For the sake of clarity, we have re-ordered the issues from the manner in which they were presented by the 1

Defendant in his appellate brief and have combined two arguments that dealt with the same issue.

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

Assigned on Briefs February 7, 2006

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. TAMAINE WORKS

Direct Appeal from the Criminal Court for Shelby County

No. 04-02521 James C. Beasley, Jr., Judge

No. W2005-01048-CCA-R3-CD - Filed May 26, 2006

This is a direct appeal from a conviction on a jury verdict of first degree premeditated murder. See

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202. The Defendant was sentenced to life in prison. On appeal, the

Defendant raises five issues: (1) the trial court erred in allowing the State to define premeditation

for prospective jurors through the uses of examples during voir dire; (2) the trial court erred in

excluding from evidence the victim’s alleged involvement in a prior homicide; (3) the trial court

erred in allowing as evidence at trial the prior testimony from an unavailable witness; (4) the trial

court erred by allowing the testimony of three of the State’s rebuttal witnesses; and (5) the evidence

was insufficient to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime of first degree,

premeditated murder. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. 1

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed

DAVID H. WELLES, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JERRY L. SMITH and NORMA

MCGEE OGLE, JJ., joined.

Mark Mesler, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Tamaine Works.

Paul G. Summers, AttorneyGeneral and Reporter; Brian Clay Johnson, Assistant Attorney General;

William L. Gibbons, District Attorney General; Paul Hagerman and Dean Decandia, Assistant

District Attorney Generals, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
The indictment recites the victim’s last name as “McChristain.” 2

The record reveals that Ms. Pruitt’s cousin could not be located at the time of the trial. 3

-2-

OPINION

FACTS

The conviction in this case stems from the October 9, 2003 murder of Mr. Keon McChristian2

(the “victim”) in an apartment complex in Memphis. The Defendant, Tamaine Works, confronted

the victim in a second floor hallway at the Peppertree Apartments about 10:30 at night and fired four

shots from an assault-type weapon, hitting the victim twice. The victim died from his wounds. The

Defendant fled the scene but was arrested by police at the same apartment complex several months

later. In March of 2004, the Defendant was indicted by a Shelby County grand jury on one count of

first degree, premeditated murder. The Defendant received a jury trial, which was conducted over

the course of several days in February and March, 2005. 

Before the jury was seated, the trial court took up several preliminary matters. The State

presented a motion to exclude the Defendant from introducing testimony concerning the victim’s

alleged involvement in the death of a friend of the Defendant a few hours prior to the murder at issue

in this case. The State argued that any evidence of this prior killing was not relevant. The Defendant

presented a motion to exclude the prior testimony of a State witness who was unavailable to testify

at trial, alleging that the statement, although made under oath at a preliminary hearing, was

unreliable. The trial court granted the State’s motion and excluded testimony concerning the prior

homicide but denied the Defendant’s motion and allowed the prior testimony of the unavailable

witness. 

At trial, the State’s lead witness, Ms. Kimberly Pruitt, testified that on the night of the

murder, she was staying with her cousin at the Peppertree Apartments. As she exited her cousin’s

apartment with her six-year-old son sometime after 10:00 in the evening on October 9, 2003, she

passed the Defendant in the hallway on the second floor of the apartment complex building. She

recognized the Defendant as someone she had seen around the complex for several years and who

was a friend of “Brian,” the man her cousin was dating at the time. As the Defendant passed her in

the hallway, Ms. Pruitt’s cousin, who was immediately behind her, asked: “Tamine, what you fixin’

to do?” Ms. Pruitt stated the Defendant replied, “Shhh,” indicating the two women should remain 3

quiet. 

Ms. Pruitt stated that at the time, the Defendant was not wearing a shirt, had on black or darkcolored jeans, and was carrying a large gun only partially concealed in a garbage bag. She further

stated that the Defendant was only three or four feet from her when they passed in the hallway, and

she saw his face. The Defendant walked toward the apartment next door, the residence of a man

known as “V.” Ms. Pruitt walked the opposite direction toward the stairs, and her cousin went back

inside her apartment and closed the door. Ms. Pruitt testified that she then saw the Defendant shoot

the victim, which she described as follows: the victim came out of “V’”s apartment; the Defendant
Sergeant Barry Hanks of the Memphis Police Department also testified at trial that he showed Ms. Pruitt the 4

photographic line-up while she was in the hospital, but she stated she could not see well due to medication.

