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Ru le 23 or derfiled NO. 5-09-0389 July 14, 2010; Mot ion t o pu bli sh gr an ted I N THE July 29, 2010. AP PE LLA TE C O U R T O F IL LIN O IS FI FTH DI STRI CT

________________________________________________________________________ LESLI E HAN SON, as the Admi nistrator of the ) Appeal f

rom the Estate of Brian R. Waters , Deceased, ) Circuit Co urt of ) Madison County. Plaintiff-A ppella nt, ) ) v. ) No. 08-MR-658 ) LUMLEY TRUC KING, LLC, and ) GENERA L CA SUA LT Y COMPANY OF ) ILLI NO IS, ) Ho nora ble ) C lar en ce W . H ar ris on II, Defendants-Appellees. ) Jud ge, p resid ing.

________________________________________________________________________ JUST ICE ST EW ART delivered the op inion o f the co urt: L eslie Han son, as the a dministrator of the estate of B rian R. W aters, decease d (t h e estate), appeals f

rom the ent

ry of a j udgment on t

he pleadi ngs i n favor

of the d efendant insurance company, G eneral Casualty Company of Illinois (Ge neral Casualty) . The tri al court determined that

the ins urance policy i ssued to t he defendant , LumleyTrucking, LLC (Lumley), unambiguo usly barred th e s tac kin g or agg re gat io n o f u nd er in su re d- mo to ris t (U IM )
cove rage because the declar ations page of t he insur ance poli cy lis tedthe U IM co verage on ly
once. On appe al, H anso n argue s that the trial cou rt erred in ruling tha t the po licy pro hibits the s tackingof the UIM cov erag e. We aff irm

. BACKGR OUND In De cemb er 20 07, B rian W aters, w hile employ ed by Lumley, was invol ved i n a motorvehi cle acci dent with Dal e Phill ips. Waters died as a r esult of inj uries sustained in the accid ent. Phil lips 's vehi cle was ins ured by Progressi ve Insurance Company (Pr ogres siv e) with liabi lit y limits of

$50 ,000 per p erson and $ 100 ,000 per ac ciden t. After the accid ent,2

Progressi ve paid the e state its po licy l imit o f $5 0,0 00 t o se ttle th e es tate's c laim aga ins t Phillips. On November 19, 2008, t he estat e fil ed a complai nt for declar atory r elie f, al leg ing that th e insur an ce poli cy that General Casual ty had is sued to L umley, which cov ered the vehicle W aters was driv ing at the time of t he accident , all owed the estate to recover up to $1 mill ion. The est ate ar gued that the policy provide d a $40,000 li mit of liability fo r its U IM
cove rage for each of

the 25 v ehicl es covered by the policy but did not pr ohibit

the st acki ng
or a ggre gat io n o f th at c ove ra ge. H en ce , th e e sta te a rgu ed th at t he po lic y p ro vid ed U IM
cove rage i n the amount of $40,000 times 25 vehi cles f or a tot al of $1 mi lli on. The defen dants fil ed an answ er and a cou ntercla im, see king an adjudica tion tha t the po licy did not all ow its U IM co ver age to be sta cke d. Ad di tio na lly , th e d ef en da nt s a lle ged th at n o U IM
cove rage applie d bec ause the esta te had alread y bee n paid $50,000, which was $10,00 0 more th an th e li mi t o f U IM covera ge under t he General Casual ty poli cy for t he vehi cle i nvolv ed in the a ccide nt. On Ma rch 6, 20 09, G eneral Ca sualty filed a motion fo r a judgment on the p lead ings in its favor . The estat e fil ed a r espo nse to that motion and r equested a judgment

on the pleadings in its favor. On June 23, 2009, the tri al cour t entere d an o rder fin ding tha t the ca se w as "rea dily subject to" a ju dgmen t on the plead ings sinc e neith er party had id entified any d isputed fact. The court f

ound that t

he " dete rmi nativ e issue " was whether the UIM coverag e for t he 25 vehi cles in the Gener al Casual ty poli cy could st ack i n order t o provi de the estate with $1 million in UIM covera ge. Th e cou rt ruled a s follow s:

"The General Cas ual ty p olicy con tains a sin gle lin e on its de clara tion page sett ing f orth a shorthan d identification of '46' (which cross -references a se t of 2 5 vehicles). While this declar ation may be ' tantamount' to many thing s (as plaintiff3

ar gues), it is facially a single line with a single id entificatio n of a single am oun t o f U IM covera ge. S imply bec ause plaintif f can sug gest

creat ive possibi lities f or it s meaning do es not rend er this policy amb iguous." (Em phasis in original.) The tri al court

ruled t hat the declar ations page was not ambiguous and creat ed no confli ct with other provisions of the policy. Th e court found that the UIM endorsement

spec ifically incorpor atedthe unambi guous decl arati ons sheet and specif

ical ly prohibited stac king. According ly, t

he court granted Gener al Casualty' s moti on for a j udgment on t he p lead ings and denied t

he estat e' s moti on for a j udgment on t he pleadi ngs. Thi s appeal f ollowed. AN AL Y SIS The parti es do not r aise any i ssues of fact but argue only abouthow to inter pret t he insurance policy. The only iss ue is whether the poli cy, proper ly c onstrue d, all ows the stacking of the UI M coverage, a questi on of law for which our review is de novo

. Hobbs v. Hartford Insurance Co. of the Midwest , 214 Ill. 2d 11, 17 (2005). Th e gener al rul es that govern the interpret ation of other t ypes of contra cts also g overn t he inte rpret ation of insurance c ontracts. Hobbs , 214 I ll. 2d at 17. When we interpr et an i nsurance pol icy, our primary go al is t o ascert ain and g ive effect to the parti es' intention as expr essed i n the language of the po licy. Hobbs , 214 I ll. 2d at 17. The t erms of t he polic y are to be applie d
as writt en unless the poli cy language i s ambiguous orcontravenes p ublic policy. Hobbs , 214 Ill. 2d at 17. "Whether an amb iguity exists turns on w hether the po licy language is subject to mo re than one reasonabl e inte rpret ation. Although 'cr eati ve poss ibil iti es' may be sugg ested, only reasonab le interpretations will be co nsidered. Br uder v. Country Mutual InsuranceCo. , 156 Ill. 2d 179, 1 93 (199 3). T hus, we will not s train to fi nd an ambiguity where none exists." Hobbs , 214 Ill. 2d at 17. Policyter

ms that limit an insur er' s li ability are to be libe rally constr ued in fav or of the4

insure d, but this rul e of construction comes into pl ay o nly if the policy langua ge is ambiguous. Hobbs , 214 I ll. 2d at 17. The estat e acknowled ges that m ost cas es in which t he court ha s found that an insu ran ce p olicy allow s stac king h ave done so on the bas is that the language of t he polic y
was ambiguous because the declaration sh e et listed m ore tha n on e vehicle with sepa rate
covera ges and sep arate premium s. E.g. , John son v . Da vis , 377 Ill. App. 3d 602, 608-09 (2007) (w here the decl arati on sheetlisted the limits of liab ility sepa rately fo r each vehicle
covere d under the p olicy, there w as a conflict w ith other pro vis ions i n the poli cy, which creat ed an am biguity that w as reso lved in favo r of th e ins ure d, a llow ing th e grea ter co verage provi ded by stacking) . Alt hough the inter

pretation of an insurance policy mus t be conduct ed
on a case-by- case basi s, the mannerin which the insurance company li sts t he covera ge on its declar ation s heet prov ides i mportant infor mation t hat is specif

ic to t he polic yholder. See Johnson , 377 Il l. App. 3d at 609. In Johnson , thi s court found that s ta ck in g w a s all owed underthe poli cy bec au se the limi ts of the UIM coverage were list ed four separate ti mes, "once for each vehicle cov ered," and four separate premiums for t he UIM co verage were also listed on the dec larations sheet. Johnson , 377 Ill. App. 3d a t 609. The pertinent pr ovisions of t he General Casual ty poli cy at i ssue in t his cas e are as follows: Und er

"I TEM TWO–S CHEDUL E OF COVERAGES AND CO VE RE D AU TO S," there is a columnar li st of t he cover ages, covere d autos, l imit s, and premiums. I n the row associ atedwith "UNDERINS URED MOT ORISTS ," t he number

