Illinois Official Reports 

Appellate Court

Copes v. Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter R.R. Corp.,

2015 IL App (1st) 150432

Appellate Court 

Caption

CHARLETHA COPES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NORTHEAST 

ILLINOIS REGIONAL COMMUTER RAILROAD 

CORPORATION, d/b/a Metra, Defendant-Appellee.

District & No. First District, Sixth Division

Docket No. 1-15-0432

Filed December 4, 2015

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 13-L-11946; the 

Hon. James N. O’Hara, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed.

Counsel on

Appeal

Law Office of John Bishof, P.C., of Chicago (John S. Bishof, Jr., of 

counsel), for appellant.

Metra Law Department, of Chicago (Sue-Ann Rosen, General 

Counsel, and Stephen G. Goins, of counsel), for appellee.

Panel PRESIDING JUSTICE ROCHFORD delivered the judgment of the 

court, with opinion.

Justices Hall and Delort concurred in the judgment and opinion.
- 2 - 

 OPINION 

¶ 1 The instant personal injury suit, filed by plaintiff-appellant, Charletha Copes, against 

defendant-appellee, the Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter Railroad Corporation, d/b/a 

Metra (NIRCRC), was dismissed for having been untimely filed beyond the one-year statute of 

limitations period contained in section 5.03 of the Regional Transportation Authority Act (Act) 

(70 ILCS 3615/5.03 (West 2012)). Plaintiff has appealed, contending that the limitations 

period contained in section 5.03 applies only to actions brought against the Regional 

Transportation Authority (Authority) itself, and it therefore does not bar plaintiff’s instant suit 

against NIRCRC. For the following reasons, we affirm. 

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND 

¶ 3 On October 29, 2013, plaintiff filed this action, identifying NIRCRC as “a corporation 

[which] provided rail passenger service within the territory serviced by the Regional 

Transportation Authority, including the county of Cook, State of Illinois.” Plaintiff sought 

damages for injuries she sustained on or about December 2, 2011, when she allegedly slipped 

and fell on a wet and icy platform while attempting to board a train at the Stony Island Metra 

train station. Plaintiff further alleged that NIRCRC owned, operated, and maintained the Stony 

Island station, which is a stop on the Metra Electric District line. 

¶ 4 NIRCRC responded to plaintiff’s suit by filing a motion to dismiss, pursuant to section 

2-619(a)(5) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(5) (West 2012)). In 

its motion, NIRCRC stated that its “true and proper name is the Northeast Illinois Regional 

Commuter Railroad Corporation, d/b/a METRA.” NIRCRC further asserted that it was 

organized under the Act (70 ILCS 3615/1.01 et seq. (West 2012)), which includes a one-year 

statute of limitations (70 ILCS 3615/5.03 (West 2012)). NIRCRC also maintained that, as a 

public entity, it was protected by the one-year statute of limitations contained in the Local 

Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Immunity Act) (745 ILCS 

10/8-101 (West 2012)). NIRCRC argued that plaintiff’s suit–filed on October 29, 2013, with 

respect to an incident occurring on or about December 2, 2011–was untimely under the 

applicable limitations periods of both the Act and the Immunity Act. 

¶ 5 Plaintiff responded to the motion to dismiss by arguing that the limitations provision of the 

Act applied only to actions against the Authority and that the Immunity Act did not cover suits 

against public entities which operate as a common carrier. See 745 ILCS 10/2-101 (West 

2012). Rather, plaintiff maintained that her action was timely filed within the general two-year 

statute of limitations period applicable to personal injury suits. See 735 ILCS 5/13-202 (West 

2012). 

¶ 6 In reply, NIRCRC argued that section 5.03 of the Act was applicable because it was 

organized under the Act and, pursuant to section 2.20(a)(x) of the Act, “the same exemptions, 

restrictions and limitations as are provided by law with regard to the Authority shall apply to 

[NIRCRC].” 70 ILCS 3615/2.20(a)(x) (West 2012).