-3-

shot the victim two times; the victim fell to the floor; the Defendant shot the victim two more times;

the Defendant then fled.

Ms. Pruitt testified that after the Defendant fled, she ran to the victim, who said: “He shot

me.” Ms. Pruitt stated that she called 911 from her cellular phone and reported the incident. She

also stated that approximately five or ten minutes after the shooting, “V” came and asked her who

shot the victim, but she declined to answer. She further stated that when “V” heard the police arrive,

he took off. Ms. Pruitt also testified that the victim did not have a gun. When the police arrived, she

was forced to place her hands in the air, but when they learned she was not a threat, she was allowed

to leave and did not give a statement to the police the night of the murder. 

Ms. Pruitt also testified that she began to receive threats over her cellular phone from the

Defendant’s friend, who would call and tell her that she did not “need to be testifying against his

friend and that something’s going to happen to [her] and [her] children if [she] do[es] come

forward.” Because of these threats, Ms. Pruitt did not make a statement to the police until several

weeks later when she was in the hospital. 

On cross-examination, Ms. Pruitt admitted she had a felony record. She stated that she did

not tell “V” who shot the victim because she was “paranoid.” She also stated that “V” did not take

anything from the victim, but that “V” was carrying a hand gun. Ms. Pruitt also clarified that while

she did not make a statement to the police the night of the murder, she did leave an anonymous tip

on the 528-CASH tip-line the following day. However, she then began to receive threats over the

phone and therefore did not talk to the police until several weeks later when she was in the hospital

suffering from anxiety attacks and no longer wanted to “hold it in.” The police came to her hospital

room and she gave them a statement. She also admitted that during this meeting she was shown a

photographic line-up but could not identify the Defendant’s photo because she was on medication

that caused blurred vision. However, she did identify the Defendant’s photo at trial. She also 4

identified the Defendant in court as the man she witnessed shoot the victim.

Ms. Memorie Noel, the victim’s aunt, also testified at trial, stating that she lived in the same

apartment complex and heard four gunshots on the evening of the incident at approximately 10:30.

Shortly thereafter, a neighbor came to her door and informed her that her relative had been shot. She

rushed to the victim, who was lying on the ground, and noted that also at the scene was “a girl” and

“V,” whom she identified as Vincent Sulton, who also went by the moniker “Big V” and “V Dog.”

 

 Sergeant Gene Hulley, an Investigator with the Memphis Police Department Felony

Response Squad, testified that he assisted the crime scene investigators on this case. Although the

victim had been removed by the time he arrived, he stated that he observed at the crime scene bullet

holes on the building walls, spent shell casings, and a blood stain on the floor. He described the

shell casings as consistent with a “large caliber, automatic weapon.” 
The record reveals that Sergeant Sims of the Memphis Police Department was deceased at the time of trial. 5

A copy of the advice of rights form, bearing the signatures of the Defendant, Sgt. Sims and Officer Merritt,

6

was entered into evidence. 

-4-

Officer Ellason Flagg of the Memphis Police Department testified that on January 24, 2004,

she received a report that the Defendant was at the Peppertree Apartments. There was a warrant for

the Defendant’s arrest. Officer Flagg stated that when the Defendant saw the uniformed officers, he

fled. The officers pursued, eventually captured the Defendant, and placed him under arrest.

An audio tape of Memphis Police Officer Sergeant Sims’ testimony at the Defendant’s March

4, 2004 preliminary hearing was played for the jury at trial and entered into evidence. Sgt. Sims 5

testified that he attempted to take a statement from the Defendant after his arrest, but the Defendant,

after he was advised of his rights, elected to not make a formal statement. However, the Defendant

did remark to Sgt. Sims that “wasn’t nobody going to make it to testify against him in the

courtroom.” Sergeant Sims also stated that the Defendant refused to sign the advice of rights form.

Dr. Karen Chancellor, the Chief Medical Examiner for Shelby County, was certified as an

expert in the field of forensic pathology, and testified that the victim suffered from a gunshot wound

to the lower abdomen that did “extensive damage,” and one gunshot wound to the leg. Dr.

Chancellor opined that the gunshot wound to the abdomen was the cause of death because it severed

two large blood vessels and caused massive bleeding. 

