IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

GGNSC Clarion LP d/b/a “Golden :

Living Center – Clarion”, :

GGNSC Warren Kinzua Valley LP :

d/b/a “Golden Living Center – Kinzua”, :

GGNSC Wilkes-Barre II LP d/b/a :

“Golden Living Center – Summit”, :

HarmarVillage Care Center LLC :

d/b/a HarmarVillage Care Center, :

Providence Care Center LLC d/b/a :

Providence Care Center, Mulberry :

Square Elder Care & Rehabilitation, :

LLC, Guardian Elder Care at Carlisle, :

LLC, Guardian Elder Care at Mountain :

Top I, LLC & Rehabilitation Center, :

Guardian Elder Care at Nanticoke LLC, :

Jefferson Hills Manor LLC, :

Brookline at Mifflintown, Inc., :

Reliant Audubon Holdings LLC, :

Reliant Evergreen Holdings LLC, :

Reliant Palmyra Holdings LLC, :

Reliant Silver Oaks Holdings LLC, :

Reliant Kade Holdings LLC, Reliant :

Coventry Holdings LLC, Reliant :

Overlook Holdings LLC, Reliant :

Briarcliff Holdings LLC, :

Pennsylvania Health Care Association, :

:

Petitioners :

:

v. : No. 165 M.D. 2015

: Argued: November 18, 2015

Kathleen G. Kane, in her Official :

Capacity as Attorney General of the :

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and :

Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, :

:

Respondents :
BEFORE: HONORABLE DAN PELLEGRINI, President Judge1

HONORABLE BERNARD L. McGINLEY, Judge

HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Judge

HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge

HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge

HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

OPINION BY

PRESIDENT JUDGE PELLEGRINI FILED: January 11, 2016

Before the Court are the preliminary objections and motion to dismiss 

of Kathleen G. Kane, in her Official Capacity as Attorney General of the 

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (collectively, OAG) and Cohen Milstein Sellers 

& Toll PLLC (Cohen Milstein) to the amended petition for review seeking 

declaratory relief filed by GGNSC Clarion LP d/b/a “Golden Living Center –

Clarion,” et al. (collectively, Facilities)2pursuant to the Declaratory Judgments 

Act.3 We sustain the preliminary objections, grant the motion to dismiss, and 

dismiss the amended petition for review.

 

1

This matter was assigned to this panel before January 1, 2016, when President Judge 

Pellegrini assumed the status of senior judge.

2

The petitioners and their affiliated entities are the owners and operators of long-term 

care facilities including skilled nursing facilities that are licensed by the Pennsylvania 

Department of Health (DOH) and that are certified under the Medicare and Medicaid programs 

pursuant to Titles XVIII and XIX of the federal Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§1395 et seq., 

and 42 U.S.C. §§1396-1, et seq., administered by the United States Department of Health and 

Human Services (HHS) through the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). 

(Amended Petition for Review at ¶4). In August 2015, this Court discontinued the matter as to 

the eight named Reliant facilities upon praecipe to discontinue.

3

42 Pa. C.S. §§7531-7541. The purpose of the Declaratory Judgments Act is to “settle 

and to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status, and other legal 

(Footnote continued on next page...)
2

I.

A.

In 2012, OAG entered into a contingent fee agreement with Cohen 

Milstein, which has been subsequently amended, through which Cohen Milstein 

began an investigation into whether a number of the Facilities had fraudulently, 

deceptively or falsely represented their services in their billing and marketing 

practices under the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law 

(Consumer Protection Law),4breach of contract and unjust enrichment.

 

(continued...)

relations, and is to be liberally construed and administered.” 42 Pa. C.S. §7541(a). An action 

brought under the Declaratory Judgments Act “must allege an interest by the party seeking relief 

which is direct, substantial and present ... and must demonstrate the existence of an actual 

controversy related to the invasion or threatened invasion of one’s legal rights.” Bowen v. Mount 

Joy Township, 644 A.2d 818, 821 (Pa. Cmwlth.), appeal denied, 652 A.2d 1326 (Pa. 1994). 

Granting or denying an action for a declaratory judgment is committed to the sound discretion of 

a court of original jurisdiction. Gulnac by Gulnac v. South Butler County School District, 587 

A.2d 699, 701 (Pa. 1991).

4 Act of December 17, 1968, P.L. 1224, as amended, 73 P.S. §§201-1 – 201-9.3. Section 

2 of the Consumer Protection Law defines “unfair or deceptive acts or practices” to include: 

“[u]sing deceptive representations ... in connection with ... services;” “[r]epresenting that ... 

services have ... characteristics, ... uses, benefits, or quantities that they do not have...;” 

“[r]epresenting that ... services are of a particular standard, quality or grade ... if they are of 

another;” “[a]dvertising ... services with intent not to sell them as advertised;” or “[f]ailing to 

comply with the terms of any written guarantee ... given to the buyer at, prior to or after a 

contract for the purchase of ... services is made[.]” 73 P.S. §201-2(4)(iv), (v), (vii), (ix), (xiv). 

