## I L L I N O I S 

## O F F I C I A L 

## RE P O R T S Appellate Court

People v . Y oung , 2013 IL App (2d) 120167

Appellate Court Caption THE PEOPL E OF THE STATE OF I L L I NOI S, Plaintiff-Appe l lee, v. NI COL E L . YOUNG , Def endant- Appellant.

District & N o. Second District Docke t No. 2-12-0167

Filed September 24, 2013

Held (Note : Thi s syl lab us

con s t it ute s no par t of the opi nio n of the cour t but has bee n pre

par ed b y the Repo rt er of D e c i s i o n s f

o r t h e

c o n v e n i e n c e o

f t h e

rea der

. ) Although the trial court err ed in failing to proper ly instruct the jury on the limit ations ap p licable to the use of other-c rimes evidenc e and the
prosec utor improperly bolstered the cre dibilit y of the police office rs who testified during closing arguments, those err ors di d not amount t o plain

err or that would require reve rsal of defe ndant’s convic tion for unlawf ul possession of coc aine.

Dec ision Under
Review Appea l from the Circuit C o u rt of Kane County
, No. 10-CF- 2414; the Hon. Patricia P. Golden, Judge , presiding

.

J udg ment Affir med.Counsel on

Appea l Thomas A. L ilien and J ack Hildebra nd, both of State Appellate Def ender ’s Off

ice, of Elg in, for appe llant.

J oseph H. McMahon, State’s Attorney
, of St. C h ar les (L awr ence M. Ba uer and Matthew J

. Schmidt, both of State’s Attorney s Appellate Prosecutor’ s Offic e, of c ounsel), for the People.

Panel J USTI CE Z ENOF F de livered the judgme nt of the cour t, with opinion.
J ustices Hudson and B irkett conc urre d in the judgme nt and opinion.

OP INION

¶ 1 Def

endant, Nicole L

. Young
, appea ls her conviction of unlawful possession of less than 15 g rams of coca ine (720 I L CS 570/402(c) (West 2010)). She contends that it was plain err or when (1) the court allowed the jury to hear evidenc e of other crimes involving possession of drug s and then g ave a li m i t i ng instruction that the evidenc e could be considere d as to her knowledge an d “possession,” and (2) the State improperly bolstered the cre dibilit y of the testifying police office rs during closing arguments. We de termine that both wer e err or, but not plain error . Acc ording ly , we a ffirm.

¶ 2 I . BA CKGROUND ¶ 3 Def

endant was char g ed in connec tion with events that occur red on September 24, 2010, in which s h e was seen parking her vehicle outside of a house, her passeng er enter ed the house for approximate l y three minutes, and coca ine was later found in the g love
compar tment of her ve hicle. Be fore trial, defe ndant moved in limine to e x clude statements she m ade to police officer s about her previ o u s dru g use and about drug purchase s she had previously made from the resident of the house. The State noted that the matter was one of constructive possession and arg ued that the evidenc e could be used to show knowledg e. The
court held that it would allow the evidenc e and would g ive a limit ing instruction that it could be considere d only on the issues of knowledg e and possession. The court specific ally asked if defe ndant wanted an instruction derive d from I llinois Pattern J ury Instructions, Criminal, No. 3.14 (4th ed. 2000) ( here inafter , I PICriminal 4th No. 3.14) that informed the jury that the evidenc e was rec eived o n o nly the issues of defe ndant’s knowledg e and possession. Def endant’ s counsel stated “ that’s cor rec t.” A jury

trial was then he ld. ¶ 4 Elg in police detec tive J ames Bisce g lie testified about his qualifications and that he had previously participated in about 400 investigati o n s and over 300 or 350 arr ests, including work with fede ral ag encie s. On September 24, 2010, he and his partne r, Be th Sterricke r, wer e

-2-in an unmarked surveillance vehicle. Bisce g lie saw defe ndant park in front of a house on

Four th Street and saw a man, later identi fi ed as M i ch ael Mallory
, in the passeng er seat. Mallory g ot out of the vehicle and enter ed the house. About three minut es l at er , Mallory
returne d to the vehicle. Bisce g lie believed that narc otics ac tivity had taken place and he
contac ted Elg in police offic er B ernie Ba jak to assist in stoppi ngthe vehicle

