Filed 5/27/21 In re K.M. CA2/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re K.M., a Person Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

 B307942

 (Los Angeles County Super. 

 Ct. No. 20CCJP02157A)

 

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF 

CHILDREN AND FAMILY 

SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

MARK M.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 ORDER MODIFYING 

 OPINION

 NO CHANGE IN THE

 JUDGMENT
2

THE COURT:

It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on May 21, 2021, 

be modified as follows: 

1. On page 18, delete the URL in angled brackets—

"https://casetext.com/rule/ca-rules-ofcourt/appendices/appendix-i-emergency-rules-related-tocovid-19/rule-emergency-rule-6-emergency-ordersjuvenile-dependency-proceedings”—and insert the 

following URL in its place: “https://perma.cc/KU3SC2XN.”

2. Immediately following the bracketed URL, delete “(last 

viewed, March 6, 2021),” and insert “(as of Mar. 6, 

2021)” in its place. 

* * *

There is no change in the judgment. 

——————————————————————————————

LUI, P. J. CHAVEZ, J. HOFFSTADT, J.
Filed 5/21/21 In re K.M. CA2/2 (unmodified opinion)

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re K.M., a Person Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

 B307942

 (Los Angeles County Super. 

 Ct. No. 20CCJP02157A)

 

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF 

CHILDREN AND FAMILY 

SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

MARK M.,

Defendant and Appellant.
2

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Kristen Byrdsong, Judge Pro Tempore. 

Affirmed.

Benjamin Ekenes, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rodrigo A. Castro-Silva, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, 

Assistant County Counsel, Sally Son, Deputy County Counsel, for 

Plaintiff and Respondent. 

* * * * * *

Following an incident where a father choked, punched, 

shoved to the ground, and stomped on the mother of his sevenyear-old daughter, the juvenile court exerted dependency 

jurisdiction over the daughter based on father’s unresolved 

domestic violence issues and abuse of marijuana, and the 

mother’s failure to protect the child. The court removed the child 

from father’s custody. On appeal, father challenges the 

sufficiency of the evidence supporting jurisdiction and removal 

and argues that the juvenile court erred in migrating from 

monitored in-person visits to monitored visits by telephone or 

videoconference after father exhibited aggressive behavior during 

the in-person visits. We conclude there was no error, and affirm.1

1 Father also challenged the 10-year duration of the 

protective order the juvenile court entered to protect the 

daughter’s mother, but the court subsequently reduced the 

duration to the statutory maximum period of three years. The 

court’s subsequent action—of which we can and do take judicial 

notice—renders this challenge moot.
3

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

I. Facts

Mark M. (father) and K.P. (mother) have one child 

together, a daughter named K.M. who was born in May 2012. 

They split up within a year of K.M.’s birth, and a family court 

order granted mother physical custody of K.M.; father gets 

weekend visits. The custody exchanges occur at a police station. 

On March 30, 2020, father physically assaulted mother and 

then seven-year-old K.M. after exchanging her at the police 

station. Specifically, father drove his car onto a sidewalk in front 

of mother and K.M. as they walked from the station to a bus stop. 

Father got out of his car and followed mother and K.M. into an 

alleyway. There, father pushed mother up against a wall, choked 

her, punched her in the head with a closed fist, threw her to the 

ground, and stomped on her. In this flurry of blows, he 

inadvertently punched K.M. on the top of the head. Mother, K.M. 

and an eyewitness all attested to father’s assault on mother.

This was not father’s first physical attack on mother or 

K.M. He had physically assaulted mother on several prior 

occasions, including another incident in K.M.’s presence when 

K.M. was just a baby in June 2012. He had also physically 

assaulted K.M. at an earlier custody handoff when he chased 

mother and K.M. and pushed K.M, causing her to fall and hit her 

head on the ground. 

In fact, father has a long history of physical, verbal and 

psychological aggression toward women in general. He has 

physically punched his own mother and his sister. He has

stalked mother as well as another girlfriend, prompting both of 

them, and his own mother, to obtain restraining orders against 

him. And he regularly argues with his current girlfriend as well.
4

Father’s sister reported that father intimidates people and will 

“go off on you” if he does not get what he wants.

