## I L L I N O I S 

## O F F I C I A L 

## RE P O R T S Appellate Court

Moenning v. Union Pacific R.R. Co. , 2012 IL App (1st) 101866

Appellate Court Caption R I CHARD C. MOENNI NG, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNI ON PAC I FI C RAI L ROAD COMPANY, a Utah Corporation, COMMUTER RAI L DIVI SI ON, the Oper ation Division of th e R egional Transpor tation Authority , and RI CHA RD G LADKOWSKI , Def endants, and NORMAN J . L ERUM, Petiti oner- Appellee

.

District & N o. First District, F irst Division Docke t No. 1-10-1866

Filed Rehea ringdenied Fe bruar y 21, 2012 Marc h 20, 2012
Held (Not e: This syl lab us
con st i t ute s no par t of the opi nio n of the cour t but has bee n pre

par ed by the Repo r t er of D e c i s i o n s f

o r t h e
c o n v e n i e n c e o

f t h e
rea der

. ) In an action arising from the injuries plaint i ff s u ffered while disembarking from a car of a passeng er train, wher e the judgme nt enter ed for plainti ff wa s upheld on appea l and plaintiff’s trial counsel filed a petition to adjudicate his attorney ’s lien, the trial court’s order s granting the petition and deny

ing plaintiff’s m otion to rec onsider we re a ffirme d,

s i n ce plaintiff failed to file with the appellate court the repor t o f t h e proce eding s in the trial court on the petition to adjudicate or a by stander’ s repor t or an agree d statement of fac ts, and under those circ umstances, the order s would be p re s u med to be in confor mity with the law and have a sufficie nt fac tual basis.

Dec ision Under Review Appea l from the Circuit Court of Cook County , No. 04-L -8443; the Hon. Eileen Mar

y Br ewe r, Judge, pr esiding

.

J udg ment Affir med.Counsel on

Appea l Richard C. Moenning , of Chicag o, appellant pro se

.

Norman J

. L erum, P.C., of Chicag o (Norma n J

. L erum, of co u n sel), appellee pro se

.

Panel J USTI CE ROCHFORD delivere d t h e judgme nt of the court, with opinion. Presiding J ustice Hoffma n and J ustice Hall concur red in t h e j u dg ment and opinion.

OP INION

¶ 1 Plaintiff, Richard C. Moenning , an at to rney , brought this action ag ainst defe ndant, Union Pacific Railroad Company (Union Pacific) , fo r p er s onal injuries he suffe red while disembarking from a passeng er train car , which was off the platform. A t t o rn ey Norman J

. L erum repr esente d plaintiff in his pursuit of those claims in the trial court. Plaintiff now challeng es the circ uit court’s order s granting Mr. L erum’s petition to adjudicate his attorney s’s lien and de nying pla intiff’s motion to reconsider that order . We affir

m.

¶ 2 BA CKGROUND ¶ 3 In his co mp l ai n t , p laintiff raised claims of neg lige nce and wilful and wanton conduc t ag ainst Union Pacific. The cas e proce eded to trial. The trial court grante d defe ndant a direc ted verdic t on plaintiff’s wilful and wanton claim. On J une 29, 2007, the jury returne d

a ver dict in favor

of plaintiff in the amount of $125,000, after findingplaintiff was 50% at fault for his injuries. Plaintiff, in a combined motion, moved for a new trial and for sanctions pursuant to I llinois Supreme Court Rule 137 (I l l

. S

. Ct. R. 137 (ef f. Feb. 1, 1994)) ag ainst d e f e n d a n t f o r h a v in g denied it was neg lige nt. Plaintiff’s motions wer e denied. Plaintiff time ly appea led from the judgme nt enter ed on the jury verdic t and the order denying his combined posttrial motion and moti on for sa nctions. The notice of

appea l stated:
“B y this Appea l, the pl aintiff wi l l ask the Appellate C ourt to vacate and/or reve rse the jury ’s finding that the plaintiff was 50% con tributorily neg lige nt and then enter judgme nt in plaintiff’s favor for $250,000, the total a

mount of damag es which the jury found the plaintiff had suffe red as a proxi mate result of defe ndant Union Pacific Railroad Company ’s neg lige nce. The plaintiff also will ask th e Appellate Court to reve rse and

rema nd the denial of

his Motion for Sanctions Pursuant to S upreme Court Rule 137.
Alternatively , the plaintiff will ask that the Appellate Court vacate the jury ’s verdic t,
reve rse the afor ementioned J une 29, 2007, J udg ment, and rema nd this matter for a new

