alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# C o u rt o f

A p p ea ls

o f t h e S t a te o f

G eo rg ia

ATLANTA,_

_ _ __ _ _ __ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ __ _

Th e Co u rt

o f Ap p ea l s h er eb y p a s s es t h e f

o ll owi n g o r der :

A1 7 E0 01 4

. I N THE I NTEREST OF R. C. AND C

. C. CHI LDREN (MOTHER)

v . THE STATE OF GEORGI A.

It i s h ereb y o rd ered t h at t h e em erg en cy m o ti o n req u es t i n g an ex t en s i o n o f t i m e

i n wh i ch t o fi l e an Ap p l i cat i o n f o r D i s cret i o n ary Ap p eal i s hereb y GRANTED

p u rs u an t t o Co u rt o f A p p eal s Ru l e 3 1 (g ). T he Ap p l i cat io n fo r Di s cret i o n ary Ap p eal

wi l l n o w b e d u e o n o r b efo re t h e 2 1 s t d ay o f Decem b er 2 0 1 6

.

C o u r t o f A p p e a l s o f t h e S t a t e o

f G e o r g ia

C le r k ’ s O f f i c e

, A t la n t a

,

_

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ I c e r ti fy t h a t t h e a b o v e is a tr u e e x t r a c t f r o m

t h e m i n u t e s o

f t h e C o u r t o

f A p p e a l s o f G e o r g i a

. W i tn e s s m y s i g n a t u r e a n d t h e s e a l o

f s a i d c o u r t

h e r e t o a f f i x e d t h e d a y a n d y e a r l a s t a b o v e w r i t t e n

.

, C l e r k

. 11/14/2016 November 14, 2016
#### SEFF v. GENERAL OUTDOOR ADVERTISING CO. et al.

Civ. No. 25967.

United States District Court N. D. Ohio, E. D.

July 2, 1951.

See, also, D.C., 11 F.R.D. 596.

*599Samuel T. Gaines, Cleveland, Ohio, Carl M. Myers, Akron, Ohio, for plaintiff.

Raymond T. Jackson, Cleveland, Ohio, for General Outdoor Advertising Co.

Fred J. Perkins—McKeehan, Merrick, Arter & Stewart, all of Cleveland, Ohio, for Outdoor Advertising, Inc.

Ernest Scott, Philadelphia, Pa., for Central Outdoor Advertising Co., Inc.

JONES, Chief Judge.

This is a private anti-trust action. Defendants are charged with conspiracy “to place unlawful restraints upon the trade and commerce in outdoor advertising between and among the several states”, and with directing such conspiracy against plaintiff by the use. of their position in noncompetitive situations to influence the competitive situation in which plaintiff conducts his business.

To prepare his case and to facilitate proof of his charges at trial, plaintiff has directed 38 interrogatories to defendant, Central Outdoor Advertising Company. These interrogatories relate to ownership and control of “Central”, to its business operations, to its competition, if any, with defendant, General Outdoor Advertising Company, and to its connection, if any, with the Harry H. Packer Company.

Defendant “Central” objects to Interrogatories 20 to 31, inclusive, and to additional Interrogatories 1 and 2, on the ground that:

(1) Interrogatories 20 to 24 and additional Interrogatories 1 and 2 relate to matters not relevant to the subject matter of the action, and

(2) Interrogatories 25 to 31 are too broad and will require defendant “Central” to divulge confidential information and to engage in extensive research to compile the data which is sought.

Interrogatories 20 to 24 and additional Interrogatories 1 and 2 . seek information concerning a possible connection between “Central” and the Harry H. Packer Company or companies designated “A Packer Operation”. This information relates to the extent of defendants’ control of the outdoor advertising industry. It may lead to the discovery of relevant evidence. It is therefore within the scope of discovery permitted by Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. rule 26 (b), 28 U.S.C.A.

Interrogatories 25 to 31 seek information concerning “Central’s” activities on behalf of advertisers in subletting poster advertising business. This information in its broadest aspect is clearly relevant. The conspiracy presently alleged and its. impact upon plaintiff’s business can best be seen by an analysis of the background and extent of defendants’ business operations.

Defendant “Central’s” further objections to interrogatories 25 to 31 also must be overruled.

Defendant’s answer shows that it presumably ‘has the information called for, and it would not require an “excessive or oppressive amount of research or compilation of data at great expense” to disclose it. See Moore’s Fed. Practice, 2nd Edition, Section 33.20 and the cases cited there. That the information is possibly confidential is not a valid objection where, as here, it clearly is relevant and material.