In turn, Section 3 “declare[s] unlawful any “unfair or deceptive acts or practices” as defined in 

Section 2. 73 P.S. §201-3.

Additionally, Section 4 of the Consumer Protection Law provides:

Whenever the Attorney General ... has reason to believe that any 

person is using or is about to use any method, act or practice 

declared by section 3 of this act to be unlawful, and that 

(Footnote continued on next page...)
3

In this declaratory judgment action, the Facilities contend the 

investigation was not based on any material consumer complaints, but was based 

on Cohen Milstein’s efforts to persuade OAG, among many other state attorneys 

general, to investigate purported violations and to sue. In their petition for review, 

they contend that the Attorney General exceeded her authority by issuing a series 

of administrative subpoenas and retaining Cohen Milstein to assist in her

investigation and the related litigation and sought a declaration:

 In Count I, that OAG lacks authority to investigate 

or pursue litigation concerning staffing levels at their 

skilled nursing facilities because the Health Care 

 

(continued...)

proceedings would be in the public interest, he may bring an action 

in the name of the Commonwealth against such person to restrain 

by temporary or permanent injunction the use of such method, act 

or practice.

73 P.S. §201-4.

Finally, Section 4.1 of the Consumer Protection Law, added by Act of November 24, 

1976, P.L. 1166, states:

Whenever any court issues a permanent injunction to restrain and 

prevent violations of this act as authorized in section 4 above, the 

court may in its discretion direct that the defendant or defendants 

restore to any person in interest any moneys or property, real or 

personal, which may have been acquired by means of any violation 

of this act, under terms and conditions to be established by the 

court.

73 P.S. §201-4.1.
4

Facilities Act5vests exclusive jurisdiction in DOH and 

that OAG’s action in this case violates their due process 

rights by circumventing the authorized regulatory 

process;

6

 In Count II, that OAG is not empowered to 

delegate its authority to Cohen Milstein and the contract 

 

5 Act of July 19, 1979, P.L. 130, as amended, 35 P.S. §§448.101-448.904b. Section 

201(1) of the Health Care Facilities Act states that “[t]he [DOH] shall have the power and its 

duties shall be ... [t]o exercise exclusive jurisdiction over health care providers in accordance 

with this act.” 35 P.S. §448.201(1). In turn, Section 813(a) provides, in relevant part:

For the purpose of determining the suitability of the applicants and 

of the premises or for determining the adequacy of the care and 

treatment provided or the continuing conformity of the licensees to 

this act and to applicable local, State and federal regulations, any 

authorized agent of [DOH] may enter, visit and inspect the 

building, grounds, equipment and supplies of any health care 

facility licensed or requiring licensure under this act and shall have 

full and free access to the records of the facility and to the patients 

and employees therein and their records....”

35 P.S. §448.813(a). See also Section 801.1, added by Act of July 12, 1980, P.L. 655, 35 P.S. 

§448.801a (“It is the purpose of this chapter to protect and promote the public health and welfare 

through the establishment and enforcement of regulations setting minimum standards in the ... 

operation of health care facilities ... to assure safe, adequate and efficient facilities and services, 

and to promote the health, safety and adequate care of the patients or residents of such facilities. 

It is also the purpose of this chapter to assure quality health care through appropriate and 

nonduplicative review and inspection with due regard to the protection of the health and rights of 

privacy of patients and without unreasonably interfering with the operation of the health care 

facility or home health agency.”); Section 817(a), 35 P.S. §488.817(a) (“Whenever any person 

... has violated any of the provisions of this Chapter or the regulations issued pursuant thereto, 

[DOH] may maintain an action ... for an injunction or other process restraining or prohibiting 

such person from engaging in such activity.”).

6

Specifically, the Facilities assert that OAG’s investigation constitutes administrative 

rulemaking without following the notice and comment requirements of the statute commonly 

referred to as the Commonwealth Documents Law, Act of July 31, 1968, P.L. 769, as amended, 

45 P.S. §§1102-1602; 45 Pa. C.S. §§501-907, and the Regulatory Review Act, Act of June 25, 

1982, P.L. 633, as amended, 71 P.S. §§745.1-745.14.
5

between OAG and Cohen Milstein constitutes an 

improper expenditure of state funds under state law and 

the Pennsylvania Constitution;

7

and

 In Count III, that OAG’s subpoenas were 

improperly issued for the purpose of litigation in 

violation of Sections 918,8919,9and 921 of the 

 

7 Article 3, Section 24 provides that “[n]o money shall be paid out of the treasury, except 

on appropriations made by law and on warrant issued by the proper officers....” Pa. Const. art. 

III, §24.

