

child. About one month before the child’s detention, mother had arranged for the child to 

live with mother’s friend. M.J., the child’s maternal grandmother, reported that in about 

February 2012, mother began staying at a motel. At the end of April or beginning of 

May 2012, father had been arrested and was currently in the Yolo County jail. According 

to M.J., after father’s arrest, “things went downhill even more because [father] had 

helped stabilize [mother] and that he was taking care of [his son] primarily. [M.J.] 

reported that [father] had kept [mother] away from drugs, steered her . . . on the right 

track, and ensured [his son] went to school.” M.J. also explained her current 

circumstances and willingness to care for the child. 

 In its first amended petition, filed on July 2, 2012, the agency sought court 

intervention, alleging mother had failed to protect the child (§ 300, subd. (b)) based on 

her history of substance abuse, unstable housing, untreated mental health needs, and 

leaving the child with various caretakers without additional provisions for support, 

placing him at substantial risk of physical harm or illness, and father had failed to provide 

support for the child (§ 300, subd. (g)) based on the fact that father was “currently 

incarcerated” and “[d]ue to . . . father’s absence, he cannot make appropriate provisions 

for [the child’s] ongoing care and supervision which places the minor at substantial risk 

of serious physical harm or illness.” After a hearing on July 3, 2012, the court continued 

the child’s detention and scheduled a combined jurisdictional and dispositional hearing 

for July 24, 2012. In its findings and orders after detention hearing filed on July 3, 2012, 

the court found reasonable efforts were made to prevent or eliminate the need for the 

child’s removal from the home and “[a] relative who is able, approved, and willing to 

care for the child is not available. This is a temporary finding and does not preclude later 

placement with a relative under Welf. & Inst. Code, § 361.3.” (Italics in original.) 
4

 In advance of the jurisdictional and dispositional hearing, the agency social worker 

filed a jurisdictional report on July 19, 2012. By that time the child had been placed with 

maternal relatives, provisionally approved by the agency. Based on an interview with 

father, the agency social worker reported the following information. Father asserted that 

since the child’s birth he had provided financial support for the child and the day-to-day 

care for the child including taking the child to school every day. However, he admitted 

he had no knowledge of the arrangements mother had made for the child to stay with 

mother’s friend. He was opposed to any plan to return the child to mother as she was not 

able to provide appropriate care. When father received the section 300 petition he was 

relieved to know the child had been removed from mother’s care and was safe. Father 

explained the circumstances leading to his March 29, 2012 arrest on charges of evading a 

police officer and driving with a suspended license. Since father had been in police 

custody he had not seen the child. The agency social worker concluded her assessment of 

the father’s situation as follows: Father “has expressed his deep love and concern for [the 

child]. [Father] has stated that were he not incarcerated, he would be able to make 

appropriate arrangements for the care of [the child], and has further stated that prior to his 

incarceration he ensured that [the child] was cared for, fed, and attended school. The 

outcome of his sentencing for his current incarceration is still unknown. As a result, 

there is, again, little alternative to the continued detention of the [child].” 

 At the originally scheduled jurisdictional and dispositional hearing on July 24, 

2012, father was not present but was represented by a deputy public defender. The 

matter was continued for a month to allow counsel to speak with father in jail. At the 

continued hearing on August 24, 2012, father was again not present in court. The court 

was informed that there was an agreement “to resolve jurisdiction and potential 

disposition” at that time. Mother submitted to allegations, as amended, that she had 

failed to protect the child (§ 300, subd. (b)) based on a history of unstable housing, a past 

history of substance abuse, and untreated mental health needs, which periodically 

affected her ability to protect the child from physical harm and/or illness. Father’s 

counsel told the court: “I did visit with [father] in custody in Yolo County. I advised 
5

him of his right to be present today, but he had a court appearance scheduled at the same 

time up there, so he opted to stay up there. [¶] And as to the [section 300, subdivision (g), 

failure to provide support] allegation . . . , we did review that, and he was prepared to 

submit on that.” Based on the agency’s detention report and jurisdictional report, as well 

as the certified documents regarding the criminal proceedings against father, the court 

found by a preponderance of the evidence, that the allegations, as amended, against both 

parents were true, and accordingly, the child came within the jurisdiction of the court 

under subdivisions (b) and (g) of section 300. The court then discussed the terms and 

conditions of a disposition order. The court granted the agency’s request that the child 

remain in an out-of-home placement with maternal relatives and both parents be granted 

reunification services. On August 29, 2012, the court issued its findings and order after 

jurisdictional hearing, and later, on September 7, 2012, issued its findings and order after 

dispositional hearing. The court declared the child a dependent after finding that, based 

on the facts stated on the record, (1) continuance of the child in the mother’s home was 

contrary to his welfare and physical custody should be removed from mother, and 

(2) although father did not reside with the child at the time the petition was filed and 

desired custody of the child, “[b]y clear and convincing evidence, placement with the 

