1

Filed 1/30/15

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

MONNIE WRIGHT,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

Defendant and Respondent.

 A139034

 (Marin County

 Super. Ct. No. 1200705)

Plaintiff Monnie Wright was a correctional officer at San Quentin State Prison 

(San Quentin), who lived on the San Quentin premises, in a unit he rented from his 

employer, defendant State of California (State). Wright was injured when he fell in the 

course of his lengthy walk from his home to his actual place of work. Following his 

injury, Wright sought workers’ compensation, and received it. He thereafter filed suit 

against the State, which moved for summary judgment on the ground that workers’

compensation was Wright’s exclusive remedy, an argument based on the “premises line” 

rule, which provides that the employment relationship commences once the employee

enters the employer’s premises. The trial court agreed and granted the motion. 

We reverse, concluding that it was error to hold Wright’s tort claim barred solely 

because he was on his employer’s premises at the time of his fall, particularly where 

Wright lived on those very premises.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In 1997, Wright began working at San Quentin. The following year, he moved 

into a State-owned rental unit within the gated area of the San Quentin grounds. Living 

there was voluntary on Wright’s part: it was not a condition of his employment with the 
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State, and he paid market rate rent, receiving no discount or other employment benefit for 

living on the property.

Wright’s original lease for the unit required that he obtain a “broad policy of 

comprehensive coverage of public liability insurance, naming the State as the insured.” 

The policy was to be issued by an insurance company acceptable to the State and insure

“against loss or liability caused by or connected with [Wright’s] occupation and use of 

said premises under [the] rental/lease agreement.” The lease operable at the time of 

Wright’s injury contained an indemnity clause that provided as follows: “Owner will not 

be liable for any damage or injury to Tenant, or any other person, or to any property, 

occurring on the premises, or in common areas, unless such damage is the legal result of 

the negligence or willful misconduct of the Owner, his or her agents, or employees. 

Tenant agrees to hold Owner harmless from any claims for damages, no matter how 

caused, except for injury or damages caused by negligence or willful misconduct of the 

Owner, his or her agents, or employees.” 

Wright’s walk from his residence to the prison building where he carried out his 

work duties required him to walk approximately 10 feet to a common area staircase,

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at 

the bottom of which were two pillars painted with the address numbers for Wright’s unit 

and a neighboring unit. Wright would descend that staircase, cross a street, walk through 

a park, descend another staircase, walk down a path, descend another staircase, cross 

another street, and then traverse a sidewalk in front of the sally port,2all of which 

occurred on State property.3 Once inside the sally port, he walked through a series of 

security doors to enter the secured perimeter, and then walked to his assigned work 

building in the South Block and then to the Donner Unit, where he signed in for work. 

 

1 Another estimate put the distance at 30 to 40 feet. 

2 Wright describes the “sally port” as “the check-point to enter the secure part of 

the prison . . . .” 

3

The actual distance of Wright’s walk from his home to the sally port is not in the 

record. As depicted in aerial photos, it is a significant distance, appearing to be the 

equivalent of multiple city blocks. 
3

On December 14, 2010 at approximately 5:30 a.m., Wright left his rental unit and 

began his walk to the Donner Unit to begin his 6:00 a.m. shift. As he neared the bottom 

of the first staircase just outside his unit, a concrete step allegedly collapsed beneath him, 

and he fell. 

On December 20, 2010, Wright filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits 

for injuries resulting from the fall. He received benefits in the form of medical expenses 

and disability payments. And in July 2012, he went on early disability retirement. 

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The Pleadings

Wright filed a complaint against the State, asserting one cause of action, for 

premises liability. He alleged that he “fell and was injured when a defectively 

constructed and dangerously maintained stair crumbled beneath him.” 

The State filed an answer, followed by a first amended answer, generally denying

Wright’s allegations. The answer also set forth numerous affirmative defenses, including 

this as affirmative defense no. 21: Wright’s injuries “occurred, if at all, because of 

conduct arising out of, or in the course of employment or voluntary service or 

rehabilitative work for a public agency” and his tort claim was “therefore barred as 

Worker’s Compensation is the exclusive remedy . . . .” 

The Motion For Summary Judgment

The State moved for summary judgment on the ground that Wright’s claim was 

barred by the workers’ compensation exclusive remedy rule. According to the State,

Wright was a State employee and was injured while walking on State-owned premises to 

his work location. It contended that the going and coming rule—which generally 

provides that an employee who is injured en route to or from work is not entitled to 

worker’s compensation benefits—did not preclude workers’ compensation coverage for 

Wright’s injuries because he was injured on his employee’s premises, thereby falling 

within the premises line rule, an exception to the going and coming rule. The State also 

noted that Wright had received over $137,000 in workers’ compensation benefits which, 
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it submitted, constituted a “representation that the injuries he attributes to the incident 

arose out of and occurred in the course of his employment with the State of California.” 

