NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

File Name: 23a0452n.06

No. 23-1125

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

LEVY MACHINING, LLC; ROBERT LEVY;

SHERILENE LEVY; RYAN LEVY,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

HANOVER TOWNSHIP, MICHIGAN; JEFF 

HEATH,

Defendants-Appellees.

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ON APPEAL FROM THE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT

COURT FOR THE EASTERN

DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

OPINION

Before: MOORE, READLER, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. Hanover Township sued Sherilene Levy, 

Mike Levy, and Levy Machining, LLC in state court to enforce Hanover Township’s zoning 

ordinances. The state court granted Hanover Township the relief it requested and ordered Levy 

Machining to relocate so that it complied with the zoning regulations. Sherilene Levy, Robert 

Levy, Ryan Levy, and Levy Machining now sue Hanover Township and Jeff Heath in federal court

based on alleged conflicts of interest and selective enforcement of the zoning ordinances. The 

district court granted Hanover Township and Heath judgment on the pleadings based on claim 

preclusion. We AFFIRM the district court.
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I. BACKGROUND

For sixteen years, Mike Levy1operated Levy Machining without any issue on a property 

in Hanover Township, Michigan, that was zoned Agriculture-1 (“AG-1”). R. 1 (Compl. ¶¶ 13–

14) (Page ID #3). In April 2019, Jeff Heath was elected as the Hanover Township Supervisor. Id.

¶ 18 (Page ID #4). Heath owned the property adjacent to Levy Machining and had a tense 

interpersonal relationship with Mike Levy that had at times “devolved into face-to-face shouting 

matches” about “driveway use” and “illegal dumping.” Id. ¶¶ 17, 25 (Page ID #4–5). Heath and 

his family also had connections to Lomar, a direct competitor of Levy Machining, and Lematic, a 

Levy Machining customer. Id. ¶¶ 26–30 (Page ID #5–6).

After Heath was elected Hanover Township Supervisor, he initiated zoning enforcement 

proceedings against Mike Levy, Sherilene Levy, and Levy Machining in Michigan state court (the 

“State-Court Action”). Id. ¶ 19 (Page ID #4). In the State-Court Action, Hanover Township 

alleged that Mike Levy, Sherilene Levy, and Levy Machining violated several ordinances because 

they operated a business in an AG-1 zone without permission from Hanover Township. Id. ¶ 24 

(Page ID #5). Hanover Township moved for summary disposition of the State-Court Action. 

R. 19-5 (State Court Mot. Hr’g Tr. at 3:13–16) (Page ID #226). In response, Mike Levy, Sherilene 

Levy, and Levy Machining impliedly conceded that they had violated the ordinances, and instead 

argued several defenses. R. 19-3 (State Defs.’ Opp’n at 5–7) (Page ID #141–43). First, they 

argued that Hanover Township’s motion for summary disposition should be denied because 

1Mike Levy is married to Sherilene Levy and together they have two sons, Robert and Ryan 

Levy. R. 19-3 (Opp’n to Mot. for Summ. Disp. at 2) (Page ID #138). Mike Levy owned Levy 

Machining until 2018 when he transferred ownership to his wife and two sons. Id. Mike Levy 

was a party in only the state-court proceedings. Id.
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Hanover Township was “selectively enforcing its zoning ordinance” against Levy Machining in 

violation of their “equal protection rights.” Id. Second, they argued that the Heath family’s 

connections to Lomar and Lematic were conflicts of interest that should invalidate the Hanover 

Township board’s vote to pursue litigation against Levy Machining. Id. at 7–8 (Page ID #143–

44).

On June 4, 2020, after hearing arguments on the motion for summary disposition, the state 

court concluded that Mike Levy, Sherilene Levy, and Levy Machining violated each of the 

ordinances and that they “fail[ed] to state a valid defense that tests the legal sufficiency of” the 

claims. R. 19-5 (State Court Mot. Hr’g Tr. at 40–41) (Page ID #263–64). By granting Hanover 

Township’s motion, the state court determined that “the defenses [were] so clearly untenable as a 

matter of law that no factual development could possibly deny [Hanover Township’s] right to 

recover” relief. Id. Levy Machining was ordered to move and, as a result, incurred significant 

costs, such as moving costs, “sizeable rental obligation[s],” and several lost business contracts. R. 

