Filed 2/10/21 Gobron v. Pesheva CA2/3

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

STEPHANE GOBRON,

Appellant,

v.

MARIA PESHEVA,

Respondent.

B294271

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. GF003972)

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles 

County, Shirley K. Watkins, Judge. Affirmed. 

Brian G. Magruder for Appellant.

James Alex Karagianides for Respondent. 

________________________
2

Appellant Stephane Gobron (father) and respondent Maria 

Pesheva (mother) were never married, but are the parents of 

seven-year-old twin children. In 2016, mother was granted sole 

legal and primary physical custody of the children, and father 

was ordered to pay child support. The following year, father 

sought modification of the child support order, contending that he 

had been furloughed from his job. The court temporarily 

suspended father’s child support and set the matter for a hearing. 

Prior to the hearing, father apparently filed an income and 

expense declaration stating he had a new job and was earning in 

excess of $8,000 per month; however, there is no evidence that he 

served the income and expense declaration on mother, and the 

declaration does not appear in the superior court’s docket. The 

court apparently was not aware of father’s new employment, and 

it issued an order suspending father’s child support until further 

court order. Father did not advise the court of its error and did 

not pay any child support for more than 18 months.

In May 2018, mother filed a motion for current and 

retroactive child support. The trial court found father had failed 

to disclose his new employment as it had ordered him to do, and 

it thus ordered father to pay child support retroactive to the date 

he began working. The court further ordered father to pay 

mother attorney fees of $2,750 “because of his bad faith conduct 

which required the hearing on this motion.”

On appeal, father challenges nearly all elements of the trial 

court’s order, contending that the trial court lacked authority to 

enter a modified child support order, erred in calculating support 

under California’s uniform support guidelines, and abused its 

discretion by ordering retroactive support and attorney fees. As 

we discuss, we conclude that father forfeited the first two 
3

contentions by failing to raise them below, and his latter two 

contentions lack merit. We therefore affirm the trial court’s 

orders in full.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Background

Mother and father are the parents of twin children, A. and 

D., who were born in January 2013. Father is an engineer, and 

mother is an ophthalmologist and eye surgeon.

Father filed a paternity action immediately after the 

children’s birth. Following a contested trial, the court entered a 

judgment in December 2015 that determined paternity and made 

child custody and support orders. Mother was given primary 

physical custody of the children, as well as the authority to make 

health-care decisions for the children; as to all other issues, the 

parents were ordered to make decisions jointly. The court 

ordered father to pay mother child support of $1,738 per month, 

plus 50 percent of uninsured health care expenses.

B. August 31, 2016 Order

On August 31, 2016, after further litigation between the 

parties, the court granted mother sole legal and primary physical 

custody of the twins. The court explained the basis for its order

as follows:

“After many appearances in court by [father], the court was 

able to experience first-hand the extraordinarily contentious 

nature of his personality. His testimony was presented in a 

manner which was consistently strident, argumentative, and 

rude to the court, [mother], and opposing counsel. He was 

uncompromising in his testimony and positions. His face was 

angry, livid, and his voice was often raised. His entire demeanor 

was abusive and demanding and he seemed on the verge of a 
4

tantrum at many points. By contrast, [mother] throughout these 

proceedings talked in a calm, gentle voice; she has been courteous 

to [father] and has never argued with him nor raised her voice. 

She has been respectful of the proceedings and has never seemed 

aggravated or upset, despite the prolonged nature of these 

proceedings. . . . 

“Analyzing the dynamic between the parties, the court 

finds that [mother] constantly has to pacify or accommodate 

[father] because of the aggressiveness of his physical posture and 

tone of voice. [Father] had no insight into his own aggressiveness 

or the inappropriateness of his tone of voice or angry visage. 

[Mother] appeared emotionally battered in her posture and 

demeanor in court. The court believes exposing the children to 

this dynamic or to a father who cannot control himself in this 

manner ultimately will have a very damaging effect on the 

children.

“The current custody orders fashioned by the court are 

untenable due to the contentious nature of the parties’ 

relationship. . . . Having now evaluated the parties’ demeanor in 

the courtroom on several occasions, the deteriorating situation 

between the parties, the twins’ exhaustion (as described by both 

parents), and having considered the parties’ many declarations, 

the court concludes that while [mother] has been willing to 

modify her behavior and try to co-parent, [father] remains 

intransigent, immature, and hostile to [mother]. The court sees 

no likelihood whatsoever of his gaining insight into his behavior 

nor being able to co-parent. The court finds his pugnacious 

conduct, his disparaging comments about [mother], his 

inflexibility and his belief that he is the only parent to offer 

anything to the children will result in further conflict and 
5

emotional distress for the children, from which they must be 

protected. . . . [¶] . . . [¶]

“Accordingly, the court finds that there has been a 

substantial change of circumstance since the court last made its 

custody orders, that the children are at risk of being engulfed in 

the virulent relationship which the father is intent on fostering, 

and that it is in the best interests of the children to . . . award[] 

[mother] sole legal [custody] on all issues, not only medical. She 

shall provide the father with information about the children’s

health, education, and welfare, but she shall have final decisionmaking power. To rule otherwise would inflict on [mother] and 

the children, endless vituperative and over-bearing arguments by 

their father as he attempts to gain his way in all decisions,

regardless of whether the mother’s input is more appropriate for 

the children.”

