J-A29010-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: JOHN E. JACKSON AND SUE 

M. JACKSON, CHARITABLE TRUST

APPEAL OF: POLLY J. TOWNSEND 

AND WILLIAM R. JACKSON, JR.

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 70 WDA 2019

Appeal from the Order Entered December 11, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Orphans' Court at 

No(s): 3999 of 1988

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., KUNSELMAN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED APRIL 17, 2020

Polly J. Townsend and William R. Jackson, Jr. (“Individual Trustees”), 

appeal from the December 11, 2018 order, approving a mediation settlement 

agreement they entered into with co-trustee, PNC Bank, N.A. (“PNC”), to 

resolve a dispute regarding the John E. Jackson and Sue M. Jackson Charitable 

Trust (“Trust”). After careful review, we affirm. 

John E. Jackson and Sue M. Jackson (“Grantors”) established the Trust

on February 6, 1950.

1

 It was created “solely for charitable purposes, and the 

income and principal of the [T]rust estate is to be used for the sole benefit of 

public charities....” Trust at ¶ 4. The Trust originally named two trustees—

W.R. Jackson (John E. Jackson’s younger brother) and Commonwealth Trust 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 John E. Jackson lived until April of 1971, and Sue M. Jackson lived until 

January of 1994. 
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Company of Pittsburgh. In 1989, W.R. Jackson resigned and his daughter, 

Polly J. Townsend, was appointed to replace him as a co-trustee. The Trust 

was reformed in 1998 to provide that there shall always be two trustees—

National City Bank of Pennsylvania and its successors,

2 and an individual 

trustee who is a member of the Jackson family. In May of 2005, the orphans’ 

court entered an order reforming the Trust’s appointment provision again, and 

stated, in part:

There shall always be three trustees acting hereunder, National 

City Bank of Pennsylvania and its successors, which shall possess 

at all times one-half of the voting power of the trustees, and two 

individual trustees who are members of the Jackson family, each 

of whom shall possess at all times one-fourth of the voting power 

of the trustees.

Order, 5/24/05. The court also approved the appointment of William R. 

Jackson, Jr. (Polly’s brother) as the second individual co-trustee. PNC became 

the successor corporate co-trustee in 2009, after it acquired National City 

Bank. 

Section 6 of the Trust provides the following regarding distributions:

The [t]rustees shall distribute the income of the [T]rust fund 

among such public charities created for religious, educational or 

other charitable purposes as they in their sole discretion may 

deem proper. The Grantors may from time to time suggest to the 

[t]rustees specific charitable institutions or charitable causes to 

which they would like contributions made by the [t]rustees but 

the [t]rustees are in no manner obligated to follow the requests 

of the Grantors but, on the contrary, may distribute the income 

and principal of the [T]rust fund for such charitable purposes as 

they in their sole discretion may determine. 

____________________________________________

2 National City Bank of Pennsylvania was a successor in interest to 

Commonwealth Trust Company of Pittsburgh. 
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Trust ¶ 6. 

In 2016, PNC filed a petition to resolve a deadlock, which had formed 

between PNC and Individual Trustees regarding the amounts and recipients of 

the donations for 2016. According to PNC, it sought judicial intervention 

because, in order to avoid a tax penalty under Section 4942 of the Internal 

Revenue Code, the Trust needed to distribute at least 5% of its net assets 

before the end of the year. PNC’s Petition, 11/28/16, at 6 ¶ 20 (citing 26 

U.S.C. § 4942). PNC further indicated that “in keeping with the traditional 

giving pattern of the ... Trust during the lifetime of the [Grantors],” it has 

strongly favored distributing the Trust’s funds “to civic organizations, 

educational/arts organizations, health care facilities and children & youth 

organizations, with at least one-half of such distributions being to charitable 

organizations primarily situated in Western Pennsylvania.” Id. at 6 ¶ 21. PNC 

contrasted its list of “worthwhile charities” with the organizations favored by 

Individual Trustees, which PNC characterized as “political advocacy groups[,]” 

and which it believed to be inconsistent with the past giving practices of the 

Grantors. Id. at 8 ¶ 27. PNC provided the court with a list of 26 organizations 

that it selected to receive one-half of the required distribution for 2016, along 

with a list of 18 organizations it selected from the list submitted by Individual 

