SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3907-19

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

MATTHEW D. ROLLE,

a/k/a DASHAUN CHEEKS,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Submitted May 17, 2021 – Decided July 19, 2021

Before Judges Sabatino and Gooden Brown.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Salem County, Indictment No. 15-07-0387.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Craig S. Leeds, Designated Counsel, on the 

brief).

John T. Lenahan, Salem County Prosecutor, attorney 

for respondent (David Galemba, Assistant Prosecutor, 

of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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Defendant Matthew Rolle appeals the trial court's denial of his petition 

for post-conviction relief ("PCR") without an evidentiary hearing. We affirm.

I.

We incorporate by reference the facts detailed in this court's unpublished 

2017 opinion upholding defendant's conviction and sentence. State v. Rolle, 

No. A-5239-15 (App. Div. Aug. 15, 2017), certif. denied, 232 N.J. 285 (2018). 

A brief summary will suffice for our present purposes.

The jury found defendant guilty on six of eight counts connected to the 

brutal beating of a former friend, Christopher Hill, and his mother Rosemary 

Hill. The attacks occurred when the victims approached defendant and two 

other individuals late one evening, having perceived they were engaged in

suspicious activity near a relative's home.

Both victims previously knew defendant, and they identified him as one 

of the attackers. The evidence showed the victims were struck in the head and 

other parts of their bodies with what the indictment described as a "knife or 

machete type object." The weapon was not recovered, and the two other 

perpetrators were never identified.

The jury found defendant not guilty of two counts of attempted murder. 

As to the remaining charges, the jury most severely convicted defendant of two 
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counts of second-degree aggravated assault, comprising one count for each 

victim.

Judge Benjamin C. Telsey, who presided over the trial, sentenced 

defendant to an extended seventeen-year custodial term for one of the seconddegree aggravated assaults (count five), plus a consecutive nine-year term for 

the other second-degree aggravated assault (count eight). Both of those counts 

were subject to the parole ineligibility periods mandated by the No Early Release 

Act ("NERA"), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. The court also imposed a concurrent 

sixteen-month sentence for count four, the unlawful possession of a weapon. 

All other counts either merged or were dismissed. The aggregate sentence was

therefore twenty-six years, subject to NERA.

In his present PCR petition, defendant principally claims his trial attorney 

was ineffective by failing to object to jury charges that used the term "knife or 

machete type object," rather than the generic term "deadly weapon" contained 

in the model jury charges. Defendant further claims his appellate counsel on 

direct appeal was ineffective in not arguing that there were inconsistencies in 

the testimony of the State's witnesses. He also argues the trial court improperly 
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corrected a discrepancy in the judgment of conviction1 without scheduling a 

hearing at which he would be allowed to appear.

The judge who considered defendant's PCR application, Judge Sandra 

Lopez, denied it without an evidentiary hearing. The judge issued a written 

opinion on January 22, 2019. She first determined that defendant's 

ineffectiveness claims relating to the jury charge are procedurally barred under 

Rule 3:22. Turning to the merits, the PCR judge found defendant had presented 

no prima facie case of ineffectiveness by either trial or appellate counsel 

warranting relief or an evidentiary hearing.

II.

In appealing the PCR denial, defendant makes the following arguments:

POINT I 

MR. ROLLE WAS DENIED THE EFFECTIVE 

ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL COUNSEL IN 

VIOLATION OF THE UNITED STATES AND NEW 

JERSEY CONSTITUTIONS AND THE LOWER 

COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING OTHERWISE. 

1

 The judgment of conviction had incorrectly referred to "count six," on which 

he was acquitted, merging into the second-degree aggravated assaults, rather 

than count seven. 
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POINT II

THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THE ERRORS 

COMPLAINED OF RENDERED THE TRIAL 

UNFAIR.

POINT III

THE SENTENCE IMPOSED BY THE TRIAL COURT 

WAS IMPROPER, ILLEGAL AND/OR OTHERWISE 

UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

POINT IV

MR. ROLLE WAS DENIED THE EFFECTIVE 

ASSISTANCE OF APPELLATE COUNSEL ON 

DIRECT APPEAL. 

POINT V

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENYING MR. 

ROLLE'S PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION 

RELIEF WITHOUT AFFORDING HIM AN 

EVIDENTIARY HEARING.

Our appellate review of these arguments is guided by well-established 

principles. Pursuant to the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, 

a person accused of crimes is guaranteed the effective assistance of legal counsel 

in his defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). To 

establish a deprivation of that right, a convicted defendant must satisfy the twopart test enunciated in Strickland by demonstrating that: (1) counsel's 

performance was deficient, and (2) the deficient performance actually 
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prejudiced the accused's defense. Id. at 687; see also State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 

58 (1987) (adopting the Strickland two-part test in New Jersey). In reviewing 

such claims, courts apply a strong presumption that defense counsel "rendered 

adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of 

reasonable professional judgment." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. "[C]omplaints 

'merely of matters of trial strategy' will not serve to ground a constitutional claim 

of inadequacy . . . ." Fritz, 105 N.J. at 42, 54 (1987) (citations omitted).