8 Act of April 29, 1929, P.L. 177, added by Act of December 17, 1968, P.L. 1221, 71 P.S. 

§307-2. Section 918 provides that “[t]he Bureau of Consumer Protection [(Bureau)] shall have 

the power and its duties shall be ... [t]o investigate commercial and trade practices in the 

distribution, financing and furnishing of goods and services to or for the use of consumers ... to 

determine if such practices are detrimental to the public interest[; t]o investigate fraud, 

misrepresentation and deception in the sale, servicing and financing of consumer goods and 

products[; and t]o do such other acts as may be incidental to the exercise of its powers and 

functions.” See also Section 201(c) of the Commonwealth Attorneys Act, Act of October 15, 

1980, P.L. 950, 71 P.S. §732-201(c) (“The Attorney General shall appoint and fix the 

compensation of a first deputy attorney general, a director of the [Bureau] and such other 

deputies, officers and employees who may, at any time, exercise such powers and perform such 

duties as may be prescribed by the Attorney General. The Attorney General may establish such 

bureaus or divisions as may be required for the proper conduct of the office, including a criminal 

investigation bureau.”); Section 204(d) of the Commonwealth Attorneys Act, 71 P.S. §732-

204(d) (“The Attorney General shall administer the provisions relating to consumer protection 

set forth in sections 917 through 922 of the [Administrative Code] and appoint the advisory 

committee established under section 922.”).

9

71 P.S. §307-3. Section 919 states, in relevant part:

(a) The Attorney General shall be authorized to require the 

attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of any 

books, accounts, papers, records, documents, and files relating to 

any commercial and trade practices which the [Bureau] has 

authority to investigate and conduct private or public hearings; 

and, for this purpose, the Attorney General or his representative 

may sign subpoenas, administer oaths or affirmations, examine 

witnesses and receive evidence during any such investigation or 

public or private hearing....

(Footnote continued on next page...)
6

Administrative Code of 1929 (Administrative Code)10

and are unenforceable as overbroad and lacking 

definiteness.

In May 2015, this Court granted the Pennsylvania HealthCare 

Association (PHCA) leave to intervene in the action. In its petition, PHCA stated 

that “[i]f permitted to intervene, PHCA will adopt the petition for review filed by 

[the Facilities] as the basis for challenge to [OAG’s] actions, and would not 

propose to file a separate petition for review.” (Unopposed Petition for Leave to 

Intervene at ¶28).

B.

Overtaking the Facilities’ declaratory judgment action, in July 2015, 

OAG filed Kane v. GGNSC, LLC, et al., docketed in this Court at No. 336 M.D. 

2015, which is an enforcement action under the Consumer Protection Law against 

two of the GGNSC facilities and twelve other Golden Living nursing homes. In 

that case, OAG alleged violations of the Consumer Protection Law and common 

 

(continued...)

(b) No documentary material produced pursuant to a demand under 

this section shall, unless otherwise ordered by a court for good 

cause shown, be produced for inspection or copying by, nor shall 

the contents thereof be disclosed to any person other than the 

authorized employe of the Attorney General without the consent of 

the person who produced such material....

10 71 P.S. §307-5. Section 921 states that “[t]he [Bureau] shall not duplicate or interfere 

with the function of the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission and shall not be in substitution 

of any other Commonwealth agency having the power and duty to protect consumer interests in a 

particular field....”
7

law arising from the marketing and billing practices of Golden Living skilled 

nursing facilities and their parent corporations. Specifically, OAG claimed that 

Golden Living facilities’ statements in their marketing promising to meet 

residents’ needs for hygiene, comfort and nourishment were false, deceptive and 

misleading. OAG also claimed that the Golden Living defendants had engaged in 

deceptive, misleading and unfair practices by representing to consumers, insurers 

and the Commonwealth that they had provided basic care to residents when such 

basic care had, in fact, not been provided to residents. In their answer to OAG’s 

complaint, the Facilities allege, among other things, that the complaint was filed in 

retaliation for its filing the declaratory judgment action now before us as well as 

stating that the OAG complaint mooted the request for subpoenas to the 

Facilities.11

II.

A.

As noted above, presently before the Court are OAG’s preliminary 

objections12 and motion to dismiss13 the amended petition for review. With respect 

 

11 The docket entries in the enforcement matter at No. 336 M.D. 2015 indicate that there 

is an active stay. Pursuant to a September 2015 order, this Court, inter alia, deferred ruling on 

the Facilities’ opposition to OAG’s motions for admission pro hac vice in that matter until the 

same issues have been heard by the Court on the preliminary objections filed in the instant case 

docketed at No. 165 M.D. 2015. The attorneys seeking admission are from Cohen Milstein. The 

arguments for and against their admission mirror the parties’ arguments regarding OAG’s 

preliminary objections in the instant case, e.g., whether OAG exceeded its authority in retaining 

the law firm.

12 As this Court has explained:

(Footnote continued on next page...)
8

to Count I of the amended petition, as outlined above, the Facilities allege that 

OAG is without authority to conduct an investigation and to pursue litigation 

concerning the staffing level at their facilities, and that it is enforcing standards 

that are not required by DOH or federal agencies which constitutes administrative 

rulemaking in violation of the regulatory procedures and their due process rights. 

Additionally, with respect to Count III, the Facilities allege that OAG’s subpoenas 

were improperly issued for the purpose of litigation in violation of the 

Administrative Code and are unenforceable as overbroad and lacking definiteness.

 

(continued...)

