PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-2418

MINGO LOGAN COAL COMPANY,

Petitioner,

v.

ERMA JEAN OWENS, widow of DALLAS R. OWENS; DIRECTOR, OFFICE 

OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION PROGRAMS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT 

OF LABOR,

Respondents.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Benefits Review Board.

(11-0154 BLA)

Argued: March 21, 2013 Decided: July 31, 2013

Before NIEMEYER, DAVIS, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Petition for review denied by published opinion. Judge Niemeyer 

wrote the opinion, in which Judge Davis and Judge Diaz joined. 

Judge Niemeyer wrote a separate concurring opinion.

ARGUED: William Steele Mattingly, JACKSON KELLY, PLLC, 

Morgantown, West Virginia, for Petitioner. John Crawford Cline, 

Piney View, West Virginia; Sarah Marie Hurley, UNITED STATES 

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, Washington, D.C., for Respondents. ON 

BRIEF: Ashley M. Harman, Jeffrey R. Soukup, JACKSON KELLY, 

PLLC, Morgantown, West Virginia, for Petitioner. M. Patricia 

Smith, Solicitor of Labor, Rae Ellen James, Associate Solicitor, 

Sean G. Bajkowski, Counsel for Appellate Litigation, UNITED 
2

STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, Washington, D.C., for Federal 

Respondent.
3

NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge:

After nearly 30 years of coal mine employment, Dallas Owens 

became totally disabled because of breathing difficulties, and 

in April 2008, he filed a claim for black lung benefits. An 

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) found that Owens’ claim 

triggered the rebuttable presumption for benefits under 30 

U.S.C. § 921(c)(4), available to miners who are totally disabled 

and have worked 15 years or more in underground coal mines, and 

that Mingo Logan Coal Company, Owens’ former employer, failed to 

rebut the presumption. The ALJ therefore awarded benefits to 

Owens, and the Benefits Review Board affirmed.

On appeal, Mingo Logan contends that the ALJ and the Board 

applied the wrong legal standard in evaluating whether it had 

met its rebuttal burden, erroneously limiting it to the two 

methods that the text of the statute specifies are the only 

means by which the Secretary may rebut the presumption. See 30 

U.S.C. § 921(c)(4) (providing, “The Secretary may rebut such 

presumption only by establishing that (A) such miner does not, 

or did not, have pneumoconiosis, or that (B) his respiratory or 

pulmonary impairment did not arise out of, or in connection 

with, employment in a coal mine”). Mingo Logan contends that 

limiting it to these two methods of rebuttal violated not only 

the clear language of § 921(c)(4), which makes the rebuttal

limitations applicable to the Secretary, but also the Supreme 
4

Court’s holding in Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 

1, 35 (1976) (construing the statute to place no limitations on 

the means by which an employer may satisfy its burden on 

rebuttal).

Both Owens and the Director of the Office of Workers’ 

Compensation Programs argue that even though the statute does 

not, by its terms, limit employers to the two specified methods 

of rebuttal, logic does, and therefore the ALJ and the Board 

articulated the correct legal standard.

We do not reach Mingo Logan’s challenge to the standard 

announced by the Board to rebut the § 921(c)(4) presumption of 

entitlement to benefits, because we conclude that the ALJ did 

not in fact apply rebuttal limitations to Mingo Logan, and the 

Board affirmed the ALJ’s analysis. Because we also find that 

Mingo Logan’s other challenges to the ALJ’s factual findings

lack merit, we affirm the Board’s award of benefits. 

Accordingly, we deny Mingo Logan’s petition for review.

I

Owens worked in West Virginia coal mines for close to 30 

years, beginning in 1974, and he spent the last 10 of those 

years working in coal mines as an electrician for Mingo Logan 

Coal Company. He stopped working in 2003 when he developed 

difficulty breathing, a problem that got worse with time. In 
5

April 2008, Owens filed a claim under the Black Lung Benefits 

Act, which awards benefits to coal miners who are totally

disabled due to pneumoconiosis. See 30 U.S.C. § 901 et seq. 

The statute’s implementing regulations define the term 

pneumoconiosis to include not only those diseases medically 

recognized as pneumoconiosis (“clinical pneumoconiosis”), but 

also “any chronic lung disease or impairment and its sequelae

arising out of coal mine employment” (“legal pneumoconiosis”). 

