COURT OF APPEALS 

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-15-00435-CR 

NO. 02-15-00436-CR 

NO. 02-15-00437-CR 

MICHAEL ALVIN LLOYD APPELLANT

V. 

THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

---------- 

FROM CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT NO. 4 OF TARRANT COUNTY 

TRIAL COURT NOS. 1401032D, 1404399D, 1404400D 

---------- 

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

---------- 

In each case, Appellant Michael Alvin Lloyd pled guilty to aggravated 

robbery with a deadly weapon, and the trial court convicted him and sentenced 

him to sixteen years’ confinement, with the sentences to run concurrently. 

Appellant timely appealed. 

 1See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4. 
2 

 Appellant’s court-appointed counsel has filed a motion to withdraw as 

counsel and a brief in support of that motion. In the brief, counsel avers that, in 

his professional opinion, these appeals are frivolous. Counsel’s brief and motion 

meet the requirements of Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744–45, 87 S. Ct. 

1396, 1400 (1967), by presenting a professional evaluation of each appellate 

record demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds for relief. See Stafford 

v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 510–11 & n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). 

In compliance with Kelly v. State, counsel (1) notified Appellant of his 

motion to withdraw; (2) provided him a copy of both the motion and brief; 

(3) informed him of his right to file a pro se response; (4) informed him of his pro 

se right to seek discretionary review should this court hold the appeals frivolous; 

and (5) took concrete measures to facilitate his review of the appellate record in 

each case. See 436 S.W.3d 313, 319 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). This court 

afforded Appellant the opportunity to file a response on his own behalf, but he did 

not do so. The State likewise declined to file a brief. 

After an appellant’s court-appointed counsel files a motion to withdraw on 

the ground that an appeal is frivolous and fulfills the requirements of Anders, this 

court is obligated to undertake an independent examination of the record to see if 

there is any arguable ground that may be raised on his behalf. See Stafford, 

813 S.W.2d at 511. Only then may we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. See 

Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 82–83, 109 S. Ct. 346, 351 (1988). 
3 

Because Appellant entered open pleas of guilty, our independent review 

for potential error is limited to potential jurisdictional defects, the voluntariness of 

his pleas, error that is not independent of and supports the judgments of guilt, 

and error occurring after entry of the guilty pleas. See Monreal v. State, 

99 S.W.3d 615, 619–20 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); see also Faisst v. State, 

98 S.W.3d 226, 227 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). 

We have carefully reviewed counsel’s brief and the appellate record in 

each case. We agree with counsel that these appeals are wholly frivolous and 

without merit; we find nothing in the appellate records that arguably might 

support these appeals. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2005); see also Meza v. State, 206 S.W.3d 684, 685 n.6 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2006). Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw, deny 

Appellant’s motion to appoint new counsel, and affirm the trial court’s judgments. 

PER CURIAM 

PANEL: PITTMAN, WALKER, and MEIER, JJ. 

DO NOT PUBLISH 

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b) 

DELIVERED: March 30, 2017