### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs S ep te m be r 17, 200 3

ST A TE OF TE N N ES SE E v

. BO BB Y BL A IR
Appeal f rom the Circ uit Court for Humphreys County No. 10122 Allen W. Wallace, Judge

No. M2002- 01610-CCA -R3-C D - F iled Fe bruary 13, 2004

A Humphre y s County

Circu i t C ourt jury

convicted the defe ndant, B obby Bla ir, of manuf

actur ing methamphetamine, a Class B felony , and the trial court sentenc ed him a s a Rang e I , s t an d ard offe nder to twe lve y ear s in the Depa rtment of C orre ction. The de fenda nt appea ls, claiming that (1) the e vid e nc e is i ns uf

fi c ie nt to sup po rt his c on vic tio n; (2 ) the tr ia l cou rt e rr e d b y

re fu sin g to g ra

nt a continuance when the state announc ed a f ew da y s befor e trial that it was g o i n g t o ca l l an ex pert witness to te stify ; ( 3) the trial court err ed by denying the defe ndant’s motion to s uppress a nd exclude evidenc e bec ause the defe nse was not a ble to e x amine and test the equipment and c hemicals found at the cr ime scene ; (4) the tria l court er red by allowing the state’s e x pert to testify that the def

endant
wa s n ot m a nu fact uring me tha mph e tamin e fo r p e rs on a l us e ; ( 5) the tr ia l c ourt e rr e d b y fa ili ngto instruct the jury

on the lesser included offe nse of simple possession of methamphe tamine; and (6) the trial cour

t erre d by ref using to instruc t the jury on “immediate prec ursor.” We conclude that no
e rr or oc c ur re d, a nd we a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he tr ia l c ourt

. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Aff irm ed

J OS EP H M. T I PTON , J. , d e li v e r e d th e o p in io n o f th e c o u rt, in which D AVI D G. H AYES and J OHN E VE R E TT W I L L I AMS , J J ., joined.

Wil liam B. “ J ake” L ocker t, I I I , District Public Defe nder, f or the a ppellant, B obby

Bla ir.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney Gene ral a nd Reporte r ; Jo hn

H

. B le d s o e , A s s is tant Attorney Gene ral; Da

n Mitchum Alsobrooks, D i s t ri ct Attorney Gene ral; and L isa Carol Done g an, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.

OP IN ION

Th is c a se re la te s to the de fe nd a nt’ s bei ng fo un d at a camps ite wi th e qu ipm e nt a nd c he mic a ls commonly

used to make me thamphetamine. Ronnie T. Toung ette, the Humphr ey s County Sheriff, testified that on the af

ternoon of J uly 10, 2001, he and another deputy went to a remote are a on Bea r Cr e e k

. H e s a id th a t th e a r e a h a d a b o a t r a mp a n d w a s a p o p u la r f is h in g s p o t, th a t c a mp in g was-2-

prohibited there , and that the near est house was about one- quarte r mile awa y . He sa id that when he and the de puty

arr ived at Be ar Creek, they saw a campe r-ty

pe vehic le, evidenc e of a

campf ire, a nd evidenc e that someone had bee n cooking . He said that an all-te rra in vehicle a lso was pre sent and that wooden boa

rds had be en nailed to tre es in order to make tables. H e said that a boat was pa

rked at the ca mpsite but that he saw no evidenc e any one had been fishing. H e said that no one was at the campsite a

nd that he and the deputy left. He said that when he returne d to the Sheriff’ s Offic e, he posted a fly er or deringnight of fice rs to return to the a

rea

.
Jess ie Mc Clo ud

te sti fi e d th a t in

July 20 01 , h e wa s a

deputy fo r t he Humphre y s Co un ty Sheriff’ s Depa

rtment. He te stified that on J uly 10, h e wo rk ed t h e eve ning shift a nd saw Sherif

f To un g e tte ’s or de r p os te d o n th e bu lle tin bo a rd . H e sa id h e a nd

Of fi c e r Wi lli a m Ma c ke n w e nt t o Be ar Cre ek L anding about 11:00 p.m. and saw the defe ndan t s i t t i n g i n a re cliner w ith a blanket
cover ing the rec liner. He said that he called t o the defendant a couple of times a nd that the def

endant fi na lly g ot o ut o f t

he c ha ir

. He sa id h e tol d th e de fe nd a nt t hat th e de fe nd a nt w a s g oin g to h a ve to leave beca

use ca mping wa s not allowed. He said he wa s standing be side a c losed cooler and smelled ether in th e c o o le r

