[Cite as State v. Carter, 2022-Ohio-206.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

 CLARK COUNTY 

STATE OF OHIO 

Plaintiff-Appellee 

v. 

LARRY CARTER, JR. 

Defendant-Appellant 

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Appellate Case No. 2021-CA-36 

Trial Court Case No. 2021-CR-155 

(Criminal Appeal from 

Common Pleas Court) 

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O P I N I O N 

Rendered on the 28th day of January, 2022. 

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IAN A. RICHARDSON, Atty. Reg. No. 0100124, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Clark 

County Prosecutor’s Office, Appellate Division, 50 East Columbia Street, Suite 449, 

Springfield, Ohio 45502 

Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee 

 

H. MICHELE THOMAS, Atty. Reg. No. 0082848, P.O. Box 695, Eaton, Ohio 45320 

 Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 

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DONOVAN, J. 
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{¶ 1} Larry Carter Jr. pled guilty in the Clark County Court of Common Pleas to 

one count of improper handling of a firearm in a motor vehicle, a felony of the fourth 

degree, in violation of R.C. 2923.16(B). He appeals from his conviction. Counsel for 

Carter has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 

L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), asserting that there are no arguably meritorious arguments to raise 

on appeal. Carter was notified that he had the right to file a pro se brief, but he did not 

do so. For the following reasons, the trial court’s judgment will be affirmed. 

{¶ 2} On March 6, 2021, Carter’s girlfriend, Diane Fick, contacted law enforcement 

and reported that Carter had hit her with a chair and stolen her motor vehicle. She also 

stated that she did not want to discuss the physical altercation but did want her car 

returned so that she could go to work in the morning. Fick stated that she and Carter 

had lived together for seven years and that Carter had just recently moved out. He was 

supposed to come over and gather some belongings when they decided to hang out 

longer. Carter was preparing to leave when he was unable to locate his keys. He became 

agitated and hit Fick with a chair. He then took Fick’s keys and ran out of the residence. 

{¶ 3} Law enforcement officers were standing in the driveway of Fick’s home upon 

Carter’s return. Carter drove to another home and used that driveway to turn around, but 

the officers initiated a traffic stop. Carter was removed from the vehicle and detained. 

While an officer was doing a pat-down, he discovered two 20-gauge shell casings in 

Carter’s coat pocket. The officer asked Carter if he had a shotgun as well. Carter stated 

that he had driven to pick up the shotgun from a friend and that was why it was in the 

motor vehicle. 

{¶ 4} The law enforcement officers placed Carter under arrest and in the backseat 
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of a patrol car. Officers then searched the vehicle and located the shotgun wrapped in a 

sweat pants leg in the backseat, lying half on the seat and half on the floorboard. The 

shotgun had two 20-gauge shells in the barrel. 

{¶ 5} The officers requested that Fick come down and collect her belongings from 

the vehicle. Fick said she did not want Carter to be charged with stealing the motor vehicle 

or the assault that had occurred earlier. However, while the officers were speaking with 

her, she stated that she was having trouble thinking due to being hit in the head with a 

chair. 

{¶ 6} Fick was advised that due to her injuries and her statements, Carter would 

be charged with domestic violence. Fick stated that she did not want to do anything due 

to a fear that Carter would kill her. An officer took photos of Fick’s injuries and one photo 

of Carter. Officers then transferred Carter to Springfield Police Headquarters where he 

was charged with having weapons while under disability and improper handling of a 

firearm in a motor vehicle; the indictment also included a forfeiture specification related 

to the gun. 

{¶ 7} On May 17, 2021, Carter pled guilty to improper handling of a firearm in a 

motor vehicle, in exchange for which the charge of having weapons while under disability 

was dismissed; Carter also agreed to the forfeiture of the weapon. During the plea 

hearing, the trial court asked if Carter understood the terms of the agreement, and Carter 

stated that he did. The trial court then asked Carter if he wanted to proceed with the plea 

agreement. Carter stated that he had “no choice” in accepting the plea agreement, as 

reflected in the following exchange: 

THE COURT: Do you understand the terms of the agreement, Mr. Carter? 
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THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 

THE COURT: Is that what you want to do this morning? 

