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FILED

JAN 07 2015

SUSAN M. SPRAUL, CLERK

U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL

OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ORDERED PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL

OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

In re: ) BAP Nos. CC-13-1374-KiKuDa

) CC-13-1375-KiKuDa

EPD INVESTMENT COMPANY, LLC ) (Related Appeals)

and JERROLD S. PRESSMAN, )

) Bk. No. 2:10-bk-62208-ER

Consolidated Debtors. )

 ) Adv. Nos. 2:12-ap-02576-ER

) 2:12-ap-02596-ER

JASON M. RUND, Chapter 7 )

Trustee, )

)

Appellant, )

)

v. ) O P I N I O N

)

BANK OF AMERICA CORPORATION; )

BANK OF AMERICA, N.A.; FIA )

CARD SERVICES, N.A. fka MBNA )

AMERICA BANK, )

)

Appellees. )

______________________________)

)

JASON M. RUND, Chapter 7 )

Trustee, )

)

Appellant, )

)

COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS, INC. )

and BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., )

)

Appellees. )

 )

Argued and Submitted on September 18, 2014, 

at Pasadena, California

Filed - January 7, 2015

Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court

for the Central District of California

Honorable Ernest M. Robles, Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding

 

Appearances: Corey R. Weber, Esq. of Ezra Brutzkus Gubner LLP
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argued for appellant Jason M. Rund, Chapter 7

Trustee; Zareh A. Jaltorossian, Esq. argued for

appellees Bank of America, N.A., Bank of America

Corporation and FIA Card Services, N.A.

 

Before: KIRSCHER, KURTZ and DAVIS,1 Bankruptcy Judges.

1 Hon. Laurel E. Davis, Bankruptcy Judge for the District of

Nevada, sitting by designation.

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KIRSCHER, Bankruptcy Judge:

Chapter 72 trustee Jason M. Rund (“Trustee”) appeals orders

granting the motions of Bank of America Corporation, Bank of

America, N.A. and FIA Card Services, N.A. fka MBNA America Bank

(together “Bank of America”) and Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.,

Bank of America, N.A. successor by merger to BAC Home Loans

Servicing, LP fka Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, LP (together

“Countrywide”) (collectively “Defendants” or “Appellees”) to

dismiss Trustee’s claims against Appellees for certain fraudulent

transfers.

Under § 544(b) and CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3439-3439.12, Trustee

sought to avoid certain fraudulent transfers to Appellees that

occurred up to seven years prior to the debtors’ petition date. 

Trustee filed his complaints against Appellees within the two

years prescribed in § 546(a)(1)(A). Finding that the California

fraudulent transfer statute, CAL. CIV. CODE § 3439.09(c), is a

statute of repose, the bankruptcy court, relying on an unpublished

Ninth Circuit decision, ruled that Trustee could reach back only

to those transfers occurring up to seven years prior to the filing

of his complaint, not the petition date. In other words, the

bankruptcy court determined that § 546(a) has no effect on the

seven-year limitations period set forth in CAL. CIV. CODE

§ 3439.09(c); it runs concurrently with the two year statute of

limitations set forth in § 546(a). Trustee appeals, contending

2 Unless specified otherwise, all chapter, code and rule

references are to the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532, and

the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, Rules 1001-9037. The

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are referred to as “Civil Rules.”

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that the filing of a bankruptcy petition tolls the California

statute and gives a trustee an additional two years to investigate

and file an avoidance action, regardless of whether CAL. CIV. CODE

§ 3439.09(c) is a statute of repose.

The narrow question of whether § 546(a) preempts a state-law

statute of repose such as CAL. CIV. CODE § 3439.09(c) is an issue of

first impression in this circuit. At least no published decisions

have addressed it. While relatively few courts have addressed

this particular issue, virtually all have held in favor of

Trustee. We conclude that the bankruptcy court erred in its

application of § 546(a), and we REVERSE.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

EPD Investment Company, LLC (“Debtor”) was operated by

Jerrold S. Pressman (together “Debtors”)3 as a sole proprietorship

between the 1970s and June 27, 2003. On June 27, 2003, when

Debtor was formed as a California limited liability company,

Pressman transferred the sole proprietorship’s assets to Debtor.

Trustee filed his complaints against Defendants on November

30 and December 2, 2012 (the “Complaints”). Trustee alleged that

Debtor operated as a Ponzi scheme between 2003 and the petition

3 EPD Investment Company, LLC was filed as an involuntary

case on December 7, 2010. The bankruptcy court entered an order

for relief on February 9, 2011, nunc pro tunc to December 7, 2010. 

