FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SUMONTINEE SRIDEJ, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

 v. 

ANTONY J. BLINKEN; MERRICK 

B. GARLAND, Attorney General; 

GARY SCHOFIELD; LUIS ROSA, 

Jr., Warden, 

Respondents-Appellees.

No. 23-16021 

D.C. No. 

2:23-cv-00114-

ART-BNW 

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada

Anne R. Traum, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted May 8, 2024

Pasadena, California

Filed July 23, 2024

Before: Kim McLane Wardlaw, Morgan Christen, and 

Mark J. Bennett, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Christen
2 SRIDEJ V. BLINKEN

SUMMARY*

Habeas Corpus

The panel affirmed the district court’s order denying 

Sumontinee Sridej’s motion to reopen habeas corpus 

proceedings and provide relief from the Secretary of State’s 

grant of Thailand’s request for Sridej’s extradition pursuant 

to the extradition treaty between Thailand and the United 

States.

The panel held that the Secretary of State established 

that, in granting extradition for Thailand to prosecute Sridej 

for fraud, the Secretary properly considered whether Sridej 

would face a risk of torture, as required under the 

Convention Against Torture’s implementing regulations.

The panel concluded that a declaration by an Attorney 

Adviser at the Office of the Legal Adviser for the 

Department of State was sufficient to establish that the 

Secretary complied with his obligation to consider whether 

it was more likely than not that Sridej would face torture if 

she were extradited to Thailand. The panel held that there 

was no requirement that the declaration be signed by the 

Secretary or a senior official properly designated by the 

Secretary. Rather, what was required was competent 

evidence that the Secretary or a properly designated official 

made the determination required by CAT’s implementing 

regulations. The panel also held that the declaration need 

not include a case-specific explanation for the extradition 

decision because the doctrine of separation of powers and 

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has 

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
SRIDEJ V. BLINKEN 3

the doctrine of non-inquiry blocked any inquiry into the 

substance of the declaration.

The panel resolved additional issues in a concurrently 

filed memorandum disposition.

COUNSEL

Jeremy C. Baron (argued) and Wendi L. Overmyer, 

Assistant Federal Public Defenders; Rene L. Valladares, 

Federal Public Defender; Federal Public Defender's Office, 

Las Vegas, Nevada; for Petitioner-Appellant.

Adam McMeen Flake (argued), Assistant United States 

Attorney; Jason M. Frierson, Unted States Attorney; Robert 

L. Ellman, Appellate Chief; Office of the United States 

Attorney; Las Vegas, Nevada, for Respondents-Appellees.
4 SRIDEJ V. BLINKEN

OPINION

CHRISTEN, Circuit Judge:

The United States seeks to extradite Appellant 

Sumontinee Sridej to the Kingdom of Thailand, which 

requests her extradition because it intends to prosecute her 

for committing fraud in Thailand. Sridej argues the 

Secretary of State has not complied with his obligations 

under the Convention Against Torture’s (CAT) 

implementing regulations because he failed to consider that

she would face a substantial risk of torture if extradited to 

Thailand.1 We must decide whether the Secretary 

established in this case that he properly considered whether 

Sridej would face a risk of torture. We conclude that he did.

BACKGROUND

The Treaties

The United States and Thailand signed the extradition 

treaty at issue on December 14, 1983. The treaty went into 

force on May 17, 1991. In Article 1 of the treaty, the parties 

“agree[d] to extradite to each other . . . persons found in the 

territory of one of the [parties] who . . . have been charged 

with . . . an extraditable offense, by the judicial authority of 

the Requesting State.” 

The United States has also signed and ratified the CAT. 

Nuru v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 1207, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005). 

Congress implemented the CAT as part of the Foreign 

Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (FARRA), 

which “declares it ‘the policy of the United States not to . . . 

1 We resolve the remaining issues on appeal in a concurrently filed 

memorandum disposition. 
SRIDEJ V. BLINKEN 5

extradite . . . any person to a country in which there are 

substantial grounds for believing the person would be in 

danger of being subjected to torture.’” Trinidad y Garcia v. 

