J-S67016-14 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee 

v. 

SCOTT ISAAC BOWRA 

 Appellant No. 330 WDA 2014 

Appeal from the PCRA Order February 20, 2014 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0010997-2007 

BEFORE: DONOHUE, J., MUNDY, J., and FITZGERALD, J.* 

MEMORANDUM BY MUNDY, J.: FILED DECEMBER 09, 2014

Appellant, Scott Isaac Bowra, appeals from the February 20, 2014 

order, denying relief in response to his self-titled “Post-Sentence Motion,” 

which we deem to be a denial of a motion filed pursuant to the Post 

Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.1 After careful 

review, we affirm, albeit on a different basis than that relied on by the trial 

court. 

We summarize the procedural history of the case as determined from 

the certified record as follows. On May 13, 2008, a jury found Appellant 

____________________________________________ 

*

 Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. 

1

 As discussed more fully within, Appellant purports to appeal from a 

February 6, 2014 judgment of sentence. As we conclude Appellant’s 

characterization of the procedural posture of this case is faulty, we have 

amended the caption to reflect the true position of this appeal. 
J-S67016-14 

- 2 - 

guilty of possession of a controlled substance, possession of a controlled 

substance with intent to deliver (PWID), and conspiracy.2 On August 28, 

2008, Appellant was sentenced to an aggregate sentence of five to ten 

years’ incarceration followed by two years’ probation. Specifically, Appellant 

received three to six years for the PWID count, a consecutive two to four 

years for the conspiracy count, and a consecutive two years’ probation on 

the possession count. On direct appeal, this Court vacated the sentence and 

remanded because the trial court had not conducted a full suppression 

hearing in response to Appellant’s omnibus pre-trial motion. See 

Commonwealth v. Bowra, 13 A.3d 987 (Pa. Super. 2010) (unpublished 

memorandum). On remand, the trial court, after a full hearing, denied 

Appellant’s suppression motion and reinstated the original sentence on 

January 3, 2011. Appellant again appealed, and this Court affirmed the 

judgment of sentence on May 4, 2012. See Commonwealth v. Bowra, 50 

A.3d 233 (Pa. Super. 2012) (unpublished memorandum). Appellant did not 

seek allowance of appeal from our Supreme Court. 

On December 20, 2012, Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition. 

Counsel was appointed and an amended PCRA petition was filed on January 

31, 2013. Therein, Appellant raised the legality of his sentence for the 

failure of the trial court to merge the possession of controlled substance and 

____________________________________________ 

2

 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16), (30), 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903, respectively. 
J-S67016-14 

- 3 - 

PWID counts. The PCRA court agreed and provided the following relief on 

February 14, 2013. 

[Appellant’s] PCRA Petition is GRANTED to the extent 

that an amended sentencing order shall be entered, 

which shall sentence the Petitioner as follows: Count 

1: Possession of a Controlled Substance (Heroin) 

with Intent to Deliver Said Controlled Substance, 3

to 6 years incarceration; Count 2: Possession of a 

Controlled Substance (Heroin), merged for purpose 

of sentencing with Count I; and, Count 3: Criminal 

Conspiracy, 2 to 4 years of incarceration to be 

followed by a consecutive period of 2 years 

probation. 

PCRA Court Order, 2/14/13, at 1. No appeal was taken from the PCRA 

court’s February 14, 2013 order. 

 On February 10, 2014, Appellant filed a counselled post-sentence 

motion. Therein, Appellant references the trial court’s issuance, on February 

6, 2014, of “a Form DC-300B Court Commitment State of County 

Correctional Institution” that he purports resentenced Appellant in 

accordance with the February 14, 2013 PCRA order. Appellant’s PostSentence Motion, 2/10/14, at 3-4, ¶ 17. In his post-sentence motion, 

Appellant sought modification of his sentence in consideration of his 

rehabilitative efforts since his initial 2008 sentencing. Id. at 4 ¶ 18. The 

trial court denied Appellant’s post-trial motion, without hearing or 

accompanying reasons, on February 20, 2014. 

 Appellant filed a notice of appeal on February 27, 2014, purportedly 

from the “judgment of sentence—amended February 6, 2014.” Appellant’s 
J-S67016-14 

- 4 - 

Notice of Appeal, 2/27/14, at 1. Although not ordered to do so, Appellant 

filed a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to 

Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(b) contemporaneously with 

his notice of appeal. The trial court filed its Rule 1925(a) opinion on July 14, 

2014, addressing the merits of Appellant’s discretionary aspects of 

sentencing issue. 

