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PROFESSIONAL EVALUATION OF THE RECORD

On April 15, 2014, Braggs was adjudged guilty of the Second Degree

Felony offense ofBurglary ofa Habitation.7 That same day, Braggs pled true to the

second paragraph of the indictment which alleged a prior felony conviction. On

May 28, 2014, the trial court sentenced Braggs to fifteen years in prison.9 The

following is counsel for Appellant's professional evaluation of the record in this

case:

Factual Background

This appeal follows Braggs' conviction for burglary of a habitation.10 The

evidence adduced at trial by the State was as follows:

Margie Carlton testified that on the date ofthe offense, she lived in a duplex

apartment near her daughter.11 In the early morning hours ofthat day, Carlton had

visited with her daughter, who lived six apartments down from her apartment, and

she had begun walking back towards her own apartment. As she neared her

home, she noticed her next-door neighbors' windows to be broken and the back

door appeared to have been left open. Carlton also identified Braggs as another

7C.R. 52-54; 6 R.R. 166-167

86R.R. 168

97 R.R. 28-29; C.R. 52-54

10 C.R. 52-54

"5R.R. 14-15

12 Id.

13 Id. at 15-18
one ofher neighbors, and she also identified him in-court as the defendant.

Patrol Officer Debreah Chism testified that she responded to the call which

led to this case, and that when she arrived at the duplex she could see that the

windows were broken and that the back door was open, at which time she called

for another officer.15 Chism and the other officer "cleared" the duplex and

confirmed that no one was inside.16 Chism testified that the residence was located

in Killeen, Bell County, Texas. Chism also took fingerprints. Chism also spoke

with the owner of the residence, and he identified items which had been taken.

Among those items were approximately 95 DVDs and a 52-inch television.

Edward Barfield, Evidence Manager and fingerprint examiner for the

Killeen Police Department, testified that a palm print taken from the scene matched

a known print belonging toBraggs.21

Patrol Officer Albert Haas, Jr. testified that his work duties are with the

Burglary Unit of Killeen Police Department, and this led to him working on this

case.22 Haas began investigating this case with the knowledge that Braggs' palm

14 Id. at 19.

Id. at 20-22

16 Id. at 23

17 Id.

18 Id. at 27-31

19 Id. at 27

20 Mat 27, 43-44

21 6R.R.6, 13-25

11 Id. at 31-32
print had matched a palm print taken from the scene of the burglary. Haas did a

search on Braggs' name in an online database which tracks pawned items. As a

result of his search, Haas learned that Braggs had pawned eighteen movies and one

video game on the same day as this burglary. Haas contacted the victim of the

burglary, and he stated that the pawned items were items which belonged to him.

On cross-examination, Haas admitted that the date of birth shown on the pawn

ticket was not the same as Braggs', and further that the signature on the ticket is

not similar toBraggs' signature found elsewhere.27

Kyle Kelley testified that on the date of the offense he was working at a

business known as Game Exchange, and at that business he had engaged in a

transaction with Braggs. On cross-examination, Kelley admitted that he did not

recall the specific transaction with Braggs and that the date of birth discrepancy

had not been noticed, and was likely an error made by another employee.

Elizabeth Estrada testified that she is the area manager for Game

Exchange.30 She described part of her job duties as being the custodian ofrecords

23 Id. at 35-36

24 Id.

25 Id. at 36

26 Id. at 37

27 Id. at 50

28 Id. at 53-54

29 Id. at 63-64, 69-70

30 Id. at 78
for Game Exchange.31 She was the one who provided the receipt to Detective

Haas.32 Estrada also testified that if no date of birth is entered into an account when

it is setup in their system, the default is January 1, 1950 (the date shown as the date

of birth for Braggs; indicating that no date of birth was actually entered for him at

the time the account was created).33 She also testified that the receipt reflected one

video game and eighteen movies had been pawned to them on the date in

question.34

Finally, Nicolas Koonce, testified that on the date ofthis incident, he lived at

if

the residence the subject of this case. Koonce testified that a television, some

movies and at least one video game had been taken in the burglary.36 Koonce

reviewed the list of pawned items with Detective Haas and he believed the items

were his items which had been taken during the burglary.37 Koonce did not know

Braggs at the time, and did not give him permission to be inside his residence or to

take the items which had been stolen.