It also ordered substantive consolidation of Debtor’s case and

Mr. Pressman’s individual voluntary case nunc pro tunc to

December 7, 2010. Therefore, the petition date and the order for

relief date are the same; Trustee could arguably recover transfers

going back seven years from December 7, 2010. See Alexander v.

Compton (In re Bonham), 229 F.3d 750, 771 (9th Cir. 2000) (when

court orders substantive consolidation nunc pro tunc, the filing

date of the original involuntary bankruptcy petition is the

controlling date from which to measure the limitations period for

trustee’s avoidance actions).

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date. Pursuant to § 544(b) and CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3439.04(a) and

3439.07, Trustee’s first claim for relief sought to avoid

transfers from Debtors to Defendants occurring up to seven years

prior to the petition date: December 7, 2003 through December 7,

2010 (the “First Claim”).4 As to Bank of America, Trustee sought

to avoid transfers made between December 24, 2003 and December 18,

2009. Trustee sought to avoid transfers to Countrywide made

between December 15, 2003 and June 11, 2009.

Defendants moved to dismiss Trustee’s Complaints under Civil

Rule 12(b)(6) (“Motions to Dismiss”). Citing CAL. CIV. CODE

§ 3439.09(a) and (b),5 Defendants argued that Trustee’s recovery

was limited to transfers made within four years preceding the date

the bankruptcy court entered the order for relief, or February 9,

2011. Thus, argued Defendants, all transfers made prior to

February 9, 2007, were time-barred and should be dismissed. Based

on their arguments, Defendants maintained that the time

limitations in CAL. CIV. CODE § 3439.09(a) and (b) were “tolled” as

4 Although Trustee alleged other claims for relief, his

First Claim is the only claim at issue in these appeals.

5 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3439.09(a) and (b) provides:

A cause of action with respect to a fraudulent transfer or

obligation under this chapter is extinguished unless action

is brought pursuant to subdivision (a) of Section 3439.07 or

levy made as provided in subdivision (b) or (c) of Section

3439.07:

(a) Under paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) of Section

3439.04, within four years after the transfer was made or the

obligation was incurred or, if later, within one year after

the transfer or obligation was or could reasonably have been

discovered by the claimant.

(b) Under paragraph (2) of subdivision (a) of Section 3439.04

or Section 3439.05, within four years after the transfer was

made or the obligation was incurred.

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of the date of the order for relief, and that Trustee could reach

back to any transfers within the four-year period preceding

February 9, 2011.

Trustee opposed the Motions to Dismiss. Citing Von Gunten v.

Neilson (In re Slatkin), 243 F. App’x 255, 258 (9th Cir. 2007)

(“Slatkin II”), an unpublished Ninth Circuit case, Trustee argued

that §§ 544(b) and 546(a) effectively preempted the statute of

limitations set forth in CAL. CIV. CODE § 3439.09, including the

seven-year period in subdivision (c).6 Trustee argued Slatkin II,

relying on Acequia, Inc. v. Clinton (In re Acequia, Inc)., 34 F.3d

800 (9th Cir. 1994), held that the filing of a bankruptcy petition

tolls the limitations period on a creditor’s state-law fraudulent

transfer action and permits a trustee up to two years to file an

avoidance action, even if the state’s limitations period has

otherwise expired. Therefore, argued Trustee, because he filed

his Complaints within the two years required under § 546(a),

Defendants had failed to show his claims were time-barred.

Defendants argued that CAL. CIV. CODE § 3439.09(c) was a

statute of repose, not limitations, and was not subject to

tolling. To support their argument, Defendants cited Jenner v.

Neilson (In re Slatkin), 222 F. App’x 545, 547 (9th Cir. 2007)

(“Slatkin I”), another unpublished Ninth Circuit case issued six

months prior to Slatkin II, for the proposition that the seven

year reach back period should be measured from the date of the

6 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3439.09(c) provides, in relevant part:

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a cause of action

with respect to a fraudulent transfer or obligation is

extinguished if no action is brought . . . within seven years

after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred.

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filing of the complaint, not the petition date. Thus, argued

Defendants, to the extent Trustee sought to avoid transfers made

more than seven years prior to the date of the filing of the

Complaints, such claims should be dismissed with prejudice.

In its decision, the bankruptcy court identified CAL. CIV. CODE

§ 3439.09(a) and (c) as the applicable “statute of limitations”

for a fraudulent transfer claim under CAL. CIV. CODE § 3439.04(a). 

Relying on Slatkin I, the court dismissed Trustee’s First Claim

against Defendants, with prejudice, to the extent it sought to

avoid transfers occurring more than seven years prior to the date

he filed his Complaints. After considering the parties’ arguments

at the hearing on the Motions to Dismiss, the court added:

First, I believe that the Slatkin I case better reflects

the application of relevant California law. And so I

think it’s a better -- it’s not binding on the Court, but

I think it reflects appropriately what the state of the

law is in California with respect to that statute of

repose.

