J-S64017-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

J.L.J. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v.

S.L.J. N/K/A S.L.M.

Appellant

 v.

A.P. & B.P., JR.

No. 1093 MDA 2015

Appeal from the Order Entered May 27, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of York County

Civil Division at No.: 2009-FC-000619-03

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., WECHT, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY WECHT, J.: FILED DECEMBER 07, 2015

S.L.J. (“Mother”) appeals the May 27, 2015 order that disposed of 

J.L.J.’s (“Father”) petition for modification of custody and A.P. and B.P., Jr.’s 

(“Maternal Grandparents”) complaint for partial custody. After careful 

review, we affirm.

Mother and Father are the parents of C.R.J. (“Child”), born in January 

2005. Mother and Father separated around Christmas 2006, and divorced 

on July 9, 2007. As of April 2007, Mother resided in Montgomery County. 

She had primary physical custody of Child and Father had custody every 

other weekend plus every Thursday evening. By April 2009, when Father 

____________________________________________

*

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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filed a complaint for custody, Mother had moved to York County, 

Pennsylvania, (with Father’s consent) and Father had moved to New Jersey. 

In September 2009, the parties reached a custody agreement that was 

entered as an order on October 2, 2009. Mother had primary custody. 

Father had alternate weekends during the school year with ten additional 

overnights to be selected that did not interfere with Child’s school and five 

weeks in the summer.

Custody was modified again in May 2012. During the school year, 

Father had custody for one extended weekend per month and, if the school 

calendar did not have an extended weekend, then Father had two weekends 

in that month. For the summer, the parties alternated custody with Father 

having three weeks, followed by Mother having two weeks.

On May 30, 2014, Father filed a petition for contempt and for 

modification of custody. Father alleged that Mother had violated the 2012 

custody order in a variety of ways,

1

and he sought to modify the custody

schedule. Also, on June 2, 2014, Maternal Grandparents filed a complaint 

for custody, in which they sought partial physical custody and to have their 

____________________________________________

1

For example, Father alleged that Mother failed to keep Father informed 

of medical appointments and treatment, failed to inform Father of school 

meetings, failed to notify Father when Mother was out of town, failed to 

notify Father of Child’s out-of-state travel, failed to inform Father of the 

names of childcare providers, scheduled activities during Father’s custodial 

time, withheld Child from Father during Father’s custodial time, and 

interfered with Father’s phone calls with Child.
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complaint consolidated with Father’s custody action. On September 12, 

2014, the trial court ruled upon Father’s petition for contempt. Although the 

court did not find Mother to be in contempt, the court issued some 

clarifications of the custody order to promote communication between Child 

and Father.

After Father filed his petition and approximately two weeks before the 

trial started, Mother informed the trial court that she intended to move from 

York, Pennsylvania to Huntingtown, Maryland because her employer had 

offered to relocate her. Mother sought to retain primary custody of Child in 

Maryland. However, Mother never provided notice of the relocation as 

required by 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5337.

The trial court heard testimony on March 6, April 24, and May 1, 2015. 

Father lives in Toms River, New Jersey. Joint Stipulations, 5/28/2015, at 2. 

He lived with M.W.-J. (“Wife”) in a house owned by Wife’s parents, D.A.F. 

(“Father-in-Law”) and C.F. Id. at 3. Because the house had been damaged 

by Hurricane Sandy, Father, Wife, and her parents had been living about an 

hour away with Father’s mother while repairs were made. Notes of 

Testimony (“N.T.”), 4/24/2015 (afternoon), at 7.2 Father testified that he 

____________________________________________

2

From the record, it appears that some of Father’s testimony may be

missing. The April 24, 2015 transcript notes that Father’s direct examination 

was continued from an earlier time. N.T., 4/24/2015, at 6. However, no 

testimony from Father is recorded either in the morning or afternoon 

volumes of the March 6, 2015 testimony. No other transcript has been 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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had communication issues with Mother and that Mother recently withdrew 

Child from soccer without talking to Father about it. Id. at 16. Father 

stated that, previously, if Child had a Saturday soccer game on Father’s 

scheduled weekend, Mother refused to transport Child from soccer to the 

scheduled custody exchange point and instead required Father to pick Child 

up from soccer. Id. at 14-15. Father had difficulty Skyping with Child 

because Mother would not initiate a call or would refuse to take a call,

claiming that there was a schedule conflict or that Father was late. Id. at 

35-38. When Father went to pick Child up after the March 6, 2014 court 

date, Mother’s husband, J.M. (“Husband”), told Father that he was not 

welcome and that he could not enter the house. This conversation occurred 

when Child was close enough to overhear. Id. at 39-40. Father learned of 

Mother’s proposed move when Child told him about it. Id. at 29. Father 

testified that Mother told him that she was required to move for work, even 

though it was not true. Id. at 28. 