¶ 7 On May 13, 2014, the circuit denied the motion to dismiss, finding that: (1) the one-year 

statute of limitations provision of the Act applied only to the Authority and not to NIRCRC; 

and (2) the one-year statute of limitations contained in the Immunity Act did not apply to 
- 3 - 

NIRCRC “while operating as a common carrier.” The circuit court denied NIRCRC’s motion 

to reconsider the denial of its motion to dismiss on August 29, 2014. 

¶ 8 On October 1, 2014, NIRCRC filed a second motion to dismiss pursuant to section 

2-619(a)(5) of the Code, arguing only that plaintiff’s suit was untimely under the one-year 

statute of limitations contained in the Act. NIRCRC again maintained that, because it was 

organized under the Act and section 2.20(a)(x) of the Act states that “the same exemptions, 

restrictions and limitations” (id.) which apply to the Authority also apply to it, the one-year 

statute of limitations set forth in section 5.03 of the Act applied to this case and barred 

plaintiff’s action. In a written order entered on January 14, 2015, the circuit court granted 

NIRCRC’s motion to dismiss after finding that–pursuant to the language contained in section 

2.20(a)(x) of the Act–the one-year statute of limitations contained in the Act applied to this 

action. Plaintiff timely appealed the circuit court’s dismissal order.

¶ 9 II. ANALYSIS 

¶ 10 On appeal, plaintiff concedes that her suit was not filed within the one-year statute of 

limitations set forth in section 5.03 of the Act, arguing instead that the limitations provision 

contained therein covers only the Authority, and not NIRCRC. We disagree, and therefore 

affirm the circuit court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint.

¶ 11 Under section 2-619(a)(5) of the Code, the circuit court may dismiss a complaint which is 

“not commenced within the time limited by law.” 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(5) (West 2012). We 

review the dismissal of a complaint on limitations grounds de novo. Ferguson v. City of 

Chicago, 213 Ill. 2d 94, 99 (2004). 

¶ 12 Further, this appeal requires us to construe the meaning of certain provisions of the Act. 

The rules applicable to this task are well-established, and were recently outlined in Hendricks 

v. Board of Trustees of the Police Pension Fund, 2015 IL App (3d) 140858, ¶ 14: 

“The fundamental rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the 

intent of the legislature. [Citation.] The most reliable indicator of that intent is the 

language of the statute itself. [Citation.] In determining the plain meaning of statutory 

language, a court will consider the statute in its entirety, the subject the statute 

addresses, and the apparent intent of the legislature in enacting the statute. [Citations.] 

If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, it must be applied as written, 

without resorting to further aids of statutory interpretation. [Citation.] A court may not 

depart from the plain language of the statute and read into it exceptions, limitations, or 

conditions that are not consistent with the express legislative intent. [Citation.]”

¶ 13 However, “[w]hen a statute is ambiguous, we look to aids of statutory construction, 

including legislative history.” BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP v. Mitchell, 2014 IL 116311, 

¶ 38. We review questions of statutory construction de novo. Feltmeier v. Feltmeier, 207 Ill. 2d 

263, 267 (2003). 

¶ 14 While our analysis might well begin with the plain language of section 5.03 itself, we first 

place the language of section 5.03 into context by discussing the history of the Act and certain 

related statutory provisions. 

¶ 15 The Act was first enacted in 1973, and provided for the creation of “a regional 

transportation authority to furnish public transportation services, facilities and funding in the 

six northeastern counties of Cook, Du Page, Kane, Lake, McHenry and Will,” upon the success 
- 4 - 

of a 1974 referendum approving that action. Hoogasian v. Regional Transportation Authority, 

58 Ill. 2d 117, 120 (1974); Pace v. Regional Transportation Authority, 346 Ill. App. 3d 125, 

129 (2003). The need for the creation of such a regional authority was due, in large part, to the 

“grave financial condition” of public transportation facilities in northeastern Illinois. Pub. Act 

78-5, § 1.02(a)(iii) (eff. Dec. 12, 1973) (adding 70 ILCS 3615/1.02(a)(iii)). The referendum 

approving the Act was found constitutional in Hoogasian, 58 Ill. 2d at 137. The Authority is a 

unit of local government. Pace, 346 Ill. App. 3d at 129; 70 ILCS 3615/1.04 (West 2012) 

(“Upon its establishment the Authority shall be a unit of local government, body politic, 

political subdivision and municipal corporation.”). Among the many powers granted to the 

Authority is the power to “sue and be sued.” 70 ILCS 3615/2.20(a)(i) (West 2012).

