J-A24027-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

RICHARD GEORGE SCHMIDT, M.D. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

STEVEN LEE LEBOON AND CASSANDRA

LEBOON

Appellants No. 3484 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Order Entered on November 24, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County

Civil Division at No.: 2013-00951

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., WECHT, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY WECHT, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 09, 2015

Steven LeBoon (“LeBoon”)1and Cassandra LeBoon appeal the 

November 24, 2014 order in which the trial court resolved several discovery 

motions. We affirm.

A prior panel of this Court summarized the initial factual history of this 

case as follows:

LeBoon suffered from work related injuries when, on May 6, 

2009, management employees of the Alan McIlvain Company 

attempted to perform the tasks of rank and file workers during 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 Although both Steven and Cassandra LeBoon are the 

defendants/appellants in this matter, Steven LeBoon’s injury precipitated all 

of the litigation in this case. Therefore, we use LeBoon to refer to the 

defendants/appellants in the instant litigation and refer directly to Cassandra 

LeBoon when relevant.
J-A24027-15

- 2 -

the course of a labor stoppage. While removing lumber from a 

cutting table, LeBoon injured his right shoulder and later alleged 

injuries to his back and left shoulder. On May 12, 2009, LeBoon 

filed a Workers’ Compensation claim, [in] which LeBoon allege[d]

Liberty Mutual (his employer’s Workers’ Compensation carrier) 

denied on the basis that LeBoon had no medically documented 

injury. Thereafter, LeBoon consulted his personal physician and, 

relying on his health insurance, determined to undergo surgery 

on June 11, 2009. Informed of the pending surgery, Liberty 

Mutual requested that LeBoon undergo an independent medical 

examination (“IME”). Thereafter, IMX Medical Management 

Services, acting on Liberty Mutual’s behalf, scheduled the IME 

with Richard George Schmidt, M.D., to take place on June 19, 

2009. Dr. Schmidt is a board-certified orthopedic surgeon.

Following the examination, Dr. Schmidt completed a Bureau of 

Workers’ Compensation Physician’s Affidavit of Recovery 

attesting that LeBoon was able to return to work. Subsequently, 

Liberty Mutual introduced that affidavit at Workers’ 

Compensation hearings held on July 8, 2009, and October 14, 

2009. In addition, Dr. Schmidt testified at a deposition 

convened in conjunction with the Workers’ Compensation 

hearing in October. [Dr.] Schmidt noted that he had examined 

magnetic resonance images of LeBoon’s shoulder, neck, and 

spine and observed post-surgical changes in the shoulder as well 

as degenerative changes in the spine, but saw no acute changes 

or disc herniation. Although [Dr.] Schmidt conceded that 

LeBoon suffered a work place injury (as LeBoon’s employer had 

also conceded), he opined that the injury had resolved by the 

time he conducted the IME. He described LeBoon’s injuries as a 

transient strain of the shoulders, neck, and lower back and 

suggested that LeBoon’s complaints were indicative of “symptom 

magnification.” [Dr.] Schmidt showed no awareness of LeBoon’s 

operative report, which documented actual tearing in LeBoon’s 

shoulder.

Following the proceedings, on December 31, 2009, Workers’ 

Compensation Judge Bruce K. Doman (“WCJ”) rendered a 

decision granting LeBoon’s claim for Workers’ Compensation 

benefits. In his Findings of Fact in support of the decision, Judge 

Doman found [Dr.] Schmidt’s testimony credible in part, to the 

extent that [Dr.] Schmidt found the work-related injuries of 

LeBoon’s left shoulder and cervical and lumber spines to be 

resolved prior to the date of the IME. The WCJ found [Dr.] 

Schmidt’s testimony not to be credible concerning LeBoon’s right 
J-A24027-15

- 3 -

shoulder, as it appeared to ignore the diagnostic studies and 

operative reports compiled by LeBoon’s treating physicians. In 

addition, the WCJ accepted documentation of LeBoon’s average 

weekly wage at the time of injury and awarded him 

compensation for total disability to be paid on a monthly basis 

over the remainder of LeBoon’s projected life span.