Initially, Father sought more time with Child, but thought that Child 

should stay in Mother’s primary care because Child, who suffered from 

learning difficulties, had been making so much progress. Id. at 30. 

However, when he learned that Child would be moving to Maryland, he 

sought primary custody. Id. at 30-31. Father talked with staff at Child’s 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

entered in the certified record and we can find no reference to any other 

hearing date in the record.
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potential school in New Jersey and was convinced that the school could 

handle Child’s learning needs. Id. at 12-14. Father has been in 

communication with Child’s psychologist and kept him informed of Child’s 

progress while at Father’s house. Id. at 29. Father also discussed the 

possible transition to New Jersey with Child’s psychologist. Id. at 42-43.

Father encouraged Maternal Grandparents’ involvement in Child’s life 

because Maternal Grandparents provided a great deal of care for Child when 

he was young. Father believed that Maternal Grandparents are important 

to Child. Id. at 24-25. To that end, Father has included Maternal 

Grandparents in Christmas and other events. Id. at 26-27.

Mother testified that she lives in York, Pennsylvania, with Husband, 

Child, and J.A.J. (“Brother”), her three-year-old son with Husband. Id. at 

82. Mother stated that Child and Brother get along well, but that there is 

competition for attention at times. Id. at 83. Child gets along well with 

Husband, too. Id. Mother indicated that Husband is retired and is therefore

able to care for Child and Brother. Id. at 95. Mother works in human 

resources and has worked primarily in Harrisburg or Bowie, Maryland; 

however, travel to other sites was necessary at times. Id. at 97. Recently,

though, Mother’s company merged with another, and Mother’s region grew. 

Id. at 98. Mother’s region is now focused on Chantilly, Virginia, Baltimore, 

and Bowie, Maryland, although working in Harrisburg remained an option. 

Id. at 99. Mother’s home in York is a two-hour drive to her closest office. 

Id. at 100. Mother testified that her move to Huntingtown, Maryland, would 
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allow her to be home more and to spend less time travelling and commuting. 

Id. at 104-05. The new location would add one half-hour each way to the 

distance to Father’s house. Id. at 200. Mother admitted that she did not 

inform Father about the move immediately because Mother did not believe 

that the move constituted a relocation under the custody statute. Id. at 

174. Mother entered into a contract to build her new home in Maryland in 

April 2015, after the custody litigation had begun. Id. at 202.

Mother was Child’s primary caretaker, although Child did attend 

daycare. For one year, Maternal Grandparents helped with childcare. Id. at 

85. Mother contended that Father’s active involvement in Child’s life only 

has been recent. Mother noted that Father had not attended soccer games, 

school activities, or doctor appointments consistently. Id. at 89-90. Mother 

contended that Father was the cause of the communication difficulties 

regarding custody. Id. at 168-70. Mother admitted that she cut off contact 

between Maternal Grandparents and Child after Maternal Grandparents filed 

to intervene in the custody case. Id. at 178. 

Child’s first-grade teacher brought Child’s learning difficulties to 

Mother’s attention and she had him start seeing his current psychologist. 

Id. at 85-86. Mother has worked with Child on exercises to improve his 

reading on a daily basis. Id. at 196. In considering relocating, Mother 

reviewed schools and found one that offered programs comparable to those 

that Child already was receiving. Id. at 109. 
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Child testified in camera. Child testified that Husband usually gets him 

ready for school and watches him after school because Mother is at work. 

