Filed 12/22/20 In re Jeanine R. CA2/7

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

In re JEANINE R. et al., 

Persons Coming Under the 

Juvenile Court Law.

 B301685

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. 19CCJP05049)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

FELIPE R. et al.,

Defendants and 

Appellants.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Annabelle G. Cortez, Judge. Dismissed.
2

Paul A. Swiller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, 

for Defendant and Appellant Felipe R.

Patricia K. Saucier, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Yeny R.

Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, Kristine P. Miles, 

Assistant County Counsel, and William D. Thetford, Principal 

Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

__________________________

Yeny R. (Mother) and Felipe R. (Father) appeal from the 

juvenile court’s jurisdiction findings and disposition order 

declaring 12-year-old Jonathan R. and four-year-old Jenesis R. 

dependents of the court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions 

Code1 section 300, subdivision (b)(1). Mother also appeals from 

the disposition order as to 14-year-old sibling Jeanine R. The 

children came to the attention of the Los Angeles County 

Department of Children and Family Services (Department) after 

Father slapped Jeanine, who had severe mental and emotional 

problems.

Mother and Father contend as to Jonathan and Jenesis 

substantial evidence does not support the jurisdiction findings 

that the children were placed at substantial risk of serious harm 

and the juvenile court abused its discretion in failing to 

terminate dependency jurisdiction over Jonathan and Jenesis at 

the disposition hearing because by that time Jeanine was not 

living in the family home. The juvenile court has since 

1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the 

Welfare and Institutions Code.
3

terminated jurisdiction as to Jonathan and Jenesis and released 

them to Mother and Father. Because we cannot grant Mother 

and Father effective relief, we dismiss their appeals as to 

Jonathan and Jenesis.

Mother contends as to Jeanine the juvenile court abused its 

discretion by delegating to the Department the discretion to 

determine the frequency and duration of Mother’s visitation with 

Jeanine, who was placed in a therapeutic foster care treatment 

facility an hour from where Mother and Father live. Mother’s 

appeal as to Jeanine has also been rendered moot by a 

subsequent order requiring overnight unmonitored visitation 

with Mother to resume and for Mother or Father to return to 

court if the visits do not resume.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The Referral and Petition

On July 18, 2019 the Department received a referral 

alleging Father had physically abused then-13-year-old Jeanine. 

The caller stated Jeanine had been placed on a section 5585 hold 

by law enforcement.2 According to the caller, Jeanine had a black 

eye that appeared fresh. Jeanine stated Father hit her a lot as a 

form of discipline. Father did not deny he hit Jeanine, but he 

2 The Children’s Civil Commitment and Mental Health 

Treatment Act of 1988 (§ 5585 et seq.) provides for a 72-hour 

evaluation and treatment in an evaluation facility of a minor who 

“as a result of mental disorder, is a danger to others, or to himself 

or herself, or gravely disabled and authorization for voluntary

treatment is not available.” (§ 5585.50, subd. (a).)
4

stated he did so in self-defense while Jeanine was having a 

mental health crisis. The caller stated Jeanine had been 

hospitalized numerous times for being a danger to herself and 

others, and she had a history of self-cutting and suicidal ideation. 

The caller also stated Jeanine had homicidal ideation with a plan 

to stab her parents. She had been diagnosed with major 

depressive disorder with psychotic symptoms and had been 

prescribed psychotropic medication. Mother stated Jeanine’s 

discharge plan provided for her to be placed in a residential 

mental health facility. On August 5, 2019 the juvenile court 

issued a removal order, and the Department detained Jeanine at 

a residential facility. Jonathan and Jenesis remained with 

Mother and Father.

On August 8, 2019 the Department filed a petition alleging 

Jeanine, Jonathan, and Jenesis came within the jurisdiction of 

the juvenile court under section 300, subdivisions (a), (b)(1), and 

(j). The petition alleged Father physically abused Jeanine by 

slapping her face and inflicting redness and swelling, and he and 

Mother were unable to provide parental care and supervision 

over Jeanine because of Jeanine’s severe mental and emotional 

problems, including suicide attempts, homicidal ideation, and 

aggressive behavior. The petition alleged Mother and Father 

failed to protect the three children from harm.

