### IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT KNOXVILLE May 21 , 2002 Ses sion

STATE OF TENN ESSEE v. ROGER D ALE QUILLEN

Direct Appeal from the Criminal Court for Sullivan County

No. S42,442 Phyllis H. Miller, Judge

No. E2001-01411-CCA-R3-CD January 8, 2003

The appellant, Roger

Dale Quillen, was convicted by a jury in the

Criminal Court of Sulli van County of ag gr av at ed bu rg la ry, felony murder
, premeditated first degree murde r, and simple assault. The trial court merged the

murder convictions and sentenced the appellant to an effective sentence of life imprisonme

nt. On appe al, the a

ppellant asserts t hat he es tablished

the aff irmative defense of insanity by clear and convincing evidence and, therefore, he should have been found not guilty by

reason of in sa ni ty. After a

caref ul revie w of the r

ecord a nd the par ties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial cou rt.
Tenn. R. App.P. 3 Appe al as of Right ; Judgme nt of the Cr

iminal Court is Affirm

ed.

N ORMA M C G EE O G LE , J., de livered the opinion of the court, in which T HOM AS T. W OODA LL and J OHN E VERE TT W IL LI AMS , JJ., joined.

Kenneth F. Irvine, Jr., Knoxville, Tennessee (on appe al), and Larry Dillow and R ichard H opson, Kingsport, Tennessee (at trial), for the appellant, Roger Dale Quillen.

Paul. G. Summers, Attorney Genera l and Repo

rter; An gele M. Grego

ry , Assistan

t Attorne y General ; H. Greeley

Wells, Jr., District Attorney General; and B arry Staubus and G ene Perri n, Assistan t District Attorneys Gene

ral, for the appellee, State of Tennessee

.

OPINION I. Fact ual Backgro

und At approxima

tely 7:00 a.m. o n Decem

ber 6, 19 98, the ap

pellant w ent to his father’s house on Bloomingdale Pike in Kingspo rt, Tenne ssee, to d

iscuss put ting a mo bile home on prope rty ownedby h

is father in Scott County, Virginia. After his father rejected the idea , the appellant went
to his own house, retrieved an axe and two rifles, and returne d to his father’s house. The appellant then used the axe to break through the back door and gain access into the house. As the appellant entered the house, his father approached him to ask what he wa nted. However, b efore his father could finish his sentence, the appellant loaded a round into the chamber of the rifle and shot his father in the chest. His father fell to the floor.1 Because the victim and two witnes ses share the l ast name “Quillen” and two witnesses share th e l ast name “Pre sley,” we have elect ed to ut ili ze fi rst names for the purpos e of brevi ty. We intend no dis respect by thi s procedure.

-2- Wayne Presley, Jr., whowas living withthe appellant’s father at the time, heard the commotion in the kitchen a nd, upon e

ntering the room, saw “fir

eworks”as the ap

pellant’ s father

fell
to the floor. Wayne 1 begged the appellant, “no, Rog er, no,” but t he app ellan t did not ac knowl edge Wayne as he reloaded the gun

and shot his father a

second time. Wayne then plea ded, “Roger, L

ord, please don’t shoot me.” The appellant turned to Way ne and said, “I’m not g oing to hurt you, I love you, I’m n ot goi ng t o sh oot you.

. . . I’ m g oing to go over, and I ’m going to shoot Ly nn, and I’m going to shoot myself, and tell Susan, she can ha ve it all.” As the ap pell ant left the house, he retrieve d the axe and told Wayne, “[Y]ou can call L ynn too if y

ou want to try to save his life.” Wayne called 911.

The appella

nt drove a pproximate

ly thirteen miles to his brother

Ly nn’s mobile

home in Scott County, Virginia. When h e arrived, he parked his truck behind an old bar n so that the vehicle could not be seen from his brother’s home. The appellant then wa lked up t o the mobile homeand used the axe to break the window in the door. Ly nn heard a “loud crash” and got out of bed to investigate. After arming himself with a loade d shotgun, Ly nn observed his brother coming around the corner toward the master be droom. Ly nn pointed his shotgun at the ap pellant a nd told him, “[S]urely

to God, a little piece of property ain’t worth all of this.” The appe

llant, who had his gun to his side, said, “[P]lease, brother , don’t k ill me.” L

ynn told the a

ppellant to lay down his weapon and the appellant complied.

The brothers sat down on the couch and the appellant informed Ly

nn that he had shot and killed their father. The appellant then asked L ynn to take him outside and shoot him, but Ly nn refused. At that time, the phone rang. I t was the Scott County Sheriff’s Depa rtment calling to warn Ly nn that his brother

was on the way

to his home to harm him. Ly nn informed the authorities that the appellant

had already

arrived and the dispatcher instructed L ynn to keep the a

ppellant calm until the officers arrived. The offi cers arr ived fifteen minutes later. The appellant coopera ted as the officers took him into custody, telling the m to “go ahead and treat me as the murde rer I am.” The officers took possession of the appellant’s rifle and the ammuni tion fou nd in the pockets of the appellant’s jacket. The officers also recovered a loaded .22 rifle from the appe llant’s truck.

The appellant’s father died as a result of the gunshot wounds. On March 17, 1999, the Sullivan Cou

nty grand jury charg ed the ap

pellant in a four- count pre sentment with aggravated burgla ry , felony murder, premeditated fir st degr ee murde r, and ag grava

ted assa ult.

At trial, L ieutena nt Damon C. Gordon of the Sullivan County Sheriff’sDepartment testified that

he was the first officer to arrive at the a ppellant’s father’s house on December 6, 1998. Upon entering the house, Lieutenant Gordon observe d damage to the door and saw the appellant’s father laying in the floor with gunshot wounds to the neck and chest. The para medics, who had already arrived, alerted L

ieutenant Gordon that the appellant’s father was de ad. Except for the-3-

dama ge to the door, Lieutenant Gordon observed no signs of struggle and recovered no weapons

. Lie ut en an t G or do n f ou nd a s he ll ca si ng lyi ng ne ar th e b od y.

Wayne Presley, Jr., testified tha

t at the time of the shooting he was living with the appellant’s father in order to care for him and his y ard. Wayne wa s dating the app ellant’s si ster, Susan, at that time and at the time of trial he and Susan were married. Way ne recalled that when he first observed the appellant that morning, the appellant appe ared “very angry , . . . eyes in the

back of his head.” However, after shooting his fa ther, the appellant looked as though “a ton of bricks fell off him.” Wayne acknow ledged th at the relationship between the appellant and his father wa s strained. Wayne testified that the appe llant did not say any

thing about hearing voices commanding him to shoot his father.

