UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD 

SUZANNE MACMULLIN,

Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 

SECURITY,

Agency.

DOCKET NUMBER

PH-0842-21-0140-I-2

DATE: December 6, 2022

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL1

Lawrence Berger, Esquire, Glen Cove, New York, for the appellant.

David M. Burns, Esquire and Sarah L. Montgomery, Esquire, Washington, 

D.C., for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman

Raymond A. Limon, Member

Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which

affirmed the agency’s decision denying her application for Federal Employees’ 

Retirement System (FERS) law enforcement officer (LEO) retirement credit. For 

 

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add 

significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, 

but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not 

required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a 

precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board 

as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
2

the reasons discussed below, we GRANT the appellant’s petition for review and 

REVERSE the initial decision. The appellant’s application for LEO retirement 

credit is GRANTED. 

BACKGROUND

¶2 The appellant worked in various law enforcement positions within the 

Department of the Interior from September 17, 1995, through January 7, 2006. 

MacMullin v. Department of Homeland Security, MSPB Docket No. PH-0842-21-

0141-I-1, Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 8 at 13-18. On January 8, 2006, she 

transferred directly from one of these positions to a Supervisory Physical Security 

Specialist position within the Department of Homeland Security, the respondent 

agency in this appeal. Id. at 114. During her tenure in that position, the agency 

“corrected” the appellant’s retirement plan code several times, switching it back 

and forth between LEO-covered and non-LEO-covered, until finally settling on 

LEO coverage. Id. at 9, 27-35. On September 28, 2008, the appellant was 

promoted to the position of Supervisory Criminal Investigator, which the agency 

also coded for LEO coverage. Id. at 54-55. Thereafter, the agency maintained 

records indicating that the appellant had been earning LEO retirement credit 

throughout this entire period, and it continued deducting retirement contributions 

at the LEO rate. IAF, Tab 8 at 60, Tab 13 at 19-21, 71.

¶3 In June 2017, incidental to a retirement estimate request, the agency took 

note of the multiple “corrections” that it had previously made to the appellant’s 

retirement coverage code while she was serving as a Physical Security Specialist. 

IAF, Tab 8 at 57-59. The agency then embarked upon an extensive review of the 

appellant’s employment history to determine whether there were any errors in her 

retirement coverage. Id. at 57. On April 30, 2020, the agency notified the 

appellant that her Physical Security Specialist position had not been approved for 

LEO coverage, and because of this break in LEO-covered service, she also did not 

meet the conditions of secondary LEO coverage for her service as a Supervisory 
3

Criminal Investigator. Id. at 60-61. Thus, the appellant was informed for the 

first time that none of her previous 14 years of service were creditable towards an 

LEO retirement. The agency notified the appellant of her right to seek a 

determination of coverage under 5 C.F.R. § 842.804(c). Id. at 60-61. The 

appellant submitted a request for rigorous LEO coverage, and on February 4, 

2021, the agency denied the request.2 Id. at 11-134.

¶4 The appellant filed a Board appeal. IAF, Tab 1. After a hearing, the 

administrative judge issued an initial decision affirming the agency’s decision. 

MacMullin v. Department of Homeland Security, MSPB Docket No. PH-0842-21-

0140-I-2, Appeal File, Tab 12, Initial Decision (ID). Considering the appellant’s 

position description and testimony regarding her day-to-day duties, the 

administrative judge found “less than preponderant evidence that the purpose of 

the subject position was law enforcement.” ID at 2-6, 8-9.

¶5 The appellant has filed a petition for review, disputing the administrative 

judge’s analysis. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 5. The agency has 

responded to the petition for review, and the appellant has filed a reply to the 

agency’s response. PFR File Tabs 7-8.

ANALYSIS

¶6 Under 5 U.S.C. § 8412(d), an employee covered under FERS may retire at 

age 50 after completing 20 years of LEO service, or at any age after completing 

25 years of LEO service. For purposes of FERS retirement coverage, there are 

two types of LEO positions—rigorous and secondary. 5 C.F.R. § 842.803(a)-(b). 

