______________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
 

State of California
 

JOHN K. VAN DE KAMP
 

Attorney General
 

OPINION :
 

: No. 89-601
 

of :
 

: OCTOBER 24, 1989
 

JOHN K. VAN DE KAMP :
 

Attorney General :
 

:
 

RONALD M. WEISKOPF :
 

Deputy Attorney General :
 

:
 

THE HONORABLE ARLO SMITH, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, CITY AND
 

COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, has requested an opinion on the following
 

question:
 

Is a ballet teacher employed by a private ballet school
 

required to report instances of child abuse under the Child
 

Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act?
 

CONCLUSION
 

A person who teaches ballet at a private ballet school is
 

required to report instances of child abuse under the Child Abuse
 

and Neglect Reporting Act.
 

ANALYSIS
 

The Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act (Pen. Code,
 

§ 11165 et seq.) creates a system whereby "child protective
 

agencies" (i.e., police and sheriff's departments and county
 

welfare and probation departments) can be promptly notified of
 

suspected instances of child abuse so that they can take timely
 

action if necessary to protect the children.1 (65
 

1

The Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act (the "Act") is
 

codified as article 2.5 (§§ 11165-11175.5) of chapter 2 of Title 1
 

of Part 4 of the Penal Code. Before 1987, when it received its
 

current name (§ 11164 added by Stats. 1987, ch. 1444, § 1.5), it
 

was sometimes referred to as the Child Abuse Reporting Law. (See
 

e.g., Planned Parenthood Affiliates v. Van de Kamp (1986) 181
 

Cal.App.3d 245, 255; 67 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 235 (1984); 65
 

1. 89-601
Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 345, 347 (1982); cf., Planned Parenthood
 

Affiliates v. Van de Kamp (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 245, 258, 267, 272,
 

279; see also, Krikorian v. Barry (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 1211, 1216­

1217.) The Act does this by requiring certain categories of
 

persons whose occupations place them in contact with children to
 

report to a "child protective agency" when, in the course of their
 

work, they come to know or reasonably suspect that someone under
 

the age of eighteen has been a victim of child abuse. (§ 11166,
 

subd. (a).) These persons are provided with an absolute immunity
 

from any civil or criminal liability in connection with any report
 

they are required or authorized to make under the Act (§ 11172,
 

subd. (a); cf., Krikorian v. Barry, supra, 196 Cal.App.3d 1211,
 

1215), but their failure to make a required report is a
 

misdemeanor, carrying a maximum punishment of six months in jail
 

and a $1,000 fine. (§ 11172, subd. (e).)
 

Among the persons who are required to report instances of
 

child abuse are "child care custodians" (§ 11166, subd. (a)), a
 

broad category that includes teachers, day care workers, and a
 

variety of public health and educational professionals.
 

(§ 11165.7; cf., § 11166.5, subd. (a); Planned Parenthood
 

Affiliates v. Van de Kamp, supra). We are asked whether a ballet
 

teacher who teaches ballet at a particular private ballet school is
 

included among them. We conclude that such a person is included in
 

the category of persons who must report instances of child abuse
 

under the Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act. 


Since the nature of the position and the school has
 

prompted the request for this Opinion, we describe it here as it
 

has been described to us in information accompanying the opinion
 

request: The San Francisco Ballet School is an arm of the San
 

Francisco Ballet Association, a private non-profit organization
 

which operates independently from the City and County of San
 

Francisco. The School derives operating revenue from student
 

tuition for its classes and from funds provided by the Ballet
 

Association. The Ballet Association does not receive general fund
 

revenue from the City and County of San Francisco, but it does
 

receive a grant award as a non-profit private entity from the
 

latter's Publicity and Advertising Fund which is established
 

through the collection of hotel tax revenue. 


The Ballet School holds an "Authorization to Operate As
 

a Private Postsecondary Educational Institution" issued by the
 

State of California Department of Education because it has been
 

accredited for its nondegree objective by a national accreditation
 

agency (the National Association of Schools of Dance) recognized by
 

Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 345, 345 (1982).) All unidentified statutory
 

references herein will be to the Act as codified in the Penal Code.
 

