RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)

File Name: 19a0228p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF HAMILTON 

COUNTY, OHIO,

Defendant-Appellee,

CITY OF CINCINNATI,

Defendant-Appellant.

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No. 18-4036

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Ohio at Cincinnati.

No. 1:02-cv-00107—Michael R. Barrett, District Judge.

Argued: August 6, 2019

Decided and Filed: September 6, 2019

Before: ROGERS, BUSH, and LARSEN, Circuit Judges.

_________________

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Aaron M. Herzig, TAFT, STETTINIUS & HOLLISTER LLP, Cincinnati, Ohio, for 

Appellant. Anthony L. Osterlund, VORYS, SATER, SEYMOUR AND PEASE LLP, 

Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Aaron M. Herzig, Donnell J. Bell, TAFT, 

STETTINIUS & HOLLISTER LLP, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellant. Anthony L. Osterlund, 

Mark A. Norman, Nathan L. Colvin, VORYS, SATER, SEYMOUR AND PEASE LLP, 

Cincinnati, Ohio, James W. Harper, Charles W. Anness, Michael Friedmann, HAMILTON 

COUNTY PROSECUTOR’S OFFICE, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellee.

>
No. 18-4036 United States v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Hamilton Cty., et al. Page 2

_________________

OPINION

_________________

ROGERS, Circuit Judge. In 1968, the Board of County Commissioners of Hamilton 

County, Ohio and the City of Cincinnati consolidated their sewer districts into a single sewer 

system and entered an agreement providing that the City would manage the sewer system’s 

operations, subject to County oversight, for a period of fifty years. After the City indicated that 

it planned to unilaterally withdraw from the agreement in 2018, the Board sought intervention 

from the district court. The court found that the City’s withdrawal would interfere with 

environmental remediation projects that the City and Board had committed to implement under a 

2004 consent decree. To prevent this from happening, the court temporarily extended the term 

of the 1968 agreement, enjoining the City’s withdrawal pursuant to the court’s inherent power to 

enforce consent decrees. The district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the temporary 

injunction because doing so was necessary to enforce the terms and objectives of the 2004 

consent decree.

I. 

A. 

The Board of County Commissioners of Hamilton County established and operated sewer 

districts in accordance with Ohio law beginning in 1924, and a few decades later it consolidated 

the sewer districts into a single county sewer district called “Hamilton County Sewer District No. 

1.” By 1968 the Board’s management of the consolidated sewer district had attracted criticism 

due to mounting problems with pollution in Hamilton County. To resolve these problems, the 

Board turned to the City of Cincinnati, which had managed its own sewer system for over 150 

years. 

The City assisted the Board in two ways. First, the City passed an ordinance authorizing 

the consolidation of its sewer system with Hamilton County Sewer District No. 1. The ordinance 

provided that “in becoming a part of Hamilton County Sewer District No. 1, [the City] Council 

conveys to the Board of County Commissioners, for use only, all of the sanitary sewage 
No. 18-4036 United States v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Hamilton Cty., et al. Page 3

facilities” that were “owned and operated by the City of Cincinnati for the sole and exclusive use 

of the sewer district.” The reason for the ordinance was “the necessity of providing for the 

creation of one combined sewer district for the City and County under the direction and control 

of the County Commissioners,” and the City “authorize[d] and consent[ed] to the construction, 

maintenance, repair and operation of any sewer improvement for local service” within the City 

by the Board. The Board approved the consolidation of the City’s sewer system with Hamilton 

County Sewer District No. 1 through a resolution, with the new consolidated sewer district being 

named “The Metropolitan Sewer District of Greater Cincinnati” (“MSD”). Neither the City’s 

ordinance nor the Board’s resolution contained provisions about when, if ever, the sewer district 

was to be de-consolidated. 

Second, the Board and the City entered into a written agreement (the “1968 Agreement”) 

that established what the district court would later characterize as a principal-agent relationship 

between the two respective parties. The City, assuming the role of an agent, was to “provide a 

total and complete management service for the operation of the county sewer system.” To fulfill 

its responsibility of doing “all things necessary to manage and operate the [MSD] in an efficient 

and businesslike manner,” the City agreed, among other things, to “[m]aintain and operate all 

sanitary and combined sewers, sewage pumping stations and sewer treatment facilities,” and to 

“draft all necessary legislation” for the sewage system and submit such legislation to the Board 

“for consideration and approval.” The City also agreed to employ MSD staff, including those 

who transferred to the City from the County. Such transferees were “completely subject to the 

City’s personnel Rules and Regulations” after the transfer was completed, though they had the 

option of participating in the retirement system of either the City or the State. 