Based on the award, LeBoon elected to settle his claim for a 

lump sum payment of $185,000, subject to the terms of a 

Compromise and Release Agreement by Stipulation Pursuant to 

Section 449 of the Workers’ Compensation Act. In paragraph 

18, LeBoon, with the aid of counsel, inserted the following 

language purporting to limit the scope and effect of the 

Agreement:

This Agreement does not impact in any manner any other 

legal matter or administrative proceeding involving the 

parties. This agreement fully and completely resolves any 

workers’ compensation claim involving the Claimant, 

including the work injury of May 6, 2009.

Compromise and Release Agreement by Stipulation Pursuant to 

Section 449 of the Workers’ Compensation Act, 5/6/10, at 3 ¶18.

Following payment of the award, LeBoon commenced [a] civil 

action, pro se, against Liberty Mutual, IMX and Dr. Schmidt, 

alleging tortious conduct surrounding the manner in which each 

had fulfilled its respective role in the evaluation and processing 

of LeBoon’s Workers’ Compensation claim.1 Although LeBoon’s 

Complaint did not differentiate his causes of action by count, it 

did include summary assertions of intentional infliction of 

emotion distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress and 

fraud, all arising from the mishandling of his Workers’ 

Compensation claim. [As part of a claim that Dr. Schmidt 

inflicted emotional distress by deviating from the standard of 

care, LeBoon submitted a certificate of merit signed by Theron C. 

Male, Ph.D.] It also specified harm resulting from LeBoon’s loss 

of income during the claim’s disposition process including the 

loss of his home and his car, and his family’s dependency on 

public welfare for sustenance. All defendants denied LeBoon’s 

allegations and each filed preliminary objections in the nature of 

demurrer on the grounds, inter alia, that any conduct otherwise 

actionable in tort was subsumed in the remedy of the Workers’ 

Compensation Act. The trial court, the Honorable Clyde W.
J-A24027-15

- 4 -

Waite, granted the defendant’s respective preliminary objections 

and dismissed LeBoon’s complaint with prejudice.

1

LeBoon had previously commenced an action in the 

United States District Court for the Eastern District of 

Pennsylvania naming IMX and Dr. Schmidt as defendants. 

Shortly after commencing that action LeBoon amended the 

complaint, adding Liberty Mutual as a defendant. By order 

of April 18, 2011, the court dismissed LeBoon’s action 

without prejudice.

LeBoon v. Schmidt, IMX Med. Mgmt. Svcs., Inc., & Liberty Mutual Ins. 

Co., 2235 EDA 2011, slip. op at 2-5 (Pa. Super. Feb. 28, 2012).

LeBoon appealed the dismissal of his complaint to this Court, and we 

affirmed the trial court on February 28, 2012. LeBoon then filed a petition 

for allowance of appeal with our Supreme Court, which was denied on 

August 16, 2012. 

On February 13, 2013, Dr. Schmidt filed an initial complaint against 

LeBoon. On May 31, 2013, Dr. Schmidt filed an amended complaint in which 

he asserted claims of wrongful use of civil proceedings and abuse of process. 

Dr. Schmidt also sought counsel fees and an injunction to prevent LeBoon 

from filing further lawsuits against Dr. Schmidt in relation to LeBoon’s 

workers’ compensation claim, from issuing subpoenas for Dr. Schmidt’s 

testimony or documents related to the workers’ compensation claim, and 

from contacting Dr. Schmidt.2 As suggested by the foregoing history, the 

____________________________________________

2 On March 12, 2013, LeBoon filed a new federal lawsuit against Dr. 

Schmidt, which was dismissed for failure to state a claim.
J-A24027-15

- 5 -

filing of the complaint initiated a flurry of activity and over two hundred 

docket entries have been made in the intervening time.

The trial court summarized the most recent procedural history of this 

case as follows:

On November 20, 2014, [the trial court] held a hearing to 

resolve ten discovery motions filed by both parties to this 

litigation. [The trial court] then entered an Order on November 

24, 2014 (“the November 24th Order”) ruling on each discovery 

motion from the November 20th hearing. As is relevant to this 

Appeal, the November 24th Order: (i) granted [Dr. Schmidt’s] 

motion to compel Theron C. Male, Ph.D. to testify regarding his 

psychological care and treatment of [LeBoon]; (ii) granted [Dr. 

