J-S53002-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: X. E. A., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: F. M. R., MOTHER

No. 817 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Decree Entered February 2, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Family Court at No(s): 

CP-51-AP-0000919-2015

CP-51-DP-0001708-2013

IN THE INTEREST OF: X. A. A., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: F. M. R., MOTHER

No. 822 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Decree Entered February 2, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Family Court at No(s): 

CP-51-AP-0000954-2015

CP-51-DP-0001721-2013

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., OLSON, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED OCTOBER 11, 2017

F.M.R. (“Mother”) appeals from the decrees entered February 2, 2017, 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, which involuntarily 

terminated Mother’s parental rights to her minor twin children, daughter 

X.E.A., and son X.A.A. (collectively, “the Children”) (born in August of 

2013), pursuant to sections 2511(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5), (a)(8), and (b) of the 

Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101-2938. After careful review of the record 

and applicable law, we affirm. 
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The trial court set forth the following findings of fact in its Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(a) opinion: 

On August 10, 2013, [Philadelphia County Department of 

Human Services, Children and Youth Division (“DHS”)] received 

a General Protective Services (“GPS”) Report stating Mother 

gave birth to the twin Children [in August of 2013] at Temple 

University Hospital (“TUH”). The GPS alleged the [Children] 

were born at 36 weeks gestation and each weighed less than five 

(5) pounds at birth. Prior to the birth of her Children, Mother 

had been arrested on May 6, 2013[,] due to an active bench 

warrant. On August 13, 2013, DHS obtained an Order of 

Protective Custody (“OPC”) for Child[,] X.E.A. On August 14, 

2013, DHS obtained an OPC for Child[,] X.A.A.

An adjudicatory hearing was held on August 30, 2013. 

The Honorable Jonathan Irvine adjudicated the Children 

dependent due in part to Mother’s incarceration at the CurranFromhold Correctional Facility. 

Mother was released from prison on February 2, 2015. At 

the permanency review hearing on February 9, 2015, Mother

appeared before the Honorable Jonathan Irvine, who ordered[:] 

(1) that the Children remain as committed; (2) Mother was to 

visit the Children weekly; (3) Mother was referred to the 

[c]ourt’s Clinical Evaluation Unit (“CEU”) for a dual diagnosis and 

random drug screens; and that (4) Mother be referred to the 

Achieving Reunification Center (“ARC”) for services. 

On May 12, 2015, CEU completed a Progress Report 

regarding Mother stating that she failed to complete a drug and 

alcohol assessment as ordered by the [c]ourt. On November 4, 

2015, Mother gave birth to another child. Mother had failed to 

receive substance abuse treatment during her pregnancy and 

was discharged from the ARC program twice for noncompliance. 

On or about December 22, 2016, DHS filed the underlying 

Petition to Terminate Mother’s Parental Rights to the Children[,] 

X.E.A. and X.A.A. On February 2, 2017, this [c]ourt terminated 

Mother’s parental rights to Children pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.[] § 

2511(a)(1)[,](2)[,](5)[,] and (8). The [c]ourt also ruled that 

termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the best interests 

of the Children pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.[] § 2511(b). The [c]ourt 

ordered that the Children’s goal be changed to adoption. 
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Trial Court Opinion (“TCO”), 4/24/17, at 2-3 (citations to record omitted). 

Thereafter, Mother timely filed notices of appeal on March 2, 2017, 

along with concise statements of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). This Court consolidated Mother’s appeals 

sua sponte on April 3, 2017. 

Mother now raises the following issues for our review: 

A. Whether the trial court committed reversible error when it 

involuntarily terminated [M]other’s parental rights where such 

determination was not supported by clear and convincing 

evidence under the Adoption Act[,] 23 Pa.C.S.[] § 

2511(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5), and (a)(8)[,] as [M]other made 

progress towards working and meeting her [Single Case Plan 

(“SCP”)] goals, namely staying drug free, working towards 

obtaining housing, working on parenting skills, and other 

goals, during [the Children’s] placement?

B. Whether the trial court committed reversible error when it 

involuntarily terminated [M]other’s parental rights without 

giving primary consideration to the effect that the termination

would have on the developmental[,] physical[,] and emotional 

needs of [the Children,] as required by the Adoption Act[,] 23 

Pa.C.S.[] § 2511(b)?

