UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 17-6881

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

RODERICK D. STEVENS,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at 

Wilmington. Terrence W. Boyle, District Judge. (7:12-cr-00140-BO-2; 7:15-cv-00184-

BO)

Submitted: July 26, 2018 Decided: August 16, 2018

Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Roderick D. Stevens, Appellant Pro Se. Donald Russell Pender, Assistant United States 

Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, 

for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Roderick D. Stevens appeals the district court’s order denying his Fed. R. Civ. P. 

60(b) motion seeking relief from the court’s judgment denying Stevens’ 28 U.S.C. § 2255 

(2012) motion. On appeal, Stevens argues that the district court erred in denying Rule 

60(b) relief and declining to allow him to amend his § 2255 motion. We granted a 

certificate of appealability as to two issues: (1) whether the district court had jurisdiction 

to deny Stevens’ Rule 60(b) motion on the ground that it did not present a meritorious 

claim or defense; and (2) if so, whether the district court erred in rejecting two of 

Stevens’ proposed claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. After considering the 

parties’ briefs, we vacate and remand for further proceedings.

Generally, to obtain relief from a judgment under Rule 60(b), a movant must make 

a threshold showing of “(1) timeliness, (2) a meritorious defense, (3) a lack of unfair 

prejudice to the opposing party, and (4) exceptional circumstances,” and “then must 

satisfy one of the six specific sections of Rule 60(b).” Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. AMH 

Roman Two NC, LLC, 859 F.3d 295, 299 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). In the habeas context, however, the permissible use of Rule 60(b) is more 

closely circumscribed due to the statutory limitations on second or successive § 2255 

motions and 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012) petitions. See Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 

531-32 (2005) (distinguishing between true Rule 60(b) motion and successive habeas 

petition); United States v. McRae, 793 F.3d 392, 397 (4th Cir. 2015) (same); United 

States v. Winestock, 340 F.3d 200, 206-07 (4th Cir. 2003) (same). “Using Rule 60(b) to 

present new claims for relief from a . . . judgment of conviction—even claims couched in 
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the language of a true Rule 60(b) motion—circumvents AEDPA’s requirement that a new 

claim be dismissed unless it relies on either a new rule of constitutional law or newly 

discovered facts.” See Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 531. Thus, “a district court has no 

discretion to rule on a Rule 60(b) motion that is functionally equivalent to a successive 

[§ 2255 motion].” Winestock, 340 F.3d at 206. 

Stevens argued in his Rule 60(b) motion that, prior to the district court’s order 

ruling on his § 2255 motion, he had moved the district court for leave to amend his 

§ 2255 motion to raise additional claims, but the court did not address his motion or these 

additional claims in denying § 2255 relief. Stevens stated that his motion to amend had 

raised three claims: (1) counsel misrepresented the statutory maximum term of 

imprisonment applicable to Stevens’ wire fraud conspiracy offense in light of United 

States v. Ubankanma, 215 F.3d 421, 426 (4th Cir. 2000), which, coupled with the district 

court’s and the Government’s similar representations, rendered Stevens’ guilty plea 

involuntary; (2) counsel at sentencing and on appeal were ineffective in failing to object 

to Stevens’ term of supervised release, which exceeded the statutory maximum under 

Ubankanma; and (3) the sentencing court erred in applying a specific Guidelines 

enhancement in light of Stevens’ guilty plea to aggravated identity theft, and counsel was

ineffective in failing to object. In his Rule 60(b) motion, Stevens did not argue the merits 

of these new claims, but instead sought to reopen the underlying proceedings to develop 

the claims and to permit the court to consider their merits. 

Stevens’ Rule 60(b) motion, as he describes it, was properly classified as a true 

Rule 60(b) motion because it “challenge[d] [a] defect in the integrity of the federal 
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habeas proceedings”—namely, the court’s purported failure to address Stevens’ motion 

to amend his § 2255 motion. McRae, 793 F.3d at 397 (internal quotation marks omitted); 

see Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 531-32. Although the district court noted that it had not 

docketed a motion to amend, it did not resolve whether Stevens had attempted to file a 

motion to amend during the pendency of his § 2255 proceedings. Instead, the court 

denied Rule 60(b) relief after concluding that Stevens could not satisfy the requirement of 

a meritorious claim or defense.

While Rule 60(b) directs a district court to consider whether the movant presents a 

meritorious defense, “Rule 60(b) applies to § 2255 proceedings . . . only to the extent that 

it is not inconsistent with applicable statutory provisions and rules.” McRae, 793 F.3d at 

397 (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). Without vacating its judgment 

based on a finding that Stevens sought and was entitled to amend his § 2255 motion 

during his initial § 2255 proceedings, the court lacked jurisdiction to address the merits of 

his proposed claims.

Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s order and remand to permit the district 

court to consider whether Stevens submitted a motion to amend prior to the district 

court’s § 2255 judgment or, alternatively, whether the Rule 60(b) motion should be 

dismissed as an unauthorized, successive § 2255 motion. In so doing, we express no 

opinion as to the propriety of Rule 60(b) relief or the merits of the proposed claims, 

discussed above, described in Stevens’ Rule 60(b) motion. We dispense with oral
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argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 

materials before this court and argument would not aid in the decisional process.

VACATED AND REMANDED