United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 00-2829

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Joel C. Peterson, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of Minnesota

Burlington Northern and Santa Fe *

Railway Company, a * [UNPUBLISHED]

Delaware corporation, *

*

Appellee. *

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Submitted: March 12, 2001

Filed: July 6, 2001

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Before LOKEN, MURPHY, and BYE, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.

Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Corporation (BNSF) refused to allow

Joel Peterson to return to work for a period of 30 months following a medical leave of

absence. Peterson sued BNSF under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42
1The Honorable Paul A. Magnuson, Chief Judge, United States District Court

for the District of Minnesota.

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U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213. We now affirm the district court’s1 grant of summary

judgment in favor of BNSF.

In 1991, Peterson suffered a head injury on the job. He eventually took BNSFapproved sick leave in April 1994. In November 1994, Peterson sued BNSF under the

Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. § 51. Peterson’s treating

physician opined that Peterson had a permanent disability, while BNSF’s doctors

believed that Peterson could return to work. The parties settled the case after BNSF

tendered a $120,000 offer of judgment.

In June 1996, Peterson informed BNSF of his intention to return to work. BNSF

replied that Peterson could not return because the FELA settlement was designated

“Out-of-Service,” meaning that Peterson had left BNSF’s employ. No further

communications occurred until, by coincidence, in early 1997, BNSF sent Peterson a

notice requesting that he take a physical to update his driver certification. Peterson

believed that the notice signaled his return to work; he took and passed the physical,

then contacted his union official.

A union official interceded on Peterson’s behalf and Mike Collins, a BNSF

official unfamiliar with Peterson’s employment history, permitted him to return to work

after obtaining a medical release from his new doctor. A short time later, BNSF

officials removed Peterson from service pending a medical release by BNSF’s Medical

Department. They explained to the union official that Peterson’s own medical release

was unacceptably incomplete because it did not address the conclusion by Peterson’s

FELA doctor that Peterson was permanently disabled.
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In January 1998, BNSF convened a Medical Board inquiry to ascertain

Peterson’s status. After a series of false starts and delays, the Board recommended that

Peterson be returned to full active duty effective August 1998. Peterson actually

returned to work in November 1998, and he is presently employed by BNSF.

Prior to his return to work, Peterson sued BNSF alleging discrimination on the

basis of disability. He sought both damages and injunctive relief. Although the

injunctive relief component of Peterson’s complaint was mooted when he returned to

work, Peterson maintained his suit for damages. The district court granted BNSF’s

motion for summary judgment. The court assumed that Peterson was disabled for

purposes of the ADA. The court then determined that BNSF had articulated legitimate,

non-discriminatory reasons for delaying Peterson’s return to work, and that Peterson

had adduced no proof that BNSF’s stated reasons were pretextual.

The parties and the district court adopted the legal framework we employ in

cases where an employee is discharged, even though in this case, Peterson was not

terminated, but only temporarily prevented from returning to work. We adopt the

parties’ framework for purposes of this opinion, and we review de novo the district

court’s grant of summary judgment. Cooper v. Olin Corp., 246 F.3d 1083, 1087 (8th

Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).

We agree entirely with the district court’s conclusions that (1) BNSF stated

legitimate reasons for its treatment of Peterson, and (2) Peterson failed to produce

evidence that BNSF’s reasons were in fact pretextual. BNSF believed that Peterson’s

FELA settlement precluded him from returning to work. This belief was eminently

reasonable in light of the expert opinion of Peterson’s FELA treating physician that

Peterson was permanently disabled and could not return to work. Thereafter, it was

reasonable for BNSF to demand clarification from Peterson’s new physician that his

condition had improved to the point where Peterson could return to work at BNSF.

Peterson casts aspersions on these reasons, but he provides no evidence that calls into
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question the non-discriminatory motivations of the BNSF employees who handled his

case. It may well be that BNSF dallied somewhat in responding to certain of

Peterson’s requests, but the evidentiary record in this case does not give rise to the

inference that BNSF delayed proceedings because of Peterson’s disability. We reject

out of hand Peterson’s claims that the district court unfairly “weighed” the evidence

presented at the summary judgment phase, or failed to interpret the facts in evidence

in his favor.

We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court in all respects.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.