Schmidt’s] motion to compel Steven Goldflam to produce 

[LeBoon’s] tax returns for the years 2007-2013; (iii) granted 

[Dr. Schmidt’s] motion to overrule [LeBoon’s] objections to over 

twenty interrogatories; (iv) granted [Dr. Schmidt’s] motion to 

overrule [LeBoon’s] objections to seventeen requests for 

production of documents; and (v) granted [Dr. Schmidt’s] 

motion to compel both [LeBoon and Cassandra LeBoon] to 

appear for a deposition.

On November 26, 2014, [LeBoon] filed a Notice of Appeal from 

that Order. . . .

Trial Court Opinion (“T.C.O.”), 12/26/2014, at 1 (unnumbered).

The trial court did not order, and LeBoon did not file, a concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).

LeBoon raises the following issues for review:

1. Were [LeBoon’s] rights under 45 CFR 1644.512(e), Pa.R.C.P.

4033.1, Pa.R.C.P. 4011, Pa.R.A.P. 313, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5929 

and 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5944 violated due to [the trial judge’s] 

err[or] when he granted [Dr. Schmidt’s] Motion to Compel 

Theron C. Male to testify about his psychological care and 

treatment of [LeBoon]?
J-A24027-15

- 6 -

2. Were [the LeBoons’] rights under Pa.R.C.P. 4003.1, 23 USC 

§ 7525, IRSRRA’98, The Privacy Act of 1974, Pa.R.A.P. 313, 

and 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5928 violated due to [the trial judge’s] 

err[or] when he granted [Dr. Schmidt’s] Motion to Compel 

Steve Goldflam produce [LeBoon’s] tax returns for the years 

2007-2013?

3. Were [the LeBoons’] rights under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5923, 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 5924, Pa.R.C.P. 4003.1, Pa.R.C.P. 4011, and 

Pa.R.A.P. 313 violated due to [the trial judge’s] err[or] when 

he granted [Dr. Schmidt’s] Motion Overrule [the LeBoons’] 

Objections to Interrogatories?

4. Were [the LeBoons’] rights under 42 Pa.C.S.A § 5923, 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 5924, Pa.R.C.P. 4003.1, Pa.R.C.P. 4011, 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 5928 and Pa.R.A.P. 313 violated due to [the trial 

judge’s] err[or] when he granted [Dr. Schmidt’s] Motion to 

Overrule [the LeBoons] Objections to Requests for Production 

of Documents?

5. Were [the LeBoons’] rights under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5923, 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 5924, Pa.R.C.P. 4003.1, Pa.R.C.P. 4011, 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 5928 and Pa.R.A.P. 313 violated due to [the trial 

judge’s] err[or] when he granted [Dr. Schmidt’s] Motion to 

Compel the deposition of [LeBoon]?

6. Were [the LeBoons’] rights under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5923, 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 5924, Pa.R.C.P. 4003.1, Pa.R.C.P. 4011, 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 5928 and Pa.R.A.P. 313 violated due to [the trial 

judge’s] err[or] when he granted [Dr. Schmidt’s] Motion to 

Compel the deposition of Cassandra LeBoon?

7. Were [the LeBoons’] rights under rules of Discovery violated 

due to [the trial judge’s] err when he denied access to [Dr. 

Schmidt’s] financial tax returns, even after he stated in the 

Amended Complaint that [Dr.] Schmidt “has been forced to 

expend time at the expense of his medical practice”?

LeBoon’s Brief at 6-7 (citations modified).

We first must determine whether we have jurisdiction. LeBoon asserts 

that the order is a collateral order pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 313 and, therefore, 
J-A24027-15

- 7 -

we have jurisdiction. However, LeBoon provides no argument in support of 

his assertion.

Addressing this issue, we have stated:

“[I]n general, discovery orders are not final, and are therefore 

unappealable.” Jones v. Faust, 852 A.2d 1201, 1203 (Pa.

Super. 2004). However, “discovery orders involving privileged 

material are nevertheless appealable as collateral to the principal 

action” pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 313 (“Collateral Orders”). Id.

Rule 313(a) states that “[a]n appeal may be taken as of right 

from a collateral order of [a] . . . lower court.” Pa.R.A.P. 313(a).

