By order of the Bank ruptcy Appe llate Panel, the prec edential effec t of t his de c isi on is l im ite d to thec as e an d p ar tie s p ur su an t to 6th Cir. BAP LBR 8013-1(

b) . See also 6th Cir. BAP LBR 8010-1©.
F ile Nam e: 12b0006n.06
BA NK RU P TC Y A P P ELLA TE P AN EL OF THE SI XT H C IR CU IT

I n re: SANTAN A CL I

NE, ) ) No. 11-8075 D e b t o r
. )

_____________________________________ )

Appea l from the United States B ankruptc y Court for the Southern District of Ohio Case No. 11- 54893
Dec ided and F iled: J une 1, 2012
B e fo re : EM ERS ON , H ARRI S, a nd SHE A- STO NU M, B ank ru ptc y Ap pe llate Pane l Judg e s.

____________________ CO UN SEL
O N B RI E F : Noah M. Schottenstein, UNI TED S TATES DEPA RT M E N T O F JU ST I CE, Was hington, D.C., Mar

y Anne Wilsbacher , UNI TED STATES DEPARTMENT OF J USTI CE, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellee. Santa na Cline, Dublin, Ohio, pro se.

____________________ OP IN ION

____________________ ARTHUR I . HARRI S, Bankr uptcy Appellate Pane l J udg e
. Ch a p te r 1 3 debtor, Santana

Cline (“D ebtor” ), appe als the orde r of the ba nkruptcy court finding Debtor in contempt of c ourt, g ranting defa ult judgment in favor of the U nited States Trustee (“U.S. Trustee”) on the U.S. Trustee ’s motion- 2-

to dismi ss, and imposing a two-y ear filing ba r. F or the re asons that foll o w, the orde r of the bankruptc y

court is AF FI RMED.
I. ISSU ES ON AP P EAL The issues pre sented by t his appea l are whether the bankr

uptcy court a bused its discretion in finding D ebtor in contempt of court, g ranting defa ult judg ment in favor of

the U.S. Trustee on the U.S. Trustee’ s motion t o dismiss , and imposing a two-y ear filing ba r.
II. JU RI SDI CT ION AND STANDARD OF RE VI EW
Th e B ank ru ptc y Ap pe llate Pane l of the Sixth C ir c uit ha s juri sd ic tio n to de c ide thi s a pp e a l. The United States District Court f or the Southern District of Ohio has authorized appea ls t o the Pane l, a nd ne ith e r pa

rt y ha s tim e ly e le c te d to have thi s a pp e a l he ard

by the dis tr ic t c ourt . 2 8 U .S. C. § 158(b)( 6) and ( c)( 1). A fina l order of the bankr uptcy court may be appealed as of rig ht pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1)

. Fo r p u rp o s es o f appeal, an or der is fina l if it “ends the litigation on the merits and leave s nothing for the c ourt to do but ex ecute the judg ment.” Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States , 489 U.S. 794, 798, 109 S. C t. 1494, 1497 (1989) (c itations omi tted). An orde r g ranting a motion to dism iss is a final, appea lable orde r.
A tri a l c ourt ’s or de r g ra nti ngde fa

ult jud g me nt f

or fa ilure to c oo pe rate in d iscovery is revie wable f

or abuse of discre tion. Bank Oneof Cleveland, N.A. v. Abbe , 9 16 F .2 d 1 06 7, 10 73 (6 th C i r. 1 9 9 0 ) ( ci t i n g Regional Refuse Sy s. v. Inla n d Rec lamation Co. , 842 F.2d 150, 154 ( 6th Cir. 1988)).
A bankr

uptcy court a buses its discretion when it re lies upon clea rly err oneous finding s of fa ct or wh en i t i m proper ly applies the lawor uses a n err oneous leg al standard. T he finding s o f a bankr uptcy court whic h support dismiss al of the ba nk ru ptc y c a se are fa c tua l de te rm inatio ns wh ic h a re re vie we d und e r t

he c le arl y err oneous standar d.
Riverv iew Trenton R.R. Co. v. DSC, Ltd

. ( In re DSC, Ltd. ), 486 F .3d 940, 944 (6th Cir. 2007) (interna l citations and quotation marks omitted).
The ba nkruptcy court’s le g al conc lusions, including whethe r the ba nkru p t cy court ha d authority to bar De btor from re filing f or two y ear s, are revie wed de novo

. Cusano v . Klein ( In re- 3-

Cusano ), 4 3 1 B. R

. 7 2 6 , 7 3 0 (B

. A. P

. 6 t h C i r. 2 0 1 0 ) ( ci t i n g Marshall v. McCarty ( In re Ma rsh all

), 407 B.R. 359, 362 (B .A.P. 8th Ci r. 2009)). “ ‘De novo means that the a ppellate c ourt deter

mines the law indepe ndently

of the trial c ourt’s dete rmin at i o n
. ’ ” Cusano , 431 B.R. at 730 ( quoting Treinish v. Norwest Bank Minn., N.A. ( In re Pe ria nd

ri ), 266 B.R. 651, 653 (B .A.P. 6th Ci r. 2001))