Father is also a regular marijuana user. When he had

custody of K.M. on the weekends, he would leave K.M. in the 

room with (1) a container containing marijuana helpfully labeled 

“Weed” or (2) a bakery item containing marijuana he helpfully 

dubbed “Weed cake.” He would also leave his apartment to 

smoke marijuana with friends, leaving K.M. alone and forced to 

find food for herself in his residence. 

Father denied that he struck mother during the March 

2020 incident, denied that he has ever used marijuana, and 

denied that he has any criminal history despite his prior 

conviction of crimes that render him a sex offender.

II. Procedural Background

On April 15, 2020, the Los Angeles County Department of 

Children and Family Services (the Department) filed a petition 

asking the juvenile court to assert dependency jurisdiction over 

K.M. on two grounds: First, father and mother have a history of 

engaging in violent altercations in K.M’s presence; father’s 

violent conduct places K.M. at risk of serious physical harm; and 

mother failed to protect K.M. by allowing father unlimited access

to her (rendering dependency jurisdiction appropriate under 

Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a) and 

(b)(1)).

2 Second, father’s abuse of marijuana renders him 

incapable of providing regular supervision of K.M., which places 

her at substantial risk of serious physical harm (rendering

dependency jurisdiction appropriate under section 300, 

subdivision (b)(1)).

2 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and 

Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
5

On April 20, 2020, the juvenile court detained K.M. from 

father’s custody, placed her with mother, and entered a protective

order requiring father to stay away from mother. 

On September 17, 2020, the juvenile court held a hearing 

on whether to exert jurisdiction over K.M. Father testified, and 

denied striking mother on March 30, 2020, and denied using 

marijuana. The juvenile court found father to be not “credible in 

the least.” During the hearing, father was also verbally 

aggressive and rude, and repeatedly interrupted the court. The 

court sustained the petition as pled, removed K.M. from father’s 

custody, and ordered the Department to provide him 

reunification services and monitored telephonic or videoconference visitation with K.M. The court also granted the 

Department discretion to liberalize the visits to monitored inperson visits “if father seems like he is benefitting from the 

services” provided by the Department. 

Father filed this timely appeal. 

DISCUSSION

I. Justiciability

As a threshold matter, we must decide whether to entertain 

father’s challenge to the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings

because mother did not appeal the court’s exercise of dependency 

jurisdiction resting on the allegation against her. Dependency 

jurisdiction under section 300 is said to be taken over the child, 

not the parents, as a result of the harm or risk of harm the child 

faces. (See, e.g., Kern County Dept. of Human Services v. 

Superior Court (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 302, 310.) Because the 

juvenile court assumes jurisdiction over the child, not over the 

parents, jurisdiction may exist based on the conduct of one parent 
6

alone. (In re J.C. (2014) 233 Cal.App.4th 1, 3; see § 302, subd. 

(a).)

However, we may exercise our discretion to reach the 

merits of a single parent’s challenge to any jurisdictional finding 

when the finding (1) serves as the basis for dispositional orders 

that are also challenged on appeal (see, e.g., In re Alexis E. (2009) 

171 Cal.App.4th 438, 450, 454), (2) could be prejudicial to the 

appellant or potentially impact the current or future dependency 

proceedings (see, e.g., In re D.C. (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1010, 

1015; see also In re I.A. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1494), or (3) 

“could have other consequences for [the appellant], 

beyond jurisdiction.” (In re I.A., at p. 1493.)

We elect to exercise our discretion to reach the merits of 

father’s challenge to the exercise of jurisdiction.

II. Sufficiency of Evidence Supporting Jurisdiction

Father attacks the sufficiency of the evidence underlying 

each of the two grounds for asserting dependency jurisdiction 

over K.M. We review the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings 

for substantial evidence. (In re F.S. (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 799, 

811-812, disapproved on another ground in Conservatorship of 

O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1010, fn. 7.)