A collateral order is an order separable from and collateral 

to the main cause of action where the right involved is too 

important to be denied review and the question presented 

is such that if review is postponed until final judgment in 

the case, the claim will be irreparably lost.

Pa.R.A.P. 313(b). “A discovery order is collateral only when it is 

separate and distinct from the underlying cause of action.” 

Feldman v. Ide, 915 A.2d 1208, 1211 (Pa. Super. 2007).

As this Court explained recently:

Prior to the decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 

Ben v. Schwartz, 729 A.2d 547 (Pa. 1999), Pennsylvania 

courts did not often entertain interlocutory appeals from 

discovery orders, unless the discovery order was not 

related in any way to the merits of the action itself. In 

Schwartz, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court revised this 

rule and held that an appeal from a discovery order raising 

a question of the application of a privilege is separable 

from the underlying issue, so long as the issue of privilege 

may be addressed by an appellate court without analysis 

of the underlying issue. Schwartz, 729 A.2d at 551–52.

Castellani v. Scranton Times, L.P., 916 A.2d 648, 652 (Pa.

Super. 2007). 

T.M. v. Elwyn, Inc., 950 A.2d 1050, 1056-57 (Pa. Super. 2008) (some 

citations modified; others omitted).
J-A24027-15

- 8 -

As stated above, normally, we first would determine whether the order 

appealed is a collateral order. However, LeBoon has asserted his arguments 

about privilege in the merits portion of his brief and intertwined the 

jurisdictional and merits issues. Therefore, we examine each issue in turn to 

determine whether the order is collateral or interlocutory and then discuss 

the merits if we have the jurisdiction to do so.

In his first issue, LeBoon asserts that the trial court erred in permitting 

Dr. Male to be deposed regarding LeBoon’s treatment. LeBoon argues that 

the psychologist-patient privilege pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5944 prevents 

disclosure of any information regarding treatment. He also asserts that he 

has not waived any Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 

1996 (“HIPAA”) protection. LeBoon’s Brief at 14-15.

We have previously found similar claims to be reviewable as collateral

orders. See Gormley v. Edgar, 995 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa. Super. 2010). 

Therefore, we proceed to the merits. 

Our standard of review is well-settled. “Generally, in reviewing the 

propriety of a discovery order, our standard of review is whether the trial 

court committed an abuse of discretion. However, to the extent that we are 

faced with questions of law, our scope of review is plenary.” Id. at 1202.

In reviewing a claim of privilege in mental health records pursuant to 

the Mental Health Procedures Act, our Supreme Court stated that “[i]t must 

be emphasized that evidentiary privileges have been viewed by this Court to 

be in derogation of the search for truth, and are generally disfavored for this 
J-A24027-15

- 9 -

reason. . . .” Octave ex rel. Octave v. Walker, 103 A.3d 1255, 1262 (Pa. 

2014). In that case, the Court held that “a patient waives his confidentiality 

protections under the MHPA where, judged by an objective standard, he 

knew or reasonably should have known his mental health would be placed 

directly at issue by filing the lawsuit.” Id. In Gormley, we affirmed the 

trial court’s decision to order disclosure of mental health records, despite the 

plaintiff’s claim of psychologist-patient privilege, when the plaintiff put her 

mental health at issue in the case by claiming anxiety as a result of an 

accident. Gormley, 995 A.2d at 1206; see also Rost v. State Bd. of 

Psychology, 659 A.2d 626, 629 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995) (“Waiver of the 

privilege may occur where the client places the confidential information at 

issue in the case. It may also be waived where there is no longer an 

expectation of privacy regarding the information because the client has 

made it known to third persons.”) (citations omitted). Here, in the 

underlying case, by claiming infliction of emotional distress, LeBoon firmly 

put his mental health at issue. Therefore, he waived any claim to privilege.

Insofar as LeBoon has asserted a privilege pursuant to HIPAA, he cites

“45 CFR 1644.512(e).” Although that section does not exist, we presume 

that LeBoon intended to cite 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e). The section provides 

that “a covered entity may disclose protected health information in the 

course of any judicial . . . proceeding” “in response to an order of a court . . 

. provided that the covered entity disclosed only the protected health 

information expressly authorized by such order.” 45 C.F.R. 
J-A24027-15

- 10 -

§ 164.512(e)(1)(1). Here, the trial court issued such an order directing Dr. 

Male to testify regarding his treatment of LeBoon. Dr. Male can do so 

without violating HIPAA. LeBoon has raised no other HIPAA privilege and 

has, therefore, waived any other that he might have raised. The trial court 

did not abuse its discretion in ordering this discovery.

LeBoon next contends the trial court erred in ordering his bookkeeper 

to provide copies of his tax returns. LeBoon cites a variety of statutes to 

assert a privilege for those returns. LeBoon’s Brief at 16-18.

However, none of the “privileges” LeBoon asserts is even remotely 

relevant. He cites the attorney-client privilege, but no attorney is involved 

in this case. He cites two general rules of discovery, Pa.R.C.P. 4003.1 and 

4011, neither of which involves a privilege. He cites the collateral order

rule, Pa.R.A.P. 313, without any explanation as to how that would assert a 

privilege. He asserts a federal privilege between a taxpayer and a federally 

authorized tax practitioner, 26 U.S.C. § 7525, although Mr. Goldflam has not 

been alleged to be a federally authorized tax practitioner.3 LeBoon purports 

to find a privilege in other federal laws without citation to any statute or 

decisional authority. Nothing LeBoon cites provides a privilege that would 

protect his tax returns. As no actual assertion of privilege has been made, 

____________________________________________

3 Under federal law, a certified public accountant may practice before 

the Internal Revenue Service. See 5 U.S.C.A. § 500. The record reveals 

that Mr. Goldflam is not an accountant, let alone a certified public 

accountant. 
J-A24027-15

- 11 -

there is no right that is too important to be denied review. Therefore, the 

order to compel the production of the tax returns is not a collateral order,

and we do not have jurisdiction to reach its merits. 

In the next four issues, LeBoon asserts that the trial court erred by 

failing to recognize that a spousal privilege precludes answers to 

interrogatories, production of documents, and the taking of LeBoon’s and 

Cassandra LeBoon’s depositions. We first address jurisdiction.

As with other claims of privilege, the privilege would be lost if review 

were postponed until after a final judgment. The spousal privilege has long

been recognized in our law and serves an important public policy of 

preserving marital harmony. See Commonwealth v. Mattison, 82 A.3d 

386, 394 (Pa. 2013) (“The spousal confidential communications privilege has 

its roots in common law and ‘is based upon considerations of public policy, 

as in the case of husband and wife to preserve the peace, harmony and 

confidence’ in their relations.”). In this case, the privilege also is separable 

from the underlying issue of wrongful use of judicial process.4 Thus, Rule 

313 is satisfied.

____________________________________________

4 But see Fid. Nat. Title Ins. Co. of New York v. United Settlement 

Servs., Inc., 924 A.2d 1270, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2007) (holding that spousal 

privilege was not separable in case alleging that husband and wife engaged 

in fraud, because the spousal privilege does not extend to communications 

that perpetrate a fraud, and the court would have to determine whether 

fraud was committed to determine whether the privilege applied).
J-A24027-15

- 12 -

The two privileges cited by LeBoon are as follows:

Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, in a civil matter 

neither husband nor wife shall be competent or permitted to 

testify to confidential communications made by one to the other, 

unless this privilege is waived upon the trial.

42 Pa.C.S.A § 5923.

In a civil matter neither husband nor wife shall be competent or 

permitted to testify against each other.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5924(a).

A communication does not qualify as a confidential communication 

when it has been divulged to a third party. Commonwealth v. G.Y., 63 

A.3d 259, 267 (Pa. Super. 2013).

5

 “The determination of what constitutes a 

confidential communication depends upon whether the defendant has a 

reasonable expectation that the communication will remain confidential.” 

Mattison, 82 A.3d at 394. Additionally, our Supreme Court has held that, 

while communication can be non-verbal, observations of conduct without 

“the attribution of a message” would not be a communication between 

spouses. Id. at 395.

We also have recognized that the testimonial privilege requires that 

the spouse must be called upon to testify against the other for it to apply. 

____________________________________________

5 There are few cases addressing sections 5923 and 5924. Therefore, 

we look to the cases that construed the substantially similar equivalents in 

criminal proceedings, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 5913 and 5914.
J-A24027-15

- 13 -

No such privilege exists when the testimony is not adverse to the other 

spouse. Com. ex rel. Platt v. Platt, 404 A.2d 410, 413 (Pa. Super. 1979).

