alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
i i i i i i



### MEMORANDUM OPI NIO N No. 04-10-00502- CR IN RE Demar cus STE ADMA N Orig inal Mandamus Proce eding 1 PER C URI AM Sitt ing: Kar en Ang elini, J ustice

Phy lis J . Speedlin, J ustice Marialy n Ba rnar d, J ustice Deliver ed and F iled: J uly 21, 2010 PETI TI ON F OR WR I T OF MANDAMUS DEN I ED On J uly 7, 2010, rela tor Demar cus Steadman filed a petition for writ of mandamu s , complaining of the trial court’s failure to rule on his pro se motion to dismiss his appointed counsel. Howeve r, in order

to obtain a wr it of mandamus compelling the trial cour t to consider and rule on a motion, a rela tor must e stablish that the trial court: (1) had a leg al duty to pe rfor m a nondiscretionar

y act; (2) was asked to perf orm the act; and (3) failed or ref used to do so. In re Molina , 94 S.W .3d 885, 886 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, orig
. proce eding) (per curia m). When a proper ly filed motion is pending befor e a trial court, the act of g iving considera tion to and ruling upon that motion is mini s t er i al , and mandamus may issue to compel the trial judge to act. See

1 ... T h i s p r o c e e d i n g a r i s e s o u t o f C a u s e N o . 2 0 0 9
- C R
- 7 0 4 3 B , s t y l e d S t a t e o f T e x a s v . D e m a r c u s S t e a d m a n , i n t h e 2 2 7 t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t C o u r t , B e x a r C o u n t y , T e x a s , t h e H o n o r a b l e P h i l i p K a z e n p r e s i d i n g .0 4
- 1 0
- 0 0 5 0 2
- C R

Safety-Klee n Corp. v. Garcia , 945 S
. W
. 2 d 268, 269 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997, orig
. proce eding ). Howeve r, mandamus will not issue unless the rec ord shows that a proper ly filed motion has awaited di sposition for a n unrea sonable a mount of time. See id. I t is rela tor’s burden to provide this court with a re cord suf ficient to establish his rig ht to relief
. W alker v . Pack

er , 827 S.W .2d 833, 837 (Tex. 1992); T E X . R. A P P . P. 52.3(k), 52.7(a ). The rec ord befor e us fails to establish rela tor is entitled to the relief reque sted. Relator indicates he filed his pro se motion to dismiss his appointed counsel on J uly 4, 2010, just three day s prior to filing this petition for writ of mandamus. A trial court has a rea sonable time within which to perfor m its m inisterial duty
. See Safety-Kleen , 945 S.W .2d at 269. Relator has not e stablished the motion has awa ited dispositi on for a n unrea sonable a mount of time. Be cause rela tor has not met his burden of providing a rec ord establishing that a motion was proper ly filed and has awa ited dispositi on for an unrea sonable amount of time, he has not provided this court with g rounds t o usurp t he trial court’s i n h er ent authority to control i ts own docket. See In re Mendoza , 131 S
. W
. 3 d 167, 168 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2004, orig
. proce eding ). Acc ording ly , rela tor’s petition for wr it of mandamus is denied. T E X . R. A P P . P. 52.8(a)
. PER C URI AM DO NOT PUBL I SH

- 2
-
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

The undersigned, William McGinty, President, Secretary and Treasurer of Global Innovative Systems, Inc., hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1)	the annual report on Form 10-KSB of Global Innovative Systems, Inc. for the year ended September 30, 2003 (the "Report") fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)	the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Global Innovative Systems, Inc.

Dated: December 23, 2003

/s/ William McGintyWilliam McGinty
President, Secretary and Treasurer
(Principal Executive Officer and Principal Financial Officer)

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, has been provided to Global Innovative Systems, Inc. and will be retained by Global Innovative Systems, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

1091 

CAF 14-00713 

PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., CENTRA, VALENTINO, WHALEN, AND DEJOSEPH, JJ. 

 

IN THE MATTER OF JOYCE S., PETITIONER-APPELLANT, 

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

KEVIN M. AND ROBERT S., RESPONDENTS-RESPONDENTS.

 

MICHAEL STEINBERG, ROCHESTER, FOR PETITIONER-APPELLANT. 

KELIANN M. ARGY, ORCHARD PARK, FOR RESPONDENT-RESPONDENT ROBERT S. 

JENNIFER M. LORENZ, ATTORNEY FOR THE CHILD, LANCASTER. 

 

Appeal from an order of the Family Court, Wyoming County (Michael

F. Griffith, J.), entered August 15, 2013 in a proceeding pursuant to

Family Court Act article 5. The order dismissed the petition. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is

unanimously affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: Petitioner commenced this proceeding pursuant to

article 5 of the Family Court Act, seeking a determination that

respondent Kevin M. is the biological father of the subject child. 

Petitioner appeals from an order granting the motion of respondent

Robert S. to dismiss the petition based on the doctrine of equitable

estoppel. Contrary to petitioner’s contention, Family Court properly

determined that petitioner was equitably estopped from asserting

paternity on behalf of Kevin, based on the best interests of the child

(see generally Matter of Shondel J. v Mark D., 7 NY3d 320, 326). The

court properly conducted a hearing to determine whether the best

interests of the child required the application of that doctrine (see

generally Matter of Tracy C.O. v Douglas A.F., 66 AD3d 1390, 1392),

and the evidence from that hearing supports the court’s conclusion

that Kevin does not have any meaningful bond with the subject child. 

The evidence also supports the court’s further conclusion that the

child recognized Robert as her father for her entire life until

petitioner attempted to remove Robert from the child’s life, that

petitioner permitted Robert to be the child’s primary caregiver and to

develop a close and loving bond with Robert during that time, and that

it would be “detrimental to the child’s interests to disrupt her close

relationship” with Robert (Matter of Fidel A. v Sharon N., 71 AD3d

437, 437; see Matter of John S. v Imari W., 121 AD3d 538, 538). 

Indeed, we note that Kevin admittedly did not visit the subject child

for the seven months prior to the hearing on this issue, despite the

fact that petitioner had custody of the child for the majority of that
-2- 1091 

CAF 14-00713 

time. Thus, we agree with Robert and the Attorney for the Child that

the court properly applied the doctrine of equitable estoppel to bar

petitioner from challenging Robert’s paternity.

Entered: October 9, 2015 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court
EXHIBIT 31.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES–OXLEY ACT OF 2002

        I, Robert H. Fisher, certify that:

        (1)  I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K for the period ending September 27, 2003;

        (2)  Based on my knowledge, this annual report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this annual report;

        (3)  Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this annual report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this annual report;

        (4)  The registrant’s other certifying officers and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a–15(e) and 15d–15(e)) for the registrant and have:

        (a)  Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this annual report is being prepared;

        (b)  Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this annual report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this annual report based on such evaluation; and

        (c)  Disclosed in this annual report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s fourth fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and

        (5)  The registrant’s other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of the registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent function):

        (a)  All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and

        (b)  Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting.
#### George F. Johnson, Respondent, *v.*Helen F. Monahan, Appellant.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Term,

June, 1905.)

Practice — Stipulation — Restoring cause to calendar after dismissal.

Where a cause, which by stipulation had been adjourned to a particular day, is dismissed by the clerk on the call of the calendar the day before the adjourned day, the court may receive the cause and set a day for the trial over defendant’s objection.

Appeal by the defendant from an order restoring the .above action to the calendar after it had been dismissed for failure of the plaintiff to appear, and from a judgment by default entered after the case had been restored to the calendar of the Municipal Court of the city of New York, .twelfth district, borough of Manhattan.

•J. J. Karbry O’Kennedy, for appellant.

Bradbury & Lee, for respondent.

MacLean, J.

This cause being at issue in February, 1905, its trial was adjourned from time to time by consent to March thirteenth. Hpon the eleventh, it was agreed that it be further adjourned to the twenty-first and a stipulation -signed by the respective attorneys to that effect was mailed the clerk of the court the day following, a Sunday. On the twenty-first, both parties attended with their attorneys. Then it transpired that the stipulation not having reached the clerk betimes and no one appearing on the call of the -calendar the cause had been dismissed. The stipulation was produced by the clerk, the cause was restored and its trial set for the twenty-seventh, the defendant opposing, ^according to the order entered, but consenting according to the return. On the twenty-seventh, an inquest was taken, the defendant’s attorney appearing only and specially to contend that jurisdiction had been lost by the dismissal. That *690contention was not available then and there nor is it now and here. The learned justice did but, as he should, effectuate the stipulation. The agreement of the parties bound them and concluded the court in that proceeding and the court was-bound as between the parties to observe, enforce and carryout the agreement. Matter of N. Y., L. & W. R. R. Co., 98 N. Y. 447, 452. Proof having been given upon the inquest sufficient to sustain the judgment, that judgment should' he affirmed.

Sgott and Dttgro, JJ., concur.

Judgment affirmed, with costs.
No. 732.

#### Helwig *v.*United States.

May 27, 1946.

*Per Curiam:*

The petition for writ of certiorari is granted. The judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals is vacated and the cause remanded to the Circuit Court of Appeals with directions to require the District Court to perfect the record. Rule 39 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See *Miller*
      *821v. *United States,*317 U. S. 192, 199-200.

Petitioner *pro se.*

*Solicitor General McGrath, Robert S. Erdahl*and *Leon Ulman*for the United States.
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 99.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Annual Report of The Wiser Oil Company (the "Company") on
Form 10-K for the period ending December 31, 2002, as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, George K. Hickox,
Jr., Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that:

     (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the
Company.