The Board, assuming the role of a principal, was granted the authority to oversee the 

City’s management of the sewer system, with the 1968 Agreement providing that the City’s 

management was “subject to the exclusive control and direction of the [Board of] 

Commissioners.” Similarly, a different provision of the 1968 Agreement stipulated that 

“authority and control of the sewer system of the sewer district shall remain vested in the [Board 

of] Commissioners including, but not limited to, the major responsibilities of fixing sewerage 

service charges, adopting Rules and Regulations and approving capital improvement programs, 
No. 18-4036 United States v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Hamilton Cty., et al. Page 4

and undertaking the necessary legislation therefor.” The arrangement was to “be in full force 

and effect for a fifty (50) year period beginning May 1, 1968, and thereafter extended for 

additional periods of time as are mutually agreed upon by the County and the City.” During that 

time period, the 1968 Agreement provided that “the City will be the sole management and 

operating agency for the sewer system of the district.” 

B.

In 2002, the United States Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), the State of Ohio, 

and the Ohio River Valley Water Sanitation Commission (“Sanitation Commission”) sued the 

Board and the City, alleging that the codefendants’ management of MSD had violated the Clean 

Water Act, along with similar Ohio laws and regulations. According to the Amended Complaint, 

the codefendants had allowed MSD’s discharge of certain pollutants to exceed authorized limits, 

had discharged other pollutants from MSD’s sewage system without obtaining permits to do so, 

and had failed to prevent the release of sewage overflows into buildings. The plaintiffs sought, 

among other things, injunctive relief and civil penalties for the various alleged infractions. 

The parties resolved the dispute in 2004 by entering into two consent decrees—one 

interim decree and one final decree (collectively, the “Consent Decree”). The parties’ “express 

purpose” in entering into the Consent Decree was “to further the objectives set forth in Section 

101 of the [Clean Water] Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251, and to resolve the claims of the Plaintiffs for 

injunctive relief and civil penalties for the violations alleged in [the Amended Complaint] in the 

manner set forth in” a later section of the Consent Decree. To effectuate these objectives, the 

Board and the City agreed:

to use sound engineering practices, consistent with industry standards, to perform 

investigations, evaluations and analyses and to design and construct any remedial 

measures required by this Decree; to use sound management, operational, and 

maintenance practices, consistent with industry standards, to implement all the 

requirements of this Consent Decree; and to achieve expeditious implementation 

of the provisions of this Decree with the goals of eliminating all Sanitary Sewer 

Overflows and Unpermitted Overflows and coming into and remaining in full 

compliance with the requirements of the Clean Water Act, U.S. EPA’s 1994 

Combined Sewer Overflow (CSO) Policy, Chapter 6111 of the Ohio Revised 

Code and the rules promulgated thereunder, the Compact and the pollution control 

standards promulgated thereunder, and Defendants’ Current Permits.
No. 18-4036 United States v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Hamilton Cty., et al. Page 5

The Consent Decree required the Board and the City to take measures to remedy the 

pollution and sewage overflow problems in MSD by particular dates and to pay civil penalties if 

they missed the deadlines. The codefendants’ environmental reform efforts were to be 

conducted in two phases. The first phase was to be completed by December 31, 2018 at an 

estimated cost of $1.145 billion, while the second phase was scheduled to begin on January 1, 

2019 at an estimated cost of $2.145 billion. In the Consent Decree, the district court retained 

jurisdiction to “enforce the terms and conditions and achieve the objectives of this Consent 

Decree and to resolve disputes arising hereunder as may be necessary or appropriate for the 

construction, modification, implementation, or execution of this Decree.” The Consent Decree 

also granted the district court jurisdiction to resolve disputes related to the implementation of the 

Consent Decree:

This Court shall retain jurisdiction of this matter for the purposes of 

implementing and enforcing the terms and conditions of this Consent Decree and 

for the purpose of adjudicating all disputes among the Parties (including [the 

Sanitation Commission]) that may arise under the provisions of this Consent 

Decree . . . . [including] any dispute that arises with respect to the meaning, 

application, implementation, interpretation, amendment or modification of this 

Consent Decree, or with respect to Defendants’ compliance herewith . . . or any 

delay hereunder, the resolution of which is not expressly provided for in this 

Consent Decree.