On cross-examination, Wayne testified that the appellant’s father intimidated and controlled Susan and would not allow her to marry Wayne. Moreover, the appellant’s father was not kind to the appellant. Although Way ne described the appellant as nice and gentle, he testified that he had obse

rved cha nges in the appe llant ove r the pas t eight y

ears. Wa yne explained

that “y ou could kind of tell tha

t [the appe

llant] was in a dif

fer ent place.” Way

ne recalled an incident where the appella nt, believin g he wa s a

prophet, invited Sus an and Way ne to the appellant’s home to pray for his father and brother. Way ne testified that on the day of the offenses, the appellant never pointed the rifle at him.

Ly nn Quillen te stified th at the ap pellant d id not menti on command halluci nations, religion, or numbers when he told Ly nn he had shot and killed their father. L ynn testified that the appellant appear ed calm a

nd did not te

ll Ly nn that h e had “snapped.” Ly nn recalled that the appellant cooperated with the officers when they arrived and told them

to be car eful bec ause

the gun still had two live rounds in it. The appellant also told Ly nn to take the seven hundred dollars ($700) from the appellant’s coat, have his door repaired, and then givethe remainder of the money to the appellant’s wife.

When asked to d

escribe his relat ionship with the appellant, Ly nn stated that he and the appellant “seemed to get along . . . [and] were not hostile toward one another.” Ly nn testified that the appellant had visited him approximately three w eeks before the offenses and a nnounced that he had been diagnosed as homicidal and suicidal; however, the appellant had assured L ynn that he

was not suicidal. Ly

nn testifie d that his f

ather ha d provide d in his will for Ly nn, the appellant and Susan to inherit property loca ted in Scott County, Virginia. L ynn added

that the appellant wanted
to place a mobile home on that property . Ly nn described the appellant’s relationship with his father

as one of “indiffer

ence” a nd stated that t he appe ll ant was je alous of h is father ’s relat

ionship wit

h Ly nn. Ly nn testified that his father was good to his family and “one of the best people I have ever known in my life.”

On cros s-examination, Ly nn conceded that he told L ieutenant David Klepper that “[i] t seemedlike there was a wedge be tween [the appellant] and Dad” and that the appe llant con stantly begged for his fa ther’s lo ve. L

ynn testifie d that, al

though h is father had

initially told the appellant-4-

that he could not place the mobile home on theprop erty, his father had changed his mind but had
notinformed

the appe llant. Ly nn conceded that on

the day of the of

fenses, “a calm” came over the appellant when Ly nn spoke his name; however, Ly nn attributed the calm

to the fact that the appellant “was on the wrong end of a gun.” L ynn denied telling

his sister that the appellant was deranged

. Final ly, Ly

nn ackno wledge d that he w ould inher it the app ellant’sshare of the prope

rty if th e appellant were convicted.

Deputy Martha W hitt of the Scott County Sheriff’s Depar tment testified that on December

6, 1998, the depar

tme nt received a

call that “there was someone in route (sic) fr om Sullivan County

to a Quillen

residence.” De

puty Whitt respo nded tothe call. When she arrived at Ly nn Quil len’ s mobile home, Deputy Whitt observed two men sitting on a c ouch. As she handcuffedth e app ella

nt, he told her to

“go ahea d and trea t me a s the m

urde rer I am. . . . [D]o whatever you need to, I

know I am proba bl y g oing to hell, I will probably die of lethal injection.” Deputy Whitt secured the appellant’s rifle and the appellant warned her to be

careful because it was still loaded. Deputy Whitt then rec overed a mmunit ion from th

e appell ant’s jac

ket and a .22 rifle from the appellant’s truck.

Scott County detective, J.P. Bledsoe, questioned the appellant at the jail. Detective Bledsoe testified that throu ghout qu estioning the appe llant waspolite an d cooper ative an d did

not appear to be confused

or in an altered state. Moreover, the appellant did not speak of c ommand hallucinations or religion. After Detective Bledsoe obtained the appellant’s personal information,
t he appellant inquired about his father’s condition and Detective B ledsoe responded that the appellant’s father had died.

Detective Bledsoe

record ed the ap pellant’ s stat ement in writing and had the appellant review the statement to ensure th at i t wa s ac cur ate . In his statement, the appellant acknowledged that his father had decided to allowhim to put the mobile home on the Scott County property . However, when he went to visit his father on the morning of December 6, the appellant told Detective B ledsoe that his father had done a 180° turn . . . [and] said I could not put the trailer there, he didnot want me

over the re bothe ring my b rother, and did not want

me controlling any

thing ove r th ere, and to stay away f rom him and my brother. . . . I we nt home and got my r ifles and went down the roadto where he lived. I loade d the high pow ered rifle with four cartrid ges. I took the sledge h a mmer and knocked in the door. He

came toward me and asked

what wasgoing

on. I shot him twice wit h the high powered rifle, a 7.67 Russian. According to his statement, the appellant advised Wa

yne Presley that he wa s “going

to my brother ’s, I’m going to kill him and then kill myself. I want it all to be o ver with.” The appe llant then left, taking the rifles and hammer with him. The ap pe llant drove to Ly nn’s mobile home, broke a window with the sl edge hammer, and went inside. Upon being confronted by Ly nn, the appellant informed Ly

nn,-5- I came ove

r here t o kill y ou but I

ca n’t do it. I

want you to kill me [but] . . . I don’t want to bleed on y our carpet. I’ll go to the door or outside and you ca

n shoot me anyway

you want bec ause I’ve killed Dad. . . . I’d been a

bused too long and . . . I snappe d. Detective Bledsoe testified that the appellant requested to speak with him on Dec ember 15, but he advised the appellant to contact his lawyer.

On cross-e

xamination, Detecti ve Bled soe conc eded tha t he did not

record his interview with the appellant on audio tape. Detective Bledsoe recalled that the appellant was “diffe rent” wh en he ca me into contact with him on December 15, but stated that the appella nt did
notappear to be a person who had “s nappe d.” W hen as ked ab out t he mot ive fo r the s hoot ing, Detective Bledsoe responded that he “ felt like there was a problem over some rea l estate.”

After the State completed its case in ch ief, the appellant presented the following witnesses in support of the affirmative defens e of ins anity: L isa Quillen, the appellant’s wife; Dr. Eric Moffet, the appellant’s treating psy chiatris t; Dr. Thoma s Schach t, a fore nsic psy cholog ist; J.M. Baker, a long-time friend of the appellant; Dr. Tony Gonzales, the pastor of S tateline M issionary Baptist Church; and Susan Quillen Presley , the appellant’s sister.

Lisa Quillen testified that she and the appellant had been married for twen ty y ears. She testifie d that whe

n they were fi rst marr ied, the a ppellant had bee n able to work “a regular

job” and had ob tained hi s real estate license. However, the a ppellant never “earned a living” as a real
estate agent. Lisa a

lso testified thatsince closing his own real estate business, the appellant had not been able to ma

intain full-time employment. I

nstead, the appellant

worked as a landlord, taking care of the couple’s r

ental pr opertie s.

