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In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

____________________

NO. 09-17-00244-CR

____________________

KENNETH RAY CHATMAN, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

__________________________________________________________________ 

On Appeal from the 359th District Court

Montgomery County, Texas

Trial Cause No. 15-08-08596-CR

__________________________________________________________________ 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Appellant Kenneth Ray Chatman appeals his conviction for forgery. See Tex. 

Penal Code. Ann. § 32.21 (West Supp. 2017).1 In issue one, Chatman argues that the 

evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for the offense charged in the 

indictment because there is a fatal variance between the language in the indictment 

and the evidence presented at trial. In issue two, Chatman complains that his trial 

 

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We cite to the current version of section 32.21 of the Penal Code because the 

subsequent amendment is not material to the outcome of the appeal. 
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counsel provided him with ineffective assistance of counsel by requesting a jury 

instruction that allowed Chatman to be convicted of the lesser-included offense of 

forgery. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

Background

A grand jury charged Chatman with the offense of forgery against an elderly 

individual, a third-degree felony, and further alleged five prior felony convictions

for purposes of punishment enhancement. The indictment alleges that Chatman

on or about March 14, 2015 . . . did then and there, with intent to defraud 

or harm another, pass a writing that is or purports to be a check, that 

was altered, made, completed, executed, or authenticated so that it 

purports to be the act of [K.V.], . . . an elderly individual, who did not 

authorize that act[.]

The check was issued from the account of Beacon Holdings Corporation 

(“Beacon”), dated March 14, 2015, made payable to the order of Kenneth Ray 

Chatman, and signed by Alma Michaels. K.V., who owns Beacon and who was 

seventy-eight years old when the offense occurred, testified that his bank notified 

his secretary that one of Beacon’s issued checks contained an unauthorized 

signature, and K.V. testified that he did not know Alma Michaels.

K.V. testified that he kept some of Beacon’s checks in his vehicle’s glove 

compartment, and he believed that someone from the local car wash had taken the 

check while his vehicle was being washed. K.V. explained that his bank gave him a 
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copy of the stolen check, which was made payable to Chatman. K.V. testified that 

neither he nor his secretary had signed the check, nor had he authorized Chatman to 

use the check. 

Louis Nava, the district manager of a local liquor store, testified that he 

reviewed the store’s surveillance video footage from March 14, 2015, and he gave 

the video to the police. Nava testified that when a person cashes a check at the liquor 

store, the store requires that he put his personal information and thumbprint on the 

check. Leslie McCauley, a Sergeant with the Montgomery County Sheriff’s Office’s

Crime Laboratory, testified that she is a latent print examiner, and McCauley 

determined that the thumbprint on the check belongs to Chatman. Kenneth Lewis, 

the owner of the car wash where K.V.’s check was stolen, testified that Chatman 

worked for him part-time over the past few years and that K.V. was one of his longtime customers. After viewing the video footage from the liquor store, Lewis 

testified that the person cashing the check in the video “looks like” Chatman.

Officer Rodney Baseke of the Willis Police Department testified that in March 

2015, he was working as a detective when he was assigned to investigate Chatman’s 

case. Baseke testified that after viewing the video from the liquor store, he positively 

identified Chatman as the person who cashed the check. During his investigation, 

Baseke spoke with Chatman, and a recording of their conversation was admitted into 
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evidence. Chatman told Baseke that K.V. gave him a blank check for washing his 

car and that Chatman had someone else make it out. Chatman also admitted that he

had made a mistake and wanted to pay K.V. back. According to Baseke, Chatman 

confessed to committing the forgery. 

After the State rested, Chatman’s counsel moved for a directed verdict, 

arguing that the State failed to show that the offense was committed against an 

elderly person because Beacon is not an elderly individual, Beacon and K.V. are 

different entities, and there was no evidence that Chatman cashed the check 

purporting to be an act of K.V. The trial court, finding that reasonable minds could 

draw more than one conclusion from the evidence, denied Chatman’s motion for a 

directed verdict. During the jury charge conference, defense counsel requested that 

the trial court include the lesser-included offense of forgery in the jury charge, and 

the trial court granted the request.