¶ 16 The Act, both as originally enacted and pursuant to amendments passed very shortly after 

the referendum, authorized the Authority to establish, by ordinance, a “separate public 

corporation to be known as the Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter Railroad Corporation” 

(i.e., the defendant here). Pub. Act 78-5, § 2.20(a)(xii) (eff. Dec. 12, 1973) (adding 70 ILCS 

3615/1.02(a)(xii)). NIRCRC was defined as a “separate operating unit to operate on behalf of 

the [Authority] commuter railroad facilities, subject at all times to the supervision and 

direction of the [Authority].” Id. At the time, NIRCRC was governed by the board of directors 

of the Authority. Id. The Act also stated that NIRCRC had very nearly all the powers given the 

Authority with regard to the operation of railroad facilities as were delegated by the Authority, 

including the power to sue and be sued but not including the power of eminent domain, and 

that “the same exemptions, restrictions and limitations as are provided by law with regard to 

the Authority shall apply to [NIRCRC].” Id. Finally, the Act designated NIRCRC as a 

“transportation agency as provided in this Act except for purposes of paragraph (e) of Section 

3.01 of this Act.” Id.

1

¶ 17 As originally enacted, the Act also provided that all civil actions for personal injury or 

death against “the Authority” must be commenced within one year from the date the action 

accrued. Pub. Act 78-5, § 5.03 (eff. Dec. 12, 1973) (adding 70 ILCS 3615/5.03). In an 

amendment added shortly following the passage of the referendum, that limitation period was 

lengthened to two years. Pub. Act 78-1267, § 1 (eff. Dec. 30, 1974) (amending Ill. Rev. Stat. 

1973, ch. 1112/3, ¶ 705.03).2

¶ 18 Due to recurring financial deficits in the operations of public transportation facilities in the 

area covered by the Authority, the Act was amended in 1983 to provide for additional state 

financial aid and to create “operating division[s]” within the Authority, including the 

commuter rail division (70 ILCS 3615/3B.01 (West 2012)), and the suburban bus division (70 

ILCS 3615/3A.01 (West 2012)). See 70 ILCS 3615/1.02(b) (West 2012); Pace, 346 Ill. App. 

 

1

Paragraph (e) of section 3.01 originally provided that no member of the Authority’s board of 

directors “shall, while serving as such, be an officer, a member of the Board of Directors or Trustees or 

an employee of any Service Board or transportation agency, or be an employee of the State of Illinois or 

any department or agency thereof, or of any municipality, county, or any other unit of local government 

or receive any compensation from any elected or appointed office under the Constitution and laws of 

Illinois.” Pub. Act 78-5, § 3.01(e) (eff. Dec. 12, 1973) (adding 70 ILCS 3615/3.01(e)). 

2As we will discuss more fully below, section 5.03 of the Act was subsequently amended again to 

return the limitations period to one year. Pub. Act 89-109, § 5 (eff. Jan. 1, 1996) (amending 70 ILCS 

3615/5.03 (West 1994)). 
- 5 - 

3d at 129; Stroger v. Regional Transportation Authority, 201 Ill. 2d 508, 513 (2002).3 As 

relevant here, section 3B.01 of the Act specifically states that “[t]here is established within the 

Authority the Commuter Rail Division as the operating division responsible for providing 

public transportation by commuter rail.” (Emphasis added.) 70 ILCS 3615/3B.01 (West 2012).

