## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 97-3189

___________ United States of America, * * Plaintiff-Appellee, * * v. * * Alberto Alaniz, Jr., also known as Betin, * * Defendant-Appellant. *

___________ Appeals from the United States District No. 97-3299 Court for the Western District o f Missouri.

___________ United States of America, * * Plaintiff-Appellee, * * v. * * Alejandro Alaniz, also known as Alex, * * Defendant-Appellant. *

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___________ No. 97-3300

___________ United States of America, * * Plaintiff-Appellee, * * v. * * Alberto Alaniz, Jr., also known as Betin, * * Defendant-Appellant. *

___________ No. 97-3395

___________ United States of America, * * Plaintiff-Appellee, * * v. * * Alberto Reyna Alaniz, also known as * Beta, also known as Beto, * * Defendant-Appellant. *

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___________ 97-3604

___________ * United States of America, *

Plaintiff-Appellee, * * v. * * Lonnie Henry, * * Defendant-Appellant. * *

___________ 97-3605

___________ United States of America, * * Plaintiff-Appellee, * * v. * * Nick Cuevas, * * Defendant-Appellant. *

___________ Submitted: April 14, 1998

Filed: June 24, 1998

___________The Ho norable Pasco M. Bowman became Chief Judge of the United State s 1 Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit on April 18, 1998. The Honorable Fernando J. Gaitan, Jr., United States District Judge for th e 2 Western District of Missouri. -4- Before BOWMAN, Chief Judge, McMILLIAN, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges. 1

___________ MURPHY, Circuit Judge. Alberto Rey na Alaniz, Alejandro Alaniz, Alberto Alaniz, Jr., Nick Cuevas, and Lonnie Henr y were all convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribut e mari juana, 21 U.S.C. § 846. In addition Alejandro Alaniz, Alberto Alaniz, Jr., an d Lonni e Henry were convicted of criminal forfeiture, 21 U.S.C. § 853; Alberto Alaniz, Jr. was c onvicted of distribution of marijuana, 21 U.S.C. § 841; and Alberto Reyn a Alaniz and Alejandro Alaniz were convicted of aiding and abetting the distribution of marijuana, 21 U.S.C. § 841. They appeal their convictions and the sentences imposed by the district court. We affirm. 2
I.
Evide nce at trial indicated that in late 1993 appellants were engaged in th e bus iness of distributing marijuana. Under the supervision of Alberto Reyna Alani z (Alberto) and the day to day direction of Alejandro Alaniz (Alejandro) marijuana was obtained, packaged, and

distributed for sale. Marijuana was purchased from suppliers in Mexico and transported by couriers affiliated with the co nspiracy from various points in south Te xas to appellants and their affiliates in Kansas City, Missouri. Once th e marijuana a rrived in Kansas City it was stored at several safe houses around the cit y where it was weighed and repackaged for distrib ution under the supervision of Alberto, Alejandro, and Alberto Alaniz, Jr. (Alberto, Jr.). The marijuana was then sold on the-5-

street through a system of distributors including Lonnie Henr y, Bryan Jones, and others.

The consp iracy handled a large amount of marijuana during its operation

. Between O ctober 1993 and September 1994 over 1,000 pounds of marijuana wa s trans ported to Kansas City from Fort Worth and an additional 600 pounds fro m Houston. Another 1,500 to 2,000 pounds was distributed between February and July 1995. Nick Cuevas put Ale jandro in contact with a supplier of methamphetamine, and the cons pirators began to market it as well, using many of the same shipping channels and procedures developed for marijuana. One of the couriers, Roel Cantu, was stopped by law enforcement agents at the Kansas City airport who discovered he was carrying methamphetamine. The conspiracy began to unravel when Sharon Hughes d ecided to cooperate with government

officials. Sharon Hughes was the widow of T.B. Hughes who had owe d Al berto money for drugs, and she was selling marijuana to pay off his debts. Sh e allowedher phone conversations with members of the conspiracy to be recorded an d wore a recording device on her person. The investiga tion continued and expanded until sufficient evidence was developed, and the members of the conspiracy were arrested.
Lonnie Hen

ry and Nick Cuevas pled guilty to the charges against them, and the thre e members of the Alaniz family went to trial and were found guilty on all counts

