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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

AMY E. ESPINOZA,

Respondent,

v.

URSULA JANEE URIBE,

Appellant.

 No. 82451-1-I

 DIVISION ONE

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

COBURN, J. — Amy Espinoza filed a petition for an Order of Protection –

Stalking against Ursula Uribe. Both parties represented themselves at a 

telephonic hearing, and Amy1 submitted testimony and evidence in support of her

petition. Uribe argued general denial. The court entered a five-year order for 

protection. Several months later, Uribe filed a declaration of Nancy Regnier, who 

did not testify or file a declaration at the original hearing. Six months after filing 

Nancy’s2 declaration, Uribe filed a motion to vacate under CR 60, citing newly 

discovered evidence in support of an allegation of fraud against Amy. The court 

denied the motion to vacate, and Uribe appeals. We affirm.

 1 Because Amy Espinoza and her husband, Giovanny Espinoza, share the 

same surname, we refer to them by their first names for clarity. 2 Nancy shares a surname with her husband, Jake Regnier, so we also 

refer to them by their first names for clarity.
No. 82451-1-I

2

FACTS

On May 11, 2020, Amy filed a Petition for an Order of Protection –

Stalking against Uribe. The petition contained allegations that Uribe had created 

several fake social media accounts, email addresses, and internet telephone 

numbers to harass and cyberstalk Amy, Amy’s husband Giovanny, and her 

friends and family members. Uribe and Giovanny were in a past relationship and 

share a child together. Amy provided evidence in support of her petition by way 

of multiple screenshots of conversations from different Instagram accounts,

Facebook accounts, and emails she alleged were all created by Uribe. Of 

particular note is an email Amy received on November 26, 2019, (November 26th 

message) from a sender identified as “Jake Regnier,” Nancy’s husband. Nancy 

had previously worked with Giovanny. Amy stated in her petition,

In the email, the sender wrote to me that my husband is 

having an affair with the sender’s wife, and invites me to call if I 

want to talk about it. On December 21, 2019, I received a second 

email from this address advising me that the sender reached out to 

Giovanny about the affair and hear no response back; and that the 

sender is getting a divorce and that my husband and I need to 

‘figure this out for everyone involved.’ After receiving that email, I 

blocked the email address from further contact. 

A true and accurate copy of these email contacts are attached 

hereto as Exhibit 4, and fully incorporated herein. 

NOTE: Jake Regnier is the husband of Nancy Regnier. Leading up 

to my receipt of these emails, Ursula—impersonating me—had 

been contacting Nancy Regnier, Jake Regnier, as well as Nancy’s 

sisters, accusing Nancy and Giovanny of engaging in an 

extramarital affair.3 

 3 The email exchange that Amy references was not included in the record 

provided to the court.
No. 82451-1-I

3

On May 19, 2020, the trial court held a telephonic hearing to consider the 

petition. The court considered arguments from both parties. Amy stated,

In April 2019 Ms. Uribe fraudulently accessed my husband’s 

business email and then began harassing at least one of my 

husband’s business contacts Nancy [Regnier]. Ms. Uribe 

presented herself as me and contacted Nancy, her husband, 

Nancy’s parents and siblings and repeated accused Nancy of 

engaging in an extra-marital affair with my husband.

Amy further explained that Uribe went to great lengths to create mistrust 

between Giovanny and her in order to get them to divorce. Amy provided the 

court with a declaration from Uribe’s ex-husband, Adam Fulton, from their 2018 

dissolution proceeds. Fulton testified in his declaration about Uribe’s history of 

harassment and cyberstalking.

Uribe argued that she was “completely innocent” but did not offer any 

evidence to rebut the 154-page petition submitted by Amy. 

The court stated that it was unfortunate that Uribe just provided the court 

with a “flat-out denial,” and the evidence presented by Amy was “overwhelming.”

Accordingly, the court ruled that Amy met her burden, and it entered a five-year 

order of protection against Uribe. Uribe did not appeal this order or file a motion 

for reconsideration.

The final order for protection was clarified on June 2, 2020, to correct the 

expiration date. Uribe once again did not appeal the order or file a motion for 

reconsideration. 

At some point after the issuance of the protection order, Uribe retained 

counsel. On August 6, 2020, Uribe filed a declaration from Nancy. Six months 

after filing the declaration, Uribe, relying on Nancy’s declaration, filed a motion to 
No. 82451-1-I

4

vacate the protection order on the basis of CR 60(b)(3), (4), and (11) citing 

“newly discovered evidence” in support of an allegation of fraud against 

Espinoza.4 The declaration amounted to Nancy believing that the messages 

sent to Jake were from Amy, because “I’ve seen the conversations myself and 

know that it was Amy and nobody else.” 

