IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Atlantic Richfield Company, E.I. du :

Pont de Nemours and Company, NL :

Industries, Inc., PPG Industries, Inc., :

and The Sherwin-Williams Company, :

Appellants :

:

v. : No. 1338 C.D. 2021

:

The County of Montgomery, :

Pennsylvania : Argued: December 14, 2022

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge

HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

OPINION BY JUDGE CEISLER FILED: May 5, 2023

Atlantic Richfield Company, E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company, NL 

Industries, Inc., PPG Industries, Inc., and The Sherwin-Williams Company 

(together, Manufacturers) appeal from the October 15, 2021 Order of the Court of 

Common Pleas of Montgomery County (Trial Court) overruling their Preliminary 

Objections to the County of Montgomery’s (County) Second Amended Complaint 

in this public nuisance action. In its Second Amended Complaint, the County seeks 

a declaratory judgment that lead paint is a public nuisance under the common law as 

well as the Lead Certification Act (Certification Act), Act of July 6, 1995, P.L. 291, 

No. 44, 35 P.S. §§ 5901-5916. On appeal, the Manufacturers argue that the County’s 

proposed interpretation of the Certification Act is contrary to its plain language and 

legislative intent and that the County has failed to establish proximate causation 

under Pennsylvania tort law. Upon review, we reverse the Trial Court’s Order and 
2

remand to the Trial Court for the entry of an order dismissing the Second Amended 

Complaint. 

I. Background 

The Manufacturers are businesses that “manufactured, sold, distributed, 

and/or promoted” paints or pigments for household use between 1880 and 1977, or 

are the successors-in-interest to such businesses. Original Record (O.R.), Item No. 

4, Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 13, 18, 22, 28, 32. During that period, lead was a prevalent 

ingredient in many types of paints intended and sold for exterior and interior 

residential use. Id. ¶ 35. The use of lead paint is associated with various health 

hazards that have been widely known for centuries. Id. However, the Manufacturers 

continued to market lead paint in ways that omitted or obfuscated these health 

hazards. Id. ¶ 94. 

The danger of lead paint arises from its tendency to erode over time into chips, 

flakes, and dust, which are then deposited on floors, windows, and other inside 

surfaces. Id. ¶ 36. Because children normally engage in “hand-to-mouth” behavior 

as part of their physical and mental development, they are particularly vulnerable to 

such sources of contamination. Id. ¶ 37. Exacerbating the danger is the especially 

hazardous effect of lead on children; exposure can lead to devastating and permanent 

mental injuries. Id. ¶ 38. Beyond the individual health consequences, lead 

poisoning creates a cumulative, deleterious effect on whole communities by 

depriving them of well-adjusted, happy, and productive citizens. Id. ¶ 44. Because 

of its dangers, the federal government banned the manufacture and sale of lead paint 

in 1978. Id. ¶ 46. Leading experts agree, however, that deteriorating lead paint 

continues to be the primary source of lead poisoning in young children today. Id. ¶ 

46. 
3

With a population of approximately 800,000 people, the County is the thirdmost populous in Pennsylvania. Id. ¶ 7. The County estimates that 211,402 of its 

residential structures, or 64.9% of the total, were built before lead paint was banned

and, therefore, may be “contaminated by lead paint.” Id. ¶¶ 9,10. However, the risks 

of lead exposure are particularly serious in rental housing inhabited by low-income 

families, where painted surfaces tend to be poorly maintained. See id. ¶¶ 51-52. 

Using United States Census data, the County estimates that at least 4,512 of its 

residential structures are “in critical and immediate need of abatement to address the 

risks posed by lead paint hazards.” Id. ¶ 53. 

The County initiated this action by filing a Complaint in the Trial Court on 

October 4, 2018.1 See O.R., Item No. 0. The Complaint consisted of two counts. 

The first was a common law public nuisance claim, in which the County asserted 

that the continued presence of lead paint in County residences “pose[s] a past, 

present, and ongoing risk of lead poisoning” to their inhabitants, particularly 

children. Id. ¶ 123. The County maintained that the Manufacturers’ conduct “is a 

direct, legal, and proximate cause of [a] public nuisance currently afflicting the 

County and its citizens.” Id. ¶ 127. The second count sought a declaratory judgment 

that Section 2(a) of the Certification Act2 “explicitly and/or implicitly identified” 

1 On October 12, 2018, the County of Lehigh also filed an action in the Court of Common 

Pleas of Lehigh County, in which it made substantially the same allegations, and sought 

substantially the same relief, as the County in the instant matter. The County of Lehigh action is 

the basis of a separate appeal before this Court. See Atl. Richfield Co. v. Lehigh County (Pa. 

Cmwlth., No. 1260 C.D. 2021, filed May 5, 2023) (Lehigh County). 

2 Section 2(a) of the Certification Act provides: 

(a) Findings.--The General Assembly finds as follows:

(Footnote continued on next page...)
4

lead-based paint as a public nuisance. Id. ¶ 133. As a proposed remedy, the County 

called for the cost of abatement of lead paint “throughout the County,” among other 

damages. See id. ¶ 130. The County filed an Amended Complaint on October 18, 

2018, in which it made only minor changes to the original Complaint. See O.R., 

Item No. 1. 

On November 6, 2018, the County filed a Second Amended Complaint, which 

is the operative complaint at issue in this appeal. See O.R., Item No. 4, Second Am. 

Compl. It included a single count, in which the County again alleged that lead paint 

“constitute[s] a public nuisance under the common law of Pennsylvania.” Id. ¶ 123. 

