alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### NEW DYCKMAN THEATRE CORPORATION v. RADIO-KEITH-ORPHEUM CORPORATION et al.

United States District Court S. D. New York.

Jan. 25, 1955.

William Gold, New York City, for plaintiff.

O’Brien, Driscoll & Raftery, New York City, George A. Raftery,- New York City, of counsel, for defendants Radio-KeithOrpheum Theatres, Inc., and RKO Theatres Corp.

R. W. Perkins, New York City for defendants Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. and Warner Bros. Pictures Distributing Corp.

Dwight, Royall, Harris, Koegel & Caskey, New York City, for defendants Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. (New York) and Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. (Delaware).

Donovan, Leisure, Newton & Irvine, New York City, James V. Hayes, New York City, of counsel, for defendants RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., RKO Pictures Corp., and Radio-Keith-Orpheum Corp. (dissolved).

*37Schwartz & Frohlich, New York City, Everett Frohlich, New York City, of counsel, for defendants Stanley Warner Corp. and Warner Bros. Circuit Management Corp., now known as Stanley Warner Management Corp.

Adolph Schimel, New York City, for defendants Universal Pictures Co., Inc., and Universal Film Exchanges, Inc.

DAWSON, District Judge.

The motion to strike that part of paragraph 1(a) of the amended complaint which reads “and the ‘Robinson-Patman Act’ ” is granted.

The motion to strike the amended complaint in its entirety and the motion to strike from the complaint allegations, except that hereinabove mentioned, is denied.

In the memorandum submitted by attorneys for the defendants on the motion, they state: “The amended complaint, as it now stands, with its broad allegations, presents the same vice as the original complaint in that the defendancs would be subjected to interrogatories and depositions in respect to situations existing all over the United States that have no relationship to the true issue in this case.” Counsel should be aware of the fact that in the order entered on September 27, 1954, on the motion to strike the original complaint, D.C., 16 F.R.D. 203, it is ordered “that 60 days after the joinder of issue by the service of answers by the defendants herein, a preliminary pretrial hearing before this Court will be held, at which time the issues set forth in the amended complaint and answers will be particularized and the bounds of permissible discovery, interrogatories, inspection and production of documents, depositions and subpoenas formulated.”

A proper use of pre-trial procedure should make it possible to restrict and limit interrogatories and depositions to matters which are directly relevant to the amended complaint and the answers.
CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS

The Board of Directors
Del Webb Corporation:

We consent to incorporation  by reference in the  Registration  Statements (Nos.
33-12023, 2-78336, 33-32309,  33-10228,  33-46720,  33-46704, 33-6564, 33-52725,
33-65161,  33-65163,  333-72733 and 333-72735 on Forms S-8 and No.  333-81507 on
Form S-3) of Del Webb Corporation of our report dated August 18, 2000,  relating
to the  consolidated  balance sheets of Del Webb Corporation and subsidiaries as
of June 30, 2000 and 1999 and the related  consolidated  statements of earnings,
shareholders'  equity and cash flows and related  schedule for each of the years
in the three-year  period ended June 30, 2000 which appears in the June 30, 2000
annual report on Form 10-K of Del Webb Corporation.


                                                  /s/ KPMG LLP

Phoenix, Arizona
September 13, 2000
Exhibit 32.1

Certification of the Chief Executive Officer Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350

In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q
for the fiscal quarter ended August 4, 2007 of Stein Mart, Inc. (the Form 10-Q), I, Jay Stein, Co-President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



|1. | The Form 10-Q fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
|-- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|2. | The information contained in the Form 10-Q fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
|-- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                         |  |                                         
|------------------------ |  | ----------------------------------------
|Date: September 12, 2007 |  | /s/ Jay Stein                           
|                         |  | Jay Stein                               
|                         |  | Co-President and Chief Executive Officer



19
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL  INFORMATION  EXTRACTED FROM THE 10-QSB
FOR THE PERIOD ENDED  SEPTEMBER 30, 1999, FOR ALTERNATIVE  TECHNOLOGY  RESOURCES
AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>

