Reversed and Remanded and Opinion filed October 25, 2016.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-15-00708-CV

CITY OF GALENA PARK; DANNY P. SIMMS, CRUZ R. HINOJOSA, JR., 

MARICELA SERNA, AND JUAN FLORES, IN THEIR OFFICIAL

CAPACITIES AS MEMBERS OF THE GALENA PARK CITY

COMMISSION; ROBERT PRUETT, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS 

CITY ADMINISTRATOR OF THE CITY OF GALENA PARK; MAYRA 

GONZALES, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS CITY SECRETARY OF

THE CITY OF GALENA PARK; JIM DEFOYD, IN HIS OFFICIAL 

CAPACITY AS CITY ATTORNEY OF THE CITY OF GALENA PARK; 

AND ESMERALDA MOYA, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS MAYOR 

OF THE CITY OF GALENA PARK, Appellants

V.

BARRY PONDER, Appellee

On Appeal from the 270th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 2015-00781

O P I N I O N

This appeal concerns the validity of a petition seeking an election to amend 
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the charter of the City of Galena Park, Texas. Appellants, the City of Galena Park 

and several city officials in their official capacities (collectively, at times, “Galena 

Park”),

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challenge the trial court’s grant of summary judgment favoring appellee 

Barry Ponder and denial of summary judgment favoring Galena Park. In its 

judgment, the trial court ordered Galena Park to hold an election on the proposed 

amendments. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

I. Background

On September 15, 2014, Ponder delivered a set of papers to Galena Park 

City Secretary Mayra Gonzales that purported to be a petition in support of city 

charter amendments proposed by a group called Citizens for a Better Galena Park. 

The top page of the papers was an unsigned cover sheet, the body of which read as 

follows:

To the City Commission of Galena Park:

We, the undersigned, registered and qualified voters of the State of 

Texas, residents of Galena Park, . . . present to the city Commission 

this petition and request that the following proposed amendments to 

the charter of the city of Galena Park be submitted to the registered 

and qualified voters of the city of Galena Park for the adoption or 

rejection at the next special election . . . .

The next ten pages contained four proposed charter amendments. The 

amendments concerned, respectively, (1) the creation of four new commissioner 

positions to act as liaisons from the city commission to certain departments of the 

city government; (2) appointment and duties of fire chief, fire marshal, and police 

chief; (3) a detailed procedural system for voter initiative, referendum, and recall 

petitions; and (4) changes to the general powers of the mayor and the commission. 

 

1

These officials are Mayor Esmeralda Moya, City Administrator Robert Pruett, City 

Secretary Mayra Gonzales, City Attorney Jim DeFoyd, and City Commissioners Danny Simms, 

Cruz Hinojosa, Maricela Serna, and Juan Flores.
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None of these pages were signed or dated. The next page in the set also appears to 

be an unsigned cover sheet, the body of which read:

Attached is a petition bearing 614 signatures of registered and 

qualified voters of the State of Texas and City of Galena Park. 

Additional are the affidavit of those volunteer petitioners. [sic] 

Present[ed] to the City Secretary of Galena Park on this date

September 15, 2014.2

After the second cover letter came several sets of signature pages. Each 

individual signature page is labeled “Charter Amendment Petition” and includes 

the following language above the signatures:

To the Galena Park City [Commission]:

We, the undersigned duly qualified electors of the City of Galena 

Park, by affixing our signatures hereon, demand the attached Charter 

Amendments to be placed before the citizens of Galena Park for their 

approval.

Each of the signature pages contains multiple columns listing information for each 

signatory, including date of signature, address, and date of birth or voter 

registration number. At the end of each set of signature pages is a signed and 

notarized “Circulator’s Statement,” each of which reads: “I, the petition circulator, 

swear or affirm that I personally circulated the petition papers; it bears ___ 

signatures: all signatures thereto were made in my presence; and I believe them to 

be the genuine signatures of the persons whose name they purport to be.” In each 

statement, the blank space is filled in by hand with the number of signatures in the 

particular set.3

 

2 While most of the cover letter was typed, the number “614” was handwritten into a 

blank.

