[Cite as State v. High, 2017-Ohio-8264.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

 )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF MEDINA ) 

STATE OF OHIO 

 Appellant 

 v. 

IAN E. HIGH 

 Appellee 

C.A. No. 17CA0019-M 

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT 

ENTERED IN THE 

MEDINA MUNICIPAL COURT 

COUNTY OF MEDINA, OHIO 

CASE No. 16 TRC 04875 

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY 

Dated: October 23, 2017 

 

CALLAHAN, Judge. 

{¶1} Appellant, the State of Ohio, appeals from the judgment of the Medina Municipal 

Court, granting Appellee, Ian High’s, motion to suppress. This Court affirms. 

I. 

{¶2} Close to midnight one evening, Sergeant Scott Schmoll was dispatched to a home 

on Stone Road because the man who lived there had threatened suicide. He arrived along with 

two other officers and found that the man’s daughter and her husband, Mr. High, also had 

responded to the scene. Mr. High sat in the driver’s seat of his truck with the engine running 

while his wife entered her father’s home. An officer then spoke with him and asked him to turn 

off his engine. Mr. High complied, but remained in the truck. Meanwhile, his wife, who was 

intoxicated, became disruptive and was asked to return to the truck and leave. Before she did so, 

the officer who had spoken with Mr. High notified Sergeant Schmoll that Mr. High also 
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appeared to have been drinking. The officer told Sergeant Schmoll to speak with Mr. High 

before allowing him to drive. 

{¶3} When Sergeant Schmoll spoke with Mr. High, he immediately detected the odor 

of alcohol on his breath. Mr. High admitted that he had consumed alcohol earlier that evening, 

so Sergeant Schmoll asked him to step out of the vehicle. The sergeant then performed field 

sobriety tests and observed multiple clues on each of the three tests he performed. Subsequently, 

Mr. High completed a breathalyzer test and was found to have a blood alcohol content in excess 

of the legal limit. 

{¶4} Mr. High was charged with having physical control of a vehicle while under the 

influence of alcohol, in violation of R.C. 4511.194(B)(1) and (B)(2). He filed a motion to 

suppress, and a hearing was held on his motion. Following the hearing, the trial court granted his 

motion. 

{¶5} The State now appeals from the trial court’s ruling on the motion to suppress and 

raises one assignment of error for this Court’s review. 

II. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 

THE MEDINA MUNICIPAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING APPELLEE’S 

MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE. 

{¶6} In its sole assignment of error, the State argues that the trial court erred when it 

granted Mr. High’s motion to suppress. Specifically, it argues that the totality of the 

circumstances supported the conclusion that Sergeant Schmoll had reasonable suspicion to 

conduct field sobriety testing. This Court disagrees. 

{¶7} A motion to suppress evidence presents a mixed question of law and fact. State v. 

Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8. “When considering a motion to suppress, 
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the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact and is therefore in the best position to resolve 

factual questions and evaluate the credibility of witnesses.” Id., citing State v. Mills, 62 Ohio 

St.3d 357, 366 (1992). Thus, a reviewing court gives deference to and “must accept the trial 

court’s findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence.” Burnside at ¶ 8, 

citing State v. Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 20 (1982). “Accepting these facts as true, the appellate 

court must then independently determine, without deference to the conclusion of the trial court, 

whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard.” Burnside at ¶ 8, citing State v. 

McNamara, 124 Ohio App.3d 706, 710 (4th Dist.1997). 

{¶8} “[A] police officer does not need probable cause to conduct a field sobriety test; 

rather, he must simply have a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.” State v. Slates, 9th Dist. 

Summit No. 25019, 2011-Ohio-295, ¶ 24. “‘Reasonable suspicion’ is more than an ill-defined 

hunch * * *.” State v. Hunter, 151 Ohio App.3d 276, 2002-Ohio-7326, ¶ 31 (9th Dist.). 