Thomas, 683 F.3d 952, 956 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) 

(quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1231 note (a) (United States Policy With 

Respect to Involuntary Return of Persons in Danger of 

Subjection to Torture)). In FARRA, Congress required 

“appropriate agencies”—including the Department of 

State—to “prescribe regulations to implement the 

obligations of the United States under Article 3 of the 

[CAT].” § 1231 note (b); see also Trinidad y Garcia, 683 

F.3d at 956. The Department of State implemented such 

regulations. See 22 C.F.R. §§ 95.1–95.4. 

Extradition Proceedings

Sridej, a Thai citizen, previously worked as the Assistant 

Director for Sales and Marketing at an electronics 

wholesaler in Thailand. The Thai government alleges that, 

from 2013 to 2015, she defrauded her employer by stealing 

electronics worth roughly $4 million. 

In January 2015, Sridej left Thailand and entered the 

United States. Shortly thereafter, a Thai court issued an 

arrest warrant for Sridej on fraud charges. Rather than 

returning to Thailand, Sridej moved to Las Vegas, Nevada, 

and began a new life. 

Years later, in 2022, Thailand requested Sridej’s 

extradition pursuant to the extradition treaty between 

Thailand and the United States. In response, the United 

States filed a complaint pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3184 in 

federal district court, seeking the arrest and extradition of 

Sridej. On January 6, 2023, a magistrate judge certified 

Sridej’s extradition. 
6 SRIDEJ V. BLINKEN

Later that month, Sridej filed a petition for a writ of 

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenging her 

extradition. The district court denied the petition. With 

respect to Sridej’s argument concerning her risk of torture, 

the district court denied relief without prejudice to Sridej 

renewing her claim after the Secretary of State reached a 

formal extradition determination. Sridej timely appealed

that order. 

Roughly a month later, the United States notified the 

district court that the Secretary of State had granted 

Thailand’s request for extradition. Sridej subsequently filed 

a motion to reopen pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 60(b) and requested an indicative ruling. The 

district court denied the motion pursuant to its authority 

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62.1(a)(2). Sridej 

timely filed an amended notice of appeal. 

JURISDICTION AND SCOPE OF REVIEW

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We 

review a district court’s ruling on a Rule 60(b) motion for 

abuse of discretion and review any underlying questions of 

law de novo. Washington v. Ryan, 833 F.3d 1087, 1091 (9th 

Cir. 2016) (en banc). 

DISCUSSION

Legal Framework for Torture Claims in Extradition 

Cases

We previously addressed the scope of judicial review for 

torture claims in extradition proceedings in Trinidad y 

Garcia v. Thomas, 683 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) 

(per curiam). There, we recognized that the CAT “and its 

implementing regulations are binding domestic law,” and 

that an extraditee “possesses a narrow liberty interest” under 
SRIDEJ V. BLINKEN 7

the Due Process Clause in the Secretary of State complying 

with those regulations. Id. at 956–57. 

The CAT’s implementing regulations provide that “the 

Secretary [of State] is the U.S. official responsible for 

determining whether to surrender a fugitive to a foreign 

country by means of extradition.” 22 C.F.R. § 95.2(b); see 

also 22 C.F.R. § 95.3(b). To fulfill the United States’s 

obligations under the CAT, the Department of State 

considers, when appropriate, “the question of whether a 

person facing extradition from the U.S. ‘is more likely than 

not’ to be tortured in the State requesting extradition.” 

§ 95.2(b). Where an extraditee raises torture allegations, the 

“appropriate policy and legal offices review and analyze 

information relevant to the case in preparing a 

recommendation to the Secretary as to whether or not to sign 

the surrender warrant.” § 95.3(a). Based on these analyses, 

the Secretary decides whether to surrender the extraditee. 

§ 95.3(b). Accordingly, the regulations provide that “the 

Secretary of State must make a torture determination before 

surrendering an extraditee who makes a CAT claim” and 

must “find it not ‘more likely than not’ that the extraditee 

will face torture.” Trinidad y Garcia, 683 F.3d at 956–57. 