-2-trial on damag es only , or on all issues. Alternatively , the plaintiff will reque st such other and fur ther re lief as may

be dee med appr opriate.”
Def endant did not appea l the judgme nt. Plaintiff, in his brief on appea l, made two arguments: (1) the jury ’s finding as to his contributory neg lige nce was contra ry to the evidenc e; and (2) the trial court err ed in g ranting defe ndant a direc ted v er d i ct as to the wilful and wanton claim. We aff

irmed the judgme nt of the circ uit court on September 14, 2009. See Moenning

v. Union Pacific R.R. Co. , No. 1-08-0543 (2009) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). Plaintiff filed a petition for leave to appea l, which was denied on Marc h 24, 2010. Moenning v. Union Pacific R.R. , 236 I ll. 2d 508. The mandate from this court to the circ uit court issued on May

7, 2010. ¶ 4 On September 22, 2009, Mr. L erum, who had repr esente d plaintiff in the trial court but not on the appea l from the judgme nt on the persona l injury suit, filed a petition to adjudicate and enfor ce his attorney s lien pursuant to the Attorney s L ien Act (770 I L CS 5/1 (West 2010)). The petition attached a co p y of a signe d conting ency fee agree ment (agree ment), which provided that plaintiff a gree d “to pay and here by *** assign to N orman J

. L erum an amount equal to one-third (33 a %) of all monies rec overe d (gross rec overy ) befor e, during

or afte r trial, whether by suit, settlement or otherwise, exc luding any recov ery made during

or after an appeal or a retri a l

. ” (E mp h as is added.) Plaintiff also agree d to reimburse Mr. L erum for all expenses incurre d during the course of the l i t i g ation. The ag ree ment did not obligate Mr. L erum to represe nt plaintiff on any appea l. ¶ 5 In his pe tition, Mr. L erum alleg ed that he expended 341.5 hours in connec tion with the pursuit of plaintiff’s suit in the trial court and set forth, in de tail, the service s he perf ormed

on behalf of plaintiff, including: the prepa ration of pleading s, discovery and motions; court appea ranc es; and prepa

ration for and repr esentation of plaintiff at trial. The petition itemiz ed the unpaid litigation ex penses, whic h totaled $9,471.03. ¶ 6 Mr. L erum further alleg ed that, on J uly 13, 2007, a notice of attorney s lien (notice) was
serve d by cer

tified mail on Union Pacific at its Chicag o office , located at 101 North Wacker Drive, Room 1920. The notice was addre ssed to Thomas W. Cushing, an attorney in the law depar tment of Union Pacific. On J uly 18, 2007, the notice was acc epted by a signature of “M. Bove nza.” A copy of the notice and the cer tified mail r ece ipt wereattache d to the petition. Mr. L erum asser

ted that the not i ce was serve d on Union Pacific during his attorney-client relationship wit h plaintiff. ¶ 7 Plaintiff filed a response to Mr. L erum’s petition asser ting, g ener ally , that Mr. L erum had not properly perf

ecte d his lien, and, there fore , the circ uit cour t lacke d subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the lien. The trial court, afte r a hearing held on Dec ember 2, 2009, in a written order , g rante d the petition “in the amount of $51,137.69 plus a prop ortionate share of statutory interest from the entry of judgme nt.” The order included finding s that the service of the notice was prope r, and the notice wa s proper ly direc ted to Thomas Cushing, “an attorney and office r of the Union Pacific Railroad.” The rec ord on appea l does not contain a r eport of pr ocee dings or by stander’ s repor

t as to the Dec ember

2, 2009, hearing.

