UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE D ISTRIC T OF CO LU M BIA

C AR L OS L OP E Z, : : Plaintiff, : Civil Action No.: 07-2002 (RMU)

: v. : Document No.: 11 : EXECUTIVE OF FI CE FOR THE : UN I TE D ST AT ES A TT OR NE YS, :

: De fe nd ant. :

M EM OR

AN DU M OP IN ION G R A N TI N G TH E D E F E NDANT ’ S M OT I ON F OR S UM M ARY J UDGMENT

I. IN TR OD UC TIO N The plaintiff, Car los L opez, filed this suitunder the Fr eedom of Information Ac t ( “ F O IA ” ) , 5 U
. S
. C
. § 5 5 2
. T h e d e f e n d an t , th e E x e c u t i v e O f

f i c e o f th e U
. S
. A t t o r

n e ys (“ EO USA ” ), fi le d a

mot ion fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt u

nd e r R ule 56 of the F e de ra l Ru le s o f C ivi l Procedur e, which the plaintiff has opposed. B eca use there is no ge nuine issue of mate rial fa ct and the de fenda

nt is entitl ed to judg ment as a matter of law , the cour t gr ants the def

endant
summa ry jud g me nt.

II. BACKG ROUND L opez was ar

rested in 2001 on f

eder al nar cotics and f

irea rms char g es, havingbeen identified by

a conf idential informant, Jennifer Webber , who later testified ag ainst him at his trial in 2003. L opez, who is curre ntly incar cer ated a fter ha

ving be en convic ted of the c harg es-2-

ste mmi ngfr om t

hat arr e st, su

bmi tte d a F OIA r e qu e st t o E OU SA a sk ingfo r “ a ll a nd any re c or ds
. . . relating to my

arr est and prose cution on fede ral na rcotic a nd firea rm violations in the St ate of Ne w H amps hir e [,]” and

in p art ic ula

r s e e kin g“ c op ie s o f S pe c ia l A g e nt ( SA) Ste ve n St or y , SA Norman H oule, and SA Edwa rd B als’ investig ation repor ts made on this matter.” SeeDef .’s Mo t. f or Summ. J. ( “ De f. ’s Mo t.” ), Ex. B . T he purp os e of his F OIA r e qu e st w a s to ob ta in inf or matio n th at w ou ld p ro vid e ans we rs to t he fo llo wi ngqu e sti on s a

bo ut We bb e r: (1) Was the g overnme nt awar e that their ma in witness, J ennife r Webber, ha d a f e l o n y dr u gc a s e p e n d i n gw h i l e s h e s e r v e d a s th e i r c o n f i d e n t i a l i n f

o r m an t ? (2) Did the g overnme nt, or any of its employ ees, ha

ve conta ct with any

State of New H ampshire e mploy ee r eg ardingMs. Webber or he r then-pe nding f elony case s in St raf

ford County

Superior Court? and (3) Whether Ms. Webber wa s the rec ipient of favor able tre atment on behe st of the g overnme nt for coope ratingas the ir wi tne ss a nd /or se rv inga s a

c on fi de nti a l in fo rm ant. Pl. ’s Op p’ n at 7. L op e z as se rt s th at We bb e r g ave fa lse te sti mony a bo ut t he status of

state criminal cha

rg es pendingag ainst her at the time she testified ag ainst L opez. Affidavit of Car los L opez (“L opez Aff.” ) ¶ 13. He further asser ts that the g overnme nt failed to disclose to the defe nse an a lleg ed “‘ deal’ made with Ms. Webber to sec ure he r assistance and testimony .” Id. ¶ 14. L opez made his FO I A re quest by letter in August 2006. I n November 2007, having
rec eived no doc uments in response to his reque st, L opez initi ated this ac tion. By letter dated Dec ember

21, 2007, the def

endant r eporte d to the plaintiff that it had identified 980 pa g es of responsive material, re lease d 311 pag es in full, rele ased a nother 72 pa g es with reda ctions and withheld 276 pag es under stated statutory

exemptions enumer ated in the F OIA and the Priva cyThe rep ort an d relea se w ere o rig inally sen t to a prio r add

ress. This error was corrected w hen 1 discov ered, and

the pack ag e re- sent to plain tiff’s correct address on January 30 , 2 008. F inneg an Decl. ¶ 15
. -3- Act. SeeDec laration of Kare n Finneg an (“ Finneg an De cl.”) ¶¶ 13, 16. In addition, 327 pag es 1
wer e re fer

red to other

ag encie s for re view and pote ntial relea se to the plaintiff. Id. ¶ 15. The de fenda

