If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

JOSHUA RAY CAVINS,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

UNPUBLISHED

May 23, 2024

v No. 363424

Oakland Circuit Court

BAT COMMERCIAL, LLC, BEST AMERICAN 

AMUSEMENT GROUP, INC., AIRTIME 

TRAMPOLINE & GAME PARK, A/T NOVI LAND 

DEVELOPMENT, LLC, AT OF WOODHAVEN,

LLC, AT OF NOVI, LLC, MICHIGAN AIRTIME I,

LLC, MICHIGAN AIRTIME II, LLC, MICHIGAN 

AIRTIME III, LLC, MICHIGAN AIRTIME 

HOLDINGS, LLC, SPRING LOADED II, LLC, and 

JAMES NAFSO,

LC No. 2021-187255-NO

Defendants,

and

MICHIGAN AIRTIME IV, LLC,

Defendant-Appellant. 

Before: FEENEY, P.J., and M. J. KELLY and RICK, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

In this action arising from a trampoline injury, defendant Michigan Airtime IV, LLC1

appeals by leave granted the trial court’s order denying its motion for summary disposition under 

MCR 2.116(C)(10). We reverse for the reasons stated in this opinion.

 

1 All other named defendants were previously dismissed from this action. Thus, Michigan Airtime 

is the only defendant participating in this appeal.
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I. BASIC FACTS

Plaintiff Joshua Ray Cavins sustained a cervical spinal injury while attempting to perform 

a flip on one of Michigan Airtime’s trampolines at its indoor trampoline park. Michigan Airtime 

had posted signs at its facility stating instructions and warnings for patrons using the trampolines, 

as required by the Michigan Trampoline Court Safety Act (TCSA), MCL 691.1731 et seq. One of 

the signs contained the verbatim text of MCL 691.1735, which prescribed the duties of 

trampoliners. This sign was posted above an ATM and paperwork kiosk near the facility’s 

entrance. Although only one sign listed all of the prescribed duties in MCL 691.1735, other signs 

were posted that stated the substance of various statutory duties for trampoliners. The other signs 

warned trampoliners to maintain control of their speed and course, to refrain from participating 

while under the influence of drugs or alcohol, to use the trampoline court within their own 

“limitations, training, and acquired skills,” and to avoid landing on their head or neck. In 

particular, signage in the “Distortions” area where Cavins’ accident occurred advised: “DO NOT 

jump if you have health limitations or injuries, are under the influence of alcohol or drugs, or are 

pregnant,” “DO NOT land on head or neck” and “ALWAYS remain in control,” and “Master the 

fundamentals of single trampoline jumping before moving on to more advanced maneuvers such 

as trampoline-to-trampoline jumping, wall trampoline jumping, and aerial type skills, which 

increase the risk of injury.” Michigan Airtime also used recorded video and audio recordings that 

repeatedly reminded trampoliners to exercise caution. A recorded audio statement reminded them 

to land on both feet and to not attempt a double flip. A safety video also advised trampoliners to 

follow posted rules, to jump with both feet, and to not attempt double flips.

Cavins and his family visited the trampoline court on April 6, 2018. Cavins authorized2

his wife to fill out the paperwork, including a release of liability. Cavins admitted that he had 

consumed “a couple of half-pints of vodka” between leaving work and arriving at the trampoline 

park. He also stated that after he arrived at the facility, he returned to his vehicle to drink still

more vodka while his wife completed the paperwork. Cavins denied seeing the sign listing the 

statutory duties of trampoliners. He testified that the sign was on the wall opposite the reception 

desk, in a location where patrons would not see it unless they turned around to look behind them.

After jumping for a few minutes in the “Distortions” area, Cavins tried to perform a flip. 

Cavins said that he attempted to perform just a single flip, but he inadvertently over-rotated and

landed on his head or neck on an adjacent trampoline. He sustained an injury to his cervical spine, 

leaving him quadriplegic. A blood draw after Cavins injury indicated that he had a blood alcohol 

content (BAC) of 0.21.