A. Jurisdiction based on risk to K.M. arising from 

history of domestic violence

A juvenile court may exert dependency jurisdiction over a 

child if “[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk the 

child will suffer” (1) “serious physical harm inflicted 

nonaccidentally upon the child by the child’s parent” (§ 300, subd. 

(a)), or (2) “serious physical harm . . . as a result of the failure or 

inability of . . . her parent . . . to adequately supervise or protect 

the child” (§ 300, subd. (b)(1)). Exposing a child to domestic 
7

violence can risk the nonaccidental infliction of serious physical 

harm under subdivision (a) of section 300 (In re Giovanni F.

(2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 594, 598-599), and can constitute a failure 

to protect the child from the risk of such injury under subdivision 

(b)(1) (In re Heather A. (1996) 52 Cal.App.4th 183, 194). Because 

dependency jurisdiction turns on the risk of the child “‘“at the 

time of the [jurisdictional] hearing”’” (In re M.M. (2015) 240 

Cal.App.4th 703, 719), the propriety of jurisdiction due to a 

child’s exposure to domestic violence under subdivisions (a) and 

(b) of section 300 turns on whether “the violence is ongoing is or 

likely to continue” (In re Daisy H. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 713, 

717; In re M.W. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1444, 1453-1454).

Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding 

that father’s violent behavior was, at the time of the 

jurisdictional hearing, likely to continue and thereby to place 

K.M. at substantial risk of serious physical harm. On appeal, 

father does not dispute that he attacked mother on March 30, 

2020. This incident was just one of the more recent chapters in a 

much longer history of violence—from father’s assaults on his 

own mother and sister, to his prior assaults on mother, to his 

stalking behavior. And this history continues to this day: Father 

behaved in a “hyperactive angry manner” during a monitored, inperson visit with K.M. in early September 2020, and was rude 

and aggressive to the juvenile court at the jurisdictional hearing 

itself. Not only has father’s prior assaultive and aggressive 

behavior put K.M. in harm’s way, but he has actually harmed 

K.M. two times. Father urges us to ignore the second incident 

involving K.M. on the ground that K.M. was “confused,” but it is 

not our role to re-evaluate the evidence on appeal. (In re Lana S. 

(2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 94, 103 (Lana S.).) What is more, father 
8

has repeatedly denied engaging in domestic violence or 

aggressive behavior. Such false denials of violent and aggressive 

behavior are unlikely to accompany a change in that behavior, so 

the risk arising from that behavior remains. (In re Esmeralda B.

(1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1036, 1044 [“denial is a factor often 

relevant to determining whether persons are likely to modify 

their behavior in the future without court supervision”]; In re 

Gabriel K. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 188, 197 [“One cannot correct a 

problem one fails to acknowledge”].)

Father offers what boil down to four arguments as to why, 

in his view, the evidence of risk to K.M. is insubstantial.

First, he argues that K.M. is in no danger of harm because 

father has not engaged in any domestic violence toward mother 

in the five months between the juvenile court’s issuance of its 

restraining order in April 2020 and the jurisdictional hearing in 

September 2020. To be sure, a parent’s compliance with a 

restraining order can eliminate the risk of harm necessitating the 

exercise of jurisdiction. (In re Destiny D. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 

197, 203, 212 [so finding, at least where Department conceded 

the risk had been wholly eliminated].) But compliance does not 

inevitably eliminate the risk of harm, and the evidence in this 

case does not compel a finding that such risk has been 

eliminated. (See In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1528, 

disapproved on another ground in Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 

9 Cal.5th 989, 1010, fn. 7.) That is because father’s period of 

nonviolence is relatively brief (five months) compared with the 

decades of violence and aggression he has exhibited; moreover, 

even the five months without an assault has been punctuated by 

several incidents of verbal aggression and hostility.
9

Second, father contends that his violent attack on mother 

on March 30 was “an isolated incident” because mother’s “vague 

reports of prior physical incidents” should be disregarded. In 

essence, father invites us to reject part of mother’s testimony and 

hence to reweigh her credibility. This is an invitation we must 

decline. (Lana S., supra, 207 Cal.App.4th at p. 103.)

