SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3564-15T3

UMUT TURKDOGAN and 

ENGIN TURKDOGAN,

Plaintiff-Respondents/

Cross-Appellants,

v.

MEDISPA OF SHREWSBURY LIMITED

LIABILITY COMPANY d/b/a MEDISPA

AT SHREWSBURRY, MARGUERITE

DEFONTE, CHRISTINA LYNN

TSAGARIS, NICHOLAS DEFONTE, LASER 

MED SPA MANAGEMENT LIMITED LIABILITY

COMPANY, and DR. JAMES AVELLINI,

Defendants,

and

DR. JOSEPH FRETTA,

Defendant-Appellant/

Cross-Respondent.

__________________________________________

Submitted May 25, 2017 – Decided

Before Judges Lihotz, Hoffman and O'Connor.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Law Division, Special Civil Part, Monmouth 

County, Docket Nos. DC-6054-14 and DC-4870-

14.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.

June 29, 2017
A-3564-15T3

2

Law Offices Robbins and Robbins LLP, 

attorneys for appellant/cross-respondent

(Spencer B. Robbins, on the brief).

The Swain Law Firm, P.C., attorneys for 

respondents/cross-appellants (Andrew D. 

Swain and Christopher A. Bradley, on the 

brief).

PER CURIAM 

Defendant Joseph Fretta, M.D., appeals from a March 14, 

2016 Special Civil Part order denying his motion for 

reconsideration of the December 17, 2015 order, which directed 

he pay $7000 in counsel fees to plaintiffs, Umut Turkdogan and 

Engin Turkdogan.1 Umut and Engin cross appeal from a November 

13, 2015 order entering judgment for $590.96 in their favor, as 

well as the December 17, 2015 order. 

After reviewing the record, briefs, and applicable law, we 

affirm in part and remand in part for further proceedings. 

I

Plaintiffs' complaint alleges in May 2012, they each 

sustained burns after undergoing a procedure to remove hair from 

their backs using a laser. The procedure was performed at 

defendant Medispa of Shrewsbury, L.L.C., (Medispa) by defendant 

Christina Lynn Tsagaris, a cosmetician. Before trial, 

 

1 Engin Turkdogan is the father of Umut Turkdogan. To avoid 

confusion, we refer to the father as Engin and the son as Umut. 

We do not intend any disrespect by such informality.
A-3564-15T3

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defendants Medispa, Tsagaris, and Marguerite Defonte, the owner 

of Medispa, each settled for $8000. Defendants James Avellini, 

M.D., and Nicholas Defonte were dismissed from the complaint. 

The matter was then tried against the sole remaining defendant, 

Fretta. 

It is not disputed cosmeticians are prohibited from using a 

laser, see N.J.S.A. 45:5B-3, and that Tsagaris used a laser to 

remove hair from both of plaintiffs' backs. In their complaint, 

plaintiffs alleged Fretta held himself out to be and was in fact 

Medispa's medical director. Plaintiffs specifically contended 

Fretta violated the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (CFA), 

N.J.S.A. 56:8-1 to -204, because, as medical director, he failed 

to properly supervise Tsagaris to ensure she did not use a laser 

for hair removal. Plaintiffs also claimed that, as medical 

director, Fretta was negligent; specifically, he breached a duty 

of care toward them by failing to ensure Tsagaris did not use a 

laser and, as a proximate result, they were injured. 

Plaintiffs further maintained that, even if he were not in 

fact Medispa's medical director, Fretta violated the CFA by 

allowing Medispa to falsely advertise that he was, thus inducing 

plaintiffs to use Medispa's services out of a belief its 

cosmeticians' services were being supervised by a physician. 
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They also claimed Fretta was negligent for permitting Medispa to 

use his name and, as a proximate result, sustained injury.

2 

At trial, plaintiffs, representatives of Medispa, and 

Fretta testified. Both plaintiffs stated they received medical 

treatment after being burned by the laser. Umut claimed his 

economic damages were $1050; Engine testified his were $1190. 

