THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Supreme Court

Stephany A. Connelly and James M. Connelly, Plaintiffs,

v.

The Main Street America Group, Old Dominion 

Insurance Company, Allstate Fire and Casualty Insurance 

Company, Debbie Cohn, and Freya Trezona, Defendants, 

of which Allstate Fire and Casualty Insurance Company, 

The Main Street America Group, and Old Dominion 

Insurance Company are the Petitioners, 

and Stephany A. Connelly and James M. Connelly are 

the Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2021-000005

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS

Appeal from Richland County

Jocelyn Newman, Circuit Court Judge

Opinion No. 28130

Heard April 6, 2022 – Filed January 11, 2023

REVERSED

Thomas Frank Dougall and Michal Kalwajtys, both of 

Dougall & Collins, of Elgin, and Eugene Hamilton 

Matthews, of Richardson Plowden & Robinson, PA, of 

Columbia, all for Petitioners Old Dominion Insurance 
Company and The Main Street America Group; and 

Alfred Johnston Cox and Kendall Patricia Crawford, both 

of Gallivan, White & Boyd, PA, of Columbia, for 

Petitioner Allstate Fire and Casualty Insurance Company.

John D. Kassel and Theile Branham McVey, both of 

Kassel McVey, of Columbia, for Respondent James M. 

Connelly; and Bert Glenn Utsey III, of Clawson Fargnoli 

Utsey, LLC, of Charleston, for Respondents Stephany A. 

Connelly and James M. Connelly.

John Robert Murphy and Megan Noelle Walker, both of 

Murphy & Grantland, P.A., of Columbia, for Amicus 

Curiae Progressive Select Insurance Company.

JUSTICE KITTREDGE: This case involves the intersection of the uninsured 

motorist (UM) statute1 with the Workers' Compensation Act (the Act).

2

 

Respondent Stephany Connelly was a passenger in a vehicle driven by her coworker Freya Trezona during the course and scope of their employment when 

Trezona negligently caused an accident, injuring Connelly. Because workers' 

compensation benefits did not fully redress Connelly's injuries, Connelly made a 

claim for bodily injury and UM benefits with her own insurance carrier and with 

Trezona's carrier. Both companies denied the claim, maintaining Connelly's sole 

remedy lay with the Act. After Connelly filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment 

that both policies provided coverage, the parties agreed the dispute turned on the 

proper interpretation of the phrase "legally entitled to recover" found in the UM 

statute. See S.C. Code Ann. § 38-77-150(A) (stating all insurance policies must 

contain a UM provision "undertaking to pay the insured all sums which he is 

legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured 

motor vehicle" (emphasis added)).3

 The trial court ruled in favor of Connelly, 

 1 S.C. Code Ann. § 38-77-150 (2015).

2 S.C. Code Ann. §§ 42-1-10 to -19-50 (2022).

3 The terms of both insurance policies closely mirror the statutory language, stating 

the insurers will pay "those damages that an insured person is legally entitled to 

recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured auto."
finding the phrase "legally entitled to recover" ambiguous. The court of appeals 

concurred in the finding of ambiguity and affirmed the trial court's determination 

that a plaintiff merely needed to show fault on the part of the uninsured driver and 

resulting damages, both of which had been satisfied here.

We find the statutory phrase "legally entitled to recover" unambiguous. We 

conclude the amount a plaintiff is "legally entitled to recover" under a UM 

provision of an insurance policy is the amount for which the plaintiff has secured a 

judgment against the at-fault defendant. Because the Act prevents Connelly from 

ever becoming "legally entitled to recover" from Trezona under these facts, we 

reverse.

I.

The parties jointly stipulated the underlying facts, which are not in dispute. 

Connelly was injured in an automobile accident while riding as a passenger in a 

vehicle owned and operated by Trezona. The vehicle was covered by an 

automobile liability insurance policy issued by Petitioner Old Dominion Insurance 

Company (Old Dominion).

4

 Additionally, Connelly had purchased UM coverage 

through her own automobile insurance policy with Petitioner Allstate Fire and 

Casualty Insurance Company (Allstate). At the time of the accident, Connelly and 

Trezona were co-workers acting within the course and scope of their employment. 

Therefore, Connelly made a successful claim for benefits under the Act.

