SIXTH DIVISION

									February 8, 2002

Nos. 1--99--1005)

     1--99--1006)

In re C.J., a Minor					)	Appeal from the

(THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,	)	Circuit Court of

								)	Cook County.

	Petitioner-Appellee,			)

								)

v.								)	No. 98 JD 12893

								)

C.J.,							)	The Honorable

								)	Edward N. Pietrucha,

	Respondent-Appellant).			)	Presiding Judge.

	JUSTICE BUCKLEY delivered the opinion of the court:

	Respondent-appellant C.J., a minor, was adjudicated delin-

quent.  He appeals, contending that the pretrial detention provis-

ion of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (the Act), (705 ILCS 405/5-

501 (West 1998)), violates the United States and Illinois Constitu-

tions.  We affirm.

	BACKGROUND

	The minor's adjudication of delinquency arises from two

separate cases.  On November 16, 1998, when the minor was almost 16

years old, he was stopped by Chicago police officers.  During a

field interview, a clear plastic bag containing a yellow rock fell

out of his mouth.  Subsequently, he spit out three more such bags,

all containing suspect cocaine, and was arrested.  The next day, the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship alleging

possession of a controlled substance.  

	It is unclear whether the minor was ever detained on this

charge.  There is no such indication in the record.  All that

exists regarding this drug case is an order for temporary detention

dated November 17, 1998, which states there is probable cause to

believe the minor is delinquent but does not indicate the required

"immediate and urgent necessity" to detain him.  Moreover, no judge

ever signed this order.

	While his drug case was pending, the minor was again arrested

on January 23, 1999.  In response to shots fired at an apartment

building, Chicago police officer Ted Davis patted down the minor

and recovered a .38-caliber revolver.  On January 25, 1999, the

State filed a second petition for adjudication of wardship alleging

unlawful use of a weapon and unlawful possession of a firearm.

	A detention hearing on this weapons case was held that same

day.  The State asked to proceed against the minor by way of

proffer pursuant to section 5-501 of the Act.  The proffer included

Officer Davis' testimony and police report, signed by two other

officers and their sergeant.  The minor objected and asked the

court for leave to file a motion declaring section 5-501

unconstitutional.  The court granted leave and continued the

constitutional challenge.

	However, the detention hearing proceeded.  First, based on the

State's proffer, the court found probable cause to believe the

minor was delinquent and in need of supervision.  Second, based on

the minor's juvenile record published at this hearing, the court found "immediate and urgent necessity" to detain him pursuant to

section 5-501(2) (705 ILCS 405/5-501(2) (West 1998)).  That record

revealed that he had three referrals to juvenile court:  two (the

drug case of November 17, 1998, and a burglary case from December

4, 1998) were pending, and a third (an armed robbery on June 27,

1996) had already resulted in a finding of delinquency.  The

minor's record also showed various probation violations and arrest

warrants.

	However, the case was continued until the next day for the

hearing on the minor's constitutional challenge to the Act.  The

parties appeared, but the matter was set for February 22, 1999,

with a separate hearing on the constitutional claim to be held

before that date.  There is no indication in the record that a

hearing on this claim took place.

	At the adjudicatory hearing on February 22, 1999, the court

heard arguments on the minor's motion to quash arrest and suppress

evidence on both his drug and weapons cases.  The court denied the

motion as to both cases and finally adjudged the minor delinquent. 

On March 8, 1999, the court entered a disposition of 30 days in the

juvenile detention center, time considered served, and 5 years'

probation.

	The minor appeals his disposition.  He contends that section

5-501 of the Act, which allows a juvenile court to order the

pretrial detention of a minor based on the State's proffer, is

unconstitutional in several respects.  He argues that it violates

the Illinois Constitution in that it denies juveniles the same

procedural protections as adult criminals.  He also maintains that it violates the fourth and sixth Amendments of the United States

Constitution (U.S. Const., amends. IV, Vl) in that it denies

juveniles a preliminary hearing, the right to effective counsel and

an adequate determination of probable cause.