<S>                                        <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                  3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              Jun-30-2000
<PERIOD-END>                                   Sep-30-1999
<CASH>                                         854,227
<SECURITIES>                                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  241,091
<ALLOWANCES>                                   0
<INVENTORY>                                    0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               1,184,524
<PP&E>                                         0
<DEPRECIATION>                                 0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 1,184,524
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          5,031,346
<BONDS>                                        0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
<PREFERRED>                                    1,225,002
<COMMON>                                       542,141
<OTHER-SE>                                     (5,613,965)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   1,184,524
<SALES>                                        0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               949,901
<CGS>                                          0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  1,132,131
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               2,512,402
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             2,523,511
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (2,694,632)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (2,694,632)
<DISCONTINUED>                                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                0
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (2,694,632)
<EPS-BASIC>                                  (.07)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  (.07)


</TABLE>
**CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM**

 

We consent to the use in this Post-Effective Amendment No. 4 to RegistrationStatement No. 333-190913 on Form N-1A of our report dated January 12, 2015, relating to the financial statements and financialhighlights of American Funds Developing World Growth and Income Fund appearing in the Statement of Additional Information, whichis part of such Registration Statement, and to the references to us under the headings “Financial highlights” in theProspectus and “Independent registered public accounting firm” and “Prospectuses, reports to shareholders andproxy statements” in the Statement of Additional Information, which are part of such Registration Statement.

 

 

 

DELOITTE & TOUCHE LLP

 

Costa Mesa, California

January 29, 2015
#### In re: CONAGRA PEANUT BUTTER PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION Tina Walker, et al. v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., et al., C.D. California, C.A. No. 5:07-1423 Amanda Wyatt v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., E.D. Missouri, C.A. No. 4:07-2064.

MDL No. 1845.

United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation.

April 8, 2008.

Before JOHN G. HEYBURN II, Chairman, D. LOWELL JENSEN, J. FREDERICK MOTZ, ROBERT L. MILLER, JR., KATHRYN H. VRATIL, DAVID R. HANSEN, and ANTHONY J. SCIRICA*, Judges of the Panel.

*

 Judge Scirica took no part in the disposition of this matter.

TRANSFER ORDER

JOHN G. HEYBURN II, Chairman.

Before the entire Panel*: Plaintiffs in actions pending, respectively, in the Central District of California and the Eastern District of Missouri have moved pursuant to Rule 7.4, R.P.J.P.M.L., 199 F.R.D. 425, 435-36 (2001), asking the Panel to vacate its orders conditionally transferring the actions to the Northern District of Georgia for inclusion in MDL No. 1845. Defendant *1373ConAgra Foods Inc. (ConAgra) opposes the motions.

After considering all argument of counsel, we find that these actions involve common questions of fact with the actions in this litigation previously transferred to the Northern District of Georgia, and that transfer of these actions to the Northern District of Georgia for inclusion in MDL No. 1845 will serve the convenience of the parties and witnesses and promote the just and efficient conduct of the litigation. We further find that transfer of these actions is appropriate for reasons that we set out in our original order directing centralization in this docket. In that order, we held that the Northern District of Georgia was a proper Section 1407 forum for actions in which plaintiffs allege harm from consuming and/or purchasing contaminated peanut butter that was manufactured and packaged at ConAgra’s Sylvester, Georgia, plant. *See In re ConAgra Peanut Butter Products Liability Litigation,*495 F.Supp.2d 1381 (Jud.Pan.Mult.Lit.2007).

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407, these actions are transferred to the Northern District of Georgia and, with the consent of that court, assigned to the Honorable Thomas W. Thrash, Jr., for inclusion in the coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings occurring there in this docket.
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Stillwater Lakes Civic Association, Inc. :

and Stillwater Sewer Corporation :

:

 v. : No. 998 C.D. 2018

:

George Kuzni, :

Appellant :

PER CURIAM O R D E R 

NOW, March 31, 2020, having considered appellees’ application for 

reargument, the application is denied.
#### TEXAS EASTERN TRANSMISSION CORP. et al. v. STANDARD ACC. INS. CO. et al. (ANDERSON BROS. CORP. et al., third-party defendants).

Civ. No. 1470.

United States District Court M. D. Tennessee, Nashville Division.

Dec. 16, 1952.