N.T., 3/6/2015 (afternoon), at 37-38. Husband also is generally the person 

who disciplines Child while he’s in Mother’s custody. Id. at 41. Child 

described a sometimes difficult relationship with Husband, but also testified 

that Husband helps Child with his homework. Id. at 42-43. Child enjoys his 

time with Father. Id. at 46. Father and Wife sometimes attend Child’s 

soccer games. Id. at 49. Child did not want to move to Maryland. Id. at 

51-52. Child testified to his good relationship with Maternal Grandparents 

and expressed the wish that there was an extra weekend in the month so he 

could have a weekend with Maternal Grandparents without losing time with 

Mother and Father. Id. at 55-56, 62-63.

Maternal Grandmother testified about her close relationship with Child. 

N.T., 5/1/2015, at 6. However, when recommended by Child’s psychologist, 

Maternal Grandparents stepped back from spending as much time with 

Child. Id. at 7. Father has a good relationship with Maternal Grandparents 

and supports their time with Child. Id. at 8. Maternal Grandmother 

testified that Child is more relaxed and happy at Father’s home and believed 

that it was in Child’s best interest to live primarily with Father even though 

that would limit Maternal Grandparents’ time with Child. Id. at 10, 14. 

Maternal Grandmother reached out to Father because she had concerns 

about Husband’s relationship with Child and about Child’s medical condition. 

Id. at 39-40.
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Child’s treating psychologist, Dan Ingram, Psy.D., testified. Dr. 

Ingram diagnosed Child with situational depression, phonological dyslexia, 

dysgraphia, and ADHD. N.T., 3/6/2015 (morning), at 9, 83. Dr. Ingram has 

worked significantly with Child’s school to develop a plan that meets Child’s 

educational needs. Id. at 82. Dr. Ingram described Child as very 

emotional, very manipulative, and very affected by conflict. Id. at 57-58. 

Dr. Ingram felt that Child’s view about who he wants to live with is colored 

by whom he was with most recently. Id. at 72. Dr. Ingram testified that he 

works with Mother and Father and their respective spouses as well as Child 

and that he communicates with Father after Child’s sessions to keep Father 

informed. Id. at 58-59. Dr. Ingram expressed no concerns about Husband 

in regards to his care of Child and found Husband to be knowledgeable about 

Child’s problems and needs. Id. at 62-63. Although Mother expressed 

concerns about Maternal Grandparents’ stability, Child was very positive 

about his time with them. Id. at 64-65. Given Maternal Grandparents 

history in Child’s life, Dr. Ingram opined that ongoing access is in Child’s 

best interest, but that Maternal Grandmother must keep Child out of the 

conflict between her and Mother. Id. at 98. Dr. Ingram recognized that 

Mother has more insight and involvement in Child’s school and treatment, 

but believed that, if Child were to live with Father, Father would provide 

good care and would be as involved. Id. at 74-75. Dr. Ingram cautioned 

that any change in school for Child would have to be well-planned given 
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Child’s educational needs. N.T., 4/24/2015, at 130. Dr. Ingram also opined 

that a change in school would be a difficult transition for Child. Id. at 140.

Peter H. Thomas, Ph.D., a psychologist, provided a custody evaluation 

and testified as an expert witness. N.T., 3/6/2015 (morning), at 9. Dr. 

Thomas recommended, without knowledge of Mother’s proposed relocation, 

that Mother remain primary custodian because Child is strongly attached to 

Mother. Id. at 12. However, Dr. Thomas was concerned about Husband

because Child and Husband had conflicts. Id. at 10-11. Dr. Thomas 

described Husband as “aggressive . . . with an undercurrent of some anger 

and probably some tendency to be involved in conflicts.” Id. at 11. Dr. 

Thomas opined that Husband may have made the conflict between Mother 

and Maternal Grandparents more difficult because Husband handled issues 

with them “in a more angry fashion.” Id. at 33. Dr. Thomas also stressed 

that, although Husband is present in the home more than Mother, Mother 

must remain the primary disciplinarian. Id. at 12. When informed about 

Mother’s move, Dr. Thomas was concerned about separating Child from his 

school, environment, and current therapist, and also the increased distance 

between Child and Father and Maternal Grandparents. Id. at 15-16. Dr. 

Thomas found Maternal Grandmother to be difficult and to have trouble 

respecting boundaries. Id. at 33. However, Dr. Thomas found Child’s 

relationship with Maternal Grandparents to be an important part of his life. 

