IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

May 21, 2019 Session

DOUGLAS A MESSERLI, ET AL. v. VICKIE SUE WILLIAMS, ET AL.

Appeal from the Chancery Court for Knox County

No. 188158-3 Michael W. Moyers, Chancellor

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No. E2018-01807-COA-R3-CV

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This action was filed by two brothers, after the death of their father, contesting the 

validity of an amendment to their father’s trust agreement. The brothers alleged that their 

siblings coerced their infirmed father to amend his trust in such a manner that was 

favorable to the siblings’ pecuniary interests and that two sisters had a confidential 

relationship with their father. The trial court directed a verdict in favor of the defendants. 

The plaintiffs appealed. We affirm the decision. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court

Affirmed; Case Remanded

JOHN W. MCCLARTY, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which CHARLES D.

SUSANO, JR., and THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, JJ., joined.

T. Michael Craig-Grubbs, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellants, Douglas A. Messerli, 

and Charles Messerli.

Mital D. Patel, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellees, Vickie Sue Williams, Logan 

Williams, Beverly K. Blakeman, Billy Messerli, and Lisa D. Edquist.1

OPINION

I. Background

Roy A. Messerli (“Father”) was a retired nuclear submarine inspector, a general 

contractor, and an owner/operator of several rental properties. Father lived in California 

until about 2006, when he and his wife moved to Knoxville, Tennessee. Their daughter, 

 

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Edquist, a defendant in the original court proceeding, was a witness in the appeal, not an 

appellee.

09/18/2019
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Beverly K. Blakeman (“Blakeman”) lived with her parents.

On January 10, 2008, Father executed updated estate planning documents which 

included a Will, Power of Attorney, Living Will, and the “Roy A. Messerli 2008 

Revocable Trust Agreement” (“the 2008 Trust”). These documents had been prepared by 

Knoxville attorney Dale C. Allen. 

At the time of execution of these documents, Father was a widower. He named as 

his children: Douglas A. Messerli, Billy Steven Messerli, Beverly K. Blakeman, Vickie 

Sue Williams (“Defendant Williams”), Lisa Doreen Edquist, and Charles Messerli. 

Charles Messerli was Father’s son from his first marriage. The other five children were 

from his second marriage. Father appointed Defendant Williams as the Personal 

Representative of his Will and his attorney-in-fact, with Blakeman as the successor. 

Father appointed Defendant Williams, Blakeman, and Logan Williams as Co-Trustees of 

the 2008 Trust. If any of the original trustees were unable or unwilling to serve, the 

remaining trustees could serve without appointing a successor. A successor trustee could 

be appointed by Father, if not disabled, or by his children, but only those who were not 

disabled. In addition, the 2008 Trust provided Blakeman the option to purchase Father’s 

home within six months from the date of Father’s death.

On August 3, 2010, Father executed an amendment to the 2008 Trust (“the 2010 

Amendment”), pursuant to Section 9 of the 2008 Trust. Douglas A. Messerli and Charles 

Messerli (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) contest this amendment in this appeal.

 

In 2011, Father was diagnosed with lung cancer. He passed away on December 3, 

2012, survived by his six children. 

On June 3, 2013, Plaintiffs filed a complaint contesting the validity of the 2010 

Amendment. Plaintiffs alleged that in 2010, (1) Father’s mental and physical condition 

was such that he could no longer care for himself; (2) Blakeman was Father’s primary 

caretaker and this position created a confidential relationship between the two; (3) 

Defendant Williams met with attorney Allen without Father, insisting on changes to the 

estate planning documents Allen had previously prepared; (4) Father lacked the mental 

capacity to prepare the 2010 Amendment and that all or some of the following 

individuals (Defendant Williams, Logan Williams, Blakeman, Edquist, and Billy 

Messerli) (collectively, “Defendants”) drafted the 2010 Amendment and coerced Father

to sign the document; and (5) the combination of Father’s diminished physical and 

mental capacity and Defendants’ confidential relationship with Father “raise[d] a 

presumption that the purported 2010 Amendment was the product of duress and undue 

influence.”