Stewart, McCary & Crownover, Nashville, Tenn., Vinson, Elkins & Weems, Houston, Tex., and Powell, Wirtz & Rauhut, Austin, Tex., for plaintiffs.

Will R. Manier, Jr. and Cecil Sims, Nashville, Tenn., for defendants.

Miller Manier, Lowe Watkins, and Dan E. McGugin, Nashville, Tenn., for third-party defendants.

DAVIES, District Judge.

The third-party defendants, Anderson Brothers Corporation and United States Guarantee Company, have filed a motion to vacate the previous order of the Court which allowed the original defendants, as third-party plaintiffs, to make Anderson Brothers Corporation and • United States Guarantee Company third-party defendants to this suit under Rule 14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.

It is the opinion of the Court that Rule 14 does not contemplate a motion to vacate a previous order of the Court allowing a defendant as third-party plaintiff to serve a summons and complaint upon a person, not a party to the action who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff’s claim against him, as a third-party defendant. The Rule provides that upon the granting of such a motion the third-party defendant shall make his defenses to the third-party plaintiff’s claim as provided in Rule 12 and his counterclaims against the third-party plaintiff and cross-claims against other third-party defendants as provided in Rule 13. The Court, in granting the motion to make Anderson Brothers Corporation and United States Guarantee Company third-party defendants, has already acted upon the question of the original defendants’ claim that the third-party defendants may become liable to them for all or part of plaintiffs’ claim, and under the orderly procedure provided for in Rule 14, it now becomes the duty of the third-party defendants to make their defense to the third-party plaintiffs’ claim just as if they had been made defendants to any other lawsuit filed in the usual manner. Rules 12 and 13 set out fully the nature of the defenses available to the third-party defendants, and a motion to vacate the original order would only amount to a rehearing or retrial of the same matters upon which the Court has already acted, and is not in order and not contemplated 'by Rule 14.

For these reasons, the motion to vacate will be overruled and disallowed.
NO. 07-12-00250-CV

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AT AMARILLO

PANEL B

JULY 5, 2012

IN RE R. WAYNE JOHNSON, RELATOR

Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and HANCOCK, JJ.

**MEMORANDUM OPINION**

	Relator R. Wayne Johnson, proceeding *pro se*, has filed a petition seeking a writ of mandamus compelling the respondent, the Honorable Edward L. Self, Judge of the 242nd District Court of Castro County, to rescind an order dismissing a lawsuit Johnson filed in Castro County.[footnoteRef:1]  According to Johnson, Judge Self abused his discretion by dismissing the suit because mandatory venue lay in another county.  We previously denied Johnson’s mandamus relief for this same dismissal. *In re Johnson,* No. 07-11-0433-CV, 2011 Tex. App. Lexis 8662 (Tex.App.--Amarillo Oct. 31, 2011, orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (mem. op.).  We also affirmed the dismissal on Johnson’s appeal.  *Johnson v. Cornelius,* No. 07-11-0091-CV, 2011 Tex. App. Lexis 7762 (Tex.App.--Amarillo Sept. 28, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.).  The contentions in his present petition are variations on the same arguments he made in those proceedings.  Johnson’s petition is denied. [1:  Johnson v. Cornelius, No. B9231-1011 (242nd Dist. Ct. Castro County, Tex. Jan. 13, 2011).] 

Per Curiam

2

2
IV 

108TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. RES. 330

Relating to a question of the privileges of the House. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JULY 23, 2003

Ms. PELOSI submitted the following resolution; which was laid on the table 

RESOLUTION

Relating to a question of the privileges of the House.