-3-¶ 8 In his motion to rec onsider, filed on J anuar y 4, 2010, plaintiff, for the first time, a sserted that the trial court was divested of ju ri sdiction to hear the petition to adjudicate the lien beca use his petition for leave to appea l as to the judgme nt in his persona l injury suit was still pending , and, there fore , the mandate had not yet issued. Plaintiff also argued the trial court had made “er

roneous finding s” and failed to make “nec essar y finding s” as to the sufficie ncy of the notice and petition. Finally , plaintiff contended the attorney-client rela tionship had terminated prior to the service of the notice, and the petition ha d failed to state the specific amount of the interest Mr. L erum had in the judgme nt. Plainti ff’ s motion t o rec onsider did not include evidentiary support. On Februa ry 3, 2 0 1 0, Mr. L erum filed his response to the motion for rec onsideration. ¶ 9 Howeve r, pl aintiff failed to notice his motion to rec onsider for heari n g wi t hin 90 day s of its filing, as provided in Circuit Court of Cook County Rule 2.3 (Cook Co. Cir. Ct. R. 2.3 (Jul y 1, 1976)). On April 11, 2010, Mr. L erum filed a motion to deny plaintiff’s motion for

rec onsideration for violation of Rule 2.3. In his response , plaintiff argued his ref usal to call his motion to rec onsider for h ea ri n g wa s j ustified on the ground that the circ uit court was without jurisdiction until the mandate from the appellate court as to the judgme nt on the jury verdic t was re turned. ¶ 10 After

hearing or al arguments on both moti ons, the trial cour t, on J une 4, 2010, grante d Mr. L erum’s motion to deny the motion for rec onsideration and denied plaintiff’s motion to
rec onsider. At that time, the mandate as to plaintiff’s origina l appea l had issued. ¶ 11 Plaintiff filed a notice of appe al from the Dece mber 2 , 2009, and J une 4, 2010, orde rs
on June 30, 2010. Plaintiff did not post an appea l bond and did not seek to stay enfor ceme nt of the orde rs pending

appea l. ¶ 12 On J uly 14, 2010, Union Pacific filed a motion for rele ase of judgmen t , s t at i n g i thad tender ed pay

ment of j u d g ment plus interest to both plaintiff and Mr. L erum on J une 24, 2010. Plaintiff declined the tender

. Union Pacific soug ht to terminate the running of statutory interest on the persona l injury judgme nt and to distribute the funds to the cler k of the circ uit court. Mr. L erum then filed a motion for turnover of funds ad j u d i cated to belong to him pursuant to the Dec ember 2, 2009, order

. This motion is not included in the rec ord on appea l. Howeve r, an unstamped cop y o f M r. L erum’s motion is included in the appendix of the appellee ’s brief

. ¶ 13 The circ uit court enter ed an order on July 21, 2010, which grante d Mr. L erum’s motion to enfor ce the Dec ember 2, 2009, order ; found that on June 24, 2010, Union P acific had made a proper tender as to the amounts owed to Mr. L erum and plaintiff including costs and interest; and authorized the pay ment of $64,931.48 by Union Pacific to Mr. L erum in full and final satisfac tion of all sums owing to him under the court order of Dec ember 2, 2009, and pay ment of $73,862.31 by Union Pacific to plaintiff in full and final satisfac tion of all sums owing to plaintiff under the verdic t. On Novemb er 9, 2010, the circ uit court corr ecte d the J uly 21, 2010, order to rea d that the s um payable to the clerk of the circuit court on behalf of plaintiff wa s $93,804.12.