With this background in mind, we address each of LeBoon’s 

contentions in turn. Regarding interrogatories, LeBoon asserts that 

Cassandra LeBoon has no independent knowledge about the case and that 

the only answers that she could supply would be known to her through 

confidential communications with LeBoon. LeBoon’s Brief at 19-21. LeBoon 

makes the same argument with respect to the production of documents. Id.

at 22-24.

In his written answers, LeBoon only claimed spousal privilege in 

response to one of more than twenty disputed interrogatories. Similarly, he 

did not raise that privilege as a response to any additional interrogatories at 

argument. LeBoon also did not assert a spousal privilege to any of the 

disputed document requests, and we can find no such assertion in the 

hearing transcript. Therefore, because the privilege was not raised as an 

issue before the trial court, the issue is waived on appeal. See Majorsky v. 

Douglas, 58 A.3d 1250, 1267 (Pa. Super. 2012); Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).

For the interrogatory in which the issue was preserved, the privilege is 

inapplicable. That interrogatory asked whether an attorney provided 

assistance to the LeBoons in the underlying suit. Because this would involve 

a third party, no spousal privilege would apply.

LeBoon next contends that the trial court erred in granting Dr. 

Schmidt’s motions to compel LeBoon’s and Cassandra LeBoon’s depositions. 
J-A24027-15

- 14 -

LeBoon argues that the deposition would require him to divulge confidential 

communications with Cassandra LeBoon. LeBoon contends that the trial 

court ordered him and Cassandra LeBoon to answer all questions “regardless 

of [the] privilege asserted.” LeBoon’s Brief at 26, 30. LeBoon also argues 

that Cassandra LeBoon cannot be forced to testify against her husband, so 

anything elicited in her deposition would be inadmissible in court. LeBoon’s 

Brief at 25-32.

LeBoon and Cassandra LeBoon cannot assert a blanket spousal 

privilege that entirely prevents Dr. Schmidt from questioning them. The 

privilege only applies to confidential communications between spouses. It is 

not reasonable to suggest that every question that Dr. Schmidt would ask 

would elicit a confidential communication. Additionally, the trial court did 

not preclude the LeBoons from asserting a spousal privilege during the 

deposition. The trial court stated:

You will appear for deposition. Mrs. LeBoon will appear for 

deposition. If there is an objection to a specific question 

regarding a communication between spouses or against another 

spouse, you can make that objection, you can provide the 

answer, and then the trial judge will determine whether or not it 

will proceed further.

Notes of Testimony, 11/20/2014, at 68-69. It is clear that the court 

specifically permitted the LeBoons to object to specific questions, subject to 

the trial court’s ruling upon those objections, but not to avoid a deposition 

entirely based upon a blanket assertion of spousal privilege. Thus, no relief 

is due at this time.
J-A24027-15

- 15 -

As to LeBoon’s final objection, our rules state that “[i]t is not 

ground[s] for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at 

the trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to 

the discovery of admissible evidence.” Pa.R.C.P. 4003.1(b). Therefore, it 

does not matter if Cassandra LeBoon’s deposition testimony would not be 

admissible at trial, provided that it reasonably could lead to admissible 

evidence. Because Cassandra LeBoon was a party to the underlying lawsuit 

and was involved in events leading to the current litigation, it is reasonable 

to anticipate that her testimony, even if not admissible, would lead to the 

discovery of admissible evidence. Again, a blanket claim of privilege cannot 

shield Cassandra LeBoon from being deposed, although she certainly may 

assert a privilege in response to individual questions as the trial court 

acknowledged. Because the trial court correctly disposed of the assertions 

of spousal privilege that were raised before it, there was not abuse of 

discretion.

Finally, LeBoon asserts that the trial court erred in failing to compel 

Dr. Schmidt to turn over Dr. Schmidt’s tax returns. However, LeBoon does 

not argue that any privilege applies to this issue. See LeBoon’s Brief at 33-

34. Because there is no privilege at issue, this is not a collateral issue and 

we do not have jurisdiction to review its merits.

Order affirmed.
J-A24027-15

- 16 -

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/9/2015