Connelly then sought additional compensation against her co-worker under the 

bodily injury provision of the Old Dominion policy, as well as under the UM 

provision of both the Old Dominion and Allstate (collectively, Petitioners') 

policies,

5 but Petitioners denied Connelly's claims. Petitioners admitted that 

Connelly is an insured person, as defined in the policies, and that Trezona's 

negligence caused the accident and Connelly's resulting injuries. However 

Petitioners claimed, among other things, that (1) because Connelly was injured 

during the course and scope of her employment, the Act provides her exclusive 

remedy; (2) because the Act affords tort immunity to the employer and co-workers 

 4 Petitioner Main Street America Group is a holding company that owns Old 

Dominion. Its interests are identical to those of Old Dominion.

5 The Old Dominion policy provides liability coverage of $100,000 per person and 

$300,000 per accident. The Allstate policy provides liability coverage of $250,000 

per person and $500,000 per accident.
of an injured employee, Trezona is immune from suit by Connelly, thereby 

rendering Petitioners likewise immune; and thus (3) Connelly is not legally entitled 

to recover against Trezona or Petitioners.

Notwithstanding the exclusivity provision of the Act, Connelly filed suit, seeking a 

declaratory judgment that the UM provisions of both polices provided coverage for 

her injuries. Initially, Connelly named Petitioners and Trezona as co-defendants, 

but—perhaps in recognition of the statutory immunity the Act affords Trezona—

Connelly later dismissed Trezona from the suit.6

 Petitioners answered, asserting

Connelly was not "legally entitled to recover" from Trezona based on the plain 

meaning of that phrase as used in the UM statute (section 38-77-150). Petitioners 

and Connelly then filed cross-motions for summary judgment.

The circuit court granted Connelly's motion and denied Petitioners' motions. In 

relevant part, the circuit court held Trezona's vehicle was an uninsured vehicle 

because—despite the fact that Connelly was admittedly an insured person under 

the policies—Petitioners had denied coverage. See S.C. Code Ann. 

§ 38-77-30(14)(b) (Supp. 2021) (defining an uninsured motor vehicle as, inter alia, 

a vehicle for which "there is nominally [bodily injury liability] insurance, but the 

insurer writing the same successfully denies coverage thereunder" (emphasis 

added)).

Likewise, the circuit court found the "legally entitled to recover" language of the 

UM statute was ambiguous, reasoning that the phrase is not defined in either the 

South Carolina Code or Petitioners' insurance policies, and there is a jurisdictional 

split on the correct interpretation of the phrase. The circuit court explained that it 

was therefore required to interpret the UM statute in a manner consistent with the 

legislature's intent, that being "to provide benefits to protect against the peril of 

injury or death by an uninsured motorist to an insured motorist." Thus, the circuit 

court held that "legally entitled to recover" meant a plaintiff merely needed to 

show fault on the part of the uninsured driver and damages, and the Act's provision 

of immunity to Trezona did not impact the availability of UM coverage to 

Connelly. (Citing Borjas v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 33 P.3d 1265 (Colo. 

App. 2001); Barfield v. Barfield ex rel. Barfield, 742 P.2d 1107 (Okla. 1987); 

Torres ex rel. Torres v. Kan. City Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 849 P.2d 407 (Okla. 

 6 Likewise, Connelly's husband initially asserted a claim for loss of consortium. 

As we explain below, the circuit court granted summary judgment on his claim, 

and no one challenges the propriety of that decision to this Court. We therefore do 

not address it further.
1993)). Expounding on that point, the circuit court explained UM coverage could 

coexist with the Act's exclusive remedy in these circumstances because (1) the 

Act's exclusivity provision only bars tort actions, but a UM claim sounds in 

contract, not tort; (2) Connelly did not sue Trezona or her employer, so her claims 

did not run afoul of the exclusivity provision; and (3) Connelly's recovery of UM 

benefits did not frustrate the Act's goals, as Trezona, her employer, and the 

workers' compensation carrier remained unaffected by allowing Connelly to 

receive UM benefits.

Petitioners appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed. Connelly v. Main St. Am. 

Grp., 432 S.C. 122, 850 S.E.2d 627 (Ct. App. 2020). In large part, the court of 

appeals concurred with the circuit court that the phrase "legally entitled to recover" 

is ambiguous, citing the jurisdictional split of authority on the issue. In light of the 

finding of ambiguity, the court of appeals concluded Connelly was merely required 

to show fault and damages. The court of appeals explained that allowing UM 

coverage in this situation effectuated the legislature's intent, noting the UM statute

must be liberally construed in favor of coverage, and the Act only bars tort claims 

against employers and co-employees, not contract claims for UM benefits.

