### IN THE S UP REME COURT OF TENNESS EE AT KNOXVI LLE Ma y 5, 200 4 S es sio n

ROG ER L. HICKM AN v. S TAT E OF TEN NES SEE

App e al b y pe r m iss ion fro mth e Co ur t o f Cr im ina l A ppe als

Crim inal Cou rt for K nox Coun ty Nos. 74318 Ray L. Jenkin s, Jud ge

No. E2002-01916-SC-R11- P C - F iled Septem ber 22, 2004

We g r a n te dRo g e r

L

. H ic kman p e r mi s s io n to ap p e a l t o c o n s id e r w h e th e r th e trial c o u rt an dCour t of Criminal Appea ls erre d in dismi ssing his habe as corpus petition. Hic kman’s petition, prepa red with the aid of c ounsel, alleg ed that his 1986 misdemeanor conviction, for w hich he r ece ived a tenday suspended sentence , is void beca use t he judgment does not affirmatively indicate that Hic kman was re prese nted by

counsel or that he waive d his right to counse l. We hold that the trial court and Court of Criminal Appeals prope rly dismiss ed the pe tition. The petition failed to comply with the presc ribed statutory

form, failed to alleg e that Hickman is “imprisoned or re strained of his liberty ,” as re quired by

Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 29-21-101 (2000), and fa i l ed t o all eg e g rounds fo r h abe a s c or

pu s r e lie f. Ac c or din g ly , w e a ff irm th e jud g me nt o f the Cou rt of Crimi na l A pp e a ls.

Tenn. R. App . P . 11; Judgme nt of th e Court of Crim inal Ap peals Aff irm ed

F RAN K F. D R OW OTA , III , C. J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which E. R I L EY A NDE R S ON , A DOL PH O A. B I RCH , J R ., J ANI CE M. H OL DER , and W I L L I AM M. B ARKE R , J J ., joined. Doug las A. Trant, Knox ville, Tennesse e, for the appe llant, Roge r L . Hickman
Pau l G

. Su mm e r s , A tt o r n e y G e n e r a l a n d Re p o rte r ; Mi c h a e l E

. M o o r e , So li c it o r G e n e r a l; G o r d o n W. Smith, As so c iate Sol ic ito r G e ne ral; Rand a ll E . N ic ho ls, Di stric t A tto rn e y Ge ne ral; andZ a ne M. Scarle tt, Assist ant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

OP IN ION-2- I. F acts and P roce dural Hi story OnJune 6, 19 86 , th e pe tit ion e r, Rog e r L . H ic kman, ple a de d g uil ty in the Kn ox Cou nty Gene ral Sessions Court to possession of marijuana and rec eived a ten-day suspended se ntence and a fifty dollar fine. T he ce rtified copy of the judgment does not indicate whether Hickman wa s repr esente d by

counsel or w aived his rig ht to counsel that day

. Almost sixt een y ear s later, on F ebrua ry 25, 2002, Hickman, by

and throug h counsel, filed a habea s corpus pe tition i n the Knox C ounty Criminal Court challeng ing the val i d i t yof his 1986 conviction. Hickman’ s petition asserted that the 1986 co n v i ct ion was void bec ause the judgme nt did not affirmatively

rec ite whether Hickman was repr esente d by counsel or w aived c ounsel. The pe tit ionso ug ht t o s e t a sid e the 19 86 c on vic tio n “ so [that] it may no t bec on sid e re d ina

c a se in U .S. District Court.” Finding that the g rounds alleg ed, if true , rende red the conviction voidable, not void, thetria l c ou rt

dis mis se d th e ha

be a s c or pu s p e tit ion . A lte rn a tiv e ly , th e tria l c ou rt c on c lud e d th a t, i f treated as a

petition for post-conviction re l i ef , t h e petition was time-bar red by the statute of limit ations.
Hickman a

ppeale d, and in a split dec ision, the Court of Criminal Appeals af firmed the trial court’s judg ment. Emphasizing that the ten- day s u s p ended se ntence on the 1986 conviction had expired long be fore the habea s corpus petition wa s filed, the majority conclude d that Hickman wa s not “imprisoned or restrained of his liberty ” and the ref ore w as not entitled to habea s corpus re lief. The majority also pointed out that Hickman’ s petition failed to complywith the statutory form and failed to provide statutorily mandated inf

ormation. See Te nn. Code Ann. § 29-21- 107 (2000). Finally , in a footnote, the majority indicated that if the defe ndant is prese ntly in fede ral c ustody , as he alleg ed in another

caseattack i n g h i s 1986 conviction, then he is bar red f rom obtaining habea s corpus r elief by

Tenne ssee Code A n n o t at ed section 29-21- 102, which provide s that “[p] ersons committed or detaine d by virtue of proce ss issued by a court of t he United States, or a judg e ther eof . . . arenot entitled to the benef its of this writ.” We gr anted the de fendant’s application for permis s io nto a

p p e al a n d n o w affirm the judg ment of the lowe r courts dismi ssing the ha beas c orpus petition.

II. Stand ard of Review The de termination of whe ther ha beas c orpus re lief should be g rante d is a question of law. McL aney v. Be ll, 59 S.W .3d 90 , 92 (Tenn. 2001) . Acc ording ly , our re view is de novo with no presumption of cor

rec tness acc orded to the c ourts below. I d.