1 (Compl. ¶¶ 20–22) (Page ID #4).

On November 1, 2021, Sherilene Levy, Ryan Levy, Robert Levy, and Levy Machining

filed suit against Hanover Township and Heath in federal court. Id. ¶¶ 1–8 (Page ID #2). The 

plaintiffs alleged eight counts: violation of their equal protection rights (“Count One”); violation 

of their substantive due process rights (“Count Two”); violation of their procedural due process 

rights (“Count Three”); conspiracy to interfere with civil rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985 

(“Count Four”); tortious interference (“Count Five”); defamation (“Count Six”); intrusion upon 

seclusion (“Count Seven”); and civil conspiracy (“Count Eight”). Id. ¶¶ 31–87 (Page ID #6–16).
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The plaintiffs’ equal protection claim is based on a “class-of-one” selective enforcement 

theory of liability. Id. ¶ 33 (Page ID #6). To support this theory, the plaintiffs allege that there are 

twenty businesses similarly situated to Levy Machining that are operating in Hanover Township’s 

AG-1 zones, but that these businesses have not been subject to zoning enforcement proceedings. 

Id. ¶¶ 23, 33 (Page ID #5–6). Instead, Hanover Township’s decision to institute enforcement 

proceedings against Levy Machining was allegedly motivated by Heath’s “vindictive grudge 

against the Levy family as a result of his prior conflicts with Mike Levy,” id. ¶ 43 (Page ID #8), 

and Heath’s “conflict of interest,” which “interfered with” Hanover Township’s zoning 

enforcement decisions, id. ¶¶ 50–51 (Page ID #9).

Hanover Township and Heath moved for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(c), arguing that the plaintiffs’ claims were barred by res judicata because the 

plaintiffs had the opportunity to, and did, fully litigate the claims in the State-Court Action. R. 19 

(Mot. for J. at ii) (Page ID #107). The district court found that Counts One, Two, Three, Four, 

Five, and Eight were barred by res judicata and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over 

the remaining two state-law claims. R. 37 (Dist. Ct. Op. at 23–24) (Page ID #733–34).

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

“We review de novo a grant of judgment on the pleadings” brought under Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(c), and “apply the same standard used to evaluate a motion to dismiss.”

Donovan v. FirstCredit, Inc., 983 F.3d 246, 252 (6th Cir. 2020). We must construe the allegations 

in the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and determine whether the complaint 

contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on 
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its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 

U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “Although typically courts are limited to the pleadings when faced with a 

motion under Rule 12[(c)], a court may take judicial notice of other court proceedings without 

converting the motion into one for summary judgment.” Buck v. Thomas M. Cooley Law Sch., 

597 F.3d 812, 816 (6th Cir. 2010).

B. Claim Preclusion

“Res judicata ‘preclude[s] parties from contesting matters that they have had a full and fair 

opportunity to litigate.’” Arangure v. Whitaker, 911 F.3d 333, 337 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting 

Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979)). “In deciding whether res judicata . . . lend[s] 

preclusive effect to a particular state court decision, federal courts look to the state’s law to ‘assess 

the preclusive effect it would attach’ to [a] decision.” Gutierrez v. Lynch, 826 F.2d 1534, 1537 

(6th Cir. 1987) (quoting Loudermill v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 721 F.2d 550, 557 (6th Cir. 1983)).

Accordingly, in this case we will apply Michigan res judicata law.

Michigan courts have adopted a “broad view of res judicata,” In re MCI Telecomms. 

