alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 31.2**Certification Pursuant to Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**I, Steve R. Martin, certify that: 1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of Stratagene Corporation;  2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material factor omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of thecircumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the periodcovered by this report;  3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included inthis report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results ofoperations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in thisreport;  4. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing andmaintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have: a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controlsand procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material informationrelating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us byothers within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is beingprepared;  b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures andpresented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controlsand procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on suchevaluation; and  c) disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (theregistrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materiallyaffected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal controlover financial reporting; and 5. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recentevaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and tothe audit committee of the registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing theequivalent functions): a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation ofinternal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affectthe registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information;and  b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees whohave a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting.        Date: March 20, 2006 By:       /s/ Steve R. Martin    Steve R. Martin    Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
#### In the Matter of Elaine Sicardo, Appellant, v Peter Smith, Respondent.

[853 NYS2d 639]

*762The determination finding the petitioner in violation of the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program regulations due to her failure to notify the respondent that her former husband was living in the subject residence with her and her children *(see*24 CFR 982.551 [h] [2]) was supported by substantial evidence *(see 300 Gramatan Ave. Assoc. v State Div. of Human Rights,*45 NY2d 176 [1978]; *Matter of Steward v Mulligan,*47 AD3d 822 [2008]; *cf. Matter of Pena v Mulligan,*32 AD3d 952, 953 [2006]). However, under the particular circumstances of this case, the penalty imposed was so disproportionate to the offense as to be shocking to one’s sense of fairness *(see generally Matter of Kreisler v New York City Tr. Auth.,*2 NY3d 775, 776 [2004]; *Matter of Pell v Board of Educ. of Union Free School Dist. No. 1 of Towns of Scarsdale & Mamaroneck, Westchester County,*34 NY2d 222, 237 [1974]; see *also*24 CFR 982.552 [c] [2] [i]; *cf. Matter of Smith v New York City Hous. Auth.,*40 AD3d 235 [2007]). Accordingly, we remit the matter to the respondent for the imposition of a lesser penalty.

The petitioner’s remaining contentions are without merit. Mastro, J.P., Covello, Dickerson and Eng, JJ., concur.
#### Stephen Murphy, Appellant, *v.*The Union Railway Co., Respondent.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Term,

June, 1905.)

Street railway — Accident to passenger preparing to alight — Question for jury.

Where a street car, after slowing down on signal so as to be barely moving, suddenly starts forward with a jerk, violently throwing a passenger preparing to alight, to the street and injuring him, whether in the circumstances the defendant was guilty of negligence in suddenly starting the car, and the plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence in preparing to alight therefrom, should be submitted to the jury.

*673Appeal by the plaintiff from a judgment rendered in favor of the defendant in the Municipal Court of the city of New York, second district, borough of the Bronx.

Frank A. Acer, for appellant.

William E. Weaver, for respondent.

Scott, J.

This was an action for personal injuries occasioned by the alleged negligence of the defendant. At the close of the plaintiff’s case the trial judge refused to 'submit the case to the jury, dismissed the complaint and rendered judgment in favor of the defendant. The plaintiff boarded defendant’s car at One Hundred and Twenty-ninth street and Third avenue, his destination being One Hundred and Forty-eighth street. After the car had left One Hundred and Forty-seventh street, the plaintiff signal-led the conductor, and the conductor pulled the bell-rope, evidently signalling the motorman to stop at One Hundred and Forty-eighth street. At a .point about thirty feet south of the corner of One Hundred and Forty-eighth street the plaintiff arose from his seat, grasped the stanchion on the side of the car and placed his left foot on the running board. In the meantime the car had materially slackened its speed and was moving very slow; as the plaintiff says “ was barely moving.” With the plaintiff in this position, the car suddenly shot forward with a jerk and the plaintiff was thrown violently to the street receiving the injuries complained of. It is clear from the testimony that the plaintiff intended to alight, not at the north side of One Hundred and Forty-eighth street, the regular stopping place of the car, but at a point south of One Hundred and Forty-eighth street and before the car had reached an actual stop. Whether or not under these circumstances the defendant was guilty of negligence in suddenly starting its car after having slowed down so as to be “barely moving” at the point designated apparently in response to the signal and whether or not the plaintiff was guilty of negligence in preparing to alight at *674that point were, questions of fact that should have been submitted to the jury, and the dismissal of the complaint was error. Crow v. Metropolitan St. R. Co., 70 App. Div. 202.

Dugro and MacLeah, JJ., concur.