Objections overruled.
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 
                          WASHINGTON, D.C.  20549

                               FORM 10-QSB/A
              QUARTERLY REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OF 15(D) 
  
                  OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934

  FOR QUARTERLY PERIOD ENDED                       COMMISSION
FILE NUMBER
        JUNE 30, 1996                                   
33-78602
                       
                         PEOPLES BANCORPORATION, INC.
     (exact name of small business issuer as specified in its
charter)

             SOUTH CAROLINA                           
57-09581843
       (State of other jurisdiction of              (I.R.S.
Employer
        incorporation or organization)            
Identification No.)
                 
                1800 EAST MAIN STREET, EASLEY SOUTH CAROLINA 
29640
               (Address of principal executive offices)    
(Zip Code)     

                               NOT APPLICABLE
(Former name, former address and former fiscal year, if changed
since last
 report)

Indicate by check mark whether the registrant (1) has filed all
reports required
to be filed by Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 during
the preceding 12 months (or for such shorter period that the
registrant was
required to file such reports), and (2) has been subject to
such filing
requirements for the past 90 days.

                 Yes __X__                   No _____

State the number of shares outstanding of each of the issuer's
classes of common
equity, as of the latest practicable date:

     Common Stock $3.33 Par Value              760,935
              Class                  Outstanding as of August
1, 1996



                                SIGNATURES

    Pursuant to the requirements of the Securities and Exchange
Act of 1934,
the Registrant has duly caused this report to be signed on its
behalf by the
undersigned thereunto duly authorized.

                                    PEOPLES BANCORPORATION, INC.



Dated:     October 16, 1996       By:___/s/__Robert E.
Dye______________
                                     Robert E. Dye
                                     President and Chairman of
the Board



Date:      October 16, 1996       By:___/s/__R. Riggie
Ridgeway__________
                                     R. Riggie Ridgeway
                                     Secretary and Treasurer
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
THIS  SCHEDULE  CONTAINS  SUMMARY  FINANCIAL   INFORMATION  EXTRACTED  FROM  THE
FINANCIAL  STATEMENT  OF THE COMPANY AS OF  SEPTEMBER  30, 1997  INCLUDED IN THE
10QSB AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH 10QSB
</LEGEND>
<CIK>  0000886093
<NAME> VIKING CAPITAL GROUP, INC
       
<S>                              <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                    3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                                  DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                                     JUL-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                                       SEP-30-1997
<CASH>                                                   3,136
<SECURITIES>                                                 0
<RECEIVABLES>                                          131,026
<ALLOWANCES>                                                 0
<INVENTORY>                                                  0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                        84,162
<PP&E>                                                 101,379
<DEPRECIATION>                                               0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                         301,708
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                1,304,808
<BONDS>                                                 64,585
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                        0
<PREFERRED>                                                  0
<COMMON>                                                16,906
<OTHER-SE>                                         (1,078,185)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                           301,708
<SALES>                                                 50,000
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                        50,000
<CGS>                                                        0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                          466,458
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                      (24,929)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                             0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                    (27,514)
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                      (441,387)
<INCOME-TAX>                                                 0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  (441,387)
<DISCONTINUED>                                               0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                              0
<CHANGES>                                                    0
<NET-INCOME>                                         (441,387)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                          (0.028)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                          (0.028)
        


</TABLE>
No. 1304.

#### Richmond Screw Anchor Co., Inc. *v.*Walling, Wage & Hour Administrator.

June 10, 1946.

*E. John Ernst, Jr.*and *Julius L. Goldstein*for petitioner.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied.
#### In re REEVES.

(Circuit Court, S. D. New York.

May 2, 1903.)

1. Habeas Corpus—Federal Courts—Discharging State Prisoner,

A federal court will not discharge a prisoner confined under a conviction by a state court on a writ of habeas corpus, on the ground that the statute under which the trial was held is in violation of the Constitution of the United States, where the state statute provides for an appeal and for the acceptance of ball or a stay of proceedings pending such appeal.

¶ 1. Jurisdiction of federal courts In habeas corpus proceedings, see note to In re Huse, 25 C. C. A. 4.

See Habeas Corpus, vol. 25, Cent. Dig. § 44.

On Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

Karasik & McGovern (Thomas A. Atchison, of counsel), for petitioner.

Wm. Travers Jerome, Dist. Atty.

LACOMBE, Circuit Judge.

Petitioner is confined in the penitentiary on Blackwell’s Island, New York, under a judgment of the court of special sessions of the city of New York convicting him of a crime. He contends that the section of the Code of Criminal Procedure under which said court took jurisdiction of his case violates certain provisions of the Constitution of the United States, in that it deprives the person there arraigned of a trial by jury, un*344less he can show that the case involves very intricate questions of law and fact, or that some important and material witnesses reside without the state of New York,-or that the court is prejudiced, and that a fair trial cannot be had.