nt filed this moti on for summary judgme nt alongwith exhi bits, the Finneg an Dec laration, and a Vaughn ind e x indi c atin gthe statut or y ba sis fo r a

ny inf or matio n n ot r e le a se d to the plaintiff. See ge nerally Def .’s Mot. The plaintiff f

iled an opposition in which he cha lleng es the def endant’ s decision to apply persona l privacy

exemptions to information about Webber. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 6-7. In support, the plaintiff alleg es that Webber g ave pe rjured te stimony at the plaintiff’s cr iminal trial and that the g overnme nt’s conduct c onstitut ed a Brady violation insofar as his defe nse wa s deprived of impeachme nt material to use a g ainst Webber. See id. at 5; see also L op e z Af

f. & Exhi bit s. Thro ug ho ut h is s ub mis sio ns , th e pla int if f e mph a size s th at be c a

us e the alleg ed Brady violation involves rights of c onstitut ional dimension, the persona l privacy rig hts of third parties must g ive way
. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 7; Pl.’s Request for Production of Documents to EOUSA ¶

7 (statingthat “[t] he De fenda nts have c ited numerous F OIA exemptions based on third pa

rty privac y interests to justify

their dec ision to wit hhold documents from the Plaintiff. I t is respec tfully submitt ed that those e x emptions cannot circ umvent y our Plaintiff’s constitutional rights”)
.-4- III . A NA LY SIS A. Le ga l St anda r d forSum m ar y J udgm e ntin a F OIACa se Summary jud g me nt m ay

be g ra nte d o nly wh e re the “ ple a din g s, de po sit ion s, ans we rs to interrog atories, a

nd admissions on file, toge ther with the a ffidavits, if any , show that there is no g enuine issue of

materia l fac t and the movingparty is entitled to judgment as a matter of la

w.” F e d. R. C iv. P. 5 6( c ); Burke v . Gould, 286 F.3d 513, 517 ( D.C. Cir. 2002). A mater ial fac t is one that is capa

ble of a ffe ctingthe outcome of the litigation. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 47 7 U .S. 24 2, 24 8 ( 19 86 ). A g e nu ine iss ue is o ne wh e re the “ e vid e nc e is s uc h th at a re a so na ble jur y c ou ld return a verdic t for the nonmovingparty ,” id., as opposed to evide nce that “is so one-sided that one par ty must prevail as a

matter of la

w.” Id. at 252. A cour

t consideringa motion for summary judgme nt must draw all “justifiable infe renc es” f rom the evide nce in f

avor of the nonmovant. Id. at 255. In a F OIA suit, an ag ency is entitled to summ ary

judgme nt once it bea

rs its burden of de mon str atin gthat no mate ri a l f a c ts a re in d isp ute and

that it ha s c on du c te d a

se arc h r e a so na

bly calc ulated to uncove r all re levant information, W eisberg v. D ep’t of Justice , 745 F.2d 1476, 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1984), which e ither has be en re lease d to the reque stor or is exempt from disclosure, Students Against Genocide v . Dep’ t of State, 257 F.3d 828, 833 ( D.C. Cir. 2001). A cour t may
awa rd summary

judgme nt to a FOIA def

endant solely

on the basis of infor

mation provided by

the depar tment or ag ency

in sworn statements with re asonably specific detail that justify the nondisclosures, demonstrate that the information withheld logica lly falls within the claimed exemption, and are not c ontroverte d by either c ontrary

evidenc e in the re cord nor by evidenc e of ag ency bad fa ith. Military Audit Project v. Casey, 656 F.2d 724, 738 ( D.C. Cir.1981). ToFO I A Exem ption 7(C) exem

pts “re cords or info rm ation com piled for lawenfo rcem ent p urpose s, 2 but o nly

to the ex tent that the produ ction of su ch law enfo rcem ent rec ords or info rm ation
. . . could reasona

bly be expec ted to con stitute an unwarran ted inv asion of p ersonal priv acy .” 5 U
. S
. C
. § 5 52 (b )( 7) (C ). B ec au se th e de fe nd an t a ss erte d E xe m pt io n 6 ine v er

y in st an ce th at

it asserted Exem

ption 7(C) and becau se the priv acy inqu iry in the tw o ex em

ptions is esse ntially

the sam e, see J

udicial W atch, Inc. v. D ep’t o

f Justice, 365 F.3 d 1 108, 11 25 (D. C. C ir. 2 004), the applicab ilityof Exem

ption 6 n eed not b e, and is no t here, sep arately ana ly z ed. -5- succe ssfully

challeng e such a

showing by

the def endant a g ency , the plaintiff par ty must do more tha n me re ly e sta bli shso me “ me ta

phy sic a l do ub t;” ra

the r, the pla int if

f m us t c ome fo rw ard

wi th “spec ific fa cts” de monstrating a g enuine issue. Ma tsu sh ita Ele c . I nd us . Co . v . Ze nit

h R ad io Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986).