20 C.F.R. § 718.201(a). A claims examiner found that Owens was 

eligible for benefits and ordered Mingo Logan to pay him 

$1,048.10 a month. Mingo Logan contested the award and 

requested a formal hearing with an ALJ. The hearing was 

conducted on December 9, 2009.

At the hearing, Owens testified about his employment 

history and his breathing problems, for which he had been 

prescribed oxygen. He also testified that he had smoked about a 

quarter of a pack of cigarettes a day when he was in his late 

teens and early twenties but that he had not smoked since 1965. 

In addition to Owens’ testimony, the parties introduced various 

forms of medical evidence concerning his condition, including 

(1) conflicting interpretations of two chest X-rays and three CT 

scans; (2) the results from pulmonary function tests and 

arterial blood gas studies; (3) notes of observations from two 

of his treating physicians, Dr. Maria Boustani and Dr. Oscar 
6

Figueroa, indicating that Owens had pneumoconiosis; and (4) 

conflicting medical opinions from three physicians, Dr. D.L. 

Rasmussen (offered by the Director), Dr. George Zaldivar 

(offered by Mingo Logan), and Dr. Kirk Hippensteel (offered by 

Mingo Logan), all three of whom agreed that Owens was totally 

disabled by a pulmonary impairment but disagreed as to its 

diagnosis and cause. Dr. Rasmussen diagnosed Owens as having 

both clinical pneumoconiosis and interstitial fibrosis and 

opined that both conditions were attributable to Owens’ exposure 

to coal mine dust. Dr. Zaldivar diagnosed Owens with idiopathic 

interstitial fibrosis or, in his words, “an interstitial 

fibrosis of undetermined cause,” but unrelated to coal mining. 

Dr. Hippensteel essentially reached the same conclusion, opining 

that Owens’ “type of lung disease is a disease of the general 

public unrelated to his prior coal mine dust exposure” and that 

he “would be just as impaired by the same pulmonary problem had 

he never worked in a coal mine.”∗

 ∗ After the hearing but before the ALJ issued her decision, 

Congress enacted the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 

(“PPACA”), which contained a section amending the Black Lung 

Benefits Act. See Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1556, 124 Stat. 119, 

260 (2010). As relevant here, for pending claims filed after 

January 1, 2005, the PPACA reinstated a presumption that had 

lapsed in 1982, specifying that a miner with at least 15 years 

of underground coal mine employment who “demonstrates the 

existence of a totally disabling respiratory or pulmonary 

impairment” is entitled to a rebuttable presumption that he is 

“totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis.” 30 U.S.C. 
7

In October 2010, the ALJ awarded Owens benefits. She 

concluded that because Owens had more than 15 years of 

underground coal mine employment and because the evidence 

established that he was totally disabled by a respiratory 

impairment, the rebuttable presumption of § 921(c)(4) arose that 

he was totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis. The ALJ also 

found that Mingo Logan did not rebut that presumption. In this 

respect, the ALJ considered seven interpretations of two chest 

X-rays, giving more weight to the readings that interpreted the 

films as positive for pneumoconiosis based on the physicians’ 

relative qualifications. The ALJ also gave greater weight to 

Dr. Rasmussen’s opinion as to the cause of Owens’ disability 

than to the opinions offered by Dr. Zaldivar and Dr. 

Hippensteel, emphasizing that Dr. Rasmussen’s opinion was better 

 

§ 921(c)(4). In response to the amendment, the ALJ reopened the 

record to allow both parties an opportunity to submit new 

evidence, and Mingo Logan submitted supplemental reports from 

both Dr. Zaldivar and Dr. Hippensteel.