The County also reiterated its assertion that Section 2(a) declares lead paint a public 

nuisance. Id. ¶ 124. It further argued that it had the power to bring suit against the 

Manufacturers pursuant to Section 2(a). Id. ¶ 133. As a remedy, the County 

proposed a declaratory judgment that lead paint is a public nuisance, plus an award 

of the cost of abating affected properties, and other damages, which the County 

referred to as “supplemental relief.” Id. ¶ 134. 

(1) Lead poisoning is a significant health hazard to the citizens of this 

Commonwealth. Lead poisoning is particularly a hazard to children who typically 

are exposed to lead through environmental sources such as lead-based paint in 

housing and lead-contaminated dust and soil. It is the policy of this Commonwealth 

to protect the health and welfare of its citizens through reduction of lead in the 

environment.

(2) Improper abatement of lead-based paint within this Commonwealth constitutes 

a serious threat to the public health and safety and to the environment. The handling 

of lead-containing substances by inadequately trained employers, employees and 

other persons subjects the citizens of this Commonwealth to the risk of further 

release of lead into the environment. 

35 P.S. § 5902(a). 
5

The Manufacturers filed their Preliminary Objections to the Second Amended 

Complaint on December 21, 2020. See O.R., Item No. 38, POs. Their first objection, 

in the nature of a demurrer, asserts that the County’s claim fails to satisfy the 

necessary elements of common law public nuisance. Id. ¶ 5. Specifically, the 

Manufacturers argue that a public nuisance plaintiff must allege that the defendant 

maintained control over the nuisance, that the defendant’s conduct interfered with a 

“right common to all members of the public,” and that the conduct was the proximate 

cause of the alleged injuries. See id. ¶¶ 6, 8. The Manufacturers further assert that 

the County did not sufficiently allege causation, since it was the poor maintenance 

of existing lead paint, in the decades since any of the Manufacturers last sold lead 

paint, which is the proximate cause of the injuries. Id. ¶ 9. Furthermore, the 

Manufacturers assert, the County only alleged private, personal injuries, rather than 

any interference with a public right. Id. ¶ 8. 

The Manufacturers’ second objection, also in the nature of a demurrer, asserts

that the County’s allegations lacked any support in the Certification Act. Id. ¶ 12. 

The Manufacturers explained that the legislation “regulates the training, certification 

and performance of persons engaged in lead abatement,” not the manufacture of lead 

paint. Id. ¶ 13 (citing Section 2(a) of the Certification Act, 35 P.S. § 5902(a)(2)). 

The Manufacturers additionally argue that the Certification Act does not declare a 

public nuisance of any sort, does not authorize legal action unless its provisions have 

been violated, and grants the Department of Labor and Industry (Department) the 

exclusive authority to enforce those provisions.3 Id. ¶ 15. 

3 The Manufacturers also asserted that the County failed to join necessary parties pursuant 

to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1028(a)(5), Pa.R.Civ.P. 1028(a)(5). Specifically, the 

Manufacturers argued that the County should have joined the individual property owners, since 

(Footnote continued on next page...)
6

In opposition to the Preliminary Objections, the County clarified that it sought 

“declaratory relief only on the basis of [the Certification Act, which] focused entirely 

and specifically on the hazards of lead paint.” O.R., Item No. 66, County’s 

Memorandum (Mem.) of Law at 1 (emphasis added). In enacting the Certification 

Act, the County argued, the General Assembly declared that “lead paint is, in and of 

itself, always and everywhere a health hazard.” Id. at 28. Accordingly, the County 

explains, “Pennsylvania state law is clear: lead paint is illegal in Pennsylvania, 

always and everywhere.” Id. at 27. The County maintained, however, that it 

satisfied the elements of a common law public nuisance claim. See generally id. at 

9-23. 

On October 15, 2021, the Trial Court overruled the Manufacturers’ 

Preliminary Objections. See O.R., Item No. 100. The Trial Court explained that its 

decision was “made difficult by the paucity of Pennsylvania appellate opinions 

directly on point.” Id. The Trial Court further noted that two other public nuisance 

claims against manufacturers of allegedly dangerous products, including Lehigh 

County, had recently been permitted to proceed at the trial court stage. Id. Given 

those recent decisions, “the absence of appellate authority directly on point,” and the 

principle that preliminary objections should only be sustained in cases that are free 

and clear from all doubt, the Trial Court concluded that the Manufacturers’ 

Preliminary Objections should be overruled. Id.

The Manufacturers filed a motion with the Trial Court seeking permission to 

file an interlocutory appeal, which the Trial Court granted and certified its order

pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 702(b). See O.R., Item No. 105. On February 18, 2022, 

the remedies sought “would subject [them] to potential criminal and civil liability.” O.R., Item 

No. 38, POs ¶ 16. However, that issue is not one of the issues on which this Court granted 

permission to appeal. 
7

this Court entered an Order granting the Manufacturers’ petition for permission to 

appeal the Trial Court’s order. We limited the issues on appeal to the following: 

Does the Supreme Court’s decision in Skipworth v. Lead Indus[tries]

Ass[ociation], 690 A.2d 169 (Pa. 1997), apply to a public nuisance 

claim and require dismissal because the County does not “identify the 

manufacturer of any of the lead pigment” allegedly at any property that 

is part of the alleged public nuisance?

Does the . . . Certification Act[] . . . preclude the County’s public 

nuisance claim where the statute permits residential lead paint in a 

“lead-safe” condition and does not declare all lead paint in housing to 

be a public nuisance?