. H e s a id h e h a d b e c o me f a mi li a r w it

h th e s me ll o f e th e r b e c a

u s e h e had bee n working on case s involving methamphe tamine. He sa id he opene d the cooler , saw a red buc ket
c on ta ini nga

liq uid a nd so me thi ngfl oatin g in t

he liq uid , a nd arr e st ed the d e fe nd a nt, c ha rg inghim with manufac turing methamphetamine. H e s ai d t hat he tele phoned the Tw enty -Third Judicial District Drug Task For ce and that it c ontacted the fede ral Dr ugEnforc ement Administration (DEA) , which ar rived to cle an up the sc ene.
Mr. McCloud testified that a DE A ag ent poure d out the liquid in t h e re d bucket, let the substance that had bee n floating in the liquid air dry , and g ave him the substance as e vidence . He said that he thoug ht the substance w as methamphe tamine and that the substanc e wa s sent to the Tenne ssee B urea

u of I nvestig ation (TB I ) for testing. H e said the D EA destroy ed a bottle of Hee t and
a b o t t l e o f

dr a i n c l e a n e r

t h a ta l s o w e r e a tt h e c a mp s i t e

. H e s a i d t h a tb a t t e r i e s , M o rt o n ’ s s a lt,
a lum inum f

oil , f ive e mpt y Ma so n ja rs wi tho ut l ids , a

nd Col e man la

nte rn s a lso we re pr e se nt.

On cr oss-examination, Mr. McCloud testified that a police inventory li s t s h owed that of

fice rs found the following items at the sce n e: Fo u r C oleman lanter ns, one tac kle box containing fishing tackle, a motorcy cle, a

n all-terr ain vehicle , a ra

ke, three folding chair s, an ax, three c oolers, five skillets, a radio, a canoe , and ten fishing poles. He sa id that he did not know if other pe ople wer e staying at the campsite with the defenda nt and that when he arr ived at the sc ene, the defe ndant was pr e te nd ingto b e a sle e p. He sa id t hat he did

no t tr y to c oll ect fing e rp ri nts fr om a ny of the ite ms found at the campsite and that he did not ask the DEAag ents to fing erpr int any thing. He said the DEA ke pt most of the chemica ls found at the ca mpsite and d es t roy ed them. He said that police office rs photog raphe d the sce ne but that the only phy sical evide nce he was allowed to keep w as the air-dr ied sub s t ance from the r ed bucke t. He ac knowledg ed that at the de fenda nt’s preliminary hear ing, he testified that he was positive the s ubstance in the red buc ket was me thamphetamine. He
a c kn ow le dged, th oug h, that he la te r l e a rn e d th e su bs tanc e wa s n ot m e tha

mph e tamin e . H e a lso acknow ledg ed that he did not find iodine or anhy drous ammonia, ingr edients commonly used in the methamphetamine ma

nufac turing proce ss, at the campsite. He said that he was at the campsite for-3-

three to four hours and that he did not see any one other than law e nforc ement off icer s arr ive during that time.

Tara Ba rker , a spec ial ag ent fore nsic scientist with the TBI , testified t hat s he tested the dried substance f

rom the re d bucket. She sa id that the substance w as 378.6 g rams of pse udoephedr ine.
Rick Stewart, a D EA age nt and ex pert in manufa cturing methamphetamine, testified that he did not visi t the campsite but saw photog raphs of it. He said that when small-town police of fice rs find methamphetamine laboratories, they should call the DEA a

nd let DEA a g ents destroy the labora t o ri es b ec ause they are extremely

dang erous. He said offic ers should not try to fing erpr int items at a methamphe tamine laboratory beca use che micals could re act or g et on the off icer s’ skin. He sa id there a

re two me thods for making m et hamphetamine, the “Na zi” method and the “Red Phosphorous” method. He sa id that in order to make methamphetamine, a person ne eds a pr ecur sor su c h a s p se ud oe ph e dr ine , w hic h is c on ta ine d in de c on g e sta

nt p ill s su c h a s Su da fe d. He sa id t he pil ls
mus t be mixe d wi th a liq

uid su c h a s H e e t in

or de r t o s e pa

ra te the ps e ud oe ph e dr ine fr om t he pil ls’ other ing redie nts.

The state show ed Ag ent Stewar t a photog raph of

the re d bucket c ontaining the liquid and the
su bs tanc e fl oatin g in t

he liq uid . H e no te d tha t the su

bs tanc e ha d a pink tin t, ind ic a tin g that th e liq uid
was brea king down Sudafed pills, which have a pink coating . He sa id that using the Red Phosphorus

m et h o d , a p er son could make a bout one-ha lf pound of methamphe tamine and that a pound of methamphetamine w as worth $10,000 to $20,000. He said that based upon photogr aphs taken at the campsite a

nd the larg e amount of pse udoephedr ine pre sent, he bel i ev ed the def endant wa s manufa cturing methamphetamine a nd that the def

endant wa s not making the drug for pe rsonal use.

