J-S70020-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: J.R.M., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: C.P.

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 782 MDA 2017

Appeal from the Decree Entered April 12, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County Orphans’ Court at No(s): 

A-8513

IN THE INTEREST OF: A.R.P., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: C.P., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 783 MDA 2017

Appeal from the Decree Entered April 12, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County Orphans’ Court at No(s): 

A-8514

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., SHOGAN, J., and OTT, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED DECEMBER 28, 2017

C.P. (“Mother”) appeals from the April 12, 2017 decrees in the Court of 

Common Pleas of Luzerne County that terminated her parental rights

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2504, with respect to her son, J.R.M., born in 

October of 2013, and daughter, A.R.P., born in March of 2007 (collectively, 
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“the Children”).1 N.T., 4/12/17, at 10. After careful review, we vacate both 

decrees.

We summarize the relevant facts and procedural history as follows: 

The Children were placed in the custody of Luzerne County Children and 

Youth Services (“CYS”) on March 25, 2015, due to Mother’s and Father’s 

drug and alcohol use and concerns regarding housing. N.T., 4/12/17, at 10; 

Petition for Termination of Parental Rights, 11/28/16, at ¶ 10. CYS placed 

the Children in kinship foster care with A.R. (“Foster Mother”), their 

maternal aunt. N.T., 4/12/17, at 84. At all times up to and including the 

date of the termination hearing on April 12, 2017, Mother visited with the 

Children “on a daily basis.” Id. at 28. On November 28, 2016, CYS filed 

petitions for the involuntary termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental 

rights. By order dated November 17, 2016, and filed November 28, 2016, 

the trial court appointed Richard Wojtowicz, Esquire, to represent Mother.

On December 13, 2016, Mother executed the following documents with 

respect to the Children at the CYS office in the presence of two CYS 

employees: (1) consent to adoption; (2) voluntary relinquishment of 

parental rights colloquy (“colloquy”); and (3) acknowledgment of voluntary 

relinquishment procedure (“acknowledgment”). Court-appointed counsel 

____________________________________________

1 On April 12, 2017, the orphans’ court involuntarily terminated the parental 

rights of the Children’s father, M.M. (“Father”). Father did not file a notice of 

appeal nor is he a party to this appeal.
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was not present, nor is there any indication in the record that he had notice 

of the meeting. N.T., 4/12/17, at 17. In the acknowledgment, Mother 

agreed not to proceed with the subsequent voluntary relinquishment 

procedure, which would require her to appear for a voluntary relinquishment 

hearing. Instead, she acquiesced that CYS would request the court to 

confirm her consent to the adoption of the Children. N.T., 4/12/17, at 16. 

On March 13, 2017, CYS filed petitions to confirm Mother’s consent to 

adoption with respect to the Children. Id. at 11.

The orphans’ court held a hearing on the aforesaid petitions on April 

12, 2017, during which CYS presented the testimony of its casework 

supervisor, Allison Miller, who was assigned as the Children’s caseworker in 

January, 2016. N.T., 4/12/17, at 8–9. At this hearing, Mother was 

represented by new court-appointed counsel, Robert L. Kobilinski, Esquire, 

who succeeded Mr. Wojtowicz.2 As noted, Mr. Wojtowicz was not present 

____________________________________________

2

It is not clear from the certified record when the orphans’ court appointed 

Mr. Kobilinski to represent Mother in the termination matter. CYS counsel 

stated at the confirmation-of-consent hearing on April 12, 2017, that Mr. 

Kobilinski had “mistakenly” been appointed for Father” and requested “an 

amended order correcting it.” N.T., 4/12/17, at 7–8. Thus, Mr. Kobilinski 

was erroneously appointed for Father, not Mother, at some unknown date, 

and the appointment order was not corrected until April 12, 2017. During 

the April 12, 2017 hearing, Mr. Kobilinski told the court he was appointed 

“maybe 30 days ago,” that is, in mid-March, 2017. N.T., 4/12/17, at 33. 

