### TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03
- 22
- 00321
- CV

Vista Grande Homeowners Association, Inc. , Appellant

v. Dennis Brand and Kimberly Harper , Appellee s

FROM THE 201ST DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY NO. D
- 1
- GN
- 20
- 003601 , THE HONOR A BLE MADELEINE CONNOR , JUDGE PRESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Vista Grande Homeo wners Association, Inc . (t he Association) appe al s from the di strict court ’ s order dismissing its breach of contract claim against Dennis Brand and Kimberly
H arper (collectively, the Owners) for lack of su bject matter jurisdiction. We will affirm.

BACKGROUND
Th is d ispu te involves the construction o f a home on Lot 63 in Vista Grande Section Two (Section Two) , a subdivision in the Hudson Bend commun it y i n Tr a vis County. Section Two is composed of four lo ts

— Lot 43, Lot 44, Lot 62, and Lot 63

. Section Two is in the center of an d surrounded by another subdivision, Vista Grande Section One (Section One). The plat for S ection One wa s filed August 2, 1973 , and re c orded at Plat Book 64, Page 26 of the Travis Cou nt y P lat Records. T he plat for Section Two was filed October 8, 1973 , and recorded at Plat Book 66, Page 87 of the Travis County Plat Records

. Section One and Section Tw o each2

have separate declarations im p osing restrictive covenants on the lots within each section. The original Secti on One declaration auth orize d th e cr eation of a h omeowner s ’ association (the Associatio n) and provid e d for Section One lot owners ’ mandatory member ship in th e Association

. T h e original d eclaration for Sec tion One wa s signed August 30, 1973, but not recorded until March 2000. Therea f ter, th e Section One dec laration w as ame nd ed by a majority of the Section One lot owners in January 2003, but the am ended declaration that was re c o r ded

w as signed by only the officers of the home owner s ’ association rather than by a majority of the then o w n e rs of the lots in Section One a s require d to compl y with the pro visions of the

o riginal declaration . In February 2012, cor rective action w as t ak e n , and the majority of the Section One lot owners filed a “ First Amended and R estated Restricti ve Coven ants of Vista Grande Subdivision ” for S ec tion O n e ( the Section One Amended Declarat i on)

.

The original declaration for S e ction Two ( the S ecti on Two D ec l a ration) was signed and recorded on May 10, 1977, and was not su bsequently amended

. The Section Two
D eclarat ion do es not provide for any ho meowners ’ associ at ion , nor do es it impose on S ection Two lot owners manda tory membership in any home owners ’ assoc ia t i on .

The Own ers purchased Lot 63 in Section Two (the Pro perty) in November 2019. Desiring to build a home on the Property, the Owners submitted a project a pproval plan to the A ssociation seeking architectural appro val from the Association ’ s Architect ur a l Contr ol
Comm ittee (ACC). The ACC denied the application citing concerns that the proposed resid ence could obstruct an adjoining lot owner ’ s view of the l a ke. After a failed attempt to secure the
ACC ’ s approval by citing certain provision s of the Sec ti o n One Amended Declaration, the
Owners ’ lega l counsel sent the Association a letter stat ing:3

After further review of the applicable plats and restrictive cove n ants for the Property, we have discovered tha t neither you, the Architectural Control C ommittee ( t h e “ ACC ” ), no r the Vista Grande H omeowners Association , Inc. ( the “ HOA ” ) have any authority over the Property or o ver our clients. Specific ally, the First A mended and Restated Rest ri c tive Covenan ts o f Vista Grande Su bdivision, filed as Instrume nt#201204 4 3 1 1 in the Tra vis County Clerk ’ s Real Property Records (the “ Declaration ” ) encumbers only the original Vista Grande subdivision located at Plat Book 64, Page 26 of the Plat Records of Travis County, Texas. Our clients ’ P roperty is located s olely within V i s t a Grande Sec tion Two, located at Plat Book 66, Page 87 of the Plat Records of Travis County, Tex as. N owhere in the Declaration is Plat Book 66, Pa ge 87 ref erenced, incorporated or otherwise dedic at ed.
Having express ed their view that the Property was n o t s ubject to t he Section One building restrictions and that they did not need appro val from the Section One ACC , th e O wners
p roceeded to begin construction of a house on the P roperty in the s pring of 2020. On July 9,
2020 , the Assoc iation sent the Owners c o p ies of recorded in strument s execute d by the owners of Lot 43, Lot 44, an d land constituting .046 2 acres out of Lot 62