Third, father asserts that this case has the “earmarks of a 

contentious family court custody battle” and is best left to the 

family courts. To be sure, “‘the juvenile court must not become a 

battleground by which family law war is waged by other means,’ 

particularly when ‘the resources of local government social 

services agencies are stretched thin . . . .’” (In re Nicolas E.

(2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 458, 466, quoting In re John W. (1996) 41 

Cal.App.4th 961, 975; see In re Alexandria M. (2007) 156 

Cal.App.4th 1088, 1096.) “But where the Department is able to 

prove that dependency jurisdiction is warranted, these concerns 

must give way to the primacy of dependency court jurisdiction 

and its special role.” (In re Nicholas E., at p. 466; John W., at p. 

975.) Because dependency jurisdiction is warranted in this case, 

the fact that mother and father have had a contentious 

relationship is not a barrier to the juvenile court’s intervention to 

protect K.M.

Lastly, father argues that the Department’s view that 

mother and father would benefit from jurisdiction is not a basis 

for jurisdiction. Along similar lines, father argues that minor’s 

counsel did not see a risk to K.M. even with monitored visitation. 

This is irrelevant because this was not the basis for any of the 

juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings and because the juvenile 

court is not bound by the positions of counsel.
10

B. Jurisdiction based on risk to K.M. from use of 

marijuana

A juvenile court may exert dependency jurisdiction over a 

child if the child faces “substantial risk . . . [of] serious physical 

harm” due to a parent’s inability to care for the child resulting 

from the parent’s substance abuse. (§ 300, subd. (b)(1).) Risk to a 

child from substance abuse can be established either by (1) proof 

of an “‘identified, specific hazard in the child’s environment,’” or 

(2) proof that the child is of “tender years,” in which case “the 

finding of substance abuse is prima facie evidence of the inability 

of a parent or guardian to provide regular care resulting in a 

substantial risk of physical harm.” (In re Drake M. (2012) 211 

Cal.App.4th 754, 766-767.) 

Although K.M. is just beyond her tender years (which end 

at age six), substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding 

that father’s marijuana use created identified, specific hazards in 

her environment. The evidence supports two such hazards that 

warrant the exercise of jurisdiction. First, jurisdiction is 

appropriate when a parent’s substance abuse prompts the parent

to leave the substance in a place accessible to a child who knows 

what it is and may be tempted to try it. (In re Rocco M. (1991) 1 

Cal.App.4th 814, 825-826, abrogated on another ground in In re 

R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 629.) Here, K.M. testified that father 

left his “Weed” container and his “Weed cake” on the table to 

which she had access while father left the apartment. Second, 

jurisdiction is appropriate when a parent’s substance abuse 

leaves him unable to provide the child with the basic necessities 

of life. (Angela S. v. Superior Court (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 758, 

761-763.) Here, K.M. testified that father would leave her to fend 

for her own food when he went downstairs to be with his friends 
11

and that her father smoked marijuana with his friends outside 

his residence; from this, the juvenile court could reasonably infer 

that father was leaving K.M. on her own so he could smoke 

marijuana with his friends. (See In re Tracy Z. (1987) 195 

Cal.App.3d 107, 113 [substantial evidence review requires 

reviewing court to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of 

ruling below].) This inference is not, as father asserts, 

“speculative.” 

Father resists this conclusion with four further arguments. 