We granted Petitioners a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the court of 

appeals.

II.

A declaratory judgment action to determine coverage under an insurance policy is 

an action at law. City of Hartsville v. S.C. Mun. Ins. & Risk Fin. Fund, 382 S.C. 

535, 543, 677 S.E.2d 574, 578 (2009). In an appeal from an action at law, the 

Court's jurisdiction is limited to correcting errors of law. Pope v. Gordon, 369 S.C. 

469, 474, 633 S.E.2d 148, 151 (2006). "The trial judge's findings of fact will not 

be disturbed on appeal unless the findings are wholly unsupported by the evidence 

or controlled by an erroneous conception of the application of the law." Id.

In reviewing the grant of a motion for summary judgment, appellate courts apply 

the same standard as the trial court under Rule 56(c), SCRCP. Dawkins v. Fields, 

354 S.C. 58, 69, 580 S.E.2d 433, 438–39 (2003). "[S]ummary judgment is proper 

when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Montgomery v. CSX Transp., Inc., 376 

S.C. 37, 47, 656 S.E.2d 20, 25 (2008).
III.

Petitioners contend Connelly's recovery of workers' compensation benefits under 

the Act renders Trezona immune from lawsuits stemming from the accident. As a 

result, Petitioners argue Connelly is precluded from recovering under the UM 

provisions of the Old Dominion and Allstate policies because Connelly will never 

be "legally entitled to recover" against Trezona, and therefore, UM coverage under 

the policies will never be triggered. For purposes of this discussion, we will 

assume, without deciding, that Trezona's vehicle was uninsured and focus our 

analysis on whether Connelly is "legally entitled to recover" damages from 

Trezona.

South Carolina's UM statute provides, in relevant part,

(A) No automobile insurance policy or contract may be issued or 

delivered unless it contains a provision by endorsement or 

otherwise, herein referred to as the uninsured motorist provision, 

undertaking to pay the insured all sums which he is legally entitled 

to recover as damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured 

motor vehicle . . . .

(B) No action may be brought under the uninsured motorist provision 

unless copies of the pleadings in the action establishing liability 

are served in the manner provided by law upon the insurer writing 

the uninsured motorist provision. The insurer has the right to 

appear and defend in the name of the uninsured motorist in any 

action which may affect its liability and has thirty days after 

service of process on it in which to appear.

S.C. Code Ann. § 38-77-150(A)–(B) (emphasis added). 

The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intent 

of the legislature. Sloan v. Hardee, 371 S.C. 495, 498, 640 S.E.2d 457, 459 

(2007). When the statute's language is clear and unambiguous, the rules of 

statutory interpretation are unnecessary, as a court has no choice but to apply the 

statute as written. Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 85, 533 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2000). 

This is because the language used in the statute is generally considered to be the 

best evidence of the legislature's intent. Cain v. Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 

378 S.C. 25, 30, 661 S.E.2d 349, 352 (2008). As a result, "words must be given 

their plain and ordinary meaning without resort to subtle or forced construction to 
limit or expand the statute's operation." State v. Blackmon, 304 S.C. 270, 273, 403 

S.E.2d 660, 662 (1991).

While the precise question presented in this case is a novel one in South Carolina, 

we have occasionally addressed the interplay between the Act and the UM statute. 

Generally, the Act "provides the exclusive remedy against an employer for an 

employee's work-related accident or injury." Posey v. Proper Mold & Eng'g, Inc., 

378 S.C. 210, 224, 661 S.E.2d 395, 403 (Ct. App. 2008). "Under the scheme [set 

forth in the Act], the employee receives the right to swift and sure compensation; 

the employer receives immunity from tort actions by the employee." Wright v. 

Smallwood, 308 S.C. 471, 475, 419 S.E.2d 219, 221 (1992) (cleaned up); see also

Nolan v. Daley, 222 S.C. 407, 416, 73 S.E.2d 449, 453 (1952) (explaining the Act 

confers tort immunity not only on the employer but also on any negligent coemployees).

