Dismissed and Opinion Filed December 12, 2016 

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In The 

## Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-14-00856-CV IN THE INTEREST OF C.S.B AND R.D.B On Appeal from the 255th Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. DF-11-15158 

### MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Franci s, Stoddart and Whitehill Opinion by Justice Francis In this appeal from a final decree of divorce, appellant Mary Davis Beougher challenges the trial court’s division of the pa rties’ property, debts, and attorney ’s fees. In response, appellee Ritchie Dean Beougher has requested this Cour t dismiss the appeal based on appellant’s acceptance of certain benef its of the judgment. It is a well-established rule that a litigant cannot treat a judgment as both right and wrong by voluntarily accepting some of the judgment’s benefits and appealing the remainder. See Carle v. Carle , 234 S.W.2d 1002, 1004 (Tex. 1950); In re M.A.H. , 365 S.W.3d 814, 817–18 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.). This doctrine of ten arises in divorce cases where one spouse accepts part of the divorce decree and tries to appeal the rest. See M.A.H. , 365 S.W.3d at 818. Once a spouse affirmatively acquiesces to the judg ment of divorce, and relies on it to receive benefits, that spouse is estopped from challengi ng the judgment’s validity unless an exception to the rule applies. See Waite v. Waite , 150 S.W.3d 797, 803–04 (Tex. A pp.—Houston [14th Dist.]–2– 2004, pet. denied); Haggard v. Haggard , 550 S.W.2d 374, 376 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1977, no writ). The appellee has the burden to prove estoppel. See M.A.H. , 365 S.W.3d at 818. Once estoppel is shown, the burden then shifts to the appellant to show that his or her actions fall within an exception to the rule. See Waite , 150 S.W.3d at 804; Richards v. Richards , 371 S.W.3d 412, 415 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.) In this case, the final decree of divorce aw arded each of the partie s a one-half, undivided, separate property interest in a lake house owned during the marriage. The decree further ordered that the lake house be sold and the proceeds used to pay court costs and the parties’ attorney’s fees. The court appointed a receiver and a realtor to effectuate the sale. Appellee submitted an affidavit in which he testified that he and appellant agreed on a sales price for the house. Appellee also submitted evidence that the lake house was sold and, approximately two months later, the trial court ordered the receiver to disburse the net pro ceeds of the sale to the parties’ attorneys. By acquiescing in both the sale of the house and the use of the proceeds to pay her separate debts, appellant voluntarily accepted so me of the benefits of the judgment she now challenges. We conclude appe llee met his burden to show th at appellant is estopped from appealing the decree. The burden then shifted to appellant to show that her acceptance of the benefits of the judgment fell within either of two narrow excepti ons to the estoppel rule : (1) acceptance of the benefits of the judgment was a result of financ ial duress or other economic circumstances or (2) reversal of the judgment on the grounds appealed could not possi bly affect her right to the benefits accepted. See Richards , 371 S.W.3d at 414–15. Appellant filed no response to appellee’s request for dismissal of the appeal. Absent any showing that either of the two exceptions applies to appellant’s actions, we conclude she is est opped from appealing the trial court’s judgment.–3– Based on the foregoing, we dismiss this appeal. See id . at 417.

140856F.P05 /Molly Francis/ MOLLY FRANCIS JUSTICE–4– 

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Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT

IN THE INTEREST OF C.S.B AND R.D.B No. 05-14-00856-CV On Appeal from the 255th Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. DF-11-15158. Opinion delivered by Justice Francis. Justices Stoddart and Whitehill participating. In accordance with this Court’s opi nion of this date, the appeal is DISMISSED

. It is ORDERED that appellee Ritchie Dean Beougher recover his costs of this appeal from appellant Mary Davis Beougher.

Judgment entered December 12, 2016.