The court granted father overnight visits with the children 

on alternating weekends, plus holidays. Based on the visitation 

schedule, the court found father’s custodial share was 

approximately 20 percent, and it increased his child support 

obligation to $2,335 per month ($1,735 in guideline support, plus 

$600 for childcare expenses).

C. Father’s Request to Modify Child Support

In November 2016, father filed requests to increase 

visitation and reduce child support. In support, he submitted an 

income and expense declaration stating that he was still working 

for the same employer, Andrew Technologies, LLC, but his salary 

had been reduced. Subsequently, on February 15, 2017, father 

filed another income and expense declaration stating he had been 

furloughed by Andrew Technologies on February 13, 2017.
6

On March 2, 2017, the court ordered father’s child support 

obligation temporarily reduced to zero, and it continued the 

hearing to May.

On April 19, 2017, father filed a declaration that stated, 

among other things, that as of March 6, 2017, he was “working a 

full-time salaried position at MDIC (Irvine, CA), with a weekly 

gross salary of $2,000.” There is no evidence that father served 

the April 19 declaration on mother. Thereafter, on May 3, 2017, 

father apparently filed an income and expense declaration that 

contained similar information—i.e., that father began working at 

MDIC on March 6, earning a gross salary of $2,000 per week. 

Although the income and expense declaration bears a 

“conformed” file stamp, it does not appear in the trial court’s 

docket and does not include a proof of service on mother. 

The court held a hearing on May 10, 2017, and on June 12, 

2017, it issued a written order reducing father’s child support 

obligation to $0 commencing March 2017 and continuing until 

further order of the court. The express basis for the elimination 

of child support was the court’s erroneous belief that father was 

not employed: The order recites that father’s income as of 

February 15, 2017 “declined to zero as he was furloughed by 

Andrew Technologies.”1 The court ordered father to make at 

least three job inquiries each week, and to provide mother “with 

copies of any correspondence with Andrew Technologies that 

reflects that he has been permanently terminated, rehired, or 

1 It is clear from the order that the court was not aware 

father had filed another income and expense declaration in May. 

The order says: “Neither party appeare[d] to have filed a new 

Income and Expense Declaration after March 2, 2017.”
7

taken off furlough, as well as copies of his pay stubs for the first 

three months when his employment status with Andrew 

Technologies changes.” The court also advised father that he had 

“an equal responsibility to support the children provided he is 

capable of full time employment[,] and that the court may impute 

income to [father] should he fail to do so.”

D. 2017 Requests for Orders

In August 2017, both mother and father filed motions that 

are not part of our appellate record, but which appear to have 

addressed child support, visitation, attorney fees, and sanctions. 

On March 14, 2018, the court entered an order that denied 

father’s request for attorney fees and sanctions but, for reasons 

not apparent from the record, did not address any other pending 

issues.

E. Mother’s Request to Modify Child Support and for 

Retroactive Child Support; Father’s Request for Joint 

Legal and Physical Custody

On May 18, 2018, mother filed a request for current and 

retroactive child support. Mother asserted that father was 

employed, but had not paid any child support since 

February 2017. She therefore asked the court to enter a support 

order based on the child support guideline and to make the order 

retroactive to the date father became employed. Mother asserted: 

“Both [father] and [mother] requested modifications of the 

support order in August of 2017. The matter was continued 

several times and [mother] believed that when the court took all 

matters under submission at the last hearing that child support 

would be addressed and . . . ordered. It was not. [Mother] needs 

guideline support.”
8

On June 1, 2018, father filed a request for joint legal and 

physical custody of the children. Father argued that a change in 

custody was appropriate in light of his changed circumstances—

namely, he had moved from Irvine to San Gabriel, and thus he 

was living near mother’s residence and the children’s school.

Father filed an updated income and expense declaration on 

August 20, 2018. It stated that during the preceding 12 months 

(August 2017 through July 2018), father had been employed by 

both MDIC, for whom father began working on March 6, 2017, 

and Andrew Technologies, which apparently rehired father or 

took him off furlough at some unspecified date.2 Father stated 

that his most recent month’s income was $11,499, and his 

average monthly income during the last 12 months was $9,193. 

Both calculations were based on combined earnings from MDIC 

($5,200—$12,300/month) and Andrew Technologies ($3,226—

$6,299/month).