Mother’s Brief at 4. 

We review an appeal from the termination of parental rights under the 

following standard: 

[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion 

standard when considering a trial court’s determination of a 

petition for termination of parental rights. As in dependency 

cases, our standard of review requires an appellate court to 

accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the 

trial court if they are supported by the record. In re: R.J.T., ... 

9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010). If the factual findings are 

supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial court 

made an error of law or abused its discretion. Id.; R.I.S., 36 
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A.3d [567,] 572 [(Pa. 2011) (plurality opinion)]. As has been 

often stated, an abuse of discretion does not result merely 

because the reviewing court might have reached a different 

conclusion. Id.; see also Samuel Bassett v. Kia Motors 

America, Inc., ... 34 A.3d 1, 51 (Pa. 2011); Christianson v. 

Ely, ... 838 A.2d 630, 634 (Pa. 2003). Instead, a decision may 

be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration 

of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or illwill. Id. 

As we discussed in R.J.T., there are clear reasons for 

applying an abuse of discretion standard of review in these 

cases. We observed that, unlike trial courts, appellate courts are 

not equipped to make the fact-specific determinations on a cold 

record, where the trial judges are observing the parties during 

the relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous other 

hearings regarding the child and parents. R.J.T., 9 A.3d at 

1190. Therefore, even where the facts could support an 

opposite result, as is often the case in dependency and 

termination cases, an appellate court must resist the urge to 

second guess the trial court and impose its own credibility 

determinations and judgment; instead we must defer to the trial 

judges so long as the factual findings are supported by the 

record and the court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an 

error of law or an abuse of discretion. In re Adoption of 

Atencio, ... 650 A.2d 1064, 1066 (Pa. 1994). 

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-27 (Pa. 2012). 

In termination cases, the burden is upon the petitioner to prove by 

clear and convincing evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the 

termination of parental rights are valid. In re S.H., 879 A.2d 802, 806 (Pa. 

Super. 2005). We have previously stated:

The standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined as 

testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to 

enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without 

hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue. 

In re J.L.C., 837 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2003) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). 
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Termination of parental rights is governed by section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis. 

Our case law has made clear that under Section 2511, the court 

must engage in a bifurcated process prior to terminating 

parental rights. Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the 

parent. The party seeking termination must prove by clear and 

convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the 

statutory grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). 

Only if the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants 

termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in 

the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): 

determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the 

standard of best interest of the child. One major aspect of the 

needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the 

emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention 

paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such 

bond. 

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citing 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511; 

other citations omitted). 

This Court must agree with only one subsection of 2511(a), in addition 

to section 2511(b), in order to affirm the termination of parental rights. See 

In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). Herein, we 

review the decrees pursuant to sections 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide 

as follows: 

(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds: 

...

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect 

or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without 

essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary 

for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions 
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and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal 

cannot or will not be remedied by the parent. 

...

(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the 

child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on 

the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, 

furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be 

beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition 

filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not 

consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions 

described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the 

giving of notice of the filing of the petition. 

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2) and (b). 

We first address whether the trial court abused its discretion by 

terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to section 2511(a)(2). 

In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.[] § 

2511(a)(2), the following three elements must be met: (1) 

repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) 

such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the child to 

be without essential parental care, control or subsistence 

necessary for his physical or mental well-being; and (3) the 

causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will 

not be remedied. 

In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation 

omitted). “The grounds for termination due to parental incapacity that 

cannot be remedied are not limited to affirmative misconduct. To the 

contrary, those grounds may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to 

perform parental duties.” In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 

2002) (citations omitted). 

There is no simple or easy definition of parental duties. Parental 

duty is best understood in relation to the needs of a child. A 
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child needs love, protection, guidance, and support. These 

needs, physical and emotional, cannot be met by a merely 

passive interest in the development of the child. Thus, this 

[C]ourt has held that the parental obligation is a positive duty 

which requires affirmative performance. 

In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 759 (Pa. Super. 2008). 

Moreover, this Court has previously stated:

A parent must utilize all available resources to preserve the 

parental relationship, and must exercise reasonable firmness in 

resisting obstacles placed in the path of maintaining the parentchild relationship. Parental rights are not preserved by waiting 

for a more suitable or convenient time to perform one’s parental 

responsibilities while others provide the child with his or her 

physical and emotional needs.

