COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Moon, Judges Fitzpatrick and Annunziata 

Argued at Charlottesville, Virginia 

REVCO DRUG STORES, INC. and 

 LIBERTY MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 0720-96-3 JUDGE ROSEMARIE ANNUNZIATA 

 NOVEMBER 19, 1996 

DIANE BRUENING 

 FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION 

 Beth M. Coyne (Fowler, Griffin, Coyne & 

Coyne, on briefs), for appellants. 

 Terry L. Armentrout (Roger Ritchie & 

Partners, on brief), for appellee. 

 Claimant, Diane Bruening, filed a claim for benefits, 

alleging an injury by accident occurring February 2, 1994 and 

arising out of and in the course of her employment with employer, 

Revco Drug Stores, Inc. The deputy commissioner denied benefits, 

and the full commission reversed. Employer appeals. 

 To be compensable, a claimant's disability must have been 

caused by an injury by accident arising out of and in the course 

of employment. See Southall v. Reams, Inc., 198 Va. 545, 548, 95 

S.E.2d 145, 147 (1956); Ratliff v. Rocco Farm Foods, 16 Va. App. 

234, 239, 429 S.E.2d 39, 42-43 (1993). To establish an "injury 

by accident," a claimant must prove "an identifiable incident or 

sudden precipitating event [that results] in an obvious sudden 

mechanical or structural change in the body." E.g., Morris v. 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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Morris, 238 Va. 578, 589, 385 S.E.2d 858, 865 (1989). To prove 

an injury "arose out of" employment, a claimant must show that a 

condition of the workplace either caused or contributed to the 

accident. See, e.g., Southside Va. Training Center v. Shell, 20 

Va. App. 199, 202, 455 S.E.2d 761, 763 (1995). 

 On appeal, we construe the evidence in the light most 

favorable to claimant, the prevailing party below. See, e.g., 

R.G. Moore Bldg. Corp. v. Mullins, 10 Va. App. 211, 212, 390 

S.E.2d 788, 788 (1990). We are bound by the commission's 

findings of fact if they are supported by credible evidence. 

E.g., Continental Forest v. Wallace, 1 Va. App. 72, 73-74, 334 

S.E.2d 149, 150 (1985). In light of these principles, we affirm 

the decision of the commission. 

 There is no dispute that claimant has been disabled since 

February 21, 1994. Prior to that time, claimant worked as a 

clerk in employer's store. Claimant's unrebutted testimony 

established that on February 2 she tripped and fell over the step 

leading into the pharmacy area of employer's store. At the time, 

claimant was carrying a two foot by one-and-one-half foot "tote," 

weighing approximately twenty pounds, which obstructed claimant's 

view of the floor and her feet. The "tote" contained 

pharmaceutical inventory that claimant intended to stock on the 

pharmacy shelves. Pain developed in claimant's knee the 

following day. The day after that, February 4, claimant felt a 

"pop" in her knee as she descended the stairs from the office 
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area of employer's store. Claimant reported both the February 2 

trip and the February 4 incident to her treating physician, Dr. 

Harrison, as well as to Dr. McCue to whom Dr. Harrison referred 

her. Claimant also related both incidents to the claims 

representative of employer's insurance carrier. A physical 

therapy evaluation conducted the following Fall describes the 

"pop" claimant felt in her knee as a symptom of the February 2 

trip. Although Dr. Harrison initially opined that claimant's 

injuries were proximately caused by her "tripping over the step 

at work on February 4, 1994," he later stated that "the date of 

injury should be February 2, 1994 when she tripped up the steps." 

 Employer contends that claimant's injury occurred on 

February 4. This contention is without merit. The evidence 

clearly supports the commission's decision. The trip claimant 

described as occurring on February 2 was unquestionably a sudden, 

precipitating event. Although Dr. Harrison was not certain 

whether the mechanical change to claimant's body occurred on 

February 2 or 4, Dr. Harrison clearly identified claimant's trip 

as the causative event, on whatever day the trip occurred. 

 Employer also contends that the February 4 event did not 

"arise out of" claimant's employment. However, claimant does not 

suggest that the February 4 event "arose out of" her employment. 

 Likewise, the commission did not find the February 4 event to be 

a compensable injury by accident. Dr. Harrison's opinion, as 

well as the reports of Dr. McCue and the physical therapist, 
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clearly establish the causal link between claimant's injury by 

accident on February 2 and her disability. Claimant's injury 

clearly "arose out of" her employment; there can be no doubt that 

the carrying of the "tote" on February 2 was a condition of 

employment which at least contributed, if not caused, her 

accident. 

 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the 

commission. 

Affirmed.