Id. at 34. Dr. Thomas acknowledged that Father has a more positive 

relationship with Maternal Grandparents than Mother does. Id. at 46.
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Wife testified that she had a good relationship with Child. N.T., 

4/24/2015, at 64. Wife confirmed that there are difficulties between Mother 

and Father in relation to custody and corroborated Father’s account of his

relationship with Mother. Id. at 65-67. 

Husband testified that he is retired and has two adult daughters in 

addition to Brother. Id. at 208. Husband is involved in Child’s care and 

educational needs on a daily basis. Id. at 211-12. Husband testified that 

Maternal Grandmother insisted on going to custody exchanges with Mother, 

but that he and Mother began to refuse this because Maternal Grandmother

would upset Child. Id. at 218-20. Husband described Mother as a 

committed and dedicated parent. Id. at 224.

B.V.J. (“Paternal Grandmother”) testified that Father and Wife lived 

with her for some time after their home was damaged by Hurricane Sandy. 

N.T., 3/6/2015 (afternoon), at 8. Father and Wife had moved back to their 

home about two months before the first trial date. Id. Paternal 

Grandmother lives about forty-five minutes from Father’s house and would 

be available to help care for Child if Child was home sick from school or if 

Father and Wife were working. Id. at 10. Father facilitates Paternal 

Grandmother spending time regularly with Child during Father’s custodial 

time. Id. at 16.

Father-in-law testified that Wife and Father live in a separate wing in 

the house. N.T., 3/6/2015 (afternoon), at 19. Father-in-law intended to 

transfer the deed of the house to Wife with a living trust for him and his 
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wife. Id. at 20. Father-in-law and his wife are retired and would be able to 

provide after-school and other care for Child as needed if Father and Wife 

were unavailable. Id. at 22-23. 

On May 27, 2015, the trial court issued an opinion and order. The trial 

court denied Mother’s request for relocation. The trial court ordered shared 

legal custody between Mother and Father. If Mother moved to Maryland, the 

trial court ordered that Father would have primary physical custody and 

Mother and Maternal Grandparents would have partial custody. Mother’s 

custody during the school year would be alternating weekends and Maternal 

Grandparents would have eight hours of custody during one of Father’s 

weekends and three hours on alternating Wednesdays. During the summer 

vacation, Father would have custody for the first, sixth, and tenth weeks. 

Mother would have custody during the second through fourth weeks and 

seventh through ninth weeks. Maternal Grandparents would have custody 

for the fifth week of summer.

However, if Mother did not move, then Mother would have primary 

physical custody of Child. In that scenario, Father would have the same 

custody that was afforded to Mother if she moved and Maternal 

Grandparents’ custody would remain the same.

On June 25, 2015, Mother filed a notice of appeal. On the same date, 

she filed a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). On July 9, 2015, the trial court issued an 

opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), in which it referred to its May 27 
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opinion and responded to the issues that Mother preserved in her concise 

statement.

Mother raises the following issues for our review:

I. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law and/or 

abused its discretion in determining that Mother’s 

proposed move qualified as a relocation pursuant to 23 

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 5322 and 5337?

II. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law and/or 

abused its discretion in deciding the issue of relocation 

before making a custodial decision based upon the best 

interests of the children?

III. If it is determined that Mother’s proposed move qualified 

as a relocation, did the trial court err as a matter of law 

and/or abuse its discretion in denying Mother’s request to 

relocate and in not awarding primary custody to Mother in 

Maryland?

IV. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law and/or 

abused its discretion in failing to consider the relocation 

factors in awarding Father primary physical custody in New 

Jersey if Mother is to move to her proposed new residence 

in Maryland?

V. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law and/or

abused its discretion in awarding Maternal Grandparents 

rights of partial physical custody without properly 

evaluating the factors as set forth in 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328?

VI. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law and/or 

abused its discretion in failing to consider and give the 

appropriate weight to the well-reasoned preferences of the 

child?

Mother’s Brief at 4-5.

Our standard of review in child custody is as follows:

In reviewing a custody order, our scope is of the broadest type 

and our standard is abuse of discretion. We must accept 

findings of the trial court that are supported by competent 
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evidence of record, as our role does not include making 

independent factual determinations. In addition, with regard to 

issues of credibility and weight of the evidence, we must defer to 

the presiding trial judge who viewed and assessed the witnesses 

first-hand. However, we are not bound by the trial court’s 

deductions or inferences from its factual findings. Ultimately, 

the test is whether the trial court’s conclusions are unreasonable 

as shown by the evidence of record. We may reject the 

conclusions of the trial court only if they involve an error of law, 

or are unreasonable in light of the sustainable findings of the 

trial court.