However, "UM coverage does not sound in tort, but in contract." Wright, 308 S.C. 

at 475, 419 S.E.2d at 221. Thus, an employee injured within the course and scope 

of his employment may, in appropriate circumstances, recover both workers' 

compensation benefits and UM benefits, as the exclusivity provision of the Act 

does not automatically bar all contractual claims for UM benefits. Id.7

A.

Here, the lower courts found the phrase "legally entitled to recover" is ambiguous 

in part because there is a jurisdictional split on how best to interpret the phrase. 

However, in finding the jurisdictional split legally significant, neither the circuit 

 7 It is nonetheless worth noting that the Act does not contain a provision expressly 

authorizing the receipt of UM benefits in the event workers' compensation benefits 

do not fully redress the employee's injuries—a perhaps notable omission that 

stands in contrast to a provision in the Tort Claims Act. See S.C. Code Ann. 

§ 15-78-190 (2005) ("If the amount of the verdict or judgment is not satisfied by 

reason of the monetary limitations of this chapter upon recovery from the State or 

political subdivision thereof, the plaintiff's insurance company, subject to the . . . 

uninsured defendant provisions of the plaintiff's insurance policy, if any, shall 

compensate the plaintiff for the difference between the amount of the verdict or 

judgment and the payment by the political subdivision. If a cause of action is 

barred [entirely] under § 15-78-60 of the 1976 Code, the plaintiff's insurance 

company must compensate him for his losses subject to the aforementioned 

provisions of his insurance policy.").
court nor the court of appeals analyzed the specific statutory language used by the 

various jurisdictions to determine whether their UM statutes or workers' 

compensation acts were worded differently from our own. A jurisdictional split—

standing alone—does not render ambiguous a South Carolina statute dealing with 

the same subject matter. Relying on other states' interpretations of foreign law is 

of little use in determining and effectuating the legislative intent underlying our 

own UM statute.

8

Compounding the error, in resolving the supposed ambiguity in the UM statute, the 

court of appeals relied heavily on a case decided by the Supreme Court of Appeals 

of West Virginia, Jenkins v. City of Elkins, 738 S.E.2d 1 (W. Va. 2012). Jenkins

dealt with a situation in which an employee was injured in a motor vehicle accident 

with a third party. Id. at 4, 12. The West Virginia Supreme Court itself 

acknowledged that this is an entirely distinct factual scenario from one in which an 

employee is injured by a negligent co-employee. See id. at 12 (quoting Henry v. 

Benyo, 506 S.E.2d 615, 619 (W. Va. 1998)).9

 In fact, most state courts have 

interpreted differently the legislative intent behind and requirements of their 

individual UM statutes when the tortfeasor is a co-employee rather than a third 

party. Our court of appeals, quoting Jenkins, found a "slight majority" of 

 8 For example, the Supreme Court of Colorado found even if the court were to 

assume (without deciding) that "legally entitled to recover" meant merely fault and 

resulting damages, the particular language of Colorado's workers' compensation act 

nonetheless barred an injured employee's claim for UM benefits. See Ryser v. 

Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 480 P.3d 1286, 1290–91 (Colo. 2021) (en banc). We find 

this recent interpretation of Colorado law particularly significant given that the 

lower courts here relied in part on the Borjas case decided by the Colorado Court

of Appeals in 2001.

9 Specifically, the Jenkins court distinguished another of its prior decisions in 

which—as is the case in the instant appeal—an employee-plaintiff was injured in a 

motor vehicle accident caused by his negligent co-employee and attempted to 

recover UM benefits in addition to workers' compensation benefits. See Wisman v. 

Rhodes, 447 S.E.2d 5, 8–9 (W. Va. 1994) (disallowing the recovery of UM 

benefits in that circumstance due to the exclusivity provision in West Virginia's 

workers' compensation act). The Jenkins court explained that "the scope of the 

Wisman decision is limited to those motor vehicle accidents involving two 

employees. Wisman does not discuss the situation here at hand regarding motor 

vehicle accidents between an employee and a third-party nonemployee." 738 

S.E.2d at 12 (quoting Henry, 506 S.E.2d at 619).
jurisdictions held a plaintiff was required only to establish the tortfeasor's fault and 

the amount of the plaintiff's damages. However, as we explain more fully below, 

that "slight majority" deals with the distinct factual situation presented in Jenkins, 

in which there was a third-party tortfeasor. In contrast, when looking only at cases 

dealing with motor vehicle accidents caused by a negligent co-employee, the 

jurisdictional split is decidedly different from the one examined in Jenkins.

