THIRD DIVISION Decem ber 28, 2007 No. 1-07- 0621

CIRC LE MA

NA GEMENT, LL C., ) Appe al fro m the ) Ci

rcu i t Cou rt of Pl ai ntif f -Ap pel l ee, ) Co o k C o un t y. ) v. ) No. 06M1722987 ) BEVER LY O LIVIER

, ) T he Ho no r ab le ) She l don C . Garb er, De f en da n t-A pp el l an t. ) Judge Presidin g.
JU STI CEGR

EIM A N del i v ered th e op i n i on of th e c our t: Defend ant Beve rly Olivi

er app eals a t rial co ur t or der gr ant ing po sses sion o f her a par t ment to plai ntif f Ci rcle Managem

ent, LLC. (Circle Managem ent) as a sanction for her failure to p ay use and occupancy

charges duri

ng the pen

dency of Ci rcle M anagem

ent’s f orcibl e entry a nd detai ner action b rought under the Ill

in ois F orcibl

e Entry an

d Detain er Act (Act) (735 ILCS 5/9-101 et seq. (Wes t 200 4) ). On ap pea l, Beve rly asse rt s t hat t he t rial co ur t lacke d bo t h t he st at ut or y and in herent authority

to grant Circl

e Manage me nt possession under the Ac t as a sancti on for her i n ab i l i ty to m ake u se an d oc cu pa n cy pa y men ts a b se n t an y con si dera ti on of th e u n derl y i n g m eri ts of C i rcle Ma na gem en t’s pos ses si

on cl ai m . We reverse . On Novem be r 11 , 20 05, Beve

rl y an d her h usba nd Col l i ns Ol i vi er exe cu ted a l ea se f or apartment 801 l

ocated at 5718 N. Wi

nthrop in Chi cago. The leas e required the Ol iv ie rs to pay $800 per month i

n rent on the f

irst day of every month. On

Septembe

r 20, 2006, Circle1-07-0621

1 A l th oug h Bev erl y ’s h us b an d w as n am ed a def en da n t i n Ci rc l e M an ag em en t’s com pl ai n t, he wasnot i nv olv ed i n l i tig ati on i n the tri al court an d i s n ot a party to thi s ap peal
. 2 Managem ent, lessor o f the Oliv

iers’ apartment, fi

led a compl

ain t against Beverly

and Coll ins. 1 T he co mpla int alle ge d t ha t st ar t ing Au gu st 1, 20 06 , Be ve r ly and Co llins fa iled t o mak e t he ir
m onthl y ren tal pay men ts an d tha t Ci rcle Ma na gem en t was owe d $2,45 0 i

n b ack re nt. Ac cordi ngl y , the c omp l ai

nt soug ht poss ess i on of

, and ba ck ren t for, th e Ol

i vi ers’ apartm

en t. Bev erl y resp onde d wi

th a g eneral

appe aran ce a nd a j ury dem and. She con

tin ued re sidi ng th ere with h er two chi ldren durin g the penden

cy of Ci rcle M anagem

ent’s f orcibl e entry a nd detai ner action. On Oc t obe r 1 1, 200 6, t he co ur t ent er ed a n agr eed or der est ablishing a pr et rial fil ing
sch ed ul e. In perti n en t pa rt, th e a gr ee d order gra

n ted Ci rc l e M an ag em en t “ f our tee n (1 4) da y s, to and i ncl udin g October 25, 2006, t o file a Motion f

or Use and Occupan

cy .” On October 26, 2006, one d ay af ter the d eadl i ne set f orth i n the agre ed order , Ci

rcle Ma na gem en t fi l ed a m otion f or a use and occupan

cy award. In the m

ot ion, Ci rcle M anagem

ent asserted its b elie f that “[d]ef endan ts plan on assertin

g a counterclai

m a gai nst Pla in tif f wh ic h wi ll del ay a speedy
re sol uti on to thi s m atte r a n d p re v en t Pl ai n ti f f f rom re gai n i n g p oss es si

on of th e p re m i se s i n ti me to re n t th e p re m

i se s f or th e wi n ter to n ew ten an ts” an d s oug h t a c our t order re qui ri n g B ev erl y to
make re gul

ar us e an d occup ancy

pay men ts duri ng th e pen den cy of the ca se. On Novemb er 30, 2 006, t he trial court ent ered an agreed o rder r eached by the part ies, whi ch cal le d for Beverl

y to pay Ci rcle Managem

ent $800 a m

onth begi nni ng Decem

ber 14, 2006, for use an d occupancy

of the apartmen

t. Beverly

, however, fai

le d to ma ke her f irst use an

d1-07-0621

3

occupa nc y pa y men t. A cc ordi

ngl y , on De cem be r 20 , 20 06, Ci

rcl e M an ag em en t f i l ed a m oti on f or im medi ate po ssession, assert in

g that it was entitled to po ssession of Beverly ’s apartment as a
resu l t of her f ail ure to com

pl y wi th the agree d use

and occup ancy

order. Beve rly fi led a r esp ons e o bject ing t o t he pr op riet y of Circ le Manag ement ’s mot ion, stati ng: “W hi l e [Ci rcle Ma na gem en t] id en tif i es n o statute, regu

l ati on, ordi

na nc e or rule of

court upon whi ch i t bases thi s request, defen dant presum

es that [Circl

e Manage me nt] is s eeki

ng a fi ndi ng that Mrs. Oli

vier is i n contempt o f court , and asking thi s Court to award po ssession as a sanction for Mrs. Oliv