Lisa testified that the appellant had alway s been nervous, prone to p anic attacks, and had strange sleeping patterns. Howe ver, she never discussed psy chiatric treatment with the appellant because she attri buted his b ehavior

to his “dysfunctional upbring ing.” Then, in 1993, while working as a real estate agent, the a ppellant was the victim of an armed robbery

which caused his behavior
to worsen. According to Lisa, the appellant became very

paranoid and unable to work. She testified that the appellant would not sleep at night and would wa ke her, talking to her in a rapid speech pattern and jumpin g from t opic to top ic. L

isa testif ied that th e appell ant soug

ht psychiatric

treatment following the robbe

ry . Despite

his bizarr

e behavior, L

isa described the appellant as sweet and affec tionate, not agg

ressive or violen t.

Lisa testified that on e night in 1 994 the ap pellant w oke her t

o tell her about a conversation he had with God and to ask her to g et down on the floor and pray with him. The appellant told Lisa that the devil told him that “things will get worse.” L isa testified that after

this incident
, the ap pella nt bega n spea king i n “a real ly strange voice” and using words such as “thee” and “thou.” That same weekend, the appellant told Lisa to “ [t]hrow away y our birth control pills. . . . It is an abomination to try and preve nt something as beautiful as thebirth of a child. Go d has told

me that we can have a baby .” The appellant then put on a trench coat which had belonged to L isa’s-6-

grandfather

“because he was a saint and I now feel that I ca

n wear it.” The appellant left the house, saying, Do not worry about me my wife, I am g oing to my cousin’s house. I must take the Bible and I must tell my cousin that the end of the world is near and do not worry about me, I will return , no thing will happen to me, do not fear. When the appellant returned, he informed L isa that he and his cousin, Randall, wer e the l ast two prophetsand that t

hey “must go house to ho

use and . . . tell people that the end of the world is near.” The appella

nt then ca lled his sister, Susan, and had her come to his house to “pray for our father and brother.”

Lisa

testified that the appellant did not sleep that night and, when sh e woke up Sunday morni ng, the appellant was dressed and ready for church. When the couple arri ved at Sta teline Baptist Church, the appellant hurried inside. L isa recalled that [t ]he preach

er was u p teaching Sunda

y sc hool and [the appell ant] walkedstraight down the

hall and [ was] very intr usiv e, jus t babb ling, talking about David the King and all this psy cho-babble or whatever you want to ca

ll it, and I kept say ing, “Ro ger ple asecome her e, come here,” because I wa s totally embarrasse d. I wanted to craw l under the pew. But . . . he said “no.” He was talking loud . . . and it was like he was in another world and he wa lked straight down to where the preacher was and he had his Bible down and he started . . . preaching to the preacher. Lisa testified that

she did not discuss this episode with the appellant or his psychiatr ist because she did not wa

nt the app ellant to t

hink that s he was e

mbarra ssed by

him.

Lisa describ ed the ap

pellant’ s relatio nship with his father as one-sided. She stated that the appellant loved his father and desired to have a relationship with him, but “[h]is dad would

n otallow that.” Lisa testified that all the appellant’s f ather ever did was “cuss” and “ rag” t h e appellant and, despite this behavior, the appellant never arg ued with his father. Lisa testified that the appe llant nev er “expr

essed him self” to h

is father , except in

letters.

Lisa testified that

the first time the appellant was suicidal was after his mother died of cancer in 1987. Lisa recalled that the a ppellant was upset and shouting, “Why does my dad do this to me, why can’t he love me?” The ap

pellant th en picke d up a gu

n and said , “You kno w, my mama’s gone, he just wants me to be gone too.” Lisa screamed a nd grabbed the

gun. Lisa testified that the appe llant’s mo st rece

nt suicida l episode was appr oximately tw o y ears before the instant offense s, but that he hadexperienced fifteen to eighteen of the se episodes over the past tw elve y

ears.

Lisa’s testimony then focused on the pe riod of time just prior to the shooting. At that time, the appellant was taking only Xa nax even though his treating phy sician, Dr. Moffet, had also prescribed

Depakote. Lisa explained that the appe llant had not informed her that he had been diagnosed

as having bipolar

disorder . Lisa

believed that the Depakote was simply an antidepressant-7-

and she aske d the appe

llant to re

frain fr om taking

the Depa

kote bec ause she

was try in g to get pregn ant. The appe

llant stopp ed taking

the Depa koteapproxima

tely two week s before

the offe nses.

Lisa testified that she observed a great c hange in theappellant

during the two weeks prior to the offenses. According to L isa, the appellant was on an emotional roller coaster. His mood swings . . . were more apparent a nd they happened faster. One day he would be

up and the next day he would be down. H i s appearance, he wouldn’t evenbathe. . . . I’d come home a nd the first thing I’d notice is, “

Well, he’snot e v en taken a bath today . I can’t believe it.” He could go a week with out bathing. . . . [G]et outof bed

an d go to Low es or some place, j ust same c lothes, wo uld not com

b his hair, wore the same clothes for a week.

Lisa t es tified tha

t on the Fr

iday before the shooti ng, the

appella nt was “e xtremely

e nergetic
, and just e

uphorica lly h appy .” She re called th at the ap pellant w oke her a

t 1:30 a.m. Saturday morning

to pray for his fa

ther and brother. He woke her ag ain at 5:30 a.m., advising her
to dr in k h er mi lk an d o ra ng e j ui ce . Li sa te st if ie d t ha t h is mo od on Sa tu rd ay was very differe nt, describing the appellant as “psy chotic.” Lisa stated that she “fussed” at the appellant because she didnot want him to use a credit card to order an item from the interne t. The appellant

became upset and “all of a sudden he got real loud in the kitchen and h e said, ‘I don’ t understand, I don’t understand. . . why are

you fussing at me about it.’” The appellant then began opening and shutting drawers and cabinet doors, shouting, “Don’ t fuss at me, I can’t handle it, I can’t handle it.”

Lisa testified that the appellant was completely exhausted that eve

ning an d went to sleep early. He

woke Lisa at 11:00 p.m. and told her, “I’m re sted and I’ve g ot a lot of energy and I’m going to go down to the

studio and work for a while.” He left and L isa did not see the appellant again before the shooting. L

isa learned about theshooting when a friend called Sunday morning and askedher wha

t had happ ened at h

er father-in-l aw’s hou se. On th e way to churc h, Lisa stopped at her father-in-law’s house where she w as informed that the appella

nt had bee

n arres ted and w as in the Scott Co

unty jail.

Lisa testified that

she immediately went to the jail to visit the appellant. She stated that the appellant

wa s c al m t ha t f

ir st da y, b ut he di d n ot re ma in ca lm in th e d ays following his arre st. She stated that the appellant “was absolutely driving every

body crazy ,” calling Li sa and he r paren ts several time s a day. Lisa t estif ied th at to h er kno wledge the appellant was receiving his medication while in jail and that she “would have never dreamed” that the appellant would kill his father.