Is the County’s claim a misuse of the Declaratory Judgment[s] Act[, 42 

Pa. C.S. §§ 7531-7541,] where the County has failed to join the owners 

whose private properties are at issue, and where the County is 

advancing novel theories of liability that seek to change Pennsylvania 

law?

O.R., Item No. 116. 

II. Issues 

The Manufacturers argue that the Certification Act does not support a claim 

that the mere presence of lead paint is a public nuisance. According to the 

Manufacturers, such an interpretation is contrary to the Certification Act’s plain 

language, broad structure, history, and application. The Manufacturers further argue 

that if this Court considers the County’s common law nuisance claim, the County 

failed to identify the Manufacturers on a property-by-property basis, as is required 

to establish causation. Finally, the Manufacturers argue that the County is misusing 

the Declaratory Judgments Act in an effort to overturn existing law. Consequently, 

the Manufacturers argue that the Trial Court erred as a matter of law in overruling

their Preliminary Objections. 
8

III. Discussion 

Our scope of review of a trial court’s ruling on preliminary objections is 

limited to a determination of whether the trial court abused its discretion or 

committed an error of law. Leahy v. Pa. Liquor Control Bd., 551 A.2d 1153, 1156

(Pa. Cmwlth. 1988). Preliminary objections are to be sustained only in cases where 

the pleader has clearly failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted. Torres 

v. Beard, 997 A.2d 1242, 1245 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010). Where a preliminary objection 

presents a question of law, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review 

is plenary. Firearm Owners Against Crime v. City of Harrisburg, 218 A.3d 497, 

505 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019). 

A. Lead Paint as a Public Nuisance Pursuant to the Certification Act 

The Manufacturers argue that the Certification Act does not declare, in any 

fashion, the presence of lead paint to be a public nuisance. O.R., Item No. 35, 

Manufacturers’ Preliminary Objections (POs) ¶ 12. Rather, they argue, the 

Certification Act is solely concerned with “the training, certification, and 

performance of persons engaged in lead abatement.” Id. ¶ 13. According to the 

Manufacturers, the Certification Act’s findings state only that lead poisoning, not 

lead paint, is a health hazard, and that improper abatement poses a threat to public 

health. Id. ¶ 14. Furthermore, the Manufacturers argue, the Certification Act grants 

exclusive enforcement authority to the Department, and even then, only for 

violations of the Certification Act, which the County did not allege. Id. ¶ 15. Thus, 

the Manufacturers argue that the Trial Court improperly overruled their Preliminary 

Objection to the County’s statutory public nuisance claim. 

A brief summary of the Certification Act’s historical background aids in 

clarifying its purpose. In 1992, the United States Congress enacted the Residential 
9

Lead-Based Paint Hazard Reduction Act of 1992, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4851-4856 (Hazard 

Reduction Act). The legislation was enacted with the purpose of “radically alter[ing] 

the federal paradigm for identifying and treating lead-based paint hazards” by 

“targeting federal efforts to the reduction and elimination of actual, not potential 

hazards, and by permitting interim hazard reduction measures, rather than full hazard 

elimination.” S. Rep. No. 102-332, at 111 (1992). One of the Hazard Reduction 

Act’s measures was the provision of up to $250 million in federal grants “to assist 

cities and states in addressing the enormous lead paint poisoning risks posed by 

private low income housing.” Id. at 115. To be eligible, a state was required to 

develop and obtain federal approval of its own lead-reduction program. See 15 

U.S.C. § 2684(a)-(g). 

Just minutes before the Pennsylvania House of Representatives passed the 

Certification Act unanimously in 1995, the legislation’s sponsor explained that it 

was drafted to “fulfill the requirements contained in the . . . Hazard Reduction Act . 

. . , which stipulates that States must develop programs for the certification of leadbased paint workers and the accreditation of lead-based paint training providers.” 

Legislative Journal–House, June 21, 1995, at 1628.4 Urging passage, the sponsor 

explained that the legislation would “allow Pennsylvania to draw down millions of 

dollars in federal funds to assist in lead abatement work.” Id. 

In Section 2(a)(1) of the Certification Act, the General Assembly cited two 

key findings as the basis for the legislation: first, that lead poisoning had become “a 

significant health hazard to the citizens of this Commonwealth”; and second, that 

“[i]mproper abatement of lead-based paint within this Commonwealth constitutes a 

4 While intent cannot be conclusively determined from legislative remarks, this Court may 

review legislative policy reasons expressed in the House and Senate journals as an aid in 

construction. Young v. Ins. Dep’t, 604 A.2d 1105, 1108 n.8 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992). 
10

serious threat to the public health and safety and to the environment.” 35 P.S. 

§ 5902(a)(1). More specifically, the “handling of lead-containing substances by 

inadequately trained employers, employees and other persons subjects the citizens 

of this Commonwealth to the risk of further release of lead into the environment.” 

Section 2(a)(2) of the Certification Act, 35 P.S. § 5902(a)(2). 

The General Assembly’s stated intent in enacting the Certification Act is to 

address the above concerns “by preventing exposure to lead through regulation of 

lead-based paint activities”; by “establish[ing] a program to train individuals 

engaged in lead-based paint activities to insure they have the necessary skill, 

training, experience and competence to perform” them; by “monitor[ing] the work 

practices of those persons performing lead-based paint activities”; and by “insur[ing] 

that the cleanup, disposal and post[-]abatement clearance testing activities of persons 

performing lead-based paint activities are performed in accordance with required 

standards.” Section 2(b)(1)-(4) of the Certification Act, 35 P.S. § 5902(b)(1)-(4). 