The Consent Decree stipulated that its provisions were “binding upon the Defendants,” 

and a sale or transfer of either defendant’s interest in the sewer system would not alter that fact:

Effective from the Date of Lodging of this Consent Decree until its 

termination, any sale or transfer of either Defendant[’s] interests in or operating 

role with respect to the Sewer System or WWTPs [wastewater treatment plants] 

shall not in any manner relieve either Defendant of its responsibilities for meeting 

the terms and conditions of this Consent Decree, except as provided in Paragraph 

III.C.

Paragraph III.C’s exception applied if either defendant sought to name a successor in interest to 

assume its responsibilities under the Consent Decree and succeeded in obtaining permission from 

the parties or the district court to amend the Consent Decree to effectuate the change:

If either Defendant seeks to name a successor in interest to assume any or 

all of its interest in, or operating role with respect to, the Sewer System or 

WWTPs, such defendant may request modification of this Consent Decree from 
No. 18-4036 United States v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Hamilton Cty., et al. Page 6

U.S. EPA/Ohio EPA/[Sanitation Commission] to amend this Consent Decree in 

accordance with the role to be assumed by the proposed successor in interest. 

Upon such Defendant’s request, the Parties shall discuss the matter. If the Parties 

agree on a proposed modification to the Consent Decree, they shall prepare a joint 

motion to the Court requesting such modification and seeking leave to join the 

proposed successor in interest. If the Parties do not agree, and the Defendant still 

believes modification of this Decree and joinder of a successor in interest is 

appropriate, it may file a motion seeking such modification in accordance with 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b); provided, however, that nothing in this 

Paragraph is intended to waive the Plaintiffs’ right to oppose such motion and to 

argue that such modification is unwarranted.

The Consent Decree’s description of the relationship between the Board and the City was 

consistent with the 1968 Agreement, as multiple Consent Decree provisions recognized the 

principal-agent relationship that the Board and City established. For example, the Consent 

Decree described the Board as

the duly authorized governing body of Hamilton County, Ohio, pursuant to the 

laws of the State of Ohio. The County is the holder of various NPDES permits 

that govern discharges from the County’s Wastewater Treatment Plants and 

Sewer System. As such, it is responsible for operating the County’s Wastewater 

Treatment Plants and Sewer System. The County has established the MSD, a 

county sewer district established pursuant to Chapter 6117 of the Ohio Revised 

Code, and acts as the principal of MSD, including maintenance of funding 

authority for MSD.

A different Consent Decree provision characterized the City as the Board’s agent:

Defendant, City of Cincinnati (“the City”), is a chartered municipal 

corporation, organized and existing under the laws of the State of Ohio. Pursuant 

to an agreement with the County, and subject to the pertinent provisions of the 

Ohio Revised Code, the City also serves as the agent for the County in the 

management and operation of MSD. It is in this capacity that the City is named 

as Defendant.

C.

The implementation of the Consent Decree has not gone smoothly. Consent Decree 

projects have been set back by delays and budgetary shortfalls, and the Board and the City have 

blamed each other for the problems. By 2013, City officials were becoming increasingly 

frustrated with the County’s attempts to implement new oversight measures, because the 

oversight allegedly interfered with the City’s management of MSD. The oversight measures 
No. 18-4036 United States v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Hamilton Cty., et al. Page 7

included “requests for reports, records, justifications, and financial information,” along with the 

use of County “monitors” (consisting of “new County employees, consultants, and lawyers”) to 

evaluate the City’s work. Meanwhile, County officials were opposed to the City’s decision to 

pass three procurement ordinances that were intended to apply to contract bids for Consent 

Decree projects. The first ordinance required contractors to ensure that a certain percentage of 

construction worker hours were performed by Hamilton County residents, the second required 

some contractors to employ a certain percentage of apprentices in their workforces, and the third 

gave a bidding advantage to small businesses from the City. 

The County did not approve of the City’s procurement policies, as County officials 

believed that MSD should be governed by State and County law. When the City refused to back 

down and comply with the County’s position, the County responded by passing a series of 

resolutions. The first resolution suspended appropriations for MSD projects pending resolution 

of the procurement dispute. The second resolution terminated the suspension and authorized 

MSD contract bidding to proceed under State law, providing that any project bid “awarded 

contrary to this authorization” would be “de-legislated effective immediately.” The County 

followed through on this threat in a subsequent resolution, which de-legislated MSD projects that 

had “violated the County’s policies” by being subject to the City’s procurement ordinances. 