The preexisting regulation that implemented former 

§ 921(c)(4), 20 C.F.R. § 718.305, remains inapplicable by its 

terms. See 20 C.F.R. § 718.305(e) (providing that the 

regulation “is not applicable to any claim filed on or after 

January 1, 1982”). The Department of Labor, however, asserts 

that the substance of that regulation “remains the Department’s 

definitive interpretation of Section 921(c)(4),” and it has 

proposed a new version of the regulation, which has not yet gone 

into effect. See Regulations Implementing the Byrd Amendments 

to the Black Lung Benefits Act: Determining Coal Miners’ and 

Survivors’ Entitlement to Benefits, 77 Fed. Reg. 19,456 

(proposed Mar. 30, 2012).
8

supported by the objective medical evidence and “the opinions of 

two pulmonary experts who treated [Owens],” while Dr. Zaldivar 

and Dr. Hippensteel “chose to totally eliminate consideration of 

[Owens’] 29 years of coal dust exposure as a potential 

environmental factor in the development of his interstitial 

fibrosis.” The ALJ therefore concluded that “the preponderance 

of the best documented and reasoned evidence of record 

establishes the presence of clinical and legal pneumoconiosis.” 

She also found that Dr. Zaldivar and Dr. Hippensteel’s diagnosis 

of idiopathic interstitial fibrosis was “not sufficient to 

establish a cause of [Owens’] disability other than [coal 

workers’ pneumoconiosis].” She concluded, at bottom, that Mingo 

Logan failed to rebut the § 921(c)(4) presumption.

The Benefits Review Board affirmed by a decision and order 

dated October 28, 2011. The Board concluded that the ALJ’s 

findings were supported by substantial evidence and that the ALJ 

properly explained her finding that the positive X-ray readings 

outweighed the negative X-ray readings and “properly found that 

Dr. Rasmussen’s opinion was better documented and reasoned than 

the opinions of Drs. Zaldivar and Hippensteel.”

Mingo Logan filed this petition for review, challenging 

both the legal standard applied to its rebuttal evidence, as 

well as the sufficiency of the analysis and the evidence.
9

Owens died on July 8, 2012, but his widow continues to 

pursue his claim on behalf of his estate.

II

Mingo Logan contends that the ALJ and the Benefits Review 

Board applied the wrong legal standard in assessing whether it 

rebutted the presumption established by 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(4). 

Under § 921(c)(4), if the miner shows that he worked 15 years or 

more in underground coal mines and that he suffers from a 

totally disabling respiratory or pulmonary impairment, a 

rebuttable presumption arises that the miner “is totally 

disabled due to pneumoconiosis.” In the absence of credible 

rebuttal evidence, the miner would then be entitled to benefits.

In its opinion affirming the ALJ’s award of benefits, the 

Board stated that Mingo Logan could rebut the § 921(c)(4) 

presumption only by showing either (1) that Owens did not have 

pneumoconiosis or (2) that his respiratory or pulmonary 

impairment did not arise out of, or in connection with, his coal 

mine employment. In support of this statement, the Board cited

the statutory language: “The Secretary may rebut such 

presumption only by establishing that (A) such miner does not, 

or did not, have pneumoconiosis, or that (B) his respiratory or 

pulmonary impairment did not arise out of, or in connection 

with, employment in a coal mine.” 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(4).
10

Mingo Logan argues that the Board improperly applied to it 

the rebuttal limitations of § 921(c)(4) even though the plain 

text shows that those limitations apply only when the 

“Secretary” seeks to rebut the presumption. See Usery v. Turner 

Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 35 (1976) (“[I]t [is] clear as a 

matter of statutory construction that the [provision’s] 

limitation on rebuttal evidence . . . applies only to ‘the 

Secretary’ and not to an operator seeking to avoid liability

. . .”). By applying the rebuttal limitations to it, Mingo

Logan argues, the Board denied it the chance to rebut the 

presumption with evidence that pneumoconiosis did not 

substantially contribute to Owens’ total disability.

Owens and the Director of the Office of Workers’ 

Compensation Program contend that the standard announced by the 

Board was appropriate even if the statutory language does not 

directly apply to the employer, because the methods of rebuttal 

articulated in § 921(c)(4) are the only logical methods by which 

the presumption can be rebutted. In short, they argue that the 

statute’s “rebuttal limitations” are actually not limitations at 

all.

While the dispute over the correct rebuttal standard could 

affect whether a miner receives benefits, in this case we 

conclude that Mingo Logan was not in fact restricted in the 

evidence it offered in rebuttal, and the ALJ did not apply the 
11

rebuttal limitations in considering the evidence. Rather, the 

ALJ analyzed whether Mingo Logan presented credible evidence to 

rebut any aspect of the miner’s claim covered by the 

presumption.