The record also reveals that Mother did not learn of the appointment of Mr. 

Kobilinski until March 20, 2017, at the earliest, and never spoke to Mr. 

Kobilinski until roughly March 28, 2017, two weeks before the instant 

hearing. N.T., 4/12/17, at 51, 52–53.
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when Mother executed the documents on December 13, 2016. N.T., 

4/12/17, at 31-32. Further, Mr. Wojtowicz was on vacation at an 

unspecified time in December of 2016, and he subsequently retired. Id. at 

33. At the April 12, 2017 hearing, Mr. Kobilinski asserted that Mother was 

effectively without legal counsel from December of 2016 until new counsel’s

appointment. Id. at 33, 39. For this reason, Mr. Kobilinski argued during 

the hearing that the documents executed by Mother were not valid. Id. at 

31-32, 38-39. Mother testified on her own behalf to this effect.

By decrees dated April 12, 2017, the orphans’ court granted the 

petitions to confirm Mother’s consent to the adoption of the Children and 

terminated her parental rights. On April 13, 2017, the court amended the 

decree with respect to J.R.M. for the purpose of correcting his middle name. 

Mother timely filed notices of appeal and concise statements of errors 

complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b), which 

this Court consolidated sua sponte. The orphans’ court filed its Rule 1925(a) 

opinion on June 8, 2017.

On appeal, Mother presents the following issues for our review:

Whether the [orphans’] [c]ourt erred in terminating the parental 

rights of [the Children], as testimony offered did not establish by 

clear and convincing evidence the requirements of the Adoption 

Act of 1980, October 15, P.L. 934, No. 163, 1, 23 [Pa.]C.S.A. 

Section 2504[?]

Whether the [orphans’] [c]ourt abused its discretion/erred in 

terminating parental rights of [Mother], as she had not been 

given effective assistance of counsel at the time she signed a 
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voluntary confirmation of consent to adoption of her minor 

children[?]

Whether the [orphans’] [c]ourt committed an error of law in the 

[c]ourt’s decision to terminate [Mother’s] parental rights by 

improperly accepting [CYS’s] petition to confirm adoption due to 

the fact that [Mother] produced this document without the 

effective assistance of counsel[?]

Mother’s Brief at 3-4.

Mother’s issues involve our interpretation and application of the 

Adoption Act (“ the Act”), 23 Pa.C.S. § 2101-2938. This Court has explained 

this process as follows:

“The interpretation and application of a statute is a 

question of law that compels plenary review to determine 

whether the court committed an error of law.” Wilson v. 

Transport Ins. Co., 889 A.2d 563, 570 (Pa. Super. 2005). “As 

with all questions of law, the appellate standard of review is de 

novo and the appellate scope of review is plenary.” In re 

Wilson, 879 A.2d 199, 214 (Pa. Super. 2005) (en banc). 

Further, 

we are constrained by the rules of statutory 

interpretation, particularly as found in the Statutory 

Construction Act. 1 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 1501-1991. The goal in 

interpreting any statute is to ascertain and effectuate the 

intention of the General Assembly. Our Supreme Court 

has stated that the plain language of a statute is in 

general the best indication of the legislative intent that 

gave rise to the statute. When the language is clear, 

explicit, and free from any ambiguity, we discern intent 

from the language alone, and not from the arguments 

based on legislative history or “spirit” of the statute. We 

must construe words and phrases in the statute according 

to their common and approved usage. We also must 

construe a statute in such a way as to give effect to all its 

provisions, if possible, thereby avoiding the need to label 

any provision as mere surplusage.
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Cimino v. Valley Family Medicine, 912 A.2d 851, 853 (Pa. 