Cavins brought this action against defendant and other related entities. He asserted claims 

for “Negligence,” “Negligence in Product,” “Implied and Expressed Warranty of Fitness and 

Merchantability,” “Products Liability,” “Knowledge of Defective Product,” “Gross Negligence,” 

and “Wanton Misconduct.” Michigan Airtime moved for summary disposition on grounds that 

there were no genuine issues of material fact that it was liable under the TCSA or under any 

 

2 Although not raised by the parties, we question whether a husband may orally “authorize” his 

wife to sign a liability release on his behalf.
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common-law theory. Michigan Airtime argued that Cavins could not establish that it violated any 

provision of the TCSA, and that Cavins’ claims were barred by the defense of assumption of risk, 

the liability release signed by his wife on his behalf, and because Cavins was intoxicated and more 

than 50 percent at fault for the accident. Cavins filed his own motion for summary disposition to 

challenge the validity of the release.

The trial court concluded that Michigan Airtime failed to comply with the TCSA because 

it required signage listing the trampoliners’ duties in more than one location. The court concluded 

that there were issues of fact regarding whether Michigan Airtime’s statutory violation was the 

proximate cause of Cavins’ injury. The court also found that there were questions of fact as to

whether Cavins’ intoxication precluded his claim. Further, the court denied summary disposition 

on the basis of the release because it was uncertain whether a release could bar Michigan Airtime’s 

liability for noncompliance with a statutory duty. The trial court agreed that Cavins failed to 

establish a question of fact regarding whether Michigan Airtime’s equipment was defective on the 

day of the accident, or whether any defect contributed to the accident, but it declined to grant 

partial summary disposition and instead denied Michigan Airtime’s motion in full. This Court 

granted Michigan Airtime’s application for leave to appeal.3

II. SUMMARY DISPOSITION

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Michigan Airtime argues that the trial court erred by denying its motion for summary 

disposition. A trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition is reviewed de novo. 

West v Gen Motors Corp, 469 Mich 177, 183; 665 NW2d 468 (2003). Summary disposition under 

MCR 2.116(C)(10) is warranted “when the affidavits or other documentary evidence, viewed in 

the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 

material fact and the moving party is therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Lowrey v 

LMPS & LMPJ, Inc, 500 Mich 1, 5; 890 NW2d 344 (2016). The reviewing Court must “review 

the pleadings, affidavits, and other documentary evidence submitted, make all reasonable 

inferences therefrom, and determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, giving the 

nonmoving party the benefit of reasonable doubt.” Wheeler v Shelby Charter Twp, 265 Mich App 

657, 663; 697 NW2d 180 (2005). “If the moving party properly supports his or her motion, the 

burden shifts to the nonmoving party to establish that a genuine issue of material fact exists.” 

Redmond v Heller, 332 Mich App 415, 438; 957 NW2d 357 (2020). “A genuine issue of material 

fact exists when the record leaves open an issue upon which reasonable minds might differ.” 

Johnson v VanderKooi, 502 Mich 751, 761; 918 NW2d 785 (2018) (quotation marks, brackets, 

and citation omitted). “Where the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue rests on a 

nonmoving party, the nonmoving party may not rely on mere allegations or denials in pleadings, 

but must go beyond the pleadings to set forth specific facts showing that a genuine issue of material 

 

3 Cavins v BAT Commercial LLC, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered March 16, 

2023 (Docket No. 363424).
-4-

fact exists.” Lowrey, 500 Mich at 7. “If the opposing party fails to present documentary evidence 

establishing the existence of a material factual dispute, the motion is properly granted.” Id.

B. ANALYSIS

1. CAUSATION AND TCSA VIOLATION

Cavins’ complaint asserted seven counts, which were predicated on two factual bases for 

recovery relevant to Michigan Airtime: (1) that Michigan Airtime failed to post sufficient 

warnings regarding the hazards of trampolining; and (2) that Michigan Airtime’s equipment was 

faulty. The former of these theories asserted that Michigan Airtime failed to comply with the 

TCSA, MCL 691.1733, which imposes the following duties on the operator of a trampoline court:

An operator shall do all of the following:

(a) Post the duties of trampoliners and spectators as prescribed in this act 

and the duties, obligations, and liabilities of operators as prescribed in this act in 

conspicuous places.