In reviewing preliminary objections, all material facts averred in 

the complaint, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn 

from them, are admitted as true. However, a court need not accept 

as true conclusions of law, unwarranted inferences, argumentative 

allegations, or expressions of opinion. “Preliminary objections 

should be sustained only in cases that are clear and free from 

doubt.”

Seitel Data, Ltd. v. Center Township, 92 A.3d 851, 859 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014), appeal dismissed, 

111 A.3d 170 (Pa. 2015) (citations omitted).

13 See Pa. R.A.P. 1532(b) (“At any time after the filing of a petition for review in an ... 

original jurisdiction matter the court may on application enter judgment if the right of the 

applicant thereto is clear.”); Pa. R.A.P. 1972(a)(4) (“[S]ubject to Rule 123 (applications for 

relief), any party may move: ... (4) To dismiss for mootness.”). See also Pa. R.A.P. 105(a) 

(“These rules shall be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive 

determination of every matter to which they are applicable. In the interest of expediting 

decisions, or for other good cause shown, an appellate court may ... disregard the requirements 

or provisions of any of these rules in a particular case ... on its own motion and may order 

proceedings in accordance with its direction.”).
9

OAG filed the motion to dismiss as to some GGNSC facilities and 

Golden Living nursing homes on the grounds of mootness. OAG averred that the 

Facilities could raise matters raised in this action in the context of OAG’s 

affirmative enforcement action. Moreover, OAG contends that because the 

administrative subpoenas issued to all GGNSC facilities were withdrawn, the 

Facilities’ Count III claims that those subpoenas were improperly issued is moot,

and to the extent that the Facilities’ action was premised on the investigatory 

subpoenas, they now lack standing to pursue their amended petition for review. 

Accordingly, OAG concluded that because it filed an affirmative complaint against 

two of the GGNSC facilities and withdrew the subpoenas issued to all of the 

GGNSC facilities, judgment as it relates to GGNSC facilities should be granted in 

favor of OAG and Cohen Milstein with respect to those facilities.

As noted above, OAG has filed an enforcement action under the 

Consumer Protection Law in Kane v. GGNSC, LLC, et al., docketed at No. 336 

M.D. 2015, against two of the GGNSC facilities and twelve other Golden Living 

nursing homes and has asserted that any administrative subpoenas issued to these 

entities have been mooted or withdrawn. As a result, those Facilities may raise all 

of the claims raised in Counts I and III of the instant petition seeking declaratory 

relief that directly challenge OAG’s authority to enforce the Consumer Protection 

Law against them in that enforcement proceeding. In fact, those Facilities raise the 

same claims in their preliminary objections to OAG’s petition for review in the 

enforcement action that are raised in Counts I and III of the instant petition seeking 

declaratory relief.
10

Moreover, in the instant petition seeking declaratory relief, the 

Facilities specifically allege that “[l]itigation is therefore imminent and inevitable” 

in attempting to establish that “[a]n actual and immediate controversy exists 

between” them and OAG and Cohen Milstein. (Amended Petition for Review at 

¶¶124, 131, 138).14 It is well settled that “[i]n Pennsylvania, declaratory relief is 

unavailable when it is sought merely in anticipation of an action at law by another 

party. Department of General Services v. Frank Briscoe Company, Inc., [466 A.2d 

1336, 1339-40 (Pa. 1983)]; Penox Technologies, Inc. v. Foster Medical Corp., 

[546 A.2d 114, 115 (Pa. Super. 1988)].” American Nuclear Insurers v. 

Metropolitan Edison Company, 582 A.2d 390, 393 (Pa. Super. 1990), appeal 

denied, 592 A.2d 1295 (Pa. 1991). Similarly, as here, where a declaratory 

judgment action has been filed in anticipation of an administrative enforcement 

proceeding, a court should decline to exercise jurisdiction. Ven-Fuel, Inc. v. 

Department of the Treasury, 673 F.2d 1194, 1195 (11th Cir. 1982) (citations 

omitted).15

 

14 “A motion for summary relief may be granted only where no material fact is in dispute 

and the right of the moving party to relief is clear.” Brown v. Pennsylvania Department of 

Corrections, 932 A.2d 316, 318 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007) (citing Pa. R.A.P. 1532(b)). When 

considering a motion for summary relief, “the record must be viewed in the light most favorable 

to the opposing party, and all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact must 

be resolved in favor of the nonmoving party.” Taglienti v. Department of Corrections, 806 A.2d 

988, 991 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002).

15 Generally, decisions of federal district courts and courts of appeals are not binding on 

this Court, even where a federal question is involved, but they may have persuasive value. 

Weaver v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 688 A.2d 766, 772 n. 11 (Pa. Cmwlth.