 On appeal, Appellant raises the following issue for our review. 

1. Whether the [trial court] failed to consider—in 

light of [Appellant’s] conduct since imposition of the 

August, 6, 2008 sentence in this matter—all of the 

factors contained in 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9721(b) and/or 

9781(d) prior to denying [Appellant’s] February 10,

2014 Post-Sentence Motion? 

Appellant’s Brief at 4. 

 We first address the Commonwealth’s contention that the trial court’s 

apparent treatment of Appellant’s post-sentence motion as timely filed is 

erroneous. Commonwealth Brief at 9. The Commonwealth asserts 

Appellant’s characterization of the trial court’s issuance of Pennsylvania 

Department of Corrections form DC-300B as a sentencing order is not 

correct.3 Id. at 9, n.7. We agree. 

 The DC-300B form is not a court order imposing a sentence. It serves 

as a commitment form addressed to the Department of Corrections. 

____________________________________________ 

3

 We note the DC-300B form referenced by Appellant in his notice of appeal 

and appellate brief is not contained in the certified record. 
J-S67016-14 

- 5 - 

Form DC–300B is a commitment document 

generated by the Common Pleas Criminal Court Case 

Management System. See 37 Pa.Code § 96.4; 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9764. Section 9764 of the Judicial Code 

sets forth the procedure associated with transfer of 

an inmate into DOC custody and provides that, on 

commitment of an inmate, the transporting official 

must provide the DOC with a copy of the trial court’s 

sentencing order and a copy of the DC–300B 

commitment form. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9764(a)(8). 

Commonwealth v. Heredia, 97 A.3d 392, 394 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2014). 

 The amended sentence in this case was imposed on February 14, 

2013, by the PCRA court’s order granting relief and pronouncing the new 

sentence. “As a practical matter... a defendant begins to serve his or her 

sentence immediately after the pronouncement of sentence. The 

pronouncement of sentence is not merely informational. It is the actual 

imposition of penalty.” Commonwealth v. Nahavandian, 954 A.2d 625, 

630 (Pa. Super. 2008), quoting Commonwealth v. Green, 862 A.2d 613, 

620 (Pa. Super. 2004). Accordingly, Appellant’s post-sentence motion was 

untimely. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(A)(1) (requiring a post-sentence motion to 

be filed within 10 days of the imposition of sentence). Further, absent the 

filing of a timely post-sentence motion, any direct appeal from the judgment 

of sentence must be filed within 30 days of the date of the imposition of the 

sentence. Id. at 720(A)(3); Pa.R.A.P. 903(c)(3). Additionally, a sentencing 

court loses jurisdiction to modify a sentencing order more than 30 days after 

it is entered or after an appeal has been filed. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5505. 
J-S67016-14 

- 6 - 

 In light of the above, the Commonwealth recognizes that we must 

determine whether Appellant’s self-titled post-sentence motion should have 

been treated as an untimely post-sentence motion or as a PCRA petition. 

Commonwealth’s Brief at 9. If treated as an untimely post-sentence motion, 

Appellant’s appeal should be quashed as patently untimely, depriving this 

court of jurisdiction. “[T]he timeliness of an appeal implicates our 

jurisdiction and may be raised sua sponte.” Commonwealth v. Trinidad, 

96 A.3d 1031, 1035 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citations omitted). We note again 

that a timely appeal must be filed within 30 days of the imposition of a 

judgment of sentence. Pa.R.A.P. 903(c)(3). The period for filing an appeal 

may not be enlarged by this Court. Id. at 105(b). 

 However, this Court has previously treated filings, raising discretionary 

aspects of sentencing claims, entered after the direct appeal period has 

expired, as PCRA petitions. See Commonwealth v. Taylor, 65 A.3d 462, 

465-468 (Pa. Super. 2013) (recognizing “that an untimely post-sentence 

motion filed after finality of judgment is to be treated as a PCRA petition[]”), 

citing Commonwealth v. Evans, 866 A.2d 442, 443 (Pa. Super. 2005), and

Commonwealth v. Guthrie, 749 A.2d 502, 503 (Pa. Super. 2000).4 

____________________________________________ 

4

 The Taylor panel recognized a tension between its holding and the holding 

in Commonwealth v. Wrecks, 934 A.2d 1287 (Pa. Super. 2007) 

