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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

FOR PUBLICATION

January 9, 2018

9:00 a.m.

In re Miller Minors.

No. 338871

Jackson Circuit Court

Family Division

LC No. 16-005854-NB; 

16-005855-NB

Before: O’CONNELL, P.J., and BECKERING and STEPHENS, JJ.

O’CONNELL, P.J.

Petitioner, Adoption Associates, a child placement agency, appeals by leave granted the 

trial court’s order denying petitions to terminate parental rights concerning children surrendered 

under the Safe Delivery of Newborns Law, MCL 712.1 et seq. The trial court concluded that the 

Safe Delivery of Newborns Law only applied to the mother of the surrendered children but not to 

the legal father. We reverse. 

I. BACKGROUND 

In August 2016, a woman gave birth to twins. She surrendered the twins to the hospital 

the day after they were born under the Safe Delivery of Newborns Law. The surrendering 

mother did not provide her address or marital status, she gave no other indication that she was 

married, and she declined to identify the father. Adoption Associates took custody of the 

children and placed them with prospective adoptive parents. In September 2016, the adoption 

agency filed petitions to terminate the parental rights of the surrendering parent and the 

nonsurrendering parent. 

Also in September 2016, Adoption Associates requested the children’s birth certificates 

for purposes of the adoption. In October 2016, the Vital Records Office notified the agency that 

it could not provide the birth certificates because of an “unresolved paternity issue.” After the 
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Vital Records Office learned that the mother was married, although it is not clear how, it 

produced birth certificates in December 2016 listing the mother’s husband as the father.1 

This development raised the issue whether the adoption agency had a duty to notify the 

man listed as the father on the birth certificates about the surrender of the children. The adoption 

agency protested that it did not. In a written order, the trial court concluded that the Safe 

Delivery of Newborns Law only applied to the mother in this case, but not the legal father

identified on the birth certificates. 

II. ANALYSIS 

This case concerns the intersection of the Safe Delivery of Newborns Law with the 

presumption of legitimacy. We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. Parks v 

Parks, 304 Mich App 232, 237; 850 NW2d 595 (2014). The primary goal of statutory 

interpretation is to effectuate the Legislature’s intent. Sinicropi v Mazurek, 273 Mich App 149, 

156; 729 NW2d 256 (2006). We do so by applying the statute as written if it is unambiguous. 

Parks, 304 Mich App at 237-238. 

This Court reads the statute as a whole and generally reads statutes covering the same 

subject matter together. Sinicropi, 273 Mich App at 157. However, the Safe Delivery of 

Newborns Law provides that neither “a provision in another chapter of this act” nor the Child 

Custody Act, MCL 722.21 et seq., apply to the Safe Delivery of Newborns Law unless 

specifically stated. MCL 712.2(3). 

A. SAFE DELIVERY OF NEWBORNS LAW 

The Safe Delivery of Newborns Law “encourage[s] parents of unwanted newborns to 

deliver them to emergency service providers instead of abandoning them[.]” People v Schaub, 

254 Mich App 110, 115 n 1; 656 NW2d 824 (2002). The statute permits a parent to surrender a 

child to an emergency service provider within 72 hours of the child’s birth. MCL 712.1(2)(k); 

MCL 712.3(1). When the emergency service provider takes temporary custody of the child, the 

emergency service provider must reasonably try to inform the parent that surrendering the child 

begins the adoption process and that the parent has 28 days to petition for custody of the child. 

MCL 712.3(1)(b) and (c). The emergency service provider must furnish the parent with written 

notice about the legal custody process. MCL 712.3(1)(d). The emergency service provider 

should also try to inform the parent that, before the child can be adopted, “the state is required to 

make a reasonable attempt to identify the other parent, and then ask the parent to identify the 

other parent.” MCL 712.3(2)(e). Finally, the emergency service provider must take the newborn 

to a hospital, if the child was not born in the hospital, and the hospital must take temporary 

protective custody of the child. MCL 712.5(1). The hospital then notifies a child placement 

agency about the surrender, and the child placement agency has various obligations, including 

 1 Effective January 18, 2018, a birth certificate for a newborn surrendered under the Safe 

Delivery of Newborns Law must list the parents as “ ‘unknown’ ” and the newborn as “ ‘Baby 

Doe.’ ” 2017 PA 142. 
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making “reasonable efforts to identify, locate, and provide notice of the surrender of the newborn 

to the nonsurrendering parent” within 28 days, which may require “publication in a newspaper of 

general circulation . . . .” MCL 712.7(f). 

Either the surrendering parent or the nonsurrendering parent may file a petition to gain 

custody of the child within 28 days of surrender and published notice of surrender, respectively. 

MCL 712.10(1). If neither the surrendering parent nor the nonsurrendering parent files a petition 

for custody within 28 days of surrender or notice of surrender, the child placement agency must 

immediately file a petition with the court to terminate the rights of the surrendering parent and 

the nonsurrendering parent. MCL 712.17(2) and (3). The agency “shall present evidence that 

demonstrates that the surrendering parent released the newborn and that demonstrates the efforts 

made by the child placing agency to identify, locate, and provide notice to the nonsurrendering 

parent.” MCL 712.17(4). If the agency meets its burden of proof by a preponderance of the 

evidence, the trial “court shall enter an order terminating parental rights of the surrendering 

parent and the nonsurrendering parent under this chapter.” MCL 712.17(5). The Safe Delivery 

of Newborns Law does not define “parent,” surrendering parent,” or “nonsurrendering parent.” 

