[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 

State ex rel. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc. v. Indus. Comm., Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-1894.] 

NOTICE

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 

an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested 

to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 

65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 

other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 

made before the opinion is published. 

SLIP OPINION NO. 2014-OHIO-1894 

THE STATE EX REL. HONDA OF AMERICA MANUFACTURING, INC., APPELLANT,

v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF OHIO ET AL., APPELLEES. 

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, 

it may be cited as State ex rel. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc. v. Indus. Comm., 

Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-1894.] 

Workers’ compensation—Temporary-total-disability compensation—Involuntary 

retirement—Claimant entitled to compensation when there is evidence that 

claimant retired because of the industrial injury and no evidence that 

claimant abandoned the workforce. 

(No. 2012-1499—Submitted October 22, 2013—Decided May 7, 2014.) 

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 11AP-528, 

2012-Ohio-3335. 

____________________

Per Curiam. 

{¶ 1} Honda of America Manufacturing, Inc., appeals the judgment of 

the Tenth District Court of Appeals denying its request for a writ of mandamus 
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that would require the Industrial Commission to vacate its award of temporarytotal-disability compensation to Honda’s former employee, Robert Corlew. 

{¶ 2} For the reasons that follow, we affirm. 

Facts and Procedural Background

{¶ 3} Corlew began working for Honda in 1988. On December 5, 2003, 

he was injured while working. His workers’ compensation claim was allowed for 

contusion and tendonitis of the right wrist and related injuries, as well as for 

anxiety disorder. 

{¶ 4} Honda, a self-insured employer, paid Corlew temporary-totaldisability compensation at various times until February 29, 2008, when a district 

hearing officer determined that his allowed conditions had reached maximum 

medical improvement and terminated Corlew’s compensation. Honda then 

offered Corlew the opportunity for vocational-rehabilitation services, but Corlew 

chose not to participate. 

{¶ 5} Between December 2006 and December 2008, Corlew participated 

in Honda’s Medically Inactive Transition Program (“MIT”), a recovery-andtreatment program for employees who are unable to work for an extended period 

of time due to a medical condition. For some of the time that he was in the 

program, Corlew received long-term-disability benefits. 

{¶ 6} After 130 weeks in the MIT program, Honda’s long-term-disability 

insurance carrier evaluated Corlew and determined that he was no longer eligible 

for ongoing benefits because he was capable of gainful employment outside of 

Honda. There being no position available at Honda, Corlew retired as of 

December 31, 2008. 

{¶ 7} On December 29, 2009, Corlew underwent surgery on his wrist. 

He applied for temporary-total-disability compensation to be paid during his 

postsurgical recovery. A district hearing officer awarded benefits and a staff 

hearing officer affirmed that decision. 
January Term, 2014 

3 

{¶ 8} Honda appealed to the full commission. At the hearing, Honda’s 

representative stated that Corlew’s long-term-disability benefits ended when it 

was determined that he could return to some type of work outside of Honda and 

that in lieu of termination, the claimant decided to take an age-based retirement. 

Corlew testified that he retired because of his industrial injury and that he wanted 

to return to work, but his injury prevented him from doing so. 

{¶ 9} The commission found Corlew’s testimony persuasive and 

concluded that he had not voluntarily retired or abandoned the workforce. The 

commission noted that Honda did not argue voluntary abandonment, refusal of a 

good-faith job offer, voluntary retirement, or maximum medical improvement. 

The commission rejected as unsupported by law Honda’s sole argument that the 

claimant must sustain an economic loss to be eligible for temporary-totaldisability compensation. Instead, the commission concluded that Corlew had met 

the statutory requirements for temporary total disability and granted his request 

for compensation. 

{¶ 10} Honda filed a complaint in the Tenth District Court of Appeals for 

a writ of mandamus. Honda alleged that the commission’s order contained a clear 

mistake of law and constituted an abuse of discretion because the claimant had 

failed to demonstrate that he suffered a loss of earnings caused by his industrial 

injury during the period he was claiming to be disabled. 

{¶ 11} The magistrate concluded that the commission did not abuse its 

discretion when it awarded compensation for temporary total disability. The 

magistrate agreed with the commission that Corlew’s retirement had been due to 

his industrial injury and thus was involuntary and that Corlew wanted to return to 

work but was unable to do so as a result of the conditions allowed in his claim. 

