Filed 9/25/20 In re D.N. CA2/8

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

In re D.N. et al., Persons Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

______________________________

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

A.N., Sr.,

Defendant and Appellant;

E.P., Sr.,

Defendant and Respondent.

B299211

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. 

19CCJP01974A,B)

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles 

County, Brett Bianco, Judge. Affirmed.
2

Christopher Blake, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, Kristine P. Miles, 

Assistant County Counsel, and Kim Nemoy, Principal Deputy 

County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Jesse McGowan, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Respondent.

_______________________

In this juvenile dependency appeal, Alejandro N. challenges 

two rulings: a paternity finding about a child, and a separate 

denial of reunification services. He has forfeited the first issue 

about paternity. On the second issue, the juvenile court had good 

reason to rule as it did. We affirm all around.

I

Confidentiality and anonymity are desirable in juvenile 

dependency actions, but can make it hard to describe clearly the 

actors in an appeal. That problem is acute here, for there are 

many actors, and generic labels conceal their memorable 

individuality. We balance the interests at stake, favoring the 

interest in confidentiality. But we regret the abstracted nature of 

the factual presentation that follows. 

A

First, the people. This appeal involves three parties. 

The appellant is Alejandro N., whom the juvenile court 

declared the presumed father of two girls. 

The respondents are the Department of Children and 

Family Services and a man named Edgar P., who has been 

declared the presumed father of the younger of the two girls. 

Neither the mother nor the girls themselves are parties in 

this appeal.
3

For the first issue, the paternity issue, the two appellate 

actors are the two men: appellant Alejandro N. versus 

respondent Edgar P. Alejandro N. wants to be the sole presumed 

father of the younger girl. Alejandro N. attacks the court finding 

that Edgar P. is also a presumed father of this girl.

On the second issue, the reunification issue, one party 

again is appellant Alejandro N. He wanted family reunification 

services from the Department. The Department opposes this 

demand, which the juvenile court denied.

B

Next, the procedural history, which is extensive. Alejandro 

N. and Edgar P. both have been involved with Mother, who has 

seven children. Drug use and domestic violence have plagued the 

relationships. These two men, this woman, and these children 

have been involved in three different and successive juvenile 

dependency actions over the years. These actions were in 2007, 

2012, and 2019. This appeal is from an action begun in 2019. 

We sketch the 2007, 2012, and 2019 cases.

1

The 2007 case involved four children Alejandro N. had with 

Mother. These children are different from the girls in this case. 

The juvenile court removed these four children from Mother’s and 

Alejandro N.’s custody and offered reunification services but the 

parents failed to reunify. The maternal grandparents adopted 

these children in 2008. These children are not parties to this 

appeal.
4

2

The 2012 action involved three children, two of whom are 

the girls involved in this case. The third child is not involved in 

this case. 

The juvenile court declared Alejandro N. to be the 

presumed father of the two girls. This juvenile court closed this 

case with a family law order granting Mother sole custody and

giving Alejandro N. monitored visits. 

3

The 2019 action began on March 28, 2019, when the 

Department acted on behalf of three children. Two were the girls 

from the 2012 case, who were ages 10 and eight by the time of the 

disputed hearings in this case. We call these girls the 10-year-old 

girl and the eight-year-old girl. The third child was a one-yearold boy whose father is Edgar P. This boy is not involved in this 

appeal.

We have transcripts from four hearings in this 2019 action: 

March 29; April 2; May 9; and May 20. 

Before we review each hearing date by date, we observe the 

first two hearings, on March 29, 2019 and April 2, 2019, 

proceeded without involving Alejandro N., who entered prison on 

July 13, 2018. The term was four years for domestic violence. 

For the third and fourth hearings, however, Alejandro N. 

appeared by phone and was represented by an attorney in the 

courtroom.

a

On March 29, 2019, the juvenile court proposed to find 

Edgar P. to be the presumed father of the eight-year-old girl and 

the 10-year-old girl, based on statements by Mother and Edgar P. 

The attorney for the girls asked the court to defer this paternity 
5

finding as to the eight-year-old girl until the attorney could speak 

to the girl “about either relationship with the fathers . . . .” The 

girl reportedly had not been able to come to court that day 

because of lice. The court agreed to defer the question of 

paternity. 

b

At the April 2, 2019 hearing, the girls attended and their 

attorney was able to speak with them. The court returned to the 

topic of paternity. The girls’ lawyer asked the court to find 

Alejandro N. was the presumed father of the 10 year old and 

Edgar P. was the presumed father of the eight year old. The 

court agreed and ordered these findings. 