Mr. Anton Armour, an acquaintance of the Defendant, was subpoenaed by the State and

testified at trial, admittedly against his will, that at some point after the murder he was with the

Defendant. They were talking about the past, and the Defendant made the following statement:

“Man, you know I’m a real nigger, I’m a killer, you can ask them niggers in the Peppertree about

me.” On cross-examination, Mr. Armour admitted he was a convicted felon. 

The Defendant, properly advised of his rights, elected not to testify on his own behalf. The

defense did called Sergeant Timothy Cooper of the Memphis Police Department, who testified that

when he arrived at the crime scene shortly after midnight, there was no one there who witnessed the

crime and was willing to talk to him. Officer William Merritt of the Memphis Police Department

testified that he interviewed the Defendant along with Sgt. Sims, and stated that the Defendant did

sign the advice of rights form. Officer Merritt also stated that the Defendant never made any 6

incriminating or threatening statements while in his presence, but admitted on cross-examination that

there were times when the Defendant was alone with Sgt. Sims. 

The defense also called Mr. Vincent Sulton, a.k.a. “V.” Mr. Sulton testified that in his initial

statement to the police, made about four days after the crime, he stated that he had no personal

knowledge of the events on the evening of the murder but knew the Defendant shot the victim

because the Defendant had communicated threats, warning him not to talk. However, Mr. Sulton

later made a second statement to police in which he recounted that he and the victim were away from
-5-

the apartments the day of the murder when the victim informed Mr. Sulton he was going to go to his

apartment at Peppertree. Mr. Sulton informed police that the victim arrived first, he followed, and

he was just coming up the stairs when he heard shots and saw the Defendant with a gun. The

Defendant pointed the gun at him and then ran off. Mr. Sulton then informed the police that he was

unarmed, went to the victim, took a handgun from the victim, threw it onto the roof, and ran when

he heard the police. 

On cross-examination, Mr. Sulton gave a third version of the events of the evening, testifying

that he in fact did not come up the stairs, but rather was in his apartment when he heard the shots

fired, and then came out. He maintained that he did not have a gun until he took one off of the

victim, and he then chased after the Defendant. Mr. Sulton further stated that the Defendant called

him “not even an hour afterwards” and threatened to kill him. Mr. Sulton also denied having ever

told Ms. Turner, Mr. Nelms or Ms. Noel that the gun he had was his and that he retrieved it from off

the television set in his apartment. 

The State called three rebuttal witnesses: Ms. Roshunda Turner, the victim’s aunt; Mr.

Damen Nelms, the victim’s uncle; and Ms. Memorie Noel, another aunt of the victim and a previous

witness. All three testified that they saw Vince Sulton a day after the murder, and he told them that

after the shooting he went into his apartment and got a gun which was located on his television set.

At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on the indicted charge of

first degree, premeditated murder. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to life in the custody of

the Department of Correction. The Defendant timely filed a motion for a new trial, which was

denied, and this appeal followed.

ANALYSIS

 On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in allowing the State to make

conclusions of law during voir dire and made several errors in the admission and exclusion of

evidence. Specifically, the Defendant claims the trial court erred by excluding evidence pertaining

to a prior murder, erred in allowing into evidence the prior testimony of a deceased declarant, and

erred in allowing into evidence the testimony of three rebuttal witnesses called by the State.

Additionally, the Defendant argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient for any

rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that he was guilty of first-degree, premeditated

murder. 

I. Voir Dire

In his first issue on appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred by “allowing the

State to give numerous examples to the potential jurors of what the State believed was the difference

between premeditated murder and a killing of passion.” The Defendant objected to two examples

used by the State during voir dire; stopping to get gas on a drive home as an example of

premeditation, and the classic “law school” hypothetical for a heat of passion killing: a man comes

home, finds his wife in bed with another man and then kills him immediately, as opposed to waiting
We note that the record is devoid of evidence that a “heat of passion” defense was ever pursued by the 7

Defendant at trial. 

-6-

three hours, following the miscreant home and then killing him. The Defendant argues that these

hypotheticals “improperly tracked the evidence admitted at trial” because one possible defense was

a heat of passion killing as revenge for the victim’s alleged involvement in a murder of the

Defendant’s friend that occurred three hours prior to the murder at issue in this case. Thus, the

Defendant argues, the State’s examples “grossly encroached on the province of the jurors in

determining the factual point in time when a crime of passion would become a premeditated

murder.” 

7

We begin our analysis of this issue by noting that the trial court is vested with great discretion

in determining how voir dire examination will be conducted, and the trial court’s decision on how

this examination will be conducted will not be overturned absent a finding of abuse of discretion.

