AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED and Opinion Filed January 5, 2024

In the

Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05-22-00550-CR

RICKY LEE STEVENSON, II, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 199th Judicial District Court

Collin County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 199-81736-2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Carlyle, Goldstein, and Breedlove

Opinion by Justice Carlyle

Ricky Lee Stevenson, II, appeals his conviction for aggravated kidnapping. 

We affirm in this memorandum opinion. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4.

Mr. Stevenson began trafficking C.R. for prostitution when she was sixteen

years old. On January 23, 2021, Mr. Stevenson and C.R., who was seventeen by 

then, were arguing outside a shop in Plano. Surveillance footage showed Mr. 

Stevenson stomping on C.R.’s foot and punching her in the face. As C.R. fell 

backwards onto the concrete, Mr. Stevenson turned, walked back towards his car,

and opened his door. Then, after appearing to realize C.R. was lying on the ground

unconscious, Mr. Stevenson returned to C.R. and told her to get in the car. When she 
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did not respond, he yanked her up by her shirt, and forced her into the passenger side 

of his car. As Mr. Stevenson closed the door behind her and started running back to 

the drivers’ side, C.R. opened the door and climbed out. Mr. Stevenson then ran back 

around the car and again forced C.R. inside. But as he ran back around to the drivers’

side, C.R. again climbed out.

By this time, a crowd had gathered and called police. An onlooker took C.R. 

to safety, and Mr. Stevenson fled in his car. Police later identified him from the 

surveillance footage, and the grand jury indicted him on charges of aggravated 

kidnapping, enhanced by a prior felony conviction for Assault Family Violence 

Impede Breath/Circulation.

Before trial, Mr. Stevenson hired multiple attorneys to represent him, but he 

fired each within a few months of retention. At a pretrial hearing, Mr. Stevenson 

informed the trial court that he wished to represent himself, and the court appointed 

Matthew Goheen as standby counsel to assist him in the proceedings.

The jury convicted Mr. Stevenson as charged and sentenced him to 59 years’ 

imprisonment. In his motion for new trial, Mr. Stevenson asserted denial of his Sixth 

Amendment right to counsel for the first time, claiming he asked standby counsel to 

take over representation mid-trial and that standby counsel refused. The trial court 

denied Mr. Stevenson’s motion, and he appeals.
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THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT DENY MR. STEPHENSON HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL

Mr. Stevenson first contends the trial court’s “unjustifiable interference”

prevented him from reasserting his right to counsel during the trial, thus denying him 

his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Subject to exceptions not at issue here, a 

defendant may waive the right to self-representation once asserted. See TEX. CODE 

CRIM. PROC. art. 1.051(h); Funderburg v. State, 717 S.W.2d 637, 642 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 1986) (A “defendant may . . . waive his right to represent himself once it has 

been asserted.”). But to establish error based on the trial court’s refusal to allow such 

a waiver, the record must show it was reasonably apparent to the trial court that the 

defendant “abandoned his initial request to represent himself.” Funderburg, 717 

S.W.2d at 642.

Here, it is undisputed that Mr. Stevenson never informed the trial court that 

he wished to abandon self-representation. Nevertheless, Mr. Stevenson makes the 

novel argument that the trial court denied him the right to counsel by preemptively 

refusing to allow him to waive self-representation. He bases his argument primarily 

on the following exchange at a pretrial hearing:

[STATE]: And, Judge, I apologize coming late in the game. I 

know the Court’s done admonishments with this defendant. I was 

informed that that’s been done ad nauseam. Just so that I can understand 

with this type of proceeding, once we have a jury in the room, from that 

point forward, while Mr. Goheen will be there for consultation or 

discussion for procedural matters, my understanding is that it would be 

the defendant whose voice is the only voice heard from counsel table 

to the jury. Is that correct?
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THE COURT: Correct.

[STATE]: Okay. That’s all I need to know.

MR. GOHEEN: I’m [here] to ensure due process and procedure.

[STATE]: Then we’re on the same page.

THE COURT: And that was at the Court’s request. Not at Mr. 

Stevenson’s request that I appoint standby counsel. Because, obviously, 

in a felony court on first-degree felonies, we do not see people 

representing themselves because most people understand the stakes are 

really, really high. And literally their life is at risk. So. But he is -- it’s 

his decision. I have explained it. We’ve gone over it. I appointed Mr. 

Goheen as standby counsel. He also has conferred with Mr. Stevenson. 

And, at this point, he has elected to continue to represent himself.

[STATE]: Thank you, Judge. That’s all I have.

THE COURT: So Mr. Goheen will be here just in case Mr. 

Stevenson has questions, that sort of thing. But Mr. Stevenson has 

elected to represent himself. So, yes, he will be the one presenting the 

case.

Nothing in that exchange suggests the trial court would prevent standby 

counsel from taking over the representation later upon Mr. Stevenson’s request. The 

trial court merely clarified that, “at [that] point,” because Mr. Stevenson had elected 

to “continue to represent himself,” standby counsel’s role was to advise Mr. 

