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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 36621

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

LORI DESHINER STITES,

Defendant-Appellant.

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2010 Unpublished Opinion No. 583

Filed: August 9, 2010

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED

OPINION AND SHALL NOT

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada

County. Hon. Thomas F. Neville, District Judge. 

Order denying motion to suppress, affirmed.

Molly J. Huskey, State Appellate Public Defender; Eric D. Fredericksen, Deputy 

Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Jessica M. Lorello, Deputy 

Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. 

________________________________________________

GRATTON, Judge

Lori Deshiner Stites appeals from her judgment of conviction for possession of a 

controlled substance, Idaho Code § 37-2732(c). We affirm.

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Stites was charged with possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug 

paraphernalia. Stites filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained during a search after a traffic 

stop. Stites claimed that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop her vehicle, and 

impermissibly extended the length of the investigatory detention longer than necessary to 

effectuate the purpose of the stop. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied the 

motion to suppress. Thereafter, Stites entered a conditional plea of guilty to possession of a 

controlled substance, preserving her right to appeal the district court’s denial of her motion to 
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suppress, and the State agreed to dismiss the misdemeanor charge of possession of drug 

paraphernalia. This appeal followed.

II.

ANALYSIS

Stites was stopped by Officer Jones for having an expired registration and for failing to 

stop her vehicle behind the stop line. Stites asserts that Officer Jones impermissibly extended the 

investigatory detention longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop, without her 

consent, in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 

17 of the Idaho Constitution. Specifically, Stites argues that Officer Jones delayed and exceeded 

the length of time necessary to investigate and cite her for the violations for which she was 

stopped in order to wait for a canine unit to arrive. Upon arrival, a drug dog detected the 

presence of narcotics and the officers located methamphetamine within Stites’ purse. Stites 

contends that the district court erred in denying her motion to suppress evidence from the search 

on the ground that she was detained longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. 

She does not claim on appeal, as she did below, that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion 

to stop her vehicle.

The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a 

motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court’s findings of fact that are supported by 

substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts 

as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). At a 

suppression hearing the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, 

weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 

127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d 

659, 662 (Ct. App. 1999). 

A traffic stop by an officer constitutes a seizure of the vehicle’s occupants and implicates 

the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. Delaware v. 

Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979); Atkinson, 128 Idaho at 561, 916 P.2d at 1286. Under the 

Fourth Amendment, an officer may stop a vehicle to investigate possible criminal behavior if 

there is a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the vehicle is being driven contrary to traffic 

laws. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981); State v. Flowers, 131 Idaho 205, 208, 

953 P.2d 645, 648 (Ct. App. 1998). 
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The determination of whether an investigative detention is reasonable requires a dual 

inquiry--whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception and whether it was reasonably 

related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place. State v. 

Roe, 140 Idaho 176, 181, 90 P.3d 926, 931 (Ct. App. 2004); State v. Parkinson, 135 Idaho 357, 

361, 17 P.3d 301, 305 (Ct. App. 2000). An investigative detention is permissible if it is based 

upon specific articulable facts which justify suspicion that the detained person is, has been, or is 

about to be engaged in criminal activity. State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983, 88 P.3d 1220, 

1223 (Ct. App. 2003). Such a detention must be temporary and last no longer than necessary to 

effectuate the purpose of the stop. Roe, 140 Idaho at 181, 90 P.3d at 931; State v. Gutierrez, 137 

Idaho 647, 651, 51 P.3d 461, 465 (Ct. App. 2002). Where a person is detained, the scope of 

detention must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification. Roe, 140 Idaho at 181, 90 

P.3d at 931; Parkinson, 135 Idaho at 361, 17 P.3d at 305. In this regard, we must focus on the 

intensity of the detention, as well as its duration. Roe, 140 Idaho at 181, 90 P.3d at 931. The 

scope of the intrusion permitted will vary to some extent with the particular facts and 

circumstances of each case. Id.; Parkinson, 135 Idaho at 361, 17 P.3d at 305. 

