In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 15-2976

EYMARDE LAWLER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

PEORIA SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 150,

An Illinois Local Governmental Entity,

Defendant-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Central District of Illinois.

No. 12-1299 — James E. Shadid, Chief Judge.

____________________

ARGUED JULY 7, 2016 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 16, 2016

____________________

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and KANNE, Circuit 

Judges.

PER CURIAM. Eymarde Lawler was diagnosed with posttraumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) at least five years before

School District 150 in Peoria, Illinois, hired her to teach students with learning disabilities. For the next nine years 

Lawler performed that job satisfactorily and was given tenure, and not until 2010, when her psychiatrist concluded that 
2 No. 15-2976

Lawler had suffered a relapse of her PTSD, did District 150 

learn about her impairment. After that Lawler was transferred to a different school to teach children with not only 

learning disabilities but also severe emotional and behavioral disorders. Both Lawler and her supervisor at the new 

school thought she was ill-prepared for this new role, but 

District 150 did not relent. After a year in the new position, 

Lawler was rated as “satisfactory,” but then at the start of 

her second year she was injured by a disruptive student,

sending her to the hospital with a concussion and neck injury. Her psychiatrist notified District 150 that this episode 

and other recent incidents had “retriggered” Lawler’s PTSD 

and that she needed to be transferred to a different teaching 

environment. District 150 did not transfer Lawler but instead 

accelerated her next performance appraisal, rated her as unsatisfactory, and fired her as part of an announced reduction 

in force that ended with all but “unsatisfactory” teachers being rehired. Lawler then filed this action under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, see 29 U.S.C. § 794, claiming that District 

150 not only failed to accommodate her PTSD but also fired 

her in retaliation for requesting an accommodation. The district court granted summary judgment for the school district, 

and in this appeal the principal issue is whether a jury reasonably could find, as Lawler says, that the school district 

failed to accommodate her PTSD. We conclude that a jury 

could find for Lawler, and thus we vacate the judgment and 

remand the case for trial. 

Background

Except as noted, the parties agree about the material evidence, which we view in the light most favorable to Lawler, 
No. 15-2976 3

the opponent of summary judgment. See E.E.O.C. v. Sears, 

Roebuck & Co., 233 F.3d 432, 437 (7th Cir. 2000).

Dr. Steven Hamon, a clinical psychologist, began treating 

Lawler in 1994. He diagnosed complex PTSD with accompanying symptoms of dissociation and depression. After five 

years of treatment, Lawler was hired by District 150 to teach 

special education classes part time but eventually obtained 

full-time employment and then tenure. She received annual 

performance reviews, which included satisfactory ratings 

from 2006 through 2011. As of 2011, Lawler’s PTSD was still

in remission.

The school district first found out about Lawler’s PTSD 

during the 2009–2010 school year, after Lawler’s relationship 

with the principal of her school had deteriorated and she 

asked to take a leave of absence. Dr. Hamon wrote a letter to 

Human Resources recommending that Lawler be given a 

temporary leave of absence followed by a transfer to a different school. Hamon explained that the “conflictual situation” between Lawler, the principal, and other teachers was 

affecting Lawler’s mental health. Lawler’s request for a leave 

of absence was granted in May 2010, and she did not return 

to work until the beginning of the 2010–2011 school year. 

That fall Lawler was reassigned to the Day Treatment 

program at Trewyn School. That program is for children 

with learning disabilities as well as severe behavioral and 

emotional disorders. Lawler, who had not been consulted 

about this assignment, was nervous about her qualifications. 

Although she was trained to educate students with learning 

disabilities, she did not have any experience working with 

students suffering from severe behavioral problems. Before 

the school year began, Lawler communicated her apprehen-
4 No. 15-2976

sion to her new supervisor at Trewyn Day Treatment, Mary 

Camp, who shared her concerns and contacted Human Resources about Lawler’s lack of experience. In response District 150 told Lawler that she had no choice about the 

Trewyn placement. Lawler made the best of this inflexibility, 

and by the end of her first year, she had earned a “satisfactory” rating from Camp, who even noted areas of improvement. Camp wrote that Lawler had “been developing interpersonal skills that have been [cited] as weaknesses in the 

past.” She noted that Lawler had made improvements in 

managing the classroom, actively engaging students, and 

using nonverbal means of correcting behavioral problems. 

She added that Lawler needed to continue improving in 

these areas. 

Lawler was assigned to the same position for 2011–2012, 

but that school year proved to be a difficult one for her. During the summer her father had passed away unexpectedly, 

leaving Lawler and her siblings to cope with caring for their 

disabled mother. And just before school started, Lawler had 

been at an ice cream shop when a woman pulled up in an 

SUV and began screaming that her friends had been shot; 

Lawler went to the SUV to help, saw a man with severe gunshot wounds, and called 911. Then on September 16, a male 

student in Lawler’s class broke away from a police officer 

and collided with Lawler, causing her to hit her head against 

a wall and suffer a concussion. She was taken to the hospital, 

where she was treated for neck spasms. Her family physician, Dr. Henry Gross, followed up and treated Lawler for 

neck pain and stiffness as well as headaches. After this incident Dr. Hamon, the psychologist, notified Human Resources that the year’s events had “retriggered” Lawler’s 

PTSD. He opined that Lawler needed, and requested on her 
No. 15-2976 5

behalf, a two-week leave of absence and then a transfer to a 

classroom having fewer students with behavioral and emotional disorders. 

Teri Dunn, the Director of Human Resources, received 

Dr. Hamon’s letter on September 21, 2011, and met with 

Lawler the same day. Lawler was given a two-week medical 

leave of absence but not a transfer, and she and Dunn disagree about when and why the decision was made to refuse a 

transfer. According to Lawler’s deposition testimony, Dunn 

told her during this meeting that she would not be given a 

transfer and asked her to complete paperwork relevant only 

to the medical leave of absence. In contrast, at her deposition 

Dunn said that she recalls telling Lawler that additional information was needed to process her transfer request and 

included the necessary forms in a packet of paperwork provided during the meeting. Dunn insisted that only later did 

she deny the transfer request, and that was because she never received the completed paperwork. 

Lawler’s leave of absence started immediately after the 

meeting with Dunn. Two days later, Lawler sent Dunn an 

e-mail stating in part: “I am confident that if I return to Day 

Treatment I’ll be able to do the job I’ve been hired to do. 

I realize that my request for a transfer is not a guarantee.” 

Lawler then met with Dr. Hamon, who wrote Human Resources saying that “Lawler may return to work” on October 5, 2011. This letter from the psychologist did not list any 

work restrictions or allude to his earlier opinion that Lawler 

should be transferred.

The day she returned to work in October 2011, Lawler 

used the school’s photocopier to duplicate a letter from 

Dr. Gross, the family physician, stating that “due to injury at 
6 No. 15-2976

work” Lawler “can no longer participate” in the Day Treatment program. Gross wrote that Lawler should be removed 

from that program for children with severe behavioral and 

emotional disabilities and transferred to an environment 

comparable to where she had worked previously. Lawler 

inadvertently left the doctor’s note on the copier, where it 

was found by Mary Camp. After reading it Camp sent 

Lawler home with instructions to contact Human Resources. 

That same day, by Lawler’s account, she met with Teri Dunn 

and explained that, although she realized Dunn had denied 

her transfer, she procured the letter to give to her union because she still wanted a different teaching placement. During discovery Dunn denied any recollection of this meeting. 

Dr. Gross’s letter would become significant the following 

February when Lawler received her next (and, as it turned 

out, last) performance evaluation. In that evaluation, 

Carolyn Nunn, who replaced Mary Camp as Lawler’s supervisor in October, says that Lawler eventually confessed to 

her that a friend, not Dr. Gross, had written the letter so that 

she could be transferred away from Camp. Nunn repeated 

that accusation in her deposition, but Lawler says it’s a lie. 

There is no evidence that the letter is a fake, and the copy 

produced during discovery appears to have been faxed directly from Dr. Gross’s medical office.