See State v. Mickens, 123 S.W.3d 355, 375 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003). In this case, the Defendant

argues that the State improperly tried to coerce potential jurors into committing to a particular course

of action through the use of hypothetical scenarios. 

We find the examples or hypotheticals used by the State to be rather innocuous and conclude

that the questioning conducted by the State during voir dire did not result in any commitment from

prospective jurors beyond their “appropriate willingness to decide the [issues in the case] on all of

the evidence adduced at trial, free of any preconceived notion[s].” State v. Coe, 655 S.W.2d 903,

911 (Tenn. 1983). Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

conducting the qualification process of jurors during voir dire in this case. See Solomon v. State,

489 S.W.2d 547, 550 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1972) (holding it was within the trial court’s discretion to

allow a voir dire to continue after the Defendant sought to get jurors to commit to a course of action

through the use of a hypothetical question). Additionally, we note that the trial court instructed the

jury to “take the law as I give it to you,” and recited during both the opening and closing jury

instructions the correct legal explanation pertaining to the element of premeditation. Accordingly,

had there been an error during voir dire, it was cured by the court’s thorough instructions and

therefore rendered harmless. See Tenn. R. App. P. 36(b). 

II. Evidentiary Rulings

The Defendant asserts in his next three issues that the trial court erred in its determination

of admissible evidence. Specifically, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in excluding

evidence of a prior murder, in including the prior testimony of an unavailable declarant, and in

allowing the testimony of three State rebuttal witnesses. 

A. Exclusion of evidence pertaining to a prior murder

The Defendant claims that the trial court erred in excluding from evidence any testimony that

the victim in this case was involved in the murder of the Defendant’s friend only “hours earlier.”

The trial court granted the State’s motion to exclude this evidence after concluding that testimony

concerning this separate homicide was not relevant to the issues in the Defendant’s case. The
-7-

Defendant now argues this evidence is relevant as it explained his “state of mind.” The Defendant

also argues that it was error for the trial court to prohibit him from arguing two separate defense

theories. 

The record reflects that prior to trial, the court conducted an evidentiary hearing on several

preliminary motions including the State’s motion to exclude testimony of a prior murder. The State

argued that it was not aware of any proof that the Defendant knew of this prior murder, so it was

therefore irrelevant. The Defendant expressed his desire to have the option of presenting the defense

that he did not commit premeditated murder but rather a heat of passion killing as revenge for this

prior murder; thus, the evidence was relevant. The trial court stated: “If your defense is, I didn’t do

it, then I don’t see how the first case is relevant,” but added that if the Defendant was going to argue

an “alternative mental state,” then evidence of the prior murder would be relevant. However,

defense counsel declared that he would proceed based on the defense that the Defendant “didn’t do

it and [the State] ha[s] to prove otherwise.” Accordingly, the trial court found that the evidence of

the prior murder would merely “smear[] the credibility” or character of the victim and was not

relevant. 

 Generally, evidence is relevant if it tends “to make the existence of any fact that is of

consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be

without the evidence.” Tenn. R. Evid. 401. Tennessee Rules of Evidence provide that “[a]ll relevant

evidence is admissible except as provided by the Constitution of the United States, the Constitution

of Tennessee, these rules, or other rules or laws of general application in the courts of Tennessee.

Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.” Tenn. R. Evid. 402. Rule 403 states that

“[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by

the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations

of undue delay, waste oftime, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” Tenn. R. Evid. 403.

In this case, any testimony that may have been proffered with regard to an alleged prior

murder was not relevant based on the defense theory presented to the jury. The record reflects that

the Defendant made tactical decisions pertaining to his defense in which he elected not to testify

himself and to pursue a primary defense theory of “I didn’t do it.” As such, the Defendant never

proffered any evidence that he was aware of the prior murder. More significantly, even if the

Defendant did know of this earlier act and wished to avenge the murder of his friend, his defense,

which was completely devoid of arguments pertaining to a lesser mental state than that required for

a conviction of premeditated murder, rendered any evidence of a prior murder irrelevant in his case.

Accordingly, the trial court did not err in granting the State’s motion to exclude this evidence. This

issue is without merit.

