UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 08-4601

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

 v. 

ERVIN CALVIN CRAWFORD, a/k/a Early Crawford, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle 

District of North Carolina, at Durham. N. Carlton Tilley, Jr., 

District Judge. (1:07-cr-00317-NCT-1) 

Submitted: January 29, 2009 Decided: February 17, 2009 

Before MICHAEL and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Louis C. Allen, III, Federal Public Defender, William S. 

Trivette, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greensboro, North 

Carolina, for Appellant. Angela Hewlett Miller, Assistant 

United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
PER CURIAM: 

 Ervin Calvin Crawford pled guilty pursuant to a 

written plea agreement to possession with intent to distribute 

4.2 grams of heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), 

(b)(1)(C) (2006), and possession of a firearm by a convicted 

felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(e) (2006). 

The conditional plea preserved Crawford’s right to appeal the 

district court’s denial of his motion to suppress. Fed. R. 

Crim. P. 11(a)(2). He was sentenced to 210 months in prison. 

Counsel for Crawford filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. 

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), certifying that there are no 

meritorious grounds for appeal, but questioning whether the 

district court erred in denying the motion to suppress. Crawford 

was notified of his right to file a supplemental pro se brief 

but has not done so. The Government has declined to file a 

reply brief. Finding no reversible error, we affirm. 

 This court reviews the factual findings underlying a 

motion to suppress for clear error, and the legal determinations 

de novo. United States v. Wilson, 484 F.3d 267, 280 (4th Cir. 

2007). When evaluating the denial of a suppression motion, we 

review the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

Government. United States v. Uzenski, 434 F.3d 690, 704 (4th 

Cir. 2006). 

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 “[A]n officer may, consistent with the Fourth 

Amendment, conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer 

has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity 

is afoot.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000) 

(citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)). There must be 

“at least a minimal level of objective justification for making 

[a Terry] stop.” Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 123. Reasonable 

suspicion requires more than a hunch but less than probable 

cause, and may be based on the collective knowledge of officers 

involved in an investigation. Id. at 123-24; United States v. 

Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 232 (1985). 

 Courts assess the legality of police conduct during a 

Terry stop under the totality of the circumstances. United 

States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8 (1989). An officer conducting 

a lawful Terry stop may take steps reasonably necessary to 

protect his personal safety and to maintain the status quo 

during the course of the stop. Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 

408, 413-15 (1997); Hensley, 469 U.S. at 235. 

 With these standards in mind, and having reviewed the 

transcript of the suppression hearing, we conclude the district 

court did not err in denying the motion to suppress. We agree 

with the district court that the police lawfully stopped the 

vehicle based on the tip from the confidential informant and the 

officer’s observation of a vehicle matching the description in 

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the tip. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146-49 (1972) 

(finding officer possessed reasonable suspicion to stop person 

in vehicle based upon informant’s tip). Moreover, the officers 

were permitted to frisk Crawford as they were legitimately 

concerned for their safety. See United States v. Raymond, 152 

F.3d 309, 312 (4th Cir. 1998). Once the officers found a 

firearm in Crawford’s possession, the discovery of the heroin in 

Crawford’s pocket pursuant to a lawful search incident to arrest 

became inevitable. Thus, the heroin found in Crawford’s back 

pocket was admissible. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 

(1984); United States v. Allen, 159 F.3d 832, 838-39 (4th Cir. 

1998). Therefore, we conclude the district court did not err in 

denying the motion to suppress the evidence of the firearm, 

drugs and Crawford’s statements. 

 In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record 

in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. 

We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court 

requires that counsel inform Crawford, in writing, of the right 

to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further 

review. If Crawford requests that a petition be filed, but 

counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then 

counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from 

representation. Counsel=s motion must state that a copy thereof 

was served on Crawford. 

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We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process. 

AFFIRMED