THE DEFENDANT: I have no choice, Your Honor. 

THE COURT: Really? Because you have a choice to go to trial if you want a trial. 

THE DEFENDANT: No, I just don’t like – 

THE COURT: Will you take your mask off and speak up? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 

THE COURT: You have a choice. You can plead guilty or you can go to trial. You 

have a trial scheduled for tomorrow. 

THE DEFENDANT: I plead guilty. 

THE COURT: So you do have a choice, right? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 

Plea Hearing Tr. p. 4-5. 

{¶ 8} The trial court then asked Carter if he was under the influence of drugs or 

alcohol. Carter replied that he had had a couple of beers the previous day. The trial court 

asked if he was a United States citizen and if he understood the nature of the case and 

the facts placed on the record by the prosecutor, to which Carter replied affirmatively. 

The trial court asked if Carter was on probation, community control, post-release control, 

or parole, to which Carter replied that he was not. 

{¶ 9} The trial court also asked if Carter’s signature was on the written plea 

document, if he had had an opportunity to review it with his lawyer, and if he understood 

it. Carter replied in the affirmative. The trial court asked if it was Carter’s understanding 

that, in exchange for his guilty plea to count two (improper handling of a firearm), the 
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State had agreed to dismiss count one (having weapons while under disability). Carter 

stated that it was. 

{¶ 10} The trial court asked Carter if any other promises had been made to him or 

if he had been threatened, pressured, or coerced into pleading guilty. Carter stated that 

no other promises (other than the dismissal of count one) were made to him, and that he 

had not been threatened, pressured, or coerced into pleading guilty. The trial court asked 

if Carter was entering the guilty plea voluntarily, to which Carter replied affirmatively. The 

trial court asked if Carter understood that, upon his pleading guilty, the court would accept 

his plea, find him guilty, order a presentence investigation, and schedule sentencing for 

a later date. Carter stated that he understood. 

{¶ 11} The trial court reviewed the possible maximum prison term and fine for the 

improper handling of a firearm in a motor vehicle offense. Carter stated that he 

understood. The trial court also informed Carter that if he were placed on community 

control, the conditions could include time in the county jail, fines, and restitution. Carter 

replied that he understood. 

{¶ 12} The trial court informed Carter that if he were to be sentenced to prison, he 

could be placed on post-release control for up to three years. The trial court also reviewed 

the potential consequences of violating post-release control and the consequences of 

being convicted of a felony offense while on post-release control. Carter stated that he 

understood. 

{¶ 13} The trial court also asked if Carter understood that he had the right to a jury 

trial, the right to require the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every element of 

the offense, the right to confront witnesses, cross-examine witnesses, and use the Court’s 
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subpoena power to compel the attendance of witnesses, the right to testify in his own 

defense (but could not be forced to do so), that he could only be convicted upon the 

unanimous verdict of the jury, and that by pleading guilty he would be waiving all of those 

rights. Carter replied in the affirmative. 

{¶ 14} Carter then pled guilty to improper handling of a firearm in a motor vehicle, 

and the trial court found that Carter had knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived 

his rights and entered into a plea of guilty. The trial court found Carter guilty upon his plea 

and ordered a presentence investigation. The trial court scheduled his sentencing for 

June 7, 2021. 

{¶ 15} On June 7, 2021, the trial court sentenced Carter to 18 months in prison. 

The trial court also stated that, upon his release, Carter could be placed on post-release 

control for up to three years and that he would receive credit for time spent in the Clark 

County Jail. The court did not impose a fine, and it ordered forfeiture of Carter’s firearm. 

{¶ 16} Carter appeals. 

I. Anders Appeal Standard 

{¶ 17} Carter’s appellate counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California 

386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396 18 L.Ed.2d 493, indicating that she found no arguable issues 

for appeal. Counsel offers one potential assignment of error: whether the trial court erred 

in imposing the maximum prison term of 18 months when Carter’s only prior felony was 

in 1998. 