Wright opposed the State’s motion, arguing the State failed to meet its initial 

burden of showing that his claim was barred by the workers’ compensation exclusive 

remedy rule. As he explained it, “The mere fact that the injury occurred on the 

employer’s premises is not the sole test of compensability. The injury must be one 

arising out of and in the course of the employment.” And, Wright contended, there 

existed a question of fact whether he was injured in the course of his employment. 

According to Wright, at the time he was injured, he was commuting to his work 

location—or as he put it, the “business premises”—such that the going and coming rule 

barred workers’ compensation coverage. Wright also disputed that the premises line 

applied, arguing he had not left his residence and arrived at his work premises. 

Wright also argued that the “bunkhouse rule,” and the principle underlying it,

precluded summary judgment. This argument relied in part on Vaught v. State of 

California (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1538, 1545 (Vaught), which summarized the 

bunkhouse rule as follows: “When an employee is injured while living on the employer’s 

premises, the course of employment requirement in [Labor Code] section 3600, 

subdivision (a), is satisfied if the employment contract of the employee contemplates, or 

the work necessity requires, the employee to reside on the employer’s premises.” Here, 

by contrast, Wright was not required to live in the State-owned housing, and his 

employment contract did not contemplate he would do so. Thus, he contended, he did 

not fall within the bunkhouse rule and, consequently, was not injured in the course of 

employment. 

Wright also argued that the lease agreement he signed when he rented the 

residence showed that the State did not intend he would be covered by workers’ 

compensation while residing in the residence. Finally, Wright represented that he was 

not seeking double recovery, as the State would receive a credit against any tort recovery 

he might obtain that overlapped with the workers’ compensation proceeds he was 

previously awarded. 
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The State filed a reply, asserting that it was “undisputed that (1) Officer Wright 

was an employee of the State of California at San Quentin State Prison; (2) whose alleged 

injuries occurred while he was walking on prison grounds; (3) to the prison area where he 

was to begin his work duties.” Under these facts, the State contended, the premises line 

rule dictated that Wright’s injuries fell within the scope of workers’ compensation. 

Wright’s argument to the contrary, the State complained, sought “to eviscerate 40 years 

of expansive workers’ rights in California and take this Court back to Lochner-era

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Pennsylvania in his attempt to carve out an exception to pursue this civil action and 

simultaneously take advantage of the security and ‘relatively swift and certain payments 

of [workers’ compensation] benefits’ he has received, and continues to receive. Not only 

is Officer Wright’s interpretation contrary to public policy, but it would severely limit the 

rights of future California employees injured on their employer’s premises before they 

have actually clocked in for work.” 

The State also challenged Wright’s attempt to distinguish between the employer’s

premises and business premises, contending no California authority recognized such a 

distinction. 

Finally, the State disputed Wright’s argument based on the rental agreement 

because the incident did not occur on the rental premises, but rather on a stairway 

30 to 40 feet away from his front step. As such, the State submitted, the lease agreement 

did not apply. 

Curiously, the State did not respond to Wright’s “bunkhouse rule” argument, 

making no mention of it whatsoever.

The Order Granting Summary Judgment

After the close of briefing, the trial court issued a tentative ruling, apparently in 

favor of the State, and the motion came on for hearing on March 5, 2013, a hearing that 

was brief indeed. Wright’s counsel argued that the “rationale” of the rules, especially the 

premises line rule—which counsel called a “bright line” rule—did not apply in the 

 

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Lochner v. New York (1905) 198 U.S. 45.
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circumstances here. Counsel offered instead the bunkhouse rule, application of which 

demonstrated that Wright was not injured in the course of employment and thus his 

injuries did not fall within the scope of workers’ compensation. The hearing concluded 

with the trial court taking the matter under submission. 

Later that same day, the court entered an order granting summary judgment, which 

order provided in pertinent part as follows:

“Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. The undisputed evidence 

shows that Plaintiff was going to work and was on the premises of his employer at the 

time of his fall. [Citations.] ‘For purposes of the going and coming rule, the employment 

relationship begins when the employee enters the employer’s premises. . . .’ (Santa Rosa 

Junior College v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 345, 353. fn. 11.) 

‘ . . . Prior to entry the going and coming rule ordinarily precludes recovery; after entry, 

injury is generally presumed compensable as arising in the course of employment.’ 

(Price v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1984) 37 Cal.3d 559, 567.) Plaintiff fails to offer 

any evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption.

“The authorities cited by Plaintiff in support of his contention that the ‘premises’ 

must be limited to some smaller ‘business’ area (two 1920s Pennsylvania cases and 

U.S. v. Browning (10th Cir. 1966) 359 F.2d 937) are not persuasive authority in 

addressing California workers’ compensation law as it exists today. Additionally, the 

court notes that the holding in Browning was called into question in White v. U.S. 