1997). However, Ven-Fuel, Inc. was specifically cited by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 

Frank Briscoe Company, Inc., 466 A.2d at 1339-40, in holding that the Department of General 

Services could not obtain declaratory relief from this Court where the Department sought to 

establish its obligations under construction contracts and an affirmative defense to the contracts 

because the Department knew that the contractual relations with the five prime contractors had 

(Footnote continued on next page...)
11

In the instant motion to dismiss, OAG alleges that “as to the other 

causes of action, the GGNSC Petitioners can raise these arguments in the context 

of OAG’s [enforcement action];” that “raising such arguments in that action is 

preferable because any challenges to the OAG’s authority ... can be assessed in the 

context of [OAG]’s enforcement action – and not some hypothetical future

pleading” as alleged in the amended petition for review. (Motion to Dismiss at 

¶17). OAG also contends that “as for the other causes of action, the fact that 

OAG’s affirmative [enforcement] Complaint provides GGNSC Petitioners with a 

vehicle to raise their challenges—through Preliminary Objections or otherwise—

and litigate these challenges in the context of a specific Complaint moots the 

present hypothetical challenge. See Horsehead Resource [Development Company, 

Inc. v. Department of Environmental Protection, 780 A.2d 856, 859 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2001), appeal denied, 796 A.2d 987 (Pa. 2002) (matter was moot, in part, because 

after the orders were withdrawn the challenger had avenues available to it for 

securing review).” (Id. at ¶21). We agree and because the issues raised in Counts I 

and III of the instant petition regarding OAG’s authority will be disposed of in the 

now-pending enforcement action, we will not grant the declaratory relief that the 

Facilities seek herein with respect to two of the GGNSC facilities and twelve other 

Golden Living nursing homes. Id.

 

(continued...)

deteriorated and that the contractors were about to commence an action against the Department 

in the Board of Claims for breach of contract.
12

Likewise, with respect to the remaining claims in Count III relating to 

OAG’s purported improper use of the administrative subpoenas, this claim is now 

moot as to the two GGNSC facilities and twelve other Golden Living nursing 

homes named in the enforcement action because any subpoenas issued to these 

entities have been mooted or withdrawn. See, e.g., Ocala Star Banner Corporation 

v. State, 721 So.2d 838-39 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (“Because the subpoena has 

been withdrawn, the petition for writ of certiorari is denied as moot. Discretionary 

review by certiorari should be afforded only where there is a departure from the 

essential requirements of law causing a miscarriage of justice, and, in this case, 

there can be no miscarriage of justice since the subpoena in question is no longer in 

effect.”) (citations omitted).

B.

Regarding the claims made by the remaining facilities and PHCA in 

Count I of the amended petition for review, which are not subject to the 

enforcement action, OAG contends in its first and second preliminary objections

that the allegations fail to state a valid claim for relief. We agree.

Contrary to the Facilities’ assertion, DOH does not have exclusive 

authority to investigate or pursue litigation concerning staffing levels at skilled 

nursing facilities or to employ a model to establish such standards within the 

context of an anticipated action under the Consumer Protection Law. As outlined 

above, the Health Care Facilities Act does vest DOH with the authority to establish 

and enforce regulations setting minimum standards in the operation of health care 

facilities, to assure safe, adequate and efficient facilities and services, and to 
13

promote the health, safety and adequate care of the patients or residents of such 

facilities. 35 P.S. §448.801a.16 DOH also has the authority to initiate an 

enforcement action to restrain violations of the Health Care Facilities Act or the 

DOH’s regulations. 35 P.S. §441.817(a).

However, DOH has no authority to investigate the consumer 

marketing and billing practices of skilled nursing and long-term care facilities or to 

initiate litigation to correct illegal acts in this regard. Rather, Section 204(d) of the 

Administrative Code authorizes OAG to administer its provisions regarding 

consumer protection, and Sections 4, 4.1 and 5 of the Consumer Protection Law 

specifically authorize OAG to restrain and obtain restitution for acts deemed illegal 

 

16 With respect to nursing services in “long term care facilities,” Section 211.12 of 

DOH’s regulations provides, in relevant part:

(a) The facility shall provide services by sufficient numbers of 

personnel on a 24-hour basis to provide nursing care to meet the 

needs of all residents.

* * *

(g) There shall be at least one nursing staff employe on duty per 20 

residents.

(h) At least two nursing service personnel shall be on duty.

(i) A minimum number of general nursing care hours shall be 

provided for each 24-hour period. The total number of hours of 

general nursing care provided in each 24-hour period shall, when 

totaled for the entire facility, be a minimum of 2.7 hours of direct 

resident care for each resident.

28 Pa. Code §211.12(a), (g), (h), (i).
14

under its provisions. In turn, Section 2 defines such illegal acts, “unfair or 

deceptive acts or practices,” as including “[u]sing deceptive representations ... in 

connection with ... services;” “[r]epresenting that ... services have ... 

characteristics, ... uses, benefits, or quantities that they do not have...;” 

“[r]epresenting that ... services are of a particular standard, quality or grade ... if 

they are of another;” “[a]dvertising ... services with intent not to sell them as 

advertised;” or “[f]ailing to comply with the terms of any written guarantee ... 

given to the buyer at, prior to or after a contract for the purchase of ... services is 

made[.]” 73 P.S. §201-2(4)(iv), (v), (vii), (ix), (xiv).