Stevenson rather than address the jury. The trial court’s statements in that regard are 

consistent with protecting Mr. Stevenson’s elected right to self-representation

against potential interference from standby counsel. See McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 

U.S. 168, 181–82 (1984) (noting that participation by standby counsel in the jury’s 

presence is “problematic” because it undermines the defendant’s pro se presentation 
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of his defense); Culverhouse v. State, 755 S.W.2d 856, 861 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) 

(“There was no unsolicited, unwarranted participation by court-appointed standby 

counsel so as to interfere with appellant’s Sixth Amendment right to selfrepresentation.”).

The only other portion of the record Mr. Stevenson identifies as support for

his argument is standby counsel’s post-trial testimony that it was his 

“understanding,” based in part on previous unspecified warnings and 

admonishments from the trial court, that “should [Mr. Stevenson] insist on 

representing himself, that he would have to do so; and that, basically, he wouldn’t 

be able to switch courses midstream.” But the record does not reflect what the trial 

court purportedly said to give counsel that “understanding,” apart from the exchange 

identified above—which we conclude does not establish an objectively reasonable 

basis for believing that the trial court would reject any future request to waive selfrepresentation. Thus, without excluding the possibility that a trial court could

preemptively deny the right to counsel by making statements suggesting that it 

would not permit a defendant to waive his right to self-representation once asserted, 

the record does not establish such a denial here.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED MR. STEVENSON’S 

MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

Mr. Stevenson next contends the trial court erred by denying his motion for 

new trial, regardless of whether the trial court had preemptively denied him the right 
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to waive self-representation. We review the trial court’s ruling for abuse of 

discretion. See State v. Gutierrez, 541 S.W.3d 91, 97–98 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). Mr. 

Stevenson contends he proved that: (1) he “unequivocally reasserted his right to 

counsel” by asking standby counsel to take over the case; and (2) switching

representation during the trial was permissible under the factors identified in Medley 

v. State, 47 S.W.3d 17 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2000). Thus, according to Mr. 

Stevenson, standby counsel’s refusal to take over the case effectively denied him the 

right to counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment, warranting a new trial.

We reject the initial premise of Mr. Stevenson’s argument because merely 

asking standby counsel to take over representation is not sufficient to reassert the 

right to counsel once it has been waived. To waive the right to self-representation 

after asserting it, a defendant must make it reasonably apparent to the trial court that 

he wishes to abandon self-representation. See Funderburg, 717 S.W.2d at 642 (“A 

waiver may be found if it reasonably appears to the court that defendant has 

abandoned his initial request to represent himself.”). Mr. Stevenson did nothing to 

make the trial court aware that he wished to abandon self-representation, despite his 

standby counsel advising him that abandoning self-representation was an issue he 

would have to take up with the court. On this record, Mr. Stevenson did not establish 

that he was denied the right to the assistance of counsel guaranteed under the Sixth 

Amendment and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying his motion for 

new trial.
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THE EVIDENCE SUFFICIENTLY SUPPORTS MR. STEVENSON’S CONVICTION

Mr. Stevenson next contends the evidence does not support his conviction for 

aggravated kidnapping. We review evidentiary sufficiency under the familiar 

Jackson v. Virginia1standard, viewing all evidence in the light most favorable to the 

verdict to determine whether the factfinder could rationally find guilt beyond a 

reasonable doubt. See Temple v. State, 390 S.W.3d 341, 360 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).

A person commits aggravated kidnapping if “the person intentionally or 

knowingly abducts another person and uses or exhibits a deadly weapon during the 

commission of the offense.” TEX. PENAL CODE § 20.04(b). “‘Abduct’ means to 

restrain a person with intent to prevent his liberation by . . . using or threatening to 

use deadly force.” Id. § 20.01(2)(B). “‘Restrain’ means to restrict a person’s 

movements without consent, so as to interfere substantially with the person’s liberty, 

by moving the person from one place to another or by confining the person.” Id.

§ 20.01(1). “Restraint is ‘without consent’ if it is accomplished by . . . force, 

intimidation, or deception.” Id. § 20.01(1)(A).

As relevant to Mr. Stevenson’s arguments, the indictment alleged that he

did intentionally and knowingly abduct [C.R.] . . . by restricting the 

movements of [C.R.] without her consent so as to interfere substantially 

with her liberty, by moving her from one place to another with the intent 

to prevent her liberation, by using or threatening to use deadly force, 

namely striking [C.R.] in the head with a deadly weapon, to wit: 

Defendant’s hand.

 

1 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
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Mr. Stevenson does not challenge the jury’s conclusion that he committed the 

requisite conduct; instead, he argues the evidence is insufficient to prove he formed 

the requisite intent to restrain C.R. before using the deadly force, so as to meet the 

statutory definition of “abduct.” He argues that, because the surveillance video 

shows he walked back to his car after punching C.R., rather than forcing her to get 

into the car immediately after the punch, a rational jury could not conclude he 

punched C.R. with the intent to force her into the car.