Super. 2006) (quoting Weiner v. Fisher, 871 A.2d 1283, 1285-

86 (Pa. Super. 2005)). See also 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(b). Under 

Section 1921(c), the court resorts to considerations of “purpose” 

and “object” of the legislature when the words of a statute are 

not explicit. Sternlicht v. Sternlicht, 583 Pa. 149, 876 A.2d 

904, 909 (2005) (referring to consideration of matters such as: 

(1) occasion and necessity for statute; (2) circumstances under 

which it was enacted; (3) mischief to be remedied; (4) object to 

be attained; (5) former law, if any, including other statutes upon 

same or similar subjects; (6) consequences of particular 

interpretation; (7) contemporaneous legislative history; (8) 

legislative and administrative interpretations of such statute). 

Finally, 

It is presumed that the legislature did not intend an 

absurd or unreasonable result. In this regard, we . . . are 

permitted to examine the practical consequences of a 

particular interpretation.

Commonwealth v. Diakatos, 708 A.2d 510, 512 (Pa. Super. 

1998).

In re Adoption of J.A.S., 939 A.2d 403, 405-406 (Pa. Super. 2007).

The pertinent provisions of the Act are as follows, in relevant part:

§ 2504. Alternative procedure for relinquishment

(a) Petition to confirm consent to adoption.—If the parent 

or parents of the child have executed consents to an 

adoption, upon petition by the intermediary or, where 

there is no intermediary, by the adoptive parent, the court 

shall hold a hearing for the purpose of confirming a 

consent to an adoption upon expiration of the time periods 

under section 2711 (relating to consents necessary to 

adoption). The original consent or consents to the adoption 

shall be attached to the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2504(a).

§ 2711. Consents necessary to adoption
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(a) General rule.—Except as otherwise provided in this part, 

consent to an adoption shall be required of the following:

* * *

(3) The parents or surviving parent of an adoptee who has 

not reached the age of 18 years.

* * *

(c) Validity of consent.—No consent shall be valid if it was 

executed prior to or within 72 hours after the birth of the 

child. . . . A consent to an adoption may only be revoked as set 

forth in this subsection. The revocation of a consent shall be in 

writing and shall be served upon the agency or adult to whom 

the child was relinquished. The following apply:

(1) Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (3):

* * *

(ii) For a consent to an adoption executed by a birth 

mother, the consent is irrevocable more than 30 

days after the execution of the consent.

(2) An individual may not waive the revocation period 

under paragraph (1).

(3) Notwithstanding paragraph (1), the following apply:

(i) An individual who executed a consent to an 

adoption may challenge the validity of the consent only 

by filing a petition alleging fraud or duress within the 

earlier of the following time frames:

(A) Sixty days after the birth of the child or 

the execution of the consent, whichever occurs 

later.

(B) Thirty days after the entry of the adoption 

decree.
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(ii) A consent to an adoption may be invalidated only if 

the alleged fraud or duress under subparagraph (i) is 

proven by:

(A) a preponderance of the evidence in the 

case of consent by a person 21 years of age or 

younger; or

(B) clear and convincing evidence in all other 

cases.

(d) Contents of consent.—

(1) The consent of a parent of an adoptee under 18 years 

of age shall set forth the name, age and marital status of 

the parent, the relationship of the consenter to the child, 

the name of the other parent or parents of the child and 

the following:

I hereby voluntarily and unconditionally consent to 

the adoption of the above named child.

I understand that by signing this consent I indicate 

my intent to permanently give up all rights to this 

child.

I understand such child will be placed for adoption.

I understand I may revoke this consent to 

permanently give up all rights to this child by placing 

the revocation in writing and serving it upon the 

agency or adult to whom the child was relinquished.

* * *

If I am the birth mother of the child, I understand 

that this consent to an adoption is irrevocable unless 

I revoke it within 30 days after executing it by 

delivering a written revocation to (insert the name 

and address of the agency coordinating the 

adoption) or (insert the name and address of an 

attorney who represents the individual relinquishing 

parental rights or prospective adoptive parent of the 
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child) or (insert the court of the county in which the 

voluntary relinquishment form was or will be filed).

I have read and understand the above and I am 

signing it as a free and voluntary act.

(2) The consent shall include the date and place of its 

execution and names and addresses and signatures of at 

least two persons who witnessed its execution and their 

relationship to the consenter.

