United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 13, 2015 Decided June 2, 2015

No. 13-7165

DANIEL BRINK, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

v.

CONTINENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:11-cv-01733)

Joshua T. Gillelan II argued the cause and filed the briefs 

for appellants. 

Richard J. Doren argued the cause for appellees. With 

him on the brief were Geoffrey M. Sigler, Thomas M. 

Johnson, Holly P. Smith, Molly S. Carella, Christopher E. 

Appel, Roderick L. Thomas, Mark B. Sweet, Lawrence S. 

Ebner, Raymond B. Biagini, Tami L. Azorsky, Alejandro L. 

Sarria, David I. Ackerman, Kenneth Pfaehler, Avi D. Schick, 

Sandra D. Hauser, Leslie Paul Machado, Robert B. Wallace, 

David M. Ross, Matthew W. Carlson, F. Greg Bowman, 
2

David Randall J. Riskin, Charles C. Platt, Dina B. Mishra, 

John B. Rudolph, Brannon C. Dillard, Tara M. Lee, Joseph C. 

Davis, and Sara Z. Moghadam. Timothy W. Bergin and 

Daniel P. Rathbun entered appearances.

Before: GARLAND, Chief Judge, BROWN, Circuit Judge, 

and SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

SENTELLE.

SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judge: Appellant Daniel 

Brink, joined by thirty-one other individuals, brought a class 

action lawsuit stemming from the workers’ compensation 

benefits owed to class members under the Defense Base Act, 

42 U.S.C. § 1651 et seq., for injuries suffered while working 

for United States government contractors in Iraq and 

Afghanistan. In connection with their Base Act claims, 

appellants alleged that several government contractors, 

insurance companies, and third parties (collectively 

“contractors”) committed torts and violated the Longshore 

and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, the Racketeer 

Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), and the 

Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). The district court 

dismissed all of appellants’ claims. We affirm the dismissal 

of appellants’ class-wide tort claims as well their RICO and 

Longshore Act claims. This dismissal, however, does not 

preclude any individual appellants from bringing independent

claims outside of the Base Act’s statutory scheme. With 

respect to the ADA claims brought by three individual 

appellants, we remand to the district court to reconsider and

explain its denial of leave to amend the complaint.
3

I.

Members of the plaintiff class suffered severe injuries. 

They lost limbs in massive explosions, suffered traumatic 

brain injuries from “concussive blasts, mortars, rockets, and 

bombs,” and developed post-traumatic stress disorder after 

witnessing “gruesome scenes of carnage.” Second Am. 

Compl. ¶¶ 12, 48, Brink, et al. v. Xe Holding, LLC, et al., 910 

F. Supp. 2d 242 (D.D.C. 2012) (No. 11-cv-01733) (“SAC”). 

Because they were injured while working “under contracts or 

subcontracts” with the United States government in Iraq and 

Afghanistan, appellants alleged that class members are 

covered by the Base Act. Id. ¶ 562. 

Enacted in 1941, the Defense Base Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1651 

et seq., provides relief to employees of government 

contractors whose death or injuries occurred while 

accompanying military forces overseas. The Base Act builds 

upon and incorporates provisions of the Longshore Act, 

which was enacted to provide workers’ compensation 

coverage to maritime employees. See 42 U.S.C. § 1651(a); 33 

U.S.C. § 902(3). As with the Base Act, Congress passed the 

Longshore Act “to strike a balance between the concerns of 

[the employees] on the one hand, and their employers on the 

other.” Morrison-Knudsen Constr. Co. v. Dir., Office of 

Workers’ Comp. Programs, 461 U.S. 624, 636 (1983). 

“Employers relinquished their defenses to tort actions in 

exchange for limited and predictable liability,” and employees 

accepted “limited recovery because they receive prompt relief 

without the expense, uncertainty, and delay that tort actions 

entail.” Id. Both the Longshore Act and the Base Act contain 

exclusivity provisions stating that employer liability under the 

statutes “shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability.” 