Moreover, the health care services that the Facilities provide to their

residents fall within the ambit of the Consumer Protection Law. See, e.g., Chalfin 

v. Beverly Enterprises, Inc., 741 F.Supp. 1162, 1175-76 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (holding 

that the corporate owner of a nursing home was a “person” within the meaning of 

Section 2(2) of the Consumer Protection Law; that the health care services 

provided by the nursing home were within the scope of “trade or commerce” 

Section 2(3); and that the nursing home’s representation that it would assist the 

residents in procuring Medical Assistance benefits when it never intended to do so 

was an “unfair or deceptive act or practice” under Section 2(4)(xviii)); Zaborowski 

v. Hospitality Care Center of Hermitage, Inc., 60 Pa. D. & C.4th 474, 493-94

(2002) (“Nursing homes are not one-dimensional business enterprises, but instead 

they are hybrid organizations, offering both medical and non-medical services. 

Thus, this court holds that a plaintiff can maintain a private cause of action against 
15

a nursing home under [Section 9.2 of the Consumer Protection Law17] based only 

upon the non-medical services provided by the nursing home.”).18

Any investigation or enforcement action initiated by OAG is directly 

related to “unfair or deceptive acts or practices” purportedly committed by the 

Facilities with respect to the staffing levels at their facilities. As a result, while 

minimum staffing levels may be regulated by DOH for health and safety purposes, 

any representations, advertisements or agreements that the Facilities made with 

their residents with respect to staffing levels, whether in accord with those required 

 

17 Added by Act of November 24, 1976, P.L. 1166, as amended, 73 P.S. §201-9.2. 

Section 9.2(a) provides, in relevant part:

(a) Any person who purchases or leases ... services primarily for 

personal, family or household purposes and thereby suffers any 

ascertainable loss of money or property, real or personal, as a 

result of the use or employment by any person of a method, act or 

practice declared unlawful by Section 3 of this act, may bring a 

private action to recover actual damages or one hundred dollars 

($100), whichever is greater

73 P.S. §201-9.2(a).

18 See, e.g., Foflygen v. R. Zemel, M.D. (PC), 615 A.2d 1345, 1354 (Pa. Super. 1992), 

appeal denied, 629 A.2d 1380 (Pa. 1993) (“According to the [Consumer Protection Law], unfair 

methods of competition and deceptive practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are 

unlawful. 73 P.S. §201-3. The phrase ‘trade or commerce’ includes the sale of services. 73 P.S. 

§201-2(3). Among the practices condemned by the [Consumer Protection Law] are various 

misrepresentations as well as other fraudulent conduct that creates a likelihood of confusion or 

misunderstanding. 73 P.S. § 201-2(4). However, even though the Act does not exclude services 

performed by physicians, it is clear that the [Consumer Protection Law] is intended to prohibit 

unlawful practices relating to trade or commerce and of the type associated with business 

enterprises. It equally is clear that the legislature did not intend the Act to apply to physicians 

regarding medical services.”) (citation omitted.)
16

by statute or regulation or not, may properly be enforced by OAG through its 

authority conferred by the Administrative Code and the Consumer Protection Law. 

Such action is proper under the foregoing statutes and does not constitute any 

impermissible administrative rulemaking regardless of whatever evidence OAG 

uses to establish a violation, including any type of staffing model. What OAG is 

seeking to enforce is the level of staffing that the Facilities either represented, 

advertised, or promised to provide to their residents and not what level OAG 

deems to be appropriate for the care of such residents. Accordingly, Count I of the 

amended petition for review is dismissed as to the remaining facilities and PHCA.

C.

Regarding the remaining claims raised by the remaining facilities and 

PHCA in Count III of the amended petition for review regarding the subpoenas, 

OAG contends in its sixth and seventh preliminary objections that the Facilities fail 

to state a valid claim for relief and that the claims with respect to the subpoenas are 

not ripe. We agree.

Section 919(a) of the Administrative Code provides, in relevant part:

In case of disobedience of any subpoena ... the Attorney 

General or his representative may invoke the aid of the 

Commonwealth Court or any court of record of the 

Commonwealth, and such court may thereupon issue an 

order requiring the person subpoenaed to obey the 

subpoena ... or to produce books, accounts, papers, 

records, documents and files relative to the matter in 

question. Any failure to obey such order of the court 

may be punished by such court as a contempt thereof.
17

71 P.S. §307-3(a).

As outlined above, OAG has no independent authority to enforce its 

subpoenas and the Facilities cannot contest the validity of the subpoenas in an 

action in equity until OAG invokes the foregoing enforcement procedure in a court 

of record or this Court. In re Subpoena of Pennsylvania Crime Commission, 309 

A.2d 401, 404 (Pa. 1973). With respect to a motion to quash an administrative 

subpoena issued by the Pennsylvania Crime Commission, the Supreme Court 

explained:

[W]e note that appellants’ motion to quash the subpoena 

in the Common Pleas Court was improper. Appellants 

cannot contest the validity of the subpoena until the 

Commission invokes enforcement procedures in either 

the Courts of Common Pleas or the Commonwealth 

Court. This is so because, unlike a judicial subpoena, the 

Crime Commission is not given power to enforce 

compliance. Therefore, individuals are not placed in the 

dilemma of having to disobey the Commission’s

subpoena at their peril in order to contest its validity. 