3 Although the pages containing the circulator’s statements also have rows for voter 

signatures, no signatures appear on them other than those of the circulators themselves. The 

circulator’s statement pages also do not include the language that appears at the top of each of 
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According to Gonzales’s uncontroverted affidavit, there were no proposed 

charter amendments attached to the signature pages delivered to her. Gonzales 

reviewed the signature pages to determine the validity of the signatures. She then

sent a letter to Citizens for a Better Galena Park in which she stated

I . . . have reviewed the election petition and other documents

submitted on September 15, 2014, in connection with a proposed 

charter amendment.

I have determined that 492 of the signatures that were contained in the

documents meet the requirements for signatures on election petitions . 

. . . I have also determined, based on the voter registration records 

maintained by Harris County, that there are between 3,677 and 4,025 

qualified voters in the City of Galena Park and that the number of

valid signatures is in excess of 5% of the number of qualified voters in 

the City of Galena Park.

I have made no investigation into any issues concerning the manner in 

which the petition and related documents were circulated or how the 

signatures were obtained and I make no determination concerning

those matters.

According to City Attorney Jim DeFoyd’s affidavit, he also reviewed the 

submitted papers and concluded that they did not constitute a proper petition 

primarily because (1) the signature pages did not include the text or a description 

of any proposed amendment to the charter, (2) there were no amendments attached 

to the signature pages as referenced, and (3) the proposed amendments covered

multiple subjects, which he asserts is not permitted under the law. DeFoyd further 

stated in his affidavit that neither he nor Gonzales certified that the papers 

constituted a proper petition. Attached to DeFoyd’s affidavit were five additional 

affidavits, which DeFoyd stated are from signatories. Several of the affiants stated 

that they were told the amendments were aimed at lowering Galena Park water 

 

the other signature pages addressed to the “City of Galena Park City [Commission]” and 

referencing attached amendments.
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bills, but some also acknowledged not reading the materials for themselves. 

DeFoyd further stated that he reported this information to the city commission.

After the commission refused to call an election on the proposed 

amendments, Ponder filed the present lawsuit. Both sides filed motions for 

summary judgment. In his motion, Ponder contended that because the petition met 

the legal requirements for a valid petition and City Secretary Gonzales certified the 

validity of a sufficient number of signatures, the commission had a ministerial duty 

to submit the proposed charter amendments to voters. As evidence in support,

Ponder attached the papers that he had presented to Gonzales, the letter sent by 

Gonzales regarding the number of valid signatures, and a copy of the city charter.

In its motion, Galena Park asserted that the papers did not constitute a proper 

petition because it was impossible to discern exactly what amendments were being 

supported by the signatories, the proposed amendments improperly covered 

multiple subjects, and the submission lacked a Spanish translation. Galena Park 

also denied in its motion that Gonzales had certified the petition. Galena Park 

attached as evidence the affidavits of Gonzales, DeFoyd, and the five signatories;

the papers presented to Gonzales; and Gonzales’s letter regarding the validity of 

the signatures. In a reply, Ponder additionally argued that Gonzales’s letter 

constituted a certification of the election petition. The trial court granted Ponder’s 

motion for summary judgment, denied Galena Park’s motion, and ordered that the 

“City Defendants shall place the proposed amendments on the ballot for the next 

available election date.” In its appeal, Galena Park contends the trial court erred in 

granting summary judgment for Ponder and, instead, should have granted summary 

judgment favoring Galena Park.
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II. Legal Foundations

A. Summary Judgment Standards

We review a trial court’s summary judgment rulings under an abuse of 

discretion standard. See Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding, 

289 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. 2009). In respect to traditional motions for summary

judgment, such as those filed by both sides in this case, the movant has the burden 

of establishing that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 

movant is therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. (citing Tex. R. Civ. 

P. 166a(c)). The nonmovant has no burden to respond to or present evidence 

regarding the motion until the movant has carried its burden to conclusively 

establish the cause of action or defense on which its motion is based. State v. 

$90,235, 390 S.W.3d 289, 292 (Tex. 2013). We consider all the evidence in the 

light most favorable to the nonmovant, crediting evidence favorable to the 

nonmovant if reasonable jurors could, and disregarding contrary evidence unless 

reasonable jurors could not. See Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez, 206 S.W.3d 572, 582 

(Tex. 2006). Evidence raises a genuine issue of fact if reasonable and fair-minded 

jurors could differ in their conclusions in light of all of the summary judgment 

evidence. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Mayes, 236 S.W.3d 754, 755 (Tex.