The City and the Board continued to discuss their procurement policies and exchange 

memos on the issue in 2013 and 2014, but their efforts to resolve the dispute proved futile. As a 

result, the Board sought intervention from the district court, filing a motion to enjoin the City 

from violating the Consent Decree. The Board argued that the 1968 Agreement established a 

principal-agent relationship between the Board and the City, and that the City was accordingly 

required to follow the laws and regulations of the State and County while operating MSD. 

Because the City’s procurement ordinances allegedly conflicted with Ohio law, the Board 

requested that the court issue an injunction “pursuant to the Consent Decree, the All Writs Act, 

and the Court’s inherent powers and prior orders.” The City countered that the Board’s motion 

amounted to a request for the court “to rewrite the 1968 Agreement,” because the City and Board 

had “agreed that the City’s sole management of [MSD] meant that the City would follow the 

laws and requirements which pertain to Cincinnati as a municipal corporation in contracts and 
No. 18-4036 United States v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Hamilton Cty., et al. Page 8

purchases for the MSD.” According to the City, the 1968 Agreement put the City in charge of 

MSD’s operations, and MSD should be subject to City ordinances rather than the laws and 

regulations of the State and the County. 

The district court granted the Board’s motion. The court determined that the 1968 

Agreement established a principal-agent relationship between the Board and the City, citing 

multiple provisions from the 1968 Agreement providing that the City’s management authority 

was subject to County oversight. The court reasoned that because the Board acts as MSD’s 

principal, the City was bound to apply the laws of the State and County in its operation of MSD, 

rather than City ordinances: “The City’s authority to operate and manage MSD is not unqualified 

but is restricted by the 1968 Agreement and state law which require the City—as the agent for 

the County—to apply County rules and regulations and state law in procuring contracts for 

Consent Decree projects.” The court concluded that “the plain terms of the 1968 Agreement” 

indicated that “the City must adhere to the County’s rules and regulations, as well as the 

County’s resolutions, for procuring Consent Decree projects.” The City did not appeal the 

district court’s order.

D.

The order did not resolve the parties’ disputes over procurement policies and other 

Consent Decree issues. In 2016, the Board filed a second motion to enjoin the City’s alleged 

violations of the Consent Decree, characterizing the City as a “rogue agent” that was “opposing 

County oversight and directives and MSD Rules” and subjecting taxpayers to “soaring” costs in 

the process. The Board also moved for the court “to order the County and City to mediation to 

address the impending termination” of the 1968 Agreement. In its Response, the City opposed 

the Board’s request for an injunction, arguing that such an injunction would “nullify the 1968 

Agreement by permitting the County to take managerial and operational control of [MSD] and 

the City’s sewer assets.” However, on the issue of mediation, the City agreed to participate in 

“Court-led negotiations designed to help ensure that termination of the 1968 Agreement proceeds 

in an orderly manner.” 
No. 18-4036 United States v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Hamilton Cty., et al. Page 9

The Board and the City began mediation, which culminated in their agreement to a 

“MSD Operation Transition and Cooperation Agreement Commitment Letter” (“Commitment 

Letter”) in 2017. The Commitment Letter provided a preliminary plan for the termination of the 

1968 Agreement and the transfer of MSD operations to the Board. Two conditions precedent 

needed to be satisfied before a final termination plan would go into effect: (1) the City was to be 

“removed as a defendant” in the MSD case and was to “not remain or act to become a party,” a 

condition that required court approval “under the terms of the Consent Decrees in the MSD 

case”; and (2) “[a]ll present and future Sewer District employees” were to become “County 

[Board] employees” and “Members of the Cincinnati Retirement System,” an arrangement that 

required a change in state law. If the parties were unable to approve a final termination plan 

prior to the expiration of the 1968 Agreement, the Commitment Letter provided for an extension 

of the 1968 Agreement through September 30, 2018. The Commitment Letter also granted the 

district court “continuing jurisdiction” over the Commitment Letter and the eventual termination 

agreement. 

E.

