NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT GLENN GALVAN, pro se,

Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v. MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC., AKA ME RS, AKA MERSCORP Holdings, Inc.; DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, Defendants

- Appellees. No. 17

- 16930
D.C. No. 3:15

- cv - 00632

- MMD

VPC

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Nevada Miranda M. Du, District Judge, Presiding Submitted May 15, 2018 **
Before: SILVERMAN, BEA, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.
Glenn Galvan appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his diversity action arising from foreclosure proceedings

. We have jurisdiction

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

MAY 23 2018 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S2 17

- 16930

un der 28 U.S.C. § 129 1. We review de novo. Garity v. APWU Nat ’l Labor Org ., 828 F.3d 848, 854 (9th Cir. 2016) (issue preclusion); Ford v. City of Yakima , 706 F.3d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir. 2013) (cross

- motions for summary judgment)

. We affirm. The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendants on the basis of issue preclusion because the issue of whether the assignment of the loan
was fraudulent was actually litigated and decided against Galvan in his prior
action

. See Five Sta r Capital Corp. v. Ruby , 194 P.3d 709, 713

- 14 ( Nev. 2008) (en banc) ( elements of iss ue preclusion under Nevada law)

. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Galvan’s requests for judicial notice. See Lee v. City of Los Angeles , 250 F.3d 668, 689

- 90 (9th Cir. 2001) ( setting forth standard of review and circumstances under which judicial
notice is inappropriate). The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Galvan’s disco very requests because Galvan failed to demonstrate how the denial resulted in actual and substantial prejudice to him. See Laub v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior , 342 F.3d 1080, 1085, 1093 (9th Cir. 2003) ( setting forth standard of review and explaining that district court’s decision to deny discovery will not be dis turbed unless there is a clear showing that the denial “results in actual and substantial prejudice” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).3 17

- 16930

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Galvan’s motion to stay. See Clinton v. Jones , 520 U.S. 681, 706

- 07 (1997) ( setting forth standard of review and explaining that district court “has broad discretion to stay proceedings as an incident to its power to control its own docket” )

. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Galvan leave to
amend because amendment would have been futile. See Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. , 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) ( setting forth standard of review and stating that leave to amend may be denied where amendment would be
fu tile ).
To the extent that Galvan seeks review of orders from his state court proceedings, we d o not consider those orders as they are not properly before this
court. We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the openin g brief

. See Padgett v. Wright , 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009)

. AFFIRMED.