Hr’g Tr. (July 16, 2013) 13:2-7 (emphasis added). We granted

Trustee’s motion for leave to file interlocutory appeals. Rule

8004.

II. JURISDICTION

The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334

and 157(b)(2)(H). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158.

III. ISSUE

Does § 546(a) preempt a state-law fraudulent transfer statute

of repose such as CAL. CIV. CODE § 3439.09(c)?

IV. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

The bankruptcy court’s dismissal of an adversary complaint

for failure to state a claim under Civil Rule 12(b)(6) is reviewed

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de novo. Barnes v. Belice (In re Belice), 461 B.R. 564, 572 (9th

Cir. BAP 2011). A dismissal without leave to amend is reviewed

for abuse of discretion. Ditto v. McCurdy, 510 F.3d 1070, 1079

(9th Cir. 2007). A bankruptcy court abuses its discretion if it

applies an incorrect legal standard or its factual findings are

illogical, implausible or without support from evidence in the

record. TrafficSchool.com, Inc. v. Edriver Inc., 653 F.3d 820,

832 (9th Cir. 2011).

We review a bankruptcy court’s conclusions of law, including

its interpretations of provisions of the Bankruptcy Code and state

law, de novo. See New Falls Corp. v. Boyajian (In re Boyajian),

367 B.R. 138, 141 (9th Cir. BAP 2007), aff’d, 564 F.3d 1088 (9th

Cir. 2009).

V. DISCUSSION

A. Civil Rule 12(b)(6) standards

Under Civil Rule 12(b)(6), made applicable in adversary

proceedings through Rule 7012, a bankruptcy court may dismiss a

complaint if it fails to “state a claim upon which relief can be

granted.” In reviewing a Civil Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the trial

court must accept as true all facts alleged in the complaint and

draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Navarro

v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). However, the trial

court need not accept as true conclusory allegations in a

complaint or legal characterizations cast in the form of factual

allegations. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56

(2007); Hartman v. Gilead Scis., Inc. (In re Gilead Scis. Sec.

Litig.), 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008).

We do not ignore affirmative defenses to a claim; if the

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allegations show that relief is barred as a matter of law, the

complaint is subject to dismissal. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199,

215 (2007) (dismissal is appropriate under Civil Rule 12(b)(6) if

the allegations show that relief is barred by the applicable

statute of limitations).

To avoid dismissal under Civil Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff

must aver in the complaint “sufficient factual matter, accepted as

true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550

U.S. at 570). It is axiomatic that a claim cannot be plausible

when it has no legal basis. A dismissal under Civil Rule 12(b)(6)

may be based either on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or on

the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal

theory. Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare Sys., 534 F.3d 1116, 1121

(9th Cir. 2008).

B. The interplay of § 544(b), § 546(a) and the statute of

limitations in Cal. Civ. Code § 3439.09(a) and (b).

Section 544(b)(1) authorizes a trustee to avoid “any transfer

of an interest of the debtor in property . . . that is voidable

under applicable law” — i.e., state law. The transfers at issue

here were argued to be fraudulent transfers under the California

Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (“UFTA”), found in CAL. CIV. CODE

§§ 3439-3439.12. Specifically, Trustee sought to avoid certain

transfers under CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3439.04(a) and 3439.07. Monies

lost by Ponzi-scheme investors are recoverable under the UFTA. 

See Donell v. Kowell, 533 F.3d 762, 767 (9th Cir. 2008). A

trustee’s right to bring a state-law fraudulent transfer action

under § 544(b) is a creation of the Bankruptcy Code; it is not an

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action to assert an independent state law created right. Gen.

Elec. Capital Auto Lease, Inc. v. Broach (In re Lucas Dallas,

Inc.), 185 B.R. 801, 804 (9th Cir. BAP 1995) (citing Mahoney,

Trocki & Assocs., Inc. v. Kunzman (In re Mahoney, Trocki &

Assocs., Inc.), 111 B.R. 914, 918 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1990)).

CAL. CIV. CODE § 3439.09(a) and (b) are statutes of limitation

requiring a plaintiff to file a fraudulent transfer action within

four years of the transfer or, for an intentional fraud, within

one year after the transfer was or could reasonably have been

discovered. In re JMC Telecom LLC, 416 B.R. 738, 742 (C.D. Cal.

2009); Macedo v. Bosio, 86 Cal. App. 4th 1044, 1050 n.4 (2001).