Apart from details and temporary promotions, all service in a rigorous LEO 

position is covered under 5 U.S.C. § 8412(d). 5 C.F.R. § 842.803(a)(1)-(2). 

Service in a secondary LEO position is covered if the employee moves directly 

 

2

The agency denied the request on both timeliness and substantive grounds. IAF, 

Tab 8 at 123-34. The parties briefed the timeliness issue before the Board, and the 

administrative judge ruled that the appellant’s request was timely. IAF, Tabs 12-15. 

We agree with the administrative judge’s ruling, which the agency has not contested.
4

from a rigorous position to a secondary position, the employee has completed 

3 years of service in a rigorous position, and the employee has been continuously 

employed in a secondary position without a break in service exceeding 3 days. 

5 C.F.R. § 842.803(b). The issue in this appeal is whether the appellant met the 

conditions for coverage in a rigorous LEO position during her employment as a 

Supervisory Physical Security Specialist from January 8, 2006, through 

September 27, 2008.3

¶7 An employee can qualify for LEO retirement credit in a rigorous position 

either by serving in a position that has been approved as such, or by applying for 

LEO credit and satisfying the employing agency that she is entitled to LEO 

retirement credit because her actual duties primarily involve pursuing or 

detaining criminals. Watson v. Department of the Navy, 262 F.3d 1292, 1296 

(2001); Bingaman v. Department of the Treasury, 127 F.3d 1431, 1434 (Fed. Cir. 

 

3

For reasons that are unclear, the appellant never attempted to claim secondary 

coverage for her service as a Supervisory Physical Security Specialist (although the 

agency’s decision denied both rigorous and secondary coverage). The record was never 

developed on this issue, and it was not addressed in the initial decision. Based on the 

record before us, it seems highly likely that the appellant’s service in this position 

satisfied the conditions for secondary coverage set forth in 5 C.F.R. § 842.803(b)(1). 

Nevertheless, because we find that the appellant’s service in this position qualified for 

coverage under 5 C.F.R. § 842.803(a), as service in a rigorous position, it is 

unnecessary for us to remand the appeal for adjudication of the secondary coverage 

issue.

Similarly, there is an unresolved issue of fact as to whether the agency head previously 

made a determination, in accordance with 5 U.S.C. § 842.803(a), .804(a), and .808(a), 

that Supervisory Physical Security Specialist was a rigorous or secondary LEO position. 

IAF, Tab 8 at 28-29, Tab 13 at 10. If that were the case, there is a serious question as 

to whether the agency had the authority to revoke that determination retroactively 

14 years later. An agency is authorized to retroactively designate a position as LEO 

covered, but it does not appear that an agency is authorized to retroactively revoke such

coverage. See Office of Personnel Management, CSRS and FERS Handbook, Special 

Retirement Provisions for Law Enforcement Officers, Firefighters, Air Traffic 

Controllers, and Military Reserve Technicians, ch. 46, §§ 46A3.2-6, 46B3.2-3

(April 1998), https://www.opm.gov/retirement-services/publications-forms/csrsfershandbook/c046.pdf. We likewise decline to decide this issue because the appellant is 

prevailing on other grounds.
5

1997); see 5 C.F.R. § 842.803(a), .804. To prove entitlement to service credit for 

the relevant period, the appellant must establish that she occupied a “rigorous 

position whose primary duties [were] the investigation, apprehension, or 

detention of individuals suspected or convicted of offenses against the criminal 

laws of the United States, or the protection of officials of the United States 

against threats to personal safety.” 5 C.F.R. § 842.802. Employees “whose 

primary duties involve maintaining order, protecting life and property, guarding

against or inspecting for violations of law, or investigating persons other than 

those who are suspected or convicted of offenses against the criminal laws of the 

United States” are not entitled to rigorous LEO credit. Id. 

