Docket No. 89061–Agenda 3–January 2001.

In re D.D., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellee,  								v. M.D., Appellant).

Opinion filed June 21, 2001.

	JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of the court:

	On April 23, 1999, the circuit court of Kane County issued an

order terminating M.D.’s parental rights to his son, D.D., after

finding M.D. to be an unfit parent pursuant to sections 1(D)(m)

and 1(D)(s) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m), (D)(s)

(West 1998)). The order was affirmed by the appellate court on

appeal. 309 Ill. App. 3d 581. This court granted M.D.’s petition for

leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a). For the reasons that follow,

we now affirm.

BACKGROUND

	On July 18, 1996, Copley Hospital notified the Department of

Children and Family Services (DCFS) that on July 17, 1996, Penny

Warren (Warren) gave birth to a son, D.D., who had been exposed

to cocaine. A DCFS Division of Child Protection (DCP)

investigator went to Copley Hospital and spoke with Warren,

offering her services and drug treatment. Warren refused the offer

of services and informed the investigator that she planned to give

D.D. to Elizabeth Washington (Washington), a woman whom she

had met two months earlier. After the investigator’s visit, Warren

had no further contact with DCFS. Warren left Copley Hospital

and disappeared. Despite diligent searches, DCFS was unable to

locate her.

	D.D. was taken into protective custody by DCFS and, on July

23, 1996, DCFS filed a petition for adjudication of wardship on the

basis that D.D. was abused and neglected. See 705 ILCS 405/2–13

(West 1996). The petition alleged that D.D. was neglected “in that

he was born with cocaine in his urine which is not a result of

medical treatment administered to the mother or infant,” and

abused “in that his mother created a substantial risk of physical

injury to [D.D.] when she was pregnant; to wit: the mother was taking cocaine or ingesting cocaine while pregnant.”1 The petition listed D.D.’s father as “unknown.”

	Shortly after the petition was filed, DCFS was contacted by

M.D., who identified himself as D.D.’s putative father. M.D.

requested a blood test to establish paternity and notified DCFS

that, if he was D.D’s father, he wanted D.D. placed with

Washington, whom he identified as his fiancé. M.D. was unable to

take custody of D.D. himself, however, because he was being held

in the Kane County jail, awaiting trial on charges of home invasion

and armed violence.

	On August 12, 1996, M.D. appeared before the court,

acknowledged paternity for D.D., and stipulated to the State’s

neglect petition, admitting that D.D. was a neglected minor

because he had been born with cocaine in his system. The court

declined, at that time, to remove D.D. from the care and custody

of DCFS. The court ordered shelter care to continue pending the

completion of a home study on Washington. The court also

directed DCFS to determine whether any blood relatives were

willing and able to care for D.D.

	On September 17, 1996, DCFS filed a court report indicating

that it had been in contact with Paulette D., D.D.’s paternal

grandmother, and June S., D.D.’s maternal grandmother, and

learned that there were no relatives available to care for D.D.

	On December 17, 1996, Washington married M.D. at the

Kane County jail. Shortly thereafter, on December 23, 1996, M.D.

was tried and found guilty of home invasion and armed violence

(predicated on aggravated battery causing great bodily harm). He

was sentenced to a term of 10 years’ imprisonment for the armed

violence conviction, with a concurrent term of 6 years’

imprisonment for the home invasion conviction.

	On January 6, 1997, M.D. and his now-wife, Washington,

petitioned the court to set aside the adjudication of neglect and all previous shelter care orders and have D.D. placed in the

guardianship and custody of Washington.

	On January 10, 1997, DCFS filed with the court its completed

home study and investigation of Washington. According to the

report, the physical environment of Washington’s home was

adequate, but Washington was unqualified to become a registered

foster care provider under DCFS standards due to her extensive

criminal history.2

	On January 14, 1997, the court denied M.D.’s petition to set

aside the adjudication and shelter care orders. However, M.D. was

given leave to file a new motion for change of custody and

guardianship. M.D. filed this motion on March 10, 1997.