Trustees to receive the other one-half of the distribution. See id. at 8-9 ¶¶ 

29-30. It asked the court to “resolve the current deadlock by casting a ‘third 

vote[,’] either in favor of the list submitted by [PNC] ... or the list submitted 

by ... [I]ndividual [T]rustees....” Id. at 9 ¶ 32. 
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On December 1, 2016, Individual Trustees filed an answer and new 

matter, in which they alleged that PNC “unilaterally imposed an artificial 5% 

limit on the Trust’s annual charitable giving, forced the Trust to donate to local 

causes supported by PNC, and refused to allow charitable contributions to 

legitimate charities recommended by [Individual Trustees] (and supported by 

the Trust for decades).” Answer and New Matter, 12/1/16, at 1. They also 

averred that the Grantors intended for Individual Trustees to make donation 

decisions, and that PNC’s “proper role” is to work with them to facilitate 

donations to charities selected by Individual Trustees and to manage the 

Trust’s assets. Id. at 3, 6. 

After hearing oral argument on the petition on December 2, 2016, the 

orphans’ court stated that it would cap donations at 5% of the Trust’s assets 

to avoid a tax penalty and took the designation of charitable recipients under 

advisement. On December 7, 2016, the orphans’ court entered an order 

selecting the charities on PNC’s list for distributions in 2016. Individual 

Trustees filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the court on 

December 19, 2016. 

On January 5, 2017, Individual Trustees filed a timely appeal at 61 WDA 

2017, in which they argued, inter alia, that the orphans’ court erred in limiting 

the Trust’s 2016 distributions to 5% of the Trust’s assets and by selecting 

PNC’s list of proposed donees without attempting to discern the Grantors’ 

intent. In response, the orphans’ court issued an opinion pursuant to 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), in which it explained that its decision was based on the 
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time constraints placed upon the court and the lack of time needed to fully vet 

all options. Orphans’ Court Opinion (“OCO I”), 5/2/17, at 2. 

This Court concluded that the orphans’ court acted prudently in limiting 

the amount of the 2016 distribution to avoid the imposition of a tax penalty 

on the Trust. In re Jackson, 174 A.3d 14, 33 (Pa. Super. 2017). Going 

forward, however, we deemed it necessary to develop a factual record for the 

purpose of exploring the Grantors’ intent. Id. In regards to the orphans’ 

court decision to select PNC’s list of proposed donees, we concluded:

[T]he court abused its discretion by making a decision that was 

not based on any evidence. We also conclude[d] that the court 

abused its discretion by accepting PNC’s invitation to choose either 

its list or that proffered by Individual Trustees; the court was 

required to exercise judgment to determine appropriate recipients 

of the Trust’s gifts, and it should not have allowed its selection to 

be constrained by the parties’ submission of exclusive slates. 

The Grantors’ intent with regard to beneficiaries cannot be 

ascertained based on the Trust Agreement alone.... [T]he 

[o]rphans’ [c]ourt was required to consider extrinsic evidence of 

the Grantors’ intent to determine whether additional criteria 

should be applied to the donee selection process. The court 

abused its discretion in failing to do so.

Id. at 34.

Accordingly, we affirmed that part of the orphans’ court’s order that 

required distribution of 5% of the Trust’s assets in 2016 and vacated the part 

of the order that adopted PNC’s list of donees. We remanded the matter for 

further proceedings to determine the Grantors’ intent with regard to 

distribution of the Trust’s funds and directed the orphans’ court to permit 

expedited discovery. Id. at 37. Moreover, we stated:
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We also leave it to the [o]rphans’ [c]ourt in the first instance to 

determine as a matter of equity what, if anything, should be done 

regarding the 2016 distributions that were made by the Trust 

pursuant to that court’s December 7, 2016 order, which selected 

charitable recipients from PNC’s preferred list. Recipients of those 

distributions are likely to have relied on those funds, and it may 

be unrealistic and inequitable to consider any repayment 

obligation if the [o]rphans’ [c]ourt ultimately decides that gifts 

should have been awarded to different recipients. It also may no 

longer be practical to make additional 2016 contributions to 

additional charities from Individual Trustees’ preferred list. The 

[o]rphans’ [c]ourt should work with the parties to craft any 

additional remedy. 

Id. 