The Black Lung Benefits Act awards benefits to miners who 

are totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis. 30 U.S.C. 

§§ 901(a), 921; 20 C.F.R. §§ 718.204(a), 725.1(a), 

725.201(a)(1). This language defining when benefits are 

available is the same as the language defining the scope of the 

presumption created by § 921(c)(4). To establish an entitlement 

to benefits, a claimant must show (1) that he has 

pneumoconiosis, in either its “clinical” or “legal” form; (2) 

that the pneumoconiosis arose out of coal mine employment; (3) 

that he is totally disabled by a pulmonary or respiratory 

impairment; and (4) that his pneumoconiosis is a substantially 

contributing cause of his total disability. 20 C.F.R. §§ 

725.202(d)(2), 718.204(c)(1). “Pneumoconiosis is a 

‘substantially contributing cause’ of the miner’s disability if 

it (i) [h]as a material adverse effect on the miner’s 

respiratory or pulmonary condition; or (ii) [m]aterially worsens 

a totally disabling respiratory or pulmonary impairment which is 

caused by a disease or exposure unrelated to coal mine 

employment.” Id. § 718.204(c)(1).
12

Relating these claim elements to § 921(c)(4)’s presumption, 

when a miner proves 15 years of coal mine employment and element 

(3), i.e., the total disability element, a rebuttable 

presumption arises that the miner is totally disabled due to 

pneumoconiosis. Thus, with this provision, the miner 

presumptively satisfies claim elements (1) (the existence of 

pneumoconiosis), (2) (pneumoconiosis arose out of coal mine 

employment), and (4) (pneumoconiosis caused the total 

disability). Although Mingo Logan argues that the ALJ limited 

its ability to rebut the presumption by applying to it the 

rebuttal methods applicable only to the Secretary, the record in 

fact shows that the ALJ did no such thing. Rather, the ALJ 

considered all of the evidence that Mingo Logan presented and 

found that it did not rebut any of the three elements covered by 

the presumption.

Specifically, as to element (1) (the presence of 

pneumoconiosis), the ALJ considered Mingo Logan’s evidence, 

together with the evidence presented by Owens, and concluded, “I 

find that the preponderance of the best documented and reasoned 

evidence of record establishes the presence of clinical and 

legal pneumoconiosis.” As to element (2) (that pneumoconiosis 

arose out of coal mine employment), the ALJ pointed to another

rebuttable presumption, as stated in 20 C.F.R. § 718.203(b), 

which establishes this element if the miner had at least 10 
13

years of coal mine employment. She then concluded that because 

Mingo Logan “ha[d] not presented evidence to rebut the 

presumption,” Owens “ha[d] established the presence of 

pneumoconiosis arising out of coal mine employment.” And 

finally as to element (4) (that pneumoconiosis caused the total 

disability), the ALJ understood that the presumption could be 

rebutted by the employer. The ALJ considered the causation 

evidence submitted by both sides and concluded that Mingo Logan 

“has failed to establish that [Owens’] respiratory disability is 

due to a condition other than pneumoconiosis.” The ALJ thus 

effectively rejected the evidence offered by Mingo Logan to 

rebut element (4) by showing that pneumoconiosis was not a 

substantially contributing cause of Owens’ total disability.

In affirming the ALJ, the Benefits Review Board recited the 

ALJ’s holding, explicitly referring to the ALJ’s conclusion that 

Mingo Logan did not rebut element (4):

The administrative law judge also found that employer 

failed to establish that claimant does not have 

clinical or legal pneumoconiosis, or that claimant’s 

total disability was not due to pneumoconiosis. 

Consequently, the administrative law judge found that 

employer failed to rebut the presumption of total 

disability due to pneumoconiosis at Section 411(c)(4) 

of the Act, 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(4).

(Emphasis added). While the Board then summarized its 

affirmance by referring to the sentence in § 921(c)(4) that 

addresses how the Secretary may rebut the presumption, it 
14

nonetheless proceeded to address substantively the ALJ’s factual 

findings and evaluation of the evidence and affirmed them.

