Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr., Chief Justice

Stephen J. Markman

Mary Beth Kelly

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano

Richard H. Bernstein, Justices

Order 

May 1, 2015

149168-9

DIANE NASH, Personal Representative of the

ESTATE OF CHANCE AARON NASH,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 149168

COA: 309403 

Ottawa CC: 10-002119-NO

DUNCAN PARK COMMISSION,

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/

DIANE NASH, Personal Representative of the

ESTATE OF CHANCE AARON NASH,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 149169

COA: 314017 

Ottawa CC: 12-002801-NO

DUNCAN PARK TRUST, and EDWARD 

LYSTRA, RODNEY GRISWOLD, and JERRY

SCOTT, Individually and as Trustees of the

DUNCAN PARK TRUST,

Defendants-Appellants. 

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, leave to appeal having been granted and the briefs and oral 

arguments of the parties having been considered by the Court, we VACATE our order of 

October 24, 2014. We further VACATE that part of the March 20, 2014 Court of 

Appeals opinion addressing whether the Duncan Park Commission is a “board” of the 

City of Grand Haven. That issue was not raised below and the Court of Appeals should 

not have reached it sua sponte. In all other respects, leave to appeal is DENIED, because 

we are no longer persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this 

Court.

BERNSTEIN, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part). 

While I agree with the majority’s decision to vacate the order granting leave to 

appeal in this case as improvidently granted and deny leave, I respectfully dissent from 
I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 May 1, 2015

t0428

2

Clerk

the majority’s decision to vacate the part of the Court of Appeals’ opinion addressing 

whether the Duncan Park Commission (Commission) is a “board” of the city of Grand 

Haven.

The governmental tort liability act (GTLA), MCL 691.1401 et seq., provides 

narrow exceptions to the general rule that governmental entities are immune from tort 

liability. The question presented by this case is whether an entity like the Commission is 

a “board . . . of a political subdivision,” MCL 691.1401(e), and therefore entitled to 

immunity.

The Court of Appeals concluded that the Commission was not a board of a 

political subdivision, emphasizing that the Commission was not subject to any 

meaningful oversight by Grand Haven. I agree with the Court of Appeals’ conclusion 

that “[r]ather than serving as an instrumentality or ‘political subdivision’ of Grand 

Haven, the Commission is an independent, autonomous, private body that administers 

privately held land.” Nash v Duncan Park Comm, 304 Mich App 599, 634-635 (2014). 

Like private entities that are not entitled to governmental immunity, the 

Commission functions independently from the municipal government. The Commission, 

as a private entity would, maintains and operates Duncan Park without significant 

supervision from Grand Haven. The ordinance that created the Commission allows the 

Commission to make its own rules and regulations. Although the mayor formally ratifies 

the appointment of each member of the Commission, it is the Commission itself that 

chooses its own successors who serve unlimited terms. Unlike other boards and 

commissions created by Grand Haven and bound by the Grand Haven City Charter, the 

Commission appoints its members without the city council’s confirmation. 

If an entity does not function and operate as a governmental entity, then it should 

not receive the privileges of governmental immunity no matter what label the entity has 

given itself. As the Court of Appeals stated, “Designating the Commission a ‘board’

does not transform a private group into a political subdivision.” Id. at 635. I agree with 

this statement and would retain its inclusion in the Court of Appeals’ opinion to 

emphasize that the entitlement to governmental immunity should not be so readily

accessible to an entity operating without governmental oversight in a manner similar to a 

private entity. Accordingly, while I agree with the majority’s decision to preserve the 

result of the Court of Appeals’ opinion, I would simply vacate the order granting leave as 

improvidently granted and deny leave to appeal, leaving in place the entirety of the Court 

of Appeals’ opinion.