Evidentiary hearings were held on May 29 and June 27, 1997, and

the motion was denied.

	In July 1997, at an administrative case review, DCFS changed

the permanency goal for D.D. to substitute care pending the filing

of a termination petition. The case passed legal screening in

September 1997 and was referred to the State’s Attorney for the

filing of a termination petition.

	On March 9, 1998, the State filed a petition for the termination

of M.D.’s parental rights. Five grounds for finding M.D. unfit were

alleged: (a) failure to maintain a reasonable degree of interest,

concern, or responsibility; (b) failure to make reasonable efforts to

correct the conditions which were the basis for removal and/or

failure to make reasonable progress toward the return of D.D.

within 12 months of adjudication; (c) desertion; (d) incarceration

which prevents the discharge of parental duties for a period in

excess of two years, accompanied by little or no previous contact

and/or little or no support; and (e) repeated incarceration as a

result of criminal convictions, which has prevented the discharge of parental duties. See 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b), (D)(c), (D)(m),

(D)(r), (D)(s) (West 1998).

	Hearing on the petition was initially set for July 9, 1998.

However, on that date, M.D. filed a motion seeking a substitution

of judges. After a number of continuances, the motion was heard

and granted on October 7, 1998. After several more continuances,

evidentiary hearings on the termination petition were held on

March 25 and 26, 1999.

	In addition to the background evidence set forth above, the

court received testimonial and documentary evidence, which

revealed the following.

	When D.D. was born on July 17, 1996, M.D. was in jail

awaiting trial on charges of armed violence and home invasion.

After a trial on December 23, 1996, M.D. was found guilty as

charged after it was shown that, on June 22, 1996, he entered the

home of Jeffrey Martin without permission and stabbed Martin

with a knife. M.D. was sentenced to concurrent terms of 10 years

and 6 years, respectively. Darlene Bridge, the record office

supervisor at Sheridan Correctional Center (Sheridan), testified

that M.D. was incarcerated and serving his sentences at Sheridan.

According to her most recent calculations, M.D. was scheduled to

be released on June 24, 2001.

	DCFS records showed that, due to M.D.’s incarceration,

M.D.’s opportunity to interact with D.D. was extremely limited.

Between July 1996 and March 1997, M.D.’s only contact with

D.D. occurred at the court house, on the few occasions when M.D.

was brought from jail to attend court hearings regarding D.D.’s

care and custody.

	After M.D. was convicted and moved to Sheridan, a visitation

schedule was established. Beginning March 11, 1997, a case aide

brought D.D. to Sheridan once each month for a scheduled one-

hour supervised visitation. Visits at Sheridan took place in a large,

cafeteria-like room where other inmates and their guests also were

present. Before a visitation began, there often was a long wait

while everyone was searched and processed. The visits generally

did not last the full hour because D.D. did not react well to the

surroundings and typically spent most of the visit crying. According to the case aide who supervised the visits, M.D. was

unable to engage D.D. or develop any bond with him.

	Visitations also were sporadic. No visit took place in October

1997 because the prison was in lock-down. At the November 1997

visit, M.D., citing a concern for D.D.’s health, asked that visitation

be suspended. Visitations did not resume until May 1998.

	After the May 20, 1998, and June 24, 1998, visits, the foster

mother and the case aide reported to DCFS worker Rachel Weiss3 that they were concerned about D.D.’s traumatic reaction to the

renewed visitation. It was reported that D.D. would work himself

up into such a state that they feared for his safety. While crying

heavily, D.D. would put his fist in his mouth and gag himself. D.D.

refused all physical contact with M.D. and would not even look at

him. M.D., the aide said, appeared unmoved by D.D.’s distress and

incapable of taking any action to correct it.

	Because of the reported difficulties, Weiss decided to

personally supervise the next few visits. Weiss accompanied D.D.

and the foster mother to Sheridan on July 22, 1998, but no visit

took place. When M.D. saw that Weiss was present, he refused

visitation. Weiss immediately contacted M.D. by letter, explaining

that she would be personally supervising visitation for assessment

purposes. However, after Weiss traveled to Sheridan with D.D.

and the foster mother for the next scheduled visit on September 11,

1998, M.D. again refused visitation.