Although father acknowledged that he had been employed 

since March 6, 2017, he objected to mother’s request for support 

prior to May 18, 2018, the date mother filed her modification 

request. Father asserted that he had disclosed his MDIC income 

in his April 19, 2017 declaration, his May 3, 2017 income and 

expense declaration, a motion for reconsideration filed June 22, 

2017, and a response to mother’s declaration filed in October 

2017.3 Thus, he asserted, mother had been on notice prior to the 

2 Because father’s August 20 income and expense declaration 

addressed only the preceding 12 months, it did not indicate when 

father resumed working for Andrew Technologies.

3 The latter two documents are not part of our appellate 

record.
9

May 10, 2017 hearing that father had resumed gainful 

employment, and she “could have used this information at said 

hearing and requested a support order based on the income I had 

disclosed in my Income and Expense Declaration. However, for 

whatever reasons, she did not.”

Father estimated based on mother’s December 15, 2017 

paystub that her current gross income was $144,670 per year, or 

$12,580 per month. Because mother worked approximately 

24 hours per week, father asserted mother was “under employed,” 

and he asked that child support be based on mother’s earning 

capacity, rather than on her actual income. 

F. August 30, 2018 Hearing

The court held a combined hearing on mother’s and father’s 

motions on August 30, 2018. Mother’s counsel noted that father 

had not paid any child support in over a year, and that mother 

had expected child support to be addressed in the court’s most 

recent order. Counsel thus asked that support be awarded 

retroactively. 

The court asked father whether he had paid anything 

towards the children’s support since March 2017; father said he 

had bought the children food and clothes and had paid “what the 

court order stated.” Father also admitted that he had started a 

new job “three or four days” after the March 2, 2017 hearing, and 

he contended that he had filed an updated income and expense 

declaration disclosing his new income in April 2017, and “four 

times in the last six months.”

At the conclusion of the hearing, father’s counsel told the 

court that mother had not filed an income and expense 
10

declaration with her request for child support.4 The court noted 

that the docket showed mother had filed an income and expense 

declaration in January, and it asked whether mother’s income 

had changed since then. Her counsel said it had not. The court 

thus directed mother to file and serve a current income and 

expense declaration no later than September 4, 2018, and it said 

that all pending matters would be submitted as of that date.

Mother filed an updated income and expense declaration 

immediately after the hearing. It stated that mother continued 

to work for Dr. Paul Urrea, earning an average monthly salary of 

$12,751, and her childcare expenses were $500 per month.

G. September 7, 2018 Orders

1. Child Support Order

On September 7, 2018, the court ordered father to pay child 

support of $1,678 per month beginning March 6, 2017. The court 

stated that its support order was based on father’s average 

income of $11,499 per month, mother’s average income of $12,580 

per month, childcare expenses of $500 per month, and an 80/20 

custody split. The court explained that it was electing to make 

its order retroactive to March 6, 2017 because “[father] was 

granted a temporary stay of child support and was ordered to 

disclose new employment and earnings[,] which he failed to do. 

Because [mother] should not have been prejudiced by this failure 

to disclose, child support is retroactive to the date of his new 

employment.”

4 Mother’s counsel said mother had attached a current 

income and expense declaration to her May 18, 2018 motion for 

child support. The court did not find that document in its docket, 

but it noted that the clerk’s office recently had not been 

separately filing declarations attached to requests for orders. 
11

The court also ordered father to pay mother attorney fees of 

$2,000 pursuant to Family Code5 section 271 “because of his bad 

faith conduct which required the hearing on this motion. [¶] The 

bases for this ruling include: [¶] ATTORNEY FEES [¶] A. The 

court finds that the attorney fees requested by [mother] are 

reasonable and necessary because of [father’s] conduct in failing 

to disclose his income as required by the court. [¶] B. Father 

made his payment of guideline child support dependent on 

changes to the custody order in his declaration of 2/5/18, further 

evidence of his bad faith.”6

2. Custody and Visitation Order

In a separate order, the court denied father’s request for a 

change in legal and physical custody, denied father’s request for 

changes to the visitation order, and granted mother attorney fees 

of $750. The court found that changes in custody and visitation 

were not in the children’s best interests, noting that it found 

credible “the testimony of mother that father continues to engage 

in obstreperous behavior, continues to disregard co-parenting, 

continues to diminish and disrespect the mother, routinely 

embroils the children in this litigation, and is self-centered and 

not child-centered.” 

On November 30, 2018, father timely appealed from the 

September 7, 2018 orders.

5 All subsequent undesignated statutory references are to 

the Family Code.