2. 89-601
 
 

 

the U.S. Department of Education. (Ed. Code, § 94311, subd. (c)2;
 

see generally, 68 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 278 (1985); 67
 

Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 250 (1984).) The school may participate in the
 

Student Tuition Recovery Fund", and since it meets the Department
 

of Health, Education and Welfare's definition of an institution of
 

higher education, it is eligible to apply for participation in
 

various student financial assistance programs administered by the
 

Federal Office of Education.
 

The teaching staff of the Ballet School is composed
 

primarily of former professional ballet dancers. These teachers
 

are not trained as academic personnel in the traditional sense, but
 

rather are performing artists who have studied at some of the most
 

prestigious ballet institutions around the world. They do not hold
 

academic degrees in education and they do not necessarily possess
 

teaching certificates or credentials from the State. (Cf., Ed.
 

Code, §§ 44001-44005, 44250.) 


The School accepts students beginning at eight years of
 

age, and provides instruction and performance opportunities
 

(including performances with the Ballet Company) that prepare them
 

for careers as professional ballet performers. [The School also
 

provides adult classes for persons who are not artists or
 

performers.] The School does not provide "academic" instruction
 

(except as it may bear on dance history and performance technique),
 

and attendance at it is not mandatory as it is in public or private
 

educational schools. (Ed. Code, §§ 48200, 48220, 48222.)3
 

2

Section 94311 of the Education Code provides that no
 

postsecondary educational institution may offer courses of
 

education leading to educational, professional, technological, or
 

vocational objectives unless it has been approved or authorized by
 

the Superintendent of Public Instruction. One of the bases on
 

which that approval/authorization is given is where "an institution
 

... has accreditation of the institution, program or specific
 

course of study ... by a national or applicable regional
 

accrediting agency recognized by the United States Department of
 

Education...." (Ed. Code, § 94311, subd. (c).)
 

3

Under California's Compulsory Education Law (Ed. Code,
 

§ 48000 et seq.), every person between the ages of 6 and 16, not
 

otherwise exempt, is required to attend public full-time day
 

school. (Ed. Code, § 48200.) However, that obligation may be
 

satisfied, inter alia, by attending a private full-time day school
 

that meets certain statutory standards. ( Id., § 48220.) Among
 

them is that the private schools "offer instruction in the several
 

branches of study required to be taught in the public schools of
 

the state." (Id., § 48222; cf., 70 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 282, 284-285
 

(1987.)
 

3. 89-601
 
In addition to regular classes held at the School, the
 

Ballet School conducts a local outreach program in the public
 

schools in San Francisco. This consists of introductory dance
 

sessions or classes in those schools at which the regular public
 

school teachers are always present. The Ballet School teachers who
 

attend this activity are considered to be guest artists or
 

performers. Student attendance at the sessions and classes is
 

required as part of the regular public school arts educational
 

program. A public school student may go on to take dance lessons
 

at the Ballet School itself, but that would not be a mandatory part
 

of his or her regular public education.
 

It is patent from the foregoing that in the course of his
 

or her profession, a ballet teacher at the San Francisco Ballet
 

School is in daily contact with persons under the age of eighteen.
 

It would also seem fair to say that because of the nature of ballet
 

classes, the ballet teacher would be in a special position to
 

observe instances of child abuse. To return to our question then,
 

when he or she comes to know or reasonably suspect that a student
 

at the School has been a victim of child abuse, must he or she
 

report it under the Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act? 


Our task in answering the question is to ascertain the
 

intent of the Legislature: Did the Legislature intend for such
 

private school ballet teachers to be included in the class of
 

persons for whom reporting child abuse is compulsory under the
 

Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act? (Cf., Planned Parenthood
 

Affiliates v. Van de Kamp, supra, 181 Cal.App.3d 245, 267; Select
 

Base Materials v. Board of Equalization (1959) 51 Cal.2d 640, 645.)
 

To ascertain that intention we turn first to the words of the
 

statute itself. (People v. Stockton Pregnancy Control Medical
 

Clinic, Inc. (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 225, 235; Moyer v. Workmen's
 

Compensation Appeals Board (1973) 10 Cal.3d 222, 230; Rich v. State
 

Board of Optometry (1965) 235 Cal.App.2d 591, 604.)
 