¶ 19 The commuter rail (70 ILCS 3615/3B.02 (West 2012)) and suburban bus (70 ILCS 

3615/3A.02 (West 2012)) divisions have separate governing boards, or “Service Boards,” 

which have the responsibility for providing and operating their respective transportation 

systems. Pace, 346 Ill. App. 3d at 129; 70 ILCS 3615/2.01(a), 1.03 (West 2012). The 1983 

amendments “also designated as a service board the governing board of the Chicago Transit 

Authority (CTA),” which has existed since 1945 pursuant to the Metropolitan Transit 

Authority Act. Pace, 346 Ill. App. 3d at 129 (citing 70 ILCS 3605/1 et seq. (West 2000)).

¶ 20 The service boards “determine the level, nature and kind of public transportation which 

should be provided” (70 ILCS 3615/2.01(a) (West 2012)), and “may provide public 

transportation by operating facilities or through purchase of service agreements (PSAs) with 

other transportation agencies.” Barton v. Chicago & North Western Transportation Co., 325 

Ill. App. 3d 1005, 1010 (2001); 70 ILCS 3615/2.03 (West 2012). Under section 3B.09 of the 

Act, the commuter rail board has very nearly all of the powers given to the Authority in section 

2.20 of the Act, including the power to sue and be sued but not including the power to enter 

onto private property. 70 ILCS 3615/3B.09, 2.20(a)(i), (a)(v) (West 2012). The commuter rail 

board is “to cooperate with the [Authority] in the exercise by the [Authority] of all the powers 

granted it by [the Act].” 70 ILCS 3615/3B.09(a) (West 2012).

¶ 21 Under the 1983 amendments: “The [Authority] retained responsibility for the financial 

oversight of the system and for facilitating the service boards’ efforts to deliver public 

transportation in the region.” Pace, 346 Ill. App. 3d at 129 (citing 70 ILCS 3615/1.02(c) (West 

2000)); see also 70 ILCS 3615/2.01(a)(v), (b) (West 2012) (requiring the Authority to “provide 

financial oversight of the Service Boards” and to “subject the operating and capital plans and 

expenditures of the Service Boards *** with regard to public transportation to continuing 

review so that the Authority may budget and expend its funds with maximum effectiveness and 

efficiency”). The legislature has described the purpose of the Act, as amended, to be as 

follows: 

“It is the purpose of this Act to provide for, aid and assist public transportation in the 

northeastern area of the State without impairing the overall quality of existing public 

transportation by providing for the creation of a single authority responsive to the 

people and elected officials of the area and with the power and competence to develop, 

implement, and enforce plans that promote adequate, efficient, and coordinated public 

transportation, provide financial review of the providers of public transportation in the 

metropolitan region and facilitate public transportation provided by Service Boards 

which is attractive and economical to users, comprehensive, coordinated among its 

various elements, economical, safe, efficient and coordinated with area and State 

plans.” 70 ILCS 3615/1.02(d) (West 2012).

 

3Although not included anywhere in the language of the Act, the commuter rail division and the 

suburban bus division are commonly known as, respectively, “Metra” and “Pace.” Stroger, 201 Ill. 2d 

at 513. 
- 6 - 

¶ 22 Section 2.20(a)(x) of the Act, as amended, provides that the commuter rail board “shall 

continue the separate public corporation, known as the Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter 

Railroad Corporation, as a separate operating unit to operate on behalf of the Commuter Rail 

Board commuter railroad facilities.” 70 ILCS 3615/2.20(a)(x) (West 2012). Thus, under the 

amended Act it is the commuter rail board, rather than the Authority’s board, which now 

directly oversees NIRCRC. Id.; Barton, 325 Ill. App. 3d at 1010 (“NIRCRC is a corporation 

maintained, supervised and directed by the Commuter Rail Board ***, the governing body of 

the Commuter Rail Division *** of the [Authority] *** under [the Act] [citation].”). Further, 

section 2.20(a)(x) states that NIRCRC “shall have all the powers given the Authority and the 