D.K. v. S.P.K., 102 A.3d 467, 478 (Pa. Super. 2014) (quoting J.R.M. v. 

J.E.A., 33 A.3d 647, 650 (Pa. Super. 2011)).

Mother first asserts that the trial court erred in determining that 

Mother’s move to Maryland constituted a relocation. Mother argues that the 

move would not impair Father’s custody because Father still would be able to 

participate in his weekend and summer custody schedule. Mother contends 

that the increase in distance is minimal. Mother also argues that the move 

would not interfere with Maternal Grandparents’ partial custody. Mother’s 

Brief at 14-17.

The statute defines a relocation as “[a] change in a residence of the 

child which significantly impairs the ability of a nonrelocating party to 

exercise custodial rights.” 23 Pa. C.S.A. § 5322. We have not often had the 

opportunity to confront whether a proposed move constitutes a relocation 

under this definition. However, in C.M.K. v. K.E.M., 45 A.3d 417 (Pa. 

Super. 2012), we found that a proposed move of sixty-eight miles did 

constitute a relocation. In that case, the mother had primary custody and 

the father had custody every other weekend and one weeknight for two-and-
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one-half hours. Id. at 419-20. The father was found by the trial court to be 

actively involved in the child’s life, including school and extracurricular 

activities. Id. at 420. Rejecting the mother’s contention that there was no 

substantial impairment in the father’s custody because his custodial time 

would increase under the mother’s proposal, the Court determined that the 

proposed move would significantly threaten the father’s ability to exercise 

custody. Id. at 426. The Court cited attendance at the child’s school, 

sports, and medical appointments as evidence of the father’s involvement. 

We stated that “[t]he record confirms the trial court’s conclusion that [the 

mother’s] proposed relocation would break the continuity and frequency of 

[the father’s] involvement with [the child] and therefore threatens 

significant impairment of [the father’s] ability to exercise his custodial 

rights.” Id.

Here, the trial court made a similar finding. First, the trial court cited 

Mother’s exhibit that demonstrated that her move would add approximately 

fifty miles each way to the travel between Mother’s and Father’s homes. The 

court found that would increase Child’s travel by two hours for every 

weekend exchange. Further, the eight-hour round trip would significantly 

curtail Father’s ability to attend Child’s sporting or school events. Trial Court 

Opinion (“T.C.O.”), 5/27/2015, at 5. The trial court also considered the 

impact of the proposed move upon Maternal Grandparents, who attend 

Child’s sports practices, games, and school events “on a regular basis.” Id.

at 6. The new location would require an approximately four-hour round trip,
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which would significantly hinder Maternal Grandparents’ ability to exercise 

their partial custody rights because “[i]t would be fairly implausible for 

Maternal Grandparents to regularly attend [Child’s] soccer games or other 

school and extracurricular activities during the week.” Id.

The record supports the trial court’s finding that Mother’s proposed 

move would substantially impair custody. Although Father’s custodial time 

would not decrease, a lack of reduction of custodial time does not, by itself,

preclude finding a substantial impairment in custody. See C.M.K., supra. 

Father has attended Child’s sports and school events, even outside of his 

custodial periods. Father has maintained a presence in Child’s medical care 

by being in regular and consistent contact with Dr. Ingram. Father has 

participated in the extra academic activities that have been designed to aid 

with Child’s learning difficulties. The extra distance and a new psychologist 

and school threatens impairment of Father’s ability to participate in these 

parts of Child’s life. Further, the greatly increased distance for Maternal 

Grandparents would impair their ability to participate in Child’s activities at 

the level they currently do. Given the support for the trial court’s findings, 

the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Mother’s 

proposed move would impair the custody rights of the nonrelocating parties 

and, therefore, was a relocation.

Mother next argues that the trial court erred in deciding relocation 

before engaging in an analysis of Child’s best interest. Mother asserts that 
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the trial court should have conducted both analyses in unison, rather than in 

sequence. Mother’s Brief at 18-19.