. The ba nkruptcy court’s de cision to bar De btor from subsequent filing s for two y ear s and to provide prospec tive relief

from the a

utomatic stay

is also review ed under the abuse of discre tion standard. Cusano , 4 3 1 B. R

. at 7 3 0 (c i t i n g Ma rsh all , 407 B.R. at 362)

. III . F AC TS
This is Debtor’ s fourth bankr uptcy case since Apr il 17, 2008. Throug hout the pendenc y of her f our ca ses, Debtor has continued to live in her persona l residenc e, appr aised on Septembe r 21, 2010, at $450,000, without making any mortg ag e pay ments. On April 19, 2008, De btor initiated her first bankruptc y case , case no. 08-53519, by filing for relief under Chapter 13, and on J uly 9, 2008, the bankr uptcy court dismissed the ca se for cause pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c). O n October 30, 2008, Debtor initiated he r sec o n d bankruptc y case , case no. 08-60588, by filing f or re lief under Chapter 7. De btor’s Schedule A in he r sec ond bankruptc y case indicated a

fee simple interest in rea l proper ty located at 8243 Chippenh am Drive, Dublin, Ohio 43016, and valued the pr operty at $650,800 with $541,359 of s ec u re d d eb t

. On Fe bruar y 17, 2009, the bankr

uptcy court g rante d Debtor a discharg e in her Chapter 7 c ase. O n J uly 7, 2010, Debtor initiated he r third bankr uptcy proce eding , case no. 10-58115, by filing f or re lief under

Chapter 13, a

nd on J anuar

y 10, 2011, the bankruptc y

court dismissed the case for c ause pur suant to 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c). In the bankr uptcy court’s or der de ny ing D ebtor’s moti on to reinstate he r third bankr uptcy case , the bankr

uptcy court stated that “the Court must doubt Debtor’ s g ood faith and intention to diligently prosec ute this case.”
On M ay 5 , 2 0 1 1 , De b t o r i n i t i at edh er fo u rt h b an kru p t cy

ca s e b y fi l i n g pr o s e a petition for relief under Chapte r 13. Jus t like in Debtor’s sec ond bankruptc y case , Debtor’ s S ch ed u le A ind ic a te d a

fe e sim ple int e re st i n r e a l pr op e rt y loc a te d at 82 43 Chi pp e nh a m D ri ve , D ub lin , O hio 43016; how ever , this time Debtor valued the proper ty at $450,000 with $0 of sec ured de bt. During the pe nd e nc y

of he r c a se , D e bto r f

ile d f our C ha pte r 13 pl ans , all of w hic h r e c e ive d o bje c tio ns to confirmation by

either the Chapter 13 trustee, a party in inter est, or both. O n September 9, 2011, the U.S. Trustee move d to dismiss Debtor’ s case with pr ejudice and for c ause unde r 11 U.S.C. §§ 349(a)- 4-

and 1307(c ) and Rule 1017 of the Fe dera l Rules of Ba

nkruptcy Procedur e. On S eptember 21, 2011, the bankr uptcy cou rt h el d a pre trial hea

ring on the U.S. Trustee ’s motion to dis miss and Debtor’s response . At the hea

ring , the bankr

uptcy court set a

trial date and timetable for discovery , to which De bto r d id n ot o bje c t. On September

26, 2011, the U.S. T rustee filed a notice of deposition of Debtor, sc heduling the de po sit ion

fo r O c tob e r 2 8, 20 11 , a

nd re qu e sti ngthat D e bto r pr od uc e va ri ou s doc ume nts . Als o on September 26, 2011, D ebtor filed a motion to di smiss t he U.S. Trustee ’s m otion to dis miss. On October 12, 2011, the bankr

uptcy court de nied Debtor ’s mo t i o n. Five da y s later, De btor filed a motion for rec onsideration, which the bankruptc y court a lso denied. On Oc tober 24, 2011, Debtor fi le d a mot ion tit le d “ Mo tio n to Qua sh De po sit ion ,” wh ic h th e ba nk ru ptc y c ourt int e rp re te d a s a motion for a protec tive order (“motion for a protec tive order ”). On October 26, 2011, Debtor move d for lea ve to appe al the bankr

uptcy court’s or der de ny ing D ebtor’s motion for r econside ration and f or
a sta y pe nd inga

pp e a l.
A ls o o nO c to b e r

2 6 , 2 0 1 1 , th e b an kr

u p tc y c o u rt h e ld

a h e ar in g o nD e b to r ’ s motion for a pr ote c tiv e or der and the U. S. T ru ste e ’s ob je c tio n, a t w hic h b oth