Commuter Rail Board under Article II of this Act [other than under the power of eminent 

domain] as are delegated to it by ordinance of the Commuter Rail Board with regard to such 

operation of facilities and the same exemptions, restrictions and limitations as are provided by 

law with regard to the Authority shall apply to such Corporation.” 70 ILCS 3615/2.20(a)(x) 

(West 2012). Finally, section 2.20(a)(x) of the Act provides that NIRCRC is a “transportation 

agency as provided in this Act except for purposes of paragraph (e) of Section 3.01 of [the 

Act].” Id.

4

¶ 23 As defined in the Act, references to the “ ‘Authority’ ” mean the “Regional Transportation 

Authority” (70 ILCS 3615/1.03 (West 2012)), while a “ ‘Transportation Agency’ ” refers to 

“any individual, firm, partnership, corporation, association, body politic, municipal 

corporation, public authority, unit of local government or other person, other than the 

Authority and the Service Boards, which provides public transportation, any local mass transit 

district created pursuant to the ‘Local Mass Transit District Act’, as now or hereafter amended, 

and any urban transportation district created pursuant to the ‘Urban Transportation District 

Act’, as now or hereafter amended, which districts are located in whole or in part within the 

metropolitan region.” Id. “ ‘Service Boards’ ” are defined to include “the Board of the 

Commuter Rail Division of the Authority, the Board of the Suburban Bus Division of the 

Authority and the Board of the Chicago Transit Authority established pursuant to the 

‘Metropolitan Transit Authority Act’, approved April 12, 1945, as now or hereafter amended.” 

Id. 

¶ 24 In summary, under the Act as currently amended, the Authority is charged with providing 

transportation to the public in the northeast region of this state. To achieve that goal, the 

legislature created operating divisions “within” the Authority, including the commuter rail 

division. The commuter rail board governs the commuter rail division and provides commuter 

rail service, in part, through a separate operating unit and public corporation, NIRCRC. 

NIRCRC was first created by the Authority pursuant to an Authority ordinance under the Act 

as originally enacted. After the 1983 amendments, the commuter rail board was to continue 

and, also govern, NIRCRC as a separate operating unit and public corporation. Under the Act, 

 

4

The current reference to paragraph (e) of section 3.01, as opposed to paragraph (f), appears to 

represent either a typographical error or a failure of the legislature to account for prior amendments to 

section 3.01 of the Act. As we noted above, paragraph (e) of section 3.01 originally contained 

restrictions on the members of the Authority’s board of directors from serving in various capacities 

with a transportation agency or other governmental unit. Those restrictions are now contained in 

paragraph (f), and also include similar restrictions with respect to the more recently created service 

boards. The current content of paragraph (e) seems irrelevant to NIRCRC. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 

1112/3, ¶ 703.01(e); 70 ILCS 3615/3.01(e), (f) (West 2012). 
- 7 - 

NIRCRC is to be considered a transportation agency, albeit one with all the powers given the 

Authority and the commuter rail board with regard to the operation of commuter rail facilities 

as delegated to it by commuter rail board ordinance–subject to some limited exceptions–and 

subject to the same exemptions, restrictions and limitations as are provided by law with regard 

to the Authority. 

¶ 25 With this background in mind, we now turn to the plain language of section 5.03, which 

includes both an immunity provision and a statute of limitations. Specifically, section 5.03 

provides: 

“The Authority shall not be liable in any civil action for any injury to any person or 

property for any acts or omissions of any transportation agency or unit of local 

government, as a result of the Authority making grants to or having a purchase of 

service agreement with such agency or unit of local government. Nothing in this Act, 

however, limits the power of the Authority in its purchase of service agreements to pay 

the cost of any such injuries. 

 No civil action shall be commenced in any court against the Authority by any 

person on account of any wrongful death or for any injury to any person unless it is 

commenced within one year from the date that the cause of action accrued; provided, 

however, that the foregoing shall not limit a transportation agency in bringing a civil 

action to enforce its rights under a purchase of service agreement with the Authority. 