6 Father attached to his reply declaration (filed August 23, 

2018) a June 22, 2018 email to mother in which he offered to 

resume paying guideline support if mother agreed to increase 

visitation. 
12

DISCUSSION

Father makes 13 separate arguments in support of 

reversal, but his contentions may be summarized as follows: 

(1) The trial court abused its discretion by modifying the 

child support order because mother did not submit a current 

income and expense declaration prior to the August 30, 2018 

hearing; 

(2) The trial court erred in calculating guideline child 

support because it miscalculated mother’s and father’s salaries 

and custodial percentages; 

(3) The trial court abused its discretion by making its 

child support order retroactive to March 6, 2017; and 

(4) The trial court exceeded its jurisdiction by ordering 

father to pay mother’s attorney fees and costs.

As we discuss, each of father’s contentions either was 

forfeited or is without merit. We therefore will affirm in full. 

I.

Legal Standards

“California has a strong public policy in favor of adequate 

child support.” (In re Marriage of Cheriton (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 

269, 283, citing County of Kern v. Castle (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 

1442, 1455; Stewart v. Gomez (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1748, 1754.) 

That policy is expressed in statutes embodying the statewide 

uniform child support guideline, which require courts “to adhere 

to certain principles, including these: ‘A parent’s first and 

principal obligation is to support his or her minor children 

according to the parent’s circumstances and station in life.’

(§ 4053, subd. (a).) ‘Each parent should pay for the support of the 

children according to his or her ability.’ (§ 4053, subd. (d).) 

‘Children should share in the standard of living of both parents. 
13

Child support may therefore appropriately improve the standard 

of living of the custodial household to improve the lives of the 

children.’ (§ 4053, subd. (f).)” (In re Marriage of Cheriton, at 

p. 283.)

“The amount of child support normally payable is 

calculated based on a complicated algebraic formula found at 

Family Code section 4055. Although this formula is referred to 

as the statewide uniform ‘guideline’ (§ 4055), ‘guideline’ is a 

misleading term. (In re Marriage of Hubner (2001) 

94 Cal.App.4th 175, 183.) The formula support amount is 

‘presumptively correct’ in all cases (see §§ 4053, subd. (k), 4057, 

subd. (a)), but ‘may be rebutted by admissible evidence showing 

that application of the formula would be unjust or inappropriate 

in the particular case . . . .’ (§ 4057, subd. (b).)” (In re Marriage 

of Cryer (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1039, 1047–1048, fn. omitted.) 

“A trial court’s award concerning child support is reviewed 

for abuse of discretion. [Citations.] Likewise, a determination 

regarding a request for modification of a child support order will 

be affirmed unless the trial court abused its discretion, and it will 

be reversed only if prejudicial error is found from examining the 

record below. [Citation.] In addition, a trial court’s decision 

whether to make an order for child support retroactive is 

reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. [Citation.] 

“Of course, the trial court’s discretion is not unfettered. It 

has ‘ “a duty to exercise an informed and considered discretion 

with respect to the [parent’s child] support obligation . . . .”

[Citation.]’ [Citation.] Moreover, we are mindful that the 

deferential standard concerning child support orders is tempered 

significantly by this state’s uniform child support guideline . . . . 

‘In short, the trial court’s discretion is not so broad that it “may 
14

ignore or contravene the purposes of the law regarding . . . child 

support.” ’ ” (In re Marriage of Leonard (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 

546, 555.)

II.

Father Forfeited His Objection to the Trial Court’s 

Entry of a Modified Child Support Order

Father urges that the trial court lacked discretion to 

proceed with the August 30 hearing and to enter a child support 

award because mother did not file an income and expense 

declaration prior to the hearing. He contends that allowing 

mother to update her income and expense declaration after the 

hearing precluded him from “ ‘meeting and rebutting’ ” mother’s 

evidence of her income and, thus, denied him a fair trial. 

Alternatively, father urges that mother’s untimely submission of 

her income and expense declaration violated the California Rules 

of Court. 

Mother contends that father forfeited this contention by 

failing to raise it below, and we agree. A party forfeits his or her 

right to challenge a ruling on appeal by failing to raise the issue 

in the trial court. (In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293.) 

“ ‘[A] reviewing court ordinarily will not consider a challenge to a 

ruling if an objection could have been but was not made in the 

trial court. [Citation.] The purpose of this rule is to encourage 

parties to bring errors to the attention of the trial court, so that 

they may be corrected. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (In re Daniel B. 