	We note that at oral argument before our court, the minor

requested leave to file supplemental authority.  We granted this

request.  The minor then cited Williams v. Kobel, 789 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1986).  While Williams stands for the proposition that there are two levels of probable cause in an adult criminal proceeding

(Williams, 789 F.2d at 470 (the probable cause to bind adult over for trial in preliminary hearing is more stringent than the

probable cause necessary to arrest adult)), we do not believe, for

the reasons set forth below, that this aids the minor in his cause.

	ANALYSIS

	This appeal challenges the constitutionality of a statute;

therefore, it is subject to de novo review.  See Miller v. Rosenberg, 196 Ill. 2d 50, 57 (2001).  However, a statute is presumed to be

constitutional, and the burden lies with the party challenging it

to clearly establish its constitutional invalidity.  See Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder, 187 Ill. 2d 341, 351 (1999); Russell v. Department of Natural Resources, 183 Ill. 2d 434, 441 (1998) (court must construe statute to affirm constitutionality if reasonably

capable of such construction). 

	The Juvenile Justice Reform Provisions of 1998 (Pub. Act 90-

590, eff. January 1, 1999) are a set of provisions that became

effective on January 1, 1999, and changed several delinquency

portions of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987.  In the instant case, the minor makes both state and federal constitutional challenges to

section 5-501 of the Juvenile Court Act as reformed by Public Act

90-590 that now permits pretrial detention of minors based on a

proffer made at the detention or shelter care hearing. 

Specifically, the minor challenges this portion of the statute:

	"At the appearance of the minor before

the court at the detention or shelter care

hearing, the court shall receive all relevant

information and evidence, including affidavits

concerning the allegations made in the peti-

tion.  Evidence used by the court in its find-

ings or stated in or offered in connection

with this Section may be by way of proffer based on reliable information offered by the State or

minor."  (Emphasis added.)  705 ILCS 405/5-501

(West 1998).

	We are confronted with two distinct cases on appeal:  the

minor's drug case and his weapons case.  Because different facts

are involved, we address each separately.

	A.  The Drug Case

	As a threshold matter, the instant facts indicate that the

minor does not have standing to constitutionally challenge section

5-501 as it relates to his drug case.  Thus, this part of his

appeal is dismissed.

	As a general principle, the legal doctrine of standing

prevents a party from challenging the constitutionality of a

statute that does not affect him.  See People v. Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d 413, 425 (2000) (standing ensures only those with real interest

in outcome of controversy raise such issues); Chicago Teachers Union, Local 1 v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 189 Ill. 2d 200, 206 (2000) (court will not analyze constitutionality

of statutory provision which does not affect parties to cause at

hand).  The standing requirements for a statutory challenge under

our federal constitution include an actual "case or controversy": 

the plaintiff must allege that he was personally injured by

unlawful conduct fairly traceable to the defendant and request

relief that will likely redress this injury.  See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751, 82 L. Ed. 2d 556, 569-70, 104 S. Ct. 3315, 3324

(1984).  Similarly, a statutory challenge under our state constitu-

tion requires the plaintiff to have sustained, or be in immediate

danger of sustaining, a direct injury from the enforcement of the

statute and that injury is (1) distinct and palpable; (2) fairly

traceable to the defendant's actions; and (3) substantially likely

to be redressed by granting the relief requested.  See Glisson v. City of Marion, 188 Ill. 2d 211, 221 (1999). 

	There is nothing in the record to indicate that the minor was

ever detained on his drug case.  Police took him into custody on

November 16, 1998, and the State, believing he should be detained

further, filed a formal petition for adjudication of wardship the

next day, all pursuant to the Juvenile Court Act.  See 705 ILCS

405/5-415(1), (2), 5-520 (West 19998).  An order for the minor's

temporary detention is in the record, but it is incomplete:  the

minor's name is filled in under part one of the two-step detention

analysis that indicates a finding of probable cause to believe he was delinquent (see 705 ILCS 405/5-501(1) (West 1998)), but the

order is blank as to a finding of "immediate and urgent necessity"

for detention (see 705 ILCS 405/5-501(2) (West 1998)).  Moreover,

the order was never signed or issued by any judge.  Nothing in the

record shows that a detention or shelter care hearing was even

conducted on the drug case.  Thus, the State's ability to proceed

at such a hearing by way of proffer under section 5-501, which the

minor challenges here, never materialized.  