A trustee’s action under § 544 is also subject to the time

limitations set forth in § 546(a), which provides, in relevant

part, that an action or proceeding under § 544 to avoid a transfer

must be commenced within “2 years after the entry of the order for

relief.” § 546(a)(1)(A). Many courts, including the Ninth

Circuit, have held that if the statute of limitations period

governing a state-law fraudulent transfer action has not yet

expired on the petition date (or the date the order for relief is

entered, which is generally the same date), the trustee may bring

the action under § 544(b), provided it is filed within the

§ 546(a) limitations period. This rule applies even if the state

statute of limitations expired while the bankruptcy case was

pending. Acequia, Inc., 34 F.3d at 807 (applying Idaho fraudulent

transfer law and describing Karnes v. McDowell (In re McDowell),

87 B.R. 554, 558 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1988), as holding that “a

bankruptcy petition tolls the statute of limitations on a

creditor’s state-law fraudulent conveyance action and permits the

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trustee to initiate avoidance litigation even where the

limitations period otherwise would have expired”); Slatkin II, 243

F. App’x at 258 (applying CAL. CIV. CODE § 3439.09 and citing

Acequia, Inc.); Richardson v. Preston (In re Antex, Inc.), 397

B.R. 168, 174 (1st Cir. BAP 2008); Rosania v. Haligas (In re Dry

Wall Supply, Inc.), 111 B.R. 933, 936 (D. Colo. 1990); Picard v.

Estate of Chais (In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Secs. LLC), 445 B.R.

206, 231 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011); Summit Secs., Inc. v. Sandifur

(In re Metro. Mortg. & Secs. Co.), 344 B.R. 138, 141 (Bankr. E.D.

Wash. 2006); Bay State Milling Co. v. Martin (In re Martin), 142

B.R. 260, 265 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992); In re Mahoney, Trocki &

Assocs., Inc., 111 B.R. at 919-20.

Simply put, so long as the state-law fraudulent transfer

claim exists on the petition date (or the order for relief date),

the state statutes of limitations cease to have any continued

effect, and the only applicable statute of limitations for

bringing the claim thereafter is within § 546(a). Accordingly,

the reach back period is established on the petition date (or the

order for relief date) and encompasses all transfers within the

relevant period provided by state law. Trustee’s Complaints were

timely filed under § 546(a).

C. The interplay of § 546(a) and CAL. CIV. CODE § 3439.09(c) and

similar state statutes of repose

In contrast to subdivisions (a) and (b), the seven year time

limitation set forth in CAL. CIV. CODE § 3439.09(c) is a statute of

repose. Donell v. Keppers, 835 F. Supp. 2d 871, 877 (S.D. Cal.

2011) (citing Forum Ins. Co. v. Comparet, 62 F. App’x 151, 152

(9th Cir. 2003) (“[W]e find that CAL. CIV. CODE § 3439.09(c) is a

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statute of repose pertaining to all actions relating to fraudulent

transfers.”) (relying on Macedo, 86 Cal. App. 4th at 1050 n.4));

In re JMC Telecom LLC, 416 B.R. at 742.

Relying on Slatkin I, the bankruptcy court determined that

the seven-year repose period in CAL. CIV. CODE § 3439.09(c) was not

tolled and, therefore, Trustee could not avoid any transfers that

occurred more than seven years prior to the filing of the

Complaints as those claims were extinguished. In Slatkin I, the

chapter 7 trustee initiated an avoidance action to recover

fraudulent transfers made by debtor during the course of a Ponzi

scheme. 222 F. App’x at 546. Citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 3439.09(c),

the Ninth Circuit found the bankruptcy court had erred in

measuring the trustee’s seven-year claims from the petition date

rather than the date he filed his complaint. Following Macedo,

the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the seven-year repose period

“extinguished the Trustee’s ability to reach the transfers that

occurred more than seven years prior” to the filing of the

complaint. Id. at 547. The court concluded that such error was

harmless, however, because the transfers at issue had occurred

within the seven-year period prior to when the trustee filed his

complaint. Id.

In Slatkin II, which involved a different transferee of the

debtor and was decided six months after Slatkin I, the Ninth

Circuit stated in its introductory paragraph: “The bankruptcy

court determined that Slatkin had been running a fraudulent Ponzi

scheme and that the transfers from Slatkin were voidable

fraudulent conveyances that occurred within seven years of

Slatkin’s bankruptcy. We affirm the bankruptcy court’s order.” 

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243 F. App’x at 257 (emphasis added). The court rejected the

transferee’s argument that the trustee could not avoid transfers

reaching back seven years from the petition date. Id. at 258.

Relying on Acequia, Inc., 34 F.3d at 807, the Slatkin II court

concluded that upon the bankruptcy petition filing, the trustee

then has two years to initiate avoidance litigation as § 546(a)

tolls the statute of limitations on a creditor’s state-law

fraudulent transfer proceeding pursued through § 544(b). Id.