[father] . . . would be detrimental to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional wellbeing of the child.” The juvenile court found father to be the presumed father of the child. 

The court granted both parents reunification services after finding, in pertinent part, that 

services to father would benefit the child. As to father’s contact with the child, the court 

directed that father’s “[i]n-person” visits “shall commence upon the father’s release from 

jail. The father shall contact the Department upon his release to initiate visits,” and 

“[t]elephone and written contact are permitted, as allowed by the relative caregiver. 

Letters containing inappropriate content may be returned to the writer.” On January 15, 

2013, the child was removed from the home of his maternal relatives at their request and 

moved to a foster family agency home. 
6

B. Six-Month Review Hearing 

 In advance of the six-month review hearing, the agency social worker submitted a 

report indicating father had remained incarcerated in Yolo County for the duration of the 

current reporting period. As to visits, the agency social worker reported: “As [father] is 

currently incarcerated, he does not have in person contact with [the child]. He is allowed 

and encouraged to mail letters or cards to [the child] through the Department. [Father] 

has mailed one letter to [the child] during the current reporting period. The [agency 

social worker] is not recommending changes to [father’s] visitation schedule.” The 

agency social worker further reported: “[Father] states that he needs to have contact with 

[the child]. He states that he wants in person visitation with [the child]. He would also 

like to have better access to services while he is incarcerated in Yolo County.” 

 At the six-month review hearing held on February 26, 2013, father was not 

present. Father’s counsel stated he would “submit” on the matter, but was granted ten 

days to recalendar the matter because counsel had not heard from father and was not able 

to confirm if father had received the agency’s report. In its February 28, 2013, written 

findings and order entered after the six-month review hearing, the court continued its 

previous orders granting reunification services and directing that father’s in-person visits 

with the child would commence on his release from incarceration and father was to 

contact the agency on his release to initiate visits. On May 1, 2013, the child was moved 

from his foster care home placement to the home of his maternal grandmother. 

C. Twelve-Month Review Hearing 

 In advance of the 12-month review hearing, the agency social worker filed its 

August 5, 2013, report, recommending termination of family reunification services for 

both parents. As to the child’s circumstances, the agency social worker reported that 

between January 15, 2013 and April 2013, the child had spent every weekend with his 

maternal grandmother in anticipation of placement in her home that occurred on May 1, 

2013. The child was adjusting well to his placement and enjoyed living with the maternal 

grandmother. The maternal grandmother was committed to providing the child 

permanency in the form of adoption or guardianship, should reunification efforts with the 
7

parents fail. Since March 2013, the child had weekly individual counseling sessions with 

a mental health therapist. The therapist reported the child was “ ‘bright and 

precocious,’ ” and “ ‘very, very smart and delightful.’ ” The child loved his maternal 

grandmother and “ ‘is ready to attach.’ ” The child was in need of healthy adult 

relationships and would easily attach to anyone with a strong presence in his life. The 

child expressed anxiety over not knowing what would happen to him, and this anxiety 

was manifesting as stomach aches and chest pains. The child wanted to live with his 

father, but if he could not do so he wanted to live with his maternal grandmother. 

 As to father’s circumstances, the agency social worker reported that on June 26, 

2013, father had been sentenced to more than seven years in prison, and therefore there 

was no substantial probability of return of the child to him within the next six months. 

The agency social worker reported father did not have in person visits with the child 

because of father’s incarceration. Father sent letters and comic strips to the child who 

reportedly enjoyed the correspondence. The child asked the agency social worker to send 

father a school picture of child and on the back, the child had written that he loved his 

dad, and he and the maternal grandmother missed father a lot. The agency social worker 

opined that once father was assigned to permanent prison housing, the child would 

benefit from visits with father, provided the prison could arrange for contact visits and 

the decision was made in conjunction with the child’s therapist. 