Id. Where a parent does not “exercise reasonable firmness in declining to 

yield to obstacles, his [parental] rights may be forfeited.” In re A.S., 11 

A.3d 473, 481 (Pa. Super. 2010). 

Instantly, Mother argues that the evidence demonstrates her attempt 

to establish a loving relationship with the Children. See Mother’s Brief at 7. 

Additionally, Mother claims that her efforts to remain close to the Children 

and her attempt to complete her objectives “exhibited that she was trying to 

eradicate any neglect or abuse that caused [the Children] to be placed in 

foster care.” Id. at 8. However, the record clearly belies Mother’s claims. 

First, Mother’s own testimony contradicts her claim that she attempted 

to complete her objectives. Mother stated at the termination hearing that 

there was “no point” in her attending ARC services because “it don’t benefit 

[her],” and that “it’s too much weight for [her] to handle.” N.T. 

Termination, 2/2/17, at 56-57. Mother also indicated that she did not have 
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transportation to get to the ARC programs. Id. at 57. She admitted that 

she was aware she could request transportation tokens from [the 

Community Umbrella Agency (“CUA”)] 48 hours in advance of her 

appointments, but that she never complied with the 48-hour requirement. 

Id. at 57-58. 

Moreover, DHS reports:

Mother was compliant with services while still incarcerated. 

However, once Mother was released from prison and expected to 

show initiative in order to complete her SCP objectives, she was 

unable to do so and thus failed in meeting her objectives. She 

did not attend services at ARC, failed to maintain contact with 

the CUA, and failed to attend the majority of her visits. 

Not only did Mother lack the initiative to pursue 

reunification with Children, she also struggled with her limited 

capacity to undertake the parental role. When given the 

opportunity to take on a limited parental roll in a supervised 

setting, Mother failed to attend the majority of her visits. Of the 

few visits she did attend with Children, all of which were 

supervised, she would curse in front of them. Beyond these 

limited visits, Mother never took care of Children on a daily 

basis. Mother’s behavior and lapses demonstrated that Mother 

lacked both the intent and willingness to parent and the 

“reasonable firmness” required by § 2511(a)(2). 

DHS’s Brief at 17-18 (citations to record omitted). 

The trial court concluded that “[t]he record demonstrated Mother’s 

ongoing unwillingness to provide care or control for the Children[,] to 

perform any parental duties[,] and a failure to remedy the conditions that 

brought the Children into care.” TCO at 4. The court emphasized the fact 

that the Children had never once lived with Mother and had received 

parental care from their foster parents since birth. Id. at 5. The court also 
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found persuasive the testimony of the CUA Representative, who noted that 

Mother’s SCP objectives were: (1) to maintain contact with CUA; (2) to visit 

the Children; (3) to complete random drug screens; (4) to comply with the 

ARC program; and (5) to complete a CEU assessment. Id.

The CUA Representative testified that Mother had not maintained 

consistent contact with CUA since August 2016. The CUA 

Representative also testified that Mother was sporadic with 

visitation of the Children. Specifically, Mother was scheduled to 

visit the Children on a weekly basis but made only five (5) visits 

since October 4, 2016. The CUA Representative testified that 

Mother had failed to complete the ARC program.[1] The CUA 

Representative also testified that Mother failed to complete a 

court ordered parenting program, and that Mother was 

unemployed and did not have suitable housing.[2] By her own 

testimony, Mother confirmed that she was unemployed and did 

not have stable housing.[3] 

____________________________________________

1 Mother was referred to ARC for parenting, housing, employment, and 

mental health services. At the time of the termination hearing, Mother had 

not completed any of these programs. Rather, the CUA Representative 

testified that Mother was “closed out from ARC” due to lack of attendance. 

N.T. Termination at 17-19. 

2 Mother was not placed on a list to receive appropriate housing, because 

she failed to complete the ARC housing program. Id. at 18. Instead, 

Mother had numerous living arrangements since her release from prison, 

including staying with a friend, staying at a shelter, moving in with her mom 

and, most recently, residing with her uncle. Id. at 59. 

