COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Baker, Bray and Overton 

Argued at Norfolk, Virginia 

DALE CHESTER BOLESTA 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 2842-96-1 JUDGE NELSON T. OVERTON 

 FEBRUARY 3, 1998 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH 

Kenneth N. Whitehurst, Jr., Judge 

 Theresa B. Berry (Samford & Berry, P.C., on 

brief), for appellant. 

 (Richard Cullen, Attorney General; John K. 

Byrum, Assistant Attorney General, on brief), 

for appellee. 

 Dale Chester Bolesta (defendant) appeals the decision of the 

Circuit Court of the City of Virginia Beach revoking the 

suspension of his seven year sentence arising from his conviction 

for cocaine possession with intent to distribute. He claims that 

a March 1993 revocation and re-suspension of that sentence was 

void because it occurred outside of the statutory time limit set 

by Code § 19.2-306. Because we agree that the revocation and 

re-suspension violated the statute, we reverse. 

 The facts in this case are undisputed. On March 20, 1984 

defendant was found guilty of possession of cocaine with intent 

to distribute and was sentenced to seven years incarceration. 

The trial judge suspended the sentence for seven years on the 

condition that the defendant comply with his probation 

requirements and enter a drug counseling program. On March 24, 
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1993, nine years and four days later, the trial court conducted a 

hearing pursuant to Code § 19.2-306 in which it revoked and 

re-suspended the sentence for another seven years. On October 

21, 1996 the trial court again conducted a revocation hearing. 

At this third proceeding, the trial court revoked the suspended 

sentence and ordered that defendant serve the entire seven years. 

 "[W]hen the language of an enactment is free from ambiguity, 

resort to legislative history and extrinsic facts is not 

permitted because we take the words as written to determine their 

meaning." Brown v. Lukhard, 229 Va. 316, 321, 330 S.E.2d 84, 87 

(1985). Code § 19.2-306 states in pertinent part: 

 The court may . . . cause the defendant to be 

arrested and brought before the court at any 

time . . . within one year after the period 

of suspension fixed by the court . . . 

whereupon, in case the imposition of sentence 

has been suspended, the court may pronounce 

whatever sentence might have been originally 

imposed. 

Therefore, the outside time limit within which the court may 

recall a defendant is the period of suspension plus one year, 

which in this case was eight years. See Grant v. Commonwealth, 

223 Va. 680, 684, 282 S.E.2d 348, 350 (1981) (holding that if a 

period of probation was prescribed, the time for revocation 

extends until one year later). The March 24, 1993 revocation 

hearing was conducted over nine years after the original order 

was entered. Therefore, the order was void ab initio because the 

court lacked jurisdiction to enter it. See, e.g., Cofer v. 

Cofer, 205 Va. 834, 837, 140 S.E.2d 663, 665-66 (1965) ("It is 
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well settled that a void decree or order is a nullity and may on 

proper application be vacated at any time."). Without the March 

1993 suspended sentence, the trial court had no authority to 

order defendant incarcerated on October 21, 1996. 

 Because the trial court lacked jurisdiction, we reverse the 

imposition of his sentence. 

 Reversed.