We concluded in Trinidad y Garcia that the record must 

contain evidence that the Secretary complied with his 

obligations. See id. at 957. If it does so, the extraditee’s 

“liberty interest shall be fully vindicated.” Id. “The doctrine 

of separation of powers and the rule of non-inquiry block 

any” substantive review beyond ensuring the Secretary’s 
8 SRIDEJ V. BLINKEN

“compliance with [his] obligations under domestic law.” 

Id.2 

Applying these principles in Trinidad y Garcia, we noted

the record “provide[d] no evidence that the Secretary ha[d] 

complied with the procedure” prescribed in the regulations 

“in Trinidad y Garcia’s case.” Id. Instead, the Department 

of State relied on “a generic declaration outlining the basics 

of how extradition operates at the Department and 

acknowledging the Department’s obligations under the 

[CAT].” Id.3 Because we lacked “any evidence that the 

Secretary ha[d] complied with the regulation,” we “lack[ed] 

sufficient basis in the record to review the district court’s 

order.” Id. 

Given this lack of evidence, counsel for the government 

represented at oral argument that, if the court so instructed, 

the Secretary would supply “a declaration that she ha[d]

complied with her obligations.” Id.; see also id. at 961 (S.R. 

Thomas, J., concurring). We remanded and instructed the 

government to do so. Id. at 957 (per curiam). We explained 

that “[i]f the district court receives such a declaration” on 

remand, “it shall determine whether it has been signed by the 

Secretary or a senior official properly designated by the 

Secretary.” Id. “If so,” we recognized, “the court’s inquiry 

shall have reached its end.” Id.

2 Under the “rule of non-inquiry,” “it is the role of the Secretary of State, 

not the courts, to determine whether extradition should be denied on 

humanitarian grounds or on account of the treatment that the fugitive is 

likely to receive upon his return to the requesting state.” Prasoprat v. 

Benov, 421 F.3d 1009, 1016 (9th Cir. 2005).

3 The surrender warrant signed by the Secretary was not in the record. 

See Trinidad y Garcia, 683 F.3d at 962 (S.R. Thomas, J., concurring); 

id. at 982 (Tallman, J., dissenting). 
SRIDEJ V. BLINKEN 9

Sridej’s Torture Claim

To show that the Secretary complied with his obligations 

in this case, the United States relies on the declaration of 

Tom Heinemann, an Attorney Adviser at the Office of the 

Legal Adviser for the Department of State.4 The declaration 

states that “Acting Deputy Secretary of State Nuland 

authorized Sumontinee Sridej’s extradition” following “a 

review of all pertinent information.” After explaining the 

procedures required by the CAT’s implementing 

regulations, Heinemann asserts: “As the official responsible 

for managing the Department’s responsibilities in this case, 

I confirm that the decision to surrender Sumontinee Sridej to 

Thailand complies with the United States’ obligations under 

the Convention and its implementing statute and 

regulations.” 

Sridej argues this evidence fails to establish that the 

Secretary of State complied with his obligation to consider 

whether it is more likely than not that Sridej will face torture 

if she is extradited to Thailand. Sridej raises two separate 

arguments. First, Sridej contends that Heinemann’s

declaration is not signed by a suitable official because 

Heinemann is neither “the Secretary [n]or a senior official 

properly designated by the Secretary,” Trinidad y Garcia, 

683 F.3d at 957. Second, Sridej argues that Heinemann’s

declaration lacks a sufficient case-specific explanation for 

how the Secretary reached his decision. We reject both 

arguments. 