10 Due 

to the factual and legal distinctions present when the tortfeasor is a co-employee, 

the court of appeals' reliance on Jenkins was misplaced.

B.

Looking solely at the language used by our General Assembly in the UM statute, 

we find the phrase "legally entitled to recover" is wholly unambiguous: it means a 

plaintiff has secured a judgment against an at-fault defendant after overcoming any 

defenses the defendant may have presented. After all, it is only then that the 

plaintiff becomes legally entitled to recover against that defendant. We reject the 

lower courts' interpretation of the UM statute as requiring a plaintiff to show only 

fault and resulting damages. Such a reading automatically negates any defenses 

the at-fault driver could present, such as the statute of limitations, comparative 

negligence, or statutory immunity. We see nothing in the language of the UM 

statute to suggest the legislature intended that result.

While not necessary to interpret our own state statute, we briefly note our reading 

of the legislative intent underlying section 38-77-150, as applied to motor vehicle 

accidents caused by negligent co-employees, dovetails with the near-unanimous 

national approach to this factual scenario. We say this while acknowledging our 

decision not to parse the language of each individual state's statutes related to UM 

coverage or workers' compensation, for regardless of the language used by each 

individual legislature, there appears to be a "nationwide" legislative intent (as 

interpreted by each state's courts). Specifically, it appears legislatures collectively 

intended that their state's workers' compensation act serve as the exclusive remedy 

for an employee who seeks recompense for injuries caused by a negligent coemployee in an automobile-related accident that occurs during the course and 

 10 Tellingly, in Jenkins's tallying of various jurisdictions' approaches to the proper 

interpretation of the phrase "legally entitled to recover," the overwhelming 

majority of jurisdictions in its purported "slight majority" dealt with third-party 

accidents, whereas the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions in the "minority 

approach" dealt with co-employee accidents. See 738 S.E.2d at 12–14 (collecting 

cases).
scope of his employment. It necessarily follows that the workers' compensation 

acts' immunity provisions ensure the injured worker will never be "legally entitled 

to recover" against his co-employee. See 10 Larson's Workers' Compensation Law

§ 110.05[10] (2021) ("Ordinarily, for the uninsured motorist clause to operate in 

the first place, the uninsured third person must be legally subject to liability. Thus, 

if the third person is specifically made immune to tort suit by the compensation 

act's exclusive remedy clause, the uninsured motorist provision does not come into 

play. In the familiar example of co-employee immunity, the issue thus becomes 

whether the accident was in the course of employment; if it was, the uninsured 

motorist carrier has no liability." (internal footnotes omitted) (collecting cases)); 

John P. Ludington, Annotation, Automobile uninsured motorist coverage: "legally 

entitled to recover" clause as barring claim compensable under workers' 

compensation statute, 82 A.L.R.4th 1096 § 2 (1990) ("Does the tort immunity of 

an employer or co[-]employee mean that an injured employee is not 'legally 

entitled to recover' from the employer or co[-]employee, and therefore cannot 

receive uninsured motorist benefits for vehicular injuries received in an accident 

arising out of, and in the course of, employment? The answer is yes, with [limited] 

dissent and some qualifications. Insofar as the uninsured motorist coverage has 

been bought and paid for by someone other than the injured employee, the results 

have been uniform. The injured employee cannot recover uninsured motorist 

benefits under the uninsured motorist coverage in policies obtained by his or her 

employer, partner, or the negligent co[-]employee. The more common situation is 

where the injured employee attempts to secure uninsured motorist benefits under 

his or her own automobile insurance policy. Does it matter that the employee 

himself or herself obtained and paid for this uninsured motorist coverage? Most 

courts which have considered the question have held no, since the workers' 

compensation statute grants tort immunity to a negligent employer or 

co[-]employee, and therefore the injured employee is not 'legally entitled to 

recover' from either of them." (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted)); see 

also Ex parte Carlton, 867 So. 2d 332 (Ala. 2003) (following the majority 

approach in holding the workers' compensation act is the employee's exclusive 

remedy); Perkins v. Emps. Mut. Cas. Co., 507 F. Supp. 3d 1172 (D. Ariz. 2020) 

(same, applying Arizona law); Ryser v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 486 P.3d 344 (Colo. 