“Lead-based paint activities” is defined as “risk assessment, inspection, and 

abatement.” Section 3 of the Certification Act, 35 P.S. § 5903. In turn, “abatement” 

includes “[l]ess-than-full abatement whereby the sources of lead contamination are 

reduced sufficiently to create a ‘lead-safe’ environment rather than a ‘lead-free’ 

environment.” Id. (emphasis added). In furtherance of its aims, the Certification 

Act empowers the Department “to issue an order requiring compliance with this 

[A]ct or regulations promulgated under this [A]ct.” Section 10(a) of the 

Certification Act, 35 P.S. § 5910(a). 

Instantly, the County avers that in Section 2 of the Certification Act, the 

General Assembly “has explicitly and/or implicitly declared that lead paint is a 

public nuisance.” O.R., Item No. 19, Second Am. Compl. ¶ 124. The County further 
11

claims that it has brought the instant action pursuant to Section 2, which empowers 

the County to “enforce the public rights of its citizenry.” Id. ¶ 125. Additionally, 

the County explains that it derives this power from Section 10(d)(4), which, in the 

County’s view, authorizes the “initiation of legal action or proceeding in a court of 

competent jurisdiction” for violations of a regulation promulgated under the 

Certification Act. Id. (citing 35 P.S. § 5910(d)(4)). 

We begin our analysis by rejecting the County’s contention that the 

Certification Act “explicitly” declares anything to be a public nuisance. Such a 

declaration would be self-evident through the use of clear legislative language. See, 

e.g., Act of June 23, 1931, P.L. 1178, No. 319, 68 P.S. § 467 (providing that “any 

building, or part of a building, used for the purpose of fornication, lewdness, 

assignation, and/or prostitution is hereby declared to be a common nuisance”); 

Section 3 of the Clean Streams Law,5 35 P.S. § 691.3 (providing that the pollution 

of Commonwealth waters “is hereby declared not to be a reasonable or natural use 

of such waters, to be against public policy and to be a public nuisance”) (emphases 

added). The Certification Act, by contrast, does not contain a single occurrence of 

the word “nuisance.” 

Next, we consider the argument that the General Assembly “implicitly” 

declared lead paint to be a public nuisance. Our courts have, on occasion,

determined certain conduct to be a public nuisance “because it is so declared by 

statute . . . implicitly.” Com. v. MacDonald, 347 A.2d 290, 303 (Pa. 1975). In 

Pennsylvania Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Bravo Enterprises, 

Inc., 237 A.2d 342, 360 (Pa. 1968), for example, our Supreme Court reasoned that a 

statute outlawing bullfighting “is declarative of the public policy and is tantamount 

5 Act of June 22, 1937, P.L. 1987, as amended, 35 P.S. §§ 691.1-691.1001. 
12

to calling the proscribed matter prejudicial to the interests of the public.” Reasoning 

that “[i]njury to the public is the essence of a public nuisance,” the Court concluded 

that bullfighting is “properly enjoinable as being contrary to law and prejudicial to 

the interests of the public.” Id. In other words, the statute’s prohibition of the 

underlying conduct was a necessary condition to the determination that the statute 

implicitly declared that conduct to be a public nuisance. See also MacDonald, 347 

A.2d at 290 n.30 (explaining that Bravo Enterprises stands for the proposition that 

“bullfighting is [a] public nuisance because [it is] proscribed by statute”); Phila.

Chewing Gum Corp. v. Dep’t of Env’t Res., 387 A.2d 142, 150 n.5 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

1978) (determining that conduct prohibited by Section 316 of the Clean Streams 

Law, 35 P.S. § 691.316, “constitutes an implicitly declared statutory public 

nuisance”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, Natural Wood Preservers, Inc. v. Dep’t of 

Env’t Res., 414 A.2d 37 (Pa. 1980). 

The Certification Act stands in stark contrast to other statutes that our courts 

have interpreted to implicitly declare public nuisances. There is nothing in the 

Certification Act that retroactively proscribes the past manufacture and sale of lead 

paint, which is the only conduct the Second Amended Complaint attributes to the 

Manufacturers. Indeed, the Certification Act’s stated intent, its plain language, its 

drafting history, and its mechanisms of enforcement all indicate that the legislation 

was enacted to address the dangers posed by the improper abatement of lead paint. 

We conclude that, contrary to the County’s assertions, the Certification Act does not 

declare, explicitly or implicitly, that all lead paint is a public nuisance. Indeed, 

Section 3 specifically provides that proper abatement may create a “‘lead-safe’ 

environment” rather than one that is “‘lead-free.’” 35 P.S. § 5903. 
13

In addition, the County misinterprets the Certification Act’s enforcement 

provisions. It is true that Section 10(d)(4) provides that “a person who fails to 

comply with a requirement of this act or a regulation promulgated under this act or 

who fails to obey an order issued by the [D]epartment may be subject to . . . initiation 

of legal action or proceeding in a court of competent jurisdiction.” 35 P.S. 

§ 5910(d)(4). However, the preceding subsections of Section 10 grant only the 

Department the power of enforcement.6 See 35 P.S. § 5910(b) (authorizing the 

Department to “issue an order requiring compliance with this act or regulations 

promulgated under this [A]ct”); id. § 5910(c) (authorizing additional remedies if 

“the [D]epartment determines that a hazardous condition exists due to the failure to 

comply with a provision of this act or a regulation promulgated under this [A]ct”); 

id. § 5910(d)(1) (authorizing the “[d]enial, suspension or revocation of accreditation 

for a person, training provider or contractor”). Section 10(d)(4) therefore cannot be 

reasonably interpreted to empower political subdivisions to take action against 

alleged violators of the Certification Act or its accompanying regulations. Even if 

such a broad interpretation were warranted, the County has not alleged that any 

Manufacturer violated a Certification Act regulation. 

