[Cite as State v. Stahl-Francisco , 2020-Ohio-5456.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUNTY OF MEDINA )
STATE OF OHIO Appellee

v. JENNIFER M. STAHL-FRANCISCO Appellant C.A. No. 19CA0093-M

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE MEDINA MUNICIPAL COURT COUNTY OF MEDINA, OHIO CASE No. 19TRC04877
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY Dated: November 30, 2020

HENSAL, Judge. {¶1} Jennifer Stahl-Francisco appeals her convictions in the Medina Municipal Court. For the following reasons, this Court affirms.
I. {¶2} Ms. Stahl-Francisco was tried before a jury on one count of ope rating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol. About an hour after the jury b egan deliberations, the court received a question from it concerning whe ther a juror could be removed for being mentally unstable. While the court was consulting with c ounsel and crafting an appropria te response, it received a second question concerning what would happen if the jurors could not a ll agree on a verdict. After the court answered that question but was still reviewing the first question with counsel, it learned that the jury had reached a verdict. Upon calling the jury back int o the courtroom, the court inquired with the juror who was the targ et of the first question. The j uror indicated that she did not agree with the verdict but could not sta y there forever and needed to go home. When the court inquired2 further, the juror admitted that she was going along with the v erdict not based on her own independent assessment of the case but because of her desire to get finished sooner. {¶3} Based on the juror’s statements, the court dismissed her and re called the alternate juror to take her place. The court then instructed the jury to begin their deliberations anew. The recomposed jury found Ms. Stahl-F rancisco guilty of the offense , and the trial court found her guilty of displaying improper taillights. The court sentenced Ms. Stahl-Francisco to 90 days in jail, but it suspended 80 of the da ys. Ms. Stahl-Francisco has appealed, assigning five errors.
II. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE AND PLAIN ERROR WHEN IT, REMOVED A JUROR FOR REASONS STEMMING FROM THE JUROR’S VIEWS ON THE MERITS OF THE CASE IN VIOLATION OF SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, § 10 O F THE OHIO CONSTITUTION. {¶4} Ms. Stahl-Francisco argues that the trial court denied her the right to an impartial jury when it removed the juror w ho expressed disagreement with the verdict. Criminal Rule 24(G)(1) indicates that the purpose of alternate jurors is to r eplace jurors who “become or are found to be unable or disqualifie d to perform their duties.” T he rule implicitly gr ants a trial court the authority to dismiss a juror who is not impartial or is oth erwise not suitable for service. State
v. Smith , 9th Dist. Summit No. 23288, 2007-Ohio-1680, ¶ 43. The Ohio S upreme Court has held, however, that “a juror cannot be removed if there is ‘any possi bility’ that fellow jurors’ complaints about him or her are rooted in his or her view of the merits of the case.” State v. Robb , 88 Ohio St.3d 59, 81 (2000), quoting United States v. Thomas , 116 F.3d 606, 621 (2d Cir.1997). “[T]o remove a juror because [s]he i s unpersuaded by the Government’s case is to deny the defendant his right to a unanimous verdict.” Id . We review the trial court’s de cision to discharge a juror fo r abuse of discretion. State v. Bryan , 101 Ohio St.3d 272, 2004-Ohio-971, ¶ 80.3
{¶5} The jury’s initial question was “Can a jury member be removed f rom being what seems unstable, paren, very shake n, closed paren, mentally, que stion mark.” Before the parties and court determined how to respond to the question, the jury a sked a second question of “What happens if we can’t agree?” Noting that it had only been about an hour since deliberations had begun, the court returned an answer on the second question that the jury should review the instructions and keep deliberating. The court then returned to discussing the first question with counsel. Before reaching an agreement on how to respond, the j ury returned a verdict, so the court answered the jury that its first question was moot. {¶6} When the jury was called into t he courtroom, the court asked wh ether the juror who was alleged to be unstable was feeling well. She responded tha t she “actually disagree[d] with the overall verdict, but I can’t stay here forever, and I need to g o home. And I think it’s not right, actually, that you make people stay until they decide, because then people are going to choose to go with the group.” The court rep lied that the point of delibe rations “is that the parties work through disagreements, examine evidence together, reason with e ach other, and come to certain conclusions.” It also informed t he juror that deliberations “a re giv[en] a sufficient amount of time so people can work through those issues. But it sounds to me a s though you have decided to acquiesce your verdict reached by your co-jurors for reasons no t having to do with your own independent assessment in this case, but your desire to get out of here soon.” The juror verified that the court’s assessment was correct. The court, therefore, concluded that the verdict was not unanimous, finding that the jury had only reached a conclusion because one juror “for reasons ha[ving] nothing to do with actually delivering a verdict in th is case, desire[d] to leave the court, [and] abandon her jury duty * * *.” It determined, however, th at Ms. Stahl-Francisco could still receive a fair trial by dismissing the juror and replacing her with the alternate juror. The court4 called the jury back into the courtroom and dismissed the juror finding that “she has abdicated her responsibilities as a juror, she ha s decided not to participate in accordance with the Court’s instructions, and that she is reaching her conclusions by reaso ns, I think, creates an obvious injustice to [Ms. Stahl-Francisco] * * *.” {¶7} The jury’s first question did not contain any indication that i ts concern about one of its members had anything to do with that juror’s views on th e merits of the case. The jury’s second question did not indicate that it was the juror who was the subject of the first question who was creating disagreement among the jurors. When the jury retu rned to the courtroom, the court did not ask the jurors to describe anything that had occurred d uring deliberations. It simply asked the juror who was referenced in the first question whether she was feeling well. It was at that point that the juror volunteered that she was only going along with t he verdict because she wanted to leave. The court did not actuall y know whether the verdict was to convict or acquit Ms. StahlFrancisco. It decided, however, that the juror was declining t o participate in further conversations about the merits of the case and was only going along with the verdict to facilitate the end of her service. {¶8} Upon review of the record, we conclude that there is no indicat ion that the jury’s concern about one of its members was rooted in the juror’s view of the merits of the case. There is also no indication that the court removed the juror because she was unpersuaded by the State’s case. Although the jury convicted Ms. Stahl-Francisco after th e alternate juror was substituted for the removed juror, at the time the court removed the juror, it had no idea whether the jury’s original verdict was for conviction or acquittal. We cannot say that th e trial court exercised improper discretion when it decided to rem ove the juror based on her adm ission that she was refusing to perform her responsibilities as a juror. We also conclude that the removal of the juror did not5 deprive Ms. Stahl-Francisco of the right to a fair trial. Ms. Stahl-Francisco’s first assignment of error is overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE AND PLAIN ERROR WHEN IT INSTRUCTED THE JURY TO RESUME DELIBERATIONS AFTER IT REMOVED A JUROR AND REPLACED THE JUROR WITH AN ALTERNATE IN VIOLATION OF SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND SECTION 10, ARTICLE I OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION. {¶9} Ms. Stahl-Francisco next argues that the trial court committed error when it replaced the removed juror beca use it failed to instruct the re constituted jury that it should begin its deliberations anew. Rule 24(G)(1) provides that, “[i]f an alternate replaces a juror after deliberations have begun, the cour t must instruct the jury to b egin its deliberations anew.” Ms. Stahl-Francisco acknowledges that she did not object to the cou rt’s instructions to the new jury but contends that the alleged error was plain. {¶10} The record does not support Ms. Stahl-Francisco’s argument. Af ter replacing the dismissed juror, the court explained to the jury: [N]ow that you are recomposed with this new juror, you need to start anew when you begin your deliberations. In other words, you don’t just p ick up and work with [the replacement juror] with regard to the conclusions you’ve a lready made. You owe it to [Ms. Stahl-Francisco] and to the State that the evide nce and the law be reexamined fresh with the new composition, with this new Jury, so that everyone gets a fair and impartial trial in this case. Immediately thereafter, it directed the jury to “please reconve ne to restart your deliberations * * *.” We, therefore, conclude tha t the trial court did not fail to comply with the requirement in Rule 24(G)(1) that it instruct the jury to begin its deliberations a new. Ms. Stahl-Francisco’s second assignment of error is overruled.6