	A court hearing was held on September 16, 1998, at which

time visitation problems were discussed. In the course of this

hearing, M.D. made threatening statements toward Weiss in front

of the judge.4 The judge admonished M.D. regarding his behavior and directed M.D. to cooperate with Weiss, whose job it was to

supervise visitation if she felt there was a need. Despite these admonishments, M.D. elected to cancel the next scheduled

visitation.

	M.D. did not have another visit with D.D. until November 12,

1998. On this occasion both foster parents accompanied D.D. to

Sheridan. Weiss supervised the visit and observed M.D.’s

interaction with D.D., who continued to cry and refuse all contact

with M.D. During this visit, M.D. spent much of the time speaking

to the foster father, attempting to negotiate an agreement. M.D.

indicated that he would be willing to voluntarily surrender D.D. for

adoption if the foster parents would sign an agreement to allow

him to visit. In the course of the conversation, M.D. made a remark

about knowing the foster parents’ address. This remark was

perceived by the foster parents as a subtle threat.

	The next visit, on December 8, 1998, proceeded much the

same way–D.D. refused to interact with M.D. In the absence of the

foster father, M.D. tried to discuss his earlier proposal with the

foster mother. Weiss interceded and told M.D. that no agreement

would be made. Weiss then noticed M.D. gesturing to another

inmate. Weiss found this nonverbal communication with another

inmate to be threatening and inappropriate. As a result, the visit

was terminated.

	In 1999, visitation was limited, by court order, to half-hour

visits. Visits took place in January and March, but not in February.

The February visit was canceled by M.D. because he believed he

was being moved from Sheridan.

	The State also presented evidence pertaining to M.D.’s

compliance with the service plans developed by DCFS. The service

plans, which had been discussed with and agreed to by M.D.,

recommended that M.D. participate in various services, including

substance abuse counseling, anger management classes, parenting

classes, and psychological testing and counseling. Steven Stocker,

a Sheridan case work supervisor, testified that some of the services

recommended by DCFS, though available at Sheridan, had been

unavailable to M.D. because of his advanced release date. There

were other services, however, which were available to M.D.,

although he never participated in them. Stocker testified that anger

management classes were available and had been recommended

since January 1997, but M.D. never signed up for them. Cooperative work training, a course that teaches life skills,

including parenting, also was available to M.D. He did not register

for this class until January 1999, just two months before the

termination hearings were held.

	The court admitted into evidence State’s Exhibits 8 and 9,

which contained records of M.D.’s two prior criminal convictions.

According to these exhibits, M.D. had been charged by indictment

on December 11, 1984, with three counts of murder in relation to

the December 9, 1984, stabbing death of Edward Ortega. M.D.

also was charged with one count of attempted murder in relation

to the December 9, 1984, stabbing of Juan Galindo. M.D. pleaded

guilty to attempted murder in exchange for a dismissal of the

murder charges. A sentence of 12 years’ imprisonment was

imposed. The exhibits also revealed that M.D. was charged on June

11, 1991, with two counts of attempted murder, one count of

home invasion, and two counts of aggravated discharge of a

firearm. The indictments alleged that on May 23, 1991, M.D.,

while armed with a gun, entered the home of Dorothy Yager

without permission. While inside the home, M.D. fired the gun in

the direction of James and Dennis Pendall in an attempt to kill or

do great bodily harm to them. On July 13, 1992, M.D. pleaded

guilty to one count of aggravated discharge of a firearm in

exchange for an agreement to have the remaining charges nol-

prossed. A sentence of seven years’ imprisonment was imposed.

	At the close of the State’s evidence, the circuit court judge

granted M.D. a directed verdict on two of the unfitness grounds

alleged in the petition–failure to make reasonable efforts (750

ILCS 50/1(D)(m) (West 1998)) and desertion (750 ILCS

50/1(D)(c) (West 1998)). M.D. then presented the testimony of

Paulette, his mother, and Washington, his wife. Only his wife’s

testimony is relevant here.