. 1 These documents, which were each titled “ Acknowl e dgement , ” were executed a n d recorded in early July 2020 . Each of the Acknowle dg me n t s recite s :

I understand [my lot] to be included in the real property that i s des cribed in and subject to the Amended and Restated Covenant s of Vista Grande Homeow n ers Association , filed as Document 200411662 and 20120 44311 in the real property records of T r a vis Cou nty, Texas (the “ Amended and R estated Coven ants ” ) and part of the “ Association ” because: (a) [ m y lot] has always been subject to assessment by th e Association; (b) a rc hitectural review is conducted by the Association; (c) [my lot] is affor ded notice and vo t in g rights wit h regard to Association matters; and

1 T h is portion of Lot 62 , which constitut es a pproximat el y 7% o f the tot al s quare foo tage of L o t 62 , is adjacent to Lot 44 and was co nveyed to the owner of Lot 44 by the t hen

- o wner of Lot 62.4

(d) the “ Section Two ” property w as included in the vote on the Amended Declaration (as evidenced by the Lot 44 a cknowledg ement document included in Doc. No. 2012044311). [My lot ] is also subject to the Section T w o coven ants found at Volume 5774, Pages 2216

- 2219 in the real property reco r d s of Travis C ounty, Texas (the

“ Section Two Covenan ts ” ). The Sectio n Two Covenants s tate that “ at any t ime the then record owners of a majo rity of the lots shall have the powe r t h rough a duly recorded written in strument to change the membership of the [ A CC] ” and further provides the covenant can be chan ged by “ an inst rument signed by the majority of the then owners of the l ots has been record ed, agreeing to change the covenants i n whole or in part. ” W hether or not the Sec tion Two Covenant s were supplemen t ed/amended by the Amended and Restated Covenan ts, I hereby consent to , ratify, and approve, the adoption o f the Amended and R e stated Covenan ts as a supplement to the Section Tw o C o venan ts, to include any ch ange to the ACC to have the ACC for the Vista Gra n de Home o wners Association serve as the ACC under the Secti on Two Covenants. The covenants of Section Two that cont ain limitations and restr ictions on deve lopment and construct io n th at are more stringent than those in the Amended and Res tated Covenants sh a ll con tinue to apply to all Section Two property and property subject to the S ection Two Covenants, including the garage restriction i n Sect ion B

- 1.

The Associa tion asserted t h at t he se Acknowle d gements demonstr ated th at the Proper ty , even though located i n Sec tion Two, was subject to the Section One Amended Declaration because lots in Sectio n Two had paid asses s ments levied by the Association and had participated in
votes regard in g Associ ation matters. The Association also claimed that the Acknowle dgement s constituted an agreement by the majority of the Section Two lot owners t o (1) am end the
Se ction Two Declaration by supplement ing it with th e Section One Amended De cl aration an d ( 2 ) provide tha t the Sect ion One ACC would serve as th e ar chitectural control committee for
S ection Two

. On July 14, 2020, the As sociation filed suit again st the Owners asserting a cause of action for breach of contr act alleging that the Owners br eache d r e strictive covenants burdening the Property by failing to secure architectural approval from the Association for their construction on the Prop erty

. The Associa ti on alleged that the Property was subject to the5

Sectio n One Amended Declaration and that i t w a s authorized to enforce the restrictions containe d therein. The As sociation sought the court ’ s c onf irmation that the Ow ners had breac hed the Section One Amended Declarat ion and injuncti ve relief requiring the O wner s to bring their construction into co mp l i ance with the Section One Am ended Declaration.

The Owners filed a gener al and verified denial asserting that the Ow n ers wer e not party to any contract with the Association

. Th e Owners also fi led a counter cl aim for declaratory relief that the Associa ti o n had no authority o ver them or the Property and could not enforce any provision of the S ection One Amended Declaration against them

.

The Association then filed a motion for partial summary judgment arguing that, as

a matter o f law, the Pro perty was s ub j e ct to th e Section One Am ended Declaration . In addition, the Association argued that a m ajority of the Section Two lot owners had executed and recorded acknowledgement i n s truments t o conf irm that the Section Two lots “ have alwa ys been included in the S ub d i vision ” and tha t the Section One Amended Decl arati on applies to those l ots as well as to the lots in Section One. The Associatio n sought summary judgm ent that the Property was part of Section One , th at the Owners we re required to obtain ar chitectural re v i ew and appro val from the Association, and that no such approval had been grante d. In response, the Owners asserted that the Pr operty was not part of Section One, that the relevant plats and declarations of restricti ve covenants e sta blish that the Asso ci a t ion ’ s authority exten ds only to those lots that are in Section One, and tha t the Associa t ion had no standing to bring a br each of c ontra ct claim against the Owners. With respect to the allegation that a m ajority of the Section Two lot owners had filed a c k now ledgements that purpor ted to bring Section Two within the scope of the Association ’ s authority, the O wners asserted that only fifty p ercent of the Section Two lot owners had filed acknowledgements, n ot a m ajority of the m , which was not sufficien t to m a k e6

any changes to the declarations governing Secti on Two. After considering the Associ ation ’ s motion and the evidence submitted by the part ies, which in cluded the rel evant plats, declarations, and other filing s in th e Travis County property records, t h e d i strict court denied the Associa tion ’ s motion for summary judgment.

Thereafter, the Association filed a second mot ion for par tial summary judgment in which it a rgued that, even if the Owners were correct that the Pr operty was separately platted and
pa rt o f Section Two rather than part of Section One, a majority of the Section Tw o lot owners had “ opted into the [Section One] governance scheme ” by filing the Acknowledgements, which the Association asserted had amended the S e ction Two Declarat ion. The As so c i ation again sought summary judgment that the Prope rty was subject to the ar chitectural review and approval requirement s of the S e ction One Amended De cl aration. The Owners filed motion s for summary judgment on b oth the Association ’ s br each of contract cl a i m and their counterclaims for declaratory relief

. The Owners re

- urged their arguments that the Property was not subject to the
As soci a ti on ’ s auth orit y and that, as a matter of law, the Association had no standin g to bring a b reach of contr act claim ag ai n s t them. Th e Owners requested tha t the court render judg ment in their favor on the A s sociation ’ s claims against them. The Owners also requ ested that the court grant summary judgment in their favor on their counterclaims against the Association seeking d e c larations that the Assoc iation had no au thority over the Property or the Owners and that the Association could not enforce the S e c tion One restrictive covenants against the m. After considering the motions a nd summary judgment evidence, the court found t h a t the Property was7

“ su bject to the Vista Grande, Section Two Architectural Control Committee. ” 2 The court denied all other relief requ ested in the summary judgment motions.

The O wners the n filed a plea to the jurisdi c t ion arguing that the Associ atio n d i d not have standing to enforce Secti on One restrictive c ovenants against owners of lots in Section
Two . The O wners submitte d ev idence of the separate plats and restrictive cove nants for Section One and Sect ion Two and argued that because the lots in S ec t i o n Two, including the Property, were not governed by the S e ction One Amended Declarations, the Ass oc iation had no standing

t o bring a br each of contract claim against the Owners , who wer e not su b ject to the Associa tion ’ s authority

. The Asso ciation cou nt e r ed that certain event s and documents confirmed that the Property was “ part of the Associa t io n, ” and that, in an y event, the Section Two lot owners had

“ ceded architectura l review authority to the A s soci a tio n ” because of the “ m ajor ity of the then

owner s o f the lots ” in Section Two having filed the Acknow le d gements. After a hearing, t he district court granted the Owners ’ plea to the jurisdiction and dismissed the Association ’ s claims without prej udice

. After the district court filed its findings of fac t a n d conclu sions of law, the Association p erfected this appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The trial court ’ s subject matter jurisdiction may be ch allenged through a plea to the jurisdiction. See Texas Dep ’ t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda , 133 S.W.3d 217, 225

- 2 6 ( T ex. 2004) ; Bland Indep . Sch. Dist. v. Blue , 34 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex. 2000) . Whether a court has subject matter jur isdiction is a question of law we review de novo. Miranda , 133 S

. W.3d at 226

.

