J-S56004-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

JEREMIE ALAN BAKER,

Appellant No. 56 MDA 2016

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 17, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Adams County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-01-CR-0000538-2014

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., PANELLA, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED OCTOBER 21, 2016

Appellant, Jeremie Alan Baker, appeals nunc pro tunc from the 

judgment of sentence of an aggregate term of 11 to 22 years’ imprisonment, 

imposed after he was convicted of one count each of burglary (18 Pa.C.S. § 

3502(a)(1)), robbery (18 Pa.C.S. § 3701(a)(1)(ii)), and criminal conspiracy 

to commit robbery (18 Pa.C.S. § 903(1)(1)). Counsel seeks permission to 

withdraw from further representation pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 

A.2d 738 (Pa. 1967). Upon review, we find that counsel’s Anders brief 

substantially satisfies the requirements set forth in Commonwealth v. 

Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009). We also agree with counsel that the 

issues Appellant seeks to raise on appeal – challenges to the sufficiency of 

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*

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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the evidence – are frivolous, and there are no other non-frivolous issues he 

could raise herein. Accordingly, we grant counsel’s petition to withdraw and 

affirm the judgment of sentence. 

Appellant’s convictions stem from an incident that occurred during the 

early morning hours of May 21, 2014, at the home of the victims, Sanjiv and 

Rashmi Mohla. Mr. and Mrs. Mohla own three gas stations and two small 

motels. They reside next door to one of their motels, the Fairfield Lodge, 

located in Fairfield, Pennsylvania. N.T. Trial, 12/9/14, at 59-60. Mr. and 

Mrs. Mohla routinely brought cash home at the end of each business day and 

kept the cash in a money bag in either their kitchen or bedroom overnight. 

Mrs. Mohla would then deposit the funds at the bank the next day. Id. at 

65-67. 

Appellant’s father, Phillip Baker, was a master electrician and did some 

work for Mr. and Mrs. Mohla at their places of business beginning in July or 

August of 2013. Later that year, Phillip Baker introduced Appellant to the 

Mohla’s. Appellant and his brother, Jeffrey Baker, began doing yard work 

and other odd jobs around the Fairfield Lodge in December 2013. Id. at 60-

64. Mr. Mohla testified that there were several occasions between April 14, 

2014 and May 20, 2014, where a portion of the cash from their business 

went missing from their home. Id. at 72-75. At first, the Mohla’s thought 

perhaps they had miscounted the funds, but then later began to suspect that 

Appellant and/or his brother were responsible. Id. at 113, 128. 
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On the night of the incident, Mr. and Mrs. Mohla were sleeping in their 

bedroom and were awoken around 1:00 a.m. by two men with flashlights. 

Id. at 76. Mr. Mohla attempted to get up, but was struck on the head with a 

flashlight by one of the men, causing him to bleed profusely and fall to his 

knees on the floor. The intruder then threatened to shoot him and held a 

gun to his forehead. Id. at 77. The other intruder went straight to the 

drawer where Mr. and Mrs. Mohla usually kept their money bag, and after 

discovering that the bag was empty, asked: “Where’s the money?” Id. at 

79-80. Mr. Mohla stated that both men became agitated and that the man 

holding the gun then demanded “the big money” or else he would shoot him. 

Id. at 80-82. The man with the gun then forced Mr. Mohla to his feet and 

prodded him with a gun to his back until Mr. Mohla finally led him to the 

money bag in another bedroom. The intruder instructed Mr. Mohla to get on 

the floor and not to look up at him or else he would shoot him. He then 

turned on the light, counted the money, and shouted to the other man, “We 

got the money. Let’s go.” Id. at 83-84. While Mr. Mohla was being held at 

gun point and led throughout the house by one intruder, the other intruder 

stayed with Mrs. Mohla and instructed her to “lie down or you’ll get hurt.” 

Id. at 122. Mrs. Mohla testified that she recognized this man as Appellant. 

Id. at 120. 

Following a jury trial, Appellant was sentenced to the above-stated 

term on February 17, 2015. The trial court summarized the subsequent 

procedural history of this case in its Pa.R.A.P. Rule 1925(a) opinion: 
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No direct appeal was filed. However, on April 9, 2015, Appellant 

filed pro se correspondence challenging trial counsel’s 

performance. This [c]ourt treated the correspondence as a Post 

Conviction Relief Petition[1]and appointed P.C.R.A. counsel to 

represent Appellant. Appointed counsel was further granted 

opportunity to file an Amended P.C.R.A. Petition in compliance 

with statutory authority. Thereafter, [an] Amended P.C.R.A. 

Petition was timely filed which included a claim that trial counsel 

abandoned Appellant on direct appeal. After [a] pre-hearing 

conference, this [c]ourt conducted [a] hearing on October 19, 

2015. By Order dated December 17, 2015, Appellant’s P.C.R.A. 

Petition was granted to the extent trial counsel was ineffective in 

failing to timely perfect an appeal. Accordingly, Appellant’s 

post[-]sentence rights were reinstated. This direct appeal 

follows. See Commonwealth v. Huddleston, 55 A.3d 1217 

(Pa. Super. 2012). 