(b) Comply with the safety standards specified in ASTM[4] F2970 - 13, 

“Standard Practice for Design, Manufacture, Installation, Operation, Maintenance, 

Inspection and Major Modification of Trampoline Courts” published in 2013 by the 

American society for testing and materials.

(c) Maintain the trampoline court according to the safety standards cited in 

subdivision (b).

(d) Maintain the stability and legibility of all required signs, symbols, and 

posted notices.

MCL 691.1734 further provides that an operator must:

(a) Deliver instructions concerning trampoline court rules to trampoliners 

before they participate in the trampoline court. The instructions may be delivered 

to trampoliners using video, audio, or computer-based programs, a prerecorded 

spiel, a written document, signage, verbal instruction, or other delivery method 

approved by the operator.

(b) Convey to trampoliners the substance of the trampoliner responsibility 

requirements under section 5.

The TCSA imposes the following duties on trampoliners:

While in a trampoline court, a trampoliner shall do all of the following:

 

4 American Society for Testing and Materials.
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(a) Maintain reasonable control of his or her speed and course at all times.

(b) Read and follow all posted signs and warnings.

(c) Avoid bodily contact with other trampoliners or spectators.

(d) Not run on trampolines, over pads, or on platforms.

(e) Refrain from acting in a manner that may cause injury to others.

(f) Not participate in a trampoline court when under the influence of drugs 

or alcohol.

(g) Properly use all trampoline court safety equipment provided.

(h) Not participate in a trampoline court if he or she has a preexisting 

medical condition, a bone condition, a circulatory condition, a heart or lung 

condition, a back or neck condition, high blood pressure, or a history of spine, 

musculoskeletal, or head injury, if he or she has had recent surgery, or if she may 

be pregnant.

(i) Remove inappropriate attire, including hard, sharp, or dangerous objects, 

such as buckles, pens, purses, or badges.

(j) Conform with or meet height, weight, or age restrictions imposed by the 

operator to use or participate in the trampoline court activity.

(k) Avoid crowding or overloading individual sections of the trampoline 

court.

(l) Use the trampoline court within his or her own limitations, training, and 

acquired skills.

(m) Avoid landing on the head or neck. Serious injury, paralysis, or death 

can occur from that activity. [MCL 691.1735.]

The TCSA also imposes an assumption of risk on participants for injuries inherent in 

trampoline use unless the operator breaches any of the duties imposed on an operator:

An individual who participates in trampolining accepts the danger that 

inheres in that activity insofar as the dangers are obvious and necessary. Those 

dangers include, but are not limited to, injuries that result from collisions with other 

trampoliners or other spectators, injuries that result from falls, injuries that result 

from landing on the trampoline, pad, or platform, and injuries that involve objects 

or artificial structures properly within the intended travel of the trampoliner that are 

not otherwise attributable to the operator's breach of his or her common law duties. 

[MCL 691.1736.]
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MCL 691.1737 provides that “[a] trampoliner, spectator, or operator who violates this act is liable 

in a civil action for damages for the portion of the loss or damage that results from the violation.” 

In sum, if Cavins can prove that Michigan Airtime violated a specific duty imposed on an operator 

under the act, Cavins may recover damages for injuries caused by that violation. See Rusnak v 

Walker, 273 Mich App 299, 304; 729 NW2d 542 (2006) (construing virtually identical language 

in the in the Ski Area Safety Act (SASA), MCL 408.321 et seq.).

The trial court concluded that Michigan Airtime failed to comply with the statute that 

requires an operator to “[p]ost the duties of trampoliners . . . in conspicuous places” because 

Michigan Airtime posted the duties in only one place. Michigan Airtime argues that, to the extent 

that it was not in compliance with the signage requirements of the TCSA, the trial court erred by 

ruling that there was a genuine issue of material fact whether this omission was the cause of 

Cavins’ injuries. We agree.