ie r’s al le ged contempt. *** [Circl e Manage me nt] has n ot provided defen dant wi th adequate notice of the ty pe of contempt i

t seeks, nor is a f

in din g of contempt
wa rr an t ed , as it is imp o ss ible fo rMr s. Oli vie rt o co mp ly wi t h t his Co ur t ’s o r de r . ” A cc o r di ng ly, Bev erl y reque sted the court to den y Ci rcle Ma na gem en t’s m otion
. T he r ea ft er , o n Ja nu ar y 5, 20 06 , t he t r ial c o ur t co nd uc t ed a h ea r ing o n C irc le Ma na ge men t’s moti on f or i m medi atepos se ss i on. Beve rl y i nf orm ed the cou rt th at s he ha d n ot pai d th e u se an d oc cu pa n cy ch arge s or dere d b y th e c our t b ec au se sh e d i d n ot h av e th e f un dsto com pl y wi th th e ord er. She e xp l ai

ne d that her h

usba nd ha d lef t he r i n S ep tem be r or A ugu st of 2006 a nd h ad n ot provided h

er wi th an y i nc ome or chi l d sup port fol l owi ng h i s de parture . Mo r eo ve r , Be ve r ly t es t ified t ha t she wa s c ur r en t ly un emp lo yed , bu t t ha t wa s s he wa s a ct ive ly seeki ng em ploy me nt. When asked by the trial court why

she en tered into the Novemb er 30, 2006, agreed order t o make m

onthly use and occupan

cy pay me nts, Beverl

y e xpl ai ned that she h

ad be l i eved sh e w oul d b e a bl e to re ce i ve rev en uef rom va riousch ari ti es , but that the m

one y ha d n ot been fo rt hco ming. T he pa rt ies st ipulat ed t hat Beve rly’s failure t o c omp ly with t he us e and1-07-0621

4

occupa ncy order wa s n

ot wil l f ul
. The re aft er , B ever ly’s cou nsel ad dr esse d t he co ur t and c hallenged t he validity o f the pr ac ti ce of gr an ti n g p oss es si

on un der the A ct to a l es sor as a s an cti on f or a l es se e’ s i n ab i l i ty to pay us e and oc cup ancy cha rg es. Co unse l arg ued t hat t he sa nct ion Cir cle Mana gement ur ged t he court to im

pose did n

ot constitute a val

id c ontempt sanction. Specif ic ally , counsel ma in taine d t ha t t he sa nc t io n w as no t a v alid cr imina l co nt emp t sa nc t io n be ca us e B ev er ly d id no t ac t wil fu lly;
m oreov er, cou ns el as serted , th e s an

cti on c oul d n ot be cl as si f i ed asa val i d c i vi l con tem pt s an cti on because Beverl y’ s abi li ty to purge t he contem

pt o rder was lim

ited. The court responded, “S o meb o dy s ho uld t ak e it up t o t he co ur t s a nd ge t us so me g uid eline s, ” a nd gr an t ed Cir cle Managem ent’s motion for im

medi ate po ssession “as a sanction” f or Beverly’ s nonpaym

ent of use and o ccu panc y charg es. The co ur t furt her st at ed t hat t he po sses sion o rd er co uld be “p ur ged by pay i ng th e us e an d occup ancy

” by Jan uary 31, 200 6, an

d stay ed th e proce edi

ngs unti l that da te. The trial court then set a trial

date for February

26, 2007, “i

n the event it be comes n

ecessary .” The t rial co ur t did no t hear any evidenc e co ncer ning t he merit of Cir cle Mana gement ’s und er lyi ng po ss es sio n c laim. Mo r eo ve r , t he t r ial c o ur t did no t sp ec ify t he au t ho r it y o n w hic h it r elie d in i m posi ng th e sa nction
. On Jan uary 29, 2006, Bev

erly fi le d a m ot ion to cla

rif y the court ’s Jan

uary 5, 2006, po sses sion o rd er . T he mot ion so ught clarificat ion as t o “w het her [t he o rd er ] w as a final j udg ment as to the di sputed i ssue of posse ssi on, or a tem

porary order pendi

ng th e di sposi tion of the m atter, at whi ch tim

e possessi on could reve

rt t o [Beverly

] if she is success ful

at the tr ia

l s tage.” In her motion to clari

fy , Beverl y a ls o indi cated that she sought “to appeal the Order at this tim e, under1-07-0621

5

Il l i noi s Suprem

e Court Ru

l e 304 (a), so that f

urthe r gui dan ce on the issues s

urroundi ng a n a ward
o f immed iat e p o ss es sio n fr o m failu r e t o pa y us e a nd o cc up an cy ma y be s o ug ht fr o m t he I llino is Appel la te Court .” On Febr uar y 14, 200 7, t he t rial co ur t ent er ed a n or der in resp ons e t o B ever ly’s mot ion,
con f i rm i ng tha t the pos se ss i on or

de r “ wa s ente red asa s an cti on p urs ua nt to P l ai nti f f ’s req ue st f or failure t o p ay use and o ccu panc y.” T he co ur t also amende d t he o rd er “to include a finding pur suan t to Suprem

e C ourt R ule 3 04( a) th

at there i s n o j us t rea son

f or de l ay i ng en f orce men t or ap pe al o rbo t h. ” B ev er ly filed a t imely no t ice o f ap pe al. On appeal, Beverl

