FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

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No. 1D20-589

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STANLEY TYRON HARRIS,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County.

Mark Borello, Judge.

September 22, 2021

M.K. THOMAS, J.

Stanley Harris (Appellant) pleaded guilty to one count of 

third-degree murder and one count of discharging a firearm from 

a vehicle with a negotiated sentence of twenty-five years in state 

prison—an agreement which he now would like withdrawn. 

Appellant raises two issues: 1) that the trial court erred by denying 

his motion to withdraw the plea agreement prior to the sentencing

pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.170; and 2) the 

sentencing procedures ultimately employed by the trial court were 

improper. Finding no error, we affirm.

Appellant’s case springs from the tragic shooting of a sevenyear-old girl (the Victim) as she sat in her parents’ car in a 

shopping center parking lot. Appellant was at the shopping center 

participating in a gun sale—the sale was to be conducted by an 
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associate of Appellant at one location in the parking lot, and 

Appellant’s role was to provide protection from a car in another 

location in the lot. The sale apparently went south when the 

anticipated buyers instead robbed Appellant’s associate, and the 

crossfire which followed inadvertently struck the Victim in the 

head, killing her. 

Appellant entered a plea, and a plea hearing followed. The 

parties agreed that the plea would be entered at the hearing, but 

the sentencing would be postponed for two months so that 

Appellant and all co-defendants could be sentenced at the same 

hearing. At the plea hearing, the trial court engaged Appellant in 

a plea colloquy during which Appellant confirmed that he had 

sufficient opportunity to confer with counsel and that he was 

satisfied with her representation. Appellant also confirmed that he 

was pleading guilty based on a belief that doing so was in his best 

interest, and the court found that Appellant appeared “coherent 

and cognizant of what’s going on.” As a factual basis for the plea, 

the State offered that it would show that Appellant fired eleven 

shots toward the buyers as they walked away from the scene, and 

that one of these shots passed the intended targets and struck and 

killed the Victim, who was sitting behind the buyers relative to 

Appellant. The trial court then asked whether the State was “able 

to determine who actually fired the fatal shot.” The prosecutor 

answered as follows:

Your honor, based upon a trajectory analysis, it—the 

State believes that we could prove beyond a reasonable 

doubt that [Appellant’s] weapon was the weapon that 

fired the fatal shot; however, [one of the buyers] had a 

nine-millimeter Glock handgun as well and discharged 

that two times during the course of the incident back at 

[Appellant]. 

Based upon the damage to the bullet travelling 

through the car and then striking the Victim, no 

definitive and absolute determination of the ballistics 

could be made. However . . . there was evidence both by 

the firearms examiner and then . . . the entire incident 

was captured on videotape and we can see the shots being 

fired and the result. And so based upon that the State 
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believes we can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that it 

was [Appellant’s] bullet that struck that little girl in the 

head and killed her.

The trial court again confirmed that Appellant understood the 

issues surrounding the agreement and the plea form and accepted 

the agreement as freely and voluntarily entered. Nonetheless, 

Appellant later filed a motion to withdraw the plea prior to the 

sentencing hearing. As grounds for the withdrawal, Appellant 

argued that: 1) he had misunderstood one of the pieces of evidence; 

2) that he had been misled by the prosecutor’s statement in 

reading the factual basis that a “trajectory analysis” would confirm 

Appellant was the killer (as it was the defense’s understanding 

prior to the plea that the State had no such analysis, per the State’s 

expert’s contention that no ballistics report could be done under 

the circumstances); and 3) that he had directed a previously 

retained expert to do further trajectory analysis which confirmed 

that Appellant could not have killed the Victim. 

At the hearing, Appellant explained that he misunderstood 

his attorney’s explanation of the bullet evidence as showing that 

eleven projectiles associated with him had been found in the 

Victim’s car, but this was never the case. Instead, the evidence 

showed that eleven casings had been found where Appellant had 

been standing on video. He testified that this misapprehension had 

influenced him to enter the plea, that the State’s mention of a 

previously unknown trajectory analysis also “scared” him, and 

that his newly obtained trajectory analysis also compelled him to 

withdraw the plea. 