2007). When, as in this case, the order granting summary judgment does not 

specify the grounds upon which the trial court relied, we must affirm if any of the 

independent summary judgment grounds is meritorious. $90,235, 390 S.W.3d at 

292.

When parties file competing motions for summary judgment, and the trial 

court grants one motion and denies the other, we may consider the propriety of the 

denial as well as the grant. See Grant Prideco, Inc. v. Empeiria Conner L.L.C., 

463 S.W.3d 157, 160 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.). If the issue 
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raised is based on undisputed and unambiguous facts, we may determine the 

question presented as a matter of law. Id. We may then either affirm the judgment 

or reverse and render the judgment the trial court should have rendered. Id.

B. Election Petitions

Galena Park’s city charter has little to say regarding procedures to amend its 

charter, merely referencing section 9.004 of the Texas Local Government Code. 

Galena Park, Tex., City Charter art. VIII, § 19 (1946).

4

 Section 9.004 reads in 

relevant part:

§ 9.004. Charter Amendments

(a) The governing body of a municipality . . . shall submit a proposed 

charter amendment to the voters for their approval at an election if the 

submission is supported by a petition signed by a number of qualified 

voters of the municipality equal to at least five percent of the number 

of qualified voters of the municipality or 20,000, whichever number is 

the smaller.

. . . . 

(d) An amendment may not contain more than one subject.

(e) The ballot shall be prepared so that a voter may approve or 

disapprove any one or more amendments without having to approve 

or disapprove all of the amendments.

Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code § 9.004.

Section 9.004(a) outlines the right of the qualified voters of a municipality to 

petition their governing body to amend its charter, a power sometimes referred to 

 

4

“SECTION 19: AMENDMENTS. This Charter after its adoption by the qualified 

voters of the City may be amended in accordance with Article 1170 of the Revised Civil Statutes 

of Texas of 1925, and any amendments thereto.” The current version of Article 1170 is section 

9.004 of the Local Government Code. See Act of June 17, 1961, 57th Leg., R.S., ch. 500, 1961 

Tex. Gen. Laws 1108–09, repealed by Act of May 21, 1987, 70th Leg., R.S., ch. 149, § 49(1), 

1987 Tex. Gen. Laws 1306.
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as “initiative and referendum.” See In re Roof, 130 S.W.3d 414, 417 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, orig. proceeding); see also Coalson v. City Council of 

Victoria, 610 S.W.2d 744, 747 (Tex. 1980); Taxpayer’s Ass’n of Harris Cty. v. 

City of Houston, 129 Tex. 627, 105 S.W.2d 655, 657 (1937) (“[T]he power of 

initiative and referendum . . . is the exercise by the people of a power reserved to 

them, and not the exercise of a right granted. It follows that, in order to protect the 

people of the city in the exercise of this reserved legislative power, such charter 

provisions should be liberally construed in favor of the power reserved.”); accord 

In re Woodfill, 470 S.W.3d 473, 480 (Tex. 2015) (quoting Taxpayer Ass’n). When 

the requirements of section 9.004 are met, the proposed amendments must be put 

to a vote, and the duty of the municipal officials to do so is a ministerial one. See 

Coalson, 610 S.W.2d at 747 (addressing predecessor statute); In re Roof, 130 

S.W.3d at 417-18.

III. Analysis

A. Ponder’s Motion

We begin our analysis by addressing whether the trial court properly granted 

Ponder’s motion for summary judgment. As discussed above, Ponder raised 

essentially two grounds, contending that the commission had a ministerial duty to 

submit the proposed charter amendments to voters because the papers submitted 

met all of the legal requirements for a valid petition, or, alternatively, Gonzales’s 

letter regarding the validity of the signatures constituted a certification of the 

petition. Neither the papers themselves nor Gonzales’s letter, however, 

demonstrate Ponder’s entitlement to summary judgment as a matter of law.

