COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Benton, Willis and Lemons 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

JASON ANTHONY JACKSON 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 0119-98-2 JUDGE DONALD W. LEMONS 

 APRIL 6, 1999 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HALIFAX COUNTY 

Charles L. McCormick, III, Judge 

 Buddy A. Ward, Public Defender (Office of the 

Public Defender, on brief), for appellant. 

 Kathleen B. Martin, Assistant Attorney 

General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General; 

Lisa R. McKeel, Assistant Attorney General, 

on brief), for appellee. 

 Jason A. Jackson was convicted of one count of statutory 

burglary in violation of Code § 18.2-91 and one count of petit 

larceny in violation of Code § 18.2-96. On appeal, he argues 

that the trial court erred in imposing a juvenile sentencing 

option as a condition of suspending the execution of a prison 

sentence. Because we hold that the trial court committed no 

error, we affirm the convictions. 

I. BACKGROUND 

Jason A. Jackson was indicted for one count of statutory 

burglary and one count of grand larceny arising from events that 

occurred on or about April 16, 1997. On May 13, 1997, pursuant 
to Code § 16.1-269.1(A), Jackson, a sixteen-year-old juvenile, 

was transferred from the Halifax Juvenile and Domestic Relations 

District Court to the Circuit Court of the County of Halifax to 

be tried as an adult for both charges. At a hearing held on 

June 30, 1997, Jackson appealed his transfer to the circuit 

court. By order entered the same day, the court upheld the 

transfer of the charges to the circuit court and permitted the 

Commonwealth to seek an indictment. 

On September 12, 1997, pursuant to a plea agreement, 

Jackson pled guilty to the charge of statutory burglary and the 

reduced charge of petit larceny. On December 12, 1997, the 

trial court sentenced Jackson to ten years in prison for the 

statutory burglary charge to be served concurrently with one 

year in prison for the petit larceny charge. The court 

suspended his entire sentence for both convictions upon the 

conditions that Jackson be committed to the Department of 

Juvenile Justice pursuant to Code § 16.1-285.1 until he turned 

twenty-one, that Jackson complete the “Serious Offender Program” 

of the State Department of Juvenile Justice, and that he be of 

good behavior for ten years upon his release from the Department 

of Juvenile Justice. 

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II. CONDITIONAL SENTENCE 

A trial court is permitted to sentence a juvenile offender 

as an adult, under certain circumstances. Code § 16.1-272 

provides in pertinent part: 

(A) In any case in which a juvenile is 

indicted, the offense for which he is 

indicted and all ancillary charges shall be 

tried in the same manner as provided for in 

the trial of adults, except as otherwise 

provided with regard to sentencing. Upon a 

finding of guilty of any charge other than 

capital murder, the court shall fix the 

sentence without the intervention of a jury. 

1. If a juvenile is convicted of a violent 

juvenile felony, the sentence for that 

offense and for all ancillary crimes shall 

be fixed by the court in the same manner as 

provided for all adults, but the sentence 

may be suspended conditioned upon a 

successful completion of such terms and 

conditions as may be imposed in a juvenile 

court upon disposition of a delinquency 

case. 

2. If the juvenile is convicted of any 

other felony, the court may sentence or 

commit the juvenile offender in accordance 

with the criminal laws of this Commonwealth 

or may in its discretion deal with the 

juvenile in the manner prescribed in this 

chapter for the hearing and disposition of 

cases in the juvenile court, including, but 

not limited to, commitment under 

§ 16.1-285.1. 

Code § 16.1-285.1 permits a trial court to sentence a 

juvenile offender over the age of fourteen who is considered a 

“serious offender.” A juvenile may be committed under Code 

§ 16.1-285.1(A) if he or she was found guilty of an offense 

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which would have been a felony if committed by an adult and if 

either, 

(i) the juvenile is on parole for an offense 

which would be a felony if committed by an 

adult, (ii) the juvenile was committed to 

the state for an offense which would be a 

felony if committed by an adult within the 

immediately preceding twelve months, (iii) 

the felony offense is punishable by a term 

of confinement of greater than twenty years 

if the felony was committed by an adult, or 

(iv) the juvenile has been previously 

adjudicated delinquent for an offense which 

if committed by an adult would be a felony 

punishable by a term of confinement of 

twenty years or more, and the circuit court, 

or the juvenile or family court, as the case 

may be, finds that commitment under this 

section is necessary to meet the 

rehabilitative needs of the juvenile and 

would serve the best interests of the 

community, then the court may order the 

juvenile committed to the Department of 

Juvenile Justice for placement in a juvenile 

correctional center for the period of time 

prescribed pursuant to this section. 

