J-S04033-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

SANTIAGO SALGADO-OCHOA 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 192 EDA 2023

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 18, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-15-CR-0001494-2021

BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and LANE, J.

MEMORANDUM BY LANE, J.: FILED MAY 28, 2024

Santiago Salgado-Ochoa (“Salgado-Ochoa”) appeals from the judgment 

of sentence imposed following his convictions for indecent exposure, 

corruption of minors, and false imprisonment.1 Additionally, Salgado-Ochoa’s 

counsel has filed an application to withdraw and an accompanying brief 

pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). After careful review, 

we grant counsel’s application to withdraw and affirm Salgado-Ochoa’s 

judgment of sentence.

In 2020, the victim, L.O., reported to police that a male relative, 

Salgado-Ochoa, had acted inappropriately towards her when she was a child. 

Police investigated and filed charges against Salgado-Ochoa. The matter 

proceeded to a two-day jury trial at which L.O., then seventeen years old, 

testified that, when she was seven years old, Salgado-Ochoa, then twenty-six 

____________________________________________

1 See 18 Pa.C.S.A §§3127(a), 6301(a)(1)(ii), 2903(b).
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years old, trapped her alone in a room she shared with her family in his 

cousin’s house,2 pulled his pants down exposing his penis, and repeatedly told 

her to touch his penis while grabbing it with one hand. See N.T., 6/28/22, at 

32, 35-36, 38-41; see also N.T., 6/29/22, at 88. L.O. tried to go around him 

to leave the room, but he blocked the door. See N.T., 6/28/22, at 41. L.O. 

testified that she felt “really uncomfortable” when this happened “because this 

was [her] first time seeing that part of a man.” Id. at 40.

Salgado-Ochoa testified on his own behalf and denied all of L.O.’s 

allegations. At the conclusion of trial, the jury found Salgado-Ochoa guilty of 

indecent exposure, corruption of minors, and false imprisonment. See N.T.; 

6/29/22, at 176-78. The trial court scheduled a sentencing hearing and 

ordered a pre-sentence investigation report (“PSI”).

On November 18, 2022, after reviewing the PSI, the trial court imposed 

the following sentences: (1) a term of sixteen months to thirty-six months’ 

imprisonment plus five years’ probation consecutive to parole for false 

imprisonment; (2) a term of nine months to twenty-four months plus three 

years’ probation consecutive to parole for corruption of minors; and (3) a term 

of three months to twelve months to be served consecutively for indecent 

exposure. In sum, the trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of two years 

and four months to six years’ incarceration followed by eight years’ probation.

____________________________________________

2 L.O. testified that she referred to Salgado-Ochoa as “uncle.” See N.T., 

6/28/22, at 36.
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Salgado-Ochoa’s former defense counsel filed a timely motion for postsentence relief challenging the weight of the evidence and the discretionary 

aspects of his sentence. The trial court denied the motion and Salgado-Ochoa 

filed a timely notice of appeal. The trial court ordered Salgado-Ochoa to file 

a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. In 

response, newly-appointed counsel submitted a statement of intent to file an 

Anders brief pursuant to Rule 1925(c)(4). In this Court, counsel filed an 

Anders brief and an application to withdraw from representation. SalgadoOchoa did not respond to the application to withdraw.

Counsel’s Anders brief identifies the following issues for our review:

I. Was sufficient evidence presented to support [Salgado-Ochoa’s] 

convictions beyond a reasonable doubt on the charges of: 

indecent exposure, corruption of minors, and false imprisonment? 

II. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in finding the jury’s 

verdict was not against the weight of the evidence?

III. Was the imposed sentence manifestly unreasonable and 

excessive?

Anders Brief at 4 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

Before we assess the substance of counsel’s Anders brief, we must first 

determine whether counsel’s request to withdraw meets certain procedural 

requirements. See Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 928 A.2d 287, 290 (Pa. 

Super. 2007) (en banc). An Anders brief that accompanies a request to 

withdraw must:

(1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with 

citations to the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that 
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counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set forth 

counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state 

counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous. 

Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling 

case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the conclusion 

that the appeal is frivolous. 

Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349, 361 (Pa. 2009). Counsel must 

also provide a copy of the Anders brief to the client, and a letter that advises 

the client of the right to “(1) retain new counsel to pursue the appeal; (2) 

proceed pro se on appeal; or (3) raise any points that the appellant deems 

worthy of the court’s attention in addition to the points raised by counsel in 

the Anders brief.” Commonwealth v. Orellana, 86 A.3d 877, 880 (Pa. 

Super. 2014) (citation omitted). If counsel has satisfied these requirements, 

we then conduct “a full examination” of the record “to decide whether the case 

is wholly frivolous.” Commonwealth v. Dempster, 187 A.3d 266, 271 (Pa. 

Super. 2018) (en banc) (quoting Anders, 386 U.S. at 744).

Here, in the Anders brief, counsel provides a procedural and factual 

history of the case, with citations to the record, discusses the issues arguably 

supporting the appeal, and explains why counsel concludes those issues are 

frivolous. See Anders Brief at 5-33. Counsel mailed a copy of the Anders

brief to Salgado-Ochoa, and in her cover letter, counsel advised him that he 

could raise any additional issues before this Court pro se or with private 

counsel. See Petition to Withdraw as Counsel, 10/17/23, Exhibit 3. As 

counsel has substantially complied with the requirements of Anders and 

Santiago, we will conduct an independent review to determine whether this 

appeal is frivolous.
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The first issue raised in the Anders brief presents a challenge to the 

sufficiency of the evidence supporting Salgado-Ochoa’s convictions. Thus, as 

a part of our duty to conduct an independent review of the entire case, we will 

address the sufficiency claim.

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence 

is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light 

most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence 

to enable the factfinder to find every element of the crime beyond 

a reasonable doubt. In applying [the above] test, we may not 

weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the factfinder. 

In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established 

by the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of 

innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be 

resolved by the factfinder unless the evidence is so weak and 

inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be 

drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth

may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial 

evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record 

must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be 

considered. Finally, the trier of fact while passing upon the 

credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, 

is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Wright, 846 A.2d 730, 736 (Pa. Super.2004) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Bullick, 830 A.2d 998, 1000 (Pa. Super.2003)).

A person commits indecent exposure “if that person exposes his or her 

genitals in any public place or in any place where there are present other 

persons under circumstances in which he or she knows or should know that 

this conduct is likely to offend, affront or alarm.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3127(a).

A person commits the crime of corruption of minors when the person is 

over the age of eighteen and the victim is less than eighteen years of age and 
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the person “by any course of conduct in violation of Chapter 31 (relating to 

sexual offenses) corrupts or tends to corrupt the morals of any minor less than 

18 years of age, or who aids, abets, entices or encourages any such minor in 

the commission of an offense under Chapter 31 . . ..” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 

6301(a)(1)(ii).

Finally, false imprisonment of a minor by an offender who is not the 

victim’s parent is established when the offender “knowingly restrains another 

unlawfully so as to interfere substantially with his liberty.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 

2903(b).

Counsel concedes that the evidence was sufficient to establish indecent 

exposure and corruption of minors. With respect to false imprisonment of a 

minor, counsel concedes that the evidence was sufficient, but posits whether 

it could be argued that Salgado-Ochoa did not substantially interfere with 

L.O.’s liberty because the entire incident lasted approximately one minute, 

and Salgado-Ochoa did not physically restrain L.O. in any manner.

Based on our independent review of the record, and viewing the 

evidence presented in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, we 

conclude that Salgado-Ochoa’s convictions are supported by sufficient 

evidence. L.O. testified that, when she was seven years old, Salgado-Ochoa 

restrained her in a bedroom by closing the door, blocking her exit, and 

preventing her from leaving the room, and then pulled his pants down, 

exposed his penis, and repeatedly told her to touch his penis while grabbing 

it with one hand. See N.T., 6/28/22, at 36, 38-41. L.O. further testified that 
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Salgado-Ochoa’s conduct made her “very uncomfortable” because she had 

never seen male genitals. Id. at 40.

This evidence was sufficient to establish indecent exposure based on 

L.O.’s testimony that Salgado-Ochoa exposed his genitals to her when he 

knew or should have known that his conduct was likely to offend, affront, or 

alarm a seven-year-old child. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3127(a). Additionally, 

because Salgado-Ochoa was over the age of eighteen and L.O. was less than 

eighteen years of age at the time he exposed his penis to her and directed her 

to touch it, such testimony also sufficiently established corruption of minors 

because Salgado-Ochoa engaged in a course of conduct in violation of Chapter 

31 which corrupted or tended to corrupt the morals of a minor less than 

eighteen years of age. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6301(a)(1)(ii).