(2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 663, 672; see also In re A.C. (2017) 

13 Cal.App.5th 661, 671 [“ ‘ “An appellate court will ordinarily 

not consider procedural defects . . . where an objection could have 

been but was not presented to the lower court by some 
15

appropriate method” ’ ”]; In re Marriage of Hinman (1997) 

55 Cal.App.4th 988, 1002 [same].) 

In the present case, father knew well in advance of the 

August 30 hearing that mother had not filed an updated income 

and expense declaration; indeed, it was father’s counsel who 

brought the issue to the court’s attention. In response, the court 

ordered mother to file an income and expense declaration no later 

than September 4, and it said that all pending matters would be 

submitted as of that date. Neither father nor his counsel objected 

to the court’s order, requested a continuance of the hearing, or 

requested the opportunity to submit a response to mother’s 

income and expense declaration. Nor did father file an objection, 

response, or request for further hearing during the seven days 

between mother’s filing of her updated income and expense 

declaration and the issuance of the court’s order. Accordingly, 

father failed to preserve the issue for appeal.7

7 Although it is not relevant to our forfeiture analysis, we 

note that mother’s updated income and expense declaration 

reflected nearly the same income father himself had attributed to 

mother. In his August 20, 2018 submission to the court, father 

estimated that mother’s average monthly income was $12,580;

mother’s actual average monthly income, as reflected in her 

amended income and expense declaration, was $12,751. Under 

these circumstances, were we to reach father’s contentions on the 

merits, we would be hard-pressed to find a violation of father’s 

“constitutionally guaranteed right to a fair trial.” 
16

III. 

Father Forfeited His Specific Objections to 

the Trial Court’s Modified Child Support Order

In addition to challenging the trial court’s authority to 

order him to resume paying child support, father also challenges 

the court’s support calculation. Specifically, father contends the 

trial court erred by calculating guideline support based on 

(1) father’s most recent monthly income, rather than his average 

monthly income, (2) father’s estimate of mother’s income, rather 

than mother’s actual income as disclosed in her income and 

expense declaration, and (3) an erroneous estimate of each 

parent’s custodial time. 

Mother contends father forfeited these contentions by 

failing to raise them below and, again, we agree. “For better or 

worse, California child support law now resembles determinate 

sentencing in the criminal law: The actual calculation required 

of the trial judge has been made . . . so complicated (see 

generally, Fam. Code, § 4055) that, to conserve judicial resources, 

any errors must be brought to the trial court’s attention at the 

trial level while the error can still be expeditiously corrected.” (In 

re Marriage of Whealon (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 132, 144.) If the 

parent fails to do so, the errors are forfeited. (Ibid.)

In re Marriage of Whealon, supra, 53 Cal.App.4th 132, is 

illustrative. There, a father asserted on appeal that the trial 

court had overstated his income for purposes of determining child 

support by using only his last month’s income, rather than an 

average of the last 12 months. (Id. at pp. 143–144.) The Court of 

Appeal held that because the father had failed to bring the error 

to the attention of the trial court in a motion for reconsideration, 

the error was forfeited. (Id. at p. 144.)
17

Similarly, in In re Marriage of Hinman, supra, 

55 Cal.App.4th at p. 1002, a noncustodial mother urged that the 

trial court had improperly calculated child support by, among 

other things, miscalculating father’s federal withholding 

exemptions and custodial time. The Court of Appeal held mother 

had forfeited these alleged errors by failing to raise them below: 

“ ‘An appellate court will ordinarily not consider procedural 

defects or erroneous rulings . . . where an objection could have 

been, but was not, presented to the lower court by some 

appropriate method. [Citations.] [Citation.]’ Failure to object to 

the ruling or proceeding is the most obvious type of implied 

waiver. [Citation.] Accordingly, [mother] is foreclosed from 

challenging the computation of the child support award on 

appeal.” (Ibid.; see also In re Marriage of Calcaterra & Badakhsh

(2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 28, 37 [father forfeited alleged child 

support calculation error by failing to ask trial court to accept 

revised Dissomaster calculation during hearing on motion for 

reconsideration]; Hogoboom & King, Cal. Practice Guide: Family 

Law (The Rutter Group 2020), ¶ 6:250 [“any claimed error in the 

formula support calculation . . . must be brought to the trial 

court’s attention (by objection to the evidence, by motion for 

reconsideration or otherwise) while the error can still be 

expeditiously corrected; otherwise, the error is waived”].)

In the present case, the record does not reflect that father 

brought any of the alleged errors of which he now complains to 

the trial court’s attention, either at the hearing, in a post-hearing 

motion for reconsideration, or otherwise. Accordingly, father is 

foreclosed from challenging the trial court’s computation of the 

child support award.
18

IV.

The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion

by Ordering Child Support as of March 6, 2017 

Father contends the trial court erred by making its award 

of child support retroactive to March 6, 2017. As we discuss, we 

find no abuse of discretion.

A. Legal Principles

Under California law, both parents are “mutually 

responsible for the support of their child[ren].” (See § 4053, 

subd. (b); see also § 3900.) This principle is embedded in 

California’s statutory statewide uniform guideline, which 

calculates support based principally on each parent’s net 

disposable income and custodial time. (§§ 4055, 4060; In re 

Marriage of McHugh (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1245.) 