Amy rebutted the declaration by providing declarations from four different 

people. In her declaration submitted to the court in reply to Amy’s response, 

Uribe acknowledged that she received a copy of an email Nancy sent to the 

court.5 Nancy’s email stated,

In regards to the above referenced case, I had previously sought to 

rescind my Declaration that was prepared by Ursula Uribe’s 

attorney . . . . After I received the Declaration from Erica’s office, I 

had informed them that there are revisions that would need to be 

made in order for it to be factual. They declined to do this and filed 

it with the courts anyway. I do not agree with this. I do not know the 

process to rescind a Declaration that has already been filed with 

the courts, but I am making you aware, as the court date is 

February 12th.

Uribe asserted that “Nancy’s claim is that the incorrect portion of her 

previously filed Declaration was simply one sentence where she stated she had 

received the initial Petition for Protection Order from Giovanny.” To support this 

claim, Uribe attached a copy of what appears to be an email exchange between 

her attorney and Nancy. Though the declaration states, “Attached as EXHIBIT B 

is a copy of the correspondence Nancy had with my office following her email to 

 4 Uribe did not request oral argument. 

5 The court’s bailiff, who forwarded a copy of the email to all parties, 

responded to Nancy by explaining, “we do not litigate through email. Anything 

you want to convey to the court must be done in the form of a motion to rescind 

and filed with the clerk’s office.” 
No. 82451-1-I

5

the Court stating she wanted to retract her prior Declaration.” (Emphasis added.)

The declaration includes Uribe’s counsel’s contact information in the footer, but it 

is not signed by counsel. Nor did counsel submit her own declaration or reply 

motion. Uribe’s counsel wrote to Nancy,

It appears there is just one correction to your declaration, 

specifically that you did not receive copies of Amy’s filings from 

Giovanny correct? I want to make sure I completely understand. If 

that is the correction we can draft a declaration for you that literally 

states just that and get that filed. Let me know if you want us to do 

that. It would be short and would just state the correction that you

want made to your prior declaration.

No response from Nancy is included. There is no record of any other declaration 

from Nancy that was obtained or submitted to the court. 

The court, after considering the materials submitted by the parties and the 

record, denied the motion in February 2021. Uribe appeals pro se the denial of 

that motion. 

DISCUSSION

Uribe bases her claim for relief on CR 60(b)(3), (4), and (11). CR 60(b) 

provides, in pertinent part:

On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may 

relieve a party or the party’s legal representative from a final 

judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons:

. . . .

(3) Newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could 

not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under rule 

59(b); 

(4) Fraud . . . misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an 

adverse party;

. . . . 
No. 82451-1-I

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(11) Any other reason justifying relief from the operation of 

the judgment.

The motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for 

reasons (1), (2) or (3) not more than 1 year after the judgment, 

order, or proceeding was entered or taken. 

Newly Discovered Evidence

We review a trial court’s order denying a motion to vacate for an abuse of 

discretion. In re Marriage of Scanlon, 110 Wn. App. 682, 686, 42 P.3d 447 

(2002). “A trial court abuses its discretion if its decision is manifestly 

unreasonable or based on untenable grounds or untenable reasons.” In re 

Marriage of Littlefield, 133 Wn.2d 39, 46-47, 940 P.2d 1362 (1997).

Nancy’s declaration does not satisfy CR 60(b)(3). Under CR 60(b)(3), the 

court may relieve a party from a final judgment when a party presents “[n]ewly

discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in 

time to move for a new trial under rule 59(b).” CR 60(b)(3). To justify vacating a 

judgment on the ground of newly discovered evidence, the moving party must 

establish that the evidence (1) would probably change the result if a new trial was

granted, (2) was discovered since trial, (3) could not have been discovered 

before the trial by the exercise of due diligence, (4) is material, and (5) is not 

merely cumulative or impeaching. Jones v. City of Seattle, 179 Wn.2d 322, 360, 

314 P.3d 380 (2013). “Failure to satisfy any one of these five factors is a ground 

for denial of the motion.” Go2Net, Inc. v. C I Host, Inc., 115 Wn. App. 73, 88, 60 

P.3d 1245 (2003) (citing Holaday v. Merceri, 49 Wn. App. 321, 330, 742 P.2d 

127 (1987)).
No. 82451-1-I

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Uribe has failed to show that Nancy’s testimony qualifies as “newly 

discovered evidence.” Amy’s petition put Uribe on notice that Amy claimed Uribe 

had impersonated Amy and sent messages to “Jake Regnier” and “Nancy 

Regnier” and that Jake was Nancy’s husband. Amy’s petition also explained that 

“Nancy Regnier is a business contact of Giovanny’s. She has been the 

site/project manager at several commercial properties at which Giovanny 

maintains the HVAC systems, and Giovanny also contracted her as a project 

assistant on a limited basis for another construction project he oversees.” 