In order to avoid the possibility of another deadlock between PNC and 

Individual Trustees regarding the charitable distributions for 2017, the 

orphans’ court ordered that “all outstanding issues among the parties relating 

to the on-going administration of the ... Trust” be submitted to mediation with 

retired Judge Frank J. Lucchino. Order, 9/5/17. After a 10-hour mediation 

session on October 11, 2017, the parties reached a settlement agreement 

(“Mediation Agreement”), the terms of which were read on the record by Judge 

Lucchino and were fully memorialized by a court reporter. See N.T. Mediation, 

10/11/17, at 2-32. The orphans’ court summarized these terms as follows: 

The result of the mediation was for the five-year period of 2017-

2021 inclusive. The rate of distribution for the five-year period is 

6.5% per year. At the end of this five-year period, the parties will 

meet and[,] if in agreement[,] may maintain [the rate] at 6.5% 

per year. If no agreement is reached[,] 6%[] per year will be the 

floor. 

For the calendar year [of] 2018 and going forward, it was 

agreed that the CyberGrant platform that PNC is currently using 

to receive applications for grants would be used and access given 

to [] [I]ndividual Trustees regarding the Trust. The deadline for 
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receiving applications for 2018 and going forward will be June 15. 

That by June 30, and going forward, [] [I]ndividual Trustees, as 

well as PNC, as trustee, will select up to 25% of the grantees in 

terms of dollars. PNC will do an analysis of the grants that they 

receive, that are not part of the 25% that each trustee designates 

in the list that they exchanged, by June 30. PNC will provide the 

analysis of that 50% to [] [I]ndividual [T]rustees. [] [I]ndividual 

[T]rustees will have 30 days to analyze these analyses. That on 

or before August 31[] of each year, and if it happens to fall on a 

holiday, it will be carried over to the next business day following 

the holiday, [] [I]ndividual [T]rustees and PNC, as trustee[,] will 

meet for their first meeting. At this meeting, the co-trustees can 

decide what they agree on, up to the limit that is provided for total 

distribution. If the co-trustees cannot reach a decision at the first 

meeting, they will have until November 1[] of that year to meet 

again. If the co-trustees are deadlocked, the remaining parts of 

the 50% will have their grant increased to cover the required 

minimum distribution required by the IRS. 

For 2017, it had been agreed that 6.5% times the market 

value of the [T]rust as issued by PNC as of December 31, 2016, 

will be the amount that will be distributed for 2017. 

Orphans’ Court Opinion (“OCO II”), 12/11/18, at 1-2 (unnecessary 

capitalization omitted). 

At the end of the mediation, counsel for Individual Trustees discussed 

the possibility of his clients’ withdrawal of the appeal at 61 WDA 2017. The 

withdrawal never occurred, however, and this Court issued its decision in that 

matter on November 7, 2017. See Jackson, supra (“Jackson Opinion”). 

On February 2, 2018, Individual Trustees filed a motion to commence the 

proceedings dictated by the Jackson Opinion and to abrogate, amend or, in 

the alternative, suspend implementation of the Mediation Agreement (“Motion 

to Abrogate”). A hearing was held on February 12, 2018, and the court

subsequently issued an order setting a discovery schedule. 
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On June 19, 2018, PNC filed a petition for a rule to show cause why the 

Mediation Agreement should not be enforced. Individual Trustees filed an 

answer and new matter on July 9, 2018. On December 11, 2018, the orphans’ 

court entered an order stating that “the terms of the agreed upon [M]ediation 

[Agreement] between the [p]arties are binding for 2017 going forward as 

outlined in the accompanying [o]pinion.” Order, 12/11/18. Individual 

Trustees filed a timely notice of appeal on January 10, 2019, and herein 

present the following issues for our review: 

I. Whether the [orphans’] court erred by enforcing and binding 

the trustees to a purported settlement agreement 

(“Mediation [Agreement]”) in perpetuity without holding an 

evidentiary hearing to decide controverted issues regarding 

the existence, terms, and binding effect of any purported 

settlement?

II. Whether the [orphans’] court erred by enforcing and binding 

the trustees to the Mediation [Agreement] in perpetuity 

even though the purported terms of the Mediation 

[Agreement] are contrary to the law, as set forth in the 

subsequently issued Superior Court’s November 7, 2017 

[o]pinion, and [] Grantors’ intent?

III. Whether the [orphans’] court erred by enforcing and binding 

the trustees to the Mediation [Agreement] in perpetuity 

even though it is an unenforceable agreement to agree?

IV. Whether the [orphans’] court erred by enforcing and binding 

the trustees to the Mediation [Agreement] in perpetuity 

even though the purported agreement lacks consideration, 

fails for indefiniteness, and is otherwise unenforceable 

under traditional principles of contract law?

