J-S57043-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

W. W. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellant

v.

M.S. – W.

Appellee No. 1044 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Order Entered March 5, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Civil Division at No: 1310V7081

BEFORE: DONOHUE, MUNDY, and STABILE, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 13, 2014

Appellant, W.W.,1appeals pro se from the trial court’s March 5, 2014 

order denying Appellant’s petition for contempt. Appellant alleged Appellee, 

M.S.-W., repeatedly violated the trial court’s final order entered pursuant to 

the Protection From Abuse Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6101, et seq. We affirm. 

Appellant commenced this litigation with a Protection From Abuse 

(“PFA”) petition he filed against Appellee on October 9, 2013. Appellee filed 

a PFA petition against Appellant on October 17, 2013. On November 5, 

2013, the parties appeared at a hearing before Judge Ida K. Chen and 

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1

 In a prior appeal, at number 987 EDA 2013, this Court redacted the 

parties’ names. See infra at footnote four. For consistency, we have done 

the same here. 
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consented to entry of a mutual stay-away order to be effective for one year. 

Also on November 5, 2013, the trial court devised a temporary custody 

order to govern the parties in their ongoing dispute over the custody of their 

minor child.2 

On January 23, 2014, Appellant filed a petition to hold Appellee in 

contempt of the PFA order, alleging Appellee violated a no contact provision 

in the order. Appellant filed a second petition to hold Appellee in contempt 

of the PFA order on January 31, 2014. On March 5, 2014, Judge Maria 

McLaughlin conducted a hearing, at the conclusion of which she declined to 

hold Appellee in contempt but ordered make-up custody time for Appellant. 

N.T. Hearing, 3/5/14, at 29-31. Appellant filed this timely pro se appeal on 

April 1, 2014. He raises two issues for our review: 

Did the trial court erred [sic] when during Appellant’s 

Petition for Contempt [. . .] and without a petition for 

modification of custody filed or pending, unilaterally and without 

a petition for modification of custody filed or pending, 

unilaterally and illegally modified the custody provisions 

contained in the original mutual Protection From Abuse Orders 

agreed to by the parties and entered as an Order of Court? 

Did the trial court erred [sic] when it failed to find Appellee 

in contempt for violating the mutual Protection From Abuse 

Order agreed to by the parties and entered as an Order of 

Court? 

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2

 See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6108(a)(4) (permitting the trial court to create 

temporary custody arrangement as part of a PFA order). 
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Appellant’s pro se Brief at 8.3 

Appellant’s first issue is not properly before this court. “Generally, a 

custody order will be considered final and appealable only if it is both: (1) 

entered after the court has completed its hearings on the merits; and (2) 

intended by the court to constitute a complete resolution of the custody 

claims pending between the parties.” Wagner v. Wagner, 887 A.2d 282, 

285 (Pa. Super. 2005). The parties’ custody battle is ongoing, and the trial 

court planned additional hearings shortly after the March 5 PFA contempt 

hearing. The record reflects the trial court conducted an expedited hearing 

on the custody dispute on March 12, 2014, only one week after the order 

presently on appeal. At the conclusion of that hearing, the trial court issued 

an interim custody order pending a full hearing to be held July 30, 2014.4 

Since the trial court has not completed its hearings on the pending custody 

dispute, and since the order on appeal plainly does not constitute a complete 

resolution of the parties’ custody claims, we decline to address Appellant’s 

first assertion of error. 

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3

 Appellee has not filed a brief with this Court. 

4

 By order of May 9, 2014, this Court quashed Appellant’s appeal from the 

trial court’s March 12, 2014 order because that order was not final and 

appealable. W.W. v. M.S.-W., 987 EDA 2013 (per curiam order, May 9, 

2014). We note that the appendix to Appellant’s pro se brief erroneously 

includes the trial court opinion pertaining to the March 12, 2014 order. 
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In his second assertion of error, Appellant claims the trial court erred 

in not finding Appellee in contempt of the March 5, 2014 PFA order. 5 

Section 6114.1 of the PFA Act permits a plaintiff to file a petition for civil 

contempt with the court that issued the PFA order. 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6114.1. 