On cross-examination, Lisa conceded that she ne ver consulted Dr. Moffet about the appellant’s bizarre behavior. She testif ied that sh

e went to D

r. Moffe t’s offic e on thre e occas ions, butnever went inside because she knew the a ppellant “was paranoid and

terrified of the power that [ Dr. Moffet] ha

d to put him a

way .” Li sa also a

dmitted tha

t even pr ior to the r

obbery incident in 1993, the appellant had a sporadic work history and the coup le had depended on Lisa’s salar y throughout

most of their marriage. L isa testified that

despite numerous attempts to take his own life,-8-

the appellant had never succeeded in e ven hurting himself. Lisa denied that the appellant was obsessed about putting a m ob il e h om e o n h is fa th er ’s pr op er ty; however, she conceded that she had

no personal knowledge of any discussions the appellant had with his father or Ly nn regardi ng th e mobile home. Lisa recalled that on the da y of the shooting, she

did notsee the appellant retrieve or load the rifles and she did not have any persona l knowledge of the appellant’s state of mind at that time. Finally, L

isa testified that although the appellant told he r that he had “snapped,” he did not mention he aring v oices or command h allucina

tions when

she visite d him on the

day of his ar rest.

The next witness to testify for the defense was Dr. Eric Moffet. Dr

. Moffet began treating the appellant

in 1994 and at the time of trial, was still his treating psy chiatrist. Dr. Moffet testified that the appellant made an appointment at his office after being unable to contact the AFGEAP, an employee

a ssis tance program offered by L isa’s employer. The

appellant had initially sought
treatment through the AFG-EAP following the 1993 robbe ry incident

. The psychiatrist at the AFGEAP placed the appellant on Xanax; however, the appellant stopped taking the medication, fearing that h e woul d beco me add icted to th e drug.

Dr. Moffet te stified th at he fir st treate d the appe llant on Au gust

17, 1994
, approxima

tely one yea r after the robbery . Based upon the appellan t’ s r ec ol le ct io n o f t he ro bb er y, his fearf ul behavi or since

the robbe

ry , conce rns reg arding

profuse sweating , complai nts o f anxiousnes s and irritability, a family history of anxiety , and his social history, Dr. Moffet diagnosed the appellant

as suffe ring fr om post-tr

aumatic s tress diso

rder (PT SD) and pa

nic di so rd er . In it ia ll y, he prescribed Xanax for the appellant. Dr. Moffe t related that, although the appellant had bouts of increased anxiety when facing

stressful situations, overall the appellant’s condition improved over the next few year s. Although Dr. Moffet experimented with other anti-anxiety drugs, he

concluded that Xana x was the mos t effec tive trea tment for the appe llant.

Dr. Moffet testified that at his May 26, 1998 a ppointment, the appellant’s condition had worsened. The appellant reported that

he was getting now three hours of sleep; he was going to sleep at five

a.m

. ; he was up

at eigh t a.m.; he could not f

all aslee p; his thoug

hts

were racing; he stated to me “I ’m thinking, thinking, thinking”; . . . he noticed more irritability and wa y to o m uc h e ne rg y; he was hyperverbal [and] talking to others to the pointwhere h e annoy s them with his t alkin g. Dr. Moffet decided to place the appellant on De pakote, which he explained was a mood stabilizer used to t reat bip olar disorder. Dr. Moffet testified that he diag nosed the appellant as having hypomania, bipolar I

I disorder.

On June 2, 1998, the appellant called Dr. Moffet and informed him that the

Depakot e
was causing severe

diarrhe a and lig

ht-head edness. D r. Moffe t allowed the appe llant to ce asetaking the medication until his next appointment. At his next appointment on June 10, 1998, the appellant reported that he cont inued t o have difficulty slee ping, irritability, hig

h amounts of energy , and “racing thoughts.” At that time, Dr. Moffet decided to try the drug Klonopin. When the appellant-9-

didnot improve, Dr. Moffet discontinued the Klonopin and again placed the appellant on Xa nax and Depakote. The appellant claimed to be taking the Depakote; howe ver, Dr. Moffet testified

that “in hindsight I do not think

he did.” D

r. Moffe t stated th at the ap

pellant “ was afr

aid . . . tha

t I would have him somehow locked up in an asy lum for the

rest of his life, so he kept things from me.” The appellant’s final appointment before committing the offenses was October 15, 1998. Dr. Moffet opined that the appellant was making progre ss on that date.

The next time Dr. Moffet saw the appellant was on television after the commission of the offenses. Dr. M offe

t desc ribe d the appellant as ap pear ing “ [dishe

vele d], unkept, he just didn’t look l ike hims elf.” Following the appellant’s arre st, Dr. Moffet received telephone ca lls and correspondence

from the appellant and his wife, but he did not meet face-to-face with the

appellant until April 28, 1999. Dr. Moffet continued the Depako te and prescribed other mood stabilizing medicati ons, including Lithium. He also prescribed anti-psychotic medications when the appellant “would get out of touch with reality .” Dr. Moffet explained that one is out of touch with rea lity if he is hallucinating, delusional, or paranoid.

After evaluating the a

p pellant following his arrest, Dr. Moffet opined that the appellant was no longer hy

pomanic, but hadbecome “manic with psy chosis,” a more se vere pha se of bipolar disorder. M o reover, Dr. Moffet testified that it was evident the appe llant was having delusions of a religious nature and command hallucinations, which are “hallucinations that tell y ou to do certain things.” Dr. Moffet reviewed the reports prepare d by Frontier Health and Dr. Thomas Schacht, interviewed fami ly members, and read letters written by the appellant, which Dr. Moffet described as “mani c ty

pe letter s.” Nota

bly , the appe

llant wro te one letter to Dr. Moffet in which the appellant indicate d that he h ad been possesse d by

a demon th at commanded him to kill his father

and brother. Dr. Moffet testified that a person can be suffering from hallucinations and psy chosis and,
at times, appear normal. He opined that, because the a ppellant appeared

calm upon being arrested, the appella

nt “was ma

ybe still psy chotic a t the time but people

weren’ t realizin g it.” D r. Moffe t did
notfind the appellan t to be mali ngering. When asked about the appe llant’s mental state on December

6, 1998, Dr. Moffet opined that the appellant was suffering from bipolar disorde r, manic phase with psychosis, and that the appellant was unab le to appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions or form the culpable mental state required for the offenses for which he was char ged.