Compl., 596 N.W.2d 164, 183 (Mich. 1999), of which there are two types: issue preclusion and 

claim preclusion, Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892 (2008). Claim preclusion “forecloses 

‘successive litigation of the very same claim,’” while issue preclusion “bars ‘successive litigation 

of an issue of fact or law.’” Taylor, 553 U.S. at 892 (quoting New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 

742, 748 (2001)). “[T]he burden of proving the applicability of the doctrine of res judicata is on 

the party asserting it.” Baraga County v. State Tax Comm’n, 645 N.W.2d 13, 16 (Mich. 2002).

At issue here is claim preclusion, which “bars not only claims already litigated, but also every 

claim arising from the same transaction that the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, could 
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have raised but did not.” Adair v. State, 680 N.W.2d 386, 396 (Mich. 2004). Michigan courts have 

adopted a three-part test such that claim preclusion “bars a second action on the same claim if ‘(1) 

the prior action was decided on the merits, (2) both actions involve the same parties or their privies, 

and (3) the matter in the second case was, or could have been, resolved in the first.’” Mecosta 

Cnty. Med. Ctr. v. Metro. Grp. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 983 N.W.2d 401, 405 (Mich. 2022) (quoting 

Foster v. Foster, 983 N.W.2d 373, 379 (Mich. 2022)).

1. Decision on the Merits

First, the district court properly found that the State-Court Action resulted in a decision on 

the merits. Typically, a state court’s final judgment and permanent injunction constitute a merits 

decision for the purpose of claim preclusion. AuSable River Trading Post, LLC v. Dovetail Sols., 

Inc., 874 F.3d 271, 274 (6th Cir. 2017); Ludwig v. Township of Van Buren, 682 F.3d 457, 459–60 

(6th Cir. 2012). Despite this well-established law, the plaintiffs argue that the state-court judgment

is not a final decision on the merits because the state court did not explicitly discuss the merits of 

their defenses. Appellant Br. at 14–15. The state court, however, was not required to do so under 

the first element of the claim-preclusion inquiry. See AuSable River Trading Post, 874 F.3d at 274 

(finding that the Michigan state-court permanent injunction was a final merits decision, even 

though the claims “could have been raised . . . as a defense in the original action” but were not and 

the Michigan state court thus did not analyze the defense on its merits). Michigan’s claimpreclusion test plainly contemplates situations in which the first court does not have the 

opportunity explicitly to analyze a particular claim on its merits. See Adair, 680 N.W.2d at 396 

(stating that res judicata bars “every claim arising from the same transaction that the parties, 

exercising reasonable diligence, could have raised but did not”). Under the first element of the 
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claim-preclusion test we consider only whether there was a final decision on the merits, not 

whether the substance of the claim was addressed.

Even if the plaintiffs were correct that the state court was required to assess their defenses 

on the merits to satisfy this element of claim preclusion, the state court’s oral decision and 

judgment make clear that it rejected their defenses on their merits. See R. 19-5 (State Court Mot. 

Hr’g Tr. at 40–41, 45) (Page ID #263–64, 268) (stating that the court must find that “the defenses 

are so clearly untenable as a matter of law” to grant judgment in favor of Hanover Township and 

then concluding that “the defendants have really not presented any tenable defense”); R. 19-2 

(State Court J. at 2) (Page ID #134) (granting Hanover Township’s motion for summary 

disposition because there was “no valid defense” and “no issue of material fact”). Therefore, there 

was a determination on the merits in the State-Court Action.

2. Privity

Next, the district court correctly found that both actions involved the same parties or their 

privies. Levy Machining, Hanover Township, and Sherilene Levy were parties to both cases. 

Therefore, the parties dispute only whether Heath is in privity with Hanover Township and whether 

Robert Levy and Ryan Levy are in privity with Levy Machining. “To be in privity is to be so 

identified in interest with another party that the first litigant represents the same legal right that the 

later litigant is trying to assert.” Adair, 680 N.W.2d at 396. “[A] perfect identity of the parties is 

not required, only a ‘substantial identity of interests’ that are adequately presented and protected 

by the first litigant.” Id. at 397.

