FILED U.S. COURT OF APPEALS ELEVENTH CIRCUIT January 28, 2003 THOMAS K. KAHN CLERK [PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________ No. 01-14986

________________________ D.C. Docket No. 01-00287-CR-WPD UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus HENRY AFFIT LEJARDE-RADA, a.k.a. Manuel Parejo Gamero, Defendant-Appellant.

__________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida

_________________________ (January 28, 2003) Before CARNES, MARCUS and SUHRHEINRICH*, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: Defendant Henry Affit Lejarde-Rada pl ed guilty, pursuant to a written plea agreement, to one count of attempte d illegal reentry into the United States

_________________ *Honorable Richard F. Suhrheinrich, United States Circuit Judge for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.2 following deportation subsequent to a c onviction for an aggravated felony, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), (b)(2). At sentencing, the district court denied Lejarde-Rada’s motion for a downward departure and sentenced him to 41 months of imprisonment, in addition to three years of supervised release, and a $100 special assessment. On appeal, Lejarde- Rada argues that his guilty plea is invalid because the district court failed to ensure that he understood the direct consequences of his guilty plea. When a district court accepts a guilty pl ea, it must ensure that the three core concerns of Rule 11 of the Federal Rule s of Criminal Procedure have been met: “(1) the guilty plea must be free from coercion; (2) the defendant must understand the nature of the charges; and (3) th e defendant must know and understand the consequences of his guilty plea.” United States v. Mosley , 173 F.3d 1318, 1322 (11th Cir. 1999) (internal marks omitted); see also United States v. Quinones , 97 F.3d 473, 475 (11th Cir. 1996). Because Lejarde-Rada failed to object to any alleged error under Rule 11 before the district court, we review only for plain error. Mosley , 173 F.3d at 1322. Thus, Lejarde-Rada must show that there is (1) “error” (2) that is “plain” and (3) that “affect[s] substantial ri ghts.” United States v. Olano , 507 U.S. 725, 732, 113 S. Ct. 1770, 1776 (1993). “If all three c onditions are met, an appellate court3 may then exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if (4) the error ‘seriously affect[s] the fairness, inte grity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’” Johnson v. United States , 520 U.S. 461, 467, 117 S. Ct. 1544, 1549 (1997) (quoting Olano , 507 U.S. at 732, 113 S. Ct. at 1776) (other internal quotation marks omitted). We have previouslysaid that “[a] district court’s failure to address a core concern of Rule 11 c onstitutes plain error.” United States v. Hernandez-Fraire , 208 F.3d 945, 949 (11th Cir. 2000); see also Quinones , 97 F.3d at 475. The context in which we have saidthat, however, is one in which there was a violation of an explicit and specific requirement of Rule 11. See HernandezFraire , 208 F.3d at 949-51 (failure to inform the defendant of his right to plead not guilty, right to the assistance of counsel at trial, right to confront and crossexamine adverse witnesses at trial, and right against compelled self-incrimination, as required by Rule 11(c)(3)); Quinones , at 474-75 (failure to inform the defendant of the nature of the charge as require d by Rule 11(c)(1)). The rationale is that where Rule 11 explicitly, specifically, and pl ainly requires that a court inform the defendant of something, it is plain error for the court not to do so. That is not the type of alleged error at issue here. Lejarde-Rada contends that the guiltyplea colloquy in his case did not meet the third core concern of ensuring his awar eness of the direct consequences of his1 Lejarde-Rada’s plea agreement did not contain an appeal waiver provision.

2 During Lejarde-Rada’s plea colloquy, defense counsel indicated that he intended to introduce evidence of coercion at sentencing in support of a motion for a downward departure. In response, the district court informed Lejarde-Rada that he could present his claim of coercion to the jury as a defense to the charged crime, but if he pled guilty he would waive the defense. Indicating that he understood his rights, Lejarde-Rada persisted in his plea of guilty and declined an opportunity to discuss the matter further with his attorney. Before accepting his guilty plea, the district c ourt mentioned Lejarde-Rada’s appellate rights, and Lejarde-Rada indicated his understanding of these rights, as follows: THE COURT: Do you understand that you gi ve up your right to appeal any matter relating to your case, including the judgment and sentence which the Court may impose[], except as to the validity of the sentence. [LEJARDE-RADA:] Yes, I understand. THE COURT: That means if you went to trial and got convicted, you could have taken an appeal saying the jury wasn’t fair or I wasn’t fair. But when you plead guilty, you give up that right to appeal. Do you understand that?