Uribe claims that she “did not learn of the new information, specifically 

regarding Amy’s involvement in orchestrating the emails between she and Jake 

in order to blame those on Ursula until months after the order was entered.” 

Uribe claims that she learned of this information only after Nancy called her 

attorney after the entry of the protection order. 

Uribe has not demonstrated that Nancy’s testimony could not have been 

discovered before the initial hearing or soon after through the exercise of due 

diligence, especially given Nancy knows Giovanny, who shares a child with 

Uribe.6 Because Uribe has not satisfied one of the factors required to prevail 

under CR 60(b)(3), we need not review the other factors.

The court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to vacate 

under CR 60(b)(3).

 6 The court recognized that Uribe was served only four days before the 

hearing and explained to Uribe that she was entitled to a continuance so that she 

could retain an attorney or prepare a written response. Uribe stated she wished 

to proceed. Uribe acknowledges that she is not asking us to review the propriety 

of the underlying protection order.
No. 82451-1-I

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Fraud or Misrepresentation

CR 60(b)(4) authorizes a trial court to vacate a judgment for fraud, 

misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party. Lindgren v. 

Lindgren, 58 Wn. App. 588, 596, 794 P.2d 526 (1990). Fraudulent conduct or 

misrepresentation must cause the entry of the judgment such that the losing 

party was prevented from fully and fairly presenting its case or defense. Id. “The 

party attacking a judgment under CR 60(b)(4) must establish the fraud, 

misrepresentation, or other misconduct by clear and convincing evidence.” Id.

Clear and convincing evidence is that which shows the ultimate fact in issue to 

be highly probable. In re Vulnerable Adult Petition for Winter, 12 Wn. App. 2d 

815, 830, 460 P.3d 667 (2020).

Uribe contends that we should vacate the trial court’s order because the 

trial court “was presented with substantial evidence to support the allegation of 

fraud and to undermine Petitioner’s credibility.” 

We find no indication in the record that Nancy’s declaration, which Uribe 

herself acknowledged that Nancy wished to rescind, establishes that the 

protection order was entered as a result of fraud, misrepresentation, or 

misconduct by Amy. Nancy’s declaration allegedly proving that Amy and not 

Uribe sent the messages to Jake was based on Nancy concluding she believed it 

was Amy based on reading the communications herself. 

This allegation did not prevent Uribe from fully and fairly presenting her 

case or defense. In Uribe’s motion to vacate, she concedes that “[m]ost of the 

other baseless allegations in Amy’s Petition cannot be proven false but at least 
No. 82451-1-I

9

this one allegation can be shown to be a complete fabrication.” Amy submitted a 

154-page petition and the court found that the evidence presented by Amy was 

“overwhelming.” 

Uribe has not established fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct 

by clear and convincing evidence. The record does not justify a vacation of the 

protection order on the ground that it was procured by fraud.7

Findings of Fact

Uribe also contends that the trial court erred by not entering findings of 

fact. We disagree.

The trial court must make findings and conclusions in certain instances. 

See CR 52(a). However, CR 52 provides that findings of fact and conclusions of 

law are unnecessary “[o]n decisions of motions under rules 12 or 56 or any other 

motion, except as provided in rules 41(b)(3) and 55(b)(2).” CR 52(a)(5)(B) 

(emphasis added). Neither exceptions apply to the instant case. See CR 

41(b)(3) (involving motion after plaintiff rests); see also CR 55(b) (involving entry 

of default judgments). Uribe cites to no authority requiring a court to enter 

findings when denying a CR 60 motion. 

Attorney’s Fees

Uribe also contends that she is entitled to attorney’s fees under RCW 

4.84.185. We disagree.

 7 Uribe appears to also argue that because the trial court did not find that 

the motion to vacate because of fraud was timely filed, the record is insufficient to 

review this issue. Because we affirm by addressing Uribe’s underlying claim, we 

need not address whether her CR 60(b)(4) was filed within a reasonable time.
No. 82451-1-I

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RCW 4.84.185 provides:

In any civil action, the court having jurisdiction may, upon written

findings by the judge that the action, counterclaim, cross-claim, third

party claim, or defense was frivolous and advanced without reasonable

cause, require the nonprevailing party to pay the prevailing party the

reasonable expenses, including fees of attorneys, incurred in opposing

such action, counterclaim, cross-claim, third party claim, or defense.

RCW 4.84.185. This statute is inapplicable and Uribe is not a prevailing party. 

She is not entitled to attorney fees.

CONCLUSION

The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Uribe’s motion to 

vacate. Accordingly, we affirm.

WE CONCUR: