*

 Judge, U.S. Court of International Trade, sitting by designation.

Revised February 14, 2003

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_____________________

No. 00-20041

Consolidated With

No. 01-20823

_____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

GEORGE L. J. WILSON, 

Defendant-Appellant.

_______________________________________________

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas 

_______________________________________________

February 13, 2003

Before WIENER and STEWART, Circuit Judges, and RESTANI, Judge.*

RESTANI, J.:

The primary issues before the court in this appeal of a criminal conviction are (1) whether

the district court improperly applied the preponderance of the evidence standard in determining

whether the statute of limitations was tolled under 18 U.S.C. § 3292; (2) whether the district

court abused its discretion in admitting new evidence proffered by the Government at the hearing

on remand; and (3) whether the district court’s finding that the Government proved by a
1

 Wilson also claims that his conviction and sentence violate the Ex Post Facto and Due

Process clauses of the United States Constitution. These arguments could have and

should have been raised before both the trial court and before this court in Wilson’s first

appeal. See, e.g., Martinez v. Mathews, 544 F.2d 1233, 1237 (5th Cir. 1976) (citation

omitted) (noting exception to this general rule “when a pure question of law is involved

and a refusal to consider it would result in a miscarriage of justice.”). Regardless, the

court in Wilson I affirmed in all respects the judgment and sentence of the district court

and retained jurisdiction only as to the appeal of the trial court’s ruling on the motion to

dismiss after an evidentiary hearing. 249 F.3d at 380. We therefore decline to consider

these new arguments.

2

preponderance of the evidence that it sent a foreign discovery request, necessary to toll the statute

of limitations under § 3292, was clearly erroneous. Though Wilson’s remaining claims are either

untimely, without merit, or both,1 we find that the district court clearly erred in concluding that

the Government proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the discovery request was sent to

the Bahamian Government. We therefore REVERSE the decision of the district court denying

George Wilson’s motion for reconsideration of his motion to dismiss the indictment as timebarred, REVERSE Wilson’s conviction, and VACATE his sentence. 

BACKGROUND

In 1999, Defendant-Appellant George L. J. Wilson was convicted by a jury of multiple

charges of conspiracy to commit money laundering, money laundering, mail fraud, and engaging

in monetary transactions involving property derived from specified unlawful activity. United

States v. Wilson, 249 F.3d 366, 368 (5th Cir. 2001) (“Wilson I”). In Wilson I, we affirmed

Wilson’s convictions in all respects, subject to the district court’s ruling on remand, after an

evidentiary hearing, on Wilson’s motion for reconsideration of his motion to dismiss based on the

statute of limitations. Id. at 380. Wilson now appeals the district court’s July 26, 2001 order

denying his motion for reconsideration. 
3

Wilson was indicted on October 26, 1998. On July 13, 1999, the United States District

Court for the Southern District of Texas denied Wilson’s motion to dismiss the indictment as

time-barred because, in 1994, it had entered an order suspending the statute of limitations for

offenses then under investigation, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3292. The order suspended the

limitations period beginning November 24, 1993, the date on which the United States Department

of Justice, Office of International Affairs (“OIA”) allegedly made an official request for assistance

to the Commonwealth of the Bahamas pursuant to a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (“MLAT”). 

The Government required assistance in obtaining Wilson’s financial records from a Nassau bank. 

Wilson filed a motion for reconsideration on July 22, 1999, challenging for the first time

the Government’s assertion that it had sent the discovery request to the Bahamas and claiming

that, because the letter was never sent, the statute of limitations was not tolled. Wilson I, 249

F.3d at 372. Wilson presented evidence to the district court in support of the motion, but the

court denied it without a hearing on August 4, 1999. See id. (detailing the evidence supporting

Wilson’s theory that the letter submitted to the court by the United States was merely a draft that

was neither sent to nor received by the Bahamian Government). At the time the court considered

the motion for reconsideration, the only evidence proffered by the Government to support its

claim that the letter was sent was a copy of the disputed letter itself and the Government’s

“representation that it was sent . . . .” Id. In Wilson I, this court ruled that the evidence raised a

factual issue as to whether the Government actually sent the discovery request to the Bahamas,

and that the district court erred in denying Wilson’s motion for reconsideration without a hearing. 

Id. The court remanded the case to the district court with instructions to conduct an evidentiary

hearing on whether the letter was sent. Id. at 373. 
2

 Lanyi testified that paralegal specialists assist OIA attorneys with monitoring the

progress of outgoing extradition and legal assistance requests and help respond to

incoming requests. 

3

 According to Lanyi, Federal Express cannot track a package or retrieve its

corresponding invoice without the tracking number. There was no evidence, however,

that the Government ever attempted to obtain evidence from Federal Express, though

Lanyi testified that the company would have kept the relevant records for seven years.

4

 Wilson objected to the admission of the correspondence log on several grounds,

including hearsay. He also argued that the log was inadmissible because the Government

had not produced it in response to his motion for reconsideration, despite the fact that it

was available to the Government and could have been introduced at that time. The court

overruled Wilson’s objections, and Wilson appeals the district court’s admission of the log

into evidence. As discussed infra, the court finds that the district judge did not abuse his

discretion in admitting the correspondence log. 

4

On remand, the Government called one witness and introduced one additional piece of

documentary evidence to prove that it sent the letter to the Bahamas. The Government’s witness,

Helma Lanyi, was a paralegal specialist2 who had worked for the OIA since 1991. Lanyi did not

work on the Wilson case until 1996 or 1997, but she claimed familiarity with the office policies

and procedures in place in 1993 when OIA allegedly sent the MLAT request. The district court

expressed concerns about the Government’s failure to produce a Federal Express tracking

number, air bill, or monthly invoice for the November 1993 letter. Lanyi’s explanation to the

court was that staff secretaries do not always keep such records, though official policy was to

keep them for one year. Furthermore, Lanyi testified that OIA’s failure to include the Federal

Express tracking number on the letter explains why OIA could not request documentation from

Federal Express that would have proven the letter was sent.3 The Government then introduced,

over defense objection,4 a computer-generated correspondence log from OIA containing a data

entry for a November 24, 1993 request for bank records to the Bahamas. Lanyi testified that if an
5

 Lanyi explained that OIA’s docketing unit logs incoming and outgoing correspondence

into OIA’s computer system upon the receipt of copies of outgoing correspondence that

are provided by each team’s secretary. The secretaries are responsible for mailing

outgoing correspondence, via Federal Express or otherwise. 

6

 On cross-examination, Wilson’s counsel impeached Lanyi’s testimony with a letter

addressed to her from the U.S. Department of Labor, Office of Inspector General, which

clearly requested proof that the November letter was sent: “Please provide confirmation

that the November 1993 letter was in fact dispatched to the proper authorities in the

Bahamas.” See Letter from Edward P. Fischer, Regional Inspector General for

Investigations to Helma Lanyi, OIA (Aug. 4, 1997), Record Excerpts (“RE”) 13. Defense

counsel also established that, within the same week, Lanyi’s phone record reflected that

the Attorney General’s office in the Bahamas “had not received [OIA’s] request for Gulf

Union Bank records.” See Lanyi Phone Record, RE 18. 

Lanyi responded to the Labor Department’s request for proof by sending the old

correspondence log. See Gov’t Ex. 4. The FAX cover sheet read, “Attached please find

our OIA computer printout which shows that OIA sent the request in 1993,” and

explained that the log reflected all outgoing communications. Id. The log, however,

included only one entry for an outgoing MLAT request, a request to depose three

Bahamian citizens. There was no entry for a November letter. 

5

entry was made into this log, this signified that the document had been sent.5 Lanyi, however,

neither worked in OIA’s docketing unit nor was she personally responsible for drafting or typing

foreign legal assistance requests, copying them for OIA’s records, or sending them out. 

As to the discrepancy between the correspondence log submitted earlier by Wilson in

support of his motion for reconsideration that did not reflect a November 1993 MLAT request

(“old log”), see Wilson I, 249 F.3d at 372, and the one submitted by the Government at the

evidentiary hearing on remand that did include such an entry (“new log”), Lanyi testified that she

had mistakenly sent the wrong page from the report when responding to a request for proof that

the November letter had been sent.6 Compare Gov’t Ex. 1 with Gov’t Ex. 4. In the course of this

explanation, however, Lanyi testified that: (1) the correspondence log listed documents in reverse

chronological order, i.e., the first piece of correspondence in a case would be the last entry on the
7

 The December 1993 letter did not request the documentation requested by the

November letter and was not the basis of any decision to suspend the statute of

limitations. The statute was determined to be suspended for three years from the

November letter, making the October 26, 1998 indictment timely. Wilson I, 249 F.3d at

371. 

8

 Wilson argued, “[The correspondence log] is not direct evidence of anything. . . .

[S]omebody at OIA, as I understand the procedure, had a piece of paper put in her box or

his box and typed [a correspondence entry] in the computer. [Docketing clerks] have no

personal knowledge that it was sent or not sent.” Tr. of Remand Hr’g at 68-69 (July 12,

2001). 

9

 The November MLAT letter submitted by the Government to the district court in 1994

in support of its application to toll the statute of limitations did not have a date stamp on

the first page, while another copy of that same letter submitted by the Government to the

court in 1999 did have a date stamp. Compare RE 20 with RE 9. 

Turning to the differences between the two MLAT letters allegedly sent by the

same attorney at OIA to the Bahamas within 9 days of each other, Wilson showed that the

December 1993 letter had various initials appearing in the letterhead area indicating, for

example, the secretary who typed the letter and the person who signed the letter. The

November 1993 letter was blank in that area. The December letter referenced the OIA

docketing number for the MLAT request, which Lanyi testified was included on all official

correspondence dealing with MLAT requests, yet the alleged November letter did not. 

The December letter had a return address for OIA’s Criminal Division on the upper right-

(continued...)

6

log; (2) the page allegedly sent by mistake was the “last page,” and (3) the entry in the log for a

December 1993 letter was the “first entry.”7 Nevertheless, Lanyi claimed that the entry for the

November letter on the new log, a product of a new software system after a 1999 upgrade at OIA

that was printed just two days prior to the evidentiary hearing, was not newly created and that the

system was tamper-proof. 

Wilson argued that the entry in the log was only circumstantial evidence and did not prove

that the letter was sent,8 especially in light of Lanyi’s testimony that OIA’s office procedures were

frequently disregarded or considered as “discretionary.” On cross-examination of Lanyi, Wilson's

counsel pointed out discrepancies in the form of the November 24 and the December 3 letters,9
9

(...continued)

hand side of the page; the November letter had no return address. The December letter

indicated that there was an enclosure, i.e., the actual MLAT request for legal assistance;

the November letter did not. Compare RE 9 with RE 12. 

7

which Lanyi testified were not significant. Lanyi admitted that she had no personal knowledge of

the correspondence procedures used by Deborah Gaynus, the OIA attorney whose signature

appeared on both the November and December MLAT requests, and her secretary, Niges Forgee. 

In his cross-examination of Lanyi, Wilson’s counsel also emphasized the other factual allegations

which had led this court to remand in Wilson’s first appeal, including the fact that the Government

had no records of the Federal Express tracking number and that it made no attempt to obtain any

evidence from Federal Express to prove that the letter was sent, despite the fact that the company

keeps such records for seven years. Wilson’s lawyer did not put on any additional evidence or

call any witnesses, stating to the court that he felt that the Government had not met its burden of

proving that the MLAT request was sent by a preponderance of the evidence. 

The presiding judge allowed the attorneys to make closing arguments to the court. The

Government argued that, based on Lanyi’s testimony about OIA procedures and the

correspondence log entry for the November 24 letter, the court should find the Government met

its burden of proof. Responding to the court’s questions, however, the Government’s attorney

apparently conceded that the Government had not met its burden, stating that “at best” the case

was “a wash.” The court stated that if it was a wash, then the Government did not prove its case

by a preponderance of the evidence. The Government then tried to correct its unfortunate choice

of words, admitting that it was a wash whether or not the Bahamian officials received the letter,

but maintaining that it had shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the letter was sent and
8

that it had provided explanations for all of the concerns raised by Wilson, the trial judge, and this

court. 