33 U.S.C. § 905(a) (Longshore Act); 42 U.S.C. § 1651(c) 

(Base Act). 
4

Appellants brought this action on behalf of themselves 

and an estimated 10,000 similarly situated workers, 

SAC ¶¶ 560–62, seeking $2 billion in damages as well as 

declaratory and injunctive relief to require the contractors “to 

comply with their legal obligations here and around the world, 

as to all past, present and future individuals who work in 

support of America’s wars,” id. ¶ 1. Appellants alleged the 

contractors “failed or refused to provide medical benefits 

owed to [them] under the [Base Act];” “cut off medical 

benefits;” delayed providing benefits; “made false statements 

and misrepresentations” regarding payment of Base Act 

benefits “while actually reducing, denying or ignoring 

[appellants’] medical needs;” failed to comply with orders to 

pay benefits; “threatened or discouraged workers from 

making [Base Act] claims;” and terminated appellants’ 

employment “after they were disabled by their [Base Act]-

covered injuries.” Brink, 910 F. Supp. 2d at 247. Appellants

asserted class-wide claims for discrimination and retaliatory 

discharge under the Longshore Act (Count I); violations of 

RICO (Count II); bad faith and tortious breach of the 

covenant of good faith (Count III); unconscionable, 

fraudulent, and deceptive trade practices (Count IV); civil 

conspiracy (Count V); violations of the ADA (Count VI); 

outrage (Count VII); and wrongful death (Count VIII). See 

SAC ¶¶ 564–631. In addition, appellants sought preliminary 

and permanent injunctive relief (Count IX). Id. ¶¶ 632–39. 

The extensive factual allegations in the complaint include 

some assertions that could be predicates for independent legal 

claims, falling outside this class action. For example, Ronald 

Bell alleged that employees from Kellogg Brown & Root 

“intimidated and threatened” him and that he reported the 

assault to a local sheriff’s department. Id. ¶ 79. Christine 

Holguin-Luge alleged she was sexually assaulted in Iraq.
5

Id. ¶¶ 321–35. Nicky Pool, the owner of a nursing care 

company, alleged that CNA Global Insurance “approved 

numerous medical treatments” but then refused to pay for 

them, causing her company to lose $200,000. Id. ¶¶ 351,

477–88. We note, however, that the complaint before us 

includes no separate counts or claims for relief for any of 

these individuals.

The contractors moved to dismiss appellants’ second 

amended complaint in its entirety, and the district court 

granted the contractors’ motions pursuant to Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Relying on “this 

Circuit’s binding precedent” in Hall v. C&P Telephone 

Company, 809 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (per curiam), the 

district court concluded that appellants’ “state law causes of 

action all arise out of their underlying claims to [Base Act]

benefits and thus are barred by the exclusive scheme set forth 

in the [Base Act] and [Longshore Act].” Brink, 910 F. Supp. 

2d at 249–50, 252 (dismissing Counts III, IV, V, VII, and 

VIII). The district court similarly held that the comprehensive 

statutory scheme barred appellants’ RICO claims as well as 

their discrimination and retaliatory discharge claims arising 

under the Longshore Act, 33 U.S.C. § 948a. Id. at 254–56 

(dismissing Counts I and II). 

Three individuals—Merlin Clark, Harbee Kreesha, and 

Mohsen Alsaleh—alleged violations of the ADA. Id. at 256 

(citing SAC ¶¶ 111, 113, 203, 215, 608–18). The district 

court “interpret[ed] these allegations as including two 

possible claims under the ADA: (1) failure to accommodate, 

and (2) disability discrimination for firing Plaintiffs.” Id. at 

256–57. Under either theory, the district court concluded that 

Clark, Kreesha, and Alsaleh failed to state a claim under the 

ADA. Id. at 258. The district court held that their allegations 

were “insufficient . . . to meet their burden of demonstrating 
6

that their injuries substantially limited a major life activity 

and thus qualified them as disabled under the ADA.” Id. 

Therefore, the district court dismissed their ADA claims 

(Count VI). 

Appellants moved for reconsideration pursuant to Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), and sought leave to file an 

amended complaint under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 15(a) to correct the defects in their ADA claims.

The district court denied both motions with prejudice.

Appellants timely appealed. 

 

II.

On appeal, appellants raise three issues: (1) whether the 

statutory scheme bars appellants’ tort claims; (2) whether the 

district court erred in dismissing appellants’ federal claims; 

and (3) whether the district court abused its discretion when it 

denied the motion for leave to allow some of the appellants to 

amend their ADA claims. For the reasons discussed below, 

we conclude that the statutory scheme bars appellants’ classwide tort claims; the district court did not err in dismissing 

appellants’ RICO and Longshore Act claims; and the district 

court abused its discretion by denying without explanation the 

motion for leave to allow some of the appellants to amend 

their ADA claims.