. ¶ 5 Ba

jak stopped the vehicle when defe ndant pulled into a g as station. Ba jak testified that Mallory was s t an d i n g outside of t he vehicle wit h the door open and that there wer e st acks of money on the passeng er seat. The g love compar tment was open, and Mallory shut it, but he put the money in his pockets. Mallory then strug g led with Ba jak fo r a moment, while defe ndant re mained in the drive r’s seat. ¶ 6 Bisce g lie arr ived a few minutes later, sear ched Mallory
, and found $300 and mar ijuana in his pockets. Bisce g lie then talked to defe ndant, who, when as k ed
, said that she did not have a ny thing illeg al in the vehicle

. Def endant g ave permission to se arc h and, in the g love
compar tment, B isceg lie found a coca ine pipe and six small pa ckets of coca ine, which later

wer e tested a

nd found to weigh 1.3 g rams. In the ce nter c onsole, he found a rose tube with a dark s m u d ge o n i t and a piece of st eel wool inside. Bisce g lie testified t hat t his would be used for smoking c ocaine

. ¶ 7 The State called S t er ri ck er t o t est ify about statements defe ndant made to the police. Be fore she testified, the State reminded the court that she would provide the statements that

wer e previously objected to. The court then said “[s] o I would rea d this befor e,” and defe nse counsel said “ [y ]es.” The c ourt then told the jury : “I have an instruction to rea d befor e this witness. It is a cautionar y instruction. And it is that evidenc e may be rec eived that the defe ndant has been involved in conduct other than that char g ed in the indictment. This evidenc e will be rec eived on the issue of the defe ndant’s kn o wl edg e and possession and may be considered by you only for those limited purposes. I t is for y ou to deter mine whether the defe ndant was involved in that conduct, and if so, what weight should be g iven to this evidence on the issues of knowledg e and posse ssion.” ¶ 8 Sterricke r testified that, afte r defe ndant was arr ested and taken to the police station, she told office rs that she knew the man who lived in the house wher e the drug s wer e purcha sed. Def endant said that the man’s name was Vanc e and that she had purcha sed marijuana from him in the past. Def

endant said that she had rec ently moved back to I llinois from Florida
, had begun purcha sing both marijuana and coca ine from Vanc e, and had done so within three day s of the arr est. She also smoked marijuana and coca ine during that period. Def endant said that she and Mallory went to Vanc e’s house on September 24 to purcha se marijuana
, but she did
not know about the coca ine. The interview was not rec orded, and Sterricke r did not write a repor t. Bisce g lie wrot e a re p ort that purportedly included statements from defe ndant, but Sterricke r stated on cross, without additional explanation, that she did not trust that what he put in his report was a ccur ate. ¶ 9 Def

endant testified and denied knowledg e of the coca ine. She testified that Mallory was her boy friend, that he had previously used coca ine and heroin, but that, until the arr est, she thought he was clea

n. She said that she allowed Mallory to use her vehicle three to four times

-3-per wee k when she was not with him and that he had used it within a wee k of the arr est. On

September 24, 2010, she picked up her salary of $330 in cash, and she and Mallory went to buy $25 worth of marijuana from Vanc e. She and Mallory did not discuss purcha sing

coca ine. S he did not see Mallory open the g love compartme n t an d to her knowledg e there

was no coca ine or drug para pherna lia in her vehicle. W hen she pulled into the gas stati o n, she asked Mallory to fill up the vehicle and g ave her money to him. When Ba jak pulled up, she saw the glove compartment open and saw M al l o ry s hut it, but she di d not see him put any thing inside of i t