The jury found Chatman guilty of the lesser-included offense of forgery. The 

trial court conducted a punishment trial, during which Chatman stipulated to the 

enhancement paragraphs alleged in the indictment. The trial court found the 

enhancement paragraphs to be true and assessed Chatman’s punishment at five years 

of confinement. Chatman appealed. 

Analysis
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In issue one, Chatman argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his 

conviction for the offense charged in the indictment because there was a fatal 

variance between the language in the indictment and the evidence presented at trial.

Chatman contends that according to the specific language in the indictment, the State 

was required to prove that he passed a writing that purported to be the act of K.V., 

but the evidence shows that the act was not authorized by K.V. According to 

Chatman, the signature on the check purported to be an act of A.M., and K.V., whose 

name did not appear on the check, testified that he did not make, sign, or authorize 

the check. Chatman argues that because the State named the wrong victim in the 

indictment, it was impossible for the State to prove the offense as pleaded. The State 

argues that no variance exists because the evidence showed that K.V. was the person 

authorized to sign company checks on Beacon’s behalf.

In a legal sufficiency review, we examine the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the verdict to determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found 

the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 

443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Ramsey v. State, 473 S.W.3d 805, 808 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2015). Thus, the sufficiency of the evidence should be measured by the elements of 

the offense as defined by the hypothetically correct jury charge for the case. Malik 

v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). A hypothetically correct jury 
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charge accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not 

unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or restrict its theories of liability, 

and adequately describes the offense for which the defendant was tried. Id.

A variance occurs when there is a discrepancy between the allegations in the 

indictment and the proof offered at trial. Byrd v. State, 336 S.W.3d 242, 246 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2011). In conducting an evidentiary-sufficiency analysis, we consider 

two types of variances: material and immaterial. Thomas v. State, 444 S.W.3d 4, 9 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2014). Because immaterial variances do not affect the validity of 

a criminal conviction, a hypothetically correct jury charge need not incorporate 

allegations that give rise to only immaterial variances. Id. A variance is fatal when 

it is a material variance that prejudices the substantial rights of the defendant. Id.; 

Gollihar v. State, 46 S.W.3d 243, 257-58 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). In determining 

whether a variance is material, we look to see whether the indictment informed the 

defendant of the charge against him sufficiently to allow him to prepare an adequate 

defense at trial and whether the indictment would subject him to the risk of being 

prosecuted later for the same crime. Gollihar, 46 S.W.3d at 258.

The jury charge instructed the jury to consider the lesser-included offense of 

forgery, and the application paragraph of the lesser-included instruction omitted any 

reference to K.V. or his status as an elderly individual. The jury found Chatman 
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guilty of the lesser-included offense of forgery. Because the jury did not convict 

Chatman for the offense of forgery against an elderly individual as alleged in the 

indictment, we conclude that Chatman’s argument that there was a fatal variance 

between the language in the indictment and the evidence presented at trial is without 

merit. We further conclude that Chatman’s argument that it was impossible for the 

State to prove the offense as pleaded is also without merit, because the jury charge 

for the lesser-included offense of forgery did not reference K.V. or his status as an 

elderly individual. 

