1 

### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE

AT NAS HVILLE A pr il 15, 200 5 S es sio n
MOSE S PIE NY v. UNIT ED IMPO RTS, I NC.
Appeal f romthe Circ uit Court for Davidson County No. 03C-885 Thom as W. Brothers, Judge

No. M2004- 01695-COA-R 3-CV - F iled Septem ber 6, 2005

The a ppellant, United I mports, I nc. (“United”) seeks relief from a circuit court’s order on its appeal from a g ener al sessions action broug ht by the late Moses Pieny

. Pursuant to a L ocal Rule of Pra ctice, the circ uit court’s orde r di smissed United’s appe al and a dopted the g ener al sessions order in favor of the de c e a se d p la int if

f. We r e ve rs e the or de r o f thetr ia l c ou rt a nd re ma nd the c a se to the c ir c uit
c ou rt fo r d ism iss a l of

the c la im.
Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Reve rsed

W I L L I AM B. C A IN , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which F RAN K G. C L EME NT , J R ., J . and D ONAL D P. H A R R IS , S R

. J ., joined.

J oel H. Moseley , Sr., Nashville, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellant, United I mports, I nc.

R a l p h W

. M e l l o , N a s h v i l l e , T e n n e s s e e , f o r t h e ap p e l l e e , M o s e s P i e n y.

OP IN ION

The a ppeal in this case conce rns a peculiar , almost singular , issue of proc edura l law and loca l pr a c tic e . T he de te rm inativ e fa c ts of the c on tr ov e rs y are no t in dis pu te a ndapp e ar i n U nit e d Impo rt s, I nc .’ s State me nt o f U nd isp ute d F a c ts:

1. On or a

bout J une 1, 2003, the plaintiff, Mose s Pieny , was murde red. RESP ONSE:
2. Mr. Ralph Mello, the attorne y who had r ep re s en t ed the plaintiff,
announce d this in open court on J une 6, 2003.2 RESP ONSE:

3. Th e pla int if

f’ s a tto rn e y

su bmi tte d a n o rd e r o n Jun e 10 , 2 00 3, with
c e rt if ic a te of se rv ic e on a ll oth e r part ie s, wh ic h ord e r co ntaine d a sug g e sti on of de a th of the plaintiff. RESP ONSE:

4. As of Februa

ry 20, 2004, no motion for substitution of the plaintiff has been f iled in this case. RESP ONSE:

Th e c a se orig inate d in g e ne ra l se ssi on s c ou rt wh e n th e plaint if

f, Mr . Pi eny , fil e d a

c ivi l
war rant alleg ing a vi olation of t he Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. That warr ant re sulted in a judgme nt for Moses Pieny in the amount of $5,985. Thoug h the appe al bond in the re cord be fore thi s C ourt sug g ests that United appe aled f rom the judg ment on Marc h 19, said appe al was not stamped as f

iled in the circ uit court cler k’s offic e until March 26, 2003.

At the time the g ener al sessions judg ment was appea led, the L ocal Rules of Practice for courts of r ecor d in the 20th J udicial District containe d th e fo llowing r equire ment reg arding the obtaining of

a court date:

RULE 20. GENERAL SESS IONS APP EALS I N CIRCU IT COURT

a. It shall be the duty

of the pa rties and/or the ir attorney s to determine whe n a ca se appe aled f

rom the Ge nera l Sessions C ourt is filed with the Circuit Court Clerk. b. On c e the wa

rr a nt b e ing app e a le d is re c e ive d b y a ndfi le d w ith the Cir c uit Court Clerk, the app ell ant has the duty to set the appe al for a

hearing be fore a trial jud g e . T he app e lla nt has for ty fi ve (4 5) da y s to se c ur e a tr ia l date fr om the c ou rt

. Th is t ime is c ou nte d f

ro m th e date the Cir c uit

Cou rt Cle rk fi le s th e app e a le d w arr a nt. I f the app e lla nt f

a ils to s e c ur e thi s o rd e r w ith in the 45 da y tim e pe ri od , a n o rd e r w ill be ente red ma

king the judgme nt of the Genera l Sessions Court the j udg ment of the Circuit Court with costs taxed to the appellant. At the time the a ppeal is per fec ted in the Clerk’s of

fi ce , t h e cle rk shall g ive the appe llant or the appe llant’s attorney written notice of

this rule.
c. The signature of an attorney or party to an appea l from Gene ral Sessions Court shall constitute a certificate unde r Tenn.R.Civ.P. 11.