 The agency social worker concluded her report by commenting: Father “has 

attempted to engage in the few services he has access to while incarcerated in Yolo 

County. He sends letters to [the child] which [he] enjoys. [The child] misses [father] and 

painted a broken heart for him. However, [father] will be incarcerated for a significant 

portion of [the child’s] childhood. There is no probability that [the child] can be returned 

to father within the next several years.” The agency social worker included in her report 

certified documents relating to the criminal proceedings against father. The certified 

documents indicated that on June 26, 2013, pursuant to a plea agreement, father was 

sentenced to an aggregate term of seven years and four months for the felony offenses of 

“evading a peace officer with reckless driving” and “evading a peace officer while 
8

driving in the opposite direction,” that he waived presentence custody credit up to 

May 29, 2013, and he was granted credit for time served of 56 days. 

 The 12-month review hearing was ultimately held on September 16, 2013. Father 

was not present but was represented by a deputy public defender. The court stated it had 

read and considered the agency’s report filed on August 5, 2013, and took judicial notice 

of the certified documents relating to father’s criminal proceedings in Yolo County. 

When asked for father’s position on the matter, his counsel replied that based on the 

information regarding defendant’s seven-year sentence, counsel was prepared to submit. 

Based on the agency’s recommendations, the court terminated reunification services for 

both parents and scheduled a section 366.26 hearing for January 7, 2014, to determine the 

child’s permanent placement. In so ruling, the court explained: “The Court having read 

and considered the status review report does find at this point in time that [the child’s] 

needs have become paramount . . . . [¶] . . . I am going to terminate reunification services 

for both [mother] and [father] at this point in time given their absence of compliance with 

the existing case plan, and in [father’s] case, the fact that notwithstanding his effort to try 

to complete his case plan, his present prison sentence does not authorize the Department 

to extend services beyond the time in which he would otherwise be incarcerated, and the 

provisions of additional services would not be of benefit to the minor.” With respect to 

visitation, the court ruled that “[w]hen [father] is settled in an appropriate facility, I’ll 

direct the Department to inquire whether or not it’s possible for them to arrange a special 

visit for [father] consistent with the rules and regulations of the facility in which he is 

incarcerated.” In its written findings and order filed on September 19, 2013, the court 

directed that “in-person visitation shall be allowed at the discretion of the social worker 

in conjunction with the child’s therapist while the father remains incarcerated, 

consideration being given to the rules and regulations of the penal institution. Should the 

father be released from custody, supervised visitation will occur at least once monthly,” 

and “[w]ritten contact is permitted.” 

 Father, in propria persona, filed a notice of intent to file a writ petition and request 

for record to review the September 19, 2013 order. However, this court struck the filing 
9

of the record after father failed to timely file a writ petition. In our order, we stated that 

“[t]he failure to file a timely petition shall preclude any subsequent appellate review of 

the order setting a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 (Welf. and 

Inst. Code, section 366.26, subd. (l)).” 

D. Section 366.26 Hearing 

 In advance of the section 366.26 hearing, the agency social worker filed a 

December 20, 2013, report, recommending termination of parental rights and adoption as 

the child’s permanent placement plan. By that time, the child had been detained for 18 

months and had been living with his maternal grandmother for seven months. The 

maternal grandmother had moved to a two-bedroom apartment and had retired from her 

employment. She was committed to adopting the child, providing him with a safe, stable 

home into adulthood, and supporting the child’s contact with both parents as the child 

had stated that was important to him. If the maternal grandmother was not able to adopt 

the child, there were other family members who had expressed an interest in adopting the 

child. Father remained incarcerated. He maintained some contact with the child and was 

supportive of the child remaining in the care of the maternal grandmother. The agency 

social worker also reported on the child’s circumstances. The child appeared comfortable 

and well-adjusted in the maternal grandmother’s home, enjoyed living with her and 

wanted to stay there if he could not reunify with the parents. The child and father 

exchanged letters and had infrequent telephone calls. The child enjoyed his contact with 

father. The child had received counseling from March 2013 to August 28, 2013, when 

his case was closed after he showed significant progress. However, in December 2013, 

the agency social worker again referred the child for counseling after he began to show 

some serious anger and aggression when upset, expressing that he was angry because his 

mother had not visited him. 