	Washington testified that she had known M.D. for about 18

months before they were married in December 1996. In the fall of

1995, shortly after they met, M.D. introduced her to Warren, who

was pregnant with M.D.’s baby. Washington said M.D. introduced

her to Warren because she (Washington) wanted a child, but could

not have any of her own, and Warren was looking for someone to

“take over the baby when it was born.” According to Washington, after they met, Warren agreed to allow Washington to adopt the

baby. No legal steps were taken to finalize the agreement,

however. Washington said that M.D. gave her money toward the

purchase of a crib, clothes, and other items and promised to

contribute financial assistance for the baby in the future.

	Washington also testified that she found M.D. to have a

“mellow” and “good-natured” temperament. She said she had

never seen him violent and he has never been angry with her.

Although M.D. told her about his previous attempted murder

conviction, she did not know about his conviction for aggravated

discharge of a firearm. However, Washington said, she did not hold

a person’s past against them and judged a person by the way they

treated her.

	After all of the evidence was received, the court ruled M.D.

unfit pursuant to section 1(D)(m) (failure to make reasonable

progress toward the return of the child) and section 1(D)(s)

(repeated incarceration). 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m), (D)(s) (West

1998).

	On April 20, 1999, the court conducted a best interests

hearing and determined it was in D.D.’s best interests to terminate

M.D.’s parental rights. An order terminating M.D.’s parental rights

and authorizing the Guardianship Administrator to consent to

D.D.’s adoption was issued on April 23, 1999. See 705 ILCS

405/2–29 (West 1998). As noted earlier, this order was affirmed on

appeal to the appellate court. This court granted M.D.’s petition

for leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R. 315).

ANALYSIS

	The Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/1–1 et seq. (West 1998)) is a comprehensive statutory scheme which creates

rights and duties that have no counterparts in common law or

equity. In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d 53, 65 (1993). In Illinois, when a court conducts proceedings to involuntarily terminate parental

rights, its authority is statutorily derived and the scope and

application of these proceedings are defined solely by the

legislature. In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d at 63-66; In re S.B., 305 Ill. App. 3d 813, 817 (1999); In re M.V., 288 Ill. App. 3d 300, 304 (1997). A proceeding to involuntarily terminate parental rights is

a drastic measure which determines whether, under our laws, a

person should continue to hold the legal status of parent or have

“the entire bundle of parental rights, custodial and noncustodial,”

forever removed. In re S.W., 315 Ill. App. 3d 1153, 1157 (2000); see also In re D.R., 307 Ill. App. 3d 478, 482 (1999).

	Parental termination proceedings are initiated by the filing of

a petition pursuant to section 2–29(2) of the Juvenile Court Act

(705 ILCS 405/2–29(2) (West 1998)). Section 2–29 provides that

a parent’s rights may be terminated upon proof, by clear and

convincing evidence, that the parent is unfit, as that term is defined

in section 1(D) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1 (West 1998)).

When deciding a parent’s fitness, the court is not to consider the

best interests of the child but, rather, must focus on whether the

parent’s conduct falls within one or more of the several “grounds

of unfitness” described in section 1(D) of the Adoption Act. In re Adoption of Syck, 138 Ill. 2d 255, 276 (1990). A court’s determination that clear and convincing evidence of a parent’s

unfitness has been shown will not be disturbed on review unless it

is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re D.L., 191 Ill. 2d 1, 13 (2000); In re A.S.B., 293 Ill. App. 3d 836, 843 (1997). A decision regarding parental fitness is against the manifest weight of

the evidence where the opposite conclusion is clearly the proper

result. In re T.B., 215 Ill. App. 3d 1059, 1062 (1991).

