15-246

Singh v. Lynch

BIA

Nelson, IJ

A200 770 773

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER

FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF

APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY

ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL

APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING

TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals

2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United

3 States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,

on the 4th 4 day of October, two thousand sixteen.

5

6 PRESENT:

7 JOSÉ A. CABRANES,

8 DENNY CHIN,

9 RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,

10 Circuit Judges.

11 _____________________________________

12

13 VARINDER SINGH,

14 Petitioner,

15

16 v. 15-246

17 NAC

18 LORETTA E. LYNCH, UNITED STATES

19 ATTORNEY GENERAL,

20 Respondent.

21 _____________________________________

22

23 FOR PETITIONER: Jaspreet Singh, Law Office of

24 Jaspreet Singh, Jackson Heights,

25 New York.

26

27 FOR RESPONDENT: Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal

28 Deputy Attorney General; Anthony

29 P. Nicastro, Acting Assistant

30 Director; Joanna L. Watson, Trial

31 Attorney; Sandy R. Pineda, Law
1 Clerk, Office of Immigration

2 Litigation, United States

3 Department of Justice, Washington,

4 D.C.

5

6 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a

7 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby

8 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review

9 is DENIED.

10 Petitioner Varinder Singh, a native and citizen of

11 India, seeks review of a December 31, 2014, decision of the

12 BIA affirming a March 20, 2013, decision of an Immigration

13 Judge (“IJ”) denying him asylum, withholding of removal, and

14 relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re

15 Varinder Singh, No. A200 770 773 (B.I.A. Dec. 31, 2014),

16 aff’g No. A200 770 773 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Mar. 20, 2013). 

17 We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts

18 and procedural history in this case.

19 We have reviewed both the IJ’s and the BIA’s decisions

20 “for the sake of completeness.” Wangchuck v. Dep’t of

21 Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). The

22 applicable standards of review are well established. See

23 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d

24 510, 513 (2d Cir. 2009). 

2
1 The agency did not err in finding that Singh failed to

2 establish past persecution or a well-founded fear of

3 persecution in India. Singh asserted that he was threatened

4 in India as a Sikh and because of his political support for

5 the Shiromani Akali Dal Amritsar (“SADA”) party. 

6 A past persecution claim can be based on harm other

7 than threats to life or freedom, including non-life8 threatening violence and physical abuse, Beskovic v.

9 Gonzales, 467 F.3d 223, 226 n.3 (2d Cir. 2006), but the harm

10 must be sufficiently severe, rising above “mere harassment,”

11 Ivanishvili v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 433 F.3d 332, 341 (2d

12 Cir. 2006). In evaluating a past persecution claim, the

13 agency considers the harm suffered in the aggregate. 

14 Poradisova v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 70, 79-80 (2d Cir. 2005).

15 The agency did not err in finding that Singh’s

16 experiences in India did not constitute persecution. 

17 Singh’s claim of past persecution rested on unfulfilled

18 threats directed at him and his uncle after political

19 rallies in India and harm that his father suffered when

20 Singh was a child. These incidents, even considered

21 cumulatively, do not constitute persecution of Singh. See

22 Gui Ci Pan v. U.S. Att’y General, 449 F.3d 408, 412-13 (2d

3
1 Cir. 2006) (recognizing that unfulfilled threats do not

2 amount to persecution). 

3 Singh argues that the agency failed to consider his age

4 at the time he received the threats. “[A]ge can be a

5 critical factor in the adjudication of asylum claims and may

6 bear heavily on the question of whether an applicant was

7 persecuted or whether she holds a well-founded fear of

8 future persecution.” Jorge-Tzoc v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 146,

9 150 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Liu v. Ashcroft, 380 F.3d 307,

10 314 (7th Cir. 2004)). The IJ was aware, however, of Singh’s

11 age when he was purportedly threatened, and Singh does not

12 further explain how or why his perspective as a teenager

13 requires a finding of past persecution. Cf. Jorge-Tzoc, 435

14 F.3d at 150 (remanding, in a case where past harm occurred

15 when applicant was seven, for IJ to consider “harms . . .