23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2504, 2711.

With these provisions in mind, we turn to the merits of Mother’s issues 

on appeal.3 Initially, we acknowledge that Mother did not revoke her 

consents to adoption in writing within thirty days or at any time after 

execution of the consents. 23 Pa.C.S. § 2711(c)(1)(ii). In addition, Mother 

did not file petitions alleging fraud or duress within sixty days or at any time 

after execution of the consents. 23 Pa.C.S. § 2711(c)(3)(i)(A). Rather, 

____________________________________________

3 We are compelled to note that Mother’s brief does not comply with 

Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) in that it does not divide the argument section into as 

many parts as there are questions to be argued. Indeed, Mother does not 

divide the argument into any separate parts nor does she distinctively 

display any particular point. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (“The argument shall be 

divided into as many parts as there are questions to be argued; and shall 

have at the head of each part—in distinctive type or in type distinctively 

displayed—the particular point treated therein, followed by such discussion 

and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent”). Pa.R.A.P. 2101 

underscores the seriousness with which this Court takes deviations from 

procedural rules, as we may quash or dismiss an appeal if an appellate brief 

has substantial defects. See Pa.R.A.P. 2101 (Conformance with 

Requirements). Here, we address Mother’s arguments insofar as we are 

able to discern them, noting that Mother’s first issue is wholly abandoned in 

her brief.
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Mother has asserted that she was without the effective representation of 

counsel throughout the process.

We summarize Mother’s arguments. Mother argues that she “had no 

legal representation” within thirty to sixty days after executing the consents 

to adoption. Mother’s Brief at 15. Mother argues she was unable to discuss 

the possibility of signing a revocation of consent with her counsel because 

when she contacted Mr. Wojtowicz a few days later with “second-thoughts,”

he told her he was going on vacation and advised her to call him again after 

he returned. Id. at 14, 18. Mother maintains that he never took her calls 

upon his return, and then he retired. In addition, Mother contends that CYS 

never advised her that she had the right to have counsel present when she 

signed the documents. Id. at 20.

Mother therefore advances a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 

during the applicable thirty or sixty-day statutory period. Mother argues as 

follows:

[Mother], as an indigent party, indeed was [not] afforded 

the protection of legal counsel under the law. The 

ineffectiveness of this counsel by not contacting her to discuss 

the legal significance of a voluntary relinquishment of parental 

rights led [Mother] to, in fact, sign a voluntary relinquishment 

and . . . consent to adoption, which were ultimately the cause of 

the decree[s] of termination.

Mother’s Brief at 17–18.

This Court has explained an indigent person’s right to counsel in a 

termination of parental rights case as follows:
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The unique nature of parental termination cases has long been 

recognized by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Thus, In Re: 

Adoption of R.I., 312 A.2d 601 (Pa. 1973), the Supreme Court 

held that an indigent parent in a termination of parental rights 

case has a constitutional right to counsel. The right to counsel 

in parental termination cases is the right to effective 

assistance of counsel even though the case is civil in 

nature. In Re: Adoption of T.M.F., 573 A.2d 1035 (Pa. 

Super. 1990) (en banc); see also In the Interest of S.W., 781 

A.2d 1247 (Pa. Super. 2001). However, this right is more 

limited than that in criminal cases, as claims of ineffective 

assistance of counsel must be raised on direct appeal. We then 

review the record as a whole to determine whether or not the 

parties received a “fundamentally fair” hearing; a finding that 

counsel was ineffective is made only if the parent demonstrates 

that counsel’s ineffectiveness was “the cause of the decree of 

termination.” T.M.F., 573 A.2d at 1044; see also S.W., 781 

A.2d at 1249.

In the Interest of J.T., 983 A.2d 773, 774–775 (Pa. Super. 2009)

(emphasis added).