Trustee argues that Slatkin I and Slatkin II are inconsistent

as to whether a trustee can recover transfers that occurred up to

seven years prior to the petition date or to the date the

complaint is filed. We agree. Slatkin I appears to hold that,

unlike the four year statute of limitations set forth in CAL. CIV.

CODE § 3439.09(a), the seven-year repose period in CAL. CIV. CODE

§ 3439.09(c) is not tolled upon the filing of the bankruptcy

petition, and therefore a trustee can only recover transfers

occurring up to seven years from when the complaint is filed. 

Slatkin II arguably holds just the opposite, that a trustee can

recover transfers occurring up to seven years prior to the

petition date. Slatkin II, however, made no mention of whether

CAL. CIV. CODE § 3439.09(c) is a statute of repose or limitations. 

Either way, while the Slatkin cases may provide persuasive

authority on the matter at hand, we are not bound by them.7 See

7 Appellees argue that in the underlying district court

order from Slatkin II, it is clear the issue there was only the

four year statute of limitations set forth in CAL. CIV. CODE

§ 3439.09(a), not the seven-year repose period in CAL. CIV. CODE

§ 3439.09(c). While that was certainly one of the issues, the

district court nonetheless proceeded to affirm the bankruptcy

(continued...)

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9th Cir. R. 36-3(a). We disagree with Trustee that Acequia, Inc.

has answered the question before us. That case did not address

the effect of § 546(a) on a state statute of repose such as CAL.

CIV. CODE § 3439.09(c).

No published Ninth Circuit case has addressed this specific

issue. Therefore, we turn to other jurisdictions which have

considered it. First, however, we believe a brief explanation

about the difference between statutes of limitations and statutes

of repose is in order. In a recent decision, we explained that a

statute of limitations creates an affirmative defense if a party

fails to initiate an action within a specific time period, whereas

a statute of repose extinguishes a party’s claim after a fixed

period of time, usually measured from one of the defendant’s acts. 

The former involves a party’s diligence; the latter promotes a

defendant’s peace from litigation. DeNoce v. Neff (In re Neff),

505 B.R. 255, 263 (9th Cir. BAP 2014). “A statute of repose is

thus harsher than a statute of limitations in that it cuts off a

right of action after a specified period of time, irrespective of

7(...continued)

court’s finding that the trustee could bring fraudulent transfer

claims up to seven years prior to the date of the debtor’s

bankruptcy filing:

The Court finds that pursuant to CAL. CIV. CODE § 3439.09(a),

the Trustee presented sufficient evidence to avoid transfers

up to seven years prior to Slatkin’s bankruptcy and the

transfers actually avoided did not go beyond seven years.

The Court finds that pursuant to [§ 546(a)(1)(A)], the

Bankruptcy Court did not err in finding that the Trustee’s

claims against Appellants were timely.

Von Gunten v. Neilson (In re Slatkin), No. 2:04-cv-10280, at 4

(C.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2005) (emphasis added).

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accrual or even notice that a legal right has been invaded.” 

Giest v. Sequoia Ventures, Inc., 83 Cal. App. 4th 300, 305 (2000)

(citation omitted).

Although statutes of limitations are subject to equitable

tolling, equitable tolling is inconsistent with statutes of

repose. In re Neff, 505 B.R. at 264 (citing Lampf, Pleva,

Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 363

(1991)). Several federal courts in California have held that CAL.

CIV. CODE § 3439.09(c) is not subject to tolling. See Donell, 835

F. Supp. 2d at 878 (dismissing claims filed more than seven years

after fraudulent transfers were made and holding that repose

period in CAL. CIV. CODE § 3439.09(c) was not subject to tolling

under CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 356 (relating to tolling where an

injunction against commencement of an action exists) because

tolling is inconsistent with the statute’s plain language, which

is “absolute” and “cannot be tolled or otherwise extended”); In re

JMC Telecom LLC, 416 B.R. at 742-43 (following Macedo and holding

that CAL. CIV. CODE § 3439.09(c) “operates as an absolute bar on

fraudulent transfer claims older than seven years” and is not

subject to extension by CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 338(d), the statute

of limitations applicable to California common law fraudulent

transfer claims); Roach v. Lee, 369 F. Supp. 2d 1194, 1198-99

(C.D. Cal. 2005) (holding that seven-year repose period in CAL.

CIV. CODE § 3439.09(c) trumps the statute of limitations period in

CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 338(d) and dismissing claims for transfers

outside seven years).

