* Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c), Kenneth S. Apfel is substituted for

John J. Callahan, former Acting Commissioner of Social Security, as the

defendant in this action.

** This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court

generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order

and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

F I L E D

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

OCT 20 1998

PATRICK FISHER

Clerk

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

INEZ KOOPMAN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

KENNETH S. APFEL, Commissioner,

Social Security Administration, *

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 98-7002

(D.C. No. 97-CV-153)

(E.D. Okla.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT **

Before PORFILIO , KELLY , and HENRY , Circuit Judges.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined

unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
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argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore

ordered submitted without oral argument. 

Claimant Inez Koopman appeals from the district court’s judgment

affirming the Commissioner’s decision denying her claim for disability

insurance benefits at step five of the five-part process for determining disability,

see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. In what now stands as the final decision of the

Commissioner, the administrative law judge determined that claimant was

severely impaired by high blood pressure, angina, and back pain, and that while

she could not return to her past relevant work as a cook and housekeeper, she

retained the functional capacity to perform the full range of light work reduced by

a sit or stand option. Relying on a vocational expert’s testimony, the ALJ found

that there were jobs available that claimant could perform with this limitation and

thus found her not to be disabled. We review the Commissioner’s decision to

determine whether factual findings are supported by substantial evidence and

whether correct legal standards were applied. See Winfrey v. Chater, 92 F.3d

1017, 1019 (10th Cir. 1996). 

On appeal, claimant contends generally that the ALJ’s step-five decision is

not supported by substantial evidence and that the ALJ failed to meet his burden

of showing that there were jobs in the economy that claimant could perform. 

Specifically, she contends that the ALJ erred by relying on the Medical-
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Vocational Guidelines, 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P., App. 2 (the “grids”) because

her residual functional capacity (RFC) did not precisely match the definition of

light work and therefore there was “no ‘exact fit’ to place this Appellant on the

Grid of nondisability.” Appellant’s Br. at 11. Claimant’s argument relies

primarily on Talbot v. Heckler , 814 F.2d 1456, 1463 (10th Cir. 1987) (“Alternate

sitting, standing, or walking by implication precludes the kind of extensive

sitting, standing and walking contemplated by the definition of light activity.”). 

Claimant contends that since she cannot do the full range of light work, she is

presumptively able to do only sedentary work, and given her age, education and

lack of transferable skills, she should be considered disabled under the grids, Rule

201.10.

The flaw in claimant’s argument is that she completely misperceives the

ALJ’s basis for finding that there were jobs she could perform despite her

impairments. While the ALJ did say that he was using the grids as a framework

for his analysis, it is clear that he based his ultimate determination that claimant

was not disabled on the testimony of a vocational expert. The ALJ found that

claimant could do the full range of light work reduced by a sit or stand option. 

Because her RFC did not precisely fit the definition of light work, the ALJ could

not rely solely on the grids for his determination. See Daniels v. Apfel , ___ F.3d

___, No. 98-5004, 1998 WL 515160, at *2 (10th Cir. Aug. 18, 1998 ). And
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because the ALJ could not and did not rely on the grids, claimant’s reliance on

Talbot is misplaced. While Talbot did say that an alternating sitting, standing and

walking requirement was inconsistent with being able to do the full range of light

work, Talbot is a grids case, 814 F.2d at 1459, where the exact fit or perfect

match is generally required. 

Here, claimant’s RFC was less than the full range of light work, but that

does not mean that it is presumed to be limited to sedentary work. Claimant could

perform the lifting requirements of light work, which exceed those for sedentary

work, but could not stand as much as the definition of light work required. She

thus fell between the two RFC levels, one of which under the grids would have

indicated a finding of disability (sedentary) and the other a finding of

nondisability (light). Faced with this situation, the ALJ did exactly what he

should have done--he turned to a vocational expert. 

In situations where the rules would direct different

conclusions, and the individual’s exertional limitations are

somewhere “in the middle” in terms of the regulatory criteria for

exertional ranges of work, more difficult judgments are involved as

to the sufficiency of the remaining occupational base to support a

conclusion as to disability. Accordingly, [vocational expert]

assistance is advisable for these types of cases. 

S.S.R. 83-12, 1983 WL 31253, at *3. The vocational expert identified a variety

of light exertional level jobs that claimant could perform with a sit-stand option,

and the ALJ properly relied on this testimony.
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Claimant also appears to argue that the ALJ erred by failing to consider the

vocational expert’s testimony, in response to hypothetical questions asked by

claimant’s counsel, that there would be no jobs claimant could perform if she

were unable to make repetitive use of her left extremities due to weakness on that

side of her body. The ALJ did not find that claimant was impaired in her use of

her left extremities, and claimant does not contend that this lack of a finding was

error. The ALJ therefore was under no obligation to consider the vocational

expert’s testimony. See Decker v. Chater , 86 F.3d 953, 955 (10th Cir.1996)

(hypothetical questions to the VE need only reflect impairments and limitations

that are borne out by the evidentiary record). 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of

Oklahoma is AFFIRMED.

Entered for the Court

Paul J. Kelly, Jr. 

Circuit Judge