Judgment reversed and new trial ordered, with costs to appellant to abide event.
#### In the Matter of Jason Tayler, Petitioner, v Donald Selsky, as Director of Special Housing and Inmate Disciplinary Programs, et al., Respondents.

[853 NYS2d 441]

Petitioner was charged in one misbehavior report with refusing a direct order and obstructing the visibility into his cell and, in another report, with refusing a direct order and assaulting a staff member. At a tier III disciplinary hearing on both misbehavior reports, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charges in the first report and was found guilty of the charges in the second. The determination was affirmed upon administrative appeal, and this CPLR article 78 proceeding ensued.

Initially, we note that petitioner’s guilty plea with respect to the charges in the first misbehavior report precludes any challenge to the determination as to those charges *(see Matter of Spencer v Goord,*38 AD3d 1028, 1028 [2007], *lv denied*9 NY3d 802 [2007]; *Matter of Price v Goord,*29 AD3d 1203,1204 [2006]). The second misbehavior report and the related documentation provide substantial evidence to support the determination of guilt with respect to the remaining charges *(see Matter of Moxley v Selsky,*45 AD3d 1084, 1084 [2007]; *Matter of Graham v Goord,*43 AD3d 526, 526 [2007]). To the extent that petitioner offered a contrary version of the incident, he created a credibility issue for the Hearing Officer to resolve *(see Matter of Ramirez v Goord,*32 AD3d 601, 601 [2006]). Petitioner’s remaining claims are not preserved inasmuch as he failed to make the necessary objections at the hearing *(see Matter of Tafari v Brown,*47 AD3d 979 [2008]; *Matter of Rosario v Goord,*25 AD3d 841, 842 [2006]).

Cardona, P.J., Mercure, Carpinello, Lahtinen and Kavanagh, JJ., concur. Adjudged that the determination is confirmed, without costs, and petition dismissed.
IV 

House Calendar No. 16

108TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. RES. 152

[Report No. 108–45] 

Waiving a requirement of clause 6(a) of rule XIII with respect to 

consideration of certain resolutions reported from the Committee on Rules. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MARCH 19, 2003

Mr. HASTINGS of Washington, from the Committee on Rules, reported the following resolution; which was referred to the House Calendar and ordered 

to be printed 

RESOLUTION

Waiving a requirement of clause 6(a) of rule XIII with 

respect to consideration of certain resolutions reported 

from the Committee on Rules.

1 Resolved, That the requirement of clause 6(a) of rule 

2 XIII for a two-thirds vote to consider a report from the 

3 Committee on Rules on the same day it is presented to 

4 the House is waived with respect to any resolution re5 ported on the legislative day of March 20, 2003, providing 

6 for consideration of the concurrent resolution (H. Con. 

7 Res. 95) establishing the congressional budget for the 
2

HRES 152 RH 

1 United States Government for fiscal year 2004 and setting 

2 forth appropriate budgetary levels for fiscal years 2003 

3 and 2005 through 2013. 

House Calendar No. 16

108TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. RES. 152

[Report No. 108–45] 

RESOLUTION

Waiving a requirement of clause 6(a) of rule XIII 

with respect to consideration of certain resolutions reported from the Committee on Rules. 

MARCH 19, 2003

Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be 

printed
DENDREON CORPORATION
AMENDED AND RESTATED
2000 EMPLOYEE STOCK PURCHASE PLAN
2009 OFFERING
 Adopted By the Board of Directors
December 3, 2008
 Section 1 Introduction
    Section 2 Eligible Employees
      Section 3 Offering and Offering Date
 Offering Date
  1




---



##### 



Early Termination of Offering
  Section 4 Participation
 Enrollment
  Increasing, Reducing, Discontinuing and Resuming Payroll Deductions
 Increasing Deduction Percentage
    Reducing Deduction Percentage




---



##### 



Discontinuing Payroll Deductions
 Election To Discontinue
  Resuming Payroll Deductions
    Election Procedures
  Automatic Renewal
  Earnings




---



##### 



Section 5 Special Enrollment for New Hires and Late Enrollments
 
 Section 6 Purchase Dates and Purchase Price
 Purchase Dates
 
 Purchase Price
  Section 7 Purchase Limitations
  Purchase Date Share Limit




---



##### 



$25,000 Calendar Year Limit
 $25,000 Limit
  Example
    Aggregate Limit
  Section 8 Amendments
 Prospective Amendments




---



##### 



Exception
## F IRST 

## D ISTRICT 

## C OURT OF 

## A PPEAL 

## S TATE OF 

## F LORIDA

_____________________________

No. 1D17-2308

_____________________________ P HILLIP D EQUAZE H ENRY, Appellant,
v. S TATE OF F LORIDA , Appellee.

___________________________ On appeal from the Circuit Court for Alachua County. James M. Colaw, Judge. January 26, 2018 P ER C URIAM . A FFIRMED . W ETHERELL , M AKAR

, and K ELSEY, JJ., concur.