. De fe n d ant said that she allowed the office rs to sear ch her vehicle beca use she did not believe that there was any contra band inside of it and she assumed that Mallory put the marijuana in his pocket. However, defe ndant also said that she told the office rs that they

would find some marijuana

. ¶ 10 Def

endant sa id that she told the police that she tried coca ine when shewas 16 a nd that she rec ently boug ht and s m o k ed m ar ijuana. She told the police that she thought Mallory boug ht the coca ine from Vanc e beca use Mallory had rec ently moved to the are a and Vanc e

was the only person he knew. Sterricke r wa s t h en called as a rebuttal witness and she

rea ffirme d that defe ndant said that she had p re viously boug ht both marijuana and coca ine from Va nce. ¶ 11 Du ring closing arguments, with reg ard to the evidenc e of other condu ct , t h e S t at e discussed constructive possessi o n an d circ umstantial evidenc e, rec ited the limit ing instruction, and told the jury : “Now what does that mean? That means that you can take t h e evidenc e and the
t est imony by Detec tive Be th Sterricke r that the Def endant was–whe n she was interviewe d, drove and knew why she wa s dri ving to her drug supplier’s house, the evidenc e that she has smoked both coca ine and marijuana in the past three day s, the fac t that she has boug ht coca ine and marijuana from him befor e, that g oes to the knowledg e and possession. That g oes to why the Def endant knowing ly

possessed the c ocaine .” ¶ 12 The S t at e th en s t re ssed that defe ndant was guilty of unlawful possession of coc aine beca use she and Mallory both posse ssed it. The State later repe ated the idea that defe ndant
must have known that the drug s wer e in the vehicle, beca use of the things that had happene d in the past. ¶ 13 The State a lso refe renc ed B isceg lie’s experienc e and the n said:

“[A]l l of that g oes to why Detec tive Bisce g lie and Detec tive Sterricke r do what they did. They ’ve been trained on this. Two to three minutes at the house, out-of-state plates that made them suspicious. They ’re pretty g ood at what they do. They found drug s in the car

. They knew e x actly

what happe ned.” ¶ 14 In response to an ar gument that the offic ers lied, the State a rgued:
“The best thing I can say about that, if an Offic er is g oing to g et on the stand and take an oath, and they ’re g oing to lie, why not make it a g ood one? Why not g et up there on the stand–they ’re g oing to risk perjury
, risk their car eer , risk ever y thing to put her awa

y for whateve r–why

don’t they

just sitthere and say , ‘He y , we f ound the drug s on her.’ ” ¶ 15 There wer e no objections to the State’s comments in closing

. Wit hout objection, the trial
court g ave the jury the limit ing instruction ag ain befor e delibera tions. The court also

-4-instructed the jury on the defin i t ion of constructive possession and instructed that closing

arguments are not evidenc e. The jury found defe ndant guilty
, and she moved for a new trial,
arguing that the court err ed in allowing evidenc e of her prior drug use and purcha ses. She did
not argue that the limit ing instruction was improper. The motion was denied, and defe ndant
appea ls.

¶ 16 I I . ANALYSI S ¶ 17 A. Other -Crimes Instruction ¶ 18 Def

endant conce des t h at s h e did not object to the jury instruction, but contends that it was plain err or for the court to instruct the j ury that th e ev i d en ce of other crimes could be considere d on the issues of knowledge and possession. She arg ues that the use of t he term “possession” was the same as instructing the jury that it could use the evidenc e to e stablish her pr opensity

to commit the crime of unlaw ful possession of coc aine. ¶ 19 Both an objection at trial and raising th e i s s u e i n a p o sttrial motion are nece ssary to prese rve the issue for appellate review. See People v. Herron
, 215 I ll. 2d 167, 175 (2005). Howeve r, “[u] nder the plain-er ror doctrine, this court will revie w forf eited challeng es when: (1) a clea r o r o b v i o u s er ror occur

red and the evidence is so closely balanc ed that the error alone threatene d to tip the s cale s of j ustice aga ins t t he defenda nt; or (2) a clear or obvious

err or occur

red, and the err or is so serious that it aff ecte d the fairne ss of the defe ndant’s trial and the integ rity of the judicial proce ss, reg ardle ss of the closene ss of the evidenc e.” People v. Taylor , 2011 I L110067, ¶ 30. ¶ 20 “[U]nder I llinois Supreme Court Rule 451(c) (ef f. J uly 1, 2006), wher e a jury instruction suffe rs fr o m a s ubstantial defe ct, claims of err or are not subject to forf eiture on appea l.” People v. Johnson
, 2013 I L App (2d) 110535, ¶ 76. “An err oneous instruction constitutes a substantial defe ct, or plain err or, when the instruction cre ated a serious risk t h at the defe ndant was incorre ctly convicted beca use the jury did not understand the applicable law,

so as to threaten the fundame ntal fairne ss of the defe ndant’s trial.” Id

. Also, “ ‘[w] hen there is err or i n a cl ose case , we choose to err on the side of fairne ss, so as not to convict an innocent person.’ ” Id

