SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2451-17T2

CALEB LANG,

Appellant,

v.

NEW JERSEY STATE

PAROLE BOARD,

Respondent.

Submitted February 25, 2019 – Decided

Before Judges Gooden Brown and Rose.

On appeal from the New Jersey State Parole Board.

Caleb Lang, appellant, pro se.

Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for 

respondent (Melissa Dutton Schaffer, Assistant 

Attorney General, of counsel; Christopher C. 

Josephson, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

March 19, 2019
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Caleb Lang, a State prison inmate, appeals from a December 20, 2017 

final decision of the New Jersey State Parole Board (Board), denying his parole 

and establishing a twenty-month future eligibility term (FET). We affirm. 

In 2006, Lang pled guilty to first-degree robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1, and 

an amended charge of fourth-degree attempted criminal sexual contact, N.J.S.A. 

2C:5-1, 2C:14-2(c) and 2C:14-3(b). On July 24, 2006, Lang was sentenced to 

an aggregate twelve-year prison term, with an eighty-five percent period of 

parole ineligibility pursuant to the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. 

He was also subject to a mandatory five-year period of parole supervision upon 

his release. 

On October 23, 2015, Lang was released on parole, and was rearrested for 

a parole violation on August 4, 2016. On October 19, 2016, the Board revoked 

Lang's mandatory supervision status and established a twelve-month FET. Lang 

did not appeal that decision. 

Lang next became eligible for parole on August 17, 2017. On June 30, 

2017, a hearing officer conducted a hearing and referred the matter to a Board 

panel. On July 21, 2017, a two-member panel denied parole and established a 

twenty-month FET. Although the panel found seven mitigating factors, 

including the lack of infractions, participation in institutional and behavior-
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specific programs, and a positive interview, the panel found several factors 

supporting its reasons for denial. 

Among other things, the panel cited Lang's: offense of conviction, 

specifically, the "violent[] attack[ on the] victim, caus[ed] serious injuries"; 

extensive and repetitive prior record; commitment to incarceration for multiple 

offenses; violation while released on parole; prior incarceration did not deter 

criminal behavior; risk assessment evaluation; and insufficient problem 

resolution. In particular, the panel noted Lang denies the offense, minimizes his 

conduct, his substance abuse problem has not been sufficiently addressed, and 

he "denies the sexual nature of this crime and blames his addiction to 

mar[i]j[uana] for his problems. He minimizes his violent behavior in cutting his 

victim and needs to work on his addiction and criminal thinking." 

 Lang filed an appeal with the full Board. In a thorough written decision, 

the Board upheld the recommendation to deny parole and to impose a twentymonth FET. This appeal ensued.

On appeal, Lang raises the following points for our consideration: 

POINT I

THE . . . BOARD ERRON[E]OUSLY RELIED ON 

N.J.A.C. 10[A]:71-3.21 WHEN DETERMINING 

THAT PETITIONER['S] 2006 FI[RS]T[-]DEGREE 
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ROB[B]ERY CONVICTION WARR[A]NTED AN 

INCREASE IN THE FET DATE.

(Not raised below)1

POINT II

THE . . . BOARD FAILED TO ADD THE 

ADDITIONAL FET DATE TO THE INITIAL TERM 

AND SHOULD MODIFY THE SECOND FET DATE 

TO COIN[C]IDE WITH THE STATUTE IT 

IMPOSED.

(Not raised below)

We have considered these contentions in light of the record and applicable 

legal principles and conclude they are without sufficient merit to warrant 

discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). We affirm substantially for 

the reasons expressed in the Board's comprehensive written decision, which "is 

supported by sufficient credible evidence on the record as a whole." R. 2:11-

3(e)(1)(D). We add only the following comments. 

We must accord considerable deference to the Board and its expertise in 

parole matters. Our review of a Parole Board's decision is limited. Hare v. N.J. 

State Parole Bd., 368 N.J. Super. 175, 179 (App. Div. 2004). "'Parole Board 

decisions are highly individualized discretionary appraisals,' and should only be 

reversed if found to be arbitrary or capricious." Id. at 179-80 (citations omitted) 

 

1

It appears petitioner presented this argument to the Board.
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(quoting Trantino v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 166 N.J. 113, 173 (2001) (Trantino 

VI)). We "must determine whether the factual finding could reasonably have 

been reached on sufficient credible evidence in the whole record." Id. at 179 

(citing Trantino VI, 166 N.J. at 172). In making this determination, we "may 

not substitute [our] judgment for that of the agency, and an agency's exercise of 

its statutorily-delegated responsibilities is accorded a strong presumption of 

reasonableness." McGowan v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 347 N.J. Super. 544, 563 

(App. Div. 2002) (citation omitted). Accordingly, "[t]he burden of showing that 

an action was arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious rests upon the appellant." 

Ibid.

Initially, we note Lang essentially challenges the Board's decision to 

revoke his mandatory parole supervision. As noted, however, Lang did not 

appeal the Board's October 19, 2016 final decision revoking his mandatory 

supervision status. Because the issue is not properly before us, and we lack 

jurisdiction to review it, we do not address it. See State v. Rambo, 401 N.J. 

Super. 506, 520 (App. Div. 2008) ("[I]t is a fundamental of appellate practice 

that we only have jurisdiction to review orders that have been appealed to us."); 

see also 1266 Apartment Corp. v. New Horizon Deli, Inc., 368 N.J. Super. 456, 
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459 (App. Div. 2004) ("[O]nly the judgment or orders designated in the notice 

of appeal . . . are subject to the appeal process and review . . . ."). 

Regarding the imposition of the FET, pursuant to N.J.A.C. 10A:71-

3.21(a)(2), when a panel denies parole to an inmate serving a sentence for 

robbery, the standard FET is twenty-three months. However, pursuant to 

N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.21(c), the standard FET "may be increased or decreased by 

up to nine months when, in the opinion of the Board panel, the severity of the 

crime for which the inmate was denied parole and the prior criminal record or 

other characteristics of the inmate warrant such adjustment." Here, the panel 

decreased the standard FET by three months. In so doing, the panel properly 

considered Lang's mitigating factors. 

Applying our deferential standard of review, we find no basis in the record 

to disturb the Board's decision in this case. We are satisfied that the Board 

considered all the relevant material facts and had sufficient credible evidence 

before it to deny the parole request and impose the FET under the presumptive 

term. Moreover, the Board applied the correct legal standard in making its 

ultimate determination that the evidence gave rise to a reasonable expectation 

Lang would violate his parole if released at that time. N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.53(a). 
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Accordingly, we find the Board's decision was not arbitrary, capricious or 

unreasonable on the record presented. 

To the extent not otherwise addressed, petitioner's remaining arguments 

lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-

3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.