Wilson’s closing argument emphasized the fact that the Government called Lanyi as its

only witness – a paralegal who had no personal knowledge as to whether the disputed letter was

sent in 1993 and who did not work on the Wilson case until at least four years later – but did not

call as witnesses the three people with actual knowledge relevant to this disputed, and dispositive,

issue: Gaynus, Forgee, or the docketing clerk who made the entry for the November letter. Lanyi

testified that all three of these potential witnesses still worked for the Government at the time of

the remand hearing. According to Wilson, the Government’s failure to call those with personal

knowledge of the letter and the circumstances of its transmission to the Bahamas was an implicit

acknowledgment that their testimony would have hurt the Government’s case. 

Wilson also urged that the new correspondence log, which was admitted into evidence by

the district court on remand, did not prove that the letter was sent, only that somebody put a copy

of a letter that was allegedly sent into a docketing clerk’s in-box. Because the docketing clerks

themselves do not actually know whether a piece of correspondence they enter was mailed or not,

Wilson suggested that the log entry could have been fabricated in some way, highlighting various

circumstances where, if the log entry actually existed as of November 24, 1993, an OIA employee

could have simply printed it out, allowing the Government to avoid all of the evidentiary problems

presented here. For example, Wilson stressed that in 1997, Lanyi, by “mistake,” sent the “wrong

page” of the correspondence log in response to a request for proof from the Labor Department

that the November letter was sent. Despite this obvious mistake, neither the requesting case

agent nor the federal prosecutor sought the correct page of the log from OIA, though the
10 Wilson also presented two alternative theories whereby the log entry was innocently,

though erroneously, created. The crux of the first theory was that OIA attorney Gaynus

attempted to type and transmit the November letter herself, but the letter was never

actually sent out due to her secretary’s absence during the Thanksgiving holiday. The

second theory was that an outgoing fax to the Bahamian Attorney General in 1997, which

transmitted the November 1993 MLAT request after he informed OIA that he never

received it, was incorrectly docketed as of the date on the MLAT request attached,

November 24, 1993, rather than the date of the FAX transmittal. The Government

characterized these theories as speculative and conjectural. 

9

evidence reflected that they were both on notice that proof of OIA’s transmission of the

November MLAT was crucial to the Government’s case. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying

text. 

Two years passed without OIA providing the proper documentation as requested by the

Labor Department and, in 1999, the federal prosecutor in this case finally sought proof from OIA

that the letter was actually sent. The prosecutor needed such proof in order to respond to

Wilson’s original motion to dismiss the indictment as time-barred, yet OIA again did not (or could

not) produce a log entry or other proof that the November letter was sent. Nevertheless, the

entry inexplicably appeared on the new log introduced at the July 2001 evidentiary hearing. The

evidence showed that, in the time between Wilson’s motion for reconsideration and the remand

hearing, OIA upgraded its MLAT request tracking system and converted it to a new Oracle

program. Wilson argued that the system could have been tampered with or the entry added at

that time.10 Finally, Wilson argued that the Government’s failure to subpoena Federal Express or

produce other relevant records, along with proof that the Bahamian Attorney General never

received the November request for bank records, supported Wilson’s theory that the letter was

never sent.
11 We note that the original panel that presided over Wilson I rescinded its April 19, 2001

direction that it would “consider any appeals” from the district court’s ruling after the

evidentiary hearing, relinquishing control of the appeal to the present panel. Order of

November 21, 2002; see Wilson I, 249 F.3d at 380. 