The district court found:

The Court finds Officer Jones stopped the Defendant at 1:31 a.m. on May 11, 

2008. As the officer conducted his investigation, extra time was required because 

under the circumstances the officer had to check out registration, car ownership, 

and licenses in two different states as well as insurance issues. During that time, 

Officer Jones called for a canine unit at 1:41 a.m. Officer Nance arrived with the 

canine approximately 11 minutes later at 1:52 a.m. and immediately ran the dog 

around the outside of the vehicle. The Defendant was on scene 21 minutes before 

the canine unit arrived and conducted the sniff of the vehicle.

The district court’s factual findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record. The 

officer’s testimony was consistent relative to the time frames involved, and was verified by 

records. Officer Jones testified that Stites’ vehicle had an expired Montana registration and 

Stites told Officer Jones that the car belonged to her parents. Officer Jones, therefore, testified 

that he had to run checks in both Montana and Idaho. In addition, because she said she did not 

own the vehicle, Officer Jones testified that he had to verify the ownership and match the vehicle 

to the registration. Stites also did not have proof of insurance and was cited for that violation. 

Officer Jones testified that, because of the registration and ownership checks, the stop was a “bit 

longer than a normal traffic stop.” Additionally, the district court’s finding that Officer Jones 
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called for the canine unit, contemporaneously with processing the information relative to the 

purpose of the traffic stop, is supported by the testimony in the record. Finally, the evidence 

reflects that the drug dog was deployed, as the district court found, immediately upon arrival.

The district court determined that the length of the stop was not unreasonable and, in fact,

was reasonable under the circumstances. While Stites testified she felt that Officer Jones was 

taking his time writing the citation in order to await the canine unit, and that he told her that she 

had to wait for the canine unit, the district court specifically found the officer’s “testimony and 

recollection of the evidence to be more credible than that of the defendant.” Credibility is a 

determination solely for the district court. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho at 106, 897 P.2d at 997. 

Officer Jones testified that when the canine unit arrived he was talking with Stites regarding the 

citation, and Officer Nance confirmed that when he arrived Officer Jones was standing outside of 

the vehicle talking to Stites.

Brief inquiries not otherwise related to the initial purpose of the stop do not necessarily 

violate a detainee’s Fourth Amendment rights. Roe, 140 Idaho at 181, 90 P.3d at 931. Although 

an investigative detention must ordinarily last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the 

purpose of the stop, a detention initiated for one investigative purpose may disclose suspicious 

circumstances that justify expanding the investigation to other possible crimes. State v. 

Chapman, 146 Idaho 346, 350, 194 P.3d 550, 554 (Ct. App. 2008). The district court determined 

that it was not unreasonable for Officer Jones to expand the scope of questioning based upon the 

following facts:

As Officer Jones initially approached the vehicle and before he spoke to the 

Defendant, he observed the Defendant frantically searching her purse. Officer 

Jones also recalled he had met the Defendant before in a prior event involving 

drugs and that the Defendant was on probation for drugs. Officer Jones 

questioned the Defendant and found her answers to be evasive or at least 

equivocal.

The district court’s factual findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record. Both 

Officer Jones and Stites testified that she was frantically digging in her purse as the officer 

approached and before he asked her for any information. They recognized each other from the 

prior event and discussed that fact. Officer Jones asked Stites if there were illegal drugs in the 

vehicle and whether he could search the vehicle. While he believed that by her response she 

consented to a search, he testified that her answers were evasive. Officer Jones asked Stites to 
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step out of the vehicle to gather additional information, but did not conduct a search at that time. 

Under these circumstances and, in particular, Officer Jones’ testimony regarding the continuous 

processing of the investigation related to the purpose of the initial stop, the scope of the search 

was not improperly expanded. 

III.

CONCLUSION

The investigatory detention was not impermissibly extended longer than necessary to 

effectuate the purpose of the stop. The district court’s order denying Stites’ motion to suppress 

is affirmed.

Chief Judge LANSING and Judge MELANSON, CONCUR.