J-S35001-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: S.W.C., JR., A 

MINOR

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: Y.C., NATURAL MOTHER

No. 3354 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Order Entered October 10, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000643-2012

 CP-51-DP-0055444-2010

IN THE INTEREST OF: J.D.C., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: Y.C., NATURAL MOTHER

No. 3355 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Order Entered October 10, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000223-2012

 CP-51-DP-0055445-2010

IN THE INTEREST OF: Y.L.C., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: Y.C., NATURAL MOTHER

No. 3356 EDA 2014
J-S35001-15

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Appeal from the Order Entered October 10, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000224-2012

 CP-51-DP-0055446-2010

IN THE INTEREST OF: K.M.C.C., A 

MINOR

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: Y.C., NATURAL MOTHER

No. 3357 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Order Entered October 10, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000225-2012

 CP-51-DP-0055447-2010

IN THE INTEREST OF: H.E.A.D.C., A 

MINOR

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: Y.C., NATURAL MOTHER

No. 3358 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Order Entered October 10, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000226-2012

 CP-51-DP-0055448-2010
J-S35001-15

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BEFORE: MUNDY, J., OLSON, J., and PLATT, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY MUNDY, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 15, 2015

Appellant, Y.C. (Mother), appeals from the October 10, 2014 decrees 

involuntarily terminating her parental rights to five of her minor children: 

S.W.C., Jr., a male, born in January 2000; J.D.C., a female, born in 

September 2001; Y.L.C., a female, born in July 2002; K.M.C.C., a male, 

born in April 2005; and H.E.A.D.C., a male, born in January 2010 

(collectively, the Children). After careful review, we affirm.1

This Court set forth the factual and procedural background of this case 

in our review of the decrees involuntarily terminating Father’s parental rights 

to the Children. See J.D.C., supra at 3-5. Therein, we stated, in relevant 

part, as follows.

Mother and Father’s three oldest children, Do.L.C. 

(female), Jaz.C[.] (female), and Du.C[.] (male), ages 

16, 17, and 18, are all under ... Department of 

Human Services’ (“DHS”) supervision, but are not 

subject to the current termination petitions....

DHS became involved with the Children in May 

2010 following numerous calls to DHS’ hotline that 

the Children were coming to school dirty and hungry, 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 By separate decrees the same date, the parental rights of the Children’s 

father, S.W.C., Sr., a/k/a S.C., were involuntarily terminated. Father 

appealed the decrees, which this Court affirmed by separate memorandum. 

See In re J.D.C., Y.L.C., K.M.C.C., H.E.A.D.C., and S.W.C., Jr., --- A.3d -

--, 3208, 3214-3217 EDA 2014 (Pa. Super. 2015) (unpublished 

memorandum). 
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that the Children’s home was cluttered and 

disorganized, that Do.L.C. was not attending school, 

and that Father had hit Y.L.C. At the time, the 

Children were living with Mother; Father was not a 

custodial caregiver. 

Dependency petitions were filed on May 24, 

2010, and granted on June 10, 2010. Initially, the 

Children remained in Mother’s custody. However, 

the Children were placed in foster care in November 

2010 ....

DHS filed petitions for goal change to adoption and 

involuntary termination of parental rights to the four 

youngest children, H.E.A.D.C., K.M.C.C., Y.L.C., and 

J.D.C. on May 24, 2012. On December 21, 2012, a 

petition was filed as to S.W.C., Jr.

...

Hearings were held on the termination petitions on 

April 22, 2014 and October 10, 2014.2 DHS 

presented five witnesses: Henry Bullock, the original 

DHS worker assigned to the case from April 2010 to 

November 2010; Bianca Lahara, the first case 

manager assigned to the case from November 2010 

to January 2014; Latoya Carr-Hermitt, case manager 

assigned to the case from December 2010 through 

the October 2014 termination hearing; Ms. Griffin3of 

First Home Care, current case manager; Antoinette 

Bogan, First Home Care Social Worker, assigned to 

the case in July 2014 to present....[2]

__________________________________________

2 A partial termination hearing took place in 2013 

before the Honorable E. Wright. Due to time 

constraints, the remainder of the hearing was 

continued. Before the remainder of the case could 

be heard, Judge Wright recused himself on 

September 25, 2013, following an ex parte

____________________________________________

2 Mother testified on her own behalf during the hearing. 
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communication of Mother’s former counsel to the 

court. The case was reassigned to the Honorable 

Allen Tereshko, who ordered the termination 

proceedings start again de novo.