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III
MS. STAHL-FRANCISCO WAS DENIED HER CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AT TRIAL WHEN HER TRIAL COUNSEL FAILED TO OBJECT TO THE TRIAL COURT’S INSTRUCTING THE JURY TO RESUME DELIBERATIONS. {¶11} Ms. Stahl-Francisco next argues that she received ineffective a ssistance of trial counsel. To prevail on a claim of i neffective assistance of co unsel, she must establish (1) that her counsel’s performance was defic ient to the extent that “counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defenda nt by the Sixth Amendment” and (2) that “the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). A deficient performance is one that falls below an objective stan dard of reasonable representation. State v. Bradley , 42 Ohio St.3d 136 (1989), paragr aph two of the syllabus. A c ourt, however, “must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistan ce; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the cha llenged action ‘might be consid ered sound trial strategy.’”
Strickland at 689, quoting Michel v. Louisiana , 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955). To establish prejudice, Ms. Stahl-Francisco must show that there existed a reasonable p robability that, but for her counsel’s errors, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. State v. Sowell , 148 Ohio St.3d 554, 2016-Ohio-8025, ¶ 138. {¶12} Ms. Stahl-Francisco argues that her counsel should have objecte d when the trial court violated Rule 24(G) after replacing one of the jurors. S he also alleges that t he error directly affected the outcome of the proceedings. As noted above, howev er, the trial court did not fail to instruct the jury to begin its deliberations anew after it repl aced one of the jurors with the alternate. We, therefore, conclude that Ms. Stahl-Francisco’s counsel did not render deficient performance when she dd not object to the c ourt’s instructions. Consequent ly, Ms. Stahl-Francisco has not7

