SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1217-15T3

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

MORTON RESNICOFF,

Defendant-Appellant.

___________________________

Argued March 29, 2017 - Decided

Before Judges Fuentes, Simonelli and Carroll. 

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Law Division, Bergen County, Indictment No. 

09-02-0314.

James H. Maynard argued the cause for 

appellant (Maynard & Sumner, LLC, attorneys; 

Mr. Maynard, on the briefs).

Elizabeth R. Rebein, Assistant Prosecutor, 

argued the cause for respondent (Gurbir S. 

Grewal, Bergen County Prosecutor, attorney; 

Catherine A. Foddai, Assistant Prosecutor, of 

counsel and on the brief).

The opinion of the court was delivered by 

FUENTES, P.J.A.D.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." 

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.

September 19, 2017
2 A-1217-15T3

A Bergen County grand jury returned Indictment No. 09-02-

00314, charging defendant Morton Resnicoff with three counts of 

second degree attempted sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2c(4), and 

N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1, third degree attempted endangering of a child, 

N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4a and N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1, second degree dissemination 

or distribution of child pornography, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4b(5)(a), and 

second degree possession of child pornography, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-

4b(5)(b). Pursuant to a negotiated agreement with the State, 

defendant pled guilty on August 31, 2009 to one count of fourth 

degree attempted criminal sexual contact, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3b. The 

State agreed to dismiss the remaining counts in the indictment and 

recommended the court sentence defendant to a term of probation,

conditioned on serving 364 days in the county jail.

On October 23, 2009, the court sentenced defendant,

consistent with the plea agreement, to a two-year term of 

probation, conditioned upon serving 364 days in the county jail. 

As part of his sentence, the court ordered defendant to register 

as a convicted sex offender under N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2, commonly known 

as Megan's Law. Defendant did not appeal his sentence.

N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2f provides:

Except as provided in subsection g. of this 

section, a person required to register under 

this act may make application to the Superior 

Court of this State to terminate the 

obligation upon proof that the person has not 
3 A-1217-15T3

committed an offense within 15 years following 

conviction or release from a correctional 

facility for any term of imprisonment imposed, 

whichever is later, and is not likely to pose 

a threat to the safety of others.

[Emphasis added.]

Defendant was sixty-seven years old when he committed this crime. 

He claims he will be eighty-four years old by the time he is 

eligible to apply for relief under N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2f. 

On October 17, 2014, defendant filed a post-conviction relief 

(PCR) petition arguing that the fifteen-year offense-based 

procedural bar to termination unconstitutionally discriminates 

against a class of convicted defendants who are at least sixty 

years old at the time of conviction. According to defendant, the

application of this fifteen-year procedural bar under N.J.S.A.

2C:7-2f to this class of elderly registrants is the functional 

equivalent of a lifetime registration requirement. The court will 

lose jurisdiction to provide any relief because the registrant 

will likely be dead or unable to reap any meaningful benefit due 

to poor health.

The matter came for oral argument before the PCR judge on 

September 24, 2015. In support of his petition, defendant cited 

studies that "suggest" that individuals released from prison after 

the age of sixty present a mere 3.8% risk of reoffending. 

Defendant also noted that the Legislature recognized "advanced age 
4 A-1217-15T3

or debilitating illness" as among the factors relevant to the risk 

of re-offense. N.J.S.A. 2C:7-8b(2).

The PCR judge explained the reasons for rejecting defendant's 

argument and denying his PCR petition in a written opinion dated 

October 6, 2015. Before addressing defendant's arguments 

directly, the judge provided the following brief recitation of the 

circumstances that led to defendant's conviction.

On January 9, 2008, an undercover agent of the 

Bergen County Prosecutor's Office assumed the 

online identity of a thirteen-year-old girl 

named "Danielle DeJoseph" in an internet chat 

room on Yahoo.com, entitled "New Jersey 4,"

using the screen name "danigurl1017." The 

same day, at approximately 3:32 p.m., another 

user with a screen name entitled 

mike_reese2002," later identified to be 

[defendant], contacted the agent online.

[Defendant] then sixty-seven years old, texted 

he was seventeen years of age, and the agent 

responded that she was thirteen-years old. He 

asked the agent if she had ever seen male 

genitalia and subsequently transmitted those 

images to her. [Defendant] also sent the 

agent an invitation to view a webcam feed, 

depicting a male masturbating. He invited the 

agent to join him after school one day for 

sexual activity.

On January 28, 2008, [defendant] and the 

undercover agent, purporting to be a thirteenyear old child, exchanged internet chat 

communications in which [defendant] 

transmitted a webcam feed, depicting him 

masturbating. In the same chat session, 

[defendant] sent twenty-four pornographic 

images to the purported thirteen-year old 

girl.
5 A-1217-15T3

On February 27, 2008, [defendant] again sent 

the agent a webcam showing him masturbating. 

Finally, on March 3, 2008, [defendant] 

provided his cellular phone number to the 

presumed thirteen-year old child. A recorded 

phone call subsequently took place between 

[defendant] and "danigurl107," voiced by BCPO 

[D]etective Kristen Mecionis. During the call 

[defendant] arranged to meet the child at the 

Old Navy store in the Paramus Park Mall. 

[Defendant] expressed an interest in going to 

a nearby hotel after meeting at the mall where 

he suggested that he and the child could look 

at pictures and videos.

The day the meeting was to take place, 

[defendant] was sighted at the Crowne Plaza 

Hotel adjacent to the mall where the meeting 

was to occur. He was arrested, having in his 

possession a duffle bag containing condoms, 

lubricant, a portable DVD player and two DVDs.

The PCR judge noted that defendant was, at the time of the 

hearing, seventy-five years old. He had successfully completed 

his two-year term of probation. The judge also considered a report 

of a psychological evaluation of defendant submitted by Sean 

Hiscox, Ph.D., who concluded:

[It] is my opinion to a reasonable degree of 

professional certainty that in [defendant's]

case specifically and with offenders at an 

advanced age generally, a comprehensive, 

individualized, risk and needs based 

assessment informed by the empirical research 

is superior to a charge-based assessment of 

risk. Such an approach is best practice in 

the field and it is also my opinion that such 

an approach sufficiently protects the public 

from sex offenders who are at an advanced age. 

It is also my opinion that [defendant] is not 
6 A-1217-15T3

likely to pose a threat to the safety of others 

and therefore could be safely removed from the 

requirements of New Jersey's community 

notification and registration law.

The PCR judge began his legal analysis by reaffirming our 

Supreme Court's admonition in State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 459 

(1992): "Post-conviction relief is neither a substitute for direct 

appeal, R. 3:22-3, nor an opportunity to relitigate cases already 

decided on the merits, R. 3:22-5." The judge also noted that the 

constitutionality of the statutory notification scheme of 

convicted sex offenders known as Megan's Law was settled by the 

Supreme Court in Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 90-91 (1995). 

The judge also rejected defendant's attempt to apply the 

Court's holding in In re Registrant J.G., 169 N.J. 304 (2001), 

which concerned the application of the registration and community 

notification requirements of Megan's Law to a juvenile who pled 

guilty to conduct that, if committed by an adult, would constitute 

the crime of second degree sexual assault as defined in N.J.S.A. 

2C:14-2c(1). J.G "was ten years old when the incident occurred, 

and the victim was the juvenile's eight-year-old female cousin." 

Id. at 309. Applying the registration and notification 

requirements of Megan's Law, "the trial court Law Division

classified J.G. as a Tier 2 offender and ordered notification of 
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various elementary and middle schools in the vicinity of J.G.'s 

residence." Ibid.

In holding that Megan's Law registration and community 

notification orders for juvenile delinquents under the age of 

fourteen will terminate at age eighteen, the Court took "careful 

cognizance of the philosophy underlying the creation of our 

separate juvenile justice system, as well as of the specific 

provisions of our Juvenile Code intended to implement that 

philosophy." Id. at 321. The Court also emphasized that:

The Juvenile Code also limits the duration of 

dispositions imposed on juveniles by providing 

that all orders of disposition other than for 

incarceration in delinquency cases shall 

terminate at age eighteen, or three years from 

the date of the order, whichever is later. 

Moreover, as noted, ante at 324, 777 A.2d 904, 

the Code states that no disposition "shall 

operate to impose any of the civil 

disabilities ordinarily imposed by virtue of 

a criminal conviction. . . ." N.J.S.A. 2A:4A48. 

[Id. at 335-36.]

Of particular relevance here, the Court in J.G. made clear 

that it had previously "generally upheld the constitutionality of 

Megan's Law." Id. at 338 (citing Doe v. Poritz, supra, 142 N.J.

at 12, 110-11). The PCR judge addressed and rejected the remaining 

arguments raised by defendant, concluding that "Megan's Law, as 
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it is presently written, does not authorize special exceptions for 

any alleged class of sex offenders."

Defendant now appeals raising the following arguments:

POINT I

THE PURPOSE OF MEGAN'S LAW IS TO DEFEND 

AGAINST INDIVIDUALS LIKELY TO POSE A THREAT 

OF SEX OFFENSE RECIDIVISM; ADVANCED AGE 

REGISTRANTS ARE EMPIRICALLY LESS LIKELY TO 

PRESENT A RISK THAN THEIR YOUNGER 

COUNTERPARTS.

POINT II

OFFENSE-BASED BARS TO TERMINATION OF MEGAN'S 

LAW, WHEN APPLIED TO ADVANCED AGE REGISTRANTS, 

CREATE AN IRREBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION OF RISK AND 

ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER PROCEDURAL DUE 

PROCESS AND FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS ANALYSIS.

POINT III

OFFENSE-BASED BARS TO TERMINATION OF MEGAN'S 

LAW, WHEN APPLIED TO ADVANCED AGE REGISTRANTS, 

VIOLATE SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS.

Defendant's arguments lack sufficient merit to warrant 

discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). We affirm 

substantially for the reasons expressed by the PCR judge.

Affirmed.