10

On July 26, 2001, the district court, “[h]aving considered the evidence and arguments of

counsel at the hearing, together with the submissions on file,” denied Wilson’s motion for

reconsideration. The court found that, based upon Lanyi’s credible testimony about office

correspondence procedures, the OIA correspondence log, and the transmittal letter, the

Government met its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that OIA sent the

MLAT request on November 24, 1993. This appeal followed.11

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a district court’s admission or exclusion of evidence for abuse of discretion. 

General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 141 (1997) (citations omitted). A district court’s

factual findings, such as the district court’s determination here that the letter was sent, are

reviewed for clear error. United States v. Meador, 138 F.3d 986, 991 (5th Cir. 1998). The

district court’s ultimate decision that the statute of limitations was properly tolled is a legal

conclusion reviewed de novo. Id.

DISCUSSION

A. Government’s Burden of Proof

Wilson argues that the district court improperly applied a preponderance standard for the

Government’s burden of proof at the hearing on remand. We considered and rejected this

argument in Wilson’s first appeal, holding that the plain language of the statute, 18 U.S.C. § 
11

3292, required the district court to decide by a preponderance of the evidence whether the statute

of limitations should be tolled. Wilson I, 249 F.3d at 373. This decision cannot be reexamined

either by the district court on remand or by this court in a subsequent appeal pursuant to the “law

of the case doctrine.” United States v. Becerra, 155 F.3d 740, 752 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting

Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R. v. Int’l Paper Co., 889 F.2d 536, 539 (5th Cir. 1989)). Therefore,

Wilson’s argument that the district court should have required the Government to carry a more

stringent burden is without merit.

B. Admission of OIA Correspondence Log

Wilson argues that the district court improperly considered Government Exhibit 1, the

new correspondence log containing an entry for the November 24 letter, at the remand hearing. 

He contends that the Government should be estopped from using the log now because the

Government did not present this document to the district court when it first considered his motion

for reconsideration. 

We remanded this case to the district court with instructions to conduct an evidentiary

hearing to determine whether the letter was sent. Wilson I, 249 F.3d at 372-73. On remand, the

district court is not limited to the record before it and “retains the discretion to admit additional

evidence,” United States v. Bell Petroleum Servs., Inc., 64 F.3d 202, 204 (5th Cir. 1995)

(citations omitted), unless bound by the appellate court’s specific mandate to restrict its review in

some manner. See Becerra, 155 F.3d at 754. By recognizing a disputed issue of fact and

remanding the case for an evidentiary hearing, the court’s prior opinion obviously contemplated

the taking of additional evidence. See Wilson I, 249 F.3d at 372-73. Because the Government

claims that the log entry for the November letter has always existed, the court is puzzled by the
12

Government’s failure to produce this log in response to Wilson’s motion to dismiss or motion for

reconsideration. Nevertheless, given the purpose of the evidentiary hearing, the district court did

not abuse its discretion in allowing the Government to present the evidence at its disposal to

refute Wilson’s claims that the letter was never actually sent.

C. District Court’s Factual Finding That the Government Sent a Formal Request for Legal 

Assistance to the Bahamian Government

Wilson argues that the district court clearly erred in finding that the Government had

established by a preponderance of the evidence that the November 24, 1993 letter was sent. He

directs this court to numerous deficiencies in the Government’s proof: (1) the Government did not

produce Federal Express or other relevant records to prove the letter was sent, despite the fact

that such documentary evidence would have been readily available; (2) the Government did not

call as witnesses the attorney who drafted and signed the letter, the secretary who would have

typed and mailed it, or the data entry person who logged in the correspondence, even though they

were still Government employees when the hearing on remand took place; (3) there was no

Federal Express number, ID number, OIA case number, or other identifying information on the

disputed letter, despite routine practice to include such information on all outgoing

correspondence; (4) internal government documents existed that questioned whether the letter

was sent out by OIA’s correspondence unit, that exposed the Government’s failure to obtain

proof of mailing in response to its own inquiries, and that indicated it was never received by the

Bahamian Government; (5) the Government had the opportunity and incentive to produce the

new correspondence log earlier in the proceedings and failed to do so, yet managed to provide it

at the remand hearing, after OIA’s computer system upgrade had taken place and certain

identifying information concerning log entries was changed in the conversion; and (6) the
12 The Government did offer a few paragraphs of argument in favor of the district court’s

1994 order suspending the running of the statute of limitations in its Wilson I brief. This

argument is wholly insufficient to support the district court’s July 2001 order denying

Wilson’s motion for reconsideration after the evidentiary hearing. The Government’s brief

in the present appeal argues that the preponderance standard is the appropriate burden of

proof under § 3292, but fails to respond to Wilson’s argument that the Government did

not sustain this burden at the evidentiary hearing. 