A. Tort Claims

Appellants contend that neither the Base Act nor the 

Longshore Act bars their tort claims. In their view, the Base 

Act “does not extend tort immunity to intentional torts of the 

employer, the insurance carrier, or third parties.” Appellants’

Br. 20. Appellants also suggest their injuries, caused by the 

contractors’ intentional post-employment acts, are not 
7

covered by the Longshore Act because they are not 

“accidental.” See 33 U.S.C. § 902(2) (defining the term 

“injury” as “accidental injury or death arising out of and in 

the course of employment”); Martin v. Travelers Ins. Co., 497 

F.2d 329, 330–31 (1st Cir. 1974).

We reject appellants’ arguments. As previously noted, 

the statutory scheme represents a “legislated compromise 

between the interests of employees and the concerns of 

employers.” Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth. v. Johnson, 

467 U.S. 925, 931 (1984). In other words, “there is a quid pro 

quo.” Id. “In return for the guarantee of compensation, the 

employees surrender common-law remedies against their 

employers for work-related injuries,” while the employers 

gain “immunity from employee tort suits.” Id. The statutory 

text codifies this legislative compromise by making statutory 

remedies exclusive. The Longshore Act provides: 

The liability of an employer prescribed in section 904 

of this title shall be exclusive and in place of all other 

liability of such employer to the employee, his legal 

representative, husband or wife, parents, dependents, 

next of kin, and anyone otherwise entitled to recover 

damages from such employer at law or in admiralty on 

account of such injury or death . . . .

33 U.S.C. § 905(a) (emphasis added). The Base Act

expressly incorporates this exclusivity provision, see 42 

U.S.C. § 1651(a), and includes an additional exclusivity 

provision. Under a subsection titled, “Liability as exclusive,” 

the statute states: 

The liability of an employer, contractor (or any 

subcontractor or subordinate subcontractor with 

respect to the contract of such contractor) under this 
8

chapter shall be exclusive and in place of all other 

liability of such employer, contractor, subcontractor, 

or subordinate contractor to his employees (and their 

dependents) coming within the purview of this 

chapter, under the workmen’s compensation law of 

any State, Territory, or other jurisdiction, irrespective 

of the place where the contract of hire of any such 

employee may have been made or entered into.

42 U.S.C. § 1651(c) (emphasis added). 

In the Hall decision we construed the District of 

Columbia Workers’ Compensation Act, which, like the Base 

Act, incorporates the exclusive remedy provision of the 

Longshore Act. The plaintiff in Hall, “[u]nsatisfied with the 

statutory quid pro quo,” contended that “employees should be 

permitted to bring tort claims when the employer refuses to 

make timely compensation payments with an intent to 

injure.” 809 F.2d at 926 (emphasis added). We rejected 

Hall’s argument and refused to undo the “legislated 

compromise” codified in the statutory scheme. Id. (quoting 

Johnson, 467 U.S. at 931). All the tort claims—including 

intentional tort claims—“fall within the [statutory] exclusivity 

provisions.” Id. 

As the district court rightly discerned, the reasoning of 

Hall governs this case. First, the complaint alleges that all 

class members “were covered by the Defense Base Act.” 

SAC ¶ 562. Second, based on appellants’ own allegations, 

their class-wide tort claims (including the alleged intentional 

torts) directly relate to their claims for Base Act benefits. See 

id. ¶¶ 59, 61; Brink, 910 F. Supp. 2d at 252 (summarizing 

appellants’ claims). Consequently, appellants’ class-wide tort 

claims are barred by the exclusive statutory scheme set forth 

in the Base Act and Longshore Act. Hall, 809 F.2d at 926; 
9

see also Oral Arg. Recording 15:00–16:33 (acknowledging 

that Hall bars appellants’ class-wide tort claims). 

Appellants suggest that Martin v. Travelers Insurance 

Co., a First Circuit case decided in 1974, identifies an 

exception to Hall. See Appellants’ Br. at 43–44 (discussing 

Martin, 497 F.2d at 330–31). The First Circuit in Martin

permitted a narrow exception to the Longshore Act’s 

exclusivity because “the crux of the complaint [was an] 

insurer’s callous stopping of payment without warning when 

it should have realized that acute harm might follow.” 