. (q u o ting Herron
, 215 I ll. 2d at 193). Thus, in this context, “[p] lain

er ro r arises in two circ umstances: (1) when the flawe d instruction was provided in a ca s e wher e the evidenc e was closely balanc ed or (2) when t he fl aw i n the i nstruction is ‘grave ’

or so serious that it denied the defe ndant a substantial rig ht and undermined the integ rity of the judicial proc ess.” Id. (citing Herron , 215 I ll. 2d at 178-79). ¶ 21 The defe ndant has the burden of persua sion under both prong s of the plain-er ror analy sis. People v. Lewis
, 234 I ll. 2d 32, 43 (2009). Be fore deter mining whether plain err or occur red, howeve r, we first deter

mine whether erro r o ccur red at all. Id. I f err or did occur , we then consi d er whether either prong of the plain-er ror doctrine has been satisfied. People v. Sargent , 239 I ll. 2d 166, 189-90 (2010). ¶ 22 “Ot h er -c rimes evidenc e encompa sses misconduct or criminal acts that occur red e ither befor e or afte r the alleg ed criminal conduct for wh i ch the defe ndant is standing trial.” Johnson
, 2013 I L App (2d) 110535, ¶ 61. “Other -cr imes evidenc e is admissible to prove any

m at er i al fac t rele vant to the case [citation]
, but is inadmissible if it is rele vant only t o

-5-demonstrate the defe ndant’s propensity to eng ag e in criminal activity [citation] .” Id. “Such

evidenc e may be admissible when it is rele vant to show, among other things, motive, intent, identity
, absenc e of mistake or acc ident, modus operandi
, or the exis tence of a common plan

or desig n.” Id. “Howe ver, rele vant other- cr imes evidenc e may y et be excluded if its prejudicia l effe ct substantially outweighs its probative value.” Id. ¶ 23 Her e, defenda nt does notdispute that the evidenc e wa s admissible to show knowledg e and intent. Instead, she takes issue with the limit ing instruction, which said that the evidenc e could show “posse ssion” when possession wa s the crime c harg ed. ¶ 24 “Jury instructions g ive the jurors the corr ect principles of law applicable to the fac ts so they can rea ch a corr ect conclusion acc ording to the l aw and the ev i d en ce

. ” Id. ¶ 68. “In a criminal case , the applicable I llinois Pattern J ury Instruction ‘shall be used, unless the court deter mines that it doe s not a ccur ately state the law.’ ” Id. (quoting I ll. S. Ct. R. 451(a ) (ef f. J uly 1, 2006)). “In deter

mining the adequa cy of instructions, a revie wing court will consider all the instructions as a whole to asce rtain if they fully and fa irly

cover the law.” Id. ¶ 25 I PICriminal 4th No. 3.14 provides as follows:

“[1] Evidence has been rec eived that the de fenda nt[ s] [ (has) (have )] been involved i n [(an offe nse) (off

enses) (conduc t)] other than [(that) (those)] charg ed in the [(indictment) (information) (c omplaint)]. [2] This evidenc e has been rec eived on the issue[s] of the [(defenda nt’s) ( defe ndants’)] [(identification) (pre sence ) (intent) ( mo ti v e ) ( d e s ig n ) ( k n o w le d g e ) (

_

_ _ _) ] and may be conside red by

you only for that limited purpose. [3] It is for y o u t o d et ermine [whether the defe ndant[s] [(was) (we re) ] involved in [(that) (those)] [(offense ) (off enses) (conduc t)] and, if so,] what weight should be g iven to this evidence on the issue[s] of ____.” ¶ 26 There does not a ppear to be any I llinois authority addre ssing the use of “possession” in the limit ing instruction. Howeve r, we have addre ssed an instruction that mistakenly allowed a jury to consider e vidence for pur poses of showingpropensity