When awarding custody, the trial court must determine the child’s best 

interest by considering all relevant factors as outlined in 23 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 5328:

(1) Which party is more likely to encourage and permit frequent 

and continuing contact between the child and another party.

(2) The present and past abuse committed by a party or 

member of the party’s household, whether there is a continued 

risk of harm to the child or an abused party and which party can 

better provide adequate physical safeguards and supervision of 

the child.

(2.1) The information set forth in section 5329.1(a) (relating to 

consideration of child abuse and involvement with protective 

services).

(3) The parental duties performed by each party on behalf of the 

child. 

(4) The need for stability and continuity in the child’s education, 

family life and community life.

(5) The availability of extended family.

(6) The child’s sibling relationships.

(7) The well-reasoned preference of the child, based on the 

child’s maturity and judgment.

(8) The attempts of a parent to turn the child against the other 

parent, except in cases of domestic violence where reasonable 

safety measures are necessary to protect the child from harm.

(9) Which party is more likely to maintain a loving, stable, 

consistent and nurturing relationship with the child adequate for 

the child’s emotional needs.

(10) Which party is more likely to attend to the daily physical, 

emotional, developmental, educational and special needs of the 

child.
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(11) The proximity of the residences of the parties.

(12) Each party’s availability to care for the child or ability to 

make appropriate child-care arrangements.

(13) The level of conflict between the parties and the willingness 

and ability of the parties to cooperate with one another. A 

party’s effort to protect a child from abuse by another party is 

not evidence of unwillingness or inability to cooperate with that 

party.

(14) The history of drug or alcohol abuse of a party or member 

of a party’s household.

(15) The mental and physical condition of a party or member of 

a party’s household.

(16) Any other relevant factor.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a).

In addition, when considering whether to permit a relocation, the trial 

court must consider the following factors:

(1) The nature, quality, extent of involvement and duration of 

the child’s relationship with the party proposing to relocate and 

with the nonrelocating party, siblings and other significant 

persons in the child’s life.

(2) The age, developmental stage, needs of the child and the 

likely impact the relocation will have on the child’s physical, 

educational and emotional development, taking into 

consideration any special needs of the child.

(3) The feasibility of preserving the relationship between the 

nonrelocating party and the child through suitable custody 

arrangements, considering the logistics and financial 

circumstances of the parties.

(4) The child’s preference, taking into consideration the age and 

maturity of the child.

(5) Whether there is an established pattern of conduct of either 

party to promote or thwart the relationship of the child and the 

other party.
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(6) Whether the relocation will enhance the general quality of life 

for the party seeking the relocation, including, but not limited to, 

financial or emotional benefit or educational opportunity.

(7) Whether the relocation will enhance the general quality of life 

for the child, including, but not limited to, financial or emotional 

benefit or educational opportunity.

(8) The reasons and motivation of each party for seeking or 

opposing the relocation.

(9) The present and past abuse committed by a party or 

member of the party’s household and whether there is a 

continued risk of harm to the child or an abused party.

(10) Any other factor affecting the best interest of the child.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5337(h).

In a similar case, we found no error when a trial court denied 

relocation and made custody contingent upon whether or not the mother 

moved. S.J.S. v. M.J.S., 76 A.3d 541, 544 (Pa. Super. 2013). There, the 

mother complained that the trial court should have engaged in a best 

interest analysis and then the relocation analysis. Id. at 549. However, 

because the trial court considered all of the factors of both sections and set 

forth a detailed and comprehensive discussion, and because “the two 

analyses are not entirely separate,” we held that “it as suitable to engage in 

a dual analysis and enter one order.” Id. at 549-50. 

Here, the trial court considered all of the factors and provided an 

analysis that thoroughly discussed those factors and considered Child’s best 

interest. T.C.O. at 5-14, 19-25. After engaging in that analysis, the trial 

court issued a single order addressing both issues. We can find no 

authority, and Mother provides none, to suggest that the trial court must 
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engage in a section 5328 analysis first. Hence, the trial court did not err in 

addressing relocation first in its order.

Mother next argues that the trial court erred in denying Mother’s 

request to relocate. Mother contends that the trial court did not consider 

that the move to Maryland would improve her quality of life and, therefore, 

improve Child’s life as well. Mother relies upon better career opportunities 

and the ability to spend more time at home as evidence of that 

improvement. Mother argues that the court did not give sufficient weight to 

her testimony that the schools in Maryland would be able to meet Child’s 

needs when the court found that a move would have a negative impact on 

Child. Mother also maintains that the trial court treated Child’s testimony 

inconsistently by discounting it in the relocation analysis and giving it some 

weight in the best interest analysis.3 Mother’s Brief at 19-28.