“‘[R]easonable suspicion exists if an officer can point to specific and articulable facts indicating 

that [an individual] may be committing a criminal act.’” State v. Osburn, 9th Dist. Wayne No. 

07CA0054, 2008-Ohio-3051, ¶ 9, quoting Wadsworth v. Engler, 9th Dist. Medina No. 2844-M, 

1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 5993, *9 (Dec. 15, 1999). “Reasonable suspicion is based on the totality 

of the circumstances.” State v. Hochstetler, 9th Dist. Wayne No. 16AP0013, 2016-Ohio-8389, ¶ 

10. 

{¶9} In reaching its decision, the trial court made each of the following findings. 

Sergeant Schmoll and Deputies Clinage and Telakto responded to a home shortly before 11:00 

p.m. because the man who lived there had threatened self-harm. The man’s daughter was also 

present, along with her husband, Mr. High. Mr. High remained seated in the driver’s seat of his 

truck and left it running until Deputy Clinage spoke with him and told him to turn it off. 
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Meanwhile, Sergeant Schmoll spoke with Mr. High’s wife, told her she was clearly intoxicated, 

and asked her to return to her husband’s truck and leave. Deputy Clinage then told Sergeant 

Schmoll that he “might want to check [Mr. High].” 

{¶10} When Sergeant Schmoll spoke with Mr. High, he detected the odor of alcohol on 

his breath. He then asked Mr. High about the odor, and Mr. High said he had “consumed ‘a few 

beers with dinner,’ and moments later that he had consumed ‘a couple beers.’” Sergeant 

Schmoll did not characterize the intensity of the odor or observe any other indicia of intoxication 

such as red, glossy, or bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, overly deliberate speech, or lack of 

coordination. Mr. High was cooperative during the encounter, and there was no evidence of any 

erratic driving, as Mr. High’s truck was parked. In granting the motion to suppress, the court 

concluded that “[t]he unspecified odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from an individual’s 

breath, combined solely with the admission of consumption of a few beers * * * does not create a 

reasonable and articulable suspicion that [he] has committed some criminal activity * * *.” 

{¶11} The State does not challenge any particular factual finding that the trial court 

made. Instead, it challenges the court’s ultimate legal conclusion. The State argues that, based 

on the totality of the circumstances, Sergeant Schmoll had reasonable suspicion to believe Mr. 

High was impaired and to subject him to field sobriety testing. Because the State limits its 

argument to the court’s ultimate legal conclusion, this Court accepts the trial court’s factual 

findings as true and considers the law as applied to those factual findings. See Burnside, 100 

Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, at ¶ 8. 

{¶12} Importantly, Sergeant Schmoll was the only witness to testify at the suppression 

hearing. The State did not call Deputy Clinage as a witness, so he was not there to explain what 

particular observations he made when he spoke to Mr. High. Moreover, Sergeant Schmoll did 
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not know what particular observations the deputy made. The trial court only found that Deputy 

Clinage told Sergeant Schmoll he “might want to check [Mr. High].” There was no evidence, 

therefore, that Deputy Clinage made any particular observations that would support a finding of 

impairment. 

{¶13} Though Sergeant Schmoll testified that he detected the odor of alcohol on Mr. 

High’s breath, the State never asked him to characterize the odor. Thus, he did not specify 

whether it was slight, moderate, or strong. Compare State v. Kodman, 9th Dist. Medina No. 

06CA0100-M, 2007-Ohio-5605, ¶ 1, 4 (strong odor of alcohol and admission to having 

consumed four beers provided reasonable suspicion); State v. Blackburn, 115 Ohio App.3d 678 

(7th Dist.1996) (strong odor of alcohol and admission to having consumed “a few beers” 

provided reasonable suspicion). Though Mr. High admitted to having “a few” or “a couple” 

beers, Sergeant Schmoll never asked him exactly how many beers it was or exactly when he had 

consumed them. Compare State v. Dierkes, 11th Dist. Portage No. 2008-P-0085, 2009-Ohio2530, ¶ 25 (defendant’s claim that he had stopped drinking almost seven hours earlier was a 

factor in support of reasonable suspicion where officer still detected a moderate odor of alcohol 

on defendant’s breath). The sergeant never testified as to any red, glossy, or bloodshot eyes, any 

slurred speech, any difficulties with coordination, or any belligerent behavior. Compare State v. 

Thayer, 9th Dist. Medina No. 11CA0045-M, 2012-Ohio-3301, ¶ 4, 29 (red, glassy eyes, strong 

odor of alcohol, and admission to having consumed four drinks provided reasonable suspicion). 

Further, he never testified that his suspicions were aroused as a result of any other factors such as 

the late hour, the fact that Mr. High’s passenger (i.e., his wife) was clearly intoxicated, or the fact 

that Mr. High chose to remain seated in his truck rather than accompany his wife inside or 

voluntarily interact with the officers. The only evidence the State presented was that Mr. High’s 
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breath smelled of alcohol and he admitted to drinking “a few” or “a couple” of beers at some 

earlier point. 

{¶14} This Court has held that even a mild odor of alcohol can provide reasonable 

suspicion for field sobriety testing when paired with other factors such as a traffic infraction, 

bloodshot eyes, and an admission to having consumed two beers. See State v. Tomko, 9th Dist. 

Summit No. 19253, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 5133, *8-9 (Nov. 3, 1999). Yet, this Court cannot 

conclude that the result is the same when an unspecified odor of alcohol is paired strictly with an 

admission to having had a few beers. “For better or worse, the law prohibits drunken driving, 

not driving after a drink.” (Emphasis sic.) State v. Taylor, 3 Ohio App.3d 197, 198 (1st 

Dist.1981). Accord State v. Reed, 7th Dist. Belmont No. 05 BE 31, 2006-Ohio-7075. Likewise, 

it is only a crime to be in physical control of a vehicle while under the influence. R.C. 

4511.194(B)(1). The fact that Mr. High had been drinking was not enough to subject him to 

field sobriety testing. If Sergeant Schmoll suspected that Mr. High was impaired, it was his duty 

to substantiate his hunch by asking additional questions. See Hunter, 2002-Ohio-7326, at ¶ 31. 

Similarly, if the State had other evidence that Mr. High was impaired (e.g., any testimony 

Deputy Clinage might have given), it was the State’s duty to present that evidence at the hearing. 

Neither Sergeant Schmoll, nor the State acted to ensure proof of reasonable suspicion. 

{¶15} This Court in no way condones the act of drinking and driving, but the law 

criminalizes the act only if an individual indulges to the point of intoxication or impairment. See 

Taylor at 198; Reed at ¶ 18, 27. Based on the record before this Court, the State simply did not 

produce enough evidence to show that Sergeant Schmoll possessed “‘specific and articulable 

facts indicating that [Mr. High] [was] committing a criminal act.’” Osburn, 2008-Ohio-3051, at 

¶ 9, quoting Engler, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 5993, at *9. See also State v. Davis, 140 Ohio 
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App.3d 659, 664-665 (9th Dist.2000). Without more, this Court has no choice but to conclude 

that the trial court acted properly when it granted Mr. High’s motion to suppress. The State’s 

sole assignment of error is overruled. 

III. 

{¶16} The State’s sole assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of the Medina 

Municipal Court is affirmed. 

Judgment affirmed. 

 

 There were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

 We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Medina Municipal 

Court, County of Medina, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy 

of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27. 

 Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of 

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the 

period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is 

instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the 

mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30. 

 Costs taxed to Appellant. 

 

 LYNNE S. CALLAHAN 

 FOR THE COURT 
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CARR, P. J. 

TEODOSIO, J. 

CONCUR. 

APPEARANCES: 

J. MATTHEW LANIER, Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellant. 

DAVID C. SHELDON, Attorney at Law, for Appellee.