Trial Court Opinion (TCO), 3/11/16, at 1 n.1. 

Appellant now presents the following claims, via counsel’s Anders

brief, as follows:

I. Was the evidence insufficient to find [Appellant] guilty of 

conspiracy when the element of planning of the crime of 

conspiracy was not established at trial, in that no other 

person was charged? 

II. Was the evidence insufficient to find [Appellant] guilty of 

robbery when there was no testimony that [he] had a 

weapon, nor was there testimony that [Appellant] made 

any threats of force? 

Anders Brief at 7. 

“When faced with a purported Anders brief, this Court may not review 

the merits of the underlying issues without first passing on the request to 

withdraw.” Commonwealth v. Rojas, 874 A.2d 638, 639 (Pa. Super. 

____________________________________________

1

Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. 
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2005) (quoting Commonwealth v. Smith, 700 A.2d 1301, 1303 (Pa. 

Super. 1997)). 

Court-appointed counsel who seek to withdraw from 

representing an appellant on direct appeal on the basis that the 

appeal is frivolous must: 

(1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that, 

after making a conscientious examination of the record, 

counsel has determined that the appeal would be frivolous; 

(2) file a brief referring to anything that arguably might 

support the appeal but which does not resemble a “no 

merit” letter or amicus curiae brief; and (3) furnish a copy 

of the brief to the [appellant] and advise the [appellant] of 

his or her right to retain new counsel or raise any 

additional points that he or she deems worthy of the 

court’s attention. 

Commonwealth v. Miller, 715 A.2d 1203 (Pa. Super. 1998) 

(citation omitted). 

Rojas, 874 A.2d at 639. Appellant’s counsel has complied with these 

requirements. Counsel petitioned for leave to withdraw, and filed a brief 

satisfying the requirements of Anders, as discussed, supra. Counsel also 

provided a copy of the brief to Appellant, and submitted proof that he 

advised Appellant of his right to retain new counsel, proceed pro se, and/or 

to raise new points not addressed in the Anders brief. 

Our Supreme Court has held, in addition, that counsel must explain 

the reasons underlying his assessment of Appellant’s case and his conclusion 

that the claims are frivolous. Thus, counsel’s Anders brief must satisfy the 

following criteria before we may consider the merits of the underlying 

appeal: 
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[I]n the Anders brief that accompanies court-appointed

counsel’s petition to withdraw, counsel must: (1) provide a 

summary of the procedural history and facts, with citations to 

the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that counsel 

believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set forth counsel’s 

conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state counsel’s 

reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous. Counsel 

should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling case 

law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the conclusion that 

the appeal is frivolous. 

Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361. 

Upon review of the Anders brief submitted by Appellant’s counsel, we 

find that it contains a summary of the procedural history and facts of this 

case, identifies the issues that Appellant wishes to raise, and references 

facts and case law arguably supporting those claims. We acknowledge that 

counsel’s Anders brief lacks a conclusion that Appellant’s claims are 

frivolous and reasons to support this conclusion. However, counsel did state 

in his petition to withdraw that, after a conscientious examination of the 

record, he determined the issues to be frivolous. 

Here, we will overlook counsel’s failure to include a statement of 

frivolity in his Anders brief, because that omission does not impede our 

ability, in this case, to review Appellant’s sufficiency claims in accordance 

with our standard of review.2 Based on the foregoing, we find that 

Appellant’s counsel has substantially complied with the Anders’

requirements. Substantial compliance has been deemed sufficient for 

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2 Counsel should be careful to fully comply with all of the Anders 

requirements in future cases. 
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withdrawal on direct appeal. Commonwealth v. Wrecks, 934 A.2d 1287, 

1290 (Pa. Super. 2007). Thus, we now examine whether Appellant’s claims 

are, indeed, frivolous. 

To begin, we note our standard of review:

In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we must 

determine whether the evidence admitted at trial, as well as all 

reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, when viewed in the light 

most favorable to the verdict winner, are sufficient to support all 

elements of the offense. Additionally, we may not reweigh the 

evidence or substitute our own judgment for that of the fact 

finder. The evidence may be entirely circumstantial as long as it 

links the accused to the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Commonwealth v. Koch, 39 A.3d 996, 1001 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations 

omitted). 

First, we review Appellant’s challenges to the sufficiency of the 

evidence to support his conviction of robbery. To sustain a conviction for 

robbery under 18 Pa.C.S. § 3701(a)(1)(ii), the Commonwealth is required to 

prove “that in the course of committing a theft, [the] [a]ppellant threatened 

another with or intentionally put her in fear of immediate serious bodily 

injury.” Commonwealth v. Valentine, 101 A.3d 801, 806-807 (Pa. Super. 