To prove causation, a plaintiff “must demonstrate that ‘but for’ the defendant’s negligence, 

the plaintiff’s injury would not have occurred.” Nathan v David Leader Mgt, Inc, 342 Mich App 

507, 522; 995 NW2d 567 (2022) (citation omitted). “Proof of proximate cause requires 

establishing two elements: (1) cause in fact and (2) legal cause or proximate cause.” Auto Owners 

Ins Co v Seils, 310 Mich App 132, 157; 871 NW2d 530 (2015). “Cause in fact requires that the 

harmful result would not have come about but for the defendant’s . . . conduct.” Haliw v Sterling 

Hts, 464 Mich 297, 310; 627 NW2d 581 (2001). “A plaintiff must adequately establish cause in 

fact in order for legal cause or ‘proximate cause’ to become a relevant issue.” Skinner v Square D 

Co, 445 Mich 153, 162-163; 516 NW2d 475 (1994). Once a plaintiff produces the factual support 

establishing a logical sequence of cause and effect, the plaintiff must also come forward with 

evidence supporting that the actual cause was proximate, meaning that it created a foreseeable risk 

of the injury the plaintiff suffered.” Nathan, 342 Mich App at 522 (citation omitted).

“Proximate cause is that which in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any 

new, independent cause, produces the injury, without which such injury would not have occurred.” 

Auto Owners Ins Co, 310 Mich App at 157. “[C]ausation theories that are mere possibilities or, at 

most, equally as probable as other theories do not justify denying defendant’s motion for summary 

judgment.” MEEMIC Ins Co v DTE Energy Co, 292 Mich App 278, 282; 807 NW2d 407 (2011) 

(quotation marks and citation omitted). “[P]roper analysis of a proximate cause question 

frequently will turn on accurately determining whether the facts in a case present a situation 

involving direct causality or intervening causality.” McMillian v Vliet, 422 Mich 570, 577; 374 

NW2d 679 (1985). “The fact that more than one cause operates to produce an injury is not in itself 

determinative. Two causes frequently operate concurrently so that both constitute a direct 

proximate cause of the resulting harm.” Id. “An intervening cause situation is distinguishable 

from concurrently operating causes in that it involves an intervening cause or act which begins 

operating ‘after the actor’s negligent act or omission has been committed.’ ” Id., quoting 2 

Restatement Torts, § 441, p 465. “Whether proximate cause or legal cause is established normally 

requires examining the foreseeability of the consequences and whether the defendant should be 

held legally responsible for those consequences.” Auto Owner, 310 Mich App at 157.

The evidence demonstrated that Michigan Airtime had one sign that fully listed all of the 

duties of trampoliners prescribed in MCL 691.1735, but had other signs that conveyed the same 

information, but without citing the TCSA or quoting its language verbatim. Assuming for 
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purposes of this issue that the TCSA required Michigan Airtime to post more than one sign listing 

all of the prescribed statutory duties, Cavins must still establish that any noncompliance with this 

signage requirement was a proximate cause of his injury. Cavins’ only evidence of causation is 

his affidavit, in which he averred that he would not have attempted the flip maneuver if he had 

seen a sign informing him “to use the trampoline court within [his] own training and acquired 

skills.”

We are not persuaded that a reasonable trier of fact could find that the absence of a second 

sign directly quoting and citing the TCSA was the proximate cause of Cavins’ injury. The fullycompliant TCSA sign and two other signs advised trampoliners to use the facility consistently with 

their level of skill. Moreover, signage in the Distortions section where Cavins was jumping 

advised trampoliners not to jump while under the influence of alcohol and to “[m]aster the 

fundamentals of single trampoline jumping before moving on to more advanced maneuvers such 

as trampoline-to-trampoline jumping, wall trampoline jumping, and aerial type skills, which 

increase the risk of injury.” The signs also instructed trampoliners to avoid landing on their head 

or neck, and to jump and land with both feet. Thus, regardless of the number of other signs posted 

by Michigan Airtime in its facility, signage in the Distortions section where Cavins was jumping 

advised him of the increased risk of injury from trampoline-to-trampoline jumping and advanced 

maneuvers involving aerial type skills, and that a jumper should master the fundamental skills of 

single trampoline jumping before attempting such maneuvers. Cavins was not deprived of any 

specialized information regarding the difficulties or hazards of attempting to invert one’s body in 

the air.