Recall the court in 2012 had designated Alejandro N. as the 

presumed father of both girls. So, as of April 2, 2019, Alejandro 

N. remained the presumed father of both girls, and now the court 

had added Edgar P. to be the second presumed father of the eight 

year old.

c

The court reconvened on May 9, 2019, now with the 

telephone participation of Alejandro N. from his place of 

incarceration. The court appointed counsel for Alejandro N. This 

attorney actively participated. 

The court asked Alejandro N.’s attorney whether she 

wanted to speak to the issue of parentage. She said yes: her 

client wanted “presumed father status” for the eight-year-old girl. 

The attorney noted the court previously found Alejandro N. to be 

the presumed father of the 10 year old. The court said, “All right. 

Thank you. Does anyone wish to be heard on that issue?” 
6

The attorney for Edgar P. reported his client “has no 

objection as he retains his presumed [father] status as well” for 

the eight-year-old girl. 

Alejandro N. thus asked the court to find the eight-year-old 

girl had two legally presumed fathers. No one objected. No one 

asked for DNA or other analysis to ascertain whether Alejandro 

N. or Edgar P. was her biological father.

The court did as Alejandro N. asked: it found both 

Alejandro N. and Edgar P. to be the presumed fathers of the 

eight-year-old girl. 

The parties turned to other topics. One was the 

Department’s recommendation Alejandro N. should receive no 

family reunification services. The court continued the matter so 

Alejandro N.’s lawyer could gather information on this score. 

d

The final hearing was on May 20, 2019. The Department 

reiterated its recommendation that Alejandro N. should receive 

no family reunification services. The girl’s attorney shared this 

view. Mother’s lawyer took no position. 

The court thanked the lawyers for their comments and 

solicited Alejandro N.’s views. His attorney asked for 

reunification services to Alejandro N. The juvenile court thanked 

counsel and denied reunification services for Alejandro N., citing 

Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5, subdivisions (b)(10), 

(11), and (e). 

Alejandro N.’s lawyer expressly objected to this ruling. The 

court thanked counsel for her comment. 

The court added that, should Alejandro N. “be paroled and 

if he can demonstrate that he has addressed the issues that led to 

the issues that brought him before the court and if he’s interested 
7

in reunification services at that time, he can always file a 

[petition for a change of order under section] 388” of the Welfare 

and Institutions Code. 

Alejandro N. appealed. No one joins his appeal. In 

particular, neither the girls nor their mother have appealed or 

have given us briefing. 

II 

Alejandro N. raises two issues. 

First, he objects to the juvenile court’s order that Edgar P. 

is a presumed father of the eight-year-old girl. Alejandro N. 

would like to oust Edgar P. and would like to be the sole 

presumed father of this girl. The girl has not joined his appeal, 

nor has Mother. Only Edgar P. disputes this argument; the 

Department takes no position.

Second, Alejandro N. objects to being denied family 

reunification services. The Department responds on this issue; 

Edgar P. takes no position on it.

We treat these two issues in turn.

A

Alejandro N.’s first claim is the juvenile court erred by 

finding Edgar P. is a presumed father of the eight-year-old girl. 

Alejandro N. argues he and he alone should be this girl’s 

presumed father.

Alejandro N. has forfeited this argument.

The attorney for Alejandro N. never presented this 

argument to the juvenile court. His attorney did not object to the 

decisions at the May 9, 2019 hearing. Rather, Alejandro N.’s 

lawyer informed the court the eight-year-old girl currently had a 

presumed father—this was Edgar P.—and then requested that 

Alejandro N. be added as her second presumed father. 
8

The juvenile court granted Alejandro N.’s request. 

Afterwards, counsel for Alejandro N. expressly and on the 

record stated there was no objection. 

This is forfeiture.

A party forfeits its claim of error on appeal if the party 

failed to raise the issue in the trial court. (In re S.B. (2004) 

32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293.) Alejandro N. admits his lawyer did not 

raise this issue in the trial court. 