On c ro ss- e xami natio n, Ag e nt S te wa rt te sti fi e d th a t it

wo uld have be e n im

pr a c tic a l to du st the re d buc ke t for fi ng e rp ri nts be c a us e fi ng e rp ri nts c a n only

be c oll e c te d f

ro m f la t, c le a n s ur fa c e s. He sa id that Coleman fuel is used to make me thamphetamine a nd that lithium strips from batterie s ar e u s e d in th e N a zi me th o d

. H e a c kn o w le d g e d th a t b a tt e r ie s a ls o a r e u s e d in f la s h li g h ts and that Coleman fuel could have been use d in the Coleman lanterns f ound at the sce ne. He said that taken alone, the e quipment and che micals found at the c ampsite had leg itimate purposes. He s ai d that take n to g e the r, tho ug h, the ite ms i nd ic a te d ma nu fa c tur ingme tha

mph e tamin e

. He sa id that he c ou ld not tell which manufa cturing method the defendant was using but that the pseudoephedr ine in the red buc ket was a

n “immediate pr ecur sor” to makingmethamphet am i n e. The jury convicted the defe ndant of manuf

actur ing me thamphetamine, a Schedule I Icontrolled substanc e.

I. SUFF ICIENCY OF THE E VIDENCE

The de fenda

nt claims that the evidenc e is insufficient to support his conviction. He c ontends that beca use almost all of the e quipment and che micals found at the c ampsite wer e destroy ed, the state wa s una

ble to l ink him to the e qu ipm e nt thr ou g h fin g e rp ri nt ev ide nc e or pr ov e wi th s c ie nti fi c te sti ngthat th e c he mic a ls w e re the c he mic a ls the state c la ime d. He a lso a rgue s th a t th e e vid e nc e is insufficient to show that he w as manufa cturing methamphetamine f or distribution be cause the police-4-

did not find any

scale s, packa g ing materials, or c ash at the campsite to indica te that the def

endant was manuf

actur ing the drug for a

ny thing other

than per sonal use. F inally , he conten d s that the evidenc e is insufficient be cause the police did not find methamphetamine at the c ampsite and beca use pseudoe phedrine is not an “immediate pre cur s o r ” to ma nufac turing methamphetamine. T he state cla ims that the evidence is sufficient. We ag ree with the state.

Our standa

rd of r eview w h en t h e defenda nt questions the sufficienc y of the e vidence on appea l is “whether , afte r viewingthe evidenc e in the lig ht mos t fa v o ra b l e to the prosec ution, any
ratio na l tr ie r o f f

a c t c ou ld h a ve fo un d th e e sse nti a l e le me nts of the c ri me be y on d a

re a so na ble d o u b t

. ” J ac k s o n v

. Vi rgi n i a, 4 4 3 U. S

. 3 0 7 , 3 1 9 , 9 9 S

. C t

. 2 7 8 1 , 2 7 8 9 (1 9 7 9 ). W e d o n o tre we i gh the e vid e nc e bu t pr e su me that th e jur y ha s r e so lve d a ll c on fl ic ts i n th e te sti mony and dr a wn a ll
rea sonable infe renc es fr om the evidenc e in favor of the state . See State v. Sheff ield, 676 S.W .2d 542, 547 (Tenn. 1984) ; State v. Cabbag e, 571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978)

. Questions about witness cre dibilit y

wer e re solved by

the jury

. See State v. Bla

nd, 958 S.W .2d 651, 659 (Tenn. 1997)

.
I t is a crime f

or a person knowingly to manufac ture a controlled substanc e. T.C.A. § 39-17- 41 7( a )( 1) . A “ c on tr oll e d s ub sta nc e ” is a “ dr ug , s ub sta

nc e , o r i mme diate pr e c ursor in S chedule s I throug h VI

of §§ 39-17- 403 – 39-17-415.” T.C. A. § 39-17-402( 4). Pursuant to T.C.A. § 39-17- 40 8( d) (2 ), me tha

mph e tamin e is a

Sc he du le I Ic on tr oll e d s ub sta nc e . “ Ma nu fa c tur e ” me a ns the produc tion, prepar ation, propag ation, compounding , conver sion or proc essing of a controlled substance, e ither direc tly or indirec tly

by extract ion from substance s of natura l orig in, or independe ntly by means of c hemical sy

nthesis, and includes a ny packa g ing or repa ckag ing of

the substance or l abeling or re labeling of its container , except that “manuf

actur e” d o es n ot include the pre paration or compounding of a c ontrolled substance by an individual for the individual’s own use . . . .
Viewing the evidence i n the light most favor able to the state , the proof show s that the defe ndant was al o ne at the c ampsite with much of the c hemicals a nd equipment nee ded to make methamphetamine. Mr . McCloud testified that he sm elled ether in a c ooler at the campsite a nd that he was familiar with the smell f rom working in othe r methamphetamine case s. Ex pert witness Ag ent Rick Stewart studied photog raphs take n at the sce ne and identified various items in the photog raphs
a s b e ingne e de d to make me tha mph e tamin e . H e te sti fi e d th a t w hil e e a c h ite m a lon e ha d a le g iti ma te purpose, the items a s a whole showe d the campsite was a methamphetamine labor atory . Moreove r, he te st i f i e d t h a tt h e l i qu i d

i n t h e r e d

b u c k e tw a s b r e a k i n g d o w n p s e u d o e p h e dr i n e , a n i m m e d ia te prec ursor to me thamphetamine; that the larg e amount of pseudoephe drine rec overe d demonstrated that the campsite was a methamphetamine labor atory ; a nd that the methamphetamine w as not being manufa cture d for pe rsonal use.