The United States Supreme Court has many times condemned the practice of undertaking to review judgments of conviction obtained in state courts by the issue of a writ of habeas corpus, when such judgments may be reviewed by appeals to the state courts and ultimately to the United States Supreme Court, and when all points which may be raised upon the writ can be presented on the appeal. The Code of Criminal Procedure of the state of New York has provided for'an appeal from a judgment such as this, and has given power to the proper judicial officer, when there is reasonable doubt whether the conviction should stand, to enlarge on bail or to stay proceedings on the judgment.

For these reasons the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied.
#### Elizabeth SHAPIRO, Petitioner-Appellant, v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 2012-5152.

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

May 8, 2013.

Clifford J. Shoemaker, Shoemaker, Gentry & Knickelbein, of Vienna, VA, argued for petitioner-appellant.

Lynn E. Ricciardella, Trial Attorney, Torts Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, argued for respondent-appellee. On the brief were Stuart F. Delery, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Rupa Bhattacharyya, Director, Vincent J. Mat-naoski, Deputy Director, and Gabrielle M. Fielding, Assistant Director.

O’MALLEY, SCHALL, and WALLACH, Circuit Judges.

JUDGMENT

PER CURIAM.

This Cause having been heard and considered, it is

OrdeRed and Adjudged:

AFFIRMED. See Fed. Cir. R. 36.
#### DU VAUL v. MILLER et al.

No. 7567.

United States District Court W. D. Missouri, W. D.

Sept. 22, 1952.

Quinn & Peebles, Kansas City, Mo., for plaintiff.

Sam Mandell, Kansas City, Mo., for defendant.

REEVES, Chief Judge.

Based upon assertions that Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Company of Washington is an insurance carrier and paid the plaintiff certain benefits arising from his claimed injuries, the defendants now seek to have said insurance carrier named as a party plaintiff. The defendants rely on the case of Gas Service Co. v. Hunt, 183 F.2d 417, 419, where the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals determined' an identical question. That court was construing the statute law and decisions of the State of Kansas, which appeared to be exactly like those of Missouri on the subject of the rights of a subrogee, such as in this case. The court held that the right against a wrongdoer is substantive yet, said the court:

> “But the person in whose name the action may be prosecuted for the enforcement of the substantive right is procedural, not substantive.”

The court supported this ruling by citing the case of Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Callahan, 10 Cir., 127 F.2d 32.

Counsel for the plaintiff relies upon contrary opinions of the Supreme Court of Missouri, namely, Smith v. Siedhoff, 209 S.W.2d 233, loc. cit. 239 and Schumacher v. Leslie, 360 Mo. 1238, 232 S.W.2d 913, loc. cit. 919, and, as well, an opinion of this court in the case of Colorado Milling & Elevator Co. v. American Cyanamid Company, D.C., 11 F.R.D. 191.

*198In the latter case the court relied upon the substantive law of Missouri. A re-examination of Rule 17, as well as Rule 19, Fed.Rules Civ.Proc., 28 U.S.C.A., convinces us that the question is purely a procedural one in this court and does not change the substantive law of Missouri. Being procedural, the national court would not be bound by the rulings of the state courts. Moreover, it would not impair the rights of the plaintiff to require a joining of the insurance carrier. It would not be prejudicial as urged by counsel, and, accordingly, the motion to join should be sustained and it will be so ordered.
# United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 20-2631

___________________________ Manuel Lopez-Ajualip, by next friend Santos Lopez-Gabriel

lllllllllllllllllllll Petitioner

v. Monty Wilkinson, Acting Attorney General of the United States 1

lllllllllllllllllllll Respondent

____________ Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

____________ Submitted: February 23, 2021 Filed: February 26, 2021 [Unpublished]

____________ Before GRASZ, WOLLMAN, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.

____________ PER CURIAM.

1 Monty Wilkinson is serving as Acting Attorney General of the United States, and is substituted as respondent pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c).Guatemalan citizen and native Santos Lopez-Gabriel, on behalf of his minor