3 Ms. Griffin’s first name was inaudible when she 

testified.

Id. (citations omitted; footnotes in original).

On October 10, 2014, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental 

rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). On 

November 10, 2014, Mother filed timely notices of appeal and concise 

statements of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule 

of Appellate Procedure 1925(a)(2)(i).3 This Court consolidated Mother’s 

appeals sua sponte. See Pa.R.A.P. 513. On December 10, 2014, the trial 

court issued an opinion pursuant to Rule 1925(a).

On appeal, Mother presents the following issues for our review.

1. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred in relying on 

inadmissible evidence to render its findings of fact[?]

2. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred and/or abused its 

discretion by terminating the parental rights of 

[M]other ... pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. [§] 2511(a)(1), 

(2), (5), (8), where the findings of fact were not 

supported by clear and convincing evidence[?]

____________________________________________

3 On November 21, 2014, Mother filed amended notices of appeal, which 

included separate captions reflecting the separate decrees that were entered 

on separate dockets. See TCPF Ltd. P’ship v. Skatell, 976 A.2d 571, 574 

n.2 (Pa. Super. 2009) (noting that taking one appeal from several orders is 

not acceptable practice and is discouraged, but declining to quash the appeal 

where appellant filed an amended appeal). 
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Mother’s Brief at 7.

We consider Mother’s issues mindful of our well-settled standard of 

review.

The standard of review in termination of parental 

rights cases requires appellate courts to accept the 

findings of fact and credibility determinations of the 

trial court if they are supported by the record. If the 

factual findings are supported, appellate courts 

review to determine if the trial court made an error 

of law or abused its discretion. A decision may be 

reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon 

demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, 

partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial court’s 

decision, however, should not be reversed merely

because the record would support a different result. 

We have previously emphasized our deference to 

trial courts that often have first-hand observations of 

the parties spanning multiple hearings.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks 

omitted). 

Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated 

analysis. 

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. 

The party seeking termination must prove by clear 

and convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct 

satisfies the statutory grounds for termination 

delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court 

determines that the parent’s conduct warrants 

termination of his or her parental rights does the 

court engage in the second part of the analysis 

pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the 

needs and welfare of the child under the standard of 

best interests of the child. One major aspect of the 

needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and 
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status of the emotional bond between parent and 

child, with close attention paid to the effect on the 

child of permanently severing any such bond.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted). The 

burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing evidence that 

the asserted statutory grounds for seeking the termination of parental rights 

are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009).

Instantly, we conclude the trial court properly terminated Mother’s 

parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide as 

follows.4

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard 

to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on 

any of the following grounds:

...

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, 

abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has 

caused the child to be without essential 

parental care, control or subsistence necessary 

for his physical or mental well-being and the 

conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal cannot or will not be 

remedied by the parent.

____________________________________________

4

In light of our disposition regarding Section 2511(a)(2), we need not 

consider Mother’s arguments with respect to Section 2511(a)(1), (5), and 

(8). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc) 

(stating that this Court need only agree with any one subsection of 23 

Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a), along with Section 2511(b), in order to affirm the 

termination of parental rights), appeal denied, 863 A.2d 1141 (Pa. 2004).
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...

(b) Other considerations.--The court in 

terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary 

consideration to the developmental, physical and 

emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights 

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the 

basis of environmental factors such as inadequate 

housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical 

care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. 

With respect to any petition filed pursuant to 

subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not 

consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the 

conditions described therein which are first initiated 

subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the 

petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (b).

