Present: All the Justices 

SUSSEX COMMUNITY SERVICES ASSOCIATION 

v. Record No. 950843 OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 

 March 1, 1996 

THE VIRGINIA SOCIETY FOR 

MENTALLY RETARDED CHILDREN, INCORPORATED 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HENRICO COUNTY 

Buford M. Parsons, Jr., Judge 

 The issue in this appeal is whether Code § 36-96.6(C) 

applies retroactively to restrictive covenants recorded in 1975. 

 Sussex Community Services Association (Sussex) is a nonstock 

corporation whose members are the owners of lots located in the 

Sussex residential subdivision in Henrico County. All lots in 

the subdivision are subject to restrictive covenants that were 

recorded on June 10, 1975. One of those covenants provides that 

an owner of real property in the subdivision may not "occupy or 

use his Lot . . . for any purpose other than as a private singlefamily residence." 

 The Virginia Society for Mentally Retarded Children, Inc. 

(the Society) purchased a vacant lot in the subdivision and 

executed a contract to purchase another lot with an existing 

house in the subdivision. The Society intends to use the 

existing house as a group home for six unrelated mentally 

retarded young adults, with a paid employee staff of two with one 

or more present at all times. The Society plans to construct a 

house on the vacant lot and use it for the same purpose. 

 Sussex filed a bill of complaint seeking a declaratory 

judgment that the Society's proposed use of the two lots violated 

the restrictive covenant limiting the use of lots in the 
subdivision to single-family dwellings. The Society responded 

that the restrictive covenant was subject to Code § 36-96.6(C) 

which provides that group homes such as those proposed by the 

Society are considered "residential occupancy by a single family" 

when construing a restrictive covenant limiting occupancy to 

members of a single family. Following a hearing and argument of 

counsel, the trial court concluded that Code § 36-96.6(C) applied 

to the restrictive covenant and entered an order holding that the 

covenant could not be enforced against the Society. We awarded 

Sussex an appeal. 

 In its appeal, Sussex asserts that the current version of 

Code § 36-96.6(C), as amended in 1991, cannot be applied to 

covenants recorded in 1975. Sussex bases its position on the 

principle that statutes are generally presumed to be prospective 

in their application unless the General Assembly has manifested 

its clear intent to apply the statute retroactively. Gloucester 

Realty Corp. v. Guthrie, 182 Va. 869, 875, 30 S.E.2d 686, 688-89 

(1944). In this case, Sussex asserts, there is no manifestation 

of such a legislative intent.1

 

 We begin our analysis of the issue presented by Sussex with 

an examination of the express language of Code § 36-96.6(C): 

 A family care home, foster home, or group home in which 

physically handicapped, mentally ill, mentally 

retarded, or developmentally disabled persons reside, 

with one or more resident counselors or other staff 

persons, shall be considered for all purposes 

residential occupancy by a single family when 

 

 1In oral argument Sussex specifically stated that it is 

not challenging the ability of the General Assembly to apply 

Code § 36-96.6(C) retroactively, and that issue is not before 

us. 
construing any restrictive covenant which purports to 

restrict occupancy or ownership of real or leasehold 

property to members of a single family or to 

residential use or structure. 

The language of the section makes it applicable to "any 

restrictive covenant" restricting occupancy to members of a 

single family. Therefore, construction of the word "any," added 

by the 1991 amendment, is pivotal in determining the intended 

application of the section. 

 The word "any," like other unrestrictive modifiers such as 

"an" and "all," is generally considered to apply without 

limitation. We have held that the phrase "any action" includes 

actions filed both before and after the passage of the statute in 

which the phrase was used. Town of Danville v. Pace, 66 Va. (25 

Gratt.) 1, 4 (1874). We have said that a provision including the 

phrase "all condominiums" was consistent with an intent that the 

provision applies to all condominiums existing at the time the 

legislation was enacted. Harbour Gate Owners' Ass'n v. Berg, 232 

Va. 98, 103, 348 S.E.2d 252, 255 (1986). Similarly in the 

context of the Workers' Compensation Act, Code §§ 65.2-100 

through -1310, we have held that the phrase "an award" is allinclusive, applying to awards made both before and after 

statutory amendment. Buenson Div. v. McCauley, 221 Va. 430, 433, 

270 S.E.2d 734, 736 (1980); Allen v. Mottley Constr. Co., 160 Va. 

875, 889-90, 170 S.E. 412, 417 (1933). In Allen, we noted that 

in order to apply the statute prospectively only, it would be 

necessary to judicially amend the statute, "supply[ing] words not 

found in the statute," so that the phrase would read "any award 
hereafter made." 160 Va. at 889, 170 S.E. at 417. 

 The analysis used in Allen has continued to be a "'decisive' 

example of a situation where retrospective intent is expressed in 

legislative language." Buenson Div. v. McCauley, 221 Va. at 435, 

270 S.E.2d at 737 (citing Duffy v. Hartsock, 187 Va. 406, 417-19, 

46 S.E.2d 570, 575-76 (1948)). Our conclusion in Allen, that 

nothing in the phrase "an award" "confines its operations to 

either past or future awards, but both are included," 160 Va. at 

890, 170 S.E. at 417, is equally applicable to the phrase "any 

covenant" as used in Code § 36-96.6(C). The plain meaning of the 

phrase "any covenant" encompasses all covenants of the type 

described in the statute without limitation, whether recorded 

before or after 1991. 

