No. 3--01--0227 _________________________________________________________________

							IN THE

							APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

							THIRD DISTRICT

							A.D., 2002

In re C.T.S.,                   )  Appeal from the Circuit Court

                                )  of the 10th Judicial Circuit,

	a Minor			       )  Peoria County, Illinois

	                           ) 

(The People of the State	       )

of Illinois,				  )

						  )

	Petitioner-Appellee,	  )  No. 00--JD--153 

									  ) 

	v. 					  )

						  )

C.T.S.,    			       )	Honorable

	               		  )  Chris L. Frederickson

	Respondent-Appellant)      )  Judge, Presiding

________________________________________________________________

	JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE delivered the Opinion of the court:

________________________________________________________________

	The minor, C.T.S., was found delinquent for having committed

unlawful possession of a motor vehicle and residential burglary. 

625 ILCS 5/4--103(a)(1); 720 ILCS 5/19--3(a) (West 2000).  The

trial court sentenced the minor in absentia to an indeterminate term not to exceed her 21st birthday in the Department of

Corrections, Juvenile Division (DOCJD).  The minor appeals,

contending the trial court erred in proceeding with sentencing in

her absence.  We affirm.

	FACTS

	The minor was charged with unlawful possession of a motor

vehicle and residential burglary.  At arraignment, the trial

court appointed counsel for the minor.  The minor signed a form acknowledging that she had been advised of her rights and the

possibility of trial in her absence.  

	The minor later admitted the allegation of unlawful

possession of a motor vehicle, but denied the residential

burglary charge.  The matter was set for trial on the residential

burglary charge.  

	The minor failed to appear for trial.  The trial court

denied her attorney’s motion for a continuance and proceeded with

the trial in her absence.  After hearing the State’s evidence,

the court adjudicated the minor delinquent for the offense of

residential burglary and set the matter for a posttrial motion

hearing.  

	The trial court subsequently denied the minor’s posttrial

motion and the matter was set for a sentencing hearing.  The

minor failed to appear for sentencing.  The trial court denied

her attorney’s motion for a continuance and committed her to the

DOCJD for an indeterminate term not to exceed her 21st birthday.  

		DISCUSSION

	On appeal, the minor contends her sentence should be vacated

because she was not admonished that she could be sentenced in her

absence, but was only informed that a trial could be held in her

absence.  The minor concedes that the Juvenile Court Act of 1987

(Act) (705 ILCS 405/1--1 et seq. (West 2000)) does not specifically require that juveniles be admonished regarding the

possibility of trial or sentencing in their absence.  However,

the minor contends the statute governing adult defendants should apply because the Act provides that juveniles "shall have all the

procedural rights of adults in criminal proceedings, unless

specifically precluded by laws that enhance the protection of

such minors."  705 ILCS 405/5--101(3) (West 2000).    

	We agree the Act requires that minors receive, at a minimum,

the same procedural rights as adults.  In this regard, we note

that a trial court must advise an adult defendant that trial may

proceed in his absence if he fails to appear.  725 ILCS 5/113--

4(e) (West 2000).  A sentencing hearing has been construed to be

part of the trial.  People v. Marks, 239 Ill. App. 3d 178, 607 N.E.2d 286 (1992).  Therefore, when an adult defendant has been

informed that trial may proceed in his absence, he need not also

be specifically told that sentencing may occur in his absence. 

Marks, 239 Ill. App. 3d 178, 607 N.E.2d 286; People v. Clark, 96 Ill. App. 3d 491, 421 N.E.2d 590 (1981).  We conclude that this

procedural right afforded to adult defendants also applies to

juveniles.  Accordingly, a juvenile must be advised that trial

may proceed in her absence before she is tried or sentenced in

her absence.  The minor was so advised in this case; therefore,

she was afforded the same protections that adults receive under

the adult criminal provisions.  

	However, the minor further contends juveniles should be

afforded greater protections.  The minor asserts this court

should require that a juvenile be specifically admonished that

she could be sentenced in absentia prior to any such sentencing.  The minor also argues juveniles should always be present for sentencing because the purpose of the Act, to rehabilitate the

juvenile, cannot be accomplished without his or her presence.

	A primary rule of statutory construction is to give effect to the legislative intent.  People v. Whitney, 188 Ill. 2d 91, 720 N.E.2d 225 (1999).  The best indicator of such intent is the

plain and ordinary meaning of the language used.  People v. Jones, 306 Ill. App. 3d 793, 715 N.E.2d 256 (1999).  Courts should not add requirements that are inconsistent with the plain

meaning of the statute.  People v. Holmes, 268 Ill. App. 3d 802, 644 N.E.2d 1 (1994).  

	The Juvenile Court Act allows sentencing of minors in absentia.  705 ILCS 405/5--625 (West 2000).1  However, the Act does not require the trial court to admonish a juvenile that she

may be sentenced in her absence.  See 705 ILCS 405/5--625 (West

2000).  The Act does provide other safeguards for a juvenile who

is sentenced in absentia, including a provision that a minor must be granted a new sentencing hearing if she can establish that her

failure to appear was not her fault and due to circumstances

beyond her control.  705 ILCS 405/5--625(5) (West 2000). 

Therefore, the legislature considered in absentia sentencing of minors and provided safeguards, but did not include a requirement

that a minor must be admonished that she could be sentenced in

her absence. 

	As stated, courts should not add requirements that are inconsistent with the plain meaning of the statute.  The legislature could have chosen to give juveniles more protection

in this regard, but it did not do so.  Accordingly, we conclude the Act does not require that a minor be admonished that she may

be sentenced in absentia if she fails to appear.  The trial court satisfied any requirement that the minor be admonished of the

possibility she could be sentenced in her absence when it

informed her that she could be tried in her absence.  

	The minor also contends her sentence should be vacated

because she did not fail to appear on two successive court days

prior to being sentenced in absentia.

	The Act provides that "[i]f trial had previously commenced

in the presence of the minor and the minor willfully absents

himself for 2 successive court days, the court shall proceed to

trial."  705 ILCS 405/5--625(1) (West 2000).   

	This statute section deals with a trial court’s authority to

proceed with a trial when a minor is present to start the trial,

but later willfully fails to appear.  In this case, the trial did

not commence in the presence of the minor.  The minor was not

present for the one-day trial.  Therefore, this statute does not

apply to this case.

	Moreover, our supreme court has construed similar statutory

language as being permissive rather than mandatory because to

hold otherwise would result in an unconstitutional infringement

upon the inherent powers of the judiciary.  See People v. Flores, 104 Ill. 2d 40, 470 N.E.2d 307 (1984) (construing similar

language in Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 115--4.1). 

Therefore, the decision to proceed in such circumstances is in

the discretion of the trial court.  Flores, 104 Ill. 2d 40, 470 N.E.2d 307.  

	Here, the trial court considered and denied the request for

a continuance by the minor’s attorney.  The court did not abuse

its discretion in denying the request for a continuance and

proceeding with sentencing.  Accordingly, the statute did not

prevent the court from proceeding in the minor’s absence. 

CONCLUSION

	For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Peoria County

circuit court is affirmed.  

	Affirmed.

	HOLDRIDGE, J., with LYTTON, P.J., AND and MCDADE, J., COCconcur.

NCU