DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

FREDERICK LONGO,

Appellant,

v.

ASSOCIATED LIMOUSINE SERVICES, INC. and LIMOUSINE 

MANAGEMENT, INC.,

Appellees.

No. 4D17-516

[ January 24, 2018 ]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, 

Broward County; John J. Murphy, III, Judge; L.T. Case No. CACE10-

045646 (09).

Mark W. Rickard of Law Guard, Plantation, for appellant.

Edward J. Jennings and Jenna L. Wulf of Edward J. Jennings, P.A., 

Fort Lauderdale, for appellees.

TAYLOR, J.

The judgment creditor, Frederick Longo, appeals a final order denying 

his Motion for Proceedings Supplementary to Execution and to Implead. 

We affirm in part and reverse in part. We find that the trial court erred in 

denying the judgment creditor’s request for proceedings supplementary, 

but that the trial court properly refused to issue Notices to Appear to the 

proposed impleader defendants where the judgment creditor’s motion and 

affidavit did not satisfy the description requirement of section 56.29(2), 

Florida Statutes (2016). However, our affirmance on the impleader issue 

is without prejudice to the judgment creditor submitting a supplemental 

affidavit in compliance with section 56.29(2).

Facts

In 2011, the judgment creditor obtained a final judgment against the 

judgment debtor, Associated Limousine Services, Inc., in the amount of 

$623,370.05.
2

On June 29, 2016, the judgment creditor filed a Motion for Proceedings 

Supplementary to Execution and to Implead, alleging that the final 

judgment remained unsatisfied and that the judgment debtor was 

administratively dissolved in 2012. Attached to the motion was an 

Affidavit of Unsatisfied Final Judgment.

In the motion, the judgment creditor named the judgment debtor as a 

respondent, moved the court to grant proceedings supplementary, and 

requested an order directing Robert Boroday, as the sole officer of the 

judgment debtor, to appear before the court for an examination of the 

judgment debtor’s assets and finances.

The judgment creditor also sought to implead Robert Boroday, three 

other members of the Boroday family, and eight business entities 

connected to the Boroday family. The parties that the judgment creditor 

sought to implead will be collectively referred to as the “impleader 

defendants.”

The judgment creditor essentially alleged that the impleader defendants 

were operating a business that was a continuation of the judgment 

debtor’s business. The judgment creditor further alleged that the eight 

business entities named as impleader defendants were “alter egos of the 

Judgment Debtor and the Boroday family business.” Among other things, 

the judgment creditor claimed that the impleader defendants:

 Conspired to organize and operate alternate business 

entities that would acquire the accounts and clients of the 

judgment debtor, while avoiding creditors;

 Comingled assets with each other and the judgment debtor;

 Acted and operated as a single business entity;

 Used fictitious names that were similar to and substantially

the same as the judgment debtor; and

 Profited from the judgment debtor’s business, procured the 

judgment debtor’s clients for their own benefit, and attempted 

to conceal the transactions to prevent existing creditors from 

collecting from the judgment debtor.

The judgment debtor did not file any response to the judgment 

creditor’s motion for proceedings supplementary. However, the impleader 
3

defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the judgment creditor failed to 

comply with section 56.29, Florida Statutes (2016).

Following a hearing, the trial court denied the judgment creditor’s 

motion in its entirety. The court found, in relevant part, that the judgment 

creditor did not comply with section 56.29(2), Florida Statutes (2016), as 

the judgment creditor’s motion and affidavit failed to describe any property 

whatsoever of the judgment debtor in the hands of the impleaders or any 

property, debt, or other obligation due to the judgment debtor which may 

be applied toward the satisfaction of the judgment.1 The judgment creditor 

appealed.

Standard of Review

Where a trial court’s ruling on a motion for proceedings supplementary 

presents an issue of law, the standard of review is de novo. Sargeant v. 

Al-Saleh, 137 So. 3d 432, 434 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014).

Background on Proceedings Supplementary

Section 56.29, Florida Statutes (2016), governs proceedings 

supplementary, which allow for a judgment creditor “to ferret out what 

assets the judgment debtor may have or what property of his others may 

be holding for him, or may have received from him to defeat the collection 

of the lien or claim, that might be subject to the execution.” Young v. 

McKenzie, 46 So. 2d 184, 185 (Fla. 1950). The statute governing 

proceedings supplementary is “equitable in nature and should be liberally 

construed.” Mejia v. Ruiz, 985 So. 2d 1109, 1112 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008).

Proceedings supplementary “enable speedy and direct proceedings in 

the same court in which the judgment was recovered to better afford to a 

judgment creditor the most complete relief possible in satisfying the 

judgment.” Zureikat v. Shaibani, 944 So. 2d 1019, 1023 (Fla. 5th DCA 

2006). “The statutory procedure was designed to avoid the necessity of 

the judgment creditor initiating an entirely separate action for a creditor’s 

bill.” Regent Bank v. Woodcox, 636 So. 2d 885, 886 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994).

Judges thus have the power and duty “to bring in and implead third 

parties wherever it appears relief against them may be warranted.” 

1 In the order, the trial court first determined that section 56.29, as amended on 

July 1, 2016, was a procedural statute that would be applied retroactively to the 

case, even though the judgment creditor’s motion was filed on June 29, 2016. 

The judgment creditor does not challenge this ruling on appeal.
4

Richard v. McNair, 164 So. 836, 840 (Fla. 1935). However, “an order 

allowing impleader of third parties under section 56.29 does no more than 

allow third parties to be sued, and does not determine any substantive 

rights.” NTS Fort Lauderdale Office Joint Venture v. Serchay, 710 So. 2d 

1027, 1028 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).

Section 56.29, as amended effective July 1, 2016, now states in relevant 

part:

(1) When any judgment creditor holds an unsatisfied 

judgment or judgment lien obtained under chapter 55, the 

judgment creditor may file a motion and an affidavit so 

stating, identifying, if applicable, the issuing court, the case 

number, and the unsatisfied amount of the judgment or 

judgment lien, including accrued costs and interest, and 

stating that the execution is valid and outstanding, and 

thereupon the judgment creditor is entitled to these 

proceedings supplementary to execution.

(2) The judgment creditor shall, in the motion described in 

subsection (1) or in a supplemental affidavit, describe any 

property of the judgment debtor not exempt from execution in 

the hands of any person or any property, debt, or other 

obligation due to the judgment debtor which may be applied 

toward the satisfaction of the judgment. Upon filing of the 

motion and affidavits that property of the judgment debtor, or 

any debt, or other obligation due to the judgment debtor in 

the custody or control of any other person may be applied to 

satisfy the judgment, then the court shall issue a Notice to 

Appear. The Notice to Appear shall direct such person to file 

an affidavit . . . stating why the property, debt, or other 

obligation should not be applied to satisfy the judgment. . . . 

The Notice to Appear must describe with reasonable 

particularity the property, debt, or other obligation that 

may be available to satisfy the judgment, must provide such 

person with the opportunity to present defenses, and must 

indicate that discovery as provided under the rules of civil 

procedure is available and that there is a right to a jury trial 

as provided in s. 56.18. . . . A responding affidavit must raise 

any fact or defense opposing application of the property 

described in the Notice to Appear to satisfy the judgment, 

including legal defenses . . . 

§ 56.29(1), (2), Fla. Stat. (2016) (emphasis added).
5

The 2016 amendment left section 56.29(1) largely unchanged, but 

substantially amended section 56.29(2) in order to clarify the procedure 

for bringing non-parties into proceedings supplementary. See Ch. 2016-

33, § 19, Laws of Fla.

Whether the Trial Court Erred in Denying Proceedings 

Supplementary?

On appeal, the judgment creditor first argues that the trial court erred 

in denying proceedings supplementary to execution where he filed a 

motion and affidavit that fully complied with section 56.29(1). We agree.

To initiate proceedings supplementary, section 56.29(1) “requires that 

the judgment creditor have an unsatisfied judgment and file an affidavit 

averring that the judgment is valid and outstanding.” Fundamental Long 

Term Care Holdings, LLC v. Estate of Jackson ex rel. Jackson-Platts, 110 

So. 3d 6, 8 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012). When a judgment creditor holds an 

unsatisfied judgment and files a motion and affidavit in compliance with 

section 56.29(1), “the judgment creditor is entitled to these proceedings 

supplementary to execution.” § 56.29(1), Fla. Stat. (2016). “Upon a 

showing of the statutory prerequisites, the court has no discretion to deny 

the motion.” Biloxi Casino Corp. v. Wolf, 900 So. 2d 734 (Fla. 4th DCA 

2005).