 The conclusion we reach with regard to the meaning of the 

plain language of the statute is reinforced by its legislative 

history. As originally enacted in 1986, subsection C 

specifically applied only to restrictive covenants executed after 

July 1, 1986.2

 In 1989, the General Assembly established a joint 

subcommittee to study site selection issues relating to 

 

 2Code § 36-91(c), the predecessor to Code § 36-96.6(C), 

provided in relevant part: 

 Notwithstanding any restrictive covenant executed 

after July 1, 1986, which restricts occupancy or 

ownership of real or leasehold property to members of 

a single family or to residential use or structure, a 

family care home, foster home or group home in which 

no more than six physically handicapped, mentally 

ill, mentally retarded or developmentally disabled 

persons reside, with one or more resident counselors 

or other staff persons, shall be considered for all 

purposes residential occupancy by a single family. 
residential facilities for the mentally disabled. In its 1990 

report, the joint subcommittee identified restrictive covenants 

as a barrier to securing housing for mentally disabled persons. 

Report of the Joint Subcommittee Studying Site Selection of 

Residential Facilities For Mentally Disabled To The Governor and 

General Assembly of Virginia, Senate Document No. 36, at 3 

(1990). Because Code § 36-96.6(C) as it then existed did not 

apply to pre-July 1, 1986 covenants, the committee concluded that 

a segment of the available housing was excluded from 

consideration for group home residential facilities. Id. The 

joint subcommittee recommended that subsection C be repealed 

"because it appears to passively encourage discrimination and 

does not apply to covenants executed prior to July 1, 1986." Id.

at 8-9. 

 In 1991, the General Assembly deleted language restricting 

the application of the section to restrictive covenants executed 

after July 1, 1986 and added the word "any." These amendments 

manifest a clear intent of the General Assembly to apply 

subsection C to restrictive covenants recorded both before and 

after July 1, 1986. To conclude otherwise and find that current 

subsection C applies only to post-1986 restrictive covenants, as 

Sussex argues, would render the 1991 amendments to the subsection 

meaningless. That result would be contrary to the principle that 

statutory amendments are presumed purposeful and not unnecessary 

or vain. Cape Henry Towers, Inc. v. National Gypsum Co., 229 Va. 

596, 600, 331 S.E.2d 476, 479 (1985). 

 It is true, as Sussex points out, that the General Assembly 
often uses the phrase "heretofore or hereafter" to indicate that 

a statute is to be applied both prospectively and 

retrospectively. Indeed that phrase is used in subsection A of 

Code § 36-96.6. As demonstrated in the cases discussed above, 

however, we have never imposed a requirement that any specific 

word or phrase be used in order to support a finding of clear 

legislative intent of retroactive application. See Hagen v. 

Hagen, 205 Va. 791, 796, 139 S.E.2d 821, 824 (1965). The failure 

of the General Assembly to include this specific phrase in 

subsection C does not override the unambiguous meaning of the 

word "any" as used in the subsection and the clear import of the 

1991 amendments to the subsection. 

 Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

Affirmed.

CHIEF JUSTICE CARRICO, with whom JUSTICE COMPTON and JUSTICE 

STEPHENSON join, dissenting. 

 I must concede that, in a previous case, this court has 

given the word "any" the retrospective effect the majority 

opinion gives it in today's decision. But it does not follow 

that the word should always be given such effect. 

 As the Society points out on brief, this is the issue in the 

present case: "Did the General Assembly intend that section 36-

96.6[C] apply to all restrictive covenants, or only to those 

executed after its passage?" We ascertain legislative intent 

from the language actually used, considering not only each word 

that is employed but also how it is utilized in the context of 

the whole statutory enactment. When the word "any" is considered 
in this context, it becomes clear, in my opinion, that the 

General Assembly did not intend that "any" should have the 

retrospective effect the majority gives it today. 

 The word "any" is used not once but twice in § 36-96.6. It 

appears in both subsections A and C. Subsection A reads as 

follows: 

Any restrictive covenant purporting to restrict 

occupancy or ownership of property on the basis of 

race, color, religion, national origin, sex, 

elderliness, familial status, or handicap, whether 

heretofore or hereafter included in an instrument 

affecting the title to real or leasehold property, is 

declared to be void and contrary to the public policy 

of this Commonwealth. 

(Emphasis added.) 

 Subsection C reads as follows: 

 A family care home, foster home, or group home in which 

physically handicapped, mentally ill, mentally 

retarded, or developmentally disabled persons reside, 

with one or more resident counselors or other staff 

persons, shall be considered for all purposes 

residential occupancy by a single family when 

construing any restrictive covenant which purports to 

restrict occupancy or ownership of real or leasehold 

property to members of a single family or to 

residential use or structure. 

(Emphasis added.) 

 If, in the enactment of § 36-96.6, it was intended that the 

word "any," standing alone, should have retrospective effect, the 

General Assembly need only have used that discrete word at the 

beginning of subsection A. Yet, the General Assembly found it 

necessary to state expressly that the provisions of the 

subsection would apply to "[a]ny restrictive covenant . . . 

heretofore or hereafter included in an instrument affecting the 

title to real or leasehold property." (Emphasis added.) 
 It is obvious to me the General Assembly did not intend that 

the word "any," standing alone in subsection A, should have 

retrospective effect. It strains credulity, therefore, after its 

careful use of "heretofore or hereafter" in subsection A, to say 

the General Assembly intended by its mere use of the word "any" 

in subsection C, that the provisions of subsection C should also 

be given retrospective effect. Accordingly, I would reverse the 

judgment of the trial court and enter final judgment here in 

favor of Sussex.