Th e de fe nd a nt c or

re c tly po in ts out

tha t ps e ud oe ph e dr ine is n ot l ist e d a s a n “ imm e diate prec ursor” to methamphetamine a s defined in the T ennesse e Dr ug Control Act of 1989. See T.C.A.-5-

§ 39-17-408( f) ( listi ng only phenylace tone as an “i m m ediate prec ursor” ). Howe ver, the fac t that pseudoephe drine is not listed does not mean it is not an immediate prec ursor to the drug , i.e., a
su bs tanc e fr om w hic h th e dr ugis d e ri ve d. I ns te a d, it mea ns that ou r C omm iss ion e r o f M e nta l H e a lth and De velopmental Disabilities has not desig nated pse udoephedr ine as a prec ursor that needs to be controlled. See T.C.A. § 39-17-402( 13) (pr oviding that a n “immediate pr ecur sor” is a “ substance which the commissioner of m ental health and developmental di sabilities

. . . has found to be and by rule de signates as being. . . an immediate c hemical inter mediary used or likely

to be used in the
manu fa c tur e of a c on tr oll e d sub sta nc e , the c on tr ol o f w hic h is ne c e ssa ry to p re ve nt, c ur

ta il, or lim it manufa cture ”). The ref

ore, ba sed upon the e x pert’s opinion and the evidenc e found at the campsite,
a ra ti o n a l ju

r y c o u ld h a v e f

o u n d b e y o n d a r e a s o n a

b le d o u b t th a t th e d e f

e n d a n t w a s g uilty

of manufa cturing methamphetamine.

II. MOTION TO CONTINUE

The de fenda

nt claims that the trial cour t err ed by ref

using to g rant a

continuance when the
s t at e an n o u n ce d a fe w da y s b ef o re t ri al t h at i t wa s go i n g t o ca l l an ex p er t wi t n es s t o t es t i fy

. In addition, he contends that he was pr ejudiced by the trial cour

t’s denying his motion to continue beca use he did not have time to inter view the state’s e x pert or hir e his own expert to contra dict the state expert’s testimony

that the defen d an t was manuf actur ing me thamphetamine a nd was not making the drugfor his persona l use onl y

. The state a rg ues that the de fenda

nt has waive d this iss ue b e c a u s e h e f a i l e d t o i n c l u d e t h e t r a n s c r i p t o f t h e h e a r i n g o n t h e m o t i o n i n t h e a p p e l l a t e r e c o r d

. In addition, the state contends that the t rial court proper ly denied the motion. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discre tion by denying the defe ndant’s motion for a c ontinuance.

The rec ord ref

lects that in O ctober 2001, the trial court order ed the state t o p ro v i d e t he defe nse with a list of witnesses and potential witnesses. On t he afternoon of Fr iday , Fe bruar y 15, 2002, the state noti fied the defe nse t hat it intended to call DEAAg ent Rick Stewart to testify at the Fe bruar y 20 trial. Fe bruar

y 16-18 wa s a three -day wee kend due to Pre sident’s Day . On the morning of the trial, the defe nse filed a mot ion reque sting a continuance beca

use the de fense had not had a n opportunity

to talk with Age nt Stewart. Duringthe hea ring o n t h e m o t i o n , the state infor med the trial court that it had told the defe nse “fr om the word g o” that it was trying to f ind an expert to testify in the case , that it did not find Age nt Stewart until the Fr iday befor e trial, that it had infor med the de fe ns e imm e diate ly

of its int e nt t o c a ll A g e nt S te wa rt to t e sti fy , a

nd th at it pr ov ide d th e de fe ns e with Ag ent Stewar

t’s telephone numbe r on F ebrua ry 19. The de fense acknow ledg ed that it had not at t em p t edt o co n t ac tAge n tS t ew ar tan d s t at edt h e f

o l l o wi n g: [Th e state ] is c or

re c t th a t sh e did

a ff or d us the op po rt

un ity to talk to the person y esterda y . Iwould still point o u t -- and we we re a wa re a nd a nti c ipate d th a t sh e wa s g oin g to t ry to f ind a n e xpe rt

. Until the state does produc e an expert, it would be prematur e to come in to Your Honor and say I want to g et an expert to r ebut the expert that Ithink the state is goingto ge t if they are apt to find one. And we a re a sking f

or $5,00 0

. 0 0 t o do that, beca use we think they-6- will probably

find one. Until they

g et an e x per t , we are not in a po sit ion to d o th a t and

jus tif y do ingthat.