In July of 2018 the parties realized that “the conditions precedent identified in the 

Commitment Letter could not be completed by the time the [1968 Agreement] was set to expire, 

September 30, 2018.” After a series of exchanges, the Board and the City remained deadlocked 

on how to proceed. The County proposed that they unconditionally extend the 1968 Agreement 

to July 1, 2019 and use the remaining time to continue mediation. The City refused. Instead, the 

City promised to continue to manage the sewer system, provided that the County agreed to 

implement multiple recommendations made by a consulting firm, Roetzel & Andress LPA, that 

the City and County had hired to evaluate MSD’s operations. The recommendations included 

that the County end its monitor program, that the County “[r]epeal redundant and overly 

burdensome administrative rules and regulations,” and that the County agree to follow the City’s 

approach for the second phase of the Consent Decree. If the Board refused to acquiesce to the 

City’s proposal, a City memo suggested that the City planned to unilaterally withdraw from the 

1968 Agreement:
No. 18-4036 United States v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Hamilton Cty., et al. Page 10

The Agreement becomes effective only when the conditions precedent are met. If 

they are not met by September 30, 2018, the 1968 Agreement expires. At that 

point, the City returns to operating the City sewer system as it did before the 1968 

Agreement was signed. The [Board] could negotiate with the City for the City to 

continue operating the County system as well.

In light of this impasse, the Board filed a third motion to enjoin the City from violating 

the Consent Decree. The Board requested that the district court act “pursuant to the Court’s 

inherent injunctive power and the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), or, alternatively, to Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 65” by issuing an order: (1) to enjoin the City from withdrawing or deconsolidating from 

MSD; (2) to enjoin the City “from attempting to assert control over, or otherwise interfere with 

MSD assets”; (3) to grant a temporary extension of the 1968 Agreement; and (4) to require the 

City to “adhere to the law of the case established by multiple Court orders.” In support of its 

Motion, the Board emphasized that the City’s unilateral withdrawal from MSD would prevent 

the parties from managing the sewer system and complying with their Consent Decree 

commitments. According to the Board, “the City would irreparably harm implementation of this 

Court’s Consent Decree, the County, and MSD ratepayers, if it refuses to temporarily 

unconditionally extend the [1968 Agreement].” In its Response, the City contended that the 

district court should deny the Board’s requested injunction and instead order the County to 

comply with the consulting firm’s recommendations, in which case the City would continue to 

“manage and operate the entire sewer system and meet Consent Decree obligations.” 

The district court granted the Board’s motion in part and denied it in part. Relying on the 

“inherent power to enforce its consent decrees,” the court “temporarily extend[ed] the [1968 

Agreement] until further order of this Court.” In support of its decision, the court determined 

that the City’s proposal to “return to a pre-1968 arrangement where the County and the City 

manage their own sewer systems is not workable and threatens the successful completion of the 

objectives of the Consent Decree.” It also ordered the County and the City “to continue 

mediation efforts, which shall include addressing the City’s concerns regarding the County’s 

monitoring program; certain County rules and regulations which the City has identified as 

unworkable and inefficient; and reaching consensus with regard to the projects planned for Phase 

II of the Consent Decree.” 
No. 18-4036 United States v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Hamilton Cty., et al. Page 11

II.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in temporarily enjoining the City from 

withdrawing from the 1968 Agreement by the termination date. The court possessed the inherent 

power to enforce consent decrees, and the temporary injunction was a proper exercise of that 

power in two respects.

A.

First, the temporary injunction was necessary to enforce provisions in the Consent Decree 

providing that the Consent Decree would remain binding on the City and the Board, unless either 

party named a successor in interest and obtained approval from the other Consent Decree parties 

or from the district court to permit the successor in interest to take over the party’s 

responsibilities (the “successor-in-interest provision”): 

If either Defendant seeks to name a successor in interest to assume any or all of its 

interest in, or operating role with respect to, the Sewer System or WWTPs 

[wastewater treatment plants], such defendant may request modification of this 

Consent Decree from U.S. EPA/Ohio EPA/[Sanitation Commission] to amend 

this Consent Decree in accordance with the role to be assumed by the proposed 

successor in interest. Upon such Defendant’s request, the Parties shall discuss the 

matter. If the Parties agree on a proposed modification to the Consent Decree, 

they shall prepare a joint motion to the Court requesting such modification and 

seeking leave to join the proposed successor in interest. If the Parties do not 

agree, and the Defendant still believes modification of this Decree and joinder of 

a successor in interest is appropriate, it may file a motion seeking such 

modification in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b); provided, 

however, that nothing in this Paragraph is intended to waive the Plaintiffs’ right to 

oppose such motion and to argue that such modification is unwarranted.