Cavins’ interpretation of the “Master the fundamentals” statement as “informing invitees” 

that they are “ready for ‘aerial type skills’ ” is unreasonable and untenable. In context, the phrase 

expresses a level of achievement a trampoliner should accomplish before attempting advanced 

maneuvers, but it does not otherwise express that a trampoliner who has mastered the fundamentals 

of single trampoline jumping is ready for advanced maneuvers. Moreover, the warning 

specifically advises trampoliners of the increased risk of injury from performing advanced 

maneuvers.

In conclusion, to the extent that Michigan Airtime was not in compliance with the TCSA 

by failing to post signs listing all of the prescribed statutory duties of trampoliners in multiple 

conspicuous places, because Cavins’ injury arose from his attempt to execute an advanced 

maneuver involving an aerial jump, and because signage in the Distortion section where he was 

jumping warned of the increased risk of injury from advanced maneuvers, including those 

involving aerial skills, and that such maneuvers should not be attempted before mastering single 

trampoline jumping, there is no genuine issue of material fact whether the alleged signage violation 

was a proximate cause of Cavins’ injury. The trial court, therefore, erred by denying Michigan 

Airtime summary disposition on this basis.

2. VOLUNTARY INTOXICATION

Michigan Airtime argues that it was also entitled to summary disposition on the basis of 

Cavins’ intoxication because Cavins failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact to overcome 

the presumption that he was intoxicated and that his intoxication rendered him 50 percent or more 

at fault for his accident. Under MCL 600.2955a and MCL 257.625a(7), as amended by 2017 PA 
-8-

153,5in order to successfully avail itself of the absolute defense of impairment under MCL 

600.2955a, Michigan Airtime “was required to establish that (1) [Cavins] had an impaired ability 

to function due to the influence of intoxicating liquor or a controlled substance, and (2) that as a 

result of that impaired ability, [Cavins] was fifty percent or more the cause of the accident or event 

that resulted in his [injury].” Harbour v Correctional Med Servs, Inc, 266 Mich App 452, 456; 

702 NW2d 671 (2005). If an intoxicated person has a blood alcohol level at the statutory threshold 

under MCL 257.625a(7), he or she “presumptively had an ‘impaired ability to function due to the 

influence of intoxicating liquor’ under MCL 600.2955a(2)(b).” Harbour, 266 Mich App at 457. 

“[T]he intoxication statute sought to place more responsibility on intoxicated plaintiffs who are 

equally or more to blame for their injuries, therefore marking a shift toward personal responsibility 

envisioned by overall tort reform.” Wysocki v Kivi, 248 Mich App 346, 358-359; 639 NW2d 572 

(2001).

In this case, Michigan Airtime presented evidence that Cavins consumed two half pints of 

vodka between leaving work and arriving at the trampoline park, consumed yet more vodka in the 

parking lot at the facility, and registered a BAC of 0.21 at the hospital. This evidence established 

a rebuttable presumption of impairment under MCL 600.2955a(2)(b). Cavins argues that his BAC 

when his blood was collected after the accident might not reflect his BAC at the time of the 

accident. He suggests the possibility that the accident occurred after the effect of his earlier alcohol 

consumption wore off, and before the effect of his consumption in the parking lot manifested itself. 

However, Cavins did not submit any expert opinion or other evidence supporting his hypothesis 

that a 0.21 BAC after his injury might not accurately reflect his BAC level at the time of his injury 

to rebut the presumption of impairment. Cavins also argues that he was not visibly impaired in 

the trampoline park, but the only evidence he offered in support of this allegation was a set of still 

photographs from video footage. He further speculates that a sober person with no gymnastics 

experience might make the mistake of over-rotating in a flip. However, Cavins did not 

demonstrate conduct or decision-making of a person who was acting reasonably or responsibly. 

On the contrary, he delegated to his wife the task of completing the release and paperwork while 

he went to his car to drink more vodka. He failed to observe warning signs in the section he was 

jumping. Additionally, he attempted to perform an advanced aerial stunt after only a few minutes 

of trampoline use, despite admittedly having no gymnastic experience or experience performing 

aerial maneuvers on a trampoline. He additionally ignored nearby signage that warned against 

performing such maneuvers before mastering single trampoline jumping and the increased risk of 

injury associated with such maneuvers. Thus, a reasonable trier of fact could not conclude that 

Cavins rebutted the presumption of impairment. Further, there is no genuine issue of material fact 

that Cavins was 50% or more at fault for his injuries given that it was Cavins’ decision to attempt 

a risky maneuver far outside his skill and experience level. Therefore, the trial court erred by 

denying Michigan Airtime’s motion for summary disposition on the basis of Cavins’ intoxication.