. Alberto was sentenced to 250 months for conspiracy with a concurrent term of 12 0 mo nths for aiding and abetting. Alejandro received a life sentence on the conspirac y count and concurrent terms of 120 m onths on two aiding and abetting counts. Alberto, Jr. was sentenced to 240 months on the conspirac y count with a concurrent term of 120 months on the distribution count. Henry was sentenced to 76 months, and Cuevas to 168 months.Other grounds are raised in supplemental pro se briefs submitted by Alberto and 3 Alejandro. They complain the district court should have held a hearing about a brief courthouse encou nter between a juror and a government witness and the prosecutor’s closing argument. Pro se submissio ns by parties represented by counsel are ordinarily not co nsidered. U.S. v. Marx , 991 F.2d 1369, 1375 (8th Cir. 1993). Moreover , objections to these points were not raised at trial and no plain error has been shown. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); U.S. v. Olano , 113 S.Ct. 1770, 1776 (1993). -6- II.
The Alaniz defe ndants attack their convictions on a variety of grounds, some of which they all join in and others which are raised singly. These grounds includ e sufficiency of the evidence, improper forfeiture, evidentiary rulings by the district court, and restrictions placed on cross examination and the time for closing argument. 3
A. Alberto, Jr. argues tha

t there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for conspiracy to possess with inte nt to distribute marijuana. The conviction should be upheld unless the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict could not supp ort a finding that he entered into an agreement with one or more individuals t o possess ma rijuana with the intent to distribute it. U.S. v. Bascope-Zurita , 68 F.3 d 1057, 1060 (8th Cir. 1995). He does not dispute that a conspiracy existed betwee n October 1993 and September 1995, but he claims that he was not a knowing participant. Once the existence of an agreement is established, however, only slig ht evidence linking a member to the co nspiracy is required. U.S. v. Jenkins , 78 F.3d 1283, 1287 (8th Cir. 1996). Several participants in the conspiracytestified about the involvement of Alberto, Jr.. Sharon Hughes testified that beginning in the summer of 1994 , Alberto, Jr. obtained marijuana from one of the safehouses and from her late husband. William-7-

Turner testifi ed that Alberto, Jr. solicited him to purchase marijuana and began selling to him on a regular basis beginning in late 1994. He also testified that when a dispute about payme nt arose, Alejandro and Alberto came with Alberto, Jr. to see him an d threaten him with violence but that they eventually reached an agreement for him to pay off t he debt. Bryan Jones testified that Alberto, Jr. was a primary distributor for th e conspirac y, that he helped weigh and package the drugs for resale, and that h e distributedan average of fifty pounds of marijuana per week. Cybil Hudson testified that Alberto, Jr. stored both marijuana and methamphetamine at the safehouses involved in the conspiracy, that he transported and dist ributed both drugs for the conspiracy, and that she once saw him separating a shipment of over 1,000 pounds of marijuana int o quantities suitable for storage and distribution. This was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that Alberto, Jr., knowingly participated in the conspiracy to possess an d distribute marijuana, and his conviction should be affirmed. Bascope-Zurita , 68 F.3d at 1060.
Alb erto, Jr., also claims that the prosecution impermissibly varied from th e conspiracy charged in

the indictment by introducing evidence of a separate conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine. Since no objection was raised to the failure to give a jury instruction on multiple conspiraci es, we review only for plain error. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52( b); Slaughter , 128 F.3d at 629. The evidence at trial indicated tha t metham phetamine was distributed by the same individuals involved in the marijuan a conspiracy through the same channels and procedures. It was part of the activities of the conspirators who primarily distributed marijuana. Rather than being a distinct and se parate conspiracy, the methamphetamine transactions were part of the operation o f the mariju ana conspiracy, U.S. v. Slaughter , 128 F.3d 623, 630 (8th Cir. 1997), and it was not plain error to admit this evidence. Another claim of insufficiency raised by Alberto, Jr., is tha t evidence was lacking to link the $2000 federal agents seized from him to the criminal activities of th e conspiracy. The money was found in a ski jacket in a closet at one of the safehouses-8-