To satisfy the requirements of Section 2511(a)(2), the moving party 

must produce clear and convincing evidence regarding the following 

elements.

(1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal; (2) such incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal caused the child to be without 

essential parental care, control or subsistence

necessary for his physical or mental well-being; and 

(3) the causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal cannot or will not be remedied.

In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation 

omitted). “The grounds for termination [of parental rights under Section 

2511(a)(2),] due to parental incapacity that cannot be remedied, are not 

limited to affirmative misconduct; to the contrary those grounds may include 

acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental duties.” In re 

A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 2002). 
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With respect to Section 2511(b), the requisite analysis is as follows.

Subsection 2511(b) focuses on whether termination 

of parental rights would best serve the 

developmental, physical, and emotional needs and 

welfare of the child. In In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 

1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005), this Court stated, 

“Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and 

stability are involved in the inquiry into the needs 

and welfare of the child.” In addition, we instructed 

that the trial court must also discern the nature and 

status of the parent-child bond, with utmost 

attention to the effect on the child of permanently 

severing that bond. Id. However, in cases where 

there is no evidence of a bond between a parent and 

child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists. 

In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-63 (Pa. Super. 

2008). Accordingly, the extent of the bond-effect 

analysis necessarily depends on the circumstances of 

the particular case. Id. at 63.

In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. Super. 2010).

In this case, the trial court made the following factual findings.

Mother’s FSP [Family Service Plan] Objectives 

were established on May 25, 2010. Mother was 

ordered to comply with housing, mental health 

treatment; visitation, bonding evaluation; signing for 

mental health therapists; and attending medical 

appointments. The record shows that Mother has 

minimally complied with her FSP Objectives.

Mother has failed to comply with her housing 

FSP Objective. When asked for her current 

residence, Mother refused to provide the information 

and directed DHS to send all correspondence to her 

mother’s address. She has also failed to avail herself 

to any of the housing programs available through 

ARC.

Mother has also failed her bonding evaluation 

FSP Objective. Mother was referred to ATA to 

complete a bonding evaluation, but missed the first 
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appointment and never rescheduled. Moreover, 

Mother was previously ordered at multiple court 

hearings to reschedule the bonding evaluation, but 

did not comply.

Mother has failed to comply with her mental 

health FSP Objective. Mother was ordered to comply 

with DHS mental health but had never completed the 

goal. She was referred to services at ARC but 

stopped attending because she didn’t want to go on 

Saturdays. Even though Mother provided notice of 

attending treatments in March and April of 2014, she 

did not attend any treatment between 2011 and 

March of 2014.

Additionally, Mother has minimally complied 

with her visitation FSP Objective. The Case Manager 

[Bianca Lahara] testified that there were concerns 

about Mother’s attendance at the visits.

...

Further, Mother has minimally complied with 

the FSP Objective requiring her to consent to the 

[C]hildren’s medical treatment. [Lahara] testified 

that she ran into issues when contacting Mother for 

consent. Mother never picked up the phone when 

someone from the agency called and would rarely 

return[] calls. In addition, [Lahara] testified that in 

one instance Mother did not want to sign a document 

for Y.L.C.’s psychiatrist appointments because of 

scheduling issues resulting in a lapse of time for the 

child’s appointments. The DHS Worker [Latoya CarrHermitt] also testified,

One time [Y.L.C.] needed to have services 

signed for TSS and DHS services, for emotional 

support. That was scheduled through the 

school psychiatrist on several occasions. 

[Mother] was supposed to come, she didn’t 

show up. I would offer to bring her, provide 

tokens, she never came. On several occasions 

K.M.C.C. was hospitalized after being 302’d. 

Mom was requested to come to the hospital for 
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intake, she never did, so DHS had to get a 

consent to treat. So he could be released from 

the hospital.

Trial Court Opinion, 12/10/14, at 12-14 (internal citations omitted). 