On Ma y 9, 20 03 , th e 44 th d a y

of the pe ri oda s c ou nted fro m Mar c h 2 6, Un ite d f ile d it s Motion to S et the Case for Trial. The Motion was schedule d to be hea rd on June 6, 2003. On J une 2, 20 03 , i n accorda nc e wi th L oc a l Ru le of Pr a c tic e 26 .0 4( e ), Pla int if f f ile d it s Re sp on se to Defen dan t’ s Mo tio n to Se t arg uin g that th e de fe nd a nt’ s f a ilu re to s e c ur e a n o rd e r c on sis te nt w ith Rule 20(b) mandated the dismissal of t he appeal and adoption of t he gene ral sessions judg ment as3

the j udg ment of the c ircuit court. As f ate would ha ve it, Plaintiff Pieny was shot and killed on June 1, 2003. The motion was ar g ued on June 6, after which the c ourt enter ed the f ollowing or der:

This matter ca me to be hea rd on June 6, 2003 upon the Defe ndant’s motion fo r an o rd e r se tti ng thi s ca se fo r tr ia l. Th is i s a n a pp e a l f ro m th e Da vid so n Co un ty Gene ral Sessions Court following a judgme nt f or the Plaintiff. Upon re viewing the entire f ile in this case, the plea dings f iled by the parties, and the arg ument of counse l the court fin d s t h at t h e De fenda nt failed to obtain a tria l date within the forty -five (45) da y s require d b y L o ca l R u l e 20(b) . The Court fur ther finds that the Plaintiff, Moses Pieny , has died since the trial in the Da vidson CountyGene ral Sessions Court and his estate w ould be substantially and unfa irly

prejudice d if the Court wer e to set thi s c a se fo r t

ri a l a nd all ow th e De fe nd a nt t o p ro c e e d w ith its app e a l de sp ite its failure to comply

with L ocal Rule 20(b)

. THEREFO RE, the Defenda nt’s motion to set this case for trial is DENI ED.

Th e or de r d e ny ing the mot ion did no t a do pt the or de r o f the g e ne ra l se ssi on s c ou rt . T he c a se was ther efor e set for

a conf ere nce at 1:45 p.m. on March 2, 2004, by ord er en t er ed De cembe r 12, 2003. Prior to the schedule d confe renc e date , on Fe bruary 2 3, 2004, United filed its Motion for Summary J udg ment including t h e Statement of Material Fa cts Not I n Dispute which wa s quoted
abo ve . T he de fe nd a nt a

rg ue d to the tr ia l c ou rt

that, d ue to the failu re of the plaint if

f’s c ou ns e l to substitut e a pa

rty consistent with the require ments of Tenne ssee Rule of Civil Procedur e 25.01, the defe ndant there fore was e ntitled to sum mary judgme nt. The Motion came to be h ea rd b ef o re the circ uit court on April 2, 2004. The c ourt took the following action in it order:

This Court has previously denied the Def endant’ s Motion to Set this Genera l Sessions Appe al for Trial since the Motion to Set was not filed within forty -five ( 45) day s of the appe al and the Plaintiff’s claim would suffe r substantial unfair prejudice since the Plaintiff ha d died. Since the appea l could not be set for hearing, pur suant to L ocal Rule 20, a n Order s hould have be en ente red dismissing this appe al and
makin g the Ge ne ra l Se ssi on s O rd e r the Or de r o f this Cir c uit Cou rt

.
Acc ording ly , this Court her eby dismiss es this appea l and adopts the Ge nera l Sessions judgment in the amount of $5,985.00 and especially makes it an Order of thi s Co urt.

On Ap ri l 16 , 2 00 4, the de fe nd a nt f ile d a Mo tio n to Al te r o r A me ndthe Or de r o f the Cou rt

. B y Or de r f ile d Jun e 29 , 2 00 4, the c ir c uit c ou rt de nie d the Mo ti on to Alt e r o r A me nd , f ind ing in pe rt ine nt p art :
This Court finds that De fe n dant’s position is without merit. Althoug h the
case was a

ppeale d on Marc h 19, 2003, it was not officia lly “re ceive d” by

the cler k4

until March 26, 2003. The ref ore the forty -fifth da y fell upon May 10, 2003 (which
was a ctually

52 day s after

Def endant ha d initiated the appea l), which wa s a Saturday and ther efor e the pe riod was e x tended until May 12, 2003. A Motion to S et filed on Ma y 9 fa lls on the fo rt y -f

ou rth d a y of the pe ri od

. Th is la te fi lin g ma de it i mpo ssi ble th to secure a trial da te within the 45 day s. There is no showing of why the Def endant did not file the m otion any ear lier. There is also no showing w hy the motion was not set to be hea

rd until J une 6th. The s e we re all matters within the control of the De fe nd a nt.

De sp ite the fa c t th a t th is C ou rt has hi stor ic a lly sh ow n e xtre me le nie nc e in allowing Gene ral Sessions appea ls to be set, provided some sincere eff ort to set had be e n s ho wn , in the pr e se nt c a se , it is c le ar that th e P la int if

f w ou ld b e su bs ta nti a lly and unfa irly

prejudice d by

allowing this appeal to g o forth since the Plaintiff was
app are ntly th e sol e wi tne ss o n h is b e ha lf a ndhis de a th m ake s p ro se c uti on of his claim impossible. Further , the Court finds that no justifiable excuse has bee n shown as to why no eff ort was made to set this matter for trial within the g uidelines of our L oc a l Ru le s.
Acc ording ly , th i s Court respec tfully denies De fenda nt’s Motion to Alt er or Amen d a n d r e a f

f irms it s d is mi s s a l o f

th is ap p e a l an d a d o p ts th e G e n e r a l S e s s ions judgme nt in the amount of $5,985.00 tog ether with costs of $195.00.
United appe als from the or ders of the court, arg uing that the fi l i n g of the Motion to Set constitute d co m pliance w ith the L ocal Rule in ac corda nce w ith this Court’s decision in May v

. W oodlawn Memorial Park, Inc

. , No. M2001 -0 2 945-COA-R3-CV, 2002 WL 31059223 (T e nn .Ct .A pp .) . U nit e d f

urthe r a rg ue s th a t si nc e the re wa s no subs tituti on of a pa rt y plaint if

f w ith in 90 day s of t he sugg estion of death upon the record, as provided in Tenne ssee Rule of Civil Procedur e 25 .0 1, that U nit e d is e nti tle d to su mma ry jud g me nt.

P R A C T IC E U N D E R LO C A L R U LE

Th e c ha lle ng e in thi s app e a l doe s not co nc e rn the a uth ority of c ir c uit c ou rt s to pr omu lg a te Rules of Practice ; suc h power has been well established by our Supreme Court r ules and a ffirme d by statute. See Te nn .R. Sup .Ct . 1 8( a )( 1) ; see also Te nn .Co de An n. § 16- 2- 51 1. Ho we ve r, the fi rs t part of United’s two-step challeng e conce rns the mode of prac tice under these local rules an d t he
e ff e c t of tho se ru le s o n a

c on tr ov e rs y . In th is r e g ard, we fi nd the fo llo wi ng dis c us sio n f ro m May instructive.

L ocal Rule 20(b) states t hat t he appellant has t o secur e a trial date f rom the court and contemplates that securing a t rial date is by court order. To obtain such an orde r, a written motion must be filed. Tenn.R.Civ.P. 7.02. The primary principle unde rly ing5

these d e c is io n s is th a t “ p r o c e d u r a l ru le s s h o u ld b e u s e d to e n h a n c e , r a th e r than impede, the se arc h for justice a nd avoid leg al technic alities and proc edura l niceties.” Se e Le v yv
. B d