The trial court denied the defe ndant’s motion, ruling that the def ense ha d had time to contac t Ag ent Stewart a nd that, in an y ev en t , g iven the evide nce a g ainst the defe ndant, the def ense should have hired a n expert without wa iting “for the state to pr ove something and then y ou try to rebut it.” The trial court he ld that the defendant ha d waited too long to reque st a defe nse expert’s assistanc e and denied his motion for a c ontinuance.

Th e d e c i s i o n w h e t h e r t o g r a n t a c o n t i n u a n c e r e s t s w i t h i n t h e d i s c r e t i o n o f t h e t r ia l c ou rt

. Sta te v. Mo rg a n, 82 5 S. W.2 d 113 , 117 (T e nn . Crim . App . 1 99 1) . T he de nia l of a c on tin ua nc e wi ll not le ad to a reve rsal absent an abuse of discretion and re sulting pre judice. See State v. Sea ls, 735 S.W .2d 849, 853 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987)

.
I nitially , we note that despite the state’ s claim that the def endant fa i l ed t o include the transcr ipt of the hea

ring on the mo t i o n t o co ntinue in the appellate rec ord, the tra nscript is in the
rec ord before us and, therefor e, the defe ndant has not waived the issue. That said, we do not believe t h e t rial cour

t abused its discretion by

denying the defe ndant’s motion. The def ense told the trial court that it knew the state wa s try ing to f ind an ex p er t

. Ne verthe less, despite the fa ct that the defe nse wa s “aw are and anticipated” that the state was looking for a n ex p er t we l l before trial, the def e n s e d id n o t a tt e mp t to h ir e a n e xp e rt to te s ti f y o n th e d e f

e n d a n t’ s b e h a lf

. M oreove r, the d ef en d an t has fa iled to show that he wa s prejudice d by the trial cour

t’s ruling . He ha s not demonstrated that had a c ontinuance bee n g rante d, he would have hired a n expert to rebut Ag ent Stewar t ’s co n cl u s i o n t h at t h e d ef en d an twa s m an u fa ct u ri n g m et h am p h et am i n e and tha t the defe ndant was not manufa cturing it f or persona l use

. The defe ndant did not introduce a ny additional evidenc e a t th e he ari ngon

the mot ion

fo r n e w tri a l to su pp ort a sho wi ngof pr e jud ic e . H e is n ot e nti tle d to relief

.
III. MOTION TO SUP P RESS EVIDENCE

The defenda

nt contends that the t rial court err ed by allowing photogr aphs of and testimony about equipment and c hemi ca l s found at the campsite bec ause the evidenc e wa s destroy ed bef ore the def ense g ot to inspect or test it. He contends that pursuant to State v. Fe rg uson, 2 S.W .3d 912 (Tenn. 1999) , in which our supreme c ourt stated that the pr osecution has a g ener al duty

to preser ve evidenc e, the tria l court sh o u l d h av e dismissed the ca se or instructe d the jury that the missing evidenc e may have ha d exculpatory value. The state cla ims that the defenda nt is not entit led to relief beca use his inability

to inspect or test the e vidence did not result from bad faith or neg lige nce by the prosec ution. W e conc lude t hat t he trial court did not err by allowing into evidence photogr aphs and te sti mony a bo ut t he e qu ipm e nt a

nd c he mic a ls.
On the morning of trial, the de fense fi l ed a Motion to Suppress and Exclude State’s Ev ide nc e

. Ac c or din g to the mot ion , the state “ by de str oying the ph y sic a l e vid e nc e , h a s e ff e c tiv e ly deprive d the de fe n d an t o f h i s rig ht to confront the e vidence the Gover nment will introduce . . . .”-7-

The de fense reque sted the trial cour t “to suppress and e x clude f rom evidenc e any

items not phy sically

befor e the jury

for its inspection, and to stay the State f

rom mentioning throug h any witness the exist ence of any item not before the jury .” J ust be fore trial, the trial court he ld a hea ring on the motion. The trial cour t overrule d the defense, holding that the def ense ha d known for a

long time that the evidenc e had be en destroy ed and ha d waited too long to file its moti on.