A person commits a forgery by passing a writing that has been altered made, 

completed, executed, or authenticated so that it purports to be the act of another who 

did not authorize that act. Tex. Penal Code. Ann. § 32.21(a)(1)(A)(i), (B). A person 

must pass the writing with the intent to defraud or harm another. Id. § 32.21(b). The 

Texas Penal Code defines “another” as a “person other than the actor.” Id. § 

1.07(a)(5) (West Supp. 2017). “Person” means “an individual, corporation, or 

association.” Id. § 1.07(a)(38) (West Supp. 2017). The testimony at trial established 

that K.V. owned Beacon and that only K.V. and his secretary, D.W., were authorized 

to sign checks on behalf of Beacon. The evidence further showed that there was no 

Alma Michaels associated with Beacon. Thus, the evidence showed that to be valid, 

any check issued from Beacon’s account would have to be signed by K.V. or D.W.
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We conclude that by passing the Beacon check from “Alma Michaels” to the 

liquor store, Chatman did, with intent to defraud or harm another, pass a writing that 

is or purports to be a check, that was altered, made, completed, executed, or 

authenticated so that it purports to be the act of another who did not authorize that 

act. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 32.21(a)(1)(A)(i), (B); Williams v. State, 688 

S.W.2d 486, 488-90 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (concluding evidence was sufficient to 

find defendant guilty of forgery); Hill v. State, 750 S.W.2d 2, 5 (Tex. App.—Fort 

Worth 1988, pet. ref’d) (holding that an allegation of the non-existence of the person 

whose writing the instrument is purported to be constitutes an allegation that such 

person did not authorize the act). Because the evidence is sufficient to support 

Chatman’s conviction for forgery, we overrule issue one. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 

319; Malik, 953 S.W.2d at 240. 

In issue two, Chatman complains that his trial counsel provided him with 

ineffective assistance of counsel by requesting a jury instruction that allowed 

Chatman to be convicted of the lesser-included offense of forgery. According to 

Chatman, his conviction was the result of the erroneously submitted jury instruction 

because the instruction more broadly defined the offense and lacked a specific 

victim. 
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To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, an appellant must 

satisfy a two-pronged test:

First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was 

deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that 

counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant 

by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the 

deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing 

that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a 

fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); see also Hernandez v. State, 

726 S.W.2d 53, 56-57 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). An appellant must demonstrate a 

reasonable probability that but for his counsel’s errors, the outcome would have been 

different. Bone v. State, 77 S.W.3d 828, 833 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). “Appellate 

review of defense counsel’s representation is highly deferential and presumes that 

counsel’s actions fell within the wide range of reasonable and professional 

assistance.” Id.

Chatman must prove that there was no professional reason for specific acts or 

omissions of his counsel. See id. at 836. In addition, any allegation of ineffectiveness 

“must be ‘firmly founded in the record’ and ‘the record must affirmatively 

demonstrate’ the meritorious nature of the claim.” Menefield v. State, 363 S.W.3d 

591, 592 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (quoting Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 813

(Tex. Crim. App. 1999)). Ordinarily, trial counsel should be given an opportunity to 
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explain his actions before being denounced as ineffective. Menefield, 363 S.W.3d at 

593. Thus, the bare record on direct appeal is usually insufficient to demonstrate that 

“counsel's representation was so deficient and so lacking in tactical or strategic 

decisionmaking as to overcome the presumption that counsel’s conduct was 

reasonable and professional.” Bone, 77 S.W.3d at 833 (footnote omitted). 

Because Chatman did not file a motion for new trial, Chatman’s counsel did 

not have an opportunity to explain the choices he made in representing Chatman, 

and the record before us is silent about the strategy Chatman’s attorney employed.

Consequently, on this record, we cannot conclude that Chatman received ineffective 

assistance of counsel. See Goodspeed v. State, 187 S.W.3d 390, 392 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2005). Chatman has failed to defeat the strong presumption that counsel’s 

decisions during trial fell within the wide range of reasonable professional 

assistance. See Bone, 77 S.W.3d at 833; see also Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 814. We 

overrule issue two. Having overruled both of Chatman’s issues on appeal, we affirm 

the trial court’s judgment.

AFFIRMED. 

______________________________

 STEVE McKEITHEN

 Chief Justice

Submitted on September 4, 2018
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Opinion Delivered October 10, 2018

Do Not Publish

Before McKeithen, C.J., Kreger and Horton, JJ.