3 When asked what effort she made to try to obtain housing, Mother 

testified: “I don’t have a job. So, there was no point in me getting a house 

for myself.” Id. at 60. Mother also testified that because of her 

incarceration, she has been unable to find a job, and that she relies on her 

mother and siblings for financial support. Id. at 60-61, 68. 
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Id. at 5-6 (citations to record omitted). The trial court found the testimony 

of the CUA Representative to be credible and accorded it great weight. Id.

at 6. After careful review, we deem the court’s decision to terminate 

Mother’s parental rights, pursuant to section 2511(a)(2), to be wellsupported by the record. 

After we determine that the requirements of section 2511(a) are 

satisfied, we proceed to review whether the requirements of subsection (b) 

are met. See In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1009 (Pa. Super. 

2008) (en banc). This Court has stated that the focus in terminating 

parental rights under section 2511(a) is on the parent, but the focus is on 

the child pursuant to section 2511(b). Id. at 1008. 

In reviewing the evidence in support of termination under section 

2511(b), our Supreme Court recently stated as follows: 

[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are met, a 

court “shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” 23 

Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). The emotional needs and welfare of the child 

have been properly interpreted to include “intangibles such as 

love, comfort, security, and stability.” In re K.M., 53 A.3d 781, 

791 (Pa. Super. 2012). In In re E.M., [620 A.2d 481, 485 (Pa. 

1992)], this Court held that the determination of the child’s 

“needs and welfare” requires consideration of the emotional 

bonds between the parent and child. The “utmost attention” 

should be paid to discerning the effect on the child of 

permanently severing the parental bond. In re K.M., 53 A.3d at 

791. 

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). 
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Here, the trial court concluded that it would be in the Children’s best 

interests for Mother’s parental rights to be terminated. The court 

emphasized that the Children have never lived with Mother and that they 

have received parental care from their foster parents since birth. TCO at 4-

5. Mother argues that the trial court erred in terminating her parental 

rights, because DHS failed to provide the court with clear, competent, and 

convincing evidence that termination was in the best interest of the Children, 

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). Mother’s Brief at 6. Mother claims that 

she offers the Children “love, comfort, security, and closeness-entailed in a 

parent-child relationship,” id. at 10, and further suggests that the record 

reflects her efforts to comply with her objectives “in attempts to make 

herself a better parent and reunify with her [C]hildren because [she] loves 

her [C]hildren.” Id. at 11.

Again, we conclude that the record supports the trial court’s decision 

to terminate Mother’s parental rights. The CUA Representative testified that 

Mother has never lived with or cared for the Children, nor has she ever 

maintained consistent contact with them. See N.T. Termination at 11-15, 

20. In contrast, DHS reports:

Children share a strong maternal bond with their Foster Mother, 

with whom they have lived since birth. Foster Mother was their 

primary parental bond. Foster Mother provided Children with 

love, safety, stability, and support. Children knew no other 

person as their motherly figure. Children would run to Foster 
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Mother at the end of visits with Mother.[4] Foster Mother took 

care of them when they were sick and made sure that they 

received proper education. Children were thriving with Foster 

Mother. 

DHS’s Brief at 23. 

In reaching its conclusion that termination of Mother’s parental rights 

would be in the best interests of the Children pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 

2511(b), the trial court explained that it relied on the CUA Representative’s 

testimony that: (1) Mother had never cared for the Children and that she 

lacked the ability to care for them on a full-time basis; (2) the Children’s 

pre-adoptive foster mother was able to meet the Children’s medical and 

educational needs; (3) the Children were bonded to their foster mother; (4) 

it would be in the Children’s best interest to be adopted; and (5) termination 

of Mother’s parental rights would not harm the Children and would be in the 

Children’s best interest. TCO at 6. 

As there is competent evidence in the record that supports the trial 

court’s credibility and weight assessments regarding the Children’s needs 

and welfare, and the absence of any bond with Mother, we conclude that the 

court did not abuse its discretion as to section 2511(b). See S.P., 47 A.3d 

at 826-27. Accordingly, we affirm the decrees terminating Mother’s parental 

rights to the Children. 

____________________________________________

4 Even Mother testified that at the end of her visits with the Children, “[i]t’s 

like they’re in a rush to leave.... Like when the foster mom comes, it’s like 

they in a rush to leave. Like they want to go.” N.T. Termination at 65. 
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Decrees affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/11/2017