Umut also testified "it gave me assurance there was a medical 

director. So it gave me understanding of the legitimacy of the 

practice." Engin did not know there was a medical director or 

physician associated with Medispa. 

Both the owner of Medispa and one of its cosmeticians 

testified that, at the time plaintiffs received the laser hair 

removal services, Fretta was Medispa's medical director and 

regularly represented such fact to third parties. Fretta 

testified he was not Medispa's medical director and never 

authorized Medispa to represent he was.

Following trial, the court issued an oral decision, in 

which it found plaintiffs and the representatives of Medispa 

 

2 Plaintiffs asserted other causes of action against Fretta in 

their complaint, but none are at issue on appeal, with the 

exception of the count alleging negligence per se. In their 

brief before us, plaintiffs argue the trial court failed to 

address whether Fretta was negligent per se. However, our 

reading of this count reveals no allegation against Fretta was 

made. Accordingly, we do not address any claim Fretta was 

negligent per se. 
A-3564-15T3

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more credible than Fretta, who the court determined had not been 

"completely forthright" with the court. Although not well 

articulated, implicit in the court's findings was Fretta was not 

in fact Medispa's medical director, but that Fretta allowed 

Medispa to hold him out as though he were. The court found 

that, as a result, Umut relied on the fact Medispa "was 

operational under guise of medical authority overseeing the day 

to day operations." 

The court concluded that by allowing third parties to 

believe he was Medispa's medical director when in fact he was 

not, Fretta violated N.J.S.A. 56:8-2, which prohibits, among 

other things, a misrepresentation, "or the knowing, concealment, 

suppression, or omission of any material fact with intent that 

others rely upon such concealment, suppression or omission, in 

connection with the sale or advertisement of any merchandise." 

The court held Fretta was liable to plaintiff "in consumer fraud 

for treble damages," and "Fretta is responsible for 20 percent 

of the cost spent by [Umut] for the procedure done." The court 

reduced the damages attributable to Fretta to twenty percent 

because 

Fretta really didn't have anything to do 

with these patients but for the fact that he 

held himself out as a medical director. So 

his percentage of culpability is much less 

than that of the . . . co-defendants. And 
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. . . based on my assessment of the facts 

and evidence as I see it, it is 20 percent. 

The court then found Umut sustained economic losses of 

$984.94. After trebling and then reducing this amount by twenty 

percent, the court calculated Umut was entitled to $590.96 in 

damages, plus reasonable attorneys fees. The court did not make 

any findings as to Engin or any findings on plaintiffs' claim 

Fretta had been negligent. 

On November 2, 2015, the trial court entered an order 

stating it was entering judgment in favor of "plaintiff" in the 

amount of $590.96, and that plaintiffs' counsel was to submit a 

certification on counsel fees. On November 13, 2015, the court 

entered an order amending the November 2, 2015 order, stating 

judgment for $590.96 was entered in favor of "plaintiffs"

instead of "plaintiff." 

Plaintiffs' counsel submitted a certification in support of 

their request for attorneys fees and, on December 17, 2015, the 

court entered an order awarding plaintiffs $7000 for such fees. 

In the order, the court provided its reasons for awarding this 

particular sum in counsel fees. On March 14, 2016, the court 

denied Fretta's motion for reconsideration of the December 17, 

2015 order. In the March 14, 2016 order, the court stated: 

This Court's award of attorney fees to 

Plaintiff in the amount of $7,000 is clearly 
A-3564-15T3

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outlined in the Order dated December 17, 

2015. This Court finds no palpable mistake 

of law or fact that would warrant 

reconsideration of this award. Accordingly, 

the Order dated December 17, 2015 remains in 

full force and effect. 

Fretta filed a notice of appeal and, on June 6, 2016, we 

entered an order clarifying Fretta's appeal is limited to a 

review of the March 14, 2016 order.