. ¶ 27 In Jo h n s o n , we held that the use of a defe ctive jury instruction reg ardingother-c rimes evidenc e was plain err or. Johnson
, 2013 I L App (2d) 110535, ¶ 76. There
, the defe ndant was char g ed with two counts of unlawful possession of a wea pon by a felon, which alleg ed that he knowing ly possessed a firea rm and ammunition. He was also charg ed with d o m es tic battery

. We deter

mined that evidenc e of previous threats was admissible to show intent and lack of mistake with reg ard to the battery charg e. By statute, some of the evidenc e could also
arguably have been admissible to show propensity as to the battery charg e. Howeve r, the trial
court did not narr owly tailor the limit ing instruction to those purposes and instead listed “ ‘intent, motive, desig n, knowledg e, ab s en ce o f m istake, and propensity .’ ” Id. ¶ 35. We deter mined that this was err or, since the jury was wr ong ly

instructed that it could consider the evidenc e for propensity even as to the wea pons charg es. We then deter mined that it was plain err or beca

use, re g ardle ss of the closene ss of the evide nce, the err or was so g rave that it denied the defe ndant a fair trial and undermined the integ rity of the judicial proce ss. Id. ¶ 76. ¶ 28 Her e, it was err or not to specific ally tailor the instruction to the rea sons the evidenc e was

-6-proper ly admitted. Gi ven that defe ndant was charg ed with “possession,” and that the

instruction told the jury that it could use the evidenc e to deter mine “possession,” the instruction implied that the evidenc e could show propensity

. Thus, we d et ermine that the failure to tailor the instruction to explain the proper use of the evidenc e was err or. The next question, howeve r, is whether it amounted to plain error

. ¶ 29 Def

endant first argues that the case depende d on the cre dibilit y of the witnesses, making the evidenc e close ly

balanc ed. We disagree

. ¶ 30 “T o sustain a char g e of possession of a controlled substance, the State must pro v e t h e defe ndant had knowledg e of the prese nce of an illicit s ubstance and that the substance was in his i m m ed i at e and exclusive control.” People v. Carodine
, 374 I ll. App. 3d 16, 24-25 (2007). The elements of possession can b e proved by circ umstantial evidenc e. S ee People

v. Chavez
, 327 I ll. App. 3d 18, 25 (2001). “[K]nowledge may be established by evidenc e of

ac t s , d ecla

rations or conduct of the defe ndant from which it may be inferr ed that t h e defe ndant knew of the exis tence of the narc otics.” Id. at 24. “ ‘[T] he mere prese nce of illega l drug s on premises which are under the control of the defe ndant g ives rise to an infere nce of knowledg e and possession sufficie nt to sustain a conviction absent other fac tors which might

cre ate a rea sonable doubt as t o the defendant’s guilt.’ ” Id. at 26 (quoting People v. Smith
, 191 I ll. 2d 408, 413 (2000))

. Undisputed control of a vehicle g ives rise to an infere nce of the defe ndant’s knowledg e of the pre s en ce o f contra band inside of that vehicle. See id. Fur thermore
, possession may be joint. See People v. Ingram
, 3 8 9 I l l. App. 3d 897, 901 (2009). Mere acc ess by others does not defe at a f inding of constructive possession. People v. Bui , 381 I ll. App. 3d 397, 424 (2008). ¶ 31 Her e, the c ase w as not closely balanc ed. The State prese nted evidence that the cocaine

was found inside of defe ndant’s vehicle afte r she was seen parke d briefly outside of a house, and she admitte d t h at she knew that Mallory had purcha sed drug s inside. She further admitted that she had pr eviously purcha sed both coca ine and marijuana fr om the occupa nt of t he house and that she had used co ca i n e and marijuana within the past wee k. When the vehicle was st opped, defenda nt saw t h e g love compartment open and saw Mallory shut it. The coca ine was found in the g love compar tment, an d u s ed para

pherna lia for smoking

coca ine was also found in the vehicle. Meanwhile, defe ndant’s evidenc e was mere ly her selfserving testimony that she had not admitted buying coca ine from Vanc e and that she thought that Mallory had purcha sed only marijuana