1. Validity of Petition

Although section 9.004 of the Local Government Code does not dictate a 
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precise form for election petitions, it clearly requires the submission to be 

supported by a petition signed by a certain number of qualified voters in order to 

mandate an election. It states: “The governing body of a municipality . . . shall 

submit a proposed charter amendment to the voters . . . if the submission is 

supported by a petition signed by a [sufficient] number of qualified voters.” Tex. 

Loc. Gov’t Code § 9.004(a). 

We know that a sufficient number of qualified voters signed the petition. 

But, has Ponder conclusively shown that the petition supported the submission? 

As citizens may support the right of initiative and referendum irrespective of the 

proposition submitted to the voters, we do not construe the plain language of 

section 9.004 as requiring all petition signatories as being “FOR” voters. But, 

Ponder must establish that the petition supported the submission of the proposed 

charter amendments.

The cover letter in the papers Ponder presented to Gonzales represents that 

the collected signatures were in support of the submission of proposed 

amendments. Additionally, the signature pages themselves reference “Charter 

Amendments” with a demand that they be placed before the citizens for their 

approval. The circulator’s statements aver that the circulator’s circulated a 

“petition paper.” The gap in Ponder’s motion for summary judgment, however, is 

that the evidence he attached—the papers submitted, Gonzales’s letter, and the city 

charter—do not conclusively establish that the four amendments presented are the 

actual amendments that the signatories were demanding be placed on the ballot. 

The signature pages note that amendments were attached, but when Ponder 

submitted the papers, nothing was attached to the signature pages.5 Neither the 

 

5

Ponder does not contest Gonzales’s statement that no amendments were attached to the 

signature pages when filed. Moreover, there were multiple sets of signature pages submitted and 

only one set of amendments, so the amendments could not have been attached to each different 
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signature pages, the circulator’s statements, nor the cover letters describe the 

amendments. 

In his motion, Ponder failed to conclusively establish that the signatories on 

the provided signature pages supported the petition that was submitted. See Mann 

Frankfort, 289 S.W.3d at 848.

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 The papers he submitted to Gonzales did not do so, 

and he offered no other evidence to demonstrate that this elemental requirement 

was met.

2. Scope of Letter

Although Ponder contends that the letter from Gonzales constituted a 

certification of the election petition, it is clear from the face of the letter itself that 

this is not so. In the letter, Gonzales stated that she determined only that the 

signatures were valid and numbered in excess of 5% of qualified voters in the city. 

However, she further explicitly stated that she “made no investigation into any 

issues concerning the manner in which the petition and related documents were 

circulated or how the signatures were obtained and [makes] no determination 

concerning those matters.”7 Although Ponder emphasizes Gonzales’s use of the 

 

set of signature pages.

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Some city charters contain provisions specifying how petition signature pages must 

indicate the substance of the amendment or other issue of governance on which supporting 

signatures are being sought. See, e.g., City of Sherman v. Hudman, 996 S.W.3d 904, 916-17 

(Tex. App.—Dallas 1999, pet. granted, judgm’t vacated w.r.m.) (noting Sherman charter 

required full text of ordinance in petition forms). Although the Galena Park charter does not 

contain such specification, this fact does not mean that the substance of the supported 

amendments does not need to be established in some manner. To hold otherwise would be to 

sanction bait-and-switch tactics that could undermine the integrity of the initiative process.

Here, there is at least some indication in the record that the amendments Ponder 

submitted to Gonzales were not the same amendments presented to at least some of the 

signatories. As discussed above, a few of the signatories provided affidavits to Galena Park in 

which they stated they were told by circulator’s that the proposed amendments concerned an 

issue not addressed in the amendments Ponder submitted: lowering water bills.

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In his reply to Galena Park’s response and cross-motion, Ponder states that in her letter, 
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term “election petition,” there is no indication in the context of the letter that she 

intended this term to indicate that the submitted papers were a valid and proper 

election petition; indeed, she explicitly indicates that she did not make such a 

determination.8 Accordingly, Gonzales’s letter does not support the trial court’s 

grant of summary judgment. Because Ponder failed to prove conclusively either of 

his grounds for summary judgment, the trial court erred in granting summary 

judgment favoring Ponder and ordering an election be held.