y ass erts t hat the po ssession or der was enter ed cont rary to law, because t he t rial co ur t lacks t he st at ut or y aut hor ity t o a war d a land lor d po sses sion o f a re sidenc e und er t he Act when a t enant is unable t o c omp ly with a us e and oc cup ancy o rd er wit hou t co nsider ing t he underl yi ng m erits of the l

andl ord’s possession cl ai

m. Moreover, she as serts that t hi s practice
can not be upheld asa v al

i d exercise of

the tri al court’s i nh eren t authori ty to sa nction
. The Legal Assis

tance Foundat ion of Metropo li tan Chicago (LAF), the Lawyers’ Com m i ttee f or Better Hous i

ng ( LCB H), Ca

bri ni -Gree n L egal Ai d (CGLA ) and the Northwe stern Un ive r sit y S ch o o l o f La w B lu hm L eg al C linic ( Blu hm C linic ) ( co llec t ive ly am ic i), each of wh

ic h pr ovid es fre e lega l service s t o lo w- income t enant s facing e victio ns, ha ve filed an am ic i curiae bri ef in support o n Bev

erly. In thei

r bri ef, the am

ic i as se rt th at th e p ra cti ce of aw ardi n g p oss es si

on to la ndl ords when tenan

ts fai l to compl y w ith us e and occupanc

y orders wi

thout heari

ng ev ide nce conc ern i ng th e m eri ts of th e un derl y i ng p osse ssi

on cl ai m i s “ prev alen t” at the D aley

Cen ter. Speci fi cally , the am ic i stat e in their bri ef that the t rial

cour t “holds approxim

ately f iv e hearin gs a1-07-0621

6

week on m otion s f or san cti ons f or the ten an t’s f ail ure to m ake [u se a nd oc cupa

ncy] pay men ts. Approxi ma tely one tenant a week i s evi

cted as a resul

t o f thes e sanction heari

ngs.” The am

ic i di spute th e propri ety of th i s preva l en t practice b eca

use i t reli ev es l

andlords of

thei r statutory ob l i ga ti on to prov e th

ei r ri gh t to pos se ss i on

un der the A ct. In i ti al l y , we m us t de term

i ne whether we h

ave j urisd i cti on to e nte rtai n B everl y ’s appe al or wh ethe r he r appe al shoul d be

di sm i sse d asmoot. Foll

owi ng th e en try of the p osse ssi

on order, Beverl y m oved out o f the apa

rtment. Thereaf

ter, at oral argum

ent, Circl e Manage me nt’s counsel i nf orme d the court that th e apa

rtme nt had subs eque

ntl y be en l eas ed to another ten

an t. A l th oug h n ei th er pa rty ch al l en ge d ou r j uri sd i cti on , a re v i ewi n g c our t h as a d uty to co nsider its jur isdict ion sua s pon te . Em ery v. North ea st Il l i noi s R eg i ona l Tra ns porta ti on C o. , 374 Ill . App. 3d 974, 977 (2007). As a rule, “ [t]he exi stence of an actual controversy

is an ess entia

l
re qui si te to a pp el l ate j uri sd i cti on , a n d c our ts o f re v i ew wi l l gen eral l y n ot de ci de ab strac t, hy pot hetic al , or moot questions.” In re Marriage of Nien house , 355 Il

l . Ap p. 3d 14 6, 149 ( 2004) , ci ting Steinb

recher v. Stei

nbrech er , 19 7 I ll. 2 d 5 14 , 52 3 ( 20 01 )
. A c as e b ec o mes mo o t wh er e it is i m possi bl e to rend er ef f ecti ve rel i ef to the app eal

i ng p arty . Be

rl i n v . Sa ra h Bu sh Li n col n He al th Center , 17 9 I ll. 2d 1, 7 ( 19 97 )
. Fo rex amp le, “ ‘ an ap pe al is mo o t if asp ec ific pr o pe r t y, posse ssi on or ownersh

i p of whi ch i s the rel i ef sough t on app eal, ha s b een

conv ey ed to thi rd parties.’ ” Cosmopoli

tan National

Bank of Chi cago v. Nunez , 265 Il

l . Ap p. 3d 10 12, 101 5 (199 4), quot in g Town of Li

bertyv il le v. Moran , 17 9 Ill. App. 3d 8 80, 886 (19 89) ; Poulos v. Reda , 16 5 I ll. App. 3d 793, 798 (1987) (decli ni ng to exercis e j urisdi

ction over a f

orcibl e entry a nd detai ner appe al be caus e “the def

endan ts can no l onger be place d i n pos ses sion of

the prem i ses ”).1-07-0621

7

However, pursuant t o t he “publ ic i nterest ” or “public policy ” exception to the moot ness doctr in e, a reviewi

ng court may

address an

ot herwi se m

oot is sue “i

f i t inv olve s a questi on of great publ ic in terest. ” In

re A Mi nor , 12 7 Il

l . 2d 247 , 25 7 (1 989 ); se e al so In r e Chr isto pher K. , 21 7 I ll. 2d 348, 3 58-59 ( 2005). To d etermine wh ether t he exception appli

es, a reviewi

ng court must eval uate three factors, incl

udin g: “(1) the publ

ic nature of the questi on; (2) the desi rabi li ty of an authoritative determ

in ation f or t he purpose of gui

din g publ ic off ic ers; an d (3) the li

kelih ood t hat the question wi

ll recur.” In re Andrea F. , 20 8 I ll. 2 d 1 48 , 15 6 ( 20 03 )
. I n o r de rfo ran iss ue t o fall withi n the conf in es of the pub li