De bto r a nd c ouns e l f or the U. S. Trustee appea

red. A t the hear ing, D ebtor a rg ued that the m ortg ag e docume ntation reque sted by the U. S. T ru ste e wa s n ot r e le va nt b e c a us e , a c c or din g to D e bto r, the U. S. T ru ste e ’s mo ti on to dis mis s
was based on 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c) (1), which require s prejudice to cre ditors, and there was not any pr e jud ic e to c re dit or s in

thi s c a se be c a

us e the mor

tgag e c la ims we re imp ro pe r. I n r e sp on se to Debtor’ s argument, the bankr uptcy court explained that “ [counsel f or the U.S. Trustee ] has filed a motion based on numerous g rounds, not just prejudice to cr editors: g ood faith, serial filing, f ailure to pr o p e r ly p r o s e c u te th e c u r r e n t c a s e
. ” T h e b an kr

u p tc y c o u rt f

u rth e r e xp la in e d th a t th e “ list of things that the Court c an consider in c onnection with a g ood faith ar g ument g oes on and on a nd on. I t’ s n ot m e re ly

a bo ut m or tg a g e s, no t me re ly a

bo ut t he pla n, no t me re ly

a bo ut w hat y ou ’r e do ingin this particular c ase, not mer ely about how many

case s y ou’ve f

iled.”
W i t h re gard to the sc heduled de position, t he bankr uptcy court a dvised Debtor, “ [Y] ou are expected to appea

r and in f act a re c ompelled to attend. I f y ou do not attend, then [counsel for the U.S. Trustee] will f

ile some sort of motion and I will f avora bly consider dismissal of this case . Do y ou un d erstand?” To which Debtor r eplied, “Y es.” I n addition, the bankruptc y court infor

med- 5-

Debtor that she was r equire d to pr ovide the U.S. T rustee copies of doc uments that she contemplate d

su bmi tti nga s e xhibi ts or , a g a in, the ba nk ru ptc y c ourt wo uld fa

vo ra bly c on sid e r a mot ion by

the U. S. Tr us te e c on c e rn ingany

fa ilure to p ro vid e the do c ume nts

. On October 28, 2011, Debtor failed to a ppear at the schedule d deposition, a n d on November

1, 2011, the U.S. Trustee filed a mot i o n requesting sa nctions and an or der r equiring De bto r t o a

pp ear and sh owc a

us e wh y sh e sh ou ld n ot b e he ld i n c on te mpt of c ourt fo r f a ili ngto comply with the bankruptcy court’s prior order

. The U.S. Trustee ’s not ice of the m otion provided 21 day s for a response ; how ever , on November 2, 2011, the U.S. T rustee filed a motion to shorten the re sponse time to three da y s and a motion fo r an ex pedited hea ring on the matter so that the ba nk ru ptc y c ourt c ou ld c on sid e r t

he ma tte r pr ior to the tr ia l on the U. S. Tr us te e ’s mot ion to d ism iss , schedule d for Nove mber 14, 2011. On November 2, 2011, the bankr uptcy court g rante d the motion to shorten time a

nd the motion for an expedited hea ring and orde red D ebtor to appe ar on N ovember 7, 20 11 , a nd sh owc a us e wh y sh e sh ou ld n ot b e he ld i n c on te mpt

. Acc ording to the Clerk’s Certific ation of S ervic e, notice of the show ca

use orde r wa s serve d upon Debtor “ [b] y

Fe dEx on November

3, 2011, with completion of delivery to Debtor’s r esidenc e of re cord on N ovember

4, 2011. Deliver

y was fully executed and evidenc ed by the attac hed F edEx confirmation documentation.” The attache d Fe dEx documentation stated that the priority envelope

wa s “ de liv e re d” and

le ft a t th e fr on t do or

of the re c ipi e nt’ s a dd

re ss.
On No ve mbe r 7 , 2 01 1, the ba nk ru ptc y c ourt he ld a he ari ngon

its or de r r e qu ir ingDe bto r t o appea r and show c ause w hy

sh e s h o u l d not be held in contempt. De btor did not appea r. On No ve mbe r 8 , 2 01 1, the U. S. T ru ste e fi le d a n a ff ida vit a tte sti ng that De bto r f

a ile d to pr ov ide the U. S. Trustee copies o f t h e d ocuments listed on Debtor’ s Ex hibit L ist, as require d by the bankr

uptcy
c ourt ’s or de r. Al so on

No ve mbe r 8, 20 11 , the ba nk ru ptc y c ourt iss ue d an or de r f ind ingDe bto r i n contempt of c ourt for disre g ardingits order to appe ar f or the d eposi tion scheduled for October 28, 2 0 1 1 , an d for disre g ardinga sepa rate order to appea r at the he aringon November 7, 2011. The ba

nkruptcy court g rante d the U.S. Trustee ’s motio n t o dismiss with prejudice and imposed a two-y ear

filing ba r. On Nove mber 10, 2011, De btor timely filed a notice of appe al. On J anuar y 4, 2012, the Panel dismiss ed De b t o r’ s motion for leave to file an interloc utory appea l as moot because Debtor’ s curr ent appe al fr o m the bankruptc y court’s or der e ntere d on November- 6-

