2006 D e c i sion s O p inion s of the U nit e d S t at e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit

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### The Honorable Eugene E. Siler, Jr., Senior United States Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation. NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 04-4399
ZE FENG WANG, Petitioner

v. ALBERTO R. GONZALES, Attorney General of the United States Respondent
On Petition for Review from the United States Department of Justice Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA No. A77 994 125)
Submitted pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) January 31, 2006 Before: McKEE, VAN ANTWERPEN, and SILER, * 

### Circuit Judges

. (Filed February 17, 2006)

OPINION OF THE COURT

### -1- SILER, Circuit Judge

. Petitioner Ze Feng Wang petitions this court for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision summarily affirming th e Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of relief under Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.16. He argues that (1) the IJ erred in its adverse credibility finding, (2) the IJ incorrectly decided the case, and (3) the BIA improperly affirmed summarily the decision of the IJ. For the following reasons, we DENY the petition. BACKGROUND Wang, a native and citizen of China, arrived inthe United States in 2001 without valid entry documents and was placed in removal proceedings. After removability was established in a hearing before an IJ, Wang applied for protection under Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture; however, he did not request asylum or withholding of removal. Insubmitting his application, he did not claim any past persecution by the Chinese governme nt, but claimed that si nce he had left China illegally he feared that he would be severely persecuted should he return to that country. Wang’s stated reason for leaving China was the “economic pr oblems” he was facing relating to various debts he owed. In 2003, the IJ denied Wang’s application for relie f stating that Wang had “failed to meet his burden to establish that it is more likely than not that he or anyone in his family or anyone else would be tortured on his return to China.” In 2004, the BIA affirmed, without opinion, the IJ’s decision pursuant to the streamlining regulation contained in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4). IV. DISCUSSION A. Negative Credibility Finding Wang first claims that the IJ abused its discre tion in finding him to be an incredible witness.1 

### Because the BIA summarily affirmed the IJ’s decision without opinion, we review the findings and conclusions of the IJ. See Partyka v. Att’y Gen. , 417 F.3d 408, 411 (3d Cir. 2005). 

### -2- Normally, an IJ’s adverse credibility determination, like other factual findings, is reviewed for substantial evidence. See Butt v. Gonzales , 429 F.3d 430, 433 (3d Cir. 2005). However, a substantial evidence inquiry is not required here since the IJ made no adverse credibility finding as to Wang. As the IJ stated, “The Court does not doubt the testimony the respondent has given.” The only question in the IJ’s mind was the extent to which the information Wang had received was reliable. As this shows, the IJ accepted Wang’s a ssertion as the truth, but ultimately found that even assuming truthfulness Wang had failed to meet hi s burden of proof. Therefore, Wang’s adverse credibility challenge fails. B. IJ’s Denial of Relief Wang also alleges that the IJ decided the case incorrectly. 1 Specifically, Wang notes that the IJ “ignored the overall picture,” neglected to cons ider a significant factor, and did “not make a careful and individualized determination.” In the asylum context, factual decisions of the IJ are reviewed under a substantial evidence standard. Mulanga v. Ashcroft , 349 F.3d 123, 131 (3d Cir. 2003); see also Auguste v. Ridge , 395 F.3d 123, 137-38 (3d Cir. 2005) (in a case involving solely the Convention Against Torture, the court noted that on direct review appellate courts normally reviewed factual decisions of the IJ under a s ubstantial evidence standard). “We will uphold the findings of the BIA to the extent that they ar e supported by reasonable, substantial and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole, and will reverse those fi ndings only if there is evidence so compelling that no reasonable fact -finder could conclude as the BIA did.” Kayembe v. Ashcroft , 334 F.3d 231, 234 (3d Cir. 2003) (citation omitted) . In order to qualify for relief under the Convention Against Torture, an applicant must “establish that it is more likely than not that he

### -3- or she would be tortured if removed to the pr oposed country of removal.” 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2). The regulations go on to state that the testimony of an applicant, if credible, “may be sufficient to sustain the burden of proof without corroboration.” Id. Although Wang alleges error below, he presents no evidence on appeal supporting this claim. In alleging that the IJ “ignored the overall pictur e,” Wang fails to relate what exactly the overall picture involves. Similarly, he fa ils to explain his other claims of error. For example, although he hints that the IJ failed to consider a significant factor, he does not expl ain what that factor was. The IJ provided a reasoned and cogent analysis of the evidence. As stated above, while accepting Wang’s testimony as credible, the IJ pointed out th at there was little indication that the second-hand information relayed by Wang was reliable. In the end, the IJ simply noted that by asking for relief under the Convention Against Torture, and in not requesting asylum or withholding of removal, Wang bore the heavy burden of showing that it was mo re likely than not that he would be tortured should he return to his country and he had failed to meet that burden. Gi ven that Wang’s allegations of error are unsupported and that the IJ’s decisi on appears well reasoned on its face, Wang has failed to present compelling evidence that no reasonable fact-finder could have concluded as the IJ did. C. BIA’s Summary Affirmance Lastly, Wang challenges the BIA’s summary affirmance of the IJ’s decision as an error “as a matter of law” and an abuse of the BIA’s disc retion. However, Wang’s objections to the summary affirmance procedure are misplaced. We have prev iously held that the BIA’s use of this summary affirmance procedure is proper and that it neither violates due process nor runs afoul of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Dia v. Ashcroft , 353 F.3d 228, 238 (3d Cir. 2003). Accordingly, this argument is without merit. 

### DENIED.