¶8 During the pendency of the petition for review, the United States Court of 

Appeals for the Federal Circuit issued a precedential decision directly addressing 

the issues in this appeal. Klipp v. Department of Homeland Security, 34 F.4th 

1326 (Fed. Cir. 2022). In particular, the court emphasized that “the Board must 

make two independent findings: the first must be based on the position 

description evidence alone, and if that finding is adverse to the emplo yee, the 

second must be based solely on evidence of his or her actual duties.” Id. at 1333. 

In this case, the administrative judge did not make these two independent 

findings. Instead, she essentially weighed the appellant’s position description 

against her day-to-day job duties, and concluded that the Supervisory Physical 

Security Specialist position was not created for the purpose of law enforcement. 

ID at 8-9. This analysis is not consistent with the court’s holding in Klipp. 

Nevertheless, because that the record is fully developed on the relevant issues, the 

Board will apply the two-part analysis on review. See Vitale v. Department of 

Veterans Affairs, 107 M.S.P.R. 501, ¶ 16 (2007) (addressing the jurisdictional 

issue for the first time on petition for review where the record on jurisdiction was 

fully developed).

¶9 Considering the position description itself, we find that it does not denote 

that Supervisory Physical Security Specialist is a rigorous LEO position. IAF, 
6

Tab 8 at 194-99. The summary description of the position indicates that the 

incumbent is responsible “for the planning, operation and leadership of assigned 

security and enforcement activities,” and “serves as primary advisor to the 

District Director regarding physical security, crime prevention and law 

enforcement operations for an assigned geographic area.” Id. at 195. It does not 

mention investigation, apprehension, or detention of individuals or the protection 

of officials of the United States. The long list of “major duties” that follows 

covers duties associated with advising the Director, monitoring the effectiveness 

of personnel, conducting security assessments, acting as a liaison between the 

agency and various third parties, data collection and analysis, and work planning. 

Id. at 196-97. The last category of “major duties” concerns “duties as a law 

enforcement official,” performed “[o]n a recurring basis.” Id. at 197. The 

position description provides that the incumbent is authorized to carry a firearm 

and make arrests, but it goes on to say that this law enforcement work concerns 

the protection of life, property, and the rights of individual citizens, as well as 

enforcement of compliance with laws and regulations. Id. This type of work 

does not qualify as LEO work under 5 C.F.R. § 842.802. The position description 

ends by stating that the incumbent “arrests offenders and provides police 

assistance during emergency and/or life threatening situations,” which does 

qualify as rigorous LEO work, see 5 C.F.R. § 842.802, but in the context of the 

position description as a whole, such work does not appear to constitute a 

Supervisory Physical Security Specialist’s primary duties, IAF, Tab 8 at 198. 

Furthermore, although the position description refers to “medical testing 

requirements,” these requirements are not specified, and there are no provisions 

for maximum entry or minimum retirement ages. Id. at 199. For these reasons, 

we find that the position description does not describe a LEO position as defined 

in 5 U.S.C. § 8401(17). Rather, we find that the position description is akin to 

the one at issue in Watson, 262 F.3d at 1303-04, which the court found did not 
7

primarily consist of the investigation, apprehension or detention of criminals or 

suspected criminals.

¶10 Turning to the second inquiry, we find that evidence of the appellant’s 

actual job duties is sufficient to establish that her service as a Supervisory 

Physical Security Specialist was creditable as service in a rigorous LEO position. 

Physical vigorousness and hazardousness are the major factors to be considered in

determining a Federal employee’s LEO status based on actual duties. Klipp,

34 F.4th at 1332; Crowley v. United States, 398 F.3d 1329, 1338-39 (Fed. Cir. 

2005). “Physical vigorousness,” is the first and predominate factor. Crowley, 

398 F.3d at 1339. “The relevant considerations in any vigorousness 

determination are whether or not the position brings with it (in order of 

importance): 1) strenuous physical fitness requirements; 2) age requirements 

(such as a mandatory retirement age or a maximum entry age); or 3) a 

requirement that an employee be on call twenty four hours a day.” Id. As to the 

first subfactor, the record in this case shows that the appellant’s position had 

strenuous physical fitness requirements. Prior to her appointment, the appellant 

was required to take and pass a demanding physical fitness examination that 

included a 1.5 mile run, agility, bench press, body composition, and flexibility 

requirements. Hearing Transcript (Tr.) at 29-30 (testimony of the appellant). 

