2024 IL App (1st) 221088

No. 1-22-1088 

FIRST DIVISION

April 29, 2024 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

R. SCOTT ALSTERDA, in His Capacity as Bankruptcy 

Trustee for the Estate of Jaime Mireles, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

THOMAS J. DART and THE COOK COUNTY 

SHERIFF’S MERIT BOARD, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

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Appeal from the Circuit Court 

of Cook County. 

No. 15 CH 03489 

Honorable 

Neil H. Cohen, 

Judge presiding.

JUSTICE PUCINSKI delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 

Presiding Justice Fitzgerald Smith and Justice Lavin concurred in the judgment and 

opinion. 

OPINION

¶ 1 Plaintiff R. Scott Alsterda, in his capacity as bankruptcy trustee for the estate of Jamie 

Mireles, appeals from the circuit court’s June 2022 order dismissing his second amended 

complaint with prejudice. For the following reasons, we affirm. 

¶ 2 BACKGROUND
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¶ 3 Mireles was formerly employed as a correction officer by the Cook County Sheriff’s 

Department. On July 22, 2014, Thomas J. Dart, in his capacity as Cook County Sheriff

(Sheriff), filed a complaint against Mireles with the Cook County Sheriff’s Merit Board 

(Board). The Sheriff alleged that on March 31, 2012, Mireles used excessive force when he 

struck a detainee’s face with his hand. The Sheriff also alleged that Mireles failed to submit an 

incident report documenting the use of force or to present himself to be interviewed about the 

incident. The complaint requested that Mireles’s employment be terminated.

¶ 4 The Board’s Termination Decision and Mireles’s Prior Appeal

¶ 5 The Board conducted a hearing on October 23, 2014. In January 2015, the Board issued a 

final administrative decision upholding the charges against Mireles and terminating his 

employment. The decision was signed by eight Board members, including John Rosales. 

¶ 6 On February 27, 2015, Mireles filed a complaint for administrative review in the circuit 

court of Cook County. On January 7, 2016, the circuit court entered an order affirming the 

Board’s decision.

¶ 7 Mireles appealed to this court, raising a number of arguments. Among these, he claimed

that his use of force was not excessive; the investigation into the incident was insufficient; and 

the Board’s determination that he failed to properly report the incident was against the manifest 

weight of the evidence. Mireles v. Cook County Sheriff’s Merit Board, No. 1-16-0203 (Mar. 8, 

2017) (unpublished summary order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23(c)). Notably, Mireles 

did not raise any challenge to the composition of the Board. In March 2017, this court affirmed

the Board’s termination decision. Id.

¶ 8 The 2014 Circuit Court Decision in Taylor v. Dart and Affirmance by Our Court 
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¶ 9 In a separate proceeding involving a different employee’s termination by the Board, in 

August 2014 the circuit court issued a decision that forms the basis of Mireles’s current appeal. 

Specifically, in Taylor v. Dart, No. 13-CH-26319 (Cir. Ct. Cook County) (Aug. 19, 2014), the 

circuit court vacated a termination decision on the basis that one of the Board members, 

Rosales, was not duly appointed under the governing statute. Specifically, whereas section 3-

7002 of the Counties Code (55 ILCS 5/3-7002 (West 2012)) required Board members to be 

appointed for six-year terms, Rosales was appointed for a term of less than one year. The circuit 

court in Taylor found that the Board “was not lawfully constituted at the time of the hearing 

and decision” so that the termination decision was invalid.

¶ 10 After the Sheriff and Board appealed, we agreed with the circuit court that the Board 

decision was void because it was “illegally constituted” at the time of Taylor’s termination 

decision. Taylor v. Dart, 2016 IL App (1st) 143684, ¶ 47. In January 2017, our supreme court 

issued a supervisory order directing our court to additionally consider whether the Cook 

County Board of Commissions had home rule authority to approve interim appointments to 

the Board. Taylor v. Dart, No. 121507 (Ill. Jan. 25, 2017). Pursuant to that supervisory order, 

this court issued another opinion, holding that that (1) the Board was not authorized to appoint 

an individual for less than a six-year term, (2) Rosales’s participation in Taylor’s termination 

decision rendered it void, and (3) the Cook County Board of Commissioners did not have home 

rule authority to approve interim appointments. Taylor v. Dart, 2017 IL App (1st) 143684-B.