13

Government’s sole witness at the hearing on remand was a paralegal who did not work on

Wilson’s case until 1996, approximately three years after the letter was allegedly sent, who had no

personal knowledge as to whether the disputed letter was actually mailed, who only testified as to

routine correspondence procedures, and who admitted that those procedures were flexible and

were not always followed by OIA staff. Thus, Wilson argues that the Government failed to prove

that the MLAT request was sent to the Bahamas in November of 1993 by a preponderance of the

evidence. The Government, without explanation, failed to respond to Wilson’s argument that it

did not sustain its burden at the evidentiary hearing.12 

This court must determine whether the district court committed “clear error” when it

found that the Government proved its case by a preponderance of the evidence. See Meador, 138

F.3d at 991. 

“The burden of showing something by a preponderance of the evidence . . . simply

requires the trier of fact to believe that the existence of a fact is more probable than

its nonexistence before [he] may find in favor of the party who has the burden to

persuade the [judge] of the fact’s existence.” Concrete Pipe &Products of Cal., Inc.

v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust for Southern Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 622 (1993)

(internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, the preponderance standard goes

to how convincing the evidence in favor of a fact must be in comparison with the

evidence against it before that fact may be found . . . . See Greenwich Collieries v.

Director, OWCP, 990 F.2d 730, 736 (CA3 1993) (“A preponderance of the evidence

is . . . [e]vidence which is . . . more convincing than the evidence . . . offered in

opposition to it . . .”) (internal quotation marks omitted)), aff’d, 512 U.S. 267 (1994).

. . . “[W]hen the evidence is evenly balanced, the [party with the burden of
14

persuasion] must lose,” Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs v.

Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267, 281 (1994). 

Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v. Rambo, 521 U.S. 121, 137 n.9 (1997). A reviewing court,

however, “will not reverse a lower court’s finding of fact simply because [it] ‘would have decided

the case differently.’” Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 242 (2001) (quoting Anderson v.

Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985)). Instead, the court must ask “whether ‘on the entire

evidence,’ it is ‘left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’” Id.

(quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)). 

A review of the “entire evidence” presented to the district court leaves us “with the

definite and firm conviction” that the court was mistaken in its finding that the Government

proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the letter was sent. See id. at 242-43. The

district court’s order denying Wilson’s motion for reconsideration relied in part upon a

presumption of mailing derived from the testimony of Lanyi. The court stated, “[t]he Fifth Circuit

‘has long accepted proof of the normal practice of the use of the mails by means of circumstantial

evidence, without requiring the testimony of a business’ mail clerk, ostensibly the only person

who could testify directly to the business practice of mailing and receiving letters.’” Order of July

26, 2001, RE 5 (citations omitted). The court found that Lanyi qualified as a person familiar with

OIA’s routine correspondence practices, and that her testimony was therefore sufficient to

establish the letter was sent according to routine practices. 

The district court failed to recognize an important distinction between Lanyi’s testimony

and that which is normally accepted as adequate to establish routine business practices. Lanyi was

a paralegal, not a secretary or docketing clerk, and she testified that she was not responsible for

drafting or mailing MLAT requests or for making correspondence log entries. Aside from her
13 We note that the effect of the presumption relied upon by the district court here is

simply to shift the burden of producing evidence that the letter was not sent to Wilson. 