c i nterest exception, “ [a]ll

three factors mus

t be cl early

shown.” Brow n v . Joh ns on , 362 Il

l . Ap p. 3d 41 3, 417 ( 2005)
. In thi s c as e, w e f

i nd tha t the publ i c i nte res t exce ption a ppl i es . F i rs t, th e q ue sti on of whether a tr ial

cou rt may

award a landlor d po ssession under t he Act as a sa nction for the t enant’s inabili t y to co mply with a u se a nd o ccu panc y or der is one of p ublic impor t ance , a ffect ing t he right s o f co unt less landlo rd s and t enant s in Illinois. Mo re ove r, t her e is a nee d fo r a n aut hor itat ive det er minatio n on t his issue. At o ra l arg ument , bo t h par t ies co nfirmed t he ac cur acy o f the statistics ci ted in the am

ic i curiae bri ef s ubm itted in this case, whi ch reve al that t hi s particul

ar practice i s “prev

al ent.” In addi

tion, the trial

court ’s i nstruction to Beverl

y’ s trial counsel to “take it up to t he courts and get us some gui delin es” whe n he chal le nged thi s practice i

ndicates a need for an au t hor itat ive det er minatio n as t o t he pr op riet y of t his pra ct ice. Finally , be cau se t his cur re nt practi ce is so pre

va l en t, it i s l i kel y to conti nue to recur ab sen

t any authority to the con

trary . Acco rd ingly, based on a re view o f the se fac t or s, w e find t hat t he pu blic inter est exce pt ion t o t he
m ootness doctri ne appl i es, a nd we wi l l addre ss th

e m eri ts of B ev erl

y ’sappe al
.1-07-0621

8

We t ur n first t o B ever ly’s arg ument t hat t he t rial co ur t ’s sa nct ion wa s no t aut hor ized by the A ct. The Act set s for t h a mecha nism for t he pe ace ful adjud icat ion o f po sses sion r ight s in the trial cou rt ( Per ry v. E vanst on Y ou ng Me n’s Chr istian As s’n, 92 I ll. App. 3d 8 20, 823 (1 981 )) and “provide[s] the compl

ete remedy

for settli ng di sputes about real property” ( Ch ica go T r an sit Authority v. Clear Chan

nel Outdoo r, Inc. , 36 6 Il

l . A pp. 3d 3 15, 325 (20 06) ; s eealso Peo ple v. Eva ns , 16 3 Il

l . A pp. 3d 5 61, 564 -65 (19 87)(re cog ni zi ng tha t the A ct p rovi de s th

e s ol e m ea ns of
settl i ng di spute s b etw een l

an dl ords an d te na nts )). B ec au se

the A ct i s a de roga ti on of com mon l aw, cour ts m ust stri ctl y com pl y wi th the procedu re outli ne d i n the statute. Fi

rs t Na ti ona l Ba nk of Evergreen Park v . Chrysl er Real ty Corp. , 168 Il

l . Ap p. 3d 78 4, 791 ( 1988)
. Altho ugh no t ack now ledge d by eithe r p ar t y, sec t ion 9 -2 01 o f the Act per mits a p ar t y who brings a for cible ent ry and det ainer a ct ion t o r eco ver use and o ccu panc y charg es p ending resolution of

the possessi

on cl ai m. 735 ILCS 5/9-201 (West 2004). Use and occupancy awards
are au thor ize d un de r th e A ct b ec au se

“ [a] l es se e’ s ob l i ga

ti on to p ay

ren t con ti nu esasa m atte r of law, even t hou gh t he lesse e may ultimat ely est ablish a right t o r esc ind t he lease , va cat e t he premises, or obtain other reli ef.” Peop l e e x r

el . De pa rtm en t of Tra ns porta ti on v . Cook De ve l opm

en t Co. , 274 Ill . App. 3d 175, 180 (1995). There is n o lan guage i n section 9-201, however , t hat expr essly

permits a t rial court to award a landlor d po ssession foll owing a lessee’s fai lure to pay the s

tatut oril y a uthorized use an

d occupancy

charges. Moreover, Beverl y i s correct t hat t her e is “no * * * pr ovisio n [a nywhere in the Ac t ] t hat aut hor izes sa nct ions fo r no n-p ayment of rent pendi

ng trial .”1-07-0621

9

In a ddit ion t o t he abs ence of st at ut or y aut hor ity explicit ly pro viding for suc h a sa nct ion, Beve rly maintains t hat t he sa nct ion impo sed in her ca se w as imper missibl e bec aus e it “d efie[d ] t he well-cons ide

red procedural f

ramework of the [Act].” Specif ic ally , Beverl y asserts that the Act place s t he bur den o n t he plaint iff t o e st ablish its r ight t o p os sess ion and per mits t he de fendant named in t he plaint iff