Here, Heath is in privity with Hanover Township because he was in an employer-employee 

relationship with Hanover Township, the claims and defenses arose out of his actions as an 
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employee, and he and Hanover Township both intended to enforce the ordinance in the same way. 

See Bates v. Township of Van Buren, 459 F.3d 731, 736 (6th Cir. 2006) (finding the parties were 

in privity because both parties “sought a facial invalidation of the ordinance” and the parties had 

an employer-employee relationship); McCoy v. Michigan, 369 F. App’x 646, 650 (6th Cir. 2010)

(finding the parties were in privity “when the previous governmental-unit Defendant . . . and the 

present-case [individually named defendants] ha[d] an employer-employee relationship”).

Likewise, Robert Levy and Ryan Levy are in privity with Levy Machining because they 

were co-owners of Levy Machining at the time of the State-Court Action and they now seek to 

assert the same legal rights that Levy Machining asserted as defenses in the State-Court Action. 

See Peterson Novelties, Inc. v. City of Berkley, 672 N.W.2d 351, 358–59 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003) 

(finding privity because the plaintiff in the second case was the owner of the company that was a 

plaintiff in the first case and both suits related to the company’s rights and liabilities); see also 

Washington v. Sinai Hosp. of Greater Detroit, 733 N.W.2d 755, 757–58, 760–61 (Mich. 2007) 

(finding that the first personal representative of an estate was in privity with the second 

representative of an estate because both were asserting the estate’s rights). Therefore, both actions 

involve the same parties or their privies.

3. Resolution of the Second Matter during the First Matter

Finally, the district court was correct in determining that the current claims were or could 

have been resolved in the State-Court Action. Claim preclusion “bars not only claims already 

litigated, but also every claim arising from the same transaction that the parties, exercising 

reasonable diligence, could have raised but did not.” Adair, 680 N.W.2d at 396. “Whether a 

factual grouping constitutes a transaction for purposes of res judicata is to be determined 
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pragmatically, by considering whether the facts are related in time, space, origin or motivation, 

[and] whether they form a convenient trial unit.” Id. at 398 (quoting 46 AM. JUR. 2D Judgments

§ 533) (emphasis omitted). The plaintiffs do not contest that the claims in their federal complaint 

arise out of the same transaction as the State-Court Action. Appellant Br. at 16–19. Instead, the 

plaintiffs argue only that they could not have successfully brought counterclaims during the StateCourt Action because, at that time, damages were not ascertainable. Id.

A second action is not precluded by the first if there are new or continuing wrongs that 

occur after judgment was entered in the first action. See Jones v. Westminster, LLC, No. 334447,

2018 WL 2370634, at *5–6 (Mich. Ct. App. May 24, 2018) (per curiam) (citing Restatement 

(Second) Judgments §§ 24, 26(1)(e) (1982)). “[A] plaintiff may only bring a second suit when the 

defendant continues in his or her tortious act, but not where the plaintiff experiences ‘continual

harmful effects from an original, completed act.’” Id. at *6 (quoting Terlecki v. Stewart, 754 

N.W.2d 899, 908 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008)); see also Frank v. Linkner, 894 N.W.2d 574, 586 (Mich. 

2017) (stating that a “claim accrues at the time the wrong upon which the claim is based was done”

(quoting MICH COMP. LAWS § 600.5827)). Because the plaintiffs do not argue that any wrongful

conduct occurred after the judgment was entered in the first matter2—and the complaint similarly 

2Although the plaintiffs mention in passing that there were “continuing violations of federal 

law,” and “new conflicts” of interest, that occurred after the judgment in the state-court 

proceedings, Appellant Br. at 13, 19, they fail fully to develop the argument and, therefore, it is 

forfeited. See United States v. Reed, 167 F.3d 984, 993 (6th Cir. 1999) (stating that the “settled 

appellate rule” is “that issues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort 

at developed argumentation” are forfeited (quoting United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st 

Cir. 1990))). Moreover, the argument lacks merit because there are no allegations in the complaint 

to support the plaintiffs’ assertion that there were “new conflicts” and “continuing violations of 

federal law.” Appellant Br. at 13, 19.
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does not include any such allegations—there is no continuing wrong that would allow for a 

subsequent suit.