While these cases have determined that the repose period in

CAL. CIV. CODE § 3439.09(c) is not subject to equitable tolling or

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any type of extension provided in potentially conflicting

California statutes, such as CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 356 or 338(d),

none confronted the interplay between CAL. CIV. CODE § 3439.09(c)

and the Bankruptcy Code, namely § 546(a).8 In fact, few cases

have dealt with the interplay between § 546(a) and a state statute

of repose.

1. Cases supporting Trustee’s position

Trustee argues that § 546(a) makes no distinction between

statutes of limitations and statutes of repose, and therefore the

bankruptcy court erred in determining he could reach back only to

those transfers occurring within seven years from the filing of

his Complaints. Several cases support Trustee’s position.

In Gibbons v. First Fid. Bank, N.A. (In re Princeton-New York

Invs., Inc.), 199 B.R. 285 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1996) (“Princeton I”),

the chapter 11 trustee sought to avoid an alleged fraudulent

transfer under §§ 544, 548 and the New Jersey UFTA. The transfer

in question occurred on November 14, 1990. The bankruptcy

petition was filed on August 12, 1994. The four-year repose

period under the New Jersey UFTA expired on November 14, 1994. 

The trustee filed his avoidance action on October 6, 1995. Id. at

288-89. Defendants moved to dismiss the trustee’s complaint under

8 In In re JMC Telecom LLC, the district court held that

because of the language contained in CAL. CIV. CODE § 3439.09(c) —

“Notwithstanding any other provision of law” — all fraudulent

transfer claims were barred after seven years whether they arose

under the UFTA or CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 338(d). 416 B.R. at 742-

43. However, § 546(a) is not mentioned anywhere in the decision,

and it is not clear whether the district court even considered it. 

While the cases cited by Appellees on pages 14-15 of their brief

have held that equitable tolling is inconsistent with the statute

of repose in CAL. CIV. CODE § 3439.09(c), none dealt with § 546(a),

and some did not involve the Bankruptcy Code at all.

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Civil Rule 12(b)(6), contending that his right to bring such an

action was extinguished on or about November 14, 1994, and so his

complaint filed on October 6, 1995, was untimely. Id. at 292. 

Both parties agreed the fraudulent transfer claim existed as of

the petition date. Id. at 293.

As with Appellees in the instant case, the defendants in

Princeton I argued that § 544(b) gave the trustee no more rights

than a hypothetical unsecured creditor has under state substantive

law, which requires that the fraudulent transfer action be brought

within four years. Id. at 292-93. They further argued that even

though a state statute of limitations on a fraudulent transfer

action may be tolled upon the bankruptcy petition date, the same

rule did not apply to a statute of repose. Id. at 294. The

bankruptcy court disagreed, holding that the four-year statute of

repose in the New Jersey UFTA was preempted by § 546. Id. at 297-

98. Accordingly, because the fraudulent transfer claims were

viable on the petition date, the trustee’s avoidance action filed

within the two years prescribed in § 546(a) was timely.

The district court affirmed. First Union Nat’l Bank v.

Gibbons (In re Princeton-New York Invs., Inc.), 219 B.R. 55, 64

(D.N.J. 1998) (“Princeton II”). Rejecting the bank’s argument

that the trustee’s avoidance action was governed by the

substantive limitations of New Jersey law, the district court held

that because the trustee’s action under § 544(b) and the New

Jersey UFTA was filed within the time prescribed in § 546(a), his

complaint was timely. Id. at 64-65. In other words, as long as

the applicable statute of repose has not yet expired at the time

the bankruptcy petition is filed, a trustee’s complaint is timely

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if filed in accordance with § 546(a). The district court found

that holding otherwise would frustrate a trustee’s ability to

recover property for the bankrupt estate’s benefit, “a

congressional goal intended to be accomplished by the Code.” Id.

at 65.

Not convinced by the bank’s argument that a statute of repose

should be treated differently under § 546(a), the district court

in Princeton II stated:

The Court is not convinced that § 25:2–31's status as a

statute of repose, alone, is sufficient to establish an

overriding state public policy requiring subordination of

the Code’s goals for §§ 544(b) and 546(a). After

carefully weighing the goals of the Code, namely for the

Trustee to maximize the bankruptcy estate for creditors’

benefit, with the New Jersey legislature’s purposes for

enacting the statute of repose, pursuant to the Supremacy

Clause and substantive countervailing federal law

considerations, the state statute must give way. Section

546(a)’s wording is clear. It applies to those actions

brought under § 544. If § 546(a)’s plain meaning has led

to unworkable results, it is for Congress and not the

courts to remedy that problem.

Id. at 65-66 (footnote omitted).