III . A nal ys is I n Tenne ssee, two distinct proce dural a venues are av ai l able to collate rally attack a final judgme nt in a criminal ca se -- habea s corpus and post-conviction p et i t i o n s. Tay lor v. State, 995 S.W .2d 78, 83 (Tenn. 199 9 ); P o t t s v
. State, 833 S.W .2d 60, 62 (Tenn. 1992) . The rig ht to seekA r t i cl e I , s ect i on 15 o f t he T enn es s ee C ons t i t ut i on provi des t hat “ t he pri vi l ege of t he wr i t of

H abeas 1 C o rpus s hal l not b e sus p end ed , unl ess when i n case of rebell i o n or i nvasi o n, t he G eneral A ss em b l y s hal l de cl are t he p u b lic sa fety re q u ire s it. ”

See 196 7 T enn
. P ub. Act s ch

. 310

. T he 19 67 Act was amended i n i t s en t i r et y i n 1995 by t he G ene r al 2 As s embl y , Se e 1995 T en n
. Pub. Act s
. c h

. 207, 81, a n d i s n ow codi f i ed at T en n es s ee Code An n ot at ed s ec t i on s 40- 30- 101 t h r ou g h 40- 30- 122. -3- habea s corpus re lief is g uaranteed by article I , s ec t i o n 1 5 of the Te nnessee Constit ution. The 1 proc ed u re s g overning habea s corpus pe titions arecodified at Tennesse e Code Annotated sec tions 2 9 -21-101 throug h 29-21-130. This Court has pre viouslyacknow ledg ed that “the proce dural provisions of the habe as cor pus statutes are mandatory and mus t be followe d scrupulously .” Ar cher v. State, 851 S.W .2d 157, 165 (Tenn. 1993) (citing Bateman v. Smith, 194 S .W.2d 336, 337 (1946)). Although the re is no habe as cor pus statute of limitations, t h e gro u nds upon which habe as cor pus relief will be g rante d arenarr ow. Dixon v. Holl and, 70 S.W.3d 3 3 , 36 (Tenn. 2002) ; See State v. Ritc hie , 2 0 S. W.3 d 6 24 , 6 30 (T e nn . 2 00 0) ; A rc he r, 85 1 S. W.2 d at 16 4. Ha be as corpu s r e lie f i s pr op e r o nly

if thepe tit ione sta

bli sh e s th a t th e c ha lle ng e d ju dg me nt i s v oid , a s o pp os ed to me re ly v o id ab le

. T a y lo r , 9 9 5 S. W. 2 d a t 8 3 ; P o tt s , 8 3 3 S. W. 2 da t 6 2

. A ju d g me n t i s v o id“ o n ly w h e n ‘ [i ]t app e ars up on thefa c e of

thejud g me nt o r the re c or d of thepr oc e e din g s u po n w hic h th e jud g me nt i s rende red’ that a convic ting c ourt was without jurisdiction or authority to sentencea def

endant, or that a defendant’s sentenc e of imprisonment or ot her restraint has expired.” R itchie, 20 S.W.3d at 630 (quoting Arc her, 851 S.W.2d at 164 (quot i n g State v. Galloway , 45 Tenn. (5 Cold.) 326, 336- 37 (1868)) . Furthermore , a sente nce “ imposed in direct contr avention of a statute . . . is void and illegal.” Stephenson v. Carlton, 28 S.W.3d 910, 911 (Te nn. 2000). When the habe as cor pus petition fails to demonstrate that the judgme nt is void, a trial court may properly dismiss the petition without a hea ring . Tenn. Code Ann. § 29- 21-109 (2000) ; Dix on, 70 S.W .3d at 36. A p e tit ionfo r p os t- c on vic tio n r e lie f i s th e pr oc e dural a ve nu e fo r atta c kin g vo ida ble judgme nts. Tay lor, 995 S.W .2d at 83; State v. McClintock, 732 S.W

. 2 d 2 6 8 , 2 72 (Tenn. 1987)

. Re cognizing thena

rr ow sc op e of

ha be a s c or pu s r e lie f, in 1 96 7 th e Te nn e sse e Ge ne ral A sse mbl y enac te dth e Po s t- Co n v ic ti o n Pr o c e d u r e s A c t. Po s t- c o n v ic ti o n p e ti ti o n e r s , u n li k e h ab e a s c orpus 2 petitioners, may

challeng e convic tions or sentenc es t hat are either void or voidable be causeof the abridg ment of constitutional rig hts. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-103 (2003); Tay lor, 995 S.W .2d at 83; Potts , 833 S.W .2d at 62. “A voidable conviction or sentenc e is one which is facially valid and re qu ir e s th e int

ro du c tio n o f p ro of

be y on d th e fa c e of

there c or d o r j ud g me nt t o e sta bl is h it s invalidity .” Taylor, 995 S.W .2d at 83 (c iting Dy kes v. Compton, 978 S.W .2d 528, 529 (Tenn. 1998) ; Arc her, 851 S.W.2d at 161-64). A one -y earstatute of limitations applies to post -convic tion petitions. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-102 (2003). Having briefly revie wed these distinct procedur al avenue s, we will addre ss the issues raised in this appeal.