Braggs, during opening argument, indicated that the evidence regarding the

palm print (found on the outside of the residence) and the pawning of the items

31 Id. at 80

32 Id. at 87-88

33 Id. at 90-91

34 Id. at 95-96

35 Id. at 116-118

36 Id. at 123

37 Mat 125-126, 130-131

38 Id. at 126
was going to be contested (the items pawned were not identifiable as the specific

items stolen from the residence, and that the identity of the person who sold the

items to the third party was uncertain).39 Braggs' presentation of evidence in this

regard was through cross-examination ofthe State's witnesses.

Sufficiency ofthe Indictment

The indictment filed against Braggs alleged that on June 26, 2012, Braggs

"did then and there intentionally or knowingly enter a habitation, without the

effective consent of Nicolas Koonce, the owner thereof, and attempted to commit

or committed theft of property, to-wit: dvd's and video game, owned by Nicolas

Koonce."40

The offense of Burglary of a Habitation, as alleged in the indictment, is

found inTexas Penal Code Section 30.02(a)(3).41 That section states, inpart, that a

person commits an offense if, without the effective consent of the owner, the

person... enters a building or habitation and commits or attempts to commit a

felony, theft, or anassault."42

The general rule is that an indictment which tracks the statutory language

proscribing certain conduct is sufficient to charge a criminal offense.43 Here, the

395R.R. 11-12

40 C.R. 4-5

41 (West 2012)

42 Id.

43 State v. Edmond, 933 S.W.2d 120, 127 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (en banc); See also, Hatch v.

State, 174 S.W. 1062, 1064 (Tex. Crim. App. 1915)
indictment does so.

Further, there were no objections filed or made against the indictment in this

case by Braggs. The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure requires that any objection

to a defect, error, or irregularity of form or substance in an indictment must be

made before the date on which the trial on the merits commences; otherwise the

defendant waives and forfeits the right to object to the defect, error, or irregularity

and he may not raise the objection on appeal. Thus, the indictment is sufficient.

Jurisdiction. Venue & Limitations

This case was indicted by the Grand Jury of Bell County, Texas and filed in

the 426th Judicial District Court on April 10, 2013.4D The presentment of an

indictment to a court invests the court with jurisdiction of the cause.46 The

judgment in this case was entered by the 27th Judicial District Court of Bell

County, Texas, on May 28, 2014.47 The 27th Judicial District Court and the 426th

Judicial District Court have concurrent jurisdiction in Bell County.48 Thus,

jurisdiction was proper in the trial court below.

The indictment did allege that the offense was committed in the county

wherein the prosecution was carried on.49 To sustain an allegation of venue, it is

44 Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 1.14 (West 2014)

45 C.R. 4-5

46 Tex. Const. Art. V, § 12

47 C.R. 52-54

48 Tex. Gov't Code § 24.129(b) (West 2014)

49 C.R. 4-5
only necessary to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that by reason of the

facts in the case, the county where such prosecution was carried on had venue.50

The testimony at trial was that the acts which led to this case being brought against

Braggs all occurred within Bell County, Texas.51 Thus, venue was proper in the

trial court below.

The statute of limitations for the offense of burglary of a habitation is five

^9 _ S^ years. The offense was alleged to have occurred on June 26, 2012. The

indictment was filed April 10, 2013.54 Thus, the five year limitations period was

satisfied in this case.

Adverse Pretrial Rulings Affecting the Course ofTrial

The trial court's docket reflects that there were no adverse pretrial rulings in

this case.55

Jury Selection

The voir dire transcript reflects that there were no adverse rulings made.56

Adverse Rulings During Trial on Objections or Motions

1. Admission ofa Leading Question on Direct ofa Witness by the State

Braggs objected to the State's leading of a State's witness. Specifically,

50 Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 13.17

5l5R.R.23

52

53 C.R. 4-5

54 C.R. 4-5

55 C.R. 61

564R.R. 1-105

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 12.01(4)
S7 Braggs objected to a question by the State of Officer Debreah Chism. During the

first day oftrial, the following exchange occurred:

State: "So you would have checked it anyway, but certainly once you

saw those prints that could be partially seen—

Braggs: "Your honor, I've been pretty lenient here, you know, but I

think counsel is leading the witness a little excessively."

The Court: "Overruled."

The objection was that the question was leading. Texas Rule of Evidence

611(c) generally prohibits leading questions on direct examination of witnesses

CO

"except as may be necessary to develop the testimony ofthe witness."

It is not clear why the trial court overruled the objection. It certainly appears

that the question was headed in the direction of being a leading question, but

Braggs objected prior to the conclusion ofthe question. Perhaps the trial court felt

that it was necessary to develop the testimony of the witness. After being

overruled, the State asked one more question and passed the witness.59 The bottom

line is that it is not clear what harm resulted from the overruling of his objection, as

Braggs clearly stated that he had been "pretty lenient" in allowing many leading

questions prior that one objection.

2. Admission ofnumberoftransactions made by Appellant

Braggs objected to the State asking the Game Exchange area manager,

57 5 R.R. 37

58 Tex. R. Evid. 611 (West 2014)

59 5 R.R. 37
Elizabeth Estrada, how many transactions Braggs engaged with Game Exchange

during part of 2012.60 Braggs objected to relevancy, the State responded that the

defense brought up the issue, and the trial judge agreed that "It's in issue" and

overruled the objection.61 The State then repeated the question and Braggs made no

objection that time.

It is a general rule that "almost every right, constitutional and statutory, may

be waived by the failure to object." Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1

requires an appellant to show a complaint before the trial court.

Here, Braggs objected once, but not the second time. Thus, the error, if any,

was waived.

3. OtherAdverse Rulings During Trial on Objections or Motions

There were no other adverse rulings during the course of the trial on either

objections or motions by Braggs. To be certain, both the State and Braggs made

other objections, but the record does not demonstrate that any of those preserved

anything for appellate review.

Jury Instructions

At the conclusion ofthe charge conference, both the State and Braggs stated

60 6 R.R. 92 61 Id.

62 Smith v. State, 721 S.W.2d 844, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986)

10
that they had no objections with the charge as prepared.

In this case, the jury charge tracks the language of the indictment and

correctly includes the statutory elements of the offense. Further, the definitions,

instructions and application ofthe law to the facts of this case was done properly.

Regardless, as there was no objection to the charge, the general rule is still that

"almost every right, constitutional and statutory, may be waived by the failure to

object."64 Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1 requires an appellant to show a

complaint before the trial court.

Adverse Rulings on Post-Trial Motions

The trial court's docket reflects that there were no post-trial rulings in this

65 case.

Sufficiency ofthe Evidence

As stated above, the offense for which Braggs was convicted was burglary

of a Habitation as a repeat offender, and that offense is found in Texas Penal Code

Section 30.02(a)(3).66 The relevant elements of that offense are: 1) a person, 2)

without the effective consent of the owner, 3) enters, 4) a habitation, and 5)

commits theft.67 The indictment further alleged that the offense occurred on or

63 6 R.R. 143-144

64 Smith, 721 S.W.2d at 855

65 C.R. 65

66 (West 2012)

67 Id.

11
about June 26, 2012; and that it occurred inBell County, Texas.68

The testimony admitted during this trial showed that Braggs was the person

alleged to have committed the offense. Nicolas Koonce testified that on the date of

this incident, he was the owner of a residence in Bell County, Texas. Koonce

testified that a television, some movies and at least one video game had been taken

from the inside of his residence. Kyle Kelley testified that on the date of the

offense, he was working at the Game Exchange and engaged in a transaction ofthe

7 1 items with Braggs, who pawned them to the Game Exchange. Koonce reviewed

the list of pawned items with Detective Haas and he believed the items were his

79 items which had been taken during the burglary. Koonce did not know Braggs at

the time, and did not give him permission to be inside his residence or to take the

items which had been stolen.

Having found some evidence for each of the elements of the offense, it

appears that the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's findings in this

case.

Review of Sentence Imposed

The trial court sentenced Braggs to fifteen years in the Institutional Division

68 C.R. 4-5

69 5 R.R. 23; 6 R.R. 116-118

706R.R. 123

71 6 R.R. 53-54

72 Id. at 125-126, 130-131

73 Mat 126

12
of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice.74 The offense of burglary of a

Habitation is normally a second degree felony offense.7:) However, Braggs pled

true to a prior felony conviction. The punishment range on a repeat second

degree felony offense is that of a first degree felony offense. The trial court found

the prior felony convictions to be true. Therefore, the punishment range was

elevated to a minimum of 5 years to a maximum of 99 years, or life, in prison.

Braggs was sentenced to fifteen years, which is within the punishment range

available to the court upon a finding of guilt in this case. Because fifteen years is a

sentence which is within the punishment range available to the court upon a

finding of guilt in this case, there is no error regarding the sentence imposed.

<*Y QtherJ.Errors Rising to-ItefltefaafffttaftttAjtar T*

74 C.R. 52-54 75 Tex. Penal Code § 30.02(c)(2) (West 2012)

766R.R. 168

77 Tex. Penal Code § 12.42(b) (West 2014)

786R.R. 168; 7 R.R. 28-29

79 Tex. Penal Code §§ 12.42(b), 12.32 (West 2014)

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THE STATE OF TEXAS

VS.

MARCUS BRAGGS

e*.\\Afe.*Cf°>

CAUSE NO. 70294; m.112/

S IN THE 27th DISTR

§ COURT OF

§ BELL COUNTY, TEXAS

'eteefc

MAYO2 2013

MOTIOM gQR PSYCHIATRIC EXAMINATION ^ *s"

TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT:

NOW COMES MARCUS BRAGGS, the Defendant herein, by and through

counsel, and would show unto the Court as follows:

I.

The Defendant herein does not, in the opinion of counsel,

have sufficient present ability to consult with counsel to a

reasonable degree of rational understanding, and does not have a

rational or factual understanding of the proceedings against

Defendant.

II.

The facts and circumstances of the alleged offense give rise

to the possibility that the Defendant was not competent at the

time of the alleged commission of said offense.

III.

In order to determine the present mental status of the

Defendant, a psychiatric examination is requested by Counsel for

the Defense, pursuant to Article 46.02, Section 3, Texas Code of

Criminal Procedure. In order to permit the undersigned attorney

to properly and adequately represent said Defendant, it is

necessary that the stated attorney be notified of the date, time

and place of any examination, so as to allow such attorney for SCAtf

PJ'IW 13 r'\
Defendant to attend said examination, and in this regard, Counsel

for the Defendant expressly objects to any mental examination

conducted outside of the presence of Counsel for the Defense.

Further, such appointment is required to preserve Defendant's

rights under the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the

United States Constitution, Article 1, Sections 10 and 19 of the

Texas Constitution, and Articles 1.04, 1.05 and 1.051, Texas Code

of Criminal Procedure.

IV.

Defendant requests that any expert appointed to conduct the

necessary examination be directed to reduce all

medical/psychiatric findings pertaining to the Defendant's

competence to stand trial to written form, and to include within

such written report the methods, tests or procedures utilized in

the examination, any observations and/or findings, recommended

treatment, and whether or not there is a substantial probability

that the Defendant will attain competency to stand trial in the

foreseeable future.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Defendant herein, by and

through counsel, prays that the Court order the appropriate

authorities to conduct a psychiatric examination, in the presence

of Defense counsel, to determine the competency of the Defendant

to stand trial, in conformity with the law and the relief sought

herein.

14
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

[M MAHLER

ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT

P.O. BOX 266

200 E. CENTRAL AVENUE

BELTON, TEXAS 76513

PHONE: 254-939-5845

FAX: 254-939-5147

STATE BAR #: 12836700

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

As Attorney of Record for Defendant, I do hereby Certify that

a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document was

this date provided to the Attorney for the State.

Date: S~ "& "V 3

Attorney for Defendant

15
CAUSE NO. 70294; 71112

THE STATE OF TEXAS § IN THE 27th DISTRICT

VS. § COURT OF

MARCUS BRAGGS § BELL COUNTY, TEXAS

ORDBR FOR PSYCHIATRIC EXAMINATION

BE IT REMEMBERED, that on the *> day of JhA *i /

20JJ> came on to be heard the above and foregoing matter, wherein

Defendant, by and through counsel, seeks psychiatric examination

to determine the competency of the Defendant to stand trial.