Unfitness Pursuant to Section 1(D)(s)

	 Section 1(D)(s) of the Adoption Act provides that a parent

may be found unfit if:

			“The child is in the temporary custody or guardianship

of the Department of Children and Family Services, the

parent is incarcerated at the time the petition or motion for

termination of parental rights is filed, the parent has been

repeatedly incarcerated as a result of criminal convictions,

and the parent’s repeated incarceration has prevented the

parent from discharging his or her parental responsibilities

for the child.” 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(s) (West 1998).

	The ground of a parent’s repeated conviction and

incarceration was added only recently to the definition of “unfit person” in section 1(D) of the Adoption Act. See Pub. Act 90–28,

eff. January 1, 1998. For this reason, it has not yet been construed

by this court.

	In the case at bar, M.D. challenges the circuit and appellate

courts’ interpretation and application of this unfitness ground

under the circumstances of this case. The dispute centers on the

final phrases of the provision, “the parent has been repeatedly

incarcerated as a result of criminal convictions, and the parent’s

repeated incarceration has prevented the parent from discharging

his or her parental responsibilities for the child.” M.D. contends

that these phrases, properly interpreted, provide that a parent may

be found unfit only when it can be shown that the parent was

unable to fulfill his or her parental duties as a result of being

repeatedly unavailable, during the lifetime of the child, due to

incarceration. Because, in this case, M.D. was incarcerated only

once during D.D.’s lifetime, M.D. argues that the provision does

not apply to him. We disagree.

	 Whether the trial and appellate courts have correctly

interpreted this statutory provision is a question of law and,

accordingly, our review is de novo. See In re Application of the Cook County Treasurer, 185 Ill. 2d 428 (1998). The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the true

intent of the legislature (People v. Latona, 184 Ill. 2d 260, 269 (1998); Solich v. George & Anna Portes Cancer Prevention Center of Chicago, Inc., 158 Ill. 2d 76, 83 (1994); Kraft, Inc. v. Edgar, 138 Ill. 2d 178, 189 (1990)), while presuming the legislature did not intend to create absurdity, inconvenience, or

injustice (Henrich v. Libertyville High School, 186 Ill. 2d 381, 394 (1998)). When determining legislative intent, the starting point

always is the language of the statute, which is the most reliable

indicator of the legislature’s objectives in enacting the particular

law. Michigan Avenue National Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493 (2000); Nottage v. Jeka, 172 Ill. 2d 386, 392 (1996). When the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, courts may not

read in exceptions, limitations, or other conditions. People v. Lavallier, 187 Ill. 2d 464 (1999); People v. Daniels, 172 Ill. 2d 154, 163 (1996). Only when the meaning of the enactment cannot

be ascertained from the language may a court look beyond the language and resort to aids for construction. Gem Electronics of Monmouth, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 183 Ill. 2d 470, 475 (1998); Solich, 158 Ill. 2d at 81.

	Applying the principles and standards above, we find the

language of section 1(D)(s) to be clear and unambiguous. Nowhere

do we find a requirement that the repeated incarceration take place

during the lifetime of the child. Nor would insertion of such a

limiting condition be consistent with the “reason and necessity for

the law, the evils to be remedied, and the objectives to be

obtained.” Cummins v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 178 Ill. 2d 474, 479 (1997); accord People v. Bole, 155 Ill. 2d 188, 195 (1993).

	Section 1(D)(s) is contained within the Adoption Act and sets

forth one of the grounds for finding a parent unfit. This ground

may then be used as the basis for terminating a parent’s rights

pursuant to section 2–29 of the Juvenile Court Act. Our

construction of this provision, therefore, must take into account the

nature and purpose of the Juvenile Court Act. See In re K.B.J., 305 Ill. App. 3d 917 (1999). The stated purpose of the Juvenile

Court Act is to “secure for each minor subject hereto such care and

guidance *** as will serve the safety and moral, emotional, mental,

and physical welfare of the minor and the best interests of the

community; to preserve and strengthen the minor’s family ties

whenever possible, removing him or her from the custody of his or

her parents only when his or her safety or welfare or the protection

of the public cannot be adequately safeguarded without removal

***.” 705 ILCS 405/1–2(1) (West 1998). Applying the plain

language of the provision, without the addition of the limiting

language proposed by M.D., is consistent with the stated purpose

of the Act, and so we apply the provision as written.