	It is clear that the minor did not sustain a distinct injury

in his drug case directly traceable to the enforcement of the

proffer provision of section 5-501.  He was not detained for this

offense and, thus, the proffer provision was neither used against

him nor even played a role.  Striking this portion of the section 5-

501JJRA, the relief the minor seeks, will not provide any redress or

remedy.  Accordingly, the minor has no standing under either the

federal or state constitution to challenge section 5-501 and thus,

his appeal on the drug case is dismissed.   

	B.  The Weapons Case

	However, the minor does have standing to challenge section 5-

501 in relation to his weapons case, as the juvenile court found,

based on the State's proffer, both probable cause to declare him

delinquent and an "immediate and urgent necessity" to detain him on

these charges.

	The minor asserts that the detention or shelter care hearing

is equivalent to a preliminary hearing in an adult criminal case. 

Thus, he contends, section 5-501 must conform to article I, section

7, of our state constitution (Ill. Const. 1990, art. I, §7) and the fourth and sixth amendments of the federal constitution )U.S.

Const., amends. IV, VI) and we should analyze section 5-501

according to these provisions.  We disagree.

	1.  Precedent Reveals Due Process Analysis	

	The minor's proposed method of analysis demonstrates a

misunderstanding of both federal and state treatment of the 

juvenile system.  A review of major juvenile cases relied upon by

both federal and state courts establishes that the correct method

of review does not comprise specific constitutional provisions, but,

rather, a generalized due process and fundamental fairness

analysis.

	In the 1960s, the sSupreme cCourt found it necessary to examine the differences between the juvenile and adult systems.  See

generally Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 16 L. Ed. 2d 84, 86 S. Ct. 1045 (1966).  At that time, it declared that juvenile pro-

ceedings were civil rather than criminal and were meant to guide

and rehabilitate children, not treat them criminally or impose

guilt and punishment.  See Kent, 383 U.S. at 555, 16 L. Ed 2d at 94, 86 S. Ct. at 1054.  Despite a concern that juveniles would not

receive the same procedural protections afforded to adults, the

Court firmly held that, based on the systems' differences, it would

not extend those constitutional guarantees to juveniles.  See Kent, 383 U.S. at 556, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 94, 86 S. Ct. at 1054-55.  

	However, it was not as if juveniles were not to be afforded

any protections.  To the contrary, over the next decades, the Court

granted them several rights, including appropriate and timely

notice, counsel, confrontation and cross -examination of witnesses (see In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33, 18 L. Ed. 2d 527, 549, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 1446 (1967)); the privilege against self -incrimination (see Gault, 387 U.S. at 412, 18 L. Ed. 2d at 554, 87 S. Ct. at 1451; Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 55, 8 L. Ed. 2d 325, 329, 82 S. Ct. 1209, 1213 (1962)); and the standard of proof beyond a

reasonable doubt (see In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368, 375, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 1073 (1970)).  Yet, because the Court

strongly believed that not "all rights constitutionally assured to an adult accused of crime also are to be enforced or made available

to the juvenile in his delinquency proceeding" (emphasis in

original), it decided that a method of analysis different from that used for adults was necessary when deciding what protections a

juvenile should receive.  McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 533, 29 L. Ed. 2d 647, 654, 91 S. Ct. 1976, 1980 (1971), relying on

Kent, 383 U.S. at 562, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 97-98, 86 S. Ct. at 1057 (juvenile delinquency hearing is not to conform to requirements of

criminal trial or even administrative hearing; it need only

"measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment"). 

