NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential. 

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

DEAN SENECA,

Petitioner

v.

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD,

Respondent

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN 

SERVICES,

Intervenor

______________________ 

2020-1842

______________________ 

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in No. DC-0731-16-0470-I-1.

______________________ 

Decided: September 26, 2022

______________________ 

DENNIS GRADY CHAPPABITTY, Elk Grove, CA, argued for 

petitioner. 

 DEANNA SCHABACKER, Office of General Counsel, 

United States Merit Systems Protection Board, Washington, DC, argued for respondent. Also represented by 

TRISTAN L. LEAVITT, KATHERINE MICHELLE SMITH. 

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2 SENECA v. MSPB

 MATTHEW JUDE CARHART, Civil Division, Commercial 

Litigation Branch, United States Department of Justice, 

Washington, DC, argued for intervenor. Also represented 

by JEFFREY B. CLARK, SR., ALLISON KIDD-MILLER, ROBERT 

EDWARD KIRSCHMAN, JR. 

 ______________________ 

Before PROST, TARANTO, and STOLL, Circuit Judges. 

TARANTO, Circuit Judge.

Dean Seneca, an employee of the Centers for Disease 

Control and Prevention (CDC), which is a component of the 

Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), applied 

for a higher level position at another HHS component, the 

National Institutes of Health (NIH). NIH sent him a letter 

stating that it had selected him for the position, with appointment to take effect a month later, but within a week

of sending that letter, NIH rescinded the promotion offer, 

well before the effective date of the appointment. Mr. Seneca appealed the promotion rescission to the Merit Systems 

Protection Board. The Board dismissed Mr. Seneca’s appeal, determining that it lacked jurisdiction to review 

NIH’s action, which it concluded was a non-selection for a 

specific position and not a reviewable “suitability action” 

under 5 C.F.R. pt. 731. Seneca v. Department of Health and 

Human Services, No. DC-0731-16-0470-I-1, 2016 WL 

4088357 (M.S.P.B. July 26, 2016) (Board Opinion) (hereafter cited with page numbers shown at Appx. 1–9). We affirm.

I 

On March 3, 2016, Mr. Seneca received a letter from 

NIH “confirm[ing]” his promotion to the position of Health 

Science Policy Analyst, “with an effective date of April 3, 

2016.” Supp. App’x (S.A.) 77. On March 8, 2016, however, 

Mr. Seneca received another letter from NIH, notifying him 

that the promotion offer was rescinded due to “information 

received.” S.A. 78. 

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SENECA v. MSPB 3

Mr. Seneca appealed the rescission to the Board. He 

alleged that the rescission by HHS (through NIH) constituted a negative “suitability action”—based, he said, on an 

improper “constructive” negative suitability determination—which was appealable under the grant to the Board 

of jurisdiction to review “a suitability action.” 5 C.F.R. 

§ 731.501(a); see also id. § 1201.3(a)(9) (jurisdiction to review “suitability action”). Although Mr. Seneca also alleged that the NIH promotion rescission violated certain 

other statutory and constitutional rights of his, those allegations of wrong are not asserted to provide an independent basis of Board jurisdiction: It is undisputed before us 

that the Board’s jurisdiction over Mr. Seneca’s appeal depends on whether the NIH action was a suitability action 

appealable under 5 C.F.R. § 731.501(a). 

HHS moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that NIH’s promotion rescission was not a 

suitability action (indeed, not based on a determination of 

Mr. Seneca’s suitability for federal employment) and, in 

particular, that it was a non-selection for a specific position, which, under 5 C.F.R. § 731.203(b), is “not a suitability action,” id. (emphasis in original). The administrative 

judge assigned to the case stayed discovery deadlines and 

ordered Mr. Seneca to address the Board’s jurisdiction by 

furnishing “evidence and argument amounting to a nonfrivolous allegation” to support the asserted basis of jurisdiction. S.A. 30; see also S.A. 60–61. In response, Mr. 

Seneca asserted that the promotion rescission was a “[c]ancellation of eligibility,” which is one of the “suitability action[s]” listed in § 731.203(a).

On July 26, 2016, the administrative judge, rejecting 

Mr. Seneca’s assertion, dismissed Mr. Seneca’s appeal 

without a hearing. Board Opinion at 3–4. To establish jurisdiction under § 731.501(a), the administrative judge 

stated, the promotion rescission needed to come within 

§ 731.203(a), which defines “suitability action” as a cancellation of eligibility, removal, cancellation of reinstatement 

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4 SENECA v. MSPB

eligibility, or debarment, and also needed to fall outside

§ 731.203(b), which excludes a non-selection for a specific 

position from the category of suitability actions. The administrative judge, without repeating the nonfrivolous-allegation standard he had recited earlier, concluded that the 

promotion rescission was a non-selection for a specific position, before the proposed appointment ever occurred, and 

was not a suitability action, leaving the Board without jurisdiction here. Board Opinion at 3. 