Failure to comply is not punishable by fine or 

imprisonment unless it continues after a court has 

ordered compliance....

Until the Commission invokes the aid of a court to 

enforce compliance with its subpoenas, the court is 

without jurisdiction in the matter. To hold otherwise 

would be to ignore the obvious possibility that the 

Commission may elect not to enforce its subpoena. Until 

the decision is made by the Commission to seek 

enforcement the subpoena is no more than an invitation 

to appear which can be ignored without peril by the 

recipient. Therefore, the premature initiation of equitable 

proceedings by appellants is in effect a nullity and it is 

incapable of divesting the Commission of its legal right 
18

to elect to proceed to seek enforcement in the forum of its 

choice as provided under the statute[]....

Id. at 404-05 (footnotes omitted). Likewise, in the instant matter, the Facilities’

initiation of the instant declaratory judgment proceeding to challenge OAG’s 

administrative subpoenas is premature because OAG has not yet asked a court to 

enforce the subpoenas under Section 919(a) of the Administrative Code. 

Accordingly, Counts I and III in the amended petition for review are dismissed.

D.

Finally, in OAG’s third preliminary objection, it alleges that the 

Facilities and PHCA lack standing to challenge OAG’s use of outside counsel to 

conduct its investigation in Count II of the amended petition for review, citing 

Section 103 of the Commonwealth Attorneys Act, and Commonwealth v. Janssen 

Pharmaceutica, Inc., 8 A.3d 267, 276 (Pa. 2010).19 With respect to the Facilities’ 

and PHCA’s standing to assert Count II or any claims in Counts I and III relating 

to the contingent fee agreement with Cohen Milstein or its participation in the 

investigation and litigation, we find that the Supreme Court’s opinion in Janssen 

Pharmaceutica is dispositive.

 

19 71 P.S. §732-103. Section 103 states that “[n]o party to an action, other than a 

Commonwealth agency including the Departments of Auditor General and State Treasury and 

the Public Utility Commission, shall have standing to question the authority of the legal 

representation of the agency.”
19

In that case, the Commonwealth’s Office of General Counsel (OGC)20

filed a complaint in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas raising 

statutory and common law tort claims relating to a prescription antipsychotic 

medication marketed and promoted by Janssen for uses that had not been approved 

by the Food and Drug Administration or “off label” uses. In filing the action, OGC 

did not use government attorneys, but retained Bailey Perrin, a private law firm 

from Houston, Texas, to prosecute the matter on a contingent fee basis. Janssen 

filed a motion to disqualify Bailey Perrin as OGC’s counsel alleging that while 

OGC filed the complaint, no OGC attorney had filed an appearance, the complaint 

 

20 Section 301 of the Commonwealth Attorneys Act states, in pertinent part:

There is hereby established the [OGC] which shall be headed by a 

General Counsel appointed by the Governor to serve at his 

pleasure who shall be the legal advisor to the Governor and who 

shall:

(1) [A]ppoint for the operation of each executive agency 

such chief counsel and assistant counsel as are necessary for the 

operation of each executive agency.

(2) Supervise, coordinate and administer the legal services 

provided by ... the chief counsel and assistant counsel for each 

executive agency.

* * *

(6) Initiate appropriate proceedings or defend the 

Commonwealth or any executive agency when an action or matter 

has been referred to the Attorney General and the Attorney General 

refuses or fails to initiate appropriate proceedings or defend the 

Commonwealth or executive agency.

71 P.S. §732-301(1), (2), (6). In turn, Section 102 defines “executive agency,” in pertinent part, 

as “[t]he departments ... of the Commonwealth government....” 71 P.S. §732-102.
20

was signed by a local counsel for Bailey Perrin, and a Bailey Perrin attorney 

verified the complaint. Janssen alleged that the contingent fee agreement restricted 

OGC’s ability to consent to a non-monetary settlement of the action; the agreement 

contained a waiver of conflicts of interest arising out of Bailey Perrin representing 

other states in similar actions that varied from the usual conflict provisions in 

contingent fee agreements executed by OAG; and the agreement did not provide 

for OGC’s control and management of the case as is usually provided in OAG’s 

contingent fee agreements. As a result, Janssen claimed that the agreement 

violated the separation of powers doctrine by usurping the General Assembly’s 

exclusive spending powers and violated its due process rights because those 

exercising governmental powers in adjudicative proceedings must have no 

financial interest in the outcome, must be impartial, and must maintain the 

appearance of impartiality.

The trial court denied the motion and the Supreme Court exercised 

extraordinary relief21 to consider, inter alia, whether Section 103 of the 

Commonwealth Attorneys Act dictated that Janssen lacked standing to seek the 

 

21 Section 726 of the Judicial Code provides:

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Supreme Court 

may, on its own motion or upon petition of any party, in any matter 

pending before any court or magisterial district judge of this 

Commonwealth involving an issue of immediate public 

importance, assume plenary jurisdiction of such matter at any stage 

thereof and enter a final order or otherwise cause right and justice 

to be done.