¶ 11 Mireles Challenges His Termination Decision on the Basis of Taylor

¶ 12 In October 2017, Mireles filed a petition pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil 

Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2016)) seeking to vacate the January 2016 circuit court 

judgment that affirmed the Board decision. Mireles asserted, for the first time, that the Board’s 
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decision was void because one or more members “were not duly appointed” at the time it 

rendered the January 2015 decision. He noted that Rosales (whose appointment was found 

invalid by our court’s decisions in Taylor) was a member of the Board that rendered his 

termination decision. Thus, he urged that the Board was “illegally constituted” pursuant to 

Taylor and the Board’s decision was void. 

¶ 13 The Sheriff moved to dismiss Mireles’s section 2-1401 petition, arguing, inter alia, that 

section 2-1401 could not be used to challenge an administrative decision and that Mireles 

“waived or forfeited his argument that the Merit Board was not properly constituted” by not 

previously raising it. In April 2018, the circuit court granted the Sheriff’s motion to dismiss 

the section 2-1401 petition and remanded the case to the Board. 

¶ 14 The Sheriff subsequently moved to reconsider the April 2018 remand order based on “new 

and controlling law” applying the de facto officer doctrine to bar similar challenges based on 

the invalidity of the Board members. Specifically, the Sheriff argued that Lopez v. Dart, 2018 

IL App (1st) 170733, and Cruz v. Dart, 2019 IL App (1st) 170915, had “altered the legal 

application of Taylor v. Dart.” The Sheriff argued that in light of those decisions, the de facto

officer doctrine barred Mireles from relying on Taylor to collaterally attack his termination 

decision.

¶ 15 In his opposition to the Sheriff’s motion, Mireles argued that the de facto officer doctrine 

did not apply to him. He also asserted that all eight of the Board members who participated in 

his termination decision (not just Rosales) were illegally appointed for terms of less than six 

years. 

¶ 16 The circuit court stayed any decision on the Sheriff’s motion to reconsider, citing the

pending appeal before our supreme court in Goral v. Dart. Our supreme court issued that 
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decision in October 2020. Goral v. Dart, 2020 IL 125085. In January 2021, the Sheriff filed a 

motion to “recall and dismiss the case,” arguing that the supreme court’s decision in Goral

made clear that the de facto officer doctrine bars a challenge to the composition of the Board 

that is not asserted until after the Board has taken “substantive action.” 

¶ 17 Substitution of Plaintiff and Filing of the Second Amended Complaint 

¶ 18 In May 2021, Alsterda, as bankruptcy trustee for Mireles’s estate, moved for substitution 

as plaintiff.1 In January 2022, the circuit court granted the substitution motion.2 In the same 

order, the circuit court granted leave to file a superseding amended complaint. 

¶ 19 On January 14, 2022, Mireles filed a second amended complaint for judicial review of the 

Board’s January 2015 decision. Mireles pleaded two counts, only one of which is germane to 

this appeal. In count I, Mireles sought review under the administrative review law, but he 

explicitly recognized “this count had already been ruled upon and it is included solely for the 

purpose of preserving it for any appeal.”3

¶ 20 The second count was entitled “declaratory judgment” and sought to invalidate Mireles’s 

termination decision based on the composition of the Board, combined with the fact that the 

Board rendered its decision after the August 2014 circuit court order in Taylor. In that count, 

Mireles alleged that the Board was defective in several respects when it rendered the January 

2015 termination decision. First, Rosales was one of the Board members, notwithstanding that 

he had “already been determined improperly-seated” by the prior August 2014 Taylor order. 

1 The record reflects that in May 2015, Mireles filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy in the U.S. 

Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois.

2 For ease of reference, we refer to plaintiff-appellant as “Mireles” notwithstanding the 

substitution of Mireles’s bankruptcy trustee as the party plaintiff. 

3 In briefing in the circuit court, Mireles acknowledged he included this count to preserve it for 

appeal but was “not seeking to relitigate” that count.
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Further, Mireles alleged that several other Board members had been appointed to terms of less 

than six-years and that certain of these were “non-staggered.” Mireles alleged that the August 

2014 Taylor order “put the Sheriff and the Board on notice of the defects,” yet his termination 

decision was entered in January 2015 without “any action to fix the defects in the 

appointments.” 