	Section 1(D)(s), no doubt, is applicable in situations where the

parent, during the lifetime of the child, has had recurring absences

caused by incarcerations which have prevented the parent from

providing his or her child with a stable home environment. See In re M.M.J., 313 Ill. App. 3d 352 (2000); In re Sheltanya S., 309 Ill. App. 3d 941 (1999). However, the plain language of the provision

allows for a broader application. We note, as the trial court did,

that the final phrase of section 1(D)(s) uses the term “repeated incarceration,” not “repeated incarcerations.” Though this may

seem a minor distinction, we find the legislature’s use of the

singular form to be both deliberate and significant.

	The plural form has a more narrow connotation. Had the

the

legislature used the plural form, stating “the parent’s repeated incarcerations have prevented the parent from discharging his or her parental responsibilities for the child,” the specific reference

would be to the incarcerations themselves. A parent’s unfitness

would stem from these incarcerations–these absences–which

prevent the parent from discharging his or her parental duties.

	The singular term, however, has a broader connotation. By

using the singular form, stating “the parent’s repeated incarceration has prevented the parent from discharging his or her parental responsibilities for the child,” the legislature makes

reference to the general inclusive concept of “repeated

incarceration,” suggesting that courts may consider the overall

impact that repeated incarceration may have on the parent’s ability

to discharge his or her parental responsibilities–circumstances

which may flow from the fact of repeated incarceration, such as the

diminished capacity to provide financial, physical, and emotional

support for the child.

	The facts of this case provide a representative example. The

record reveals that M.D. was just 21 years old when, on December

9, 1984, he stabbed a person with a knife. After pleading guilty to

a charge of attempted murder, he was sentenced to 12 years’

imprisonment. M.D. could not have been out of prison long when,

on May 23, 1991, he committed acts which resulted in his

conviction for aggravated battery and was sentenced to a term of

seven years’ imprisonment. Then, soon after his release from prison

the second time and while aware that Warren was pregnant with

his child, M.D. was arrested on charges of home invasion and

armed violence. He was found guilty and imprisoned on concurrent

sentences of 6 and 10 years’ imprisonment respectively.

	To date, M.D. has been imprisoned nearly all of his adult life.

He has acquired no appropriate life skills. Furthermore, his

repeated incarceration demonstrates an inability to conform to

societal norms. Even after becoming aware that he had fathered a

child, M.D. committed acts, shortly before the baby was due, which caused him to be incarcerated at the time of the child’s birth.

Since D.D.’s birth, there has been no indication that M.D. has been

able to form any bond with D.D. M.D. has demonstrated no real

interest or ability in meeting any of D.D.’s needs, whether they be

physical, mental, material, or emotional. We conclude that M.D.

has been prevented, not only by his present incarceration, but as a

result of his repeated incarceration, from discharging his parental

responsibilities.

	While M.D.’s present incarceration has precluded him from

providing for D.D’s physical and material needs for the entirety of

D.D.’s lifetime, the cumulative effect of M.D.’s repeated

incarceration has rendered him incapable of meeting D.D.’s moral,

mental, and emotional needs.

	Of course, in cases involving the termination of parental rights,

each case is sui generis and must be decided based on the particular facts and circumstances presented. In re Adoption of Syck, 138 Ill. 2d 255, 279 (1990). In the present case M.D. has been shown to be unfit pursuant to the plain language of section

1(D)(s) because the evidence clearly and convincingly establishes

that M.D.’s repeated incarceration has prevented him from

discharging his parental responsibilities to D.D. Under different

circumstances, a parent’s repeated incarceration, whether during

the lifetime of the child or not, may not prevent the parent from

discharging his or her parental duties and, therefore, would not

establish that parent’s unfitness.