4 At oral argument, counsel for the government conceded that the 

surrender warrant signed by Acting Deputy Secretary of State Nuland is 

not in the record. 
10 SRIDEJ V. BLINKEN

We begin with Sridej’s argument concerning the 

declaration’s signatory. Sridej interprets Trinidad y Garcia 

to require that, where the government relies on a declaration 

to establish the Secretary’s compliance with the CAT’s 

regulations, that declaration must be “signed by the 

Secretary or a senior official properly designated by the 

Secretary.” Id. Sridej misreads Trinidad y Garcia. There, 

where there was “no evidence that the Secretary complied 

with the procedure” set forth in the CAT’s implementing 

regulations, the United States “represented that the Secretary

would provide . . . a declaration” showing “that she complied 

with her obligations.” Id. (emphasis added).5 Because we 

understood that the official responsible for considering the 

risk of torture—the Secretary—would provide a declaration 

on remand, we directed that if the district court received such 

a declaration, it should verify that the declaration was 

“signed by the Secretary or a senior official properly 

designated by the Secretary.” Id. We did so to ensure that 

the consideration of torture risks required by the CAT’s 

implementing regulations was undertaken by someone with 

proper authority.6

5 At oral argument in Trinidad y Garcia, the government endorsed the 

view that the court may require submission of “a certification or affidavit 

from the Secretary or her authorized designee certifying compliance with 

the non-discretionary obligations imposed by statute and regulation.” Id.

at 961 (S.R. Thomas, J., concurring). 

6

“Unless otherwise specified in law, the Secretary may delegate 

authority to perform any of the functions of the Secretary or the 

Department to officers and employees under the direction and 

supervision of the Secretary.” 22 U.S.C. § 2651a(a)(4). Although “the 

Secretary is the U.S. official responsible for determining whether to 

surrender a fugitive to a foreign country by means of extradition,” 22 

C.F.R. § 95.2(b), the regulations provide that “Secretary means 
SRIDEJ V. BLINKEN 11

Here, by contrast, the government has not provided a 

declaration from the official responsible for considering the 

risk of torture in Sridej’s case. Instead, the government 

relies on a declaration from Heinemann, an Attorney 

Adviser within the Department of State who is “the official 

responsible for managing the Department’s responsibilities 

in this case.” Because the government offered different 

evidence to show that it complied with its obligations under 

the CAT, the government was not necessarily required to 

provide a declaration signed by the Secretary or a senior 

official properly designated by the Secretary. See Trinidad 

y Garcia, 683 F.3d at 957 (directing the district court to 

determine that the signatory was the Secretary or his 

designee who made the determination required by the CAT

“[i]f it receives such a declaration” (emphasis added)). 

What was required was competent evidence that the 

Secretary or a properly designated official made the 

determination required by CAT’s implementing 

regulations.7 

The CAT’s implementing regulations require that the 

Secretary make a determination about the risk of torture. 22 

C.F.R. §§ 95.2–95.3; Trinidad y Garcia, 683 F.3d at 956–

57. Here, unlike in Trinidad y Garcia, the record contains

evidence that shows Acting Deputy Secretary Nuland 

actually complied with the regulations in Sridej’s case. 

Thus, Sridej’s narrow liberty interest has been vindicated. 

Trinidad y Garcia, 683 F.3d at 957. 

Secretary of State and includes . . . the Deputy Secretary of State, by 

delegation” 22 C.F.R. § 95.1(d). 

7 Because Sridej does not contend that Acting Deputy Secretary Nuland 

lacked the authority to fulfill the Secretary’s duties regarding the 

consideration of the risk of torture, we do not address that issue. 
12 SRIDEJ V. BLINKEN

As for Sridej’s argument that Heinemann’s declaration 

lacks a case-specific explanation for the extradition decision, 

this argument is foreclosed by Trinidad y Garcia. We 

expressly held that “[t]he doctrine of separation of powers 

and the rule of non-inquiry block any inquiry into the 

substance of the Secretary’s declaration.” Id. (emphasis 

added). And we expressly overruled prior decisions 

implying judicial review beyond ensuring that the Secretary 

complied “with her obligations under domestic law.” Id. 

Thus, a declarant with knowledge that the Secretary or his 

designee has made the determination required by the CAT

need only verify that the Secretary “has complied with her 

obligations.” Id. Heinemann’s declaration clears this 

hurdle. 

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order denying 

Petitioner’s Rule 60(b) motion.

8

AFFIRMED.

8 We deny as moot Sridej’s Motion for Stay of Extradition Pending 

Appeal (Dkt. 20).