At the detention hearing on August 9, 2019, the court 

ordered Jeanine detained and Jonathan and Jenesis released to 

Mother and Father. The court ordered Mother to have monitored 

visits at a minimum of three times per week for three hours each 

visit. The court ordered “[t]he Department to follow up and set 

up a written visitation schedule with [Mother]. The minimum 

[is] three times a week. But that is consistent with any rules in 
5

terms of placement.” Father agreed to have no visitation pending

the jurisdiction hearing.

B. The Jurisdiction/Disposition Report and Addendum Report

On August 16, 2019 Mother talked to the social worker 

about her visitation with Jeanine. The social worker stated that 

although the Department was working to accommodate 

visitation, the facility where Jeanine had been placed stated it 

was not in Jeanine’s best interest to allow visits with Mother due 

to the child’s mental health and well-being.

On August 27 Jeanine was placed in an intensive 

therapeutic foster care home in Victorville. She was doing well in 

the home. Mother called Jeanine every day. Mother, Jeanine, 

and Jeanine’s siblings spoke every day for about 30 minutes.

On August 30 Mother informed the social worker she had 

not been able to see Jeanine since Jeanine was detained. Mother 

had contacted the foster home, which told her she could have a 

single nine-hour weekly visit “all the way at the high [desert],” 

even though the court had ordered three 3-hour visits. Mother 

later met with social worker Nischell Tolbert, who had just been 

assigned the case. Tolbert explained she needed time to review 

the file and to make a visitation schedule. She asked Mother for 

her availability, and Mother responded she was available except 

she needed to pick up Jonathan by 5:30 p.m. from school. Tolbert

agreed to provide a visitation schedule the following week.

On September 4 Tolbert mailed a visitation schedule to 

Mother and called her to discuss the schedule. The visitation 

schedule provided for Mother to have visits with Jeanine for 
6

three hours on Wednesdays and six hours on Saturdays.3 The 

agreement provided for the foster parents to transport Jeanine to 

and from the visits.

Mother e-mailed Tolbert that evening to express her 

concerns about the schedule. Mother explained she was available 

Tuesdays and Sundays, but not Wednesdays and Saturdays, and 

a six-hour visit would not be “in our best interest,” instead of two 

visits for four and a half hours each. Mother also requested the 

visits be “at the half way point for both of us,” and in a park 

instead of a mall. Mother complained she was not consulted 

about her availability for visits, and her comment to Tolbert that 

she needed to pick up Jonathan at 5:30 p.m. on school days was 

not in response to “a direct question about availability for 

visitation.”

The Department recommended the children be declared 

dependents of the juvenile court with Jonathan and Jenesis 

placed with Mother and Father and Jeanine removed from the 

parents’ home with family reunification services. The 

Department recommended Mother have monitored visitation 

with Jeanine, and Father visit Jeanine in a therapeutic setting.

C. The Jurisdiction Hearing

At the jurisdiction hearing on September 23, 2019, Mother 

and Father urged the juvenile court to dismiss the petition as to 

Jonathan and Jenesis because they were not at risk of 

3 The visitation schedule, dated September 4, 2019, is titled 

“Visitation Agreement,” and it states the agreement was reached 

among the Department, the caregiver, and Mother. Mother 

disputes she was ever consulted about the schedule.
7

substantial harm from witnessing the incident between Father 

and Jeanine, and Jeanine was no longer living at home. Mother’s 

counsel submitted as to Jeanine. Father requested the court 

strike the allegation Father physically abused Jeanine. Counsel 

for Jonathan and Jenesis objected to dismissing the allegations 

as to Jonathan and Jenesis because the siblings had been present 

for “severe behavioral issues” and were afraid. However, the 

Department and minors’ counsel agreed with Father’s proposal to 

strike the language regarding his physical abuse of Jeanine.