App. 2019) (same), aff'd on other grounds, 480 P.3d 1286; Allstate Ins. Co. v. 

Boynton, 486 So. 2d 552 (Fla. 1986) (same); Williams v. Thomas, 370 S.E.2d 773 

(Ga. Ct. App. 1988) (same); Atl. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Payton, 682 N.E.2d 1144 (Ill. 

App. Ct. 1997) (same); O'Dell ex rel. O'Dell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 362 

N.E.2d 862 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977) (same); Otterberg v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 

696 N.W.2d 24 (Iowa 2005) (same); Chance v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 756 F. 

Supp. 1440 (D. Kan. 1991) (same, applying Kansas law); State Farm Mut. Auto. 
Ins. Co. v. Slusher ex rel. Slusher, 325 S.W.3d 318 (Ky. 2010) (same); Hebert v. 

Clarendon Am. Ins. Co., 984 So. 2d 952 (La. Ct. App. 2008) (same); Hopkins v. 

Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 200 N.W.2d 784 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972) (per curiam) 

(same); Peterson v. Kludt ex rel. Lyczewski, 317 N.W.2d 43 (Minn. 1982) (same); 

Medders v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 623 So. 2d 979 (Miss. 1993) (same); Kesterson 

v. Wallut, 157 S.W.3d 675 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004) (same); Okuly ex rel. Okuly v. 

USF & G Ins. Co., 78 P.3d 877 (Mont. 2003) (same); Matarese v. N.H. Mun. Ass'n 

Prop.-Liab. Ins. Tr., Inc., 791 A.2d 175 (N.H. 2002) (same); Kough v. N.J. Auto. 

Full Ins. Underwriting Ass'n, 568 A.2d 127 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990) 

(same); Vasquez v. Am. Cas. Co. of Reading, 389 P.3d 282 (N.M. 2016) (same); 

Hauber-Malota v. Phila. Ins. Cos., 991 N.Y.S.2d 190 (App. Div. 2014) (same); 

Stuhlmiller v. Nodak Mut. Ins. Co., 475 N.W.2d 136 (N.D. 1991) (same); Sims v. 

Marren, 36 N.E.3d 780 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015) (same); Cope v. W. Am. Ins. Co. of 

the Ohio Cas. Grp., 785 P.2d 1050 (Or. 1990) (en banc) (same); Petrochko v. 

Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 15 Pa. D. & C.5th 312 (C.P. 2010) (same), aff'd, 38 A.3d 

917 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011); Soledad v. Tex. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 506 S.W.3d 

600 (Tex. App. 2016) (same); Welch ex rel. Welch v. Miller & Long Co. of Md., 

521 S.E.2d 767 (Va. 1999) (same); Romanick v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 795 P.2d 

728 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990) (same); Wisman, 447 S.E.2d 5 (same); cf. State Farm 

Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Royston, 817 P.2d 118 (Haw. 1991) (holding, in part based 

on the co-employee related cases, that an injured government employee could not 

recover under his own UM policy because he had received workers' compensation 

benefits and therefore would not be "legally entitled to recover" against his 

employer, as the owner of the uninsured vehicle); Lieber v. ITT Hartford Ins. Ctr., 

Inc., 15 P.3d 1030 (Utah 2000) (involving a claim for UM benefits brought by an 

employee injured in an accident with a third-party, but nonetheless analyzing the 

state's UM and workers' compensation statutes and concluding that the exclusive 

remedy of the workers' compensation act only prevented the employee from 

becoming "legally entitled to recover" against an employer or co-employee, not a 

third party).

We too believe our legislature, like the legislatures of the overwhelming majority 

of jurisdictions around the country, intended the Act to be the exclusive remedy 

since the injured employee will never be "legally entitled to recover" against his 

co-employee.

C.

Subsection (B) of the UM statute provides further support for our conclusion that 

the General Assembly intended the "legally entitled to recover" language in 

subsection (A) to mean the injured motorist must prove he has a viable claim that 
is able to be reduced to judgment in a court of law, rather than merely fault and 

resulting damages. Specifically, subsection (B) states that an action for UM 

benefits may not be brought "unless copies of the pleadings in the action 

establishing liability" are served on the insurer, and the insurer "has the right to 

appear and defend in the name of the uninsured motorist in any action which may 

affect its liability." S.C. Code Ann. § 38-77-150(B). From this language, it is 

manifest the General Assembly has imposed several hurdles as conditions

precedent to recovering UM benefits: (1) an injured motorist must file a tort suit 

against the at-fault driver prior to seeking contractual UM benefits from an insurer, 

and (2) a copy of the pleadings from that tort suit must be served on the insurer so 

as to allow it to limit its possible exposure in the event of an adverse judgment.

