******************************************************

The ‘‘officially released’’ date that appears near the

beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will

be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the

date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative

date for the beginning of all time periods for filing

postopinion motions and petitions for certification is

the ‘‘officially released’’ date appearing in the opinion.

In no event will any such motions be accepted before

the ‘‘officially released’’ date.

All opinions are subject to modification and technical

correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the

event of discrepancies between the electronic version

of an opinion and the print version appearing in the

Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the

latest print version is to be considered authoritative.

The syllabus and procedural history accompanying

the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official

Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service

and in the Connecticut Law Journal and bound volumes

of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of

the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced and distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal

Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.

******************************************************
MAUREEN LISKO v. MICHAEL LISKO

(AC 36693)

Gruendel, Sheldon and West, Js.

Argued March 9—officially released July 28, 2015

(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of New

Haven, Hon. John C. Flanagan, judge trial referee

[dissolution judgment]; Morgan, J. [child support

arrearage motion].)

Gerald H. Kahn, for the appellant (defendant).

Maureen Lisko, self-represented, the appellee

(plaintiff).
Opinion

SHELDON, J. This appeal arises from a postdissolution order regarding child support for the parties’ minor

child. The defendant, Michael Lisko, appeals from the

judgment of the trial court ordering him to pay the sum

of $4246 to the plaintiff, Maureen Lisko, as the arrearage

due to her on his child support obligation. On appeal,

the defendant claims that the trial court erred in failing

to reduce the amount of the arrearage by the amount

of dependency benefits paid directly to the plaintiff, as

custodian of and representative payee for the child, by

the Social Security Administration, as additional support for the child in light of the awarding of Social

Security disability benefits to the defendant. The court

instead determined that the defendant had obligated

himself to pay the entire arrearage to the plaintiff based

upon the parties’ prior agreement, which had been

adopted as an order of the court. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following undisputed facts and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. The marriage of the

parties was dissolved on April 10, 2007. Pursuant to

the judgment of dissolution, the parties had joint legal

custody of their minor children, the primary residence

of the children was with the plaintiff, and the defendant

was to pay child support in the amount of $121 per

week. On August 13, 2009, on the defendant’s first

motion to modify, the child support order was reduced

by court order to $70 per week. On October 29, 2009,

on the defendant’s second motion to modify, the parties

entered into an agreement regarding the payment of

child support, which became an order of the court.

Pursuant to that agreement, the defendant’s child support payments were adjusted to permit him to pay only

half of his $70 weekly child support obligation on an

ongoing basis to the plaintiff, while the remaining half

accrued as an arrearage, on condition that the accumulating arrearage was to be paid in full upon the first of

two events to occur: the defendant obtaining full-time

employment or his receipt ofretroactive Social Security

disability benefits. The defendant never obtained fulltime employment, but sometime in 2013, his application

for Social Security disability benefits was approved,

whereupon the Social Security Administration issued

lump sum retroactive benefit checks, both to the defendant, as the qualified claimant, and to the plaintiff, as

the representative payee for the parties’ son.1

On November 14, 2013, the parties returned to court

on the defendant’s motion to determine the arrearage

that he owed to the plaintiff for past due child support

that had accrued since October 29, 2009. The parties

agreed, inter alia, that the total amount of the arrearage

was $4246, but they could not resolve their dispute as

to whether the dependency benefits paid directly to the

plaintiff on behalf of the parties’ son should be credited
to the defendant to reduce the amount he owed to the

plaintiff. The court heard argument on that issue and

the parties filed postargument briefs in support of their

respective positions.

On February 14, 2014, the court issued a memorandum of decision, in which it concluded that, although

our precedent allows for the reduction of arrearages

for child support based upon direct payments of dependency benefits to or on behalf of minor children, the

defendant in this case had entered into an agreement

under which he agreed to pay his entire child support

arrearage from his own funds. The court thus determined that the defendant’s arrearage had not been satisfied by the payment of dependency benefits to the

plaintiff by the Social Security Administration, and

ordered the defendant to pay the entire arrearage from

his own funds in accordance with the parties’ November

14, 2013 agreement. This appeal followed.

The defendant claims that the trial court erred in

determining that the payment of dependency benefits

by the Social Security Administration to the plaintiff

on behalf of the parties’ minor child did not satisfy the

child support arrearage that he owed to the plaintiff.

The defendant contends that the law mandates that

social security dependency benefits be credited against

child support obligations. Our Supreme Court has

explained: ‘‘The characterization of dependency benefits as a substitute for the disabled party’s lost income

has been identified as the basis for allowing a credit to

the noncustodial parent toward his or her child support

obligation. The majority view . . . regards social security benefits [paid to dependent children] as earnings

of the contributing parent and, for this reason, allows

benefits paid to a child on the parent’s behalf to be

credited toward child support obligations.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Jenkins v. Jenkins, 243

Conn. 584, 592, 704 A.2d 231 (2004).

Although Jenkins and other authority cited by the

defendant permit an offset or adjustment to a party’s

child support obligation based upon dependency benefits paid directly to the minor child, neither those cases,

nor any other authority of which we are aware, state

that such a credit is in fact required.2 The trial court

acknowledged the precedent allowing for such an offset, but, nevertheless found that the benefits received

by the plaintiff on behalf of the parties’ minor child

should not be credited toward the defendant’s arrearage

because the court’s previous order, entered pursuant

to an agreement between the parties, provided that

the arrearage ‘‘would be paid to the plaintiff by the

defendant once he received his disability benefits payment from the [Social Security Administration].’’

(Emphasis in original.)