Finally, as Salgado-Ochoa was not L.O.’s parent, her testimony 

sufficiently established that, by closing the door, blocking her exit, and 

refusing to let her leave the room, he falsely imprisoned L.O. because he 

knowingly and unlawfully restrained her and interfered substantially with her 

liberty. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2903(b). That the incident lasted only one minute, 

and Salgado-Ochoa did not physically restrain L.O., is not determinative. 

Section 2903(b) does not include a temporal element or require that the minor 

be physically restrained to obtain a conviction. Moreover, the jury was entitled 

to find that, for a seven-year-old child, the mental trauma resulting from being 

trapped in a room with an adult who closed the door, blocked her exit, and 

would not let her leave, was a substantial interference with L.O.’s liberty, even 
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if only for one minute. Thus, based on our independent review of the record, 

we conclude that Salgado-Ochoa’s sufficiency challenge is wholly frivolous.

The second issue raised by counsel in the Anders brief is that the verdict 

was against the weight of the evidence. A motion for new trial on the grounds 

that the verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence, concedes that there 

is sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict. Commonwealth v. Rayner, 153 

A.3d 1049, 1054 (Pa. Super. 2016) (quoting Commonwealth v. Widmer, 

744 A.2d 745, 751 (Pa. 2000)). Our review of a weight challenge is wellsettled:

[t]he determination of whether to grant a new trial because the 

verdict is against the weight of the evidence rests within the 

discretion of the trial court, and we will not disturb that decision 

absent an abuse of discretion. Where issues of credibility and 

weight of the evidence are concerned, it is not the function of the 

appellate court to substitute its judgment based on a cold record 

for that of the trial court. The weight to be accorded conflicting 

evidence is exclusively for the factfinder, whose findings will not 

be disturbed on appeal if they are supported by the record. A 

claim that the evidence presented at trial was contradictory and 

unable to support the verdict requires the grant of a new trial only 

when the verdict is so contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s 

sense of justice.

Commonwealth v. Lyons, 833 A.2d 245, 259 (Pa. Super. 2003). A trial 

court’s determination that a verdict was not against the interest of justice is 

“[o]ne of the least assailable reasons” for denying a new trial. 

Commonwealth v. Colon–Plaza, 136 A.3d 521, 529 (Pa. Super. 2016) 

(quoting Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049, 1055 (Pa. 2013)).
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Here, in the Anders brief, counsel explains that L.O. waited eight years 

before bringing her accusations against Salgado-Ochoa, and one year later 

she added additional details to her accusation. Counsel further explains that 

L.O. wrote a letter to her mother in 2020 in which she expressed that she was 

overwhelmed and angry with her mother about the adult responsibilities that 

were forced upon L.O. when she was a very young child. Counsel queries 

whether L.O.’s anger against her mother and her mother’s illicit relationship 

with Salgado-Ochoa may have caused L.O. to bring her accusations against 

Salgado-Ochoa. Counsel also points out that the accusations made by L.O. 

would have granted L.O. and her immediate family, who are undocumented 

immigrants, U visa protection. However, counsel nonetheless concedes:

There is no evidence of record indicating the trial court’s denial of 

[Salgado-Ochoa]’s motion for new trial was the result of partiality, 

prejudice, bias or ill-will. Further, there is also no evidence that 

the trial court’s judgment was manifestly unreasonable. The 

jury’s verdict was based on evidence of record and the jury’s 

credibility determinations. Therefore, it was not manifestly 

unreasonable.

Anders Brief at 23.

The trial court considered Salgado-Ochoa’s challenge to the weight of 

the evidence and determined that it lacked merit. The court reasoned:

Considering the verdict, it seems the jury did not give much 

weight to [Salgado-Ochoa]’s denials of guilt or his claims that the 

charges against him were the result of [L.O.'s] ulterior motives. 

The jury chose to accept the uncontradicted and consistent 
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testimony from [L.O.] that, when she was six years old,[3] she 

returned from kindergarten while living in the same house as 

[Salgado-Ochoa] and while he was in her room, he pulled down 

his pants, and asked her to touch his penis. When she refused, 

he blocked her exit and continued to ask her to touch his penis. 