On cross-examination, Dr. Moffet conceded that until October 15, 1998, he believed the appellant was improving. When asked if his diagnosis of hypomania at that time was inac curate, Dr. M offet responde d that it wa s not. He e xplained th at “you may

have some

body who has a

Bipolar [II] illness, meaning hypo- mania and they ma y be in that

state for ye ars and then suddenly they will become manic or s uddenly th ey will bec ome psy

chotic a nd at that point their

diagno sis will change.” Dr. Moff

et conceded, howe

ver, tha t the appe llant n ever report ed having any hallucin ations, command or otherwise, until he was charged with the de a th of hi s father. Moreover, prior to that time, Dr. Moff

et did not le arn that

the appe llant waskeeping

things f rom him bec ause

he was a fraid Dr. Moffet would institutionalize him. Finally, Dr. Moffet conc eded that the only e vidence o f command hallucinations were reports by the appellant and his wife.-10- Also testifying for

the defe nse was Dr. ThomasSchacht, a foren sic psychologist and professor in the Department of Psyc hiatry at East Te

nnessee State University’s College of Medicine. The defense hired Dr. Schacht to conduct a for ensic evaluation of

the appe llant. I n conduc ting his evaluation, Dr. Schacht interviewed the appellant on four sepa rate oc casions between November 1999 and January 2000. He a lso interviewed the appellan t’s wife, the appellant’s sister, Way ne Pr es le y, and Dr. Moffet. Dr. Schacht attempted to interview the a ppellant’s brother, Ly

nn; however, Ly nn did notreturn Dr. Schacht’s phone calls. In a ddition to these interviews, Dr. Schacht reviewed

numerous record s, includi ng the a ppellant ’s statem

ents to Sco tt County

and Sullivan County police office rs, the appellant’s school records, his medical records, a number of letters and writings by the appella nt, a letter from the appe llant’s sister regarding their fa mily history , and a 1974 audio tape recording of an ar

gument b etween

the appe llant’s pa rents. F inally , Dr. Sc hacht administered two psychologic al tests, the Minnesota Multiphasic Persona l ity I nventory (MMPI

) and the Structured Intervi ew of R ecord S ymptoms (SIRS) , to d eterm ine wh ether t he app ellan t was m alinge ring.

At trial, Dr. Schacht concluded that the appellant’s history of menta l illness “extends back before the time of thealleged offense[s]. Looking at [the appellant’s] life as a whol e it is likely that there were forms of emotional disturbance that be gan in his childhood in as sociation with domestic violence, family violenc e in a very dis-functional (sic) family.” Th e appellant told Dr. Schach tthat he was verbally abused by his fathe

r and witnessed his father phy sically abuse h i s mother. In order to cope, the a ppellant tol d Dr. Sch acht that he would escape from his family by going to his friends’ homes. The appellant further related to Dr . Schacht that he had a p ersis tent problemwith extreme sweating in high school, which Dr. Schacht opined could be“the product of living in an extremely stressful environment.”Dr. Scha cht testif ied that th

ere we re also e vents in the appel lant’s adult life which contributed to the appellant’s mental disturbance, including performing poorly in colleg e, abandoning his career in the Coast Guardafter surviving a hurricane while at sea, a serious motorcycle wr eck, and the 1993 armed robbery . Dr. Schacht explained that the appellant became overwhelmed with anxiety and sought treatment

from Dr. Moffet. Dr. Schacht testified that alt

hough Dr . Moffet eventually diagnosed the appellant as bipolar, the appellant’s
treatment was not continued in the proper manner and the appellant was in a state of “decompensation” at the time he shot his father.

Dr. Schacht testified that when he questioned the appel lant about the shooting, the appellant reported that when he stopped by his father’s house that morning, his father came out and “blasted” him, orde

ring him not to visit h

im, Susan, L

ynn , or the Sc ott C ou nt y property. The appellant recalled that his father told him, “I’ve g ot something in there for y ou and for her, y ou know what it is.” The appellant stated that his father was referring to a re

volver and that after his father’s comment, the appellant had a vision “of a scene from the pa st in which his mother had been dragged by t he h air by

his fathe r with this s ame rev olver pointed at he r head a nd he des cribed t

hat . . . his mother’s face interchanged and bec ame his wife’s face and his sister’s face.” The appellant told Dr. Schacht that he then had anout-of-body experience in which a voice commanded him to “go . . . g et your guns , get a sledge hammer.”When the appellant returned to his father’s house, the voi c e ordered him to brea

k down the

door and kill his father. Thevoice the n command

ed him to g o to his brother’s home, kill his brother, and then kill himself. However, when his b rother c onfronte d him-11-

and ca ll ed his name, the voice vanished. The appellant compared this experience to a camera recording an even

t, but having no will to stop it. Dr. Schacht testified that he asked the appellant if,
at the t ime, he was aware of whether his ac ts were right or wrong. The appellant responde d tha t “[f]rom the observer’s point of view, from the part of me that was back there

like a camera, right or wrong didn’t exist, it was just watching and documenting.”

Dr. Schacht d

iagnosed the appe

llant as bi

polar wit h “mood-c onger

ing psy chotic featur es” and opined that the appellant was suffering f romthis seve

re menta l disease or defect at the time of these offenses. Dr. Schacht further opined that the app ellant was unable to appreciate the wrongf ulness of his ac tions at tha t time. Dr. Schacht t

estified that the MMPI and SIRS testing indi cated t hat th e appel lant w as not mali ngerin g.

On cross-examination, Dr. Schacht testified that hedid not mee t with the appellant until November 30, 1999, nearly one yea r aft er the shoo ting. Dr. Schacht conceded that over the period of a yea

r, one’s mental status could change or one could form a defense strategy . Dr. Schacht acknowledged

that, when interviewing the appellant, Dr. Schac ht and the appella

nt did not di scuss the period following the appellant’s arrest, but rather focused upon the appellant’s state of mind at the time of the offenses. Dr. Schac ht conceded that the appellant admitted he lied to the Naval psy chiatris tin order

to be discharged from the Coast Guard. More over, in spite of all the appellant’s alleged suicidal e pisodes, D

r. Schacht could po int to no evidence that the appellant ever succeeded in injuring himself.

Dr. Schacht conceded that he never spoke with the police officers or jailers who came into contact with the appellant, nor did he speak with Stacy Cox wh o interviewed the appellant within day s of his ar

rest. How ever, D r. Schacht testified that he d id review Cox’s evaluation of the appella nt. Dr. Schacht stated

that although he could not recall the contents of the appe llant’s letters
to his father, he did remember the appellant writing about his father’s property and a mobile home. Dr. Schacht tes tified that he di d not ask th e appell ant wheth

er the vo ice comma

nded him to

tell Wayne Presley on the day

of the shooting that

“Susan can have it all.” Although Dr. Schacht ha d previous ly

testified that the appellant “snapped out of it” whe n he heard h is brother’s voice, Dr. Schachta greed that the appellant may have snapped out of it because he was “looking down t h e wrong end of a gun.” Finally , Dr. Schacht conced ed that one could in

terpre t the appe llant’s r equest for his brother to kill him and his statement to officers to “treat me as the murderer I am” as evidence that the a ppellant was able to appre ciate the

wrongf ulness of his acts.