¶ 21 Mireles additionally pleaded that the Board decision “could not be protected by the de facto

officer doctrine” in light of the circuit court’s August 2014 Taylor order. Mireles 

acknowledged that he did not raise these defects in his proceedings before the Board, but he 

alleged “he did not need to as a matter of law once Taylor’s challenge was made because the 

doctrine is ‘backward looking’ and does not allow a Board with defectsto continue operating.”

¶ 22 Mireles’s second amended complaint thus sought declarations that the Board was illegally 

constituted during his proceedings before the Board “from the [August 2014] Taylor order 

onward,” including his January 2015 termination decision, and that the de facto office doctrine 

did not apply to him. 

¶ 23 In February 2022, the Sheriff moved to dismiss Mireles’s second amended complaint

pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2022)). 

The Sheriff argued that the de facto officer doctrine warranted dismissal because Mireles did 

not raise a timely challenge to the composition of the Board. The Sheriff urged that application 

of the de facto officer doctrine was supported by the 2020 supreme court decision in Goral and 

several other appellate court decisions. The Board subsequently joined the Sheriff’s motion to 

dismiss. Mireles filed an opposition to the motion. 

¶ 24 The Circuit Court Dismisses the Second Amended Complaint
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¶ 25 On June 23, 2022, the circuit court dismissed the second amended complaint with 

prejudice. The circuit court first acknowledged that “Count I is clearly pled solely to preserve 

the issue for appeal.” The circuit court proceeded to agree with the Sheriff that count II was 

barred by the de facto officer doctrine, relying on the supreme court decision in Goral and First 

District case law. The circuit court rejected Mireles’s argument that the doctrine should not 

apply to his challenge to the Board’s January 2015 decision because the Board was already

“on notice” that it was “illegally constituted” after the 2014 circuit court order in Taylor. The 

circuit court noted that the First District had applied the de facto officer doctrine in Cruz, 2019 

IL App (1st) 170915, and Lopez, 2018 IL App (1st) 170733, notwithstanding that the Board 

decisions at issue in those cases were also rendered after the 2014 Taylor order. 

¶ 26 Further, the circuit court found that in Malacina v. Cook County Sheriff’s Merit Board, 

2021 IL App (1st) 191893, “the First District has now expressly held that the de facto officer 

doctrine applies unless the plaintiff raised the issue of the illegal composition of the Merit 

Board before the issuance of the final administrative decision.” The circuit court concluded 

that because Mireles “never raised the issue of the Merit Board’s composition prior to the 

issuance of the final administrative decision,” count II of the second amended complaint was 

barred by the de facto officer doctrine. On that basis, it dismissed the second amended 

complaint.

¶ 27 Mireles filed a timely appeal. 

¶ 28 ANALYSIS

¶ 29 On appeal, Mireles maintains that the January 2015 decision was invalid because Rosales 

and other Board members were seated for less than six-year terms. He emphasizes that the 

decision against him was issued after the circuit court’s 2014 decision in Taylor vacating a 
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Board decision due to Rosales’s illegal appointment. He thus reasons that the Sheriff and Board 

were “put on notice that such a defect violated the Act,” yet the Board issued the 2015 decision 

against him without correcting the defects in its composition. Because he asserts that the circuit 

court in Taylor decision put the Board on “notice” of the defects, he maintains that it is 

inequitable to apply the de facto officer doctrine against him. In doing so, he emphasizes 

certain language in this court’s decision in Goral that the doctrine “looks backward” but does 

not permit an illegally constituted board to “keep doing business” after a court declares it 

invalid. Goral v. Dart, 2019 IL App (1st) 181646, ¶ 101. He suggests he raises a unique 

argument that distinguishes his case from other recent precedent applying the de facto officer 

doctrine to bar similar challenges to Board decisions.