After careful consideration, the Court is of the opinion that

such should be:

(!^fGRANTED.

( ) DENIED, to which ruling the Defendant excepts.

( ) SET FOR HEARING ON THE day of ,

20 , at o'clock .

SIGNED:

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Number 70294 and^lljT)

THE STATE OF TEXAS INTHEDIS

VS.

MARCUS DEWAYNE BRAGGS BELL COU

ORDER APPOINTING DISINTERESTED EXPERT TO EXAMINE DEFEND

COMPETENCY UNDER ART. 46B. C.C.P.

On thisday, came to beheard theMotion of Tim Mahler, attorney, for appointment of a

disinterested expert toexamine (he defendant, and after considering the Motion, the Court isof

the opinion that the Motion shouldbe granted.

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDEREDTHAT DR. CHARLES PIERCE, DR. FRANK

PUGLTESE, OR OTHER QUALIFIED PERSON be appointed to examine the defendant asto his

competency tostand trial and for such expert toreport in writing tothis Court his findings and to

testify at any trial orhearing inconnection with the accusation against the defendant.

In connection with the examination, the expert is instructed as follows:

(1) A person is incompetent to stand trial if he does nothave:

(a) Sufficient present ability toconsult with his lawyer with areasonable degree of

rational understanding; or

(b) A rational as well asfactual understanding of the proceedings against him/her.

(2)The charge alleged against thedefendant is attached to this Order.

(3) No statement made by thedefendant during theexamination orhearing on his

competency to stand trial may beadmitted inevidence against the defendant onthe

issue of guilt in any criminal proceeding.

(4) The appointed expert shall submit awritten report tothe Court as tothecompetency

in of the defendant to standtrial,

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(5) The written report ofthe examination shall be submitted tothe Court within thirty

(30) days of the order of examination, and the Court shall furnish copies of the report

to thedefense counsel and theprosecuting attorney. The report shall include a

description ofthe procedures used inthe examination, the examiner's observations

and recommendations for treatment.

(6) If the examiner concludes that thedefendant isincompetent to stand trial, the report

shall include the examiner's observations and findings about whether there is a

substantial probability that the defendant will attain the competency tostand trial in

the foreseeable future.

(7) The examinershall also submit aseparate report setting forth his observations and

findings concerning:

(a) Whether thedefendant ismentally ill and requires observation and/or treatment or

hospitalization in amental hospital for his own welfare and protection of others;

or

(b) Whether the defendant isamentally retarded person as defined in the Mentally

Retarded Persons Act (Article 5547-300 V.A.C.S.) and requires commitment to a

mental retardation facility.

(c) A mentally retarded person means aperson determined by acomprehensive

diagnosis and evaluation to be ofsubaverage general intellectual functioning with

deficits in adaptivebehavior.

(8) Ifthe examiner is aphysician and concludes that the defendant is mentally ill he shall

complete and submit to the Court acertificate ofmedical examination for mental

illness which is attached to this order.

(9) If the examination is conducted by aUnit ofthe Texas Department ofMental Health

and Mental Retardation and the examiner concludes that the defendant is amentally

retarded person, the examiner shall submit to the Court an affidavit setting forth the

conclusionsreached as a result of the diagnostic examination.

(10) The appointed expert shall be paid areasonable fee for his services and he shall submit

a reasonable estimate of bis services to the Court.

Signed and entered this the 2nd day of May, 2013.

cc: Sheriffs Office -

District Attorney's Office - LeslieMcWilliams

Defense Attorney - Tim Mahler

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NOS. 70,2<

Cm,

ORIGINAL

THE STATE OFTEXAS § IN THE 27TH DISTRICT

VS. § COURT OF

MARCUS DEWAYNE BRAGGS § BELL COUNTY, TEXAS

AGREED ORDER OP COMMITMENT - NON - SECURE FACILITY

DEFENDANT INCOMPETENT WITH A PROBABILITY OF RECOVERY

On May 13, 2013, this matter came before the Court inconnection with the issue of the

competency of MARCUS DEWAYNE BRAGGS, Defendant, tostand trial herein.

