COURT OF APPEALS

	SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

	FORT WORTH

	NO.  [CASE NO.]2-02-136-CR

[APPELLANT NAME]SANDRA ELAINE WRIGHT	APPELLANT

	V.

[APPELLEE NAME]THE STATE OF TEXAS	[APPELLEE OR STATE]STATE

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	FROM THE [COURT]158TH DISTRICT COURT OF [COUNTY]DENTON COUNTY

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	MEMORANDUM OPINIONOPINION1

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	2-02-136-CR

	Wright v. State

	MEMORANDUM OPINION1

	Appellant Sandra Elaine Wright appeals from a conviction for burglary of a habitation.  Counsel on appeal has filed an Anders brief asserting that there are no grounds that could be argued successfully on appeal.  See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396 (1967). 

	On January 3, 2001, appellant enteredmade an open pleaded of guilty to the offense of burglary of a habitation.  , and tThe trial court assessed punishment at six years’ confinement and a $500 fine, suspended but suspended the imposition of thate sentence and for placedsentenced her placed her on deferred adjudicationtoon six yearssix years’ community supervision for six years for six years. [CR 8-9]  Subsequently, the State filed a motion to revoke proceed to an adjudication of guilt, alleging appellant had violated certain conditions of her community supervision by committing a new offense (theft of services), and failing to pay community supreervisions fees, and failureing to complete community service feefailing to pay.  [CR 13-14] On March 232, 2002, pursuant to a plea bargain agreement, the State withdrew one of the allegations alllegation concerning the new officense of theft of services in ,  and the appellant pleaded not true to the two remaining one aallegations,   in the petition, but pleaded true to two others and the State recommended three years’ confinement. [RR 6-8]  The trial court revoked appellant’s community superfvision adjudicated appellant guilty of the offense of burglary of a habitation and assessed her punishment at three years’ confinement. [CR 26-27]  Following the adjudication hearingrevocation proceeding, appellant filed a general notice of appeal. [CR 35]

	The State’s burden of proof in a revocation proceeding is by a preponderance of the evidence.  Cobb v. State, 851 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).  Where the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s order is challenged, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s findings.  Jackson v. State, 645 S.W.2d 303, 305 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).  The trial court is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony.  Garrett v. State, 619 S.W.2d 172, 174 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1981); Montoya v. State, 832 S.W.2d 138, 140 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1992, no pet.).

	Appellate review of an order revoking community supervision is limited to a determination of whether the trial court abused its discretion.  Jackson, 645 S.W.2d at 305.  Where the State has failed to meet its burden of proof, the trial court abuses its discretion in issuing an order to revoke community supervision.  Cardona v. State, 665 S.W.2d 492, 493-94 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984).   

	A plea of true, standing alone, is sufficient to support the revocation of community supervision.  Cole v. State, 578 S.W.2d 127, 128 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1979).

	Appellant’s court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a motion to withdraw as counsel and a brief in support of the motion.  In the brief, counsel avers that, in his professional opinion, this appeal is frivolous.  Counsel’s brief and motion meet the requirements of Anders v. California by presenting a professional evaluation of the record demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds for relief.  This court provided appellant the opportunity to file a pro se brief, and she did not file a brief.

	Once appellant’s court-appointed counsel files a motion to withdraw on the ground that the appeal is frivolous and fulfills the Anders requirements, this court is obligated to undertake an independent examination of the record and to essentially rebrief the case for appellant to see is there is any arguable ground that may be raised on appellant’s behalf.  Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

	The State’s burden of proof in a revocation proceeding is by a preponderance of the evidence.  Cobb v. State, 851 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).  Where the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s order is challenged, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s findings.  Jackson v. State, 645 S.W.2d 303, 305 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).  The trial court is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony.  Garrett v. State, 619 S.W.2d 172, 174 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1981); Montoya v. State, 832 S.W.2d 138, 140 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1992, no pet.).

	Appellate review of an order revoking community supervision is limited to a determination of whether the trial court abused its discretion.  Jackson, 645 S.W.2d at 305.  Where the State has failed to meet its burden of proof, the trial court abuses its discretion in issuing an order to revoke community supervision.  Cardona v. State, 665 S.W.2d 492, 493-94 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984).  A plea of true, standing alone, is sufficient to support the revocation of community supervision.  Cole v. State, 578 S.W.2d 127, 128 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1979).

	The trial court had jurisdiction over this case.   Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12, § 10(a) (Vernon Supp. ____2003).  Appellant was properly a;dmoadmonished concerning the range of punishment, her plea was voluntary,  and t 

	The right to appeal from a negotiated plea is limited by the rules of appellate procedure.  See Vidaurri v. State, 49 S.W.3d 880, 882-83 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001); Ex parte Howard, 685 S.W.2d 672, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).  To invoke this court’s jurisdiction over an appeal from a negotiated guilty plea, a notice of appeal must expressly specify that the appeal is for a jurisdictional defect, specify that the substance of the appeal was raised in writing and ruled on before trial, or state that the trial court granted permission to appeal.  See  former Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(b)(3) (amended effective January 1, 2003)2 (version in effect at time appellant’s notice of appeal was due); Villanueva v. State, 977 S.W.2d 693, 695 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1998, no pet.).  A defendant placed on deferred adjudication may raise issues relating to the original plea proceeding only in appeals taken when the deferred adjudication is imposed an d not after guilty is adjudicated.  Vidaurri, 49 S.W.3d at 884; Manuel v. State, 994 S.W.2d 658, 661 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).  Thus, this court lacks jurisdiction to address any potential error occurring before and up to appellant’s placement on deferred adjudication community supervision.  See Vidaurri, 49 S.W.3d at 884.

	This court, however, retains jurisdiction to determine whether error occurred during the punishment phase after appellant was adjudicated guilty.  See id. at 885.  	Our review of the record from punishment yuieilds no reversible error, and tThe sentence assessed by the trial court is within the statutorily permissible range.  See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 12.33, 30.02 (Vernon 1994 &Supp Syuppupp. 2003 ).  Moreover, tThere is no evidence in the record indicating that appellant’s trial counsel at punishment did not provide constitutionally required effective assistance of counsel.  See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984).

	After independently reviewing the record, we agree with appellate counsel’s determination that any appeal from this case would be frivolous.  Accordingly, we grant appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw and , affirm the trial court’s judgment.  regarding sentencing, and dismiss the remainder of the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

							PER CURIAM

PANEL F:

DNP      	GARDNER, DAUPHINOT, and HOLMAN, and GARDNER, JJ.

		DO NOT PUBLISH

		Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)   	

DELIVERED:  Msaarch 27, 2003