B. Galena Park’s Motion

Next, we must consider whether the trial court erred in denying Galena 

Park’s motion for summary judgment. We begin here by noting that the grounds 

Galena Park urges on appeal are not in complete sync with the grounds it raised in 

the trial court. In its motion, Galena Park asserted that as a matter of law, the 

papers Ponder submitted did not constitute a valid election petition because (1) it 

 

Gonzales “certif[ied] that the Election Petition contained no deficiencies.” The letter itself 

refutes this contention. It is clear from the letter that Gonzales’s review was limited to the 

validity of the signatures and did not extend to the validity of the petition as a whole. Ponder 

further does not cite any authority supporting his position that Gonzales’s letter was sufficient to 

certify the petition and thus mandate an election.

8 Moreover, Ponder does not cite any authority supporting the proposition that even if the 

city secretary had certified the petition as valid that this would have resolved the issue as a 

matter of law. See Sherman, 996 S.W.3d at 916-17 (holding city official was without authority 

to certify petition where petition was not in compliance with applicable law). We further note 

that, although not cited by Ponder, the recent Texas Supreme Court opinion In re Woodfill, 470 

S.W.3d 473, is distinguishable for several reasons. First, the city charter at issue in Woodfill

specifically assigned the duty to certify referendum petitions to the city secretary, whereas, the 

Galena Park charter contains no such assignment. Id. at 475-76. Second, the secretary in 

Woodfill in fact certified the petition and did not adopt the city attorney’s contrary findings,

whereas, Gonzales here did not certify the petition and expressly deferred to the city attorney’s 

opinion regarding the sufficiency of the petition papers. Id. at 478-79. Third, Woodfill was a 

mandamus action in which the city council did not request any relief on the merits, and a direct 

appeal concerning the sufficiency of the petition was then pending in the court of appeals,

whereas, the present case is a direct appeal concerning the validity of the petition. Id. at 480 & 

n.10. And fourth, Woodfill did not involve the fundamental question posed in the present case 

concerning whether the signatories actually supported the submitted petition.
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was impossible to tell what amendments had been supported by the signatories, (2) 

the proposed amendments improperly covered multiple subjects, and (3) no 

Spanish-language translation was provided. On appeal, Galena Park raises the first 

two grounds, but instead of arguing that a Spanish translation was required, it 

asserts that the proposed amendments were not in proper form and “would leave a 

voter guessing as to the chief features and the character and purpose of the 

proposed amendments.” Because Galena Park has abandoned its Spanishtranslation argument on appeal, we will not address the merits of that contention. 

See Fort Bend County Drainage Dist. v. Sbrusch, 818 S.W.2d 392, 395 (Tex. 

1991). And because Galena Park did not preserve its objection to the form of the 

proposed amendments, we likewise will not address the merits of that assertion.

9

 

See Stiles v. Resolution Trust Corp., 857 S.W.2d 24, 26 (Tex. 1993); Envtl. 

Procedures, Inc. v. Guidry, 282 S.W.3d 602, 621 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th 

Dist.] 2009, pet. denied).

1. Sufficiency of Petition

Turning to the first ground, concerning whether Galena Park demonstrated 

as a matter of law that the papers Ponder submitted did not constitute a valid

election petition, the evidence clearly shows that voter signatures were collected in 

support of proposed charter amendments. The signature pages indicate that the 

signatures were in support of submitting proposed charter amendments to the 

voters and, that at the time the signatures were obtained, the proposed amendments 

were attached to the signature pages. Additionally, as discussed above, Gonzales 

determined that the number of valid signatures on the signature pages was in 

excess of the number required by section 9.004. It is also important to note that 

 

9

In its motion, Galena Park actually described the proposed amendment pages as

“contain[ing] an adequate description of a request.”
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Ponder provided an unsigned cover letter to Gonzales indicating that the submitted

amendments were the ones the signatories requested be submitted to voters. 

Although, as discussed above, the papers Ponder submitted do not conclusively 

establish that the petition was the one the signatories supported, the papers do 

contain enough information to raise a fact question as to whether the requirements 

of section 9.004 were met. See Mann Frankfort, 289 S.W.3d at 848; see also

Coalson, 610 S.W.2d at 747; In re Roof, 130 S.W.3d at 417-18.