See Beck, 882 F.2d at 996; Wells Fargo Bus. Credit v. Ben Kozloff, Inc., 695 F.2d 940,

944 (5th Cir. 1983) (discussing burden shifting in the context of circumstantial evidence of

routine mailing practices of the sender). Given the evidence Wilson presented in support

of his theory that the November letter was only a draft that was never mailed by OIA or

received by the addressee, even if we were to find that the presumption of mailing

properly arose here, Wilson produced sufficient evidence of non-mailing to rebut the

presumption. “If the party against whom the presumption operates produces evidence

challenging the presumed fact, the presumption simply disappears from the case.” 

Pennzoil Co. v. F.E.R.C., 789 F.2d 1128, 1136-37 (5th Cir. 1986). 

15

personal inexperience with executing OIA correspondence procedures, her testimony

demonstrates that there really were no consistent procedures or practices at OIA during the time

in question. Furthermore, though Lanyi worked at OIA in November of 1993 when the MLAT

was allegedly mailed to the Bahamas, she was not assigned to work on the Wilson case until

approximately four years later. She testified, “I was not there at that time. So, I do not know

what the procedures were for Ms. Gaynus and her secretary in what they sent out. . . . There

would not be a consistency [in correspondence procedures] of the kind that you describe.” Tr. of

Remand Hr’g at 89 (emphasis added). This demonstrates that Lanyi was not a competent witness

qualified to give evidence as to the correspondence procedures used by the OIA team responsible

for the November letter. Accordingly, we find that there was insufficient evidence before the trial

court to give rise to a presumption that the letter was mailed. See Beck v. Somerset

Technologies, Inc., 882 F.2d 993, 996 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that “a copy of the properly

addressed letter, a certified mail receipt and signed return post cards” was sufficient to raise the

presumption that a letter was received in the due course of the mail). 

Because the presumption of mailing does not arise in this case,13 we must review the

“entire evidence” to determine whether the district court’s factual finding that the letter was sent
16

constituted clear error. What particularly informs this court on review is that the Government

failed to meet proof with proof in every step of the litigation here: first in its response to Wilson’s

motion for reconsideration, next at the remand hearing, and now here on Wilson’s appeal of the

district court’s ruling in its favor. In light of the persuasive evidence Wilson proffered in support

of his position that the MLAT request was never mailed to the Bahamas, the Government’s

burden of proving that it was more likely than not that OIA mailed the November letter required

more than circumstantial evidence of questionable origin and the testimony of an OIA employee

wholly without personal knowledge relevant to the MLAT request at issue here. “Whenever

circumstantial evidence is relied upon to prove a fact, circumstances must be proved and cannot

be presumed.” Montgomery-Ward & Co. v. Sewell, 205 F.2d 463, 467 (5th Cir. 1953). As

described in detail above, Lanyi’s testimony was often either contradictory (e.g., the

circumstances surrounding her allegedly mistaken transmission of the wrong page of the old

correspondence log in 1997), displayed a lack of personal knowledge (e.g., her testimony about

office correspondence procedures, when she was never responsible for such matters in her

position as a paralegal specialist and when she admitted total unfamiliarity with the procedures of

the OIA attorney and secretary responsible for the November MLAT), or was wholly without

probative value (e.g., her lay opinion that OIA’s computer software was tamper-proof). This

testimony does not prove the circumstances surrounding the mailing of the letter and the

subsequent correspondence log entry as required by Sewell. Even if we consider the evidence as

equally balanced, the Government still must lose. See Rambo, 521 U.S. at 137 n.9 (quoting

Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. at 281). 
14 There is, however, an important exception to the applicability of the presumption: if the

witness is “equally available” to both parties, any negative inference from one party’s

failure to call that witness is impermissible. McClanahan v. United States, 230 F.2d 919,

925 (5th Cir. 1956) (citation omitted). A missing witness’s availability, however,

is not to be determined from his mere physical presence at the trial or his

accessibility for the service of a subpoena upon him. On the contrary, his

availabilitymaywell depend, among other things, upon hisrelationship to one

or the other of the parties, and the nature of the testimony that he might be

expected to give . . . . 