’s fo rc ible entr y and de t ainer a ct ion t o p re sent any ger mane de fenses a nd have t he ca se t ried by a jury. Ac co rd ingly, she maint ains t hat t he t rial co ur t ’s o rd er defied t he A ct’ s statu

tory sch em e b ec au se i t re l i ev ed Ci rc l e M an ag em en t of i ts s tatu tory ob l i ga ti on to est ablish its r ight t o p os sess ion and dep rived her of he r st at ut or y right s t o p re sent defens es a nd ha ve the c ase trie d an d dec i ded on

the m eri ts. “T he dis t inc t pu r

po se o f t he fo r cib le e nt ry and de t ain er pr o ce ed ing is t o de t er mine o nly who should be i

n rightful possession.” Mill

er v. Daley , 131 Ill . App. 3d 959, 961 (1985). Under t he A ct , it is t he p ar t y ass er t ing it s r ight t o po ss es sio n wh o bea rs t he b ur de n o f pr o o f ( Harper Square Ho usin

g Corp . v. Hayes, 305 Ill. App. 3d 9 55, 963 (19 99) ; City o f Chicago v. Airline Canteen Serv

ic e, Inc. , 64Ill . A

pp. 3d 4 17, 435 (19 78) ) an d m us t es tab l i sh

i ts ri gh t to pos se ss i on b y a p repon dera n ce of th e ev i den ce . 73 5 I LC S 5 /9 -1 09 .5 (W est 20 04 ). I f th e p l ai n ti f f f ai l s to meet t his burd en, t he Act pr ovid es t hat “judgment for co st s shall be ent er ed in favo r o f the defend ant .” 735 ILC S 5 /9 -1 14 ( West 200 4) . T he de fendant in forc ible det ainer a ct ion has t he right to assert any german e defenses

in response t o t he pl ain

tiff ’s possession claim. 735 I LCS 5/ 9- 106 (2 004 ) ( “The d efenda nt may under a ge ner al denial o f the allegat ions o f the co mplaint offer in evidence any matt er in defense o f the ac tio n”); Rosewood Co rp. v. Fi sher , 46 Ill . 2d 249, 25 5 ( 19 70 ). M ore ov er , the A ct rec ogn ize s th at b oth pa rties h av e th e ri gh t to h av e th e d i spute1-07-0621

10

tri ed by a j ury. 73 5 IL CS 5/9 -10 8 (W es t 200 4) ( “ In

an y ca se rel ati ng to prem i se s u se d f

or reside nce pu rpo ses, either par ty may demand a t rial by jury”); Tw in–City I nn, I nc. v. H ahne Enterprises, In

c. , 37 Il l . 2d 133 , 137-3 8 (196 7). Cir cle Ma na ge men t do es no t dis pu t e t ha t t he t r ial c o ur t en t er ed t he po ss es sio n o r de rin this case wi thout heari

ng an y e vi dence conce

rni ng an y a ff irm ative defen se Beverly

ma y h ave h ad in response to its forci

ble entry a

nd detai ner action. Howeve

r, Circl e Manage me nt denies that Beverl y was “depri

ve[d] * * * of her righ

t t o present any

german e defe nses ” becaus e she wa

iv ed her right to do so when sh e “m ade no at tempt t o fil

e an answer to t he complain t let alone raise
an y affir mat ive de fen se s o ran y co un t er cla ims” at an y t ime in t he cir cu it co ur t . Cir cle Ma na ge men t ’s ar gu men t , ho we ve r , is no t we ll t ak en be ca us e I llino is S up r eme Co ur t Ru le 181(b)(2) provides that “[i ]n actions for forci ble detain er * * * t he de fendant must app ear at t he tim e and pl ace speci fi ed i n the sum mons . If the def

endan t appears, he or she need n ot fi le an answ er unless o rd er ed by t he co ur t ; and w hen no answ er is or der ed, t he allega t ions o f the
co mpla int will be de eme d d en ied , an d a ny d efe nse may be pr o ve d a s if it we r e s pe cific ally pl eade d.” 21 0 Ill . 2d R. 1 81(b )(2). In t his case , B ever ly f

iled a ge ner al app ear ance , bu t did no t fil e an a nswe r o r a sser t any af f i rm ati v e def ense . H owev er , B ev

erl y wa s n ev er ord ered to do s o. Acc ordi

n gl y , pu rsua n t to Rule 181(b) (2) , her ap peara nce act ed as a de nial to the claim

s raised in Ci

rcle Management’s
com plai nt, an d sh e was perm i tted to rai se a

ny def en ses there af ter. 210 Il

l . 2d. R. 1 81(b )(2). Mo r eo ve r , it ap pe ar s t ha t Be ve r ly int en de d t o r ais e a n a ffir mat ive de fen se at t r ial. Sp ec ifica lly, in
re spo nse t o C ircle Ma nage ment’ s inte rr og at or y ques t ions, Beve rly indicat ed t hat she be lieved she1-07-0621

11

waswrong f

ull y evi cted b eca

use “[t]h e landlord bre ach

ed th e i m pli ed wa rran ty of ha bi tabi l i ty,” whi ch i s a g erm ane af f i rm ati ve def en se to a l

andlord’sposse ssi

on cl ai m . See, e.g. , Pole R

eal ty Co.
v. So rr ells , 84 Ill. 2d 1 78, 182 (19 81) ; Ri ch ardson v. W i l son, 46 Il

l . Ap p. 3d 62 2, 623- 24 (19 77). Ci rcle Managem

ent al so does not dispute that t he trial court entered the order without he ar ing an y ev id en ce co nc er nin g t he un de r lying mer it s o f it s p o ss es sio n c laim
. Ac co r di ng ly, Beve rly maintains t hat t he t rial co ur t ’s failure t o a bide by the pr ovisio ns o f the Act invalidate s t he
sanc t ion. In su ppo rt , she cite s o ur pr eviou s ho lding in Eckel v . MacNeal , 256 Ill . App. 3d 292 (1 993 ), wher e we re ver sed a t rial co ur t or der gr ant ing a landlo rd po sses sion o f an apa rt ment because the trial court never considered the me rits of the posses si on cl ai