(5th Cir. 1998) 143 F.3d 232. The fact that in many cases the ‘premises’ will consist of a 

‘parking lot, plant or office’ (see Lewis v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 

559, 563 [illegible] must be so limited. (See, e.g., Lefebvre v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals 

Bd. (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 745 [illegible] the going and coming rule but indicting that 

the employer’s premises was the entire campus.)[5] The purpose of the premises line rule 

 

5 All copies of the court’s order in the record are marked up, making these portions 

of the order illegible. 
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is to ‘ “enabl[e] courts to ascertain the point at which employment begins—objectively 

and fairly.” ’ (Santa Rosa Junior College, supra, 40 Cal.3d at 353, fn. 11.)

“In order to raise a triable issue, Plaintiff relies primarily on the fact that he had a 

landlord-tenant relationship with Defendant and a lease which imposed obligations on 

Defendant, including the duty to maintain the stairs. ‘Where the conditions of 

compensation set forth in Section 3600 concur, the right to recover such compensation 

is . . . the sole and exclusive remedy of the employee . . . against the employer, and the 

fact that either the employee or the employer also occupied another dual capacity prior to, 

or at the time of, the employee’s industrial injury shall not permit the employee . . . to 

bring an action at law for damages against the employer.’ (Lab. Code, § 3602, subd. (a).) 

‘ . . . The dual capacity doctrine holds that if an employer occupies another relationship 

toward its employee that imposes a duty different from those arising from the 

employment relationship, the employer can be liable in tort for a breach of that duty. The 

1982 amendments to Labor Code section 3602, subdivision (a), however, abrogated much

of the dual capacity doctrine. . . .’ [Citation.] The dual capacity doctrine is now 

‘limit[ed] . . . to cases in which the parties’ dual capacity did not exist prior to the 

employee’s industrial injury, but arose only after the injury. . . .’ [Citation.] Here, it is 

undisputed that the landlord-tenant relationship and the obligations thereby imposed on 

Defendant by that relationship existed prior to Plaintiff’s accident.” 

As shown, the trial court, like the State, made absolutely no mention of the 

bunkhouse rule.

The Motion For New Trial

Following entry of judgment, Wright filed a notice of intention to move for new 

trial. In his supporting memorandum of points and authorities, he argued that because he 

was residing on his employer’s premises, the court should have analyzed the bunkhouse 

rule, pursuant to which “an employee-resident’s injuries are covered by workers’ 

compensation only if the employment contract contemplates or the work requires the 

employee’s resident on employer-owned premises,” neither of which was the case here. 

Wright contended that the rule on which the court relied addresses only employees who 
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do not live in employer-owned housing. Alternatively, Wright argued that even if the 

premises line rule applied, it precluded workers’ compensation coverage here because he 

was still commuting at the time of his injury and had not yet reached the business 

premises. 

In opposition, the State argued that the bunkhouse rule was inapplicable where, as 

here, the basic relationship between the parties was that of landlord and tenant, and that 

the trial court correctly found the premises line rule dispositive. And, again, the State 

noted that no California authority recognized the distinction Wright attempted to draw

between the employer’s premises and the business premises. 

Following Wright’s reply, the matter came on for argument, and the following 

day, the court denied Wright’s motion in an order that stated in its entirety: “Plaintiff’s 

motion for new trial is denied. The bunkhouse rule is inapplicable to this case. Plaintiff 

was not injured in his residence and the State did not invoke the bunkhouse rule. In 

reaching its decision, the Court relied on the premises line exception to the going and 

coming rule.” 

This timely appeal followed. 

DISCUSSION

Summary Judgment and the Standard of Review

The standard pursuant to which we review an appeal from an entry of summary 

judgment is well established. We summarized it in Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 

178 Cal.App.4th 243, 253–254, as follows:

“Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c) provides that summary 

judgment is properly granted when there is no triable issue of material fact and the 

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. [Citation.] As applicable here, 

moving defendants can meet their burden by demonstrating that ‘a cause of action has no 

merit,’ which they can do by showing that ‘[o]ne or more elements of the cause of action 

cannot be separately established. . . .’ [Citations.] Once defendants meet this burden, the 

burden shifts to plaintiff to show the existence of a triable issue of material fact. 

[Citation.]
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“On appeal ‘[w]e review a grant of summary judgment de novo; we must decide 

independently whether the facts not subject to triable dispute warrant judgment for the 

moving party as a matter of law. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] Put another way, we exercise 

our independent judgment, and decide whether undisputed facts have been established 

that negate plaintiff’s claims. [Citation.] As we put it in Fisherman’s Wharf Bay Cruise 

Corp. v. Superior Court (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 309, 320: ‘[W]e exercise an 

independent review to determine if the defendant moving for summary judgment met its 

burden of establishing a complete defense or of negating each of the plaintiff’s theories 

and establishing that the action was without merit.’ [Citation.]

“But other principles guide us as well, including that ‘[w]e accept as true the 

facts . . . in the evidence of the party opposing summary judgment and the reasonable 

inferences that can be drawn from them.’ [Citation.] And we must ‘ “view the evidence 

in the light most favorable to . . . the losing part[y]” and “liberally construe [his] 

evidentiary submissions and strictly scrutinize [the moving party’s] own evidence, in 

order to resolve any evidentiary doubts or ambiguities in [the losing party’s] favor.” ’ 

[Citation.]”

