* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and

is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-30825

Summary Calendar

SSC ACQUISITION CORP., doing business as Scientific Systems Corporation

Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

DAVID R. RATCLIFF; ANTHONY W. COLLIER; SAFE AIR TECHNOLOGY

LLC

Defendants - Appellants

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Louisiana

USDC No. 3:04-CV-421

Before JOLLY, BENAVIDES, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

David Ratcliff, Anthony Collier, and Safe Air Technology, LLC

(collectively, “Safe Air”) appeal the district court’s denial of their motion to

interpret a settlement agreement and its grant of Appellee SSC Acquisition

Corp.’s (“SSC”) motion to enforce the settlement agreement. Because the order

does not fully resolve the rights and liabilities of the parties under the

settlement agreement and does not conclude the district court’s role in enforcing

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

February 12, 2009

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
08-30825

1 The settlement agreement providesthat thedistrict court “shallretain jurisdiction to enforce the terms

and conditions of this Agreement, to resolve disputes arising hereunder and for such other action as may be

necessary or appropriate for construction or execution of this Agreement.”

2

the settlement agreement, the order is not final and appealable. We therefore

dismiss the appeal.

I.

In 2004, SSC sued Safe Air alleging, among other things,that Safe Air had

violated federal copyright law by infringing on SSC’s trademarks in the

manufacture and sale of certain specialized heating and cooling systems.

Following negotiations, the parties entered into a settlement agreement and

filed a joint motion to dismiss in part, which the district court granted on May

1, 2006. In granting the motion, the district court specifically retained

“jurisdiction for the limited purpose of enforcementin accordance with the terms

of the Settlement Agreement.”1 Under the terms of the settlement agreement,

the parties’ dispute was to be resolved by a technical auditor and, if necessary,

a special master, a consulting attorney, and an accounting auditor. The

technical auditor’s role was:

(a) to identify the first generation of a [Safe Air Technology]

product for a comparison to SSC products; and

(b) to ascertain whether an existing or new product of [Safe Air

Technology] was “copied” from the products of SSC as they existed

prior to January 1, 2003, with information in which SSC had a

protectable interest. “Protectable information” as used herein is

information whose source and/or applications came from SSC.

“Copied” as used herein shall exclude any products copied or that

could have been copied from another source other than SSC.

On October 15, 2007, the technical auditor finished his report on certain

Safe Air Technology products and found that they were “copied.” Under the
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3

terms of the settlement agreement, Safe Air must pay SSC a royalty of eight

percent (8%) of the gross sales of a “copied” product. Safe Air appealed the

technical auditor’s finding to the special master, as provided by the settlement

agreement. The special master affirmed the technical auditor’s findings. Safe

Air subsequently refused to allow the technical auditor to audit its remaining

products. SSC filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement in the district

court seeking to require Safe Air to allow the technical auditor to continue,

participate in selecting a financial auditor, and pay SSC’s legal fees resulting

from Safe Air’s appeal to the special master. Safe Air then filed a motion to

interpretthe settlement agreementin which it asked the district courtto require

the special master to reconsider his decision on the grounds that he had

erroneously construed the settlement agreement. On July 16, 2008, the district

court granted SSC’s motion and denied Safe Air’s, and directed Safe Air, inter

alia, to comply with the settlement agreement’s procedures to appoint an

accounting auditor, to cooperate with the technical auditor, and to pay fees due

to SSC’s attorneys. Safe Air appealed from this ruling, and SSC filed a motion

to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

II.

“As a general rule, federal law limits our appellate jurisdiction to

reviewing final decisions of the district courts.” Graham v. Johnson, 168 F.3d

762, 774 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1291). “A ‘final decision’ generally is

one which ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to

do but execute the judgment.” Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945).

“[T]he final judgment rule promotes efficient judicial administration while at the

same time emphasizing the deference appellate courts owe to the districtjudge’s

decisions on the many questions of law and fact that arise before judgment.”
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2 We express no opinion as to whether, to obtain quicker appellate review, Safe Air could have raised

its claims in a separate action for declaratory judgment, nor asto whether the district court could have certified

its ruling as a final judgment under Rule 54(b).

4

Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 430 (1985). “Immediate review

of every trial court ruling, while permitting more prompt correction of erroneous

decisions, would impose unreasonable disruption, delay, and expense. It would

also undermine the ability of district judges to supervise litigation.” Id. Section

1291 does not allow “piecemeal appellate review of trial court decisions which do

notterminate the litigation.” Id. (quoting United States v. Hollywood Motor Car

Co., 458 U.S. 263, 265 (1982)).

Here, the district court’s ruling is not a “final decision.” We have

previously indicated, in an unpublished opinion, that as long as a district court

“retains its residual grant of jurisdiction further to enforce, administer, and

interpretthe settlement agreement, any action ittakes in this capacity lacks the

attribute of finality that is necessary to make the order immediately appealable.”

McMahon Foundation v. Amerada Hess Corp., 98 F. App’x 267, 271 (5th Cir.

2004). It is clear that the order here has not concluded the district court’s role

in enforcing the settlement agreement. Moreover, even if we were ever to allow

an appeal of a district court’s ruling on a motion to enforce or interpret a

settlement agreement while the district court retained jurisdiction, we would not

do so here, where there is an obvious risk of “piecemeal appellate review.”

Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 472 U.S. at 430 (quotation omitted). Safe Air alleges

thatthe technical auditor and special master have misinterpreted the settlement

agreement, and itis undisputed thatthe technical auditor has not completed his

review of Safe Air Technology’s products—thus, further issues relating to that

review may yet arise.2 Under these facts, the district court has more to do than
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3 SafeAir cites Lindsay v. Ford Motor Co., No. 94-10503, 1994 WL 684970 (5th Cir. Nov. 22, 1994)

(unpublished), for the proposition that a ruling on a motion to enforce a settlement agreement is final and

appealable. In Lindsay, however, the Court specifically noted that as a result of the district court’s order, the

district court had “nothing left to adjudicate.” 1994 WL 684970 at *2. As discussed above, that is not the case

here. Similarly, in Evans-Carmichael v. United States, also cited by Safe Air, the order at issue “effectively

resolved all of thematters between the parties, and wasthus appealable as a final decision.” 250 F. App’x 256,

261 (10th Cir. 2007). Finally, while Safe Air cites Kirkland v. Legion Insurance Co., there, too, “[t]here

was no other conceivable district court order with respect to the case’s merits once the court in effect

approved the settlement agreement by enforcing its terms.” 343 F.3d 1135, 1139–1140 (9th Cir.

2003).

5

merely execute the judgment, and the decision atissue here is notfinal.3 Catlin,

324 U.S. at 233. We therefore GRANT SSC’s motion and DISMISS the appeal

for want of jurisdiction. We do not reach the merits of the district court’s ruling.