COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Willis and Bumgardner 

Argued at Salem, Virginia 

RONNIE LEE MOTSINGER 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 1406-98-3 CHIEF JUDGE JOHANNA L. FITZPATRICK 

 APRIL 13, 1999 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PITTSYLVANIA COUNTY 

William N. Alexander, II, Judge 

 Albert L. Shaw for appellant. 

 Richard B. Campbell, Assistant Attorney 

General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, 

on brief), for appellee. 

 Ronnie Motsinger (appellant) was convicted in a jury trial 

of two counts of grand larceny by check, in violation of Code 

§ 18.2-181. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred 

by instructing the jury on the rebuttable presumption of intent 

to defraud provided by Code § 18.2-183. He argues that while 

Code § 18.2-183 does not require the Commonwealth to prove the 

date when the payee sent notice to the defendant, this Court 

should imply such an obligation as a matter of law. Finding no 

error, we affirm his convictions. 

 

 * Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code 

§ 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication. 
- 2 -

 I. 

 Under familiar principles of appellate review, we examine 

the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, 

the prevailing party below, granting to it all reasonable 

inferences fairly deducible therefrom. See Juares v. 

Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 154, 156, 493 S.E.2d 677, 678 (1997). 

So viewed, the evidence established that appellant purchased 

jewelry from Peter Paul Yun (Yun), the manager of Oknam Jewelry 

(Oknam), a wholesale jewelry business in Atlanta, Georgia. 

Appellant, trading as "Jewel City" in Danville, Virginia, had 

done business with Yun for "one to two years" prior to the time 

of the instant charges. 

 In the fall of 1996, appellant ordered two shipments of 

jewelry from Oknam, which were sent by UPS. Yun later received 

two checks from appellant for the orders. Check 173 was written 

on September 14, 1996, in the amount of $868.56; check 175 was 

written on September 18, 1996, in the amount of $974.54. The 

business name on the checks was "Jewel City" and appellant 

signed the checks. 

 Yun deposited the checks twice, but they were returned each 

time unpaid and marked, "NOT SUFFICIENT FUNDS." Thereafter, he 

attempted to contact appellant to demand repayment. Yun 

testified as follows: 

Q. What did you do after that to attempt 

to collect on these two checks? 
- 3 -

A. I immediately sent Certified letters 

for each check. 

Q. And to what address did you send those 

Certified letters to? 

A. Jewel City, the address on the check. 

Yun further testified that there were two additional checks 

written to Oknam that were also returned for insufficient funds. 

 Yun stated that he sent notices for every check from Jewel 

City that had bounced and the notices were returned "Refused." 

One notice, sent on December 24, 1996, was admitted into 

evidence. The return receipt card for that notice indicated 

that delivery was attempted on three different dates and was 

stamped, "UNCLAIMED." 

 On cross-examination, Yun admitted that he was not sure 

whether the December 24, 1996 notice corresponded with either 

check 173 or check 175. 

Q. The question is, can you say that this 

notice [dated December 24, 1996], as opposed 

to some other notice . . . [and] it's an 

important distinction for this case, that 

this notice contained information about 

these checks? 

A. Those checks in your hand? 

Q. Couldn't it have been the other two 

checks? 

A. May have been. 

Q. Okay, so you're not sure of this 

notice? 

A. I'm not sure, no sir. 
- 4 -

However, Yun reiterated that four checks from Jewel City were 

returned for insufficient funds and that he sent out a certified 

letter on each check. 

 Q. Do you remember sending this notice for 

these checks, absolutely, unequivocally, or 

could there have been some . . . ? 

A. Without, without a doubt in my mind, 

any checks that have bounced from Jewel 

City, a Certified letter went along with 

that. 

* * * * * * * 

Q. Any checks that came from Jewel City 

that bounced, of those checks, did you ever 

not send a Certified notice? 

A. No, I did send a Certified notice for 

any bounced check coming from Jewel City. 

That is standard procedure. 

 At the conclusion of the evidence, appellant objected to 

Instruction No. 3, which provided as follows: 

If the holder of a check sends notice by 

certified or registered mail to the maker or 

drawer of a check at the maker's address 

written or printed on the face of the check, 

whether that address is his home, office, or 

otherwise, that the check has not been paid 

to the holder, and if the maker or drawer 

fails to pay the amount due on the check 

together with interest within five days of 

the notice, you may infer that the maker or 

drawer had the intent to defraud or had 

knowledge or insufficient funds in, or 

credit with, the bank. You are further 

instructed that such notice shall be deemed 

sufficient and equivalent to notice having 

been actually received by the maker or 

drawer, whether such notice shall be 

returned undelivered or not. 
- 5 -

 The jury found appellant guilty of two counts of grand 

larceny by check. Appellant filed a post-trial Motion to Set 

Aside the Jury's Verdict, which was denied by the trial court. 

II. 

 Code § 18.2-181, the statute under which appellant was 

convicted, provides that it is unlawful for any person, with the 

intent to defraud, to make, draw or utter a check, knowing at 

the time of such making, drawing or uttering, there are 

insufficient funds in his or her account.1 Under Code 

§ 18.2-183, 

. . . the making or drawing or uttering or 

delivery of a check, draft, or order, 

payment of which is refused by the drawee 

because of lack of funds or credit shall be 

prima facie evidence of intent to defraud or 

of knowledge of insufficient funds in, or 

credit with, such bank . . . unless such 

maker . . . shall have paid the holder 

thereof the amount due thereon, . . . within 

five days after receiving written notice 

that such check . . . has not been paid to 

the holder thereof. Notice mailed by 

 1

 Code § 18.2-181 provides in part: 

Any person who, with intent to defraud, 

shall make or draw or utter or deliver any 

check, . . . knowing, at the time of such 

making, drawing, uttering or delivering, 

that the maker or drawer has not sufficient 

funds in, or credit with, such bank, . . . 

for the payment of such check, . . . 

although no express representation is made 

in reference thereto, shall be guilty of 

larceny; and, if this check . . . has a 

represented value of $200 or more, such 

person shall be guilty of a Class 6 felony. 
- 6 -

certified or registered mail, evidenced by 

return receipt, to the last known address of 

the maker or drawer shall be deemed 

sufficient and equivalent to notice having 

been received by the maker or drawer. 

 If such check . . . shows on its face a 

printed or written address, home, office, or 

otherwise, of the maker or drawer, then the 

foregoing notice, when sent by certified or 

registered mail to such address, with or 

without return receipt requested, shall be 

deemed sufficient and equivalent to notice 

having been received by the maker or drawer, 

whether such notice shall be returned 

undelivered or not.

(Emphasis added). 

 In the instant case, appellant concedes that Code 

§ 18.2-183 does not require the Commonwealth to prove the date 

the notice was sent or that the notice was actually received by 

appellant. Additionally, he agrees that oral testimony or 

circumstantial evidence may be used to show that the payee sent 

the notice. Nevertheless, appellant asks this Court to imply 

the obligation to establish the date the notice was sent even 

though such proof is not required specifically by the statute. 

 "Where a statute is unambiguous, the plain meaning is to be 

accepted without resort to the rules of statutory 

interpretation." Sykes v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 77, 80, 497 

S.E.2d 511, 512 (1998) (quoting Last v. Virginia State Bd. of 

Med., 14 Va. App. 906, 910, 421 S.E.2d 201, 205 (1992)). 

"Courts are not permitted to rewrite statutes. This is a 

legislative function. The manifest intention of the 
- 7 -

legislature, clearly disclosed by its language, must be 

applied." Id. at 80-81, 497 S.E.2d at 512-13 (quoting Barr v. 

Town & Country Properties, Inc., 240 Va. 292, 295, 396 S.E.2d 

672, 674 (1990) (quoting Anderson v. Commonwealth, 182 Va. 560, 

566, 29 S.E.2d 838, 841 (1944))). 

 Applying these rules to the instant case, we hold that Code 

§ 18.2-183 does not require the Commonwealth to establish either 

actual receipt of the notice or the date the payee sent the 

notice. Rather, the statute only requires proof the notice was 

sent by certified mail and the accused failed to repay the 

amount due within five days. See Code § 18.2-183. Here, the 

Commonwealth introduced the check numbers 173 and 175, which 

were returned for insufficient funds. Yun testified he sent 

certified letters to appellant requesting payment on each of the 

checks in question. Significantly, the evidence established 

that appellant never paid the amount due on the outstanding 

checks and certainly he did not make payment within five days of 

a written request to do so. 

 "[An appellate] court's responsibility in reviewing jury 

instructions is 'to see that the law has been clearly stated and 

that the instructions cover all issues which the evidence fairly 

raises.'" Lewis v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 164, 171, 502 

S.E.2d 222, 225 (1998) (quoting Darnell v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. 

App. 485, 488, 370 S.E.2d 717, 719 (1988)). Instruction No. 3 

clearly stated the principle of law codified in Code § 18.2-183. 
- 8 -

Furthermore, the evidence fairly raised the presumption of 

intent to defraud and having introduced evidence that certified 

notice was sent to appellant, the Commonwealth was entitled to 

rely upon that presumption. Finding no error, we affirm 

appellant's convictions. 

 Affirmed.