In short, while the Benefits Review Board purported to

subject the employer to the rebuttal methods applicable to the 

Secretary in § 921(c)(4), it concluded in substance that no 

aspect of the presumption was rebutted, affirming the ALJ’s 

finding that Mingo Logan failed to show that Owens had only mild 

pneumoconiosis that did not substantially contribute to his 

total disability. Accordingly, because the record shows that 

§ 921(c)(4)’s two methods of rebuttal did not affect the Board’s 

disposition of this case, we need not address Mingo Logan’s 

claim that restricting employers to those methods improperly 

raised its burden on rebuttal.

III

On the merits, Mingo Logan contends that, in concluding 

that it had not rebutted the § 921(c)(4) presumption, the ALJ 

failed to consider the medical evidence in its entirety and 

failed to provide an adequate rationale in support of her 

conclusions, resulting in a decision that falls below the 

minimum threshold required by the Administrative Procedure Act

(“APA”). Specifically, it argues (1) that the ALJ did not 

adequately explain her weighing of the chest X-ray evidence; (2)

that she improperly discounted the medical opinions of Dr. 
15

Zaldivar and Dr. Hippensteel; and (3) that Dr. Rasmussen’s 

opinion, combined with Owens’ treatment records, was

insufficient to support the ALJ’s finding of legal 

pneumoconiosis.

Our review of these matters assesses whether “substantial 

evidence supports the factual findings of the ALJ and whether 

the legal conclusions of the [Board] and ALJ are rational and 

consistent with applicable law.” Harman Mining Co. v. Dir., 

Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 678 F.3d 305, 310 (4th Cir. 

2012) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a 

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.” Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 

(1938). As part of “determining whether substantial evidence 

supports the ALJ’s factual determinations, we must . . . address 

whether all of the relevant evidence has been analyzed and 

whether the ALJ has sufficiently explained his rationale in 

crediting certain evidence.” Milburn Colliery Co. v. Hicks, 138 

F.3d 524, 528 (4th Cir. 1998). But we must also be mindful that 

the ALJ, as the trier of fact, “is charged with making factual 

findings, including evaluating the credibility of witnesses and 

weighing contradicting evidence.” Doss v. Dir., Office of 

Workers’ Comp. Programs, 53 F.3d 654, 658 (4th Cir. 1995).
16

With respect to Mingo Logan’s contention that the ALJ 

failed “to provide adequate explanation under the APA for her 

weighing of the chest X-ray evidence,” the APA does require ALJs 

to “include a statement of . . . findings and conclusions, and 

the reasons or basis therefor, on all the material issues of 

fact, law, or discretion presented on the record.” 5 U.S.C. 

§ 557(c)(3)(A). An adequate explanation, however, “can be a 

succinct one,” Lane Hollow Coal Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ 

Comp. Programs, 137 F.3d 799, 803 (4th Cir. 1998), and the APA’s 

“duty of explanation” is satisfied as long as “a reviewing court 

can discern what the ALJ did and why she did it,” Harman, 678 

F.3d at 316 (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted).

In this case, the ALJ had before her three interpretations 

of a chest X-ray taken on May 15, 2008, and four interpretations 

of an October 15, 2008 X-ray. The ALJ first explained the

relative radiological qualifications of the persons who made an 

interpretation, noting that a physician becomes a “B reader” 

when he passes an examination testing his “proficiency in 

assessing and classifying X-ray evidence of pneumoconiosis,” 

while a Board-certified radiologist has received certification 

in radiology or diagnostic roentgenology by the American Board 

of Radiology or the American Osteopathic Association. See 20 

C.F.R. § 718.202(a)(ii)(C), (E). The ALJ then explained that a 

dually qualified physician (i.e., a radiologist who was both a B 
17

reader and Board-certified) and a doctor who was a B reader had 

interpreted the first X-ray as positive for the presence of 

pneumoconiosis, while one dually qualified physician read the 

film as negative. Giving more weight to the reading that had 

been corroborated, the ALJ found “that this [May 2008] film 

supports finding the presence of pneumoconiosis.”

The ALJ similarly evaluated the conflicting interpretations 

of the October 2008 X-ray, noting that it had been read as 

positive by two dually qualified physicians and negative by one 

dually qualified physician and by one physician, Dr. Zaldivar, 

who had subsequently lost his B reader certification. She then 

explained that she was giving “more weight to the jointly held 

opinions of the dually qualified physicians who interpreted the 

film as positive.” She thus concluded that “the preponderance 

of the X-ray evidence supports a finding of the presence of 

pneumoconiosis.”