Furthermore, during her entire tenure in this position, the appellant was required 

to participate quarterly in a rigorous defensive tactics course that included 

handcuffing and ground fighting, and she employed these skills frequently in the 

execution of her job duties. Tr. at 21-22, 31, 33-34 (testimony of the appellant), 

123 (testimony of the Regional Director). The agency also afforded the appellant 

3 hours every week of on-duty “fitness time” during which she was encouraged to 

go to the gym and maintain her physical conditioning. Tr. at 31 (testimony of the 

appellant). Regarding the second subfactor, it is undisputed that there was no 

maximum entry or minimum retirement age for Supervisory Physical Security 

Specialists. Tr. at 81-83 (testimony of the appellant). Regarding the third 
8

subfactor, it is also undisputed that the appellant was on call 24 hours per day. 

Tr. at 18-19 (testimony of the appellant). Considering these three subfactors 

together and assigning them weight in accordance with their importance, we find 

that the physical vigorousness factor is satisfied. We therefore move on to the 

hazardousness factor. See Crowley, 398 F.3d at 1339.

¶11 To determine hazardousness, the Board will “consider whether the position 

(in order of importance): requires frequent and consistent contact with criminal 

suspects on the part of the employee (including interrogation of suspects and 

pursuit or detention of criminals); or authorizes the employee to carry a firearm.” 

Crowley, 398 F.3d at 1339. The record in this appeal shows that both of these 

subfactors are satisfied. First, the appellant estimated that, during the 33 months 

that she served as a Supervisory Physical Security Specialist, she made on 

average 1 or 2 arrests per month, for a total of approximately 40 or 50 arrests. Tr. 

at 15-16 (testimony of the appellant). She also testified that, apart from 

individuals whom she actually arrested, she had contact with criminal suspects 

multiple times per week, and that this was a “constant” part of her job. Tr. at 17 

(testimony of the appellant). The appellant’s testimony in this regard is not in 

dispute. Nor is it disputed that the appellant was authorized to carry a firearm. 

Tr. at 19 (testimony of the appellant). In fact, firearms qualification was a part of 

the quarterly defensive tactics course discussed above. Tr. at 32-33 (testimony of 

the appellant). In any event, the administrative judge credited the appellant’s 

testimony that she spent at least half of her working time, about 60%, pursuing 

criminal investigations. ID at 5-6; Tr. at 24 (testimony of the appellant), 122-23 

(testimony of the Regional Director). We therefore find that the appellant’s job 

duties satisfy the hazardousness factor as well. See Klipp, 34 F.4th at 1333 

(explaining that, under Federal Circuit precedent, an individual who is authorized 

to carry a firearm and spends 50% or more of her time pursuing criminal 

investigations likely satisfies the hazardousness requirement).
9

¶12 The administrative judge acknowledged that the appellant regularly 

performed rigorous LEO duties during the course of her employment as a 

Supervisory Physical Security Specialist. However, she found that this was not a 

function of the appellant’s position as set forth in the position description and 

was instead an unintended consequence attributable to the unavailability of 

Special Agents to perform rigorous LEO work in her area. ID at 8-9. However, 

this situation, where the employee’s actual experience of the job differs 

substantially from the official position description, is exactly what the two-part 

inquiry was meant to address. See Klipp, 34 F. 4th at 1332; Crowley, 398 F.3d 

at 1340. By considering evidence of the position description and the 

appellant’s actual job duties together rather than separately, the administrative 

judge did not reach the central issue of whether, in the real world, the service that 

the appellant actually rendered as a Supervisory Physical Security Specialist 

consisted primarily of rigorous LEO duties. For the reasons explained above, in 

our application of the two-step analysis, we conclude that it did.