m. Sh e contends that Eckel “deal t with the ve

ry issue presen

ted in thi s case” an d necess aril

y “ compels reversal .” In Eckel , a landlord bro ught an actio n under t he Act aga inst its tenant due t o t he tenant ’s failure t o p ay rent , a nd in re spo nse, t he t enant fil ed a number of a ffi

rmat ive defens es a nd
co unt er claims. T her eaft er , t he t rial co ur t ent er ed a n or der re quir ing t he t enant t o p ay use and
o cc up an cy c ha r ge s a nd info rmed t he t en an t t ha t failu r e t o co mply w it h t he o r de rwo uld r es ult in imm ediat e po sses sion in favo r o f the landlor d. The t enant failed t o c omp ly, and a cco rd ingly, the tria l court en tered j udgm

en t in f avor of the landlord. Eckel , 256 Ill . App. 3d at 293-95. On appe al , th e tena

nt c ha l l en ge d the p oss es si

on or de r, a rgu i ng tha t i t depri ve d her of

he r ri gh t to a tria l
. Eckel , 2 56 I ll. App. 3d a t 296 . I nitially, we no t ed t hat for cible ent ry and det ainer a ct ions
co uld be r eso lved wit hou t co nduc t ing a t rial if the t rial co ur t co nsider ed t he merit s o f the und erl y i ng p osse ssi

on cl ai m and en tered j udgm

en t on the p l eadi

ngs or sum mary j udgm en t. Eckel , 256 Ill . App. 3d at 297-98. Ho wever, we f ound that t he record reveal ed that the tr ia

l c ourt fai le d1-07-0621

12

t o a bide by any of t hese pr oc edu re s. Ac co rd ingly, we he ld t hat its failur e t o d o s o r esu lted in a void j udgm

ent, stati ng: “T his c o ur t is fu lly aw ar e t ha t fo r cib le d et ain er an d e nt ry cla ims a r e a dju dic at ed in a hi gh vol ume court . (See Pecoraro v. Kes ner , 217 Il

l . Ap p. 3d 10 39, 104 3 (199 1)). Ho we ve r , t his fa ct do es no t alt er pla int iff’s bu r de n o f pr o o f. I n t his c as e, pla int iff wa s a ble to obtain a

judgm ent agai nst def endan t without foll

owing the most basi

c procedural requirem ents of a trial

, summ ary judgme

nt or judgm

ent on the pl eadi

ngs. The proceedi

ngs pr ese nt ed in t he r eco rd her e ca nnot be ca lled due pr oc ess. Given t he fact s and ci rcumstances of this case, thi s court is f orced to concl

ude that the judgm

ent entered agai nst def endan t is v oid.” Eckel , 256 Il

l . Ap p. 3d a t 298. Sim il arly , in this case, t he t rial co ur t gr ant ed C ircle Ma nage ment p os sess ion wit hou t co nsider ing the u nde rl y i ng m eri ts of i ts poss ess i on cl

ai m . Ac cordi

ngl y , as in Eckel , the order was entered

“ wi thou t f ol l owi ng the most b as i c p roce dur

al req ui rem en ts of a tri al , su m mary j udg men t or judgm ent on the pl eadi

ngs.” Eckel , 256 Ill . App. 3d at 298. Although the tri al court did provi

de Beverl y w ith the opportunity

to purge the order by pay in g the requis ite use an

d occupancy char ges and s et a t rial da t e “in the event it [ beca me] nec essa ry,” Beve rly was u nable t o mak e t he payment s, a nd po sses sion w as a war ded t o C ircle Ma nage ment. Acco rd ingly, the re sult of t he sanction was that Circl

e Manage me nt was abl

e to o btain

possession of the apartmen t without
es t ab lishin g it s r igh t t o po ss es sio n. Cle ar ly, t he pr o ce ss ut ilize d in t his c as e t o r es o lve Cir cle Managem ent’s f orcibl e entry a nd detai ner action di

d not comply

with the e

xpress procedural pro tect ions set forth in the Act or with due pro cess.1-07-0621

13

In so findin

g, we are sensitive to the plight faced by l andlords in Circle Management’s situ at ion t hat have filed a c omp laint p ur sua nt t o t he Act follow ing a t enant ’s no npayment of r ent an d a reun ab l e to c oll ec t us e a

n d oc cu pa n cy pa y men ts d uri n g th e p en den cy of th ei r a cti on s d ue to t he t ena nt ’s ina bility t o pa y. We re alize t hat land lo rd s d ep end up o n r ent al p aymen t s t o sa t isfy their m ort gage pay

me nts and other m

onetary obl

iga tions. These

val id c oncerns n

ot withs tandin g, i t i s i n cu m b en t up on a l an dl ord th at b ri n gsan ac ti on un der the A ct to prove th

at i t i s e n ti tl ed to po ss es sio n. T he t r ial c o ur t may no t gr an t po ss es sio n u nd er t he Ac t mer ely be ca us e a t en an t is unable t o c omp ly with a us e and oc cup ancy o rd er . As w e exp lained in Eckel , due pr ocess requires tha

t t he un derly in g possession cl ai

m b e resolv

ed i n conf ormance with the procedural requi rem en ts of tri al , sum mary j udgm en t, or jud gm en t on the p l eadi

ngs . Eckel , 256 Ill . App. 3d at 298. Accordingl

y, at the very

le ast, when the tria

l c ourt hel

d a heari ng an d determi ned that Beve rly fail

ed t o c omp ly with t he us e and oc cup ancy o rd er , she was ent itled t o a hear ing o n t he und erl y i ng p osse ssi