 Code § 19.2-303 provides that, “[a]fter conviction, whether 

with or without a jury, the court may suspend imposition of 

sentence or suspend the sentence in whole or part and in 

addition may place the accused on probation under such 

conditions as the court shall determine . . . .” 

 Jackson pled guilty to statutory burglary, a felony, and 

petit larceny, a misdemeanor. Had Jackson been found guilty of 

a violent juvenile felony defined in Code § 16.1-228, the trial 

judge would be required pursuant to Code § 16.1-272(A)(1) to 

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sentence him as an adult, but the court could suspend the adult 

sentence “conditional upon successful completion of such term 

and conditions as may be imposed in a juvenile court upon 

disposition of a delinquency case.” Because statutory burglary 

is not considered a violent juvenile felony, the trial court 

sentenced him pursuant to Code § 16.1-272(A)(2). Code 

§ 16.1-272(A)(2) does not require the imposition of an adult 

sentence, but authorizes it, and further authorizes a juvenile 

sentence. Jackson argues that the trial court did not have the 

authority under Code § 16.1-272(A)(2) to order a “combination of 

sentences which impose a juvenile commitment and an adult prison 

sentence . . . .” Jackson contends that the word “or” in the 

text of Code § 16.1-272(A)(2) reflects a legislative intent to 

prohibit a judge from sentencing a juvenile both as an adult and 

as a juvenile “serious offender” pursuant to Code § 16.1-285.1. 

We disagree. In Nuckoles v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 

1083, 407 S.E.2d 355 (1991), the defendant was convicted of 

taking indecent liberties with a child in violation of Code 

§ 18.2-370, and was sentenced to five years in the penitentiary, 

which was suspended for a period of twenty years based upon 

various conditions, including that “he serve twelve months in 

jail to be followed by supervised probation.” Id. at 1084, 407 

S.E.2d at 355. After his release from jail, the defendant was 

arrested on new charges for a similar offense. The court held a 

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revocation hearing, and the trial judge imposed the five year 

suspended sentence, crediting him for the twelve months he 

served in jail. See id. at 1084, 407 S.E.2d at 355. 

The defendant in Nuckoles argued that “under Code 

§ 18.2-370 a court has authority to sentence a person convicted 

of a class six felony to one of two maximum punishments: either 

twelve months in jail or five years in prison, but not both.”1 

Id. at 1085, 407 S.E.2d at 356. We disagreed and stated, “the 

court imposed a five year penitentiary sentence and suspended 

the execution of this sentence based on several conditions, one 

of which was that the defendant serve a twelve-month jail term.” 

Id. at 1085, 407 S.E.2d at 356. In upholding the trial court’s 

revocation of the defendant’s suspended sentence, we stated: 

Code § 19.2-303 allows a trial judge, after 

conviction, to suspend a sentence in whole 

or in part, and in addition, to place the 

defendant on probation “under such 

conditions as the court shall determine.” 

The statute places wide discretion in the 

trial court to determine what conditions are 

to be imposed in each particular case. The 

Virginia Supreme Court has noted the wide 

latitude the legislature has afforded trial 

courts in fashioning rehabilitative programs 

for defendants. Inherent in the power 

granted under § 19.2-303 . . . to suspend 

imposition or execution [of sentence,] is 

 1

 Code § 18.2-10 authorizes punishments for conviction of a 

felony. For Class 6 felonies, punishment is "a term of 

imprisonment of not less than one year nor more than five years, 

or in the discretion of the jury or the court trying the case 

without a jury, confinement in jail for not more than twelve 

months and a fine of not more than $2,500, either or both." 

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the power to place conditions on such 

suspension. 

Id. at 1085, 407 S.E.2d at 356 (citations omitted). The “only 

limitation placed upon the discretion of the trial court in its 

determination of what conditions are to be imposed is that a 

condition be ‘reasonable.’” Id. at 1086, 407 S.E.2d at 356 

(citation omitted). 

