[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 19-13270

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket Nos. 1:17-cv-00430-WS,

1:15-cr-00212-WS-C-1

EDWARD JOSEPH BAKER, 

 Petitioner-Appellant,

versus

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Respondent-Appellee.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Alabama

________________________

(March 15, 2021)

Before ROSENBAUM, NEWSOM, and BLACK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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Edward Joseph Baker, pro se, appeals the district court’s denial of his 28 

U.S.C. § 2255 motion. We issued a certificate of appealability (COA) on one 

issue: whether the district court wrongly assessed Baker’s ineffective assistance of 

counsel claim based on documents not in the record.

1

 No reversible error has been 

shown,2 and we affirm. 

I. DISCUSSION

A. Documents Considered

In denying Baker’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the district court

relied on alleged statements made by the district court and Baker during the plea 

hearing and the sentencing hearing. However, when Baker appealed this case to 

our court, transcripts from those hearings were not in the district court record. The 

Government filed a motion for leave to supplement the record on appeal with 

transcripts of the plea and sentencing hearings, and we granted the motion. See 

Dickerson v. Alabama, 667 F.2d 1364, 1367 & n.5 (11th Cir. 1982) (stating while 

1 As a preliminary matter, most of Baker’s arguments on appeal fall outside the scope of 

the COA, and he has not filed a motion to expand the COA. Because there are not any 

exceptional circumstances warranting a sua sponte expansion of the COA, we will not address 

Baker’s arguments that are outside the scope of the COA. See Dell v. United States, 710 F.3d 

1267, 1272 (11th Cir. 2013) (explaining we may sua sponte expand a COA under “exceptional 

circumstances,” but an appellant granted a COA on one issue cannot simply brief other issues to 

force both us and his opponent to address them). 

2

 In reviewing the denial of a § 2255 motion, “we review legal conclusions de novo and 

findings of fact for clear error.” Spencer v. United States, 773 F.3d 1132, 1137 (11th Cir. 2014)

(quotations omitted). Whether trial counsel was ineffective is a mixed question of law and fact 

that is reviewed de novo. United States v. Bender, 290 F.3d 1279, 1284 (11th Cir. 2002). 

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we do not often supplement the record on appeal with evidence not reviewed by 

the district court, we may do so under our inherent equitable powers).

In Dickerson, we held it was appropriate to supplement the appellate record 

with transcripts of state proceedings that the district court did not consider when it 

denied a petitioner’s motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Id. at 1367. We held that, 

because the proper resolution of the substantive issues when viewed in the context 

of the relevant facts was beyond any doubt, remanding the case to the district court 

to review the additional transcripts would be contrary to both the interests of 

justice and efficient use of judicial resources. Id. Noting that appellate courts had 

been granted unique powers in habeas proceedings, we considered the transcripts 

while reviewing the district court’s denial of the habeas petition. Id. at 1368 & n.7. 

While Baker fails to point to specific documents outside the record on which 

the court improperly relied, he appears to challenge the report and 

recommendation’s findings about his guilty plea without access to the plea hearing 

transcript, as well as its reliance on the presentence investigation report (PSI) in 

finding he had notice of the statutory sentencing minimums. First, Baker’s 

argument he was unaware he was subject to statutory minimum sentences on 

Counts One and Three fails. The record shows that Baker was advised of the 

statutory minimum multiple times before, during, and after he pleaded guilty: his 

indictment included an attachment describing the penalties; a guidelines worksheet 

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prepared by a probation officer before his plea included the statutory minimum 

sentences and Baker’s attorney advised the court that he reviewed the worksheet 

with him; the plea agreement outlined the statutory minimum penalties; and the 

PSI stated the statutory minimum penalties. While the PSI was prepared after 

Baker pleaded guilty, he still had the opportunity to object to the information 

within it either before or during his sentencing hearing—which he did not do. This 

Court can affirm on any basis supported by the record, and the record shows Baker 

was advised multiple times by the court and his attorney of the statutory minimum 

penalties he faced. See Martin v. United States, 949 F.3d 662, 667 (11th Cir.), 

cert. denied, No. 20-30 (U.S. Oct. 5, 2020) (stating this Court “can affirm on any 

basis supported by the record, regardless of whether the district court decided the 

case on that basis”) . 

Next, even if the magistrate judge did not have access to the plea hearing 

transcript, the district judge who denied Baker’s § 2255 motion after reviewing the 

report and recommendation and his objections was the same judge who presided 

over the underlying criminal proceedings. See Broadwater v. United States, 292 

F.3d 1302, 1304 (11th Cir. 2002). We have noted that “some situations may be 

resolved by the district court’s personal knowledge or recollection,” and here, 

because we allowed the Government to supplement the record with the plea 

hearing transcript, we are able to review the accuracy of the district court’s 

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recollection. See id. at 1303-04. A review of the plea hearing transcript shows that 

Baker’s plea was knowing and voluntary and not the product of ineffective 

assistance of counsel, as discussed below. Thus, remanding the case for the district 

court to consider the transcripts would be contrary to the interests of justice and 

efficient use of judicial resources, and we shall consider the plea hearing and 

sentencing hearing transcripts when reviewing the district court’s denial of Baker’s 

§ 2255 motion. See Dickerson, 667 F.2d at 1367.

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that: 

(1) counsel’s performance was deficient; and (2) the deficient performance 

prejudiced the defendant. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).

Counsel’s performance is deficient only if it falls below the wide range of 

competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. Id. at 687-89. Prejudice is a 

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding 

would have been different. Id. at 694.

“A plea of guilty is constitutionally valid only to the extent it is voluntary 

and intelligent.” Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 618 (1998) (quotations 

omitted). On collateral review, the Strickland standard applies to a claim that a 

plea was not knowing and voluntary due to ineffective assistance of counsel. Hill 

v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57-58 (1985). Accordingly, where a defendant enters a 

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plea based on the advice of counsel, “the voluntariness of the plea depends on 

whether counsel’s advice was within the range of competence demanded of 

attorneys in criminal cases.” Id. at 56 (quotations omitted). A defendant who 

pleaded guilty satisfies the prejudice standard of Strickland by establishing “a 

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded

guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Id. at 59 (quotations omitted).

Under Rule 11, before a court can accept a guilty plea, it must inform the 

defendant of his rights should he plead not guilty, the nature of the charges against 

him, the potential penalties, and the court’s obligation to calculate his advisory 

guideline range. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(B)-(E), (G)-(M). The court must 

also explain that a guilty plea waives the defendant’s trial rights as well as ensure 

that the plea is entered voluntarily and is supported by a sufficient factual basis. 

See id. 11(b)(1)(F), (b)(2)-(3). In evaluating whether a Rule 11 error substantially 

has affected a defendant’s rights, we have examined Rule 11’s three “core 

principles,” which are ensuring that: (1) the guilty plea is free of coercion; (2) the 

defendant understands the nature of the charges against him; and (3) the defendant 

understands the direct consequences of the guilty plea. United States v. Moriarty, 

429 F.3d 1012, 1019 (11th Cir. 2005). There is a strong presumption that the 

defendant’s sworn statements made during a plea colloquy are true. United States 

v. Medlock, 12 F.3d 185, 187 (11th Cir. 1994).

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The plea hearing transcript refutes Baker’s claim he pleaded guilty only 

because of his counsel’s ineffectiveness. First, the district court placed Baker 

under oath and ensured he was competent to plead guilty. Baker confirmed he was 

satisfied with the advice his attorney gave him and his representation and had read 

the plea agreement with his attorney. He confirmed to the court he had not been 

induced to plead guilty by any threats or outside promises. The court advised 

Baker he faced a ten-year minimum statutory sentence on Count One and a fiveyear mandatory consecutive sentence on Count Three, and Baker responded he 

understood the penalties. Baker confirmed he understood that by pleading guilty 

he was waiving his rights to plead not guilty and proceed to trial, confirmed his 

understanding of the elements of the offenses, and admitted the acts described in 

the factual resume. 

Baker’s ineffective assistance claim also fails because he has not shown he 

was prejudiced by any deficient performance of counsel. Aside from his belated, 

self-serving statements, Baker presented no evidence he would not have pleaded

guilty but for his counsel’s allegedly erroneous advice. While the § 924(c) count 

was likely an important consideration, under the plea agreement the Government 

agreed to dismiss Count Two, a substantive drug count that would have carried 

another ten-year statutory minimum sentence, and it would not have been rational 

to reject a plea offer under these circumstances. Further, Baker has not explained 

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why, when given the opportunity to object to the PSI, allocute, and object to the 

sentence imposed, he never asked the court about his sentence. 

II. CONCLUSION

In sum, the record shows Baker was advised multiple times of the statutory 

minimum sentences, he failed to present evidence he would not have pleaded

guilty but for his attorney’s advice, and despite multiple opportunities, he never 

questioned his sentence. The plea hearing and sentencing hearing transcripts, 

which we consider under our inherent equitable powers, further show that Baker’s 

plea was not the product of ineffective assistance, contradict his assertions the 

court and his attorney did not advise him of the statutory minimum sentences, and 

show he never questioned his sentence. Accordingly, the district court did not err 

in denying Baker’s § 2255 motion.

AFFIRMED.

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