The juvenile court sustained the petition as to all three 

children, amended to allege under section 300, subdivision (b)(1), 

that Mother and Father were unable to provide Jeanine with 

appropriate parental care and supervision due to her severe 

mental and emotional problems, including suicide attempts and 

aggressive behavior; Father “is unable to appropriately address 

[Jeanine’s] behaviors and has physically disciplined [Jeanine] in 

response to [her] behaviors”; Jonathan and Jenesis were present 

and were afraid; and Mother and Father’s inability to provide 

appropriate parental care and supervision of Jeanine placed 

Jonathan and Jenesis at risk of serious physical harm. The court

dismissed the allegations under section 300, subdivisions (a) and 

(j).

The juvenile court continued the disposition hearing to 

address placement of Jeanine. Mother and Father requested 

Jeanine be placed in an intensive therapeutic foster home in Los 

Angeles County instead of Victorville so she could be closer to her 

family. The court directed the Department to make efforts to 

place Jeanine in a facility in Los Angeles County that met her 

needs. Mother’s attorney stated Mother had not been able to 

visit Jeanine because of “scheduling and distance.” The attorney 
8

explained Mother had requested the Department meet with her 

to “come up with a schedule that fits her needs. Because . . . the 

proposed schedule that was given to Mother didn’t work with her 

since she has to pick up [her other] children from school . . . . So 

she is able to as long as the Department is flexible with Mother 

given the distance.” Father did not have visitation because he 

had agreed to wait for the court to order visitation at the hearing.

The court ordered “the Department to work out a written 

visitation schedule with [Mother and Father] within seven days. 

And the Department to take into account the fact that Jeanine is 

placed out of county and that the parents have Jonathan and 

Jenesis in their care, so just to work with their schedules in 

working out something that accommodates the distance and the 

schedule.” The court also ordered the Department to look into 

alternatives until Jeanine transitioned to a placement in Los 

Angeles County. The court added, “[T]he Department [is] to 

ensure that the parents are getting consistent contact with 

Jeanine . . . .” The court ordered “the Department to ensure that 

they’re working closely with the parents so that . . . they can 

remain involved in Jeanine’s care.”

D. The Disposition Hearing

The October 16, 2019 last minute information for the court 

reported the Department had requested placement for Jeanine in 

an intensive specialized foster care home in the Los Angeles area, 

but no homes were available. Mother continued to object to the 

visitation schedule, but the foster parents were not able to 

supervise a visit on Sundays, which is why they requested 

Wednesdays and Saturdays. Mother was “refusing to travel per 

visitation schedule.”
9

At the disposition hearing on October 16, the Department 

recommended Jeanine be removed from Mother and Father and 

suitably placed and Jonathan and Jenesis be released to Mother 

and Father. Mother agreed with the Department’s 

recommendation, but she renewed her request Jeanine be placed 

in Los Angeles County instead of over an hour away in 

Victorville. In addition, Mother had not had any visits because of 

the location, and the schedule was “virtually impossible for her to 

make” because she was caring for the younger siblings. Mother 

was willing to travel halfway to the foster home for visitation. 

Mother requested the Department modify the visitation schedule 

to work with her schedule. Mother also urged the juvenile court 

to terminate jurisdiction as to Jonathan and Jenesis. Father 

joined in Mother’s requests. Counsel for Jonathan and Jenesis 

argued jurisdiction was still warranted as to Jonathan and 

Jenesis because of the significant issues with Jeanine.

The court declared Jeanine, Jonathan, and Jenesis 

dependents of the court under section 300, subdivision (b), 

ordered Jeanine removed from Mother and Father, and released 

Jonathan and Jenesis to the home of Mother and Father. As to 

visitation with Jeanine, the juvenile court noted the visitation 

schedule prepared by the Department predated the jurisdiction 

hearing. The court ordered “the Department to follow up with 

both parents and work out a written visitation schedule that 

takes into account the various barriers, including the distance.” 

The court noted the current visitation order provided for one long 

visit on Saturdays, but the court suggested the Department find 

alternatives to the visitation order to allow a long visit, but with 

increased contact with Jeanine. The court also ordered the 

Department to continue its efforts to place Jeanine in an 
10

intensive therapeutic foster home in Los Angeles County. 