on cl ai m be f ore poss ess i on wa s gra

nted to Ci rcle Ma na gem en t. Circle M anag ement makes no e xpr ess a t t empt t o d istingu ish Eckel , bu t insists t hat t he order en tered i n th i s ca se w as proper b eca

use a tri al court has the

i nh eren t authori ty to sa nction
. W hi l e B everl y agree s th at c ourts ha ve i nh ere nt a uthori ty to i m pos e s an cti ons to pun i sh f or con tem pt or i n re sp on se to a p ar ty ’s f ai l ur e to a b i de b y i ts o rd er s a s a

mea n s to con trol i ts d ock et, she m ai ntai ns that the san cti on i m posed i n th i s ca se exc eede d an

y i nh eren t authori ty th e tri al court may have had. Sp ecifi

call y, Beverly

fi rst mai ntains that the o rder exceeded t he tr ial cou rt ’s in herent authority

to im pose a contempt sanction because the sanction im

posed in this case does not con sti tute a v al i d j udgm en t of cri m i na l or ci vi l contem pt.1-07-0621

14

Court s hav

e i nhe rent authority to puni sh a party for contempt. See People v . Warren , 173 Ill . 2d 348 , 37 0 (1 996 ) (“Th e p ower to pu ni sh f or con tem pt doe s n ot depe nd on c ons ti tutiona l or l eg i sl ati ve gra nt”); se e al so Del

Dott o v. Olse

n , 25 7 Ill. App. 3d 4 63, 464 (19 93) ; In re E sta te of Mill er , 19 7 I ll. A pp . 3d 67 , 73 ( 19 90 )
. “ ‘C o nt emp t o f co ur t ha s be en de fine d a s a ny ac t t ha t is
ca lcu lat ed t o emb ar r as s, hind er , o ro bst ruc t a c o ur t in t he ad minist r at io n o f jus t ice , o rt ha t is calcul ated to le ssen

its authority

or digni ty.’ ” Lev acc are v . Lev

acc are , No. 1- 06-1224, sli p op. at 8 (September 17, 2007), quoting People v . Budzyn ski , 333 Il l . Ap p. 3d 43 3, 438 ( 2002)
. Co nt emp t ca n e it he rbe cr iminal o rciv il ( Em ery v. North ea st Il l i noi s R eg i ona l Tra ns porta ti on C o. , 37 4 I l l . A pp . 3d 97 4, 9 77 (2 00 7) ), a s w el l as i n di re ct or di re ct ( Levac care, slip op. at 8; Ed en v. Eden , 34 Il

l . Ap p. 3d 38 2, 388 ( 1975) ). Criminal cont empt sanc t ions a re punit ive in natu re and r equ ire a finding t hat t he contem ptuous con

duct wa s wi

l f ul
. Peop l e v . Mi

nor , 28 1 Ill. App. 3d 5 68, 574 (19 96) ; Peo ple v. Ernest , 141 I ll . 2d 412, 422 (199 0). I n contrast , civi l contempt is prospective in nature, and i s “ ‘desi gned to compel

future compl

ia nce wi th a court order.’ ” Emery, 374 Ill . App. 3d at 977, quot in g In re Marri age of Sha rp , 369 Ill . App. 3d 271, 279 (2006). Although a court may enf orce an order to pay

mone y through contem

pt, t hi s power is “

li mi ted to cases of

wil ful refusa l to obey the court ’s order.” In re

Marri age of Logston , 10 3 I ll. 2 d 2 66 , 28 5 ( 19 84 )
. Ac co r din gly, “ ‘[ i]t is not a co nt empt of c ou rt t o fa il to pay mone y which one neithe r ha s no r c an o bt ain and w hich [s] he has n ot causel essl y e ither put out o f [h

er] hands or faile d to recei

ve.’ ” Sha

pi ro v. Sh api ro , 113 Ill . App. 2d 374, 388 (1969), quo ting Wh ite v. A dolph , 305 Il

l . Ap p. 76, 79(1940 ). I n t his c as e, Be ve r ly’s f

ailu r e t o co mply w it h t he us e a nd o cc up an cy o r de rst emme d fr o m1-07-0621

15

her insolvenc y and inability to pay r at her t han wilful defiance o f the agr eed or der . I ndee d, t he pa r t ies st ip ul at ed , an d t he co ur t fo un d, t ha t Be ve r ly’s ac t io ns we r e n o t wil fu l. Ac co r di ng ly, Beverl y’ s l ack of wi

lf uln ess precl udes a f in din g that t he court’s order co nsti tut es a val

id c ontempt order. Log ston , 103 Il

l . 2d at 28 7. Ci rcle Ma na gem en t agree s tha

t “n one of the procedur

es f or any ki nd of contem pt were followed i n thi s case,” b

ut mai ntain s that “the possessi

on order is not a contempt order.” In ste ad , Ci

rcl e M an ag em en t as serts th

at the s an cti on e nte red i n th i s c as e w asa val

i d e xe rci se of t he t r ial c o ur t ’s inhe r en t au t ho r it y t o sa nc t io n a pa r t y wh o fails t o ab ide by it s o r de r s. Be ve r ly
co nc ed es t ha t co ur t s ha ve su ch inhe r en t au t ho r it y bu t as se r t s t ha t t he sa nc t io n imp o se d in t his
ca se , wh ich es se nt ially r es ult ed in a de fau lt jud gme nt ag ain st he r , ca nno t be up he ld a s a va lid
ex ercise of