Endings tfthf C9Mrt;

After hearing thetestimony ofwitnesses and considering the evidence presented, the Court

found as follows: p I I FR

MARCUS DEWAYNE BRAGGS isnot competent tostand trial. «\U?i« nmo'clock

Finding of the Court: MAY 16 2013

The Defendant has been determined incompetent. Di8lrict ^^gTM Texas

By: Susan Montgomery. Deputy Clark

Commitment for Restoration to Competency under Chanter 46B a^ffiYYX-/

The Court further finds that MARCUS DEWAYNE BRAGGS is a danger to others and

public safety.

TheCourt, therefore, MARCUS DEWAYNE BRAGGS,Defendant, COMMITTED to and

confined to the appropriate facility designated bythe Forensic Admissions Clearing House for the

Department of State Health Services. The Court further ORDERS that Defendant beconfined at

said facility for a period not toexceed 120 days for further examination and treatment toward the

specific objective of attaining competency to stand trial.

It is further ORDERED that the Sheriff of Bell County take the person of Defendant,

MARCUS DEWAYNE BRAGGS. and transport Defendant to said facility.

It isfurther ORDERED that acopy ofthis orderbesent tothe facility towhich thedefendant

is committed. It is further ORDERED thatsaid facility shall be furnished copies ofthe following .

made available to theCourt during the incompetency hearing: H .'~r

fjDp^4°.:.. SCAN \yi^\\\^> 19
(1) reportsof eachexpert;

(2) psychiatric, psychological, orsocial workreports thatrelate to the mental condition

of the defendant;

(3) documents provided by the attorney representing the State or the attorney

representing the Defendant that relate to the Defendant's current or past mental

condition;

(4) copies of the indictment orinformation and any supporting documents used to

establishprobable causein the case;

(5) the Defendant's criminal history record; and

(6) the addresses ofthe attorney representing the State and the attorney representing the

Defendant.

Itisfurther ORDERED that thecourt reporter forthwith prepare atranscript of all medical

testimony received by the jury or Court, and that such transcript be forwarded to said facility.

Treatment Program:

It is further ORDERED thatthe facility to whichtheDefendant is committed shall:

(1) develop an individual program of treatment;

(2) assess and evaluatewhetherthe Defendantwillobtaincompetency in the foreseeable

future; and

(3) report to the Court and to the local mental health authority or to the local mental

retardation authority onthe Defendant's progress toward achieving competency.

It is further ORDERED that if theDefendant is committed to an impatient mental health

facility or to aresidential care facility, the facility shall report to the Court at least once during the

commitment period. Ifthe Defendant isreleased to atreatment program not providedbyan inpatient

mental health facility oraresidential care facility, the treatment program shall report tothe Court:

(1) not laterthan the 14th day afterthe date on which the Defendant's treatment begins;

and

(2) until the Defendant is no longer released to the treatment program, at least once

during each 30-day period following the date the aforementioned report is required.

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PpH.m tn ^ommlttino Court:

It is further ORDEREDthat MARCUS DEWAYNEBRAGGS, Defendant, shall be returned

tothis Court assoonas practicable afterthe earliest of the following dates:

(1) thedate onwhichthefacility determinesthattheDefendant hasattained competency;

(2) the date on which the facility determines that the Defendant will not attain

competency in the foreseeable future; or

(3) the date on which the term of commitment expires.

Notice to Co"imJft|ff)g frflllt

It is further ORDERED that the head of a facility to which MARCUS DEWAYNE

BRAGGS. Defendant, has been committed underthissubchapter, notlaterthan the 14th day before

the date on which a commitment order is to expire, shall notify this Court that the term of the

commitment is about to expire.

The Court further finds that the head of the facility to which the Defendant has been

committed under this subchapter shall promptly notify the committing Court when the head ofthe

facility is of the opinion that:

(1) the Defendant hasattained competency to stand trial; or

(2) theDefendant willnotattain competency inthe foreseeable future.