Upon reviewing the record in light of these standards, we affirm the denial 

of defendant's PCR petition. We do so substantially for the sound reasons 

thoroughly set forth in Judge Lopez's thirty-one-page written decision. 

Although we do not rest on the procedural bars cited by the judge, we concur 

with her conclusion that defendant's arguments have no substantive merit and 

that an evidentiary hearing is unnecessary. We add only a few amplifying 

comments.

First, we join with Judge Lopez in rejecting defendant's argument that the 

jury charge was defective in describing the weapon used in the attack as "a knife 

or machete type object." The phrase tracked the language of the indictment. 

None of the charged weapons-related offenses here required the State to prove 

as an essential element the exact weapon defendant used, so long as it was 
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"deadly." See N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(2); Model Jury Charges (Criminal), 

"Aggravated Assault – Bodily Injury with Deadly Weapon (Purposely or 

Knowingly) (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(2))" (rev. Nov. 3, 2008) (a "deadly weapon is 

any firearm or other weapon, device, instrument, material or substance, whether 

animate or inanimate, which in the manner it is used or is intended to be used is 

known to be capable of producing death or serious bodily injury"). (emphasis 

added). 

In this case, the trial judge gave instructions on the definition of a deadly 

weapon nearly verbatim to the model charges on aggravated assault, including 

the fact that when giving the charge he omitted the "knife or machete type" 

weapon language for the more generic term "deadly weapon." By contrast, when 

giving the possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose instruction, the judge 

included the description of the weapon from the indictment in explaining that 

the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant possessed a 

weapon consistent with the indictment. He additionally included the "object as 

a weapon" portion of that charge. See Model Jury Charges (Criminal),

"Possession Of Weapon With A Purpose To Use It Unlawfully Against The 

Person Or Property Of Another (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4d)" (rev. Jun. 16, 2003)
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(explaining that the State must prove, where the weapon is unavailable, that 

"there was a weapon"). 

Although the weapon in this case was not recovered, we agree with Judge 

Lopez there was nonetheless "overwhelming proof," including the eyewitness 

accounts and the testimony of the hospital physician, that the device caused

"slicing-type injuries."

If anything, the insertion into the jury charge of the phrase "knife or 

machete type object" which tracked the wording of the indictment, added to the 

State's burden by making the description of the weapon more specific. Thus, 

the wording did not manifestly disadvantage defendant. 

Moreover, defendant's trial counsel competently objected to the medical 

witness's qualifications to determine the exact type of weapon used. The 

attorney did acknowledge at sidebar that the nature of the injuries were 

obviously from "a blade," and did his best to deal with that irrefutable fact in his 

arguments to the jury. 

Defense counsel also moved for a new trial based on the jury charge's 

"knife or machete type object" language. Although that motion was 

appropriately denied, its filing bespeaks the vigorous advocacy provided by 

defense counsel.
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Similarly, defendant's trial counsel was not ineffective with respect to the 

sentencing process. We have already upheld the sentence as non-excessive and 

appropriate on direct appeal. The clerical error in the judgment of conviction 

concerning counts seven and eight, which was since rectified in August 2016 

pursuant to Rule 1:13-1, did not require a resentencing hearing and defendant's 

presence in court. See State v. Matlack, 49 N.J. 491, 501-02 (1967). The PCR 

petition did not identify any meritorious reason to reopen the sentence.

We likewise reject defendant's claims that his appellate counsel was 

constitutionally ineffective. It would not have been fruitful for appellate counsel 

to argue the verdict should be set aside based on the weight of the evidence or 

matters of witness credibility. The jurors reasonably decided to believe the 

prosecution's witnesses, despite alleged inconsistencies in their accounts. A 

reviewing court considers whether "based on the entirety of the evidence and 

after giving the State the benefit of all its favorable testimony and all the 

favorable inferences drawn from that testimony, a reasonable jury could find 

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Williams, 218 N.J. 576, 594 (2014) 

(citing State v. Reyes, 50 N.J. 454, 458-59 (1967)). That deferential standard 

was surely met here.
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We further agree with Judge Lopez that no evidentiary hearing was 

warranted, because defendant's PCR petition failed to present a prima facie basis 

for relief. State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 462-63 (1992); see also State v. 

Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 354 (2013). 

All other arguments raised by defendant lack sufficient merit to warrant 

discussion in this opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).

Affirmed.