16 cumulatively and from the perspective of a small child”). 

17 Absent past persecution, an alien may establish

18 eligibility for asylum by demonstrating a well-founded fear

19 of future persecution. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2). That fear

20 must be both subjectively credible and objectively

21 reasonable. Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 178

22 (2d Cir. 2004). To demonstrate a well-founded fear, an

4
1 applicant must show either a reasonable possibility that he

2 would be singled out for persecution or that the country of

3 removal has a pattern or practice of persecuting individuals

4 similarly situated to him. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(iii). 

5 “An alien must make some showing that authorities in his

6 country of nationality are either aware of his activities or

7 likely to become aware of his activities.” Hongsheng Leng

8 v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 135, 143 (2d Cir. 2008). The agency

9 did not err in finding that Singh failed to establish a

10 well-founded fear of persecution on account of his religion

11 or political opinion.

12 First, the agency reasonably gave diminished weight to

13 Singh’s letters from family, friends, and the SADA party,

14 because they were largely from interested witnesses and

15 provided conclusory assertions and little detail regarding

16 the possibility of harm to Singh. See Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S.

17 Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 342 (2d Cir. 2006) (the

18 weight accorded to documentary evidence lies largely within

19 agency’s discretion); In re H-L-H- & Z-Y-Z-, 25 I. & N. Dec.

20 209, 215 (BIA 2010) (giving diminished weight to letters

21 from relatives because they were from interested witnesses

5
1 not subject to cross-examination), rev’d on other grounds by

2 Hui Lin Huang v. Holder, 677 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2012).

3 Further, Singh testified that his father returned to

4 India in 2011 and did not present any evidence that he had

5 encountered problems as a Sikh or a SADA supporter. See

6 Melgar de Torres v. Reno, 191 F.3d 307, 313 (2d Cir. 1999)

7 (finding alleged future fear diminished when similarly

8 situated individuals are able to live unharmed in asylum

9 applicant’s native country); see also Jian Xing Huang v.

10 U.S. INS, 421 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir. 2005) (“In the absence

11 of solid support in the record . . . , [an applicant’s] fear

12 is speculative at best”). Accordingly, as the agency

13 concluded, Singh failed to establish a reasonable

14 possibility that he will be singled out for persecution. 

15 See Hongsheng Leng, 528 F.3d at 142-43. 

16 Moreover, the agency did not err in determining that

17 Singh failed to establish a pattern or practice of

18 persecution of similarly situated individuals. See id. The

19 IJ reasonably concluded that the country conditions evidence

20 reflected that Sikhs had “significant problems” in the

21 1980s, but not that those problems persisted. The 2010 U.S.

6
1 Department of State Human Rights Report described serious

2 human rights violations against Sikhs between 1984 and 1994,

3 but identified no current threats to the Sikh community. 

4 Singh’s additional evidence consisted of newspaper articles

5 that addressed only the situation in the 1980s and instances

6 of voter fraud. The IJ reasonably determined that this

7 evidence was insufficient to demonstrate systemic or

8 pervasive harm that rose to the level of persecution. See 8

9 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(iii); Santoso v. Holder, 580 F.3d

10 110, 112 & n.1 (2d Cir. 2009); In re A-M-, 23 I. & N. Dec.

11 737, 741 (BIA 2005) (recognizing that a pattern or practice

12 of persecution is the “systemic or pervasive” persecution of

13 a group). 

14 Accordingly, we find no error in the agency’s

15 conclusion that Singh failed to demonstrate past persecution

16 or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of his

17 political opinion or religion. These conclusions are

18 dispositive of the claims for asylum, withholding of

19 removal, and CAT relief because all three claims were based

20 on the same factual predicate. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444

21 F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2006).

7
1 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is

2 DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of

3 removal that the Court previously granted in this petition

4 is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in

5 this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for

6 oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with

7 Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second

8 Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).

9 FOR THE COURT: 

10 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk

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