2 The court also found that there was a fa ct issue as to t he current membership of the Section T wo ACC , which , according to th e S e ction Tw o Declarat io n, was o riginally composed of “ Don Cav ness and Joe McMordie and a third member to be agre ed upon by both par ties. ”8

The plaintiff has the burden of allegin g facts that af fi rm a t i v ely demonstrate the trial court ’ s juris diction. Id. We begin with the allegations in the plaintiff ’ s live plea di ngs, which we construe liberally in favor of jurisdi ction and , unless challenged wi th evidence , take as true

. See id. at 226

- 27 . We co ns i d e r any evidence introduced by the plaintiff relevant to the jurisdictional inquiry. See City of Elsa v. Gonzal ez , 325 S.W.3d 622, 625 (Tex. 2010) ; Blue , 34 S.W.3d at 555 ( “ [A] court deciding a plea to the jurisdicti on is not required to look solely to t h e p leadings bu t may consider evidence and must do so when necessary to resolve the jurisdictional issue s rai sed. ” ). When , as her e, a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the existence of jurisdic tional fa c ts that do not implicate the merits and those fa ct s a r e disputed, the cour t must make the necessary fact findings to resolve the jurisdictional issue. See Miranda , 1 33 S

. W.3d at 226 ( “ Whether a district court has subject matt er jurisdiction is a question for the cou rt, not the jury, to decide, even if th e d e ter mination requires making factual findings, unless th e jurisdictional inquiry is inextricably bound to th e meri ts of the case. ” ). On appeal, an y fact findings made to resolve the jurisdicti onal issue may be challenged , a s any other fact findings, fo r l e gal and factua l sufficiency. See University of Tex. v. Poinde xter , 306 S.W.3d 798, 806

- 07 (Tex. App.

— Aust in 2009, no pet.)

. A plaintiff ha s standing to sue when the pleaded facts state a “ con crete an d particularized , actual or imminent, and not hypo t h e t ical ” injury. Heckman v. Williamson C ou nty , 369 S.W.3d 137, 155 (Tex. 2012) (quoti ng Da imlerChrysler Corp. v. In man , 252 S.W.3d 299,
304

- 05 (Tex. 2008) ). Standing is a “ pre requisite to su bject

- m at ter jurisdiction, and subject

matter jur isdiction is esse n t ial to a court ’ s power to decide a case. ” Blue , 34 S.W.3d at 553

- 54

. The a bse nce of s ubje ct

- matter juri sdiction may be raised by a plea to the jurisdiction. Id. When a defendant asserts that a plaintiff organization does not have sta nding to ass ert c l a i ms on behalf9

of its member s , an evidentiary inquiry sufficient to deter mine standing does not involve a significant inquiry into the substance of the claims. Id. “ [A] det er mination of associat ional

s tanding is a prer equisite to the pl aintiff ’ s pr esent a t ion of its substantive claims. ” I d. The Texas Property Code provides t hat “ a property owners ’ associ ation . . . may in itiate, defend, or intervene . . . in litigation affec ting the enforcement of a restr ictive covenant

. . . . ” Tex

. P rop. Co de § 202.0 0 4 (b)

. The Associa tion ’ s s tanding is not conditioned on whether the claim it asserted against the O w n ers is ultimately valid b ut “ merely requires that the parties to the suit be

s ubject to t he cov enant. ” Teal Trading & Dev

. , L.P. v. C ham pee Springs Ranch e s Prop. Owners
Ass ’ n , 593 S.W.3d 324, 331 (Tex. 20 20)

. Th us, t he Association ’ s standing to bring suit for breach of the Secti on One Amended Declaration depends on whether the Property i s subject to the Section One Amended De clar ati on.

DISC USSION

Th e di s trict cour t found that the Property is in Section Two, tha t Sectio n Two ’ s deed restriction s are separ ate from those that burden the lots in S e ction One, and that the
Pr o perty wa s not encumbered by the S ection One Amended Dec lara tion. Thus, the d istri ct c o urt concluded that the Association did not have standing to assert a claim against the O wner s for breac h of contract for allegedly v iolating S ection One ’ s architectural review p rocess in dev eloping the Property

. In its firs t is sue , the Ass ociati on a s sert s that the trial court erred in dismissing it s claims against the O wners for lack of standing. In its brief, the As soc iation argues that the trial court erred in finding that th e Pro perty is not subject to the Section One Am ende d Declaratio n . Sp ecifi call y , the Association states that the Acknowledgements , which it claim s were executed and recorded by a majority of the Section Two lot owners, “ provide tha t t he10

property depicted i n the S e ction Two plat is sub ject to the archit ectu ral review o f the Assoc iati o n and supplement the S e ction Two Declaration with the language fr om the [Section One] Amended Declaration. ” We understand the Association to argue that the Acknow ledgements
op erate to amend the Section Two restrictive coven ants to bring th ose lo ts wi thin the purview of the Association and it s architectural review process, thereby co nfe rring on the Assoc iation standing to enforce the S ection One restr ictive covenants with respec t to the lots in Section Two.