Martin, 497 F.2d at 331. Appellants read Martin as creating 

an exception to exclusivity for intentional tort claims, and ask 

us to reverse the district court’s dismissal because their classwide tort claims were “clearly pleaded outside of the 

exclusive remedy setting.” Appellants’ Br. at 43. We 

disagree with appellants’ broad reading of Martin. In fact, we 

implicitly rejected Martin in Hall. There we stated explicitly 

that the D.C. Court of Appeals had been “clearly correct” in 

Garrett v. Washington Air Compressor Co., 466 A.2d 462 

(D.C. 1983), in concluding that the tort claims before it “[fell]

within the Act’s exclusivity provisions.” Hall, 809 F.2d at 

926. In the citations following that conclusion, we suggested 

our rejection of Martin by introducing it with the negative 

“but see” signal. Id. We were not then, nor are we now, 

bound to follow the decisions of other circuits. We are, 

however, bound to follow those of our own. Therefore, as the 

appellants recognize, they must petition for rehearing en banc 

in order to make the case for narrowing or overruling Hall. 

And, whatever the scope of the First Circuit’s Martin

decision, Hall clearly encompasses intentional tort claims of 

the kind alleged in this class action.1

 

 1 We are not alone in declining to follow Martin. Other courts 

have done so, including even the First Circuit, which gave it birth 
10

Appellants argue that the statutory scheme does not 

provide remedies for the tortious injuries caused by the 

contractors’ intentional actions. That is incorrect. The Base 

Act penalizes employers for failing to pay (or timely pay) 

benefits. See 33 U.S.C. § 914(e), (f). If an employer fails to 

comply with a Department of Labor compensation order, 

federal courts have jurisdiction to enforce the compensation 

order, id. § 921(d), and assess criminal penalties, id. § 938. 

Additionally, the employer is criminally liable for knowingly 

making false statements to reduce, deny, or terminate 

benefits. Id. § 931(c). Even though some of these remedies 

sound in criminal law and not in tort, the statute provides 

remedy against contractors and insurers who do not comply 

with statutory obligations. 

Appellants complain that the Base Act’s “minuscule” 

penalties are provided by “a bureaucratic system of 

government administration . . . that is complex and slow,” 

SAC ¶ 58, but that does not empower us to disturb the 

“legislatively enacted compensation scheme,” Duke Power 

Co. v. Carolina Env’t Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 88 

(1978). “While it may be that the penalty provisions are 

inadequate to fully compensate a worker who has been 

harmed by an employer’s refusal to pay when due, the 

 

but subsequently limited its application closely to its facts. See 

Barnard v. Zapata Haynie Corp., 975 F.2d 919, 920–21 (1st Cir. 

1992); see also Sample v. Johnson, 771 F.2d 1335, 1347 (9th Cir. 

1985) (criticizing Martin as an “opinion free of citation to 

authority” and stating that the “bulk of authority” contradicts it); 

Atkinson v. Gates, McDonald & Co., 838 F.2d 808, 813 n.6 (5th 

Cir. 1988) (deciding to “follow Sample and Hall” instead of 

Martin). 
11

problem requires a political solution.” Sample, 771 F.2d at 

1347. 

As the district court correctly opined, the precedent of 

Hall requires that we apply the exclusivity provision of the 

Longshore Act as incorporated in the Base Act according to 

the statutory terms. We affirm the district court’s dismissal of 

appellants’ class-wide tort claims (Counts III, IV, V, VII, and 

VIII). 

We note, as the appellees acknowledge, that Hall does

not preclude individual appellants from pursuing claims that 

arise independently of an entitlement to benefits under the 

Longshore Act, such as a common-law assault claim based on 

a threat against a Longshore Act claimant, see Oral Arg. 

Recording 34:15-35:15, or a claim by a Longshore Act careprovider sounding in contract and based on a separate 

agreement to make payments to her to provide care to the 

Longshore Act claimant, see id. 40:01-57. We reiterate that 

such claims are not encompassed in this class-action 

complaint. See SAC ¶¶ 564–639; Oral Arg. Recording

38:43-39:04, 49:29–50:25, 52:39–54. Therefore, our decision 

does not preclude separate proceedings for Ronald Bell to 

allege assault, SAC ¶ 79, Christine Holguin-Luge to allege 

sexual assault, id. ¶¶ 321–35, and Nicky Pool to allege a 

breach of contract, id. ¶¶ 351, 477–88. 