By his own admission, father was employed at all times 

between March 6, 2017 and September 7, 2018. For the periods 

March through May 2017 and August 2017 through July 2018, 

father’s monthly income was never less than $8,200, and in some 

months it exceeded $12,000.8 Accordingly, there can be no real 

dispute that father’s income throughout the 18 months at issue 

would have required a guideline child support award well above 

$0. 

Although father appears to concede his income would have 

justified a child support award during the relevant period, he 

urges that the trial court was precluded by section 3651 from 

ordering support retroactive to a date prior to May 18, 2018, the 

8 The appellate record does not contain information about 

father’s income in June or July 2017.
19

day mother filed the present modification request.9 Not so. 

Section 3651, subdivision (c)(1), provides that, with exceptions 

not relevant here, a support order “may not be modified or 

terminated as to an amount that accrued before the date of the 

filing of the notice of motion or order to show cause to modify or 

terminate.” (Italics added.) “ ‘Accrued’ means ‘past due.’ ” (In re 

Marriage of Sabine & Toshio M. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1203, 

1212, citing Taylor v. Superior Court (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1185, 

1188.) By its plain language, thus, this section precludes courts 

from retroactively forgiving past-due support. (E.g., S.C. v. G.S.

(2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 591, 600 [support arrears].)10 In the 

9 Although child support ordered for any period prior to the 

entry of an order technically is “retroactive,” the Family Code 

distinguishes between support orders that concern periods before

and after the filing of a notice of motion or order to show cause to 

modify or terminate support. (E.g., § 3653, subd. (a).) Because 

father concedes trial courts have discretion to award child 

support retroactive to the date a request to modify support is 

filed, for purposes of this opinion we will use the term 

“retroactive support” to refer only to support that predates a 

motion to modify support.

10 This section implements federal law, which requires each 

state to “have in effect laws requiring” that each installment of 

child support “is (on and after the date it is due)—[¶] (A) a 

judgment by operation of law, with the full force, effect, and 

attributes of a judgment of the State, including the ability to be 

enforced, [¶] (B) entitled as a judgment to full faith and credit in 

such State and in any other State, and [¶] (C) not subject to 

retroactive modification by such State or by any other State; 

[¶] except that [a state] may permit modification with respect to 

any period during which there is pending a petition for 

modification . . . .” (42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(9)(B)), italics added; see In 
20

present case, however, father was not ordered to pay any support 

between February 2017 and September 2018, and thus no 

support “accrued”—i.e., was past due—as of the date of the filing 

of the notice of motion. Section 3651, subdivision (c), thus, does 

not govern the present case. 

Father’s contention regarding retroactive child support 

arguably finds some support in section 3653, which father has 

not cited. Section 3653 says that an order modifying or 

terminating a support order “may be made retroactive to the date 

of the filing of the notice of motion or order to show cause to 

modify or terminate.” (§ 3653, subd. (a).) Some appellate 

opinions have said this provision “ ‘permit[s] the trial court to 

make its ruling retroactive to the filing date of the motion, but no 

earlier.’ ” (Stover v. Bruntz (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 19, 26, italics 

added; see also In re Marriage of Gruen (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 

627, 638 [“even on a showing of changed circumstances, a ‘court

may not retroactively modify a prior order for temporary spousal 

support’ ”]; S.C. v. G.S., supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at pp. 598–599 

[“ ‘ “[t]he Legislature has established a bright-line rule that 

accrued child support vests and may not be adjusted up or down. 

[Citations.] If a parent feels the amount ordered is too high—or 

too low—he or she must seek prospective modification” ’ ”].)

Significantly, however, none of these opinions applied section 

3653 as father would have us do here, to shield a noncustodial 

parent from paying retroactive support based on undisclosed or 

unattributed income. To the contrary, each of the cited cases 

re Marriage of LaMoure (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 807, 818.) 

Plainly, a temporary suspension of child support is not a 

“judgment” which may be accorded “full faith and credit.”
21

considered a noncustodial parent’s request to retroactively 

decrease support, not to increase it. (See Stover v. Bruntz, supra, 

12 Cal.App.5th at pp. 26–27, 29–30 [trial court abused its 

discretion by retroactively reducing father’s child support 

arrearages by giving father a “credit” for months in which mother 

could not prove childcare expenses; allowing father to 

retroactively avoid childcare costs “could seriously destabilize the 

minor children’s home life and [mother’s] ability to meet their 

needs”]; In re Marriage of Gruen, supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 639 [trial court exceeded its jurisdiction by reducing father’s 

support obligation retroactively; mother was “entitled to rely on 

the amount of temporary support ordered without the threat of 

having to repay or credit [father] with any portion of accrued 

support”]; S.C. v. G.S., at p. 600 [trial court abused its authority 

by absolving father of support arrears and associated interest 

that had accrued years earlier].)