The trial court entered an Order on November 17, 2017, finding that Plaintiffs’ 

challenge to the 2010 Amendment on the ground that Father lacked mental capacity 
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could not be substantiated with any medical records. The trial court also entered an 

Order on March 20, 2018, stating that Plaintiffs’ claim that Defendant Williams, by virtue 

of her appointment as attorney-in-fact held a confidential relationship with Father, was 

unfounded, as Defendant Williams never exercised that appointment. Furthermore, the 

court also granted, in part, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to 

the allegations of undue influence against Defendant Williams. The trial court did 

determine that genuine issues of material fact existed as to Plaintiffs’ claims that

Blakeman exercised dominion and control over Father to establish a confidential 

relationship and that she unduly influenced Father to execute the 2010 Amendment.

The trial commenced on August 29, 2018. Plaintiffs argued that Blakeman, taking 

advantage of Father’s age and failing physical health, exercised control over his finances. 

Plaintiffs claimed that Blakeman’s personal financial issues motivated her to unduly 

influence Father to amend the 2008 Trust. At the close of Plaintiffs’ proof, the trial court

granted Defendants’ motion for directed verdict, stating that it did not believe that 

reasonable minds could differ on whether the burden of proving the confidential 

relationship had been met. 

II. ISSUE

The issue raised in this appeal is whether the trial court erred in granting a directed 

verdict in favor of Defendants on the issue of whether Blakeman had a confidential 

relationship with Father.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

An appellate court must review a trial court’s ruling on a motion for directed 

verdict de novo. Brown v. Christian Bros. Univ., 428 S.W.3d 38, 49 (Tenn. Ct. App. 

2013) (citing Brown v. Crown Equip. Corp., 181 S.W.3d 268, 281 (Tenn. 2005) (citing 

Gaston v. Tenn. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 120 S.W.3d 815, 819 (Tenn. 2003)). “Directed 

verdicts are available in will contest cases to the same extent that they are available to 

other civil cases.” Mitchell v. Smith, 779 S.W. 2d 384, 387 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989) (citing

Scott v. Atkins, 314 S.W.2d 52, 60 (1957)).

When deciding a motion for a directed verdict, “courts must take the strongest 

legitimate view of the evidence against the directed verdict and must deny the motion in 

any case where all reasonable persons would not reach the same conclusion.” Brown, 

428 S.W.3d at 49-50 (citing Smith v. Inman Realty Co., 846 S.W.2d 819, 821 (Tenn. Ct. 

App. 1992); Brown, 181 S.W.3d at 281; Gaston, 120 S.W.3d at 819).

Under Rule 50 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, to circumvent a motion 
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for a directed verdict, the nonmoving party must present enough evidence to establish a 

prima facie case on every element of its case. Brown, 428 S.W.3d at 50 (citing 

Harrogate Corp. v. Systems Sales Corp., 915 S.W.2d 812, 818 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995)). 

The legal question before the appellate court is whether, for each element, the material 

evidence presented was sufficient to create a jury issue. Id. (citing Richardson v. Miller, 

44 S.W.3d 1, 30 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000)).

IV. DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs assert that before Father executed the 2010 Amendment, Blakeman, as 

his caretaker, held a confidential relationship with him. Plaintiffs also assert that at the 

time of the execution of the 2010 Amendment, Blakeman took advantage of Father’s age 

and failing health and exerted undue influence over him to force the 2010 Amendment, a 

document which is favorable to Defendants’ pecuniary interests.

Because confidential relationships can exist in a variety of forms, our courts have 

not clearly defined the elements constituting a confidential relationship. In re Estate of 

Morrison, No. E2014-00764-COA-R3-CV, 2015 WL 2258286, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. 