2014) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Appellant alleges 

that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of robbery 

because he did not have any weapon and did not make any threats. 

Appellant’s Brief at 15. However, under Pennsylvania law, “[t]he evidence is 

sufficient to convict a defendant of robbery under this section if the evidence 

demonstrates aggressive actions that threatened the victim’s safety. The 
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court must focus on the nature of the threat posed by an assailant and 

whether he reasonably placed a victim in fear of immediate serious bodily 

injury.” Id. at 807 (internal citations omitted). Thus, this claim is frivolous. 

Appellant contends that he lacked the criminal intent to cause serious 

bodily harm and that he did not assist with the robbery, but rather attended 

to the wife and kept her from getting hurt. Appellant’s Brief at 15. After 

careful review, we discern Appellant’s contentions to be wholly frivolous. As 

the trial court summarized in its opinion: 

[T]wo intruders entered the home of the victims in the middle of 

the night. One victim was struck in the head by a heavy 

flashlight and led away by gunpoint. The other was forced to the 

ground with the instruction to lie there or she would be hurt. 

This instruction followed her observation of the other intruder 

putting a gun in her husband’s face after knocking him to the 

floor with a flashlight blow to his head and thereafter threatening 

to shoot him. Although it is reasonable to conclude from the 

trial evidence that the intruder other than Appellant was the 

more violent of the two and possessed the firearm, this 

distinction is immaterial. Pennsylvania law is clear that evidence 

of Appellant’s assistance to the other intruder throughout the 

course of the robbery is sufficient to support a finding of shared 

intent to facilitate the other’s actions. Commonwealth v. 

Everett, 443 A.2d 1142, 1145 (Pa. 1982). Thus, even assuming 

Appellant did not carry a weapon, employ threats, or cause 

physical injury, his assistance to the other intruder is sufficient 

to support the elements necessary for conviction. Id. 

TCO at 4. 

Next, Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his 

conviction of conspiracy to commit robbery. He asserts that a conspiracy 

requires at least two members and suggests that he was the only person 

charged in this matter with conspiracy. Appellant’s Brief at 12. Appellant 
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also argues that the Commonwealth failed to prove that he entered into an 

agreement to commit a crime. Id. Based on the following, Appellant’s 

claims are frivolous. 

It is well-established that “[t]o sustain a conviction for criminal 

conspiracy, the Commonwealth must establish the defendant: (1) entered 

into an agreement to commit or aid in an unlawful act with another person 

or persons; (2) with a shared criminal intent; and (3) an overt act was done 

in furtherance of the conspiracy.” Commonwealth v. Devine, 26 A.3d 

1139, 1147 (Pa. Super. 2011). “This overt act need not be committed by 

the defendant; it need only be committed by a co-conspirator.” 

Commonwealth v. Hennigan, 753 A.2d 245, 253 (Pa. Super. 2000) 

(citations omitted). 

As the trial court stated in its well-thought-out opinion, the evidence at 

trial overwhelmingly satisfied the above elements. TCO at 2. Both victims 

testified, 

that they were awakended at gunpoint in the middle of the night 

by two individuals who were shining flashlights in their eyes. 

The male victim was struck in the head with a large metal 

flashlight and [was] removed from the bedroom at gunpoint 

while being directed to take one of the intruders to the location 

... where the money was secured. The second intruder remained 

upstairs with the female victim instructing her to lie on the floor 

and remain there or “she would get hurt.” Both victims 

described a scenario wherein the two intruders were acting in 

concert with each other. After locating the money, both 

intruders fled .... 

Id. (internal footnote omitted) (emphasis added). 
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“Proof of conspiracy is almost always extracted from circumstantial 

evidence.” Hennigan, 753 A.2d at 253. Even if an explicit agreement to 

commit a crime cannot be proven, “[t]he conduct of the parties and the 

circumstances surrounding such conduct may create a web of evidence 

linking the accused to the alleged conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

Devine, 26 A.3d at 1147. Moreover, “[e]ven if the conspirator did not act 

as a principal in committing the underlying crime, he is still criminally liable 

for the actions of his co-conspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy.” 

Commonwealth v. Knox, 50 A.3d 749, 755 (Pa. Super. 2012). Finally, 

“this Court has repeatedly held that flight, along with other circumstantial 

evidence, supports the inference of a criminal conspiracy.” Commonwealth 

v. Marquez, 980 A.2d 145, 150 (Pa. Super. 2000). Flight from the scene of 

the crime, when viewed in the totality of the circumstances, can be evidence 

of consciousness of guilt and a desire to escape prosecution. Id. 

We conclude that the totality of the evidence, viewed in the light most 

favorable to the Commonwealth, was sufficient to sustain Appellant’s 

convictions for robbery and conspiracy to commit robbery, and that 

Appellant’s sufficiency claims are frivolous. Finally, our review of the record 

reveals no other potential, non-frivolous issues which Appellant could raise 

on appeal. Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. 
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Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/21/2016