B. Federal Claims

 1. RICO Claims

Because the statutory scheme of the Base Act and 

Longshore Act contains exclusive remedies, it “leaves no 

room” for appellants’ RICO claims. Danielsen v. BurnsideOtt Aviation Training Ctr., Inc., 941 F.2d 1220, 1226 (D.C. 
12

Cir. 1991). Appellants alleged the contractors violated RICO 

by conspiring “to misrepresent” information related to Base 

Act claims “to injured parties and the [Department of Labor],” 

and “by denying claims using fraud.” SAC ¶ 573. The Base 

Act, however, already provides a remedy for the alleged 

misconduct. Titled “Penalty for misrepresentation,” § 931 of 

the Longshore Act (which the Base Act incorporates) 

provides an exclusive remedy for false statements made by 

“an employer, his duly authorized agent, or an employee of an 

insurance carrier who knowingly and willfully makes a false 

statement or representation for the purpose of reducing, 

denying, or terminating benefits to an injured employee, or 

his dependents.” 33 U.S.C. § 931(c). The violator “shall be 

punished by a fine not to exceed $10,000, by imprisonment 

not to exceed five years, or by both.” Id. These exclusive 

remedies leave no room for appellants’ RICO claims. 

 

Appellants further alleged the contractors violated RICO 

by conspiring to “delay payments to providers or to 

claimants” and to “stop payments on checks.” SAC ¶ 573.

However, § 914 of the Longshore Act, as incorporated by the 

Base Act, already provides a penalty for employers who do 

not make on-time payments. See § 914(e)–(f) (increasing the 

amount due by 10 and 20 percent). Thus, there is no room for 

a RICO claim based on delayed or stopped compensation 

payments. 

Even if the statutory scheme left room for appellants’ 

RICO claims, the district court stated another ground for 

dismissing these claims: Appellants “fail[ed] to state a cause 

of action under RICO.” Brink, 910 F. Supp. at 255 n.12. We 

agree. To state a RICO claim, appellants needed to allege 

four elements: “(1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a 

pattern (4) of racketeering activity.” W. Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. 

Mkt. Square Assocs., 235 F.3d 629, 633 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
13

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Appellants’ 

claims fail on the second element because they alleged an 

indeterminate “RICO enterprise of individuals” broadly 

consisting of “insurance companies, attorneys, adjusters, third 

party medical providers, third party case administrators, third 

party investigators and contractors.” SAC ¶ 576 (emphasis 

omitted). Appellants did not allege any facts establishing 

required elements of a RICO enterprise: “(1) a common 

purpose among the participants, (2) organization, and 

(3) continuity.” United States v. Richardson, 167 F.3d 621, 

625 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Thus, they failed to allege a RICO 

enterprise. 

Appellants also failed to plead predicate acts with 

particularity to satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). 

See Danielson, 941 F.2d at 1229. Neither appellants’ mail

nor wire fraud claims contain any reference to “specific 

fraudulent statements, who made the statements, what was

said, when or where these statements were made, and how or 

why the alleged statements were fraudulent.” Brink, 910 F. 

Supp. 2d at 255 n.12. Appellants’ “[t]hreadbare recitals of the 

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 

statements, do not suffice” for Rule 12(b)(6), let alone Rule 

9(b). Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 

Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of appellants’ RICO 

claims. 

2. Longshore Act Claims

The Longshore Act prohibits an employer from 

discriminating against or discharging an employee who has 

filed (or attempted to file) a claim for compensation benefits. 

See 33 U.S.C. § 948a; 20 C.F.R. § 702.271(a)(1). Appellants 

alleged that the contractors violated the Longshore Act

because they “discriminated against,” SAC ¶ 565, and 
14

terminated employees who filed claims, id. ¶ 567. Appellants 

sought “reinstatement or damages,” id. ¶ 570, the same 

remedy available under the statute, see § 948a, as well as 

attorney’s fees. However, the district court dismissed 

appellants’ claims for failing to exhaust their administrative 

remedies. Brink, 910 F. Supp. 2d at 256. 

We affirm the dismissal of appellants’ Longshore Act

claims. The Base Act incorporates the Longshore Act’s 

administrative procedures for the filing, adjudication, and 

payment of workers’ compensation claims. Appellants 

explained: “Th[e] [Base Act] system is administered 

according to statute by the United States Department of Labor 

(DOL), in the administrative Office of Workers’ 

Compensation Programs (OWCP), subject to hearing and 

decision in contested cases by the Office of Administrative 

Law Judges (OALJ) of the DOL, and administrative appeal to 

the Benefits Review Board.” SAC ¶ 2 (citing 33 U.S.C. 

