[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 21-10062

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

JOSEPH NORMAN BROWN, III, 

Individually, and on behalf of others similarly 

situated, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

WAYNE IVEY, 

Sheriff, in his individual and official capacity, 

MIKE DEMORAT, 

Chief Deputy Sheriff, in his individual and official 

capacity, 

JANE DOE, 

Law Library Clerk, 

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2 Opinion of the Court 21-10062

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 6:20-cv-02158-WWB-EJK

____________________

Before NEWSOM, LUCK, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Joseph Brown sued several prison officials under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 for violating his constitutional rights while he was held in 

pretrial detention in Brevard County, Florida. The district court 

dismissed his complaint without prejudice because he failed to 

state a claim upon which relief could be granted. We affirm.

I 

 Brown alleged that prison officials “hinder[ed]” his “ability 

to pursue non frivolous legal claims” by “limiting the amount of 

legal material an inmate can obtain.” Pl.’s Compl. at 12–13. The 

district court screened Brown’s complaint, see 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(a), and sua sponte dismissed it because Brown failed to allege that he had suffered an actual injury, see 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) (“[T]he court shall dismiss the case at any time if 

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21-10062 Opinion of the Court 3

the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state 

a claim on which relief may be granted.”).1

Brown appeals that dismissal, contending that it was error 

for the court to dismiss his complaint without granting him the opportunity to amend. We affirm because (1) the district court did 

not err in determining that Brown’s complaint failed to plead facts 

sufficient to state a claim for relief, and (2) the court didn’t abuse 

its discretion in dismissing the complaint without prejudice rather 

than affording Brown the opportunity to amend.

II 

To allege facts sufficient to state a claim, the plaintiff must 

“plead[] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).2 To state a 

§ 1983 claim arising from the denial of meaningful access to the 

courts, an inmate must assert “an actual injury,” by demonstrating 

that his “efforts to pursue a nonfrivolous claim were frustrated or 

impeded by a deficiency in the prison library or in a legal assistance 

1 The district court initially did not specify whether the dismissal was with or 

without prejudice. But when it denied Brown’s motion for reconsideration, it 

confirmed that its earlier dismissal was without prejudice. 

2 We review “[a] district court’s sua sponte dismissal for failure to state a claim 

under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) . . . de novo, viewing the allegations in the complaint 

as true.” Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1159–60 (11th Cir. 2003).

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4 Opinion of the Court 21-10062

program or by an official’s action.” Barbour v. Haley, 471 F.3d 

1222, 1225 (11th Cir. 2006). 

Brown acknowledges that he did not assert “an actual injury” necessary to state a claim. In fact, he candidly admits that his 

complaint “stated only mere generalized injuries and did not specify those injuries.” Appellant’s Br. at 15. Therefore, as Brown concedes, the district court correctly concluded that the complaint 

failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Rather than challenging the bottom-line conclusion that his 

complaint was deficient, Brown instead contends that the district 

court should have afforded him an opportunity to amend his complaint to cure those deficiencies. We review the district court’s sua 

sponte decision to dismiss—rather than instructing the plaintiff to 

amend his complaint—for abuse of discretion. Cf. Baez v. Banc 

One Leasing Corp., 348 F.3d 972, 973 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) 

(“We review for abuse of discretion the district court’s decision to 

deny the motion for leave to file an amended complaint.”).

“[B]efore the district court dismisses [an] action with prejudice”—and “where a more carefully drafted complaint might state 

a claim”—it “must” afford “a pro se plaintiff . . . at least one chance 

to amend the complaint.” Silberman v. Miami Dade Transit, 927 

F.3d 1123, 1132 (11th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up) (emphasis added). 

And a court might face a similar obligation “where the dismissal is 

without prejudice, but the applicable statute of limitations probably bars further litigation.” See Boazman v. Econ. Lab’y, Inc., 537 

F.2d 210, 213 (5th Cir. 1976) (stating that when the statute of 

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21-10062 Opinion of the Court 5

limitations is likely to preclude further litigation, “the standard of 

review of the District Court’s [nonprejudicial] dismissal should be 

the same as is used when reviewing a dismissal with prejudice”).

Neither of those circumstances is present here. As stated 

above, the dismissal was without prejudice. And the applicable 

statute of limitations—which, for a § 1983 claim brought in Florida, 

is four years, Chappell v. Rich, 340 F.3d 1279, 1283 (11th Cir. 

2003)—does not “probably bar[] further litigation,” Boazman, 537 

F.2d at 213. The earliest possible date that Brown’s cause of action 

accrued is January 3, 2019—the date his incarceration began. That 

gives him until at least January 3, 2023 to re-file his complaint.

Accordingly, the district court’s sua sponte dismissal—

which was without prejudice, and which leaves Brown ample time 

to re-file his claim—was not an abuse of discretion.

AFFIRMED. 

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