This amendatory Act of 1995 applies only to causes of action accruing on or after 

January 1, 1996.” 70 ILCS 3615/5.03 (West 2012).

¶ 26 Viewing section 5.03 in isolation, it might appear that the one-year statute of limitations 

contained therein does not apply to NIRCRC. The plain language of section 5.03 clearly 

differentiates between the Authority and transportation agencies such as NIRCRC, both in the 

initial immunity provision and in the second paragraph containing the statute of limitations. 

Furthermore, by its own plain language, section 5.03 only provides for a one-year statute of 

limitations for personal injury or wrongful death actions “against the Authority.” Id. 

¶ 27 However, we note again that “[i]n determining the plain meaning of statutory language, a 

court will consider the statute in its entirety.” Hendricks, 2015 IL App (3d) 140858, ¶ 14. Thus, 

we must also consider the language of section 2.20(a)(x) of the Act, which specifically 

provides that NIRCRC “shall have all the powers given the Authority and the Commuter Rail 

Board under Article II of this Act [other than under the power of eminent domain] as are 

delegated to it by ordinance of the Commuter Rail Board with regard to such operation of 

facilities and the same exemptions, restrictions and limitations as are provided by law with 

regard to the Authority shall apply to [NIRCRC].” 70 ILCS 3615/2.20(a)(x) (West 2012). The 

parties have not provided, and this court has not reviewed, any of the ordinances passed by the 

commuter rail board to determine exactly which of the powers contained in article II of the Act 

have actually been delegated to NIRCRC. 

¶ 28 Nevertheless, it seems apparent that one of the powers delegated to NIRCRC is the power 

of the Authority and the commuter rail board to sue and be sued. See 70 ILCS 3615/3B.09, 

2.20(a)(i) (West 2012). Indeed, neither party here has questioned the fact that NIRCRC also 

has this power, and this court’s own research indicates that the ability of NIRCRC to be 

involved in litigation as a separate legal entity has not been questioned in dozens of other 

matters involving NIRCRC as a party. If NIRCRC has the Authority’s power to be sued under 
- 8 - 

the Act, we fail to see why it would not also have the protections from suit provided to the 

Authority in section 5.03. 

¶ 29 We need not rely upon any such speculation here, however, as we actually rely upon that 

portion of section 2.20(a)(x) of the Act which provides that “the same exemptions, restrictions 

and limitations as are provided by law with regard to the Authority shall apply to [NIRCRC].” 

70 ILCS 3615/2.20(a)(x) (West 2012). We find that this expansive language is sufficient to 

include the one-year statute of limitations period contained in section 5.03 of the Act, leading 

us to further conclude that this limitations period therefore also applies to NIRCRC. 

¶ 30 In reaching this conclusion, we have considered and rejected the two cases primarily relied 

upon by the parties on appeal. First, NIRCRC asks this court to analogize this matter to the 

situation presented in Brown v. Pace Suburban Bus Service, 2014 IL App (1st) 132831-U, 

wherein this court found that a personal injury suit filed against Pace–an operating division of 

the Authority–was subject to the one-year limitations period of section 5.03. Id. ¶ 20. 

However, as Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23(e) (eff. July 1, 2011), provides, such unpublished 

orders are “not precedential and may not be cited by any party except to support contentions of 

double jeopardy, res judicata, collateral estoppel or law of the case.” Thus, NIRCRC should 

not have cited Brown as precedential authority in support of its arguments and we will not 

consider it further here. 

¶ 31 Plaintiff, in turn, has primarily relied on this court’s decision in Eskew v. Burlington 

Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 2011 IL App (1st) 093450. In that case, the plaintiff brought suit 

against the Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Company (BNSF), NIRCRC, and the 

Authority. Id. ¶ 1. The Authority was dismissed prior to trial. Id. ¶ 61. In returning a verdict 

against the remaining defendants, the jury apportioned liability between BNSF and NIRCRC. 