On this record, the Board found that the ALJ adequately 

explained her assessment of the X-ray evidence. And we agree. 

The applicable regulation specifies that “where two or more 

X-ray reports are in conflict,” the ALJ must consider “the 

radiological qualifications of the physicians interpreting such 

X-rays.” 20 C.F.R. § 718.202(a)(1). Because the ALJ did just 

that here, we conclude that she sufficiently explained why she 

found the X-ray evidence on the whole indicated that Owens had 
18

pneumoconiosis and that substantial evidence supported that 

finding.

Next, with respect to Mingo Logan’s contention that the ALJ 

incorrectly disregarded the opinions of its experts, the ALJ 

gave a number of reasons in support of her decision to “accord 

less weight to the opinions of Drs. Zaldivar and Hippensteel.” 

She found that they both “dismissed in a cursory [fashion] the 

medical literature that associated coal dust exposure with 

interstitial fibrosis;” that they both “maintained that 

idiopathic interstitial fibrosis exists in the general 

population, but neither adequately addressed the fact that 

[Owens] is not a member of the general population” based on his 

extensive coal-dust exposure; and that they “[b]oth acknowledged 

that the diagnosis of idiopathic interstitial fibrosis depended 

on ruling out all suspected factor[s], but neither doctor gave 

an adequate explanation for why coal dust inhalation could not 

have caused at least some of [Owens’] impairment.” The ALJ also 

found their opinions “compromised by not being fully 

documented,” noting (1) that “[n]either doctor fully addressed 

the fact that two treating pulmonary specialist[s] found 

sufficient evidence to diagnose [coal workers’ pneumoconiosis] 

rather than idiopathic interstitial fibrosis;” (2) that “[b]oth 

doctors relied upon negative readings of X-rays and CT scans, 

regardless of contrary interpretations by dually qualified 
19

physicians, or by the doctor who read the films during 

treatment;” (3) that neither addressed one of the treating 

pulmonologists’ “findings of a mixed obstructive and restrictive 

defect;” and (4) that neither “gave adequate consideration to 

whether the evidence established legal pneumoconiosis.” 

At bottom, the ALJ found that Dr. Zaldivar and Dr. 

Hippensteel did not adequately explain why, in their view, 

Owens’ interstitial fibrosis was not “significantly related to, 

or substantially aggravated by,” his exposure to dust through 

his coal mine employment. 20 C.F.R. § 718.201(b). In other 

words, the ALJ found that these doctors’ reports and testimony 

did not adequately explain why Owens’ interstitial fibrosis --

which they identified as the cause of his total disability --

did not constitute legal pneumoconiosis.

Nonetheless, Mingo Logan challenges this finding by 

pointing to places in the record where it contends Dr. Zaldivar 

and Dr. Hippensteel did indeed explain “how and why they 

eliminated Mr. Owens’ coal dust exposure as the cause of his 

interstitial fibrosis.” But the ALJ never said that these 

doctors failed to provide any explanation for their views on 

this critical point. Instead, she found that the explanations 

they gave were inadequate and ultimately unconvincing.

Having fully reviewed the record, we conclude that the ALJ 

acted within her factfinding role in deciding to give less 
20

weight to the opinions of Dr. Zaldivar and Dr. Hippensteel. See

Westmoreland Coal Co. v. Cochran, __ F.3d __, No. 11-1893, slip 

op. at 13 (4th Cir. June 4, 2013) (noting that “[i]t is the role 

of the ALJ -- not the appellate court -- to resolve” the “battle 

of the experts”).

Finally, Mingo Logan contends that Dr. Rasmussen’s opinion, 

combined with the notes of Owens’ treating pulmonary 

specialists, did not amount to substantial evidence to support 

the ALJ’s finding that Owens had both clinical and legal 

pneumoconiosis or her finding that Mingo Logan failed to show 

that Owens’ pulmonary disability was not due to these diseases. 

Mingo Logan argues that Dr. Rasmussen offered only an equivocal, 

differential diagnosis. This assertion, however, takes certain 

statements by Dr. Rasmussen out of context and overlooks his 

clearly expressed opinion that Owens’ condition was “primarily 

the result of [his] long term exposure to coal mine dust and 

that he suffers from coal mine induced, totally disabling 

chronic lung disease.”

Similarly, Mingo Logan argues that the ALJ relied too 

heavily on Owens’ treatment records. In our view, however, the 

ALJ followed the standards established in 20 C.F.R. § 718.104(d) 

and gave appropriate consideration to the opinions of Dr. 

Boustani and Dr. Figueroa, noting that “the record is not 

developed sufficiently to allow me to accord their opinions 
21

controlling weight” and instead deciding to give their opinions 

“significant weight.”

We thus reject Mingo Logan’s challenge to the sufficiency 

of the evidence.

* * * 

In sum, we was not in fact applied by either the ALJ or 

the Board. Instead, the ALJ considered all of the evidence that

Mingo Logan offered to demonstrate that pneumoconiosis did not 

cause or substantially contribute to Owens’ total disability, 

and the Board affirmed the substance of the ALJ’s analysis. We 

also reject Mingo Logan’s challenges to the ALJ’s analysis and 

the sufficiency of the evidence.

Accordingly, Mingo Logan’s petition for review is denied.

It is so ordered.
22

NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge, concurring:

I write this separate concurring opinion on my conviction 

that Mingo Logan’s challenge to the standard for rebutting the 

§ 921(c)(4) presumption should have been addressed. And in 

addressing it, I would hold that the rebuttal standard announced 

by the Board was erroneous, as demonstrated both by the explicit 

language of § 921(c)(4) and the Supreme Court’s holding in 

Usery.

The Board stated that it was applying to Mingo Logan the 

limiting rebuttal standard applicable to the Secretary, failing

to recognize that in Usery, the Supreme Court held that the 

standard applicable to the Secretary did not apply to employers. 

Only because it applied the limiting standard clumsily in this 

case -- and thus considered all methods of rebutting the 

§ 921(c)(4) presumption that Mingo Logan offered -- have we been 

able to resolve this appeal without addressing the standard. 

But this quirk, which was uncovered only by a close reading of 

the Board’s opinion, leaves sufficient doubt about the issue 

that we should resolve it.

I now write to demonstrate why the standard announced by 

the Board was erroneous.

As we point out, under § 921(c)(4), if the miner shows that 

he worked 15 years or more in underground coal mines and that he 

suffers from a totally disabling respiratory or pulmonary 
23

impairment, a rebuttable presumption arises that the miner “is 

totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis.” In the absence of 

credible rebuttable evidence, the miner would then be entitled 

to benefits.

The Board indicated that Mingo Logan could rebut the 

§ 921(c)(4) presumption only by showing either (1) that Owens 

did not have pneumoconiosis or (2) that his impairment did not 

arise out of, or in connection with, his coal mine employment. 

In doing so, the Board referenced the statutory language: “The 

Secretary may rebut such presumption only by establishing that 

(A) such miner does not, or did not, have pneumoconiosis, or 

that (B) his respiratory or pulmonary impairment did not arise 

out of, or in connection with, employment in a coal mine.” 30 

U.S.C. § 921(c)(4).

As noted above, the parties disagree on whether the Board 

announced the correct rebuttal standard for employers. Mingo 

Logan argues that the Board improperly applied to it the 

rebuttal limitations of § 921(c)(4) because the plain text shows 

that those limitations apply only when the “Secretary” seeks to 

rebut the presumption. See Usery, 428 U.S. at 35. By applying 

the rebuttal limitations to it, Mingo Logan argues, the Board 

denied it the chance to rebut the presumption with evidence that 

pneumoconiosis did not cause the miner’s total disability. 

Relying on how 20 C.F.R. § 718.204(c)(1) defines this causation 
24

standard, it reasons that the Board’s standard effectively 

denied it the opportunity to show that Owens’ disability was 

caused by idiopathic interstitial fibrosis and that his 

pneumoconiosis was so mild as not to “substantially contribute” 

to his disability. Id.