ORDER

¶13 We ORDER the agency to grant the appellant the appropriate amount of 

LEO retirement credit. The agency must complete this action no later than 

20 days after the date of this decision. In connection with these awards, the 

appellant is ORDERED to make appropriate arrangements with the agency to 

deposit into the Civil Service Retirement and Disability Fund an amount to cover 

the higher withholding rate that applies to LEO positions.

¶14 We also ORDER the agency to tell the appellant promptly in writing when 

it believes it has fully carried out the Board’s Order and of the actions it has 

taken to carry out the Board’s Order. The appellant, if not notified, should ask 

the agency about its progress. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.181(b). 

¶15 No later than 30 days after the agency tells the appellant that it has fully 

carried out the Board’s Order, the appellant may file a petition for enforcement 
10

with the office that issued the initial decision on this appeal if the appellant 

believes that the agency did not fully carry out the Board’s Order. The petition 

should contain specific reasons why the appellant believes that the agency has not 

fully carried out the Board’s Order, and should include the dates and results of 

any communications with the agency. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.182(a).

NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT REGARDING

YOUR RIGHT TO REQUEST

ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS

You may be entitled to be paid by the agency for your reasonable attorney 

fees and costs. To be paid, you must meet the requirements set forth at Title 5 of 

the United States Code (5 U.S.C.), sections 7701(g), 1221(g), or 1214(g). The 

regulations may be found at 5 C.F.R. §§ 1201.201, 1201.202, and 1201.203. If 

you believe you meet these requirements, you must file a motion for attorney fees 

and costs WITHIN 60 CALENDAR DAYS OF THE DATE OF THIS DECISION. 

You must file your motion for attorney fees and costs with the office that issued 

the initial decision on your appeal.

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS4

You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By 

statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such 

review and the appropriate forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). 

Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit 

Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most 

appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a 

statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their 

jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should 

immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all 

 

4

Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated 

the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the 

Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
11

filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time 

limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.

Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review 

below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions 

about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you 

should contact that forum for more information. 

(1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking 

judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S. 

Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court 

within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C. 

§ 7703(b)(1)(A). 

If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 

Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the 

following address: 

U.S. Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit 

717 Madison Place, N.W. 

Washington, D.C. 20439 

Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal 

Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular 

relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is 

contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11. 

If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to 

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at 

http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation 

for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The 

Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that 

any attorney will accept representation in a given case. 
12

(2) Judicial or EEOC review of cases involving a claim of 

discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you 

were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action 

was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain 

judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination 

claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court (not the 

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you 

receive this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems 

Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017). If you have a 

representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before 

you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days

after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of 

discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling 

condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and 

to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a. 

Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective 

websites, which can be accessed through the link below: 

http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx. 

Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment 

Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding 

all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the 

EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive

this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case, 

and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file 

with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives

this decision. 

If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the 

address of the EEOC is: 
13

Office of Federal Operations 

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 

P.O. Box 77960 

Washington, D.C. 20013 

If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or 

by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to: 

Office of Federal Operations 

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 

131 M Street, N.E. 

Suite 5SW12G 

Washington, D.C. 20507 

(3) Judicial review pursuant to the Whistleblower Protection 

Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised 

claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or 

other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D). 

If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s 

disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in 

section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 

2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial 

review either with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court 

of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 5 The court of appeals must receive your 

petition for review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision. 

5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B). 

 

5

The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain 

whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on 

December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on 

July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of 

MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 

The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115 -195, 

132 Stat. 1510. 
14

If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for 

the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the 

following address: 

U.S. Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit 

717 Madison Place, N.W. 

Washington, D.C. 20439 

Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal 

Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular 

relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is 

contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11. 

If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to 

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at 

http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation 

for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The 

Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that 

any attorney will accept representation in a given case. 

Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their 

respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below: 

http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx. 

 

 

FOR THE BOARD:

Washington, D.C.

 /s/ for 

Jennifer Everling

Acting Clerk of the Board