J.M. Baker , a long -time fr iend of the appell ant, testi fied tha t he had k nown the appellant for eighteen to twenty

years a nd that they were

the “best of friends.” Baker de scribed the appellant as a “great, fun loving, wonde rful person” an d stated t hat he had never witnessed the appellant behaving strangely prior to the shoo ting. Ho wever, Baker testifie d that whe

n he went to visit the appellant

at the Scott County jail several days afte r the shooting, the appellant looked like “a totally different pe

rson.” According to Baker , the appellant appeared depressed a nd confused

and his speech w as “disc onnecte d with reality.” B aker testified that he visited the appellant on several occasions at the Scott Cou nty jail and later at the Sullivan County jail. Baker indicated that the-12-

appellant improved

witheach vis it, describ ing the a ppellant as “comi ng back to reality. ” On cro ssexamination, Baker admitted that the appellant had never told him that he had experienc ed hallucin ations. Baker also conceded that, while visiting the a ppellant in jail, the appellant made a po in t o f t el li ng Ba ke r t ha t h e h ad lo st to uc h w it h r ea li ty.

Also testifying for

the defense was Dr. Tony

Gonzales, pastor of Stateline Missionary Baptist Church in

Kingspo rt, Te nnessee. Dr. Gonzales testified that he had been the pastor a t Stateline for forty y

ears. Dr. Gonzales stated that the appe llant’s w ife had a

ttended h is church “most of her life” and that he had known the appellant for twenty y ears. Dr. Gonz ale s described the appellant as a “quiet gentleman” with a “mee k spirit.” When asked if he had e ver witnessed the appe llant beh aving s trangel y, Dr. Gon zales respo nded t hat in the fal l of 19 98 he w as teac hing a Sunday scho ol class w hen the appellant and Lisa wa lked in and sat down. According to Dr. Gonzales, the appe

llant wastalking

loudly and disrupting the class, which behavior was totally out of chara ct er for the appellant. Dr. Gonzales told the appellant to be quiet and the a ppellant responded, “Yes sir.” The appellant th en hung

his head f

or the re mainder of the cl ass and a

t all subsequent

church services. Dr. Gonzales testified, “That’s the only time that I ’ve ever witnessed anything like tha

t out of [the appellant].”

On December 6, 1998, Dr. Gonzales went to the Scott County jail to visit the appella nt. Dr. G onza

le s recalled that the appellant “had a very wild look [in] his eyes.” The appellant told him that “the demons of hell were talking to him and . . . he only obeyed the

voice of Satan.” According to Dr. Gonzales, the appellant did not show any remorse at that time, “except that he cried and was concerned about God ’s forgive ness.” Dr. Gonzales also testified that when he placed his hand on the appellant’s hand, he noticed that the appellant’s palm was swe ating pr of us el y. Approximat

ely two weeks later, Dr. Gonzales visited the appellant a second time at the

Scott County jail. Dr. Gonzales recalled that the appellant appear ed calmer and asked, “Pastor would you

believe me if I told you that God has commissioned me and commanded me like he did Moses and I have

a mission to accomplish here on earth and I must get the word of God out.” Dr. Gonzales visited the appellant once more after the

appella nt was tra nsported to the Sullivan County jail. Dr. Gonzales testified that the appellant was “a much calmer

person” and was starting to look “more like the Rog er I knew from churc

h.”

On cross-e

xami n ation, Dr. Gonzales conceded that his contact with the appellant during the past twenty y

ears had been limited to Sunday church services. Dr. Gonzales testified that he had never visited the appellant outside of church prior to visiting him in jail, nor had he ever counseledthe appe

llant. Dr . Gonzale s agre ed that wh en he visited the a

ppellant immedia tel y following his arre st, he bel ieved tha t the appe llant “ was a ma

n professing his sins and asking for forgiveness.”

The final witnes s fo r t he de fe ns e w as th e a pp el la nt ’s si st er , S us an Qu il le n P re sl ey. Susan described the appellant as “kind of peculiar . . . [with] an odd sense of humor.” She explained that the a ppellant was a gentle person, neither aggre ssive nor violent. When asked to describe the appellant’s relationship with his father, S usan testified that, although she could not recall any2 The ap pel lan t’ s mot her ’s mai den n ame was Anderson. Be cause of the ap pellan t’s physica l resem blanc e to his mother, h is f

ather often call ed him by t hat name.

-13- argume nts between the two, the appellant “got on dad’s nerves.” Susan testified that her father was nice to her

and Ly nn, but h e was no t kin d to t he app ellan t, oft en refe rring t o the a ppell ant as a “lon gneck” or a

“ G– d— Anderson.” 2 Accord ing to Susa

n, the app ellant de sired to h ave a re lationship with his fa

ther, but his fathe r did not r eturn tho se feel

ings.

Susan testified that her

father often fought with her mother, desc ribing her father

as
a “shover and a pus her and a

hair dragger when he

was mad.” Susan testified that after her brothers moved out of the house, she told her mother that she could no longer tolera te the a rgui ng, and

in 1986 she and her mother moved to the house on Bloomingdale Pike. However, a short time later, her mother was diagnosed with cancer a nd her father moved in to take care of her. Susan testified that her father was “real g ood” to her mother until her death three months later. After her mother’s death, her father continued to live in the house on Bloomingda le Pike.

Susan next described instances in which she ob served the ap pella nt ex hibi t str ange behavior. Sh e s ta te d t ha t t he fi rs t i nc id en t o cc ur re d a pp ro xi ma te ly t wo ye ars before the offe nses. Susan testified that the appellant called her and in a deep voice said, “My sister I need y

ou to come, come, come to my house, we must pra y. We must pray

for Ly nn and dad’s salvation.” Susan related that she and Wayne r

eluctantly went to the a

ppellant’s house wherethe appellant was waiting outside in the cold t

o welcome

them. Susa

n testifie d that t

he appellant “led me by

my hand and he w as shaking and he was holding it tight and he said, ‘Come, come and sit at mother’s table.’ . . . And we
sat do wn a nd there was candles and he started pra ying out loud and c

rying a nd acting strange and weird.” Susan also testified that after that incident , the appe

llant beg an to pr ea ch Bi bl e n um er ol og y. One such exper

ience oc curred

when Su san visited the appellant at the Scott County jail. Susan testified that the appellant’s “eyes were dancing” and he was demanding that Susan “take heed.” Susan testified that her brother was not acting like himself and she w as “scared for him.”