In the case before us, Jackson pled guilty to statutory 

burglary and petit larceny. At the sentencing hearing, 

Jackson’s counsel requested that the court sentence him as a 

“juvenile as a serious offender” to keep Jackson out of the 

penitentiary system. The Commonwealth stipulated that Jackson 

qualified as a serious offender under the definition of the 

statute but opposed the court’s sentencing him under this 

statute, citing two previous commitments of Jackson to a 

juvenile facility. 

The court considered Jackson’s age, physical size, and 

previous offenses, stating, “we could put him in this serious 

offender program and give him a chance down there but at the 

same time let it be known that if he didn’t take advantage of 

it, of that chance, then I would transfer him over to the adult 

system. . . .” In deciding to sentence Jackson as a “serious 

offender” under Code § 16.1-285.1, the court intended to benefit 

Jackson by keeping him out of the penitentiary system as 

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requested by his counsel. If we adopted the construction of 

Code § 16.1-272(A)(2) advanced by Jackson, less serious 

offenders would be deprived of an option given juveniles 

convicted of a “violent juvenile felony.” We do not believe the 

legislature intended such a result. 

As we stated in Nuckoles, 

[t]he obvious purpose of affording trial 

courts discretion in matters of suspension 

and probation is to provide a remedial tool 

to use in the rehabilitation of criminals. 

A jail condition serves a punitive function, 

demonstrating to offenders the seriousness 

of their conduct. Moreover, this condition 

also serves as a deterrent by giving 

offenders a taste of what lies ahead if they 

do not reform their conduct. 

Id. at 1086, 407 S.E.2d at 356. 

We find nothing in the record indicating that the 

imposition of a juvenile sentencing option as a condition of 

suspending the execution of Jackson’s prison sentence was 

unreasonable. We therefore affirm the sentence imposed by the 

trial court. 

Affirmed.

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Benton, J., concurring. 

 I adhere to the view I expressed in Nuckoles v. 

Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 1083, 1087-92, 407 S.E.2d 355, 357-60 

(1991) (Benton, J., dissenting), that absent legislative 

authorization a trial judge may not impose incarceration in jail 

as a condition for suspending a prison sentence. However, I 

believe the juvenile offender sentencing statute contains that 

authorization, and, therefore, I agree with the majority that 

the trial judge did not err. 

 Code § 16.1-272 expressly grants the trial judge the 

discretion to suspend a prison sentence imposed on a juvenile 

who was tried as an adult and convicted of a violent felony. It 

states that “the sentence may be suspended conditioned upon 

successful completion of such terms and conditions as may be 

imposed in a juvenile court upon disposition of a delinquency 

case.” Code § 16.1-272(A)(1). Given this express grant of 

discretion under Code § 16.1-272(A)(1), which applies to violent 

juvenile felonies, I find no logical reason to deny similar 

authority under Code § 16.1-272(A)(2), which applies to 

non-violent juvenile felonies. If the trial judge has 

discretion to sentence a violent juvenile felon as an adult, yet 

commit the juvenile to the juvenile system as a condition of a 

suspended sentence, the legislature surely intended the trial 

judge to have the same discretion when sentencing a non-violent 

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juvenile felon. To hold otherwise would mean that violent 

juvenile felons who are sentenced as adults could be committed 

to the juvenile system while trial judges who decide to sentence 

non-violent juvenile felons as adults would have no choice but 

to commit the juvenile to the adult prison system. I believe 

the legislature did not intend such an anomalous result. 

 By placing the various sentencing schemes within one 

statute, the legislature has given a clear indication that it 

intended to grant trial judges authorization to exercise the 

same discretion under Code § 16.1-272(A)(2) as the trial judge 

would exercise under Code § 16.1-272(A)(1). “[A] fundamental 

rule of statutory construction requires that courts view the 

entire body of legislation and the statutory scheme to determine 

the ‘true intention of each part.’ In construing statutes, 

courts should give the fullest possible effect to the 

legislative intent embodied in the entire statutory enactment.” 

Virginia Real Estate Bd. v. Clay, 9 Va. App. 152, 157, 384 

S.E.2d 622, 625 (1989) (citation omitted). 

 For these reasons, I concur in affirming the trial judge’s 

decision. 

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