But the jury saw the surveillance video. The jury heard evidence that C.R. told 

a witness that Mr. Stevenson was trying to take her somewhere she did not want to 

go. The jury could rationally infer from that statement that Mr. Stevenson punched

C.R. to coerce her into going with him against her will. With respect to Mr. 

Stevenson initially walking back to the car after punching her, the jury could 

rationally conclude he expected C.R. to follow, and when she did not—because she 

was lying on the ground unconscious—he walked over, told her to get in the car, and 

then physically forced her to do so. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, 

the jury could rationally conclude Mr. Stevenson struck C.R. with the requisite intent

to “restrain” her for purposes of meeting the statutory definition of “abduct.”

THE JUDGMENT SHOULD BE MODIFIED

Mr. Stevenson next contends the trial court erred by requiring Mr. Stevenson 

to register as a sex offender, and the State appropriately concedes the error. As Mr. 

Stevenson correctly points out, the State did not allege or prove either that Mr. 
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Stevenson committed aggravated kidnapping with the intent to sexually abuse C.R. 

or that C.R. was younger than seventeen years old at the time of the offense. Thus, 

Mr. Stevenson’s conviction for aggravated kidnapping is not a reportable conviction. 

See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. arts. 62.001 (5)(C), (E), 62.0051. We modify the 

judgment to remove the sex offender registration requirement.

Mr. Stevenson next contends we should modify the judgment to accurately 

reflect that his waiver of counsel and punishment election were not made in writing 

and that he did not waive his right to appeal. The State agrees. We have the power 

to modify judgments to speak truth when provided with the necessary information. 

TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b); McDade v. State, 613 S.W.3d 349, 358 (Tex. App.—Dallas 

2020, no pet.) (citing Asberry v. State, 813 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Tex. App.—Dallas, pet. 

ref’d)). The record shows Mr. Stevenson’s counsel waiver was not in writing, that 

he made an oral election for the jury to assess punishment, and that he did not waive 

his right to appeal. We therefore modify the judgment accordingly.

THERE WAS A RECORD BASIS FOR THE CHALLENGED COSTS 

Finally, Mr. Stevenson complains that the trial court improperly assessed 

certain costs against him—$35 for serving a writ and $50 for a “warrant”—because 

there is no basis in the record for assessing those costs under code of criminal 

procedure article 102.011. With respect to the $35 assessment, the record shows the 

sheriff served a search warrant for Mr. Stevenson’s Facebook records. Thus, there 

was a basis for that cost under code of criminal procedure article 102.011(a)(4).
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With respect to the $50 assessment, the State argues that a “bench warrant” 

issued in the case qualifies as a reimbursable “arrest warrant” under article 

102.011(a)(2). According to the State, a “bench warrant is, by definition, an arrest 

warrant.” See Bench Warrant, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (defining 

“bench warrant” as including “a writ issued directly by a judge to a law-enforcement 

officer, esp. for the arrest of a person who has been . . . indicted”)). We agree. 

Though the statute does not specifically define “arrest warrants,” subsection 

(b) describes reimbursement fees in addition to those provided by subsection (a). 

One of those fees is for mileage associated with “conveying a prisoner arrested on a 

warrant or capias issued in another county to the court or jail of the county.” TEX.

CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 102.011(b)(2). This describes the situation here, where as Mr. 

Stevenson’s brief accurately describes, “a ‘bench warrant’ was issued to return 

Appellant from another county.” We conclude the statute contemplates including 

bench warrants in the $50 fee “for executing or processing an issued arrest warrant, 

capias, or capias pro fine.” See id. (a)(2).

As modified, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. We direct the trial court to 

prepare a corrected judgment that reflects the modifications made in this Court’s 

opinion and judgment. 
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See Shumate v. State, 649 S.W.3d 240, 245–46 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2021, no

pet.); see also Jones v. State, No. 05-22-00328-CR, 2023 WL 6567781, at *6 (Tex. 

App.—Dallas Oct. 10, 2023, no pet. h.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

220550f.u05

Do Not Publish

TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b)

/Cory L. Carlyle//

CORY L. CARLYLE

JUSTICE
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Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

JUDGMENT

RICKY LEE STEVENSON, II, 

Appellant

No. 05-22-00550-CR V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 199th Judicial 

District Court, Collin County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 199-81736-

2022.

Opinion delivered by Justice Carlyle. 

Justices Goldstein and Breedlove 

participating.

Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is 

MODIFIED as follows:

We remove the mark in the box next to the sentence: “Defendant is 

required to register as sex offender in accordance with Chapter 62, 

CCP.”

We remove the phrase “in writing” from the sentence in the judgment 

stating: “Defendant appeared without counsel and knowingly, 

intelligently, and voluntarily waived the right to representation by 

counsel in writing in open court.”

We replace the phrase “filed a written election” with “orally elected” 

in the sentence: “Defendant entered a plea and filed a written election 

to have the jury assess punishment.”

We remove the following sentences: “APPEAL WAIVED. NO 

PERMISSION TO APPEAL GRANTED.”

As REFORMED, the judgment is AFFIRMED.
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Judgment entered this 5th day of January, 2024.