United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

Submitted March 19, 2021*

Decided March 23, 2021 

Before 

DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge 

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge 

DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge

No. 20-2355 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

ISAIAH C. FISHER, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

 Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Northern District of 

Indiana, South Bend Division. 

No. 3:15-CR-39 RLM 

Robert L. Miller, Jr., 

Judge. 

O R D E R 

Isaiah Fisher, a federal inmate who had served just five years of his 16-year 

sentence for bank robbery, sought compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), contending that his health conditions make him susceptible to 

COVID-19. Accepting that Fisher’s health conditions and the risks posed by the 

pandemic constituted an extraordinary and compelling reason for Fisher’s release, the 

district court nonetheless denied his motion after applying the sentencing factors under 

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). It concluded that Fisher’s early release would endanger the public 

*

 We have agreed to decide this case without oral argument because the briefs 

and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would 

not significantly aid the court. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C). 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION 

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 
No. 20-2355 Page 2 

because of his history of committing violent crimes while on supervised release and the 

substantial portion of his sentence remaining. Because the court did not abuse its 

discretion in weighing the § 3553(a) factors, we affirm. 

Fisher, who is 40 years old and has been serving a 188-month sentence for bank 

robbery since 2015, see 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), moved for compassionate release in April 

2020. He argued that he had two extraordinary and compelling reasons for early 

release. First, his health conditions—he is prediabetic, a former smoker, and has a low 

platelet count—place him at heightened risk of serious illness if he contracts COVID-19. 

Second, his sentence was based on a career-offender designation that the Sentencing 

Commission has since revised, and if he were sentenced today he would no longer be 

subject to the career-offender designation. Fisher also urged that the § 3553(a) factors 

supported his early release—he maintained that he was no longer a danger to the 

public, as he had completed rehabilitation courses and had maintained a clean 

disciplinary record during his incarceration. 

The district court denied Fisher’s motion. It acknowledged that Fisher “laid out a 

reasonable case that, at least with respect to . . . his physical condition, that the 

COVID-19 pandemic constitutes a[n] ‘extraordinary and compelling reason’ for a 

sentence reduction.” Even so, it concluded that the § 3553(a) factors weighed against his 

early release, which, the court believed, would threaten public safety. The court 

recognized that Fisher had a record of good behavior during his current stint in prison. 

But it noted that the same was true of his previous imprisonments—despite consistently 

staying out of trouble while in prison, Fisher had twice committed robbery while out on 

supervised release. His recidivism, combined with his having served only about a third 

of his 16-year sentence, led the court to conclude that continued incarceration was 

necessary to “protect the public from the violent and dangerous side of Mr. Fisher.” 

On appeal, Fisher tells us that he “does not believe that the district judge erred.” 

Nonetheless he asks us to “reconsider” his request for release because the district court 

said that he has an extraordinary and compelling reason for release. And, he repeats, he 

has completed rehabilitative programming in prison, which he believes means that he 

will not endanger the public. 

Fisher misapprehends our role on appeal. We review the district court’s denial of 

compassionate release only for abuse of discretion. United States v. Saunders, 986 F.3d 

1076, 1078 (7th Cir. 2021). We do not replace our judgment for that of the district court. 

Because Fisher points to no error in the court’s reasoning and asks only that we reweigh 
No. 20-2355 Page 3 

the § 3553(a) factors, his arguments must fail. See United States v. De La Torre, 940 F.3d 

938, 954 (7th Cir. 2019). 

Regardless, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Fisher’s 

motion. Even if Fisher established an extraordinary and compelling reason for release, a 

court may grant compassionate release under § 3582(c)(1)(A) only “after considering the 

factors set forth in section 3553(a).” Saunders, 986 F.3d at 1078. Indeed, “[b]ecause of the 

importance of the § 3553(a) factors, courts are not compelled to release every prisoner 

with extraordinary and compelling health concerns.” Id. As Fisher acknowledges, the 

court’s analysis of the sentencing factors was reasonable. It emphasized that, despite 

Fisher’s good behavior in prison, he has repeatedly committed violent crimes upon 

release, even after similar displays of good prison behavior. See § 3553(a)(1). And, given 

the sentencing goals of deterring crime and protecting the public, the court permissibly 

ruled that it should not excuse Fisher from two-thirds of his sentence for his serious 

crime. See §§ 3553(a)(2)(B), (C); see also Saunders, 986 F.3d at 1078 (affirming denial of 

compassionate release, despite prisoner’s extraordinary and compelling reasons, given 

the district court’s assessment that the defendant’s offense was serious, and he had 

served only one-third of his sentence). 

Fisher also seeks to introduce on appeal new evidence of additional medical 

conditions (a recent intestinal infection and high blood pressure), records of his 

rehabilitative programming, and evidence of low recidivism in people over 40 years 

old. But we are limited to reviewing the evidence presented in the district court. 

United States v. Acox, 595 F.3d 729, 731 (7th Cir. 2010). And, in any case, the court was 

aware that Fisher had health issues and had completed rehabilitative programs, but 

nonetheless reasonably found that Fisher’s early release would endanger the public. 

Finally, Fisher repeats his argument that, along with his health conditions, 

changes to the sentencing guidelines affecting career-offender designations, which 

would result in a lower sentence if he were sentenced today, create an extraordinary 

and compelling reason for a sentence reduction. See U.S.S.G. amend. 798 (Aug. 1, 2016).

The guidelines changes, however, were not made retroactive, see U.S.S.G. 

§§ 1B1.10(a)(1), (a)(2)(A), (d), so the district court was not required to grant a sentence 

reduction on that basis. Further, as we explained above, even if the guidelines changes 

did constitute a compelling circumstance, it would not help Fisher, as the court 

reasoned that his release was not warranted under § 3553(a). 

AFFIRMED