8, 2011, draw s into que stion the bankruptcy court’s or der that would have be en cha lleng ed by the int e rl oc uto ry

a pp e a l.
IV . D ISC USS ION
De bto r m a ke s se ve ra l argume nts on a pp e a l a s to ho w the ba

nk ru ptc y c ourt a bu se d it s discretion whe n it found Debtor in c ontempt of court a nd g rante d defa

ult judgment in favor of the U.S. Trustee on the U.S. T rustee’ s motion to dismiss

. First, Debtor alleg es that the ba nkruptcy court improperly

dismiss ed her

case based on pe rce ived prejudice t o nonparties and noncre ditors. Second, Debtor a rg ues that she did not receive notice of the bankruptc y court’s or der r equiring her to a ppear on Novemb er 7 , 2 0 1 1 , and show c ause w hy she should not be held in contempt. Third, De btor

c on te nd s th a t th e ba

nk ru ptc y c ourt la c ke d s ub

je c t matt e r jur isd ic tio n to ent e r jud g me nt on t he U. S. Trustee ’s m otion to dis miss. I n addition, Debtor a lleg es that the ba nkruptcy judge was biase d and should have re cused he rself.
A. The bankruptcy

court did not abuse its discretion in entering default judgment in favor of the U. S. Tru ste e on theU. S. Tru ste e ’s mo tio n to dis mi ss.
On Novembe r 8, 2011, as a sa nction for De btor disobeying a discovery

order requiringher to appea r at a schedule d deposition, the bankruptc y court entered an order gra nting default judg ment in favor of

the U.S. Trustee on the U.S. Trustee ’s motion t o d i s m i ss for ca use under 11 U.S.C. § 13 07 (c ). “ A [tr ia l] c ourt

may sanc tio n p art ie s wh o f

a il t o c omp ly

wi th d isc ov e ry

or de rs in a

va ri e ty of wa y s, including dismissal of their law suit or entry of default judgme nt ag ainst them.” Bank One of Cleveland , 916 F.2d at 1073. Fe dera l Rule of C ivil Procedur e 37(b), made a pplicable to conte sted

ma tte rs in bank

ru ptc y c a se s b y F e de ra l Ru le s o f B ank

ru ptc y Pr oc e dure 70 37 and

90 14 , p ro vid e s in pe rt ine nt p a rt : (2) Sanctions in the District W here the Action Is Pending

. ( A ) For Not Obeying a Di s cove ry Order . I f a pa rt y

. . . f a i l s t o o b e y

ano r d e r t o p r o v i d e o r

p e r m i td i s c o v e r y, includ in g ano r d e r

u n d e r Ru le 2 6 ( f

) , 3 5 , o r 3 7 ( a ) , th e court w h e r e t h e a c t i o ni s p e n d i n g m ay i s s u e f u rt h e r j u s to r d e rs
. T h ey m ay i n cl u d e t h e f

o l l o wi n g:

. . . .- 7- (vi) re nderinga def

ault judgme nt aga i n st the disobedient party [.]
Fe d. R. Civ. P . 37(b)( 2)(A) (vi). “Simply put, if a par

ty has the ability to c omply with a discover

y order and does not, dismissal o r
. . . en t ry of def ault, is not an abuse of

discretion.” Bank Oneof Cleveland , 9 1 6 F. 2 d

at 1 0 7 3 (q u o t i n g Re

gio na l R e fus e Sy s. , 842 F.2d at 154).
“Just as dismissal of an ac tion for failure to coope rate in discovery is a sanction of last re sort that may be im posed onl y if the court conclude s that a party ’s failure t o cooper ate in discove ry is due to willfulness , bad fa ith, or fault, so, too, is entry of defa ult judgment.” Bank Oneof Cleveland , 916 F.2d at 1073 (internal c itation and quotation marks omitted). The Six th Circuit has articulate d four f actor s for de termining whether an entr y of d ef au l t j u d g ment under Rule 37 is appr opriate:

“ (1 ) w he the r t

he pa rt y ’s fa ilure to c oo pe ra

te in d isc ov e ry

is d ue to w ilf uln e ss, ba d f

a ith , o r f a ult ; ( 2 ) w h e t h e r t h e a d v e r s ar

y w a s p r e j u d i c e d b y t h e d i s m i s s e d

p art y’ s f a i l u r e t o c o o p e r a t e i nd i s c o v e r y; (3) whe ther the dismissed par ty wa s warned that fa ilure to coope rate could lead to dismissal; and (4) whe ther less dra

matic sanc tions were imposed or considere d befor e dismi s s al was orde red.” Stamtec, I

nc. v. A nson , 1 9 5 Fe d

. Ap p ’x 4 7 3 , 4 7 9 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 6 ) ( c i t i n g Re gio na l R e fus e Sy s. , 842 F.2d at 155).
I n this case, the rec ord adequately establishes t hat Debtor’s failure to attend the de position schedule d for Oc tober 28, 2011, wa s the result of willfulness, ba d faith, and fault. Debtor’ s actions sug g est that s h e d id not desire or intend to a ppear at the sche duled deposition. First, De btor attempted t o h av e t h e bankruptcy court dismiss the U.S. Trustee’s motion to dismis s. Second, Debtor filed a motion for a protec tive order one day afte r the bankruptc y court deni ed De b tor’s

mo t i o n t o r e c o n s i d e r t h e b an kr u p t c y c o u rt ’ s o r d e r d e n y i n g D e b t o r ’ s m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s the U. S. Trustee ’s motion to dis miss. And third, on October 26, 2011, Debtor moved for le ave to a ppeal the ba nk ru ptc y c ourt ’s or de r d e nyingDe bto r’ s mo tio n to re c on sid e r a nd fo r a sta y pe nd inga

pp e a l.
Fur ther, at the hearing on October 26, 2011, reg ardingDebtor’ s motion for a protec tive order , De bto r u ns uc c e ssf ull y a rg ue d th a t he r m oti on

sh ou ld be g ra

nte d be c a us e sh e did no t a g re e to t

he date of the de po sit ion

and be c a us e the do c ume nts re quest ed were no t ne c e ssa ry to p ro ve the U. S. Trustee ’s ca se. The bankruptc y court pointed out that Debtor ha d an entire month to prepare for the deposition and make he rself a vailable. Af

ter the ba nkruptcy court stated that it had o bserve d that- 8-

Debtor w as utiliz ing ever y means that she could to delay counsel for

the U.S. Trustee in the proper pr os e c uti on

of he r d uti e s, the ba

nk ru ptc y c ourt inf

or me d De bto r that she wa s expe c te d to, an d in f a c t,
was c ompelled to attend the de position. W hen aske d if Debtor unde rstood, Debtor r esponded “ y es.” Henc e, De btor had a ctual knowledg e that the ba nkruptcy court ha d compelled he r t o at t end the deposition scheduled f

or Oc tober 28, 2011, a n d s t i l l s he did not attend, attempt to re schedule , or even pr ovide any

excuses for disobey

ing the bankruptc y

court’s or d er
. T h erefore , the re cord establishes that Debtor’ s failure to a ttend the deposition w as the result of willfulness, bad f aith, and fa ult

. Withre g a

rd to t he se c on d f

a c tor , th e U. S. T ru ste e wa s p re jud ic e d by De bto r’ s f

a ilure to
c oo pe rate in dis c ov e ry
. Th e U. S. T ru ste e ’s mot ion a tte mpt e d to e sta

bli shthat D e bto r’ s c a se sh ou ld be dismissed under 1 1 U. S

. C

. § 1307(c) for c ause, inc luding lac k of g ood faith, and D ebtor’s deposition would have be en an importa nt part of the U .S. Tru s t ee ’s eff orts in building its case. Henc e, the U.S. Truste e wa s prejudice d by Debtor’ s failure to attend the sche duled deposition.
Wit h reg ard to the third fac tor, the bankruptcy court warned Debtor at the October 26, 2011, he ari ng that if

sh e did no t a tte nd

the sc he du le d d e po sit ion , th e n c ouns e l f or the U. S. T ru ste e wo uld file some sort of motion and the bankruptc y court would favor ably consider dismissal of the c ase. There fore , Debtor w as awar e that failure to cooper ate c ould lead to the bankr uptcy court g ranting the U.S. Trustee ’s motion and dismiss ing D ebtor’s c ase.
Withre g ard

to t he fo ur th f a c tor , th e re c or d re ve a ls that th e ba nk ru ptc y c ourt c on sid e re d le ss drastic sa nctions befor e g ranting the U.S. Trustee ’s motion an d d ismiss ing D ebtor’s c ase. U pon learnin g th a t D e b to r h a d d is o b e y e d th e b an kr u p tc y c o u rt’ s o r d e r to a