In its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, the orphans’ court found that it must 

first review the timeliness of Mother’s request to revoke or challenge the 

validity of her consents to adoption prior to addressing whether her consents 

were valid. In so doing, the orphans’ court rejected Mother’s ineffectiveassistance-of-counsel claims. It concluded that Mother failed to revoke her 

consent to adoption within thirty days from the date of her consent to 

adoption and that her consent was knowing, voluntary, and deliberate 

“regardless of her claim that she did not receive effective assistance of 

counsel.” Orphans’ Court Opinion, 6/8/17, at 5. We conclude the record 

compels otherwise.
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Allison Miller testified that when she served Mother with the 

involuntary termination of parental rights petition on November 30, 2016, 

Mother indicated that she had been speaking to Foster Mother “about the 

possibility of signing over guardianship” to her. N.T., 4/12/17, at 12, 21. 

Ms. Miller stated that she proceeded to advise Mother “that there was [sic] 

different ways if she wished to do a voluntary. She would be able to either 

do that by coming into the office to sign the paperwork or by coming into 

the hearing and verbalizing her desire to voluntarily relinquish her parental 

rights.” Id. Ms. Miller subsequently scheduled an appointment for the 

confirmation of consents for December 13, 2016. Id. at 12–13.

The December 13, 2016 appointment occurred at CYS offices. N.T., 

4/12/17, at 15. Ms. Miller explained that Mother had questions about the 

process and “especially in regards to the colloquy, which we had her sign 

prior to the consent.” Id. at 14. Ms. Miller continued to extend advice to 

Mother and explained:

that she already had signed the consent . . . and that was her 

intention for the minor children to be adopted. I also 

explained . . . that by signing this document, if she chose not to 

attend the voluntary relinquishment hearing . . . the Agency 

would be able to testify on her behalf. But that if she did attend, 

she may have to take the stand and indicate to the [c]ourt why 

she would wish to relinquish her parental rights.

Id. at 16. Regarding the colloquy signed prior to the consents, CYS counsel 

asked Ms. Miller if Mother requested the presence of counsel, and Mother 

replied that he “just was not really helping her in this matter.” Id. at 17.
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Ms. Miller further acknowledged that Mother “was very tearful” and 

stopped numerous times during Ms. Miller’s explanation of the colloquy. 

N.T., 4/12/17, at 18. Ms. Miller admitted that “[i]t was very hard for 

[Mother] to sign these documents. I know that she loves her children very, 

very much. Her children love her as well.” Id. at 24. Ms. Miller noted:

Specifically on the question number 15 of the colloquy, when we 

read to her, do you understand that if you voluntarily relinquish 

your parental rights[,] your rights to [the Children] are forever 

ended and your child[ren] would be placed for adoption, she did 

ask us on that particular question, so you mean to tell me if I get 

my life back in order in five years, I wouldn’t be able to get my 

children back . . .[?]

Id. at 18. Ms. Miller discerned that Mother mistakenly “thought that by 

signing the documents it would be a matter of transferring guardianship of 

the two children over to [Foster Mother],” and she described Mother as 

“appear[ing] to be in shock.” Id. at 20, 25. Ms. Miller acknowledged that 

Foster Mother subsequently told Ms. Miller on December 29, 2016, that 

Mother “was thinking about revoking her consent.” Id. at 19, 26.

Mother told the orphans’ court she “feel[s] like I’m a 5th grader 

standing up in court. I hear the laws and what’s being presented to me, but 

I’m not sure I understood, but I tried to understand.” N.T., 4/12/17, at 44. 

Mother testified that Attorney Wojtowicz never gave her any advice, and 

when she brought up any concerns, he “put [her] down and [told her] that 

[she] was floating on a cloud.” Id. at 53. She did not speak with counsel 

before signing the consents on December 13, 2016, and when she contacted 
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him a few days later, counsel told Mother he was going on vacation. Id. at 

52–53. When Mother tried to reach counsel, he did not take her calls and 

did not call her back. Id. Mother stated that she did not know she could get 

a different attorney, professing: “I thought that was my attorney and I had 

to stick with him. I never had the option or being told by anybody that I had 

the option to get another attorney.” Id. at 55.