Pursuant to Rule 12(b)( 3), Tenn. R. Crim. P., motions to suppress evidenc e must be ra ised “p r io r to tr ia l, ” w h ic h me a n s s o me ti me e a r li e r th a n th e d a y o f th e tr ia l. St a te v

. Hamilton, 628 S.W. 2d 74 2, 74 4 ( Te nn . Cr im. Ap p. 19 81 ). Th e fa ilure to p ur su e a mot ion to supp res s “ pr ior

to trial” c onstitut es wa iver unle s s go o d cause is shown for the f ailure to move f

or suppre ssion in a timely manner . Tenn. R. Crim. P. 12(f) ; Hamilton, 628 S.W .2d at 744; Davidson, 606 S.W.2d 293, 295 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980). Obviously , the defe ndant knew we ll before trial that virtually all of the phy sical ev i d en ce co l lected in this ca se wa s unavailable and that only photogr aphs of the evidenc e existed. H oweve r, he has provided no explanation to the trial court or this court as to why h e w a i t e d u n t i l t h e m o r

n i n g o f t r i a l t o f i l e a m o t i o n t o s u

p p r e s s t h e p h o t o g r a

p h s o r t e s t i m o n y. Th e r e f o r e , w e c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u rt d i d n o t e r r b y r u l i n g t h a t t h e d e f

e n d a n t ’ s m oti on to suppress and e x clude e vidence was untimely

. As to the defe ndant’s cla im that the trial court should have dismiss ed the c ase or instructed th e ju r y p u r s u a n t t o St a te v

. F e r g u s o n , w e n o te th a t he ma d e n o s u c h a r g u me n t in th e tr ia l c o u rt. We conclude that the issue is waived. See T.R.A.P. 3(e).

IV. EXP ERT’S TE STIMONY

The de fenda

nt c laims that the trial court e rre d by allowing Ag ent Stewar

t to testify that the defe ndant was not manuf actur ing me thamphetamine f or per sonal u s e. He argues that this was an iss ue to b e r e s o l v e d

b y t h e j u r y , n o tA g e n tS t e w a rt

. T h e s t a t e d o e s n o ta d dr e s s t h i s arg ume nt. Howeve r, we conclude that Ag ent Stewar t’s testimony

was prope r. During Ag ent Stewar

t’s direc t testimony , the following exchang e occ urre d:
[S tate]: I nsofar as y our experience , is this t y pe of la b, g i v e n t h e qu a n t i t y t h a t yo u ’ v e s e e n h e r e t o d a y, is this t y pe of la b consistent with --
[De fe ns e ]: Ob je c tio n. Judg e , h e c a n te sti fy a s to wh a t it was, but if she’ s g oing a

step furthe r now a

nd
a sk ing him

wh a t it ’s c on sis te nt w ith , I ’d a sk for a jury o u t b efore we g o into what she’s g oing to g o into.

TH E CO UR T: Ido n’ t kn owwh a t th e qu e sti on is y e t.-8- [Defense ]: Idon’t either, I anticipate.

TH E CO UR T: As k th e qu e sti on a nd the n I ’l l r

ule on it.

. . . . [S tate]: I s this ty pe of la b consistent with a lab for
manu fa c tur ingpurp os e s, fo r b ro a d sca le
ma n u f a c tu r in g p u r p o s e s , o r is it c o n s is te nt with a lab for

persona l use?
[Age nt Stewa

rt:] Ag ain, we g et a lot of what we ca ll mom and pop labs, just f

or persona l use , that just makes g rams or ounces at a

time. You don’t find
ne a r thi s ma

ny ps e ud oe ph e dr ine or

at le a st this much pseudoe phedrine afte r it’s bee n washe d
or str ipp e d d ow n o r red

uc e d. So I ’d

have to say based on the amount of pseudoe phedrine he h a d a n d th e w a y th a t i t w a s f

o u n d , n o, that’s not persona l use.
Rule 702, Tenn. R. Evid., provid es that if “scie ntific, technic al, or other specia liz ed knowledg e will substantially assist the trier of f

act to under stand the evide nce or to determine a

fac t in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledg e, skill, ex perie nce, tr aining , or educ ation may te sti fy in t he fo rm of a n o pin ion

or oth e rwi se .” Th e tr ia l c ourt “ sh a ll d isa llo w [a

n e xpe rt ’s ] testimony in the form of a

n opinion or infere nce if the under ly ing f

acts or data indicate lack of tr us tw or thi ne ss. ” Te nn . R. Ev id. 70 3. Mo re ov e r, te sti mony is n ot o bje c tio na ble me re ly

be c a us e it embra ces a

n ultimate issue befor e the trier of fac t. Tenn. R. Evid. 704. We r eview the admission or exclusion of evidenc e for an abuse o f d i s cr et i o n. State v. Gra y , 960 S.W .2d 598, 606 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).