-4-¶ 14 On ap p eal, plaintiff arg ues: (1) beca

use the mandate had not issued as to hi s o ri gi n al appea l, the circ uit c ourt was divested of jurisdiction on Dec ember 2, 2009, when it grante d the petition to adjudicate the at t o rn ey s l i en; and (2) Mr. L erum had failed to perf ect his attorney s lien, and, there fore , the trial court l ac k ed s ub j ect- matter jurisdiction to grant his petition. Mr. L erum, in turn, argues: (1) the Dec ember 2, 2009, and J anuar y 4, 2010, order s
wer e not final order s, and, there fore , this court lacks appellate jurisdiction; (2) the trial court had jurisdiction to consider the petition to adjudicate his attorney s lien, as it was a matter independe nt of and collater al to the judgme nt on appea l; and (3) the trial court properly held that the l ien had been perfec ted i n acc ordanc e with the Att orney s L ien Act and commit ted

no err or in the adjudication of his lien.

¶ 15 Attorney s L iens ¶ 16 Be fo re ad dre s s i n g the issues raised by the parties, we will examine the nature of a n attorney s lien and proce dures relating to the enfor ceme nt and adjud ication of an attorney s lien under the Attorney s L ien Act. ¶ 17 Where, as here , there is an agr eeme nt as t o fee s, the Attorney s L ien Act “ provides that attorney s ‘shall have a lien upon all claims’ pursued on behalf of their clients for the amount of any fee s agree d upon by the attorney and client.” Kovitz Shifrin Nesbit, P.C. v. Rossiello , 3 9 2 I l l

. App. 3d 1059, 1064 (2009) (quoting 770 I L CS 5/1 (West 2006)). The attorney i s require d to perf

ect the lien by servingwritten notice of the l ien on the party ag ainst whom the claim is made. Id

. “The lien attache s to any mo ney or property rec overe d in the m atter upon the dispositi on of the claim.” Id

. Thus, once notice of the lien is serve d, “ ‘the attorney in eff ect become s a joint claimant with his client *** in the proce eds of any settlement that may be made by the client, and to the ex tent of the amount of hi s fee has the same interest in such proceeds *** as hi s client and is entitled to his pro rata share there of.’ ” People v

. Philip Morris, Inc. , 198 I ll. 2d 87, 97-98 (2001) (quoting Bake r v. Bake r , 258 I ll. 418, 421 (1913))

. The notice of lien informs the party of the claim and prohibits resolution of the suit or cla im in dis reg ard of

the lien. Kovitz Shifr in , 392 I ll. App. 3d at 1064. ¶ 18 To enfor ce the lien, “the attorney must file a petition in a court of competent jurisdiction to ‘adjudicate the rights of the parties.’ ” Id

. (quoting 770 I L CS 5/1 (West 2006)). Once the petition is filed, the court must hold a hearing within five day s and hear evidenc e related to the service s rende red by the attorney and deter mine the rights of the parties. Id

. at 1064. The circ uit court that hear d the under lying matter or ha s jurisdiction over the recove red money is a court of competent jurisdiction to adjudicate a lien. Philip Morris, Inc ., 198 I ll. 2d at 95. ¶ 19 At the hearing on the petition, the attorney has the burden to make a primafacie showing that there has been compliance with the Attorney s L ien Act. Kovitz Shifrin , 392 I ll. App. 3d at 1064. The court must hear evidenc e as to the service s rende red by the attorney and decide the rights of the par

ties. Id

.

-5-¶ 20 Circuit Court J urisdiction

¶ 21 P l ai n t i ff argues the circ uit court was divested of jurisdiction to adjudicate t h e l i en beca use the mandate as to his a ppeal from the persona l injury judgme nt ha d not yet issued. We disag ree

. ¶ 22 A timely notice of appea l “vests jur i s d i ct i o n i n th e appellate court in order to permit revie w of the judgme nt such that it may be aff irmed, reve rsed, or modified.” Gene ral Motors Corp. v. Pappas , 242 I ll. 2d 163, 173 (2011). Upon the fi l i n g o f t he noti ce of appea l, “the

cause of action is beyond the jurisdiction of the circ uit court.” Id

. Howeve r, the circ uit court reta ins jurisdiction to decide matters that are independe nt of or collater al or incidental to the judgme nt. Id. at 173-74; W ierzbicki v. Gleason , 388 I ll. App. 3d 921, 926 (2009). “Collatera l

or supplemental matters i n cl u d e t hose lying outside the issues in the appea l or arising

s ub s eq u en t t o delivery of the judgme nt appea led from.” Town of Libertyville v. Bank of W aukegan , 152 I ll. App. 3d 1066, 1073 (1987). Thus, we must deter mine whether the circ uit court was divested of juris d i ct i o n t o hear the petition to adjudicate the attorney s lien, or whether this matter was incidental or collater al to or independe nt of the judgme nt on appea l. ¶ 23 We find our s up reme court’s rece nt decision i n Gene ral Motors Corp. to be helpful to this analy sis. In that case , the Cook County tax collector (collec tor) re ache d agree ments in

cer tain tax valuation objection case s which require d the ref und of overpa id taxes plus interest

as set forth in section 23-20 of the Property Tax Code. 35 I L CS 200/23-20 (West 2006). At the t ime th e t ax es we re paid, section 23-20 provided for a 5% interest rate on tax ref unds. Gene ral Motors Corp. , 242 I ll. 2d at 168. Howeve r, sec tion 23-20 was ame nded, ef fec tive J anuar y 1, 2006, to provide that the rate of interest should be the lesser of a rate based on the Consumer Price Index (CPI ) or a flat 5% rate

. Id

. at 167. The collector paid the settlements based on the then-lowe r CPI rate

. Id

. at 168. Plaintiffs filed a motion to enfor ce the judgme nts reque sting interest at the 5% rate , which was applicable at the time the taxes wer e paid. Id

. The circuit co u rt order ed that interest be paid at a rate of 5% from the date of t he tax pay ments through Dec ember 31, 2005, and at the CPI rate from J anuar y 1, 2006, forwa

rd. Id

. The collector filed notices of appea l in the case s seeking to vacate the parts of the order s requiringpay

ment of 5% inter est. Id

. at 169. The c ollector a lso filed motions i n the circ uit court to stay the pay

ments to the obj ector s of the 5% interest u n d er section 23-20 pending appea l. Id

. ¶ 24 The trial court stayed that portion of its order s requir i n g t h e p aym en t o f 5% intere st pending appea l, but order ed, in eac h case , that plaintif f was “ ‘entitled to the pay ment of judgme nt interest at the rate of 6% per annum pursuant to [section 2-1301 of the Code of Civil Procedure] o n t h e am ount of interest stayed and not paid to Plaintiff pending the outcome of any appea l, from the date of final judgme nt ordering a proper ty tax ref und in this matter, through the date theadditional interest is paid to Plaintiff.’ ” Id. ¶ 25 The supreme court found the circ uit court had jurisdiction to awa rd judgme nt interest as it was a matter collater al to the judgme nts on appea l. Id

. at 175. The court noted that the trial court’s o rder “did not aff ect or alter the issue from which the collector filed her notices of appea l.” Id

.

-6-¶ 26 In t h i s ca s e, p l ai n t i ff h ad filed a notice of appea l from the judgme nt enter ed in his

persona l injury suit and the denial of his posttrial and sanctions motions. In his brief, plaintiff argued error as to the j ury ’s findi ng that he was 50% at fault a n d th e directed verdict as to his wilful and wanton claim. The petition to adjudicate the attorney s lien did not addre ss these issues or challeng e the judgme nt, which was subject to the earlier notice of appea l. The circ uit court’s order s g ranting the petition t o adjudicate the attorney s lien and denying the motion to reconsider did not af fec t or alter the issues that were then on appe al. ¶ 27 Fur

thermore , the petition to adjudicate the lien was not pending at the time plaintiff filed his notice of appea l from the orig inal judgme nt. We find Town of Libertyville and Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. W

hitehall Convalescent &Nursing Home, Inc. , 321 I ll. App. 3d 879 (2001), instructive as to this point. In Town of Libertyville , the trial court dismiss ed the complaint for condemnation and the Town of L iberty ville appea led. Town of Liberty vi l l e , 152 I ll. App. 3d at 1067-68. After the notice of appea l was filed, defe ndant soug ht attorney fee s and costs under section 7-123(a) of the Code of Civil Procedur e (I ll. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, ¶ 7-123(a )), which authori z ed s u ch pay ment to a succe ssful defe ndant in a condemnation action. Town of Libertyville , 152 I ll. App. 3d at 1068, 1072. The circ uit court
was found not to have been divested of jurisdiction to consider defe ndant’s motion for fee s and costs, while the c ondemnation judg ment was a ppeale d, for these rea sons: “He re, attorney fee s and costs wer e soug ht pursuant to section 7-123(a ) and application could not be made there under until final judgme nt in the condemnation suit. The application for these fee s and costs lies outside the issues in the underly ing judgme nt and there is no time se t in section 7-123(a ) for seeking these expenses. Moreove r, a litigant may wish either to wait unt il the appeal process ends before fi l i n g an application or t o proce ed at a

time after

the judg ment is entere d. Acc ording ly , the notice of appea l from the final judgme nt in the condemnation proce eding did not deprive the trial co u rt of jurisdiction to hear the collater al or supplemental matter of fe es and costs pursuant to section 7-123(a).” Town of Libertyville , 152 I ll. App. 3d at 1073 (citing Hise v. Hull , 116 I ll. App. 3d 681, 684-85 (1983) (a petition for attorney fee s pursuant to section 2-611 of the Code of Civil Procedur e then in eff ect (I ll. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 110, ¶ 2-611) brought

as a separ ate ac t i o n afte r a dismiss al would not impact appea l from dismiss al), In re Estate of Trampenau , 88 I ll. App. 3d 690, 698 (1980) (whe re court noted that a trial court may not lose jurisdiction to hear a petition for attorney fee s under section 41 of the Civil Practice Act (I ll. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 110, ¶ 41) afte r the filing of a notice of appea l), and Chicago Titl e & Trust Co. v. Czubak, 67 I ll. App. 3d 184, 185 (1 9 7 8 ) (t ri al court had jurisdiction to hear sec tion 41 petition for attorney fee s that did not affe ct the appe al)). ¶ 28 The trial court, in Hartford Fire In s u ra n ce Co ., found Har tford did not have a duty

to defe nd or indemnify its insured in a suit alleg ing improper billing. Hartford Fire Insurance Co. , 321 I ll. App. 3d at 884. After the insured f iled a notice of

appea l, Hartfor d moved for reimburse ment of the fee s and costs relating to the defe nse of the underly ing suit ag ainst its insured. Id

. The appellate court found the trial co u rt had jurisdi ction to hear the m otion as it had no bearing on the judgme nt as to the decla ratory action and was not pending at the time the ruling was made or the appea l taken. Id. at 887 (citin g wi t h ap p roval Physicians

-7-Insurance Exc hange v. Jennings , 316 I ll. App. 3d 443, 452 (2000) (whe re court found motion

for costs pursuant to section 5-109 of the Code of Civil Procedur e (735 I L CS 5/5-109 (West 1998)) was co l l at er al to orig inal judgme nt as it did not direc tly challeng e or bear on that judgme nt and did not modify the judg ment)). ¶ 29 Simi larly , Mr. L erum brought his petition to adjudicate his lien and deter mine his right to a share of the jury verdic t a fter the notice of appea l from that verdic t had been filed. The Attorney s L ien Act does not set forth a time for bringing a pe t i tion to adjudicate , but does

re qu i re a hearing on the petition within five day s of its filing. A hearing on a petitio n t o adjudicate an attorney s lien relates to whether there has been compliance with the Attorney s L ien Act and the scope of the service s provided. We note that under the agree ment, Mr. L erum was not entitled to fee s based on “any rec overy made during or afte r an appea l or retria l.” Mr. L erum’s petition to adjudicate his lien did not impact the issues that then wer e
on appea l–whether the jury ’s finding of contributory neg lige nce and the entry of a direc ted verdic t on the wilful and wanton claim wer e proper

. The circ uit court, which had hear d the persona l injury suit, was a court of competent jurisdiction to hear the petition ( Phillip Morris , 198 I ll. 2d at 95) and was not dive sted of jurisdiction by plaintiff’s earlier notice of appea l.