Further, the court ordered the Department “to work out a 

visitation schedule that takes into account the parents[’] and 

Jeanine’s needs and the distance . . . as well as the parents’ 

availability.” The court denied the parents’ request to terminate 

jurisdiction as to Jonathan and Jenesis. The court ordered

Jeanine be suitably placed and Jonathan and Jenesis released to 

Mother and Father.

The court’s October 16, 2019 minute order reflects that the 

juvenile court signed and filed the attorney order submitted by 

minors’ counsel on that date. The order states it was prepared by 

Mother’s counsel and agreed to by counsel for Father, the minors, 

and the Department. The order provides for the Department to 

continue its efforts to place Jeanine in an intensive therapeutic 

foster home in Los Angeles County. As to visitation, the order 

requires the Department “to follow up with the parents about 

their availability for visits and provide [the] parents with a 

written visitation schedule,” and as long as Jeanine is placed 

outside of Los Angeles County, “to facilitate visits at the halfway 

point.”

Mother and Father timely appealed.

E. The Juvenile Court’s Termination of Jurisdiction

On September 23, 2020 the juvenile court terminated 

jurisdiction over Jonathan and Jenesis and released the children 

to Mother and Father.

4 As to Jeanine, Mother and Father had 

4 On our own motion we take judicial notice of the 

September 23, 2020 minute orders and hearing transcript. (Evid. 

Code, § 452, subd. (d).) Consideration of postjudgment evidence 
11

progressed to unmonitored weekend visitation, including 

overnight visits, until there were “two incidents” that led to 

visitation becoming monitored, and then to stop. As Jeanine’s 

attorney explained, there had been a falling out between the 

family and Jeanine, which occurred at recent visitations and 

conjoint therapy sessions, causing Jeanine “to remove herself 

from the family[,] and both [Jeanine and the family] had to take a 

break from seeing and talking to each other.” The court 

continued jurisdiction as to Jeanine, finding by clear and 

convincing evidence return of Jeanine to the physical custody of 

the parents would create a substantial risk of detriment to 

Jeanine. However, the court found “[t]here is a substantial 

probability that Jeanine may be returned home by the next 

review period,” with the next hearing scheduled for February 6, 

2021.

The court ordered the Department “to follow up and ensure 

overnight visitation resumes safely” and provided that “[c]ounsel 

has discretion to walk the matter on the Court’s calendar if 

overnight visitation does not resume within 30 days.” The court 

envisioned that “overnights can resume before the next court 

hearing.” The order also provided the Department “has 

continued discretion to liberalize parents’ visits” and “[a]ll prior 

is appropriate when the later orders are relevant to a motion to 

dismiss an appeal or to a determination whether the evidence 

renders the appeal moot. (In re Josiah Z. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 664, 

676 [“appellate courts routinely consider limited postjudgment 

evidence” for motions to dismiss]; In re N.S. (2016) 

245 Cal.App.4th 53, 58 [appellate court may consider postappeal 

rulings that affect its ability to grant effective relief].)
12

orders not in conflict shall remain in full force and effect.” 

Mother and Father have not appealed from the order terminating 

jurisdiction over Jonathan and Jenesis.

DISCUSSION

A. Mother’s and Father’s Appeals as to Jonathan and Jenesis 

Are Moot

The Department contends Mother’s and Father’s appeals 

are moot as to Jonathan and Jenesis because the juvenile court 

terminated jurisdiction with Mother and Father retaining 

custody.5 Mother and Father argue their appeals are not moot 

because absent reversal of the jurisdiction findings, they will be 

prejudiced in any future juvenile or family court proceeding 

involving Jonathan or Jenesis by the finding they failed to protect 

the children from an unreasonable risk of harm. Father also 

argues he would suffer a stigma from the juvenile court’s 

findings, and the findings would “likely” cause Father’s name to 

be listed in the Child Abuse Central Index (CACI). (See Pen. 