In a factually similar case, the transferee defendants moved

under Civil Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss the trustee’s avoidance

actions as barred by the limitations period set forth in the New

Jersey UFTA, arguing that the transfers occurred more than five

years before the trustee filed his complaint. Tsai v. Bldgs. by

Jamie, Inc. (In re Bldgs. by Jamie, Inc.), 230 B.R. 36, 40, 45

(Bankr. D.N.J. 1998). Persuaded by the district court’s analysis

in Princeton II, the bankruptcy court held that because the fouryear statute of repose had not expired at the time the bankruptcy

petition was filed, the trustee’s avoidance actions were not timebarred as long as they were filed within the two years prescribed

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in § 546. Id. at 45.

The bankruptcy court in Mi-Lor Corp. v. Gottsegen (In re MiLor Corp.), 233 B.R. 608, 619 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1999), reached the

same conclusion as Princeton I, Princeton II and In re Bldgs. by

Jamie, Inc. There, the chapter 11 debtors’ bankruptcy cases were

filed in March 1995. Based on the date of the alleged transfers,

the six-year contract claims limitations period applicable under

the Massachusetts Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act (the precursor

to the UFTA) expired in March 1996. The debtors filed their

fraudulent conveyance action under § 544(b) and Massachusetts

state law in February 1997. Id. at 618. Defendants argued that

debtors’ claims were extinguished by March 1996, and therefore

their action was time-barred because the alleged “transfers were

not then, in the words of section 544(b)(1), ‘voidable under

applicable law by a creditor.’” Id. The debtors argued that

§ 546(a) gave them an additional two years from the bankruptcy

filing to bring their avoidance action under § 544(b). The

bankruptcy court agreed with debtors and held that, whether viewed

as a statute of limitations or repose, because the state law

limitations period had not expired when debtors filed their

bankruptcy petitions, debtors’ action was timely under § 546(a). 

Id. at 619.

In Smith v. Am. Founders Fin. Corp., 365 B.R. 647, 676-78

(S.D. Tex 2007), the district court for the Southern District of

Texas rejected arguments similar to those raised by the defendants

in Princeton I and Princeton II. In considering the interplay

between § 546(a) and the repose period set forth in the Texas

UFTA, the district court agreed with the holdings of Princeton I,

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Princeton II and In re Bldgs. by Jamie, Inc., and held that

§ 546(a) preempted state law and controlled the timing of the

trustee’s avoidance action. Id. at 678-79. As long as the

trustee’s claims are viable when the debtor files its bankruptcy

case, the trustee has two years from the petition date to file the

avoidance action. Id. at 679.

While Appellees argue that CAL. CIV. CODE § 3439.09(c) cannot

be equitably tolled or held in abeyance until the discovery of

alleged fraudulent transfers, none of the above courts based their

decisions on the doctrine of equitable tolling. Rather, each

concluded, either expressly or implicitly, the statute of repose

in their respective state fraudulent transfer statute was

preempted by § 544(b) and the statute of limitations set forth in

§ 546(a).

2. Cases supporting Appellees’ position

Far fewer cases support Appellees’ position that Trustee’s

claims for fraudulent transfers occurring more than seven years

prior to the complaint date are barred by California’s statute of

repose. We located two.

The first case supporting Appellees is Official Comm. of

Unsecured Creditors v. Action Indus., Inc. (In re Phar-Mor, Inc.

Secs. Litig.), 178 B.R. 692 (W.D. Pa. 1995), aff’d, 101 F.3d 689

(3d Cir. 1996) (“Phar-Mor”). In Phar-Mor, the creditors committee

filed an avoidance action under §§ 544, 548 and Ohio’s fraudulent

transfer statutes. Id. at 693-94. One of the defendants who

participated in the alleged fraudulent transfers died during the

bankruptcy case. The committee did not learn of the man’s death

until his estate executor moved for summary judgment on the

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committee’s claim against the man’s estate; the committee had not

filed its claim against his estate until eighteen months after his

death. Id. at 694. The executor moved for summary judgment on

the basis that the applicable Ohio probate statute (referred to as

a “nonclaim” statute, which is effectively a statute of repose)

barred all claims against a decedent’s estate not presented within

one year of the decedent’s death. Id. The committee contended

the one-year nonclaim statute was inapplicable because it

conflicted with the two year statute of limitations in § 546(a). 

Id.

In considering the interplay between § 546(a) and the Ohio

probate statute, the district court held that § 546(a) did not

preempt Ohio law. Id. at 694-96. Preemption in this case was

“inappropriate because [the court could not] discern a ‘clear and

manifest’ intention on the part of Congress to override the

state’s strong and traditional interest in regulating the probate

matters of its citizens.” Id. at 696. See also Marshall v.

Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 308 (2006) (recognizing the probate

exception as described in Markham v. Allen, 326 U.S. 490, 494

(1946)). Notably, the district court did say, in dicta, that had

the Ohio probate statute been a statute of limitations, it would

have been inclined to find that § 546(a) preempted it. Id. at

695. It concluded that when considering a probate nonclaim

statute the calculus requires attention to a “state’s traditional

right to regulate probate matters” and “the right to determine the

capacity of its citizens to be sued,” thereby defeating a

preemption argument. Id. at 695-96.

The other case is Floyd v. Option One Mortg. Corp. (In re

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Supplement Spot, LLC), 409 B.R. 187 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009). 

There, the trustee sought to recover fraudulent transfers under

§ 544(b), § 548 and the Texas UFTA. Id. at 197. Applying the

same Texas statute of repose as the district court did in Smith,

the bankruptcy court determined the trustee could avoid transfers

going back four years from the date he filed his complaint. 

Id. at 202-03. We do not find In re Supplemental Spot, LLC

persuasive. The bankruptcy court believed it did not need to

conduct a preemption analysis between § 546(a) and the Texas UFTA

and thus did not do so. Id. at 197. The court indicated that, if

it had done such a preemption analysis, it would have required the

trustee to comply with both the state and federal limitations

periods. Id. at 198.

D. The bankruptcy court erred when it dismissed Trustee’s First

Claim in part as being barred by the seven year statute of

repose in CAL. CIV. CODE § 3439.09(c).

We are persuaded by the well-reasoned holdings of Princeton I

and Princeton II and their progeny and conclude that the state

statute of repose at issue here presents an obstacle to the

objectives of Congress in enacting the Code. In cases like PharMor, which involve state probate statutes, we agree that because

Congress has not expressed an intention to override a state’s

strong and traditional interest in regulating probate matters, the

Code may not control.

However, by enacting the Code, Congress has expressed an

intent to regulate bankruptcy and maximize the bankruptcy estate

for the benefit of creditors. Congress enacted § 544(b) and

§ 546(a) to foster a trustee’s ability to avoid fraudulent

transfers of property under state law and to recover that property

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for the benefit of the estate. Section 546 was created with the

intent to give trustees sufficient time or “breathing room” to

determine whether to assert any claims under § 544. Princeton I,

199 B.R. at 297 (citing In re Dry Wall Supply, Inc., 111 B.R. at

936). Although “§ 544(b) does not explicitly preempt state law,

inclusion of § 546(a) in the Code evidences Congress’ intent to

subordinate state law restrictions.” Princeton II, 219 B.R. at

64.

The California Legislature has expressed an intent in CAL.

CIV. CODE § 3439.09(c) to extinguish liability if an avoidance

action is not timely filed. In addition, the phrase

“notwithstanding any other provision of law” found in CAL. CIV. CODE

§ 3439.09(c) expresses the legislature’s intent for the seven-year

repose period to control despite the existence of other laws which

might otherwise govern. See Roach, 369 F. Supp. 2d at 1199. 

However, to the extent CAL. CIV. CODE § 3439.09(c) tries to affect

or conflicts with federal bankruptcy law, the state law must

yield.

In considering both California and federal law, we conclude

the time bar set forth in CAL. CIV. CODE § 3439.09(c) frustrates

Congress’ intent in § 546 and collides with federal bankruptcy

law. And, unlike the probate statute at issue in Phar-Mor, we see

no substantial countervailing state interest that outweighs

Congress’ goal of maximizing the bankruptcy estate for the benefit

of creditors. Princeton I, 199 B.R. at 297. Therefore, pursuant

to the Supremacy Clause, the state law must yield. Id. at 298;

Princeton II, 219 B.R. at 65-66.

Accordingly, we hold that so long as a state-law fraudulent

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transfer claim exists on the petition date (or the date the order

for relief is entered), i.e., the state’s applicable repose period

governing the action has not yet expired on the petition date (or

the order for relief date), the trustee may bring the avoidance

action under § 544(b), provided it is filed within the limitations

period in § 546(a). The “reach back” period is established on the

petition date (or the order for relief date) and encompasses all

transfers within the relevant period provided by state law.

In this case, Trustee should have been allowed to bring a

claim for those transfers occurring within seven years prior to

the petition date — i.e., back to December 7, 2003 — and the

bankruptcy court erred in dismissing his First Claim under Civil

Rule 12(b)(6) to the extent it sought to avoid the transfers to

Bank of America from December 24, 2003 through November 21, 2005,

and the transfers to Countrywide from December 15, 2003 through

November 16, 2005. Because Trustee timely filed his First Claim

within the two years prescribed in § 546(a)(1)(A), recovery of

these transfers was not time-barred.

VI. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE.

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