The magistrate noted that Honda did not argue that the retirement was voluntary 

or that Corlew had abandoned the entire workforce. The magistrate 

recommended that the appellate court deny Honda’s request for a writ. 
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{¶ 12} Honda filed objections to the magistrate’s decision, arguing that 

the magistrate had failed to address the issue raised, i.e., whether a claimant must 

first prove a loss of earnings to be eligible for temporary-total-disability 

compensation. The court of appeals, however, overruled Honda’s objection, 

adopted the magistrate’s decision, and denied the writ of mandamus.

{¶ 13} This cause is now before the court on an appeal as of right. 

Analysis 

{¶ 14} This case involves Corlew’s postretirement request for temporarytotal-disability compensation to be paid during his postsurgical recovery period. 

The narrow issue advanced by Honda is whether a claimant who has not suffered 

a loss in earnings due to the industrial injury is entitled to an award of temporarytotal-disability compensation. According to Honda, Corlew had been retired for 

one year at the time of the surgery and was not looking for a job, and there was no 

evidence that he intended to reenter the workforce. Honda has consistently 

maintained that regardless of whether Corlew’s retirement was voluntary or 

involuntary, he was not eligible for temporary-total-disability compensation, 

because he suffered no economic loss that could be directly attributed to his 

industrial injury. 

{¶ 15} The court of appeals concluded that when considering a 

postretirement request for temporary-total-disability compensation, the relevant 

issue is whether the claimant voluntarily or involuntarily retired. 10th Dist. 

Franklin No. 11AP-528, 2012-Ohio-3335, ¶ 7. Our case law supports this 

conclusion. State ex rel. Lackey v. Indus. Comm., 129 Ohio St.3d 119, 2011-

Ohio-3089, 950 N.E.2d 542; State ex rel. Corman v. Allied Holdings, Inc., 132 

Ohio St.3d 202, 2012-Ohio-2579, 970 N.E.2d 929. In Lackey, we addressed a 

claimant’s request for postretirement temporary-total-disability compensation 

following knee surgery. We clarified that “[e]ligibility for compensation under 

these circumstances depends on whether the separation from employment was 
January Term, 2014 

5 

injury-induced.” Id. at ¶ 11. And if the retirement is related to the injury, it is not 

necessary for the claimant to first obtain other employment, but it is necessary 

that the claimant has not foreclosed that possibility by abandoning the entire 

workforce. Id.; Corman at ¶ 7. 

{¶ 16} Here, the court of appeals concluded that the commission had 

properly addressed the relevant issue of Corlew’s retirement and had determined 

that the record contained evidence that Corlew retired because of his industrial 

injury, but that there was no evidence that he had abandoned the entire workforce. 

{¶ 17} We agree and therefore affirm the judgment of the court of 

appeals. 

Judgment affirmed. 

PFEIFER and O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 

O’CONNOR, C.J., and LANZINGER, J., concur in judgment only. 

O’DONNELL, KENNEDY, and FRENCH, JJ., dissent. 

____________________ 

LANZINGER, J., concurring in judgment only.

{¶ 18} On first blush, the dissent’s argument holds some appeal. The 

typical claimant who receives temporary-total-disability compensation is one who 

is still employed but unable to work due to a workplace injury. It seems 

incongruent that someone who has retired can be eligible for this award. But we 

have previously held that if the decision to retire is causally related to the 

workplace injury, an employee’s retirement is involuntary, and temporary-totaldisability compensation may be awarded if there is some evidence that the 

employee had intended to remain in the workforce. State ex rel. Lackey v. Indus. 

Comm., 129 Ohio St.3d 119, 2011-Ohio-3089, 950 N.E.2d 542, ¶ 11; State ex rel. 

Rockwell Internatl. v. Indus. Comm., 40 Ohio St.3d 44, 46, 531 N.E.2d 678 

(1988). In other words, but for the workplace injury, the claimant would have 

been gainfully employed and earning wages. 
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{¶ 19} Honda failed to challenge the hearing officer’s determination that 

Corlew had retired due to his workplace injury. This leaves standing the 

determination that the retirement was involuntary and makes Corlew eligible for 

temporary-total-disability compensation. I therefore concur in judgment only. 