 At the section 366.26 hearing held on February 10, 2014, the court heard 

testimony from father, the child’s maternal grandmother, and the agency’s reunification 

and adoption social worker assigned to the case. Both the agency’s counsel and the child 

counsel’s urged the court to follow the agency’s recommendations and terminate the 
10

parental rights of both parents after finding that the child was adoptable in general and by 

the maternal grandmother. Father’s counsel argued that the court should select legal 

guardianship, rather than adoption, as the child’s permanent plan on the ground father 

had met his burden of showing there was a compelling reason for finding that termination 

of parental rights would be detrimental to the child because father had maintained visits 

and contacts with the child to the best of his ability and the child would benefit from 

continuing the relationship. Counsel noted that legal guardianship would give the child 

stability because the child would not be moving and the maternal grandmother would be 

able to raise the child while father’s parental rights would be maintained and kept intact. 

 The juvenile court found the agency had met its burden of demonstrating that the 

child’s permanent placement plan should be adoption. In so ruling, the court explained: 

“[F]irst of all, it’s uncontradicted here today that [the child] is adoptable, both generally 

and specifically. His grandmother very much wants to adopt him. And even if that were 

not to occur, the only evidence I have is that he’d be a very adoptable child, even without 

his grandmother there specifically indicating that she wanted to adopt him. [¶] Second, 

the only evidence I have, and I’ll take judicial notice of the file I have, is that family 

reunification services were terminated for both . . . mother and . . . father back on 

September 16th, 2013. [¶] . . . [H]aving made those findings, that brings me to the 

exceptions to the adoption permanency plan that [father’s counsel] has referred to . . . 

known as the [parental] beneficial relationship exception.” The court found, however, 

that the parental beneficial relationship exception did not apply in this case for the 

following reasons: “[E]ach party in this case has focused in on the portions of the statute 

that, well, benefits their approach to this case. [¶] . . . I’m extremely pleased that 

everybody in this room has [the child’s] best interests at heart. . . . [¶] . . . I want to do 

what’s best for [the child.] [¶] These types of decisions are frequently not easy, and this is 

one of those times. . . . [¶] . . . What I have to decide is the application of the exception. 

And I note that the burden of proof is on [father] in that regard, the department having 

already met its burden [o]n the question of adoptability. [¶] . . . [A]s I understand the 

statute, there are two prongs. [¶] Prong one is that [father] has the burden of showing that 
11

he had regular visitation and contact. I don’t think that the evidence shows anything 

other than he hasn’t. But as I understand his position, his position is that he hasn’t had 

regular contact, but, well, it’s not his fault. And I have some difficulty with that, [father]. 

I recognize that the department did not facilitate visitation and contact by you with [the 

child] while you were incarcerated in Yolo County, but . . . that’s not their fault. . . . The 

fault is yours [because] you were incarcerated for mistakes that you made. And I 

recognize that this is a very heavy price to pay, maybe more than other people have to 

pay for their mistakes. [¶] The second prong is benefit to the child. And without a doubt, 

in my mind, I am perfectly sure that you love [the child] very much, and that he loves 

you. And . . . that’s very important to me. [But] . . . . it has to be weighed against the 

benefit to [the child] of adoption. And in this particular case, it appears to me that [the 

child] does need that stability. [¶] And I recognize that during a portion of his life, you 

did have a parental role and an important parental role. But that hasn’t been possible 

since you were incarcerated almost two years ago. And that’s been lacking from [the 

child’s] life. And he needs this. And you’re going to be incarcerated for some time in 

the future, for a period of time in which none of us are clear exactly what that is. And as 

a result of that, you don’t currently occupy a parental role. And, admittedly, that role has 

been given to [the maternal grandmother]. [¶] And I have to say, after seeing her testify 

and hearing her testimony, I can understand why you’re comfortable with that and why 