The administrative judge’s decision became the final 

decision of the Board on March 27, 2020, after Mr. Seneca 

was permitted by the Clerk of the Board to withdraw his 

request for the full Board to review the administrative 

judge’s decision. Mr. Seneca timely appealed within the 

allowed 60 days. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(A). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9).

II

Mr. Seneca challenges the Board’s determination that 

it lacked jurisdiction and its stay of discovery before deciding the jurisdictional issue. We must affirm the Board’s 

decision unless it is “(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 

discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) obtained without procedures required by law, rule, or regulation having been followed; or (3) unsupported by 

substantial evidence . . . .” 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c). We review 

the Board’s jurisdictional ruling de novo, Stoyanov v. Department of Navy, 474 F.3d 1377, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2007), 

and the Board’s discovery ruling for an abuse of discretion, 

Curtin v. Office of Personnel Management, 846 F.2d 1373, 

1378 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 

A 

An employee appealing to the Board generally has the 

burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, 

that the Board has jurisdiction over his appeal. 5 C.F.R. 

§ 1201.56(b)(2)(i)(A); Stoyanov, 474 F.3d at 1379. At the 

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SENECA v. MSPB 5

threshold, the employee must make “non-frivolous allegations that, if proven, could establish the Board’s jurisdiction,” Garcia v. Department of Homeland Security, 437 F.3d 

1322, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (en banc), which requires a 

“plausible” allegation of the elements material under the 

asserted jurisdictional standard, 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(s)(2); 

see Hessami v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 979 F.3d 

1362, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2020). Without such allegations, dismissal without a hearing is appropriate. Garcia, 437 F.3d 

at 1325.

The Board does not have plenary appellate jurisdiction 

over personnel actions. Lazaro v. Department of Veterans 

Affairs, 666 F.3d 1316, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Its jurisdiction is limited to actions made appealable to it by law, rule, 

or regulation. 5 U.S.C. § 7701(a). Here, only one basis for 

Board jurisdiction is asserted. 

Under regulations promulgated by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), the Board has jurisdiction to review a “suitability action” taken against a person by an 

agency with OPM-delegated authority. 5 C.F.R. 

§ 731.501(a); see id. § 1201.3(a)(9). The definitional regulation first states that, for purposes of 5 C.F.R. pt. 731, “a

suitability action is one or more of the following: (1) Cancellation of eligibility; (2) Removal; (3) Cancellation of reinstatement eligibility; and (4) Debarment.” Id. § 731.203(a). 

It immediately adds, however: 

A non-selection, or cancellation of eligibility for a 

specific position based on an objection to an eligible 

or pass over of a preference eligible under 5 CFR 

332.406, is not a suitability action even if it is based 

on reasons set forth in § 731.202.

Id. § 731.203(b) (emphasis in original). The referred-to 

§ 731.202 identifies the “[c]riteria for making suitability 

determinations,” which govern the determination on which 

a “suitability action” is to be based. See id. § 731.203(c) (“A 

suitability action may be taken against an applicant or an 

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6 SENECA v. MSPB

appointee when OPM or an agency exercising delegated authority under this part finds that the applicant or appointee is unsuitable for the reasons cited in § 731.202, subject 

to the agency limitations of § 731.103(g).”).

It is sufficient to affirm the Board’s dismissal for want 

of jurisdiction that this case comes within the express exclusion from what constitutes a “suitability action” stated 

in § 731.203(b) under our precedent. We do not address 

whether NIH’s action also falls outside the list of “suitability actions” in § 731.203(a), considered separately from 

§ 731.203(b). Mr. Seneca, in his brief to us, has not argued 

that the Board mistakenly relied on § 731.203(b).

In Ricci v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 953 F.3d 

753, 757 (Fed. Cir. 2020), we held that a revocation of a 

tentative offer of employment before the offered appointment took effect was a non-selection for a vacant position 

that came within § 731.203(b), which we read as excluding 

a “non-selection . . . for a specific position” from the scope 

of “suitability action.” That holding reflects the subsection’s history as well as language. In 2008, OPM amended 

its preexisting regulations on suitability actions by, among 

other things, both removing “denial of appointment” from 

the list of “suitability actions” in § 731.203(a) and adding

what is now § 731.203(b). See Suitability, 73 Fed. Reg. 

20149, 20150–51 (OPM Final Rule, Apr. 15, 2008) (Final 

Rule); compare 5 C.F.R. § 731.203 (2007), with 73 Fed. Reg. 

at 20157 (amended regulation, matching current form as 

relevant here). In proposing the changes, OPM explained 

that its changes would “remove ‘denial of appointment’ as 

a suitability action, as currently defined in § 731.203” and 

“confirm that a non-selection for a specific position based 

on reasons set forth in this part is not a suitability action.” 