§§ 919, 921(b)(3)). Only after “a matter works its way 

through the OWCP, OALJ, and [the] Board,” can a claimant 

“appeal into the federal courts.” Id. Appellants have not even 

attempted to comply with the statutory requirements. There is 

no evidence appellants followed the administrative process set 

forth in the statute and related regulations. See 33 

U.S.C. § 948a; 20 C.F.R. §§ 702.271–274. In particular, there 

is no evidence that any appellants filed a complaint with the 

district director of the applicable compensation district, or that 

a district director conducted an investigation of the complaint. 

20 C.F.R. § 702.271(b). Nor is there any evidence that the 

district director determined that discrimination occurred or 

recommended reinstatement, restitution, or compensation for 

lost wages. Id. § 702.272(a). Under these circumstances, 

dismissal is warranted because appellants have not exhausted 

their administrative remedies. 
15

3. ADA Claims

As noted above, the district court ordered dismissal of the 

ADA claims and denied appellants’ motions for 

reconsideration under Rule 59(e) and for leave to file an 

amended complaint under Rule 15(a). “When the district 

court denies a motion for leave to amend under Rule 15(a), 

we review its decision for abuse of discretion, bearing in mind 

that the rule is to be construed liberally.” Belizan v. Hershon, 

434 F.3d 579, 582 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). 

Courts “should freely give leave” for a party to amend a 

pleading “when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). 

In light of the “liberal intent of Rule 15(a)(2),” appellants

argue that the district court abused its discretion when it did 

not provide them leave to amend their ADA claims. 

Appellants’ Br. 57–58. We agree. 

Appellants could amend their complaint after it was 

dismissed with prejudice “only by filing, as they properly did, 

a 59(e) motion to alter or amend a judgment combined with a 

Rule 15(a) motion requesting leave of court to amend their 

complaint.” Firestone v. Firestone, 76 F.3d 1205, 1208 (D.C. 

Cir. 1996). We have said that denial of the Rule 59(e) motion 

in that situation is an abuse of discretion if the dismissal of the 

complaint with prejudice was erroneous; that is, the 

Rule 59(e) motion should be granted unless “the allegation of 

other facts consistent with the challenged pleading could not 

possibly cure the deficiency.” Id. at 1209 (internal quotation 

marks omitted); see also Belizan, 434 F.3d at 583 (same). 

That high bar was not met here. “Turning . . . to the Rule 

15(a) issue, we find error in the district court’s complete 

failure to provide reasons for refusing to grant leave to 

amend.” Firestone, 76 F.3d at 1209; see also Foman v. Davis, 
16

371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) (“[O]utright refusal to grant the 

leave without any justifying reason appearing for the denial is 

not an exercise of discretion; it is merely abuse of that 

discretion and inconsistent with the spirit of the Federal 

Rules.”). Moreover, although the contractors argue that the 

proposed amendment would have been futile, it is at least

“plausible,” see Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 

556 (2007), that the severe injuries described by Clark, 

Kreesha, and Alsaleh could interfere with major life activities

within the meaning of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A); see 

also Adams v. Rice, 531 F.3d 936, 944 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 

Kreesha and Alsaleh also expressly allege that they sought the 

accommodation of doing translation work in the United 

States, and it again seems facially plausible that translating 

from home would be a “reasonable accommodation” under 

the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9). 

We therefore remand for the district court to reconsider 

and explain its decision to deny leave to amend. See Belizan, 

434 F.3d at 584. The contractors do not resist this result. See 

Oral Arg. Recording 46:30–43 (“To the extent this court 

requires [the district court] to offer further explanation as to 

the three plaintiffs bringing ADA claims against three 

defendants, we defer to the court on that.”).

* * *

For the reasons stated, we affirm the district court’s 

judgment dismissing appellants’ class-wide tort claims as well 
17

as appellants’ RICO and Longshore Act claims.2 We vacate 

the district court’s denial of appellants’ motion for 

reconsideration and leave to file an amended complaint, and 

remand to the district court to explain its decision not to grant 

leave to some of the appellants to correct the defects in their 

ADA claims.

So ordered.

 2 On February 10, 2015, Appellees US Investigations Services, 

LLC and USIS International, Inc. (collectively “US Investigations”) 

notified this Court that US Investigations had filed a petition under 

chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code and that all judicial proceedings 

against the debtor are stayed under 11 U.S.C. § 362. Suggestion of 

Bankruptcy, Brink, et al. v. Continental Insurance Co., et al., 

No. 13-7165 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 10, 2015). We ordered all parties 

except US Investigations to file responses. After reviewing the 

suggestion of bankruptcy and responses thereto, we held this case 

in abeyance as to US Investigations pending further order of the 

court.