The underlying rationale for the Court's decisions about juvenile

rights was based, not on the specific constitutional amendments and

provisions used in adult cases, but more and more on the concept of

due process.  See Kent, 383 U.S. at 557, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 95, 86 S. Ct. at 1055 (reading juvenile statute at issue "in the context of

constitutional principles relating to due process").

	Today, it is this test--whether the juvenile provision in

question violates the fundamental fairness aspects of due process--

that the Court has chosen to undertake in examining juvenile cases.  See Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 37-38, 47 L. Ed. 2d 556, 565- 66, 96 S. Ct. 1281, 1289 (1976) (constitutional challenge to juve-

nile system is to be reviewed under due process, not specific

amendments, since "there are elements about [that system] which

sufficiently distinguish it from a traditional *** criminal

trial"); McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 543, 29 L. Ed. 2d at 659, 91 S. Ct. at 1985 ("the applicable due process standard in juvenile

proceedings *** is fundamental fairness"); Winship, 397 U.S. at 359, 25 L. Ed. 2d at 372, 90 S. Ct. at 1070 (safeguards in juvenile

cases arise from due process and fundamental fairness); Gault, 387 U.S. at 24, 18 L. Ed. 2d at 544, 87 S. Ct. at 1442 (Court is to use

"application of due process requirements" in connection with

juvenile delinquency cases).  

	The same is true for our state supreme court and our own

district.  After thorough review of the Juvenile Court Act, they

too have found that juvenile proceedings are "distinct and differ-

ent from a criminal prosecution;"; juveniles are not adjudicated

criminals nor do they suffer the same consequences as convicted

adults.  People v. Woodruff, 88 Ill. 2d 10, 18-19 (1981); see In re J.E., 282 Ill. App. 3d 794, 799 (1996) (juvenile detention hearings are limited in scope and transitory in nature, unlike adult

proceedings).  Moreover, our courts have consistently held that the

unique underlying philosophy of the juvenile system merits

retention of its differentiation from the adult criminal process. 

See In re W.C., 167 Ill. 2d 307, 320 (1995); Woodruff, 88 Ill. 2d at 19-20; J.E., 282 Ill. App. 3d at 799.  Our state supreme court has been careful to point out that neither general criminal practice rules nor provisions of the criminal code or criminal

procedural code have been incorporated into the juvenile system. 

See W.C., 167 Ill. 2d at 322; Woodruff, 88 Ill. 2d at 15-16.  Thus, it has chosen, as has the United States Supreme Court, to adopt due

process instead of specific state constitutional provisions to

safeguard juvenile rights.  See W.C., 167 Ill. 2d at 320.  

	We do recognize that, with the implementation of the Public Act

90-590JJRA, several aspects of the Illinois juvenile system have

changed in recent years.  Specifically, the Public Act 90-590JJRA modified

article V of the Juvenile Court Act dealing with pretrial

detention, including the statutory provisions the minor challenges

here:  section 5-501.  See In re A.G., 195 Ill. 2d 313, 317 (2001).  The Public Act 90-590JJRA has created a "fundamental shift from the

singular goal of rehabilitation to include the overriding concerns

of protecting the public and holding juvenile offenders accountable

for violations of the law."  A.G., 195 Ill. 2d at 317.  Thus, it has become somewhat of a misno-mer to label juvenile proceedings as

"civil."  However, even with this slight change in purpose, our

supreme court still affirms that juvenile proceedings are not criminal in nature and should continue to be dissected from the

adult criminal system.  See A.G., 195 Ill. 2d at 317.  

	Therefore, contrary to the minor's contentions here,

examination of his constitutional challenges should be according to

due process:  is section 5-501, specifically that portion which

allows the State to proceed by way of proffer against a juvenile

during a detention or shelter care hearing, fundamentally unfair

such that an adult preliminary hearing should be mandated in its place?  We hold that it is not.  