Applying those principles, we conclude the State failed to satisfy its burden of 

demonstrating there were no triable issues of material fact whether Wright’s injury arose 

out of and in the course of his employment, and was therefore subject to workers’ 

compensation exclusivity. Thus, the summary judgment was error.

The Summary Judgment Was Error

Workers’ Compensation Law: The Statute and the General Principles

California’s Workers’ Compensation Act (Labor Code, § 3600 et seq.) provides an 

employee’s exclusive remedy against his or her employer for injuries arising out of and in 

the course of employment. Specifically, Labor Code section 3600, subdivision (a), states: 

“Liability for the compensation provided by this division, in lieu of any other liability 

whatsoever to any person . . . , shall, without regard to negligence, exist against an 

employer for any injury sustained by his or her employees arising out of and in the course 

of the employment . . . .” (See also Vaught, supra, 157 Cal.App.4th at p. 1543 [“Subject 
10

to certain statutory exceptions not applicable here, an injured employee’s sole and 

exclusive remedy against his or her employer is the right to recover workers’ 

compensation benefits,” provided the injury arose out of and in the course of 

employment].) The phrase “arising out of” refers to the origin or cause of the injury, 

while the phrase “in the course of employment” refers to the time and place of the injury. 

(State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1952) 38 Cal.2d 659, 661; 

Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd. (1967) 247 Cal.App.2d 669, 

676-677.) Courts have consistently recognized the act’s two-pronged requirement: the 

injury must have arisen out of and occurred in the course of employment. Indeed, the 

California Supreme Court has described this two-pronged requirement as “the 

cornerstone of the workers’ compensation system.” (Maher v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals 

Bd. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 729, 732–733; Vaught, supra, 157 Cal.App.4th at p. 1544.)

In light of the parties’ positions here, it bears noting that the provisions of the 

Workers’ Compensation Act must be liberally construed in the employee’s favor, and all 

reasonable doubts as to whether an injury arose out of employment are to be resolved in 

favor of awarding the injured employee compensation. (Lab. Code, § 3202; Department

of Rehabilitation v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1281, 1290–1291.) 

This rule of liberal construction applies to “factual as well as statutory construction. 

[Citations.] Thus, ‘[i]f a provision in [the Workers’ Compensation Act] may be 

reasonably construed to provide coverage or payments, that construction should usually 

be adopted even if another reasonable construction is possible.’ [Citation.] The rule of 

liberal construction ‘is not altered because a plaintiff believes that [he or she] can 

establish negligence on the part of [his or her] employer and brings a civil suit for 

damages.’ [Citation.] It requires that we liberally construe the Act ‘in favor of awarding 

work[ers’] compensation, not in permitting civil litigation. [Citation.]’ [Citations.]” 

(Arriaga v. County of Alameda (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1055, 1065.)

Workers’ Compensation Law: The Common Law Developments

As a general rule, injuries sustained by an employee while commuting to and from 

work are not compensable under the workers’ compensation system. (Zenith Nat. Ins. 
11

Co. v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd. (1967) 66 Cal.2d 944, 946–947.) This rule, known 

as the going and coming rule, bars workers’ compensation for injuries that occur “during 

a local commute enroute to a fixed place of business at fixed hours in the absence of 

special or extraordinary circumstances.” (Hinojosa v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd. 

(1972) 8 Cal.3d 150, 157; see also General Ins. Co. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd.

(1976) 16 Cal.3d 595, 598.) 

The going and coming rule is a judicially created doctrine first recognized in 

California jurisprudence in Ocean Acc. & Guarantee Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1916) 

173 Cal. 313 (Ocean Accident), where the California Supreme Court held that the death 

of a shipworker who fell into the water and drowned on the way to the vessel on which he 

worked was not covered by workers’ compensation. The reason was that an employee 

going to or coming from his place of employment, such as the shipworker there, was not 

rendering a service to his or her employer at the time of the accident. (Id. at pp. 321–322; 

see also Hinojosa v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd., supra, 8 Cal.3d at pp. 153–154 

[discussing Ocean Accident]; Zenith Nat. Ins. Co. v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd., 

supra, 66 Cal.2d 944 at p. 946 [California has not adopted a statutory codification of the 

going and coming rule, but it has become a part of workers’ compensation jurisprudence 

by judicial decision].) A leading commentator explains the rule as premised on the 

theory that an employee who travels to his or her place of employment has not yet 

entered the course of employment. (See Lewis v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., supra,

15 Cal.3d at p. 562, citing 2 Hanna, Cal. Law of Employee Injuries and Workers’

Compensation (2d ed.) § 9.03 [3][b].) 

The going and coming rule became the subject of significant criticism, the 

California Supreme Court, for example, describing it as a “slippery concept,” “riddled 

with exceptions,” and difficult to apply uniformly. (Santa Rosa Junior College v. 

Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 352.) Such criticism led, among 

other things, to the premises line rule.

In an effort to create a “sharp line of demarcation” as to when the employee’s 

commute terminates and the course of employment commences, courts adopted the 
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premises line rule, which provides that the employment relationship generally 

commences once the employee enters the employer’s premises. (Lefebvre v. Workers’ 

Comp. Appeals Bd., supra, 106 Cal.App.3d at p. 750.) “The ‘premises line’ has the 

advantage of enabling courts to ascertain the point at which employment begins—

objectively and fairly. This outweighs the disadvantages incurred by attempting to 

formulate and apply a subjective rule justly.” (General Ins. Co. v. Workers’ Comp. 

Appeals Bd., supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 599.) Succinctly put, prior to entry on the employer’s 

premises, “the going and coming rule ordinarily precludes recovery; after entry, injury is 

generally presumed compensable as arising in the course of employment.” (Id. at p. 598; 

see also Pacific Indem. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1946) 28 Cal.2d 329, 335–336.) 

As indicated, the trial court applied the premises line rule, without considering 

whether Wright’s living on the property owned by his employer required any limitation

or qualification of that rule. This was error.

While the premises line establishes when a nonresident employee enters the course 

of his or her employment, an employee who resides in employer-owned housing is 

differently situated. As to such an employee, the “in the course of employment” 

requirement is generally analyzed by what is called “the bunkhouse rule.”

The bunkhouse rule dates back to the 1920’s, with the earliest mention found in 

Associated Oil Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1923) 191 Cal. 557. There, an employee who 

lived in a rooming house provided by his employer and on the employer’s property was 

injured when the leg of a chair on which he sat went through a crack in the porch floor, 

causing him to fall from the porch. (Id. at pp. 558-559.) The Industrial Accident 

Commission awarded the employee workers’ compensation benefits. (Id. at 

pp. 558-559.) The employer sought certiorari. And got it. 

The Supreme Court considered whether “ ‘injuries occurring about the employer’s 

bunkhouse situated on the employer’s working premises, sustained by employees during 

their leisure hours while reasonably using the bunkhouse in a proper manner during 

intermissions from work, the injury being due to unsafe conditions of the premises 

provided by the employer, are within the protection of the Workmen’s Compensation 
13

Act.’ ” (Associated Oil Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., supra, 191 Cal. at p. 559.) It noted 

the general rule that “when the contract of employment contemplates that the employees 

shall sleep upon the premises of the employer, the employee, under such circumstances, 

is considered to be performing services growing out of and incidental to such 

employment during the time he is on the premises of the employer. (Ibid., citing 

1 Schneider’s Workmen’s Compensation Law, p. 608, ¶ 279.) 

Applying this rule, the court held that the circumstances did not trigger workers’

compensation coverage. Specifically, it noted the employee fell from the porch on a 

Sunday “at a time when not at work and [he] was neither required to work nor to be on 

the premises.” Additionally, he had a choice of residing in a nearby town but opted to 

reside in the more convenient lodging provided by his employer. (Associated Oil Co. v. 

Industrial Acc. Com., supra, 191 Cal. at p. 560.) Under these circumstances, the court 

concluded, the employee’s injuries did not occur in the course of his employment, and it 

annulled the award. (Id. at pp. 561–562.)

The following year, the California Supreme Court again addressed the bunkhouse 

rule, in Larson v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1924) 193 Cal. 406. There, two employees were 

killed and two others severely burned when a wood stove used for heating an employerowned bunkhouse exploded. (Id. at p. 408.) The Industrial Accident Commission 

awarded workers’ compensation benefits. (Id. at pp. 408–409.) The Supreme Court

affirmed the awards, noting that the employees were required to lodge in the bunkhouse 

as a condition of their employment, with room and board a part of their wages. This 

distinguished the case from Associated Oil Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., supra, 191 Cal.

557, where the employee had the option of lodging in the bunkhouse. And, quoting a 

1919 Wisconsin case, the court observed, “The facts of the case we are now considering 

present a situation in which ‘the employer places the employee in such circumstances that 

his time is never his own, where he has no discretion as to where he shall sleep and where 

he shall eat. Under such circumstances the workman must be considered in the employ 

of the employer all of the time, or at least performing a service which is incidental to the 

employment he is engaged in.’ ” (Larson v. Industrial Acc. Com., supra, 193 Cal. at 
14

pp. 410–411, quoting Holt Lumber Co. v. Industrial Com. (1919) 168 Wis. 381

[170 N.W. 366].)

A few months after Larson v. Industrial Acc. Com, supra,193 Cal. 406, the

Supreme Court issued State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1924) 

194 Cal. 28, again affirming an award of workers’ compensation benefits. In that case, a 

maid employed by the Fairmont Hotel was injured when she exited the hotel premises 

through the servants’ entrance the employees were required to use and slipped on a public 

sidewalk outside the hotel premises. She was not on duty at the time and was leaving the 

hotel on her day off to run a personal errand. She was not required to live at the hotel, 

but was given the option to do so, in exchange for which her wages were reduced. (Id. at 

pp. 29–31.) According to the Court, it “seem[ed] clear” the injury arose out of the maid’s 

employment, since she was compelled to use the entrance that exited into the hazardous 

condition, and there was thus “a direct causal connection between the injury received by 

the employee and her employment by the hotel.” (State Compensation Ins. Fund v. 