We conclude that Section 2 of the Certification Act does not declare lead paint 

to be a public nuisance. Section 10 of the Certification Act also does not empower 

the County or other political subdivisions to enforce its provisions, and even if it did, 

the Second Amended Complaint fails to identify which provision the Manufacturers 

allegedly violated. Accordingly, we conclude that the Second Amended Complaint 

fails to state a cause of action for public nuisance under the Certification Act. 

6

In interpreting Section 10(d)(4) of the Certification Act, we are mindful that “a court 

should not interpret statutory words in isolation, but must read them with reference to the context 

in which they appear.” Roethlein v. Portnoff Law Assocs., 81 A.3d 816, 822 (Pa. 2013). 
14

B. Lead Paint as a Public Nuisance Pursuant to the Common Law 

1. Public Right 

Next, the Manufacturers argue that the Second Amended Complaint “fails to 

allege the interference with a public right”; rather, it alleges “a risk of personal injury 

from lead paint to individuals within privately owned—not [publicly] accessible 

residences.” O.R., Item No. 35, POs ¶ 8. 

Section 821B of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (Am. Law Inst. 1965) 

(Restatement (2nd)), on which Pennsylvania courts rely in public nuisance actions,7

provides: 

(1) A public nuisance is an unreasonable interference with a right 

common to the general public.

(2) Circumstances that may sustain a holding that an interference with

a public right is unreasonable include the following:

(a) whether the conduct involves a significant interference with

the public health, the public safety, the public peace, the public 

comfort or the public convenience, or

(b) whether the conduct is proscribed by a statute, ordinance or 

administrative regulation, or

(c) whether the conduct is of a continuing nature or has 

produced

a permanent or long-lasting effect, and, as the actor knows or 

has reason to know, has a significant effect upon the public right.

Restatement (2nd) § 821B. 

Unlike reasonableness, which is a factual inquiry, whether a right is public is 

a question of law. Machipongo Land & Coal Co. v. Com., 799 A.2d 751, 773 (Pa. 

2002). In the context of public nuisance claims, a public right is necessarily 

7 The Restatement (Third) of Torts (Am. Law Inst. 1998) was published in 1998; however, 

Pennsylvania remains a Second Restatement jurisdiction until the courts adopt the Third 

Restatement definition. Com. v. Monsanto, 269 A.3d 623, 648 n.18 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021). 
15

collective in nature. Restatement (2nd) § 821B cmt. g. It is not like an individual’s

right to be free from assault or defamation, fraud, or injury by negligent actions of 

others. Id.; see also Blue Mountain Pres. Ass’n v. Twp. of Eldred, 867 A.2d 692, 704 

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2005) (explaining that a public nuisance “affects the general public,” 

rather than “merely some private individual or individuals”) (citing Groff v. Borough 

of Sellersville, 314 A.2d 328, 330 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1974)). 

Because the rights affected by a public nuisance are collective, the nuisance 

“produces no greater injury to one person than to another.” Twp. of Eldred, 867 

A.2d at 704; see also Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Peter Pan Bus Lines, Inc., 845 F.

Supp. 295, 302 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (explaining that, under Pennsylvania tort law, “the 

law of public nuisance comprehends threats to the public at large, not specific 

persons”). The Second Restatement gives the hypothetical example of pollution in 

a stream, which, if it “deprives fifty or a hundred lower riparian owners of the use 

of the water for purposes connected with their land,” is not a public nuisance. 

Restatement (2nd) § 821B cmt. g. “If, however, the pollution prevents the use of a 

public bathing beach or kills the fish in a navigable stream and so deprives all 

members of the community of the right to fish, it becomes a public nuisance.” Id. 

(emphasis added). 

Instantly, the County argues that its citizens have “a common right to be free 

from the detrimental effects of exposure to lead paints/pigments in, on, and around 

private homes and residences throughout the County.” O.R., Item No. 19, Second 

Am. Compl. ¶ 123. Because the Manufacturers’ conduct has “significantly and 

materially” interfered with such rights, and continues to do so, the County alleges, 

they are liable for public nuisance. Id. The County further explains that public 

nuisances need not only impact “public space[s]” or “shared[,] indivisible 
16

resource[s],” but private dwellings as well. O.R., Item No. 60, County’s Mem. of 

Law at 13. In support, the County cites this Court’s decision in Feeley v. Borough 

of Ridley Park, 551 A.2d 373 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1988). In that case, we affirmed a lower 

court’s finding that a homeowner’s “deplorable state of disrepair, lacking proper 

plumbing, electricity, or water,” in addition to her failure to care properly for her 

many household cats, constituted a public nuisance. Id. at 375. If, the County 

argues, this Court could determine that conduct with such a limited impact could be 

a public nuisance, then “the poisonous and decaying paint on tens of thousands of 

walls of the County’s homes . . . would also qualify.” County’s Mem. of Law at 14. 