thi s i nh eren t authori ty. It i s w el l -re cog n ize d th at tr i al cou rtsh av e i n h eren t au th ori ty to i m pos e s an cti on s a gai n st a party that f ail s to abi de b y va l i d court orders
. San

de r v . Dow

Ch em i cal Co. , 166 Ill . 2d 48, 67 (19 95) ; Smi

th v. Ci ty of Ch ic ago , 29 9 Il

l . A pp. 3d 1 048 , 10 54 ( 198 8). A sa nc ti on i m pos ed f or violat ion o f a t rial co ur t or der , ho weve r, must be r eas ona ble and r esp ons ive to t he fact s and ci rcum stan ces of e ach cas e. Sm

i th , 2 99 I ll. App. 3d a t 105 4. “[S ]a nct ions w hich res ult in a defaul t judgm ent are drastic sa

nctions and sh ould onl y b e em ploy ed when it appears that al

l other enf orcemen t eff ort s of the court have f

ai le d to advan

ce the liti gation.” Sander , 166 Ill . 2d at 67- 68. Moreo ver, such s ancti ons are onl y a ppropriate “where the pa

rty’s actions show a del

ib erate, contumaci

ous or unwarranted disregard of the court’s authority .” Shi ma novsky v. General Moto rs Corp. , 181 Il

l . 2d 112 , 123 (1 998).1-07-0621

16

In th i s c as e, th e s an

cti on i m pos ed b y th e tr i al cou rt a s a re su l t of Bev erl y ’s f ai l ur e to com pl y wi th the use and occup ancy

order es sen

tia l l y resu l ted i n a def aul t ju dgm en t agai nst her. We can not say that Beverly ’s f

ai lure to pay the us e and occupanc y c harges constituted a de l i be rate or con tum ac i ousdi sreg ard

of au thor i ty . Mor eover, wedo n

ot f i nd tha t the sa nc ti on im pose d was r easo nable and resp onsive to the fact s in the case at bar. He re, due t o Bever ly ’s inabili t y to make p ayments and c omp ly with t he us e and oc cup ancy o rd er , C ircle Ma nage ment wasgi ven pos ses sion of

the a partm en t in whi ch she res i ded, wi

thout satisf

y i ng i ts statutory obligat ion t o p ro ve its right t o p os sess ion u nder t he Act . Ac co rd ingly, we d o no t find tha t t he
sa n cti on i m pos ed i n th i s c as e c an

b e u ph el d a s a v al i d e x ercise

of a tr i al cou rt’ s i n h eren t au th ori ty to sanc tion
. Ci rcle Managem

ent, however, al so argues that t he possess ion order i n thi s case was

la wful b ec au se i t ste m med f rom th e tr i al cou rt’ s i n h eren t au th ori ty to act sua sp on

te . Ci rcle Managem

ent, citi ng Peop l e v . A

nd ers on , 35 2 I l l . A

pp . 3d 93 4, 9 43 (2 00 4) , a ss er

ts th at th e tr i al cou rt has th e i n h eren t pow er to act sua sp on

te as long as i

t pro vi des the parties noti ce a nd a n opportun

i ty to res pond. A ccordi ngl y , Ci rcle Ma na gem en t argues that tri al court ac ted wi th i n i ts i n h eren t pow er to act sua sp on

te beca use Beve rly was p ro vided w ith “no t ice and opportuni ty to res pond to the

court’s m otion” an d sh e atten ded the heari

ng on the m otion
. We f in d this argumen t unpersuasi

ve. Wh il e courts do have the i

nhe rent authority to act
sua sp on te (see Peo ple v. Vincent , 22 6 Il l . 2d 1, 2 4 (2 007 )), th

e m oti on f or i m medi atepos se ss i on wa s f i l ed by Ci rcl e M an ag em en t an d n ot i ni ti ate d by the cou rt. Acc ordi

ngl y , th e ord er wasnot i m pos ed pu rsua n t to the tr i al cou rt’ s i n h eren t au th ori ty to act sua sp on

te .1-07-0621

17

For the f oreg oi ng rea sons, we h

ol d that the tri

al cou rt er red when i t gra nte d pos se ss i on of th e p rop er

ty to Ci rc l e M an ag em en t pu rsua n t to the A ct a s a sa n cti on f or B ev erl y ’s i n ab i l i ty to co mply w it h t he us e a nd o cc up an cy o r de rab se nt an y co nsid er at io n o f t he mer it s o f Cir cle Managem ent’s possess ion c la

im . The trial

court ’s order defi

ed the procedural f

ramework and due pr oc ess g uar ant ees of t he Act and c anno t be up held as a valid exe rc ise o f a co ur t ’s inher ent authority to sanc tion
. Because we c an resol

ve Bev erly ’s appeal

on these grounds, we need n ot address he

r argum en t that the s ancti on en

tered i n th i s ca se v i ola ted the due process

and se parati on of powers provisi ons set forth i

n the Il li nois Constitution. See Bona

guro v . Coun

ty O f f i cers El ection Boar

d , 15 8 I ll. 2 d 3 91 , 39 6 ( 19 94 ) ( r ec o gn izing t ha t a c o ur t sho uld co nsid er co nst it ut io na l qu es t io ns o nly wh en “the ca se c an

not be determ i ne d on othe

r grounds” ). Ac cordi ngl y , we reverse th

e j udgm en t of the tria l court. Rev erse d. QUINN , P.J., an

d CUN NINGH AM , J., con

cur.