The defendant’s brief is devoid of any analysis as

to the effect, if any, of the parties’ October 29, 2009
agreement, upon which the trial court relied in rejecting

his claim for a credit against the arrearage in the amount

of the paid dependency benefits. The defendant argues

instead that ‘‘[t]o distinguish between payments made

by the defendant’s own hand and payments made by

the Social Security Administration from the defendant’s

Social Security account is to exalt form over substance

and to ignore the purpose of the Social Security Act.’’

We disagree.

‘‘In domestic relations cases, [a] judgment rendered

in accordance with . . . a stipulation of the parties

is to be regarded and construed as a contract. . . .

Accordingly, [o]ur resolution of the [plaintiff’s] claim

is guided by the general principles governing the construction of contracts. A contract must be construed to

effectuate the intent of the parties, which is determined

from the language used interpreted in the light of the

situation of the parties and the circumstances connected with the transaction. . . . [T]he intent of the

parties is to be ascertained by a fair and reasonable

construction of the written words and . . . the language used must be accorded its common, natural and

ordinary meaning and usage where it can be sensibly

applied to the subject matter of the contract. . . .

‘‘Where the language of the contract is clear and

unambiguous, the contract is to be given effect

according to its terms. A court will not torture words

to import ambiguity where the ordinary meaning leaves

no room for ambiguity . . . . Similarly, any ambiguity

in a contract must emanate from the language used in

the contract rather than from one party’s subjective

perception of the terms. . . . [T]he mere fact that the

parties advance different interpretations of the language in question does not necessitate a conclusion

that the language is ambiguous. . . . [I]n construing

contracts, we give effect to all the language included

therein, as the law of contract interpretation . . . militates against interpreting a contract in a way that renders a provision superfluous. . . . If a contract is

unambiguous within its four corners, intent of the parties is a question of law requiring plenary review. . . .

When the language of a contract is ambiguous, the

determination of the parties’ intent is a question of fact,

and the trial court’s interpretation is subject to reversal

on appeal only if it is clearly erroneous. . . . To identify and to apply the appropriate standard of review,

we must, therefore, initially determine whether the

agreement . . . was unambiguous.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Marshall v. Marshall, 151 Conn.

App. 638, 640–41, 97 A.3d 1 (2014).

The parties’ October 29, 2009 agreement provided, in

relevant part, as follows: ‘‘The [defendant] will pay the

accrued amount to the [plaintiff], in full, on the first to

occur of the following: (a) the [defendant’s] obtaining

full-time employment, payment of accrued support to
be received within one month of the [defendant’s] first

paycheck, [or] (b) [t]he [defendant] receiving his check

for retroactive Social Security disability benefits, payment of accrued support to be received within seven

days of the [defendant’s] receipt of such check.’’

(Emphasis added.)

The plain language of the parties’ agreement contemplated that if the defendant qualified for retroactive

Social Security disability benefits, he would pay in full

the accrued arrearage owed to the plaintiff within seven

days of receiving his retroactive disability check. Pursuant to this agreement, and the court order into which

it was incorporated, the defendant’s obligation to pay

his entire child support arrearage was to be triggered

by his receipt of that check. The agreement makes no

mention whatsoever of the plaintiff’s receipt of dependency benefits, or of how, if at all, her receipt of such

benefits would affect the amount of the defendant’s

required payment.3 The absence of any reference to the

dependency benefit, itself,reinforces the plain language

of the agreement, which required the defendant to pay

the arrearage in full within seven days of receiving

his check.

To be sure, without the parties’ agreement, the defendant may have been entitled, under our case law, to have

the dependency benefits paid to the plaintiff credited to

the amount of his child support arrearage. The parties’

October 29, 2009 agreement, however, makes this case

purely one of contractual interpretation, and thus we

are bound to give effect to the plain and unambiguous

language that the parties used in drafting that

agreement. ‘‘[C]ourts do not unmake bargains unwisely

made. Absent other infirmities, bargains moved on calculated considerations, and whether provident or

improvident, are entitled nevertheless to sanctions of

the law. . . . Although parties might prefer to have the

court decide the plain effect of their contract contrary

to the agreement, it is not within its power to make a

new and different agreement; contracts voluntarily and

fairly made should be held valid and enforced in the

courts.’’ (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) Tallmadge Bros., Inc. v. Iroquois Gas Transmission System, L.P., 252 Conn. 479, 505–506, 746 A.2d

1277 (2000).

Both parties make arguments as to what they

intended in entering into the October 29, 2009

agreement. As noted, however, simply advancing alternative interpretations of contractual language does not

render that language ambiguous. Because the language

of that agreement is unambiguous, we are constrained

by its plain meaning. We thus agree with the trial court’s

determination that the defendant’s arrearage owed to

the plaintiff was not satisfied by the dependency benefit

paid directly to the plaintiff by the Social Security

Administration on behalf of the parties’ minor child.
The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 The Social Security Administration also issued a retroactive dependency

benefit to the parties’ daughter, who had reached the age of majority in

March, 2013. That payment is not at issue on appeal.

2 We note that the defendant’s current support order was reduced to zero

at the November 14, 2013 hearing because he received an adjustment to his

obligation by the amount that the minor child would be receiving as a

dependency benefit. This order was entered pursuant to an agreement by

the parties in accordance with the child support guidelines.

3 We note that the defendant’s disability benefit is not impacted by the

payment by the Social Security Administration of a dependency benefit. He

receives 100 percent of his share regardless of how many dependents he

has. In other words, although the dependency benefit is derived from the

defendant’s entitlement to disability benefits, it is not actually coming from

the defendant. The minor child’s entitlement to the dependency benefit is

separate and apart from the defendant’s disability benefits. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 402 (d) (2).