Absent a modification of the Consent Decree pursuant to this provision, the Consent Decree 

provided no way for either the City or the County to terminate its responsibilities. Instead, the 

Consent Decree was “binding upon” both the City and the County, and a “sale or transfer of 

either [the City’s or the County’s] interests in or operating role with respect to” MSD would not 

automatically terminate that Defendant’s obligations.

The City’s unilateral withdrawal from the 1968 Agreement with no succession plan 

would likely have resulted in violations of the Consent Decree. The Consent Decree explicitly 
No. 18-4036 United States v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Hamilton Cty., et al. Page 12

recognized that the parties’ operation of MSD was subject to a principal-agent relationship, as set 

forth in the 1968 Agreement. For example, one provision of the Consent Decree referred to the 

County as the “principal of MSD,” while another stipulated that the City “serves as the agent for 

the County in the management and operation of MSD” under “an agreement with the County” 

and was named as a defendant in that capacity. The City’s planned withdrawal from the 1968 

Agreement would have terminated the principal-agent relationship between the Board and the 

City and thus altered the parties’ respective roles in the operation of MSD. To ensure that its 

withdrawal complied with the Consent Decree, which assumed the existence of the principalagent relationship, the City would have needed to follow the requirements laid out in the Consent 

Decree’s successor-in-interest provision. But the City did not attempt to do so. Instead, when 

the parties were unable to agree on a final termination plan, the City claimed that the imminent 

expiration of the 1968 Agreement meant that the City would return “to operating the City sewer 

system as it did before the 1968 Agreement was signed.” 

In light of the City’s refusal to follow the Consent Decree’s protocol for transferring the 

City’s operating role with respect to MSD, the district court properly enjoined the City from 

withdrawing from the 1968 Agreement. As the district court determined, the City’s position 

“ignores the City’s obligations under the Consent Decree” and would have resulted in an 

arrangement that was “not workable.” To prevent this from happening, the court “temporarily 

extend[ed]” the 1968 Agreement “until further order” of the district court, and its decision to do 

so was a proper exercise of its inherent power to enforce consent decrees. “[A] consent decree is 

a ‘settlement agreement subject to continued judicial policing.’” Vanguards of Cleveland v. City 

of Cleveland, 23 F.3d 1013, 1017 (6th Cir. 1994) (quoting Williams v. Vukovich, 720 F.2d 909, 

920 (6th Cir. 1983)). “[I]t is well-settled that ‘courts retain the inherent power to enforce 

agreements entered into in settlement of litigation pending before them.’” Id. at 1018 (quoting 

Sarabia v. Toledo Police Patrolman’s Ass’n, 601 F.2d 914, 917 (6th Cir. 1979)). We have 

emphasized that the district court’s inherent power is “broad,” and “[t]he court’s choice of 

remedies is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” Shy v. Navistar Int’l Corp., 701 F.3d 523, 533 

(6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Stone v. City & Cty. of S.F., 968 F.2d 850, 861 (9th Cir. 1992)). The 

district court did not abuse that discretion here, given that issuing an injunction was necessary to 

prevent the City from violating the Consent Decree.
No. 18-4036 United States v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Hamilton Cty., et al. Page 13

This is especially true given the temporary nature of the injunction. Notwithstanding the 

City’s claims to the contrary, both the plain language of the injunction and the record below 

illustrate that the injunction is temporary. With respect to the district court’s language, the order 

stipulates that the “Court temporarily extends” the 1968 Agreement “until further order of this 

Court.” This is consistent with the district court’s description of the injunction as amounting to a 

way of effecting a “transition period of some kind.” It is also consistent with the County’s 

injunction request, which was for the district court to temporarily enjoin the termination of the 

1968 Agreement for a period of less than a year while the parties continued mediation. 

Although the City offered to continue managing MSD while negotiations continued after 

the termination of the 1968 Agreement, that does not weigh against the district court’s decision 

to issue the temporary injunction instead of requiring the parties to follow the terms of the City’s 

offer. The City’s offer was contingent on the Board’s agreeing to reduce its oversight of the 

City’s MSD management and to repeal a number of rules and regulations that the City found to 

be burdensome. If the measures had been implemented, then they would have conflicted with 

provisions in the Consent Decree specifying that the Board amounted to the “principal of MSD,” 

while the City acted as the Board’s agent. The measures would have also conflicted with the 

district court’s prior order determining that the 1968 Agreement established a principal-agent 

relationship, according to which the City’s management of MSD was subject to State and County 

laws and regulations. For these reasons, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it 

declined to permit the City to manage MSD under the terms of the offer.