While it is true that public nuisances may occur on private property, the rights 

that are adversely impacted must still be “collective in nature.” Restatement (2nd) 

§ 821B cmt. g. The purported rights in the Second Amended Complaint, by contrast, 

are akin to the individual rights “not to be assaulted or defamed or defrauded or 

negligently injured,” which cannot give rise to public nuisance actions. The 

distinction between public and individual rights still holds even in instances where 

the individual rights of a large number of persons have been affected. In contrast to 

public nuisances, 

[t]he manufacture and distribution of products rarely, if ever, causes a 

violation of a public right as that term has been understood in the law 

of public nuisance . . . . Even if the owners of a fast-food chain were to 

sell millions of defectively produced hamburgers causing harm to 

millions of people who ate them, the violation of rights is a series of 

separate violations of private rights—typical tort or contract rights that 

the consumers might have—not a violation of the rights of the general 

public, or of the public as the public. The sheer number of violations 

does not transform the harm from individual injury to communal injury.

Donald G. Gifford, Public Nuisance as a Mass Products Liability Tort, 71 U. CIN.

L. REV., 741, 817 (2003) (emphasis added). 
17

For these reasons, we also conclude that Feeley is inapposite here. In that 

case, the alleged nuisance consisted entirely of “noxious and overpowering odors 

emanating from [the defendant’s] home.” 551 A.2d at 375. Neighbors testified that 

the odors “forced [them] to keep their windows closed.” Id. Residents who lived 

“down the block and around the corner” were also affected. Id. In other words, it 

was the collective interest in the neighborhood’s clean air that was impacted, not 

merely the accumulation of various injuries to individual property rights. The injury 

was therefore more akin to the pollution of a stream, which deprives the entire 

community of the right to fish, than to the injuries alleged by the County. 

Furthermore, the plaintiff in Feeley did not allege that the defendant’s conduct 

impacted only some neighborhood residents, or impacted some residents 

substantially more than others. This case is therefore distinguishable from Feeley in 

that one dwelling may be adversely impacted by lead paint, while others nearby may 

not be impacted at all. Such individual injuries are distinct from a public nuisance, 

which “produces no greater injury to one person than to another.” Twp. of Eldred, 

867 A.2d at 704. 

2. Causation 

Next, the Manufacturers maintain that the Trial Court erred in overruling their

Preliminary Objections because the County has failed to satisfy Pennsylvania tort 

law’s “fundamental causation requirement.” Manufacturers’ Br. at 32. Specifically, 

the Manufacturers explain that “in order to establish a viable claim for abatement of 

lead paint and pigment, a plaintiff must allege on a property-by-property basis that 

lead paint or pigment manufactured by a particular identified defendant is present 

today and causing harm at a particular property.” Id. at 31-32. 
18

The Manufacturers further argue that the County “is trying to bring the same 

claim” as the one brought by the unsuccessful plaintiffs in Skipworth. 

Manufacturers’ Br. at 34. In that case, the child plaintiff had been hospitalized for 

lead poisoning after ingesting lead paint in her legal guardian’s home, which was 

built circa 1870. Skipworth, 690 A.2d at 170-71. The guardian and mother filed a 

products liability action against several paint manufacturers. Id. at 171. Admittedly 

unable to identify the specific manufacturer that made the lead paint used in the 

guardian’s home, the plaintiffs “proceeded against the [defendants] by invoking 

theories of collective liability.” Id. The trial court granted summary judgment on 

all counts and the Superior Court affirmed, explaining such alternative liability 

theories have not been adopted into Pennsylvania law. See Skipworth by Williams 

v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, Inc., 665 A.2d 1288, 1291 (Pa. Super. 1995), aff’d, 690 A.2d 

169. 

On appeal, the primary question before the Supreme Court was whether the 

Court “should adopt the market share liability theory in the context of lead poisoning 

cases.” Skipworth, 690 A.2d at 171. Describing market share liability as “an 

exception to the general rule that a plaintiff must establish that the defendant 

proximately caused his or her injury,” the Court compared the matter sub judice to 

the seminal case on market share liability, Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 607 P.2d 

924 (Cal. 1980).8 The Court acknowledged the possibility of a situation, such as in 

8

In Sindell, the plaintiff suffered severe health complications allegedly caused by 

diethylstilbestrol (DES), a medicine once prescribed to prevent miscarriages, taken by her mother 

before the plaintiff’s birth. 607 P.2d at 926. Unable to identify the specific manufacturer of her 

mother’s drugs, the plaintiff joined as defendants 5 of the approximately 200 drug companies that 

were manufacturing DES during the relevant period. Id. at 929. The California Supreme Court 

overruled the manufacturers’ preliminary objections and instructed the trial court to apply a 

(Footnote continued on next page...)
19

Sindell, which may compel Pennsylvania courts “to depart from our time-tested 

general rule” of proximate causation. Skipworth, 690 A.2d at 172. However, the 

Court declined to do so, holding that application of market share liability to lead 

paint cases “would lead to a distortion of liability which would be so gross as to 

make determinations of culpability arbitrary and unfair.” Id. The Court explained 

that, in order to apply market share liability, all of the makers of lead paint during 

the more than 100 years when it may have been used in the guardian’s home would 

have to be held liable. Id. at 173. During that period, many manufacturers entered 

and left the lead paint market. Id. Furthermore, the Court noted that the offending 

drug in Sindell was a “fungible commodity,” which all companies manufactured 

according to a single formula. Id. at 172. Lead paint, by contrast, had “different 

chemical formulations, contained different amounts of lead, and differed in potential 

toxicity.” Id. at 173. Such complications, the Court held, were “fatal to [the] claim 

that application of market share liability to these defendants would be appropriate.” 

Id. 