Id. ¶ 1. The train involved in the suit was operated by BNSF under a purchase service 

agreement with NIRCRC. Id. ¶ 2. 

¶ 32 On appeal, NIRCRC argued that the claims against it were time-barred under section 5.03 

of the Act. Id. ¶ 60. In response to this contention, this court first stated that “[t]he clear and 

unequivocal language in this provision establishes that the one-year statute of limitations 

applies only to claims against the [Authority].” Id. 

¶ 33 However, we also observed that while the Authority was dismissed pursuant to a motion to 

dismiss which raised, in part, the limitations provision of section 5.03, NIRCRC had not 

contended that it was “the same as the [Authority] and should have been similarly dismissed.”

Id. ¶ 61. Further, NIRCRC did not “cite any precedential authority or evidentiary support in the 

record explaining how the one-year statute of limitations” in section 5.03 applied to NIRCRC 

and, therefore, the issue had been forfeited on appeal. Id. Thus, this court did not actually reach 

the merits of NIRCRC’s argument regarding section 5.03 in Eskew, we were not asked to 

consider the language of section 5.03 in light of the language contained in section 2.20(a)(x), 

and that decision therefore does not lend any support to plaintiff here. 

¶ 34 Indeed, neither party has cited a published decision which substantively addresses the issue 

of whether the protections provided in section 5.03 of the Act apply to NIRCRC, nor has this 

court’s research revealed any such case. Published cases have, however, made the assumption 

that section 5.03 does apply to NIRCRC, albeit without any further discussion. See Barton, 

325 Ill. App. 3d at 1035 (assuming, without discussion, that the immunity provision contained 

in section 5.03 applies to NIRCRC); Bergstrom v. McSweeney, 294 F. Supp. 2d 961, 969 (N.D. 

Ill. 2003) (same, with respect to the limitations period contained in section 5.03). 
- 9 - 

¶ 35 Ultimately, we conclude that the plain language of the Act supports NIRCRC’s argument 

that the limitations period contained in section 5.03 applies to suits against it, and that at most

plaintiff has raised a plausible argument that the language of the Act is ambiguous with respect 

to this issue. Any possible ambiguity is easily resolved, however, when we consider the Act’s 

purpose and legislative history. See Relf v. Shatayeva, 2013 IL 114925, ¶ 24 (“Statutes of 

limitation, like other statutes, must be construed in the light of their objectives.”); Advincula v. 

United Blood Services, 176 Ill. 2d 1, 19 (1996) (“Valuable construction aids in interpreting an 

ambiguous statute are the provision’s legislative history and debates ***.”).

¶ 36 It must be recalled that the Authority was originally created due to the “grave financial 

condition” of public transportation facilities in northeastern Illinois. Pub. Act 78-5, 

§ 1.02(a)(iii) (eff. Dec. 12, 1973) (adding 70 ILCS 3615/1.02(a)(iii)). Similarly, the significant 

amendments to the Act that called for–inter alia–the creation of the commuter rail division and 

the commuter rail board were necessitated by continuing and recurring financial deficits in the 

operations of public transportation facilities in that area. Pace, 346 Ill. App. 3d at 129; Stroger, 

201 Ill. 2d at 513. Throughout its history, the Act has sought to address such financial struggles 

while also providing public transportation “which is attractive and economical to users, 

comprehensive, coordinated among its various elements, economical, safe, efficient and 

coordinated with area and State plans.” 70 ILCS 3615/1.02(d) (West 2012).

¶ 37 In order to achieve these goals, the Act authorizes the creation of a number of separate local 

governmental entities, including: (1) the Authority (70 ILCS 3615/1.04 (West 2012) (“Upon 

its establishment the Authority shall be a unit of local government, body politic, political 

subdivision and municipal corporation.”)); (2) the commuter rail and suburban bus divisions of 

the Authority (see Pace, 346 Ill. App. 3d at 142-43 (recognizing that Pace, as the suburban bus 

division of the Authority, is a separate local governmental entity), and City of Evanston v. 