On cross-e

xamination, Susan conceded th at, prior to his father’s death, the appellant wantedto place a mobile home on his father’s property in Scott County. Susan testified that the property wa s to be divided among the children upon their father’s death. Susan conceded that he r father would not allow the appellant to place the mobile home on the prope rty and the a ppellant did
notwant to wait until his father’s death. Su san testif ied that th e appell ant would

anger their father by asking about the property

. Indeed, Susan stated that she wa s “the mediator” between the two men because her father did not

want to discuss the property with the appe llant. Susan testified that over the years, the appell ant neve r told her that he ha

d experie nced ha llucinati ons.

The Statepresented the following witnesses in rebuttal: James Lawson and William “Bud” Flanery , jailers at the Scott County jail in December 1998; Dr. James Turnbull, a foren sic psy chiatris t; and Stacy Cox, a licensed profe ssional co unselor. James L awson te stified th at in December

1998, he was employe d as a jailer for the Scott County Sheriff’s Depa rtment. One of his duties as a jailer was to make “rounds” to check on the inmates. Lawson testified that on Dece mber-14-

16, the appellant

was in the holding cell when he lifted a noose made of shoestring s and told Lawson, “Y ou need to remember this.” Lawson c onfiscated the shoestrings and recorded the event in the incident book. On another occasion, the appellant asked Law son to call Scott County Mental Health. Lawson describ ed the ap

pella nt as “calm” and “a normal inmate.” L awson testified that the appellant never made any

statement regarding hallucinations, the B ible, or nu mbers. On

crossexamination, Lawson conceded that his encounte rs with the appellant were brief.

Also testify

ing for the State was William “Bud” F

lanery , a retir

ed jailer for the Sc ott County Sheriff ’s Depa rtment. Flanery

was employed by

the Department for twenty -three y ears and

was chief jailer

in December 1998. Flanery testified to an incident on December 11, 1998, in which the appella

nt feig ned losing

consciou sness. Flanery

was dispensing medication to the inmates when he came to the appellant’s cell. The appellant refuse d his medication and told Flanery that he needed
to go to the emergency

room because he could not sleep. Flaner y a greed to call “mental health” and returned to the office to record that the appellant had re fused his medication. At that time, a trustee knockedon the office door and Flane ry and the t

rustee returned to the appellant’s cell. Flane ry observed the appellant “lay

ing on his left side piled up in the floor.” Flanery ordered the other jailer
to call the “life saving crew” and two paramedics arrived five minutes later. One of the paramedics placed an ammoni a capsul e under the appellant’s nose and the appellant “jerked his hea d up and he shook it a lit tle bit an d he laid it back down.” The paramedic placed the capsule under the appellant’s nose a second

time, but th

e capsul e had “r

un out.” T

he para medic took another

ammonia capsule and, without breaking it open, placed the capsule under the appellant’s nose. The appellant again “jerked his head up and shook his head a

nd laid his head back down.” The paramedic showed Flanery the unopened capsule. Other than this incident, Flanery testified that the appellant appeared to be normal and ne

ver ment ioned any hallucin ations or

religio us number s.
Dr. James Turnbull, a forensic psy chiatrist and medical director at Frontier Health, testified next for the State. On January 27, 1999, Dr. Turnbull e valuate d the appe

llant at the reque st of the court to de term ine wheth er ther e was sup port for the insan ity d efense . Dr. Tur

nbull firs t obtained a social history from the a

ppellant in which th

e appell ant rela

ted to Dr. Turnbull t

hat his father ha d a bad temper and that he drank some when he w as younge r

. [ The appellant] related that his parents however g ot along fine andstated tha

t he was c loser to h

is mother than his father. [The appella nt] related that he got along well w ith h is si blin gs and denied any signific ant diffi culties. . . . [The appellant] earned his real e state license [] in the 1980' s and app arently by h is repor t did well e nough
to retir e at the age of thirty -seven (37) from real estate. [The appella nt] describ ed himself

as an entrepr

eneur w ho has g enerally done well in business. . . . [The appellant] relat ed t hat he had been seeing a psychiatrist since he was robbed

in his real estate office and described himself as nervous. .

. . [The appellant stated] that he sees Dr. Gary Bush and is als o seeing Dr. Eric Moffet who has diag nosed him by h is repor t as havin g bipola

r disorde r. [The ap pellant] w as also diagnosed in the past . . . as having a panic disorde r.-15-

Based on this social history, the appellant’ s mental status evaluation, and the appellant’s statement
t o police the day

he was a

rrested , Dr. Tur

nbull initia

lly d iagnosed the appe

llant as having “a n adjustmentdisorder with depressed mood . . . [where] y ou get depressed as a r esult of your situation.” Dr. Turn

bull dete rmined tha

t the appe llant wasnot suffe

ring fr om a seve re menta l disease or defe ct at the t

ime of the

offense s and wasable to a pprecia te the wr ongfuln ess of his actions.

On Oct ober 9, 2000, at the request of the court, Dr. Turnbull perf ormed a second evaluation to determine whether the appellant suffered from

a diminished capacity a

t the time of the offenses. In addition

to the dat a obtained at the previous evaluation, Dr. Turnbull also considered the reports of Dr. Schacht and Dr. Moffet, the results of evaluations performed by counselor Stacy Cox, writings of the appellant, notes of the jailers, the 1974 audi o tape, a nd a seco nd interview with the appellant. Based upon this additional information, Dr. Turnbull change d his diagnosis of the appellant to bipolar disorder. Howeve r, Dr. Tu rnbull tes tified tha

t his new diagnosis did not affect his prio r findings regarding the appellant’s ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of his acts. Dr. Turnbull testified that, although he now c oncluded that the appellant was suffering f rom a severe ment al disease or defect and diminished capacity at the time of the offenses, in his opi nion th e appella nt was ab le to appreciate the wrongfulness of his ac tions and to form the requisite culpable mental state to commit the offenses. Dr. Turnbull further opined that it was un usual for an individual to experience a command hallucination on only one occasion.

On cross-e

xamination, Dr. Turn

bull conceded that at the second interview, the appellant retracted the statement that he had a happy childhood. Dr. Tur nbull opined that he did not find the appellant

to be malingering and

had no reason to doubt that the appellant had experienced hallucinations and delusions. Dr. Turnbull then testified that in over twenty y

ears of practice, he had

never had a patient

who was experiencing command hallucinations carry out an order to kill another. However, he agreed that “it’s certainly ha ppened.” When asked if patients often hide information from their psychiat rist s, Dr. Turnb ull re spond ed tha t alt hough it was possible, “[i]t’s relatively rare because most of the people who come to see me are coming for hel p.” Dr . Turnbull testified that individua ls may, as a r

esult of severe stress, go into a dissociative state in which they experience an out-of- body

experience, but ot

herwise appear normal.