(concluding the trial court properly treated Wrecks’ filing, after his sentence 

was final, as an untimely post-sentence motion). Taylor criticized Wrecks

for essentially ignoring Evans and Guthrie and relying on cases with 

analyses that are no longer applicable. See Taylor, supra at 467, n.4. 
J-S67016-14 

- 7 - 

Accordingly, we conclude the trial court should have treated Appellant’s selftitled post-sentence motion as a timely PCRA petition.5

 Instantly, as noted above, Appellant filed a counseled motion, and said 

counsel continues to represent Appellant. Thus, there is no need to remand 

for appointment of counsel. Cf. Evans, supra, Guthrie, supra (remanding 

for appointment of counsel when trial court failed to treat untimely pro se

post-sentence motions as PCRA petitions). We therefore proceed to 

determine if the trial court’s order denying relief is nevertheless proper when 

Appellant’s motion is viewed as a PCRA petition. “[W]e, as an appellate 

court, are empowered to affirm [the PCRA court’s] decision on any ground 

without regard to the ground relied upon by [the PCRA court] itself.” 

Commonwealth v. McKeever, 947 A.2d 782, 786 (Pa. Super. 2008) 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

We reiterate the following principles guiding our consideration of an 

appeal from the denial of PCRA relief. 

“On appeal from the denial of PCRA relief, our 

standard and scope of review is limited to 

determining whether the PCRA court’s findings are 

supported by the record and without legal error.” 

Commonwealth v. Edmiston, 65 A.3d 339, 345 

(Pa. 2013) (citation omitted)[, cert. denied, 

Edminston v. Pennsylvania, 1345 S. Ct. 639 

____________________________________________ 

5

 There being no direct appeal, Appellant’s amended sentence became final 

on March 16, 2013, 30 days after its imposition on February 14, 2013. See

Pa.R.A.P. 903(c)(3). Accordingly, Appellant had until March 16, 2014 to file 

a timely PCRA petition, unless an exception to the one-year time 

requirement applies. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b). 
J-S67016-14 

- 8 - 

(2013)]. “[Our] scope of review is limited to the 

findings of the PCRA court and the evidence of 

record, viewed in the light most favorable to the 

prevailing party at the PCRA court level.” 

Commonwealth v. Koehler, 614 Pa. 159, 36 A.3d 

121, 131 (2012) (citation omitted). “The PCRA 

court’s credibility determinations, when supported by 

the record, are binding on this Court.” 

Commonwealth v. Spotz, 610 Pa. 17, 18 A.3d 

244, 259 (2011) (citation omitted). “However, this

Court applies a de novo standard of review to the 

PCRA court’s legal conclusions.” Id.

Commonwealth v. Medina, 92 A.3d 1210, 1214-1215 (Pa. Super. 2014) 

(en banc). Further, in order to be eligible for PCRA relief, a petitioner must 

plead and prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his conviction or 

sentence arose from one or more of the errors listed at 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 9543(a)(2). These issues must be neither previously litigated nor waived. 

Id. § 9543(a)(3). “A claim is waived under the PCRA if, inter alia, it could 

have been raised on direct appeal.” Commonwealth v. Price, 876 A.2d 

988, 993 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 897 A.2d 

1184 (Pa. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 902 (2006). 

 Instantly, Appellant’s sole issue is a challenge to the discretionary 

aspect of his sentence. Appellant’s Brief at 12. This issue was not raised in 

a timely post-sentence motion or a timely direct appeal. Consequently, the 

issue is “previously waived” and relief under the PCRA is unavailable. See

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(3); Price, supra. As no claim cognizable by the 

PCRA has been advanced by Appellant in his counselled February 10, 2014 

motion, we conclude the denial of relief by the trial court was legally correct. 
J-S67016-14 

- 9 - 

 In sum, we determine that Appellant’s characterization of the trial 

court’s issuance of the Department of Corrections form DC-300B as an 

imposition of sentence is mistaken. We conclude the trial court should have 

treated Appellant’s counselled motion as a petition filed pursuant to the 

PCRA. We nevertheless affirm the trial court’s decision to deny relief on the 

alternative ground that Appellant failed to assert a claim cognizable under 

the PCRA. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s February 20, 2014 order 

denying relief, albeit on other grounds. 

 Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 12/9/2014 
J-S67016-14 

- 10 -