	Under the juvenile system, the officer who takes the minor

into custody must immediately try to notify the minor's parent or

guardian.  See 705 ILCS 405/5-401, 5-405(1), (2) (West 19998).  The

officer has discretion to either release the minor or present him

before a juvenile court within 40 hours.  See 705 ILCS 5/405(3), 5-

415(1) (West 1998).  If the State believes the minor should remain

in custody, it must file a formal petition for adjudication of

wardship.  See 705 ILCS 405/5-415(2), 5-520 (West 1998).  Then, a

detention or shelter care hearing is held pursuant to section 5-

501, and the juvenile court must conduct a two-step analysis in

order to detain the minor before trial.  First, it must decided

whether there is probable cause to believe that the minor is

delinquent.  See 705 ILCS 405/5-501(1) (West 198).  If yes, the

court must then find that detaining the minor comprises an

"immediate and urgent necessity."  705 ILCS 405/5-501(2) (West

1998).  If not, the minor is released from custody.  See 705 ILCS

405/5-501(2) (West 1998).

	Contrary to the minor's assertions, section 5-501 is replete

with protections specifically designed for juveniles according to

their distinctive legal system.  The section directs the juvenile

court to "receive all relevant information and evidence" by

relaxing the formal rules of evidence used in adult proceedings. 

705 ILCS 405/5-501 (West 1998) ("[a]ll evidence shall be admissible

if it is relevant and reliable regardless of whether it would be

admissible under the rules of evidence applicable at a trial").  It

also gives the minor a right to counsel for this hearing.  While it is true that, as the minor here attacks, the State may present

viable evidence by way of a proffer which the court can use in its

findings, section 5-501 allows the minor to do the same.  This

section further ensures that the proffer must be based on reliable

information.  Nowhere in this section does it mandate that the

State proceed in this manner or, more significantly, that the court

must accept the proffer; it is for the court to decide whether to

believe the evidence presented pursuant to this method. 

	Further protections exist in that the court is forced to

complete a two-part analysis.  In addition to probable cause, sec-

tion 5-501 outlines factors that the court is to use in determining

"immediate and urgent necessity."  See 705 ILCS 405/5-501(2) (West

1998).  Also, this section permits any party, even the minor himself, to file a motion to vacate a detention or shelter care

order on several grounds.  See 705 ILCS 405/5-501(7) (West 1998). 

	When studying section 5-501 within the context of the juvenile

justice system--retaining its informal, nonadversarial nature and

main goal to rehabilitate, not punish--it is clear that this

section complies with due process.  The "proffer based on reliable

information" allows both sides, not just the State, to present to

the juvenile court in a short amount of time all relevant evidence

regarding the juvenile and the situation at hand.  This is

necessary if the court is to fulfill its traditional role as parens patriae in juvenile cases and maintain their transitory and flexible nature.  The safeguard is clearly present:  the court must deem the

proffer reliable.  That is, if either party can demonstrate that it is unreliable, the court may simply decline to accept the proffer

in its discretion without incident.  Moreover, section 5-501 does

not insist that a proffer must be used to the exclusion of all

other evidence.  To the contrary, that section permits both the

State and the juvenile to present other forms of evidence,

including live witness testimony and examination, if they are so

able.  

	The minor's call for an adult-like preliminary hearing would

strike a blow to the juvenile system.  It would turn this system

into an adversarial one, which, as noted above, was and is exactly

what our legislators attempted to avoid in creating it.  So too

would be sacrificed speed, efficiency, informality and flexibility,

the system's main tenets.  See Winship, 397 U.S. at 366, 25 L. Ed. 2d at 376-77, 90 S. Ct. at 1074.  As it stands, section 5-501

remains critically unlike an adult preliminary hearing and we will not change it here.  From it, a juvenile reaps several benefits,

including the ability to have his hearing reconsidered and his

detention order modified or vacated if facts change.  See Woodruff, 88 Ill. 2d at 19 ("the minor enjoys certain protections and

benefits under the Juvenile Court Act that are not extended to one

charged with a crime").  Simply superimposing an adult-style

preliminary hearing, as the minor requests us to do, will only

upset the substantive benefits he already receives under the

juvenile system.  

	Because we find that section 5-501 is fundamentally fair and

does not violate the minor's due process rights, we dismiss his

appeal.