A. P r oc e dur al R e quir e m e nt s for P e ti ti on fo rWr it

of Ha be as Co r pus Te nn e sse e Cod e An no tate d s e c tio n 2 9- 21 -1 07 (a ) p ro vid e s th a t ha be a s c or pu s p e tit ion s mu st be sig ned and ve rified by aff idavit. This statute further r equire s the petition to state:-4-

(1) That the person in whose behalf the writ is soug ht, is il leg al l y restrained of liberty , and the pe rson by

whom and plac e whe re r estraine d, mentioning the name of such per son, if known, and, if unknow n, describing the p erson with as much particula rity as pra cticable ; (2) Thecauseor pre tense of suc h rest ra i n t acc ording to the best information of the applicant, and if it be by

virtue of any

leg al process, a copy there of shall be annexed, or a satisfactory

rea son g iven for its abse nce; (3) That t h e lega lityof the re straint has not alre ady been a djudge d upon a prior proce eding of the same char acte r, t o the best of the a pplicant' s knowledg e and be lief; and (4) That it is first application for the writ, or, if a pre vious a pplication has bee n made, a copy o f t he petition and proc eeding s thereon sha ll be produce d, or satisfac tory rea sons be g iven for the failure so to do. Tenn. Code Ann. § 29- 21-107(b) (2000). Hickman’ s petition f ailed to c omply with this statute. The pe tit ion , p re pa

re d andfi le d b y

c ou ns e l onHi c kman’ s b e ha lf, s tate s inits e nti re ty a s f oll ow s: Comes the Petitioner, Roge r L

. Hickman, by and through counsel, Doug las A. Trant, to petition for a writ of ha beas c orpus conc er n i n g h is conviction in the Knox C ounty Sessions Court for Knox County , Tenne ssee in ca se number 72333 G wher ein he wa s convicted of simple possession of m arijuana

. A ce rtified copy of the c on vic tio n is a tta c he d andis v oidon its fa c e be c aus e the con vi cti on doe s n ot s tate that he had c ounsel nor did he waive counsel. Waiver of the consti tutional rig ht of counsel c annot be pr esumed fr om a silent rec ord

. Bu rgett v. Tex as, 389 U.S. 109, 88 S.Ct . 258, 19 L .Ed. 2d 319 (1967) and Ba ldassar v. Illinois , 446 U.S. 222, 100 S.Ct . 1585, 64 L .Ed. 2d 169 (1980).
As theCou rt

of Crimi na l Ap pe a ls no te d, Hi c kman’ s pe tit ion wa s no t ve ri fi e d b y a ff idavit , f a ile d to name the r estraining authority and the plac e of r estraint, failed to state w hether the leg ality

of the restraint ha d been previously adjudicate d, and failed to state w hether previous applications for the writ ha d be e n mad e . How e ve r, theState didno t mo ve to d ism iss thepe tit ionfo r f a ilu reto c omp ly with Code section 107, nor did the trial c ourt dismiss t he petition for pr ocedur al noncompliance

. As previously

explained, the proce dural re quirements of the hab ea s corpus statutes “ are mandatory

and must be followed scrupulously .” Ar cher , 851 S.W .2d at 165; Bateman, 194 S.W.2d a t 33 7. A ha

be a s c or pu s c ou rt may pr op e rl y c ho os e to dis mis s a pe tit ion fo r f a ili ng to c omp ly

wi thSe e St at e ex r el

. G os s v
. H ee r , 413 S. W

. 2d 688, 693 ( 1967) ( s t at i n g t h at “ i t i s pr oper t o di s mi s s a pe t i t i on 3 wh en t h e pet i t i on er f ai l s t o c ompl y w i t h t h e man dat or y pr ov i s i on s of t h e [ t h e s t at u t e] ”) ; J oh n s on v
. Rus s el l , 404 S. W

. 2d 471, 473 ( 1966) ( “ T h er ef or e, pu r el y for t h i s t ec h n i ca l r ea s on [ f ai l u r e t o a n n ex a c opy of t h e l eg al pr oce s s or j u dg men t ] t h e pet i t i on for h abe as c or pu s s h ou l d be de n i ed

. . . . ”) ; St at e ex r el Ree d v

. H ee r , 403 S. W

. 2d 310, 313 (19 6 6 ) ( no t i ng t hat t he p et i t i o ner had f ai l ed t o co m p l y wi t h t he m and at o ry pro vi si o ns o f t he st at ut e, but res o l vi ng t he
c a se o n the m e rits); S ta te e x re l. W o o d v. J o h n so n , 3 9 3 S .W .2 d 1 3 5 , 1 3 6 (1 9 6 5 ) (s ta ting tha t “the failur e to c o m p ly wi t h [ t h e s t at u t e] ma y be g r ou n ds for di s mi s s i n g t h e pet i t i on ”) ; St at e ex r el

. Al l en v
. J oh n s on , 394 S. W

. 2d 652, 653 (19 6 5 ) ( st at i ng t hat “ t he t ri al judge wa s co rr ect i n dis m i ss i ng t he p et i t i o n fo r fai l ure t o co m p l y wi t h [t he st at ut e]”); Stat e ex rel

. K unt z v. B o m ar, 38 1 S.W

. 2 d 29 0 , 29 1 (T enn. 1 9 6 4 ) ( “[ T ]he peti t i o n .
. . did no t co m p l y wi t h t he p ro v isio n s o f [the sta tute ], a n d fo r th a t re a so n a lo n e , i t co u ld ha v e p ro p e rly b e e n d ism isse d a s ins u ff ic ie n t.”)