W e first conside r wh ether the Ac know l e dg men ts w e re, in fact, executed and recorded by a majority of the S e c tion Two lot owners as required to effect any changes

to the restrictive covenants burdening the S e ction Two lo ts

. The record includes three ackno wledg em ents fi led by (1) the o wner of L o t 43; (2) the owner o f Lot 44; and (3) Don
Bra euer, an individual who purported t o be the owner of Lot 62 by virtue of having bee n conveyed .046 2 acres out of Lot 62 by that lot ’ s previou s owner . The conveyance of a p o rtion of
Lot 6 2 to Br aeuer alon e, ho w ever, did not operate either to create a new lot in the platted S ect ion
Two or to make Braeuer the owner of Lot 62. Any revisions or amendment s to a plat must be approved, file d, an d recorded

. See Tex. Loc

. Gov ’ t Cod e § § 232.0 09 (r evising plat s ); .011 (a mendi n g plats). The record contains no evidence that the Secti on Two pl at was revised or amended to address the co nveyance of a small portion of Lot 62 to Braeuer. The evide n ce in the record establishes that Lot 62

— e xc ept for the p reviously co n vey ed

. 04 62 ac r e s

— was conveyed to and is currently o wned by the O wners, not Braeuer. Thu s, only the owners of two of the four lots in Section Two

— Lot 43 and Lot 44

— agreed to have their l ots bound by the Section One Amended De claration a nd su bj ec t to the architec tu ral r e v iew p roc ess appli ca ble to Section One lots. Because this does not constitute the ma jori ty of owners of lots required to amend the
Sect ion Two restrictive covenants, the A cknowled g ments di d not operate to effect uate the11

c h ange s the Associ a tion rel ie s on t o support its power to enforce the Section One Am ended Declarat ions against the Property or the Owners.

On appeal, the Associatio n asserts that cer t ain provi sions in the Texas Business Organi zat ions Code govern how to de termi ne whether t h e votes of the o w ners o f Lot 42, Lot 43, and Braeuer constitute the re q u ired majority of o wners of lots i n Sect ion Two. First, the Association cl aims that owner s of property in the Sectio n Two plat cons titu te an “ association” as
that t er m is def

ined in t h e Texas Bu sines s Organizations Code. Specifically , the Associ ation

r elies on section 252.001(2), wh ich defines “nonpro fit associ ation ” as “an un incorporated organization . . . consisting of three or more members joined by mutual conse nt for a common,

n on p rofit purp ose. ” See T ex. Bus. Orgs. Code § 252.001(a)

. The code defines a “nonprofit
purpose ” to include serving “civic purposes. ” See id. § 2.002 (1)

. Relying on City of Dal las v.
Eas t Vill age Association , the A ssoci ation asserts t hat “pro tecting th e q uality of ne igh b o rhood living is a civic purpos e. ” 480 S.W.3d 37, 43 (Tex. App.

— Dallas 2015, p et. denied)

. The Association also points to Texas P roperty Code section 209.002 to suppor t its contention that the owners of property on the S ec ti o n Two plat c o ns tit ute a n “as s o ciation. ” Se e Tex. Prop. Code § 209.002 (providing that “pr operty owners associatio n ” constitutes uninc orporated association ). The Association then argues that “[b]ec ause the me mbers constitute an associ ation, the act ion s of the majority of t he ow ners on the S e ction Two Plat are binding on all of the property, including the Owners, as l ong as the actions are not illegal, against some public policy , or f raudulent. ” See Episco pal C hurch v. Salazar , 547 S.W.3d 353, 421 (Te x . App

. — Fort Worth 2018) , af f ’d i n p art

,

rev ’d in part sub no m Episcopal D iocese of Fort Worth v. Epis copal Church , 602 S.W.3d 417 (Tex. 2020 )

.12 A ssuming , wi thout deciding, that the Associ ation ’s a ssert ions are correct, it must still have been the case th a t a m ajority of t h e owners of lo ts in Section Two voted to su bject the lots in Section Two to the S ection One Am end ed Declaration. In support of it s position th at
Br a e uer ’s vote along with those of the own ers of Lot 43 an d Lot 44 const ituted a majority o f
vote s, the Assoc i atio n rel i es o n a nother sectio n of the Texas Business Or ganization Code that it claims “ap plies fo r vot ing by the members. ” See Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code § 6 .157