p p e ar a t th e d e p o s it ion, the ba nk ru ptc y c ourt se t th e ma tte r f

or a he ari ng on No ve mbe r 7, 20 11 , so that De bto r c ou ld sh owc a us e why she shoul d not be held in contempt of c ourt. After Debtor f ailed to appe ar at the hear ing a nd afte r De btor failed to de li v er doc uments to the U.S. Trustee a s require d by the bankr

uptcy court’s scheduling order , the bankruptcy court sti ll explained that “[d] ismiss al of a case is a harsh sanction to b e imp os e d o nly

in e xtre me c ir c ums tanc e s, ” and that “ [t]he Cou rt se e s n o a lte rn a tiv e bu t to dismiss this case.” Acc ording ly , the bankr uptcy court’s e ntry

of def au l t j u d gm ent in favor

of the U.S. Trustee on the U.S. Trustee’ s motion t o dismiss was not an a buse of discr etion.- 9-

B. Debtor rec eive d due proce ss in the form of proper notice of the bankruptcy court’s order requiring Debtor to appear on Novem ber 7, 2011.

“ An e le me nta ry and fu nd a me nta l re qu ir e me nt of du e pr oc e ss i n a ny pr oc e e din g wh ic h is to be ac cord ed fi n ali ty

is notice rea sonably

calc ulated, under

all circ umstances, to appr ise intereste d parties of the pende ncy

of t h e ac tion and aff

ord them an oppor

tunity to present their

objections.” Mullane v. Central Hanov er Bank & Tru s t Co. , 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S. C t. 652, 657 (1950) (citations omitted). Debtor a rg ues that she did not re ceive due proc ess bec ause she did not rece ive notice of the bankruptcy court’s order r equiring her to a ppear and show c ause; howe ver, the rec ord sho ws t h at o n November 4, 2011, Debtor r ece ived notice, de livered by Fe dEx , of the ba

nkruptcy court’s or der r equiring her to a ppear on November

7, 2011.
The F edEx documentation st at es that the prior ity envelope was “ delivere d” and le ft at the fr on t do or

of the re c ipi e nt’ s a dd

re ss. Con tr ary

to D e bto r’ s argume nt, de liv e ry by F e dE x is

c omp ara ble to s e rv ic e by ma il un de r F e de ra l Rul e of Civ il Pr oc e dure 5( b) (2 )( C) , ma de a pp lic a ble to this contested matter by Fe dera l Rule of Ba

nkruptcy Procedur e 9014(b)

. S u ch n o tice wa s
rea sonably

calc ulated, under the circumstances, to apprise Debtor of the hearing set for N ovember 7, 20 11 , a

nd a ff or d h e r a n o pp or tun ity to s ho w c a

us e wh y sh e sh ou ld no t be he ld i n c on te mpt

. Fur ther, De btor has not pr offe red a ny explanation or miti g ating circ umstances that, ha d she attende d the hea ring on November

7, 2011, might have been prese nted i n defe nse of her failure to a ppear at the sc he du le d d e po sit ion

and to p ro vid e the U. S. Tr

us te e wi th c op ie s of

the re qu e ste d d oc ume nts

. C. The bankruptcy

court had proper su b

j ect matter juris diction to grant t he U.S. Trustee’ s
mo t i o n t o di

s mi s s De b t o r ’s ca s e f

o r ca u s e u n d

er 1 1 U. S

. C

. § 1 3 0 7 (c).
De bto r c on te nd s th a t th e ba nk ru ptc y c ourt la c ke d s ub

je c t matte r j ur isd ic tio n to g ra nt t he U. S. T r u s t e e ’ s m o t i o nt o d i s m i s s , b a s e d i np arto n1 1 U

. S

. C

. § 1 3 0 7 ( c ) ( 1 ) , b e c a u s e , a s D e b t o r

a l l e g e s, there wer e no proper cre ditors in her case to be prejudiced. Howeve r, Debtor is mist aken a s to the app li c a b le la w . T h e ju

r is d ic ti o no f

f e d e r a l d is tr ic t c o u rts in

b an kr u p tc y matt e r s is d e s c r ib e d

by statut e in 2 8 U .S. C. § 13 34 , w hic h p ro vid e s in pe rt ine nt p art : (a) Ex cept a s provided in subsection (b) of this section, the di s t r i c t c o u rt s s h a l l h a v e o r i g i n a l an d e xc l u s i v e j u r i s d i c t i o n of a ll case s under title 11.- 10- (b )

. . . [T ]h e d is tr ic t c o u rts s h a ll h a v e o r ig in a l b u t not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proce eding s arising under title 11, or ar ising in or r elated to c ases unde r title 11.
28 U. S.C. § 1 33 4( a ) a

nd (b ). I f a dis tr ic t c ourt

ha s b ank ru ptc y jur isd ic tio n o ve r a

c a se , 28 U. S.C. § 1 57 (a ) a llo ws the dis tr ic t c ourt to r e fe r t he c a se to t

he ba nk ru pt cy court . Purs ua

nt t o 2 8 U .S. C. § 157 (a ) an d L o ca l Gene ral Or der N o. 05-02, the United States District Court for the Southern Di str ic t of

Oh io h a s r e fe rr e d a ll c a se s und e r T itl e 11 of the Un ited S tat es Co de, and a ll a c tio ns , matters or pr ocee dings a

rising unde r Title 11 of the United S tates C ode to the bankruptcy court. The U.S. Trustee’ s m o t i on to dismi ss Debtor’s c ase f or ca use under 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c) is an a ction arising under Title 11; ther efor e, the ba nkruptcy court ha d proper

subject matter jur isdiction to enter defa ult judgment in favor of the U .S. Trustee on the U .S. Trustee’s motion to dismis s.
D. The bankruptcy

court d i d n o t a b u s e its discretion by imposing a two-year filing bar on De bto r.
A cour t must be care ful when c onsidering whether to impose sanctions. “When a c ourt metes out a sanction, it must exercise such power with restra int and discretion. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc

. , 501 U.S. 32, 44, 111 S. C t. 2123, 2132-33, 115 L .ED.2d 27 (1991). The sanc tion levied must thus be commensur ate with the e g reg iousness of the conduc t.” Mapother &Mapother, P.S.C. v. Cooper ( In re Downs ), 103 F .3d 472, 478 (6th Cir. 1996). “Sec tion 10 9 (g) of the B ankruptc y

Code was ‘adde d t o t he B ankruptc y Code in 1984 to address the pr ecise abuse of the bankr

uptcy sy stem at issue here —the filing of meritless petitions in rapid s ucce ssion to improperly obtain the bene fit of the B ankruptc y C o d e’ s au tomatic stay provisions as a mea

ns of avoiding fore closure unde r a mortg ag e or o t h er secur ity interest.’ ” In re Price , 304 B.R. 769, 772 (B ankr. N .D. Ohio 2004) (q u o t i n g In re Tom lin , 1 05 F .3 d 9 33 , 9 37 (4 th C ir . 1 99 7) ). Se c tio n 349 pr ov ide s, in p e rt ine nt p a rt :

(a) Unless the cour

t, for cause, orders other

wise, the dismissal o f a c a s e u n d e r t h i s t i t l e d o e s n o t b ar t h e d i s c h ar g e , i n a l a t e r c a se un de r t his tit le , o f d e bts th a t w e re dis c ha rg e a ble in t he c a se dismiss ed; nor doe s the dismiss al of a case under this tit le pre judice the de bto r wi th r e g ard

to t he fi lin g of

a su bs e qu e nt p e tit ion

un de r t his title, ex cept a s provided in sec tion 109(g ) of this title.
11 U. S.C. § 3 49 (a ). Se c tio n 1 09 (g ) p ro vid e s, in p e rt ine nt p art :- 11- ( g ) N o tw it

h s ta n d in g an y o th e r p r o v is io n o f th is s e c ti o n , no individual or family

far mer may be a debtor under this tit le who has been a debtor in a c ase pe nding unde r this titl e at a n y t ime in the prec eding 180 day s if—

(1) the c ase was dismissed by the cour t for willful fa ilure of the de bto r t o a

bid e by or de rs of

the c ourt , o r t o a p p e ar b e f o r e th e c o u rt i np r o p e r

p r o s e c u ti o no f

th e c a s e [. ] 11 U.S.C. § 109(g) (1). In Cusano v. Klein ( In re Cusano ), 431 B.R. 726 (B .A.P. 6th Ci r. 2010), the Panel consid er ed t h e bankr uptcy court’s a uthority to impose a filing ba

r beyond 180 day s, and

re a so ne d th a t: Section 109(g ) is not, however , a limitation on the bankruptc y court’s authority to impose sa nctions fashioned to pre vent abuse of the bankruptc y

sy s tem. Where ther e is sufficie nt cause , bankruptc y courts have the authority

pursuant to 11 U.S .C. §§ 105(a) a nd 349(a) to prohibit bankruptcy

filings in excess of 180 da y s. . . .
Cusano , 4 31 B .R. a t 73 7 ( c itatio ns omi tte d); s e e als o 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(21) ( excepting f rom the automatic stay

any act to enf orce a security

interest in re al prope rty

if the debtor is inelig ible under § 109(g ) or

if the ca se wa s filed in violation of a prior court order prohibiti ngthe debtor f rom filing

an o t h er ca s e)