Id. at 926 (citation omitted). Thus, when the person not called is connected in some way

to one of the parties and “it might be expected that his testimony, if given, would

corroborate” that party’s theory of the case, the missing witness is not considered to be

“equally available” to both parties and the adverse inference arises. Id. at 925 (making

adverse inference when missing witness was party’s attorney whose legal advice was at

issue); see Labit v. Santa Fe Marine, Inc., 526 F.2d 961, 962-63 (5th Cir. 1976)

(suggesting that the negative inference arises when the missing witness is an employee

whose testimony would favor the employer-party); Chapman, 435 F.2d at 1247 (“When a

witness is controlled by one party, failure to call the witness, if his testimony would

elucidate facts in issue, creates an inference which the [court] is permitted to draw against

that party”). 

17

In addition, this circuit has long recognized that a party’s failure to call available witnesses

or produce evidence that would clarify or explain disputed factual issues can give rise to a

presumption that the evidence, if produced, would be unfavorable to that party. See, e.g., Streber

v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 138 F.3d 216, 221-22 (5th Cir. 1998); United States v. Lehmann,

613 F.2d 130, 135 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Chapman, 435 F.2d 1245, 1247 (5th Cir.

1970); United States v. Johnson, 288 F.2d 40, 45 (5th Cir. 1961). The court can only draw a

negative inference when the missing witness has information “peculiarly within his knowledge,”

i.e., a party need not call a witness if her testimony would be cumulative, and the strength of the

inference to be drawn from the witness’s absence varies with the particular facts of each case.14

Streber, 138 F.3d at 221-22 (citations omitted). In Coyle Lines, Inc. v. United States, 195 F.2d
18

737, 741-42 (5th Cir. 1952), this court found a “particularly strong” adverse inference from the

Government’s failure to call employee-witnesses who would have supplied direct testimony

regarding the subject matter of the lawsuit. 

The present case presents a similar situation to that addressed by this court over fifty years

ago in Coyle Lines. The Government failed to call a single witness with actual personal

knowledge of the November 1993 letter or its subsequent entry into the OIA correspondence

tracking system, though all three of the Government employees involved in 1993 were still in the

Government’s employ at the time of the hearing on remand. The OIA attorney and secretary who

allegedly drafted and mailed the letter would have testified to matters “peculiarly within [their]

knowledge,” and their testimony would have been directly relevant to the Government’s case. 

Therefore, the Government’s failure to call its own employees as witnesses when they had crucial

information about this dispositive issue of fact gives rise to a “particularly strong” adverse

inference against it. See Coyle Lines, 195 F.2d at 742.

The district court’s error is highlighted by the Government’s approach before this court. 

Its appellate brief completely ignores Wilson’s argument that the Government failed to meet the

preponderance standard, and the Government offers neither argument nor legal authority

supporting the district court’s finding that the letter was sent. Perhaps the Government found it a

difficult argument to make. Nevertheless, the Government’s complete failure to dispute any of

the factual errors Wilson raises here or to otherwise defend the district court’s ruling – in addition

to the Government’s failure to attempt to subpoena Federal Express records or to call any one of

the potential witnesses who had personal knowledge of the November 1993 letter in the

proceedings below – appears to us to be an implicit acknowledgment that the Government could
19

not, and did not, sustain its burden. Considering the lack of any direct evidence supporting the

Government’s allegation that the letter was sent, the questionable circumstances surrounding the

Government’s tardy production of the correspondence log, Lanyi’s lack of capacity to testify

regarding the mailing of the November 1993 MLAT, and the adverse inference we draw from the

Government’s failure to call available and pertinent witnesses, we hold that the district court

clearly erred in finding that the Government proved that the MLAT letter was sent by a

preponderance of the evidence. The trial court therefore improperly tolled the five-year statute of

limitations on Wilson’s offenses. 

CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, we REVERSE the decision of the district court denying Wilson’s

motion for reconsideration of his motion to dismiss based on the statute of limitations. Because

Wilson was not indicted within five years of the acts allegedly constituting offenses under federal

law, we REVERSE Wilson’s conviction on all counts and VACATE his sentence.