son, Manuel Lopez-Ajualip (Petitioner), petitions for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) order. The BIA dismissed his appeal from an immigration judge’s (IJ’s) decision, which denied asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). We reject Petitioner’s challenge to the IJ’s jurisdiction over his removal proceedings, as it is foreclosed by this court’s precedent. See Ali v. Barr, 924 F.3d 983, 985-86 (8th Cir. 2019) (jurisdiction over removal proceedings vests when charging document, such as notice to appear, is filed with immigration court). Further, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the agency’s decision to deny the asylum application, because a reasonable fact finder could conclude that Petitioner failed to demonstrate past persecution or a well-founded fear of future prosecution on account of a protected ground. See Garcia-Milian v. Lynch, 825 F.3d 943, 945 (8th Cir. 2016) (standard of review). Because he did not prove eligibility for asylum, he necessarily failed to satisfy the more rigorous standard for withholding of removal, see Martin Martin v. Barr, 916 F.3d 1141, 1145 (8th Cir. 2019) (recognizing more rigorous standard of proof); and the claim for CAT relief was also properly denied, as it was based on the same evidence as the claims for asylum and withholding of removal, see Ming Ming Wijono v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 868, 874 (8th Cir. 2006) (denial of asylum and withholding of removal dictates outcome on CAT claim when petitioner alleged same factual basis for all 3 claims). The petition for review is denied.

______________________________

-2-
CAPITAL INCOME BUILDER, INC.
333 South Hope Street o Los Angeles, California 90071 o Telephone (213) 486-9200



VINCENT P. CORTI
   Secretary

                                                              January 5, 2004



Document Control
Division of Investment Management
Securities and Exchange Commission
Judiciary Plaza
450 Fifth Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.  20001

Re:      Capital Income Builder, Inc.
         File Nos.  2-12967 and 811-5085

Dear Sir or Madam:

                  Pursuant to Reg.230.497(j) under the Securities Act of 1933
(the "Act"), I hereby certify that no changes have been made to the form of
prospectus and Statement of Additional Information since the electronic filing
on December 29, 2003 of the Registrant's Post-Effective Amendment No. 22 under
the Act and Amendment No. 24 under the Investment Company Act of 1940.

                                                         Sincerely,


                                                         /s/ Vincent P. Corti
                                                         Vincent P. Corti

Attachment

cc:  Linda Stirling


<PAGE>
<PAGE>


                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.2


                    CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER

   PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 (18 U.S.C. 1350)

         The undersigned executive officer of Anchor BanCorp Wisconsin, Inc.
(the "Registrant") hereby certifies that the Registrant's Form 10-Q for the
three months ended June 30, 2003 fully complies with the requirements of Section
13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the information contained
therein fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and
results of operations of the Registrant.




                       /s/ Michael W. Helser
                      -------------------------------------------------
                       Michael W. Helser, Treasurer and
                       Chief Financial Officer

July 31, 2003




A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other
document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that
appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement
required by Section 906, has been provided to Anchor BanCorp Wisconsin, Inc. and
will be retained by Anchor BanCorp Wisconsin, Inc. and furnished to the
Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.







                                       31
STATSURE DIAGNOSTIC SYSTEMS, INC.
                               SEPTEMBER 30, 2006

                                                                    Exhibit 32.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                               18 U.S.C. ss.1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


I, Steve Peltzman, Chief Executive Officer of StatSure Diagnostic Systems, Inc.,
hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss.1350, as adopted pursuant to Section
906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002:

      (1)   the Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB of StatSure Diagnostic Systems,
            Inc. for the quarter ended September 30, 2006 as filed with the
            Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof, fully
            complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as
            applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

      (2)   the information contained in the such Quarterly Report on Form
            10-KSB of StatSure Diagnostic Systems, Inc. for the quarter ended
            September 30, 2006 fairly presents, in all material respects, the
            financial condition and results of operations of StatSure Diagnostic
            Systems, Inc.

Dated: November 27, 2006

                                       /s/ Steve M. Peltzman
                                       -----------------------------------------
                                       Steve M. Peltzman
                                       Chief Executive Officer
                                       (principal executive officer
                                       and duly authorized officer)
Nicor Gas Company
                                                                     Form 10-K/A
                                                                    Exhibit 32.2

                                  CERTIFICATION

      Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as created by Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the undersigned officer of Nicor Gas Company (the
"Company") hereby certifies, to such officer's knowledge, that:

      (i) the accompanying Annual Report on Form 10-K/A of the Company for the
   fiscal year ended December 31, 2003 (the "Report") fully complies with the
   requirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d), as applicable, of the
   Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

      (ii) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
   material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
   Company.


Dated:    March 1, 2004                   /s/ RICHARD L. HAWLEY
       -------------------                ---------------------
                                          Richard L. Hawley
                                          Executive Vice President and
                                          Chief Financial Officer
No. 1199.

#### Century Indemnity Co. *v.*Arnold et al.

May 27, 1946.

*John Wilson Hood*for petitioner.

*Bertrand L. Pettigrew*for respondents.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied.