SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0960-17T4

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

GILBERT FAHNBULLEH,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________

Submitted May 1, 2019 – Decided July 15, 2019

Before Judges Accurso and Moynihan.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Hudson County, Docket Nos. W-2015-6386-

0906 and W-2015-6387-0906.

Gilbert Fahnbulleh, appellant pro se.

Esther Suarez, Hudson County Prosecutor, attorney for 

respondent (Stephanie Davis Elson, Assistant 

Prosecutor, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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Defendant Gilbert Fahnbulleh appeals his conviction for obstructing the 

administration of law or other governmental function, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(a), 

entered by the Law Division judge following his de novo review of defendant's 

municipal court conviction.1 In his self-authored merits brief, defendant argues:

POINT I

THIS COURT SHOULD FIND IN THE NEGATIVE 

THAT APPELLANT'S ACTION(S) DID NOT 

PURPOSELY OBSTRUCT[], IMPAIR[], OR 

PERVERT[] THE ADMINISTRATION OF LAW OR 

OTHER GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTION OR 

PREVENT[] OR ATTEMPT[] TO PREVENT A 

PUBLIC SERVANT FROM LAWFULLY 

PERFORMING AN OFFICIAL FUNCTION "BY 

MEANS OF FLIGHT, INTIMIDATION, FORCE, 

VIOLENCE, OR PHYSICAL INTERFERENCE OR 

OBTACLE, OR BY MEANS OF ANY 

INDEPENDENTLY UNLAWFUL ACT." N.J.S.A.

2C:29-1A.

 

1

 Defendant's notice of appeal and criminal case information statement list the 

municipal court's December 9, 2016 order of conviction rather than the Law 

Division's August 11, 2017 order denying his appeal. "It is clear that it is only 

the orders designated in the notice of appeal that are subject to the appeal process 

and review." W.H. Indus., Inc. v. Fundicao Balancins, Ltda, 397 N.J. Super. 

455, 458 (App. Div. 2008). Although we are not required to do so, we will 

address defendant's pro se appeal, particularly since the State did not object and 

replied to defendant's arguments. See Ridge at Back Brook, LLC v. Klenert, 

437 N.J. Super. 90, 97 n.3 (App. Div. 2014) (noting that we possess the 

discretion to overlook "a party's failure to designate an order in the notice of 

appeal" in certain circumstances); see also N. Jersey Neuro. Assoc. v. Clarendon 

Nat'l Ins. Co., 401 N.J. Super. 186, 196 (App. Div. 2008) (holding an earlier 

order not listed in the notice of appeal was nevertheless before the court because 

the argument on the order appealed from continued to raise the earlier issue).
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A-0960-17T4

POINT II

THE STATUTE OF N.J.S.A. 2C:19-1A STATES ["A 

PERSON COMMITS AN OFFENSE IF HE 

PURPOSELY OBSTRUCTS, IMPAIRS, OR 

PERVERTS THE ADMINISTRATION OF LAW OR 

OTHER GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTION OR 

PREVENTS OR ATTEMPTS TO PREVENT A 

PUBLIC SERVANT FROM LAWFULLY 

PERFORMING AN OFFICIAL FUNCTION BY 

MEANS OF FLIGHT, INTIMIDATION, FORCE, 

VIOLENCE, OR PHYSICAL INTERFERENCE OR 

OBSTACLE, OR BY MEANS OF ANY 

INDEPENDENTLY UNLAWFUL ACT. IN ORDER 

TO FIND THE DEFENDANT GUILTY OF THIS 

OFFENSE, THE STATE MUST PROVIDE EACH OF 

THE FOLLOWING ELEMENTS BEYOND A 

REASONABLE DOUBT: (1) THAT THE 

DEFENDANT (A) COMMITTED AN ACT OF 

FLIGHT, INTIMIDATION, FORCE, VIOLENCE, OR 

PHYSICAL INTERFERENCE OR OBSTACLE"].

POINT III

GIVEN THE FACTS, APPELLANT DID NOT 

COMMIT A VIOLATION OF OBSTRUCION "BY 

MEANS OF FLIGHT, INTIMIDATION, FORCE, 

VIOLENCE, OR PHYSICAL INTERFERENCE OR 

OBSTACLE, OR BY MEANS OF ANY 

INDEPENDENTLY UNLAWFUL ACT" AS 

STIPULATED IN THE ELEMENTS OF THE 

STATUTE N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1A. 

Our review of the record reveals substantial evidence which proved each 

element of the offense; we thus affirm defendant's conviction. We are, however, 
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A-0960-17T4

constrained to remand this matter because the Law Division judge did not 

impose sentence and enter a judgment as required by Rule 3:23-8(e).2

In pertinent part, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(a) provides:

A person commits an offense if he purposely obstructs, 

impairs or perverts the administration of law or other 

governmental function or prevents or attempts to 

prevent a public servant from lawfully performing an 

official function by means of flight, intimidation, force, 

violence, or physical interference or obstacle, or by 

means of any independently unlawful act. 

The State was, therefore, required to prove: (1) defendant committed "an act of 

flight, intimidation, force, violence, or physical interference or obstacle [or] an 

unlawful act[.] [I]n other words, an act that is, without regard to its purpose to 

obstruct justice, already declared illegal"; (2) the defendant's purpose for the 

unlawful act was to obstruct, impair or pervert the administration of law or to 

prevent a public servant from performing an lawful function; and (3) defendant 

attempted to, or did, "obstruct, impair, or pervert the administration of law or 

the official governmental function . . . ." Model Jury Charges (Criminal), 

 

2

 Although the order entered by the Law Division judge states, "Defendant's 

Municipal Appeal is DENIED," we perceive from our review of the judge's 

entire oral decision that he conducted a de novo review in accordance with Rule

3:23-8(a)(2). The judge, however, did not sentence defendant or enter the 

required judgment. 
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A-0960-17T4

"Obstructing Administration of Law or Other Governmental Function (N.J.S.A. 

2C:29-1)" (approved Oct. 23, 2000).

The Law Division judge found the State met its burden as to each of those 

elements based on the testimony of the officer who conducted a motor vehicle 

stop after he viewed an expired registration sticker on defendant's vehicle. The 

judge cited verbatim portions of that testimony, found credible by the judge who

deferred to the municipal court judge's credibility findings. See State v. Locurto, 

157 N.J. 463, 474 (1999).

The Law Division judge found the officer and his partner were in full 

uniform when they exited their marked police vehicle, approached defendant's 

vehicle and requested his driver's license, registration and insurance card. The 

officer said defendant "stated he did not have to give it to me and refused to give 

it to me." The officer asked defendant for those credentials "upwards of ten 

times" and advised defendant he was subject to arrest if he refused to give that 

information to the officer. Defendant was arrested after he "remained obstinate 

in his refusals" to produce his driving credentials "that would have aided the 

policing in determining the identity of [defendant]." Defendant's failure to 

produce his credentials necessitated the police to arrest him under the name, 

"John Doe." Although a fingerprint search later identified defendant, the State 
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was unable to locate and produce the summonses on the day of trial because all 

summonses issued that day were under the common pseudonym. 

Our function as a reviewing court is to determine whether the findings of 

the Law Division judge "could reasonably have been reached on sufficient 

credible evidence present in the record." State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 162

(1964). If we determine that the findings and conclusions of the judge meet that 

criterion, our "task is complete" and we "should not disturb the result" even if 

we "might have reached a different conclusion . . . ." Ibid.; see also State v.

Avena, 281 N.J. Super. 327, 333 (App. Div. 1995). Just as the Law Division

judge did when conducting his de novo review, we "defer to [the] trial court['s] 

credibility findings that are often influenced by matters[,] such as observations 

of the character and demeanor of witnesses and common human experience[,] 

. . . not transmitted by the record." Locurto, 157 N.J. at 474. We reverse if we 

find the "judge went so wide of the mark, a mistake must have been made." Id.

at 471 (quoting Johnson, 42 N.J. at 162). That is not the case here.

The Law Division judge determined defendant committed an unlawful act 

by violating N.J.S.A. 39:3-29 which requires a driver of a motor vehicle to 

"exhibit his [or her] driver’s license and an insurance identification card, and 

. . . shall also exhibit the registration certificate, when requested so to do by a 
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A-0960-17T4

police officer . . . while in the performance of the duties of his [or her] office 

. . . ." When a "defendant fail[s] to produce his [or her] driver's license and a 

registration certificate, the officers [are] empowered to arrest him [or her]." 

State v. Gray, 59 N.J. 563, 568 (1971). Defendant's refusal to produce his 

license, registration and insurance card was an unlawful act, State v. Perlstein, 

206 N.J. Super. 246, 255 (App. Div. 1986), that prevented the police from 

identifying him, verifying whether the vehicle registration was current, issuing 

any summons to an identified defendant and requiring a fingerprint investigation 

to learn defendant's identity. Defendant's "obstinate" refusal, "upwards" of ten 

times, proves that his "act of affirmative interference," State v. Fede, 237 N.J. 

138, 149 (2019), was purposeful,

3 N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2(b)(1). 

 

3

 "Purposely" is defined by statute:

A person acts purposely with respect to the nature of 

his conduct or a result thereof if it is his conscious 

object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause 

such a result. A person acts purposely with respect to 

attendant circumstances if he is aware of the existence 

of such circumstances or he believes or hopes that they 

exist. "With purpose," "designed," "with design" or 

equivalent terms have the same meaning.

[N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2(b)(1).]
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The substantial credible evidence in the record supported the Law 

Division judge's findings and proved each of the elements of N.J.S.A. 2C:29-

1(a). We discern no reason to disturb defendant's conviction for obstruction.

We determine the balance of defendant's arguments are without sufficient 

merit to warrant discussion in this written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).

Affirmed but remanded to the Law Division for imposition of sentence 

and entry of a judgment in compliance with the procedures set forth in Rule

3:23-8(e). We do not retain jurisdiction.