Section 11166, subdivision (a) of the Child Abuse and
 

Neglect Reporting Act provides in pertinent part as follows:
 

"[A]ny child care custodian, health practitioner, or
 

employee of a child protective agency who has knowledge
 

of or observes a child in his or her professional
 

capacity or within the scope of his or her employment
 

whom he or she knows or reasonably suspects has been the
 

victim of child abuse shall report the known or suspected
 

instance of child abuse to a child protective agency
 

immediately or as soon as practically possible by
 

telephone and shall prepare and send a written report
 

thereof within 36 hours of receiving the information
 

concerning the incident.... For the purposes of this
 

article, 'reasonable suspicion' means that it is
 

objectively reasonable for a person to entertain such a
 

suspicion, based upon facts that could cause a reasonable
 

4. 89-601
 
 

person in a like position, drawing when appropriate on
 

his or her training and experience, to suspect child
 

abuse...." (Emphasis added.)
 

For purposes of the Act, the term "child care custodian" is defined
 

in section 11165.7, subdivision (a), to mean:
 

"a teacher; an instructional aide, a teacher's aide,
 

or a teacher's assistant employed by any public or
 

private school, who has been trained in the duties
 

imposed by this article, if the school district has so
 

warranted to the State Department of Education; a
 

classified employee of any public school who has been
 

trained in the duties imposed by this article, if the
 

school has so warranted to the State Department of
 

Education; an administrative officer, supervisor of child
 

welfare and attendance, or certificated pupil personnel
 

employee of any public or private school; an
 

administrator of a public or private day camp; a
 

licensee, an administrator, or an employee of a licensed
 

community care or child day care facility; [a] headstart
 

teacher; a licensing worker or licensing evaluator; [a]
 

public assistance worker; an employee of a child care
 

institution including, but not limited to, foster
 

parents, group home personnel and personnel of
 

residential care facilities; a social worker or a
 

probation officer or any person who is an administrator
 

or presenter of, or a counselor in, a child abuse
 

prevention program in any public or private school." (§
 

11165.7, subd. (a), as amended by Stats. 1987, ch. 1459,
 

§ 14; emphases added.)
 

Looking at the words and phrases, and the punctuation (cf.,
 

Wholesale T. Dealers v. National Etc. Co. (1938) 11 Cal.2d 634,
 

659; Paris v. County of Santa Clara (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 691, 699)
 

of subdivision (a) of section 11165.7, we see that the Legislature
 

has now used semicolons to designate distinct subcategories of
 

persons within the overall category of "child care custodians" who
 

must report instances of child abuse. With respect to those who
 

are involved with students in school they include
 

-- teachers;
 

-- instructional aides, teacher's aides, or teacher's
 

assistants employed by any public or private school, who have been
 

trained in the duties imposed by the Child Abuse and Neglect
 

Reporting Act, if their school district has so warranted to the
 

State Department of Education;4
 

4

Subdivision (b) of section 11165.7 details they type of
 

training contemplated. The Legislature has provided that
 

5. 89-601
-- classified employees of any public school who have
 

been trained in the duties imposed by the Act, if the school has so
 

warranted to the State Department of Education;
 

-- administrative officers, supervisors of child welfare
 

and attendance, or certificated pupil personnel employees of any
 

public or private school; 


-- headstart teachers; and
 

-- persons who are administrators or presenters of, or
 

counselors in, a child abuse prevention program in any public or
 

private school.
 

A ballet teacher at the San Francisco Ballet School would
 

not fall in any of the last four of these subcategories. Neither
 

would he or she fall into the second category --that of aides and
 

assistants, because he or she would have primary responsibility for
 

instruction in his or her ballet class and so would not be an aide
 

or assistant to someone else. And even when he or she appears at
 

a public school, he or she does so as a guest performer and not as
 

a teacher's aide or assistant regularly employed at that school.
 

Thus if the ballet teacher is to fall in any of the subcategories
 

of "child care custodians" who must report child abuse under the
 

Act, it would have to be in the first, as a "teacher". The
 

question thus becomes whether he or she is a "teacher" within the
 

meaning of the Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act. 


The term "teacher" is not defined in the Child Abuse and
 

Neglect Reporting Act or elsewhere in the Penal Code. Absent that,
 

the word as used in the Act should be interpreted according to its
 

usual, ordinary and generally accepted meaning. (Cf., People v.
 

Craft (1986) 41 Cal.3d 554, 560; People v. Castro (1985) 38 Cal.3d
 

301, 310; People v. Belleci (1979) 24 Cal.3d 879, 884; Palos Verdes
 

Faculty Assn v. Palos Verdes Peninsula Unified Sch. Dist. (1978) 21
 

Cal.3d 650, 658; Great Lakes Properties Inc. v. City of El Segundo
 

(1977) 19 Cal.3d 152, 155-156.) There, reference to the dictionary
 

is helpful to understand the common generally accepted meaning of
 

the term. (Cf., People v. Spencer (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 563, 565;
 

People v. Medina (1972) 27 Cal.App.3d 473, 479; People v. Johnson
 

"[t]raining in the duties imposed by [the Act] shall include
 

training in child abuse identification and training in child abuse
 

reporting" (§ 11165.7, subd. (b)) and that "[a]s part of that
 

training, school districts shall provide to all employees being
 

trained a written copy of the reporting requirements...." (Ibid.)
 

It has also provided that "[s]chool districts which do not train
 

the employees specified in subdivision (a) [of section 11165.7] in
 

the duties of child care custodians under the child abuse reporting
 

laws shall report to the State Department of Education the reasons
 

why this training is not provided." (Id., subd. (c).)
 

6. 89-601
 
(1957) 147 Cal.App.2d 417, 419.) Indeed, in a recent Opinion, 70
 

Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 139 (1987), we looked to the dictionary to
 

discern the meaning of the phrase "teaching staff". (Id. at 144.)
 

Doing so here, we see that the term "teacher" is defined,
 

inter alia, as "one whose occupation is to instruct", as for
 

example "a driving teacher." (Webster's Third New Intn'l. Dict.
 

(1971 ed.) at p. 2346.) And the term "teach", we are told, "is a
 

general term for causing one to acquire knowledge or skill,
 

usu[ally] with the imparting of necessary incidental information
 

and the giving of incidental help and encouragement", as in
 

teaching "boys how to swim." (Ibid.) 


There is nothing in the definition of "teacher" or
 

"teach" to suggest that either is in any way limited to particular
 

subjects, knowledge, or skills. It seems clear that one whose
 

occupation is to instruct others in the skill of dance is a
 

"teacher" in the ordinary use of the word, and we thus consider the
 

ballet teacher here to be a teacher within the common meaning of
 

the term.
 

We are to construe the Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting
 

Act "according to the fair import of [its] terms, with a view to
 

effect its objects and to promote justice." (Pen. Code, § 4.) In
 

looking at "the ordinary import of the language used in framing
 

[it]" (Moyer v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd., supra, 10 Cal.3d 222,
 

230; In re Alpine (1928) 203 Cal. 731, 737) "[a] narrow or
 

restricted meaning should not be given to a word, if it would
 

result in an evasion of the evident purpose of the act, when a
 

permissible, but broader, meaning would prevent the evasion and
 

carry out that purpose." (In re Reineger (1920) 184 Cal. 97, 103.)
 

The purpose of the Reporting Act is to detect and prevent
 

child abuse, an objective in which the State of California has a
 

significant state interest. ( People v. Stritzinger (1983) 34
 

Cal.3d 505, 511-512; People v. Stockton Pregnancy Control Medical
 

Clinic, Inc., supra, 203 Cal.App.3d 225, 241; Planned Parenthood
 

Affiliates v. Van de Kamp, supra, 181 Cal.App.3d 245, 258, 279; 65
 

Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 345, 347, supra.) As noted at the outset, the
 

primary means in which the Act's purpose of protecting victims from
 

child abuse is attained, is to have child abuse agencies promptly
 

notified of its occurrence. (Cf., People v. Stritzinger, supra, at
 

511-512; People v. Stockton Pregnancy Control Medical Clinic, Inc.,
 

supra, at 241; Krikorian v. Barry, supra, 196 Cal.App.3d 1211,
 

1216-1217; Planned Parenthood Affiliates v. Van de Kamp, supra, at
 

258-259, 267, 272, 279; 65 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 345, 347, supra.) To
 

ensure that that occurs, the Legislature has decided that when
 

persons engage in certain callings which bring them into contact
 

with persons under eighteen years of age, they must assume a
 

responsibility to report instances of child abuse that they come to
 

know about or suspect through that contact. (§ 11166,, subd. (a);
 

7. 89-601
 
 

 

cf., Planned Parenthood Affiliates v. Van de Kamp, supra, 181
 

Cal.App.3d 245, 272.) 


Originally, reporting was required only of physicians
 

(former § 11161.5 added by Stats. 1963, ch. 576, § 1, p. 1454),
 

reflecting a belief that they "were in a unique position to
 

discover child abuse and particularly the battered child syndrome."
 

(Comment, Reporting Child Abuse: When Moral Obligations Fail
 

(1983) Pacific L.J. 189, 213; fn. omitted.). But over the years
 

the Legislature has expanded the categories of persons who have a
 

duty to report.5 (Cf., Kimberly M. v. Los Angeles Unified School
 

Dist. (1987) 209 Cal.App.3d 1326, 1333; see also, Comment, supra,
 15 Pacific L.J. at 213-214 & 213 fn. 223.) School superintendents
 

and principals became mandatory reporters in 1966 (Stats. 1966,
 

First Ex. Sess., ch. 31, § 2, p. 325), and the law was amended in
 

1971 to include school teachers. (Stats. 1971, ch. 1729, § 7, p.
 

3680). "Thus school teachers and administrative officers [became]
 

designated 'child care custodians' charged with mandatory reporting
 

duties, the violation of which is a misdemeanor." (Kimberly M. v.
 

Los Angeles Unified School Dist., supra, 209 Cal.App.3d at 1333.)
 

If we look at the 1971 amendments to the statute which
 

originally imposed the duty on teachers to report child abuse under
 

the precursor of the Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act, former
 

section 11161.5 of the Penal Code, we see that it imposed that duty
 

on "any teacher or [sic, of] any public or private school."
 

(Stats. 1971, ch. 1729, § 7, p. 3680.)6 The Legislature thus
 

5

Over the years the Legislature also lessened the degree of
 

certainty in the basis upon which a report would have to be made
 

and increased the degree of civil and criminal immunity afforded
 

mandatory reporters. (See Krikorian v. Barry, supra, 196
 

Cal.App.3d 1216-1217.) This was done to rectify the problem of
 

inadequate child abuse reporting by removing two of the impediments
 

which deterred professionals from reporting suspected cases of
 

child abuse. (Ibid.)
 

6

As amended in 1971, section 11161.5 provided in pertinent
 

part that:
 

"...in any case in which a minor is observed by ...
 

any teacher or [sic, of] any public or private school ...
 

and it appears to the ... teacher ... from observation of
 

the minor that the minor has physical injury or injuries
 

which appear to have been inflicted upon him by other
 

than accidental means by any person, he shall report such
 

fact by telephone and in writing to the local police
 

authority having jurisdiction and to the juvenile
 

probation department. The report shall state, if known,
 

the name of the minor, his whereabouts and the character
 

and extent of the injuries. [¶][¶] No person shall incur
 

8. 89-601
 
 

clearly included persons who taught in private schools among those
 

who would have a duty to report. But in so doing the Legislature
 

did not impose any restriction or limitation on the types of
 

private school teachers who would have that duty, based either on
 

what they taught, or on the types of private schools at which they
 

might teach. (Cf., Emmolo v. Southern Pacific Co. (1949) 91
 

Cal.App.2d 87, 92; 64 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 192, 202 (1981); 62
 

Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 394, 395-396 (1979); 20 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 31, 33
 

(1952): [effect of the use of the indefinite adjective "any"].)
 

The plain wording of the statute which imposed the reporting duty
 

on "any teacher of any public or private school" thus included
 

among those upon whom it imposed the reporting duty, persons who
 

might teach ballet at a private non-academic ballet school.
 

In 1980, the child abuse reporting laws were
 

substantially recast and collected into article 2.5. (Stats. 1980,
 

ch. 1071, §§ 1-4, p. 3420; 4 Stats. 1980 [Sum.Dig. SB 781] at p.
 

333; cf., Krikorian v. Barry, supra, 196 Cal.App.3d 1211, 1216­

1217.) The language of former section 11161.5, which imposed the
 

duty to report child abuse on "any teacher ... of any public or
 

private school", was carried through to the definition of "child
 

care custodian", which was now set forth as section 11165,
 

subdivision (h). (Stats. 1980, ch. 1071, § 4, p. 3421.) 7 "Child
 

care custodian was defined to mean-­

"a teacher, administrative officer, supervisor of
 

child welfare and attendance, or certificated pupil
 

personnel employee of any public or private school; an
 

administrator of a public or private day camp; a licensed
 

day care worker; an administrator of a community care
 

any civil or criminal liability as a result of making any
 

report authorized by this section." (Stats. 1971, ch.
 

1729, § 7, supra.)
 

In 1973 the technical correction was made to have the section read
 

"any teacher of any public or private school." (Stats 1973, ch.
 

1151, § 1, p. 2380; cf., 2 Stats. 1973 [Sum.Dig. SB 398] at p.
 

182.)
 

7

Before 1980, the number of different callings on which
 

section 11161.5 imposed a duty to report child abuse had grown to
 

twenty. (Stats. 1978, ch. 136, § 1, p. 358.) The 1980 amendments
 

repealed that section (Stats. 1980, ch. 1071, § 1, supra) and
 

adopted a new section 11165 which defined the mandatory reporters
 

in broad categories --i.e, "child care custodian[s]" (subd. (h)),
 

"medical practitioner[s]" (subd. (i)), "nonmedical practitioner[s]"
 

(subd. (j)) and employees of "child protective agenc[ies]" (subd.
 

(k)). . (Id., § 4, pp. 3421-3422; see, 65 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 345,
 

346, supra; cf., Planned Parenthood Affiliates v. Van de Kamp,
 

supra, 181 Cal.App.3d 245, 258.) 


9. 89-601
 
facility licensed to care for children; headstart
 

teacher; public assistance worker; employee of a child
 

care institution including but not limited to, foster
 

parents, group home personnel and personnel of
 

residential care facilities; a social worker or a
 

probation officer." (Former § 11165, subd. (h), as added
 

by Stats. 1980, ch. 1071, § 4, supra; emphasis added.)
 

Section 11165 was repealed in 1987 (Stats. 1987, ch. 1459, § 1)
 

when the definition of "child care custodian" was transferred to
 

newly adopted section 11165.7, where it appears today. (Stats.
 

1987, ch. 1459, § 14, supra.) 


However, as it appears today, the definition of "child
 

care custodian" no longer speaks of "a teacher ... of any public or
 

private school" as it did until 1987. It speaks merely of "a
 

teacher" without any qualification. Thus any reason to exclude
 

persons who might teach in particular types of private schools is
 

even less compelling than before. We thus are reinforced in our
 

conclusion that the definition of child care custodian found in
 

section 11165.7 includes persons who teach ballet at a private
 

ballet school. 


It has been suggested that our reading of the meaning of
 

"teacher" is too broad. It is pointed out that if the term were
 

indeed so encompassing, there would have been no need to include
 

"headstart teachers" among the occupations listed as "child care
 

custodians" in 1980 (Stats. 1980, ch. 1071, § 4, p. 3421) because
 

the subcategory of "teacher[s] ... of any public or private school"
 

would have already sufficed to include them. That would have made
 

the addition of the subcategory of "headstart teachers"
 

unnecessary, and statutes are supposed to be interpreted to avoid
 

surplusage. (Cf., City and County of San Francisco v. Farrell
 

(1982) 32 Cal.3d 47, 55; California Mfgrs. Assn. v. Public
 

Utilities Com. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 836, 844; Fields v. Eu (1976) 18
 

Cal.3d 322, 328.)
 

The suggestion is that the term "teacher" should only
 

apply to persons who teach in those K-12 public and private schools
 

which a pupil must attend under the Compulsory Education Law.
 

(Cf., fn. 3, ante.) After all, those schools and teachers already
 

have broad authority over children and a concomitant duty and
 

responsibility for their care and supervision. (Cf., Kimberly M.
 

v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist., supra, 209 Cal.App.3d 1326,
 

1331-1332, 1337-1338). And public school teachers, at least, are
 

specifically given training in the detection of child abuse (Cf.,
 

§ 11165.7, subds. (b), (c); Ed. Code, § 44691.) As the argument
 

goes, ballet teachers at private ballet schools would not be the
 

type of trained "professionals" upon whose judgment and experience
 

the Legislature relied "to distinguish between abusive and
 

nonabusive situations" when it adopted the Child Abuse and Neglect
 

10. 89-601
 
 

 

Reporting Act. (Cf., Planned Parenthood Affiliates v. Van de Kamp,
 supra, 181 Cal.App.3d 245, 258-259, 272.)8
 

We reject the position and the associated suggestion that
 

the term "teacher" as used in the Act only applies to persons who
 

teach in public and private K-12 schools. First, we do not view
 

the addition of "headstart teachers" as in any way derogating from
 

the basic meaning of "teachers." That category is used without any
 

qualification, which means any kind of teacher. We believe
 

"headstart teachers" were specifically mentioned as "child care
 

custodians" to make sure that those pre-school teachers were
 

included among those who would have a reporting duty under the Act.
 

Their addition could not have been meant to limit the existing
 

subcategory of "teachers" as "child care custodians" for to turn
 

the argument about: what types of teachers would have then been
 

excluded, because "headstart teachers" were now included in the
 

definition of "child care custodian"?
 

Without intending to suggest that the meaning of the word
 

"teacher" as found in the Act is without bounds and mandates a
 

reporting duty on any person who happens to impart some knowledge
 

or skill to a child, we do not accept the proffered limitation that
 

it applies only to teachers in K-12 schools. We find nothing in
 

the statutory language of the Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act
 

to support such a limitation on the plain meaning of the word
 

"teacher". Second, it bears noting that the particular private
 

Ballet School that has been described does not operate free from
 

all governmental oversight. It is "licensed" by a state agency to
 

operate as a Private Postsecondary Educational Institution in
 

California (cf., Ed. Code, § 93411, subd. (c), supra, fn. 2), and
 

its credentials permit it to participate in the Student Tuition
 

Recovery Fund and to apply for other student financial assistance
 

programs. In its operation, it deals with students as young as
 

eight years of age, whom it owes as much a duty of care and
 

supervision as does a public or private K-12 school. (Cf., Hoyem
 

v. Manhattan Beach City Sch. Dist. (1978) 22 Cal.3d 508, 518-520;
 

Kimberly M. v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist., supra, 209
 

8

In support of this argument attention is also drawn to
 

subdivision (a) of section 11166.5 of the Act which requires "any
 

person who enters into employment on and after January 1, 1985, as
 

a child care custodian, health practitioner, or with a child
 

protective agency, prior to commencing his or her employment, and
 

as a prerequisite to that employment, [to] sign a statement ... to
 

the effect that he or she has knowledge of the [mandatory
 

reporting] provisions of sections 11166. It is claimed that the
 

Legislature would not have meant to impose such a precondition of
 

employment on those in the private sector. This much of the
 

argument we reject on the basis that the definition of child care
 

custodian itself includes persons in the private sector.
 

11. 89-601
 
Cal.App.3d 1326, 1337 fn. 10; see generally, Comment, supra, 15
 

Pacific L.J. 189, 202-207.)
 

But most important, we cannot accept the notion that a
 

ballet teacher at the School would not be a type of trained
 

"professional" upon whose judgment and experience the Legislature
 

relied to report known or suspected instances of child abuse. Such
 

a person is professionally in contact with children on a regular
 

and continuous basis (cf., Ed. Code, § 44690), and deals with them
 

in a setting where evidence of child abuse may be uniquely readily
 

apparent. We do not believe that "drawing when appropriate on his
 

or her training and experience" (§ 11166.5, subd. (a)) he or she
 

would be unqualified to make informed judgments regarding child
 

abuse from empirical observation. (Cf., Planned Parenthood
 

Affiliates v. Van de Kamp, supra, 181 Cal.App.3d at 259; Comment,
 

supra, 15 Pacific L.J. at p. 214.) In this vein we note that the
 

Act has imposed the obligation to report known or suspected
 

instances of child abuse on other persons in the private sector,
 

such as administrators of private day camps, employees of child day
 

care facilities, and foster parents. (§ 11165.7.) We do not think
 

it incongruous for the Legislature to have intended that ballet
 

teachers at private ballet schools have that duty as well.
 

The Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act imposes a duty
 

on "teachers" to report instances of child abuse that they come to
 

know about or suspect in the course of their professional contact
 

in order that child protective agencies might take appropriate
 

action to protect the children. We are constrained to interpret
 

the language of the Act according to the ordinary meaning of its
 

terms to effect that purpose. Doing so, we conclude that a person
 

who teaches ballet at a private ballet school is a "teacher" and
 

thus a "child care custodian" as defined by the Act, and therefore
 

has a mandatory duty to report instances of child abuse under it.
 

* * * * *
 

12. 89-601