affiliated with the conspiracy and was folded in a manner consistent with dru g trafficking. The close t also contained a letter addressed to Alberto, Jr. who was living at the safehouse at the time and had used it as a base to distribute drugs. Based on this evidence the jury could reasonably find that the money resulted from the crimina l conspiracy, and the judgment of forfeiture shou ld be affirmed. U.S. v. Wojcik , 60 F.3d 431, 434 (8th Cir. 1995).
B.
Both Alejandro and Alberto, Jr. object that evidence of their earlier dru g convi ctions and of uncharged methamphetamine violations was improperly admitted

. The government introduced certified copies of judgments of conviction agains t Alej andro for conspiracy with intent to distribute cocaine and against Alberto, Jr. fo r felony possess ion of marijuana. Evidence was also introduced that both men used the machinery of the conspiracy to deal methamphetamine contemporaneously with th e marijuan adistribution. The prosecutor provided notice of intent to use this evidenc e prior to trial. Alejandro argues that evidence of his 1989 conspiracy conviction shoul d not have been i ntroduced because it involved cocaine, it was too remote in time, and it s admission violated Rule 403. Alejandro’s prior conspir acy conviction involved the sale and transp ort of both cocaine and marijuana in south Texas. This earlier activity i n moving drugs for sale through shipment points in Texas was sufficiently similar to the present conspiracy to be probativeof plan and intent under Rule 404(b). Fed. R. Evid. 404(b); U.S. v. Johns on , 977 F.2d 457, 458 (8th Cir. 1992). The prior conviction was not too remote in time be cause Alejandro was incarcerated for almost the whole of the intervening period between that conviction and the indictment in this case. The jury was instr uctedthat the prior conviction could only be considered on the issue of whethe r Alejandro intentionally participated in the charged conspiracy, and the district-9-

court did not abuse its discretion by admitting it. Fed. R. Evid. 403; U.S. v. Mihm , 13 F.2d 1200, 1204 (8th Cir. 1994). The prior conviction offered against Alberto, Jr. was a 1993 c onviction for felony posses sion of marijuana, not for distribution. Alberto, Jr. placed his intent in issue by arguing that he was not a knowing and intentional participant in the conspiracy so the convi ction was offered for a permissible purpose under Rule 404(b). The court instructed the jury that this evidence was applicable only on the issue of intent and not to d emonstrate participation in the charged conspiracy. Any error in admission of the evidence of felony possession was harmless because of the strength of the rest of the case against Alberto, Jr. U.S. v. Mejia-Uribe , 75 F.3d 395, 398-99 (8th Cir. 1996).
Both Alberto, Jr. and Alejandro also object under Rules 403 and 404(b) t o testimony by Sharon Hughes that during the course of the conspiracy she was give n methamphetamine to distribute in addition to marijuana. Her testimony showe d met hamphetamine was an integral part of the conspiracy’s distribution system, and i t was therefore not Rule 404(b) evidence of other crimes. U.S. v. Luna , 94 F.3d 1156, 1162 (8th Cir. 1996). Even if Rule 404(b) applied, it would be admissible as proof of pla n, knowledge, and intent, and its probative value was not substantially outweighed by any prejudicial effect. Fed. R. Evid. 403.
C. The Alaniz defendants argue tha t the district court erred in restricting their cross examina tionof several prosecution witnesses. They say that they were improperl y prevented from asking Roel Cantu about an incident during his work as a jailer in Texas when he allegedly “turned his head” to allow several inmates to beat another. Th e distri ctcourt did not err in excluding this inquiry into a specific instance of conduct