B. Prior testimony of an unavailable declarant

The Defendant next claims that the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce the

preliminary hearing testimony of Sergeant Sims ofthe Memphis Police Department. To support this

claim the Defendant argues that the testimony was unreliable and therefore should not have been

allowed at trial pursuant to the prior testimony hearsay exception. The Defendant also argues that
This Court previously noted that “[a]t one time, there was a third requirement, that the evidence not be crucial 8

or devastating.” Summers, 159 S.W.3d at 597 n.4. However, our most recent case law has “disposed” of this third

requirement. Id. 

-8-

the statement Sgt. Sims testified the Defendant made was either not relevant to his first degree

murder case or any probative value it had was outweighed by the substantial prejudicial effect it had

on the Defendant. 

 1. Prior testimony hearsay exception

It is undisputed that Sgt. Sims’ testimony from the preliminary hearing was given under oath

and the Defendant had opportunity to cross-examine him at that time. Additionally, the record

reveals that Sgt. Sims was deceased at the time of trial and therefore obviously unavailable to testify

in person. Nevertheless, the Defendant argues that Sgt. Sims’ testimony was “absolutely and

verifiably false,” and therefore unreliable. The basis of the Defendant’s argument centers around

a contradiction in Sgt. Sims’ testimony and other evidence presented at trial. Sergeant Sims testified

at the preliminary hearing that the Defendant did not sign the advice ofrightsform, but a copy of this

form bearing the Defendant’s signature was introduced at trial. Following an evidentiary hearing

on the matter, the trial court noted that the misstatements in Sgt. Sims’ testimony “would go to the

weight that a jury wants to give that statement,” but was nevertheless admissible under the long

recognized hearsay exception. 

Tennessee Rule of Evidence 801(c) defines hearsay as “a statement, other than one made by

the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the

matter asserted.” Generally, “[h]earsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules or

otherwise by law.” Tenn. R. Evid. 802. Clearly, Officer Sims’ preliminary hearing testimony was

hearsay. See Tenn. R. Evid. 801(c). However, in limited circumstances, prior testimony may be

admissible at trial via a hearsay exception if the declarant is unavailable and if the party against

whom the testimony is offered had an opportunity and a similar motive to develop the testimony

through other methods such as cross-examination. See Tenn. R. Evid. 804(b)(1). 

In addition to the general rule excluding hearsay, criminal defendants are also guaranteed the

right to confront witnesses against them. See U.S. Const. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions,

the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .”); Tenn.

Const. art. I, § 9 (“That in all criminal prosecutions, the accused hath the right . . . to meet the

witnesses face to face . . . .”). Accordingly, in cases such as this where the prosecution offered the

former testimony of an unavailable witness, the State must also establish two prerequisites in order

to satisfy a defendant’s constitutional right of confrontation. First, the State must show that the

declarant is truly unavailable after good faith efforts to obtain his presence, and second, that the

evidence carries its own indicia of reliability. State v. Summers, 159 S.W.3d 586, 597 (Tenn. Crim. 8

App. 2004). See also State v. Arnold, 719 S.W.2d 543, 548 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1986). With respect

to the latter requirement, the United States Supreme Court has recently mandated that the reliability

of a prior testimonial statement is established exclusively through cross-examination. See Crawford

v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54 (2004). 
-9-

In this case, it is undisputed that the declarant was deceased at the time of the Defendant’s

suppression hearing and trial and therefore was unavailable to testify in person. As to the second

requirement, our supreme court has previously ruled that the former testimony exception to the

hearsay rule is based on such a firm foundation that it meets the indicia of reliability requirement.

See State v. Causby, 706 S.W.2d 628, 631 (Tenn. 1986). Additionally, the audio recording of Sgt.

Sims’ testimony entered into evidence clearly captured the Defendant’s then counsel crossexamining the officer. This cross-examination was thorough and did indeed reveal weaknesses in

the officer’s statements, such as the fact that the Defendant’s statement was not recorded via any type

of electronic media and that Sgt. Sims failed to note the incriminating statement in his written report

even though it was the type of statement that would normally be documented. Under these

circumstances, we are unwilling to find that the cross-examination requirement was not met.

Moreover, any mistakes or misstatements contained in Sgt. Sim’s testimony goes to the weight of

his testimony, not its admissibility, and is therefore properly a matter for the jury to consider. See

Williams v. State, 520 S.W.2d 371, 374 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1974). As such, we find the testimony

met the indicia of reliability requirement necessary to comply with the Defendant’s right to confront

witnesses and be admitted under the prior testimony hearsay exception. 

 2. Defendant’s statement was irrelevant or excessively prejudicial

The Defendant also argues that the statement attributed to him by Sgt. Sims was not relevant

to his trial, or if it was, any probative value it had was outweighed by substantial prejudicial effect.

Sergeant Sims testified that the Defendant made the remark that there “wasn’t nobody going to make

it to testify against him in the courtroom.” The State argues on appeal that this not so veiled threat

was relevant as it reflected his consciousness of guilt. We note that the trial court overruled the

Defendant’s motion to suppress on this issue, finding that the statement was relevant as to the

“mental state” or “guilty knowledge” of the Defendant. 

This Court has previously declared that “[a]ny attempt by an accused to conceal or destroy

evidence, including an attempt to suppress the testimony of a witness, is relevant as a circumstance

from which guilt of the accused may be inferred.” Tillery v. State, 565 S.W.2d 509, 511 (Tenn.

Crim. App. 1978). The Tennessee Supreme Court has endorsed this Court’s holding that

“[g]enerally, evidence of threats against witnesses attributed to the accused is probative as being

either (1) conduct inconsistent with the accused’s claim of innocence or (2) conduct consistent with

the theory that the making of such threats evinces a consciousness of guilt.” State v. Austin, 87

S.W.3d 447, 477 app. (Tenn. 2002) citing Neil P. Cohen et al., Tennessee Law of Evidence § 4.01

(4th ed. 2000)). Accordingly, we conclude that the statement made by the Defendant to Sgt. Sims

was relevant, and further find that no danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighed its

admission. Therefore, we conclude the trial court did not err in denying the Defendant’s motion to

exclude the testimony of Sgt. Sims. This issue is without merit.

C. Admission of testimony from three rebuttal witnesses

In the Defendant’s final evidentiary issue he claims that the trial court erred in allowing the

State to introduce the statements of three rebuttal witnesses, whose testimony about a prior

inconsistent statement made by defense witness Vince Sulton, a.k.a. “V,” refuted portions of the
It appears that the Defendant is operating under the following theory: the victim had a gun; this gun was used 9

by the victim to murder the Defendant’s friend; this prior murder occurred only several hours before the murder at issue

in this case; therefore, allowing the rebuttal witness testimony about the gun “opened the door” to admission of evidence

concerning this prior murder. 

-10-

testimony Mr. Sulton gave at trial. To support this claim the Defendant argues that the court erred

by accepting the rebuttal testimony as “substantive evidence,” and that the admission of the rebuttal

witness testimony made the previously excluded evidence concerning the prior murder relevant and

therefore admissible. 

Mr. Sulton testified at trial that he took a hand gun off of the victim, and he specifically

denied that he obtained the gun from off of the television set in his own apartment or told anyone

else that he had. The Sate called three rebuttal witnesses, Ms. Turner, Mr. Nelms and Ms. Noel, who

all testified that Mr. Sulton previously informed them that he obtained the gun he had the evening

of the murder from off the television set in his apartment. The State argues on appeal that the trial

court was correct in its determination that the rebuttal witness testimony be presented to the jury as

evidence of a prior inconsistent statement made by defense witness Mr. Sulton. This evidence, the

State argues, is relevant to the credibility of Mr. Sulton’s testimony. The Defendant argues that the

trial court entered the rebuttal testimony as “substantive evidence” that the victim did not have a gun,

and this “opened the door to evidence of the first homicide.” 

9

Tennessee Rules of Evidence state that the “credibility of a witness may be attacked by any

party . . . .” Tenn. R. Evid. 607. Thus, a prior inconsistent statement may be used to impeach the

credibility of a witness who denies having made the prior statement. See State v. Jones, 15 S.W.3d

880, 891 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999). Additionally, Tennessee Rule of Evidence 613 governs the use

of extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement of a witness, and mandates that such extrinsic

evidence is inadmissible until (1) the witness is asked whether he or she made the prior inconsistent

statement; and (2) the witness denies having made the prior inconsistent statement. See also State

v. Martin, 964 S.W.2d 564, 566-67 (Tenn. 1998). 

In this case, the record clearly demonstrates that Mr. Sulton was asked whether he made a

prior inconsistent statement to his testimony at trial, i.e., that he previously told several people he

obtained the gun from his apartment and not from the victim as he stated for the jury. Mr. Sulton

denied having made this inconsistent statement. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by allowing

the State to introduce extrinsic evidence of this prior inconsistent statement in the form of rebuttal

witness testimony for the purpose of attacking the credibility of Mr. Sulton. 