Industrial Acc. Com., supra, 194 Cal. at p. 31.) 

The more difficult question was whether the injury occurred in the course of 

employment, a question the court ultimately answered in the affirmative. (State 

Compensation Ins. Fund v. Industrial Acc. Com., supra, 194 Cal. at pp. 31-32, 36.) The 

court reasoned that, although the employee was given a choice regarding her lodging, 

once she made her choice, her employment contract required her to live on the hotel 

premises and have her meals there, which meals and lodging were part of her 

compensation for her services. (Id. at pp. 34–35.) Doing so, the Court quoted Associated 

Oil Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., supra, 191 Cal. at p. 559, for the proposition that “ ‘when 

the contract of employment contemplates that the employees shall sleep upon the 

premises of the employer, the employee, under such circumstances, is considered to be 

performing services growing out of and incidental to such employment during the time he 

is on the premises of the employer.’ ” (Id. at p. 35.)

Since 1924, a number of cases have addressed the bunkhouse rule, analyzing its 

application under a variety of circumstances. (See, e.g., Truck Ins. Exchange v. 
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Industrial Acc. Com. (1946) 27 Cal.2d 813; Crawford v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. 

(1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 1265; State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals

Bd. (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 643; Leffler v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1981) 

124 Cal.App.3d 739; Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd., supra,

247 Cal.App.2d 669; Rosen v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1966) 239 Cal.App.2d 748; Aubin v. 

Kaiser Steel Corp. (1960) 185 Cal.App.2d 658.) Most recently, the Fourth District 

discussed it at length in a case we find particularly instructive here—Vaught, supra, 

157 Cal.App.4th 1538. 

Vaught worked as a State park ranger. The State offered him a new ranger 

position, and to entice him to accept, offered him and his wife residence in a ranch house 

within the park, first offering the smaller of two houses, and then, at Vaught’s request,

the larger one. Vaught accepted the position, and he and his wife moved into the house

under a month-to-month agreement. At some point, Vaught discovered a water leak in 

one of the bathrooms and contacted the State for repairs. While the repairs were being 

done, Vaught, who was off work that day, and his wife left the house. After returning

and discovering the repairs unfinished, Vaught slipped on the bathroom floor, sustaining 

injuries. The Vaughts filed a tort action against the State, which moved for summary 

judgment based on workers’ compensation exclusivity. The trial court granted the 

motion, the Vaughts appealed, and the Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the 

exclusive remedy rule barred the Vaughts’ civil action. (Vaught, supra, 157 Cal.App.4th 

at p. 1542.) 

The Court of Appeal began its analysis by confirming the two-prong requirement 

of Labor Code section 3600: that a compensable injury must have arisen out of and 

occurred in the course of employment. (Vaught, supra, 157 Cal.App.4th at p. 1544.) 

And under the bunkhouse rule, the court explained, “[w]hen an employee is injured while 

living on the employer’s premises, the course of employment requirement in section 

3600, subdivision (a), is satisfied if the employment contract of the employee 

contemplates, or the work necessity requires, the employee to reside on the employer’s 

premises.” (Id. at p. 1545.) 
16

Then, after applying the bunkhouse rule to the facts of that case, the court 

concluded that Vaught’s injury occurred during the course of his employment, providing 

the following explanation: “The State offered [Vaught] residence in the State-owned 

ranch house as incentive to accept the new resource ranger position in the District. 

[Vaught] understood the ranch house was offered to him as an ‘employment benefit.’ 

[Vaught] initially declined the State’s offer to relocate and take the new position because 

the State offered him the smaller of the two homes. The parties thus specifically 

negotiated over the issue of [Vaught’s] residence in the District, which the State offered 

the Vaughts as part of [Vaught’s] compensation package. . . .

“We further conclude [Vaught] resided in the ranch house out of work necessity, 

which provides an independent basis to satisfy the course of employment requirement. 

As a park ranger, [Vaught] was required to be ‘on call all the time.’ [Vaught] was also 

required to patrol within the District. Because of the location of the ranch house in 

connection with his work, [Vaught] and the State agreed [Vaught] ‘would report to 

Borrego Springs to the district office,’ but he ‘could work out of the house at Vallecito.’

“[Vaught] also used a portion of the ranch house as his office, where he stored

equipment, topographical and park maps, and various items he used on patrol, for fire 

protection, and search and rescue in connection with his job. Although [Vaught] was not 

compelled to live in the ranch house, the nature of his work as a resource ranger 

necessitated that he live there.” (Vaught, supra, 157 Cal.App.4th at p. 1546.)