Moreover, notwithstanding the language of section 3653, 

appellate courts have affirmed orders retroactively modifying 

support where appropriate in light of the equities of particular 

cases. For example, In In re Marriage of Economou (1990) 

224 Cal.App.3d 1466, 1476–1478, the Court of Appeal held that 

the trial court did not abuse its discretion by setting aside a 

stipulated support order and retroactively increasing a father’s 

child support obligation to a date prior to the mother’s filing of a 

modification request because “special circumstances” and “the 

interest of fairness” so required. Similarly, in In re Marriage of 

Ford (1972) 24 Cal.App.3d 62, 64–68, the trial court was held not 

to have abused its discretion by directing a father to pay a 

portion of a child’s medical expenses incurred prior to the date 

the mother filed an order to show cause. (See also In re Marriage 
22

of Spector (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 201, 207–218 [trial court did not 

abuse its discretion by, on its own motion, retroactively modifying 

spousal support order to correct errors]; In re Marriage of Freitas

(2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1059, 1073–1076, [trial court not 

precluded from retroactively amending spousal and child support 

orders because it had expressly reserved jurisdiction to do so]; 

In re Marriage of Murray (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 581, 593–594, 

599–600, disapproved on other grounds in Conservatorship of 

O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1010, fn. 7 [affirming order 

retroactively reinstating spousal support and awarding 

arrearages; although trial court had abused its discretion years 

earlier by reserving right to award support retroactively, 

husband had not challenged that order, and thus the retroactivity 

provision was beyond the reach of the current appeal]; see also

In re Marriage of Starr (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 277, 290–291 

[where support order was based on obvious Dissomaster error, 

whether noncustodial parent was entitled to credit for past 

overpayment was within the trial court’s sound discretion; trial 

court did not abuse its discretion by declining request for credit].)

B. Analysis

Taken together, the cases cited above stand for the 

proposition that trial courts do not abuse their discretion by 

retroactively modifying child support orders in some limited cases 

as necessary to correct obvious errors and to assure children are 

appropriately supported. For the reasons that follow, we 

conclude that this is such a case.

First, as noted above, California has a strong public policy 

in favor of adequate child support. (E.g., In re Marriage of 

Cheriton, supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at p. 283; County of Kern v. 

Castle, supra, 75 Cal.App.4th at p. 1455.) Permitting father to 
23

entirely evade his statutory obligation to support his children for 

well more than a year would be wholly inconsistent with the 

principles articulated in the child support guidelines. 

Second, family courts are, fundamentally, courts of equity. 

(See In re Marriage of Siva, supra, 53 Cal.App.5th at p. 1181; In 

re Marriage of Calcaterra & Badakhsh, supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 38.) Accordingly, “[a]lthough a court cannot transgress 

statutory mandates, family law proceedings ‘ “are equitable 

proceedings in which the court must have the ability to exercise 

discretion to achieve fairness and equity.” ’ ” (In re Marriage of 

Siva, at p. 1181.) In the present case, the equities plainly favor 

an award of retroactive support. As we have said, the trial court 

relieved father of his child support obligation in June 2017 based 

on its mistaken belief that father was unemployed and had no 

income. In fact, father was earning in excess of $8,000 per month 

at a new job he began more than two months before the court 

entered its order. Although the error was apparent on the face of 

the court’s order, father did not bring it to the court’s attention; 

instead, he took advantage of the error by failing to make any 

child support payments for more than 18 months. Under these 

circumstances, father “is in no position to complain” about the 

court’s retroactive correction of its error. (In re Marriage of 

Calcaterra & Badakhsh, at p. 38.)

Finally, pursuant to section 290, a judgment or order made 

or entered pursuant to the Family Code “may be enforced by the 

court by execution, the appointment of a receiver, or contempt, or 

by any other order as the court in its discretion determines from 

time to time to be necessary.” In the present case, the trial court 

ordered father in June 2017 to advise mother when he resumed 

working, and to provide her “with copies of any correspondence 
24

with Andrew Technologies that reflect that he has been 

permanently terminated, rehired, or taken off furlough, as well 

as copies of his pay stubs for the first three months when his 

employment status with Andrew Technologies changes.” Despite 

this order—and notwithstanding father’s present admission that 

he received income from Andrew Technologies in nearly every 

month between August 2017 and July 2018—there is no evidence 

in the appellate record that father ever advised mother that he 

had been reinstated by Andrew Technologies. 

There similarly is no evidence that father timely advised 

mother that he began working for MDIC in March 2017. 

Although father contends he filed and served declarations on 

April 19 and May 3, 2017 that disclosed his employment with 

MDIC, he has not provided this court with proofs of service on 

mother of either declaration. The trial court’s docket similarly 

does not reflect that proofs of service were filed in connection 

with these declarations.11 Under these circumstances, the order 

did not exceed the trial court’s broad discretion to enforce its 

order that father disclose to mother when he became reemployed.