. -5- the statutory

proce dural re quirements; howeve r, dismissal is not require d. The ha beas c orpus court 3 may i n s t ea d ch oose to aff

ord the pe titioner an opportunity to comply

with the proce dural require ments, or the habe as cor pus court may

choose to a djudi ca t e t h e p et i t ion on its m erits. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-21-109 (2000) (“If, from the showing of the petitioner, the plaintiff would not be entitled to any relief

, the writ may be refused, the rea sons for such ref usal being briefly

endorse d upon the petition, or appe nded ther eto.”) (empha sis added).
I n th is c a s e , th e St a te d id n o t mo v e to d is mi s s H ic k man ’ s p e ti ti o n f o r proc edura l no nc omp lianc e e ve n th ou g h it wa s pre pa

re d an d fil e d by c ou ns e l. Like wi se , the tria l cou rt c ho se to adjudicate the petition on its m erits and certainly acte d within its discretion in doing so. Thus, we decline to ba se our de cision to dismi ss the petit ion upon the petitioner’s f ailure to c omply

with the statut ory pr oc e du rea ndwi ll i ns te a d c on sid e r the pe tit ionon its me ri ts

B. Restr aint of

Lib erty Hickma n ar gu es t h at t he lower courts er red in c oncluding that he is not entitled to habea s corpus r elief be causehe is neither “imprisoned” nor “re strained of liberty ” by his 1986 conviction. Hi ckm an ass erts th a t th e us e of his 19 86 c on vic tio n to e nh a nc e his fe de ral se nte nc e re str a ins his liberty . We disag ree
. Tenne s s e eCo d eA n n o ta

te d s e c ti o n2 9

- 2 1

- 1 0 1 ( 2 0 0 3 ) , p r o v ide s that “[a]nyperson imprisoned or re str a ine d o f l ibe rty , und e r an y pr e te ns e wh atso e ve r,
. . . may pr os e c ute a writ of ha be a s c or pu s, to inquire into the cause of such i mprisonment and restraint” (empha sis added.) The statute doe s not define the terms “imprisoned” and “re strained of liberty .” When construing statutes, this Court asce rtains and e ffe ctuates le g islative intent. Dix on, 70 S.W .3d at 37. L eg islative intent is derived from the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory lang uag e. I d. When the meaning of the lang uag e is unclea

r, the e ntire statutory

scheme must be examined to determine leg islative intent and purpose. I d. The ordina

ry meaning of the term “imprisoned” is clea r. To “imprison” is “to conf ine (a pe rs on ) i n p ri so n. ” B la c k’ s L a w D ic tio na ry 76 0 ( 7the d. 19 99 ). Pla inl y , th e n, “ imp ri sone d” in this statute refe rs to actua l phy sical conf inement or de tention. Unlike “imprisonment,” the m ea ning of “re strained of

liberty ” is not limi ted to phy sical confine ment or dete ntion. The Uni ted States Supreme Court has state d: “History , usag e, and-6-

prec edent c an lea ve no doubt that, besides phy sical imprisonment, there a re othe r re straints on a [person’s] liberty , restraints not share d by the publ ic gene rally , which havebeen thoug ht sufficient in the Eng lish-speaking world to support the issuance of habea s corpus.” J ones v. Cunningham, 371 U

. S

. 2 3 6 , 2 4 0 ( 1 9 6 3 )

. T h i s C o u rt h a s a l s o r e c o g n i z e d t h a t a p e r s o n m a y b e “ r e s tr a i n e d o f l i b e rt y” and entitled to see k habea s corpus re lief even when not phy sically confine d. State ex rel Dillehay v. Whit e, 398 S.W.2d 737 (Tenn. 1966). Dil l ehay challeng ed the leg ality

of her restraint under a judgme nt committi ng her to the M au ry C o u nty jail to work off the fine and costs imposed in her criminal ca se. I d. at 738. The trial judge dismiss ed the pe tition butrele ased D illehay on her ow n r e c o g n i z a n c e p e n d i n g ap p e a l ; h o w e v e r , t h e b o n dp r o h i b i t e dD i l l e h a y f r o ml e a v i n g M au ry C o u n t y. I d. Dillehay appealed, and the State arg ued that, beca use Dillehay was no longe r phy sically confine d i n j ai l , h erap p ea l wa s m o o t

. I d

. T h i s C o u rtd i s agr ee d , s t at i n g:
Al tho ug h s he is n ot b e ing he ld i n jail, sh e is, ne ve rthe le ss, re stric te d inhe r l ibe rty to Maury Cou nty pe nd ing thi s a

pp e a l a nd is su bje c t to imm e diate c on fi ne me nt s ho uld her a ppeal be dismiss ed. By g rac e of the trial judge she is now at liberty , but upon her violation of he r conf

inement to Maury

Countyshe could be place d in jail ag ain. Ha be a s c or pu s, if oth e rw isepr op e r, c a n r e a c h th is c on str uc tiv e c on fi ne me nt.
I d. (citing J ones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963))

. Thus, Dillehay stands for the pr oposition that, when the challeng ed judgment i tself i mposes a restraint upon the petitioner’ s fre edom of a ction or movement, the pe titioner is entitled to seek ha beas c orpus re lief, eve n though the petitioner is not phy sically

confine d or deta ined. See a lso J ones, 371 U.S. at 243 (“ Whil e petitioner’ s parole r elea ses him from immediate phy sical imprisonment, it imposes conditions which signif icantly confine and restrain his fre edom .