In its appellate brief, the County argues that Skipworth is inapposite because 

its holding “was specifically limited to products liability cases.” County’s Br. at 24 

(emphasis in original). According to the County, in Skipworth, the Supreme Court 

ruled out market share liability “in large part because it would be difficult to 

ascertain which lead paint manufacturers would have been responsible for the paint 

on the walls of that one particular victim’s house.” Id. at 23 (emphasis in original). 

That issue, the County argues, is irrelevant to a public nuisance claim, “which by its 

nature implicates” all of the Manufacturers in the manufacture, sale, distribution, 

formula whereby “[e]ach defendant will be held liable for the proportion of the judgment 

represented by its share of that market unless it demonstrates that it could not have made the 

product which caused [the] plaintiff’s injuries.” Id. at 937. 
20

and or promotion of lead paint across the County. Id. at 23-24. The usual standard 

of proximate causation, the County concludes, is therefore inapplicable.9

We disagree with the County that Skipworth’s holding was specifically 

limited to products liability cases. To the contrary, the Supreme Court clearly stated 

that it was considering whether Pennsylvania “should adopt the market share 

liability theory in the context of lead poisoning cases.” 690 A.2d at 171 (emphasis 

added). After weighing and rejecting the plaintiffs’ arguments, the Supreme Court 

concluded that the “[a]pplication of market share liability to lead paint cases such 

as this one would lead to a distortion of liability which would be so gross as to make 

determinations of culpability arbitrary and unfair.” Id. at 172 (emphasis added). 

The Supreme Court’s rationale for rejecting market share liability further 

militates against distinguishing Skipworth from the instant matter. The inherent 

difficulties of apportioning liability, which the Court determined would prevent the 

fair application of market share liability in lead paint cases, are just as relevant in 

this case. For example, the Skipworth Court expressed skepticism that accurate 

market share estimates would ever be obtainable, “considering the lengthy relevant 

9 Although the County argues that proximate causation is not a necessary element of its 

claim, it fails to state which theory of liability it believes should be applied in this case. Given the 

County’s extensive discussion of Skipworth and attempt to distinguish it, we surmise that it has 

market share liability in mind. We note, however, that the Supreme Court in Skipworth briefly 

discussed several other liability theories in relation to lead paint litigation and similarly rejected 

all of them. See Skipworth, 690 A.2d at 174 (explaining that “alternate liability” was inapplicable 

because the defendant manufacturers “did not act simultaneously in producing the lead paint”); id.

(explaining that “conspiracy liability” was inapplicable because the plaintiffs failed to show that 

two or more defendants had “combined or agreed with intent to do an unlawful act or to do an 

otherwise lawful act by unlawful means”); id. at 174-75 (explaining that “concert of action” 

liability is inapplicable because the plaintiffs failed to “identify the wrongdoer or the person who 

acted in concert with the wrongdoer”). Since these liability theories appear to be inapplicable to 

this case for the same reasons as in Skipworth, we do not address them separately. 
21

time period in question.”10 690 A.2d at 173. Even if they were obtainable, the Court 

concluded, such estimates “would not serve to approximate [a] defendant’s 

responsibility for injuries caused by its lead paint,” given the varying levels of 

toxicity and bioavailability in different paint formulas, among other factors. Id. The 

“distortion of liability” that the Supreme Court anticipated would result does not 

depend on the specific legal theory being advanced by the plaintiff. As the Supreme 

Court observed, the essential purpose of market share liability is to ensure that “each 

manufacturer’s liability would approximate its responsibility for the injuries caused 

by its own products.” Id. Whether a plaintiff alleges negligence or a public 

nuisance, the same impediments to a reliably accurate calculation of liability prevent 

the market share liability theory from being fairly applied in the lead paint context.11 

10 We note that Skipworth involved a period nearly identical to the relevant period in this 

matter. The Skipworth plaintiffs “alleged that they had identified and joined in this action 

substantially all of the manufacturers of lead pigment used in residential house paint from 1870,” 

when the guardian’s house was built, “until production of lead pigment ceased in 1977.” 690 A.2d 

at 171. Here, the County seeks damages for lead paint manufactured and sold in the County 

between 1880 and 1978. 

11 In its appellate brief, the County relies on this Court’s recent decision in Monsanto,

which, in the County’s view, stands for the proposition that the public nuisance plaintiff “need not 

meet any of the elements of product liability law.” County’s Br. at 31. In Monsanto, the 

Commonwealth brought an action against a chemical corporation’s successors for the release of 

polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) into public waterways, in violation of Section 3 of the Clean 

Streams Law, 35 P.S. § 691.3. The Commonwealth alleged, inter alia, that the release of PCBs 

constituted a public nuisance. 269 A.3d at 635. The defendants objected on the basis that the 

chemicals had been sold to third parties by the time of their discharge into the waterways, and that 

“Pennsylvania does not impose nuisance liability against a manufacturer after placing a product 

into the stream of commerce.” Id. at 648. This Court overruled the objection, explaining: “the 

[Commonwealth] clearly declare[d] that [the d]efendants are responsible for PCBs entering the 

Commonwealth’s waters because [the d]efendants knew that the uses for which they marketed, 

sold, and distributed PCB mixtures would result in leaching, leaking, and escaping their intended 

applications and contaminating (i.e., polluting) those waters.” Id. at 653. 

(Footnote continued on next page...)
22

The County maintains that “any continued reference to Skipworth and other 

products liability cases is simply a red herring,” since its public nuisance action does 

not seek relief for private harms. County’s Br. at 25. The Trial Court agreed, and 

explained that “Skipworth . . . was a [products liability] suit on behalf of one 

individual, so it would make sense to require proof of the manufacturer of the paint 

that injured that individual. By contrast, the [C]ounty here alleges widespread harm 

throughout the community.” O.R., Item No. 100 n.1. 

We disagree that such purported differences justify distinguishing this matter 

from Skipworth. As explained in the foregoing section, the harms alleged by the 

County, even if alleged to have occurred in large numbers, do not constitute the 

injury to communal interests required of a public nuisance claim. Since the County 

only alleges individual harms occurring on private property, as an alleged result of 

the use of the Manufacturers’ products, we agree with the Manufacturers that the 

County’s claim is essentially a products liability claim in the guise of a public 

nuisance action. For this additional reason, we conclude that Skipworth’s holding is 

properly applied to this matter. 

C. The County’s Claims and the Declaratory Judgments Act

Finally, the Manufacturers argue that the County’s request for declaratory 

relief in the Second Amended Complaint would effectively “rewrite the Certification 

Act and judicially impose a new policy decision that federal, state, and local 

authorities all reject.” Manufacturers’ Br. at 44. The Manufacturers argue that, far 

We conclude that Monsanto is distinguishable from this case for two reasons. First, the 

defendants in Monsanto allegedly engaged in conduct that had been explicitly declared by a statute 

to be a public nuisance, which, this Court noted, would constitute a nuisance per se. Id. at 649. 

Second, the Commonwealth alleged harm to public waterways, which, as this Court concluded, 

constituted an “offense that annoys the community in general.” Id. (citing SPTR, Inc. v. City of 

Phila., 150 A.3d 160, 167 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016)). 
23

from “affording ‘relief from uncertainty and insecurity,’” the relief sought would 

“not settle anything between the parties,” because it would not identify which, or 

how many, properties are in need of abatement. Id. at 46-47 (citing 42 Pa. C.S. 

§ 7541(a)). The Manufacturers also argue that the County failed to join “all persons 

. . . who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the declaration,” as 

required by the DJA. See 42 Pa. C.S. § 7540(a).

While the DJA is broad in scope and is to be liberally construed, it is not 

without limits. Ronald H. Clark, Inc. v. Twp. of Hamilton, 562 A.2d 965, 967 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 1989). For example, declaratory judgment proceedings cannot be used to 

make new law, but only to declare the state of the existing law on a particular issue. 

P.J.S. v. Pa. State Ethics Comm’n, 669 A.2d 1105, 1109 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996); see 

also Doe v. Johns-Manville Corp., 471 A.2d 1252, 1254 (Pa. Super. 1984) 

(explaining that declaratory judgments “may not be used to search out new legal 

doctrines”). The purpose of the DJA is “to settle and to afford relief from uncertainty 

and insecurity with respect to rights, status, and other legal relations.” 42 Pa. C.S. 

§ 7541(a). Thus, courts generally should refuse to grant declaratory relief where it 

would not resolve the controversy or uncertainty that spurred the request. Rendell 

v. Pa. State Ethics Comm’n, 938 A.2d 554, 559 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007). Furthermore, 

all persons who have an interest in the declaration must be made parties to the action. 

HYK Constr. Co. v. Smithfield Twp., 8 A.3d 1009, 1015 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010); 42 Pa. 

C.S. § 7540(a). 

In this case, the County seeks a declaration that the Certification Act declares 

lead paint itself to be a public nuisance and that the Manufacturers are liable for 

damages, even though the County admittedly does not show proximate cause. As 

explained above, however, the County’s proposed interpretation of the Certification 
24

Act is contrary to its plain meaning and legislative intent. Consequently, the relief 

requested, if granted, would be tantamount to creating new law in contravention of 

the DJA. Additionally, because the County has never identified which of the 

211,402 possibly affected structures are in need of abatement, or which 

Manufacturer’s products are found in each structure, the requested relief, if granted,

would likely create far more legal uncertainties than it would settle. 

Lastly, the County has not joined the owners of any of the potentially affected 

properties, or any County property owners at all. The owners of those properties 

would obviously have an interest in the declaration; thus, their joinder was 

mandatory for this action to proceed pursuant to the DJA. See HYK, 8 A.3d at 1015. 

For these reasons, we conclude that the County is not entitled to declaratory relief. 

IV. Conclusion

In sum, we conclude that the County failed to identify a statutory basis for its 

public nuisance action and failed to allege that the Manufacturers proximately 

caused its alleged injuries under Pennsylvania tort law. Therefore, the Second 

Amended Complaint fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted. 

Furthermore, the County’s request for declaratory relief is contrary to the scope, 

stated purpose, and requirements of the DJA. Accordingly, we reverse the Trial 

Court’s Order and remand to the Trial Court for the entry of an order dismissing the 

Second Amended Complaint. 

__________________________________

ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Atlantic Richfield Company, E.I. du :

Pont de Nemours and Company, NL :

Industries, Inc., PPG Industries, Inc., :

and The Sherwin-Williams Company, :

Appellants :

:

v. : No. 1338 C.D. 2021

:

The County of Montgomery, :

Pennsylvania :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 5

th day of May, 2023, the Order of the Court of Common 

Pleas of Montgomery County (Trial Court) in the above-captioned matter, dated 

October 15, 2021, is hereby REVERSED. This matter is hereby REMANDED to 

the Trial Court for the entry of an order dismissing the County of Montgomery, 

Pennsylvania’s Second Amended Complaint. 

Jurisdiction relinquished. 

__________________________________

ELLEN CEISLER, Judge