The trial court concluded that, after weighing all the relocation factors, 

the move was not in Child’s best interest. T.C.O. at 15. The court cited 

Child’s special education needs that are well-met in his current school and by 

his current psychologist, as well as the emotional distress that Child would 

encounter in leaving his familiar environment. Id. Further, the trial court 

found Mother’s testimony to be inconsistent with regard to the benefits of a 

____________________________________________

3 Mother makes this same argument in her final issue on appeal. We 

address her concerns about the trial court’s weighing of Child’s testimony in 

the discussion of her final issue.
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move. The trial court did not believe Mother’s testimony that her 

commuting time would be significantly shorter or that her move was 

required by her employer. Id. at 12. The record amply supports the trial 

court’s findings. Both Dr. Ingram and Dr. Thomas opined that moving would 

be a difficult transition for Child. That Child has shown great progress with 

Dr. Ingram and his academic interventions are not disputed. To the extent 

that Mother invites us to re-weigh the evidence or re-consider the trial 

court’s credibility determinations, we are unable to do so. See D.K., supra. 

Given the support in the record for its findings, the trial court did not abuse 

its discretion.

Mother next argues that the trial court erred in not analyzing the 

relocation factors when it awarded primary custody to Father if Mother 

moved to Maryland. Mother contends that the move to New Jersey would be 

a relocation for Child, and that the trial court only discussed the relocation 

factors in connection with Mother’s move to Maryland. Mother’s Brief at 30-

34.

In D.K., supra, the father lived in Pittsburgh while the mother lived in 

North Carolina. The father had primary custody of the children. When the 

mother filed for primary custody, the father objected that the mother had 

not complied with the notice provisions of the relocation statute. D.K., 102 

A.3d at 469-70. After conducting a statutory analysis, “we conclude[d] that 

where neither parent is relocating, and only the custodial rights of the 

parties are at issue, section 5337 of the Child Custody Act is not per se
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triggered.” Id. at 474. However, we also held that, when a child would 

move a significant distance, the trial court should consider the relevant 

relocation factors in its best interest analysis. Id. at 477-78. Although most 

of the relocation factors have a counterpart in the best interest factors, 

some do not. Specifically, we cited the following factors that are not already 

encompassed by the best interest factors: 

the age, developmental stage, needs of the child and the likely 

impact the child’s change of residence will have on the child’s 

physical, educational and emotional development (23 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 5337(h)(2)), the feasibility of preserving the relationship 

between the other parent and the child (23 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 5337(h)(3)), and whether the change in the child’s residence 

will enhance the general quality of life for the child (23 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 5337(h)(7)). 

Id. at 477.

In the instant case, Mother is relocating, but Father has resided at his 

New Jersey residence for years, notwithstanding a forced temporary change 

in residence due to storm damage to his home. Applying D.K., section 5337 

does not apply to Father’s request for primary custody. However, the trial 

court was obligated to consider any relevant relocation factors in considering 

Father’s custody request. The trial court analyzed the relocation factors, 

focusing upon Mother’s move to Maryland, and the best interest factors,

while also discussing New Jersey, York, and Maryland. Of the three specific 

relocation factors that the D.K. Court cited for additional consideration, the 

trial court considered Child’s needs and the impact of a change in residence. 

The trial court found that any change in residence would have a negative 
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impact upon Child because of the change in psychologist and school, and the 

diminution of the important role Maternal Grandparents play in Child’s life. 

T.C.O. at 8-9. The trial court also found that Father would permit continuing 

contact to preserve the relationship between Child and Mother. Id. at 19. 

The trial court concluded that any move by Child would not have a positive 

impact on his quality of life because of the change to his educational plan, 

having to find a new psychologist, additional travel time, and loss of his 

friends and significant access to Maternal Grandparents. Id. at 12. The trial 

court gave adequate consideration to all the factors that are required by 

D.K. The court concluded that it was in Child’s best interest to remain in 

York. However, if Mother relocated to Maryland and Child could not stay in 

York, the trial court found that it was in Child’s best interest to be with 

Father, who will promote Child’s relationship with Mother and Maternal 

Grandparents. The record supports the court’s findings and conclusions. 

