UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

In Re: REYNALDO LOZADA; JEANNETTE

LOZADA,

Debtors.

REYNALDO LOZADA; JEANNETTE

LOZADA, No. 98-1606

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

OLD BRIDGE ESTATES COMMUNITY

ASSOCIATION, INCORPORATED,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria.

Claude M. Hilton, Chief District Judge.

(CA-97-2077-A, BK-95-13599, AP-97-1184)

Argued: January 25, 1999

Decided: April 7, 1999

Before WIDENER, MURNAGHAN, and HAMILTON,

Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________
COUNSEL

ARGUED: Joel Steinberg, JOEL STEINBERG & ASSOCIATES,

P.C., Fairfax, Virginia, for Appellants. James Van Ingold, CHADWICK, WASHINGTON, OLTERS, MORIARTY & LYNN, P.C.,

Fairfax, Virginia, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

After a Chapter 7 bankruptcy, the debtors sought discharge of post

petition homeowners association fees and assessments that had

occurred after the debtors had vacated the subject residence property.

It was located in Virginia. The landlord sought $581.57 in homeowner association fees and assessments which the bankruptcy court

did not discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(16) reasoning that while

in many ways similar, a community association (homeowner's association) fee still differed somewhat from a condominium or cooperative

association fee.

The applicable statute, § 523(a)(16) allows a discharge for a condominium fee or for a share of the cooperative housing corporation

unless the debtor continues physically to occupy the condominium or

cooperative project or unless the debtor rented the dwelling unit.

Neither of those exceptions apply in the present case thus increasing the similarity of the homeowner's association here involved. It did

not, however, lead the district judge to grant the discharge sought for

the homeowner's fees and assessments. Similarity is not identity.

Congress referred to "similar membership associations" as the wording of § 523(a)(16) was discussed. See 140 Cong. Rec. H10764,

14650. But those words were not included in § 523(a)(16) itself. The

 2
absence of ambiguity in the statutory language was clear and so was

its meaning. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Dep't of Public Welfare v.

Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 557-58 (1990) (under the Bankruptcy Code,

the court must begin with language of the statute itself); Patterson v.

Shumante, 504 U.S. 753, 757, 761 (1992) (plain language of the Code

is determinative; turn to legislative history only when statute is

ambiguous).

We consequently apply the language as unambiguously appearing

in the statute, agreeing that discharge of the homeowner's association

fees and assessments should not be granted. This case is governed by

our decision in River Place East Housing Corp. v. Rosenfeld, 23 F.3d

833 (4th Cir. 1994). While Rosenfeld was superseded as it applied to

condominium and cooperative housing association fees, § 523(a)(16)

did not affect Rosenfeld's treatment of other homeowner's association

fees.

AFFIRMED

 3