established that she received ineffective assistance of counsel . Ms. Stahl-Francisco’s third assignment of error is overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR A TRANSCRIPT OF THE SUPPRESSION HEARING IN VIOLATION OF MS. STAHL-FRANCISCO’S RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND TO EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER THE LAW. {¶13} Ms. Stahl-Francisco’s fourth assignment of error is that the tr ial court incorrectly refused to provide her with a copy of the transcript of the sup pression hearing. According to Ms. Stahl-Francisco, because she did not have a copy of that transc ript, it hindered her crossexamination of the trooper who c onducted the traffic stop of he r vehicle. {¶14} The transcript of the suppressi on hearing has been prepared forappeal. Ms. StahlFrancisco, however, has not identified anything in her argumentthat she would have used to crossexamine the trooper. In her state ment of facts, Ms. Stahl-Fran cisco notes that, at the suppression hearing, the trooper was able to identify the shoes she was wea ring at the time of the stop. She alleges that at trial, however , he could not identify the shoes

. {¶15} On cross-examination, Ms. Stahl-Francisco asked the trooper whe ther they had talked about “these shoes” during a previous hearing. The troo per agreed. She then asked whether he agreed that “these are the ones she was wearing.” He replie d that they “could be, yes.” Accordingly, we do not agree that the trooper was unable to ide ntify Ms. Stahl-Francisco’s shoes at trial. In addition, Ms. Stahl-Francisco does not argue how a transcription of the trooper’s answers regarding her shoes dur ing the suppression hearing woul d have aided her crossexamination of him. Upon review of the record, we conclude tha t, even if Ms. Stahl-Francisco was entitled to a copy of the suppr ession hearing transcript, s he was not prejudiced by the trial court’s denial of her motion. Cri m R. 52(A) (“Any error, defec t, irregularity, or variance which8 does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.”). Ms . Stahl-Francisco’s fourth assignment of error is overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR V
THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THE TRIAL COURT’S ERRORS DENIED DEFENDANT A FAIR TRIAL. {¶16} Ms. Stahl-Francisco’s final argument is that the cumulative eff ect of all of the trial court’s errors deprived her of a fair trial. “Under the doctri ne of cumulative error, ‘a conviction will be reversed when the cumulative effect of errors in a tria l deprives a defendant of a fair trial even though each of the numerous instances of trial-court error does not individually constitute cause for reversal.’” State v. Froman , __ Ohio St.3d __, 2020-Ohio-4523, ¶ 156, quoting State v.
Powell , 132 Ohio St.3d 233, 2012-Ohio-2577, ¶ 223. {¶17} Ms. Stahl-Francisco has not established that the trial court co mmitted multiple errors in this case. The doctrin e of cumulative error, therefo re, is not applicable. State v. Hunter , 131 Ohio St.3d 67, 2011-Ohio-6524, ¶ 132. Ms. Stahl-Francisco’ s fifth assignment of error is overruled.
III. {¶18} Ms. Stahl-Francisco’s assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the Medina Municipal Court is affirmed. Judgment affirmed.

There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.9 We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, direc ting the Medina Municipal Court, County of Medina, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27. Immediately upon the filing hereof , this document shall consti tute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file s tamped by the Clerk of the Cour t of Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to m ake a notation of the mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30. Costs taxed to Appellant.

JENNIFER HENSAL FOR THE COURT

CARR, P. J. SCHAFER, J. CONCUR.

APPEARANCES: OLIVIA A. MYERS, Attorney a t Law, for Appellant. ROBERT B. CAMPBELL, Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.