. o f Z o n i n g A p p e a l s , W ill iam so n Co un ty , M1999-001260COA-R3-CV, 2001 L exis 722 *1 at *12 (Te nn.Ct.App. Sept. 27, 2001). Consequently , wher e no prejudice exis ts, procedur al rules should not be used to “thwa rt the consider ation of
case s on their merits.” Id. a t *1 3; see also Wallace v. Wallace , 733 S.W .2d 102, 106 (Tenn.Ct.App.1987). “[I ]t is the g ener al rule that courts are reluc tant to give eff ect to rules of proc edure which see m harsh and unf air, a nd which pre vent a lit igant from having a claim adjudicate d upon its merits.” Childress v. Benne tt, 816 S.W .2d 314, 316 (Tenn.1991) ( citing Stapp v. Andre ws, 172 Tenn. 610, 113 S.W .2d 749, 7 50 (1938))

. May v . W oodlawn Memorial Park, Inc

. , 2002 WL 31059223, *2.
May conce rned a n unsucce ssful plaintiff who h ad s uffe red a dismiss al in g ener al sessions court for failure to prosecute

. The plaintiff a ppeale d to the circ uit court, and, ha ving f iled its Moti on to Set within the 45-day time limit , obtained a hearing date outs ide of that limit . I n considering the eff ect of this failure on the me rits, this C ourt held:

The trial c ourt’s re quirement that Appellant secur e an actua l date, af ter he had filed a Motion to Set, ere cts a tec hnical bar rier to appeal, suc h as our Supre me Court has cautioned ag ai nst. Se e J oh ns on v . H

ar din , 926 S.W .2d 236, 238 (Tenn.1996)

. Ne ith e r a n a tto rn e y

no r a pr o s e lit ig a nt has th e po we r t o mand a te a c ou rt to s e t a he ari ng da te . T he mos t th a t th e a tto rn e y c a n do is to re qu e st, by mot ion , th a t a

da te be se t. O nc e that mo tio n h a s b e e n f ile d, th e ma tte r i s, fo r a ll i nte nts a ndpu rp os e s, out of the hands of

the attorne y

or litiga nt. As in Frazier , su pr a , the a p p el l an t has taken the ste ps within his power to obtain a trial da te. See E aton Crop. v. Appliance Valves Co. , 634 F.Supp. 974, 982-83 (N.D.I nd.1984). Consequently , in the instant
c a se , it wo uld fl y in the fa c e of

jus tic e to r e qu ir e that th e ma tte r a c tua lly be se t w ith in the fo rt y -f

ive (4 5) da y

pe ri od pr e sc ri be d by L oc a l Rul e 20 (b ). Suc h a ho ldi ng c ou ld
o p en t h e rul e to abuse and contr avene the purpose be hind the Tennessee Rules of Civ il P ro c e du re
. May v . W oodlawn Memorial Park, Inc

. , 2002 WL 31059223, *3.

Th is p oli c y

in s up po rt

of a de c isi on on the me ri ts i s e c ho e d in ou r s ta tut e s:
16-15-729. Trial d e n o v o on app eal — Dec ision on m erit s. —No c ivi l
case , orig inating in a

g ener al sessions court a n d car ried to a hig her c ourt, shall be dis mis se d b y

su c h c ou rt fo r an y inf

orma lit y wh a te ve r, bu t sha ll be tr ie d o n it s me ri ts; and the court shall allow all amendments in the form of a ction, the parties thereto, or the state me nt o f the c a us e of a c tio n, ne c e ssa

ry to r e a c h th e me ri ts, up on su c h te rm s6

a s may be de e me d ju st a ndpr op e r. Th e tr ia l sh a ll b e de n ov o, in cludin g da ma g e s. [C ode 1858, § 4177 (deriv. A cts 1851-1852, ch. 100, § 2); § 5989; mod. Code 1932, § 1 01 90 ; impl. a m. A c ts 1 97 9, c h. 68 , § § 2 , 3 ; T .C.A . ( orig . e d. ), § 1 9- 42 5; A c ts 1993, ch. 241, § 46; T.C.A., § 19-1-118; Ac ts 1995, ch. 418, § 1.]
Tenn.Code Ann. § 16- 15-729 (Supp.2004).

Th is de novo app e a l in c ir c uit c ou rt is n ot l ike oth e r a

pp e llate pr oc e e din g s:

De no vo app e a ls f

ro m th e g e ne ra l se ssi on s c ou rt s d if fe r f ro m othe r t ype s o f a

pp e llate proce eding s. The circ uit c ourt does not r eview the g ener al sessions court’s de cision. Hohenb erg B ros. Co. v. Missouri Pac. R.R. , 586 S.W .2d 117, 119 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1 9 7 9 ). Rather, it provides the pa rties an e ntirely

new tria l as if no other tria l had
occur red a nd as if the c ase ha d orig inated in the circ uit court. Teague v. G ooch , 206 Te nn . 2 91 , 2 96 , 3 33 S.W. 2d1, 3 ( 19 60 ); Odle v. Mc Cormack , 185 Tenn. 439, 445, 20 6 S.W.2 d 416 , 4 19 (1 94 7) ; Braverm an v. Robe rts Const r. Co. , 748 S.W .2d 433, 435 (Tenn.Ct.App.1987); L awr ence A. Pivnick, Tennesse e Circuit Court Practice , § 3-10, at 115 (3d e d. 1991) (“ Pivnick”).

W are v . M e ha rryMe d. Col l. , 898 S.W .2d 181, 185 (Tenn.1995)

.

DEATH A ND REVI VER Our analy sis of t his portion of Appellant’s challeng e begins with Rule 25 of the Te nnessee Rules of Civil P roce dure:

25.01 Deat h. — (1) I f a pa rty dies and the c laim is not t here by exti ng uished, the court may

order substitut i o n o f t he prope r parties. The motion for substitution may be made by

any party or by the succ essors or r epre sentat i v es of the de cea sed party and, tog ether

with the notic e o f h earing, sha ll be serve d on the parties as provided in Rule 5 and upon pe rsons not pa rties in the manner provided in Rule 4 for the servic e of pr ocess. Unle ss the motion fo r substitut ion is made not later than ninety (90) day s afte r the death is sug g ested upon the r ecor d by service of a state ment of t he f a c t o f th e d e a tha s p r o v id e d h e r e in f o r th e s e r v ic e o f

th e mo ti o n , th e a c ti on s h a l l b e d i s m i s s e d a s t o t h e d e c e a s e d p ar t y. Tenn.R.Civ.P. 25.01 (emphasis added)

.
I n t he case a t ba

r, the a c tio n to be dis mis se d is the app e a l f ro m g e ne ra l se ssi on c ou rt

. Ho we ve r, if

the app e a l is dis mis se d a s to the de c e a se d p la int if f, th e qu e sti on re ma ins do e s th is dis mis sa l ha ve the e ff

e ct of a bin din g jud g me nt i n th e de fe nd a nt’ s f a vo r, e xting uis hin g the c la im7

wh ic h p la int if

f w on in the g e ne ra l se ssi on s c ou rt . F or a n ans we r to this qu e sti on , the Cou rt turns to the supplemental authority submitt ed on United’ s behalf:

Th e de fe nd a nt c on te nd s th a t w he n a pa rt y die s, the su it as to s uc h p art y die s; that a de c re e re nd e re d e ith e r i n f a vo r o f o r a g a ins t th e de c e a se d pa rt y is a n a bs olu te nullityand that until the suit has b ee n re surre cted by a scire fac ias or a r evivor no valid step ca n be take n aff ecting the dea d party or those standing in his shoes, citing Morrison v. Dea deric k, 29 Tenn. 342.
Also from Rog ers, e t al. v. Br een, 56 T enn. 679, def endant r eli es upon the following quotation: ‘The death of a sole de fenda nt or complainant during the pendenc y of a suit in equity

cause s the ac tion to abate or suspe nd.’ And ag ain from An de rso n, e t al . v . S tribli ng , e t al

. , 15 Tenn.App.267, the following quotation: ‘A revivor of a pending suit , upon the death of a ne cessa ry party , is indispensable. I n the absenc e of a

seasona ble re vivor, the suit abates a nd a judgment or a dec ree rende red
e i t h e r i n f a v o r o f o r a g a i n s t t h e d e c e a s e d p ar t y i s a n ab s o l u t e n u l l i t y. ’ T h e n , f i n a l l y, the following quotation from Gibson’s Suits in Chance ry , 5th Edition, S ection 744, ‘When a suit in Chancery is abated’ :
‘Wheneve r a suit in Chance ry become s defe ctive, for want of pa

rties befor e the Court, by

or ag ainst whom it ca n , in whole or in part, be prosec uted, it is said to be a bated. An a

batement in the se nse of the Common L aw, is an e ntire destruc tion of the suit, so that it is quashed and ende d. But in th e sense of Courts of Equity , an abatement signifie s only

a pre sent suspension of all proceeding s in the suit, from the want of

proper parties capa

ble of proc eeding , or being proce eded
a g a ins t, the re in. At

the Com mon L a w, a

su it w he n a

bate d, is ab s o lu te ly d e a d

. B u t in E q u it y a s u it , w h e n ab a te d , is mere ly in a state of suspend ed anim ation; and may be re vived. The de ath, or marria g e, of one of the orig inal parties to the suit is the most common
cause of the a

batement of

a suit in Equity .’

I t is the c ontention of the appe llees that the de fenda nt could not possiblyhave been pr ejudiced by

the fa ct that the ca

use was not r evived in f

avor of the a

ppellees befor e the ve rdict of the jury beca use the status of the pa

rty complai n ant was immaterial as to any

of the issues ac tually

submitt ed to the jury ; and that so long as there wer e in fa ct heirs at law entit led to maintain the suit it could not m ake any differ ence in the trial of the c ause just who these heirs we re.

We co p y t h e following Code section re lating to a batement a nd revivor of
su its :8

‘20-601. No a

batement whe re cause survives. – – Actions do not abate by the death,
or oth e r dis abil ity of e ith e r pa rt y , or by the tr a ns fe r of a ny int e re st the re in, if the c a us e of ac tion survives or continues. [Code1858, §2845 (deriv. Acts 1785, ch. 2 , § 2; 1786, ch. 14, § 1; 1819, ch. 16, §§ 1, 3; 1835-1836, c h. 77 §1); Shan., § 4568; mod. Code 1932, § 8693.] ‘20-602. Ac tions surviving death of party . – – No civil action commenc ed, whe ther founded on wrong s or contracts, ex cept actions for wrong s aff ecting the cha

rac ter of the pl aintiff, shall abate by the death of either pa rty , but may

be re vived. [Code 1858, §2846 (deriv. Acts 1835-1836, ch. 77, § 1) ; Shan., §4569; Code 1932, § 8694.] ‘20-615. Reviva l after

death of one plaintiff. – – Where one (1) or more of se vera l plaintiffs, not partner s, dies, the per son entitled to repre sent the dec edent may revive , by motion, at any

time be fore the cause is trie d or abate d. But, if the suit is not thus
re viv e d w ith in the tw o ( 2) te rm s a llo we d, the defe nda nt m a y re viv e or

e le c t to p r o c e e d t o tr i a l w i t h t h e s u r v i v i n g p l a i n t i f f, o r ab a t e t h e s u i t , i f

r e v i v o r i s n e c e s s ar y. [C ode 1858, §§ 2851, 2852 (de riv. Acts 1825, ch. 65, § 3); Shan., §4573; Code 1932, §8698.]

‘ 2 0

- 6 1 8

. P ar t y s u b s t i t u t e d i n r e v i v o r

. – – S u i t ab a t e d b y t h e d e a t h o f e i t h e r p ar t y, may be revive d by or ag ainst the heir, persona l r epre sentative, g uardia n, o r a s s i gn, a s th e c a se ma y

be , w ho ma y be le g a lly e nti tle d to the de c e de nt’ s pla c e in the su bje c tmatter of litig ation. [C ode 1858, §2858 (de riv. Acts 1786, ch. 14, § 1; 1794, ch. 1, § 64; 1809 (Sept.) Ch. 121, § 3); Shan., § 4579; Code 1932, § 8704.] ‘20-619. Me thod of revivor . – – The a ction may be re vived by t h e p ro p er pe rson e nti tle d to the de c e de nt’ s p la c e , b y mot io n a lon e , a ndby

the a dv e rs e pa

rt y a g a ins t such prope r per son, by consent of that person on mer e motion, and without consent by scire f acia s or notice. [ Code 1858, §§ 2855, 2856; Shan., §4576; Code 1932, § 8 7 0 1

. ]’

Th e e vid e nc e he ard by the Cou rt a nd jury be low is not pr e se rv e d in the bil l of ex cept io ns . Ho wev er, t he re cord do es affi rm ati vel y sh ow th at aft er deat h of B. B. Jef fe rs on , Sr

. wa s or a lly su g g e ste d to the Cou rt , a dmi tte d by c omp la inant’ s c ou ns e l, and af ter solicitors for de fenda nt moved the Court for a mistrial which was then a nd there overr

uled bythe Court, duly

excepted to, the Chanc ellor stated that it was the intention of the C ourt to char g e the jury and subm it the i ssues of fact t o the jury for the ir de lib e ratio n a ndve rd ict witho ut d isc los ing to the m th a t th e re a l c omp la inant, B. B . J eff erson, Sr., ha d died and this the Court did.

Th e or ig ina l bill fil e d in this caus e so ug ht the re c ov e ry of re a l est a te a nda lso pers on al p rop ert y

forB. B. J effers on , S r. as nex t o f ki n a n d o n l y h e irof R os a B. Jef fe rs on . T he re fo re up on B

. B

. Jef fe rs on , Sr .’ s de a th i t w a s n e c e ssa ry that th e su it be re vived in the name of the persons entitled to stand in the place of B . B. Jeffe rson, Sr. in the subject matter of the litigation. T.C.A. Section 20-618. The Conservator
c ou ld n ot c on tin ue a s so le pa rt y c omp la inant.9 Since the suit sought r ecove ry of per sonal property

and/or a money judgme nt it w a s n e c e s s ar y th a t th e A d mi n is tr a to r C. T

. A

. o f B

. B

. Je f f e r s o n , Sr

. be made a party complainant; since the suit also soug ht rec overy or real estate it was nece ssary that the devisee s under his wi l l b e m ade pa rty complainants. His two sons above
na me d w e re his on ly

he ir s a nda lso so le de vis e e s un de r his wi ll. Gi bs on ’s Sui ts i n Chance ry , 5th E dition, Section 120. I n our opinion His Honor the Chanc ellor, af ter the death of Mr. Jeffer son was sug ges ted and a dmitted, was in err or in proce eding wi th the c a se wi tho ut r e viv or in the na me of

the pr op e r p art y

c omp la inant s andin withholding fr om the jury the information of Mr . J eff erson’ s death.

Ho lm e s v . D or ris , 399 S.W .2d 512, 515-57 (Te nn.Ct.App.1964).
Our statutes provide for de novo he ari ng s in the c ir c uit c ou rt on app e a l f

ro m g e ne ra l se ssi on s. I n addition, “if t he papers are properly returne d and the a

ppellant fa ils to appear or

defe nd as above , or if the a ppeal is dismissed for any cause , the appellee is entitled to an af firmanc e of the judgme nt below, with costs.” Te nn.Code Ann. § 27-5- 107. This sta t u t e wo u ld sugg est that should United ha ve fa ile d to pr os e c ute its app e a l, the n in de e d M r. Pie ny wo uld be e nti tle d to a n a ff ir ma nc e wi th the judg ment in g ener al sessions c ourt and costs. As ha s alrea dy been disc ussed, there was no fa ilure
u p o n t h e p ar to f

t h e ap p e l l a n tt o p r o s e c u t e i t s ap p e a l , a n d t h a ta l l i t c o u l d d o i td i d

. T o t h e c o n tr ar y, once the Motion to S et was de nied, the duty devolved upon the a

ppellee/plaintiff t o s ubstitut e a proper party in acc ordanc e with Rule 25.01. This rule did not abrog ate the proce ss by which ac tions
are revive d. The proc ess simply allows the substitut ion of an appropriate repr esenta tive party

. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 30- 2-320, Midsouth Pavers, Inc . v. Arnco Construction, Inc. , 771 S.W .2d 420, 424 (Tenn

. Ct

. A pp.1989). Without such substituti on, any action take n by

the court lacks adjudicative eff ect. We find the f

ollowing lang uag e of long standing from our Supreme Court illust rative of the steps to be taken on be half of the plaintiff:

T h e s o l e object of Sec . 2849 of the Code is to preve nt an abatement or dis c on tin ua nc e of

a su it o n a c c ou nt o f the de a th of e ith e r pa rt y , wh e re no pe rs on wi ll administer on the estate of a dece ased pl ai n t i ff or

defe ndant. To pre vent such
aba te me nt o r d isc on tin ua nc e , it is p ro vid e d th a t th e su it m a y be re viv e d by

or a g a ins t the h ei rs o f t he dec edent, in whose favor or ag ainst whom a judg ment may be rende red. B ut such judg ment cannot be rende red ag ainst the heirs or in their favor , except in their repr esenta tive char acte r.

Brown v. L. Rocco & Co. , 56 Tenn. 187 (1872)

. Ap pe lle e ’s c ou ns e l w ou ld a rg ue that, sin c e thi s c la im f ro m g e ne ra l se ssi on s c ou rt is the on ly asset which w ould a

ppear in Mr

. Pieny ’s estate, should one be opene d, such an ope ning w ould prove po int le ss. Ho we ve r, there c or d r e ve a ls that no app lic a tio n f or the app oint ment

of a pu bli c administrator for

the estate had bee n made.10

Un ite d Impo rt s, I nc . is no t r e sp on sib le fo r the un tim e ly de a th o f M r. Pie ny . H a vin g be e n c a st in Gene ral S essions Court, United ex erc ised its rig ht to appea l to the Circuit Court for a de novo tr ia l. Wit hin the 45-day time limit ation of L ocal Rul e 20(b), counsel for Appellant filed a Motion to S et the Case f or Tria l in Ci rcuit. This Motion to S et came on for hearing on J une 6, 2003, but on June 1, 20 03 , M r. Pie ny wa s sh ot a nd kil le d. Th e tr ia l c ou rt a t the June 6thhe ari ng re fu se d to se t th e c a se for tria l. There afte r United filed its Motion for Summary J udg ement which c ame on to be he ard on April 2, 2004. The tria l court there upon dismiss ed the a ppeal a nd adopted the G ener al Sessions Court judgment. F ollowing the f iling of U nited’s Motion to Alter or A mend, the trial c ourt enter ed its J une 2 9 , 2004 Orde r denying the Motion and asserting “it is clear that the plaintiff would be substantially

and unfa irly

pre j udiced by

allowing this appeal to g o forth since the plaintiff wa s appar ently

the sole witness on his behalf , and his dea th makes prose cution of his claim impossible.”
The only thing United f

ailed to do was to ha ve the case actua lly set for trial in Circ uit Court within the 45-day limit ation of Rule 20(b). As set forth by this Court i n May v . W

oodlawn Memorial Park, Inc

. , 2 00 2 WL

31 05 92 23 , “ Th e mos t tha t the a tto rn e y c a n do is to re qu e st, by mot ion , th a t a date b e set. Onc e that motion has bee n filed, the matter is, for all intents and purpose s, out of the hands of the attorney o r l i t i gan t

. ” T he re sult of the holding in the tria l court is to cast upon the appellant the bur den of the untimely death of Mr. Pieny with no evidence at all that Appellant wa s complicit in the death of Mr . Pieny or had a ny

advanc e knowledg e of his impending fate

.
A judgme nt ha s been enter ed in the trial court in fa vor of a plaintiff who wa s dece ased at the tim e the jud g me nt w a s e nte re d. No a dmi nis tr a tor ha s e ve r b e e n a

pp oin te d to fu rthe r p ro se c ute thi s case . The judg ment is a nullityand pursua nt to Tennessee Rule of Civil P roced u re 2 5

. 0 1 , the judgme nt of t he trial court is reve rsed, and the action is dismiss ed. The case is rema nded to the trial
c ou r tf o r s u c h f u r th e r p r o c e e d i n g s a s m a y

b e n e c e s s ar y

. C o s t s o f

t h e c a u s e ar e a s s e s s e d a g a i n st Appellant, United Imports, I nc.

___________________________________ WI LL I AM B. CAIN, J UDGE