. Given defe ndant’s undisputed contro l o f the vehicle a nd the other c ircumstantial evidenc e, the c ase w as not close. ¶ 32 As to the second prong , its purpose is to gua rd ag ainst err ors that er ode the integrity of the judicial proce ss and undermine the fairne ss of the defe ndant’s trial. Sargent
, 239 I ll. 2d
at 190-91. “Unlike the first prong , prejudice need not be established. Rather, beca use of the importance of the rig ht involved, prejudice is presumed.” Id. at 191. “The err oneous omission of a jury instruction rises to the level of plain err or only when the omission cre ates

a serious risk that the jurors incorre ctly convicted the defe ndant beca use they did not understand the applica

ble law, so a s to se vere ly threa ten the fairne ss of the trial.” Id. “This standard is a difficult one to meet.” Id. For example, “it is not nece ssarily plain err or to omit the definition of a term used to instruct the jury on the essential issue in the case .” Id. “Eve n

an incorre ct instruction on an element of the offe nse is not nece ssarily reve rsible err or.” Id.

-7-¶ 33 Her e, while the instruction ha d the potential to be confusing
, the err or was not a s g rave

as it was in Johnson
, wher e the jurors wer e specific ally told that they could use the evidenc e to find the defe ndant guilty based on propensity

. Standing alone, the instruction here

cer tainly prese nted a problem, and we caution the State and the trial court to be more car eful when prese nting limit ing instructions in the future. Howeve r, the instruction was not g iven in a vacuum. At trial, defe ndant denied knowledg e of the cocaine. The jury wa s prese nted

w it h th e definition of constructive possession, and the State noted the limit ing instruction an d
argued how the other-c rimes evidenc e could s h o w d ef endant’ s knowledg e and thus her constructive possession. There fore
, the dang er was g reatly lessened that the jury mistakenly thought that it could use the evidenc e for propensity

. Acc ording ly
, in the context of the entire

case , we cannot say that the err or cre ated a serious risk that the jurors incorre ctly convicted defe ndant beca

use they did not understand the applicable law, so as to sever ely threaten the fairne ss of the trial.

¶ 34 B. ClosingArguments ¶ 35 Def

endant next argues that it was plain err or for the court to allow the State to bolster the testimony of the off icer s during closing arguments by ref err ing to their credentials a nd the risks they would fac e by

lying. ¶ 36 “Dur ing closing arguments, a ‘p ro s ec utor may comment on the evidenc e and any fair,

rea sonable infere nces it yields.’ ” People v. Syke s , 2012 I L App (4th) 111110, ¶ 45 (quoting People v. Nicholas
, 218 I ll. 2d 104, 121 (2005))

. “A court will rever se a judgme nt be cause of improper closing arguments only if the defe ndant identifies remark s made by the
prosec utor that wer e (1) improper and (2) so prejudici al t hat real justice was denied or t he jury may have r eac hed its verdict be cause of the e rror .” Id. ¶ 37 “The prosec utor may comment on a witness’s cr ed i b i l i t y o n l y if the rema rks are fair infere nces from th e ev idence .” People v. Barraza
, 303 I ll. App. 3d 794, 797 (1999). To deter mine whether

a prose cutor’s c omment is proper , courts must view it in contextof the entire closing argument. Syke s , 2012 I L App (4th) 111110, ¶ 47. “Challeng ing a witness’s

cre dibilit y may invite a prosec u t o r t o respond, but it does not g ive the prosec utor carte blanche to make up evidenc e during closing argument.” Id. ; see People v. Rivera
, 277 I ll. App. 3d 811, 820-21 (1996) (re versible e rror occur red when the pr osecutor, in r esponse to defe nse counsel attacking the cr ed ibilit y of a State witness, arg ued that the witness was putting his life at risk by testifying beca use the defe ndant was a known g ang member, when no evidenc e wa s prese nted that the witness fe are d for his life)

. ¶ 38 In People v. Adams
, 2 0 1 2 I L 1 1 1 1 6 8
, ¶¶ 2 0 -2 3
, our supreme court held that it was improper for the State to comment to the jury that police office rs should be believed beca use they would not risk their jobs by lying on the witness stand, but that the comments did not amount to plain err or. There
, the defe ndant was indicted for unlawfu l p o s s essi on of a controlled s ub s t an ce. During closing argument, the State commented to the jury that, if it believed the defe ndant’s case , it would have to believe that the two police office rs involved

wer e risking t hei r cre dibilit y , their j obs, and their fre edom over 0.8 g rams of coca ine. The State repe ated the conce pt during rebuttal and also commented that one of the office rs was