The reliability of [L.O.’s] allegations is corroborated by their 

consistency and by the fact that they came to light due to an 

investigation initiated by [L.O.’s] school to address her lack of 

attendance and poor grades, not a criminal complaint. Thus, we 

found nothing in the record to support [Salgado-Ochoa]’s 

contention that the jury should have given the [L.O.’s] testimony 

less weight, and we found that the jury’s assessment of the 

evidence was reasonable. Accordingly, we found that [SalgadoOchoa] failed to meet his burden to show that his convictions were 

contrary to the weight of the evidence produced at trial and denied 

his post-trial motion.

Supplemental Rule 1925(a) Opinion, 4/29/24, at 6.4

We discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court in concluding that 

the jury’s verdict was not against the weight of the evidence. The verdict 

confirms that the jury credited the testimony of L.O., despite her delay in 

revealing Salgado-Ochoa’s crimes against her and despite a minor addition to 

the details of the encounter, her anger at her mother, and her status as an 

illegal immigrant. The jury’s verdict additionally reflects its rejection of 

Salgado-Ochoa’s testimony as credible, as well as its finding that his denials 

of the encounter and claims of innocence were not believable. Based on the 

record before us, we find no basis to disturb the trial court’s determination 

____________________________________________

3 L.O. testified that the incident occurred when she was six or seven years old. 

See N.T. 6/28/22, at 34, 48, 52-53.

4

In its initial Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court did not specifically address 

Salgado-Ochoa’s weight challenge. Pursuant to this Court’s judgment order, 

the trial court filed a supplemental Rule 1925(a) opinion in which it addressed 

the weight challenge.
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that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence. It is not the 

function of the appellate court to substitute its judgment based on a cold 

record for that of the trial court. See Lyons, 833 A.2d at 259. Thus, as we 

discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court regarding the denial of 

Salgado-Ochoa’s motion for a new trial, we conclude that Salgado-Ochoa’s 

challenge to the weight of the evidence is wholly frivolous.

The final issue raised by counsel in the Anders brief concerns the 

sentencing guidelines used by the trial court when imposing Salgado-Ochoa’s 

sentence. This issue presents a challenge to the discretionary aspects of his 

sentence. Such challenges must be raised in a post-sentence motion or during 

the sentencing proceedings, or they are waived. See Commonwealth v. 

Griffin, 65 A.3d 932, 935 (Pa. Super. 2013); see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a)

(providing that issues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be 

raised for the first time on appeal).

In the Anders brief, counsel contends that the sentencing guidelines 

suggested by the prosecutor—and used by the trial court with the agreement 

of all parties—were the incorrect guidelines which did not apply to the period 

of time specified in the verdict slip. Counsel argues that incorrect offense 

gravity scores for false imprisonment and corruption of minors were used, 

resulting in the trial court considering incorrect guideline ranges.

Counsel additionally points out that the prosecutor indicated to the trial 

court that Salgado-Ochoa’s convictions for false imprisonment and corruption 

of minors required him to register as a Tier I sex offender for fifteen years. 
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Counsel asserts that the verdict slip indicated that Salgado-Ochoa committed 

his crimes against L.O. between October 2010 and October 2012. Counsel 

maintains, based on this timeframe, Salgado-Ochoa was Subchapter I, which 

applies to sexual offenders who committed an offense on or after April 22, 

1996 but before December 20, 2012. See Anders Brief at 31 (citing 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.55). Counsel challenges Salgado-Ochoa’s registration 

requirements because Subchapter I does not require registration for any of 

Salgado-Ochoa’s convictions.

Here, we are precluded from reviewing these particular challenges to 

the discretionary aspects of Salgado-Ochoa’s sentence because he did not 

raise these issues at sentencing or in his post-sentence motion. Therefore, 

he did not properly preserve these claims for our review, and they are waived.

See Griffin, 65 A.3d at 935. Accordingly, we conclude that any challenge to 

the discretionary aspects of Salgado-Ochoa’s sentence is frivolous.

Lastly, our independent review of the record reveals no non-frivolous 

issues to be raised on appeal. See Commonwealth v. Yorgey, 188 A.3d 

1190, 1196 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en banc). Accordingly, we affirm the judgment 

of sentence.

Application to withdraw granted. Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Date: 5/28/2024