. . .”); W ales v. Whit ney , 114 U.S. 564, 572 (1885) ( “The re must be [either] actua l confineme nt or the pre sent means of enfor cing it.”); 39 Am. J ur. 2d Ha beas Corp u s , § 17 (1999) ( “Any

restraint that preclude s fre edom o f ac t i o n
. . . is sufficient, notwithstanding lack of confine ment in a j ail or prison, as, for example, a re straint that consists in forbidding a man to leave the city and keeping him under the surveillance of an office r, or the restraint that exis ts by virtue of the conditions of par ole or probation.”)
Howeve r, when the re straint on a petitioner’ s liberty is merely a collate ral c onsequenc e of the cha lleng ed judg ment, habea s corpus is not an a ppropriate avenuefor se eking relief . I n Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488 (1989), the United States Supreme explained this di stinction.
Th e qu est ionpr e se nte d b y thi s c a se is w he the r a

ha be a s p e tit ion e r r e ma ins “ in custody ” under

a convic tion after the sentence i m p o s ed for it has fully expired, mere ly beca use of the possibility that the prior conviction will be used to enhanc e the sentenc es imposed for any subsequent crimes of which he is convicted. We hold that he does not. Whil e we ha ve very liberally construed the “in custody ” re quirement for purposes of fede ral habeas, we have never extended it to the sit uation wher e a ha beas petitioner suffe rs no pre sent restraint from a convic tion. Si nce almost all st ates ha ve ha bitua l of fe nd e r s tatut e s,
. . . a c on tr ary ru lin g wo uld me a n th a t a pe tit ion e r w ho se sen te n c e h a s c o mp le te ly

e xp ir e dc o u ldn o n e th e le s s c h a ll e n g e th e c o n v ic ti o n f orW e n ot e, as di d t he C our t of Cri mi nal Ap peal s , t hat t he l ang uag e “ i mp r i s oned or r es t r ai ned of l i bert y ” u s ed 4 i n T enness ee C o d e A nno t at ed s ect i o n 29

- 2 1

- 1 0 1 (20 0 0 ), t he hab eas corp us st at ut e, i s no t co
- ext ensi ve wi t h t he

“ per s on i n c u s t ody ” l an g u ag e of T en n es s ee Code An n ot at ed s ec t i on 40- 30- 102 ( 2003) of t h e Pos t

- Conv i ct i on P ro c e d u re A c t. T h e lan g u a g e “in c u sto d y” ha s lo n g b e e n b ro a d ly co n stru e d to p e rm it p e rs o n s to c o llate ra lly cha l l eng e, by means of a pos t

- convi ct i on pet i t i on, a j udgment of conv i ct i on t hat l at er may be us ed t o enh anc e a s ent enc e on a not her conv i ct i on. Suc h c hal l eng es ha ve been al l owed even i f t he s ent enc e on t he cha l l eng ed
con v i ct i on h as be en s er v ed or h as e x pi r ed at t h e t i me t h e pos t

- con v i ct i on pe t i t i on i s f i l ed. Se e M cCr aw v
. St at e, 551 S. W

. 2d 692, 694 ( T en n
. 1977) ; Al ber t v
. St at e, 813 S. W

. 2d 426, 427 ( T en n
. 1991)

. Ac cor di n g l y , H i ck man ma y be

“ i n c u s t ody ” for pu r pos es of t h e Pos t

- Conv i ct i on Pr oce du r es Act , bu t h e i s n ei t h er “ i mpr i s on ed” n or “ r es t r ai n ed of lib e rty” fo r p u rp o se s o f see k ing ha b e a s c o rp u s re lief.

B ec au s e H i ck man ’ s pe t i t i on doe s n ot i n di ca t e h i s pl ac e of c on f i n eme n t a n d be ca u s e t h i s c as e may be 5

res o l ved on o t her gr o und s, we need not co nsi d er whet her t he C o urt of C ri m i nal A p p eal s erred b y i m p l y i ng i n a fo o t no t e t hat T enness ee C o d e A nno t at ed s ect i o n 29

- 2 1

- 1 0 2 precludes persons i n f ed eral cust o d y f

rom s eeki ng ha b ea s co rp us reli ef f

ro m T en ne ssee jud gm en t s.

-7- wh ic h it wa s impo se d at a ny

tim e on fe de ral ha

be a s. Th is w ou ld r e a d th e “ in custody ” re quirement out of the statute . . . .
I d. at 492. Even thoug h the lang uag e of the fede ral ha beas c orpus statute diffe rs s omewhat from the la ng ua g e of

theTe nn e sse e statut e , w e a g re e wi th M a le ng ’s a nal y si s on thi s is su e . Ind e e d, thi s a na ly sis is c on sis te nt w iththehis tory a ndus a g e of the writ of ha be a s cor pu s, prior de c isi on s o f this court, and the over all statutory scheme g overn i n g t he writ of habea s corpus in Tenne ssee. Acc ording ly , we hold that a pe rson is not “restrained of liberty ” for purposes of the habea s corpus statute unless the cha lleng ed judg ment itself imposes a re straint upon the petition er ’s freedom of a c tio n o r m ov e me nt. Us e of the c ha lle ng e d jud g me nt to e nh a nc e the se nte nc e imp os e d o n a se pa rate conviction i s not a restraint of l iberty sufficie nt to permit a ha beas c orpus cha lleng e to the orig inal conviction long afte r the sente nce on the orig inal conviction has e x pired. 4
Hickman ha s not alleg ed that he pr esently is se rving the ten-day suspended sentenc e imposed for his 1986 conviction in the Knox County Gene ral Sessions Court. Thus, Hickman cle arly is not

