NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA,

Appellee,

v.

BRADLEY JUSTIN BOWLING,

Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 18-0091 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2017-106927-001

The Honorable William R. Wingard, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General's Office, Phoenix

By Nicholas Chapman-Hushek

Counsel for Appellee

Maricopa County Public Defender's Office, Phoenix

By Rena P. Glitsos

Counsel for Appellant

FILED 1-10-2019
STATE v. BOWLING

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Diane M. Johnsen delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Maria Elena Cruz and Judge Randall M. Howe joined.

J O H N S E N, Judge:

¶1 Bradley Justin Bowling appeals his disorderly conduct and 

shoplifting convictions and the resulting sentences, arguing the superior 

court abused its discretion when it failed to inquire into his purported 

request for new counsel. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Bowling was charged with disorderly conduct, a Class 6 

felony, and shoplifting, a Class 1 misdemeanor. The superior court found 

Bowling indigent, appointed him a lawyer and set a firm trial date.

¶3 At the beginning of the comprehensive pretrial conference 

one month before trial, the following exchange occurred:

[Defense counsel]: Your Honor, before we address the 

[scheduled pretrial matters], Mr. Bowling would like to 

address the Court.

[Bowling]: [H]ow do I get my lawyer removed from the case?

The Court: I'm sorry, what?

[Bowling]: My lawyer removed from the case.

The Court: Well, you need to file a motion.

[Bowling]: Yeah, I can't file because my hand is all messed up 

and [Defense counsel] said I could just ask you and you 

would remove him, and deal with it.

The Court: No, I don't deal with oral motions. You have to 

file something in writing.

[Bowling]: I guess you're on board, because I can't write. I 

have all those pins in my hand.
STATE v. BOWLING

Decision of the Court

3

[Defense counsel]: Your Honor, I'm not – I'm unable to file a 

motion to remove myself, so . . .

The Court: No, no, he has to do it.

[Bowling]: So then I guess he's staying on, I'm guessing. 

Okay.

[Defense counsel]: That's fine. It appears that I'm going to 

stay on if he's not going to file the motion, right?

[Bowling]: I can't – I don't have nothing to write with. My 

hand's all messed up.

The Court: I'm not talking about writing it now, sometime in 

the future –

[Bowling]: I don't get medical treatment in there.

* * *

[Bowling]: He can't write it himself, so he's back on board.

The Court: Okay.

Bowling did not raise the issue with the court again, either in writing or 

orally.

¶4 After a three-day trial, the jury convicted Bowling of both 

charges. Before sentencing, Bowling admitted to three prior felony 

convictions; the superior court then sentenced him to concurrent terms of 

incarceration, the longest of which was 2.25 years. Bowling timely 

appealed. We have jurisdiction over Bowling's appeal pursuant to Article 

6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution, and Arizona Revised Statutes 

("A.R.S.") sections 12-120.21(A)(1) (2018) and 13-4033(A)(1) (2018).1

DISCUSSION

¶5 Bowling argues the superior court violated his Sixth 

Amendment right to counsel when it "failed in its duty to make any inquiry 

into the reasons for [Bowling's] request" for a change of counsel.

 

1 Absent material revision after the date of an alleged offense, we cite 

the current version of a statute or rule.
STATE v. BOWLING

Decision of the Court

4

¶6 "The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the 

right to representation by counsel," but does not guarantee indigent 

defendants "counsel of [their] choice." State v. Torres, 208 Ariz. 340, 342, ¶ 6 

(2004). Nonetheless, when a defendant asks to change appointed lawyers, 

the court must "inquire as to the basis of a defendant's request." Id. at 343, 

¶ 7. We review a superior court's ruling denying a change of counsel for an 

abuse of discretion. State v. Hernandez, 232 Ariz. 313, 318, ¶ 11 (2013).

¶7 Here, the superior court did not abuse its discretion because 

Bowling did not make clear whether he wanted the court to replace his 

current appointed counsel with another or wanted the court to allow him 

to discharge that lawyer and represent himself. The transcript reveals that 

Bowling's question – "how do I get my lawyer removed from the case?" –

and the ensuing discussion only focused on the procedure Bowling would 

have to follow to end his current counsel's participation in the case. At no 

point did Bowling unequivocally ask the court to appoint him a different 

lawyer; nothing he said gave the court any indication that he had an 

irreconcilable conflict or a complete breakdown in communication with his 

lawyer. See Torres, 208 Ariz. at 342, ¶ 6 (stating grounds for change of 

counsel under Sixth Amendment). As the State suggests, the court could 

have construed Bowling's question to suggest that he was merely thinking 

about whether to ask for a change of counsel.

¶8 If the superior court discerned that Bowling might have been 

suggesting he wanted to change counsel, the better course would have been 

for the court to ask Bowling for clarification. Nevertheless, on this record, 

the court observed, heard and spoke with Bowling, and so was in a better 

position than we to understand the basis for his request. See State v. 

Calderon, 171 Ariz. 12, 13-14 (App. 1991). Because Bowling did not inform 

the court of grounds that might have supported a request for change of 

counsel under the Sixth Amendment, the court did not abuse its discretion

by failing to inquire. See Torres, 208 Ariz. at 343, ¶ 7 (citing Smith v. Lockhart, 

923 F.2d 1314, 1320 (8th Cir. 1991) ("When a defendant raises a seemingly 

substantial complaint about counsel, the judge 'has an obligation to inquire 

thoroughly into the factual basis of defendant's dissatisfaction.'")).

¶9 Bowling also argues the superior court abused its discretion 

when it "expressly prohibited him from making his claim unless he did so 

in writing." We disagree. First, regardless of whether a motion for change 

of counsel must be made in writing, Bowling did not clearly indicate even 

orally that he wanted to change his counsel. Second, nothing precluded 

Bowling from asking someone else to hand-write his motion for him, and 

Bowling does not argue he could not have done so.
STATE v. BOWLING

Decision of the Court

5

CONCLUSION

¶10 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Bowling's convictions 

and sentences.