Individual Trustees’ Brief at 4. 

Preliminarily, we address PNC’s motion to dismiss claims I, III, and IV, 

for failure to preserve these issues at the trial court level. See Renewed 
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Motion to Dismiss, 10/28/19.

3

 PNC argues that Individual Trustees never 

disputed the existence of the Mediation Agreement before the lower court, 

failed to assert that the Mediation Agreement was a mere “agreement to 

agree[,]” and failed to aver that the Mediation Agreement “lacked 

consideration” or “fails for indefiniteness[.]” Id. at 1 ¶ 3. See also id. at 3 

¶ 10. Rather than preserve these issues, PNC asserts that Individual Trustees 

conceded that a settlement agreement was reached at the conclusion of the 

mediation. Id. at 2 ¶ 4. 

Indeed:

Issue preservation is foundational to proper appellate review. Our 

rules of appellate procedure mandate that “[i]ssues not raised in 

the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time 

on appeal.” Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). By requiring that an issue be 

considered waived if raised for the first time on appeal, our courts 

ensure that the trial court that initially hears a dispute has had an 

opportunity to consider the issue. This jurisprudential mandate is 

also grounded upon the principle that a trial court ... must be given 

the opportunity to correct its errors as early as possible. 

In re F.C. III, 2 A.3d 1201, 1211-12 (Pa. 2010) (internal citations omitted). 

In their first claim, Individual Trustees aver that the orphans’ court erred 

in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing before enforcing the Mediation 

Agreement, as the terms and existence of the Mediation Agreement were in 

dispute. Individual Trustees’ Brief at 21. They claim that they preserved their 

____________________________________________

3 On July 29, 2019, PNC filed a “Motion to Dismiss Certain Appellate Issues for 

Failure to Preserve.” This Court entered a per curiam order on August 1, 2019, 

denying PNC’s motion without prejudice to its right to renew its motion on 

appeal after the assignment of this matter to a merits panel. PNC filed its 

renewed motion to dismiss on October 28, 2019, which was deferred by per 

curiam order of this Court to the time of disposition. Order, 11/7/19. 
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argument in their February 2, 2018 Motion to Abrogate, and in their answer 

and new matter to PNC’s petition to enforce the Mediation Agreement. Id. at 

22. The record clearly belies their claim. 

In their motion, Individual Trustees expressly stated:

[T]his Petition seeks to abrogate, amend, or, in the alternative, 

suspend the implementation of [the] Mediation [Agreement] 

established during mediation between the parties pertaining to the 

procedure for making future donations and reimbursement of 

legal fees for the Trustees from the Trust. That [agreement] is 

now moot and, as further explained herein, implementation of the 

Mediation [Agreement] would be contrary to the [Jackson] 

Opinion—and, therefore, illegal—because, among other reasons, 

the Mediation [Agreement] does not allow for consideration of the 

factors the Superior Court has held are necessary for ascertaining 

and effectuating Grantor[s’] intent, including historical deference 

to the Jackson family regarding donation decisions. At minimum, 

however, implementation of the Mediation [Agreement] now, 

before the proceedings ordered by the Superior Court, would be 

premature and contrary to the directives of the Superior Court. 

Thus, in the alternative, the [M]ediation [Agreement] should be 

suspended pending the discovery and evidentiary hearings 

ordered by the Superior Court.

Motion to Abrogate at 3 (emphasis in original). Not only does it not dispute 

the existence of the Mediation Agreement, Individual Trustees’ argument 

presumes that a settlement agreement was, in fact, reached. The premise of 

their motion is that the Mediation Agreement is contrary to the Jackson

Opinion and, thus, cannot be implemented as a matter of law. Id. at 3, 11-

17. Moreover, counsel for Individual Trustees acknowledged the existence of 

the Mediation Agreement at the February 12, 2018 hearing on the motion. 