The forfeiture rule is a fundamental precept of sensible 

appellate administration. The rule encourages parties to bring 

issues to the attention of the trial court in a timely fashion, thus 

giving the other side notice and an opportunity to be heard. Once 

alerted by an objection, the trial court also can attempt to resolve 

the issue swiftly and efficiently. If a party does not object to the 

trial court but instead waits to announce dissatisfaction only in 

an appellate forum, it causes delay. This delay can be glacial in 

terms of the life of an eight year old. It also hinders 

opportunities for informed and inventive trial courts to facilitate 

dispute resolution on the spot. (See People v. Welch (1993) 

5 Cal.4th 228, 236 [requiring objections encourages “development 

of the record and a proper exercise of discretion in the trial 

court”].)

Alejandro N. claims it would have been futile for his lawyer 

to object to the trial court. This argument is misplaced. Nothing 

about either of the two hearings would have made it futile for his 

counsel to object. (Cf. People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 821

[finding futility when trial court responded to appellant’s 

objections with comments before the jury suggesting lawyer was 

an obstructionist who was delaying the trial with meritless 

objections, and opposing counsel demeaned appellant with a 
9

barrage of unethical attacks the trial court consistently failed to 

rein in, all of which created a “poisonous” trial atmosphere].) 

The juvenile court’s conduct of these hearings was 

respectful, receptive, and professional in every way. The court 

made counsel’s contributions welcome, not futile. The court 

thanked counsel for their contributions.

Alejandro N. protests the hearing on April 2, 2019. He says 

that the trial court should not have made paternity findings at 

this detention hearing, that this earlier hearing was “nothing 

more than a travesty,” and that the trial court “should have 

vacated its own rulings sua sponte and not waited for any request 

from any of the parties.” These protests do not alter the decision 

by Alejandro N.’s lawyer on May 9, 2019 to avoid questions about 

the presumed paternal status of Edgar P. On the record, the trial 

court demonstrated its willingness to hear from all counsel on 

any issue counsel cared to raise. Alejandro N.’s lawyer made one 

request of the court, which it granted, and signified there were no 

other concerns. This inaction, possibly tactical in character, 

forfeited Alejandro N.’s ability to appeal a decision he did not 

challenge in the trial court.

B

The second issue is whether the juvenile court erred by 

denying reunification services to Alejandro N. This order was not 

error. It was proper under subdivision (b)(10) of Welfare and 

Institutions Code section 361.5. 

The facts are undisputed. When these hearings began, the 

two girls were not in Alejandro N.’s custody, nor did he request 

custody at the disposition hearing. Alejandro N. raises the legal 

question of whether the juvenile court could nonetheless remove 

the girls from his custody and proceed to deny him reunification 
10

services. We independently review this legal question. (In re 

R.C. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 741, 748.)

The pertinent statute is subdivision (b)(10) of Welfare and 

Institutions Code section 361.5. This statute has a two-pronged 

test. The first prong need not detain us; Alejandro N. concedes it. 

The second prong (with our italics) inquires whether 

Alejandro N. “subsequently made a reasonable effort to treat the 

problems that led to removal of the sibling or half sibling of that 

child from that parent.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 361.5, subd. 

(b)(10).) We italicize “problems” because this case turns on that 

statutory word.

Alejandro N. says his past “problems” were confined to 

drug problems, and there was no proof at the hearing that he has 

had recent or current drug problems during his incarceration. 

The Department correctly responds, however, that 

Alejandro N.’s past parenting problems were not limited to drug 

problems. Alejandro N. also had a domestic violence problem. 

The record included information about his verbal altercations 

that placed children at risk of physical harm, damage, and 

danger. 

The Department likewise observes Alejandro N. was 

serving a four-year sentence for domestic violence at the time of 

the juvenile court hearing. 

Alejandro N.’s retrograde motion contradicts his suggestion 

he has made “a reasonable effort” to treat his domestic violence 

problem. 

As a matter of law, this domestic violence incarceration 

shows the juvenile court was right to deny Alejandro N.’s request 

for family reunification services.
11

In reply, Alejandro N. maintains there were no allegations 

of domestic violence against him in this 2019 case. “So the fact 

that he may have had domestic violence issues with someone who 

had no connection with the children so far as this record is 

concerned is irrelevant.” 

Not so. A propensity to commit domestic violence is a 

problem transcending any single legal case. (E.g., Evid. Code, 

§ 1109, subd. (a)(1).) Alejandro N.’s domestic violence 

incarceration validates the juvenile court’s ruling.

DISPOSITION

We affirm.

WILEY, J. 

WE CONCUR:

BIGELOW, P. J. 

STRATTON, J.