This opinion is fully consistent with the views expressed by Judge Kelly during 1

the panel's conference following the oral argument of the case. Because of illness,

Judge Kelly is presently unable to review the opinion, which is filed without awaiting

his express concurrence to avoid undue delay.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 98-1292

_____________

Sandra Easley, *

*

Appellant, * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the Eastern

v. * District of Arkansas.

*

American Greetings Corporation, *

*

Appellee. *

_____________

Submitted: September 21, 1998

Filed: October 19, 1998

_____________

Before BOWMAN, Chief Judge, WOLLMAN and KELLY, Circuit Judges. 1

_____________

BOWMAN, Chief Judge.

Sandra Easley brought suit against her former employer, American Greetings

Corporation ("American Greetings" or "the company"), alleging the company fired her

in 1996 in retaliation for reporting sexual harassment by her supervisor in 1993. The
The Honorable Henry Woods, United States District Judge for the Eastern

2

District of Arkansas.

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District Court excluded certain evidence Easley sought to introduce, including

2

testimony regarding specific details of the 1993 sexual harassment and testimony

concerning incidents involving the person who later became Easley's supervisor and

who ultimately fired her in 1996. The case then went to trial, and the jury found for

American Greetings. The District Court denied Easley's motion for a new trial and

entered judgment on the jury verdict. Easley appeals, arguing the District Court erred

in excluding the above-mentioned evidence. We affirm.

I.

Easley worked for American Greetings in its Osceola, Arkansas, plant from June

1978 to October 1996. She started as a forklift driver on the general assembly line and

worked her way up to the position of engraver making dies for greeting cards. In 1993,

Easley reported to the company that her supervisor, Ray Ward, was sexually harassing

her. American Greetings conducted an immediate investigation, found evidence of

harassment, and terminated Ward's employment five days after Easley made her

complaint.

Two months later, the company moved John Hall from its plant in Kentucky to

replace Ward as Easley's supervisor. From the start, Easley and Hall did not have a

good relationship. Hall was a friend of Ward, the supervisor whose termination

resulted from Easley's sexual harassment complaint. Hall warned Easley that she

would not intimidate him as she had intimidated Ward. Hall also subjected the

employees under his supervision to more rigorous review than Ward had done. Easley

complained that Hall had particularly targeted her work, and that he had done so

because Easley's complaints had caused Hall's friend Ward to be fired.
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While under Hall's supervision, Easley's performance at American Greetings

deteriorated. Suffering depression from a recent divorce, her experience with Ward,

and other problems, Easley took a four-month medical leave from work. After this

leave ended and Easley returned to work, American Greetings permitted Easley to

work fewer hours and at a lower level of efficiency than other workers. By May 1994,

however, Easley had not returned to what the company considered an acceptable level

of performance. American Greetings issued her an "informative" (an informal notice

of job deficiency), but Easley's problems continued. She received a formal warning for

leaving the plant without notifying her supervisor in 1994, and a second warning for

falling asleep on the job in 1995. Throughout 1995 and 1996, Easley had numerous

discussions with Hall and other supervisors regarding the need to improve her

efficiency levels, and she received additional warnings that her job performance was

unacceptable.

In 1995, Easley filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). The charge contained two claims: first, that Ward

(Easley's former supervisor, who had been fired in 1993) had sexually harassed her;

and second, that Hall was retaliating for Easley's 1993 sexual harassment complaint

concerning Ward by scrutinizing Easley's work more closely. The EEOC found the

first claim was "untimely" and dismissed it, but issued a right-to-sue letter on the

second claim. While she was still employed by American Greetings, Easley filed suit

for violation of federal and state statutory law and state tort law.

In October 1996, shortly after filing her suit, Easley was fired by American

Greetings. Easley filed a second EEOC charge, adding a claim that Hall terminated her

employment in retaliation for her 1993 sexual harassment complaint. The EEOC issued

a second right-to-sue letter, and Easley amended her complaint to include claims

regarding her termination.
All of Easley's other claims were resolved before trial, either by her dismissal 3

of the claims or by the District Court's grant of American Greetings's motion for partial

summary judgment. 

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Before trial, American Greetings filed a motion in limine regarding numerous

evidentiary matters. The District Court's rulings on two of the matters in this motion

are the subject of this appeal. First, the District Court granted American Greetings's

motion to exclude specific testimony concerning Ward's 1993 harassment of Easley.

Second, the District Court excluded testimony about some interactions between Easley

and Ward's replacement, Hall, that occurred before Hall became Easley's supervisor.