B. Because There ar e No M ater ial Fac ts at Issue, th e Co ur t G r ant s Sum m ar y J udgm e ntto th e De fend ant The de fenda

nt has filed a sw orn statement de scribingthe sea rch f or re sponsive rec ords. SeeDef .’s Mot. at 4-6 (c iting F inneg an De cl.). The plaintiff does not dispute that the sea rch w as
a de qu ate . T he de fe nd ant’ s Vaughn index, which is commendably detailed, infor

mative and
c omp re he ns ibl e , d e sc ri be s th e natur e and c on te nt o f e a c h d oc ume nt t hat w a s n ot r e le a se d in

fu ll to the plaintiff and both cites a statutory exemption and provides a nar rative spe cific to the document that explains the application of the a sserted e x emptions to that particular doc ument. All documents that wer e withheld in full or in par t were withheld for multiple rea sons. See Vaughn Index. The defe ndant explained the statutory exemptions and ea ch exemption’s application to spec ific categ ories of infor mation. SeeDef

.’s Mot. at 17-31 (e x plaining the application of Exemptions 6 and 7(C), which pr otects the identities and pr ivacy of third par

ties), 2 12-17 (e x plaining the application of Exemption 5, which protec t both attorney work produc t and information cr eate d as par t of the deliber ative proc ess), a nd 8-12 (e x plaining the application of-6-

Ex emption 3, which was use d to withhold secret grand jury information in acc ord with Fe dera l Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) and to withhold confidential c onflict of intere st forms in acc ord wi th 5 U. S.C. Ap p. 4 § 10 7( a )( 1) ). Whe re inf or matio n w a s w ithhe ld i n f

ull , th e re wa s a

sp e c if ic deter mination made that no information could r easona bly be segreg ated. SeeDef

.’s Mot. at 31- 32. The Vaughn ind e x an d th e F inn e g an D e c laratio n p ro vid e su ff ic ie nt i nf or matio n, a bs e nt a g e nu ine iss ue of

mate ri a l f

a c t r a ise d b y

the de fe nd ant, to c on c lud e that th e de c isi on to w ithho ld information was pr operly justified in each c ase. Foc using on Webbe r’s trial testimony and what he believe s to be a Brady violation by the g overnme nt, he has identified a list of 26 documents he asks the Court to inspect “ to learn if a ny of them conta in information rele vant to Ms. Webber and/or the State of Ne w Hampshire .” Pl.’s Opp’n at 8. A court is neither require d nor we ll-advised to under take in camera inspection of documents at issue in a F OIA ca se abse nt some compelling rea son. Mead D ata Central, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’ t of Air Force , 566 F.2d 242, 262 ( D.C. Cir. 1977) (noting that routine re liance on in
came ra i n s p e c t i o ni s n e i th e r c o n s i s t e n tw i thth e F O IAn o r a w i s e u s e o f

j u d i c i a l r e s o ur c e s )
. In this case the Vaughn index demonst rate s that there is no ne ed for an in camera inspection of the 26 do c ume nts of

int e re st t o th e pla int if

f. Th e de fe nd ant c la ims Exe mpt ion 5, 5 U .S. C. § 552(b)( 5), as to 18 of those 26 doc uments, assertingthat the withheld information is either attorney work produc t or was c reated as pa rt of the de liberative pr ocess. Com pa reFinneg an Dec l. ¶ 29 (listing doc uments as to which the de fenda nt asserts Exemption 5) with Pl.’s Opp’n at 8 (listing doc uments as to which he r equests an in camera revie w). The plaintiff offe rs no challeng e to the def

endant’ s invocation of Exemption 5 for withholding information in these 18-7-

documents. Ther efor e, the de fenda nt has ca rried its burde n under the FOIA with respe ct to the these 18 doc uments at issue, and only the 8 other doc uments remain at issue. In a dd iti on , th e pla int if

f c ha lle ng e s th e a

pp lic atio n o f t

he pe rs on a l pr iva c y

pr ote c tio ns , FOIA Exempti ons 6 and 7(C), to information about Webber. Pl.’s Opp’n at 6. The plaintiff argues that the pe rsonal priva cy exemptions defe ndants must y ield in the fac e of the plaintiff’s belief that a Brady violation infected his cr iminal trial. Id. at 7. Th e pla int if f’ s a rgume nt s imp ly does not comport with the law. G iven the natur e of la w enf orce ment rec ords, the individual’s “priva cy interest at stake is substantial.” Sa fe Car d S e rv ., In c . v . S