First, he argues that he never smoked marijuana in K.M.’s 

immediate presence. This may be true, but it is irrelevant

because the risk attendant to father’s marijuana use stems from 

its effect on him (in impairing his ability to provide a safe 

environment and the necessities of life), not on where he ingested

it. Second, father argues that K.M.’s report that his appearance 

changed after he ingested marijuana is not a sufficient basis for 

exerting jurisdiction. This may also be true, but is irrelevant 

because there is sufficient evidence of risk without this additional 

fact. Third, father argues that jurisdiction is not warranted on 

this ground because K.M.’s attorney asked for this jurisdictional 

allegation to be dismissed. While K.M.’s attorney did request 

dismissal of this allegation, that request is irrelevant because the 

substantiality of the evidence supporting a jurisdictional finding 

is not dependent upon what positions the litigants take with 

regard to that finding. Lastly, father argues that his use of 

marijuana does not meet the standard for substance abuse

adopted in In re Drake M. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 754, 766—

namely, that a finding of substance abuse “must be based on 

evidence sufficient to (1) show that the parent or guardian at 

issue had been diagnosed as having a current substance abuse by 
12

a medical professional or (2) establish that the parent or 

guardian at issue has a current substance abuse problem as 

defined in the DSM-IV-TR.” Not only has father waived this 

argument by waiting until his reply brief to raise it (In re Daniel 

M. (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 703, 708, fn .4), but we agree with 

other courts that have rejected this requirement (In re Rebecca C.

(2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 720, 726; In re Christopher R. (2014) 225 

Cal.App.4th 1210, 1218; In re K.B. (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 593, 

601), and it is in any event satisfied in this case because the most 

recent version of the Manual defines “substance abuse” to include 

drug use resulting in interpersonal problems (such as physical 

fights) (In re Natalie A. (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 178, 185). There 

is substantial evidence of such interpersonal problems here. 

Father cites In re J.A., supra, 47 Cal.App.5th 1036, 1046-1047 as 

support for his position that there was insufficient evidence for 

the court to find that his marijuana rose to the level of substance 

abuse. J.A. involved a mother who used edible marijuana to 

alleviate pregnancy symptoms and stopped immediately after 

being told to do so (as confirmed by postnatal drug tests) (J.A., at 

p. 1047); father has been uncooperative with the Department and 

untruthful with the juvenile court, such that there is no evidence 

that father has stopped using marijuana or otherwise addressed 

the issues arising from his substance abuse.

III. Removal

Father also challenges the juvenile court’s order removing 

K.M. from his custody for (1) lack of sufficient evidence, and (2) 

failing to comply with a variety of procedural requirements.

A. Sufficiency of the evidence supporting removal

A juvenile court may remove a child from her parent only if 

it finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) “[t]here is or 
13

would be a substantial danger to the physical health, safety, 

protection, or physical or emotional well-being” of the child if the 

child were returned to that parent’s custody, and (2) there are no 

reasonable means short of removal by which the child’s physical 

health can be protected. (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).) We review the 

juvenile court’s findings underlying its removal order for 

substantial evidence by asking whether there was evidence that 

is reasonable, credible, and of solid value sufficient for the court 

to reasonably make these findings by clear and convincing 

evidence. (In re V.L. (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 147, 154-155; In re

M.M., supra, 240 Cal.App.4th 703, 719-720.)

Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s removal 

finding. For the reasons outlined above, the evidence supports 

the court’s finding that father has longstanding and unresolved 

anger issues that have caused physical harm to several women in 

father’s life and, on two occasions, to K.M. herself. Father’s 

issues pose a substantial danger to K.M.’s physical health and 

safety were she returned to his custody. The evidence also 

supports the court’s finding that K.M.’s physical health cannot be 

protected by any reasonable means short of removal. Father’s 

outbursts have occurred and can occur at any time—during 

exchanges of K.M., during monitored visits with K.M., and even 

during court proceedings. Given the danger posed by those 

outbursts, there is ample support for the court’s finding that 

keeping K.M. out of father’s custody is necessary for her safety 

until father has demonstrated a commitment and ability to 

address the issues causing those outbursts. (Cf. In re Jasmine G.

(2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 282, 288-289 [removal inappropriate where 

parents expressed remorse for prior physical discipline of child, 

had attended parenting classes and therapy, a therapist had 
14

opined that returning the children to their custody was “totally 

safe,” and the sole basis for removing the child was the social 

worker’s opinion that the parents “‘lack[ed] understanding of 

their responsibility’”].)