Code, § 11169, subd. (a) [providing designated agencies, including 

the Department, “shall forward to the Department of Justice a 

report in writing of every case it investigates of known or 

5 At our request, the Department, Mother, and Father 

submitted supplemental letter briefs addressing whether the 

juvenile court’s September 23, 2020 orders rendered moot 

Mother’s and Father’s appeals. The Department in its letter brief 

states it does not oppose reversing the jurisdiction findings as to 

Jonathan and Jenesis, but it acknowledges that termination of 

jurisdiction rendered the appeal moot.
13

suspected child abuse or severe neglect that is determined to be 

substantiated, other than cases coming within subdivision (b) of 

Section 11165.2,” which defines “‘[g]eneral neglect’”].) Mother’s 

and Father’s appeals are moot as to Jonathan and Jenesis.

We have a duty to decide actual controversies and not to 

give opinions upon moot questions. (Eye Dog Foundation v. State 

Board of Guide Dogs for the Blind (1967) 67 Cal.2d 536, 541; In re 

David B. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 633, 644.) A dependency appeal 

“‘“becomes moot when, through no fault of the respondent, the 

occurrence of an event renders it impossible for the appellate 

court to grant the appellant effective relief.”’” (In re J.P. (2017) 

14 Cal.App.5th 616, 623; accord, In re David B., at p. 644 [appeal 

moot where minor was over 18 at time of appeal]; In re N.S.

(2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 53, 61 (N.S.) [mother’s appeal moot where 

juvenile court awarded her custody of minor and dismissed 

dependency proceedings].)

An order terminating juvenile court jurisdiction generally 

renders an appeal from a previous order moot because the 

appellate court can no longer grant effective relief. (In re C.C.

(2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1481, 1488.) There may be circumstances 

where termination of jurisdiction will not render an appeal moot 

because an erroneous jurisdiction finding results in an order that 

continues to affect the parent adversely. (See In re J.P., supra, 

14 Cal.App.5th at p. 623 [father’s appeal not moot where he lost 

legal and physical custody of his children with only monitored 

visitation]; In re Joshua C. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1544, 1547-

1548 [father’s appeal not rendered moot by termination of 

jurisdiction where juvenile court awarded sole physical and legal 

custody to mother and restricted father’s visitation].) This is not 

one of those situations.
14

The procedural posture here is similar to N.S., in which the 

court concluded the mother’s appeal was moot because she was 

awarded custody of her child and “the jurisdictional findings 

[were] not the basis of any current order that [was] adverse to 

her.” (N.S., supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 61.) Jonathan and 

Jenesis have remained in Mother and Father’s custody, and there 

is no exit order that adversely affects them. Mother and Father 

raise a concern about the impact the juvenile court’s jurisdiction 

findings would have in a hypothetical future dependency case, 

but the court’s findings are based on the facts concerning their 

response to Jeanine’s severe mental and emotional problems. 

Regardless of whether we reach the merits, “[t]hose facts would 

almost certainly be available in any future dependency 

proceedings . . . .” (Id. at p. 63.) In addition, the facts that could 

have been potentially prejudicial to Father—the initial allegation 

of Father’s physical abuse of Jeanine—were stricken from the 

amended petition. Further, a determination of any future 

dependency case would need to be based on conditions that exist 

at that time. (In re I.A. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1494-1495 

[rejecting father’s contention court should consider appeal of 

jurisdiction finding based on a five-year-old act of domestic 

violence in light of impact finding would have on future 

dependency proceeding].)

Father’s concern that the juvenile court’s findings would 

cause his name to be placed on the CACI database is speculative. 

As discussed, Penal Code section 11169, subdivision (a), provides 

for reporting of substantiated “child abuse or severe neglect.”6 As 

6 Whether a report of child abuse or neglect is 

“substantiated” for purposes of Penal Code section 11169 does not 
15

relevant here, the statute defines “child abuse” to include 

“willfully caus[ing] or permit[ting] any child to suffer, or 

inflict[ing] thereon, unjustifiable physical pain or mental 

suffering” (Pen. Code, § 11165.3) and “willfully inflict[ing] upon 

any child any cruel or inhuman corporal punishment or injury 

resulting in a traumatic condition” (§ 11165.4). (See Pen. Code,

§ 11165.6 [defining “child abuse or neglect” under the statute].) 