[the child’s] mother is comfortable with that, because, . . . she apparently is doing a very 

good job. [¶] I have to find that the beneficial relationship exception does not apply in 

this particular case, for the reasons that I’ve stated.” The court further commented that its 

ruling concerned only the termination of father’s “legal rights to make parental decisions 

for [the] child. Now I recognize that if that happens, it leaves [father] with no legal rights 

to force contact to occur that . . . [a] legal parent would have. But somehow, with this 

family, . . . at least right now, I don’t hear anything like that . . . in this courtroom. [¶] I 

have to do what’s right for [the child]. And in this particular case, I think what’s right for 

him is that he needs that stability that his grandma is giving him. And as a result, I’m 

going to terminate the parental rights of both [parents], therefore leaving [the child] 
12

available to be adopted by his grandmother.” The court filed an order on February 14, 

2014, embodying its section 366.26 findings. Father filed a notice of appeal challenging 

the February 14, 2014 order, and later filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, which we 

consolidated with this appeal. 

DISCUSSION 

 In his appellate briefs and his petition, father essentially argues that all the findings 

and orders issued in this dependency proceeding starting with the jurisdictional finding 

against him should be reversed because of various errors made by the trial court and 

ineffective assistance of father’s trial counsel. He argues that but for counsel’s failure to 

object to the jurisdictional allegation against father, father’s parental rights would not 

have been put into jeopardy because he could have demonstrated he was entitled to 

custody of the child and could have made alternative living arrangements for the child 

with the child’s maternal grandmother. He also argues that but for trial counsel’s failure 

to object to the lack of visits, it is reasonably likely that visits would have occurred, had 

such visits occurred his bond with the child could have been preserved and he might have 

been able to maintain and/or strengthen his relationship with the child and establish the 

parental beneficial relationship exception to the termination of his parental rights. He 

asks us to reverse the February 14, 2014 order, and remand the matter to the juvenile 

court with directions to reverse the findings and order made after the section 366.26 

hearing, vacate all prior findings and orders affecting him, and hold a hearing, or if 

appropriate, a series of hearings, to which father would be entitled to notice and the right 

to appear and participate with assistance of counsel, at which time the court shall 

determine what findings and orders affecting father are appropriate and to grant such 

other and further relief as the trial court deems appropriate. 

 We conclude that father has forfeited for review his challenges to the findings and 

orders regarding jurisdiction and disposition, and the findings and orders made after the 

six-month review and the 12-month review hearings, for which he did not file either a 

notice of appeal or a writ petition. (See In re Jesse W. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 349, 355 

[“ ‘[a] challenge to the most recent order entered in a dependency matter may not 
13

challenge prior orders for which the statutory time for filing an appeal has passed’ ”].) 

“Given the state’s strong interest in the expeditiousness and finality of juvenile 

dependency proceedings (citation), the statutory scheme generally does not permit the 

critical findings and orders made prior to the final setting of the 366.26 hearing to be 

reopened and relitigated in an appeal from the order terminating parental rights. Nor can 

the order setting the hearing itself, or any findings subsumed therein, be appealed unless 

earlier writ review of any substantive claim was first sought and denied. (§ 366.26, subd. 

(l).)” (In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 412-413, fn. omitted.) 

 Contrary to father’s contention, we see no reason to apply “an exception” to the 

forfeiture rule in this case “even though the issues raised involve the important 

constitutional and statutory rights to . . . effective assistance of counsel.” (Meranda P., 

supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 1151.) “Enforcing the [forfeiture] rule against [father’s] 

representational claims does not infringe [his or his child’s] due process rights. Three 

elements must be assessed in order to determine ‘ “what due process requires” for 

fundamental fairness, specifically, “the private interests at stake, the government’s 

interest, and the risk that the procedures used will lead to erroneous decisions.” ’ 

[Citations.] The interplay of these three factors favors application of the [forfeiture] rule 

because, whatever benefits might accrue to the parent in the absence of the rule, the 

resulting costs to the child and the state are ‘greater.’ [Citation.] Of the many private 

and public concerns which collide in a dependency proceeding, time is among the most 

important. [Citation.] The action ‘ “must be concluded as rapidly as is consistent with 

fairness . . . .” ’ [Citations.] The state’s interest in expedition and finality is “strong.” 

[Citation.] The child’s interest in securing a stable, ‘normal,’ home ‘support[s] the state’s 

particular interest in finality.’ [Citation.] To permit a parent to raise issues which go to 

the validity of a final earlier appealable order would directly undermine these dominant 

concerns of finality and reasonable expedition.” (Id. at pp. 1151-1152, fn. omitted.) 