As mentioned, Galena Park additionally attached several affidavits allegedly 

from signatories who stated that they were told the petition they were signing was 

aimed at reducing water bills.10 None of the affiants, however, made any claims 

regarding the written text of the amendments. In fact, it is clear from several of the 

affidavits that the affiants did not read the proposed amendments but at best 

depended on statements by the circulators. Galena Park complains of alleged 

improprieties in how the signatures were gathered but not of any violation of 9.004 

requirements. Galena Park did not establish its entitlement to summary judgment 

based on its first ground. 

2. Scope of Amendments

Galena Park’s second ground for summary judgment is premised on section 

9.004(d) of the Local Government Code, which states in full: “An amendment 

may not contain more than one subject.” Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code § 9.004(d). 

Although Galena Park does not offer much detail regarding its second ground, it 

suggests that the papers Ponder submitted could not have constituted a valid 

election petition because they included four separate amendments on different 

 

10 We note that, although Galena Park describes the affiants as signatories, it does not

reference where their signatures appear, and it provides no evidence whether these signatories 

were among the 492 determined by Gonzales to be qualified voters.
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subjects and at least one of the amendments (number two) contained provisions 

dealing with two separate subjects: the appointment and qualifications of the fire 

chief and the appointment and qualifications of the police chief. Nothing in the 

text of section 9.004, however, expressly prohibits an election petition from 

proposing more than one amendment. Section 9.004(e) requires that an election 

ballot must be “prepared so that a voter may approve or disapprove any one or 

more amendments without having to approve or disapprove all of the 

amendments,” but there is no such requirement in section 9.004 for petitions used 

to garner supporting signatures. The language of a ballot proposition is the 

responsibility of the authority ordering the election, not the responsibility of the 

party petitioning for an election to be called. See Tex. Elec. Code § 52.072.

Concerning the fire chief and police chief changes sought in amendment 

two, what constitutes the same subject matter for section 9.004(d) purposes is 

generally construed broadly. See Gibson v. City of Orange, 272 S.W.2d 789, 790 

(Tex. App.—Beaumont 1954, writ ref’d) (construing predecessor statute broadly 

and approving ballot proposition that proposed numerous interconnected changes 

to city charter); Edwards v. Murphy, 256 S.W.2d 470, (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 

1953, writ dism’d) (holding proposed charter amendment concerned only one 

subject where all suggested changes were already contained within single state 

statute); Garitty v. Halbert, 235 S.W. 231, 236 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1921, writ 

dism’d w.o.j.) (concluding proposed amendment of two sections of city charter 

dealt with the single subject of taxation, even though the funds were to be spent on 

both schools and libraries); see also Dacus v. Parker, 383 S.W.3d 557, 568-69 

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012) (citing Gibson and Garrity and holding 

proposition involved only one subject—creation of a municipal fund—even though 

fund was to be used to support improvements to both streets and drainage), rev’d 
15

on other grounds, 466 S.W.3d 820 (Tex. 2015). This reading acknowledges that 

proposed changes to a city charter may seek broader schematic changes to city 

government that may make sense only as an all-or-nothing proposition. See 

Gibson, 272 S.W.2d at 790. In the present context, new rules governing the 

appointment and qualifications for police chief and fire chief are part of the subject 

of how the city’s emergency services departments are to be organized. 

Consequently, amendment two did not impermissibly address more than one 

subject and the trial court did not err in refusing to grant summary judgment 

favoring Galena Park on this ground.

IV. Conclusion

The record demonstrates that a sufficient number of qualified voter 

signatures were obtained in support of putting proposed charter amendments up for 

election. However, the manner of submission of the election petition materials left 

it unclear whether the petition submitted was the one supported by the signatories. 

Because the evidence does not demonstrate conclusively that the petition was the 

one the signatories supported, summary judgment is not supportable on this record.

Accordingly, we sustain Galena Park’s issues to the extent they challenge

the trial court’s grant of summary judgment favoring Ponder and deny the issues to 

the extent they urge judgment favoring Galena Park. We further reverse the trial 

court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

/s/ Martha Hill Jamison

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Jamison, Donovan, and Brown.