_____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331 .

_____________________________ Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Lori Willner, Assistant Public2

Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant. Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Steven Woods, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
HOUSEHOLD DATA

ANNUAL AVERAGES

27. Unemployed persons by reason for unemployment, sex, and age

[Numbers in thousands]

Reason

Total,

16 years

and over

Men,

20 years

and over

Women,

20 years

and over

Both sexes,

16 to 19

years

2015 2016 2015 2016 2015 2016 2015 2016

NUMBER OF UNEMPLOYED

Total unemployed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8,296 7,751 3,959 3,675 3,371 3,151 966 925

Job losers and persons who completed temporary jobs. . . 4,063 3,740 2,361 2,165 1,570 1,461 132 113

On temporary layoff. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974 966 563 537 362 383 50 45

Not on temporary layoff. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,089 2,774 1,798 1,628 1,208 1,078 83 68

Permanent job losers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,178 1,965 1,240 1,148 888 780 50 37

Persons who completed temporary jobs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910 809 558 480 320 298 32 31

Job leavers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819 858 379 388 389 417 51 53

Reentrants. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,535 2,330 1,014 936 1,220 1,087 301 307

New entrants. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879 823 206 185 192 186 481 453

PERCENT DISTRIBUTION

Total unemployed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Job losers and persons who completed temporary jobs. . . 49.0 48.2 59.6 58.9 46.6 46.4 13.7 12.2

On temporary layoff. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.7 12.5 14.2 14.6 10.7 12.2 5.2 4.9

Not on temporary layoff. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37.2 35.8 45.4 44.3 35.8 34.2 8.5 7.3

Job leavers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.9 11.1 9.6 10.6 11.6 13.2 5.3 5.7

Reentrants. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30.6 30.1 25.6 25.5 36.2 34.5 31.2 33.2

New entrants. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.6 10.6 5.2 5.0 5.7 5.9 49.8 48.9

UNEMPLOYED AS A PERCENT OF THE

CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE

Job losers and persons who completed temporary jobs. . . 2.6 2.3 2.9 2.6 2.2 2.0 2.3 1.9

Job leavers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.9 0.9

Reentrants. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.6 1.5 1.3 1.1 1.7 1.5 5.3 5.2

New entrants. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 8.4 7.7

NOTE: Updated population controls are introduced annually with the release of January data.

1
[No. 55192-2-I.

Division One.

December 19, 2005.]

#### Nancy Alexander Anderson et al., *Appellants,*v. Elizabeth Lufburrow et al., *Respondents.*

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for King County, No. 03-2-23440-1, Charles W. Mertel, J., entered October 14, 2004. *Affirmed*by unpublished opinion per Becker J., concurred in by Baker and Ellington, JJ.
THEOPHILUS BESSELLIEU , Appellant,

v. STATE OF FLORIDA , Appellee

. IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
CASE NO. 1D 16

- 4508

_____________________________/ Opinion filed June 6, 2017. An appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County

. Steven B. Whittington , Judge

. Theophilus Bessellieu, pro se , Appellant. Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Robert Charles Lee, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee , for Appellee.

PER CURIAM. Appellant, Theophilus Bessellieu, challenges the summary denial of his rule
3.850 m otion. In his brief, Bessellieu raised four issues. This Court affirms without further comment on three of the issues. However, Appellant’s argument that Ground One of his motion was not conclusively refuted by the portions of the record attached
to the lo wer court’s order is found to have merit. The lower court’s attachment of an2 outdated Information has led us to this conclusion. We hereby reverse and remand with instruction to either attach portions of the record conclusively refuting Appellant’s claim i n Ground One, or to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine whether ineffective assistance of counsel was provided.
REVERSED and REMANDED for attachment of record evidence to the lower court’s order, or, in the event of the absence of such evidence, fo r an evidentiary hearing

. ROBERTS , C. J. , WINOKUR , and M.K. THOMAS , J J

. , CONCUR.
```

Exhibit 32

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

        In connection with the annual report of HydroFlo, Inc. (the "Company") on
Form 10-K for the period ending June 30, 2004, as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Dennis Mast, acting in
the capacity as the Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of the
Company, certify to the best of my knowledge, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section
1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that:

        (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

        (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the
Company.

/s/ Dennis Mast
    Dennis Mast
    CEO, Principal Financial Officer and Principal
    Accounting Officer

    October 13, 2004
```
<PAGE>   1