	For the reasons stated, we find that the circuit and appellate

courts’ interpretation of section 1(D)(s) was proper and their

determination that clear and convincing evidence established

M.D.’s unfitness pursuant to section 1(D)(s) was not against the

manifest weight of the evidence. Furthermore, because parental

rights may be terminated upon proof, by clear and convincing

evidence, of a single ground for unfitness (In re D.L., 191 Ill. 2d 1, 8 (2000); In re M.S., 302 Ill. App. 3d 998, 1002 (1999)), we need not consider here whether M.D. also was unfit because he failed to

make reasonable progress pursuant to section 1(D)(m).

CONCLUSION

	The appellate court’s judgment affirming the trial court’s order

terminating M.D.’s parental rights is hereby affirmed.

Affirmed.

	CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON, dissenting:

	If section 1(D)(s) of the Adoption Act is applied as written, it

cannot serve as the basis for terminating M.D.’s parental rights.

Section 1(D)(s) of the Act and section 1(D)(r), which precedes it,

address the impact of parents’ incarceration on their present ability

to fulfill their parental duties. Where a parent is incarcerated, he or

she previously had little or no contact with the child or provided

little or no support, and the term of confinement is so lengthy that

the parent will not be able to discharge his parental responsibilities

for a period in excess of two years, a finding of unfitness can be

sought under section 1(D)(r) of the Adoption Act.

	Where the parent is faced with a shorter period of

incarceration, section 1(D)(r) is inapplicable. If the incarcerated

parent has been in jail or prison before, however, the cumulative

effect of the multiple but shorter incarcerations may be as

deleterious to the parent’s parenting abilities as a single long jail

sentence. Repeated absences due to jail confinement are scarcely

conducive to the exercise of child-rearing obligations. A parent

who has been jailed again and again for less serious offenses may

therefore be no more fit than a parent who has only been convicted

once but for a more serious crime.

	The purpose of section 1(D)(s) is to address this situation. It

recognizes that the length of a parent’s present prison term is not

dispositive. It eliminates any disparity by treating chronic minor

offenders the same as those who have offended less often but more

seriously.

	Section 1(D)(r) of the Act plainly requires the parent’s

incarceration to occur while the child is alive. In eliminating the

disparity between parents serving longer sentences and those

serving multiple shorter sentences, section 1(D)(s) does not alter

this requirement. As I have just indicated, the chief distinction

between parents subject to section 1(D)(s) and those subject to

section 1(D)(r) is simply the duration of their incarceration. Nothing in section 1(D)(s) gives the court additional authorization

to look back and assess events which occurred before an individual

even became a parent.

	Consider again what the statute actually says. Under section

1(D)(s), the repeated incarceration must have prevented the parent

from discharging his or her parental responsibilities. Until a child

is born, however, there is no way for a parent’s conduct to

interfere with his or her discharge of parental responsibilities

because there are no such responsibilities to discharge. For

purposes of evaluating fitness, the responsibilities of parenthood

commence with a child’s birth.

	Before an individual actually has children, the only effect

incarceration can have in terms of parenting is to handicap the

individual’s ability to develop parental skills for use in the future.

While I do not question that a person confined to jail or prison on

a regular basis will have a more difficult time acquiring the life

skills needed to be an effective parent, that is simply not the issue.

In applying section 1(D)(s), we must look to the language

employed by the legislature, and nothing in the language of the

statute makes failure to develop parenting ability before the child

was born a basis for a finding of lack of fitness now. What matters

under the law is whether recurring confinement has had an adverse

effect on the parent’s actual parenting activities since the child’s

birth.

	For the foregoing reasons, I agree with M.D.’s contention that

in order for repeated incarceration to have prevented the

discharging of parental responsibilities within the meaning of

section 1(D)(s), that incarceration must have occurred during the

child’s lifetime. In the case before us, M.D. had not been

repeatedly incarcerated during his child’s life. He was only

incarcerated once. As a result, section 1(D)(s) could not serve as

the basis for terminating M.D.’s parental rights. I therefore believe

that it was incumbent on this court to consider the additional

question of whether M.D. was properly found unfit on the

alternative ground that he failed to make reasonable progress

pursuant to section 1(D)(m) of the Adoption Act. Accordingly, I

dissent.