Despite these contentions by Appellant on direct examination, 

he acknowledged on cross examination that he signed and 

conveyed the offer to the State prior to the hearing taking place

and prior to any factual basis statement being made. He further 

admitted that he agreed to the plea based on a belief that it was in 

his best interest to do so and acknowledged having discussed with 

his attorney the State’s intent to amend the information against 

him to charge him with a higher degree charge of felony murder. 

But, he denied that this was the compelling factor influencing him 

to plead guilty, instead contending that it was the projectile versus 

casing confusion which did so. Notably, Appellant further 
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acknowledged that his expert had already concluded prior to the 

hearing that he was not the one who actually shot the Victim, and 

that the additional analysis only added support to that conclusion.

The trial court denied Appellant’s request to withdraw the 

plea, finding Appellant’s testimony that he was mistaken about 

the evidence was not credible. Furthermore, the case presented a 

classic example of “buyer’s remorse.” The trial court further found 

that no new evidence had been presented which was not known to 

Appellant at the time of the plea and that no evidence raised a 

substantial question as to Appellant’s guilt so as to require the 

court to allow the withdrawal of the plea. 

At sentencing, Appellant presented mitigating witnesses. As 

part of his presentation, Appellant attempted to have his defense 

expert testify to his finding that a bullet from Appellant’s gun did 

not strike and kill the Victim. But the trial court denied the 

opportunity after finding that the testimony was not relevant to 

the negotiated sentence, since the court had no discretion to 

deviate from the sentence regardless of the evidence on the point. 

Appellant was then sentenced to twenty-five years consistent with 

his plea agreement. This appeal followed. 

I.

Appellant’s first issue contends that the trial court erred in 

denying Appellant’s motion to withdraw the plea. When a motion 

to withdraw a plea is made prior to sentencing, Florida Rule of 

Criminal Procedure 3.170 provides the guidelines for the trial 

court’s consideration of the request. See Scott v. State, 629 So. 2d 

888, 890 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) (noting “the Florida Rules of 

Criminal Procedure provide guidelines for withdrawing a plea 

before sentencing” (emphasis in original)). Rule 3.170 provides as 

follows:

The court may in its discretion, and shall on good cause, 

at any time before a sentence, permit a plea of guilty or 

no contest to be withdrawn and, if judgment of conviction 

has been entered thereon, set aside the judgment and 

allow a plea of not guilty, or, with the consent of the 

prosecuting attorney, allow a plea of guilty or no contest 
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of a lesser included offense, or of a lesser degree of the 

offense charged, to be substituted for the plea of guilty or 

no contest. The fact that a defendant may have entered a 

plea of guilty or no contest and later withdrawn the plea 

may not be used against the defendant in a trial of that 

cause.

Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.170(f) (2019). 

Only where a defendant shows that there is “good cause” to 

withdraw a plea is a trial court required to grant such a 

presentence motion. Tanzi v. State, 964 So. 2d 106, 113–14 (Fla. 

2007). Whether good cause was demonstrated is a determination 

within the discretion of the trial court, and the trial court’s findings 

in this regard must be affirmed where they are supported by 

competent, substantial evidence. Id. at 114. As always, appellate 

courts must recognize and honor “the trial court's superior vantage 

point in assessing the credibility of witnesses and in making 

findings of fact.” Id. (quoting Stephens v. State, 748 So. 2d 1028, 

1034 (Fla. 1999)).

On appeal of a denial of a presentence motion to withdraw 

plea, the applicable standard is whether the trial court abused its 

discretion in failing to find good cause. See id. at 113. A court 

abuses its discretion when no reasonable person would take the 

position of the trial court on a matter, considering any findings 

which are supported in the record. Salazar v. State, 991 So. 2d 364, 

372 (Fla. 2008).

Here, the findings must be affirmed, as all are supported by 

competent, substantial evidence in the record. The trial court’s 

determination that Appellant’s testimony was not credible is a 

reasonable conclusion based on the record testimony. Appellant’s

contention that his confusion regarding ballistics evidence was the 

deciding factor in his decision to plea—rather than the higherdegree-charge of felony murder which he acknowledged avoiding 

by virtue of his plea—stretches credulity. And his contention that 

he was mistaken is inconsistent with his previous confirmation 

that he had sufficient opportunity to confer with counsel. 

Considering that Appellant’s contention of a mistake was not 

credible, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding no 
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good cause based on Appellant’s supposed misapprehension of the 

evidence. 

Appellant also argues that the prosecutor’s misstatement 

during the factual basis that a “trajectory analysis” would show 

that he killed the Victim also influenced his decision to plea, but 

this is nonsensical considering Appellant’s acknowledgement that 

he agreed to the plea prior to any statement being made. Appellant 

further contends that the trial court should have found good cause 

based on the “newly discovered evidence” of the defense expert’s 

trajectory analysis. But, as the trial court found, the expert’s 

conclusion that Appellant did not kill the Victim was already 

known to Appellant when he decided to plead guilty to third-degree 

murder. Further, even if the evidence speaks to Appellant’s 

innocence on one element of the third-degree murder charge to 

which Appellant pleaded, it does not speak to Appellant’s 

innocence on the higher felony murder charge that he bargained 

out of, since that charge does not require that a defendant actually 

cause the death of a victim. See § 782.04(3)(o), Fla. Stat. (2018) 

(providing that it is second degree murder—a first degree felony, 

punishable by life—where a person other than the person engaged 

in one of the listed felonies kills any human being during the 

course of said felony). 

Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm 

the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s presentence motion to 

withdraw his plea pursuant to rule 3.170. 

II.

Appellant’s second argument is that the trial court erred 

during sentencing by declining to allow the presentation of the 

defense expert’s testimony on the actual-cause-of-death question. 

Initially, we note that Appellant implies that the remedy for such 

an error would be reversal of the trial court’s denial of his motion 

to withdraw the plea. This is incorrect, and the remedy for a such 

a sentencing error would be reversal for resentencing. See Hutto v. 

State, 232 So. 3d 528, 529 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017) (“A new sentencing 

hearing should be granted if a defendant has not been given an 

opportunity to be heard.”). Regardless, we must affirm the 

sentencing done because sufficient process was afforded and 
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because the court reasonably concluded that the testimony was 

irrelevant to sentencing.

“Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.720(b) provides that the 

sentencing court ‘shall entertain submissions and evidence by the 

parties that are relevant to the sentence.’” Hodierne v. State, 141 

So. 3d 1254, 1255 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) (quoting Fla. R. Crim. P. 

3.720(b)). Thus, a sentencing court is required to entertain certain 

submissions and evidence, but only if they are relevant to the 

sentence. Put differently, a court is not required to entertain 

submissions which it reasonably determines are not relevant.∗

We affirm, as the trial court’s conclusion that the evidence was 

not relevant is reasonable. Further, as the court noted, it had no 

discretion to deviate from the agreed-upon term. That said, the 

evidence was not relevant to the issues being addressed during the 

sentencing hearing; thus, the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in declining to hear the evidence. 

The foregoing considered, the judgment and sentence of the 

trial court is AFFIRMED.

B.L. THOMAS and OSTERHAUS, JJ., concur.

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Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

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∗ Appellant implies that his second issue involves insufficient 

due process. But this is not an instance where a defendant was 

denied the opportunity of allocution or to present mitigating 

evidence. Instead, the question is whether the trial court erred in 

limiting Appellant’s presentation of evidence based on its 

determination that the evidence sought was not relevant to the 

sentencing. This is a question of discretion on the part of the trial 

court, as explained above.
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Lynn W. Martin of the Law Offices of Lynn W. Martin, P.A., Ponte 

Vedra Beach, for Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Robert "Charlie" Lee, 

Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.