O’CONNOR, C.J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 

____________________ 

KENNEDY, J., dissenting.

{¶ 20} Respectfully, I dissent. I agree that when considering a claimant’s 

postretirement request for temporary-total-disability compensation, the initial 

inquiry is whether the claimant voluntarily or involuntarily retired. However, 

because I believe that R.C. 4123.56(A) requires an actual wage loss, in order to 

qualify for temporary-total-disability compensation the claimant must also 

demonstrate an economic loss. Since Robert Corlew had no loss of earnings, he is 

not entitled to temporary-total-disability compensation. Therefore, I would 

reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and issue a writ of mandamus 

ordering the Industrial Commission to vacate its order granting temporary-totaldisability compensation. 

{¶ 21} The majority fails to address Honda’s proposition of law, which 

raises an issue of first impression. Honda does not challenge the factual 

determination that Corlew involuntary retired as a result of an industrial injury. 

Instead, Honda argues that the court of appeals made an error of law and abused 

its discretion by failing to apply R.C. 4123.56(A) as written. 

{¶ 22} R.C. 4123.56 requires an actual wage loss (“an employee shall 

receive sixty-six and two-third percent of the employee’s average weekly wage so 

long as such disability is total”). This court has repeatedly stated that the purpose 

of temporary-total-disability compensation is to compensate for the loss of 

earnings while an industrial injury heals. In State ex rel. McCoy v. Dedicated 
January Term, 2014 

7 

Transport, Inc., 97 Ohio St.3d 25, 2002-Ohio-5305, 776 N.E.2d 51, ¶ 35, this 

court stated: 

All forms of death and disability benefits provided by R.C. 

Chapter 4123 are intended to compensate “for loss sustained on 

account of the injury.” R.C. 4123.54(A). For purposes of 

compensability, a causal relationship must exist between the 

employee’s industrial injury and the loss that the requested benefit 

is designed to compensate. 

See also State ex rel. Rouan v. Indus. Comm., 133 Ohio St.3d 249, 2012-Ohio4639, 977 N.E.2d 648; State ex rel. Gross v. Indus. Comm., 115 Ohio St.3d 249, 

2007-Ohio-4916, 874 N.E.2d 1162; State ex rel. Ashcraft v. Indus. Comm., 34 

Ohio St.3d 42, 517 N.E.2d 533 (1987). Therefore, to qualify for temporary-totaldisability compensation, Corlew must show not only an industrial injury but an 

actual loss of wages as a result of the injury. 

{¶ 23} At the time Corlew applied for temporary-total-disability 

compensation, he had been retired and out of the workforce for one year. 

Therefore, Corlew could not have suffered a loss of earnings and was ineligible 

for temporary-total-disability compensation regardless of the reason for his 

retirement. 

{¶ 24} Moreover, because I believe that the statute requires an actual loss 

of earnings, an award of temporary-total-disability compensation absent such an 

economic loss is an unauthorized damage award. This violates Article II, Section 

35, of the Ohio Constitution. Ohio’s workers’ compensation laws were enacted to 

provide compensation to workers who are injured in the course of employment 

“in lieu of all other rights to compensation, or damages, for such death, injuries, 

or occupational disease.” Id. 
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{¶ 25} Since I believe that an award of temporary-total-disability 

compensation is predicated on an actual loss of earnings, in order for a claimant to 

be eligible under R.C. 4123.56 for that compensation, the claimant must establish 

not only that his industrial injury is disabling but also that he has sustained an 

actual economic loss. 

{¶ 26} Therefore, I respectfully dissent. I would reverse the judgment of 

the court of appeals and grant a writ of mandamus ordering the commission to 

vacate its order granting temporary-total-disability compensation. 

O’DONNELL and FRENCH, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion. 

____________________ 

Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, L.L.P., and Robert A. Minor, for 

appellant. 

Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Patsy Thomas, Assistant 

Attorney General, for appellee Industrial Commission. 

Law Office of Stanley R. Jurus and Frank A. Vitale, for appellee Robert L. 

Corlew. 

_________________________