2015) (citing Robinson v. Robinson, 517 S.W.2d 202, 206 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1974)). This 

court, however, has rejected the notion that a confidential relationship is merely a 

relationship of mutual trust, but rather is one 

where confidence is placed by one in the other and the 

recipient of that confidence is the dominant personality, with 

the ability, because of that confidence, to influence and 

exercise domain over the weaker or dominated party, such as 

nurse and invalid, trusted business advisor and friend, etc.

Iacometti v. Frassinelli, 494 S.W.2d 496, 499 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1973) (citing Bayliss v. 

Williams, 46 Tenn. 440 (6 Cold.) (1869)). 

Because it cannot be presumed that in a parent-adult child relationship, one person 

exercises control over the other, the relationship between the two is not necessarily a 

confidential one. Iacometti, 494 S.W.2d at 499. Unless it can be proven that the free 

agency of the parent or adult-child was destroyed, either by way of physical or mental 

deterioration, or through fraud or duress, the relationship is assumed not to be 

confidential in nature. Kelly v. Allen, 558 S.W.2d 845, 848 (Tenn. 1977).

In this case, the record does not substantiate that a confidential relationship existed 

between Father and Blakeman when the 2010 Amendment was executed. Sufficient 

proof has not been presented that would lead reasonable minds to conclude that 

Blakeman exercised dominion and control over Father. Plaintiffs assert that because 
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Father was of advanced age and declining physical health, he depended on Blakeman for

assistance in his daily life. However, according to the preponderance of the evidence, 

Father showed no signs of susceptibility to influence. No medical records were produced 

indicating that Father was unable to live independently or care for himself. Blakeman

appears to have resided with Father not because he needed a caregiver but on her own 

accord.

Plaintiffs further assert that Father’s dependence on Blakeman enabled her to 

assume command of his finances. They point to withdrawals made by Blakeman from 

the joint bank account she held with Father as proof that Blakeman exercised control over 

Father’s finances. Of particular contention is one withdrawal in the amount of $20,000. 

Plaintiffs compare the instant case with Kelley v. Johns, 96 S.W.3d 189 (Tenn. Ct. App. 

2002), in which the question arose whether son had a confidential relationship with his 

father and used that relationship to unduly influence his father to draft a new will. In 

Kelley, we observed: “In addition to proving the existence of a confidential relationship 

between two family members, a will’s contestant must establish at least one other 

suspicious circumstance, such as a transaction benefitting the dominant party in the 

confidential relationship.” Id. at 197. There was evidence in Kelley that the son, as an 

authorized signer on his father’s accounts, wrote several checks payable to himself, his 

various businesses, and his wife’s daughter. This did not happen in the case before us. 

Here, the evidence shows that, from January through September 2010 (one month after

the 2010 Amendment was executed), Father wrote the majority of the checks from the 

joint checking account to pay bills. The $20,000 withdrawal by Blakeman was wired to 

Logan Williams and was ultimately paid back. It appears to have been a loan.

Plaintiffs also contend that the 2010 Amendment directly conflicts with Father’s 

intentions in the 2008 Trust and with Father’s signed statement that he loved all of his 

children equally. The terms of the 2008 Trust provide for revocation or amendments to 

the trust through a written instrument. Father abided by these terms when he executed, in 

the presence of a notary, the 2010 Amendment. Furthermore, simply because “a will 

may be unnatural, unfair or unjust creates of itself no presumption that the testator was 

incompetent at the time of its execution.” Farmers Union Bank of Henning v. Johnson, 

181 S.W.2d 369, 373 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1943). Plaintiffs may believe that the 2010 

Amendment is unnatural or unfair, but that does not prove that Father was incompetent or 

was being unduly influenced by Blakeman.
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V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the trial court’s decision is affirmed and the case 

remanded for further proceedings as may be necessary. Costs of this appeal are assessed 

to the Appellants, Douglas A. Messerli and Charles Messerli.

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JOHN W. MCCLARTY, JUDGE