As we have explained previously,

The right to sue and collect from one's own liability insurance carrier 

in case of a loss caused by [an uninsured motorist] is a creature of the 

legislature. Except for the statute, and endorsements required, no 

right exists to recover from one's own insurance carrier. One must 

look to the terms of the [UM] statute and policy endorsements and 

comply therewith to get the benefit of law.

Criterion Ins. Co. v. Hoffmann, 258 S.C. 282, 290, 188 S.E.2d 459, 462 (1972)

(emphasis added) (interpreting the prior version of the UM statute, which included 

language identical to the current subsection (B)).

To that effect, we have repeatedly emphasized the importance of an injured 

motorist filing a tort suit and establishing the liability of the uninsured motorist 

prior to filing suit for UM benefits against an insurer. See Laird ex rel. Laird v. 

Nationwide Ins. Co., 243 S.C. 388, 394, 134 S.E.2d 206, 209 (1964) ("Recovery 

under the uninsured endorsement is subject to the condition that the insured 

establish legal liability on the part of the uninsured motorist. Such an action is one 

ex delicto and the only issues to be determined therein are the liability and the 

amount of damage. After judgment is entered against the uninsured motorist, a 

direct action ex contractu can be brought to recover from the insurance company 

on its endorsement . . . ." (emphasis added)); see also Lawson v. Porter, 256 S.C. 

65, 68–69, 180 S.E.2d 643, 644 (1971) (collecting cases outlining the same 

requirement); cf. Williams v. Selective Ins. Co. of Se., 315 S.C. 532, 534, 446 

S.E.2d 402, 404 (1994) (making a similar observation about the requirements of 

the underinsured motorist (UIM) statute, S.C. Code Ann. § 38-77-160 (2015)).
We have further explained the UM insurance carrier has a right to demand strict 

compliance with subsection (B) of the UM statute. See Criterion Ins. Co., 258 

S.C. at 294, 188 S.E.2d at 465. In doing so, we noted the language used in

subsection (B) is clear and unambiguous, and therefore, there was no room to 

apply the rules of statutory construction. See id. at 292, 188 S.E.2d at 463 ("Most 

courts take a liberal view when dealing with the question of coverage; however, the 

procedural obligations that the insured must discharge in order to recover, since 

they are prescribed by statute, are viewed by the courts as mandatory, and strict 

compliance with them is a prerequisite to recover." (emphasis added)).

Thus, an insurer must be served with copies of the pleadings in the underlying tort 

suit against the uninsured motorist, and those pleadings must include "the formal 

allegations by the parties of their respective claims and defenses." Id. at 290, 292, 

188 S.E.2d at 462, 464 (emphasis added) (citation omitted) ("For reasons 

satisfactory to the legislature, service of the pleadings is required in the usual 

uninsured motorist suit." (internal quotation marks omitted)). In this manner, the 

insurer is afforded the opportunity to investigate and "take such steps as it deems 

necessary to protect its interest"—a matter of no small importance to the insurer 

given that it will be required to pay (within policy limits) any judgment entered 

against the uninsured motorist. Squires ex rel. Squires v. Nat'l Grange Mut. Ins. 

Co., 247 S.C. 58, 69, 145 S.E.2d 673, 678–79 (1965); see also Criterion Ins. Co., 

258 S.C. at 290, 188 S.E.2d at 462 ("It is the province of the lawmakers to create a 

right of action, to provide for process and to declare the procedure for collecting 

from one's own insurance carrier. They did just that."); Park v. Safeco Ins. Co. of 

Am., 251 S.C. 410, 413–15, 162 S.E.2d 709, 710–11 (1968) (rejecting an injured 

motorist's attempt to proceed against the UM carrier in the first instance without 

filing the initial tort suit against the at-fault, uninsured driver).