Turning to the merits of Mother’s appeal, she first asserts that the trial 

court erred in relying on inadmissible evidence in terminating her parental 

rights. In addition, Mother asserts that the trial court’s “opinion cites 

liberally from evidence not introduced at the termination hearing, and as 

such its findings are not supported by the record.” Mother’s Brief at 14. 

Significantly, Mother does not support her argument with legal 

discussion and analysis. In fact, Mother does not specify which evidence the 

court relied on that was allegedly either inadmissible or not introduced at the 

hearing. As such, we conclude that Mother’s first issue is waived. See

Giant Food Stores, LLC v. THF Silver Spring Dev., L.P., 959 A.2d 438, 

444 (Pa. Super. 2008) (stating that, “[t]he Rules of Appellate Procedure 

state unequivocally that each question an appellant raises is to be supported 

by discussion and analysis of pertinent authority. Failure to do so 

constitutes waiver of the claim[]”) (citations and quotation marks omitted), 

appeal denied, 972 A.2d 522 (Pa. 2009); accord Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). Even if 

Mother’s issue was not waived, we would conclude that her issue is without 

merit because the testimonial evidence supports the trial court’s factual 

findings.
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In her second issue, Mother argues that the termination of her 

parental rights under Section 2511(a)(2) is not warranted, as follows. 

[T]he evidence presented at trial showed that 

[M]other has remedied the conditions that caused 

the [C]hildren to come into foster care and, but for 

housing, is now able to care for her [C]hildren. 

Additionally, DHS did not provide [M]other with 

reasonable efforts to reunify her with her [C]hildren.

Mother’s Brief at 11. 

The foregoing factual findings by the trial court belie Mother’s 

assertion that she is now able to care for the Children. Further, Mother’s 

argument acknowledges that she has not found suitable housing. Indeed, 

Mother testified on October 10, 2014, the final day of the hearing, that she 

has been living with her aunt “since August 8th .... And I’m getting ready to 

move on my own after I leave here today to put a down payment on a 

place.” N.T., 10/10/14, at 67. Mother testified on cross-examination by 

counsel for DHS that the home she plans to move to has only one bedroom. 

Id. at 71. Therefore, more than four years after the Children were placed in 

the custody of DHS, Mother remains unable to provide for their physical and 

mental well-being. 

In addition, to the extent Mother asserts that her conduct does not 

warrant termination pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2) because DHS failed to 

provide her with “reasonable efforts to reunify her with her Children,” we 

disagree. Mother’s Brief at 11. In In re D.C.D., 105 A.3d 662 (Pa. 2014), 

our Supreme Court held that neither Section 2511(a)(2) nor Section 2511(b) 
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“requires a court to consider the reasonable efforts provided to a parent 

prior to termination of parental rights.” Id. at 672. Therefore, Mother’s 

assertion is without merit.

Further, Mother argues as follows.

[P]ast incapacity alone is not [a] sufficient basis for 

involuntary termination, there must be evidence of a 

parent[’]s present incapacity. [Mother]’s unrefuted 

testimony was that she received treatment for her 

anxiety over ‘probably a total of a year’ of the two 

years prior to the filing of the termination petition. 

Furthermore, there has been no showing that her 

‘anxiety’ was ever so serious as to incapacitate her 

as a parent.

Mother’s Brief at 15-16 (citations omitted).5 

Because the record supports the trial court’s credibility findings in 

favor of the DHS caseworkers that Mother did not comply with her mental 

health FSP objective, we will not disturb the decrees. Moreover, we reject 

Mother’s argument that the trial court terminated her parental rights on the 

basis of her past incapacity, or, in the alternative, that she was ever 

incapacitated from performing her parental duties. To the contrary, the 

court terminated Mother’s parental rights under Section 2511(a)(2) due to 

her neglect and/or refusal to comply with her FSP objectives related to 

obtaining housing, a bonding evaluation, mental health treatment, and 

providing consents for the Children’s medical treatment. We discern no 

____________________________________________

5 The record reveals that Mother was diagnosed with an anxiety disorder in 

2011. See Trial Court Opinion, 12/10/14, at 8.
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abuse of discretion by the trial court. Indeed, Mother’s repeated neglect or 

refusal to comply with her FSP objectives has caused the Children to be 

without essential parental care, control, or subsistence for their physical or 

mental well-being since 2010. Further, the causes of Mother’s neglect or 

refusal cannot or will not be remedied. Therefore, Mother’s issues on appeal 

fail.