	2.  The Minor's Constitutional Challenges

	We briefly address the minor's three constitutional challenges

to further emphasize that due process governs our examination here.

	a.  Article 1, Section 7, of the Illinois Constitution

	The minor asserts that he deserves the same constitutional

protections granted to adults under article I, section 7, of the

Illinois Constitution, namely, a preliminary hearing to determine

probable cause.  Article 1I, section 7, states:

	"No person shall be held to answer for a

crime punishable by death or by imprisonment

in the penitentiary unless either the initial

charge has been brought by indictment of a

grand jury or the person has been given a

prompt preliminary hearing to establish

probable cause."  Ill. Const., art. I, §7.

	Reviewing this section shows many flaws in the minor's

argument and reveals that it is inappropriate in our analysis of

the constitutionality of section 5-501.  First, it is obvious that

the framers of our constitution did not envision applying this part

of the constitution to juveniles.  It refers to crimes punishable

by death, to which juveniles never have been, nor currently are,

subjected.  Second, article 1I, section 7, does not, as the minor

argues, "guarantee" adults a preliminary hearing with the opportun-

ity to test the sufficiency of the charges or cross-examine

witnesses; probable cause may just as easily be determined through a grand jury indictment.  See People v. Franklin, 80 Ill. App. 3d 128, 131 (1979).  

	Thus, the minor demands that juveniles must be constitution-

ally afforded a "right" that not even adult criminals receive under

article I, section 7.  He neglects that, as demonstrated above,

juveniles do receive adequate determinations of probable cause under section 5-501 of the Act; that section mandates such a

finding in a detention or shelter care hearing before a juvenile

may be detained.  Because the adult and juvenile systems operate as

such different mechanisms here, it is not feasible to simply

superimpose article I, section 7's adult protections on juveniles.

	The minor relies on In re W.C. for his challenge of section 5- 501 under the Illinois Constitution.  While that case is factually

similar in that a juvenile was adjudicated delinquent, it severely

departs from the minor's contentions.  Our supreme court clearly

denominated juvenile proceedings to be "not criminal" and "nonad-

versarial."  W.C., 167 Ill. 2d at 320, 326.  Moreover, the court did not use an article 1I, section 7, approach to determine whether

rules regarding written posttrial motions applicable to adults in

criminal proceedings also applied to juveniles.  Rather, because it

recognized the essential differences between the adult and juvenile

systems, it employed a due process/fundamental fairness analysis

instead.  See W.C., 167 Ill. 2d at 320-324.

	Therefore, article 1I, section 7, of our state constitution

does not apply to the minor's challenges to section 5-501 and its

effects on the juvenile system.

	b.  The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution

	The minor next contends that the Ssixth Aamendment's "critical

stage" analysis should be employed, and, because section 5-501 allows the State to proceed by proffer in the detention or shelter

care hearing, it deprives juveniles of effective assistance of

counsel in violation of this amendment.

	However, again, the minor's constitutional challenge is

inapplicable because the sixth amendment does not govern juvenile

cases.  That amendment grants assistance of counsel "[i]n all cri-

minal prosecutions" at those critical stages that greatly impact an

accused's liberty.  U.S. Const., amend. VI; see generally Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 26 L. Ed. 2d 387, 90 S. Ct. 1999 (1970).  Our Supreme Court has addressed whether juvenile proceedings may be

classified as "criminal prosecutions" for purposes of a potential

sixth amendment analysis, and has, time and again, specifically

found that that they may not.  See  Middendorf, 425 U.S. at 38, 47 L. Ed. 2d at 566, 96 S. Ct. at 1289 (juvenile proceeding, even

though iy "may result in deprivation of liberty[,] is nonetheless

not a 'criminal proceeding' within the meaning of the Sixth

Amendment"); McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 541, 29 L. Ed. 2d at 658, 91 S. Ct. at 1984 (juvenile court proceedings have "not yet been held to

be a 'criminal prosecution,' within the meaning and reach of the

Ssixth Aamendment").  In addition, thisre Supreme Court has found that even adult probable cause proceedings do not amount to a "critical

stage" that would employ Sixth Amendment examination.  See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 122, 43 L. Ed. 2d 54, 70, 95 S. Ct. 854, 867 (1975).

