COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Benton, Coleman and Willis 

ORA G. HARRIS 

v. Record No. 1155-96-3 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

 PER CURIAM 

WEST POINT PEPPERELL, INC. NOVEMBER 26, 1996 

AND 

TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY 

 OF ILLINOIS 

 FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION 

 (Ora G. Harris, pro se, on brief). 

 (Warren G. Britt; Britt & Gnapp, on brief), 

for appellees. 

 Ora G. Harris contends that the Workers' Compensation 

Commission erred in finding that she failed to prove she 

sustained (1) an injury by accident arising out of and in the 

course of her employment; or (2) a compensable occupational 

disease. Upon reviewing the record and the briefs of the 

parties, we conclude that this appeal is without merit. 

Accordingly, we summarily affirm the commission's decision. Rule 

5A:27. 

 On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the prevailing party below. R.G. Moore Bldg. Corp. v. 

Mullins, 10 Va. App. 211, 212, 390 S.E.2d 788, 788 (1990). 

 So viewed, the evidence established that Harris worked for 

West Point Pepperell, Inc., a towel manufacturer. Harris' job 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
 2 

required her to work at four machines, repetitively placing seven 

to eight pound spools of yarn on a rack and threading the yarn 

through a machine. 

 On May 30, 1995, Harris filed a claim seeking compensation 

benefits beginning July 21, 1993. In her application, Harris 

alleged she sustained an injury by accident and an occupational 

disease related to lifting and repetitive use of her wrist and 

back, which caused carpal tunnel syndrome and bulging lumbar 

discs. At the hearing, Harris stipulated that she was not 

claiming an occupational disease, but was claiming an injury by 

accident of unknown date, which resulted in carpal tunnel 

syndrome and lumbar disc problems. Harris testified that she 

believed her carpal tunnel syndrome and back problems began in 

April 1993 as the result of repetitive lifting at work. 

 Harris acknowledged that she had sustained back injuries in 

an August 1, 1992 motor vehicle accident not related to her 

employment. Dr. Ronald Haney examined Harris after the accident 

and noted that Harris sustained injuries to her forehead, right 

forearm, elbow, and both knees. Harris also complained of 

thoracic pain, chest pain, right hand numbness, and right hip 

pain. 

 Dr. Haney ultimately diagnosed Harris as suffering from 

carpal tunnel syndrome on the right and bulging discs at L4-5 and 

L5-S1. He performed carpal tunnel release surgery on her right 

wrist. After Harris continued to complain of chest and back 
 3 

pain, Dr. Haney diagnosed myofascial syndrome. Although Dr. 

Haney referred to the August 1, 1992 motor vehicle accident in 

his notes, he never referred to Harris' employment as a cause of 

her conditions nor did he ever relate Harris' conditions to any 

specific work-related incident. 

 I. Injury by Accident 

 "In order to carry [her] burden of proving an 'injury by 

accident,' a claimant must prove the cause of [her] injury was an 

identifiable incident or sudden precipitating event and that it 

resulted in an obvious and sudden mechanical or structural change 

in the body." Morris v. Morris, 238 Va. 578, 589, 385 S.E.2d 

858, 865 (1989). Unless we can say as a matter of law that 

Harris' evidence sustained her burden of proof, the commission's 

finding is binding and conclusive upon us. Tomko v. Michael's 

Plastering Co., 210 Va. 697, 699, 173 S.E.2d 833, 835 (1970). 

 Neither Harris' testimony nor the medical records 

established that Harris' carpal tunnel syndrome or lumbar disc 

condition was caused by a specific identifiable work-related 

incident. Furthermore, in Stenrich Group v. Jemmott, 251 Va. 

186, 199, 467 S.E.2d 795, 802 (1996), the Supreme Court held that 

"job-related impairments resulting from cumulative trauma caused 

by repetitive motion, however labeled or however defined, are, as 

a matter of law, not compensable under the present provisions of 

the Act." Accordingly, we cannot say as a matter of law that 

Harris proved she sustained an injury by accident arising out of 
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and in the course of her employment. 
 5 

 II. Occupational Disease 

 Any theory of recovery that is not raised before the 

commission will not be considered for the first time on appeal. 

Kendrick v. Nationwide Homes, Inc., 4 Va. App. 189, 192, 355 

S.E.2d 347, 349 (1987); Rule 5A:18. Harris did not pursue an 

occupational disease claim before the commission. Therefore, we 

will not consider this claim on appeal. 

 For the reasons stated, we affirm the commission's decision. 

 Affirmed.