Suitability, 72 Fed. Reg. 2203, 2203 (OPM Proposed Rule, 

Jan. 18, 2007). 

The Board concluded that the exclusion stated in 

§ 731.203(b) applies to this case. The key question for 

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SENECA v. MSPB 7

application of that subsection on the motion to dismiss in 

this case is whether Mr. Seneca, through his evidence and 

argument, made a nonfrivolous allegation that the scope of 

NIH’s action went beyond “non-selection” of Mr. Seneca for 

the “specific position” at issue—that some broader action 

was taken. Mr. Seneca has not shown that the Board erred 

in answering that question “no.”1 

The rescission occurred before an appointment had 

taken effect. The NIH action was not something other than 

a non-selection just because it was made on second rather 

than first thought or because the initial selection (unlike 

the one in Ricci) was not expressly tentative. And, crucially, Mr. Seneca has identified no plausible basis, in the 

materials considered by the Board as constituting his allegations, for viewing the NIH action as broader in scope 

than simply a non-selection for the specific position. 

It makes no difference whether, as Mr. Seneca suggests, NIH’s action stemmed from a determination that he 

was unsuitable for reasons that could have supported a 

“suitability action.” As noted above, § 731.203(b) says that 

a non-selection as described is excluded from being a “suitability action” even if it was based on the same criteria that 

can be used to support a negative suitability determination, see 5 C.F.R. § 731.202, to give rise to one of the “suitability actions” listed in § 731.203(a). Relatedly, nor would 

it make a difference if NIH’s action, though limited to a 

1 Mr. Seneca does not object in this court to the 

Board’s failure to repeat the nonfrivolous-allegation standard in its ruling on the dismissal motion or to the Board’s 

consideration of the invited and submitted evidence in that 

ruling. In this circumstance, we treat the Board as having 

concluded that Mr. Seneca’s submissions did not include or 

add up to a plausible allegation of the scope of the NIH’s 

action (something more than a non-selection for a specific 

position) essential to escaping § 731.203(b). 

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8 SENECA v. MSPB

non-selection for a specific position, could be characterized 

as a “constructive” suitability action. Before 2008, the 

Board had found jurisdiction over such a “constructive” 

suitability action, see Edwards v. Department of Justice, 87 

M.S.P.R. 518, 521–24 (2001), but as we have recognized, 

OPM’s 2008 regulatory change rejected such a basis for 

Board jurisdiction, see Final Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. at 20152–

53 (characterizing Edwards as an “incorrect reading of the 

authority that OPM conferred” on the Board and “agreeing 

that the proposed change would overrule Edwards”); Ricci, 

953 F.3d at 759 (“OPM specifically rejected Edwards’ holding that the board can exercise jurisdiction over ‘constructive’ suitability actions . . . .”). 

In short, under Ricci, NIH’s action comes within 

§ 731.203(b) and therefore is “not a suitability action” reviewable by the Board. For that reason, Mr. Seneca did not 

make a nonfrivolous allegation that the Board had jurisdiction over his appeal.

B 

Mr. Seneca asserts that the Board’s stay of discovery 

was a harmful error because it deprived him of his right to 

fairly present his case for jurisdiction. “Procedural matters 

relative to discovery and evidentiary issues fall within the 

sound discretion of the board and its officials.” Curtin, 846 

F.2d at 1378; see 5 C.F.R. §§ 1201.71–.72. For Mr. Seneca 

to prevail, moreover, any error had to have “caused substantial harm or prejudice to his rights which could have 

affected the outcome of the case.” Curtin, 846 F.2d at 1379. 

We cannot so find here. 

Mr. Seneca does not argue to us that discovery would 

have turned up evidence that the NIH action was actually 

of broader scope than non-selection for the specific position. 

Rather, he argues only that he should have been given discovery to uncover the specifics of the information that motivated the promotion rescission. But Mr. Seneca has not 

explained how the content of the “information received” by 

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SENECA v. MSPB 9

the agency could affect anything but the reasons for NIH’s 

action. And under § 731.203(b), the reasons for the agency 

action are a quite separate matter from the scope of the 

action taken: An action limited to a non-selection for a specific position remains unreviewable even if it was taken for 

reasons that would support a negative suitability determination that could be used to take a broader action qualifying as a reviewable “suitability action.” Thus, even if Mr. 

Seneca had access through discovery to the “information 

received” by NIH and the information was related to any of 

the suitability determination criteria set out in 5 C.F.R. 

§ 731.202, the outcome of his appeal to the Board would be 

the same: dismissal for lack of Board jurisdiction. As a result, we see no error in the administrative judge’s stay of 

discovery in the first place and in any event no basis for 

finding any error to be harmful.

III

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the 

Board.

The parties shall bear their own costs.

AFFIRMED

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