{¶ 18} When an Anders brief is filed, the appellate court must determine, “after a 

full examination of the proceedings,” whether the appeal is “wholly frivolous.” Id. at 744; 

Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988). An issue is not 
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frivolous merely because prosecution can be expected to present a strong argument in 

reply. State v. Pullen, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 19232, 2002-Ohio-6788, ¶ 4. Rather, a

frivolous appeal is one that presents issues lacking arguable merit, which means that "on 

the facts and law involved, no responsible contention can be made that it offers a basis 

for reversal." State v. Marbury, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 19226, 2003-Ohio-3242, ¶ 8, 

citing Pullen at ¶ 4. If we find that any issue -- whether presented by appellate counsel, 

presented by the defendant (if a pro se brief is filed), or found through an independent 

analysis -- is not wholly frivolous, we must appoint different appellate counsel to represent 

the defendant. Id. at ¶17.

{¶ 19} "An appellate court must determine whether the record affirmatively 

demonstrates that a defendant's plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary[.]" State v. 

Russell, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25132, 2012-Ohio-6051, ¶ 7, citing Boykin v. Alabama, 

395 U.S. 238, 243, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969). If a defendant's plea is not 

knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, it "has been obtained in violation of due process and 

is void." Id.

{¶ 20} } "In order for a plea to be given knowingly and voluntarily, the trial court 

must follow the mandates of Crim.R. 11(C)." State v. Brown, 2d Dist. Montgomery Nos. 

24520, 24705, 2012-Ohio-199, ¶ 13. The Supreme Court of Ohio has urged trial courts 

to comply literally with Crim.R. 11. State v. Clark, 119 Ohio St.3d 239, 2008-Ohio-3748, 

893 N.E.2d 462, ¶ 29. However, in reviewing the plea colloquy, the focus should be on 

whether "the dialogue between the court and the defendant demonstrates that the 

defendant understood the consequences of his plea." State v. Dangler, 164 Ohio St.3d 1; 

2020-Ohio-2765, 164 N.E.3d 286, ¶ 12. 
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{¶ 21} Crim.R. 11(C)(2) requires a trial court to address the defendant personally 

and (a) determine that the defendant is making the plea voluntarily, with an understanding 

of the nature of the charges and the maximum penalty, and, if applicable, that the 

defendant is not eligible for probation or for the imposition of community control sanctions; 

(b) inform the defendant of and determine that the defendant understands the effect of 

the plea of guilty and that the court, upon acceptance of the plea, may proceed with 

judgment and sentencing; and (c) inform the defendant and determine that he or she 

understands that, by entering the plea, the defendant is waiving the rights to a jury trial, 

to confront witnesses against him or her, to have compulsory process for obtaining 

witnesses, and to require the State to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at 

which he or she cannot be compelled to testify against himself or herself. State v. Brown, 

2d Dist. Montgomery No. 21896, 2007-Ohio-6675, ¶ 3. 

{¶ 22} In general, a defendant is not entitled to have his or her plea vacated unless 

the defendant demonstrates he or she was prejudiced by a failure of the trial court to 

comply with the provisions of Crim.R. 11(C). Dangler at ¶ 16, citing State v. Nero, 56 Ohio 

St.3d 106, 108, 564 N.E.2d 474 (1990). The test for prejudice is "whether the plea would 

have otherwise been made." Id. 

{¶ 23} This general rule is subject to two exceptions. Id. at ¶ 16. First, the trial court 

must comply strictly with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) as it pertains to the waiver of federal 

constitutional rights. Id. at ¶ 14; Clark at ¶ 31. "When a trial court fails to explain the 

constitutional rights that a defendant waives by pleading guilty or no contest, we presume 

that the plea was entered involuntarily and unknowingly, and no showing of prejudice is 

required." Dangler at ¶ 14. 
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{¶ 24} Second, "a trial court's complete failure to comply with a portion of Crim.R. 

11(C) eliminates the defendant's burden to show prejudice." Id. at ¶ 15, citing State v. 

Sarkozy, 117 Ohio St.3d 86, 2008-Ohio-509, 881 N.E.2d 1224, ¶ 22. See also State v. 

Bishop, 156 Ohio St.3d 156, 2018-Ohio-5132, 124 N.E.3d 766, ¶ 11 (a defendant must 

show prejudice if the trial court partially complied with Crim.R. 11(C) in regard to a nonconstitutional right, but no showing of prejudice is required if the trial court completely 

failed to comply). 