“Severe neglect” is defined under section 11165.2, subdivision (a), 

as where a person with care or custody of a child “willfully causes 

or permits the person or health of the child to be placed in a 

situation such that his or her person or health is endangered, . . . 

including the intentional failure to provide adequate food, 

clothing, shelter, or medical care.” The juvenile court sustained 

the petition as amended to allege Father “is unable to 

appropriately address [Jeanine’s] behaviors and has physically 

disciplined [Jeanine] in response to [her] behaviors” The failure 

depend on whether a juvenile court has sustained a Welfare and 

Institutions Code section 300 petition relating to the abuse 

allegations. Rather, “[a] report is ‘“[s]ubstantiated”’ if the 

conduct reported is ‘determined by the investigator who 

conducted the investigation to constitute child abuse or 

neglect . . . , based upon evidence that makes it more likely than 

not that child abuse . . . occurred. A substantiated report shall 

not include a report . . . [found by] the investigator who conducted 

the investigation . . . to be false, inherently improbable, to involve 

an accidental injury, or to not constitute child abuse or neglect as 

defined in Section 11165.6.’ (Pen. Code, § 11165.12, subd. (b).)” 

(Gonzalez v. Santa Clara County Dept. of Social Services (2014) 

223 Cal.App.4th 72, 85.)
16

to protect at issue here does not reasonably fall within these

definitions of child abuse or severe neglect.

Because Mother and Father have not shown any prejudice 

from the jurisdiction findings or disposition order for which we 

can grant effective relief, we dismiss their appeals.

B. We Cannot Grant Mother Effective Relief as to Jeanine

Mother contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in

delegating to the Department the creation of a visitation schedule 

for Jeanine without setting a minimum number of visits and 

hours each week. But given the current circumstances—

including an increase in visitation to unmonitored weekend 

overnight visitation—we can no longer provide effective relief.

At the detention hearing on August 9, 2019, the court 

ordered Mother to have monitored visits at a minimum of three 

times per week for three hours each visit. That order has 

remained in place, and the Department consistently provided 

Mother with nine hours per week of visitation, but on days 

Mother asserted were unacceptable. For example, the 

September 4, 2019 visitation schedule provided for a three-hour 

visit on Wednesdays and a six-hour visit on Saturdays, but 

Mother stated she was unavailable on those days, and she 

requested the Department arrange for four-and-a-half-hour 

visits. Following the disposition hearing, the court entered a 

visitation order requiring the Department to provide a revised 

visitation schedule to the parents that would accommodate their 

needs and facilitate visitation.

Mother’s request we reverse the disposition order and 

direct the juvenile court to set a specific number of weekly visits 

and hours of duration has been rendered moot by the progression 
17

of visitation to overnight visits as of the September 23, 2020 

hearing. Further, even if we were to order the juvenile court to 

set a specific number of hours of required visitation, by the time 

of the September 23 hearing, there were two incidents involving 

Jeanine and the family that had caused visitation temporarily to 

cease. The court acknowledged Jeanine would likely return home 

by the February 6, 2021 hearing, so it ordered the Department to 

“ensure overnight visitation resumes safely.” And, if overnight 

visitation did not resume within 30 days of the hearing, Mother 

or Father could return to court for relief. The court also made 

clear “[a]ll prior orders not in conflict shall remain in full force 

and effect,” which would include the visitation order entered at 

the detention hearing providing for nine hours of visitation each 

week. Under these circumstances, given that the court has now 

ordered overnight visitation to resume, the prior order setting 

nine hours of visitation each week remains in effect, and the 

parents and the Department need to address the family dynamic 

that caused the visits to cease, the relief requested by Mother 

with respect to the disposition order—directing the court set a 

specific number of weekly visits and hours of visitation—would 

not address the current circumstances. To the extent Mother 

now seeks relief to ensure visitation returns to unmonitored 

overnight visitation, this is not relief we can provide. Thus, her 

appeal as to Jeanine is also moot. (N.S., supra, 245 Cal.App.4th 

at p. 61.)
18

DISPOSITION

Mother’s and Father’s appeals as to Jonathan, Jenesis, and 

Jeanine are dismissed.

FEUER, J.

We concur:

PERLUSS, P. J.

DILLON, J.*

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the 

Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California 

Constitution.