“ i m p r i s o n e d ” u n d e r

t h e c h a l l e n g e dj u d g m e n t

. F u rt h e r m o r e , H i c k m a n i s n o t“ r e s tr a i n e do f l i b e rt y” as a direct consequenc e of the 1986 judgme nt. I ndeed, the ten-day sentenc e has long a g o expired, and the Ge nera l Sessions j udg ment does not impose any further restraint upon his phy sical movem e n t o r

a c ti o n
. A lth o u g h th is 1 9 8 6 c o n v ic ti o n may h a v e b e e n u s e dto e n h a n c e a f e d e r al se nte nc e H i c km ani s s e rv i n g , e nh a nc e me nt i s me re ly a c oll a te ral c on se qu e nc e of the19 86 jud g me nt. 5 Thus, Hickman is not “re strained of liberty ” for

purposes of the habea s corpus statute. Furthermor e, a s e xpla ine d b e low , th e tria l c ou rt c or re c tly he ld that H ic kman’ s 1 98 6 ju dg me nt is n ot v oidon its fac e

C. Vo id o rVo ida ble Hi c kman’ s p e tit iona lle g e s th a t th e 19 86 jud g me nt i s v oidbe c aus e it d oe s n ot a ff irmativ e ly indicate that he was re prese nted by counsel or that he waived his right to c ounsel when he plea dedSe e T enn. C o d e A nn. § 3 9

- 6

- 4 1 7 (b) (19 8 2 & 19 8 6 Sup p
. ). 6

Se e T enn. C o d e A nn. § 4 0

- 1

- 1 0 9 (19 8 2 & 19 8 6 Sup p
. ). 7

Se e W are v. M eharry M ed

. C o l l ege, 89 8 S.W

. 2 d 18 1 , 18 3

- 8 4 (T enn. 19 9 5 ). 8

For pu r pos es of

t h i s a ppea l , w e as s u me wi t h ou t de ci di n g t h at H i ck man h ad a r i g h t t o t h e as s i s t an ce of 9

c o u n se l wh e n he p le a d e d gu ilt y to a m isd e m e a n o r in 1 9 8 6

. -8- g uil ty to m isd e me a no r p os se ssi on of mari juana . T he State re sp on ds that th e jud g me nt i s n ot f a c ia lly invalid because the judg ment does not show that the convic ting c ourt wa s wi t h o ut jurisdiction or authority to acc ept the plea

and to sentenc e the de fendant. We ag reewith the State. As previously

indicated, “ the g rounds upon which habea s corpus relief will be g rante d are na rr ow .” Di xon, 70 S.W. 3da t 36 . H abe a s c or pu s is a ve hic le fo r atta c kin g a

jud g me nt that is vo id on its fa c e
. Ritc hie , 20 S.W. 3d a t 63 0. “ ‘[A ] v oid jud g me nt is on e in wh ic h th e jud g me nt i s f a c ia lly invalid b ec au s e t h e court lacked jurisdiction or authority to rende r the judg ment or bec ause the de fe nd a nt’ s se nte nc e ha s e xpir e d. ’” I d. (q uo tin g Tay lor , 99 5 S.W. 2d a t 83 ). I n c on tr a st, a vo ida ble judgme nt “is fac ially

valid and re quires the introduc tion of proof be y ond the face o f the re cord or jud g me nt t o e sta

bli shits in val id it y .” I d. a t 63 3. Th us , “ [i]n a ll c a se s w he rea pe tit ion e r mus t introduce pr oof bey ond the rec ord to e stablish the invalidityof his conviction, then that convic tion by definition is merely

voidable, and a Tenne ssee court cannot issue the writ of ha beas c orpus under such circ umstances.” Ritchie, 20 S.W .3d at 633. The judg ment in this case is not fac ially invalid be cause the judgme nt doe s not show that the convicting court was without jurisdiction or authority to acc ept the plea

and to sentenc e Hickman. The c opy of t h e j u dg ment attache d to Hickman’s pe tition demonst rate s that the Gene ral Sessions Cou rt ha d bo t h s u b

j e c tm a t t e r

a n dp e r s o n a l j u r i s d i c t i o n
. T h e w arr a n tc h ar g e dH i c k m a n w i th possession of m arijuana on May 5, 1986, a mi sdemeanor off ense over w hich the Ge nera l Sessions 6 Court had subject matter

jurisdiction. Be causethe Gene ral Sessi o n s Court is a court of limited

7 jurisdiction, jurisdictional fac ts must affirmatively appea r upon the re cord. SeeRitchie, 20 S.W .3d 8 at 631n.14; McClintock, 732 S.W .2d at 270-71. He re, those f acts a ppear : the war

rant re flec ts that Hickman e ntere d a written guilty plea, r equeste d a trial on the merits in G ener al Sessions Court, and e xpre ss l y w a i v e dh i s r i g h tt o i n d i c t m e n t , p r e s e n t m e n t , g r a n dj u ry i n v e s t i g a t i o n , a n dj u ry