¶ 30 Appellate Jurisdiction ¶ 31 Mr. L erum asser ts this court is without jurisdiction to consider the trial court’s order s of December 2, 2009, and J une 4, 2010, as these order s wer e not final and appea lab l e. W e disagree

. ¶ 32 The order of Dec ember 2, 2009, grante d the petition to adjudicate the attorney s lien and fully deter

mined the rights of the parties as to this issue and claim. The Dec ember 2, 2009, order was a final order subject to appea l. See Hartford Fire Insurance Co. , 321 I ll. App. 3d at 885 (“A final order or judgme nt is a deter mination by the court on the issues prese nted by the pleading s which asce rtains and fix es absolutely t h e rights of the parties to the litigation.”)

. Supreme Court Rule 303(a) (1), which g overns appea ls from final judgme nts in civil case s, provides in rele vant par t: “The notice of appea l must be filed with the cler k of the circ uit court within 30 day s afte r the entry of the final judgme nt appea led from, or, if a timely po s t t ri al m o tion direc ted ag ainst the judgme nt is filed, whether in a jury or a nonjury case , within 30 day s afte r the entry of the order disposing of the last pending postjudgment motion direc ted ag ainst that judgme nt or order

***.” I ll. S. C t. R. 303(a)(1) (ef f. May 30, 2008). Plaintiff timely filed a motion to rec onsider the Dec ember 2, 2009, order and then filed his appea l w ithin 30 day s afte r the denial of his motion to rec onsider, in compliance with Rule 303(a) (1). Id. ¶ 33 M r

. L e r

u m, howeve r, argues the subsequent motions–hi s motion to e n f o rc e th eD e c e mb e r 2, 2009, order , and Union Pacific’ s motion for rele ase of judgme nt–made plaintiff’s appea l from the De cembe r 2, 2009, orde r, af ter the de nial of the motion to reconside r, pre mature.

-8-¶ 34 For a motion in a nonjury matter to qualify as a posttrial motion, which tolls the time for

taking an appea l within the meaning of Supreme Court Rule 303(a) (1), the movant must reque st one o r more of the ty pes of relief set forth in section 2-1203 of the Code of Civil Procedur e. 735 I L CS 5/2-1203 (West 2010); Haye s Machine ry Move rs, Inc. v. REO Move rs & Van Lines, Inc. , 338 I ll. Ap p. 3d 443, 445 (2003). Section 2-1203(a ), which g overns postjudgment motions in nonjury case s, states:
“In all case s tried without a jury , any party may , within 3 0 day s afte r the entry of the judgme nt or within any further time th e court may allow within the 30 day s or any extensions there of, file a motion for a rehe aring , o r a retria l, or modification of the judgme nt or to vaca

te the judgme nt or for other relief .” 735 I L CS 5/2-1203(a) (West 2010).
The “other relief

” languag e in section 2-1203(a ) has been interpre ted to mean relief simil ar in nature to the other forms of reli ef s p ec i fi ca l ly set forth in that section. R& G, Inc. v. Midwest Region Foundation for Fair Contracting, Inc ., 351 I ll. App. 3d 318, 321 (2004). ¶ 35 Mr. L erum’s motion rela ting to enfor ceme nt of the Dec ember 2, 2009, order and Union Pacific’ s motion for rele ase of judgme nt did not, in any way , attack or challeng e the Dec ember 2, 2009, order

. These motions did not co n s titute postjudgment motions under section 2-1203( a) and, there fore , did not toll the time for f iling a notice of appe al from the Dec ember 2, 2009, order

. See Jame s v. Lifeline Mobile Medic s , 341 I l l

. App. 3d 451, 455 (2003) (ap p ea l did not divest trial court of jurisdiction to hear enfor ceme nt issues). As plaintiff’s notice of

appea l was timely

filed, we have jurisdiction to hear this appea l.