The State’s final rebuttal witness was Stacy Cox, a licensed professional counselor withthe Scott Co

unty Mental He alth Cente

r whose d uties incl uded tre ating the inmatesat the Sco tt County jail. Cox testified that he first counseled the appellant at the Scott County jail on December 11, 1998. The appellant’s chief complaint was that he was anxious and ha ving d iffic ulty sle eping. Cox testi fied that the appellant appeared to be “oriented” and the appellant did not report any delusions or religious ideations. Cox determined that the appellant did not require hospitalization at that time.

Cox returned to the jail on December 15, 1998. At t his session, the appellant immediate

ly began discussing “relig ious ideation and the numbers stating that . . . 3 and 7 were the numbers of God and 6 was the numbe r of the d evil.” Th e appell ant also

stated that he “must have been under demonic possession when he killed his father” and that Cox “must think that he is-16-

d elusional or psychotic.” Cox testified, however , that he found these comments to be unusua l because individua

ls gene rally do not admit to being delusional or psyc hotic. Cox also testified that the appella

nt admitte d that he w as attempting to ma nipulate Cox. On cros s -exam ination, Cox conceded that in assessing the appellant, he did not contact Dr. Moffet or D r. Turnbull. Cox opined that the appellant was not malingering.

The jury convicted the a

ppellant of aggravate d burglary , felony murder
, p remeditated first degree murder, and s imple assault, thereby r ejecting the defense of insanity . The trial court merged the convi ctions for premeditated first degree murder and felony

murder. The appellant received a life sentence for the first deg ree murder and the

trial court sentenced the appellant to four yearsincarceration for the ag gravated burglary and eleven months and twen ty-nine day s in the county jail for the a ssault. The trial court ordered that the sentences be served concurr ently for an e

ffective life sentence. Again, the sole issue on a ppeal is whet her the appellant proved by clear and convincing evid

ence tha t he was le gally

insane a t the time o f the com

mission of t

he offe nses.
II. Analysis The defense

of insanity

became an affirmative defense effe ctive July 1,1995. The

curren t insanity statute pr ovides: It is an aff irmati ve de fense to prosecution that, at the time of the commission of the acts constituting the offense, the def endant, as a result of a severe mental disease or def ect, was unable to

apprec iate the nature or

wrongfulness of such

defenda nt’s acts . Mental d

isease

or defect does not otherwise constitute a defense. The defenda nt has the burden of proving the defense of insanity by clear and convincing evidence. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-501(a) (1997). E vidence is clear and convincing when “the re is no serious

or substantial doubt about the correctness of the conclusions to be drawn from the evidence.” State v. Holder , 15 S.W.3d 905, 912 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999)

.

In determining the issue of insanity , the jury may cons ider bot h lay and expert testimonyand may discount exper t testi mony which it finds to be in conflict with the facts of the

case. State v. Sparks , 891 S.W.2d 607 , 616 ( Tenn. 1995). Moreover, where expert testimony conflic ts with testim

ony as to the f

acts, the jury is not req uired to r esolve the confli ct infavor of the experttestimony , but must determine the we

ight and credibi lity

of each in light of all the facts and circumstances of the case. Holder , 15 S.W.3d at 912. In determining a de fendant’s mental state at the time of the alleged o ffense , the jury may consider “evidence of hisactions a nd words b efore, at, and immediately afte

r the commission of the offense.” Id.

Our supreme court recently

set forth the parameters of appellate re view of issues involving an insanity defense. State v. Christopher M. Flake , No. W2000-01131-SC-R11-CD, 2002 Tenn. LEXIS 375, (Jack son, Aug. 29, 2002) (publication pending). T he court unanimous ly concluded

that “ap pellate c ourts in

Tennessee should apply the rea sonableness standard when reviewing a jury’s re

jection of the insanity defe n se.” Id. at *38 -39. I

n other w ords, an a

ppellate-17-

court should reverse a jury

verdict rejecting the insanity defense “ only if, considering

the evidence in the ligh t most favo

rable to the [State], no reasonable trier of fact could have failed to find that the defenda nt’s insan ity a t the time of the offense was established by clear and convincing evidence .” Id. at *39. The court found this standard to beproperly de f erential to the jury’ s finding, without

co mpl etely

insulating such finding from appellate review

. Id. The court noted that this standard “enhances appellate review by virtue of i ts s imilarity to the familiar sufficiency standard whic h appellate courts are accustomed to apply ing.” Id.

Considering the evidence in this record in the light most favorable to the State, we conclude that a re asonable trier of fact could have found that the appellant failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, as a re sult of a severe mental disease or de fect, he was un able to apprec iatethe nat ur e and wrongfulness of his acts. Although the pa rties agreed that the appellant was suffering from bipolar disorder a t the time of the offenses, mental disease or disord er alone is
notsufficie

nt. To esta

blis h the aff

irmati ve defe

nse of ins anity , the appe

llant must s how that a s a result of mental disease

or disord er, he w as unable

to apprec iate the n ature or wrongf ulness of his
acts. The appellant argues that the overwhelming weight of the evide nce showed that the appellant was not able to appreciate the wrong fulness of his acts on December 6, 1998. We disagree.

The record contains ample evidence from which the jury could have concluded that the appellant appreciated the wrongf ulness of his acts o n the day

of the of fenses. First, De

puty Whitt testified that as she was placing handcuffs on the a ppellant, the appellant told her to “go ahead and
treat me as the murderer

I am . . . do whate

ver you need to , I kn ow I a m probabl

y g oing to he

ll, I will probably die of lethal injection.” This statement demonstrated that the appellant was aware tha t he had committed a cr ime and that there would be consequences for his a ctions. Second, the record reflec ts that, after Ly

nn confronted the appellant on the morning of the off enses, the appellant begged Ly nn to “take him ou tside and shoot him.”Defens e expert Dr. Schacht conce ded on crossexa mination that the appellant’s request for L ynn to kill him, as well as his statement to Dep ut y Whitt, could be interpre

ted as evidence t

hat the a ppellant apprec iated the

wrongf ulness of his ac ts. Next, Dr. Gonzales testified that when he visited theappellant in jail on the day he was arrested, Dr. Gonzales bel ieved tha t the appellant “was a man professing his sins and asking for forgiveness.” There was also evidence that the appellant never reported experiencing hallucinations prior to, or on the day of, his arr

est. Moreover, because his father would not allow him to place a mobile home on the Scott County property , the appellant had a motive to shoot his father. Finally, the State off ered the expert tes timo ny of Dr. T urnbull, who opined that the appellant was able to appreciate the wrongf ulness of his act at the time of the offenses. Dr. Turnbull further testified that the appellant had the abilit

y to act inten tionally and with premeditation. Applying the reasonableness standard of review, a standard deferential to the trier of fact, we are unable to conclude that no reasona ble trier of fact could have f

ailed to f ind that the

appella nt’s insanit

y at the time of the off

enses was established by clea

r and convincing evidence.-18- III. Conclusion Accordingly , we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

___________________________________ NORMA McGEE OGLE, JUDGE