"46" a ppear s inthe c olumn assigned to cov eredautos. Under the column heading"LI MIT–THE MO ST WE W IL L PAY FOR ANY ON E AC CID EN T O R LO SS" is the figur e "$4 0,00 0." T he es tate refer s us to t he "TRUCKERS COVERA GE FO RM ," in w hich th e num ber "4 6" ap plies to " Specific ally Described'Autos,' " which are furt her de scribed as "[o] nly thos e ' autos'described in I tem Three of the D eclara tions fo r wh ic h a prem ium charge is shown." "ITEM TH REE " is a5

sche dule of the 25 cov ered aut os, in whichvehicle numb er "022," the one that the decedent
was driv ing at the time of t he accident , is l ist ed. I n the "I TEM TH REE" schedule, the colum ns refe rencin g vehicle 0 22 in dicate the amount s associ atedwith the v arious kinds of premiums, covera ges, and deductibles appl icabl e to that ve hicle : $2,251 for liabi lit y, $9 for

" UM- UI M" (uninsured-underinsured) covera ge, $248 for compre hensiv e cover age, $1, 207 forcolli sion cov erage , and $1,000 each f or the deduc tibl es for t he compreh ensiv e an d colli sion cov erage . T he estat e argue s that

because GeneralCasualty c hose to r eferenc e the covere d vehic les in it em two of the dec laration sheet by the desi gnat ion 46, which i s a shortha n d refer ence to 25 separ atel y lis ted v ehicl es, that desi gnat ion creat es an ambiguity in the poli cy. The estat e concludes that by us ing t he number 46 to r eferenc e all the 25 covered v ehicles, itshould b e allowed to add or stack the $ 40,000 UIM coverage fo r vehi cle 022 to the $40,000 U IM covera ge for each of the remaining 24 ve hicle s cover ed under the policy. This argument

is conf usingto fol low because i t is neithe r a reas onable i nterpr etat ion of t he polic y language nor sup ported by any case law. "The touchst one when determi ning whether an ambig uity exi sts r egarding a n insurance policy is wh ether th e relevan t portion is subje ct to mo re than one r easo nable inter pretation, not whether c reative poss ibil iti es can be suggested." Pekin I nsurance Co. v. Esta te of Goben , 303 Il l. App. 3d 639, 646 (1999). The t rialcourt cor

rectly determined that the policy' s use of t

he number "46" as a shorthand identi fication of t he 25 cover ed vehi cles
was not an invitation to m ultip ly o r stac k the U IM c over age fo r all th e veh icles even tho ugh only one of them was i nvolv ed in the accident at issue. R ather, the court determined, and
we agree , that

the only reasonable inter pretation of t

he polic y was that t

he UIM coverag e was listed in "a single line with a single identification of a single am ount of U IM coverage." We agree with the t

rialcourt t

hat the ambiguity the e stat e urges us to find does not6

exist. T ha t i s p ar ti cu la rl y o bv io us in li gh t o f t he po li cy 's inclus ion of an antist acki ng clause which is clear and un ambiguous. In the se ction of the po licy entitled "Limit of Insurance," the poli cy pro vi des as fol lows: "Regardl ess o f th e numb er of co vered 'autos,' ' insureds,' premiums paid , cl aims ma de [, ] o r v eh ic le s i nv ol ve d i n the ' ac ci de nt ,'th e m os t we will pay forall damages r esult ing f rom any one 'acc ident' is the Li mit of insurance for Underi nsured Motorist Co verage sh ow n in this endorsement ." Since the UI M coverage i s li sted as $40,000 only one time , t here is no re ason able w ay to in terpret th e polic y as a llow ing the es tate to stack the cov erage for al l the covere d vehi cles f or the unf

ortunat e injuries and death that resulted from this acc ident. Our ruling in th is regard is firmly supported by the case law. In Bruder v. Coun try MutualInsurance Co. , 156 I ll. 2d 179, 19 2 (1993 ), the Illinois Suprem e Cou rtposit ed that it"wo uld n ot be d ifficult to fin d an a mbig uity" where an insur ance poli cy lis ted the uninsure d- or underinsured-motorist coverage amounts and premiums sep arate ly for each vehicle covere d under the pol icy. Where that occurs, it is "rea s onable t o assume that the parti es intende d " that, in ret urn for t he premiums paid, an equa l amount of uninsure d- or underinsured-motorist