The Defendant is correct in his assertion that restrictions on hearsay limit the admissibility

of prior inconsistent statements. The Tennessee Supreme Court has clarified that “prior inconsistent

statements ‘are not to be considered as substantive evidence of the truth of the matter asserted

therein’” but rather such evidence is “‘limited to the function of discrediting the witness.’” State v.

Smith, 24 S.W.3d 274, 279 (Tenn. 2000)(quoting Jones v. Lenoir CityCar Works, 392 S.W.2d 671,

673 (Tenn. 1965) and Rhea v. State, 347 S.W.2d 486, 488 (Tenn. 1961)). However, contrary to the
The record reveals that the Defendant, through counsel, did object to the admission of the rebuttal witness

10

testimony at trial, but did so based on relevance and concern over the admission of additional hearsay evidence. In a

jury-out side bar, the trial court agreed to have the State limit its questioning to only the prior inconsistent statement and

instruct the witnesses to not volunteer additional testimony while on the stand. Thus, the Defendant did request and was

granted a restriction on the evidence submitted, but he did not request jury instruction on the matter. See Tennessee Rule

of Evidence 105. 

More to the point, the admission of evidence pertaining to the prior murder is a separate issue which was fully 11

addressed in a preceding section of this opinion. 

-11-

Defendant’s claims, there is no evidence in the record before this court that the rebuttal witness

testimony was admitted for any purpose other than to impeach the credibility of Mr. Sulton.

Moreover, if the Defendant was concerned that the jurymayimproperlyconsider the rebuttal witness

testimony as evidence of the facts stated, he had the duty to make a “timely objection,” id., and to

make a request that the trial court instruct the jury that the evidence may only be considered as

reflecting upon the credibility of the witness. See Tenn. R. Evid 105 (“[w]hen evidence which is

admissible . . . for one purpose but not admissible . . . for another purpose is admitted, the court upon

request shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly.”) (emphasis

added). Accordingly, we conclude that the rebuttal witness testimonywas properly admitted in this

10

case for the limited purpose of attacking the credibility of Mr. Sulton.

Because we find the evidence of Mr. Sulton’s prior inconsistent statement was admitted for

the sole purpose of attacking his credibility and not as substantive evidence of the facts recited, the

Defendant’s argument that this rebuttal witness testimony “opened the door” to evidence of the prior

murder must fail. Based on the record before this Court, we conclude that the trial court did not 11

err in admitting the rebuttal witness testimony. This issue is without merit. 

III. Sufficiency of the Evidence

In the Defendant’s final issue on appeal, he claims that “[w]hen the evidence is considered

in itstotality, no reasonable jury could have concluded that the State had proved beyond a reasonable

doubt that [the Defendant] committed first degree murder.” In support of this assertion, the

Defendant argues that the State failed to present any physical evidence and that the eye witness

testimony submitted at trial was conflicting and generally unreliable. We disagree.

Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 13(e) prescribes that “[f]indings of guilt in criminal

actions whether by the trial court or jury shall be set aside if the evidence is insufficient to support

the findings by the trier of fact of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” A convicted criminal defendant

who challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal bears the burden of demonstrating why the

evidence is insufficient to support the verdict, because a verdict of guilt destroys the presumption

of innocence and imposes a presumption of guilt. See State v. Evans, 108 S.W.3d 231, 237 (Tenn.

2003); State v. Carruthers, 35 S.W.3d 516, 557-58 (Tenn. 2000); State v. Tuggle, 639 S.W.2d 913,

914 (Tenn. 1982). This Court must reject a convicted criminal defendant’s challenge to the

sufficiency of the evidence if, after considering the evidence in a light most favorable to the

prosecution, we determine that any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of
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the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); State v.

Hall, 8 S.W.3d 593, 599 (Tenn. 1999).

On appeal, the State is entitled to the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all

reasonable and legitimate inferences which may be drawn therefrom. See Carruthers, 35 S.W.3d at

558; Hall, 8 S.W.3d at 599. A guilty verdict by the trier of fact accredits the testimony of the State’s

witnesses and resolves all conflicts in the evidence in favor of the prosecution’s theory. See State

v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651, 659 (Tenn. 1997). Questions about the credibility of witnesses, the

weight and value of the evidence, as well as all factual issues raised by the evidence are resolved by

the trier of fact, and this Court will not re-weigh or re-evaluate the evidence. See Evans, 108 S.W.3d

at 236; Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 659. Nor will this Court substitute its own inferences drawn from

circumstantial evidence for those drawn by the trier of fact. See Evans, 108 S.W.3d at 236-37;

Carruthers, 35 S.W.3d at 557.