Easley and Hall had met each other at company meetings, through business phone calls,

and through similar corporate activities before Hall was transferred to the Osceola

plant. Easley claimed that during several work-related telephone conversations in 1992

Hall had invited Easley to meet him for a drink on Beale Street in Memphis. Easley on

these occasions declined Hall's invitations. Easley also claimed that during a company

meeting in early 1993 Hall had invited her to join him in a hot tub without her swimsuit,

another invitation that she declined. Easley sought to introduce the evidence because

she felt it would help the jury understand that Hall had fired her because of her 1993

sexual harassment complaint, not because of deficient work performance.

The parties tried Easley's retaliation claim. Easley argued she was retaliated

3

against and fired for reporting Ward's sexual harassment in 1993. American Greetings

argued Easley was fired for poor job performance. The jury reached a unanimous

verdict in favor of American Greetings. The District Court entered judgment on this

verdict. Easley moved for a new trial and, when the motion was denied, entered this

appeal.
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II.

This Court will reverse a district court's ruling on the admissibility of evidence

only if it finds the district court abused its discretion. See Harris v. Secretary, United

States. Dep't of the Army, 119 F.3d 1313, 1321 (8th Cir. 1997). "A district court has

wide discretion in ruling on the admissibility of proffered evidence . . . ." Id.

The District Court excluded specific testimony regarding Ward's harassment of

Easley because it "would be highly prejudicial . . . and would outweigh any probative

effect." Tr. of Prelim. M. at 3 (Sept. 29, 1997). The District Court also indicated

specific testimony concerning Ward's harassment would be needless cumulative

evidence: "[T]he jury was told generally of the sexual harassment, but the plaintiff was

not permitted to go into a blow-by-blow account of Ward's misconduct. It was

undisputed, and the jury was informed, that the plaintiff had been sexually harassed by

her former supervisor, Ray Ward." Easley v. American Greetings Corp., No. J-C-96-

122, at 1 (E.D. Ark. Jan. 2, 1998) (order denying motion for new trial). The District

Court thereby invoked Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Rule 403 permits

a court to exclude evidence if "its probative value is substantially outweighed by the

danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by

consideration of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative

evidence." Fed. R. Evid. 403.

We conclude it was not an abuse of discretion to exclude testimony concerning

the specific acts of Ward's harassment on a finding that the danger of unfair prejudice

substantially outweighed the probative value of such evidence. The proffered evidence

had little probative value, because the severity of harassment would not make it more

or less likely for an employer to retaliate against an employee who had complained.

The serious nature of the harassment, however, created a risk of unfair prejudice

against American Greetings, despite the company's prompt investigation of Easley's

complaint and termination of Ward's employment. Such testimony also would
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encourage the jury to grant the plaintiff relief on the grounds she had suffered from

Ward's conduct, not because she had shown her discharge was retaliation for

complaining about Ward's actions. 

We next review the decision of the District Court to exclude testimony

concerning Hall's alleged overtures to Easley. In its order denying Easley's motion for

a new trial, the District Court made clear it excluded this testimony pursuant to Rule

403: 

Had John Hall been the plaintiff's supervisor at the time of the hot tub

incident, then that evidence would have been more probative than unfairly

prejudicial. In this case, the Court believed that Hall's invitation to join

him in a hot tub at a company meeting would have been unfairly

prejudicial to Hall since, at the time of the "invitation," it would not have

been a violation of Title VII.

Easley v. American Greetings Corp., No. J-C-96-122, at 2 (E.D. Ark. Jan. 2, 1998)

(order denying motion for new trial). After a review of the record, we find the District

Court did not abuse its discretion when it determined the evidence should be excluded

pursuant to Rule 403. 

First, the relevance and probative value of the proffered evidence were slight.

Testimony concerning Hall's advances would have little relevance to Easley's theory

of the case. Before and during trial Easley asserted she had been fired for complaining

about Ward's behavior, not for refusing Hall's advances. Testimony that Hall

unsuccessfully extended social invitations to Easley on a few occasions would provide

little help in convincing the jury that Hall had retaliated against Easley because she had

complained about his friend's behavior and had caused that friend to be fired. Easley

also admitted in her deposition that Hall had not sexually harassed her, and she did not

seek to recover on a hostile-workplace theory for Hall's alleged overtures.
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Second, it is clear that the District Court had a reasonable basis for concluding

that the proffered testimony's slight probative value was substantially outweighed by

counterbalancing Rule 403 considerations. Admitting the evidence would have opened

the door to the introduction of evidence on collateral issues (the existence, context, and

appropriateness of Hall's overtures to Easley) that only would prolong the trial and that

might confuse the jury. The testimony also would have created a risk of unfair

prejudice: the jury might conclude Easley should recover on the grounds that Hall had

sexually harassed her or that he had retaliated because she had rejected his advances,

when neither of these issues was properly before the jury.

III.

For the reasons stated above, we conclude the District Court did not abuse its

discretion when it excluded the proffered testimony. Therefore, we affirm the judgment

of the District Court.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.