covera ge may be st acked f or any one accide nt, re gardl ess of langu age indicatingotherw ise in the policy. Bruder , 156 Ill. 2d at 192-93. Since the unins uredmotoristcov erag e was lis ted only one time in the poli cy at i ssue in Bruder , eve n th ough sepa rate premiums w ere listed fo r each v ehi cle co vered, th e cou rt foun d that " [t]he o nly reasonabl e inte rpret ation" was that the pol icy p rov idedonly t he amount

li ste d the one t ime foreach person injured r egardl ess of t he numberof v ehicl es insured or premiums paid. Bruder , 156 Il l. 2d at

193-94. Based up on these facts, the court ruled t hat, as there was no amb iguity in the li mitation-of -li ability prov isi on, it

was to be appli ed as written, and no aggregation or stacking of coverage wou ld be allow ed. Bruder , 156 Ill. 2d at 194. The case law since Bruderhas f oll owed the same line of reasoni ng when considering7

whetherto all ow the stacking of uninsured- or underinsure d-motor ist covera ge. In Estate of Goben , the court

reli ed upon the Bruderdecisi on and fou nd t hat, bec aus e the UIM cove rage
was set forth two times, o nce fo r each covere d vehic le, there we re tw o po ssible inter pretations of

the policy, which requir ed the pol icy to be stri ctly c onstrue d agai nst the insurer, so that stacking was allow ed. Estate of Goben , 303 I ll. App. 3d at 648-49; see also Profittv. OneBeacon Insurance , 363 I ll. App. 3d 959, 963 (200 6) (t he ex is te nc e o f t wo declar ations pages attach ed to the ins urance pol icy did not rais e an ambiguity entitl ing t he insu red to st ack t

he limits of l iabil ity pr ovide d on those t wo pages because the second decla ration p age w as inclu ded o nly to show that one vehi cle had been a dded to the policy to replace ano ther, and th e liability lim its we re iden tical and not listed sepa rately for each vehicle). Even in cases such as this, whe re the UIM coverage limits are lis ted only onc e but the prem iums fo r that co verage are listed sep arately with eac h co vered vehic le, c our ts ha ve found no ambiguity that allows f or sta cki ng. S ee Prude ntial Property & Ca sualty Insurance Co . v. K elly , 352 Ill. App. 3d 8 73, 876 (2004). CONCL USI ON For all t he reasons stat ed, we affir m the trial c ourt' s order

entering a j udgment in favor of General Casua lty.

Affi rmed.

GO LDE NH ER SH, P.J., a nd W EX STTE N, J., co ncur.NO. 5-09-0389 I N THE AP PE LLA TE C O U R T O F IL LIN O IS

FI FTH DI STRI CT

___________________________________________________________________________________ LESLI E HAN SON, as the Admi nistrator of the ) Appeal f

rom the Estate of Brian R. Waters , Deceased, ) Circuit Co urt of ) Madison County. Plaintiff-A ppella nt, ) ) v. ) No. 08-MR-658 ) LUMLEY TRUC KING, LLC, and ) GENERA L CA SUA LT Y COMPANY OF ) ILLI NO IS, ) Ho nora ble ) C lar en ce W . H ar ris on II, Defendants-Appellees. ) Jud ge, p resid ing.

___________________________________________________________________________________ Rule 2 3 O rder F iled: July 14, 2010 M otion to Publish Gra nted: July 29, 2010 Opini on Fi led : July 29, 2010

___________________________________________________________________________________ Justi ces : Honorable B ruce D. Stewart, J.

Honorable Richar d P. Goldenhersh, P.J., and Hon orable Jame s M . W exstten, J., Concur

___________________________________________________________________________________ Attorn ey David E . Leefers, Leefers Law Office, 21 0 No rth W est Street, Jacksonville, IL for 62650 Appe llant

___________________________________________________________________________________ Attorn ey Michael J. Bedesk y, Reed, Armst

rong, Gorman, Mudge & Morrissey, P.C., 115 for North Buchanan, P.O. Box 368, Edwardsvi lle, IL62025 Appell ees

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