First degree premeditated murder is defined in our criminal code as the “premeditated and

intentional killing of another.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202(a)(1). Premeditation is further defined

as 

an act done after the exercise of reflection and judgment. [It] means that the intent

to kill must have been formed prior to the act itself. It is not necessary that the

purpose to kill pre-exist in the mind of the accused for any definite period of time.

The mental state of the accused at the time the accused allegedly decided to kill must

be carefully considered in order to determine whether the accused was sufficiently

free from excitement and passion as to be capable of premeditation. 

Id. § 39-13-202(d). The Defendant in this case does not challenge on appeal that a murder was

committed or that it was premeditated. Rather, the Defendant argues that the State failed to provide

sufficient proof of his identity as the perpetrator. Specifically, the Defendant argues that the State

failed to present any direct physical evidence: no gun was produced; no fingerprints were found; no

other physical evidence linking the Defendant to the crime was introduced. The Defendant also

challenges the reliability of several witnesses’ testimony, noting that Mr. Armour and Ms. Pruitt

were both convicted felons, Mr. Armour did not witness the murder, and Ms. Pruitt’s testimony was

riddled with “discrepancies” and portions were “absolutely absurd.” 

In this case, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to establish that the Defendant

killed the victim intentionally and with premeditation. Ms. Pruitt testified that she observed the

Defendant the night of the murder at the Peppertree Apartments carrying a large gun, and saw the

Defendant shoot the victim, firing four shots. Ms. Noel confirmed that four shots were fired the

night of the murder, and Officer Hulley testified that the shell casings recovered at the crime scene

were consistent with a “large caliber, automatic weapon.” Dr. Chancellor testified that the victim

died from the gunshot wound to his abdomen. Ms. Pruitt further testified that she was the first to

approach the victim, followed by “V” and the victim’s aunt. Ms. Noel confirmed that she was the

victim’s aunt, and when she arrived at the scene “V” was there along with “a girl.” Mr. Armour

testified that he had a conversation with the Defendant at some point after the murder during which
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the Defendant bragged that he was a “killer,” and if confirmation was needed Mr. Armour need only

“ask [the residents] in the Peppertree about me.” Officer Flagg testified that several months after

the murder, when she and other uniformed officers approached the Defendant, the Defendant ran.

Officer Sims testified that the Defendant made the remark that no witness would testify at trial

against him. 

A jury may infer guilt from the flight of a suspect if the facts of the situation support such

an inference. See State v. Zagorski, 701 S.W.2d 808, 813 (Tenn. 1985) (“A defendant’s flight and

attempts to evade arrest are relevant as circumstances from which, when considered with the other

facts and circumstances in evidence, a jury can properly draw an inference of guilt.”). Likewise, as

noted above, “[a]ny attempt by an accused to conceal or destroy evidence, including an attempt to

suppress the testimony of a witness” is evidence from which a jury may infer guilt. Tillery, 565

S.W.2d at 511. 

Additionally, the Defendant’s emphasis on the lack of physical evidence in his case is

misplaced, as such evidence is not required to uphold a jury verdict. This Court has previously held

that convictions based upon witness testimony alone are sufficient. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 623

S.W.2d 118, 120 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981). The Defendant also asks this Court to discount the

testimony of the State’s witnesses because of “discrepancies” or because the declarants were

themselves convicted felons. However, as noted above, this Court will not re-weigh or re-evaluate

the evidence. See Evans, 108 S.W.3d at 236. Furthermore, questions about the credibility of

witnesses, the weight and value of the evidence, as well as factual issues raised by the evidence are

to be resolved by the trier of fact. Id. 

After considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we determine that the

Defendant has failed to demonstrate that the jury was presented with insufficient evidence at trial

to find him responsible for the murder at issue in this case. Accordingly, we conclude that the

evidence submitted at trial was legally sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find the Defendant

guilty of first degree, premeditated murder beyond a reasonable doubt. This issue is without merit.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing reasoning and authorities, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

___________________________________ 

DAVID H. WELLES, JUDGE