{¶ 25} We have reviewed the transcript of the plea hearing and find that the trial 

court fully complied with the requirements of Crim.R. 11. The court initially questioned 

Carter about his guilty plea. The court inquired if he was under the influence of alcohol or 

drugs. The court asked Carter if he had reviewed the plea agreement with his attorney. 

All of Carter’s responses were appropriate. 

{¶ 26} The trial court reviewed the offense to which Carter was entering a plea and 

the maximum prison sentence and fine for the offense. The court also reviewed what 

post-release control is and the potential consequences of violating post-release control. 

{¶ 27} The trial court reviewed the constitutional rights that he was waiving by 

entering a plea. Carter denied that his plea was the result of promises (other than the plea 

agreement) or threats. Carter pled guilty to one count of improper handling of a firearm in 

a motor vehicle. The trial court found that Carter had entered his plea voluntarily and 

that Carter had signed the written plea form. 

{¶ 28} Upon review of the plea hearing transcript, we find no non-frivolous issues 

for appeal relating to Carter’s plea. 

{¶ 29} In addition, we find nothing in the record to suggest that anything occurred 
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prior to the plea hearing that precluded Carter from entering a knowing, intelligent, and 

voluntary plea. A plea of guilty is a complete admission of guilt. E.g., State v. Faulkner, 

2d Dist. Champaign No. 2013-CA-43, 2015-Ohio-2059, ¶ 9; State v. Wheeler, 2d Dist. 

Montgomery No. 24112, 2011-Ohio-3423, ¶ 3; Crim.R. 11(B)(1). Consequently, a guilty 

plea generally waives all appealable errors that may have occurred in the trial court, 

unless such errors precluded the defendant from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily 

entering his or her guilty plea. See, e.g., State v. Kelley, 57 Ohio St.3d 127, 566 N.E.2d 

658 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus; Wheeler at ¶ 3. We find no non-frivolous issues 

related to the events prior to Carter's guilty plea.

{¶ 30} We now turn to Carter’s sentence. In reviewing felony sentences, 

appellate courts must apply the standard of review set forth in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), rather 

than an abuse of discretion standard. See State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-

Ohio-1002, 59 N.E.3d 1231, ¶ 9. Under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), an appellate court may 

increase, reduce, or modify a sentence, or it may vacate the sentence and remand for 

resentencing, only if it "clearly and convincingly" finds either (1) that the record does not 

support certain specified findings or (2) that the sentence imposed is contrary to law. State 

v. Huffman, 2d Dist. Miami No. 2016-CA-16, 2017-Ohio-4097, ¶ 6.

{¶ 31} } "The trial court has full discretion to impose any sentence within the 

authorized statutory range, and the court is not required to make any findings or give its 

reasons for imposing maximum or more than minimum sentences." State v. King, 2013-

Ohio-2021, 992 N.E.2d 491, ¶ 45 (2d Dist.). However, in exercising its discretion, a trial 

court must consider the statutory policies that apply to every felony offense, including 

those set out in R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12. State v. Leopard, 194 Ohio App.3d 500, 
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2011-Ohio-3864, 957 N.E.2d 55, ¶ 11 (2d Dist.), citing State v. Mathis, 109 Ohio St.3d 

54, 2006-Ohio-855, 846 N.E.2d 1, ¶ 38.

{¶ 32} The presentence investigation report reflects that Carter was 41 years old 

at the time of the offense and disposition. Carter had both prior juvenile and adult 

convictions. 

{¶ 33} The maximum penalty for one count of improper handling of a firearm in a 

motor vehicle, a felony of the fourth degree, was 18 months in prison and a $5,000 fine. 

The trial court’s sentencing of 18 months with no fine was not contrary to law. 

{¶ 34} We have examined the entire record and conducted our independent review 

in accordance with Penson, 488 U.S. 75, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300. We conclude 

that no non-frivolous issues exist for appeal in this case.

II. Conclusion

{¶ 35} The trial court’s judgment is affirmed. 

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TUCKER, P.J. and WELBAUM, J., concur. 

Copies sent to: 

Ian A. Richardson 

H. Michele Thomas 

Larry Carter, Jr. 

Hon. Douglas M. Rastatter