See MCL 712.1(2) (definitions). 

B. PRESUMPTION OF LEGITIMACY 

When a child is born during a marriage, the child is presumed to be the issue of that 

marriage. Barnes v Jeudevine, 475 Mich 696, 703; 718 NW2d 311 (2006). The Revocation of 

Paternity Act (RPA), MCL 722.1431 et seq., defines a “presumed father” as “a man who is 

presumed to be the child’s father by virtue of his marriage to the child’s mother at the time of the 

child’s conception or birth.” MCL 722.1433(3). The RPA governs actions to determine that a 

presumed father is not a child’s father. MCL 722.1435(4). 

A biological father has no standing to seek a declaration of paternity under the Paternity 

Act, MCL 722.711 et seq., when the child’s mother is married to another man unless a court has 

previously determined that the child was born out of wedlock. Pecoraro v Rostagno-Wallat, 291 

Mich App 303, 311-313; 805 NW2d 226 (2011). The Paternity Act defines a child born out of 

wedlock as “a child begotten and born to a woman who was not married from the conception to 

the date of the birth of the child, or a child that the court has determined to be a child born or 

conceived during a marriage but not the issue of that marriage.” MCL 722.711(a). Until the

biological father of a child obtains a declaration of paternity, he has no lawful rights to a child 

who has a presumed father because “a child may have only one legal father.” Helton v Beaman, 

304 Mich App 97, 106; 850 NW2d 515 (2014), aff’d 497 Mich 1001 (2015). 

C. SYNTHESIS 

We conclude that the Safe Delivery of Newborns Law does apply to the husband of a 

surrendering mother. The trial court’s decision and the nonsurrendering parent’s argument rely 

on the fallacy that the children of a married mother could have two legal fathers. The trial court 

and the nonsurrendering parent were concerned about a situation in which an order terminating 

the parental rights of the mother and the nonsurrendering parent would only terminate the rights 

of a biological father but not the husband of the surrendering mother. In this scenario, the
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husband of the surrendering mother could seek to assert his parental rights to the surrendered 

child after the child has been adopted. 

However, a child may have only one legal father, Helton, 304 Mich App at 106, so the 

legal father is presumed to be the mother’s husband until that presumption is defeated, Barnes, 

475 Mich at 703. The Safe Delivery of Newborns Law tests this presumption through DNA 

testing if either a presumed or putative father attempts to gain custody of the child, leaving only 

one as the true legal father. See MCL 712.11(1). 

If no one claims paternity, the Safe Delivery of Newborns Law provides for termination

of the parental rights of the nonsurrendering parent. MCL 712.17(3). The Safe Delivery of 

Newborns Law refers to the “nonsurrendering parent” in the singular, MCL 712.7(f), MCL 

712.10(1), and MCL 712.17, and requires a party claiming paternity to submit to DNA testing,

MCL 712.11(1), so the parental rights at issue in a surrender proceeding concern the biological 

father. If a presumed father later appeared to challenge the children’s adoption, he would be 

precluded from asserting paternity because he was either the biological father whose parental 

rights were terminated or he would have to demonstrate that he was not the biological father 

whose parental rights were terminated, effectively defeating the presumption of legitimacy. 

Accordingly, there are no circumstances in which a party would later be able to challenge the 

adoption by claiming paternity and asserting his parental rights. 

Applying this discussion to the present case, the husband of the surrendering mother was 

presumed to be the legal father of the children by virtue of the marriage. See MCL 722.1433(e). 

If the husband had filed a petition for custody of the children within 28 days of published notice 

of the surrender, see MCL 712.10(1), he would have been required to submit to a DNA test to 

determine paternity, see MCL 712.11(1). If he were not the children’s biological father, the trial 

court would have dismissed his petition for custody. See MCL 712.11(5). This dismissal would

be consistent with the rules governing the presumption of legitimacy. The DNA test would have 

demonstrated that the children were not the issue of the marriage, thereby defeating the 

presumption of legitimacy. See 722.711(a); Barnes, 475 Mich at 703. On the other hand, if the

husband of the surrendering mother were the biological father, the trial court would have held a 

hearing to determine the children’s custody. See MCL 712.14. If the biological father never 

claimed paternity, the trial court would have terminated the parental rights of the biological 

father. See MCL 712.17(3). 

In this case, no one claimed paternity. If the trial court terminates the parental rights of 

the nonsurrendering parent, and the husband of the surrendering mother later seeks to assert his 

parental rights, he would have to demonstrate that he was not the biological father to show that 

the order terminating parental rights did not apply to him. However, in doing so, he would be 

defeating the presumption of paternity, and he would be without parental rights to assert to 

disrupt an adoption. Accordingly, the Safe Delivery of Newborns Law does apply to the legal 

father in its termination proceedings. 
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We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not

retain jurisdiction. 

/s/ Peter D. O’Connell

/s/ Jane M. Beckering

/s/ Cynthia Diane Stephens