The court’s temporary injunction is distinguishable from a consent decree modification 

that the Supreme Court vacated in Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 

(1984), and Stotts does not provide a basis for reversing the temporary injunction here. Stotts

involved consent decrees entered into by the Memphis Fire Department in 1974 and 1980 to 

resolve allegations of racially discriminatory hiring and promotion practices. 467 U.S. at 565–

66. After the entry of the 1980 consent decree, projected budget deficits required the city of 

Memphis to reduce nonessential government personnel, and Memphis attempted to do so by 

implementing a layoff rule that favored the retention of senior employees. Id. at 566. The 

district court enjoined the layoff plan and ordered Memphis instead to comply with a modified 
No. 18-4036 United States v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Hamilton Cty., et al. Page 14

layoff plan that was “aimed at protecting black employees” who would have been 

disproportionately terminated if the seniority system remained in place. Id. at 567. The Supreme 

Court determined that the district court exceeded its inherent power to enforce the consent decree 

by entering the injunction, in part because the consent decree did not contain any textual 

provisions indicating that the parties intended to “depart from the existing seniority system.” Id.

at 574. 

The Court’s analysis rested on multiple factors that distinguish Stotts from this case. 

First, the Court determined that the Stotts injunction was inconsistent with the 1980 consent 

decree that it was purportedly designed to enforce, given that the 1980 consent decree “stated 

that it was not ‘intended to conflict with any provisions’ of the 1974 [consent] decree” and that 

“the latter decree expressly anticipated that the City would recognize seniority.” Id. Here, the 

temporary injunction is consistent with the terms of the Consent Decree, including the successorin-interest provision. Second, the terms of the Stotts injunction conflicted with a federal antidiscrimination statute, Title VII, making it reasonable to presume that the parties would not have 

agreed to such an injunction absent an express provision in the consent decree stipulating 

otherwise. Id. at 575. The temporary injunction in this case presents no such conflict with 

federal law. Third, the Stotts injunction interfered with the rights of nonminority employees and 

a local union, despite the fact that neither of those groups was a party to the litigation that 

culminated in the 1980 consent decree. Id. at 575–76. In contrast, the court’s temporary 

injunction in this case does not interfere with the rights of third parties. For these reasons, the 

Court’s rejection of the district court’s injunction in Stotts does not compel a similar result here.

Although the parties anticipated the termination of the 1968 Agreement, that does not 

undermine the appropriateness of the temporary injunction. The City cites two cases purportedly 

establishing that a district court exceeds its power when it extends an agreement that “every 

party knew was set to expire.” However, both of the cited cases are distinguishable from this 

one because they involved motions for modification of a consent decree, raising questions about 

the extent of the district court’s inherent power to make modifications. See Rufo v. Inmates of 

Suffolk Cty. Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 371–72 (1992); Vanguards of Cleveland, 23 F.3d at 1017–18. 

“Modification of a consent decree is appropriate” when one of three circumstances applies: 
No. 18-4036 United States v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Hamilton Cty., et al. Page 15

(1) “changed factual conditions make compliance with the decree substantially more onerous”; 

(2) “a decree proves to be unworkable because of unforeseen obstacles”; or (3) “enforcement of 

the decree without modification would be detrimental to the public interest.” Vanguards of 

Cleveland, 23 F.3d at 1018 (quoting Rufo, 502 U.S. at 384–85). Conversely, “modification 

should not be granted where a party relies upon events that actually were anticipated at the time 

it entered into a decree.” Rufo, 502 U.S. at 385. The modification rules are inapplicable to this 

case because the temporary injunction did not modify the Consent Decree.

For these reasons, the district court did not abuse its discretion by entering the temporary 

injunction, given that doing so was necessary to ensure that the City did not violate the Consent 

Decree by ceasing to perform its responsibilities without selecting a successor in interest.

B.