II

On appeal, Fretta contends the trial court erred when it 

ordered him to pay $7000 in counsel fees, because he was 

responsible for causing only $590.96 in damages. He also 

challenges the November 2 and November 13, 2015 orders. As our 

review is limited to the March 14, 2016 order, we do not address 

Fretta's challenges to the November 2 and November 13, 2015 

orders. 

A trial court's award of counsel fees "will be disturbed 

only on the rarest occasions, and then only because of a clear 

abuse of discretion." Rendine v. Pantzer, 141 N.J. 292, 317 

(1995). Under state fee-shifting statutes, "the first step in 

the fee-setting process is to determine the 'lodestar': the 

number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by a reasonable 

hourly rate." Id. at 334-35. This is the "most significant 

element in the award of a reasonable fee because that function 
A-3564-15T3

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requires the trial court to evaluate carefully and critically 

the aggregate hours and specific hourly rates advanced by 

counsel for the prevailing party to support the fee 

application." Id. at 335. 

"It does not follow that the amount of time actually

expended is the amount of time reasonably expended." Ibid.

(quoting Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 891 (D.C. Cir. 

1980)). Hours are not considered reasonably expended if they 

are "excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary" or are 

spent on "claims on which the party did not succeed" or "that 

were distinct from claims on which the party did succeed."

Ibid. (quoting Rode v. Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d 1177, 1183 (3d 

Cir. 1990)). 

We have considered Fretta's arguments, and conclude they 

are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written 

opinion. See R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). Bearing in mind a court's

discretion in awarding counsel fees, we affirm the March 14, 

2016 order for substantially the same reasons set forth in that 

order, as well as in the December 17, 2015 order. 

In their cross-appeal, plaintiffs contend the trial court 

erred because it awarded them only $7000 in fees and, further, 

the court failed to find defendant's actions also constituted 

negligence. Plaintiffs also point out the court did not make 
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any findings about Engin with respect to any of his claims, and 

that the court's findings on Umut's economic damages were 

unsupported by the evidence. 

After examining plaintiffs' arguments and the applicable 

law on the question of counsel fees, we similarly conclude their 

arguments devoid of merit. We affirm the December 17, 2015 

order for the reasons expressed in that order. 

We agree the court overlooked making any findings 

concerning Engin's claims, and failed to provide its reasons for 

rejecting plaintiffs' claim Fretta was negligent. "The judge's 

failure to make findings and conclusions is not only in 

disregard of oft-stated admonitions," but also causes "a 

substantial disservice, for [the appellate court is] left unable 

to resolve the meritorious issues which they project."

Girandola v. Allentown, 208 N.J. Super. 437, 440-41 (App. Div. 

1986). However, because the court found Fretta was not in fact 

the medical director of Medispa, we question, without deciding, 

whether Fretta can be held liable for failing to ensure, as 

plaintiffs allege, the cosmeticians did not use lasers on 

customers to remove hair. But plaintiffs also contend Fretta 

breached a duty of care to them by allowing his name to be used 

by Medispa to attract customers. Plaintiffs maintain this 

breach proximately caused them injury. Thus, we are compelled 
A-3564-15T3

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to remand this matter to the trial court, so that it may 

determine whether a duty of care existed, see Hopkins v. Fox & 

Lazo Realtors, 132 N.J. 426, 439 (1993), and if so, whether 

Fretta breached that duty of care and proximately caused the 

damages plaintiffs allege. 

Finally, although a very minute point, the evidence reveals 

Umut's economic damages totaled $1050, not $984.94; thus, after 

making the adjustments the court found warranted, Umut's damages 

total $630, not $590.96.3 On remand the court shall amend the 

judgment to reflect Umut's damages on the claim Fretta violated 

the CFA are $630. 

Affirmed in part and remanded in part for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain 

jurisdiction. 

 

3 These adjustments are that $1050 is to be trebled and the 

resulting sum reduced by twenty percent.