                                                                   EXHIBIT 23(b)

                       CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS

    We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in each prospectus
constituting part of the Registration Statements on Form S-3 (Nos. 33-30729,
33-41417, 33-41475, and 33-51298), and on Form S-8 (Nos. 2-92085, 33-44044,
33-45365, 33-46779, 33-51445, 33-51579, 33-53815, 33-53819, 33-62043, 33-62045,
333-12583, 333-12589, 333-12591 and 333-13219) of Westinghouse Electric
Corporation of our report appearing on page 28 of this Form 10-K/A, dated
February 12, 1996, except for the restatements discussed in notes 1, 3, and 24,
for which the dates are March 31, 1996, November 13, 1996, and July 11, 1997.

LOGO
Price Waterhouse LLP
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
July 11, 1997

                                       67
#### Raymond L. Weiss et al., Appellants, v Allstate Insurance Company, Respondent, et al., Defendants.

[856 NYS2d 331]

*1252Memorandum: Plaintiffs commenced this action alleging, inter alia, that Allstate Insurance Company (defendant) improperly disclaimed insurance coverage for fire damage to plaintiffs’ property. Supreme Court properly granted that part of defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the first cause of action. As a preliminary matter, we conclude that the term “business,” defined in the insurance policy as “any full or part-time activity of any kind engaged in for economic gain including the use of any part of any premises for such purposes,” is not ambiguous with respect to the facts of this case *(cf. Roland v Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,*286 AD2d 872 [2001]; *see generally W.W.W. Assoc. v Giancontieri,*77 NY2d 157, 162 [1990]). We further conclude that plaintiffs’ daughter is an “insured person” under the unambiguous definitions of that term in the insurance policy *(see generally*W.W.W. *Assoc.,*77 NY2d at 162). Contrary to plaintiffs’ contention, defendant met its initial burden on its cross motion with respect to the first cause of action by establishing that the barn located on the property at issue was being used by plaintiffs’ daughter for business purposes and that the insurance policy excluded coverage for structures used for business purposes *(see generally Zuckerman v City of New York,*49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]).

Contrary to the further contention of plaintiffs, they failed to raise a triable issue of fact whether their daughter’s business activities were sporadic or not motivated by profit *(cf. Pepper v Allstate Ins. Co.,*20 AD3d 633, 635-636 [2005]; *Bragin v Allstate Ins. Co.,*238 AD2d 773, 774 [1997]; *see generally Showler v*
      *1253
      *American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co.,*261 AD2d 896, 897 [1999]). Indeed, plaintiffs’ daughter candidly acknowledged during her deposition that she used the barn for her business involving breeding and boarding horses and that she was operating that business at the time of the fire. We reject the further contention of plaintiffs that there is a triable issue of fact whether defendant is vicariously liable for the negligent act of its agent in procuring an insurance policy that was insufficient to meet plaintiffs’ needs *(see generally Zuckerman,*49 NY2d at 562). The complaint, as amplified by the bill of particulars, asserts only causes of action for breach of contract against defendant. Present—Smith, J.P., Centra, Fahey, Peradotto and Green, JJ.
```

[Congressional Bills 108th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 15 Engrossed in House (EH)]

                 In the House of Representatives, U.S.,

                                                       January 8, 2003.
    Resolved, That upon the adoption of this resolution it shall be in order 
without intervention of any point of order to consider in the House the joint 
resolution (H.J. Res. 1) making further continuing appropriations for the fiscal 
year 2003, and for other purposes. The joint resolution shall be considered as 
read for amendment. The previous question shall be considered as ordered on the 
joint resolution to final passage without intervening motion except: (1) one 
hour of debate on the joint resolution equally divided and controlled by 
Representative Young of Florida and Representative Obey of Wisconsin; and (2) 
one motion to recommit.
    Sec. 2. Upon the adoption of this resolution it shall be in order without 
intervention of any point of order to consider in the House the joint resolution 
(H.J. Res. 2) making further continuing appropriations for the fiscal year 2003, 
and for other purposes. The joint resolution shall be considered as read for 
amendment. The previous question shall be considered as ordered on the joint 
resolution to final passage without intervening motion except: (1) one hour of 
debate on the joint resolution equally divided and controlled by Representative 
Young of Florida and Representative Obey of Wisconsin; and (2) one motion to 
recommit.
            Attest:

                                                                          Clerk.
```