I nitially , we note that the defe nse should have stated the grounds for its obj ection more clea rly

. See Tenn. R. Evid. 103(a) (1) (providing that a timely objection for pur

poses of pre serving the i s s u e fo r appeal must state “the spe cific g round of objec tion if the specific g round wa s not appar ent from the c ontext ”). In any event, Rule 704 states that experts may g ive their opinion on an ultimate issue to be decide d by the jury . Ag ent Stewar

t testified that the amount of pseudoe phedrine found in the re d bucket was en o u gh to make one- half pound of me thamphetamine a nd that one pound of m ethampheta

mine was worth $10,000 to $20,000. He also testified that most “mom and pop labs” produc e only

a fe w ounce s or a f

ew g rams of the drug . In light of thi s testimony , we believe that A g ent Stewart e stablished a basis for his conclusion that the def endant wa s not making the methamphetamine for pe rsonal use a nd that his testimony

was prope r. See State v. William Ray Colli er, N o. M2001-00893-CCA-R3-CD, Davidson County (Tenn. Crim. App. Fe b. 4, 2002), app. denied ( Tenn. July

15, 2002) (police serg ean t p ro p er l y testified as e x pert witness that amount of-9-

he ro ine re c ov e re d a

nd wa y in w hic h it wa s pac ka g e d de mon str a te d tha t def e nd a nt did no t po sse ss drug for pe rsonal use) ; State v. Wi lliam Aubrey Trotter, Jr., No. 01C01-9701-CR-00019, Davidson County (T e nn

. Cr im. Ap p. F e b. 24 , 19 98 ) (o ff ic e r pr op e rl y te sti fi e d that a mou nt of c oc a ine a nd

c a sh on defe ndant’s per son indicated c ocaine was not for persona l use).

V. LESSER

IN CL UD ED OF F EN SE IN STR UC TIO N

Th e de fe nd a nt c la ims that the tr ia l c ourt e rr e d by fa ili ng to ins tr uc t the jury

on si mpl e possession as a lesse r included o ff ense of manufa cturing a Schedule I Icontrolled substanc e. He argues that a simple posse ssion instruction was war rante d in this case beca

use the police found no larg e amount of mone y , packa g ing materials, sca les, or other items at t he campsite to indicate that the de fe nd ant w a s ma

kin g the me tha

mph e tamin e fo r a

ny re a so n o the r t

ha n p e rs on a l us e

. Th e state argues that eve n if the trial cour t erre d by failing to give t h e i n s truction on simple possession, the
err or is harmless be cause the trial cour t instructed the jury

on possession of drug para pherna lia, which the jury

reje cted. See State v. Wil liams, 977 S.W .2d 101, 106 (Tenn. 1998) (holding that “by finding the def

endant guilty

of the highe st of

fense to the exclusion of the immediately lesser of fense , . . . the jury nece ssarily reje cted all other lesser offe nses”)

. We hold that a lthough simple possession is a lesser included offe nse of manufa cturing a controlled substance, an instruct i o n wa s not
war rante d in this case.
Our supre me cour

t has held that an of

fense is a lesser inc luded offe nse if:
(a) all of its statutory

elements a

re inc luded within the statutory elements of the offe nse cha rg ed; or
(b ) i t f a ils to m e e t th e de fi nit ion in part (a ) onl y in the re sp e c t tha t it contains a statutory

element or

elements e stablishing
(1) a differ ent mental state indicating a lesser kind of culpability ; and/or
(2 ) a less se ri ou s h a rm

or ri sk of ha rm to t he same person, pr operty

or public intere st; or (c) it consists of
(1 ) f a c ili ta tio n of the of

fe ns e c ha rg e d or of an o ff e ns e that otherwise me ets the def inition of lesser-include d offe nse in part ( a) or

(b); or
(2) a n attempt t o commit the offense char g ed or a n offe nse that otherwise meets the definiti o n of lesser- included off

ense in pa rt (a) or (b) ; or-10- (3) solicitation to commit the offense char g ed or an offe nse that o t h erw ise meets the de finition of lesser- included off

ense in pa rt (a) or (b)

.
State v. Bur

ns, 6 S.W .3d 453, 466-67 (Tenn. 1999) . I f an of fense is a lesser inc luded offe nse, then the trial court must conduct the following two-step analy sis in order to de termine whe ther the le sser included off

ense instruc tion should be give n: First, the tria l court m ust deter mine whether any evidenc e exists t hat

r e a s o n a b l e m i n d s c o u l d

a c c e p ta s t o t h e l e s s e r
- i n c l u d e d o f f e n s e

. In making this determin at i o n , the trial cour t must vi ew the e vidence liberally in the light m o s t favorable to the e x istence of the lesser-i n cl u ded off

ense w ithout making any judgme nts on the
cre dibilit y

of such evidence

. Second, the trial court must deter mine if the e vid e nc e , v ie we d in

thi s li g ht, is le g a lly su ff

ic ie nt t o s up po rt

a conviction for the lesser- included off ense.

I d. at 469.

As previously stated, T.C .A. § 39-17-417( a)( 1) provides that it is an offense for a defe ndant knowing ly

to “[m] anufa cture a contr olled substance.” “M an u facture” means “ the produc tion, p re p ar ation, propag ation, compounding , conver sion or proce ssing of a contr olled substance of
natur a l or ig in, or ind e pe nd e ntl y by me a ns of c he mic a l sy nth e sis

. . . .” Simp le po sse ssi on is se t f or th in T .C. A. § 3 9- 17 -4 18 (a ), wh ic h pro vid e s tha t it is an of fe ns e “ fo r a pe rs on

to k no wi ng ly po sse ss .