Dated: March 31, 2003                               /s/ George K. Hickox, Jr.
                                                    --------------------------
                                                    George K. Hickox, Jr.
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<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-30-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             OCT-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1997
<CASH>                                          30,276
<SECURITIES>                                    20,703
<RECEIVABLES>                                    4,531
<ALLOWANCES>                                       449
<INVENTORY>                                      1,199
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                58,778
<PP&E>                                          11,415
<DEPRECIATION>                                   6,541
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  70,762
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            9,439
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        74,801
<OTHER-SE>                                     (14,042)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    70,762
<SALES>                                         13,970
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                13,970
<CGS>                                            2,349
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    2,349
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                    44
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  3,299
<INCOME-TAX>                                     1,574
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              1,680
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<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.06
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```

[Congressional Bills 108th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 347 Introduced in House (IH)]

108th CONGRESS
  1st Session
H. RES. 347

 Concerning United States assessed contributions to the United Nations.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             July 25, 2003

Mr. Pence submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the 
                  Committee on International Relations

_______________________________________________________________________

                               RESOLUTION

 
 Concerning United States assessed contributions to the United Nations.

    Resolved, That it is the sense of the House of Representatives that 
the Representative of the United States to the United Nations should 
seek an agreement to lower the assessment level of the United States 
for the regular budget of the United Nations when the United Nations 
General Assembly considers the scale of assessments for member nations 
for the period 2004 through 2006.
                                 <all>
```
#### Joseph Glaser, Appellant, *v.*The Home Insurance Company, Respondent.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Term,

April, 1905.)

Insurance — Fire — Waiver of formal proofs of loss — Question for jury — Evidence as to value of property destroyed by fire.

Where, in an action upon a policy of fire insurance, the proof shows that the company retained an unsigned paper sent to it, containing a notice of the fire and an itemized list of articles and their value, for sixty days without objection and soon after receiving it offered to pay to plaintiff a specific amount as an adjustment of the loss, the question whether the defendant had waived the furnishing of formal proofs of loss should be submitted to the jury.

In such an action, as bearing upon the amount of plaintiff’s loss, testimony as to the cost price of articles destroyed by the fire is competent, as is also the opinion of a witness as to its value.

Appeal by the plaintiff from a judgment of the City Court of the city of New York dismissing the complaint at the close of the plaintiff’s case.

*90Sigmund S. Rotter, for appellant. , ,

Richards & Heald (Alfred B. 1ST a than, of counsel), for respondent.

Scott, J.

Upon a former trial the complaint in this action was dismissed upon the ground that plaintiff had not furnished the defendant with formal proofs of loss as required by the policy. It did appear, however, that an unsigned paper had been sent to defendant containing notice of the fire and an itemized list of articles and value. While it Avas conceded that this paper did not amount to, and could not take the place of formal proofs of loss, yet it was held that there Avas evidence upon which a jury might find that the defendant, had waived such proofs. That evidence consisted of proof that the defendant retained the formal notice for sixty days without objection and soon after receiving it offered to pay to plaintiff the sum of $38, as an adjustment of the loss. The same facts appeared upon the present trial, and justified the submission of the case to the jury on this feature. There is no proof of the amount of plaintiff’s loss, but this is due to the fact that all the evidence offered on that point was excluded. Among other things plaintiff sought to show the cost price of certain articles which had been destroyed. In the case of articles destroyed by fire such evidence has frequently been held to be competent and is' often the only available evidence. An attempt was also made to prove value by a witness who had some knowledge of the property destroyed and had been for some years in the business of dealing in second-hand furniture. It may be that he was not a very satisfactory expert, but we think that his evidence should have been received, leaving it to the jury to give it such weight as it deserved.

Leyeetritt and Greeebatjm, JJ., concur.

Judgment reversed and new trial granted, with costs to appellant to abide event. • '---
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS FOR THE SIX MONTHS ENDED APRIL 5, 1997, AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS
ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
       
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<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          APR-05-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               APR-05-1997
<CASH>                                         477,991
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                               39,291,069<F1>
<ALLOWANCES>                                (1,575,000)<F1>
<INVENTORY>                                 36,601,299
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            75,410,018
<PP&E>                                     125,168,586
<DEPRECIATION>                             (58,724,601)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             200,587,563
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       17,807,763
<BONDS>                                     82,511,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       131,340
<OTHER-SE>                                  90,880,829
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>               200,587,563
<SALES>                                     89,830,755
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            89,830,755
<CGS>                                       70,257,960
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               12,221,656
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               861,531
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           2,949,125
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              4,402,014
<INCOME-TAX>                                 1,738,844
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          2,663,170
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<NET-INCOME>                                 2,663,170
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.20
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.20
<FN>
Amounts inapplicable or not disclosed as a separate line on the Balance Sheet
or Statement of Income are reported as $0 herein.
<F1>Notes and accounts receivable - trade are reported net of allowances for
doubtful accounts in the Balance Sheet.
</FN>
        

</TABLE>