.E.C. , 926 F.2d 1197, 1205 (D .C. Cir . 1 99 1) ; see also Bast v. U.S. D ep’t of Justice , 665 F.2d 1251, 1254 ( D.C. Cir. 1981) (h old ingthat, i n li g ht o f t he sti g ma po te nti a lly

a sso c iate d w ithlaw e nf

or c e me nt i nv e sti g atio ns , Ex emption 7(C) aff

ords broa d privac y

rig hts to suspects, witnesses and investig ators). G iven the signific ant individual privacy interest, disclosure of 7(C) mate rial is war rante d only

when the individual’s interest in privac y is outweig hed by

the public’s intere st in disclosure. United States De p’ t of J us tic e v . R e

po rte rs C om m. for Fr e e do m o

f th e Pr ess, 489 U.S. 749, 776 (1989) (r e qu ir ingc ourt

to “ ba lanc e the pu

bli c int e re st i n d isc los ur e a g a ins t th e int e re st C on g re ss int e nd e d [E xemp tio n 7 (C )] t o p ro te c t” ); Bec k v. D ep’t of Justice , 997 F.2d 1489, 1491 ( D.C. Cir. 19 93 ). He re , th e int e re st p la int if f a dv anc e s is pr ivate , n ot p ub lic , whic h is “ ir re le va nt t o th is balanc ing.” Mays v . Drug Enforcem ent Admin., 234 F.3d 1324, 1327 ( D.C. Cir. 2000). Fur thermore , even if

the plaintiff’s pr ivate intere st is construed as a public interest in promoting the ru le of

law, “ [f]ir st, the c iti zen

mus t sh owthat th e pu

bli c int e re st s ou g ht t o b e a dv anc e d is a signific ant one, a

n interest more specific than havingthe information for its own sake. Second, the citizen must show the information is li kely to advanc e that intere st. Otherwise the invasion-8-

of privac y

is unwarr anted.” Nat’l Archives &Rec ords Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 172 (2004). Eve n if the plaintiff satisfied the first showing , on these fa cts, he would fa il to satisfy the second showing . The Vaughn index on i ts face shows that there is no basis on which to conclude that the sort of infor

mation the plaintiff is seekingis contained in the re maining 8 doc uments at issue. Four

of the doc uments have be en withheld only in part, re dactingonly

witness names a

nd addre sses, but disclosing to the plaintiff the other c ontents of the docume nts. See V aughn In d e x, Docs. 42, 61, 87, a

nd 1-S. There is no indication from plaintiff that the disclosed c ontent of any of those four

documents is associate d with Webber or the inf ormation he re lated to her that he seeks. The other four

documents, ea ch of which is a handwritten note on a sing le pag e, have been w ithheld in full. For ea ch of the se, the na rrative in the Vaughn index i ndicates that the document conta ins no information other than witness name and a ddress infor mation. See id. , Docs. 3 (“ Hand- written note c ontaining the names a nd business addre sses of two witnesses” ), 4 (“H and-written list of witnesses to rec eive a trial subpoena” ), 5 (“ Hand- written note c ontaining witness’s name, pla ce of

residenc e, and f

ax number”), a

nd 25 (“H and-written note conta ining the name, a ddress & telephone numbe r of a third party”). Thus, the information disclosed in the Vaughn ind e x de mon str ate s th at di sc los ur e of the inf or matio n w ithhe ld i n th e se 8 d oc ume nts is not likely to advanc e any

signific ant public intere st, even if the pla intiff could establish that the public has a sig nificant intere st in the material he is see king. O n this recor d, the plaintiff has not sh own a pu bli c int e re st i n d isc los ur e that outw e ig hs the su bs tanti a l pr iva c y

int e re sts . The re cord in this case establishes that the de fenda nt properly

applied seve ral identified exemptions to withhold certain infor mation from re lease to the public. The plaintiff c halleng ed only the per sonal privac y

exemption wit h respe ct to cer tain documents, and he failed to show a-9-

public interest in disclosure that outweig hed the substantial priva cy interest prote cted by

the statutory exemption. On thi s rec ord, there is no ge nuine dispute of mater ial fac t and the defe ndant is entitled to judgment a s a matter of law. IV . C ON CL USI ON For the fore g oing r easons, the c ourt g rants the de fenda nt’s motion for summary

judgme nt. An Orde r consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is separately and conte mporane ously

issued this 25th day

of F ebrua

ry 2009.
RI CARDO M. URBI NA Un i t edS t at es Di s tri ctJ u d ge