4 guilty plea, not because the district cour t failed to inform him of something Rule 11 specifically requires, but because the district court did not go beyond the specific informational requirements of the rule and tell him that his right to appeal his sentence was limited by 18 U.S.C. § 3742. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(1)-(4) (identifying the circumstances in which a defendant may appeal his sentence). 1 Specifically, Lejarde-Rada argue s that when the district court advised him that he had the right to appeal the validity of his sentence, it was error not to go further and tell him that pursuant to § 3742(a) he w ould be not be able to appeal a denial of his motion for a downward departure. 2[LEJARDE-RADA:] Yes, I understand.

5 It is the law of this circuit that, atleast where the explicit language of a statute or rule does not specifically resolv e an issue, there can be no plain error where there is no precedent from the S upreme Court or this Court directly resolving it. United States v. Magluta , 198 F.3d 1265, 1280 (11th Cir. 1999) (“a district court’s error is not ‘plain’ or ‘obvious’ if there is no precedent directly resolving an issue”), vacated in unrelated part on other grounds , 203 F.3d 1304 (11 thCir. 2000). No decision of this Court or the Supreme Court requires a district court to inform the defendant during a guilty plea colloquy that he may or will be unable to appeal any refusal by the court to depart downward at sentencing. Our decision in United States v. Pierre , 120 F.3d 1153 (11th Cir. 1997), does not do that. It involved a defendant who notonly reasonably believed but was also affirmatively misinformed by the court he w ould be allowed to appeal an issue that his guilty plea waived. Id. at 1155-56. By contrast, Lejarde-Rada was not misinformed of anything, and there is no indication that he reasonably believed3 The decision in Peguero v. United States , 526 U.S. 23, 119 S. Ct. 961 (1999), is even more distinguishable. That case involved Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32's explicit requirement that a defendant be notified at sentencing of his ri ght to appeal, a requireme nt that was violated in that case. Id. at 26-27, 119 S. Ct. at 963-64. 6 that he could appeal the court’s refusal to depart downward. 3 In the absence of any controlling precedent, there is no plain error in this case. Indeed, there is no error at all. Le jarde-Rada does not identify any provision of Rule 11 explicitly or implicitly requiri ng a district court to inform a defendant that his appellate rights are limited by § 3742(a). See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11. Instead, the rule requires only that the district court ensure that a defendant is aware of the direct consequences of his plea. See United States v. Morse , 36 F.3d 1070, 1072 (11th Cir. 1994). “[T]he court need not explain the possible collateral consequences of a guilty plea.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see, e.g. , Holmes v. United States , 876 F.2d 1545, 1549 (11th Cir. 1989) (“[T]he requirements of Rule 11 do not encompass th e court’s failure to inform a defendant of his ineligibility for parole since parole eligibility is a collateral rather than a direct consequence of a guilty plea.”); United States v. Campbell , 778 F.2d 764, 767 (11th Cir. 1985) (noting that possible deportation is a colla teral consequence of a guilty plea that need not be explained to a defendant during his plea colloquy).7 The application of § 3742(a) and the restraints it places on review of downward departure decisions is at most a collateral consequence of a guilty plea, just as it is at most a collateral conseque nce of conviction after trial. Regardless of whether a defendant pleads guilty or is convi cted after trial, § 3742(a) applies. A guilty plea changes nothing about the operati on of that provision. So, Rule 11 does not require a court to inform a defendant about that provision or its effect on his right to appeal. Therefore, we find no error, and certa inly no plain error, with respect to Lejarde-Rada’s plea colloquy.
AFFIRMED.