Nunn’s evaluation of Lawler also describes purported 

problems with unnecessarily abrasive communications, inappropriate interruptions of classes, inappropriate interactions with other employees and students, and inappropriate 

handling of confidential matters. Nunn says in the evaluation, for example, that on one occasion Lawler “needlessly 

interrupted instruction” to retrieve a document that she felt 
No. 15-2976 7

was missing from the computer lab’s binder of student signin sheets. Another time, according to the evaluation, Lawler 

interrupted a teacher who was collecting student breakfast 

orders to get the teacher’s write-up about a student who had

reported feeling unsafe with his father (an incident that occurred two months previously). According to the evaluation, 

Lawler had “upset the teacher for the rest of the day” by interrupting the breakfast preparations and made her “unable 

to complete her responsibilities clearly.” Yet another example Nunn gives of Lawler’s “inappropriate interactions with 

other employees” is an incident in which Lawler dispatched 

another teacher to the office to get assistance in dealing with 

unruly students after she apparently had told a teaching assistant, who was having an asthma attack, to seek help from 

another TA. The students, Nunn says in the evaluation, 

“perceived this as disrespect for the aide and started yelling 

at Mrs. Lawler and throwing objects.” The students’ unruliness “could have been avoided,” the evaluation continues, 

“if Ms. Lawler had shown compassion for the aide’s medical 

condition.” As an example of Lawler not “handling confidential matters tactfully,” Nunn describes a situation when a 

security officer found marijuana in a student’s desk and, before the officer could notify Nunn, Lawler had “walked from 

one end of the building to the other” to find Nunn and tell 

her “which student’s desk and who was thought to be the 

rightful owner.” 

Ultimately, Nunn rated Lawler’s performance as “unsatisfactory” in that February 2012 evaluation. This was the first 

unsatisfactory rating that Lawler had received in her 14 

years with District 150. Other evaluations (typically completed in April or May of each year) had remarked generally 

that Lawler “would benefit from handling confidential in-
8 No. 15-2976

formation and difficult situations with her students and colleagues more tactfully in accordance with district policies 

and practices.” One review, written by Lawler’s supervisor 

right before Lawler’s transfer to the Day Treatment program 

at Trewyn, noted that Lawler’s “greatest obstacle” was 

“working cooperatively with colleagues” and stated that she 

had created “so much unnecessary drama” that “no one else 

wanted to work with her.” Despite these critical comments, 

however, Lawler always had received “satisfactory” ratings. 

Lawler also received two disciplinary write-ups during 

the 2011–2012 school year. In December 2011, after Lawler 

had asked to be transferred out of the Day Treatment program at Trewyn, District 150 suspended her for three days

on account of an incident that had occurred in September, 

before she was injured by the unruly student. Lawler was 

required under 320 ILCS 20/4(a-5) to report suspected child 

abuse to the Illinois Department of Child and Family Services. Lawler had overheard a student telling another that 

his father was abusing him, and Lawler immediately reported the conversation to Camp, who was still her supervisor. 

District 150 does not dispute that Camp told Lawler she 

need not report the incident to DCFS because the student 

was a “liar.” Nevertheless, after Nunn had replaced Camp as 

her supervisor, Lawler also reported the incident to her. 

Nunn countermanded Camp and told Lawler to call DCFS 

and make a report, which Lawler did. Lawler also was disciplined in February 2012, two days after the unsatisfactory 

performance evaluation, because she had “dumped” a disruptive student out of his desk and used improper restraint 

techniques. 
No. 15-2976 9

A couple of weeks after receiving her performance evaluation, Lawler submitted to Human Resources another letter 

from Dr. Hamon recommending a leave of absence for the 

remainder of the school year and then reassignment to a different classroom at the start of the new school year. The 

school district approved a leave of absence through the end 

of March 2012 but asked Lawler for additional medical documentation before deciding whether to extend that leave 

through the end of the year. Lawler provided more documentation from Dr. Hamon and a psychiatrist, Dr. Arun Pinto, substantiating the need for extended leave because of her 

mental health.