tr i a l. Be causethe judg ment plainly st at es t h e esse ntial fac ts establishing the c ourt’s jurisdiction, the judgme nt is entitl ed to a pr esumption of reg ularity . I d. The judg ment’s silence as t o whether the petitioner wa s repr esente d by counsel or w aived the rig ht to counsel does not def eat the pr esumption of reg ul ar i t y an d re n der the judgme nt void. 9 Prior decisions of this Court clearly indicate that the pr esumption of reg ularity applies unless a de fec t appea rs on the fa ce of

the judgme nt. For example, in McClintock, this C ourt noted that, a c onviction should be considere d void on its fa ce when “the rec ord aff irmatively reve al[s] that the defe ndant had neither been repre sented by counsel nor waived his rig ht to counsel . . . .” 723 S.W.2d at 273 (citing B a lda sa r v . Illi no is, 44 6 U .S. 22 2 ( 19 80 )) (e mph a sis a dd e d) . We po int e d o ut that th e Pos t--9-

Conviction P roce dures Ac t is the pr oper avenue for c halleng ing f acia lly valid judgme nts. I d. at 274. Simi larl y , in Ritc hie , thi s Co urt de nie d h abe a s c or pu s r e lie f andhe ld that a

c on vic tio n is vo id o n it s f a c e o n l y w h e n t h e f

a c e o f t h e j u d g m e n to r t h e r e c o r do f t h e p r o c e e d i n g s “ c l e ar l y a n di n d i s p u t ab l y” re fl e c ts that th e c ou rt

of c on victio n lac ke d te rrito ri a l ju ri sd ic tio n. 20 S.W. 3da t 63 3. Th us , th is Court’s prior dec isio n s s t and for the proposition that a judg ment is entitled to a presumption of reg ularity and is not void unless a defe ct appe ars on the f aceof the judg ment. These prior dec isions do not support Hickman’ s arg ument that a judgment i s fac ially void unless it affirmatively rec ites that th e de fe nd a nt w a s r e pr e se nte d b y c ou ns e l or

waive d th e ri g ht t o c ou ns e l.
F urthe rm or e , w e ha ve c on sid e re d the c a se s H ic kman r e lie s u po n andfi ndthe m r e a dil y dis tin g uis ha

ble . F or e xamp le , inB a lda sa

r v . Illi no is, 44 6 U.S. 22 2 ( 19 80 ), there c or d a ff irmativ e ly re ve a le d th a t th e de fe nd a nt h a d n e ith e r b e e n r e pr e se nte d b y c ou ns e l nor waive d the ri g ht t o c ou ns e l. I d. a t 22 3; M c Clin toc k, 73 2 S. W.2 d at 27 3 (n oti ng thi s dis tin c tio n)

. Simi larl y , in B ur g e tt v . T e xas, 389 U.S. 109 (1967), the e vidence of the prior Tenne ssee c onviction includ ed t wo “r ecords,” one re c iti ng that th e a c c us e d a pp e are d “ ‘w ith ou t Co un se l,’ ” a ndtheoth e r m akin g no re fe re nc e to counsel. I d. at 112. Given these two rec ords, one aff irmatively rec iting that the defe ndant did not have c ounsel and the other silent as to whe ther the de fendant had counse l or waive d counsel, the Supreme Court conc luded t h at the “r ecor ds of the Te nnessee conviction on their fa ce r aise a presumption that p et i t i o n er was denied his rig ht to counsel in the Tenne ssee pr ocee ding, and there fore t h at h i s co n v iction was void.” I d. at 114 (e mphasis added) . Centrally important to the Bu r g e tt h o ld in g , th e n , w a s th e a f f irmati v e s tate me n t th a t th e d e f e n d a n t h a d ap p e ared “ without Cou ns e l.” I n li g ht o f this fa c ia l def e c t, the Un ite d Stat e s Supr e me Cou rt simply re fu se d to pr e su me a va lidwaive r o f the ri g ht t o c ou ns el from th e oth e r T e nn e sse e re c or d, wh ic h w a s si le nt a s to counsel.
Th e lim ite d s c op e of the B ur g e tt ho ldi ng wa s c on fi rm e d b y theSup re me Cou rt ’s de c isi on in Parke v. Rale y , 506 U.S. 20 (1992). In P ar k e a s t at e prisoner soug ht to vacate his Kentucky sentenc e, ar g uing that the prior convic tions used to enhancehis s entenc e we re not knowing ly and voluntarily

enter ed bec ause hehad not b ee n ad v ised of his rig hts under B oykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969). Certifie d copies of the prior convic tions did notaff irmatively show that Raley had b e e n a d v i s e do f

h i s B o yk i n r i g h t s , a n dtr a n s c r i p t s o f t h e p l e a p r o c e e d i n g s w e r e n o ta v a i l ab l e
. In reje cting Raley ’s claim, the Court first distinguishe d Boy kin, which st ands for the proposit ion that the g overnme nt must ordinarily cre ate a rec ord aff irmatively showing that a g uiltyplea wa s knowing an dv o l u n t ar y , ex p l ai n i n g: Boy kin involved dir ect r eview of a convic tion alleg edly

based upon an uninformed g ui l t y p lea. Responde nt, however , never appealed his earlier convic tions. They be c a me fi na l y e ars a g o, a ndhe no w s e e ks to r e vis it the qu e sti on of the ir va lid ity in a se pa rate re c idi vis m pro c e e din g . To impo rt B oy kin ' s pre su mption of

inv a lid ity int o this ve ry differ ent context would, in our view, improperly ignor e a n other presumption deeply

rooted in our jurisprudence : the "pr esumption of reg ularity " that a tta c he s to fi na l jud g me nts , e ve n wh e n the qu e sti on is waive r of c on sti tution a l rig hts