. T h e ad d i t i o n o f t h i s p ro v i s i o n i n2 0 0 5 i n d i ca t es t h at co u rt s ar e n o tl i m i t edt o § 1 0 9 (g) when it comes to imposing f iling bar s on debtors. In Cusano , the Panel conc luded:
Th e re c or d b e fo re us de mon str a te s s uffic ie nt c a us e to p ro hib it this Debtor f rom ref iling for Chapter 13 pr otection fo r t wo y ear s. The De bto r f ile d thr e e Cha

pte r 1 3 p e tit ion s in

thr e e y e ars , a ll i n r e sp on se to ac tio ns take n by

the Ap pe lle e s in

the Ca lif or nia lit ig a tio n in

the ir eff orts to collect on their judg ment.
Cusano , 431 B.R. at 737.
L ik e th e r e c o r d

in Cusano , th e re c or d in thi s c a se a lso de mon str a te s su ff ic ie nt c a us e to prohibit Debtor fr om refiling for ba nkruptcy for two y ear s. At t h e hea ring on November

7, 2011, the bankr uptcy court e x plained its rea soning, in part, for dismiss ing D ebtor’s c ase a nd imposing the two-y ear filing ba r:
This case is the debtor’s f ourth ca se i n t h ree y ear s and her third Chapter 13 c ase. The previo u s t wo C h apter 13 case s . . . were unsucce ssful and t h e Chapter 13 trustee has objec ted to the- 12- confirmation to the debtor’s plan propose d in the instant c as e. The debtor filed a

n adver sary

p r o c e e d in g

a g a in st entities alleg edly

holding mortg ag es on her

home but a state c ourt has alr eady en tere d final judgme nt in favor of those entities, fore closing their mortg ag es. . . . Fur thermore , at l east one of the pre vious bankruptcy proce eding s was filed on the e ve of a

fore closure sa le. The de b t o r h as n o t made pay ments in a

pproxi mately five y ear s and to utiliz e the wor ds of the Un ite d St a te s Tru stee ’s c ouns e l, t he de bto r h a s sy ste ma tic a lly thwarte d mortg ag e holder s’ ef forts to pursue the ir non bankrup tcy re me die s a s to the ir

c oll a te ra l.
Acc ording ly , the Panel finds that the ba nkruptcy court did not abuse its discre tion in bar ring Debtor fr om f ili ngano the r b ank

ru ptc y c a se fo r t wo y e ars
. E. The Panel will not consider Debtor’s argument, raised for the first ti me on appeal, t hat the ba nk ru ptc yjud ge was bia se d a nd

sh ou ld h av e re c us e d h e rse lf. Debtor alleg es t hat t he bankruptcy judge was biased and did not act impar tially throug hout the case , and argue s th a t th e ba nk ru ptc y jud g e sh ou ld h a ve re c us e d h e rs e lf purs ua nt t o 2 8 U .S. C. § 4 55 (a ). Ho we ve r, De bto r ra ise s thi s iss ue fo r the fi rs t tim e on a pp e a l. T he Sixth C ir c uit

ha s h e ld that, in ge nera l, issues not presented to the tria l court but raised for the first time on appea l are not pr op e rl y be fo re the a

pp e llate c ourt

. McFarland v . Hende rson , 307 F.3d 402, 407 (6th Cir. 2002);

see also Bailey v. Floyd Cnty. Bd. of Educ. , 106 F.3d 135, 143 ( 6th Cir. 1997) (“I t is well-settled that this court will not consider arguments raised for the first time on appea l unless our failure to consider the issue will result in a plain miscarr iag e of justice.” ). As t h er e is no reason in this case for dep arti n g f

r o m th is w e ll

- s e tt le d p o li c y , th e Pa n e l d e c li n e s to c o n s id e r D e b to r ’ s ar g u me nt that the ba nk ru ptc y jud g e fa ile d t o recu se her se lf , w hic h is ra ise d f

or the fi rs t ti me on

a pp e a l. T his is espec ially true g iven (1) the absenc e of a ny rea so n why

Debtor did not ra ise this issue before the ba nk ru ptc y c ourt , an d (2) the la c k of any c la im of bia s b a se d o n e xtra jud ic ia l c on du c t a s o pp os e d to op ini on s f or me d ba se d up on De bto r’ s ow n c on du c t duri ng the c ours e of he r b ank ru ptc y pr oc e e din g s, other than the asser

tion that the bankruptcy

judge had at some time be en ac tiv e in the Americ an Ba nkers Association. See Liteky v. United States , 510 U.S. 540, 550-56, 114 S. Ct. 1147, 1154-57- 13-

(1994) ( disqualification under 28 U.S.C. § 455 must be predic ated upon extrajudicial conduct rather than on judicial conduc t).
V. CO NC LU SION
For the fore g oing r easons, the or der of the bankr uptcy court is AF FI RMED.