Whereas during a meeting of the Committee on Ways and 

Means on July 18, 2003, for the consideration of the bill 

H.R. 1776, the chairman of the Committee on Ways and 

Means offered an amendment in the nature of a substitute; 

Whereas during the reading of that amendment the chairman 

of the Ways and Means Committee directed majority 

staff of the committee to ask the United States Capitol 

Police to remove minority-party members of the committee from a room of the committee during the meeting, 

causing the United States Capitol Police thereupon to 

confront the minority-party members of the committee; 

and 

Whereas pending a unanimous consent request to dispense 

with the reading of that amendment the chairman delib-
2

HRES 330 LTH 

erately and improperly refused to recognize a legitimate 

and timely objection by a member of the committee: Now, 

therefore, be it

1 Resolved, That the House of Representatives dis2 approves of the manner in which Representative Thomas 

3 summoned the United States Capitol Police to evict minor4 ity party members of the Committee on Ways and Means 

5 from the committee library, as well as the manner in which 

6 he conducted the markup of legislation in the Committee 

7 on Ways and Means on July 18, 2003, and finds that the 

8 bill considered at that markup was not validly ordered re9 ported to the House, and calls for the police report to be 

10 placed in the Congressional Record.

Æ
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM
TRANSKARYOTIC THERAPIES, INC.'S FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR THE SIX MONTHS ENDED
JUNE 30, 1997 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1
<CURRENCY> U.S. DOLLARS
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1997
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                      1
<CASH>                                      16,166,703
<SECURITIES>                                68,271,572
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            84,913,172
<PP&E>                                       9,745,220
<DEPRECIATION>                               6,630,893
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              88,688,475
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        1,868,814
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       166,845
<OTHER-SE>                                  86,593,083
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                88,688,475
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             7,465,120
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               10,932,118
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                      0
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (3,466,998)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (0.21)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.21)
        

</TABLE>
#### Lafauci *v.*Kinler and others.1

*(Circuit Court, E.D. Louisiana.*

March 26, 1886.)

1. Petitory Action.

In a petitory action, the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his own title, and not upon the weakness of that of his adversary.

2. Prescription.

Defendants having shown that they and their authors had been in possession of the real property for a period of more than 80 years, they are protected in the title thus acquired until a better is shown.

At Law.

*Ernest T. Florance,*for plaintiff.

*James D. Augustin,*for defendants.

1

 Reported by Joseph R. Hornor, Esq., of the New Orleans bar.

*443Billings, J.

The defendants in this ease derive title through Baptiste St. Armand, who claims to have purchased in 1830 from, the United States, among other lands, section No. 119, in which is included the tract in dispute, and to have obtained a patent therefor on the seventeenth day of September, A. D. 1858. The plaintiff, deriving title through Emile St. Armand, claims that he entered the saute tract in 1855, and obtained a patent for it in 1878.

In the view the court takes of the case, it is not necessary to inquire into this apparent-conflict of these patents; nor is it necessary to investigate as to whether the land in controversy is within the proper limits of the Paul Loup grant,—since, in 1856, the United States relinquished claim to all lands covered by said grant, reserving all rights of settlers thereon, by whatever title they claimed to hold.

This being a petitory action, the plaintiff must rely upon the strength of his own title, and not upon the weakness of that of his adversaries. The court is of opinion that it has been established that neither the plaintiff, nor any ono through whom he claims title, lias ever been in possession of these lands in his own right. Their author, Emile St. Armand, with his family, for about two years lived on these lands by permission of Lartigue Mongrue, who was then in possession, and removed from them m 1857, when Mongrue leased it to other tenants. The evidence establishes, also, that the defendants, and the authors of their title, have been in actual possession of the lands in controversy for a period of more than 30 years. They are protected in the title thus acquired until a better is shown. The plaintiffs have failed to show a better title.

Judgment for defendants, with costs.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 06-7109

WAYDE ALVIN HESLOP, Petitioner - Appellant, versus RONALD HUTCHINSON, Warden; JOHN JOSEPH CURRAN, JR., Attorney General of the State of Maryland, Respondents - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. William M. Nickerson, Senior District Judge. (1:04-cv-01181-WMN) Submitted: January 19, 2007 Decided: February 9, 2007 Before NIEMEYER, MICHAEL, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Wayde Alvin Heslop, Appellant Pro Se. John Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General, Mary Ann Rapp Ince, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MARYLAND, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.- 2 - PER CURIAM: Wayde Alvin Heslop seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000) petition. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that any assessment of the constitutional claims by the district court is debatable or wrong and that any dispositive procedural ruling by the district court is likewise debatable. Miller-El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); Rose v. Lee , 252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th Cir. 2001). We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Heslop has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and di smiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED