UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. No. 95-5927

ORLANZO HOLLINGSWORTH,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of South Carolina, at Greenville.

G. Ross Anderson, Jr., District Judge.

(CR-95-331)

Submitted: February 11, 1997

Decided: September 16, 1997

Before ERVIN, WILKINS, and NIEMEYER, Circuit Judges.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

Brent O.E. Clinkscale, HAYNSWORTH, MARION, MCKAY &

GUERARD, L.L.P., Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellant. J.

Rene Josey, United States Attorney, E. Jean Howard, Assistant

United States Attorney, Christopher W. Seybolt, OFFICE OF THE

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greenville, South Carolina, for

Appellee.

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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

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OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Appellant appeals from his conviction by a jury of one count of

possession of cocaine with intent to distribute in violation of 21

U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1994). We affirm.

Appellant takes issue with the trial court's denial of his motion for

judgment of acquittal, contending that the Government failed to present sufficient evidence of constructive possession. This court reviews

the denial of a motion for acquittal under a sufficiency of the evidence

standard. Fed. R. Crim. P. 29; see United States v. Brooks, 957 F.2d

1138, 1146-47 (4th Cir. 1992). To support a conviction, "the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the government,

must be sufficient for a rational trier of fact to have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." United States

v. Brewer, 1 F.3d 1430, 1437 (4th Cir. 1993). Circumstantial as well

as direct evidence is considered, and the government is given the benefit of all reasonable inferences from the facts proven to those sought

to be established. United States v. Tresvant, 677 F.2d 1018, 1021 (4th

Cir. 1982).

Appellant first contends that the trial court should have granted his

motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the Government's

case because the Government failed to show he had exclusive control

over the drugs. This contention is meritless because possession, both

actual and constructive, need not be exclusive, but may be shared

with others. United States v. Nelson, 6 F.3d 1049, 1053 (4th Cir.

1993).

Appellant next maintains that the trial court should have granted

his motion for judgment of acquittal because there was insufficient

evidence that he knew the drugs were in the car and that he had

dominion or control over them. Our review reveals, however, that the

evidence was indeed sufficient to submit the issue to the jury.

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The record discloses that two investigators who approached the

vehicle after Appellant was removed both observed the potato chip

bag with the drugs visibly protruding on the floorboard of the front

passenger seat. Further, Appellant was extremely nervous when

apprehended, placed his hands high in the air and carefully watched

the vehicle after he was removed. When the investigators recovered

the potato chip bag from the car, Appellant sighed, placed his hand

over his face and sank back into the seat of the patrol vehicle. Finally,

Appellant was the driver of the vehicle which evidence established

was being driven to a local mall to make a large drug sale. In light

of this evidence, Appellant's second contention fails as well.

Finally, Appellant maintains that as a matter of public policy, constructive possession cases should not be submitted to a jury absent a

showing of exclusive control over the drugs. As noted above, however, exclusive control is not required to show possession. This assertion is therefore without merit.

Accordingly, we affirm Appellant's conviction. We dispense with

oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

presented in the materials before the court and argument would not

aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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