See N.T. Hearing, 2/12/18, at 52-53 (“I am not up here saying we didn’t reach 

[an] agreement. I am saying the agreement that was reached was wrong, it 
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was based upon a misunderstanding of the law....”). Likewise, Individual 

Trustees continued to aver in their answer and new matter that the Mediation 

Agreement cannot be enforced because it is in “material violation of” the 

Jackson Opinion. See Answer and New Matter, 7/9/18. Thus, we deem this 

issue waived.4 

In issues III and IV, Individual Trustees assert that the Mediation 

Agreement is an unenforceable “agreement to agree,” that it fails for lack of 

consideration, and that the agreement has terminated due to an indefinite 

duration. They have failed to demonstrate, however, that these claims were

properly raised before the orphans’ court. Prior to the filing of their appellate 

brief, the crux of their argument had been that the Mediation Agreement was 

inconsistent with the Jackson Opinion. Whether the parties had reached a 

settlement agreement had not been a question. After careful review of the 

____________________________________________

4 Even if we determined that Individual Trustees had properly preserved this 

issue, we would deem their claim that the orphans’ court erred in not holding 

an evidentiary hearing to be meritless. While it is true that an evidentiary 

hearing must be held where a trial court is placed on notice of a dispute 

regarding whether a settlement agreement exists, no such dispute existed 

here. Thus, Individual Trustees’ reliance on Viola v. Krouse, 2013 WL 

11276788, at *2 (Pa. Super. Feb. 21, 2013) (remanding for a hearing to 

determine if the parties reached a settlement where the Violas strongly 

contested the terms of the agreement as described in the motion to enforce)

and Brannam v. Reedy, 906 A.2d 635, 641-42 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006) (finding 

that the trial court erred in ruling on the appellants’ motion to strike a 

settlement agreement without holding an evidentiary hearing where the 

appellants’ counsel notified the court that the appellants had rejected the 

settlement), is misplaced. Moreover, we note that Individual Trustee’s citation 

to Viola, an unpublished Superior Court memorandum, violates Superior 

Court Internal Operating Procedure 65.37, which prohibits citation to 

unpublished memorandum decisions filed prior to May 1, 2019. 
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record, we agree with PNC that Individual Trustees have also failed to preserve 

issues III, and IV. Accordingly, we grant PNC’s motion to dismiss issues I, III, 

and IV. See Pa.R.A.P.302(a) (stating “[i]ssues not raised in the lower court 

are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal”). 

Before addressing the merits of Individual Trustees’ remaining claim

(Issue II), we set forth our scope and standard of review:

The enforceability of settlement agreements is determined 

according to principles of contract law. Because contract 

interpretation is a question of law, this Court is not bound 

by the trial court’s interpretation. Our standard of review 

over questions of law is de novo and to the extent 

necessary, the scope of our review is plenary as [the 

appellate] court may review the entire record in making its 

decision. 

Ragnar Benson, Inc. v. Hempfield Township Mun. Auth., 916 

A.2d 1183, 1188 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations and quotation marks 

omitted). With respect to factual conclusions, we may reverse the 

trial court only if its findings of fact are predicated on an error of 

law or are unsupported by competent evidence in the record. 

Skurnowicz v. Lucci, 798 A.2d 788, 793 (Pa. Super. 2002) 

(citation omitted). 

Mastroni-Mucker v. Allstate Ins. Co., 976 A.2d 510, 517-18 (Pa. Super. 

2009). 

It has been well-established that: 

Where a settlement agreement contains all of the requisites 

for a valid contract, a court must enforce the terms of the 

agreement. McDonnell v. Ford Motor Co., ... 643 A.2d 1102, 

1105 ([Pa. Super.] 1994).... This is true even if the terms of the 

agreement are not yet formalized in writing. Mazzella v. Koken, 

... 739 A.2d 531, 536 ([Pa.] 1999); see Commerce 

Bank/Pennsylvania v. First Union Nat. Bank, 911 A.2d 133, 

147 (Pa. Super. 2006) (stating “an agreement is binding if the 

parties come to a meeting of the minds on all essential terms, 
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even if they expect the agreement to be reduced to writing but 

that formality does not take place”). Pursuant to well-settled 

Pennsylvania law, oral agreements to settle are enforceable 

without a writing. Pulcinello [v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 784 

A.2d 122, 124 (Pa. Super. 2001)] (citing Kazanjian v. New 

England Petroleum Corp., ... 480 A.2d 1153, 1157 ([Pa. Super.] 

1984)). 

Id. at 518. See also Step Plans Services, Inc. v. Koresko, 12 A.3d 401, 

409 (Pa. Super. 2010). 

Moreover, we note:

The law of this Commonwealth establishes that an agreement to 

settle legal disputes between parties is favored. There is a strong 

judicial policy in favor of voluntarily settling lawsuits because it 

reduces the burden on the court and expedites the transfer of 

money into the hands of a complainant. If courts were called on 

to reevaluate settlement agreements, the judicial policies favoring 

settlements would be deemed useless. 

