United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted December 6, 2017*

Decided December 19, 2017

Before

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge

No. 16‐3950

BARRY A. ROBIN and ANNA MARIE

ROBIN,

Plaintiffs‐Appellants,

v.

BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON, et al.,

Defendants‐Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Illinois,

Eastern Division.

No. 15 CV 9099

Sharon Johnson Coleman,

Judge.

O R D E R

Barry and Anna Marie Robin sued several financial institutions and law firms,

which, they allege, wrongfully obtained a foreclosure judgment against their home in

state court by engaging in a fraudulent scheme that violated the federal RICO statute.

The district court, concluding that the Robins’ lawsuit effectively sought review of the

                                                 

* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and

record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not

significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).  

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 16‐3950    Page 2

state court’s foreclosure judgment, granted one defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of

subject‐matter jurisdiction on the basis of the Rooker–Feldman doctrine. See D.C. Court of

Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983); Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923).

The court entered judgment for all defendants, and the Robins did not appeal.

Four months later, the Robins filed a “Motion To Reconsider.” They argued that

the district judge had overlooked Iqbal v. Patel, 780 F.3d 728 (2015), in which we explained

that the Rooker‐Feldman doctrine does not apply when a plaintiff seeks damages for fraud

that occurred outside of state litigation and that independently caused injury. Id. at 730

(when extrajudicial fraud causes injury, “then a district court has jurisdiction—but only

to the extent of dealing with that injury.”). Reasoning that the Robins’ case did not fit this

description, the judge denied the motion.  

On appeal the Robins contend that the district judge misconstrued their

allegations and therefore wrongly concluded that the Rooker‐Feldman doctrine deprived

the court of jurisdiction. We cannot consider this argument directly because the Robins

did not file a timely appeal of the judgment of dismissal or file, within the allotted 28

days, a motion to alter or amend the judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

59(e). See Banks v. Chi. Bd. of Educ., 750 F.3d 663, 666–67 (7th Cir. 2014). Given the timing

of their motion to the district court, they could obtain relief only under the catchall‐

provision of Rule 60(b)(6). See Blue v. Intʹl Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local Union 159, 676 F.3d

579, 583, 585 (7th Cir. 2012). A Rule 60(b)(6) motion is not a substitute for a timely appeal,

e.g., Mendez v. Republic Bank, 725 F.3d 651, 660 (7th Cir. 2013), so the Robins needed to

show that “exceptional circumstances” warranted the “extraordinary remedy” of

reviving their dismissed case. Blue, 676 F.3d at 585 (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted); see also Banks, 750 F.3d at 667–68. In their motion and appellate brief, the Robins

presented arguments that might have been appropriate for a timely appeal (though we

are not saying they would have prevailed), but they did not identify any exceptional

circumstances that made it an abuse of discretion to deny their motion. See Mendez, 725

F.3d at 660–61 (reviewing denial of Rule 60(b)(6) motion only for abuse of discretion).

It does not matter that the district judge, in denying the Robins’ motion, referred

to Rule 59(e)’s standards of “manifest error” and “newly discovered evidence” and not

to Rule 60(b). See Banks, 750 F.3d at 668. Their motion, however styled, argued that there

was federal subject matter jurisdiction and therefore asked the judge to correct a

purported legal error. The district judge did not abuse her discretion in denying the Rule

60(b)(6) motion to reconsider her earlier decision on that issue.  

AFFIRMED.