The fact that the "pleadings" that must be served on the insurers include possible 

defenses necessarily lends support to our conclusion that the UM statute requires a 

factfinder to consider the presence and viability of any defenses to liability in a 

separate tort action. Were we to read "legally entitled to recover" as only requiring 

fault and resulting damages, as urged by Connelly and held by the lower courts

here, an injured motorist would never need to acknowledge the existence or merit 

of any possible defenses to liability, thereby contravening the purpose of the notice 

provision in section 38-77-150(B).

Here, Connelly did not file a separate tort suit against Trezona, much less secure a 

judgment against her, so she is not "legally entitled to recover" against Trezona. 

While it is understandable why Connelly did not sue Trezona in tort—the Act 

indisputably provides Trezona with an ironclad defense to any possible liability—
Connelly's failure to follow the substantive requirements of the UM statute are 

fatal to any possible claim against Petitioners for UM benefits.

IV.

While our holding today is on firm legal footing, we note our disquiet at the result: 

Connelly—who paid for UM and UIM coverage—will not receive the benefit of 

her contractual bargain with Allstate, through no fault of her own. We can think of 

no other step Connelly could have taken to protect herself from this type of 

circumstance: she was not driving, she did not cause or contribute to the accident, 

she had automobile insurance, and she paid additional amounts for UM and UIM

coverage. As a result, Connelly's argument—that our reading of the UM statute

runs counter to the underlying legislative intent—has equitable appeal. See Laird, 

243 S.C. at 392, 134 S.E.2d at 208 (explaining the purpose of UM coverage "was 

to provide financial recompense to innocent persons who receive bodily 

injuries . . . through the wrongful conduct of uninsured motorists").

However, ruling in favor of Connelly would require us to contort the plain 

meaning of "legally entitled to recover" and materially rewrite the notice provision 

in subsection (B) to provide an exception in the case of accidents caused by 

negligent co-employees who, by function of the Act, are immune from tort suits. 

There is nothing in the language of the UM statute or the Act that leads us to 

believe the legislature intended us to take such liberties—particularly when 

contrasted with an explicit provision of the Tort Claims Act addressing a similar 

possibility. See S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-190 (stating that if an award under the 

Tort Claims Act is insufficient to redress the plaintiff's injuries in full, and UM 

coverage would otherwise be available to cover the plaintiff's damages, the UM 

carrier shall compensate the plaintiff within the limits of the policy). Given that

the Tort Claims Act expressly contemplates and allows UM coverage in the event 

of an injured plaintiff's incomplete recovery, it is clear the legislature knows how 

to provide a statutory exemption to tort immunity or damage limitations on an 

insured's rights against a tortfeasor. We find the fact that the legislature chose not 

to include a similar exemption in the UM statute or the Act significant. See 82

C.J.S. Statutes § 460 (2009) ("[W]here a statute contains a given provision, the 

omission of such a provision from a similar statute concerning a related subject is 

significant to show that a different intention has existed.").

We decline the invitation to rewrite the statute or construe it in a manner 

manifestly at odds with its plain meaning. Connelly's remedy in this instance is not 

with the courts, but with the legislature. See Criterion Ins. Co., 258 S.C. at 294, 

188 S.E.2d at 464 ("The statute made service of a copy of the [pleadings] upon [the 
insurer] a condition precedent to [the plaintiff's] recovery. If it is advisable that the 

statute be changed, it is within the province of the legislature to do so. For the 

courts to set about to [change the requirements of the UM statute themselves] 

would inevitably lead to the establishment of a mischievous precedent, and to great 

uncertainty and confusion in the determination of future cases of a similar nature.

It is needless to describe the effects of such a condition of things in order to 

appreciate the necessity of avoiding it." (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks 

omitted)).

IV.

This case presents a straightforward question of the correct interpretation of the 

UM statute, particularly the "legally entitled to recover" language of subsection (A) 

and the notice provision of subsection (B). See S.C. Code Ann. § 38-77-150. Any 

unease with today's result lies in the outcome of that interpretation, for our holding 

today arguably does not comport with equity and one's sense of fairness. We state 

the obvious: we are a court, not a legislative body. We are thus constrained by our 

judicial role to interpret the law as written and not to create exceptions to plainlyworded statutes. That is the province of the legislature alone, and a boundary we 

do not cross, even in sympathetic situations such as this.

The decision of the court of appeals is

REVERSED.

BEATTY, C.J., HEARN, FEW and JAMES, JJ., concur.