[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 20-13893

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 1:08-cr-00014-AW-GRJ-2

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

 versus

BRANDON TERELL STEVENSON, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Florida

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(May 28, 2021)

Before NEWSOM, BRASHER, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Brandon Stevenson appeals the district court’s order denying his motion to 

reduce his sentence under Section 404(b) of the First Step Act of 2018. Pub. L. 115-

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391, § 404, 132 Stat. 5194, 5222 (2018). He argues that the district court erred in 

concluding that it did not have the authority to reduce his sentence because his 

multi-drug conspiracy conviction was not a covered offense under Section 404(b). 

Additionally, he contests the district court’s alternative holding that, even if it had 

authority to reduce his sentence, it would not do so.

We review de novo whether a district court had the authority to modify a term 

of imprisonment. United States v. Jones, 962 F.3d 1290, 1296 (11th Cir. 2020). We 

review the district court’s denial of an eligible movant’s request for abuse of 

discretion. Id. A district court abuses its discretion when it applies the incorrect legal 

standard, makes clearly erroneous factual findings, or commits a clear error of 

judgment. United States v. Harris, 989 F.3d 908, 912 (11th Cir. 2021) (citations 

omitted).

Just over ten years ago, Congress reduced the sentencing disparity between 

crack and powder cocaine offenses through the Fair Sentencing Act. Pub. L. No. 

111-220, § 404, 124 Stat. 2372, 2372–73 (2010); see Dorsey v. United States, 567 

U.S. 260, 268–69 (2012). Specifically, Section 2 of the Fair Sentencing Act changed 

the quantity of crack cocaine necessary to trigger a 10-year mandatory minimum 

from 50 grams to 280 grams and the quantity necessary to trigger a 5-year mandatory 

minimum from 5 grams to 28 grams. Fair Sentencing Act § 2(a)(1)–(2); see also 21 

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U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii), (B)(iii). Those amendments did not apply retroactively. 

United States v. Berry, 701 F.3d 374, 377 (11th Cir. 2012). 

The First Step Act changed that. It made those amended statutory penalties 

apply retroactively if a pre-Fair-Sentencing-Act defendant had committed a covered 

offense. See First Step Act § 404. Under Section 404(b) of the First Step Act, a court 

“that imposed a sentence for a covered offense may . . . impose a reduced sentence 

as if sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act . . . were in effect at the time the 

covered offense was committed.” Id. at § 404(b). The statute defines “covered 

offense” as “a violation of a Federal criminal statute, the statutory penalties for 

which were modified by section 2 or 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act . . . , that was 

committed before August 3, 2010.” Id. at § 404(a). The First Step Act further 

provides that “[n]othing in this section shall be construed to require a court to reduce 

any sentence pursuant to this section.” Id. at § 404(c).

In United States v. Taylor, 982 F.3d 1295 (11th Cir. 2020), we held that “the 

First Step Act’s definition of a ‘covered offense’ covers a multidrug conspiracy 

offense that includes both a crack-cocaine element and another drug-quantity 

element.” 982 F.3d at 1300. We then noted that Taylor’s specific offense was 

“conspiring to possess with intent to distribute at least 5 kilograms of powder 

cocaine and at least 50 grams of crack cocaine” and concluded that “his offense 

[was] a covered offense.” Id. at 1301.

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Similarly, Stevenson was convicted of conspiring to possess with intent to 

distribute at least 5 kilograms of powder cocaine and at least 50 grams of crack 

cocaine before the Fair Sentencing Act became effective. After Taylor, it is clear 

that Stevenson’s offense is a covered offense under Section 404(b) and that the 

district court erred in concluding otherwise. See Taylor, 982 F.3d at 1300–01.

Even so, a district court is never required to reduce a defendant’s sentence 

under Section 404(b). Jones, 962 F.3d at 1304. It has “wide latitude” in deciding 

whether to exercise its discretion to reduce a sentence. Id. The court may consider 

the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors, as well as any other information relevant 

to its decision, including “its previous findings regarding the quantities of crack and 

powder cocaine involved in the conspiracy, and the fact that the powder cocaine 

element of [the defendant’s] offense still triggers the highest tier of statutory 

penalties.” Taylor, 982 F.3d at 1302; see Jones, 962 F.3d at 1301, 1304. And if we

can discern from the record that the district court would decline to exercise its 

discretion to award a sentence reduction, then remand would be futile and is not 

required. See United States v. Hersh, 297 F.3d 1233, 1250–54 (11th Cir. 2002). 

Here, the district court alternatively held that it would not reduce Stevenson’s 

sentence even if it had the authority to do so. In explaining its alternative holding, 

the district court analyzed the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. It noted Stevenson’s 

rehabilitative efforts but concluded that those efforts were insufficient to warrant a 

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reduction in light of other circumstances, such as Stevenson’s criminal history and 

the significant amount of drugs involved in the conspiracy. See Taylor, 982 F.3d at 

1302; Jones, 962 F.3d at 1301, 1304. It also noted that the President had commuted 

Stevenson’s sentence from life imprisonment to 210 months, which would be the 

low-end of his recommended Guidelines range if it were recalculated today. 

The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to reduce 

Stevenson’s sentence. See Jones, 962 F.3d at 1304. The district court did not apply 

the wrong legal standard, fail to follow proper procedure, or make a clear error of 

judgment. See Diveroli v. United States, 803 F.3d 1258, 1262 (11th Cir. 2015).

Because the district court provided a reasoned explanation for its decision, a remand 

for further consideration would be futile. See Hersh, 297 F.3d at 1250–54. 

AFFIRMED.

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