UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. No. 97-4241

NATHANIEL NORRIS,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of South Carolina, at Spartanburg.

Henry M. Herlong, Jr., District Judge.

(CR-96-248)

Submitted: January 20, 1998

Decided: February 12, 1998

Before WIDENER, NIEMEYER, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

Renee R. Christina, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellant. Harold

Watson Gowdy, III, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellee.

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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

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OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Nathaniel Norris appeals from his 188-month sentence imposed

after his guilty plea to possession with intent to distribute cocaine

base (crack), in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1994). Norris'

attorney filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California, 386

U.S. 738 (1967), challenging the sentencing court's classification of

Norris as a career offender and contending that the sentence imposed

was too severe. However, counsel asserted that there are no meritorious issues for appeal. Norris, after notification of his right to file an

additional brief, filed a brief asserting several claims of ineffective

assistance of counsel. For the reasons below, we affirm.

During a traffic stop, Norris consented to a search of his vehicle.

Prior to the search, the officer conducted a pat-down search of Norris

and found 19.3 grams of crack and .9 grams of marijuana in Norris'

jacket pocket. After a hearing conducted according to Fed. R. Crim.

P. 11, the district court accepted Norris' guilty plea.

In Norris' Presentence Report, the probation officer noted that Norris is a career offender under the guidelines; therefore, his base

offense level is 34, because of the quantity involved. U. S. Sentencing

Guidelines Manual § 4B1.1 (1995). After the three-level reduction for

acceptance of responsibility, Norris' offense level is 31. With a criminal history category of VI, the applicable guideline range is 188 to

235 months imprisonment. Norris did not object to the guideline calculations; he merely requested a lengthy term of house arrest in lieu

of imprisonment.

The day after he was sentenced, Norris first asserted that he did not

plead guilty or agree to plead guilty to the two prior controlled substance offenses on which his career offender status is based. Because

Norris failed to object to this recommendation in the presentence

report and failed to raise this issue at sentencing, we review for plain

error. See United States v. Grubb, 11 F.3d 426, 440-41 (4th Cir.

1993).

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Section 4B1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines provides for an

increase in the offense level of a "career offender." The enhancement

for career offender applies when the Defendant is over the age of

eighteen at the time of the offense, the offense is a felony which is

either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense and the

Defendant has "at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime

of violence or a controlled substance offense." USSG § 4B1.1. Norris'

two prior state convictions for distribution of cocaine and for possession of crack cocaine with intent to distribute qualify as felony convictions. See USSG § 4B1.2(2). Norris' belated challenge to the use

of his two prior convictions in determining his status as a career

offender does not present an error "`so obvious and substantial that

failure to notice and correct it would affect the fairness, integrity or

public reputation of judicial proceedings.'" Grubb, 11 F.3d at 440-41

(quoting United States v. Fant, 974 F.2d 559, 565 (4th Cir. 1992)).

Norris also asserts that the district court imposed too severe a sentence. As previously discussed, the district court properly determined

that Norris should be sentenced as a career offender, with an offense

level of 31 and a criminal history category of VI. The resulting guideline range of 188 to 235 months was thus properly determined. See

USSG Ch.5, Pt.A (Sentencing Table). Norris received a sentence at

the lowest point in this range. This court is precluded from reviewing

the "sentencing court's discretion in setting a sentence anywhere

within a properly calculated sentencing range." United States v.

Porter, 909 F.2d 789, 794 (4th Cir. 1990). Norris requested that the

district court impose a long term of home confinement in lieu of

imprisonment. However, the Sentencing Guidelines do not provide

for such a sentence, and therefore the district court did not abuse its

discretion in denying this request. See United States v. Morgan, 986

F.2d 151, 152-53 (6th Cir. 1993).

In his pro se brief, Norris asserts that counsel was ineffective in a

number of respects. However, claims of ineffective assistance of

counsel are not cognizable on direct appeal unless counsel's deficient

performance conclusively appears from the record. Because such

ineffectiveness does not conclusively appear from the record, these

claims are better raised in a 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West 1994 & Supp.

1997) motion. See United States v. Fisher, 477 F.2d 300, 302 (4th Cir.

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1973); see also United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114 (4th Cir.

1991).

Finding no error on the record before us, we affirm Norris' conviction and sentence. We deny Norris' motion to relieve counsel. This

court requires that counsel inform his client, in writing, of his right

to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review.

If the client requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that

such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this

court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel's motion

must state that a copy thereof was served on the client. We dispense

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument

would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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