¶ 36 Trial Court’s Rulings a s to the Attorney s L ien ¶ 37 Be fore deciding the petition to adjudicate the lien, the trial court held a hearing and then found the lien was perf

ecte d properly

. The trial court further found that Thomas Cushing was
an office r of Union Pacific and service of the lien was properly direc ted to him. Finally , the trial court deter

mined the amount of fee s and costs owed to Mr. L erum, pursuant to the lien. Plaintiff argues the trial court err ed in deciding the lien was properly perf ecte d and, there fore , lacke d subject-matter

jurisdiction. ¶ 38 As the appellant, plaintiff “has the burden of presentin g a sufficiently complete r ecor d of th e proce eding s *** to support a claim of err or.” Midstate Siding & W indow Co. v. Rogers , 204 I ll. 2d 314, 319 (2003) (citing Foutch v. O’Bry ant , 99 I ll. 2d 389, 391-92 (1984))

. In the absenc e of a complete rec o rd , a revie wing court presumes that the order enter ed by

the trial cour

t was in confor

mity with the law and ha d a sufficie nt fac tual basis. Foutch , 99 I ll. 2d at 392. “In fac t, when the rec ord on appea l is incomplete, a revie wing court should actua lly ‘indulg e in ever y rea sonable presumption favor able to the judgme nt from which the appea l is taken, including that the trial court ruled or acte d corr ectly .’ ” Smolinski

v. Vojta , 363 I ll. App. 3d 752, 757-58 (2006) (quoting People v. Majer , 131 I ll. App. 3d 80, 84 (1985))

.

-9-¶ 39 Plaintiff failed to file t he report of the procee dings in the c ourt below a s to the hearing

on the petition to adjudicate or, in the absenc e of such a repor t, a by stander’ s repor

t or agree d statement of fac ts pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 323(c)

. I ll. S. Ct. R. 323(c) (ef f. Dec

. 13, 2005). We do not have a rec ord of the issues that wer e addre ssed or the arg ument s and evidenc e that wer e p resented or considere d by the trial court in granting the petition to adjudicate the lien and in making its finding that the lien was properly perf ecte d. Under these circ umstances, and based on the rec ord on appea l, we cannot conclude that the trial court’s Dec ember

2, 2009, order

was in er ror. ¶ 40 Plaintiff also appea ls from the deni al o f h i s m otion to rec onsider the granting of the petition to adjudicate

. The motion challeng ed the circ uit court’s application of the Attorney s L ien Act to the fac ts, and raised new arguments and leg al theories, including argument that the trial court wa s d i v ested of jurisdiction. Following a hearing, the trial court denied plaintiff’s motion for

rec onsideration, stating : “You violated c erta in court rules, 2.3, when you failed to schedule a hearing for your motion within 90 day s. It’s also denied for the same
re as ons as I denied your orig inal motion and it is clea r to me that these mat t er s ar e collater al–which are befor e me now, are collater al and incidental to the merits of the case .” As discussed, plaintiff failed to include the repor t of the proce eding s or a by stander’ s repor t of the Dec ember 2 hearing on the petition to adjudicate the lien, and there fore we do not have

a rec ord of the issues that wer e addre ssed, or the arguments and evidenc e that wer e prese nted

or considere d by the trial court when granting the petition to adjudicate the lien and making its finding that the lien was properly perf ecte d. As the denial of the motion to rec onsider was based in pa

rt on the same a

rguments and evidence at the Dec ember 2 hearing that plaintiff failed to incorpora

te in the appellate rec ord, we must presume the order of the trial court denying the motion fo r rec onsideration was in “conf ormity with law and had a sufficie nt fac tual basis.” Foutch , 99 I ll. 2d at 391-92.

¶ 41 CONCLUSI ON ¶ 42 Acc ording ly , we aff i rm t h e tri al co urt ’s o rd er s granting Mr. L erum’s petition to adjudicate the lien and de nying pla intiff’s motion to reconsider that order

.

¶ 43 Affir

med.

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