 

5 This version of the statute became effective November 8, 2017, and applies to Cavins’ 

intoxication on the date of the accident.
-9-

3. FAULTY EQUIPMENT

Michigan Airtime next argues that the trial court erred by not dismissing Cavins’ claims 

predicated on allegedly defective equipment in its trampoline park. The TCSA requires that 

trampoline court operators “[c]omply with the safety standards specified in ASTM F2970 – 13” 

and maintain the trampoline courts according to ASTM standards. MCL 691.1733(b) and (c). 

Additionally, Cavins alleged that defendants violated the Michigan Product Liability Act, MCL 

600.2945 et seq., “by failing to properly design, manufacture, construct, test, guard, maintain and 

inspect the product, i.e., the trampolines.” Cavins also alleged defective conditions in his various 

claims for negligence, breach of warranty, and product liability. We conclude that, based upon the 

pleadings, failure to maintain and failure to inspect are the only alleged omissions that reasonably 

apply to Michigan Airtime.

Regardless of Cavins’ theory of liability, he failed to establish a genuine issue of material 

fact as to whether there was a defect with Michigan Airtime’s equipment on the date of his injury 

or whether any defect proximately caused his injury. “A court may only consider substantively 

admissible evidence actually proffered by the parties when ruling on the motion.” Anderson v 

Transdev Servs, Inc, 341 Mich App 501, 507; 991 NW2d 230 (2022); MCR 2.116(G)(6). Evidence 

is relevant if “(a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without 

the evidence” and “(b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” MRE 401. Generally, 

relevant evidence is admissible unless provided otherwise by the United States Constitution, the 

Michigan Constitution, or the rules of evidence. MRE 402.

In support of his claim that Michigan Airtime failed to maintain the trampolines that caused 

his injury, Cavins cited maintenance and inspection requirements from the equipment’s 

manufacturer, but he did not present any evidence that Michigan Airtime failed to comply with 

these requirements on the date of his injury. Although Cavins also cited findings from an 

inspection of the equipment at the trampoline part, the record reflects that the inspection was 

conducted more than 2-1/2 years after he was injured. Such evidence was not probative of the 

equipment’s condition or the existence of any defect on the date of Cavins’ accident. Moreover, 

Cavins failed to explain how any of the defects allegedly discovered in 2020 might have caused 

him to land unsafely. Cavins opined that the trampolines were too small and that some were 

“springier” than others. However, he did not offer any evidence indicating whether these 

conditions failed to comply with ASTM standards or otherwise made the trampolines unreasonably 

dangerous. Indeed, these issues involve questions of technical or specialized knowledge that 

would require expert testimony under MRE 702. Cavins did not offer any expert testimony that 

the conditions he observed on the date of his injury rendered the trampolines unreasonably 

dangerous, let alone were a cause of his injury. Thus, Cavins failed to establish a genuine issue of 

material fact regarding his claims that defendant violated the TCSA by failing to properly maintain 

its trampoline court or that the trampolines otherwise were unreasonably dangerous.

III. CONCLUSION

In sum, Cavins failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact in support of any of his 

theories of liability against Michigan Airtime. Cavins cannot recover for any failure to comply 

with the signage requirements of the TCSA because he cannot establish a causal connection 

between the alleged signage violation and his injury and because there is no genuine issue of 
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material fact that he was 50 percent or more responsible for his accident because of his 

intoxication. Plaintiff also failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding his claim 

that Michigan Airtime’s equipment was defective or contributed to his injury. Accordingly, we 

reverse the trial court’s order denying summary disposition.6

Reversed. Michigan Airtime may tax costs as the prevailing party. MCR 7.219(A).

/s/ Kathleen A. Feeney

/s/ Michael J. Kelly

/s/ Michelle M. Rick

 

6 Given our resolution, we decline to consider whether Michigan Airtime was entitled to summary 

disposition because of the release of liability that Cavins’ wife signed.