¶ 30 In response, the Sheriff first contends that, as a procedural matter, Mireles’s second 

amended complaint was barred by waiver, forfeiture, or res judicata because Mireles did not 

challenge the composition of the Board until after his prior appeal. Secondly, the Sheriff argues 

that the circuit court correctly found that the de facto officer doctrine bars Mireles’s challenge, 

as he did not raise any issue concerning the composition of the Board until long after it rendered 

in its January 2015 termination decision. 

¶ 31 For the following reasons, we affirm the dismissal of the second amended complaint. 

¶ 32 Standard of Review

¶ 33 With respect to the standard of review, we note that Mireles’s brief recites the standards 

for challenging a decision pursuant to the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3-101 et 

seq. (West 2022)). See Medponics Illinois, LLC v. Department of Agriculture, 2021 IL 125443, 

¶ 29 (describing standard for reviewing administrative agency’s determinations on questions 

of law, fact or mixed questions of law and fact). However, in this appeal he is not directly 
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challenging a decision of the Board. Rather, he appeals from the dismissal of count II of his 

second amended complaint, in which he sought a declaratory judgment from the circuit court 

that, inter alia, the Board was not legally constituted at the time of his termination decision 

and that de facto officer doctrine did not apply to him.

¶ 34 The trial court granted the motion to dismiss under section 2-615 of the Code of Civil 

Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2022)). Such a motion “challenges the legal sufficiency 

of a complaint based on defects apparent on its face,” and an order granting such a motion is 

reviewed de novo. Marshall v. Burger King Corp., 222 Ill. 2d 422, 429 (2006); see Cahokia 

Unit School District No. 187 v. Pritzker, 2021 IL 126212, ¶ 24 (de novo review applies to a 

dismissal under either section 2-615 or section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure).4

¶ 35 Res Judicata Bars Mireles’s Current Claim Because It Could Have Been Raised Earlier

¶ 36 Before we delve into the parties’ arguments regarding the application of the de facto officer 

doctrine, we address the Sheriff’s threshold arguments that Mireles’s second amended 

complaint is procedurally barred by waiver, forfeiture, or res judicata. The Sheriff points out 

that Mireles did not raise any argument disputing the validity of the Board that rendered his 

termination decision, either in the prior administrative review action in the circuit court, or in

his corresponding unsuccessful appeal to this court. See Mireles, No. 1-16-0203. 

¶ 37 We find the Sheriff’s res judicata argument persuasive. “The doctrine of res judicata

provides that a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction bars 

4 We note that the Sheriff’s motion to dismiss could properly have been asserted as one under 

section 2-619, which “admits the legal sufficiency of the claim but asserts defenses or defects outside the 

pleading to defeat the claim.” Cahokia Unit School District No. 187, 2021 IL 126212, ¶ 23. In any event, 

the standard of review is the same.
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any subsequent actions between the same parties or their privies on the same cause of action.” 

Hudson v. City of Chicago, 228 Ill. 2d 462, 467 (2008). “Three requirements must be satisfied 

for res judicata to apply: (1) a final judgment on the merits has been rendered by a court of 

competent jurisdiction; (2) an identity of cause of action exists; and (3) the parties or their 

privies are identical in both actions.” Id. The doctrine “bars not only what was actually decided 

in the first action but also whatever could have been decided.” Id. 

¶ 38 In his reply brief, Mireles does not dispute that the parties or their privies in his original 

action for administrative review and his current challenge are identical. However, he asserts 

that the other two elements of res judicata are missing. First, he claims there was no “final 

judgment” because “[t]he entire premise of Mireles’ 2-1401 petition was to aver that the Merit 

board’s termination decision is void because the Board was not properly constituted.” Thus, 

he claims “res judicata does not apply because the decision is void and does not constitute a 

final judgment.” 

¶ 39 This argument is unpersuasive. Notwithstanding his current assertion that the Board’s 

decision was void, his original complaint for administrative review and prior appeal resulted 

in two final judgments on the merits rendered by courts of competent jurisdiction: the circuit 

court’s January 2016 decision, as well as this court’s March 2017 order affirming the Board’s 

determination. Mireles, No. 1-16-0203. Mireles does not attempt to suggest that this court’s 

prior decision in his original appeal was not a final judgment rendered by a court without 

jurisdiction. We find that the prior court decisions constituted final judgment on the merits that 

fulfilled this element of res judicata.

¶ 40 Mireles otherwise asserts there is no identity of cause of action because his “initial appeal 

was about whether or not the Board’s decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence” 
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and the merits of whether his termination was justified, whereas “[t]he 2-1401 petition relates 

to the Board having improperly-seated members and the decision being void as a result.”5

Thus, he claims his prior appeal and this one do not have “the same body of operative facts.” 

¶ 41 We disagree, keeping in mind that “Illinois has adopted the transactional test in 

determining whether an identity of cause of action exists for purposes of res judicata.” Oshana 

v. FCL Builders, Inc., 2013 IL App (1st) 120851, ¶ 34 (citing River Park, Inc. v. City of 

Highland Park, 184 Ill. 2d 290, 309-11 (1998)). Under this test, “claims are part of the same 

cause of action if they arise from the same transaction or series of connected transactions.”

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. “Subsequent claims may be barred if they originate 

from a single group of operative facts.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Significantly, 

this proposition applies “regardless of whether the claims assert different theories of relief or 

are based on evidence that does not substantially overlap, as long as they arise from the same 

transaction.” Id.

¶ 42 Although Mireles’s instant challenge to the Board decision is based on a very different 

legal theory from his prior appeal, both challenges are based on the same transaction: the 

January 2015 Board decision. All of the operative facts underlying the instant appeal—

including the identity of each Board member that participated in the decision—were already 

known at the time of his prior challenge to the decision and related appeal. Although Mireles 

chose not to raise any claim disputing the validity of any Board member’s appointment in the

prior proceedings, that does not mean his current challenge is based on a different “transaction” 

5 We note that Mireles’s reference in his briefing to “the 2-1401 petition” is puzzling, since the 

record reflects that the section 2-1401 petition was superseded by the second amended complaint, whose 

dismissal is the subject of this appeal.
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for purposes of res judicata. We agree with the Sheriff that insofar as both challenges were 

premised on the same Board decision, they arise from the same transaction.

¶ 43 Finally, although Mireles does not dispute the point, we find that there is an “identity of 

parties or their privies” for application of res judicata. Hudson, 228 Ill. 2d at 470. We recognize 

that the prior challenge and related appeal were brought by Mireles personally, whereas his 

bankruptcy trustee was substituted as the party plaintiff before filing the second amended 

complaint that is the subject of this appeal. However, for res judicata purposes, “[a] nonparty 

may be bound pursuant to privity if his interests are so closely aligned to those of a party that 

the party is the virtual representative of the nonparty.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) 

Oshana, 2013 IL App (1st) 120851, ¶ 23. It is clear that a bankruptcy trustee is aligned with 

the interests of debtor (Mireles), such that they are in privity for purposes of applying

res judicata. 

¶ 44 We thus agree with the Sheriff that the current challenge is barred by res judicata. This is 

an independent ground for affirming dismissal of the second amended complaint. Nonetheless, 

even assuming that res judicata did not apply, we otherwise agree with the circuit court that 

the de facto officer doctrine independently warranted dismissal.

¶ 45 De Facto Officer Doctrine

¶ 46 “The de facto officer rule is a common law equitable doctrine that confers validity on acts 

performed by an official acting under the color of official title, even though it is later 

determined that the official’s appointment to that position was legally deficient.” Malacina, 

2021 IL App (1st) 191893, ¶ 20 (citing Goral, 2020 IL 125085, ¶ 71). “Under the doctrine, the 

acts of a person actually performing the duties of an office under color of title are valid so far 

as the public or third parties who have an interest in them are concerned.” Goral, 2020 IL 
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125085, ¶ 71. The doctrine is meant to “avoid the chaos that would result from multiple and 

repetitious suits challenging every action taken by every official whose claim to office could 

be open to question.” Id.

¶ 47 The doctrine “is applied as a defense to an attack on the acts of an officer or appointee in a 

collateral proceeding,” which “necessarily requires a prior act or judgment that is, or may be, 

subject to attack.” Id. ¶ 72. “[T]he doctrine was never intended to preclude a timely challenge 

to an official’s authority; it is, instead, a defense to a collateral challenge brought after the 

official’s action has been completed.” (Emphasis in original and omitted.) Malacina, 2021 IL 

App (1st) 191893, ¶ 21. 

¶ 48 This district has applied a “first challenger exception” to the de facto officer doctrine, by 

which “the first individual to raise a challenge to an official’s authority to act is entitled to 

relief—a reward for exposing the defective appointment.” Id. ¶ 23. However, “once that first 

party secures the court ruling invalidating the Board’s composition (and gets relief for having 

done so), any previous final decisions from that illegally constituted board are insulated from 

challenge.” Goral, 2019 IL App (1st) 181646, ¶ 91. Consistent with this exception, the Taylor 

plaintiff—the first one to raise the defect in the Board member Rosales’s appointment—

received the benefit of having his termination decision vacated. Taylor, 2017 IL App (1st)

143684-B. However, this district has “taken a narrow view of the ‘first challenger’ exception. 

Malacina, 2021 IL App (1st) 191893, ¶ 25 (recognizing that “in Cruz, 2019 IL App (1st) 

170915, we held that a post-decision challenge to the composition of the Board was barred by 

the de facto officer rule, even though Cruz identified different invalidly appointed officials” 

than the one identified in Taylor). 
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¶ 49 Following this court’s determination in Taylor that Rosales was invalidly appointed 

(Taylor, 2017 IL App (1st) 143684-B), this court has consistently applied the de facto officer

doctrine to bar a number of similar challenges to Board’s authority, where the challenges were 

not asserted until after the Board’s issued a final decision. See, e.g., Acevedo v. Cook County 

Sheriff’s Merit Board, 2019 IL App (1st) 181128, ¶ 25 (plaintiff’s claim that his termination 

decision was void because Rosales participated in it was barred by the de facto officer doctrine

where “Acevedo raises the same issue with Rosales’s appointment as was raised in Taylor, 

Lopez, and Cruz—an appointment to a term of less than six years”); Cruz, 2019 IL App (1st) 

170915, ¶ 38 (de facto officer doctrine applied to attempt to void decision based on 

appointments of three other Board members to terms of less than six years, which was “the 

same problem with the appointment procedure that was before us in Taylor and Lopez”); Lopez, 

2018 IL App (1st) 170733, ¶ 59 (applying de facto officer doctrine where Lopez was “not the 

first claimant to have brought the illegal appointment of Rosales to light,” reasoning this “will 

circumvent the upheaval that would doubtlessly result if we were to invalidate the Merit 

Board’s decision and invite hundreds of plaintiffs” to challenge decisions rendered during 

Rosales’s “unauthorized term”).

¶ 50 By contrast, in Goral, both this court and our supreme court rejected the Sheriff’s reliance 

on the de facto officerdoctrine where the plaintiffstimely challenged the authority of the Board

by filing a complaint before the Board had rendered decisions against them. See Goral, 2019 

IL App (1st) 181646, ¶ 1 (explaining that Goral plaintiffs consisted of employees charged by 

the Sheriff with disciplinary infractions who “[f]rom the outset of their administrative cases

*** have challenged the authority of the Board to hear their cases, based on claims that the 

Board is illegally constituted”). This court’s decision explained that the doctrine did not apply 
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to the Goral plaintiffs because at the time they filed a lawsuit challenging the validity of

Board’s composition, “none of plaintiffs’ administrative actions had gone to a final decision.” 

Id. ¶ 99. Rather, they “have been raising statutory-authority arguments before the Board since 

their cases began.” Id.

¶ 51 Our court in Goral went on to emphasize that the timing of the challenge “makes all the 

difference in the world.” Id. ¶ 100. Then, in language relied upon by Mireles in this appeal, we 

went on to say: 

“The ‘de facto officer’ doctrine is concerned with the fear of unearthing old decisions 

***. But that doctrine is not—and could not—be concerned with pending or brand-new 

cases. Once a court decides that a board is illegally constituted, that board can’t keep 

hearing pending cases, much less entertain newly filed ones. To say otherwise would 

be to say that court decisions mean nothing. 

The ‘de facto officer’ doctrine looks backward. It does not look forward. Once a 

court declares a board’s composition invalid, we may protect its old decisions, but we 

absolutely do not allow it to keep doing business—illegally—as if we had never issued 

our ruling.” (Emphasis omitted.) Id. ¶¶ 100-01. 

¶ 52 Our supreme court affirmed, emphasizing that the timing of the plaintiffs’ challenge 

precluded application of the de facto officer doctrine: 

“Timing matters. Here, given that the Merit Board had not taken any substantive action 

regarding plaintiffs’ disciplinary charges prior to the filing of their lawsuit in circuit court, 

we conclude that the de facto officer doctrine does not apply. Plaintiffs were not trying to 

unwind or undermine any administrative determination by the Merit Board. At the time 

plaintiffs filed both their original and second amended complaints, there had been no action 
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or judgment by the Merit Board in plaintiffs’ proceedings to which the doctrine could 

confer validity. Because the de facto officer doctrine has not been—and should not be—

employed as an obstacle to preclude a timely challenge to the authority of an administrative 

agency, it does not justify the dismissal of plaintiffs’ complaint.” Goral, 2020 IL 125085, 

¶ 75. 

¶ 53 The De Facto Officer Doctrine Applies to Bar Mireles’s Challenge

¶ 54 Mireles urges that despite the above precedent, he presents an argument against application 

of the de facto officer doctrine that is unique and unresolved by this court. His position is that 

after the 2014 circuit court decision in Taylor, the Board was on notice of any defective 

appointments and thus had an obligation to correct them before it issued the 2015 decision 

terminating him. He suggests that this invalidates the decision, regardless of when he first 

raised a challenge to the Board’s composition. That is, he argues that the “timing matters” 

language from the supreme court decision in Goral does not addresshis “particular issue: what 

effect does the original [circuit court] Taylor Order have on the application of the de facto

officer doctrine given that [our appellate court decision in Goral] recognized that the doctrine 

is ‘backwards looking’?” 

¶ 55 To be clear, Mireles does not dispute that he did not challenge the Board’s composition 

before it rendered a decision against him. Rather, relying on the language from this court’s 

opinion in Goral that a board should not be permitted to “keep doing business” after a court 

declares its composition invalid (2019 IL App (1st) 181646, ¶ 101), he suggests the Board was

obligated to “fix[ ] itself” after it was put on notice by the circuit court’s 2014 Taylor order.

He suggests there should be no obligation to raise a timely challenge to the Board’s 

composition, as it is “unjust” to “place the onus on officers to raise an objection” when the 
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Board and the Sheriff “knew full well” of defects in the composition. Mireles argues that 

application of de facto officer doctrine would reward the Sheriff and Board’s “bad behavior” 

for failing to correct defects after the Taylor order.

¶ 56 He asserts that our court has “never squarely confronted this issue, and has never explained 

why the Taylor order does not matter.” He suggests that officers subject to an adverse Board 

decision issued after the August 2014 Taylor order and “while the Board had the same defects” 

should not be barred by de facto officer doctrine, regardless of whether they raised a challenge 

before the Board’s decision. Mireles urges his position is supported by Justice McMorrow’s 

concurrence in Daniels v. Industrial Comm’n, 201 Ill. 2d 160 (2002), insofar as it urged that 

the de facto officer doctrine should not be applied “mechanically” and should not apply where

illegal appointments “were the result of malfeasance or a deliberate attempt to subvert” a 

governing statute. Id. at 174-75 (McMorrow, J., specially concurring). Indeed, he accuses the 

Board of “deliberate malfeasance” by continuing to render decisions with “defective 

appointments” after the August 2014 Taylor order.

¶ 57 We find Mireles’s arguments unavailing in light of precedent from this court and the 

supreme court reaffirming the validity of the de facto officer doctrine and the requirement of a

timely challenge to avoid its application. We point out that, notwithstanding Mireles’s reliance 

on certain language of our 2019 decision in Goral, that decision still made clear that an officer 

has the burden to make a timely challenge to avoid the de facto officer doctrine. Indeed, shortly 

after stating that the doctrine “looks backward” and does not allow the Board to keep doing 

business illegally (Goral, 2019 IL App (1st) 181646, ¶ 101), this court in Goral made clear 

that a party still needed to assert a timely challenge to the Board’s composition, i.e., while the 

matter was still pending: 
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“To put it plainly: Once Taylor was decided, any Sheriff’s employee whose case was 

then-pending before the Board, or who was charged in a new case post-Taylor, had every 

right to challenge the Board’s composition for the same reasons as in Taylor (or for 

different reasons). Old cases already finally decided, no, but pending or new administrative 

cases, yes. Plaintiffs’ cases were pending *** and the ‘de facto officer’ doctrine did not 

prevent them from challenging the Board’s composition.” (Emphasis added.) Id. ¶ 105. 

