UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

IRA B. KEARSE, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.  No. 03-1009

LARRY G. MASSANARI, Acting

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant-Appellee. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of South Carolina, at Columbia.

Patrick Michael Duffy, District Judge.

(CA-01-2521-3-23)

Submitted: June 17, 2003

Decided: August 26, 2003

Before WIDENER and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges,

and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

COUNSEL

Ronald A. Hightower, HIGHTOWER LAW FIRM, Lexington, South

Carolina, for Appellant. Robert D. McCallum, Jr., Assistant Attorney

General, J. Strom Thurmond, Jr., United States Attorney, John B.

Grimball, Assistant United States Attorney, Yvette G. Keesee,

Regional Chief Counsel, Region VIII, Bonnie E. Sims, Assistant

Regional Counsel, Office of the General Counsel, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee. 
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c). 

OPINION

PER CURIAM: 

Ira B. Kearse appeals the district court’s order rejecting the magistrate judge’s recommendation to reverse the Commissioner’s decision

and remand, instead affirming the Commissioner’s denial of social

security disability and supplemental security income benefits. We

affirm. 

Kearse makes the following arguments: (1) the ALJ erred in his

weighing of the medical evidence; (2) the ALJ erred in his credibility

determination; and (3) the ALJ presented an inaccurate and/or incomplete hypothetical to the vocational expert. 

We must uphold the district court’s disability determination if it is

supported by substantial evidence. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2000);

Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990). Contrary to

Kearse’s argument, the ALJ properly discredited the disability determination of Carey A. Washington, Ph.D. The medical source opinion

regulations indicate that the more consistent an opinion is with the

record as a whole, the more weight the Commissioner will give it. See

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d), 416.927(d) (2000). The record reveals that

the other medical sources opined that, although Kearse experienced

various limitations, he still was able to perform various functions,

including, inter alia, understanding, remembering, and carrying out

simple instructions. Moreover, Kearse’s activities of daily living contradict Washington’s disability determination. In particular, Kearse

testified that he was able to cut wood, mow grass, and occasionally

shop. Likewise, Franklin J. Klohn, Jr., Ph.D., a state agency psychologist, found that Kearse could take care of personal tasks such as making a bed, sweeping, mopping, mixing, cooking, straightening his

room, and cleaning house. Thus, we find that the ALJ did not err by

discrediting Washington’s disability determination. 

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Next, Kearse argues that the ALJ made an improper credibility

determination regarding his allegations of pain. Again, we find that

this argument fails. In evaluating a claim of pain, the ALJ should

determine whether the claimant has produced evidence of a condition

that could be expected to produce the pain alleged. See Craig v.

Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 594-96 (4th Cir. 1996). Once medical evidence

is produced supporting the existence of a condition that could reasonably produce pain, the Commissioner must assess the effect of pain

on the claimant’s residual functional capacity. See Foster v. Heckler,

780 F.2d 1125, 1129 (4th Cir. 1986). Evidence of a claimant’s activities as affected by the pain is relevant to the severity of the impairment. See Craig, 76 F.3d at 595. An ALJ’s assessment of a claimant’s

credibility regarding the severity of pain is entitled to great weight

when it is supported by the record. See Shively v. Heckler, 739 F.2d

987, 989-90 (4th Cir. 1984). 

In reaching his credibility determination, The ALJ found that

although Kearse suffered from impairments that could cause some of

the alleged symptoms, the objective medical evidence did not support

the alleged severity. An extensive analysis of the objective medical

evidence revealed that Kearse did not begin to complain of headaches

until after filing his disability applications. Furthermore, there is no

objective evidence in the record to support such complaints. Moreover, although Kearse testified that he had to be hospitalized approximately twice a year for such headaches, there is no such supporting

documentation contained in the record. Kearse noted several times

that he either took no prescription medication, or only samples that

he received from the hospital. Instead, the record reveals that he took

only Tylenol and Motrin for pain. See Shively, 739 F.2d at 989-90

(upholding the ALJ’s finding that claimant’s pain was not as severe

as he alleged based partly on the prescribed medications of record).

Additionally, several inconsistent statements by Kearse are contained in the record, including statements regarding his education,

hospitalizations due to severe headaches, and the reason he stopped

working in 1989. Moreover, Kearse’s activities of daily living, as previously described, do not support his subjective allegations. Thus, we

find that the ALJ properly evaluated Kearse’s credibility. 

Lastly, Kearse argues that the ALJ erred by posing an incomplete

and/or inaccurate hypothetical to the vocational expert. We disagree.

KEARSE v. MASSANARI 3
This court held in Walker v. Bowen, 889 F.2d 47, 50 (4th Cir. 1989),

that in order for a vocational expert’s opinion to be relevant or helpful, it must be based upon a consideration of all the evidence of

record, and it must be in response to proper hypothetical questions

that fairly set out all the claimant’s impairments. The ALJ’s decision

reveals that he considered all relevant evidence, including Kearse’s

testimony, the objective medical evidence of record, and the findings

of the state agency physicians and psychologists. Moreover, the

ALJ’s hypothetical encompassed all of Kearse’s impairments. 

Although the record reveals that Kearse clearly suffers from deficiencies of concentration as a result of a gunshot wound, substantial

evidence supports a finding that these deficiencies do not significantly

limit his ability to work. For instance, two state agency psychologists,

Martha Westrope, Ph.D., and Larry Clanton, Ph.D., agree that

although Kearse "often" suffers from deficiencies of concentration,

persistence, or pace, he, nonetheless, is not significantly limited in his

ability to perform work-related tasks. Likewise, both Westrope and

Clanton agree that Kearse retains the ability to carry out short, simple

instructions. Moreover, Klohn evaluated Kearse’s motivation, concentration, and ability to remain on task, finding it to be "adequate."

Finally, while Washington noted that Kearse had difficulty maintaining concentration and alertness, he did not elaborate on the degree to

which these problems would limit Kearse’s ability to work. Moreover, Washington’s opinion was properly rejected by the ALJ. Thus,

we find that the ALJ’s hypothetical, which asked the vocational

expert to assume an individual "who can maintain attention and concentration and work at an adequate pace," is supported by substantial

evidence of record. 

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order denying benefits.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and

argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED

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