CYS counsel asked Mother if she tried to get a new lawyer once she 

knew Attorney Wojtowicz retired. Mother responded:

I found there was a free place there for public defenders, 

lawyers. I went to the 5th floor to the lawyers and they told me 

they do not do anything for children, like where I’m at with 

Children and Youth.

So then I proceeded to go to the third floor and I got a 

bunch of paperwork to fill out but they told me I was going to 

need at least a month and a half for even free I guess, but 

nothing ever came of it.

N.T., 4/12/17, at 58–59. 

Our review of the record reveals that the orphans’ court’s conclusions 

are not supported therein. Regarding Mother’s assertion that Mr. Wojtowicz 

was unavailable during the thirty-day period during which Mother could have 

revoked her consents because he went on vacation and then did not return 

her telephone calls, the orphans’ court found that Mother did not indicate 

she tried to call her counsel for the sole purpose of intending to revoke her 

consent. Trial Court Opinion, 6/8/17, at 9. The record is clear that Mother 

hesitated about professing consent, she had no counsel to advise her, and 
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her efforts to reach her counsel in the ensuing thirty-day period were 

rebuffed. The orphans’ court’s theory that because CYS told Mother she 

could revoke the consents herself within thirty days and she understood its 

advice, her claim had no merit, is not relevant. Mother was entitled to 

effective representation by counsel, and this record reveals that Mother did 

not receive it.

Thus, we have no hesitation in concluding that Mother was deprived of 

effective representation by counsel at every turn.4 At the December 13, 

2016 meeting with the CYS caseworker, Mother’s court-appointed counsel 

was not present, and Ms. Miller offered explanation and advice. When 

Mother attempted to contact her counsel a few days after signing the 

consents, and within the thirty-day period in which she could revoke them, 

counsel told Mother he was going on vacation and to call him back. When 

Mother called him back, he refused her calls, and subsequently retired

without ever contacting Mother. Mother’s efforts to obtain new counsel were 

unfruitful for a variety of reasons, not the least of which was Mother’s 

misunderstanding of the nature of the court appointment. When new 

____________________________________________

4

 CYS’s assertion that Mother had counsel present at the “hearing” held two 

days after she signed the consents is specious, and counsel’s suggestion 

borders on the absurd. First, as previously noted, Ms. Miller “advised” 

Mother she need not be present at the hearing. Second, the orphans’ court 

compelled CYS counsel to clarify that there actually was no hearing; it 

merely was “the call of the list” “to schedule [a] date for the [termination] 

hearing.” N.T., 4/12/17, at 35.
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counsel eventually was appointed, he was erroneously appointed for Father, 

not Mother, and the correction was not made until the April 12, 2017 

hearing. Mother did not learn of the appointment of new counsel until two 

weeks before the April hearing, well beyond the thirty and sixty-day 

statutory periods.

Our courts have acknowledged that termination of parental rights “is a 

drastic measure that should not be taken lightly” because the parent’s rights 

to her child are at stake as well as the child’s relationship with his or her

parent. In re Adoption of Stickley, 638 A.2d 976 (Pa. Super. 1994). We 

cannot say that Mother’s consent was intelligent, voluntary, and deliberate,

as required, Matter of Christopher P., 389 A.2d 94 (Pa. 1978), because 

Mother failed to receive the effective representation of counsel mandated by 

law. Our review of the record does not advance a procedure of fundamental 

fairness. Instead, there is clear and convincing evidence that it is more 

likely than not that the result herein would have been different absent 

counsel’s ineffective assistance. In re K.D., 871 A.2d 823, 829 (Pa. Super. 

2005).5

Decrees vacated.

____________________________________________

5

 The orphans’ court’s additional analysis under 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b) is 

irrelevant in this case. Section 2511(b) applies only to the involuntary 

termination of parental rights. In this case, CYS requested that the court 

confirm Mother’s consent to adoption pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2504(a).
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/28/17