Appellant has done so here. 

In proceedings for civil contempt of court, the general rule 

is that the burden of proof rests with the complaining party to 

demonstrate, by preponderance of the evidence, that the 

defendant is in noncompliance with a court order. However, a 

mere showing of noncompliance with a court order, or even 

misconduct, is never sufficient alone to prove civil contempt. 

To be punished for contempt, a party must not only have 

violated a court order, but that order must have been "definite, 

clear, and specific-leaving no doubt or uncertainty in the mind of 

the contemnor of the prohibited conduct. Because the order 

forming the basis for civil contempt must be strictly construed, 

any ambiguities or omissions in the order must be construed in 

favor of the defendant. In such cases, a contradictory order or 

an order whose specific terms have not been violated will not 

serve as the basis for a finding of contempt. To sustain a finding 

of civil contempt, the complainant must prove certain distinct 

elements: (1) that the contemnor had notice of the specific order 

or decree which he is alleged to have disobeyed; (2) that the act 

constituting the contemnor’s violation was volitional; and (3) 

that the contemnor acted with wrongful intent. A person may 

not be held in contempt of court for failing to obey an order that 

is too vague or that cannot be enforced.

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5

 An order declining to hold a party in contempt is appealable where the 

contempt relates to a prior final order. Schultz v. Schultz, 70 A.3d 826, 

828 (Pa. Super. 2013). Since the alleged contempt relates to the final PFA 

order entered March 5, 2014, we will address the merits of Appellant’s 

argument. 
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In re Cullen, 849 A.2d 1207, 1210-11 (Pa. Super. 2004). We review the 

trial court’s decision for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 1210. 

Appellant claims the trial court erred because Appellee repeatedly 

contacted him in violation of the no contact provision in the November 5, 

2013 PFA order. Appellee, through counsel conceded at the hearing that she 

contacted Appellant regarding custody exchanges of the parties’ minor child. 

N.T. Hearing, 3/5/14, at 7. Appellee believed she was free to do so 

because, on the written PFA order, the trial court left the “no contact” box 

unchecked. Id. at 6. Appellant argues the PFA order was clear, definite, 

and specific in ordering no contact despite the unchecked box, because 

language elsewhere in the PFA order prohibited contact between the parties. 

Appellant also asserts the box was erroneously left unchecked.6 

The trial court concluded reasonable minds could differ as to whether 

the PFA order prohibited contact, and therefore declined to hold Appellee in 

contempt. We agree with the trial court’s assessment. The text next to the 

unchecked box reads as follows: “Except as provided in paragraph 5 of this 

order, [M.S.-W.] shall not contact [W.W.] by telephone or by other means, 

including through third persons.” PFA Order, November 5, 2013. Paragraph 

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6

 Though the transcript is less than clear on the subject, the parties seem to 

reference subsequent corrections to the PFA order. N.T. Hearing, 11/5/13, 

at 10. They did not, however, have signed copies of it at the hearing. Id. 

We have confined our analysis to the order of record that was the basis for 

the trial court’s decision to deny Appellant’s contempt petition. 
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5 of the order details the parties’ custody arrangement regarding their minor 

child.7 

Under these circumstances, we believe the trial court acted within its 

discretion in determining that Appellee’s conduct did not amount to an 

intentional violation of a definite, clear, and specific court order. 

Furthermore, it appears Appellee could reasonably believe contact was 

permissible regarding custody exchanges even if the disputed box was 

checked. We find no error in the trial court’s decision. 

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/13/2014

 

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7

 The record reflects that the parties made custody exchanges at a police 

station in Ardmore, Pennsylvania. N.T. Hearing, 11/5/13, at 10.