Applying the foregoing authorities to the facts of this case demonstrates at the 

least a triable issue of material fact whether Wright was acting in the course of his 

employment at the time he was injured. Wright lived on the San Quentin grounds purely 

voluntarily. It was not required by his employment contract, nor was it necessary for him 

to live there. Indeed, the State expressly concedes “[i]t is undisputed that living in the 

residence was not a condition of Wright’s employment with the State.” Wright paid 

market rate for the rental, and the rental was not a benefit of his employment. Further, 

there was no evidence that Wright was ever on call or performed any work out of his 

rental unit. 
17

As noted, in its order granting summary judgment the trial court did not mention, 

let alone analyze, the bunkhouse rule, even though Wright raised it in his opposition, not 

even considering whether the fact that Wright lived on State-owned property should 

affect whether the premises line rule applied. And in denying Wright’s motion for new 

trial, the court dismissed the rule, saying, “The bunkhouse rule is inapplicable to this 

case. Plaintiff was not injured in his residence and the State did not invoke the 

bunkhouse rule. In reaching its decision, the Court relied on the premises line exception

to the going and coming rule.”

We do not understand the significance of the State’s not invoking the bunkhouse 

rule. And the court’s expressed rationale for omitting the rule from its analysis was 

flawed, as many cases demonstrate that it is not a requirement that the employee was 

injured within the confines of the bunkhouse for the rule to apply. (See, e.g., Truck Ins. 

Exchange v. Industrial Acc. Com., supra, 27 Cal.2d 813 [employee killed in a car 

accident on a public highway; bunkhouse rule analyzed and found applicable]; State 

Compensation Ins. Fund v. Indus. Acc. Com., supra, 194 Cal. 28 [employee injured after 

she exited her employer’s hotel through the servants’ entrance; bunkhouse rule analyzed 

and found applicable]; Aubin v. Kaiser Steel Corporation, supra, 185 Cal.App.2d 658

[employee killed by train while driving on a recreational outing on employer’s property; 

bunkhouse rule analyzed and found applicable].) 

The State argues the trial court correctly disregarded the bunkhouse rule, claiming 

“[i]t is well-settled that the bunkhouse rule does not apply where the basic relationship 

between the parties is that of a landlord and tenant,” relying on Rosen v. Industrial Acc. 

Com., supra, 239 Cal.App.2d 748. But Rosen is distinguishable. There, an apartment 

tenant and his wife agreed with their landlord to perform certain minor services on the 

premises on a part-time basis, in addition to the husband’s regular work elsewhere, in 

return for a nominal credit allowance on their rent. The husband was injured while 

descending a stairway at the apartment building on his way to run a personal errand. 

(Id. at pp. 748–749.) The Industrial Accident Commission found that because the 

tenant’s duties contemplated he live on the premises in order to enjoy the benefits of his
18

rental allowance, his apartment was the equivalent of a bunkhouse, and the bunkhouse 

rule dictated that he was injured in the course of employment. (Id. at p. 750.)

The Court of Appeal reversed, finding that neither “the theory [n]or the 

philosophy underlying the development of the bunkhouse rule would warrant its 

application” in that case. (Rosen v. Industrial Acc. Com., supra, 239 Cal.App.2d at 

p. 750.) It agreed with the landlord “that it is unreasonable and beyond the contemplation 

of the Workmen’s Compensation Act to hold that an agreement between a landlord and 

his tenants whereby a modest rental allowance is given the tenants in return for certain 

relatively nominal services creates a situation in which the landlord must furnish, in 

effect, a completely comprehensive health, accident and life insurance policy covering 

the tenants 24 hours a day so long as they are upon the premises.” (Id. at p. 750.) It 

reasoned that in prior instances in which the bunkhouse rule had been applied, the 

employee was expected or required to reside on the employer’s premises by virtue of the 

employment relationship, and the “landlord/tenant relationship was entirely subsidiary 

and collateral to the basic employment relationship.” (Ibid.) But in a situation such as 

that present there, the basic relationship being that of landlord and tenant with the tenant 

being employed full time in other pursuits and merely rendering relatively minor services 

to the landlord, the bunkhouse rule did not govern. (Id. at p. 751.)

The State claims here that, as in Rosen, the basic relationship between it and 

Wright was that of a landlord and tenant, such that the analysis for a residential employee 

does not apply. We disagree. The landlord/tenant relationship here was “entirely 

subsidiary and collateral” to the employment relationship between the parties. Put 

conversely, the employee relationship between the State and Wright dominated: but for 

that relationship, there would be no landlord/tenant relationship, the undisputed evidence 

showing that Wright worked at San Quentin before he resided there.

The State further attempts to distance the setting here from the bunkhouse rule by 

arguing that none of the cases Wright cites “involved a landlord tenant relationship 

between employee and employer such as existed in this case . . . .” This is indeed 

accurate—and supports our conclusion. Five of the six bunkhouse cases Wright cites—
19

Truck Ins. Exchange v. Industrial Acc. Com., supra, 27 Cal.2d 813; State Compensation

Ins. Fund v. Indus. Acc. Com., supra, 194 Cal. 28; Larson, supra, 193 Cal. 406; Aubin v. 