.-10-

Parke, 506 U .S. at 29 (internal c itations omi tted). The Court squa rely reje cted Rale y ’s claim that B ur g e tt s up po rt e d “ thepr op os iti on that e ve ry pr e vio us c on vic tio n u se d to e nh a nc e pu ni sh ment is ‘pre sumptivelyvoid’ if waive r of [ any ] claimed constitut ional rig ht does not appea r fr om the fac e of the re cord.” P arke, 506 U.S. at 31. The Court re fused to “r ead the decision so broa dly ” and l i m i t ed Bu rge t tt o i t s p ro p erh i s t o ri ca l an dp ro ce d u ra l co n t ex t , s t at i n g: [a] t the time the prior convic tion at issue in Burg ett was e ntere d, state criminal defe ndants’ fede ral constitutional rig ht to counsel had not y et bee n rec og nized, and so it was rea sonable to pre sume that the def endant ha d not w aived a

rig ht he did not po ssess.
. . . [ T]h e sa me c a nn ot b e sa id a bo ut a re c or d th a t, b y

virtueof

its un a vaila bil ity on c oll a te ral r e vie w, fails to s ho w c omp lianc e wi th the we lle sta bli sh e d B oy

kinre qu ir e me nts

. I d. at 31. The Court c oncluded:
Onc oll a te ral r e vie w, wethi nk it d e fi e s lo g ic to p re su me fr om the me reun a vaila bil ity of a transcript .

. . that the defendant wa s not advised of his rig hts. I n this sit uation, Boy kin does not prohibit a state court from presuming , at least initially , that a fina l jud g me nt o f c on vic tio n o ff e re d for pu rp os e s of se nte nc ing e nh a nc e me nt w a s v a lid ly obtained.
I d. a t 30 . T hu s, ne ith e r B a lda sa r n or B ur g e tt s up po rt

Hi c kman’ s c la im that a

jud g me nt is v oidun le ss it af fi rm a tiv e ly re c ite s tha t the de fe nd a nt h a d c ou ns e l or waive d c ou ns e l. T he Un ite d St a te s Su pr e me Court’s decision in Parke support s t h e o p posite conclusion. See a lso United States v. J ones, 332 F.3d 688 ( 3rd Cir. 2003); United States v. Gray , 177 F.3d 86 ( 1st Cir. 1999); Nicely v. Commonwealth, 490 S.E.2d 281 (Va

. Ct. App. 1997). These de cisions affirm the presumption of reg ularity that has long been a

pplied in habea s corpus proce eding s in T ennesse e. Furthermore , our re se arc h ha s re ve a le d no Te nn e sse e ha be a s c or pu s c a se ho ldi ng that a jud g me nt i s v oidun le ss i t f a ils to affirmatively

rec ite that the def

endant had counsel or waived the right to counse l. We also decline to a dopt suc h a rule and instead rea ffirm the well-settled principle that a judg ment is void onlyif the fac e of the judgme nt or

the re cord of

the proc eeding s clea

rly ref lects that the c ourt lacke d jurisdiction to rende r the judg ment or that the sente nce ha s expi red. Ritchie, 20 S.W.3d at 633. Returning to the rec ord i n this case, weconclude that the judg ment is not void on i ts faceand is instea d entitled to the presumption of reg ularity

. The judgme nt c ontains a blan kl i n e where defe nse counse l is ordinarily listed, and the pre-printed “Waiver of Attorney ” wa s not signed by the de fe nd a nt. Th is j ud g me nt d oe s not cl e arl y re fl e c t th at th e de fe nd a nt w a s d e nie d th e ri g ht t o c ou ns e l. Th e jud g me nt i s me re lysil e nt. Ad dition a l in fo rm a tio n o uts idethejud g me nt w ou ld b e ne e de d to establish that Hickman in fa ct was not re prese n t ed b y counsel. As we pre viouslystated, whe re additional proof is ne eded, the judgme nt is at most voidable , rathe r than void, and a post-conviction petition i s t he prope r method for attacking a voidable judg ment. Taylor, 995 S.W .2d at 83; McClintock, 732 S.W .2d at 27 2

. T hus, Hickman is not entitled to habea s corpus re lief. Furthermore , the trial court corre ctly conclude d that, if viewe d as a post-co n v i ct i on petition,-11-

Hickman’ s petition is t ime-bar red by the statute of limitations. S ee T enn. Code Ann. § 40- 30-102 (1990) ( repe aled 1995) ; Abston v. St ate, 749 S.W.2d 487 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988).

IV. Conclusion F o r t h e s e r e a s o n s , H i c k m a n i s n o t e n t i t l e d t o r e l i e f o n h i s h ab e a s c o rp u s c l a i m
. A c c o r d i n g l y, the judg ment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed. Cost s o f t h i s ap peal a re ta x ed to the p e t i t i o n e r , R o g e r

L

. H i c k m a n , f

o r w h i c h e x e c u t i o n m a y i s s u e i f n e c e s s ary.

__________________________________________ F R A N K F

. D R O W O T A III , CH IEF JUSTI CE