District 150 agreed to extend Lawler’s leave through the 

end of the school year, but she was not reassigned to a different classroom for the 2012–2013 school year. Instead, District 150 notified Lawler in April 2012 that she and 57 other 

teachers were being “honorably” discharged as part of a reduction in force. The unsatisfactory evaluation had placed 

Lawler in “Group 2” of teachers—by statute, the first group 

to be discharged during a RIF after those teachers who were 

recently hired or only part-time. 105 ILCS 5/24-12(b).

Although the position that Lawler had held at Trewyn 

School became available again in the fall after District 150 

concluded that its finances were adequate to reverse the RIF 

and fill all vacated teaching jobs, Lawler was not rehired. 

She sued the school district in state court claiming that it had 

violated the Illinois School Code by not rehiring her, but the 

state courts concluded that teachers in Group 2 do not have 

recall rights under the School Code. See Frakes v. Peoria Sch. 

Dist. No. 150, 12 N.E.3d 217 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014). 
10 No. 15-2976

A couple of weeks before filing that lawsuit, Lawler 

brought this one in federal court under the Rehabilitation 

Act, claiming that District 150 had failed to accommodate 

her PTSD and also had retaliated with the unsatisfactory 

evaluation because she had asked for an accommodation. In 

granting summary judgment for District 150 on both claims, 

the district court reasoned that the school district had sufficiently engaged in an interactive process to accommodate 

Lawler’s PTSD by permitting a two-week medical leave of 

absence. The court thought that Lawler’s e-mail saying that 

she could return to work and Dr. Hamon’s letter approving 

her return were “fatal” to her assertion that the accommodation was insufficient. And the retaliation claim also failed 

because Lawler, according to the court, had not demonstrated a causal connection between her expressed need for an 

accommodation and the unsatisfactory performance evaluation. 

Analysis

As an initial matter, District 150 argues that the final 

judgment in Lawler’s state-court lawsuit precludes her federal claims under the doctrine of res judicata. We disagree. 

Even assuming that Lawler could have joined her Rehabilitation Act claims with her claim in state court under the 

School Code, see Walczak v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 739 F.3d 

1013, 1016–17 (7th Cir. 2014), we conclude that District 150 

acquiesced to “claim-splitting.” Federal courts must give a 

state judgment the same preclusive effect that it would have 

in state court, see Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ.,

465 U.S. 75, 81 (1984); Walczak, 739 F.3d at 1016, and one aspect of Illinois’s preclusion doctrine is the rule against “splitting” a claim between separate lawsuits, which prohibits a
No. 15-2976 11

plaintiff from suing for part of a claim in one action and then 

suing for the remainder in another action. See Brown v. City 

of Chicago, 771 F.3d 413, 414–15 (7th Cir. 2014); Rein v. David 

A. Noyes & Co., 665 N.E.2d 1199, 1206–07 (1996). An exception exists, however, if the defendant acquiesces to claimsplitting, which may occur by not timely objecting. See Rein, 

665 N.E.2d at 1207; see also Piagentini v. Ford Motor Co., 852 

N.E.2d 356, 363 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006) (concluding that defendant had acquiesced to claim-splitting by participating in discovery and waiting 31⁄2 years before moving to dismiss second lawsuit on ground of res judicata), vacated on unrelated

ground, 886 N.E.2d 1025 (Ill. 2008); Thorleif Larsen & Son, Inc. 

v. PPG Indus., Inc., 532 N.E.2d 423, 427 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988)

(concluding that defendant acquiesced to claim-splitting by

not objecting to maintenance of separate suits); RESTATEMENT 

(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 26, cmt. a, at 235 (“The failure of 

the defendant to object to the splitting of the plaintiff’s claim 

is effective as an acquiescence in the splitting of the claim.”). 

Even though Lawler filed her state-court complaint within 

weeks of filing her federal suit, District 150 waited more 

than 18 months to raise res judicata as a potential affirmative 

defense in the federal case. District 150 hasn’t given any reason for this delay, nor has it explained why its prolonged 

inaction should not be treated as acquiescence. What is 

more, even if we did not interpret District 150’s conduct as 

acquiescence, the only claim that could plausibly have been 

barred by the rule against claim-splitting would be Lawler’s 

contention that, after she had sought an accommodation,

District 150 retaliated by giving her the negative performance evaluation that prevented her rehire when the school 

district reversed its RIF. Lawler’s claim that District 150 

failed to accommodate her need for a transfer in September 
12 No. 15-2976

2011, long before the RIF was announced, has little, if any, 

overlap with Lawler’s state-court case, which dealt only with 

whether she was improperly dismissed and whether the 

School Code obligated the school district to hire her back 

when the RIF was deemed unnecessary. 