42 Pa. C.S. §726.
21

disqualification of Baily Perrin because of the alleged constitutional violations. In 

holding that Janssen lacked such standing, the Court explained:

[T]he language of Section 103 is clear and unambiguous 

and thus provides a clear indication of the General 

Assembly's intent. The obvious interpretation of Section 

103 is that no party to an action, other than the 

Commonwealth agency involved in the action itself, may 

challenge the authority of the agency’s legal 

representation. Looking for the occasion of the 

Attorneys Act, Janssen has constructed a cogent 

argument that Section 103 could be read as intending 

only to preclude parties involved in litigation against the 

Commonwealth from challenging whether [OAG] or 

OGC properly should represent the Commonwealth 

agency, but does not extend to challenges against outside 

counsel representing the Commonwealth agency. But, to 

credit Janssen’s extra-textual argument would require a 

policy and statutory construction analysis of Section 103 

that is not fairly invited by the clear and unambiguous 

statutory language actually employed in the legislation. 

And, in any event, if we were to indulge in a digression 

into the purpose of the provision, we note that it is 

perfectly logical to conclude that the General Assembly 

fully intended the broad effect of the actual words 

chosen: i.e., that, in addressing the authority of 

Commonwealth attorneys, it intended that no party but 

the affected agency should be heard to complain about so 

fundamental an executive matter as the identity of the 

lawyers representing Commonwealth entities....

[T]he OGC, on behalf of the Commonwealth and two of 

its agencies, sued Janssen, retaining Bailey Perrin to 

prosecute the action. Pursuant to the plain language of 

Section 103, Janssen, as a party to the action other than 

the Commonwealth party, cannot be heard to challenge 

Bailey Perrin’s authority to represent the Commonwealth 

party. Because the statutory language is plain and 

unambiguous, the alternative construction offered by 

Janssen must fail.
22

Janssen Pharmaceutica, 8 A.3d at 276. See also Sears v. Wolf, 118 A.3d 1091, 

1105 n. 18 (Pa. 2014) (“In [Janssen Pharmaceutica], this Court recognized that the 

general standing principles fashioned by the judiciary may yield to the will of the 

General Assembly when the question is one of standing under a specific statutory 

regime. See [id.] at 275.”). Likewise, in the instant case, the Facilities lack 

standing under Section 103 of the Commonwealth Attorneys Act to assert any 

claim with respect to the contingent fee agreement between OAG and Cohen 

Milstein or the participation of Cohen Milstein in OAG’s investigations or 

enforcement actions under the Administrative Code or the Consumer Protection 

Law. As a result, Count II, and the portions of Counts I and III relating to the 

contingent fee agreement with Cohen Milstein or its participation in the 

investigation and litigation, are dismissed.

Accordingly, the preliminary objections of the Attorney General and 

Cohen Milstein are sustained; their motion to dismiss is granted; and the Facilities’ 

amended petition for review is dismissed.

___________________________________

DAN PELLEGRINI, President Judge

Judge Cohn Jubelirer did not participate in the decision of this case.

Judge McCullough dissents.
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

GGNSC Clarion LP d/b/a “Golden :

Living Center – Clarion”, :

GGNSC Warren Kinzua Valley LP :

d/b/a “Golden Living Center – Kinzua”, :

GGNSC Wilkes-Barre II LP d/b/a :

“Golden Living Center – Summit”, :

HarmarVillage Care Center LLC :

d/b/a HarmarVillage Care Center, :

Providence Care Center LLC d/b/a :

Providence Care Center, Mulberry :

Square Elder Care & Rehabilitation, :

LLC, Guardian Elder Care at Carlisle, :

LLC, Guardian Elder Care at Mountain :

Top I, LLC & Rehabilitation Center, :

Guardian Elder Care at Nanticoke LLC, :

Jefferson Hills Manor LLC, :

Brookline at Mifflintown, Inc., :

Reliant Audubon Holdings LLC, :

Reliant Evergreen Holdings LLC, :

Reliant Palmyra Holdings LLC, :

Reliant Silver Oaks Holdings LLC, :

Reliant Kade Holdings LLC, Reliant :

Coventry Holdings LLC, Reliant :

Overlook Holdings LLC, Reliant :

Briarcliff Holdings LLC, :

Pennsylvania Health Care Association, :

:

Petitioners :

:

v. : No. 165 M.D. 2015

:

Kathleen G. Kane, in her Official :

Capacity as Attorney General of the :

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and :

Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, :

:

Respondents :
O R D E R

AND NOW, this 11th day of January, 2016, the preliminary objections of 

Kathleen G. Kane, in her Official Capacity as Attorney General of the 

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, are 

sustained; their motion to dismiss is granted; and the petition for review seeking 

declaratory relief filed by GGNSC Clarion LP d/b/a “Golden Living Center –

Clarion,” et al. is dismissed.

___________________________________

DAN PELLEGRINI, President Judge