Regional Transportation Authority, 202 Ill. App. 3d 265, 275 (1990) (same)); and (3) NIRCRC 

(Smith v. Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter R.R. Corp., 210 Ill. App. 3d 223, 227 (1991) 

(recognizing that NIRCRC is a local governmental entity, as it “is a not-for-profit corporation 

with no shareholders, funded with public funds from [the Authority] and operates a commuter 

rail line in the public interest”)).5 Illinois has long offered such local governmental entities 

legal protection in the form of the abridged, one-year statute of limitations period contained in 

the Immunity Act. 745 ILCS 10/8-101(a) (West 2012). As our supreme court has stated: 

“The purpose of the one-year limitation period contained in section 8-101(a) is to 

encourage early investigation into a claim against a local governmental entity when the 

matter is still fresh, witnesses are available, and conditions have not materially 

changed. [Citations.] Such an investigation permits prompt settlement of meritorious 

claims and allows governmental entities to plan their budgets in light of potential 

liabilities. [Citations.] Because a local governmental entity must anticipate that the 

number of claims made against it will far exceed those brought against a private 

individual, the provision of an abridged limitations period is reasonable. [Citations.]” 

Hubble v. Bi-State Development Agency of the Illinois-Missouri Metropolitan District, 

238 Ill. 2d 262, 279 (2010). 

 

5As we noted above, while the Act did not create the CTA it did designate the governing board of 

the CTA as a service board. 70 ILCS 3615/1.03 (West 2012). The CTA is also considered a unit of local 

government. 70 ILCS 3605/3 (West 2012). 
- 10 - 

¶ 38 These same concerns apply here, especially in light of the long history of financial 

difficulties among public transportation providers in northeastern Illinois. As much as placing 

such public transportation providers on a more sound financial footing motivated the 

legislature to pass the Act in a general sense, it also clearly motivated the legislature to provide 

for a one-year statute of limitations specifically applicable to actions brought against the 

Authority, Pace, Metra, and NIRCRC.6

¶ 39 Indeed, the relationship between the limitations periods contained in the Act and the 

Immunity Act was made explicit in connection with the most recent amendment to section 5.03 

of the Act, which as noted above returned the limitations period contained therein to one year. 

Pub. Act 89-109, § 5 (eff. Jan. 1, 1996) (amending 70 ILCS 3615/5.03 (West 1994)). In the 

debate surrounding this amendment in the House of Representatives, it was explained that this 

amendment would: 

“[M]ake[ ] a correction in the RTA Act that was the result of a legislative oversight 

several years ago. It’s very simple. It reduces the statute of limitations for filing suits 

under the RTA Act from two years to one year. In 1986[,] all units of local government 

were granted one-year statute of limitations under the Local Government and 

Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act. The CTA has that limitation. This bill 

simply addresses the oversight and provides the RTA, Metra and Pace with the same 

protection now provided the CTA and every other unit of local government.” 89th Ill. 

Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, Mar. 23, 1995, at 42 (statements of Senator Parker). 

A similar colloquy in the House of Representatives also establishes that the purpose behind the 

1996 amendment was to ensure that suits against “all local public entities,” including suits for 

“a bodily injury accident if they are related to the RTA,” would be subject to a one-year statute 

of limitations. 89th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, May 8, 1995, at 52 (statements of 

Representative Pankau). 

¶ 40 In the end, the plain language of the Act viewed in its entirety, its legislative history and 

purpose, and the content of the legislative debate quoted above all lead us to conclude that the 

one-year statute of limitations contained in section 5.03 applies to NIRCRC. As such, the 

circuit court properly dismissed plaintiff’s complaint.

¶ 41 III. CONCLUSION 

¶ 42 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed. 

¶ 43 Affirmed. 

 

6The legislature has also specifically provided that a one-year statute of limitations applies to 

actions brought against the CTA. 70 ILCS 3605/41 (West 2012).