Although Mother does not present an issue on appeal with respect to 

Section 2511(b), in light of the requisite bifurcated analysis, we consider it.

See In re C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1009 (Pa. Super. 2008) (addressing 

Section 2511(b) although “Mother does not expressly challenge the trial 

court’s determination that termination would best serve C.L.G.”). Our 

Supreme Court has explained that, “the mere existence of a bond or 

attachment of a child to a parent will not necessarily result in the denial of a 

termination petition.” In re T.S.M., supra. The Court further stated that, 

“[c]ommon sense dictates that courts considering termination must also 

consider whether the children are in a pre-adoptive home and whether they 

have a bond with their foster parents.” Id. at 268 (citation omitted). 

In considering the affection a child may have for his or her natural 

parents, this Court has stated the following.

[C]oncluding a child has a beneficial bond with a 

parent simply because the child harbors affection for 

the parent is not only dangerous, it is logically 

unsound. If a child’s feelings were the dispositive 

factor in the bonding analysis, the analysis would be 

reduced to an exercise in semantics as it is the rare 
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child who, after being subject to neglect and abuse, 

is able to sift through the emotional wreckage and 

completely disavow a parent. .... Nor are we of the 

opinion that the biological connection between [the 

parent] and the children is sufficient in of itself, or 

when considered in connection with a child’s feeling 

toward a parent, to establish a de facto beneficial 

bond exists. The psychological aspect of parenthood 

is more important in terms of the development of the 

child and its mental and emotional health than the 

coincidence of biological or natural parenthood.

In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 535 (Pa. Super. 2008) (internal citations 

and quotation marks omitted). 

[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court 

can equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, 

and should also consider the intangibles, such as the 

love, comfort, security, and stability the child might 

have with the foster parent. Additionally, this Court 

stated that the trial court should consider the 

importance of continuity of relationships and whether 

any existing parent-child bond can be severed 

without detrimental effects on the child.

In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2015), quoting

In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011).

Instantly, the trial court concluded that “because there was not a 

strong bond between Mother and her [C]hildren, terminating Mother’s 

parental rights would not cause the [C]hildren irreparable harm and would 

be in the best interest of the [C]hildren pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b).” 

Trial Court Opinion, 12/10/14, at 14. We discern no abuse of discretion by 

the trial court. 
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The trial court based its decision on the testimony of DHS workers, 

Carr-Hermitt and Griffin “concerning the lack of relationship between Mother 

and her children in contrast to the bond that exists between [the Children] 

and their respective foster parents.” Id. at 14; see also id. at 15 (citing 

relevant testimonial evidence). Further, the trial court found credible the 

testimony of Lahara and Griffin that, “[the Children] would not suffer 

irreparable harm if Mother’s parental rights were terminated[.]” Id. at 15. 

Upon careful review, the testimony of Carr-Hermitt, Griffin, and Lahara 

supports the trial court’s conclusion that terminating Mother’s parental rights 

would best serve the developmental, physical, and emotional needs and 

welfare of the Children. We further note that the Children’s right to a 

permanent and safe environment has been delayed far too long in this case. 

See In re B.,N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 856 (Pa. Super. 2004) (stating “a 

parent’s basic constitutional right to the custody and rearing of his child is 

converted, upon the failure to fulfill his or her parental duties, to the child’s 

right to have proper parenting and fulfillment of his or her potential in a 

permanent, healthy, safe environment”), appeal denied, 872 A.2d 1200 (Pa. 

2005). 

Based on the foregoing, we affirm the October 10, 2014 decrees 

involuntarily terminating Mother’s parental rights to the Children pursuant to 

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2) and (b). 

Decrees affirmed. 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/15/2015