. . a c on tr oll e d s ub sta

nc e un le ss t

he su bs tanc e wa s o bta ine d d ir e c tly fro m, or pur su a nt t o, a va lid pr e sc ri pti on .” B e c a

us e manu fa c tur inga

c on tr oll e d s ub sta

nc e c on te mpl a te s th a t a pe rs on a lso wi ll possess it, sim ple possession is a lesser inc luded offe nse under part (a ) of the B urns test.

Neve rtheless, a

n instruction on simpl e possession was not wa rran t ed i n t h i s case . A “contr olled substance” is “ a drug , substance, or immediate prec ursor in Sche dules I throug h VI of §§ 39 -1 7- 40 3 – 39 -1 7- 41 5. ” T. C.A

. § 3 9- 17 -4 02 (4 ). Ho we ve r, a s st a te d e a rl ie r, our r e vie w o f t ho se se c tio ns re ve a ls that ps e ud oe ph e dr ine ha s n ot b e e n d e sig nat ed as a dr ug , s ub sta nc e , o r i mme diate prec ursor of amphetamine or methamphetamine. There fore , beca use the defe ndant only

possessed ps e ud oe ph e dr ine , w hic h is no t a c on tr oll e d s ub sta

nc e in T e nn e sse e , h e c ou ld n ot be g uil ty of sim ple possession, and the trial c ourt’s fa ilure to instruct on that offe nse wa s not error

.
We note t hat d e s p it e th e s tate ’ s c la im , p o s s e s s io n o f dr u g p a r a p h e r n a li a is n o t a le s s er inc lud e d o ff

e ns e of manu fa c tur inga

c on tr oll e d s ub sta

nc e . D ru g pa

ra ph e rn a lia me a ns all equipment, produc ts and materia ls of any ki n d which ar e used, i n t e n d edfo r u s e, o r d es i gn edfo r u s e i n p l an t i n g, p ro p aga t i n g, cu l t i v at i n g, gro wi n g, h ar v es t i n g, m an u fa ct u ri n g, co mp o u n d i n g, co n v er t i n g, p ro d

u ci n g, p ro c es s i n g, p re p ar i n g, t es t i n g, an al y z i n g,-11- p ac k agi n g, re p ac k ag i n g , s t o ri n g, co n t ai n i n g, co n ce al i n g, i n j ec t i n g, inges ting, inhaling or otherw ise introducing into the human body , a c o n tr o ll e d

s u b s ta n c e a s d e f

in e d in [T

. C. A

. § 3 9

- 1 7

- 4 0 2 ( 4 ) ].

The e lements of possession of drugpara pherna lia are that (1) the de fenda nt posse ssed an object, (2) the object is cla ssified as “dr ug para pherna lia,” and (3) the defe ndant i ntended to use the object for
an i ll icit pur

po se lis te d in

the statut e . St a te v. Ma lla rd , 4 0 S. W.3 d 4 73 , 4 86 (T e nn . 2 00 1) . T he se statutory elements a

re not inclu d ed withi n the statutory elements of ma

nufac turing a contr olled substance

. W e co n clude that possession of drug para pherna lia is not a lesser include d offe nse of
manu fa c tur ingun de r B ur ns

.
VI . “ IM M ED IA TE P RE CU RSO R” IN STR UC TIO N
Finally , the def

endant c laims that the trial court e rre d by failing to ins t ru ct t he jury on the statutory definition of an “ immediate pre cursor .” He contends that p s eu d o ephedr ine is not
rec og nized as an “immediate prec ursor” in this st ate a nd, t h er ef o re, that the jury

could not have convicted him if the tria l court had g iven the jury an “immediate prec ursor” instruction.

As noted i n section I , the fact that pseudoephe drine is not a li sted “immediate pr ecur sor” a s de fi ne d in the Te nn e sse e Dr ugCon tr ol A c t of

19 89 is i rr e le va

nt t o w he the r t

he de fe nd a nt w a s g uil ty of manufa cturing methamphetamine. T hus, inst ru cting the jury on the statutory

definition of an “immediate pr ecur sor” would have confuse d and misled the jury , and the trial court did not err by failing to give an “immediate prec ursor” instruction.

We n ote that th e de fe nd a nt a lso c la ims tha t c umu la tiv e e rr or s d e nie d h im the ri g ht t o a fa ir tr ia l. H ow e ve r, havin g fo un d n o e rr or s, the re is n o me ri t to thi s c la im.

B a se d u po n th e fo re g oin g a nd

the re c or d a s a wh ole , w e a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he tr ia l c ourt

.

___________________________________ J OSEPH M. TI PTON, J UDGE