. Section 6.15 7 addresses the voting procedure for a jointly held ownership inte rest, which it co n tend s is the c as e with Lot 62

. The Association argues that , by virtue of section 6.157 , it is irreleva nt th at Lot 62 is

o wned by someone other than Bra euer ; that because he owns

. 04 62 acres out of tha t lot, his vote

counts ; and that “ [ b]ec au se there are 4 lots, t he 2 vote s in fa vor (50%) , plus Mr

. Br aeuer ’ s
pr op ortionat e vote for lot 62, is suffici en t t o meet the simpl e majority thresh old. ” Th is argument fails because the Texas Business Organizatio ns Code itse lf provides that the only code
p ro visions th a t apply t o or gove r n chapter 252 “ nonprofit associations ” are the provision s of ch apter 252. I

d. § 252.017

. Th e voting proc edure the Association reli es on , which is found in chap ter 6 of the co de, does not apply t o a “ nonprofit associa tion. ”

Alternati v el y, t he Ass oc iati o n argues that it has standing to sue the Owners to enfo rce restrictive covenants because the S ecti on Two lot owners who executed and file d the Acknowl e dgements thereby des ign ate d the Association as thei r r epresentative to in itiate litig a ti on to e nforc e re s trictive covenants. See Tex. Prop. Code § 202.004( b) ( providing that representative desig nated by owner of real property may initiate, d efend, or intervene
in litigation affectin g enf orcement of restrictive covenant ). The Associati on a ss erts th at , b y

ex e cuting the Acknowl edgments, the Section Two property o w ners “ designate[d] the Association to govern the pr operty subject to the Section T wo plat. ” As an initial matter, the13

Association ’ s brief does not identify what l anguag e in the Ack n ow ledgem e nts p urpo r tedly d esignates it as a “ designated representative ” of Section Two lot owners or for what purpose the designation wa s made. And we find no such language in the t ext of the Acknowledgem ents themselves. Moreover, the Associ at ion does n o t explain , nor can we discern , how the Association, even i f a designated re presentative o f the Section Two lot owners, could enforce restrictive covenants a gainst the Owners that do not apply to the Property. The Associat ion ’ s reli ance on the Acknowledge m en ts t o d emons trat e their s tanding to bring this suit against the Owners is misplaced. We overrule the Associ ation ’ s fi rst appel late issue.

In it s second issue, the Association assert s that the trial court erred when on c ross mo tions for su mmary judgme n t and b ef ore r ulin g on the Owners ’ plea to the jurisdiction, it made

a finding that the Pr o p erty “ is subject to the Vista Grande, Section Two Architec tural Control Committee. ” Th e Assoc iation argues tha t (1) the Owners ’ p leading s did no t requ est this fin d ing and , th ere fore , the relief was not supported by the pleadings; (2 ) the court had no basis to grant what the Association charact erizes as declaratory relief; and (3) the Owners ’ summary judgment evidence did not conclusively establish that the Ackno wle d gements d id no t am e nd the S e ction Two Declaration and cause the Property to be subject to the Section O ne Amended Declaration. Even assumin g the trial court ’ s summary judgment order was erroneous, however, the Association has not explain ed how it cons titu t es rever si ble erro r . See Tex. R. App. P. 44.1 (no judgment may be rever sed on appeal on ground tha t trial court made error of law unless a ppellate court concludes that error complained of probably caused rendition of improper judgment).
A fter consid ering the Own ers ’ p lea t o the jurisdiction , the trial court correctly fo und that the Association lacked standing to bring a claim a gainst the Ow ners and di smissed th e suit for lack of subject

- matter jurisdiction. The Owners thereaf ter non

- sui ted th eir c ou nterc l aims ag ainst the14

A s sociation. Having ultimately deter mined that i t did not have subject

- matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the Association ’ s claims , any error by the trial court in its previous summary judgment order was harmless and doe s not constit ute r e versibl e err or. W e overrule the Association ’ s second appellate is sue.

CONCLUSION

Having overruled the Association ’ s two appellate iss u es , w e affirm the trial

court ’ s judgment

.

__________________________ ________________ Thomas J. Baker , Justic e Before Justices Baker, Kelly, and Smith Affirmed Filed: November 22, 2023