There is no error of law or abuse of discretion. 

Mother also argues that the trial court erred in awarding partial 

custody to Maternal Grandparents. Mother asserts that, pursuant to section 

5328(c), the trial court must consider whether a custody award to a 

grandparent interferes with the parent-child relationship and whether the 

award is in the best interests of the child. Mother argues that Maternal 

Grandparents’ custody interferes with her relationship with Child because 

Child does not display his “normal personality and demeanor” when he 

returns from his custody with them. Mother asserts that Maternal 
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Grandparents have opposed her move for the purpose of interfering with her 

relationship with Child. Mother concludes that the custody award was not in 

Child’s best interest. Mother’s Brief at 35-39.

In considering whether to award partial custody to grandparents who 

have standing because the parents are separated or divorced, the trial court 

must consider the following in its best interest analysis:

(i) the amount of personal contact between the child and the 

party prior to the filing of the action;

(ii) whether the award interferes with any parent-child 

relationship; and

(iii) whether the award is in the best interest of the child.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(c)(1).

Here, the trial court considered that Maternal Grandparents had 

“played a substantial role” in Child’s early years, providing childcare and 

support. T.C.O. at 7. The trial court credited Dr. Ingram’s testimony that 

Maternal Grandparents’ involvement with Child is important to him. Id. at 

10. The trial court recognized that Mother and Maternal Grandparents’ 

relationship is contentious. Id. at 25. However, considering all this, the 

trial court determined that it was in Child’s best interest to continue to have 

court-ordered time with Maternal Grandparents to preserve that important 

relationship. Id. at 26. The trial court committed no error of law, because it 

considered all of the factors as required by statute. Further, the record 

provides support for the trial court’s findings. The court did not abuse its 

discretion.
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Finally, Mother argues that the trial court erred in not giving weight to 

Child’s testimony. Mother again contends that the trial court reached 

inconsistent conclusions from Child’s testimony because, in its relocation 

analysis, the trial court found that Child was concerned about moving, but 

found the factor to be neutral, and, in its best interest analysis, the trial 

court found that Child’s testimony leaned in favor of Maternal Grandparents. 

Mother also argues that Child’s testimony demonstrated that he wanted to 

spend more time with Mother so the trial court should have concluded that 

the relocation, which would have cut down Mother’s commuting time, was in 

Child’s best interest. Mother’s Brief at 39-41.

We find no inconsistencies in the trial court’s consideration of Child’s 

testimony. In both analyses, the trial court cited Child’s apprehension about 

moving, but ultimately relied upon Dr. Ingram’s opinion that Child’s thoughts 

about where he wants to live are too easily swayed by Child’s most recent 

custody experience. There is no error in the trial court’s reliance upon the 

opinion of Child’s treating psychologist in this regard. With regard to 

relocation, the trial court found that Child expressed reluctance about 

moving, which could have weighed against relocation. However, the trial 

court credited Dr. Ingram’s testimony that Child was influenced by his most 

recent custodial period, and hence did not give much weight to Child’s 

testimony. In the best interest analysis, the trial court cited that same 

testimony from Dr. Ingram, but also credited Child’s testimony that he 

wished for time with Maternal Grandparents. The trial court still did not give 
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much weight to that testimony, stating that it “weighs slightly in favor of 

Maternal Grandparents,” even given the strength of Child’s testimony. 

T.C.O. at 22. In both instances, the trial court did not place much weight 

upon Child’s testimony based upon the opinion of Dr. Ingram. The trial 

court was entitled to credit Dr. Ingram’s testimony and did not abuse its 

discretion in doing so. Further, we may not reweigh the evidence. See 

D.K., supra.

Finally, the trial court did not credit Mother’s testimony that the move 

to Maryland would reduce her commuting time significantly. T.C.O. at 12. 

Therefore, even if the trial court had placed greater weight upon Child’s 

testimony that he wanted to spend more time with Mother, it would not have 

concluded that the relocation would serve that goal. We may not re-weigh 

the evidence. See D.K., supra. The record supports the trial court’s 

conclusions. There is no abuse of discretion.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/7/2015