The second reason that the district court acted within its discretion to issue the temporary 

injunction was because of its finding, which was not clearly erroneous, that the City’s 

withdrawal from the 1968 Agreement would interfere with the parties’ fulfillment of their 

Consent Decree obligations. The court did not abuse its discretion in temporarily enjoining the 

City’s attempt to withdraw as a way of ensuring that the Consent Decree projects would continue 

on schedule.

There is sufficient information in the record to support the district court’s finding that the 

City’s proposal to withdraw from the 1968 Agreement “threatens the successful completion of 

the objectives of the Consent Decree.” For example, an affidavit from a County official attests to 

the Board’s inability to manage MSD without the City’s assistance. Among other problems, the 

County lacked the employees that would be required to operate MSD when the district court 

entered the temporary injunction. A County attorney also told the district court that the City’s 

withdrawal would “jeopardize MSD bond debt and credit,” and the City did not challenge that 

statement before the district court or on appeal. When we review a temporary injunction, “[t]he 

ultimate decision to grant an injunction is reviewed for an abuse of discretion,” while the court’s 

“findings of fact are reviewed for clear error.” Southern Glazer’s Distribs. of Ohio, LLC v. 

Great Lakes Brewing Co., 860 F.3d 844, 849 (6th Cir. 2017). The district court did not clearly 
No. 18-4036 United States v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Hamilton Cty., et al. Page 16

err when it found that the City’s withdrawal from the 1968 Agreement would interfere with the 

timely completion of Consent Decree objectives, and the court did not abuse its discretion by 

preventing that problem through the entry of the temporary injunction.

This determination is supported by our affirmance of an injunction in a related MSD 

case. In United States v. City of Loveland, 621 F.3d 465 (6th Cir. 2010), the district court 

entered a judgment on the pleadings that enjoined the City of Loveland from withdrawing from 

MSD. Id. at 467–70. We affirmed the injunction, in part because Loveland was equitably 

estopped from arguing for withdrawal due to the fact that the Board and City had relied on 

Loveland’s willingness to participate “as they crafted the complex, multiyear infrastructure 

improvements that have begun the implementation of the remedies required by the Consent 

Decrees.” Id. at 474 (quoting United States v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Hamilton Cty., Nos. 1:02-

CV-00107, 1:09-CV-00029, 2010 WL 200326, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 14, 2010)). Loveland

supports the district court’s temporary injunction in light of the consistency between the Sixth 

Circuit’s affirmance of the finding that Loveland’s withdrawal from MSD would interfere with 

the implementation of the Consent Decree, and the district court’s finding in this case that the 

City’s withdrawal from the 1968 Agreement would similarly interfere with the parties’ 

fulfillment of their Consent Decree obligations.

The temporary injunction did not exceed the district court’s authority, despite the 

existence of the contractual provision in the 1968 Agreement providing that the 1968 Agreement 

was to “be in full force and effect for a fifty (50) year period beginning May 1, 1968, and 

thereafter extended for additional periods of time as are mutually agreed upon by the County and 

the City” (the “termination provision”). District courts possess broad authority to enforce the 

terms of consent decrees, even where doing so requires interfering with municipal prerogatives 

or commitments. For example, in Sarabia, we held that “it was within the power of the district 

court to suspend a civil service rule whose application prevented achievement of the stated goal 

of the consent decree.” 601 F.2d at 918. Executing their authority to enforce consent decrees, 

district courts may also limit a municipality’s contracting power where necessary. The Third 

Circuit came to this conclusion when it affirmed a district court’s injunction preventing the 

Government of the Virgin Islands from performing a contract because the court determined that 
No. 18-4036 United States v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Hamilton Cty., et al. Page 17

implementing the contract would interfere with the party’s ability to fulfill its obligations under a 

consent decree. United States v. Virgin Islands, 363 F.3d 276, 280, 289 (3d Cir. 2004). The City 

does not cite cases supporting the contrary position that a district court lacks the power to 

abrogate contractual provisions that interfere with the enforcement of a consent decree. 

Accordingly, the district court did not exceed its inherent power by abrogating the 

termination provision of the 1968 Agreement and entering the temporary injunction, given the 

court’s determination that the abrogation was necessary to effectuate the parties’ obligations to 

implement environmental reform projects under the Consent Decree.

Because the temporary injunction was a proper exercise of the district court’s inherent 

power to enforce consent decrees, we need not address whether the court had the authority to 

issue the temporary injunction under the All Writs Act or Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65.

III.

The temporary injunction is affirmed.