Here, the trial court erred in denying the judgment creditor’s request 

for proceedings supplementary. The judgment creditor’s motion and 

affidavit satisfied the requirements of section 56.29(1), so the judgment 

creditor was entitled to proceedings supplementary. The trial court’s 

ruling was based on section 56.29(2), but that provision governs the 

process for bringing third parties into proceedings supplementary. The 

judgment creditor’s entitlement to proceedings supplementary is a 

separate issue from whether the judgment creditor complied with section 

56.29(2)’s procedure for impleading third parties into the proceedings.

Notably, under section 56.29(2), the required description of “any 

property of the judgment debtor . . . or any property, debt, or other 

obligation due to the judgment debtor” need not be provided in the initial 

motion and affidavit, but may instead be provided in a supplemental 

affidavit. Moreover, section 56.30 allows for the examination of the 

judgment debtor to occur before a third party is issued a Notice to Appear. 

See § 56.30, Fla. Stat. (2016). This provision contemplates that 

proceedings supplementary may be commenced, and discovery may occur, 

before the impleader of third parties.
6

In short, because the judgment creditor submitted a motion and 

affidavit in compliance with section 56.29(1), the trial court erred in 

denying proceedings supplementary altogether.

Whether the Trial Court Erred in Denying Impleader of Third 

Parties?

The judgment creditor next argues that the trial court erred in denying 

the impleader of third parties. We disagree, but our affirmance on this 

issue is without prejudice to the judgment creditor submitting a 

supplemental affidavit in compliance with section 56.29(2).

As noted above, section 56.29(2) governs the process of impleading 

third parties into proceedings supplementary. The plain language of 

section 56.29(2) requires that a judgment creditor “describe any property 

of the judgment debtor not exempt from execution in the hands of any 

person or any property, debt, or other obligation due to the judgment 

debtor which may be applied toward the satisfaction of the judgment.” § 

56.29(2), Fla. Stat. (2016). Moreover, when a trial court issues a Notice to 

Appear to a third party, the Notice to Appear “must describe with 

reasonable particularity the property, debt, or other obligation that may 

be available to satisfy the judgment . . . .” § 56.29(2), Fla. Stat. (2016).

Simply put, the entire statutory scheme of section 56.29(2) 

contemplates that the judgment creditor describe “any property of the 

judgment debtor” or “any property, debt, or other obligation due to the 

judgment debtor” that may be applied to satisfy the judgment, so as to 

enable the trial court to issue Notices to Appear that describe the property, 

debt, or other obligation “with reasonable particularity.”

Here, the trial court properly refused to issue Notices to Appear to the 

impleader defendants. The judgment creditor’s motion and affidavit failed 

to comply with section 56.29(2)’s requirement to “describe any property of 

the judgment debtor not exempt from execution in the hands of any person 

or any property, debt, or other obligation due to the judgment debtor which 

may be applied toward the satisfaction of the judgment.” Thus, the 

judgment creditor failed to meet the statutory prerequisite for the trial 

court to issue Notices to Appear to the impleader defendants.

The judgment creditor complains that the trial court should have given 

section 56.29 a liberal construction. This argument is unpersuasive. 

While it is true that section 56.29 is a remedial statute, the rule of liberal 

construction “comes into play only when there is some ambiguity in the 
7

statutory text.” Gallagher v. Manatee Cty., 927 So. 2d 914, 919 (Fla. 2d 

DCA 2006). “When the statute is clear and unambiguous, courts will not 

look behind the statute’s plain language for legislative intent or resort to 

rules of statutory construction to ascertain intent.” Daniels v. Fla. Dep’t 

of Health, 898 So. 2d 61, 64 (Fla. 2005). Here, the description requirement 

in section 56.29(2) is clear and unambiguous. Indeed, while the judgment 

creditor urges us to adopt a liberal interpretation of the statute, he fails to 

explain what such an interpretation might be, apart from simply ignoring 

the plain language of the statute.

To be sure, we have some practical concerns with the 2016 amendment 

to section 56.29(2), but those concerns do not change our conclusion. 

Although the current statutory scheme set forth in section 56.29(2) is wellsuited to fraudulent transfer cases, it is unclear if the legislature 

contemplated cases involving alter ego liability.

Before the 2016 amendment to section 56.29, Florida case law 

permitted a judgment creditor to implead third parties into proceedings 

supplementary based on a showing that the third parties were the alter 

egos of the judgment debtor. See, e.g., Johnson v. Merry Go Round, Inc., 

45 So. 2d 181 (Fla. 1950). For example, applying an earlier version of 

section 56.29, we explained that “a court may fashion an appropriate 

equitable remedy to afford a judgment creditor as complete relief as 

possible including finding a new corporation liable for a judgment against 

its predecessor corporation when the new corporation is merely the alter 

ego of the predecessor corporation.” Amjad Munim, M.D., P.A. v. Azar, 648 

So. 2d 145, 150 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994).

The concept of alter ego or continuation of business “arises where the 

successor corporation is merely a continuation or reincarnation of the

predecessor corporation under a different name.” Id. at 154. “The bottomline question is whether each entity has run its own race, or whether there 

has been a relay-style passing of the baton from one to the other.” Orlando 

Light Bulb Serv., Inc. v. Laser Lighting & Elec. Supply, Inc., 523 So. 2d 740, 

742 n.1 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988) (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted).

In cases where the judgment creditor is seeking to implead a third party 

on the basis that the third party is the alter ego of the judgment debtor (as 

opposed to cases where the third party is the recipient of a fraudulent 

transfer of property), it seems odd to require the judgment creditor to 

“describe any property of the judgment debtor” or “any property, debt, or 

other obligation due to the judgment debtor.” A third party’s liability under 

an alter ego theory is not premised upon a fraudulent transfer of the 
8

judgment debtor’s property, but is instead premised on the notion that the 

judgment debtor and third party should be treated as the same entity. 

Still, the description requirement in section 56.29(2) is a clear requirement 

of the statute, and the judgment debtor failed to satisfy that requirement 

in this case.

Based on the foregoing, we affirm the trial court’s order to the extent 

that the trial court refused to issue Notices to Appear to the impleader 

defendants. However, our affirmance on this issue is without prejudice to 

the judgment creditor inquiring further into the assets of the judgment 

debtor and submitting a supplemental affidavit in compliance with section 

56.29(2).

Furthermore, to provide clarity on remand, we conclude that in cases 

alleging alter ego liability, the description requirement of section 56.29(2) 

is satisfied if the judgment creditor describes any property of an alter ego 

of the judgment debtor not exempt from execution in the hands of any 

person, or any property, debt, or other obligation due to an alter ego of the 

judgment debtor which may be applied toward the satisfaction of the 

judgment.

Contrary to the impleader defendants’ suggestion, the judgment 

creditor’s affidavit does not need to identify property that had been 

transferred to the impleader defendants. Because a judgment debtor and 

an alter ego are treated as the same entity, we find that section 56.29(2)’s 

required description of “any property of the judgment debtor . . . or any 

property, debt, or other obligation due to the judgment debtor” may 

include property of an alleged alter ego of the judgment debtor. Cf. In re 

Am. Int’l Refinery, 402 B.R. 728, 744–45 (Bankr. W.D. La. 2008) (because 

the law deems a corporation and its alter ego to be a single entity, a debtor 

corporation has an equitable interest in the assets of its alter ego).

Conclusion

We reverse the trial court’s denial of proceedings supplementary, but 

affirm the trial court’s refusal to issue Notices to Appear to the impleader 

defendants.2 Our affirmance on the impleader issue is without prejudice 

2 The judgment creditor also argues that the trial court erred in entering a 

proposed order prepared by counsel for the impleader defendants without giving 

the judgment creditor’s counsel an opportunity to review it. Because we are 

reversing in part and remanding for further proceedings, we find this issue to be 

moot. See Hamilton v. Ford Motor Co., 936 So. 2d 1203, 1207 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) 
9

to the judgment creditor submitting a supplemental affidavit in 

compliance with section 56.29(2). We remand for further proceedings 

consistent with this opinion.

Affirmed in part, Reversed in part, and Remanded.

WARNER and DAMOORGIAN, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

(alleged error in adopting a party’s proposed order was moot where we reversed 

in part on other grounds and remanded for further proceedings).