-8-an 81⁄2 -year veter an of the sheriff ’s depar tment and that the other was a 5-year veter an of the fore st prese rve police. The defe ndant appea led his conviction, arguing in part that the State’s
comments constituted plain err or and require d reve rsal of his conviction beca use they wer e

so prejudicia l. The appellate court agree d and reverse d. Peo p le v. Adams
, 403 I ll. App. 3d 995, 1008 (2010), rev’d, 2012 I L111168, ¶ 31. ¶ 39 T h e s up re m e co u rt agr ee d that the comments wer e improper as i m p erm i s s i b l e speculation, since no evidenc e was introduced at tr i al fr om which it could be inferr ed that the offic ers would r isk their car eer s if they testified fa lsely . The State a lso impl ied that the office rs we re m o re cre dible solely beca use they wer e police office rs, which violated the principle that a prosec utor may not argue that a witness is more cre dible beca use of his or her
status as a p o l i ce office r. Adams
, 2012 I L 111168, ¶ 20. Howeve r, whil e it agree d that the
comments wer e improper, the supreme court disag ree d with the appellate court’s conclusion that the comments amounted to plain err or. The court revie wed the evidenc e and deter mined that it was not closely balanc ed; it also noted that the jurors had been proper ly instructed that counsels’ arguments wer e not evidenc e and th at they wer e the judge s of the witnesses’

cre dibilit y

. See id. ¶¶ 22-23. There fore
, the supreme court conclude d that, though improper, the prosec utor’s comments wer e not inflammatory e noug h to have threatened to tip the scale s of justice ag ainst the defe ndant. See id. ¶ 23. The supreme court al s o co n cluded that the
prosec utor’s comments did not rise to the l evel of aff ecting the fairness of the defendant’s trial and the integrity

of the judicial proc ess. See id. ¶ 24. ¶ 40 Her e, the S tate did not prese nt evidenc e that a poli ce office r would be at risk of losing his or her job or being charg ed with perjury if he or she l ied on t he st and. By emphasizing their cre dentials, the State also indicated that the police office rs wer e more cre dible simply beca use they wer e police office rs. Acc ording ly
, under Adams
, the State’s comments wer e improper. Thus, the ne x t question is whether the e rror amounts to plain error

. ¶ 41 As to the first p ro n g, d efendant argues that the case was closely balanc ed beca use it depende d upon the cre dibilit y of the witnesses. As previously noted, howeve r, defe ndant’s self-se rving denial of knowledg e was overwhelmed by the State’s evidenc e. Thus, we are unable to deter

mine that the improper comments threatened to alter the outcome of the case

. ¶ 42 As t o t h e s ec o n d prong , defe ndant argues that the err or, compounded with the erro r reg arding the other-c rimes evidenc e, aff ecte d the fundame ntal fairne ss of her trial. In Adams
, the supreme court held that the prosec utorial comments, simil ar to those in this case , did not amount to second- prong plain err or. Id. Howeve r, there is some prec edent for finding plain

err or when multipl e err ors have occur red i n a ca s e. See, e.g. , Johnson
, 2013 I L App (2d) 110535, ¶ 81; Syke

s , 2012 I L App (4th) 111110, ¶ 56. While the err ors in this case trouble
us, we ultimately conclude that, even when combined, they do not amount to pl ai n er ro r. When the context of the entire case is c onsidered, we do not be lieve that the err ors beca me

so serious that they aff

ecte d the fairne ss of defe ndant’s trial and the integ rity of the judicial
proce ss.

¶ 43 I I I . CONCLUSI ON ¶ 44 The trial court err ed whe n it failed to properly tailor the limiti ng instruction on the us e

-9-of other-c rimes evidenc e. The State also improperly bolstered the cre dibilit y of the testifying

police office rs during closing arguments. Howeve r, the err ors do not constitute plain err or. Acc ording ly , the judg ment of the c ircuit court of Kane County

is affirme d.

¶ 45 Affir

med.

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