Father responds with three categories of arguments. To 

begin, he asserts that there is usually no danger to K.M. because 

father is only violent and aggressive when father is with mother. 

This assertion ignores the record, which shows that father is 

aggressive in K.M.’s presence even when mother is absent.

Next, father urges us to take a different view of the 

evidence, including blaming his behavior in juvenile court on the 

attorneys and even the court itself. As noted above, it is not our 

role to reweigh the evidence de novo.

Further, father asserts that there were reasonable means 

short of removal for protecting K.M. and offers three arguments 

in support of this assertion.

First, he argues that the juvenile court’s assertion of 

jurisdiction was itself a reasonable alterative to removal. For 

support, he cites the dissenting opinion in In re G.C. (2020) 48 

Cal.App.5th 257. Apart from having no precedential value, this 

dissenting opinion does not support father’s position. The 

dissenter writes that a juvenile court in assessing whether 

removal is necessary should do so while keeping in mind that it 

“has taken jurisdiction.” (Id. at pp. 271-272.) This does not stand 

for the proposition that the assertion of jurisdiction itself obviates 

the need for removal; were we to give it such a reading, we would 

wipe section 361 from the statute books entirely, which is 

something only our Legislature can do. What is more, the 

juvenile court did consider whether removal was necessary in 

light of the Department’s efforts and the court’s intervention 
15

when it noted how father nonetheless continued to be aggressive

during monitored visits and court proceedings. 

Second, father argues that a plan of “strict supervision” by 

the Department, including unannounced visits, was a reasonable 

alternative to removal. For support, he cites In re Henry V.

(2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 522. However, unannounced visits would 

not alleviate the juvenile court’s concerns about father’s 

outbursts of aggression and violence unless those visits occurred 

all the time and unless father were willing to acknowledge and 

address them. (Henry V., at pp. 529-530 [unannounced visits 

may be a viable alternative to check on bruises due to excessive 

child discipline, at least where the discipline is a one-time 

incident and the parent has embraced counseling].) Nor, as 

father argues for the first time in his reply brief, did the juvenile 

court somehow impermissibly shift the burden to him to prove 

that “strict supervision” would have worked. 

Lastly, father argues that removal is warranted only in 

extreme cases of “parental abuse or neglect” where a child was 

“physically harmed”; for support, he cites In re Basilio T. (1992) 4 

Cal.App.4th 155, 170-172. While Basilio T. contains this 

language, it is no avail to father because this case does involve an 

extreme case of parental abuse or neglect and K.M. has been 

physically harmed by father—twice.

B. Procedural requirements

Father contends that the juvenile court’s removal finding is 

defective because (1) the Department did not provide the court 

with a social study that included “[a] discussion of the reasonable 

efforts [undertaken by the Department] to prevent or eliminate 

removal,” as required by California Rules of Court, rule 

5.690(a)(1)(B)(i), and (2) the court did not discuss and then reject 
16

various alternatives short of removal (such as unannounced

visits) and hence did not comply with the statutory mandate to 

“state the facts on which [its] decision to remove” K.M. was based 

(§ 361, subd. (e)). We reject these contentions for three reasons.

First, father has forfeited these arguments by failing to 

raise the alleged inadequacy of the Department’s report and the 

juvenile court’s own findings with the juvenile court—at a time 

when any deficiencies could be corrected. This amounts to a 

forfeiture. (In re A.A. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1292, 1317; In re

Brian P. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 616, 623.)

Second, father’s arguments lack merit. The Department’s 

social study set forth bullet points enumerating the efforts the 

Department had undertaken. This is precisely what the rule 

requires—namely, “[a] discussion of the reasonable efforts 

[undertaken by the Department] to prevent or eliminate 

removal.” Father faults the Department for not also “discuss[ing] 

alternatives to removal it had considered and rejected,” but the 

rule does not require that discussion. (Cf. In re Ashly F.(2014) 

225 Cal.App.4th 803, 809 [rule is violated where social study 

merely states “reasonable efforts were made” without delineating 

what those efforts were].) The juvenile court also complied with 

the statutory mandate to state the facts supporting its decision 

on removal because it explained why any disposition short of 

removal would not suffice; specific findings cataloguing lesser 

effective alternatives are not required by the language of section 

361.