11 Although father contends he disclosed his new job at MDIC 

at the May 10, 2017 hearing, his disclosure plainly was not 

sufficiently clear to communicate to either the court or to mother 

that father was employed. Father’s statement to the court, as 

reflected in the reporter’s transcript of proceedings, is as follows: 

“[B]ack in October of 2016 my salary again was cut in half. I 

have provided [the] pay stub, W-2 and clearly establishing that. 

[¶] Eventually I lost the job because the company furloughed 

every employee, give or take, and I have to look for a new job. [¶] 

I have provided new I and E with pay stub associated with my 

new position, so clearly this is not the story. Clearly this is the 

truth.”
25

In short, father’s evasive conduct and failure to clearly 

apprise the court and mother of his employment status allowed 

him to avoid his child support obligation for more than 

18 months. In light of the unique facts of this case, we conclude 

the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering father to 

pay child support retroactive to March 6, 2017. 

V.

The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion 

by Awarding Fees and Costs Pursuant to Section 271

A. Legal Standards 

Section 271 provides, in relevant part: “Notwithstanding 

any other provision of this code, the court may base an award of 

attorney’s fees and costs on the extent to which the conduct of 

each party or attorney furthers or frustrates the policy of the law 

to promote settlement of litigation and, where possible, to reduce 

the cost of litigation by encouraging cooperation between the 

parties and attorneys. An award of attorney’s fees and costs 

pursuant to this section is in the nature of a sanction. In making 

an award pursuant to this section, the court shall take into 

consideration all evidence concerning the parties’ incomes, assets, 

and liabilities. The court shall not impose a sanction pursuant to 

this section that imposes an unreasonable financial burden on 

the party against whom the sanction is imposed. In order to 

obtain an award under this section, the party requesting an 

award of attorney’s fees and costs is not required to demonstrate 

any financial need for the award.” (§ 271, subd. (a).)

“ ‘We review an award of attorney fees and costs under 

section 271 for abuse of discretion. [Citation.] “Accordingly, we 

will overturn such an order only if, considering all of the evidence 

viewed most favorably in its support and indulging all reasonable 
26

inferences in its favor, no judge could reasonably make the order.

[Citation.]” [Citation.] We review any factual findings made in 

connection with the award under the substantial evidence 

standard.’ ” (Parker v. Harbert (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 1172, 

1177.)

B. Analysis

Father’s sole contention with regard to attorney fees is that 

the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering him to pay 

fees and costs under section 271 because “[t]he record is devoid of 

any evidence of the amount of attorney’s fees and costs [mother] 

incurred as result of [father’s] alleged failure to disclose his 

income.” Father does not support his contention with citations to 

any authority suggesting section 271 requires such evidence, 

however, and the law is to the contrary. 

In re Marriage of Corona (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1205, is 

illustrative. There, the appellant made a contention similar to 

father’s here—that the trial court’s award of fees to his former 

wife under section 271 was improper because she “provided no 

evidentiary support as to the amount of attorney fees and costs 

she had incurred.” The Court of Appeal disagreed, finding no 

abuse of discretion. It explained: “ ‘[T]he only stricture imposed 

by section 271 is that the sanction may not impose 

“an unreasonable financial burden” on the party sanctioned.’

(Burkle v. Burkle (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 387, 403.) [Husband]

does not challenge the financial impact of the sanctions order 

upon him. Further, [husband’s] argument as to the lack of 

supporting evidence fails because a sanctions award under 

section 271 need not ‘be limited to the cost to the other side 

resulting from the bad conduct.’ (In re Marriage of Quay (1993) 

18 Cal.App.4th 961, 970 [addressing Civ. Code, former § 4370.6, 
27

the substantively identical predecessor statute to Fam. Code,

§271].) Because section 271 is not a need-based statute and does 

not require a correlation between the sanctioned conduct and 

specific attorney fees, it was not essential that [wife] demonstrate 

her current financial situation and attorney fees.” (Id. at 

pp. 1226−1227; see also In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2012) 

203 Cal.App.4th 964, 994 [no merit to wife’s challenge to order 

requiring her to pay former husband’s attorney fees; 

“ ‘a sanctions award under [Family Code] section 271 need not 

“be limited to the cost to the other side resulting from the bad 

conduct.” [Citation.] . . . [It] does not require a correlation 

between the sanctioned conduct and specific attorney 

fees. . . .’ ”].)

Because evidence of mother’s attorney fees was not 

required under section 271, the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion by entering an attorney fee award in the absence of 

such evidence. 
28

DISPOSITION

The September 7, 2018 orders are affirmed. Mother is 

awarded her appellate costs.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL 

REPORTS

EDMON, P. J.

We concur:

LAVIN, J.

DHANIDINA, J.