Step Plans Services, Inc., 12 A.3d at 408-09. 

Here, the record supports the orphans’ court’s finding that an agreement 

was reached at the October 11, 2017 mediation pertaining to the five-year 

period of 2017-2021 and thereafter, and that the terms of the Mediation 

Agreement are binding. See Order, 12/11/18; OCO II at 3 (“Given the 

immense detail in the mediation settlement as set forth by retired Judge ... 

Lucchino, it is obvious that an agreement for 2017 moving forward had been 

effectuated.”). All parties and their counsel expressly agreed to the Mediation 

Agreement on the record. See N.T. Mediation at 20-21, 32.

Having determined that the Mediation Agreement is a valid, binding

agreement between the parties, we address Individual Trustees’ claim that 

the Mediation Agreement is “materially inconsistent” with the subsequently 
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issued Jackson Opinion and the purpose of the Trust and, thus, it cannot be 

enforced. Individual Trustees’ Brief at 27. First, we note that, in support of 

their argument, Individual Trustees falsely claim that the Mediation 

Agreement imposes “hard upper limits on annual donations in perpetuity[.]”

Id. at 27-28. Pursuant to the terms of the Mediation Agreement, distributions 

for the five-year time period of 2017-2021 are limited to 6.5% of the market 

value of the Trust. Thereafter, if no agreement can be reached, 6% will be 

the floor. No ceiling has been set for distributions for 2022 and going forward. 

See OCO II at 1; N.T. Mediation at 9-10.

Individual Trustees further purport that the Mediation Agreement 

violates the Jackson Opinion and the terms of the Trust, because it does not 

require the trustees to act jointly. Individual Trustees’ Brief at 29. As we 

previously established, Paragraph 6 of the Trust “requires the trustees to 

exercise their discretion in selecting gift recipients anew each year, and does 

not bind the trustees to contribute to the same organizations year after year.” 

Jackson, 174 A.3d at 36-37. Additionally, we stated that “[the] selection of 

gift recipients must be done jointly by the Trust’s three trustees in a good faith 

exercise of their discretion under the Trust[,]” and we emphasized that “the 

Trust ... requires the Trust’s three trustees to work together to perform that 

task.” Id. at 37. 

Contrary to Individual Trustees’ position, we deem the Mediation 

Agreement to represent a “good faith exercise” of the parties’ discretion under 

the Trust and to be consistent with this Court’s directive that the trustees work 
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together. The Mediation Agreement represents an agreed upon compromise 

of the trustees on how to make annual distributions and to honor the Grantors’ 

intent. Moreover, it allows for renewed discretion each year as to the charities 

selected to receive the Trust’s distributions. Accordingly, we deem this 

argument meritless.

We reject the Individual Trustees’ claim that the Mediation Agreement

was nullified by the subsequent issuance of the Jackson Opinion. Based on 

our careful review, we discern no conflict in the terms of the Mediation 

Agreement and the determinations set forth in the Jackson Opinion. It is 

clear that the issues before this Court on appeal at 61 WDA 2017 concerned

the amount and recipients of charitable distributions for 2016 only,

5 whereas 

the Mediation Agreement clearly applies to 2017 and thereafter. Nothing in 

the Jackson Opinion conflicts with the terms of the Mediation Agreement or 

prevents its terms from being carried out. 6 

____________________________________________

5

In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the orphans’ court explained its December 7, 

2016 order, in which it selected PNC’s proposed list of charities for 

distributions in 2016 and limited the donations to 5% of the Trust’s assets, as 

well as its denial of Individual Trustees’ motion for reconsideration. It 

expressly stated that “nothing in the court’s determinations for this calendar 

year[] should be interpreted or extrapolated to any future years.” OCO I at 

2.

6 PNC’s renewed motion to strike Individual Trustees’ Appendix, filed on 

October 28, 2019, and deferred to the time of disposition by per curiam order 

of this Court dated November 7, 2019, is granted, without prejudice to 

Individual Trustees’ right to present its petition to remove PNC as the 

corporate co-trustee before the orphans’ court. See Renewed Motion to 

Strike, 10/28/19.
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Accordingly, we affirm the orphans’ court’s December 11, 2018 order 

approving the Mediation Agreement.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/17/2020