Owens and the Director of the Office of Workers’ 

Compensation Program contend that the standard announced by the 

Board was appropriate even if the statutory language does not 

directly apply to the employer, because the methods of rebuttal 

articulated in § 921(c)(4) are the only logical methods by which 

the presumption can be rebutted. In short, they argue that the 

statute’s “rebuttal limitations” are actually not limitations at 

all.

Resolution of the parties’ differences requires comparing 

the four claim elements necessary to establish a claim for 

benefits and the rebuttal methods contained in § 921(c)(4).

As we have already pointed out, to establish entitlement to 

benefits, a claimant must show that (1) he has pneumoconiosis; 

(2) his pneumoconiosis arose out of coal mine employment; (3) he 

has a total disability; and (4) his pneumoconiosis caused the

total disability. Thus, claim elements (1) and (3) are 

existential elements, requiring the existence of pneumoconiosis 

and the existence of total disability, while claim elements (2) 

and (4) articulate causal relationships.
25

Relating the claim elements to § 921(c)(4), when the miner 

proves 15 years of coal mine employment and claim element (3), 

i.e., the total disability element, a rebuttable presumption 

arises that the miner is totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis. 

Thus, with this provision, the miner presumptively satisfies 

claim elements (1) (the existence of pneumoconiosis), (2) 

(pneumoconiosis arose out of coal mine employment), and (4) 

(pneumoconiosis caused the total disability). Because the 

presumption is rebuttable, the coal mine operator would 

logically be entitled to defeat it by introducing evidence 

rebutting any of those three claim elements.

Because the statute specifies that the Secretary may rebut 

the presumption only by showing that the miner does not have 

pneumoconiosis (rebutting claim element (1)) or that there is no 

connection between the miner’s disability and his coal mine 

employment, it imposes a higher standard for rebuttal than would 

otherwise be logically permissible to rebut claim element (4). 

Claim element (4) could logically be rebutted by showing that 

the miner’s pneumoconiosis was not a substantially contributing

cause of his total disability, even if it contributed some 

minimal amount to his impairment. See 20 C.F.R. 

§ 718.204(c)(1). In this way, the statute limits the 

Secretary’s ability to rebut claim element (4). But the statute 

is silent about the scope of an employer’s rebuttal, and the 
26

employer’s methods of rebuttal are thus not limited. 

Consequently, because the presumption covers claim elements (1),

(2), and (4), the employer may carry its burden by introducing 

evidence rebutting any of these elements, without limitation.

Owens and the Director failed to appreciate the statutory 

language and the logic of § 921(c)(4), claiming that the 

Secretary’s rebuttal methods are also the employer’s only 

logical rebuttal methods, especially when the various elements 

of a claim are examined through their definitions. But the 

straightforward language of § 921(c)(4) belies their position, 

as noted. Moreover, the Supreme Court has confirmed the 

existence of a limitation on the Secretary that does not apply 

to the employer, necessarily recognizing that rebuttal methods 

(A) and (B) identified in § 921(c)(4) are not logically 

equivalent to the methods that would otherwise be available.

In Usery, the Court actually stated that the rebuttal 

methods of § 921(c)(4) were limiting. Usery, 428 U.S. at 34. 

And precisely because they were limiting, the coal mine 

operators involved in Usery made the same argument that Mingo 

Logan makes here:

The Operators contend that this limitation erects an 

impermissible irrebuttable presumption, because it 

establishes liability even though it might be 

medically demonstrable in an individual case that the 

miner’s pneumoconiosis was mild and did not cause the 

disability -- that the disability was wholly a product 

of other disease, such as tuberculosis or emphysema. 
27

Disability due to these diseases, as the Operators 

note, is not otherwise compensable under the Act.

Id. at 34-35. Accepting the legitimacy of the operators’ 

argument, the Court held:

[W]e think it clear as a matter of statutory 

construction that the [§ 921(c)(4)] limitation on 

rebuttal evidence is inapplicable to operators. By 

the language of [§ 921(c)(4)], the limitation applies

only to “the Secretary” and not to an operator seeking 

to avoid liability [for benefits].

Id. at 35.

Accordingly, I would conclude that the Board announced and 

purported to apply to Mingo Logan rebuttal limitations that 

applied only to the Secretary and that, in this respect, it 

erred as a matter of law.