Lastly, these alleged deficiencies are not prejudicial. The

juvenile court’s finding that there were, in fact, no reasonable 

alternatives to removal is amply supported. There is no 

reasonable probability that the court would have come to a 
17

contrary conclusion had the Department or the court explicitly 

articulated why those alternatives were insufficient. (In re J.S.

(2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1069, 1078-1079.)

IV. Order For Telephonic / Videoconference Monitored 

Visits

Father lastly challenges the juvenile court’s order requiring 

father’s monitored visits to be telephonic or by videoconference 

rather than in-person. When a juvenile court removes a child 

from her parent with the eventual goal of reunification, the court 

should provide for visitation between the parent and child 

“consistent with the well-being of the child” unless doing so will 

“jeopardize the safety of the child.” (§ 362.1, subds. (a)(1)(A) & 

(a)(1)(B).) We review a trial court’s order regarding visitation for 

an abuse of discretion. (In re J.P. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 616, 

624.)

The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in ordering 

father’s monitored visits to be telephonic or by videoconference 

rather than in person. At a monitored visit just a week before the 

jurisdictional and dispositional hearing, father “behaved in a 

hyperactive angry manner” in K.M.’s presence and, when the 

monitor attempted to redirect father’s behavior, father “ma[d]e 

accusations and raise[d] his voice in a threatening manner.” He 

thereafter made “aggressive phone calls and intimidating 

statements” to Department personnel. Based on this behavior, 

the Department recommended that future monitored visits take 

place in the Department’s offices or “somewhere with security,” 

but in light of the COVID pandemic’s closure of the Department’s 

offices, recommended that visits take place telephonically or by 

videoconference. The court followed this recommendation, 

determining that father’s outbursts required a more secure 
18

location and that the closure of the Department’s offices left the 

most viable secure option as monitored visits via telephone or 

videoconference. However, the court granted the Department 

discretion to resume in-person monitored visits “if father seems 

like he is benefitting from the services” provided by the 

Department. This order is entirely consistent with Emergency 

Rule 6, which empowers the court to consider public health 

directives and the best interest of the child when making 

visitation decisions during the COVID pandemic. (See 

Emergency Rule 6, located at < https://casetext.com/rule/ca-rulesof-court/appendices/appendix-i-emergency-rules-related-to-covid19/rule-emergency-rule-6-emergency-orders-juvenile-dependencyproceedings> (last viewed, March 6, 2021).)

Father makes two categories of challenges. First, he 

asserts that the Department should have explored other 

alternatives such as (1) in-person visits at police stations, (2) inperson visits with a different monitor who is more resilient to 

father’s hyperactive aggressiveness, or (3) in-person therapeutic 

visits. Therapeutic visits are not an option because father denies 

having any issues warranting therapy. Given father’s 

demonstrated aggression and rudeness to the juvenile court, the 

court was within its discretion to conclude that father’s 

aggressiveness was not a function of a timid monitor. And father 

cites nothing to support his suggestion that courts must co-opt 

police stations into daycare centers because father is unable and 

unwilling to control his aggressive and violent outbursts. Second,

father asserts that the juvenile court should have mandated a 

return to in-person monitored visits the instant the Department 

reopens its offices or another secure location is available. The 

court did not abuse its discretion in pegging the resumption of in-
19

person visits to father’s progress in managing his anger issues 

rather than mandating in-person visits once the Department’s 

offices reopen notwithstanding father’s ability (or inability) to 

manage his aggression.

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

______________________, J.

HOFFSTADT

We concur:

_________________________, P. J.

LUI

_________________________, J.

CHAVEZ