NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

GEORGE M. REED, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 19-0701

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2016-005718-001

The Honorable Sally Schneider Duncan, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Michael Valenzuela

Counsel for Appellee

The Law Office of Kyle T. Green, Tempe

By Kyle T. Green

Counsel for Appellant

FILED 03-30-2021
STATE v. REED

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Kent E. Cattani delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Randall M. Howe and Judge Cynthia J. Bailey joined.

C A T T A N I, Judge:

¶1 George M. Reed appeals his conviction and sentence for sale 

or transportation of narcotic drugs (heroin), a class 2 felony. For reasons 

that follow, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 In 2016, detectives from the Arizona Department of Public 

Safety and Phoenix Police Department conducted a year-long investigation 

of illegal drug activity at an apartment complex. Undercover detectives 

identified and began using Eddie Flores, who lived at the complex, as a 

“middleman” to procure drugs from others in the complex.

¶3 In July 2016, detectives met Flores outside of the apartment he 

shared with Reed and asked to buy a quarter ounce of heroin. Flores 

telephoned someone to obtain the drugs, and a short time later, Reed 

arrived and walked into the apartment. Flores followed Reed into the 

apartment. A few minutes later, Flores returned and delivered a bag of 

heroin to the detectives. The detectives gave Flores an extra $10 for 

arranging the deal.

¶4 In August 2016, a detective sent a text message to Flores 

saying he had a friend who wanted to purchase “a ball from OG Reed.” 

The detective later testified that “ball” meant 3.5 grams of heroin and that 

“OG Reed” was Reed’s nickname. Later that day, detectives met Flores at 

the apartment complex, and Flores told them they could meet Reed at 

another location to get the heroin. Flores then made a phone call to Reed, 

and the detectives heard Flores tell him “they just picked me up,” then ask 

Reed if he wanted to meet at a gas station. The detectives recorded the call.

¶5 The detectives drove Flores to the gas station and waited in 

the parking lot. While they were waiting for Reed, the detectives gave 

Flores $175 for the heroin. Reed eventually pulled up in a van, and Flores 

walked over to the van and got in the front passenger seat. Flores then 

returned to the detectives’ car with a small plastic bag containing heroin.
STATE v. REED

Decision of the Court

3

¶6 The State charged Reed, as a principal or an accomplice, with 

two counts of sale or transportation of narcotic drugs—the first count for 

the July 2016 sale and the second count for the August 2016 sale. The jury 

acquitted Reed of the first count but convicted him of the second count. The 

superior court sentenced Reed as a repetitive offender on felony release at 

the time of the offense to 14 years’ imprisonment. See A.R.S. 

§§ 13-703(J), -708(D).

¶7 Reed appealed, and we have jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 13-

4033(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence.

¶8 Reed argues that the evidence did not support his conviction, 

asserting that the State did not establish that he intended to sell drugs to the 

detectives. We determine de novo whether the evidence supports a 

conviction, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the 

verdict. State v. Burns, 237 Ariz. 1, 20, ¶ 72 (2015). 

¶9 We review this type of claim by assessing whether substantial

evidence supports the jury’s findings. State v. Tison, 129 Ariz. 546, 552 

(1981). Evidence is substantial if reasonable jurors could conclude that it 

supports a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. West, 226 

Ariz. 559, 562, ¶ 16 (2011). 

¶10 To convict Reed, the State had to prove that he knowingly 

transported for sale, offered to transport for sale, sold, transferred, or 

offered to sell or transfer a narcotic drug or was an accomplice in such a 

transaction. A.R.S. §§ 13-3408(A)(7), -303(A)(3). An accomplice is someone 

who intendeds to aid or counsel another person in planning or committing 

an offense or “[p]rovides means or opportunity to another person to 

commit the offense.” A.R.S. § 13-301(2), (3). Generally, criminal intent is 

shown by circumstantial evidence because it reflects a defendant’s “state of 

mind,” State v. Bearup, 221 Ariz. 163, 167, ¶ 16 (2009) (quoting State v. 

Routhier, 137 Ariz. 90, 99 (1983)), and we do not distinguish “between the 

probative value of direct and circumstantial evidence” in assessing the 

defendant’s state of mind. See State v. Bible, 175 Ariz. 549, 560 n.1 (1993).

¶11 Reed does not challenge the State’s evidence showing that 

Flores sold heroin to the detectives or that he provided heroin to Flores. He 

instead argues that (1) the State did not present evidence that he knew 

Flores would sell the heroin to the detectives or that he intended to aide 
STATE v. REED

Decision of the Court

4

Flores in the sale of the heroin, and (2) his sale or transfer of drugs to Flores 

was a discrete transaction different from Flores’s sale to the detectives.

¶12 Both of Reed’s arguments fail because the State proffered 

evidence that Reed and Flores were accomplices selling heroin to the 

detectives. First, the quantity of drugs involved in the transaction 

permitted the jury to infer Reed’s knowledge of Flores’s sale to the 

detectives. And Flores contacted Reed after a detective texted Flores and 

asked to buy drugs from “OG Reed.” The detective testified that he told 

Flores he wanted to buy heroin from Reed because Reed was someone he 

could trust, further explaining at trial that he “always ask[ed] for a large 

quantity of heroin in order to find out who the main dealer was in the 

complex.” The detective’s requested quantity of heroin matched the 

amount Reed gave Flores, and the jury could reasonably infer that Reed 

knew that Flores was not intending to keep the heroin for his personal use 

based on the quantity involved. See, e.g., State v. Cheramie, 218 Ariz. 447, 

450, ¶ 18 (2008); State v. Arce, 107 Ariz. 156, 161–62 (1971). 

¶13 Additionally, Flores’s transactions were directly traceable to 

Reed. Although each transfer was arguably a discrete event, Reed was 

involved in the overall transaction with the detectives. See, e.g., State v 

Brown, 217 Ariz. 617, 620–21, ¶ 10 (App. 2008). After Flores told the 

detectives they could meet Reed somewhere else to get the heroin, Flores 

called Reed, telling him that “they just picked me up,” and that they would 

meet him at a convenience store. Once Reed arrived, Flores approached 

Reed’s van, and Reed gave him the heroin. Flores later told the detectives 

that if Reed “didn’t like something, he would have driven off,” but he did 

not do so, and one of the detectives testified that he looked at Reed, the 

driver and only occupant of the van, for a few seconds before Reed left the 

parking lot. And finally, although the jurors acquitted Reed of the charge 

relating to the July sale, they heard evidence of his involvement in that sale. 

The acquittal did not prevent the jury from considering this other-act 

evidence because it was properly admitted under a lesser standard of proof

than that required for conviction of the offense. Cf. State v. Yonkman, 233 

Ariz. 369, 374, ¶ 15 (App. 2013).

¶14 Based on this evidence, a reasonable juror could infer that 

Reed promoted or facilitated the August 2016 transaction or provided the 

means for its occurrence. See, e.g., Cheramie, 218 Ariz. at 450, ¶ 18; see also

State v. McNair, 141 Ariz. 475, 480–81 (1984) (noting that a jury can infer 

criminal intent from the relationship of the parties and their conduct before 

the crime occurred). Accordingly, Reed’s conviction is supported by 

substantial evidence.
STATE v. REED

Decision of the Court

5

II. Alleged Due-Process Violations Under A.R.S. § 13-303(A)(3). 

¶15 For the first time on appeal, Reed argues that he was 

convicted “under a natural and probable or reasonably foreseeable 

consequence theory” and that his conviction on that basis violates due 

process. Reed asserts that (1) a jury instruction on the natural and probable 

or reasonably foreseeable consequences doctrine allowed the jurors to 

apply a lesser mens rea in convicting him as an accomplice than the mens 

rea required for a principal, and (2) the language describing the reasonably 

foreseeable consequences doctrine in A.R.S. § 13-303(A)(3), which the jury 

instruction tracked, is unconstitutionally vague. Because Reed did not 

object at trial, we review this issue only for fundamental, prejudicial error. 

See State v. Escalante, 245 Ariz. 135, 140, 142, ¶¶ 12, 21 (2018).

¶16 Section 13-303(A)(3) imposes criminal liability for the actions 

of another person if the defendant is an accomplice to the other’s offense, 

and it extends accomplice liability to “include[] any offense that is a natural 

and probable or reasonably foreseeable consequence of the offense for 

which the person was an accomplice.” But here, Reed was not convicted 

under the reasonably foreseeable consequences theory of liability. As 

discussed above, substantial evidence that established Reed was Flores’s 

accomplice in the sale or transportation of a narcotic drug. The prosecutor 

never argued to the jurors that Reed was guilty under the reasonably 

foreseeable consequences doctrine, and there was no other offense of which 

the sale to the detectives was a reasonably foreseeable consequence. 

Instead, Reed’s conduct in selling heroin to the detectives constituted “the 

offense for which [Reed] was an accomplice.” See State v. Lee, 236 Ariz. 377, 

382, ¶ 16 (App. 2014). Because Reed was convicted as an accomplice of 

Flores in the commission of the drug offense itself (not of some other offense 

resulting in the drug offense, or vice versa), the challenged aspect of the 

statute was not at issue, and we need not address his remaining arguments 

challenging its constitutionality.

CONCLUSION

¶17 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Reed’s conviction and 

sentence.