¶ 58 Importantly, this statement of the law “not only survived the supreme court’s review of our 

decision but was the very basis for the supreme court’s holding” affirming our decision in 

Goral. Malacina, 2021 IL App (1st) 191893, ¶ 31 (citing Goral, 2020 IL 125085). As 

explained in Malacina, our supreme court held that 

“[t]he Board’s then-illegal composition remained ripe for a challenge by a party before the 

Board—as long as the party raised it at the time of those administrative proceedings, and 

not merely afterward, post-final decision. Goral did so *** before the Board’s final 

administrative decision was rendered. And that is precisely why the Illinois Supreme Court 

held that Goral’s claim was not subject to a de facto officer defense.” (Emphases in 

original.) Id. (citing Goral, 2020 IL 125085, ¶ 75). 

¶ 59 In short, our supreme court held that the de facto officer doctrine did not apply to the Goral

plaintiffs because they made a “timely challenge” before an adverse Board decision; that is, 

they “were not trying to unwind or undermine any administrative determination by the Merit

Board.” Goral, 2020 IL 125085, ¶ 75. This is precisely what Mireles is attempting to do here

with respect to his 2015 termination decision by the Board, without having made a timely 

challenge.
No. 1-22-1088

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¶ 60 Our supreme court’s holding in Goral controls. This is so notwithstanding Mireles’s claim 

that it is “unjust” to require him to raise a challenge because the Board should have fixed any 

defects after the circuit court’s 2014 decision in Taylor.6

¶ 61 Our supreme court in Goral reaffirmed that the de facto officer doctrine “serves to preserve 

the integrity of an official action that is complete and where the authority of the agency or 

public official was not challenged in a timely manner.” Id. ¶ 74. Goral makes clear that the 

doctrine is a valid defense to a collateral attack on an old decision—which is exactly what 

Mireles attempted through his second amended complaint. While Goral held that the doctrine 

does not apply to a party who raised a “timely challenge to the authority of an administrative 

agency” (id. ¶ 75), that is, before the Board rendered a decision, it is undisputed that Mireles

did not do so. Indeed, he did not raise a challenge to the validity of the Board until October 

2017, after this court rejected his prior appeal from the same Board decision.

¶ 62 Goral is binding precedent that requires a timely challenge to the Board’s composition to 

avoid the de facto officer defense. Therefore, we must reject Mireles’s various equitable and 

policy-related arguments that he should be excluded from that requirement. Accordingly, the 

circuit court correctly concluded that the de facto officer doctrine warranted dismissal.

¶ 63 CONCLUSION

¶ 64 In summary, we find that: (1) Mireles’s challenge to the composition of the Board that 

rendered his termination decision is barred by res judicata given his failure to raise it in the 

6 We note, as explained by our supreme court, that “in response to Taylor, the legislature

amended the Code provision governing Merit Board appointments.” Goral, 2020 IL 125085, ¶ 12. The 

amendment permitted the Sheriff to make interim appointments, abolished all existing terms of each 

Board member, and created a new schedule for staggered terms of Board members. Id. (citing Pub. Act 

100-562, § 5 (eff. Dec. 8, 2017) (amending 55 ILCS 5/3-7002)).
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prior action and appeal, and (2) in any event, the de facto officer doctrine operates to

independently bar his untimely collateral attack on the Board’s decision. 

¶ 65 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed. 

¶ 66 Affirmed.
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Alsterda v. Dart, 2024 IL App (1st) 221088

Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 15-CH-03489; 

the Hon. Neil H. Cohen, Judge, presiding.

Attorneys

for

Appellant:

Cass T. Casper, of Disparti Law Group, P.A., of Chicago, for 

appellant.

Attorneys

for

Appellee:

William Andrichik, of Steptoe & Johnson, LLP, of Chicago, for 

appellee Thomas J. Dart.