	Therefore, the minor's proposed Sixth Amendment constitutional

challenge to section 5-501 is misplaced.

	c.  The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution

	Finally, the minor maintains that section 5-501 violates the

fourth amendment in that it allows the juvenile court to make a

probable cause determination based solely on a proffer which does

not require an oath or affirmation.  

	The minor's contentions here are incorrect for several

reasons.  First, he relies on the warrant clause of the fourth

amendment, which is inapplicable to the instant case.  That portion

states:  "no Warrants shall issue but upon probable cause,

supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the

placed to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." 

U.S. Const., amend. IV.  What is to be "supported by Oath or

affirmation" is not a proffer, as the minor claims, but rather a

warrant.  Because the instant case did not involve a warrant, the

minor's argument is inapplicable.

	Were we to address the minor's constitutional claim here,

however, we would conclude that it must fail.  Our sSupreme cCourt

has clearly delineated what the Ffourth Aamendment requires in order

to detain someone:  simply, "a judicial determination of probable

cause."  Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 114, 43 L. Ed. 2d at 65, 95 S. Ct. at 863.  This does not require those protections found in adversa-

rial proceedings, such as right to counsel, confrontation, or cross

examination of witnesses.  See Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 119, 43 L. Ed. 2d at 68, 95 S. Ct. at 866.  In fact, ourthe United States Supreme

Court has approved the determination of probable cause by a

magistrate, without an adversarial hearing, and even based solely

on hearsay and written testimony.  See Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 120, 43 L. Ed. 2d at 69, 95 S. Ct. at 866.  As long as the procedure used, whatever it may be, is a "fair and reliable determination of

probable cause *** made by a judicial officer either before or

promptly after arrest," a viable basis has been established for

pretrial restraint.  Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 125, 43 L. Ed. 2d at 71- 72, 95 S. Ct. at 868-69.

	Section 5-501 of the Act clearly comports with these fourth

amendment requirements.  The first part of the detention or shelter

care hearing requires the juvenile court to find probable cause in

order to detain a juvenile.  See 705 ILCS 405/5-501(1) (West 1998). 

This determination must occur promptly after the juvenile is taken

into custody, i.e., within 40 hours, and if the court does not find probable cause, it must release him.  See 705 ILCS 405/5-415(1), 5-

501(1) (West 1998).  Juvenile proceedings are not adversarial. 

However, under the mandates of our Supreme cCourt, this does not

violate the Ffourth Aamendment.  As we have just noted, in the adult

criminal system, probable cause for detention may be determined

through a nonadversarial hearing and based on even hearsay or

written testimony, not live witnesses, as long as that determination-

tions is fair and reliable.  This is satisfied under sec-tion 5-501: 

during the analysis for probable cause, the State may present, and

the court may accept, evidence "by way of proffer," as long as it

is "based on reliable information."  705 ILCS 405/5-501 (West

1998).

	In the instant case, the State presented its evidence on the

weapons case against the minor by way of proffer.  This comprised the testimony of Officer Davis, as well as his corroborating police

report, signed by two other officers (who were present when the weapon was recovered from the minor) and affirmed by their

sergeant.  After reviewing this information and finding it relia-

ble, the court accepted the proffer.  We find no reason to declare

the proffer, or the information it was based upon, to be unrelia-

ble.

	Therefore, even if probable cause concerns do play a role

here, section 5-501 clearly satisfies the requirements of the

fourth a m endment and is in no way unconstitutional in this regard.

	CONCLUSION

	Because the minor has not met his burden in establishing the

invalidity of section 5-501 of the JJRAAct under either our state or

federal constitution, we affirm the juvenile court's adjudication and disposition of his delinquency.

	Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County

is affirmed.

	Affirmed.

	Buckley, J., with GallagherALLAGHER, P.J., and O'BrienRIEN, J., concur-ring.