. Fed. R. Evid. 608(b). They also complain that they were unable to question Brya n Jones and William Turner, Jr. about the quantity of drugs mentioned in their plea-10-

agreements. These quantities were lower than the amounts they testified about at trial, and defense counsel wanted to impeach their testimony. The court excluded th e questions o n the basis that “it’s not uncommon to compromise coming into ple a agr eements and I think it would mislead the jury.” Both Jones and Turner were cross examined extensively on the fact that they had entered plea agreements and woul d receive favorable sentencing recommendat ions for their cooperation. The district court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the questioning in light of the entire record. U.S. v. Brown , 110 F.3d 605, 611 (8th Cir. 1997); Delaware v. Van Ars dall , 106 S.Ct. 1431, 143 8 (1986). Finally, after Sharon Hughes admitted that she had a substance abus e probl em and that she was taking anti-depressant medication, counsel wanted to as k whether she had “e ver been on any medication or undergone any kind of treatment for subst ance abuse?” because “there’s some things that lawyers just have to shoot in the dark on if she h as a history.” The court did not abuse its discretion in barring thi s repetitive question. Brown , 110 F.3d at 611.
Alberto ar gues that he was unfairly limited to twelve minutes for his closin g argumen t which prevented fully pointing out the deficiencies in the testimony of th e government witnesses. When the court asked how much time was needed for closings, the government requested thirty minu tes, Alberto, Jr. and Alejandro each requested ten minu tes, and counsel for Alberto initially requested thirty minutes but amended it t o twenty. Counsel said “I would like to have my client feel I’m doing something and I don’t think twenty minutes is that far o ut of line.” The court allowed thirty-six minutes for each side, le aving up to sixteen minutes for Alberto. The record demonstrates that the several defendants divided the burden of discrediting the government’s case during clos ing argument by attacking different points. The equal time period granted th e government to build its case and the defendants to contest it was sufficient opportunity to explore the evidence imp ortant to resolution of the issues. The district court did not abuse its disc retion in setting the time for closing argument based on its assessment of the complexity of iss ues and evidence involved. U.S. v. Bednar , 728 F.2d 1043, 1048 (8th Cir. 1984).-11- III.
All appellants except Alberto Reyna Alaniz raise challenges to their sentences. Albert o, Jr. attacks the increase in his sentencing range because of his prior dru g convictio ns, Alejandro contends that the court did not make adequate sentencin g findings, Henry objects to the denial of an acceptance of responsibility reduction, and Cuevas alleges he was sentenced on an incorrect drug quantity and should ha ve received reductions for a minor or minimal role and for acceptance of responsibility. Alberto, Jr. attacks the increase of his sentencing range under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) which provides for more serious penalties when a drug offender has prior conviction s involving controlled substances. He asserts that the government did no t make an adequate showing to trigger the enhancement and that the statute is ambiguous so the rule of lenit

y prevents him from receiving a higher sentence under it. Under the st atutory scheme the government may file an information to establish prior dru g convictions if the defendant “either waived or was afforded prosecution by indictment forthe offen se for which such increased punishment may be imposed.” 21 U.S.C. § 851(a)(2). Alberto, Jr. argues that the statute is unclear whether the opportunity fo r prosecution by indictment must be available for the prior offenses or for the charge for which he is currently being sentenced. He asserts that the government has no t established that his prior convictions were pursuant to indictment. We have previously ruled that § 851 is not ambiguous and that prosecution by indictment need only b e available for the current offense. U.S. v. Trevino-Rodriguez , 994 F.2d 533, 536 (8th Cir. 1993). Alberto, Jr. was p rosecuted by indictment in this case, and the information detailin g his prior drug offenses was properly filed so his argument is without merit

. The district court did not err in sentencing him using the higher range available under § 841(b)(1)(A).-12-

Alejandro Alaniz argues that the distric t court did not make sufficient findings to support the quantity of drugs on which it based his sentence and the enhancement s imposedfor role in the offense, U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b), obstruction of justice, U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, and use of a firearm in the offense, U.S.S .G. § 2D1.1(b)(1). The district court must make sentencing findings sufficient to permit meaningful appellate review. U.S. v. Fetlow , 21 F .3d 243, 248 (8th Cir. 1994). Here the district court relied on th e evidence produced at trial and the sentencing hearing to overru le Alejandro’s objections to th e presentence report and to adopt its findings. This included evidence that i n March 1995 Alejandro assumed the leadership role in the conspiracy previously hel d by Alberto Alaniz, that he threatened to kill Roel Cantu if he cooperated with prosecuto rs or refused to “take the rap” himself, that Alejandro kept a gun with hi m during drug transactions at his house, and that certain amounts of marijuana wer e regularly shipped and handled by Alejandro and his co-conspirators. The distric t cour t’s statement that the quantity determinations and sentence enhancements wer e based on the trial testimony and evidence presented at the sentencing hearing provide a sufficient basis for adequate appellate review. Fetlow , 21 F.3d at 249. The court also specifically noted that a preponderance of the evidence demonstrated that the objections raised were without merit. Lonnie Henry co ntends that the district court erred in denying him a three level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Henry pled guilty to conspiracy to possess withintent to distribute marijuana and agreed to testify for the government in the trial of the Alani z family members. At the time of trial Henry was in custody, and his wife gave his attorney a suit for him to wear to testify. A courtroom deputy discovered a package of marijuana in the suit, and the government chose not to call Henry . He denies knowing that the marijuana was there and argues that there was no evidence linking him to it. We need not consider his claims of error because his sentence of seventy-si x month s was less than the applicable guideline range of seventy-seven to ninety-si x months if he had been granted the acceptance of responsibility. U.S. v. Williams , 97 F.3d 240, 243 (8th Cir. 1996).-13-

The district court found Nick Cuevas responsible for 710 grams o f me thamphetamine for sentencing purposes, but he says there was no evidence linking him to these drugs and there were not sufficient findings. Considerable evidence linked Cuev as to the 710 grams that were found on Roel Cantu in the Kansas City airport

. There was evidence at his sentencing hearing that Cue vas had facilitated the acquisition of the methamphetami ne by giving Alejandro Alaniz the name of a supplier and giving Cantu directions on how to contact hi m. There was also a taped conversation in which Cuevas ask ed Cantu if he had contacted the supplier. Testimony by Bryan Jone s indicated that Cuevas occasionally supplied him with methamphetamine and tha t Cuevas had a ccess to kilogram quantities. Michael Regan testified that Cuevas had delivered th e 710 grams of methamphetamine which Cantu had when he was arrested

. Furthermore, Cuevas could be sentenced as a participant in a joint criminal activity for any acts that he aided, abetted, or procured, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A), or any acts by other members of the enterprise that were in its furtherance and reasonably foreseeable to him. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B); U.S. v. Strange , 102 F.3d 356, 359 (8th Cir. 1996). The evidence at sentencing demonstra ted by a preponderance of the evidence both that Cuevas directly aided in the acquisition of this methamphetamine and that its acquisition was reasonably forese eable to him. U.S. v. Hammer , 3 F.3d 266, 273 (8th Cir. 1993). The court’s findings were sufficient, Edwards , 994 F.2 d at 423, and use of the evidence for his sentence was proper. Cuevas argues also that he should have received sentence reductions for minimal or min or role in the conspiracy and acceptance of responsibility. Cuevas bore th e burden of demonstrating his eligibility for the red uctions, and we review their denial for clear error. U.S. v. Raymer , 2 F.3d 286, 288 (8th Cir. 1993). The evidence a t sentencing showed that Cuevas was important in expanding the conspiracy to include the dis tribution of methamphetamine. He was not “plainly among the least culpable” or without knowledge of the sco pe and activities of the conspiracy. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, comm entary. Because his involvement was not an isolated unsubstantial instance , Cuevas is not entitled to a reduction simply because his culpability was less than some-14-

others involved in the consp iracy. Raymer , 2 F.3d at 288. Entry of a guilty plea alone does not entitle Cuevas to acceptance of responsibility because he continued to deny his involvement after there was substantial evidence of his participation. U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, commentary (n 3). Denial of a reduction for acceptance of responsibility can only be reverse d if clearly erroneous, U.S. v. Furlow , 980 F.2d 476, 476 (8th Cir. 1992) (e n banc), and we find that it was not.
IV.
After consideration of the claimed errors raised on appeal and a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the district court. A true copy.
Attest: CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.