Kaiser Steel Corp., supra, 185 Cal.App.2d 658; and Vaught, supra, 157 Cal.App.4th 

1538—involved employees who lived on their employers’ premises as a requirement or 

benefit of their employment. In each case, the court found that, per the bunkhouse rule, 

the employee was injured in the course of employment. Here, Wright’s employment 

contract did not contemplate that he reside on prison grounds, nor was it a necessity of 

his job. The sixth case—Crawford v. Worker’s Comp. Appeals Bd., supra, 

185 Cal.App.3d 1265—questioned whether a state prisoner injured while off-duty at the 

forestry conservation camp where he lived and worked while serving his sentence was 

engaged in assigned work and thus fell within the bunkhouse rule, a question the court 

answered in the negative. Crawford has no application here. 

The State asserts, however dramatically, that if Wright is correct, “each workers’ 

compensation claim involving incidents at San Quentin would be evaluated on a myriad 

of factors, including each individual’s work location, parking location, and residence 

location, whether they reside on or off the prison grounds. Thus, an officer working at 

the East Gate would be entitled to compensation upon passing onto the prison premises, 

the warden would be entitled to compensation only upon reaching his office outside of 

the ‘sally port’ entrance, while Wright is only entitled to compensation upon reaching the 

‘Donner’ area. These disparate treatments of injured employees are exactly what the 

‘premises line’ rule was intended to preclude.” The State’s concern is a classic red 

herring, however, because most San Quentin correctional officers—approximately 

98 percent, according to Wright—live off premises. As to them, the premises line rule 

would generally govern the question of when they entered the course of employment. As 

to tenant employees, however, the bunkhouse rule exists in recognition of the fact that 

they are differently situated, and that they have not entered the course of employment

simply by virtue of living on their employers’ premises. And as has been recognized, 

“The point at which an employee is no longer ‘going or coming’ and has entered the area 
20

of his employment involves a factual determination.” (Lefebvre v. Workers’ Comp. 

Appeals Bd., supra, 106 Cal.App.3d at p. 749.)

Were the rule to the contrary—that residential employees are covered by workers’ 

compensation at all times they are on their employers’ premises—the State would find 

itself in the position of insuring its San Quentin tenant employees for all injuries suffered 

on the State-owned premises. This is not the law, as the Supreme Court recognized in 

Larson, supra, 193 Cal. at p. 409: “It is, of course, a fundamental doctrine that it was not 

intended by the compensation act that an employer who comes within its provisions shall 

be the insurer of his employee at all times during the period of the employment, but is 

liable for compensation only when the injury occurs to the employee while performing 

some act for the employer in the course of his employment, or is doing something that is 

incidental thereto.”

That the State did not intend its workers’ compensation policy would insure 

Wright for all injuries suffered on San Quentin grounds—even at or near the home where 

he lived—is further evidenced by the terms of Wright’s lease agreement. The original 

lease required Wright to obtain a “broad policy of comprehensive coverage of public 

liability insurance, naming the State as the insured.” The policy was to be issued by an 

insurance company acceptable to the State and insuring “against loss or liability caused 

by or connected with [Wright’s] occupation and use of said premises under [the] 

rental/lease agreement.” The lease operable at the time of Wright’s injury contained an 

indemnity provision clause that provided as follows: “Owner will not be liable for any 

damage or injury to Tenant, or any other person, or to any property, occurring on the 

premises, or in common areas, unless such damage is the legal result of the negligence or 

willful misconduct of the Owner, his or her agents, or employees. Tenant agrees to hold

Owner harmless from any claims for damages, no matter how caused, except for injury or 

damages caused by negligence or willful misconduct of the Owner, his or her agents, or 

employees.” Why would the State have inserted these provisions into Wright’s lease if it 

believed him covered by workers’ compensation at all times?
21

DISPOSITION

The question here is whether Wright’s injury arose out of and in the course of his 

employment. The trial court concluded there was no triable issue of material fact on that 

question, answered it in favor of the State, and granted summary judgment. We conclude 

otherwise, that the question is disputed. The summary judgment for the State is reversed.

Wright shall recover his costs on appeal.

_________________________

Richman, J.

We concur:

_________________________

Kline, P.J.

_________________________

Stewart, J.
22

A139034, Wright v. State of California

Trial Court: Marin County Superior Court

Trial Judge: Honorable M. Lynn Duryee

Attorney for Plaintiff and Appellant: The Veen Firm, Anthony Label, Andje M. 

Medina; Smith & McGinty, Daniel U. 

Smith, Valerie T. McGinty

Attorneys for Defendant and Respondent: Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, 

Kristin G. Hogue, Senior Assistant 

Attorney General, John P. Devine, 

Supervising Deputy Attorney General, 

Troy B. Overton, Deputy Attorney General, 

Grayson W. Marshall, III, Deputy Attorney 

General