“[A]t some point the interests of a parent, and therefore the correction of purported error 

which operates to the detriment of the parent, must give way to the interest of the child in 

a stable, secure, long-term, continuous home environment. Under California’s 
14

dependency statutes, this moment arrives when the juvenile court terminates reunification 

and sets a permanency hearing. [Citations.] At this juncture, the balance of the 

competing interests is tipped well towards the child; it is presumed the interests of the 

child and the natural parents have diverged and are inconsistent. [Citations.] Therefore, 

if a parent, for whatever reason, has failed to timely and appropriately raise a claim about 

the existence of quality of counsel received at a proceeding antedating the [section 

366].26 hearing, we will apply the [forfeiture] rule to foreclose the parent from raising 

such an objection on appeal from the termination order.” (Id. at p. 1160.) For similar 

reasons, we reject father’s attempt to raise representational issues with respect to earlier 

final appealable orders in his petition for writ of habeas corpus. “[T]he rationale which 

supports our holding that the [forfeiture] rule should be enforced on the [parent’s] appeal 

from the termination order applies equally to the [parent’s] habeas corpus petition. The 

now paramount interests of the child in a stable, secure, long-term, continuous home 

environment and the associated interest of the state in reasonable expedition and finality, 

which have overcome the parent’s interests in maintaining the family relationship, would 

be no less subject to subversion by a habeas petition than they would be by a direct 

appeal.” (Id. at p. 1163; see In re Carrie M. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 530, 534 [“a claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with jurisdiction and disposition orders . . . 

may not be raised by a habeas corpus petition filed in connection with an appeal from an 

order terminating parental rights”].) 

 Father’s reliance on In re Janee J. (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 198 (Janee J.) is 

misplaced. In that case, the court held the forfeiture rule “will be enforced unless due 

process forbids it.” (Id. at p. 208.) But, in allowing for an exception to the forfeiture 

rule, the Janee J. court set forth the following guidelines: “First, there must be some 

defect that fundamentally undermined the statutory scheme so that the parent would have 

been kept from availing himself or herself of the protections afforded by the scheme as a 

whole. Lack of notice of . . . [writ] rights [is] one such example. . . . Second, to fall 

outside the [forfeiture] rule, defects must go beyond mere errors that might have been 

held reversible had they been properly and timely reviewed. To allow an exception for 
15

mere ‘reversible error’ of that sort would abrogate the review scheme [citation] and turn 

the question of [forfeiture] into a review on the merits.” (Id. at pp. 208-209.) Father has 

presented no defect that fundamentally undermined the statutory scheme so that he was 

prevented from availing himself of the protections afforded by the scheme as a whole. At 

most, father has alleged deficiencies that might have led to a finding of reversible error, 

which is not excepted from the forfeiture rule. (Ibid.) If father was concerned that his 

assigned trial counsel were not pursuing his interests, he could have asked for new 

counsel. (See In re V.V. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 392, 398 [juvenile courts allow 

“parents, who have a statutory and a due process right to competent counsel, to air their 

complaints about appointed counsel and request new counsel be appointed”].) Instead, 

father made not the slightest effort to inform the agency social worker or the juvenile 

court that he was unhappy with his assigned counsel at any time. Although father filed a 

notice of intent to file a writ petition challenging the order scheduling the section 366.26 

hearing, he complains his counsel refused to file a writ petition. Had father brought the 

matter to the juvenile court’s attention, however, the court could have rescheduled the 

section 366.26 hearing and extended father’s time to file a writ petition if his concerns 

were found to be valid. “Instead, [father] chose to remain silent throughout the juvenile 

court proceedings.” (Meranda P., supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 1158.) 

 Accordingly, we conclude father has forfeited his arguments challenging any 

findings or orders filed antecedent to the February 14, 2014, order. Because father 

presents no substantive challenge to the February 14, 2014, order, terminating his 

parental rights and selecting adoption as the child’s permanent plan, we shall affirm that 

order. 

DISPOSITION 

 The order filed on February 14, 2014, is affirmed. The petition for writ of habeas 

corpus is summarily denied. 

 _________________________ 

 Jenkins, J. 
16

We concur: 

_________________________ 

McGuiness, P. J. 

_________________________ 

Siggins, J.