STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
 

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
 

Larry Ranson, FILED 

Petitioner Below, Petitioner May 22, 2017 

RORY L. PERRY II, CLERK vs) No. 16-0368 (Jackson County 76-C-62) SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS 

OF WEST VIRGINIA 

Patricia Barr, and the West Virginia 

Department of Health and Human 

Resources, Bureau for Child Support 

and Enforcement, 

Respondents Below, Respondents 

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Petitioner Larry Ranson, by counsel Lee F. Benford, II, appeals the Circuit Court of 

Jackson County’s March 8, 2016, order affirming the family court’s order finding that petitioner 

was in arrearages of child support in the amount of $97,738.98. Respondent West Virginia 

Department of Health and Human Resources, Bureau for Child Support Enforcement, by counsel 

Dee-Ann Burdette, filed a response. Respondent Patricia Barr made no appearance. On appeal, 

petitioner alleges that the family court erred in failing to apply the applicable statute of 

limitations, which should have barred the decretal child support judgments and that earlier orders 

entered below are res judicata as to the decretal judgments entered against him. 

This Court has considered the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal. The facts and legal 

arguments are adequately presented, and the decisional process would not be significantly aided 

by oral argument. Upon consideration of the standard of review, the briefs, and the record 

presented, the Court finds no substantial question of law and no prejudicial error. For these 

reasons, a memorandum decision affirming the circuit court’s order is appropriate under Rule 21 

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

The parties to this action were married in August of 1967 and had three children.1 They 

were divorced by order entered in August of 1977. The divorce order required petitioner to pay 

child support in the amount of $115 per month per child beginning in June of 1977. By later 

order, petitioner’s child support obligation was modified to $130 per month per child to continue 

until the children reached the age of eighteen. 

In July of 1980, Ms. Barr filed a petition for rule to show cause that alleged petitioner 

was in arrears on his child support obligation. By order entered in September of 1980, petitioner 

was found to be in arrears as of June 9, 1980, for child support in the sum of $560 and for 

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The parties’ children have since reached the age of majority. 

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medical expenses. 

Ms. Barr filed a second petition for rule to show cause in May of 1981 that alleged 

petitioner was in arrears as of April 20, 1981, on his child support and medical expense 

obligations in the amount of $3,541.81. In June of 1981, a writ of execution was entered against 

petitioner that ordered him to pay Ms. Barr $3,981.81 for past-due child support and medical 

expenses. 

In 1990, Ms. Barr applied for services from respondent. In October of 2003, respondent 

filed a notice to withhold income for support and sought to garnish petitioner’s wages for pastdue child support. Thereafter, respondent filed a motion for decretal judgment in September of 

2004 that alleged petitioner was in arrears for child support in the amount of $33,887.85 plus 

interest in the amount of $58,603.98. In October of 2004, petitioner filed a notice of bona fide 

defense to respondent’s motion. Petitioner thereafter filed no additional answer or responsive 

pleading. In April of 2005, the family court held a hearing on the motion for decretal judgment. 

Petitioner did not appear for this hearing. The family court entered an order granting the motion 

in May of 2005 in the principal amount of $33,887.85 and an interest amount of $58,603.98. 

Petitioner did not appeal this order. Thereafter, an abstract of judgment was recorded in the 

Jackson County Clerk’s office in June of 2005. Through October of 2006, respondent issued 

three additional notices to withhold petitioner’s income. 

In October of 2014, respondent filed another motion for decretal judgment that alleged 

petitioner to be in arrears in the amount of $97,738.98 for child support and interest. The family 

court held a hearing in March of 2015, after which it entered an order in May of 2015 granting 

respondent’s motion for child support arrears in the amount of $97,738.98, of which $78,526.18 

was designated interest, for child support arrears from June 1, 1977, to August 31, 2014. 

Thereafter, petitioner filed a motion to reconsider in June of 2015, which the family court 

summarily denied by order entered in July of 2015. 

In August of 2015, petitioner filed an appeal to the circuit court. The circuit court 

thereafter held a hearing in December of 2015, after which it affirmed the family court’s ruling 

by order entered in March of 2016. It is from this order that petitioner appeals. 

We have previously established the following standard of review: 

In reviewing a final order entered by a circuit court judge upon a review 

of, or upon a refusal to review, a final order of a family court judge, we review the 

findings of fact made by the family court judge under the clearly erroneous 

standard, and the application of law to the facts under an abuse of discretion 

standard. We review questions of law de novo. 

Syl., Carr v. Hancock, 216 W.Va. 474, 607 S.E.2d 803 (2004). On appeal, petitioner argues that 

the family court erred in failing to apply the applicable statute of limitations in order to bar the 

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decretal child support judgments entered below.2 Specifically, petitioner alleges that the first 

decretal judgment in May of 2005 was erroneous because it was barred by the applicable statute 

of limitations because it was based on an order from 1977. He further argues that prior orders 

entered in this case indicating a lower amount of arrearages bar the later decretal child support 

judgments on the basis of res judicata. We do not agree. 

As respondent argued below and argues on appeal, because petitioner did not raise the 

defense of the expiration of the statute of limitations during the earlier decretal judgment 

proceeding that resulted in the May of 2005 judgment or otherwise appeal the same, he is barred 

from raising it now in defense of respondent’s 2014 motion for decretal judgment. As we have 

previously stated, “[i]ssues not raised on appeal or merely mentioned in passing are deemed 

waived.” See Tiernan v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 203 W.Va. 135, 140 n. 10, 506 S.E.2d 

578, 583 n. 10 (1998). Moreover, “[r]es judicata or claim preclusion ‘generally applies when 

there is a final judgment on the merits which precludes the parties or their privies from 

relitigating the issues that were decided or the issues that could have been decided in the earlier 

action.’” Beahm v. 7–Eleven, Inc., 223 W.Va. 269, 272–73, 672 S.E.2d 598, 601–02 (2008) 

(quoting, in part, State v. Miller, 194 W.Va. 3, 9, 459 S.E.2d 114, 120 (1995)). Therefore, 

petitioner may not now argue that West Virginia Code § 38-3-18 barred the entry of the decretal 

judgment in 2005. 

Further, we find no merit to petitioner’s argument that res judicata should limit his 

arrearages to $560 as set forth in a September of 1980 order. Essentially, petitioner is again 

attempting to relitigate the 2005 decretal judgment order by arguing that this prior order is 

conflicting and should control. However, much like his argument regarding the statute of 

limitations, we find that petitioner’s failure to raise this issue in the 2005 action or otherwise 

appeal the same bars him from now raising this issue in regard to respondent’s 2014 motion for 

decretal judgment. Accordingly, we conclude that the circuit court did not err in affirming the 

family court’s May 26, 2015, order wherein the family court refused to revisit the May 18, 2005, 

judgment. 

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm. 

Affirmed. 

ISSUED: May 22, 2017 

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The applicable statute of limitations is the ten-year statute governing the enforcement of 

judgments found at West Virginia Code § 38-3-18. In 2008, the Legislature amended West 

Virginia Code § 38-3-18 to add a specific subsection pertaining to child support orders. 

However, because the relevant judgment in this case was granted in May of 2005, the pre-2008 

version of West Virginia Code § 38-3-18 governs. 

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CONCURRED IN BY: 

Chief Justice Allen H. Loughry II 

Justice Menis E. Ketchum 

Justice Elizabeth D. Walker 

DISSENTING: 

Justice Robin Jean Davis 

Justice Margaret L. Workman 

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