Moreover, applying res judicata in this case does not, as the plaintiffs suggest, lead to the 

perverse outcome evident in Sherrell v. Bugaski, 425 N.W.2d 707 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988). In 

Sherrell, the plaintiff was denied damages in her first action and then prevented by res judicata 

from bringing a second action based on an injury that did not manifest until after the first action

was complete. Id. at 709.3 Here, even if the plaintiffs are correct and their damages were not 

sufficiently ascertainable during the State-Court Action, they could have requested equitable 

injunctive relief, as they did in the federal complaint, see R. 1 (Compl. at 16 ¶ B) (Page ID #16) 

(requesting equitable relief in the form of “[a]n injunction prohibiting any further acts of 

wrongdoing, discrimination, or retaliation”), or the plaintiffs could have more fully developed the 

evidentiary record in support of their defense before the state court. Had the plaintiffs done so and 

had the state court agreed with them on the merits, there would be no state-court order forcing the 

plaintiffs to move Levy Machining. In other words, there would be no additional damages that 

became ascertainable only after the state-court proceedings because any additional harm would 

have been prevented. Indeed, this is the precise efficiency that claim preclusion—and res judicata 

more broadly—is meant to encourage. See Taylor, 553 U.S. at 892 (“By ‘preclud[ing] parties from 

contesting matters that they have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate,’” res judicata “protect[s]

against ‘the expense and vexation attending multiple lawsuits, conserv[es] judicial resources, and 

foste[rs] reliance on judicial action by minimizing the possibility of inconsistent decisions.’” 

3Notably, the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the application of res judicata in those

circumstances, which directly contradicts the plaintiffs’ argument that their continuing damages 

prevents application of res judicata. Sherrell, 425 N.W.2d at 709.
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(quoting Montana, 440 U.S. at 153–54)).

4

 Therefore, the district court properly found that the 

plaintiffs could have resolved the federal claims during the State-Court Action and thus, res 

judicata bars Counts One, Two, Three, Four, Five, and Eight.

C. Supplemental Jurisdiction

Finally, the plaintiffs argue that the district court abused its discretion by declining 

supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims because the district court improperly found that 

claim preclusion applied to the other claims. Appellant Br. at 19–20. Because we affirm the 

district court’s application of claim preclusion and the plaintiffs do not argue that the district court 

erred in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under these circumstances, there is no 

occasion to address the plaintiffs’ argument on this point.

III. CONCLUSION

The district court properly found that Counts One, Two, Three, Four, Five, and Eight were 

barred by res judicata and properly declined supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining statelaw claims. We therefore AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

4Likewise, the plaintiffs’ reliance on Ternes Steel Company v. Ladney, 111 N.W.2d 859 

(Mich. 1961), is misplaced. The portion of Ternes Steel that the plaintiffs cite is dicta. Id. at 861 

(stating that the portion of the opinion concerning res judicata was “not determinative of this

appeal,” “not pleaded below,” and not “argued to, or considered by the trial judge,” but discussing 

it nonetheless “because of the probability that it will be relied upon by defendant on remand”). 

Even if it were not dicta, under Ternes Steel, if a litigant “does not rely upon his claim as a defense 

to the first action, or as a counterclaim thereto, he is not barred from subsequently maintaining his 

action for affirmative relief in an independent suit.” Id. Here, the plaintiffs asserted the selectiveenforcement and conflict-of-interest claims as a defense in the first matter, and therefore they 

cannot now assert these claims, or claims arising from the same transaction, as an independent 

suit. See id.; see also AuSable River Trading Post, 874 F.3d at 274 (finding the third element of 

the Michigan res judicata test met because “the challenge to the validity of the . . . trademark could 

have been raised by Agnello as a defense in the original action”).