15-246 Singh v. Lynch BIA Nelson, IJ A200 770 773 

### UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS **FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT** 

# SUMMARY ORDER

**RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED**  **AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF**  **APPELLATE PROCEDURE**  **32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUM** **ENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL**  **APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.**  **At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals** 1 **for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United** 2 **States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,** 3 **on the 4 th** **day of October, two thousand sixteen.** 4 5 **PRESENT:** 6 **JOSÉ A. CABRANES,** 7 **DENNY CHIN,** 8 **RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,** 9 Circuit Judges. 10

**_____________________________________** 11 12 **VARINDER SINGH,** 13 Petitioner**,** 14 15 **v. 15-246** 16 **NAC** 17 **LORETTA E. LYNCH, UNITED STATES** 18 **ATTORNEY GENERAL,** 19 Respondent**.** 20

**_____________________________________** 21 22 **FOR PETITIONER:** Jaspreet Singh, Law Office of 23 Jaspreet Singh, Jackson Heights, 24 New York. 25 26 **FOR RESPONDENT:** Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal 27 Deputy Attorney General; Anthony 28 P. Nicastro, Acting Assistant 29 Director; Joanna L. Watson, Trial 30 Attorney; Sandy R. Pineda, Law 31Clerk, Office of Immigration 1 Litigation, United States 2 Department of Justice, Washington, 3 D.C. 4 5 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 6 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 7 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review 8 is DENIED. 9 Petitioner Varinder Singh, a native and citizen of 10 India, seeks review of a December 31, 2014, decision of the 11 BIA affirming a March 20, 2013, decision of an Immigration 12 Judge (“IJ”) denying him asylum, withholding of removal, and 13 relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re 14 Varinder Singh, No. A200 770 773 (B.I.A. Dec. 31, 2014), 15 aff’gNo. A200 770 773 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Mar. 20, 2013). 16 We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts 17 and procedural history in this case. 18 We have reviewed both the IJ’s and the BIA’s decisions 19 “for the sake of completeness.” Wangchuck v. Dep’t of 20 Homeland Sec. , 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). The 21 applicable standards of review are well established. See 22 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 23 510, 513 (2d Cir. 2009). 24

2The agency did not err in finding that Singh failed to 1 establish past persecution or a well-founded fear of 2 persecution in India. Singh asserted that he was threatened 3 in India as a Sikh and because of his political support for 4 the Shiromani Akali Dal Amritsar (“SADA”) party. 5 A past persecution claim can be based on harm other 6 than threats to life or freedom, including non-life7 threatening violence and physical abuse, Beskovic v. 8 Gonzales , 467 F.3d 223, 226 n.3 (2d Cir. 2006), but the harm 9 must be sufficiently severe, rising above “mere harassment,” 10 Ivanishvili v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice , 433 F.3d 332, 341 (2d 11 Cir. 2006). In evaluating a past persecution claim, the 12 agency considers the harm suffered in the aggregate. 13 Poradisova v. Gonzales , 420 F.3d 70, 79-80 (2d Cir. 2005). 14 The agency did not err in finding that Singh’s 15 experiences in India did not constitute persecution. 16 Singh’s claim of past persecution rested on unfulfilled 17 threats directed at him and his uncle after political 18 rallies in India and harm that his father suffered when 19 Singh was a child. These incidents, even considered 20 cumulatively, do not constitutepersecution of Singh. See 21 Gui Ci Pan v. U.S. Att’y General , 449 F.3d 408, 412-13 (2d 22 3Cir. 2006) (recognizing that unfulfilled threats do not 1 amount to persecution). 2 Singh argues that the agency failed to consider his age 3 at the time he received the threats. “[A]ge can be a 4 critical factor in the adjudication of asylum claims and may 5 bear heavily on the question of whether an applicant was 6 persecuted or whether she holds a well-founded fear of 7 future persecution.” Jorge-Tzoc v. Gonzales , 435 F.3d 146, 8 150 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Liu v. Ashcroft , 380 F.3d 307, 9 314 (7th Cir. 2004)). The IJ was aware, however, of Singh’s 10 age when he was purportedly threatened, and Singh does not 11 further explain how or why his perspective as a teenager 12 requires a finding of past persecution. Cf. Jorge-Tzoc , 435 13 F.3d at 150 (remanding, in a case where past harm occurred 14 when applicant was seven, for IJ to consider “harms . . . 15 cumulatively and from the perspective of a small child”). 16 Absent past persecution, an alien may establish 17 eligibility for asylum by demonstrating a well-founded fear 18 of future persecution. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2). That fear 19 must be both subjectively credible and objectively 20 reasonable. Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft , 357 F.3d 169, 178 21 (2d Cir. 2004). To demonstrate a well-founded fear, an 22 4applicant must show either a reasonable possibility that he 1 would be singled out for persecution or that the country of 2 removal has a pattern or practice of persecuting individuals 3 similarly situated to him. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(iii). 4 “An alien must make some showing that authorities in his 5 country of nationality are either aware of his activities or 6 likely to become aware of his activities.” Hongsheng Leng 7 v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 135, 143 (2d Cir. 2008). The agency 8 did not err in finding that Singh failed to establish a 9 well-founded fear of persecution on account of his religion 10 or political opinion. 11 First, the agency reasonably gave diminished weight to 12 Singh’s letters from family, friends, and the SADA party, 13 because they were largely from interested witnesses and 14 provided conclusory assertions and little detail regarding 15 the possibility of harm to Singh. See Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. 16 Dep’t of Justice , 471 F.3d 315, 342 (2d Cir. 2006) (the 17 weight accorded to documentary evidence lies largely within 18 agency’s discretion); In re H-L-H- & Z-Y-Z- , 25 I. & N. Dec. 19 209, 215 (BIA 2010) (giving diminished weight to letters 20 from relatives because they were from interested witnesses 21

5not subject to cross-examination), rev’d on other grounds by 1 Hui Lin Huang v. Holder, 677 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2012). 2 Further, Singh testified that his father returned to 3 India in 2011 and did not present any evidence that he had 4 encountered problems as a Sikh or a SADA supporter. See 5 Melgar de Torres v. Reno , 191 F.3d 307, 313 (2d Cir. 1999) 6 (finding alleged future fear diminished when similarly 7 situated individuals are able to live unharmed in asylum 8 applicant’s native country); see also Jian Xing Huang v. 9
U.S. INS, 421 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir. 2005) (“In the absence 10 of solid support in the record . . . , [an applicant’s] fear 11 is speculative at best”). Accordingly, as the agency 12 concluded, Singh failed to establish a reasonable 13 possibility that he will be singled out for persecution. 14 See Hongsheng Leng, 528 F.3d at 142-43. 15 Moreover, the agency did not err in determining that 16 Singh failed to establish a pattern or practice of 17 persecution of similarly situated individuals. See id.The 18 IJ reasonably concluded that the country conditions evidence 19 reflected that Sikhs had “significant problems” in the 20 1980s, but not that those problems persisted. The 2010 U.S. 21

6Department of State Human Rights Report described serious 1 human rights violations against Sikhs between 1984 and 1994, 2 but identified no current threats to the Sikh community. 3 Singh’s additional evidence consisted of newspaper articles 4 that addressed only the situation in the 1980s and instances 5 of voter fraud. The IJ reasonably determined that this 6 evidence was insufficient to demonstrate systemic or 7 pervasive harm that rose to the level of persecution. See8 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(iii);Santoso v. Holder, 580 F.3d 9 110, 112 & n.1 (2d Cir. 2009); In re A-M- , 23 I. & N. Dec. 10 737, 741 (BIA 2005) (recognizing that a pattern or practice 11 of persecution is the “systemic or pervasive” persecution of 12 a group). 13 Accordingly, we find no error in the agency’s 14 conclusion that Singh failed to demonstrate past persecution 15 or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of his 16 political opinion or religion. These conclusions are 17 dispositive of the claims for asylum, withholding of 18 removal, and CAT relief because all three claims were based 19 on the same factual predicate. See Paul v. Gonzales , 444 20 F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2006). 21

7For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 1 DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of 2 removal that the Court previously granted in this petition 3 is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in 4 this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for 5 oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with 6 Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second 7 Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b). 8
FOR THE COURT: 9 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk 10 11 12

8