Ifthe head ofthe facility to which the Defendant has been committed notifiestheCourt that

the commitment order isabout toexpire, the notice may contain arequest for an extension of the

commitment order for aperiod of60 days and an explanation for the basis ofthe request.

RennrtBv Facility Head:

It is further ORDERED that when the head of a facility to which MARCUS DEWAYNE

BRAGGS, Defendant, iscommitted, dischargesthe Defendant and the Defendant is returned tothe

committing court, the head ofthe facility shall file afinal reportwith the courtstating the reason for

the discharge. TheCourtshall furnish copies ofthe reporttothe defense counsel and the prosecuting

attorney.

Itis further ORDERED thatif thehead of the facility believesthat theDefendant is aperson

with mental illness and meets thecriteria for court-ordered inpatient mental health services under

Subtitle C, Tide 7, Health and Safety Code, the head of the facility shall submit to the court a

certificate of medical examination for mental illness. The head of the facility shall include inthe

final report alist ofthe types and dosages ofmedications wityh which the defendant was treated for

mental illness while in the facility.

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Furthermore, if thehead of the facility isof theopinion that theDefendant isa person with

mental retardation, the head of the facility shall submit to the Court an affidavit stating the

conclusions reached as a result ofthe examination.

Return ofDeffrfttiftn' to fftyrf 1ft JfrtfrffliPE Competency:

It is furtherORDERED thaton the returnofMARCUS DEWAYNE BRAGGS, Defendant,

to the committing court, the court shall make a detennination with regard to the Defendant's

competency tostand trial. The Court may make the determination based solely onthereport filed

under Article46B.080(b), unless any party objects inwriting or inopen courtto the findings ofthe

report not later than the 15th day after the date onwhich the report isserved onthe parties.

Subsequent Determination ofCompetency:

It is further ORDERED that if MARCUS DEWAYNE BRAGGS, the Defendant, is found

competent to stand trial, criminal proceedings against the Defendant may beresumed.

It is further ORDERED that if MARCUS DEWAYNE BRAGGS, the Defendant, is found

incompetent to stand trial and if all charges pending against the Defendant are not dismissed, the

Court shall proceed under Subchapter EofArticle 46B of the Texas Rules ofCriminal Procedure.

It is further ORDERED that if MARCUS DEWAYNE BRAGGS, the Defendant, is found

incompetent to stand trial and ifall charges pending against the Defendant are dismissed, the Court

shall proceed under Subchapter FofArticle 46B ofthe Texas Rules ofCriminal Procedure.

It is further ORDERED that a Defendantcommitted under this subchapter may not be

recommitted in connection with the same offenseunder Subchapter D of Article46B of theTexas

Rules ofCriminal Procedure.

SIGNED onmfyiu. .,2013.

APPRO

M*«-

ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY

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THE STATE OF TEXAS

VS.

MARCUS DEWAYNE BRAGGS

Wtb^ CcD

NO. 70,294

§ IN THE 27TH DISTR ILED

COURT OF tt^1* Pm0'C,°*

BELLCOUNTY, TEXjSP* 26 2013

SHELIA NORMAN

DistriclCfiurt. Bell Counly. Texas

JUDGMENT RESTORING COMPETENCY * s^5rr^t^^ Do(»"> Cle" By: Sytfan

Signal

The defendant, MARCUS DEWAYNE iBRAGGS, having been found tobementally

incompetent to stand trial on the 6th day ofMay, A.D. 2013; and the defendant having been

committed for treatment toMontgomery County Mental HealthTreatment Facility and the head of

that facility having informed this Court on the 3rd day ofSeptember, A.D. 2013; that said

defendant is now competent to stand trial; and a copy ofthe report from the head ofthe facility

having been served on the District Attorney and the attorney for the defendant; and thefifteen day

period having expired with no objectionstothe report having been presented, in writing orin

open court, by the DistrictAttorney orthe attorney for the defendant and this Court having

examined the medical report which statesthat the defendant has now attained competency to stand

trial and it appearing to this Court that the defendant is presently competent;

It is ADJUDGED andDECREED that the Defendant, MARCUS DEWAYNE BRAGGS,

is now competent to stand trial.

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JUDGE PRESIDING

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