So neither of Lawler’s claims was precluded, but in this 

court she does not discuss—and thus has abandoned—her 

claim of retaliation. Thus, we consider only her claim that 

District 150 failed to accommodate her disability. On that 

claim Lawler argues that the district court erred in granting 

summary judgment to District 150 because, she asserts, the 

record includes a material dispute about whether Teri Dunn, 

the Director of Human Resources, worked with her to accommodate her PTSD. Lawler insists that, during their very 

first meeting on September 21, 2011, Dunn summarily refused to consider transferring her out of the Day Treatment 

program at Trewyn. And this action, Lawler contends, constituted a refusal to engage in the interactive process required by statute. Moreover, Lawler continues, if the school 

district interpreted her follow-up e-mail or Dr. Hamon’s follow-up letter to mean that she no longer sought an accommodation, someone should have asked for clarification. But, 

Lawler concludes, no one at District 150 followed up until 

she renewed her request for a transfer later that spring, after 

her allegedly declining performance already had earned her 

the negative performance evaluation.

Under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 

42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (and thus, the Rehabilitation Act, 

see Ozlowski v. Henderson, 237 F.3d 837, 839 (7th Cir. 2001)), 

both the employer and employee are responsible for engaging in an “interactive process” to find a reasonable accom-
No. 15-2976 13

modation for the employee’s disability. See 29 C.F.R. 

§1630.2(o)(3); Spurling v. C & M Fine Pack, Inc., 739 F.3d 1055, 

1061 (7th Cir. 2014); Beck v. Univ. of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 75 

F.3d 1130, 1135 (7th Cir. 1996). Both parties are required to 

make a “good faith effort” to determine what accommodations are necessary, but if a breakdown of the process occurs, 

“courts should attempt to isolate the cause ... and then assign responsibility.” Beck, 75 F.3d at 1135.

According to Lawler’s version of events (which, because 

this case was decided at summary judgment, must be credited), the school district’s response to her expressed need for a 

transfer amounted to a refusal to engage in the interactive 

process. The Director of Human Resources summarily refused to authorize a transfer after reading Dr. Hamon’s letter 

in which he opined that Lawler should “transfer to another 

special education job in the District that does not involve 

[behavioral and emotional disorder] students.” The Director’s outright refusal belies any contention that District 150 

made a reasonable attempt to explore possible accommodations, such as looking for open positions in other schools or 

reducing the number of students with behavioral or emotional disorders in Lawler’s classroom. See Miller v. Ill. Dep’t 

of Corr., 107 F.3d 483, 486 (7th Cir. 1997) (explaining that employer must “make a reasonable effort to explore the possibilities” after learning of employee’s request for accommodation). The school district simply sat on its hands instead of 

following-up with Lawler or asking for more information. 

See E.E.O.C. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 417 F.3d 789, 803–04 

(7th Cir. 2005) (“[A]n employer cannot shield itself from liability by choosing not to follow up on an employee’s requests for assistance, or by intentionally remaining in the 

dark.”). If the school district had inquired about its long-
14 No. 15-2976

term employee, it would have learned that many of the interpersonal issues cited by Lawler’s supervisors as performance problems likely were caused by her PTSD. As 

Dr. Hamon later testified during discovery, Lawler often resorted to interpersonal coping methods like trying to help 

others or offering them information in order to get close to 

them when she felt stressed, frightened, or anxious. These 

behaviors, he explained, signaled her feelings of uncertainty

around authority figures, but often were misinterpreted as 

Lawler being “nosy” and elicited negative feedback from 

colleagues. 

District 150 contends that it reasonably accommodated 

Lawler’s PTSD by granting her request for a 2-week medical 

leave of absence. That contention is frivolous. This shortterm leave after Lawler’s on-the-job injury and hospital visit 

did not address her psychologist’s concern that Lawler’s 

PTSD was aggravated by working with the students having 

severe behavioral and emotional disorders. A few weeks 

respite from that environment might have given Lawler 

some relief while she was away, but according to her psychologist, returning to the same position would impede her 

ability to control her PTSD. An employee is not entitled to 

the accommodation of her choice, see Swanson v. Vill. of 

Flossmoor, 794 F.3d 820, 827 (7th Cir. 2015); Cloe v. City of Indianapolis, 712 F.3d 1171, 1178 (7th Cir. 2013), but if Lawler’s 

job performance really did decline after she returned to the 

same position despite wanting a transfer, then the school 

district surely was on notice that more than a two-week 

break was needed to give Lawler an opportunity to continue 

working with PTSD (as she had been doing for years before 

the school district learned of her impairment). See Bultemeyer 

v. Fort Wayne Comm. Schs., 100 F.3d 1281, 1285–86 (7th Cir.
No. 15-2976 15

1996). And a jury could find from the evidence that Lawler’s 

need for a transfer easily could have been accommodated, 

since at least seven openings for special education teachers 

existed in other schools within District 150 at that time. 

See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) (listing reassignment to vacant 

position as example of reasonable accommodation); Hendricks-Robinson v. Excel Corp., 154 F.3d 685, 693 (7th Cir. 1998)

(ADA may require employer to reassign employee to vacant 

position if available). What was not an option, however, was 

for the school district to look the other way until Lawler 

could be fired for poor performance.

Somewhat antithetical to District 150’s argument that it 

did accommodate Lawler is it’s contention that it was not 

required to consider Lawler’s request for a transfer because 

Lawler never completed the necessary paperwork allegedly 

given to her by Dunn at their meeting on September 21, 

2011. But this response suffers from two fatal flaws. For one, 

it would require that we view the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the school district rather than Lawler, who testified at her deposition that Dunn turned her down at their 

first meeting, not later. And Lawler’s testimony highlights 

the second flaw: The packet of information supposedly given to Lawler—an exhibit produced during discovery by the 

school district, not Lawler—relates only to medical leave 

under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. 

§ 2601–2654, not the Rehabilitation Act or the ADA. And neither is there anything in that packet about the steps to request an accommodation. 

Moreover, even if District 150 did think that Lawler had 

changed her mind about the need for an accommodation 

during her two weeks of medical leave, the school district 
16 No. 15-2976

failed to engage in the interactive process by making that assumption without seeking clarification from Lawler or 

Dr. Hamon. See Spurling, 739 F.3d at 1061–62 (explaining that 

employer has not engaged in interactive process if it has not 

sought clarification from employee or doctor when in doubt 

about employee’s continuing desire for accommodation). 

Dunn said during her deposition that she interpreted 

Lawler’s e-mail expressing confidence about returning to 

work as a representation that she could continue performing 

her job with the Day Treatment program and no longer 

sought a transfer. Dunn similarly testified that she interpreted Dr. Hamon’s note approving Lawler’s return to work 

without mentioning a transfer or other restrictions as indicating that Lawler no longer needed an accommodation. But 

Lawler continued to insist on transferring, and the letter 

from Dr. Gross found its way into the hands of both 

Lawler’s direct supervisor and Dunn, the Director of Human 

Resources, after the school district’s receipt of Lawler’s 

e-mail and Dr. Hamon’s work release, so even If Lawler had 

not formally submitted the physician’s letter to them, they 

were on notice that Lawler still wanted her PTSD accommodated by a classroom transfer. See Miller, 107 F.3d at 486–87 

(explaining that employer on notice that employee suffers 

disability must make reasonable effort to understand what 

employee’s needs are even if not clearly communicated to 

employer); Bultemeyer, 100 F.3d at 1285 (same). A jury reasonably could conclude that District 150’s failure to seek 

clarification from Lawler or her doctors caused the breakdown in the interactive process.

Accordingly, we VACATE the district court’s judgment, 

and REMAND for further proceedings.